Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth: 338-196 BC (Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies) [1 ed.] 9780415735513, 9781315771809, 0415735513

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L A T E C L A S S I C A L A N D EA R L Y H E L L E N I S T I C CO R I N T H , 3 3 8 –1 9 6

B.C.

Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth, 338–196 B.C. challenges the perception that the Macedonians’ advent and continued presence in Corinth amounted to a loss of significance and autonomy. Immediately after Chaironeia, Philip II and his son Alexander III established close relations with Corinth and certain leading citizens on the basis of goodwill (eunoia). Mutual benefits and respect characterized their discourse throughout the remainder of the early Hellenistic period; this was neither a period of domination or decline, nor one in which the Macedonians deprived Corinthians of their autonomy. Instead, Corinth flourished while the Macedonians possessed the city. It was the site of a vast building program, much of which must be construed as the direct result of Macedonian patronage; evidence suggests strongly that those Corinthians who supported the Macedonians enjoyed great prosperity under them. Corinth’s strategic location made it an integral part of the Macedonians’ strategy to establish and maintain hegemony over the mainland Greek peninsula after Philip II’s victory at Chaironeia. The Macedonian dynasts and kings who later possessed Corinth also valued its strategic position, and they regarded it as an essential component in their efforts to claim legitimacy due to its association with the Argead kings Philip II and Alexander III the Great and the League of Corinth they established. This study explicates the nature of the relationship between the Corinthians and the Macedonians that developed in the aftermath of Chaironeia, through the defeat at the battle of Kynoskephalai and the declaration of Greek freedom at Isthmia in 196 B.C. Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth is not simply the history of a single polis; it draws upon the extant literary, epigraphic, prosopographic, topographic, numismatic, architectural, and archaeological evidence to place Corinth within the broader Hellenistic world. This volume, the first full treatment of the city in this period, contributes significantly to the growing body of scholarly literature focusing on the Hellenistic world and is a crucial resource for specialists in late Classical and early Hellenistic history. Michael D. Dixon is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern Indiana, USA.

ROUTLEDGE MONOGRAPHS IN CLASSICAL STUDIES

APULEIUS AND AFRICA Edited by Benjamin Todd Lee, Ellen Finkelpearl and Luca Graverini CONSUMERISM IN THE ANCIENT WORLD Imports and Identity Construction Justin St. P. Walsh MENANDER IN CONTEXTS Edited by Alan H. Sommerstein DISPLAYING THE IDEALS OF ANTIQUITY The Petrified Gaze Johannes Siapkas and Lena Sjögren ROMAN THEORIES OF TRANSLATION Surpassing the Source Siobhán McElduff ROMAN LITERATURE, GENDER, AND RECEPTION Domina Illustris Edited by Donald Lateiner, Barbara K. Gold and Judith Perkins CHILDHOOD IN ANCIENT ATHENS Iconography and Social History Lesley A. Beaumont PLATO’S DIALECTIC ON WOMAN Equal, Therefore Inferior Elena Blair VIRGIL’S HOMERIC LENS Edan Dekel

ROME IN THE PYRENEES Lugdunum and the Convenae from the First Century to the Seventh Century A.D. Simon Esmonde-Cleary

B.C.

DACIA Landscape, Colonization and Romanization Ioana A. Oltean PASSIONS AND MORAL PROGRESS IN GRECO-ROMAN THOUGHT John T. Fitzgerald BETWEEN ROME AND PERSIA The Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia and Palmyra Under Roman Control Peter Edwell GREEK MAGIC Ancient, Medieval and Modern Edited by John Petropoulos UTOPIA ANTIQUA Readings of the Golden Age and Decline at Rome Rhiannon Evans LIFE AND LETTERS IN THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD John Muir ACTORS AND AUDIENCE IN THE ROMAN COURTROOM Leanne Bablitz THE EUNUCH IN BYZANTINE HISTORY AND SOCIETY Shaun Tougher THE ROMAN GARDEN Space, Sense, and Society Katharine T. von Stackelberg Forthcoming: RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE Vasily Rudich

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LATE CLASSICAL AND EARLY HELLENISTIC CORINTH, 338–196 B.C.

Michael D. Dixon

First published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Michael D. Dixon The right of Michael D. Dixon to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dixon, Michael D. Late Classical and early Hellenistic Corinth : 338–196 B.C. / Michael D. Dixon. pages cm. – (Routledge monographs in classical studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Corinth (Greece)–Civilization. 2. Corinth (Greece)–History. 3. Corinth (Greece)–Relations–Macedonia. 4. Macedonia–Relations–Greece–Corinth. 5. Macedonia–Kings and rulers–History. 6. Macedonians–Greece–Corinth–History– To 1500. 7. Corinth (Greece)–Antiquities. 8. Greece–History–To 146 B.C. I. Title. DF261.C65D48 2014 9380 .7–dc23 2013048098 ISBN: 978-0-415-73551-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-77180-9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Taylor & Francis Books

FOR JOSEPHINA AND ADONIA

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CONTENTS

List of figures List of maps Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

x xi xii xiv

1

Corinth, “the gateway of Isthmian Poseidon” (Pindar Ol. 13.4–5)

2

Corinth in the age of Philip II and Alexander III, 338–323 B.C.

15

“The Corinthian troubles,” Corinth and the Diadochoi, 323–301 B.C.

46

4

Antigonos Gonatas and Corinth, “the passion of his life”

75

5

Monuments and cult in early Hellenistic Corinth

110

6

The Achaian interlude, 243–224 to rebellion

143

3

B.C.:

1

from liberation

7

The end of Macedonian Corinth

168

8

Conclusions and reflections

198

Bibliography Index

212 228

ix

L I S T O F FI GURE S

1.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

Corinth and its immediate environs [after Corinth XX, Plan V] Hellenistic Corinth, general plan [after Corinth XX, Plan III] West Foundation, Isthmia [after Isthmia II, Plate 79] Stele Shrine [after Williams 1978a: Fig. 1] South Stoa, plan and elevation [after Corinth I.4: Plan Xa] South Stoa, restored façade and shop fronts [after Corinth I.4: Plan XIIIb] 5.6 South Stoa, east end restored [after Corinth I.4: Frontispiece] 5.7 Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia [after AndersonStojanovic´ 1996: Fig. 1] 5.8 Rachi settlement, partially restored plan [after AndersonStojanovic´ 1996: Fig. 3]

x

11 113 116 120 123 124 125 133 135

LIST OF MAPS

1 2 3

The Corinthia Greece, the Aegean, and Asia Minor The Hellenistic world

xi

xix xx xxi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Work on this project began almost 20 years ago when I developed an interest in Hellenistic history, Greek epigraphy, and the Achaian koinon. It could not have been completed without the support, assistance, and encouragement of many friends and colleagues and it is an honor to acknowledge them here. At the Ohio State University, Stephen Tracy introduced me to the study of epigraphy and Hellenistic history; he has remained a mentor and a friend. I had the pleasure of studying under Nathan Rosenstein and the late Jack Balcer. In Greece, I was incredibly fortunate to spend three years at the American School of Classical Studies. Ronald Stroud served as Mellon Professor while I was there and he was always generous with his time. He taught me the importance of topography during many walks, he always answered my questions, and he instilled in me a love of all things Corinthian. He also read an early draft of this manuscript and improved it in immeasurable ways. I also was privileged to excavate at Corinth in 1997 under the direction of Charles K. Williams and Nancy Bookidis. Both taught me much about Corinth and archaeology; their continued support has been invaluable. I have been fortunate to return to Corinth many times since then and I have profited greatly from discussions with colleagues there. Guy Sanders, Director of the Corinth Excavations, has always challenged my interpretations of Corinthian history and archaeology and I have become a better student of Corinth as a result. Ioulia Tzonou-Herbst, Assistant Director, has provided assistance over the course of many years. James Herbst, Architect, accompanied me on many walks throughout the Corinthia and around Corinth. Elisabeth Pemberton and Ian McPhee provided me with a copy of their Corinth VII.6 manuscript prior to publication. Yannis Lolos answered many questions about Sikyon. I also thank Ben Millis, with whom I have discussed Corinth more than anyone else. In spring 1997, I had the pleasure of meeting the late Michael Jameson in Athens. During our first conversations he encouraged me to pursue an epigraphic and topographical study of several border disputes from the northeast Peloponnese that I had been considering for my doctoral dissertation. One of the inscriptions recorded the resolution of a dispute between Corinth and Epidauros. That meeting led to my dissertation “Disputed Territories: Interstate xii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Arbitrations in the Northeast Peloponnese, ca. 250–150 B.C” (Ohio State University, 2000). While working on this project Jameson told me that the history of Hellenistic Corinth needed to be written. His advice has been invaluable. I would like to thank Elizabeth Gebhard for helping me to understand the Sanctuary of Poseidon. I owe a debt of thanks to Timothy Gregory for his willingness to assist me in my work in Isthmia and throughout the Corinthia. I was also very fortunate to meet Alastair Jackson on my last visit to Isthmia in spring 2010. He accompanied me to the West Foundation and the Rachi settlement. He also made available to me his forthcoming manuscripts on both sites. In Evansville, I have many colleagues at the University of Southern Indiana to thank. Casey Harison read part of this manuscript. Michael Aakhus has been a friend and mentor; Patricia Aakhus provided encouragement for many years and she continues to be an inspiration. Joan Kempf deJong prepared the maps and assisted with the preparation of all figures. The staff of the David L. Rice Library always provided me with assistance and acquired quickly all the materials I needed. Much of the initial writing of this manuscript was completed during a sabbatical leave in 2010. Travel to Corinth was made possible through a Lily Excellence through Engagement sabbatical grant. Additional research grants were made available by the College of Liberal Arts. I owe thanks to the Fourth Ephoreia of Prehistoric and Classical Antiquities for permission to study IG IV2.1.71 at the Epidaurian Asklepieion. I also would like to thank the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and the Canadian Institute in Greece for the use of their facilities. I am indebted to the Trustees of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and the American School of Classical Studies, Corinth Excavations, for granting permission to reproduce several figures here. Others from whom I have benefited over many years include Waldemar Heckel, Alan Kaiser, John Lee, Mark Munn, Yanis Pikoulas, Brian Rutishauser, Graham Shipley, Jonathan Tomlinson, Pat Wheatley, and Orestes Zervos. I am grateful to Amy Davis-Poynter of Routledge for showing interest in this project and for answering patiently all of my questions. I must also express my gratitude to the anonymous readers of this manuscript who improved it tremendously and saved me from many errors. Any errors that remain are my responsibility alone. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted. I would like to thank my mother and father for all that they have given me. I wish only that my father had been able to read this book. Lastly, Josephina Kiteou and Adonia Dixon have offered years of support and understanding. This project could never have been completed without their encouragement. As a small token of my gratitude, I dedicate this work to them.

xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB Agora XVI Berve BE BG

CAH2 CEG II CID Corinth Corinth I.1 Corinth I.3 Corinth I.4 Corinth II Corinth III.1 Corinth III.2 Corinth VII.3

Austin, C. and G. Bastianini, eds. Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia. Milan, 2002. A.G. Woodhead. Inscriptions: The Decrees. Princeton, 1997. H. Berve. Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage. 2 vols. Munich, 1926. J. and L. Robert. Bulletin épigraphique in Revue des études grecques 1938–84; Ph. Gauthier et al. 1987–. G. Bastianini and C. Gallazzi with C. Austin, eds. Posidippo di Pella: Epigrammi (P.Mil.Vogl. VIII 309). Papiri dell’ Università degli Studi di Milano, VIII. Milan, 2001. Cambridge Ancient History. Second edition. Cambridge. P.A. Hansen. Carmina Epigraphica Graeca. Vol. II. Saeculi IV a.Chr.n. Berlin, 1989. Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes. Paris, 1977–. Corinth: Results of the Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. H. Fowler and R. Stillwell. Introduction, Topography, Architecture. Cambridge, MA, 1932. R.L. Scranton. Monuments in the Lower Agora and North of the Archaic Temple. Princeton, 1951. O. Broneer. The South Stoa and its Roman Successors. Princeton, 1954. R. Stillwell. The Theatre. Princeton, 1952. C.W. Blegen, O. Broneer, R. Stillwell, and A.R. Bellinger. Acrocorinth: Excavations in 1926. Cambridge, MA, 1936. R. Carpenter and A. Bon. The Defenses of Acrocorinth and the Lower Town. Cambridge, MA, 1936. G.R. Edwards. Corinthian Hellenistic Pottery. Princeton, 1975. xiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Corinth VII.6

Corinth VIII.1 Corinth VIII.3 Corinth XII Corinth XIV Corinth XV.1 Corinth XV.2 Corinth XVII Corinth XVIII.1 Corinth XVIII.3 Corinth XVIII.4

Corinth XX Études FD FGrH FHG FRA

GG HCP Hellenica

HM ICGH

I.D. McPhee and E.G. Pemberton. Late Classical Pottery from Ancient Corinth: Drain 1971–1 in the Forum Southwest. Princeton, 2012. B.D. Meritt. Greek Inscriptions, 1896–1927. Cambridge, MA, 1931. J.H. Kent. The Inscriptions, 1926–1950. Princeton, 1966. G.R. Davidson. The Minor Objects. Princeton, 1952. C. Roebuck. The Asklepieion and Lerna. Princeton, 1951. A.N. Stillwell. The Potters’ Quarter. Princeton, 1948. A.N. Stillwell. The Potters’ Quarter: The Terracottas. Princeton, 1952. J.C. Biers. The Great Bath on the Lechaion Road. Princeton, 1985. E.G. Pemberton. The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore: The Greek Pottery. Princeton, 1989. N. Bookidis and R. Stroud. The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore: Topography and Architecture. Princeton, 1997. G. Merker. The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore: Terracotta Figurines of the Classical, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods. Princeton, 2000. C.K. Williams II and N. Bookidis, eds. Corinth, the Centenary. 1896–1996. Princeton, 2003. Holleaux, M. Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques. 6 vols. Paris, 1938–68. Fouilles de Delphes, 1–. Paris, 1909–. F. Jacoby. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, 1–IIIc. Berlin/Leiden, 1926–58. C. Müller. Fragmenta Historicum Graecorum. 1841–70. M.J. Osborne and S.G. Byrne. The Foreign Residents of Athens. An Annex to the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names: Attica. Studia Hellenistica 33. Louvain, 1996. K.J. Beloch. Griechische geschichte I–IV. Berlin, 1912–27. F.W. Walbank. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. 3 vols. Oxford, 1957–79. L. Robert. Hellenica Recueil d’épigraphie, de numismatique et d’ antiquités grecques. 13 vols. Limorge, 1940–65. N.G.L. Hammond, G.T. Griffith, and F.W. Walbank. A History of Macedonia. 3 vols. Oxford, 1972–88. M. Thompson, O. Mørkholm, and C.M. Kraay, eds. An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards. New York: American Numismatic Society, 1973. xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IG I. Iasos I. Oropos I. Magnesia IPArk

I. Rhamnous

I. Smyrna Isthmia

Isthmia II Isthmia V Isthmia VII I. Thesp

Kenchreai I

LGPN

Inscriptiones Graecae (Berlin 1877–). Blumel, W. Die Inschriften von Iasos i–ii. Bonn, 1985. B.Ch. Petrakos. Οι επιγραφές του Ωρωπού. Athens, 1997. O. Kern. Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander. Berlin, 1900. G. Thür and H. Taeuber. Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der Griechischen Poleis: Arkadien (Sitzungberichte der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaft 607, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für antike Rechtsgeschichte, 8. Vienna, 1994. B.Ch. Petrakos. Ο Δήμος του Ραμνοῦντος, vol. II (Βιβ. της εν Αθ. Αρχ. Ετ. 182). Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens, 1999. G. Petzl, ed. Die Inschriften von Smyrna. 3 vols. Bonn, 1982–90. Isthmia: Excavations by the University of Chicago under the Auspicies of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. O. Broneer. Topography and Architecture. Princeton, 1973. T.E. Gregory. The Hexamilion and the Fortress. Princeton, 1993. I. Raubitschek. The Metal Objects (1952–1989). Princeton, 1998. P. Roesch. Les Inscriptions de Thespies. Edition électronique mise en forme par G. Argoud, A. Schachter, and G. Vottéro (Histoire et Sources des Mondes Antiques), Maison de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, J. Pouilloux, Lyon, 2007. Rev. 2009. R.L. Scranton, J.W. Shaw, and W. Ibrahim. Kenchreai, Eastern Port of Corinth: Results of Investigations by the University of Chicago and Indiana University, I: Topography and Architecture. Leiden, 1976. Lexicon of Greek Personal Names. I, The Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica, eds. P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews; II, Attica, eds. M.J. Osborne and S.G. Byrne; III.A, The Peloponnese, Western Greece, Sicily, and Magna Graecia, eds. P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews; III. B, Central Greece: From the Megarid to Thessaly, eds. P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews; IV, Macedonia, Thrace, Northern Regions of the Black Sea, eds. P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews; V.A, Coastal Asia Minor: Pontos to Ionia, ed. T. Corsten. Oxford 1987–.

xvi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Milet

A. Rehm. Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899. vol. 1.3. Berlin 1914. MRR T.R.S. Broughton. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. 2 vols. New York, 1951–60. Nemea Excavations at Nemea. 3 vols. Berkeley, 1992–2005. New Pauly, Antiquity H. Cancik and H. Schneider, eds. Brill’s New Pauly: Encyclopedia of the Ancient World. Antiquity. Boston, 2002–10. OGIS W. Dittenberger. Orientis Graeci inscriptions selectae. Supplementum sylloges inscriptionum Graecarum. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1903–5. Reprinted Hildesheim, 1960. Olympionikai L. Moretti. Olympionikai: I vincitori negli antichi agoni olimpici. Memorie della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di Scienze Morali, Storichi e Filologiche, ser. 8, vol. 8 (2). Rome, 1957. Perachora H.G.G. Payne, et al. Perachora: The Sanctuaries of Hera Akraia and Limenia. Excavations of the British School of Archaeology at Athens, 1930–1933. 2 vols. Oxford, 1940–62. PP W. Peremans, E. van’t Dack, et al., eds. Prosopographia Ptolemaica. 9 vols. Studia Hellenistica, 6, 8, 11–13, 17, 20–21, 25. Louvain, 1950–81. RE A.F. Pauly, G. Wissowa, E. Kroll, et al., eds. RealEncyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. 66 vols. Stuttgart, 1894–1980. RO P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, eds. Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 B.C. Oxford, 2003. SAGT W.K. Pritchett. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography. Berkeley, 1965–89. SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum. SGDI H. Collitz, F. Bechtel, et al., eds. Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften. 4 vols. Göttingen, 1884– 1915. Staatsverträge Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, I, ed. H. Bengston, Munich, 1937; II, ed. H. Bengtson, Munich, 1962; III, ed. H.H. Schmitt, Munich, 1969. Strategie H. Bengston. Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht, vol. I (Munich, 1937), vol. II (Munich, 1944), vol. III (Munich, 1952). Suppl Hell. H.J. Lloyd-Jones and P.J. Parsons, eds. Supplementum Hellenisticum. Berlin, 1983. SVF J. von Arnim. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Vol. 1. Leipzig, 1905.

xvii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Syll3

Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. W. Dittenberger, 4 vols. (3rd edn ed. F. Hiller von Gaertringen). Leipzig, 1915–24. Tataki, Macedonians A.B. Tataki. Macedonians Abroad. A Contribution to the Prosopography of Ancient Macedonia. Melemata 26. Athens, 1998. Wehrli F. Wehrli. Hermippos der Kallimacher. Die Schule des Aristoteles. Supplement 1. Basel, 1974.

xviii

Ri

ea

em

Map 1 The Corinthia (J. Kempf deJong)

Kleonai

Mt. Apeses

rN ve

New Corinth

Perachora Bissie

Geraneion

Mavro Limni

Chiliomodi Tenea Klenies

Ancient Corinth

Athikia

Korphos

Sophiko

Cape Trachyli

Cape Spiri

Krommyon (Ag. Theodoroi) Sidous Isthmia Kromna (Sanctuary of Poseidon) Examilia Acrocorinth Xylokeriza Solomos Saronic Gulf Penteskouphi Mt. Oneion Kenchreai Loutro Elenis Maritsa Mt. Skiona Stanotopi Pass Mapsos Lychnari Bay Spathovouni Vayia

Lechaion

Lake Vouliagmeni

Heraion

10 km

os

5

potam Long o River

0

Corinthian Gulf

rias)

n (Xe Leuko River

Leukas

100

200 km

Tainaron

Gytheion

Kythera

Cape Malea

Crete

Melos

Siphonos

Delos

Andros

Skyros

THRACE

Kos

Samos

Miletos Iasos

Rhodes

Kaunus

Magnesia on the Meander

Magnesia by Sipylos Smyrna Sardis

Pergamon

Lysimacheia

Mytilene

Amorgos

Naxos

Chios

Lesbos

Imbros

Thasos

Lemnos

Euboia AITOLIA Delphi Chaironeia Chalkis Oiniadai Thermon BOIOTIA Eretria Patrai Thebes ACHAIA Sikyon Megara Eleusis Elis Corinth Piraeus Athens Nemea Aigina Mantinea Argos Olympia Epidauros Cape Tegea Sounion Megalopolis MESSENIA Messene Sparta

AKARNANIA

Lamia

Krannon THESSALY Demetrias

Map 2 Greece, the Aegean, and Asia Minor (J. Kempf deJong)

0

Dodona

Ambrakia

Echinades Islands

Kerkyra

EPEIROS

Amphipolis

Olynthos Kassandreia (Potidaia)

Aigai

Pella

MACEDON

Ipsos

250

500 km

Egypt

Alexandria

Gaza

Panion

Phoinikia

Tyre

Cyprus

le Ni

0

Kyrene

Mediterranean Sea

Syria

r

ian

Per s

Susiana

Gu

Caspian Sea

Media

Babylonia

ive r Babylon

Mesopatomia

Eu ph rat es R

ive

Rhodes

Pergamon

R ris Tig

Crete

Peloponnese

Corinth

Thessaly Aitolia

Black Sea

Paphlagonia Bithynia Phrygia Halys River Lydia Kappadokia Karia Lykia Pamphylia Kilikia

Epeiros Macedon Thrace

Danube River

lf

Persis

Areia

Baktria

Indiana Ocean

Gedrosia

Parthia

Karmania

Persepolis

r ve

Ri

Red

er R iv

Map 3 The Hellenistic world (J. Kempf deJong)

Illyria

Aral Sea

os Ox

Sea

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1 C ORINT H, “ THE GATEWAY OF ISTHMIAN POSEIDON” (PINDAR O L . 13 .4 – 5)

Between the battles of Chaironeia (338 B.C.) and Kynoskephalai (198 B.C.) several different Macedonian dynasts and kings possessed Corinth. Their presence there was interrupted only once, when in 243 Aratos of Sikyon captured Acrocorinth and expelled the Macedonian garrison. Before recounting Aratos’ capture of Corinth’s citadel, Plutarch (Arat. 16.5–6) astutely assessed its potential value: when Acrocorinth, which is a lofty hill springing up at this center of Greece, is held by a garrison, it hinders and cuts off all the country south of the Isthmos from intercourse, transits, and the carrying on of military expeditions by land and sea, and makes him who controls the place with a garrison sole lord of Greece. (B. Perrin, trans., Loeb Classical Library) It is certain that whoever controlled Corinth and its citadel possessed one of the most strategically located positions within the Greek peninsula. Plutarch’s assessment, however, only tells half the story, when one considers that a foreign power with a garrison could exploit Corinth’s full potential when it had secured the support, cooperation, and loyalty of its citizens. Demetrios Poliorketes, for example, captured Corinth from Kassandros’ garrison, only with the assistance of some Corinthians within the city. Kassandros held the citadel, but he had not won the loyalty of those Corinthians who colluded with Demetrios. The Macedonians who possessed Corinth, or sought to capture it, did so on account of its potential or perceived strategic value. Corinth provided a strongly fortified position at the crossroads of Greece that allowed one controlling it to check movement of troops into and out of the Peloponnese, as Plutarch observed. This monograph traces the history of Corinth in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods, years in which the Macedonians possessed the city and affected it in many ways. In many ways Acrocorinth and its strategic value constantly loom over the story of their presence in Corinth. Late 1

CORINTH, “THE GATEWAY OF ISTHMIAN POSEIDON”

Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth addresses the period in which the Macedonians possessed Corinth and it has three primary aims. The first is to provide an account of Corinth in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods that addresses its political, military, and economic histories. No such account has been written previously and one is sorely needed. Its second goal is to understand fully why the Macedonians desired so strongly to possess Corinth and why they endeavored so fiercely to maintain it. Corinth’s strategic value is virtually self-evident, as Plutarch has demonstrated. The possession of Corinth offered many other benefits to various Macedonians that will be explored below. None of these benefits, however, could be exploited fully or realized completely without possessing also the goodwill of the Corinthians, or at least a powerful faction of its demos. Lastly, the third goal is to comprehend how the Macedonians’ presence within Corinth affected its citizens. A pro-Macedonian faction within the city certainly reaped the rewards of their support. The methods by which the Macedonians sought to maintain control of Corinth, and the benefits they bestowed upon the pro-Macedonians, as they can be traced between the battles of Chaironeia and Kynoskephalai, shed valuable light on the effect that their presence had upon the Corinthian demos. Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth is neither an “antiquarian” exercise nor a simple retelling of what happened at Corinth within this period. A diachronic approach toward Corinth’s relationship with the Macedonian kings who possessed it between 338 and 243 and again between 224 and 196, as well as the Achaian koinon to which it belonged between 243 and 224, constitutes the framework around which this analysis is developed. The effect that the Macedonians’ and Achaians’ advent had upon the polis, its inhabitants, and its chora is explored to understand more clearly Corinth’s position and significance within the early Hellenistic world. It explores why some Macedonians possessing Corinth succeeded in using it to control the Greek peninsula and why others failed. Ultimately the answers to these questions depend heavily upon the nature of the relationship that any of the Macedonians who possessed Corinth had developed with the Corinthians. Those kings and dynasts who had established and nurtured a relationship founded upon displays of reciprocal goodwill were the most successful at maintaining control of Corinth and securing their positions within the Greek peninsula.

Eunoia Isokrates (5.68) had advised Philip II that “it is much better to gain this [eunoia] than to seize many Greek cities by force.”1 Philip, according to Diodoros (16.3.3), “was gentle in his intercourse with men and he sought to win over the crowds to the greatest eunoia (εἰς τὴν μεγίστην εὔνοιαν) through gifts and promises.” The concept of eunoia that Philip was advised to utilize and is said to have employed defines the Corinthians’ relations with the Macedonians more than any other. Eunoia represents a condition of goodwill that exists 2

CORINTH, “THE GATEWAY OF ISTHMIAN POSEIDON”

between two individuals, a state and an individual, or even two states. This condition, which euergetism or reciprocal exchange of benefactions defines, is established over time.2 It is evident that Philip and Alexander, as well as their successors, heeded Isokrates’ counsel concerning their relations with Corinth. Philip had utilized skillfully this type of relationship elsewhere and he had refined his use of it by the time he came to possess Corinth.3 The pro-Macedonian Corinthians consistently displayed to the king their own benefactions through their loyalty to him. Philip crafted these relationships that involved the reciprocal exchange of benefactions to establish goodwill between himself and others. While this might create the perception of a balanced relationship, it is important to remember that the two parties in this relationship were not equal partners. Alexander the Great was as adept as his father was in utilizing the principle of reciprocal goodwill with the Greek poleis and others.4 The Argeadai forged this relationship with pro-Macedonian Corinthians in the aftermath of Chaironeia and, in doing so, secured their loyalty that was essential in maintaining possession of this strategically and politically important location. Their success in this enterprise allowed the Argeadai to exploit fully the benefits that the possession of Corinth offered. Their relationship established the precedent for subsequent interaction between Macedonians and Corinthians, but not all of their successors were as successful in developing and maintaining the levels of goodwill that the Argeadai had established. The two decades following Alexander’s death, for example, were ones in which several Diadochoi possessed Corinth, and in most cases they established associations with the pro-Macedonian Corinthians through acts of euergetism. Their attempts, however, typically fell short of the successes that the Argeadai had achieved. The Diadochoi had desired to control Corinth and to secure the goodwill and loyalty of at least a powerful faction of Corinthians for many of the same reasons that the Argeadai had. They wished to possess the strategically important Acrocorinth, but they also utilized control of Corinth to associate themselves with the Argeadai and legitimize their claims to dynasty and kingship. Their failures can be attributed to many factors, and they are reflected in the frequency that control of Corinth shifted from one dynast to another. Demetrios Poliorketes, however, was unlike his contemporaries. He captured Corinth in 303 and restored reciprocal goodwill with the pro-Antigonid Corinthians that was preserved unbroken for more than five decades. The break occurred when Aratos and the Achaians expelled the Macedonians from Corinth and attached it to their koinon. The Achaian interlude (243–224) interrupted the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth and the Corinthians’ receipt of the benefits they received from the latter. Achaian possession of Corinth also highlighted to the Corinthians how well they had fared under the Macedonians, as the Achaians never engaged the Corinthians in a discourse founded upon reciprocal goodwill. When the Antigonids recovered Corinth they restored a state of goodwill with the pro-Antigonid Corinthians. The kings of the 3

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Antigonid dynasty were arguably as successful, if not more so, than the Argeadai in securing the Corinthians’ goodwill through bestowal of benefactions to which the Corinthians responded in kind with displays of continued loyalty and support. The Antigonid kings had been advised well by Antigonos Monophthalmos, the founder of the dynasty, when he remarked that “goodwill is a noble and unshakable gangway” (Plut. Demetr. 8.3). No direct evidence attests to the Antigonids’ euergetism toward the Corinthians, as is typically found within countless honorific decrees or dedications found throughout the Hellenistic world. John Ma, for example, has demonstrated in his study of the discourse between the cities of Asia Minor and King Antiochos III how this relationship worked and how it can be traced.5 Unfortunately, the assemblage of epigraphic and literary evidence at his disposal is far greater than that which is preserved at Corinth. Nevertheless, throughout the period that the Macedonians possessed Corinth all indications point to a relationship founded upon reciprocal exchange of benefactions that often produced a continuous state of goodwill between the two. A preponderance of evidence, some of which is circumstantial, establishes a clear picture of the methods by which the Antigonids secured the pro-Macedonian Corinthians’ enduring goodwill and unremitting loyalty. There is no evidence that they were taxed, that they were compelled to finance the garrison’s presence on Acrocorinth, or that the Macedonians grossly infringed upon their freedom and autonomy.6 Furthermore, the frequent attempts rivals made to capture Corinth often resulted in damage to the city’s fortifications, harbors, and the devastation of the Corinthian chora and its agricultural produce. Many Corinthians surely desired more than anything else that the Macedonians defend the Corinthian chora as vigorously as they would defend their own position on Acrocorinth. Security and stability constituted the greatest acts of euergetism that the Macedonians could offer to those inhabiting or farming the Corinthian countryside. The pro-Macedonian Corinthians reciprocated in kind, providing loyalty and support within this carefully orchestrated discourse. Although our evidence for early Hellenistic Corinth is far from satisfactory, nothing suggests that the Corinthians ever attempted to expel the Macedonians in order to recover their freedom and autonomy. Segments of the demos did, however, conspire to hand over their polis to a rival dynast or state on a few occasions. It is clear, however, that this occurred only in those times when the dynast possessing Corinth had failed to secure or lost the goodwill of the demos through an inability to provide the most important benefactions the Corinthians sought from them: stability and security.

Scholarship on the Hellenistic period and Corinth Scholarship on the Hellenistic world has exploded over the past few decades both in quantity and in quality. Numerous scholars have made great strides in 4

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our understanding of the complexities of the period and how it is perceived.7 Unfortunately, as scholars’ views of the Hellenistic period have matured, perceptions of Hellenistic Corinth have not mirrored trends in scholarship. On the contrary, appreciation of early Hellenistic Corinth has lagged far behind our understanding of other poleis. A perception permeates modern scholarship that Philip installed a garrison on Acrocorinth to control and dominate this strategic location and that his successors maintained this policy.8 They exploited Corinth’s strategic position, and regarded it merely as one of the “fetters of Greece.”9 Their occupation of Acrocorinth, therefore, deprived Corinth of its autonomy and freedom, and their presence was resented.10 The extant evidence assembled below points to a very different conclusion. The lack of attention devoted to early Hellenistic Corinth undoubtedly stems from the paucity of sources pertaining to the city as well as the enduring allure of its earlier and later grandeur.11 No comprehensive treatment of Corinth’s early Hellenistic history exists.12 James Wiseman’s study of its history between the years 228 B.C. and A.D. 267 concentrates upon Roman interaction with Corinth; nevertheless, it serves as the only approach to the final years (224–196) of the Macedonians’ presence in the city.13 Several recent studies of Athens, on the other hand, have illuminated tremendously our understanding of its early Hellenistic history and relations with the Macedonians.14

The ancient sources Reconstruction of Corinth’s late Classical and early Hellenistic history, and the nature of its relationship with the Macedonians who possessed it, can be achieved only by drawing upon the extant literary, epigraphic, prosopographic, topographic, numismatic, and archaeological evidence. Overreliance upon one or neglect of another would yield an incomplete picture. Utilization of all that is known about Corinth within this period allows one to discern trends and patterns in the Corinthians’ activities, and the nature of their interactions with the Macedonians. Admittedly, neither trends nor patterns constitute evidence carved in stone, but those Greek poleis from which a larger corpus of epigraphic evidence is preserved provide a paradigm alongside which to consider Corinth. This approach produces a clearer picture of early Hellenistic Corinth than one might have expected; it also opens the door for further studies of this period and provides an additional body of material for those working on other poleis. Our literary sources for the Hellenistic world are extremely limited and, more frequently than not, these were written by authors writing many years after the events they describe. Diodoros’ narrative and several of Plutarch’s biographies permit the reconstruction of the years prior to 301. For those following 301, however, the historical narrative of Diodoros is lost and only Justin, in his Epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Philippic History, preserves a continuous account of events throughout the third century.15 Not until Polybios’ Histories illuminates the affairs of the late third-century Hellenistic world, can 5

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one feel somewhat confident in the sources. Plutarch and the Roman historian Livy, who relied heavily upon Polybios, often supplement his account where it is no longer extant. The two former authors, however, often color their narratives with anecdotes of questionable veracity or rhetorical elements that complicate interpretation and diminish their utility. A full-scale treatment of these issues cannot be addressed in full here; concerns regarding those passages that belong to either category are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Very few other literary sources permit reconstruction of early Hellenistic history. A few scattered references preserved in the works of later authors, such as Polyainos, Athenaios, Strabo, and Pausanias, record single events taken out of context. It is difficult to assign a date to these events and more difficult to assess their value; inevitably many gaps remain in our understanding of Hellenistic history. The extant sources preserve primarily references to Corinth that pertain overwhelmingly to military operations within the northeastern Peloponnese. It is a somewhat depressing picture and one that undoubtedly contributes to the lack of attention that historians have devoted to Corinth. Nevertheless, our literary sources preserve enough tantalizing information concerning the Macedonians’ presence in the city to recover the nature of their impact upon Corinth. The virtual dearth of epigraphic evidence from Corinth is more frustrating than the paucity of literary sources.16 For a study such as that conducted here, this is unfortunate as no decrees of the Corinthian state honoring Macedonian kings, garrison commanders, or governors, nor dedications of the latter to the former have been discovered. The poverty of epigraphic evidence seriously inhibits our ability to discern and analyze the discourse that surely existed between Corinthians and Macedonians. Fortunately, however, the epigraphic picture is not as bleak at other locations and Corinthians are attested abroad throughout this period in numerous capacities. This record is invaluable as frequently the locations at which they were active and their activities at those locations can illuminate events at Corinth.

Archaeological excavation The archaeological remains from Corinth, like the literary and epigraphic records, preserve little trace of the Macedonians. Other than the copious numismatic evidence, it is as if the Macedonians never possessed the city. Nevertheless, excavation has unveiled substantial information concerning building activity within the early Hellenistic period. Admittedly, however, our understanding of the monuments of Hellenistic Corinth has improved tremendously in recent decades, but many gaps still linger and uncertainties about the chronological sequence of Corinthian pottery continue to cloud our comprehension of the archaeological and architectural remains. Corinth and its territory have been explored, excavated, and studied for more than a century. The American School of Classical Studies has excavated 6

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the city and its environs since 1896.17 Excavations commenced at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia (University of Chicago and University of California at Los Angeles/Ohio State University) more than fifty years ago; study of the excavated remains and additional excavations have continued.18 Corinth’s eastern harbor, Kenchreai, also has been explored thoroughly.19 The British School of Archaeology has excavated the Sanctuary of Hera at Perachora.20 More recently the Eastern Korinthia Archaeological Survey (EKAS) has employed an intensive “siteless” survey to investigate the northern Corinthian plain, specifically the area east of the city near ancient Kromna.21 Additionally, generations of scholars have explored thoroughly the whole of the Corinthia.22 Recently, the southeastern Corinthia and the southwestern Corinthia and its border with Sikyon have been investigated closely.23 The Greek Ministry of Culture also has conducted countless excavations throughout the Corinthia. Unfortunately, archaeology has not illuminated the Macedonians’ presence in the city as much as one would expect, considering the duration of time they spent in the city. Archaeologists working at Corinth have devoted much less attention to the Hellenistic period than they have to the more alluring Archaic/ Classical and Roman periods. For example, Corinth XX, The Centenary, celebrating 100 years of American excavations, contains 26 articles each of which will define the study of archaeology at Corinth and will complement historical analyses of the city for generations. Unfortunately, only one article deals exclusively with the Hellenistic period, and it only briefly addresses the Macedonian presence in the Corinthia.24 Several factors account for the lack of attention paid to Hellenistic Corinth. Its perceived loss of autonomy and freedom after the Macedonians occupied Acrocorinth also account for a general indifference towards the city’s synchronous material remains. The relative poverty of finds, specifically abundant epigraphic evidence, also stands out as an additional factor explaining the limited attention devoted toward the period. The absence of an historical account of Hellenistic Corinth further inhibits the archaeologist from attributing excavated material to historical events and the historian from associating historical events with the archaeological record. Despite the bleak picture painted here, significant contributions have been made toward our understanding of the material remains of Hellenistic Corinth.25 One modest aim of the present study is that it will provide an historical narrative for archaeologists that will facilitate examination of the material remains excavated from Hellenistic Corinth.

The Corinthian economy before the Macedonians The early fourth century was one that witnessed a decline in Corinthian significance as well as devastation to its economy and countryside. Nowhere can this be seen more acutely than during the Corinthian War (394–387). In its aftermath, Corinth fell into a depressed economic condition that diminished her will to impose itself upon the Greek world. As John Salmon has observed, “after the 7

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King’s Peace … Corinth behaved in accordance with the implication of her history, that she was no longer fitted to occupy even a small part of the centre of the Greek stage. With a few exceptions … Corinth was merely passive.”26 Certainly the Corinthian War affected Corinth and its territory negatively.27 Hostile forces had occupied Lechaion, Krommyon, Sidous, and Perachora, while allied forces maintained garrisons on Acrocorinth and Kenchreai. Its Long Walls were damaged badly, and its agricultural produce must have been constantly in peril. Further wars and the movements of soldiers across the Isthmos perpetuated instability within the Corinthia. Most importantly, perhaps, is the perception that following the King’s Peace, Corinth’s prosperity declined considerably; its diminished economic resources likely persisted until the late fourth century.28 Poseidon’s temple at Ishtmia, for example, had been destroyed by fire in 390 (Xen. Hell. 4.5.4); recent examination of the architectural remains indicates that it was not repaired until the end of the fourth century.29 Nancy Bookidis and Ronald Stroud, however, have pointed to dedications from the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore at Corinth in the second half of the fourth century as an indication of economic revival, especially in the aftermath of Timoleon’s campaign in Sicily.30 Examination of the epigraphic record for Corinthians working on building projects abroad paints a slightly different picture than that which emerges domestically. Corinthian craftsmen are attested at Delphi and Epidauros between the 370s and the 340s; Corinthian building materials seem to have been used at Troizen in the 350s.31 Both stone and timber appear regularly to have been cut within the Corinthia and exported.32 Evidence from one quarry in the northwestern Corinthia above the west bank of the Longopotamos River valley suggests that it was state owned.33 If this, and other Corinthian quarries such as those at Hexamilia, east of the city, were owned by the state, then one can reasonably conclude that revenues were more significant in the four decades prior to Chaironeia than others have surmised.34 Nevertheless, three decades of nearly continuous conflict within the Corinthia prompted the city to adopt a foreign policy of strict neutrality that commenced in 365;35 it was broken by its participation in the anti-Macedonian coalition that confronted Philip II at Chaironeia. The wars fought in and around Corinth, as well as the seemingly continuous movement of troops across the Isthmos between the late 390s and the mid-360s, surely impeded Corinth’s economic growth. Following the period of Corinthian neutrality, however, some return to normalcy may have commenced, but the general picture preserved in the literary and archaeological records indicates diminished resources available to the Corinthian state.36

Corinth’s location Corinth is situated at the crossroads of Greece. Acrocorinth towers over the city; it is a massive outcropping of natural limestone that reaches an elevation 8

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of 575 m. On a clear day, one can see from it the passes to the Argolid, the frontier with Sikyon, the Corinthian Gulf and the Perachora peninsula, the Isthmos, the Saronic Gulf, Attica, and the passes to the southeastern Corinthia. A garrison holding the citadel can block access to and from the Peloponnese with relative ease, as Plutarch observed (see Map 1). Extending northwards from the eastern and western foothills of Acrocorinth, Corinth’s walls encircle the city. Joining the city walls are the two long walls that project northwards and link the city to its western harbor, Lechaion. The city walls and the Long Walls collectively render Corinth a virtually impregnable fortress that protected its inhabitants and the garrison on Acrocorinth, which itself was enclosed with a wall.37 In addition to these features, the imposing Mt. Oneion extends eastward not far from the southeastern slope of Acrocorinth; only the pass following the Leukon (Xerias) river separates the two. Mt. Oneieon nearly reaches the coast of the Saronic Gulf to the south of Korinth’s eastern harbor, Kenchreai. The Mt. Oneion range also had at least two fortresses within its narrow passes and it greatly augmented a garrison’s ability to control traffic across the eastern Corinthian plain to and from the Isthmos (see Fig. 1.1). The Isthmos joins the Peloponnese to the Greek peninsula and separates the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs, on which were located Corinth’s harbors, Kenchreai and Lechaion respectively. Corinth ranked highly among the Greek naval and mercantile elite throughout the Archaic and Classical periods on account of the eastward and westward access each gulf offered. Allegedly, the first triremes were built at Corinth (Thuc. 1.13.2–5 and Diod. 14.42.3) and Corinthians’ skill in shipbuilding persisted throughout the third century. The two harbors benefited the Macedonians nearly as much as the strategic considerations Acrocorinth offered. The diolkos, linking the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs, supplemented their combined value further. The Corinthians had derived considerable economic benefit from their harbors and the diolkos for centuries prior to the advent of the Macedonians.38 As Philip II of Macedon sought to establish hegemony throughout mainland Greece, Corinth’s strategic value and economic potential cannot have escaped his notice. The Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia is located approximately 16 km to the east of the city; it is situated on the Isthmos, joining the Peloponnese to the trans-Isthmian Corinthia and central Greece.39 In 582/580, athletic competitions were first held here and it then become recognized as one of the four major panhellenic sanctuaries along with Olympia, Delphi, and Nemea.40 The Isthmian Games were celebrated every two years, most likely late April/early May.41 They were the most popular and most widely attended of all four panhellenic competitions; the favorable location of the Isthmos made it “the meeting place of Asia and Greece.”42 Both Poseidon’s sanctuary and the city of Corinth certainly drew considerable financial gain from the visitations of those attending the Isthmian Games. Naturally, similar economic benefits accompanied the numerous gatherings of the League of Corinth and the Hellenic 9

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League that the Macedonians convened throughout the period that they possessed Corinth. Representatives (synedroi) from numerous states descended upon Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon in order to attend the meetings of these leagues. The Corinthians surely profited from their presence and one ought to construe these frequent meetings as one Macedonian benefaction that enhanced Corinth’s prestige, increased its revenues, and was intended to win the Corinthians’ goodwill.

Timoleon’s expedition to Sicily and late Classical Corinth Prior to Chaironeia, autonomous Corinth had been a first-tier power within the Greek world since the eighth century and had affected dramatically its landscape.43 She had been instrumental in the colonization of the western Mediterranean, most famously establishing the colony of Syracuse in 732 (Thuc. 6.3.2). As Corinth’s primacy began to wane in the sixth century, so too did its place within the Peloponnese and the Greek world. Throughout the Classical period, however, Corinth still retained a place of prominence among the Greek poleis. Timoleon’s expedition to Sicily, for example, illustrates this fact. Ambassadors from Syracuse arrived in their metropolis in 346/5, requesting aid to depose the tyrant Dionysios II. After considerable debate, the Corinthian assembly moved to assist its colony and appointed Timoleon son of Timainetos to command the expedition.44 The Corinthians allotted Timoleon nominal forces and funds with which he recruited mercenaries, including a number of Phokaians.45 Once preparations were completed he departed for Sicily, probably in 344, accompanied by the goddesses Demeter and Kore.46 Within one year of his arrival, Timoleon achieved successes that were nothing short of spectacular. He had rid Syracuse of its tyrant, Dionysios II, who was dispatched to Corinth where he spent the remainder of his life in exile. He secured alliances with numerous Greek poleis and he began to engage the Carthaginians, Sicily’s other great colonial presence. Timoleon’s successes inspired the Corinthians and in spring 343 they dispatched reinforcements to Sicily, including Demaratos and Deinarchos, who later became the two most influential pro-Macedonian Corinthians. Aided now by the arrival of these reinforcements, Timoleon’s reputation grew even stronger throughout Sicily and his victories increased in number. No military success was more significant than his victory over the Carthaginians at the battle of the Krimisos in 341.47 Timoleon and his allies accumulated vast sums of money, and they dispatched their spoils to Corinth, and perhaps to the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia.48 Corinth’s allies also dedicated a remarkable monument in Corinth to commemorate Timoleon’s victory at the Krimisos. A bronze sculpture of Korinthos or perhaps Poseidon (if so, possibly the work of Lysippos) once stood on the inscribed base of the monument.49 As the late Classical period drew to a close, many Greeks and Macedonians looked to the East, Persia, and future glory; many Corinthians simultaneously 10

Corinthian Gulf

Lechaion

Corinth Isthmian Gate Tile Works North Cemetery Cheliotomylos Asklepieion Sikyonian Gate

Kraneion Theater South Stoa Kenchreaian Gate

Potter’s Quarter Hadji Mustafa Fountain Phliasian Gate

Southeast Gate

Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore

Teneatic Gate?

Acrocorinth 0

500

1000 M

Figure 1.1 Corinth and its immediate environs [J. Kempf de Jong, after Corinth XX, Plan V]

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looked to the West, its ancient colonies, and its glorious past. Timoleon’s expedition to Sicily embodies this retrospective gaze and it constituted one of Corinth’s greatest achievements, and its last as a truly autonomous polis. The Syracusans, for example, decreed that Timoleon “defeated the barbarians, and resettled the mightiest of Greek cities, and so became the author of freedom for the Greeks of Sicily.”50 While the Corinthians restored freedom in Sicily, Philip II of Macedonia threatened their own.

***

When Philip II first visited Corinth following his victory at the battle of Chaironeia (338), according to Plutarch (Tim. 15.7), he dined in the city. At the banquet he met the deposed tyrant Dionysios II of Syracuse, whom Timoleon had exiled to Corinth, and ridiculed his proclivity for writing lyrics and tragedies. Quite possibly Philip even observed while walking through the Upper Lechaion Road Valley the recently erected monument commemorating Timoleon’s Sicilian campaign. These were transitional times; three years after Timoleon’s victory at the Krimisos the Corinthians and a coalition of Greek states fought unsuccessfully against Philip II at Chaironeia. The Macedonians subsequently possessed the city and garrisoned Acrocorinth; arguably Corinth’s illustrious history as an autonomous power that extended back to the eighth century had ended. The following chapter traces Corinth’s relations with Philip prior to Chaironeia and those factors that led the Corinthians to oppose him. It also examines the nature of the relationship that Philip first formulated with the Corinthians and Alexander the Great perpetuated.

Notes 1 Trans. Papillon 2004. 2 For an analysis of eunoia in the fourth century, with an emphasis upon its use in Isokrates, see de Romilly 1958: 92–101. She defines (92) eunoia as “something more than good will: it means approval, sympathy and readiness to help. Having such meanings, it soon came to be applied to politics in a number of ways, as describing one’s feelings towards a person, or a party, or the city-or even another city.” See also Ma’s (2000: 191–93) important discussion on eunoia, which he identifies as the “most common word in the euergetic exchange” (191). 3 Mitchell 1997: 148–66. 4 Mitchell 1997: 167–77. 5 Ma 2000. 6 Compare, for example, the well-documented Athenian revolts against the Macedonians, see Habicht 1997: 36–42, 81–87, 95–97, 142–49, 173–74. Argos, too, revolted on several occasions; see Tomlinson 1972: 147–63. Revolts against the Macedonians are attested also at Thebes and Elis. 7 Several excellent surveys of the Hellenstic period have appeared recently; see, for example, Shipley 2000; Erskine 2003; Bugh 2006. 8 Broneer, Corinth I.4: 157 (Macedonian “occupation”); Wiseman 1979: 451 (“Macedonian domination”); Worthington 2008: 158 (Philip’s “denuding” of Corinth after Chaironeia). See also the comments of Griffith (HM II: 542 and 646). Perhaps

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29

the perception is most evident in scholars’ characterization of Aratos’ expulsion of the Macedonians from Corinth as “liberation,” which certainly implies prior domination. For Philip V’s designation of Corinth as one of the “fetters of Greece” (πέδας Ἑλληνικάς), see Polyb. 18.11.5; Plut. Arat. 16.6. See also Strabo 9.4.15 and App. Mac. 8.2 (πέδας τῆς Ἑλλάδος). For an important discussion of early Hellenistic perceptions of “freedom” and “autonomy,” see Oliver 2001: 35–36. Salmon (1984: vii), for example, wrote “I have written a history of an independent city, and although Corinthians no doubt continued to take a distinct view of their interests after 338, the nature of our evidence does not allow it to be traced.” Roberts (1983) completed a dissertation (unpublished) that treats in part post-Classical Corinth. Wiseman 1979: 450–91. Tracy 1995; Habicht 1997; Mikalson 1998; Dreyer 1999; Tracy 2003; Palagia and Tracy 2003; Oliver 2007. For an overview of Trogus’ Philippic History and his sources, see Yardley and Heckel 1997: 19–34. Dow 1942: 89–90; Stroud 1972: 198. In fact, only one public inscription (Corinth VIII.1: no. 5) from the Hellenistic period can be assigned a date with any confidence. Dow (1942: 111) first recognized that this Corinthian inscription was the work of the same man who inscribed IG II2 910+Agora I 600. See now Tracy (1990: 108–9 and 265), who has identified this Athenian as the Cutter of Agora I 247, who was active between 194/3 and 148/7, and Tracy suggests further that the Corinthian stone be dated ca. 170. See Corinth XX for a general bibliography as well as detailed studies of the site and objects excavated there. Publication of the essays presented at the conference “Half a Century on the Isthmus” (2007) is forthcoming. See Kenchreai I: xvii–xxi. Perachora I and Perachora II; Tomlinson 1969. Tartaron et al. 2006; Caraher and Gregory 2006; Caraher, Nakassis, and Pettegrew 2006; Caraher, Pettegrew, and James 2010. Wiseman (1963: 257, 271–73; 1978: 66–68) first identified the site as ancient Kromna. For doubts about this identification, see Caraher, Nakassis, and Pettegrew 2006: 14 and Tartaron et al. 2006: 494–95. See Corinth I.1: 18–114; Sakellariou and Faraklas 1971; and Wiseman 1978. For the southeastern Corinthia, see Dixon 2000: 51–122 and 2005b; see also the work of the Saronic Harbors Archaeological Research Project, for example, Tartaron, Pullen, and Noller 2006; Tartaron et al. 2011. For the southwestern Corinthia, see Bynum 1995; Marchand 2002 and 2009. For the border with Sikyon, see Lolos 2011: 16. Gebhard and Dickie, Corinth XX, 261–78. Several others focusing on specific types of objects (sculpture, pottery, terracotta figurines) touch upon the Hellenistic material. Some notable examples include Bookidis 1982; Pemberton 1985; Mattusch 1992; Sturgeon 1998. Salmon 1984: 371. For the Corinthian War, see Salmon 1984: 342–62; Seager, CAH2 VI: 97–119. Roberts (1983: 221–23) and Salmon (1984: 178–85) argue that the wars of the first third of the fourth century had an adverse effect on the Corinthian economy. Salmon (1984: 178–85) considers repairs to the roof a sign of recovery, conceding that the date of the repairs is not known. Gebhard and Hemans (1998: 10–11), citing Corinthian poverty following the Corinthian War and those military operations that followed it, have demonstrated that the temple remained in ruins until repairs were completed in the late fourth century. In fact, the authors conclude that there are no signs of building activity at the sanctuary “until the end of the fourth century.”

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30 Corinth XVIII.3: 430. 31 No fewer than 23 Corinthians worked at either Delphi or Epidauros between ca. 370 and 343. Three Troizenians were sent to Corinth ca. 350 to procure building materials. 32 See Meiggs 1982: 424–25, 430–32; Burford 1969: 176 note 2. 33 Lolos 2002: 201–7. 34 For the Hexamilia quarries, see Wiseman 1978: 66; Haywood, Corinth XX: 27–28. For quarrying activity at Kromna, near Hexamilia, see Tartaron et al. 2006: 508–9. 35 See Salmon 1984: 375–81. The principal primary sources are Xen. Hell. 7.4.6–10; see also Diod. Sic. 15.76.3. 36 For the return of some normalcy after neutrality was declared, see Roberts 1983: 223–24. 37 For Corinth’s walls, see Corinth III.2; Winter 1991. 38 Wiseman 1978: 46; Salmon 1984: 133, 136–40, 142–44, 160–61; Raepsaet 1993: 255–56; Freitag 2005; Pettegrew 2011. 39 The Isthmos, according to Strabo (8.2.1), is 40 stades in width, or approximately 8 km. 40 Gebhard 1992. 41 The precise time of the year at which the Isthmian Games were celebrated is unknown, although it is generally believed to be either late spring or early summer. For the fullest discussion on the topic, see Ferguson (1948: 122–23), who concludes that the games were held in April/May. See also Dixon 2007: 158 note 24. 42 Livy 33.32.1–2: concilium Asiae Graeciaeque is mercatus erat. 43 See especially the remarks of Thucydides (1.13.2–5) and Strabo (8.6.20). 44 Plutarch (Tim.) and Diodoros (16) have documented thoroughly his accomplishments; Nepos’ Life of Timoleon adds little to the two more preferable accounts. The most comprehensive modern analyses include Talbert 1974 and Smarczyk 2003. 45 For the significance of the Phokians’ presence, see Chapter 2, p. 16. 46 Talbert 1974: 47–48. For the significance of Demeter and Kore in Timoleon’s expedition, see Diod. Sic. 16.66.1–5 and Plut. Tim. 8. 47 The date of the battle is highly controversial. Sordi (1961: 109–12) advocated a date in 339 (May or June). Others have argued that this provides too little time for Timoleon’s reorganization of Syracuse and his other actions on the island prior to his retirement in 337/6; see Talbert (1974: 44–47), dating the Krimisos to 341 (June). 48 Plut. Tim. 29.5–6; Diod. Sic. 16.80.6. See Corinth XVIII.3: 271, 430 note 52 for speculation that a large cutting (T:19) on the Upper Terrace of the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore might have accommodated a dedication of Timoleon. 49 Corinth Inv. 431, 1896, 2150. Smith 1919: 362–72, no. 75 (ed. pr.); Corinth VIII.1: no. 23; Corinth VIII.3: no. 23; Kent 1952: 9–18; RO, 368–70: no. 74. It is comprised of two extant blocks (of four original) that were excavated on the west side of the Roman forum; it must have stood in that proximity, see Williams 1970: 25–26 and note 30. Some editors have restored “Corinthians” in line 1, interpreting the dedication as one made by the metropolis and its colonies; see Smarczyk 2003: 153–58. It is, however, conceivable that the colonies dedicated the monument alone. For the suggestion that “Korinthos” stood atop the base, see J. and L. Robert (REG 66 [1953]: 136, no. 69). Lysippos is attested at Corinth, his name appearing on an inscribed base found in 1901 on the top of the triglyph wall of the Sacred Spring in an upside-down position: Corinth Inv. 29, Corinth VIII.1: no. 34; and on a second: Corinth Inv. 160, Corinth VIII.1: no. 35. Lysippos is said to have sculpted a bronze Poseidon set up in Corinth; see Luc. Iupp. Trag. 9; see further Mattusch, Corinth XX, 223–24. 50 Diod. Sic. 16.90.1, trans. C.B. Welles, Loeb Classical Library. See also Plut. Tim. 39.1–3.

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2 C O R I N T H I N TH E A G E O F P H I L I P I I A N D A L E X AN D E R III, 338 –3 2 3 B . C .

When Alexander the Great triumphantly arrived at Susa, he entered the palace of the deposed Persian king Darius III, sitting upon the royal throne underneath a golden canopy. Demaratos of Corinth began to weep, proclaiming that all Greeks should have had the opportunity to witness the scene. He was both Alexander’s friend (philos) and companion (hetairos); earlier he had been a guest-friend (xenos) of Philip II. The Corinthian’s standing at the courts of the two Argead monarchs illustrates the significance that each attached to his city; his loyalty to both underlines many Corinthians’ reception of the Macedonians within their polis. Corinth, however, did not align itself willingly with Philip; some of its citizens had fought against him at Chaironeia and had prepared to resist his advance toward their city following his victory. Those intent on opposition, however, quickly realized the futility of confrontation. Philip entered the city and installed a garrison on Acrocorinth, commencing more than a century-long Macedonian presence at Corinth. The rapport between Demaratos and the Argead kings Philip and Alexander exemplifies patently that the Macedonian presence did not devolve into a contentious occupation. Corinthians and Macedonians regularly displayed reciprocal goodwill (eunoia) toward one another; both reaped the benefits of cooperation that developed and that characterized their relationship. Studies of the Argead kings’ relations with the Greek poleis have focused on states for which we possess an abundance of evidence; nevertheless there is much we can learn from their interactions with Corinth.

Corinth and Philip II before Chaironeia Philip II assumed the Argead throne in late summer/early autumn 360 following the death of his brother King Perdikkas.1 After he had established his position within Macedonia and attained security along its borders, Philip initiated the first of his many campaigns that left him by 338 in total control of the Greek peninsula. His first offensive was the attack and subsequent capture

15

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of Amphipolis in 357 (Diod. Sic. 16.8.2); the city had been of critical importance to the Athenians and its loss initiated a two-decade long courtship throughout which Philip and Athens vacillated between war and peace. At this early date, however, Philip’s imperialism threatened directly few poleis of southern Greece; fewer lamented Athens’ loss of Amphipolis.2 He next allied himself with the Chalkidians; the consequences of this alliance would not escape Corinth’s notice.3 Corinth’s relationship with Philip II of Macedon prior to the battle of Chaironeia was contentious. Tensions most likely developed in 356 following his seizure of the Corinthian colony of Potidaia, the sale of its inhabitants into slavery, and the grant of its territory to Philip’s Chalkidian allies.4 Corinthian colonists had founded Potidaia ca. 600 B.C. and it had remained one of Corinth’s closest colonies and its only one in the Aegean.5 Although the relationship between Corinth and its former colony was not strong in the early 350s, Philip’s destruction of it and the sale of the Potidaians into slavery could not have escaped the notice of its metropolis and it must have troubled them deeply. Moreover, with Philip’s destruction of Olynthos in 348, Potidaia fell under his immediate control, becoming part of Macedonia proper.6 Throughout the decade following Philip’s capture of Potidaia the Corinthians had no conflict with him, nor did they raise alarms about his expansionist policies in central and northern Greece. Perhaps Isokrates was correct in his assessment that “no one would fault … the Corinthians … if they valued nothing besides their own survival and security.”7 Its policy of neutrality, since 365, accounts for this.8 Involvement, whether active or passive, in the Third Sacred War (356–346), however, was one Corinth could not altogether avoid. The war itself commenced with the Phokians’ seizure of Delphi. Over the course of a decade the Phokians and Thebans waged war against one another for control of Apollo’s sanctuary, which the former had regularly plundered. A lengthy stalemate was finally resolved when the Thebans appealed to Philip to intervene on their behalf.9 The war ended in 346 when the Phokian general Phalaikos surrendered to him.10 At the first meeting of the Amphiktyony following the war’s conclusion, Philip claimed that the Corinthians had been party to the Phokian sacrilege, excluding them from the organization of the Pythia in 346 (Diod. Sic. 16.60.2). Although Corinthians had participated in the Amphiktyony while under Phokian control, our sources offer no indication that they supported the Phokians through formal alliance or military aid during the Sacred War itself.11 Phalaikos’ subsequent presence in Corinth (Diod. Sic. 16.61.4) and Timoleon’s employment of Phokian mercenaries for his expedition to Sicily (345/4) is noteworthy.12 The Amphiktyonic Council had decreed (Diod. 16.60.1) that those Phokians who had fled were to be cursed and apprehended wherever they might be. Although the Phokians’ presence in Corinth and Timoleon’s employment of some as mercenaries occurred at least a year after their surrender, these facts may account for Philip’s subsequent exclusion of the Corinthians from Delphi. 16

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Corinthian naopoioi, who had been active throughout the period of Phokian control, continued to serve at Delphi, where they are last attested at the autumn Pylaia of 343.13 While clearly suffering some recriminations for at best tacit approval of or at worst their collusion with the Phokian-controlled Amphiktyony, their presence at the sanctuary following the end of the Sacred War in 346 seems to have been reduced; this decreased capacity persisted until as late as autumn 343, after which date, however, the extant evidence suggests an even further diminished Corinthian role at Delphi. After gaining control of Phokis, Philip also acquired access to the Corinthian Gulf and the harbor at Kirrha. As early as 344, he had troops conveyed across the Gulf to support his Peloponnesian allies in Messene (and possibly Argos).14 The anti-Macedonians in Corinth cannot have failed to observe the presence of the Macedonians and their allies in the Corinthian Gulf contemporaneous with Timoleon’s departure for Sicily. Philip also launched a military expedition against the Corinthian colonies Ambrakia and Leukas in the Adriatic in 343/2.15 Demosthenes is precise concerning neither the nature of his attack nor its outcome, although evidence suggests that Philip captured neither. He, however, clearly had adopted an aggressive position against these two Corinthian colonies. When examined together, both Philip’s punishment of the Corinthians at Delphi and his attacks against Leukas and Ambrakia, an inescapable conclusion emerges. At some point in late 343 (or early 342), he began to provoke Corinth, the reasons for which require explanation. The most logical solution lies in the Corinthians’ dispatch of Timoleon and his expedition to Sicily in 344, specifically his employment of Phokian mercenaries. At least one scholar has attempted to connect Timoleon’s expedition with the advent of an “antiMacedonian” faction in Corinth, arguing that Timoleon, Demaratos, and Deinarchos were all “pro-Macedonians” and that their removal was orchestrated to facilitate opposition to Philip.16 Equally plausible, and perhaps more probable, is the likelihood that Philip recognized the diminution of Corinth’s military resources (700 mercenaries and seven ships had been dispatched with Timoleon) and sought to exploit this temporary weakness.17 The subsequent dispatch of reinforcements in 343 (2,000 hoplites, 200 cavalry, and ten ships) further reduced Corinth’s capacity to resist militarily should that necessity arise.18 Cognizant of this situation, Philip may well have exploited the Phokians’ presence with Timoleon as a pretext to provoke Corinth and undermine its anti-Macedonian faction. While the evidence is irrefutable that Demaratos and Deinarchos, both pro-Macedonians (see pp. 27–9, 49–50), were active in Sicily with Timoleon, they were not sent out to reinforce the original expedition until 343. Not a single piece of evidence, however, exists to conclude that Timoleon himself was either anti- or pro-Macedonian. Philip’s attacks against Leukas and Ambrakia, both of which sent ships and troops with Timoleon, may indicate his opposition to the expedition itself or those who sent it as much as they represent his desire to establish a foothold along the northwestern coast of Greece and to test the resolve of his opponents at Corinth. 17

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Philip also initiated an interest in Peloponnesian affairs contemporary with his provocations of Corinth; the two are likely related. By the end of 343, he had established close relations with Argos, Elis, Megalopolis, and Messene.19 A pro-Macedonian faction at Elis established an oligarchic government in 343; a feat most likely accomplished through bribery and facilitated with the exile of political opponents.20 Philip also concluded an alliance with Messene (Paus. 4.28.2). The nearly contemporary establishment of influence in Messene and provocations of Corinth indicate clearly that he comprehended the value of possessing both for one seeking to control the Peloponnese. More than a century later, Demetrios of Pharos (Plut. Arat. 50.6) vividly reminded Philip V of their significance, comparing possession of each polis’ fortress to holding a bull by its two horns. The cumulative effects of Philip’s activities permitted an anti-Macedonian faction, emboldened by Philip’s aggression, to gain prominence in internal politics. This anti-Macedonian faction moved, in early 340, to join the Athenians and the Thebans in their alliance.21 Unfortunately, not a single Corinthian can be attached to this faction, but an intriguing honorary decree from Athens might permit the recovery of one person’s name. In the archonship of Nikomachos (341/0) at Athens, a decree (IG II2 229) was moved to honor Theoklos of Corinth for taking care of a certain one of the Athenians in Corinth, and for his goodwill in all matters toward the Athenian demos (lines 8–11).22 Evidence from the Athenian orators allows us to place Athenian ambassadors in Corinth on two occasions; both are nearly synchronous with the decree honoring Theoklos. Demosthenes (9.72), accompanied by Polyeuktos and Hegesippos and others, led an embassy to the Peloponnese in 342/1 for the purpose of securing allies and support for the war against Philip. Aeschines (3.95–98) relates the details of Kallias of Chalkis’ embassy in winter (probably) 341.23 He claims that Kallias reported that he had received explicit commitments to the war effort from the Achaians, and that secret agreements, to which some Athenians were witness, had been arranged with other Peloponnesians. If we can associate the evidence from IG II2 229, the latter embassy fits chronologically better. Kallias’ embassy possibly marks the occasion at which the Corinthians joined the alliance; if this decision had not been made in winter 341, it surely happened in early 340.24 One might plausibly suggest that Theoklos of Corinth, the honorand on IG II2 229, was not only a member of the anti-Macedonian faction, but also that those Athenians present in Corinth included Demosthenes, for he was called as a witness to Kallias’ deposition.25 It seems inconceivable that the Athenians in 341/0 would honor a pro-Macedonian Corinthian, and their presence in Corinth at this date suggests strongly ambassadors seeking to win their support. After resolving to join the alliance, the Corinthians began to mobilize their forces for the war the Athenians had declared against Philip in 340. Although the number of troops they supplied to the alliance is not recorded, it most likely was not great.26 The Corinthians fought with Leukadians, indicating 18

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either that these were exiles, who sought refuge at Corinth following Philip’s attack, or more likely that he had not successfully captured it. At the battle of Chaironeia, on 2 August 338, the Corinthians (together with contingents from Leukas and Kerkyra) fought unsuccessfully alongside the Athenians and Thebans.27 After Philip’s victory, the Corinthians began to gather weapons and to collect stones for the construction of walls.28 Despite these initial pretensions of resistance, they surrendered to Philip shortly thereafter.29 An anti-Macedonian faction in Corinth was responsible for the resolution to join the alliance in 340 and its presence at Chaironeia; it retained prominence until news reached the city of the Boiotians’ and Athenians’ decisions to sue for peace with Philip. The Corinthian decision to surrender, however, altered radically its political landscape; unfortunately, we do not know who was responsible for it, how it occurred, or when it happened.30 Almost certainly, those who had advocated war with Philip and who steered Corinth to the alliance against him lost their standing; most likely some fled voluntarily, others were exiled or possibly executed.31 With their removal or acquiescence, new politicians, led by Demaratos and Deinarchos, both veterans of Timoleon’s expedition, negotiated the city’s surrender.32 Demaratos, as we shall see, possibly was already one of Philip’s xenoi, making him an ideal figure to arrange favorable terms for Corinth.33 At the time of Chaironeia, many of Timoleon’s veterans must have returned from Sicily, and it is conceivable that many of them constituted this ascendant political faction, if the examples of Deinarchos and Demaratos provide any indication.34 Corinth’s willingness to cooperate with Philip, and later Alexander, also may account for the king’s decision not to punish it as he had Thebes.35 The two Corinthians, Demaratos and Deinarchos, who became leaders of the pro-Macedonian faction that gained ascendance after the battle of Chaironeia, had fought on Sicily with Timoleon. Philip cultivated their support and placed them in positions of power; his son confirmed their status. Corinth’s commanding geographical position, Acrocorinth, and the additional strategic benefits Corinth offered were essential as they sought to pacify the Greek mainland in preparation for the Asian campaign and to keep it docile during it. Both actively supported this pro-Maceodonian faction in order to help it maintain influence in the city and control of its citadel. Philip was also aware of Corinth’s long association with panhellenism. His desire to unify the Greek poleis in a campaign against Persia as hegemon of a newly established League of Corinth required that he and Corinth be on favorable terms with one another.

Corinth after Chaironeia At the sight of Philip’s forces encamped on the Isthmos, according to Plutarch (Mor. 221f), the Spartan Thorykion remarked, “The Peloponnesos has poor gate-keepers in you, Corinthians.” From a Spartan perspective, this may have been true; however, the anti-Macedonian faction at Corinth had done all it 19

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could to keep Philip out of the Peloponnese. The pro-Macedonian faction reaped the benefits of his entry. Following Corinth’s surrender, Philip issued a summons to the Greek poleis to assemble at Corinth; there he established his League of Corinth.36 The first meeting of representatives occurred shortly after the battle, most likely in winter 338, or perhaps early 337.37 At the second meeting in late spring/early summer 337, Philip II assumed the titles hegemon and strategos autokrator (στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος) of Greece and declared his intention to invade Persia.38 The nature of his League of Corinth is best detailed in a fragmentary inscription from Athens.39 The regulations preserved on this stone, which contains an oath to the gods as well as a fragmentary list of members, stipulate that members are not allowed to take up arms against one another, arms are not to be used against Philip and his descendants and that the member states’ constitutions in place at the time the oath was sworn are not to be overthrown. Lastly, members are not to undertake anything contrary to the agreements of the League of Corinth. Philip clearly established a peace, not unlike the several “common peace” (koine eirene) agreements made throughout the fourth century, although “common peace” is nowhere extant in our sources for his League of Corinth. He called upon each of the League’s members to contribute soldiers for his auxiliary force that is said to have totaled 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.40 Corinth’s standing within Philip’s League of Corinth is nowhere attested. Philip visited the city at least once while presiding over the meetings of the League. The sources attest to an exchange with the deposed tyrant Dionysios of Syracuse, who now resided there in a state of house arrest. This meeting occurred at a banquet, marking the first of many that later Macedonian kings would host while visiting Corinth.41 Not long after entering the Peloponnese, Philip embarked on an ambitious program of settling affairs throughout the peninsula.42 Most conspicuous was his desire to settle by arbitration outstanding territorial disputes among Peloponnesian states; this may even have been a feature of the League of Corinth itself.43 Extant evidence suggests that he heard claims concerning a number of disputes, rendering judgments in many cases.44 The practice of settling league members’ disputes certainly foreshadows both the Achaian practice of resolving disputes between new member states as well as the similar policy that Antigonos III Doson and Philip V utilized with their Hellenic Symmachy. No evidence attests to Corinth’s involvement in a settlement initiated by Philip. Although it is not known why Philip selected Corinth as the meeting place for his League, neither its long association with Greek freedom and panhellenism that one could trace back to the Hellenic League of 480 (Hdt. 7.145) nor its location at the crossroads of Greece can have been overlooked. No testimony supports the suggestion that Philip selected Corinth as the site to establish his League on account of its panhellenic association, although Diodoros (16.89.2) states explicitly that before Philip had convened the Greeks at Corinth, he had professed a desire to make war against Persia to avenge the profanation 20

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of temples in Greece during the Persian War. Additionally, but no less significant, was Corinth’s position at the crossroads of Greece. Control of the city and its citadel, Acrocorinth, afforded nearly unassailable dominance over the only corridor between the Peloponnese and central Greece. Corinth’s harbors of Lechaion and Kenchreai provided access to the sea and their shipyards, as well as financial revenues that could be drawn from them and the diolkos. Neither Philip nor Alexander seems to have exploited either harbor.45 The most dramatic development for the Corinthians after Chaironeia was Philip’s installation of a military garrison on Acrocorinth that would become over time the centerpiece of the Macedonians’ strategy by which they controlled southern Greece for nearly a century and a half.46 Abundant evidence attests to the installation of the garrison.47 The only detail (albeit a significant one) that remains obscure is whether it had been installed prior to the constitution of the League of Corinth or subsequent to it.48 Two important questions must be addressed at this point; neither, unfortunately, can be answered satisfactorily. First, we should like to know what was the precise nature of the government at Corinth following Chaironeia. Corinth, since the expulsion of the Kypselidai, had been ruled by an oligarchy and throughout the Classical period it had been a strong advocate of oligarchic constitutions.49 Confounding this, however, are the statements of Diodoros (16.82.6–7) and Plutarch (Tim. 24.3) that in the aftermath of his military victories on Sicily, Timoleon, through the agency of his nomothetes Kephalos, instituted a democratic constitution at Syracuse.50 This evidence, however, cannot be taken to represent a democratic movement in Corinth in the aftermath of Chaironeia. In fact, on the basis of the two individuals, whom we can identify in post-Chaironeia Corinthian politics, great wealth is a characteristic seemingly shared by both. While this is hardly adequate evidence on which to form conclusions, the limitations of the available evidence do not permit clarification. It seems probable, therefore, that post-Chaironeia Corinth represented a continuation of an oligarchic constitution that had long been a feature of Corinthian history. Those members of this oligarchy must have belonged to a pro-Macedonian faction. We should also like to know what the city’s relationship to the Macedonian garrison was; specifically, whether or not the former was in any way compelled to finance, wholly or partially, the latter. In other words, did Philip declare Corinth free from tribute (ἀφορολόγητος) following the battle of Chaironeia? This is a critical issue for understanding Macedonian control of Corinth. Although evidence pertaining to this question exists for later periods, we should like to know if this represents a departure from or perpetuation of Argead policy. Unfortunately, evidence for the Corinthians’ obligation(s) toward the Macedonian garrison is non-existent. Attestation of its presence on Acrocorinth is irrefutable, but we simply do not know if, for example, Kenchreai and Lechaion were garrisoned also in 338, or at any other time during the reigns of Philip or Alexander. Macedonian garrisons certainly occupied Corinth’s 21

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two harbors in the late fourth and third centuries; perhaps Philip installed troops within both in 338. These issues concerning Corinth’s obligations toward the garrison and Macedonian possession of its harbors may be interrelated. Later evidence from other coastal poleis with garrisons confirms that the Macedonians frequently received harbor dues, or at least a share of them.51 Considering Corinth’s unique position on the Peloponnesian Isthmos, one must also speculate on the diolkos while Philip controlled the city. Evidence attests to the Macedonians’ use of it after 220 (see Chapter 7, pp. 172–3, 175–6) and this can have little bearing on its standing in the 330s and 320s. It seems likely considering Philip’s financial difficulties at the end of his reign and the debt Alexander inherited from him that both needed all the financial resources they could muster to fund not only their garrisons in southern Greece but also the Persian campaign. On the basis of these financial considerations, it is possible, but by no means certain, that despite the goodwill both displayed toward Corinth, some financial obligation was placed upon its citizens to defray (partially or in whole) the cost of maintaining the garrison that occupied Acrocorinth. Philip likely reciprocated any Corinthian demonstration of goodwill with some tangible reward, or act of euergetism, to ameliorate the pro-Macedonians’ acquisition of political influence within the city, thus diminishing any residual animosities between it and any anti-Macedonians who remained in the city or other Corinthians who had committed to neither faction.52 Corinth’s relationship with Philip had been contentious since 356. Evidence from Delphi indicates that after Chaironeia Philip restored his new ally’s position at Delphi in an attempt to secure Corinthian goodwill.53 The presence of Corinthians at Delphi constitutes the most tangible evidence by which one can detect his efforts to reconcile himself with them. Extant testimony demonstrates that no Corinthians are attested at Delphi following the autumn Pylaia of Kleon’s archonship (343/2) and that they do not reappear until 337 when two Corinthians were naopoioi. Philip, almost certainly, punished the Corinthians for their dispatch of Timoleon’s expedition to Syracuse and their recruitment of Phokian mercenaries. He also sought to exploit Corinth’s depleted military resources. Nevertheless, despite Corinth’s opposition at Chaironeia, he restored the Corinthians, governed now by a pro-Macedonian oligarchy, to the prominent role it had long enjoyed at Apollo’s sanctuary; Alexander continued this policy.54 Between the years 338/7 and 323, at least fourteen Corinthians are attested in various capacities in Delphi; two others are probably Corinthians. Six of these were naopoioi, including Eupeithidas son of Timolas, Androkles son of Androtimos, Kallisthenes son of Saigalos, Soiadas son of Somestor, Phylakidas son of Leon, and K[.6–7.].55 Damochares served as hieromnemon in 324.56 The poet Aristonoos son of Nikosthenes composed hymns to both Apollo (FD III.2.191) and Hestia (FD III.2.192); for both hymns proxenia, euergasia, promanteia, proedria, prodikia, asylia, atelia, and epitimia at Delphi were bestowed upon him 22

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and his descendants in the archonship of Damochares (334/3).57 Four Corinthians are attested in 334/3 among the metalworkers who replaced the Lydian offerings that the Phokians had removed.58 Archedamos was contracted for the cutting of stone between 337 and 33559 and Kaphisodoros was contracted to convey wood from Sikyon.60 Two other individuals, probably Corinthians, were contracted to transport stone from Corinth ca. 335.61 On the basis of the evidence assembled above, Philip restored Corinth’s prominence at Delphi, one that she had enjoyed for centuries prior to his intervention in the Third Sacred War. We know little regarding any resolution to Philip’s other provocations. Leukas, which he had attacked in 343/2, seems not to have suffered any consequence for its presence at Chaironeia; perhaps it was spared a garrison through the industry of Corinth’s pro-Macedonian government. Ambrakia, however, was not so fortunate; it too received a garrison, presumably not long after Chaironeia.62 Potidaia continued to remain under direct Macedonian control following Philip’s sack of Olynthos in 348. The only evidence for direct diplomatic contact between Philip and Corinth pertains to the Pixodaros affair that occurred in 337 or early 336.63 Philip had agreed to a proposed marriage alliance with the Karian satrap Pixodaros, whose daughter would marry his son Arrhidaios. Alexander, feeling slighted by this pact, intervened, sending the tragic actor Thessalos to Karia to arrange for his own marriage to the satrap’s daughter.64 Philip became incensed when he learned of Alexander’s interference, immediately exiling five of his son’s closest friends, whom he believed had encouraged his disobedience.65 Philip, according to Plutarch (Alex. 10.4), also wrote to the Corinthians, requesting that they send Thessalos in chains to Macedonia. Thessalos’ ethnicity is unknown; although his name suggests a familial connection with Thessaly, he may well have been a Corinthian.66 While certainty regarding his ethnicity would be most welcome, it is nevertheless intriguing that he fled to Corinth. Clearly, Thessalos was aware of the others’ exile and the risk he faced from Philip. Seeking refuge, therefore, in a polis that housed a Macedonian garrison simply makes no sense, unless he was a citizen of it and felt confident that he would be safe there. His proximity to Alexander indicates that he was cognizant of Demaratos’ status as Philip’s xenos and perhaps he hoped to exploit this fact and their common ethnicity. Philip wrote to the Corinthians, expecting compliance. Thessalos’ relationship to Alexander, which persisted for many years following the Pixodaros affair, suggests that the Corinthians did not hand over the actor or that Philip rescinded his request; Philip’s tenuous reconciliation with his son soon after the affair had been revealed may account for either alternative. The veracity of the Pixodaros affair has come under recent scrutiny; some have rejected its authenticity.67 In fact, Philip’s letter to the Corinthians has been cited as an improbability, specifically that his request was not fulfilled despite the garrison’s presence.68 This would amount to a reasonable objection only if it could be demonstrated that he controlled Corinth in an authoritarian 23

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manner. All evidence, specifically Demaratos’ relationship with Philip, points to a contrary conclusion. The king’s letter to the Corinthians, requesting the surrender of a citizen or at least political refugee, while his garrison occupied Acrocorinth, constitutes additional evidence of his goodwill toward Corinth and his willingness to allow it to retain a degree of autonomy. Had Corinth been deprived wholly of its autonomy, no such request by letter would have been necessary, as the garrison would have handled the matter without Corinthian assent.

Alexander III and Corinth Philip did not live to realize the plans he proclaimed to the League of Corinth in 337. While celebrating the wedding of his daughter Kleopatra at Aigai in October 336, he was assassinated.69 His son Alexander was present, as was most likely his Corinthian xenos Demaratos. After Alexander dealt with the immediate issue of the accession, he proceeded south, possibly accompanied by Demaratos, to Corinth where he convened representatives of the League of Corinth at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, inheriting his father’s former offices.70 As discussed above, Philip’s title was strategos autokrator of Greece (στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς Ἑλλάδος); Diodoros (17.4.9) alone records that the same title was bestowed upon Alexander.71 Alexander is attested within intramural Corinth after the League of Corinth’s ratification of his Persian campaign and his position as its hegemon and strategos. Plutarch (Alex. 14.2–5) records the anecdote of his meeting with the philosopher Diogenes of Sinope at Kraneion, just a short distance from the agora of Corinth. There, Alexander greeted him as he basked in the sun; the Cynic famously requested that he move aside so as not to obstruct it. Following their brief exchange, Alexander departed Corinth to prepare for his invasion of Persia. There is no indication that he altered the relationship that had existed between the Corinthians and his father. In fact, Demaratos’ likely presence with Alexander on his Persian expedition indicates that he continued this same policy. Deinarchos apparently remained in Corinth; his later prominence in the city (see Chapter 3) under Antipatros indicates that he held a position of some significance with the pro-Macedonian oligarchy during Alexander’s absence.

The revolt of Thebes The pro-Macedonian government remained in power following Philip’s assassination, acknowledging Alexander as his successor and strategos autokrator of the League of Corinth (before spring 335). There was little chance that the Corinthians would follow the lead of Thebes and Athens, who both revolted openly, following erroneous reports of Alexander’s death while fighting the Triballians.72 The pro-Macedonian government and the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth helped to contain the extent of the revolt and limited its 24

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effectiveness. Diodoros (17.8.5–6) claims that the Thebans appealed to the Arkadians, Eleians, and Argives for aid; the reinforcements made it as far as the Isthmos, where “they waited to see what would happen.” Deinarchos (1.18) Aischines (3.240), and Arrian (Anab. 1.10.1) refer to the Arkadians, who made it to the Isthmos. While these Peloponnesians might be credited with prudence, one cannot deny that the pro-Macedonian government in Corinth and, much more importantly, the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth affected their ability to proceed beyond the Isthmos. Rather than waiting at the Isthmos to learn the outcome at Thebes, these Peloponnesians either were unwilling to test the Macedonian garrison or it prohibited their egress. In its first test, Macedonian control of Acrocorinth proved its value, contributing as much to Alexander’s success as his own celerity in his march on Thebes. The garrison’s effectiveness was demonstrated again both during the Lamian War (323/2) and the Chremonidaean War (268–263/2), with equally devastating effects for those who sought to drive the Macedonians from southern Greece. Although not analogous to these two examples, in which Peloponnesians sought to come to the aid of allies in central Greece, Macedonian possession of Corinth was similarly effective when Agis III of Sparta initiated war within the Peloponnese itself. After successfully dealing with Thebes and Athens, Alexander returned to Macedonia, from which he began his campaign against Persia. He never again visited the Greek cities he controlled through his League of Corinth, but he had numerous interactions with Greeks of those poleis throughout his campaign, fighting alongside some and against others, hearing embassies and appeals from the poleis’ representatives and issuing decrees that affected them favorably and adversely. Although he departed Europe for Asia, he continued to exercise considerable influence over the Greek poleis for the next 11 years, albeit from a considerable distance. Nevertheless, Alexander had taken measures prior to his departure to ensure that the Greek poleis remained loyal and that the League of Corinth continued to meet. He appointed Antipatros as regent of Macedonia, general of Europe, and most likely hegemon of the League of Corinth in his absence.73 Antipatros had been a fixture at the Macedonian court for many years; he had been Philip’s hetairos and was among the first and most influential of the Macedonians to recognize Alexander as king following his father’s assassination.74 He had a very influential role in the affairs of the Greek states until his death in 319; his descendants and their progeny also affected tremendously the development of the early Hellenistic world. Throughout the 11 years of his absence, Alexander had the greatest influence within the Greek poleis, but it was Antipatros with whom the Greeks interacted personally. Very little changed at Corinth, it seems, between the arrival of Philip following Chaironeia and Alexander’s departure for the East. While he campaigned against the Persians, we have little evidence of events at Corinth although the garrison played a role in Agis’ War and at least two meetings of the League of Corinth were held at Isthmia. 25

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Agis’ War Philip’s and Alexander’s policy of maintaining a garrison at Corinth began to bear fruit not long after the latter departed for Asia. King Agis III of Sparta exploited his absence, seizing the opportunity in summer 331 to lead a coordinated war against Macedonian control of Greece that he directed against Antipatros.75 Few details are preserved about Agis’ War, but enough is known to state with certainty that the Macedonian garrison at Corinth contributed to Antipatros’ victory. At the time of the war, Alexander is said (Arr. Anab. 3.6.3) to have sent one hundred ships (Phoinician and Kypriot) to the Peloponnese to help those who had remained loyal to him. Corinth was the only loyal Peloponnesian state with a harbor large enough to accommodate a fleet of this size, making it likely that Kenchreai was its port of call. The first engagement of the war occurred near Megalopolis; there, Agis defeated the Macedonian strategos Korrhagos, who may have been the Macedonian garrison commander on Acrocorinth.76 The Spartan King Agis III exploited Antipatros’ preoccupation in putting down a revolt in Thrace and recalled a number of Spartan mercenaries who had been active previously on Crete. The recent transfer of 15,000 recruits to reinforce Alexander further hindered Antipatros; 6,000 of these were Macedonians and another 4,000 were Peloponnesian mercenaries. Following his victory, Agis sought to enlist Athenian support. He had already secured the support of Elis, the Achaians (save Pellene), and the Arkadians, with the exception of Megalopolis, which Agis quickly besieged.77 Agis commanded more than 20,000 troops and 2,000 cavalry. The Athenians were of two minds regarding the war; despite decreeing to send ships in support of the Spartans, they were never sent.78 As the siege of Megalopolis progressed, Antipatros reached an arrangement with the rebellious Thracians (Diod. 17.63.1) and marched toward the Peloponnese, arriving there with a force of 40,000 including soldiers from those Greek poleis still loyal. The critical encounter took place in the vicinity of Megalopolis, where Agis himself was killed and Antipatros’ forces prevailed.79 Antipatros convened the allies following the victory to determine the punishment to be meted out to those who had supported Agis, referring the matter to the League of Corinth (Curt. 6.1.19); this meeting, according to Diodoros (17.73.5), was held at Corinth.80 Unlike the Spartan King Areus, who three times attempted to pass the Macedonian garrison at Acrocorinth nearly 70 years later, the Athenians were unwilling to try to force their way through the Isthmos to aid the Spartans.81 The effect of Agis’ failure is clear: it allowed the Macedonians to dominate much of the Greek peninsula without interruption for nearly a century. Macedonian control of Corinth contributed to this success.

Corinthians in Alexander’s campaign Alexander the Great had many Greeks in his army and fought against many others whom Darius III had employed as mercenaries.82 Several of the latter 26

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are mentioned in our extant sources by name, as well as some of the former. More often than not, however, our sources simply refer to these soldiers on both sides of the battlefield as “Greeks.” If some Corinthians went into exile after the battle of Chaironeia and the introduction of the pro-Macedonian government in Corinth, it would not be surprising to find them in Darius’ employ at the war’s inception.83 Nevertheless, two Corinthians are mentioned by name as serving with him, and both undoubtedly demonstrate the significant role Corinthians played in his campaign. Certainly the most prominent of all Corinthians accompanying Alexander, and the one whom the extant sources mention most often, was his hetairos Demaratos.84 His career was long, spanning several decades, and his resume parallels Corinth’s position in the early Hellenistic period.85 Demaratos is first recorded as having served under Timoleon (Plut. Tim. 21, 24, 27) in Sicily. Following his return to mainland Greece (after 341/0), he became a figure whose prominence at Corinth, where an anti-Macedonian faction predominated, was limited, but whose influence upon Philip II is well documented. Plutarch (Alex. 9.12) refers to Demaratos as a “guest-friend of the royal house” (ξένος ὢν τῆς οἰκίας). He, according to Diodoros (17.76.6), brought the famous horse Boukephalos to Macedonia; Plutarch (Alex. 6.1), however, claims that Philoneikos of Thessaly conveyed him there.86 Neither author records Alexander’s age at this time, but he was still rather young. The sale of Boukephalos must have taken place some time before 343, when Demaratos sailed to Sicily and Alexander was 13. If Diodoros (or Berve) is correct, Demaratos had been guest-friend of the royal house prior to his departure for Sicily with the Corinthian reinforcements for Timoleon. In addition to his prestige, Demaratos was also an extremely wealthy man, as the price for the horse Boukephalos is said to have been either 13 talents or 16 talents.87 Later, probably in 337, according to Plutarch (Alex. 9.12–14, Mor. 70b–c, 179c), he served as the chief intermediary who reconciled Philip and Alexander in the aftermath of the latter’s flight to Illyria prior to the former’s marriage to Kleopatra and the infamous incident involving the bride’s uncle Attalos.88 He was likely present at Aigai in 336, witnessing Philip’s assassination.89 Demaratos remained close to Alexander, likely accompanying him to Corinth in 336; considering their relationship, he may even have been among the first Greeks to acknowledge him as Philip’s successor. He subsequently participated in the expedition against the Persians as one of Alexander’s hetairoi. According to Arrian (Anab. 1.15.6), he fought at the Granikos River in close proximity to Alexander himself, for he gave to the king his own spear (δόρυ) after the king’s had broken; with it Alexander killed Mithridates, Darius’ son-in-law. Considering the prestige that Kleitos the Black won at the battle of the Granikos for saving Alexander’s life, it is probably safe to assume that Demaratos’ standing was enhanced as well for his role at the battle. Plutarch (Alex. 37.7) later notes his presence at the court, recording that in Susa he wept at the sight of Alexander on Darius’ throne, proclaiming that all Greeks should have had 27

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the opportunity to witness the sight.90 This passage is significant, for Plutarch (or his source) writes, describing Demaratos with suggestive language, that he “was a well-disposed man (εὔνουν) and a friend (φίλον)” of Alexander. More importantly, however, Plutarch (Alex. 56.2) relates the same anecdote a second time within his biography of Alexander, concluding it with the story of Demaratos’ death. After describing the scene at Susa, Plutarch claims that he “no longer enjoyed the king’s goodwill towards him, but he died from a state of bad health” (οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλέον γε τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίας τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπέλαυσεν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρρωστίας ἀποθανὼν). A review of Demaratos’ relationship with Philip and Alexander demonstrates that the Corinthian continuously displayed goodwill toward the kings; Plutarch’s testimony is unequivocal, Alexander demonstrated reciprocal goodwill toward him that did not cease upon the Corinthian’s death, despite Plutarch’s claim. The king’s arrangements for his funeral provide tangible evidence for the fact that the goodwill he demonstrated to Demaratos continued after his death. When Demaratos died (327) of a natural illness, according to Plutarch (Alex. 56.2), Alexander provided an elaborate (μεγαλοπρεπῶς) funeral and the army erected a tumulus (cenotaph), 80 cubits in height, in his honor.91 His ashes were then conveyed by a four-horse chariot, or quadriga, to the sea, from which one can only presume they were then transported to Corinth, and possibly commemorated somewhere within the Corinthia by the establishment of a heroon in his honor. A plausible candidate for one, the West Foundation, has been excavated 2 km to the west of Poseidon’s Sanctuary at Isthmia (see Chapter 5). Demaratos had distinguished himself in the Persian expedition; pro-Macedonians in Corinth could easily have exploited his relationship to Philip and his service with Alexander to strengthen their faction in the city and their own ties to the king. Several conclusions about Demaratos’ career during the reigns of Philip and Alexander can be offered. His relationship to both kings, and their association with Corinth, indicate that he was among the most influential figures at the Argead court and within the pro-Macedonian faction at Corinth.92 He also was likely an associate of Deinarchos in this capacity; their earlier collaboration in Sicily suggests this conclusion. Moreover, Demosthenes (18.295) condemns these two men for reducing the Corinthians to a virtual state of slavery under Philip and he charges that they were bought men.93 Demaratos’ prominence at the Granikos and in Persia further suggests that he held a significant position among those Greeks serving under Alexander. The relationship between a pro-Macedonian faction at Corinth and the Argead kings was one developed after Chaironeia upon the principle of reciprocal goodwill. Moreover, Demaratos may be viewed as the primary intermediary between the pro-Macedonian Corinthians and the kings. In this capacity, one can discern the development of that relationship. He was a xenos of Philip, an hetairos of Alexander, and he was the recipient of the latter’s goodwill. Conversely, Demaratos displayed goodwill toward both mornarchs. The relationship between Demaratos and 28

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the two Argead kings symbolically represents the relationship between the pro-Macedonians within the city and the kings. After Demaratos, Euagoras the son of Eukleon was the most significant Corinthian accompanying Alexander on his Persian expedition.94 He is mentioned only once in the extant sources (Arr. Ind. 19.5), where he is said to have been the grammateus of the fleet that traveled into the Indian Ocean (in 326) following the journey down the Indus River. As its grammateus, Euagoras held a position nearly analogous to that held by Eumenes of Kardia, and his position must have placed him in regular contact with the fleet’s admiral Nearchos of Krete and its helmsman Onesikritos of Astypalaia.95 Both later composed accounts of the campaign, and likely utilized Euagoras’ records.96 Although nothing is heard of him again, he may be the same Euagoras whom Antigonos Monophthalmos appointed satrap of Areia in 316.97 This is an attractive suggestion, as Euagoras’ position as secretary of the fleet is paralleled with Eumenes’ position as archsecretary. Hieronymos of Kardia, Eumenes’ secretary, also later ended up in the Antigonid camp, and it would not be surprising if Euagoras followed a similar path. One additional reference to a Corinthian is preserved in the extant sources. Alexander, according to Plutarch (Alex. 22.3), became irate with one Hagnon of Teos who had purchased a beautiful Corinthian youth, Krobylos, as a gift for his king.98 Presumably, Krobylos, if available for purchase, was a slave. One final possibility requires inclusion here. It was suggested tentatively above (see p. 23) that Thessalos the tragic actor was a Corinthian. He held a close position to Alexander that dates to 337 and their relationship persisted until he performed at Susa, as part of Alexander’s mass-marriage in 324 (Chares, FGrH 125 F 4 = Ath. 12.538). If Thessalos was indeed a Corinthian, then he represents another citizen who traveled in the king’s circle. While the direct evidence for Corinthians’ roles in Alexander’s campaign is limited to two individuals, both clearly held prestigious positions. Demaratos’ proximity to Alexander afforded him the opportunity to display his goodwill toward the king and to act as the representative of Corinth’s pro-Macedonian faction. The honors Alexander bestowed upon Demaratos after his death are more than commensurate with the services he rendered to the Argead house and represent Alexander’s reciprocal goodwill toward his hetairos and Corinth. Euagoras’ position as secretary of the fleet a year after Demaratos’ death confirms that he also had benefited from Alexander’s goodwill.

Alexander, the Sanctuary of Poseidon, the Isthmian Games, and Isthmionikai After Alexander assembled representatives of the Greek poleis at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia in 336 to assume the role of the League of Corinth’s hegemon and strategos autokrator, the League continued to meet at Poseidon’s sanctuary. Only two meetings at Isthmia following Alexander’s departure are 29

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attested in the sources, but in each case the decisions taken there were significant and other meetings almost certainly were convened there. Both Curtius (4.5.11) and Diodoros (17.48.6) record that in 332 the League dispatched 15 representatives to Alexander, presenting him with a gold crown for his victory at the Granikos River. Additionally, according to Diodoros (17.73.5), the League met soon after Antipatros defeated Agis III (spring 330), for he referred to it the question of the fate of those who fought against the Macedonians.99 League representatives made no decision on the matter, forwarding it instead to Alexander. The presence of synedroi for these meetings at Isthmia undoubtedly afforded the Corinthians new economic opportunities; these and the regular celebration of the Isthmian Games contributed to the sanctuary’s and the city’s increasing prosperity under the Argeadai. Alexander’s disdain for games and athletes competing in them has been accepted by generations of historians, citing Plutarch’s report that he would compete in the Olympic Games only if the other contestants were kings and that he was unfavorably disposed toward athletes.100 Recently, however, W.L. Adams has challenged this perception through a systematic investigation of the numerous games (15) that Alexander himself staged throughout his Persian campaign and the apparent prestige attached to victors in the Olympic Games (Olympionikai).101 His arguments are convincing, but one aspect of Alexander’s relationship with athletes in particular, on which Adams does not focus, is their appointment to prominent positions in mainland Greece during his absence. Moreover, the status of Isthmian victors (Isthmionikai) under Alexander has yet to be analyzed. Unfortunately, very little information about the Isthmian victors lists is known; nevertheless, a few individual victors are known and one may discern an association between them and Alexander. Only one Macedonian who accompanied Alexander is known to have won a crown at the Isthmos. Archon the son of Kleinos of Pella compiled an impressive resume in athletic competitions, including the horse race at the Isthmian Games (before 333/2).102 During the final year of Alexander’s life, he appointed Archon satrap of Babylon, a position he continued to hold after the king’s death.103 Another Isthmian victor can claim, on the basis of the extant sources, to have benefited from his association with the Macedonian king. Alexander installed Chairon of Pellene as the pro-Macedonian tyrant of his native polis before 331, after he had won four victories in wrestling competitions at Olympia (356, 352, 348, and 344) and two at Isthmia.104 Alexander’s benefaction again paid dividends when Chairon remained loyal to Antipatros (Aeschin. 3.165). According to Philodemos (P.Herc. 1021: col. 12), Chairon also conceived a plan to construct a canal across the Isthmos; work on this project apparently never began. Another possible candidate exists. Cheilon the son of Cheilon of Patrai won the wrestling competitions at the Isthmos four times in addition to two victories at Olympia (332 and 328).105 Upon his death, the Patraians set up a monument in his honor, which Pausanias saw centuries later. He wrote (7.6.6) that this Cheilon, according to the inscribed monument, died “in war” by 30

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which either the battle of Chaironeia or the Lamian War was meant. The Patraians believed, he continues, that he had perished in the latter. In the second century A.D., it is not surprising that those living in Patrai attempted to disassociate their Cheilon from Alexander and to associate him with their independence from Macedonia. The reality of the late fourth century, however, would suggest more likely not only that the Isthmian victor from Patrai remained loyal to Antipatros during the Lamian War, but also that he was in a position to affect Patrai’s political process on account of his position vis-à-vis Macedonia. Although insufficient evidence exists to discern a clear pattern that Alexander favored Isthmian victors, one can suppose that Alexander’s association with Corinth and Poseidon’s sanctuary did not harm those Isthmionikai who were granted positions of influence during his absence. The Sanctuary of Poseidon also was the recipient of Alexander’s benefaction on at least one known occasion. Diodoros (17.113.4) alone records an intriguing list of embassies that arrived to see Alexander in Babylon in 324/3. He heard those embassies first who were there concerning religious matters. The fourth embassy he heard was the Corinthian. Diodoros’ list clearly includes sanctuaries of great importance; he claims in fact that Alexander heard their petitions in the order of their importance. The Eleian, Ammonian, and Delphian embassies preceded Corinth’s, which contextually must have concerned the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. Diodoros does not indicate what this embassy sought, although it may have concerned much-needed repairs to Poseidon’s temple or perhaps permission or a request for funds to establish a heroon in honor of Demaratos, Alexander’s recently deceased hetairos (for both, see Chapter 5). The embassy possibly even brought word to Alexander that the demos of Corinth had decreed him to be a god. Furthermore, Diodoros does not preserve Alexander’s response to each embassy, stating simply that each one was favorable (πάσαις δὲ ταῖς πρεσβείας φιλοτιμηθεὶς κεχαρισμένας δοῦναι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις). A pattern of reciprocal goodwill had become a hallmark of the relationship between the Argead kings and the pro-Macedonian faction at Corinth. The evidence of Diodoros demonstrates conclusively that this paradigm extended to the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, one that the Corinthians had long controlled. Diodoros’ use of the participle φιλοτιμηθεὶς certainly recalls the language of honorific decrees, in which the noun philotimia is attested abundantly. While one would naturally like to find an abundance of similar language to establish beyond doubt that such a dialogue existed between city and king, the surviving evidence certainly suggests strongly that Corinth and the Argeadai communicated within these parameters.

Deinarchos the son of Sostratos, the Exiles’ Decree, and the Harpalos Affair Deinarchos the son of Sostratos, a Corinthian who spent most of his life in Athens, is the best-documented Corinthian of the late Classical and early 31

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Hellenistic periods.106 He was most likely born around 361/0 and had left Corinth ca. 340/339 to study in Athens with Theophrastos and to have listened to Demetrios of Phaleron’s lectures.107 Quite possibly, anti-Macedonian fervor ca. 340 might have served as additional incentive to depart his native Corinth. This suggestion is, of course, problematic if Deinarchos did in fact fight with the Athenians at Chaironeia. Presuming his arrival at Athens predates 338, then he most likely did.108 As a metic in Athens, he could not speak in the lawcourts, but he became a prolific author of forensic speeches, composing approximately 61 throughout his career.109 Only three of his speeches are preserved and all three deal directly with the Harpalos Affair. In fact, these speeches represent our only complete primary sources for this important period in early Hellenistic history. Following Demetrios of Phaleron’s expulsion from Athens in 307, Deinarchos voluntarily went into exile in Chalkis (Dion. Hal. Din. 2; Plut. Mor. 850d). He remained an exile until his return to Athens in 292, dying shortly thereafter, presumably in Athens, although he may at some point have returned to Corinth.110 Deinarchos clearly demonstrated pro-Macedonian tendencies throughout his career. His stance is evident concerning his positions on the scandal created when Alexander’s former treasurer Harpalos arrived in Athens, Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree, and Alexander’s request for divine honors. Moreover, his association with Demetrios of Phaleron and his friendship with Antipatros and his son Kassandros further confirm that Deinarchos prospered as a result of his association with Macedonians and pro-Macedonian Athenians. Neither Harpalos’ presence in Athens and the southern Peloponnese nor the Exiles’ Decree affected Corinth adversely. In August 324, only months before his death, Alexander’s emissary Nikanor read the king’s infamous decree at Olympia by which he restored those exiled to their native poleis.111 An important Tegean decree from Delphi concerning the restoration of exiles supplies further invaluable information.112 We simply have no idea how, if at all, Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree affected the city of Corinth.113 Nevertheless, a number of Corinthians, probably anti-Macedonians, most likely fled the city, or were exiled in the aftermath of Chaironeia. If this assumption is accurate, then a number of them may have sought repatriation in late 324 on the basis of the decree. Closely associated with the Exiles’ Decree is Alexander’s request that the Greek poleis afford him divine honors. As with the Exiles’ Decree, his requisition for divine honors was probably made public at Olympia in August 324.

The divine Alexander A year before his death, while at Ekbatana (324), Alexander made his desire for divine honors known throughout the Greek world.114 Evidence for the institution of cults in his name throughout the Greek world is limited, but enough remains to conclude that at least several poleis instituted the asked-for divine honors, and Athens supplies the best evidence. Demades, so we are told, 32

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moved to give divine honors to Alexander, as the son of Zeus. Demosthenes, who initially had opposed it, quickly changed his mind, as did Lykourgos and other Athenians.115 Hyperides (6.21) indicates that a cult to Alexander existed in Athens, including statues, altars, and a temple; these surely were abandoned in the immediate aftermath of the Lamian War.116 While some states apparently resisted Alexander’s request, anecdotal evidence from Sparta, where one Damis uttered, “if Alexander wants to be a god, let him be a god,” suggests indifference.117 In addition to Athens and Sparta, evidence from Megalopolis implies the implementation of a cult for Alexander. Pausanias (8.32.1) refers to a private house near the center of the city that had been previously built for Alexander.118 Further evidence establishes that cults in honor of Alexander had been established in other poleis throughout mainland Greece; Corinth may well have been among them.119 The presence of the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth alone was probably enough to convince the Corinthians to accept Alexander as a god, but one must recall additional factors as well. As far as we are aware, Deinarchos still remained the leading figure of the pro-Macedonian faction governing the city and only a few years had passed since Alexander had honored Demaratos with an elaborate funeral and massive cenotaph, and repatriated his ashes. The proMacedonian Corinthians’ goodwill toward Alexander is implicit. At Athens, too, the Corinthian citizen Deinarchos, judging by his hostility toward Demosthenes and his contempt for his volte-face on the subject of Alexander’s divinity, may be counted among those who advocated for the grant of divine honors. Although the evidence is circumstantial, it remains likely that the Corinthians accorded Alexander divine honors and dedicated some space as sacred for his rites. As suggested above (p. 31), the Corinthian ambassadors who approached Alexander at Babylon (324/3) may well have informed the king that their demos had accepted his request for divine honors. The timing would have been flawless, as the ambassadors were present to make a request of their own to Alexander. No evidence has been identified in the excavations at Corinth that permits identification as a space sacred to Alexander. Antipatros opposed Alexander’s divinity; he alone of the Diadochoi is said to have regarded it as impious.120 Any sacred space dedicated to the divine Alexander ceased to be utilized as such between the end of the Lamian War and Antipatros’ death in autumn 319.

Corinth, the grain supply, and the citizen population Like virtually every other city in mainland Greece, Corinth suffered not only from the political upheavals of the second half of the fourth century, but also from drought and an acute shortage of grain.121 Two sources name Corinth as the recipient of foreign grain; both are closely connected in date and at first glance the source from which the grain originated also appears to be the same. The archaeological record at Corinth and Isthmia confirms the evidence of the 33

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literary record. The most important literary source is the famous inscription from Kyrene (SEG 9.2), which has regularly been dated between 330 and 326. It records those cities and individuals in Greece to whom the Kyreneans distributed 805,000 medimnoi of grain “during the grain shortage.”122 Corinth (line 9) received 50,000 medimnoi. Thirty-eight other poleis are recorded on the stone as having received grain from Kyrene; Alexander’s mother Olympias (lines 6 and 22) and his sister Kleopatra (line 10), who received 72,600 and 50,000 medimnoi respectively, are the only individuals listed on the stele. The Athenian orator Lykourgos preserves the second reference to the importation of grain to Corinth. In his prosecution of Leokrates (ca. 331 or 330), he asserts that, while living in Megara, Leokrates invested monies derived from the sale of his property in Athens to ship grain bought from Kleopatra in Epeiros to Leukas and from there to Corinth.123 Leukas, too, appears on the Kyrene inscription (line 20) as the recipient of 15,000 medimnoi of grain. Some scholars have proposed that the two sources possibly provide a connection between the grain Kleopatra received and the grain she sold to Leokrates, who then moved it to Corinth.124 Others have attempted to connect Harpalos’ presence in the Megarid between 333 and 331 with the distribution of the grain from Kyrene.125 Several problems, however, are immediately apparent in both reconstructions. Evidence for dating the Kyrene inscription to the years between 330 and 326 is derived primarily from other epigraphic and literary sources that point to these years as ones during which grain was in especially short supply. Lykourgos’ prosecution of Leokrates must have taken place in 331 at the earliest and 330 at the very latest, on the basis of the claim within the speech that he had lived in Megara for five years, following his flight from Athens after Chaironeia and his sojourn to Rhodes. Those who have associated the Kyrene inscription either with Harpalos or Kleopatra’s sale of grain to Leokrates (i.e. 333–331) face a difficult burden. The solution, that has proved satisfactory to the proponents of both, has been to assign a date to the Kyrene inscription that is earlier than 330.126 A date between 330 and 326 also is not without its problems. Most troubling to those who ascribe to the 330–326 date is Elis’ (line 34) receipt of 10,000 medimnoi. Elis had joined Agis III in his war and the League of Corinth had assessed it with a fine following the war’s conclusion. Advocates of a 330–326 date concede that it is difficult to explain Elis’ presence within this list of recipients, considering its participation in Agis’ War and its subsequent punishment. The presence of Olympias and Kleopatra on the stele creates further difficulty for those ascribing a 330–326 date to the stone. Between these dates, it is all but certain that both women were in Epeiros and a total figure of 122,600 medimnoi distributed to that region is almost inconceivable. The solution offered by those who wish to date the stone prior to 330, has been to interpret both Olympias and Kleopatra as acting heads of state in Macedonia and Epeiros respectively.127 Neither solution is wholly satisfactory, nor does it seem one can be ascertained. The evidence, however, for a date between 330 and 326 for 34

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the importation of grain from Kyrene seems the most compelling, and a solution explaining the presence of both Olympias and Kleopatra in Epeiros at this time may be suggested. The principal objection to their receipt of as much grain as both women received has been that Epeiros could not have required so much. Clearly, however, on the evidence of Lykourgos, Kleopatra had enough grain in Epeiros to export in the late 330s; there is no reason to reject the possibility that she and Olympias distributed the grain they received from Kyrene (while both were in Epeiros) and again that one or both exported the excess at a price to states of their choice. Plausibly, some of the excess might have been intended for export to Macedonia, which is curiously absent from the Kyrene inscription. Despite the chronological difficulties, it is evident from the Corinthian perspective that 50,000 medimnoi arrived from Kyrene; prior to its arrival, or nearly contemporaneous with it, Leokrates sold to the Corinthians additional grain that he had purchased from Kleopatra. This evidence alone is adequate to substantiate a shortage of grain between the late 330s and the early 320s. Grain from Sicily also may have been imported within these two decades.128 Timoleon’s role in the restoration of stability in Syracuse and Sicily could have facilitated grants or the sale of grain to Corinth. Evidence for a drought at Corinth during the third quarter of the fourth century is abundant. This is confirmed further by comparable evidence from the nearby Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia as well as the vicinity of the Sanctuary of Hera at Perachora, across the Gulf of Corinth from Lechaion. Numerous wells from several locations throughout the city went out of use and several cisterns were constructed contemporaneously.129 The Centaur Bath went out of use and the Sacred Spring, one of the city’s most important fountain houses, received modifications. A deep well (ca. 42 m) on the Rachi at Isthmia went out of use in the third quarter of the fourth century, apparently as a result of this drought.130 Perhaps around this time, the “bottle-shaped cistern” on the south slope of the site was constructed.131 Across the Corinthian Gulf at Perachora, a massive cistern was constructed contemporaneously near the Sanctuary of Hera.132 The Kyrene inscription also offers tantalizing evidence to approximate the size of the Corinthian population in the earliest stages of the Macedonian control of the city. Jameson, Runnels, and van Andel have proposed that the amount of grain each polis received was proportionate to the adult male citizen population of that polis.133 On the basis of Athens’ receipt of 100,000 medimnoi and an approximate figure of the Athenian adult male population in the late fourth century of 30,000,134 the authors therefore calculate that the number of adult male citizens corresponds to 30 percent of the total received. On the basis of this distribution ratio, they suggest further that Corinth’s adult male citizen population at the time the city received its 50,000 medimnoi would have been approximately 15,000.135 Additionally, they propose that an estimated total population can be determined if the number of adult male 35

THE AGE OF PHILIP II AND ALEXANDER III

citizens is multiplied by 3.7. This formula results in an approximation at Corinth in the second quarter of the fourth century of 55,500 total citizens (excluding metics).136 Although this figure is speculative, it permits a rough estimate of the citizen population.

*** At the time of Alexander’s death, the framework of the relationship between Corinthians and Macedonians was established. Over the course of the next 127 years this relationship matured and deepened as Corinth assumed new significance to his successors. There were, however, periods of great difficulties that taxed both sides; the period of the Diadochoi (323–301) represents the nadir in this development, and it is considered in the following chapter. Before turning to those events, however, this chapter closes with reference to an event at Corinth that foreshadows their turbulence. It occurred at some point in close proximity to Alexander’s death, perhaps as early as 327–325 or more probably as late as 325–315. Some individual at Corinth dug a small groove (ca. 10 cm) below the floor “at the northeast corner of the eleventh pier” of the North Stoa.137 Within it, this individual placed a hoard of 51 gold staters and a gold necklace; 41 of the coins are of Philip II (minted both during his life and shortly after his death) and ten are of Alexander the Great (all minted during his lifetime).138 The pocket was then covered with a black-glazed saucer and carefully concealed.139 Speculation surrounding the presence of the gold coins includes the suggestion that the money was in Corinth for the recruitment of soldiers, that a Corinthian veteran of Alexander’s campaign returning from the East brought it with him, or (most likely) that its presence was designated for some official business associated with the Macedonian garrison.140 The circumstances surrounding the hoard’s concealment cannot be ascertained, but clearly one possibility is that the individual in possession of it did so, anticipating the tumultuous events following Alexander’s death, hoping to recover his treasure at some later date; he never did so. Other scenarios could have accounted for the hoard’s concealment; nevertheless, it symbolically marks the end of the age of Philip II and Alexander the Great at Corinth.

Notes 1 For the date, see Hatzopoulos 1982a. 2 Athens’ loss of Amphipolis (Diod. Sic. 16.8.2) came at a time when it was hegemon of the Second Athenian Confederacy; its loss initiated a state of war between Athens and Macedon; see Ellis 1986: 163–65; Cargill 1981: 179–80. 3 For the alliance between Philip and the Chalkidians, to whom he promised Potidaia as a condition, see Diod. Sic. 16.8.3. For the inscription recording the alliance, see Staatsverträge II: 279–81, no. 308; Hatzopoulos 1996 II: no. 2 and RO: 244–49, no. 50. 4 Diod. Sic. 16.8.3–5; Paus. 5.23.3. Philip allowed the Athenian cleruchs he captured in Potidaia to return home. 5 Periander’s son Euagoras (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 10) apparently died while in the process of founding the colony; see FGrH 90 F59.1.

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6 For Philip’s capture of Potidaia and the fate of the Chalkidike peninsula following the destruction of Olynthos, see Hatzopoulos 1996 I: 189–99. For his capture of Olynthos, see the important study of Lee 2001. 7 6.91. Trans. T. Papillon 2004. 8 For Corinthian neutrality, see Salmon (1984: 377–83), who argues that this policy remained at least until 362, and perhaps as late as 340 B.C. See also Roy CAH2 VI: 200. Surely, however, Timoleon’s dispatch to Syracuse in 344 represents a departure from “strict neutrality.” 9 Diod. 16.58.2–3. 10 Diod. Sic. 16.59.2–4; Just. 8.5.1–3. See also Staatsverträge II: 318–19, no. 330. 11 For Corinthian participation at Phokian-controlled Delphi, see CID II.3.10A, col. 1, line 11; CID II.3.31, lines 76, 87–88, and 95–96; CID II.3120A, lines 32–40. Ellis (1986: 74 and 93) believes that the Corinthians probably had established an alliance with the Phokians; see also Roberts (1983: 163–64), who argues, on the basis of Diod. Sic. 16.29.1, that the Corinthians allied themselves with the Phokians and that the Corinthians may have aided them in the war. Salmon (1984: 382) rightly shows caution, noting that if Corinth had sided with the Phokians, it played nothing more than “a minor part” in the war, on account of its neutrality since 365. 12 Diod. Sic. 16.77.3–4; Plut. Tim. 30.7–8; Mor. 552f.; Salmon 1984: 382; contra Talbert 1974: 57. For Timoleon’s use of mercenaries, see Parke 1933: 170–76; Talbert 1974: 65–69; Trundle 2004: 69–70. 13 Lists of the naopoioi from 343/2–338 are incomplete. Political circumstances in central Greece during these years, including the Fourth Sacred War (339) and the war that was concluded at Chaironeia, also limited activity at Delphi. Damophanes son of Mnasidamos (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 9) was one of the naopoioi at the autumn Pylaia of 343, see CID II.31, lines 95–96 and 120A, line 33. Corinthian stone was contracted for the replacement of six architraves, fourteen triglyphs and seven coping stones; Agathonymos of Corinth (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2) was contracted to convey it from Lechaion to Delphi (CID II.34, col. II, lines 72–88 and CID II.31, lines 98–99). Chairolas of Corinth (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2) was also contracted for the transport of stone in autumn 343 (CID II.31, line 98). 14 Paus. 4.28.2. See further, Ellis 1986: 150–51; Griffith, HM II: 474–75. 15 [Dem]. 7.32; 9.27, 34, and 10.10. See Salmon (1984: 383), who is certainly correct in rejecting Ellis’ (1986: 158) claim that, in response to calls for help from both, the Corinthians appealed to Athens for aid following Philip’s attacks. Conspicuously absent here is the Corinthian colony of Kerkyra, which like Leukas had contributed ships – two and one respectively – to Timoleon’s expedition (Diod. Sic. 16.66.2; Plut. Tim. 8.4) and had joined Corinth’s other allies in erecting the victory monument at Corinth (RO, no. 74). For the foundation in the late seventh century of Leukas, see Strabo 7.7.6 and 10.2.8; Ps.-Scymnus 465; and of Ambrakia, see Strabo 10.452 and Ps.-Scymnus 453–55. For discussions of both, see Graham 1983: 30 and Salmon 1984: 209–17. 16 Sordi 1961: 9–12; contra Salmon 1984: 391. 17 Mercenaries: Diod. Sic. 16.66.2. Ships sent with Timoleon: Plut. Tim. 8.4 and Diod. Sic. 16.66.2, who adds that the total included four triremes and three fast sailing ships. 18 Hoplites and cavalry: Plut. Tim. 16.3; ships: Diod. Sic. 16.69.4. 19 For Philip’s intervention in both Messene and Elis, see Ellis (1986: 151) who emphasizes that Philip was neither directly nor indirectly involved. Nevertheless, he surely supported these efforts. At the same time (summer 343), Demosthenes also reports strife at Megara, as a pro-Macedonian faction attempted (unsuccessfully) to take power.

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20 Dem. 9.27; Paus. 4.28.4; Diod. Sic. 16.63.4 attests to the internal strife. 21 Dem. 18.237; Plut. Dem. 17.5–6, Mor. 845a and 851b. The Corinthian colonies of Leukas and Kerkyra also joined the alliance, presumably at this time or shortly afterwards. 22 The name of the honorand in IG II2 229 (and subsequent editions) is Θέο[.]ον. Lambert (2006: 136 and note 101 [SEG 54.131]) reports reading traces of a kappa after the omicron in line 11, reading the name as Θέοκ[λ]ον. The name is not otherwise attested at Corinth. The archon name is restored, but its attribution to 341/0 is certain. 23 Griffith, HM II: 549–50. 24 Perhaps the best evidence is Aeschines 3.98, who mentions that date on which the allies were to meet in Athens, 16 Anthesterion (February/March 340). See also Dem. 9.72. IG II2 225, of the year 342, records an Athenian alliance with Messene. See also Plut. Dem. 17.3; Just. 9.3.6–8. 25 Lambert (2006: 136 and note 101) also suggests that this decree was in some way associated with Athens’ attempts to forge an alliance against Philip II. 26 Strabo (9.2.37) alone claims that the Corinthians fought at Chaironeia; see also Salmon 1984: 383 and note 61. Roberts (1983: 171), however, while acknowledging Strabo’s testimony, argues that Corinthians were not present at Chaironeia, on the basis of Diodoros’ claim (16.84.5) that the Athenians did not have enough time to summon their allies to Boiotia. 27 Plutarch (Cam. 19.8) dates the battle to 7 Metageitnion, see Ellis 1986: 197 and note 71; Griffith, HM II, 596 and note 4. For the battle itself, see Diod. Sic. 16.85.5–86.6; Plut. Alex. 9.2; Just. 9.3.9; Polyainos 4.2.2 and 7. See also Griffith (HM II: 596–603) and, recently, Ma (2008: 72–91) with earlier bibliography. 28 Lucian (Hist. Conscr. 3). After recording the Corinthians’ construction of a wall in preparation for a possible siege, he then relates an anecdote concerning Diogenes of Sinope, who began to roll around on the ground in order to appear as busy as the others constructing the wall. For the possible identification of this wall in the vicinity of Kraneion, see Stroud 1972: 215–17. 29 Aelian (VH 6.1) notes the Corinthian surrender. See also Roebuck 1948: 83; Salmon 1984: 383. 30 Roebuck 1948: 83 believes that an “internal revolution” occurred at Corinth after Chaironeia and that a pro-Macedonian faction made the decision to surrender. Griffith, HM II: 613 and note 3 rejects associating Corinth’s surrender with a change in government. 31 Compare Philip’s treatment of the anti-Macedonian faction in Thebes after Chaironeia, which included executions, exile, and the confiscation of property: see Just. 9.4.6–9. 32 Dem. 18.295. For the Athenians’ peace treaty and alliance with Philip after Chaironeia, see Just. 9.4.5. 33 Demaratos is first attested as Philip’s xenos and philos in 337; see Plut. Mor. 329d: Δημάρατος μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος εἷς ὢν τῶν Φιλίππου ξένων καὶ φίλων. The date at which he attained this status is uncertain. He is first attested with Philip, according to Diodoros (17.76.6), who reports that the Corinthian conveyed the famous horse Boukephalos to Macedonia. Plutarch (Alex. 6.1), however, records that Philoneikos of Thessaly brought the horse. 34 One wonders why Timoleon did not return to Corinth following his retirement in 337/6 if he truly was a “pro-Macedonian,” as Sordi (1961: 9–12) has suggested. Moreover, if he was a “pro-Macedonian,” then the monument set up at Corinth (see Chapter 1) must surely then have been erected following the battle of Chaironeia. Timoleon remained in Syracuse for the remainder of his life, dying ca. 336.

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35 For Philip’s treatment of Thebes after Chaironeia, see Just. 9.4.6–10. 36 Diod. Sic. 16.89.1–3; Just. 9.5.1–8; FGrH 255 F 5. The bibliography on Philip’s League of Corinth is vast. See especially Wilcken 1917: 42–49; Staatsverträge III: 3–7, no. 403I; Ryder 1965: 102–15, 150–62; Perlman 1985: 153–74; Ellis 1986: 203–10; Griffith, HM II: 623–46; Buckler 1994: 99–133; Jehne 1994: 139–97; and Adams 1996: 15–22. 37 The location at which the League met is a matter of some uncertainty. The sources (Diod. Sic. 16.89.3: ἐν Κορίνῳ; Justin 9.5.1: Corinthum) explicitly place it in Corinth. Broneer (Corinth I.4: 156–57), however, has argued that the meeting took place at Isthmia and that the delegates resided at Corinth, specifically within the newly constructed South Stoa, which functioned as their hostel. Our understanding of the date at which the South Stoa was constructed makes his suggestion impossible. 38 The number of meetings Philip convened at Corinth is not entirely clear from the sources; nevertheless, there must have been two separate meetings; see Ellis 1986: 204–9 and CAH2 VI: 783–85 for the dates. For Philip’s title hegemon, see Dem. 18.201; Polyb. 9.33.7; Plut. Mor. 240a; for the title strategos autokrator, see Diod. Sic. 16.89.3. 39 For the text, see Heisserer 1980: 3–26 and, most recently, RO: 372–79, no. 76. 40 Diod. Sic. 16.89.3; Justin (9.5.4–6) provides the totals of the auxiliaries; they are most certainly too high. 41 Plut. Tim. 15.7. For an analysis of the symposia of Philip and Alexander, see Pownall 2010: 55–65. 42 See Ellis 1986: 203–4. 43 See Polyb. 9.33.11–12; Griffith, HM II: 636–37; Ager 1996: 40–41. 44 For a discussion of the evidence, see Walbank, HCP II: 172–73. For an inscribed record of a dispute between Melos and Kimolos (probably after 336) settled by Argos, see Ager 1996: 43–45, no. 3; RO, no. 82. 45 See Hauben 1976 for a summary of the naval policies of Philip and Alexander. 46 A Macedonian military official surely commanded the garrison; Philotas, whose position provides an instructive parallel, was the garrison commander (φρούραρχος) on the Kadmeia of Thebes between 338 and 335 (Diod. Sic. 17.8.7); see further Berve ii: 399, no. 808; Heckel 2006: 216, no. 1. 47 Polyb. 38.3.3; Plut. Arat. 23.4. Din. (1.18) may imply its presence after 335 B.C. Historians have long accepted the presence of the Macedonian garrison in Corinth. There is no reason to accept Rosen’s (1967: 58) objection that there is no proof for it. See Faraguna 2003: 100, note 5 for citations to earlier scholarship. 48 Salmon (1984: 383 and note 64) has posed the question. While it cannot be answered, it may be instructive to compare Philip’s actions in 338 with those of T. Quinctius Flamininus in 196. The latter had installed his garrison on Acrocorinth prior to the declaration of Greek freedom during the Isthmian Games (April/ May 196), see Polyb. 18.45.12. 49 For the oligarchic constitution at Corinth, see Salmon 1984: 231–39. 50 See Talbert 1974: 130–43. 51 For the Seleukid practice of levying a harbor tax, see Ma 2000: 131–33. 52 For the numerous benefits Philip similarly bestowed on the Athenians despite their role at Chaironeia, see Habicht 1997: 11–12. 53 I am aware of no evidence to substantiate Worthington’s (2008: 158) claim that Philip II stripped Corinth of its control of Aigeiroussa, granting it to Megara, “further denuding Corinth.” Worthington cites no evidence in support of this assertion. In fact, the location of Aigeiroussa is a matter of some dispute. Smith (2008: 62–63) has recently revived Hammond’s (1954b: 111, 118–20) suggestion

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54

55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63

64 65 66

67 68 69

that it be identified with modern Vathykhoria, a location some distance from the Corinthian–Megarian border. Hammond (1954b = 1973: 443–44), citing Theopompos’ (FGrH 115 F 241) reference to Ageiros, speculates that Philip may have garrisoned two towers near Vathykhoria to guard the road between Thebes and Corinth. Others have suggested placing Aigeiroussa elsewhere; Wiseman (1979: 24–27), for example, locates it at Mavrolimni, a site that would be much closer to Corinth’s border with Megara. See Ellis (1986: 203), who writes, “Although the Korinthians also retained their status at Delphoi and suffered no known punishment, it seems that the position of what was probably a Macedonian partisan government was not only confirmed by the charter of the Hellenic League, but guaranteed by the installation of a garrison.” Eupeithidas son of Timolas (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1); Androkles son of Androtimos (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 14); Kallisthenes son of Saigalos (LGPN III.A, s.v., no.23); Soiadas son of Somestor (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1); Phylakidas son of Leon (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5); for K[.6–7.], see FD III.5, no. 20, line 33. If the name is restored as K[ephalos], then perhaps he may be identified with Kephalos of Corinth who was active in Sicily as lawgiver (nomothetes); see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 19. LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 4; CID II.102, col. I, lines 7–8. FD III.2, no. 190. See also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 3 and New Pauly, Antiquity, vol. 1: 1123, no. 4. Alypetos (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5), Menios (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2), as well as two others whose names are not preserved. For all four, see CID II.79A, col. I, lines 26–28. CID II 56, col. 3, lines 15–19 and 5–9 (restored); CID II 63, lines 11–13 (restored); see also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 18. CID II 60, lines 15–23; see also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 3. These are Praxiteles (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 6) and Pythis (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1). Both are listed together at CID II.62, col. I, fr. B, line 80 and col. II, fr. A, line 1. Diodoros (17.3.3) writes that after Philip’s death became known Aristarchos, a pro-democratic Ambrakiot, persuaded the Ambrakiots to drive out the garrison Philip had installed. We do not know if his endeavor succeeded. Aristarchos is not attested elsewhere, LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 50. Plutarch alone preserves evidence for this conflict between Philip and Alexander and its date and historicity are controversial. It could conceivably be placed anywhere between summer 337 and early 336; see French and Dixon 1986: 75–82; Bosworth 1988: 22 and note 55 for a discussion of the date. For Thessalos, see Berve ii: no. 371 and Heckel 2006: 265 with references to his later career. Plutarch (Alex. 10.4) lists Harpalos, Nearchos, Erigyos, and Ptolemy. Arrian (Anab. 3.6.5) lists these four, adding Laomedon. For example, Thessalos of Corinth was an Olympic victor in 504 and in numerous other competitions; see Olympionikai, 154; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5. The editors of LGPN II (s.v. Θετταλός, no. 1) consider him to be from “Athens?” His flight to Corinth, rather than Athens, would seem to suggest that he was a Corinthian, and not an Athenian. The name Thessalos is attested elsewhere at Athens. See also Tritle (2009: 123 note 6), who suggests tentatively that Thessalos may have been a Corinthian. Ellis 1981; Hatzopoulos 1982b. See, however, French and Dixon (1986: 74–82), who accept its authenticity, and also Ruzicka (2010), who does not question its historicity. Hatzopoulos 1982b: 61. For the date of Philip’s assassination, see Bosworth 1980: 45–46 and Hatzopoulos 1982a: 37–42.

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70 Plutarch (Alex. 14.1) alone specifies that the meeting occurred at the Isthmos of Corinth (εἰς δὲ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν); Diodoros (17.4.9) and Justin (11.2.5) place it in Corinth, while Arrian (Anab. 1.1.1–2) places it in the Peloponnese. The meeting occurred in late 336 or before 335; see Bosworth 1988: 28–29. For general discussion of Alexander’s League, see Hamilton 1969: 33–34; Bosworth 1980: 46–50 and 1988: 187–97; Yardley and Heckel 1997: 85–86; Poddighe 2009: 99–120. 71 Alexander’s titles vary slightly in our other sources. Arrian (Anab. 1.1.2) records that Alexander was given the leadership of the army against the Persians (τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατιᾶς) and Plutarch (Alex. 14.1) records that he was proclaimed hegemon (ἡγεμών). 72 For the Theban revolt, see Arr. Anab. 1.7–8, 10.9–10; Plut. Alex. 11.6–12; Diod. Sic. 17.8.3–14.4; Just. 11.3.6–4.8. 73 Arr. Anab. 1.11.3 (τὰ μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἀντιπάτρω ἐπιτρέψας); Diod. Sic. 17.118.1 (ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης στρατηγὸν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καταλειφθέντα), 18.12.1 (δ’ἀπολελειμμένος ὑπ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγὸς τῆς Εὐρώπης); Curt. 4.1.39; Just. 11.7.1. 74 For Antipatros, see Berve ii: no. 94; Heckel 2006: 35–38, no. 1. 75 The chronology is vexing; I have followed that revived by Bosworth 1975 (with references to previous scholarship) and Bosworth 1988: 200 and note 14. The other reconstruction would have the war begin in spring 331 with its conclusion in autumn of the same year; see Badian 1967. The former represents the general consensus in recent studies. See, for example, Badian 1994; Faraguna 2003: 105. There is no doubt that the Corinthians did not aid Agis during the war. McQueen (1978: 41) has demonstrated that Corinth did not join the coalition as a result of the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth. 76 Aeschines (3.165) preserves our only evidence for Agis’ victory. For Korrhagos, see Berve ii: 219–20, no. 444; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 1, p. 198; Tataki, Macedonians, 346, no. 72; Heckel 2006: 94. For the suggestion that he may have been commander of the garrison on Acrocorinth, see Bosworth 1988: 201; Faraguna 2003: 105. 77 For full analysis of those who joined Agis in the war, see McQueen 1978: 45–51. See Cartledge and Spawforth (2002: 16–25) for an account of the war from the Spartan perspective. 78 For Athens during Agis’ War, see Habicht 1997: 20–21. 79 See Diod. Sic. 17.63.2, 4; Curt. 6.1.14–15; Plut. Ag. 3.3. See also Justin 12.1.4–11 for a brief account of the war, and Din. 1.34. In addition to Corinthians, Argos, Megalopolis, Messene, and Pellene must have supplied Antipatros with soldiers. 80 Despite Diodoros’ claim that the synedroi met at Corinth, there remains a likely possibility that they met in Poseidon’s sanctuary at Isthmia; this becomes more likely if the war had been concluded early enough in spring 330 to coincide with the celebration of the Isthmian Games. 81 Undoubtedly, it factored into the Athenian decree to send ships and the subsequent decision not to dispatch them; see Plut. Mor. 818e–f. 82 For example, Greek mercenaries fought against Alexander at the battle of the Granikos River (Arr. Anab. 1.16.6), many of whom were Athenians (Arr. Anab. 1.29.5–6, 3.6.1). Arrian also (Anab. 3.7.1) records the presence of 2,000 Greek mercenaries fighting with Darius at Gaugamela. For detailed treatment of Greek mercenaries who fought on both the Macedonian and Persian sides, see Parke 1933: 177–98. See also Badian (1961: 25–29) for Alexander’s treatment of them. 83 Corinthian exiles are attested as mercenaries in Agesilaos’ army in 390, see Plut. Ages. 21. According to Xenophon (Hell. 6.5.11), in 370 an army of mercenaries that had been collected in Corinth was brought into Mantinea. See also Apollonidas, a Corinthian mercenary who served in Egypt with Chabrias (CEG II 874 ii, line 3;

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84 85

86 87

88 89 90 91

92

93 94

LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 15), soon after 366. Perhaps Corinth’s neutrality of 365 drove him to seek out mercenary service. Berve ii: no. 253. LGPN III.A., s.v., no. 5; Heckel 2006: 107. Bosworth (1980: 122–23) unnecessarily proposes the existence of two Demaratoses of Corinth in the extant sources. He argues that the Demaratos who fought at the Granikos was most likely a “younger relative” of the Demaratos who was Philip’s xenos and Alexander’s hetairos; the latter, he claims, was an “old man” when he died in 327, who had joined Alexander in Susa only in late 330 (on the basis of Plut. Alex. 56.1). Bosworth makes no attempt to identify either Philip’s xenos or Alexander’s hetairos as the Demaratos who campaigned in Sicily with Timoleon. Bosworth’s proposal may be rejected on two counts. First, the presence in Alexander’s army of aged men was commonplace and many of these continued to be active for years after the king’s death. Second, Plutarch twice mentions that Demaratos was an aged man and explicitly that he was a friend of both Philip and Alexander. Heckel (2006: 107) rightly has identified Demaratos as the veteran of Timoleon’s campaign, Philip’s xenos, and Alexander’s hetairos. Berve (ii: no. 253) has suggested plausibly that Demaratos bought the horse from Philoneikos and then presented it to Philip, followed by Anderson (1930: 12) and Hamilton (1969: 15). Thirteen talents: Plut. Alex. 6.1; Gell. NA 5.2. Pliny (HN 8.154) records the price at 16 talents. Demaratos’ command of the Corinthian cavalry at the battle of the Krimisos (341/0) and his service as one of Alexander’s hetairoi clearly indicates that he possessed an intimate knowledge of horsemanship. See recently Ruzicka (2010: 8), who argues that Demaratos personally conveyed Alexander back to Pella from Illyria. Heckel (2006: 107), citing Diodoros (16.91.4–6), who writes that Philip invited all of his guest friends in Greece to attend the wedding ceremony at Aigai; as one of Philip’s xenoi, Demaratos surely qualifies. See, however, Plutarch (Ages. 15.3 and Mor. 329d) where he expresses disagreement with Demaratos, claiming instead that Greeks should have wept for their generals who fell on the battlefields of Leukrta, Koroneia, Corinth, and Arkadia. On Demaratos’ death, see Hamilton (1969: 157), who argues that Plutarch intentionally placed it after Kallisthenes’ execution to contrast the deaths of a loyal friend and a disloyal enemy. On his tumulus, see Ma (2008: 77 and note 40), who observes that its height is “unparalleled,” suggesting that it (80 cubits) ought to be emended “to forty feet?” Ma mistakenly claims that the tumulus, according to Plutarch, was 40 cubits in height. Tarn (1948: 169–71) has demonstrated that the Macedonian cubit was somewhere between 13 and 14 inches; taking the average of 13.5 inches, Demaratos’ tumulus would have been 90 feet in height. Writing about his funeral, Roisman (2003: 312) claims that his ashes were sent to Corinth “in a splendid chariot pulled by four horses.” Plutarch is explicit: the chariot conveyed the ashes to the sea (ἐπὶ θάλασσαν κατεκόμισε). As Borza (1995: 155 = 1991: 21–25) has noted, Alexander had 65 known hetairoi; nine of these men were Greeks, and only three were from the mainland. Four Greek hetairoi had long connections to the Argead house, and of these Demaratos alone had not been raised as a Macedonian. The other three are Nearchos (Berve ii: no. 544; Heckel 2006: 171–73), Erygios (Berve ii: no. 302; Heckel 2006: 119), and Laomedon (Berve ii: no 464; Heckel 2006: 146). See also O’Neil (2003: 510), who calculates that possibly 13 of 61 of Alexander’s hetairoi were Greek. For discussion, see Salmon 1984: 391. Berve ii: no. 307; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 11; Heckel 2006: 124. For his father Eukleon, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 3.

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95 For Eumenes’ position, see Arr. Anab. 5.24.6; Plut. Eum. 1.4. 96 For the extant fragments of each one’s work, see Nearchos, FGrH 133 and Onesikritos, FGrH 134. 97 Diod. Sic. 19.48.2. Willrich (RE VI: 828, no. 11) suggested that the two may be identical. Berve (ii: no. 307) and Heckel (2006: 124) call the identification “uncertain.” The satrap of Areia appears in Diodoros again (19.92.1–4), in Nikanor’s army, and he was killed fighting against Seleukos, while satrap of Persia. For the identification of the satrap of Areia with the satrap of Persia, see Hornblower (1981: 279 and note 20) and Billows (1990: 384–85); neither addresses the possibility that the satrap may be identical to the Corinthian. Euagoras cannot be identified with the hunchbacked parasite of Demetrios Poliorketes (Ath. 6.244), as Berve and Heckel have argued. Billows has demonstrated that they cannot be the same. 98 Berve ii: no. 454; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2; Heckel 2006: 100. 99 See also Curt. 6.1.19. 100 Plut. Alex. 4.10–11; Mor. 179d; 331b. 101 Adams 2007. 102 Berve ii: no. 163; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 1; Tataki, Macedonians, 151–52, no. 24; Heckel 2006: 43. See also the dedicatory inscription in his honor from Delphi, RO, no. 92. 103 Diod. Sic. 18.3.3; Justin 13.4.23. 104 ([Dem]. 17.10; Paus. 7.27.7; Ath. 11.509b.) See also Moretti, Olympionikai, nos. 432, 437, 443, 447; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1; Berve ii: no. 818; Heckel 2006: 82–83, no. 2. See also Bollansée 2002. The dates of his two Isthmian crowns are unknown, although dates between 356 and 344 are likely. 105 LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1; Moretti, Olympionikai, nos. 461 and 465. 106 His patronymic is attested at Dion. Hal. Din. 2 and Plut. Mor. 850b, who notes also that his father’s name may have been Sokrates; the former is much more likely. See Worthington 1992: 3, note 3. 107 Dion. Hal. Din. 4 places his birth in 361/0. Plut. Mor. 850c; cf. Dion. Hal. Din. 2. Deinarchos arrived in Athens as late as 334 or at a date prior to 338. 108 Deinarchos’ presence at Chaironeia is inferred from Rutilius Lupus (2.16), quoting what is believed to be a fragment of a speech of Deinarchos. See Worthington 1992: 4–5. 109 Worthington 1992: 10–11, with references to the range of speeches attributed to Deinarchos in antiquity. 110 Worthington 1992: 7. 111 For Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree, see Diod. Sic. 17.109.1; 18.8.3–5; Curt. 10.2.4; Just. 13.5.1–4. For earlier bibliography and discussion of the decree, see Seibert 1972: 170–71, 295–96; Bosworth 1988: 220–28; and, more recently, Dmitriev 2004: 348–81. 112 See Syll.3 306. The most recent editions of the text are Heisserer (1980: 204–29) and IPArk, no. 5. Both RO (no. 101) and Bencivenni (2003: 79–103, [SEG 53.417]) follow Heisserer’s text. The earlier bibliography on the stone can be found in the commentary of both editions. 113 According to Diodoros (18.8.6), the decree affected most adversely Athens and Aitolia. Dreyer (2009: 231 and note 113), citing Pausanias 5.25.1, claims that a “group of Corinthian exiles who benefitted from the [Exiles’] decree erected a statue in Alexander’s honor at Olympia.” This is incorrect; Pausanias explicitly states that a Corinthian of the Roman colony erected this statue within the Altis. See further Stewart 1994: 330 and S3; T94; and Millis 2010b: 15–16 and note 10. See further below, Chapter 8, p. 210. 114 Modern scholarship on Alexander’s divinity is vast. Some of the better treatments of the subject include Habicht 1970: 245–55; Fredricksmeyer 1979; Badian 1981; Bosworth 1988: 278–90; and Dreyer 2009.

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115 On Demosthenes’ opposition to the deification of Alexander, see Polyb. 12.12b3; for his reversal, see Din. 1.94; Hyp. 5.31–32. Plutarch (Mor. 842d) records Lykourgos’ opposition, as well as Pytheas’ (Mor. 804b). For an analysis of Demosthenes’ position, see Worthington (1992: 61–62, 262–64), who argues that the orator simply sought to appease Alexander in order to increase the likelihood that the Athenians would receive a favorable response regarding their request that their exiles not be repatriated and that they be allowed to retain control of Samos. 116 See Mikalson 1998: 46–48. 117 Resistance to the request: Polyb. 12.12b3; Plut. Mor. 219e; Ael. VH 5.12; Damis’ remark: Ael. VH 2.19 and Plut. Mor. 219e. 118 Fredricksmeyer 1979: 1–3. 119 Arr. Anab. 7.23.2; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 13.2. 120 Suda, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος, Α 2703. 121 For the drought and famine of the 330s and 320s, see Camp 1982; Garnsey 1988: 150–64; Montgomery 1986: 43–61; Jameson, Runnels, and van Andel 1994: 87, 559–61; Tracy 1995: 30–36. 122 The most balanced recent treatments of the inscription include Laronde 1987: 30–36; Brun 1993: 185–96; and RO, no. 96. 123 Leoc. 26. For the date of the prosecution, see Harris 1995: 173–74 and Oliver 2007: 24. 124 Oliverio 1933: 33–35, followed by Blackwell 1999: 97–98. 125 Kingsley 1986. 126 Kingsley (1986) argues for 333/2, followed by Carney (2000: 86) who also argues (89) that Kleopatra’s grain was shipped to Corinth in 333/2 or earlier; Blackwell (1999: 89) posits a date before 331/0 and probably closer to 334/3. 127 Blackwell 1999: 89–91; Carney 2006: 51. 128 See Talbert 1974: 165–66 and Garnsey (1988: 153–54), who discuss the importation of Sicilian grain to Athens during the 330s and 320s. 129 See Camp (1982: 15–16) who has assembled the evidence available. For the sake of convenience, I have included those references he has compiled and the additional evidence that has come to light since the publication of his article. For the wells, Camp cites Corinth VII.3: 198–212 (well nos. 17, 20, 21, 24, and 43). Edwards dated nos. 17 and 21 to the third quarter of the fourth century and nos. 20, 24, and 43 to the last quarter of the fourth century. Considering the adjustments that have been made to Edwards’ chronology for the pottery associated with the South Stoa, it is very likely that these wells should be dated more closely to the end of the fourth century, or slightly later. If correct, the capping of these wells might better be associated with the clean up of earthquake damage. 130 Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1993: 269–70. 131 Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1993: 259. 132 Tomlinson 1969: 157–64. 133 Jameson, Runnels, and van Andel 1994: 559–61. 134 For a recent discussion of the population of Athens in the late fourth century, see Oliver 2007: 76–87, who also assumes an adult male population of 30,000, extrapolating from this a total population (including women and children) of 100,000, with anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000 metics and a slave population of more than 60,000. Oliver concludes, therefore, that the total population of Attica in the third quarter of the fourth century was between 200,000 and 300,000. 135 This number of adult male citizens is considerably larger than the 10,000 Beloch (1886: 119–21, 123) proposed on the basis of a polis’ land area. 136 Salmon (1984: 165–69) estimates that Corinth’s population in the fifth century consisted of a maximum of 15,000 adult male citizens, a total citizen population of 50,000, and a total population (including metics and slaves) of 70,000.

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137 de Waele 1931: 405. 138 IGCH, no. 77, dated to 327–325. The coins of Philip II were minted in Pella and Amphipolis, those of Alexander in Amphipolis, Tarsos, Salamis, and Sidon, and one is from an uncertain mint. For the excavation report, see de Waele 1931: 405, 418–22. Edwards and Thompson (1970: 343–50) represents the most thorough treatment of the hoard and plate that covered it. Martin (1985: 275–82) interprets the hoard as the personal savings of a single Macedonian, accumulated over time. See also Troxell 1997: 115–16, 123–25, who dates the hoard to 323 or a year or two later. For the necklace, see Corinth XII: 256–57, no. 2055; Williams 2003: 235 (who speculates that it was brought back to Corinth by the returning veteran’s wife). See also the recent analysis in the context of the Macedonian presence at Corinth in McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6: 15, 20–21. 139 Edwards (Edwards and Thompson 1970: 344–46) identified the plate as a small black-glazed saucer of Corinthian manufacture, dating it to ca. 325–315. 140 Edwards and Thompson 1970: 349–50 (recruitment of troops); Williams 2003: 234 (returning veteran); Martin 1985: 278–81 (a Macedonian’s personal savings); McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6: 21 (official Macedonian business).

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3 “ T H E CO R I N T H I A N T R O U B L E S ,” CORINTH AND THE DIADOCHOI, 323 –3 0 1 B . C .

Shortly after 302/1 the Athenian comic poet Menander composed his Perikeiromene. Although fragmentary, the delayed prologue, spoken by the goddess Agnoia, establishes the play’s location in Corinth.1 Moreover, she adds (ll. 124–26), “the war had been going on for some time and the Corinthian troubles were getting worse.” In many ways, as we shall see, the last quarter of the fourth century was a time of considerable troubles for Corinth, and thus Menander’s phrase aptly fits this period. These were tumultuous years throughout the empire that Alexander left for his heirs and successors and Corinth vividly reflects these disturbances. Numerous Macedonian dynasts possessed Corinth between 323 and 301, and it was the site of many military operations by which one tried to wrest control of it from another. Antipatros, Polyperchon, Ptolemy, Kassandros, and Demetrios Poliorketes each possessed Corinth and each (with the exception of Antipatros and Kassandros) utilized it as a means by which to legitimize their claims. In addition to the five mentioned above, Polyperchon’s son Alexandros and his widow Kratesipolis each held Corinth on separate occasions. While the Macedonian dynasts possessing Corinth changed frequently throughout this period, the Macedonian garrisons on Acrocorinth and its harbors, Lechaion and Kenchreai, remained constant. The Diadochoi’s unremitting struggles throughout this period in addition to two earthquakes of some magnitude certainly exacerbated the “Corinthian troubles.” Other aspects of life, however, continued as if the Macedonians’ advent had little effect upon some Corinthians. Unfortunately, the evidence that points to this conclusion – as remains the case throughout the first half of the third century as well – generally comes from outside the Corinthia itself. The Corinthian Andromenes, for example, won the stade race at Olympia in 304; Hermokrates son of Androsthenes received proxenia at Delphi. Despite the death of Diogenes the Cynic, another famous Cynic is attested at Corinth. Corinthian relations with Syracuse remained close. Considered within this chapter are the methods by which the Diadochoi who possessed Corinth attempted to foster a relationship founded upon the principle of the reciprocal exchange of goodwill, and their motivations for possessing Corinth. 46

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The Lamian War The struggle for Alexander’s empire began in Babylon immediately after the king’s death. The Greek poleis of the mainland responded to the news when much of the Greek world under Athenian leadership revolted from Antipatros, initiating what has come to be known as the Lamian War.2 One factor that led the Athenians and others to embark on this course was Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree, issued in August 324.3 Corinthian loyalty to Antipatros during the Lamian War was the result of the Macedonian garrison, the pro-Macedonian government in control of the city, and the reciprocal goodwill that had developed between them over the previous 15 years. Corinth must be counted as one of the poleis that Diodoros (18.11.1) described as favorably disposed (ἀπέκλινον) toward the Macedonians. Antipatros’ control of Corinth, on account of these factors, played a far more decisive role in the Lamian War than has been recognized previously. The Peloponnesian poleis’ decision to join the alliance against Antipatros had no impact on the war.4 The probable explanation for this was their inability or unwillingness to force their way past the Macedonian garrison controlling the Isthmos, recalling vividly the Peloponnesians’ failure to come to Thebes’ aid during its revolt (335) from Alexander. Sikyon alone of the Peloponnesians appears to have sent troops to Thessaly where the war on land was fought.5 The Sikyonians may have arrived in Thessaly across the Isthmos, passing the Macedonian garrison at Corinth along their way; it is perhaps more likely that they sailed across the Corinthian Gulf to central Greece. Antipatros nearly lost the war in Thessaly, as Leosthenes’ allied forces defeated the Macedonians; they were driven into the fortified city of Lamia, which the allies besieged.6 The decisive battles of the Lamian War were fought at sea as much as they were on land. Macedonian possession of Corinth and the loyalty of its pro-Macedonian oligarchy played a critical role in the war’s naval phases that was equal to the garrison’s ability to prevent the Peloponnesians from joining their allies in Thessaly. A.B. Bosworth has called attention to the importance of the Lamian War’s naval campaigns, particularly his demonstration that Diodoros’ (18.15.9) reference to two Athenian naval defeats off the Echinades islands need not be emended or altered.7 The Athenian fleet outnumbered the Macedonian at the commencement of the war; shortly thereafter, Kleitos the White’s arrival in the Aegean with a fleet of 240 ships from the Levant tipped the balance of naval superiority in the Macedonians’ favor. Bosworth defends convincingly their presence off the coast of Akarnania in close proximity to the Echinades islands by pointing to the Aitolians’ seizure of Oiniadai, their consternation at losing it as a result of the Exiles’ Decree, and Alexander’s personal threat to deal with them himself (Diod. Sic. 18.8.6). The arrival of the Macedonian fleet off the Akarnanian coast near Oiniadai, as Bosworth suggests, likely accounts also for the Aitolians’ withdrawal from Thessaly at the height of the siege at Lamia.8

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Kleitos and his Macedonian fleet had been operating in the west in spring 322; the rapidity of their arrival surely surprised the Aitolians. The quickest and safest way by which to travel by sea from the Aegean to coastal northwestern Greece is certainly across the Isthmos of Corinth, utilizing the diolkos. Neither Diodoros nor any other source indicates that Kleitos’ fleet (or more likely part of it) was conveyed across the Isthmos, but this is almost certainly the case.9 Following his two victories over the Athenian fleet near the Echinades, Kleitos returned to the Aegean, where he again defeated the Athenians at Amorgos. Once again, the diolkos is the most likely candidate by which part of his fleet sailed from the Adriatic to the Aegean.10 A sense of urgency must have accompanied the Macedonian fleet’s voyage to the Echinades as well as their return to the Aegean. The near equilibrium in naval strength prior to the Macedonians’ two victories off the Echinades also suggests that Kleitos could not afford to lose any ships. The voyage by sea around the southern coast of the Peloponnese requires far greater time than that across the diolkos; moreover, it involves sailing around the notoriously treacherous straits of Cape Malea. Passage across the diolkos would have saved Kleitos considerable time and ensured greater safety on his voyage. Explicit reference to the Macedonians’ use of the diolkos is limited to the last two decades of the third century, when both Taurion, Philip V’s strategos at Corinth, and Philip himself used it to transport ships across the Isthmos.11 If this reconstruction of Kleitos’ route to and from the Echinades is correct, then Macedonian control of Corinth, specifically the diolkos, had a profoundly important effect on the Lamian War’s outcome. It may also explain the report (Plut. Mor. 338a) that following his victory at Amorgos, Kleitos had himself proclaimed Poseidon and carried a trident. Poseidon’s association with the Isthmos requires no additional comment; Kleitos’ self-professed association with the god lends further weight to the suggestion that he exploited the diolkos.12 The Lamian War neared its end in July 322 with Kleitos’ naval victories at Abydos and Amorgos.13 These Macedonian victories, as well as the two Athenian defeats suffered near the Echinades islands, effectively marked the end of the latter’s naval power. Antipatros retreated to Macedonia to collect reinforcements from Krateros, who had arrived from Kilikia. Their combined forces (numbering 40,000) defeated the allies at Krannon in August, concluding the war in the Macedonians’ favor.14 It also signaled the necessity of their surrender to Antipatros on 20 Boedromion (mid-September) 322.15 Antipatros had become well acquainted with the strategic importance of Corinth during Agis’ War. Throughout the Lamian War, his garrison at Corinth successfully prevented those Peloponnesian states from crossing the Isthmos into central Greece. Possession of Corinth proved versatile and decisively important as the diolkos likely provided Kleitos and part of his fleet with swift and safe conveyance to the coast of Akarnania and back to the Aegean. Antipatros nearly lost the Lamian War; his narrow escape offered valuable testimony 48

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of the Macedonians’ need to possess Corinth. Philip’s investment of it in 338 again paid valuable dividends. Antipatros, whose position in Macedonia was in jeopardy months before Alexander’s death, now securely controlled it; the settlement at Triparadeisos offered the opportunity to turn his attention to the poleis of southern Greece, both those that had revolted and those that had remained loyal during the Lamian War.

Deinarchos of Corinth, epimeletes Following his victory in the Lamian War, Antipatros appointed Deinarchos of Corinth his “epimeletes of the Peloponnese” (ἐπιμελητὴς Πελοποννήσου).16 He had been a leader of Corinth’s pro-Macedonian faction since Philip’s victory at Chaironeia, and unlike his colleague Demaratos, with whom he served in Sicily under Timoleon, Deinarchos apparently remained in Corinth while Alexander campaigned in Asia.17 Antipatros’ appointment of Deinarchos suggests that the two had established a mutually beneficial relationship during Alexander’s absence; it may also imply that Philip or Alexander had appointed him earlier to a similar position. Demosthenes (Ep. 6), in fact, attests to their relationship, referring to a letter Antipatros addressed to Deinarchos that he received at Corinth; the Athenian disparagingly refers to Deinarchos and others as Antipatros’ “underlings” (τοῖς δ’ ὑπηρετοῦσιν Ἀντιπάτρῳ).18 Arrian places Deinarchos’ denouncement of Demades at the Macedonian court.19 Deinarchos’ relationship with Antipatros likely began as early as 331 while the latter witnessed firsthand Corinth’s strategic value during Agis’ War. Deinarchos’ title gave him direct authority over not only Corinthian but also Peloponnesian affairs. The later example of Demetrios of Phaleron, whom Kassandros son of Antipatros appointed epimeletes at Athens (317–307),20 may be instructive, as Deinarchos quite probably served a very similar function in Peloponnesian and Corinthian politics, including governance and domestic matters.21 It is also significant that Antipatros appointed a Corinthian to this office, implying that while under his control, he allowed his Corinthian supporters to retain a degree of autonomy in internal affairs as Philip and Alexander had allotted them. There remains a distinct possibility that Antipatros appointed Deinarchos to this office, but allowed the Corinthians to elect him, as his son Kassandros later did with Demetrios of Phaleron in Athens.22 Moreover, the simple fact that Antipatros entrusted this responsibility to a Corinthian indicates that Deinarchos must have won both his trust and respect. His reward for loyalty and apparent displays of goodwill was the prestigious title of epimeletes of the Peloponnese to which Antipatros appointed him. Evidence also attests to Antipatros’ presence in the vicinity of Corinth (if not the city itself) after the Lamian War. Once captured, the orator Hypereides and other Athenian politicians who played prominent roles in the war were brought to Antipatros at Kleonai (Plut. Dem. 28.4; Phoc. 29.1) where they were executed.23 This has led some to conclude that Kleonai functioned as Antipatros’ 49

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“headquarters” following the conclusion of the Lamian War.24 This is unlikely considering an inscribed proxeny decree from Argos that provides evidence for Kleonai’s participation in the Lamian War with the alliance against Macedonia. The Argive decree demonstrates that Kleonai was incorporated into Argive territory, thus losing its political independence.25 Kleonai, a polis visible from Acrocorinth, joined the anti-Macedonian coalition in the Lamian War and was punished for it; it is not surprising that a polis loyal to the Macedonians would receive rewards. Following the conclusion of the Lamian War, according to Diodoros (18.18.8), Antipatros retained control of Corinth and established oligarchies in the Greek poleis, a policy for which he received commendations (ἐπαίνων) and crowns (στεφάνων).26 It may be safe to assume, therefore, that he installed proMacedonian, oligarchic governments where they did not already exist and possibly tyrants throughout the Peloponnese and in other poleis throughout southern Greece. No evidence indicates that Antipatros altered Corinth’s constitution, suggesting either that it was already a pro-Macedonian oligarchy or that he did not feel a change of government was necessary on account of its demonstrable loyalty. The two alternatives are compatible with one another, and probably represent the most likely reconstruction. Corinth clearly escaped the imposition of a tyrant; Deinarchos, one of its own citizens, received the position of epimeletes. Corinth, therefore, was likely one of the poleis Diodoros claimed had honored Antipatros with a commendation and a crown.

Polyperchon and Corinth Antipatros appointed Polyperchon to succeed him as strategos autokrator and guardian (epimeletes) of kings Philip III Arrhidaios and Alexandros IV shortly before his death in late summer 319.27 As strategos autokrator and the kings’ epimeletes, Polyperchon came into nominal possession of Corinth in late summer 319. He possessed Corinth briefly; nevertheless his actions while there were shrewd and they affected several of his rivals’ policies. Antipatros also named his son Kassandros chiliarchos before his death.28 Kassandros’ displeasure with this arrangement had far-reaching consequences throughout the Greek world, contributing to the outbreak of the Second Diadoch War. For several years after Antipatros’ death, Polyperchon and Kassandros, as well as the former’s son Alexandros, struggled politically and militarily for control of both Greece and Macedonia; Corinth was not spared the grief their struggles caused. Kassandros lost no time in challenging Polyperchon’s position and the Peloponnese was one of the primary theatres of their war. He secretly sent messages, according to Diodoros (18.49.3), to commanders and poleis throughout Greece, encouraging them to ally with him. Many poleis remained in the hands of commanders whom Antipatros had installed, while others were ruled by oligarchies he had created (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2). In response to Kassandros’ maneuvering, Polyperchon assembled a council of his friends at Pella, where he 50

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resolved to free the Greek poleis and to overthrow the oligarchies that Antipatros set up in them, for in this way they would best minimize Kassandros’ influence and thus make a great reputation for themselves as well as many important allies. (Diod. Sic. 18.55.2–3) This meeting ultimately resulted in Polyperchon’s most controversial undertaking when in autumn 319 he issued his diagramma in the name of King Philip III Arrhidaios.29 Among other things, it proclaimed the restoration of exiles to their native poleis (with a few exceptions) and called for a restoration of the poleis’ constitutions in place at the time of Philip and Alexander, resolutions designed to undermine Kassandros’ position in southern Greece. Polyperchon’s diagramma has long been recognized as an attempt to re-enact Alexander’s Exiles’ Decree of August 324; the controversy surrounds its further implications. In short, scholarship has been divided as to whether or not the diagramma represents either an opportunistic declaration of “freedom” or a calculated effort to revive the League of Corinth that Philip II created and Alexander the Great inherited.30 The diagramma clearly calls for the restoration of peace (εἰρήνη) and the constitutions (πολιτείας) Philip had established, but it lacks any guarantee of autonomy. Polyperchon later professed such a promise. Several months after the diagramma’s publication, Polyperchon traveled to Phokis and sent his son Alexandros ahead to Attica to prevent Kassandros from gaining control of the Piraeus.31 Alexandros could not prevent him from taking the harbor; Nikanor retained possession of the garrison in Mounychia (Diod. Sic. 18.68.1). Polyperchon’s son did, however, assist the Athenians with the restoration of their democracy.32 An embassy comprised of Phokion of Athens, Solon of Plateia, and Deinarchos of Corinth met Polyperchon while he was still in Phokis. Upon its arrival, Polyperchon had Deinarchos of Corinth, Antipatros’s epimeletes of the Peloponnese, arrested, tortured, and executed.33 Plutarch (Phoc. 33.8) preserves our only evidence for Deinarchos’ execution and he supplies an approximate date for it. Phokion, Plutarch (Phoc. 37.1) records, was executed in Athens on 19 Mounychion (early May); Deinarchos was executed not long before this date. Unfortunately, Plutarch offers no explicit explanation for his execution, but he curiously notes that Deinarchos (and the other ambassadors) was thought to be on friendly terms with Polyperchon.34 Despite their purported friendship, Deinarchos’ connection to Antipatros and possibly his son Kassandros provided Polyperchon with sufficient justification to pass the sentence.35 Polyperchon, moreover, may have regarded Deinarchos, in his capacity of epimeletes, a “tyrant” whom Antipatros had appointed and thus a departure from the constitution Corinth possessed at the time of Philip and Alexander in an effort to display the legitimacy and authority of his diagramma. Nevertheless, Corinth’s pro-Macedonian oligarchy likely perceived his actions as hostile, and a violation of the relationship with the Argeadai and Antipatros that had been predicated on reciprocal goodwill. 51

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Polyperchon recognized the necessity of possessing Corinth, on account of its strategic value, its Panhellenic connections, and most importantly for the Diadochoi its connection to the Argeadai. His execution of Deinarchos represented a threat to the goodwill of Corinth’s pro-Macedonian faction and he needed to act quickly to restore it. Polyperchon arrived in Attica after Deinarchos’ execution, joining his son Alexandros (Diod. Sic. 18.68.1–2); the large number of their soldiers and the time of year (early May) made it impossible to feed the army. Kassandros had secured the loyalty of Aigina and he had begun to besiege Salamis before Polyperchon departed Attica. Polyperchon dispatched infantry and ships that raised the siege of Salamis (Diod. Sic. 18.68.3–69.2). The purpose of his departure for the Peloponnese, according to Diodoros (18.68.3), was to confront Megalopolis, which an oligarchy installed by Antipatros governed and which continued to display loyalty to Kassandros. Diodoros’ narrative, however, provides no indication that he reached Megalopolis before dispatching his troops and ships to Salamis. Corinth’s eastern harbor, Kenchreai, provided Polyperchon’s fleet that had raised Kassandros’ siege of Salamis’ safe harbor; it likewise allowed his fleet to maintain a careful eye on his rival’s movements within the Saronic Gulf, as he still held Piraeus and Aigina remained loyal to him. Before arriving at Megalopolis, according to Diodoros (18.69.3), Polyperchon met with assembled synedroi from various Greek cities to discuss their alliances (συμμαχίας) with him. He again reaffirmed the overthrow of the oligarchies Antipatros had established and he restored autonomy (τοῖς δὲ δήμοις ἀποδοῦναι τὴν αὐτονομίαν) to the cities. Polyperchon almost certainly met these synedroi at Corinth, or more likely the Sanctuary of Poseidon, in early summer 318, possibly during the celebration of the Isthmian Games or shortly after their conclusion. There, in the presence of Philip III Arrhidaios, he revived the League of Corinth that Philip II had founded and that his son Alexander III had inherited. Polyperchon’s diagramma alone does not constitute its revival; his subsequent declarations of autonomy (Diod. Sic. 18.64.3; 69.5) and his meeting with synedroi either at Corinth or the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia point us toward that conclusion.36 Both Corinth and Isthmia hosted meetings of the League of Corinth that Philip created and Alexander inherited, making either a logical candidate for the meeting place Polyperchon selected.37 This decision may also have been designed as an overt display of goodwill to secure the support of Corinth’s pro-Macedonian faction. Megalopolis, however, resisted Polyperchon; soon after meeting the synedroi he besieged it unsuccessfully. As a result, according to Diodoros (18.74.1), most of the Greek poleis abandoned Polyperchon and joined Kassandros, but Corinth remained in the possession of Polyperchon, whose son Alexandros commanded its garrison. Tegea also remained loyal to Polyperchon and Kassandros besieged it. Upon learning that Olympias had returned to Macedonia through Polyperchon’s machinations, he came to terms with the Tegeans (316) and set out for Macedonia, allowing Polyperchon’s son Alexandros to attack his Peloponnesian allies from 52

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his base at Corinth (Diod. Sic. 19.35.1). The Macedonian garrison at Corinth again played a major role in this campaign, as without it Alexandros could not have initiated his counterattack. Later that same year (316), Kassandros returned to the Peloponnese to dislodge Alexandros from it (Diod. Sic. 19.53.1); presumably his target was Corinth. Although Polyperchon possessed Corinth, there is no indication that the Corinthians either accepted or rejected his attempts to forge a mutually beneficial relationship founded upon the principles of goodwill.

Corinth, Polyperchon, Alexandros, and the Third Diadoch War The strength of Antigonos’ position in Asia, after he had defeated Eumenes in winter 317/16, alarmed his peers, as a coalition of Diadochoi aligned itself against him, initiating the Third Diadoch War (Diod. Sic. 19.57.1–3). Antigonos responded, besieging Tyre; during the course of the siege (315/14), Antigonos issued his famous Tyre Decree (Diod. Sic. 19.61.3). According to the decree, all Greeks were to be free, free of garrisons, and autonomous (ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρητούς, αὐτονόμους), recalling the similar declarations made by Philip II and Alexander the Great. It may also be viewed as a response to Polyperchon’s diagramma and revival of the League of Corinth in 318.38 Earlier, Antigonos had initiated steps to gain control of Corinth; after issuing it, he endeavored to do so. Ptolemy also issued his own declaration of freedom (Diod. Sic. 19.62.1), and he too commenced efforts to gain control of Corinth. As the polis singularly associated with the Argeads’ League of Corinth, it became throughout the Third Diadoch War the object of considerable attention as Antigonos Monophthalmos and Ptolemy both sought to acquire it in order to legitimize their declarations of freedom and to connect themselves to the Argeadai. Kassandros, although not interested in declaring the Greeks free, persisted in his efforts to capture Corinth so as to command this strategic location and in order to prevent his rivals from reviving the League of Corinth. Polyperchon’s son Alexandros, according to Diodoros (19.54.3), still held Corinth in 316 and blocked the Isthmos with guards (φυλακαῖς) in an effort to prevent Kassandros’ entrance into the Peloponnese with a force that included elephants.39 Kassandros retreated to Megara, from which he sailed to Epidauros with his soldiers and elephants. After campaigning in the Peloponnese for some time, he departed across the Isthmos and left one Molykkos in command of 2,000 soldiers in Corinthian territory at the Isthmos toward Geraneion (Diod. Sic. 19.54.4). Presumably his forces held one of the important positions along the Geraneion range, but no evidence attests for how long or to what effect.40 Although Alexandros’ garrison at Corinth had prevented Kassandros’ army from entering the Peloponnese via the Isthmos, it was unable to prevent it from departing the Peloponnese across it. Kassandros’ passage through the Corinthia likely entailed some plundering of Corinth’s chora. It is possible that the grain had been harvested between Kassandros’ attempt to enter the Peloponnese and 53

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his departure; if this is correct, Alexandros likely chose to avoid armed conflict, preferring that his rival depart the Peloponnese. Nevertheless, any devastation inflicted upon the Corinthia is sure to have jeopardized the relationship he and his father aimed to construct with the pro-Macedonian Corinthians. Unfortunately for Kassandros, Polyperchon, and Alexandros, 316/15 marked Antigonos Monophthalmos’ entrance in Peloponnesian affairs. In that year, he sent his general Aristodemos of Miletos to the Peloponnese with 1,000 talents to establish friendship with Alexandros and Polyperchon and to hire mercenaries for the war against Kassandros, who had joined the alliance against him (Diod. Sic. 19.57.5). Aristodemos sailed directly to Lakonia (undoubtedly Tainaron), where he acquired the services of 8,000 mercenaries, met Alexandros and Polyperchon, and established a friendship between them and Antigonos. As part of this arrangement, according to Diodoros (19.60.1), Aristodemos appointed Polyperchon “strategos of the Peloponnese” (στρατηγὸν τῆς Πελοποννήσου). Alexandros afterwards traveled to Asia, meeting Antigonos personally, from whom he received an additional 500 talents. Perhaps significantly, Alexandros was present at Antigonos’ court in Tyre to hear the famous proclamation of freedom; he subsequently returned to the Peloponnese (Diod. Sic. 19.61.5). Antigonos’ alliance with Polyperchon and Alexandros now meant that allies possessed Corinth, a situation far more tolerable than a rival’s occupation of it. Anticipating a showdown, Antigonos sent an additional 50 ships to the Peloponnese to reinforce those already with Aristodemos (Diod. Sic. 19.62.9). In late summer 315, before presiding over the Nemean Games (Diod. Sic. 19.64.1), Kassandros successfully forced his way across the Isthmos and into the Corinthian chora after learning of Polyperchon’s alliance with Antigonos Monophthalmos (Diod. Sic. 19.63.3).41 Almost certainly, as in the previous year, Alexandros (for some reason) must not have ventured beyond Corinth’s walls to engage Kassandros’ forces; a late summer (September) date would also mean that crops were almost fully ripe and it was nearly time for the harvest. Kassandros, Diodoros (19.63.4) reports, ravaged the chora and captured Kenchreai and two fortresses, all of which had garrisons. This attack upon the Corinthia was the second within one year, and the pro-Macedonians within the city could not have perceived Alexandros’ inability to defend it successfully as beneficial to their interests. Kassandros’ passage through the Corinthia also represents the earliest evidence that the Macedonians maintained garrisons within the Corinthia at locations other than Acrocorinth. After capturing the two fortresses, Kassandros allowed the garrisons (φρουρούς) to depart. Two late Classical/Hellenistic fortifications have been identified on Mt. Oneion, controlling two different passes over this range that forms a natural barrier extending west from Loutro Elenis, approximately 1 km south of Kenchreai, toward the southeast base of Acrocorinth, from which the Leukon (Xerias) river valley separates it. The Stanotopi pass is the easternmost of the two and Ronald Stroud has proposed that it was one of the two fortifications Kassandros captured.42 A second fortification was 54

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discovered recently by the Eastern Korinthia Archaeological Survey, overlooking the Maritsa pass, approximately 2 km to the west of the Stanotopi pass.43 The proximity of these two fortifications to Kenchreai makes it likely that Kassandros captured them in 315.44 Despite the vigor with which Kassandros attacked Corinth, Alexandros managed to retain physical possession of the city and Acrocorinth, although we cannot recover how the Corinthians perceived his continued presence. It remains unclear whether or not Kassandros continued to possess Kenchreai after he had captured it. Any prolonged length of time, however, would have affected the importation of grain to Kenchreai and threatened Alexandros’ position within Corinth.45 The need for grain must have been acute within Corinth, as Kassandros almost certainly had destroyed many crops just prior to the harvest. Kassandros dispatched his general Prepelaos to Alexandros later in 315, and the latter persuaded the former to abandon his alliance with Antigonos. Kassandros then appointed Alexandros “strategos of the Peloponnese.” Diodoros (19.64.4) records that Ptolemy’s admiral Polykleitos subsequently arrived at Kenchreai, departing only when he learned that Alexandros had allied with Kassandros; he immediately departed for Pamphylia. How Alexandros’ acceptance of the title affected his relationship with the Corinthians is unclear. His failure to defend the Corinthia twice within a year cannot have endeared him even to a pro-Macedonian faction. Moreover, Kassandros had inflicted the devastation upon the chora, just before the harvest, an action that all Corinthians must have regarded as hostile. Additionally ambiguous is how the alliance with Kassandros affected Alexandros’ relationship with his father Polyperchon, as we have no indication of his whereabouts at this point.46 Reasonably it constituted open revolt from his father; perhaps Polyperchon had yielded authority to his son, and accepted the new alliance. Shortly after receiving his command from Kassandros, Alexion of Sikyon and some others assassinated Alexandros in 314 as he departed Sikyon.47 In 313 Antigonos Monophthalmos sent Telesphoros, his admiral and possibly his nephew, with 50 ships for the liberation of the Greek cities, hoping further to demonstrate to the Greeks the sincerity of his promises to restore their autonomy.48 After arriving at an unnamed harbor in the Peloponnese, Diodoros (19.74.2) reports, Telesphoros liberated all of the cities Alexandros’ garrisons held, with the exception of Corinth and Sikyon.49 Diodoros prominently names Alexandros in this passage, but he had been dead for several months; it is clear that his widow Kratesipolis commanded the soldiers at Corinth and Sikyon.

Kratesipolis’ Corinth Alexandros’ assassination at Sikyon and Telesphoros’ inability to liberate both it and Corinth left control of the poleis in the hands of Kratesipolis, the former’s widow. She was a remarkable woman, certainly Macedonian by birth and probably from a family of some nobility.50 She held Corinth until 308, perhaps 55

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jointly between 313 and 310 with her father-in-law Polyperchon, who was likely (Diod. 19.74.2) in Corinth or Sikyon when Telesphoros attempted to liberate both. He presumably remained in either city until 310 when he acquired Alexander the Great’s illegitimate son Herakles in an effort to undermine Kassandros’ authority and recover his own.51 Polyperchon and Kassandros reached an agreement (Diod. Sic. 20.28.2), according to which the former murdered Herakles, Alexander the Great’s last remaining son. As compensation, Kassandros promised to bestow upon him the title strategos of the Peloponnese (στρατηγὸς ἀποδειχθήσεται περὶ Πελοπόννησον). According to Diodoros (20.28.4), however, a force of Boiotians and Peloponnesians prevented him from entering the Peloponnese and he spent the winter of 309/8 in Lokris.52 Kratesipolis certainly held both Corinth and Sikyon at this time. Kratesipolis retained both control over and the loyalty of her murdered husband’s soldiers, who held her in high regard on account of her kindness (διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας) toward them. Apparently she also disregarded his alliance with Kassandros as she held Corinth and Sikyon as her own between 314 and 313, as well as between 310 and 308. Diodoros (19.67.1) adds that Kratesipolis was accustomed to help the unfortunate as well as the many in need (διετέλει γὰρ βοηθοῦσα τοῖς ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀπόρων ὑπολαμβάνουσα). The Sikyonians, nevertheless, attempted to liberate their polis. The widow responded swiftly and ruthlessly: she and her forces routed the Sikyonians with great slaughter; she also had 30 citizens arrested and crucified (Diod. Sic. 19.67.2). Thereafter, Kratesipolis continued to hold Sikyon with many soldiers and she employed mercenaries to garrison Acrocrinth.53 Diodoros contrasts her compassion with her brutality at Sikyon, and it is unfortunate that he describes netiher her acts of kindness nor the beneficiaries of them. While Kratesipolis held Corinth and Sikyon, Antigonos Monophthalmos intensified his efforts to establish his presence in the Peloponnese; this objective had become more pressing since his declaration of freedom at Tyre in 315 and Alexandros’ defection to Kassandros in late 315. Antigonos appointed his strategos Polemaios as his commander in Greece in 313 (Diod. Sic. 19.77.2).54 Telesphoros, while in the vicinity of Corinth, learned that Antigonos had sent Polemaios to command his forces in Greece (Diod. Sic. 19.87.1). His activity around Corinth (312) suggests devastation to its chora, although Diodoros attests to nothing specific. After selling his ships and enlisting soldiers, Telesphoros departed the Corinthia, acting now as an independent power within the Peloponnese. He inflicted considerable damage upon cities in the western Peloponnese, most notably Elis and the Sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia (Diod. Sic. 19.87.2). Polemaios, Antigonos’ new strategos in command of Greek affairs (ὁ Ἀντιγόνου στρατηγὸς ἦν μὲν τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πραγμάτων), however, soon convinced Telesphoros to rejoin the Antigonid camp (Diod. Sic. 19.87.3). The Third Diadoch War ended after Demetrios’ failed attempt to invade Egypt. The Antigonid defeat at the battle of Gaza paved the way for negotiations that culminated with the Peace of 311. This settlement 56

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guaranteed the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities, while essentially preserving the status quo.

Ptolemaic Corinth All signatories of the Peace of 311 guaranteed Greek freedom, and the murder of Herakles, Alexander the Great’s one remaining son, removed the last Argead heir.55 These events prompted Ptolemy son of Lagos to commence in 309/8 an aggressive campaign both in Asia Minor and Greece to validate his prior claims of Greek freedom.56 He gained control of Corinth in 308 when Kratesipolis willingly relinquished it to him.57 Her mercenaries on Acrocorinth had advised her to guard it more vigilantly and she agreed to summon additional forces from Sikyon. In the meantime she secretly sent word to Ptolemy, whose soldiers she then welcomed into the city as if they were the Sikyonian reinforcements. Ptolemy probably also had professed promises of marriage to Kratesipolis.58 Once in possession of Acrocorinth he fulfilled his proclamation of Greek freedom, reviving the League of Corinth in his name. He did not, however, satisfy whatever promises of marriage that he may have made to Kratesipolis.59 Ancient testimony confirming Ptolemy’s revival of the League of Corinth is limited and circumstantial, and there has been some hesitation to accept its authenticity.60 The Suda, however, provides important testimony that Ptolemy presided over the Isthmian Games of 308. As discussed earlier, those Diadochoi who declared Greek freedom attached a special significance to Corinth on account of its association with the League of Corinth that Philip established and Alexander inherited. Fulfillment of his promise of Greek freedom was central to his propaganda campaign of 309/8. His capture of Corinth in 308, an Isthmian year, allowed him to preside symbolically over the games at Poseidon’s sanctuary as Polyperchon may have in 318 when he revived the League of Corinth. According to Diodoros (20.37.2), Ptolemy believed freeing the Greeks would win for him their goodwill; from his perspective, this did not work out according to plan, as they did not reciprocate his goodwill by supplying him with the grain (σῖτον) and money (χρήματα) they had promised. Ptolemy, therefore, made peace with Kassandros; its terms allowed each to retain the cities they held at the time of its agreement. Ptolemy’s revival of the League of Corinth had little impact in Greece; his successors in Alexandria seem to have attached greater significance to it for their own purposes. Ptolemy II Philadelphos, for example, instituted the “Great Procession” in honor of his father and the dynasty. In this procession, a statue of “Corinth” was positioned on a float near those of Alexander the Great and Ptolemy I.61 “Corinth’s” presence in the Great Procession, almost certainly representing the League of Corinth, offers further evidence that Ptolemy I revived it in 308, regardless of its failure at the time.62

57

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We hear virtually nothing of the garrison until 306, when Ptolemy’s strategos Kleonides commanded his forces in Sikyon and Corinth (Plut. Demetr. 15.1).63 One other source, however, may elucidate our understanding of Ptolemaic control of Corinth in 307. According to Polyainos (4.7.6), Demetrios Poliorketes entered the Piraeus because the Athenians thought that his ships were Ptolemaic on their way to Corinth. Plutarch (Demetr. 8.4–5) confirms that the Athenians believed his fleet was Ptolemaic without mentioning that their destination was thought to be Corinth. The size of Demetrios’ fleet is unclear; Plutarch notes 250 ships whereas Polyainos reports that Demetrios left the majority of his triremes at Sounion and sailed with 20 ships toward Salamis. As 20 ships sailing to Corinth’s harbor Kenchreai is much more likely than 250, Polyainos’ version is preferable to Plutarch’s.64 The Athenians (specifically Demetrios of Phaleron) surely thought the Ptolemaic ships were en route to Corinth because Ptolemy had supplied the city with grain as late as 307; whether it was intended for the citizen body, his garrison, or both is unclear.65 Grain shortages in mainland Greece during the last part of the fourth and early third centuries B.C. were endemic. The conclusion seems inescapable that for the remainder of the fourth and into the third century, Corinth and much of the Greek world relied heavily upon imported grain.66 Nevertheless, the possibility that Ptolemy supplied Corinth with Egyptian grain in 307 is puzzling, considering the king’s request for grain and money a year earlier as well as his rapid departure after reviving the League of Corinth. Perhaps he recognized the volatility of the situation in mainland Greece and retained his control of Corinth in order to preserve an additional tie to the Argead dynasty. His efforts to display goodwill toward the Corinthians constituted the best means by which to secure theirs and maintain possession of the city. Corinth also played an important role in the Four Years’ War (307–304).67 While waging the war in Greece, Antigonos ordered his son to attack Kypros and detach it from Ptolemaic control. Before departing, Demetrios sent a letter to Kleonides (307), the commander of Ptolemy’s forces in Corinth and Sikyon, offering money if he would free both poleis. Kleonides rejected the bribe and Demetrios withdrew from the Peloponnese, sailing to Kypros (Plut. Demetr. 15.1–2), where he besieged the Ptolemaic forces at Salamis. Ptolemy demanded that he abandon all attempts to take it and as a condition for his withdrawal, Demetrios ordered that he remove his garrisons from Sikyon and Corinth. Kleonides still commanded in 306 the Ptolemaic forces in both poleis. Numismatic evidence from the Corinthian chora sheds invaluable light on the details of Ptolemaic Corinth and possibly the date at which Kassandros’ forces gained control of it. A hoard of 196 silver coins found in 1932 at Chiliomodi, not far from the ancient Corinthian kome Tenea, was buried in 306 or less likely as late as 304.68 The Chiliomodi hoard includes 21 tetradrachms and 12 drachms all of Ptolemy I.69 Ravel has demonstrated that the 12 drachms of Ptolemy and 14 of the Corinthian drachms were all minted at Corinth; the letters ΔΟ on the reverse of all 26 drachms indicate that the same mint officials were responsible 58

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for both issues. Moreover, he proposed that the Ptolemaic issue was minted at Corinth to pay the garrison controlling Acrocorinth.70 Ptolemaic use of Corinth’s mint did not infringe upon its autonomy or ability to mint its own issues, but it does raise a number of questions.71 Perhaps the most pressing concerns the source of the silver used for the minting of the Ptolemaic issue. As noted above, Ptolemy failed to secure grain and money from the member states of his revived League of Corinth. The request certainly underscores his need for both, presumably to feed and pay the garrison on Acrocorinth. One cannot help but wonder whether Ptolemy required more than the use of Corinth’s mint and if he also exacted contributions from the demos to finance the garrison. Ptolemy would not have won the goodwill of the Corinth through any levy upon its citizens. The numismatic evidence alone cannot answer this question; likewise, the literary record offers no help. We are, therefore, left with the intriguing conclusion that Ptolemy utilized Corinth’s mint and its officials for coinage issued in his name. This fact alone represents no curtailment of Corinthian autonomy, unless of course the Corinthians themselves were compelled to supply the silver for the coins. Ptolemy’s propaganda campaign in the Peloponnese was not nearly as successful as he had hoped: the Greek poleis failed to rally behind his revival of the League of Corinth. Despite their lack of enthusiasm, Ptolemy could now hope that its revival and his accompanying proclamation of Greek freedom would help elevate him to the status of Alexander’s legitimate successor. For Ptolemy this was apparently the extent of his interest in Corinth; he returned to Egypt after installing a garrison on Acrocorinth (Diod. Sic. 20.37.2) that would ensure no rival could challenge his assertion. Ptolemaic possession of Corinth did not last long and the literary sources provide little assistance in ascertaining when and how it was lost.

Kassandros’ Corinth Ptolemaic control of Corinth ended when it fell to Kassandros son of Antipatros. His father had benefited from Corinth’s strategic position during Alexander’s absence in both Agis’ War and the Lamian War, and Kassandros himself had attempted to take it on several occasions beginning no later than 316. Following Plutarch’s account of Demetrios’ attempt to bribe the Ptolemaic garrison commander Kleonides to vacate Corinth and Sikyon, Corinth reappears in the literary record under the control of Kassandros’ strategos Prepelaos.72 The Chiliomodi hoard also may assist in assigning a date to Kassandros’ acquisition of Corinth. The condition of the 12 Ptolemaic drachms marked with ΔΟ also indicates that they had not been in circulation long.73 A date of 306 for the hoard’s burial might permit its association with Demetrios Poliorketes’ offer of a bribe to Ptolemy’s general Kleonides in that same year. Demetrios’ certain presence in the vicinity of Corinth likely provided the motivation for the hoard’s burial. 59

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Another possibility is that the Ptolemaic garrison abandoned Corinth at some point in late 306, or possibly as late as early 305. This theory would also account for the burial of the hoard at this time. It is far less conceivable that Ptolemy recalled his garrison from Corinth following his disastrous defeat at Kypriot Salamis in late 306 (Diod. Sic. 20.47.7–52; Plut. Demetr. 16), considering the fact that when Demetrios Poliorketes captured Sikyon in 303 (Diod. Sic. 20.103.1), Ptolemy’s strategos Philip still held it.74 If the Ptolemaic garrison did not abandon Corinth, Kassandros may have seen this as an opportune moment to launch an attack against the city despite his alliance with Ptolemy. Regardless of the circumstances by which Kassandros came to invest Corinth, it seems incontrovertible that the Chiliomodi hoard was buried in 306, quite probably coinciding with the expulsion of the Ptolemaic garrison from Corinth. Kassandros exploited Corinth for neither propaganda purposes nor a revival of the League of Corinth. He harbored a hatred of Alexander the Great throughout his adult life and he actively sought to distance himself from the king’s memory.75 Kassandros’ policy of establishing oligarchies and tyrannies (like those his father had established) throughout the Peloponnese and in Athens contradicted the principles of the League of Corinth and about this he made no apologies. He understood as well as any other the strategic importance of Corinth and he utilized his control of it for this purpose exclusively.76 No evidence suggests that political upheaval within Corinth accompanied Kassandros’ capture of it, thus prohibiting us from determining if any change to the city’s constitution occurred while he controlled it. If political allies of Deinarchos still resided in Corinth, Kassandros plausibly sought to re-elevate these men to the positions like those they had held in the aftermath of Chaironeia and the Lamian War. Entrusting the affairs of the Peloponnese to a nonMacedonian, however, appears to have been out of the question. Unlike his rivals, Kassandros appreciated Corinth’s strategic value exclusively. He maintained a garrison on Acrocorinth, and almost certainly one at Kenchreai. Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrios Poliorketes, however, consistently exploited Kassandros’ failure to pay even lip service to Greek freedom and autonomy. As the champions of Greek freedom, they had an obligation to liberate Corinth from Kassandros if their proclamations were to have any semblance of truth. Claims of Greek freedom had no meaning if a rival occupied the city from which Philip II and Alexander the Great had decreed it. Kassandros’ control of Corinth, however, was brief and its loss drastically affected his fortunes. Following Demetrios’ victory over the Ptolemaic fleet at Kypriot Salamis (306) and his subsequent siege of Rhodes (305–304), at which he earned the name Poliorketes, he returned to Greece liberating a number of cities, as well as Corinth’s eastern harbor, Kenchreai (Plut. Demetr. 23.3). Plutarch does not state from whom Demetrios captured it, but it can only have been Kassandros. Additional evidence confirms that Demetrios had occupied Kenchreai some time before taking Corinth. According to Polyainos (4.7.3), he wasted time there on pleasures and luxuries before advancing against Sikyon, which 60

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he captured from Ptolemy’s strategos Philip in early 303. Demetrios, Plutarch (Demetr. 25.1) states, subsequently secured Corinth, along with the cities of the Akte, Arkadia (except Mantinea), Argos, and Sikyon, after bribing the garrisons with 100 talents. Diodoros and Polyainos offer much more detailed narratives of Demetrios’ capture of Corinth; their respective accounts differ in certain details, as each emphasizes different phases of his attack. When examined alongside one another, Diodoros and Polyainos preserve an almost complete account of Demetrios’ assault. Due to these difficulties, the light they shed on the state of affairs in Kassandros’ Corinth, and the details of Corinthian topography both passages preserve, it is necessary to quote both accounts in full. Since Polyainos places greater emphasis upon the early stages of the attack, we shall begin with his account. Polyainos naturally emphasizes the stratagem Demetrios employed to seize the city. He writes: When Corinth was betrayed to him, Demetrios arrived at night before the betrayers had opened the gate at the citadel. Fearing that men in the city would attack him when they realized what had happened, he drew round them a large force and assaulted the gate toward Lechaion. These men shouted loudly, and the Corinthians all ran together in the direction of the shout. The betrayers, opening the gates at the citadel, admitted the enemy. Demetrios captured Corinth, while the Corinthians guarded the gate toward Lechaion. (Polyainos 4.7.8; trans., Krentz and Wheeler 1994, slightly modified) Diodoros, on the other hand, echoes some important details contained in Polyainos, but he emphasizes the final phase of the attack, namely the capture of Acrocorinth itself: Demetrios, having set things in order around Sikyon, set out with all his might against Corinth, which Prepelaos, Kassandros’ strategos, garrisoned. At first, he was admitted at night by some citizens through some gate and he seized the city and its harbors. While some of the garrison fled to the so-called Sisypheion, and others fled to Acrocorinth, Demetrios brought up his siege engines to the strongholds, and suffering many misfortunes, he took the Sisypheion by storm. Then, when those there fled to the others holding Acrocorinth, Demetrios amazed them and compelled them to hand over the citadel. The king was terribly irresistible in his attacks, being ingenious regarding the construction of siege works. But he did not free the Corinthians, having led a guard to Acrocorinth, since the citizens wanted the city protected by the king until he should end the war against Kassandros. (Diod. Sic. 20.103.1–3) 61

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While both clearly attest to the fact that the attack occurred at night, the most informative detail of Diodoros’ and Polyainos’ accounts is the evidence they preserve regarding some citizens’ betrayal of the city to Demetrios.77 The fact that some Corinthians aided Demetrios by opening up one of the city’s gates illustrates their dissatisfaction with Kassandros. Many Corinthians must never have tolerated his presence within their walls; he had attacked the city on more than one occasion, he had ravaged its chora, and captured its harbor Kenchreai as many as 10 or 11 years earlier. These assaults brought considerable pain and suffering to Corinth’s citizens and the memory of them surely weighed on their minds as he introduced his garrison on Acrocorinth. As a result, Kassandros, unlike the Argeadai and his father Antipatros, probably never secured the goodwill of its citizens, with the exception of those whom Polyainos reports defended the Lechaion Gate. His attacks against the city account only partially for his failure or his unwillingness to secure the goodwill of those Corinthians who conspired with Demetrios against him and his local partisans. Kassandros never declared Corinth free and autonomous, and he never purported a connection to the Argeadai. Philip and Alexander selected Corinth as the meeting place of their League of Corinth on account of its location and its panhellenic associations; Kassandros never revived the League and it seems that he never regarded Corinth as anything more than a strategic location he needed to possess in the struggles with his rivals. The lack of goodwill he displayed toward a majority of Corinthians did not escape their notice; as a result, they preferred to turn over control of their city to Demetrios. Polyainos alone, however, records that in the midst of Demetrios’ attack, he feared an ambush from “men in the city.” Later in his narrative, he adds that some Corinthians assisted in the defense of the city’s “gate toward Lechaion.” There can be little doubt that the Macedonians and Corinthians within the city knew who was attacking. Demetrios had held Kenchreai for nearly a year and he had recently captured Sikyon. Confusion concerning the attackers’ identity cannot account for some Corinthians’ defense of the polis; likewise, Demetrios’ fear of ambush from “men in the city” reflects his awareness of a division among Corinth’s citizens (pro-Kassandros and pro-Demetrios factions). Undoubtedly some Corinthians found life under Kassandros tolerable or, possibly, they thrived while he held the city. Although only a hint, the evidence that some citizens sought to betray the city to Demetrios while others aided Kassandros’ garrison in its defense strongly suggests discord among the demos and this was likely a feature of internal Corinthian politics while the Macedonians controlled the city. Each faction likely supported either Kassandros or Demetrios on account of the former’s penchant for oligarchic constitutions and the latter’s proclivity to replace them with democracies. Almost certainly a pro-Macedonian oligarchy had held power in Corinth since Philip installed his garrison. There is no indication of political turmoil or upheaval between 338 and 303; perhaps now, however, a faction opposed to Corinth’s oligarchs and the benefits they received from Macedonian control of the city began to manifest itself.78 62

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Cognizant of Demetrios’ inclination to support democracy elsewhere, these Corinthians might have professed democratic tendencies, but there is no reason to suppose that they were in fact democrats, or that Demetrios installed a democratic constitution once he had expelled Kassandros’ garrison. Diodoros and Polyainos also offer valuable information concerning the topography of early Hellenistic Corinth.79 The latter notes that Demetrios first entered “the gate at the citadel.” Fearing ambush here, he apparently exited the city walls and led his forces to “gate toward Lechaion” which some proKassandros (or at least anti-Demetrios) Corinthians now defended vigorously. He instructed his soldiers to raise a great shout at this gate, drawing their attention to the northwestern quarter of the city while he entered the city through the “gate at the citadel” at which he had initiated his attack; the conspirators again opened it for him. As the Corinthians defended the gate toward Lechaion, where Demetrios left some soldiers to make the diversion credible, he captured the city, by which we must surely take Polyainos to mean he seized control of Acrocorinth. According to Diodoros, on the other hand, some citizens opened “a certain gate,” allowing Demetrios to enter the city. Whereas Polyainos provided details that led to Demetrios’ entry within the walls (the gate at the citadel), Diodoros places greater emphasis upon those events that Polyainos summarizes tersely. Polyainos’ “gate at the citadel” and Diodoros’ “gate” must be the same, and should be identified as Corinth’s Phliasian Gate (see Figure 1.1).80 Considering that Demetrios approached Corinth from the west, the only gates accessible to him were the Sikyonian, the Phliasian, and possibly the Teneatic.81 The Sikyonian Gate is the northernmost of the two, and must be identified with Polyainos’ “gate toward Lechaion.” Diodoros indicates that Demetrios’ successful attempt to capture Corinth originated at Sikyon; the gates to which Polyainos and Diodoros refer must be on Corinth’s western side where three (the Sikyonian, Phliasian, and Teneatic) are known. Topographically, the Phliasian Gate occupies a hill at a higher elevation than the Sikyonian and unlike the Teneatic is readily accessible from Sikyon.82 Moreover, it may be instructive that when Aratos of Sikyon captured Corinth in 243, he too set out from Sikyon at night and gained entrance through the Phliasian Gate.83 Only Diodoros preserves precise details of Demetrios’ capture of Acrocorinth, and the most prominent topographical feature in his account is the Sisypheion, whose location has yet to be identified.84 Tantalizing, however, is Diodoros’ remark that upon becoming aware of Demetrios’ entry “some of the garrison” fled to the Sisypheion and others to Acrocorinth, raising the questions from where did they flee and what were they doing there? As we shall see later, the Sisypheion must be located somewhere on the northern slope of Acrocorinth; if this is the case, those of the garrison who fled to it must have come from the city. Considering Demetrios’ prolonged presence in the Corinthia and Sikyonia, Kassandros certainly anticipated an assault upon Corinth and he probably had increased the garrison’s complement. It is conceivable that those of the garrison who fled to the Sisypheion had been billeted in citizens’ homes.85 63

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Demetrios’ assault on the Sisypheion resulted in heavy casualties. After taking it, he moved against those who held Acrocorinth, overcoming them with his siege engines. Neither Polyainos nor Diodoros mention the bribe Plutarch cites in his cursory account of Demetrios’ capture of Corinth. His testimony indicates, however, that in the final surrender those last few soldiers on Acrocorinth received, in addition to guarantees for their safety, a financial incentive to do so. Prepelaos’ subsequent career as a general in Lysimachos’ army offers evidence for their safe escape from Corinth.86

Antigonid Corinth Shortly after liberating Corinth from Kassandros’ garrison, Demetrios convened a conference at the Isthmos in spring 302 concurrent with the celebration of the Isthmian Games, where in both his and his father’s names he revived the League of Corinth. An inscription (IG IV2.1.68) recording its constitution has been found at Epidauros.87 Demetrios (Plut. Demetr. 25.4) was proclaimed the League’s hegemon. As with the Tyre decree of 315, the Epidaurian inscription recording the Antigonid League of Corinth guaranteed freedom, autonomy, and the freedom from garrisons. Nevertheless, just as Philip II had done 35 years earlier, Demetrios installed a garrison on Acrocorinth.88 According to Diodoros (20.103.3), he garrisoned Acrocorinth (φυλακὴν), at the Corinthians’ request (βουλομένων τῶν πολιτῶν), to protect the city until the conclusion of the war with Kassandros.89 Demetrios’ installation of a garrison, thus, can be viewed as an act of euergetism: he responded favorably to a Corinthian request, and he subsequently could expect their reciprocal goodwill. The name of its commander is unknown, although his official title was certainly strategos, as is clear from the Epidaurian inscription that preserves two references to a strategos, who likely commanded the garrison on Acrocorinth.90 Such terminology for the commander is consistent with the titles held by officials since the death of Alexander the Great. Internal strife, as described above, accompanied Demetrios’ attack against Corinth, as some opened the gates for him, while others defended the city alongside Kassandros’ garrison. Those who beseeched Demetrios to install a garrison can only be identified with those who opened the gate. Demetrios’ garrison certainly augmented Corinth’s defenses and would at least have brought an end to a prolonged period during which the Corinthians suffered greatly. Devastation of the Corinthian chora, the loss of Kenchreai, and two fortifications to Kassandros in 315 caused enough pain, but his capture of the city (306/5?), followed shortly by Demetrios’ seizure of Kenchreai (304), would have damaged greatly Corinth’s ability to import much-needed grain and disrupted other commercial activities. This is especially so if Plutarch and Polyainos correctly assert that Demetrios held Kenchreai while Prepelaos maintained his garrison in the city.

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The Macedonians had controlled Corinth for 35 years by the time Demetrios captured it; undoubtedly some Corinthians had perceived the value that they attached to the garrison. Their request that Demetrios maintain one certainly indicates foremost a desire to protect their chora from Kassandros’ anticipated attacks; it also reflects that the Corinthians had become fluent in their interactions with dynasts and kings. Recognizing that Demetrios would impose his own garrison, the Corinthians anticipated him, requesting that he do so in order to position themselves better when they might make reciprocal requests from him.91 Demetrios Poliorketes apparently remained in Corinth throughout 302 and perhaps into early 301 when his father recalled him to Asia Minor. While resident, a series of “posthumous Alexanders” once attributed to Sikyon were minted at Corinth in association with the League of Corinth; it is quite likely that Corinth also functioned as the chief Macedonian mint in Greece.92 The introduction of these tetradrachms apparently coincided with the cessation of production of Corinthian pegasi, silver staters that had been the standard Corinthian coinage for generations and which had recently gained widespread use throughout Sicily and Southern Italy, following Timoleon’s expedition in the late 340s.93 These “posthumous Alexanders,” like the coinage Ptolemy struck at Corinth, most likely were used to pay for his garrison. As we shall see later (Chapter 5), the years after Demetrios captured Corinth also appear to have initiated a building program and this coinage may have helped to fund it. Posthumous Alexander tetradrachms continued to be struck at Corinth until as late as 287/6 B.C. and perhaps slightly later.94 These coins, like the revival of the League of Corinth, further legitimized the Antigonids’ claim to be the heirs of the Argeadai. Demetrios departed Corinth not later than early 301 and he was accompanied by Pyrrhos of Epeiros, a member of the Epeirot royal line, a relative of Olympias, and by extension Alexander the Great. The whereabouts of his son Antigonos Gonatas are unknown.95 Shortly afterwards Demetrios arrived in Asia where he and his father met the forces of Seleukos and Lysimachos at Ipsos. The results of this engagement were disastrous for the Antigonids: Antigonos Monophthalmos was killed and Demetrios narrowly escaped.

*** The period of the Diadochoi was a chaotic one at Corinth as Antipatros, Polyperchon, Alexandros son of Polyperchon, Kratesipolis, Ptolemy, Kassandros, and Demetrios Poliorketes each held the city, its harbors, and citadel between the years 323 and 301. In addition to the military struggles around Corinth, the city suffered the effects of two devastating earthquakes. Further destruction in the Corinthia has been associated either with Kassandros’ attack in 315 or Demetrios’ between 304 and 303. The Greek Archaeological Service excavated three houses in 1961 at Moulki, near modern Agioi Theodoroi, or ancient Krommyon, at least one of which was destroyed by fire.96 In one of the houses

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(House A), a single coin of Kassandros, datable between 316 and 297, was discovered amidst the destruction debris.97 This coin’s presence securely places the house’s destruction within the last years of the fourth century or early in the third century and it is quite possible to suggest that it could be associated either with Kassandros’ or Demetrios’ assaults on the Corinthia between 315 and 303. One cannot, however, discount the possibility that the two earthquakes of the late fourth century may have accounted for the destruction. Further excavation at the site, conducted in 1992, has revealed more extensive remains in the area datable to the Hellenistic period. Among the new finds were coins, but the excavator provides no details about them in the published report.98 While we await final publication, we can only hope that the coins discovered may allow us to date more accurately the site’s destruction and the circumstances that accounted for it. Until that time, however, it is safest to conclude that the houses’ destruction cannot have been before 316 and could have been after 297. The destruction wrought by the struggles of the Diadochoi throughout the Corinthia suffices to judge this period at Corinth as a time of troubles, as Menander alluded in his Perikeiromene. The dynasts who possessed Corinth throughout this period, save Demetrios, lacked the ability to secure the Corinthians’ goodwill and this contributed to the difficulties the latter experienced. In many ways, however, the picture may be even worse than this. As discussed in Chapter 2, Corinth was a major supplier of skilled craftsmen and building materials to sanctuaries such as Delphi and Epidauros between the years ca. 370 and 323. We possess not a single epigraphic reference to a Corinthian employed abroad or the use of Corinthian building materials between 323 and the early third century. Perhaps the tumultuous nature of these years, as well as the completion of nearby building programs, contributed to the decline in employment of Corinthian craftsmen and the use of Corinthian building material abroad. As we shall see in Chapter 5, these years have also been the matter of considerable speculation regarding the initiation of a large-scale building program at Corinth. It appears, however, that no public or Macedonian building projects could have begun before (at the earliest) Demetrios’ advent in 303. What building occurred between the death of Alexander the Great and Demetrios’ arrival seems limited to repairs associated with the earthquakes that affected Corinth. Other indicators suggest, however, that life for some Corinthians continued with some normalcy throughout the Diadoch era. The Corinthian Andromenes, for example, won the stade race at Olympia in 304.99 Hermokrates son of Androsthenes was granted proxenia at Delphi not long after 315.100 Around 300, Theodoros of Kyrene is reported (Diog. Laert. 2.102–3) to have met Metrokles, the Cynic at Corinth, indicating continuity with Diogenes’ earlier presence. Corinthians also continued to play a role in Sicilian affairs; they dispatched to Sicily Akestorides, whom the Syracusans elected as their strategos after the death of Timoleon.101 He successfully expelled Agathokles from the city in 317/16 (Diod. Sic. 19.5.1–3). Agathokles, however, was able to establish tyranny in 66

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Syracuse, initiating a break in its relations with its metropolis. This break is noticeably punctuated by his appeal to Ophellas (309/8), a veteran of Alexander’s campaign, who in Ptolemaic service had been appointed governor of Kyrene.102 The presence of a Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth, as well as other fortified places throughout the Corinthia, including Kenchreai and probably Lechaion, represents further continuity. Many poleis experienced tremendous political turmoil within these years, as oligarchic constitutions and tyrants were imposed or removed with great frequency. Exiles and executions of citizens regularly accompanied these political upheavals. Our sources are frustratingly silent concerning alterations that may have been made to Corinth’s constitution. Construction of an argument founded upon the sources’ silence is perilous; however, Corinth quite likely had an oligarchic constitution at the time of its surrender to Philip after Chaironeia. Antipatros and Kassandros favored this form of constitution and may have left it unaltered. Polyperchon as well as Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes preferred to restore the poleis’ constitutions that were in place at the time of Philip and Alexander, thus providing them with justification to leave Corinth’s constitution unaltered. Some Corinthians’ betrayal of Corinth to Demetrios, however, suggests that alterations to the polis’ constitution, or change in the men who governed it, may have accompanied his arrival.103 Furthermore, with the exception of the period during which Kassandros controlled Corinth, the sources offer no evidence of Corinthian dissent or attempts to assert their own voice in the choice of constitution. Nevertheless, few of the Diadochoi, with the exception of Antipatros, appear to have acted with a desire to secure the Corinthians’ goodwill. Polyperchon had the Corinthian epimeletes Deinarchos executed, and his son Alexandros failed to defend the Corinthian chora on several occasions. Polyperchon’s attempt to revive the League of Corinth, however, may have benefited Corinth temporarily, but its ultimate failure cannot have won enduring Corinthian goodwill. Likewise, Ptolemy attempted to revive the League of Corinth, but simultaneously demanded money and grain from his allies. Kassandros had attacked Corinth several times before capturing it. He appears neither to have displayed goodwill toward the Corinthians nor sought reciprocal goodwill from them. Demetrios Poliorketes possessed the city briefly before departing, but he indicated that he was capable of mutually beneficial exchanges with the Corinthians. The uninterrupted presence of a Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth and within the Corinthia certainly impinged on the Corinthians’ ability to express discontent with the Macedonians. Expediency probably demanded such a prudent course of action.

Notes 1 For the date of the Perikeiromene’s composition (after 302/1) and its setting in Corinth, see Dixon 2005a: 131–32 and 137–40.

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2 The principal sources include Diod. Sic. 18.8–18; Plut. Phoc. 23–29; Dem. 27–31; Hyp. 6; Paus. 1.25.3–5; and Just. 13.5.1–17. See also Seibert (1983: 92–98) and the discussions of Badian (1961: 16–43); Tracy (1995: 23–29); Habicht (1997: 36–42); and Bosworth (2003: 14–22). 3 See above, p. 32. According to Diodoros (18.8.6) the Exiles’ Decree affected most adversely the Athenians and Aitolians. 4 Diodoros (18.11.1–2) notes that some Greek poleis remained on the Macedonian side, while others remained neutral. He later records that Argos, Sikyon, Elis, Messene, and those inhabiting the Akte joined the alliance against the Macedonians. Pausanias (1.25.4) lists Argos, Epidauros, Sikyon, Troizen, Elis, Phlious, and Messene as the Peloponnesians who took part. Justin (13.5.10) includes Sikyon, Argos, Corinth, and others as those Peloponnesian states that joined the revolt. Justin’s inclusion of Corinth cannot be correct; see Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 131. Rosen (1967: 58), however, accepts Justin’s account, believing that the Corinthians initially joined the alliance, but that they later “stood apart” from it. 5 See the Athenian decree in honor of Euphron of Sikyon, IG II2.448; Schwenk 1985: no. 83, 407–18; Poddighe 2002: 141–47; Oliver 2003: 95–110. See also Griffin 1982: 76–77. 6 Diod. Sic. 18.12.4; Hyp. 6.12. 7 Bosworth 2003: 16–20, with earlier bibliography. See also the comments of Oliver 2007: 45. Previous commentators on the Diodoros passage, arguing that the naval war could not have extended to western Greece, have proposed numerous suggestions to place the two naval battles within the Aegean; see Heckel (2006: 88) for support of the emendation to Lichades islands; yet more recently, see Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel (2011: 128) for retention of Echinades. 8 Bosworth 2003: 17–18. 9 Conveyance of 240 ships across the diolkos would have been impossible. See Pettegrew (2011: 563–67) for the difficulties in transporting military vessels across the diolkos; he demonstrates that the transportation of military vessels across the diolkos that are attested in the literary sources between the Classical and early Hellenistic periods never exceed 60 ships. 10 Bosworth (2003: 20) reconstructs the Macedonian fleet’s return to the Aegean: “from Acarnania [Kleitos’] route would have taken him south of the Peloponnese and then directly through the Cyclades and past Amorgos.” 11 For the Macedonians’ use of the diolkos during the Social War, see Polyb. 4.19.7–9; 5.29.4–6; and probably 5.101.4. See also below, pp. 172–3, 175–6. 12 For examples in which crossings of the Isthmos were presented as “heroic achievements” and commemorated as such, see Pettegrew 2011: 567–70. 13 Marm. Par. = FGrH 239 B9; Plut. Demetr. 11.4. For the date, see Habicht 1997: 39 and note 7. 14 Diod. Sic. 18.16.4–17.5; Plut. Phoc. 26.1. The battle of Krannon took place on 7 Metageinion (early August); see Plut. Cam. 19.5. 15 For the date, see Plut. Dem. 28.1. 16 Suda s.v., Δείναρχος, Δ 333. 17 There is little merit to Paschidis’ (2008: 69–70) suggestion that this Deinarchos was an Athenian. Paschidis seems unaware that a Deinarchos of Corinth fought in Sicily with Timoleon and that Demosthenes (18.295) named Deinarchos (and Demaratos) was one of two individuals who “betrayed” Corinth to Philip. 18 Worthington (2003) has argued recently that Ep. 6 is authentic and that it was composed shortly after the allies’ victory over the Macedonians at Thermopylai. 19 FGrH 156 F 9.15: Δείναρχος δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος ὁ κατήγορος ἦν. [Demades] (fr. 91) also places Deinarchos at Antipatros’ court in Macedonia in summer of 319,

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20 21

22 23

24

25

26 27 28 29

30 31

32 33 34 35

36

shortly before the regent’s death, where he leveled accusations against Demades of Athens. For Demetrios’ official title in Athens, see Tracy 1994: 151–61; 1995: 43–46; 2000: 336–37; O’Sullivan 2009: 95–97. It must be noted that during the reign of Demetrios of Phaleron at Athens, Kassandros also maintained a garrison on Mounychia that his phrourarchos Dionysios commanded (Diod. Sic. 20.45.2). Similarly, an unknown Macedonian surely commanded the garrison on Acrocorinth while Deinarchos was epimeletes. For Demetrios’ elections, see Diod. Sic. 18.74.3 and Tracy 1995: 45–46 and notes 56 and 57 with earlier bibliography. Two other traditions exist regarding the location at which Hypereides was executed. Plutarch (Mor. 849b–c) records that he was brought to Antipatros either in Corinth, Macedonia, or Kleonai. See Pritchett (1996: 141, with earlier bibliography) for an attempt to identify Hypereides’ place of execution at Phokian Kleonai in the territory of Hyampolis. For a thorough refutation of this proposal, see Miller 1982: 105 and note 40; Marchand 2002: 24–25. See Miller (1982: 106–7), who explains this conclusion by pointing to Kleonai’s loyalty to Macedonia during the war and as a result of the favorable Macedonian policy regarding the Nemean Games. See also Marchand (2002: 507), who cautiously argues that Antipatros’ presence at Kleonai may represent punishment or reward. For the inscription see, Piérart and Thalmann 1980: 261–69, no. 3 (SEG 30.355). This inscription was published too late for Miller to take account of it in his article, but as he notes in an addendum (107–8), “one is entitled to wonder if this development might not, in some sense, have been a result of Kleonai’s role in the Lamian War.” For Antipatros’ activities during the Lamian War and following it, see Heckel (1992: 43–46) and Baynham (1994: 344–56). Diod. Sic. 18.48.4; Plut. Phoc. 31.1. For Polyperchon, see Berve ii: no. 655 and Heckel 1992: 188–204; 2006: 226–31. Diod. Sic. 18.48.4; Plut. Phoc. 31.1. For Kassandros, see Berve ii: no. 414 and Heckel 2006: 79–81. Polyperchon’s diagramma has been recognized as an authentic document recorded by Hieronymos of Kardia and reproduced by Diodoros (18.56); see Rosen 1967: 41–45, 64–68; Hornblower 1981: 131; Billows 1990: 198–99; Bosworth 2002: 22. For autumn 319 as its date of publication, see Poddighe (1998: 39–40; 2013: 225–40) and Dixon (2007: 156). See Staatsverträge, III, no. 403 III; and more recently Poddighe (1998: 5–59; 2002: 172–90; 2013) and Dixon (2007: 156–70) for earlier bibliography on this question. For the chronology of Polyperchon’s movements in the vicinity of Athens, see Williams (1984: 300–305), who argues that he left Attica in autumn 318. Bosworth (1992: 70 and 80 and 2002: 282) places his departure from Attica in summer 318. Dixon (2007: 158 and note 24) argues for early summer 318, with Polyperchon possibly arriving at Poseidon’s sanctuary in concert with the Isthmian Games. For the restoration of the democracy in early March 318, see Habicht 1997: 47–52. Plutarch (Phoc. 33.6) notes that Deinarchos fell sick (ἀρρωστία) on the way to meet Polyperchon. Plut. Phoc. 33.5: ἐπιτήδειοι τοῦ Πολυσπέρχοντος εἶναι δοκοῦντες καὶ συνήθεις. Compare Polyperchon’s letter to Argos (Diod. Sic. 18.57.1), in which he ordered them to exile those involved in the government that Antipatros had established. Moreover, he instructed them to condemn to death certain ones of them and to confiscate their property. Dixon 2007: 156–70.

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37 Dixon 2007: 158–60. Bosworth (1992: 70 and note 75) suggested that Polyperchon was in the vicinity of Corinth. Earlier, Wiseman (1979: 539, Table 3) had included Polyperchon’s declaration of freedom in his list of “International Meetings at Corinth and Isthmia, 480–146 B.C.,” placing the meeting at Isthmia. 38 For the Tyre decree, see Billows 1990: 113–16, 199–205. Beloch (GG IV.1: 120) argued that Polyperchon’s diagramma inspired Antigonos’ proclamation. See, recently, Dixon 2007: 170–71. 39 Stroud (1971: 142) argues that the fort he discovered in the Stanotopi pass of Mt. Oneion formed part of Alexandros’ defenses that blocked Kassander’s attempted invasion of the Peloponnese. For a recent examination of the Stanotopi fortification, see Caraher and Gregory 2006: 333–34. 40 For discussion of the pass through the Geraneion range and the Corinthian fortification at Oenoe, see Wiseman (1978: 20–32), who identifies Kassandros’ route with this pass. 41 For the late summer date of the Nemean Games, see Perlman 1989: 57–90; see also Lambert 2002: 72–74. 42 See Stroud (1971: 127–38) for the remains and finds. He has demonstrated that this fortification had been constructed before the last third of the fourth century and he suggests that the Macedonians occupied it following 338. See also Caraher and Gregory (2006: 333–34) for a recent discussion of the remains. I would like to thank R. Stroud for accompanying me to the site in January 1998 and discussing it with me. 43 For its discovery, a detailed description of it, the associated finds, and additional fortification walls between the two sites, see Caraher and Gregory 2006: 334–45. 44 Stroud (1971: 142–43) proposed the identification for the fort at Stanotopi; Caraher and Gregory (2006: 346–47) have endorsed Stroud’s identification and proposed that the Maritsa fortification was the other that Kassandros captured. See, however, Perlman (2000: 148–49) who asks whether or not the two fortifications Kassandros captured might be located near Kleonai. 45 One may plausibly suggest that the recently discovered fortification at Ano Vayia in the southeastern Corinthia, overlooking Lychnari Bay, was utilized in this context, see Caraher, Pettegrew, and James (2010: 385–415). The authors interpret these towers and fortifications at Vayia “as buildings for small garrisons around Lychnari Bay” (408). Increased reliance upon importations from Lychnari Bay while Kassandros occupied Kenchreai might provide one suitable historical context in which to situate these sites. 46 Polyperchon’s disappearance is impossible to explain, as is his second disappearance after he re-emerges again in 310. In fact, we have no idea where he went or when he died. 47 Diod. Sic. 19.67.1. Their motives for assassinating Alexandros are unknown; they also may have acted as agents of someone (Antigonos Monophthalmos, Polyperchon, or the Corinthians?). Schwartz (1929: 34) has attempted to associate his murder with the composition of Menander’s Perikeiromene; Dixon (2005a: 136–37), however, has demonstrated that this is not tenable. 48 For the relationship between Antigonos and Telesphoros, see Billows 1990: 435–36, no. 111. 49 For a brief overview of Sikyonian history in the early Hellenistic period, see Griffin 1982: 76–79; Lolos 2011: 70–77. 50 For her background, see Macurdy 1929: 273–78; Tataki, Macedonians, 350, no. 100; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 1. 51 See Diod. Sic. 20.20, 28.1. For Polyperchon’s attempt to reassert himself in Macedonia with Alexander’s illegitimate son Herakles, see Wheatley 1998. 52 We have no evidence of Polyperchon again until 303 when he is still allied with Kassandros and is somewhere in the Peloponnese; see Diod. Sic. 20.103.7.

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53 Polyainos (8.58) alone attests to Kratesipolis’ use of mercenaries to guard Acrocorinth. See the comments of Griffith 1935: 89. 54 For Polemaios, see Billows 1990: 426–30, no. 100. See Geagan (1968: 381–84) for an attempt to associate an inscribed record (SEG 25.357) of soldiers with Polemaios’ expedition of 313. Geagan dates the stone to 313 or 312. The inscription is of considerable interest for there is reference to Acrocorinth ([–] Ἀκροκορ[ινθ – -]) in line 1. Geagan concedes that its role is “not clear.” 55 For the Peace of 311, see Diod. Sic. 19.105.1; for the murder of Herakles and Polyperchon’s role in it, see Wheatley 1998: 12–23. 56 For an overview of Ptolemy’s activities in Asia Minor and Greece as well as his aggressive propaganda campaign during these years, see Seibert 1969: 184–89; Billows 1990: 143–45. Bosworth (2000: 207–41) argues for dating the composition of the Liber de Morte precisely to 309/8 and within the context of this campaign. 57 Diod. Sic. 20.37.1; Polyainos 8.58. 58 Macurdy 1929: 274–75; 1932: 106; Carney 2000: 229. 59 It is unclear what happened to Kratesipolis after Ptolemy took control of Corinth. Plutarch (Demetr. 9.5) places her at Patrai in August 307 when she met with Demetrios Poliorketes. See, however, Wheatley (2004: 1–9), who accepts emendation of Patrai to Megara’s harbor of Pagai and prefers to date the meeting to 303 and Demetrios’ campaign in the northern Peloponnese following his capture of Sikyon. 60 Diodoros (20.37.2) records that Ptolemy planned to free the Greeks (ἐπεβάλετο μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις Πτολεμαῖος ἐλευθεροῦν). The Suda (s.v. Δημήτριος, Δ431) contains the best evidence we have for a revival of the League of Corinth. We should not forget, however, that Diodoros mentioned neither the revival of the League by Polyperchon nor Antigonos and Demetrios. Beloch (GG IV.1: 145–46) first suggested that Ptolemy revived the League of Corinth. For tentative acceptance of this conclusion, see Bengston, Strategie I, 144; Will 1979: 69 and CAH2 VII.1: 54–55; Billows 1990: 144–45. Heuss (1938: 151–52) and Simpson (1959: 391) reject the association of Ptolemy’s decree as a revival of the League of Corinth. Bosworth (2000: 216 and 222), although recognizing that Ptolemy presided over the Isthmian Games and proclaimed Greek freedom, does not address the issue. For warnings concerning the date of the alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrios recorded in the Suda entry, see Seibert 1969: 180–83 and Billows 1990: 145, note 18 and 201, note 32. 61 Kallixeinos, FGrH 627 F 2 = Athen. 201d. 62 Tarn (1913: 371) recognized the significance of “Corinth” in the procession, citing it as evidence for Ptolemy’s revival of the League of Corinth. Rice (1983: 102–10) interprets “Corinth’s” presence as a representation of the League of Corinth and thus evidence that Ptolemy I had revived it. Stewart (1994: 256–58) has endorsed this conclusion. See also Dixon 2007: 173–74. 63 The Suda (s.v., Δημήτριος, Δ431) reports that Ptolemy installed a Leonidas as commander of his Greek forces (ἐπὶ τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ ἀρχῇ ἐπιστήσας). This is most likely an error for Kleonides, whom Ptolemy installed upon his departure from Corinth in 308. 64 Plutarch, however, may be correct that the total of Demetrios’ fleet was 250 ships. If Demetrios left 230 of them near Sounion, that would correspond reasonably with Polyainos’ “majority” of his ships. 65 Ptolemy’s failure to secure grain promised to him when he revived the League of Corinth probably indicates that he required it for his garrison. Any grain sent to Corinth from Egypt, therefore, most likely served the garrison first. 66 For shortages of grain in the late fourth century, see above, pp. 33–5, and in the 290s, see Plut. Demetr. 34.2. For Athens’ reliance on Ptolemaic support for grain in the 280s, see SEG 28.60, lines 53–54, the decree in honor of Kallias of Sphettos.

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67 For the ancient sources, see Diod. Sic. 20.45–46.5; Plut. Demetr. 8–14. For the Four Years’ War in general, see Will 1979: 77–78; Habicht 1985: 77–82. 68 ICGH, no. 85; Ravel 1938: 98–108; Jenkins 1960: 32–34. Mørkholm (1980: 156; 1991: 65), however, argues for a date of 304 for the hoard’s burial. 69 The other coins include: 70 Corinthian staters, 84 Corinthian drachms, and nine staters from Leukas. 70 Ravel 1938: 98–108. The drachms of Ptolemy are nos. 22–33; the 14 Corinthian drachms are nos. 174–87. See also Martin (1985: 180–83) and Mørkholm (1991: 64–65, 87) for endorsement of Ravel’s conclusions concerning the Ptolemaic use of the Corinthian mint and its purpose. Both Martin and Mørkholm, however, offer very different conclusions from Ravel concerning the hoards’ significance to the end of Corinthian “autonomous” coinage. 71 See especially Martin 1985: 180–82. 72 Diod. Sic. 20.103.1–3. Our sources do not indicate when Kassandros gained control of Corinth. It is generally assumed that this occurred in 306, some time after Demetrios Poliorketes defeated Ptolemy at Kypriot Salamis. 73 Ravel 1938: 104. The tetradrachms of Ptolemy, on the other hand, were all slightly worn, indicating a more prolonged period of circulation. 74 When Ptolemy replaced Kleonides with Philip as commander of his forces at Sikyon is unknown. See Tataki, Macedonians, 447, no. 29; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 193. 75 For the causes, see Plutarch (Alex. 74. 6) and Hamilton’s (1969: 204–7) comments. See also Badian 1961: 34 and note 139; Bosworth 1988: 162; and Stewart 1994: 38, 149, note 86, and 278. 76 As suggested above, Kassandros’ attempts to capture Corinth may have been designed to prevent his rivals from proclaiming the Greeks free and reviving the League of Corinth (in addition to its strategic location at the crossroads of the Greek mainland). These proclamations and revivals of the League undoubtedly were troublesome for his oligarchies. 77 Diodoros is certainly incorrect in stating that Demetrios took both the city and its harbors. He seems to have forgotten the status of Kenchreai, for Plutarch and Polyainos state explicitly that Demetrios had held it for as much as a year prior to his assault on the city (we do not know the status of Lechaion). 78 Compare Roberts 1983: 186–87. 79 For the likelihood that Hieronymos of Kardia was Diodoros’ source for Demetrios’ attack, see Hornblower 1981: 49 and 251. 80 Xenophon (Hell. 7.1.18) provides the only attestation of the name. For Corinth’s Phliasian Gate, see Corinth III.2: 74–76; Wiseman 1978: 81. Billows (1990: 171 note 16), however, speculates that the gate through which Demetrios entered the city was the Teneatic Gate. Another road to Tenea undoubtedly led from Corinth’s Southeast Gate, see further Corinth III.2: 51–54. 81 Although no traces of it survive, the Teneatic Gate most likely stood along Corinth’s western fortifications, not far distant from the sanctuary of Eileithyia and the fortifications of Acrocorinth; see Pausanias (2.5.4). For speculation on its precise location, see Corinth I.1: 88–89; Corinth III.2: 47–48, 65. Sakellariou and Faraklas 1971: 21. Wiseman (1978: 81) postulates that it was located “on the saddle that connects Acrocorinth to Penteskouphia.” It seems implausible that Demetrios would have bypassed the Phliasian Gate to enter the Teneatic Gate; if correct, this makes the former the most likely candidate. 82 For the Sikyonian Gate, of which no traces have been identified, but whose location has been approximated on the evidence of traces of roads leading toward and from the city walls, see further Wiseman 1978: 84–85. 83 For a detailed description of the roads from Sikyon to Corinth, see Lolos 2011: 98–112.

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84 Strabo (8.6.21), however, notes that “below Peirene is the Sisypheion, which preserves no small remains of some sanctuary, or royal palace, made of white stone.” Strabo’s Peirene must be the spring of Upper Peirene on Acrocorinth. Both he and Diodoros represent our only attestations of the Sisypheion at Corinth and by extension the cult associated with it. See also Corinth III.1: 26 for an inscription discovered on Acrocorinth that apparently refers in some way to Sisyphos. Billows (1990: 171 note 17) tries to explain the topographical problems by postulating that the Sisypheion was located on a “spur or saddle below the peak of Acrocorinthos.” The accounts of both Strabo and Diodoros ultimately derive from the same source, namely Hieronymos of Kardia’s digression on the topography of Corinth; see Hornblower 1981: 49, 251. Strabo, however, seems to have visited Acrocorinth personally, thus making his account of the citadel’s topography preferable; see Wallace 1969: 495–99. 85 The Macedonians regularly resorted to billeting; see, for example, Launey 1949: 695–713; Ma 2000: 112–14; 2002: 118–19; Chaniotis 2002: 104; 2005: 124–25. 86 Diod. Sic. 20.107.2–4, 11.3. For details of his later career, see Tataki, Macedonians, 414, no. 106; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 2. 87 For a more recent edition of the stele, see Staatsverträge III, no. 446. On the League itself, see Will 1979: 77–79; Hammond, HM III, 176–77; Billows 1990: 228–30. 88 Diod. Sic. 20.103.3: παρεισήγαγε φυλακὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον; see further below. 89 For Hellenistic monarchs’ conscious use of φυλακή to portray the installation of a garrison (φρουρά) as a benefaction upon a city, see Chaniotis 2002: 106–7. 90 This official is called [τῶι στρατη]γῶι τῶι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ τῆς κοι[ν]ῆς φυλακῆς καταλελειμμέν[ωι] (IG IV2.1 68, III, lines 68–69) and again ὁ{ι} ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἀποδεδειγμένος στρ[ατ]ηγός (lines 71–72). 91 Compare, for example, the Athenians’ request that Demetrios maintain a garrison in the Piraeus and Mounychia, Plut. Demetr. 34.6. 92 Troxell 1971: 44–50. Noe (1950: nos. 17–19, 22–39) initially ascribed this coinage to Sikyon. See also Price 1991: 155–59; Mørkholm 1991: 61. 93 Mørkholm 1991: 87–88. 94 Mørkholm 1991: 61. 95 Tarn (1913: 19) suggests that he and his mother Phila (Antipatros’ daughter) met Kassandros in 303, possibly to negotiate a truce with him on Demetrios’ behalf. See, however, Carney 2000: 166–67. 96 Verdelis and Alexandri 1961–62: 52–54. Evidence for destruction by fire was found in House B, which led Alexandri, the excavator of the houses, to conclude that it was destroyed in this manner. She does not state that the others were destroyed in the same way, but it seems clear that the destruction of all three houses was contemporaneous. Interestingly she also reports the existence at the site of wells and cisterns. The presence of cisterns here in the late fourth century lends further weight to Camp’s (1982: 15–16) proposal that similar cisterns in Corinth reflect the precarious state of the water and grain supply at this time. 97 Verdelis and Alexandri 1961–62: 54. See also Wiseman (1978: 19) who suggests that the destruction be associated either with Kassandros (315) or Demetrios Poliorketes (303). 98 Parlama 1992: 54–56. She also reports discovering pottery and jewelry, as well as another cistern. 99 Moretti, Olympionikai, 493; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 9. 100 FD III, I, no. 179, line 2. The inscription is dated 315–300 B.C. See also LGPN (III.A, s.v., no. 4) where the grant is dated between 315 and 280. 101 LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2. See also Talbert 1974: 124. 102 For Ophellas, see Berve ii: 598; Heckel 2006: 184–85, no. 2.

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103 Corinth has been identified as the polis that issued a decree found on Delos (SEG 30.990), recording a grant of proxenia for the Athenian Xenokles son of Hagnotheos and Pausimachos son of Demokles, and it has been cited as evidence for the working of its ekklesia during the late fourth or early third century. Millis (2010a: 254–56, with earlier bibliography), however, has demonstrated that the decree must date post-166, as Robert (Hellenica V: 5–15) first suggested.

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4 A N T I G ON OS GON A TAS AN D C O R I N T H , “T H E PA S S I O N O F H I S LI F E ” 1

Antigonos Monophthalmos is said to have remarked, “goodwill is a noble and unshakable gangway.”2 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, pro-Macedonian Corinthians consistently exhibited their goodwill (eunoia) toward the Argeadai; the latter frequently reciprocated the former’s displays. The Diadochoi who possessed Corinth, on the other hand, despite sporadic efforts were much less successful than Philip and Alexander in securing the goodwill of the proMacedonian Corinthians. Perhaps, however, these Corinthians’ relationship with the Antigonids was one in which the mutual benefits for both parties reached unprecedented levels. Some assisted Demetrios in his capture of Acrocorinth and they shrewdly requested that he maintain a garrison to protect their polis from Kassandros. Demetrios responded auspiciously, reviving the League of Corinth and successfully defending the Corinthia. He also initiated a large-scale building program at Corinth prior to his departure for the battle of Ipsos (301). Antigonos Monophthalmos died on the battlefield, having lost the empire he had constructed over the course of two decades, bequeathing virtually nothing to his son and heir. His ruminations on the nature of eunoia, however, amounted to a valuable patrimony as Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Gonatas attempted to pick up the pieces of the dynasty’s devastating loss at Ispos. Considered in this chapter, therefore, is Corinth’s importance to the Antigonids between the battle of Ipsos (301) and Aratos of Sikyon’s capture of Acrocorinth (243) as well as the intensification of reciprocal goodwill between the Corinthians and the Antigonids.

The aftermath of Ipsos After reviving the League of Corinth, Antigonos I Monophthalmos summoned his son Demetrios I Poliorketes to Asia for the imminent encounter with their rivals.3 There is no evidence to support the claims that Kassandros recaptured Corinth after Demetrios’ departure or even that he attacked it.4 Antigonos was killed at the battle of Ipsos in 301; his son managed to escape with some of his

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fleet intact. Demetrios returned to mainland Greece, hoping first to gain entrance into Athens, upon whose goodwill he thought he could rely. The Athenians, however, met him as he sailed towards Piraeus, informing him that he would not be granted entrance (Plut. Demetr. 30.3–4). Demetrios demanded that they return his ships stationed in Piraeus; they complied willingly, returning even his famous ship of 13 banks of oars. Once he received them, he sailed to the Isthmos (Kenchreai), discovering that his garrisons were being expelled and others had gone over to his enemies (Plut. Demetr. 31.2); the proMacedonian Corinthians, however, remained loyal to the king, in stark contrast to the Athenians, whose goodwill toward Demetrios, according to Plutarch (Demetr. 30.5), proved on this occasion empty (κενήν) and feigned (πεπλασμένην). One can only infer that Demetrios perceived the welcome he received from the Corinthians as a display of their continued goodwill towards him and he recognized that he would have to respond in kind to maintain it. King Demetrios, after arriving at Corinth, embarked upon a series of adventures throughout the Aegean to recover a kingdom. He visited Asia Minor, campaigned within the Peloponnese, against Athens, within the Adriatic, and he captured Macedonia. In fact, he rarely visited the city again. His absence, coupled with the necessity of maintaining Corinth, required the presence of someone whom he could trust to foster a continued state of goodwill with the Corinthians. He first left Pyrrhos of Epeiros in charge of affairs in Greece (ἀπολιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος).5 He had fought with distinction alongside the Antigonids at Ipsos and accompanied Demetrios on his return. Pyrrhos likely remained in Corinth, which may well have been Demetrios’ lone possession in Greece. Plutarch’s terminology for his command recalls the title of those officials from his League of Corinth, found on the Epidaurian inscription (IG IV2.1 68) recording the revival of the League.6 He, however, did not command the affairs of Greece for long, as Demetrios in 299 offered him as a hostage to Ptolemy I, with whom Poliorketes sought to establish peace (Plut. Pyrr. 4.5). Before Demetrios departed for Asia in 287, he left Antigonos in charge of his affairs in Greece (ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατέλιπεν), but the location(s) from which he carried out his responsibilities is not recorded (Plut. Demetr. 44.4). Antigonos’ title recalls that bestowed upon Pyrrhos, ca. 301–299, as well as the title of the League of Corinth’s officers.7 It is likely that from 294 Gonatas was located at Corinth, or perhaps he regularly divided his time between Corinth and the three other prominent Antigonid fortresses (Chalkis, Demetrias, and Piraeus) for the administration of Greek affairs. While Pyrrhos maintained affairs in Greece, Demetrios concluded an alliance with Seleukos and agreed to a treaty of friendship between Ptolemy. More significantly, Demetrios also visited Kyinda in Kilikia (Plut. Demetr. 32.1), where he discovered 1,200 talents still located in his father’s former treasury; after collecting the money, he quickly departed.8 This acquisition is significant, as it demonstrates the vast sums of money Demetrios and his son Antigonos still had at their disposal in the early third century. The Antigonid treasury certainly 76

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was not as vast as it had been prior to the battle of Ipsos, but nevertheless father and son still had access to substantial financial resources. Demetrios returned his attention to Greece and it remained focused there between 297 and 295. While engaged in an attack upon Athens (297), he responded to the news of Kassandros’ death and the opportunities it offered. Demetrios attacked Messene and in spring 295 he attacked Athens again. These campaigns required the use of his army and his fleet. Demetrios utilized both Corinth and its harbor of Kenchreai as his base of operations. He then invaded Macedonia in autumn 294, killing Kassandros’ youngest son, Alexandros, and driving another of his sons, Antipatros, into exile with Lysimachos, and was proclaimed king of Macedonia.9 His coronation added new credence to his claim that he and his descendants were the legitimate heirs of the Argeadai. In fact, many of Demetrios’ actions between his assumption of the royal title in Macedonia and his departure for the east (287) appear scripted to recall those of Philip and Alexander prior to the former’s assassination and the latter’s departure for Asia.10 While successes and setbacks punctuated Demetrios’ reign as king of Macedonia, the loyalty of Corinth remained steadfast. He secured control of Thessaly, but then had to confront a revolt in Boiotia.11 After Demetrios’ suppression of the revolt at Thebes (Plut. Demetr. 39.4), he installed garrisons in the rebellious Boiotian cities, exacted much money from them, and installed Hieronymos of Kardia as governor (epimeletes and harmost).12 In general, our evidence for the exaction of monies and regular taxation of garrisoned poleis is very limited.13 The example of the failed Boiotian revolt, however, may be instructive, as Demetrios demanded money only after its suppression. Conversely, the Corinthians’ unremitting goodwill and loyalty suggest that Demetrios did not impose taxes upon them; instead he preferred both to reward their past loyalty and to ensure its continuance through exemption from taxation (ἀφορολόγητος) or possibly grants of tax exemption (ἀτέλεια). The imposition of a governor, garrisons, and taxation in Boiotia, however, prompted a second revolt in 291 that Demetrios’ son Antigonos Gonatas successfully contained until his father suppressed it.14 Recovery of the Asian empire that he and his father had held jointly and lost at Ipsos, however, remained Demetrios’ primary objective while in Macedonia.15 He commissioned the construction of 500 ships for the campaign, some of which were built at Corinth, and he visited each of the construction sites.16 This commission certainly generated countless jobs for Corinthians and a tremendous influx of capital to the local economy. In fact, the years of Demetrios’ reign in Macedonia (294–287) also coincide with a period of increased activity in the minting of coinage, some of which was certainly struck at Corinth. A series of “posthumous Alexanders” that once were attributed to a mint in Sikyon has now been ascribed confidently to Corinth. These “posthumous Alexanders” are silver tetradrachms issued on the Attic standard and have been dated to ca. 290–288 B.C.17 This coinage was likely used not only to pay for ship construction but also to fund the large building program underway at Corinth. 77

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While these ships were under construction, Demetrios’ reign in Macedonia neared its end as a coalition formed against him. Pyrrhos and Lysimachos conspired to invade Macedonia from the west and east respectively; Ptolemy sent a fleet to Athens.18 Demetrios returned to Macedonia to confront the threat, but defections from his camp crippled his defense. Fleeing to Kassandreia, he retreated ignominiously to the friendlier confines of his mainland Greek fortresses. News reached Demetrios that Athens, aided by Ptolemy I Soter, had revolted.19 According to the decree in honor of Kallias of Sphettos (SEG 28.60, lines 16–17), who aided the Athenian revolt, Demetrios descended upon the city with his army from the Peloponnese; his point of departure was certainly Corinth.20 These episodes, however, demonstrate not only Corinth’s strategic importance to the Antigonids, but also the value of its loyalty. They illustrate also the Corinthians’ obligations as they hosted royalty, countless troops encamped within the Corinthia, ships anchored at its harbors, and a garrison on Acrocorinth overlooking the city beneath it. Although potentially onerous, such responsibility must not always have had negative consequences; considerable opportunity for the demonstration of goodwill and income certainly accompanied them. According to Plutarch (Demetr. 43.3), Demetrios considered recovery of his father’s Asian empire the aim of his eastern expedition. The Antigonid emphasis upon empire inherited from one’s forebears and the repossession of territory they once held motivated Demetrios; it would inspire his descendants just as much. Philip V, for example, considered Corinth an “ancestral possession” during the Second Macedonian War (see pp. 184–5). An Antigonid preoccupation with the inheritance of territory from their ancestors begins with Demetrios, who instilled this principle in his son. Antigonos Gonatas, for example, paid homage to his ancestors with the dedication of the “progonoi monument” on Delos.21 This monument included 20 sculptures of his ancestors, which included Alexander the Great, Herakles, and other Argeadai. Demetrios Poliorketes, as Billows has proposed, also commissioned the paintings preserved in Roman copies from the villa Boscoreale, associating the original paintings specifically with his intention to recover Antigonos Monophthalmos’ Asian empire.22 The father’s paintings and the son’s monument emphasized their connections with Alexander, as well as their Antigonid ancestors; as such they added legitimacy to their own achievements. Nothing, however, went according to plan in Asia; Demetrios soon had no alternative but to surrender himself to Seleukos, who subsequently interred his one-time father-in-law (Plut. Demetr. 49–50). While imprisoned, according to Plutarch, Demetrios sent messages to those around Antigonos, and to his commanders and friends both in Athens and Corinth.23 He implored them to disregard other letters sent under his seal and to preserve for his son what remained of his possessions. After nearly three years of imprisonment, Demetrios died in 283. Antigonos was confronted with several challenges to his position while his father was absent, but again Corinth remained reliably loyal. When 78

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he learned of his father’s death, Demetrias, Corinth, and the Piraeus were his most critical possessions. Although strategically important, Antigonos, like his father after the battle of Ipsos, was reduced to very little; against all likelihood, however, he recovered the kingship of Macedonia. Once again, Corinth played a vital role in his ability to do so.

Antigonos after Demetrios Seleukos returned Demetrios Poliorketes’ ashes; Antigonos Gonatas received them somewhere in the Aegean. He displayed them solemnly in the harbors still under his control. Demetrios’ remains arrived in Corinth in a cinerary urn placed upon the flagship’s stern deck. Great fanfare surrounded their display: Xenophantos the flute-player accompanied the rowers with music suitably solemn for the occasion; royal purple and a diadem adorned the urn while young men under arms surrounded it. Gonatas wept, as the Corinthians bestowed fillets and crowns (ταινιῶν καὶ στεφάνων) upon the urn, after which he personally escorted the remains to Demetrias, the king’s final resting place (Plut. Demetr. 53.4–7). These fillets and crowns reflect both their goodwill toward him as well as their promise to display continuously goodwill to his son and heir. Antigonos, however, now was compelled to confront reality; he possessed a few strongholds throughout Greece and little more. His source of income seems non-existent, and he perhaps resorted to taxation of those few poleis in which he maintained garrisons, as his father Demetrios almost certainly had; Corinth, although no direct evidence suggests it, was likely exempt.24 Antigonos Gonatas continued to possess Corinth without interruption for 34 years after his father’s death. Despite its garrison, Corinth’s status as one of the “three fetters of Greece” seems to have perpetuated a period of relative stability, lasting until ca. 251/0, that was shattered within the turbulent 240s, when possession of Acrocorinth changed hands on three separate occasions. The archaeological record at Corinth, as we shall see below, bears out this conclusion. Now a king without a kingdom, Antigonos possessed only Corinth, Chalkis, Demetrias, and Piraeus, as well as a few additional Peloponnesian cities (Argos, Megalopolis). His father’s death left him in a precarious position; nevertheless, the vicissitudes of fortune conspired, offering new opportunities by which to recapture the kingdom of Macedonia his father had lost. Lysimachos represented the first threat.25 He exploited the chance to add Macedonia to his Thracian kingdom, after which he sought an even greater prize. The result of his efforts collapsed on the battlefield of Korupedion (281) where he was killed by Seleukos’ troops.26 After his victory, Seleukos too succumbed to ambition, crossing the Hellespont in an attempt to claim both Thrace and Macedonia, kingdoms he could rightfully boast were “spear-won.” His vision was never realized, as Ptolemy Keraunos, the disowned son of Ptolemy I Soter,

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assassinated him.27 Antigonos Gonatas was not ignorant of events transpiring in the East and the prospects they offered; he sailed from one of his naval bases to Macedonia, aspiring to reach it before Keraunos’ arrival and coronation.28 He failed, as Keraunos soundly defeated him at sea (Memnon FGrH 434 F 8; Just. 24.1.8). This failure had repercussions in southern Greece (280) as many of the poleis Antigonos held now expelled their garrisons; Argos, Megalopolis, Megara, and Boiotia appear to have revolted, and Sparta exploited the turmoil.29 Tarn’s assessment that “Corinth saved him from irremediable disaster. It cut the revolution in two” remains perceptive.30 Just as with the Theban revolt, Agis’ War, and the Lamian War, Macedonian control of Corinth prevented the Peloponnesians and their central Greek allies from uniting against Macedonian interests in Greece. Once again, however, while possessing Corinth and little else, Antigonos retained just enough so that when opportunity again presented itself he seized the occasion. The failures of Seleukos and subsequently Keraunos to maintain the northern defenses of Macedonia and Thrace proved the latter’s undoing. By late 280/early 279 thousands of Gauls moved south.31 Keraunos (281–279) marched against them in February 279; he was killed in battle.32 Virtual anarchy enveloped Macedonia.33 A large number of Gauls, led by Brennos, proceeded south toward Delphi (279), aiming to plunder Apollo’s sanctuary.34 A contingent of Greeks assembled at Thermopylai sought to halt their advance. Antigonos and Antiochos I each contributed 500 mercenaries; the Athenians also sent a delegation.35 Perhaps, however, the Aitolians contributed the most to the defense of Greece and the Sanctuary of Apollo.36 The Greek forces at Thermopylai repelled the Gauls temporarily, but could not halt altogether their advance toward Delphi. The attack, however, was an absolute failure, as the Delphians, reinforcements, and divine aid in the form of crashing mountainsides and spring snowstorms preserved the sanctuary’s inviolability.37 Other than his contribution of 500 mercenaries for the defense at Thermopylai, Antigonos’ movements after Keraunos had defeated him are obscure. He certainly, however, faced numerous challenges. Keraunos’ victory (in 281/0) prompted a Spartan-led effort throughout the Peloponnese to expel the Macedonians, but Corinth, Antigonos’ most critical Peloponnesian possession, remained loyal. James Wiseman has suggested that he also exploited the Gauls’ advance to improve his standing among the Peloponnesian poleis, summoning representatives to Corinth or Isthmia for the common defense of the peninsula.38 Traces of a trans-Isthmian wall, between Kenchreai and a point on the Corinthian gulf in the modern village of New Corinth, were discovered in 1957 and partially excavated in 1960–61.39 On the basis of historical considerations, Wiseman associates this early third-century wall with the Gaulish invasion and the defense of the Peloponnese, assigning its construction to autumn 279.40 Pausanias (7.6.7–8), in fact, clearly states that the Peloponnesians had (at least) resolved by a bouleuma to build the wall, yet he gives no indication that it was constructed. Prior to the discovery and excavation of this early third-century 80

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trans-Isthmian wall, few scholars accepted its authenticity; the evidence Wiseman has assembled, however, now compels us to accept its historicity.41 One of the most complicated aspects of Antigonos’ reign is the apparent fact that he alone of the Antigonids who possessed Corinth neither revived the League of Corinth that his father and grandfather had established (302) nor created an entirely new one modeled upon it as his nephew Antigonos III Doson later did (224). Wiseman tentatively associated Antigonos’ coordination of the Peloponnesian defense and the bouleuma authorizing it with an attempted renewal of the Hellenic League (League of Corinth).42 The evidence is suggestive, especially considering the panhellenic significance Philip II and Alexander the Great attached to their League of Corinth and the city’s association with the Hellenic League of 480, and the conscious effort in our extant sources to depict the Gaulish invasion of Greece in terms reminiscent of the Persians’ invasion of 481–479.43 Although the proposal has a certain appeal, it remains highly circumstantial and has not garnered widespread acceptance.44 Gonatas was active in Asia Minor shortly after 279/8. The purpose of his expedition is unclear. Justin (25.1.1) attests to a peace between Antigonos and Antiochos I, after which the former arrived in Thrace where he met a Gaulish force of 15,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry at Lysimacheia. Antigonos inflicted total defeat upon them by means of a carefully executed ambush.45 His victory at the battle of Lysimacheia (277) effectively arrested the Gauls’ movement into Macedonia and Thrace; more importantly, it facilitated his entry into Macedonia and the recovery of the kingship his father had held and lost. Antigonos subsequently subdued further resistance, employing Ameinias of Phokis the “archpirate” to put down the general Apollodoros, who still held out against him at Kassandreia (Polyainos 4.6.18).

Antigonos II Gonatas, king of Macedonia, and the garrison at Corinth After assuming the royal title in Macedonia, Antigonos shifted his attention and residence to the north, where his presence was regularly required. While the likelihood is great that for long stretches of time between 301 and 277 Antigonos frequently resided at Corinth and as a result possibly had no need for an official epistates or garrison commander, the need was now real. Several possible candidates exist for commanders of the garrison prior to the late 270s when Krateros is attested in this capacity. One possibility is the historian Hieronymos of Kardia.46 Strabo (8.6.21 = FGrH 154 F 16) in his description of Acrocorinth records that his two sources for the topography of pre-Roman Corinth were Hieronymos and Eudoxos of Knidos. Since Strabo did not include Hieronymos’ ethnic, his source may be identified as either the Kardian or Hieronymos of Rhodes. Jane Hornblower has demonstrated conclusively on the basis of comparisons with other topographical digressions attributed to Hieronymos of Kardia that he was Strabo’s source.47 Whether or not he served 81

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at Corinth, his autopsy of Acrocorinth and the city testifies to his presence there in some capacity and increases the value of his topographical account of Acrocorinth as reflected in Strabo and Diodoros. The years between 301 and 271/0 represent a critical period in the development and formalization of Antigonid control of Corinth, but unfortunately these years are poorly attested in our sources. An assessment of its status and administration during these three decades is necessary, since they possessed the city for an additional half-century (inclusive) beyond 271/0. While Demetrios may have exacted some form of taxation from the Greek poleis he held, there is no direct evidence to suggest that Antigonos Gonatas did. It is possible, however, that the specific form of taxation imposed upon Corinth was limited to an exaction of duties from the movement of goods through its harbors.48 Less onerous methods of revenue collection at Corinth are also possible. As we shall see below (Chapter 5), the Antigonids almost certainly funded construction of Corinth’s South Stoa (ca. 300). Its 33 shops or suites were used for dining and the service rooms behind them for food preparation. Pottery assemblages, especially inscribed drinking cups with dedications to several divinities, from the wells in 31 of the 33 shops suggest that officials associated with Corinthian cults utilized these suites for their secular proceedings.49 Very little attention, however, has been given to ownership of the South Stoa; it is not known whether the Corinthian demos or the Macedonians controlling Corinth “owned” it. In either case someone surely received the revenues for the use of its suites, as those utilizing them paid some rent or fee. An inscription from Sardis may shed some light on this question. In 213, King Antiochos III granted to the demos of Sardis an exemption from the payment of rent for use of workshops presumably in one of the city’s stoas.50 While this example is later than our context and it is a Seleukid rather than Antigonid parallel, it still remains instructive, illustrating the variety of means by which Hellenistic monarchs could exact revenues from the poleis they garrisoned. The unstinting loyalty that pro-Macedonian Corinthians demonstrated to both father and son, even during the bleakest of times, is likely to have been rewarded. Exemption from taxation, and perhaps additional burdens that Gonatas regularly imposed upon other Greek poleis, possibly constitute his euergetism to the Corinthians. There is no doubt, for example, that Antigonos Gonatas installed tyrants loyal to him in Greek poleis (Elis, Megalopolis, Argos), although the extent to which he relied upon this policy is disputed and the dates at which he installed them are uncertain.51 Again, as with taxation, no evidence attests to the imposition of a tyrant upon Corinth. Admittedly, the poverty of our sources may account for this silence; on the other hand, the sources’ silence may be telling. Antigonos’ garrison at Corinth was composed primarily of mercenaries.52 He continued to rely heavily upon them after assuming the kingship of Macedonia. For example, Ameinias’ expedition from Corinth to Sparta (272) included mercenaries and when Aratos took Acrocorinth (243) it housed 400 Syrian 82

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mercenaries. While I have argued throughout this study that a symbiotic relationship developed gradually over time between the Macedonians and the Corinthians who supported them, the mercenary (Gauls and Illyrians) element was probably never embraced. Menander’s Perikeiromene, especially the overbearing behavior of the mercenary Polemon (especially Acts I and III), may reflect Corinthian contempt for mercenaries within the city walls.

Antigonos and Pyrrhos Antigonos’ reign in Macedonia did not remain unchallenged for long. Pyrrhos initiated a war against him in late 275 that concluded with the former’s death in 272. Pyrrhos and Antigonos met in spring 274, probably within the Aous gorge; the former carried the day, defeating the latter’s Gaulish mercenaries.53 Pyrrhos pursued Antigonos, who ceded much of Macedonia to him. Pyrrhos then turned his attention to the Peloponnese, specifically Sparta, whose deposed king Kleonymos had enlisted his aid (Plut. Pyrr. 26.15–20). Antigonos Gonatas exploited his absence to recover Macedonia. The Peloponnesian theatre now became Antigonos’ primary concern. He sailed to Corinth, the one Peloponnesian stronghold he and his predecessors had held for decades. As Pyrrhos besieged Sparta, the tide of the conflict changed with the arrival from Corinth of Ameinias, one of Antigonos’ generals, and a mercenary force.54 Ameinias of Phokis may have held an official position at Corinth or he simply may have used it as his point of departure. Most likely, however, Antigonos had installed him as garrison commander shortly after the Phokian had captured Kassandreia, recalling Krateros to Macedonia.55 The nearly synchronous arrivals at Sparta of Ameinias and the Spartan King Areus from Crete convinced Pyrrhos to abandon his designs; he received further incentive when the anti-Macedonian Aristeas invited him to intervene in Argos.56 When he appeared outside the city, Pyrrhos found Antigonos encamped on the heights above the plain (Plut. Pyrr. 31.2).57 He had sped from Macedonia to Corinth, leading its garrison to Argos. Now that the full force of the two kings lay at their doorstep, the Argives appealed for both to withdraw and accept their neutrality and goodwill (Plut. Pyrr. 31.5). Antigonos abandoned his position after handing over to the Argives his son Halkyoneos as a sign of good faith; Pyrrhos also proposed to depart, offering, however, no token of his good faith. That night, the latter returned, entering the city through a gate Aristeas had opened. Once the Argives realized what had happened, they sent message to Antigonos, pleading with him to return to their aid. An epic struggle of urban warfare, fought in the dead of night and with total confusion, ensued (Plut. Pyrr. 32.1–7). As dawn broke, Pyrrhos despaired, seeing the enemy in command of the Aspis. He suffered a head wound, from which he soon collapsed. Zopyros, a soldier under Gonatas’ command, recognized Pyrrhos’ body and dragged it into a doorway, where he decapitated him with his Illyrian short-sword.58 83

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Pyrrhos’ death permitted Antigonos to solidify his position in both Macedonia and the Peloponnese. In fact, according to Justin (26.1.2), the Peloponnesians now were delivered up to Antigonos, as all hope of his expulsion clearly had vanished. Aristotimos, for example, seized the tyranny in Elis and subsequently attached himself to Gonatas.59 Corinth’s loyalty to Antigonos played a decisive role in his victory over Pyrrhos. Its utility as the location from which Ameinias led his expedition to relieve Sparta and from which Antigonos marched upon Argos was reaffirmed. Corinth’s efficacy would be tested again.

Krateros, epistates of Corinth Evidence for Corinth in the second quarter of the third century is as poor as that for the rest of the Hellenistic world. One can be certain, however, that Antigonos (or possibly Demetrios Poliorketes) installed Krateros there in some capacity; the date of his appointment is uncertain.60 His role in the detention of Mithres at Corinth and afterwards Piraeus, places him at Corinth between 280 and 277.61 Krateros’ presence at Corinth at this time, however, need not preclude his subsequent absence from it. Quite possibly, for example, Antigonos may have recalled Krateros as the former established his authority in Macedonia. The paucity of testimony placing him in Corinth has not deterred numerous scholars from arguing that he maintained office there for as many as 30 years, until his death in the 250s. Krateros son of Krateros was Antigonos’ older half-brother; their mother Phila, Antipatros’ daughter, had been married first to Krateros and after his death to Demetrios Poliorketes.62 Other than his position at Corinth, few details of Krateros’ life are known.63 He dedicated a famous monument at Delphi, honoring his father and emphasizing his connection with Alexander the Great. It consisted of a sculpture group depicting the elder Krateros and Alexander engaged in a lion hunt, almost certainly one at which the former saved the latter’s life.64 He also compiled a collection of Athenian decrees (FGrH 342).65 According to Plutarch (Mor. 486a), not only were Antigonos and Krateros blood relatives, but they also enjoyed a very close relationship. Unfortunately, few details of Krateros’ tenure at Corinth are known, including the date of his appointment and the date and circumstances of his death. It is, however, widely accepted that he served at Corinth as epistates or strategos, functioning as a governor or viceroy; his command is believed to have included Euboia. This reconstruction is supported only by the fact that his son Alexandros commanded both Corinth and Euboia in the late 250s and early 240s.66 It is curious that we hear nothing of Krateros while Pyrrhos’ campaigned in the Peloponnese, especially if he continued to hold office at Corinth after ca. 280–277, when he is first attested there. Ameinias, as described above, led the mercenary force from Corinth to Sparta and Antigonos subsequently marched against Pyrrhos at Argos. The earliest attestation of Krateros’ presence at Corinth, after the death of Pyrrhos, concerns the marriage of his son Alexandros 84

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to the Macedonian Nikaia in 272 (Livy 35.26.5). Antigonos may have reappointed Krateros to a position at Corinth after he defeated Pyrrhos, for no evidence places him there later than 277. Moreover, Ameinias’ role in the war against Pyrrhos suggests that he commanded the garrison prior in 272 and possibly earlier. The second (and final) attestation of Krateros at Corinth occurred only a year or so after his son’s marriage, when he hastened to Elis (ca. 271/0) to aid Aristotimos son of Damaretos (Plut. Mor. 253a), who had established himself as tyrant in Elis with Antigonos’ support. On account of several heinous crimes, a rebellion initiated by Elean citizens ended with the tyrant’s assassination.67 Corinth is absent from the historical record until the Spartan king Areus’ attempts to pass it in the Chremonidaean War.68 Curiously, the sources make no mention of Krateros after 271/0, nor of his presence at Corinth during the Chremonidaean War or the years after its conclusion. While the inferiority of the sources after 271/0 may account for Krateros’ absence from the literary record, it cannot explain his absence from it between 280–277 and 272. There is no certainty, therefore, that Krateros held an official position at Corinth in the years after 271/0, although he may have been present there. An examination of the Antigonid Peloponnese following Pyrrhos’ death reveals a grim picture. Krateros unsuccessfully attempted to preserve the pro-Antigonid tyranny of Aristotimos at Elis; contemporaneously, the Spartans expelled Antigonos’ garrison from Troizen (Polyainos 2.29.1). The Peloponnesian states allied with Sparta in 268/7 included Elis, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, the Achaians, Phigaliai, and Kaphyai. Whether or not any of these states, save Elis, had been under Antigonid control before 272/1 is unclear, but if they had been, their defection was a failure. If Krateros held an official position at Corinth between 271/0 and 268/7, his record is one of widespread failure. Unfortunately, we have no literary evidence for Corinthians at home within this period (301–271/0). Abroad, however, several references attest to Corinthians’ presence at Delphi. No less than four served as naopoioi in the 270s, a fifth Corinthian was naopoios in 269/8, and another naopoios can be dated between ca. 300 and 250.69 The Aitolian koinon granted a Corinthian proxenia, most likely in the mid-270s.70 The Aitolians also awarded Sostratos son of Ti[–] with proxenia and isopoliteia of the koinon (ca. 273/2), as recorded on an inscription set up at the federal sanctuary at Thermon.71 Another Corinthian received proxenia at Delphi between ca. 315 and 280.72 No additional evidence describes the actions for which they received these grants, nor the circumstances explaining their presence abroad. Additionally, two Corinthians were employed in connection with the construction of buildings at Epidauros between 290 and 270; Damostratos supplied Corinthian tiles, Glaukias supplied wood from Corinth.73 Aristogeitos of Corinth was hired to saw wood on Apollo’s island in 274.74 After nearly three decades of uncertainty, Antigonos Gonatas must have believed that he had at last attained stability. All sense of security won at Argos in 272, however, was short-lived. Four years after defeating Pyrrhos, Athens 85

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and Sparta, with the support of Ptolemy II and his sister-wife Arsinoë II, colluded to drive Gonatas from Greece. Antigonos and his garrison on Acrocorinth, however, were well positioned to withstand any challenge to his position in southern Greece.

The Chremonidean War (268/7–263/2) and its aftermath The Chremonidean War is one of considerable importance in the grand scheme of Hellenistic politics and war. It plainly illustrates that the years ca. 280–220 were not ones during which the three Macedonian monarchies (Antigonid, Ptolemaic, and Seleukid) had settled upon their own spheres of influence with an established balance of power; the Hellenistic world of the third century, like the decades before and after it, was one of anarchy.75 The Macedonian garrison at Corinth played a decisive role in the Peloponnesian theatre of the Chremonidean War that ultimately resulted in Antigonos’ victory. The vagaries of the sources for events around Corinth and their emphasis upon Athens have obscured the significance of the Macedonian garrison’s role in Antigonos’ victory. The Corinthia was one of two theatres of the war between its inception and the death of the Spartan King Areus in 265/4. The precise number of Areus’ attempts to force his way past the Macedonian garrison at Corinth is unclear, but he certainly made two attempts and quite probably a third. One must also contemplate the impact Areus’ army had on the Corinthia, especially the Corinthians’ ability to harvest grain. The presence of hostile forces within the chora undoubtedly had a devastating effect and the agricultural land must have been consistently in peril. The ability to import grain through Corinth’s eastern harbor of Kenchreai also must have been restricted considerably. A Ptolemaic fleet maintained a presence at Arsinoë on the Methana peninsula within the southern Argolid, offering a vantage point from which to monitor the Antigonid fleet’s movements in the Saronic Gulf.76 Furthermore, the Ptolemaic fleet also maintained positions along shipping lanes at Patroklos’ Island, and at Vouliagmeni on the western coast of Attica.77 Contemporary decrees from Athens and Rhamnous illustrate the Athenians’ insecurities concerning their ability to harvest ripened grain in the Attic countryside; surely the Athenian testimony reflects closely the Corinthian situation as well.78 The Athenians and Spartans, each of which had been allied previously with Ptolemaic Egypt, now allied with one another in 268/7; preparations for war began immediately.79 The war’s name is derived from that of the Athenian, Chremonides son of Eteokles, who proposed the decree initiating the war in summer 268.80 Our literary sources for the war itself are sparse and consist of scattered references found in several later writers. Over the past several decades, however, archaeology and epigraphy have enhanced greatly our understanding of the war and its chronology. Among the most important epigraphic discoveries is the honorary decree for Epichares found at Rhamnous. The text details that Antigonos had enlisted the aid of pirates in his war against Athens.81 86

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Considering Ameinias’ status as one of Antigonos’ strategoi (at least in 272, when he is last attested) and his reputation as an archpirate, it is conceivable that he led these attacks against the countryside of Rhamnous. These attacks likely originated from one of the harbors, Chalkis or Demetrias, that Antigonos controlled in the western Aegean, suggesting that Ameinias, who was last attested at Corinth in 272, no longer served there. As noted above, Krateros is attested at Corinth between 272 and 271/0; it is likely that Antigonos had appointed him to replace Ameinias. The majority of the recently discovered archaeological evidence comes from Athens and Attica, enlightening the direct role that Ptolemy II’s forces played in the war. The allies’ strategy was relatively simple: as the Athenians rebelled against the Macedonians in Mounychia, King Areus of Sparta would lead a force of Spartans and their allies across the Isthmos to support the Athenians’ revolt. Ptolemy II promised to assist both. Until excavations conducted in the region of Porto Raphti in eastern Attica during the 1950s, historians had believed, on the basis of the literary sources, that the Ptolemaic contribution to the allied war effort was minimal. Those excavations, however, have demonstrated that the Ptolemaic contribution was much more extensive than previously thought. A fortified camp on the Koroni peninsula, on the eastern coast of Attica, was constructed during the war, and occupied by Ptolemaic troops briefly.82 Archaeological and epigraphic evidence from the Corinthia supplements neither our understanding of events in the war’s western theatre nor the topography of Areus’ campaigns. The literary sources preserve very little information about these campaigns, but enough is preserved to reconstruct a rough outline of events. The outcome of Areus’ attempts to reach the Isthmos illustrates once again the significance of the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth; just as during the Theban revolt, Agis III’s War, the Lamian War, and the Spartan-led revolt of 280, one holding Acrocorinth could effectively prevent those within the Peloponnese from supporting their allies outside of it or those outside from coming to the aid of those within it. Spartan participation in the war against Antigonos Gonatas, less than four years after he had aided the Spartans against Pyrrhos, is curious. The Spartans had allied themselves with Ptolemy II prior to summer 268; a half-century of resistance to the Macedonian presence within the Peloponnese certainly accounts for this. Patroklos (apparently early in the war itself) persuaded King Areus to invade Attica; he promised further to attack Antigonos’ forces personally once the battle had begun. Areus, however, withdrew as his supplies were exhausted (Paus. 3.6.4–6); apparently the Corinthians had already completed their harvest prior to his arrival. Pausanias’ account implies that this attempt to invade Attica across the Isthmos occurred early in the war, perhaps only months after the Athenians enacted Chremonides’ resolution. He certainly made at least one additional attempt to force his way across the Isthmos, possibly while Antigonos attempted to overwhelm a revolt of his Gaulish mercenaries (266?) at Megara. Justin (26.2.1–8) records that Areus and the 87

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Ptolemaic forces withdrew from the Isthmos, avoiding battle with Antigonos, once they learned he had suppressed the revolt. Gonatas then attacked Athens, which was relieved only on account of Alexandros of Epeiros’ (the son of Pyrrhos and Lanassa) invasion of Macedonia. He returned to Macedonia, deeming Alexandros’ invasion worthy of his presence.83 Areus may have made one final attempt (his third) to cross the Isthmos; our sources indicate that Antigonos was present and that the engagement (265/4) resulted in the Spartan’s death.84 We know neither the location of these engagements, nor the route(s) by which Areus entered the Corinthia. The sources for events in Attica during the Chremonidean War are poor; for those within the Corinthia they are abysmal. The references to the war in the Corinthia discussed above represent the sum of our knowledge; Areus appears to have made three separate attempts to pass the Macedonian garrison, but even this is not entirely certain.85 After Areus’ death, King Ptolemy II wavered in his commitment to the war and withdrew his forces from Porto Raphti. The Athenians were left to continue the war alone; they managed to hold out for some time, but starvation soon set in throughout the city, compelling their surrender in 263/2.86 The only other evidence for Corinthian activity during the Chremonidaean War is preserved at an unexpected location. The Aitolian koinon granted the Corinthian Chairon son of Neon proxenia in 263.87 An inscription from Thermon records the award of proxenia to a number of individuals, some from poleis allied with Antigonos, others from the alliance against him; the document, therefore, suggests Aitolian neutrality throughout the war.88 As noted above, the Aitolian koinon also had granted proxenia to two other Corinthians in the second half of the 270s; the award of proxenia to Chairon indicates some connection between Antigonid-controlled Corinth and the Aitolians into the late 260s.

Corinthians at Delphi and Athens after the Chremonidean War The years between the end of the war in 263/2 and 251 are ones for which we have neither literary nor epigraphic evidence of activity at Corinth. Its citizens, however, are attested again at Delphi. More than a century ago a case was made that the Aetolians barred states with Macedonian garrisons imposed upon them from participation in the Amphiktyonic Council at Delphi.89 Denis Knoepfler has recently reasserted this position with respect to the poleis of Euboia.90 Exceptions to the rule, however, are clearly attested in the epigraphic record; Corinth represents one. Archillos of Corinth served as hieromnemon at Delphi in 258/7.91 Corinthians also competed in the Soteria at Delphi. The Aitolians instituted this festival in 278 to commemorate annually or biannually their role in the preservation of Apollo’s sanctuary when the Gauls advanced upon it. Two Corinthians, between the years 259/8 and 254/3, competed at the Games, and a 88

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third served as didaskalos. Deinon of Corinth participated in the dance competition either in 259/8 or 255/4.92 Two Corinthians, the poet Xenon (ποιητὴς προσοδίων) and the didaskalos Arkesilaos son of Hieron, participated in the Soteria of either 258/7 or 254/3.93 The Corinthian presence at Aitolian-controlled Delphi apparently represents a rapprochement between Antigonos and the Aitolians in the aftermath of the Chremonidean War.94 Another, albeit more salacious, story attests to a Corinthian’s influence at Athens after its surrender to Antigonos Gonatas, who installed Demetrios of Phaleron, grandson of the Demetrios of Phaleron as its governor. Demetrios consistently, we are told, offended the Athenians’ sensibilities (and those of his deceased grandfather); one of his most egregious transgressions was the construction of a viewing stand for his mistress Aristagora of Corinth. Upon learning of this, Antigonos is said to have appointed Demetrios thesmothetes.95

Antigonos and Corinth’s shipyards When Aratos of Sikyon captured Acrocorinth from Antigonos’ garrison (243), he also seized 25 of the king’s ships at Lechaion (Plut. Arat. 24.1). These ships provide a mere glimpse of the Antigonid fleet and Corinth’s utility in its revival. Additional evidence points to a renewal of Antigonid naval power between 271 and 251; it may have begun in the early 260s and as such been one of the factors that prompted Ptolemy II to instigate the Chremonidean War.96 The cessation of hostilities around Corinth after Areus’ death may have provided adequate stability at Lechaion and Kenchreai to commence shipbuilding, especially considering a fleet’s potential utility in the continuation of the war. Antigonos’ naval prowess increased after its conclusion, winning probably two important naval victories (the battles of Kos and Andros) in the Aegean over Ptolemaic fleets. His efforts to reassert his dynasty’s fortunes within the Aegean would have impacted Corinth favorably. Although no direct testimony indicates that ships were constructed at Corinth, circumstantial evidence points toward that conclusion. The revival of the Antigonid fleet commenced earlier than the end of Chremonidean War, as shortly afterwards Antigonos’ fleet defeated a Ptolemaic fleet near Kos; the date of the battle is impossible to determine conclusively, although indications are that it was fought around 261.97 Evidence for the battle of Andros, on the other hand, not only prohibits the assignment of a date, but whether or not Antigonos Gonatas or Antigonos Doson won the victory remains unclear. Nevertheless, a date of 246/5 has gained general acceptance.98 Antigonos’ “sacred trireme” is certainly connected with his victory at Kos; Moschion records that the king dedicated it to Apollo on Delos after his victory off Leukolla on Kos.99 Tarn has identified it with the dedicated ship that Pausanias (1.29.1) mentions on Apollo’s island.100 Specifically, he associates this victorious trireme with Antigonos’ flagship Isthmia.101 Somewhat more adventurously, Tarn suggests that its original name was Corinthia and that 89

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upon its dedication to Apollo he renamed it Isthmia; Hiero of Syracuse’s ship Syrakousia, later renamed Alexandria, which was constructed in part by the Corinthian architect Archias, constitutes his evidence.102 Despite the flaws in his reconstruction of the life of Antigonos’ flagship, Plutarch certainly establishes its name as Isthmia.103 This ship (and others), however, plausibly were constructed at Corinth, perhaps specifically at Kenchreai as Tarn first proposed. Nevertheless, he certainly pushed the available evidence too far, claiming that “of the naval arsenals in [Antigonos’] empire – Demetrias, Chalcis, Piraeus, Corinth – Corinth appears to have been the most important.”104 One cannot underestimate Corinth’s worth to whomever possessed it. Acrocorinth was not its only strategic attribute; the harbors Kenchreai and Lechaion, and the diolkos, as we have seen, often proved equally valuable to the Macedonians.

The Corinthian economy under Antigonos Little evidence preserves a picture of the Corinthian economy during the halfcentury after Ipsos (301). As discussed above, nothing suggests that Demetrios Poliorketes or Antigonos Gonatas imposed a system of taxation upon Corinth. Whether or not the Antigonids exacted harbor dues, tolls for the use of the diolkos, or derived rent from the South Stoa throughout these years is unknown. Nevertheless, the restoration of stability to the region following a quarter century of devastation caused by military attacks and two earthquakes apparently improved Corinth’s economy. As described below (Chapter 5), the years following Demetrios Poliorketes’ capture of Corinth (303) witnessed a large-scale building program. The Antigonids had a relatively abundant supply of money at their disposal, some of which was spent on the construction of a large fleet (500 ships), a number of which were built at Corinth. Corinthian craftsmen, who were employed widely throughout the second and third quarters of the fourth century, are not attested abroad during the final quarter of that century. In fact, we cannot locate them again at sanctuaries such as Delos, Delphi, and Epidauros until ca. 275. As argued in Chapter 3, rebuilding and repairs as a result of the two earthquakes probably account for one reason that raw materials and craftsmen are not attested outside the Corinthia. Likewise, for much of the first quarter and into the second quarter of the third century, construction of new monuments throughout the Corinthia was widespread. Although damage caused by the earthquakes apparently led to the cessation of production at the Tile Works and the Potters’ Quarter, some manufacture of goods for export also resumed within the Corinthia after Ipsos. Significantly, these objects were exported to Pella in Macedonia and Dodona in Epeiros. For example, the “Parmeniskos Group” of amphorae with stamped handles has been excavated in the 1980s from the agora of the Macedonian capital of Pella. Among the handles one discovered in 1983 bears the stamp ΦT that has been identified as a Corinthian import and dated to the late fourth/early third century B.C.105 Another, stamped Θ, may also be a Corinthian export.106 Corinth 90

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also has been proposed as the production site of three bronze drinking vessels (two kylikes and a skyphos) dedicated to Zeus and excavated at his sanctuary at Dodona, as well as one small kantharos from Divritsa in the Peloponnese. The kylikes and the skyphos are dated to ca. 330–300 and the kantharos to ca. 300–275 B.C.107 On the basis of our understanding of Corinth between these years, historical considerations indicate that a date very close to 300 for the cups excavated at Dodona is more likely than an earlier one. The return of some prosperity lasted a little more than a half century (ca. 303–249). The second half of the third century, however, opened with the revolt of Krateros’ son Alexandros, Antigonos’ recovery of Acrocorinth, and Aratos’ subsequent capture of it. The turbulent 240s marked a return to instability within the Corinthia that almost certainly was accompanied by a decline in exports and a cessation of the Antigonid building program at Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. This decline, as we shall see in Chapter 6, persists while Corinth belonged to the Achaian koinon (243–224).

Alexandros the son of Krateros Reconstruction of mid-third-century chronology is notoriously complicated and the date of the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros remains one of the most vexing issues. From the perspective of Corinthian history, his revolt marks an intriguing moment; it represents the first break with Antigonid control in more than half a century. It also appears to mark another break as the archaeological record indicates that the construction of new buildings and the renovation of older ones, so common throughout the Antigonid period, seem to cease. One also can detect a decline in some of the religious continuity so prevalent throughout the late fourth and first half of the third century. The epigraphic record, moreover, indicates that some Corinthians took flight after Alexandros’ assertion of independence, suggesting that they had belonged to a pro-Antigonid faction at Corinth. Alexandros’ revolt initiates a tumultuous quarter century (249–224) in which Corinth changed hands on several occasions, as several powers vied for primacy within the Peloponnese; Corinth, however, still remained a “gateway to the Peloponnese” as had been the case throughout the late fourth and early third centuries. When Corinth reappears in the sources (251), Alexandros son of Krateros was present in some capacity, but it is unlikely that he already had revolted from his uncle Antigonos Gonatas. Nearly all scholars have assumed that Gonatas handed command of the garrisons at Corinth, Chalkis, and Eretria directly to Alexandros, after his father’s death.108 No evidence confirms this linear succession. In fact, as discussed above, our only testimony for Krateros’ presence at Corinth is limited to the years 280–277 as well as between 272 and 271/0; it is very possible that others held command at Corinth following 271/0. For example, a case has been made recently that Gonatas installed the archpirate Ameinias as commander of the garrison after Krateros’ death and that this 91

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prompted the spurned Alexandros, who had hoped to inherit his father’s office, to revolt.109 As with the more linear reconstruction (directly from father to son), however, there is no indication that Ameinias remained in Corinth after 272; in fact, circumstantial evidence (see above) quite likely places him elsewhere (Chalkis? and from there to Rhamnous) during the Chremonidean War. In sum, like virtually everything Corinthian between the years 271/0 and 251/0, one cannot establish certainty; possibly Krateros lived until ca. 253/2 (or slightly later) and Antigonos appointed Alexandros as his father’s successor. It is also plausible that Krateros had died some years earlier (if not by natural causes, Areus’ attempts to pass Corinth during the Chremonidean war represent other possible circumstances) and that Antigonos named Alexandros (or some other individual) as his strategos/epistates in Corinth. Whatever the circumstances were, it is certain that Alexandros son of Krateros revolted from his uncle, attempting to establish an independent kingdom of his own. Alexandros son of Krateros was neither a Corinthian nor presumably the king of Corinth.110 Few details of his life are preserved, other than the fact that he was at Corinth while his father Krateros served as its governor in the late 270s. Alexandros married Nikaia in 272; she was a woman whose origins are virtually unknown, although she certainly was a Macedonian and quite possibly connected to the house of Antipatros.111 Livy preserves an approximate date for their marriage. Writing in the context of the year 192, he records that “an antiquated [in 192] quadrireme, having been captured 80 years earlier [272 B.C.] when it was carrying Nikaia, wife of Krateros from Naupaktos to Corinth.”112 The testimony of Livy establishes 272 as an approximate date of the marriage; he does not record who captured the vessel, how Nikaia ultimately arrived in Corinth, or the quadrireme’s fate. The date, however, puts it in the context of Pyrrhos’ activities within the Peloponnese, perhaps shortly after his death at Argos, and there may be some connection between the two events. Nikaia’s departure from Naupaktos also suggests that Antigonid relations with the Aitolians were good. Clearly, Alexandros declared himself independent from Antigonos and he possessed the fortresses of Acrocorinth as well as Eretria and Chalkis. Neither the date at which nor the means by which Alexandros usurped control is certain, but a date in the late 250s is frequently accepted, with 253/2 or 251, immediately before or after Aratos’ capture of Sikyon, the most popular options.113 A date of 251 for the revolt rests upon Plutarch’s account (Arat. 9.1) of Aratos’ capture of Sikyon in May 251, specifically the fire set to the house of the deposed tyrant Nikokles and its visibility from Corinth, whose citizens were on the point of rushing there to help.114 Additionally, those favoring 251 have pointed to the reputed alliance between the Achaians and Alexandros shortly after Sikyon’s admission to the Achaian koinon; Aratos, according to Plutarch (Arat. 18.2), abandoned his plans to capture Corinth when the Achaians and Alexandros established an alliance (συμμαχίας). Recently, however, a date in 249 or slightly later has gained increased acceptance.115 92

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While an alliance between Alexandros and the Achaians unquestionably dates to 251/0, there is no reason to conclude that the former had declared his independence from Antigonos before it was agreed; in fact all one can derive from Plutarch’s report is that Alexandros was in Corinth at this date, possibly serving as its governor (epistates?). Quite clearly, it seems, Antigonid governors and garrison commanders had the freedom to make tentative agreements on their king’s behalf. For example, Taurion, Philip V’s garrison commander at Corinth, made an on-the-spot decision in 220 to convey Demetrios of Pharos’ ships across the diolkos at his own expense; in exchange, Demetrios agreed to attack the Aitolians as they attempted to cross the Gulf of Corinth. Taurion’s quickly negotiated arrangement soon thereafter led to an alliance between Demetrios and Philip, whom Taurion could not have consulted before making his offer. Perhaps as Antigonos’ governor or garrison commander, Alexandros in 251/0 acted on his own, making some tentative agreement with Aratos that ultimately led to or was intended to lead to an alliance between the Achaian koinon and Antigonos. Plutarch, in an extremely important passage for understanding the chronology of Alexandros’ revolt, attests to Antigonos’ presence in Corinth after Aratos’ capture of Sikyon and apparently prior to his own recovery of Acrocorinth.116 While in Corinth, according to Plutarch (Arat. 15.1–3), Antigonos hoped to detach Aratos, who had returned recently from Egypt, from Ptolemy.117 He displayed kindness (φιλανθρωπίας) toward Aratos, and the king made sacrifices to the gods, sending portions of the victims to the Sikyonian. Dining afterwards, Antigonos spoke candidly about Aratos, referencing even his recent (νυνὶ δέ) sojourn to Egypt.118 In fact, according to Plutarch, the king remarked that Aratos had come over to him (ὅλος ἡμῖν προσκεχώρηκεν). Additionally, Antigonos instructed those present to regard the Sikyonian as their friend (ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ φίλον νομίζειν).119 His observations made their way back to Alexandria, perhaps by design; his presence at Corinth, on the other hand, and his remarks might be explained if interpreted as acceptance of the preliminary alliance Alexandros negotiated with the Achaians. The date of Antigonos’ visit to Corinth and his performance of sacrifices to the gods is critical to understand the chronology of Alexandros’ revolt. Plutarch notoriously includes information within his biographies without adhering strictly to chronology; if that is the case here, then Antigonos’ presence at Corinth may post-date his recovery of it from Nikaia in 244, as many contend.120 If, on the other hand, it took place subsequent to the Achaian alliance with Alexandros and prior to Alexandros’ revolt and Antigonos’ recovery of Acrocorinth from Nikaia (as seems likely), then Antigonos sacrificed in Corinth at some point in (late?) 250. This obviously eliminates the possibility that the revolt of Alexandros preceded Aratos’ capture of Sikyon, and the revolt, therefore, must post-date his visit to Egypt. The date and route of Aratos’ adventurous journey to Egypt, as Plutarch (Arat. 12.2–6) relates it, is likewise difficult to determine, but a date (250) not long after Sikyon joined the Achaian koinon is all but certain.121 The likelihood, 93

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therefore, is strong that Alexandros son of Krateros revolted in 249 subsequent to Antigonos’ visit to Corinth. The evidence assembled thus far suggests strongly that Alexandros son of Krateros was present at Corinth in 251, possibly serving as its governor when Aratos captured Sikyon. Not long afterwards, he negotiated a preliminary alliance between Antigonos and the Achaian koinon. Aratos then departed for Egypt and returned in (late?) 250 to Sikyon, while Antigonos Gonatas was sacrificing to the gods at Corinth. Antigonos sent portions of the victims to Aratos and while dining (certainly with Alexandros present) he spoke openly (and quite sarcastically) about his own “alliance” with the Sikyonian. It seems likely that Antigonos’ visit to Corinth pre-dates Alexandros’ revolt. It was probably his last before his nephew revolted in 249. New evidence has emerged recently that may elucidate the nature and date of Alexandros’ revolt. A papyrus from Milan preserves 112 epigrams attributed to the Ptolemaic court poet Posidippos of Pella.122 The epigrams are arranged topically and those of interest to us concern horse racing and are included under the heading hippika. Without doubt, the most significant for our purposes is AB 82; its potential importance merits its quotation in full.123 ε[ἶδ]ε [Ποσειδάων εὖχος μέ]γα, τὸν Βερενίκης ν[ι]κ[ῶντ’ ὠκυδρόμω]ν ἵππον ἐπὶ σταδίων, τὴν δὲ [πολυστέφα]νον Μακέτην πέλας ἀκρ[ο]κ[ο]ρίνθ[ο]υ παῖδα τὸ Πει[ρήνης σε]μνὸν ἐθαύμασ’ ὕδωρ σὺν πατρὶ Π[τολ]ε[μ]αίωι· ἐκήρυξας γὰρ ἐν ἰσθμῶι τοσσάκις ἀθλ[οφ]όρον δῶμα μόνη βασιλίς. [Poseidon saw a great triumph,] Berenike’s horse [victorious at the swift-running] race-courses. The [much-garlanded] Macedonian child near Acrocorinth was admired by [Peirene’s] majestic water with her father Ptolemy. For you proclaimed at the Isthmos your house so often victorious – a Queen on your own. This epigram represents our sole testimony for Berenike’s victory at the Isthmian Games and the possible presence of her father Ptolemy there.124 Identification of Berenike and Ptolemy, therefore, is critical, as it may represent the first attestation of a Ptolemy at the Isthmian Games since Ptolemy I Soter revived the League of Corinth in 308. The editors of the editio princeps and the editio minor have identified the victor as Berenike II, wife of Ptolemy III Euergetes and daughter of Magas of Kyrene and Apama.125 Her victory at the Isthmos, accordingly, is placed in 248. Dorothy Thompson has questioned their identification of Berenike on philological grounds, and identified Berenike of AB 82 as Berenike III, daughter of Ptolemy II Philadelphos and his wife Arsinoë I; she argues further that her Isthmian victory should predate 252.126 Posidippos, 94

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citing Berenike’s victory at Nemea (AB 79), calls her a maiden (παρθένος), and in the epigram celebrating her victory at Isthmia (AB 82 and 80) she is called a child (παῖς). These terms, as Thompson argues, emphasize her youth, and παρθένος especially indicates that she had not yet married. Berenike II married Ptolemy III on 28 January 246, complicating matters further as this would require her adoption by Ptolemy II, who is called her father in the poem, prior to her marriage. Despite these philological arguments, Thompson concedes it is plausible that Berenike II was the Isthmian victor in 248.127 If the editors of BG have correctly identified Berenike and the date of her victory (248), then her presence at Isthmia coincided with the period of Alexandros’ independence. A victory prior to 252 (i.e. 254, 256, etc.), on the other hand, pre-dates Alexandros’ revolt from his uncle, King Antigonos Gonatas. Thompson’s philological arguments for identifying Berenike as the daughter of Ptolemy II and Arsinoë I are persuasive and formulated on the basis of “details within the relevant poems;”128 she has not, however, considered the historical evidence from the Peloponnese, specifically Antigonos’ control of Corinth until his nephew’s revolt in 249.129 Ptolemaic presence at the Isthmian Games a decade (or possibly less) after the Chremonidean War and contemporaneous with Antigonos’ control of Corinth seems highly implausible.130 An Isthmian victory in 248, on the other hand, appears much more likely, as Antigonos no longer possessed Corinth. Furthermore, Ptolemy II’s presence at the Isthmos in spring 248 mandates further reconsideration of the proposed diplomatic connections between the king and Alexandros son of Krateros. Some scholars have argued that Ptolemy was the impetus behind Alexandros’ revolt and declaration of independence from Gonatas. While the evidence of the Milan papyrus in no way confirms this conclusion, it does, however, suggest contact between the two figures. Ptolemy’s presence at Isthmia also demonstrates that his intervention in the Greek world had not subsided following Antigonos’ naval victories over the Ptolemaic fleet at Kos (ca. 261), which certainly predates Alexandros’ revolt. The historical evidence from Corinth strengthens the identification of Berenike as the wife of Ptolemy III Euergetes, daughter of Magas of Kyrene and Apama, despite the philological complexities. Dee Clayman has reframed the argument for identifying the victor in AB 82 as Berenike II.131 She contends that neither Berenike II nor Ptolemy II was present at the Isthmian Games, proposing instead that the Berenike of AB 82 refers to a “youthened statue” of Berenike II that formed part of a sculpture group, which included her adoptive father Ptolemy II. Berenike II, therefore, was not physically present at the Isthmian Games, but a chariot team had been entered in her name. Moreover, if the Berenike of AB 82 is a statue, Clayman contends, the poem tells us nothing about the date of her Isthmian victory.132 The historical considerations examined above corroborate the identification of the victor of AB 82 as Berenike II, as a Berenike would unlikely compete, in person or in name alone, at Isthmia prior to the revolt of Alexandros. Whether she attended the celebration of the Games as most contend, or if a team had 95

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been entered there on her behalf, as Clayman has proposed, is impossible to determine. Any Ptolemaic presence at Isthmia at the games of 250 or earlier is implausible on the basis of historical considerations. While controlling Corinth, Alexandros waged war, primarily in Attica, against his uncle Antigonos Gonatas. Other than a single literary reference, the sources for this war are entirely epigraphic.133 The Athenians on Salamis, for example, honored the Antigonid strategos Herakleitos for his service in the war with Alexandros.134 A second Athenian decree honors Aristomachos of Argos for his role in securing a truce with Alexandros. According to the decree, Aristomachos demanded that the truce between Argos and Alexandros also include Athens; Alexandros demanded 50 talents to accommodate the Argive, who paid the sum with his own resources.135 Refusal to cooperate with Alexandros was not an option to the Corinthians; whether they did so willingly or under duress is unknown. Possession of Acrocorinth and a garrison atop it made any attempted resistance untenable. Nevertheless, Alexandros’ usurpation of authority affected Corinth; what precisely its impact was, one cannot say definitively. Several Corinthians, however, are attested abroad during this war. Perhaps the most significant was one Philokles, a resident of Athens in 248/7. The Athenians collected funds “for the safety of the city and the protection of the chora,” in the epidosis of 248/7 (late March/early April 247), apparently in the early stages of the war between Alexandros son of Krateros and Antigonos Gonatas.136 The Corinthian Phi[l]okles contributed the maximum amount (200 drachmai) to the fund.137 Philokles is not attested elsewhere, but his presence in Athens in 248/7 and his generous contribution to the epidosis might suggest that he was a pro-Antigonid who had fled Corinth (or was exiled from it) following Alexandros’ coup. His financial means while resident in Athens also suggest that he had departed Corinth, possessing at least some of his personal wealth; admittedly, it may also mean that he had lived in Athens for some time prior to Alexandros’ revolt and accumulated wealth while there, in which case he cannot be associated with a pro-Antigonid faction at Corinth.138 Another Corinthian, whose name and patronymic are not preserved, is included on a list of soldiers, who served under the command of Timokrates at Rhamnous.139 The inscription has been dated in the mid-250s to as late as ca. 240.140 While one cannot place this Corinthian soldier at Rhamnous precisely to the years of war between Antigonos and Alexandros, it is a possibility. Equally plausible, if a date ca. 240 is correct, there may be some connection to Aratos’ capture of Corinth and its adhesion to the Achaian koinon. The revolt of Alexandros or Aratos’ capture of Corinth possibly provided the incentive for an unemployed soldier to seek work abroad. A third Corinthian, Eukles son of [–]drios, also is attested at Argos, possibly in the context of the war with Alexandros.141 He received a grant of proxenia and was appointed thearodokos for the games of Zeus at Nemea and the festival of Argive Hera. The editor of the editio princeps dated the decree to 96

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ca. 247–244; recently, however, a much more conservative third-century date has been assigned to it.142 If the former date is accurate, the most likely historical context for which Eukles received honors at Argos must be the war with Alexandros. The proposed identification of Eukles as a Ptolemaic military official makes matters interesting.143 As a thearodokos, his responsibilities would have included hosting and entertaining the theoroi present in Corinth announcing the celebration of both festivals.144 His presence, therefore, in Alexandros’ Corinth indicates support of the regime; his probable Ptolemaic connection implies that he was not pro-Antigonid. The Argive award of proxenia, however, for a Corinthian hostile to Antigonos Gonatas and sympathetic to Alexandros, is prima facie paradoxical as Argos was allied with the Macedonian king; one reasonable solution that accounts for the conflicting evidence is to posit that Eukles had a hand in the negotiations between Argos and Alexandros that culminated in the peace between the two that is recorded on IG II2 774. The decree honoring Aristomachos of Argos implies complex negotiations that an intermediary may have handled. A Corinthian favorable to both parties would make a sensible selection for this responsibility, as both sides apparently sought peace. Several Corinthians served in Egypt as mercenaries. Their appearance in Egypt after ca. 247 also may denote some connection with Alexandros’ revolt. In addition to the possible Lagid officer Eukles, other Corinthians attested in Egypt after 247 include Neon (247) and Stachys son of Theokles (239).145 One should probably assume that others served in the Ptolemaic forces after ca. 247. Examination of Posidippos’ epigrams in praise of Berenike II’s victory at the Isthmian Games and the attestations of Corinthians in Ptolemaic service after ca. 247 point strongly to a similar conclusion. On the one hand, the evidence pertaining to Corinth indicates that Alexandros revolted from Antigonos in 249 and that Berenike II was victorious at the Isthmian Games shortly thereafter (spring 248 or later). She and her father may have attended the Isthmian Games; if they did, he possibly presided over them as his father had in 308. Ptolemy could have secured concurrently the employment of several Corinthians who are attested subsequently in Ptolemaic service.

Nikaia and the recovery of Acrocorinth Nikaia briefly held Corinth and its citadel Acrocorinth after the death of her husband Alexandros (245 or early 244).146 His death rekindled Antigonos Gonatas’ hopes to recover Corinth and its citadel.147 The sources agree that Gonatas sought to recover it from Nikaia by means of a deceitfully proposed marriage to his son and heir, Demetrios.148 They also indicate that Nikaia accepted willingly the prospect of a marriage alliance with the heir apparent and that the “wedding” occurred in Corinth.149 She, however, was not naïve; when the groom and his father arrived, she ceded the city, but maintained a strong garrison on Acrocorinth, to which Gonatas remained indifferent for several days (Plut. 97

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Arat. 17.3). He spent his time putting on daily spectacles and hosting drinking parties (καὶ θέας ἐπετέλει καὶ πότους συνῆγε καθ’ ἡμέραν). A great crowd gathered on the wedding day, awaiting a performance by Amoibeos the famous kitharode.150 Guards attended the bride, according to Polyainos; Plutarch claims Antigonos himself escorted her. She wore royal attire while being conveyed in her litter toward the Theater, where the “wedding” was to take place. As the wedding train reached the intersection of the road that leads up to the citadel, according to Plutarch, Antigonos raced to Acrocorinth, ordering that Nikaia be taken to the Theater.151 Antigonos, Polyainos writes, took the citadel easily (ῥᾳδίως), as its guards had concerned themselves with the wedding ceremony. Plutarch (Arat. 17.5–6), however, claims that Antigonos found its gates locked, ordering that they be opened as he rapped the gate with his staff; terrified, the guards complied. Here ends Polyainos’ account; Plutarch, however, adds that Antigonos could not control his excitement as he drank and danced in the alleys (ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς) and through the agora with crowns (στεφάνους) on his head and flute girls attending him.152 Fittingly, the king, whose maternal grandfather (Antipatros) and father (Demetrios Poliorketes) had both been awarded crowns by the Corinthians, now celebrated his recovery of city and citadel adorned with crowns.153

Persaios of Kition and Aratos’ capture of Acrocorinth Imediately after recovering (κτησάμενος) Acrocorinth, Antigonos installed a garrison (Plut. Arat. 18.1) on it.154 He also may have reconsidered his approach to the administration of Corinth. More Antigonid officials are attested at Corinth than at any other time, indicating a new level of concern to retain the “passion of his life.” The governorship was not entrusted to one who could engineer dynastic claims as Alexandros son of Krateros had. Antigonos appointed Persaios of Kition, the Stoic philosopher and student of Zeno (Athen. 4.162d–e) to a position of considerable importance at Corinth. In fact, no other Antigonid official is better attested in our sources, yet his official title is not clear. Plutarch (Arat. 18.1) records that Antigonos named Persaios archon (ἐπιστήσας ἄρχοντα); his official title, however, was probably epistates, and he functioned as governor.155 Pausanias (2.8.4 and 7.8.3), on the other hand, twice calls him the garrison commander (Περσαῖον ἐπὶ τῃ φρουρᾷ τεταγμένον) and (Περσαῖον ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνου ταχθέντα ἐπὶ τῇ φρουρᾷ). Hermippos (fr. 91, Wehrli = Athen. 4.162c) also reports that Antigonos had entrusted Acrocorinth to Persaios (ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον κωθωνιζόμενος). Polyainos (6.5) writes that Persaios and Archelaos the strategos (ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ Περσαῖον τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ Ἀρχέλαον τὸν στρατηγόν) commanded Antigonos’ garrison on Acrocorinth. Additional royal officials installed at Corinth after its recovery include Archelaos (Plut. Arat. 22.5; Polyainos 6.5), the commander of the king’s forces (ὁ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἡγεμὼν στρατιώτας), and Theophrastos (no title preserved).156 Changes in the king’s

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approach to the administration of Corinth did not affect the garrison’s composition as he continued to rely heavily upon mercenaries. Persaios was a well-known Stoic philosopher, who had been Zeno of Kition’s student.157 The latter, in fact, sent the former to the king, who requested that he serve as tutor to his son Halkyoneos (Diog. Laert. 7.6, 7.36). Persaios also had been present at Gonatas’ court for many years before serving as epistates at Corinth (Timon of Phleious, Suppl. Hell. 780 = Athen. 6.251c). He was a member of Gonatas’ inner circle (hetairos) and, as a non-Macedonian, he could have had no pretensions to claim Corinth for himself or take a royal title, as Alexandros the son of Krateros had. Persaios’ appointment, therefore, represents, at first glance, an astute choice; he had been an hetairos at the Antigonid court for many years and Antigonos must have trusted him implicitly.158 Antigonos Gonatas did not enjoy the “passion of his life” for long after its recovery from Nikaia. Plutarch (Arat. 18.3–24.1) preserves the most detailed account of Aratos’ capture of Acrocorinth in 243; Polyainos (6.5), clearly using the same source (certainly Aratos’ own Memoirs, FGrH 231) as Plutarch, records many identical details in his briefer report. Their accounts elucidate the topography of mid-third-century Corinth, the composition of the Macedonian and Achaian garrisons, and the significance of its loss to the Antigonids. Aratos’ plot to take Acrocorinth developed quickly, following the arrival in Sikyon of three Syrian brothers, who had fled Corinth after stealing an unspecified amount of Antigonos’ gold housed in the royal treasury.159 A fourth brother remained in Corinth, continuing to serve in the garrison.160 One of the brothers, Erginos, through the agency of a Sikyonian banker, informed Aratos that Acrocorinth could be captured easily, as the fortifications were vulnerable at a spot where ascent was not difficult.161 Taking with him 400 picked men, Aratos approached Corinth from the west, arriving near the temple of Hera at a gate that can only be identified as the Phliasian (see Fig. 1.1).162 The moon was full on the night of the assault in summer 243; Aratos gained entry through the Phliasian Gate when Erginos and seven others approached it, killing the gate-keeper and guards. One hundred men scaled the wall with Aratos; once within the city this group proceeded toward Acrocorinth and the remainder followed at a distance behind him. Four guards passed Aratos and his hundred; concealing themselves behind some walls and buildings, the Achaians fell upon them, killing three while the fourth, despite a head wound, managed to shout that the enemy were within the walls. Trumpets sounded the alarm, throwing the city into general confusion. As the streets of the city below filled with people, Aratos and his men reached the citadel’s wall. The 300 Aratos had left behind at the Phliasian Gate now entered the city; the confusion within it prevented them from locating the path toward Acrocorinth that Aratos had taken. Hiding beneath a cliff, they waited. Shortly thereafter, the garrison commander Archelaos and many soldiers began their ascent (ἀνέβαινε) to attack Aratos from the rear. The 300 pounced upon them from their place of concealment, killing many and dispersing the remainder throughout the city. 99

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Erginos arrived at this moment with news that Aratos was involved in a fierce struggle at the wall of Acrocorinth and that help was needed. As they approached the wall shouting, the full moon illuminated their arms. Upon their arrival, the reunited force overwhelmed the defenders, seizing control of the citadel and its garrison. As dawn approached, reinforcements from Sikyon arrived; Corinthians eagerly welcomed them at the gates, assisting them with the capture of the Antigonid soldiers. Several interesting details emerge from Plutarch’s account. Just as Demetrios Poliorketes had 60 years earlier, Aratos managed to capture Corinth and its citadel by approaching from the west and gaining access through the Phliasian Gate. Unlike Demetrios, however, Aratos had no support from Corinthians within the city; he had bought assistance from the Syrian brothers. Clearly both opted for the Phliasian Gate as it is the nearest to the walls of Acrocorinth; once within the city walls they knew there would not be much time before they were detected. The most significant detail preserved in Plutarch’s account concerns Archelaos’ response to the alarm. Plutarch leaves no doubt that he and many soldiers began to ascend (ἀνέβαινε) the citadel after it had been sounded. In the dead of the night, the alarm must have woken these men and they could only have been sleeping in the city beneath the citadel. The speed with which they must have assembled to begin their climb suggests clearly that they were not billeted throughout the city; the only other solution is that they resided in barracks (perhaps tents) or a Macedonian residence (a permanent structure?) located in the lower city. After gaining control of the citadel, Aratos proceeded along the road to the city, entering the Theater where a crowd of assembled Corinthians greeted him with applause. He addressed these Corinthians and returned to them the keys to the gates of their city that had been in Macedonian hands since Philip took it in 338, following the battle of Chaironeia. Plutarch and Polyainos then add that Aratos freed Archelaos, who had been captured during the assault. Theophrastos, on the other hand, according to Plutarch refused to abandon his position and was killed defending it. The post he held is unknown, but later in his account, Plutarch notes that Aratos immediately captured Lechaion and 25 of Antigonos’ ships, suggesting that Theophrastos commanded a garrison at Lechaion. Several different versions are preserved concerning the fate of the governor Persaios, who according to one account was inebriated at the time of Aratos’ assault.163 According to Plutarch, he escaped to Kenchreai; Polyainos adds that he then managed to make his way back to Antigonos. Pausanias, on the other hand, twice (2.8.4; 7.8.3) records that Persaios was killed during the attack. As both Plutarch and Polyainos clearly used Aratos’ own Memoirs as their primary source, Persaios likely managed to escape to Kenchreai.164 His flight to Corinth’s eastern harbor suggests that he regarded it a safe haven; presumably a garrison controlled it and Antigonid ships remained there. Whether or not he actually returned to Antigonos at Pella is unknown. Plutarch completes his catalogue of the Antigonid complement at Corinth, claiming that 100

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Aratos seized 500 of Antigonos’ horses and 400 Syrian mercenaries, all of which he sold. The Achaian historian Polybios remarkably claims that Aratos’ seizure of Acrocorinth was an “injustice against the dynasty” and also a “crime against the dynasty.”165 Polybios’ assessment is surprising considering his admiration for Aratos.166 Antigonos apparently made no military effort to retake Acrocorinth after Aratos captured it; undoubtedly he understood better than anyone the fortress’s impregnability and thus the futility of an assault on the position.

Notes 1 Tarn’s (1913: 371) loose translation of Plut. Arat. 17.1: οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπε πάθει τῶν ἐμμανεστάτων ἐρώτων. 2 Plut. Demetr. 8.3: ἀλλ’ ἐπιβάθραν μὲν ἔφη καλὴν καὶ ἀσάλευτον εἶναι τὴν εὔνοιαν. The response was directed to one of his friends who encouraged Antigonos and Demetrios to capture Athens, for it would be a “gangway to Greece.” 3 For the battle of Ipsos, see Plut. Demetr. 28–29; Diod. Sic. 21.1.1–4b; Just. 15.4.21–22. See also Billows 1990: 175–85. The alliance against Antigonos and Demetrios included Lysimachos, Seleukos, and Ptolemy, but it was primarily Seleukos’ forces that defeated father and son. 4 Ravel (1948: 28–29) argued that Kassandros recovered Corinth in 300. Martin (1985: 180–83), on numismatic grounds, has refuted this proposition. Wiseman (1963: 257) claims he attacked Corinth after Demetrios had departed. 5 Plut. Demetr. 31.2; compare Pyrr. 4.5 where he writes that Pyrrhos guarded those cities in Greece that Demetrios had entrusted to him (τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεις πιστευθεὶς διεφύλαξε). See further Bengston (Strategie I, 165–67), who also compares the titles with Antipatros’ at Diod. Sic. 17.118.1; Lévêque 1957: 106–7; Will, CAH VII.1: 101. 6 See also Lévêque (1957: 106), accepting this parallel as possible. 7 The titles recorded on the Epidaurian stele (IG IV2.1 68) are: τῶι στρατη]γῶι τῶι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἐπὶ τῆς κοι[ν]ῆς φυλακῆς καταλελειμμέν[ωι] (IG IV2.1 68, III, lines 68–69) and again ὁ{ι} ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων ἀποδεδειγμένος στρ[ατ]ηγός (lines 71–72). 8 For Kyinda as the location of a treasury under Alexander as well as Antigonos and Demetrios, see Simpson 1957; see also Billows 1990: 256–57 and Bosworth 2002: 31 and note 13. For its possible function as an Assyrian and Persian treasury, see Bing 1973. 9 Plut. Demetr. 36–37; Diod. Sic. 21.7; Just. 16.1.1–18. 10 Bosworth 2002: 247–59. 11 The Spartan Kleonymos inspired the revolt and his appearance in Boiotia defies explanation. Plutarch (Demetr. 39.1–3) is our only source for Kleonymos’ arrival in Boiotia and his departure from it; he implies that both occurred by land, presumably over the Isthmos. If this is the case, it represents one of very few times that a force hostile to Antigonid interests managed to cross the Isthmos. The garrison’s failure to halt Kleonymos’ progress is unexplainable; it may have been the result of an armed encounter within the Corinthia that resulted in Spartan victory, or even a passive approach, if the harvest had been collected already, that allowed the Spartans to cross through the Corinthia unchecked. 12 Wehrli 1968: 185–86; Hornblower 1981: 13–14. 13 Other reports of Demetrios’ imposition of taxes upon garrisoned poleis include Diog. Laert. 2.140; see also Tarn 1913: 113 note 4. 14 Plut. Demetr. 39.6–7 – 40.1–6.

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15 Errington 1990: 150–54. 16 The other ships, according to Plutarch (Demetr. 43.4), were constructed at Piraeus, Chalkis, and Pella. 17 Troxell 1971: 49–52. See also Mørkholm 1991: 155–59. 18 Habicht 1997: 95. 19 For the revolt of Kallias, see Habicht 1997: 95–97, 127–29; Oliver 2007: 122–23. 20 As Shear (1978: 16) recognized. For Athens’ revolt, see also IG II2 682 and Plut. Demetr. 46.2–3. 21 For the inscription, see IG XI.4 1096; Stewart 1994: 410, S 28 and T 145. See also Billows 1995: 42–43. 22 Billows 1995: 45–55. 23 Demetr. 51.1: τοῖς περὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀθήνας καὶ Κόρινθον ἡγεμόσι καὶ φίλοις. Hornblower (1981: 14) speculates that Hieronymos of Kardia may have been among those to whom Demetrios sent the letter. It is conceivable that Krateros son of Krateros also was one of the recipients. 24 Tarn 1913: 113–14 and note 4 (enumeration of Demetrios’ taxes with sources). He suggests that harbor dues and duties on trade provided Gonatas with revenues from Corinth. There is no evidence to support this suggestion, however plausible it may seem. 25 Tarn 1913: 115–16; Walbank, CAH2 VII.1: 111. 26 For the battle of Korupedion, see App. Syr. 62; Just. 17.1.8–2.1. 27 App. Syr. 62; Just. 17.2.4–8. Ptolemy Keraunos had been at Seleukos’ court since 283/2 and had been a vocal proponent, encouraging the king to make war against Lysimachos; see Walbank (HM III, 239 and note 4) for discussion of the problems involved with Keraunos’ departure from Egypt. Among the immediate results of Keraunos’ assassination of Seleukos was the former’s marriage to Lysimachos’ widow Arsinoë, who also was his half-sister. Keraunos killed two of the three children she had with her deceased husband (Just. 24.2–3.8). 28 Tarn (1913: 131–32) argues that Antigonos probably levied new taxes upon the Greek cities he possessed to fund this expedition to Macedonia. See also Heinen 1972: 63–68; Walbank, HM III, 244–45. 29 See Just. 24.1.1–2 and, further, Walbank, HM III, 249; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002: 32. 30 Tarn 1913: 132. 31 Paus. 10.19.5–7; Justin 24.4.1. See also Nachtergael 1977: 126–37. 32 Diod. Sic. 22.3.1–2; Paus. 10.19.7; Just. 24.4.8–5.7. 33 In brief succession, Keraunos’ brother Melagros, Antipatros son of Philip and grandson of Kassandros, and the general Sosthenes each attempted unsuccessfully to preserve some modicum of stability within Macedonia. 34 Nachtergael 1977: 137–40. 35 Paus. 1.3.5, 4.2, 7.15.3. For a full catalogue of those who assembled at Thermopylai to resist the Gauls, see Paus. 10.20.3–5. See further Nachtergael 1977: 140–50. 36 For the Aitolians’ role in the defense, see Scholten 2000: 31–45. 37 Diod. Sic. 21.9; Paus. 1.4.4, 10.23.1–8; Just. 24.7–8. Nachtergael 1977: 150–64. 38 Wiseman 1963: 267–69. 39 For a description of the course of the wall and the excavations conducted in 1960–61, see Wiseman 1963: 249–65. Wiseman (1978: 62–63 and 76 note 51) reports the discovery of additional traces of the same wall on a hill north of Kenchreai, altering slightly his earlier reconstruction in this area. On the basis of the excavated material, Wiseman dates its construction to the early third century. See also Gregory, Isthmia V: 5. The Eastern Korinthia Archaeological Survey (EKAS) has endorsed Wiseman’s early third-century date; see Tartaron et al. 2006: 500.

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40 Wiseman 1963: 267–70. 41 See Wiseman 1963: 269 for a review of previous scholarship on the subject. Tarn (1913: 150–51), for example, accepts the possibility that Antigonos constructed the wall to which Pausanias refers and that he may have been present at the Isthmos in winter 279/8. 42 Wiseman 1979: 539, Table 3. 43 This is especially true of Pausanias’ tenth book. 44 Nachtergael (1977) makes no reference to the wall. Gabbert (1997: 35), acknowledging neither the evidence from the Corinthia nor Wiseman’s proposal, argues that it was more advantageous to Gonatas that the League neither exist nor be revived. 45 Diog. Laert. 2.141; Just. 25.1.2–2.1.7. See Tarn 1913: 165–66; Nachtergael 1977: 167–69. 46 Hieronymos of Kardia is attested as the epimeletes and harmost of Thebes after Demetrios’ capture of it in 291; see Plut. Demetr. 39.4. 47 See Hornblower (1981: 49, 251) for the attribution and earlier bibliography regarding the identification of Strabo’s Hieronymos. She places his digression on Corinthian topography in the context of Demetrios Poliorketes’ capture of Corinth in 303. 48 While conceding that no evidence supports the conclusion that Antigonos exacted taxes from the Greek poleis, Tarn (1913: 113–14) argues that heavy taxation was necessary to pay for the mercenaries in his garrisons. He suggests that duties and harbor dues accounted for Corinth’s contribution. Shipley (2005: 320; 2008: 58) rejects the belief that Antigonos taxed Greek poleis, but accepts that Corinth’s harbors may have been “tithed” to pay for the garrison. 49 See Williams 1978b: 49–53. See also below for a full discussion of the South Stoa, Chapter 5, p. 121–7. 50 Gauthier 1989: no. 3, lines 8–9, and discussion, 101–7 (SEG 39.1285). See also Ma 2000: 287–88, no. 3. 51 See Shipley 2005: 319–21. 52 The number of troops and ships that accompanied Demetrios to the East make this conclusion almost inevitable. Plutarch (Demetr. 46.4) records the numbers: 11,000 soldiers and all the ships at his disposal. See also Griffith 1935: 67. 53 Diod. Sic. 22.11.1; Plut. Pyrr. 26.3–8. 54 Plut. Pyrr. 29.11: τῶν Ἀντιγόνου στρατηγῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου. For Pyrrhos’ campaign against Sparta, see Lévêque 1957: 590–606. 55 Willamowitz (1881: 213 and note 35) first suggested that Ameinias commanded the garrison in Corinth, while Krateros served as its governor. Tarn (1913: 271–72 and note 38) argues that Krateros would not have risked diverting troops from Corinth, proposing instead that Ameinias commanded Gonatas’ “advance-guard.” 56 In addition to the arrivals of Ameinias and Areus at Sparta, the earlier valor of the Spartan women (Plut. Pyrr. 27.4–10; 29.5–8) factored heavily into Pyrrhos’ decision. 57 For a detailed analysis of the events at Argos, see Lévêque 1957: 608–26. 58 Plut. Pyrr. 34.5–6. One might identify Zopyros as an Illyrian mercenary in Gonatas’ employ, who probably served in the garrison on Acrocorinth, as Tarn (1913: 273) suggested. 59 Plut. Mor. 251a; Paus. 5.5.1. See also Paschidis 2008: 281–83. 60 Tarn (1913: 133 and note 46) believes Krateros was not installed at Corinth until after Antigonos became king in Macedonia (277); Bengston, Strategie II: 347–48. Errington (1990: 169–71) dates Krateros’ presence at Corinth to Antigonos’ departure for Macedonia. Gabbert (1997: 21) suggests that Krateros received his command at Corinth between 286 and 283, if not earlier; no evidence, however, supports such an early date.

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61 P. Hercol. 1418, col. 32a; Epicurus, fr. 49; Arghetti 1973. See also Walbank, HM III: 270 and note 2; Gabbert 1997: 35; Burstein 1985: 18–19, no. 14. For Mithres, see Habicht 1997: 125. 62 For Phila, see Wehrli 1964: 140–46; Carney 2000: 165–69. 63 For a summary of Krateros’ life and career, see Billows 1990: 396–97, no. 60. 64 See Pliny NH 34.64; Plut. Alex. 40.4–5. For discussions of the monument and sculptures, see FD 3.4.2, no. 137; Stewart 1994: 270–77; Billows 1995: 44; Palagia 2000: 184–85. 65 For Krateros’ works, see Erdas 2002. 66 Tarn (1913: 195 and note 96) suggests that Krateros’ command included Euboia, although he concedes that the only evidence for it is the parallel with Alexandros. 67 Just. 26.1; Paus. 5.5.1; Plut. Mor. 251a, 253a. 68 No evidence supports Tarn’s (1913: 298) narrative of Krateros’ defense against Areus. 69 The Corinthian naopoioi include Gorgias son of Pherekles, CID II 120, A, line 39 and CID II 121, col. 2, line 16 (ca. 275–260); Thrasydamos son of Thrasydamos, CID II 120, A, line 40 and CID II 121, col. 2, line 17 (ca. 274); Psarchos son of Kleandridas, CID II 120, A, line 33 (ca. 274); one whose ethnic alone is preserved, CID II 121, col. 1, line 14 (ca. 270); and Samion son of Polykritos, CID II 120, A, line 35, CID II 121, col. 2, line 11 (269/8). Another fragmentary name, [.]εοι[.]ρεύς with patronymic, is preserved, CID II 122, col. 1, line 4 (ca. 300–250); his patronymic is Chrysis, see LGPN (III.A, s.v., no. 2) where the editors restore the name Ἐοι[-]ρεύς. 70 IG IX 12 1, 5, lines 7–10. The name and ethnic are partially preserved (lines 9–10) and it is not entirely certain that he was a Corinthian: [.4–5.]δώρωι Εὐθυκλέους Κο[ριν|θίωι]. The inscription is dated to 290/89 in IG, but it probably belongs in the mid-270s; see Scholten 2000: 43 with references. For the proxenos’ father, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 7. 71 IG IX.12 1, 11. LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 57, where he is listed as a “Corinthian?” 72 SEG 1.192. In addition to proxenia, he and his descendants also received promanteia, proedria, prodikia, asylia, and ateleia. Only his patronymic and ethnic are preserved: [- – Φι]λοξένου Κορινθίωι. See LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 64 for the father. 73 Damostratos: IG IV2.1 109, lines 97 and148; LGPN III.A, s.v. no. 3. Glaukias: IG IV2.1 110B, lines 3–10; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 7. 74 IG XI.2 199 A, line 89; LGPN III.A, s.v. no. 18. 75 Austin 1986; Ager 2003: 35–50; Eckstein 2006: 79–117. 76 The Ptolemies almost certainly founded Arsinoë on the Methana peninsula near the outbreak of the Chremonidean War; see in general Bagnall 1976: 135–36; Mee and Forbes 1997: 73–75; Dixon 2000: 189–90. 77 Paus. 1.1.1, 7.3, 3.6.4; Habicht 1997: 146–47 and note 89. 78 For an analysis of the Athenians’ preoccupation with harvesting local grain throughout the Chremonidean War, see Oliver 2007: 127–31. 79 Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies also joined the alliance. They included Elis, the Achaians, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Phigaliai, and Kaphyiai. 80 For the decree, see IG II2 686+687, Staatsverträge III: no. 476 and for its date, see Habicht 1997: 143. 81 I. Rhamnous, no. 3, line 22. 82 McCredie 1966: 1–16. See also Habicht 1997: 145 and note 84 with bibliography. 83 Just. 26.2.9–12, 3.1. Ironically, Antigonos had restored Alexandros to Epeiros following Pyrrhos’ death at Argos in 272. 84 Plut. Ag. 3.7; Trog. Prol. 26. The date of Areus’ death (265/4) is fixed by Diodoros (20.29.1), who, in the context of 309, writes that he reigned for 44 years. 85 Heinen (1972: 199–202) provides the most thorough analysis of Areus’ campaigns to cross the Isthmos; he posits three attempts in 267, 266, and 265. He also suggests (1972: 199–200 note 432) that Wiseman’s (1963) trans-Isthmian wall might

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86 87 88 89 90 91

92 93

94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104 105 106 107 108 109 110

have been employed during the Macedonians’ defense of the Isthmos. Cartledge and Spawforth (2002: 37) suggest that Areus may have attempted three times to cross the Isthmos. Habicht (1997: 146) claims he advanced “several times,” adding that he was stopped either at the Isthmos or before reaching the Thriasian plain. McCredie (1966: 110–12), who argues that Areus passed through the Corinthia and into Attica during his first attempt, associates Areus’ second attempt with his return from Attica and the revolt at Megara. Areus’ second attempt to pass the Macedonian garrison at Corinth, according to McCredie, resulted in his death. It seems unlikely, however, that the Spartans ever managed to traverse the Isthmos. Habicht 1997: 146; Oliver 2007: 131. IG IX 12 1, 17, line 84. For Chairon, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2. For Aitolian neutrality during the Chremonidean War, see Scholten 2000: 72–77 and 75 note 56. Beloch, GG IV.2: 388. Tarn (1913: 213–15) argued that the absence of Greek poleis with Antigonid garrisons was the result of a calculated policy of abstention. Knoepfler 1995: 137–56. See CID IV.45 and 46, and Flacelière 1937: App. I.19a, b; Scholten (2000: 87 and note 99) speculates that Archillos’ appointment may indicate that Alexandros son of Krateros was already “testing the waters” in an effort to gain the Aitolians’ goodwill. Unfortunately, there is no evidence indicating that Alexandros was in Corinth as early as 258. See LGPN III.A, s.v., nos. 4 and 5. LGPN III.A s.v., no. 23. See also Nachtergael 1977: 34, no. 8. Xenon is attested at SGDI, no. 2565, line 14. See further LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 57; Nachtergael 1977: 14, no. 9; Stephanis 1988: no. 1918. Arkesilaos son of Hieron is attested at SGDI, no. 2565, line 56. See further LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 6; Nachtergael 1977: 56, no. 9; Stephanis 1988: no. 400. See Scholten 2000: 83–93. Hegesander, fr. 8, FHG iv.415 = Athen. 4.167e-f. Habicht 1997: 153. For Aristagora, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5. For discussion of Antigonos’ naval strength and needs, see Walbank 2002a: 107–15. Heinen 1972: 193–97; Walbank 2002a: 113–14; Reger 1994: 40–41. See, however, Buraselis (1982: 146–51), who argues for a date of 255/4. Buraselis 1982: 144–45; Reger 1994: 46. FGrH 575 F 1 = Athen. 5.209e. Tarn 1910: 215–18. See also Hammond and Walbank, HM III: 595–96. Plut. Mor. 676d: ἡ Ἀντιγόνου ναυαρχὶς … Ἰσθμία ἐπωνομάσθη. Tarn 1910: 218–21. For Archias of Corinth, see further below, p. 150. Tarn cites Antigonid coins representing Poseidon as a crucial piece of evidence in his reconstruction, connecting the flagship to Corinth. These coins, as is known now, almost certainly belong to the reign of Antigonos Doson; see Mørkholm 1991: 135. For recent discussion of the ship and the problems with Tarn’s conclusions, see Murray 2012: 185–88. Tarn 1910: 219. For the publication of the Corinthian amphora stamp, see Akamatis (2000: 20 and note 85 [SEG 50.614]), citing Koehler 1978: 291, no. 572 as a parallel. See Lilibaki-Akamati 2000: 142 (SEG 50.615). Sideris 2002: 173–77 (SEG 52.571). Tarn 1913: 355; Walbank, HM III: 300; Errington 1990: 172; Lane Fox 2011: 515. Gabbert 1997: 35–36, 54–55. She does acknowledge (54) that Krateros’ death could have occurred at any time between 270 and 252. The evidence for his title “king” is limited to two references. The Suda (s.v. Εὐφορίων, Ε 3801) refers to him as “king of Euboia.” An inscription from Eretria

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111

112

113

114 115 116 117 118

119 120

121

(IG XII, 9 212, line 4) refers to him as “Alexandros the king.” See, however, Errington (1990: 288 note 36), who casts considerable doubt upon the evidence for his title. For Nikaia, see Tataki Macedonians, 378, no. 12; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 9. Ogden (1999: 180), without elaborating, suggests that she was a descendant of Antipatros. This possibility rests solely upon her homonymous namesake, Nikaia daughter of Antipatros. Carney (2000: 188–89), however, speculates that she was from an elite northern family, but not a royal one. 35.26.5: navis erat quadriremis vetus, capta annis octoginta ante, cum Crateri uxorem Nicaeam a Naupacto Corinthum veheret. Livy incorrectly refers to Nikaia as Krateros’ wife; apparently he omitted Alexandros’ name inadvertently. Briscoe (1981: 183) suggests, however, that Nikaia was possibly Krateros’ wife. He also tentatively proposes emending Livy’s text to sexaginta in order to place the marriage in 252, a date at which he believes Alexandros was in revolt and in alliance with the Achaians, whom he believes seized the ship. Emendation is unnecessary; Alexandros was beyond the age in 252 at which he would have married and nothing suggests that the Achaians captured the ship and Nikaia. Errington (1969: 102) and Urban (1979: 10) also believe that the Achaians seized the ship. Achaian possession of it 80 years after its capture cannot be evidence for their capture of it. In fact, Achaian and Antigonid ships frequently operated together following 224 when the Achaian koinon became a member of Doson’s Hellenic Symmachy; see, for example, Polybios (5.2.4), where Philip V assembled Achaian and Macedonian ships at Lechaion. It is much more likely that the Achaians acquired the famous ship after abandoning the Symmachy with Philip V and joining the Roman alliance against him in autumn 198. Plutarch (Phil. 14.5) and Pausanias (8.50.7), calling it a trireme, also mention Philopoimen’s use of the ship. See also Heinen 1972: 192–93; Knoepfler 2001: 287 and note 113. For dates of 253/2 or prior to 251, see Beloch, GG IV.2: 519–22; Tarn 1913: 355–56; Will 1979: 317–18; Picard 1979: 272–73; Orsi 1987; Gabbert 1997: 35–36, 54–55; Scholten 2000: 256–58. Those supporting 251 include Knoepfler (1995: 155 and 2001: 286–95) and Habicht (1997: 162). See also Paus. 2.8.3. For the date of Aratos’ capture of Sikyon, see Urban 1979: 16–33; Walbank, HM III: 301. For the date of Alexandros’ revolt in 249, see Urban 1979: 16–38; Walbank, CAH2 VII.1: 247; Walbank, HM III: 301. Recently Paschidis (2008: 216 note 2 and 527) has argued for a date before 248/7. As Porter (1937: xxxv–xlvii), who dates Alexandros’ revolt to spring 249, recognized. Tarn (1913: 374 and note 16) recognized the significance of the Plutarch passage, calling it “the key to the chronology of Alexander.” Several scholars have accepted Plutarch’s testimony, placing Antigonos’ visit to Corinth in 250, shortly after Aratos had captured Sikyon. They, however, had followed a high chronology for Alexandros’ revolt and death, believing that by the time of Antigonos’ arrival at Corinth he had already recovered Acrocorinth from Nikaia. Walbank (CAH2 VII.1: 247) calls the anecdote “dubious” but also seems to accept its placement in 250. Knoepfler (2001: 293 and note) has argued that Antigonos’ visit to Corinth occurred in 244, asserting that his remarks could not have been made while Alexandros was still alive. Alternatively, however, the king could have made his comments prior to Alexandros’ death if the latter had not concluded an independent alliance with the Achaian koinon, but had acted on behalf of Antigonos to whom he was still loyal in 251/0. See Knoepfler’s (2001: 290–93) discussion.

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122 For the editio princeps of the papyrs (P. Mil. Vogl. VIII 309) see BG; the standard text is now AB, the editio minor. 123 The text and translation (with slight modifications to spelling) are from AB 82. 124 Berenike may also have won another crown at the Isthmian Games. A second epigram (AB 81), although very fragmentary, clearly refers to “Dorian leaves of celery” and a second victory in the chariot race. She is attested also as a victor at the Nemean Games, AB 79. Victors at both the Isthmian and the Nemean games received crowns of celery during the third century. Prior to the early fifth century, victors at the Isthmian Games had received wreaths of pine; see Broneer 1962b: 259–63. 125 BG, 210–11. 126 Thompson 2005: 275–79. See also Criscuolo (2003) and Remijsen (2010: 104), who have endorsed this identification. See, however, Huss (2008: 55–57), who defends the identification of the victor with Berenike II. 127 Thompson (2005: 277) writes: “the timetable involved in this scenario is possible, just even plausible, but it is a very, very crowded one.” 128 Thompson 2005: 275. 129 Criscuolo (2003: 316–17) has considered the historical evidence, yet concludes that Berenike of AB 82 is Berenike III. 130 As Clayman (2013: 138) recognizes. 131 Clayman 2012: 121–30; 2013: 148–58. 132 Clayman 2012: 125; 2013: 153. 133 Trog. Prol. 26: cum fratris sui Crateri filio Alexandro bellum habuerit. 134 IG II2 1225. Herakleitos was also an Athenian citizen; see Habicht 1997: 162. 135 IG II2 774. See also Habicht 1997: 162. 136 Agora XVI 213 = IG II2 791. The epidosis is dated to the archonship of Diomedon, whose year as archon must be 248/7. See Tracy (2003: 124 and 166–67) for a discussion of the problems involved; see further Habicht 2003: 55; Osborne 2003: 69–70. His placement in 248/7 rests on an unpublished inscription from Rhamnous, honoring the Athenian general Archandros, in which reference is made to Alexandros’ attacks against Attica. For a brief description of the decree’s contents, see Kralli 2003: 65. For a thorough analysis of the epidosis of 248/7, see Oliver 2007: 200–204 and 277–84. For the late March/early April date, see Habicht 1982: 28. 137 Agora XVI: 213, column I, line 65. LGPN III.A s.v., no. 39; FRA, no. 3005. 138 In addition to Philokles, several other non-Athenians made contributions to the fund, including Lyko the head of the Aristotelian school; see Habicht 1997: 163. For analyses of the contributors, see Habicht 1982: 30–33; Oliver 2007: 277–84. 139 IG II2 1286; see now I. Rhamnous II, no. 11, line 25: [- – -Κο]ρίνθιος. 140 The inscription is dated to ca. 244/3 in IG; Pouilloux (1954: no 11) dated it between 256/5 and 244/3; Petrakos (I. Rhamnous II, no. 11) dates it to ca. 240. 141 LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 16. 142 Vollgraff (1915: 371–74, D) dated this and several other Argive inscriptions between 249 and 244, believing them to have come from some Ptolemaic building (Egyptian gods? One of the Ptolemies?) and identifying these years as ones in which relations between Egypt and Argos were favorable (see 367–71). The Posidippos epigrams discussed above, attesting Berenike II’s victories at the Nemean Games in the early 240s, supply a context to support Volgraff’s suggestion. Perlman (2000: 260, no. 128; 229, Ep. Cat. A.23 with bibliography) offers no specific explanation for dating the decree to the third century. 143 Launey (1949 I: 106 and II: 1116) suggests that he was a Ptolemaic dignitary and without doubt a Lagid officer. 144 For a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of theorodokoi, see Perlman 2000: 45–60.

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145 Launey 1949 I: 106–7; II: 1116. 146 Plut. Arat. 17.2: ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένης καὶ φυλαττούσης τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον. 147 Conceivably, as Plutarch records (Arat. 17.2), Antigonos Gonatas’ agents poisoned Alexandros. After his death, Plutarch claims Antigonos immediately (εὐθύς) initiated designs by which to retake it from Nikaia. 148 Plut. Arat. 17.2–7; Polyainos 4.6.1. 149 Carney (2000: 189) accepts that the marriage occurred. Tarn (1913: 373) believes that it never took place. 150 Zeno is said (Plut. Mor. 443a) to have brought his students regularly to hear Amoibeos. 151 Plut. Arat. 17.5, cf. Polyainos 4.6.1. It is difficult to determine the topography of the account. Possibly, Nikaia proceeded toward the Theater along the East Theater Street; see Williams and Zervos (1982: 118–19; 1983: 4 and Fig. 1; 1984: 83). It certainly extends south from the Theater and intersects with the main road to Acrocorinth in the northwestern corner of the Roman forum. If this is the intersection to which Plutarch refers, perhaps Antigonos met Nikaia to the west of the South Stoa and they proceeded from here along the western limit of the Forum area until they reached its northwest corner, at which East Theater Street passes to the west of the Temple of Apollo. From here, Nikaia proceeded alone to the Theater; Antigonos retraced his route and ascended Acrocorinth. This route would be identical to that Bookidis and Stroud (2004: 407) have proposed Aratos of Sikyon took in 225, after escaping near assassination in the Apollonion (see also Chapter 6, pp. 156–7). I would like to thank Ronald Stroud for his assistance in helping me reconstruct the route proposed here. 152 Although conceding that there may be some truth to the account of Antigonos’ celebrations after recovering Acrocorinth, Tarn (1913: 373) is inclined to reject it on the basis of Pylarchos’ (Plutarch’s probable source) known anti-Macedonian sentiments. 153 The primary difference between Plutarch’s and Polyainos’ versions of the Nikaia story is that the former describes the king simply walking up to Acrocorinth and knocking on the gate, whereas the latter describes a “vigorous attack” after which he captured it easily. Nikaia certainly suspected that something was afoot; Polyainos’ description of a struggle at the gates of Acrocorinth, therefore, seems preferable to Plutarch’s more peaceful acquisition of it. Remarkably, this marked the second time within 70 years that a Macedonian woman held control of Corinth. Other than the fact that Polyainos (4.6.1) claims Nikaia was “advanced in age,” we know virtually nothing about her. Nevertheless, like Kratesipolis before her, she is a remarkable figure. Undoubtedly, Nikaia’s trepidation concerning the proposed marriage to Demetrios son of Gonatas is best explained by her knowledge of Kratesipolis’ acceptance of Ptolemy’s proposal of marriage and his failure to consummate it. 154 For use of the verb ἀνακτάομαι to refer to the recovery of ancestral territory, see Ma 2000: 29–31, 81. 155 Plutarch’s use of archon is not a title regularly associated with the Antigonid administration of their possessions. It is generally believed to mean that Persaios was epistates at Corinth; see Tarn 1913: 374 note 15. 156 Tataki (Macedonians, 327 no. 23) considers Theophrastos a Macedonian. O’Neil (2003: 513) doubts that he was, but offers no suggestion as to his ethnicity. He is considered possibly Macedonian in LGPN IV, s.v., no. 1. 157 LGPN I, s.v., no. 1. For a list of the works attributed to Persaios, see D.L. 7.36 and FGrH 584 and SVF I, 96–102. 158 It is also possible that Zeno’s pupil, Kallipos of Corinth (Diog. Laert. 7.38, citing Hippobotos, see also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 24), may have resided in Corinth at this time.

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159 Polyainos: βασιλικὸν χρυσίον. Presumably this was gold kept on hand at Corinth for the minting of coinage to pay mercenaries and regular troops. Plutarch (Aem. 28.10) mentions the silver and gold that Aemilius Paullus found in the royal treasury of the palace at Pella: πολὺ μὲν ἀργύριον πολὺ δὲ χρυσίον ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν. See also Livy 44.46.7. Perhaps, similarly, the “royal treasury” at Corinth ought to be located within the King’s Residence, on which see Chapter 5, pp. 128–30. 160 Tarn (1913: 396 note 6) unnecessarily argues that only the fourth brother was a mercenary, and that the three others simply were foreign residents in Corinth. While Plutarch certainly does not refer to the three as currently serving, the fact that they had absconded Antigonos’ gold from the treasury surely accounts for the termination of their status as mercenaries serving in the garrison. For these Syrians’ presence at Corinth speculation abounds. Beloch (GG IV.1: 612 and note 1) believed that Antiochos had given them to Alexandros in support of his revolt; Ferguson (1910: 196 and note 35) speculates that Antigonos received them from Laodike in exchange for Macedonian troops; see also the comments of Griffith (1935: 68 and note 3). 161 Erginos and his brothers received a handsome reward for their information. Plutarch (Arat. 19.1) claims that they were promised a reward of 60 talents if the operation was successful. Polyainos (6.5) records that the reward was seven talents. 162 The temple of Hera has not been identified, although Wiseman (1978: 81–82) has proposed a possible candidate. There is general agreement that Aratos entered the city through the Phliasian Gate; see Porter 1931: 57–58 and 1937: 63; Wiseman 1978: 81. For the Phliasian Gate, see Carpenter, Corinth III.2: 79, fig. 53; Wiseman 1978: 81. 163 For his intoxication, see Hermippos (fr. 91, Wehrli = Athen. 4.162d). 164 See Tarn (1913: 397–98 and note 9) who attributes the version preserved by Pausanias to “the later Stoics.” He also points out that Aratos had no reason to distort the truth concerning Persaios’ fate. 165 2.50.9: ἀδικίαν περὶ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον εἰς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν; 2.52.4: τὸ γεγονὸς ἔγκλημα πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν. 166 See further Tarn (1913: 396) who argues that there had not previously been hostilities (thus no state of war) between the Antigonids and the Achaians; Aratos’ attack, therefore, was unprovoked and a violation of “international law.”

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5 M O N U M E N T S AN D C U L T I N E A R L Y H E L L E NI S T I C C O RIN TH

Shortly after Demetrios Poliorketes had captured Kenchreai, he moved against Sikyon, a polis whose easternmost border was separated from the Corinthia by the Nemea river (Livy 33.15.1). Demetrios liberated the city of its Ptolemaic garrison, according to Plutarch (Demetr. 25.3), and told the Sikyonians that “their city was in the wrong place, and persuaded them to change its site to that which it now has; moreover, with the site he also changed the name of the city, calling it Demetrias instead of Sikyon.”1 This account demonstrates Demetrios’ financial ability to implement a large-scale construction project and his willingness to oversee one. No literary or epigraphic evidence from Corinth attests to the initiation of a building program similar in scale to that carried out at Sikyon. The Macedonians’ arrival at Corinth following the battle of Chaironeia seems to have had little immediate impact on the physical appearance of the city and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. Corinthians and raw materials from the Corinthia continued to be utilized extensively abroad for several years after the installation of the Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth in 338. This fact apparently inhibited the Corinthians’ ability to construct new buildings within their polis and at Poseidon’s sanctuary. Moreover, at least one but likely two earthquakes in the final two decades of the fourth century badly affected the Corinthia. Throughout this period, therefore, Corinthians were occupied with repairing damage done to existing buildings throughout their city; no evidence attests to the employment of Corinthians or the use of its resources abroad. As established in Chapter 3, the 20 years separating Alexander the Great’s death and Demetrios Poliorketes’ capture of the city were a time of troubles. Several Macedonian dynasts vied for control of the city, and numerous military operations throughout the Corinthia produced untold suffering as the harvest was repeatedly threatened and the importation of grain often impeded. When one considers the turbulent nature of the final two decades of the fourth century and the impact of the two earthquakes alongside the fact that those Macedonians who possessed Corinth prior to Demetrios Poliorketes held it for no more than a few years each and had limited financial resources, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the late fourth- and early third-century building 110

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program at Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia can only be assigned to the years following Demetrios Poliorketes’ arrival at Corinth. He held it jointly with his father for two years; after Antigonos Monophthalmos’ death at the battle of Ipsos, Demetrios and his son Antigonos Gonatas continued to possess it. Prior to Ipsos, Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios enjoyed nearly limitless financial resources; the defeat at Ipsos diminished the Antigonid treasury, but by no means exhausted it. Some new construction may have begun immediately following Demetrios’ capture of Corinth in 303, perhaps associated with the Antigonids’ revival of the League of Corinth in spring 302.2 Undoubtedly, construction continued after Ipsos. We are left, therefore, to speculate whether or not certain features of this new building program can be interpreted as Antigonid donations or the product of the Corinthians’ own initiative. Excavations at Corinth and Isthmia have revealed numerous new constructions and refurbishments to existing ones datable to the late fourth and early third centuries. All quarters of Corinth witnessed building activity. The city walls and the fortifications of Acrocorinth were repaired. North of temple hill, the Asklepieion and Lerna were rebuilt; so too was the Theater. Within the area of the later Roman forum, the Northwest Shops, Temple A, the Sacred Spring, and the Northwest Stoa all were remodeled or refurbished. The racecourse that spanned the Upper Lechaion Road Valley was reoriented and redesigned in the early years of the third quarter of the third century. Perhaps most important, however, was the construction of the South Stoa. On the northern slope of Acrocorinth, the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore was adorned with a new propylon, an elaborate staircase joining its three terraces; these features constitute only a small part of the rebuilding at the sanctuary ca. 300 or slightly thereafter. Construction assigned to the late fourth and early third centuries also occurred at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. A new North Propylon and East Gate to the sanctuary were built. The Temple of Poseidon was refurbished after standing in a ruinous state for many decades. The theater was constructed, as too was the Later Stadium. Southwest of the temple, on the Rachi, a new domestic and industrial settlement was established. Several new structures also were constructed toward the end of the fourth century at Perachora. There can be no doubt that construction throughout the Corinthia in the late fourth and early third centuries was widespread. Unfortunately, neither inscriptions nor literary references permit the association of any one building or monument with a specific Macedonian ruler who possessed Corinth. Strabo (1.3.11), citing Eratosthenes, however, claimed that Demetrios planned to construct a canal across the Isthmos, linking Corinth’s two harbors.3 His engineers informed him that the project was not feasible, and he abandoned it. This notice represents the full extent of our literary testimony for Macedonian construction within the Corinthia. One is compelled, therefore, to rely exclusively upon the excavated remains, specifically pottery from uncontaminated deposits, to assign a relative date (typically within a quarter century) to those monuments and buildings belonging to the late fourth 111

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and third centuries. Whether or not a monument constructed within these chronological limits was a Macedonian donation or a Corinthian construction represents a critically important question in any attempt to understand the Macedonians’ impact upon Corinth and the nature of the relationship that developed between Corinthians and Macedonians. The assignation of any monument at Corinth or Isthmia to a Macedonian dynast requires an assemblage of circumstantial evidence. Our current understanding of Corinth’s Hellenistic architecture and monuments prohibits discussion of each one; considered here, however, are those for which some evidence suggests either that it was a Macedonian donation or that the Macedonians utilized it. Necessity compels us to rely upon the construction dates that the excavators have proposed for various buildings and monuments. Unfortunately, some were dated to the late fourth or early third century decades ago and, in some cases, these dates have not been reassessed thoroughly. Certainly one must question the accuracy of these dates, as our understanding of late Classical and early Hellenistic pottery has improved tremendously in recent decades. The buildings and monuments discussed below, therefore, are primarily those that have been excavated or re-examined recently. Only a relatively secure date for a monument’s construction permits even tentative association with a specific Macedonian dynast active in Corinth. Naturally, therefore, any discussion of architecture at Corinth and Isthmia and their construction dates is predicated upon an understanding of the sequence and chronology of early Hellenistic Corinthian pottery. G.R. Edwards’ publication Corinth VII.3, Corinthian Hellenistic Pottery (1975) still represents the most thorough analysis of the evidence so critical for understanding the period during which the Macedonians possessed Corinth. While in many ways an admirable publication, Edwards’ volume is not without its problems. He, for example, followed closely the previously established chronology of the ceramic evidence, particularly that for the South Stoa, the pottery from which formed the primary basis of his study.4 Already at the time of its publication in 1975, however, skepticism about his chronology as well as the date assigned to the construction of the South Stoa had developed.5 New evidence, especially from excavations in the 1970s and 1980s, has prompted a reappraisal of the late fourth-century pottery sequence, a thorough analysis of which still remains incomplete, although significant advances have been made recently.6 Scholars working on excavated materials from Corinth, particularly its architecture and monuments, have assigned a date of the last quarter of the fourth century to a substantial number of archaeological features (graves, architecture, monuments, etc.). The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to present a panoramic perspective of the Hellenistic building program at Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, while setting it against contemporaneous historical knowledge of Corinth and the Macedonians who possessed it. The dating of most early Hellenistic constructions at Corinth and Isthmia to the late fourth and early third centuries naturally places them within the period 112

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Figure 5.1 Hellenistic Corinth, general plan [after Corinth XX, Plan III. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Corinth Excavations]

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that the Antigonids possessed Corinth. This analysis hopefully will serve the interests of those studying the Corinthian ceramic and architectural records and prompt others to re-examine that record.

The West Foundation, Isthmia Philip II and Alexander the Great commissioned the construction of several monuments within the Greek world; it is nearly inconceivable that they or their successors did not also dedicate monuments at Corinth.7 We have no evidence whatsoever associating Philip II with the construction of a new monument at Corinth or the refurbishment of an existing one; the reign of Alexander presents a more ambiguous picture. Following its discovery in 1960, Oscar Broneer excavated in 1961 one of the most intriguing monuments in the vicinity of Isthmia.8 The West Foundation, as it has come to be known, is situated ca. 2 km southwest of the Temple of Poseidon and it appears to be a cenotaph, which Broneer dated to ca. 350.9 It is a Π-shaped structure constructed in three or four separate phases that appear to have been separated by “no great chronological difference.”10 The earliest phase is a shallow (0.40 m) ash pit excavated in the center of the monument, filled with ash, carbonized wood, and some animal bones; the absence of human bones confirms that this monument was a cenotaph. Also excavated from the pit were a number of metal objects, as well as several fragmentary “berries” and “laurels” that apparently came from a bronze wreath/crown, plated in gold.11 A ring of stone (9.20 m in diameter [outer], east–west) surrounded the pit itself. Additional metal objects found within it include numerous iron strigils and one of bronze.12 Several other iron objects all appear to belong to a chariot or a wagon.13 Broneer also reports some iron hoops that may have decorated a table for offerings within the heroon.14 Perhaps contemporary with the ash pit is an east–west retaining wall (17.0 m) of polygonal masonry immediately south of it. The smooth surface of its south face indicates that it was designed intentionally to be visible.15 Not long after the construction of this wall, three heavy foundations were constructed to the east, west, and south of the ash pit.16 Broneer restores the monument without a colonnade, but with a parapet surrounding its east, west, and south sides.17 The outer foundation had a profiled parapet, which he estimates to have been ca. 1 m in height. He also reports that the excavated fragments of the parapet displayed little signs of weathering, indicating that the monument was demolished not long after its construction. Also excavated within the West Foundation were spear-heads and spearbutts that show no signs of use in combat, suggesting their use exclusively for dedicatory purposes.18 The weapons excavated in the West Foundation have been identified recently as Macedonian, with parallels found at Vergina and Derveni, establishing a date of within the second half of the fourth century for what must surely be identified as a heroon.19 Offerings of Macedonian weapons 114

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and horse trappings at this heroon/cenotaph suggest a connection to Demaratos of Corinth (see Chapter 2, pp. 27–9), who famously provided Alexander with his own spear (δόρυ) at the battle of the Granikos after the king had lost his. Demaratos’ affinity for horsemanship might also account for the numerous offerings at the West Foundation that are associated with horse trappings and chariots. Equally plausible, if the horse trappings are identifiable as the remains of a chariot, is their association with the four-horse chariot that conveyed Demaratos’ remains to the sea. Recalling Demaratos’ acumen with horsemanship – his likely conveyance of the horse Boukephalos to Philip II, his command of the cavalry at the battle of the Krimisos (341) in Sicily, and his service in Alexander’s cavalry as one of his hetairoi – tentative identification of the heroon with Demaratos becomes even more plausible. As discussed above, Demaratos was one of a small number of Philip II’s Greek xenoi, he played a significant role in the rapprochement between Philip and Alexander following the Pixodaros affair, and, following Philip’s assassination, Demaratos became one of Alexander’s hetairoi. Alexander honored him with an elaborate funeral and the construction of an enormous tumulus. Demaratos’ association with both Philip and Alexander attests to his high status at the Argead court; it would come as no surprise that the pro-Argead Corinthians and Macedonians at Corinth might honor him with a magnificent heroon, such as the West Foundation. The heroon’s relatively short life-span also merits consideration, as it is somewhat surprising that it did not remain in use (apparently) for long following Alexander’s death. Perhaps it was abandoned while Antipatros controlled Corinth or while Kassandros attacked it. In fact, enmity between Alexander the Great and the house of Antipatros (Kassandros’ father) is abundantly attested in the literary sources. Regardless of the identity of the individual honored at the West Foundation, it remains the only monument that can be associated conclusively with the Macedonian presence in the Corinthia.

The North Stoa The North Stoa potentially represents the most likely building in early Hellenistic Corinth that may be associated with the Macedonians’ presence, specifically within the age of Alexander and the two decades following his death. The stoa was constructed originally in the late fifth century, north of the Temple of Apollo and it has three discernible construction phases.20 Its third phase is that utilized in the early Hellenistic period and is a remarkable monument.21 Its northern façade is a two-storied stoa looking north toward Lechaion harbor, whereas its southern façade was only one story that opened up to the terrace of the temple of Apollo. Very little evidence survives to restore the stoa’s features with certainty, although enough exists to suggest that its southern façade was adorned with a Doric colonnade. Perhaps the most significant find during the excavations of the North Stoa was the gold hoard (see Chapter 2, p. 36), which included 51 gold staters 115

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Figure 5.2 West Foundation, Isthmia [after Isthmia II, Plate 79. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens]

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(41 of Philip II and ten of Alexander the Great) and a gold necklace. With the exception of the scholarly attention devoted to the coin hoard and the necklace, the North Stoa itself has received very little attention in the architectural history of Corinth. Nevertheless, the hoard of gold coins has led to some speculation regarding its function. Several scholars have posited that the individual who concealed it was a Macedonian serving in some official capacity or that the coins were used to pay the soldiers of the garrison. These suggestions are all plausible; all, moreover, imply that the Macedonians employed the North Stoa for official business. Plausibly, one might suggest that they used it prior to the construction of the South Stoa at the end of the fourth century or the king’s official residence within the city.

The earthquake(s) of the late fourth century

B.C.

Decades of excavation at Corinth have revealed that one or, more likely, two bad earthquakes afflicted the city in the late fourth century. The evidence for destruction is widespread, affecting all quarters of the city; no evidence suggests human agency.22 Damage has been detected within the area of the Roman forum, specifically to the Centaur Bath, Temple A, and Buildings I–II.23 Along the northern city wall, the Asklepieion was badly damaged.24 Northeast of the Asklepieion and north of the city wall, but within the Long Walls themselves, the Tile Works was affected and subsequently went out of use.25 The Potters’ Quarter, situated alongside the city’s western wall, was also damaged and abandoned.26 The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore on the northern slope of Acrocorinth suffered badly from the seismic event(s).27 Further evidence for destruction during the last quarter of the fourth century and rebuilding ca. 300 comes from the area of the Roman forum, specifically Cistern F and Well E, both located to the east of the Museum and just west of the West Shops.28 Earthquake damage is not limited to Corinth; it also has been identified at the Sanctuary of Poseidon, specifically at the Rachi settlement.29 Unfortunately, no literary references permit the assignation of a date to the earthquake(s), although it seems apparent from the evidence of Drain 1971-1 that enough time had elapsed between the two events for the clean-up and repair to Buildings I and II.30

Stele Shrine Incontrovertible archaeological evidence at Corinth has demonstrated that a number of late Classical structures in the city were overhauled, destroyed, or dismantled during the last quarter of the fourth century, in order to accommodate new buildings and monuments. Excavation of these structures beneath the South Stoa, especially along its western side, has clarified considerably the date and circumstances at which several were destroyed; these provide a terminus post quem for the South Stoa’s construction. 117

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Only one monument partially escaped the ravages of the earthquakes and the construction of the South Stoa. The Stele Shrine discovered and excavated in 1977 holds a unique position among the monuments and cults of Corinth, as its continuity from the Archaic and Classical periods into the early Hellenistic clearly attests.31 This important shrine was originally constructed ca. 570–560 above the remains of a domestic structure, specifically a storeroom.32 Williams posits that it functioned as a hero shrine, honoring a Corinthian who played some role in the expulsion of the Kypselid tyranny.33 This shrine continued in use until the late fourth century (ca. 300) when the South Stoa’s construction altered dramatically its appearance. The South Stoa’s construction obscured the Stele Shrine’s entire original east wall, as well as the eastern sections of its northern and southern walls; its extant remains abutted the westernmost wall of the South Stoa, which now served as the shrine’s new eastern wall. Despite these alterations, use of the Stele Shrine continued in its diminished form until some point in the mid-third century, or possibly somewhat later.34 It apparently went out of use completely in the late third century, or contemporaneously with the alterations to the South Stoa.35 Williams’ attractive suggestion raises a number of interesting questions regarding the continuity of this Archaic–Classical Corinthian cult into the Hellenistic period. He rightly observes that the Stele Shrine “was considered important enough even into the early Hellenistic period to keep its place when the South Stoa was erected.”36 One must, therefore, attempt to ascertain why it escaped total destruction contemporaneous with the South Stoa’s construction. This question becomes especially pertinent if the South Stoa is a Macedonian donation. Alterations to the Stele Shrine, following Williams’ chronology, occurred within the first years of the Antigonids’ possession of Corinth. Its decline in use, ca. 250, coincides with the tumultuous years of the 240s, during which Alexandros son of Krateros revolted (249), Antigonos Gonatas recovered Corinth from his widow Nikaia (245/early 244), and Aratos captured Acrocorinth (243), attaching the city to the Achaian koinon. Any one of these events could have accounted for the decline; collectively they almost certainly resulted in reduced interest in this local cult. Abandonment of the Stele Shrine at the end of the third century is virtually synchronous with Philip V’s defeat in the Second Macedonian War and the end of the Macedonian presence at Corinth. Excluding its alteration with the construction of the South Stoa, all indications suggest that its continued use within the third century corresponded closely to the Antigonid presence at Corinth. Although Williams concludes that the Stele Shrine did not receive the attention while the Macedonians possessed Corinth that it had prior to their advent,37 it is startling that the shrine itself was not destroyed completely with the South Stoa’s construction.38 Its preservation, albeit in a diminished form, demonstrates continuity of this important local cult under the Macedonians, perhaps even their veneration for it. Only the identification of some correlation between the Stele Shrine and the Macedonians, however, may reasonably account for its continuity. 118

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One may propose that the Macedonians deliberately preserved the Stele Shrine for reasons beyond simple reverence for a local Corinthian cult, although this may have played a role. As noted above, Williams has proposed that the Stele Shrine honored some individual associated with the expulsion of the Kypselid tyranny, which itself had been established with the overthrow of the Bacchiadai, Corinth’s ruling oligarchy in the eighth and early seventh centuries. Strabo (7.7.8) notes that Arrabaios, the fifth-century king of Lynkestis in western Macedonia, was a descendant of the expelled Bacchiadai who had migrated to Macedonia.39 Arrabaios’ house remained the most important aristocratic family in Lynkestis until Alexander’s ascension to the Macedonian throne in 336.40 Although the Corinthian hero honored at the Stele Shrine for his role in the removal of the Kypselidai could not have been a Bacchiad associated with the foundation of the Lynkestian ruling house, he was revered for his role in restoring the oligarchy that the earlier Bacchiadai had established. Any correlation between the Macedonians and the preservation of the Stele Shrine, therefore, must be associated closely with the Lynkestian ruling house, which traced its descent to the Bacchiadai of Corinth. Naturally, however, this presents some problems as the Lynkestian ruling house itself was implicated in Philip II’s assassination and purged dramatically in its aftermath.41 Alexander the Great, for example, killed immediately the two brothers Arrabaios and Heromenes, both sons of Aeropos, who was son of Arrabaios II, formerly king of the Lynkestians; Alexander spared only the third brother Alexandros the Lynkestian, who was first to recognize Alexander as king and Philip’s successor.42 Alexandros the Lynkestian later (334/3) was connected to a plot against Alexander (Arr. Anab. 1.25.3; Curt. 3.7.12) and he was executed in 330 when he became associated with the conspiracy of Philotas.43 At first glance, therefore, it seems highly improbable that Alexander or any of the Diadochoi would have preserved a Corinthian shrine that could reasonably be associated with the Lynkestian royal house or the retribution of those who suffered an injustice at the hands of the Kypselidai. Eurydike the daughter of Sirrhas and granddaughter of Arrabaios I, however, was the mother of Philip II and the grandmother of Alexander the Great; thus Eurydike, Philip, and Alexander could reasonably claim descent from Corinth’s Bacchiadai.44 In addition to the Lynkestian–Bacchiad connection to Philip and Alexander, one can identify an additional association between the Lynkestian ruling house and the house of Antipatros. Alexandros the Lynkestian married Antipatros’ daughter, whose name does not survive.45 This marriage establishes Alexandros the Lynkestian as the brother-in-law of Kassandros and also makes Phila, whose two husbands were Krateros and Demetrios Poliorketes, his sister-in-law. Phila’s marriage to the latter produced Antigonos Gonatas. Her family history, specifically her sister’s marriage to Alexandros the Lynkestian, provides at least circumstantial evidence suggesting that the houses of Antipatros and Antigonos Monophthalmos did not perpetuate Alexander’s animosity toward the Lynkestian line. It also provides a legitimate reason that explains why the 119

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Childhood Figure 5.3 Stele Shrine [after Williams 1978a: Fig. 1. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Corinth Excavations]

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Antigonids might preserve the cult of a local Corinthian hero, whom they could tenuously connect to the Lynkestian house of Arrabaios. Regardless of the historicity of the connection between the Corinthian Bacchiadai and the house of Arrabaios of Lynkestis, it must have been regarded as fact in the late fourth century; perhaps even Arrabaios’ descent from the Bacchiadai was conceived at this time. Any explanation that accounts for the Stele Shrine’s partial preservation at the westernmost end of the South Stoa ca. 300 and the continuity of this cult throughout the first half of the third century likely required the sanction of Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Gonatas; Alexandros the Lynkestian, as noted above, had been married to the sister of Phila, the wife of the latter and mother of the former. Considering Phila’s indirect connection to the Lynkestian house of Arrabaios and its purported descent from Corinth’s Bacchiadai, the suggestion that Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Gonatas had a hand in the Stele Shrine’s continuity becomes more attractive. Moreover, the Antigonids undoubtedly regarded themselves as the rightful heirs of the Argead dynasty and considered Corinth an ancestral possession; they would have embraced any association, no matter how tenuous, to the Bacchiadai through Eurydike and to a lesser extent Phila’s sister. Establishment of ancestral ties between Corinth’s Bacchiadai, Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Antigonids elucidates further Williams’ proposed third-century chronology of the Stele Shrine; it also contributes to our understanding of the South Stoa.

The South Stoa The most imposing structure that has held a central position in our understanding of late fourth-century Corinth remains the South Stoa. It is oriented nearly east–west along the southern limits of what became the Roman forum. It is nearly 165 m in length and 25 m in width. On its northern façade are 71 Doric columns and 34 Ionic columns in the interior; 33 shops lined its southern, interior wall. Each shop had two rooms, the northern of which contained a well. All 33 shops were likely used as dining facilities, often in the context of some cultic activity. The upper story of the South Stoa also had a number of rooms, probably 33, corresponding to the number of shops on the ground floor. Broneer argued that the South Stoa, on the basis of pottery as well as architectural and historical considerations, must date to the third quarter of the fourth century. He attributed the initiation of its construction to Philip II, while conceding that it was completed during Alexander’s reign. Moreover, Broneer interpreted the shops of the first floor as taverns and restaurants, and he posited the existence of hostels with sleeping quarters on the upper level. These, he continued, accommodated the representatives of the League of Corinth that Philip II established in 338/7.46 Edwards, in his publication of Hellenistic pottery from Corinth, reaffirmed Broneer’s date for the South Stoa’s construction, arguing that “construction of the building probably began around 121

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350 or in the early third quarter of the fourth century; that construction of it, the terracing and its paving to the north were complete, making it possible to use the building by ca. 330 B.C.”47 Many scholars, however, immediately questioned the date Broneer assigned to the South Stoa, preferring to place its construction at the end of the fourth century, specifically ca. 300.48 If Williams and others are correct in assigning a date of at least ca. 25 years later to the pottery associated with the construction of the South Stoa, then a date at the very end of the century, when the Antigonids possessed Corinth, is inevitable.49 Such a date is much more harmonious with the literary and historical evidence currently at our disposal. Archaeological evidence, therefore, places the construction of the South Stoa somewhere in the last two decades of the fourth century, following the earthquake(s). On the basis of historical considerations, that would mean Polyperchon, Alexandros, Kratesipolis, Ptolemy, Kassandros, or Demetrios Poliorketes could potentially be associated with its construction. All of these possibilities, with the exception of Demetrios Poliorketes, can be excluded. Polyperchon simply had no time to commission the construction of the South Stoa. He revived the League of Corinth in spring 318, almost certainly during a celebration of the Isthmian Games, providing him an occasion to adorn Corinth with a monument like the South Stoa. Polyperchon’s ability to do this, however, seems improbable. No sooner had he refounded his League of Corinth than he fell under concerted attacks by Kassandros. Polyperchon also did not have the financial means; he was more concerned with his war against Kassandros and Eumenes’ war against Antigonos Monophthalmos. So fierce was the contest for control of Greece and Asia, Polyperchon could not have initiated its construction. Neither Alexandros nor his widow Kratesipolis held Corinth long enough to initiate the project. Similarly, Ptolemy’s brief stay at Corinth and his lack of financial resources while there (see above, Chapter 3, pp. 57–59), eliminate him as a possible benefactor of the South Stoa. Kassandros also held Corinth briefly and there is no indication whatsoever that he cultivated an image as the city’s benefactor. A construction date of ca. 300 for the South Stoa places it immediately after Demetrios Poliorketes’ liberation of the city from Kassandros’ garrison in 303. If construction began slightly earlier than 300, he commisioned it with his father Antigonos Monophthalmos and, if slightly later, with his son Antigonos Gonatas. Although no direct literary or epigraphic evidence attests to Demetrios’ role in its construction, we must explore carefully this likelihood. The South Stoa’s monumental size alone indicates that it was an extremely expensive monument to finance; the source of funding, therefore, may assist in assigning the monument to the Antigonids. No Macedonian king or dynast before Demetrios Poliorketes’ arrival in the city had the financial means to construct the South Stoa; prior to the battle of Ipsos, Demetrios and his father most certainly possessed nearly unlimited financial resources. Even following the battle and Demetrios’ return to Corinth, he and his son Antigonos maintained 122

Figure 5.4 South Stoa, plan and elevation [after Corinth I.4: Plan Xa. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Corinth Excavations]

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Figure 5.5 South Stoa, restored façade and shop fronts [after Corinth I.4: Plan XIIIb. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Corinth Excavations]

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Figure 5.6 South Stoa, east end restored [after Corinth I.4: Frontispiece. Courtesy of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Corinth Excavations]

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a treasury healthy enough to donate the South Stoa at Corinth. It is unlikely, however, that the Corinthians could have done so on their own. The question is ultimately impossible to answer, as there is no indisputable evidence concerning the Antigonids’ policy of taxation at Corinth, or if they even levied taxes upon the city. The Corinthians certainly enjoyed some prosperity following the Macedonians’ arrival in the city; the two decades after Alexander’s death, however, were ones in which warfare and the destruction of crops certainly affected Corinth’s economy. Repairs to buildings destroyed by the earthquake(s) must have drained any available funds that the city possessed. The assemblage of circumstantial evidence suggests strongly that the Antigonids financed the construction of the South Stoa. They possessed the financial means to do so; its construction also would have been perceived by those Corinthians who had aided Demetrios in his expulsion of Kassandros’ garrison and had remained loyal to him after Ipsos as a reciprocal act of goodwill. The Antigonid donation of the South Stoa, therefore, might easily be construed as an act of euergetism, rewarding the pro-Antigonid Corinthians for their enduring fidelity. Later in the third century some alterations were made to the South Stoa. A drain was constructed behind it, perhaps shortly after the Antigonids regained possession of Corinth in 224.50 Moreover, a stairway to the second floor was built on the west end of the stoa, and service rooms were added behind storerooms II–XXXII; these modifications were added late in the third century or in the second century.51 Collectively, these changes indicate a transformation in how the area west of the South Stoa was used; the dates assigned to these alterations appear contemporaneous with the final years of the Macedonians’ possession of Corinth. Although we have a clear understanding of the South Stoa’s function and its construction date, we do not know who owned it. The evidence suggests that the South Stoa was an Antigonid construction; this does not mean, however, that they owned it or that they handed ownership of it to the Corinthians. The Antigonids possibly retained ownership of the South Stoa and permitted Corinthians to lease space within it. Epigraphic evidence from Seleukid Sardis offers an instructive parallel. King Antiochos III granted an exemption from the payment of leases in a stoa at Sardis as an expression of gratitude.52 The king’s ability to issue this grant implies ownership of the stoa. Perhaps we might also posit a similar situation at Corinth. If the South Stoa was an Antigonid donation, then quite possibly the kings retained ownership of it and leased the shops and suites within it. This would represent one way by which the Antigonids derived revenues from the Corinthians, while not resorting to overtly burdensome taxation. It also would offer the Antigonid monarchs, as was the case with Antiochos III, the opportunity to display their goodwill to the Corinthians through exemptions of lease payments, if they so desired. The South Stoa was certainly the most conspicuous construction in early Hellenistic Corinth; it is unfortunate that we do not have a clearer understanding of its history. Nevertheless, all archaeological indications point to a construction 126

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date of ca. 300; historical considerations also suggest the same date. Demetrios Poliorketes expelled Kassandros’ garrison from Corinth with the aid of some Corinthians in 303; he and his dynasty possessed the city without interruption until 249. The likelihood, therefore, is strong that the Antigonids had a hand in the construction of the South Stoa; perhaps it was an Antigonid donation, associated with their revival of the League of Corinth (302) or perhaps as an expression of their gratitude for the aid of the pro-Antigonid Corinthians’ in expelling Kassandros from Acrocorinth (303) and their loyalty after the battle of Ipsos (301). The South Stoa was the centerpiece of a large-scale building program at Corinth and Isthmia. It adorned a city that had suffered from two decades of war and had been damaged badly by two earthquakes. The Antigonids’ financial means far eclipsed those of the Corinthians at the end of the fourth century, making it likely that they financed its construction.

The racecourse and the torch race Corinth’s racecourse was first constructed in the fifth century; it spanned the Upper Lechaion Road valley, with a second construction phase in the late fifth–early fourth century.53 This course remained in place until it was completely redesigned with a new starting line and new orientation. This alteration occurred after 270 as a result of the South Stoa’s construction.54 The early Hellenistic racecourse was open, and roads lined all of its sides. A terrace supported by a parabolic wall, just south of the eastern end of the racecourse, was certainly associated with it. This terrace was utilized for competitions in boxing, wrestling, and the pankration.55 The racecourse and the athletic area do not appear to have been practice facilities for those training to compete in the Isthmian Games, but one used for a specific Corinthian festival. Williams suggests that the racecourse, with its unique starting line, was utilized for torch races sacred to Athena Hellotis.56 He also concedes that torch races might have been held on other occassions.57 Considering the construction date of the new racecourse (ca. 270), one is compelled to consider a Macedonian connection with its reorientation, and even to suggest an additional occasion for which the course was utilized. The Macedonians are well known to have been fond of torch races. Alexander the Great staged no less than three; these were held at Soloi (Arr. Anab. 2.5.8), Tyre (Arr. Anab. 2.24.6), and Susa (Arr. Anab. 3.16.9).58 The continued popularity of the torch race among the Macedonians is best documented in the gymnasiarch law of Beroia, in which numerous provisions are made both for the race and the competitors.59 It is plausible that the Macedonians stationed in Corinth utilized the racecourse for torch races. Perhaps even a Macedonian torch race was accompanied by a parade of troops, as occurred twice under Alexander (at Soloi and Tyre). Both parade and torch race on these occasions were preceded by sacrifice to the gods (Asklepios and Herakles respectively). Utilization of the early Hellenistic racecourse for

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events other than a festival to Athena Hellotis might be associated with any other divinity attested in the Upper Lechaion Road valley.

The Theater No structure within early Hellenistic Corinth is better attested in the literary sources than its Theater. Its second construction phase has been dated to the end of the fourth century, contemporaneous with the large-scale building program at Corinth and Isthmia.60 An extravagant “wedding” ceremony was held here (245/early 244) for Antigonos Gonatas’ son and future king, Demetrios, and Nikaia, the widow of Krateros’ son Alexandros. Aratos addressed the Corinthians in it following his expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinth. Philip V addressed the mutinous Macedonian agema within it (Polyb. 5.25.5) in 219/8. Earlier in his narrative, Polybius (5.2.2) placed the number of the Macedonians with Philip at 6,000. The Theater was more than large enough to accommodate this number; its capacity is estimated at about 15,000.61 Other than these few references, no other testimony attests to the use of the Theater by the Macedonians or Achaians.

The king’s residence (ἠ τοῦ βασιλέως αὐλή) Undoubtedly, the most important building for understanding the Macedonian presence at Corinth is the “king’s residence/palace” (ἠ τοῦ βασιλέως αὐλή), and unfortunately, no physical trace of it has been identified.62 Polybios alone attests to the residence in his account of the conspiracy against King Philip V in 219/8.63 The literary evidence implies that the structure was a permanent one, for the rebellious element of the Macedonian agema sought to tear off its doors and roof tiles.64 Moreover, Polybios clearly differentiates the royal residence from the “quarters” (καταλύσεις) of Philip’s philoi that the agema actually looted.65 The king’s residence is attested only late in the history of the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth; no remains of it have been identified in more than 100 years of excavations at Corinth and we have no idea when it was constructed. The historian provides no physical description of the residence, other than the brief mention that it had doors (θύρας), a tiled roof (κέραμον), and stewards (ῥαβδούχοι) guarded access to it.66 Polybios’ references certainly confirm that the king dined and met with his advisors within this residence.67 These physical features, and the fact that several other Macedonian monarchs undoubtedly dined and met with their advisors while visiting Corinth, suggest that Philip’s royal residence had been constructed prior to his reign, which commenced in 221. Furthermore, Polyainos’ (6.5) reference to a “royal treasury” at Corinth in 244 supplies circumstantial evidence for the existence of a “royal residence” at Corinth prior to 221.68 The large-scale building program at Corinth in the late fourth and early third century might indicate that Demetrios Poliorketes and Antigonos Gonatas constructed it shortly after Ipsos (301) 128

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when Corinth remained the single Antigonid possession in mainland Greece. The construction of a suitable residence to accommodate them and their retinues would not be surprising at all, considering the time both spent in the city. Admittedly, attribution of the royal residence at Corinth to Demetrios and Antigonos is speculative. Nevertheless, Antigonos Gonatas, Antigonos Doson, and Philip V each hosted dinner parties at Corinth; some suitable location within the city must have accommodated these spectacles. The existence of a royal residence at Corinth during the reign of Antigonos Gonatas, and perhaps as early as that of Demetrios Poliorketes, may allow for the tentative proposal of its location. The royal residence was not located on Acrocorinth’s summit, but probably on its northern slopes, overlooking the city with a view beyond it to Lechaion and Perachora, to the west and Sikyon, as well as to the east and the Isthmos. A location offering strategic views in multiple directions is paralleled both at Pella and Demetrias, where ample literary and archaeological evidence attests to royal palaces.69 The palace at Demetrias is situated below the acropolis, and above the city itself; it offers unimpeded views in multiple directions. Excavations have revealed that it included abundant space for numerous diners as well as accommodations for many, including soldiers. Demetrios founded Demetrias shortly after his return to Greece after the battle of Ipsos, ca. 293 (Strabo 9.5.15). The literary evidence also suggests the tentative placement of the king’s residence on the northern slopes of Acrocorinth. This seems inevitable considering Plutarch’s account (Arat. 22.5; see above, p. 99–100) of Aratos’ capture of Acrocorinth. Following Aratos’ entrance through the Phliasian Gate and ascent with 100 men to the summit of Acrocorinth, Plutarch describes how the 300 men he had left behind near the gate became lost in the confusion and darkness, concealing themselves beneath a cliff. The Macedonian strategos Archelaos and his men, having heard the alarm, passed the 300 as they ascended Acrocorinth. There can be no doubt that Archelaos and those accompanying him up Acrocorinth came from a location no further up its northern slope than the vicinity of the Phliasian Gate, perhaps even some distance north of it. Although certainty cannot be established, it is attractive to consider that Archelaos and those who began to ascend Acrocorinth had been near the royal residence. It is unlikely that the soldiers had been billeted throughout the city; their quick response to the alarm indicates that they resided in close proximity to their strategos Archelaos. Only one other literary reference preserves tantalizing evidence for the existence of a royal residence at Corinth. Strabo’s account (8.6.21) of the monuments he saw on the northern slope of Acrocorinth includes our only description of the Sisypheion. He places it beneath the Upper Peirene fountain on the summit of Acrocorinth, describing the considerable ruins of some sanctuary or a royal palace made of white marble.70 The Sisypheion certainly existed at the time of Demetrios Poliorketes’ capture of Acrocorinth; in fact, his troops took it by storm during their ascent from the Phliasian Gate to the summit of Acrocorinth. Several local Corinthian cults, including the cult of Sisyphos, Corinth’s legendary 129

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king, were located on Acrocorinth’s northern slope. The ruinous state of the Sisypheion and the fact that Sisyphos was both a king of Corinth and the object of a cult may have led Strabo to describe the copious remains as either a sanctuary or a royal palace. The latter term Strabo uses to describe it, however, is the more intriguing of the two, as “palace” (βασιλείου) is the term used for the royal palaces at Pella and Demetrias.71 The few literary references to early Hellenistic Corinth, specifically royal visitations, indicate that the Antigonids spent considerable time there, thus a residence to accommodate these rulers and their retinues is not surprising. Its location was probably somewhere south of the city, on the gentle slopes of Acrocorinth, probably not far from the Turkish Hadji Moustafa fountain. Considerable remains have been excavated in this area; nothing, however, permits identification of these remains with the king’s residence.72

The Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore The most thoroughly explored and published sanctuary on Acrocorinth’s north slope is the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore. Excavations in the 1960s and 1970s as well as recent final publications of the site, pottery, and terracottas have enhanced our understanding of this important sanctuary. Like many other areas within the city, the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore suffered considerable damage, most likely the result of the earthquake(s) of the late fourth century.73 Nancy Bookidis and Ronald Stroud have assigned a date of ca. 300 or slightly later to the thorough rebuilding of the sanctuary. The Lower Terrace was adorned with an elaborate new propylon, granting access to the Middle Terrace within which the courtyard was extended and the trapezoidal building constructed. At this time, a small theatral area and a small, rock-cut theater were added to the Upper Terrace.74 They concede that no indication permits association of the funding for the rebuilding either with any Macedonian who controlled Corinth or the Corinthian government itself.75 Irrefutable evidence associating the rebuilding of the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore either with the Macedonians or Corinthians would be most welcome, but its scale alone allows one to offer some observations concerning the Macedonian presence at Corinth. Evidence from the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore has revealed a large number of terracotta votives that date to the first half of the third century; the number of votives, however, declines precipitously in the mid-third century.76 This date coincides with the tumultuous 240s in which Alexandros son of Krateros revolted from Antigonos Gonatas, he recovered it from Nikaia, and Aratos of Sikyon expelled the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinth, subsequently attaching Corinth to the Achaian koinon. These historical facts might account for the decline in votive offerings at the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore. Although the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore cannot be associated with any Macedonian king or dynast possessing Corinth in the early Hellenistic period,

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the archaeological evidence corroborates a general picture that has emerged across the city. In the late fourth century, it suffered from the earthquake(s); it was rebuilt lavishly ca. 300, contemporaneous with the Antigonids’ arrival at Corinth. Although the sanctuary seems to have suffered from a decline in use following the chaotic events of the 240s, evidence of the votive offerings suggest a slight revival in the final quarter of the third century, following the Antigonids’ return to Corinth.

Corinth’s walls Repairs to Corinth’s walls dateable to the end of the fourth century suggest that Demetrios and Antigonos had a hand in this project, in anticipation both of the arrival of representatives to his League of Corinth and of a renewed assault on the city by Kassandros. Excavations conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Corinth’s Isthmian Gate have revealed considerable repairs to this structure that the excavators have dated to the end of the fourth century and have associated with Demetrios’ capture of Corinth.77 F. Winter has proposed that not all of its Hellenistic walls belong to the reconstruction phase that the excavators associate with Demetrios Poliorketes. He argues, on the basis of masonry style and stone type, that the West Gate Tower, the South Bastion, and possibly the North Bastion all belong to a second Hellenistic phase that he places in the second half of the third century which he associates with the Achaian koinon following Aratos of Sikyon’s capture of Corinth in 243.78 His attribution of the reconstruction of Acrocorinth’s fortifications to the Achaians further illustrates the conclusion that they regarded Corinth as nothing more than an important garrison town.

The Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia Recent excavations (1989) at Poseidon’s sanctuary have enlightened considerably its early Hellenistic phase. They have enhanced our knowledge of the building program at the end of the fourth–late third century, they corroborate the conclusion that new building activity ceases in the mid-third century, and they have demonstrated further that the sanctuary and the nearby Rachi settlement were damaged badly ca. 200 and were not repaired until the early Roman period. The Temple of Poseidon suffered badly from the fire in spring 390.79 Evidence from the most recent excavations has demonstrated that it was not repaired until the late fourth or early third centuries. The repairs that the excavators have attributed to the late fourth century include alterations made to the interior of the cella and the replacement of its roof.80 The Early Stadium (Phase IV) went out of use in the fourth century and was abandoned ca. 300 and the Later Stadium was constructed in its new location.81 Moreover, there appears to be

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little evidence for building activity at the Sanctuary of Poseidon within the second half of the third century.82

The Rachi settlement at Isthmia As early as the sixth century a shrine to Demeter stood on the Rachi overlooking Poseidon’s sanctuary at Isthmia. This shrine was used continuously throughout the fifth and fourth centuries; in the late fourth century it went out of use, and the worship of Demeter was most likely moved to the Sacred Glen.83 Additional changes on the Rachi at Isthmia in the third quarter of the fourth century reflect the drought that is attested throughout the Corinthia after 330. A deep well (42 m) went out of use, apparently as a result of the drought.84 Contemporaneously, a “bottle-shaped cistern” was constructed on the south slope of the ridge.85 At the end of the fourth century, however, a large settlement was constructed that is both domestic and industrial in character. The Rachi settlement is located to the south of the Temple of Poseidon, on a low ridge running from the southwest to the northeast. It was discovered in the University of Chicago Excavations and excavated between 1954 and 1956.86 Further excavations in 1989 have revealed information that is of central importance to this study.87 Study of the ceramic remains has shown that the site was constructed in the late fourth century and that it was destroyed at the end of the third century, perhaps during the Second Macedonian War (see Chapter 7, pp. 183–4). In other words, the Rachi settlement is virtually synchronous with the Antigonids’ presence at Corinth. This important site, therefore, offers a glimpse of the daily activities of those living while the Macedonians possessed the city; there is no other parallel within the Corinthia. The settlement itself is both domestic and industrial; as many as 25 (possibly 30) domestic structures, and one large building stood on the site. All indicate further that industrial activity thrived in this area. The crafts practiced in the Rachi settlement include olive production and textile manufacture, and evidence also suggests honey and wax production.88 The variety of wares manufactured at the Rachi settlement must have been (at least every two years) made available during the celebration of the Isthmian Games, recalling Livy’s (33.32.2) assessment of the Games as the market of Asia and Greece (concilium Asiae Graeciaeque is mercatus erat). Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not the Macedonians played any role in the construction or administration of the site. Virginia Anderson-Stojanovic´ has speculated that the settlement was constructed on the initiative of the priesthood of Poseidon or possibly “an independent and enterprising group of artisans.”89 It has also been suggested that the Sanctuary of Poseidon leased domestic and industrial space on the Rachi to its occupants.90 Nevertheless, its unique function and its synchronous coexistence with the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth make this site a vitally important one. The Rachi settlement offers additional evidence of widespread building activity 132

Figure 5.7 Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia [after Anderson-Stojanović 1996: Fig. 1. Courtesy of the Trustees of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens]

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throughout Corinth and Isthmia at the end of the fourth century and its destruction during the Second Macedonian War enhances greatly our understanding of how the war affected the Corinthians.

Cult in early Hellenistic Corinth: continuity and change Archaeological excavations at Corinth in the last several decades have illuminated greatly our understanding of religious life in the city, especially in the Upper Lechaion Road valley. Scholarship resulting from the archaeological discoveries naturally has focused on continuity of cult between the Greek city and the Roman colony. Considered here, however, is the degree to which the Macedonians affected the religious life of early Hellenistic Corinth. Cults attested at Corinth in the early Hellenistic period are numerous; both the Olympian deities as well as local cults are well represented. The archaeological record indicates that the area of Corinth excavated by the American School of Classical Studies to the north of Temple Hill was reserved for the major deities, whereas that area to the south of it emphasized local cults. A third area of the intramural city, the northern slope of Acrocorinth, shows signs of both types of cult.91 The summit of Acrocorinth itself was home to a temple and sanctuary of Aphrodite, the patron goddess of Corinth.92 Nancy Bookidis has discussed recently the archaeological and literary evidence for cults in early Hellenistic Corinth, focusing on those within the city and on Acrocorinth.93 One should add to her catalogue one or possibly two additional cults, one local and the other an import. The first is the cult of Sisyphos, the legendary king of Corinth. A cult in his honor is attested twice in our literary sources; both attestations derive ultimately from the same primary source. As discussed above (Chapter 3, pp. 61, 63–4), Demetrios Poliorketes ascended Acrocorinth and took the Sisypheion by storm before capturing the citadel. Strabo, who visited Corinth shortly after its refoundation in 44, also attests to the Sisypheion, describing it as the ruins of some palace. Both descriptions likely derive from Hieronymos of Kardia’s digression on the topography of Corinth.94 Both also allow us to determine conclusively that the Sisypheion existed on the slope of Acrocorinth no later than the end of the fourth century, and that it was in a state of ruin in the second half of the first century. Significantly, Pausanias makes no mention of the Sisypheion in his catalogue of cults on Acrocorinth’s north slope, indicating that traces of it no longer existed in the early second century A.D.95 The second is a cult of Bendis, for which only limited archaeological evidence attests to its existence. A sculpture of the Artemis-Bendis type, dated to the early Hellenistic period, was discovered possibly in the vicinity of the Sacred Spring.96 Additionally, a large number of terracotta figurines also of the Artemis-Bendis type, belonging to the third and second centuries, have been excavated near the peribolos of Apollo.97 While one sculpture and several

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Figure 5.8 Rachi settlement, partially restored plan [after Anderson-Stojanović 1996: Fig. 3. Courtesy of the Trustees of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens]

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terracotta figurines of the Artemis-Bendis type hardly constitute evidence for a cult of Bendis in early Hellenistic Corinth, circumstantial evidence may strengthen the case for her presence. A local Corinthian cult honoring Kotyto is well documented, and it is most likely connected with the Sacred Spring.98 Strabo (10.3.16) likens the rites of Bendis to those of Kotyto. Considering Mary Sturgeon’s suggestion that the Artemis-Bendis type sculpture was excavated near the Sacred Spring, one may suggest tentatively that Bendis was introduced at Corinth in the early Hellenistic period, in the area of the Sacred Spring.99 The most significant additions to the pantheon at Corinth in the early Hellenistic period are Isis and Sarapis, whose cults were introduced in the third century. Pausanias (2.4.6) mentions two sanctuaries, one to Pelagian Isis and the other to Egyptian Isis; additionally, he specifies two cults to Sarapis, one of which he identifies as that of Sarapis in Canopos.100 He identifies all four cults on the northern slope of Acrocorinth. Pausanias (2.2.3) also situates a cult of Isis at Kenchreai. The archaeological evidence suggests a Hellenistic date for the four sanctuaries on Acrocorinth. Most notable is an inscribed base (SEG 27.34) with dedication to Isis and Sarapis that has been dated to the third or second century.101 No further evidence survives pertaining to the cults of Isis and Sarapis or the date and circumstance at which both were introduced at Corinth. One may speculate, however, that the arrival of these cults coincided with a Ptolemaic presence in the city. Certainly the period between 308 when Ptolemy I took control of Corinth from Kratesipolis until he lost it to Kassandros in 305 represents one possibility.102 Both Alexandros son of Krateros and the Achaian koinon had close relations with the Ptolemies; logically, therefore, any time between 249 and 224 constitutes a second alternative. Continuity of cult between the Classical and Hellenistic periods is discernible on many levels. The cult of Apollo persisted, practiced at the Archaic Temple of Apollo in the center of the polis. The cult of Asklepios, the origins of which date to the late fifth century at Corinth, continues, although with some puzzling differences.103 The sacred space of the Asklepieion changed dramatically at the end of the fourth century, as too did cultic practice there. Indications point to a date at the end of the fourth century for a rebuilding of the stoa within the Asklepieion as well as other monuments.104 Most curious, however, is the apparent cessation of votive objects from the sanctuary following this rebuilding. The fourth-century Corinthian Asklepieion has produced hundreds of terracotta votives, primarily body parts; these seem to stop at ca. 300 with the new construction program.105

*** The analysis of architecture, monuments, and cult reveals a coherent picture of the early Hellenistic Corinthia. The final four decades of the fourth century saw little new construction at Corinth and Isthmia. While it is conceivable that the Argeadai dedicated monuments and buildings at either location, no trace of them survives with the possible exception of the West Foundation, located

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west of Poseidon’s sanctuary. The unequivocal evidence for one or, more likely, two bad earthquakes at Corinth in the final two decades of the century might have obscured any evidence of Argead donations at Corinth; clearly, however, these seismic events warranted immediate repairs rather than largescale new construction. Corinth was also affected badly throughout the final two decades of the fourth century by the struggles of Alexander’s successors. Several vied for control of Corinth, either on account of its strategic position or to present themselves as legitimate heirs to the Argeadai. No dynast possessing Corinth did so for long enough or had available the requisite financial resources to initiate a building program. Demetrios Poliorketes, however, took possession of Corinth from Kassandros in 303. He and his father Antigonos Monophthalmos had the will and the financial means to bestow architectural donations upon Corinth and Poseidon’s sanctuary at Isthmia. The archaeological evidence points to a late fourth- to early third-century date for the new constructions and it is all but certain that it must have been initiated while the Antigonids possessed Corinth. These facts alone do not prove that the Antigonids funded or dedicated any buildings or monuments in the city or Poseidon’s sanctuary. Circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that they did. The scale of the construction would have struck any visitor to Corinth at the inception of the third century. Its walls were repaired, the Asklepieion was altered, the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore on the northern slopes of Acrocorinth was completely overhauled. Most impressive, however, was the South Stoa, the centerpiece of the building program. Cult and donation seem to intersect with the construction of this edifice, suggesting a Macedonian connection. The northern limits of the Upper Lechaion Road valley were transformed to accommodate the South Stoa. Only the sixthcentury Stele Shrine was preserved relatively unscathed. Its form was altered, but its function and prominence demonstrated continuity of cult. Evidence suggests that the Antigonids may have manufactured a connection between themselves and Corinth’s Bacchiadai on the one hand, as well as Corinth and the Argeadai on the other. Quite possibly, this lineage was constructed in the late fourth century to connect inextricably the Antigonids with Corinth, its oligarchy, and the Argeadai. Archaeological evidence also points to the refurbishment of existing structures near the end of the third century, contemporaneous with the Antigonid recovery of Corinth. Unfortunately, little can be made of this evidence as its proximity to the end of the Antigonids’ possession of Corinth prohibits certain attribution. While Corinth and Isthmia experienced considerable physical change throughout the early Hellenistic period, continuity prevailed. Religious life in early Hellenistic Corinth was vibrant, displaying signs of continuity. No evidence suggests Macedonian interference with religious life at Corinth. The Antigonids, in fact, may even have promoted a local cult and used it to connect themselves with the Corinthians and the Argeadai. There is little direct evidence for the introduction of new cults into the city while the 137

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Macedonians possessed it. Only Sarapis and Isis, as well as Bendis, seem to have been introduced to Corinth’s pantheon in the fourth or third centuries.106 In sum, Corinth’s architectural history reflects its third-century trajectory. She was the recipient of Antigonid benefactions on account of the considerable goodwill that existed between the city and the kings. She did not fare so well as a member of the Achaian koinon, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Notes 1 Trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library. 2 Broneer (Isthmia II: 64 note 72) conceded that this was a possibility. See also Roebuck, Corinth XIV: 137–38. 3 Pliny (NH 4.10) also records Demetrios’ attempt to construct a canal across the Isthmos. See also Corinth I.1: 56 and the comments of Wiseman 1978: 48. 4 Corinth VII.3: 196–98. 5 Edwards himself (Corinth VII.3: vi) acknowledged concerns about his dating of the pottery associated with the South Stoa. 6 Pemberton (1985; Corinth XVIII.1) has presented the most comprehensive re-analysis of the late fourth-century ceramic record from Corinth. See also McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6. 7 For example, the Philippeion at Olympia; see Townsend 2003; Carney 2007: 33–56, with earlier bibliography on the monument. For the association of the building program at Nemea with Philip II and Alexander, see Nemea II: 91–93. 8 For the preliminary excavation reports, see Broneer 1962a: 16–18, 20–25; a detailed treatment of the monument is found in Isthmia II: 117–22, and 129–30, nos. 88–97 for the catalogue of architectural fragments. I thank A. Jackson for accompanying me to the site in March 2010. 9 Isthmia II: 120. In his preliminary report, Broneer (1962a: 16–18) dated the West Foundation to the second half of the fourth century. Wiseman (1963: 260) dates it to the third quarter of the fourth century. As with the South Stoa at Corinth, Broneer’s dates now may be regarded as a quarter century too high, placing this monument’s date in the early? (ca. 325) years of the last quarter of the fourth century. If accurate, the cenotaph then is almost exactly contemporaneous with Demaratos’ death and the (apparent) repatriation of his ashes. 10 Isthmia II: 120. 11 For the gold-plated terracotta beads, identified as berries, see Isthmia VII, no. 279, pl. 42. Raubitschek lists the inventory numbers of a total of 16 of these beads found in the West Foundation, associating them with the “gold crown found in the West Foundation.” She mentions “gold leaves, gilt bronze leaves, and eight glass globes, many of which were affixed by short ivory sticks” as also belonging to the crown. 12 Iron strigils: Isthmia VII, nos. 466–73 and 475. Bronze strigil: Isthmia VII, no. 474. 13 Isthmia VII, no. 341, an iron binding of an axle or a pole for a chariot or wagon; nos. 342–43, iron bindings; no. 344, an iron bolt with washer from a chariot; and no. 345 A and B, two iron bolts. 14 Broneer 1962a: 17 and 21, no. 8. 15 Isthmia II: 119. 16 Isthmia II: 118–19. 17 Isthmia II: 118.

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18 Broneer 1962a: 20–21, nos. 4–8. 19 A. Jackson, “The Weapons and their Macedonian Parallels,” forthcoming. 20 De Waele 1931: 399 dates the first stoa to the first half of the fifth century and the second stoa to the second half of the fifth century. For a summary of the North Stoa, see Scranton, Corinth I.3: 163–73. 21 According to de Waele (1931: 401), the third stoa was built near the middle of the fourth century. Scranton (Corinth I.3: 174) places its construction near the end of the third quarter of the fourth century. 22 Williams and Fisher 1976: 115–17; Pemberton, Corinth XVIII.I, 3; McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6: 18. 23 Williams and Fisher 1976: 109–15; Williams 1977: 40–41, 45–52. 24 For the late fourth-century damage to the Asklepieion, see Roebuck, Corinth XIV: 129–38, who assigns a date of post-315 for the damage. Roebuck (137–38) even speculates that the post-destruction rebuilding of the Asklepieion, Lerna, and the city wall be associated with Demetrios Poliorketes. 25 For the abandonment of the Tile Works as a result of an earthquake late in the fourth century, see Merker 2006: 15–16. 26 For the Potters’ Quarter, see Stillwell, (Corinth XV.1: 46–47 and 49), who dates the destruction to after 338, but acknowledges on the basis of a coin from Opuntian Lokris that it may be after 316. 27 Bookidis and Stroud (Corinth XVIII.3: 430–31) describe the destruction at the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore, assigning a date of ca. 300 or slightly later to the rebuilding of the sanctuary. 28 Weinberg 1948: 229–40. 29 Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1993: 261 note 24. 30 Williams (Williams and Fisher 1972: 153–54) suggests an “interim” period. See further McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6: 18–19. 31 One foundation block of the Stele Shrine had been discovered in 1938 under the floor of Shop XXXIII of the South Stoa, see Broneer, Corinth I.4: 11–12 and Williams 1978a: 5 and note 6. 32 For full discussion of the Stele Shrine, see Williams 1978a: 5–12; 1978b: 56–66. 33 Williams 1978a: 8, 11–12. For a discussion of other stele shrines at Corinth and their function, see Williams 1981: 408–21. See, however, the criticism of Salmon 1984: 230 note 171. 34 Although construction of the South Stoa reduced the area within the Stele Shrine, Williams (1978a: 5) suggests that coping blocks capped the poros orthostates enclosing the shrine in the Hellenistic period. 35 Williams 1978a: 5–6, 9–10; 1978b: 57–58. 36 Williams 1978a: 11. 37 Williams 1978b: 66. 38 Compare, for example, the Underground Shrine and temenos that was filled in completely to accommodate the South Stoa; see Morgan 1937: 543–45. Williams (1978b: 74–75) notes that nothing suggests that it was moved to another location. 39 See further Will 1955: 517 note 1, 535 note 2; Salmon 1984: 195 and note 29. 40 For the Lynkestian royal house, see Bosworth 1971: 97–101; Habicht 1977: 511–16; Hammond, HM I: 103; II: 14–17. 41 Sources: Arr. Anab. 1.25.1; Diod. Sic. 17.2.1; Plut. Alex. 10.8, Mor. 327c; Just. 11.2.2. See further Bosworth 1988: 25–26. 42 For Alexandros the Lynkestian, see Berve ii, no. 37; Tataki, Macedonians, 201, no. 2; Heckel 2006: 19, no. 4. For his recognition of Alexander as king, see Arr. Anab. 1.25.2; Just. 11.2.2. 43 Curt. 7.1.5–9; Diod. Sic. 17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1. See further Badian 2000: 56–60.

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44 The ethnicity of Eurydike’s father Sirrhas is disputed; he may be either Lynkestian or Illyrian. There is no controversy, however, concerning her grandfather Arrabaios. See further Carney (2000: 40–46) for an overview of the problems associated with Eurydike’s life and earlier bibliography. 45 Curt. 7.1.7; Just. 11.7.1, 12.14.1; and also Diod. Sic. (17.80.2) where Antigonos is incorrectly named as her father-in-law. See further Heckel 2006: 276, no. F37. 46 Corinth I.4: 94–99; 156–57 47 Corinth VII.3: 197. 48 Martin (1956: 213–16) argued for a date shortly before or after 300. Roux (1961: 348) also proposed a date of ca. 300. Coulton (1976: 58 and 228) placed its construction in the early third century; see also Mari 2002: 188 note 2 and C.K. Williams’ comments in Merker 2006: 139. 49 See especially McPhee and Pemberton, Corinth VII.6: 18–19. 50 Williams 1978a: 12–15; Williams 1980: 116–27. 51 Williams 1980: 127–31. 52 Gauthier 1989: no. 3, lines 8–9, and discussion, 101–7 (SEG 39.1285). See also Ma 2000: 287–88, no. 3. The inscription dates to 213. 53 For the fifth-century racecourse and its late fifth to early fourth-century successor, see Williams and Russell 1981: 2–11. 54 Originally excavated in 1936, see Morgan 1937: 549–51. See further Williams 1970: 1–12; Williams 1978b: 137–57; and now Williams and Russell 1981: 11–13. 55 Williams and Russell 1981: 15–19. 56 Morgan 1937: 549; Williams 1978b: 42–43, 155–56; Bookidis 2005: 144; Sanders 2010: 380–86. Herbert (1986: 35), however, argues that Artemis “under one of her Bacchic aspects or a combination of epithets” is the deity for whom the torch race was held (at least those represented on the red-figure kraters). 57 Williams 1970: 38–39. 58 Sterret (1901: 418 and note 4) lists seven torch races held by Alexander, but on only three occasions is the torch race stated explicitly; see also Adams 2007: 132. Herbert (1986: 29 and note 10), analyzing the torch race at Corinth, begins with reference to their popularity under Alexander and throughout the Hellenistic period, but then returns to the Classical period, focusing on depictions of the torch race at Corinth on red-figure vases of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. 59 Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993; SEG 27.261; Hatzopoulos 1996 II: no. 60 (date: first third of the second century). 60 Corinth II: 15–40. 61 Corinth II: 31–32. Construction of the theater at Isthmia and the Theater at Corinth are contemporaneous; see Gebhard 1973: 29–60. 62 The precise meaning of αὐλή is not entirely clear. It can mean palace, residence, or even simply a hall. 63 Polybios’ references (5.25.3, 26.9–10) clearly indicate a palace or residence that comprised several components, including quarters for the king’s friends, and possibly a treasury. Since no remains of the structure have been identified to clarify its meaning, I have used “the king’s residence.” His references have been overlooked widely. As far as I am aware, only Tamm (1968: 159 note 3) and Le Bohec (1993: 211–12) have discussed it. 64 Any possible candidate for the royal residence at Corinth might be identified through stamped roof tiles, such as those found at Pella and stamped ΒΑ|ΑΝ|ΤΙ or ΒΑΣ|ΑΝΤΙ (βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου); see Le Bohec 1993: 51; or those from the harbor fortifications at Oiniadai and stamped ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ; see Powell 1904: 170. 65 Translated as “tents” in Polybius The Histories, rev. F. Walbank and Chr. Habicht (Loeb Classical Library, 2011). There is no reason, on the basis of Polybios’

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66 67 68 69 70 71

72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

reference, to suggest that the quarters of Philip’s philoi were not also a permanent structure and that they were not located in close proximity to the king’s residence, perhaps even an extended part of it. For Alexander the Great’s use of rhabdouchoi at his court, see Diod. Sic. (17.77.4), who includes their introduction among his catalogue of Persian customs the king adopted. For the Macedonian practice of banqueting at their palaces, see Tomlinson 1970; Nielsen 1999: 97–98. For a discussion of dining at Corinth, specifically within the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore, see Bookidis 1990: 86–94. Plutarch (Aem. 28.10) and Livy (44.46.7) attest to a royal treasury at the palace in Pella. Nielsen (1999: 81, 94) identifies Macedonian palaces’ “elevated position on hills and terraces” (94) as one of their salient features. See also Hatzopoulos (2001b) on the interaction between royal palace and citizen. Strabo 8.6.21: ὑπὸ δὲ τῇ Πειρήνῃ τὸ Σισύφειόν ἐστιν, ἱεροῦ τινος ἢ βασιλείου λευκῶν λίθων πεποιημένου διασῶζον ἐρείπια οὐκ ὀλίγα. See Strabo 9.5.15 concerning Demetrias (καὶ δὴ καὶ ναύσταθμον ἦν τοῦτο καὶ βασίλειον μέχρι πολλοῦ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τῶν Μακεδόνων); the palace at Demetrias is also known as the Anaktoron. For Pella, see Skylax 66 (Πέλλα πόλις καὶ βασίλειον). For the palace at Pella, see Siganidou 1996: 144–47; Nielsen 1999: 266–68; Akamatis 2011: 399–402. For the palace at Aigai, see Kottaridi 2011: 297–333. For the palace at Demetrias, see Marzolff 1996: 148–63; Nielsen 1999: 268–70 with ancient sources and bibilography. Stroud and Bookidis (Corinth XVIII.3: 6) note that excavations in this area in 1928–29 and 1962–69 “revealed ancient remains in a field only ca. 250 m northwest of the [Hadji Moustafa] fountain. These consisted of (1) part of a Hellenistic building with a pebble mosaic pavement and walls decorated with red and white painted stucco and (2) a very elaborate system of stuccoed tunnels and manholes to carry off water to the northwest in the direction of Anaploga.” For the 1962–69 excavations, see Robinson 1969: 1–35. As Stroud and Bookidis note (6, notes 18–21) these excavations remain largely unpublished. The Byzantine Archaeological Service has excavated a Hellenistic dining complex north of the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore and south of the Hadji Moustafa fountain that was exposed partially by flooding in 1997; see Bookidis, Corinth XX: 257 note 86. I would like to thank Nancy Bookidis for sharing with me a preliminary draft of an article she has since published on these remains (Bookidis 2013). Bookidis and Stroud, Corinth XVIII.3: 430–31; Pemberton, Corinth XVIII.1: 91. Bookidis and Stroud, Corinth XVIII.3: 432–33. Bookidis and Stroud, Corinth XVIII.3: 431. See Merker, Corinth XVIII.4: 116, 249 and Corinth XX: 242–43. I would like to thank Nancy Bookidis for calling this to my attention. Corinth III.2: 122–25 (Parsons) and 126 (Carpenter). Winter (1991: 120–21) has endorsed their conclusions concerning the Isthmian Gate. See also Wiseman 1978: 86 and Winter 1991: 117–18. Winter 1991: 113–19. See Xen. Hell. 4.5.4. Gebhard and Hemans 1998: 10–11. Broneer (Isthmia II: 64, 66 and note 72) associated the repairs to the temple with Philip II and Alexander; this can no longer be maintained. Isthmia II: 55–63, 66; Gebhard and Hemans 1998: 41. Gebhard and Hemans 1998: 43. Anderson-Stojanovic´ 2002: 75–83.

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84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102

103 104 105 106

Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1993: 269–70. Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1993: 259. Broneer 1955: 124–28; Broneer 1958: 17–20, 31, 32, 32; and Kardara 1961. For the excavation report, see Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1996; see also Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1997. For a discussion of olive oil production at the Rachi settlement, see Foxhall 2007: 153–59; honey and wax production, see Anderson-Stojanovic´ and Jones 2002. The number of loom weights found in the houses suggests textile manufacture. Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1996: 92. Kardara (1961: 266) first made the suggestion in reference to a “guild of dyers” that she believed occupied the settlement. See Dixon (forthcoming, 2014), who suggests that an inscribed list of properties found at Isthmia in 1970 (SEG 29.338) may preserve a record of sale, lease, or possibly confiscation of properties at the Rachi settlement. Bookidis 2005: 142–48. For the cult of Aphrodite at Corinth, see Williams 1986. He speculates (19–20) that the paucity of Hellenistic dedications to the goddess on Acrocorinth might be the result of the Macedonian garrison and that offerings to Aphrodite might have been made in the city below. See Merker (Corinth XVIII.4: 170) for evidence of the worship of Aphrodite alongside Demeter and Kore in the late fourth and third centuries. She speculates that the Macedonian garrison’s presence on Acrocorinth might account for her presence in the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore. Bookidis 2005: 142–51. Hornblower 1981: 49, 251. See Corinth III.1: 26 for an inscription (Roman in date) discovered on Acrocorinth that apparently refers in some way to Sisyphos. Sturgeon, Corinth XX: 364. Sturgeon (1998: 6–7) identifies the sculpture as a “running Artemis.” The sculpture is Corinth S-312. Corinth XII: 42, nos. 228–35; Corinth XV.2: 124; Corinth XVII: 17 [KT 12–17]. See also Herbert 1986: 35. Williams 1978b: 125–27. For Bendis’ introduction at Piraeus and the popularity of her cult in the Hellenistic period, see Mikalson 1998: 140–45. See the comments of Bookidis 2005: 146–47 and Smith 1977: 210–12. See Bookidis and Stroud, Corinth XVIII.3: 6 and note 22; Smith 1977: 217–18. Mikalson (1998: 276) notes that a cult of Isis is first attested at Athens before 332/1; Sarapis’ introduction is attributed by Pausanias (1.18.4) to “Ptolemy,” who is most likely Ptolemy III Euergetes. Mikalson (1998: 178–80) postulates that the cult of Sarapis might have arrived in Athens as early as 224 or possibly as late as 215/4. For Asklepios’ introduction at Corinth in the late fifth century, see Corinth XIV: 22 and 152–55; Wickkiser 2010: 37–38. Pausanias (2.2.3) also attests to a temple of Asklepios at Kenchreai. For a physical description of the Hellenistic Asklepieion in the Hellenistic period, see Wickkiser (2010: 47–52), who emphasizes its extraordinary waterworks system. See Roebuck, Corinth XIV: 111–28. Pausanias (2.4.7) mentions a cult to the Mother of the Gods on the northern slope of Acrocorinth; there is no evidence of her cult at Corinth in the early Hellenistic period, see Bookidis (2005: 147), who suggests that a cult to her may have existed in the Hellenistic period.

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6 THE ACHAIAN INTERLUDE, 243 –2 2 4 B . C . From liberation to rebellion

No individual can be associated more closely with Corinth’s first tenure as a member of the Achaian koinon than Aratos of Sikyon; he expelled the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinth, and 19 years later he orchestrated the Achaian volte face, restoring the citadel to King Antigonos III Doson. One can discern most Corinthians’ public perspective of Aratos in particular and the Achaian koinon in general on both occasions. Immediately following his expulsion of the Macedonians, the Corinthians welcomed Aratos as a liberator, dedicating a monument in the city to commemorate his accomplishment; prior to his betrayal of Corinth at the height of the Kleomenic War, he narrowly escaped assassination within the city. Traditionally, scholars have interpreted the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison and Corinth’s attachment to the Achaian koinon as positive developments.1 Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. In fact, the 19 years of Corinth’s membership within the Achaian koinon must be counted among the Corinthians’ most disagreeable years within the early Hellenistic period. In this chapter, those factors that account for the Corinthians’ own volte face in which their exultation at liberation quickly turned to remorse and rebellion are enumerated. Even those Corinthians who held the Macedonians in contempt must have longed for the days when the latter respected the former. Corinth enjoyed prestige under the Macedonians and benefited from their kings’ goodwill; under the Achaians, it was reduced to nothing more than a strategically important garrison town, or some village (κώμην τὴν τυχοῦσαν).2

The Macedonian context of Aratos’ return of the keys of Corinth’s gates When Aratos of Sikyon captured Acrocorinth and expelled Antigonos’ garrisons, the Corinthians hailed him as a liberator; reacting to his presence in the Theatre, they received him with friendly greetings (φιλοφροσύναις). Aratos, according to Plutarch (Arat. 23.3), listened to their praise of his excellence (ἐπαινούντων μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν) and admiration of his good fortune (ζηλούντων δὲ τὴν τύχην). Not 143

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long afterwards, the Corinthians dedicated a monument within the city honoring “the captors of Acrocorinth.”3 These expressions of gratitude demonstrate that they responded to Aratos just as any Hellenistic polis would have conversed with a monarch. The Corinthians, especially those who had supported the Antigonids, had no other alternative. In fact, the Corinthians’ reaction resembles closely their reception of Demetrios Poliorketes after he had captured Corinth 60 years earlier. One must believe that this was a discourse with which the Corinthians had become fluent during 95 years of dialogue with Macedonian generals, dynasts, and kings. Such exchanges between polis and king commence with the city’s expression of goodwill toward the potential benefactor; in exchange, the latter also guarantees its continued goodwill toward the city.4 All indications, however, point to a short honeymoon between the Achaians and Corinthians. The Corinthians, according to Plutarch (Arat. 23.4), expressed their euphoria when Aratos “returned the keys of their gates” (τῶν πυλῶν τὰς κλεῖς ἀπέδωκε) that the Macedonians had held since Philip II had installed a garrison on Acrocorinth. Aratos carefully crafted this gesture as an act of goodwill to emphasize his hand in the Macedonians’ removal. Moreover, it is possible that his return of the keys was not simply a gesture but an action designed to reverse a similar Macedonian practice in which the Corinthians had handed their keys over to Macedonian officials. Three documents from Seleukid Asia Minor demonstrate that the procedure by which keys were handed over to a magistrate may have constituted a formal ceremony. The earliest Seleukid document pertaining to the transfer of keys comes from a decree of ca. 243 or 242 found at Smyrna, concerning its sympoliteia with Magnesia-by-Sipylos. According to the decree, the demos of Smyrna dispatched an archon to Magnesia whose inhabitants were to hand over their keys and receive a military guard to maintain it for King Seleukos II.5 Provisions were made at Iasos, as described in a fragmentary decree of ca. 196, ensuring that the strategoi leaving office turn over the keys to their successors.6 Moreover, the new strategoi were required to sacrifice at the altar to King Antiochos III. John Ma has suggested that the transfer of the keys at Iasos was probably a local ceremony, predating Seleukid control. Sacrifice to the king, however, was added under the Seleukids, establishing a “ceremony of the keys.”7 Ma has recognized a parallel from Euromos, interpreting it as a civic procedure. The Euromians, at some date after 197, handed over their keys to three kosmoi they had elected.8 These officials were entrusted with the management of the fortifications and other military matters according to their agreement with King Antiochos III. Undoubtedly, the Euromians elected the kosmoi and their keys were handed over to them; it is significant, however, that their responsibilities pertain to the alliance contracted with Antiochos III. The example from Smyrna too appears to be a civic process, but one connecting closely the demos and the inhabitants of Magnesia to King Seleukos II. Evidence for a similar Antigonid practice survives from Athens. Diogenes Laertius (7.6) records that proof of the high regard in which 144

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the Athenians held Zeno of Kition is detected in the fact that they entrusted to him the keys of their walls, and awarded him a gold crown and a bronze statue.9 They bestowed these honors upon Zeno prior to his death in autumn 262, after which the Athenian Thrason, on Antigonos Gonatas’ behalf, moved that they decree further honors upon him, including a gold crown and a tomb in the Kerameikos built at the demos’ expense.10 Shortly before Aratos captured Acrocorinth, Antigonos had entrusted the governorship of Corinth to Persaios of Kition, who had once been Zeno’s student and a member of the king’s court. It is possible that the Corinthians had transferred their keys to Persaios in a similar manner. These parallels, documenting the transmission of keys from one magistrate to another or by a city to a magistrate, differ from Aratos’ transfer of the keys to the Corinthians. All five examples, however, share in common a process by which keys are transferred. The public transfer of keys was possibly a Macedonian practice that Aratos sought to mock at Corinth. Aratos may have returned the keys to the Corinthians as a display of his goodwill toward them, while knowing that they had become inured to the practice of symbolically handing over their keys to Macedonian kings or their officials. The Corinthians comprehended the exchange; it was now their responsibility to remit their keys to Aratos as a reciprocal expression of their goodwill toward him. Aratos’ installation of a garrison on Acrocorinth confirms that he reclaimed the keys from the Corinthians. Those who had hoped that Acrocorinth would remain free of a garrison following the Macedonians’ expulsion would have been disappointed.

Corinth’s adhesion to the Achaian koinon Corinth then became a member of the Achaian koinon; the demos did not request admission: according to Polybios and Plutarch, Aratos persuaded them to join.11 Unquestionably, the Corinthians had little choice. The Achaian koinon had existed as a federal state in the northern Peloponnese during the late Classical period, but may have lapsed in the 330s, when the Achaian poleis joined the League of Corinth; it may have ceased to function as late as the early third century.12 In 281/0, however, the koinon was reconstituted, with four of its original 12 members participating; the others soon followed.13 We know very little about the conditions and circumstances surrounding other poleis’ entrance into the Achaian koinon. The erection of stelai recording new members’ admission seems to have been official Achaian practice. Two examples have been identified as records of new members’ admittance. The earliest preserves a fragmentary record of Epidauros’ (IG IV2.1.70+59) entrance and the second records the admission of Orchomenos, ca. 230.14 The inscription recording Epidauros’ admission into the koinon explicitly attests to the fact that the Epidaurians were granted freedom of a garrison (ἀφρούρατοι). Whether or not this was a standard grant made to other new adherents is unclear; the 145

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example of the Achaian garrison on Acrocorinth demonstrates that it was not universal. It also appears certain that upon joining the Achaian koinon, new members were required to submit any outstanding disputes with other members for arbitration. The inscription recording Orchomenos’ entrance apparently contained a requirement that it resolve a dispute with Megalopolis concerning Methydrion, but the specific details are not entirely clear.15 The inscription recording Epidauros’ admission also suggests that it was to submit a dispute with Corinth for arbitration.16

Corinth’s border dispute with Epidauros Both Corinth and Epidauros became members of the Achaian koinon in 243/2 and shortly thereafter they were compelled to submit for arbitration a dispute over their common boundary. The Achaians entrusted the arbitration to Megara, which appointed 151 of its citizens to settle the dispute, a record of which is preserved on an intact stele, IG IV2.1.71, found in the Asklepieion at Epidauros. In addition to the arbiters’ final decision this stele records that the Epidaurians had won an initial decision that the Corinthians appealed. Thirtyone of the original 151 Megarians returned to the disputed territory, rendering a second judgment, which is preserved on IG IV2.1.71. A second stele, IG IV2.1.70+59, also found in the Epidaurian Asklepieion, was interpreted originally as a record of the first Megarian decision, but it has since been shown to record the conditions of Epidauros’ entrance into the Achaian koinon, as noted earlier.17 Corinthians (Κορίνθιοι) certainly appear in IG IV2.1.70+59 (line 17), but the context suggests that one of the conditions of Epidauros’ admission was the submission for arbitration its dispute with Corinth. Considered here are the date of the dispute, the selection of Megarians as judges, Corinth’s earlier relations with Epidauros, and the settlement preserved on IG IV2.1.71. The date of IG IV2.1.71 cannot be determined precisely, but it can be placed within a very narrow window.18 It is dated both by Achaian strategos (Aigialeos) and priest of Asklepios at Epidauros (Dionysios), but unfortunately neither name is known securely elsewhere, thus preventing us from assigning a precise date. An Aigialeos son of Kritoboulos from Aigion, however, is known from another inscription dated between 230 and 200, but the two cannot otherwise be identified as the same man.19 Nevertheless, we know enough about the list of strategoi from this period of the Achaian koinon’s history to date the inscription with some accuracy. The strategos of the year 236/5 was most likely Dioitas, thus eliminating this year from consideration.20 Furthermore, the list of strategoi following the year 235 is securely attested.21 The arbitration, therefore, must have taken place at some time between 242 and 238/7. Since we know the years in which Aratos was strategos, Aigialeos’ strategia must be assigned to one of the following years: 242/1, 240/39, or 238/7. Considering that new members were likely required to submit outstanding disputes for 146

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arbitration, the most probable date for Aigaleos’ strategia is 242/1, the year after Corinth and Epidauros joined. The inscription records a great deal of information, both about the procedure for carrying out arbitration between members of the koinon and the topography of the disputed area. It preserves the second decision that was carried out after the Corinthians had appealed the first, which they undoubtedly had lost. No other evidence, epigraphic or literary, mentions the right of a disputant to appeal a decision rendered by arbitration. Since this is its only attestation it may be a unique case and not a regular means of recourse for a member’s disappointment with a judgment. Perhaps something unique about the way in which this dispute was settled permitted the Corinthians to appeal the decision. It has been suggested that the selection of judges from Megara to settle the dispute was a logical one considering its proximity to the disputed area.22 Megara is indeed one of Corinth’s contiguous neighbors, but the choice of Megarian judges requires further scrutiny. The selection of judges from Megara immediately calls to mind its shared mythical history with Corinth and their numerous historical border conflicts, dating from the late eighth century to at least the mid-fifth century.23 The Corinthians must not have viewed the selection of Megarian judges as logical, considering their long-standing history of border troubles. Corinth and Epidauros disputed their mutual border in 243/2; the origin of this dispute and for how long they had contended their border remains obscure. Examination of Corinthian–Epidaurian diplomatic relations between the Archaic and Classical periods, however, reveals little evidence for long-standing disputes, as was clearly the case with Corinth and Megara.24 Commercial relations between the two poleis can be seen clearly with the construction of several monuments in the Epidaurian Asklepieion. Building accounts document the Epidaurian purchase of Corinthian limestone, timber, and possibly terracotta roof tiles as well as the use of Corinthian craftsmen.25 Although not evidence of formal relations, these commercial dealings certainly reflect both the skill and quality of Corinthian work and an Epidaurian willingness to employ it. Throughout their histories, with the exception of the Archaic period, Corinthians and Epidaurians enjoyed cordial relations. When their relations cannot be traced closely it is at least clear that they normally had the same allies and were commonly united in the same causes. Nothing, however, indicates that the Corinthians had a long-standing border dispute with the Epidaurians, as they certainly did with the Megarians. The origins of the dispute are unfortunately irrecoverable; nevertheless, Epidauros certainly won.26 The Corinthian appeal of the Megarian decision signifies disappointment with the ruling; perhaps they leveled charges of bias against the judges, winning them an appeal. Unfortunately, new judges were not selected and the second decision must have been a foregone conclusion. The Megarian judges awarded the Epidaurians with territory that previously had belonged to Corinth. The region of the southern Corinthia lost to Epidauros 147

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(see Map 1) was both agriculturally productive and an important source of timber. Almost certainly lost as well was a small but important harbor, most likely known as Speiraion (modern Korphos). Ninety-five years under Macedonian control had resulted in no territorial losses; within one year of joining the Achaian koinon, the Corinthians lost a valuable and productive part of their chora. Disillusionment with their adhesion to the Achaian koinon must have begun to settle in over Corinth. The expulsion of the Macedonian garrison resulted in the advent of an Achaian one; membership demanded the settlement of the border dispute with Epidauros, resulting in loss of territory sanctioned by the koinon. The Achaian selection of Megarian judges surely delighted the Megarians; it brought consternation to Corinth.

The diminution of Corinthian prestige At the time of Corinth’s adhesion to the Achaian koinon, it arguably could point to a more prestigious ancient history than any other member state. Throughout the 19 years that Corinth belonged to the koinon it enjoyed no particular prominence, despite assertions that it enjoyed a leading role.27 When Corinth rejoined the koinon in 196, however, it arguably became one of its most significant members.28 If liberation from the Antigonids for personal gain had induced some Corinthians to collaborate with Aratos and the Achaians, the outcome did not match their aspirations. Not a single meeting of the koinon was held at Corinth between 243 and 224, and we have no evidence that the Achaians ever elected a Corinthian as strategos, the koinon’s highest elected magistracy.29 Neither Corinth’s status as a neophyte within the koinon nor the fact that it was not an ethnically Achaian polis can account for its lack of standing. Sikyon was the first non-Achaian polis to join the koinon, and Aratos was elected its strategos for the first time in 245/4; the Achaians subsequently elected him to this office every other year for the remainder of his life. Both Megalopolis (235) and Argos (229) joined the koinon after Corinth’s adhesion; the Antigonid-sponsored tyrants of each polis were elected strategos after each one had defected from the Macedonians and joined the Achaians. Lydiades of Megalopolis, according to Polybios (2.44.5) abandoned the tyranny and attached his polis to the koinon; he subsequently was elected strategos three times (234/3, 232/1, 230/29). Similarly, Aristomachos of Argos (Polyb. 2.44.6) orchestrated his polis’ admission to the koinon; he held the strategia in 228/7. In short, throughout Corinth’s 19 years of membership, the names of 17 strategoi are known and 13 of these were from poleis that were not ethnically Achaian. The poleis of the remaining four strategoi are not known; admittedly, one of these could have been a Corinthian. Corinth’s adhesion to the Achaian koinon also initiated a period of rapid expansion, as Troizen, Epiduaros, and Megara (Plut. Arat. 24.3; Paus. 2.8.5) immediately joined the koinon; Megalopolis, Argos, Hermione, and Phleious became members shortly afterwards. While other new

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members quickly assumed roles of leadership and significance within the koinon, Corinthians curiously are absent from these positions. Corinth’s status as a new member and as one that was not Achaian cannot account for the fact that it produced not a single known strategos; the fact that it did not join the koinon willingly might. Careful examination of Aratos’ motives for expelling the Macedonian garrison from Corinth and attaching it to the koinon reveals that he and the Achaians valued exclusively its strategically important position at the crossroads of Greece. They had no interest in cultivating Corinth’s association with the Argead dynasty as the Diadochoi had; its connection with panhellenism, so important to the Argeads, also was of no consequence to the Achaians, who were driven purely by panachaianism. Most of the 19 years within which Corinth belonged to the koinon, in fact, can be viewed as a struggle between the Achaians and Antigonids for control of the Peloponnese; Corinth was the keystone to that control. Loss of it stung the Antigonids and their longing to recover it was fierce; in actuality, however, they comprehended better than anyone the futility of an attempt upon it.

Corinth, the Achaian koinon, and Delphi As noted in Chapter 4, the Aitolian koinon apparently excluded some poleis with Antigonid garrisons from participation in the Delphic Amphiktyony. This policy, however, did not apply to Corinth, which was represented in 258/7 with one hieromnemon and was represented by at least three participants in the Aitolian Soteria at Delphi in the 250s. As a member of the Achaian koinon, however, no Corinthians appear in the epigraphic record at Delphi, indicating that the Aitolians may have excluded them from the sanctuary or that the Achaians prohibited its members’ participation. Traditional animosity between the two koina may account for either policy in the late 240s and throughout the 220s. Corinthians’ absence from Delphi while the Aitolian and Achaian koina were allied against King Demetrios II of Macedonia is difficult to explain. Corinthians had a long history of involvement at Delphi in a variety of capacities; only briefly prior to the battle of Chaironeia did a foreign power (Philip II) affect their right to participate. There can be little doubt, however, that Achaian membership interrupted their long tradition of activity at Delphi. Some sudden deterioration in relations between Corinthians and the Aitolians cannot account for the former’s absence from Delphi. At least one Corinthian, for example, shortly after the conclusion of the Aitolian–Achaian alliance (239) was honored at Thermon. Nikolaos son of Nikon and his descendants received Aitolian citizenship (πολιτείαν) from the koinon, ca. 238.30 Unfortunately, we do not know if Nikolaos was resident at Corinth when he received the award, or if he was in exile; the grant of citizenship, however, possibly indicates that he had left Corinth at some point prior to ca. 238.

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Corinth’s economy and the Achaian koinon Corinthians continued to thrive abroad after its adhesion to the Achaian koinon. Their presence as mercenaries in Egypt likely begins ca. 247; this trend, considering Ptolemy III’s position as the Achaians’ hegemon of war on land and sea (Plut. Arat. 24.4), continues. The Corinthian Alkaios, for example, serving under Zoilos’ command was chiliarchos of a mercenary force in Egypt between 246 and 221.31 While it is difficult to associate Corinthians’ presence abroad with its membership of the koinon and the Antigonids’ absence, some indications point to a connection between these factors and their emigration. Those Corinthians attested abroad include soldiers, an architect, and several others. This group of skilled individuals suggests that Corinth witnessed the flight of its intellectual capital in the 240s and that this may be connected to the tumultuous events early in the decade as well as the expulsion of the Macedonians, who may well have patronized previously these individuals’ talents. The patron’s expulsion drove these Corinthians to seek employment and patronage elsewhere as the Achaians showed no such favor upon them. Athenaios, quoting Moschion, preserves one extremely interesting piece of evidence, in which he provides a description of an extraordinary grain-transport ship that King Hieron of Syracuse commissioned. According to Moschion, Hieron appointed Archias of Corinth as the chief builder of the ship, overseeing its construction.32 Following its completion, Hieron had grain shipped to King Ptolemy in Alexandria, which Moschion remarks was experiencing a shortage at the time. Hieron reigned between ca. 271 and 216 and although the Ptolemy mentioned in this account is not specified, he is most likely Ptolemy III, who reigned from 246 to 221.33 If this identification is correct, then Archias almost certainly was active in Syracuse while Corinth belonged to the Achaian koinon, underscoring a major problem that the Antigonids experienced while not in possession of Corinth. Obviously, its loss deprived them of Lechaion and Kenchreai, their shipyards, and the diolkos. Their control of these harbors and ships constructed there certainly contributed to the naval victory over the Ptolemies at Kos (261) and probably Andros (ca. 246/5). Moschion’s narrative also illustrates clearly that the Antigonids were deprived of the services of Corinthians experienced in the art of ship-building. Hieron’s appointment of Archias indicates that his talent was first rate and that his services were valuable. Surely, had Corinth still been under Antigonid control, a shipwright of his caliber would have felt (or been) compelled to practice his craft for their benefit.34

The effect of Corinth’s loss on the Antigonid dynasty and military operations in the Corinthia, ca. 243/2–240/39 B.C. Three different Antigonid kings, Antigonos II Gonatas, Demetrios II, and Antigonos III Doson, ruled Macedonia throughout the 19 years that Corinth belonged to the Achaian koinon. Gonatas died four years after Aratos captured

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it, Demetrios never held it, and Doson reacquired it. Antigonos Gonatas appreciated Corinth’s strategic and military value more than any other Macedonian who had possessed it. Nevertheless, he made no effort to retake Corinth after Aratos had captured it, undoubtedly recognizing the futility involved in such an attack.35 Antigonos, according to Polybios (2.43.10; 9.34.6), allied with the Aitolians for the division of Achaia (ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ διαιρέσεως τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους).36 He died in 239; his son Demetrios II (r. 239–229) assumed the Antigonid throne. Demetrios’ reign was plagued by war, and arguably represents the dynasty’s third-century nadir after Gonatas’ assumption of the Macedonian kingship in 277. Problems along Macedonia’s northern frontiers as well as the Achaian– Aitolian alliance against him in the Demetrian War occupied his entire reign. He is also the sole third-century Antigonid not to inherit possession of Corinth and to die without having left an heir prepared to assume the kingship; his son Philip was only nine when his father died.37 Regency of the Antigonid throne was passed to Demetrios’ cousin, Antigonos Doson, first as regent and general (ἐπίτροπον καὶ στρατηγόν) until the young Philip reached his majority; after 227/6, however, Antigonos III Doson was recognized as king and his reign is crucial for understanding the development of the Antigonids’ relationship with Corinth.38 The events of the Kleomenic War so gravely affected the Achaians that Aratos approached the king for aid in the war against Sparta. The price Doson demanded for his assistance was Acrocorinth and in late spring 224 he recovered it. His reign, like his cousin’s, was brief, dying as the result of a wound he suffered at the battle of Sellasia and his subsequent campaign along Macedonia’s northern frontier (221). Philip V, after his coronation in Macedonia, also inherited possession of Corinth, just as his grandfather Antigonos Gonatas had inherited it from Demetrios Poliorketes. Very soon after Corinth was attached to the Achaian koinon, it became engaged in war with Antigonos and his ally the Aitolian koinon. Aratos attacked Salamis and Athens (242), attempting to attach it to the koinon (Plut. Arat. 24.4).39 The two adversaries agreed in winter 241/0 to suspend hostilities; the terms stipulated that the Achaians return those Athenian prisoners whom Aratos had captured in 242 (Plut. Arat. 24.3).40 The Achaians, however, continued their efforts to bring Athens into the koinon in spring 240, attacking Piraeus and its Macedonian garrison (Plut. Arat. 33.2–6).41 There can be little doubt that Aratos utilized Corinth for his attacks against Attica between 242 and spring 240. As Megara was also a member of the koinon, Aratos could lead an army from Corinth across the Isthmos, through the Megarid unimpeded, and into the Thriasian plain of Attica. The Achaians were never renowned for their capacity to launch naval campaigns, but the ships that attacked Salamis in 242 likely departed from Kenchreai; furthermore, it is conceivable that the 25 Macedonian ships Aratos had seized earlier at Lechaion featured prominently in this attack. Another remarkable event occurred in late spring 241, the first explicit reference to the Corinthia after its adhesion to the Achaian koinon. Aratos appealed 151

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to the Spartan King Agis IV for aid as the Aitolians prepared to invade the Peloponnese across the Isthmos. Agis persuaded his newly trained hoplites to fulfill this obligation to their allies (Plut. Ag. 13.5–14.5), leading his army to Corinth. Indecision followed their arrival. Citing Aratos’ Memoirs (FGrH 231 F 1; cf. Plut. Arat. 31.1–2), Plutarch (Ag. 15.1–4) claims that Agis urged the combined forces to prevent the Aitolians’ ingress, whereas Aratos argued that they let them pass without battle, since nearly all of the harvest had been collected (τοὺς καρποὺς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας συγκεκομισμένων ἤδη τῶν γεωργῶν).42 The Achaian strategos dismissed the Spartans, after he deemed their presence no longer necessary. The ignominy attached to Agis’ support for the expedition soon resulted in his execution at Sparta.43 This important passage represents the only evidence for the harvest in the Corinthia and the perils it faced as a hostile force passed through the countryside. Nevertheless, as Plutarch states, nearly (σχεδὸν) all of the harvest had been collected; what had not been harvested was unquestionably at risk and the possibility that the Aitolians had plundered extramural property within the Corinthia, particularly that east and south of Acrocorinth, cannot be excluded.44 They then attacked and captured Pellene; according to Plutarch (Arat. 31.3), Aratos was no longer the same man (οὐκέτ’ ἦν ὁ αὐτός).45 The Sikyonian, who had allowed the Aitolians to pass unmolested through the Corinthia, transformed into a man of action once cognizant of Pellene’s capture and the danger this posed to Sikyon. He proceeded immediately (εὐθὺς) to relieve the city. Plutarch (Arat. 32.5–6), citing Aratos’ Memoirs (FGrH 231 F 2), reports that he routed the Aitolians, killing 700; moreover Timanthes commemorated his heroism, depicting it vividly in a painting. Every contemporary Corinthian must have wondered where Aratos’ heroism and military acumen were when he had had the opportunity (as well as the aid of Agis and his hoplites) to divert the Aitolians’ progress into the Corinthia.46 Accounts of the Aitiolians’ rapine at Pellene suggest further that the Corinthia did not remain unscathed as they proceeded through it. Many years had passed since the Macedonians had yielded to an enemy access to the Corinthia; those farmers and landowners whose fields were at risk surely longed for the days of the garrison’s protection. Two events that followed the Aitolians’ capture of Pellene dramatically altered the system of alliances in central and southern Greece. The first was the death of Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II’s accession to the Macedonian throne in 239, and the second was Demetrios’ decision to support the kingdom of Epeiros against the Aitolian invasion of Akarnania, which then belonged to the former. The immediate effect of the latter was the collapse of the Aitolian– Antigonid alliance against Achaia and the establishment of an Achaian–Aitolian alliance against Demetrios. Aratos and his Aitolian counterpart Pantaleon (Plut. Arat. 33.1) agreed to the alliance; it led immediately to the Demetrian War.47 The first four years of Corinth’s membership in the Achaian koinon were ones that witnessed war, soldiers’ movements throughout its territory, and the loss of part of its harvest, as well as the introduction of a garrison on Acrocorinth and the loss of territory to Epidauros. 152

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The Demetrian War (239–229

B.C.)

King Demetrios II was the least successful Antigonid of the third century; in many aspects, this was no fault of his own. He never possessed Corinth, he spent his entire reign at war against the Achaian–Aitolian alliance, he died fighting against the Dardanians to protect Macedonia’s northern frontier, and he left an heir too young to rule. After his father Antigonos II Gonatas died in 239, Demetrios was unlucky, as states traditionally hostile to Macedon aligned against him. The Achaian and Aitolian koina, both known as much for their derision of one another as they were for their contempt of the Macedonians, joined forces against the new king, initiating the Demetrian War (Polyb. 2.44.1; Plut. Arat. 33.1) that spanned nearly his entire reign. Demetrios apparently maintained throughout his reign the policy of supporting pro-Antigonid tyrants in the Peloponnese (Polyb. 2.44.3). Aratos, according to Polybios (2.44.5–6), had encouraged several of them, including the tyrants Lydiades (Megalopolis), Aristomachos (Argos), Xenon (Hermione), and Kleonymos (Phleious), to abandon their ties with Demetrios and join the Achaian koinon. The king’s inability to retain those tyrants whom he had supported early in his reign (as, apparently, his father had too) is a sure sign of Corinth’s significance to the Antigonid dynasty. Once deprived of its center of operations in the Peloponnese, failure to retain possession of cities within it followed. The primary Achaian offensives in the war were directed against Athens, which Aratos sought to liberate and attach to the koinon (Plut. Arat. 33.2–6). The Macedonians’ single (it seems) attempt to retake control of Corinth occurred in 233/2.48 Bithys, Demetrios’s general in Athens, transported an army to Argos and defeated the Achaian forces at Phylakia in Arkadia.49 Reports surfaced after his victory that Aratos either had been captured or killed during the battle. King Demetrios dispatched a ship from Macedonia to convey him back in chains; while the Athenians exulted, Diogenes, the Macedonian garrison commander at Piraeus, sent a letter to Corinth, imploring the Achaians to vacate Acrocorinth. Aratos’ presence in Corinth at the time of the letter’s delivery quickly quashed rumors of his death (Plut. Arat. 34.2–3). He countered with another attack upon Athens. Late in Demetrios’ reign, a Dardanian invasion again threatened Macedonia’s northern frontier. This was the final campaign of an unspectacular reign that resulted in great losses in central and southern Greece. Problems persisted after his death, including the liberation of Athens. Its loss occurred in early 229 when Diogenes handed over control of Piraeus, Mounychia, Salamis, and Rhamnous to the Athenian demos. Aratos apparently traveled to Athens, contributing 20 or 25 talents of the 150 required to pay the soldiers in the garrisons.50 The death of Demetrios and the liberation of Athens brought an end to the tenyear-long war. The new regent, Antigonos Doson, after dealing with revolt in Thessaly and a renewed Dardanian threat on Macedonia’s northern frontier,

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now had time to embark upon other endeavors, most notably his Karian expedition of 227/6.51 Within the Peloponnese and central Greece, the end of the war also signaled the end of the Achaian–Aitolian alliance; war soon returned to the Peloponnese, however, as King Kleomenes attempted to reassert Sparta’s position within a peninsula that was now nearly dominated by the Achaian koinon. The ensuing Kleomenic War almost destroyed the Achaian koinon; its preservation required the return of Corinth to Antigonid control.

The Kleomenic War (229/8–222

B.C.)

The origins of the Kleomenic War are complex, but King Kleomenes of Sparta initiated the hostilities in fall 229 or possibly as late as spring 228.52 Kleomenes’ social reforms at Sparta and the threat they potentially posed throughout the Peloponnese also played a role in antagonizing Aratos and the Achaians.53 The Spartan seized the Arkadian poleis Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos, all of which had belonged to the Achaian koinon (Polyb. 2.46.2). The Achaians resolved to avoid war, but to resist Kleomenes until he began to fortify the Athenaion in Megalopolitan territory; this was the casus belli.54 The Kleomenic War nearly brought about the dissolution of the Achaian koinon; warfare was fierce throughout the Peloponnese and many poleis, including Corinth, suffered badly. Late in the war, for example, Corinth was nearly torn asunder, as the Achaians lost control of the city to Kleomenes, while they retained control of Acrocorinth; simultaneously, the Macedonians possessed Kenchreai. The infamous Achaian volte face ultimately resulted in the restoration of the city, citadel, and harbors to Antigonos III Doson prior to the war’s conclusion. Early Spartan successes forced Aratos to conclude that without outside assistance the war already was lost. He dispatched to Macedonia the Megalopolitans Nikophanes and Kerkidas to initiate negotiations with Antigonos Doson in autumn 227.55 Antigonos, Polybios (2.49.9–10) reports, was well disposed toward the request; the Megalopolitans assured him that he would be well compensated for his assistance. The Corinthians were aware of the negotiations; the Megalopolitan ambassadors appeared before the Achaian synod of spring 226, displaying a letter from the king, in which he promised to aid Megalopolis if it was the Achaians’ will.56 At the synod, the Megalopolitans appealed to send a formal request for assistance to Antigonos; Aratos intervened, successfully persuading the koinon to confront Kleomenes alone and to defer the request until it became absolutely necessary (Polyb. 2.50.10–12.51.1). It remains unclear whether or not the Megalopolitans and Antigonos discussed specifically the return of Acrocorinth, or if Corinthians at this meeting suspected that it might play a part in the negotiations. Two events that apparently followed in close succession to one another rendered it inevitable that Aratos would have to pursue whatever arrangements Nikophanes and Kerkidas had presented tentatively to Antigonos at Pella. The first was a serious blow: Aratos learned (Polyb. 2.51.2) that King 154

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Ptolemy III had transferred his financial support from the Achaians to Kleomenes, most likely in winter 226/5.57 This marked the end of a quarter century during which the Ptolemies had generously subsidized Aratos’ activities against the Antigonid dynasty; Kleomenes was now a more worthwhile investment. Probably not long after receiving this news, Kleomenes inflicted a devastating defeat upon the Achaians at Hekatombaion (226/5) in the vicinity of Dymai.58 A brief truce between Kleomenes and the Achaians followed the Spartan’s victory; it granted Aratos sufficient time to coordinate his next move.59 He realized now that the alliance with Antigonos had to be formalized at any cost or that the koinon faced extinction. Aratos resumed negotiations (spring 225), regarding the matter so importantly that he dispatched his son to Antigonos.60 Reservations concerning the restoration of Acrocorinth, according to Polybios (2.51.6), lingered since the Achaians believed the king would not aid them without its return. This uncertainty led to the adjournment of the meeting (Pol. 2.51.7). The Corinthian representatives at this meeting now understood fully what they had suspected since 227. Nevertheless, Polybios adds, the Achaians did not dare hand over the Corinthians unwillingly to the Macedonians. Altruistic sentiment alone cannot account for the Achaians’ vacillation; any indecision must be attributed to their own fear of losing Acrocorinth. Polybios’ account of the negotiations indicates that the return of Acrocorinth had been discussed either explicitly or implicitly during the first diplomatic contact between Antigonos and the two Megalopolitan envoys in 227/6. Aratos’ attempts to obfuscate Corinth’s role in the negotiations failed. Certainly some Corinthians had benefited from the city’s membership in the Achaian koinon over nearly two decades; most, however, seem not to have been so fortunate. Any lingering pro-Achaian sentiment in Corinth began to evaporate quickly. Some Corinthians seized the initiative and contempt for the Achaians reached unprecedented levels. Plutarch writes that the Achaians believed efforts were underway in Corinth and Sikyon to betray these cities.61 Aratos dispatched horsemen and mercenaries from Argos to guard over both. He arrested and executed those in Sikyon who were suspected of collaboration with Kleomenes. Plutarch vividly depicts the mood in Corinth as Aratos attempted to investigate and punish its citizens: his presence incited the crowd that already had been suffering and oppressed by the Achaian constitution.62 Many Corinthians had suffered and felt oppressed for some time prior to the events of 225.63 Plutarch notes also that Aratos held an examination of those suspected of lakonizing and that Corinth wished to be free of the Achaians.64 After recording that Kleomenes had seized control of Corinth, Polybios writes that the Corinthians had ordered Aratos and the Achaians to leave the city.65 The testimony of Polybios and Plutarch is unequivocal; early in the Kleomenic War (229/8–225) Corinthian resentment with Aratos and the Achaians had grown so deep that some now sought actively to rebel and turn over the city to the Achaians’ most threatening enemy. 155

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Corinthian remorse at their adhesion to the Achaian koinon had been manifest since the introduction of an Achaian garrison on Acrocorinth and the settlement of the dispute with Epidauros; throughout the Kleomenic War scorn spread widely throughout the demos. Aratos’ duplicity over the previous several years had become too much for most Corinthians to bear. Their appeal to Kleomenes, however, may suggest contempt for the Achaians, enthusiasm for the Spartan, or despair at the thought of being placed under Macedonian control again. Probably all three are represented among different segments of the population. Kleomenes’ reforms at Sparta, namely the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of property, surely appealed to some, especially those who had not profited from the earlier Macedonian presence or the contemporary Achaian occupation; on the other hand oligarchic Corinthians, whose ancestors had benefited under them, probably anticipated their return. Plutarch (Arat. 40.1) clearly states that those Corinthians and Sikyonians in conversation with Kleomenes possessed a desire for private domination; beyond this vague claim, he offers no additional details. Many Corinthian and Sikyonian supporters of Kleomenes likely desired the implementation of reforms in their poleis similar to the cancelation of debt and the distribution of land carried out at Sparta (Plut. Cleom. 10–11). Kleomenes, however, was more determined to assert his own authority over the Peloponnese than he was to implement social reform throughout it. He appealed several times to Aratos between 226 and 224, dispatching, for example, Megistonous to propose that the Achaians and Spartans jointly garrison Acrocorinth (Plut. Cleom. 19.2). He also twice offered to double the stipend that Aratos had received from King Ptolemy, promising 12 talents (Arat. 41.5). Plutarch also adds that he demanded the title hegemon of the Achaians, a title that had been held by Ptolemy.66 While still in Corinth, Aratos learned that Argos, Kleonai, and Phleious went over to Kleomenes. Corinth’s proximity to Phleious and Kleonai (and the passes from the southwestern Corinthia into the Argolid) caused Aratos considerable anxiety.67 He now perceived that Corinth was all but lost to the Spartan cause and desirous for release from the Achaians (τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι βουλομένην). Plutarch preserves two separate versions of subsequent events. He says that Aratos summoned the Corinthians to the boulouterion;68 he also claims that they rushed into the sanctuary of Apollo, summoning Aratos.69 Regardless of Plutarch’s contradiction concerning the location of the meeting and who summoned whom, his two versions reach accord once Aratos and the Corinthians met: the former narrowly escaped with his life as the latter determined either to assassinate or apprehend him. Plutarch, however, offers greater detail in his Aratos (40.2–5) than his Cleomenes. Aratos, leading his horse, arrived at the Apollonion, and many Corinthians rebuked and brought accusations against him. Coolly, he requested that they sit down, remain calm, and admit those still outdoors. After concluding these remarks, he slipped out, as if to hand over his horse to someone. He spoke calmly with those Corinthians 156

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whom he met as he departed, encouraging them to go to the Apollonion, and he came near to the citadel where he mounted his horse. Moreover, Plutarch adds, Aratos met Kleopatros, the Achaian commander of the garrison on Acrocorinth, whom he instructed to hold the citadel.70 Plutarch (Cleom. 19.2–3) much more briefly states that, once assembled, Aratos escaped to one of the city gates where a horse was ready and he fled to Sikyon. Considering his partial ascent up Acrocorinth to meet Kleopatros, the gate through which Aratos escaped was most likely the Phliasian.71 Ironically, Aratos fled through the same gate through which he had entered the city 18 years earlier when he captured Acrocorinth. Shortly after Aratos’ escape from Corinth, Kleomenes marched on the city, arriving from Argos, after he had captured Hermione, Troizen, and Epidauros along the way.72 He then, at the invitation of some Corinthians, occupied the lower city; he could not, however, dislodge the Achaian garrison from Acrocorinth.73 Having lost Corinth and the Argolid, Aratos and a few Achaians met at Sikyon, where he was appointed strategos autokrator.74 As they met in Sikyon, Kleomenes approached from Corinth, initiating a siege in mid-January 224.75 Aratos slipped away by ship to Aigion and attended the spring (April 224) synod of the koinon, at which the Achaians voted to request Antigonos’ aid and hand over Acrocorinth to him.76 Polybios regarded the Corinthians’ order that the Achaians evacuate the city a reasonable “pretext and excuse for offering to Antigonos Acrocorinth.”77 Kleomenes entered Corinth, entrusting Aratos’ house and possessions to his friends and stewards (Plut. Arat. 41.4; Cleom. 19.7). Subsequently, the Corinthians voted to hand over Aratos’ property to Kleomenes as a gift.78 Plutarch offers a somewhat different version, claiming that once it was known that the Achaians had called upon Antigonos, the Corinthians plundered his property and gave his house to Kleomenes as a gift.79 After learning of the Achaian pact with Antigonos, according to Polybios (2.52.5), Kleomenes abandoned his position outside of Sikyon. He then encamped around the Isthmos (περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν), joining Acrocorinth and Mt. Oneion by a palisade and trench (διαλαβὼν χάρακι καὶ τάφρῳ τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ τ’ Ἀκροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν Ὀνείων καλουμένων ὀρῶν). Plutarch adds that Kleomenes chose not to fortify the Isthmos, preferring instead to defend the passes along the fortified and walled Mt. Oneion.80 He (Arat. 40.7) also describes Kleomenes’ defenses, claiming that the Spartan encircled Acrocorinth with a wall and a palisade (Ἀπεσταύρου καὶ περιετείχιζε τὸν ἀκροκόρινθον). Our three sources attesting to Kleomenes’ lines of defense against Antigonos present a coherent picture. The walled city was the focal point, while a palisade blocked the pass between Acrocorinth and Mt. Oneion, through which the Leukon (Xerias) river allows access to points south (see Map 2). Kleomenes also utilized the defenses along the ridge of Mt. Oneion, namely those in the Maritsa and Stanotopi passes.81 The Spartan line of defense also extended 157

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northwards from the city to Lechaion; undoubtedly Corinth’s Long Walls still stood and constituted a formidable barrier, impeding westward movement toward Sikyon. Kleomenes’ decision to abandon the trans-Isthmian Corinthia is undeniable; the single curiosity of his defensive strategy, however, remains his willingness to yield Kenchreai, which lies approximately 1 km to the north of the Chersonesos, the easternmost limit of Mt. Oneion. No source states that Antigonos occupied Kenchreai, but it is likely that he did. Less perplexing from a strategic perspective is the abandonment of the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. One must wonder whether the games of spring 224 could have been celebrated considering the chaotic state of affairs within the Corinthia, while an Achaian garrison occupied Acrocorinth, Kleomenes possessed the city, Oneion, and Lechaion harbor, and Antigonos Doson held Kenchreai. Aratos and the Achaian damiourgoi departed Aigion (spring 224), proceeding to the Megarian port of Pagai where they met Antigonos Doson, who had begun marching south through Thessaly and Euboia at the head of a force that included 20,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry (Plut. Arat. 43.1). After exchanging formalities and oaths, Antigonos and his army (late April/early May 224), accompanied by Aratos and those with him, arrived, according to Polybios (2.52.7), “on the Isthmos” (ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν).82 Plutarch’s statement (Cleom. 20.1) that Kleomenes chose to fortify not the Isthmos but Mt. Oneion implies that he had surrendered Kenchreai and Poseidon’s sanctuary. The dispatch of soldiers from the city to relieve Kenchreai also appears out of the question, as any weakening of his intramural position would have been an invitation for Kleopatros’ Achaian garrison to launch an offensive against the Spartans within the walls. This represented a risk Kleomenes could not take, as it could have led to his encirclement. Moreover, the reports that reached Aratos from Argos and his subsequent expedition by sea from the Isthmos (ἐξ Ἰσθμοῦ) to Epidauros (Plut. Arat. 44.3) confirm Polybios’ (2.52.7) statement that the Antigonid camp was on the Isthmos. Polybios and Plutarch frequently use “Isthmos” to denote either Poseidon’s sanctuary or Kenchreai.83 Kleomenes’ concession of Kenchreai was a strategic decision and the right one. Antigonos arrived at the Isthmos in late April/early May 224, long before the harvest and approximately at the time of the Isthmian Games. Plutarch, in fact, comments upon Antigonos’ shortage of grain at the Isthmos.84 Kleomenes had calculated that cessation of Kencrheai and the northeastern Corinthia would not damage his position and would offer no advantage to Antigonos.85 The Macedonians no longer held Piraeus; aid or supplies from Athens or anywhere else, therefore, would not be forthcoming. In the same passage, Plutarch notes that Antigonos could not force his way past Kleomenes’ defenses;86 Kenchreai’s location north of the Spartans’ defensive line on Mt. Oneion suggests that the Macedonian had occupied it. Kleomenes had recognized that holding a line along Mt. Oneion would be easier than maintaining one along the Isthmos. A defensive position behind the trans-Isthmian wall constructed earlier in the third century undoubtedly would have required more men to 158

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hold than Kleomenes had available.87 The number of troops Kleomenes had available at Corinth is unknown, but it cannot have matched Antigonos’ 20,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry.88 Antigonos was confined; he could not traverse the passes of Mt. Oneion, nor could he negotiate the palisade blocking the Leukon (Xerias) river pass. Although he possessed Kenchreai, he could not move south, and there was no grain available to feed his soldiers. Antigonos’ situation became so desperate that he attempted by night to breach Kleomenes’ position along Corinth’s Long Walls and at Lechaion in order to escape the trap into which he had fallen (Plut. Cleom. 20.3). No source testifies to the use of the Long Walls; undoubtedly, however, they formed a part of Kleomenes’ defenses.89 Antigonos’ efforts to break the line failed; having lost some men in the attempt, he became disheartened (ἀθυμεῖν). He contemplated his predicament in the vicinity of Poseidon’s sanctuary, where his grandfather Demetrios Poliorketes had revived the League of Corinth, and he could see clearly Acrocorinth towering above the city before him. Recovery of these ancestral possessions had never been so close since Aratos had captured Acrocorinth; Antigonos certainly realized he might never have a better opportunity to recover this strategically critical location. For one who had in 227 reasserted his dynasty’s claims in Karia, an ardent desire to recover Acrocorinth surely consumed him. The hopelessness of his position, Plutarch (Cleom. 20.4) continues, compelled Antigonos to withdraw to the Perachora peninsula and sail across the Gulf of Corinth to Sikyon, where reinforcements and more importantly supplies were available.90 Kleomenes’ defensive strategy, ceding Kenchreai and the northeastern Corinthia, incurred no ill effects and it did not alter the course of events at Corinth; tactically, he made the correct decision to yield not only the trans-Isthmian Corinthia but also the northeastern Corinthia within the Isthmos. Those Corinthians inhabiting the northeastern Corinthia, on the other hand, must not have been so appreciative of the Spartan’s willingness to yield this part of the chora to the the Macedonians. Antigonos never managed to penetrate Kleomenes’ lines of defense (Plut. Cleom. 20.3–4). Plutarch attests to additional evidence of conflict within Corinth; he describes skirmishes around the city in which Kleomenes was well ensconced and the Corinthians actively defended themselves.91 He offers no further details, leaving us to wonder where precisely these struggles occurred and who engaged in them. The only explanation is that the Achaian garrison on Acrocorinth was not dormant, but sought to harass Kleomenes’ forces within the city, hoping to alleviate the difficulties Antigonos and Aratos faced at the Isthmos.92 One cannot exclude, however, the possibility that the conflicts involved the forces of Kleomenes and some Corinthians who, now faced with a choice between Sparta and Macedonia, chose the latter. These Corinthians apparently preferred Antigonos’ return to the continued Spartan presence in the city, the Macedonian presence within the northeastern Corinthia, and the Achaian occupation of the citadel. 159

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Rapidly moving events at Argos, which compromised the strength of Kleomenes’ position, produced a resolution to the stalemate.93 Messengers arrived at the Antigonid camp in Kenchreai, requesting that Aratos hasten to Argos, whose citizens were prepared to revolt against Kleomenes’ garrison.94 Aratos, taking 1,500 of Antigonos’ men, sailed from the Isthmos to Epidauros, according to Plutarch (Arat. 44.2; Cleom. 20.7). Before arriving, however, Timoxenos, with Achaian reinforcements from Sikyon, attacked the Spartan garrison (Cleom. 20.8). Simultaneously, reports reached Kleomenes (Polyb. 2.53.5; Plut. Cleom. 21.1; Arat. 44.3) that Argos had revolted. He immediately dispatched Megistonous, who was killed upon arrival (Plut. Cleom. 21.2–3). Kleomenes could not risk losing Argos; without it all roads to Sparta lay open and the city was undefended.95 Plutarch (Cleom. 21.2) even implies that the Corinthians had knowledge of the reports from Argos, for Kleoemenes informed them that there was no great disturbance there. Perhaps now that irrefutable news of the revolt reached Corinth, many began to realize that Kleomenes would not remain in the city much longer. The situation at Argos was more precarious than the assessment Kleoemenes had offered the Corinthians; the former, therefore, was compelled to abandon Corinth in order to relieve his garrison (Polyb. 2.53.5; Plut. Cleom. 21.2). After he had evacuated the city, the Achaians handed over Acrocorinth to Antigonos.96 A noteworthy and controversial event occurred at Kenchreai soon after Doson recovered Corinth and subsequently Argos. Aristomachos the tyrant of Argos had abandoned his familial ties with the Antigonids in 229 and attached his polis to the Achaian koinon; he later (225) abandoned the Achaians, handing over Argos to Kleomenes.97 Both Polybios (2.59.1; 2.60.7–8) and Plutarch (Arat. 44.6) record that Aristomachos was apprehended upon Doson’s arrival at Argos and that he was sent to Kenchreai, where he was tortured and killed.98 Polybios defends Aratos’ actions while criticizing Phylarchos (FGrH 81 F 54), who condemned them. He adds, employing formal terminology pertaining to Macedonian military officials, that the “officers in command at Kenchreai” drowned Aristomachos.99 Their presence at Kenchreai implies strongly that they had been appointed some time before the Antigonid recovery of Argos, possibly as early as Antigonos’ arrival “on the Isthmos.” The value of this passage extends beyond the circumstantial support it lends to the suggestion that he had occupied Kenchreai. Polybios’ formal usage is compelling and provides the only tangible evidence of such a command at Kenchreai. Soon after recovering Acrocorinth, Antigonos Doson hosted a large feast at Corinth, undoubtedly similar in scale to those his ancestors had hosted.100 Plutarch notes that many guests (πολλοὺς ὑποδεχόμενος) attended and Aratos reclined immediately above Antigonos. It is intriguing that upon recovering Corinth, Antigonos hosted a banquet, just as many of his predecessors had; as we shall see below, Philip V also perpetuated the long-standing Antigonid tradition. The Kleomenic War represented one of the most tumultuous periods of early Hellenistic Corinth’s history. After years of membership within the 160

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Achaian koinon, feelings of disdain coalesced throughout the demos. Undoubtedly, some Corinthians longed for the introduction of social reforms, similar to those Kleomenes had implemented at Sparta. The majority, however, simply had grown weary of Achaian membership. Their fatigue had grown incrementally over 18 years, it reached a peak with Aratos’ near assassination and culminated with the decision to hand over their city to Kleoemenes. Most Corinthians felt justified in both decisions, as it was patently clear that Aratos and the Achaians had arranged to return Acrocorinth to King Antigonos Doson. Although they had established long-standing goodwill with the Antigonids, who had possessed Corinth, certainly some trepidation persisted.

*** Soon after Corinth was attached to the Achaian koinon, many of its citizens began to regret their decision to welcome Aratos euphorically. Despite the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison and Aratos’ return of their “keys” an Achaian garrison was imposed upon Acrocorinth. Soon afterwards, the Achaians appointed Megarian judges to settle a border dispute between Corinth and Epidauros; the judges’ decision favored the latter, surely adding to the former’s disillusionment over Achaian membership as the judgment resulted in the loss of a productive part of the southeastern Corinthia. Aratos’ decision to allow the Aitolians to enter the Peloponnese across the Isthmos also resulted in devastation to the eastern Corinthia. Building activity at Corinth, which had slowed considerably during the 240s, appears to have stopped, as no new construction is known during the third quarter of the third century. Moreover, no Corinthians are attested abroad while it was a member of the Achaian koinon in capacities related to construction or the exportation of raw materials from Corinth. Corinth had been a thriving center of ship construction under the Antigonids; such activity surely slowed or ceased under the Achaians. The loss of productive, agricultural land, the loss of construction-related jobs, and the loss of jobs at Corinth’s shipyards depressed the city’s economy while it belonged to the Achaian koinon. As we shall see in the following chapter, the Corinthians quickly resumed their cooperation with the Macedonians. The relationship reached new levels, especially throughout the Second Macedonian War, as defeat surely meant Corinth’s reinstatement into the Achaian koinon. Recollection of its first tenure as a member in the koinon clearly made continuation of Antigonid control vastly preferable. The Antigonids’ recovery of Acrocorinth in 224 was more than the recovery of a strategic position: it amounted to the restoration of an important ancestral possession.

Notes 1 Wiseman (1979: 451), for example, claims: “Corinth at that time [228] was one of the leading states of the Achaean League. She had been a member since 243 B.C. when Aratus of Sicyon, after leading a daring and successful night assault on

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Acrocorinth, freed Corinth from nearly a century of Macedonian domination.” Earlier, Broneer (Corinth I.4: 157–58) wrote: “After the liberation of the city from Macedonian occupation in 243 B.C., when Corinth became the head of the Achaian League …” See also Roberts 1983: 231. Plutarch (Arat. 45.1) notes that many blamed Aratos for handing over Corinth to Antigonos, “as if it were some kome.” For the monuments, see Plut. Arat. 45.5: οἱ ἑλόντες τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον. For the erection of monuments to commemorate victories in war, see Chaniotis 2005: 233–40. Gauthier 1985; Ma 2000: 182–242. I. Smyrna, no. 10, line 96: καὶ παραδοῦναι τὰς κλεῖδας τῶι ἄρχοντι τῶι ἀποσταλέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ πα[ρ]αδέξ[α]σθαι φυλακὴν τὴν συνδιατηρήσουσαν μετ’ αὐτῶν τὸ χωρίον τῶι βασιλεῖ Σελεύκωι; see also Staatsverträge III, no. 492. I. Iasos, no. 4, lines 69–71: [- - -καθ’ ἕκασ]|τον ἐνιαυτὸν τὰς κλεῖδας π[αραδιδότωσαν τοῖς]| μεθ’ ἑαυτοὺς στρατηγοῖς; see also Ma (2000: 329–35, no. 26 B, col. II, lines 7–9) whose text and date I follow here. Ma 2000: 223. SEG 43.707, line 5: τὰς κλεῖδας παραδίδοσθαι τούτοις. For the editio princeps, see Errington 1993: 24–27, no. 5. See also the comments of P. Gauthier (BE 95, 525) and Ma (2000: 339–40, no. 30). Diog. Laert. 7.6: οὒτως ὡς καὶ τῶν τειχῶν αὐτῶ τὰς κλεῖς παρακαταθέσθαι. Diog. Laert. 7.10–12; 15. See further Tarn 1913: 309–10; Habicht 1997: 156–57. Polyb. 2.43.4: ἐλευθερώσας δὲ Κορινθίους προσηγάγετο πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν; Plut. Arat. 23.4: συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι. Polybios (2.38.7) also claims that some Peloponnesians joined voluntarily, while the Achaians induced others to join (πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοῖ καὶ λόγω προσηγάγετο). Polybios’ use of the same verb (προσάγειν) in both passages indicates that he counted the Corinthians among the latter group. According to Strabo (8.7.3), Aratos delivered Corinth to the Achaians, just as he had Sikyon (καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσέθηκε, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα). Pausanias (2.8.5): ἐλευθερώσαντος δὲ Ἀράτου Κόρινθον προσεχώρησαν μὲν ἐς τὸ συνέδριον. Polybios (2.40.5) says that the Macedonian kings disbanded the koinon; at 2.41.6, he implies that Philip II and Alexander III were responsible. See, however, Larsen (1968: 215–16) who argues that the koinon was not formally dissolved, but ceased to operate as such in the early third century. See further Walbank, HCP I: 228–33. Only ten of the original 12 states remained in 281/0. Polybios (2.41.1, 7–8, 12–15) records that Patrai and Dymai were the first to reconstitute the koinon and that Tritaia and Pharai soon followed. Approximately five years later (276/5 or 275/4) Aigion, Bura, and Karyneia joined them. Aigeira, Pellene, and Leontion joined later, but certainly before May 251 when Aratos attached Sikyon to the koinon. Walbank, HCP I: 230–34; Larsen 1968: 216; Urban 1979: 5–10. IG V.2.344; see also Staatsverträge III: 190–93, no. 499; Ager 1996: 129–31, no. 43. See further Ager 1996: 129–31. Ager (1996: 116–17, 131, 133) suggests the Achaian koinon had established measures for new members to submit their outstanding disputes to the Achaian court as a prerequisite of membership. Mitsos 1937: 708–14. See also the comments of Robert (BE 1940, no. 53). See also Dixon 2000: 40–41; 44. The inscription is a list of theorodokoi; see Plassart 1921: 11, col. II, line 59 = Rizakis 1995, no. 688. The two are listed separately in LGPN III.A, s.v., nos. 1 and 2. Dioitas is attested only at Polyainos 2.36. Nevertheless, the context (his attack on Heraia while strategos) makes 236/5 all but certain; see further Walbank 1933: 169–70.

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21 See Walbank 1933: 167–75. 22 Ager 1996: 117. 23 For general treatments of the Corinthian–Megarian boundary and earlier conflicts over it, see Corinth I.1: 18; Hammond 1954a: 93–102; Wiseman 1974: 535–43 and Wiseman 1978: 17–43; Legon 1981: 59–85; Salmon 1984: 1, 3; 70–71; de Polignac 1995: 51–52; and Dixon 2000: 42–44. See also Pausanias (1.44.6–10) and Plutarch (Mor. 295b), who claim that the Corinthians were always trying to subject Megara to their rule. 24 For an overview of Corinthian–Epidaurian relations between the Archaic and Classical periods, see Dixon 2000: 45–47. 25 Corinthian stone is referred to as either Κορινθία πέτρα (IG IV2.1.103, line 11) or λίθοι ἐγ λατομίας ἐνς Κεγχρέας Κορινθίου (IG IV2.1.103, lines 40–41). For the quarrystone used at Epidauros in general, see Burford 1969: 168–75. Corinthian timber (silver fir, ἐλάτη) is well attested; for example, see IG IV2.1.102, lines 24–25. For the use of Corinthian timber at the Asklepieion, see Burford 1969: 176–79. For the possibility that Corinthian terracotta roof tiles were imported for the use on the temples, see Burford 1969: 182; see, however, Williams (1988: 229), who argues that they probably were manufactured at Epidauros. Merker (2006: 16) argues that the export of Corinthian roof tiles had stopped by the end of the fourth century as a result of the earthquakes and cessation of production at the Tile Works. 26 For an extensive topographical commentary on the dispute with an attempt to trace the new boundary, see Dixon 2000: 45–122, 273–86 and 2005b: 137–44. 27 See above, note 1. 28 During its second tenure within the koinon, Corinth hosted at least four meetings of its synod, one meeting of the synkletos, and produced several magistrates. 29 All official meetings of the koinon’s synod were held at Aigion until 188, with the passage of a law allowing the synod to meet at other locations, presumably on a rotational basis; see Livy 38.30.1–6 and further Aymard 1938a: 302–5; Larsen 1968: 235. 30 IG IX 12 1, 31, lines 182–91. The grant is dated to the third strategia of Lykopos of Kalydon (see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 3). For the Corinthian Nikolaos, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 39. 31 PP VIII, no. 2290a; LGPN III.A s.v., no. 9. 32 Athen. 5.206f = FGrH 575 F2; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 34. 33 Tarn (1910: 220) associates the grain shortage with that mentioned in the Canopos Decree (238); see OGIS, no. 56. 34 Tarn (1910: 221) suggests, in fact, that Archias was probably involved in the construction of the Antigonid flagship Isthmia. 35 Tarn 1913: 399–400. 36 Staatsverträge III, no. 490. See also Urban (1979: 54–55), who speculates that this Aitolian–Antigonid alliance may have existed since the war against Alexandros son of Krateros. 37 Walbank 1940: 295–96; HM III: 336 and note 3. 38 For Doson’s titles, see Plut. Aem. 8.3; see also Paus. 7.7.4; Just. 28.3.10. For detailed discussion, see Le Bohec 1993: 113–43. 39 See also Urban 1979: 51–54; Habicht 1997: 163. 40 For reference to the cessation of hostilities, see Plutarch (Arat. 33.2): ὅτι σπονδὰς πεποιημένων αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας καὶ ἀνοχὰς ἀγόντων. See also Habicht 1997: 163. 41 According to Aratos (FGrH 231 F 3), the Syrian Erginos, whose information had allowed Aratos to capture Acrocorinth, had initiated the attack against Piraeus. 42 According to Plutarch (Ag. 15.4), Baton of Sinope (FGrH 268 F 7) wrote that Aratos sought to engage the Aitolians, while Agis was unwilling to do so. Plutarch

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43 44

45 46

47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54 55

(Arat. 31.1) places the Achaian and Spartan forces near Megara; Aratos allowed the Aitolians to cross unimpeded the passes of Mt. Geraneion. He adds nothing concerning how the Aitolians then entered the Peloponnese. For the possible effect that Agis’ reforms had upon Aratos’ decision to dismiss the Spartans, see Urban 1979: 55–56 Walbank, CAH2 VII.1: 253–54; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002: 47. Urban (1979: 57) suggests correctly, I believe, that the Aitolians passed south of Acrocorinth toward Argos. Urban’s suggestion that they then invaded Lakonia prior to the capture of Pellene cannot be correct; it occurred in 240; see Scholten 2000: 127–30. A route following the Leukon (Xerias) river valley toward Kleonai and Phleious must be correct, especially if Corinth’s Long Walls were still standing, as I believe they were. Progress along the northern road from Corinth to Pellene would have entailed passage very close to Sikyon and it is difficult to believe that Aratos would have tolerated this without a response. For support of the Aitolian route to Pellene across the northern Peloponnese and past Sikyon, see Scholten 2000: 125 and note 121, with earlier bibliography. For the northern road joining Corinth–Sikyon–Pellene, see Lolos 2011: 98–112; 155–61. He (167–72) also proposes the identification of the main road joining Phleious with Pellene; this may represent the Aitolian route to the latter. The roads from Corinth to Kleonai and from there to Nemea and Phleious are well documented; see, most recently, Marchand 2009: 109–51. Additional references to the Aitolian attack against Pellene, see Polyainos 8.59. Pausanias (2.8.5; 7.7.3; 8.27.14) mistakenly attributes the capture of Pellene to Agis IV and the Spartans. See also Urban 1979: 56–57; Scholten 2000: 123–27. Tarn (1913: 402–3) questions how those in Pellene must have viewed Aratos’ decision not to engage the Aitolians at the Isthmos, as it resulted in the sack of their city, despite Aratos’ late efforts to relieve it. Tarn does not consider the effect it may have had upon Corinthian public opinion. For the alliance and background to it, see Urban 1979: 63–65; Scholten 2000: 131–44. It was once believed (see Feyel 1942: 85–93) that after Demetrios’ capture of Boiotia, he also took Megara, a logical launching point from which to attack Corinth, but this has been disproved; see Urban 1979: 66–70; Walbank, CAH2 VII.1: 450. Bithys cannot be the same as the honorand in IG II2 208; see Hatzopoulos 1988: 38–39 and Habicht 1997: 126 and note 7. Phylakia is most likely located near Tegea; see Walbank, CAH2 VII.1: 450. Plut. Arat. 34.5–6; Paus. 2.8.6. See further Habicht 1982: 79–93; 1997: 173–74. Antigonos’ revival of the dynasty’s naval capacity is remarkable considering that he did not possess Corinth at the outset of his reign and how closely previous Antigonid naval fortunes were tied to Corinth and its two harbors. His Karian expedition is known only from Trogus (Prol. 28); several inscriptions from Karia, however, attest to his activities. See further Walbank, HM III: 343–45; Le Bohec 1993: 327–61. For the war’s outbreak, see Polyb. 2.46.7; Plut. Cleom. 14; Arat. 35.6–7. See also Walbank, HCP I: 244–45; Urban 1979: 97–116. For the Aitolian position throughout the Kleomenic War, see Scholten 2000: 184–91. Walbank 1933: 72–73; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002: 38–40. Polyb. 2.46.6. On the Achaian meeting and its declaration of war, see Walbank, HCP III: 244–45. Polyb. 2.47.5–49. Porter 1937: lxxi–lxxv; Fine 1940: 137–42; Bikerman 1943: 294–97; Walbank, HCP I: 246; CAH2 VII.1: 461; Larsen 1968: 316–17; Urban 1979: 133 and note 151; Orsi 1991: 43; Paschidis 2008: 236 and note 7. For Nikophanes and

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56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70

71 72 73

Kerkidas, see Paschidis 2008: 276–79. See, however, Gruen (1972: 615–17), who argues that Aratos played no role in the Megalopolitans’ embassy to Doson and that it was sent on Megalopolis’ initiative alone. Polyb. 2.50.10. Walbank 1933: 200–201; HCP I: 249–50. For the date, see Walbank, HCP I: 250. Polyb. 2.51.3; Plut. Cleom. 14.4–5; Arat. 39.1; Paus. 2.9.2; 7.7.3. Walbank, HCP I: 250. Plut. Arat. 39; Cleom. 15. Walbank, HCP I: 251. Polyb. 2.51.4–5. For discussion of the chronological problems associated with the younger Aratos’ embassy to Macedonia, see Paschidis (2008: 239–41) who argues that he made two separate missions to Macedonia, the first in early 225 and the second after the meeting in late spring 224 at which the Achaian koinon agreed to hand over Acrocorinth to Antigonos Doson. On the second occasion, Aratos and others also functioned as good-faith hostages to Doson until he should receive Acrocorinth. Plut. Arat. 40.1; Cleom. 17.7: προδοσίαν τινὰ πραττομένην. Plut. Arat. 40.2: τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κορίνθῳ πειρώμενος ἀναζητεῖν καὶ κολάζειν ἐξηγρίαινε τὸ πλῆθος ἤδη νοσοῦν καὶ βαρυνόμενον τὴν ὑπὸ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πολιτείαν. Urban (1979: 191–92), commenting on this passage, speculates that the Corinthian discontent concerned the social tensions within the city, as paralleled at Argos. Plut. Cleom. 19.1, lakonizing: ὁ Ἄρατος ἐν Κορίνθῳ ποιούμενός τινα τῶν λεγομένων λακωνίζειν ἐξέτασιν; wish to be free: καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι βουλομένην. Polyb. 2.52.3: των γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ μὲν Ἀράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. For Polybios’ silence on Kleomenes’ diplomatic overtures to Aratos, see Gruen 1972: 621–23. For the importance of the main road (Longopotamos) from Corinth to Kleonai, see Marchand 2009: 109–51. Plut. Cleom. 19.2: ἐκάλει μὲν εἱς τὸ βουλουτήριον τοὺς πολίτας. Plut. Arat. 40.3: εἰς τὸ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερον. Plutarch’s two versions of the Corinthians’ meeting with Aratos are critical for an understanding of the city’s topography. Donati (2010: 16 and note 55) uses Plutarch’s two versions to identify the boulouterion (Cleom. 19.2) as the Corinthian boule’s meeting place in support of his identification of Corinth’s agora beneath the Roman forum. Note, however, that his date (223) for this meeting is incorrect; it occurred in summer 225. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support his claim that Plutarch’s two versions imply that Aratos met with the Corinthian boule. Plutarch (Arat. 40.2–3) claims that the Corinthians (τὸ πλῆθος) assembled in the sanctuary of Apollo and summoned Aratos. Bookidis and Stroud (2004: 405–7) identify Plutarch’s Apollonion with the Archaic temple. Earlier commentators on this incident had accepted the identification of the Apollonion with the Archaic temple; see Porter 1931: 58–60; 1937: 77. Aratos’ own Memoirs must be Plutarch’s primary source for the version in his Aratos; Phylarchos is certainly the source for the version in the Cleomenes. Plut. Arat. 40.5: τῷ ἄρχοντι τῆς φρουρᾶς. It is intriguing that Kleopatros’ title (archon) is identical to that Plutarch gives to Persaios, the last Antigonid governor (epistates?) of Corinth prior to Aratos’ capture of it. Kleopatros is not attested elsewhere, LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1. See also Urban 1979: 191 and note 349. Porter (1931: 60; 1937: 77) first suggested that Aratos departed through the Phliasian gate. Plut. Cleom. 19.6; cf. Arat. 40.7. For the road from Epidauros to Corinth, see Wiseman 1978: 127; Dixon 2000: 61–62, 68–69. Polyb. 2.52.3: πρὸς δὲ τὸν Κλεομένη διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλούντων; Plut. Arat. 40.6: μετεπέμηψαντο τὸν Κλεομένη καὶ παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν; Plutarch (Cleom. 19.4), citing Aratos’ Memoirs (FGrH 231 F 6), claims that the Corinthians were so eager

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74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82

83

84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91

to get to Kleomenes at Argos that they ruined their horses. He then first identifies Kleomenes at Corinth, reproaching the Corinthians for having allowed Aratos to flee the city. Plut. Arat. 41.1. See also Walbank 1933: 98–99. For the date (mid-July 225), see Porter 1937: lxxvii–lxxx. Clearly the koinon’s assembly did not confer this title upon Aratos; most likely a small group of his supporters were responsible. The siege of Sikyon lasted three months, January–April; see Porter 1937: lxxxi–lxxxii; Walbank, HCP I: 253. Plut. Arat. 42.1: καλεῖν τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ παραδιδόναι τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον; cf. Cleom. 19.9. For the date, see Porter 1937: lxxxi–lxxxii; Walbank, HCP I: 253. Polyb. 2.52.3–4: παρεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις εὔλογος. ἧς ἐπιλαβόμενος Ἄρατος καὶ προτείνας Ἀντιγόνω τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον. Plut. Cleom. 19.9: καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦ Ἀράτου, τῶν Κορινθίων αὐτῷ ψηφισαμένων, δωρεὰν ἔλαβε. Arat. 42.3: τά τε χρήματα διήρπασαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τῷ Κλεομένει δωρεὰν ἔδωκαν. Cleom. 20.1: οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν τὸν Ἰσθμόν, ἀλλὰ τὰ Ὄνεια χαρακώσας καὶ τειχίσας φυλάττειν. For Kleomenes’ use of the fortification at Stanotopi, see Stroud 1971: 144. Caraher and Gregory (2006: 345–47), in their discussion of the fortification and walls in the Maritsa pass, do not comment on Kleomenes’ defenses on Mt. Oneion. It must, however, have formed part of his defenses in 225/4. For the date, see Walbank (1933: 101) who, believing the decision to call upon Antigonos occurred in November, placed his arrival at the Isthmos in December 225/January 224. Now that the koinon’s acceptance of Antigonos’ conditions can be dated to the spring (April) 224 meeting of the synod, he can only have arrived at the Isthmos after the meeting at Aigion, probably in late April or early May. Polybios (39.6.1), for example, uses “on the Isthmos” (ἐν Ἰσθμῷ) when clearly referring to Poseidon’s sanctuary. Plutarch (Demetr. 25.4) places the meeting at which Demetrios Poliorketes revived the League of Corinth “on the Isthmos” (ἐν δὲ Ἰσθμῷ); there is no doubt that this meeting occurred at Poseidon’s sanctuary. Later, Plutarch (Demetr. 31.2) notes that, upon his return to Greece, Demetrios and his fleet sailed “to the Isthmos” (εἰς Ἰσθμόν); only Kenchreai can be meant in this context. Plut. Cleom. 20.2: ὄυτε γὰρ σῖτον εἶχεν ἐκ παρασκευῆς ἱκανόν. Polybios (2.53.4) also claims that, Kleomenes was more abundantly supplied than Antigonos (χορηγίαις δαψιλεστέραις Ἀντιγόνου χρώμενος). ὄυτε βιάσασθαι τὴν πάροδον, καθημένου τοῦ Κλεομένους, ἦν ῥάδιον. For the trans-Isthmian wall, see Wiseman 1963 and above, Chapter 4, pp. 80–1. All we know is that when initial reports of the revolt at Argos reached Kleomenes, he dispatched 2,000 soldiers to help the garrison hold the citadel, see Plut. Cleom. 21.2. He had other garrisons throughout the Peloponnese, especially at Argos. At the battle of Sellasia in 222, his forces numbered 20,000; see Polyb. 2.65.7. See also Walbank (HM III: 349), who writes that Kleomenes’ numbers at Corinth “were evidently well below the 20,000 he mustered the next year at Sellasia.” Walbank 1933: 101; HCP I: 253; Stroud 1971: 144. See also Wiseman (1963: 270), who claims that Kleomenes “relied on the Long Walls to Lechaion to prevent (as they did) Antigonos from passing on north of Corinth.” Compare Philokles’ inability to cross the Isthmos as the Romans and their allies held Kenchreai during the siege of Corinth in autumn 198. He marched across the Perachora peninsula, sailing from there to Lechaion; see below, p. 181. Plut. Arat. 44.1: καὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀγῶνες ἦσαν, εὖ πεφραγμένου τοῦ Κλεομένους καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀμυνομένων προθύμως.

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92 Porter (1937: lxxxiii) suggests that Antigonos’ attempt to pass Lechaion refers to the “conflicts around the city.” This seems unlikely, as Plutarch explicitly places them around the city and not around Lechaion. 93 Polybios’ (2.52.9) account of the events around Corinth is very brief; he simply comments that Kleomenes sought to keep Antigonos out, and that Antigonos sought to enter the Peloponnese. He then immediately proceeds to the events at Argos and Kleomenes’ abandonment of Corinth. After describing the Achaian capture of Argos, however, Polybios (2.54.1) adds that Antigonos now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of Acrocorinth. 94 The date of the revolt at Argos is difficult to ascertain. It began either before May 224 (i.e. April) or in May (or later) 224. The date is contingent upon Timoxenos’ expedition to Argos; Polybios (2.53.2) claims that he was strategos at the time. Timoxenos, however, was strategos for 225/4 and his office would have expired in April 224. Walbank’s (HCP I: 254–55 with references) view that Timoxenos continued to hold some provisional command after the expiration of his office represents the best solution. Argos revolted in May 224; Antigonos, therefore, had been trapped in the northeastern Corinthian for nearly a month prior to Kleomenes’ departure from Corinth. 95 For the roads and passes south from Phleious and Argos, see Pikoulas 1995: 285–99. 96 Polyb. 2.54.1: ὁ δ’ Ἀντίγονος ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον εἰσελθὼν παρέλαβε τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθων; Plut. Arat. 44.5: Ἀντίγονος δὲ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον παρέλαβεν; Plut. Cleom. 21.3: τῆς πόλεως εἰσελθόντος Ἀντιγόνου καὶ φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος. 97 For Aristomachos’ career, see Paschidis 2008: 220–25. 98 Walbank (HM III: 350–51) dates this incident at Kenchreai to late 224, after the autumn meeting of the Achaian synod, at which the Hellenic Symmachy was constituted. 99 Polyb. 2.60.8: τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Κεγχρεαῖς τεταγμὲνων. He also cites Phylarchos’ claim (FGrH 81 F 54) that Aristomachos was tortured to death on the rack. 100 Plut. Arat. 43.8–9: συναγαγὼν ὁ Ἀντίγονος ἑστίασιν ἐν Κορίνθῳ.

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7 THE END OF MACEDONIAN C OR I NT H

The final years of the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth (224–196) were characterized by nearly incessant warfare: the end of the Kleomenic War, the Social War, the First and Second Macedonian Wars. After Doson’s death in 221, Philip V possessed Corinth until the Roman expulsion of the Macedonian garrison (196). The last quarter century of the Antigonid presence at Corinth was one in which stability was restored, yet the city, its inhabitants, and its chora suffered tremendously. Corinth, nevertheless, remained a steadfastly loyal and critical possession to the Antigonids. Their continuous displays of goodwill were reciprocated in years prior to 198, as most Corinthians apparently enjoyed greater autonomy than they had previously under the Macedonians. One novel aspect about the conflicts within these years was the initiation of Roman intervention in Greek affairs.1 The Corinthians, according to Polybios (2.12.8), first admitted the Romans to participate in the Isthmian Games of 228; Zonaras (8.19) adds that Plautus won the stade race. The Roman proconsul T. Quinctius Flamininus removed the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinth at the end of the Second Macedonian War (196), declaring the Greeks free at the celebration of the Isthmian Games. There are indications, however, that not all Corinthians were pleased with their “liberation” from the Antigonids. A close relationship had developed between Corinth and Macedonia that dated from the weeks after the battle of Chaironeia. Arguably, this relationship (in both directions) had never been stronger than in the last years of the third century and the first years of the second. Removal of the Macedonians certainly meant for many Corinthians the restoration of their city and citadel to the Achaian koinon or the reduction of their polis to the status of a Roman garrison town. Neither prospect appealed to these Corinthians. Fresh in the minds of many was bitter disappointment of nearly two decades of Achaian membership. Rome still remained a largely unknown quantity; experience with the proconsul P. Sulpicius Galba in the First Macedonian War, however, must have served as an ominous foreshadowing of what a future under Roman domination could entail. Roman participation in the First and Second Macedonian Wars accounts for the abundance of literary sources for the final years of the Macedonians’ 168

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presence at Corinth. Polybios’ narrative is crucial and, where it fails, confidence is high that Livy followed closely the Megalopolitan’s account.2 Numerous references to the city and its territory include descriptions of military operations, royal visitations, and Antigonid utilization of Kenchreai, Lechaion, and the diolkos. They also preserve important topographical details concerning the city and indications of increased Corinthian autonomy. Corinth also featured prominently in the negotiations to end the Second Macedonian War and its eventual settlement, proclaimed at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia.

Antigonos Doson’s final years Antigonos III Doson recovered Acrocorinth from the Achaian koinon during the later stages of the Kleomenic War (late spring 224). He wasted no time in reasserting Macedonian authority within Corinth and from there over the whole Peloponnese. Among his first actions in Corinth, however, was the destruction of “The Captors of Acrocorinth” (οἱ ἑλόντες τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον), a monument not yet 20 years old, erected to commemorate the Achaian expulsion of Antigonos Gonatas’ garrison (see p. 144). Doson, however, spared only the sculpture portraying Aratos of Sikyon, a man with whom he had developed a personal connection and with whom Philip V enjoyed an intimate relationship for several years. Corinthian memory of the nearly successful assassination of Aratos a year or so earlier was still fresh; Doson’s decision to preserve the sculpture of Aratos surely offered an ominous message of what the Macedonian recovery of Corinth might entail. Antigonos also hosted a large banquet (Plut. Arat. 43.8–9) soon after recovering the city, similar in scale to those his Macedonian predecessors had hosted. The return of royal patronage and prestige must have assuaged slightly the dismay at the preservation of Aratos’ sculpture. Doson met Kleomenes at Sellasia (222), thoroughly defeating the Spartans.3 Subsequently, while settling affairs in Sparta, Antigonos Doson learned of the Illyrians’ attack upon Macedonia; he sped north and resoundingly defeated the invaders. At Sellasia, however, he was suffering from consumption and while engaging the Illyrians he also burst a blood vessel. The cumulative effects of both proved fatal within a year, but not before he had concluded arrangements to transfer power to his nephew, Philip son of King Demetrios II.4 Polybios (4.87.7–8) preserves Antigonos Doson’s will and the arrangements he had made to ensure the successful transition of power to his young nephew. The men whom he entrusted to advise Philip V held prestigious positions and all were counted among his philoi; they included Apelles, Leontios, Megaleas, Taurion, and Alexandros. Doson also intended for Aratos to have an important role in his nephew’s maturation. Philip spent winter 222/1 with Aratos in order to acquaint himself with the Sikyonian and to familiarize himself with affairs of the Peloponnese.5

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These six men became the transitional figures between the reigns of Antigonos III Doson and Philip V; Taurion is of the greatest interest from a Corinthian perspective.6 He held, at the time of Doson’s death, an office of considerable importance within the Peloponnese; it is unclear how long he had held it, but most likely since the recovery of Acrocorinth.7 Several different titles are attributed to Taurion, all indicating that he served as the kings’ primary offical within the Peloponnese.8 It is generally believed that he also commanded the garrison at Corinth.9 His position may have been analogous to that held by the strategos preserved in IG IV2.1.68, the Epidaurian stele preserving the record of the League of Corinth revived by Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes in 302 B.C.10

The Hellenic Symmachy of Antigonos III Doson and Philip V The Hellenic Symmachy that Doson constituted at Aigion in autumn 224 represents the most manifest aspect in which one can detect continuity with the Argeads Philip II and Alexander the Great, as well as the Antigonids, Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes.11 The particulars of the Hellenic Symmachy are not entirely clear, although from the narratives of Polybios and Livy one can reconstruct its salient features.12 The Symmachy was a league of leagues, with the Macedonian monarch its chief authority; Doson’s inspiration was surely the earlier manifestations of the League of Corinth.13 The original members of the Hellenic Symmachy included (in addition to Doson and the Macedonians) the Achaians, the Epeirotes, the Phokians, the Boiotians, the Akarnanians, and the Thessalians (Polyb. 4.9.4, and 4.15.1). Corinth did not belong to any of the leagues that comprised the Hellenic Symmachy; its status within it is unclear. Other Greek poleis, for example those of Euboia, apparently were not members of the Symmachy.14 The Macedonian king had the right to summon the allies whenever he desired.15 The Achaians (at least?) were compelled to swear an oath of allegiance to the king annually.16 Aspiring members could be admitted only after consultation with the king and other members.17 Lastly, members were obligated to provide grain and money when called upon to do so; for example, the Achaian koinon supplied Antigonos Doson (Plut. Arat. 45.2) and later Philip V (Polyb. 5.1.6, 11–12) with both. Antigonos Doson was named hegemon (ἡγεμὼν ἁπάντων τῶν συμμάχων) of the Symmachy (Polyb. 2.54.4) at Aigion, and then went into winter quarters (224/3) at an unspecified location between Sikyon and Corinth. He and his allies confronted Kleomenes at Sellasia in summer 222.18 The following spring (221), Doson proceeded from his winter quarters into the deep Peloponnese where he arbitrated a number of border disputes between member states. His successor, Philip V, also settled disputes, apparently as hegemon of the Hellenic Symmachy.19 Their judicial activities recall the Achaian policy of settling any outstanding disputes between new members of the koinon, as it had done with Corinth and Epidauros (IG IV2.1 71) nearly 20 years earlier (see Chapter 6, 170

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pp. 146–8). Even more significant, however, are the arbitrations Philip II and later Alexander the Great settled after the foundation of the League of Corinth.20

Philip V and the Social War (220–217

B.C.)

Philip V was the first Antigonid monarch to inherit control of Corinth since his grandfather Antigonos II Gonatas had received it from his father Demetrios Poliorketes. As argued above, possession of Corinth represented one single means by which the Antigonids sought to connect themselves to Philip II and Alexander the Great. This is evident in the League of Corinth that Antigonos I Monophthalmos and Demetrios I Poliorketes had established in 302 and no less so with the Hellenic Symmachy of Antigonos III Doson and Philip V. The Antigonids presented themselves as the legitimate heirs to the Argead dynasty, specifically Philip II and Alexander III the Great. F.W. Walbank, for instance, has demonstrated that Polybios regularly employs the phrase ἡ Μακεδόνων οἰκία to mean the Argead and Antigonid dynasties collectively.21 Philip’s ambition, Walbank contends, was nothing less than the re-establishment of Alexander’s empire, a characteristic all Antigonids shared. Polybios, describing Philip V early in his reign (the context is 218), commented that “all through his life, he was at great pains to prove that he was allied in blood to Alexander and Philip, he was not in the least anxious to show himself their emulator.”22 Clearly Polybios condemns Philip’s actions as unworthy of his Argead predecessors; nevertheless, the historian is convinced that he was unwavering in his desire to prove he was a legitimate heir of the Argeadai. Possession of Corinth and his position as hegemon of the Hellenic Symmachy legitimized these claims. At the time of Antigonos Doson’s death in summer 221, Philip was still a young man (born 238), only 17 years old.23 He was forced to confront two immediate concerns of considerable magnitude: the war with Aitolia and a conspiracy from within the ranks of his closest advisors to whom Antigonos Doson had entrusted his supervision (Polyb. 4.87.6). Less than a year after coming to the Macedonian throne, Philip V led the Hellenic Symmachy to war against the Aitolians.24 Both diplomatic and military events within this war impacted Corinth indirectly yet profoundly. Lechaion and Kenchreai again became important centers for the Antigonid fleet, troops proceeded through the Corinthia, and many encamped there for prolonged periods. The Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia was the location at which the Hellenic Symmachy convened (220) to declare war against Aitolia, following its attacks against Messenia and successive appeals from King Philip’s allies. Accounts of several important events that occurred within the Corinthia shed considerable light on the nature of the relationship between city and king in the first years of Philip’s reign. The declaration of war against the Aitolians was the result of their incursion into the Peloponnese in 220 and their attack upon Kaphyai.25 The Aitolians 171

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then proceeded against Pellene, and ravaged (κατασύραντες) the territory of Sikyon, departing the Peloponnese across the Isthmos (Polyb. 4.13.5). The Aitolians’ egress is difficult to explain, considering the Macedonian garrison’s presence at Corinth, and the existence of its Long Walls. The episode recalls the Aitolian incursion into the Peloponnese in 241/0 when Aratos allowed their passage, as nearly all of the harvest had been collected. Reconstruction of the Aitolians’ route out of the Peloponnese is nearly impossible, but Polybios’ sequence of Pellene–Sikyonia–Isthmos suggests one along the coastal, northern Peloponnesian road. It remains difficult to accept, however, that the Aitolians would have risked engagement with the Macedonian garrison by breaching the Long Walls; perhaps they again followed a route from the Sikyonia to Phleious and then northeast, following the Leukon (Xerias) river valley, as they had nearly 20 years earlier. Prior to the declaration of war against Aitolia, an extremely important affair transpired (spring/summer? 220) that, although not affecting Corinth directly, had profound repercussions later and illuminates our understanding of the nature of the Macedonian presence under Philip. When the Achaians attempted to deal with an Aitolian attack in the Peloponnese, the Illyrian Skerdilaidas and Demetrios of Pharos sailed south from Illyria with 90 ships. They passed the Lissos river, in violation of their treaty (229) with Rome.26 Demetrios of Pharos continued along the southern coast of the Peloponnese, sailing into the Aegean; a fleet of Rhodian vessels eventually expelled him and pursued him to Kenchreai. Taurion, Philip’s general of the Peloponnese, sought to enlist Demetrios’ aid in the war with the Aitolians, permitting his ships (presumably the 50 with which he sailed into the Aegean; Polyb. 3.16.3) to be conveyed over the diolkos into the Corinthian Gulf (Polyb. 4.19.7–9). Significantly, Taurion paid for their conveyance himself (προσδεξαμένου ἐκείνου τὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπέρβασιν τῶν λέμβων δαπάνην).27 Demetrios subsequently raided the Aitolian coast and returned to Corinth, presumably to meet with Taurion and to report on his expedition. This episode on the eve of the Social War had profound consequences. Demetrios’ violation of the treaty did not escape Rome’s notice (Polyb. 3.16.4) and as a result he allied himself with Philip, quickly becoming one of his closest philoi.28 This passage preserves intriguing testimony pertaining to the degree of autonomy Corinth enjoyed under Philip. Polybios’ remark (4.19.8) that Taurion paid for the transportation of Demetrios’ ships across the Isthmos (via the diolkos) raises the question, whom did he pay for this service?29 Considering Taurion’s position at Corinth, the most logical conclusion would be that the Corinthians (at least in 220) possessed the authority to collect tolls for traffic across the diolkos.30 Both Thucydides (1.13.5) and Strabo (8.6.20) attest that Corinth’s wealth in the Archaic and Classical periods derived in part from the duties paid for use of their harbors and the diolkos. What appears to have been policy in 220, however, cannot be applied to all periods of Macedonian control; it also does not exclude the possibility that the Corinthians 172

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had maintained some control over the diolkos throughout earlier periods. Furthermore, Taurion’s decision to aid and enlist the military support of Demetrios of Pharos, who was not then allied with Philip V, strongly indicates that Macedonian garrison commanders at Corinth had the authority to make decisions on the spot, without seeking the king’s approval first. Certainly this was the case with Demetrios of Pharos at the Isthmos and also may have been so concerning the tentative alliance Alexandros son of Krateros reached with Aratos at Sikyon (see Chapter 4, p. 92–3). There was no time to seek royal approval; the king could be consulted later. The gravity of the Aitolian incursion into the Peloponnese warranted Philip’s presence. He marched south, arriving at Corinth where he dispatched representatives (βιβλιαφόρους) to the members of the Hellenic Symmachy, calling upon them to convene at Corinth (Polyb. 4.22.2–3). Philip returned after a brief sojourn to Tegea where he met several Spartans regarding their internal stasis. Philip found the allies’ representatives already assembled at Corinth (εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον) and he convened the Hellenic Symmachy.31 This meeting represents the first attested congress within the Corinthia since Demetrios Poliorketes convened his League of Corinth at Isthmia in 302; numerous representatives from member states attended and the Corinthians reaped economic benefits from their presence. After stating their case to the king, the synedroi of the Symmachy voted unanimously to declare war (Polyb. 4.25) against the Aitolians. According to Polybios (5.2.1–3), Philip resolved in 218 to fight the war on the sea, signaling a turning point in the war, Antigonid strategy, and Corinth’s significance.32 He assembled the fleet at Lechaion (5.2.4), indicating that it now served as one of his naval bases.33 Its crews trained there, apparently remaining for some time (Polyb. 5.2.7). When the fleet was adequately prepared, it sailed to Patrai; accompanying Philip were 6,000 Macedonians and 1,200 mercenaries (Polyb. 5.2.11), to whom he issued grain and pay before their departure. The duration of their stay at Corinth and Lechaion is unknown, but their numbers indicate that they must have taxed what resources were available.34 The source of the grain and the payment Philip supplied the soldiers is not known, but it has been suggested that the coinage they received was minted at Corinth. Many late posthumous Alexanders present in the Patras hoard (IGCH, 186) have been ascribed to the mint at Corinth; their condition indicates that they were minted shortly before its burial.35 Prior to the payment of the soldiers, according to Polybios (5.1.11–12), the Achaians had voted to give Philip 50 talents, three months’ payment for his soldiers, and 10,000 measures of grain for the campaign; the koinon resolved further to provide Philip with 17 talents a month as long as he fought in the Peloponnese. Surely the Achaians’ contribution was made in fulfillment of their obligations as a member of the Hellenic Symmachy and it may account for the payments in grain and money that Philip had disbursed at Corinth. No record attests to Corinthian contributions of grain or money. Possibly the contributions Philip exacted from others, such as the Achaians, provided him with the financial flexibility to 173

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exempt Corinth. An act of such euergetism would invite continued Corinthian displays of loyalty and goodwill towards him. From Patrai, Philip embarked upon his infamous campaign against Aitolia that included the sack and destruction of the sanctuary at Thermon.36 Following this expedition, Philip returned with the fleet to Lechaion (5.17.9, 18.9), where his troops disembarked. He briefly remained in Corinth, breaking up the camp and marching to Tegea via Argos (Polyb. 5.18.1) and from there launched his successful campaign against Sparta. Philip again returned with the army to Corinth (5.24.10) where he found Rhodian and Chian ambassadors conveying proposals to negotiate an end to the war. He sent these ambassadors to address the Aitolians, with assurances that he was ready for peace. Philip next proceeded to Lechaion, intending to sail to Phokis (Polyb. 5.24.11–12). Once Philip prepared to embark on his journey, he was confronted with one of the most serious crises of his reign, as three of his philoi (Leontios, Megaleas, and Ptolemaios) incited the agema to rebellion; this constituted only part of a more dangerous conspiracy. Its origins and the goals of the conspirators are complex and not wholly relevant to Corinth’s status as a Macedonian possession.37 Nevertheless, its significance for the topographical information it provides about Hellenistic Corinth requires discussion.38 Philip’s chief advisor, Apelles, one of the men whom Doson had entrusted to supervise the young king, formulated the plot. He, Leontios, Megaleas, and several others had become disenchanted with Philip’s new naval initiative and other aspects of the war’s prosecution, claiming primarily that it was not in the Macedonian landowners’ interests, and that they (as represented in the agema) were to lose their privileges and share of the plunder. The conspirators also (Leontios particularly) despised Aratos’ standing with Philip.39 The disturbances at Corinth began when Megaleas and Leontios collected the agema and provoked it to rebel. They first (Polyb. 5.25.3) attempted to plunder the quarters of the king’s most distinguished philoi (τὰς τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων φίλων καταλύσεις) and even more egregiously to break open the doors and cut down the roof tiles of the “king’s residence” (ἐκβάλλειν δὲ τὰς θύρας καὶ κατακόπτειν τὸν κέραμον τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως αὐλῆς).40 The whole city was thrown into disturbance and Philip hastened from Lechaion to the city. He assembled the Macedonians in the Theater where he reproached them, demanding that order be restored within the ranks.41 He, however, feigned ignorance of the larger conspiracy, demurring from pleas to apprehend and punish the ringleaders. Leontios (Polyb. 5.26.1–2) recognized the precarious nature of the situation and, despairing of the conspiracy’s success, he summoned Apelles to Corinth. Polybios (5.26.3) states that Apelles had assumed more authority while in Chalkis than had been granted to him, and upon his arrival at Corinth, the conspiracy unraveled quickly. Apelles arrived at Corinth, meeting with Leontios, Ptolemaios, and Megaleas, who still commanded the peltasts and the agema.42 They had prearranged a splendid reception to accompany Apelles’ arrival; he then proceeded to the king’s 174

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residence, but one of the stewards (τις τῶν ῥαβδούχων) refused him entrance.43 Following an indeterminate amount of time, Philip permitted Apelles to attend his banquets (ἐπὶ μὲν τὰς συνουσίας), but denied him his place in the king’s council and daily meetings (τῶν δὲ διαβουλίων καὶ τῆς μεθ’ ἡμέραν συμπεριφορᾶς οὐ μετεῖχε). The conspirators received the message. Megaleas furtively departed, eventually arriving first at Athens, and subsequently Thebes (Polyb. 5.26.14, 27.1–2), where he was arrested and committed suicide. Leontios was left behind in Corinth, but was later arrested and executed (Polyb. 5.27.5–8). Meanwhile, Philip sailed from Lechaion to Phokis, taking Apelles with him. From Kirrha, Philip proceeded to Sikyon, where he met with Aratos, sending Apelles on to Corinth. Simultaneously, the Rhodian and Chian ambassadors returned from Aitolia (Polyb. 5.28.1), having negotiated a 30-day truce. Philip accepted the terms, and sailed from Lechaion to Patrai to meet with his allies. Letters written by Megaleas to the Aitolians, urging them to press on with the war on account of Philip’s weakness, were intercepted and delivered to him at Patrai. Philip concluded that Apelles had been the originator of the treason. He was arrested and committed suicide (Polyb. 5.28.4–8). Philip later returned to Corinth (5.29.4–5), dismissing his Macedonian troops and sending them home for winter. He then embarked upon a ship at Kenchreai, sailing to Demetrias, where Ptolemaios, the final conspirator of the failed coup, was tried, convicted, and executed (Polyb. 5.29.4–6). Philip’s decision in 218 to revitalize the Antigonid fleet had several consequences. The utilization of Lechaion and Kenchreai most affected Corinth; as the narrative above demonstrates, he spent considerable time in both throughout 218. One other incident regarding the fleet’s operations in 217 may illuminate further the Corinthians’ relationship with Philip. Taurion, Philip’s general in charge of Peloponnesian affairs, had access to a number of Macedonian ships based at Lechaion. He entrusted four ships to the command of Agathinos and Kassandros of Corinth for the campaign.44 Philip’s erstwhile Illyrian ally, Skerdilaidas, seized at Leukas both Corinthians and the four ships under their command.45 While only a minor engagement in the latter stages of the Social War, this tantalizing reference constitutes our first evidence for Corinthians holding military or political appointments since Polyperchon’s execution of Deinarchos in 318.46 This fact, in addition to Corinth’s apparent ability to collect tolls for traffic across the diolkos, indicates that Philip V entrusted greater authority to some Corinthians and possibly greater autonomy than his Antigonid predecessors. Moreover, the Corinthian commander Kassandros offers potential onomastic evidence for a family with close ties to Macedonia.47 The name is Macedonian, not attested widely abroad between the fourth and second centuries.48 After the capture of Agathinos and Kassandros, Philip anchored off Kenchreai (Polyb. 5.101.4), ordering his decked ships to sail around the Peloponnese to Aigion and Patrai, while he took the rest over the Isthmos via the diolkos, anchoring them at Lechaion. It is unclear if Philip had to pay a toll for his use 175

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of the diolkos, or if he was exempted. He and his friends (philoi) traveled to Nemea after disembarking to preside over the celebration of the games (217) while his soldiers and ships presumably remained at Corinth and Lechaion respectively. While at Nemea, reports of Rome’s defeat at Cannae reached Philip. Demetrios of Pharos then offered his infamous counsel that Philip abandon the war with Aitolia in order to concentrate upon an expedition to Italy and “conquest of the world” (ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς). When he returned to Corinth, he met his friends (philoi) to discuss peace with the Aitolians. Polybios (5.102.5) remarks that Philip took his ships (still anchored at Lechaion) and land forces (τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὴν πεζὴν δύναμιν) from Corinth and sailed to Aigion, where the Achaians awaited him. Shortly afterwards, he sailed with his army to Naupaktos to negotiate peace. At this conference, Agelaos of Naupaktos delivered his famous speech (Polyb. 5.104), in which he admonished Philip to take notice of “the clouds that loom in the west.” Agelaos’ ominous words affected Philip and those others assembled; there they agreed to peace.49 The Peace of Naupaktos not only concluded the war, according to Polybios (5.105.4), it also initiated the symploke that brought the eastern and western Mediterranean worlds into a single oikoumene.50 Corinth again became a central feature to Antigonid naval power during the Social War following Philip’s initiative in 218 to revive the dynasty’s fortunes on the sea. Correspondingly, Lechaion and Kenchreai hosted countless ships and the diolkos was employed on at least two occasions to convey ships from one gulf to the other.51 Events of the Social War also point to an almost inescapable conclusion regarding Corinth’s autonomy under Philip. Taurion’s conveyance of Demetrios of Pharos’ ships across the diolkos at his own expense certainly suggests that the Macedonians did not collect tolls for traffic across this important causeway; apparently the Corinthians had been allowed to retain this authority. Moreover, two Corinthians, Agathinos and Kassandros, commanded a small squadron of four Macedonian ships in 217, marking the first time in just over a century that a Corinthian held political or military command under the Macedonians. Shortages of grain at Corinth during the Social War must have been acute, considering the numbers of Macedonian troops who passed by or encamped within the city or at Lechaion. Philip himself visited Corinth several times to collect supplies, further taxing already limited resources. Nevertheless, despite these hardships, all indications point to the pro-Antigonid Corinthians’ unwavering loyalty to Philip throughout the war; the king’s apparent extension of greater autonomy to these Corinthians had proved a wise decision. Reciprocal benefactions had characterized the relationship between the Macedonians and Corinthians and they had been expedient to both.

The First Macedonian War (214–205

B.C.)

Macedonia and Rome went to war in 214 as a result of Philip’s alliance with the Carthaginian Hannibal following the latter’s victory over Rome at Cannae 176

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(215) and the former’s interference in Illyria.52 Rome viewed this war as one of containment, striving to prevent Philip from crossing into Italy to aid Hannibal.53 Philip’s objectives are not clear and have been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. The conflict between Rome and Macedon did not impact Corinth directly during its first three years; the war, however, moved into southern Greece in 211, after Rome allied with Aitolia (Livy 26.24.3). The latter now initiated again operations in the Peloponnese with its allies in Sparta and Messenia, recalling the alignment against the Philip and the Hellenic Symmachy during the Social War (220–217).54 Rome aided the Aitolians and their allies in their Greek war, with P. Sulpicius Galba’s (cos. 211) dispatch; his command (as a promagistrate) in Greece was prorogued annually until his departure at the conclusion of 206.55 Several military operations, movement and encampment of troops near Corinth, and royal visitations to the city affected Corinth, but not the course of the war. Nevertheless, they constitute valuable evidence on the nature of the Macedonians’ relationship with the Corinthians during the last quarter century of Macedonian control of Corinth. P. Sulpicius Galba guided the Roman war effort in Greece for six years (211–206 B.C.). The capture of Aigina (Polyb. 9.42.5–8), after which he probably sold its inhabitants into slavery, constituted his first success (Polyb 22.8.9).56 Subsequently, he granted control of it to his Aitolian allies, who in turn sold it to King Attalos for 30 talents (Polyb. 22.8.10). The Attalid and Roman fleets’ regular presence on the island certainly affected the importation of grain to Corinth’s eastern harbor and transformed Aigina into what could be described aptly as the “eye-sore of Kenchreai.” P. Sulpicius Galba and the Roman fleet also utilized the harbor of Naupaktos, in the Corinthian Gulf, from which they could check any activity at Lechaion and launch military operations within the Peloponnese. Although the Romans only attacked the vicinity of Corinth once, the war affected the city and its citizens, especially in the years 209 and 208. The most dangerous situation developed in summer 209, when the Roman fleet and its proconsul P. Sulpicius Galba sailed from Naupaktos and disembarked in the territory between Corinth and Sikyon. According to Livy (27.31.1–3) he inflicted considerable damage to the agricultural lands in this area prior to Philip’s arrival from Nemea, where he had presided over the Games. He successfully drove the Romans back to Naupaktos, relieving Corinth and Sikyon of a pressing danger. The course of the war changed dramatically after Philip’s ally in Bithynia attacked Attalos’ territory; the Pergamene king immediately withdrew from the war. Galba, however, continued to use Aigina as one of his naval bases. Philip stopped at Corinth in 208, arriving from Megara to collect supplies (Livy 28.7.16) before he proceeded to Phleious and Pheneos. In late summer/ early autumn 208 he had seven quinqueremes and more than 20 lembi transported across the diolkos of Corinth into the Corinthian Gulf, hoping to meet with Carthaginian reinforcements under Bomilcar.57 Again, no evidence suggests 177

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whether or not Philip paid a toll or had been exempted from this obligation. Either way, his transportation of these ships across the diolkos offered the Corinthians an opportunity to display their goodwill to the king. After attending to an arbitration between Megalopolis and Aliphera in his capacity as the Hellenic Symmachy’s hegemon, Philip returned to Corinth, sending his infantry north. He departed Kenchreai with his fleet, bypassing Galba’s own that was stationed at Aigina, sailing along the coast of Attica and then to Chalkis. The regular movement of Macedonian troops in and out of the Peloponnese via the Isthmos, as well as likely difficulties in importing grain to Kenchreai on account of the regular presence of the Roman and Attalid fleets at Aigina, must have taxed severely Corinth’s limited resources during this stage of the war. P. Sulpicius Galba was also responsible for one of the most heinous crimes of the war (Paus. 7.8.2). Most likely in autumn 208 he attacked Dymai, sacking it and enslaving its population. His reputation for brutality became legendary; he earned it both at Dymai and at Oreos in Euboia, which he sacked and allowed King Attalos and his soldiers to plunder.58 A year after the sack of Dymai, the Aitolians and Philip agreed to peace (207) and in 205 the Romans and Philip concluded the First Macedonian War with the Peace of Phoinike (Livy 29.12.11–15).

Philip V’s campaign in Asia Minor (201–200

B.C.)

Just as Antigonos Doson had a quarter of a century earlier, Philip V sought also to reassert his dynasty’s ancestral claims in Asia Minor. Philip embarked on an ambitious naval campaign in the years 201 and 200 that has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest for its meaning in the broader context of Hellenistic affairs at the end of the third century, specifically the authenticity of the “secret pact” with Antiochos III.59 Among the poleis that Philip acquired during his campaign was Miletos, whose citizens awarded the king and his admiral Herakleides crowns (Polyb. 16.15.6) and handed over their city to him after defeating the Rhodians at the battle of Lade.60 Shortly after Philip’s acquisition of Miletos, its citizens granted citizenship to the Corinthian Nikandros son of Asklepiades.61 One cannot recover the reasons he received Milesian citizenship ca. 200, yet it is tempting to associate the grant with Philip’s arrival in 201. Possibly, Nikandres served in Philip’s fleet, perhaps even undertaking some actions on behalf of the Milesians. Philip, however, did not treat them as well as might have been expected from a city that had awarded him a crown.62 He granted the town of Myous, which formerly belonged to Miletos, to Magnesia on the Maeander, as a gift for the figs the Magnesians had provided for his soldiers.63 The Corinthians also had established ties with Magnesia on the Maeander seven or so years earlier, responding favorably to its request that the games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene be regarded as crowned games and that the city and its territory receive a grant of asylia (I. Magnesia, 42; see below, p. 187). 178

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The Second Macedonian War (200–196

B.C.)

The Second Macedonian War affected both the eastern and western Mediterranean worlds. Androsthenes (dux praesidii/urbis) commanded the Antigonid garrison at Corinth throughout the war. Philip’s philos Philokles also was in Corinth on at least two separate occasions.64 Corinth maintained a significant and symbolic place throughout the war. Several important military engagements and royal visitations occurred there, it played a central role in the negotiations between the Romans and Philip, and T. Quinctius Flamininus famously announced the peace settlement at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia. The first two years of the war were largely ineffective from the Roman perspective. Neither P. Sulpicius Galba (cos. 200) nor P. Villius Tappulus (cos. 199) managed to engage Philip V prior to the end of their respective commands. The war changed dramatically, however, in 198 with the arrival of the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus, who aggressively changed the war’s theatre from northern to southern Greece. Late in autumn 198 the Roman, Attalid, and Rhodian fleets, under the command of Flamininus’ brother Lucius, arrived off the coast of Kenchreai.65 Their ships displayed the spoils taken from the recent sack of Eretria and Karystos on Euboia.66 From this position within the Saronic Gulf, the legate L. Calpurnius was dispatched to a meeting (synkletos) of the Achaian koinon at Sikyon, where he attempted by diplomatic means to dislodge the Achaians from their alliance with Philip (Hellenic Symmachy) and to join Rome’s coalition against Macedonia. After three successive days of speeches, deliberations, and political machinations, the Achaians joined the Roman alliance.67 L. Calpurnius’ promise to restore Corinth to the Achaian koinon (Livy 32.19.4) proved a compelling incentive to do so. While these negotiations at Sikyon proceeded, the Romans moved west from Kenchreai, probably inflicting serious damage upon Kromna (see Map 1).68 The Romans commenced a full-scale assault upon Corinth and the Macedonian garrison within it (Livy 32.23.3). A siege immediately followed.69 This was no small enterprise, representing perhaps the most ambitious operation that Rome and its allies had undertaken. No one had captured Corinth and its citadel by full-scale assault since Demetrios Poliorketes (303) just over a century earlier. Antigonos Gonatas had captured the citadel from Niakaia in 245, accomplishing it by means of a fraudulently proposed marriage alliance; Aratos had captured it in 243, succeeding through nocturnal stealth. Meanwhile, Rome’s new Achaian allies marched eastwards from Sikyon, establishing a position near Corinth’s Sikyonian Gate, possibly taking siege engines with them.70 King Attalos, Livy adds, advanced “having led his army through the Isthmos from Lechaion.”71 Attalos’ movements require explanation, as his last-known location had been with the allied fleet at Kenchreai; one must ask what he had been doing at Lechaion.72 He had not traveled to Sikyon with L. Calpurnius; Livy (32.19.11) states explicitly that the king’s legates addressed (Attali regis legati) the Achaian synkletos. Although not

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precluding Attalos’ presence at Sikyon, one must recall that in spring 197, while Flamininus and his Greek allies met the Boiotians at Thebes, Attalos was present, and he was the first of Rome’s allies to speak; while addressing the allies, he collapsed and died not long afterwards.73 Incontrovertible archaeological evidence discussed below indicates considerable damage and destruction at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia and the adjacent Rachi settlement ca. 200. The siege of Corinth represents the most plausible historical circumstance for the damage; most likely it occurred during Attalos’ sojourn from Lechaion and through the Isthmos. Attalos’ movement may have represented an effort to capture Lechaion from the Macedonians that met in failure. Perhaps from its vicinity Attalos took the road to the sanctuary, allowing his troops to sack it.74 As discussed above (Chapter 6, p. 158 and p. 166, note 83) “Isthmos” is often used to refer to Poseidon’s sanctuary; in this instance, Livy’s (following Polybios) “Isthmos” surely means the sanctuary. The siege of Corinth was well coordinated, with pressure bearing down on the city both from the east and the west. As the Romans (east of the city) and their Achaian allies (to the west) settled into their respective positions, they anticipated sedition within the walls and a Corinthian insurrection against the garrison.75 One can only infer from Livy’s seditionem that the besiegers’ expectation was grounded in secret negotiations between some Corinthians and others in the Roman alliance. Prearranged perfidy from within also clarifies the Roman decision to besiege the virtually impregnable city and citadel that had not been taken by assault in more than a century. Any hope of betrayal, or prearranged agreements toward this end, proved unfounded and unrealized. Livy (32.23.5) describes in extraordinary detail the mentality of the besieged as the Romans anticipated seditionem: Postquam uno animo omnes, et Macedones tamquam communem patriam tuebantur, et Corinthii ducem praesidii Androsthenen haud secus quam civem et suffragio creatum suo imperio in se uti patiebantur. Afterwards all were of one mind, on the one hand the Macedonians conducting the defense as if it were their common fatherland, on the other hand the Corinthians permitting Androsthenes, the commander of the garrison, to exercise his authority over them as if he were a citizen and their elected general. Livy’s remarks regarding the temperament in Corinth during the siege are remarkable for the potential illumination of the relationship that had developed between the Corinthians and the Macedonians over nearly a century and a half. Several interpretations of Livy’s assessment are readily available. His remarks may simply be a rhetorical device by which the Roman historian (following Polybios) sought to emphasize the precariousness of those within the city, or they should be taken literally. Admittedly, the former interpretation is 180

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possible, for Livy employs communis to modify patria five other times within his extant work.76 The latter also is certainly plausible, as the Macedonians and Corinthians had developed a symbiotic relationship within the city over nearly one and a half centuries.77 The siege continued, and Livy’s (32.23.6–13) detailed description confirms that the Romans effected substantial damage in the area between Kenchreai and the city walls. They moved their siege engines toward the walls and constructed mounds in the vicinity. The attackers employed battering rams, breaching part of the wall, which the Macedonians rushed to defend; a fierce battle took place here (Livy 32.23.7). The defenders repulsed the attackers, until the arrival of King Attalos (from Lechaion through the Isthmos) and the Achaians (from west of the city) evened the struggle. Whether or not Corinth’s Long Walls still stood in 198 is not entirely certain, although Strabo (8.6.22) apparently saw them shortly after 44, calculating their distance at 12 stadia.78 It is, however, nearly inconceivable considering the importance the Macedonians had attached to Corinth and Lechaion since their recovery in 224 that they did not maintain the Long Walls. Only two explanations, therefore, account for the Achaians’ arrival at the Roman position if the Long Walls still stood in autumn 198. Either the Achaians circumvented them, traveling a long and circuitous route around the southern slope of Acrocorinth, or they somehow managed to breach the Long Walls, but were repulsed from the city in an engagement Livy does not describe. The former itinerary seems the more plausible considering the available evidence. The Macedonian garrison included 500 Macedonians and 800 auxiliaries (mercenaries) of various ethnicities, including a number of Italian deserters, some from Hannibal’s army and others who had been rowers in the fleet. They distinguished themselves, fearing the consequences of capture by the Romans. The tide of the battle, however, turned decisively with the arrival of Macedonian reinforcements. Philokles (regius et ipse praefectus) arrived at the Perachora peninsula from Chalkis with 1,500 soldiers from Boiotia. Macedonian ships at Lechaion then conveyed them to Corinth. His arrival at Lechaion confirms that it had remained under Macedoninan control. If Attalos had attempted to seize Lechaion earlier, his inability to do so undermined the entire venture. Philokles’ arrival with reinforcements convinced King Attalos to abandon the siege; Lucius agreed. The Romans withdrew to Kerkyra from Kenchreai, which they continued to hold for the remainder of the war; Attalos sailed to the Piraeus. Early in 197 (February–March), Flamininus departed a meeting at Mykenai and proceeded to Corinth, where he met Philokles, whom Livy (32.40.5–6) calls the praefectus urbis, informing him of the Spartan Nabis’ renunciation of his alliance with Philip V.79 The Roman implored Philokles to surrender Corinth; the latter’s response indicated delay and not rejection. Macedonian occupation of Corinth quickly approached its end. Concurrently, Attalos departed Mykenai (via Argos), arriving at Sikyon; its citizens heaped honors upon him, and in return he awarded them 10 talents of silver and 10,000 medimnoi of grain.80 181

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Royal euergetism of this sort in the vicinity of Corinth could not have gone unnoticed; perhaps attempts to incite Corinth’s citizens to revolt against the Macedonian garrison were renewed at this time. After departing Sikyon, Attalos returned to his fleet at Kenchreai. He could only have made this voyage over land, and that he could indicates that the Macedonians within Corinth did not venture beyond the walls to impede his progress. Corinth’s Long Walls still stood; Attalos, therefore, must have arrived at Kenchreai from Sikyon by a route that took him around the southern slopes of Acrocorinth. As the Romans and their allies had held Kenchreai for several months, while ravaging the Corinthian chora, grain must have become scarce. Undoubtedly, the soldiers of the Macedonian garrison were granted first privilege to available grain. Corinthian indecision regarding their commitment to Philip not surprisingly became manifest under these circumstances. According to Livy, Philip visited Corinth shortly before the final encounter with Rome (late 198–early 197?), inviting its leading citizens (principes) to a meeting, ostensibly convened to discuss their contribution of cavalrymen for the war.81 After they arrived, however, he seized them, subsequently holding them hostage. Suspicion that they had sought earlier (and possibly were continuing to seek) to betray city and citadel explains the detention of the Corinthian principes. Corinthian contemplation of revolt suggests further that grain had become scarce in the city and that many perceived Philip’s ability to retain control of Corinth as futile. Under such circumstances, the Corinthians could no longer expect his benefactions. They, therefore, began to contemplate the discontinuance of theirs. Philip marshaled a force of 6,000; it included the 500 Macedonians and 800 auxiliaries (Italians) who had been at Corinth during the siege several months earlier. He also enrolled 700 Corinthian youths (iuventutes), entrusting them to his garrison commander Androsthenes. They were likely the sons and/or relatives of the principes whom Philip had detained earlier. This identification of the iuventutes, when examined alongside the Romans’ expectation of rebellion (seditionem) within the city, strongly suggests that some of Corinth’s leading citizens (principes), certainly the pro-Antigonid oligarchy, had negotiated with the Romans or Rome’s allies to betray the city and its citadel. Philip’s actions toward the principes (late 198/early197?) indicate that he was aware of attempted betrayal, or at least that he suspected collusion with the enemy. We must caution ourselves, however, not to view these Corinthians’ potential betrayal of the city and citadel as an “anti-Antigonid” enterprise. They may simply have concluded that Philip’s chances of victory were slim and they wished to prevent further harm from befalling their city. Possibly they sought royal largess, such as that Attalos had bestowed earlier at Sikyon, to alleviate what very well may have been an acute shortage of grain. Livy describes another series of engagements to the west and southwest of Corinth, where the Achaians defeated Androsthenes (dux regis), the garrison commander.82 This encounter occurred on the same day that Flamininus 182

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defeated Philip at Kynoskephalai in late May/early June 197.83 Androsthenes, with the force Philip had provided, proceeded against the Achaians at Sikyon, who would not engage him. He then moved toward Pellene, ravaging its land, as well as that of Phleious and Kleonai. The Achaian strategos Nikostratos lulled Androsthenes into a false sense of security, finally striking against the three separate bodies into which he had divided his forces. Only 4,200 of the men entrusted to Androsthenes returned to Corinth alive; 1,500 were killed and another 300 were taken prisoner. Negotiations commenced to conclude the war, following Flamininus’ victory at Kynoskephalai. He offered terms that Philip accepted and they were sent to Rome for ratification. Corinth’s status as one of Philip’s “fetters of Greece” (along with Chalkis and Demetrias) made it a key negotiating point in the discussions that ensued.

Destruction at the Sanctuary of Poseidon and the Rachi settlement Evidence uncovered in the University of Chicago’s excavations at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia in 1989 has illuminated considerably our understanding of events within the Corinthia during the Second Macedonian War. Signs of damage at Poseidon’s sanctuary and its immediate environs, datable to ca. 200, are incontrovertible and, furthermore, these excavations have shown that few repairs were undertaken at the sanctuary until the Roman period (post 44). The evidence found within the Rachi settlement conveys a considerably more graphic tale. Several houses (II, VII, IX, X, and XI) were destroyed by fire; the excavators have discovered burned mud bricks and roof tiles within the basements of these houses, confirming this conclusion.84 Numerous weapons were found in the destruction debris on streets, as well as in the basements of several houses collapsed underneath roof tiles, including an iron spear tip, iron boss, arrowhead, three lead sling bullets, and four possible iron javelin sockets.85 Virginia Anderson-Stojanovic´ has suggested that its destruction may have occurred during a “military operation in 198 B.C.”86 On the basis of the excavated remains, this conclusion is almost certainly correct. One may, however, propose that its destruction be associated specifically with Attalos and his soldiers, who made their way through the Isthmos from Lechaion. Perhaps Attlaos sought not only plunder, which he was prone to do, but also to avenge Philip’s sack of the Nikephorion and Temple of Aphrodite at Pergamon.87 The archaeological record may also preserve evidence relating to the siege of Corinth in autumn 198. E. Gebhard and M. Dickie have suggested that damage to Corinth’s North Stoa, which the excavators attribute to L. Mummius (146), should instead be associated with the engagement of 198.88 The excavators discovered within the North Stoa’s destruction debris some 30 complete catapult balls as well as at least 70 fragments.89 Other weapons include sling bullets and spear tips, as well as burned roof tiles. It is, however, difficult to 183

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conjecture how such a violent event could have occurred so far within the city walls. Livy explicitly records that the Romans and their allies breached the wall on the eastern side of the city, facing Kenchreai, and that the Macedonian garrison immediately repelled the besiegers from this position. The North Stoa lies in the city center, a considerable distance from the eastern circuit of Corinth’s walls. If the armaments (and, more importantly, the pottery) excavated within the North Stoa are dateable to ca. 200, perhaps one ought to conclude that a separate struggle occurred within the town between those seeking to betray the city and citadel and the Macedonians seeking to retain them.

Corinth in the negotiations to end the Second Macedonian War Twice prior to the battle of Kynoskephalai, first at the Aous and again at Nikaia, Flamininus accepted Philip’s invitation to negotiate an end to the war. The two sides attempted to reach an acceptable settlement; on both occasions, they failed. Shortly after Flamininus’ arrival in Greece, Philip appealed to him for peace to be decided through mediation. At the Aous conference (in summer 198), Flamininus demanded that Philip remove his garrisons from cities and restore the property from those cities he had sacked. Philip replied that the condition of all states was not identical; he would evacuate those that he had captured, but he would not surrender those that his ancestors had bequeathed to him as they constituted hereditary and lawful possessions.90 Although he does not specify which states he regarded as hereditary possessions, it becomes clear during the Nikaia conference that he included Corinth among them. At the Nikaia conference (November 198), Flamininus explicitly stated the conditions by which Philip could secure peace: these included his complete withdrawal from Greece.91 The Achaians Aristainos of Dymai and Xenophon of Megalopolis accompanied Flamininus as representatives of their koinon. They sought from Philip the restoration of Corinth and Argos, which had defected only months earlier.92 Prior to Aristainos’ speech at Sikyon (in autumn 198), L. Calpurnius had promised explicitly (Livy 32.19.4) the return of Corinth to the Achaians; there was every reason for them to expect it now. Philip responded to their demands, conceding on many points; he promised to return Argos, but he asked for a meeting with Flamininus regarding Corinth. He asked the Roman (Polyb. 18.7.1), πότερον οἴεται δεῖν ἐκχωρεῖν ὧν ἐπέκτηται πόλεων καὶ τόπων ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἢ καὶ τούτων ὅσα παρὰ τῶν γονέων παρείληφε. whether he demanded his withdrawal from these towns and places in Greece which he had himself conquered or from those also which he had inherited from his forebears.

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Livy, whose account is clearly derived from Polybios, similarly records Philip’s concerns regarding Corinth (32.34.12–13): de Corintho cum imperatore Romano deliberaturum esse quaesiturumque ab eo simul, utrum iisne urbibus decedere se aequum censeat, quas ab se ipso captas iure belli habeat, an iis etiam, quas a maioribus suis accepisset. concerning Corinth, he would discuss the matter with the Roman commander and would at the same time ask him whether he thought it right that the king should leave only the cities which he captured himself, and which he now occupied by the rules of war, or whether he should also withdraw from those which he had received from his ancestors. The context makes it clear that he refers to Corinth.93 Recalling the promise L. Calpurnius made at Sikyon undoubtedly created an awkward moment for Flamininus; furthermore, his mind was occupied at the moment with concerns regarding the prorogation of his command and how he might exploit the negotiations toward that end.94 During the Second Macedonian War, Philip V referred to Corinth as an ancestral possession that he would not relinquish at the Aous conference (implied) and at the Nikaia conference (explicit). One can state confidently that Philip’s “ancestors” in this case meant Antigonos III Doson, Demetrios II, Antigonos II Gonatas, Demetrios I Poliorketes, and Antigonos I Monophthalmos, as well as the Argeads Alexander the Great and Philip II. We have noted above that Philip (and the other Antigonids) considered themselves the legitimate heirs and successors of the Argead dynasty. Some scholarly controversy surrounds Philip’s request to discuss with Flamininus “Corinth” at the Nikaia conference; some have interpreted his decision to discuss “Corinth’s” status as applicable only to the lower city itself and that he had no intention of yielding Acrocorinth.95 Others have argued that Philip indeed intended to discuss the evacuation of both the city and its citadel.96 Undoubtedly, the Antigonid garrison on Acrocorinth played an important role in the negotiations between Philip and Flamininus prior to the battle of Kynoskephalai. Nearly a century and a half of Macedonian control of Corinth had demonstrated that the Macedonians enjoyed the fruits of more than the city’s citadel. Regular use of the Theater in the lower city, the literary evidence for a royal residence on the northern slopes of Acrocorinth, the significance of Lechaion, Kenchreai, and the diolkos provide ample testimony to this fact. The Macedonians regarded Corinth as an ancestral possession, meaning all of its salient features, not simply Acrocorinth. Philip V, or any other Macedonian monarch, referring to Corinth cannot have implied the lower city exclusively.

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His offer to discuss “Corinth” means not only Acrocorinth but the entire Corinthia.

Flamininus’ declaration of freedom The Isthmian Games of 196 are by far the best-attested celebration at Poseidon’s sanctuary. The whole of the Greek world, so we are told, assembled there in anticipation of the Roman decree; tensions were high, anticipation great. The prospect of Rome fulfilling its promise to liberate Greece from Antigonid control reached a fever pitch. So jubilant was the assembled crowd after the herald read the Roman declaration that he had to be recalled to reiterate it. The Romans promised that all Greeks were to be free, free from taxation, free from garrisons, and able to use their ancestral constitutions (ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις).97 Analyses of Flamininus’ declaration of Greek freedom at Isthmia have sought to discern both his inspiration and its meaning. Among the candidates suggested for its inspiration include the Peace of Antalkidas, the constitution of the Second Athenian Confederacy, Polyperchon’s diagramma, and Antigonos Monophthalmos’ Tyre decree.98 Recently, however, a consensus has developed that the model for Flamininus’ Isthmian declaration was the Hellenic Symmachy’s declaration of war against Aitolia in 220.99 Concerning its meaning, it has been suggested that Flamininus attempted to reconstitute an alliance modeled loosely on the Antigonid Hellenic Symmachy.100 Others have emphasized its meaninglessness, pointing to the Roman garrisons on Acrocorinth and at Chalkis.101 Too often, however, these philological exercises have had one single goal, namely to affirm or disprove Flamininus’ alleged philhellenism. Certainly similarities can be detected in many Hellenistic decrees of Greek freedom predating Flamininus’ own; the declaration of 196, however, shares one simple characteristic with several of its predecessors: it was issued at Isthmia during a celebration of the Games. One need not stress this fact about declarations of freedom alone. As noted above, a consensus has developed that Flamininus’ model was the Hellenic Symmachy’s declaration of war against the Aitolian koinon in 220; the Symmachy met at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia for this declaration of war (see above, p. 171). This important topographical consideration cannot have been coincidence and it need not be passed over so quickly in order to determine its similarities with the Hellenic Symmachy’s declaration of war or any other predecessors. A Roman in 196 did not need to be a philhellene to comprehend the panhellenic connections that Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia shared. Thirty-two years had passed since Romans first competed at the Isthmian Games; there can be no doubt that they discerned the panhellenic significance of the Games and Poseidon’s sanctuary. Flamininus used the occasion of the Games intentionally to illustrate his sincerity in liberating the Greeks from the Antigonid Macedonians. 186

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Corinth, Artemis Leukophryene, and Philip V Perhaps the most significant inscription attributed to early Hellenistic Corinth is a complete decree of the Corinthian ekklesia preserved at Magnesia on the Maeander.102 In 208, the Magnesians sent out requests for recognition of the games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene as crowned games and asylia for the polis and its territory. The Corinthian ekklesia responded favorably to both requests and appointed Pantainetos son of Mnasikleidas as thearodokos for the games.103 This reply to the Magnesians offers valuable insight into the workings of its ekklesia under Macedonian control in the late third century, but perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the decree becomes evident when comparing it to the corresponding partial acceptance of the same request from Chalkis. The Chalkidians accepted the request to recognize the Leukophryeneia as a crowned competition following the receipt of a letter from King Philip V on this topic, but Chalkis, like several others states, did not offer a grant of asylia.104 Their decision not to grant asylia has led scholars to speculate upon their reasons. The discussion has focused primarily upon states that were not independent, belonged to a koinon, or were garrisoned by a monarch. Chalkis, on account of the royal letter inscribed above the polis’ response, and Eretria’s acceptance provide immediate parallels, as both housed Antigonid garrisons, both were on the island of Euboia, and neither belonged to a koinon. Picard has argued that Chalkis’ decision not to recognize the inviolability of Magnesia demonstrates that states under a king’s control could not exercise this right.105 Giovannini, on the other hand, has argued that states under a king’s control or that were members of a koinon could not recognize another state’s inviolability.106 More recently, Rigsby has proposed two alternatives: either Eretria enjoyed a more privileged status than Chalkis, or the Eretrians had not yet received Philip’s letter prior to their acceptance of both the games and asylia.107 Rigsby also suggests that some states that did not grant asylia to the Sanctuary of Artemis Leukophryene may have done so in ca. 221/0, when the Magnesians had sought for the first time recognition of the sanctuary’s inviolability.108 The Corinthian reply seems prima facie to negate nearly all of these suggestions. The two “fetters” of Greece that were not Macedonian foundations (Demetrias, the third fetter, was) granted the Magnesians their request for recognition of the games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene. The decrees of Corinth and Chalkis suggest that both acted autonomously; however, there is no indication that Philip V conveyed his sentiments to Corinth. Comparison of the two fetters’ responses suggests that each enjoyed a different degree of freedom to pass a decree concerning a foreign state, specifically its inviolability. The Corinthian response to the Magnesians’ request, however, constitutes additional evidence of a cooperative arrangement between Philip and the Corinthians, in which the king granted certain rights and privileges to the latter. Clearly the ekklesia could meet and pass decrees concerning foreign states as well as non-Corinthians,

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a privilege not extended to other states under Macedonian control and one that the Achaians did not grant to member states of its koinon.

Corinthians abroad, ca. 224–196

B.C.

More Corinthians are attested abroad within the final 28 years that the Macedonians possessed the city than any earlier period. The locations at which they are attested are widespread and their actions indicate little variation from earlier periods; they do, however, suggest further that the Achaian koinon had restricted Corinth’s interaction with other states while Corinth belonged to it. Interestingly, Corinthian activity abroad throughout this period is connected heavily with religious contexts. They were theorodokoi, involved in various capacities at sanctuaries, and the Corinthian ekklesia accepted a request that the games of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia on the Maeander be recognized as equal to the Pythian Games and that the city be granted asylia. This assemblage suggests no Macedonian infringement upon Corinth’s right to deal with other states independent of royal approval; in fact, the decree from Magnesia suggests freedom to do so. Shortly after the conclusion of the Social War, Philoxenos son of Xenniadas is attested at Delphi, as a victorious kitharistes in the Soteria.109 His victory constitutes our only attestation of Corinthians at Delphi following Doson’s recovery of Corinth in 224; although our sole example within the final 28 years of Macedonian control, it is significant. As noted above (Chapter 6, p. 149), Corinth’s membership in the Achaian koinon marks the single break of Corinthians’ presence at Apollo’s sanctuary since Philip II had removed them in 346. Another Corinthian, Aristophilos son of Eusthenos, sculpted in bronze a statue that one Soteles son of Telemnestos dedicated “to the gods.”110 Corinthians are also attested at sanctuaries for which we have no previous record of their presence throughout the periods of Macedonian control. As many as three Corinthians, for example, are known at the Amphiareion of Oropos. Mnasikles dedicated a tripod there at the end of the third century, perhaps ca. 204.111 The two other Corinthians were honored with grants of proxenia. Hipparchos son of Memnon received his grant at Oropos between ca. 225 and 220.112 Nikandres of Corinth also received a grant between 240 and 222 (I. Oropos 162). Nikostratos son of Nikandros served as a theorodokos for Hermione, ca. 225–220.113 Nikanor son of Euios received a grant of proxenia and euergesia from the demos of Thespiai, ca. 215–213.114 Another Corinthian, whose name is lost, was awarded grants of proxenia and euergesia from the Boiotian polis of Koroneia in the late third century.115 While the circumstances that account for these two decrees honoring Corinthians from two different Boiotian poleis cannot be recovered, it is perhaps significant that the Boiotian koinon, to which both Thespiai and Koroneia belonged, was itself a member of the Hellenic Symmachy.

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Hageisandros son of Dorortheos was granted proxenia at Akraiphia between 225 and 200.116 Perhaps most surprising is the attestation of four Corinthians at Epidauros shortly after Antigonos’ recovery of Corinth in spring 224. Three of the four are attested together, all serving as witnesses of a financial transaction between the Epidaurians and Eliphasians, ca. 221/0.117 Our fourth Corinthian, whose name is unknown but whose father was Krateas, was awarded a grant of proxenia for his service as a theorodokos.118 These contacts between Corinth and Epidauros mark the first attested interaction between the two poleis following the Megarians’ settlement of their boundary under the auspices of the Achaian koinon. The fact that so many of these Corinthians were honored for religious services or were active at religious sanctuaries might indicate that their freedom to interact with foreign states was limited to religious activities. Other Corinthians attested abroad between 224 and 196 are active in contexts, indicating that they had not been resident at Corinth for some time; their positions are clearly in conflict with Antigonid foreign policy. Corinthians continued to serve as mercenaries in Ptolemaic employ throughout the final 28 years that the Antigonids possessed their polis. As noted previously (p. 97), Corinthians first appear as mercenaries in Egypt shortly after the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros and Berenike II’s victory in the horse race at the Isthmian Games of 248. All three Corinthians are attested in Egypt between the Social War and the First Macedonian War.119 Stachys son of Theokles is attested as a klerouch in Tholthis in 216/5.120 His father (or possibly his son) Theokles himself was a mercenary and klerouch in Tholthis in the following year, 215/4.121 A third Corinthian, whose name is not preserved, was a soldier in a mercenary army under Philon’s command in 215/4.122 Another Corinthian, Aristomachos, is attested in Syracuse, at the court of King Hieronymos, advising him to honor the treaty his father had established with Rome, immediately after the Roman defeat at Cannae (215).123 Unfortunately, nothing else is known about Aristomachos; it is however, intriguing that more than one hundred years after Timoleon’s expulsion of the tyrant Dionysios II from Syracuse a Corinthian now served as member of the king’s council at Syracuse. Corinthians were active widely within these years, appearing throughout Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Sicily. The connection with religious activities outside Corinth reflects a high degree of continuity with nearly all earlier periods of Macedonian control and indicates that the Macedonians granted Corinthians a great deal of freedom to interact with other states in such circumstances. Perhaps the most convincing evidence suggesting this conclusion is the Corinthian acceptance of Magnesia’s request to recognize the games in honor of Artemis Leukophryene as crowned and to grant the polis asylia. The absence of a royal directive, as Chalkis received, pertaining to the Magnesians’ requests is 189

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extraordinary and it underscores the reciprocal goodwill that the Macedonians and Corinthians had developed over nearly a century and a half that was interrupted only by the Achaian interlude.

*** Mid-way through the Kleomenic War, King Antigonos III Doson recovered Corinth and he reinstalled a Macedonian garrison on Acrocorinth for the first time in 19 years. He and his successor Philip V continued to possess Corinth until the Romans expelled the Macedonian garrison at the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War. Two features of the Corinthian–Macedonian relationship during the reigns of Antigonos Doson and Philip become evident toward the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War. Philip, in his negotiations with Flamininus, regarded Corinth as an “ancestral possession” of the Antigonid dynasty.124 Simultaneously, as the Romans and their allies besieged Corinth in autumn 198, the Macedonians defended it as their common fatherland, while the Corinthians fought under Androsthenes as if he were a citizen whom they had elected general by their own vote (Livy 32.23.5). These claims by the Macedonian king, Macedonian soldiers, and Corinthian citizens suggest that a close bond had been forged between Corinthians and Macedonians throughout 123 years of the latter’s presence within the former’s polis. These observations occurred in a time of war and this final phase of Macedonian control of Corinth was one of incessant warfare. As a result, Corinth was the site not only of several military engagements, but of numerous movements of soldiers and ships through its territory. Royal visitations also became a regular feature, as the volatile nature of these wars often required the king’s presence. Several extraordinary features pertaining to the Macedonians’ control of Corinth appear in the narrative of these wars. First is the fact that (for the first time in just over a century) Corinthians served in official military capacities under Philip V, when Kassandros and Agathinos commanded a contingent of four ships that were captured near Leukas. Also during the Social War, Taurion, Philip’s official in charge of Peloponnesian affairs, conveyed at his own expense Demetrios of Pharos’ fleet across the diolkos. While this alone does not amount to freedom from taxation (ἀφορολογήτος), it does illustrate that the Corinthians apparently retained some control over the collection of tolls and possibly traffic across the diolkos. Many Corinthians longed to be free of the Achaian koinon; its 19 years of membership within it were among the most difficult years of the early Hellenistic period. When the opportunity presented itself, the Corinthians opted for liberation with Kleomenes’ aid; deliverance was achieved finally with King Antigonos Doson’s assistance. The Macedonians’ recovery of Corinth in 224 initiated the final period of their presence there. These years preserve illuminating evidence for Corinth’s ability to interact with other states as well as for the relationship that had developed between Corinthians and Macedonians, who regarded the city as an ancestral possession.

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Notes 1 Prior to the First Macedonian War (214–205) the Romans had twice crossed the Adriatic, in the First and Second Illyrian Wars (229 and 219 respectively). For a recent analysis of Rome’s involvement in Illyria, see Eckstein 2008: 29–76. 2 For Livy’s use of Polybius in his Fourth Decade, see Briscoe 1973: 1–12; Tränkle 1977. 3 For the topography of the battle of Sellasia, see Pritchett, SAGT I: 59–70. 4 For Doson’s last years, ailments, and death, see Le Bohec 1993: 447–76. 5 Plut. Arat. 46.2–3. Walbank (1940: 20–22, 30–31) places great emphasis on this visit and the relationship that subsequently developed between Philip V and Aratos, concluding that the latter imparted to the former a deep sense of philhellenism that affected his relations with the Greeks for several years. Aratos also may have been one of Philip’s philoi; see O’Neil 2003: 515–16; Paschidis 2008: 246–50; contra Le Bohec 1985: 96. 6 Olshausen 1974: 137–38, no. 103; LGPN IV, s.v., no. 1; Tataki, Macedonians, 439, no. 6; Le Bohec 1985: 112, no. 14. 7 Wiseman 1979: 453; Le Bohec 1985: 112 and 1993: 267–68. 8 Polybios (4.6.4) first calls Taurion ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων ὑπ’ Ἀντιγόνου καταλελειμμένος. Shortly before Doson’s death, according to Polybios (4.87.1), the king appointed Taurion ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τεταγμένος. 9 Bengston, Strategie I: 155, 165; II: 357–60; Walbank, HCP I: 454; Le Bohec 1993: 268. 10 Treves (1935: 54) first observed the similarity; see also Bengston, Strategie I: 154–55; Walbank 1940: 20, note 2. Walbank (HCP I: 454) later conceded that the responsibilities of each were different: the official in Demetrios’ League had authority over Greek affairs, whereas Taurion’s purview was limited to the Peloponnse; see also the comments of Le Bohec (1993: 268). Although the positions were not identical, the similarities in language alone are noteworthy. 11 The evidence for the Symmachy is assembled at Staatsverträge III: 212–17, no. 507. See also Scherberich 2009: 15–79. 12 Numerous fragments of three separate stelai have been excavated at the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia that appear to record the alliance between King Antigonos Doson and King Philip V and the Symmachy. These inscriptions remain unpublished, but have been mentioned several times; see Ehrhardt 1975: 217; Le Bohec 1993: 43 (mistakenly attributes the stones to Corinth); Gebhard and Hemans 1998: 57–58 and note 162; Gebhard and Dickie, Corinth XX: 262. The only other epigraphic testimony for the Symmachy is IG XI 4, 1097 (Delos), a dedication of the spoils from the battle of Sellasia offered by King Antigonos, the Macedonians, and the allies to Apollo. 13 Walbank (HCP I: 256), for example, writes: “The Symmachy was a League of Confederacies, following in other respects the example of the Leagues of Alexander and Demetrius Poliorcetes.” See also Walbank 1940: 15–16. 14 Picard 1979: 274; Hammond, HM III: 351 and note 6. 15 Walbank, HCP I: 536. 16 Livy 32.5.4; see also 21.5; Polyb. 2.54.4 and 4.9.4. 17 Polyb. 4.9.3; 15.1–2. See also Heuss 1937: 160–61. 18 For discussion of the date, see Walbank (HCP I: 272), who favors a date of 222. Le Bohec (1993: 405) and Cartledge and Spawforth (2002: 570) place the battle in the summer. 19 Philip V, for example, restored the territory of Aliphera to Megalopolis, after the latter had produced evidence demonstrating it had once belonged to them; see Livy 28.8.6.

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20 There is no question that settlement of disputes by arbitration was a long-standing Greek tradition. The frequency with which the Greeks employed it, however, increases dramatically following Philip II’s creation of his League of Corinth. For more on the history of interstate arbitration in the Greek world, see Gruen 1984: 96–99; Ager 1996: 3–33. 21 Polyb. 5.10.10. Walbank 2002b: 131–36; Eckstein 2008: 81. 22 Trans. W.R. Paton, Polybius III, rev. F.W. Walbank and Chr. Habicht (Loeb Classical Library, 2011). 23 Polyb. 4.5.3, 24.1; see also Walbank 1940: 295. 24 For the causes of the Social War, see Fine 1940: 150–65; Scholten 2000: 200–212. 25 Polyb. 4.11–12; Plut. Arat. 47.4. For the battle of Kaphyai, see Pritchett, SAGT II: 120–32. 26 Polyb. 4.16.6; App. Ill. 8. Hammond, HM III: 372; see, however, Gruen (1984: 369–71), who argues that Demetrios’ actions in 220 had little effect on Roman opinion. 27 Pettegrew (2011: 567) discusses this passage briefly. 28 Eckstein (2008: 61) rightly points out that Demetrios was not concerned with Rome at this time, focusing instead upon Greek affairs. For Demetrios’ status as Philip’s philos, see Le Bohec 1985: 107, no. 7; O’Neil 2003: 515–16. 29 Eckstein (2008: 62) refers to Demetrios’ attacks against the Aitolian coast as a “mercenary transaction” on account of Taurion’s payment to convey his ships across the diolkos. See also Gruen (1984: 369) for a similar assessment. While this may be accurate, only the fact that Taurion himself paid for the transportation is significant. 30 This conclusion contradicts Shipley’s (2008: 58) suggestion that Macedonian kings exacted a share of Corinthian harbor dues to pay for the garrison on Acrocorinth. 31 Despite Polybios’ claim that the synedroi were assembled in Corinth, it remains a possibility that the actual meeting took place in Poseidon’s sanctuary at Isthmia, as those meetings of the League of Corinth had following Alexander’s death. 32 Walbank 2002a: 117–18. 33 It is clear that no new ships were built at this time; Philip relied instead on those Macedonian ships that remained and those of his Achaian allies. See Walbank 1940: 51 and 2002a: 117. 34 Shipley (2008: 57–58) rightly recognizes the effect that soldiers’ passage through a city’s territory or their encampment within it must have had on the landscape. 35 Troxell 1971: 60–61, 86–88. He cites similarities with coins from the Corinth 1938 hoard (IGCH, no. 187) in support of his conclusions. For the coins minted at Corinth, see Price (1991: 156, nos. 697–706), who endorses Troxell’s suggestion. 36 For a topographical analysis of Philip’s march on Thermon, see Pritchett, SAGT VI: 126–40; SAGT VII: 41–45. 37 For general discussions of the conspiracy, see Errington 1967; Hammond, HM III: 381–83; Herman 1997: 216–20. 38 See Ma (2011: 521–23) for an insightful discussion of this episode as it pertains to understanding life at the Antigonid court. He does not, however, comment upon the significance of the king’s residence, beyond noting that Corinth, like Demetrias, Chalkis, Argos, and others, comprised the the Antigonid kings’ “geography of power.” 39 Plut. Arat. 48; see also Walbank 1933: 138–46. 40 The Macedonian palace at Pella is also called an αὐλή. For discussion of Polybios’ reference to the king’s αὐλή at Corinth, see Tamm 1968: 159 and 167 note 3. Note, however, that her proposed identification of the “king’s palace” at Corinth is incorrect; the remains to which she refers belong to the Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore. For further discussion of the “king’s residence” at Corinth, see Chapter 5, pp. 128–30.

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41 Polyb. 5.25.4–5. On the nature of the forces at Corinth, see Hatzopoulos 2001a: 144–45, although he incorrectly dates the episode to 219. See also Hatzopoulos 1996 II, no. 12, a diagramma of Philip V, in which some language is paralleled in our passage from Polybios. 42 Polyb. 5.26.8. For τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων συστημάτων referring to the agema in this context, see Walbank, HCP I: 559. 43 For a brief discussion of the rhabdouchoi, see Le Bohec 1987: 321–22. Alexander the Great is said (Diod. Sic. 17.77.4) to have utilized rhabdouchoi at his court. 44 Polyb. 5.95.3, 5.108.1. For Agathinos, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 4 and for Kassandros, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 7. 45 Skerdilaidas had been an Aitolian ally early in the course of the war, until he met Philip in Macedonia (winter 220/19), where he allied with the king, Polyb. 4.29.2–7. 46 See above, Chapter 3, pp. 51–2. 47 The only other Corinthian attested with a clearly Macedonian name is Antipatros son of Menedamos (see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 28), a proxenos at Delphi in 181/0. For foreign names at Athens, see Habicht (2000: 119–21 and 125–26 for Macedonian names), who argues that foreign names were introduced through xenia or intermarriage, the naming by a citizen of a son after a monarch or other well-known foreigner, or lastly through naturalization. Any one of these possibilities could explain Kassandros of Corinth’s name. 48 There are 56 attestations of the name Kassandros from Macedonia, 15 belong to the second century and earlier, see LGPN IV: 188. Outside Macedonia, the earliest attestation of the name is an Athenian of the fourth century (LGPN II, s.v., no. 1); in addition to our Corinthian, only six others are attested: LGPN I, s.v., nos. 2, 3, and 4; LGPN III.A, s.v., nos. 1 and 4; LGPN III.B, s.v., no. 7 in the second century or earlier. 49 Polyb. 5.105.1–2. For the significance of Agelaos’ speech to Polybios’ Histories, see Walbank 1972: 68–70; Eckstein 2008: 79–80; for the Romans as barbaroi in Agelaos’ speech, see Champion 2004: 55–56. 50 Polybios’ primary goal in his Histories was to illustrate the symploke. 51 Despite the use of Corinth’s harbors, it remains doubtful that Philip utilized them for the construction of new ships. After the end of the Social War, Polybios (5.109.3) remarks, Philip regarded Illyrian shipwrights as the best and he decided to build 100 ships there (ca. 216). 52 Polybios 7.9.5 and 7. This alliance was actually one between Hannibal and Carthage on the one hand and Philip and the Hellenic Symmachy on the other; see Hammond, HM III: 393–94; Eckstein 2008: 84. 53 Eckstein 2008: 85–89. 54 For Rome’s alliance with Aitolia, see Gruen (1984: 17–21), who demonstrates that this was not a permanent alliance, but one of expediency. See also Scholten 2000: 229–33. 55 See MRR I: 272, 280, 287, 292, 296, 300. 56 Walbank, HCP II: 186. 57 Livy 28.8.8. See further Walbank 1940: 96. 58 For the sack of Dymai, see Livy 32.21.28; 22.10; Paus. 7.17.5. For the sack of Oreos, see Livy 28.7.4–5. See further Eckstein 1976: 126; Gruen 1984: 204–6. 59 For discussions of Philip’s campaign, see Walbank 1940: 117–35; Hammond, HM III: 413–16; Eckstein 2008: 150–80; see also Ma (2000: 74–82), who considers whether or not “ancestral claims” on Doson’s possessions inspired Philip’s expedition, concluding that “an attempt on Aegean power” best explains the campaign. One cannot forget, however, that Antigonos Monophthalmos had held coastal Asia Minor and that Demetrios Poliorketes had attempted to recover it; one must go back further than Doson to determine if ancestral claims could be made upon coastal Asia Minor.

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60 Miletos in 201 almost certainly had been allied with Ptolemaic Egypt; see Eckstein (2008: 153–55) with bibliography on the question. 61 Milet I.3, no. 78, lines 1–2. LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 99. 62 See the comments of Walbank, HCP II: 519–20. 63 Polyb. 16.24.9. Walbank 1940: 118; Ma 2000: 78–81. 64 For Philokles, see Le Bohec 1985: 111. 65 Livy 32.17.3; 19.3; 41.24.13. The allied fleet was large, including 24 quinqueremes under Attalos’ command; the Rhodian fleet was comprised of 20 decked vessels under the command of Agesimbrotos (Livy 32.16.6). Livy does not record the number of Roman ships, but he does mention that prior to the attack against Euboia, L. Quinctius Flamininus had brought three quinqueremes and assumed command of those left by L. Apustius (legate in 200 and 199, see MRR I: 325 and 328), whose fleet in 200 (Livy 31.47.2) had numbered 30 ships; how many of the 30 were handed over to Lucius is not known. This count, therefore, puts the combined fleet’s strength at not more than 77 ships, provided that Apustius had not added ships to the 30 he commanded in 200. Livy (32.16.10) also states that as the fleet sailed to Euboia, it was carrying all types of devices and machines for the destruction of cities (omnis generis tormenta machinasque ad urbium excidia secum portabant). 66 Livy 32.16.10–17.3; cf. 32.21.7: urbium Euboeae spolia prae se ferens. See also Paus. 7.8.1. 67 For the meeting at Sikyon, see Livy 32.19–23.3; App. Mac. 7; Paus. 7.8.1–2; and Zon. 9.16.3. For the Achaian alliance with Rome, see Aymard 1938b: 83–97 and Gruen 1984: 445–46. On the procedural workings of an Achaian assembly (synkletos), see Aymard 1938a: 324–31, 359–61, and 373–77; Larsen 1968: 228–31. 68 For the identification of the site as Kromna, see Wiseman 1963: 257, 271–73 and 1978: 66–68. For recent study of the area and remains, see Caraher, Nakassis, and Pettegrew 2006: 14–21; Tartaron et al. 2006: 494–513. One must wonder if the decrease in surface finds that EKAS dates to the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods may in some way be associated with the siege of Corinth in autumn 198. 69 Livy’s account (32.23.4–13) is the most important. Additional sources that mention the siege of Corinth include Zon. 9.16 and App. Mac. 7. Pausanias’ account (7.8.1) is confused, as he mentions the siege and then describes Corinth’s liberation from the Macedonians and its adhesion to the Achaian koinon. He clearly conflated the events between autumn 198 and spring 196. See also Wiseman’s (1979: 455) analysis of the siege. 70 Livy 32.23.4: e regione portae quae fert Sicyonem posuerunt castra. For the Sikyonian Gate, see Wiseman 1978: 81 and above, p. 72, note 82. Appian (Mac. 7) alone indicates that the Achaians brought siege engines with them. 71 Livy 32.23.4: Attalus traducto per Isthmum exercitu ab Lechaeo. 72 Similarly perplexing is the Rhodians’ absence following the arrival of the fleet at Kenchreai. 73 See Livy 33.2.1–3; Plut. Flam. 6; Zon. 9.16.9; cf. Polyb. 18.41.9. 74 For the road from Kenchreai to Poseidon’s sanctuary, see Wiseman 1978: 52. 75 Livy 32.23.4: sperantes seditionem intus fore inter oppidanos ac regium praesidium. He does not specify the garrison’s strength in his account of the siege, but during Philip’s visit to Corinth in early 197, Livy (33.14.3) records that 500 Macedonians and 800 auxiliaries (mercenaries) of various ethnicities had been there for some time (quot iam ante ibi fuerant). These 1,300 must represent those within Corinth’s walls in autumn 198. 76 In the context of the Struggle of the Orders, the Aequi and Volsci attacked Rome because the Romans no longer regarded their city as a communem patriam (3.66.4). After their attack on the city walls of Rome, the consul T. Quinctius Capitolinus

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77

78

79 80 81 82 83

84 85 86

87 88

rhetorically asked (3.69.5) the plebeian assembly when their patriam would be communem. Later the senators pleaded with the tribunes of the plebs, claiming (3.69.5) that the communem patriam cried out to them to defend the city. While contemplating revolt from Rome, several Syracusans began discussions (24.32.5) to open their gates and defend the communen patriam. After Cannae, the Romans appealed (23.5.11) to the Campanians (who were wavering in their commitment to Rome) not to go over to Hannibal, for the communem patriam calls for defending. In four of these five examples, citizens of a place (Rome, Syracuse) are called upon to defend the communem patriam; the fifth example pertains to the Romans’ appeal to the Campanians, who had been Roman allies and in some cases citizens for generations, to defend the communem patriam. This example constitutes the closest parallel to the relationship between the Macedonians and Corinthians. It is conceivable that some of the 500 Macedonians serving in the garrison had ancestors who had served also at Corinth or that some had taken Corinthian wives, such as Eutychis (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 10), the Corinthian who was interred in Macedonia (Kato Kerdyllion) at some point in the third century. Wiseman (1979: 456 note 71) posits that they no longer existed. For a discussion of the Long Walls, see Parsons, Corinth III.2: 84–94. A stretch of the western Long Wall, measuring 15 m in length and 3 m in height, has been excavated recently; see Whitley 2005: 18. For the date, see Walbank, HCP II: 570. Polyb. 18.16; Livy 32.40.8–9. This passage constitutes our best evidence that Corinthian cavalry had been called upon to serve with the king’s army. Livy 33.14–15. For an extremely valuable topographical analysis of the Achaians’ movements, see Marchand 2009: 115–17. For the date of Kynoskephalai, see Walbank, HCP II: 572, 579; for the topography of the battle, see Pritchett SAGT II: 133–44. As Briscoe (1973: 275) observes, placing two battles on the same day is a standard historiographical device. Even if not on the same day, the Achaian’s victory over Androsthenes must have occurred in close proximity to Kynoskephalai. See Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1996: 63 and 77–78 for detailed observations on the destruction debris of House IX. Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1996: 94 and note 113. A. Jackson’s “Arms and Weapons on Rachi” will appear in the forthcoming Isthmia volume on the settlement. Anderson-Stojanovic´ 1996: 94; Gebhard and Dickie, Corinth XX: 262. Gebhard and Hemans (1998: 58–59) suggest tentatively that the destruction be associated with the siege of Corinth in 198, pointing to Philip’s two sacks of the sanctuary at Thermon (in 218 and 207) as well as the damage he inflicted upon the sanctuaries in the vicinity of Pergamon. Philip (or, more accurately, Philip’s garrison, since he was not present at Corinth in autumn 198 during the siege) would not likely have been responsible for destroying that which they sought to defend. A far more compelling parallel, considering the circumstances, must be King Attalos’ presence with the Roman forces at Kenchreai in 198. Following Sulpicius’ sack of Oreos, he allowed King Attalos and his soldiers to plunder it as well. Afterwards, Attalos is said to have exacted money from the chief citizens of the town (Livy 28.7.4–5). Even more indicative of the allies’ propensity to plunder is their arrival at Kenchreai from Euboia, displaying on their ships the spoils taken from their sack of Eretria and Karystos; see p. 179. For Philip’s destruction at Pergamon, see Polyb. 16.1.1–5, 18.2.2, 18.6.4; Diod. Sic. 28.5; Livy 31.46.4; App. Mac. 4. See also Walbank 1940: 119. Gebhard and Dickie, Corinth XX: 262, note 4.

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89 De Waele 1931: 409 and note 2. According to de Waele, some of the catapult balls were inscribed with the letters IΓ, N or NH? and ΔH. He compares them to similar catapult balls from Pergamon. De Waele strongly defends associating the destruction of the North Stoa with Mummius, but his argument is somewhat circular. 90 Livy 32.10.4; Diod. Sic. 28.11. See Walsh (1996: 347–48) for comments on Diodoros’ version. 91 Polyb. 18.1.13; Livy 32.33.3. Other accounts of the Nikaia conference: Plut. Flam. 5.8; App. Mac. 8; Just. 30.3.8–10; and Zon. 9.16. For its date, see Walbank, HCP II: 548–49. 92 Aristainos and Xenophon: Polyb. 18.1.4; Livy 32.32.11. Restoration of Corinth: Polyb. 18.2.5; Livy 32.33.7. 93 Note the similarity of Philip’s response to Flamininus at the Aous conference (Livy 32.10.4), but without mentioning any specific city or region. 94 For the role of Flamininus’ prorogation during the Nikaia conference, see Holleaux, Études V: 27–79; Badian 1970: 40–48; and Pfeilschifter 2005: 186–203 for Flamininus’ relations with the Achaian koinon during the war. 95 Polyb. 18.6.8; Livy 32.34.13. See also Aymard 1938b: 118–20; Walbank, HCP III: 553; Gruen 1984: 447 and note 49. 96 Holleaux, Études V: 54 and note 2; Briscoe 1973: 223. 97 Polyb. 18.46–47. The other principal sources are Livy 33.32–34; Plut. Flam. 10–12; App. Mac. 9.3–4; and Val. Max. 4.8.5. 98 For bibliography and discussion, see Ferrary 1988: 83; Eckstein 1990: 65 and note 63. 99 For the declaration of war, see Polyb. 4.25. See further Heidemann 1966: 5–14, 94–95; Walbank, HCP II: 612; Ferrary 1988: 88–95; and Eckstein (1990: 66–67), who speculates that Achaian statesmen were Flamininus’ source for ideas related to “Greek freedom.” 100 Ferrary 1988: 81–95. For a convincing refutation of this thesis, see Eckstein 2008: 286–87. 101 Harris 1979: 142; Mandell 1989: 89–94. 102 I. Magnesia 42. See also Rigsby (1996: 224–25, no. 92), whose discussion of the Corinthian response is of little value on account of his belief that Corinth still belonged to the Achaian koinon in 208. 103 I. Magnesia 42, line 17. LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 7. 104 I. Magnesia 47; Rigsby 1996: 233–35, no. 97. See also the comments of Picard 1979: 275 and note 6. For the Eretrian acceptance, see Rigsby 1996: 235–36, no. 98; Knoepfler 2001: 360–61. 105 Picard (1979: 275) follows closely Welles’ (1934: 147) suggestion that refusal to grant asylia was a deliberate measure. Welles also concedes that the kings may have granted asylia following the initial Magnesian request. 106 Giovannini 1977: 465–72. Again, however, Giovannini has not considered the Corinthian response in his analysis. 107 Rigsby 1996: 182–83. 108 For the initial Magnesian request of 221/0, see I. Magnesia 16, line 24 and Rigsby 1996: 180. Welles (1934: 147) had suggested that those who did not grant asylia in 208 might have done so in 221/0; see also Rigsby 1996: 183. 109 FD III: 4 126, line 8. See also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 66; Nachtergael 1977: 65, no. 8; Stephanis 1988, no. 2545. 110 IG XI, 4 1173. For Aristophilos, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5. 111 I. Oropos 324, lines 64–65. LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 10. 112 I. Oropos 85; Petrakos speculates that Hipparchos may have been a doctor. See also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 20.

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113 IG IV 727, Face A, line 6; Perlman 2000: Ep. Cat. H.1, Pros. Cat. No. 225. See also LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 63. 114 I. Thesp. no. 2. See also IG VII 1721; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 104. 115 SEG 26.552. 116 Perdrizet (1899: 91–94, no. 3, line 15) assigns an early second-century date to the inscriptions; LGPN (III.A, s.v., no. 19) dates Hageisandros to ca. 225–220. 117 The three Corinthians are Pompis son of Timoleon (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 1), Olympiodoros son of Apollodoros (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 13), and Timosthenes son of Timyllos (LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 13); see IG IV2.1 42, lines 23–25. 118 Peek 1969: 137, no. 331. (For the ed. pr., see SEG 11.414). See also Perlman (2000: 192, Ep. Cat. E.5), who dates the inscription to ca. 220–200. For Krateas, see LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 5. 119 For these Corinthians, see Launey 1949 I: 107–8; II: 1116. 120 PP II: no. 4101; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 2. 121 PP II, 3960; LGPN III.A, s.v., 11. 122 PP VIII, no. 2019. 123 Polyb. 7.5.3; LGPN III.A, s.v., no. 51. 124 Polyb. 18.6.8–7.1; Livy 32.34.12–13.

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8 C O N C L U S I ON S A ND R E F L E CTIO N S

Corinth after Kynoskephalai Not long after the Romans had defeated Philip V at the battle of Kynoskephalai (198), they demanded that his forces vacate the city and Acrocorinth. Shortly before the celebration of the Isthmian Games in 196, the Romans installed a garrison on the citadel and handed over the city to the Achaians.1 According to Strabo, “the Corinthians, who had fought with Philip throughout the war, treated the first Roman ambassadors to enter their city with contempt; certain ones poured filth (βόρβορον) upon them as they passed by their house.”2 Almost certainly these citizens belonged to a pro-Macedonian faction that had fought with the Macedonian garrison commander Androsthenes, following him as if he were their own elected general; the Macedonians under his command had defended Corinth as if it were their own homeland (Livy 32.23.5). Their actions vividly demonstrate disdain for the Roman decision to return their city to the Achaian koinon and to install a Roman garrison on Acrocorinth. The fears of those Corinthians sympathetic toward the Macedonians must have increased when the Achaian strategos Aristainos of Dymai erected within the city a remarkable dedication, honoring T. Quinctius Flamininus on “account of his excellence and euergesia.” The most likely date at which the dedication was set up is 196, as Polybios comments (18.46.11) on the “expressions of thanks” heaped upon Flamininus after the announcement of the declaration of Greek freedom.3 The inscription was excavated in 1901 “in front of the vaulted chamber of the Northwest Shops,” and the restored text reads as follows:4 Τιτον [Τίτου Κοίγκτιον Ῥωμαῖον] Ἀρισταιν[ος Τιμοκάδεος Δυμαιος] ἀρετᾶς ἕνε[κα καὶ εὐεργεσίας τᾶς] εἴς τ’ ἑαυ[τὸν καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιούς] (In honor of) Titus, [(son of) Titus, Quinctius, Roman,] (by) Aristain-[os (son of) Timokades of Dyme] on account of his excellence [and euergesia] toward both him [and the Achaians].

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CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth began with an inscribed dedication honoring Timoleon that several of Corinth’s colonies set up in the city; it nears its conclusion with a dedication in honor of the Roman conqueror of the Macedonians erected within the city by an Achaian. While this inscription honoring Flamininus demonstrates Aristainos’ gratitude toward the Roman, not all Corinthians shared the Achaian strategos’ sentiment. The visibility of the monument must have been met with considerable disquiet. Flamininus remained in Corinth for some time after the celebration of the Isthmian Games, listening to the appeals of individual Greek poleis, and entertaining the envoys of King Antiochos III (Livy 33.33.1–2). The Roman garrison occupied Acrocorinth for the next two years and Corinth was returned to the Achaian koinon. Perhaps, however, some Corinthians were relieved and surprised at how events transpired over the next several years. Flamininus utilized Corinth as the meeting place of representatives from the Greek poleis in 195 to declare war against Nabis of Sparta (Livy 34.22.6–24.7) and again in 194 to announce the complete withdrawal of Roman forces from Greece, and specifically the transfer of Acrocorinth to the Achaian koinon.5 The city had never been employed as an international meeting place during its first tenure as a member state of the Achaian koinon. This second period of membership was one in which Corinth enjoyed far greater prestige within the federal state than it had between 243 and 224. Several fragmentary inscriptions attest to Corinthians’ role as judges in the settlement of arbitration disputes, possibly carried out under the auspices of the Achaian koinon.6 Corinth was host to several meetings of the koinon until its dismemberment in 146 at the conclusion of the Achaian War.7 Renewed building in the city also seems to have occurred in the first half of the second century; some may be associated with its Achaian membership. For example, a new structure known as the Columned Hall was constructed to the west of the South Stoa.8 Excavated within its remains was a larger than life-size marble sculpture that appears to have been set up on the eve of the Achaian War. The figure represents a “Hellenistic general” and has been identified tentatively as Kritolaos, the Achaian strategos responsible for the declaration of war against Rome.9 Although Corinth achieved prominent status within the koinon throughout its second period of Achaian membership, it remained host to a garrison and a location of strategic importance for the occupiers and their allies. Corinth was the site at which the koinon declared war upon Rome; its territory was ravaged as the Romans dealt the koinon a crushing defeat at the battle of Leukopetra near the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia; the city of Corinth subsequently felt the full impact of the disaster.10

Corinthian politics in the early Hellenistic period Corinth had been governed by an oligarchy since the expulsion of the Kypselidai in the second quarter of the sixth century. At the time of Chaironeia, Corinth 199

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still maintained an oligarchy, yet it was one that may be divided into pro-Macedonian and anti-Macedonian factions. Following Philip’s arrival in Corinth the former replaced the latter. There is no indication that Philip or his Macedonian successors altered Corinth’s constitution throughout the early Hellenistic period. No evidence suggests that the Corinthians ever adopted a democratic constitution or that a pro-Macedonian tyrant was ever imposed upon them, as frequently occurred within many other Peloponnesian poleis that the Macedonians possessed. On more than one occasion, however, the sources attest to internal discord, or possibly stasis, among the Corinthians demos. While Kassandros held Corinth, for example, a faction of the Corinthian demos aided Demetrios Poliorketes while another faction within the city defended it from him. Nothing further is known of the internal strife that accompanied Demetrios’ capture of Corinth, but the evidence likely indicates the presence of proDemetrios and pro-Kassandros factions within the demos. Both likely represented segments of the Corinthian oligarchy; those who collaborated with Demetrios most likely expected to benefit more from his euergetism than they had from any such displays Kassandros might have bestowed upon them. Antigonos Gonatas twice lost control of Corinth, first to his nephew Alexandros son of Krateros and again to Aratos of Sikyon and the Achaian koinon. There is no indication in the extant sources that either seizure of Corinth occurred with the support of the Corinthians. In both cases, however, it is apparent that the pro-Antigonid Corinthians who remained within the city had no alternative other than to support the new occupiers or to go into self-exile. The known actions of some Corinthians after each coup indicate certain efforts to win the goodwill of the new power within the city. Some Corinthians, for example, decreed that a sculpture group honoring Aratos and those who had captured Acrocorinth from Antigonos Gonatas be erected within the city. This was an overt bestowal of goodwill upon Aratos and the Achaians and also an exercise in opportunism. After the Antigonids recovered control of Corinth there is again little indication of internal politics until the final stages of the Second Macedonian War that resulted in the removal of a Macedonian garrison from Corinth. Philip arrived at Corinth at a tense stage of the war when negotiations with Flamininus had failed and there were indications that the Corinthians within the city had conspired to betray the Macedonians within it. The king summoned the Corinthian principes to him, and subsequently detained them until the conclusion of the war. He later enrolled 700 Corinthian iuventutes in the force of Androsthenes, his garrison commander. These principes certainly represent the pro-Antigonid faction that formed Corinth’s ruling oligarchy. Philip’s ruthlessness does not necessarily represent a termination of his goodwill toward the pro-Macedonian Corinthians, as much as it represents his perception that they had ceased to display theirs toward him. 200

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Corinth’s value to the Macedonians Philip II and his Macedonian successors who possessed Corinth desired to control it for its strategic value. Corinth also offered many additional strategic benefits to the Macedonian dynast possessing it. Lechaion and Kenchreai afforded to the Macedonians the benefit of its shipyards for ship construction and safe harbors for their fleets. The Corinthian and Saronic gulfs are separated by the Isthmos, across which the diolkos permitted the portage of commercial and military vessels. Demetrios Poliorketes had ships constructed at Corinth prior to his departure for Asia Minor in 284. Philip V utilized the diolkos once during the Social War, and so too did Taurion, his garrison commander at Corinth. Philip again transported his ships across it during the First Macedonian War. The value of Corinth’s harbors and the diolkos is amplified when one considers the testimony for Macedonian garrisons stationed in each harbor and the attacks that dynasts seeking to capture Corinth directed against each harbor. Kassandros, Demetrios Poliorketes, Antigonos Doson, and the Romans, for example, each seized Kenchreai prior to their capture of the city and its citadel. When Aratos captured Acrocorinth from Antigonos, it is clear that the Macedonians had garrisoned both harbors and that Macedonian ships were docked at each. As Plutarch observed, one who held Acrocorinth with a garrison could check the movement of troops both into and out of the Peloponnese, and become the “sole lord of Greece.” The Macedonians were certainly aware of these benefits and they sought to exploit them. Corinth’s strategic value was tested twice during the reign of Alexander the Great. The garrison on Acrocorinth proved invaluable as it prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding Thebes in its revolt against Alexander. Antipatros, regent of Macedonia in Alexander’s absence, also benefited from the garrison’s presence at Corinth as it prevented the poleis of central Greece from aiding Agis III of Sparta in his war against the Macedonians in the Peloponnese. The Lamian War illustrates Corinth’s full strategic value vividly. The Macedonian garrison again prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding their allies in central Greece against Antipatros; its control of the diolkos facilitated Kleitos the White’s ability to wage successfully the war’s naval campaign. Demetrios Poliorketes was a king without a realm following the defeat and death of his father Antigonos Monophthalmos at the battle of Ipsos. Demetrios returned to Greece and the one location he had held previously that granted him entrance was Corinth. He utilized his possession of the city and its citadel to wage campaigns throughout the Peloponnese, Greece, and Asia Minor that ultimately resulted in his capture of Maecedonia and his assumption of its royal title. His son Antigonos Gonatas similarly retained possession of a few fortified locations throughout the Greek mainland after his father’s Asian campaign met with disaster. As his father had previously, Antigonos utilized his possession of Corinth to reclaim the royal title in Macedonia that his father had lost.

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Throughout the remainder of his reign, Antigonos continued to benefit from his possession of Corinth; he also lost control of it twice. Shortly after becoming king of Macedonia, Antigonos’ primacy there and within the Peloponnese was challenged by Pyrrhos of Epeiros. Antigonos eventually defeated him at Argos, and his garrison at Corinth played a critical role in preserving his position. Ptolemy II shortly thereafter threatened Antigonos’ control of the Greek mainland by forging alliances with Sparta and Athens and aiding both in the Chremonidean War. Ptolemy supported the Athenian revolt that was to be supplemented by the arrival of the Spartan King Areus in Attica. On as many as three different occasions, the Macedonian garrison at Corinth successfully prevented the Spartans from passing through the Corinthia and crossing the Isthmos.11 Additionally, the Spartan Kleomenes, who held control of the city during the Kleomenic War while the Achaians held Acrocorinth, managed successfully to prevent Antigonos Doson and his allies from threatening the intramural city. The final stages of the Macedonians’ presence in Corinth also witnessed a full-scale assault upon the city led by the Romans and their Achaian and Attalid allies. Despite the strength of their combined forces Corinth’s walls proved impregnable, and the Macedonian garrison with the Corinthians alongside them successfully defended their position. The Macedonians also utilized their control of Corinth for its political benefits. The Argeadai, for example, may have established their Leagues at Corinth on account of its panhellenic associations, particularly its location as the site at which the Greeks had established the Hellenic League against Persia nearly 150 years prior to their arrival at the city. Its central location at the crossroads of Greece may have contributed equally to their decision. Nevertheless, Philip is said to have desired to avenge the Persians’ desecration of temples during the Persian Wars (Diod. Sic. 16.89.2); clearly this indicates that panhellenic sentiment was on his mind. The Diadochoi, who vied for control of Corinth following the death of Alexander, certainly coveted its strategic value as their Argead predecessors had. They also attached a new significance to the city. Philip and Alexander had linked themselves to Corinth through their League of Corinth, and those Diadochoi who subsequently revived it in their own names clearly sought to connect themselves with the Argeads in order to legitimize their claims to dynasty or kingship. Polyperchon and Ptolemy, as well as Antigonos Monpththalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes, each revived the League of Corinth after taking control of the city from their rivals. There is no evidence that Antigonos Gonatas ever revived the League of Corinth during the years he possessed the city, but the Antigonids who recovered the city, Antigonos Doson and subsequently Philip V, each used it as the location at which they established their Hellenic League. The Antigonids regarded possession of Corinth as so critical to their ability to control the Peloponnese specifically and mainland Greece in general that they came to regard it as an ancestral possession. Demetrios Poliorketes and his father Antigonos Monophthalmos first acquired possession 202

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of Corinth and the former bequeathed control of it to his son Antigonos Gonatas. He was unable to leave it for his heir Demetrios, as the Achaians had captured it from him shortly before his death. Antigonos Doson, however, recovered this ancestral possession for the dynasty and upon his death his successor Philip V, the son of Demetrios, received possession of it. Philip insisted during negotiations with Flamininus that he would not vacate Corinth, as he regarded it as an ancestral possession. The Antigonid kings consistently emphasized their ancestry and legitimized themselves through a fabricated lineage with the Argeadai. Possession and retention of Corinth, as well as one’s ability to bequeath it for his progeny, constituted one means of accomplishing this goal. The Argeadai, the Diadochoi, and the Antigonids all had strategic and political incentives to possess Corinth and this accounts for the tenacity with which they sought to defend it or to wrest control of it from a rival. Possession of Corinth and the installation of a garrison on Acrocorinth, however, do not inevitably make one the “sole lord of Greece,” as Plutarch claimed. Numerous examples demonstrate clearly that one possessing Corinth also required the goodwill of its demos in order to ensure that he could realize Corinth’s full value.

Eunoia The Macedonians managed to maintain control of Corinth and the proMacedonian Corinthians embraced their presence on account of the mutually beneficial exchanges of goodwill (eunoia) that each displayed regularly toward the other. The Macedonians who possessed Corinth bestowed acts of euergetism upon its citizenry in order to secure their goodwill, or at least the goodwill of a powerful oligarchic faction of the demos. These Corinthians responded to the Macedonians’ euergetism with corresponding displays of their own. The state of goodwill between the Macedonians and these Corinthians developed and it was contingent upon the continuous exchange of these benefits and euergetic displays. The most valuable display of goodwill the Corinthians offered to the one possessing the city was their unremitting loyalty. As we have seen, one maintaining a garrison on Acrocorinth could potentially make himself the “sole lord of Greece,” but this required the concurrent support and loyalty of an influential faction of Corinthians. The Macedonians appear to have bestowed a variety of benefits upon the Corinthians. They granted, it seems, a certain degree of freedom and autonomy to the Corinthians, they likely funded or donated many of the monuments constructed ca. 300 at Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, they never infringed upon local Corinthian religious practice, and they apparently provided opportunities by which the Corinthians profited financially. From the perspective of many Corinthians, however, it seems that the most important benefit they derived from the Macedonians’ presence was the security the latter provided. The Corinthians expected that the Macedonians would defend their 203

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chora, its agricultural produce, and the property of those who resided in the Corinthia. The state of goodwill between the Macedonians and Corinthians was threatened when one or the other ceased to provide the requisite benefits. For example, the Corinthians never appear to have embraced Polyperchon or his son Alexandros, despite their efforts to win their goodwill. They had failed to defend the Corinthian chora against Kassandros’ attacks on several occasions, and at least once his attacks resulted in the loss of the harvest. Moreover, Polyperchon had the pro-Argead Corinthian Deinarchos executed shortly before his arrival in Corinth. Similarly, some Corinthians conspired with Demetrios Poliorketes while Kassandros held the city and assisted the former in his capture of Corinth. Kassandros had not secured the goodwill of those Corinthians who had aided Demetrios. This is likely on account of the destruction he had inflicted earlier upon the Corinthia, his failure to promise freedom and autonomy, as well as his decision not to revive the League of Corinth, as Polyperchon had. Although Aratos and the Achaians were welcomed profusely in Corinth after expelling the Macedonians from the city, they quickly lost whatever goodwill the Corinthians had displayed towards them initially. The Achaians forfeited the Corinthians’ goodwill for several reasons, one of which was Aratos’ inexplicable decision to allow the Aitolians to pass across the Isthmos and through the Corinthia unimpeded. Their transit was accompanied by the destruction of crops and property throughout the Corinthia. Additionally, the Achaians imposed their own garrison on Acrocorinth without Corinthian request to do so, after Aratos had returned to them the keys of the citadel. Not long after Corinth was adhered to the Achaian koinon, they lost significant territory within the southeastern Corinthia as the result of the settlement of a border dispute with Epidauros. The decision was rendered under the auspices of the Achaian koinon and sanctioned by it. Many Corinthians had no alternative but to perceive these actions as insults that were not commensurate with the displays of goodwill they had bestowed upon Aratos and the Achaians following their expulsion of the Macedonians. The Corinthians had little reason to express further goodwill toward them. Several years later, in fact, a group of Corinthians reacted to Aratos’ presence within their city by attempting to assassinate him. Their experience with the Achaian koinon, therefore, illustrates vividly that the one possessing Acrocorinth with a garrison needed to secure and maintain the Corinthians’ goodwill. Once the Corinthians perceived that their displays of goodwill were not reciprocated in kind, they ceased to participate in this discourse with the Achaians. Their decision to do so resulted in the Achaian loss of the city to the Spartan Kleomenes and subsequently the loss of Acrocorinth to Antigonos Doson. Demetrios Poliorketes is attested as a recipient twice of the Corinthians’ goodwill. In the aftermath of his defeat at Ipsos, he fled to Greece and sought entry first in Athens, a polis he had liberated several years earlier and whose citizens had bestowed extravagant honors upon him and his father. The Athenians defiantly denied him entry, rendering their goodwill toward him, 204

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according to Plutarch (Demetr. 30.5), “empty” and “feigned.” Demetrios proceeded next to Corinth, where he was welcomed. One can only infer from this episode that he regarded the Corinthians’ goodwill toward him as full and sincere. The Corinthians also adorned the cinerary urn containing Demetrios’ ashes with fillets and crowns when Antigonos Gonatas conveyed it to Corinth. These overt displays were part of a carefully crafted discourse with the Antigonids, and those Corinthians who supported them achieved successful levels of fluency, employing it to their advantage. Macedonian monarchs also established relationships founded upon reciprocal goodwill with individual Corinthians. Philip II, for example, counted the proMacedonian Corinthian Demaratos as his xenos prior to the battle of Chaironeia. Demaratos likely brought the famous horse Boukephalos to Philip and he facilitated the reconciliation between father and son in the wake of the Pixodaros affair. After Philip’s assassination, Demaratos was among the first Greeks to recognize Alexander as king and he subsequently took his place among the latter’s hetairoi and philoi. He also accompanied Alexander on his Persian campaign and handed over his spear to the king after his had broken. Only death, according to Plutarch (Alex. 56.2), stopped him from enjoying the goodwill that Alexander had displayed toward him. In truth, Plutarch erred, as Demaratos continued to receive the king’s goodwill posthumously. Alexander held an elaborate funeral, had an enormous cenotaph prepared in the Corinthian’s honor, and he had his ashes conveyed to the sea in a four-horse chariot. From there, it seems that the cinerary urn was transported to Corinth, and Demaratos may have been the recipient of an elaborate monument constructed just to the west of Poseidon’s sanctuary at Isthmia. Deinarchos, like Demaratos, had served with Timoleon in Sicily prior to the battle of Chaironeia. After returning to Corinth he too became a leading figure among the pro-Macedonian faction. Nothing is known of his personal relationship with either Philip or Alexander, but Antipatros did appoint him as epimeletes of the Peloponnese. Antipatros’ appointment of Deinarchos can be construed only as an act of goodwill toward the latter and it is inconceivable that the pro-Macedonians in Corinth did not perceive it similarly. Deinarchos, however, was executed by Polyperchon who later came to possess Corinth. The latter’s efforts to win the Corinthians’ goodwill were unsuccessful and it is likely that they perceived his treatment of Deinarchos as anything but a display of goodwill. Somewhat astonishingly, no other Corinthians are known to have established personal relationships with any of the Macedonians who possessed Corinth. There surely were others, whose names are lost. The Corinthians Agathinos and Kassandros, however, commanded Macedonian ships during the Social War; their elevation to these offices may have been the result of similar relationships to those Demaratos and Deinarchos had enjoyed with Macedonian kings and dynasts earlier. The nature of the relationship that developed between the Corinthians and the Macedonians over a more than 140-year period was predicated upon 205

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reciprocal displays of goodwill. The Corinthians responded to the presence of some Macedonians more favorably than others. The pro-Macedonian Corinthians developed the strongest connection with the Antigonid dynasty and its kings Demetrios Poliorketes, Antigonos Gonatas, Antigonos Doson, and Philip V, who collectively possessed Corinth for more than 80 years. The longevity of their presence alone contributes to this fact; so too, however, does the acumen with which the Antigonids approached their relationship with the Corinthians. The strength of their relationship is best attested near the end of the Second Macedonian War, as the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth drew to a close. While the Romans and their Achaian and Attalid allies besieged Corinth, Livy remarked that the Macedonians defended the city as if it were their own homeland and the Corinthians followed the Macedonian commander Androsthenes as if they had elected him their general. This remarkable assessment reflects the levels of goodwill that the Corinthians and Macedonians had forged over decades of reciprocal exchange of benefactions.

Effect of the Macedonians’ presence upon the Corinthians Many of the Macedonians who held Corinth managed successfully also to secure the goodwill of its demos. This state of goodwill between the two was predicated upon the reciprocal exchange of benefits. The Corinthians regularly demonstrated their loyalty and support to those Macedonians who had demonstrated consistently their goodwill. An imbalance of power characterized this relationship, yet it was one from which the Corinthians derived many benefits. In reality, the Corinthians had known since Philip’s victory at Chaironeia that their defeat had marked the end of their resistance to him and subsequent Macedonians. The most viable option under these circumstances was to find an acceptable and agreeable existence. Macedonian kings regularly promised freedom and autonomy to poleis as part of an effort to secure their goodwill. While many of them made these promises at Corinth or the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia, it remains unclear how much of either the Macedonians actually granted to the Corinthians. Once again, nothing testifies to specific benefits bestowed upon them or to indicate they enjoyed both, but conversely nothing suggests that they were deprived of either. Throughout the period discussed here, however, nearly all indications point to the conclusion that the Macedonians permitted the Corinthians a high degree of both freedom and autonomy. The Macedonians who had earned the goodwill of the pro-Macedonian Corinthians displayed their gratitude in many ways. There is no evidence to suggest that the Corinthians were ever taxed. If this is truly the case, then it would be fitting as the Macedonians who founded or revived the Leagues of Corinth promised freedom from taxation (ἀφορολόγητος) to its members. Whether or not the Corinthians received this exemption throughout the entire period that the Macedonians possessed Corinth is impossible to determine. It 206

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is rather likely that in austere times various dynasts and kings who possessed Corinth may have resorted to taxation or levies upon Corinthian financial resources. This, however, is again speculation on the basis of our sources’ silence or the absence of sources. One clear indication that the Corinthians retained some autonomy and freedom from tribute or taxation comes from late in the Macedonians’ tenure at Corinth. On the eve of the Social War, Philip V’s general of the Peloponnese, who also commanded his garrison at Corinth, permitted Demetrios of Pharos to convey his fleet of 50 ships across the diolkos from the Saronic to the Corinthian Gulf. Polybios (4.19.7–9) adds, moreover, that Taurion paid for the portage of these ships. This isolated detail of an event that occurred in 220 constitutes the firmest evidence that the Macedonians did not collect revenues for the transport of ships across the diolkos. If they did not, one can assume only that the Corinthians did. While this singular indication of the Corinthians’ apparent collection of revenues for the transportation of ships across the diolkos in 220 suggests considerable autonomy and freedom from economic burden, it can in no way be viewed as illustrative of the entire period that the Macedonians possessed Corinth. One of the most visible and tangible ways by which a monarch might foster a relationship of goodwill with a subject polis is through benefactions of buildings and monuments. Both Corinth and the Sanctuary of Poseidon at Isthmia were sites of widespread building activity that began ca. 300 and continued into the second quarter of the third century. Not only does the construction of monuments beautify a polis, but it also stimulates the economy through the purchase of materials and payment of wages. Corinthian stone and timber had been exported regularly for use in construction projects, most frequently at Delphi and Epidauros. Corinthian craftsmen also had been employed often at these and other sanctuaries. The building program that began at Corinth and Isthmia ca. 300 certainly exploited local resources. Not a single monument can be attributed to any Macedonian; nevertheless, indications are that the Antigonids funded or donated much of this building program. Financial considerations alone render the Antigonids its most likely benefactors. Archaeological evidence places its inception to ca. 300, or contemporaneous with the Antigonid’s arrival at Corinth. Demetrios Poliorketes had demonstrated at Sikyon the will and financial means to alter dramatically the physical appearance of a polis. He attempted unsuccessfully, we are told, to dig a canal across the Corinthian Isthmos and this is the sole attestation of his building activity at Corinth. Nevertheless, financial considerations make it very likely that he initiated this building program and that his son Antigonos Gonatas perpetuated it into the second quarter of the third century. Either the Antigonids or the Corinthian demos funded this building program. While the latter are certainly plausible benefactors, this would require that their economic condition had improved considerably beyond the state into which it had fallen throughout most of the fourth century. There is no indication of an influx of capital to Corinth that could account for the necessary 207

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funds for the construction of this building program. It is certain that some revenues were dispatched to Corinth as a result of Timoleon’s Sicilian expedition, but their arrival must be roughly synchronous with his victories in the late 340s. The building program itself began approximately four decades after Timoleon’s victory at the Krimisos and the spoils from this and other victories that were sent to Corinth cannot account for the building program that commenced ca. 300 and spanned at least the first three decades of the third century. Furthermore, the drought and damage caused by two earthquakes throughout the last three decades of the fourth century would have depleted the financial resources of the state. Any Corinthian funding of this building program must also take into account the presence of the Macedonians for four decades prior to its inception. The Corinthians cannot have had the financial resources to fund it if they were also burdened by a financial commitment to the Macedonians. Evidence elsewhere documents the Macedonians’ capacity to tax heavily those poleis they occupied with a garrison. There is no evidence that the Corinthians were ever compelled to finance the Macedonian garrison’s presence on Acrocorinth. One is reduced to employing an argument ex silentio in order to make a case that they never were obligated to finance the Macedonians’ presence. Nevertheless, it is virtually implausible to suggest that the Corinthians financed both the building program that began ca. 300 and the Macedonians’ garrison on Acrocorinth. The Macedonians never appear to have infringed upon the Corinthians’ religious practice either domestically or abroad. In fact, religion at Corinth throughout the early Hellenistic period demonstrates remarkable continuity with the Classical period. Circumstantial evidence explored above suggests strongly that the Antigonids even embraced the local cults housed within the Stele Shrine that was preserved in slightly diminished form to accommodate the construction of the South Stoa, ca. 300. Philip V did not obstruct the Corinthian ekklesia in its decision to recognize the contests in honor of Artemis Leukophryene as crowned games and to grant asylia to Magnesia on the Maeander and its territory. Similarly, the Macedonian kings never appear to have prevented the Corinthians from participating in religious festivals abroad.

New directions in the study of Hellenistic Corinth Corinth is a literal “gateway,” as Pindar (Ol. 13.4–5) claimed in his ode celebrating the Olympic victory of Xenophon of Corinth in 464. Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth hopefully will open new gateways to the study of the city within this period as well as the study of the Macedonians’ presence throughout the Greek peninsula. The likelihood that new epigraphic sources will shed further light upon the history of early Hellenistic Corinth or the Macedonians’ presence within it is very slim. One can expect, however, that new archaeological discoveries or the reinterpretation of previously excavated material

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will elucidate further our understanding of these years. Additional studies geographically broader in scope than Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth that explore the Macedonian presence within the Peloponnese or mainland Greece also may clarify the Macedonians’ approach to poleis such as Corinth. One modest aim of this monograph has been to provide archaeologists with an historical framework with which to approach Hellenistic Corinth. Hopefully the previous pages have achieved that goal; if so, some of the tentative conclusions and reconstructions proposed above will encourage others to re-examine previously excavated remains, such as material remains from the North Stoa, to determine if it was utilized by the Macedonians and to determine the date of its destruction. The assemblage of evidence presented above for the existence of a royal residence at Corinth should encourage others to seek out traces of it. The Macedonians’ possession of Corinth was interrupted only once within a 140-year period; traces of their presence await discovery. A clearer understanding of Corinthian autonomy under the Macedonians may be achieved through further study of the numismatic evidence. The coinage examined above has focused primarily upon posthumous Alexanders minted at Corinth and these represent only some of the available material. No effort has been made here to determine at which point and why Corinth ceased to mint “autonomous coinage.” The possible dates of cessation range from the late fourth century to the middle of the third century, and the explanation for its cessation remains equally obscure. A mid-third-century date for the cessation of Corinthian autonomous coinage would seem most reasonable, as this date is followed immediately by the tumultuous decade of the 240s during which Antigonos lost possession of the city to his nephew Alexandros son of Krateros and later to Aratos and the Achaians. Corinthian autonomy does not appear to have been affected dramatically on the basis of the numismatic evidence. Additional study dedicated to the coinage minted at Corinth between Chaironeia and Kynoskephalai, however, might alter this picture somewhat and has the potential to elucidate further the effect that the Macedonians’ presence in Corinth had upon its citizenry. Tarn observed many years ago that Corinth functioned as a “connecting knot” in the Macedonian strategy to control the Greek mainland through possession of states within the Peloponnese, Chalkis, Demetrias, and Piraeus.12 These fortified strongholds comprised a Macedonian “geography of power,” as John Ma has described it more recently.13 Those pursuing further study of Hellenistic Corinth would profit from consideration of the polis in this “geography of power.” A study of the “three fetters of Greece” and Corinth’s status among them represents one possible approach. Another would be to consider Corinth as a “gateway” for understanding the Macedonians’ control of the Peloponnese.14 As has been demonstrated above, the stability of the Macedonians’ presence at Corinth reflects consistently their position within the Peloponnese as well as within mainland Greece. 209

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While many Corinthians certainly benefited frequently from the Macedonians’ presence within Corinth, many certainly suffered throughout these years. Natural calamities, such as shortages of grain, droughts, and earthquakes within the first 40 years after the Macedonians’ arrival at Corinth, affected the entire demos, regardless of political affiliation. These years, like the entire 140 covered within Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Corinth, also witnessed virtually incessant warfare, devastation of crops and property within the chora, and the presence of foreign soldiers and mercenaries. Collectively, it is likely that many citizens throughout this period suffered tremendously; these natural and manmade catastrophes, however, offered endless opportunities for the Macedonians to display their goodwill to the Corinthians. The latter’s reciprocal displays of goodwill demonstrate that they not only tolerated the Macedonians’ presence but that they benefited from it.

*** Shortly after Corinth’s foundation as the Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis in 44, a citizen of the new colony dedicated a statue of Alexander the Great as Zeus near the great temple at Olympia. Pausanias (5.25.1) records that the dedicant was one of the Roman settlers sent by an unnamed emperor; although his ethnicity is not stated, he was possibly a Greek freedman.15 Approximately 300 years after the Macedonians first arrived at Corinth, this citizen of the Roman colony fascinatingly selected the city’s association with Alexander as the object of his civic pride; neither its Archaic or Classical accomplishments nor its association with Rome and Julius Caesar captured his imagination. He fittingly chose Alexander the Great of Macedonia, thus perpetuating the lasting association between Corinth and the Macedonians.

Notes 1 Polyb. 18.45.12; Livy 33.31.11, 34.9. 2 Strabo 8.6.23: Κορίνθιοι δ’ ὑπὸ Φιλίππῳ ὄντες ἐκείνῳ τε συνεφιλονείκησαν καὶ ἰδίᾳ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὑπεροπτικῶς εἶχον, ὥστε τινὲς καὶ τῶν πρέσβεων παριόντων τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτῶν ἐθάρρησαν καταντλῆσαι βόρβορον. 3 Another similar monument was set up at Delphi (FD III, no. 122). Its text is completely preserved and it supplies the restorations to the Corinthian example. 4 Corinth Inv. No. 141. Powell 1903: no. 14, 40–41 (ed. pr.); Corinth VIII.1, no. 72. See now Bousquet 1964: 607–9 (SEG 22.214), whose text and restorations I have followed here. I note, however, that εὐνοίας is a possible restoration in line 3; see, for comparison, FD III, no. 122, line 3: ἀρετᾶς ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας. 5 Livy (34.48.3–50.11) places this meeting at the “beginning of spring” (veris initio) and “at Corinth” (Corinthum). Considering, however, that this meeting occurred in an Isthmian year and that the Games most likely were celebrated in late April/ early May (see Chapter 1, p. 14, note 41), it is highly probable that this meeting was held at Isthmia and coincided (as in 198) with their celebration. 6 See, for example, Corinth VIII.1, nos. 4 and 6; Corinth VIII.3, nos. 46a and 46b; Stroud 1972: 201–3, no. 3; Robertson 1976: 253–66 (SEG 26.392). 7 Meetings of the Achaian synodos or synkletos occurred at Corinth on at least six different occasions between 168 and 146.

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8 Williams 1977: 53–58. 9 See C. de Grazia in Williams 1977: no. 30, 73–77; Sturgeon 1998: 4–5, fig. 12. For Kritolaos’ role in the outbreak of the Achaian War, see Polyb. 38.12.7–13.8; Diod. Sic. 32.26.4–5; Paus. 2.1.2, 7.14.4–5. 10 Sources: Livy Perioch. 52; Justin 34.2.6; Strabo 8.6.23; Paus. 7.16.7 and 9; Vell. Pat. 1.13.1; and Zon. 9.31. For events that led to the outbreak of war, see Gruen 1976: 46–69. Our only source that placed the final battle at Leukopetra is [Aur. Vict.] de vir. ill. 60.2. 11 Lane Fox (2011: 512) has noted recently that “The key to the war was Antigonos’ rock-solid retention of Corinth.” 12 Tarn 1913: 289. 13 Ma (2011: 523) includes Pella, Thessalonike, and Argos in his enumeration of states “where the Antigonid kings moved between and stayed at a number of fixed points.” 14 For two discussions of methods by which to approach the Macedonian presence in southern Greece and the Peloponnese respectively, see Shipley 2005 and 2008. 15 See Stewart (1994: 339–40; S3 and T94). See also the comments of Millis (2010b: 15–16 and note 10), who stresses the colonists’ desire “to emphasize and promote their status not as interlopers but as legitimate successors and inheritors of the Greek city” (15). No evidence supports Dreyer’s (2009: 231 and note 113) assertion that the monument was erected at Olympia by several of the beneficiaries of Alexander the Great’s Exiles’ Decree.

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227

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Achaian koinon 2, 91, 92–4, 96, 118, 130, 131, 136, 138, 143, 145–6, 148–56, 160–1, 168, 169, 170, 179, 188, 189, 190, 198–9, 200, 204 Achaians 2, 3, 18, 26, 85, 92–3, 99, 106n112, 128, 131, 143–4, 146, 148–57, 160–1, 170, 172, 173, 176, 179, 180–1, 182–3, 184, 188, 198, 200, 202–3, 204, 206, 209 Acrocorinth Map 1, Figure 1.1, 1, 3, 8–9, 19, 50, 61, 63, 75, 79, 81–2, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98–101, 118, 127, 129–30, 134, 136, 151, 153, 154–5, 157, 159–61, 169–70, 185–6, 198, 200–1; Achaian garrison on 99, 145–6, 152, 154, 156–9, 161, 202, 204; fortifications of 100, 111, 131; Macedonian garrison on 4–5, 7–8, 12, 15, 21–2, 24–6, 33, 46, 54, 57, 59–60, 62, 64, 67, 78, 86, 87, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 110, 128, 130, 143–4, 168, 185, 190, 201, 208; Roman garrison on 186, 198–9; strategic value of 1, 8–9, 203–204 Agioi Theodoroi see Krommyon Agis III of Sparta 25–6, 30, 34, 201 Agis IV of Sparta 152 Aigina Map 2, 52, 177, 178 Aitolian koinon 85, 88, 149, 151, 153, 186 Aitolians 47–8, 80, 85, 88–9, 92, 93, 149, 151–2, 161, 171–8, 204 Alexander III the Great 3, 12, 15, 19, 21–33, 36, 46, 47, 49, 51–2, 53, 57, 59, 60, 62, 67, 75, 77, 78, 81, 84, 114–15, 119, 121, 127, 170–1, 201, 202, 205, 210 Alexandros IV 50 Alexandros son of Krateros 84, 91–9, 118, 130, 136, 173, 189, 209

Alexandros son of Polyperchon 46, 50–6, 65, 67, 122, 204 Ameinias of Phokis, archpirate 81, 82, 83–4, 85, 87, 91–2, 103n55 Anderson-Stojanovic´, V. 132, 183 Antigonid dynasty 4, 65, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90–3, 99, 111, 114, 118, 121–2, 126–7, 130–2, 137, 144, 148–51, 153, 155, 160–1, 168, 170, 171, 175, 185, 186, 189, 190, 200, 202–3, 205–8 Antigonos I Monophthalmos 4, 29, 53–6, 58, 60, 67, 75, 111, 122, 137, 170, 171, 185, 201–2 Antigonos II Gonatas 65, 75–101, 111, 118, 119, 121, 122, 128–9, 130, 131, 145, 150–3, 169, 171, 179, 185, 186, 200, 201–3, 205–6, 207, 209 Antigonos III Doson 20, 81, 89, 129, 143, 150–1, 153, 154, 158, 160–1, 168, 169–70, 171, 174, 178, 185, 188–90, 201, 202–3, 204, 206 Antiochos I 80–1 Antiochos III 4, 82, 126, 144, 178, 199 Antipatros 24, 25, 26, 30–1, 32, 33, 46, 47–52, 62, 65, 67, 84, 98, 115, 119, 201, 205 Aratos of Sikyon 1, 3, 63, 92–4, 96, 99–101, 128, 143–6, 148–9, 151–161, 169, 172–5, 200, 204 arbitration 20, 146–7, 171, 178, 199 Areus of Sparta 26, 83, 85, 86–88, 89, 92, 202 Argos Map 2, 17, 18, 61, 79–80, 82, 83–5, 96–7, 148, 153, 156, 160, 184, 202 Argeadai 3–4, 30–1, 51–2, 53, 62, 65, 75, 77–8, 136–7, 171, 202–3 Aristainos of Dymai 184, 198–9 Arsinoë II 86

228

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Arsinoë 86, 104n76 Athens Map 2, 5, 16, 18, 20, 24–5, 31–5, 49, 51, 60, 76–8, 85–9, 96, 144, 151, 153, 158, 175, 202, 204; epidosis of 248/7 96, 107n136 Athenians 16, 18–19, 26, 32–3, 47–8, 51, 58, 76, 80, 86–9, 96, 145, 153, 204 Attalos I 177, 178, 179–80, 181–2, 183, 195n86 autonomy, Corinthian 4–5, 7, 24, 49, 59, 168–9, 172, 175–6, 204, 206–7; Greek 51–2, 55, 57, 60, 64, 206

Deinarchos of Corinth 10, 17, 19, 24, 28, 33, 49–50, 51–2, 67, 175, 204, 205 Deinarchos son of Sostratos 31–2, 33 Delos Map 2, 78, 89–90 Delphi Map 2, 9, 16, 32, 80, 84, 90, 149, 207; Soteria at 88–9, 149, 188 Demaratos of Corinth 10, 15, 17, 19, 23–4, 27–9, 31, 33, 38n33, 115, 205 Demetrian War 151–4 Demetrios of Phaleron (elder) 32, 49, 58 Demetrios of Phaleron (younger) 89 Demetrios of Pharos 18, 93, 172–3, 176, 190, 207 Demetrios I Poliorketes 1, 3, 46, 56, 58, 59–67, 75–9, 82, 84, 90, 98, 100, 110–11, 119, 121–2, 126–9, 131, 134, 137, 144, 151, 159, 170–1, 173, 179, 185, 200–2, 204–6, 207 Demetrios II 97, 128, 152 Demosthenes 17, 18, 28, 32, 49 Diadochoi 3, 33, 46, 52, 53, 57, 66–7, 75, 119, 137, 149, 202–3 Dickie, M. 183 Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic 24, 46, 66 diolkos 9, 21, 22, 48, 68n9

Berenike II 94–5, 97, 189 Berenike III 94–5 Bookidis, N. 8, 130, 134 Bosworth, A.B. 42n85, 47, 68n10, 70n37 Boukephalos 27, 38n33, 115, 205 Broneer, O. 114, 121–2 Chalkis Map 2, 32, 76, 79, 87, 91, 92, 174, 178, 181, 183, 186–7, 209, 209 Chiliomodi hoard 58, 59–60 Chremonidean War 86–8, 202 Clayman, D. 95–6 Corinth Figure 1.1, Map 2, passim; city walls 9, 54, 62–3, 83, 99–100, 111, 117, 131, 137, 157–8, 180–2, 184, 202; cult in 134, 136; democracy at 21, 63, 200; dining at 12, 20, 82, 93–4, 121, 141n67, 160, 169, 175; earthquake(s) at 46, 65–6, 90, 110, 117–18, 126–7, 130–1, 137, 208, 210; economy 7–8, 77, 90–1, 126, 150, 161, 207; Long Walls 8, 9, 117, 158–9, 172, 181–2; mint at 58–9, 65, 77, 173, 209; oligarchy at 21–2, 24, 47, 50, 51, 62, 119, 137, 182, 199–200; population of 35–6, 44n136; roads/streets 98–100, 108n151, 127; shipyards 21, 89–90, 149, 160, 201 Corinthia Map 1; chora 2, 4, 53–6, 58, 62, 64–5, 67, 86, 96, 148, 159, 168, 182, 204, 210; drought 33, 35, 132, 208, 210; grain shortages 33–5, 55, 58, 158–9, 176, 182, 210; grain supply 33–5, 53, 55, 58, 64, 86, 110, 177–8; harvest 53–5, 86–7, 110, 152; quarries 8 Corinthians: at Delos 74n103; at Delphi 8, 17, 22–3, 46, 66, 85, 88–9, 149, 188, 193n47, 207; at Epidauros 8, 66, 85, 189; mercenaries 41–2n83, 97, 150, 189; at Thermon 85, 88, 149

Echinades, islands Map 2, 47, 48 Elis Map 2, 18, 26, 34, 56, 82, 84, 85 Epidauros Map 2, 53, 64, 90, 145–8, 152, 156–8, 160, 161, 170, 189, 204, 207 Eretria Map 2, 91, 92, 179, 187 Euagoras son of Eukleon 29, 47, 65n97, 90, 93, 150, 169, 172–3, 175–6, 177–8, 185, 190, 201, 207 euergetism, euergesia 3–4, 22, 64, 82, 126, 174, 182, 188, 198, 200, 203 eunoia see goodwill Exiles’ Decree 32, 43n113, 51 factions, at Corinth: anti-Macedonian 17–19, 22, 27, 200; pro-Antigonid 3, 91, 96, 115, 126–7, 176, 182, 200; pro-Demetrios 62, 200; pro-Kassandros 62–3, 200; pro-Macedonian 2–4, 18–24, 28–9, 31, 33, 47, 49–52, 54–5, 62, 75–6, 82, 198, 200, 203, 205–6 freedom, declarations of 51, 53–4, 56–7, 59–60, 64, 186, 198, 204, 206

229

INDEX

Gates, of Corinth Figure 1.1, 100, 143–4; Isthmian 131; Lechaion 62–3; Phliasian 63, 99–100, 129, 157; Sikyonian 63, 72n82, 179; Teneatic 63, 72n81 Gauls 80–1, 83, 87, 88 Gebhard, E. 183 goodwill 2–4, 10, 15, 18, 22, 24, 28–9, 31, 33, 46–7, 49, 51–3, 57, 59, 62, 64, 66–7, 75–9, 83, 126, 138, 143–5, 161, 168, 174, 178, 190, 200, 203–7, 210

Kleopatra, daughter of Philip II and Olympias 24, 34–5 Kraneion Figure 1.1, 24 Krateros son of Krateros 81, 83, 84–5, 87, 91–2, 102n23, 103n55 and n60, 106n112, 119 Kratesipolis 46, 55–6, 57, 65, 71n59, 122, 136 Krommyon Map 1, 8, 65 Kromna Map 1, 7, 13n21, 179, 194n67

harbor dues/tolls 22, 90, 172, 175–6, 190 Harpalos 32, 34 Hellenic Symmachy 20, 170, 171, 173, 177, 186 Hieronymos of Kardia 29, 77, 81, 102n23, 103n46, 134 Hyperides 33

Lamian War 25, 31, 47–49, 80, 87, 201 League of Corinth 9–10, 19, 20–1, 24–26, 29–30, 34, 51–3, 57–9, 60, 62, 64–5, 67, 75–6, 81, 94, 111, 121–2, 127, 131, 145, 159, 170–1, 173, 202, 204, 206 Lechaion Map 1, Figure 1.1, 8, 9, 21, 46, 67, 89, 90, 100, 150, 151, 158, 159, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175–6, 177, 179–80, 181, 185, 201 Leukas Map 2, 17, 23, 34, 37n15, 175, 190 Leukon (Xerias) river Map 1, 9, 54, 157, 159, 172 Livy 6, 169, 180–1 Lynkestian royal house 119, 121 Lysimachos 64–5, 77–9

Isthmia Map 1, Figure 5.7, 9–10, 25, 29–30, 33, 52, 80, 95–6, 112, 114, 127–8, 134, 136–7, 173, 186, 207; excavations at 7, 111; Isthmian Games 9, 14n41, 30, 52, 57, 64, 95, 97, 122, 127, 132, 158, 168, 186, 198, 199, 210n5; victors at 29–31, 94–5, 97, 107n124, 168, 189 Isthmos 8, 9, 19, 22, 25, 26, 30, 47, 48, 53, 54, 64, 76, 87–8, 94–5, 111, 151–2, 157, 158–60, 161, 172–3, 175, 178, 179–81, 183, 201, 202, 204, 207 Isokrates 2–3, 16

Ma, J. 4, 144, 209 Macedonia 15–16, 25, 27, 34–5, 48–9, 52, 76–81, 83–4, 88, 90, 119, 150–1, 153, 169 Macedonian Wars, First 176–8, 201; Second 118, 134, 161, 169, 179–86, 200 Magnesia on the Meander Map 2, 178, 187, 188, 189, 208 Maritsa Pass, fortification Map 1, 55, 157 Megalopolis Map 2, 18, 26, 33, 52, 79, 80, 82, 146, 148, 154, 178 Megara Map 2, 34, 53, 80, 87, 146, 147, 148, 151 Menander 46, 66, 83 Methana see Arsinoë mercenaries 10, 16–17, 22, 26, 54, 56, 57, 80, 82–4, 87, 97, 99, 101, 150, 155, 181, 189, 210 Messene Map 2, 17, 18, 77 Mt. Geraneion Map 1, 53, 70n40 Mt. Oneion Map 1, 9, 54, 157–9

Justin 5 Kassandros son of Antipatros 32, 46, 49, 50–67, 75, 77, 115, 122, 127, 131, 136, 137, 200–1, 204 Kenchreai Map 1, 7, 8, 9, 21, 26, 46, 52, 54–5, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 76, 77, 80, 89, 90, 100, 110, 136, 150, 151, 154, 158–9, 160, 169, 171, 172, 175–6, 178, 179, 181–2, 185, 201 king’s residence, at Corinth 109n159, 128–30, 174–5, 185, 209 Kleitos the White 47–8, 201 Kleomenes of Sparta 154–61, 166n81, 169, 202 Kleomenic War 143, 151, 154–61, 168, 169, 190, 202 Kleonai Map 1, 49–50, 156, 164n44, 183

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Nemea Map 2, 176; Nemean Games 9, 54, 95, 96, 177 Nikaia, wife of Alexandros, son of Krateros 85, 92, 93, 97–8, 106n111 and 112, 108n151 and 153, 128 North Stoa 36, 115, 117, 183–4, 209

Salmon, J. 7, 13n11 and n29, 44n136 Sanctuary of Demeter and Kore, Acrocorinth North Slope Figure 1, 8, 111, 117, 130–1, 137 Sanctuary of Poseidon, Isthmia Figure 5.7, Map 1, 7, 9–10, 24, 29–31, 35, 52, 57, 91, 110–12, 117, 131–2, 137, 158–9, 169, 171, 179–80, 183, 186, 199, 203, 205–7 Sikyon, Sikyonians Map 2, 7,9, 23, 47, 55–63, 65, 77, 92–4, 99, 110, 148, 152, 155–7, 159, 172, 175, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182–3, 184, 207 Sisypheion 61, 63, 64, 73n84, 129–30, 134 Social War 168, 171–6, 177, 188, 190, 201, 205, 207 South Stoa Figures 1.1, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 39n37, 82, 90, 111, 112, 117, 118, 121–7, 137, 208 Stanotopi Pass, fortification Map 1, 54–5, 157, 166n81 Stele Shrine Figure 5.3, 117–21, 137, 208 stone, Corinthian 8, 23, 37n13, 147, 163n25, 207 Stroud, R.S. 8, 54, 130 Sturgeon, M. 136 Successors see Diadochoi Sulpicius Galba, P. 168, 177–8, 179, 195n86

Olympias 34–5, 52, 65 Patrai, Patraians Map 2, 30–1, 162n13, 173, 174, 175; Patras Hoard 173 Pellene 30, 152, 172, 183 Persaios of Kition 98–9, 100, 145 Phila, daughter of Antipatros, wife of Demetrios Poliorketes 84, 119, 121 Philip II 2–3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 15–28, 36, 49, 51–3, 57, 60, 62, 64, 67, 75, 77, 81, 100, 114–15, 119, 121, 144, 149, 151, 160, 170–1, 185, 188, 200, 201, 202, 205, 206 Philip III Arrhidaios 50–2 Philip V 48, 78, 93, 118, 128–9, 168–79, 181–5, 187, 190, 198, 200, 201, 202–3, 206, 207–8 Pixodaros Affair 23 Piraeus Map 2, 51–2, 58, 76, 79, 84, 90, 151, 153, 158, 181, 209 Plautus 168 Plutarch 5–6, 158 Polybios 5–6, 101, 158 Polyperchon 46, 50–7, 65, 67, 122, 175, 202, 204, 205; diagramma of 51–3, 186 Posidippos of Pella 94–5, 97 Posthumous Alexanders 65, 77, 173, 209 Potidaia 16 Potters’ Quarter 90, 117 Ptolemy I Soter, son of Lagos 46, 53, 55, 57–61, 65, 67, 76, 78, 94, 122, 136, 202 Ptolemy II Philadelphos 86–9, 94–5, 202 Ptolemy III Euergetes 93, 94–5, 150, 154–5, 156 Pyrrhos of Epeiros 65, 76, 78, 83–5, 87, 92, 202

Tarn, W.W. 80, 89–90, 209 Taurion 48, 115, 169, 170, 172–3, 175, 176, 190, 201, 207 taxation, taxes 4, 77, 79, 82, 90, 126, 206–8 tax exemption 77, 82, 186, 190, 206–7 Theater, Corinth Figure 1.1, 98, 100, 111, 128, 174, 185 Thessalos 23, 29, 40n66 Thompson, D. 94–5 Tile Works Figure 1.1, 90, 117 timber, Corinthian 8, 147, 148, 163n25, 207 Timoleon 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 35, 38n34, 66, 189, 199, 208 trans-Isthmian Wall 80–1, 104–5n85, 158

Quinctius Flamininus, T. 39n48, 168, 179–80, 181, 182–3, 184–5, 186, 190, 198, 199, 200, 203

West Foundation, Isthmia Figure 5.2, 28, 114–15, 136 Williams, C.K. 118–19, 121–2, 127 Wiseman, J. 5, 13n21, 80–1

Rachi Settlement, at Isthmia Figures 5.7, 5.8, 111, 117, 131, 132, 180, 183 Rigsby, K. 187

Zeno of Kition 98–9, 145

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