Arming The Free World: The Origins Of The United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950 0807819433, 9780807819432

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Arming the Free World

C h e ste r J. Pach, Jr.

A r m in g t h e FREE W O R L D The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program,

1945-1950

The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill and London

© 1991 The University of North Carolina Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee of Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 95 94 93 92 91

5 4 3 2

1

Library of C ongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pach, Chester J. Arming the free world : the origins of the United States military assistance program, 1945-1950 / by Chester J. Pach, Jr. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8078-1943-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—1945-1953. American—History. D990.E87

2. Military assistance,

I. Title.

1991

355 '.032-097309044—dc20

90-41120 CIP

Portions of chapter 2 appeared earlier in somewhat different form in Chester J. Pach, Jr., "The Containment of Military Aid to Latin America, 1944-49," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 225-43, and are reprinted here by perm ission of Scholarly Resources, Inc. Portions of chapter 7 appeared earlier in somewhat different form in Chester J. Pach, Jr., "Military Assistance and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Congress," in Congress and United States Foreign Policy: Controlling the Use of Force in the Nuclear Age, ed. Michael Barnhart (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), and are reprinted here by permission of the State University of New York Press.

For my grandmother and the memory of my grandfather

Contents

Acknowledgments ix Introduction 3 1 The Emergence of Military Assistance Programs 7

2

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense 29

3

The Limits of Aid to China 63

4 The Reorientation of American Arms Aid Policy: The Near East and the Truman Doctrine 88 5 The Decision for a Global Military Assistance Program 130

6

The Dilemma of Aid to China 160

7 The Mutual Defense Assistance Program 198 Epilogue 227 Notes 233 Bibliography 291 Index 311

Acknowledgments

^ A Æ itin g this book was a personal, but never a solitary, enterprise. At every stage of the work, I benefited from the advice, encourage­ ment, and support of many others. It is a pleasure to acknowledge these debts, and I hope that those who assisted are pleased with the results. Generous financial aid from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Texas Tech University, and, on two occasions, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute helped defray the expenses of research. I am grateful to the staffs of the Bentley Historical Library, the Center of Military History, the Seeley G. Mudd Library, the Naval History Divi­ sion, and the Washington National Records Center. Special thanks go to Dennis E. Bilger, Harry Clark, Erwin J. Mueller, C. Warren Ohrvall, and Elizabeth Safly of the Truman Library. At the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives, Milton O. Gustafson and Kathie Nicastro were especially helpful. I am particularly indebted to the staff of the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives for such informed and friendly assistance. William H. Cunliffe shared with me his unique knowledge of military records, and Marilla B. Guptil processed innu­ merable requests for documents. LeRoy Jackson, Edward J. Reese, and Charles Shaugnessy also made my work easier. At the Spencer Re­ search Library in Lawrence, Kansas, Dan Barkley and Ingeburg Starr helped me locate many government documents. I also wish to acknowledge the estate of James V. Forrestal for allowing me to exam­ ine the papers of the former secretary of defense. Am ong my greatest debts are those to teachers and colleagues who helped shape my work. I began this book while I was a student of Richard W. Leopold, who was an inspiring instructor and an exacting critic. Michael S. Sherry helped me to refine my arguments and clarify my prose. Burton I. Kaufman and William Stueck read the entire IX

x

• Acknowledgments

manuscript and provided many thoughtful suggestions for improving it. Also valuable was the assistance of T. H. Breen, George Q. Flynn, and Garry Wills. Vicky Pachall, Paula Malone, and Pam LeRow typed the manu­ script, and Linda Pickett copyedited it. Lewis Bateman, Ron Maner, and the staff at the University of North Carolina Press skillfully guided the manuscript through the steps of publication. Portions of this book previously appeared in Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982) and Congress and United States Foreign Policy: Controlling the Use of Force in the Nuclear Age, edited by Michael Barnhart. I am grateful to Scholarly Resources, Inc. and the State University of New York Press for kindly granting me permission to use that material. Several friends contributed in essential ways to the completion of this work. Donald R. McCoy and Theodore A. Wilson were constant sources of encouragement. Mary Lou Locke was a wonderful colleague and an even better friend. Beth Bailey I can never thank enough for so many things. My greatest debt is to Mary Jane Kelley, who never let me forget the unsurpassed pleasures of the present, even when I was preoccupied with the past. This book is dedicated to the best teachers I ever had, my grand­ parents, Frank and Janie Kaminski. By living their lives with simplicity, integrity, and dignity, they taught me what is truly important.

Arming the Free World

At the outset, it should be firmly fixed in mind that the mere giving of assistance to other countries will not necessarily enhance the national security of the United States. — The Joint Chiefs o f Staff, 12 M ay 1947

Introduction I think the concern I have run into is this, is this the beginning of the United States taking on an obligation to supply military assistance to every country in the world? . . . If we once take on the obligation, establish the precedent, where do we wind up? —Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator, 20 April 1949

I n his annual report of 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci warned Congress against cutting President Ronald Reagan's request for military assistance to foreign nations. During the previous three years, Carlucci complained, Congress had slashed the Reagan admin­ istration's requests for military assistance by as much as 25 percent. He insisted that the results had been disastrous. These reductions had eroded "the security and well-being of friendly countries." But their greatest effect, Carlucci asserted, had been "on the perceptions of friends and allies who fear that the United States cannot honor its commitments nor exert strong and effective leadership." In addition, "adversaries are gaining confidence that they can challenge our inter­ ests with impunity." He concluded that, should Congress once again cut the administration's proposed annual military aid budget, Ameri­ can security would suffer "serious damage."1 Carlucci's warnings recall those issued by the Pentagon four de­ cades earlier when the administration of Harry S. Truman considered reducing spending on military aid. In this instance the cuts were proposed not by Congress but by the Bureau of the Budget, which maintained that after allocating $1,314 billion to arms aid in 1949, the United States could not afford a similar expenditure in 1950. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strenuously objected. Much like Carlucci, they argued that a drastic cut would undermine the security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who were the recipients of the bulk of American military assistance at that time. Even worse, the service leaders predicted, it would raise doubts not only about American resolve, but also about the credibility of President Truman, who, in his

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4 • Arming the Free World inaugural address of 1949, had promised arms aid to the members of the North Atlantic alliance. They concluded that a sharp reduction in military assistance would "give renewed impetus to Communist strength in Western Europe."2 In the four decades since the comments of the Joint Chiefs, military assistance has been a major instrument of American national security policy. The Joint Chiefs made their remarks just before the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the first in a long series of global arms aid bills. During the next decade the Military Assistance Program expanded rapidly in size and scope, and the president secured broad powers to transfer armaments. In the late 1960s sales began to replace grants as the principal means of providing military equipment to foreign nations. At the same time, partly because of opposition to the Vietnam War, Congress curtailed the Military Assistance Program and began to regulate more closely the flow of American armaments abroad, both by grants and sales. Nonetheless, arms assistance remained an important component of the foreign aid program during the 1980s, amounting to between $3 billion and $4 billion annually during the last years of the Reagan administration. In the forty years since 1949 the United States has provided grants amounting to more than $90 billion in military equipment and training to some 120 countries.3 These expenditures have been extraordinarily controversial. Impor­ tant national security officials have long considered military aid essen­ tial to the attainment of vital objectives. They have justified arms aid as a means of deterring aggression, containing Communist expansion, protecting overseas interests short of the dispatch of combat troops, and securing foreign cooperation with American military, economic, and political policies. Critics, however, have stood these arguments on their heads. They have charged that American arms have exacerbated local and regional hostilities, assisted more often in the suppression of legitimate opposition than in the repulsion of external aggression, and burdened the United States with new obligations to defend foreign countries. They have also maintained that the Military Assistance Program is extravagant and wasteful even to the point of absurdity, as when President Mobutu Sese Seku of Zaire tried to use arms aid funds to secure $60,000 worth of Coca-Cola for troops engaged in suppress­ ing an invasion.4 Many of these issues were first broached during the late 1940s,

Introduction

• 5

when military assistance emerged as a major tool of national security policy. During that time the Truman administration launched a series of country and regional programs, principally in Western Europe but also in the Near East, Latin America, and East Asia. These first efforts resulted from piecemeal planning and reflected a variety of purposes, such as preparing for a possible war, securing customers for American armaments industries, checking the spread of Soviet influence, and cultivating foreign goodwill. The Truman administration, however, soon replaced this diverse collection of programs with a coordinated, worldwide effort, whose principal goal was the containment of Com ­ munist expansion. This transformation culminated in the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the progenitor of the annual military aid bills that have become a fixture in American national security policy. The time, then, between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War constituted the formative period of the Military Assistance Program. This book explores the history of those critical years. In writing that history I have emphasized three themes. The first is that the main impetus for the startling growth of military aid during the late 1940s was the belief that it would provide critical political and psychological reassurance to friendly nations. Whatever the ultimate military objectives of these programs, their most important and imme­ diate goals were raising foreign morale, solidifying the will to resist Communist expansion, and demonstrating American resolve and relia­ bility. Other justifications were important, but not important enough to bring about the consolidation and expansion of the Military Assistance Program. The second theme is that sharp bureaucratic disputes took place over military assistance. The first programs for postwar arms aid divided the War and Navy departments from the State Department. Both sides saw military assistance as a vehicle for enlarging their influence over national security policy; both at times fought bitterly to secure control over specific programs. Although service authorities were the strongest supporters of arms aid immediately after World War II, State Department officials became the leading advocates by the late 1940s, once they were convinced of the political and psychological utility of military aid. Bureaucratic alignments actually changed so dramatically that, during the planning for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, some intramural conflicts focused on Pentagon fears

6 • Arming the Free World that military aid would drain resources from domestic rearmament programs or lead to commitments that the United States could not sustain. The final theme is that confusion and uncertainty marked the Truman administration's attitude toward the future of the Military Assistance Program. Policymakers described the role of military assistance in raising the morale of recipients and the amount of aid needed to maintain that confidence only in general, even imprecise, terms. Several committees tried, but none was able, to design an acceptable long-range program of foreign military aid before the out­ break of the Korean War. Secretary of State Dean Acheson later recalled that despite extensive planning "there was absolutely no organized, careful thought about what it was that we were trying to do."5 This lack of clarity was one of the principal legacies of early military assistance policy. Alarmed by what it perceived as a global Communist challenge, the Truman administration rapidly expanded arms aid pro­ grams during the Korean War, often with little thought about their ultimate goals. Without clear objectives some programs, driven mainly by bureaucratic momentum, parochial interests, or vague anticom­ munism, continued even after they ceased serving useful purposes, if indeed they had ever done so. The momentum imparted to the Military Assistance Program during the Truman years may have slowed, but still remains strong, as demonstrated by Secretary of Defense Carlucci's remarks. In the intervening forty years that momentum has contributed to America's arming of almost the entire "free world."

1 1The Emergence of Military ■I Assistance Programs US military assistance to foreign nations since Lend-Lease does not appear to have sprung from any well-coordinated program. —Report by the National Security Council, 1 July 1948

L e s s than a year after the end of the Second World War, American officials had made ambitious plans to provide military assistance to several foreign nations. In the spring of 1946 President Harry S. Truman asked Congress to approve long-term arms aid to the Philip­ pines, China, and Latin America. He also requested authority to send military advisers to any foreign country whenever he thought that such help w ould advance the national interest. While the administration's plans were not so extensive as to constitute a program of "peacetime lend-lease," as they were characterized by one awestruck observer, they were nonetheless remarkable.1 Never before, except in time of war, had the United States used military assistance as a major, continu­ ing instrument of national policy. Before World War II the U.S. government seldom sent arms or military advisers beyond the Western Hemisphere. Although private manufacturers exported large quantities of munitions to non-Ameri­ can nations, the government participated in this commerce only in unusual circumstances, such as when it disposed of surplus military supplies in Europe after the First World War. Indeed, for almost two decades after these exceptional sales, Washington officials tried to limit government transfers of armaments. In 1923 President Warren G. Harding urged the secretaries of war and navy to avoid selling muni­ tions abroad for fear of encouraging warfare, and as late as 1938 the War Department still felt bound by this directive.2 Even rarer than government arms sales was the stationing of American military advisers overseas. In 1869 a group of former American army officers began training the Egyptian army, but they did so as private indi­ viduals rather than as representatives of the U.S. government. The

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8 • Arming the Free World only official missions established outside the Americas before World War II were in Korea in 1888 and the Philippines in 1935.3 Military aid was far more important as a tool of policy in Latin America. State Department officials did not let Harding's instructions hinder their efforts to help friendly Latin American governments sup­ press internal uprisings. During the 1920s the administrations of Cal­ vin Coolidge and Herbert C. Hoover sent surplus armaments to several countries—Mexico, Cuba, Honduras, and Nicaragua—in which the government was beset by revolutionary forces. At the same time that the United States armed beleaguered Latin American regimes, it also im posed embargoes on the sale of munitions to groups that opposed them. Further assistance came from army and marine advisers, who organized and trained military and police forces in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama—countries in which the United States maintained protectorates by force of arms. In addition, military and naval missions went to Peru, Guatemala, and Brazil under statutes enacted during the 1920s that allowed the dispatch of such advisory groups throughout the Americas.4The overriding purpose of these measures of military assistance was to preserve political stability in an area in which the United States had important economic and strategic interests.5 Following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt relied far more extensively on arms aid to protect American security. Roosevelt used military assistance not only to help unite the Western Hemisphere against the Axis but also to sustain Great Britain—America's first line of defense—in the war against Nazi Germany. As early as June 1940 Roosevelt offered "the material resources of this nation" to "opponents of force."6 Yet this dramatic promise greatly exceeded American capabilities. Hamstrung by neutrality legislation, isolationist sentiment, and his own cau­ tiousness in leading public opinion, FDR had to resort to complex maneuvering to transfer armaments overseas. He sidestepped legal barriers by selling government munitions to Britain through private intermediaries and exchanging American destroyers for British bases. Such legal stratagems, however, could not solve critical supply prob­ lems arising from the competing demands of domestic rearmament and foreign aid programs. Only by declaring as "surplus" the military and naval equipment that might have been used to meet their own pressing

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs * 9 needs, could the War and Navy departments furnish materiel to Brit­ ain. Even then, much of the available equipment was obsolescent, such as World War I rifles and over-age destroyers. Clearly the Roosevelt administration needed broader authority to meet the armament needs of Hitler's foes.7 A small but important step toward obtaining the needed powers came on 15 June 1940 with the enactment of the Pittman Resolution, which allowed government sales of some surplus military equipment to Latin America.8 The administration had introduced this measure more than a year earlier in the hope of supplying armaments to reduce German and Italian influence in Latin American military circles and to strengthen hemispheric defense. The legislation, however, languished in Congress until the spring of 1940, when the German blitzkrieg that overwhelmed France created a new sense of urgency. As amended by Congress, the Pittman Resolution was narrower than the administra­ tion desired; it allowed only the sale of antiaircraft and coastal defense materiel to the other American nations. The resolution did not have much practical effect since the army and navy had little equipment to spare and no credits to offer Latin American purchasers, but it was significant as an indication of congressional acceptance of the principle of supplying arms to nations considered important to the defense of the United States.9 This principle gave rise to a far more ambitious innovation, lendlease. By the end of 1940 some new form of assistance was imperative if Britain was to obtain the American tanks, guns, and planes it needed to carry on the war against Germany. Ingenious expedients, useful in circumventing legal obstacles, could not stanch the drain of Britain's dollar holdings, which threatened to halt purchases of essential mili­ tary equipment. Months of discussion culminated in Roosevelt's announcement in December 1940 that he wanted "to eliminate the dollar sign" from American arms transfers to Great Britain. FDR appealed to Congress to make the United States "the great arsenal of democracy," an extension of the policy he had been following since the beginning of the war. After first considering the legislation as an amendment to the Pittman Resolution, Congress passed on 11 March 1941 a separate Lend-Lease Act, which granted the president extraordi­ nary powers to sell, lend, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer vir­ tually any item to any country whose defense he deemed vital to the

10 • Arming the Free World security of the United States.10 Conceived as a device for helping Britain before American belligerency, lend-lease became a powerful instrument of coalition warfare after Pearl Harbor and was a foreign aid program of unprecedented scope and magnitude. Before the end of World War II the United States furnished lend-lease supplies valued at $49.1 billion to thirty-eight nations.11 Lend-lease was a "w eapon for victory," an emergency measure whose primary purpose was winning the war.12In most cases, military requirements governed the allocation of war supplies, especially dur­ ing the first two years of the program, when production of many items fell far short of needs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president's principal military advisers, generally opp osed the use of lend-lease to build up armed forces solely for postwar purposes.13They approved, for exam­ ple, the arming of eight French divisions in December 1944, only to cancel the program the following spring when it became clear that those troops were not needed in the European war. Service authorities similarly reduced planned allocations to China as the war progressed. Although more than three dozen nations received lend-lease muni­ tions, the great bulk—some 86 percent—went to America's two prin­ cipal wartime partners. Great Britain and the Soviet Union.14 Despite the emphasis on military necessity, political considerations inevitably influenced lend-lease decisions. The United States and Great Britain, for example, both seeking, in the words of an official historian, "substantial go od will of post war value," clashed over the assignment of lend-lease munitions to the Middle East.15 This rivalry was keenest in regard to Saudi Arabia, whose oil resources rapidly gained importance to Washington officials after American entry into the war. According to government and industry experts, the combina­ tion of a dramatic increase in demand for petroleum brought on by the war and the slackening in discoveries of proven reserves threatened the oil self-sufficiency of the United States, long the world's leading pro­ ducer. Although Saudi production was modest—it ranked seventeenth among all nations in 1941—the country's enormous reserves seemed a critical asset, especially since they were being exploited by the Califor­ nia Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC). Newly suspicious of Britain's long-standing involvement in Saudi affairs and prodded by CA SO C officials, the State Department was determined to protect American oil concessions from any intrusions. Eager to win King Ibn Saud's favor, diplomatic officials took the lead in arranging for lend-

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • II lease aid in February 1943 and in establishing a year later an American mission to train the king's army. An Anglo-American compromise provided that each country would furnish approximately half of the Saudis' modest internal security needs. Yet such agreements by no means calmed fears of British wartime and postwar designs on Saudi oil. As the war came to an end, State Department officials arranged for the continuation of lend-lease and the construction of an air base at Dhahran. They explained that the national interest, not military neces­ sity, justified these measures of assistance.16 Military officials also used lend-lease to pursue postwar objectives, especially in Latin America, a region they considered vital to the security of the Unites States. Even after any major military danger to the hemisphere had passed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the continuation of arms aid to Latin America, albeit in modest amounts intended primarily to maintain the goodwill of local military and political leaders. The Joint Chiefs hoped that lend-lease would lead to the standardization of hemispheric military establishments and the consequent exclusion of European arms and missions, thus insuring the orientation of Latin America toward the United States. During the last two years of the war military and naval officers used lend-lease to lay the foundation for a permanent system of inter-American military cooperation.17 Drastic restrictions at the end of hostilities, however, all but elimi­ nated lend-lease as a means of strengthening foreign armed forces. Truman severely cut back lend-lease aid after V-E Day and practically halted it after the Japanese surrender. With the exception of the Nationalist government in China, which continued to receive Ameri­ can military assistance in extending its authority over Japaneseoccupied territory, and Saudi Arabia, which obtained modest amounts of internal security equipment, the flow of lend-lease armaments to foreign governments abruptly stopped.18 To a great extent congressional pressures were responsible for the administration's stringent policies. Domestic support for large-scale foreign aid waned as Allied forces drove to victory in Europe and the Pacific. In renewing lend-lease during the spring of 1945, Congress demanded the termination of the program as soon as the fighting ceased and specifically prohibited the use of lend-lease for postwar reconstruction. These restrictions were im posed at the insistence of Republicans and conservative Democrats who were suspicious of Roo-

12 • Arming the Free World sevelt's secret diplomacy, weary of high taxes, fearful of a raging postwar inflation fueled by extravagant overseas spending, and con­ vinced that American dollars could not purchase foreign goodwill. By early 1945 Roosevelt's critics were joined by other members of Con­ gress who had grown tired of deferring to executive leadership in international affairs during the war. As senator and vice president, Truman was keenly aware of the deterioration of executive-congres­ sional relations during the last months of FDR's presidency. As presi­ dent, Truman was eager to conciliate Congress over lend-lease, lest he stir a latent "isolationist spirit" that might easily "break out into the open" and jeopardize ratification of the United Nations Charter or American participation in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Bowing to congressional pressure, Truman drastically curtailed lend-lease at war's end. These sudden and severe limitations, which dashed British expectations and Soviet hopes of generous postwar aid, elicited angry but futile protests from London and Moscow. Churchill considered the cuts "rough and harsh," and Stalin denounced them as "brutal." Yet Truman preferred rankling America's wartime partners to challenging a Congress eager to reclaim its influence over foreign policy and determined to liquidate lend-lease at the close of the war.19 The effects of lend-lease, however, lasted beyond the formal termi­ nation of the program. The widespread distribution of American arms as a result of lend-lease created pressures for continued military aid. Many nations that had received American armaments desired spare parts and additional equipment, but lacked the foreign exchange to purchase these munitions on the open market. Officials in the War and Navy departments were eager to satisfy these demands in order to prevent European suppliers from reestablishing their prewar control of the arms trade. Even more important, wartime experience persuaded of­ ficials in the State, War, and Navy departments that arms aid, in certain circumstances, could help advance American interests in the postwar world. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), for example, advised Roosevelt in December 1944 that military assistance could provide "a lever to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years." The same body also concluded that military aid to Latin America would help preserve the security of the Western Hemisphere. After lend-lease, military aid, for many Washington officials, was no longer an unfamiliar or unusual device but a tested instrument for securing American objectives overseas.20

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs * 13 Lend-lease had no sequel. Indeed wartime planners did not even try to formulate a comprehensive program of military aid to follow lendlease. Although the Truman administration continued to furnish arms and advisers to several nations, these first postwar programs were piecemeal, rather than concerted, efforts. Despite some important similarities, postwar programs arose from separate decisions and reflected the disparate and often conflicting interests of their various sponsors in the State, War, and Navy departments. Looking back on these early postwar efforts, the National Security Council rightly con­ cluded that "US military assistance since Lend-Lease does not appear to have sprung from any well-coordinated program."21 A major reason for the failure to plan such a postwar arms program was the military's preoccupation with the immediate requirements of winning the war. This concentration on short-term needs shaped the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a British proposal in August 1944 to rebuild the armed forces of the liberated nations of Western Europe, an obligation that promised to last for several years after the defeat of Germany. The British maintained that these rearmed forces would help preserve postwar stability and reduce the occupation responsibilities of British and American troops. They also stressed that the proposed arms aid would advance a vital strategic interest by forging lasting ties between Western European military establishments and those of the United States and Great Britain. The Joint Chiefs' response, however, was cool. They preferred a more limited assistance to small military units that could maintain internal security in Western Europe and assume minor roles in combat. They also worried about raising Soviet fears of an Anglo-American effort to forge a "Western European bloc."22 The demands of the European war ultimately settled this debate over the arming of liberated nations. When the Allied drive across France stalled in late 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the su­ preme Allied commander, urgently called for additional troops to de­ liver the final blows against Germany. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs approved extensive military assistance to liberated nations, and the United States began furnishing lend-lease supplies for eight new French divisions. The State Department heartily endorsed such action for political reasons, since it provided "proof of our desire to see her [France] as a strong nation, " yet wartime needs once again determined the extent of American military assistance to France. Even though the

14 • Arming the Free World eight divisions were only partly equipped, the Joint Chiefs halted lendlease to the French army as Germany collapsed in the spring of 1945. Preoccupied with the exigencies of wartime logistics, the Joint Chiefs deferred any comprehensive planning for postwar military aid until after victory was secure.23 The rush to demobilize, however, created new obstacles to the development of postwar arms aid policy.24 At the close of hostilities, officials in the State, War, and Navy departments concentrated on implementing Truman's directive halting lend-lease rather than on devising a program to succeed it. Members of Congress called not only for the liquidation of wartime assistance but also for the restriction of sales of surplus American equipment to countries carrying out occupa­ tion responsibilities or contributing to the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations. These pressures precluded the enactment of any post­ war lend-lease program.25 Instead political and military officials con­ centrated on planning arms assistance of more limited scope—country and regional programs that could be implemented without new appro­ priations from Congress. Institutional arrangements also helped to account for the absence of broad military aid planning. For most of the war no agency or commit­ tee was responsible for arms aid policy. Postwar planners in the War and Navy departments occasionally considered this subject but con­ centrated on more important and traditional tasks—preparing blue­ prints of the peacetime armed forces, defining roles and missions, formulating a strategic concept for a future war.26Their counterparts in the State Department focused on the occupation of the defeated Axis powers, the creation of the United Nations, and possible arrangements for the international regulation of armaments. A reluctance to hazard detailed estimates of the requirements of postwar security only rein­ forced the tendency of the State Department not to devote much attention to future arms assistance policy. A reluctance to become involved in political matters—which their informal chairman. Admiral William D. Leahy, considered beyond their purview—only confirmed the tendency of the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on wartime imperatives and postpone questions of postwar military aid. Not until the estab­ lishment in December 1944 of the SWNCC, com posed of assistant secretaries from the three departments, was there an organization for the discussion of political-military matters such as postwar arms aid;

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 15 and not until the creation six months later of the Rearmament Subcom­ mittee of the SW NCC was there an agency specifically charged with formulating policy on military assistance. With limited authority and even less prestige, the Rearmament Subcommittee could by no means exert strong leadership in dealing with an issue that had major implica­ tions for foreign and defense policy. Because of this lack of central direction, military aid policy emerged in piecemeal fashion, the prod­ uct of the special concerns and bureaucratic rivalries of military and political agencies.27 The War Department was the foremost advocate of postwar military aid. Plans for the largest of the early postwar programs, those for Latin America and China, originated within that agency. War Department officials were determined not to lose to such rival powers as Great Britain and the Soviet Union favored positions in Latin America and China, areas in which they sought bases, access to strategic raw ma­ terials, dependable customers for American armaments industries, and—most of all—cooperative military establishments. Nor were they willing to rely on State Department officials, whom they considered unsympathetic if not downright hostile, to secure by diplomatic means the foreign concessions that they desired. Military aid, advisory groups, and foreign training programs were powerful instruments not only for building American influence abroad but also for providing defense officials with a major voice in postwar foreign policy. War Department authorities thus urged programs of military assistance to advance their ow n interests both abroad and at hom e.28 Organizational interests also accounted in large measure for the enthusiastic support of the army air forces (AAF) for military assistance programs. One of the AAF's principal objectives was the establishment of a strong postwar aviation industry that could rapidly manufacture combat planes in the event of a national emergency. This goal was linked to a new concept of national preparedness. In a future war, AAF planners predicted, the United States could no longer count on ocean barriers or strong allies to allow a protracted mobilization of human and industrial resources, but would have to build up to full combat strength within a year. Such rapid mobilization required a high degree of wartime readiness in peacetime, including the maintenance of a large productive capacity in critical defense industries. AAF plan­ ners recalled, however, that partly because of an enormous surplus of

16 • Arming the Free World equipment after World War I, 90 percent of the aircraft industry melted away in the first year of peace. Determined to avoid a similar situation. General Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the AAF, urged the disposal of surplus American aircraft to foreign nations. Arnold pointed out that such action would not only reduce the glut of planes left over from the war but also provide the domestic aircraft industry with a head start in the competition for foreign markets.29 AAF officials quite explicitly linked their support of several military assistance programs to their concern for the domestic aircraft industry. In the fall of 1944 Arnold proposed the disposal of thousands of surplus planes to standardize the Latin American air forces on U.S. equipment and thereby preempt competition from European suppliers. Eager to corner another overseas market, the AAF in early 1945 advanced a grandiose plan to build a forty-and-one-half-group postwar Chinese air force.30 When the British suggested a joint Anglo-American effort to equip the French air force in December 1944, War Department spokesmen urged caution. Robert A. Lovett, assistant secretary for air, told Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy that the fundamental consid­ eration should be "the importance of supporting our aircraft plants during the post-war years." McCloy agreed, as did one of his subordi­ nates on the SWNCC, who argued, "We should make every effort to reserve for our well developed aircraft industry any postwar market that may appear. If the British introduce a few planes and the French grow to like them . . . the business will be lost to us."31 Lovett and McCloy both undoubtedly hoped that such foreign business would contribute to the health of the postwar economy. But any economic benefit was distinctly secondary in their minds to the strategic advan­ tage of maintaining American preparedness. Special concerns also shaped the navy's attitude toward military assistance programs. The navy strongly backed the provision of arma­ ments to the Philippines and China. Naval officers were eager to retain bases in the Philippines since postwar plans were intended to achieve American naval predominance in the Pacific. They also wanted to dispose of surplus ships, whose maintenance was a drain on the service's manpower and budget. Reflecting the navy's Pacific orienta­ tion as well as his own grave misgivings about Soviet ambitions. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal repeatedly urged military support of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime in China. Naval lead­ ers were far less enthusiastic, however, about inter-American military

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 17 cooperation. They expressed long-standing doubts about the capacity of the Latin American navies to contribute to hemispheric defense. In the autumn of 1945, for example, Admiral Ernest J. King, the chief of naval operations, asserted that the arming of Latin America would only nourish domestic strife and local quarrels. Yet by early 1946 the navy withdrew these objections in the face of foreign competition for naval influence and shipbuilding orders in Latin America.32 If particular interests conditioned the services' attitudes toward the extension of military assistance to foreign countries, so did a common concern about the nation's future security. This outlook sprang from the traumatic events of the previous decade—the collapse of interna­ tional order and the experience of global war—rather than the rise of any prospective enemy. Long before they worried about the hostile designs of the Soviet Union, military planners recognized that Pearl Harbor and the revolutionary changes in weaponry that occurred during the Second World War had overturned traditional concepts of national security. "In the future," the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted, "neither geography nor allies will render a nation immune from sud­ den and paralyzing attack should an aggressor arise to plague the peace of the world." Convinced that weakness had encouraged Axis expansion, military authorities maintained that only overwhelming force, constantly in readiness, could deter or subdue future aggressors. Indeed, in a world where war had become frighteningly dangerous, the Joint Chiefs advocated nothing less than "the absolute military security of the United States."33 Statements of postwar military policy approved by the Joint Chiefs in September and October 1945 reflected this ambitious goal. Because they expected the next conflict to exact "a terrible cost in blood and treasure," the Joint Chiefs recommended the maintenance of sufficient military power "to make it unwise for any major aggressor nation to initiate a major war against the opposition of the United States." Should deterrence fail, the service chieftains suggested the extreme alternative of preemptive war. "When it becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy," they argued, "we cannot afford, through any m isguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude to permit the first blow to be struck against us. Our government, under such conditions, should press the issue to a prompt political decision, while making all preparations to strike the first blow if necessary." Whether through deterrence or

18 • Arming the Free World preemption, unilateral action was essential to protect the nation's security, since the United Nations could not resolve "a major conflict of interest among the great powers."34 Such a conflict seemed possible by the autumn of 1945 because of the "undefined character of Russian aspirations, the background of mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, and the lack of a common basis of information and understanding with Russia." The Joint Chiefs had come slowly and somewhat reluctantly to this conclusion. In m id-1944 they expected that Britain and Russia would become competitors for European power and influence but predicted that the United States could use its influence to mitigate this postwar rivalry. During the last months of the war, a majority of the service chiefs resisted the pessimistic conclusions of Leahy, who con­ sidered Stalin "a liar and a crook" and of Forrestal, who compared Soviet leaders to oriental despots and condemned any concessions to their postwar aspirations as tantamount to appeasement. By the autumn of 1945, however, the Soviets' domination of Eastern Europe and their peremptory rejection of American proposals for diplomatic solutions to a host of postwar problems convinced the Joint Chiefs that Russia was a hostile, aggressive power and the only conceivable enemy in a future war. As early as November 1945 the Joint Intelligence Committee began conducting preliminary studies of targets for an atomic offensive against Russia. There seemed to be little immediate danger of war—at least one launched by Soviet design—because of Russia's need to repair the enormous devastation caused by World War II. Yet American demobilization and the maintenance of large Soviet conventional forces raised fears that if war did occur through accident or miscalculation, the Soviets would easily overrun most of the Euro­ pean continent. Thus even if their ultimate intentions were unclear, the Soviets, in the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, posed a danger to world peace and American security.35 To counter these threats, the Joint Chiefs urged an unprecedented program of national preparedness. They advocated the development of the world's best-trained armed forces, equipped with "superior mate­ riel," deployed for use "at the source of enemy military power," and supported by "an adequate system of bases and machinery for the rapid mobilization of our national resources." These measures, the services hoped, would lead to "the maintenance of world peace, under

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 19 conditions which insure the security, well-being and advancement of our country."36 The Joint Chiefs assigned programs of military assistance a limited, though not insignificant, role in postwar strategy. Although they endorsed arms aid to countries that strengthened the security of the United States or the Western Hemisphere, they specifically recom­ mended such help only for Latin America, Canada, and the Philip­ pines. If the selection of recipients suggested a return to traditional, prewar policies on arms aid, the reason for providing assistance was novel and ambitious. By aiding Latin America, Canada, and the Philip­ pines, the Joint Chiefs hoped to build "security in depth," a strategic necessity in an age of long-range aircraft and atomic weapons. The Joint Chiefs aimed at "keeping a prospective enemy at the maximum possible distance, and . . . projecting our advanced bases into areas well removed from the United States . . . [and] nearer the enem y."37 Military aid to the other American nations would help orient their military establishments toward the United States and shield the hemi­ sphere from hostile military influences. Arms assistance to the Philip­ pines would strengthen "a primary base area" by facilitating the estab­ lishment of a "trained naval organization capable of assisting the United States in a future war."38 Not merely a device for maintaining stability in areas of long-standing American interest, arms aid to the other American nations and the Philippines would contribute to an unprecedented program of "active—as contrasted to our traditional policy of passive—defense."39 The State Department expressed strong reservations about these ambitious plans for postwar preparedness. In formal comments com­ pleted on 16 November 1945 the Staff Committee of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes castigated the Joint Chiefs for placing too much empha­ sis on the possibility of a breakdown in relations among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union and too little on American obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Staff Commit­ tee, which consisted of senior officials from the major offices within the department, also worried about the Joint Chiefs' concentration on unilateral efforts to protect national security. It seemed to these top diplomatic officials that the assistance of allies rather than preemptive action would assure American success in the next war. The differences between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs were so great that

20 • Arming the Free World the SWNCC during the first year of peace failed in its efforts to produce a comprehensive statement of American defense policy.40 The State Department also worried about the political implications of the services' proposals for postwar arms assistance. Career diplo­ mats in the Office of American Republic Affairs maintained that an extensive program of inter-American military cooperation would strengthen authoritarian regimes and thereby undermine their policy of promoting democracy in Latin America. The department's China hands insisted that long-term arms aid to the Nationalist regime was at odds with their efforts to discourage Chiang Kai-shek from seeking a military solution to China's internal problems. Experts on U.N. affairs warned that unilateral action to build up foreign military establish­ ments might harm collective efforts to regulate the international arms traffic and keep the peace. In addition to these particular objections. State Department officials expressed a common fear that the War and Navy departments were encroaching on their authority over foreign policy. This was a particularly sensitive subject since they had long resented Roosevelt's preference for personalized diplomacy and the military's wartime influence over foreign policy. They believed that, in peacetime, political considerations rather than strictly military require­ ments should govern the transfer of armaments to foreign nations. At the end of the war the State Department's vigorous assertion of this principle caused bitter disputes with the services over arms aid, especially to Latin America and China. State Department officials became advocates rather than critics when arms aid accorded with their political goals. They asserted, for example, that limited military assistance to Saudi Arabia would protect American oil interests. They also urged more extensive aid to help turn France into a bulwark against Soviet expansion. A strong and stable France, argued Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, could resist internal Communist challenges and also prevent the resurgence of German power. So important were these objectives that Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., informed Truman on the first full day of his presidency that "the best interests of the United States require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France . . . to regain her strength and her influence." Following the termination of lendlease, the State Department responded with alacrity to a French request for continued military aid. During the next two years the Foreign Liquidation Commission sold to France some $116 million in

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 21 surplus military and naval equipment for less than 10 percent of the procurement cost.41 While concerns about Soviet expansion influenced some early plans for arms aid, there was no consensus in the State Department in the first months of peace about how to deal with the Russians. Most Soviet experts, such as Eldridge Durbrow, G eorge F. Kennan, and Loy W. Henderson, advocated firm opposition to Russian violations of the Yalta accords in Eastern Europe. Yet other foreign service officers, including Soviet specialist Charles E. Bohlen, maintained that the United States ought to recognize legitimate Soviet security interests in neighboring countries and pursue opportunities for cooperation with the Russians in shaping the peace. In a report submitted in December 1945 Bohlen suggested initiatives, such as the sharing of atomic infor­ mation, aimed at "long-term stabilization of American-Russian rela­ tions." But Senior department officials such as Benjamin Cohen, the counselor, and Leo Pasvolsky and Alger Hiss, both responsible for U.N. affairs, urged accommodation with the Soviets and emphasized the resolution of great-power disputes through the United Nations. Dean Acheson, the under secretary, condem ned Soviet police-state tactics in Eastern Europe; at the same time he recognized the need for the existence of governments friendly to the Russians in bordering countries and hoped for Soviet-American cooperation in the interna­ tional control of atomic energy. Secretary Byrnes, committed more to working out postwar agreements than to any particular view of the Soviets, oscillated between truculent intimidation and ingratiating conciliation. Thus, for the first six months after the war. State Depart­ ment thinking was divided, uncertain, and fluid. As historian Robert L. Messer has aptly written, there was "no single mainstream of thought regarding Soviet policy" but instead "a series of rivulets mean­ dering over a broad expanse of opinion from unilateral gestures of conciliation . . . to hard-line atomic diplomatic saber-rattling."42 These many currents of thought produced divergent reactions within the State Department to plans for arms aid to check the increase of Soviet power. Byrnes's Staff Committee, strongly influenced by Cohen, Hiss, and Pasvolsky, opp osed the Joint Chiefs' plans for uni­ lateral peacekeeping. Yet the department's senior specialists in Western European affairs, such as James C. Dunn, H. Freeman Matthews, and John D. Hickerson, secured approval of the sale of surplus American armaments to build up France as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

22 • Arming the Free World Aid to China divided the department. Some career officials, such as John Carter Vincent, the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, preferred using political and economic instruments rather than mili­ tary aid to encourage settlement of the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese. Byrnes, however, feared the entrenchment of Soviet power in Manchuria should the Nationalist government not receive American military assistance in extending its authority into that Soviet-occupied province.43 Thus the first plans for postwar military assistance produced frag­ mentation rather than consensus within the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Wartime experience and postwar ambition imparted momentum to several programs of arms aid. Yet policymakers tended to think of these projects as discrete efforts instead of parts of a comprehensive design. The separateness of these early programs also reflected the divisions among political and military planners over arms assistance. Indeed about the only thing on which these planners agreed was that military aid could be an important element in postwar national security policy.

R e q u e sts for military supplies from France, China, the Philippines, and several other nations convinced service officials during the fall of 1945 that the Truman administration should establish a comprehensive policy governing postwar military aid. General George A. Lincoln, the army's chief strategic planner, told his colleagues on the Joint Staff that at stake were "major strategic and military factors, including standard­ ization [of armaments] and strengthening of nations whose aims were compatible with U.S. interests."44 A related subject, the settlement of lend-lease obligations, reinforced the services' desire to clarify military aid policy. Before requesting the return of lend-lease items, the War and Navy departments sought political guidance about the desirability of supporting the postwar military establishments of foreign nations with American resources. They also wanted to know whether the State Department would use lend-lease as a bargaining lever to acquire bases and other overseas military rights. In October 1945, at the request of the services, the SWNCC began to study these questions.45 During its deliberations, the SWNCC received a report from the Joint War Plans Committee, which recommended a set of principles and priorities to guide decisions on furnishing military assistance. The

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 23 se rv ice p la n n e r s th o u g h t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld a id o n ly th o se n a tio n s w h o s e in te r e s ts c o in c id e d w ith A m e ric a n o b je c tiv e s a n d s h o u ld re fra in fro m h e lp in g c o u n trie s b u ild u p a rm e d fo rce s th a t th e y d id n o t n e e d o r c o u ld n o t s u p p o r t. T h e c o m m itte e a s s ig n e d h ig h p rio rity to th o se n a tio n s th a t re q u ire d m ilita ry h e lp to m a in ta in in te r ­ n a l se c u rity o r to c o m p le te th e u n fin is h e d ta s k s of W o rld W ar II, s u c h as d is a rm in g a n d r e p a tria tin g Ja p a n e s e so ld ie rs. T h e p la n n e r s a lso u rg e d p ro m p t a id to p ro s p e c tiv e allies in a fu tu re c o n flict in o rd e r to e n c o u r­ a g e s ta n d a r d iz a tio n o n A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t. A lth o u g h th e y d id n o t e x p licitly a d v o c a te th e u s e of m ilita ry a id to ch eck th e s p re a d of c o m m u ­ n is m , th e ir r a n k in g s of p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts re fle c te d th a t view . T he c o m m itte e re c o m m e n d e d th a t a m o n g c o u n trie s w ith c u rr e n t re q u ire ­ m e n ts C h in a , K o re a, a n d th e P h ilip p in e s , in th a t o rd er, re c eiv e im m e ­ d ia te h e lp ; a lth o u g h th e ir n e e d s w e re le ss u r g e n t, F ra n c e a n d L atin A m e ric a s h o u ld a lso re c e iv e A m e ric a n a rm s . B ecau se of c h a n g in g w o rld c o n d itio n s , th e Jo in t W ar P la n s C o m m itte e n o te d th a t a n y list of p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts o r p rio ritie s s h o u ld b e re v ie w e d p e rio d ic a lly a n d a n y r e q u e s t fo r a s s is ta n c e s h o u ld b e e x a m in e d carefu lly .46 T he d ra ft r e p o r t th a t th e S W N C C c o m p le te d o n 24 J a n u a ry 1946 w a s a m o re e x te n siv e , b u t d is jo in te d , a n a ly sis of th e ro le of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e in p o s tw a r n a tio n a l s e c u rity policy. T h e r e p o r t c o n s id e re d b o th th e s e ttle m e n t of le n d -le a s e o b lig a tio n s a n d th e p ro v is io n of a d d itio n a l a rm s to fo re ig n n a tio n s . T h e S W N C C a d v is e d th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts n o t to r e q u e s t th e r e tu r n of le n d -le a s e ite m s fo r fe a r of w e a k e n in g th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts of frie n d ly n a tio n s . T he c o m m itte e , h o w e v er, u r g e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t to tr y to ex tra ct th e c o n c e s s io n s th e se rv ic e s d e s ir e d —b a s e a n d a ir-tra n s it rig h ts —in r e tu r n fo r s u c h la r g e s s .47 T h e S W N C C d e c la re d elig ib le fo r a d d itio n a l a rm s a id a lm o s t e v e ry in d e p e n d e n t n a tio n e x c e p t G e rm a n y a n d Ja p a n , th e E a s te rn E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s in w h ic h S o v iet in flu e n c e w a s p re d o m i­ n a n t, a n d n e u tr a l S w itz e rla n d . Yet th e p la n n e r s fa ile d to in te g ra te s u c h a p o te n tia lly la rg e p r o g r a m of a rm s a id in to a n y c o m p re h e n s iv e p o licy fo r p ro te c tin g A m e ric a n secu rity . I n s te a d th e c o m m itte e c o m p ile d a lo n g list of local a n d re g io n a l o b je c tiv e s—s tr e n g th e n in g h e m isp h e ric d e fe n se , p ro te c tin g A m e ric a n oil c o n c e s s io n s in th e M id d le E ast, s e c u rin g b a s e rig h ts in th e A z o re s fro m P o rtu g a l, a n d m a in ta in in g A m e ric a's sp e c ia l re la tio n s h ip w ith L ib eria. D e sp ite its g lo b al sw eep , th e S W N C C r e p o r t c o n ta in e d n o b ro a d stra te g ic , p o litical, o r eco n o m ic ju s tific a tio n fo r a rm in g fo re ig n n a tio n s .48

24 • Arming the Free World N o r d id it p ro v id e specific a d v ic e a b o u t th e a llo c a tio n of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id a m o n g a h o s t of p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts . W h ile th e r e p o r t e s ta b lis h e d m a x im u m lim its o n a rm a m e n ts a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s , it s to p p e d s h o rt of re c o m m e n d in g s u c h la v ish help . It also fa ile d to d e s ig n a te th e c o u n trie s th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld a id first b e c a u se of e ith e r th e u rg e n c y of th e ir n e e d s o r th e ir v a lu e to A m e ric a n secu rity . T h e d o c u m e n t d id c o n c lu d e th a t w h a te v e r a id th e U n ite d S ta te s s e n t a b ro a d s h o u ld b e f u r n is h e d w ith in th e lim its of c u rr e n t le g isla tio n a n d a p p ro p r ia tio n s . T h is s tip u la tio n e ffectiv ely re s tric te d a rm s tra n s fe rs to sales of ex cess e q u ip m e n t u n d e r th e S u rp lu s P ro p e r ty A ct of 1944, th e o n ly g e n e ra l a u th o rity fo r p ro v id in g a rm s to fo re ig n n a tio n s fo llo w in g th e e x p ira tio n of le n d -le a s e .49 A lth o u g h s u r p lu s in v e n to rie s w e re e n o rm o u s a t th e e n d of th e w ar, th e y o fte n c o n s is te d of u n b a la n c e d o r in c o m p le te s e ts of e q u ip m e n t. F u rth e rm o re , m a n y c o u n trie s w ith im m e d ia te n e e d s c o u ld n o t a ffo rd to p u rc h a s e a rm s e v e n a t a n o m in a l p ric e . A s a re s u lt, s u r p lu s sa les c o u ld n o t se rv e as a n e ffectiv e m e th o d , e sp e c ia lly o v e r tim e , of s u p p o r tin g m o s t fo re ig n m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . T h e o v e ra ll effect of th e S W N C C r e p o r t w a s c o n fu s io n . It o p e n e d th e d o o r to a rm in g m o s t of th e w o rld 's n a tio n s b u t, u n a c c o u n ta b ly , d id n o t d e te rm in e h o w th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld m o s t effectiv ely d is trib u te its re s o u rc e s .50 S om e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials v ig o ro u s ly o b je c te d to th e d ra ft re p o r t. O p p o s itio n c e n te r e d in th e D iv isio n of In te rn a tio n a l S e c u rity A ffairs (IS), w h ic h w a s c o n c e rn e d w ith A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n in th e S e c u rity C o u n c il of th e U n ite d N a tio n s a n d w h ic h h a d n o t b e e n c o n ­ s u lte d in th e p re p a r a tio n o f th e r e p o r t. In a lo n g m e m o ra n d u m to h is s u p e rio rs , IS officer Jam es M . L u d lo w a tta c k e d th e S W N C C s tu d y fo r p la c in g u n d u e e m p h a s is o n a rm in g fo re ig n n a tio n s w h ile ig n o rin g th e U n ite d N a tio n s ' collective e ffo rts to m a in ta in th e p e a c e . L u d lo w also c ritic iz e d th e S W N C C p a p e r fo r its " p ie c e m e a l c o n s id e ra tio n " of fo r­ e ig n m ilita ry re q u ir e m e n ts a n d its fa ilu re to e s ta b lis h a p e rm a n e n t s ta n d a r d fo r ju d g in g r e q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . H e a rg u e d th a t th e o n ly re a s o n s fo r s e n d in g a rm s a b ro a d w e re to h e lp a c o u n try c a rry o u t d e c isio n s of th e S e c u rity C o u n c il a n d to s tr e n g th e n " a sa tisfa c to ry m ilita ry ally." To fulfill th e la tte r p u r p o s e , h e a d v o c a te d th e p ro v is io n of " s u c h a rm a m e n t a id as w is d o m a n d tim e d ic ta te " o n ly to G re a t B ritain , F ra n c e , C h in a , a n d p e r h a p s In d ia , a n d th e w ith h o ld in g of su c h a s s is ta n c e fro m th e S o v iet U n io n —th e o n ly c o n ce iv a b le m ilita ry e n e m y —a n d th o se le ss p o w e rfu l s ta te s , s u c h as K o re a, Ira n , Turkey,

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 25 a n d A fg h a n is ta n , th a t m ig h t "fall p re y to o u r m ilita ry en em y ." L u d lo w m a d e clear, h o w ev er, th a t n a tio n a l se c u rity w o u ld b e n e fit fa r m o re fro m a n A m e ric a n b a c k in g of S e c u rity C o u n c il d e c isio n s w ith a rm a m e n ts a n d , if n e c e ssa ry , a rm e d fo rc e s. H e u r g e d re v is io n of th e S W N C C r e p o r t so th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs w o u ld b e " u n d e r n o illu sio n s as to th e sig n ific a n c e w e p la c e o n a n y re -a rm a m e n t p ro g ra m s " a n d w o u ld b e fu lly a w a re of " th e e m p h a s is w e p ro p o s e to p la c e o n m ilita ry c o o p e ra ­ tio n . . . u n d e r th e U n ite d N a tio n s O r g a n iz a tio n ." 51 T h e c h a n g e s th a t th e S W N C C a p p ro v e d w e re n o t so e x te n siv e . A t th e in s is te n c e of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, th e c o m m itte e n o te d th a t th e c o n c lu s io n s of its r e p o r t w o u ld b e re v is e d to a c c o rd w ith a n y p o licy o n th e re g u la tio n of a rm a m e n ts th a t th e U n ite d N a tio n s m ig h t a p p ro v e . T h e c o m m itte e a lso a g re e d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o u ld w e ig h e ac h r e q u e s t fo r a rm a m e n ts a id in lig h t of c u rr e n t n a tio n a l policy, a n a lte ra ­ tio n th a t se v e re ly d im in is h e d th e v a lu e of th e p a p e r 's g u id e lin e s . Finally, at th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's u rg in g , th e S W N C C a g re e d th a t it w a s n o t d e sira b le to e s ta b lis h a re s e rv e of e q u ip m e n t o r d is r u p t e x ist­ in g p ro c e d u re s fo r th e d is p o s a l of s u r p lu s p r o p e r ty in o rd e r to m e e t p o ss ib le r e q u e s ts fo r a r m a m e n ts .52 F o llo w in g th e s e c h a n g e s , th e th re e d e p a r tm e n ts g a v e th e ir c o n s e n t o n 21 M a rc h 1946 to S W N C C 202/2, th e a d m in is tra tio n 's first c o m p re h e n s iv e s ta te m e n t of p o licy o n p o s tw a r m ilita ry a id .53 S W N C C 202/2 a c tu a lly h a d fa r le ss in flu e n c e o n A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs , h o w ev er, th a n d id a se t of g u id e lin e s , k n o w n a s SC /R -184, th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d a d o p te d six w e e k s earlier. O n 5 F e b ru ­ a ry B y rn es's S taff C o m m itte e a g re e d to lim it th e s u p p ly of s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts to G re a t B rita in , F ra n c e , C h in a , th e P h ilip p in e s , L atin A m e ric a , a n d C a n a d a .54 F ar m o re re s tric tiv e th a n S W N C C 202/2, th e s e g u id e lin e s m o re a c c u ra te ly re fle c te d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's th in k in g . D u rin g te s tim o n y o n 5 F e b ru a ry 1946 b e fo re th e S e n a te S p e c ia l C o m ­ m itte e In v e s tig a tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se P ro g ra m , U n d e r S e c re ta ry A c h e s o n d e c la re d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n p la n n e d sales of s u r p lu s m u n itio n s o n ly to th o s e c o u n trie s lis te d in SC /R -184. W h ile n o t ru lin g o u t f u tu r e tra n s a c tio n s , h e m a d e c le a r th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n h a d n o in te n tio n of f u r n is h in g s u c h e q u ip m e n t to o th e r n a tio n s d e s p ite th e m o re p e rm is s iv e p a p e r th a t th e S W N C C w a s a b o u t to a p p ro v e .55 T h e re s tric tiv e g u id e lin e s of SC /R -184 p re v a ile d e v e n th o u g h th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n s h ifte d in e a rly 1946 to w a rd a po licy of g e ttin g to u g h w ith R u ssia . T h is re o rie n ta tio n c a m e at th e d ire c tio n of th e

26 • Arming the Free World p r e s id e n t h im se lf. A se rie s of e v e n ts —S o v iet p r e s s u r e o n Ira n a n d Turkey, p o lic e -sta te m e th o d s of S o v ie t o c c u p a tio n a u th o ritie s in B ul­ g a ria a n d R u m a n ia , a n d th e a rr e s t of a C a n a d ia n s p y r in g a tte m p tin g to ste a l atom ic s e c re ts —h a d s h a p e d T ru m an 's d e s ire fo r a h a rd e r lin e a g a in s t th e S o v ie ts. So h a d v o c ife ro u s c ritic ism fro m th e p re s s a n d fro m c o n g re s s io n a l R e p u b lic a n s , w h o c o m p a re d th e a c c o m m o d a tio n is t d ip lo m a c y of S e c re ta ry of S ta te B y rn e s a t th e M o sco w C o n fe re n c e of F o re ig n M in is te rs to a p p e a s e m e n t. T ru m a n trie d to d is a rm th e s e critics b y a n n o u n c in g th a t h e w a s in c o m m a n d of A m e ric a n fo re ig n p o licy a n d in s tru c tin g B y rn e s to m a k e n o f u r th e r c o n c e s s io n s to th e S o v iets. D ra m a tic e v id e n c e of th e c h a n g e c a m e in M a rc h 1946 w h e n B y rn es v e h e m e n tly d e n o u n c e d th e fa ilu re o f th e S o v ie ts to h o n o r th e ir a g re e ­ m e n t fo r th e w ith d ra w a l of th e ir tr o o p s fro m Ira n a n d w h e n fo rm e r B ritish p rim e m in is te r W in s to n C h u rc h ill—w ith T ru m a n a t h is s i d e d e liv e re d h is fa m o u s Iro n C u r ta in s p e e c h . T h is to u g h a n ti-S o v ie t r h e t­ oric h a d n o effect o n th e a rm s a s s is ta n c e g u id e lin e s in SC /R -184, h o w ev er. In fact d u rin g th e crisis o v e r th e re m o v a l of S o v iet tro o p s , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t r u le d o u t th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to I r a n .56 T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t trie d to a d h e re stric tly to th e g u id e lin e s in SC /R -184. A c o n tro v e rs y o v e r th e sale of 100 s u r p lu s P-51 fig h te r a irc raft to S w e d e n re v e a le d th e s tr e n g th o f th e d e p a r tm e n t's c o m m it­ m e n t. S ta te 's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs u r g e d a p p ro v a l of th e sale " in v ie w of o u r e x tre m e ly c o rd ia l re la tio n s w ith S w e d e n " a n d th e "pacific in flu e n c e in E u ro p e " of S w e d e n 's Social D e m o cratic g o v e rn m e n t. B y rn e s, ho w ev er, re je c te d th e p r o p o s e d tra n s a c tio n b e c a u se it w a s in c o n s is te n t w ith S C /R -184.57 D e sp ite th is d is a p p ro v a l, th e F o re ig n L iq u id a tio n C o m m is s io n m is ta k e n ly s ig n e d a c o n tra c t o n 16 A p ril 1946 fo r th e d e liv e ry of th e p la n e s to S w e d e n . F or th e n e x t five m o n th s A c h e s o n m a d e e v e ry e ffo rt to c a n c e l th e c o n tra c t. U n a b le to d o so , h e in fo rm e d th e S p ecial C o m m itte e th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld c a rry o u t th e sale as a n e x c e p tio n to its g e n e ra l policy. T h e s e c re ta ry 's S taff C o m m itte e fin a lly a u th o riz e d th e re le a se of th e a irc raft o n 1 O cto b er, b u t A c h e s o n e m p h a s iz e d to th e d e p a r tm e n t's Policy C o m m itte e o n A rm s a n d A rm a m e n ts th a t SC /R -184 s h o u ld c o n tin u e to g u id e d eci­ s io n s o n a rm s tr a n s fe r s .58 W ith th e e x c e p tio n of th is tra n s a c tio n w ith S w e d e n a n d se v e ra l m in o r s u r p lu s sales, a rm s a id d u rin g th e first y e a r of p e a c e d id n o t e x c e e d th e lim its of SC /R -184. T he a d m in is tra tio n so ld c o n sid e ra b le

Emergence o f Military Assistance Programs • 27 ex cess e q u ip m e n t to F ra n c e a n d E n g la n d in 1946. A fte r p ro tra c te d in te rn a l d e b a te , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a p p ro v e d lim ite d tra n s fe rs to L a tin A m e ric a b u t g a v e o n ly te p id s u p p o r t to a bill fo r c o n tin u in g in te rA m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n , w h ic h d ie d in th e S e v e n ty -n in th C o n ­ g re s s . T ru m a n a u th o riz e d s u b s ta n tia l m ilita ry h e lp to th e N a tio n a lis t C h in e s e , b u t in A u g u s t 1946 th e p r e s id e n t's sp e c ia l re p re s e n ta tiv e in C h in a , G e n e ra l G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll, s u s p e n d e d d e liv e rie s of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t b e c a u se of th e lack of p ro g re s s to w a rd a n in te rn a l s e ttle ­ m e n t. A m e ric a n officials a g re e d in p rin c ip le to sa les of s u r p lu s e q u ip ­ m e n t to C a n a d a to f u r th e r jo in t d e fe n se , b u t n o n e to o k p lac e in th a t firs t y e a r a fte r th e w ar. Finally, th e a d m in is tra tio n fu r n is h e d s u b s ta n tia l q u a n titie s of s u r ­ p lu s a rm a m e n ts to th e P h ilip p in e s u n d e r th e a u th o rity of th e o n ly m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n e n a c te d d u rin g th e first y e a r of p e a c e . C o n g re s s a p p ro v e d th is m e a s u re b e c a u se it h e lp e d p e rp e tu a te U .S . in flu e n c e in th e P h ilip p in e s a fte r th e g r a n tin g of its in d e p e n d e n c e o n 4 Ju ly 1946, a n d d id so w ith o u t r e q u ir in g —a t le a st im m e d ia te ly —an y n e w a p p ro p r ia tio n s sin c e e x te n siv e sto c k s of e q u ip m e n t w e re left o v e r fro m W o rld W ar II a n d s to r e d in A m e ric a n d e p o ts in th e P h ilip p in e s . O n th e ev e of P h ilip p in e in d e p e n d e n c e th e U n ite d S ta te s tr a n s fe r r e d to th e m $100 m illio n in s u r p lu s m u n itio n s , th e first in s ta llm e n t in a p r o g r a m to e q u ip sm a ll a rm e d fo rc e s th a t c o u ld m a in ta in in te rn a l secu rity . T h ese tra n s fe rs p ro v id e d th e n e w ly in d e p e n d e n t re p u b lic w ith th e m e a n s to fig h t th e H u k b a la h a p s , p e a s a n t re v o lu tio n a rie s w h o b e g a n to c la sh w ith g o v e rn m e n t tro o p s in th e first h a lf of 1946. F ilip in o le a d e rs trie d to u n d e r c u t s u p p o r t fo r th e H u k s b y c h a rg in g th a t th e y w e re c o n tro lle d b y C o m m u n is ts , a n a lle g a tio n th a t w a s u n d o u b te d ly e x a g g e ra te d . A lth o u g h th e H u k re s is ta n c e w a s lim ite d a n d s c a tte re d , th e P h ilip p in e g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld n o t s u p p r e s s it w ith o u t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id . G e n e ra l W. H . A rn o ld o f th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's O p e ra tio n D iv isio n to ld th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffa irs C o m m itte e . In r e tu r n fo r th is h e lp th e U n ite d S ta te s m a in ta in e d th e frie n d s h ip of th e P h ilip p in e g o v e rn m e n t a n d , m o re im p o r ta n t, s e c u re d th e rig h ts to "a k e y s to n e in th e f o u n d a tio n of a b a s e s y s te m e s s e n tia l to th e s e c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s." A c c o rd in g to a n a g re e m e n t s ig n e d o n 14 M a rc h 1947, th e U n ite d S ta te s a c q u ire d th e rig h ts to m a in ta in six te e n b a s e s a n d m ilita ry facilities in th e P h ilip p in e s fo r n in e ty -n in e y e a rs a n d to e sta b lis h s e v e n o th e rs at d e s ig n a te d site s s h o u ld m ilita ry n e c e s s ity r e q u ir e .59 W h ile C o n g re s s a p p ro v e d th e P h ilip p in e s M ilita ry A s sista n c e A ct,

28 • Arming the Free World it b a lk e d a t th e sole a d m in is tra tio n r e q u e s t fo r g lo b al a u th o rity to a id fo re ig n m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . T h is le g isla tio n , w h ic h T ru m a n s e n t to C o n g re s s in F e b ru a ry 1946, w o u ld h a v e a llo w e d th e p r e s id e n t to s e n d m ilita ry a n d n a v a l a d v is o ry g ro u p s to a n y n a tio n th a t d e s ire d s u c h h elp . By th e a u tu m n of 1945 T urkey a n d S y ria h a d r e q u e s te d A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v is e rs; Ira n h a d a s k e d fo r th e c o n tin u a tio n of th e a rm y a n d g e n d a rm e rie m is s io n s th a t h a d b e e n e s ta b lis h e d d u rin g W o rld W ar II u n d e r e m e rg e n c y e x ec u tiv e p o w e rs . Yet e x istin g le g isla tio n , w h ic h a llo w e d th e d is p a tc h of se rv ice a d v is o ry g r o u p s o n ly to th e o th e r A m e ric a n n a tio n s a n d th e P h ilip p in e s , n o t o n ly p re c lu d e d a c tio n o n th e T u rk ish a n d S y ria n r e q u e s ts b u t a lso tacitly s u p p o r te d th e p e r ­ p e tu a tio n of s p h e re s of in flu e n c e , a c c o rd in g to th e S W N C C , w h ic h d ra fte d th e m is s io n s bill. "T h e fo re ig n p o licy of th e U n ite d S ta te s, d e v o id of im p e ria listic d e s ig n u p o n th e s o v e re ig n ty of a n y n a tio n ," d e c la re d th e S W N C C , " le a d s m a n y of th e s m a lle r n a tio n s to p re fe r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e ." D e s p ite s u c h a ltru is tic ju stific a tio n s , so m e c o n ­ g re s s io n a l c o n se rv a tiv e s re m a in e d u n m o v e d . R e p re s e n ta tiv e K arl E. M u n d t (R -S.D .) c o m p la in e d th a t th e A m e ric a n a d v is o ry g r o u p s p r o ­ v id e d th e S o v iet U n io n w ith a n ex cu se fo r k e e p in g its tro o p s in Ira n . T h e U n ite d S ta te s , h e a s s e rte d , w o u ld n e v e r c o n s e n t to sim ila r R u s s ia n m is s io n s in M exico. A lth o u g h M u n d t c o u ld n o t p r e v e n t th e bill fro m p a s s in g th e H o u s e , R o b e rt A . Taft (R -O hio) k ille d th e le g isla tio n in th e S e n a te . U n til th e U n ite d N a tio n s h a d a c h a n c e to e s ta b lis h its au th o rity , Taft a rg u e d , " w e s h o u ld n o t b e s e n d in g m ilita ry m is s io n s all o v e r th e w o rld to te a c h p e o p le h o w to fig h t in A m e ric a n w a y s ." 60 T h o se m e a s u re s th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id im p le m e n t d u rin g th e first y e a r of p e a c e d id n o t c o n s titu te a n in te g ra te d p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . A lth o u g h th e y s h a r e d c o m m o n g o a ls, s u c h as p r e p a r in g fo r a f u tu r e w ar, c h e c k in g th e s p re a d of C o m m u n is t in flu ­ e n c e , a n d a d v a n c in g b u re a u c ra tic in te re s ts , n o sin g le o b jec tiv e p r e ­ d o m in a te d . N o c o h e re n t p u r p o s e y e t tra n s c e n d e d c o n flicts w ith in th e g o v e rn m e n t. S W N C C 202/2 all b u t ig n o re d th e g e n e ra l g o a ls of m ili­ ta ry a id p ro g ra m s in fav o r of a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try c a ta lo g of policy. In d e e d th e d e b a te w ith in th e g o v e rn m e n t fo c u s e d n o t so m u c h o n g e n e ra l p o lic ies a s o n sp ecific p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id . N o t u n til th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n la u n c h e d its p o licy of c o n ta in m e n t in la te 1946 a n d e a rly 1947 d id m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s g a in th e o v e rrid in g p u r p o s e th a t c a rrie d th e m d e e p in to th e fabric of n a tio n a l se c u rity policy.

1Military Aid and I Hemispheric Defense

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I think it is fundamental that we should do everything within our pow er in a reasonable manner to unify the entire Western Hemisphere, so far as we can, in our thinking and in our arrangements, for our own security, for our own well-being. —Secretary o f State G eorge C. Marshall, 23 June 1947 The Latin American arm ed forces contribution to U.S. security would be relatively small. The chief gain to the U.S. from a Latin American military aid program would be the continued alinement of these countries with the U.S., their greater willingness to furnish bases and strategic materials and the increased security o f certain critical strategic areas. —Army staff memorandum, 16 January 1949

W o r d W ar II p ro v e d to U .S . p o lic y m a k e rs th e in te rd e p e n d e n c e of n a tio n a l a n d h e m is p h e ric secu rity . "T h e fact h a s b e e n w ell e s ta b lis h e d d u rin g th is w a r /' w ro te o n e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t e x p e rt in L atin A m e ri­ c a n a ffa irs in e a rly 1945, " th a t th e A m e ric a n re p u b lic s c o n s titu te a sin g le stra te g ic d e fe n s e a re a . N e ith e r th e U n ite d S ta te s n o r a n y o th e r A m e ric a n re p u b lic c a n b e se c u re a g a in s t a g g re s s io n fro m o v e rse a s u n le s s th e s e c u rity of all o th e r re p u b lic s is a lso s a fe g u a rd e d ." 1 T he Jo in ts C h ie fs of S taff c o m m e n te d a y e a r la te r th a t " th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re is a d is tin c t m ilita ry e n tity , th e in te g rity o f w h ic h is a fu n d a m e n ­ tal p o s tu la te o f o u r o w n s e c u rity in th e e v e n t of a n o th e r W o rld W ar."2 A lth o u g h p o litical a n d m ilita ry a u th o ritie s s h a r e d th e s e c o n v ic tio n s, th e y c la s h e d re p e a te d ly o v e r a p ro g ra m of L atin A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e d e s ig n e d to c o n so lid a te th e d e fe n s e s of th e h e m is p h e re . T h eir c o n flicts re v e a le d h o w s h a rp ly th e se rv ice s a n d th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t c o u ld d iffe r d u rin g th e e a rly p o s tw a r p e rio d o v e r u s in g m ilita ry a id as a m a jo r in s tr u m e n t to b u ild U .S . in flu e n c e o v e rse a s. A t th e e n d of W o rld W ar II th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a rtm e n ts a g re e d in p rin c ip le th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld s e n d e q u ip m e n t a n d

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30 • Arming the Free World a d v is e rs to th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s to p ro m o te th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts . E q u a lly im p o r ta n t w a s th e o b v e rs e of s ta n ­ d a rd iz a tio n , th e e x c lu sio n o f E u ro p e a n a rm s a n d m ilita ry m is sio n s fro m th e h e m is p h e re . W a s h in g to n officials re m e m b e re d th e in flu e n c e th a t G e rm a n a d v is e rs c o m m a n d e d in L a tin A m e ric a n m ilita ry circles o n th e ev e of th e w ar. T h ey a lso re c a lle d th e d iffic u lties of in te rA m e ric a n m ilita ry c o lla b o ra tio n a t a tim e w h e n th e h e m is p h e re fac ed th e d a n g e rs of A xis s u b v e rs io n a n d in v a s io n . M in d fu l of th e s e le s s o n s of th e p a s t, th e S W N C C c o n c lu d e d in Ju ly 1945 th a t " th e U n ite d S ta te s m u s t ta k e m e a s u re s to p r e v e n t s u c h a s itu a tio n as c o n fro n te d it at th e o u ts e t o f th is w a r fro m a g a in a ris in g to h a m p e r a n d je o p a rd iz e th e c o m m o n d e fe n s e ." 3 Political a n d m ilita ry officials d iffe re d , h o w ev er, o v e r th e u rg e n c y a n d im p o rta n c e of s ta n d a r d iz in g th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts of th e h e m is p h e re . B ecau se of re v o lu tio n a ry c h a n g e s in th e te c h n o lo g y of w a rfa re a n d s w e e p in g re a lig n m e n ts in in te rn a tio n a l p o w er, serv ice a u th o ritie s b e lie v e d th a t th e se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s d e p e n d e d m o re th a n e v e r b e fo re u p o n h e m is p h e ric so lid arity . In a n e ra of to ta l w ar, th e y a rg u e d , th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld n o t m e re ly u p h o ld th e M o n ro e D o c trin e b u t m u s t a lso in s u la te th e h e m is p h e re fro m all fo r­ e ig n m ilita ry in flu e n c e s . A t th e e n d of W o rld W ar II th e y a d v o c a te d sw ift p a s s a g e of a n in te r-A m e ric a n a rm s bill a n d la rg e -sc a le m ilita ry a id b e fo re E u ro p e a n a d v is e rs a n d a rm s tra d e rs c o u ld re e s ta b lis h th e ir p re w a r tie s to L a tin A m e ric a . T h e p u r p o s e of th is W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fen se P ro g ra m , th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t c o n c lu d e d , w a s n o t to p re p a re th e L a tin A m e ric a n fo rce s to fig h t in a f u tu r e co n flict b u t to se c u re g o o d w ill a n d m a in ta in th e o r ie n ta tio n of th e o th e r A m e ric a n n a tio n s to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s. T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, o n th e o th e r h a n d , saw d a n g e rs in th e a m b itio u s a rm s p ro g ra m s p r o p o s e d b y th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r t­ m e n ts . In th e a b se n c e of a n im m e d ia te m ilita ry th r e a t to th e h e m i­ s p h e re , p o litical officials fa v o re d o n ly lim ite d m ilita ry a id , in o rd e r to av o id fu e lin g local riv a lrie s a n d re in fo rc in g a u th o rita ria n re g im e s . For tw o y e a rs th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b a ttle d w ith W ar a n d N a v y o v e r m ilita ry a id to L atin A m e ric a. T h e in te n s ific a tio n of th e C o ld W ar h e lp e d e n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's re s is ta n c e in e a rly 1947, b u t it also b ro u g h t a n e w a w a re n e s s of th e lim its o n U .S . re s o u rc e s a n d a clarifica­ tio n of g lo b al p rio ritie s th a t p u s h e d th e L a tin A m e ric a n p ro g ra m to a

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 31 lo w p rio rity . S ta lle d a t first b y c o n flic tin g v ie w s w ith in th e g o v e rn ­ m e n t, th e e a rly p la n s fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to L atin A m e ric a e v e n ­ tu a lly g av e w ay to a re c a lib ra tio n of in te re s ts a g a in s t re s o u rc e s.

T h e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m s p r a n g fro m th e d e s ire s of th e a rm y a n d n a v y to p re s e rv e a n d e x te n d th e in flu e n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d b e e n b u ild in g in L a tin A m e ric a sin c e th e e v e of th e S e c o n d W o rld W ar.4 By th e late 1930s P re s id e n t F ra n k lin D. R o o se v e lt fe a re d th a t H itle r a s p ir e d to w o rld c o n q u e s t a n d p o s e d a re a l th r e a t to th e se c u rity of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re . A la rm e d b y G e rm a n y 's e x te n siv e p o litical a n d e co n o m ic p e n e tr a tio n of L a tin A m e ric a, R o o se v e lt a t­ ta c h e d n e w im p o rta n c e to in te r-A m e ric a n re la tio n s . B e g in n in g in 1938 h e a p p ro v e d a m b itio u s p ro g ra m s of e co n o m ic a id , c u ltu ra l e x ch a n g e, a n d p u b lic w o rk s a im e d at ty in g th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s clo sely to th e U n ite d S ta te s . A s G e rm a n y s w e p t first to d ip lo m a tic tr iu m p h s a n d th e n to m ilita ry v ic to rie s in E u ro p e , R o o se v e lt re p e a te d ly w a rn e d th a t th e A m e ric a n n a tio n s fa c e d th e c o m m o n d a n g e r of in v a s io n . A fte r th e o u tb re a k of w a r h e a lso w o r r ie d a b o u t o m in o u s r e p o r ts of s u b v e rs io n a n d fifth -c o lu m n m o v e m e n ts th a t m ig h t t u r n B razil, A rg e n tin a , U ru ­ guay, a n d P a ra g u a y in to N a z i sa te llite s. To m e e t th e th r e a t of G e rm a n a g g re s s io n , R o o se v e lt a n n o u n c e d in N o v e m b e r 1938 th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld u s e its a rm e d fo rc e s to p ro te c t all A m e ric a n n a tio n s , a d e c la ra tio n th a t in s p ir e d a s h ift in m ilita ry p la n n in g fro m n a tio n a l to h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se . A t in te r-A m e ric a n c o n fe re n c e s in L im a (D e ce m ­ b e r 1938), P a n a m a C ity (S e p te m b e r - O c to b e r 1939), H a v a n a (July 1940), a n d R io d e Ja n e iro (Ja n u a ry 1942), U .S . r e p re s e n ta tiv e s u r g e d c o n ti­ n e n ta l s o lid a rity a g a in s t th e A xis th re a t. T h e d e le g a te s c o o p e ra te d b y a g re e in g in H a v a n a to c o n s id e r a n a tta c k a g a in s t o n e n a tio n a n a ttac k a g a in s t all a n d b y v o tin g a t R io to re c o m m e n d to th e ir g o v e rn m e n ts th e s e v e ra n c e of d ip lo m a tic re la tio n s w ith G e rm a n y a n d Ja p a n . S u c h ac­ tio n s m a rk e d a n e w h ig h in in te r-A m e ric a n u n ity u n d e r U .S. le a d ­ e rs h ip .5 T h e e s ta b lis h m e n t of close m ilita ry re la tio n s w ith L atin A m e ric a w a s a n im p o r ta n t p a r t of th e R o o se v e lt a d m in is tra tio n 's e ffo rt to p r o ­ m o te h e m is p h e ric so lid arity . T h e re w a s m u c h ro o m fo r im p ro v e m e n t in th e s e re la tio n s , sin c e o n th e e v e of th e w a r U .S . a rm e d fo rce s h a d little in te re s t a n d e v e n le ss in flu e n c e in L a tin A m e ric a. E u ro p e a n n a tio n s

32 • Arming the Free World d o m in a te d th e tr a in in g a n d s u p p ly of L a tin A m e ric a n a rm e d fo rce s. G e rm a n y a n d Italy p la y e d le a d in g ro les, th e ir lo n g -e s ta b lis h e d a d v is o ry m is s io n s in s tillin g re s p e c t fo r A xis m ilita ry m ig h t a n d w in ­ n in g th e fav o r of a d m ira ls a n d g e n e ra ls w h o d o m in a te d L atin A m e ric a n p o litics. In e a rly 1938 th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b e g a n u rg in g th e a rm y a n d n a v y to c o u n te ra c t th e s e N a z i a n d F ascist in flu e n c e s b y in c re a s in g c o n ta c ts w ith th e ir L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n te rp a rts . T h e se rv ice s r e ­ s p o n d e d first w ith sy m b o lic g e s tu r e s —g o o d w ill v isits, d e m o n s tra tio n flig h ts, a n d tra in in g o f L a tin A m e ric a n officers in U .S . sch o o ls. T he p r o d d in g of U n d e r S e c re ta ry S u m n e r W elles, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's fo re m o s t a d v o c a te of P a n -A m e ric a n c o o p e ra tio n , a n d th e a p p ro v a l of n e w R A IN B O W w a r p la n s e n c o m p a s s in g h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se b ro u g h t m o re a m b itio u s e ffo rts, in c lu d in g th e e v e n tu a l s ta tio n in g of m ilita ry a tta c h é s o r a d v is e rs in e v e ry L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n . T h e w ith d ra w a l of G e rm a n a n d Ita lia n m is s io n s a fte r th e o u tb re a k of w a r p ro v id e d th e U n ite d S ta te s w ith a n e x tra o rd in a ry o p p o rtu n ity , u n im a g in a b le o n ly a few y e a rs earlier, to fo rg e s tr o n g lin k s w ith m o s t L a tin A m e ric a n m ilita ry le a d e rs .6 T he R o o se v e lt a d m in is tra tio n a c c e le ra te d its e ffo rts to se c u re th e s e tie s in m id -1940, as G e rm a n a rm ie s s w e p t F ra n ce fro m th e w ar. T he G e rm a n b litz k rie g c a u s e d n e w fe a rs of a tra n s a tla n tic strik e la u n c h e d fro m F re n c h W est A frica, a n d R o o se v e lt u r g e n tly d ire c te d th e a rm y a n d n a v y to p la n fo r th e d is p a tc h of a n e x p e d itio n a ry fo rce to p ro te c t th e b u lg e of B razil. H e a lso a u th o riz e d b ila te ra l sta ff ta lk s, h e ld d u rin g th e s u m m e r of 1940, to a rra n g e fo r m ilita ry c o lla b o ra tio n w ith th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s in th e e v e n t of a n e m e rg e n c y . B ecau se th e y d o u b te d th a t th e L a tin A m e ric a n fo rce s c o u ld se rv e as "effe ctiv e allies in w ar," W ar D e p a rtm e n t a u th o ritie s a im e d in s te a d d u rin g th e s e c o n v e rs a tio n s at " b e tte r m u tu a l u n d e r s ta n d in g " b y " im p re s s in g L atin A m e ric a n o fficers w ith o u r m ilita ry p r e p a r e d n e s s a n d o u r d e te rm in a tio n to u p h o ld th e M o n ro e D o c trin e ." T h is u n d e rs ta n d in g , th e y h o p e d , w o u ld le a d to c o o p e ra tio n w ith U .S . d e fe n se p la n s , p rim a rily b y p ro v id in g access to b a s e facilities in L a tin A m e ric a . T h is b a sic d e c isio n , to u s e m ilita ry a id p rim a rily to se c u re g o o d w ill ra th e r th a n to ra ise th e m ili­ ta ry c a p a b ilitie s of L a tin A m e ric a n fo rce s, g u id e d U .S . p o licy th r o u g h ­ o u t th e w a r.7 In r e tu r n fo r th e ir c o o p e ra tio n in d e fe n d in g th e h e m is p h e re , th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s r e q u e s te d s u b s ta n tia l m ilita ry a id fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s . T h e ir n e e d fo r s u c h a s s is ta n c e b e c a m e u r g e n t a fte r th e

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 33 o u tb re a k o f w a r all b u t h a lte d th e flo w of a rm s fro m th e E u ro p e a n n a tio n s th a t h a d e q u ip p e d m o s t of th e ir a rm e d fo rce s. A lth o u g h R o o se­ v e lt a n d W elles re c o g n iz e d th e a d v a n ta g e s of p ro v id in g m ilita ry a id , leg al re s tric tio n s m a d e d iffic u lt th e tra n s fe r of a n y th in g b u t a n tiq u a te d c o a s ta l-d e fe n s e e q u ip m e n t, w h ic h th e L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s re fu s e d to p u rc h a s e . T he p a s s a g e of th e L e n d -L e a se A ct in M a rc h 1941 re m o v e d th e leg al o b sta c le b u t d id n o t a llev ia te th e sc a rc ity of m a te rie l, w h ic h p ro v e d to b e th e g re a te r im p e d im e n t to m e e tin g L a tin A m e ric a n d e m a n d s . A t a tim e w h e n it c o u ld n o t sa tisfy th e re q u ire m e n ts of its o w n r e a r m a m e n t p r o g r a m s a n d th e e n o rm o u s d e m a n d s of G re a t B rit­ a in a n d th e S o v iet U n io n , th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t w a s n o t a b o u t to d iv e rt sc arce re s o u rc e s to m u c h le ss u r g e n t n e e d s . If th e L a tin A m e ric a n s c o u ld n o t u n d e r s ta n d s u c h re a s o n in g . S e c re ta ry of W ar H e n ry L. S tim s o n p riv a te ly f u m e d , th e y h a d n o in te llig e n c e .8 T h u s a t th e tim e of g re a te s t d a n g e r to th e h e m is p h e re , th e U n ite d S ta te s p ro v id e d L a tin A m e ric a w ith to k e n s h ip m e n ts of a rm a m e n ts — v a lu in g o n ly $125 m illio n b y m id-1943. T h e fa ilu re to m e e t e v e n m in i­ m a l r e q u e s ts fo r a rm s o c c a sio n a lly s tr a in e d re la tio n s w ith a few L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s , s u c h a s B razil, w h o s e le a d e rs th o u g h t th a t th e ir e n th u s ia s tic a n d e x te n siv e s u p p o r t of h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se m e a s u re s m e rite d a sp e c ia l r e la tio n s h ip w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s. Yet W ar D e p a rt­ m e n t a n a ly s ts fo u n d , o n b a la n c e , th a t th is lim ite d a ssis ta n c e w a s e n o u g h to a c h ie v e th e fu n d a m e n ta l o b jec tiv e of in d u c in g c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s . "P rim arily , it [le n d -le a se to L a tin A m erica] h a s tid e d u s o v e r a p e rio d o f u n c e r ta in ty a n d a n x ie ty w h e n it w as n o t k n o w n w h ic h w ay th e se v e ra l c o u n trie s w e re g o in g to le a n . It is b e lie v e d to h a v e b e e n a c o n trib u tin g fa c to r in sta b iliz in g in te rn a l c o n d i­ tio n s , it h a s d e v e lo p e d a n a d d e d fe e lin g of c o n fid e n c e in th e ir a b ility to re s is t a g g re s s io n a n d it h a s s e rv e d to a ro u s e a n in te re s t in A m e ric a n m a d e m u n itio n s ." 9 T h is a s s e s s m e n t re fle c te d th e s h a r p c h a n g e th a t h a d o c c u rre d in th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's th in k in g a b o u t L atin A m e ric a . D e sp ite e a rlie r r e s e r ­ v a tio n s , m a n y u n ifo rm e d o fficers b e c a m e c o n v in c e d of th e v a lu e of s tr o n g h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry tie s. T h ro u g h th e f u r n is h in g of a rm s , th e d is p a tc h of m ilita ry m is s io n s , a n d th e c re a tio n of a n In te r-A m e ric a n D e fe n se B o a rd , th e se rv ic e s d e v e lo p e d clo se re la tio n s h ip s w ith m o s t of th e L a tin A m e ric a n m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . T h o se re la tio n s h ip s y ie ld e d , in th e ir view , im p o r ta n t b e n e fits —access to b a s e s a n d stra te g ic ra w m a te ria ls , c o o p e ra tio n in e co n o m ic w a rfa re , a n d s u p p o r t of U .S.

34 • Arming the Free World d e fe n se p la n s . E a g e r to p re s e rv e th e s e a d v a n ta g e s , m ilita ry a u th o ritie s re p la c e d p o litical officials as th e p rin c ip a l a d v o c a te s of in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n . E v e n w ith th e e n d of a n y im p o r ta n t stra te g ic d a n g e r to th e h e m is p h e re , e ffo rts to p ro v id e m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a a c tu a lly g a in e d m o m e n tu m .10

I n D e c e m b e r 1943 th e se rv ic e s re v e a le d th e ir p rin c ip a l p o s tw a r o b jec ­ tiv e in L a tin A m e ric a w h e n th e Jo in t A rm y a n d N a v y A d v is o ry B o a rd o n A m e ric a n R e p u b lic s re c o m m e n d e d th e u s e of le n d -le a se to e n c o u r­ a g e th e s ta n d a r d iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts . A lth o u g h E u ro ­ p e a n n a tio n s h a d e q u ip p e d m o s t of th e L atin A m e ric a n m ilita ry e s ta b ­ lis h m e n ts b e fo re th e w ar, th e Jo in t B o a rd n o w in s is te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld se ttle fo r n o th in g less th a n a m o n o p o ly o v e r th e s u p p ly of a rm s w ith in th e h e m is p h e re . O th e rw is e , it p re d ic te d , th e e n d of th e w a r w o u ld b rin g a n u n r e s tr a in e d a rm s tra d e as fo rm e r b e llig e re n ts , in c lu d in g th e A xis p o w e rs , d u m p e d s u r p lu s m u n itio n s th ro u g h o u t th e c o n tin e n t. T he r e s u lt w o u ld b e th e in fla m m a tio n of local riv alrie s a n d th e r e a p p e a ra n c e of h o stile m ilita ry in flu e n c e s in a n a re a n o w d e e m e d v ita l to th e se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s. B ecau se it w o u ld a v e rt th e s e p r e s u m e d d a n g e rs , th e Jo in t B o a rd c o n s id e re d th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n o f h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts "o f first im p o rta n c e to th e p e a c e a n d sa fe ty of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re " a n d p r o p o s e d a m a jo r re v is io n of le n d -le a se p o licy th a t re fle c te d th is a s s e s s m e n t. W h ile u rg in g n e w re s tric tio n s o n le n d -le a se fo r w a rtim e p ro je c ts , th e Jo in t B o a rd a d v o c a te d lim ite d m ilita ry a id to p ro m o te th e p o s tw a r s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts . A m a jo r o b jec tiv e of th is n e w le n d -le a se policy, th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t e x p la in e d , w a s " to d a n g le b e fo re th e A m e ric a n R e p u b lics ju s t su ffic ie n t e q u ip m e n t to m a in ta in th a t in te re s t [in U .S . a rm a m e n ts ] w h ic h n o w e x is ts ." 11 E v e n th o u g h th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff a n d A c tin g S e c re ta ry of S ta te E d w a rd R. S te ttin iu s , Jr., e n d o rs e d th e Jo in t B o a rd 's re p o r t, co n flict s o o n e r u p te d b e tw e e n th e se rv ic e s a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o v e r re s tric tin g w a rtim e a id a n d p la n n in g p o s tw a r a ssista n c e . O n e of th e s h a r p e s t d is a g re e m e n ts c o n c e rn e d th e c o n tro l of le n d -le a se a llo ca tio n s fo r th e re m a in d e r of th e w ar. S in c e th e re w a s n o lo n g e r a n y m a jo r A xis th r e a t to th e h e m is p h e re , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t m a in ta in e d th a t p o liti­ cal c o n s id e ra tio n s s h o u ld g o v e rn th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry s u p p lie s to L atin A m e ric a , e x c e p t B razil a n d M exico, th e tw o c o u n trie s th a t w e re

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 35 p r e p a r in g sm a ll fo rc e s to fig h t o u ts id e th e h e m is p h e re . By re g u la tin g th e a s s ig n m e n t of le n d -le a se m u n itio n s , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h o p e d to e s ta b lis h its c o n tro l o v e r L atin A m e ric a n policy. B ut th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts je a lo u s ly g u a rd e d th e in flu e n c e o v e r P a n -A m e ric a n a ffa irs th a t th e y h a d g a in e d d u rin g th e w a r a n d in s is te d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s e n c ro a c h in g o n their p re ro g a tiv e s . A d m ira l E rn e s t J. K in g , th e c h ie f of n a v a l o p e ra tio n s , c o m p la in e d th a t " th e w h o le o b jec t in h a v in g a p o licy o n th is su b je c t [the d is trib u tio n of le n d -le a se to L atin A m erica] w a s to av o id th e n e c e s s ity of re fe rrin g in d iv id u a l re q u e s ts to th e D e p a rtm e n t of S ta te ." A d m ira l W. O . S p e a rs , th e se n io r n a v y m e m b e r of th e Jo in t B o a rd , b lu n tly a s s e rte d th a t th e a s s ig n m e n t of len d -le a se m u n itio n s w as b e y o n d th e p u rv ie w of th e S tate D e p a rt­ m e n t.12 T h is d is p u te c a m e to a h e a d in th e s u m m e r of 1944 o v e r a P e ru v ia n r e q u e s t fo r tw e lv e d iv e -b o m b e rs . S p e a rs in s is te d th a t th e se a irc raft w e re n e c e s s a ry fo r c o a sta l d e fe n se a n d d e c la re d th a t th e n a v y w o u ld re g a r d a n y S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in te r v e n tio n in th e m a tte r as a n " im ­ p in g e m e n t" o n its a u th o rity . O fficials in S ta te 's O ffice of A m e ric a n R e p u b lic A ffairs (A RA ), o n th e o th e r h a n d , th o u g h t th a t th e p la n e s e x c e e d e d le g itim a te m ilita ry re q u ir e m e n ts a n d th a t th e ir tra n s fe r w o u ld u p s e t re la tio n s b e tw e e n P e ru a n d its n e ig h b o rs . T irin g of S p e a rs 's a rr o g a n t e ffo rts to exclude h is d e p a r tm e n t fro m le n d -le a se d e c isio n s. S e c re ta ry of S ta te C o rd e ll H u ll a p p e a le d to th e p re s id e n t, w h o s u s ta in e d H u ll's p o s itio n . A fte r le a rn in g of R o o se v e lt's d e c isio n , se rv ice re p re s e n ta tiv e s fin a lly a d m itte d th a t c o n s id e ra tio n s of fo re ig n p o licy s h o u ld p re v a il in th e a llo c a tio n s of le n d -le a se a rm a m e n ts to L a tin A m e ric a . D e sp ite th is c o n c e s s io n , th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts c o n tin u e d to q u a rre l fo r th e d u ra tio n of th e w a r o v e r th e ir sp ecific re s p o n s ib ilitie s fo r h e m is p h e ric a rm s tr a n s f e r s .13 T he th r e e d e p a r tm e n ts e n c o u n te r e d sim ila r d iffic u lties in e s ta b lis h ­ in g p ro c e d u re s fo r b ila te ra l sta ff ta lk s w ith th e L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s . T h e p u r p o s e of th e s e c o n v e rs a tio n s w a s to in s u re L a tin A m e ric a n c o o p e ra tio n w ith U .S . p o s tw a r d e fe n s e p o licies a n d to h e lp th e R oo­ se v elt a d m in is tra tio n d e te rm in e th e a m o u n t of m ilita ry a ssista n c e n e e d e d to s ta n d a r d iz e h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts . B oth d ip lo m a tic a n d m ilita ry officials w e re e a g e r to b e g in th e sta ff ta lk s b u t w e re d iv id e d o v e r th e role of th e U .S . a m b a s s a d o r in th e d is c u s s io n s . T h is d is p u te ra is e d a g a in th e f u n d a m e n ta l q u e s tio n of re s p o n s ib ility in m a k in g h e m is p h e ric policy, a n d b o th sid e s is s u e d sh rill w a rn in g s th a t th e o th e r

36 • Arming the Free World w a s try in g to u s u r p its a u th o rity . F or e x a m p le , G e n e ra l Jo h n E. H u ll, th e a rm y 's a s s is ta n t c h ie f of sta ff fo r o p e ra tio n s , d e c la re d th a t th e p ro c e d u re s fo r th e sta ff ta lk s a d v o c a te d b y th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w o u ld e s ta b lis h " a d a n g e r o u s p r e c e d e n t . . . w h e re in m ilita ry p e rs o n n e l in fo re ig n c o u n trie s w o u ld b e su b je c t to th e o v e rrid in g a u th o rity of th e A m e ric a n A m b a s s a d o r in m ilita ry m a tte rs b e y o n d th e c o g n iz a n c e of th e D e p a rtm e n t of S ta te ." 14 S p ru ille B ra d en , a m b a s s a d o r to C u b a , c o u n te re d th a t th e s e rv ic e s' p r o p o s e d in s tru c tio n s , b y g iv in g th e a rm y a n d n a v y u n d u e in flu e n c e o v e r p o litical m a tte rs , " w o u ld v io la te th e fu n d a m e n ta l law th a t th e D e p a rtm e n t of S ta te is c h a rg e d w ith th e c o n d u c t of o u r fo re ig n affairs." U n a b le to re c o n c ile th e s e c o n flic tin g v ie w s, th e th r e e d e p a r tm e n ts h a lte d th e sta ff ta lk s in O c to b e r 1944 a fte r th e first r o u n d of d is c u s s io n s w ith B razil. O n ly a fte r m o n th s of w r a n ­ g lin g d id th e y a g re e th a t th e a m b a s s a d o r s h o u ld h a v e p r im a r y r e s p o n ­ sib ility fo r th e c o n d u c t of th e s e c o n v e rs a tio n s , a n a rr a n g e m e n t th a t a llo w e d th e sta ff ta lk s to r e s u m e in J a n u a ry 1945.15 D e sp ite p ro g re s s in s e ttlin g d iffe re n c e s o v e r th e sta ff ta lk s a n d le n d le a se , h e m is p h e ric a rm s p o licy c o n tin u e d to a ro u s e b u re a u c ra tic a n i­ m o sitie s. T he se rv ic e s ' m o s t z e a lo u s a d v o c a te s of in te r-A m e ric a n m ili­ ta r y c o o p e ra tio n , s u c h as G e n e ra l G e o rg e H . B rett, a rm y c o m m a n d e r in th e C a rib b e a n , o fte n r e g a r d e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a s a n o b sta cle to th e re a liz a tio n o f th e ir p la n s . P o s tu la tin g "a c o m m o n u n d e rs ta n d in g . . . a m o n g all m ilita ry m e n ," B rett a s s e r te d th a t " th e m o s t effectiv e m e th o d of a p p ro a c h in a n y A m e ric a n iz a tio n p ro g ra m w ill b e b y th e u s e of m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts ." H e f re q u e n tly v is ite d L a tin A m e ric a n m ili­ ta ry le a d e rs a n d o ffe re d a s s is ta n c e , so m e tim e s w ith o u t first c o n s u ltin g e ith e r th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o r th e c h ie f of m is sio n . O c c a sio n a lly h is a ctiv itie s p ro v e d e m b a rra s s in g , as w h e n h e p ro m is e d a irc raft to th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic a t a tim e w h e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s try in g to b rin g p r e s s u r e o n th e d ic ta to ria l re g im e of R afael Trujillo. Later, d u rin g th e sta ff c o n v e rs a tio n s , B rett c h a rg e d th a t se v e ra l c h ie fs of m is s io n w e re ill-p re p a re d a n d u n c o o p e ra tiv e . "W e a re h a v in g o u r tro u b le s ," h e c o m p la in e d to th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t, " tr y in g to g e t so m e of th e A m b a s ­ s a d o rs in [to ] th e b all g a m e ." 16 T he c o m m a n d in g g e n e ra l of th e a rm y a ir fo rce s. G e n e ra l H e n ry H . A rn o ld , w a s e v e n m o re c o n te m p tu o u s of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. In th e a u tu m n o f 1944 A rn o ld re c o m m e n d e d th e d is p o s a l of b e tw e e n 4,000 a n d 8,000 s u r p lu s a irc ra ft to L a tin A m e ric a to p ro m o te s ta n d a rd iz a tio n , p r e e m p t fo re ig n c o m p e titio n , a n d e n c o u ra g e r e q u e s ts fo r U .S . air

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 37 m is s io n s . A lth o u g h th is e x tra v a g a n t p ro p o s a l w a s n e v e r im p le m e n te d , A rn o ld m a d e a rr a n g e m e n ts o n h is o w n in itia tiv e to p ro v id e tra in in g a n d e q u ip m e n t o n a le s s e r scale to se v e ra l L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s . A t a W ar D e p a rtm e n t m e e tin g A rn o ld ju s tifie d h is in d e p e n d e n t a c tio n b y d e c la rin g th a t " a n y p ro g re s s w h ic h w e m ig h t m a k e in fu rn is h in g L a tin A m e ric a n s w ith A ir F orce e q u ip m e n t, to th e e x c lu sio n of fo re ig n e q u ip m e n t, w o u ld h a v e to b e a c h ie v e d th r o u g h a c tio n s o n o u r p a rt w ith o u t re fe re n c e to th e D e p a rtm e n t of S ta te ." A rn o ld a lso b o a s te d th a t b o th R o o se v e lt a n d S tim s o n w o u ld s u p p o r t h im in a n y c o n tro v e rs y w ith th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. C o n fid e n t of th e b a c k in g of h ig h e r a u th o ritie s , A rn o ld h a d h is a s s is ta n t, G e n e ra l R o b e rt L eG . W alsh , in fo rm A R A officials of h is p e rs o n a l in te re s t in th e d e v e lo p m e n t of L a tin A m e ric a n a v ia tio n —a m o v e h e u n d o u b te d ly h o p e d w o u ld in tim i­ d a te h is a d v e rs a rie s in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. F or g o o d m e a s u re , W alsh a lso d e n o u n c e d A R A 's e ffo rts to re s tra in B re tt.17 B e h in d th is d is p u te o v e r b u re a u c ra tic p re ro g a tiv e s w a s a f u n d a ­ m e n ta l d is a g re e m e n t o v e r p o s tw a r p o licy to w a rd L a tin A m e ric a . For se rv ice a u th o ritie s , m ilita ry m e a s u re s w e re th e k ey to b u ild in g h e m i­ sp h e ric so lid arity . C o m p re h e n s iv e s ta te m e n ts of re g io n a l policy, a p p ro v e d in e a rly 1945, re v e a le d th a t th e se rv ic e s a d v o c a te d a p o s tw a r p r o g r a m of m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n th a t e x c e e d e d e v e n w a rtim e m e a ­ s u re s . In a d d itio n to th e s ta n d a r d iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts , th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff d e s ire d p e r m a n e n t a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r U .S . fo rce s to u s e n a v al a n d a ir b a s e s e s s e n tia l to h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se . T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t a d d e d to th is a g e n d a a cc ess to stra te g ic ra w m a te ria ls a n d m a in te n a n c e of " a s p irit of frie n d ly c o o p e ra tio n " w ith th e L atin A m e ric a n a rm e d fo rc e s. To s e c u re th e s e g o a ls, th e se rv ic e s in te n d e d to o ffer e x te n siv e m ilita ry a id , in c lu d in g a rm s , tra in in g m is sio n s, a n d in s tru c tio n of L a tin A m e ric a n p e rs o n n e l in U .S . se rv ice sch o o ls. T h ese m e a s u re s o f m ilita ry c o lla b o ra tio n , th e ir p r o p o n e n ts a rg u e d , w o u ld n o t o n ly s a fe g u a rd th e h e m is p h e re b u t a lso so lid ify U .S . m ilita ry p r e s ­ tig e a n d p r e v e n t th e re v iv a l of E u ro p e a n in flu e n c e s in L atin A m e ric a n m ilita ry c irc le s.18 T h ese a m b itio u s p ro p o s a ls fo r in te r-A m e ric a n d e fe n se w e n t far b e y o n d stric tly m ilita ry re q u ire m e n ts . A w are of th e d o m in a n t p o s itio n of th e a rm e d fo rc e s in m a n y L a tin A m e ric a n g o v e rn m e n ts , serv ice a u th o ritie s b e lie v e d th a t m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n w o u ld in s u re frie n d ly p o litical re la tio n s . T h e g o o d w ill of h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry le a d e rs w a s v ita l n o t o n ly to g a in access to b a s e s a n d stra te g ic re s o u rc e s b u t a lso to

38 • Arming the Free World m a in ta in th e o rie n ta tio n of L a tin A m e ric a to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s. B rett, fo r e x am p le , b e lie v e d th a t th e re w a s " th e g re a te s t o p p o r tu n ity in C e n tra l a n d S o u th A m e ric a to e s ta b lis h a v e ry so lid a n d b asic frie n d ­ s h ip th r o u g h th e m e d iu m of th e m ilitary ." A lo n g w ith o th e r u n ifo rm e d officers, h e also th o u g h t th a t U .S . a rm s a n d tra in in g w o u ld h e lp p r e ­ se rv e in te rn a l se c u rity a n d e n h a n c e sta b ility th r o u g h o u t th e c o n tin e n t. In s h o rt, m ilita ry officials b e lie v e d th a t e x te n siv e in te r-A m e ric a n m ili­ ta ry c o o p e ra tio n w o u ld re s u lt in sta b le , c o o p e ra tiv e , e v e n c o m p lia n t re g im e s in s u la te d fro m h o stile in flu e n c e s a n d tie d c lo sely to th e U n ite d S ta te s. In d e e d , in th e o p in io n of R o b e rt R P a tte rs o n , w h o b e c a m e s e c re ta ry of w a r in S e p te m b e r 1945, th e re a s o n s fo r e x te n d in g m ilita ry a ss is ta n c e to L atin A m e ric a w e re " fra n k ly . . . m o re p o litical th a n m ilita ry ." 19 E conom ic c o n s id e ra tio n s a lso s h a p e d th e s e rv ic e s' th in k in g . C o n ­ v in c e d th a t th e re w o u ld b e little tim e to m o b iliz e b e fo re th e n e x t w ar, th e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n c lu d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld m a in ta in a rm a m e n ts in d u s trie s th a t c o u ld ra p id ly m e e t e m e rg e n c y n e e d s . L atin A m e ric a n o rd e rs w o u ld h e lp s u p p o r t s u c h p ro d u c tiv e capacity. It w as n o a c c id e n t th a t th e a rm y a ir fo rce s, fo r w h ic h th e m a in te n a n c e of a la rg e a n d m o d e rn a irc ra ft in d u s tr y w a s a p a ra m o u n t c o n c e rn , a g ­ g re ssiv e ly s o u g h t to d o m in a te L a tin A m e ric a n m a rk e ts . In d e e d , th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t m a in ta in e d th a t o n e of th e b e n e fits of s ta n d a rd iz a tio n w a s m a k in g L atin A m e ric a " d e p e n d e n t o n th e U n ite d S ta te s a v ia tio n in d u stry ." F or th e se rv ic e s, th e n , s ta n d a rd iz a tio n s e rv e d b o th m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic e n d s .20 T h is b lu r r in g of tra d itio n a l d is tin c tio n s b e tw e e n p o litical, e co ­ n o m ic, a n d m ilita ry o b je c tiv e s re fle c te d a n e w id e o lo g y of p r e p a r e d ­ n e s s , a b e lie f th a t th e n a tio n m u s t m o b ilize its fu ll re s o u rc e s to p ro te c t its security. M o re th a n fe a rs of a n y c u rr e n t o r f u tu r e a d v e rsa ry , th e e x p e rie n c e of to ta l w a r c re a te d th is a n x ie ty a b o u t th e n a tio n 's w e ll­ b e in g . A s th e y s h a p e d p o s tw a r g o a ls, m ilita ry p la n n e r s re p e a te d ly re fe rre d to th e w e a k n e s s e s in h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se th a t h a d e x iste d at th e b e g in n in g of th e w ar, v u ln e ra b ilitie s th a t a p p e a r e d e v e n m o re frig h te n in g in a w o rld in w h ic h th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s n o lo n g e r im m u n e to s u d d e n a ttac k . F or m ilita ry officials th e le s s o n s of th e p a s t w e re clear: th e y c o u ld n o t a llo w th e re c u rre n c e of th e s e w e a k n e s s e s b e c a u se th e n e x t war, th e y fe a re d , w o u ld co m e w ith little, if any, w a rn in g . T h e ir s o lu tio n s w e re e x tre m e . D e te rm in e d to p r e v e n t a n o th e r h o stile p o w e r fro m g a in in g a fo o th o ld in L atin A m e ric a , th e y w a n te d to

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 39 seal off th e h e m is p h e re fro m all fo re ig n m ilita ry in flu e n c e . A la rm e d b y th e a p p e a l of N a z i ideology, th e y s o u g h t " to re o rie n t th e m ilita ry th o u g h t of L a tin A m e ric a fro m E u ro p e a n in flu e n c e to th e d e m o c ratic lin e s of o u r m ilita ry d o c trin e ." D is tre s s e d b y th e in a b ility of m o st n e ig h b o rin g c o u n trie s to ta k e o n e v e n m in o r m ilita ry m is s io n s a t th e b e g in n in g of th e w ar, th e y e n d e a v o re d to m a k e th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h ­ m e n ts of th e o th e r A m e ric a n re p u b lic s a d ju n c ts of U .S . fo rce s in th e p ro te c tio n of th e h e m is p h e re . B eliev in g th e s e c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s in je o p a rd y , th e y a rg u e d th a t n o th in g less th a n a n u n q u e s ­ tio n e d —a n d u n p r e c e d e n te d —m ilita ry h e g e m o n y in L atin A m e ric a w o u ld su ffic e .21 A lth o u g h th e y to o w e re c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e n a tio n 's secu rity , S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials o b je c te d to th e se rv ic e s' g ra n d io s e p ro p o s a ls . S om e p o litica l a n a ly s ts fe a re d th a t U .S . e ffo rts to b e co m e th e ex clu siv e s u p p lie r of a rm a m e n ts w ith in th e h e m is p h e re m ig h t e n c o u ra g e o th e r n a tio n s , s u c h as th e S o v iet U n io n o r G re a t B ritain , to se e k sim ila r a rr a n g e m e n ts in o th e r a re a s of th e w o r ld .22 T h e d e p a r tm e n t's L atin A m e ric a n e x p e rts c ritic iz e d th e e x tra v a g a n c e of th e se rv ic e s' p la n s . J o h n C . D reier, c h ie f o f th e A m e ric a n R e p u b lic s A n a ly sis a n d L ia iso n D iv isio n , p o in te d o u t th a t th e a rm in g of so m e C e n tra l A m e ric a n c o u n ­ trie s of m in o r stra te g ic sig n ific a n c e cle arly e x c e e d e d th e re q u ire m e n ts of h e m is p h e ric secu rity . Ellis O . B riggs, a m b a s s a d o r to th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic, d is m is s e d as n a iv e th e c laim th a t m ilita ry m is s io n s m ig h t in c u lc a te d e m o c ra tic p rin c ip le s in L a tin A m e ric a . A R A officials in s te a d w o rrie d th a t th e s e rv ic e s' p la n s w o u ld le n d p re s tig e to d ic ta to rs a n d p ro v id e th e m w ith th e m e a n s to p u t d o w n le g itim a te o p p o s itio n . R a th e r th a n re ly in g so h e av ily o n m ilita ry a id a n d b u ild in g u p th e a rm ie s of d ic ta to rs , th e A R A u r g e d c o n tin u a tio n of th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy, w h ic h h a d e n c o u ra g e d " th e p o litical, e co n o m ic a n d social a d v a n c e m e n t of th e o th e r re p u b lic s " a n d h a d b e e n re s p o n s ib le fo r w a rtim e so lid arity . D re ie r th u s sa w a b a sic c o n flict b e tw e e n th e p o licies of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th o s e of th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a rtm e n ts , e v e n th o u g h all th r e e a im e d at s tr e n g th e n in g th e s e c u rity of th e h e m is p h e r e .23 Yet th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s re lu c ta n t to p ro v id e w h a t m o s t L atin A m e ric a n g o v e rn m e n ts c o n s id e re d e s s e n tia l to th e p o s tw a r c o n tin u a ­ tio n of th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy—e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e . A s th e w a r c a m e to a n e n d in 1945, th e L a tin A m e ric a n s e x p e c te d U .S . h e lp in th e fo rm of c o m m o d ity a g re e m e n ts a n d lo a n s to c u s h io n th e sh o ck s of

40 • Arming the Free World tra n s itio n to a p e a c e tim e e c o n o m y a n d to p ro m o te e co n o m ic d e v e lo p ­ m e n t. T h ey b e lie v e d th a t th e y h a d e a r n e d s u c h a id b y th e ir w a rtim e c o o p e ra tio n in p ro v id in g th e U n ite d S ta te s w ith b a s e s a n d v ita l ra w m a te ria ls . F u rth e rm o re , s u c h a s s is ta n c e w a s in th e U .S . in te re s t, e x p la in e d M ex ican F o re ig n M in is te r E z e q u ie l P ad illa, sin c e it w o u ld re m o v e th e p rin c ip a l c a u se of a n ti-A m e ric a n is m —r e s e n tm e n t of th e U .S . e co n o m ic p o s itio n —a n d d e s tro y th e a p p e a l of id e o lo g ie s th a t th r e a te n e d d e m o c ra c y in L a tin A m e ric a . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p ro m ­ is e d to h o ld a n in te rn a tio n a l m e e tin g to d is c u s s th e h e m is p h e re 's e co ­ n o m ic m a tte rs o n 15 J u n e 1945, b u t th e n p o s tp o n e d th e c o n fe re n c e in d efin ite ly . In s te a d U .S . d ip lo m a ts c o u n s e le d L a tin A m e ric a n g o v e rn ­ m e n ts to p ro m o te e co n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t b y e s c h e w in g all fo rm s of e co n o m ic n a tio n a lis m , e lim in a tin g tra d e b a rrie rs , a n d a ttra c tin g c a p ita l fro m p riv a te fo re ig n in v e s to r s .24 S u c h a d v ic e s e e m e d to m a n y L a tin A m e ric a n s n o th in g m o re th a n a p re s c rip tio n fo r c o n tin u e d u n d e rd e v e lo p m e n t a n d d e p e n d e n c e o n U .S . c o rp o ra te in te re s ts . G e n e ro u s p o s tw a r p ro g ra m s of a ssis ta n c e fo r o th e r re g io n s o n ly e x a c e rb a te d th e L a tin A m e ric a n s e n s e of b e tra y a l. In fact, th e fa ilu re to se c u re a lo n g -te rm d e v e lo p m e n t lo a n of $1 b illio n e v e n tu a lly c a u s e d B razilian A m b a s s a d o r C a rlo s M a rtin s to th ro w a ta n tr u m in w h ic h h e a c c u se d th e U n ite d S ta te s of a b a n d o n in g th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy. By re ly in g m a in ly o n p riv a te in v e s tm e n t ra th e r th a n g o v e rn m e n t a s s is ta n c e to m e e t L a tin A m e ric a's e co n o m ic n e e d s , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t u n d e r m in e d its g o a l o f p e r p e tu a tin g th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy a n d p r o v id in g a n effectiv e a lte rn a tiv e to th e se rv ic e s' p la n s to c e m e n t h e m is p h e ric s o lid a rity th r o u g h m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .25 T h e S W N C C a tte m p te d to se ttle th e d is p u te b e tw e e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e se rv ice s b y is s u in g a s ta te m e n t of p rin c ip le s to g u id e p o s tw a r in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n . It e n d o rs e d a s s is ta n c e a n d tra in in g p ro g ra m s d e s ig n e d to e n c o u ra g e th e s ta n d a r d ­ iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts a lo n g U .S . lin e s a n d a g re e d to r e q u e s t th e n e c e s s a ry c o n g re s s io n a l a u th o riz a tio n at th e e a rlie st p o s s i­ b le tim e . T h e c o m m itte e a lso re s o lv e d n o t to h e lp th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s s u p p o r t m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts th a t e x c e e d e d th e ir eco n o m ic m e a n s a n d to w ith h o ld tr a in in g a n d e q u ip m e n t fro m n a tio n s th a t w e re lik ely to u s e s u c h a id to th r e a te n a g g re s s io n o r d e n y th e ir c itiz e n s d e m o c ra tic rig h ts a n d lib e rtie s. Finally, th e S W N C C g av e th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th e p o w e r to v e to a rm s a id p r o g r a m s p r o p o s e d b y th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts th a t c o n flic te d w ith fo re ig n po licy o b je c tiv e s.

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 41 B ut th e s e c o n c lu s io n s , w h ic h T ru m a n a p p ro v e d o n 29 Ju ly 1945, d id little m o re th a n p ro v id e g u id e lin e s fo r c o n tin u in g con flict, sin ce p o liti­ cal a n d m ilita ry officials still d is a g re e d a b o u t u s in g m ilita ry a ssista n c e as a m a jo r in s tr u m e n t fo r b u ild in g U .S . in flu e n c e in L atin A m erica. D e sp ite th e S W N C C s ta te m e n t of p rin c ip le s , th e is s u e s o v e r w h ic h th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e se rv ice s h a d b a ttle d fo r a lm o st tw o y e a rs re m a in e d u n re s o lv e d a t th e e n d of th e w a r.26

W i , h th e e n d o f th e w a r a n d th e te rm in a tio n of le n d -le a se , m ilita ry officials w e re e a g e r to b e g in th e p ro g ra m s of a s s is ta n c e to L atin A m e r­ ica th a t T ru m a n h a d s a n c tio n e d . T h e b ila te ra l sta ff talk s, c o m p le te d d u rin g th e s u m m e r of 1945, w e re s u p p o s e d to b e strictly e x p lo ra to ry b u t n e v e rth e le s s ra is e d th r o u g h o u t th e h e m is p h e re e x p e c ta tio n s of e x te n siv e U .S . m ilita ry a id . T he u n ifo rm e d officers w h o le d th e se d is c u s s io n s o fte n e n c o u ra g e d s u c h th in k in g . For e x am p le . A d m ira l Jo n a s H . In g ra m , s p e a k in g w ith o u t a u th o riz a tio n , p ro m is e d B razilian n a v al o fficers th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld p ro v id e fre e of c h a rg e all th e v e sse ls th a t th e y r e q u e s te d . B rett a n d G e n e ra l R a lp h H . W o o ten , th e c o m m a n d e r of a rm y fo rc e s in S o u th A m e ric a, r e p o r te d th a t b e c a u se of th e sta ff ta lk s g o v e rn m e n t a u th o ritie s in P arag u ay , U ru g u a y , C h ile, a n d e ls e w h e re b e lie v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s c o m m itte d to s u p p o r tin g th e ir p o s tw a r m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . G iv e n s u c h th in k in g , B re tt a n d W o o te n c o n c lu d e d th a t fa ilu re to fu rn is h e q u ip m e n t a n d tra in in g p ro m p tly w o u ld d a m a g e re la tio n s w ith se v e ra l L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s a n d d e s tro y th e m ilita ry p re s tig e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d g a in e d d u rin g th e w a r.27 O n th e b a sis of th e in fo rm a tio n g a th e re d d u rin g th e staff c o n v e r­ s a tio n s , th e Jo in t A rm y a n d N a v y A d v is o ry B o a rd o n A m e ric a n R e p u b lic s c o m p le te d o n 15 S e p te m b e r a d e ta ile d p la n fo r th e s ta n d a r d ­ iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . U n d e r th is W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld o v e r se v era l y e a rs e q u ip p e a c e tim e L atin A m e ric a n a rm e d fo rce s a m o u n tin g to tw e n ty -e ig h t g r o u n d d iv is io n s a n d s u p p o r tin g tro o p s a n d so m e se v ­ e n ty -fiv e tactical a ir s q u a d ro n s . T h is e n o rm o u s in fu s io n of a ssista n c e w o u ld n o t o n ly s ta n d a r d iz e h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts b u t a lso re q u ire s u b s ta n tia l in c re a s e s in se v e ra l L atin A m e ric a n a rm ie s a n d in m o s t of th e air fo rce s. T h e Jo in t B o a rd d id n o t ju stify th e n e e d fo r th e se a rm e d fo rce s in a n y stra te g ic p la n fo r h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se . B ut it u rg e d th e

42 • Arming the Free World Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff to a p p ro v e its re c o m m e n d a tio n s p ro m p tly so th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld n o t s q u a n d e r " a s p le n d id o p p o r tu n ity fo r in te g ra tin g th e d e fe n s e s of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re ." 28 S e n io r officials in th e N a v y D e p a rtm e n t, h o w ev er, d e m u rre d . L o n g sk e p tic a l of th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss of L a tin A m e ric a n m ilita ry e s ta b lis h ­ m e n ts , A d m ira l K in g d id n o t s h a re th e e n th u s ia s m of S p e a rs a n d o th e rs fo r a rm in g L a tin A m e ric a . H e in fo rm e d th e Jo in t C h ie fs th a t th e c o m b a t v e sse ls p r o p o s e d fo r tra n s fe r to L a tin A m e ric a —in c lu d in g lig h t c ru is e rs, lig h t c a rrie rs, a n d s u b m a r in e s —w o u ld m o re lik ely b e u s e d to m e n a c e n e ig h b o rs th a n to p ro te c t th e h e m is p h e re . H e a lso c ritic ize d th e Jo in t B o a rd fo r re c o m m e n d in g ex cessiv e p ro g ra m s of a s s is ta n c e o u t of a n e x a g g e ra te d fe a r th a t th e L a tin A m e ric a n m ilita ry le a d e rs w o u ld tu r n to E u ro p e a n s o u rc e s of s u p p ly if th e U n ite d S ta te s fa ile d to m e e t th e ir a m b itio u s r e q u e s ts fo r a rm a m e n ts . In K in g 's view , th e Jo in t B o a rd 's p ro p o s a ls a im e d a t " c o m p le te c o n tro l b y th e U n ite d S ta te s o v e r th e a rm e d fo rce s o f o th e r A m e ric a n re p u b lic s ." W h a te v e r th e m ilita ry a d v a n ta g e s of s u c h a n a rr a n g e m e n t, h e w a rn e d , " th e id e a of e s ta b lis h ­ in g a h e m isp h e ric a l b lo c k [sic] of sa te llite a rm ie s a n d n a v ie s m ig h t se t a p re c e d e n t th a t w e w o u ld n o t w is h to se e fo llo w ed in re g io n a l a rr a n g e ­ m e n ts o u ts id e th e A m e ric a s ." 29 S e c re ta ry of th e N a v y Jam es V. Forre s ta l a d d e d to th e s e re s e rv a tio n s h is fe a rs th a t th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m m ig h t p ro v id e th e m e a n s fo r " w a rs a n d re v o lu tio n s w h ic h w o u ld b e a d v e rtis e d to th e w o rld as b e in g fo u g h t w ith A m e ric a n w e a p o n s ." H e r e m in d e d P a tte rs o n a n d S e c re ta ry of S ta te Jam es F. B y rn es th a t V e n e z u e la n in s u r g e n ts h a d a lre a d y u s e d le n d -le a se m u n itio n s d u rin g a re c e n t c o u p d 'é ta t. B ecau se of th e n a v y 's m is g iv in g s , th e th re e se c re ta rie s a g re e d o n 20 N o v e m b e r to p o s tp o n e a n y d e c isio n o n th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m .30 W h ile th e th r e e d e p a r tm e n ts re c o n s id e re d th is e x te n d e d p ro g ra m . W ar s o u g h t S ta te 's p e rm is s io n to s e n d a p o r tio n of th e p r o p o s e d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to L atin A m e ric a u n d e r th e a u th o rity of th e S u rp lu s P ro p e rty A ct of 1944.31 T h is in te rim p ro g ra m , d e s ig n e d to m a in ta in th e flo w of a rm a m e n ts u n til th e e n a c tm e n t of a n in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id bill, a lso m e t s tro n g o p p o s itio n w ith in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. L atin A m e ric a n e x p e rts —in c lu d in g B ra d en , th e n e w a s s is ta n t s e c re ta ry fo r A R A , a n d B riggs, th e re c e n tly a p p o in te d d ire c to r of A R A —r e ite ra te d th a t s u b s ta n tia l a rm s a id c o n flic te d w ith th e d e p a r tm e n t's p o licy of e n c o u ra g in g d e m o c ra c y in th e o th e r A m e ric a n s ta te s a n d re d u c in g te n s io n s a m o n g th e m .32 B rad en 's sp e cia l a s s is ta n t, C arl B. S p a e th ,

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 43 s u m m e d u p th e o u tlo o k of m a n y of h is c o lle a g u e s w h e n h e calle d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's p ro p o s a ls " a trag ic erro r." So d is tre s s e d w e re B riggs a n d S p a e th th a t th e y h e lp e d re v iv e a p ro p o s a l, w h ic h h a d la n g u is h e d in th e d e p a r tm e n t sin c e th e b e g in n in g of 1945, fo r a o n e -y e a r m o r­ a to riu m o n th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to fo re ig n n a tio n s , p e n d in g a p p ro v a l of lo n g -te rm re s tric tio n s b y th e U n ite d N a tio n s . D e p lo rin g th e in c o n s is te n c y of s u p p ly in g " o th e r c o u n trie s w ith th e w e a p o n s fo r a n o th e r w a r w h ile . . . p ro c la im in g a po licy of p e a c e a n d of s u p p o r t fo r th e U n ite d N a tio n s ," th e y u r g e d p ro m p t a c tio n to h a lt th e w o rld w id e d is p o s a l of s u r p lu s m u n itio n s .33 P a tte rs o n tr ie d to r e b u t th e s e c ritic ism s. D is tre s s e d b y th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p ro lo n g e d d e lib e ra tio n s , h e c o m p la in e d th a t th e d e la y in f u r n is h in g a rm s w a s e ro d in g U .S . in flu e n c e in L atin A m e ric a. "It is b e c o m in g in c re a s in g ly a p p a r e n t to th e G o v e rn m e n ts of c o u n trie s w ith w h o m sta ff c o n v e rs a tio n s h a v e b e e n h e ld th a t th e y c a n n o t d e p e n d o n o u r p ro m is e s to fu r n is h th e m w ith a rm s a n d tra in in g , " h e to ld B y rn es, e v e n th o u g h n o c o m m itm e n ts to L a tin A m e ric a h a d y e t b e e n m a d e . E c h o in g th e w a rn in g s of B re tt a n d A rn o ld , h e p re d ic te d th a t u n le s s th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n q u ic k ly to o k so m e " p o s itiv e a c tio n ," fo re ig n a rm s a n d m is s io n s w o u ld a g a in p re v a il in L a tin A m e ric a . To a v e rt th is " g ra v e d a n g e r to th e m ilita ry se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s ," P a tte rs o n a s k e d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t s p e e d ily c o n s e n t to th e in te rim a llo c a tio n s .34 F aced w ith th e o p p o s in g v ie w s of A R A a n d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t, B y rn e s a p p ro v e d a c o m p ro m ise o n th e in te rim p ro g ra m . T h e se c re ta ry a n d h is a d v is e rs re je c te d a n e m b a rg o o n a rm s e x p o rts b e c a u se , as U n d e r S e c re ta ry of S ta te D e a n A c h e so n la te r e x p la in e d , th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d in c u r r e d " a m o ra l c o m m itm e n t of a s o rt" to p ro v id e m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a as a re s u lt of th e b ila te ra l sta ff ta lk s .35 A t th e sa m e tim e th e d e p a r tm e n t's s e n io r officials h e e d e d th e w a rn in g s of A R A a n d s o u g h t to m in im iz e th e a d v e rs e p o litica l effects of f u rn is h in g su c h a s s is ta n c e . A c h e s o n in fo rm e d P a tte rs o n o n 19 D e c e m b e r th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w o u ld a p p ro v e in te rim a llo c a tio n s o n ly to c o u n trie s th a t a g re e d n o t to p u r c h a s e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t fro m o th e r n a tio n s , a c o n d i­ tio n th a t w o u ld le s s e n th e c h a n c e s of a n a rm s race in L a tin A m e ric a a n d in s u re p ro g re s s to w a rd th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of h e m isp h e ric a rm a ­ m e n ts . A c h e s o n a lso r e q u e s te d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t to w ith h o ld o r re d u c e in te rim s h ip m e n ts to se v e ra l a u th o rita ria n o r u n s ta b le re ­ g im e s —th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic, H a iti, H o n d u ra s , N ic a ra g u a , Bolivia,

44 • Arming the Free World a n d P arag u ay . A rg e n tin a , w h ic h h a d b e e n e x c lu d e d fro m th e sta ff ta lk s b e c a u se of its p ro -A x is s y m p a th ie s , w a s in elig ib le fo r a n y a s s ista n c e . Finally, a fte r f u r th e r c o n s id e ra tio n , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t d e c id e d in J a n u a ry 1946 to p ro h ib it th e tra n s fe r of b o m b e r a irc raft to all L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s e x c e p t B razil a n d M e x ico .36 A c h e s o n e x p la in e d to A c tin g S e c re ta ry of W ar K e n n e th C . R oyall th a t th e m is u s e of b o m b in g p la n e s in in te rn a l strife o r in te rn a tio n a l d is p u te s w o u ld a lie n a te " th o se p e o p le of L a tin A m e ric a w h o a re d e v o te d to th e c a u se of p e a c e a n d of sta b le d e m o c ra tic g o v e rn m e n t" a n d w h o s e s u p p o r t w a s cru c ial to " o u r p o s itio n of le a d e rs h ip a m o n g th e A m e ric a n re p u b lic s ." 37 A lth o u g h th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t a c c e p te d th e s e c o n d itio n s , A rn o ld re fu s e d to a b id e b y th e m . H e d e n o u n c e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t fo r w h a t h e c o n s id e re d its c h a ra c te ristic o b s tru c tio n is m in h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry affairs. H e w a s p a rtic u la rly e n ra g e d o v e r th e re s tric tio n s o n b o m b e rs , w h ic h th r e a te n e d to e m b a rra s s h is e ffo rts to a rra n g e fo r th e tra n s fe r of a irc raft d u rin g a n im p e n d in g v isit to se v e ra l L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s . Ju s t as h e h a d o n p re v io u s o c c a sio n s, A rn o ld a p p e a le d to th e p re s i­ d e n t, a n d T ru m a n , w h o a p p a r e n tly h a d little p a tie n c e w ith th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's s c ru p le s , o v e rru le d th e d ip lo m a ts . B efo re h is d e p a r tu r e fo r L a tin A m e ric a in J a n u a ry 1946, A rn o ld m e t w ith B ra d e n a n d a p p ro v e d a re v is e d in te rim p ro g ra m of 566 a irc raft, w h ic h w a s a p p ro x ­ im a te ly th e sa m e siz e as th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's o rig in a l p ro p o s a l, a n d in c lu d e d b o m b e rs . B ra d e n d id m a n a g e to sa lv ag e so m e of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's re s tric tio n s b y p e r s u a d in g A rn o ld to w ith h o ld a n y d e liv ­ e rie s, b e c a u se of c u r r e n t p o litical c o n d itio n s , to A rg e n tin a , B olivia, th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic , H a iti, H o n d u ra s , N ic a ra g u a , a n d P arag u ay . A r­ n o ld a lso a g re e d th a t th e n e w in te rim p r o g r a m w o u ld d is c h a rg e a n y im p lie d c o m m itm e n t a ris in g fro m th e sta ff c o n v e rs a tio n s .38 C h e e re d b y th e a p p ro v a l of th e s e in te rim a llo c a tio n s, se rv ice le a d e rs s p o k e w ith n e w u n ity a n d v ig o r in th e d e fe n se of th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fen se P ro g ra m .39 C o n c e d in g th a t th e n a v y h a d " d r a g g e d its fe e t," F o rre sta l n o w jo in e d P a tte rs o n in a d v o c a tin g im m e d ia te a ctio n o n a n in te r-A m e ric a n a rm s bill, e sp e c ia lly sin c e th e B ritish a n d C a n a d i­ a n s w e re o ffe rin g to sell v e sse ls to se v e ra l L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s .40 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff a lso re a ffirm e d th e ir s u p p o r t fo r th e s ta n d a r d ­ iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts , n o tin g th a t th e in v e n tio n of th e a to m ic b o m b , th e d e v e lo p m e n t of lo n g -ra n g e a irc raft, a n d th e a d v e n t of th e S o v iet U n io n as th e d o m in a n t p o w e r in E u ra s ia m e a n t th a t " th e u ltim a te se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s h a s b e co m e fa r m o re d e p e n d e n t

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 45 th a n h e re to fo re u p o n th e m a in te n a n c e of th e stra te g ic u n ity of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re ." 41 T h e a rm y 's n e w c h ie f of staff. G e n e ra l D w ig h t D. E isen h o w er, m e t o n a t le a s t tw o o c c a sio n s w ith A c h e so n to a s s u re h im th a t th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t h a d n o in te n tio n of s u p p ly in g " g u n s , ta n k s a n d a irp la n e s in d is c rim in a te ly to th e L atin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s , e ith e r to u n lo a d s u r p lu s e q u ip m e n t fo r c a sh o r w ith a n y d e sire to b u ild u p a m ilita ry h e g e m o n y in th e h e m is p h e re ." 42 Yet w ith o u t sig n ific a n t re d u c tio n s in th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , E ise n h o w e r's w o rd s c o u ld n o t h a v e p ro v id e d m u c h c o m fo rt to B ra d e n a n d h is staff. D e sp ite th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' c o n c e rn o v e r th e S o v iet th re a t, p o l­ ic y m a k e rs e x p re s s e d fe w w o rrie s a b o u t th e im m e d ia te a m b itio n s of th e U S S R in L a tin A m e ric a . E v e n w h e n a n e w a ttitu d e of firm n e s s to w a rd th e S o v iet U n io n to o k h o ld in W a s h in g to n at th e b e g in n in g of 1946, m ilita ry a n a ly s ts o n ly in fre q u e n tly m e n tio n e d th e p o ss ib ility of C o m ­ m u n is t s u b v e rs io n in L atin A m e ric a o r S o v iet a rm s sa les to th e o th e r A m e ric a n s ta te s . In o n e e x c e p tio n a l in s ta n c e , th e M ilita ry In te llig e n c e S e rv ice w a r n e d as e a rly as M a rc h 1945 th a t C o m m u n is t p e n e tr a tio n p o s e d " a p o s itiv e th r e a t to th e U n ite d S ta te s ' m ilitary , p o litical a n d e co n o m ic p o s itio n in L a tin A m e ric a ." Yet th is a la rm is t r e p o r t m a d e little im p re s s io n o n W ar D e p a rtm e n t officials a n d a p p a r e n tly h a d n o sig n ific a n t effect o n p la n n in g p o s tw a r m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a lso c o n s id e re d th e S o v iet U n io n a p o ss ib le c o m p e tito r fo r p o s tw a r p o litica l a n d e co n o m ic in flu e n c e in L a tin A m e ric a b u t d is ­ m is s e d a n y d a n g e r to U .S . le a d e rs h ip in th e h e m is p h e re a s re m o te .43 B o rn of th e e x p e rie n c e s of W o rld W ar II, th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , in th e e y es of b o th its critics a n d its d e fe n d e rs , w a s n o t a C o ld W ar m e a s u re . A d v o c a te s of h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry a id f r e tte d n o t a b o u t S o v iet c h a lle n g e s b u t a b o u t th e r e s u m p tio n of G re a t B ritain 's lo n g -s ta n d in g a rm s tra d e w ith L a tin A m e ric a . S erv ice a tta c h é s a n d a m b a s s a d o rs in B razil a n d C h ile r e p o r te d th a t B ritish e ffo rts to sell s h ip s a n d m u n i­ tio n s w e re e m b a rra s s in g th e U .S . m ilita ry m is s io n s a n d je o p a rd iz in g p la n s fo r in te r-A m e ric a n d e fe n s e .44 D is tu rb e d b y th is s itu a tio n , th e a rm y a n d n a v y s u g g e s te d in D e c e m b e r 1945 th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a sk th e B ritish to a b s ta in fro m th e L a tin A m e ric a n a rm s tra d e as p a rt of a s e ttle m e n t of o u ts ta n d in g fin a n c ia l is s u e s b e tw e e n th e tw o c o u n trie s . Political officials re je c te d th is p ro p o s a l e v e n th o u g h th e y w o rrie d a b o u t a p o te n tia l L a tin A m e ric a n a rm s rac e s tim u la te d b y B ritish a n d A m e ri­ c a n c o m p e titio n . B y rn e s, h o w ev er, ra is e d th e is s u e w ith B ritish offi-

46 • Arming the Free World ria ls, a n d F o re ig n M in is te r E rn e s t K. B e v in r e p lie d th a t h is g o v e rn m e n t w a s p r e p a r e d to e x p lo re w ith th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a y s of re g u la tin g th e L a tin A m e ric a n a rm s traffic. B e v in h a d a lre a d y sh o w n h is w illin g n e s s to c o o p e ra te w h e n h e jo in e d w ith B y rn e s in O c to b e r 1945 in a g e n tle m a n 's a g re e m e n t to w ith h o ld c o m b a t m a te rie l fro m A rg e n tin a . B ut th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t d id n o t p u r s u e B ev in 's s u g ­ g e s tio n of b ila te ra l d is c u s s io n s , a n d m ilita ry le a d e rs c a lle d fo r tim e ly a c tio n to exclude B ritish m ilita ry in flu e n c e fro m th e h e m is p h e r e .45 T h e S ta te , W ar, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts c o n tin u e d to d e b a te th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m u n til B y rn e s's S taff C o m m itte e v o te d o n 25 A p ril to s p o n s o r a n in te r-A m e ric a n a rm s bill. T h e S taff C o m m itte e m a d e its d e c isio n e v e n th o u g h A R A officials w e re as c o n ­ v in c e d as e v e r th a t a d d itio n a l m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e w o u ld o n ly a g g ra v a te p o litical a n d e co n o m ic in s ta b ility in L a tin A m e ric a . E is e n h o w e r a p p a r ­ e n tly p la y e d a p iv o ta l ro le in p e rs u a d in g th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's s e n io r officials to o v e rru le th e o b je c tio n s of th e L a tin A m e ric a n e x p e rts . H e m e t w ith A c h e s o n o n 22 A p ril, a n d as o n e official in A R A la te r rec o l­ le c te d , "T h e D e p a rtm e n t g av e its re lu c ta n t s u p p o r t . . . o n th e a s s u ra n c e o f th e C h ie f of S taff th a t th e bill w a s e s s e n tia l fo r th e se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s ." 46 A s th e p ric e of its s u p p o r t, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in s is te d o n m a jo r c h a n g e s in th e le g isla tio n d ra fte d b y th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t. T h e In te rA m e ric a n M ilita ry C o o p e ra tio n A ct (IA M C A ), w h ic h T ru m a n p r o ­ p o s e d to C o n g re s s o n 6 M a y 1946, a u th o riz e d th e p r e s id e n t to f u rn is h e q u ip m e n t a n d tra in in g to th e o th e r A m e ric a n n a tio n s a c c o rd in g to te rm s th a t h e d e e m e d satisfacto ry , p ro v id e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s re c e iv e d fu ll v a lu e fo r n e w p r o c u re m e n t. In o rd e r to sa tisfy th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's d e sire to h o ld to a m in im u m a n y in c re a s e in th e level of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts , th e bill a llo w e d th e L atin A m e ric a n n a tio n s to e x c h a n g e n o n s ta n d a r d ite m s in th e ir p o s s e s s io n fo r e q u iv a le n t a m o u n ts of U .S . m a te rie l. A lso a t th e d e p a r tm e n t's re q u e s t, th e p r o ­ p o s e d le g isla tio n s tip u la te d th a t all tra n s fe rs w o u ld b e su b je c t to an y in te rn a tio n a l a rm s a c c o rd to w h ic h th e U n ite d S ta te s a d h e re d . To m e e t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's fin a l o b je c tio n , T ru m a n a s s u r e d th e C o n g re s s th a t h is a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld im p le m e n t IA M C A so as to re d u c e th e c h a n c e s of e ith e r a n a rm s ra c e o r th e m is u s e of e q u ip m e n t a n d to av o id p la c in g a n u n d u e b u r d e n o n th e L a tin A m e ric a n e c o n o m ie s .47 D e s p ite th e s e c o n c e s s io n s , so m e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials still h a d s tr o n g m is g iv in g s a b o u t th e bill. O n e critic, a fo rm e r d ire c to r of A R A ,

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 47 s e n s in g th e in c o m p a tib ility o f th e s e rv ic e s' m ilita ry g o a ls in L atin A m e ric a w ith th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p o litical d e sire s, d o u b te d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld a d h e re stric tly to th e re s tra in ts th a t A R A d e m a n d e d . H e th o u g h t th a t th e se rv ic e s w o u ld p re v a il u p o n th e p re s i­ d e n t to re la x th e s e re s tric tio n s o n c e th e IA M C A w a s e n a c te d , b e c a u se o th e rw is e " n o t m a n y of th e L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s w o u ld rec eiv e a n y m ilita ry a id w h a te v e r." 48 A lth o u g h th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a g re e d to s p o n s o r th e IA M C A , it r e fu s e d to m a k e m o re th a n a p e rf u n c to ry e ffo rt to se c u re its p a ssa g e . B y rn e s te s tifie d b e fo re th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e , as d id E is e n h o w e r a n d th e c h ie f of n a v a l o p e ra tio n s . A d m ira l C h e s te r W. N im itz . B o th E is e n h o w e r a n d N im itz e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n w o u ld p r e v e n t th e re c u rre n c e of th e w e a k n e s s e s in h e m i­ s p h e ric s e c u rity th a t e x is te d at th e b e g in n in g of W o rld W ar II. T he c o m m itte e r e p o r te d th e bill u n a n im o u s ly , b u t th e fu ll H o u s e n e v e r c o n s id e re d th e m e a s u re b e c a u se of th e p r e s s of b u s in e s s to a tte n d to b e fo re a d jo u rn m e n t. T h e bill fa re d le ss w ell in th e S e n a te . T h e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , a p p a r e n tly u n im p r e s s e d b y th e a d m in is tra tio n 's c ase fo r a rm in g L a tin A m e ric a , to o k n o a c tio n a t all. A t th e e n d of th e c o n g re s s io n a l s e s s io n , E ise n h o w e r re a ffirm e d h is s tro n g p e rs o n a l s u p ­ p o r t of th e bill. B ut B y rn e s's S taff C o m m itte e re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t m a k e n o la s t-m in u te p u s h fo r th e e n a c tm e n t o f th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n . C o m m e n tin g o n th e S taff C o m m itte e 's d e c isio n , B rig g s w ro te , " G o o d . . . . It's a W ar-N a v y p ro je c t. I p re fe r n o t to g e t to o e n m e s h e d ." T h e IA M C A d ie d w ith th e a d jo u r n m e n t of th e S e v ­ e n ty - n in th C o n g re s s o n 2 A u g u s t. D e lay e d b y th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's o p p o s itio n , th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m w a s n o w also f r u s tr a te d b y c o n g re s s io n a l in a c tio n .49

I n A u g u s t 1946 A c h e s o n in fo rm e d P a tte rs o n a n d F o rre sta l th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w o u ld s u p p o r t th e r e s u b m is s io n of th e IA M C A to th e E ig h tie th C o n g re s s , b u t b y D e c e m b e r th e d e p a r tm e n t's p o s itio n h a d c h a n g e d . W a rn in g a g a in of th e b a n e fu l effects o f a rm in g L atin A m e ric a , B ra d e n a n d th e sta ff of A R A p e rs u a d e d B y rn e s to re c o n s id e r th e d e p a r tm e n t's s p o n s o r s h ip of th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n . B ra d en e m p h a s iz e d th a t m o s t of th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s c o u ld n o t affo rd e v e n th e m o d e s t q u a n titie s of s u r p lu s e q u ip m e n t o ffe re d u n d e r th e in te rim p ro g ra m . C o m p le te s ta n d a rd iz a tio n , a c c o rd in g to a re c e n t

48 • Arming the Free World e s tim a te , w o u ld c o st a lm o s t $1 b illio n , a s u m " in fin ite ly b e y o n d th e e co n o m ic re s o u rc e s of L a tin A m e ric a ." If c a rrie d o u t, s u c h a p ro g ra m w o u ld h a lt social p ro g re s s a n d p ro m o te a n a rm s race th a t w o u ld je o p a rd iz e th e p e a c e a n d se c u rity of th e h e m is p h e re . A R A u r g e d B y rn e s to w ith h o ld s u p p o r t fro m th e IA M C A u n le s s th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts c o u ld a g re e to m e a s u re s fo r h e m is p h e ric a rm a ­ m e n t s ta n d a r d iz a tio n th a t w o u ld n e ith e r im p o s e s u b s ta n tia l c o sts o n th e U n ite d S ta te s n o r b a n k r u p t L a tin A m e ric a . S u c h a re c o m m e n d a ­ tio n w a s ta n ta m o u n t to s u g g e s tin g th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s p ro v id e n o m o re th a n to k e n q u a n titie s of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to th e o th e r A m e ri­ c a n n a tio n s .50 To th e o b je c tio n s of h is a d v is e rs, B y rn e s a d d e d h is o w n . A lth o u g h th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts c o u n s e le d a g a in s t f u r th e r d e la y s o n th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n , B y rn e s to ld P a tte rs o n a n d F o rre sta l o n 18 D e c e m b e r th a t h e d id n o t c o n s id e r th e e x te n s io n of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to L a tin A m e ric a n a n u r g e n t m a tte r. H e re a liz e d th a t E u ro p e a n a rm s m a n u fa c tu re rs , p a rtic u la rly th e B ritish , c o v e te d th e L a tin A m e ric a n tra d e , b u t h e d o u b te d th a t th e ir a c tiv itie s w o u ld u p s e t th e se rv ic e s' p la n s fo r s ta n d a r d iz a tio n sin c e m o s t of th e ir p ro s p e c tiv e c lie n ts la c k e d f u n d s fo r s u b s ta n tia l p u r c h a s e s of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t. N o r w a s h e w o rrie d a b o u t th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a B ritish m ilita ry o r n a v al m is sio n in L atin A m e ric a . O n ly th e S o v iet U n io n , in h is in c re a s in g ly b ip o la r v ie w of in te rn a tio n a l affairs, c o u ld c h a lle n g e U .S . se c u rity in te re s ts in th e h e m is p h e re , b u t th e re w a s n o re a s o n to fe a r th a t a n y L a tin A m e ri­ c a n c o u n try w o u ld r e q u e s t R u s s ia n a d v is e rs in th e n e a r fu tu r e . B y rn e s in s te a d b e lie v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld u s e its re s o u rc e s to a ssist c o u n trie s th a t fa c e d a n im m e d ia te S o v iet th re a t. G re e c e , w h e re C o m ­ m u n is t-le d g u e rrilla s th r e a te n e d to to p p le th e rig h tis t g o v e rn m e n t, w a s " o u r re a l p ro b le m to d a y ," h e e m p h a s iz e d .51 B y rn e s th e n a s k e d P a tte rs o n a n d F o rre sta l to d e fin e U .S . m ilita ry in te re s ts in L atin A m e ric a . H e in q u ire d , a c c o rd in g to th e m in u te s of th e ir m e e tin g , " W h a t is o u r re a l o b jec tiv e th e re ? Is it b e c a u se [sic] w e feel th a t a L atin A m e ric a n fig h tin g fo rce w o u ld b e of a n y v a lu e to u s o r is it m e re ly to k e e p o th e rs o u t? " P a tte rs o n re p lie d th a t th e e x clu sio n of fo re ig n in flu e n c e s w a s th e a rm y 's p r im a r y g o a l, a n d F o rre sta l b a sica lly a g re e d , w h ile n o tin g th a t th e L atin A m e ric a n n a v ie s m ig h t a ss is t th e U n ite d S a te s in a n tis u b m a r in e w a rfa re . S in c e th e p rin c ip a l a rg u m e n t of h is c o lle a g u e s w a s " th e n e g a tiv e o n e of k e e p in g o th e rs o u t," B y rn es

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 49 a s s e r te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld a ch ie v e th a t o b jec tiv e b y m a in ­ ta in in g a n d e s ta b lis h in g m ilita ry a n d n a v al m is s io n s in th e h e m is p h e re w ith o u t n e c e s s a rily s u p p ly in g a rm s . D e sp ite th e s e re s e rv a tio n s , B y rn e s p o s tp o n e d a fin a l d e c isio n o n th e IA M C A u n til h e re c e iv e d a r e p o r t o n th e c o sts of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m a n d a w r itte n s ta te m e n t of th e v ie w s of th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts .52 P a tte rs o n h a d a n tic ip a te d B y rn e s's o b je c tio n s, a n d a t th e e n d of th e m e e tin g h e h a n d e d th e s e c re ta ry of sta te a le tte r th a t e x p la in e d in d e ta il h is d e p a r tm e n t's th in k in g . P a tte rs o n w ro te th a t th e n a tio n 's p rin c ip a l stra te g ic c o n c e rn s in L a tin A m e ric a w e re to p ro te c t th e P a n a m a C a n a l a n d g a in a cc ess to ra w m a te ria ls . B ut th e p r e d o m in a n t m ilita ry in te r ­ e st, in h is a n a ly sis, w a s " s im p ly . . . h a v in g a sta b le , se c u re , a n d frie n d ly fla n k to th e S o u th , n o t c o n fu s e d b y e n e m y p e n e t r a t i o n p o litical, e c o n o m ic o r m ilitary ." H e r e m in d e d B y rn e s " th a t th e p e n e tr a ­ tio n of n o n -h e m is p h e ric n a tio n s d u r in g th e y e a rs p re c e d in g W o rld W ar II r e s u lte d in a s itu a tio n so d a n g e r o u s a t th e o u tb re a k of h o stilitie s th a t w e w e re fo rc e d to d e v o te c o n s id e ra b le e ffo rt a n d re s o u rc e s to c o u n ­ te ra c t th e th re a t. It is to in s u r e th a t th is s itu a tio n is n o t r e p e a te d th a t th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t is so s tro n g ly in s u p p o r t of th e In te r-A m e ric a n M ili­ ta r y C o o p e ra tio n A ct." T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t c o n trib u te d to h e m i­ s p h e ric s o lid a rity b y s e n d in g a d v is o ry m is s io n s o v e rs e a s a n d tra in in g L a tin A m e ric a n o ffice rs in U .S . sch o o ls. T h e se a c tiv itie s p ro v id e d o p p o r tu n itie s " to in tro d u c e a n d d e m o n s tra te , to in d iv id u a ls in key p o s itio n s , U .S . d e m o c ra tic p rin c ip le s ." T h is w o rk w o u ld c e a se , h o w ­ ever, if th e U n ite d S ta te s fa ile d to s u p p ly L a tin A m e ric a w ith m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t. B elg ian a n d C z e c h o slo v a k ia n a rm s d e a le rs , P a tte rs o n r e p o r te d , h a d a lre a d y o ffe re d o r so ld m a te rie l to A rg e n tin a , C h ile, P e ru , a n d V e n e z u e la , a n d F re n c h officials w e re try in g to re e s ta b lis h th e ir p re w a r m ilita ry a d v is o ry g r o u p s in B olivia, B razil, a n d P e ru . T h ese a c tiv itie s p ro v e d th a t " th e E u ro p e a n n a tio n s a re o n ly to o w illin g to fill th e v a c u u m in m is s io n s a n d m u n itio n s of w a r w h ic h w o u ld b e c re a te d b y o u r fa ilu re to . . . se c u re p a s s a g e of th e le g isla tio n ." 53 P a tte rs o n 's a rg u m e n ts fa ile d to im p re s s officials in A R A a n d c o n s e ­ q u e n tly h a d little effect o n B y rn e s, w h o w a s n o t d e e p ly c o n c e rn e d w ith L a tin A m e ric a a n d u s u a lly a c c e p te d B ra d en 's a d v ic e .54 B y rn e s re s ig n e d in J a n u a ry 1947, h o w ev er, a n d h is su c ce sso r, G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll, h e ld fa r d iffe re n t v ie w s a b o u t in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n . A s a rm y c h ie f o f sta ff in 1945, M a rs h a ll h a d a p p ro v e d th e p la n s fo r th e

50 • Arming the Free World p o s tw a r s ta n d a r d iz a tio n o f a rm a m e n ts . L ess th a n a m o n th a fte r b e c o m in g s e c re ta ry of s ta te , h e a p p e a r e d b e fo re th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e a n d a g re e d e m p h a tic a lly w ith C h a irm a n A r th u r H . V a n d e n b e rg (R -M ich.) th a t " P a n -A m e ric a n so lid a rity " w a s " a h ig h ­ ly e s s e n tia l m ilita ry n e e d a t th e m o m e n t." 55 H o p e fu l th a t M a rs h a ll w o u ld c h o o se to r e n e w th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's s p o n s o r s h ip of th e IA M C A , P a tte rs o n p r e s s e d fo r a d e c isio n . In a le tte r to M a rsh a ll o n 24 J a n u a ry h e m a in ta in e d th a t fa ilu re to p ro c e e d w ith th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of a rm a m e n ts m ig h t fo rce so m e L a tin A m e ri­ c a n n a tio n s to tu r n to " a p o te n tia lly h o stile p o w e r" fo r a rm s a n d a d v is e rs a n d " th e in filtra tio n in to L a tin A m e ric a of th a t p o w e r's m ili­ ta r y p h ilo s o p h y a n d , u ltim ately , its p o litical id eo lo g ies, w o u ld in e v ita ­ b ly follow ." To th e s e fa m ilia r d a n g e rs P a tte rs o n a d d e d a n e w th re a t, o n e th a t h e h a d d is m is s e d o n ly a m o n th e a rlie r in h is le tte r to B y rn e s. H e n o w w a r n e d th a t fo re ig n p o s s e s s io n of e v e n a sm a ll b a s e in L atin A m e ric a m ig h t p e rm it a n a ir o r m issile a tta c k o n m a jo r U .S . cities. P a tte rs o n a lso lis te d six re g io n s in L a tin A m e ric a v ita l to U .S . se c u rity : th e P a n a m a C a n a l a n d its a p p ro a c h e s w ith in 100 m iles; th e S tra its of M a g e lla n ; N o rth e a s t B razil; M exico; th e R iv er P la te e s tu a r y a n d its a p p ro a c h e s w ith in a 500-m ile ra d iu s ; a n d M o lle n d o , P e ru a n d A n to ­ fa g a sta , C h ile . P a tte rs o n d e c la re d th a t, b e c a u se of th e ir lo c a tio n o r re s o u rc e s , th e s e a re a s w e re " s o im p o r ta n t in th e ir o w n rig h t th a t th e th r e a t of a tta c k o n a n y of th e m w o u ld fo rce th e U n ite d S ta te s to com e to th e ir d e fe n s e ," e v e n if th e re w a s n o c e rta in ty of a s u b s e q u e n t a tta c k o n th e U n ite d S ta te s itself. If P a tte rs o n th o u g h t th a t M a rsh a ll, b e c a u se of h is m ilita ry b a c k g ro u n d , w o u ld b e m o re sy m p a th e tic to th e se a rg u ­ m e n ts , h e w a s d is a p p o in te d . U n w illin g to c h a n g e po licy o r re je c t th e c o u n se l o f A R A so s o o n a fte r ta k in g office, M a rsh a ll, like B y rn es, re s e rv e d h is d e c isio n u n til th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o m p le te d its s tu d y of th e e co n o m ic effects of th e p r o p o s e d le g is la tio n .56 S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials fo c u s e d th e ir a tte n tio n o n th e eco n o m ic im p lic a tio n s of th e IA M C A b e c a u se th e y h a d le a rn e d ju s t re c e n tly th a t th e c o sts of s ta n d a rd iz a tio n w o u ld g re a tly ex ce ed th e ir p re v io u s e x p ec ­ ta tio n s . P la n s fo r a rm in g L a tin A m e ric a w e re m a d e a t a tim e w h e n , in th e w o rd s of o n e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n a ly s t, th e re w a s " m o re n av al, air a n d g r o u n d force m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t th a n w e k n o w w h a t to d o w ith ." 57 In 1945 th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t e x p e c te d to p ro v id e th e m a te rie l fo r s ta n d a rd iz a tio n fro m th e s e s u r p lu s in v e n to rie s , a n d th e IA M C A w o u ld allo w th e L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s to c o m p e n s a te th e U n ite d

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 51 S ta te s w ith n o n s ta n d a r d e q u ip m e n t in th e ir p o s s e s s io n . B ut b y e a rly 1947 th e r a p id d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s sto c k s fo rc e d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t to re ly h e a v ily o n n e w p r o c u r e m e n t to c a rry o u t th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , a n d th e L a tin A m e ric a n c o u n trie s w o u ld h a v e to p a y fu ll p ric e fo r s u c h e q u ip m e n t. A d d in g to th e c o st of s ta n d a r d iz a tio n , th e N a v y D e p a rtm e n t r e p o r te d , w a s th e e x p e n s e of r e c o n d itio n in g v e sse ls s tr ip p e d d u rin g d e m o b iliz a tio n .58 B ra d en e s ti­ m a te d th a t, b a s e d o n th is n e w in fo rm a tio n , th e c o st of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , e v e n u n d e r th e m o s t fav o ra b le te rm s , w o u ld a p p ro a c h $1 b illio n . D e ta ile d s tu d ie s b y th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts s o o n c o n firm e d th e a c c u ra c y of th a t fig u re .59 T h is $1 b illio n p ric e ta g w a s th e b a sis of th e lo n g -a w a ite d S ta te D e p a rtm e n t s tu d y 's c o n c lu s io n th a t th e c o sts of s ta n d a rd iz a tio n w e re p ro h ib itiv e . O n ly five c o u n trie s —C u b a , th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic, El S alv ad o r, P a n a m a , a n d V e n e z u e la —c o u ld m e e t th e e x p e n s e s of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m w ith o u t difficulty. A ll o th e r L a tin A m e ric a n n a tio n s w o u ld e x p e rie n c e so m e fin a n c ia l s tra in , w h ic h m ig h t fo rce th e p o s tp o n e m e n t o f th e ir p la n s fo r in te rn a l d e v e lo p m e n t o r th e d e fe rra l o f th e ir p a y m e n ts o n e x istin g fo re ig n d e b ts . Six c o u n ­ trie s —B olivia, C h ile , C o sta R ica, E cu ad o r, N ic a ra g u a , a n d P e ru —fac ed s u c h a c u te p ro b le m s w ith fo re ig n e x c h a n g e a n d r e c u rrin g in te rn a l d e ficits th a t th e ir p a rtic ip a tio n in th e p r o p o s e d a rm s p ro g ra m w a s n e a rly im p o s sib le . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s n o t th e o n ly a g e n c y th a t re a c h e d s u c h p e s s im is tic c o n c lu s io n s . T h e C a rib b e a n D e fe n se C o m ­ m a n d , u s in g in fo rm a tio n g a th e re d b y U .S . m ilita ry a tta c h é s , c o n ­ firm e d m a n y of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's fin d in g s . T h e p a s s a g e of th e IA M C A , A c h e s o n w ro te P a tte rs o n , w o u ld n e c e ssa rily y ie ld tw o u n d e ­ sira b le re s u lts : it w o u ld e x a c e rb a te c o n d itio n s of p o litical a n d eco n o m ic in s ta b ility in L a tin A m e ric a , a n d it w o u ld e n c o u ra g e r e q u e s ts fo r c o stly s u b s id ie s th a t th e e c o n o m y -m in d e d E ig h tie th C o n g re s s d id n o t w is h to p ro v id e .60 P a tte rs o n d is a g re e d totally. H e d id n o t d is p u te th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's fin a n c ia l a n a ly s is , y e t h e in s is te d th a t e n a c tm e n t of th e IA M C A w o u ld n o t p la c e n e w b u r d e n s o n th e L a tin A m e ric a n e c o n o m ie s. By u s in g " g o o d ju d g m e n t" in im p le m e n tin g th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , P a tte rs o n a rg u e d , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o u ld in s u r e th a t th e c o st of a rm a m e n ts d id n o t e x c e e d th e m e a n s of th e re c ip ie n ts . H e a lso m a in ta in e d , s o m e w h a t co n tra d ic to rily , th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld n o t d ic ta te to th e o th e r A m e ric a n n a tio n s th e size of

52 • Arming the Free World th e ir m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts . " T h u s, th e q u e s tio n w e face in L atin A m e ric a ," h e d e c la re d , " is n o t 'S h a ll th e y h a v e a rm s ? ' . . . [but] 'S h a ll th e y h a v e U n ite d S ta te s o r fo re ig n a rm s ? ' " P a tte rs o n s tro n g ly u r g e d M a rsh a ll to r e n d e r h is d e c isio n im m e d ia te ly . 61 R isin g C o ld W ar te n s io n s re in fo rc e d P a tte rso n 's d e te rm in a tio n to b re a k th e s ta le m a te o n th e a rm s bill. O n 12 M a rc h 1947 T ru m a n c alle d fo r a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey o n th e g r o u n d s th a t it " m u s t b e th e p o licy o f th e U n ite d S ta te s to s u p p o r t fre e p e o p le s w h o a re re s is tin g a tte m p te d s u b ju g a tio n b y a rm e d m in o ritie s o r b y o u ts id e p r e s s u r e s ." 62 Im p re s s e d b y th e s w e e p in g p ro m is e of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e , serv ice le a d e rs tr ie d to fit m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a in to a g lo b al c o n te x t of c o n ta in in g c o m m u n is m . F r u s tr a te d b y th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's o p p o s i­ tio n a n d c o n g re s s io n a l in a c tio n , th e y u n d o u b te d ly h o p e d th a t a n e m p h a s is o n th e S o v iet th r e a t w o u ld s tr e n g th e n th e ir c ase fo r th e a rm s bill. T h e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, fo r e x a m p le , a d d e d to th e ir re a s o n s fo r clo se h e m is p h e ric m ilita ry tie s th e g ro w in g s tr e n g th of th e L a tin A m e r­ ic a n C o m m u n is t p a r tie s .63 T h e in te llig e n c e a g e n c ie s of th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts e n d o r s e d a r e p o r t b y th e C e n tra l In te llig e n c e G ro u p th a t e m p h a s iz e d S o v iet e ffo rts " to u n d e rm in e U .S . h e g e m o n y in th e H e m is p h e re a n d m a k e in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n d iffi­ c u lt to a c h ie v e ." 64 A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry of W ar H o w a rd C . P e te rs e n c o n c lu d e d th a t, c o m p a re d to E u ro p e a n d A sia , "L a tin A m e ric a c a n b e p re s e r v e d fo r W e ste rn d e m o c ra c y at a fa r le ss c o st a n d w ith c o n s id e r­ a b ly less e ffo rt." 65 P a tte rs o n e x p re s s e d th e sa m e th e m e w h e n h e w ro te to A c h e s o n o n 27 M a rc h th a t th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro ­ g ra m w a s d e s ig n e d " to p r e v e n t th e v e ry ty p e of crisis w h ic h h a s a ris e n in T urkey a n d G re e c e ." 66 E a g e r fo r " p re v e n tiv e a n d fo re h a n d e d " a c tio n to th w a rt th e s p re a d of c o m m u n is m , m ilita ry officials to o k th e ir c ase to th e W h ite H o u s e .67 T h e th r e e se rv ic e d e le g a te s o n th e In te r-A m e ric a n D e fe n se B o a rd n o ti­ fie d th e p r e s id e n t's s e c re ta ry fo r le g isla tio n th a t th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m w a s "o f s u b s ta n tia l im p o rta n c e " to n a tio n a l secu rity . A m e m o ra n d u m to T ru m a n o n 26 M a rc h b la m e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's o b s tru c tio n is m fo r in a c tio n o n th e IA M C A a n d s u g ­ g e s te d th a t th e p r e s id e n t m ig h t in te rv e n e to e n d th e im p a ss e . A lth o u g h h e lac k ed a n y d e e p in te re s t in L a tin A m e ric a , T ru m a n w a s re c e p tiv e , in th e w a k e of h is s tr o n g s ta n d o n a s s is ta n c e to G re e c e a n d Turkey, to a p p e a ls fo r a b o ld a s s e rtio n of A m e ric a n le a d e rs h ip w ith in th e h e m is p h e re . T h e p r e s id e n t p ro m p tly in fo rm e d A c h e so n th a t h e

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 53 w a n te d th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts to se ttle th e ir d iffe re n c e s so th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld p ro v id e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to L atin A m e ric a . " I 'm of th e o p in io n th a t s tr ip e d p a n ts a re tr y in g to r u n So. A m e r.," T ru m a n c o m m e n te d sim plistically . "T h ey w o n 't b e ab le to d o it ."68 T ru m a n 's in te rv e n tio n w a s d e c isiv e .69 O n ly a few d a y s a fte r h is d is c u s s io n w ith th e p re s id e n t, A c h e so n s h ifte d IA M C A re s p o n s ib ility w ith in th e d e p a r tm e n t fro m B ra d e n to G e n e ra l Jo h n H . H ill d rin g , c h a irm a n of th e Policy C o m m itte e o n A rm s a n d A rm a m e n ts , w h o W ar D e p a rtm e n t officials d e s c rib e d as " v e ry re c e p tiv e " to th e ir v ie w s. W ith B ra d e n " o u t of th e p ic tu r e ," a s o n e a rm y officer n o te d w ith relief, A c h e s o n in fo rm e d P a tte rs o n a n d F o rre sta l o n 23 A p ril th a t h e w o u ld a sk M a rs h a ll to re n e w th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's s p o n s o r s h ip of th e IA M C A . T h e o n ly re s tric tio n w a s th a t th e th r e e d e p a r tm e n ts fin d so m e m e a n s of im p le m e n tin g th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n p ro g ra m w ith o u t a d d in g to th e d e b ts of th e re c ip ie n t c o u n trie s , a c o n d itio n th a t w a s im p o ssib le to sa tisfy w ith o u t s u b s id ie s fro m C o n g re s s . N e v e rth e le ss, M a rsh a ll a c c e p te d th is re c o m m e n d a tio n . H a v in g ju s t r e tu r n e d fro m th e sta le ­ m a te d M o sco w m e e tin g of th e C o u n c il of F o re ig n M in iste rs , h e w a s a p p a r e n tly c o n v in c e d th a t S o v iet in tra n s ig e n c e in E u ro p e m a d e th e c o n s o lid a tio n of h e m is p h e ric d e fe n s e s im p e ra tiv e . O n 1 M ay th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts fo rm a lly a g re e d to r e s u b m it th e L atin A m e ric a n a rm s bill to C o n g r e s s .70

A s th e y e n d e d th e o p p o s itio n to th e IA M C A , T ru m a n a n d M a rsh a ll a lso r e v e rs e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p o s itio n o n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n w ith A rg e n tin a . S in c e th e b e g in n in g of W o rld W ar II, th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d w ith h e ld m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e fro m A rg e n tin a b e c a u se of its u n w illin g n e s s to p a rtic ip a te in h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se m e a s u re s . In la rg e m e a s u re , A rg e n tin e n o n c o o p e ra tio n w a s th e p ro d u c t of tra d itio n a l n a tio n a lis m a n d n e u tra lis m , p o licies th a t a ro s e fro m s tro n g c u ltu ra l a n d e co n o m ic tie s w ith E u ro p e a n d fe a r of U .S . d o m in a tio n of th e h e m is p h e re . C o rd e ll H u ll, h o w ev er, v ie w e d A rg e n tin a 's n e u tra lity a fte r P earl H a rb o r m a in ly as th e p ro d u c t of p ro -A x is s y m p a th ie s . H u ll c o n d e m n e d A rg e n tin a as " th e N a z i H e a d q u a rte rs of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re " b e c a u se of its to le ra tio n of G e r m a n a g e n ts a n d e ffo rts to s u b v e rt n e ig h b o rin g g o v e rn m e n ts a n d fo rg e th e m in to a n e u tra lis t

54 • Arming the Free World bloc. A s s a n c tio n s fo r th is c o n te m p tib le b e h av io r, H u ll in s is te d o n re s tric tio n s o n tra d e a n d a id .71 F o llo w in g H u ll's r e tire m e n t, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in M a rc h 1945 re la x e d its h a r d lin e a g a in s t A rg e n tin a a t th e in te r-A m e ric a n c o n ­ fe re n c e at C h a p u lte p e c Palace in M exico City. A rg e n tin e P re s id e n t E d e lm iro F arrell a c c e p te d th e A ct of C h a p u lte p e c , w h ic h r e q u ire d th e e lim in a tio n of all A xis in flu e n c e s , a n d d e c la re d w a r a g a in s t G e rm a n y a n d Ja p a n . T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, in tu r n , lifte d e co n o m ic s a n c tio n s a n d s u p p o r te d A rg e n tin a 's a d m is s io n to th e U n ite d N a tio n s . B ut th e s e s te p s to w a rd r a p p r o c h e m e n t h a lte d a b ru p tly in m id -1945 b e c a u se of th e F arrell re g im e 's o u tra g e o u s n e w c a m p a ig n to s u p p r e s s h u m a n rig h ts a n d its sh e lte rin g o f N a z i s u b v e rs iv e s . In r e s p o n s e , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n e x c lu d e d A rg e n tin a fro m th e sta ff c o n v e rsa tio n s a n d c o n tin u e d its b a n o n th e s h ip m e n t of c o m b a t m a te rie l. B y rn e s a d d e d to th e p r e s s u r e o n th e A r g e n tin e s w h e n h e s e c u re d B ritish F o re ig n S e c re ­ ta ry B evin's p le d g e , u n d e r th e G e n tle m e n 's A g re e m e n t of O c to b e r 1945, to jo in th e e m b a r g o .72 T h e official m o s t re s p o n s ib le fo r th e re im p o s itio n of h a rd -lin e p o l­ icies to w a rd A rg e n tin a w a s th e n e w a s s is ta n t s e c re ta ry of sta te fo r in te r-A m e ric a n affairs, S p ru ille B ra d en . A lth o u g h n o t a c a re e r d ip lo ­ m a t, B ra d e n h a d c o n s id e ra b le e x p e rie n c e in in te r-A m e ric a n affairs. A fte r m a k in g a f o rtu n e as a m in in g e n g in e e r in C h ile a n d th e n lo sin g it d u rin g th e G re a t C ra s h , B ra d e n h e ld a su c c e s s io n o f d ip lo m a tic p o s ts in L atin A m e ric a, d u rin g w h ic h tim e h e b u ilt a r e p u ta tio n b o th fo r te n a c ­ ity a n d p u g n a c ity . H e p a tie n tly p a rtic ip a te d in th e le n g th y n e g o tia tio n s th a t fin ally s e ttle d th e C h a co W ar b e tw e e n B olivia a n d P a ra g u a y in 1938. B ut h e a lso a d m ire d th e s w a g g e r of T h e o d o re R o o se v e lt's "b ig stick " p o licy as m u c h as th e n o n in te r v e n tio n is m of F ra n k lin R o o se­ v e lt's G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy. A s a m b a s s a d o r to C u b a d u rin g W o rld W ar II, fo r e x a m p le , B ra d e n so v o c ife ro u sly d e c rie d g o v e rn m e n ta l c o r r u p ­ tio n th a t P re s id e n t F u lg e n c io B atista r e q u e s te d h is recall. A t th e e n d of th e w a r h e s e rv e d b rie fly as a m b a s s a d o r to A rg e n tin a a n d c o n c lu d e d th a t F arrell a n d h is c h a rism a tic v ic e -p re s id e n t, J u a n D. P e rö n , w e re u n r e p e n ta n t fascists. A fte r b e c o m in g a s s is ta n t s e c re ta ry of sta te , B ra d en d e c la re d th a t th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy w o u ld n o t re s tra in U .S . a c tio n s a g a in s t A rg e n tin a , sin c e " it w o u ld b e th e g ro s s e s t p e rv e rs io n to p r e te n d th a t it re q u ire s u s to re s p e c t F a sc ism in a n y of its g u is e s ." 73 A t B ra d en 's u rg in g , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t g o t to u g h w ith A rg e n ­ tin a . B ra d e n p e rs u a d e d B y rn e s a n d T ru m a n in S e p te m b e r 1945 to

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 55 p o s tp o n e th e im p e n d in g c o n fe re n c e at R io d e Ja n eiro fo r th e n e g o tia ­ tio n o f a n in te r-A m e ric a n d e fe n s e tre a ty b e c a u se of A rg e n tin a 's failu re to m e e t its o b lig a tio n s u n d e r th e A ct of C h a p u lte p e c . B ra d en a n d h is sta ff e la b o ra te d th e ir case b y p r e p a r in g a d o c u m e n ta ry h is to ry of A rg e n tin e c o lla b o ra tio n w ith N a z i G e rm a n y . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re le a s e d th is B lue B ook to th e p u b lic in F e b ru a ry 1946, ju s t tw o w e e k s b e fo re th e A rg e n tin e n a tio n a l e le c tio n s. B rad en 's a p p a r e n t g o al w a s to e m b a rra s s P e rö n , o n e of th e tw o le a d in g c a n d id a te s fo r p re s id e n t, b u t h is s tra te g y b a c k fire d . P e rö n s h re w d ly tu r n e d p o p u la r r e s e n tm e n t a g a in s t B ra d en 's u n d ip lo m a tic in tr u s io n in A rg e n tin e p o litics in to s u p ­ p o r t fo r h is c a n d id a c y a n d w o n a clear victory. P erö n 's triu m p h o n ly re in ­ fo rc e d B raden's d e te rm in a tio n to d e m a n d strict co m p lian ce w ith th e Act of C h a p u lte p e c b e fo re liftin g th e a rm s e m b a rg o o r calling th e Rio C o n ­ fere n ce , a policy th a t T ru m a n a n d B y rn es c o n tin u e d to e n d o rs e .74 B ut B ra d en 's s te r n p o licy a lso a ro u s e d s tr o n g critic ism . T h e m o st b itte r a d v e rs a ry w a s G e o rg e S. M e s s e rs m ith , B ra d en 's su c c e ss o r in B u e n o s A ire s. M e s s e rs m ith m a in ta in e d th a t, a lth o u g h th e A rg e n tin e g o v e rn m e n t w a s m a k in g a sin c e re e ffo rt to p u r g e A xis in flu e n c e s, B ra d e n w a s tr y in g o n ly to a n ta g o n iz e P e rö n w ith p ro v o c a tiv e s ta te ­ m e n ts a n d u n re a lis tic d e m a n d s . M e s s e rs m ith h a r a n g u e d T ru m a n a n d B y rn e s w ith le n g th y in d ic tm e n ts of B ra d en 's c o n d u c t a n d e v e n trie d to stir o p p o s itio n to B ra d e n in th e p re s s a n d o n C a p ito l H ill.75 M ess e rs m ith 's a c c u sa tio n s re in fo rc e d th e o p in io n s of le a d e rs of th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , s u c h as th e s e n io r D e m o c ra t, Tom C o n n a lly of Texas, w h o u r g e d a r a p p r o c h e m e n t w ith A rg e n tin a a n d r e s to ­ r a tio n of h e m is p h e ric s o lid a rity u n d e r U .S . le a d e rs h ip . V a n d e n b e rg , th e r a n k in g R e p u b lic a n , p u b lic ly d e n o u n c e d th e p o s tp o n e m e n t of th e R io C o n fe re n c e a n d p riv a te ly d is p a ra g e d " 'th e B ra d e n p o lic ie s' w h ic h sm a c k e n tire ly to o m u c h of th e o ld 'b ig stic k ' d a y s w h e n w e u s e d to d ic ta te to o u r P a n -A m e ric a n n e ig h b o rs ." C o n c u rrin g in th is lin e of re a s o n in g w e re a d v o c a te s of th e G o o d N e ig h b o r Policy, s u c h as fo rm e r U n d e r S e c re ta ry o f S ta te S u m n e r W elles, w h o b e m o a n e d th e d iv isio n of th e A m e ric a s a n d th e s q u a n d e r in g of U .S . in flu e n c e w ith in th e h e m is p h e r e .76 T h e s tr o n g e s t c h a lle n g e to B ra d en 's p o licies c am e fro m th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts . F o rre sta l, a m o n g o th e rs , c o m p la in e d th a t th e a rm s e m b a rg o w a s e n c o u ra g in g A rg e n tin a to lo o k to E u ro p e fo r m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t, th e re b y je o p a rd iz in g s ta n d a rd iz a tio n . T h e Jo in t C h iefs of S taff w o r r ie d th a t d e la y in n e g o tia tin g a h e m is p h e ric d e fe n se tre a ty

56 • Arming the Free World w a s lea v in g th e s o u th e rn flan k of th e U n ites S ta te s d a n g e ro u sly w e ak . T he W ar D e p a rtm e n t in fo rm e d A R A th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s co u ld n o t a ffo rd s tra in e d m ilita ry re la tio n s w ith A rg e n tin a b e ca u se of th e strateg ic im p o rta n c e of th e S tra its of M a g ellan , a n a re a th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h a v e to c o n tro l in a fu tu re war, o w in g to th e in c re a sin g v u l­ n e ra b ility to attac k of th e P a n a m a C a n al. L atin A m erica e x p e rts in th e a rm y 's O p e ra tio n s D iv isio n o b je c te d so v e h e m e n tly to w h a t th ey c o n sid ­ e re d u n w a r r a n te d in te rfe re n c e in A rg e n tin a 's in te rn a l affairs th a t th ey b e g a n u rg in g E ise n h o w e r in e arly 1946 to p re s s fo r B rad en 's rem oval. A lth o u g h E ise n h o w e r re je c te d th is advice, h e o p e n ly c h a lle n g e d B ra­ d e n 's h a rd -lin e a p p ro a c h . W h e n a sk e d to c o m m e n t o n th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's p a p e r, "F o re ig n Policy of th e U n ite d S ta te s," th e Jo in t C h iefs of Staff, at E isen h o w er's in siste n c e , re p lie d th a t A rg e n tin e c o o p e ra tio n w as e sse n tia l to h e m isp h e ric solidarity, "a c c o m p lish m e n t of w h ic h m u s t in th e e n d o v er-rid e other, m o re tran sito ry , political c o n sid e ra tio n s." 77 C o n c e rn o v e r S o v iet e x p a n s io n is m re in fo rc e d th e s e o b je c tio n s. V a n d e n b e rg , fo r e x a m p le , w o rrie d a b o u t " a p o te n tia l C o m m u n is t m e n ­ ace th ro u g h o u t C e n tra l a n d S o u th A m e ric a w h ic h could b e fa r m o re d a n g e ro u s t h a n th e F ascist p ro b le m in th e A rg e n tin e ." 78 W elles n o te d th a t th e S o v iet g o v e rn m e n t h a d e x te n d e d d ip lo m a tic re c o g n itio n to A rg e n tin a a n d w a r n e d th a t p o licies th a t a lie n a te d L a tin A m e ric a fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s o n ly o p e n e d th e d o o r to R u s s ia n m e d d lin g . T he O p e ra tio n s D iv isio n a g re e d th a t m o u n tin g d iffic u ltie s w ith th e S o v iets r e q u ire d a u n ite d h e m is p h e re . T he Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff w e n t e v e n f u r th e r in M ay 1947 in a n a s s e s s m e n t of c o u n trie s re q u irin g m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . B ecau se of th e g ro w in g s tr e n g th of C o m m u n is t p a rtie s in L a tin A m e ric a , th e y a rg u e d th a t " a n y th in g le ss th a n c o m p le te r a p ­ p ro c h e m e n t b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d e v e ry o n e of h e r n e ig h b o rs to th e s o u th is e n tire ly u n a c c e p ta b le fro m th e v ie w p o in t of U n ite d S ta te s se c u rity ."79 A ll of th e s e critics a g re e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld n o lo n g e r fo rfeit in flu e n c e in L atin A m e ric a to th e S o v iets b e c a u se of B ra d en 's p re o c c u p a tio n w ith th e r e m n a n ts of N a z is m in A rg e n tin a . Yet it w a s B ritish m o v e s, n o t S o v iet a c tio n s , th a t fin ally p re c ip ita te d a c h a n g e in p o licy to w a rd A rg e n tin a . O n 27 J a n u a ry 1947 th e B ritish a m b a s s a d o r n o tifie d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th a t h is g o v e rn m e n t w a s liftin g its b a n o n th e sale of c o m b a t m a te rie l to th e P e rö n re g im e . B evin e x p la in e d to M a rsh a ll th a t B ritain 's u r g e n t n e e d to tra d e fo r A rg e n tin e fo o d s tu ffs w a s th e p rin c ip a l re a s o n fo r h is w ith d ra w a l fro m th e G e n ­ tle m e n 's A g re e m e n t. H e also h in te d th a t d issa tis fa c tio n w ith th e U .S .

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 57 p la n s fo r th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of h e m isp h e ric a rm a m e n ts in flu e n c e d h is g o v e rn m e n t's a c tio n . B ritish a rm s m a n u fa c tu re rs w e re d e te rm in e d to c o n tin u e th e ir lo n g -e s ta b lis h e d tra d e w ith L atin A m e ric a, a n d e sp e c ia lly w ith A rg e n tin a , w h ic h p o s s e s s e d la rg e fo re ig n -e x c h a n g e re s e rv e s a n d w a s w illin g to p a y c a sh fo r m o d e rn a rm a m e n ts . E v en th o u g h B ev in still h o p e d to c o o p e ra te w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s to a v e rt a n a rm s rac e in L atin A m e ric a , h e felt th a t th e G e n tle m e n 's A g re e m e n t n o lo n g e r s e rv e d B ritish in te r e s ts .80 T he B ritish a n n o u n c e m e n t im m e d ia te ly fo rc e d th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n to re c o n s id e r its p o licy to w a rd A rg e n tin a . B ra d e n re c o m ­ m e n d e d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o n tin u e to d e n y m ilita ry e q u ip ­ m e n t a n d a tte m p t to d is c o u ra g e th e sale of B ritish m u n itio n s to P e rö n . B ut a t a C a b in e t m e e tin g o n 7 F eb ru ary , T ru m a n sa id th a t h e fa v o re d a n e n d to th e e m b a rg o o n a rm s e x p o rts to A rg e n tin a . H e a g re e d w ith F o rre sta l, w h o p o in te d o u t th a t A rg e n tin a w a s try in g to p u rc h a s e se v e ra l n e w c o m b a t v e sse ls, th e c o n s tru c tio n of w h ic h w o u ld c o n trib ­ u te to th e h e a lth of th e U .S . s h ip b u ild in g in d u stry , a v ita l c o n c e rn of th e navy. F o rre sta l w ro te in h is d iary , "T h e P re s id e n t re m a rk e d th a t if th e s h ip s w e re n o t b u ilt in th is c o u n try th e y w o u ld b e b u ilt p ro b a b ly b y th e B ritish o r b y th e F re n c h o r D u tc h . H e to ld th e S e c re ta ry of S ta te th a t h e w o u ld like to se e th e b u s in e s s com e h e re if p o ss ib le a n d M a rsh a ll sa id th a t h e w o u ld act a cc o rd in g ly ."81 M a tth e w J. C o n n elly , th e p r e s id e n t's se cre tary , s u m m a r iz e d T ru m a n 's v ie w s m o re p o in te d ly . A c c o rd in g to h is n o te s , T ru m a n d e c la re d , "T h ey [the A rg e n tin e s ] h a v e 5 b illio n c a sh . W o u ld like to g e t so m e of it." 82 In a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e p r e s id e n t's w ish e s, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re d u c e d its d e m a n d s u p o n A rg e n tin a . M a rsh a ll d e c id e d to a cc ep t re a s o n a b le a n d s u b s ta n tia l p ro g re s s to w a rd th e e lim in a tio n of N a zi in flu e n c e s , ra th e r th a n B ra d en 's m o re e x ac tin g s ta n d a r d , as a b a sis fo r re c o n c ilia tio n w ith th e P e rö n re g im e . H e in d ic a te d th e c h a n g e in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's o u tlo o k w h e n h e to ld th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e in e x ec u tiv e s e s s io n o n 11 F e b ru a ry 1947 th a t h e e x p e c te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d A rg e n tin a w o u ld se ttle th e ir d iffe re n c e s sh o rtly. T ru m a n a lso to o k a c o n c ilia to ry p o s itio n w h e n h e in fo rm e d th e A rg e n tin e a m b a ss a d o r, O s c a r Iv a n e ss e v ic h , o n 31 M a rc h 1947 th a t o n ly th e d e p o rta tio n of a p p ro x im a te ly tw o d o z e n N a z i a g e n ts w h o re m a in e d in A rg e n tin a s to o d in th e w ay of n o rm a l r e la tio n s .83 B ritish a c tio n s , h o w ev er, a g a in d is r u p te d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra ­ tio n 's p la n s . A lth o u g h th e B ritish a m b a s s a d o r h a d p re v io u s ly p ro m is e d

58 • Arming the Free World th a t h is g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld p ro v id e o n ly " a triv ia l p ro g ra m " of n av al a s s is ta n c e to A rg e n tin a , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t le a r n e d in M a y th a t th e H a w k e r S id d e le y A irc ra ft C o m p a n y of L o n d o n h a d s ig n e d a c o n tra c t fo r th e d e liv e ry of 100 je t fig h te r p la n e s . S h o c k e d b y th is tra n s a c tio n , A c h e so n e x p la in e d to T ru m a n th a t th e sale w o u ld d im in is h th e c h a n c e s o f A rg e n tin e c o o p e ra tio n in th e e x p u ls io n of N a z i a g e n ts a n d u p s e t th e m ilita ry b a la n c e in L a tin A m e ric a , p e r h a p s e v e n trig g e rin g a n a rm s race. H e a lso w o rrie d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld a p p e a r, fo r in s u b ­ s ta n tia l re a s o n s , to b e d e n y in g b u s in e s s o p p o r tu n itie s in A rg e n tin a to A m e ric a n firm s. A lth o u g h T ru m a n a p p ro v e d a le tte r of p ro te s t, B ev in re f u s e d to y ie ld . In d e e d , h e in fo rm e d M a rsh a ll of a n a d d itio n a l B ritish sale of th ir ty b o m b e rs to A r g e n tin a .84 U n a b le to d is s u a d e th e B ritish , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n ra p id ly e n d e d its d is p u te w ith A rg e n tin a . D e sp ite th e fa ilu re of th e P e rö n re g im e to d e p o r t se v e ra l im p o r ta n t N a z i a g e n ts , T ru m a n still a n ­ n o u n c e d o n 3 J u n e th e re s to ra tio n of n o rm a l re la tio n s a n d th e U .S . re a d in e s s to a tte n d th e p o s tp o n e d R io C o n fe re n c e fo r th e n e g o tia tio n of a n in te r-A m e ric a n d e fe n s e trea ty . A t th e sa m e tim e , M a rsh a ll d is ­ p o s e d o f th e d e p a r tm e n t's p rin c ip a l a n ta g o n is ts o n A rg e n tin e p o licy b y re c a llin g M e s s e rs m ith a n d a n n o u n c in g B ra d en 's r e s ig n a tio n .85 O n 26 J u n e 1947 T ru m a n fo rm a lly a p p ro v e d th e c h a n g e in p o licy h e h a d r e q u e s te d a lm o s t five m o n th s e a rlie r w h e n h e c o n c u rre d in th e C o m ­ m itte e of T h re e 's re c o m m e n d a tio n to allo w th e A rg e n tin e s to c o n tra c t w ith U .S . s h ip b u ild e rs fo r th e c o n s tru c tio n of n a v a l v e sse ls. T h e fo llo w ­ in g m o n th th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t fo rm a lly lifte d th e a rm s e m b a rg o a n d s a n c tio n e d A rg e n tin e p a rtic ip a tio n in th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g r a m .86 T he d e c isio n s o n A rg e n tin a a n d th e IA M C A w e re p a rt of a f u n d a ­ m e n ta l s h ift in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p o s itio n o n m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a . B e g in n in g in m id -1 9 4 7 th e d e p a r tm e n t d r o p p e d its o b jec ­ tio n s to in te rim a llo c a tio n s n o t o n ly fo r A rg e n tin a b u t a lso fo r o th e r c o u n trie s , s u c h as th e D o m in ic a n R e p u b lic a n d H a iti, th a t it h a d d e n ie d g o v e rn m e n t s u r p lu s fo r p o litical re a s o n s . D u rin g th e fall o f 1947 th e d e p a r tm e n t's Policy C o m m itte e o n A rm s a n d A rm a m e n ts s to p p e d d is c o u ra g in g th e co m m erc ial sa les of w e a p o n s to L a tin A m e ric a, p r o ­ v id e d th a t th o se tra n s fe rs c o n fo rm e d to th e re c o m m e n d a tio n s of th e sta ff c o n v e rs a tio n s of 1945. A c c o m p a n y in g th e s e re v is io n s of p o licy w e re s w e e p in g c h a n g e s in th e le a d e rs h ip of A R A . F o llo w in g B rad en 's re s ig n a tio n , tw o of h is m o s t im p o r ta n t s u b o r d in a te s —B riggs a n d

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 59 T h o m a s C . M a n n , th e c h ie f of th e D iv isio n of R iv er P la te A ffa irs—w e re a s s ig n e d to S o u th A m e ric a n e m b a s s ie s . T h ese c h a n g e s in s u r e d th e c e s s a tio n of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p ro tra c te d o p p o s itio n to th e W est­ e rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g r a m .87 In d e fe n d in g th e a rm s bill, M a r­ sh a ll e x p re s s e d h is d e p a r tm e n t's n e w p o s itio n : "I th in k it is f u n d a m e n ­ ta l th a t w e s h o u ld d o e v e r y th in g w ith in o u r p o w e r in a re a s o n a b le m a n n e r to u n ify th e e n tire W e ste rn H e m is p h e re , so fa r as w e c a n , in o u r th in k in g a n d in o u r a rr a n g e m e n ts , fo r o u r o w n secu rity , fo r o u r o w n w e ll-b e in g ." 88

A t th e sa m e tim e th a t it h e lp e d c h a n g e th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p o s i­ tio n o n a rm in g L a tin A m e ric a , th e d e e p e n in g of S o v ie t-A m e ric a n a n ta g o n is m p ro v o k e d a re v ie w of m ilita ry a id policy, w h ic h d im in is h e d th e im p o rta n c e of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m . I n s p ire d b y th e g lo b a l s w e e p o f th e T ru m a n D o c trin e a n d a b a n d o n in g th e ir p ie c e m e a l, c o u n try -b y -c o u n try a p p ro a c h to p la n n in g , S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n t a n a ly s ts m a d e a w o rld w id e s u rv e y of p o ss ib le d e m a n d s fo r U .S . fo re ig n a id . In a n in te rim r e p o r t of 21 A p ril 1947 th e y c a lle d fo r a c o m p re h e n s iv e , in te g r a te d p r o g r a m of m ilita ry a s s ista n c e a im e d p rim a rily a t c o n ta in in g C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n a n d b u ild in g A m e ric a n in flu e n c e o v e rs e a s. A cco rd in g ly , th e S ta te -W a r-N a v y p la n ­ n e rs g av e h ig h e s t p rio rity to e m e rg e n c y r e q u e s ts fo r h e lp in s to p p in g C o m m u n is t c o e rc io n a n d p e n e tr a tio n . T h ey r a n k e d se c o n d in im p o r­ ta n c e lo n g -te rm p ro je c ts , s u c h a s th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fen se P ro g ra m , e v e n th o u g h th e y th o u g h t th a t s u c h a s s is ta n c e m o re effi­ c ie n tly p r e s e r v e d in te rn a tio n a l p e a c e a n d se c u rity .89 T h e d is tin c tio n w a s c ru c ial, sin c e a d d itio n a l s tu d ie s re v e a le d th a t p o ss ib le d e m a n d s fo r a s s is ta n c e w o u ld b e fa r in excess of av ailab le re s o u rc e s .90 To facilitate th e a llo c a tio n of sc arc e e q u ip m e n t, p o lic y m a k e rs e s ta b ­ lis h e d p rio ritie s a m o n g p r o g r a m s of a rm s a id d u rin g th e first h a lf of 1947. F o rc e d to c h o o se fo r th e first tim e a m o n g c o m p e tin g re q u ire ­ m e n ts , b o th p o litica l a n d m ilita ry officials p la c e d th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m lo w o n th e ir lists. F irst in M a rc h a n d a g a in in J u n e th e S ta te D e p a r tm e n t r a n k e d L a tin A m e ric a la s t a m o n g c u rre n t re c ip ie n ts —b e h in d G re e c e , Turkey, Italy, Ira n , C h in a , C a n a d a , a n d th e P h ilip p in e s —a lm o s t all of w h ic h fa c e d im m e d ia te C o m m u n is t th re a ts . U s in g d iffe re n t c rite ria , th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff re a c h e d a sim ila r c o n c lu s io n . T h ey a r g u e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld e x te n d m ilita ry

60 • Arming the Free World a id o n ly to n a tio n s th a t m ig h t b e c o m e effectiv e allies in th e e v e n t of a w a r w ith th e S o v ie t U n io n . E v e n a p le a b y E is e n h o w e r th a t L atin A m e ric a d e s e rv e d sp e c ia l c o n s id e ra tio n d id n o t p re v e n t th e Jo in t C h ie fs fro m p la c in g it e le v e n th a m o n g six te e n p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts , b a s e d o n u rg e n c y of n e e d a n d im p o rta n c e to n a tio n a l se c u rity .91 T h ese n e w c a lib ra tio n s o f in te re s ts a g a in s t re s o u rc e s , m o re rig o ro u s a n d fo rm a l th a n p re v io u s e ffo rts, u n d e rc u t a rg u m e n ts fo r a rm in g L atin A m e ric a ju s t w h e n p o litica l a n d m ilita ry le a d e rs fin a lly a g re e d to se e k e n a c tm e n t of th e IA M C A . If C o ld W ar fe a rs p ro v id e d a n e w ra tio n a le fo r th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , th e y also p e rs u a d e d A m e ric a n p la n n e r s to c o n c e n tra te th e ir lim ite d re s o u rc e s e lse w h e re . W ith o u t u r g e n t b a c k in g , th e IA M C A a g a in fa ile d to m a k e m u c h h e a d w a y in C o n g re s s . A fte r T ru m a n s u b m itte d th e le g isla tio n o n 26 M ay 1947, V a n d e n b e rg p re d ic te d th a t it w o u ld p re c ip ita te a "first-c lass fig h t" in th e S e n a te , le d b y th o se w h o fe a re d th e r e m n a n ts of fascism , ra th e r th a n th e b e g in n in g s of c o m m u n is m , in h ig h g o v e rn m e n t circles in L a tin A m e ric a .92 S e n a to r R o b e rt A . Taft (R -O hio) u s e d h is p o w e rfu l in flu e n c e a g a in s t th e le g isla tio n b e c a u se h e felt th a t it w o u ld m a k e w a rs a n d re v o lu tio n s in L a tin A m e ric a m o re d e s tru c tiv e th a n e v e r b e fo re . Taft also o b je c te d to th e c re a tio n of a n o th e r c o stly fo re ig n a id p ro g ra m , a s e n tim e n t so s tro n g in C o n g re s s in m id -1 9 4 7 th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n h a d to s tru g g le to se c u re a p p ro p r ia tio n s fo r a n a u th o riz e d p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey a n d sh e lv e p la n s fo r a K o re a n a id bill. B ecause of th is o p p o s itio n , th e p r o p o n e n ts of th e IA M C A d e c id e d to d e fe r a c tio n o n th e bill ra th e r th a n risk a n e m b a rra s s in g d e fe a t o n th e e v e of th e R io C o n fe re n c e . A lth o u g h th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e a p p ro v e d th e le g isla tio n , V a n d e n ­ b e rg a n d M a rsh a ll a g re e d o n 19 J u n e to p o s tp o n e c o n s id e ra tio n of th e IA M C A u n til th e n e x t s e s s io n of C o n g r e s s .93 D u rin g th e fo llo w in g y e a r th e IA M C A , o v e rw h e lm e d b y m o re im p o r ta n t C o ld W ar m e a s u re s , s a n k in to o b liv io n . C o n g re s s to o k n o a c tio n o n th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n w h ile it a p p ro v e d th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m a n d c o n s id e re d a n a c c o m p a n y in g e m e rg e n c y a id bill. L a te r in th e s e s s io n , V a n d e n b e rg b a lk e d a t h o ld in g h e a rin g s o n th e IA M C A b e c a u se of its c o n tro v e rsia l n a tu r e a n d its s e c o n d a ry im p o r­ ta n c e . E v e n th e bogotazo—th e rio t th a t o c c u rre d in A p ril 1948 fo llo w in g th e a s s a s s in a tio n of C o lo m b ia n o p p o s itio n le a d e r Jo rg é E liécer G a itâ n a n d th a t d is r u p te d th e In te r-A m e ric a n C o n fe re n c e a t B o g o ta—fa ile d to p ro v id e n e w im p e tu s fo r th e p a s s a g e of th e IA M C A .94 T e m p o ra ry fea rs

Military Aid and Hemispheric Defense • 61 of C o m m u n is t re v o lu tio n in L a tin A m e ric a q u ic k ly re c e d e d as C o lo m ­ b ia n tr o o p s r e s to re d o rd e r a n d th e B ogota C o n fe re n c e c o m p le te d its b u s in e s s . D e s p ite M a rsh a ll's p e rs o n a l a p p e a l to c o n g re s s io n a l le a d e rs, n e ith e r c h a m b e r v o te d o n th e IA M C A b e fo re a d jo u rn m e n t o n 19 Ju n e 1948. A t th e e n d of th e y e a r th e a d m in is tra tio n fin ally a b a n d o n e d its e ffo rts to g a in p a s s a g e of th e m e a s u r e .95 T he fa ilu re to se c u re L atin A m e ric a n a rm s le g isla tio n fo rc e d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n to re ly p rim a rily o n th e sale of s u r p lu s p r o p e r ty to p ro m o te th e s ta n d a r d iz a tio n of h e m is p h e ric a rm a m e n ts . D ifficu lties p la g u e d e v e n th e s e tra n s a c tio n s . A d m in is tra tiv e p ro b le m s a n d L atin A m e ric a n d o lla r s h o rta g e s p r e v e n te d all b u t to k e n sales b e fo re m id -1 947 a n d d e la y e d fin al d e liv e rie s u n d e r th e in te rim p ro g ra m u n til 1950.96 T h e d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s in v e n to rie s h a m p e r e d th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t's a b ility to m e e t re q u e s ts fo r e v e n sm a ll a m o u n ts of a rm a m e n ts . In D e c e m b e r 1947 th e A rg e n tin e m in is te r of w a r s u b m it­ te d a list of m a te rie l h e d e s ire d fo r im m e d ia te d eliv ery , b u t th e a rm y fo u n d th a t it c o u ld p ro v id e less th a n o n e -fifth of th e e q u ip m e n t. E v e n a fte r A rg e n tin e officials p a r e d th e ir re q u e s t, S e c re ta ry of th e A rm y K e n n e th C . Royall h a d to o b ta in T ru m a n 's a p p ro v a l fo r th e sale sin c e th e ite m s w e re n o t in s u r p lu s s to c k s .97 By m id-1948 th e th r e e se rv ice s h a d p ra c tic a lly n o a rm a m e n ts to f u r n is h L a tin A m e ric a. A lack of a u th o rity a n d e q u ip m e n t b ro u g h t th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m to a h a lt.98

T h e C o ld W ar th u s h a d a d ic h o to m o u s effect o n th e p la n s fo r p o s tw a r m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a . O n o n e h a n d , c o n c e rn o v e r S oviet e x p a n s io n is m h e lp e d p e rs u a d e M a rsh a ll a n d A c h e s o n in e a rly 1947 to jo in w ith th e ir c o lle a g u e s in th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t in s p o n s o rin g th e IA M C A . A n x ie ty o v e r th e S o v iet th r e a t a lso re in fo rc e d th e se rv ic e s' c o n v ic tio n th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld n o lo n g e r a ffo rd to p o s tp o n e its lo n g -s ta n d in g p la n s fo r in te r-A m e ric a n m ilita ry u n ity . E ise n h o w e r r e m in d e d th e Jo in t C h ie fs in M ay th a t th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re w as " th e m a in b a se " of th e w a r p o te n tia l of th e U n ite d S ta te s .99 S a fe g u a rd ­ in g th e s e c u rity of th e h e m is p h e re th r o u g h th e n e g o tia tio n of a n in te rA m e ric a n d e fe n s e tre a ty a n d th e p ro v is io n of a rm s a id , in h is view , w as o n e of th e e s s e n tia l ta s k s of n a tio n a l secu rity . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e w o rld w id e sc o p e of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e —

62 • Arming the Free World ra is in g th e p ro s p e c t o f s u b s ta n tia l n e w p ro g ra m s of fo re ig n a s ­ s i s t a n c e - r e l e g a t e d th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m to a lo w p rio rity . C o n c e rn e d a b o u t o v e r-ta x in g n a tio n a l capacity, a d m in is tra ­ tio n officials d e c id e d th a t th e s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of a rm a m e n ts , h o w e v e r d e sira b le , w a s b e y o n d th e ir m e a n s . C o n v in c e d th a t th e y c o u ld n o t m e e t C o m m u n is t c h a lle n g e s o n e v e ry fro n t, th e y c o n c e n tra te d th e ir re ­ so u rc e s in th e p rin c ip a l th e a te rs of th e C o ld W ar—E u ro p e a n d th e E a s te rn M e d ite r r a n e a n —n o t L a tin A m e ric a . A lth o u g h b u re a u c ra tic c o n flict a n d c o n g re s s io n a l in a c tio n b e d e v ile d p la n s fo r p o s tw a r m ili­ ta r y a s s is ta n c e to L atin A m e ric a , it w a s th e h a rd e n in g of C o ld W ar a ttitu d e s in th e s p r in g of 1947 th a t in s u r e d th e d e m ise of th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m . O fte n a n im p e tu s to in te rv e n tio n is m . C o ld W ar th in k in g a c tu a lly r e s tra in e d , a lb e it te m p o ra rily , U .S . m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a .

3

1The Limits of IAid to China Our major objectives with respect to China are: effective joint prosecution of the war against Japan; and from a long-range standpoint, the establishment of a strong and united China as a necessary principal stabilizing factor in the Far East. S t a t e Department policy statement, 18 April 1945 There has been much loose talk about China's becom ing the stabilizing influence in the Far East. W e have never felt that this was a possibility in the reasonably near future but we have hoped that China would not becom e an unstabilizing influence—which is an entirely different thing. —Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 23 N ovember 1946

I n se v e ra l w ay s A m e ric a n p la n s to f u r n is h m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to C h in a at th e e n d of th e S e c o n d W o rld W ar re s e m b le d th o s e fo r L a tin A m e ric a . In b o th c a se s le n d -le a se a n d w a rtim e m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n p ro v id e d th e fo u n d a tio n fo r p o s tw a r a s s is ta n c e . A lso in b o th in s ta n c e s a n d fo r sim ila r re a s o n s se rv ice officials w e re th e le a d in g a d v o c a te s of s u c h help. In C h in a as in L a tin A m e ric a m ilita ry officials h o p e d to p ro m o te s ta n d a r d iz a tio n o n A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts , ex clu d e E u ro p e a n m ilita ry in flu e n c e s , a n d in s u re C h in a 's frie n d ly o r ie n ta tio n to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s in th e e v e n t of a f u tu r e c o n flict. M u c h like th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , th e ir e x tra v a g a n t p la n s fo r lo n g -te rm m a te ria l a n d a d v is o ry a s s is ta n c e to C h in a e n c o u n te r e d s tr o n g o p p o s i­ tio n fro m re g io n a l e x p e rts in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, w h o fe a re d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f " a de facto p ro te c to ra te w ith a se m i-c o lo n ia l C h in e s e a rm y u n d e r o u r d ire c tio n ." 1 T h ese d iv is io n s b e tw e e n d ip lo m a tic a n d m ilita ry officials, like th o se o v e r a rm s a id to L atin A m e ric a, w e re s h a rp a n d p e rs is te n t. Like th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , th e a m b itio u s p la n s fo r la v ish a n d c o n tin u in g a s s is ta n c e to C h in a n e v e r w e re fu l­ filled , a lth o u g h fo r d iffe re n t re a s o n s . T he e ru p tio n of civil w a r in C h in a

63

64 • Arming the Free World in 1945 p ro v o k e d e x te n d e d d e b a te w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n of H a rry S. T ru m a n o v e r th e e x te n t of A m e ric a n s u p p o r t fo r th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t of C h ia n g K a i-sh ek a n d th e ro le of a rm s a id in b rin g in g a so lu tio n to C h ia n g 's in te rn a l p ro b le m s . T ru m a n b a c k e d C h ia n g , w h ile h o p in g th a t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e w o u ld b o th e n a b le th e N a tio n a lis ts to e x te n d th e ir c o n tro l a n d e n c o u ra g e th e g e n e ra lis s im o to c o m p ro m ise w ith h is C o m m u n is t o p p o n e n ts . W h e n C h ia n g p ro v e d re c a lc itra n t, T ru m a n , o n th e re c o m m e n d a tio n of h is sp e c ia l re p re s e n ta tiv e in C h in a , G e n e ra l G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll, h a lte d A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs to th e N a tio n a lis ts . A s th e civil w a r e x p a n d e d , a d m in is tra tio n officials first sc a le d d o w n a n d th e n all b u t a b a n d o n e d p la n s fo r e x te n d e d m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n , w h ic h a s s u m e d a p e a c e fu l, u n ifie d C h in a . By e a rly 1947 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d re tra c te d b u t n o t y e t re d e fin e d its p o licy o n m ilita ry a id to C h in a .

A A ilita r y a s s is ta n c e to C h in a h a d b e e n a p e rs is te n t a n d v ex in g p r o b ­ le m fo r th e U n ite d S ta te s sin c e th e b e g in n in g of th e S e c o n d W o rld War. T h e d e c isio n of P re s id e n t F ra n k lin D. R o o sev elt a n d h is a d v is e rs to c o n c e n tra te A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s o n th e d e fe a t of G e rm a n y a n g e re d C h ia n g K ai-sh ek . In s te a d of re c e iv in g th e s u b s ta n tia l m ilita ry s u p p lie s th a t h e h a d e x p e c te d , C h ia n g h a d to se ttle fo r m e a g e r le n d -le a se a llo c a tio n s. R o o se v e lt trie d to e a se C h ia n g 's d is tre s s b y tre a tin g C h in a as a g re a t p o w e r a n d e m p h a s iz in g th a t it w o u ld p la y a m a jo r role in m a in ta in in g p e a c e in A sia a fte r th e w ar, b u t th e g e n e ra lis s im o w a s n o t a p p e a s e d . H e c o m p la in e d b itte rly in M ay 1942 th a t C h in a w as " tre a te d n o t as a n e q u a l like B rita in a n d R u ssia , b u t as a w a rd ," a n d h in te d th a t h is g o v e rn m e n t m ig h t s u e fo r p e a c e if g re a te r a id w a s n o t fo rth c o m ­ in g .2 R e s p o n d in g to C h ia n g 's d e m a n d s , R o o se v e lt trie d to in c re a s e th e flo w of s u p p lie s to C h in a w ith o u t d im in is h in g A m e ric a n e ffo rts in m o re im p o r ta n t th e a te rs of o p e ra tio n s . H e a lso g r a n te d C h ia n g 's r e q u e s t fo r a $500 m illio n lo a n a n d lo o k e d th e o th e r w ay w h e n m e m ­ b e rs of C h ia n g 's in n e r circle u s e d th e f u n d s fo r th e ir p e rs o n a l e n ric h ­ m e n t. C h ia n g 's d is sa tis fa c tio n w ith A m e ric a n a id p o licies, ho w ev er, re m a in e d a c o n tin u a l so u rc e of fric tio n b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d C h in a u n til th e e n d of th e w a r.3 N o o n e w as m o re d e e p ly in v o lv e d in s h a p in g w a rtim e p la n s fo r m ilita ry a id to C h in a th a n G e n e ra l Jo s e p h W. S tilw ell, th e c o m m a n d e r of A m e ric a n tro o p s in C h in a , B u rm a, a n d In d ia a n d c h ie f of sta ff to

Limits o f Aid to China • 65 C h ia n g . S tilw ell a rriv e d in C h in a in M a rc h 1942 c a rry in g o rd e rs to h e lp im p ro v e th e c o m b a t c a p a b ilitie s of th e C h in e s e arm y, a n d h e q u ic k ly p r o p o s e d s w e e p in g re fo rm s . H e a d v o c a te d th e tra in in g a n d e q u ip m e n t u n d e r A m e ric a n s u p e rv is io n of a th irty -d iv is io n fo rce th a t w o u ld a ssist in th e r e c o n q u e s t of n o r th e r n B u rm a, th e re b y r e o p e n in g a n o v e rla n d s u p p ly ro u te to C h in a . A tta in in g th is o b jec tiv e w a s critical b e c a u se th e o n ly A llie d lin e of c o m m u n ic a tio n to C h in a sin c e th e fall of B u rm a in M a y 1942 w a s th e a ir ro u te o v e r th e H u m p of th e H im a la y a s b e tw e e n A s s a m in In d ia a n d K u n m in g in C h in a . S tilw ell's p la n s also calle d fo r th e c re a tio n o f a s e c o n d g ro u p of th ir ty d iv is io n s th a t w o u ld p a rtic ip a te in a c a m p a ig n to o p e n a p o r t in J a p a n e s e -o c c u p ie d E a st C h in a . S tilw ell e v e n tu a lly h o p e d fo r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e in e s ta b lis h in g a th ir d th irty d iv is io n fo rce. T ogether, th e s e tro o p s w o u ld p ro v id e C h ia n g w ith a fo rm id a b le a n d e ffic ie n t a rm y fo r w a g in g w a r a g a in s t Ja p a n a s w ell as b o ls te rin g h is p o w e r a g a in s t d o m e stic riv a ls .4 S tilw ell's p r o p o s a ls in v o lv e d m a jo r c h a n g e s in C h in e s e m ilita ry o rg a n iz a tio n . T h e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s c o n s is te d of a p p ro x im a te ly 3.8 m illio n m e n o rg a n iz e d in o v e r 300 d iv is io n s , m o s t of w h ic h w e re u n d e r s tr e n g th a n d ill-e q u ip p e d . M a n y of th e local c o m m a n d e rs w e re v irtu a lly a u to n o m o u s; m any, a s w ell, w e re v e n a l a n d p la c e d p e rs o n a l g a in a b o v e m ilita ry efficien cy w h e n it c a m e to p a y in g a n d o u tfittin g th e ir tro o p s . C h ia n g m a in ta in e d th e ir lo y alty b y s h re w d ly d is trib u tin g s u p p lie s a n d p a tro n a g e . F u rth e rm o re , h e m a n a g e d th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s w ith p o litica l c o n s id e ra tio n s firm ly in m in d . M a n y of h is b e s t tro o p s b lo c k a d e d a re a s of C o m m u n is t s tr e n g th th r o u g h o u t th e w ar; o th e rs th a t w e re re s is tin g J a p a n e se a d v a n c e s fa ile d to re c e iv e v ita l s u p p lie s .5 S tilw ell's re fo rm s th r e a te n e d to s w e e p aw ay th is s y s te m , th e re b y w e a k e n in g C h ia n g 's h o ld o n h is p rim a ry so u rc e of p o w e r.6 W h ile S tilw ell p r e s s e d fo r th e re o rg a n iz a tio n of th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s , C h ia n g r e s is te d . H e d e la y e d s e n d in g tr o o p s to th e tra in in g c e n te r th a t Stil w ell e s ta b lis h e d in Y u n n a n . H e a lso e m b ra c e d p ro p o s a ls a d v a n c e d b y G e n e ra l C laire L. C h e n n a u lt, th e c o m m a n d e r of a sm a ll a ir ta s k fo rce in C h in a , th a t c h a lle n g e d S tilw ell's p la n s . A z e a lo u s a d v o c a te of a ir p o w e r, C h e n n a u lt p ro m is e d R o o se v e lt in O c to b e r 1942 th a t h e c o u ld b rin g Ja p a n to its k n e e s w ith a fo rce of ju s t 147 p la n e s . C h e n n a u lt's a ir s tra te g y a p p e a le d to th e g e n e ra lis s im o sin c e it in n o w ay je o p a r d iz e d C h ia n g 's s y s te m of p o litical a n d m ilita ry c o n tro l. C h e n n a u lt's id e a s a lso in te r e s te d R o o se v e lt, w h o h o p e d th a t a n air o ffe n siv e m ig h t in flict im m e d ia te a n d s u b s ta n tia l lo sse s o n th e Jap-

66 • Arming the Free World a n e s e a t little c o st to th e U n ite d S ta te s. R o o se v e lt also fe a re d a C h in e s e c o lla p se a n d w a s u n w illin g to u s e le n d -le a se , as S tilw ell re c o m ­ m e n d e d , to p r o d C h ia n g in to re fo rm of th e arm y. In M a y 1943, d e s p ite c o n tr a r y a d v ic e fro m G e n e ra l M a rsh a ll, th e a rm y c h ie f of staff, a n d S e c re ta ry of W ar H e n ry L. S tim s o n , h e o r d e r e d th a t s u p p lie s fo r C h e n n a u lt's a ir fo rce re c e iv e to p p rio rity in th e H u m p airlift. T h is d e c isio n , w h ic h h e ld th e flo w of g ro u n d fo rce e q u ip m e n t to a trick le, w a s a m a jo r b lo w to Stilw elT s p r o g r a m .7 D u rin g th e n e x t year, Stilw elT s p la n s c o lla p se d . T h e re o rg a n iz a tio n a n d tra in in g of N a tio n a lis t u n its in Y u n n a n p r o g r e s s e d slow ly, h a m ­ p e r e d b y lack of e q u ip m e n t a n d C h ia n g 's e rra tic c o o p e ra tio n . "I h a v e to ld h im [C h ia n g ] th e t r u th ," S tilw ell fu m e d . "All o f th is h e ig n o re s a n d s h u ts h is e y e s to th e d e p lo ra b le c o n d itio n of h is arm y." In fu ria te d b y C h ia n g 's s tu b b o r n n e s s . S tilw ell b a re ly c o n c e a le d h is c o n te m p t fro m th e m a n h e p riv a te ly c a lle d P e a n u t. By th e a u tu m n of 1943 A m e ric a n m ilita ry a u th o ritie s s h a r e d Stilw elT s c o n v ic tio n th a t th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s w o u ld b e u n a b le to m a k e a m a jo r c o n trib u tio n to th e d e fe a t of Ja p a n . W h e n S o v iet P re m ie r Josef V. S ta lin s ta te d in O c to b e r th a t h is a rm ie s w o u ld e n te r th e w a r a g a in s t Ja p a n a fte r th e s u r r e n d e r of G e r­ m any, C h in a 's im p o rta n c e in A m e ric a n stra te g ic p la n n in g d e c lin e d e v e n fu rth e r. A lth o u g h R o o se v e lt c a su a lly a p p ro v e d C h ia n g 's re q u e s t at th e C a iro C o n fe re n c e in N o v e m b e r 1943 to e q u ip n in e ty C h in e s e d iv is io n s , m ilita ry officials a c tu a lly sc a le d d o w n p la n s fo r a id to C h in a . By e a rly 1944 a n y h o p e of b u ild in g a m o d e rn a rm y in C h in a h a d v a n is h e d .8 A m e ric a n officials in s te a d w o rrie d a b o u t a v e rtin g th e c o llap se of th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt. In A p ril 1944 th e Ja p a n e se la u n c h e d a p o w e rfu l o ffen siv e in E a st C h in a th a t o v e rw h e lm e d th e N a tio n a lis t d e fe n d e rs . T h e a d v a n c in g fo rce s se iz e d C h e n n a u lt's fo rw a rd b a s e s a n d a p p e a re d to th r e a te n K u n m in g , th e e a s te r n te rm in u s of th e H u m p ro u te , a n d C h u n g k in g , th e N a tio n a lis t c a p ita l. " W h a t I a m try in g to fin d o u t," R o o sev elt c o m p la in e d , "is w h e re is th e C h in e s e A rm y a n d w h y a r e n 't th e y fig h tin g , b e c a u se th e Ja p a n e s e s e e m to b e ab le to p u s h th e m in an y d ire c tio n th e y w a n t to ." 9 O n th e ad v ic e of th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, R o o se v e lt m a d e a n e x tra o rd in a ry p ro p o s a l: h e a s k e d C h ia n g o n 6 Ju ly to p lac e S tilw ell in c o m m a n d of all C h in e s e fo rce s, in c lu d in g th e C o m m u n is ts . H e e x p la in e d to th e g e n e ra lis s im o th a t s u c h a d ra s tic m e a s u re w a s n e c e s s a ry b e c a u se " th e f u tu r e of all A sia is at sta k e a lo n g

Limits o f Aid to China • 67 w ith th e tr e m e n d o u s e ffo rt w h ic h A m e ric a h a s e x p e n d e d in th a t r e g io n ." 10 A t sta k e fo r C h ia n g w a s h is le a d e rs h ip of C h in a , a n d h e re fu s e d to c o o p e ra te . H e w a s u n w illin g to s u r r e n d e r c o n tro l of h is a rm ie s to S tilw ell—h is b itte r, p e rs o n a l a n ta g o n is t—o r to a cq u ie sc e in le n d -le a se a id to th e C o m m u n is ts . A fte r te m p o riz in g u n til th e e n d of S e p te m b e r, h e d e m a n d e d S tilw ell's recall. R o o se v e lt re lu c ta n tly c o m p lie d a n d n a m e d G e n e ra l A lb e rt C . W e d e m e y e r as S tilw ell's re p la c e m e n t. T he p r e s id e n t a n d h is to p a d v is e rs n o w a b a n d o n e d all h o p e of p e rs u a d in g C h ia n g to s te p u p h is m ilita ry e ffo rt a g a in s t th e Ja p a n e se . R o o sev elt d id n o t w a n t W e d e m e y e r to c o m m a n d th e C h in e s e a rm ie s; th e Jo in t C h ie fs o f S ta ff d id n o t o r d e r h im , as th e y h a d S tilw ell, to a tte m p t to s tr e n g th e n th e N a tio n a lis t g r o u n d fo rce s. "If C h ia n g K ai-sh ek h a d s u p p o r te d S tilw ell, w e s h o u ld h a v e h a d a w e ll-tra in e d n u c le u s of . . . C h in e s e tr o o p s to m e e t th e m [the Ja p a n e se ], " S tim s o n w ro te b itte rly in h is d iary . "As it is, th e y a re still im p o te n t C h in e s e , u n tr a in e d a n d b a d ly le d ." 11 T h e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry d isa b ilitie s, h o w ev er, w e re a m a rg in a l c o n c e rn in W a s h in g to n d u rin g th e la st m o n th s of th e w ar. A fte r Stilw ell's recall, A m e ric a n in te re s ts in C h in a in c re a s in g ly fo c u s e d o n p o s tw a r o b je c tiv e s. R o o se v e lt c o n tin u e d to b e lie v e th a t d e s p ite its " te m p o r a r y w e a k n e s s ," C h in a " w o u ld s o m e d a y . . . b e th e m o s t im p o r ta n t fa c to r in th e w h o le F ar E a s t." 12 H e w o rrie d th a t a civil w ar, w h ic h m ig h t e n c o u ra g e S o v iet in te rv e n tio n o r b rin g to p o w e r a C o m ­ m u n is t re g im e , w o u ld d e s tro y h is p la n s fo r p o s tw a r R u ss ia n -A m e ric a n c o o p e ra tio n . H is re m e d y w a s a c o a litio n b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts , a n a rr a n g e m e n t h e c o n s id e re d th e b e s t h o p e fo r u n ity a n d s ta b ility in C h in a .13 T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's C h in a e x p e rts a lso th o u g h t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld tr y to p ro m o te a s e ttle m e n t b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts , b u t c a u tio n e d a g a in s t o v e rc o m m itm e n t to C h ia n g . F o re ig n S e rv ice O ffice rs J o h n R D a v ies, Jr., a n d Jo h n S. S erv ice re ­ p o r te d th a t th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t, d o m in a te d b y C h ia n g 's K u o ­ m in ta n g p a rty , w a s c o rr u p t a n d d e c a d e n t a n d c o n c e rn e d o n ly w ith p re s e rv in g , ra th e r th a n s h a rin g , its d e c lin in g p o w er. T h e C o m m u n is ts , b y c o n tra s t, p o s s e s s e d p o p u la r a p p e a l, d y n a m ic le a d e rsh ip , a n d w ax ­ in g m ilita ry s tr e n g th . T h ey w a r n e d th a t C h ia n g 's u n w illin g n e s s to re lin q u is h o n e -p a r ty ru le w o u ld o n ly h a s te n th e o n s e t of a civil w a r th a t

68 • Arming the Free World th e K u o m in ta n g Could n o t h o p e to w in . S e rv ice a n d D a v ies re c o m ­ m e n d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld n o t ex clu siv ely s u p p o r t C h ia n g 's in c re a s in g ly re a c tio n a ry a n d re p re s s iv e re g im e b u t in s te a d sh o u ld in d u c e th e g e n e ra lis s im o to c a rry o u t re fo rm s a n d m a k e m e a n in g fu l c o n c e s s io n s to th e C o m m u n is ts . T h ey a lso u r g e d A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e C o m m u n is ts in th e w a r a g a in s t Ja p a n . By w o rk in g w ith b o th th e K u o m in ta n g a n d th e C o m m u n is ts , S erv ice e x p la in e d , th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld a v o id a lig n m e n t w ith e ith e r p a rty a n d p re s e rv e frie n d ly re la tio n s w ith a n y g o v e rn m e n t th a t m ig h t e v e n tu a lly co m e to p o w e r.14 S u c h th in k in g w a s a n a th e m a to P atrick J. H u rley , th e n e w A m e ric a n a m b a s s a d o r in C h u n g k in g . H u rle y h a d b e e n P re s id e n t H e rb e rt C. H o o v e r's s e c re ta ry of w a r a n d R o o se v e lt's d ip lo m a tic tro u b le s h o o te r in th e M id d le E ast. A lth o u g h h e p o s s e s s e d o n ly a slim k n o w le d g e of C h in e s e affairs w h e n h e a s s u m e d h is p o s t in N o v e m b e r 1944, H u rle y w a s so c e rta in of th e K u o m in ta n g 's v ita lity a n d so o p tim istic a b o u t th e p ro s p e c ts fo r u n ity u n d e r C h ia n g 's le a d e rs h ip th a t h e s u p p r e s s e d e m b a s s y r e p o r ts to th e c o n tra ry . T h e b re a k d o w n of h is m e d ia tio n e ffo rts at th e e n d of 1944 d id n o t s h a k e h is c o n v ic tio n th a t h e c o u ld c o m p o se th e d iffe re n c e s b e tw e e n th e tw o m a jo r C h in e s e fa c tio n s. H u rle y th o u g h t th a t th e C o m m u n is ts , w h o se s tr e n g th h e g re a tly u n d e re s tim a te d , w o u ld e v e n tu a lly h a v e to co m e to te rm s w ith C h ia n g . H e v e h e m e n tly o p p o s e d a n y A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o o p e ra tio n w ith th e C o m m u n is ts w ith o u t C h ia n g 's c o n s e n t, b e c a u se h e w o rrie d th a t th e ir leader, M ao T s e -tu n g , m ig h t b e co m e in tr a n s ig e n t in n e g o tia tio n s . D e sp ite a g ro w in g b e lie f in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s ty in g itself to o c lo sely to a fa lte rin g re g im e . H u rle y a d a m a n tly in s is te d th a t h is m is s io n , fo r w h ic h h e c la im e d p re s id e n tia l sa n c tio n , w a s to p r e v e n t th e c o llap se of th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t a n d to s u s ta in C h ia n g 's le a d e rs h ip .15 T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t n e v e rth e le s s c o n tin u e d to a d v o c a te a flexible p o licy to w a rd C h ia n g 's re g im e . J o h n C a rte r V in c en t, th e c h ie f of th e D iv isio n o f C h in e s e A ffairs, a d v is e d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t in J a n u a ry 1945 th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld d is tin g u is h b e tw e e n th e im m e d ia te g o a l of m o b iliz in g C h in a 's re s o u rc e s a g a in s t Ja p a n a n d th e e v e n tu a l g o a l of h e lp in g to d e v e lo p a " u n ite d , d e m o c ra tic a lly p ro g re s s iv e , a n d c o o p e ra tiv e C h in a ." C u r r e n t s u p p o r t of C h ia n g , V in c e n t a s s e rte d , s h o u ld n o t p re c lu d e f u tu r e c o o p e ra tio n w ith a n o th e r le a d e r w h o m ig h t h a v e a b e tte r c h a n c e of c re a tin g a u n ifie d a n d d e m o c ra tic C h in a .

Limits o f Aid to China • 69 A cco rdingly, h e re c o m m e n d e d th a t W e d e m e y e r a v o id s tr e n g th e n in g C h ia n g 's a rm ie s fo r p o s tw a r p u r p o s e s . L e n d -le a se a id s h o u ld b e g iv e n o n ly to th o se N a tio n a lis t fo rc e s th a t c o n trib u te d to th e w a r e ff o r t.16 T h e co n flict b e tw e e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d H u rle y p e a k e d in M a rc h 1945 o v e r th e e x te n s io n of m ilita ry a id to th e C o m m u n is ts . D is tre s s e d b y th e fa ilu re of H u rle y 's r e n e w e d m e d ia tio n e ffo rts a n d th e o u tb re a k of s k irm is h e s b e tw e e n N a tio n a lis t a n d C o m m u n is t fo rce s, V in c e n t a rg u e d th a t C h ia n g 's re lu c ta n c e to o ffer th e C o m m u n is ts m o re th a n to k e n r e p r e s e n ta tio n in h is g o v e rn m e n t w a s p re v e n tin g a n in te r ­ n a l s e ttle m e n t. S e ttin g a sid e h is e a rlie r re s e rv a tio n s , V in c e n t n o w a d v o c a te d th e p ro v is io n of a rm s to th e C o m m u n is ts w ith o u t first s e c u r­ in g C h ia n g 's c o n s e n t. H e th o u g h t th a t th is a c tio n w o u ld n o t o n ly s tr e n g th e n th e w a r e ffo rt a g a in s t th e Ja p a n e se , b u t a lso p r o d C h ia n g in to m a k in g g e n u in e c o n c e s s io n s to th e C o m m u n is ts .17 T h e e m b a s s y sta ff in C h u n g k in g a g re e d . W h ile H u rle y w a s e n ro u te to W a sh in g to n fo r c o n s u lta tio n s , h is s u b o r d in a te s r e p o r te d o n 28 F e b ru a ry th a t C h ia n g 's lib e ra l critics b e lie v e d th a t n o A m e ric a n a c tio n c o u ld d o m o re to m a k e th e g e n e ra lis s im o com e to te rm s w ith th e C o m m u n is ts . A c tin g S e c re ta ry of S ta te Jo s e p h C . G re w s e n t a c o p y of th is m e s sa g e to R o o se v e lt w ith th e s u g g e s tio n th a t it se rv e as a b a sis fo r d is c u s s io n w ith th e a m b a s s a d o r.18 H u rle y w a s e n ra g e d . H e c o n s id e re d th e d is p a tc h fro m C h u n g k in g a n act of d islo y a lty b y h is s u b o rd in a te s . F u rth e rm o re , h e v e h e m e n tly m a in ta in e d th a t th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n s , if im p le m e n te d , w o u ld d e s tro y h is e ffo rts to a rra n g e a n a c c o m m o d a tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o C h in e s e p a rtie s . R o o se v e lt s u p p o r te d H u rley , b u t fo r d iffe re n t r e a ­ s o n s . T he p r e s id e n t w a s b a n k in g o n S o v iet c o o p e ra tio n , ra th e r th a n H u rle y 's n e g o tia tio n s , to b rin g p e a c e a n d u n ity to C h in a . A t th e Yalta C o n fe re n c e in F e b ru ary , R o o se v e lt a g re e d to te rrito ria l c o n c e s s io n s in E ast A sia in r e tu r n fo r S o v iet e n tr y in to th e w a r a g a in s t Ja p a n a n d S ta lin 's s u p p o r t of th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t. H e r e a s o n e d th a t th e C o m m u n is ts , u n a b le to c o u n t o n M o sc o w 's a s s is ta n c e , w o u ld h a v e to c o m p ro m ise w ith C h ia n g . M ilita ry a id to th e C o m m u n is ts , R o o sev elt fe a re d , w o u ld m a k e th e m le ss c o m p lia n t a n d so in c re a s e th e c h a n c e s of civil w ar. A s s u r e d o f R o o se v e lt's b a c k in g . H u rle y p u r g e d th e e m b a s s y staff. P o licy m a k ers in W a s h in g to n g av e n o f u r th e r c o n s id e ra tio n , fo r th e d u ra tio n o f th e w ar, to a rm in g th e C o m m u n is ts .19 S o o n a fte r R o o se v e lt's d e c isio n to fu r n is h w a rtim e m ilita ry aid so lely to th e N a tio n a lis ts , d e fe n se a n d d ip lo m a tic officials d is c u s s e d

70 • Arming the Free World p o s tw a r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . T h e a rm y air fo rce s to o k th e lea d . O n 21 M a rc h G e n e ra l H e n ry H . A rn o ld , th e c o m m a n d in g g e n e ra l of th e a rm y air fo rce s (A A F), a p p ro v e d a te n ta tiv e p la n b a s e d o n th e re c o m m e n d a ­ tio n s of C h e n n a u lt a n d W e d e m e y e r fo r e x te n siv e A m e ric a n h e lp in b u ild in g a C h in e s e a ir fo rce of fo rty a n d o n e -h a lf air g r o u p s —a to ta l of 1,922 p la n e s —w h ic h a m o u n te d to a six-fold e x p a n s io n of C h in e s e air s tr e n g th .20 T he A A F p la n a lso c a lle d fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a n A m e ri­ c a n a d v is o ry g ro u p of 1,895 o fficers a n d m e n to tr a in C h in e s e p ilo ts a n d g ro u n d c re w s. A rn o ld th o u g h t th a t th is e x tra v a g a n t a ir fo rce w a s n e c e s s a ry " to a s s u re a sta b le g o v e rn m e n t [in C h in a ] c a p a b le of ta k in g a p ro m in e n t p o s itio n a m o n g th e A llie d N a tio n s in a n e ffo rt to m a in ta in w o rld p e a c e ." 21 P a ro ch ia l in te re s ts s tro n g ly in flu e n c e d A rn o ld 's C h in a p ro p o s a ls , ju s t as th e y h a d a ffe c te d h is p la n s fo r L a tin A m e ric a . A la rg e C h in e s e a ir fo rce s ta n d a r d iz e d o n A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t w o u ld h e lp th e A A F a ch ie v e o n e of its m o s t im p o r ta n t p o s tw a r o b jec tiv e s: th e m a in te n a n c e of a la rg e d o m e stic a irc raft in d u stry . S taff p la n n e r s , h o w ev er, felt th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld face s te r n c o m p e titio n fro m o th e r n a tio n s , e sp e c ia lly th e S o v iet U n io n , th a t w a n te d to sell m ilita ry a n d c o m m e r­ cial a irc raft to C h in a . In th e ir view , o n e of th e m a in re a s o n s fo r o ffe rin g th e C h in e s e a b u n d a n t a ir a s s is ta n c e w a s to p re v e n t s u c h c o m p e titio n . T h e p la n n e r s s ta te d b lu n tly , "W e s h o u ld b e p r e p a r e d to m e e t all o ffers b y o th e r n a tio n s ." A m e ric a n g e n e ro sity , th e y a d d e d , c o u ld a lso fo re ­ sta ll " fo r so m e y e a rs" th e c o n s tru c tio n of C h in e s e a irc raft a n d e n g in e fa c to rie s. In C h in a , as in L a tin A m e ric a , th e A A F a g g re ss iv e ly s o u g h t to d o m in a te p o s tw a r m a rk e ts fo r a irc ra ft.22 T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t q u ic k ly u r g e d re s tra in t. T h ey a rg u e d th a t a n y p o s tw a r m ilita ry o b lig a tio n s to th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld m a k e C h ia n g e v e n m o re in tra c ta b le a n d d e p riv e A m e ric a n p o licy of a n y c o n tin u in g fre e d o m of a c tio n . T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t also d is ­ c o u n te d th e A A F 's a n x ie tie s th a t o th e r n a tio n s w e re e a g e r to e q u ip th e C h in e s e a ir fo rce. T h ey a v e rre d th a t G re a t B ritain lac k ed th e re s o u rc e s, a n d th a t th e S o v iet U n io n w o u ld p ro b a b ly e x te n d a n y m ilita ry h e lp to th e C o m m u n is ts . W h ile h o p in g th a t a s tro n g a n d u n ite d C h in a w ith m o d e rn a rm e d fo rce s w o u ld e v e n tu a lly b e c o m e a n a n c h o r of sta b ility in E a st A sia, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b e lie v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld c o n fin e its m e a s u re s of m ilita ry a id to w a rtim e p ro je c ts u n til C h in a so lv e d its in te rn a l p ro b le m s . A t S ta te 's r e q u e s t th e S tate-W arN a v y C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e (S W N C C ) a n d th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff

Limits o f Aid to China • 71 a g re e d in M ay to d e fe r p la n n in g fo r p o s tw a r m ilita ry a s sista n c e to C h in a .23 A lth o u g h th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re fra in e d fro m m a k in g a n y n e w c o m m itm e n ts to th e N a tio n a lis ts , A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p o r t of C h ia n g 's a rm ie s in c re a s e d d u rin g th e fin al m o n th s o f th e w ar. B ecause o f th e o p e n in g of a s u p p ly ro u te th r o u g h B u rm a a n d th e e x p a n s io n of th e H u m p airlift, m ilita ry a id flo w e d to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm e d fo rce s in la rg e r a m o u n ts th a n e v e r b e fo re . W e d e m e y e r u s e d th e s e s u p p lie s to b u ild th ir ty - n in e C h in e s e d iv is io n s . By V-J D ay m o s t of th e A m e ric a n s p o n s o r e d (A lp h a ) u n its h a d c o m p le te d se v e ra l w e e k s of tra in in g ; m a n y a lso b e n e fite d fro m a n im p ro v e d s y s te m of ra tio n s th a t h e lp e d re lie v e m a ln u tritio n , a m a jo r p ro b le m in th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s. B ut o n ly five d iv is io n s re c e iv e d fu ll e q u ip m e n t b e fo re th e Ja p a n e se s u r ­ re n d e r, a n d e v e n th e s e tro o p s th e N a tio n a lis ts c o u ld n o t s u p p o r t re lia ­ b ly in b a ttle .24 E v e n th o u g h C h ia n g 's fo rc e s m a d e so m e g a in s a g a in s t th e Ja p a n e s e n e a r th e e n d of th e w ar, A m e ric a n a d v is e rs h a d n o illu ­ s io n s a b o u t th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry s tr e n g th . " O u r sm a ll su c c e s s e s ," W e d e m e y e r k n ew , " w e re d u e as m u c h to th e e n e m y d e c isio n to w ith ­ d ra w as to in c re a s e d C h in e s e s p irit a n d m ilita ry e ffe c tiv e n e ss ." 25 T h e p o litica l c o n s e q u e n c e s of A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p o r t of C h ia n g 's a rm ie s w e re fa r g re a te r. C o n fid e n t of A m e ric a n b a c k in g , th e g e n e ra lis s im o r e fu s e d to s h a re p o w e r w ith h is d o m e stic riv als. M ao , o n th e o th e r h a n d , g re w in c re a s in g ly m is tru s tfu l of A m e ric a n policy. D e sp ite th e ir a im of p e a c e a n d u n ity in C h in a , A m e ric a n a c tio n s a c tu a lly e n c o u ra g e d d iv is io n a n d c o n flict. "W h ile fa v o rin g n o p o litical fa c tio n , w e c o n tin u e to s u p p o r t th e e x istin g G o v e rn m e n t of C h in a , h e a d e d b y C h ia n g K a i-s h e k ," th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in fo rm e d P re s i­ d e n t T ru m a n s h o rtly a fte r h e to o k office. A t w a r's e n d n e ith e r T ru m a n n o r h is to p a d v is e rs a p p re c ia te d th e c o n tra d ic tio n in th a t s ta te m e n t.26

T h e J a p a n e s e s u r r e n d e r of 14 A u g u s t 1945 b ro u g h t th e e n d of o n e w a r in C h in a a n d th e re n e w a l of a n o th e r. C o n flic t e r u p te d im m e d ia te ly b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts o v e r th e re o c c u p a tio n of a re a s u n d e r J a p a n e s e c o n tro l. A llie d d ire c tiv e s re q u ire d th e Ja p a n e se in C h in a p r o p e r to lay d o w n th e ir a rm s o n ly to C h ia n g o r h is re p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e s. G e n e ra l C h u Teh, th e C o m m u n is t c o m m a n d e r, a n g rily p r o ­ te s te d th e s e a r r a n g e m e n ts a n d a s s e r te d th a t th e C o m m u n is ts w o u ld n o t b e p r e v e n te d fro m s h a rin g in th e v ic to ry fo r w h ic h th e y h a d fo u g h t.

72 • Arming the Free World A w are th a t th e f u tu r e of C h in a h u n g in th e b a la n c e , b o th sid e s r u s h e d tro o p s in to stra te g ic a re a s of N o rth a n d C e n tra l C h in a . C la sh e s b e tw e e n N a tio n a lis t a n d C o m m u n is t fo rce s in e v ita b ly fo llo w e d .27 C h ia n g re lie d h e a v ily o n A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e in th is race fo r s u p re m a c y in C h in a . O n 10 A u g u s t th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff a u th o riz e d W e d e m e y e r to h e lp C h ia n g 's a rm ie s re o c c u p y im p o r ta n t a re a s h e ld b y th e Ja p a n e se . A t th e sa m e tim e , th e se rv ice le a d e rs sp ecifically p r o h ib ­ ite d W ed em ey er, w h ile d is c h a rg in g th is m is s io n , fro m b a c k in g th e N a tio n a lis ts in civil strife. Yet A m e ric a n a id in e v ita b ly s u p p o r te d C h ia n g 's e ffo rts to v a n q u is h h is C o m m u n is t fo es. W ith th e h e lp of W e d e m e y e r's staff, m e m b e rs of th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry C o u n c il w o rk e d o u t a p la n to r u s h N a tio n a lis t tro o p s , c o n c e n tra te d in S o u th C h in a , to p o r ts a n d cities in th e N o rth b e fo re C o m m u n is t fo rce s c o u ld a rriv e .28 In e a rly S e p te m b e r A m e ric a n tr a n s p o r t a irc raft b e g a n fe rry in g N a tio n ­ a list a rm ie s to S h a n g h a i a n d N a n k in g , th e a re a to w h ic h p la n n e r s a s s ig n e d h ig h e s t p rio rity . A t th e e n d of th e m o n th 50,000 A m e ric a n m a rin e s c a m e a s h o re to se c u re p o r ts , a irfie ld s, a n d ra ilro a d lin e s in T ie n ts in , T sin g ta o , a n d C h e fo o . A lth o u g h th e m is s io n of th e m a rin e s w a s n o t clearly sp e c ifie d b e fo re th e ir d e p lo y m e n t, o n e of th e p rin c ip a l effects of th e ir p re s e n c e w a s to h e lp C h ia n g 's a rm ie s e x te n d N a tio n a lis t c o n tro l.29 L e n d -le a se a lso k e p t flo w in g to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm e d fo rce s. T he Jo in t C h ie fs a u th o riz e d th e c o n tin u a tio n of le n d -le a se in re s p o n s e to W e d e m e y e r's p le a s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s d o e v e r y th in g p o ss ib le to a v e rt th e o u tb re a k of civil w a r in C h in a , e v e n to th e p o in t of r a n k in g C h in a a h e a d of Ja p a n in th e a llo c a tio n of o c c u p a tio n tro o p s a n d s u p ­ p lie s. T h e se rv ice c h ie fta in s re je c te d W e d e m e y e r's p rio ritie s , b u t a g re e d to th e c o n tin u a tio n of le n d -le a se to e n a b le th e N a tio n a lis ts to tak e c o n tro l of J a p a n e s e -o c c u p ie d a re a s . In th e first tw o m o n th s a fte r V-J Day, m ilita ry le n d -le a se a m o u n te d to so m e $430 m illio n , m o re th a n h a lf th e v a lu e of w a rtim e a rm s a id . T h is tim e ly a n d e x te n siv e m a te ria l a ssista n c e , a lo n g w ith tro o p s u p p o r t a n d tr a n s p o rta tio n a id , e n a b le d N a tio n a lis t fo rce s to e s ta b lis h th e ir a u th o rity in th e m a jo r cities of N o rth a n d C e n tra l C h in a .30 C h ia n g a lso s o u g h t lo n g -te rm c o m m itm e n ts fo r A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e th a t w o u ld f u r th e r s tr e n g th e n h is p o s itio n a g a in s t th e C o m ­ m u n is ts . H e r e m in d e d H u rle y o n 11 A u g u s t of R o o se v e lt's s ta te m e n t at th e C a iro C o n fe re n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld e q u ip n in e ty C h i­ n e s e d iv is io n s . C h ia n g in s is te d th a t th is o b lig a tio n d id n o t e x p ire at th e

Limits o f Aid to China • 73 e n d of th e w a r a n d a s k e d fo r th e o u ts ta n d in g e q u ip m e n t so th a t th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t w o u ld b e ab le " to s u s ta in itself a g a in s t a rm e d fa c tio n s in C h in a ." C h ia n g a lso d e s ire d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a n A m e ri­ c a n m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p , w h ic h h e h o p e d W e d e m e y e r m ig h t h e a d , to h e lp th e N a tio n a lis ts b u ild m o d e rn a rm e d fo rce s a n d re o rg a n iz e th e ir a rs e n a l a n d s u p p ly se rv ice s. P re m ie r T. V. S o o n g p r e s e n te d th e s e r e q u e s ts to T ru m a n o n 30 A u g u s t a n d a n n o u n c e d th a t h e w a s p r e p a r e d im m e d ia te ly to d is c u s s a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r th e ir im p le m e n ta tio n .31 S e rv ice officials w e re a lm o st as e a g e r to p ro v id e m ilita ry a ssista n c e as th e N a tio n a lis ts w e re to o b ta in it. W e d e m e y e r re c o m m e n d e d a p p ro v a l of th e m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p a n d s u p p o r te d th e c o n tin u e d s u p p ly of A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm e d fo rces, a lth o u g h h e h a d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t m e e tin g C h ia n g 's e x tra v a g a n t d e m a n d s fo r a n in e ty -d iv is io n fo rc e .32 A d m ira l W illiam D. L eahy, T ru m a n 's c h ie f o f staff, u r g e d th e p r e s id e n t to h e lp C h ia n g b u ild " a w ell a rm e d a n d w ell tr a in e d a rm y ."33 S e c re ta ry of th e N a v y Jam es V. Forre s ta l r e s p o n d e d w ith a la c rity to C h ia n g 's d e sire fo r A m e ric a n n a v al a s s is ta n c e . H e fo rw a rd e d to T ru m a n o n 24 A u g u s t d ra ft le g isla tio n fo r th e c re a tio n of a n a v a l a d v is o ry g ro u p a n d th e tra n s fe r of s u r p lu s v e s s e ls .34 T he A A F p r e s s e d e v e n m o re v ig o ro u s ly fo r e x te n d e d m ilita ry c o o p ­ e ra tio n w ith th e N a tio n a lis ts . O n 23 A u g u s t A rn o ld a p p ro v e d a n e w p la n , k n o w n as PA LM Y RA , fo r A m e ric a n s u p p o r t o f th ir te e n a n d o n e h a lf C h in e s e a ir g ro u p s . A lth o u g h less a m b itio u s th a n th e p re v io u s A A F p ro p o s a l, PA LM Y RA still in v o lv e d a m a jo r e x p e n d itu re of re s o u rc e s : s u p p ly of 311 a d d itio n a l a irc raft, tra in in g of 7,700 C h in e s e p e rs o n n e l, a n d e s ta b lis h m e n t of a n A m e ric a n a ir m is s io n of 1,300 m e n . A A F p la n n e r s th o u g h t th a t th e s e m e a s u re s of a s s is ta n c e w o u ld h e lp th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t c o n so lid a te its p o w e r a n d b rin g sta b ility to p o s tw a r C h in a . PA LM YRA th u s a im e d a t th e sa m e o b je c tiv e s th a t W e d e m e y e r h a d in a s s is tin g C h ia n g in re o c c u p y in g Ja p a n e se -h e ld te rrito ry . T he A A F re ite ra te d m a n y e a rlie r w a rn in g s a b o u t fo re ig n d e s ig n s o n th e C h in e s e m a rk e t fo r a irc raft a n d v o ic e d n e w fea rs of p o ss ib le S o v iet m ilita ry a id to C h ia n g if th e U n ite d S ta te s failed to act sw iftly. W ed em ey er, to o , s u p p o r te d PA LM YRA a n d e m p h a s iz e d b o th its m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic b e n e fits . " S ta te d b lu n tly ," h e to ld th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t, " w e a re to d a y o n th e g r o u n d flo o r a n d s h o u ld n o t lo se [the] e x istin g o p p o r tu n ity to in s u re fu ll A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n " in th e d e v e lo p m e n t of m ilita ry a n d c o m m erc ial air facilities in C h in a .35

74 • Arming the Free World R eflectin g th e se rv ic e s' d e s ire to e x p a n d th e ir m ilita ry in flu e n c e in C h in a , th e S ta te , War, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts re c o m m e n d e d to T ru m a n o n 13 S e p te m b e r th a t h e re p ly fav o ra b ly to C h ia n g 's r e q u e s t fo r lo n g ­ te rm a s s is ta n c e . T h e p r e s id e n t c a lle d in S o o n g th e n e x t d a y a n d to ld h im th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h e lp th e N a tio n a lis ts d e v e lo p a rm e d fo rc e s of m o d e ra te siz e fo r th e m a in te n a n c e of in te rn a l s e c u rity a n d th e a s s u m p tio n of c o n tro l o v e r lib e ra te d a re a s . H e d is m is s e d S o o n g 's r e ­ q u e s t to a rm n in e ty C h in e s e d iv is io n s b y re p ly in g e v asiv e ly th a t h e c o u ld fin d n o re c o rd of R o o se v e lt's p le d g e at C a iro to p ro v id e s u c h a s s is ta n c e .36 H e p ro m is e d in s te a d , p e n d in g f u r th e r s tu d ie s b y th e Jo in t C h ie fs, s u p p lie s to c o m p le te th e th irty -n in e -d iv is io n p r o g r a m b e g u n d u rin g th e w ar, e q u ip m e n t fo r a n a ir fo rce of c o m m e n s u ra te size, a n d n a v a l c ra ft fo r c o a sta l a n d riv e r o p e ra tio n s . T h is a s s is ta n c e , T ru m a n a d m o n is h e d S o o n g , w o u ld b e f u r n is h e d o n th e c o n d itio n th a t it " n o t b e d iv e rte d fo r u s e in fra tric id a l w a rfa re o r to s u p p o r t u n d e m o c ra tic a d m in is tra tio n ." 37 U n ifo rm e d o fficers q u ic k ly p o in te d o u t th a t th is s tip u la tio n w a s u n re a lis tic . G e n e ra l G e o rg e A . L in co ln , th e a rm y 's c h ie f stra te g ic p la n ­ ner, to ld h is c o lle a g u e s o n th e Jo in t S taff th a t C h ia n g 's re g im e w a s u n d e m o c ra tic a n d th e re w a s g re a t d o u b t th a t a n y g o v e rn m e n t in C h in a w o u ld e n jo y w id e s p re a d p o p u la r s u p p o r t. R e q u irin g fo re ig n g o v e rn ­ m e n ts to c o n fo rm to s ta n d a r d s of lib e ral d em o cracy , a so lu tio n th a t a p p e a le d to m o s t A m e ric a n s , sim p ly w o u ld n o t w o rk in C h in a . W e d e m e y e r a lso h a d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t A m e ric a n o b je c tiv e s in C h in a . H e to ld th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t th a t h e w a s d e e p ly p e rp le x e d b y th e c o n tra d ic tio n b e tw e e n A m e ric a n m ilita ry b a c k in g of C h ia n g 's b id to u n ify C h in a , a n d s im u lta n e o u s in s tru c tio n s to a v o id in te rv e n tio n in C h in a 's civil co n flict. B ut h is a tte m p ts to se c u re a c la rifica tio n fro m W a s h in g to n d u rin g th e first w e e k s o f p e a c e p ro v e d u n a v a ilin g .38 D e ta ile d p r o p o s a ls b y th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff fo r p ro lo n g e d a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts p o in te d u p th e n e e d fo r a m o re p re c ise d e fin itio n of A m e ric a n p o licy to w a rd C h in a . T h e Jo in t C h ie fs re c o m ­ m e n d e d th e c re a tio n of a m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p o f so m e 4,000 a rm y a n d n a v y p e rs o n n e l. In r e tu r n th e y s o u g h t e x te n siv e c o n c e ssio n s, so m e of w h ic h —s u c h as A m e ric a n s u p e rv is io n of C h in e s e c o m m ercial a v ia tio n a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n s, a n d p re fe re n tia l tre a tm e n t of A m e ric a n b u s in e s s in te r e s ts —h a d n o re la tio n w h a ts o e v e r to th e o p e ra tio n of th e a d v is o ry g ro u p . T he se rv ice c h ie fs a lso p r o p o s e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s p la n to e q u ip a C h in e s e a rm y of fifty d iv is io n s , a n air fo rce of e ig h te e n

Limits o f Aid to China • 75 g ro u p s , a n d a n a v y a d e q u a te to p o lice th e c o a st a n d in la n d w a te rw a y s. A n x io u s th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts m ig h t lo o k e ls e w h e re fo r a ssis ta n c e a n d e a g e r to d is p o s e of s u r p lu s m a te rie l in E a st A sia, th e Jo in t C h ie fs a s k e d fo r p ro m p t im p le m e n ta tio n of th e s e m e a s u re s of a s s is ta n c e .39 T he sc o p e of th e Jo in t C h ie fs' p la n s d is tu rb e d Jo h n C a rte r V incent, th e n e w d ire c to r of S tate's O ffice of Far E a ste rn A ffairs. V in cen t w as c o n c e rn e d th a t th e serv ices w e re a im in g at e sta b lis h in g w h a t a m o u n te d to a p ro te c to ra te o v e r C h in a , w ith a sem ico lo n ial a rm y u n d e r A m e ric a n su p e rv is io n . H e also s u g g e s te d th a t th e c o n te m p la te d m ilita ry a ssis­ ta n c e m ig h t re d o u n d a g a in s t A m e ric a n se c u rity in te re s ts b y c re atin g frictio n w ith th e Soviet U n io n . M o st tro u b lin g to h im w a s th e p ro b ab le effect of s u c h a ssista n c e o n th e p ro s p e c ts fo r C h in e s e un ity . W ith ex tra­ o rd in a ry p re sc ie n c e , V in cen t w a rn e d S e c re ta ry of S ta te Jam es F. B y rn es th a t "if th e G ro u p se rv e s sim p ly to e n c o u ra g e C h ia n g to se e k a se ttle ­ m e n t of h is difficulties b y m e a n s of force a n d if th e m a in te n a n c e of u n ity in C h in a w e re to b e co m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n A m e ric a n m ilita ry a ssista n c e in th e fo rm of m a te rié l [sic] a n d advice, w e w o u ld fin d o u rse lv es in a n u n e n v ia b le , a n d p e rh a p s u n te n a b le , p o sitio n ." 40 R e p o rts fro m W e d e m e y e r a lso c a lle d a tte n tio n to th e p e rils o f A m e r­ ic a n m ilita ry in v o lv e m e n t in C h in a . A s h o stilitie s b e tw e e n N a tio n a lis t a n d C o m m u n is t fo rc e s s p r e a d th r o u g h N o r th C h in a , W e d e m e y er in fo rm e d th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld n o t c o n ­ tin u e to f u r n is h C h ia n g m ilita ry s u p p o r t w ith o u t p a rtic ip a tin g d ire c tly in civil strife. M in d fu l of in s tru c tio n s to a v o id s u c h in te rv e n tio n , h e re f u s e d in e a rly N o v e m b e r to tr a n s p o r t a d d itio n a l a rm ie s to N o rth C h in a b e c a u se C h ia n g in te n d e d to u s e th e m n o t to d is a rm th e Ja p a n e se b u t to fig h t th e C o m m u n is ts . (In d e e d , th e g e n e ra lis s im o w a s in n o h u r r y to re p a tria te th e Ja p a n e s e sin c e h e w a s u s in g fo rm e r e n e m y tr o o p s to p ro te c t lin e s of c o m m u n ic a tio n a g a in s t C o m m u n is t g u e r ­ rilla s.) W e d e m e y e r a lso re c o m m e n d e d th e w ith d ra w a l o f th e m a rin e s b e g in n in g o n 15 N o v e m b er, sin c e th e y h a d d is c h a rg e d th e ir m is sio n of g u a rd in g im p o r ta n t in s ta lla tio n s in N o rth C h in a p e n d in g th e arriv a l of N a tio n a lis t fo rc e s .41 W e d e m e y e r's r e q u e s t fo r g u id a n c e fro m W a s h in g to n s ta r te d a m a jo r re v ie w o f A m e ric a n p o licy to w a rd C h in a . A t is s u e . A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry o f W ar J o h n J. M cC lo y to ld a m e e tin g of th e C o m m itte e of T h re e o n 6 N o v e m b er, w a s " h o w fa r w e s h o u ld b a c k C h ia n g in h is e ffo rts to u n ify th e c o u n try ." M cC lo y b e lie v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s a lre a d y h a d " a c o n s id e ra b le in v e s tm e n t" in th e N a tio n a lists . E vacua-

76 • Arming the Free World tio n of th e m a rin e s , e v e n if th e y h a d fu lfilled th e o rig in a l m is sio n , w o u ld b e a b lo w to C h ia n g 's p re s tig e . T h e g e n e ra lis s im o n e e d e d th e ir h e lp to re p a tria te th e Ja p a n e se , b u t e v e n m o re " to in c re a s e h is A rm y 's s tr e n g th in N o rth C h in a a g a in s t th e c o m m u n is ts ." M cC loy w o rrie d th a t C h ia n g 's in a b ility to m a in ta in in te rn a l o rd e r m ig h t p ro v id e S oviet tro o p s , w h ic h o c c u p ie d M a n c h u ria d u rin g th e la s t w e e k of th e w ar, w ith a n ex cu se to d e la y th e ir w ith d ra w a l. D e sp ite h is m is tr u s t of R u s s ia n a m b itio n s , M cC lo y h e s ita te d to e n d o rs e u n r e s tric te d m ilita ry b a c k in g of C h ia n g . A lth o u g h h e c o n s id e re d A m e ric a n s u p p o r t of th e N a tio n a lis ts e s s e n tia l to s ta b ility in C h in a , h e also c a u tio n e d th a t sim ila r R u s s ia n a id to th e C o m m u n is ts w o u ld r e s u lt " in a rea l m e s s ." 42 F ar le ss s u b tle a n d m u c h le ss in fo rm e d w a s T ru m a n 's a n a ly sis. A n o te fo u n d w ith h is d a ily a p p o in tm e n t sh e e ts re v e a le d th a t th e p re s i­ d e n t re m a in e d w e d d e d to th e fic tio n th a t " w e a re n o t m ix in g in C h in a 's in te rn a l affairs." S h o w in g s ta rtlin g ig n o ra n c e of th e h is to r y of th e C h in a th e a te r in W o rld W ar II, T ru m a n d e c la re d th a t C h ia n g 's a rm ie s h a d fo u g h t " s id e b y sid e w ith u s a g a in s t o u r c o m m o n en em y ." T he C o m m u n is ts , b y c o n tra s t, " n o t o n ly d id n o t h e lp u s b u t o n o c c a sio n h e lp e d th e Jap s." F u rth e rm o re , th e p r e s id e n t r e a s o n e d , th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t h a d b e e n re c o g n iz e d b y m o s t m a jo r p o w e rs , in c lu d in g th e S o v iet U n io n . B ecause of th e p re s e n c e of la rg e n u m b e rs of Ja p a n e se tro o p s in C e n tra l C h in a , T ru m a n c o n c lu d e d , th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s p ro v id in g a s s is ta n c e fo r n o th in g m o re th a n " m o p p in g u p th e w ar."43 B efore to p officials in W a s h in g to n c o u ld re a c h a n y d e c isio n s a b o u t th e c o n tin u a tio n of a id to C h in a , C h ia n g m a d e n e w d e m a n d s . H is a m b itio n s s o a rin g , th e g e n e ra lis s im o p r e s s e d W e d e m e y e r fo r th e tr a n s ­ p o r ta tio n of tro o p s in to M a n c h u ria . W e d e m e y e r c o u n s e le d a g a in s t s u c h a m o v e o u t o f c o n c e rn th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld s tre tc h th e ir fo rce s d a n g e ro u s ly th in . H e a lso a d v is e d M a rsh a ll th a t th e d iv e rs io n of g o v e rn m e n t a rm ie s fro m N o rth C h in a to M a n c h u ria w o u ld p ro lo n g th e sta y of th e m a rin e s in d efin ite ly . O n c e a g a in , h e a s k e d th e W ar D e p a rt­ m e n t fo r in s tr u c tio n s .44 A p re lim in a ry re p ly to W e d e m e y e r o n 19 N o v e m b e r re v e a le d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w a s c a u g h t o n th e h o rn s of a d ile m m a . S e c re ta ry of S ta te B y rn e s, th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t in fo rm e d W ed em ey er, w is h e d n e i­ th e r " to s u p p o r t th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t d ire c tly a g a in s t th e C o m ­ m u n is ts " n o r to a b a n d o n " a p o licy w e h a v e lo n g s u p p o r te d w h ic h c o n te m p la te d u n ify in g C h in a a n d M a n c h u ria u n d e r C h in e s e N a tio n a l F o rces." F or th e tim e b e in g , B y rn e s d e s ire d th e r e te n tio n of th e m a rin e s

Limits o f Aid to China • 77 in N o rth C h in a , b u t r u le d o u t m ilita ry b a c k in g of th e N a tio n a lis ts " e x c e p t in so fa r a s n e c e s s a ry to g e t th e J a p a n e se d is a rm e d a n d o u t of C h in a ." B efo re m a k in g f u r th e r d e c isio n s, th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te w a n te d W e d e m e y e r's e s tim a te of C h ia n g 's n e e d fo r A m e ric a n h e lp in c le a rin g th e J a p a n e se fro m N o rth C h in a a n d M a n c h u ria .45 W e d e m e y e r s u b m itte d a se rie s of lo n g a n d d is c o u ra g in g a n a ly s e s of th e g ro w in g c h a o s in C h in a . H e r e p o r te d to th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t th a t C h ia n g 's re a c h fa r e x c e e d e d h is g ra sp . W ith o u t la rg e -sc a le a s s ista n c e , th e N a tio n a lis ts m ig h t n o t b e a b le to e s ta b lis h th e ir a u th o rity in N o rth C h in a , to say n o th in g of M a n c h u ria , fo r y e a rs. W e d e m e y e r b la m e d th e d is o rd e r in C h in a n o t o n ly o n th e C o m m u n is ts , w h o s e g u e rrilla o p e ra ­ tio n s d is r u p te d tr a n s p o r t a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n s in th e N o rth , b u t also o n th e N a tio n a lis ts , w h o s e c o rr u p tio n a n d in c o m p e te n c e a lie n a te d local in h a b ita n ts . W e d e m e y e r to ld th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t th a t C h ia n g w a s c o u n tin g h e a v ily o n A m e ric a n h e lp to re lie v e h is d ifficu lties. T he g e n e ra lis s im o c o n te m p la te d u s in g th e m a rin e s " a s a b a s e of m a n e u ­ v e r" w h ile m o u n tin g a c a m p a ig n a g a in s t th e C o m m u n is ts . H is a im w a s " to c re a te c o n d itio n s th a t r e n d e r o u r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a g a in s t th e C h in e s e C o m m u n is ts , a n d p o s s ib ly th e S o v iet C o m m u n is ts , m a n d a ­ to r y o r in e v ita b le ." T h e p o s s ib ility of a S o v ie t-A m e ric a n c o n fro n ta tio n in C h in a tr o u ­ b le d W ed em ey er. D e sp ite th e s ig n a tu re of a tre a ty o f f r ie n d s h ip b e tw e e n M o sc o w a n d C h u n g k in g o n 14 A u g u s t 1945, W e d e m e y e r w a s s u s p ic io u s of S o v iet a m b itio n s . H e to ld th e Jo in t S taff P la n n e rs d u rin g a v isit to W a s h in g to n in O c to b e r th a t th e R u s s ia n s w e re " d e te r m in e d to p e n e tr a te N o r th C h in a a n d to s e t u p a b u ffe r a re a th e re sim ila r to w h a t th e y h a v e d o n e in E u ro p e ." 46 In d e e d , th e R u s s ia n s w e re e x p lo itin g th e in d u s tria l a n d n a tu r a l re s o u rc e s of M a n c h u ria a n d a p p e a r e d to o p p o s e th e e x te n s io n of N a tio n a lis t c o n tro l in to th e p ro v in c e s b o rd e rin g th e S o v iet U n io n .47 In m id -N o v e m b e r W e d e m e y e r r e p e a te d h is e a rlie r w a rn in g s a n d e x p re s s e d n e w fe a rs a b o u t th e e x p a n s io n of S oviet p o w e r: "If C h in a w e re to b e c o m e a p u p p e t o f th e S o v iet w h ic h is ex actly w h a t a C h in e s e C o m m u n is t v ic to ry w o u ld m e a n , th e n S o v iet R u ssia w o u ld p ra c tic a lly c o n tro l th e c o n tin e n ts o f E u ro p e a n d A sia. . . . W e w e re d e te r m in e d to p r e v e n t Ja p a n fro m m a k in g C h in a a p u p ­ p e t p o w er. It is b e lie v e d e v e n m o re im p o r ta n t, if w e a re to re a liz e o u r p o lic ies w ith re fe re n c e to C h in a , th a t R u ssia n o t b e p e rm itte d to d o so." Yet W e d e m e y e r k n e w th a t o p p o s itio n to R u s s ia n a s p ira tio n s in C h in a c a rrie d g ra v e risk s, in c lu d in g w a r w ith th e S o v iet U n io n .

78 • Arming the Free World W e d e m e y e r e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld h a v e to d e c id e q u ic k ly w h e th e r it w a s w illin g to a c c e p t th e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s b e c a u se th e c u r r e n t A m e ric a n p o s itio n in C h in a w a s " u n te n a b le ." H e a s s e r te d o n c e m o re th a t th e r e te n tio n of th e m a rin e s in N o rth C h in a to h e lp w ith th e e v a c u a tio n of th e Ja p a n e se w o u ld n o t re s u lt m e re ly in in c id e n ta l a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts b u t in " d e fin ite p a rtic ip a tio n in fra tric id a l w a rfa re ." O w in g to th e C o m m u n is ts ' d e sire to o b ta in Ja p ­ a n e s e w e a p o n s a n d to a ro u s e o p p o s itio n to th e p re s e n c e of A m e ric a n m ilita ry fo rce s, " a rm e d c o n flicts b e tw e e n A m e ric a n s a n d C h in e s e " w e re u n a v o id a b le . W e d e m e y e r th o u g h t th a t a d m in is tra tio n officials h a d to c h o o se a m o n g th r e e a lte rn a tiv e s : w ith d ra w a l of all A m e ric a n tro o p s fro m C h in a , d ire c t a n d e x te n siv e in te rv e n tio n to u n ify C h in a u n d e r N a tio n a lis t ru le , o r e s ta b lis h m e n t of a tr u s te e s h ip o v e r M a n ­ c h u ria a n d r e p a tria tio n o f th e Ja p a n e s e u n d e r th e a u sp ic e s of th e U n ite d N a tio n s , a fte r w h ic h th e C h in e s e w o u ld d e te rm in e th e ir o w n f u tu r e " th r o u g h p ro c e s s e s of e v o lu tio n o r re v o lu tio n ." W e d e m e y e r m a d e n o d e fin ite re c o m m e n d a tio n to h is s u p e rio rs , b u t im p lie d th a t h e fa v o re d th e th ir d c o u rse of a c tio n .48 F o rre sta l a n d S e c re ta ry o f W ar R o b e rt R P a tte rs o n o p te d in s te a d fo r c o n tin u e d m ilita ry b a c k in g of C h ia n g . In a m e m o ra n d u m to B y rn es o n 16 N o v e m b e r th e y d is c o u n te d W e d e m e y e r's c o n te n tio n th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts h a d little c h a n c e of g a in in g c o n tro l of N o rth C h in a a n d M a n c h u ria .49 F o rre sta l a n d P a tte rs o n d o u b te d th a t th e C o m m u n is ts c o u ld m o u n t a s tr o n g c h a lle n g e to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s a n d in s is te d th a t C h ia n g , d e s p ite h is w e a k n e s s e s , still h a d th e b e s t c h a n c e of u n ify ­ in g C h in a in th e n e a r fu tu r e . D e fin in g A m e ric a's g o a l in E ast A sia as "a u n ifie d C h in a , in c lu d in g M a n c h u ria , frie n d ly to th e U .S .," th e y fa v o re d k e e p in g th e m a rin e s in C h in a , s te p p in g u p e ffo rts to re p a tria te th e Ja p a n e se , a n d s p e e d in g a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p . A lth o u g h c o n c e d in g th a t th e s e m e a s u re s c o n ­ s titu te d in te r v e n tio n in C h in a 's civil co n flict, th e y m a in ta in e d th a t th e c o n s e q u e n c e s of h a ltin g m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts w e re fa r m o re s e rio u s. E c h o in g W ed em ey er, th e y w a rn e d th a t w ith d ra w a l of A m e ric a n s u p p o r t fro m C h in a m ig h t le a d to th e d is in te g ra tio n of C h in a in to se v e ra l s ta te s o r th e e x p a n s io n of S o v iet p o w e r u n til " R u ss ia w ill h a v e a c h ie v e d in th e F ar E a st a p p ro x im a te ly th e o b je c tiv e s Ja p a n in itially se t o u t to a cc o m p lish ." C o n ta in in g th e e x p a n s io n of S o v iet p o w er, F o rre sta l a n d P a tte rs o n a s s e rte d , w a s th e m o s t im p o r ta n t re a ­ s o n fo r f u r n is h in g m ilita ry a id to C h ia n g .50

Limits o f Aid to China • 79 Like th e ir c o lle a g u e s in th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t. S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t officials a lso w e ig h e d se v e ra l o p tio n s in C h in a policy. A t th e r e q u e s t of U n d e r S e c re ta ry D e a n A c h e so n , V in c e n t d re w u p a c o m p re ­ h e n s iv e m e m o ra n d u m o n 19 N o v e m b e r th a t d is c u s s e d fo u r p o ss ib le c o u rs e s of a c tio n : w ith d ra w a l of m a rin e s , c o n tin u a tio n of p r e s e n t p o l­ icies, e x p a n s io n of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts , a n d in itia tio n of m e a s u re s to e n d th e civil strife in C h in a . V in c e n t p r e fe rre d th e la s t a lte rn a tiv e . B ecau se of h is c o n v ic tio n th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d a n o b lig a tio n to h e lp in e s ta b lis h in g a p ro g re s s iv e g o v e rn m e n t th a t c o u ld u n ify C h in a , V in c e n t w a n te d to e n c o u ra g e th e C h in e s e to solve th e ir p ro b le m s th r o u g h p o litical ra th e r th a n m ilita ry m e th o d s . A cco rd in g ly , h e th o u g h t th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld accelera te its e ffo rts to re p a tria te th e Ja p a n e s e w h ile p u ttin g p r e s s u r e o n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts to a c c e p t a tru c e a n d n e g o tia te a s e ttle m e n t. O n c e th e Ja p a n e s e w e re c le a re d fro m C h in a , V in c e n t fa v o re d a s u s p e n s io n of e c o n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e u n til th e tw o C h in e s e p a rtie s re s o lv e d th e ir d iffe re n c e .51 V in c e n t's m e m o r a n d u m a n d W e d e m e y e r's r e p o r ts s tr e n g th e n e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's o p p o s itio n to m a jo r m ilita ry in te r v e n tio n in C h in a . D u rin g a m e e tin g of th e C o m m itte e of T h re e o n 27 N o v em b er, b o th B y rn e s a n d A c h e s o n u r g e d r e s tra in t o n th e ir se rv ice c o lle a g u e s. B y rn e s, w h o w a s m o re c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e s itu a tio n in C h in a th a n th a t in a n y o th e r c o u n try , s u g g e s te d th a t th e w is e s t c o u rs e of a c tio n w a s to p re s s fo r a n a c c o rd b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts , p a rtly b y u s in g m ilita ry a id as a le v e r to g a in C h ia n g 's c o o p e ra tio n . A c h e s o n o u tlin e d a te n ta tiv e a p p ro a c h th a t d re w o n th e re c o m m e n d a ­ tio n s o f b o th V in c e n t a n d th e se rv ice se c re ta rie s . H e p r o p o s e d A m e ri­ c a n a s s is ta n c e in s u p p ly in g a d d itio n a l a rm ie s a n d tr a n s p o r tin g th e m to N o rth C h in a , a rr a n g in g a tru c e in a re a s c le a re d of Ja p a n e se , a n d e s ta b lis h in g a c o a litio n g o v e rn m e n t, e sp e c ia lly b y e x e rtin g p r e s s u r e o n C h ia n g to m a k e m e a n in g fu l c o n c e s s io n s . W h ile th e p o lic y m a k e rs re a c h e d n o a g re e m e n t a t th is m e e tin g , B y rn e s h o p e d th a t th e y m ig h t s o o n d e c id e o n a p r o g r a m th a t H u rley , w h o w a s in W a s h in g to n fo r c o n s u lta tio n s , c o u ld ta k e b a c k to C h in a .52 B ut o n ly h o u rs later. H u rle y a b ru p tly re s ig n e d . S in c e r e tu r n in g to th e U n ite d S ta te s in S e p te m b e r, H u rle y h a d trie d to q u it h is p o s t o n se v e ra l o c c a sio n s, b u t B y rn e s h a d d is s u a d e d h im . O n th e m o rn in g of th e tw e n ty -s e v e n th h e a s s u r e d th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te th a t h e w o u ld so o n d e p a r t fo r C h u n g k in g . T h e n n e w fe a rs a b o u t S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o p p o si-

80 • Arming the Free World tio n to h is p o licy o f s u p p o r tin g C h ia n g b e s e t h im , a n d h e s u d d e n ly c h a n g e d h is m in d . W ith o u t w a rn in g , h e re le a s e d a v itrio lic le tte r of re s ig n a tio n th a t b la m e d s u b v e rs iv e s w ith in th e F o re ig n S erv ice fo r th e fa ilu re of h is e ffo rts to m e d ia te th e d is p u te b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts . " S e e w h a t a so n -o f-a -b itc h d id to m e ," T ru m a n c rie d th a t a fte rn o o n as h e sh o w e d h is c a b in e t n e w s r e p o r ts of H u rle y 's o u tb u rs t. S e c re ta ry of A g ric u ltu re C lin to n P. A n d e rs o n s u g g e s te d th a t th e a p p o in tm e n t of G e n e ra l G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll, w h o p o s s e s s e d to w ­ e rin g p re s tig e , w o u ld h e lp a v e rt a fu ro r o v e r H u rle y 's sp e c ta c u la r c h a rg e s . L a te r th a t day, M a rsh a ll, w h o o n ly a w e e k e a rlie r h a d re tire d as a rm y c h ie f of staff, d u tifu lly a c c e p te d T ru m a n 's r e q u e s t to b e co m e th e p r e s id e n t's p e rs o n a l re p re s e n ta tiv e to C h in a .53 D u rin g th e n e x t tw o w e e k s th e S ta te a n d W ar d e p a r tm e n ts d e b a te d M a rsh a ll's in s tru c tio n s . Political a n d m ilita ry officials a g re e d th a t M a r­ sh a ll s h o u ld c o n tin u e H u rle y 's e ffo rts to b rin g a b o u t a c o a litio n g o v e rn ­ m e n t u n d e r C h ia n g 's le a d e rs h ip . B y rn e s w a r n e d th a t a d iv id e d C h in a w o u ld b e a n in v ita tio n to S o v iet in te rv e n tio n , a fe a r s h a r e d b y o th e r s e n io r p o lic y m a k e rs, in c lu d in g T ru m a n .54 B o th S ta te a n d W ar a n a ly s ts a lso a d v o c a te d c o n tin u e d A m e ric a n h e lp in c le a rin g th e J a p a n e se fro m C h in a a n d e s ta b lis h in g N a tio n a lis t a u th o rity in N o rth C h in a a n d M a n ­ c h u ria . T h ey d is a g re e d , ho w ev er, a b o u t th e tim in g of th e s e m e a s u re s . M a rsh a ll a n d h is u n ifo rm e d a d v is e rs w a n te d to r u s h C h ia n g 's tro o p s n o r th w a r d w ith o u t delay. V in c e n t a n d S ta te 's C h in a e x p e rts th o u g h t th a t a p o litical s e ttle m e n t s h o u ld p re c e d e fu r th e r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to C h ia n g .55 A t a m e e tin g o n 11 D e c e m b e r T ru m a n , M a rsh a ll, B y rn e s, a n d L e a h y s e ttle d th e s e d iffe re n c e s. T h ey d e c id e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld f u r n is h m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to s p e e d th e re m o v a l of th e Ja p a n e se fro m C h in a a n d , d e s p ite W e d e m e y er's w a rn in g s , to e n a b le C h ia n g to tak e c o n tro l of M a n c h u ria . T h e se rv ic e s w o u ld p r e p a r e to tra n s fe r a d d i­ tio n a l N a tio n a lis t tro o p s to N o rth C h in a b u t w o u ld k e e p th e s e a rr a n g e ­ m e n ts se c re t fo r th e tim e b e in g . If th e C o m m u n is ts b lo c k e d n e g o ­ tia tio n s to w a rd a n in te rn a l s e ttle m e n t—th e e v e n tu a lity M a rsh a ll c o n s id e re d m o s t lik ely —M a rsh a ll w o u ld a u th o riz e th e m o v e m e n t of C h ia n g 's fo rce s in to N o rth C h in a . B ut if th e g e n e ra lis s im o s ta lle d th e d is c u s s io n s , M a rsh a ll th o u g h t th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n " w o u ld h a v e to sw allo w its p rid e a n d m u c h of its p o lic y " a n d c o n tin u e to b a c k C h ia n g . O th e rw is e " th e re w o u ld follow th e tra g ic c o n s e q u e n c e s of a d iv id e d C h in a ," le a d in g to R u s s ia n h e g e m o n y in M a n c h u ria a n d " th e d e fe at o r

Limits o f Aid to China • 81 lo ss of th e m a jo r p u r p o s e of o u r w a r in th e Pacific." B y rn e s, w h o h a d e a rlie r s u g g e s te d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w ith h o ld m ilita ry a n d e co ­ n o m ic a id fro m C h ia n g s h o u ld h e re fu s e to m a k e re a s o n a b le c o n c e s­ s io n s to th e C o m m u n is ts , n o w d e fe rre d to M a rsh a ll's p o s itio n , as d id T ru m a n . T h re e d a y s la te r th e p r e s id e n t c o n firm e d th e g e n e ra l's in s tru c ­ tio n s . M a rsh a ll w o u ld p r e s s u r e C h ia n g , b u t n o t to th e p o in t of w ith ­ d ra w in g m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . O n c e a g a in A m e ric a n p o lic y m a k e rs r e ­ f u s e d to call C h ia n g 's b lu ff.56 "I k n o w v e ry little a b o u t C h in e s e p o litic s ," T ru m a n to ld S e c re ta ry of C o m m e rc e H e n ry A . W allace in J a n u a ry 1946. "T h e o n e th in g I a m in te r e s te d in is to se e a s tr o n g C h in a w ith a D e m o cratic fo rm of G o v e rn m e n t frie n d ly to u s ." 57 T h e M a rsh a ll M iss io n a im e d a t th is o b jec tiv e b u t a lso p u r s u e d a c o n tra d ic to ry po licy : m ilita ry s u p p o r t fo r C h ia n g a g a in s t th e C o m m u n is ts . V in c e n t w a s o n e of th e few g o v e rn ­ m e n t officials w h o re c o g n iz e d th e in c o m p a tib ility of th e s e g o a ls. H e p re d ic te d th a t m o v e m e n t of C h ia n g 's tro o p s in to th e N o rth w o u ld n o t p r e v e n t civil w a r b u t w o u ld s im p ly allo w th e N a tio n a lis ts , like th e Ja p a n e se , to ta k e o v e r th e m a in u r b a n c e n te rs a n d lin e s of c o m m u n ic a ­ tio n w h ile th e C o m m u n is ts h e ld th e c o u n try s id e . W ith e q u a l fo re s ig h t, a m e m b e r of th e A m e ric a n O b s e rv e r G ro u p a t Y enan w ro te to W e d e m e y e r th a t C h ia n g w o u ld n o t n e g o tia te se rio u sly as lo n g as h e felt th a t h e c o u ld c o u n t o n A m e ric a n a id to h e lp h im s u b ju g a te th e C o m ­ m u n is ts . T h ese w a rn in g s w e re ig n o re d o r re je c te d . O n ly a fte r se v e ra l m o n th s in C h in a d id M a rs h a ll re a liz e th a t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p o licy w a s im p e d in g ra th e r th a n fo s te rin g p e a c e a n d u n ity in C h in a .58

T h e M a rsh a ll M iss io n b e g a n au sp icio u sly . A fte r lis te n in g to r e p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e s of all C h in e s e fa c tio n s, M a rsh a ll e n te r e d in to n e g o tia tio n s w ith C h a n g C h u n , C h ia n g 's e m issa ry , a n d C h o u E n -lai, M ao's envoy. T h ese d is c u s s io n s le d to a c e a se -fire o n 10 J a n u a ry 1946 a n d th e c re a tio n of a n E x ec u tiv e H e a d q u a rte rs m a d e u p of A m e ric a n , N a tio n a lis t, a n d C o m ­ m u n is t c o m m is s io n e rs to s u p e rv is e th e a rm istic e . M a rsh a ll a lso p e r ­ s u a d e d C h ia n g to c o n v e n e a Political C o n s u lta tiv e C o u n c il, w h ic h p a s s e d re s o lu tio n s g r a n tin g e q u a lity to all p o litical p a rtie s a n d p ro v id ­ in g fo r th e a d o p tio n of a n e w c o n s titu tio n . M a rsh a ll c o n s id e re d h is m o s t im p o r ta n t a c h ie v e m e n t th e a g re e m e n t of b o th p a rtie s o n 25 F e b ru a ry to th e e s ta b lis h m e n t d u rin g th e n e x t e ig h te e n m o n th s of a

82 • Arming the Free World u n ifie d p e a c e tim e a rm y c o n s is tin g of fifty N a tio n a lis t a n d te n C o m m u ­ n is t d iv is io n s . By th e tim e M a rs h a ll r e tu r n e d to W a s h in g to n in M a rc h fo r c o n s u lta tio n s , s u c c e ss in C h in a a p p e a r e d to b e w ith in r e a c h .59 D u rin g h is first m o n th s in C h in a M a rsh a ll re lie d h e av ily o n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e as a n in s tr u m e n t o f p e rs u a s io n . H e o ffe re d m ilita ry a id to b o th p a rtie s a s a n in d u c e m e n t to c o o p e ra tio n . To o v e rc o m e M ao's h e s ita tio n s a b o u t a n in te g r a te d arm y, th e g e n e ra l p ro m is e d e q u ip m e n t a n d tra in in g fo r te n C o m m u n is t d iv is io n s so th a t th e y w o u ld n o t b e a t a d is a d v a n ta g e w ith th e A m e ric a n -e q u ip p e d N a tio n a lis t u n its . M a rsh a ll a lso c o n s ta n tly d a n g le d th e p ro s p e c t of A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e b e fo re C h ia n g to g a in c o n c e s s io n s fro m h im . H e re p e a te d ly e m p h a s iz e d C h in a 's critical n e e d fo r e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id , b u t m a d e cle ar th a t w ith o u t a n in te rn a l s e ttle m e n t th e g e n e ra lis s im o c o u ld n o t ex p ec t a d d itio n a l A m e ric a n h elp . M a rsh a ll s tro n g ly b e lie v e d th a t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e w a s e s s e n tia l to u n ity in C h in a . " W ith o u t th e m o s t lib eral k in d of A m e ric a n a id ," M a rsh a ll's a tta c h é to ld T ru m a n , " th e c h a n c e s of th e n e w c o a litio n G o v e rn m e n t to s u c c e e d a re d is m a l." 60 Yet A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p o licy w a s b y n o m e a n s e v e n h a n d e d . W h ile M a rs h a ll u s e d th e p ro m is e of m ilita ry a id to fo s te r n e g o tia tio n s , th e U n ite d S ta te s g ave C h ia n g critical m ilita ry b a c k in g th a t re in fo rc e d h is p re fe re n c e fo r c o n q u e s t ra th e r th a n c o m p ro m ise . P e rh a p s th e m o s t im p o r ta n t m e a s u re of a s s is ta n c e w a s th e tr a n s p o rta tio n d u rin g th e first fiv e m o n th s of 1946 of 225,597 K u o m in ta n g so ld ie rs in to M a n c h u ria .61 W e d e m e y e r o u tfitte d th e s e tro o p s a n d s u p p lie d th e ir o p e ra tio n a l n e e d s , a n d s u c h h e lp c o u n te d as a c h a rg e o n th e th irty -n in e -d iv is io n p r o g r a m .62 W ith o u t th is a s s is ta n c e C h ia n g 's b id fo r c o n tro l in N o rth C h in a w o u ld h a v e b e e n im p o s sib le . A d d e d to th is le n d -le a se a id w a s th e sale of s u r p lu s c o m b a t e q u ip m e n t. T h e first s u c h tra n s fe r o c c u rre d in N o v e m b e r 1945, w h e n th e U n ite d S ta te s so ld a s u b s ta n tia l sto c k p ile of m a te rie l in W est C h in a fo r th e n o m in a l p ric e of $20 m illio n .63 Finally, th e m a rin e s c o n tin u e d to g u a rd im p o r ta n t s u p p ly d e p o ts a n d c o m m u ­ n ic a tio n s ro u te s fo r th e N a tio n a lis ts . M a n y of T ru m a n 's to p a d v is e rs a g re e d w ith F o rre sta l th a t d u rin g th e first h a lf of 1946 th e m a rin e s w e re " th e b a la n c e of o rd e r" in C h in a . In d e e d , A c h e s o n to ld th e C a b in e t o n 2 A u g u s t th a t w ith d ra w a l of th e m a rin e s w o u ld b e " fo o lh a rd y " b e c a u se th e y w e re h e lp in g to p r e v e n t " so m e o th e r c o u n try fro m in te rfe rin g in C h in a to o u r o w n r e g re t." 64 In e a rly 1946 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n a lso e s ta b lis h e d th e m ili­ ta r y a d v is o ry g r o u p th a t C h ia n g h a d r e q u e s te d at th e e n d of th e w ar.

Limits o f Aid to China • 83 S o o n a fte r M a rsh a ll left fo r C h in a , r e p re s e n ta tiv e s of th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts u r g e d S W N C C to a p p ro v e th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' p la n fo r a m is s io n of a p p ro x im a te ly 4,000 A m e ric a n p e rs o n n e l. In a m e m o ra n ­ d u m to th e S W N C C A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry of W ar H o w a rd C . P e te rs e n re ite r a te d th e se rv ic e s ' c o n v ic tio n th a t p ro m p t a c tio n w a s n e c e s s a ry to p r e v e n t C h ia n g fro m tu r n in g to th e R u s s ia n s fo r a ssis ta n c e a n d to a v o id d is s ip a tin g th e m ilita ry in flu e n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d d e v e lo p e d in C h in a d u rin g th e w ar. P a tte rs o n e x p re s s e d sim ila r v ie w s a n d M a rs h a ll a d d e d h is s u p p o r t, p o in tin g o u t th a t th e e a rly c re a tio n of th e a d v is o ry g ro u p w o u ld h a s te n th e d e a c tiv a tio n of th e C h in a T h eater, th e re b y p u ttin g p r e s s u r e o n th e R u s s ia n s to re m o v e th e ir tro o p s fro m M a n c h u ria .65 T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, ho w ev er, c o n tin u e d to o p p o s e th e se rv ic e s' p la n fo r a n a d v is o ry g ro u p . D ra w in g o n V in c e n t's v ie w s, B y rn e s co m ­ p la in e d to th e S W N C C th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs a im e d a t c re a tin g n o t a n a d v is o ry m is s io n b u t " a m ilita ry tra in in g g ro u p w h ic h w o u ld p e rm e a te th r o u g h o u t th e C h in e s e A rm y o n a n o p e ra tio n a l lev el." H e also th o u g h t th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs h a d d is r e g a r d e d la rg e r A m e ric a n s e c u rity in te re s ts : th e ir p la n s , if " c o n s tr u e d as a p ro je c tio n o f U .S . m ilita ry p o w e r o n to th e A sia tic c o n tin e n t ra th e r th a n as sim p ly a id to C h in a in m o d e rn iz in g its A rm y ," m ig h t in v ite a c o m p a ra b le e x te n s io n of R u s ­ s ia n p o w e r. U n w illin g to c o n s e n t to th e s e rv ic e s' e x tra v a g a n t p r o ­ p o sa ls, B y rn es a sk e d th e Jo in t C h iefs to re v ie w th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n .66 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs, c o n c e rn e d th a t f u r th e r d e la y in e s ta b lis h in g a n a d v is o ry g r o u p m ig h t c a u se C h ia n g to a c c e p t R u s s ia n o r B ritish a s s is ta n c e , d id s o .67 D ra w in g o n s u g g e s tio n s fro m W e d e m e y e r a n d M a rsh a ll, th e se rv ic e c h ie fs n o w u r g e d th e im m e d ia te c re a tio n of a m ilita ry m is s io n w ith a n in itial s tr e n g th of 750 a rm y a n d 165 n a v y p e rs o n n e l, w h o s e p r im a r y f u n c tio n w o u ld b e to a d v ise th e h ig h e r staffs of th e C h in e s e d e fe n s e e s ta b lis h m e n t o n o rg a n iz a tio n a l a n d tr a in in g m a tte rs . A lth o u g h V in c e n t w o rrie d th a t th e se rv ic e s still d e s ire d e v e n tu a lly to e x p a n d th e a d v is o ry g ro u p , h e d id n o t c h a lle n g e th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' re v is e d p ro p o s a ls . O n 25 F e b ru a ry T ru m a n a u th o riz e d th e c re a tio n of a n A m e ric a n m ilita ry g ro u p in C h in a w ith a s tr e n g th of 1,000 o fficers a n d m e n .68 E v e n th o u g h in te n d e d to h e lp in th e tra in in g of a u n ifie d C h in e s e arm y, th is m is s io n o ffe re d a s s is ta n c e ex clu siv ely to th e N a tio n a lis t m ilita ry fo rc e s .69 C h ia n g a lso re c e iv e d A m e ric a n h e lp in b u ild in g u p h is air force. A g a in u n d e r p r e s s u r e fro m th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, th e se rv ice s p a re d

84 • Arming the Free World d o w n th e ir e a rlie r p ro p o s a ls fo r a ir a s s is ta n c e . W e d e m e y e r s u b m itte d in J a n u a ry 1946 a re v is e d p la n , w h ic h th e Jo in t C h ie fs p ro m p tly a p p ro v e d , fo r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e to a C h in e s e a ir fo rce of e ig h t a n d o n e -th ir d g ro u p s . In c a rry in g o u t th is p ro g ra m , h e a s s ig n e d h ig h e s t p rio rity to th e d e v e lo p m e n t of tw o tro o p -c a rrie r g ro u p s b e c a u se of th e ir v a lu e to C h ia n g in h is e ffo rts to u n ify th e c o u n try . P a ro ch ia l se rv ice in te re s ts a lso s h a p e d p la n s fo r th e C h in e s e air fo rce. A A F officials, fo r e x a m p le , p r e s s e d fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a h e a v y -b o m b e r (B-24) g ro u p b e c a u s e th e C h in e s e w o u ld th e n h a v e to b u ild a n d m a in ­ ta in facilities th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s m ig h t n e e d to u s e in th e e v e n t of a n e m e rg e n c y .70 U n d e r le n d -le a se a n d s u r p lu s p r o p e r ty a rra n g e m e n ts , th e U n ite d S ta te s tr a n s fe r r e d in th e s p r in g o f 1946 $40 m illio n w o r th of a ir fo rce e q u ip m e n t a n d p ro v id e d tr a in in g fo r a p p ro x im a te ly 3,500 C h in e s e p ilo ts a n d te c h n ic ia n s .71 T h ese v a rio u s m e a s u re s of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e e n c o u ra g e d th e K u o ­ m in ta n g h a rd -lin e rs w h o w a n te d to e lim in a te th e C o m m u n is ts b y fo rce of a rm s . B o lste re d b y a p p ro x im a te ly $700 m illio n in le n d -le a se a id in th e y e a r a fte r th e Ja p a n e s e s u rre n d e r, th e 3 -m illio n -m a n N a tio n a lis t a rm y w a s s u p e rio r to th e C o m m u n is ts in m a n p o w e r, e q u ip m e n t, a n d tra in in g . T h e C o m m u n is ts , w ith 300,000 re g u la rs , h a lf of w h o m w e re a rm e d , re c e iv e d in d ire c t h e lp fro m th e S o v iets, w h o a b a n d o n e d to th e m c a p tu r e d Ja p a n e s e w e a p o n s in M a n c h u ria . E stim a te s of th is J a p a n e se m a te rie l v a rie d , b u t th e re w a s n o d o u b t th a t th e C o m m u n is ts lac k ed th e e q u ip m e n t a n d th e m a n p o w e r to s ta n d in p itc h e d b a ttle w ith th e N a tio n a lis ts . D is c o u n tin g th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss of C o m m u n is t g u e rrilla o p e ra tio n s , K u o m in ta n g le a d e rs b e lie v e d th a t th e y c o u ld a ch ie v e a n e a s y m ilita ry v ic to ry o v e r M ao 's fo rce s e v e n if, as T. V. S o o n g o n c e b o a s te d to F o rre sta l, th e U n ite d S ta te s w ith d r e w its tro o p s fro m C h in a .72 C h ia n g 's c o n fid e n c e in h is a b ility to w in o n th e b a ttle fie ld u n d e r ­ m in e d M a rsh a ll's n e g o tia tio n s . W h ile th e g e n e ra l w a s in W a sh in g to n , w id e s p re a d fig h tin g b ro k e o u t in M a n c h u ria as b o th N a tio n a lis t a n d C o m m u n is t fo rc e s a tte m p te d to fill th e v a c u u m left b y d e p a rtin g S oviet tro o p s . M a rsh a ll r e tu r n e d to C h in a in A p ril 1946, b u t w a s u n a b le to d o m o re th a n p ie c e to g e th e r frag ile tru c e s . D e fe rrin g to th e e x tre m is ts in h is p a rty , C h ia n g sh o w e d a lm o s t n o d e s ire to c o m p ro m ise , d e s p ite M a rsh a ll's r e p e a te d w a rn in g s th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts c o u ld n o t u n ify C h in a b y fo rce. H e to ld M a rsh a ll th a t a ll-o u t civil w a r w o u ld b e p re fe ra ­ b le to c o n tin u e d n e g o tia tio n s , a n o p in io n th a t S o o n g e c h o e d in c o n v er-

Limits o f Aid to China • 85 sa tio n s w ith F o rre sta l. "At le a st w a r d id p ro v id e d e fin ite d ire c tio n a n d o b je c tiv e s ," S o o n g in s is te d , " w h e re a s th e p r e s e n t s itu a tio n w o u ld e n a b le th e C o m m u n is ts to d ra g d o w n th e g o v e rn m e n t p ie c e m e a l a n d b y d e g re e s ." F o llo w in g th e e x p ira tio n of a c ea se-fire o n 30 Ju n e , M a r­ sh a ll c o u ld d o little to s te m th e fig h tin g in C h in a . C h ia n g , h o w ev er, w a s a n y th in g b u t d is c o u ra g e d b y th e fa ilu re of M a rsh a ll's p e a c e e ffo rts. In tim e , h e c o n fid e n tly p re d ic te d , v ic to ry w o u ld fall to th e N a tio n a lis ts like rip e f r u it.73 A fte r r e tu r n in g to C h in a in A p ril, M a rsh a ll fo u n d th a t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p o licy w a s h in d e r in g h is e ffo rts to re p a ir th e s h a tte r e d a c c o rd s. C o m m u n is t le a d e rs c o m p la in e d th a t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e w a s s u s ta in in g th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt. C h o u p o in te d o u t th a t tr a n s p o r ­ ta tio n of tr o o p s in to M a n c h u ria , g u a rd in g of N a tio n a lis t ra ilro a d lin e s b y A m e ric a n m a rin e s , a n d c o n tin u e d s u p p ly of le n d -le a se m u n itio n s w e re a t o d d s w ith th e A m e ric a n d e sire to re s to re p e a c e . W h ile th o se m e a s u re s d is tu r b e d th e C o m m u n is ts , th e y e m b o ld e n e d th e K u o m in ­ ta n g irre c o n c ila b le s, as M a rs h a ll r e p o r te d to T ru m a n , " to p u s h fo rw a rd w ith a c a m p a ig n of d e te rm in a tio n a g a in s t th e C o m m u n is ts ." M a rsh a ll e x p la in e d to b o th sid e s th a t a lth o u g h A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id a im e d at c e m e n tin g ra th e r th a n d e s tro y in g u n ity , th e effect of s u c h a ssista n c e w a s ju s t th e o p p o s ite . T he C o m m u n is ts fe a re d a n d th e N a tio n a lis ts h o p e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld c o n tin u e to b a c k C h ia n g w h e th e r o r n o t h e m a d e m e a n in g fu l c o n c e s s io n s to h is a d v e rs a rie s .74 N a tio n a lis t b e llic o sity a n d C o m m u n is t p ro te s ts at la st m a d e M a r­ sh a ll a w a re of th e c o n tra d ic tio n s in A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id policy. D u r ­ in g th e s p rin g a n d s u m m e r of 1946 h e b e g a n to lim it A m e ric a n m ilita ry h e lp to th e N a tio n a lis ts . B ecau se o f th e fig h tin g in M a n c h u ria , h e re fu s e d in e a rly M a y to tr a n s p o r t a d d itio n a l K u o m in ta n g a rm ie s to th e N o rth e a s t, a n d d u r in g th e n e x t tw o m o n th s h e c u t off s h ip m e n ts of tr o o p s a n d s u p p lie s in A m e ric a n v e sse ls to N o rth C h in a as w e ll.75 M a rs h a ll a lso d id n o th in g to p r e v e n t th e d e a th of a n a d m in is tra tio n bill a u th o riz in g c o n tin u in g m ilita ry a id to C h in a , fe a rin g th a t its p a s s a g e w o u ld f u r th e r s tr e n g th e n th e re a c tio n a rie s in th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn ­ m e n t. M o s t im p o r ta n t, M a rsh a ll a rr a n g e d o n 29 Ju ly fo r th e im p o s itio n of a n e m b a rg o o n p riv a te a n d g o v e rn m e n ta l tra n s fe rs of c o m b a t e q u ip ­ m e n t to th e N a tio n a lis ts .76 T h ese a c tio n s c o n s titu te d a m a jo r re v e rsa l of A m e ric a n tactics. In s te a d of f u r n is h in g m ilita ry a id to in d u c e a s e ttle ­ m e n t, M a rs h a ll n o w h o p e d th a t th e w ith h o ld in g of s u c h a ssista n c e w o u ld fo rce th e N a tio n a lis ts to c o m p ro m is e .77

86 • Arming the Free World H e w a s w ro n g . T h e c h a n g e s in m ilita ry a id p o licy d id n o t m a k e C h ia n g m o re c o m p lia n t. N e ith e r d id a s te r n m e s s a g e fro m T ru m a n o n 10 A u g u s t th r e a te n in g a re d e fin itio n of A m e ric a n p o licy " u n le s s c o n ­ v in c in g p ro o f is s h o rtly fo rth c o m in g th a t g e n u in e p ro g re s s is b e in g m a d e to w a rd a p e a c e fu l s e ttle m e n t of C h in a 's in te rn a l p ro b le m s ." A fte r m o n th s of fu tile n e g o tia tio n s , M a rsh a ll a s k e d o n 28 D e c e m b e r to b e re c a lle d . U p o n h is d e p a r tu r e fro m C h in a o n 7 J a n u a ry 1947, h e is s u e d a s ta te m e n t th a t c a s tig a te d e x tre m is ts o n b o th sid e s fo r th e fa ilu re to a c h ie v e p e a c e a n d u n ity . "T h e sa lv a tio n of th e s itu a tio n ," h e b e lie v e d , lay in th e fo rm a tio n of a new , lib e ral g o v e rn m e n t, a n a ttitu d e th a t re fle c te d a n a ll-to o -c o m m o n b e lie f in th e u n iv e rs a l a p p lic a b ility of A m e ric a n in s titu tio n s a n d v a lu e s . M a rsh a ll w a s also k e e n ly aw are of th e lim its of A m e ric a n in flu e n c e , h o w ev er, a n d re a liz e d th a t th e C h i­ n e s e w o u ld h a v e to se ttle s u c h m a tte rs b y th e m s e lv e s .78

T h e r e h a s b e e n m u c h lo o se ta lk a b o u t C h in a 's b e c o m in g th e sta b iliz ­ in g in flu e n c e in th e F ar E a s t," A c h e s o n r e m in d e d M a rsh a ll in N o v e m b e r 1946. "W e h a v e n e v e r felt th a t th is w a s a p o s s ib ility in th e re a s o n a b ly n e a r f u tu r e b u t w e h a v e h o p e d th a t C h in a w o u ld n o t b e c o m e a n u n s ta b iliz in g in flu e n c e —w h ic h is a n e n tire ly d iffe re n t th in g ." A c h e so n 's c o n c e rn h a d b e e n R o o se v e lt's as w ell, a n d sin c e th e b e g in n in g of 1945 A m e ric a n p o licy h a d a im e d at e n c o u ra g in g C h in e s e u n ity in o rd e r to c o n ta in th e g ro w th of R u s s ia n p o w e r a n d av o id a p o ss ib le S o v ie t-A m e ric a n c o n fro n ta tio n in E a st A sia . A lth o u g h M a r­ sh a ll fa ile d to m e d ia te th e c o n flict b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts , h e w a s still d e te r m in e d to p re s e rv e a S o v ie t-A m e ric a n e q u ilib riu m in th e F ar E ast. F u rth e r A m e ric a n m ilita ry a ss is ta n c e , M a rs h a ll b e lie v e d , w o u ld n o t e n a b le C h ia n g to d e fe a t h is fo es; w o rs e , s u c h h e lp m ig h t in v ite c o m p a ra b le R u s s ia n in te r v e n tio n .79 T h is c o n c e rn a b o u t th e e x te n s io n of C o m m u n is t p o w e r w a s a critical d iffe re n c e in th e p o licy d e b a te s o v e r p o s tw a r m ilita ry a id to C h in a a n d to L atin A m e ric a . A d m in is tra tio n officials w o rrie d a b o u t w h e th e r th e p ro v is io n , o r re s tric tio n , of A m e ric a n a rm s a s s is ta n c e w o u ld affect th e g ro w th of R u s s ia n p o w e r in E a st A sia; th e y h a d little re a s o n to fe a r S o v iet p e n e tr a tio n of L a tin A m e ric a. T h is d iffe re n c e a c c o u n te d in la rg e m e a s u re fo r th e e x te n s io n of fa r la rg e r a m o u n ts of m ilita ry a ssista n c e

Limits o f Aid to China • 87 to C h in a , e v e n th o u g h A m e ric a n stra te g ic in te re s ts w e re g re a te r in L a tin A m e ric a . T h e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n s id e re d U .S . p re d o m in a n c e in L a tin A m e ric a a n e s s e n tia l re q u ir e m e n t of n a tio n a l secu rity , b u t th e y th o u g h t th a t A m e ric a n in te re s ts in E ast A sia c o u ld b e p ro te c te d fro m th e s tra te g ic fro n tie r of th e o ffsh o re is la n d s . T h e p ro s p e c t of C h in e s e d is in te g ra tio n or, e v e n w o rs e , th e tr iu m p h of a C o m m u n is t re g im e , h o w ev er, m a d e it im p e ra tiv e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s u s e its d ip lo m a tic in flu e n c e a n d m ilita ry re s o u rc e s to p r e v e n t th e S o v iet U n io n , as T ru m a n fe a re d , fro m ta k in g " th e p la c e of Ja p a n in th e F ar E a s t." 80 L atin A m e ric a , w h e re th e re w a s n o im m e d ia te d a n g e r, h a d to w a it fo r A m e ri­ c a n a rm s . H o w e v e r d iffe re n t th e m a g n itu d e of A m e ric a n a ssista n c e , th e b u re a u c ra tic d iv is io n s o v e r a rm s a id to C h in a a n d L a tin A m e ric a w e re re m a rk a b ly sim ilar. In b o th c a se s, m ilita ry p la n n e r s c la sh e d s h a rp ly w ith th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's re g io n a l e x p e rts . T h e fo rm e r w e re e a g e r to u s e a rm s a s s is ta n c e to se c u re b a s e s , s tra te g ic re s o u rc e s , o r c u s to m e rs fo r U .S . d e fe n s e in d u s trie s ; th e la tte r fe a re d th a t s u c h a id w o u ld p r e v e n t th e d e v e lo p m e n t of d e m o c ra tic re g im e s a n d lib e ral in s titu tio n s in L a tin A m e ric a a n d C h in a . M a rsh a ll's m ilita ry b a c k g ro u n d a n d h is e n o rm o u s p re s tig e k e p t th e d e b a te o v e r a id to C h in a d u rin g 1946 so m e w h a t le ss a c rim o n io u s th a n th e b a ttle s o v e r th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m . Yet th e fu n d a m e n ta l is s u e w a s th e sa m e: h o w m u c h to re ly o n m ilita ry a id as a m e a n s of s e c u rin g A m e ric a n in flu e n c e a b ro a d . S h o rtly a fte r r e tu r n in g to th e U n ite d S ta te s, M a rsh a ll b e c a m e se c re ­ ta ry of s ta te a n d so c o n tin u e d to g ra p p le w ith th is q u e s tio n as th e p rin c ip a l s h a p e r of A m e ric a n p o licy to w a rd C h in a . G u id e d b y a firs t­ h a n d a p p re c ia tio n of N a tio n a lis t w e a k n e s s e s a n d th e lim its of A m e ri­ c a n a b ility to in flu e n c e C h in a 's in te rn a l affairs, M a rsh a ll trie d c are fu lly to re g u la te th e flo w of A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts to C h in a . B ut e v e n ts in o th e r p a r ts of th e w o rld c o m p lic a te d h is e ffo rts. A m a jo r re o rie n ta tio n of A m e ric a n a rm s policy, p re c ip ita te d b y e v e n ts in Ira n , Turkey, a n d G re e c e , h e lp e d c re a te n e w p r e s s u r e s fo r in c re a s e d A m e ric a n in te rv e n ­ tio n in C h in a .

_ The Reorientation of American A Arms Aid Policy: The Near East and the Truman Doctrine Greece is our real problem today. —Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, 18 D ecem ber 1946 The choice is between acting with energy or losing by default. —Secretary o f State G eorge C. Marshall, 27 February 1947 In the long run, the U.S. must depen d upon forehanded action in its foreign policy because of the high price o f a continuous series of crises, and because the failure to prevent them will contribute to the continuation of international instability and expansionism. —General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 May 1947

12 M a rc h 1947 H a r r y S. T ru m a n w e n t b e fo re a jo in t s e s s io n of C o n g re s s a n d s te rn ly d e liv e re d th e m o s t fa m o u s s p e e c h of h is p re s i­ d ency. T h e o c c a sio n fo r T ru m a n 's a d d re s s w a s h is r e q u e s t fo r $400 m illio n in m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id fo r G re e c e a n d Turkey. T he la s tin g im p o rta n c e of h is m e s s a g e w a s h is s w e e p in g ju stific a tio n fo r th is a s s is ta n c e , s o o n k n o w n as th e T ru m a n D o c trin e : "It m u s t b e th e p o licy of th e U n ite d S ta te s to s u p p o r t fre e p e o p le s w h o a re re s is tin g a tte m p te d s u b ju g a tio n b y a rm e d m in o ritie s o r b y o u ts id e p r e s s u r e s ." 1 T ru m a n 's a d d re s s w a s re m a rk a b le fo r its effect n o t o n ly o n th e C o ld W ar b u t a lso o n m ilita ry a id policy. H is a p p e a l fo r a rm s a id to G re e c e a n d T u rk ey—th e first in s ta n c e of a p r e s id e n t s e e k in g s u c h a p p ro p ria tio n s o th e r th a n in w a rtim e —a c c e le ra te d th e e m e rg e n c e of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e as a m a jo r in s tr u m e n t of c o n ta in m e n t. A lth o u g h th e im m e d ia te c a u se of h is m e s s a g e w a s a B ritish d e c isio n to c u rta il a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey, T ru m a n 's p ro p o s a ls w e re th e p ro d u c t of m o n th s of g ro w in g c o n c e rn o v e r e v e n ts in th o se c o u n trie s . By th e late s u m m e r of 1946 W a s h in g to n officials sa w S o v iet d e m a n d s fo r c o n c e s s io n s in Turkey, a C o m m u n is t-le d g u e rrilla m o v e m e n t in

88

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 89 G re e c e , a n d a s e p a ra tis t re g im e in n o r th e r n Ira n as p a rts of a c o n c e rte d S o v iet e ffo rt to d o m in a te th e N e a r E ast. W h e n M o sco w p r o p o s e d jo in t S o v iet-T u rk ish d e fe n se of th e B lack S e a stra its in A u g u s t 1946, T ru m a n a n d h is a d v is e rs re a c te d w ith a la rm a n d re s o lv e d to " re s is t w ith all m e a n s a t o u r d is p o s a l a n y S o v iet a g g re s s io n ." 2 D u rin g th e n e x t tw o m o n th s , th e a d m in is tra tio n lifte d re s tric tio n s o n th e tra n s fe r of a rm s to Ira n , G re e c e , a n d T urkey a n d a g re e d to s h a re w ith G re a t B rita in th e b u r d e n of e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id to th e la tte r tw o n a tio n s . T h ese d e c isio n s in s u r e d th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w o u ld r e s p o n d a ffir­ m a tiv e ly to B ritain 's a p p e a l of 21 F e b ru a ry 1947 to ta k e o v e r c h ie f re s p o n s ib ility fo r a id in g G re e c e a n d Turkey. In c o n tra s t to th e ir d iv is io n o v e r m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a a n d C h in a , p o litica l a n d m ilita ry officials u n ite d in s u p p o r t of th e p ro v is io n of a rm a m e n ts to G re e c e a n d Turkey. T he Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff e m p h a ­ s iz e d th a t G re e c e a n d e sp e c ia lly T urkey w e re im p o r ta n t to th e c o n tro l of th e E a s te rn M e d ite rra n e a n ; p o litica l a n a ly s ts a d d e d th a t th e y w e re th e k e y s to th e f u tu r e o r ie n ta tio n of th e e n tire N e a r E ast. B oth d e fe n se a n d d ip lo m a tic a u th o ritie s b e lie v e d th a t m ilita ry a id w o u ld stiffe n th e re s o lv e of th e G re e k s a n d T urks to re s is t C o m m u n is t p r e s s u r e s . T h ey a lso re g a r d e d s u c h a id , co n v ersely , as a sy m b o l of A m e ric a n d e te r ­ m in a tio n to s to p S o v iet e x p a n s io n b y " b a c k in g ] o u r p o licies to th e h ilt." 3 F o llo w in g th e e n u n c ia tio n of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e , S ta te , W ar, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n t p la n n e r s c o n s id e re d th e p o s s ib ility of p ro v id in g sim ila r a s s is ta n c e to o th e r c o u n trie s fac in g C o m m u n is t th re a ts . T h eir s tu d ie s c a lle d a tte n tio n to th e e n o rm o u s g u lf b e tw e e n p o te n tia l d e m a n d s fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a n d th e m e a n s to m e e t th o s e re q u e s ts a n d fo rc e d m o re c a re fu l d is tin c tio n s b e tw e e n v ita l a n d p e rip h e ra l in te re s ts a n d th e a s s ig n m e n t of p rio ritie s to e x istin g m ilita ry a id p r o ­ g ra m s . E q u a lly im p o r ta n t. S ta te -W a r-N a v y c o m m itte e s u r g e d n e w le g isla tio n a n d b e tte r lo g istic al p la n n in g so th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld s u s ta in c u r r e n t m ilita ry a id p ro je c ts a n d p ro m p tly e x te n d a ssis ta n c e to c o u n trie s w ith u r g e n t n e e d s . In th e s e w a y s, th e G re e k -T u rk ish crisis w a s re s p o n s ib le fo r th e first im p o r ta n t s te p s to w a rd a c o m p re h e n s iv e m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m .

A t th e e n d of W o rld W ar II, S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials r e g a rd e d th e N e a r E a st as a n a re a of in te n s e —a n d p o s s ib ly e x p lo siv e —g re a t-p o w e r

90 • Arming the Free World rivalry. A s trid e v ita l c o m m u n ic a tio n s ro u te s a n d p o s s e s s in g v a st oil re s e rv e s , th is re g io n h a d e n o rm o u s stra te g ic a n d e co n o m ic im p o rta n c e to G re a t B rita in , th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n d th e S o v iet U n io n . S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t p la n n e r s h o p e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s , th r o u g h th e v ig o ro u s p u r s u it of c o m m e rc ia l a n d in v e s tm e n t o p p o r tu n itie s a n d th e e x te n s io n of e co n o m ic a n d te c h n ic a l a s s is ta n c e , w o u ld s o o n re p la c e B rita in as th e le a d in g W e ste rn p o w e r in th e N e a r E ast. T h ey also e x p e c te d th a t th e S o v iet U n io n , c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e s e c u rity of its s o u th e rn rim a n d e a g e r to p r e v e n t th e s p r e a d of B ritish a n d A m e ric a n in flu e n c e , w o u ld a s s e rt its in te re s ts v ig o ro u s ly in th a t re g io n . A lread y , in A u g u s t 1945, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's O ffice of N e a r E a s te rn a n d A fric a n A ffairs (N E A ) p re d ic te d th a t c o m p e titio n b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e S o v iet U n io n in th e N e a r E ast, if u n c h e c k e d , m ig h t e v e n le a d to a n o th e r w o rld w a r.4 A lth o u g h T ru m a n th o u g h t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld av o id s u c h a co n flict, h e b e c a m e in c re a s in g ly c o n c e rn e d , as d id m a n y of h is a d v is e rs, a b o u t S o v iet a c tio n s in th e N e a r E a s t.5 A m e ric a n m is g iv in g s first a ro s e o v e r S o v iet a s p ira tio n s in Turkey. In J u n e 1945 M o sco w re v e a le d th a t its c o n d itio n s fo r th e re n e w a l of a R u sso -T u rk ish tre a ty of f r ie n d s h ip in c lu d e d jo in t fo rtific a tio n of th e B lack S e a s tra its , b a s e s o n T u rk ish soil, a n d c e ss io n o f b o r d e r te rrito rie s , te rm s th a t T urkey flatly re je c te d .6 R e a c tin g to th e S o v iet p ro p o s a ls , th e A m e ric a n a m b a s s a d o r in A n k a ra , E d w in C . W ilso n , r e p o r te d th a t th e re a l S o v iet o b jec tiv e w a s th e in s ta lla tio n of a s u b s e rv ie n t re g im e in Turkey. S e c re ta ry of th e N a v y Ja m es C . F o rre sta l a lso c o n c lu d e d th a t th e R u s s ia n s w a n te d to tu r n T urkey in to a sa te llite . T he Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff r e c o m m e n d e d th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n re s is t S o v iet e ffo rts to se c u re b a se rig h ts in th e s tra its . So d id W ilso n , w h o c o n s id e re d a s tr o n g s ta n d a g a in s t S o v iet e x p a n s io n is m in th e N e a r E a st im p e ra tiv e sin c e, in h is o p in io n . E a s te rn E u ro p e h a d a lre a d y " b e e n lo st to [the] U S S R ."7 D e sp ite su c h c o u n se l, T ru m a n b e lie v e d at first th a t d ip lo m a c y c o u ld p ro d u c e a n a g re e m e n t th a t w o u ld p re s e rv e T u rk ish so v e re ig n ty a n d a c c o m m o d a te le g itim a te S o v iet se c u rity in te re s ts . A t th e P o ts d a m C o n ­ fe re n c e , T ru m a n a d v is e d S o v iet P re m ie r Josef V. S ta lin to se ttle a n y te rrito ria l q u e s tio n s w ith T urkey th r o u g h b ila te ra l n e g o tia tio n s . H e a lso u r g e d th e in te rn a tio n a liz a tio n of th e B lack S e a stra its a n d m a jo r in la n d E u ro p e a n w a te rw a y s, s u c h as th e D a n u b e River. B ut w h e n h is p ro p o s a l fa ile d to m a k e a n y headw ay, h e e n d o rs e d , as d id B ritish P rim e M in is te r W in s to n S. C h u rc h ill, a S o v iet r e q u e s t fo r re v is io n of th e

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Poiicy • 91 M o n tre u x C o n v e n tio n , w h ic h g o v e rn e d p a s s a g e th r o u g h th e s tra its, a n d a g re e d th a t e a c h n a tio n s h o u ld ta k e u p th e m a tte r d ire c tly w ith T urkey.8 T h e A m e ric a n p ro p o s a ls , s u b m itte d to T urkey o n 2 N o v e m b e r 1945, c a lle d fo r o p e n in g th e s tra its at all tim e s to th e w a rs h ip s of th e B lack S e a n a tio n s a n d g e n e ra lly c lo sin g th e m to th o se of o th e r c o u n ­ trie s, e x c e p t w ith th e c o n s e n t of th e rip a ria n p o w e rs .9 F o llo w in g th is in itia tiv e , h o w ev er, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n ra p id ly lo st h o p e th a t n e g o tia tio n s c o u ld se ttle R u sso -T u rk ish d if­ fe re n c e s . S o v iet officials q u ic k ly c o n d e m n e d th e A m e ric a n p ro p o s a ls a n d r e ite r a te d d e m a n d s fo r d ire c t c o n tro l of th e s tra its a n d te rrito ria l c o n c e s s io n s . D u rin g th e a u tu m n of 1945, a S o v iet p re s s c a m p a ig n e m b itte r e d re la tio n s w ith Turkey, a n d S o v iet tro o p m o v e m e n ts in th e B a lk a n s a ro u s e d a c u te a n x ie ty in A n k a r a .10 S u c h a c tio n s a lso c a u se d c o n s te rn a tio n in W a s h in g to n . A s e a rly a s 13 O cto b er, T ru m a n w ro te to S e c re ta ry of S ta te Jam es F. B y rn e s, "I a m of th e o p in io n if so m e m e a n s is n 't fo u n d to p r e v e n t it, R u ssia w ill ta k e s te p s b y d ire c t a c tio n to o b ta in c o n tro l of th e B lack S e a stra its ." A S o v iet a ssa u lt o n th e stra its, N E A in fo rm e d B y rn e s o n 5 J a n u a ry 1946, c o u ld co m e " in a m a tte r of w e e k s o r m o n th s " a n d so th e tim e h a d co m e to " s ta n d sh o u ld e r to s h o u ld e r w ith th e o th e r P o w e rs o p p o s e d to a g g re s s io n . . . in p r e v e n t­ in g a n a tta c k o n Turkey." To d o o th e rw is e , w a r n e d N E A D ire c to r L oy W. H e n d e rs o n , m ig h t " b rin g a b o u t th e re s to ra tio n of a n e ra in w h ic h a se rie s o f u n c h e c k e d a g g re s s io n s w ill re s u lt in w o rld w a r."11 S u c h d ire p re d ic tio n s a lso a ro s e fro m d is tre s s o v e r S o v iet p o licy in Ira n , a n a tio n in w h ic h u n e a s y w a rtim e c o o p e ra tio n a m o n g th e g re a t p o w e rs d is s o lv e d in to p o s tw a r c o n fro n ta tio n . R u s s ia n a n d B ritish fo rc e s o c c u p ie d th a t o il-rich c o u n tr y in A u g u s t 1941, a n d A m e ric a n tr o o p s a rriv e d fifte e n m o n th s la te r to s u p e rv is e th e tr a n s s h ip m e n t of le n d -le a s e s u p p lie s to th e S o v iet U n io n . B oth th e S o v ie ts a n d th e B ritish , im p e ria l riv als in Ira n fo r o v e r a c e n tu ry , tr e a te d th e w e a k g o v e rn m e n t of S h a h M o h a m m a d R eza P a h lav i w ith d is d a in . In th e ir o c c u p a tio n z o n e in th e n o r th , th e S o v ie ts e n c o u ra g e d th e C o m m u n is tle d T udeh p a r ty a n d a b e tte d tra d itio n a l s e p a ra tis t m o v e m e n ts . In th e ir s p h e re of in flu e n c e in th e s o u th , th e B ritish fo llo w ed co m m ercial p o l­ icies th a t a m o u n te d to " p illa g in g ," a c c o rd in g to th e Ira n ia n fo re ig n m in iste r. T h e U n ite d S ta te s, o n th e o th e r h a n d , s u p p o r te d th e S h a h 's g o v e rn m e n t b y d is trib u tin g le n d -le a se s u p p lie s , p ro v id in g fin an c ia l a n d m ilita ry a d v is e rs, a n d re ite ra tin g s u p p o r t fo r th e in d e p e n d e n c e a n d te rrito ria l in te g rity of Ira n . By n o m e a n s d is in te re s te d , th e se pol-

92 • Arming the Free World icies h e lp e d a d v a n c e A m e ric a n o b je c tiv e s in Ira n , w h ic h in c lu d e d s tim u la tin g tra d e , s e c u rin g a n oil c o n c e s s io n , a n d p r e v e n tin g th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a n y th r e a t in th e P e rs ia n G u lf a re a to A m e ric a n p e tro le u m in te r e s ts in S a u d i A ra b ia . By th e e n d of th e w ar, th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n t lo o k e d p rim a rily to th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r h e lp in c o n so l­ id a tin g its a u th o rity a n d re d u c in g B ritish a n d R u s s ia n in flu e n c e . O n 23 A u g u s t 1945 N E A is s u e d a p o licy s ta te m e n t th a t w e n t a lo n g w ay to w a rd fu lfillin g Ira n ia n d e s ire s . It a s s e r te d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w o u ld " m a k e e v e ry e ffo rt to p r e v e n t th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a n y s itu a tio n w h ic h m ig h t c o n s titu te a lim ita tio n o n Ira n ia n s o v e re ig n ty . . . o r an y a tte m p t b y a th ir d p o w e r to e x p lo it th e in te rn a l d iffic u lties of Ira n fo r its o w n e x p a n s io n is t p u r p o s e s ." A t th e sa m e tim e , N E A c a lle d fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a tr ip a rtite c o m m is s io n to s u p e rv is e th e sta b iliz a tio n a n d d e v e lo p m e n t of I r a n .12 B ut a n y h o p e of g re a t-p o w e r h a rm o n y in Ira n v a n is h e d d u rin g th e a u tu m n of 1945 w h e n in s u r g e n ts d e m a n d e d a u to n o m y fo r th e n o r th ­ w e s te r n p ro v in c e of A z e rb a ija n . T h e S o v iet o c c u p a tio n a u th o ritie s o p e n ly s u p p o r te d th e s e p a ra tis ts a n d p r e v e n te d Ira n ia n se c u rity fo rce s fro m m o v in g a g a in s t th e a rm e d in s u rre c tio n is ts . T h e A m e ric a n c o n s u l in th e p ro v in c ia l c a p ita l o f T abriz r e p o r te d th a t th e A z e rb a ija n i u p ris in g w a s m o re a n e x p re s s io n of g e n u in e d is c o n te n t w ith th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn ­ m e n t th a n th e p ro d u c t of S o v iet in tr ig u e .13 B ut A m b a s s a d o r W allace M u rra y a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's e x p e rts in N e a r E a s te rn affairs d is a g re e d . T h ey a lso d o u b te d th a t th e S o v iets w e re sim p ly e x p lo itin g th e tu rm o il in A z e rb a ija n to e x tra c t a n oil c o n c e s s io n fro m th e r e lu c ta n t Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n t. In s te a d th e y th o u g h t th a t th e S o v ie ts, w h o b lu n tly re je c te d A m e ric a n r e q u e s ts fo r th e im m e d ia te w ith d ra w a l of tro o p s , m ig h t n e x t tr y to in sta ll a s u b s e rv ie n t re g im e in T e h ra n .14 So tro u b lin g w e re S o v iet in te n tio n s in th e N e a r E a st th a t Loy H e n d e rs o n w a rn e d of a n im p e n d in g crisis. H e n d e rs o n , a c a re e r d ip lo ­ m a t a n d S o v iet sp e c ia list w h o b e c a m e d ire c to r of N E A in e a rly 1945, c o n s id e re d S ta lin a n e v e n g re a te r th r e a t to w o rld p e a c e th a n H itle r h a d b e e n . In a lo n g m e m o ra n d u m w r itte n at th e e n d of 1945, H e n d e rs o n w o rrie d th a t th e tra d itio n a l b a rrie rs to S o v iet e x p a n s io n w e re c ru m ­ b lin g . T he S e c o n d W orld W ar h a d e lim in a te d G e rm a n y in th e w e s t a n d Ja p a n in th e e a st; R u ss ia w a s n o w try in g to re m o v e " a th ir d b a rrie r in th e s o u th ," so th a t its p o w e r c o u ld flow u n im p e d e d in to th e E a s te rn M e d ite r r a n e a n a n d th e P e rsia n G ulf. A n y a p p e a s e m e n t of S o v iet a s p i­ ra tio n s , H e n d e rs o n c a u tio n e d , w o u ld " m a k e a m o c k e ry of th e p rin ci-

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 93 p ie s o n w h ic h th e U n ite d N a tio n s O rg a n iz a tio n re s ts . . . [an d ] m ig h t e v e n tu a lly g iv e b ir th to a th ir d W orld W ar." H e n d e rs o n fa v o re d th e c a llin g o f a Big F o u r c o n fe re n c e in o rd e r to p e rs u a d e th e S o v iet U n io n to " a b a n d o n its p r e s e n t u n ila te ra l a p p ro a c h to w a rd s N e a r E ast p r o b ­ le m s." H e c o n c e d e d th a t p r o s p e c ts fo r s u c h a s e ttle m e n t w e re d im . Still, a g re a t-p o w e r m e e tin g , e v e n if it failed , w o u ld at le a st p o s tp o n e a " s u p r e m e te s t" fo r th e U n ite d N a tio n s , o n e it m ig h t n o t su rv iv e " a t th e v e ry o u ts e t of its e x is te n c e ." 15 H e n d e rs o n 's m e m o ra n d u m w a s o n e of m a n y a p p e a ls fo r firm e r a n d m o re c o n s is te n t o p p o s itio n to S o v iet a m b itio n s . U n d e r th e d ire c tio n of Ja m es F. B y rn e s, A m e ric a n d ip lo m a c y h a d fo llo w ed a n e rra tic c o u rse . B y rn e s's d e m a n d s fo r d e m o c ra tic re fo rm s in E a s te rn E u ro p e a n d o m in o u s re fe re n c e s to th e atom ic b o m b h a d c o n trib u te d to th e b re a k ­ d o w n o f th e first m e e tin g of th e C o u n c il of F o re ig n M in is te rs (C FM ) in L o n d o n in S e p te m b e r 1945. A t th e n e x t C F M c o n clav e in M o sco w th re e m o n th s later, B y rn e s a b ru p tly s h ifte d tactics a n d e a g e rly a c c e p te d to k e n c o n c e s s io n s as ju s tific a tio n fo r th e n e g o tia tio n o f p e a c e tre a tie s w ith th e S o v ie t-d o m in a te d g o v e rn m e n ts of R u m a n ia a n d B u lg aria. B y rn e s's c o n c ilia tio n of th e R u s s ia n s e lic ite d v o c ife ro u s p ro te s ts . R e p u b lic a n le a d e rs of C o n g re s s , n o ta b ly S e n a to r A r th u r H . V an d en b e rg of M ic h ig a n , th e r a n k in g m e m b e r of th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m ­ m itte e , d e n o u n c e d a s " o n e m o re . . . A m e ric a n 'g iv e a w a y ' " th e a g re e ­ m e n t in p rin c ip le th a t B y rn e s h a d re a c h e d in M o sco w o n in te rn a tio n a l c o n tro l of a to m ic e n e rg y .16 E v e n in flu e n tia l D e m o c ra ts o n C a p ito l H ill, s u c h a s S e n a to r Tom C o n n a lly o f Texas, th e c h a irm a n of th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , sim ila rly c o m p la in e d to T ru m a n th a t B y rn e s w a s all to o w illin g to e n d a n g e r A m e ric a n in te re s ts in h is z ea l to c u ltiv ate S o v iet g o o d w ill. W ith in th e W h ite H o u s e , A d m ira l W illiam D. L eahy, th e c h ie f of sta ff to th e c o m m a n d e r-in -c h ie f, re p ro a c h e d B y rn e s fo r tu r n in g th e M o sco w c o n fe re n c e in to " a v e rita b le M u n ic h , " a t w h ic h th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te a p p e a s e d a n a tio n th a t b e h a v e d in E a s te rn E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E a st m o re like a p o te n tia l e n e m y th a n a fo rm e r ally .17 L ess in flu e n tia l, b u t e q u a lly v e h e m e n t, w a s th e critic ism of c a re e r fo re ig n se rv ice o fficers. T h e m o s t c o n te m p tu o u s a s s e s s m e n t c am e fro m G e o rg e F. K e n n a n , c o u n s e lo r of th e e m b a s s y in M oscow , w h o excori­ a te d B y rn e s fo r h o p in g o n ly to a ch ie v e "so m e s o rt of a g re e m e n t, h e d o e s n 't m u c h c a re w h a t." 18 In e a rly 1946 T ru m a n p la c a te d th e s e critics b y ru lin g o u t fu rth e r c o m p ro m ise w ith th e S o v ie ts. To a g re a t e x te n t, T ru m a n a c te d in o rd e r

94 • Arming the Free World to c alm th e tu r b u le n t p o litica l w a te rs a g ita te d b y B y rn e s's dip lo m acy . In a d d itio n , T ru m a n s h ifte d to w a rd a firm e r p o licy b e c a u se h e n o lo n g e r b e lie v e d , as h e h a d a t th e P o ts d a m C o n fe re n c e , th a t h e c o u ld d o b u s in e s s w ith S ta lin . W h ile B y rn e s w a s in M oscow , T ru m a n to ld h is sta ff th a t th e S o v ie ts u n d e r s to o d o n ly o n e th in g —" d iv is io n s ." S u c h th in k in g p e rm e a te d a le tte r th a t T ru m a n a d d re s s e d , b u t p ro b a b ly n e v e r re a d , to B y rn e s a fte r th e s e c re ta ry of sta te r e tu r n e d fro m M oscow . A fte r d e c la rin g th a t h e w a s in c h a rg e of fo re ig n policy, T ru m a n a n n o u n c e d h is p re fe re n c e fo r to u g h o p p o s itio n to th e S o v iets, p a rtic u la rly in th e N e a r E ast. O n ly " a n iro n fist a n d s tr o n g la n g u a g e " w o u ld p r e v e n t a S o v iet " in v a s io n of T urkey a n d s e iz u re of th e B lack S e a S tra its." A g a in s t th e " o u tra g e " o f R u s s ia n p o licy in Ira n , T ru m a n a s s e rte d , "I th in k w e o u g h t to p r o te s t w ith all th e v ig o r of w h ic h w e a re c a p a b le . . . . It is a p a ra lle l to th e p r o g r a m of R u ssia in L atv ia, E sto n ia a n d L ith u a n ia . . . [an d ] in lin e w ith th e h ig h - h a n d e d a n d a rb itra ry m a n n e r in w h ic h R u ssia a c te d in P o la n d ." 19 T ru m a n c o n c lu d e d w h a t h is to ria n R o b e rt L. M e s s e r h a s c a lle d h is " p e rs o n a l d e c la ra tio n of th e c o ld w a r" b y e x claim in g , " I 'm tire d of b a b y in g th e S o v iets." E v en th o u g h B y rn es p ro b a b ly n e v e r h e a rd th e s e w o rd s , h e q u ic k ly b e c a m e a w a re of th e n e w o rie n ta tio n in fo re ig n p o licy a n d th e p r e s id e n t's e x p e c ta tio n th a t h e s h o u ld c h a n g e h is w ay of d e a lin g w ith th e S o v iets. T ru m a n , fo r e x a m ­ p le, in fo rm e d h is sta ff o n 27 F e b ru a ry 1946 th a t h e h a d in s tru c te d B y rn e s " to stiffe n u p a n d tr y fo r th e n e x t th r e e m o n th s n o t to m a k e an y c o m p ro m is e s ." 20 B y rn e s h e e d e d th is a d v ic e d u rin g a c o n fro n ta tio n o v e r th e rem o v a l of S o viet tro o p s fro m Ira n . By treaty , B rita in a n d th e S o v iet U n io n h a d p ro m is e d to re m o v e th e ir o c c u p a tio n fo rce s fro m Ira n w ith in six m o n th s a fte r th e e n d of th e S e c o n d W o rld War. B ut w h e n th e S o v iets fa ile d to m e e t th e d e a d lin e of 2 M a rc h 1946, B y rn e s q u ic k ly s e n t a s tr o n g n o te of p ro te s t to M o sco w a n d re le a s e d its tex t to th e p u b lic . T en sio n m o u n te d in W a s h in g to n th e n e x t day, 6 M a rc h , w h e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re c e iv e d a r e p o r t fro m th e v ic e -c o n su l in T abriz th a t S oviet tr o o p s w e re a d v a n c in g to w a rd T eh ra n a n d th e T u rk ish b o rd e r.21 F e a r­ in g th a t th e S o v iets w e re " a d d in g m ilita ry in v a s io n to p o litical s u b v e r­ s io n in I r a n ," B y rn e s e x claim ed , " N o w w e 'll g iv e it to th e m w ith b o th b a rre ls ." 22 H e s tro n g ly e n c o u ra g e d th e Ira n ia n s to p u t a sid e th e ir h e s ita tio n s a n d a rg u e th e ir case b e fo re th e U n ite d N a tio n s . G e o rg e V. A llen , th e d e p u ty d ire c to r of N E A , e v e n m a d e s u re th a t H u s s e in A la, th e Ira n ia n a m b a s s a d o r to th e U n ite d N a tio n s , w e n t w ell b e y o n d h is

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 95 in s tr u c tio n s in is s u in g a s tr o n g d e n u n c ia tio n of S o v iet policy. B y rn es h im s e lf le d th e A m e ric a n d e le g a tio n to th e S e c u rity C o u n c il a n d r e p e a te d ly o p p o s e d S o v iet e ffo rts to re m o v e th e Ira n ia n q u e s tio n fro m th e a g e n d a , e v e n a fte r M o sc o w a n n o u n c e d o n 25 M a rc h th a t its tro o p s w o u ld d e p a r t in five o r six w e e k s . T h e crisis e n d e d te n d a y s la te r w h e n th e S o v iet a n d Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n ts re le a s e d a n a g re e m e n t th a t called fo r th e e v a c u a tio n o f th e R u s s ia n fo rce s in e a rly M a y in r e tu r n fo r a n oil c o n c e s s io n in n o r th e r n Ira n . B y rn e s, w h o w o n w id e s p re a d p u b lic s u p p o r t fo r h is v ig o ro u s s ta n d a g a in s t th e S o v iets, c o n c lu d e d th a t " firm n e s s a n d th e U n ite d N a tio n s w o n ." 23 T h e Ira n ia n crisis a n d th e c o n tin u in g d is p u te o v e r th e T u rk ish s tra its h e lp e d fo c u s a tte n tio n w ith in th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n o n A m e ric a n stra te g ic in te re s ts in th e N e a r E ast. In a le tte r to B y rn e s o n 13 M a rc h 1946, th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff w a r n e d th a t th e S o v iets a im e d at d o m in a tio n of th e e n tire M id d le E a st a n d E a s te rn M e d ite rra n e a n . T h is o b je c tiv e , w h ic h e n d a n g e r e d G re a t B ritain 's p o s itio n as a w o rld p o w er, in d ire c tly th r e a te n e d A m e ric a n m ilita ry in te re s ts . "T h e d e fe a t o r d is in ­ te g ra tio n of th e B ritish E m p ire ," th e Jo in t C h ie fs e x p la in e d , " w o u ld e lim in a te fro m E u ra s ia th e la s t b u lw a rk of re s is ta n c e b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d S o v iet e x p a n s io n ." S u c h a c o llap se w o u ld also , in a f u tu r e w ar, p r e v e n t th e m ilita ry p o te n tia l of th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d its p ro b a b le allies fro m m a tc h in g th e S o v iet U n io n 's. T h u s, th e Jo in t C h ie fs fo u n d th a t th e S o v iet p r e s s u r e s o n T urkey a n d Ira n , a lth o u g h n o t a n im m e d ia te th r e a t to th e U n ite d S ta te s , w o u ld " d e fin ite ly im p a ir o u r n a tio n a l se c u rity ." 24 P re lim in a ry p la n n in g fo r a f u tu r e w a r w ith th e S o v iet U n io n s u g ­ g e s te d m o re d ire c t A m e ric a n m ilita ry in te re s ts in th e N e a r E ast. A se rie s of Jo in t S taff s tu d ie s c o d e -n a m e d P IN C H E R , th e first of w h ic h w e re c o m p le te d in M a rc h a n d A p ril 1946, p o in te d to th e a d v a n ta g e s of u s in g th e C a u c a s u s M o u n ta in s -B la c k S ea re g io n , ra th e r th a n C e n tra l E u ro p e o r th e B a lk a n s, as a c o rrid o r fo r a m a jo r o ffe n siv e a g a in s t th e " in d u s tria l h e a rt" of th e S o v iet U n io n . T h ese p la n n in g p a p e rs , al­ th o u g h h ig h ly te n ta tiv e , re v e a le d th e c e n tra l im p o rta n c e th a t th e N e a r E a st w a s a s s u m in g in A m e ric a n stra te g ic th in k in g .25 F u rth e r in d ic a tio n c a m e w h e n F o rre sta l a r r a n g e d fo r a sh o w of fo rce in th e M e d ite rra ­ n e a n ; th e b a ttle s h ip Missouri a rriv e d at Is ta n b u l o n 5 A p ril, o s te n sib ly to r e tu r n th e b o d y of th e T u rk ish a m b a s s a d o r w h o h a d re c e n tly d ie d in W a s h in g to n .26 T h e Missouri a lso c a lle d at A th e n s , a n e x p re s s io n of th e T ru m a n

96 • Arming the Free World a d m in is tra tio n 's g ro w in g in te r e s t in th e p o litical a n d e co n o m ic sta b ility of G re e c e . F o llo w in g its lib e ra tio n b y B ritish tr o o p s in O c to b e r 1944, G re e c e s u ffe re d fro m th e b itte r leg a cies of G e r m a n o c c u p a tio n . Its tr a n s p o r ta tio n a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n s s y s te m s w e re p ra c tic a lly d e ­ stro y e d , fa m in e ra v a g e d th e c o u n try s id e , a n d in fla tio n s o a re d o u t of c o n tro l.27 To a d d to th e c o u n try 's p lig h t, civil w a r e r u p te d b e tw e e n th e B ritish -b a c k e d g o v e rn m e n t, w h ic h w a s c o m m itte d to th e r e s to ra tio n of th e m o n a rc h y , a n d th e N a tio n a l L ib e ra tio n F ro n t (EA M ), a c o a litio n of re p u b lic a n re s is ta n c e g r o u p s le d b y th e C o m m u n is t p a rty (K K E).28 D e te rm in e d to p r e v e n t th e e x tre m e left fro m se iz in g p o w er, C h u rc h ill p o u r e d B ritish tr o o p s in to G re e c e . A n a rm istic e h a lte d th e fig h tin g in F e b ru a ry 1945, b u t it d id n o t e n d th e c o u n try 's p o litical strife. T h ere w e re re p ris a ls a g a in s t th e E A M b y rig h tis t v ig ila n te s , o fte n w ith th e a s s is ta n c e of th e a rm y a n d th e n a tio n a l g u a rd , b o th of w h ic h cam e u n d e r ro y alist c o n tro l. E co n o m ic tu rm o il a lso c o n tin u e d u n a b a te d . D e sp ite B ritish a s s is ta n c e , a se rie s of rig h t-w in g g o v e rn m e n ts p ro v e d c o m p le te ly u n e q u a l to th e e n o rm o u s ta s k of re p a irin g th e d e v a s ta tio n of w a r.29 D u rin g th e a u tu m n of 1945, A m e ric a n officials b e c a m e c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e lack of p ro g re s s in r e b u ild in g G re e c e 's s h a tte r e d econom y. A m b a s s a d o r L in co ln M acV eagh a n d officials of th e U n ite d N a tio n s R elief a n d R e h a b ilita tio n A d m in is tra tio n w a r n e d th a t a fin a n c ia l col­ la p s e w o u ld o c c u r u n le s s th e U n ite d S ta te s p ro v id e d a d v is e rs a n d c re d its . B ritish m ilita ry a u th o ritie s a lso s ta te d th a t th e y n e e d e d A m e ri­ c a n h e lp to p re v e n t c h a o s in G re e c e .30 B y rn e s r u le d o u t s ta tio n in g A m e ric a n tr o o p s in G re e c e o r s h a rin g re s p o n s ib ility w ith th e B ritish fo r tra in in g a n d s u p p ly in g th e G re e k a rm y o r n a tio n a l g u a rd ; h e d id , h o w ev er, s e c u re T ru m a n 's a p p ro v a l to s tr e n g th e n A m e ric a n e ffo rts to sta b iliz e th e G re e k econom y. In J a n u a ry 1946 th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n n o u n c e d th e a p p ro v a l of a $25 m illio n E x p o rt-Im p o rt B an k lo a n a n d h in te d th a t f u r th e r f u n d s w o u ld b e c o m e av ailab le if G re e c e a d o p te d m a jo r fin a n c ia l a n d a d m in is tra tiv e r e f o r m s .31 D u rin g th e n e x t six m o n th s , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o u p le d g e s tu r e s of s u p p o r t, s u c h as th e v isit of th e Missouri, w ith a p p e a ls fo r in te rn a l c h a n g e s th a t w o u ld h a s te n recovery. T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re c o m m e n d e d s u c h a s s is ta n c e e v e n th o u g h it h a d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t. O fficials in N E A d e p lo re d th e c o rr u p tio n a n d in efficien c y of th e A th e n s re g im e , failin g s th e y c o n s id e re d m a jo r im p e d im e n ts to effectiv e re c o n s tru c tio n . W h e n ,

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 97 fo r e x a m p le , a G re e k m is s io n c a m e to W a s h in g to n in A u g u s t 1946 to se e k n e w lo a n s , H e n d e rs o n a n d A c tin g S e c re ta ry of S ta te D e a n A c h e s o n e x p re s s e d th e ir d is p le a s u re o v e r th e fa ilu re to u s e th e $25 m illio n a lre a d y g r a n te d a n d re ite ra te d th e n e e d fo r s trin g e n t re fo rm s b e fo re a n y n e w a id c o u ld b e e ffe c tiv e .32 B ut fe a rs of a C o m m u n is t d ic ta to rs h ip o u tw e ig h e d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t th e rig h tis t re g im e . M acV eag h s tr e s s e d th a t th e E A M w a s " u n d e r M o s c o w -tra in e d a n d d ire c te d le a d e rs h ip " a n d c o u ld c o u n t o n h e lp fro m G re e c e 's S o v ie t-d o m in a te d n o r th e r n n e ig h b o rs . A n e co n o m ic c o llap se, h e p re d ic te d , w o u ld p ro b a ­ b ly le a d to a g o v e rn m e n t o f th e e x tre m e R ig h t a n d th e n to th e se iz u re of p o w e r b y th e E A M .33 S u c h c o n c e rn s , h o w ev er, d id n o t b e co m e a c u te u n til th e civil w a r r e s u m e d in e a r n e s t in th e la s t s u m m e r of 1946. D e s p ite th e a la rm o v e r C o m m u n is t p r e s s u r e s o n G re e c e , Turkey, a n d Ira n , A m e ric a n fin a n c ia l a s s is ta n c e to th o se c o u n trie s d u rin g th e first y e a r o f p e a c e w a s e x tre m e ly m o d e s t. G re e c e re c e iv e d o n ly a $10 m illio n s u r p lu s - p r o p e r ty c re d it in a d d itio n to th e $25 m illio n E x p o rtI m p o rt B a n k lo a n ; T urkey re c e iv e d ju s t $38 m illio n in lo a n s a n d c re d its; a n d Ira n g o t n o th in g a t a ll.34 O n se v e ra l o c c a sio n s, H e n d e rs o n a p p e a le d fo r th e e x e rtio n of A m e ric a n e co n o m ic p o w e r in th e N e a r E ast, b u t to n o avail. In O c to b e r 1945 h e a d v o c a te d th e c re a tio n of a $100 m illio n f u n d fro m w h ic h lo a n s c o u ld b e m a d e to N e a r E a s te rn c o u n trie s a t th e d is c re tio n o f th e p r e s id e n t. In J u n e 1946 h e re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e E x p o rt-Im p o rt B a n k e a rm a rk $120 m illio n fo r th o se n a tio n s . B y rn e s, d o u b tin g th a t C o n g re s s w o u ld a p p ro v e , re je c te d th e first s u g ­ g e s tio n . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's fin a n c ia l o fficers o p p o s e d th e s e c o n d p r o p o s a l o n th e g r o u n d s th a t E x p o rt-Im p o rt B a n k lo a n s s h o u ld p r o ­ m o te e co n o m ic reco v ery , n o t A m e ric a n p o litica l o b je c tiv e s .35 A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e to th e a rm e d fo rc e s of N e a r E a s te rn n a tio n s w a s a lso q u ite lim ite d . O n ly Ira n re c e iv e d h e lp fro m A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v is e rs . Two a d v is o ry m is s io n s —o n e c o m m a n d e d b y G e n e ra l C la r­ e n c e S. R id le y to a s s is t th e arm y, th e o th e r h e a d e d b y C o lo n e l N o rm a n H . S c h w a rz k o p f to tra in th e g e n d a rm e rie —h a d b e e n e s ta b lis h e d in 1942 a t th e r e q u e s t of th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n t. T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h o p e d th a t th e s e m is s io n s w o u ld s tr e n g th e n Ira n 's in te rn a l security, c o u n te ra c t " p ro -A x is fe e lin g ," a n d b u ild " a firm fo u n d a tio n fo r fu tu re re la tio n s ." In p u r s u in g th e s e g o a ls, h o w ev er, R id ley a n d S c h w a rz k o p f e n c o u n te r e d p e r s is te n t o b sta c le s, in c lu d in g s h o rta g e s of tra in in g s u p ­ p lie s a n d p o litica l in te rfe re n c e in a rm y a n d g e n d a rm e rie re fo rm s. By m id -1 944 R id le y d o u b te d th a t h is m is s io n c o u ld c o n tin u e to b e effective

98 • Arming the Free World a n d re c o m m e n d e d its recall. B ut th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p re v a ile d u p o n th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t to m a in ta in b o th th e R id le y a n d S c h w a rz k o p f a d v is o ry g r o u p s th r o u g h th e e n d of W o rld W ar II a n d in d e fin ite ly a fte rw a rd . B o th m is s io n s , B y rn e s e x p la in e d , h e lp e d b o ls te r th e a u th o r­ ity of th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t, c h ec k S o v iet in flu e n c e , a n d p ro te c t A m e ric a n in te r e s ts in I r a n .36 E v e n m o re lim ite d th a n tr a in in g a s s is ta n c e w a s a rm s a id . In d e e d , th e U n ite d S ta te s p ro v id e d o n ly n e g lig ib le q u a n titie s of m ilita ry e q u ip ­ m e n t to Ira n , G re e c e , a n d T urkey d u r in g th e first y e a r of p e a c e . T he g u id e lin e s th a t B y rn e s's S taff C o m m itte e e s ta b lis h e d in F e b ru a ry 1946 fo r th e sale of s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts p re c lu d e d all b u t to k e n tra n s fe rs to N e a r E a s te rn c o u n trie s . A lth o u g h th e S ta te -W a r-N a v y C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e e n d o rs e d a le ss re s tric tiv e p o licy o n e m o n th later, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t g u id e lin e s p re v a ile d in p ra c tic e . E v e n d u rin g th e c o n fro n ­ ta tio n o v e r th e re m o v a l of S o v iet tro o p s , th e S taff C o m m itte e r e fu s e d to e a se th e r e s tra in ts o n th e tra n s fe r of a rm s to Ira n . B y rn e s re p lie d to R id ley 's in fo rm a l in q u ir y of 12 M a rc h a b o u t th e p o s s ib ility of Ira n 's p u r c h a s in g ta n k s , m a c h in e g u n s , a n d o th e r in te rn a l se c u rity e q u ip ­ m e n t b y s ta tin g th a t c u r r e n t p o licy b a r r e d s u c h tra n s a c tio n s . W h e n T u rk ish officials a s k e d a b o u t fig h te r a n d b o m b e r a irc raft th e fo llo w in g July, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t r e fu s e d to a u th o riz e th e ir sale. A lth o u g h th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d d e c id e d to s ta n d firm a g a in s t S o v iet e x p a n ­ sio n in th e N e a r E ast, it re lie d m a in ly o n d ip lo m a tic a n d lim ite d e co n o m ic m e a s u re s to im p le m e n t th a t policy.37

R i s i n g a p p re h e n s io n s o v e r S o v iet a m b itio n s in th e N e a r E a st d u rin g th e la s t h a lf of 1946 le d to th e re fo rm u la tio n of A m e ric a n a rm s policy. T h e c a ta ly st fo r c h a n g e w a s a S o v iet n o te o n 7 A u g u s t 1946 p ro p o s in g re v is io n of th e M o n tre u x C o n v e n tio n . T h e S o v ie ts a d v o c a te d a n e w re g im e fo r th e T u rk ish s tra its lim ite d to th e B lack S e a p o w e rs , a n d jo in t R u sso -T u rk ish d e fe n s e of th e s tra its . T u rk ish officials fo u n d th e s e te rm s u n a c c e p ta b le a n d lo o k e d to th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r s u p p o r t. B ecause th e re w a s n o explicit d e m a n d fo r b a s e s o n T u rk ish soil, h o w ev er. F o re ig n M in is te r H a s a n S a k a a c tu a lly b re a th e d a sig h of relief a fte r re a d in g th e R u s s ia n d é m a rc h e . N o t so A m b a s s a d o r W ilso n . T h e S oviet in itia tiv e , h e c a b le d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, w a s a th in ly d is g u is e d a tte m p t to u s e th e s tra its q u e s tio n to re m o v e th e la st o b sta cle to S o v iet p e n e tr a tio n o f th e N e a r E ast. A c c o rd in g to W ilso n , th e U n ite d S ta te s

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 99 fa c e d th e ch o ice of p ro te c tin g a v ita l in te r e s t—T u rk ish in d e p e n d e n c e — o r a c q u ie s c in g in th e " c lo s in g [of the] o n e re m a in in g g a p in [the] c h a in [of] S o v iet sa te llite s ta te s fro m [the] Baltic to [the] B lack S e a ." 38 Top officials in W a s h in g to n a g re e d . In d e e d , a crisis a tm o s p h e re e n v e lo p e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e P e n ta g o n as d ip lo m a tic a n d d e fe n s e a u th o ritie s a s s e s s e d th e S o v iet d é m a rc h e . A m e m o ra n d u m p r e p a r e d in N E A e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e S o v iet p ro p o s a ls w o u ld exclude W e ste rn n a tio n s fro m c o n tro l of th e stra its a n d re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o n tin u e to in s is t o n re v is io n of th e M o n tre u x C o n v e n ­ tio n u n d e r th e a eg is of th e U n ite d N a tio n s . M ilita ry a u th o ritie s p o in te d o u t th a t effectiv e d e fe n s e o f th e s tra its r e q u ire d c o n tro l o f th e ir a p p ro a c h e s fo r se v e ra l h u n d r e d m ile s. "T h e sa m e logic w h ic h w o u ld ju s tify S o v iet p a rtic ip a tio n in th e d e fe n se of th e D a rd a n e lle s, " th e Jo in t C h ie fs r e a s o n e d , " w o u ld a lso te n d to ju s tify f u r th e r S o v iet m ilita ry p e n e tr a tio n th r o u g h th e A e g e a n ." 39 S u c h e x tra p o la tio n tra n s fo rm e d th e S o v iet n o te fro m a d ip lo m a tic in itia tiv e in a c c o rd w ith th e P o tsd a m a g re e m e n ts in to a b id to d o m in a te th e N e a r E a st a n d E a s te rn M e d ­ ite r r a n e a n .40 A t a W h ite H o u s e m e e tin g o n 15 A u g u s t, T ru m a n h e a rd th is a la rm ­ ist a n a ly s is fro m h is to p a d v is e rs. A c h e so n , F o rre sta l, a n d S e c re ta ry of W ar R o b e rt P. P a tte rs o n fo re s a w th e in e x o ra b le g ro w th of S oviet p o w e r—a d e c a d e la te r th is o u tlo o k w o u ld b e c a lle d th e " d o m in o th e ­ o r y " —s h o u ld th e T urks a cced e to th e S o v iet p ro p o s a ls . " In o u r o p in ­ io n , " th e y w ro te , " th e e s ta b lis h m e n t b y th e S o v iet U n io n of b a s e s in th e D a rd a n e lle s o r th e in tro d u c tio n of S o v iet a rm e d fo rc e s in to T urkey o n so m e o th e r p re te x t w o u ld , in th e n a tu ra l c o u rs e of e v e n ts , r e s u lts [sic] in G re e c e a n d th e w h o le N e a r a n d M id d le E a s t . . . fallin g u n d e r S oviet c o n tro l a n d in th o s e a re a s b e in g c u t off fro m th e W e ste rn w o rld ." H e g e m o n y in th e M id d le E ast, in tu r n , w o u ld g iv e th e S o v iets c o n tro l o v e r th e re g io n 's oil re s o u rc e s a n d e n a b le th e m to s e v e r B ritish im p e ria l c o m m u n ic a tio n s . T h e S o v ie ts, th e n , w o u ld b e in a fa r b e tte r p o s itio n to a tta in th e ir g o a ls in In d ia a n d C h in a . A c c o rd in g to s u c h c o n c a te n a te d re a s o n in g , th e n , a t sta k e in T urkey w a s c o n tro l of n o th in g le ss th a n th e e n tire A s ia n m a in la n d . N e v e r b e fo re h a d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n s e e n s u c h e n o rm o u s sta k e s , h o w e v e r e x a g g e ra te d , rid in g o n a sin g le d e c is io n .41 T ru m a n 's a d v is e rs th o u g h t th a t d ip lo m a c y w a s all b u t u se le s s. T hey r e m e m b e r e d o n ly th e fu tility of p re v io u s n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e S oviets, w h ic h , th e y in s is te d , in v a ria b ly e n d e d in A m e ric a n c a p itu la tio n . T he

100 • Arming the Free World r e a s o n fo r th is s u p p o s e d o n e -s id e d n e s s w a s th a t th e S o v iets w e re im m u n e to p e r s u a s io n a n d u n w illin g to c o m p ro m ise . W h a t d ip lo m a ­ cy c o u ld n o t a c c o m p lish , h o w ev er, firm n e s s c o u ld —a c c o rd in g to A c h e s o n , F o rre sta l, a n d P a tte rs o n . T h e o n ly th in g th a t w o u ld p r e v e n t th e S o v ie ts fro m p r e s s in g th e ir d e m a n d s u p o n Turkey, th e th r e e se c re ­ ta rie s to ld T ru m a n , w o u ld b e a n a w a re n e s s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s " p r e p a r e d , if n e c e ssa ry , to m e e t a g g re s s io n w ith fo rce of a rm s ." V iew ­ in g th e T u rk ish q u e s tio n in a g lo b al c o n te x t, th e th r e e s e c re ta rie s m a in ta in e d th a t " th e tim e h a s com e w h e n w e m u s t d e c id e th a t w e sh a ll re s is t w ith all m e a n s a t o u r d is p o s a l a n y S o v iet a g g re s s io n a n d in p a rtic u la r . . . a n y S o v iet a g g re s s io n a g a in s t T urkey."42 T ru m a n w h o le ­ h e a rte d ly a g re e d . O n ly a few w e e k s e a rlie r h e h a d to ld W h ite H o u s e a id e s C la rk M . C liffo rd a n d G e o rg e M . E lsey th a t h e w a s " tire d of . . . b e in g p u s h e d a ro u n d " a n d p r e p a r e d to ta k e a s tr o n g s ta n d a g a in s t f u r th e r S o v iet " c h is e lin g ." T ru m a n th u s re s o lv e d to follow th e re c o m ­ m e n d a tio n s of h is a d v is e rs o n T urkey " to th e e n d ," a n d d e c la re d " th a t w e m ig h t as w ell fin d o u t w h e th e r th e R u s s ia n s w e re b e n t o n w o rld c o n q u e s t n o w as in five o r te n y e a rs ." 43 T ru m a n v a s tly e x a g g e ra te d th e d a n g e r of w ar. A t th e b e g in n in g of th e s tra its crisis, S ta lin a s s e r te d th a t h e h a d n o in te n tio n of u s in g fo rce to g a in S o v iet o b je c tiv e s in Turkey, a n d a n a ly s e s b y th e C e n tra l In te l­ lig e n c e G ro u p (C IG ) c o n firm e d th o s e a s s e rtio n s . C IG D ire c to r H o y t S. V a n d e n b e rg in fo rm e d T ru m a n o n 24 A u g u s t th a t th e S o v iets h a d n o t p o s itio n e d th e ir tr o o p s to strik e a g a in s t Turkey, b u t in s te a d h a d slig h tly s p e e d e d u p th e ir d e m o b iliz a tio n p ro g ra m . O n b a la n c e , V a n d e n b e rg c o n c lu d e d , th e S o v ie ts w e re c o n d u c tin g " a n in te n s iv e w a r of n e rv e s ," p ro b a b ly to " te s t U .S . d e te rm in a tio n to . . . s u s ta in its c o m m itm e n ts in E u ro p e a n affairs." T h e S o v ie ts still s h o w e d n o in c lin a tio n to w a rd m ili­ ta r y a c tio n a fte r th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d T urkey re je c te d th e ir p ro p o s a ls fo r d e fe n se of th e s tra its . A n o th e r e x c h a n g e of n o te s fo llo w ed , b u t S o v iet p r e s s u r e fo r re v is io n of th e M o n tre u x C o n v e n tio n s u b s id e d b y late O c to b e r.44 T h e o n ly sig n ific a n t d e p lo y m e n t of fo rce d u rin g th e s tra its crisis c a m e n o t th r o u g h S o v iet a c tio n b u t th r o u g h A m e ric a n d is p a tc h of a n a v a l ta s k fo rce to th e E a s te rn M e d ite r r a n e a n .45 T h e d is p u te o v e r th e s tra its , ho w ev er, m a d e a la s tin g im p re s s io n o n A m e ric a n a rm s policy. A t th e h e ig h t of th e crisis o n 23 A u g u s t, th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff re c o m m e n d e d th e sale of d e fe n siv e a rm a m e n ts to T ur­ key. T h ey c o n s id e re d T urkey " th e m o s t im p o r ta n t m ilita ry fa c to r" in th e N e a r E a st b e c a u se o f its stra te g ic lo c a tio n a n d its a p p a r e n t d é te rm in a -

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 101 tio n to fig h t, if n e c e ssa ry , to p re s e rv e its in d e p e n d e n c e . P ro p e rly e q u ip p e d , th e T u rk ish a rm y c o u ld m o u n t s tro n g re s is ta n c e a g a in s t a R u s s ia n a tta c k . E v e n m o re im p o r ta n t in th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' view , th e e x te n s io n of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id w o u ld stiffe n T urkey's w ill a n d p r e v e n t its y ie ld in g to S o v iet d e m a n d s . In a d d itio n , A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e to T urkey w o u ld in d ire c tly fo rtify o th e r n a tio n s o n th e p e rip h e r y of S o v iet p o w er. In th e s h o rt r u n at lea st, th e Jo in t C h ie fs a d v o c a te d th e tra n s fe r of a rm a m e n ts to T urkey la rg e ly to a ch iev e th e p o litica l g o a ls of r e a s s u r in g frie n d ly n a tio n s a n d s tre n g th e n in g A m e ri­ c a n c re d ib ility .46 F or sim ila r re a s o n s , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t n o w b e g a n to re v e rse its s ta n d o n th e sale of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to Turkey. In a le tte r to B y rn es, w h o w a s a tte n d in g th e P aris P eace C o n fe re n c e , A c tin g S e c re ta ry W illiam L. C la y to n e x p la in e d th a t th e S o v iet U n io n 's p e rs is te n t e ffo rts d u rin g th e p re v io u s six m o n th s to u n d e rm in e th e sta b ility a n d g a in c o n tro l of Turkey, G re e c e , a n d Ira n w e re re s p o n s ib le fo r th e c h a n g e in th e d e p a r tm e n t's th in k in g . H e w a rn e d th a t th e re fu s a l to p ro v id e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to th o s e c o u n trie s w o u ld c re a te th e im p re s s io n th a t th e U n ite d S th te s d id n o t h a v e a d e e p in te r e s t in th e p re s e rv a tio n of th e ir in d e p e n d e n c e a n d th e re b y w e a k e n th e ir re so lv e to re s is t S oviet p r e s s u r e s . C la y to n p r o p o s e d " in th e lig h t of th e D a rd a n e lle s d e cisio n " th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a lte r its p o licy to allo w th e tra n s fe r of a rm a m e n ts to c o u n trie s , " th e m a in te n a n c e a n d in te g rity of w h ic h a re c o n s id e re d to b e o f im p o r ta n t in te re s t to th e U n ite d S ta te s ." 47 B y rn e s, to o , b e lie v e d th a t a s s is ta n c e to c o u n trie s fac in g S oviet th r e a ts w a s a h ig h ly im p o r ta n t m a tte r. "T h e w o rld is w a tc h in g th e s u p p o r t . . . w h ic h w e fu r n is h o u r f rie n d s a t th is critical tim e ," h e w ro te to C la y to n fro m P aris, " a n d th e f u tu r e p o licies of m a n y c o u n trie s w ill b e d e te r m in e d b y th e ir e s tim a te of th e s e rio u s n e s s . . . w ith w h ic h th e U S u p h o ld s its p rin c ip le s a n d s u p p o r ts th o se of like m in d ." 48 B y rn e s a n d B ritish F o re ig n M in is te r E rn e s t K. B e v in a g re e d , h ow ever, th a t G re a t B rita in s h o u ld p ro v id e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to G re e c e a n d T urkey w h ile th e U n ite d S ta te s re n d e r e d all feasib le eco n o m ic a s s is ta n c e . P a tte rs o n , w h o h a d o rig in a lly fa v o re d d ire c t a rm s sales to T urkey b u t h a d c h a n g e d h is m in d , p o in te d o u t th a t th is a rra n g e m e n t w o u ld b e le ss p ro v o c a tiv e b e c a u se of B ritain 's lo n g -s ta n d in g in te re s ts in th o s e tw o c o u n trie s . S om e o f T ru m a n 's a d v is e rs also b e lie v e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld tr y to b u ild p u b lic s u p p o r t b e fo re it u n d e rto o k a d e e p e r c o m m itm e n t in G re e c e a n d Turkey.49

102 • Arming the Free World A lth o u g h th e y w a n te d to a v o id p ro v o c a tiv e a c tio n s, to p p o licy ­ m a k e rs w e re c o n v in c e d of th e n e e d fo r s tro n g e r m e a s u re s to sto p S o v iet e x p a n s io n . A lo n g r e p o r t o n S o v ie t-A m e ric a n re la tio n s , w h ic h W h ite H o u s e c o u n se l C la rk M . C liffo rd c o m p le te d in S e p te m b e r, re fle c te d th e o u tlo o k of m o s t of T ru m a n 's p rin c ip a l a d v is e rs .50 "T h e la n g u a g e of m ilita ry p o w e r," C liffo rd w ro te , "is th e o n ly la n g u a g e w h ic h d isc ip le s of p o w e r p o litics [i.e., th e S o v iet U n io n ] u n d e rs ta n d ." H e th e re fo re re c o m m e n d e d m a in ta in in g m ilita ry p o w e r su ffic ie n t to d e te r S o v iet a tta c k o n a re a s v ita l to A m e ric a n s e c u rity a n d p ro v id in g s u p p o r t to "all d e m o c ra tic c o u n trie s w h ic h a re in a n y w a y m e n a c e d o r e n d a n g e r e d b y th e U .S .S .R ." 51 C liffo rd 's p ro p o s a ls w e n t b e y o n d B y rn es's c o n c e p t of " p a tie n c e w ith firm n e s s ," b y w h ic h th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te m e a n t re fu s in g to m a k e c o n c e s s io n s in n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e S o v iet U n io n . C liffo rd e x p re s s e d th e view , w h ic h b e g a n to p re v a il in d is c u s s io n s of N e a r E a s te rn p o licy in th e la te s u m m e r of 1946, th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld d ra w fa r m o re h e av ily o n its e co n o m ic a n d m ili­ ta r y re s o u rc e s to p ro te c t its in te re s ts a b ro a d .52 T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t to o k a n im p o r ta n t s te p in th a t d ire c tio n w h e n it c o m p le te d th e re v ie w of its a rm a m e n ts p o licy a t th e e n d of O c to b er. R a th e r th a n e s ta b lis h in g n e w g e n e ra l g u id e lin e s , B y rn es's a d v is e rs re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te h a v e th e p o w e r to " d e p a r t fro m th e e x istin g p o licy w h e n it w a s clearly in th e in te re s t of th e U n ite d S ta te s to d o s o ." 53 F o llo w in g h is r e tu r n fro m P aris in m id O c to b er, B y rn e s e x e rc ise d th is a u th o rity fo r th e first tim e . A c c o rd in g to th e a g re e m e n t w ith B evin, th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld fu r n is h B ritain , fo r tra n s fe r to G re e c e a n d Turkey, a n y a rm s th a t B rita in c o u ld n o t p ro v id e th o se tw o c o u n trie s fro m its o w n in v e n to rie s . F or Ira n , w h o se le a d e rs w e re d e e p ly s u s p ic io u s of a n y e x p a n s io n of B ritish in flu e n c e , B y rn es a p p ro v e d d ire c t m ilita ry a id in th e fo rm of a $10 m illio n c re d it fo r th e p u rc h a s e of s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts . T h ese c h a n g e s in p o licy in d ic a te d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's n e w w illin g n e s s to u s e m ilita ry a id to c o n ta in S o v iet e x p a n s io n .54 T h e d e c isio n to p ro v id e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to Ira n clearly illu s tra te d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's s h ift to w a rd a to u g h e r p o licy in th e N e a r E ast. In th e p re c e d in g m o n th s , th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d p ro v id e d little a id to th e b e le a g u e re d g o v e rn m e n t in T eh ra n . A n a u to n o m o u s re g im e in A z e rb a ija n , w h ic h re m a in e d in p o w e r a fte r th e e v a c u a tio n of S o v iet tro o p s , p o s e d a m a jo r c h a lle n g e to T eh ran 's au th o rity . L a b o r strife e x p lo ite d b y th e S o v ie t-b a c k e d T udeh p a rty a n d a rev o lt of s o u th e rn

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 103 trib e s a d d e d to th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t's p ro b le m s . Ira n ia n P rim e M in ­ is te r A h m a d Q a v a m h a d b e e n u n d e r s tro n g p r e s s u r e fro m th e n e w A m e ric a n a m b a ss a d o r, G e o rg e V. A llen , to a b a n d o n h is c o n c ilia to ry p o licy to w a rd th e A z e rb a ija n i s e p a ra tis ts a n d to e x p el th e T udeh m in is ­ te rs fro m h is c a b in e t. B ut A lle n h a d little to o ffer Q a v a m b e y o n d d ip lo m a tic s u p p o r t. A p o licy s ta te m e n t d ra fte d in th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t o n 15 Ju ly r u le d o u t lo a n s to Ira n th a t w o u ld b e u s e d fo r p o litical p u r p o s e s a n d re s tric te d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to m a in ta in in g a d v is o ry m is s io n s to th e a rm y a n d g e n d a rm e rie a n d h e lp in g th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn ­ m e n t o b ta in e s s e n tia l n o n c o m b a t e q u ip m e n t. In e a rly S e p te m b e r th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's Policy C o m m itte e o n A rm s a n d A rm a m e n ts (PC A ) re fu s e d to p e rm it sa le s of c o m b a t m a te rie l to Ira n to h e lp m a in ta in in te rn a l s e c u rity b e c a u se s u c h tra n s a c tio n s w e re at o d d s w ith c u rr e n t p o licy .55 B ut se v e ra l w e e k s later, in th e a fte rm a th of th e T u rk ish s tra its crisis, th e re w a s s tr o n g s u p p o r t w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n fo r liftin g th e se re s tra in ts . W h e n Q a v a m a s k e d A lle n o n 30 S e p te m b e r fo r A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s a n d fin a n c ia l c re d its , officials in N E A u r g e d a p p ro v a l of h is r e q u e s t. "W e feel th a t Q a v a m is m a k in g c o n c e s s io n a fte r c o n c e s­ s io n to th e R u s s ia n s , " H e n d e rs o n w ro te to A c h e s o n o n 8 O c to b er, " a n d th a t o n e r e a s o n fo r h is c o u rse of a c tio n is o u r in a b ility to tak e c o n c re te s te p s to a s s is t Ira n e co n o m ic a lly o r p olitically ."56 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff a lso re c o m m e n d e d th e p ro v is io n of lim ite d m ilita ry a id to Ira n . "It is . . . to th e stra te g ic in te r e s t of th e U n ite d S ta te s ," th e y a d v is e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, " to k e e p S o v iet in flu e n c e a n d S o v iet a rm e d fo rce s re m o v e d as fa r as p o s s ib le fro m oil re s o u rc e s in Ira n , Iraq , a n d th e N e a r a n d M id d le E ast." M ilita ry a id to Ira n w o u ld a d v a n c e th is in te re s t b y s tr e n g th e n in g th e g o v e rn m e n t in T eh ra n a n d c re a tin g g o o d w ill to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s .57 A c a b in e t crisis in m id -O c to b e r in c re a s e d th e p r e s s u r e to e ase re s tric tio n s o n A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs to Ira n . A lle n u s e d h is skill in p a la c e in trig u e a n d h is in flu e n c e w ith th e S h a h —h is d o u b le s p a r tn e r in te n n is —to fo rce Q a v a m to d is m is s th e T udeh m e m b e rs of th e C a b in e t. " It w o u ld b e m o s t h e lp fu l a t th is ju n c tu r e , w h e n [the] Ira n ia n G o v e rn ­ m e n t h a s m a d e [a] g e s tu re of in d e p e n d e n c e fro m fo re ig n d o m in a tio n b y e lim in a tin g m e m b e rs of [the] C a b in e t w h o w e re u n d e r fo re ig n c o n tro l," A lle n im p lo re d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, "if I c o u ld b e a u th o ­ riz e d to offer so m e e n c o u ra g e m e n t o n [the] su b je c t of c re d its ." O fficials in N E A e c h o e d A llen 's p le a . H e n d e rs o n in fo rm e d A c h e so n th a t th e

104 • Arming the Free World T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o u ld n o lo n g e r d e la y a n s w e rin g Q a v a m 's r e q u e s t fo r m ilita ry a id . W ith o u t " c o n c re te acts" th a t d e m o n s tr a te d se rio u s A m e ric a n in te re s t, H e n d e rs o n a rg u e d , " th e Ira n ia n G o v e rn ­ m e n t a n d p e o p le w ill e v e n tu a lly b e co m e so d is c o u ra g e d th a t th e y w ill n o lo n g e r b e ab le to re s is t S o v iet p re s s u re ." A d d e d to th e u rg e n c y of th e s e w a rn in g s w a s a s u s p ic io n th a t th e Ira n ia n s w e re p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t S o v iet m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t in r e p a y m e n t fo r a w a rtim e d e b t.58 B y rn e s a c c e p te d th e re c o m m e n d a tio n s of h is a d v is e rs a n d o n 29 O c to b e r a u th o riz e d th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry a id to Ira n fo r th e p u r p o s e of p ro te c tin g th a t n a tio n 's in te rn a l secu rity . B o lste re d b y th is e x p re s s io n of A m e ric a n s u p p o r t, Q a v a m d e c id e d to s e n d tro o p s in to A z e rb a ija n . D e sp ite b lu n t w a rn in g s fro m th e S o v iet U n io n th a t it c o u ld n o t re m a in in d iffe re n t to m ilita ry a c tio n so clo se to its b o rd e rs , Q a v a m , w ith A llen 's e n c o u ra g e m e n t, re f u s e d to c an c el h is o rd e rs . T h e re s u lt w a s a n a s to n is h in g ly e a s y v ic to ry fo r th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t: th e s e p a ra tis t re g im e c o lla p s e d w ith in h o u rs a fte r Ira n ia n tr o o p s e n te r e d A z e rb a ija n o n 11 D e ce m b er. T h e S o v iets, th e ir th r e a ts n o tw ith s ta n d ­ in g , d id n o t in te r v e n e .59 T h e p ro m is e of m ilita ry a id —A m e ric a n a rm s a c tu a lly d id n o t re a c h Ira n fo r m o re t h a n tw o y e a rs —h e lp e d b rin g th e U n ite d S ta te s a n im p o r ta n t d ip lo m a tic su c c e ss th a t re in fo rc e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p re fe re n c e fo r s tr o n g e r m e a s u re s to c o n ta in th e S o v iet U n io n .60 T h e p o licy of in d ire c t a id to T urkey y ie ld e d less sa tis fa c to ry re s u lts . By a s s is tin g th e T urks in th is m a n n e r, A c h e s o n e x p la in e d to W ilso n , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h o p e d to a ch ie v e c o n flic tin g g o a ls. T h e a im of in d i­ re c t a id w a s to sile n c e critics w h o c h a rg e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s " fa n n in g th e e m b e rs of a p o ss ib le S o v iet-T u rk ish w a r" w h ile r e a s s u rin g th e T urks th a t A m e ric a n s u p p o r t w a s n o t " lim ite d to w o rd s ." T h e la tte r g o a l w a s critical sin c e th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b e lie v e d th a t T urkey w a s " th e s to p p e r in th e n e c k of th e b o ttle th r o u g h w h ic h S o v iet p o litical a n d m ilita ry in flu e n c e c o u ld m o s t e ffectiv ely flo w in to th e e a s te r n M e d ite r­ r a n e a n a n d M id d le E ast." A n y w e a k e n in g of T u rk ish re s is ta n c e m ig h t le a d to a ro w o f fa llin g d o m in o e s th a t c o u ld se rio u sly w e a k e n A m e ric a n se c u rity .61 N o n e th e le s s , d iffic u lties im p e d e d th e tra n s fe r of a rm a m e n ts to T urkey fro m B ritish a n d A m e ric a n so u rc e s . In e a rly N o v e m b e r th e T u rk ish g o v e rn m e n t in q u ir e d a b o u t c re d its fo r m o d e rn iz in g se v e ra l of its w a rs h ip s , p u r c h a s in g A m e ric a n frig a te s, a n d c o m p le tin g c o n s tru c ­ tio n o f a n a v a l y a rd . E a g e r to re d u c e B ritish e x p e n d itu re s in th e N e a r

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 105 E ast, B e v in e n c o u ra g e d B y rn e s to a ssist th e T urks. B ut A m e ric a n offi­ cials h e s ita te d . M ilita ry a n d n a v al officers q u e s tio n e d w h e th e r su c h a id w o u ld sig n ific a n tly s tr e n g th e n T urkey's d e fe n se s a g a in s t a S o v iet a ttac k . Political officials d o u b te d th a t th e T u rk ish g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld a ffo rd to g o in to d e b t fo r n a v a l a rm a m e n ts sin c e it w a s a lre a d y e x p e ri­ e n c in g so m e fin a n c ia l d iffic u lty in m a in ta in in g its la rg e m ilita ry e s ta b ­ lis h m e n t. W ilso n r e p o r te d fro m A n k a ra th a t T urkey's re q u e s ts fo r a s s is ta n c e re fle c te d a lack of p la n n in g , a n d s u g g e s te d a s u rv e y of th e c o u n try 's e co n o m ic a n d d e fe n se r e q u ire m e n ts . In N o v e m b e r a S ta te W ar-N a v y w o rk in g g r o u p e n d o rs e d th is p r o p o s a l.62 O n 10 J a n u a ry 1947, h o w ev er, B y rn e s in fo rm e d W ilso n th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d d e c id e d n o t to s e n d th e s u rv e y m is sio n . T he E x p o rt-Im p o rt B a n k la c k e d f u n d s fo r a n e w lo a n to Turkey, a n d B y rn es w a s a fra id th a t a n official A m e ric a n m is s io n w o u ld ra ise h o p e s fo r im m e d ia te a s s is ta n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld b e u n a b le to fulfill. A fte r re c e iv in g th is n e w s , W ilso n u r g e d d ire c t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id to Turkey. H e h a d n o t y e t in fo rm e d th e T urks o f th e B y rn e s-B ev in a g re e ­ m e n t a n d fe a re d th a t A m e ric a n in a b ility to p ro v id e e co n o m ic a id , a n d re lu c ta n c e to f u r n is h m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e , w o u ld d isc o u ra g e T u rk ish le a d e rs . H e a lso a rg u e d , a s d id a few m ilita ry a n d n a v al officers, th a t th e d ire c t s u p p ly of a rm s to T urkey w o u ld m a k e a s tr o n g e r im p re s s io n in M oscow . O n 20 J a n u a ry B y rn e s r e p lie d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s re c o n s id e rin g its a rm s p o licy to w a rd Turkey.63 A d m in is tra tio n officials w e re e v e n m o re c o n c e rn e d a b o u t p ro v id ­ in g effectiv e a id to G re e c e , a n a tio n in w h ic h a n o th e r r o u n d of civil w a r b e g a n in late 1946. T h e e sc a la tio n of th e fig h tin g b e tw e e n le ftist g u e r ­ rillas a n d g o v e rn m e n t fo rc e s c o in c id e d w ith a p le b isc ite o n 1 S e p ­ te m b e r th a t r e s to re d th e G re e k m o n a rc h y . C o n trib u tin g fa r m o re to th e v io le n c e w a s th e in e ffic ie n c y a n d r e p r e s s io n of G re e c e 's rig h t-w in g g o v e rn m e n t. D e s p ite e x te n siv e B ritish a id , th e G re e k e c o n o m y re m a in e d in a s h a m b le s . A c c o rd in g to th e c h ie f of th e B ritish e co n o m ic m is s io n , th e s ta te of th e G re e k e c o n o m y w a s la rg e ly d u e to th e g o v e rn ­ m e n t's " w e ll-k n o w n p r o p e n s ity to d o n o th in g ." F ar m o re e n e rg e tic w e re th e g o v e rn m e n t's e ffo rts to s u p p r e s s its le ftist o p p o n e n ts th ro u g h m a s s a rre s ts , s u m m a r y ju stic e , a n d th e in c a rc e ra tio n of th e w iv e s a n d c h ild re n of fu g itiv e s . A m b a s s a d o r M acV eag h c o m p la in e d to K in g G e o rg e II th a t to le ra tio n of p o litica l d is s e n t a n d re s p e c t fo r civil lib e r­ tie s w o u ld re d u c e th e s tr e n g th of th e g u e rrilla s b y at le a st 70 p e rc e n t. B ut M acV eagh's p le a s fo r m o d e ra tio n b ro u g h t o n ly in effectiv e g e s tu re s

106 • Arming the Free World to w a rd re c o n c ilia tio n . A n d d e s p ite th e d is m is s a l in N o v e m b e r 1946 of th e o d io u s D e fe n se M in is te r P e tro s M a v ro m ic h a lis, w h o h e lp e d fin a n c e ro y alist v ig ila n te s , a n d th e re s h u fflin g of c a b in e t m in is trie s in J a n u a ry 1947, th e R ig h t r e m a in e d firm ly in c o n tro l of th e g o v e rn m e n t. E v e n th e C IG c o n c lu d e d th a t th e in tra n s ig e n c e , in to le ra n c e , a n d in e rtia of th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t w e re m a jo r r e a s o n s fo r th e re n e w a l of civil w a r.64 W h ile d e p lo rin g th e excesses of th e rig h tist re g im e , th e T ru m an a d m in is tra tio n w o rrie d m o re a b o u t th e g ro w th of Soviet in flu e n c e in G re ec e. T he KKE le d th e in s u rg e n c y a n d re c e iv e d h e lp fro m G reece's n o rth e rn n e ig h b o rs . T he b e s t e v id e n c e in d ic a te s th a t S ta lin n e ith e r in stig a te d th e fig h tin g n o r a id e d th e re b e ls .65 B ut S ta te , War, a n d N a v y officials, b e lie v in g in m o n o lith ic c o m m u n ism , c o u ld n o t con ceiv e of in te rn a tio n a l a ctio n b y Y ugoslavia, B ulgaria, o r A lb a n ia in d e p e n d e n t of Soviet d ire c tio n . H e n c e th e y in s is te d th a t M o sco w w as d e e p ly in v o lv ed in th e G re e k civil war, to th e p o in t, as o n e a rm y p la n n e r w ro te , of "g iv in g d ire c t m ilita ry a ssista n c e to e le m e n ts se e k in g to cau se th e fall of th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t." 66 M acV eagh also c o n c lu d e d th a t th e "S oviet G o v e rn m e n t in [the] fin al a n a ly sis m u s t b e 'a s s ig n e d re s p o n sib ility fo r [the] c o n tin u e d s trife / "67 A s ta te m e n t of p olicy p r e p a re d in N E A a n d a p p ro v e d b y B y rn es at th e e n d of O c to b e r d e sc rib e d G re ec e as a p iv o tal n a tio n in th e stru g g le to c o n ta in Soviet in flu e n c e . "If G re ec e w e re allo w ed to fall v ictim to Soviet a g g re s s io n ," th e m e m o ra n d u m w a rn e d , " th e re c o u ld n o t fail to b e th e m o st u n fa v o ra b le re p e rc u s s io n s in all of th o se a re a s w h e re political sy m p a th ie s a re b a la n c e d p re c a rio u sly in favor of th e W est a n d a g a in st Soviet c o m m u n ism ." T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o n sid e re d G re ec e im p o rta n t less for its in trin sic v a lu e th a n fo r th e effect its co llapse m ig h t h a v e o n W este rn E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E a s t.68 D e te rm in e d to a rre s t th e s p r e a d of S o v iet in flu e n c e , B y rn es, in th e a fte rm a th of th e T u rk ish s tra its crisis, a g re e d w ith B ev in th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld u n d e rw r ite B ritain 's m ilita ry a id to G re e c e . In d o in g so, B y rn e s a c c e p te d a m a jo r re sp o n sib ility . T h e G re e k N a tio n a l A rm y (G N A )—p o o rly s u p p lie d , in e ffic ie n tly o rg a n iz e d , a n d se v e re ly d e m o r­ a l i z e d - r e q u i r e d s u b s ta n tia l a s s is ta n c e in o rd e r to c o n d u c t effectiv e a n tig u e rrilla o p e ra tio n s .69 B ritish F ield M a rsh a ll B e rn a rd L. M o n tg o m ­ e ry w a r n e d in D e c e m b e r th a t G re e c e w o u ld b e lo st u n le s s th e G N A w a s r e tr a in e d a n d re e q u ip p e d . G e n e ra l S te p h e n J. C h a m b e rlin , th e d ire c to r of W ar D e p a rtm e n t In te llig e n c e , c o n c lu d e d th a t o n ly larg e scale B ritish o r A m e ric a n a id c o u ld p r e v e n t th e re b e ls fro m e s ta b lis h in g c o n tro l o v e r m u c h of n o r th e r n G re e c e . M acV eag h , to o , s tre s s e d th e

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 107 u rg e n c y of s u p p ly in g th e G N A a n d w o rrie d th a t B ritish e ffo rts w o u ld fall s h o rt. O n M acV eagh's re c o m m e n d a tio n , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t e m p h a s iz e d to th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t o n 20 D e c e m b e r th e n e e d fo r p r o m p t a c tio n to m e e t G re e c e 's e s s e n tia l m ilita ry re q u ire m e n ts a n d a s k e d fo r a list of ite m s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s m ig h t h a v e to f u r n is h .70 D u rin g th e w in te r o f 1946-47, h o w ev er, A m e ric a n officials w e re f r u s tr a te d in th e ir e ffo rts to h a s te n th e d e liv e ry of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to G re e c e . N o t o n ly w e re m o s t ite m s th e G N A r e q u e s te d u n a v a ila b le in th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's d o m e stic sto c k s b u t a lso p ro b le m s a ro se in c h a n n e lin g av ailab le e q u ip m e n t th r o u g h th e B ritish .71 C itin g th e h e a v y fin a n c ia l b u r d e n th a t th e y w e re a lre a d y c a rry in g in G re e c e , th e B ritish r e f u s e d to pay, a s re q u ir e d b y law, fo r A m e ric a n s u r p lu s s u p p lie s th a t th e y p la n n e d to d e liv e r to G re e c e . (A n a c u te d o lla r s h o rta g e m a d e it im p o s sib le fo r G re e c e to re im b u rs e B rita in fo r s u c h c o sts.) T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, th e re fo re , h a d n o ch o ice b u t to sell th e e q u ip m e n t o n c re d it d ire c tly to th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t. A c h e s o n a p p ro v e d s u c h a sale of tra in in g a irc ra ft o n 5 F e b ru a ry as a n e x c e p tio n to e x istin g policy.72 B u t th is tr a n s fe r d id little to c o m p e n s a te fo r th e in a b ility o f th e s tr a p p e d B ritish g o v e rn m e n t to p ro v id e A th e n s w ith s u b s id ie s fo r a n in c re a s e in th e G N A a n d n e w e q u ip m e n t fo r a s p r in g c a m p a ig n a g a in s t th e g u e r ­ rillas. O n 20 F e b ru a ry H e n d e rs o n re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t a lte r its p o licy a n d fu r n is h d ire c t m ilita ry a id to G re e c e .73 By th a t tim e m a n y A m e ric a n officials b e lie v e d th a t G re e c e w a s o n th e v e rg e of c o llap se. P aul A . P orter, th e c h ie f of a sp e c ia l A m e ric a n s u rv e y m is s io n , p a in te d a g rim p ic tu re of fin a n c ia l c h a o s, a d m in ­ istra tiv e in c o m p e te n c e , a n d w id e s p r e a d d e m o ra liz a tio n . E co n o m ic a n d p o litica l s ta b ility in G re e c e , h e to ld th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, w o u ld b e im p o s sib le w ith o u t a n a ll-o u t A m e ric a n e ffo rt.74 M a rk F. E th rid g e , th e A m e ric a n re p re s e n ta tiv e o n a U .N . c o m m issio n in v e s tig a tin g th e fig h t­ in g a lo n g G re e c e 's n o r th e r n b o rd e rs , r e p o r te d th a t th e " S o v ie ts feel th a t G re e c e is [a] rip e p lu m re a d y to fall in to th e ir h a n d s in a few w e e k s ." 75 M acV eagh jo in e d w ith P o rte r a n d E th rid g e o n 20 F e b ru a ry in d e s c rib in g th e s itu a tio n in G re e c e a s " s o critical th a t n o tim e sh o u ld b e lo s t in a p p ly in g a n y re m e d ia l m e a s u r e s ." 76 A fte r re a d in g th e s e a la rm ­ in g r e p o r ts . S e c re ta ry of S ta te G e o rg e C . M a rs h a ll a u th o riz e d A c h e so n to p r e p a r e le g isla tio n fo r a lo a n to G re e c e a n d to p la n fo r th e d ire c t s u p p ly of a rm a m e n ts . It w a s c le a r to S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials th a t h e n c e fo rth th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h a v e to s h o u ld e r th e m a jo r r e s p o n ­ sib ility fo r a id to G re e c e .77

108 • Arming the Free World D u rin g late 1946 a n d e a rly 1947, th e n , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n in c o rp o ra te d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e in to its e ffo rts to ch eck S o v iet e x p a n ­ sio n in th e N e a r E ast. W ith in six m o n th s A m e ric a n p o licy s h ifte d fro m re s tric tin g a rm s s h ip m e n ts to G re e c e , Turkey, a n d Ira n , to s h a rin g re s p o n s ib ility w ith th e B ritish fo r s u c h tra n s fe rs , to p r e p a r in g to a s s u m e p r im a r y re s p o n s ib ility fo r a rm in g th o s e n a tio n s . B o th d e fe n se a n d d ip lo m a tic officials b e lie v e d th a t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e w o u ld s tr e n g th e n local re s is ta n c e to S o v iet d e m a n d s a n d d e m o n s tra te A m e ri­ c a n to u g h n e s s a n d d e p e n d a b ility . A lth o u g h th e a m o u n t of a rm a m e n ts a c tu a lly tr a n s fe r r e d to G re e c e , Turkey, a n d Ira n w a s sm a ll, th e c h a n g e s in A m e ric a n p o licy w e re s u b s ta n tia l.

A k B ritish d é m a rc h e h e lp e d c o m p le te th e tra n s fo rm a tio n in A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts p o licy th a t h a d b e g u n six m o n th s earlier. O n th e a fte rn o o n of 21 F e b ru a ry 1947 th e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t n o tifie d th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n th a t it in te n d e d to d is c o n tin u e its e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey at th e e n d of M a rc h . A m e ric a n officials le a rn e d of th e im p e n d in g c u to ff fro m tw o u r g e n t n o te s th a t th e B ritish e m b a s s y d e liv e re d to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. T h e first, m u c h like th e r e p o r ts of M acV eagh, E th rid g e , a n d P o rter, w a rn e d th a t G re e c e w a s o n th e v e rg e of fin a n c ia l c o lla p se a n d e s tim a te d th a t it n e e d e d a p p ro x im a te ly $250 m illio n in fo re ig n a id d u rin g 1947 a n d a n in d e fin ite a m o u n t fo r se v e ra l y e a rs th e re a fte r. T h e se c o n d s ta te d th a t Turkey, la c k in g o u ts id e help, c o u ld n o t s tr e n g th e n its a rm e d fo rce s su ffic ie n tly to re s is t S o v iet p r e s ­ s u re w ith o u t a b a n d o n in g p la n s fo r e co n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t. B oth d o c u ­ m e n ts e x p la in e d th a t B rita in , b e c a u se of its o w n fin a n c ia l w o e s, c o u ld n o lo n g e r o ffer a s s is ta n c e to G re e c e a n d T urkey a n d e x p re s s e d th e h o p e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld fu r n is h th e n e c e s s a ry s u p p o r t .78 T he B ritish n o te s d id n o t p a rtic u la rly s u rp ris e a d m in is tra tio n offi­ cials. T h e B ritish g o v e rn m e n t h a d lo n g c o n s id e re d G re e c e " a b o t­ to m le ss w e ll," a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d k n o w n fo r a t le a st six m o n th s th a t B ev in w a s c o n s id e rin g r e tr e n c h m e n t in G re e c e as a w a y of e a s in g th e d ra in o n scarce fo re ig n a id f u n d s . D u rin g th e P aris P eace C o n fe re n c e , B ev in e m p h a s iz e d th a t B rita in w a s s tre tc h in g its re s o u rc e s th in in th e N e a r E ast. In D e c e m b e r 1946 h e to ld B y rn e s th a t h e w a s e a g e r to re m o v e B ritish tr o o p s fro m G re e c e . In F e b ru a ry 1947, w h e n se v e re w in te r w e a th e r a n d a coal s h o rta g e a g g ra v a te d B ritain 's a c u te fin a n c ia l p ro b le m s , C h a n c e llo r of th e E x c h e q u e r H u g h D a lto n p ro -

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 109 p o s e d " th e m o s t r u th le s s e c o n o m y in o v e rs e a s e x p e n d itu re . . . [to] b e g in a t o n c e b y c u ttin g off th e G re e k s ." A lth o u g h th e C a b in e t d id n o t a u th o riz e s u c h a d ra s tic ste p , B e v in a p p ro v e d a m e s sa g e to th e U n ite d S ta te s s u g g e s tin g th a t it a c tu a lly h a d , " fo r th e sole p u r p o s e of b rin g in g m a tte rs to a h e a d ." 79 T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t r e s p o n d e d w ith e x c e p tio n a l s p e e d . M a r­ sh a ll, w h o w a s p re o c c u p ie d w ith o th e r m a tte rs , a s s ig n e d re s p o n s ib il­ ity to A c h e s o n a n d H e n d e rs o n , b o th of w h o m c o n s id e re d s tro n g a n d sw ift a c tio n im p e ra tiv e . B oth, as w ell, u n h e s ita tin g ly a c c e p te d th e B ritish n o te s a t face v a lu e sin c e , as H e n d e rs o n re c o lle c te d , th e y h a d b e lie v e d fo r so m e tim e th a t " th e B ritish c o u ld n o t in d e fin ite ly c o n tin u e to c a rry th e b u r d e n of G re e k a n d T u rk ish a s s ista n c e ." A t A c h eso n 's d ire c tio n , H e n d e r s o n a n d h is sta ff b e g a n to w o rk o n a se rie s of p la n ­ n in g p a p e r s s h o rtly a fte r th e B ritish n o te s a rriv e d o n F rid a y a fte rn o o n . O v e r th e w e e k e n d th e y c o m p le te d a m e m o ra n d u m re c o m m e n d in g th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s e x te n d all n e c e s s a ry m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey. A c h e s o n a p p ro v e d th is d o c u m e n t o n S u n d ay , 23 F e b ru ary . T h e C o m m itte e of T h re e a n d th e p r e s id e n t e n d o rs e d a slig h tly re v is e d v e rs io n th r e e d a y s later. E x h ila ra te d officials c o u ld n o t rec all w h e n S ta te h a d m o v e d so q u ic k ly o n a m a tte r so g ra v e .80 S u c h sw ift a c tio n w a s p o ss ib le b e c a u se th e a d m in is tra tio n 's d e ci­ s io n w a s n e v e r in d o u b t. D u rin g th e s tra its crisis, T ru m a n a n d h is to p a d v is e rs h a d re s o lv e d to s p a re n o e ffo rt, in c lu d in g th e u s e of fo rce, to p re s e rv e th e in d e p e n d e n c e of Turkey; th is policy, H e n d e rs o n n o w a s s e rte d , a p p lie d a s w ell to G re e c e . In O c to b e r 1946 B y rn e s h a d a g re e d w ith B e v in th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld b e th e g u a ra n to r of B ritain 's m ilita ry a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey. By m id -F e b ru a ry 1947 th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's e x p e rts o n N e a r E a s te rn affairs b e lie v e d th a t o n ly d ire c t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e c o u ld p r e v e n t th e co llap se o f G re e c e . In v ie w of th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p re v io u s c o m m itm e n ts a n d its g ro w in g c o n c e rn o v e r th e E a s te rn M e d ite rra n e a n , T ru m a n a n d h is p rin c ip a l a d v is e rs h a rd ly e v e n d e lib e ra te d o v e r w h e th e r to se e k th e a u th o rity a n d f u n d s fo r a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey. A s A c h e s o n re a liz e d , " u n d e r th e c irc u m s ta n c e s th e re c o u ld b e o n ly o n e d e c is io n ." 81 T h e re w e re fe w d is s e n te rs . O n e w a s G e n e ra l Jam es K. C ra in , th e d e p u ty c h a irm a n of th e P C A , w h o a rg u e d u n p e rs u a s iv e ly th a t ex ces­ siv e fo re ig n a id e x p e n d itu re s a c c o u n te d fo r B ritain 's fin a n c ia l d is tre s s . To p r e v e n t th e U n ite d S ta te s fro m s u ffe rin g a sim ila r fate, h e rec o m ­ m e n d e d c o n s e rv a tio n o f re s o u rc e s fo r " th e fin al tria l of s tre n g th " w ith

110 • Arming the Free World th e S o v iet U n io n . To p ro te c t G re e c e a n d Turkey, h e s u g g e s te d th a t T ru m a n is s u e a w a rn in g th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld fig h t, if n e c e s ­ sary, to p r e v e n t th o s e n a tio n s fro m fa llin g u n d e r C o m m u n is t c o n tro l.82 S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials p a id a b it m o re a tte n tio n to Paul P o rte r's o b je c tio n s to a rm in g th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t. P o rte r w a n te d to av o id A m e ric a n in te r v e n tio n in a civil w a r in s u p p o r t of a g o v e rn m e n t h e fo u n d " re a c tio n a ry . . . in c re d ib ly w e a k , s tu p id a n d v e n a l." So h e p r o p o s e d th a t T ru m a n m a k e n e g o tia tio n of a n a rm istic e a p re re q u is ite fo r th e p ro v is io n of A m e ric a n e co n o m ic a id to G re e c e . In a le tte r to A c h e so n , M acV eag h d is m is s e d P o rte r's s u g g e s tio n as th e p r o d u c t of " a 'n e w d e a l' e n th u s ia s t . . . w ith little k n o w le d g e of th e o u ts id e w o rld b e y o n d th e U S A ." M acV eagh in s is te d th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o u ld n o t a ffo rd " b e in g s e n tim e n ta l a b o u t w h a t is h a p p e n in g in G re e c e " b e c a u se th a t w a s " p la y in g in to th e h a n d s of th e R u ss ia n s." T he o n ly w a y to e s ta b lis h la s tin g p e a c e in G re e c e , h e c o n tin u e d , w a s to " s to p R u ssia o n th e G re e k fro n tie rs " a n d d e fe a t th e C o m m u n is t-le d g u e rrilla s . In a fin a l d e n u n c ia tio n of P o rter, o n e th a t c a p tu r e d th e p re v a ilin g m o o d of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, M acV eag h d e c la re d , " O m ­ e le ts a re n o t m a d e w ith o u t b re a k in g e g g s, a n d th e tim e h a s co m e w h e n w e m u s t b e to u g h ." 83 P re lim in a ry p la n n in g fo r th e G re e k m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m also c a u s e d few d is a g re e m e n ts . T h e m o s t sig n ific a n t d iffe re n c e of o p in io n a ro s e b e tw e e n th e W ar a n d S ta te d e p a r tm e n ts o v e r th e u rg e n c y of th e G re e k s itu a tio n . G e n e ra l S te p h e n C h a m b e rlin , th e h e a d of W ar D e p a rtm e n t In te llig e n c e , to o k is s u e w ith th e c o n c lu s io n of M acV eagh a n d E th rid g e th a t G re e c e m ig h t fall u n d e r S o v iet d o m in a tio n in a m a tte r of w e e k s . L ike m o s t of h is c o lle a g u e s in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, C h a m b e rlin b e lie v e d th a t th e S o v iet U n io n u ltim a te ly b o re re s p o n s ib il­ ity fo r th e fig h tin g in G re e c e b e c a u se it w a s c h a n n e lin g a id to in s u r ­ g e n ts th r o u g h A lb a n ia , Y u g o sla v ia, a n d B u lg aria. B ut h e d id n o t th in k th a t M o sco w w o u ld p e rm it th e g u e rrilla s to re c eiv e th e a ssis ta n c e th e y n e e d e d to o v e rth ro w th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t a s lo n g a s S ta lin d e s ire d A m e ric a n c o o p e ra tio n in th e s e ttle m e n t of m o re im p o r ta n t m a tte rs , s u c h as th e f u tu r e of G e rm a n y . In a se c o n d e s tim a te of 26 F eb ru ary , C h a m b e rlin p o in te d o u t th a t th e g u e rrilla s o p e ra te d o n ly in n o r th e r n b o rd e r re g io n s a n d c o n tro lle d n o m o re th a n 10 p e rc e n t of G re e k soil. A lth o u g h th e m ilita ry s itu a tio n w a s d e te rio ra tin g fo r th e G re e k g o v e rn ­ m e n t, h e re ite ra te d , it w a s n o t y e t c ritic a l.84 C h a m b e rlin a g re e d w ith S ta te D e p a rtm e n t e x p e rts , h o w ev er, th a t

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 111 A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id c o u ld h a v e a d e cisiv e effect o n th e G re e k civil w ar. Political a n d m ilita ry officials b la m e d th e d iffic u lties of th e 100,000m a n G re e k N a tio n a l A rm y o n a lack of e q u ip m e n t, p o o r m o rale, a n d re lia n c e o n c o n v e n tio n a l tac tic s. R e e q u ip p e d a n d re o rg a n iz e d fo r m o b ile w a rfa re , th e G N A c o u ld e x p lo it its e s tim a te d e ig h t-to -o n e n u m e ric a l a d v a n ta g e o v e r th e g u e rrilla s a n d b rin g th e fig h tin g to a n e n d , p e r h a p s in six m o n th s . P la n n e rs , to o , e a sily d is c o u n te d a n y s u g g e s tio n th a t th e e x te n s io n of A m e ric a n a id w o u ld r e d o u n d a g a in s t th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t b y s tim u la tin g g u e rrilla re c ru itin g o r e n c o u ra g ­ in g a d d itio n a l o u ts id e s u p p o r t of th e re v o lu tio n a rie s . In s te a d th e y p r e d ic te d th a t th e G re e k p o p u la tio n w o u ld ta k e a firm s ta n d a g a in s t th e in s u r g e n ts . T erro rist m e th o d s , C h a m b e rlin a rg u e d , n o t e co n o m ic w o e s , p o litica l g rie v a n c e s, o r g o v e rn m e n t r e p re s s io n , a c c o u n te d fo r th e s tr e n g th o f th e g u e rrilla s a m o n g th e n o r th e r n G re e k p e a s a n try . " In th e fin a l a n a ly s is ," c o n c lu d e d a m e m o ra n d u m b y th e S W N C C , " th e s itu a tio n is m o re p sy c h o lo g ic a l a n d p o litical t h a n m ilitary . M o rale a n d th e su p e rfic ia l m a n ife s ta tio n s of fo rce, s u c h as p o s s e s s io n of w e a p o n s a n d e q u ip m e n t, a re th e im p o r ta n t e le m e n ts ." A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v is e rs w o u ld n o t e v e n h a v e to p ro v id e o p e ra tio n a l ad v ice, b u t o n ly d e te rm in e th e e q u ip m e n t th e G N A n e e d e d a n d e d u c a te G re e k so ld ie rs in its u s e . By e x te n d in g m ilita ry a id a n d re n d e r in g te c h n ic a l ad v ice, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n all to o o p tim istic a lly h o p e d to a lte r th e p e rc e p ­ tio n s of p o w e r in G re e c e so d ra m a tic a lly th a t th e G N A w o u ld q u ick ly g a in th e u p p e r h a n d in th e civil w a r.85 P o licy m a k ers d iffe re d m o re s h a rp ly o v e r m ilita ry a id to Turkey. K e n n a n o b je c te d s tr e n u o u s ly to s u c h a s s is ta n c e . E m p h a s iz in g th a t T u rk ey fa c e d n e ith e r " s e rio u s C o m m u n is t p e n e tra tio n " n o r d o m e stic strife, K e n n a n w a n te d " th e a c c e n t . . . o n in te rn a l m o ra le a n d firm n e s s of d ip lo m a tic s ta n c e , n o t o n m ilita ry p r e p a r a tio n s ." 86 H e re c o m m e n d e d to A c h e s o n th a t th e p r e s id e n t re fra in fro m a s k in g C o n g re s s fo r a id to Turkey, a n d fa ilin g th is , th a t T ru m a n m a k e c le a r th a t th e re w a s n o c au se fo r a la rm o v e r th e s itu a tio n in Turkey. K e n n a n g o t so m e s u p p o r t fo r h is v ie w s fro m P a tte rs o n , w h o th o u g h t th a t T urkey s h o u ld re c eiv e o n ly e co n o m ic a id .87 E v e n th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, u p to a p o in t, c o n c u rre d in K e n n a n 's a n a ly s is . L ike K e n n a n , th e Jo in t C h ie fs d o u b te d th a t th e S o v iets w o u ld u s e m ilita ry fo rce to g a in th e ir o b je c tiv e s in Turkey. T h e m a in p ro b le m , th e y r e ite ra te d , w a s to m a in ta in th e T u rk s' p o litical a n d p sy ch o lo g ical r e s o lu tio n a n d p r e v e n t th e ir y ie ld in g to S o v iet d e m a n d s . U nlike K en-

112 • Arming the Free World n a n , th e Jo in t C h ie fs felt th a t th e T urks re q u ir e d " p o s itiv e a s s u ra n c e s " of A m e ric a n s u p p o r t, in c lu d in g m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . S u c h a id w o u ld b e p ro v id e d , th e y a s s e rte d , " to stiffe n th e T u rk ish w ill a n d a b ility to . . . c o n tin u e a firm n a tio n a l p o s tu r e a g a in s t S o v iet p re s s u re " a n d o n ly s e c o n d a rily to im p ro v e T u rk ish m ilita ry c a p a b ilitie s to re s is t a S oviet a tta c k . A c h e s o n a n d F o rre sta l a g re e d w ith th e se rv ice ch ie fs a n d b r u s h e d a sid e K e n n a n 's o b je c tio n s. T he C o m m itte e of T h re e te n ta ­ tiv e ly a g re e d th a t all th e a id T urkey re c e iv e d d u rin g th e c o m in g fiscal y e a r s h o u ld b e r e s e rv e d fo r m ilita ry p u r p o s e s .88 D e sp ite th e s tr o n g s u p p o r t w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n fo r a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey, th e p r o s p e c ts fo r p ro m p t c o n g re s s io n a l a p p ro v a l w e re p ro b le m a tic a l. R e p u b lic a n m a jo ritie s c o n tro lle d b o th th e H o u s e a n d th e S e n a te fo r th e first tim e sin c e 1931, a n d th e y p ro c la im e d as o n e of th e ir p a ra m o u n t g o a ls th e r e s to ra tio n of e c o n o m y in g o v e rn m e n t. A G O P p o licy c o m m itte e e n d o rs e d a 20 p e rc e n t c u t in in co m e ta x e s, a n d in F e b ru a ry 1947 a jo in t c o n g re s s io n a l c o m m itte e e n d o rs e d a b u d g e t ceilin g o f $34.7 b illio n —$3 b illio n le ss th a n T ru m a n p ro p o s e d . N e w p r o p o s a ls fo r fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e o b v io u sly w e re at o d d s w ith th e se R e p u b lic a n fiscal g o a ls. H e n d e rs o n p re d ic te d " g ra v e d iffic u lties" in o b ta in in g th e n e c e s s a ry le g isla tio n fo r a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey n o t o n ly b e c a u se m a n y m e m b e rs o f C o n g re s s w e re b e n t o n e c o n o m y b u t a lso b e c a u se th e y w e re u n a w a re of th e v ita l in te re s ts th a t T ru m a n a n d h is a d v is e rs b e lie v e d w e re at sta k e in th o se tw o n a tio n s .89 C o n s u lta tio n w ith c o n g re s s io n a l le a d e rs re v e a le d th a t th e o n ly w ay to o v e rc o m e th e s e o b sta c le s w a s th r o u g h a n e x tra o rd in a ry e ffo rt to b u ild p u b lic s u p p o r t fo r a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey. A t a W h ite H o u s e m e e tin g o n 27 F e b ru ary , a b ip a rtis a n g ro u p of le g isla to rs g av e th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p r o p o s a ls a c h illy re c e p tio n . O n ly a d ra m a tic p r e s e n ­ ta tio n b y A c h e s o n tr a n s fo rm e d th e re a c tio n of th e c o n g re s s io n a l d e le ­ g a tio n . A fe rv e n t a n d p e rs u a s iv e a d v o c a te , A c h e s o n d re w h e av ily o n a rg u m e n ts th a t h a d a p p e a r e d in d o z e n s of S ta te D e p a rtm e n t m e m o ­ r a n d a a n d g a v e th e m s tu n n in g fo rce. T h e U n ite d S ta te s, h e d e c la re d , w a s fac in g a c risis u n p a ra lle le d in m o d e r n tim e s. T h e s itu a tio n in G re e c e w a s th e re s u lt o f a S o v iet b id fo r th e c o n tro l of th r e e c o n tin e n ts . "L ike a p p le s in a b a rre l in fe c te d b y o n e ro tte n o n e , th e c o rr u p tio n of G re e c e w o u ld in fe c t Ira n a n d all to th e e a s t," h e a s s e rte d . " It w o u ld a lso c a rry in fe c tio n to A frica th r o u g h A sia M in o r a n d E g y p t, a n d to E u ro p e th r o u g h Italy a n d F ra n c e , a lre a d y th r e a te n e d b y th e s tro n g e s t d o m e stic C o m m u n is t p a rtie s in W e ste rn E u ro p e ." O n ly th e U n ite d

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 113 S ta te s w a s in a p o s itio n to th w a r t th is S o v iet c h a lle n g e . T h e is s u e w a s n o t s a v in g B ritish in te re s ts o r e x te n d in g ch arity , b u t p ro te c tin g A m e ri­ c a n f re e d o m a n d secu rity . A fte r a lo n g p a u s e . S e n a to r V a n d e n b e rg , th e n e w c h a irm a n o f th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , re p lie d gravely, "M r. P re s id e n t, if y o u w ill sa y th a t to th e C o n g re s s a n d th e c o u n try , I w ill s u p p o r t y o u a n d I b e lie v e m o s t of its m e m b e rs w ill d o th e s a m e ." 90 U n d e r A c h e so n 's le a d e rs h ip , a d m in is tra tio n officials b e g a n to p r e ­ p a re s u c h a m e s s a g e fo r T ru m a n to d e liv e r to C o n g re s s . A c h e so n in fo rm e d a S ta te -W a r-N a v y w o rk in g g ro u p o n 28 F e b ru a ry th a t th e p r e s id e n t's p ro p o s a ls fo r a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey " m u s t b e p u t o v e r forcefully. . . . W e m u s t s tre s s th e n e c e s s ity of m a in ta in in g th o se a re a s o f th e w o rld th a t a re n o w fre e a n d in w h ic h th e re a re in d iv id u a l lib e rtie s." G e n e ra l A rc h ib a ld V. A rn o ld , th e a rm y 's a s s is ta n t c h ie f of sta ff fo r p la n s , a g re e d , n o tin g th a t th e o n ly th in g th a t c o u ld sw ay th e p u b lic w a s th e n e c e s s ity of h o ld in g th e lin e a g a in s t c o m m u n is m . B u ild ­ in g o n th e s e id e a s, F ra n c is H . R u sse ll, th e d ire c to r of th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's O ffice of P u b lic A ffairs, s u g g e s te d th a t th e p r e s id e n t e x p la in h is d e c isio n to h e lp G re e c e a n d T urkey " in te rm s of [a] n e w p o licy . . . to g o to th e a s s is ta n c e of fre e g o v e rn m e n ts e v e ry w h e re ." 91 F o u r d a y s later, th e S ta te -W a r-N a v y g r o u p h a n d e d A c h e s o n a p a p e r th a t re c o m ­ m e n d e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n a d o p t as th e m a jo r th e m e of its p u b lic in fo rm a tio n p r o g r a m o n G re e c e a n d T urkey " th e w o rld co n flict b e tw e e n fre e a n d to ta lita ria n o r im p o s e d fo rm s of g o v e rn m e n t." 92 T h is m e m o ra n d u m s e rv e d a s th e b a sis fo r th e first w o rk in g d ra ft o f T ru m a n 's m e s s a g e . D u rin g th e n e x t w e e k , a d m in is tra tio n officials re v is e d th e s p e e c h fo r m a x im u m effect o n p u b lic a n d c o n g re s s io n a l o p in io n . A s T ru m a n e x p la in e d to h is C a b in e t o n 7 M a rc h , h e h a d ta k e n o n " th e g re a te s t se llin g jo b e v e r fac in g a P r e s id e n t." 93 W ith d o m e stic c o n s id e ra tio n s firm ly in m in d , th e d ra fte rs o f th e p r e s id e n t's s p e e c h d e c id e d to p la y d o w n A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id to G re e c e a n d Turkey. W h e n a n a v y p la n n e r u r g e d th e a d m in is tra tio n to e m p h a s iz e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e in o r d e r to d ra m a tiz e th e d e p th of its c o n c e rn fo r G re e c e a n d Turkey, N E A A s s is ta n t D ire c to r Jo h n D. Jern e g a n re p lie d th a t th e p u b lic w o u ld re a c t a d v e rs e ly to th e id ea of m ilita ry aid ; th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld s tre s s in s te a d th e "ec o n o m ic s id e ." 94 T h is v ie w p re v a ile d . O n 12 M a rc h T ru m a n a s k e d C o n g re s s to v o te f u n d s fo r " fin a n c ia l," " m a te ria l," a n d " e c o n o m ic " a ssista n c e , b u t d id n o t m e n tio n " m ilita ry " a id . S e v e ra l p a r a g r a p h s of h is m e s sa g e d e s c rib e d h o w th e s e f u n d s w o u ld h e lp re s to re th e s h a tte r e d G re e k

114 • Arming the Free World eco n o m y , b u t o n ly tw o s e n te n c e s e x p la in e d th a t th e y w o u ld a lso p a y fo r e q u ip m e n t fo r th e G N A . Yet $172 m illio n of th e $300 m illio n th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s o u g h t fo r G re e c e w a s a llo c a te d fo r m ilita ry p u r p o s e s . T ru m a n to ld C o n g re s s th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n 's g o a l w a s to h e lp T urkey " in e ffe c tin g th a t m o d e rn iz a tio n n e c e s s a ry fo r th e m a in te n a n c e of its n a tio n a l in te g rity ." S u c h o b liq u e p h r a s e s w e re at b e s t u n in fo rm a tiv e , a t w o rs t d e c e p tiv e . A ll of th e $100 m illio n r e q u e s te d fo r T urkey w a s in te n d e d fo r d e fe n s e .95 C o n c e rn o v e r p u b lic a n d c o n g re s s io n a l re a c tio n a lso h e lp e d lim it th e sc o p e of th e p r e s id e n t's r e q u e s t fo r f u n d s a n d a u th o rity to re n d e r fo re ig n a id . E arly d ra fts o f T ru m a n 's s p e e c h n o t o n ly p ro c la im e d a w o rld w id e p o lic y o f s u p p o r t fo r n o n -C o m m u n is t g o v e rn m e n ts b u t also c o n ta in e d a n a p p e a l fo r le g isla tio n to im p le m e n t s u c h a policy. A sp e c ia l S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o m m itte e sim ila rly re c o m m e n d e d to A c h e s o n o n 4 M a rc h th a t th e p r e s id e n t a sk C o n g re s s fo r a u th o riz a tio n " to fu r n is h a s s is ta n c e to a n y c o u n tr y fo r th e p u r p o s e of p ro m o tin g its s ta b ility a n d in d e p e n d e n c e w h e n e v e r h e fin d s s u c h a s s is ta n c e is in th e in te r e s t of th e n a tio n a l secu rity ." M a rsh a ll, h o w ev er, fe a re d th a t s u c h a r e q u e s t w o u ld a ro u s e s tr o n g o p p o s itio n o n C a p ito l H ill. In s te a d h e o r d e r e d th e p r e p a r a tio n of a bill th a t c o v e re d o n ly G re e c e a n d Turkey. O n 6 M a rc h A c h e s o n in fo rm e d Jo s e p h M . Jo n e s, th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's p rin c ip a l d ra fte r of T ru m a n 's m e s sa g e , th a t th e p r e s id e n t w o u ld m a k e a s ta te m e n t of g lo b al p o lic y b u t c o n fin e h is r e q u e s t fo r f u n d s , fo r th e tim e b e in g , to G re e c e a n d Turkey.96 S om e officials w a n te d th e p r e s id e n t to te m p e r h is rh e to ric as w ell. K e n n a n o b je c te d to p la c in g a id to G re e c e a n d T urkey " in th e fra m e ­ w o rk o f a u n iv e rs a l p o lic y ra th e r th a n in th a t of a sp ecific d e c isio n a d d re s s e d to a specific se t of c irc u m s ta n c e s ." H e w a s so d is p le a s e d w ith th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's w o rk in g d ra ft o f th e p r e s id e n t's m e s sa g e th a t h e s u b m itte d a n e w v e rs io n , s tr ip p e d of all s w e e p in g la n g u a g e , to A c h e s o n o n 6 M a rc h .97 E n ro u te to th e M o sco w fo re ig n m in is te rs ' m e e tin g , M a rsh a ll a lso c o u n s e le d m o d e ra tio n b y c a b lin g h is d is s a tis ­ fa c tio n w ith th e " fla m b o y a n t a n ti-C o m m u n is m " of th e d ra ft sp e e c h . H is d e s ire to av o id s u c h p ro v o c a tiv e la n g u a g e a ro s e m a in ly fro m h is a p p re c ia tio n o f th e lim its o n A m e ric a n m ilita ry p o w e r a ris in g fro m p o s tw a r d e m o b iliz a tio n .98 G e o rg e M . Elsey, a n a d m in is tra tiv e a s s is ­ ta n t to th e p re s id e n t, re c o m m e n d e d to C liffo rd th a t th e p r e s id e n t re s tric t th e s c o p e of h is m e s s a g e . T he S o v iet U n io n , h e e x p la in e d , h a d

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 115 n o t re c e n tly c o m m itte d a n y o v e rt act th a t w o u ld ju stify a n "a ll-o u t s p e e c h ," n o r w a s th e p u b lic p r e p a r e d fo r s u c h a s te r n m e s s a g e .99 T h ese o b je c tio n s c a m e to o late: T ru m a n h e ld firm ly to th e u n d e r ­ s ta n d in g h e h a d re a c h e d w ith V a n d e n b e rg . O n 12 M a rc h h e w e n t b e fo re C o n g re s s a n d e x p la in e d A m e ric a n in te re s t in G re e c e a n d Tur­ k e y n o t o n th e b a sis of stra te g ic o r p o litical c o n s id e ra tio n s b u t in te rm s of a g lo b al id eo lo g ica l s tru g g le . E ach n a tio n , T ru m a n a s s e rte d , h a d to c h o o se b e tw e e n tw o w a y s of life; o n e w a s b a s e d o n m a jo rity ru le a n d fre e in s titu tio n s , th e o th e r o n th e forcible s u p p r e s s io n of th e p o p u la r w ill a n d p e rs o n a l fre e d o m s . "I b e lie v e ," h e p ro c la im e d , " th a t it m u s t b e th e p o licy o f th e U n ite d S ta te s to s u p p o r t fre e p e o p le s w h o a re r e s is tin g a tte m p te d s u b ju g a tio n b y a rm e d m in o ritie s o r b y o u tsid e p re s s u re s ." T ru m a n 's a la rm is t la n g u a g e a n d sim p listic p o r tr a it of a g lo b al c o n flict b e tw e e n g o o d a n d evil a im e d " to b rin g p e o p le u p to [the] re a liz a tio n th a t th e w a r is n 't o v e r b y a n y m e a n s ," a c c o rd in g to C liffo rd , loo T he s p e e c h h a d th e d e s ire d e ffect. O n 13 M a rc h R e p re s e n ta tiv e C arl V in so n (D -G a .) to ld F o rre sta l th a t T ru m a n h a d p u t m a n y c o n se rv a tiv e o p p o n e n ts in a n u n te n a b le p o s itio n : "T h e y d o n 't like R u ssia , th e y d o n 't like C o m m u n is m , b u t th e y d o n 't w a n t to d o a n y th in g to s to p it. B ut th e y a re all p u t o n th e s p o t n o w a n d th e y all h a v e to co m e c le a n ." 101 V a n d e n b e rg a lso th o u g h t th a t C o n g re s s h a d little ch o ice b u t to a c c e p t T ru m a n 's p ro p o s a ls . H e e x p la in e d to m e m b e rs of th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e th a t th e y fa c e d a s itu a tio n sim ila r to a " P re s id e n tia l re q u e s t fo r a d e c la ra tio n of w a r . . . th e re is p re c io u s little w e c a n d o e x c e p t say 'Y es.' " 102 S u b s ta n tia l, if n o t n e c e ssa rily e n th u s ia s tic , m a jo ritie s in b o th h o u s e s a p p ro v e d th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct, w h ic h T ru m a n s ig n e d in to la w o n 22 M ay. C o n g re s s p ro v id e d th e fu ll a p p ro p r ia tio n of $400 m illio n , b u t n o t u n til m o re th a n tw o m o n th s later, la rg e ly b e c a u se of th e d ila to ry tactics of a rc h c o n s e rv a tiv e J o h n T aber (R-N. Y.), th e o b s tru c ­ tio n is t c h a irm a n o f th e H o u s e A p p r o p r ia tio n s C o m m itte e . O n e c o n s e r­ v a tiv e R e p u b lic a n , R e p re s e n ta tiv e F ra n c is H . C a se of S o u th D a k o ta, w ro te to T ru m a n th a t a t le a st se v e n ty -fiv e m e m b e rs of C o n g re s s , h im ­ self in c lu d e d , v o te d to a u th o riz e th e a s s is ta n c e o n ly b e c a u se th e y fe a re d " p u llin g th e r u g o u t fro m u n d e r y o u o r S e c re ta ry of S ta te M a rs h a ll." 103 A lth o u g h m a n y m e m b e rs of C o n g re s s felt a n o b lig a tio n to s u p p o r t th e p r e s id e n t, th e y still e x p re s s e d m is g iv in g s a b o u t m ilita ry a ssista n c e

116 • Arming the Free World to G re e c e a n d Turkey. V a n d e n b e rg , fo r e x a m p le , f r e tte d o v e r th e sec­ tio n o f th e le g isla tio n th a t a u th o riz e d th e d is p a tc h of m ilita ry a d v is e rs to th o s e tw o c o u n trie s . H e th o u g h t th a t it c o n s titu te d " a b la n k ch eck th a t co m es p r e tty c lo se to a p o te n tia l act of w a r."104 R e p u b lic a n r e p r e ­ s e n ta tiv e s K arl E. M u n d t of S o u th D a k o ta a n d Jacob K. Javits of N e w York v o ic e d sim ila r c o n c e rn s , b u t P a tte rs o n a n d A c h e s o n tu r n e d b a c k M u n d t's e ffo rts to lim it to 100 th e n u m b e r of m ilita ry a d v is e rs to e a c h n a tio n a n d Javits's to re s tric t th e ir fu n c tio n s to tr a in in g a n d lo g istical a s s is ta n c e .105 S e n a to r H . A le x a n d e r S m ith (R-N.J.) q u e s tio n e d th e u lti­ m a te e ffe c tiv e n e ss of m ilita ry a id . S u c h a s s is ta n c e to Turkey, in h is view , w a s " a p a llia tiv e ra th e r t h a n a c u re ." H e v o te d fo r th e le g isla tio n in th e h o p e th a t a s tr o n g s ta n d o n G re e c e a n d T urkey w o u ld h a s te n a s e ttle m e n t of S o v ie t-A m e ric a n d iffe re n c e s. A c h e so n , h o w ev er, w a s d isc o u ra g in g ; h e b e lie v e d th a t su c c e ss fu l n e g o tia tio n s w o u ld b e th e re s u lt of a c o n s is te n t p o licy of f ir m n e s s .106 T h e m o s t f r e q u e n t o b je c tio n —b o th p u b lic a n d c o n g re s s io n a l—to th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct w a s th a t it ig n o re d th e U n ite d N a tio n s . T h o se w h o e x p re s s e d th is c ritic ism , a c c o rd in g to a s a m p lin g of p u b lic o p in io n th a t w a s s u b m itte d to th e W h ite H o u s e b y E lm o R oper, fe a re d th a t u n ila te ra l A m e ric a n a c tio n u n d e r m in e d th e a u th o rity of th e U n ite d N a tio n s . M a n y m e m b e rs of C o n g re s s v o ic e d sim ila r c o n c e rn s . S e n a to r E d w in C . J o h n s o n (D -C olo.) p r o p o s e d a n a m e n d m e n t to re a ffirm th e b a sic A m e ric a n p o lic y of re fe rrin g to th e U n ite d N a tio n s all s itu a tio n s th a t e n d a n g e r e d w o rld p e a c e . S e n a to r C lau d e R. P e p p e r (D -F la.) w e n t e v e n fu rth e r. H e a d v o c a te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s lim it its a id to a $250 m illio n c o n trib u tio n to a U .N . relief fu n d fo r G re e c e . V a n d e n b e rg w a s s y m p a th e tic to th e s e c o n g re s s io n a l a n d p u b lic d e m a n d s fo r U .N . in v o lv e m e n t, e v e n th o u g h h e c o n s id e re d u n ila te ra l A m e ric a n a c tio n im p e ra tiv e to p r e v e n t " a c h a in re a c tio n a ro u n d th e w o rld w h ic h c o u ld v e ry e a sily leave u s is o la te d in a C o m m u n is t-d o m in a te d e a r th ." 107 H e th u s s e c u re d p a s s a g e of a n a m e n d m e n t th a t c a lle d fo r th e te rm in a tio n of A m e ric a n a id if th e G e n e ra l A s se m b ly o r S e c u rity C o u n c il d e te r ­ m in e d " th a t a c tio n ta k e n . . . b y th e U n ite d N a tio n s m a k e s th e c o n ­ tin u a tio n of s u c h a s s is ta n c e u n n e c e s s a r y o r u n d e s ira b le ." A c h e so n d is m is s e d th e a m e n d m e n t as " w in d o w d r e s s in g ," b u t th e R o p e r a n a ­ ly sts th o u g h t it w o u ld in c re a s e s u p p o r t fo r th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct fro m a " b a re m a jo rity " to " b e tw e e n tw o -th ird s a n d th re e -fo u rth s " of th e p u b lic . V a n d e n b e rg a lso p re d ic te d th a t h is a m e n d m e n t w o u ld n o t o n ly a p p e a s e b u t a lso e d u c a te p u b lic a n d c o n g re s s io n a l o p in io n b y

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 117 d ra w in g a tte n tio n to U .N . im p o te n c e b r o u g h t o n b y S o v iet o b s tru c ­ tio n is m .108 E v e n m o re tro u b lin g to so m e le g isla to rs w a s th e p o ss ib ility th a t th e G re e k -T u rk ish le g isla tio n w o u ld e s ta b lis h a p re c e d e n t fo r a ss is ta n c e to o th e r c o u n trie s fa c in g C o m m u n is t th re a ts . D u rin g th e c o n g re s s io n a l h e a rin g s , A c h e s o n re p e a te d ly a tte m p te d to clarify th e im p lic a tio n s of T ru m a n 's s w e e p in g la n g u a g e . H e to ld th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e th a t f u tu r e r e q u e s ts fo r a id w o u ld b e c o n s id e re d o n th e b a sis of a c o u n try 's n e e d fo r help, th e e x te n t to w h ic h A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s m ig h t a llev ia te th a t n a tio n 's p ro b le m s , a n d th e c o n s is te n c y of th e p r o p o s e d m e a s u re of a s s is ta n c e w ith th e a d m in is tra tio n 's fo re ig n policy. " It c a n n o t b e a s s u m e d , th e re fo re ," h e a s s u r e d th e c o m m itte e , " th a t th is G o v e rn m e n t w o u ld n e c e ssa rily u n d e rta k e m e a s u re s in an y o th e r c o u n tr y id e n tic a l o r e v e n c lo sely sim ila r to th o se p r o p o s e d fo r G re e c e a n d T urkey."109 A c h e so n , h o w ev er, re a ffirm e d T ru m a n 's p rin c ip le of s u p p o r t fo r fo re ig n p e o p le s r e s is tin g s u b ju g a tio n . "If th e re a re s itu a tio n s w h e re w e c a n d o s o m e th in g effectiv e, th e n I th in k w e m u s t c e rta in ly d o it," h e e x p la in e d to th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e .110 A c h e s o n a lso a g re e d w ith V a n d e n b e rg th a t, a lth o u g h th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld n o t n e c e s ­ sa rily re a c t in th e sa m e w ay to e v e ry c h a lle n g e to a n o n -C o m m u n is t g o v e rn m e n t, "W e p ro p o s e to re a c t." So, A c h e so n 's testim o n y , w h ile it left n o d o u b t th a t th e re w e re lim its to th e a d m in is tra tio n 's e ffo rts to re s is t c o m m u n is m , c o n firm e d th e p o ss ib ility of a d d itio n a l p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .111 In d e e d , e v e n as A c h e s o n sp o k e , a d m in is tra tio n p la n n e r s h a d b e g u n a m a jo r re v ie w of m ilita ry a id p o licies.

A A ilita r y a id to c o u n trie s o th e r th a n G re e c e a n d T urkey w a s a fre ­ q u e n t to p ic in th e F e b ru a ry a n d M a rc h 1947 d is c u s s io n s th a t fo llo w ed th e p r e s e n ta tio n of th e B ritish n o te s . Political a n d m ilita ry officials w e re c o n v in c e d th a t th e re tr e a t of B ritish p o w e r a n d th e e x p a n s io n of S oviet in flu e n c e w o u ld c a u se n e w u n r e s t th a t m ig h t n e c e s s ita te A m e ric a n in te rv e n tio n . M a rsh a ll, fo r e x a m p le , in fo rm e d T ru m a n o n 26 F e b ru a ry th a t th e S ta te , W ar, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts w e re c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e d e v e lo p m e n t of " s im ila r s itu a tio n s re q u irin g s u b s ta n tia l a id fro m th is G o v e rn m e n t." O n 5 M a rc h A c h e s o n re fe rre d th is m a tte r to th e S W N C C fo r u r g e n t stu d y . T he r e s u ltin g r e p o r ts h e lp e d c o n so lid a te a n d e x te n d th e c h a n g e s in A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts p o lic y .112

118 • Arming the Free World T h e S W N C C b e g a n its s tu d y at a tim e w h e n m ilita ry a id p o licy w a s m ire d in c o n flict b e tw e e n th e S ta te , W ar, a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts . T he d is p u te c o n c e rn e d th e re v is io n of S W N C C 202/2, th e first in te r d e p a r t­ m e n ta l s ta te m e n t o n p o s tw a r a rm a m e n ts a s s is ta n c e .113 T h e re v is io n o rig in a te d in th e P C A , a b o d y th a t B y rn e s e s ta b lis h e d in M a y 1946 to e n a b le th e S ta te D e p a r tm e n t " to a s s u m e le a d e rs h ip in a rm a m e n t m a t­ te rs b y fo rm u la tin g th e p o licy first." F a ith fu l to its c h a rg e , th e P C A q u ic k ly d e c id e d to re w rite e x istin g g u id e lin e s o n a rm s tra n s fe rs b e c a u se th e y w e re n a rro w , in c o n s is te n t, o u t-o f-d a te , a n d , in th e case of S W N C C 202/2, fla w e d b y u n a c c e p ta b le c o n c e s s io n s to th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts . M o n th s of d ra ftin g p ro d u c e d a c o m p re h e n s iv e s ta te m e n t of p o lic y th a t e n c o m p a s s e d th e s u p p ly of a rm a m e n ts to fo re ig n n a tio n s fro m all d o m e stic so u rc e s, g o v e rn m e n t a n d p riv a te . In J a n u a ry 1947 th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p r e s e n te d th is d o c u m e n t, d e sig ­ n a te d S W N C C 202/4, to th e S W N C C fo r a p p ro v a l.114 A c c o rd in g to S W N C C 202/4, th e lo n g -te rm o b jec tiv e of th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld b e " to lim it d ra s tic a lly " th e flow of A m e ric a n m u n itio n s to fo re ig n n a tio n s . S u c h a re s tric tiv e p o licy w o u ld h o ld to a m in im u m th e d iv e rs io n of h u m a n a n d e co n o m ic re s o u rc e s fro m " c re a tin g a p e a c e fu l a n d o rd e rly w o rld , " e n c o u ra g e th e s e ttle m e n t of in te rn a tio n a l d is p u te s th r o u g h th e U n ite d N a tio n s , a n d c o n fo rm to th e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly R e so lu tio n of 14 D e c e m b e r 1946 c allin g fo r th e " re g u la tio n a n d re d u c tio n of a rm a m e n ts a n d a rm e d fo rce s." S W N C C 202/4 th u s g av e s ta n d in g a p p ro v a l o n ly to tra n s fe rs of m ilita ry s u p p lie s u n d e r e x istin g p ro g ra m s fo r F ra n c e , L atin A m e ric a , C a n a d a , a n d th e P h ilip ­ p in e s .115 B ut u n til th e U n ite d N a tio n s e ffectiv ely re g u la te d th e in te r n a ­ tio n a l a rm s tra d e a n d p re s e r v e d w o rld p e a c e —d ifficu lt a n d d is ta n t g o a ls, at b e s t—S W N C C 202/4 a llo w e d th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry e q u ip ­ m e n t to o th e r n a tio n s a s w ell. S u c h tra n s fe rs w e re ju s tifie d w h e n th e y h e lp e d a c o u n tr y in m a in ta in in g in te r n a l o rd er, d e fe n d in g a g a in s t a rm e d a tta c k , o r d is c h a rg in g in te rn a tio n a l re s p o n s ib ilitie s . S W N C C 202/4 g av e th e s e c re ta ry of sta te sole a u th o rity to d e te rm in e w h e th e r fo re ig n r e q u e s ts fo r a rm a m e n ts sa tisfie d th e s e c o n d itio n s . T h e re fo re , th e p a p e r 's a u th o rs d id n o t fe a r th a t th e s e p ro v is io n s c o n s titu te d a b la n k ch eck fo r d is trib u tin g m u n itio n s . In s te a d , a n y n e w p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id , s u c h as th e re c e n t o n e fo r Ira n , w o u ld b e " c a re fu lly w e ig h e d e x c e p tio n s ra th e r th a n g e n e ra lly p e rm is s ib le ." 116 C o n s e ­ q u e n tly , S W N C C 202/4 sa tisfie d b o th S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials (su c h as A lg e r H iss a n d o th e rs c o n c e rn e d w ith U .N . affairs) w h o h o p e d fo r

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 119 in te rn a tio n a l re g u la tio n of a rm s tra n s fe rs a n d th o se (su c h as H e n d e r­ so n ) w h o in te n d e d to u s e m ilita ry a id to d e m o n s tra te A m e ric a n firm n e s s to w a rd th e S o v iet U n io n . T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t r e s is te d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's a tte m p t to ta k e c o n tro l of a rm a m e n ts policy. M ilita ry officials o b je c te d v e h e ­ m e n tly to th e g o a l of e v e n tu a l d ra s tic lim ita tio n of A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs . U n ifo rm e d o fficers fe a re d th a t th e re stric tiv e la n g u a g e of S W N C C 202/4 w o u ld p r e v e n t th e c o m p le tio n of th e W e ste rn H e m i­ s p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m a n d th e r e s u m p tio n of m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to C h in a . T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t p r o p o s e d in s te a d th e lo n g -te rm g o al of d ra s tic regulation, a s ta n d a r d th a t im p lie d clo se s c ru tin y b u t n o t re d u c ­ tio n , of th e flo w of A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s a b ro a d . E v e n m o re im p o r ta n t, d ra s tic r e g u la tio n w o u ld n o t n e c e ssa rily in te rfe re w ith th e s e rv ic e s' e ffo rts to s e c u re b a s e s a n d o th e r fo re ig n c o n c e s s io n s in r e tu r n fo r a rm s a id .117 T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t a lso c ritic iz e d S W N C C 202/4 fo r its fa ilu re to re c o m m e n d m o re e ffectiv e p ro c e d u re s fo r s u s ta in in g a p p ro v e d m ili­ ta r y a id p ro g ra m s . T he g re a te s t p ro b le m w a s th e lack of a n y g e n e ra l a u th o rity fo r g o v e rn m e n t tr a n s fe r of a rm a m e n ts , ex ce p t th e S u rp lu s P r o p e r ty A ct of 1944. T h e in a d e q u a c ie s of th a t m e a s u re as a m e a n s of a rm in g fo re ig n n a tio n s b e c a m e a p p a r e n t d u rin g th e first m o n th s of p e a c e . A s e a rly a s M a rc h 1946, th e a rm y in fo rm e d th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t th a t it c o u ld n o lo n g e r p ro v id e fro m ex cess sto c k s m a n y e s s e n tia l m a in te n a n c e ite m s a n d s p a re p a rts . A s in v e n to rie s d w in d le d , P a tte r­ s o n n o tifie d B y rn e s o n 1 Ju ly th a t th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t d id n o t h a v e o n h a n d all th e e q u ip m e n t p r o p o s e d fo r tra n s fe r to L a tin A m e ric a, C h in a , a n d th e P h ilip p in e s . H e a lso w a r n e d th a t th e d e p a r tm e n t's a b ility to m e e t th e r e q u ir e m e n ts of n e w p r o g r a m s of m ilita ry a id fro m s u r p lu s re s o u rc e s w o u ld s o o n b e "p ra c tic a lly n e g lig ib le ." 118 T he fa ilu re of C o n g re s s to p a s s th e In te r-A m e ric a n M ilita ry C o o p ­ e ra tio n A ct a n d th e a d m in is tra tio n 's d e c isio n to d e fe r a c tio n o n th e C h in a A id A ct e x a c e rb a te d th e s e s u p p ly p ro b le m s . A lso , th e d ifficu l­ tie s th a t a ro s e a fte r th e N o v e m b e r 1946 e x te n s io n to Ira n of th e $10 m illio n c re d it fo r s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts c o n v in c e d se rv ice a u th o ritie s th a t e x istin g a r r a n g e m e n ts all b u t p re c lu d e d tim e ly a n d effectiv e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s . L o g istics e x p e rts fo u n d th a t Ira n ia n n e e d s c o u ld b e m e t o n ly at th e e x p e n s e of o th e r a p p ro v e d p ro g ra m s . F u rth e rm o re , th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t, a lre a d y c h a fin g u n d e r b u d g e ta ry lim ita tio n s , h a d to b e a r th e c o sts of re p a irin g , p a c k in g , h a n d lin g , a n d

120 • Arming the Free World tr a n s p o r tin g th e e q u ip m e n t fo r I r a n .119 W ith th e a p p ro v a l of P a tte rs o n a n d E isen h o w er, A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry of W ar H o w a rd C . P e te rs e n a s k e d th a t th e S W N C C h e lp o v e rh a u l " th e p r e s e n t a w k w a rd m a c h in e ry " b y e s ta b lis h in g p rio ritie s a m o n g e x istin g m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s a n d p r e ­ p a rin g le g isla tio n th a t w o u ld p ro v id e th e p r e s id e n t w ith g e n e ra l a u th o rity to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s .120 Finally, a n d m o s t im p o r ta n t, th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t s o u g h t to p r e ­ se rv e its in flu e n c e o v e r a rm s policy. R a th e r th a n allo w th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te to d e c id e w h e th e r to a p p ro v e fo re ig n r e q u e s ts fo r a rm a m e n ts , as p ro v id e d in S W N C C 202/4, th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t w a n te d to g ive th a t p o w e r to th e S W N C C , w ith th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te re ta in in g a v e to . D e fe n se officials a lso re c o m m e n d e d th e a d d itio n to S W N C C 202/4 of a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try lis tin g of p o licy o n a rm s tr a n s fe r s —m u c h like th e o n e in S W N C C 202/2—th a t w o u ld b e k e p t c u r r e n t b y th e R e a rm a m e n t S u b c o m m itte e of th e S W N C C . T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t m a in ta in e d th a t s u c h a c a ta lo g w o u ld facilitate p la n n in g fo r n e w p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id . A t th e sa m e tim e , th is lis tin g w o u ld g iv e th e S W N C C , ra th e r th a n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, p r im a r y re s p o n s ib ility fo r d e te rm in in g p o licy o n th e p ro v is io n o f m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to fo re ig n n a tio n s .121 S W N C C 202/4 in th is w a y p ro v o k e d a n o th e r b a ttle in th e c o n tin u in g in te r d e p a r tm e n ta l w a rfa re o v e r a rm s tra n s fe rs . Political officials re a c te d w ith a la rm to th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t's u n w illin g n e s s to a g re e " th a t th e d e te rm in a tio n of a rm s p o licy lies w ith th e S e c re ta ry of S ta te a n d th a t th e im p le m e n ta tio n of s u c h p o lic y is a fu n c tio n of th e m ili­ tary ." For e x am p le , E lm er T. C u m m in s , e x e c u tiv e s e c re ta ry of th e P C A , w a r n e d th a t th e p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n ts to S W N C C 202/4 c o n s titu te d " a n a tte m p t b y th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t to in je c t itself in to th e fo rm u la tio n of fo re ig n policy." S p e c ia lists in U .N . a ffa irs v ie w e d th is th r e a t to S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p re ro g a tiv e s as p a r t of a W ar D e p a rtm e n t e ffo rt to c h a n g e c o m p le te ly th e e m p h a s is of S W N C C 202/4. "T h e effect of th e [W ar D e p a rtm e n t] re v is io n s , " c o m p la in e d Jo h n C . E lliott, " w o u ld b e to o p e n th e d o o r to tra n s fe rs of a rm s to a lm o s t e v e ry c o u n try in th e w o rld at a tim e w h e n th e U n ite d S ta te s is e n g a g e d in co m p lex n e g o tia tio n s in th e S e c u rity C o u n c il fo r th e re g u la tio n a n d re d u c tio n of a rm a m e n ts a n d a rm e d fo rc e s ." 122 T h e tw o d e p a r tm e n ts , in s h o rt, w e re u n a b le to a g re e e ith e r o n th e g o a ls of a rm a m e n ts p o licy o r th e ir re s p o n s ib ilitie s in fo rm u la tin g th e m . O n 26 F e b ru a ry th e R e a rm a m e n t S u b c o m m itte e , w h ic h h a d b e e n c o n s id e rin g S W N C C 202/4, r e p o r te d th a t it h a d re a c h e d a d e a d lo c k .123

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 121 T h e G re e k -T u rk ish crisis, ho w ev er, a b ru p tly e n d e d th e d e b a te o v e r S W N C C 202/4. O n 5 M a rc h A c h e so n a s k e d th e S W N C C to s tu d y " s itu a tio n s e ls e w h e re in th e w o rld w h ic h m a y re q u ire a n a lo g o u s fin a n ­ cial, te c h n ic a l a n d m ilita ry a id o n o u r p a rt." H is r e q u e s t w a s a p iv o ta l e v e n t sin c e it p ro v id e d th e im p e tu s fo r a fa r m o re a m b itio u s s u rv e y of fo re ig n a id r e q u ir e m e n ts th a n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d p re v io u s ly c o n te m p la te d ; it w a s g e a re d to w a rd th e e n la rg e m e n t, ra th e r th a n th e re d u c tio n , of A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs . To p r e p a r e th e r e p o rt, th e S W N C C a p p o in te d o n 11 M a rc h a S p e c ia l Ad Hoc C o m m itte e c h a ire d b y th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t r e p re s e n ta tiv e . C o lo n e l W illiam A . E ddy, a n e x p e rt o n th e M id d le E a st fro m th e O ffice of S tra te g ic S e rv ice s, w h o w a s te m p o ra rily a s s ig n e d as a sp e c ia l a s s is ta n t to M a rsh a ll. T h e selec­ tio n of E d d y —s o m e o n e w h o w a s " in b u t n o t of th e S ta te D e p a r tm e n t" — in s u r e d th a t th is fo re ig n a id s tu d y w o u ld d iffer s u b s ta n tia lly fro m S W N C C 202/4. S W N C C d ire c te d E d d y 's c o m m itte e to a d d re s s th e fo llo w in g su b je c ts: c o n s id e ra tio n s of n a tio n a l in te re s t th a t sh o u ld g o v e rn d e c isio n s to p ro v id e a id ; fo rm s of a s s is ta n c e th a t e a c h c o u n try re q u ire d ; a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r s u p e r v is in g th e u s e of aid ; a n d c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of fa ilu re to p ro v id e a s s is ta n c e . A s Jo s e p h M . Jo n e s rec o l­ le c te d , "T h e sc o p e o f th e c o m m itte e 's te rm s of re fe re n c e w a s b r e a th ­ ta k in g ." 124 T he sp e c ia l c o m m itte e w o rk e d sw iftly. D ra w in g m a in ly o n th e e x p e rtis e of th o s e a t th e m id d le a n d lo w e r lev e ls of th e th r e e d e p a r t­ m e n ts , it c o m p le te d o n 21 A p ril a n in te rim r e p o r t, d e s ig n a te d S W N C C 360, o n c o u n trie s th a t m ig h t n e e d A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e d u rin g th e n e x t se v e ra l m o n th s . A c c o rd in g to its a u th o rs , S W N C C 360 w a s a " h ig h ly te n ta tiv e " a n a ly s is p r e p a r e d fro m " fra g m e n ta r y d a ta " a n d w ritte n u n d e r s u c h in te n s e p r e s s u r e th a t its c o n te n ts c o u ld n o t b e fu lly c le a re d w ith s e n io r officials. N e v e rth e le s s , it c o n ta in e d th e b ro a d e s t e x a m in a ­ tio n to d a te of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s . It a lso re v e a le d th a t sta ff p la n n e r s in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t as w ell a s th e a rm e d se rv ice s w e re n o w b e g in n in g to th in k of m ilita ry a id as a m ajor, c o n tin u in g in s tr u m e n t of g lo b al p o licy .125 T h e s p irit of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e p e rv a d e d S W N C C 360. T he r e p o r t a s s e rte d : "T h e b ro a d p u r p o s e of U .S . a id a n d a ssis ta n c e is to e x te n d . . . th e o b je c tiv e re c e n tly e n u n c ia te d b y th e P re s id e n t fo r G re e c e a n d Turkey, b y s u p p o r tin g e co n o m ic s ta b ility a n d o rd e rly p o lit­ ical p ro c e s s e s , o p p o s in g th e s p r e a d of c h a o s a n d e x tre m ism , p r e v e n t­ in g a d v a n c e m e n t of C o m m u n is t in flu e n c e a n d u s e of a rm e d m in o r-

122 • Arming the Free World itie s, a n d o r ie n tin g o th e r fo re ig n n a tio n s to w a rd th e U .S . a n d th e U N ." R a th e r th a n e n d o rs in g , as d id S W N C C 202/4, th e g o a l of d ra s tic lim ita ­ tio n of a rm s tra n s fe rs , S W N C C 360 c o n c lu d e d th a t th e p rin c ip a l c o n ­ c e rn of A m e ric a n p o lic y m a k e rs s h o u ld b e to in s u r e th a t fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e s tr e n g th e n e d A m e ric a n secu rity . R a th e r th a n e m p h a s iz in g th e e v e n tu a l h o p e of in te rn a tio n a l a rm s re g u la tio n , th e r e p o r t u r g e d u n ila te ra l a c tio n to m e e t im m e d ia te th r e a ts to A m e ric a n o v e rs e a s in te r ­ e s ts . "A re a listic a p p ra is a l of th e w o rld s itu a tio n ," th e p a p e r e x p la in e d , re v e a le d th a t m a n y c o u n trie s fa c e d d a n g e rs , s u c h as s u b v e rs io n a n d w a r-o f-n e rv e s tactics, th a t w e re b e y o n d th e p u rv ie w of th e U n ite d N a tio n s . D ire c t A m e ric a n a id w a s n e c e s s a ry to s tr e n g th e n th e d e te r ­ m in a tio n o f th e s e im p e rile d n a tio n s —in c lu d in g se v e ra l th a t w e re p r e ­ c a rio u sly b a la n c e d b e tw e e n E a st a n d W est—to p re s e rv e th e ir in d e p e n ­ d e n c e a n d re m a in frie n d ly to th e U n ite d S ta te s . C o n ta in in g S o v iet e x p a n s io n a n d b u ild in g A m e ric a n in flu e n c e , in s h o rt, s h o u ld b e th e f u n d a m e n ta l o b je c tiv e s of fo re ig n a id .126 T h e S W N C C p la n n e r s v ie w e d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e as a p o w e rfu l in s tr u m e n t to w a rd th e s e e n d s . S u c h h e lp c o u ld s tr e n g th e n a c o u n try 's in te rn a l se c u rity fo rc e s a n d b o ls te r it a g a in s t o u ts id e a ttac k , a s w ell as o rie n t its m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s. T h e S W N C C a n a ly s ts a d d e d th a t n a tio n s s e e k in g m o d e rn a rm a m e n ts h a d to re ly la rg e ly o n e ith e r " th e S o v iet U n io n a n d its sa te llite s, o r th e U .S . s u p p le m e n te d b y B ritain ." T h is a s s e rtio n , of c o u rse , w a s sim p listic a n d m is le a d in g . B ritish a n d A m e ric a n a rm s p o licies o fte n c a m e in to c o n ­ flict—in L a tin A m e ric a , fo r e x a m p le . T h e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e S oviet U n io n w e re n o t d ire c tly c o m p e tin g fo r th e a rm a m e n ts b u s in e s s of all fo re ig n c o u n trie s . T he S W N C C p la n n e r s , th o u g h , ig n o re d th e s e q u a li­ fic a tio n s a n d m a in ta in e d th a t fa ilu re to m e e t r e q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t p ro v id e d th e S o v ie ts w ith a n o p p o r tu n ity to e x te n d th e ir m ilita ry in flu e n c e , to th e d e trim e n t of A m e ric a n secu rity . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e p ro v is io n of m u n itio n s to fo re ig n n a tio n s s tr e n g th e n e d th e A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts in d u stry , w h ic h w a s a n im p o r ta n t a d v a n ta g e , e sp e c ia lly in th e e v e n t o f m o b iliz a tio n fo r w a r.127 To a d v a n c e A m e ric a n in te re s ts m o s t effectively, th e S W N C C p la n ­ n e rs u r g e d th e a llo c a tio n o f m ilita ry a id in a " p o s itiv e , fo re h a n d e d a n d p re v e n ta tiv e " m a n n e r. B e h in d th is re c o m m e n d a tio n w a s a c o n c e rn th a t C o m m u n is t m in o ritie s m ig h t fo m e n t a su c c e s s io n of c rise s—m u c h like th e c u r r e n t s itu a tio n in G re e c e —th a t w o u ld d e p le te A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s . T he a d hoc c o m m itte e s tr e s s e d th a t th e " tim e ly p ro v is io n of

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 123 m o d e ra te a m o u n ts of a ss is ta n c e " c o u ld fo re sta ll s u c h e m e rg e n c ie s, th e re b y a v o id in g " u r g e n t, m u c h la rg e r e x p e n d itu r e s ." 128 M ilita ry le a d ­ e rs , a n x io u s a b o u t th e d w in d lin g s u p p ly of a rm a m e n ts o n h a n d fo r fo re ig n a id p ro g ra m s , a g re e d em p h a tic ally . E isen h o w er, fo r e x am p le , w ro te , " In th e lo n g r u n , th e U .S . m u s t d e p e n d u p o n fo re h a n d e d a c tio n in its fo re ig n p o licy b e c a u se o f th e h ig h p ric e of a c o n tin u o u s se rie s of c rise s, a n d b e c a u s e th e fa ilu re to p re v e n t th e m w ill c o n trib u te to th e c o n tin u a tio n of in te rn a tio n a l in s ta b ility a n d e x p a n s io n is m ." H e also c o n c u r r e d in th e S W N C C 's re c o m m e n d a tio n th a t u r g e n t d e m a n d s fo r a s s is ta n c e s h o u ld n o t p re c lu d e s u s ta in e d p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry co llab ­ o ra tio n , s u c h as th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , th a t w o u ld h e lp to a v e rt c o stly e m e rg e n c ie s .129 D e sp ite th e ir e m p h a s is o n econom y, th e S W N C C p la n n e r s re c o m ­ m e n d e d a n e x p a n s io n of c u r r e n t e ffo rts to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s . T h e a d h o c c o m m itte e f o u n d th a t s e v e n c o u n trie s n e e d e d o r m ig h t s o o n r e q u e s t e m e rg e n c y a id to c o u n te r C o m m u n is t th re a ts . Five of th e m — G re e c e , Turkey, Italy, Ira n , a n d F ra n c e —h a d b e e n o ffe re d o r h a d a lre a d y re c e iv e d A m e ric a n a rm s . A c c o rd in g to th e S W N C C staff, tw o o th e rs —K o re a a n d A u s tr ia —s h o u ld re c e iv e m ilita ry a id to m a in ta in in te r n a l s e c u rity a n d s tr e n g th e n th e ir o rie n ta tio n to w a rd th e W est. T h e c o m m itte e a lso re c o m m e n d e d th e c o n tin u a tio n of a p p ro v e d p ro g ra m s fo r C h in a , th e P h ilip p in e s , L a tin A m e ric a , a n d C a n a d a . Finally, th e p la n n e r s u r g e d p r e p a r a tio n fo r p o ss ib le a s s is ta n c e to S p a in —e v e n th o u g h c u r r e n t p o lic y b a r r e d a rm s s h ip m e n ts to F ra n co 's re a c tio n a ry re g im e —a s w e ll as N o rw a y a n d u n s p e c ifie d c o u n trie s in th e M id d le E a st. T h e S W N C C sta ff d id n o t e s tim a te th e c o st o r d u ra tio n of su c h a id , e v e n th o u g h it w a s c le a r th a t th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts w o u ld n o t b e a b le to p ro v id e th e n e c e s s a ry e q u ip m e n t fro m e x istin g sto c k s a lo n e .130 T h e sp e c ia l c o m m itte e c o n s e q u e n tly p r o p o s e d se v e ra l m e a s u re s to b r in g available re s o u rc e s a n d p o te n tia l c o m m itm e n ts in to b a la n c e . M o st im p o r ta n t w a s th e p a s s a g e o f n e w le g isla tio n . T h e c o m m itte e u r g e d p r o m p t a c tio n o n p e n d in g bills, s u c h as th e p r o p o s e d In te rA m e ric a n M ilita ry C o o p e ra tio n A ct a n d th e C h in a A id A ct, a n d o n th e s u b m is s io n of n e w le g isla tio n th a t a u th o riz e d th e se rv ice d e p a rtm e n ts to p ro d u c e n e w e q u ip m e n t fo r tra n s fe r to fo re ig n g o v e rn m e n ts . In th e m e a n tim e , th e S W N C C re c o m m e n d e d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a s y s te m of p rio ritie s to g o v e rn th e a llo c a tio n of av ailab le s u p p lie s . In g e n e ra l, th e p la n n e r s th o u g h t th a t c o u n trie s re s is tin g a g g re s s io n o r c o ercio n

124 • Arming the Free World s h o u ld h a v e first p rio rity , a fte r w h ic h re m a in in g re s o u rc e s s h o u ld b e d is tr ib u te d a m o n g th e lo n g -te rm p r o g r a m s of m ilita ry c o lla b o ra tio n . C u r r e n t ra n k in g s in th e fo rm e r c a te g o ry w e re G re e c e , Turkey, Italy, Ira n , K o rea, F ra n c e , a n d A u s tria , a n d in th e la tte r c a te g o ry w e re th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re a n d th e P h ilip p in e s , th e M id d le E a st a n d E u ro p e , a n d th e F ar E a st. Finally, a n d m o s t im p o r ta n t, th e p la n n e r s u r g e d c e n tra l p la n n in g a n d m o n ito rin g of in d iv id u a l m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s so th a t th e y c o n fo rm e d to " b ro a d n a tio n a l policy." "A c o m p re h e n s iv e p r o g r a m m u s t b e d e v e lo p e d ," th e y a rg u e d , " o n th e b a sis of a c a re fu l ju d g m e n t a n d c o n s id e ra tio n of th e m a n y a n d co m p lex U .S . in te re s ts , b o th p o litical a n d m ilitary , in v o lv e d ." 131 M ilita ry a u th o ritie s c o m m e n te d e x te n siv e ly o n th e s e re c o m m e n d a ­ tio n s . T h e m o s t d e ta ile d a n a ly s is c a m e fro m th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, w h o p r a is e d S W N C C 360 b u t s u g g e s te d th a t th e p a ra m o u n t o b jec tiv e of a n y c o m p re h e n s iv e a id p ro g ra m s h o u ld b e th e a d v a n c e m e n t of A m e ric a n s tra te g ic in te re s ts . T h ey a rg u e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld e x te n d a id o n ly to n a tio n s th a t m ig h t b e c o m e effectiv e allies in th e e v e n t of a w a r w ith th e S o v iet U n io n . A s a re s u lt, th e ir p rio ritie s fo r a s s is ta n c e d iffe re d m a rk e d ly fro m th e S W N C C 's. G re a t B ritain , F ra n c e , a n d G e rm a n y h e a d e d th e list. G e rm a n y w a s in c lu d e d b e c a u se th e re v iv a l of its m ilita ry p o w e r w a s e s s e n tia l to re s is tin g a S o v iet a ttac k in E u ro p e p rio r to th e c o m m itm e n t of A m e ric a n tro o p s . C o n v ersely , C h in a , K o re a, a n d th e P h ilip p in e s r a n k e d n e a r th e b o tto m of th e lis t.132 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs u r g e d " th a t a s s is ta n c e in e ac h in s ta n c e s h o u ld b e su ffic ie n t to p o s itiv e ly a s s is t [sic] th e n a tio n a id e d to a ch ie v e , o r re ta in , a s o u n d econom y, to m a in ta in th e a rm e d fo rce s n e c e s s a ry fo r its c o n tin u e d in d e p e n d e n c e , a n d to b e of re a l a s s is ta n c e to th e U n ite d S ta te s in c ase of id eo lo g ica l w a rfa re ." E q u a lly im p o r ta n t to th e Jo in t C h ie fs w a s w ith h o ld in g a s s is ta n c e fro m n a tio n s th a t m ig h t th r e a te n A m e ric a n secu rity . N o a id of a n y so rt, th e y in s is te d , s h o u ld go to c o u n trie s in w h ic h th e S o v iet U n io n e x e rc ise d a p r e d o m in a n t in ­ f lu e n c e .133 S e v e ra l to p a rm y o fficers a lso e n d o rs e d th e re c o m m e n d a tio n s in S W N C C 360, b u t e x p re s s e d c o n c e rn th a t th e sp e c ia l c o m m itte e h a d o v e re s tim a te d av ailab le m e a n s fo r p ro v id in g m ilita ry a id . T h ey h a d g o o d re a s o n fo r th e ir d o u b ts . T ru m a n a n d h is b u d g e t d irec to r, Jam es E. W ebb, a b h o rre d d e fic its a n d th e ir in fla tio n a ry c o n s e q u e n c e s . For fiscal y e a r 1948 th e y s e n t to C o n g re s s th e first b a la n c e d p o s tw a r b u d g e t, a n e q u ilib riu m a c h ie v e d o n ly b y lim itin g th e p r o p o s e d n e w a p p ro p ria -

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 125 tio n s fo r n a tio n a l d e fe n se to $9.5 b illio n , in c lu d in g $6 b illio n fo r th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t. T h e la tte r fig u re h a d b e e n d e te rm in e d a fte r th e se c re ta ry of w a r h a d r e d u c e d th e a rm y 's a n d th e a rm y a ir fo rc e s' re q u e s t fo r n e w f u n d s fro m $10 b illio n to $8.4 b illio n , a n d W ebb h a d s la s h e d th a t a m o u n t b y a n o th e r $2.4 b illio n . A lth o u g h E ise n h o w e r to ld C o n g re s s th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n b u d g e t " a lre a d y re fle c te d . . . d ra s tic c u rta il­ m e n ts ," C o n g re s s im p o s e d u p o n th e a rm y a n a d d itio n a l c u t of $200 m illio n ; th e s e r e d u c tio n s g u tte d th e a rm y 's p ro c u re m e n t p ro g ra m . T he re s tric tio n s o n d e fe n s e s p e n d in g , c o m b in e d w ith C o n g re s s 's w illin g ­ n e s s to s u p p o r t G re e k -T u rk ish a id o n ly u n d e r p r e s s u r e , m a d e serv ice le a d e rs c e rta in th a t n e ith e r th e a u th o rity n o r th e f u n d s w o u ld b e avail­ ab le to c a rry o u t th e sp e c ia l c o m m itte e 's re c o m m e n d a tio n s .134 B ecau se of th e re s tra in ts o n d e fe n se s p e n d in g , m a n y a rm y le a d e rs w o rrie d th a t n e w c o m m itm e n ts to p ro v id e m ilita ry a id m ig h t s tre tc h th e ir lim ite d re s o u rc e s p e rilo u s ly th in . G e n e ra l L eR oy L u te s, th e d ire c ­ to r of se rv ice , su p p ly , a n d p ro c u r e m e n t, p re d ic te d th a t C o n g re s s w o u ld a p p ro v e n e w a p p ro p r ia tio n s fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e o n ly a t th e e x p e n s e o f th e b u d g e ts o f th e W ar a n d N a v y d e p a r tm e n ts . A s a re s u lt. L u te s th o u g h t th a t th e f u n d a m e n ta l q u e s tio n a t is s u e w a s, " D o w e w is h to p u r c h a s e a c e rta in a m o u n t of s e c u rity fo r th e U n ite d S ta te s th r o u g h fo re ig n a id p r o g r a m s o r s h o u ld th is m o n e y a n d e ffo rt b e d ire c te d to w a rd b u ild in g a s tr o n g U n ite d S ta te s m ilita ry e s ta b lis h ­ m e n t? " G e n e ra l C h a rle s P. H a ll, th e d ire c to r of o rg a n iz a tio n a n d tr a in ­ in g , a lso w a r n e d th a t n e w p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id , o w in g to th e lack of s u r p lu s m a te rie l a n d th e d iffic u lties in p ro c u rin g n e w e q u ip m e n t, m ig h t d a n g e ro u s ly d im in is h th e in v e n to rie s se t a sid e fo r th e a rm y 's re s e rv e fo rce s. G e n e ra l L a u ris N o rs ta d , th e d ire c to r of P la n s a n d O p e r ­ a tio n s , d o u b te d th a t C o n g re s s w o u ld s o o n p a s s b ro a d m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n . In th e in te rim , h e s u g g e s te d , th e a rm y w o u ld h a v e to rely o n m o re c a re fu l p la n n in g to b a la n c e c o m m itm e n ts a g a in s t re s o u rc e s. T o g eth er th e s e c o m m e n ts re v e a le d a n e w a w a re n e s s a m o n g a rm y o fficers, p a rtic u la rly th o s e c o n c e rn e d w ith lo g istic s, th a t m ilita ry a id p r o g r a m s c o u ld e n d a n g e r as w ell as a d v a n c e se rv ice in te r e s ts .135 T h e S W N C C sta ff to o k a c c o u n t of th e s e v ie w s in its sp e c u la tiv e r e p o r t of 10 Ju ly o n th e g ro w th of th e m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e p ro g ra m d u rin g th e n e x t th r e e to five y e a rs. C o m b in in g th e stra te g ic a rg u m e n ts o f th e Jo in t C h ie fs w ith th e p o litica l o u tlo o k of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e , th e p la n n e r s re c o m m e n d e d th a t m ilita ry a id s h o u ld aim at c re a tin g "a c o n d itio n of g o o d w ill a n d c o m m o n m ilita ry o rie n ta tio n w h ic h w o u ld

126 • Arming the Free World p ro v id e a b a sis fo r c o n tin u e d c o lla b o ra tio n in e v e n t of w ar." A s sista n c e fo r s u c h p u r p o s e s w a s " c le a rly in d ic a te d " fo r G re a t B rita in , F ra n ce , Italy, A u s tria , G re e c e , Turkey, Ira n , K o re a, th e P h ilip p in e s , C h in a , a n d L a tin A m e ric a a n d m ig h t b e re q u ir e d fo r e ig h t o th e r n a tio n s .136 Yet th e S W N C C staff, re a c tin g to th e w a rn in g s of L u te s, H a ll, a n d N o rs ta d , u r g e d c a u tio n in m a k in g n e w c o m m itm e n ts to a rm th e s e n a tio n s . T he a rm y p ro g ra m a lo n e m ig h t a m o u n t to th e e q u iv a le n t of e q u ip m e n t fo r 169 lig h t d iv is io n s , a n d f u r n is h in g e v e n a p o r tio n of th is m a te rie l w o u ld n e c e s s ita te a t le a s t p a rtia l m o b iliz a tio n of in d u stry . W ith o u t a d e fin ite lim it o n m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s , th e s tu d y c o n c lu d e d , " th e in d u s tria l e ffo rt n e c e s s a ry to m e e t th e m m a y a p p ro x im a te a w a r c o n d i­ tio n ." F u rth e rm o re , sin c e m a n y c o u n trie s la c k e d d o lla rs, th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h a v e to p ro v id e g r a n ts a n d c re d its , w h ic h c o u ld a m o u n t to a s ta g g e rin g fin a n c ia l b u r d e n . T h e S W N C C sta ff d o u b te d th a t C o n ­ g re s s w o u ld a p p ro v e s u c h s u b s id ie s . To th e s e e co n o m ic a n d fin a n c ia l d iffic u lties, th e p la n n e r s a d d e d th e ir p o litical re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss o f m ilita ry a id as a m e a n s of m a in ta in in g frie n d ly g o v e rn ­ m e n ts in p o w e r. H e n c e , w h ile re ite ra tin g th e ir s u p p o r t fo r a n in te ­ g ra te d p r o g r a m of a rm s a id a n d n e w le g isla tio n , th e y c o n c lu d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s, " in th e lig h t of e x istin g re a litie s ," m ig h t h a v e to rely m o re h e av ily o n o th e r in s tr u m e n ts , s u c h as e co n o m ic a id o r m u tu a l a s s is ta n c e tre a tie s , to a d v a n c e its in te re s ts a b r o a d .137 T h a t is p re c ise ly w h a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id d u rin g th e n e x t year. In h is fa m o u s c o m m e n c e m e n t a d d re s s at H a rv a rd U n iv e rsity o n 5 J u n e 1947, S e c re ta ry o f S ta te M a rsh a ll a n n o u n c e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s p r e p a r e d to e x te n d s u b s ta n tia l a s s is ta n c e to a llev ia te th e crisis a ris in g fro m " th e d islo c a tio n of th e e n tire fab ric of E u ro p e a n eco n o m y." To fulfill M a rsh a ll's p le d g e . S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p la n n e r s fo r­ m u la te d a p ro g ra m th a t a im e d n o t o n ly a t re s to rin g E u ro p e a n p r o s ­ p e rity b u t a lso a t e n c o u ra g in g th e in te g ra tio n of E u ro p e a n e c o n o m ie s, h a ltin g th e s p r e a d of c o m m u n is m , a n d fo rtify in g E u ro p e 's s h a k e n c o n fid e n c e in d e m o c ra tic in s titu tio n s . O n 9 D e c e m b e r 1947 T ru m a n a s k e d C o n g re s s fo r $17 b illio n d u rin g th e n e x t fo u r y e a rs to c a rry o u t th is M a rsh a ll P la n . C o m p a re d to th is e n o rm o u s s u m , m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a c c o u n te d fo r o n ly a sm a ll p o r tio n of th e fo re ig n a id e x p e n ­ d itu r e s , d e s p ite th e in a u g u ra tio n of th e p ro g ra m s fo r G re e c e a n d Turkey. T h is h e a v y re lia n c e o n e co n o m ic a id fo rc e d th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n to d e fe r a n y re q u e s ts fo r a u th o rity o r f u n d s fo r n e w p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id u n til th e M a rsh a ll P la n h a d safely c le a re d C o n g re s s .

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 127 I n s te a d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h o p e d to re ly o n c u rr e n t le g isla tio n a n d e x is tin g re s o u rc e s , d e s p ite th e ir in a d e q u a c ie s, to m e e t u r g e n t fo re ig n n e e d s fo r a rm a m e n ts . A s a re s u lt, in O c to b e r 1947 th e S W N C C p o s tp o n e d in d e fin ite ly f u r th e r c o n s id e ra tio n of th e Ad Hoc C o m m it­ te e 's r e p o r t o n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .138 S till, th e re v ie w of m ilita ry a id p o licy th a t fo llo w ed th e T ru m a n D o c trin e s p e e c h h a d m a jo r c o n s e q u e n c e s . O n e of th e m o s t im p o rta n t w a s th a t it e n c o u ra g e d m o re s y s te m a tic tr e a tm e n t of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e m a tte rs . H o w e v e r te n ta tiv e o r q u e s tio n a b le th e ir c o n c lu ­ sio n s , th e p la n n in g p a p e r s o f 1947 w e re th e first to c o n s id e r m ilita ry a id p r o g r a m s fro m a g lo b a l p e rs p e c tiv e , to w e ig h th e ir re la tiv e sig n ifi­ c a n c e , a n d to a p p ra is e th e ir p o litical, stra te g ic , a n d lo g istical c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s . T h e a p p ro a c h re fle c te d a n a s c e n t c o n v ic tio n —as y e t s tro n g e r a m o n g m ilita ry th a n p o litica l officials—th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s sh o u ld d e v e lo p a n in te g ra te d , w o rld w id e p r o g r a m of a rm s a id . A fte r th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n o p te d in s te a d to c o n c e n tra te A m e ric a n a id o n th e re c o n s tru c tio n of th e E u ro p e a n econom y, m ilita ry officials u r g e d c o n s id e ra tio n of th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . O n 5 A u g u s t 1947 A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry of W ar P e te rs e n w ro te p re s c ie n tly to th e S W N C C , "T h e m a in te n a n c e of e x p e n siv e a rm e d fo rce s, p a rtic u la rly b y n a tio n s n o w e c o n o m ic ally b a n k r u p t, c an b e a s u b s ta n tia l fa c to r in r e ta r d in g p u r e ly e co n o m ic re h a b ilita tio n . In o n e fo rm o r a n o th e r," h e a rg u e d , " th e s u p p o r t of s u c h a rm e d fo rce s m u s t b e fin a n c e d , a n d th e s im p le s t s o lu tio n is to a sk th e U .S . to b e a r th is b u r d e n . . . . It is, th e re fo re , s e lf-e v id e n t th a t th e q u e s tio n of a rm a m e n ts a s s is ta n c e m u s t b e th o ro u g h ly . . . in te g ra te d in o v erall U .S . p r o g r a m s fo r a s s is ta n c e ." 139 Political a n d m ilita ry p la n n e r s a d d re s s e d th is is s u e r e p e a te d ly w h ile im p le m e n tin g th e M a rsh a ll P la n . T h e S W N C C r e p o r ts a lso s tim u la te d e ffo rts to so lv e th e s u p p ly p ro b le m s th a t im p e d e d th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry a id . T h e R e a rm a m e n t S u b c o m m itte e e c h o e d th e c o m p la in ts of u n ifo rm e d o fficers w h e n it w a r n e d th a t " th e U .S . is a lre a d y o v e r-e x te n d e d in its p la n s fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s ." By m id-1 9 4 7 th is d is p a rity b e tw e e n c o m m itm e n ts a n d re s o u rc e s fo rc e d th e a llo c a tio n of m a te rie l a m o n g c o m p e tin g p r o g r a m s . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t e s ta b lis h e d p rio ritie s a m o n g re c ip ie n ts of a rm s a id sim ila r to th o s e re c o m m e n d e d b y th e S W N C C . G re e c e , Turkey, Ira n , a n d Italy r a n k e d h ig h e s t, fo llo w ed b y C h in a , C a n a d a , th e P h ilip p in e s , a n d L a tin A m e ric a . A t th e sa m e tim e, th e a rm y a p p ro v e d a s y s te m of d is trib u tin g sc arce e q u ip m e n t b e tw e e n

128 • Arming the Free World th e s e fo re ig n r e q u ir e m e n ts a n d its o w n d o m e stic n e e d s . B ut th e s e e x p e d ie n ts still left th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n u n a b le to fulfill c u rr e n t o b lig a tio n s , m u c h le ss n e w d e m a n d s , fo r a rm s a id . M o reo v er, th e s e a rr a n g e m e n ts je o p a r d iz e d th e a rm y 's fig h tin g c a p a b ilitie s. A la rm e d lo g istic s o ffice rs w o r r ie d th a t o n e of th e p rin c ip a l e ffects of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e w o u ld b e th e a llo c a tio n of p re c io u s a rm a m e n ts to n a tio n s fac in g C o m m u n is t th r e a ts a t th e e x p e n s e of c o m b a t in v e n to rie s fo r a rm y re s e rv e u n its d e s ig n a te d fo r m o b iliz a tio n in a n a tio n a l e m e r­ gency. To c o n c e rn e d a rm y d iv is io n c h ie fs, s u c h as L u te s, N o rs ta d , a n d H a ll, th e S W N C C s tu d ie s re v e a le d th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o u ld n o t a d e q u a te ly m e e t e ith e r fo re ig n o r d o m e stic m ilita ry n e e d s w ith o u t f u r th e r c h a n g e s in m ilita ry a id p o licies a n d p r o c e d u r e s .140 C o n s e q u e n tly , a n d p e r h a p s m o s t im p o rta n tly , th e S W N C C s tu d ie s s tim u la te d f u r th e r p la n n in g . O n 30 Ju ly th e S W N C C d ire c te d its R e a r­ m a m e n t S u b c o m m itte e to s u b m it specific re c o m m e n d a tio n s c o n c e rn ­ in g m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n , to d e te rm in e a n o rd e r of p rio rity fo r m ili­ ta r y a id to fo re ig n c o u n trie s , a n d to e x a m in e n a tio n a l c a p a b ilitie s fo r s u p p o r tin g lo n g -te rm m e a s u re s of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . In N o v e m b e r 1947 th e S ta te -A rm y -N a v y -A ir F orce C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e , th e s u c c e s s o r to th e S W N C C , a p p o in te d a n o th e r a d h o c c o m m itte e to fo rm u la te a n e w p o licy g o v e rn in g all tra n s fe rs of A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s to fo re ig n n a tio n s . T h e r e s u ltin g r e p o r ts fig u re d p ro m in e n tly in th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a w o rld w id e p r o g r a m of m ilita ry a ssista n c e d u rin g th e s p r in g of 1948.141

I n th e y e a r b e tw e e n th e T u rk ish s tra its crisis a n d th e d e liv e ry of th e first a rm a m e n ts u n d e r th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct, A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p o licy h a d c h a n g e d re m a rk a b ly . In A u g u s t 1946, w h e n th e S o v iet n o te s a rriv e d in Is ta n b u l, a d m in is tra tio n g u id e lin e s p ro h ib ite d th e tra n s fe r of s u b s ta n tia l q u a n titie s of a rm a m e n ts to th e N e a r E ast. S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p o licy a im e d a t lim itin g th e flo w of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t a b ro a d , a n d th e S u r p lu s P r o p e r ty A ct p ro v id e d th e o n ly m e a n s fo r s u p p ly in g m a te rie l to th e N e a r E ast. In A u g u s t 1947, w h e n th e first A m e ric a n s h ip u n lo a d e d its c a rg o at P ira e u s , S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re g u la ­ tio n s n o t o n ly a llo w e d th e tra n s fe r of a rm a m e n ts to G re e c e , Turkey, a n d Ira n b u t a lso to a n y n a tio n " w h o s e in d e p e n d e n c e a n d te rrito ria l in te g rity a re im p o r ta n t to th e s e c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s." T h e G re e k T u rk ish A id A ct a u th o riz e d th e first g r a n ts fo r a rm s a id sin c e le n d -

Reorientation o f American Arms Aid Policy • 129 le a se , a n d p la n n in g c o m m itte e s u r g e d e n a c tm e n t of e v e n b ro a d e r le g isla tio n th a t w o u ld c re a te a w o rld w id e p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to c o u n te r th e s p r e a d of C o m m u n is t in flu e n c e . E v e n th o u g h in O c to b e r 1947 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d e fe rre d s u b m is s io n of a g lo b al a rm s bill, m a n y n a tio n a l se c u rity officials h a d le a rn e d d u rin g th e p re v io u s y e a r to th in k of m ilita ry a id as a n e ffe ctiv e —a n d p o te n tia lly e x te n s iv e —in s tr u m e n t of c o n ta in m e n t.142 A c c o m p a n y in g th is c h a n g e in o u tlo o k w a s a s h ift in b u re a u c ra tic a lig n m e n ts . By m id -1947 se rv ice a u th o ritie s , w h o h a d p re v io u s ly b e e n th e fo re m o s t a d v o c a te s o f m ilita ry a id , o fte n r e g a rd e d s u c h a ssista n c e as a th r e a t to th e ir in te re s ts . B ecau se of th e d w in d lin g of s u r p lu s sto c k s a n d th e p o s s ib ility of e n o rm o u s fo re ig n d e m a n d fo r A m e ric a n a rm a ­ m e n ts , m ilita ry a u th o ritie s b e g a n to d ire c t th e ir e n e rg ie s to w a rd e s ta b ­ lis h in g a b a la n c e b e tw e e n c o m m itm e n ts a n d re s o u rc e s . D ip lo m atic officials, w h o h a d e a rlie r tr ie d to lim it th e e ffo rts of th e se rv ic e s to s e n d a rm s o v e rs e a s, n o w to o k th e le a d in p la n n in g p r o g r a m s of m ilita ry a id . In th e ir view , s u c h h e lp w a s p rim a rily a p o litical a n d p sy c h o lo g ic al in s tr u m e n t th a t ra is e d fo re ig n m o ra le a n d s tr e n g th e n e d tie s to th e U n ite d S ta te s . T h e e m e rg e n c e o f c o n ta in m e n t, in s h o rt, g e n e ra lly s h ifte d th e in itia tiv e in m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e fro m th e so ld ie rs to th e d ip lo m a ts . D e sp ite s u c h c h a n g e s , m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p o licy still s u ffe re d fro m a f u n d a m e n ta l c o n tra d ic tio n . A lth o u g h m ilita ry a id a s s u m e d n e w im p o rta n c e in A m e ric a n n a tio n a l s e c u rity p o licy b y m id-1947, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id n o t ta k e a d e q u a te s te p s to e n la rg e its g lo b al c a p a b ilitie s to tr a n s fe r a rm a m e n ts . T h e e x p a n siv e rh e to ric of th e Tru­ m a n D o c trin e ra is e d fo re ig n e x p e c ta tio n s of a m b itio u s n e w p ro g ra m s of a rm s a ssis ta n c e ; b u t a d m in is tra tio n officials w o rrie d a b o u t th e h e a v y b u r d e n of o v e rs e a s c o m m itm e n ts a n d th e p e rils of s e c u rin g f u n d s fro m a p a rs im o n io u s C o n g re s s . M ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s , th e n , w h ile g a in in g n e w p u r p o s e a n d c o h e re n c e fro m c o n ta in m e n t, w e re in d a n ­ g e r of lo s in g th e ir e ffe c tiv e n e ss b e c a u se of a d m in is tra tiv e , lo g istical, a n d fin a n c ia l d iffic u lties. N o t u n til it fa c e d a crisis o v e r E u ro p e a n s e c u rity in th e s p r in g of 1948 d id th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n act to close th e g a p b e tw e e n m e a n s a n d e n d s .

5

1The Decision for a Global IMilitary Assistance Program For the U.S. to embark on a potentially world-wide program of providing military assistance to free nations is an action of transcendent importance in U.S. history. —Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee, 16 February 1949

late 1947 A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m s h a d re a c h e d a crisis. D e sp ite th e e ffo rts of th e S ta te -W a r-N a v y C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e , th e re w a s n o " n a tio n a l p o lic y g o v e rn in g th e b ro a d su b je c t of U .S . m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s ," o b s e rv e d C o lo n e l H . G . S p a r­ ro w of th e a rm y P la n s a n d O p e r a tio n s D iv isio n , n o r w e re th e re e s ta b ­ lis h e d g o v e rn m e n ta l p ro c e d u re s fo r m a k in g d e c isio n s o n a rm s aid . E m e rg e n c y a s s is ta n c e o n a c o u n try -b y -c o u n try b a sis. S p a rro w c o n ­ tin u e d , p r e v e n te d s y s te m a tic e ffo rts to b a la n c e c o m m itm e n ts a g a in s t re s o u rc e s a n d p o s tp o n e d c o n s id e ra tio n of p e r m a n e n t s o lu tio n s to fo re ig n a rm a m e n t n e e d s . T h e d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s m a te rie l, th e s h a rp c o n tra c tio n of m u n itio n s in d u s trie s sin c e 1945, a n d th e lack of " b ro a d le g islativ e a u th o rity u n d e r w h ic h th e P re s id e n t, in tim e of p e a c e , m ay ex ercise d is c re tio n a ry a u th o rity " in tra n s fe rrin g m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t th r e a te n e d n o t o n ly c u rr e n t p ro g ra m s b u t also f u tu r e e ffo rts to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s . S p a rro w c o n c lu d e d th a t d ra s tic re fo rm s w e re n e e d e d to m a in ta in m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e as a n effectiv e, c o n tin u in g in s tr u m e n t of n a tio n a l p o licy .1 T h e p ro b le m s of p ro v id in g a rm a m e n ts to E u ro p e c o n firm e d th e a c c u ra c y of th e s e w a rn in g s . C o n v in c e d th a t a d e cisiv e p o litical stru g g le fo r th e c o n tro l of th e c o n tin e n t h a d b e g u n , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n m a d e a m b itio u s p la n s fo r e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to se v e ra l E u ro p e a n n a tio n s in late 1947 a n d e a rly 1948. S ta te D e p a rtm e n t offi­ cials to o k th e le a d in a d v o c a tin g e x p a n d e d a rm s a id to G re e c e a n d e m e rg e n c y h e lp to Italy, D e n m a rk , a n d N o rw a y in th e h o p e of s tr e n g th e n in g th e ir re s is ta n c e to C o m m u n is t p r e s s u r e s a n d in s u rin g th e ir o rie n ta tio n to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s. L eg al a n d lo g istical o b sta -

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A Global Military Assistance Program

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d e s , ho w ev er, d e la y e d , re s tric te d , o r p r e v e n te d th e s e tra n s a c tio n s . M ilita ry a u th o ritie s s p a r e d n o e ffo rt in e x p la in in g to th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t th e re a s o n s fo r th e ir in a b ility to s u p p ly a rm s to th e se c o u n trie s a n d in p r o p o s in g s w e e p in g c h a n g e s . T h eir s u g g e s tio n s , w h ic h h a d p re v io u s ly y ie ld e d few re s u lts , n o w im p re s s e d d ip lo m a tic officials, w h o in c re a s in g ly c o n s id e re d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a n im p o rta n t in s tr u ­ m e n t of c o n ta in m e n t. T he fin a l im p e tu s fo r a m a jo r re v is io n of m ilita ry a ss is ta n c e p o licy a n d p ro c e d u re s c a m e in th e s p rin g of 1948 w h e n th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n d e c id e d to n e g o tia te a N o rth A tla n tic d e fe n se tre a ty a n d to p ro v id e th e s ig n a to rie s w ith e x te n siv e a rm s a id . T h e N a tio n a l S e c u rity C o u n c il (N S C ) p ro m p tly u r g e d T ru m a n to se e k fro m C o n g re s s n o t s im p ly a N o r th A tla n tic a rm s bill b u t a b ro a d e r m e a s u re th a t w o u ld p ro v id e th e p r e s id e n t w ith th e g e n e ra l a u th o rity a n d f u n d s h e lac k ed to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s . T he N S C a lso p r o p o s e d th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a c o o rd in a te d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p r o g r a m —o n e in w h ic h W e ste rn E u ro p e w o u ld h a v e first p rio rity —a im e d at s tr e n g th e n in g "p o litical re s is ta n c e to c o m m u n is t a g g re s s io n now , a n d m ilita ry re s is ta n c e la te r if n e c e s s a ry ." 2 T ru m a n 's a c c e p ta n c e of th e s e re c o m m e n d a tio n s r e p r e ­ s e n te d th e c u lm in a tio n of e ffo rts, b e g u n in th e w ak e of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e s p e e c h , to e s ta b lis h a n in te g ra te d , w o rld w id e p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .

D u r i n g th e la te s u m m e r a n d e a rly a u tu m n of 1947, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n b e c a m e a c u te ly a p p re h e n s iv e o v e r S o v iet a m b itio n s in E u ro p e . T he m o s t im m e d ia te d a n g e r, a c c o rd in g to h ig h -ra n k in g civil­ ia n a n d m ilita ry officials, w a s a d e s p e ra te S o v iet a tte m p t to fru s tra te th e p ro s p e c tiv e M a rsh a ll P la n fo r th e r e c o n s tru c tio n of E u ro p e . A lth o u g h d is c o u n tin g th e p o s s ib ility of S o v iet m ilita ry a ctio n , th e s e to p p o lic y m a k e rs fe a re d th a t local C o m m u n is t p a rtie s w o u ld s te p u p th e ir e ffo rts to se ize p o w e r in c o u n trie s s u c h as Italy, G re e c e , a n d F ra n c e , w h e re e co n o m ic d is tre s s w a s se v e re a n d po litical sta b ility fra g ile .3 T he fo rm a tio n in S e p te m b e r 1947 of th e C o m in fo rm , a c e n tra l d ire c to ra te of C o m m u n is t p a rtie s u n d e r M o sc o w 's c o n tro l, re in fo rc e d th e b e lie f in W a s h in g to n th a t th e E u ro p e a n C o m m u n is ts h a d b e g u n a " c o n c e rte d e ffo rt to s u b v e rt d e m o c ra tic g o v e rn m e n ts b e fo re . . . a c o o p e ra tiv e re c o v e ry p r o g r a m c a n g e t u n d e r w ay."4 T h e C e n tra l In te l­ lig e n c e A g e n c y s u m m e d u p th e p re v a ilin g v iew w ith in th e a d m in istra -

132 • Arming the Free World tio n b y d e c la rin g o n 26 S e p te m b e r th a t " th e g re a te s t p r e s e n t d a n g e r to U .S . s e c u rity lies, n o t in th e m ilita ry s tr e n g th of th e U .S .S .R . a n d th e p o s s ib ility o f S o v iet a rm e d a g g re s s io n , b u t in th e p o s s ib ility of th e e co n o m ic c o lla p se of W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d of th e c o n s e q u e n t a c c e ssio n to p o w e r of e le m e n ts s u b s e rv ie n t to th e K re m lin ." 5 "T h e m a rg in of sa fe ty in E u ro p e , " a d d e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's Policy P la n n in g Staff, " b o th fro m a n e c o n o m ic a n d p o litical v ie w p o in t, is e x tre m e ly th in ." R a th e r th a n e a s in g te n s io n s in E u ro p e , th e p ro m is e of M a rsh a ll P la n a id h a d h e lp e d in c re a s e th e m .6 To m e e t th is critical s itu a tio n , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n re s o lv e d to c o n so lid a te th e o p p o s itio n to S o v iet e x p a n s io n . C h a rle s E. B o h len , o n e of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's le a d in g e x p e rts o n S o v iet affairs, e m p h a ­ s iz e d to a g ro u p of s e n io r officials—in c lu d in g S e c re ta ry of W ar K e n n e th C . R oyall, A rm y C h ie f of S taff D w ig h t D. E isen h o w er, a n d A c tin g S e c re ta ry of S ta te R o b e rt A . L o v e tt—a t a P e n ta g o n m e e tin g o n 30 A u g u s t 1947 th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld b a s e its p o licies o n th e " c o m p le te d is u n ity " b e tw e e n th e S o v ie ts a n d th e re s t of th e w o rld . To c o u n te r th e " c e n tra liz e d a n d r u th le s s d ire c tio n " of th e S o v iet blo c, th e s e to p officials a g re e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld u s e its fo re ig n a id to in c re a s e th e p o litical, e co n o m ic , a n d m ilita ry u n ity of th e " n o n S o v iet w o rld ." W h ile fo rg in g th e s e lin k s, B o h le n c a u tio n e d , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d to act c a re fu lly so as to av o id c ritic ism fo r d iv id in g E u ro p e in to h o stile c a m p s . T h e su c c e ss of th is e ffo rt to b u ild a n a n ti-C o m m u n is t bloc w o u ld d e te rm in e th e o u tc o m e of "a m a jo r p o litical s h o w d o w n crisis" b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e S o v iet U n io n , w h ic h B o h le n b e lie v e d w o u ld co m e to a h e a d d u rin g th e n e x t se v e ra l m o n th s .7 S e c re ta ry of S ta te G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll p r e s e n te d a sim ila r a n a ly s is to a C a b in e t m e e tin g o n 7 N o v e m b er, as h e u r g e d th e s tr e n g th e n in g o f local re s is ta n c e to c o m m u n is m . " O u r policy," M a r­ sh a ll a s s e rte d , " m u s t b e d ire c te d to w a rd re s to rin g a b a la n c e of p o w e r in E u ro p e a n d A sia." T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b e lie v e d th a t n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e S o v ie ts w e re all b u t fu tile .8 A s a s te p to w a rd re s to rin g stability, T ru m a n a s k e d a sp e cia l s e s s io n of C o n g re s s to p ro v id e e m e rg e n c y e co n o m ic a id to E u ro p e . A t a W h ite H o u s e m e e tin g in S e p te m b e r, h e e x p la in e d to le a d e rs of C o n g re s s h is r e a s o n s fo r r e q u e s tin g s u c h a s s is ta n c e . "W e'll e ith e r h a v e to p ro v id e a p r o g r a m o f in te rim a id re lie f u n til th e M a rsh a ll p r o g r a m g e ts g o in g , " T ru m a n d e c la re d , " o r th e g o v e rn m e n ts of F ra n c e a n d Italy w ill fall, A u s tria to o , a n d fo r all p ra c tic a l p u r p o s e s E u ro p e w ill b e C o m m u n is t.

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T h e M a rsh a ll P la n g o e s o u t o f th e w in d o w , a n d it's a q u e s tio n of h o w lo n g w e c o u ld s ta n d u p in s u c h a s itu a tio n . T h is is se rio u s. I c a n 't o v e re m p h a s iz e h o w s e rio u s ." 9 T h ese a c u te fe a rs o f a C o m m u n is t E u ro p e h e lp e d th e a d m in is tra tio n o v e rc o m e m u c h of th e p a rtis a n o p p o s itio n w ith in th e R e p u b lic a n c o n tro lle d E ig h tie th C o n g re s s . T ru m a n g a in e d n o m o re v a lu a b le ally o n C a p ito l H ill th a n S e n a to r A r th u r H . V a n d e n b e rg , (R -M ich.), c h a ir­ m a n of th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , w h o w o rrie d th a t "if o u r f rie n d s in W e ste rn E u ro p e a re a llo w e d to sta rv e a n d fre e z e to d e a th th is w in te r, th e C o m m ie s w ill b e c o m p le te ly b a c k in th e sa d d le ." Like m a n y fiscal c o n se rv a tiv e s, V a n d e n b e rg w a s c o n c e rn e d a b o u t s q u a n d e rin g p re c io u s re s o u rc e s in a fu tile a tte m p t to p r e v e n t s u c h a tak eo v er. Still, h e p r e f e r r e d th e " c a lc u la te d risk " o f e x te n d in g a id to " d o [in g ] n o th in g a n d u ltim a te ly f i n d in g ] o u rs e lv e s iso la te d in a C o m m u n is t w o r ld ." 10 O n 17 D e c e m b e r T ru m a n s ig n e d th e F o re ig n A id A ct of 1947, w h ic h a u th o riz e d $597 m illio n in e m e rg e n c y a s s is ta n c e fo r A u s tria , Italy, a n d F ra n c e .11 O n th e h e e ls of th is victory, h e p r o p o s e d to C o n g re s s a fa r m o re a m b itio u s m e a s u re o f c o n ta in m e n t: M a rsh a ll P la n a id a m o u n tin g to $17 b illio n d u rin g th e n e x t fo u r y e a r s .12 A lth o u g h th e s e a c tio n s fo rtifie d so m e b e le a g u e re d g o v e rn m e n ts , th e y a lso h e lp e d d e e p e n th e E u ro p e a n crisis. By la te 1947 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n b e lie v e d th a t th e p ro s p e c t of A m e ric a n a id h a d b lu n te d C o m m u n is t e ffo rts to g a in p o w e r in W e ste rn E u ro p e th r o u g h leg iti­ m a te p o litica l p ro c e s s e s . In a se rie s of e s tim a te s , th e C IA r e p e a te d ly p ro c la im e d th e " m a rk e d d e te rio ra tio n " of th e C o m m u n is t p o litical p o s itio n in E u ro p e . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's Policy P la n n in g S taff a g re e d th a t th e "p o litic a l a d v a n c e of th e C o m m u n is ts in W e ste rn E u ro p e h a s b e e n at le a s t te m p o ra rily h a lte d ." N e v e rth e le s s , in te l­ lig e n c e a u th o ritie s to o k little c o m fo rt fro m th is p o litical v ic to ry sin c e th e y e x p e c te d th a t th e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n is t p a rtie s w o u ld tu r n in d e s p e r a tio n to m o re m ilita n t tactics. In F ra n c e , th e C IA re p o r te d , a w av e of s trik e s a n d d is o rd e rs in la te 1947 w a s a h a rb in g e r of th is sh ift. A lth o u g h th e g o v e rn m e n t of P re m ie r R o b e rt S c h u m a n h a d ra llie d su ffic ie n t s u p p o r t to q u e ll th e s e d is tu rb a n c e s , th e C o m m u n is ts c o u ld still c a u se e c o n o m ic d is lo c a tio n s th r o u g h w o rk s to p p a g e s a n d in d u s ­ tria l sa b o ta g e . In Italy, a c c o rd in g to th e C IA , w h e re th e C o m m u n is ts h a d e n o u g h s tr e n g th to la u n c h a g e n e ra l strik e o r a n a rm e d u p ris in g , th e g o v e rn m e n t's a b ility to m e e t e ith e r c h a lle n g e w a s " q u e s tio n a b le ." T h e Policy P la n n in g S taff p r e d ic te d th a t " a n in te n s ifie d p u s h a g a in st

134 • Arming the Free World G re e c e " m ig h t a c c o m p a n y C o m m u n is t d is tu rb a n c e s in F ra n c e o r Italy. A m e ric a n a id , th e n , m ig h t e v e n tu a lly b rin g e co n o m ic re c o v e ry a n d p o litica l stability, b u t n o t u n le s s se v e ra l E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s s u rv iv e d a p e rio d of tu rm o il a n d e v e n in s u r r e c tio n .13 To h e lp th e s e n a tio n s w ith s ta n d th e s e c h a lle n g e s , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n a lso e x p a n d e d p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id . T h e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t w a s o n e of th e first b e n e fic ia rie s. W h ile p la n n in g th e G re e k p ro g ra m , a d m in is tra tio n officials h a d all to o e asily c o n c lu d e d th a t th e s im p le e x te n s io n of A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e w o u ld e n a b le g o v e rn ­ m e n t fo rc e s to se ize th e in itia tiv e in th e civil w ar. D e sp ite th e a rriv a l of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v is e rs in M a y 1947 a n d th e d e liv e ry of th e first s h ip lo a d of a rm a m e n ts in A u g u s t, ho w ev er, th e m ilita ry s itu a tio n d e te rio ra te d sh a rp ly . G u e rrilla re c ru itin g s o a re d , a n d in s u r g e n t s tr e n g th b y th e e n d of 1947 re a c h e d 22,500 m e n , a n in c re a se of 50 p e rc e n t o v e r th e n u m b e r of so ld ie rs at th e tim e of th e p a s s a g e of th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct. R a th e r th a n ta k in g th e o ffe n siv e a g a in s t th e in s u r g e n ts , th e G re e k N a tio n a l A rm y fo llo w ed a d e fe n siv e s tra te g y of p ro te c tin g v illa g e s. G e n e ra l W illiam G . Livesay, th e h e a d of th e A m e ri­ c a n M ilita ry A d v is o ry G ro u p , c o n c lu d e d in f r u s tr a tio n th a t th e G N A w o u ld n o t b e " p r o p e r ly a n d v ig o ro u s ly " u s e d u n le s s th e U n ite d S ta te s c o n s e n te d to a n in c re a s e in its size. In O c to b e r 1947 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id a g re e to th e c re a tio n of a 2 1 ,0 0 0 -m an N a tio n a l D e fe n se C o rp s (N D C ) th a t c o u ld g u a rd to w n s a n d v illa g e s a n d so e n a b le th e G N A to p u r s u e th e g u e rrilla s. F u n d s o rig in a lly e a rm a rk e d fo r civ ilian p ro je c ts in s te a d p a id fo r th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of th e N D C . So w o rrie d w e re A m e ric a n p o lic y m a k e rs a b o u t th e in s u rg e n c y b y late 1947 th a t th e y b e lie v e d th a t in te rn a l s e c u rity m u s t tak e p rio rity o v er e co n o m ic re c o n s tr u c tio n .14 To in s u re th e v ig o ro u s p ro s e c u tio n of th e w ar, T ru m a n a u th o riz e d A m e ric a n a rm y o fficers to fu r n is h o p e ra tio n a l ad v ic e to G re e k c o m b a t u n its . In a p p ro v in g th is e x p a n s io n of th e A m e ric a n role in th e civil w ar, T ru m a n a c te d o n th e u n a n im o u s re c o m m e n d a tio n s of m ilita ry a n d d ip lo m a tic e x p e rts in G re e c e . D w ig h t R G risw o ld , th e c h ie f of th e A m e ric a n a id m is sio n , first p r o p o s e d th is s te p in m id -S e p te m b e r, o w in g to h is b e lie f th a t o n ly A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n in th e d ire c tio n of c o m b a t o p e ra tio n s c o u ld re v e rs e th e d e te rio ra tio n in th e m ilita ry s itu a ­ tio n . A m b a s s a d o r L in co ln M acV eagh a g re e d , n o tin g th a t "ec o n o m ic r e c o n s tru c tio n c a n n o t s u c c e e d in th e a b s e n c e of o rd e r a n d tra n q u ility , w h ile e co n o m ic c h a o s fav o rs th e s p re a d of C o m m u n is m a n d th e re c ru it-

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m e n t of th e re b e l fo rce s." P e rh a p s m o s t in flu e n tia l w a s th e r e p o r t of G e n e ra l S te p h e n J. C h a m b e rlin , th e c h ie f of a rm y in te llig e n c e , w h o v is ite d G re e c e in S e p te m b e r a n d u r g e d th a t A m e ric a n a rm y a d v is e rs h e lp re s to re " th e o ffe n siv e s p irit" in th e G N A b y " a d v is in g o n p la n ­ n in g a n d o p e ra tio n s ." C h a m b e rlin ju s tifie d th is p ro p o s a l b y is s u in g a s ta rk w a rn in g : "T h e U n ite d S ta te s h a s o n ly tw o a lte rn a tiv e s —th e y [sic] s h o u ld g e t o u t of G re e c e o r s ta y a n d b e p r e p a r e d to c o m m it th e m e a n s to w in ." D ra w in g o n C h a m b e rlin 's a n a ly sis, th e N S C re c o m m e n d e d o n 30 O c to b e r th a t A m e ric a n m ilita ry p e rs o n n e l fu rn is h stra te g ic a n d tac tic al a d v ic e to G N A u n its d o w n to d iv is io n le v e l.15 C o n g re s s io n a l o p p o s itio n to th is c h a n g e in th e a d v is o ry g ro u p 's a c tiv itie s w a s lim ite d a n d tra n s ito ry . A t first, V a n d e n b e rg w a s fu rio u s. In a m e e tin g o n 10 N o v e m b e r w ith S e c re ta ry of th e A rm y Royall, h e e v e n s p e c u la te d th a t C o n g re s s m ig h t n o t h a v e p a s s e d th e G re e k T u rk ish A id A ct h a d it k n o w n th a t th e sm a ll a d v is o ry g ro u p p ro v id in g lo g istic al a id th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n c o n te m p la te d in M a y w o u ld g ro w in to a siz a b le m is s io n f u r n is h in g o p e ra tio n a l a d v ic e b y N o v em b er. H e th e n a s k e d R oyall fo r a w r itte n e x p la n a tio n fo r th e c h a n g e a n d a n n o u n c e d th a t h e in te n d e d to ta k e u p th e m a tte r th e n e x t m o rn in g w ith th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e . B ut a fte r v e n tin g h is fury, V a n d e n b e rg c h a n g e d h is m in d a b o u t th e c o m m itte e m e e tin g a n d th e e x p la n a to ry le tte r a n d a c q u ie s c e d in th e e x p a n s io n of th e A m e ric a n m ilita ry role in G re e c e . H is c o u n te r p a r t o n th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e , C h a rle s A . E a to n , (R-N.J.), e x p re s s e d c o m p le te s u p p o r t. T h e D e p a rtm e n t o f th e A rm y is s u e d a ro u tin e a n n o u n c e m e n t a b o u t th e c h a n g e in th e re s p o n s ib ilitie s of th e m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p , a n d C o n g re s s to o k n o a c tio n .16 T he in c re a s e in m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e o c c u rre d d e s p ite p e rs is te n t A m e ric a n c ritic ism of th e A th e n s g o v e rn m e n t. B oth L iv esay a n d G ris w o ld d e p lo re d th e in e rtia of th e G re e k G e n e ra l Staff. L ivesay p a rtic u la rly r e s e n te d th e g r a n tin g o f s u b s id ie s fo r a n in c re a s e in th e G re e k a rm e d fo rc e s, a c o n c e s s io n e x tra c te d fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s, h e in s is te d , o n ly fo r p o litica l re a s o n s . In s p ite of th e S e p te m b e r 1947 fo rm a tio n of a c o a litio n g o v e rn m e n t b e tw e e n th e tw o la rg e s t p a rtie s , th e P o p u lis ts a n d th e L ib e rals, G ris w o ld c o n tin u a lly u s e d A m e ric a n e co n o m ic a id as " a c lu b " to m itig a te p o litical in fig h tin g a n d p r e v e n t th e s e iz u re of p o w e r b y th e e x tre m e rig h t. E v e n T ru m a n d e n o u n c e d th e e x ce sse s of th e G re e k le a d e rs a n d c o n s id e re d th e m "acco m p lices" in c re a tin g th e tu rm o il th a t e n g u lfe d G re e c e . H e o b je c te d to th e m a ss

136 • Arming the Free World a rr e s t in Ju ly of 14,000 p e o p le , m a n y of w h o m h a d n o th in g to d o w ith th e in su rg e n c y . In a n o te to A d m ira l W illiam D. L eahy, h is c h ie f of staff, T ru m a n e x p lo d e d : " G re e k s a n d Je w s s u ffe r fro m a n in fe rio rity co m p lex as w ell a s a p e rs e c u tio n com plex. I 'v e trie d to h e lp th e m b o th a n d so fa r th e y 'v e o n ly g iv e n m e a p a in in th e —n e c k ." Still, h o w e v e r d e te s ta b le th e p o lic ies of th e A th e n s ru le rs , th e c o n s e q u e n c e s of a C o m m u n is t in s u rg e n c y g a in in g p o w e r w e re in to le ra b le . A c c o rd in g to th e C IA , G re e c e w a s a critical te s t of th e a b ility of th e U n ite d S ta te s to c o n ta in S o v iet e x p a n s io n : "T h e c o n tin u e d a b ility of G re e c e to re s is t w ith U S a id w ill th e re fo re b e c lo sely w a tc h e d b y b o th th e E a s te rn a n d W e ste rn b lo cs a n d w ill h a v e a n im p o r ta n t in flu e n c e o n th e f u tu r e su c c e ss of U S fo re ig n p o licy in E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E a s t." 17 So critical d id th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o n s id e r th e G re e k s itu a ­ tio n in late 1947 a n d e a rly 1948 th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, th e Policy P la n n in g Staff, th e C IA , a n d th e N S C all s tu d ie d th e p o ss ib ility of s e n d in g A m e ric a n tr o o p s to G re e c e . S u c h d ra s tic a c tio n w a s c o n te m ­ p la te d b e c a u se th e d e p lo ra b le s ta te of th e econom y, " a fe e lin g of in s e c u ­ rity a m o n g th e p e o p le , fric tio n a m o n g s h o rt-s ig h te d p o litica l fa c tio n s, se lfis h n e s s a n d c o rr u p tio n in G o v e rn m e n t, a n d a d e a r th of effectiv e le a d e rs" h a d b r o u g h t G re e c e to th e e d g e of c o llap se. T h e o n ly w ay to o v e rc o m e s u c h e n o rm o u s d iffic u lties, a c c o rd in g to L oy W. H e n d e rs o n , th e d ire c to r of th e O ffice of N e a r E a s te rn a n d A fric a n A ffairs, w a s fo r th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n to re so lv e to u s e A m e ric a n a rm e d fo rce s, if n e c e ssa ry , to p r e v e n t a n in s u r g e n t victo ry . H e n d e rs o n a rg u e d th a t a s s u ra n c e s of s u c h s u p p o r t w o u ld ra ise G re e k m o ra le a n d g a lv a n iz e re s is ta n c e to th e g u e rrilla s . H e a lso felt th a t s u c h a s tro n g s ta n d w o u ld p a y p o litical d iv id e n d s e ls e w h e re sin c e G re e c e w a s " th e te s t tu b e w h ic h th e p e o p le s of th e w h o le w o rld a re w a tc h in g in o rd e r to a s c e rta in w h e th e r th e d e te rm in a tio n of th e W e ste rn p o w e rs to re s is t a g g re s s io n e q u a ls th a t of in te rn a tio n a l C o m m u n is m to a c q u ire n e w te rrito ry a n d n e w b a s e s fo r f u r th e r a g g re s s io n ." W h ile a g re e in g th a t " a C o m m u n is t v ic to ry in G re e c e w o u ld b e in te r p r e te d e v e ry w h e re as a sig n of A m e ri­ c a n w e a k n e s s ," th e Policy P la n n in g S taff w o rrie d a b o u t d e c id in g in a d v a n c e to s e n d tro o p s a n d th e d iffic u ltie s of e x tra c tin g th e m . To th e s e re s e rv a tio n s , M a rs h a ll a d d e d th a t, b e c a u se of th e lack of re s e rv e s , th e d is p a tc h o f c o m b a t fo rc e s to G re e c e w o u ld fo rec lo se a c tio n in o th e r tro u b le s p o ts , s u c h as Italy a n d P a le stin e . E v e n s tro n g e r o b je c tio n s c a m e fro m th e Jo in t C h ie fs. A c c o rd in g to th e m , th e c o m m itm e n t of A m e ric a n tro o p s to G re e c e w o u ld b e " m ilita rily u n s o u n d ," sin c e th e

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U n ite d S ta te s n e e d e d to m o b iliz e its s tr e n g th b e fo re ris k in g a m a jo r w ar. T h is v ie w p re v a ile d . T ru m a n a p p ro v e d o n 16 F e b ru a ry 1948 o n e N S C p a p e r, w h ic h d e fe rre d a n y d e c isio n a b o u t s e n d in g tro o p s to G re e c e , a n d o n 21 J u n e a n o th e r, w h ic h r u le d o u t s u c h a c o m m itm e n t b a rr in g a s h a r p c h a n g e in th e civil w ar. In s te a d , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra ­ tio n h o p e d th a t a o n e -y e a r e x te n s io n of its a id p ro g ra m a n d a n e w a p p ro p r ia tio n —$150 m illio n fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e —w o u ld c alm th e tu rm o il in G r e e c e .18 E v e n m o re a la rm in g to T ru m a n a n d h is to p a d v is e rs w as th e p o liti­ cal a n d e c o n o m ic tu rb u le n c e in Italy. B eset b y h ig h u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d a se v e re deficit in its b a la n c e o f p a y m e n ts , Italy la c k e d th e m e a n s to o b ta in m a n y b a sic c o m m o d itie s —coal, fo o d s tu ffs , p e tro le u m p r o d ­ u c ts —w ith o u t s u b s ta n tia l o u ts id e h e lp .19 Its p o litical s itu a tio n w a s e q u a lly p re c a rio u s , o w in g to th e co n flict b e tw e e n th e tw o p rin c ip a l riv als fo r p o w er, th e C h ris tia n D e m o c ra ts a n d th e C o m m u n is ts (PCI). W ith A m e ric a n e n c o u ra g e m e n t, A lcid e D e G a s p e ri, th e C h ris tia n D e m o cratic p rim e m in iste r, e x c lu d e d th e C o m m u n is ts fro m h is g o v e rn ­ m e n t in M ay 194720 T h e C o m m u n is ts in tu r n la u n c h e d a c a m p a ig n of p r o p a g a n d a , d e m o n s tra tio n s , a n d strik e s th a t, th e Policy P la n n in g S taff w a rn e d , m ig h t b e th e p re lu d e to a n a rm e d in s u rre c tio n a n d " th e c o m p le te s u b ju g a tio n of Ita ly to S o v iet c o n tro l." P a rty le a d e r P a lm iro T ogliatti p riv a te ly fa v o re d g re a te r m o d e ra tio n , b u t p r e s s u r e fro m S o v iet s p o n s o r s a n d P C I h a rd -lin e rs fo rc e d h im to e n d o rs e p u b lic ly th e m ilita n t tac tic s th a t a ro u s e d A m e ric a n fe a rs of a c o u p d 'é ta t .21 C o n ­ v in c e d th a t d e m o c ra c y in Ita ly —p e r h a p s e v e n in E u ro p e —h u n g in th e b a la n c e , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n r e s p o n d e d n o t o n ly w ith eco n o m ic a id b u t a lso w ith m ilita ry a ss is ta n c e . B oth th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d G re a t B rita in h a d b e e n p ro v id in g s u r ­ p lu s a rm a m e n ts to th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rce s sin c e th e e n d of th e S e c o n d W o rld W ar. In th e s p r in g of 1947, h o w ev er, th e B ritish a n n o u n c e d th a t th e y h a d e x h a u s te d th e ir s u r p lu s sto c k s of m a n y ty p e s of e q u ip m e n t a n d th a t fin a n c ia l d iffic u ltie s p r e v e n te d th e m fro m m e e tin g th e o u t­ s ta n d in g re q u ir e m e n ts of th e Ita lia n a rm y fro m o th e r so u rc e s. W h a t m a d e th e B ritish d e fa u lt se rio u s w a s th e im p e n d in g ra tific a tio n of th e Ita lia n P eace Treaty, w h ic h re q u ir e d th e e v a c u a tio n , w ith in n in e ty d a y s a fte r it e n te r e d in to fo rce, of B ritish a n d A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s . W ith o u t a d d itio n a l e q u ip m e n t, a llied m ilita ry a u th o ritie s re p o rte d , th e Ita lia n a rm y w o u ld n o t " b e c a p a b le of s ta n d in g o n its o w n feet o n c e th e A llies w ith d ra w ." 22

138 • Arming the Free World T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t s tr e s s e d th e p o litica l v a lu e of b u ild in g u p th e Ita lia n arm y. D e e p ly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t C o m m u n is t s tr e n g th in Italy, M a rsh a ll in s tr u c te d A m b a s s a d o r Jam es C . D u n n o n 20 M a y to o ffer D e G a s p e ri a d d itio n a l s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts , a m o n g o th e r m e a s u re s of a s s is ta n c e , a s a n in d u c e m e n t to re o rg a n iz e h is c a b in e t. D u n n u r g e d s p e e d y d e liv e ry of th is m ilita ry a id fo llo w in g th e e lim in a tio n of th e C o m m u n is ts fro m D e G a s p e r i's g o v e rn m e n t. "T h e g e n e ra l p o litical s itu a tio n of th e G o v e rn m e n t, a n d th e d e p lo ra b le in a d e q u a c y of th e p r e s e n t Ita lia n m ilita ry fo rc e s to a s s u m e re s p o n s ib ility fo r th e m a in te ­ n a n c e o f o rd e r a n d e v e n to k e n p ro te c tio n o f Ita ly 's n o r th e a s t fro n tie r, " h e c a b le d o n 19 Ju n e , " m a k e it in d is p e n s a b le to h a s te n th e A llie d p r o g r a m o f p r o v id in g fo r th e tr a n s fe r to Ita lia n tr o o p s of c o m b a t m a te ­ rial in th is th e a tre ." T h ro u g h h is p e rs o n a l in te rv e n tio n , D u n n h e lp e d a rra n g e a n a g re e m e n t o n 21 Ju ly th a t p ro v id e d fo r th e sale to th e Ita lia n g o v e rn m e n t of so m e $184 m illio n w o r th of a rm y a n d a ir fo rce e q u ip ­ m e n t fo r $18 m illio n .23 W ar D e p a r tm e n t officials, h o w ev er, w e re u n w illin g to fulfill th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p ro m is e s to Ita ly a t th e e x p e n s e of f u r th e r e ro s io n of th e ir lim ite d re s e rv e s of e q u ip m e n t. D e e p c u ts in th e a rm y 's p r o c u r e ­ m e n t b u d g e t fo r fiscal y e a r 1948, im p o s e d b y th e B u re au of th e B u d g e t a n d a p p ro v e d b y C o n g re s s , m a d e so m e ty p e s of m a te rie l sc arce a n d im p o s sib le to re p la c e . S e c re ta ry of W ar R o b e rt R P a tte rs o n in fo rm e d M a rsh a ll o n 23 J u n e th a t m e d iu m ta n k s a n d h o w itz e rs in A m e ric a n d e p o ts in Italy w e re n e e d e d fo r o th e r W ar D e p a rtm e n t p ro g ra m s . D is re g a rd in g M a rsh a ll's p le a th a t a w e ll-e q u ip p e d Ita lia n a rm y w a s " im p o r ta n t to th e n a tio n a l in te r e s t," th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t o rd e re d th e r e tu r n to th e U n ite d S ta te s of a rm o r a n d a rtille ry th a t th e Ita lia n a rm y r e q u ire d . T h e W ar D e p a rtm e n t trie d to p ro v id e th e Ita lia n s w ith s u b ­ s titu te s , b u t in m o s t c a se s th e y w e re in a d e q u a te , u n s e rv ic e a b le , o r u n a v a ila b le . L egal a n d fin a n c ia l o b sta c le s a d d e d to th e s e d ifficu lties, sin c e th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t lac k ed a u th o rity to sell n o n s u r p lu s a rm a ­ m e n ts to Italy o r to o b ta in re im b u rs e m e n t fo r re p la c e m e n t a n d h a n ­ d lin g c o sts. D u n n r e p o r te d w ith c h a g rin o n 11 S e p te m b e r th a t e v e n th e tra n s fe r of all av ailab le s u r p lu s m a te rie l in E u ro p e w o u ld n o t p r e v e n t critical d e fic ie n c ie s in th e Ita lia n a rm y .24 T he p ro b le m s of p r o v id in g m ilita ry a id to Italy b e c a m e m o re u r g e n t w ith th e p ro c la m a tio n of th e Ita lia n P eace T reaty o n 15 S e p te m b e r 1947. T h e C e n tra l In te llig e n c e G ro u p a s s e r te d th a t th e w ith d ra w a l of A m e ri­ c a n a n d B ritish o c c u p a tio n tro o p s w o u ld h a rm A m e ric a n se c u rity

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in te r e s ts b e c a u se th e D e G a s p e ri g o v e rn m e n t w a s ill-p re p a re d to c o p e w ith th e C o m m u n is t p a rty . U s in g a p o w e rfu l b u t d u b io u s an alo g y , th e in te llig e n c e a n a ly s ts w a r n e d of th e p o ss ib le e ru p tio n of a civil w a r in n o r th e r n Italy " s im ila r to th a t p re v a ilin g in n o r th e r n G re e c e ." D o u b tfu l th a t Ita lia n s e c u rity fo rc e s c o u ld h a n d le s u c h a situ a tio n , th e y re c o m ­ m e n d e d a d d itio n a l A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t a n d tra in in g fo r th e Italia n a rm y .25 T h is a n a ly s is p r o m p te d W ar D e p a rtm e n t officials to re c o n s id e r w h a t th e y m ig h t d o , w ith in th e ir re s o u rc e s , " to ch eck th e p r e s e n t d e te rio ra tio n of th e p o litica l s itu a tio n , . . . fro m w h ic h m ig h t e m e rg e a to ta lita ria n re g im e firm ly in im ica l to th e U .S ." G e n e ra l D w ig h t D. E isen h o w er, th e a rm y c h ie f of staff, d is p a tc h e d a s u rv e y m is s io n to Italy to in v e s tig a te p o s s ib le m e a s u re s of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .26 L ike th e C IG , th e a rm y s u rv e y m is s io n s tre s s e d th e sim ila ritie s b e tw e e n Ita ly a n d G re e c e . A rm e d C o m m u n is ts w e re p r e s e n t in th e ir n o r th e r n p ro v in c e s —g u e rrilla s in G re e c e a n d p a ra m ilita ry g ro u p s in Italy. B o th s h a r e d a b o r d e r w ith C o m m u n is t Y u g o sla v ia, w h ic h a id e d th e G re e k in s u r g e n ts a n d m ig h t g o so fa r a s to in te rv e n e in a n Ita lia n civil w ar, p a rtly b e c a u se of th e Y u g o sla v s' f r u s tr a te d a m b itio n s fo r th e d is p u te d re g io n o f V en ezia G iu lia a n d th e c ity of T rieste. O n th e b a sis of th is q u e s tio n a b le an alo g y , th e a rm y a n a ly s ts m a in ta in e d th a t " th e s itu a tio n in N o r th e r n Ita ly is potentially c o m p a ra b le to th a t in G re e c e ." T h ey r e c o m m e n d e d th e p a s s a g e of m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n sim ila r to th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct to fo re sta ll th is th re a t. B ecau se of th e d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s sto c k s, s u c h le g isla tio n w a s n e e d e d to e q u ip a n d m a in ta in th e Ita lia n a rm y fo r th e p re s e rv a tio n of in te rn a l o rd e r a n d th e d e fe n se of n a tio n a l fro n tie rs . T h e s u rv e y m is s io n c a u tio n e d , h o w ev er, th a t m ilita ry a id a lo n e c o u ld n o t so lv e Ita ly 's p ro b le m s a n d s h o u ld b e c lo sely in te g ra te d , as in G re e c e , w ith o th e r fo rm s of a s s is ta n c e —p a rtic ­ u la rly M a rsh a ll P la n a id . In re p ly to D u n n 's c o n te n tio n th a t su c h le g isla tio n m ig h t e m b a rra s s th e D e G a s p e ri g o v e rn m e n t b y p o in tin g u p its d e p e n d e n c e o n th e U n ite d S ta te s , th e a rm y o fficers c o n fid e n tly p re d ic te d " th a t a p r o g r a m of U .S . m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to Italy o p e n ly u n d e r ta k e n a t th is tim e as a c o ro lla ry to sim ila r a ssis ta n c e b e in g g iv e n to G re e c e a n d T urkey w o u ld e m p h a s iz e th e U .S . po licy of firm n e s s to w a rd th e a d v a n c e of C o m m u n is m , a n d w o u ld b e m o re likely to av ert th a n to e v o k e a c ris is ." 27 R e ly in g o n a n in c re a s in g ly fa m ilia r ju stific a ­ tio n , th e a rm y a n a ly s ts b e lie v e d th a t th e e x te n s io n of m ilita ry aid w o u ld p ro d u c e m a jo r p sy c h o lo g ic a l g a in s b y r e a s s u r in g th e Ita lia n s w h ile d e te r r in g a n d d e m o ra liz in g th e ir C o m m u n is t a d v e rsa rie s.

140 • Arming the Free World T h is e x c h a n g e re v e a le d th e w id e n in g d iffe re n c e s b e tw e e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e a rm y o v e r m ilita ry a id to Italy, e v e n th o u g h b o th c o n s id e re d s u c h a s s is ta n c e n e c e ssa ry . O fficials in S ta te 's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs a g re e d w ith D u n n th a t c o n g re s s io n a l in v o lv e m e n t w o u ld b rin g le n g th y a n d p u b lic sc ru tin y of a m a tte r th a t r e q u ire d sw ift a n d se c re t a c tio n . A rm y officials, o n th e o th e r h a n d , d e m a n d e d n e w le g isla tio n a n d a p p ro p r ia tio n s b e fo re re le a s in g p re c io u s a rm a m e n ts to Italy. F or e x a m p le , d u r in g d e lib e ra tio n s in th e N S C , S e c re ta ry of th e A rm y R oyall p r e v e n te d a p p ro v a l of a d ra ft r e p o r t th a t d id n o t call fo r a n Ita lia n A id A ct, y e t re c o m m e n d e d th e tra n s fe r to Ita ly of a d d itio n a l e q u ip m e n t " n o w in th e h a n d s of, o r b e in g p r e p a r e d for, o u r o w n a rm e d fo rc e s." 28 T h e re v is e d fin al v e rs io n s u g g e s te d o n ly te c h n ic a l a ssista n c e to th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rc e s .29 A s th e d e a d lin e fo r th e w ith d ra w a l of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s a p p ro a c h e d , a crisis a tm o s p h e re e n v e lo p e d R om e a n d W a s h in g to n . D u n n r e p o r te d in late N o v e m b e r a n d e a rly D e c e m b e r th a t D e G a s p e ri a n d h is a d v is e rs b e lie v e d th a t th e C o m m u n is ts w e re d e s p e ra te ly a fra id of lo sin g th e e le c tio n s sc h e d u le d fo r A p ril 1948 a n d so m ig h t la u n c h a co u p . D u n n a g re e d th a t th e " stra te g ic a lly p la n n e d strik e s a n d civil d is tu rb a n c e s " w e re " p re lim in a ry s k irm is h e s le a d in g to a n a tte m p t to o v e rth ro w th e g o v e rn m e n t." A t first D e G a s p e ri th o u g h t a n in s u r r e c ­ tio n im m in e n t. So g re a t w a s h is a n x ie ty th a t h e s e c u re d T ru m an 's c o n s e n t to d e la y th e d e p a r tu r e of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s b y te n d a y s u n til 14 D ecem b er, th e d e a d lin e e s ta b lis h e d b y th e p e a c e treaty . H e a lso u r g e d th e U n ite d S ta te s to s tr e n g th e n its fo rce s in A u s tria a n d to s ta tio n tr o o p s in th e M e d ite r r a n e a n fo r q u ic k in te r v e n tio n in Italy. E v e n b e fo re D e G a s p e ri's re q u e s t, T ru m a n a p p ro v e d a n N S C r e p o r t th a t c a lle d fo r c o u n te rin g a C o m m u n is t in s u rre c tio n b y e x te n d in g " th e stra te g ic d is p o s itio n of U n ite d S ta te s a rm e d fo rce s in Italy a n d o th e r p a r ts of th e M e d ite rra n e a n ." O n 1 D e c e m b e r th e Ita lia n s itu a tio n a p p e a r e d so o m in o u s to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffa irs th a t A c tin g S e c re ta ry L o v ett a s k e d th e a rm e d se rv ice s to p r e ­ p a re a t o n c e to c a rry o u t th is a c tio n .30 D e sp ite th e ir u n d e rs ta n d a b le fe a rs, D e G a s p e ri a n d D u n n o v e re s ti­ m a te d th e d a n g e r of a rm e d in s u rre c tio n . Togliatti a c tu a lly in te n d e d th e c a m p a ig n of strik e s a n d d is o rd e rs n o t to b e a p re lu d e to a rm e d in s u r ­ re c tio n b u t a w ay of fo rc in g D e G a s p e ri to ta k e th e C o m m u n is ts b ack in to th e g o v e rn m e n t. T ogliatti d id n o t w a n t to p r e v e n t M a rsh a ll P la n a id fro m re a c h in g Ita ly —h e d o u b te d th a t th e n a tio n 's e c o n o m y c o u ld

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su rv iv e w ith o u t it—b u t w a n te d to h e lp d e te rm in e its a llo c a tio n . B ad ly c o n c e iv e d a n d e a sily m is in te r p re te d , th e c a m p a ig n of d is r u p tio n a n d v io le n c e in s te a d p r o d u c e d g re a te r e ffo rts —Ita lia n a n d A m e ric a n —to iso late a n d c o n fro n t th e C o m m u n is ts . In m id -D e c e m b e r D e G a s p e ri to o k th e c e n te r-le ft Social D e m o cratic a n d R e p u b lic a n p a rtie s in to h is g o v e rn m e n t, th e re b y g a in in g a so lid m a jo rity in P a rlia m e n t. U p o n th e d e p a r tu r e of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s , th e W h ite H o u s e is s u e d a s tr o n g s ta te m e n t s u g g e s tin g A m e ric a n in te rv e n tio n s h o u ld th e C o m ­ m u n is ts th r e a te n Ita lia n fre e d o m o r in d e p e n d e n c e .31 A m e ric a n officials, h o w ev er, c o n tin u e d to w o rry a b o u t a C o m m u ­ n is t re v o lu tio n , e sp e c ia lly sin c e D u n n w a rn e d th a t th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rce s la c k e d th e e q u ip m e n t to q u e ll s u c h a n u p ris in g . B ased o n D u n n 's r e p o r ts , a rm y in te llig e n c e , w h ic h h a d p re v io u s ly b e lie v e d th a t th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rc e s c o u ld h a n d le a stric tly in te rn a l u p ris in g , a b ru p tly re v is e d its e s tim a te . T h e C IA c o n c u rre d , n o tin g th a t th e Ita lia n g o v e rn m e n t's a b ility to p u t d o w n a n a rm e d in s u rre c tio n w as, " a t th e m o m e n t, in d o u b t." 32 W h e n th e Ita lia n re g im e s u b m itte d a n e w r e q u e s t fo r a rm s , D u n n u r g e d " a n e x tra o rd in a ry e ffo rt" to fulfill it.33 O fficials in W a s h in g to n re a c te d quickly. O n 9 D e c e m b e r T ru m a n p e rs o n a lly in s tr u c te d S e c re ta ry of D e fe n se Jam es V. F o rre sta l to d o e v e r y th in g p o s s ib le so th a t Italy w o u ld re c eiv e th e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t it n e e d e d to c o m b a t " to ta lita ria n in s p ir e d u n r e s t." 34 A rm y officials p ro m p tly n o tifie d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th a t th e y c o u ld fu r n is h fro m e x istin g sto c k s m a n y ite m s th e Ita lia n s m o s t u r g e n tly r e q u ire d . F o r­ re s ta l, h o w ev er, r e m in d e d M a rs h a ll th a t C o n g re s s w o u ld h a v e to p r o ­ v id e th e a u th o rity a n d f u n d s fo r th is tra n s a c tio n sin c e little e q u ip m e n t w a s s u r p lu s . A fe w d a y s la te r Royall e m p h a s iz e d to th e S ta te -A rm y N a v y -A ir F orce C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e (SA N A C C ), w h ic h w a s b e ­ g in n in g a n e w s tu d y of m ilita ry a id to Italy, th e n e e d fo r le g isla tio n sim ila r to th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct. T h e arm y, in sh o rt, re m a in e d d e te r m in e d to s e c u re c o n g re s s io n a l a u th o rity a n d a p p ro p ria tio n s b e fo re m a k in g a n y n e w c o m m itm e n t to Italy .35 T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, n e v e rth e le s s , still d id n o t w a n t to p lac e th is m a tte r b e fo re C o n g re s s . O fficials in S ta te 's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs a g re e d w ith D u n n th a t s u c h a m o v e w o u ld e m b a rra s s th e D e G a s p e ri g o v e rn m e n t to th e b e n e fit of th e C o m m u n is ts . T h ey a lso d o u b te d th a t C o n g re s s c o u ld act sw iftly e n o u g h so th a t Ita ly w o u ld re c eiv e a rm a ­ m e n ts p rio r to th e A p ril e le c tio n s. D e te rm in e d to s p e e d a rm s to Italy, A c tin g S e c re ta ry R o b e rt A . L o v ett d e c id e d in s te a d to o ffer D e G a s p e ri a

142 • Arming the Free World m o d e s t q u a n tity of av ailab le s u r p lu s , p rim a rily sm a ll a rm s a n d a m m u n itio n , at a c o st of $3.75 m illio n . B ut D e G a s p e ri d e m u rre d . H e p r o te s te d th a t Ita ly la c k e d th e d o lla rs fo r th is p u rc h a s e a n d th a t an y s u c h e x p e n d itu re s w o u ld o c c a sio n th e " s tr o n g e s t k in d of a tta c k fro m th e left." B ecau se of th e p rim e m in is te r's h e s ita tio n s a n d leg al r e s tra in ts in W a s h in g to n , th e d e b a te o v e r m ilita ry a id to Italy re a c h e d a n im p a ss e . B ut as D u n n re m in d e d M a rs h a ll o n 4 F e b ru a ry 1948, th e re h a d b e e n " n o sig n ific a n t d e v e lo p m e n ts te n d in g to m a k e a n y less u r g e n t th e p ro v is io n of th o s e a rm s a n d e q u ip m e n t fo r th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rc e s." 36 T h e SA N A C C p r o p o s e d a n e w s o lu tio n to th e p ro b le m of e m e r­ g e n c y m ilita ry a id to Italy. In its r e p o r t of 16 J a n u a ry 1948, th e c o m m it­ te e fo u n d th a t th e a rm y c o u ld f u r n is h n o t o n ly m a n y of th e sm a ll a rm s th a t th e Ita lia n s u r g e n tly r e q u e s te d b u t a lso se v e ra l o th e r ite m s, in c lu d ­ in g ro c k e t la u n c h e rs , g re n a d e s , a n d ta n k s . Yet th e re w a s n o specific le g islativ e a u th o rity th a t w o u ld a llo w th e tr a n s fe r of th is e q u ip m e n t, o n ly a sm a ll p a r t of w h ic h w a s s u r p lu s . A cco rd in g ly , th e SA N A C C re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e p r e s id e n t p ro v id e th e s e m u n itio n s u n d e r " h is p le n a r y p o w e rs a s C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f a n d a s h e a d of th e S ta te in its re la tio n s w ith fo re ig n c o u n trie s a n d fo r th e p u r p o s e of p ro te c tin g p r im a r y se c u rity in te r e s ts of th e U n ite d S ta te s ." 37 T h e N S C p ro m p tly e n d o r s e d th is s u g g e s tio n , a n d T ru m a n a c c e p te d it o n 13 F eb ru ary . T ru m a n still re q u ir e d th e Ita lia n s to p a y fo r th e e q u ip m e n t, h a n d lin g , a n d tr a n s p o rta tio n , w h ic h a m o u n te d to $10 m illio n , sin c e h e h a d n o d is c re tio n a ry o r u n v o u c h e re d f u n d th a t m ig h t b e u s e d to d e fra y th o se expenses. H is a c tio n p u s h e d th e p o w e rs of th e p re s id e n c y b e y o n d p re v io u s lim its. N e v e r b e fo re h a d a c h ie f e x ec u tiv e in v o k e d s u c h c o n s titu tio n a l p o w e rs fo r th e tra n s fe r o f a rm a m e n ts to a fo re ig n n a tio n .38 T ru m a n th e n u s e d h is p re s id e n tia l a u th o rity o n 10 M a rc h to o v e rrid e fe d e ra l law b y o rd e rin g th e im m e d ia te d e liv e ry of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to Ita ly e v e n th o u g h th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d n o t re c e iv e d p a y m e n t.39 N o tw ith s ta n d in g T ru m a n 's e x tra o rd in a ry a c tio n , th e b u lk of A m e ri­ c a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s d id n o t re a c h Ita ly b e fo re th e e le c tio n s. D e G a s ­ p e ri w a s re s p o n s ib le fo r th e delay. R e v e rsin g h is p re v io u s p o s itio n , h e to ld D u n n o n 12 M a rc h th a t th e d e liv e ry of A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts w o u ld n o w h u r t h is c a m p a ig n . D e G a s p e ri's s ta te m e n t re fle c te d a s h r e w d a s s e s s m e n t of th e ra p id ly im p ro v in g e le c to ra l p ro s p e c ts of th e C h ris tia n D e m o c ra ts, w h o h a d b e e n tra ilin g in p u b lic -o p in io n p o lls

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a n d th e e s tim a te s o f p o litical e x p e rts . T h e c h a n g e w a s th e r e s u lt of th e C o m m u n is t c o u p in C z e c h o slo v a k ia in la te F e b ru ary , a d ra m a tic e v e n t th a t s u d d e n ly s h ifte d s u p p o r t to th e C h ris tia n D e m o c ra ts. D e G a s p e ri n o w m a n a g e d to d e fle c t p u b lic a tte n tio n aw ay fro m Ita lia n eco n o m ic w o e s , d iffic u ltie s e x a c e rb a te d b y th e fiscal p o licies of M in is te r of th e T re a su ry L u ig i E in a u d i. In s te a d h e in s is te d th a t th e o n ly is s u e fo r th e Ita lia n e le c to ra te w a s to c h o o se b e tw e e n d e m o c ra c y a n d to ta l­ ita ria n is m . D e G a s p e ri a lso b e n e fite d fro m a n e la b o ra te c a m p a ig n of p r o p a g a n d a a n d c o v e rt f u n d in g of th e C h ris tia n D e m o c ra ts o rc h e s ­ tr a te d b y th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n d fro m a n a rm y of c a m p a ig n w o rk e rs p ro v id e d b y th e V atican. S e n s in g v ic to ry a n d in c re a s in g ly d o u b tfu l th a t th e C o m m u n is ts w o u ld s ta g e a n in s u rre c tio n . D e G a s p e ri fe a re d th a t th e b e n e fit of d e liv e rin g A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s b e fo re th e ele ctio n w o u ld b e o u tw e ig h e d b y th e political d a m a g e fro m n e w C o m ­ m u n is t c h a rg e s th a t th e C h ris tia n D e m o crats w e re A m e ric a n p u p p e ts .40 T h is a s s e s s m e n t s tu n n e d S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials. Jo h n D. H ic k e rs o n , th e d ire c to r of S ta te 's O ffice o f E u ro p e a n A ffairs, co m ­ p la in e d to D u n n th a t D e G a s p e ri w a s p la y in g in to th e h a n d s of th e C o m m u n is ts : th e ir p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a ig n , H ic k e rs o n b e lie v e d , a im e d p re c ise ly a t p r e v e n tin g a id to th e Ita lia n a rm e d fo rc e s. O n ly d e fe a tism o r false secu rity , n o t p o litica l c a n n in e s s , c o u ld a c c o u n t fo r D e G a s p e ri's d e c isio n . In d e e d , a c c o rd in g to a n o u tr a g e d H ic k e rso n , D e G a s p e ri w a s n o w e n d a n g e rin g a n American in te re s t th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d w o rk e d so h a r d to p ro te c t—a sta b le , in d e p e n d e n t Italy. U n d e r p r e s ­ s u re , D e G a s p e ri c o n s e n te d to se c re t d e liv e rie s, b e g in n in g o n 3 A p ril, of A m e ric a n s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts th e n in G e rm a n y a n d of o th e r e q u ip ­ m e n t fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s a fte r th e e le c tio n . B ecau se of th e s e a rr a n g e m e n ts , A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id h a d n o d ire c t effect o n th e C h ris ­ tia n D e m o c ra ts ' a s to u n d in g v ic to ry a t th e p o lls o n 18 A p ril, a triu m p h th a t p ro v id e d D e G a s p e ri's p a r ty w ith a c le a r m a jo rity in P a rlia m e n t. N o r w a s it n e e d e d , as D e G a s p e ri h a d a n tic ip a te d , to p u t d o w n a n a tte m p t b y th e d e fe a te d C o m m u n is ts to se ize p o w e r.41 N e v e rth e le s s , A m e ric a n p o licy in Italy d e m o n s tr a te d a g ro w in g re lia n c e o n m ilita ry a id as a n in s tr u m e n t of c o n ta in m e n t. A lth o u g h e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e w a s th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p rin c ip a l w e a p o n a g a in s t c o m m u n is m , m a n y of T ru m a n 's to p a d v is e rs b e lie v e d , p a rtly fro m th e ir e x p e rie n c e in Italy, th a t e co n o m ic re c o v e ry w a s in s e p a ra b le fro m in te r­ n a l secu rity . M a k in g e a s y a n a lo g ie s w ith th e s itu a tio n in G re e c e , th ey e x a g g e ra te d th e C o m m u n is t th r e a t in Italy a n d u s e d m ilita ry m e a n s to

144 • Arming the Free World c o m b a t it. T h ey c o n c lu d e d th a t a rm s a id w a s u s e fu l n o t o n ly in s tr e n g th e n in g th e Ita lia n a rm y b u t a lso in s tiffe n in g th e m o ra le of d e m o c ra tic fo rc e s. S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials in p a rtic u la r fo u n d m ili­ ta r y a id a v e rs a tile to o l, sin c e th e y s tr e s s e d th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l im p o r­ ta n c e of m a in ta in in g Ita ly 's W e ste rn o rie n ta tio n . C o n v in c e d th a t th e d a n g e r in Italy w a s b o th p o litica l a n d m ilitary . S ta te D e p a rtm e n t offi­ cials r e g a r d e d a rm s a id as a n e s s e n tia l e le m e n t in p r e v e n tin g th e S o v ie ts fro m e x te n d in g th e ir s p h e re of in flu e n c e .42 J u s t as im p o r ta n t, th e p ro b le m s in p ro v id in g a rm s to Italy fo c u s e d a tte n tio n o n d e fic ie n c ie s in e x istin g a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r h a n d lin g fo re ig n r e q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . A rm y officials h a d p o in te d o u t in th e s p r in g of 1947 th a t ex cess e q u ip m e n t c o u ld n o lo n g e r s u s ta in n e w p r o g r a m s of m ilita ry a id , b u t th e S u r p lu s P r o p e r ty A ct re m a in e d th e o n ly g e n e ra l a u th o rity fo r f u r n is h in g a rm s a b ro a d . T h e d iffic u lties w ith th e Ita lia n p r o g r a m c o n firm e d th e w o rs t fe a rs of th o se a rm y officials w h o h a d w o rrie d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w o u ld m a k e n e w c o m m it­ m e n ts th a t e x c e e d e d c u r r e n t c a p a b ilitie s. N o t o n ly d id th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t v e to th e p r e s e n ta tio n of n e w le g isla tio n to C o n g re s s b u t a lso it p re v a ile d o n th e a rm y to tra n s fe r to Ita ly se v e ra l m illio n d o lla rs of e q u ip m e n t fro m its w a r re s e rv e s . N o th in g p ro v e d m o re c o n c lu siv e ly to a rm y officials th a t th e m ilita ry a id m a c h in e ry n e e d e d a d ra s tic o v e rh a u l. U n ifo rm e d o fficers r e d o u b le d th e ir e ffo rts to se c u re n e w le g isla tio n a n d a p p ro p r ia tio n s . In a d d itio n , irk e d b y th e p re v a ilin g c o u n try -b y -c o u n try a p p ro a c h , lo g istic s e x p e rts d e m a n d e d m o re s y s ­ te m a tic p la n n in g of a rm s a id . T h is d riv e fo r th e c o n s o lid a tio n of m ili­ ta ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s g a in e d e v e n g re a te r m o m e n tu m in th e s p rin g of 1948, as p o lic y m a k e rs w e ig h e d th e p o s s ib ility of r e a rm in g W e ste rn E u r o p e .43

T h e im p e tu s fo r A m e ric a n r e a r m a m e n t of W e ste rn E u ro p e c a m e fro m E u ro p e a n e ffo rts, b e g in n in g in late 1947, to p ro te c t a g a in s t S oviet e x p a n s io n . F o llo w in g th e fa ilu re of th e D e c e m b e r 1947 L o n d o n C o n ­ fe re n c e of F o re ig n M in is te rs to m a k e a n y p ro g re s s to w a rd a G e rm a n treaty , B ritish F o re ig n S e c re ta ry E rn e s t K. B ev in to ld M a rsh a ll, "T h e re is n o c h a n c e th a t th e S o v iet U n io n w ill d e a l w ith th e W est o n a n y re a s o n a b le te rm s in th e fo re s e e a b le fu tu r e . T h e sa lv a tio n of th e W est d e p e n d s u p o n th e fo rm a tio n of so m e fo rm of u n io n , fo rm a l o r in fo rm a l in c h arac ter, in W e ste rn E u ro p e , b a c k e d b y th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e

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d o m in io n s , s u c h a m o b iliz a tio n of m o ra l a n d m a te ria l fo rce [as] w ill in s p ire c o n fid e n c e a n d e n e rg y w ith in a n d re s p e c t e ls e w h e re ." 44 E lab ­ o ra tin g th e s e id e a s b e fo re th e H o u s e of C o m m o n s o n 22 J a n u a ry 1948, B e v in p r o p o s e d a n e tw o rk o f b ila te ra l a llia n c e s, m o d e le d o n th e D u n ­ k irk T reaty of 4 M a rc h 1947, e m b ra c in g B ritain , F ra n c e , a n d th e L ow C o u n tr ie s .45 B e v in p u r p o s e ly left v a g u e th e A m e ric a n re la tio n s h ip to th is W e ste rn u n io n , a lth o u g h h e in d ic a te d th a t h e w a s c o u n tin g o n A m e ric a n " p o w e r a n d re s o u rc e s ." H e a lso e m p h a s iz e d th a t th is W est­ e rn u n io n w o u ld b e b ro a d e r in c o n c e p tio n th a n a c o n v e n tio n a l m ilita ry a llian c e, th a t it m u s t b e " a s p iritu a l u n io n as w e ll," w h ic h d e riv e d its s tr e n g th " fro m th e b a sic fre e d o m s a n d e th ic a l p rin c ip le s fo r w h ic h w e all s ta n d ." 46 R e a c tio n w ith in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s m ix e d . H ic k e rs o n e n th u ­ sia stic ally s u p p o r te d B evin's p ro p o s a l, b u t th o u g h t th e e x te n s io n of th e D u n k irk T reaty a " h ig h ly d u b io u s " first s te p sin c e it w o u ld p re c lu d e G e rm a n y 's e v e n tu a l p a rtic ip a tio n . H e u r g e d in s te a d a m u ltila te ra l s e c u rity p a c t m o d e le d o n th e R io T reaty a n d in s is te d th a t A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n w a s e s s e n tia l to its su c c e ss. "I d o n 't c are w h e th e r e n ta n ­ g lin g a llia n c e s h a v e b e e n c o n s id e re d w o rs e th a n o rig in a l sin e v e r sin c e G e o rg e W a sh in g to n 's tim e , " h e e x claim ed to o n e of h is s u b o rd in a te s o n N e w Y ear's E ve in 1947. "W e 'v e g o t to n e g o tia te a m ilita ry allian c e w ith W e ste rn E u ro p e in p e a c e tim e a n d w e 'v e g o t to d o it quickly." H ic k e rs o n p ro m p tly w o n in flu e n tia l s u p p o r t fo r h is v ie w s —Jo h n F o s­ te r D u lle s, th e R e p u b lic a n e x p e rt o n fo re ig n affairs, w a s o n e of h is first c o n v e rts —a n d r e m a in e d th r o u g h o u t 1948 th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's m o st fe rv e n t a d v o c a te of a N o r th A tla n tic T reaty.47 G e o rg e F. K e n n a n , th e d ire c to r of th e Policy P la n n in g Staff, w a s far m o re c irc u m s p e c t. Like H ic k e rso n , h e a p p la u d e d B ev in 's in itia tiv e sin c e it h e ld o u t h o p e of e s ta b lis h in g a n e w E u ro p e a n e q u ilib riu m in w h ic h G e rm a n y w a s n o t th e p re d o m in a n t p o w er. H e a lso a g re e d w ith H ic k e rs o n th a t th e D u n k irk T reaty w a s a p o o r s ta rtin g p o in t fo r a W e ste rn u n io n b e c a u se it w o u ld exclu d e G e rm a n y a n d fo c u s th e a llia n c e fa r to o n a rro w ly o n m ilita ry d e fe n se . K e n n a n th o u g h t th a t m ilita ry u n io n s h o u ld b e th e c o n s e q u e n c e of, ra th e r th a n th e stim u lu s for, p o litica l, e co n o m ic , a n d s p iritu a l tie s. U n lik e H ic k e rso n , ho w ev er, h e o p p o s e d fo rm a l A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n in a E u ro p e a n allian ce. K e n n a n b e lie v e d th a t if th e E u ro p e a n s fo rg e d a n effectiv e W e ste rn u n io n th e re w o u ld b e " n o re a l q u e s tio n as to o u r lo n g -te rm re la ­ tio n s h ip to it, e v e n w ith re s p e c t to th e m ilita ry g u a ra n te e ." 48 A s h e

146 • Arming the Free World e x p la in e d later, " m ilita ry p o licy w o u ld flo w c o rre c tly of its o w n a c c o rd —it n e e d e d n o leg a l o b lig a tio n s o r p re s c rip tio n s ." 49 B ecau se of th e ir u n c e r ta in ty o v e r th e r e la tio n s h ip o f th e U n ite d S ta te s to th e p r o p o s e d W e ste rn u n io n , a d m in is tra tio n officials gav e o n ly s c a n t c o n s id e ra tio n to s u p p ly in g a rm s a id . M a rsh a ll th o u g h t at first th a t A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n in a n y W e ste rn d e fe n se s y s te m w o u ld b e re s tric te d to f u r n is h in g m a te ria l a s s is ta n c e to its m e m b e rs , b u t d id n o t e la b o ra te h is v ie w s .50 T h e o d o re C . A ch illes, H ic k e rso n 's d e p u ty fo r W e ste rn E u r o p e a n a ffairs, a lso ra is e d th e p o s s ib ility of m ilita ry a id , b u t m a in ta in e d th a t th e E u r o p e a n s fa r m o re u rg e n tly n e e d e d p u b lic a s s u ra n c e of A m e ric a n d e te r m in a tio n to d e fe n d th e ir soil. O n ly A m e ri­ c a n a d h e re n c e to a m u ltila te ra l se c u rity p a c t, in A ch illes's view , w o u ld e a se th e ir d o u b ts a b o u t th e f u tu r e .51 K e n n a n a g re e d th a t th e E u ro ­ p e a n s la c k e d c o n fid e n c e , b u t rid ic u le d th e ir a n x ie tie s. " W h a t in th e w o r ld ," h e a s k e d , " d id th e y th in k w e h a d b e e n d o in g in E u ro p e th e s e la s t fo u r o r five y e a rs? D id th e y s u p p o s e w e h a d la b o re d to fre e E u ro p e fro m th e c lu tc h e s of H itle r m e re ly in o rd e r to a b a n d o n it to th o se of S ta lin ? . . . W h y d id th e y w is h to d iv e rt a tte n tio n . . . [to] a d a n g e r w h ic h d id n o t a c tu a lly exist b u t w h ic h m ig h t in d e e d b e b r o u g h t in to e x iste n c e b y to o m u c h d is c u s s io n of th e m ilita ry b a la n c e a n d b y th e o s te n ta tio u s s tim u la tio n o f a m ilita ry riv a lry ? " 52 B ecau se h e b e lie v e d th a t th e S o v ie ts d id n o t c o n te m p la te a m ilita ry o ffe n siv e in E u ro p e , K e n n a n d id n o t e v e n c o n s id e r th e p o s s ib ility of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id d u rin g th e first w e e k s o f 1948.53 W a sh in g to n 's r e s p o n s e to B evin's in itia tiv e th u s w a s b o th e n c o u ra g ­ in g a n d c a u tio u s . M a rsh a ll re p lie d to B ev in o n 20 J a n u a ry th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld d o e v e r y th in g it p r o p e r ly c o u ld to a ss is t in th e fo rm a tio n of a W e ste rn u n io n , b u t m a d e n o c o m m itm e n ts of a n y s o rt. U n d e r S e c re ta ry L o v ett la te r in fo rm e d L o rd In v e rc h a p e l, th e B ritish a m b a ss a d o r, th a t th e re w e re tw o m a in re a s o n s fo r M a rsh a ll's h e s ita ­ tio n . F irst, th e p ro s p e c t of " n e w a n d e x te n siv e m ilita ry a n d p o litical c o m m itm e n ts " m ig h t h a rm th e c h a n c e s fo r c o n g re s s io n a l a p p ro v a l of th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m (ERP). S e c o n d , M a rsh a ll b e lie v e d th a t a n y s ta te m e n t a b o u t th e A m e ric a n r e la tio n s h ip to th e p r o p o s e d W est­ e rn u n io n w a s p re m a tu r e . "You a re in effect a s k in g u s to p o u r c o n c re te b e fo re w e se e th e b lu e p r in ts ," L o v ett to ld In v e rc h a p e l. A lth o u g h B rit­ is h officials p r o te s te d th a t th e y c o u ld n o t m a k e th e W e ste rn u n io n a g o in g c o n c e rn w ith o u t A m e ric a n p a rtic ip a tio n , M a rsh a ll w a s u n -

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m o v e d . H e w a s d e te r m in e d th a t th e in itia tiv e re m a in in E u ro p e , n o t p a s s to W a s h in g to n .54 T h ese d is c u s s io n s of E u ro p e a n se c u rity w e re tra n s fo rm e d b y a d ra m a tic se rie s of c rise s th a t b e g a n in la te F e b ru a ry w ith th e C o m m u ­ n is t s e iz u re of p o w e r in C z ec h o slo v a k ia . E x p lo itin g a g o v e rn m e n ta l crisis, th e C o m m u n is ts tra n s fo r m e d a c o a litio n re g im e in to o n e -p a rty ru le in th e la s t E u ro p e a n s ta te th a t w a s p re c a rio u s ly b a la n c e d b e tw e e n E a st a n d W est. T he m y s te rio u s d e a th o n 11 M a rc h of th e e m in e n t C z e c h F o re ig n M in is te r Jan M a s a ry k p r o fo u n d ly sh o c k e d W e ste rn p u b lic o p in io n , w h ic h w a s a lre a d y a n x io u s th a t S o v iet a m b itio n s k n e w n o lim its. M o re th a n th r e e m o n th s earlier, K e n n a n h a d w a r n e d M a r­ sh a ll a n d T ru m a n th a t A m e ric a n e ffo rts to th ro ttle C o m m u n is t in flu ­ e n c e in W e ste rn E u ro p e w o u ld p ro v o k e th e S o v ie ts to tig h te n th e ir g rip o n th e ir o w n s p h e re a n d p a rtic u la rly " to c la m p d o w n c o m p le te ly o n C z e c h o slo v a k ia ." 55 Yet K e n n a n 's p re s c ie n t a n a ly s is w a s a p p a re n tly fo rg o tte n b y e a rly 1948, a n d th e C z e c h c o u p w a s g e n e ra lly in te r p r e te d n o t as a d e fe n siv e re a c tio n b u t a s p a r t of a n o m in o u s p a tte r n of S o v iet e x p a n s io n —in E a s te rn E u ro p e , G re e c e , a n d Italy. C o m p a ris o n s a b o u n d e d , b o th p u b lic ly a n d p riv ately , b e tw e e n th e c u r r e n t C z e c h crisis a n d th e o n e o f a d e c a d e earlier. T ru m a n , fo r e x a m p le , a s s e rte d , "W e a re fa c e d w ith exactly th e sa m e s itu a tio n w ith w h ic h B rita in a n d F ra n c e w e re fa c e d in 1938-9 w ith H itle r."56 S o v iet m o v e s in S c a n d in a v ia s e e m e d to c o n firm s u c h fe a rs. Im m e ­ d ia te ly a fte r th e C z e c h co u p , th e S o v ie ts p r e s s u r e d F in la n d , a n a tio n th a t g e n e ra lly fo llo w e d th e ir le a d in fo re ig n affairs, to c o n c lu d e a m u tu a l d e fe n s e trea ty , a n d d e s p ite F in n is h re lu c ta n c e s u c h a n allian c e w a s s ig n e d o n 6 A p ril. E v e n m o re a la rm in g to W e ste rn le a d e rs w e re a p p a r e n t S o v iet d e s ig n s o n N orw ay. S in c e th e e n d of th e S e c o n d W o rld War, N o rw a y h a d m a d e s u p p o r t fo r th e U n ite d N a tio n s th e fu n d a m e n ­ ta l te n e t of its fo re ig n p o lic y a n d r u le d o u t p a rtic ip a tio n in a n y re g io n a l a llia n c e . N o rw e g ia n m ilita ry a u th o ritie s , h o w ev er, re c o g n iz e d th a t th e U n ite d N a tio n s c o u ld n o t g u a ra n te e N o rw e g ia n se c u rity a n d b a s e d th e ir d e fe n s e p la n s o n B ritish a s s is ta n c e in th e e v e n t of w ar. By e a rly 1948, h o w e v er, th e y h a d b e g u n to d o u b t w h e th e r th e y c o u ld d e p e n d o n B ritish m ilita ry h e lp a n d a s k e d a b o u t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e in th e e v e n t of a n a tta c k . T h is in q u ir y c o in c id e d w ith ru m o rs th a t S o v iets w e re tr y in g to fo rce N o rw a y to a c c e p t a n o n a g g re s s io n p a c t sim ila r to th e tre a ty w ith F in la n d .57

148 • Arming the Free World T h e r u m o r s p ro v e d false, b u t n o t b e fo re th e y p ro v o k e d a s tro n g re a c tio n in W a s h in g to n a n d L o n d o n . M a rsh a ll, a fte r c le a rin g h is r e s p o n s e w ith T ru m a n , in fo rm e d th e e m b a s s y in O s lo th a t it w a s " im p e ra tiv e th a t N o rw a y a d a m a n tly re s is t . . . [Soviet] d e m a n d s a n d p r e s s u r e " a n d im p lie d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld s u p p o r t s u c h a s tr o n g s ta n d . T h e B ritish w e re a lm o s t in a p a n ic o v e r th e p ro s p e c t of S o v iet a d v a n c e s in N orw ay. B e v in to ld M a rs h a ll th a t " th e p a c e se t b y R u ssia in C z e c h o slo v a k ia , th e n F in la n d , a n d n o w N orw ay, sh o w s cle arly th a t th e re is n o tim e to lo se." O n ly " a b o ld m o v e ," in B evin's view , c o u ld a v e rt th e d e s tru c tio n of "all e ffo rts to b u ild u p a W e ste rn U n io n " a n d th e c o n s e q u e n t " e x te n s io n of th e R u s s ia n s p h e re of in flu ­ e n c e to th e A tla n tic ." 58 T h ese a n x ie tie s a c c e le ra te d W e ste rn d e fe n s e p la n n in g . F o llo w in g th e C z e c h co u p , th e F re n c h g o v e rn m e n t, w h ic h h a d b e e n p re o c c u p ie d w ith th e th r e a t of a re v iv e d G e rm a n y , a g re e d to a c c e p t a m u ltila te ra l a llia n c e d ire c te d a g a in s t S o v iet a g g re s s io n . O n 17 M a rc h r e p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e s of G re a t B rita in , F ra n c e , a n d th e B e n e lu x c o u n trie s s ig n e d a fifty -y e ar tre a ty in w h ic h th e y p le d g e d "all th e m ilita ry a n d o th e r a id a n d a s s is ta n c e in th e ir p o w e r" in th e e v e n t of a n a tta c k o n o n e of th e s ig n a to rie s .59 T h a t s a m e day, T ru m a n h a ile d th e c re a tio n of th e W e ste rn U n io n a n d p ro m is e d " th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w ill, b y a p p ro p r ia te m e a n s , e x te n d to th e fre e n a tio n s [of E u ro p e ] th e s u p p o r t w h ic h th e s itu a tio n r e q u ire s ." 60 E v e n b e fo re h e m a d e th is p le d g e , T ru m a n a u th o ­ riz e d M a rsh a ll to a c c e p t a B ritish in v ita tio n to d is c u s s th e e s ta b lis h ­ m e n t of a n A tla n tic s e c u rity sy s te m . A m o n g th e id e a s th a t r e p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e s of th e U n ite d S ta te s , B ritain , a n d C a n a d a c o n s id e re d d u rin g th e s e se c re t P e n ta g o n ta lk s in W a s h in g to n a t th e e n d of M a rc h w a s " a m ilita ry ERP," b u t th e c o n fe re e s fa ile d to re a c h a n y firm c o n c lu s io n s .61 T he a d m in is tra tio n 's w illin g n e s s to d is c u s s a n A tla n tic se c u rity s y s te m a n d th e r e a r m a m e n t of W e ste rn E u ro p e d id n o t d e riv e fro m a b e lie f th a t th e re h a d b e e n a f u n d a m e n ta l c h a n g e in S o v iet policy, d e s p ite so m e w a rn in g s to th e c o n tra ry . T h e m o s t s e n s a tio n a l p re d ic tio n c a m e fro m G e n e ra l L u c iu s D. Clay, th e c o m m a n d e r of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tr o o p s in G e rm a n y . C lay c a b le d th e D e p a rtm e n t of th e A rm y o n 5 M a rc h th a t h e h a d p re v io u s ly th o u g h t w a r u n lik e ly fo r at le a st te n y e a rs, b u t h a d re c e n tly "felt a su b tle c h a n g e in S o v iet a ttitu d e w h ic h I c a n n o t d e fin e b u t w h ic h n o w g iv es m e a fe e lin g th a t it m ay co m e w ith d ra m a tic s u d d e n n e s s ." 62 In te llig e n c e a n a ly s ts , th o u g h , f o u n d n o b a sis fo r C lay 's s u s p ic io n s . O n ly a d a y a fte r re c e iv in g C lay 's

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te le g ra m , th e In te llig e n c e D iv isio n a s s u r e d to p a rm y officials th a t " th e S o v ie ts w ill c o n tin u e th e ir e x p a n s io n is t p o licy ta k in g care to av o id w a r."63 O n 16 M a rc h th e C IA in fo rm e d T ru m a n th a t th e re w a s n o " re lia b le e v id e n c e th a t th e U S S R in te n d s to re s o rt to m ilita ry a c tio n w ith in th e n e x t six ty d a y s." Two w e e k s later, in a m o re d e ta ile d r e p o rt, th e C IA d e c la re d th a t av ailab le e v id e n c e a n d " th e lo g ic of th e situ a tio n " s u g g e s te d th a t th e S o v ie ts w o u ld n o t la u n c h a w a r d u rin g 1948. S ta te D e p a r tm e n t e x p e rts a n d a rm y officials in d e p e n d e n tly re a c h e d sim ila r c o n c lu sio n s; th e y re c k o n e d th a t S o v iet m isc a lc u la tio n , ra th e r th a n d e s ig n , c a rrie d th e g re a te r risk of w ar. In s p ite o f th e ir a la rm o v e r re c e n t d e v e lo p m e n ts , m o s t A m e ric a n officials d id n o t th in k th a t th e S o v iets w o u ld re s o r t to fo rce of a r m s .64 In d e e d , p o lic y m a k e rs d o u b te d th a t th e S o v ie ts w o u ld c h a n g e ta c ­ tics p re c ise ly b e c a u se th e ir c u r r e n t m e th o d s h a d b e e n so su c c e ssfu l. "B y e x p lo itin g th e p o s tw a r p o litical a n d e co n o m ic in s ta b ility in E u ro p e a n d th e r e s t of th e w o rld a lo n g tra d itio n a l M a rx ist lin e s ," th e C IA a r­ g u e d , " S o v ie t le a d e rs h a v e a lre a d y o b ta in e d v e ry s u b s ta n tia l re s u lts ." A lth o u g h th e S o v ie ts w e re c a p a b le "o f o v e rr u n n in g all of W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E a st to C a iro w ith in a s h o rt p e rio d of tim e ," th e ir c u r r e n t tactics, th e C IA a n a ly s is m a in ta in e d , w e re " th e c h e a p e s t a n d sa fe st m e th o d b y w h ic h S o v iet le a d e rs c a n o b ta in th e ir o b je c tiv e s." 65 G e n e ra l C h a m b e rlin th o u g h t th a t th e S o v ie ts c o u ld c o n tin u e to d ra w o n a v a rie ty of m e a n s s h o rt of g e n e ra l w a r—"m ilita ry , d ip lo m a tic a n d p r o p a g a n d a p r e s s u r e , s u b v e rs io n , in filtra tio n of la b o r a n d s e c u rity fo rc e s, a n d civil w a r " —to g a in th e ir o b je c tiv e s. In its a n n u a l e s tim a te of S o v iet in te n tio n s , th e A m e ric a n E m b a ss y in M o sco w su c c in c tly s u m ­ m a riz e d th e p re v a ilin g v ie w b y a s s e rtin g th a t in E u ro p e a n d e lse w h e re th e S o v ie ts h a d " n o r e a s o n to c h a n g e p r e s e n t m e th o d s o f e x te n d in g C o m m u n is t in flu e n c e ." 66 G iv e n th e ir a s s e s s m e n t of S o v iet in te n tio n s , A m e ric a n officials w e re as c o n c e rn e d a b o u t re a s s u r in g th e E u ro p e a n s as d e te rrin g th e R u s s ia n s . T h e C z e c h c o u p k in d le d in E u ro p e fe a rs o f re le n tle s s S oviet e x p a n s io n th a t t h r e a te n e d to u n d e rm in e th e M a rsh a ll P la n a n d w e a k e n d e m o c ra tic g o v e rn m e n ts . R e g a rd le s s of th e fo rm a tio n of th e W este rn U n io n , th e C IA w a r n e d th a t " w ith o u t th e p r o s p e c t of activ e a n d effec­ tiv e U S s u p p o r t, th e p r e s e n t te n d e n c y to w a rd stiffer re s is ta n c e m ig h t g iv e w a y to d e s p a ir a n d to a r u s h fo r th e C o m m u n is t b a n d w a g o n ." M ilita ry officials e x p re s s e d sim ila r v ie w s. W h ile u rg in g a v a rie ty of m e a s u re s , in c lu d in g e x te n siv e a rm s a id , to b u ild u p th e m ilita ry e sta b -

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lis h m e n ts of W e ste rn E u ro p e , th e a rm y 's P la n s a n d O p e ra tio n s D iv i­ s io n (P& O ) d e c la re d th a t th e im m e d ia te p u r p o s e of s u c h a ssista n c e s h o u ld b e s tr e n g th e n in g th e w ill to re s is t in W e ste rn E u ro p e . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s e sp e c ia lly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t E u ro p e a n m o ra le . W ith K e n n a n te m p o ra rily o v e rs e a s, H ic k e rso n 's c o u n se l n o w p re v a ile d . O n e of th e g re a te s t d a n g e r s in E u ro p e , H ic k e rs o n w ro te to M a rsh a ll, w a s " th a t to o m a n y p e o p le in th e r e m a in in g fre e c o u n trie s w ill b e in tim i­ d a te d b y th e S o v iet c o lo s su s a n d th e a b s e n c e of ta n g ib le A m e ric a n s u p p o r t to th e p o in t of lo s in g th e ir w ill to re s ist." A d m in is tra tio n officials b e lie v e d th a t th e crisis in E u ro p e w a s a crisis of c o n fid e n c e .67 O n ly A m e ric a n m ilita ry c o m m itm e n ts , p o lic y m a k e rs c o n c lu d e d , c o u ld allay E u ro p e a n a n x ie tie s. D e sp ite th e p a s s a g e of th e M a rsh a ll P la n o n 3 A p ril 1948 a n d th e s u b s e q u e n t a p p ro p r ia tio n of $5 b illio n fo r its first year, E u r o p e a n le a d e rs m a in ta in e d th a t th e ir n a tio n 's s e c u rity d e p e n d e d o n A m e ric a n m ilita ry h e lp as w ell a s e co n o m ic a id . T h ey r e a s o n e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s a lo n e c o u ld n e u tra liz e th e th r e a t of fo rce th a t m a d e S o v iet tac tic s of in filtra tio n a n d in tim id a tio n so effec­ tiv e. T he F re n c h w e re e sp e c ia lly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t A m e ric a n a ssista n c e in th e d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e , sin c e o n ly s u c h h e lp c o u ld sav e th e m fro m th e tw in h o rro rs of S o v iet o c c u p a tio n a n d s u b s e q u e n t lib e ra tio n . H ig h F re n c h m ilita ry officials to ld A m b a s s a d o r Je ffe rso n C a ffe ry th a t, w ith o u t a s s u ra n c e s of A m e ric a n a rm s , th e F re n c h p e o p le " w ith th e c o n v ic tio n of g o in g to c e rta in d e fe a t," w o u ld m e e k ly s u r r e n d e r to an y C o m m u n is t c h a lle n g e . A lth o u g h n o t as jitte ry as th e F re n c h , th e B ritish in s is te d d u rin g th e P e n ta g o n ta lk s th a t th e m o s t im p o r ta n t is s u e w a s th e A m e ric a n a ttitu d e in th e e v e n t of a S o v iet in v a s io n of E u ro p e . T he A m e ric a n re s p o n s e , a lth o u g h still m e a s u r e d , w a s fa r m o re e n c o u ra g ­ in g th a n it h a d b e e n o n ly a few w e e k s earlier. A t th e c o n c lu s io n of th e P e n ta g o n ta lk s, w o rk in g lev e ls of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s ta k e th e le a d in n e g o tia tin g a N o rth A tlan tic d e fe n se a rr a n g e m e n t a n d in th e m e a n tim e o p e n m ilita ry c o n v e rs a tio n s w ith th e W e ste rn U n io n . T h e N S C s o o n e x p la in e d th a t s u c h a c tio n s w o u ld h e lp in c re a s e th e c o n fid e n c e of E u ro p e a n n a tio n s in th e ir a b ility to re s is t S o v iet a g g re s s io n .68 S e rv ice officials h a d a d d itio n a l re a s o n s fo r fa v o rin g m ilita ry c o o p ­ e ra tio n w ith W e ste rn E u ro p e . In th e ir view , re c e n t e v e n ts in E u ro p e — th e C z e c h co u p , S o v iet m o v e s in S c a n d in a v ia , th e te n s io n in I t a l y n e c e s s ita te d in c re a s e d d e fe n s e a p p ro p ria tio n s , w h ic h th e y h a d lo n g th o u g h t n e c e s s a ry to c h ec k S o v iet e x p a n s io n . "T h e a p p a re n tly u n -

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lim ite d e x te n t of S o v iet C o m m u n is tic a m b itio n s , h e re to fo re re c o g n iz e d o n ly b y a few, is n o w a p p a r e n t to all w h o a re c a p a b le of re c o g n iz in g th e t r u th ," d e c la re d th e P & O . In a d d itio n to callin g fo r a m ilita ry a id p r o g r a m m o d e le d o n th e M a rsh a ll P la n , P & O a d v o c a te d th e e x p a n s io n of th e a rm e d fo rce s to m e e t p o s s ib le o v e rs e a s c o m m itm e n ts , in c lu d in g th e d e fe n s e of W e ste rn E u ro p e . In a sim ila r re p o r t, C h a m b e rlin sp e cifi­ cally re c o m m e n d e d a n in c re a s e in tro o p lev e ls, in te n s ifie d stra te g ic p la n n in g , a n d r e s to ra tio n o f th e d ra ft. T h e c h ie f of n a v al o p e ra tio n s . A d m ira l L o u is E. D e n fe ld , u r g e d p a rtia l m o b iliz a tio n . A lth o u g h s e r­ v ice le a d e rs u n d o u b te d ly e x a g g e ra te d th e S o v iet th re a t, th e y w e re n o t m e re ly e x p lo itin g th e M a rc h crisis to a d v a n c e p a ro c h ia l in te re s ts . T h ey firm ly b e lie v e d th a t, w ith o u t in c re a s e d m ilita ry s tr e n g th , a n y e ffo rt to d e te r th e S o v ie ts o r r e a s s u re th e E u ro p e a n s w o u ld b e a h o llo w g e s tu r e .69 W h ile sta ff p la n n e r s h u r r ie d ly c o m p le te d th e first jo in t w a r p la n sin c e th e e n d of W o rld W ar II, S e c re ta ry of D e fe n se F o rre sta l le d th e c a m p a ig n fo r d o m e stic re a r m a m e n t. In d o in g so , h e a p p e a le d to T ru m a n a n d Ja m es E. W ebb, th e d ire c to r of th e B u re a u of th e B u d g e t, to e a se th e r e s tra in ts th e y h a d im p o s e d o n d e fe n se s p e n d in g in th e ir a tte m p t to c u rb in fla tio n a n d re d u c e th e p u b lic d e b t. F or fiscal y e a r 1949, T ru m a n h a d a s k e d C o n g re s s fo r m ilita ry a p p ro p r ia tio n s of ju s t $9.8 b illio n , a s u m , th e p r e s id e n t c o n c e d e d , th a t su ffic e d " o n ly fo r th e m in im u m r e q u ir e m e n ts ." 70 F o rre sta l d is p u te d e v e n th a t m o d e s t claim . T roop s h o rta g e s w e re so se v e re th a t th e a rm y h a d o n ly o n e d iv is io n in re s e rv e to m e e t a n e m e rg e n c y a n d th e n a v y h a d to im m o b iliz e 107 s h ip s . N o tin g th e d e c lin e of A m e ric a n m ilita ry c a p a b ilitie s at a tim e of ris in g C o ld W ar te n s io n s , M a rs h a ll to ld th e N S C th a t " w e a re p la y in g w ith fire w h ile w e h a v e n o th in g w ith w h ic h to p u t it o u t." 71 To h e lp in c re a s e m ilita ry r e a d in e s s , F o rre sta l s e c u re d fro m T ru m a n a c o m m it­ m e n t to a s k C o n g re s s fo r th e r e in s titu tio n of th e d ra ft, w h ic h h a d e x p ire d in 1947, a n d a s u p p le m e n ta l a p p ro p r ia tio n o f $3.2 b illio n fo r th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t.72 T ru m a n 's d e c isio n o n th e la tte r is s u e c a m e o n ly a fte r w ra n g lin g a m o n g th e se rv ic e s a n d w ith th e c o n g re s s io n a l m ilita ry affairs c o m m it­ te e s o v e r th e a m o u n t of th e a d d itio n a l fu n d in g a n d its a llo c a tio n — p a rtic u la rly o v e r w h e th e r th e a ir fo rce s h o u ld b e th e p rin c ip a l b e n e fi­ ciary. W ebb b la m e d F o rre s ta l fo r th e s e d iffic u lties b e c a u se h e h a d b e e n " b u lld o z e d " b y th e Jo in t C h ie fs a n d " lo s t c o n tro l." 73 So d id T ru m an , w h o b e m o a n e d th e in a b ility of h is s e c re ta ry of d e fe n se to se c u re th e

152 • Arming the Free World a g re e m e n t of th e th r e e se rv ic e s to " a b a la n c e d se n sib le d e fe n s e fo r w h ic h th e c o u n tr y c a n p ay."74 S u c h re s tra in t w a s im p e ra tiv e b e c a u se C o n g re s s h a d p a s s e d a $4.8 b illio n tax c u t o v e r T ru m a n 's v e to . D ra w in g o n W ebb's c o u n se l, T ru m a n d r e s s e d d o w n h is m ilita ry c h ie fs a n d in fo rm e d th e m th a t h e w o u ld n o t s u p p o r t a n e x p a n s io n of th e a rm e d fo rce s th a t c o u ld b e m a in ta in e d o n ly th r o u g h "la rg e -sc a le d eficit fi­ n a n c in g " th a t w o u ld trig g e r in fla tio n . T ru m a n th u s c o n tin u e d to p lace h ig h p rio rity o n th e m a in te n a n c e of a s o u n d e c o n o m y th r o u g h a b a la n c e d b u d g e t a n d to h o p e th a t e x te n siv e fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e , ra th e r th a n a m a jo r m ilita ry b u ild u p , c o u ld c o n ta in c o m m u n is m .75 F o rre sta l a lso to o k th e le a d in p r e s s in g fo r c h a n g e s in m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e policy. C o n v in c e d th a t th e e x istin g a rr a n g e m e n ts fo r f u r ­ n is h in g a rm s to fo re ig n c o u n trie s w e re c u m b e rs o m e a n d in e ffic ie n t, h e to ld Royall o n 7 M a rc h th a t th e a rm y a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t sh o u ld m o re c lo sely c o o rd in a te th e ir a c tiv itie s. A s a first step , h e a p p o in te d a n a s s is ta n t re s p o n s ib le fo r h a n d lin g m ilita ry a id m a tte rs a n d re c o m ­ m e n d e d th a t M a rs h a ll d o th e s a m e .76 F o rre sta l's in itia tiv e g av e th e a rm y a c h a n c e to e x p re s s a n e w its g ro w in g d is c o n te n t w ith c u r r e n t p ro c e d u re s fo r s u p p ly in g a rm s a b ro a d . In r e s p o n s e to F o rre sta l's s u g g e s tio n s , a sp e c ia l a rm y c o m m it­ te e re c o m m e n d e d o n 1 A p ril a d e ta ile d d iv is io n of re s p o n s ib ility b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t a n d th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t to re m e d y th e c o n fu s io n th a t o fte n h a m p e r e d p ro g ra m s of m ili­ ta ry a id . T h e a rm y p la n n e r s w e n t fu rth e r, h o w ev er, a n d u r g e d th e e n a c tm e n t o f le g isla tio n th a t w o u ld b r o a d e n th e a u th o rity of th e p re s i­ d e n t to a rm fo re ig n c o u n trie s . E q u a lly im p o r ta n t, in th e ir view , w e re a p p ro p r ia tio n s to re im b u rs e th e se rv ic e s fo r e x p e n d itu re s in th e im p le ­ m e n ta tio n of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p r o g r a m s .77 Finally, b e c a u se of th e e x h a u s tio n of s u r p lu s sto c k s a n d th e d e m a n d s of n e w D e p a rtm e n t of th e A rm y p ro g ra m s , th e a rm y c o m m itte e s u g g e s te d lim ite d e x p a n s io n o f th e d o m e stic a rm a m e n ts in d u stry . T h e se rv ice p la n n e r s b e lie v e d th a t, ta k e n to g e th e r, th e s e a c tio n s w o u ld p ro v id e a s o u n d b a sis fo r th e c o n tin u in g s u p p ly o f m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s .78 E v e n b e fo re th e a rm y c o m m itte e c o m p le te d its re p o r t, C o n g re s s b e g a n to c o n s id e r n e w m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n . D u rin g h e a rin g s o n th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m , th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e s u d d e n ly a s k e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t to s u b m it a bill a u th o riz in g th e p r e s id e n t to s u p p ly m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to fo re ig n n a tio n s w h e n e v e r h e th o u g h t s u c h tra n s fe rs w e re in th e n a tio n a l in te re s t. T h is m e a s u re w a s

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to h a v e b e c o m e p a r t of c o m p re h e n s iv e fo re ig n a id le g isla tio n , a u th o riz ­ in g n o t o n ly th e M a rsh a ll P la n b u t also m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e to G re e c e , Turkey, a n d C h in a . H o u s e R e p u b lic a n s fa v o re d s u c h a n o m n ib u s bill b e c a u se of th e ir d is tre s s o v e r " re c e iv in g fro m th e a d m in is tra tio n a lo n g su c c e s s io n of 'p ie c e m e a l' p ro g ra m s , e ac h w ith a s e p a ra te tim e ta b le of e m e rg e n c y , w ith o u t a n y a d e q u a te to ta l p ro g ra m e ith e r as to s c o p e o r c o m m itm e n ts ." D ra w in g o n p re v io u s S A N A CC s tu d ie s , d ip lo m a tic a n d m ilita ry officials h u rrie d ly d ra fte d a m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e bill, k n o w n as T itle VI, a n d s e n t it to th e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e in e a rly M a rc h .79 T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, h o w ev er, firm ly o p p o s e d th e m e rg e r of E u r o p e a n re c o v e ry a n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n . M a rsh a ll fe a re d a n e w r o u n d of c o n g re s s io n a l h e a rin g s th a t w o u ld d e la y h e lp to th e b e le a g u e re d n a tio n s of E u ro p e . H ic k e rs o n a lso n o te d th a t in c o rp o ra ­ tio n of Title VI in a n o m n ib u s bill w o u ld " c h a n g e th e w h o le e m p h a s is of E R P fro m a p r o g r a m to p ro m o te p o s itiv e ly E u ro p e a n re c o v e ry to a p r o g r a m o f d e fe n s e a g a in s t S o v iet a g g re s s io n ." S u c h a sh ift, h e w a rn e d , m ig h t a lie n a te E u ro p e a n n e u tr a ls s u c h as S w e d e n a n d S w itz e rla n d . V a n d e n b e rg , th e flo o r le a d e r of th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m in th e S e n a te , a lso o b je c te d to th e c o u p lin g of e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id fo r fe a r th a t s u c h le g isla tio n m ig h t fail to p a s s th e u p p e r c h a m b e r. H e p re v a ile d o n h is c o lle a g u e s in th e H o u s e to c o m p ro m ise . D e sp ite its b ro a d sw ee p , th e F o re ig n A s s is ta n c e A ct of 1948, w h ic h T ru m a n s ig n e d o n 3 A p ril, d id n o t c o n ta in th e c o n tro v e rsia l Title V I.80 B ut m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n w a s b y n o m e a n s d e a d . A s s o o n as th e F o re ig n A ffa irs C o m m itte e ta b le d T itle VI, th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h ­ m e n t b e g a n to p r e s s fo r th e in tro d u c tio n of a s e p a ra te a rm s bill. F o rre sta l w ro te to M a rs h a ll o n 24 M a rc h th a t h e u n d e rs to o d th a t T ru m a n w a s " g e n e ra lly fa m ilia r" w ith Title VI a n d s u p p o r te d th e p re s e n ta tio n o f sim ila r le g isla tio n to C o n g r e s s .81 So d id se v e ra l S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials. H ic k e rso n , fo r e x a m p le , d e c la re d th a t s u c h a m e a s u re " w o u ld u n d o u b te d ly s tr e n g th e n th e re s is ta n c e of n o n -C o m m u n is t fo rc e s th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e ." A d e p a r tm e n ta l c o m m itte e , h o w ­ ever, re c o m m e n d e d le g isla tio n m o re lim ite d in s c o p e th a n Title VI. S u c h a bill, th e c o m m itte e e x p la in e d , w o u ld h a v e a b e tte r c h a n c e in C o n g re s s w h ile m e e tin g th e a d m in is tra tio n 's m o s t p re s s in g n e e d e x p a n d e d a u th o rity to fulfill e m e rg e n c y r e q u e s ts fo r a rm s .82 A t th e e n d o f A p ril a n d th e b e g in n in g of M ay 1948, W a sh in g to n w as rife w ith s p e c u la tio n th a t T ru m a n w o u ld a sk fo r le g isla tio n to a rm

154 • Arming the Free World W e ste rn E u ro p e . W h ite H o u s e officials d e n ie d th is r u m o r o n 1 M ay, b u t p riv a te ly ra ile d a b o u t th e fa ilu re of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t to in fo rm th e m o f th e ir p la n s . T h e r e a s o n fo r th is lack of c o m m u n ic a tio n w a s th a t P e n ta g o n officials w e re tr y in g to a s s e s s th e m o o d of C o n g re s s . M a rx L ev a, o n e of F o rrestaT s d e p u tie s , p r e d ic te d th a t, b e c a u se th e re w e re so m a n y false sto rie s c irc u la tin g o n C a p ito l H ill a b o u t a n im p e n d in g a d m in is tra tio n p r o ­ p o s a l fo r a m u ltib illio n -d o lla r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m , a re q u e s t fo r in te rim a u th o rity to s p e n d $750 m illio n w o u ld a c tu a lly e a se th e a n x ie tie s of m a n y le g isla to rs a n d a id in th e p a s s a g e of o th e r p e n d in g d e fe n s e m e a s u re s , s u c h a s th e s u p p le m e n ta l a p p ro p ria tio n a n d selec­ tiv e se rv ice . M o s t o f th e u n if o r m e d a n d civ ilian se rv ic e le a d e rs, h o w ­ ever, re a c h e d a n tith e tic a l c o n c lu s io n s a b o u t th e p ro b a b le c o n g re s s io n a l re a c tio n . C e rta in ly th e o p p o s itio n of B u d g e t D ire c to r W ebb w a s b y n o m e a n s te m p e r e d w h e n h e le a rn e d th a t th e D e fe n se a n d S ta te d e p a r t­ m e n ts w e re c o n te m p la tin g o n ly a n in te rim p r o g r a m of m ilita ry aid . W ebb to ld officials fro m th o s e tw o d e p a r tm e n ts th a t all th e lo o se ta lk a b o u t s p e n d in g b illio n s fo r a rm s a s s is ta n c e w a s " v e ry d a n g e ro u s a n d . . . a lre a d y o u t of h a n d ." T h e p re s id e n t, h e d e c la re d , w o u ld n o t s u p p o r t s u c h a p ro g ra m . W ebb d o u b te d th a t T ru m a n w o u ld e n d o rs e e v e n a m o re lim ite d m e a s u re , a lth o u g h th e p r e s id e n t w o u ld w ith h o ld h is fin al d e c isio n u n til re a d in g th e d ra ft le g is la tio n .83 M a rsh a ll a n d F o rre sta l fin a lly s e n t th e p r o p o s e d M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e A ct of 1948 to th e W h ite H o u s e o n 7 M ay. B a se d o n T itle VI, it w o u ld h a v e a llo w e d th e p r e s id e n t to p ro v id e e m e rg e n c y h e lp to an y fo re ig n g o v e rn m e n t u n til 30 A p ril 1949, b y w h ic h tim e a d m in is tra tio n officials h o p e d to s u b m it m o re c o m p re h e n s iv e a rm s le g isla tio n . T he b ill's p ro s p e c ts in C o n g re s s w e re a c tu a lly q u ite p o o r, a n d n o t m e re ly b e c a u se of le g islativ e re lu c ta n c e to a p p ro v e a n o th e r c o stly n a tio n a l se c u rity p ro g ra m . V a n d e n b e rg , w h o s e s u p p o r t w a s critical, th o u g h t th a t th e E u ro p e a n s s h o u ld first p o o l th e ir m ilita ry re s o u rc e s b e fo re re q u e s tin g A m e ric a n h elp . T ru m a n , h o w ev er, n e v e r e v e n s e n t th e le g isla tio n to C a p ito l H ill; h e a n d W ebb s h a r e d a c o n v ic tio n th a t th e b u d g e t c o u ld n o t a c c o m m o d a te a n o th e r m a jo r fo re ig n a id e x p e n d itu re d u rin g th e c u r r e n t fiscal y e ar.84 D e sp ite th e fa ilu re to se c u re a n in te rim a rm s bill, p la n n in g fo r c o m p re h e n s iv e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n m o v e d a h e a d quickly, h a s te n e d in p a r t b y th e a d m in is tra tio n 's e ffo rts to c a rry o u t T ru m an 's p le d g e of s u p p o r t fo r th e W e ste rn U n io n . D u rin g th e s p rin g of 1948,

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th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in fo rm e d se v e ra l E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s th a t it w is h e d to d e v e lo p a re g io n a l a p p ro a c h to m ilita ry a ssista n c e ; it n o lo n g e r p r e f e r r e d to g r a n t in d iv id u a l r e q u e s ts fo r a rm s o n a p ie c e m e a l b a sis. S u c h th in k in g in flu e n c e d th e N S C r e p o r t o n 13 A p ril o n A m e ri­ c a n a s s is ta n c e to th e W e ste rn U n io n . A lth o u g h p rim a rily c o n c e rn e d w ith th e n e g o tia tio n of a N o rth A tla n tic d e fe n s e tr e a ty th e N S C p a p e r re c o m m e n d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s p ro m p tly c o o rd in a te its m ilita ry p r o d u c tio n w ith th e W e ste rn U n io n n a tio n s . S u c h a s u g g e s tio n im ­ p lie d s u b s ta n tia l tra n s fe rs of a rm s to E u ro p e , w h ic h , as a d m in is tra tio n officials re a liz e d , w o u ld re q u ire n e w le g isla tio n a n d a p p ro p r ia tio n s .85 S ta te D e p a r tm e n t officials w o rk e d c lo sely w ith V a n d e n b e rg , th e c h a irm a n of th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , in p la n n in g m e a s u re s o f a s s is ta n c e to W e ste rn E u ro p e . In d e e d , so h e av ily d id th e y re ly o n h is a d v ic e th a t V a n d e n b e rg b e c a m e o n e of th e a rc h ite c ts of th e N o rth A tla n tic T reaty.86 D u rin g a se rie s of m e e tin g s in A p ril w ith A c tin g S e c re ta ry L o v ett, V a n d e n b e rg firm ly o p p o s e d a n y " u n lim ite d , o p e n - e n d e d o ffer of a id ," c o n c e rn e d th a t it m ig h t e n c o u ra g e th e m a jo r­ ity of c o u n trie s e ith e r " to fo ld th e ir h a n d s a n d le t U n cle S a m c a rry th e m " or, c o n v ersely , to ta k e " s o firm a n a ttitu d e as to b e co m e p ro v o c a tiv e ." H e p r e f e r r e d in s te a d a m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p r o g r a m m o d ­ e le d o n th e M a rs h a ll P la n ; th a t is, o n e r e q u irin g th e re c ip ie n ts first to in te g ra te th e ir d e fe n s e s , ra th e r th a n " in v itin g c o u n trie s to co m e to u s w ith th e ir s h o p p in g lis ts ." 87 T h is p rin c ip le w a s e m b o d ie d in th e V an­ d e n b e rg R e so lu tio n , a p p ro v e d b y th e S e n a te o n 11 J u n e b y a v o te of six ty -fo u r to four, w h ic h a ffirm e d s u p p o r t fo r " a s s o c ia tio n of th e U n ite d S ta te s , b y c o n s titu tio n a l p ro c e s s , w ith s u c h re g io n a l a n d o th e r collective a r r a n g e m e n ts as a re b a s e d o n c o n tin u o u s a n d effectiv e selfh e lp a n d m u tu a l a id , a n d as affect its n a tio n a l secu rity ." T h e S e n a te w a s w ell a w a re of th e im p lic a tio n s o f th is g e n e ra l la n g u a g e . By a n o v e r­ w h e lm in g m a rg in , th e u p p e r c h a m b e r re je c te d a n a m e n d m e n t o ffe re d b y C lau d e R. P e p p e r (D -F la.) th a t w o u ld h a v e s tru c k fro m th e re s o lu ­ tio n a n y re fe re n c e to th e p o s s ib ility o f A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e .88 T h e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n s h a p e d p o licy o n m ilita ry a id to W est­ e rn E u ro p e to c o n fo rm to th e p rin c ip le s of th e V a n d e n b e rg R e so lu tio n . T h e N S C re c o m m e n d e d o n 28 J u n e th a t A m e ric a n u n ifo rm e d officers jo in th e W e ste rn U n io n m ilita ry c o n v e rs a tio n s in L o n d o n a n d " m a k e c le a r th ro u g h o u t th a t th e ERP p re c e d e n t s h o u ld b e fo llo w ed ." O n ly a fte r th e E u r o p e a n n a tio n s h a d c o m b in e d th e ir m ilita ry re s o u rc e s, th e N S C d e c la re d , s h o u ld th e U n ite d S ta te s c o n s id e r th e ir re q u e s ts fo r

156 • Arming the Free World s u p p le m e n ta r y a s s is ta n c e . In r e tu r n , th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld re q u e s t re c ip ro c a l a s s is ta n c e , p e r h a p s in th e fo rm of b a se a n d a ir-tra n s it rig h ts . T ru m a n p ro m p tly a p p ro v e d th e s e re c o m m e n d a tio n s , a n d in m id -Ju ly th e Jo in t C h ie fs n a m e d G e n e ra l L y m a n L. L e m n itz e r as th e ir r e p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e to th e L o n d o n ta lk s. A c e n tra l ta s k of L e m n itz e r's m is s io n w a s to s tre s s to th e E u ro p e a n s th a t th e y w o u ld re c e iv e A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id o n ly if th e y a d o p te d stra te g ic c o n c e p ts th a t o ffe re d " re a s o n a b le p ro m ­ ise of s u c c e s s ," h e ld to a m in im u m th e ir d e m a n d s o n A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s , a n d e n v is io n e d n o t o n ly " th e d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e " b u t a lso " th e r a p id a n d c o m p le te d e fe a t of a g g re s s io n ." O n c e th e E u ro p e a n s h a d m e t th e s e c o n d itio n s , th e p r e s id e n t w o u ld se e k m ili­ ta ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n fro m C o n g r e s s .89 Ju s t a s th e p o s s ib ility of r e a rm in g W e ste rn E u ro p e s h a p e d th e a d m in is tra tio n 's leg isla tiv e a g e n d a , so d id th e a rm y 's p e rs is te n t d e sire to e s ta b lis h a s o u n d b a sis fo r c o n tin u in g p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . T h ro u g h o u t th e s p r in g of 1948, G e n e ra l H e n r y S. A u ra n d , th e d ire c to r of lo g istic s, b o m b a rd e d h is s u p e rio rs w ith r e q u e s ts fo r m o re s y s te m a tic h a n d lin g of a rm s a id . Typical w a s h is s u g g e s tio n o n 19 M a rc h to B rad ley a n d Royall th a t th e a rm y o p p o s e n e w c o m m itm e n ts to fu r n is h a rm s u n til th e a p p ro v a l of " a n in te g r a te d to ta l m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m " a n d th e e n a c tm e n t of a bill m o d e le d o n le n d -le a se . B ecause of th e d e p le tio n o f s u r p lu s sto c k s, A u r a n d w a s e a g e r to a rra n g e fo r th e o rd e rly a n d e ffic ie n t p r o c u r e m e n t of m ilita ry s u p p lie s fo r tra n s fe r o v e rs e a s. H e a lso re c a lle d th a t th e S W N C C h a d e s tim a te d in th e s u m ­ m e r of 1947 th a t r e q u e s ts fo r A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id m ig h t to ta l as m u c h as $22 b illio n . A u r a n d w a s d e te r m in e d to p re v e n t s u c h a n o v e re x te n ­ sio n of n a tio n a l c a p a c ity a n d to in s u re th a t a n y n e w c o m m itm e n ts b r o u g h t th e g re a te s t p o ss ib le r e tu r n to A m e ric a n secu rity . U n til h is re c o m m e n d a tio n s w e re c a rrie d o u t, A u r a n d w a r n e d a rm y officials, " e v e ry p ie c e m e a l c o m m itm e n t fo r fo re ig n m ilita ry a id fritte rs aw ay o u r lim ite d a s s e ts a n d je o p a rd iz e s th e m a in re s u lt w e a re tr y in g to ac­ c o m p lis h ." 90 A u ra n d 's im p o r tu n in g in flu e n c e d a rm y policy. H is a p p e a l fo r le g is­ la tio n a n d a p p ro p r ia tio n s re in fo rc e d th e a rm y 's s ta u n c h s u p p o r t of th e s e m e a s u re s . H is in s is te n c e o n a n o v e ra ll p r o g r a m of m ilita ry a id re s u lte d in p la n s fo r a n e w s u rv e y of p o te n tia l d e m a n d s fo r A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t a n d th e m o b iliz a tio n of in d u s tr y to m e e t th o se r e q u ire ­ m e n ts . A lth o u g h a rm y a u th o ritie s re je c te d h is s u g g e s tio n to d e n y all r e q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry a id p e n d in g th e e n a c tm e n t of le g isla tio n , th e y d id

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s tre s s m o re v ig o ro u s ly th a n e v e r to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th a t a lack of a u th o rity , e q u ip m e n t, a n d f u n d s h a m s tr u n g th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h ­ m e n t's a b ility to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s .91 A u ra n d 's in flu e n c e s h a p e d th e a rm y 's re a c tio n to r e q u e s ts fro m D e n m a rk a n d N o rw a y fo r m ilita ry a id . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t w a s e a g e r to p ro v id e a rm a m e n ts to b o th th e s e c o u n trie s to d isc o u ra g e th e ir a d h e re n c e to a n e u tr a l S c a n d in a v ia n b lo c c h a m p io n e d b y S w e d e n a n d to in c re a s e th e ir in te r e s t in a N o rth e rn A tla n tic d e fe n se tre a ty .92 T he arm y, h o w ev er, d e m u r r e d . A fte r c o n s u ltin g w ith A u ra n d , W ed e m e y er to ld H ic k e rs o n th a t th e a rm y c o u ld f u r n is h o n ly to k e n q u a n titie s of sm a ll a rm s to D e n m a rk —n o t e v e n th e ty p e s th e D a n e s h a d r e q u e s te d — b u t e m p h a s iz e d h is o p p o s itio n to th e tra n s fe r of th is m a te ria l. "A stra te g ic a n a ly s is of E u ro p e w o u ld in d ic a te th a t D e n m a rk m ig h t b e o v e rr u n s h o u ld th e J u g g e rn a u t to th e E ast d e c id e to m o v e W e stw a rd , " W e d e m e y e r d e c la re d . "If th e J u g g e rn a u t d o e s n o t roll, th e e q u ip m e n t w o u ld n o t b e r e q u ir e d in D e n m a rk ." T h e a rm y a lso b a lk e d a t e v e n m in o r a s s is ta n c e to N orw ay, d e s p ite th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' d e sire to e n c o u r­ a g e N o rw a y 's W e ste rn le a n in g s . " F u rn is h in g a id o n th e p ie c e m e a l b a sis p r e s e n ts th e p o s s ib ility th a t w e sh a ll g iv e aw ay e q u ip m e n t w h ic h m a y b e r e q u e s te d la te r b y n a tio n s m o re v ita l to th e se c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s ," R oyall a s s e r te d in a m e m o ra n d u m d ra fte d b y A u ra n d . T h e a rm y 's p o in t w a s clear: th e a d m in is tra tio n c o u ld n o lo n g e r p o s tp o n e a s o lu tio n to th e p ro b le m s of p ro v id in g m ilita ry a id to fo re ig n n a tio n s .93 S tu d ie s b y th e S A N A C C , b e g u n in th e w a k e of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e s p e e c h a n d c o m p le te d in e a rly 1948, s u p p o r te d th e a rm y 's view . In o n e re p o r t, th e S A N A C C c o n c lu d e d th a t " th e re is a d e fin ite r e q u ire m e n t fo r le g isla tio n w h ic h w ill b ro a d e n th e a u th o rity of th e P re s id e n t to im p le m e n t U .S . m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to fo re ig n n a tio n s u n d e r a p p r o p r i­ a te c o n d itio n s ." T h e in itia tio n of n e w p ro g ra m s of m ilita ry a id , th e c o m m itte e n o te d , w a s n o w "d iffic u lt a n d in so m e in s ta n c e s im p o s s i­ b le." In a n o th e r p a p e r, th e SA N A C C w a r n e d th a t th e in a b ility to p r o ­ v id e m a in te n a n c e ite m s a n d s p a re p a rts " c o u ld te n d to d riv e so m e n a tio n s in to th e o rb it of S o v iet in flu e n c e ." E v e n th o u g h th e p re s id e n t c o u ld se e k c o n g re s s io n a l a p p ro v a l of e a c h a rm s tra n sfe r, th is m e th o d w a s u s u a lly to o slo w a n d o fte n le d to a n e x h a u stiv e p u b lic in q u iry , w h ic h th e a d m in is tra tio n h a d e v e ry d e sire to av o id . To o v erco m e th e se p ro b le m s , th e S A N A C C re c o m m e n d e d th e e n a c tm e n t of leg isla tio n th a t w o u ld allo w th e p r e s id e n t to f u r n is h m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to fo re ig n

158 • Arming the Free World n a tio n s w h e n e v e r h e th o u g h t s u c h tra n s fe rs w e re in th e n a tio n a l in te r ­ e s t.94 S u c h a m e a s u re w o u ld c o n so lid a te all m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e p r o ­ g ra m s u n d e r a sin g le a u th o rity fo r th e first tim e sin c e le n d -le a s e .95 T h e SA N A C C a lso a p p ro v e d , a fte r m o re t h a n a y e a r of d e lib e ra tio n , a n e w a rm s policy. T he c o m m itte e a g re e d th a t th e p rim a ry p u r p o s e of s e n d in g a rm s a b ro a d w a s to f u r th e r th e in te re s ts of th e U n ite d S ta te s. T h is c o n c lu s io n s e e m e d s e lf-e v id e n t a n d e m p ty , e x c e p t w h e n co m ­ p a r e d to e a rlie r p o licy s ta te m e n ts , s u c h a s SC /R -184 a n d S W N C C 202/4, w h ic h s tr e s s e d th a t th e restriction of a rm s tra n s fe rs g e n e ra lly f u r th e r e d A m e ric a n o b je c tiv e s. T he c o m m itte e e m p h a s iz e d th a t m ili­ ta ry a s s is ta n c e s h o u ld b e c o n s is te n t w ith th e n a tio n 's p rim a ry se c u rity in te re s t, " s u p p o r tin g re s is ta n c e to im m e d ia te o r p o te n tia l c o m m u n is t a g g re s s io n ." 96 M o st to p a d m in is tra tio n officials a g re e d . In A p ril Royall, fo r e x a m p le , w ro te to th e fo rm e r s e c re ta ry of w ar, H e n ry L. S tim s o n , th a t " o u r c u r r e n t th in k in g in d ic a te s th a t it w ill e v e n tu a lly b e to o u r in te re s ts to a ss is t . . . fo re ig n a rm e d fo rce s . . . in o rd e r th a t a g g re ss iv e C o m m u n is t a c tio n c a n n o t so e a sily o v e rc o m e, o n e b y o n e , o th e r fre e n a tio n s n o w o u ts id e th e S o v iet o rb it." C o n v ersely , p a rtly b e c a u se o f th e a b s e n c e of a n im m e d ia te C o m m u n is t th re a t, th e a d m in ­ is tra tio n r e fu s e d to fu r n is h m ilita ry a id to In d ia , a n d th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m s a n k in to o b liv io n . S in c e th e e n d of W o rld W ar II, c h e c k in g th e s p re a d of S o v iet in flu e n c e h a d b e e n a n im p o r ta n t o b jec tiv e of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s ; b y m id - 1948 it w a s th e o v e rrid in g p u r p o s e .97 A n tic o m m u n is m p e rv a d e d th e N S C r e p o r t of 1 Ju ly o n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to " n a tio n s of th e n o n -S o v ie t w o rld ." T h is re p o r t, th e p r o d ­ u c t o f m o re th a n a y e a r of s tu d y a n d d e b a te of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e , a s s e r te d th a t " th e su c c e ss of c e rta in fre e n a tio n s in re s is tin g a g g re s s io n b y th e fo rc e s of S o v iet d ire c te d w o rld c o m m u n is m is of critical im p o rta n c e to th e s e c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s." D ra w in g o n fa m ilia r a rg u m e n ts , th e N S C a n a ly s ts m a in ta in e d th a t A m e ric a n m ili­ ta r y h e lp w o u ld ra ise th e " m o ra l a n d m a te ria l" s tr e n g th in re c ip ie n t n a tio n s , w h ic h w a s e s s e n tia l to "p o litica l re s is ta n c e to c o m m u n is t s u b v e rs io n fro m w ith in a n d S o v iet p r e s s u r e fro m w ith o u t." Political c o n s id e ra tio n s m ig h t o c c a sio n a lly d ic ta te p ro v is io n of a rm s to n a tio n s fo r o th e r re a s o n s , th e N S C p la n n e r s a llo w e d , b u t th e c o n ta in m e n t of C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n s h o u ld b e th e g u id in g p rin c ip le of m ilita ry a id policy.98 T ow ard th is e n d , th e N S C a d v o c a te d th e c o n s o lid a tio n a n d e x p an -

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s io n of A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s . Like th e S A N ACC p la n n e r s , th e N S C sta ff c o n s id e re d im p e ra tiv e th e p a s s a g e of leg isla ­ tio n , sim ila r to Title VI, w h ic h b r o a d e n e d th e a u th o rity of th e p r e s id e n t to f u r n is h m ilita ry a id . " O n th e b a sis of le g isla tio n a lo n g th e se lin e s ," th e y e x p la in e d , " it w o u ld b e p o ss ib le to w o rk o u t . . . a c o o rd in a te d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p r o g r a m in w h ic h th e q u o ta s of e a c h re c ip ie n t w o u ld b e re la te d to o v e ra ll n e e d s , p ro d u c tio n c a p a b ilitie s, p o litical c o n s id e ra tio n s a n d stra te g ic c o n c e p ts ." W e ste rn E u ro p e , th e y b e lie v e d , s h o u ld re c e iv e first p rio rity in a n y fu tu re p ro g ra m of a rm s a id , y e t th e p la n n e r s p la c e d n o lim it o n th e sc o p e of s u c h a n e ffo rt. T he N S C a lso u r g e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s in s is t o n se lf-h e lp a n d m u tu a l a s s is ta n c e a m o n g th e re c ip ie n t n a tio n s a n d o n re c ip ro c a l a ssista n c e , p e r h a p s in th e fo rm of s tra te g ic ra w m a te ria ls . T ru m a n ra tifie d th is n e w c o n s e n s u s o n m ilita ry a id b y a p p ro v in g th e s e re c o m m e n d a tio n s o n 10 July. P ro p e lle d b y a d e s ire b o th to m a in ta in th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss of a n in s tr u m e n t o n w h ic h it h a d r e p e a te d ly d r a w n sin c e th e e n d of W o rld W ar II a n d to e m b a rk o n a n e w p r o g r a m of a s s is ta n c e fo r W e ste rn E u ro p e , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s n o w c o m m itte d to th e d e v e l­ o p m e n t of a c o m p re h e n s iv e , w o rld w id e p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a id .99

6

IThe Dilemma of IAid to China You con help any government but one which does not know how to govern. —G eorge F. Kennon , February 1948

I a m u n a b le to u n d e r s ta n d G e n e ra l M a rsh a ll's a p p a r e n t w illin g n e ss to b e co m e in v o lv e d in sa v in g th e G re e k a n d T u rk ish G o v e rn m e n ts in v ie w of h is p r e s e n t a ttitu d e to w a rd th e G o v e rn m e n t of C h in a , " A d m i­ ral W illiam D. L eahy, th e p r e s id e n t's c h ie f of staff, c o n fid e d to h is d ia ry o n 6 M a rc h 1947 "T h e tw o s itu a tio n s s e e m to b e id e n tic a l." 1 L e a h y 's c o m p la in t re fle c te d th e w id e s p re a d p e rp le x ity w ith in th e serv ice d e ­ p a r tm e n ts a n d C o n g re s s a n d a m o n g th e p u b lic o v e r th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t's a ttitu d e to w a rd m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to C h in a . A t th e sa m e tim e th a t P re s id e n t H a r r y S. T ru m a n p ro c la im e d h is d e te rm in a tio n " to s u p p o r t fre e p e o p le s w h o a re re s is tin g a tte m p te d s u b ju g a tio n b y a rm e d m in o ritie s o r b y o u ts id e p r e s s u r e s ," h e b a c k e d th e e ffo rts of S e c re ta ry of S ta te G e o rg e C. M a rsh a ll to lim it A m e ric a n m ilita ry h e lp to th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e of C h ia n g K a i-s h e k .2 M a rsh a ll u ltim a te ly p re v a ile d o v e r h is b u re a u c ra tic a n d c o n g re s s io n a l a d v e rsa rie s: h e w a s ab le to b ra k e th e m o m e n tu m of c o m m itm e n t to C h ia n g , w h ic h b y 1947 p ro m is e d to im p e ril ra th e r th a n a d v a n c e A m e ric a n g lo b al s e c u rity in te re s ts . Yet h is v ic to ry left a re s id u e of b itte rn e s s a n d m is u n d e r s ta n d ­ in g th a t n o t o n ly e x a c e rb a te d d iv is io n s o v e r C h in a p o licy b u t also a ro u s e d o p p o s itio n to th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p la n s in 1949 fo r a w o rld ­ w id e p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a id . A lth o u g h p a rtis a n R e p u b lic a n s a n d d ie -h a rd A s ia -firste rs g e n e r ­ a te d m o s t of th e c o n tro v e rs y o v e r m ilita ry a id to C h in a , T ru m a n a n d h is to p fo re ig n p o licy a d v is e rs c o n trib u te d to th e ir o w n d iffic u lties. T h eir e x p a n siv e rh e to ric of c o n ta in m e n t ra is e d e x p e c ta tio n s of a m a jo r e ffo rt to s to p c o m m u n is m in E ast A sia, a n a re a th e y r a n k e d in stra te g ic im p o rta n c e b e h in d W e ste rn E u ro p e , L atin A m e ric a, a n d th e M id d le E ast. T h e ir c o n v ic tio n th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s m u s t p ro v e its c re d ib ility le d to th e c o n tin u a tio n of a rm s a id to C h ia n g e v e n a fte r th e y th o u g h t 160

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 161 th a t s u c h h e lp c o u ld n o t p r e v e n t a C o m m u n is t victory. T ru m a n a n d M a rsh a ll a t tim e s fo u n d it e a s ie r to a p p e a s e C h ia n g 's c o n g re s s io n a l s u p p o r te r s th a n to risk re d u c tio n s o r d e la y s in v ita l p ro g ra m s of e c o ­ n o m ic o r m ilita ry a id to W e ste rn E u ro p e . A d m in is tra tio n s p o k e s m e n fra n k ly a c k n o w le d g e d th e d a n g e r s of c o m m itm e n t to C h ia n g b e h in d c lo s e d d o o rs , b u t, n o t w a n tin g to b e a c c u se d of d e a lin g a d e a th b lo w to th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t, re fu s e d to d o so publicly. By th e s e a c tio n s, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h e lp e d tu r n a p o licy th a t a im e d at p ro v in g A m e ric a n re lia b ility in to o n e th a t s e e m e d to d e m o n s tra te irre s o lu tio n a n d p erfid y .

S o o n a fte r r e tu r n in g fro m C h in a in J a n u a ry 1947, M a rsh a ll a sk e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's O ffice of F ar E a s te rn A ffairs (FE) to re v ie w A m e ri­ c a n p o licy to w a rd C h in a . T he m e m o ra n d u m th a t Jo h n C a rte r V in c en t, th e d ire c to r, p r e s e n te d to th e n e w s e c re ta ry of sta te o n 7 F e b ru a ry s tr e s s e d th e im p o rta n c e o f p re v e n tin g C h in a fro m b e c o m in g a m a jo r a re a of C o ld W ar c o n fro n ta tio n . V in c e n t re a ffirm e d h is v ie w th a t a u n ifie d a n d d e m o c ra tic C h in a w a s a m e a n s to w a rd th e " la rg e r o b jec ­ tiv e" of m a in ta in in g a S o v ie t-A m e ric a n e q u ilib riu m in E a st A sia . H e th e re fo re c o u n s e le d a g a in s t la rg e -sc a le a s s is ta n c e to C h ia n g as lo n g as th e S o v ie ts m a d e n o a tte m p t to p ro v id e m a te ria l s u p p o r t to th e C o m ­ m u n is ts . T h e U n ite d S ta te s , in s h o rt, c o u ld m o s t e ffectiv ely c o n ta in R u s s ia n in flu e n c e in C h in a fo r th e tim e b e in g b y m in im iz in g its o w n in v o lv e m e n t in th e civil w a r.3 V in c e n t in p a rtic u la r u r g e d M a rsh a ll to c o n tin u e to d e n y c o m b a t e q u ip m e n t to th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t. H e a rg u e d th a t n o a m o u n t o f m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e s h o rt of a n u n r e s tric te d c o m m itm e n t of A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s —a b u r d e n th e a d m in is tra tio n h a d n o d e s ire to a s s u m e — w o u ld e n a b le C h ia n g to d e fe a t th e C o m m u n is ts . " L im ite d a m o u n ts of m u n itio n s o f w a r," h e re a s o n e d , " m ig h t th e n se rv e o n ly to e n c o u ra g e th e K u o m in ta n g m ilita ry le a d e rs to w a g e a n in c o n c lu s iv e w a r w h ic h m ig h t c a u se th e c o lla p se of th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t fo r eco n o m ic re a s o n s ." F u rth e rm o re , h e w a r n e d th a t th e r e s u m p tio n of a rm s s h ip ­ m e n ts w o u ld s tr e n g th e n th e p o s itio n of th e K u o m in ta n g re a c tio n a rie s, w h o m M a rs h a ll b la m e d fo r th e fa ilu re of h is m e d ia tio n . " In th e a b se n c e of e v id e n c e th a t th e civil w a r m a y s o o n c e a s e ," V in c e n t c o n c lu d e d , " it w o u ld b e p re fe ra b le fro m o u r s ta n d p o in t to le t th e o p p o s in g C h in e s e m ilita ry fo rce s re a c h so m e k in d of so lu tio n o r e q u ilib riu m w ith o u t

162 • Arming the Free World o u ts id e in te rfe re n c e ." O n ly th e n m ig h t th e re b e a c h a n c e fo r g e n u in e re fo rm of th e g o v e rn m e n t, " w h ic h is th e o n ly p ra c tic a l m e th o d of c o m b a ttin g th e c h a lle n g e o f th e C o m m u n is ts ." 4 A lth o u g h V in c e n t w a s c o n v in c e d th a t A m e ric a n m u n itio n s u lti­ m a te ly c o u ld n o t solve C h ia n g 's p ro b le m s , h e d id n o t clo se th e d o o r c o m p le te ly to f u r th e r m ilita ry a id . " It w o u ld b e m a n ife s tly u n re a lis tic to w ith h o ld a rm s fro m N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t fo rc e s ," h e w ro te , "if s u c h a c tio n c o n d e m n e d th e m to a d e g re e of m ilita ry a n e m ia w h ic h w o u ld m a k e p o s s ib le a su c c e ss fu l o ffe n siv e b y C o m m u n is t fo rces." V in c e n t d o u b te d th a t s u c h a s itu a tio n w o u ld o c c u r d u rin g th e n e x t few m o n th s , b u t re c o g n iz e d th a t m a in te n a n c e of th e e m b a rg o m ig h t s o o n r e n d e r in e ffe c tiv e so m e of C h ia n g 's A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t. "T h is s itu a ­ tio n ," h e c a u tio n e d , "w ill ta k e th e m o s t c a re fu l d a y to d a y w a tc h in g ." 5 M a rs h a ll b a sic a lly a g re e d w ith V in c e n t's a n a ly s is b u t e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts ' d e p e n d e n c e o n A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p p lie s w a s a m a jo r p ro b le m . H e to ld th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e o n 14 F e b ru ary , "If w e g iv e th e m a m m u n itio n w e a re p a rtic ip a tin g in th e civil w a r d irectly. O n th e o th e r h a n d , if w e n e v e r g iv e th e m a n y a m m u n itio n w e h a v e d is a rm e d th e m , b e c a u se th e y h a v e A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t." T h is w a s a d ile m m a , h e c o n fid e d , th a t h e h a d h o p e d w o u ld n e v e r a ris e .6 It w a s a lso o n e th a t h e c o u ld n o t e s c a p e . D e sp ite th e c u rr e n t e m b a rg o , th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d p ro v id e d m o re p o s tw a r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to C h in a th a n to a n y o th e r n a tio n a n d h a d m a d e a n e x tra o r­ d in a r y e ffo rt, th r o u g h M a rsh a ll's y e a r-lo n g m e d ia tio n , to e n d th e civil w ar. S u c h a c tio n s h a d lin k e d A m e ric a n p re s tig e to th e c o n tin u e d q u e s t fo r a sta b le p o s tw a r in te rn a tio n a l o rd e r in E ast A sia a n d h a d ra is e d e x p e c ta tio n s of a d d itio n a l A m e ric a n h e lp fo r th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn ­ m e n t. B ut a s m u c h as h e w a n te d to a v e rt th e c o llap se of C h ia n g 's g o v e rn m e n t, c o n ta in th e e x p a n s io n of c o m m u n is m in E a st A sia , a n d s tr e n g th e n A m e ric a n cred ib ility , M a rs h a ll—p e r h a p s m o re th a n a n y A m e ric a n —a p p re c ia te d th e d a n g e r s of d e e p in v o lv e m e n t in th e C h i­ n e s e civil w ar. W ith n o g o o d a lte rn a tiv e , M a rsh a ll w a s e a g e r to d e fe r a c tio n o n th e p ro v is io n of f u r th e r a rm s a id to C h in a . N o t so h is c o lle a g u e s in th e se rv ice d e p a r tm e n ts . B oth S e c re ta ry of W ar R o b e rt R P a tte rs o n a n d S e c re ta ry of th e N a v y Jam es V. F o rre sta l a d v o c a te d a s tr o n g e r c o m m itm e n t to th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e . F o rre sta l w a r n e d th a t S o v iet in flu e n c e w o u ld in c re a s e in C h in a as " th e U n ite d S ta te s w ith d r e w its s u p p o r t fro m th e C e n tra l G o v e rn m e n t." P a tte rs o n

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 163 a g re e d a n d d e c la re d th a t h e w a s n o t re a d y " to a c c e p t w ith e q u a n im ity th e m ilita ry c o llap se of th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t." C o n c e rn e d o v e r th e d e te rio ra tio n of s to c k p ile d e q u ip m e n t re s e rv e d fo r C h in a , h e calle d fo r a p ro m p t d e c isio n o n th e r e s u m p tio n of a rm s d e liv e rie s a n d re c o m ­ m e n d e d th a t th e th r e e s e c re ta rie s r e q u e s t th e v ie w s of th e Jo in t C h iefs of S ta ff.7 M a rsh a ll, h o w e v er, r e s is te d s u g g e s tio n s th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s te p u p its m ilita ry a id to C h in a . O n 27 F e b ru a ry h e to ld T ru m an , w h o w a s c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e p o s s ib ility of R u s s ia n m ilita ry in te rv e n tio n in M a n c h u ria , th a t th e r e s u m p tio n of a m m u n itio n s h ip m e n ts w o u ld fo re ­ clo se a n y c h a n c e of a lib e ra l re fo rm of th e C h in e s e g o v e rn m e n t.8 H e w ro te to P a tte rs o n five d a y s la te r th a t, a lth o u g h h e a g re e d th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs s h o u ld re v ie w A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id policy, h e still p re fe rre d to e n c o u ra g e th e C h in e s e to solve th e ir p ro b le m s b y p e a c e fu l m e th o d s .9 M a rsh a ll's a ttitu d e d id n o t a rise fro m a n y false h o p e s a b o u t th e p r o s ­ p e c ts fo r C h in e s e u n ity , b u t fro m th e c o n v ic tio n th a t " th e U .S . w a s d e fin ite ly in a n e g a tiv e p o s itio n " a n d s h o u ld a v o id b e in g d r a w n d e e p e r in to a p o te n tia lly d is a s tro u s s itu a tio n .10 T h e a d m in is tra tio n 's s tr o n g r e s p o n s e to th e G re e k -T u rk ish crisis of F e b ru a ry a n d M a rc h 1947 c o m p lic a te d M a rs h a ll's e ffo rts to lim it A m e r­ ic a n in v o lv e m e n t in th e C h in e s e civil w ar. E n c o u ra g e d b y th e g lo b al rh e to ric of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e , so m e of th e p r e s id e n t's to p a d v is e rs, s u c h as F o rre sta l a n d L eahy, a rg u e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld d o m o re to p r e v e n t C h in a fro m fa llin g u n d e r C o m m u n is t in flu e n c e . W h e n th is is s u e a ro s e a t a C a b in e t m e e tin g o n 7 M a rc h , A c h e s o n e x p la in e d th a t th e p rin c ip le of c o n ta in in g C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n g u id e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's th in k in g o n C h in a as it d id o n G re e c e ; th e v a s t d if­ fe re n c e s in th e tw o c o u n trie s a c c o u n te d fo r th e v a ria tio n s in specific p o licies. S p e a k in g fa r m o re b lu n tly , T ru m a n d e c la re d th a t fu r th e r m ili­ ta r y a id to C h ia n g K a i-sh e k u n d e r p re v a ilin g c irc u m s ta n c e s w o u ld b e like " p o u r in g s a n d in a ra t h o le ." 11 R e p re s e n ta tiv e s of th e se rv ic e d e p a r tm e n ts n e v e rth e le s s c o n tin u e d to p r e s s fo r in c re a s e d a id to C h in a u n d e r th e T ru m a n D o c trin e . T he d iv is io n s b e tw e e n p o litica l a n d m ilita ry officials o n th is issu e w e re e sp e c ia lly c le a r in th e S W N C C r e p o r t of 21 A p ril o n u r g e n t fo re ig n r e q u ir e m e n ts fo r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e . S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p la n n e rs th o u g h t th a t A m e ric a n a id to C h in a d u rin g th e n e x t few m o n th s sh o u ld b e fo c u s e d o n se le c te d r e c o n s tru c tio n p ro je c ts th a t w o u ld h e lp to m e e t u r g e n t e co n o m ic n e e d s . W ar a n d N a v y officials, h o w ev er, felt th a t th e se

164 • Arming the Free World lim ite d m e a s u r e s fell s h o rt o f T ru m a n 's p u b lic p ro m is e of s u p p o r t fo r b e s ie g e d fre e p e o p le s . U n lik e th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n a ly s ts , th e y w e re n e ith e r p e s s im is tic a b o u t A m e ric a n a b ility to in flu e n c e e v e n ts in C h in a n o r c o n v in c e d th a t a n y a tte m p t to d o so w o u ld u ltim a te ly re q u ire a n e n o rm o u s e x p e n d itu re of re s o u rc e s . In s te a d o f th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's " w a it a n d se e" a ttitu d e , th e se rv ice p la n n e r s fa v o re d " a m o re c ry s ta llin e a n d p o s itiv e p o lic y in c lu d in g c a re fu lly c o n tro lle d e co ­ n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id ," d e s ig n e d to h e a d off "a crisis sim ila r to th a t in G re e c e ." T h e S W N C C w a s u n a b le to re c o n c ile th e s e c o n flic tin g v ie w s .12 T h e S W N C C , ho w ev er, d id a g re e th a t th e is s u e of f u r th e r a id to C h in a h a d g lo b al im p lic a tio n s . "If th e U .S . s u p p o r ts a fre e d o m -lo v in g p e o p le w h o s e in d e p e n d e n c e is th r e a te n e d ," th e c o m m itte e a rg u e d , " o th e r n a tio n s m a y b e s tiffe n e d in th e ir d e te rm in a tio n to re m a in free; co n v ersely , if th e U .S . n e g le c ts to s u p p o r t a fre e p e o p le , o th e r n a tio n s m a y b e p r o fo u n d ly d is m a y e d a n d m a y lo se fa ith in th e le a d e rs h ip of th e U .S ." A t sta k e in C h in a , th e n , w a s A m e ric a n c re d ib ility a s a d e p e n d ­ ab le ally of n a tio n s d e te r m in e d to re s is t C o m m u n is t p r e s s u r e s .13 A s u rg e o f c ritic ism fro m R e p u b lic a n le g isla to rs a d d e d to th e p r e s ­ s u r e o n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t to a lte r its a ttitu d e s to w a rd C h in a . S e n a to r A r th u r H . V a n d e n b e rg of M ic h ig a n , th e n e w c h a irm a n of th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , u r g e d th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n in J a n u a ry to " s h ift its e m p h a s is " fro m p ro m o tio n of a c o a litio n g o v e rn ­ m e n t to firm s u p p o r t of th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e . " It se e m s to m e ," h e e x p la in e d , " th a t w e m ig h t ju s t as w ell b e g in to face th e C o m m u n is t c h a lle n g e o n every f r o n t." 14 W h e n T ru m a n c a lle d c o n g re s s io n a l le a d e rs to a m e e tin g at th e W h ite H o u s e o n 10 M a rc h d u rin g th e G re e k -T u rk ish crisis, V a n d e n b e rg d e p re c a te d th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p o licy to w a rd C h in a , a c o u n tr y h e th o u g h t fa r m o re im p o r ta n t to A m e ric a n se c u rity th a n G re e c e . S e n a to r S ty le s B rid g e s of N e w H a m p s h ire , th e c h a irm a n o f th e A p p r o p r ia tio n s C o m m itte e , a lso a p p e a le d fo r a v ig o ro u s A m e ri­ c a n e ffo rt to p r e v e n t C h in a fro m fa llin g in to th e S o v iet o rb it. D u rin g th e h e a rin g s o n th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A ct, R e p re s e n ta tiv e W alter H . J u d d of M in n e s o ta , a fo rm e r m e d ic a l m is s io n a ry to C h in a a n d a n in flu e n tia l c h a m p io n o f th e N a tio n a lis ts , re b u k e d th e a d m in is tra tio n fo r e n c o u ra g in g C h ia n g to n e g o tia te w ith th e C o m m u n is ts w h ile h e lp ­ in g th e G re e k s to fig h t th e m . A fte r se v e ra l b itte r e x c h a n g e s w ith A c h e so n , h e a n n o u n c e d , "I d o n o t th in k w e c a n h a v e o n e k in d of p o licy in E u ro p e w ith re s p e c t to th e d a n g e r of C o m m u n is t-d o m in a te d gov-

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 165 e r n m e n ts a n d a n o th e r p o lic y in A s ia ." 15 In cre asin g ly , th e th r u s t of th is c ritic ism w a s th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n w a s failin g to c a rry o u t th e T ru m a n D o c trin e in C h in a .16 E v e n ts in C h in a h e lp e d b rin g to a h e a d th e is s u e of fu r th e r a rm s a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts . D u rin g A p ril a n d M ay, C h ia n g 's o v e re x ­ te n d e d a rm ie s s u ffe re d a se rie s of s tu n n in g re v e rs e s . T h e m o s t se rio u s o c c u rre d in M a n c h u ria , w h e re th e C o m m u n is ts la u n c h e d a g e n e ra l o ffe n s iv e —b o ld e r th a n a n y o f th e ir p re v io u s e ffo rts —th a t q u ic k ly im m o b iliz e d la rg e b o d ie s of g o v e rn m e n t tr o o p s in iso la te d to w n s a n d cities. T h e C o m m u n is ts ' a d v a n c e s s a p p e d th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m o ra le , d is s ip a te d th e ir s u p p lie s , w e a k e n e d th e ir a lre a d y te n u o u s p o p u la r s u p p o r t, a n d e x p o s e d w h a t A m e ric a n o b s e rv e rs a g re e d w a s th e ir " f a n ­ ta stic a lly in e p t le a d e rs h ip " in all c o m m a n d e c h e lo n s .17 T h e fig h tin g in M a n c h u ria e n d e d C h ia n g 's fa tu o u s h o p e s , w h ic h h e h a d e x p re s s e d to A m e ric a n officials o n ly a fe w w e e k s earlier, of d e fe a tin g th e C o m ­ m u n is ts b y S e p te m b e r. H is a rm ie s n o w fac ed , as A m b a s s a d o r Jo h n L e ig h to n S tu a r t r e p o r te d o n 7 Ju n e , " a m ilita ry d e b ac le of la rg e p r o ­ p o r tio n s ." 18 C h ia n g lo o k e d to W a s h in g to n fo r help . H e to ld A m e ric a n officials th a t h e w a s se rio u sly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t s h o rta g e s of a m m u n itio n a n d in fo rm a lly r e q u e s te d a n e n d to th e e m b a rg o o n a rm s s h ip m e n ts to C h in a . In fo rm a tio n fro m th e C h in e s e M in is try of N a tio n a l D e fe n se a p p e a r e d to c o rro b o ra te h is fe a rs. A m e ric a n m ilita ry e x p e rts e s tim a te d fro m th is d a ta th a t a s o f 31 M a rc h th e N a tio n a lis t fo rce s in M a n c h u ria p o s s e s s e d o n ly 52 d a y s w o r th of s u p p lie s of c a rtrid g e s fo r th e ir A m e ri­ c a n rifles a n d a n y w h e re fro m 5 to 160 d a y s w o r th of sh e lls fo r v a rio u s ty p e s o f m o rta rs : th e s e in v e n to rie s c o u ld n o t s u s ta in p ro lo n g e d o p e ra ­ tio n s .19 C h ia n g a n d h is a sso c ia te s im p lie d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d a re s p o n s ib ility to p r e v e n t th e A lp h a u n its fro m b e c o m in g in effe ctiv e a n d a p p e a le d fo r h e lp in o b ta in in g a m m u n itio n fo r th e ir A m e ric a n w e a p o n s .20 N a tio n a lis t officials a lso r e n e w e d th e ir e ffo rts to o b ta in 130 m illio n r o u n d s of 7.92 m m rifle a m m u n itio n fro m a rm y s u r p lu s sto c k s. T h e C h in e s e h a d s o u g h t th e s e m u n itio n s , m a n u fa c tu re d to th e ir sp ecifica­ tio n s in A m e ric a n a rs e n a ls d u rin g W o rld W ar II, sin c e th e s u m m e r of 1946, b u t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d r e fu s e d to is s u e a n e x p o rt licen se b e c a u se o f th e e m b a r g o .21 S ta te a lso h a d f r u s tr a te d C h in e s e e ffo rts in e a rly 1947 to o b ta in th is ty p e of a m m u n itio n fro m A m e ric a n a n d B elg ian m a n u f a c tu r e r s .22 B ut b y e a rly A p ril V in c e n t th o u g h t th a t th e

166 • Arming the Free World d e p a r tm e n t s h o u ld re v e rs e its p o s itio n . U p s e t b y r e p o r ts of th e N a tio n a lis ts ' d e p le te d m u n itio n s in v e n to rie s , h e to ld M a rsh a ll th a t, w h ile h e b e lie v e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld c o n tin u e to d is ­ c o u ra g e C h ia n g fro m s e e k in g a m ilita ry s o lu tio n to C h in a 's p ro b le m s , " c o m p le te w ith h o ld in g of a m m u n itio n m ig h t im p a ir [the] d e fe n siv e e ffe c tiv e n e ss of [the] C h in e s e A rm y." H e u r g e d th e s e c re ta ry of sta te to a p p ro v e th e sale o f th e s u r p lu s c a rtrid g e s as a n e x c e p tio n to th e e m b a r g o .23 T h e N a tio n a lis ts ' m o u n tin g m ilita ry d iffic u lties in M a n c h u ria at la st p e rs u a d e d M a rsh a ll to act. A t th e e n d of A p ril, h e a u th o riz e d th e m a rin e s to a b a n d o n to th e N a tio n a lis ts 6,500 to n s of a m m u n i t i o n m o s t of it, ho w ev er, u n s e rv ic e a b le o r s u ita b le o n ly fo r tra in in g p u r ­ p o s e s —as th e y w ith d r e w fro m T s in g ta o .24 A m o n th later, h e re la x e d th e e m b a rg o a n d d e c la re d th a t th e C h in e s e s h o u ld h a v e n o rm a l access to th e A m e ric a n a rm s m a rk e t. H e a lso a u th o riz e d th e sale of th e s u r p lu s 7.92 m m a m m u n itio n a n d th e r e s u m p tio n of d e liv e rie s of tr a n s p o r t a irc raft a n d s p a re p a r ts u n d e r th e C h in e s e A ir F orce P ro g ra m . H e d e c lin e d , ho w ev er, to a p p ro v e tra n s fe rs of a d d itio n a l b o m b e r a n d fig h te r p la n e s o r to a llo w th e C h in e s e to p u rc h a s e o th e r c o m b a t m a te ­ riel fro m g o v e rn m e n t s u r p lu s s to c k s .25 M a rsh a ll e a s e d th e re s tric tio n s o n a rm s tra n s fe rs to C h in a q u ietly , a f u r th e r in d ic a tio n th a t h e h a d n o t a b a n d o n e d h is e ffo rts to lim it A m e ric a n in v o lv e m e n t in th e civil w ar. H e h a d n o illu sio n s th a t th e s e lim ite d m e a s u re s w o u ld so lv e th e N a tio n a lis ts ' se rio u s m ilita ry p ro b le m s —h e to ld th e C h in e s e a m b a s ­ s a d o r e a rlie r in M a y th a t C h ia n g w a s " th e w o rs t a d v is e d m ilita ry c o m m a n d e r in h is to r y " —b u t h e a p p a r e n tly h o p e d th a t th e y w o u ld at le a s t e a se th e p r e s s u r e fo r f u r th e r m ilita ry a id .26 M a rsh a ll's h o p e s w e re n o t fu lfilled . O n 9 Ju n e th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff c h a lle n g e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's C h in a p o licy b y is s u in g a s tr o n g a p p e a l fo r in c re a s e d m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t. T h ey a rg u e d th a t s u c h a ssis ta n c e w a s n e c e s ­ s a ry to th w a rt a S o v iet b id , m u c h like sim ila r e ffo rts in E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E ast, to se ize c o n tro l of C h in a . T he se rv ice c h ie fta in s d is c o u n te d a rg u m e n ts th a t th e C h in e s e C o m m u n is ts w e re in d e p e n d e n t of M oscow . In th e ir view , M a o a n d h is fo llo w ers s u b s c rib e d to " th e sa m e b a sic to ta lita ria n a n d a n ti-d e m o c ra tic p o licies" th a t m o tiv a te d o th e r C o m m u n is t p a rtie s a n d " s h o u ld b e r e g a rd e d a s to o ls of S o v iet policy." M ao 's v ic to ry in th e civil w ar, th e Jo in t C h ie fs w a rn e d , n o t o n ly w o u ld r e s u lt in R u s s ia n d o m in a tio n of C h in a b u t a lso w o u ld le a d to C o m m u -

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 167 n is t p e n e tr a tio n of n e ig h b o rin g a re a s —In d o c h in a , M a lay sia , a n d I n d ia —a n d " e v e n tu a l S o v iet h e g e m o n y o v e r A sia." A C o m m u n is t vic­ tory, th e re fo re , w o u ld sig n ific a n tly affect th e w o rld c o n fig u ra tio n of p o w er, th e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n c lu d e d . "T h e U n ite d S ta te s m u s t se e k to p r e v e n t th e g ro w th of a n y sin g le p o w e r o r c o a litio n to a p o s itio n of s u c h s tr e n g th a s to c o n s titu te a th r e a t to th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re ," th e y d e c la re d . "A S o v iet p o s itio n of d o m in a n c e o v e r A sia, W e ste rn E u ro p e , o r b o th , w o u ld c o n s titu te a m a jo r th r e a t to U n ite d S ta te s secu rity ." H e n c e th e n e e d fo r " a n o v e r-a ll p la n ," of w h ic h m ilita ry s u p p o r t of C h in a w a s a n e s s e n tia l p a rt, to c o n ta in C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n .27 In d e e d , th e Jo in t C h ie fs a s s e r te d th a t o n ly a sm a ll a m o u n t of A m e ri­ c a n m ilita ry a id c o u ld h a v e a d e cisiv e effect o n th e C h in e s e civil w ar. S e rv ice le a d e rs b e lie v e d th a t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e h a d so fa r fa ile d to y ie ld sa tis fa c to ry r e s u lts b e c a u se it w a s " p ie c e m e a l a n d u n c o o rd i­ n a te d " a n d g iv e n in s u p p o r t of a p o licy w ith " n o firm o b je c tiv e s" o th e r th a n to effect a p e a c e fu l s e ttle m e n t b e tw e e n tw o p a rtie s w ith irre c o n ­ cilable d iffe re n c e s. T h e Jo in t C h ie fs u r g e d in s te a d th e s tr e n g th e n in g of th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t " to th e e x te n t n e c e s s a ry to p re v e n t S o v iet e x p a n s io n ." A lth o u g h u n fa m ilia r w ith th e sp ecific m ilita ry re q u ir e ­ m e n ts of th e N a tio n a lis t fo rce s, th e y n o n e th e le s s th o u g h t th a t s im p ly a p u b lic d e c la ra tio n o f firm s u p p o r t fo r th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld h a v e su c h a p iv o ta l effect o n th e m o ra le of th e o p p o s in g fo rce s th a t th e C o m m u ­ n is ts w o u ld h a v e to com e to te rm s w ith C h ia n g . A c c o rd in g to th e Jo in t C h ie fs, if th e p ro m is e of A m e ric a n a id c o u ld n o t p ro d u c e a n e g o tia te d s e ttle m e n t, sm a ll q u a n titie s of m u n itio n s w o u ld e n a b le C h ia n g 's a rm ie s to d e fe a t th e ir fo es. In s h o rt, th e y b e lie v e d th a t a m o d e s t in v e s tm e n t c o u ld p ro d u c e m a jo r re s u lts in a g lo b al s tru g g le a g a in s t c o m m u n is m .28 T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's C h in a e x p e rts ré c o ile d at th is a n a ly sis. T h ey v ig o ro u s ly d is p u te d th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' a s s e rtio n th a t m ilita ry s u p ­ p o r t of th e N a tio n a lis ts w a s a w ise a n d effectiv e in v e s tm e n t of A m e ri­ c a n re s o u rc e s . V in c e n t w ro te to M a rsh a ll o n 20 J u n e th a t a id to h e lp C h ia n g d e fe a t th e C o m m u n is ts w o u ld n o t b e c h ea p . In s te a d , it " w o u ld le a d in e v ita b ly to d ire c t in te r v e n tio n in C h in a 's civil w a r" to th e e x te n t th a t A m e ric a n officials w o u ld h a v e " to ta k e o v e r d ire c tio n of C h in e s e m ilita ry o p e ra tio n s a n d a d m in is tra tio n a n d re m a in in C h in a fo r a n in d e fin ite p e rio d ." S u c h a n e n o rm o u s e ffo rt, as th e Jo in t C h iefs th e m ­ se lv e s h a d p o in te d o u t o n ly a m o n th e a rlie r in a re v ie w of A m e ric a n

168 • Arming the Free World m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p o lic y w a s all o u t of p r o p o r tio n to A m e ric a n se c u rity in te r e s ts in C h in a .29 V in c e n t a n d h is c o lle a g u e s a lso felt th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs h a d g re a tly u n d e re s tim a te d th e o b sta c le s to S o v iet c o n tro l of C h in a . In v ie w of C h in a 's a d m in is tra tiv e in e fficien c ies, its lack of in d u s tria l a n d m a te ria l re s o u rc e s , a n d its r e s e n tm e n t of fo re ig n in te rfe re n c e , a s w ell as th e S o v iet U n io n 's in a b ility to p ro v id e th e v a st a m o u n ts o f a id th a t C h in a re q u ire d , V in c e n t c o n c lu d e d th a t a R u s s ia n -d o m in a te d C h in a w a s " n o t a d a n g e r of su ffic ie n t im m e d ia c y o r p ro b a b ility " to ju stify in te rv e n tio n o n b e h a lf o f th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t. T h e is s u e w a s n o t w h e th e r to c o n ta in th e g ro w th of S o v iet p o w e r in E a st A sia, b u t h o w to d o s o .30 M a rsh a ll a lso d is a g re e d w ith th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' c o n c lu s io n s , e s p e ­ cially th e ir a s s e rtio n th a t a re la tiv e ly sm a ll a m o u n t of a rm s a id w o u ld e n a b le C h ia n g to e lim in a te th e C o m m u n is ts . H e v ie w e d th e d is in te g ra ­ tio n of th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt—re v e rs io n to a sta tic d e fe n siv e s tr a t­ egy, c o lla p se of a rm y m o ra le , h u g e lo sse s of m a n p o w e r a n d m a te rie l to th e C o m m u n is ts —w ith d e s p a ir a n d d is g u s t.31 H e d e s c rib e d to P a tte r­ s o n a n d F o rre sta l o n 26 J u n e " th e d ile m m a c re a te d b y th e in c o m p e ­ te n c e , in efficien c y a n d s tu b b o r n n e s s of th e C e n tra l G o v e r n m e n t q u a litie s w h ic h m a d e it v e ry d iffic u lt to h e lp th e m . H e c ite d th e m ilita ry in e p titu d e of th e ir le a d e rs , th e c a s h ie rin g o f th e o n ly g e n e ra ls w h o h a d p ro d u c e d su c c e ss fu l c a m p a ig n s , th e in s ta b ility of th e ir le a d e rs h ip a n d th e a p p a llin g lack o f a n o rg a n iz a tio n to d e a l w ith th e v a s t a n d co m p lex e co n o m ic a n d social p ro b le m s of C h in a ." 32 F or th e s e re a s o n s , M a rsh a ll c o n s id e re d th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' a n a ly s is " n o t q u ite re a listic " a n d th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n s " s o m e w h a t im p ra c tic a b le , p a rtic u la rly as to im p le ­ m e n ta tio n in C h in a ." 33 O n 3 Ju ly h e a s k e d A m b a s s a d o r Jo h n L e ig h to n S tu a r t to in fo rm C h ia n g th a t, d e s p ite h is c o n c e rn o v e r th e s p re a d of h o stilitie s a n d th e r e s u ltin g e co n o m ic d e te rio ra tio n , h e b e lie v e d th a t " la s tin g s o lu tio n of C h in a 's p ro b le m s m u s t co m e fro m th e C h in e s e th e m s e lv e s . T h e U S c a n n o t in itia te a n d c a rry o u t s o lu tio n of th o se p ro b le m s a n d c a n o n ly a s s is t as c o n d itio n s d e v e lo p w h ic h g iv e so m e a s s u ra n c e th a t th e a s s is ta n c e w ill h a v e p ra c tic a l b e n e fic ia l re s u lts ." 34 A lth o u g h M a rsh a ll re je c te d e x te n siv e in te rv e n tio n , h e p o n d e re d lim ite d m e a s u re s a im e d a t p r e v e n tin g th e c o llap se of th e C h in e s e a rm ie s . A t th e m e e tin g of th e C o m m itte e of T h re e o n 26 Ju n e , h e d is c u s s e d th e r e s u p p ly of th e A lp h a d iv is io n s , a n is s u e th a t still tr o u ­ b le d h im . M a rsh a ll felt a m o ra l o b lig a tio n to p ro v id e a m m u n itio n fo r th e s e u n its , b u t w o rrie d a b o u t e x p a n d in g A m e ric a n in v o lv e m e n t in th e

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 169 civil w a r a n d p ro v o k in g sim ila r a c tio n b y th e S o v iet U n io n , w h ic h h a d so fa r re f r a in e d fro m f u r n is h in g d ire c t m ilita ry a id to th e C o m m u n is ts . T h ese c o n s id e ra tio n s b o th e re d n e ith e r F o rre sta l, w h o o p p o s e d w ith ­ d ra w a l fro m C h in a n o m a tte r w h a t d iffic u lties a ro se , n o r P a tte rso n , w h o a d d e d th e flim sy a rg u m e n t th a t m ilita ry a id , b e c a u se it w o u ld b e g o in g to th e re c o g n iz e d g o v e rn m e n t, w o u ld n o t c o n s titu te in te r v e n ­ tio n in C h in a 's in te rn a l c o n flict. M a rsh a ll, h o w ev er, re m a in e d u n p e r ­ s u a d e d a n d u n d e c id e d .35 A fte r se v e ra l d a y s of re fle c tio n , M a rsh a ll in fo rm e d T ru m a n th a t h e w a n te d to s e n d G e n e ra l A lb e rt C . W e d e m e y e r b a c k to C h in a o n a sp e c ia l m is s io n . M a rs h a ll c o n c e iv e d of th e W ed e m e y er M issio n , h e la te r e x p la in e d , as " a la s t r e s o r t," a fin a l e ffo rt to fin d so m e rea listic a n d e ffectiv e w ay o f h e lp in g C h ia n g 's fa lte rin g r e g im e .36 M a rsh a ll h a d w re s tle d fo r w e e k s w ith th e q u e s tio n of a id to C h in a . "I h a v e to r tu r e d m y b ra in a n d I c a n 't n o w se e th e a n s w e r," h e to ld a g ro u p of b u s in e s s le a d e rs o n 11 J u n e .37 H e in fo rm e d P a tte rs o n a n d F o rre sta l tw o w e e k s la te r th a t " h e h a d b e e n s e a rc h in g fo r a p o s itiv e a n d c o n s tru c tiv e fo r­ m u la to d e a l w ith th e C h in e s e s itu a tio n ." 38 A p r o d u c t of th is re fle c tio n w a s th e id e a o f s e n d in g W e d e m e y e r to C h in a . S im ila r p ro p o s a ls fro m se v e ra l R e p u b lic a n le g isla to rs, in c lu d in g W alter Ju d d , p e rs u a d e d M a r­ sh a ll to a p p ro a c h W ed e m e y er.39 In m id -Ju ly th e g e n e ra l a n d a sm a ll g ro u p o f a s s is ta n ts left fo r C h in a to in v e s tig a te p o litical, eco n o m ic, a n d m ilita ry c o n d itio n s a n d to p re p a r e re c o m m e n d a tio n s fo r f u tu r e A m e ri­ c a n a s s is ta n c e .40 T he a p p o in tm e n t of W ed em ey er, w h o w a s e s te e m e d in N a tio n a lis t circles, te m p o ra rily d is a rm e d th e critics of th e a d m in is tra tio n 's C h in a policy. F o rre sta l " h e a rtily c o n c u rre d " in th e d is p a tc h of th e W ed e m e y er M issio n , a n d V a n d e n b e rg e x p re s s e d sa tisfa c tio n th a t th e a d m in is tra ­ tio n w a s " n o w m a k in g p ro g re s s in th e rig h t d ire c tio n ." 41 So d id A d m i­ ra l L eahy, m is ta k e n ly c o n v in c e d th a t M a rsh a ll h a d c o m p le te ly re v e rs e d h is s ta n d o n C h in a . R e a s s u re d b y W e d e m e y e r's im p e n d in g d e p a rtu re , th e Jo in t C h ie fs ta b le d o n 9 Ju ly a n e w a p p e a l fo r u r g e n t m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts .42 M a rsh a ll a p p a r e n tly h o p e d th a t W e d e m e y e r's r e p o r t w o u ld fu rth e r s tr e n g th e n h is h a n d a g a in s t th e a d v o c a te s of s u b s ta n tia l m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to C h ia n g . H e e x p la in e d to T ru m a n th a t h e th o u g h t th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' re c o m m e n d a tio n s w e re b a s e d o n a fa u lty e s tim a te of c o n d itio n s in C h in a a n d fo r th a t re a s o n d e s ire d W e d e m e y er's a s s e s s ­ m e n t. F u rth e rm o re , W e d e m e y e r's in s tru c tio n s m a d e d e a r th a t ad d i-

170 • Arming the Free World tio n a l A m e ric a n a id d e p e n d e d o n th e N a tio n a lis ts ' a d o p tio n of in te rn a l re fo rm s , a s tip u la tio n th a t M a rs h a ll a n d S tu a r t—ju s t like S tilw ell a n d m a n y o th e rs —h a d r e p e a te d ly a n d fu tile ly u r g e d o n C h ia n g . A lth o u g h c o n c lu siv e e v id e n c e is la c k in g , M a rsh a ll m a y w ell h a v e felt th a t W e d e m e y e r's e n d o rs e m e n t of s u c h c o n d itio n a l a id w o u ld h e lp h im re s is t m o re a m b itio u s p r o p o s a ls fo r e x te n siv e s u p p o r t of th e N a tio n ­ a list re g im e . A t th e v e ry le a s t, h e h o p e d th a t th e W e d e m e y e r M issio n w o u ld b u y so m e tim e o n th e C h in a is s u e a n d allo w h im to fo c u s h is a tte n tio n o n th e E u r o p e a n m e e tin g s c o n c e rn in g th e M a rsh a ll P la n a n d p re p a r a tio n fo r th e R io C o n fe re n c e o n In te r-A m e ric a n S e c u rity .43 W h a te v e r M a rs h a ll's e x p e c ta tio n s m a y h a v e b e e n , W ed e m e y er's d is p a tc h e s fro m C h in a s u r p r is e d a n d d is a p p o in te d th e a d v o c a te s of a s tr o n g e r m ilita ry c o m m itm e n t to C h ia n g . A p p a lle d b y th e c h a o s h e o b s e rv e d , W e d e m e y e r s e n t b a c k a se rie s of b le a k r e p o r ts , h a rs h ly critical of N a tio n a lis t ru le . S o o n a fte r a rriv in g , h e c a b le d M a rsh a ll th a t C h ia n g 's c o rr u p t a n d in effe ctiv e g o v e rn m e n t, b e re ft of p o p u la r s u p ­ p o r t, c o u ld n o t s u rv iv e w ith o u t d ra s tic re fo rm s a n d a p u r g e of to p officials. "I feel th a t th e N a tio n a lis t C h in e s e a re s p iritu a lly in s o lv e n t," h e c a b le d . "T h ey d o n o t u n d e r s ta n d w h y th e y s h o u ld d ie o r m a k e a n y sacrifices. T h ey h a v e lo s t c o n fid e n c e in th e ir le a d e rs, p o litical a n d m ilitary , a n d th e y fo re s e e c o m p le te c o lla p s e ." 44 S u c h a la rm in g a c c o u n ts o f th e N a tio n a lis ts ' w o e s e c h o e d th e r e p o r ts th a t th e e m b a s s y h a d b e e n s e n d in g to W a s h in g to n fo r m o n th s . W e d e m e y e r's lia iso n in th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t, w h o h o p e d th a t th e m is s io n w o u ld re c o m m e n d " a new , p o s itiv e a p p ro a c h to th e C h in a p ro b le m ," c o m m e n te d g lo o m ­ ily th a t th e g e n e ra l's m e s s a g e s w e re re in fo rc in g th e a d m in is tra tio n 's " n e g a tiv e a n d p e s s im is tic " th in k in g o n C h in a .45 W e d e m e y e r's a n a ly s is of C h ia n g 's m ilita ry p lig h t w a s e sp e c ia lly d is c o u ra g in g . H e in fo rm e d M a rs h a ll o n 8 A u g u s t th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts h a d p ra c tic a lly n o c h a n c e o f re ta in in g a g rip o n M a n c h u ria : "T h e C o m m u n is ts h a v e th e in itia tiv e a n d a re ab le to c o n d u c t o p e ra tio n s w h e n a n d w h e re th e y w ill, re s tric te d o n ly b y th e ir o w n lim ita tio n s , c o m m u n ic a tio n s , te rra in a n d w e ath e r." W e d e m e y e r felt th a t if C h ia n g m o v e d re in fo rc e m e n ts in to M a n c h u ria h e ris k e d r a p id d e te rio ra tio n in th e w e a k e n e d a re a s of N o rth a n d C e n tra l C h in a . W e d e m e y e r b e lie v e d th a t th e S o v iets, th r o u g h th e ir C h in e s e C o m m u n is t a g e n ts , h a d ta k e n lo n g s trid e s to w a rd th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of " sa te llite o r p u p p e t" re g im e s in M a n c h u ria , S in k ia n g , a n d I n n e r M o n g o lia . A n d , in th e face of th is

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 171 d is m e m b e rm e n t o f C h in a , h e c o n s id e re d e sp e c ia lly d is tu rb in g " th e a p a th y a n d in e p titu d e of th e C h in e s e G o v e rn m e n t." 46 W e d e m e y e r a lso fo u n d th a t th e N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs r e g a rd e d A m e ri­ c a n a id a s a p a n a c e a fo r th e ir ills. T h eir a ll-o u t c a m p a ig n fo r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e a c c e le ra te d w ith th e a p p o in tm e n t of W ed em ey er, w h o w a s g iv e n th e u s u a l d ire w a rn in g s of im m in e n t c o lla p s e .47 W ed em ey er, h o w ev er, p a id n o a tte n tio n to th e s e w a rn in g s a n d re s is te d C h in e s e e ffo rts to c u r r y favor. O n e m e m b e r of th e e m b a s s y staff re c o rd e d in h is d ia ry th a t W e d e m e y e r w a s " v isib ly a n n o y e d b y C h in e s e p r e s s u r e tac­ tics, e sp e c ia lly th e ju s tly fa m o u s c h a rm act of M a d a m e C h ia n g . H e m a y w ell b e th e o n ly liv in g h u m a n b e in g o n w h o m it d o e s n o t w o rk ." 48 W e d e m e y e r a n g rily d is m is s e d as "ch ild -lik e " a n d " n a iv e " C h in e s e e ffo rts to p la n t e v id e n c e p u r p o r tin g to sh o w th a t th e S o v iets w e re r e n d e r in g a s s is ta n c e to th e C h in e s e C o m m u n is ts . (H e w a s n e v e r ­ th e le s s c o n v in c e d th a t th e S o v ie ts w e re b a c k in g th e C o m m u n is t w a r e ffo rt.) " E v e ry artific e w ill b e r e s o r te d to o n th e ir p a r t to c o m p e l U n ite d S ta te s a id a n d to m in im iz e c o n c u rre n tly [the] C h in e s e c o n trib u tio n ," h e to ld M a rsh a ll. W e d e m e y e r th o u g h t th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts , b y e x p lo it­ in g fe a rs of S o v iet e x p a n s io n , h o p e d to p e rs u a d e th e U n ite d S ta te s to m a k e a m a jo r e ffo rt in C h in a w h ile a v o id in g a n y re fo rm s th a t m ig h t w e a k e n th e re a c tio n a ry c liq u e s in g o v e rn m e n t.49 W e d e m e y e r trie d to d is a b u s e th e N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs of th e s e m is ­ g u id e d n o tio n s b y o p e n ly c ritic iz in g th e ir fa ilin g s. A d d re s s in g th e m b e fo re h is d e p a r tu r e , h e d e n o u n c e d official c o rru p tio n , s u p p r e s s io n of civil lib e rtie s , n e g le c t of p o p u la r re fo rm s , p re o c c u p a tio n w ith s e c u rin g fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e , a n d ex cessiv e re lia n c e o n m ilita ry fo rce as a s o lu ­ tio n to th e C o m m u n is t c h a lle n g e .50 " P ro m is e s ," h e d e c la re d , "w ill n o lo n g e r su ffice . P e rfo rm a n c e is a b s o lu te ly n e c e ssa ry ." T h ese s ta te ­ m e n ts , in te n d e d to ro u s e th e N a tio n a lis ts fro m th e ir leth arg y , d id n o t sit w ell in K u o m in ta n g r u lin g circles, e sp e c ia lly sin c e W e d e m e y e r g av e n o in d ic a tio n th a t h e p la n n e d to re c o m m e n d s u b s ta n tia l a s s is ta n c e to C h in a . To W e d e m e y e r's s u rp ris e . P re m ie r C h a n g C h u n re p lie d th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld n o t a lte r th e ir fo re ig n o r d o m e stic p o licies as a re s u lt of th e W e d e m e y e r M is s io n .51 Yet n e ith e r th e N a tio n a lis ts ' re c a lc itra n c e n o r th e ir p e rv a siv e c o r­ r u p tio n a n d in e ffic ie n c y d is s u a d e d W e d e m e y e r fro m re c o m m e n d in g in h is fin al r e p o r t of 19 S e p te m b e r a m a jo r A m e ric a n e ffo rt to p re v e n t C h in a fro m fa llin g u n d e r C o m m u n is t c o n tro l. H e c a lle d fo r p ro g ra m s

172 • Arming the Free World of e co n o m ic a id th a t w o u ld la st fo r a t le a st five y e a rs a n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e th a t w o u ld c o n tin u e fo r a n in d e fin ite p e rio d , b o th to b e s u p e r v is e d b y a n A m e ric a n m is s io n sim ila r to th e o n e in G re e c e . H e h o p e d th a t, b y m a k in g th is h e lp c o n tin g e n t u p o n th e a d o p tio n of s w e e p in g re fo rm s , th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld in d u c e th e c h a n g e s th a t C h ia n g h a d c o n s is te n tly re s is te d . W e d e m e y e r in d u lg e d in th is w is h fu l th in k in g p a rtly b e c a u se h e c o u ld im a g in e n o o th e r a lte rn a tiv e th a t w o u ld p re s e rv e A m e ric a n in te re s ts in C h in a . T h e c u rr e n t " w a it a n d see" policy, h e a rg u e d , w o u ld le a d e ith e r to th e c o llap se of th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e o r to a n in te r n a l s e ttle m e n t th a t w o u ld e v e n tu a lly b rin g th e C o m m u n is ts to p o w er. In e ith e r case, W e d e m e y e r b e lie v e d th a t th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a C o m m u n is t g o v e rn m e n t w h o s e le a d e rs h a d clo se id eo lo g ica l tie s to th e S o v iet U n io n w o u ld b e a m a jo r b lo w to A m e ric a n p re s tig e a n d se c u rity a n d w o u ld p a v e th e w ay fo r th e s p re a d of S o viet in flu e n c e in A sia a n d e ls e w h e re . M o reo v er, a n u n frie n d ly C h in a w o u ld d e n y to th e U n ite d S ta te s im p o r ta n t a ir a n d n a v al b a se s , facilities th a t th e S o v iet U n io n m ig h t u s e in th e e v e n t of w a r to la u n c h s h o rt-ra n g e a tta c k s o n A m e ric a n in s ta lla tio n s in th e P h ilip p in e s , R y u k y u s , a n d J a p a n .52 M u c h like th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, W e d e m e y e r th u s a d v o c a te d " s u ffic ie n t a n d p ro m p t" m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts as p a r t of a w o rld w id e e ffo rt to c o n ta in S o v iet e x p a n s io n . H e u r g e d th e p ro v i­ sio n of s u r p lu s a m m u n itio n , m o to r v e h ic le s, a n d n a v a l v e sse ls, th e c o m p le tio n o f th e C h in e s e A ir F orce P ro g ra m , a n d th e e x te n s io n of c re d its fo r th e p u rc h a s e of n e w m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t in th e U n ite d S ta te s . A c c o m p a n y in g th is m a te ria l s u p p o r t, h e th o u g h t, s h o u ld b e b ro a d e r A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v ic e. H e s u g g e s te d h e lp in tra in in g co m ­ b a t u n its o u ts id e a re a s of h o stilitie s a n d in o rg a n iz in g N a tio n a lis t s u p p ly se rv ic e s, b u t r u le d o u t d ire c t p a rtic ip a tio n in m ilita ry o p e ra ­ tio n s b e c a u se it w a s " c o n tr a r y to c u r r e n t A m e ric a n policy." W e d e m e y er b e lie v e d th a t th is a s s is ta n c e w o u ld h e lp sta b iliz e a g ra v e m ilita ry s itu a tio n , p ro v id e d th e N a tio n a lis ts a d o p te d s w e e p in g p o litical a n d e co n o m ic re fo rm s . T h e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld u s e its m ilita ry a id as a le v e r " to fo s te r th e e m e rg e n c e of a re g im e w h ic h w o u ld d e v e lo p a lo n g lin e s s a tis fa c to ry to th e U n ite d S ta te s , a t th e s a m e tim e e n g a g in g in a h o ld in g o p e ra tio n a g a in s t th e p ro g re s s iv e s p re a d of m ilita ristic C o m ­ m u n is m ." 53 W e d e m e y e r c o n c e d e d , ho w ev er, th a t e v e n th is e n la rg e d a s s is ta n c e w o u ld n o t e n a b le C h ia n g 's a rm ie s to h a n g o n to M a n c h u ria . T h e o n ly

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 173 way, in h is view , to p re v e n t th a t p ro v in c e fro m b e c o m in g a "S o v ie t sa tellite" w a s to p la c e it, as h e h a d re c o m m e n d e d tw o y e a rs earlier, u n d e r a fiv e -p o w e r g u a r d ia n s h ip o r a U .N . tru s te e s h ip . T h is p ro p o s a l c a u s e d c o n s te r n a tio n in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. C o n v in c e d th a t a n y s u g g e s tio n fo r th e s e p a ra tio n of M a n c h u ria fro m th e re s t of C h in a w o u ld g re a tly o ffe n d C h ia n g , M a rsh a ll a n d h is a s s is ta n ts d is m is s e d W e d e m e y e r's id e a as c o m p le te ly im p ra c tic a b le . F u rth e rm o re , S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials d id n o t w a n t to risk a n e m b a rra s s in g p u b lic d e b a te , w h ic h m ig h t le a d to p ro p o s a ls fo r sim ila r U .N . in te rv e n tio n in G re e c e . U n a b le to c o n v in c e W e d e m e y e r to d e le te h is re c o m m e n d a tio n o n M a n c h u ria , M a rs h a ll d e c id e d to s u p p r e s s h is r e p o r t.54 In a la rg e r se n se , th e W e d e m e y e r r e p o r t w a s u n a c c e p ta b le to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t b e c a u se it fa ile d to m a k e a p e rs u a s iv e case fo r th e e x te n siv e a id it re c o m m e n d e d . Its a la rm in g d e s c rip tio n of N a tio n a lis t in c o m p e te n c e a n d c o rr u p tio n u n d e r c u t its c o n c lu s io n th a t c o n d itio n a l A m e ric a n a id c o u ld b e effectiv e. T h e r e p o r t's a s s e rtio n th a t C h ia n g w o u ld a c c e p t b a sic p o litica l a n d e co n o m ic c h a n g e s w a s a t o d d s w ith h is g o v e rn m e n t's p u b lic re je c tio n of W e d e m e y e r's ad v ic e a n d s u b s e q u e n t s u p p r e s s io n of th e D e m o cratic L e a g u e , o n e of th e fe w o p p o s itio n p a rtie s . W e d e m e y e r's in s is te n c e th a t C h ia n g w o u ld face u p to C h in a 's g ra v e p ro b le m s w a s b e lie d b y th e g e n e ra liss im o 's p e tu la n t c o m p la in t to v is itin g A m e ric a n c o n g re s s m e n th a t th e d iffic u lties in M a n c h u ria w e re a n A m e ric a n re s p o n s ib ility a ris in g fro m th e Yalta a g re e m e n ts . F or all th e s e re a s o n s , M a rs h a ll a n d h is a s s is ta n ts d o u b te d W e d e m e y e r's a rg u ­ m e n t th a t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e c o u ld h e lp re v e rs e th e c o u rs e of e v e n ts in C h in a .55 F o re ig n -p o lic y p la n n e r s a lso d is a g re e d w ith W e d e m e y e r's e s tim a te of C h in a 's im p o rta n c e to A m e ric a n secu rity . G e o rg e F. K e n n a n , th e d ire c to r of S ta te 's Policy P la n n in g Staff, la te r re c a lle d th a t " d e te rio ra ­ tio n o f th e s itu a tio n in C h in a d id n o t strik e u s as fata l, in itself, to A m e ric a n in te re s ts ." K e n n a n b a s e d th is ju d g m e n t o n C h in a 's lack of in d u s tria l d e v e lo p m e n t a n d its in a b ility to p ro je c t m ilita ry p o w e r b e y o n d th e A s ia n m a in la n d , a n d o n a b e lie f th a t th e S o v iet U n io n w o u ld h a v e se v e re d iffic u lty m a in ta in in g its in flu e n c e o v e r a C h in e s e C o m m u n is t re g im e . F or sim ila r re a s o n s , th e C IA a s s e r te d in its re v ie w of th e w o rld s itu a tio n o n 26 S e p te m b e r th a t E a st A sia r a n k e d b e h in d W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d th e M id d le E a st " fro m th e p o in t of v ie w of c o n ­ ta in in g th e U .S .S .R . a n d e v e n tu a lly r e d r e s s in g th e b a la n c e of p ow er." T h e in te llig e n c e a n a ly s ts p re d ic te d th a t a c u te p o litical a n d eco n o m ic

174 • Arming the Free World d is o rg a n iz a tio n w o u ld p re v a il in C h in a fo r m a n y y e a rs, th e re b y p r e ­ v e n tin g th e c o n s o lid a tio n o f S o v iet p o w er. " W h a te v e r th e c o u rs e of e v e n ts in c o n tin e n ta l A s ia ," th e y c o n c lu d e d , " m a in te n a n c e of effectiv e U .S . c o n tro l of th e Pacific w o u ld a ffo rd a su ffic ie n t s a fe g u a rd ." 56 D u rin g th e a u tu m n of 1947, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's fo re ig n a id p ro g ra m s c o n fo rm e d to th e s e a s s e s s m e n ts of A m e ric a n in te re s ts . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o n c e n tra te d its e ffo rts o n m e e tin g th e a c u te e c o ­ n o m ic n e e d s of W e ste rn E u r o p e —a n a re a , p o litical officials felt, th a t m ig h t s o o n b e c o m e th e fo c u s of a m a jo r c o n fro n ta tio n b e tw e e n th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e S o v ie t U n io n .57 C o n c e rn e d a b o u t m a k in g c o m ­ m itm e n ts th a t e x c e e d e d n a tio n a l capacity , fo re ig n -p o lic y p la n n e r s h a d n o d e s ire to s h o u ld e r a n o th e r m a jo r b u r d e n in C h in a , a c o u n try w h e re b o th th e sta k e s a n d th e c h a n c e s of s u c c e ss w e re fa r sm aller. K e n n a n s u m m a r iz e d th e p re v a ilin g o u tlo o k w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n : " In C h in a th e re is n o t m u c h w e c a n d o , in p r e s e n t c irc u m s ta n c e s b u t to s w e a t it o u t a n d tr y to p r e v e n t th e m ilita ry s itu a tio n fro m c h a n g in g to o d ra s tic a lly to th e a d v a n ta g e o f th e c o m m u n is t fo rc e s." 58

I n la te 1947 a n d e a rly 1948 M a rs h a ll m a d e se v e ra l im p o r ta n t d e c isio n s th a t g u id e d m ilita ry a id p o licy fo r th e d u ra tio n of th e C h in e s e civil w ar. M a rsh a ll's a c tio n s in c re a s e d a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts , p a rtly b e c a u se th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te b e lie v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s m u s t p ro v e to frie n d ly g o v e rn m e n ts b o th in A sia a n d E u ro p e th a t it u p h e ld its c o m m itm e n ts . A t th e sa m e tim e , M a rs h a ll im p o s e d stric t lim its o n A m e ric a n o b lig a tio n s to C h in a . In re a c h in g th e s e d e c isio n s, h e fac ed p r e s s u r e fro m th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t—p a rtic u la rly F o rre sta l a n d W e d e m e y e r—R e p u b lic a n m e m b e rs of C o n g re s s , a n d A m b a s s a d o r S tu a rt. Yet, th o u g h h e m a d e so m e c o n c e s s io n s to h is critics, h e a v o id e d d ire c t, la rg e -sc a le m ilita ry in te r v e n tio n in th e civil w a r.59 T h e m o s t p r e s s in g is s u e M a rsh a ll c o n fr o n te d w a s th e N a tio n a lis t r e q u e s t fo r tra n s fe r of m u n itio n s fro m g o v e rn m e n t in v e n to rie s . P a tte r­ s o n in fo rm e d M a rsh a ll o n 23 Ju ly 1947 th a t th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t c o u ld s u p p ly th e m u n itio n s th e C h in e s e r e q u e s te d , b u t o n ly a t th e e x p e n s e of o th e r a p p ro v e d p ro g ra m s . H e s u g g e s te d th a t th e W ar D e p a rtm e n t le n d th e N a tio n a lis ts a m m u n itio n fro m its re s e rv e sto c k s, w h ic h w o u ld b e re p la c e d b y C h in e s e p u r c h a s e s fro m A m e ric a n in d u stry . U n ifo rm e d o fficers, e a g e r b o th to h e lp th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d to b u ild u p th e A m e ri­ c a n a rm s in d u stry , e n th u s ia s tic a lly s u p p o r te d th is p ro p o s a l. A fte r

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 175 re a d in g W e d e m e y e r's r e p o r t, M a rsh a ll a p p ro v e d P a tte rso n 's re c o m ­ m e n d a tio n a n d a llo w e d th e a d v a n c e fro m g o v e rn m e n t in v e n to rie s to th e N a tio n a lis ts of 6.5 m illio n r o u n d s o f .50 calib e r a m m u n itio n in r e tu r n fo r th e N a tio n a lis t p u r c h a s e o f e q u iv a le n t s u p p lie s to b e m a n ­ u f a c tu r e d b y O lin In d u s trie s . H e a lso a g re e d to re m o v e th e re s tric tio n s o n th e sale of g o v e rn m e n t s u r p lu s , e n a b lin g th e N a tio n a lis ts to p u r ­ c h a se , b e tw e e n D e c e m b e r 1947 a n d M ay 1948, $95 m illio n w o r th of g r o u n d a n d a ir fo rce s u p p lie s fo r a triflin g $6 m illio n .60 M a rs h a ll c o n tin u e d to ta k e s u c h s te p s q u ie tly in o rd e r to av o id fu e lin g a p u b lic d e b a te th a t m ig h t re s tric t h is fre e d o m of a ctio n . A t first, h e w a n te d to a b a n d o n s u r p lu s m a te rie l in th e Pacific to th e C h in e s e , sin c e th a t c o u ld h a v e b e e n d o n e w ith o u t a p u b lic a n n o u n c e ­ m e n t. B ut th e a rm y b rid le d at h is s u g g e s tio n . "T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t . . . is h o p in g fo r a s o lu tio n in w h ic h th e U .S . g o v e rn m e n t w ill n o t b e in v o lv e d ," o n e a rm y officer w ro te w ith a n n o y a n c e , b y h a v in g " th e A rm y, th r o u g h so m e s u b te rfu g e , g iv e th e m u n itio n s to th e C h in e s e ." 61 B ecau se o f a rm y o b je c tio n s, M a rsh a ll o p te d in s te a d fo r sale th r o u g h s u r p lu s c h a n n e ls , b u t w ith m in im a l p u b lic ity . H e a lso d e c id e d n o t to in fo rm th e N a tio n a lis ts of th e a v aila b ility of s u r p lu s m u n itio n s u n til 16 D e cem b er, a d a y a fte r th e te r m in a tio n of th e L o n d o n m e e tin g of th e C o u n c il of F o re ig n M in is te rs .62 H e e v id e n tly d e s ire d to av o id s tim u la t­ in g e ith e r n e w a p p e a ls fo r o r p ro te s ts a g a in s t d e e p e r A m e ric a n in v o lv e m e n t in th e civil w ar. M a rs h a ll a n d h is a s s is ta n ts a lso d is c o u ra g e d th e N a tio n a lis ts fro m h o p in g fo r m o re e x te n siv e A m e ric a n a rm s a id . C h in e s e p ro c ra s tin a tio n in p ro c u r in g m u n itio n s fro m c o m m e rc ia l s o u rc e s a n d n e g o tia tin g c o n ­ tra c ts fo r s u r p lu s p r o p e r ty p ro d u c e d w ith in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th e im p re s s io n th a t C h ia n g w a s still c o u n tin g o n c o n s id e ra b le A m e ric a n h elp . W. W alto n B u tte rw o rth , th e n e w d ire c to r of FE, c o m p la in e d th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts w e re r e lu c ta n t to ta k e " sm a ll s te p s " b e c a u se th e y w e re a w a itin g so m e " la rg e r s o lu tio n " to th e ir m ilita ry p lig h t.63 B u tte rw o rth 's a s s is ta n ts , R o b e rt D. M ag ill a n d P h ilip D. S p ro u s e , b e lie v e d th a t th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t e x p e c te d th a t a p p re h e n s io n o v e r C o m m u n is t g a in s in M a n c h u ria w o u ld e v e n tu a lly le a d th e U n ite d S ta te s to a s s u m e th e b u r d e n of th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt.64 S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials r e p e a te d ly w a r n e d C h in e s e re p re s e n ta tiv e s th a t th e ir fo o t-d ra g g in g w a s c a s tin g d o u b t o n th e u rg e n c y of th e ir n e e d fo r m ilita ry a id . M a r­ sh a ll w a s e v e n b lu n te r. H e to ld A m b a s s a d o r V. K. W ellin g to n K oo o n 13 N o v e m b e r th a t h e d o u b te d th a t C h ia n g w o u ld a d o p t th e re fo rm s

176 • Arming the Free World n e e d e d to re lie v e " th e p a rlo u s s ta te of th e m ilita ry s itu a tio n in C h in a ," a n d th a t h e e x p e c te d th a t p u b lic s u p p o r t fo r a id to C h in a w o u ld so o n w a n e .65 M a rs h a ll d e a lt w ith a d v is o ry a s s is ta n c e to th e C h in e s e m u c h as h e h a n d le d a rm s a id . T h ro u g h o u t th e s u m m e r of 1947, G e n e ra l Jo h n P. L u ca s, th e c h ie f of th e A rm y A d v is o ry G r o u p (A A G ), p r e s s e d fo r a n e x p a n s io n of h is m is s io n , th e n lim ite d to a d v is in g th e h ig h e r sta ffs of th e C h in e s e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t o n o rg a n iz a tio n a l m a tte rs , to in c lu d e h e lp in g th e N a tio n a lis ts p la n s tra te g y a n d tactics a n d tra in c o m b a t u n i ts .66 M a rsh a ll, h o w ev er, c o n s e n te d o n ly to a fa r m o re m o d ­ e s t in c re a s e in th e s c o p e of th e a d v is o ry g ro u p 's a ctiv itie s. H e a g re e d th a t a rm y p e r s o n n e l c o u ld a s s is t in re o rg a n iz in g th e N a tio n a lis ts ' se rv ic e s o f s u p p ly a n d a lso a llo w e d th e A A G to s e n d in s tru c to rs to a c e n te r o n F o rm o sa fo r th e re tr a in in g of c o m b a t u n its . B ut h e m a d e clear th a t h e d id n o t s h a re L u ca s's o p in io n th a t f u r th e r e n la rg e m e n t of A A G re s p o n s ib ilitie s c o u ld o v e rc o m e th e p e rs is te n t s tu b b o r n n e s s a n d in effi­ c ie n c y of th e N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs h ip . E v e n th e F o rm o sa n tr a in in g cen ter, h e to ld A m b a s s a d o r K oo, " w o u ld d o little o r n o g o o d " sin c e C h ia n g h a d m a d e n o a tte m p t, d e s p ite r e p e a te d A m e ric a n s u g g e s tio n s , to e s ta b lis h a s y s te m fo r s u p p ly in g tr a in e d re p la c e m e n t tro o p s fo r e x ist­ in g d iv is io n s .67 S u c h re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t C h ia n g 's w illin g n e s s to c o o p e ra te d e te r ­ m in e d M a rsh a ll's a ttitu d e o n th e critical q u e s tio n o f f u r n is h in g o p e ra ­ tio n a l a d v ic e to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s . M a rsh a ll c o n fro n te d th is is s u e in N o v e m b e r w h e n h e a r r a n g e d fo r G e n e ra l D a v id G . B a rr to re p la c e L u ca s, w h o m C h ia n g w is h e d re c a lle d . A lth o u g h L u ca s w a s, as Jo h n F. M e lb y of th e e m b a s s y sta ff p riv a te ly d e s c rib e d h im , " a sw e e t, in c o m p e ­ te n t o ld d a rlin g , [w ho] h a s b e e n a th o r n fo r so m e tim e n o w d u e to h is f o n d n e s s fo r e x te m p o ra n e o u s p u b lic c o n v e rs a tio n o n u n a u th o riz e d to p ic s, " C h ia n g w a s a p p a r e n tly as d is c o n te n t w ith th e lim its o n A A G a u th o rity a s h e w a s w ith L u ca s's p e rs o n a l s h o rtc o m in g s .68 S tu a r t r e p o r te d th a t th e g e n e ra lis s im o e x p e c te d th a t B arr w o u ld h a v e a u th o r­ ity to a d v ise N a tio n a lis t m ilita ry officials o n s tra te g y a n d tactics. B ut M a rsh a ll b a lk e d at th is s u g g e s tio n e v e n th o u g h h e h a d ju s t c o n s e n te d to a sim ila r e x p a n s io n of th e m is s io n of th e A m e ric a n M ilita ry A d v iso ry G r o u p in G re e c e . W o rrie d a b o u t th e G re e k g o v e rn m e n t's le th a rg y in th e face of in te n s ifie d g u e rrilla a ctiv ity a n d its te n d e n c y to re ly all to o h e a v ily o n A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e , h e still th o u g h t th a t A m e ric a n a d v is e rs c o u ld in flu e n c e G re e k le a d e rs fa r m o re re a d ily th a n th e y c o u ld C h ia n g .

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 177 C o n s e q u e n tly , M a rs h a ll w a s p r e p a r e d o n ly to le t B a rr p ro v id e stra te g ic a n d tactical g u id a n c e to th e g e n e ra lis s im o o n a p e rs o n a l a n d in fo rm a l b a sis, so th a t it w o u ld n o t a p p e a r th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s re a d y to a c c e p t re s p o n s ib ility fo r C h in e s e p la n s a n d o p e ra tio n s . S u c h r e s p o n s i­ bility, h e r e p lie d to S tu a r t, h a d " v e ry fa r-re a c h in g a n d g rav e " im p lic a ­ tio n s a n d w a s " in logic in s e p a ra b le fro m a u th o rity to m a k e it effectiv e." " W h a te v e r th e G e n e ra lis s im o m a y feel m o v e d to say w ith re s p e c t to h is w illin g n e s s to d e le g a te n e c e s s a ry p o w e rs to A m e ric a n s ," M a rsh a ll c o n tin u e d , "I k n o w fro m m y o w n e x p e rie n c e th a t a d v ic e is alw ay s lis te n e d to v e ry p o lite ly b u t n o t in fre q u e n tly ig n o re d w h e n d e e m e d u n p a la ta b le ." 69 In s p ite of M a rsh a ll's o p p o s itio n , A m e ric a n m ilita ry officials c o n ­ tin u e d to a d v o c a te m o re e x te n siv e a rm s a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . S h o rtly b e fo re r e tu r n in g to th e U n ite d S ta te s , L u ca s a d d e d to h is p ro p o s a ls fo r e x p a n d e d a d v is o ry a s s is ta n c e a p la n fo r b u ild in g u p N a tio n a lis t g r o u n d a n d a ir u n its , m e a s u re s th a t th e a rm y la te r d e te rm in e d w o u ld c o st a lm o s t $1 b illio n . O n ly s u c h d ra s tic s te p s , L u ca s felt, c o u ld re v e rs e th e s te a d y d e te rio ra tio n o f th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry p o s itio n .70 W ed em ey er, w h o b e c a m e th e a rm y 's d ire c to r of P la n s a n d O p e ra tio n s s o o n a fte r r e tu r n in g fro m C h in a , h e ld sim ila r v ie w s. Still s m a rtin g o v e r th e s u p p r e s s io n of h is r e p o r t, h e p a s s e d u p n o o p p o r tu n ity to u rg e g re a te r A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e to C h ia n g . H e w e n t b e fo re th e S e n a te A p p r o p r ia tio n s C o m m itte e o n 17 D e c e m b e r 1947 a n d re c o m m e n d e d u r g e n t m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts as p a r t of a n o v e ra ll p la n fo r c o n ta in in g c o m m u n is m . F o r g o o d m e a s u re , h e a c c u se d th e a d m in is tra tio n o f fa ilin g to h o n o r its c o m m itm e n ts to C h ia n g a n d la u d e d th e g e n e ra lis s im o 's re c o rd of fid e lity to th e U n ite d S ta te s .71 A lso , W e d e m e y e r p riv a te ly p r e s s e d S e c re ta ry o f th e A rm y Royall, A rm y C h ie f of S ta ff E isen h o w er, a n d S e c re ta ry o f D e fe n se F o rre sta l fo r a re v is io n of M a rs h a ll's p o lic y o f lim ite d a s s is ta n c e .72 W e d e m e y e r w a s e sp e c ia lly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e lack of s u r p lu s e q u ip m e n t to m e e t C h in e s e re q u e s ts . S u rv e y s of Pacific d e p o ts r e ­ v e a le d th a t so m e 63,000 to n s o f s u r p lu s m a te rie l w a s availab le fo r tra n s fe r to th e N a tio n a lis ts , b u t m u c h of it w a s u n s e rv ic e a b le o r u n ­ s u ite d to m e e tin g th e N a tio n a lis ts ' r e q u e s ts fo r sm a ll-a rm s a m m u n i­ tio n , c o m m u n ic a tio n s e q u ip m e n t, m o to r v e h ic le s, a n d s p a re p a rts . M ilita ry a u th o ritie s d e te r m in e d th a t tr a n s fe r of all av ailab le e q u ip m e n t w o u ld still leav e th e p r o g r a m to s u p p ly e ig h t a n d o n e -th ird a ir g ro u p s o n ly h a lf c o m p le te d . In v ie w of th e d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s sto c k s, W ede-

178 • Arming the Free World m e y e r u r g e d th e p a s s a g e o f a m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n fo r C h in a th a t w o u ld b e sim ila r to th e G re e k -T u rk ish A id A c t.73 S e rv ice p r o p o n e n ts o f in c re a s e d a id to C h in a c o n tin u e d to e n jo y th e v ig o ro u s s u p p o r t of F o rre sta l. E a g e r to p r e v e n t th e s p r e a d of S o v iet in flu e n c e in A sia , th e s e c re ta ry o f d e fe n s e to o k a sp e c ia l in te re s t in th e e ffo rts of th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t to p ro v id e a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts . In r e s p o n s e to F o rre s ta l's in q u iry , P & O e x p re s s e d d e e p c o n c e rn a t th e b e g in n in g of 1948 o v e r th e N a tio n a lis ts ' fa lte rin g w a r e ffo rts. D ra w in g h e a v ily o n th e v ie w s of L u ca s a n d W ed em ey er, P & O re c o m m e n d e d im m e d ia te a n d s u b s ta n tia l m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to C h in a as p a r t of a w o rld w id e p r o g r a m a im e d a t h a ltin g C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n . T h e p sy c h o lo g ic a l b o o s t th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld rec eiv e fro m th e a p p ro v a l of s u c h a p ro g ra m , th e a rm y p la n n e r s s p e c u la te d , m ig h t b e e v e n m o re im p o r ta n t th a n th e a c tu a l m a te ria l a s s ista n c e . " C o n tin u a tio n of th e p r e s e n t policy," G e n e ra l C . V. R. S c h u y le r w a rn e d , "w ill le a d to th e in e v ita b le tr iu m p h of th e C o m m u n is t P a rty . . . th e re b y th r e a te n in g th e lo n g -ra n g e m ilita ry s e c u rity of th e U .S ." 74 T h is a n a ly sis im p re s s e d F o rre sta l, w h o w o rrie d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n la c k e d " a cle arly d e fin e d p o s itio n " o n a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . O n 15 J a n u a ry h e a s k e d th e N S C to p r e p a r e a n e w s ta te m e n t of p o licy to w a rd C h in a .75 T h e r e p o r t, w h ic h th e N S C sta ff c o m p le te d at th e e n d of M a rc h , re v e a le d th e w id e a n d p e r s is te n t d iffe re n c e s of o p in io n b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o v e r s h o rt­ te r m a id to C h in a . A rm y, navy, a n d a ir fo rce sta ff m e m b e rs a d v o c a te d lim ite d m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts . T h ey n o w c o n c e d e d th a t s u c h h e lp c o u ld n o t b rin g a b o u t th e d e fe a t of th e C o m ­ m u n is ts b u t c o u ld b u y tim e , w h ic h th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e d e s p e ra te ly n e e d e d to re s to re a m o d ic u m of in te rn a l stab ility . T h e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t sta ff p la n n e r, ho w ev er, th o u g h t th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s sh o u ld f u r n is h o n ly e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e . H e a rg u e d th a t a n e w p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a id m ig h t " le a d to d e e p e r a n d d e e p e r in v o lv e m e n t of o u r n a tio n a l s tr e n g th in a n a re a of, at b e s t, s e c o n d a ry stra te g ic im p o rta n c e to u s ." R e stric tio n of A m e ric a n h e lp to lim ite d e co n o m ic m e a s u re s , o n th e o th e r h a n d , w o u ld av o id a n u n e n d in g d ra in o n A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s a n d a c o m p le te u n d e rw r itin g o f C h ia n g 's re g im e . A n d , m o s t im p o rta n t to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, "T h e m ilita ry re s p o n s ib ility fo r th e su rv iv a l of th e N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t w o u ld b e clearly p la c e d u p o n C h in e s e s h o u ld e rs ." 76

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 179 S e n io r p o litical a n d m ilita ry officials w e re a lm o st as s h a rp ly d iv id e d as th e N S C staff. M a rs h a ll p r a is e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's re c o m m e n ­ d a tio n s a n d r e ite r a te d h is c o n v ic tio n th a t f u r th e r m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld in e v ita b ly le a d to a n u n lim ite d c o m m itm e n t of re s o u rc e s a n d m a n p o w e r, a c o u rs e h e u n a lte ra b ly o p p o s e d .77 T he Jo in t C h ie fs o f Staff, o n th e o th e r h a n d , e n d o rs e d th e se rv ic e s' p o s itio n a n d re a ffirm e d th e ir o p in io n th a t se lec tiv e , w e ll-s u p e rv is e d a s s ista n c e w o u ld a d v a n c e A m e ric a n s e c u rity in te re s ts in C h in a .78 W e d e m e y er th o u g h t th a t th e se rv ic e re p re s e n ta tiv e s c o u ld h a v e p u t th e ir case e v e n m o re fo rc e fu lly b y a rg u in g th a t a N a tio n a lis t co llap se w o u ld le a d to S o v iet c o n tro l o f c o n tin e n ta l E a st A sia a n d , th u s , e n a b le th e R u s s ia n s to c o n c e n tra te th e ir e ffo rts o n o v e rr u n n in g W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d th e M id d le E a s t.79 T h e o n ly p r o m in e n t se rv ice official w h o d is s e n te d fro m th e s e v ie w s w a s R oyall, w h o e x p re s s e d " g ra v e m is g iv in g s " o v e r f u rth e r m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts b e c a u se th e ir p o s itio n s e e m e d " h o p e ­ le s s ." 80 T h e o u tc o m e of th is d e b a te w ith in th e e x ec u tiv e b ra n c h w a s to a la rg e e x te n t d e te r m in e d b y th e a c tio n s o f C o n g re s s . R e p u b lic a n criti­ c ism of th e a d m in is tra tio n 's C h in a policy, w h ic h h a d s u b s id e d d u rin g th e W e d e m e y e r M iss io n , r e s u m e d w ith n e w fe rv o r in th e a u tu m n of 1947 w h e n T ru m a n a s k e d a sp e c ia l s e s s io n of C o n g re s s to p ro v id e e m e rg e n c y e c o n o m ic a s s is ta n c e to F ra n c e , A u s tria , a n d Italy. D u rin g th e h e a rin g s in th e H o u s e F o re ig n A ffa irs C o m m itte e , R e p re s e n ta tiv e W alter Ju d d to o k th e le a d in d e n o u n c in g th e a d m in is tra tio n fo r o v e r­ lo o k in g C h in a . "I th in k w e h a v e g o t to w in in A sia , to o ," h e a s s e rte d , " o r w e w ill u ltim a te ly lo se in E u ro p e ." 81 B ack ed b y S ty le s B rid g es, S p e a k e r o f th e H o u s e Jo s e p h W. M a rtin of M a s s a c h u s e tts , a n d G o v e r­ n o r T h o m a s E. D e w e y of N e w York (th e le a d in g c o n te n d e r fo r th e G O P p r e s id e n tia l n o m in a tio n ), Ju d d 's e ffo rts g a in e d fo r th e N a tio n a lis ts o n ly $18 m illio n in e c o n o m ic a id . B ut th e R e p u b lic a n a g ita tio n h e lp e d elicit fro m M a rsh a ll a p ro m is e to s u b m it p ro m p tly a bill fo r th e relief of C h in a . A lth o u g h th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d b e e n c o n te m p la tin g m e a ­ s u re s of e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e fo r C h in a , th e c o n g re s s io n a l p r e s s u r e d e te r m in e d th e tim in g of M a rs h a ll's a n n o u n c e m e n t. S u c h a p le d g e s e e m e d p o litic at a tim e w h e n th e a d m in is tra tio n w a s d ra ftin g M a rsh a ll P la n le g is la tio n .82 In a d d itio n to c o n c ilia tin g R e p u b lic a n le g isla to rs w h o se v o tes w e re n e e d e d fo r th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m , M a rsh a ll h a d o th e r re a ­ s o n s fo r r e q u e s tin g n e w f u n d s fo r th e N a tio n a lis ts . T h e d ile m m a of a id

180 • Arming the Free World to C h in a c o n tin u e d to g n a w at h im . H e felt c o n s tr a in e d b y p re v io u s p o licy to e x te n d so m e help, h o w e v e r m o d e s t, to th e b e le a g u e re d N a tio n a lis t re g im e . "W e a re a lre a d y c o m m itte d b y p a s t a c tio n s a n d b y p o p u la r s e n tim e n t a m o n g o u r p e o p le ," h e e x p la in e d to th e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e in F e b ru a ry 1948, " to c o n tin u e to d o w h a t w e c a n to a llev ia te s u ffe rin g in C h in a , a n d to g iv e th e C h in e s e G o v e rn m e n t a n d p e o p le th e p o s s ib ility of w o rk in g o u t C h in a 's p ro b le m s in th e ir o w n w ay."83 M a rs h a ll a lso b e lie v e d th a t fa ilu re to r e s p o n d to C h ia n g 's p le a s fo r a s s is ta n c e w o u ld b e a fata l b lo w to th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t. R e g a rd le s s of h is d is illu s io n m e n t w ith C h ia n g 's le a d e rsh ip , h e d id n o t w a n t to p re c ip ita te th e N a tio n a lis ts ' d o w n fa ll—o r to b e h e ld a c c o u n t­ ab le fo r th e ir d e m ise . T he la tte r c h a rg e m ig h t se rio u sly im p a ir A m e ri­ c a n c re d ib ility a t a tim e w h e n th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s d e e p ly c o n c e rn e d a b o u t ra is in g E u ro p e a n m o ra le a n d c o n fid e n c e in A m e ric a n le a d e rs h ip . In d e e d , B u tte rw o rth c o n fid e d to th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e th a t a d e s ire to a v o id re s p o n s ib ility fo r a N a tio n a lis t col­ la p s e w a s M a rs h a ll's p rin c ip a l r e a s o n fo r s e e k in g n e w a p p ro p ria tio n s fo r C h in a .84 T h e bill th a t T ru m a n s e n t to C o n g re s s o n 18 F e b ru a ry 1948 w a s la rg e ly a d ip lo m a tic a n d p o litical g e s tu r e —little m o re th a n " th r e e c h e e rs fo r th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t," a c c o rd in g to V a n d e n b e rg . It a im e d o n ly at " g iv in g th e C h in e s e G o v e rn m e n t a re s p ite fro m r a p id e co n o m ic d e te rio ra tio n d u rin g w h ic h it c a n m o v e to e s ta b lis h m o re sta b le e co n o m ic c o n d itio n s ." 85 A lth o u g h all of th e $570 m illio n th a t th e p r e s id e n t r e q u e s te d w a s r e s e rv e d fo r fin a n c in g e s s e n tia l civ ilian im p o rts a n d re c o n s tru c tio n p ro je c ts . S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials d id n o t c o m p le te ly o v e rlo o k th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry r e q u ire m e n ts . T h ey e s ti­ m a te d th a t th e C h in a A id A ct w o u ld fre e b e tw e e n $50 m illio n a n d $100 m illio n in fo re ig n e x c h a n g e h o ld in g s , d e p e n d in g o n th e lev el of C h i­ n e s e e x p o rts , fo r th e p u rc h a s e of m ilita ry s u p p lie s . M a rsh a ll re a liz e d th a t th is m o d e s t, in d ire c t s u b s id y of th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt w o u ld n o t sa tisfy C h ia n g 's d ie -h a rd s u p p o r te r s , b u t h e s tro n g ly o p p o s e d sp e c ia l m ilita ry a id a p p ro p r ia tio n s fo r re a s o n s th a t w e re " to o se rio u s a n d to o o b v io u s to re q u ire e la b o ra tio n ." 86 D u rin g a c lo s e d m e e tin g o f th e F o re ig n A ffairs C o m m itte e o n 20 F e b ru a ry 1948, M a rs h a ll r e m in d e d th e le g isla to rs th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry d iffic u ltie s a ro s e n o t fro m a s h o rta g e of m a te rie l b u t fro m C h ia n g 's s tu b b o r n a n d fu tile e ffo rts to so lv e C h in a 's in te rn a l p ro b le m s b y fo rce , h is d is r e g a r d of A m e ric a n c o u n se l, in e p t le a d e rs h ip , c o rru p -

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 181 tio n , a n d fa ilu re to a d o p t p o p u la r re fo rm s . H e a d d e d th a t s u b s ta n tia l in f u s io n s of A m e ric a n a id h a d n o t sa v e d th e g e n e ra lis s im o fro m th e p e rils of th e c o u rs e h e h a d c h o se n . C h ia n g , n o t th e U n ite d S ta te s, M a rsh a ll e m p h a s iz e d to th e c o m m itte e , w a s re s p o n s ib le fo r th e N a ­ tio n a lis ts ' c u r r e n t p lig h t.87 M a rs h a ll d id n o t b e lie v e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld a ffo rd to b e re s p o n s ib le fo r " th e c o n tin u e d fa ilu re s of th e p r e s e n t C h in e s e G o v e rn ­ m e n t." H e w a r n e d th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s th a t a n y e ffo rt to rid C h in a of c o m m u n is m w o u ld e v e n tu a lly re q u ire th e U n ite d S ta te s " to ta k e o v er th e C h in e s e G o v e rn m e n t, practically, a n d a d m in is te r its e co n o m ic, m ilitary, a n d g o v e rn m e n t affairs." S u c h a n e n o rm o u s e x p e n d itu re of A m e ric a n capacity, h e p re d ic te d , " w o u ld in v o lv e th is G o v e rn m e n t in a c o n tin u in g c o m m itm e n t fro m w h ic h it w o u ld p ra c tic a lly b e im p o ssib le to w ith d ra w , a n d . . . w o u ld v e ry p ro b a b ly in v o lv e g rav e c o n s e q u e n c e s to th is N a tio n b y m a k in g C h in a a n a re n a of in te rn a tio n a l co n flict." S u c h a h e a v y in v e s tm e n t in C h in a w o u ld je o p a rd iz e A m e ric a n e ffo rts to c o n ta in S o v iet in flu e n c e in th e m o re v ita l re g io n of W e ste rn E u ro p e . B ecau se of th e s e d ire c o n s e q u e n c e s , M a rsh a ll w a s c e rta in th a t th e A m e ric a n p e o p le w o u ld n e v e r k n o w in g ly a c c e p t th e o b lig a tio n s of d ire c t p a rtic ip a tio n in th e C h in e s e civil w a r.88 B ut M a rsh a ll n e v e r te s te d th a t a s s e rtio n b y p u ttin g th e is s u e fra n k ly b e fo re th e p u b lic . A s h is to ria n W illiam S tu e c k h a s c o n v in c ­ in g ly a rg u e d , M a rsh a ll's u n w illin g n e s s to d o so d id n o t a rise fro m a fe a r th a t h e c o u ld n o t c u ltiv a te su ffic ie n t p o p u la r s u p p o r t fo r th e a d m in is tra tio n 's C h in a policy. P u b lic o p in io n p o lls in e a rly 1948 sh o w e d th a t a sm a ll m a jo rity fa v o re d a d d itio n a l a s s is ta n c e to C h ia n g , b u t th e a d m in is tra tio n h a d p re v io u s ly r e s h a p e d p u b lic a ttitu d e s o n c o n tro v e rsia l fo re ig n a id q u e s tio n s . M a rsh a ll, h o w ev er, w a s firm ly c o n v in c e d th a t a f ra n k p u b lic d is c u s s io n w o u ld o n ly c o m p lica te A m e ri­ c a n e ffo rts to c o n ta in c o m m u n is m th r o u g h o u t th e g lo b e. A t a tim e w h e n th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s try in g to sh o w re so lv e in th e face of a crisis in E u ro p e , a n a c rim o n io u s d e b a te a b o u t g lo b al p rio ritie s w o u ld ra is e e m b a r r a s s in g q u e s tio n s a b o u t A m e ric a n re lia b ility at h o m e a n d , p e r h a p s , d e b ilita tin g d o u b ts a b ro a d . B ecau se of th e s e c o n c e rn s , M a rsh a ll c o n fin e d h is c a n d id a s s e s s m e n ts of C h ia n g 's failin g s to c lo s e d -d o o r m e e tin g s o n C a p ito l H ill.89 M a rs h a ll's s ta rk w a rn in g s a b o u t th e d a n g e rs of a m ilita ry c o m m it­ m e n t to th e N a tio n a lis ts m a d e le ss of a n im p re s s io n o n th e F o re ig n A ffa irs C o m m itte e th a n d id th e a n a ly s e s of se v e ra l m ilita ry officers

182 • Arming the Free World w h o c o n s id e re d th e w ith h o ld in g of s u c h s u p p o r t a fa r g re a te r risk . P e rh a p s th e m o s t in flu e n tia l c a m e in a te le g ra m fro m G e n e ra l D o u g la s M ac A rth u r, th e c o m m a n d e r of o c c u p a tio n fo rce s in Ja p a n . D isc laim in g a n y e x p e rtis e o n C h in a , M a c A rth u r n e v e rth e le s s a s s e rte d th a t th e s u p p r e s s io n of civil strife w o u ld h a v e to p re c e d e in te rn a l re fo rm a n d is s u e d a b o m b a s tic a p p e a l fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e " in e q u ita b le re la tio n to s u c h g lo b a l a id as m a y b e d e te r m in e d u p o n . . . w ith o u t u n d e rr a tin g th e stra te g ic im p o rta n c e to u s , a s to th e w o rld , of a fre e a n d p e a c e fu l C h in a ." 90 W e d e m e y e r to o k a sim ila r lin e , la rg e ly re ite ra tin g h is te s ti­ m o n y of th e p re v io u s D e c e m b e r b e fo re th e S e n a te A p p ro p ria tio n s C o m m itte e .91 T h e m o s t s w e e p in g p r o p o s a ls c a m e fro m C laire L. C h e n n a u lt, th e r e tir e d a ir fo rce c o m m a n d e r w h o n o w o p e ra te d a n a irlin e in C h in a . H e re c o m m e n d e d th e e x te n s io n of $1.5 b illio n in m ilita ry a id o v e r th e n e x t th r e e y e a rs a n d th e a s s ig n m e n t o f A m e ric a n tactical a d v is e rs to th e N a tio n a lis t a rm e d fo rce s d o w n to th e lev el of th e in fa n try c o m p a n y a n d th e a ir c o rp s s q u a d ro n . T aking a p o s itio n a n tip o ­ d a l to M a rsh a ll's , h e to ld th e re p re s e n ta tiv e s th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld a s s u re th e N a tio n a lis ts th a t s u c h a s s is ta n c e w o u ld c o n tin u e u n til th e d e fe a t of th e C o m m u n is ts .92 A lth o u g h u n w illin g to g o as fa r as C h e n n a u lt s u g g e s te d , a m a jo rity of th e c o m m itte e th o u g h t th a t C h in a s h o u ld re c e iv e a d d itio n a l m ilita ry a id . T he c o m m itte e s tre s s e d th e sim ila ritie s b e tw e e n th e s itu a tio n s in C h in a a n d G re e c e : b o th c o u n trie s w e re to r n b y civil w ar; b o th r e q u ire d , in th e o p in io n of Ju d d a n d h is c o lle a g u e s, a m in im u m of m ilita ry se c u rity b e fo re p o litica l re fo rm a n d e co n o m ic re c o v e ry c o u ld occur. F u rth e rm o re , th e H o u s e p a n e l b e lie v e d th a t A m e ric a n in te re s ts in b o th c o u n trie s w e re e q u a lly s tro n g : "T h e U n ite d S ta te s c a n n o m o re a ffo rd to se e C h in a b e co m e a c o o rd in a te d p a r t of a n o th e r s y s te m th a n it c a n a ffo rd to se e G re e c e a n d T urkey b e co m e p a rt o f a n o th e r s y s te m ." O n th e b a sis of th is su p e rfic ia l a n a ly sis, th e c o m m itte e a p p ro v e d m e a ­ s u re s of a s s is ta n c e fo r C h in a sim ila r to th o se fo r G re e c e . O f th e $570 m illio n it re c o m m e n d e d fo r C h in a , th e c o m m itte e re s e rv e d $150 m il­ lio n fo r m ilita ry a id . It a lso s tip u la te d th a t th is a s s is ta n c e sh o u ld b e a d m in is te re d as in G re e c e , w h e re A m e ric a n m ilita ry p e rs o n n e l h e lp e d w ith stra te g ic p la n n in g a n d p ro v id e d o p e ra tio n a l ad v ic e d o w n to th e d iv is io n level. T h e H o u s e a c c e p te d th e s e p ro v is io n s o n 31 M a rc h w h e n it p a s s e d o m n ib u s fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n th a t e n c o m p a s s e d b o th th e C h in a A id A ct a n d th e E u ro p e a n R e co v e ry P ro g ra m s .93 T h e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e w a s fa r m o re sy m p a th e tic

Dilemma o f Aid to China * 183 to M a rs h a ll's v ie w s o n C h in a . Its m e m b e rs u n a n im o u s ly o p p o s e d f u r th e r m ilita ry c o m m itm e n ts to th e N a tio n a lis ts . Tom C o n n a lly of Texas, th e r a n k in g D e m o c ra t, c o n s id e re d th e p r o p o s e d C h in a a id p r o ­ g ra m a " h a n d o u t" th a t w o u ld p ro b a b ly d o m o re to e n ric h c o rru p t N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs th a n to im p ro v e c o n d itio n s in C h in a . W alter F. G e o rg e (D -G a .) a g re e d th a t f u r th e r a id w a s "a c o m p le te w a ste of m o n e y if it is g o in g to C h ia n g ." H e n ry C a b o t L o d g e (R -M ass.), a s ta u n c h in te rn a tio n a lis t, e x p re s s e d a la rm o v e r th e H o u s e bill, w h ic h h e felt w o u ld e v e n tu a lly le a d to a rm e d in te rv e n tio n in C h in a . "I w ill b e w illin g to v o te to s e n d th e m so m e m oney , " h e to ld h is c o lle a g u e s, " b u t I'll b e d a m n e d if I w a n t to s e n d th e m m a n p o w e r." E v e n th e c o m m itte e 's m o s t c o n s e rv a tiv e R e p u b lic a n m e m b e rs , B o u rk e B. H ic k e n lo o p e r of Iow a a n d A le x a n d e r W iley of W isc o n sin , to o k a sim ila r lin e . "T h e m ilita ry a id th e y n e e d is A m e ric a n tr o o p s ," th e la tte r w a rn e d , " a n d w e d o n 't w a n t to b e su c k e d in to th a t." 94 W h ile V a n d e n b e rg , to o , w a n te d to a v o id a n y m ilita ry c o m m itm e n ts in C h in a , h e b e lie v e d th a t th e S e n a te h a d to a p p e a s e th e H o u s e m e m ­ b e rs w h o w e re "h e ll b e n t" o n m ilita ry a id . O th e rw is e , h e fe a re d th a t th e lo w e r c h a m b e r m ig h t n o t c o n s e n t to th e E u ro p e a n R eco v ery P ro ­ g ra m . A c tin g as a le g islativ e b ro k er, V a n d e n b e rg h a d to o v e rc o m e th e h e s ita tio n s of so m e in flu e n tia l D e m o c ra ts. G e o rg e , fo r e x am p le , th o u g h t th a t th e tim e h a d com e to " ju s t . . . sa y 'N o '" to C h ia n g . C o n n a lly th o u g h t th a t th e S e n a te c o u ld c u t off a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts w ith o u t ris k in g d e fe a t of th e M a rsh a ll P la n . If V a n d e n b e rg , h o w ev er, th o u g h t m ilita ry a id to C h in a e s s e n tia l, C o n n a lly re c o m m e n d e d a lo a n ra th e r th a n a g ra n t. C o n n a lly fu lly e x p e c te d C h ia n g a n d th e " c ro o k s" s u r r o u n d in g h im to s q u a n d e r th e s e f u n d s , th e re b y a llo w in g th e C o n ­ g re s s " to w a s h o u r h a n d s of it a n d say, 'W ell, now , th e h ell w ith y o u .' " V a n d e n b e rg , th o u g h , p r o p o s e d a n o th e r fo rm u la as a s u b s titu te fo r th e o b je c tio n a b le se c tio n in th e H o u s e bill. H e s u g g e s te d th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a sp e c ia l f u n d th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts c o u ld u s e a t th e ir d is c re tio n a n d o n th e ir o w n re s p o n s ib ility fo r th e p u rc h a s e of m ilita ry s u p p lie s .95 T he S e n a te a c c e p te d th is p ro p o s a l, a n d V a n d e n b e rg p re v a ile d o n H o u s e le a d e rs to g iv e th e ir a p p ro v a l as w ell. T h e C h in a A id A ct, w h ic h T ru m a n s ig n e d in to la w o n 3 A p ril 1948, a u th o riz e d $338 m illio n in e co n o m ic a s s is ta n c e a n d $125 m illio n fo r u s e " o n s u c h te rm s as th e p r e s id e n t m a y d e te r m in e ." 96 T h is a rr a n g e m e n t, V a n d e n b e rg ex­ p la in e d , a v o id e d " a n y im p lic a tio n th a t w e a re u n d e rw ritin g th e m ili­ ta r y c a m p a ig n of th e N a tio n a lis t G o v e rn m e n t." 97

184 • Arming the Free World H o u s e R e p u b lic a n s m o u n te d o n e m o re c h a lle n g e to th e a d m in is tra ­ tio n o v e r m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . U p o n th e re c o m m e n d a tio n of its A p p r o p r ia tio n s C o m m itte e , th e lo w e r c h a m b e r a g a in v o te d to re q u ire s u p e rv is io n of th e $125 m illio n sim ila r to th a t p ro v id e d in G re e c e . A d m in is tra tio n officials r e s p o n d e d b y c lo sin g ra n k s a n d p r e s s in g th e ir c ase in th e S e n a te . R oyall, w h o p e rs o n a lly d is a p p ro v e d of a n y f u r th e r m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts , to ld th e S e n a te A p p r o ­ p ria tio n s C o m m itte e th a t s u c h s u p e rv is io n w o u ld d a n g e ro u s ly in v o lv e th e U n ite d S ta te s in C h in a 's in te rn a l co n flict. U n d e r p r e s s u r e fro m Royall n o t to o p p o s e th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's p o s itio n , W e d e m e y er s ta te d th a t m o n ito rin g of C h in e s e p ro c u r e m e n t w o u ld a d e q u a te ly p r o ­ te c t a g a in s t N a tio n a lis t m is u s e of th e sp e c ia l f u n d . T h e S e n a te s u s ­ ta in e d th e a d m in is tra tio n 's view , as d id a c o n fe re n c e c o m m itte e . T he a p p ro p ria tio n s act, w h ic h T ru m a n s ig n e d o n 28 J u n e , p ro v id e d th e full $125 m illio n b u t d id n o t c o m m it th e a d m in is tra tio n to a n y g re a te r e ffo rt to s u p p o r t th e N a tio n a lis ts .98 T he C h in a A id A ct w a s a n im p o r ta n t v ic to ry fo r th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t. T h e d e p a r tm e n t triu m p h e d o v e r p r o p o n e n ts of a lite ra l in te r ­ p r e ta tio n of th e T ru m a n D o c trin e , w h o w e re d e m a n d in g a m a jo r e ffo rt to ch eck c o m m u n is m in b o th E u ro p e a n d A sia, a n d s e c u re d a le g isla ­ tiv e m a n d a te fo r its g lo b al p e rs p e c tiv e of c o n c e n tra tin g A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s o n E u ro p e . A t th e sa m e tim e th a t C o n g re s s a p p ro v e d $400 m illio n fo r C h in a , it p ro v id e d $5.3 b illio n fo r th e E u ro p e a n R eco v ery P ro g ra m . Too, th e c o o p e ra tio n of R e p u b lic a n le a d e rs in d e fe a tin g a m b itio u s p ro p o s a ls fo r m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts s tr e n g th e n e d M a rsh a ll's h a n d a g a in s t th e critics of h is p o licy of lim ite d a s s ista n c e . Finally, th e C h in a A id A ct fo re c lo se d a n y p o s s ib ility of larg e -sca le in te r v e n tio n in C h ia n g 's b e h alf. A s A c h e s o n la te r to ld th e S e n a te , " T h is m a tte r w a s la id b e fo re th e C o n g re s s . . . th e C o n g re s s u n d e r ­ s to o d it p e rfe c tly " a n d h a d th e " s o u n d ju d g m e n t n o t to c h o o se a rm e d in te r v e n tio n ." 99

B y m id-1948 th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t w a s a p p ro a c h in g c o llap se. S tu a r t r e p o r te d th a t C h ia n g w a s " u n iv e rs a lly c o n d e m n e d fo r h is in e p t­ n e s s a n d re v ile d a n d e x c o ria te d fo r h is intransigeance in p ro lo n g in g civil w a r."100 B ereft of p o p u la r s u p p o r t, C h ia n g 's a u th o rity c ru m b le d . R eflectin g th e w id e s p re a d lo n g in g fo r p e a c e , a re fo rm fa c tio n w ith in th e K u o m in ta n g le d b y Vice P re s id e n t Li T s u n g -je n fa v o re d th e re o p e n -

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 185 in g of n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e C o m m u n is ts , a s te p th a t C h ia n g u n a lte ra ­ b ly o p p o s e d . A n o th e r g ro u p of K u o m in ta n g d is s id e n ts h e a d e d b y M a rs h a ll Li C h i-s h e n p la n n e d to e sta b lis h a n e w re g im e in s o u th ­ w e s te r n C h in a , w h ic h w o u ld a lso tr y to re a c h a n a c c o m m o d a tio n w ith th e C o m m u n is ts . L ocal p o litical a n d m ilita ry le a d e rs in c re a s in g ly d is ­ re g a r d e d th e m o rib u n d c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t. C h ia n g re s p o n d e d to th e s e c h a lle n g e s w ith r e n e w e d o b d u racy . H e a llo w e d o n ly p a p e r c h a n g e s in th e g o v e rn m e n t a n d c h o se s u b o rd in a te s o n th e b a sis of p e rs o n a l loyalty, re g a rd le s s of th e ir in c o m p e te n c e o r v en ality . S u c h b a n k r u p t p e rs o n a l ru le o n ly a c c e le ra te d th e fra g m e n ta tio n of p o w e r in N a tio n a lis t a re a s . By th e s u m m e r of 1948, A m e ric a n o b s e rv e rs w e re c o n v in c e d th a t C h ia n g 's d a y s w e re n u m b e r e d .101 T h e se v e re d e te rio ra tio n of th e N a tio n a lis ts ' m ilita ry p o s itio n r e in ­ fo rc e d th is b le a k a s s e s s m e n t. O n c e g ro s s ly in fe rio r in m a n p o w e r a n d a rm a m e n t, th e C o m m u n is t fo rc e s h a d a tta in e d p a rity w ith th e N a tio n a lis ts in b o th c a te g o rie s . In th e s p r in g of 1948 th e y c o n so lid a te d th e ir h o ld o n th e M a n c h u ria n c o u n try s id e , c o m p le tin g th e iso la tio n of la rg e N a tio n a lis t g a rris o n s in M u k d e n , C h a n g c h u n , a n d C h in ch o w . In N o rth a n d C e n tra l C h in a , in c re a s in g ly th e th e a te rs of m a jo r o p e ra ­ tio n s , M ao 's tr o o p s se iz e d th e in itia tiv e a n d fo r th e first tim e d e m o n ­ s tr a te d th e ir m a s te r y of p o s itio n a l w a rfa re a s w ell as g u e rrilla tactics. A s C o m m u n is t m ilita ry s tr e n g th w a x e d , th e N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s c o n ­ tin u e d to s u ffe r fro m in c o m p e te n t g e n e ra ls h ip a n d e b b in g m o ra le . " W h ile th e G o v e rn m e n t's m ilita ry s itu a tio n h a s p ro b a b ly n o t y e t b e co m e c ritic a l," c o llap se c o u ld b e a v e rte d o n ly b y " in s p ir e d a n d d y n a m ic m ilita ry le a d e rs h ip ," th e e m b a s s y in fo rm e d W a s h in g to n in Ju n e , " a n d th e re a re n o o fficers h a v in g s u c h q u a litie s in p o s itio n s of a u th o rity ." 102 F e a rfu l th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts w e re h e a d e d fo r c e rta in d e fe a t, A m e ri­ c a n m ilita ry a d v is e rs in C h in a m a d e o n e m o re e ffo rt to p e rs u a d e W a s h in g to n a u th o ritie s to e n la rg e th e sc o p e of th e ir m is sio n . B arr c a b le d W e d e m e y e r o n 8 J u n e th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts ' critical p ro b le m s a ro s e fro m " th e c o m p le te lack of a g g re s s iv e n e s s a n d o ffen siv e sp irit a m o n g th e N a tio n a lis t C h in e s e tr o o p s fro m th e th e a te r c o m m a n d e rs d o w n to th e p riv a te s ." 103 H e n e v e rth e le s s th o u g h t th a t A m e ric a n h e lp still c o u ld c h a n g e th is s o rry s itu a tio n a n d a s k e d fo r im m e d ia te p e rm is ­ sio n to f u r n is h o p e ra tio n a l a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis t g e n e ra l staff a n d p rin c ip a l fie ld c o m m a n d e rs . Vice A d m ira l O s c a r C . B adger, th e c o m m a n d e r of n a v a l fo rce s in th e W e ste rn Pacific, e n th u s ia stic a lly

186 • Arming the Free World s e c o n d e d B a rr's re c o m m e n d a tio n s . D e sp ite th e c u r r e n t "b lac k o u t­ lo o k ," B adger, to o , b e lie v e d th a t A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e w ith p la n s a n d o p e ra tio n s c o u ld in still o ffe n siv e s p irit in C h ia n g 's d e m o ra liz e d a rm ie s .104 S tu a r t a lso e n d o r s e d B a rr's p ro p o s a ls , c o n v in c e d th a t A m e r­ ic a n s u p e r v is io n o f th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt w a s n e c e s s a ry to t u r n th e tid e " in o u r fav o r."105 B ut p o lic y m a k e rs in W a s h in g to n d e m u r r e d . M a rsh a ll, as e v e r w a ry of N a tio n a lis t e ffo rts to d ra w th e U n ite d S ta te s d e e p e r in to th e civil w ar, to ld a m e e tin g o f p o litica l a n d m ilita ry officials th a t a c c e p ta n c e of B arr's p r o p o s a ls in c re a s e d th e risk of " g e ttin g su c k e d in ." S erv ice officials f r e tte d a b o u t th e s a m e p e ril. R e tre a tin g fro m h is e a rlie r v ie w s, W e d e m e y e r d e c la re d th a t h e n o lo n g e r fa v o re d th e p la c e m e n t of A m e ri­ c a n a d v is e rs w ith C h in e s e u n its in th e fie ld . S u c h a c tio n , h e fe a re d , w o u ld n o w o n ly a llo w th e N a tio n a lis ts to b la m e th e U n ite d S ta te s — p a rtic u la rly th e a rm y —fo r " th e fin a l d eb acle." Royall re a ffirm e d h is o p p o s itio n to f u r th e r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d G e n ­ e ra l O m a r N. B radley, th e a rm y c h ie f of staff, d is m is s e d B arr's s u g ­ g e s tio n s a s "im p ra c tic a l a n d u n d e s ira b le ." 106 F o llo w in g th is m e e tin g , th e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff r u le d o u t f u r th e r c o n s id e ra tio n o f o p e ra tio n a l ad v ic e to th e N a tio n a lis t arm y. W h e n th e lo n g -d e la y e d jo in t m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p w a s a c tiv a te d o n 1 N o v e m b e r 1948, its m is s io n w a s lim ite d to a d v ic e o n o rg a n iz a tio n a n d tr a in in g .107 A s th e d is c u s s io n of B a rr's p r o p o s a ls in d ic a te d , a s h ift h a d o c c u rre d in th e a rm y 's a ttitu d e to w a rd m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . So c o n ­ c e rn e d w a s R oyall a b o u t a n im m in e n t c o llap se o f C h ia n g 's re g im e th a t h e s u g g e s te d to F o rre sta l o n 19 Ju ly th a t th e y ta lk to T ru m a n a b o u t w ith d r a w in g all a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . S tu d ie s b y P& O , h o w ev er, c o u n s e le d a g a in s t s u c h a m o v e. T h e a b r u p t c e s s a tio n o f A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e , P & O w a rn e d , w o u ld p re c ip ita te th e fall o f th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t a n d p lac e u p o n th e U n ite d S ta te s th e o n u s fo r C h ia n g 's d e m ise . T h e a rm y p la n n e r s a lso a s s e r te d th a t s u c h a c tio n s m ig h t c ast d o u b t o n A m e ric a n d e te rm in a tio n to h o n o r its c o m m itm e n ts to o th e r n a tio n s . In s te a d th e y re c o m m e n d e d th e c o n tin u a tio n of c u rr e n t a id p ro g ra m s in o rd e r to d e la y th e c o llap se o f th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e . T h e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff a g re e d , a rg u in g th a t " th e b u y in g of tim e b y e x p e n d itu re s w ith in r e a s o n w ill c o n s titu te . . . tru e e c o n o m y in te rm s of o u r n a tio n a l secu rity ." T h e se rv ice c h ie fs, h o w ev er, h a d all b u t a b a n d o n e d h o p e of a N a tio n a lis t v ic to ry in th e civil w ar. Like th e a rm y

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 187 p la n n e r s , th e y v ie w e d m ilita ry a id to C h in a p rim a rily as a m e a n s of p o s tp o n in g a N a tio n a lis t d e fe a t.108 T h e C IA , h o w e v er, c h a lle n g e d th is a n a ly sis. C IA D ire c to r R oscoe H . H ille n k o e tte r w a r n e d T ru m a n o n 20 Ju ly th a t C h ia n g 's g o v e rn m e n t w a s " s o u n s ta b le th a t its c o llap se o r o v e rth ro w c o u ld o c c u r at an y tim e ." B ecau se o f th e d e te rio ra tio n of th e N a tio n a lis t re g im e , H ill­ e n k o e tte r th o u g h t th a t it w a s " v e ry q u e s tio n a b le " w h e th e r th e C h in a A id P ro g ra m c o u ld d o a n y th in g to slo w th e N a tio n a lis t d e c lin e . "T h u s th e U S m a y fin d itself in th e n e a r f u tu r e activ e ly s u p p o r tin g a g o v e rn ­ m e n t at N a n k in g w h ic h e x ercises m e re ly n o m in a l p o w e r," H ille n k o e t­ te r c a u tio n e d T ru m a n . T h is s itu a tio n " w o u ld g ra v e ly im p a ir U S p r e s ­ tig e a n d in te re s ts in th e F ar E a s t." 109 A s N a tio n a lis t p r o s p e c ts d a rk e n e d , officials in W a s h in g to n b e g a n im p le m e n tin g th e C h in a A id A ct. To n o o n e 's s u rp ris e , th e N a tio n a lis t m in is te r in fo rm e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o n 11 M a y 1948 th a t h is g o v e rn m e n t w is h e d to u s e th e e n tire $125 m illio n g r a n t fo r th e p u r ­ c h a se of m ilita ry s u p p lie s . W h ile d e lib e ra tin g th e a d m in is tra tiv e te rm s fo r u s e of th is sp e c ia l f u n d , B u tte rw o rth a n d h is c o lle a g u e s in FE e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld a s s u m e n o re s p o n s ib ility fo r N a tio n a lis t e x p e n d itu re s . U p o n S ta te 's re c o m m e n d a tio n , T ru m a n a p p ro v e d o n 2 J u n e p r o c e d u r e s g o v e rn in g th e $125 m illio n g ra n t th a t lim ite d A m e ric a n s u p e r v is io n m e re ly to c h e c k in g th e in v o ices s u p p o r t­ in g C h in e s e r e q u e s ts fo r p a y m e n ts . In a d d itio n , m ilita ry a n d n a v al o fficers in W a s h in g to n p ro v id e d o n ly te c h n ic a l a d v ic e o n p r o c u r e m e n t to th e ir C h in e s e c o u n te r p a r ts .110 P re s s u re fro m C h ia n g 's s u p p o r te r s in C o n g re s s fo rc e d re c o n s id e ra ­ tio n o f th e s e a r r a n g e m e n ts . S e n a to r B rid g e s a c c u se d th e S ta te D e p a rt­ m e n t o n 28 J u n e of d ila to rin e s s in a llo c a tin g f u n d s fo r N a tio n a lis t m ilita ry p u rc h a s e s . T h re e d a y s la te r h e jo in e d w ith J o h n T aber (R-N.Y.), c h a irm a n of th e H o u s e A p p r o p r ia tio n s C o m m itte e , in u rg in g T ru m a n to s te p u p th e a d m in is tra tio n 's e ffo rts to se e th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts u s e d th e $125 m illio n f u n d to m e e t th e ir p r e s s in g m ilita ry n e e d s . W alter Ju d d b e s e e c h e d L o v e tt o n 9 Ju ly to h a s te n th e d e liv e ry o f a rm a m e n ts to C h ia n g b y a rr a n g in g fo r th e tra n s fe r of e q u ip m e n t fro m th e in v e n to rie s of th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t. O w in g to th e d e p le tio n of s u r p lu s sto c k s a n d th e lo n g le a d tim e in th e co m m erc ial p r o c u re m e n t of m u n itio n s , tr a n s fe r fro m w a r re s e rv e s w a s th e fa s te s t w ay to m e e t N a tio n a lis t re q u ire m e n ts . R e s p o n d in g to th e s e a p p e a ls , T ru m a n ac-

188 • Arming the Free World c e p te d M a rs h a ll's a d v ic e a n d o n 28 Ju ly 1948 re v is e d h is e a rlie r d ire c ­ tiv e to allo w th e se rv ic e d e p a r tm e n ts to f u r n is h m ilita ry s u p p lie s d i­ re c tly to th e N a tio n a lis ts .111 B u t e v e n th e s e n e w p ro c e d u re s d id n o t re s u lt in th e p ro m p t d e liv e ry of a rm a m e n ts to th e N a tio n a lis ts . O n th e re c o m m e n d a tio n of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, th e a rm y a s s ig n e d th e C h in e s e p r o g r a m a p rio rity b e h in d G re e c e , Turkey, a n d Ira n . T h is ra n k in g m e a n t th a t th e a rm y w o u ld g iv e p re fe re n c e to th e o th e r p r o g r a m s in a llo c a tin g scarce e q u ip m e n t a n d th a t th e C h in e s e w o u ld h a v e to p a y e ith e r p r o c u r e m e n t o r re p la c e m e n t c o sts fo r m o s t of th e ite m s th e y r e q u e s te d .112 By m id -A u g u s t lo g istics e x p e rts d e te r m in e d th a t th e a rm y c o u ld p ro v id e fro m sto c k th e sm a ll a rm s a n d a m m u n itio n th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts u r g e n tly d e s ire d a n d b e g in to s h ip th e s e m u n itio n s w ith in tw o m o n th s . O th e r s u p p lie s , s u c h as m a te ria ls fo r N a tio n a lis t a rs e n a ls , w o u ld h a v e to b e o b ta in e d fro m m a n u fa c tu re rs a n d c o u ld n o t b e d e liv e re d u n til th e fo llo w in g s p rin g . A t th e e n d of A u g u s t G e n e ra l H e n r y S. A u r a n d , th e d ire c to r of lo g istic s, se t 1 M a y 1949 as a ta rg e t d a te fo r th e c o m p le tio n of th e $125 m illio n p ro g ra m . H e n o te d , h o w ev er, th a t if th e d e a d lin e w e re n o t m e t, th e re w a s little m o re u n d e r p r e s e n t p o licies th a t th e a rm y c o u ld d o .113 U p s e t b y th e slo w p a c e of d e liv e rie s of m ilita ry s u p p lie s , critics c h a rg e d th a t th e p r o g r a m fell v ic tim to b u re a u c ra tic b u n g lin g o r w illfu l o b s tru c tio n . N e ith e r w a s th e case. T h e a rm y c o m p le te d a v ailab ility s tu d ie s d u rin g A u g u s t w ith u n c o m m o n s p e e d . T h e tim e r e q u ire d to fill C h in e s e r e q u e s ts fro m sto c k w a s n o t a b n o rm a l: th e te c h n ic a l se rv ice s n e e d e d at le a st 120 d a y s to p ro v id e e q u ip m e n t to re g u la r a rm y u n its . T h e p rio rity a c c o rd e d th e C h in e s e p r o g r a m re fle c te d th e p o litical a n d stra te g ic o u tlo o k th a t p re v a ile d w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n , n o t an y d e sire to d e la y th e $125 m illio n p ro g ra m . E ffo rts b y A m e ric a n officials in C h in a to in flu e n c e th e u s e of th e sp e c ia l f u n d c o m p lic a te d th e p la n n in g in W a s h in g to n . T h e a im of th e se officials w as to s tr e n g th e n th e fo rce s in N o rth C h in a u n d e r th e co m ­ m a n d of F u T so -y i, o n e of th e few effectiv e, a g g re s s iv e N a tio n a lis t g e n e ra ls . B ecause F u w a s n o t a m e m b e r of C h ia n g 's c liq u e of fa v o re d o ffice rs—h is f r ie n d s h ip w ith Li T s u n g -je n a c c o u n te d fo r h is d iffic u lties w ith th e g e n e ra lis s im o —th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t ig n o re d h is re q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry s u p p lie s . So g re a t w e re Fu's n e e d s th a t h e trie d to o b ta in A m e ric a n e q u ip m e n t fro m fo re ig n b ro k e rs b y b a rte r in g local p ro d u c ts . T h e p a s s a g e of th e C h in a A id A ct o ffe re d a so lu tio n to Fu's p lig h t, in th e o p in io n o f se v e ra l A m e ric a n officials. E a g e r to k e e p alive N a tio n a lis t

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 189 re s is ta n c e in th e critical a re a of P e ip in g a n d T ie n tsin , th e y a tte m p te d to s e c u re fo r F u a p o r tio n of th e m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t p u r c h a s e d w ith th e $125 m illio n g r a n t .114 T he d riv in g fo rce b e h in d th e e ffo rt to h e lp F u w a s A d m ira l B adger. H e a rg u e d p e rs u a s iv e ly th a t th e lo ss of N o rth C h in a w o u ld m a k e th e N a tio n a lis t p o s itio n u n te n a b le . Yet h is p rim a ry c o n c e rn in u rg in g s u p p o r t of F u w a s p ro te c tio n of A m e ric a n n a v al facilities at T sin g ta o . B a d g e r in fo rm e d th e N a v y D e p a rtm e n t in M ay th a t h e w a s p r e p a r e d to a s s is t th e N a tio n a lis ts in th e d e fe n se of th a t city, a c o u rs e of a c tio n th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs, u n d e r p r e s s u r e fro m th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, o v e rru le d in fav o r of p r o m p t w ith d ra w a l in th e e v e n t of a C o m m u n is t a ttac k . A c c o rd in g to a n e m b a s s y official. B a d g e r w a s " d e s p e ra te at th e th o u g h t th a t h e m ig h t e v e n tu a lly h a v e to e v a c u a te T sin g ta o a n d is m o v in g h e a v e n a n d e a r th . . . to a v o id th e p o ssib ility ." H is so lu tio n w a s to h a s te n th e d e liv e ry of s u p p lie s to F u a n d to N a tio n a lis t fo rce s in S h a n tu n g . W ith u n r e le n tin g z e a l, h e p r e s s e d th is p ro p o s a l in N a n k in g a n d W a s h in g to n a n d p r e d ic te d m ag ic a l re s u lts . " It c o u ld b e th e tu r n in g p o in t," h e c a b le d th e c h ie f of n a v a l o p e ra tio n s . A d m ira l L o u is E. D e n fe ld , " w h ic h w o u ld u ltim a te ly le a d to a s tr o n g u n ite d C h in a frie n d ly to [the] U n ite d S ta te s a n d a n effectiv e o p p o n e n t of C o m m u n is m ." 115 B a d g e r g a in e d s u p p o r t fo r h is p la n s fro m S tu a rt, w h o a lso h a d a sp e c ia l r e a s o n fo r c o n c e rn o v e r th e fa te of N o rth C h in a . L ew is C lark , th e m in is te r-c o u n s e lo r of th e e m b a ssy , r e p o r te d th a t " th e A m b a s ­ s a d o r's h e a r t is m o s t d e e p ly in v o lv e d in Y en ch in g [U n iv e rsity of P e ip ­ in g ] a n d c o n s e q u e n tly in th e s ta b ility of N o rth C h in a , a n d . . . h is ju d g m e n t is in flu e n c e d b y h is d e sire at a lm o s t a n y c o st to a v o id C o m ­ m u n is t d o m in a n c e of th e P e ip in g -T ie n ts in a re a ." M e lb y w ro te th a t S tu a r t " d i d n 't g iv e a d a m n w h a t W a s h in g to n th in k s a b o u t a n y th in g . H e is in effect C h in a 's A m b a s s a d o r to C h in a ." 116 A Ju ly m e e tin g w ith F u a n d se v e ra l c o n fe re n c e s w ith B a d g e r p e r s u a d e d S tu a r t th a t m o d e s t a m o u n ts of a rm a m e n ts w o u ld e n a b le th e N a tio n a lis ts to h o ld N o rth C h in a . D e sp ite o b je c tio n s fro m th e e m b a s s y staff, S tu a rt u r g e d th e g e n e ra lis s im o to a g re e to th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry a id to Fu, w h ile a s s u rin g th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t th a t s u c h a c tio n in v o lv e d n o r e s p o n s i­ b ility fo r th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt. S tu a r t ig n o re d B a d g er's te n d e n c y to s tre tc h th e t r u th a s h e im p o r tu n e d W a s h in g to n a u th o ritie s to b ack h is p r o p o s a ls to h e lp F u. "I a m w illin g to clo se m y e y es to th a t if he c an a c c o m p lish th e e n d s o u g h t," h e c o n fid e d to C la rk .117

190 • Arming the Free World O fficials of th e E co n o m ic C o o p e ra tio n A d m in is tra tio n (EC A ) also e n th u s ia s tic a lly e n d o r s e d a id to F u. S h o rtly a fte r a rriv in g in C h in a in J u n e 1948, m e m b e rs of th e E C A m is s io n e x p re s s e d sh o c k at th e N a tio n a lis ts ' p e rilo u s m ilita ry p o s itio n a n d d is m a y o v e r th e c e n tra l g o v e rn m e n t's w illin g n e s s to w rite off N o rth C h in a , w h e re " th e a rm ie s a n d th e a rtic u la te g r o u p s . . . a re fu ll of s p irit fo r th e fig h t a g a in s t th e C o m m u n is ts ." 118 R o g e r D. L a p h a m , th e E C A c h ie f in C h in a , in s is te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld n o t a ffo rd to a b a n d o n N o rth C h in a , n o m a tte r w h a t C h ia n g d id . C o n v in c e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n sh o u ld n o lo n g e r p in its h o p e s o n th e g e n e ra liss im o 's d e c a d e n t re g im e , h e u r g e d th e p ro v is io n of A m e ric a n a rm s to F u as th e first s te p in a n "a ffirm a ­ tiv e" p r o g r a m of s u p p o r t fo r re g io n a l g ro u p s th a t activ ely re s is te d th e C o m m u n is ts . A tte m p tin g to re v iv e a d e a d is s u e , h e re c o m m e n d e d a n e x p a n d e d e ffo rt in C h in a , m o d e le d o n A m e ric a n a id to G re e c e , as v ita l to th e c o n ta in m e n t of " w o rld " c o m m u n is m .119 T h e o n ly s e n io r A m e ric a n official in C h in a w h o h a d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t p ro v id in g m ilita ry a id to F u w a s G e n e ra l Barr. C o n c e d in g th a t s u c h h e lp m ig h t p ro lo n g F u's re s is ta n c e , h e th o u g h t th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts s h o u ld u s e th e sp e c ia l f u n d p rim a rily to tra in a n d e q u ip a fo rce in S o u th C h in a c a p a b le o f ta k in g th e o ffen siv e . B ut, w ith o u t c o n s u ltin g Barr, B a d g er p e r s u a d e d C h ia n g to g iv e first p rio rity to s tr e n g th e n in g N o rth C h in a a n d S h a n tu n g . H e a p p a r e n tly sw a y e d th e g e n e ra lis s im o b y v irtu a lly p ro m is in g —w ith o u t a u th o rity —th e sale of A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts a t p r o c u r e m e n t, ra th e r th a n re p la c e m e n t, p ric e s a n d fre e tr a n s p o rta tio n of th e s e m u n itio n s to C h in a in n a v y b o tto m s. C o n v in c e d th a t C h ia n g h a d m a d e a firm d e c isio n a n d a w are of th e s tr o n g fe e lin g s o f o th e r A m e ric a n officials in C h in a , B a rr a c q u ie s c e d in th e p la n to a id F u. A t th e e n d of A u g u s t, th e g e n e ra lis s im o a ffirm e d to Barr, B adger, a n d S tu a r t h is d e c isio n to a sk th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t to f u r n is h e q u ip m e n t u n d e r th e $125 m illio n g r a n t fo r Fu's s e v e n a rm ie s a n d fo r th r e e r e o rg a n iz e d N a tio n a lis t d iv is io n s at T s in g ta o .120 W a s h in g to n a u th o ritie s p ro m p tly a g re e d to th e d e liv e ry of m ilita ry a id to N o rth C h in a . S u c h a s s is ta n c e a p p e a le d to th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t n o t as a s te p to w a rd s tr e n g th e n in g local C h in e s e le a d e rs b u t as a w ay of a rr e s tin g th e tr e n d to w a rd re g io n a lis m , w h ic h C h ia n g 's n e g le c t of N o rth C h in a w a s e n c o u r a g in g .121 P ro b le m s a ro se , h o w ev er, w h e n th e C h in e s e a m b a s s a d o r a s k e d fo r e q u ip m e n t th a t w o u ld c o st so m e $75 m illio n , a lm o s t tw ic e th e u n e x p e n d e d b a la n c e in th e sp e cia l fu n d .

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 191 A lth o u g h th e n a v y e v e n tu a lly a g re e d to p ro v id e th e fre e tr a n s p o rta tio n th a t B a d g e r h a d p ro m is e d , th e a rm y r e fu s e d to a lte r its p ric in g p o licy b u t m a d e e v e ry e ffo rt to fu r n is h ite m s at th e lo w e st p o ss ib le c o s t.122 A t th e r e q u e s t of th e arm y, th e N a tio n a lis ts d e s ig n a te d firs t-p rio rity ite m s, p rim a rily sm a ll-c a lib e r w e a p o n s a n d a m m u n itio n , w h ic h a m o u n te d to $37.8 m illio n . By e a rly O c to b e r a rm y officials o r d e r e d th e p re p a ra tio n of th e s e m u n itio n s fo r s h ip m e n t to C h in a in D e c e m b e r a n d Ja n u a ry .123 T ru m a n in te r v e n e d p e rs o n a lly to h a s te n th e d e liv e ry of th is m a te ­ riel. R e s p o n d in g to a n a p p e a l fro m C h ia n g , w h o la m e ly b la m e d re c e n t m ilita ry re v e rs e s o n s h o rta g e s of e q u ip m e n t, a n d u n d o u b te d ly th in k ­ in g a b o u t R e p u b lic a n c ritic ism of h is C h in a p o licy in th e fin al w e e k s of th e p re s id e n tia l c a m p a ig n , T ru m a n d ire c te d th e a rm y to e x p e d ite th e d e liv e ry o f th e sm a ll a rm s a n d a m m u n itio n th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts h a d re q u e s te d . S e rv ice officials r e s p o n d e d b y a s s ig n in g th e s e ite m s to p p rio rity . T h ey a lso m a d e av ailab le fro m M a c A rth u r's sto c k s in Ja p a n so m e 1,200 to n s of w e a p o n s a n d a m m u n itio n . T h ese s u p p lie s a rriv e d in C h in a in m id -N o v e m b e r 1948, w h ile th e r e s t of th e e q u ip m e n t left A m e ric a n p o r ts b e tw e e n 9 N o v e m b e r a n d 16 D e c e m b e r.124 L ittle of th is m a te rie l a c tu a lly re a c h e d F u . B ecau se of m a jo r C o m ­ m u n is t g a in s , C h ia n g 's re p re s e n ta tiv e s n o tifie d se rv ice a u th o ritie s in m id -N o v e m b e r th a t th e y w is h e d f u r th e r d e liv e rie s o f m ilita ry a id d iv e r te d fro m N o rth C h in a . T h is d e c isio n th r e w B a d g e r in to a fren zy . H e a p p a r e n tly trie d to e x tra c t fro m F u a p le d g e to re s is t to " th e b itte r e n d ." H e a lso u r g e d th e g e n e ra l to w rite a letter, w h ic h h e w o u ld r u s h to W a s h in g to n , a s k in g T ru m a n fo r help . F u w a n te d n o p a r t of th e s e d e s p e r a te m e a s u re s . In s te a d h e e n te r e d in to p e a c e n e g o tia tio n s a n d o n 23 J a n u a ry 1949 s u r r e n d e r e d in P e ip in g to th e C o m m u n is ts .125 F u's c a p itu la tio n p ra c tic a lly c o m p le te d th e C o m m u n is t c o n q u e s t of C h in a n o r th of th e Y angtze. D u rin g O c to b e r a n d N o v em b er, M ao's fo rce s to o k in r a p id s u c c e s s io n C h in ch o w , C h a n g c h u n , a n d M u k d e n , th e re b y e n d in g th e w a r in M a n c h u ria . A t th e e n d of th e year, th e p ro tra c te d sie g e of H s u c h o w e lim in a te d th e la s t N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s in th e N o rth sa v e F u's. T h e se d e fe a ts c o st C h ia n g h u g e b o d ie s of tr o o p s — in c lu d in g h is b e s t a rm ie s —a n d e n o rm o u s q u a n titie s of m a te rie l. M a r­ sh a ll w a s e sp e c ia lly fu rio u s o v e r th e N a tio n a lis ts ' fa ilu re to d e stro y th e ir a m m u n itio n d u m p s a n d th e a rs e n a l a t M u k d e n . B a rr r e p o r te d o n 16 N o v e m b e r th a t g o v e rn m e n t fo rc e s h a d n o t lo st a sin g le b a ttle sin ce h is a rriv a l fo r w a n t of e q u ip m e n t. "T h e ir m ilita ry d e b a c le s," h e e x p la in e d , " c a n all b e a ttrib u te d to th e w o rld 's w o rs t le a d e rs h ip a n d

192 • Arming the Free World m a n y o th e r m o ra le d e s tro y in g fa c to rs th a t le d to a c o m p le te lo ss of w ill to fig h t." F u rth e r in fu s io n s of A m e ric a n a rm s in th e a u tu m n of 1948 c o u ld n o t h a v e a lte re d th e re s u lts of th e fig h tin g .126 A s th e " m a n d a te of h e a v e n " s lip p e d fro m h is g rasp , C h ia n g la u n c h e d a d e s p e r a te c a m p a ig n fo r a ll-o u t A m e ric a n a ssista n c e . In a n in te rv ie w w ith a n A m e ric a n jo u rn a lis t, th e g e n e ra lis s im o a s s e rte d , "T h e c e n te r of e n d e a v o r in th e sa lv a tio n of A sia m u s t b e C h in a . . . . I h o p e th a t th e A m e ric a n p e o p le a n d th e ir s ta te s m e n w ill d e d ic a te th e ir liv e s to th is ta s k ." 127 Two w e e k s la te r h e a p p e a le d to T ru m a n fo r in c re a s e d m ilita ry a id a n d th e a s s ig n m e n t of a g e n e ra l w h o c o u ld d ire c t th e N a tio n a lis t w a r e ffo rt. L e sse r N a tio n a lis t officials r e p e a te d ly im p o r tu n e d M a rs h a ll a n d h is a s s is ta n ts fo r p u b lic e x p re s s io n s of s u p ­ p o r t. M a rsh a ll, h o w ev er, w a s u n m o v e d . H e c o n s id e re d th e a p p o in t­ m e n t of a n e w m ilita ry m is s io n a "q u ix o tic v e n tu re " a n d re ite ra te d h is b e lie f th a t A m e ric a n a rm s c o u ld n o t save C h ia n g .128 U p o n h is re c o m ­ m e n d a tio n , T ru m a n r e p e a te d h is p le d g e to C h ia n g to h a s te n th e im p le ­ m e n ta tio n of th e C h in a A id A ct b u t r u le d o u t f u r th e r a ssista n c e . A s L o v ett e x p la in e d p riv ately , " O n ly th e C h in e s e c a n sav e C h in a , a n d . . . w e m u s t n o t feel th a t th e re is a n y th in g p ra c tic a l th a t w e c a n d o to re s to re th e p o s itio n th e r e ." 129 N o n e th e le s s , a d m in is tra tio n officials s c ru p u lo u s ly a v o id e d p u b lic e x p re s s io n s of s u c h v ie w s. A t th e e n d of N o v em b er, M a rsh a ll re je c te d a re c o m m e n d a tio n fro m th e Policy P la n n in g S taff th a t th e p r e s id e n t is s u e a fra n k s ta te m e n t a im e d a t a lle v ia tin g " th e c o n fu s io n a n d b e w ild e r­ m e n t in th e p u b lic m in d r e g a rd in g o u r C h in a policy." H e e x p la in e d to th e C a b in e t, "T h e N a tio n a lis t G o v e rn m e n t of C h in a is o n its w ay o u t a n d th e re is n o th in g w e c a n d o to sav e it. W e a re fa c e d w ith th e q u e s tio n of c la rify in g th e A m e ric a n p e o p le [sic] a n d b y so d o in g d e liv e r in g ] th e k n o c k o u t b lo w to th e N a tio n a lis t G o v t in C h in a —o r w e c a n p la y a lo n g w ith th e e x istin g g o v t . . . [by] k e e p in g fac ts fro m th e A m e ric a n p e o p le a n d th e re b y n o t b e a c c u se d la te r of p la y in g in to th e h a n d s of th e C o m m u n is ts ." T ru m a n a g re e d w ith h is s e c re ta ry of sta te th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n s h o u ld follow th e la te r c o u rs e . F or sim ila r re a s o n s , th e C a b in e t d e c id e d to allo w M a d a m e C h ia n g to co m e to th e U n ite d S ta te s o n a m is s io n to se c u re f u r th e r a s s is ta n c e . T ru m a n a n d h is a d v is e rs p r e f e r r e d to s u ffe r a n y e m b a r r a s s m e n t sh e m ig h t c au se th e a d m in is tra tio n —h e r p le a s fo r a d d itio n a l a id w e re p o lite ly b u t firm ly r e f u s e d —r a th e r th a n risk c h a rg e s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s tu r n in g its b a c k o n th e N a tio n a lis ts .130

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 193 In re tro s p e c t, th e s e d e c isio n s a p p e a r u n w is e . If c o n c e rn s a b o u t A m e ric a n c re d ib ility h a d k e p t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n fro m is s u in g a fra n k p u b lic s ta te m e n t a b o u t its C h in a policy, th o se s tric tu re s sh o u ld n o lo n g e r h a v e a p p lie d b y late 1948. In C h in a , all h o p e of p re v e n tin g a N a tio n a lis t c o lla p se h a d v a n is h e d . In E u ro p e , th e crisis of c o n fid e n c e of th e p re v io u s s p r in g h a d p a s s e d , a n d M a rsh a ll P la n a id w a s b e g in n in g to re a c h th e re c ip ie n t n a tio n s . S u p p o r t fo r a d o o m e d re g im e c o u ld d o little , in th e s e c irc u m s ta n c e s , to e n h a n c e A m e ric a n cred ib ility . Still, th e c o n tin u e d p ro v is io n of a rm s a id c a rrie d th e im p lic a tio n th a t A m e ric a n h e lp c o u ld s o m e h o w p re s e rv e th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t, a d a n ­ g e ro u s e x p e c ta tio n th a t c o u ld o n ly h a rm A m e ric a n p re s tig e . By th e ir silen c e, T ru m a n a n d M a rsh a ll in a d v e rte n tly p la y e d in to th e h a n d s of p a rtis a n R e p u b lic a n s a n d e x tre m e s u p p o r te r s of C h ia n g . T h ey n e ith e r e d u c a te d p u b lic o p in io n n o r m o d e ra te d th e f u r y of critics w h o la te r c la im e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s " lo s t" C h in a .131 C o n c e rn o v e r p u b lic re a c tio n a lso in flu e n c e d th e a d m in is tra tio n 's a ttitu d e to w a rd th e c o n tin u a tio n of m ilita ry a id s h ip m e n ts to C h in a . By th e e n d of 1948, th e civil w a r h a d tu r n e d so se v e re ly a g a in s t th e N a tio n a lis ts th a t W a s h in g to n officials n o lo n g e r b e lie v e d th a t th e c e n ­ tra l g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld ra lly th e r e m a in in g fo rc e s of re s is ta n c e . F u rth e r d e liv e rie s o f a rm a m e n ts p u r c h a s e d w ith f u n d s fro m th e $125 m illio n g r a n t c o u ld d o n o th in g to s te m th e C o m m u n is t a d v a n c e . In d e e d , p o litical a n d m ilita ry a n a ly s ts fe a re d th a t th e ir p rin c ip a l effect m ig h t b e to s tr e n g th e n th e v ic to rio u s C o m m u n is t a rm ie s . A t F o rre sta l's r e q u e s t o n 16 D e ce m b er, th e N a tio n a l S e c u rity C o u n c il re v ie w e d T ru m an 's e a rlie r d e c isio n to e x p e d ite m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d a g re e d to a sk S tu a r t a n d B a rr fo r th e ir o p in io n s o n th e s u s p e n s io n of a rm s s h ip m e n ts . P e n d in g a c tio n b y th e N S C , L o v ett r e q u e s te d th e a rm y to d iv e rt v e sse ls e n ro u te to C h in a to in te rm e d ia te p o r t s .132 B o th B a rr a n d S tu a r t c o u n s e le d a g a in s t th e a b r u p t c e s s a tio n of m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . S tu a rt, w h o " n e v e r g av e u p u n til th e re w a s n o lo n g e r a n y th in g to g iv e u p ," e m p h a s iz e d th a t su c h a ctio n w o u ld d is c o u ra g e th o s e fo rce s th a t in te n d e d to c a rry o n th e fig h t a g a in s t th e C o m m u n is ts .133 In a lo n g re v ie w of th e s itu a tio n in C h in a , B a rr c o n c lu d e d th a t a d d itio n a l A m e ric a n a rm s c o u ld d o n o th in g to p r e v e n t a N a tio n a lis t d e fe a t. " O n ly a p o licy of u n lim ite d U n ite d S ta te s a id ," h e d e c la re d , " in c lu d in g th e im m e d ia te e m p lo y m e n t of U n ite d S ta te s A rm e d F o rces to b lo c k th e s o u th e rn a d v a n c e of th e c o m m u n ists, w h ic h I e m p h a tic a lly d o n o t re c o m m e n d , w o u ld e n a b le th e N a tio n a list

194 • Arming the Free World G o v e rn m e n t to m a in ta in a fo o th o ld in S o u th e rn C h in a a g a in s t a d e te r ­ m in e d c o m m u n is t a d v a n c e ." S till, B arr o p p o s e d a s u d d e n h a lt of m ili­ ta ry a id as lo n g a s th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t c o n tin u e d to exist, sin c e " s u c h a c tio n w o u ld b e w id e ly c o n d e m n e d a n d w o u ld p la c e th e U n ite d S ta te s in a n u n fa v o ra b le lig h t in th e e y es of th e w o rld ." H e u r g e d in s te a d th e c o n tin u a tio n of m ilita ry a n d e co n o m ic a id to S o u th C h in a a n d T aiw an a s lo n g as th e N a tio n a lis ts h e ld " a n y c o n s id e ra b le p o rtio n s of th e s e a re a s ." 134 O fficials in th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t, in c lu d in g th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, e x p re s s e d sim ila r v ie w s .135 T ru m a n ra tifie d th e c o n s e n s u s th a t h is a d v is e rs re a c h e d o n fu rth e r a id to C h in a . O n 31 D e c e m b e r h e a u th o riz e d c o n tin u e d im p le m e n ta ­ tio n of th e C h in a A id A ct a s lo n g as th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t o r a leg al s u c c e s s o r r e m a in e d in p o w e r a n d p u r s u e d " a n a n ti-C o m m u n is t p o lic y " a n d as lo n g as " o u r m ilita ry a u th o ritie s in C h in a " c o n tin u e d to re c o m m e n d a s s is ta n c e . B a rr th u s o r d e r e d tw o s h ip s th a t h a d b e e n d e ta in e d at in te rm e d ia te p o r ts to p ro c e e d to T aiw an fo r u n lo a d in g . F u rth e r d e liv e rie s w o u ld d e p e n d o n th e c o u rs e of m ilita ry a n d p o litical e v e n ts in C h in a . T h e o v e rrid in g g o a l of th e a d m in is tra tio n 's policy, as B a rr p u t it, w a s to a v o id " a n y a c tio n th a t w o u ld te n d to fo rce th e a b d ic a tio n of th e G e n e ra lis s im o o r th e c o llap se of th e g o v e rn m e n t." 136 T h e r a p id d e c lin e of N a tio n a lis t p o w e r le d to a re c o n s id e ra tio n of f u r th e r a rm s s h ip m e n ts o n ly o n e m o n th later. C h ia n g 's re lin q u is h m e n t of th e p re s id e n c y to Li T s u n g -je n o n 21 J a n u a ry 1949, a n d Fu's s u r ­ r e n d e r o f P e ip in g o n e d a y later, d ra m a tic a lly d e m o n s tra te d th e h o p e ­ le s s n e s s of th e N a tio n a lis t c a u se . B a rr r e p o r te d th a t effectiv e re s is ta n c e to th e C o m m u n is ts w a s n o w m o s t u n lik e ly a n d re c o m m e n d e d th e c e s s a tio n of m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . A rm y officials s u s ta in e d h is v ie w s. G e n e ra l R ay T. M a d d o c k s, W e d e m e y e r's su c c e ss o r as d ire c ­ to r of P& O , d e c la re d th a t f u r th e r e ffo rts to h e lp th e N a tio n a lis ts w o u ld o n ly p u t a rm s in to C o m m u n is t h a n d s . R oyall, w h o w a s to u rin g E ast A sia, c a b le d fro m Ja p a n th a t " a n y m ilita ry a id n o w d e liv e re d to C h in a w o u ld e ith e r g o im m e d ia te ly to th e C o m m u n is ts o r w o u ld b e so a p p lie d o r m is a p p lie d b y officials of th e N a tio n a lis t G o v e rn m e n t th a t it m ig h t w ell re a c h a n ti-d e m o c ra tic fo rc e s in o r o u ts id e of C h in a ." O n 4 F e b ru a ry 1949 T ru m a n a p p ro v e d a n N S C re c o m m e n d a tio n th a t h e s to p th e flo w of m ilita ry s u p p lie s to th e N a tio n a lis ts a fte r c o n s u ltin g w ith th e le a d e rs of th e c o n g re s s io n a l fo re ig n affairs c o m m itte e s .137 T h e le g isla to rs, ho w ev er, s tro n g ly o p p o s e d th e s u s p e n s io n of m ili-

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 195 ta r y a id to C h in a . V a n d e n b e rg m a d e a n im p a s s io n e d s p e e c h a g a in s t th e N S C re c o m m e n d a tio n . "If w e ta k e this s te p at this fate fu lly in e p t m o m e n t, " h e p le a d e d , " w e sh a ll n e v e r b e ab le to s h a k e off th e c h a rg e th a t we a re th e o n e s w h o g av e p o o r C h in a th e fin al p u s h in to d isa ster. . . . I b e g of y o u , a t th e v e ry le a st, to p o s tp o n e a n y s u c h d e c isio n fo r a fe w m o re w e e k s u n til th e C h in a q u e s tio n is s e ttle d by China a n d in China a n d n o t b y th e American government in Washington. T h is b lo o d m u s t n o t b e o n our h a n d s ." 138 V a n d e n b e rg 's a p p e a l w a s d ecisiv e. T he T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n still h a d n o d e sire to p re c ip ita te a frac tio u s, p u b lic d e b a te o v e r a id to C h in a o r to a n ta g o n iz e V a n d e n b e rg , w h o se c o o p e ra tio n w a s e s s e n tia l fo r re n e w a l of th e M a rsh a ll P la n a n d a p p ro v a l o f th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty. T h re e d a y s later, T ru m a n d e c id e d a g a in s t th e s u s p e n s io n o f a rm s s h ip m e n ts b u t o rd e re d th e p a c e of d e liv e rie s slo w e d . D u rin g th e s p r in g of 1949, A m e ric a n s u p p lie s —n o w a sy m b o l of fu tility ra th e r th a n fid e lity to a fo rm e r w a rtim e p a r t n e r tric k le d in to C h in a as th e v e s tig e s of N a tio n a lis t p o w e r w e re d riv e n fro m th e m a in la n d .139

I 'v e b e e n b a d ly m is ta k e n in C h in e s e g o v e rn m e n ts ," T ru m a n re ­ fle c te d in N o v e m b e r 1951. " W h e n I b e c a m e P re s id e n t of th e U n ite d S ta te s I th o u g h t C h ia n g K a i-sh ek 's G o v e rn m e n t w a s o n th e ro a d to a re a l re fo rm g o v e rn m e n t in C h in a . I f o u n d b y e x p e rie n c e th a t it w a s th e m o s t c o r r u p t a n d te rrib le g o v e rn m e n t th a t C h in a e v e r h a d ." 140 M o re th a n tw o y e a rs earlier, d u rin g th e fin a l m o n th s of th e civil w ar, T ru m a n fix ed th e b la m e fo r th e N a tio n a lis t d e fe a t o n th e " g ra fte rs a n d c ro o k s" in C h ia n g 's r u lin g circle w h o h a d n o in te re s t in th e n e e d s of th e C h i­ n e s e m a s s e s . H e to ld D a v id E. L ilie n th a l, th e c h a irm a n of th e A tom ic E n e rg y C o m m is sio n , th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d g iv e n th e N a tio n a lis ts $2.5 b illio n in a id sin c e W o rld W ar II, a n d " I'll b e t y o u th a t a b illio n d o lla rs of it is in N e w York b a n k s to d a y ." 141 B e h in d th is e x a s p e ra tio n w a s a fe e lin g s h a r e d b y m o s t of T ru m a n 's s e n io r fo re ig n p o licy a d ­ v ise rs: C h ia n g h a d lo st th e civil w a r b e c a u se of h is in a b ility to g o v e rn . A lth o u g h T ru m a n s p o k e b itte rly of C h ia n g , h e d id n o t th in k th a t th e g e n e ra lis s im o 's fa ilu re h a d g re a tly h a rm e d A m e ric a n s e c u rity in te re s ts in A sia . T ru m a n m e a s u r e d e v e n ts in C h in a a g a in s t th e la rg e r s ta n d a rd of c o n ta in in g S o v iet e x p a n s io n a n d a c c e p te d M a rsh a ll's c o n c lu sio n th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d little to g a in a n d m u c h to lo se b y m a k in g a m a jo r e ffo rt to s u s ta in th e N a tio n a lis ts . C o n sc io u s of th e lim its of

196 • Arming the Free World A m e ric a n pow er, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o n c e n tra te d its re so u rc e s in s te a d o n m e e tin g C o m m u n is t c h a lle n g e s in th e m o re im p o rta n t th e ­ a te rs of E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E ast, w h ile re ly in g te m p o ra rily o n a d e fe n siv e p e rim e te r in th e isla n d s of th e W este rn Pacific to p ro te c t A m e ric a n se c u rity in te re s ts in E ast A s ia .142 In th e lo n g r u n , T ru m an h e ld o u t h o p e th a t frictio n b e tw e e n th e S oviets a n d th e C h in e s e C o m m u n ists w o u ld allow th e U n ite d S ta te s to re b u ild its in flu e n c e o n th e m a in la n d . "T h e d ra g o n is g o in g to tu r n over," h e to ld L ilien th al, " a n d a fte r th a t p e rh a p s som e a d v a n c e s c a n b e m a d e o u t of it." 143 N o t all g o v e rn m e n t officials s h a r e d th e s e v ie w s. M ilita ry le a d e rs in p a rtic u la r w o r r ie d th a t th e S o v ie ts h a d g a in e d a m a jo r v ic to ry in A sia th a t w o u ld s tr e n g th e n th e ir p o s itio n in E u ro p e . B ut th is fe a r s u g g e s te d th e e x te n t to w h ic h th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t a c tu a lly a c c e p te d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's a s s e s s m e n t of A m e ric a n in te re s ts in C h in a . T he se rv ic e s u r g e d a s tr o n g e r c o m m itm e n t to C h ia n g n o t b e c a u se th e y c o n s id e re d C h in a m o re im p o r ta n t to A m e ric a n s e c u rity th a n W e ste rn E u ro p e o r th e N e a r E a s t—in d e e d th e y th o u g h t ju s t th e o p p o s ite —b u t b e c a u se th e y b e lie v e d th a t limited m ilita ry a id c o u ld p re v e n t a C o m m u ­ n is t victory. W h e n it b e c a m e cle ar th a t th e N a tio n a lis ts ' d a y s w e re n u m b e r e d , th e Jo in t C h ie fs s u p p o r te d c o n tin u e d a s s is ta n c e o n ly to d e la y th e C o m m u n is t tr iu m p h a n d d e m o n s tra te A m e ric a n re s o lu tio n to frie n d ly n a tio n s in E u ro p e a n d th e N e a r E ast, n o t to sav e C h ia n g fro m d e fe a t. E v e n th e N a tio n a lis ts ' w a rm e s t s u p p o r te r s w ith in th e a d m in is tra tio n d id n o t th in k th a t A m e ric a n in te re s ts ju s tifie d a ll-o u t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . R ather, th e critical is s u e o v e r w h ic h p o lic y m a k e rs d iv id e d w a s A m e ric a n capacity, w ith in lim ite d m e a n s , to in flu e n c e e v e n ts in C h in a . T he p ro v is io n of a rm s to C h in a a lso re v e a le d th e d iffic u lties of u s in g m ilita ry a id to fo rtify A m e ric a n cred ib ility . E v e n th o se p o lic y m a k e rs w h o fe a re d ex cessiv e in v o lv e m e n t in th e C h in e s e civil w a r b e lie v e d th a t c o n tin u e d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to th e N a tio n a lis ts w a s a n im p o rta n t m e a s u re of A m e ric a n d e p e n d a b ility , o n e th a t frie n d s a n d allies a ro u n d th e w o rld w o u ld u s e to g a u g e A m e ric a n d e te rm in a tio n to c o n ta in C o m m u n is t e x p a n s io n is m . B ecau se of th e c o n c e rn a b o u t A m e ric a n cred ibility, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id n o t h a lt d e liv e rie s of a rm s to C h ia n g e v e n a fte r th e N S C c o n c lu d e d th a t m o re m a te rie l w o u ld n o lo n g e r h e lp h is a rm ie s a v e rt d e fe a t. C o n g re s s io n a l in v o lv e m e n t—n o o th e r m ilita ry a id p r o g r a m h a d s u c h s tr o n g a n d v o c ife ro u s s u p p o r t o n C a p ito l H ill—m e a n t th a t a rm s a id to C h in a c o u ld trig g e r a n ex p lo siv e

Dilemma o f Aid to China • 197 p o litical d e b a te th a t m ig h t w e a k e n fo re ig n c o n fid e n c e in A m e ric a n re so lv e . Its sy m b o lic im p o rta n c e , th e n , m a d e m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to C h in a e x tre m e ly h a r d to c o n tro l. A lth o u g h th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p re v a ile d o v e r its b u re a u c ra tic riv als, M a rsh a ll n e v e r so lv e d th e d ile m m a of a id to C h in a . H e a v o id e d th e u n e n d in g , s te p -b y -s te p in v o lv e m e n t in th e C h in e s e civil w a r th a t h e so c o n s ta n tly d re a d e d , b u t h e n e v e r p u b lic ly e x p la in e d th e d a n g e rs of c o m m itm e n t to th e N a tio n a lis ts . O n ly a d e te rm in e d e ffo rt to in fo rm th e p u b lic th a t e v e n ts in C h in a w e re b e y o n d A m e ric a n c o n tro l m ig h t h a v e le s s e n e d th e w id e s p re a d c o n fu s io n th a t fe d th e b e lie f th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s re s p o n s ib le fo r C h ia n g 's d o w n fa ll.144 B ut M a rsh a ll a n d T ru m a n e x p licitly re je c te d th is c o u rse , a n d C h ia n g 's d ie -h a rd s u p ­ p o r te r s , tu r n in g th e rh e to ric o f th e T ru m a n D o c trin e a g a in s t th e a d m in ­ is tra tio n , c la m o re d in 1949 fo r a la s t-d itc h e ffo rt to p r e v e n t a C o m m u ­ n is t victory. D e s p ite h is to r tu o u s e ffo rts, M a rsh a ll b y n o m e a n s s e ttle d th e is s u e of f u r th e r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to C h in a .

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program

71

The effect of the assum ed military assistance program would be primarily psychological. —Central Intelligence Agency, 24 February 1949

6 O c to b e r 1949 P re s id e n t H a r r y S. T ru m a n s ig n e d in to law th e M u tu a l D e fe n se A s s is ta n c e A ct (M D A A ), a la n d m a r k in th e d e v e lo p ­ m e n t of a rm s a id as a m a jo r in s tr u m e n t of c o n ta in m e n t. T h e first g lo b al m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n sin c e le n d -le a se , th e M D A A a u th o riz e d $1,314 b illio n to a rm th ir te e n c o u n trie s a n d e m p o w e re d th e p r e s id e n t to sell m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to o th e r n a tio n s th a t jo in e d th e U n ite d S ta te s in d e fe n siv e a llia n c e s a n d re g io n a l a rr a n g e m e n ts . M o st a id w e n t to s ig n a to rie s of th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, b u t G re e c e , Turkey, Ira n , K o rea, a n d th e P h ilip p in e s a lso re c e iv e d g ra n ts of e q u ip m e n t, as d id re c ip ie n ts in th e " g e n e ra l a re a " of C h in a , th r o u g h th e u se of a n u n v o u c h e re d p r e s id e n tia l e m e rg e n c y f u n d . T h e M D A A fin ally c o r­ re c te d th e im b a la n c e b e tw e e n th e a d m in is tra tio n 's d e sire a n d its c a p a b ility to p ro v id e m ilita ry a ssista n c e , a d is p a rity th a t h a d h a m p e r e d fo re ig n p o licy p la n n e r s sin c e 1947. T h e n e w law, in sh o rt, w a s th e c u lm in a tio n of a tw o -y e a r e ffo rt to e s ta b lis h " a u n ifie d , c o h e siv e m ili­ ta ry a id p ro g ra m " th a t c o u ld ra ise th e m o ra le of frie n d ly n a tio n s a n d d e m o n s tra te A m e ric a n re so lv e to re s is t th e e x p a n s io n of C o m m u n is t p o w e r.1 A lth o u g h th e M D A A m e t m a n y of T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's p r e s s in g n e e d s , it left u n re s o lv e d so m e critical p ro b le m s . A d m in is tra ­ tio n officials a d m itte d th a t th e $1 b illio n re s e rv e d fo r th e N o rth A tlan tic allies c o n s titu te d in te rim a s s is ta n c e , b u t th e y h a d d e te rm in e d n e ith e r th e d u ra tio n n o r th e u ltim a te o b jec tiv e of s u c h h elp . In W e ste rn E u ro p e as w ell as in o th e r c o u n trie s th a t re c e iv e d A m e ric a n a rm s , M D A A p la n n e r s h o p e d to stiffe n th e w ill to re s is t C o m m u n is t p r e s s u r e s . B ut th e y lac k ed relia b le m e th o d s of d e te rm in in g w h e th e r A m e ric a n a id c o u ld a c tu a lly a ch ie v e th a t g o a l o r h o w m u c h a id m ig h t b e n e c e ssa ry . In

198

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

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its z e a l to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d ig n o re d th e q u e s tio n th a t o n e c o n c e rn e d official h a d ra is e d : "If w e o n c e ta k e o n th e o b lig a tio n , e s ta b lis h th e p re c e d e n t, w h e re d o w e w in d u p ? " 2

F o r tif ie d b y th e N S C re c o m m e n d a tio n in Ju ly 1948 to se e k n e w m ili­ ta r y a id le g isla tio n " a t th e e a rlie st feasib le tim e ," a rm y officials p r e s s e d fo r th e s u b m is s io n of a bill to C o n g re s s . In S e p te m b e r S e c re ta ry of th e A rm y K e n n e th C . Royall a s k e d S e c re ta ry of D e fe n se Jam es V. F o rre sta l to c o n s u lt w ith S e c re ta ry of S ta te G e o rg e C . M a rsh a ll a b o u t callin g a sp e c ia l s e s s io n of C o n g re s s fo r th a t p u r p o s e . B ecau se su c h a c tio n w a s o u t of th e q u e s tio n w ith n a tio n a l e le c tio n s less th a n tw o m o n th s away, F o rre sta l r e p lie d th a t e n a c tm e n t of g e n e ra l m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n w o u ld b e th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t's h ig h e s t p rio rity w h e n th e E ig h ty -first C o n g re s s c o n v e n e d in J a n u a ry 1949. T h is d e c isio n d id n o t sa tisfy G e n e ra l H e n r y C . A u r a n d , th e d ire c to r of a rm y lo g istics, w h o c o n tin u e d to c o m p la in th a t d e la y s in d e v e lo p in g a n o v erall m ili­ ta r y a id p r o g r a m w ith s u p p o r tin g le g isla tio n a n d a p p ro p ria tio n s w e re " ru in in g o u r o w n m a te ria l s itu a tio n ." A rm y p la n n e r s , h o w ev er, o n c e a g a in re je c te d A u ra n d 's a p p e a l fo r a m o ra to riu m o n fo re ig n m ilita ry a id u n til th e C o n g re s s a c te d . A lth o u g h they, to o , w e re im p a tie n t fo r th e p a s s a g e of a n a rm s bill, th e y b e lie v e d th a t o c c a sio n a l p ro v is io n of m o d e s t a m o u n ts of a rm a m e n ts , s u c h a s th e re c e n t r e e q u ip m e n t of th r e e F re n c h d iv is io n s fro m A m e ric a n sto c k s in G e rm a n y , s e rv e d b o th th e a rm y 's a n d th e n a tio n 's in te r e s ts .3 W h ile n e w le g isla tio n p ro m is e d to e a se th e a rm y 's s u p p ly p r o b ­ le m s, it a lso ra is e d th e tro u b lin g is s u e of th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n d o m e s tic m ilita ry n e e d s a n d fo re ig n a id . T h e Jo in t C h ie fs of S taff first e x p re s s e d th e ir c o n c e rn a b o u t th is m a tte r in th e s p r in g of 1948 w h e n th e a d m in is tra tio n b e g a n to c o n s id e r a rm s a id to th e W e ste rn U n io n . A lth o u g h re c o g n iz in g th e d e s ira b ility of s u c h a s s is ta n c e , th e serv ice le a d e rs m a in ta in e d th a t " its e x te n t m u s t b e lim ite d b y th e n e c e s s ity fo r a v o id in g b o th u n d u e re d u c tio n of re s o u rc e s e s s e n tia l to o u r n a tio n a l s e c u rity a n d u n d u e in te rfe re n c e w ith o u r o w n m ilita ry re q u ire m e n ts ." D e te rm in e d to p re s e rv e th e fre e d o m in th e e v e n t of w a r to r e s p o n d at p la c e s of th e ir c h o o sin g , th e y a lso c a u tio n e d th a t m ilita ry a id d e c isio n s s h o u ld n e v e r b e " d ic ta te d b y fo re ig n d e m a n d ra th e r th a n a p p r o p r i­ a te n e s s to stra te g ic p la n s ." H o w e v e r m u c h th e W e ste rn E u ro p e a n s w a n te d to h o ld th e R h in e a g a in s t a S o v iet in v a s io n , s u c h a d e fe n s e —at

200 • Arming the Free World le a st in th e s h o rt r u n —a p p e a r e d im p o s sib le to th e Jo in t C h ie fs. S erv ice le a d e rs a lso w e re c o n c e rn e d th a t la rg e e x p e n d itu re s o n fo re ig n a id m ig h t b rin g a c u t in d e fe n se a p p ro p ria tio n s , a p ro s p e c t th e y v ie w e d w ith g e n u in e a la rm . B ecau se of th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' w o rrie s , th e N S C c o n c lu d e d th a t th e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s h o u ld n e ith e r je o p a r­ d iz e th e m in im u m m a te ria l re q u ir e m e n ts of th e a rm e d fo rce s n o r b e in c o n s is te n t w ith A m e ric a n stra te g ic p la n s .4 E v e n th e s e a s s u ra n c e s d id n o t re lie v e th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' a n x ie tie s, h o w ev er. G e n e ra l H o y t S. V a n d e n b e rg , th e a ir fo rce c h ie f of staff, w ro te in Ju ly th a t c u r r e n t b u d g e t re s tric tio n s w o u ld n o t p e rm it b o th s u b s ta n ­ tial re a r m a m e n t a n d a n e x te n siv e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m a n d a s k e d fo r a s tu d y o f h o w b e s t to sa tisfy th e s e c o m p e tin g re q u ire m e n ts . T h e Jo in t S tra te g ic S u rv e y C o m m itte e p ro m p tly r e p o r te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s s h o u ld re s tric t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to a m o u n ts th a t d id n o t in te rfe re w ith d o m e stic r e a rm a m e n t. V a n d e n b e rg c ritic iz e d th is s tu d y fo r fa ilin g to re c o m m e n d lim its o n th e s e rv ic e s' re s e rv e sto c k s. So d id G e n e ra l O m a r N. B radley, th e a rm y 's c h ie f of staff, w h o also w a r n e d th a t " it w o u ld s e e m a g re a t m is ta k e to c o n c e n tra te o u r e n tire re s o u rc e s o n a U n ite d S ta te s r e a r m a m e n t p r o g r a m in th e b e lie f th a t s u c h a c tio n a lo n e w ill c o n trib u te m o s t to o u r n a tio n a l secu rity ." T he Jo in t C h ie fs e v e n tu a lly d e c id e d in e a rly 1949 th a t th e y w o u ld c o n s id e r e a c h r e q u e s t fo r a s s is ta n c e o n its o w n m e rits . A g re e in g in p rin c ip le th a t m ilita ry a id c o u ld c o n trib u te to A m e ric a n secu rity , th e y re m a in e d u n c e r ta in a b o u t h o w to b a la n c e s u c h h e lp a g a in s t d o m e stic n e e d s .5 A lso tro u b lin g th e Jo in t C h ie fs w a s th e p o te n tia l sc o p e of a w o rld ­ w id e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m . T h ey fo u n d e sp e c ia lly d is tre s s in g a d ra ft r e p o r t o n m ilita ry a id p rio ritie s p r e p a r e d b y th e S ta te -A rm y N av y -A ir Force C o o rd in a tin g C o m m itte e in A u g u s t 1948. T he SA N A C C d e c la re d elig ib le fo r A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id a lm o st e v e ry n o n -C o m m u n is t c o u n tr y —a to ta l of fifty -n in e n a tio n s —a lth o u g h it re c o m m e n d e d s u b s ta n tia l a s s is ta n c e to o n ly th e five n a tio n s of th e W e ste rn U n io n a n d C a n a d a . T h e Jo in t C h ie fs w e re a g h a s t at th e b r e a d th a n d m a g n itu d e of th e s e p o te n tia l o b lig a tio n s a n d u r g e d th e m o s t c a re fu l c o n s id e ra tio n of " o u r n a tio n a l fin a n c ia l a n d in d u s tria l lim ita tio n s a n d o u r o w n m ilita ry re q u ir e m e n ts b e fo re specific d e c isio n s a re m a d e ." T h ey a lso r e m in d e d th e S A N A C C th a t " lim ite d m ilita ry a id m a y w ell p ro v e d ifficu lt to lim it o n c e it h a s b e e n b e g u n a n d . . . to k e n a id , b y d e fin itio n , b e a rs to th e re c ip ie n t th e im p lic a tio n of m o re to com e." It w a s p re c ise ly to av o id a d iffu s io n o f A m e ric a n a id o v e rs e a s a n d to re s to re a b a la n c e b e tw e e n

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c o m m itm e n ts a n d re s o u rc e s th a t m o s t m ilita ry le a d e rs c h a m p io n e d n e w le g isla tio n a n d a c o n s o lid a tio n of th e m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e p ro g ra m . T h ese g o a ls r e m a in e d p r e e m in e n t in th e ir th in k in g , a n d d u rin g th e p la n n in g c o n fe re n c e s in la te 1948 a n d e a rly 1949 m ilita ry officials c o n tin u e d to u rg e c a u tio n a n d r e s tra in t in s e n d in g a rm s a b ro a d as w ell as im p ro v e d m ilita ry r e a d in e s s —p a rtic u la rly th e m o b iliz a tio n of in d u s ­ t r y —to s u p p o r t fo re ig n c o m m itm e n ts .6 O fficials in th e B u re a u of th e B u d g e t a lso f r e tte d a b o u t th e o v erex ­ te n s io n of th e n a tio n 's re s o u rc e s . T he r e a s o n fo r th e ir c o n c e rn w a s th e c o n s u m m a tio n in Ju ly 1948 of a n a g re e m e n t to p ro v id e $10 m illio n in s u r p lu s a rm a m e n ts to Ira n . T he T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d p ro m is e d th is m a te rie l in N o v e m b e r 1946 w h e n Ira n ia n tro o p s m a rc h e d in to A z e rb a ija n , b u t d iffic u ltie s in a rra n g in g fo r p a y m e n t h e ld u p delivery, a n d b y th e s u m m e r of 1948, so m e 60 p e rc e n t o f th e e q u ip m e n t w a s n o lo n g e r s u r p lu s . B u d g e t officials re lu c ta n tly a u th o riz e d th e tra n s fe r of th e s e s u p p lie s w h e n U n d e r S e c re ta ry of S ta te R o b e rt A . L o v ett in v o k e d o v e rrid in g p o litica l c o n s id e ra tio n s , b u t th e y w e re n o n e th e le s s d is ­ tu r b e d b y " th e c u r r e n t p ie c e m e a l b a sis" of fo re ig n m ilita ry a id b e c a u se it w a s b o th e x p e n s iv e a n d in e ffic ie n t. "U n til th e in d iv id u a l p ro p o s a ls c a n b e d e a lt w ith as p a r ts of a n o v e r-a ll p r o g r a m ," B u d g e t D ire c to r Jam es E. W ebb w a r n e d L o v ett, " w e r u n a re a l risk n o t o n ly of u n w a r ­ r a n te d c o sts a n d le ss th a n m a x im u m e m p lo y m e n t of o u r d e fe n se re s o u rc e s , b u t a lso of m a k in g c o m m itm e n ts w e c a n n o t m e e t." 7 A lth o u g h L o v ett a c c e p te d th e n e e d fo r sy s te m a tic p la n n in g , o th e r p o litical officials c o n s id e re d p ro m p t a c tio n to ra ise m o ra le o v e rs e a s far m o re im p o r ta n t. In Ju ly 1948, s h o rtly a fte r ta k in g u p h is d u tie s as T ru m a n 's sp e c ia l re p re s e n ta tiv e in E u ro p e fo r M a rsh a ll P la n affairs, W. A verell H a r r im a n c a b le d fro m P aris th a t th e " a p p e a s e m e n t p sy c h o l­ o g y " w a s " n o t d e e p ly b u rie d , " a n d so , " s tr e n g th e n in g th e w ill to re s ist in E u ro p e s h o u ld b e f u n d a m e n ta l in o u r p o licy th r o u g h th e c o m in g m o n th s ." E sse n tia l to th is o b jec tiv e , h e b e lie v e d , w a s th e e a rly d e liv e ry of A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts . H a r r im a n in s is te d th a t T ru m a n a u th o riz e th e s e s h ip m e n ts w ith o u t a w a itin g th e p a s s a g e of le g isla tio n a n d p ro m ­ ise d th a t th e effect o n E u ro p e a n p u b lic o p in io n w o u ld b e " in s p irin g ." T h e m ilita ry v a lu e of th e s e tra n s fe rs w a s " n o t im p o rta n t." W h a t m a t­ te re d , a c c o rd in g to H a rrim a n , w a s a p u b lic d e m o n s tra tio n of A m e ric a n re s o lv e —" th a t w e m e a n b u s in e s s w h e n w e say th e ir s e c u rity is o u r se c u rity ."8 In c o n v e rs a tio n w ith F o rre sta l d u rin g th e a u tu m n , h e re c o m ­ m e n d e d o n c e a g a in im m e d ia te m ilita ry a id to ra ise m o ra le in F ra n ce ,

202 • Arming the Free World th e c o u n tr y h e c o n s id e re d th e p o litical a n d m ilita ry k e y s to n e of W est­ e r n E u ro p e . H a r r im a n d id n o t fe a r th a t th e r e a r m a m e n t of W e ste rn E u ro p e w o u ld in te rfe re w ith th e M a rs h a ll P la n . R ather, h e th o u g h t th a t m ilita ry a id w o u ld in s p ire th e c o n fid e n c e e s s e n tia l to e co n o m ic reco v ­ ery. W ith o u t " ta n g ib le s u p p o r t fo r [the] W e ste rn U n io n in th e se c u rity a n d m ilita ry fie ld ," h e w ro te to L o v e tt o n 12 N o v e m b er, " th e su c c e ss of E R P w ill b e je o p a r d iz e d ." 9 M a rsh a ll, to o , s tr e s s e d th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l effects of m ilita ry a s s is ­ ta n c e o n W e ste rn E u ro p e a n s w h o w e re " c o m p le te ly o u t of th e ir sk in , a n d s ittin g o n th e ir n e rv e s ." H e th o u g h t th a t it w a s im p e ra tiv e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s e a se th e s e a n x ie tie s, a n d to k e n s h ip m e n ts w o u ld h a v e a n " e le c trify in g " effect, p a rtic u la rly if a c c o m p a n ie d b y th e p r o p e r p u b ­ licity.10 O n e m o n th la te r M a rsh a ll re ite r a te d to F o rre sta l th e im p o r­ ta n c e of g e ttin g w e a p o n s to th e E u ro p e a n s , p a rtic u la rly th e F re n c h , a n d c ritic iz e d th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t fo r w o r r y in g to o m u c h a b o u t b a la n c e d s e ts of e q u ip m e n t fo r g ro u n d fo rc e s. So g re a t w a s h is fa ith in m ilita ry a id as a m e a n s of ra is in g m o ra le th a t M a rsh a ll all b u t ig n o re d F re n c h m ilita ry re q u ire m e n ts . E v e n th o u g h th e F re n c h u rg e n tly n e e d e d h e a v y e q u ip m e n t, h e s u g g e s te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o n c e n ­ tra te o n p r o v id in g th e m sm a ll a rm s —w e a p o n s th e y w o u ld " p u t in th e ir h a n d s " —sin c e s u c h ite m s w o u ld d o m o re to w a rd " c re a tin g th e sp irit a n d w ill o f r e s is ta n c e ." 11 M a rsh a ll a n d H a r r im a n w e re so c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e w ill to re s is t b e c a u se o n c e a g a in F ra n c e w a s in th e th ro e s of p o litica l a n d eco n o m ic crisis. D e sp ite sig n ific a n t in c re a s e s in th e p r o d u c tio n of b a sic in d u s tria l c o m m o d itie s in e a rly 1948, n e w in fla tio n a ry p r e s s u r e s trig g e re d acri­ m o n io u s d is p u te s o v e r w a g e s, p ric e s, a n d g o v e rn m e n t s p e n d in g . T h e se e co n o m ic a n d fin a n c ia l d iffic u lties b r o u g h t d o w n th e m id d le -o fth e -ro a d g o v e rn m e n t of P rim e M in is te r R o b e rt S c h u m a n in m id -Ju ly a n d th r e a te n e d th e n e w c o a litio n re g im e h e a d e d b y H e n ri Q u e u ille . A m e ric a n o b s e rv e rs w o rrie d th a t, if th e F re n c h C e n te r fa ile d to h o ld , a rig h tis t g o v e rn m e n t h e a d e d b y G e n e ra l C h a rle s D e G a u lle m ig h t ta k e p o w e r a n d p lu n g e F ra n c e in to e v e n g re a te r tu rm o il. Jo h n D. H ick ers o n , th e d ire c to r of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs, d e rid e d D e G a u lle fo r p ro c la im in g a "m y stic a l (a n d illu so ry ) id e a of F ra n c e as a g re a t p o w e r" a n d h a v in g " n o re a l p ro g ra m ." U s in g a sn id e , se x ist sim ile, H ic k e rs o n s n e e r e d , " H e ta lk s a b o u t e co n o m ic s as a w o m a n ta lk s a b o u t c a rb u re to rs ." A n e v e n m o re o b je c tio n a b le a lte r­ n a tiv e w a s th e C o m m u n is t p a rty , w h ic h s te p p e d u p th e p r e s s u r e o n th e

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Q u e u ille g o v e rn m e n t in th e a u tu m n b y o rg a n iz in g d e m o n s tra tio n s a n d a strik e in th e critical c o a l-m in in g in d u stry . M a rsh a ll, H a rrim a n , a n d o th e r A m e ric a n o b s e rv e rs b e lie v e d th a t th e C o m m u n is ts in te n d e d to w re a k h av o c in th e F re n c h econom y, s a b o ta g e th e E u ro p e a n R eco v ery P ro g ra m , a n d fo rce th e ir r e tu r n to p o w e r.12 N e v e rth e le s s , th e F re n c h crisis, a c c o rd in g to A m e ric a n e x p e rts , h a d d e e p e r c a u se s th a n in fla tio n o r C o m m u n is t a g ita tio n . A lso c o n trib u t­ in g to th e c u r r e n t tu rm o il w e re p ro b le m s e n d e m ic to F re n c h society. S in c e th e la te n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , th e F re n c h p o litical s y s te m h a d c o n s is te d of a w e lte r of c o m p e tin g p a rtie s , a n d th e c u rr e n t c o n s titu ­ tio n , H ic k e rs o n a s s e r te d , m a d e it " v e ry d iffic u lt to h a v e a n y sta b le g o v e rn m e n t." H ic k e rs o n th o u g h t th a t th is s y s te m of p o litics re fle c te d th e v a lu e s of th e F re n c h p e o p le , w h o w e re " te m p e ra m e n ta lly se lfish , in d iv id u a listic a n d re lu c ta n t to c o o p e ra te w ith a n y o n e ." A m b a s s a d o r Je ffe rs o n C a ffe ry a lso b e lie v e d th a t th e crisis of 1948 a ro s e in p a rt fro m a lo n g - s ta n d in g social p r o b le m —c o n flict b e tw e e n th e m id d le a n d w o rk in g c la sse s o v e r th e ir fa ir s h a re o f n a tio n a l w e a lth . C affery a n d H ic k e rs o n a g re e d th a t A m e ric a n a id c o u ld a llev ia te F re n c h fin a n c ia l a n d e co n o m ic d iffic u ltie s. T h ey a lso re c o g n iz e d , h o w ev er, th a t " th e re is little a n y o n e o u ts id e of F ra n c e c a n d o to w a rd o b ta in in g a F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t in w h ic h a n y o n e c a n h a v e c o n fid e n c e ." 13 B ecau se of th e ir e x a s p e ra tio n w ith F re n c h p o litical in stab ility , h o w ­ ever, H ic k e rs o n a n d o th e r S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials n e v e rth e le s s p r o ­ p o s e d to u s e th e th r e a t o f a re d u c tio n in M a rsh a ll P la n a id to h a s te n th e fo rm a tio n o f a g o v e rn m e n t s tr o n g e n o u g h to so lv e F ra n ce 's eco n o m ic p ro b le m s . H ic k e rs o n a s s e r te d th a t th e tim e h a d co m e to in fo rm th e F re n c h th a t, u n le s s th e y s ta r te d m a k in g m o re p ro g re s s to w a rd th e g o a ls e s ta b lis h e d b y th e E co n o m ic C o o p e ra tio n A d m in is tra tio n , th e C o n g re s s w o u ld c u t b a c k o n F re n c h a llo c a tio n s w h e n th e E R P c am e u p fo r re n e w a l in s p r in g 1949. H ic k e rs o n c a u tio n e d th a t a n y s u c h w a rn in g w o u ld h a v e to b e d e liv e re d m o s t c a re fu lly le st th e F re n c h , " in th e ir p r e s e n t s ta te of jitte rs , . . . m e re ly th ro w u p th e ir h a n d s a n d g ive u p ." H e n ry R. L a b o u isse , Jr., th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's c o o rd in a to r of fo re ig n a id a n d a s s is ta n c e , a d v o c a te d e v e n s tr o n g e r a c tio n . H e re c o m m e n d e d im m e d ia te n o tific a tio n to all le a d e rs of F re n c h n o n -C o m m u n is t p a rtie s th a t th e a llo c a tio n of M a rsh a ll P la n f u n d s —e v e n th o se a lre a d y a u th o ­ r iz e d —w o u ld d e p e n d o n w h e th e r th e F re n c h g o v e rn m e n t u n d e rto o k n e c e s s a ry m e a s u re s to c o n tro l e co n o m ic p ro b le m s . H a rrim a n , C affery, a n d D a v id K. E. B ru ce, th e c h ie f of th e E C A m is s io n , b e lie v e d F ra n ce

204 • Arming the Free World w a s a b s o rb in g a n u n w a r r a n te d a m o u n t of A m e ric a n a id b e c a u se of its in a b ility to u n d e rta k e n e c e s s a ry m e a s u re s of e co n o m ic a n d fin a n c ia l self-h elp . B ut th e y in s is te d , a n d M a rs h a ll a g re e d , th a t " w e s h o u ld not at th is tim e lay it o n th e lin e w ith th e F re n c h p a r ty le a d e rs, " as L a b o u isse h a d s u g g e s te d .14 In s te a d , M a rs h a ll a n d H a r r im a n w a n te d to u s e p la n n e d a llo ca tio n s of e co n o m ic a id a n d th e p ro m is e of m ilita ry a id to re s to re th e c o n fi­ d e n c e o f F re n c h d e m o c ra tic fo rc e s a n d e n c o u ra g e th e ir c o o p e ra tio n w ith A m e ric a n p o litical, e co n o m ic , a n d m ilita ry p la n s . T h ey d e s ire d s u p p o r t fo r th e c re a tio n of a W est G e r m a n s ta te a n d its in te g ra tio n in to th e E u ro p e a n eco n o m y , g o a ls th a t n e c e ssa rily ra is e d F re n c h a p p r e h e n ­ sio n s. T h ey a lso w a n te d to c alm F re n c h fe a rs of b e in g " h e lp le s s p a w n s in a n im p e n d in g c o n flict b e tw e e n R u s s ia n a n d A m e ric a n ju g g e rn a u ts ." H a s te n in g th e p ro v is io n of a rm s a id , th e y re a s o n e d , w o u ld h e lp to c re a te a s e n s e of s e c u rity th a t w o u ld s tim u la te g re a te r F re n c h e ffo rts to c u rb in fla tio n a n d p ro m o te reco v ery . T h ey b e lie v e d th a t e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry a id s h o u ld b e u s e d as in c e n tiv e s " to in c re a s e F ra n c e 's selfc o n fid e n c e a n d th e F re n c h c o n fid e n c e in th e U S ." 15 M o reo v er, b o th M a rsh a ll a n d H a rrim a n b y th is tim e r e g a rd e d th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry a id as a sy m b o lic a c tio n w h o s e c o n s e q u e n c e s th e y m a y w ell h a v e e x a g g e ra te d o r m is c o n s tru e d . B oth b e lie v e d th a t E u ro ­ p e a n w ill to re s is t u ltim a te ly d e p e n d e d o n A m e ric a n a ctio n . B oth w o rrie d th a t, if th e U n ite d S ta te s a p p e a r e d irre s o lu te o r u n d e p e n d ­ ab le, a k in d of b a n d w a g o n effect w o u ld s w e e p W e ste rn E u ro p e , b rin g ­ in g e co n o m ic c h a o s, p o litical tu rm o il, a n d p e r h a p s C o m m u n is t sei­ z u re s of po w er. E v en th o u g h th e y h a d g o o d re a s o n s fo r s u c h fe a rs— a fte r all, th e W e ste rn E u ro p e a n s h a d is s u e d o m in o u s w a rn in g s in th e s p r in g o f 1948 w h ile a s k in g th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r m ilita ry c o m m itm e n ts a n d a rm a m e n ts —M a rsh a ll a n d H a rrim a n still s e e m e d u n d u ly a p p r e ­ h e n s iv e a b o u t A m e ric a n c re d ib ility w h e n th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s d e m o n s tra tin g its re so lv e b y p ro v id in g M a rsh a ll P la n a id , p a r ­ tic ip a tin g in n e g o tia tio n s fo r a N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, a n d c o n d u c tin g th e B erlin A irlift. T h ey a lso a s s u m e d th a t h ig h ly p u b lic iz e d , sy m b o lic tra n s fe rs of a rm a m e n ts w o u ld b e s e e n as g e s tu re s of a s s u ra n c e ra th e r th a n o m in o u s in d ic a tio n s of im p e n d in g c o n flict, as Ita lia n P rim e M in is­ te r A lcide d e G a s p e ri h a d w a r n e d w h e n h e a s k e d fo r th e p o s tp o n e m e n t of A m e ric a n a rm s d e liv e rie s o n th e e v e of h is c o u n try 's critical elec­ tio n s . B ut S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p o licy re fle c te d th e v ie w s of M a rsh a ll a n d H a rrim a n . A s L o v ett in fo rm e d th e la tte r at th e e n d o f 1948, "It is th e

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p sy c h o lo g ic a l effect [of aid ], ra th e r th a n th e in trin sic m ilita ry v a lu e , w h ic h is of p r im a r y im p o r ta n c e ." 16 T h e c o n c e rn s of b o th th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e N a tio n a l M ili­ ta r y E s ta b lis h m e n t s h a p e d d is c u s s io n s of m ilita ry a id w ith E u ro p e a n o fficials d u rin g th e la s t h a lf of 1948. T h ese c o n v e rsa tio n s p ro c e e d e d o n tw o fro n ts . In W a s h in g to n , S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials a n d r e p r e s e n ­ ta tiv e s of th e W e ste rn U n io n h e ld se c re t ta lk s, w h ic h y ie ld e d in S e p ­ te m b e r a w o rk in g p la n fo r th e n e g o tia tio n of a N o rth A tlan tic treaty . In L o n d o n , a n A m e ric a n d e le g a tio n p a rtic ip a te d in W e ste rn U n io n m ili­ ta r y d is c u s s io n s a im e d a t d e v is in g a n o v erall p la n fo r th e d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e . In b o th th e s e fo ru m s , E u ro p e a n s s tre s s e d th e ir im m e ­ d ia te n e e d fo r A m e ric a n a rm a m e n ts . H o w ev er, b o th L o v ett in W ash ­ in g to n a n d G e n e ra l L y m a n L. L e m n itz e r, th e A m e ric a n o b s e rv e r a t th e W e ste rn U n io n m ilita ry ta lk s in L o n d o n , m a d e cle ar th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s d e s ire d c o o rd in a te d ra th e r th a n p ie c e m e a l r e q u e s ts fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . L o v e tt e m p h a s iz e d th a t C o n g re s s w o u ld n o t s a n c tio n a c o stly g iv ea w a y p ro g ra m ; it w o u ld o n ly a p p ro v e o n e , b a s e d o n selfh e lp a n d m u tu a l a id , th a t in c re a s e d A m e ric a n secu rity . C h a rle s E. B o h le n , c o u n s e lo r of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, a d d e d th a t th e im m e d ia te p u r p o s e of th e s e collective m e a s u re s w a s to b o ls te r E u ro p e a n c o n fi­ d e n c e in th e fu tu r e , a c o n c lu s io n in w h ic h th e c o n fe re e s b a sica lly c o n c u r r e d .17 P ro b le m s a ro s e im m e d ia te ly in c a rry in g o u t th e s e p rin c ip le s, e sp e c ia lly w ith th e F re n c h . B e n t o n o b ta in in g A m e ric a n m ilita ry s u p ­ p lie s a n d a n x io u s a b o u t g e ttin g its s h a re of th e m , F ra n c e o p p o s e d th e in c lu s io n in a N o r th A tla n tic tre a ty of E u ro p e a n n a tio n s o th e r th a n th e p r e s e n t m e m b e rs of th e W e ste rn U n io n . In d e e d , th e F re n c h c o u ld n o t u n d e r s ta n d A m e ric a n c o n c e rn w ith a lo n g -ra n g e tre a ty a n d s u g g e s te d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s c o n c e n tra te in s te a d o n th e im m e d ia te r e e q u ip ­ m e n t o f th e fo rc e s of th e W e ste rn U n io n , e sp e c ia lly th e ir o w n . R e p e a t­ e d ly d u rin g th e s u m m e r a n d fall of 1948 th e y lo d g e d re q u e s ts , w h ic h w e re c o m p le te ly u n r e la te d to th e d e fe n se p la n s of th e W e ste rn U n io n , fo r m ilita ry a n d n a v a l a rm a m e n ts . B ecau se of th e crisis th a t fo llo w ed th e S o v iet b lo c k a d e of B erlin, T ru m a n in v o k e d h is p le n a r y p o w e rs to tra n s fe r A m e ric a n m u n itio n s to F re n c h o c c u p a tio n fo rce s in G erm an y , b u t at th e e n d of 1948 th e Jo in t C h ie fs d e c id e d th a t fu r th e r F re n c h r e q u e s ts s h o u ld b e c h a n n e le d th r o u g h th e W e ste rn U n io n . D e sp ite th e ir c o n c e rn o v e r F re n c h m o ra le , officials in S ta te 's O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs a lso b e c a m e im p a tie n t w ith w h a t th e y c o n s id e re d h ig h -h a n d e d

206 • Arming the Free World r e q u e s ts fo r p re fe re n tia l tr e a tm e n t in a rm s a id . H ic k e rs o n w ro te to C a ffe ry in e x a s p e ra tio n , "T h e F re n c h a re in o u r h a ir." 18 T h e W e ste rn U n io n 's r e q u e s t fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a lso fell s h o rt of A m e ric a n e x p e c ta tio n s . U n a b le to c o m p le te a c o o rd in a te d s u p p ly p la n in tim e fo r A m e ric a n officials to s tu d y it b e fo re th e n e x t s e s s io n of C o n g re s s , th e W e ste rn U n io n m ilita ry c o m m itte e in s te a d s u b m itte d in N o v e m b e r 1948 a r e q u e s t fo r h e lp in b rin g in g c u rr e n t m ilita ry u n its to fu ll s tr e n g th . T h is r e q u e s t w a s b a s e d n o t o n a d e ta ile d stra te g ic c o n c e p t b u t o n a b rie f s ta te m e n t of d e fe n se policy, th e o b je c t of w h ic h w a s " to c o n v in c e th e U .S .S .R . th a t w a r w o u ld n o t pay." M ilita ry a n a ly s ts q u ic k ly f o u n d th a t th e W e ste rn U n io n 's h a s tily d r a w n p la n n in g p a p e r s w e re " o b v io u s ly in c o m p le te " a n d g e a re d to w a rd n a tio n a l ra th e r th a n E u ro p e a n d e fe n s e . A s s u c h , th e y fa ile d to m e e t th e c rite ria th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs a n d th e N S C h a d e s ta b lis h e d th e p re v io u s su m m e r. B ut, b e c a u se of th e e n o rm o u s c o n c e rn a b o u t E u ro p e a n m o ra le , serv ice officials n e v e rth e le s s a g re e d to u s e th e W e ste rn U n io n 's in te rim s u p p ly p la n a s a b a s is fo r p r e p a r in g th e M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e P ro g ra m (M A P) th a t th e y s o o n p la n n e d to p la c e b e fo re C o n g r e s s .19 A t le a st in th e s h o rt r u n , th e n , th e s tric tu re s a b o u t c o o rd in a te d d e fe n se p la n n in g y ie ld e d to th e p o litical a n d p sy c h o lo g ic a l im p e ra tiv e s th a t ju s tifie d th e p ro v is io n of a rm s a id .

h a te v e r th e ir d iffe re n c e s o v e r fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e , p o litical a n d m ilita ry officials a g re e d b y th e e n d of 1948 th a t c e n tra liz e d p la n n in g w a s e s s e n tia l to th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a n o v e ra ll m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a c te d first, p u s h e d b y g e o g ra p h ic officers w h o c o m p la in e d th a t th e re w a s n o " c e n tra l p o in t in th e D e p a rtm e n t w h e re all a s p e c ts of th e m ilita ry a id le g isla tio n a re b e in g p u lle d to g e th e r." To re m e d y th is s itu a tio n , L o v ett n a m e d A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry E rn e s t A . G ro s s as c o o rd in a to r fo r fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m s . F o rre sta l s o o n a p p o in te d L e m n itz e r, w h o h a d r e tu r n e d fro m th e W e ste rn U n io n m ili­ ta ry ta lk s in L o n d o n , to h a n d le sim ila r re s p o n s ib ilitie s w ith in th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t. In J a n u a ry 1949 L e m n itz e r a n d G ro s s jo in e d A le x a n d e r I. H e n d e rs o n , th e g e n e ra l c o u n s e l of th e EC A , to fo rm th e F o re ig n A s s is ta n c e C o rre la tio n C o m m itte e (FACC), a w o rk in g g ro u p th a t to o k c h a rg e of s h a p in g th e M A P.20 T he c o m m itte e fa c e d a fo rm id a b le ta sk . To h is dism ay , L e m n itz e r fo u n d th a t a d m in is tra tio n p la n n e r s h a d c o n c e n tra te d o n g e n e ra l p rin -

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c ip le s ra th e r th a n specific c o u n tr y p ro g ra m s . T h e FACC, th e re fo re , h a d to w e ig h r e q u e s ts fo r a id fro m d o z e n s o f c o u n trie s a g a in s t A m e ric a n re s o u rc e s a n d s e c u rity in te re s ts a n d fu s e its re c o m m e n d a tio n s in to a c o m p re h e n s iv e , w o rld w id e p r o g r a m th a t m e t d e m a n d s fo r sy s te m a tic p la n n in g fro m C o n g re s s , th e a rm e d se rv ice s, a n d th e B u re au of th e B u d g e t. C o m p lic a tin g th e c o m m itte e 's w o rk w e re d iffe re n c e s b e tw e e n th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e se rv ice d e p a r tm e n ts , e sp e c ia lly o v e r s p o n s o r s h ip of th e a rm s le g isla tio n a n d a d m in is tra tiv e c o n tro l of th e M A P. A n d a d d e d to th e s e b u r d e n s w a s th e p r e s s u r e of tim e . A d m in ­ is tra tio n officials h o p e d to p r e s e n t th e M ilita ry A s sis ta n c e P ro g ra m a n d th e N o r th A tla n tic Treaty, th e n u n d e r n e g o tia tio n , to C o n g re s s b y th e m id d le of M a rc h 1949. B ecause of th e n e e d fo r h a s te , th e FACC c o n c e n tra te d n o t o n p ro d u c in g a n e w s e rie s of s tu d ie s b u t o n c o o rd i­ n a tin g , s y n th e s iz in g , a n d re c o n c ilin g th e p la n n in g p a p e rs of th e S ta te D e p a r tm e n t a n d th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t.21 B u d g e ta ry c o n s id e ra tio n s e x e rte d a p o w e rfu l in flu e n c e o n th e co m ­ m itte e 's d e lib e ra tio n s fro m th e s ta rt. T ru m a n w a s d e te rm in e d to ta k e a s tr o n g s ta n d a g a in s t th e S o v ie ts b u t still h o p e d to re s tric t a n d e v e n ­ tu a lly re d u c e s p e n d in g o n d e fe n s e a n d fo re ig n a id . T h e B u re a u of th e B u d g e t, th e re fo re , w a s w a ry of la rg e in c re a s e s in m ilita ry a ssista n c e a n d w a r n e d T ru m a n in N o v e m b e r 1948 th a t s u b s ta n tia l n e w e x p e n d i­ tu r e s , w ith o u t o ffs e ttin g ta x in c re a s e s , w o u ld d e e p e n th e p ro s p e c tiv e d eficit in fiscal y e a r 1950 a n d a g g ra v a te in fla tio n . C o n g re s s a lso w a s c o n c e rn e d a b o u t th e siz e of a n e w m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m , e sp e c ia lly sin c e th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n a lre a d y p la n n e d to s p e n d $4.5 b illio n o n M a rs h a ll P la n a id d u rin g th e c o m in g fiscal year. A w are of th e se p r e s s u r e s fo r eco n o m y , th e FACC se t a te n ta tiv e c e ilin g o n th e M A P of b e tw e e n $1.5 b illio n a n d $2 b illio n , th e m a x im u m a m o u n t th a t th e c o m m itte e th o u g h t th e B u re au of th e B u d g e t a n d C o n g re s s w o u ld a c c e p t. R a th e r t h a n a llo w fo re ig n d e m a n d o r lo n g -ra n g e m ilita ry g o a ls to d ic ta te th e siz e of th e M AP, th e FACC fit its re c o m m e n d a tio n s to a p r e d e te r m in e d b u d g e t.22 P o licy m a k ers a lso im p o s e d th is b u d g e ta r y ceilin g b e c a u se of th e ir d e s ire to c o n s e rv e th e n a tio n 's m a te ria l a n d m ilita ry re s o u rc e s . So g re a t w a s th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's c o n c e rn a b o u t th e effect of th e M A P o n s u p p lie s of ra w m a te ria ls th a t L o v ett a s k e d th e N a tio n a l S e c u rity R e so u rc e s B o a rd to s tu d y th is q u e s tio n in O c to b e r 1948, m o n th s b e fo re fo rm a l p la n n in g of th e M A P b e g a n . T h e r e s u ltin g a n a ly s e s e a se d a n x ie tie s. A n e x p e n d itu re of $2 b illio n , th e b o a rd c o n c lu d e d , w o u ld

208 • Arming the Free World Table 1. C o m p a ris o n o f Jo in t C h ie fs ' a n d F o re ig n A s s is ta n c e C o rre la tio n C o m m itte e 's B u d g e ts (in M illio n s of D o llars) fo r th e M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e P ro g ra m Country or Purpose

Joint Chiefs

FACC

Western Union Denmark Norway Italy Portugal Turkey Greece Austria Iran Korea Latin America Philippines Additional military production Contingency fund Administration Pipeline supplies financed with FY 1949 funds

$ 995.647 36.500 48.800 60.000 9.000 100.000 200.000 112.000 12.300 20.000 86.060 5.890 0 100.000 0

$ 830.850 49.990 81.650 44.770 7980 102.300 198.160 102.550 15.200 17650 0 10.130 200.000 100.000 25.000

0

-19.960

Total

$1,786,197

$1,766,270

Source: JCS 1868/62, 7 March 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; and table, "Proposed Military Assistance Program," [April 1949], file N7-l(l)-B.l vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA.

n e ith e r re d u c e th e a m o u n t of critical m e ta ls —a lu m in u m , ste e l, a n d c o p p e r —available fo r d o m e stic c o n s u m p tio n n o r in te rfe re w ith o th e r se c u rity p ro g ra m s th a t re q u ir e d th e s e re s o u rc e s . N o r w o u ld a m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m of th is siz e h a m p e r A m e ric a n p r e p a r e d n e s s . A l­ th o u g h th e Jo in t C h ie fs fo u n d th a t th e d e m a n d s of th e M A P w o u ld c au se so m e d e la y in th e m o b iliz a tio n of A m e ric a n g ro u n d u n its , th e y b e lie v e d th a t th e a rm in g of E u ro p e a n allies w o u ld y ie ld a n o v erall g a in fo r A m e ric a n se c u rity .23 W o rk in g w ith in th e s e lim its, th e Jo in t C h ie fs d e v is e d a te n ta tiv e p r o g r a m of $1,786 b illio n in m ilita ry a id fo r fiscal y e a r 1950. (S ee Table 1.) In d e te rm in in g re c ip ie n ts a n d a m o u n ts of a s s is ta n c e , th e Jo in t S taff p la n n e r s re lie d o n p o litical g u id a n c e fro m th e FACC a n d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t, w h ic h c o n s is te d m o stly of re ite ra tio n s of a p p ro v e d p o licy s ta te m e n ts o n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e a n d s u m m a rie s of c u rr e n t a ttitu d e s to w a rd p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts . In b a la n c in g r e q u e s ts a g a in s t re s o u rc e s,

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th e Jo in t C h ie fs w e ig h e d stra te g ic , p o litical, a n d p sy c h o lo g ic al c o n s id ­ e ra tio n s a n d trie d to " c o n c e n tra te th e a id w h e re it w ill c o n trib u te th e m a x im u m to o u r n a tio n a l secu rity ." B ut th e re c o m m e n d a tio n s th a t th e y s e n t to th e FACC o n 7 M a rc h 1949 w e re m o re a c o n s o lid a tio n of n e w a n d c o n tin u in g p ro je c ts th a n a c a re fu lly in te g ra te d p ro g ra m s h a p e d to a d e ta ile d p o litic a l-stra te g ic p la n . N e v e rth e le s s , th e ir p ro p o s a ls fo rm e d th e b a s is fo r th e M A P .24 N o t s u rp risin g ly , th e se rv ice c h ie fs th o u g h t th a t th e b u lk o f th is a s s is ta n c e ($995,647,000) s h o u ld g o to th e W e ste rn U n io n . S u c h e x te n ­ siv e h e lp re fle c te d n o t o n ly th e h ig h p rio rity th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n a c c o rd e d W e ste rn E u ro p e b u t a lso o rg a n iz a tio n a l c o n v e ­ n ie n c e . B ecau se th e N o r th A tla n tic T reaty w a s still u n d e r n e g o tia tio n in e a rly 1949, th e m e m b e rs h ip of th e a llian c e re m a in e d u n s e ttle d a n d th e c o n trib u tio n s of in d iv id u a l c o u n trie s to collective d e fe n se u n c e rta in . A lth o u g h th e y u r g e d a s s is ta n c e to o th e r s ig n a to rie s o f th e p a c t, th e Jo in t C h ie fs c o u ld m o re e a sily a s s e s s th e n e e d s of th e W e ste rn U n io n , w h ic h h a d at le a s t b e g u n to m a k e p la n s , h o w e v e r sk etch y , fo r a co m ­ m o n d e fe n s e o f E u ro p e . T h e a id th a t th e y p r o p o s e d a im e d p rim a rily at b rin g in g u p to fu ll s tr e n g th th e c o m b a t fo rc e s th a t th e m e m b e rs of th e W e ste rn U n io n m a in ta in e d d u rin g 1949. W h ile s u c h a ssista n c e o b v io u sly w o u ld b o ls te r th e m ilita ry c a p a b ilitie s of th e re c ip ie n ts , th e se rv ice c h ie fs p a rtic u la rly e m p h a s iz e d th a t it w o u ld a lso " stiffe n th e w ill of th e W e ste rn U n io n n a tio n s to r e s is t." 25 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs s tre s s e d th a t th e y w e re p ro p o s in g in te rim a s s is ta n c e , a first s te p to w a rd b u ild in g u p th e d e fe n s e s of th e W e ste rn U n io n . A rm y p la n n e r s f o u n d th a t th e W e ste rn U n io n n a tio n s w o u ld re q u ire s u b s ta n tia l a d d itio n a l in fu s io n s of A m e ric a n m a te rie l, a s w ell a s tro o p s u p p o r t, in o r d e r to m e e t th e ir g o a l of h o ld in g th e R h in e a g a in s t a S o v iet in v a s io n b y m id-1952. P rio r to th a t tim e , A m e ric a n m ilita ry a u th o ritie s c o n s id e re d th e d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e all b u t im p o s sib le . In th e e v e n t of w a r d u rin g 1949 o r 1950, stra te g ic p la n s c a lle d fo r th e e v a c u a tio n of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s fro m th e c o n tin e n t, e x c e p t p e r h a p s fo r a c o n tin g e n t th a t m ig h t m a in ta in a b rid g e h e a d o n th e Ib e ria n P e n in s u la . T he in te rim p r o g r a m o f a rm s aid , th e Jo in t C h ie fs b e lie v e d , w o u ld d o n o m o re th a n h e lp th e W e ste rn U n io n fo rce s d e la y a S o v iet a d v a n c e . A n effectiv e d e fe n se of th e c o n ti­ n e n t w o u ld re q u ire $13 b illio n of a d d itio n a l A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e d u rin g th e n e x t fo u r y e a rs, a lm o st a s m u c h as th e c o st of th e M a rsh a ll P la n .26

210 • Arming the Free World In s p ite of s u c h e s tim a te s , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s b y n o m e a n s c o m m itte d to a n y c o n tin u in g p r o g r a m of m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to th e W e ste rn U n io n . A lth o u g h th e Jo in t S taff w a s p r e p a r in g a lo n g r a n g e stra te g ic p la n a n d s u p p o r tin g p r o g r a m of a rm s a id , h ig h e r a u th o ritie s h a d n o t y e t s e ttle d th e s c o p e o r d u ra tio n of A m e ric a n m ilita ry h e lp to th e W e ste rn U n io n . N o r w a s th e re a n y a g re e m e n t a b o u t th e e v e n tu a l g o a ls of s u c h a s s is ta n c e . T h e in te rim p ro g ra m c o u ld h e lp e q u a lly in b u ild in g E u ro p e a n a rm e d fo rce s c a p a b le of d e fe n d in g a g a in s t a S o v iet in v a s io n , e ith e r b y th e m s e lv e s o r in c o n c e rt w ith A m e ric a n tro o p s , o r in c re a tin g m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts a im e d o n ly at d e te r r in g h o stile m ilita ry a c tio n s . N e ith e r A m e ric a n n o r E u ro p e a n m ilita ry e x p e rts k n e w th e siz e o f th e d e fe n se fo rc e s th a t th e W e ste rn U n io n n a tio n s c o u ld s u p p o r t w ith o u t s tra in in g th e ir e c o n o m ie s o n c e A m e ric a n m ilita ry h e lp h a d c e a s e d . H e n c e in te rim a rm s a id w a s a first in s ta llm e n t in a m ilita ry p r o g r a m w h o s e o b je c tiv e s a n d d im e n s io n s h a d n o t y e t b e e n d e te r m in e d .27 M ilita ry p la n n e r s u r g e d a rm s a id to o th e r p ro s p e c tiv e m e m b e rs of th e N o rth A tla n tic p a c t, s u c h as th e S c a n d in a v ia n n a tio n s , as m u c h to p ro m o te sp ecifically A m e ric a n o b je c tiv e s a s to f u r th e r th e collective d e fe n se of E u ro p e . In S e p te m b e r 1948 th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n re s o lv e d to u s e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e " to s tr e n g th e n th e p r e s e n t te n d e n c y of N o rw a y a n d D e n m a rk to a lig n th e m s e lv e s w ith th e W e ste rn P o w ers" a n d " to in flu e n c e S w e d e n to a b a n d o n . . . [its] a ttitu d e of su b je c tiv e n e u tra lity " to w a rd th e S o v iet U n io n . D e sp ite so m e v a cilla tio n s in c a r­ ry in g o u t th is policy, th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t re p e a te d ly in fo rm e d N o r­ w e g ia n , S w e d is h , a n d D a n is h officials th a t p a rtic ip a n ts in a n e u tra l S c a n d in a v ia n b lo c c o u ld n o t e x p e c t sig n ific a n t A m e ric a n m ilita ry h elp. So im p o r ta n t w e re A m e ric a n m ilita ry in te re s ts in S c a n d in a v ia , h o w ­ ever, th a t th e Jo in t C h ie fs re c o m m e n d e d th e p ro v is io n of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t to N o rw a y a n d D e n m a rk w h e th e r o r n o t th e y s ig n e d th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty. T h e se rv ice c h ie fs w a n te d to d e n y th e S o v iets b a s e s in N o rw a y a n d th e S p itz b e rg e n A rc h ip e la g o . T h ey a lso c o n s id ­ e re d b a se rig h ts in G re e n la n d , a D a n is h p o s s e s s io n , v ita l to A m e ric a n secu rity , a s w ell as c o n tro l of th a t is la n d in th e e v e n t of w ar. M ilita ry a id —$48.8 m illio n to N orw ay, $36.5 m illio n to D e n m a rk —w o u ld h e lp th e U n ite d S ta te s a c h ie v e th e s e o b je c tiv e s. U n a w a re , of c o u rse , of th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' re c o m m e n d a tio n s , th e N o rw e g ia n a n d D a n is h g o v e rn ­ m e n ts d e c id e d to jo in NATO, a n d th e p r o s p e c t of o b ta in in g A m e ric a n a rm s —m a te rie l th e y c o u ld n o t o th e rw is e a ffo rd —w a s a m a jo r c o n sid -

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e ra tio n in th e ir d e c isio n s. S w e d e n , le ss d e p e n d e n t o n th e U n ite d S ta te s fo r m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t, re m a in e d o u ts id e th e a llia n c e .28 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs h o p e d th a t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to P o rtu g a l, a n o th e r p o s s ib le s ig n a to ry of th e treaty , w o u ld h e lp o b ta in b a s e rig h ts in th e A z o re s . B ecau se th o s e is la n d s w e re " th e k ey to o u r p rim a ry air lin e of c o m m u n ic a tio n " w ith E u ra sia , th e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n s id e re d th e A z o re s " e s s e n tia l to th e s e c u rity of th e U n ite d S ta te s ." 29 T h e s ig n a tu re o n 2 F e b ru a ry 1948 o f a n a g re e m e n t g ra n tin g th e U n ite d S ta te s te m p o ra ry tr a n s it facilities in th e A z o re s fell s h o rt o f th e ir h o p e s fo r lo n g -te rm rig h ts . T h e se rv ic e c h ie fs p r e s s e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t to re o p e n n e g o tia tio n s a n d re c o m m e n d e d th e p ro v is io n to P o rtu g a l, sh o u ld it jo in th e N o r th A tla n tic a llia n c e , of $9 m illio n in m ilita ry a id , m a in ly a n tia irc ra ft a n d in f a n tr y e q u ip m e n t to s tr e n g th e n th e A z o re s ' d e fe n s e s . S u c h h e lp w o u ld " in th e e n d c o n trib u te to th e o v e ra ll d e fe n se of th e N o r th A tla n tic a re a , " b u t a rm y p la n n e r s c a n d id ly a d m itte d th a t it s h o u ld b e fu r n is h e d " la rg e ly fo r p o litica l p u r p o s e s ." 30 P ro p o s a ls fo r a id to Italy, a n o th e r p ro s p e c tiv e m e m b e r of th e p a c t, w e re b a s e d o n sim ila r r e a s o n in g . T h ro u g h o u t th e tre a ty n e g o tia tio n s , so m e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials e x p re s s e d re s e rv a tio n s a b o u t Ita lia n m e m b e rs h ip , o u t of c o n c e rn th a t in c lu s io n o f a n a tio n th a t d id n o t a b u t th e N o r th A tla n tic w o u ld le a d to d e m a n d s fo r th e e x p a n s io n of th e a llian c e. "B e y o n d th e A tla n tic a re a ," K e n n a n c a u tio n e d , " th e re is n o lo g ical s to p p in g p o in t in th e d e v e lo p m e n t of a s y s te m of a n ti-R u s s ia n a llia n c e s u n til th a t s y s te m h a s circ le d th e g lo b e a n d h a s e m b ra c e d all th e n o n -c o m m u n is t c o u n trie s of E u ro p e , A sia , a n d A frica." H ic k e rso n , th e d ire c to r of S ta te 's O ffice o f E u ro p e a n A ffa irs, c o u n te re d th a t fa ilu re to in c lu d e Ita ly in th e N o rth A tla n tic T reaty w o u ld b e a re p u d ia tio n of its p ro -W e s te rn g o v e rn m e n t a n d w o u ld w e a k e n Ita lia n re so lv e to o p p o s e c o m m u n is m . B o th S e c re ta ry of S ta te A c h e s o n a n d T ru m a n a c c e p te d th is logic in o r d e r to a v o id je o p a rd iz in g a tw o -y e a r in v e s t­ m e n t in " s tr e n g th e n in g Ita ly 's w e s te r n o rie n ta tio n a n d w e a k e n in g th e C o m m u n is t th r e a t in Italy." T he Jo in t C h ie fs, h o w ev er, r e m in d e d th e FACC th a t Italy, b e c a u se of re s tric tio n s o n th e siz e of its a rm e d fo rces, c o u ld m a k e o n ly a m in o r c o n trib u tio n to th e d e fe n se of E u ro p e . E v en so , th e y th o u g h t th a t Italy s h o u ld re c e iv e $60 m illio n in m ilita ry a id — m a in ly to s tr e n g th e n its in te rn a l se c u rity fo rc e s—w h e th e r o r n o t it jo in e d th e N o rth A tla n tic a llian c e. S u c h h e lp w o u ld c o n tin u e A m e ric a n e ffo rts to th w a rt th e e x p a n s io n of C o m m u n is t in flu e n c e in Italy.31 T he o n ly n e w p ro g ra m of m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e th a t th e Jo in t C h iefs

212 • Arming the Free World a d v o c a te d fo r a E u r o p e a n c o u n tr y d e fin ite ly o u ts id e th e N o rth A tla n tic a llian c e w a s fo r A u s tria . B e h in d th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n w a s c o n c e rn o v e r S o v iet e x p a n s io n . B ritish , F re n c h , S o v iet, a n d A m e ric a n tro o p s h a d o c c u p ie d A u s tria a t th e e n d of W o rld W ar II p e n d in g th e n e g o tia ­ tio n of a p e a c e trea ty . B ut a fte r th e c o u p in C z e c h o slo v a k ia in F e b ru a ry 1948, S ta te D e p a r tm e n t officials w e re a p p re h e n s iv e th a t th e c o n c lu s io n of s u c h a n a g re e m e n t a n d th e s u b s e q u e n t w ith d ra w a l of th e W e ste rn o c c u p a tio n fo rc e s " w o u ld m a k e A u s tria s u s c e p tib le to S oviet a g g re ss iv e a im s." T h e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n c u rre d , a d d in g th a t th e p re s e n c e of A m e ric a n s o ld ie rs k e p t in ta c t a n u n b r o k e n fr o n t a g a in s t th e S oviet U n io n a n d its sa te llite s fro m Ita ly th r o u g h A u s tria a n d G e rm a n y to th e N o r th S e a . In a d d itio n to th e s u p p o s e d e x te rn a l th r e a t to A u s tria , p o litical a n d m ilita ry officials a lso w o rrie d a b o u t S o v iet in s tig a tio n of a n in te rn a l u p ris in g . T h ese d a n g e rs frig h te n e d A m e ric a n p o licy ­ m a k e rs b e c a u se o f A u s tria 's m ilita ry w e a k n e s s . T h e p la n n e d p e a c e tre a ty p ro v id e d fo r a n A u s tria n a rm y of 53,000 m e n b u t d id n o t allo w th e ir tr a in in g o r e q u ip m e n t p r io r to th e d e p a r tu r e of th e o c c u p a tio n tro o p s . U n d e r th e s e c irc u m s ta n c e s , a d m in is tra tio n officials w a rn e d , th e A u s tria n a rm y w o u ld n o t b e ab le " to o p p o s e su c c e ss fu lly an y v io le n t a c tio n w h ic h m a y b e c o n te m p la te d o r a tte m p te d b y th e C o m ­ m u n is t m in o rity o r b y S o v iet a g e n ts ." 32 To a v e rt th e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s , A m e ric a n officials d e c id e d to e x te n d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to A u s tria . In th e s p rin g of 1948, th e T ru m a n a d m in ­ is tra tio n a u th o riz e d th e c o m m a n d e r of A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s to tra in A u s tria n g e n d a rm e s a n d to e s ta b lis h sto c k p ile s of e q u ip m e n t fo r th e ir u s e in th e e v e n t of a n e m e rg e n c y . A t th e sa m e tim e , A m e ric a n a n d B ritish m ilita ry e x p e rts se c re tly b e g a n to d is c u s s o rg a n iz a tio n of th e p r o p o s e d A u s tria n arm y. In v io la tio n of fo u r-p o w e r d ire c tiv e s. W est­ e rn o c c u p a tio n a u th o ritie s e n c o u ra g e d A u s tria n le a d e rs to b e g in " c o ­ v e rt p la n n in g " fo r n a tio n a l d e fe n s e , b u t as o n e a rm y a n a ly s t r e p o r te d , " p a r tis a n d iffe re n c e s a n d fe a r of S o v iet re p ris a ls . . . m a d e all e ffo rts ra th e r sk e tc h y a n d in effe ctiv e ." A m e ric a n p la n n in g fo r a rm s a id to A u s tria w a s m o re p ro d u c tiv e . In D e c e m b e r 1948 L o v ett a n d F o rre sta l a g re e d to in c lu d e A u s tria in th e M AP. T h re e m o n th s later, th e Jo in t C h ie fs re c o m m e n d e d $12 m illio n w o r th of m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t fo r th e A u s tr ia n g e n d a rm e s a n d $100 m illio n w o r th of s u p p lie s fo r th e a rm y if th e c o n c lu s io n of a p e a c e tre a ty w a s likely d u rin g th e c o m in g fiscal year. B ecause of th e o b v io u s n e e d to m a in ta in secrecy, a d m in is tra tio n offi-

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cials stric tly r u le d o u t a n y p u b lic d is c u s s io n of m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to A u s tria . N o p a r t of th e p r o p o s e d M A P w a s m o re s e n s itiv e .33 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs ' p r o p o s a ls a lso e n c o m p a s s e d th e c o n tin u a tio n of c u r r e n t p r o g r a m s in th e N e a r E ast. B oth p o litical a n d m ilita ry officials a g re e d th a t G re e c e s h o u ld re c eiv e fu r th e r a ssista n c e , e v e n th o u g h th e y c o n c e d e d th a t A m e ric a n h e lp h a d b y n o m e a n s re lie v e d —a n d h a d p e r h a p s e v e n e x a c e rb a te d —th e "in e ffic ie n c y a n d lack of s u s ta in e d fig h tin g s p irit of th e G re e k A rm y [G N A ]."34 T h is a s s e s s m e n t a ro se p a rtly fro m th e d is a p p o in tm e n t o v e r th e o ffe n siv e s th e G N A m o u n te d a g a in s t th e g u e rrilla s d u rin g 1948. U s in g h e a v y firep o w e r, in c lu d in g n a p a lm , th e G N A in flic te d s u b s ta n tia l lo sse s o n th e in s u r g e n ts d u rin g fig h tin g in th e G ra m m o s M o u n ta in s , b u t th e n r e tr e a te d a fte r a tta c k in g re b e l p o s itio n s a t V itsi. B ecau se of th e g u e rrilla s ' a b ility to ta k e re fu g e in n e ig h b o rin g Y u g o sla v ia a n d A lb a n ia a n d to re p la c e th e ir lo sse s, th e s e c a m p a ig n s , a c c o rd in g to th e C IA , " d id n o t fu n d a m e n ta lly c h a n g e th e s itu a tio n in G re e c e ." G e n e ra l Ja m es A . V an F leet, th e c h ie f of th e A m e ric a n m ilita ry a d v is o ry g ro u p , h o p e d to b u ild th e fo rce s fo r a d e cisiv e c a m p a ig n b y trip lin g th e a m o u n t of m ilita ry a id to $500 m il­ lio n . B ut A m b a s s a d o r H e n ry F. G ra d y a rg u e d th a t m o re A m e ric a n m o n e y a n d a rm s w o u ld o n ly re in fo rc e th e c o m p la c e n c y in A th e n s, sin c e " e a c h n u m e ric a l in c re a s e [in th e G N A ], w ith c o rre s p o n d in g in c re a s e in s u p p lie s , h a s a d d e d p ro o f to G re e k s th a t th is , in [the] first in s ta n c e , is A m e ric a's w a r ra th e r th a n G re e c e 's." A c c e p tin g G ra d y 's a d v ic e , th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t c o n c lu d e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s sh o u ld in s te a d b rin g p r e s s u r e o n G re e k le a d e rs fo r a m o re v ig o ro u s p ro s e c u ­ tio n of th e w ar. U n w illin g to d iv e rt sc arc e re s o u rc e s to a c o u n try th a t w o u ld n e v e r b e ab le to re s is t su c c e ss fu lly a S o v iet a tta c k in th e e v e n t of g lo b al w ar, th e Jo in t C h ie fs a lso r u le d o u t a la rg e in c re a s e in m ilita ry a id to G re e c e . In s te a d th e y re c o m m e n d e d a lim it of $200 m illio n , a n a m o u n t th a t w o u ld a llo w o n ly th e m a in te n a n c e of e x istin g G re e k fo rc e s. O n c e th e G N A h a d e lim in a te d m a jo r g u e rrilla a c tiv ity —a n e v e n t th a t fin a lly o c c u rre d in 1949 la rg e ly b e c a u se of th e c lo sin g of th e Y u g o sla v b o r d e r to th e d is s id e n ts a n d th e le a d e rs h ip of a n e w G N A c o m m a n d e r-in -c h ie f—th e Jo in t C h ie fs th o u g h t th a t m ilita ry a id sh o u ld b e " re d u c e d to th a t su ffic ie n t o n ly to m a in ta in G re e c e 's in te rn a l se c u rity ."35 P re v io u s c o m m itm e n ts s h a p e d p ro p o s a ls fo r fu tu re a id to T urkey a n d Ira n a s w ell. F e a rfu l th a t m o ra le in A n k a ra w o u ld sa g w ith o u t n e w

214 • Arming the Free World s h ip m e n ts of A m e ric a n a rm s , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d e c id e d to k e e p b u ild in g u p th e T u rk ish d e fe n s e e s ta b lis h m e n t u n til it c o u ld o ffer s tro n g re s is ta n c e to a S o v iet in v a s io n . T ow ard th is e x tra v a g a n t g o a l o n e th a t all b u t p re c lu d e d th e c e s s a tio n of A m e ric a n h e lp —th e Jo in t C h ie fs re s e rv e d $100 m illio n in th e M A P.36 Political r a th e r th a n m ilita ry c o n s id e ra tio n s a c c o u n te d fo r th e c o n tin u a tio n of a id to Ira n . T h e s u r ­ p lu s a rm a m e n ts th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d p ro m is e d in late 1946 w e re ju s t b e g in n in g to a rriv e in e a rly 1949, a n d A m e ric a n m ilita ry e x p e rts d o u b te d th a t th e Ira n ia n s c o u ld a b s o rb a d d itio n a l m ilita ry e q u ip m e n t. B ut to a p p e a s e S h a h M o h a m m a d R eza P ah lav i, w h o h e ld g ra n d io s e n o tio n s of c re a tin g a b a s tio n a g a in s t S o v iet e x p a n sio n , p o liti­ cal a n d m ilita ry officials a g re e d o n to k e n a id of so m e $12.3 m illio n , th e Jo in t C h ie fs e s tim a te d . In b o th in s ta n c e s , th e m o m e n tu m of e x istin g p o licies w a s re s p o n s ib le fo r th e a d d itio n a l in fu s io n s of a id .37 T h e Jo in t C h ie fs ' p ro p o s a ls fo r to k e n a s s is ta n c e to K o rea a n d th e P h ilip p in e s re fle c te d th e lo w p rio rity th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n a c c o rd e d E a st A sia . R e g a rd in g K o re a, M A P p la n n e r s b a la n c e d e c o n ­ o m y a g a in s t p re s tig e . M ilita ry a u th o ritie s w e re e a g e r to w ith d ra w A m e ric a n o c c u p a tio n tro o p s fro m a c o u n tr y w ith little stra te g ic sig n ifi­ c a n c e , b u t S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p la n n e r s in s is te d th a t K o re a h a d " s y m ­ bolic im p o rta n c e " b e c a u se it w a s "a te s tin g g ro u n d of th e v a lid ity of U n ite d S ta te s v. S o v iet o b je c tiv e s." In o rd e r to s tr e n g th e n th e a rm y a n d p o lice fo rce s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d tr a in e d a n d e q u ip p e d a n d d e m o n s tra te A m e ric a n in te re s t in S o u th K o re a n in d e p e n d e n c e , th e Jo in t C h ie fs re s e rv e d $20 m illio n in th e M A P.38 S im ila r c o n s id e ra tio n s le d to a to k e n g e s tu re in th e P h ilip p in e s . B ack in g aw ay fro m e a rlie r e s tim a te s of th e is la n d s ' im p o rta n c e to A m e ric a n secu rity , th e Jo in t C h ie fs a s s ig n e d th e P h ilip p in e s o n ly a m in o r ro le in A m e ric a n w a r p la n s . G e n e ra l A lb e rt C . W ed em ey er, th e d ire c to r of th e a rm y 's P la n s a n d O p e r a tio n s D iv isio n , w a r n e d a g a in s t d is s ip a tin g " lim ite d r e ­ so u rc e s in u n w a r r a n te d p ro v is io n s fo r th e d e fe n se of th e P h ilip p in e s , a t th e e x p e n s e of e ffo rt a t th e m a in c e n te rs of re s is ta n c e to th e S oviet C o m m u n is t im p e ria lis m ." T u rn in g a sid e P h ilip p in e r e q u e s ts fo r s u b ­ s ta n tia l m ilita ry a id , th e Jo in t C h ie fs re c o m m e n d e d o n ly $5.89 m illio n to p ro v id e m a in te n a n c e s u p p lie s to th e a rm e d fo rce s th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d p re v io u s ly tr a in e d a n d e q u ip p e d . In lig h t of th e im p e n d in g C o m m u n is t v ic to ry in C h in a , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h o p e d th a t s u c h m o d e s t a s s is ta n c e to th e P h ilip p in e s a n d K o rea w o u ld h e lp sta v e

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off f u r th e r C o m m u n is t a d v a n c e s in A sia a n d re c o u p A m e ric a n p r e s ­ tig e .39 Finally, th e Jo in t C h ie fs r e n e w e d th e ir lo n g -s ta n d in g e ffo rt to o b ta in a p p ro p r ia tio n s fo r m ilita ry a id to L a tin A m e ric a. A s u s u a l, th e y fa c e d o p p o s itio n fro m th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. O fficials in th e O ffice of A m e ri­ c a n R e p u b lic A ffa irs w a n te d to lim it m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e to " sm a ll a m o u n ts " to m e e t " u r g e n t r e q u e s ts " a n d to p ro v id e s u c h h e lp fro m u n r e s tric te d f u n d s in th e M A R M ilita ry a u th o ritie s d is a g re e d . A lth o u g h still e a g e r to p ro m o te th e e v e n tu a l s ta n d a rd iz a tio n of h e m i­ s p h e ric a rm a m e n ts , th e Jo in t C h ie fs c o n c e n tra te d o n th e m o re m o d e s t g o a ls of s tr e n g th e n in g local d e fe n s e s a n d m a in ta in in g sta b ility in c o u n trie s w ith stra te g ic re s o u rc e s . T ow ard th is e n d , th e y p r o p o s e d a fo rm a l p r o g r a m o f $86 m illio n fo r L a tin A m e ric a . In a d d itio n to th e se a llo c a tio n s, th e Jo in t C h ie fs still u r g e d th e c re a tio n w ith in th e M A P of a c o n tin g e n c y f u n d of $100 m illio n , w h ic h th e p r e s id e n t m ig h t u s e to m e e t th e e m e rg e n c y o r a d d itio n a l n e e d s of a n y c o u n try h e c o n s id e re d im p o r ta n t to A m e ric a n se c u rity .40 In e a rly A p ril, th e FACC m a d e so m e im p o r ta n t c h a n g e s in th e Jo in t C h ie fs ' p r o p o s e d a llo c a tio n s, a lth o u g h th e to ta l e x p e n d itu re s w e re p ra c tic a lly th e sa m e . (S ee Table 1.) T h ese m o d ific a tio n s g e n e ra lly re fle c te d th e FACC's a c c o m m o d a tio n of S ta te D e p a rtm e n t p o s itio n s . T h e c o m m itte e s u b s ta n tia lly in c re a s e d a llo c a tio n s fo r N o rw a y a n d D e n m a rk , e n o u g h to fill th e r e q u e s ts fo r a rm s a id th a t th e s e tw o c o u n trie s h a d m a d e a y e a r earlier. H ic k e rs o n a n d o th e r officials in th e O ffice of E u ro p e a n A ffairs h a d b e e n d is tre s s e d b y th e ir in a b ility to m e e t N o rw e g ia n a n d D a n is h n e e d s a n d w e re e a g e r to re w a rd th o se tw o c o u n trie s fo r re c e n tly c h o o s in g to a d h e re to th e N o rth A tlan tic Treaty. T he P h ilip p in e s a lso b e n e fite d fro m th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t. W h a te v e r th e stra te g ic sig n ific a n c e o f th e a rc h ip e la g o , its p o litical sig n ific a n c e h a d b e e n e le v a te d " a s a re s u lt of th e m ilita ry d e b ac le in C h in a ." T he S ta te D e p a rtm e n t felt th a t it w o u ld b e " d a m a g in g . . . to U .S . p re s tig e a n d in te re s ts if th e P h ilip p in e e x p e rim e n t s h o u ld fail," b e c a u se of th e w a x in g s tr e n g th of th e " c o m m u n is t-le a d [sic] H u k b a la h a p s ." S u c h re a s o n in g p e r s u a d e d th e FACC to in c re a s e th e p r o ­ p o s e d a rm s a id to th e P h ilip p in e s b y tw o -th ird s . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e c o m m itte e e lim in a te d a n y a llo c a tio n fo r L atin A m e ric a b e c a u se of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t's w illin g n e s s to c o u n te n a n c e o n ly m in o r tr a n s ­ fe rs of a rm a m e n ts to th o s e n a tio n s .41

216 • Arming the Free World T h e g re a te s t c h a n g e s , h o w ev er, w e re th a t a rm s a id to th e W e ste rn U n io n w a s r e d u c e d b y o n e -s ix th a n d a $200 m illio n f u n d w a s c re a te d to h e lp fin a n c e in c re a s e d m ilita ry p r o d u c tio n in th e N A TO c o u n trie s . O fficials fro m b o th th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e E C A w e re e a g e r to stim u la te s u c h p ro d u c tio n to e n a b le th e E u ro p e a n s e v e n tu a lly to s u p ­ p o r t th e ir m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts fro m d o m e stic s o u rc e s a n d to d e m ­ o n s tr a te to C o n g re s s th a t th e n a tio n 's n e w allies h a d a c c e p te d th e p rin c ip le of se lf-h e lp e x p re s s e d in th e V a n d e n b e rg R e so lu tio n . A m e ri­ c a n a s s is ta n c e w o u ld d e fra y th e d o lla r c o sts o f im p o r te d ra w m a te ria ls fo r a rm s p ro d u c tio n a n d c o m p e n s a te th e E u ro p e a n s fo r a n y d iv e rs io n of re s o u rc e s fro m e co n o m ic reco v ery . O n th e b a sis of s c a n t in fo rm a ­ tio n , th e FACC e s tim a te d th a t a $200 m illio n s u b s id y w o u ld a llo w th e W e ste rn U n io n n a tio n s a n d Ita ly to p ro d u c e m ilita ry s u p p lie s v a lu e d at tw ic e th a t a m o u n t.42 H o w e v e r b e n e fic ia l to E u r o p e a n r e a rm a m e n t, s u c h s u b s id ie s ra is e d tro u b lin g q u e s tio n s a b o u t th e ir effect o n th e M a rsh a ll P la n . "It is o u r policy," th e FACC s ta te d em p h a tic ally , " th a t e co n o m ic re c o v e ry m u s t n o t b e sacrifice d to r e a r m a m e n t a n d m u s t c o n tin u e to b e g iv e n a c le ar p rio rity ." 43 Yet A m e ric a n officials fo u n d th a t o n ly a sm a ll a m o u n t of slack c a p a c ity in E u ro p e m ig h t b e tu r n e d to a rm a m e n t m a n u fa c tu r­ in g . M o reo v er, th e e x p e n s e s of s u c h p ro d u c tio n w o u ld f u r th e r b u r d e n E u ro p e a n fin a n c e s a n d d is r u p t lo n g -te rm e co n o m ic p la n n in g , w h ic h w a s g e a r e d —w ith A m e ric a n e n c o u ra g e m e n t—to w a rd in c re a s e d civil­ ia n p ro d u c tio n a t th e e x p e n s e o f m ilita ry o u tla y s. F or th e s e re a s o n s , officials in th e O ffice of th e S e c re ta ry of D e fe n se h a d d o u b ts a b o u t s u b s id iz in g E u ro p e a n d e fe n s e p ro d u c tio n . B u t W. A verell H a rrim a n , th e p r e s id e n t's sp e c ia l r e p re s e n ta tiv e in E u ro p e fo r e co n o m ic affairs, b r u s h e d a sid e s u c h re s e rv a tio n s . H a rrim a n 's sta ff r e p o r te d to A c h e so n th a t n o t o n ly w o u ld th e M A P n o t je o p a rd iz e e co n o m ic re c o v e ry b u t a lso th a t th e s tim u la tio n o f a rm a m e n ts p r o d u c tio n w o u ld h e lp d e v e lo p " th e lev el of c o n fid e n c e in W e ste rn E u ro p e w h ic h is n e c e s s a ry to in s u re e co n o m ic v ia b ility b e y o n d th e M a rsh a ll P la n in 1952." Im p re s s e d b y s u c h a rg u m e n ts a n d c o n c e rn e d a b o u t p la c a tin g C o n g re s s , FACC p la n ­ n e rs a p p ro v e d th e c re a tio n of a n A d d itio n a l M ilita ry P ro d u c tio n F u n d in th e ir te n ta tiv e b u d g e t of $1,766 b illio n .44 T h e FACC n o w fa c e d th e d iffic u lt ta s k o f p e rs u a d in g th e B u re au of th e B u d g e t to a p p ro v e th e M AP. U n a n tic ip a te d d iffic u lties a ro s e w h e n E d w in G . N o u rs e , th e c h a irm a n of th e p r e s id e n t's C o u n c il of E conom ic A d v ise rs, d e c la re d in a n a d d re s s a t th e P e n ta g o n th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

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c o u ld n o t a ffo rd to in c re a s e s p e n d in g o n n a tio n a l s e c u rity p ro g ra m s d u rin g th e c o m in g fiscal year. H is c o n c lu s io n re fle c te d h is c o n v ic tio n th a t s p e n d in g o n e d u c a tio n , h e a lth , a n d so cial se rv ice s a lre a d y w a s " fa r b e lo w th e le v e l" d e s ire d b y th e p r e s id e n t a n d d e m a n d e d b y th e p u b lic . F u rth e rm o re , e v e n w ith o u t th e a d d itio n a l e x p e n s e s of th e MAP, N o u rs e a n d F ra n k Pace, Jr., T ru m an 's n e w b u d g e t d irecto r, fo re c a st a d eficit fo r fiscal y e a r 1950. F e a rfu l of th e re v iv a l of in fla tio n a ry p r e s ­ s u re s , w h ic h h a d a b a te d in la te 1948, T ru m a n a s k e d fo r a tax in c re a se in e a rly 1949, b u t h is p r o p o s a l m a d e little p ro g re s s o n C a p ito l H ill. B ecau se of th e s e fiscal d iffic u ltie s, N o u rs e p r o p o s e d n o t o n ly to m e e t th e e x p e n s e s o f th e M A P fro m th e c u r r e n t b u d g e t of th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E s ta b lis h m e n t b u t a lso p ro g re s s iv e ly to re d u c e d e fe n se s p e n d ­ in g as th e N o rth A tla n tic allies b u ilt u p th e ir a rm e d fo rc e s .45 N o u rse 's s p e e c h c a u s e d a fu r o r in th e P e n ta g o n , e sp e c ia lly sin c e it h a d b e e n c le a re d w ith T ru m a n . T h e n e w s e c re ta ry of d e fe n se , L o u is A . J o h n s o n , to ld L e m n itz e r th a t th e M A P w a s n o t " in a n y re s p e c t a ju s tific a tio n fo r a re d u c tio n in o u r o w n m ilita ry b u d g e t." T h e m o d e s t in c re a s e s in th e d e fe n se c a p a b ilitie s of th e N o rth A tla n tic c o u n trie s ; J o h n s o n in fo rm e d T ru m a n , in n o w a y le s s e n e d th e n e e d fo r A m e ric a n p r e p a r e d n e s s , w h ic h w a s n o w th e m in im u m n e c e s s a ry in v ie w of R u s s ia n " in tra n s ig e n c e " a n d " th e c u r r e n t lev el of in te rn a tio n a l t e n ­ sio n ." N o t fo r se v e ra l y e a rs, u n til th e W e ste rn E u ro p e a n s c o u ld d e fe n d th e ir soil a g a in s t a S o v iet in v a s io n , w o u ld a n y re d u c tio n in A m e ric a n m ilita ry fo rc e s b e p o s s ib le .46 A lth o u g h th e FACC w a s ab le to tu r n b a c k a n y th r e a t to th e se rv ice b u d g e ts , th e B u re a u of th e B u d g e t in s is te d o n s u b s ta n tia l re d u c tio n s in th e M A P. (S ee Table 2.) A fte r a s e a rc h in g rev iew . B u d g e t officials s la s h e d th e M A P b u d g e t b y o n e -th ir d to $1.155 b illio n , p rim a rily b y lo w e rin g a id to n o n - N o r th A tla n tic c o u n trie s a n d e lim in a tin g f u n d s fo r a d d itio n a l m ilita ry p ro d u c tio n a n d e m e rg e n c y re q u e s ts . A fte r le n g th y n e g o tia tio n s , FACC officials s u c c e e d e d in re in s ta tin g th e la s t tw o ite m s, a lb e it in r e d u c e d a m o u n ts , a s w ell a s p a rtly re s to rin g so m e of th e o th e r d e e p c u ts . A d m in is tra tio n p la n n e r s fin a lly d e c id e d to d e le te o n ly th e p r o g r a m fo r P o rtu g a l a n d re d u c e d ra s tic a lly o n ly a id fo r A u s tria , sin c e th e re w a s n o c h a n c e of a p e a c e tre a ty d u rin g th e c o m in g year. F u rth e r sa v in g s of so m e $44 m illio n , th r o u g h e lim in a tio n of an y c h a rg e fo r s u r p lu s e q u ip m e n t, b r o u g h t th e fin a l to ta l fo r th e M A P to $1.45 b illio n . T h e n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e B u re au of th e B u d g et, w h ic h fo rc e d th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n d th e N a tio n a l M ilita ry E sta b lis h m e n t

218 • Arming the Free World Table 2. C o m p a ris o n of B u d g e ts (in M illio n s of D o llars) fo r th e P ro p o s e d M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e P ro g ra m

FACC

Bureau of the Budget

Administration Request

Western Union Denmark Norway Italy Portugal Turkey Greece Austria Iran Korea Philippines Additional military production Contingency fund Administration Pipeline supplies financed with FY 1949 funds Reduced ocean transport charges Nonreimbursement for surplus

$ 830.850 49.990 81.650 44.770 7.980 102.300 198.160 102.550 15.200 17.650 10.130

$ 817630 49.990 81.650 44.770 0 75.000 150.000 12.000 4.070 0 0

$ 801.600 48.920 79.720 44.190 0 102.300 178.160 11.620 15.200 10.980 5.740

200.000 100.000 25.000

0 0 15.000

155.000 50.000 11.370

-19.960

-19.960

-19.960

0

-30.000

a

0

-45.000

-44.840

Total

$1,766,270

$1,155,150

$1,450,000

Country or Purpose

Source: Table, "Proposed Military Assistance Program," [April 1949]; and memoran­ dum, Lemnitzer to Gruenter and others, 27 April 1949, both in file N7-l(l)-B.l vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA. aSavings in ocean transport included in country totals.

to clo se ra n k s , fa c ilita te d a g re e m e n t o n a n o th e r o u ts ta n d in g m a tte r. In r e tu r n fo r th e c o o p e ra tio n of th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t in p ro te c tin g th e ir b u d g e ts , th e se rv ice d e p a r tm e n ts d r o p p e d th e ir d e m a n d s fo r a n in d e ­ p e n d e n t a d m in is tra to r a n d a g re e d to le t th e s e c re ta ry of s ta te c o n tro l th e M AP. P re lim in a ry p la n n in g of th e M A P c a m e to a n e n d o n 20 A p ril 1949 w h e n T ru m a n ra tifie d th is a g re e m e n t a n d a lso a p p ro v e d th e b u d g e t of $1.45 b illio n .47 FACC p la n n e r s th o u g h t th a t th e p ro g ra m th e y h a d d e s ig n e d w o u ld se rv e im p o r ta n t p u r p o s e s . F u n d a m e n ta l w a s th e c o n ta in m e n t of S oviet e x p a n s io n , a n o b jec tiv e so elastic th a t it e n c o m p a s s e d all th e c o u n try a n d re g io n a l p ro g ra m s w ith in th e M AP, in s p ite of th e ir d iv ersity . A rm s

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

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a id , FACC a n a ly s ts e x p la in e d , w o u ld im p ro v e th e a b ility of th e re c ip ­ ie n ts " to re s is t S o v ie t-C o m m u n is t a g g re s s io n " as w ell as s u p p o r t a n d e n c o u ra g e th e p o litica l o rie n ta tio n of " th e fre e n a tio n s of th e n o n S o v iet w o rld " to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s. T h e M A P a lso w o u ld in v ig o ­ ra te A m e ric a n d e fe n s e in d u s trie s , a b e n e fit th a t so lid ifie d s u p p o r t fo r th e p r o g r a m w ith in th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n t. A n d in r e tu r n fo r s e n d in g a rm a m e n ts a b ro a d , th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld re c eiv e rec ip ro c a l a s s is ta n c e , u s u a lly b a s e rig h ts a n d stra te g ic ra w m a te ria ls , a n o th e r d iv id e n d th a t m ilita ry le a d e rs e sp e c ia lly c o v e te d .48 A d m in is tra tio n p la n n e r s e m p h a s iz e d m o re th a n a n y of th e s e o b jec ­ tiv e s, h o w e v er, th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l effects of f u rn is h in g m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . T h e FACC in s is te d th a t " th e p sy c h o lo g ic al fac to r is of m a jo r sig n ific a n c e in th a t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e w ill in c re a s e th e d e te rm in a tio n to re s is t a n d w ill ra is e th e lev el of c o n fid e n c e in all c o u n trie s stim u la t­ in g th e m to g re a te r e ffo rts in th e ir e co n o m ic a n d m ilita ry re c o v e ry a n d e n a b lin g th e m to d im in is h th e ir d e p e n d e n c e o n th e U n ite d S ta te s." A c h e s o n e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e im m e d ia te re s u lt of a rm s a id w o u ld b e c o n fid e n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s a fu ll p a r tn e r " in th e p re s e rv a ­ tio n of th e p e a c e a n d s e c u rity of E u ro p e " a n d in a c o n s e q u e n t stiffe n in g o f E u ro p e a n re so lv e th a t w o u ld m a k e a g g re s s io n u n lik ely . T h e C IA also c o n s id e re d th e M A P a " p rim a rily p sy c h o lo g ic a l" m e a s u re , b u t c a u ­ tio n e d th a t its effect w o u ld d e p e n d o n w h e th e r it w a s r e g a rd e d " a s a n e s s e n tia l s te p to w a rd th e a c h ie v e m e n t of p e a c e a n d se c u rity o r m e re ly as p r e p a r a tio n fo r a n e w w ar."49 A p p a r e n tly im p re s s e d b y s u c h w a rn ­ in g s a n d u n w illin g to leave to c h a n c e p u b lic re a c tio n , fo re ig n p o licy p la n n e r s n o w tu r n e d th e ir a tte n tio n to w a rd se llin g th e M A P b o th a b ro a d a n d a t h o m e.

^ V f te r v is itin g L o n d o n a n d P aris in J a n u a ry 1949, Paul H . N itz e , th e d e p u ty to th e a s s is ta n t s e c re ta ry of s ta te fo r e co n o m ic affairs, r e p o r te d th a t th e s e n s e o f s e c u rity of m a n y E u ro p e a n s d e p e n d e d n o t so m u c h o n A m e ric a n m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e as o n a n e a s in g of te n s io n b e tw e e n th e S o v iet U n io n a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s . B ut b y th is tim e d é te n te w a s all b u t im p o s sib le . T ru m a n a n d h is to p a d v is e rs p la c e d th e ir h o p e s n o t in n e g o tia tio n s w ith th e S o v ie ts b u t in th e r e e s ta b lis h m e n t of th e m ilita ry a n d e c o n o m ic p o w e r o f W e ste rn E u ro p e . In d e e d , a t th e P aris m e e tin g of th e C o u n c il of F o re ig n M in is te rs in M ay 1949, A c h e so n w a s as u n y ie ld in g a s h is S o v iet c o u n te r p a r t o n th e te rm s of a G e rm a n p e a c e

220 • Arming the Free World s e ttle m e n t, p a rtly fro m fe a r th a t a n y c o n c e s s io n s m ig h t d is r u p t A m e ri­ c a n e ffo rts to b u ild W e ste rn E u ro p e a n u n ity . M o re g en erally , a d m in ­ is tra tio n officials w e re c o n c e rn e d in th e s p rin g o f 1949 a b o u t a S o v iet p e a c e o ffe n siv e th a t, th e C IA p re d ic te d , w o u ld " e v e n tu a lly w e a k e n s u b s ta n tia lly p u b lic s u p p o r t fo r r e a r m a m e n t p ro g ra m s a n d o th e r m e a ­ s u re s d e s ig n e d to im p ro v e th e w e s te rn m ilita ry p o s itio n re la tiv e to th a t of th e U S S R ." 50 E a g e r to n u r tu r e th a t p u b lic s u p p o r t, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n p o r tr a y e d th e M A P as a s te p to w a rd w o rld p e a c e . FACC p la n n e r s d e v is e d a n a m b itio u s p r o p a g a n d a p ro g ra m , in c lu d in g sp e e c h e s , p u b ­ lic s ta te m e n ts , a n d official p u b lic a tio n s , w h o s e c e n tra l th e m e w a s to c o n v in c e th e p u b lic th a t " th e M ilita ry A id P ro g ra m e x p re s s e s th e d e te rm in a tio n of th e U n ite d S ta te s to h e lp b u ild a sta b le , p e a c e fu l c o m m u n ity of n a tio n s c a p a b le of m a in ta in in g itself a g a in s t a n y th re a t." W ith a n eye to w a rd th e re a c tio n in E u ro p e , a d m in is tra tio n s p o k e s m e n e m p h a s iz e d th a t th e M A P c a rrie d n o risk s a n d im p o s e d n o c o sts o n th e re c ip ie n ts . O fficial s ta te m e n ts , fo r e x a m p le , a v o id e d callin g a tte n tio n to th e d is p a rity in c o n v e n tio n a l m ilita ry fo rce s b e tw e e n th e N o rth A tla n tic allies a n d th e S o v iet U n io n , a n im b a la n c e th a t th e M A P d id little to c h a n g e . T h ey a lso trie d to calm a n y fe a rs of a n a g g re ss iv e S oviet re a c tio n to th e p a s s a g e of th e M AP. R ather, th e y s tr e s s e d th a t A m e ric a n m ilita ry a id w o u ld " p ro m o te w o rld re c o v e ry " a n d h e lp "a c h ie v e a tim e ly s e c u rity fo r th e N o rth A tla n tic a re a . . . w h ic h w ill n o t b e su s c e p tib le to th e h o t-a n d -c o ld , 'p e a c e ' p r o p a g a n d a of th e S oviet U n io n a n d in te rn a tio n a l c o m m u n is m ." 51 T h is p u b lic in fo rm a tio n c a m p a ig n p e r h a p s h a d th e g re a te s t effect o n A m e ric a n p o lic y m a k e rs th e m s e lv e s . H a r r im a n a n d o th e r s e n io r A m e ric a n officials in E u ro p e r e p o r te d o n 5 Ju n e 1949 th a t a n y le n g th y d e la y in th e e n a c tm e n t of th e M A P w o u ld b rin g to th e su rfa c e " a d e e p la te n t fe e lin g of in s e c u rity " in W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d " re s u r r e c t o ld d o u b ts a n d u n c e rta in tie s as to d e p e n d a b ility a n d c o n s is te n c y of U S fo re ig n policy." A lth o u g h a b u n d a n t in fo rm a tio n s u p p o r te d th e s e c o n ­ c lu s io n s , A m e ric a n officials ig n o re d o r d is m is s e d c o n tra ry in d ic a tio n s. T h e e m b a s s ie s in P aris, C o p e n h a g e n , O s lo , a n d th e H a g u e , fo r e x a m ­ p le , fo u n d n o e v id e n c e th a t re c o v e ry e ffo rts w e re s u ffe rin g b e c a u se C o n g re s s h a d n o t y e t p a s s e d m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e le g isla tio n , b u t still in s is te d th a t A m e ric a n a rm s a id w a s e s s e n tia l to th e a c h ie v e m e n t of e co n o m ic stability. T h e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n , in effect, saw E u ro p e 's n e e d s th r o u g h th e p ris m of its o w n re q u ir e m e n ts . By th e s p r in g of

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1949, fo re ig n p o licy p la n n e r s h a d tu r n e d th e M A P in to a critical te s t of A m e ric a n w ill to re s is t S o v iet e x p a n s io n .52 T h e C o n g re s s , h o w ev er, w a s sk e p tic a l of th e s e v ie w s. D ifficu lties a ro s e o n 21 A p ril w h e n A c h e so n , H a rrim a n , a n d J o h n s o n in fo rm e d a n e x ec u tiv e s e s s io n of th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e a b o u t th e ir p la n s fo r th e M A P. T h e d is c u s s io n fo c u s e d o n th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e M A P a n d th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, w h ic h h a d b e e n s ig n e d o n 4 A p ril, a n d th e to p ic clearly p e rp le x e d a n d d is tre s s e d se v e ra l S e n a to rs . H e n ry C a b o t L o d g e (R -M ass.) fo u n d th e sc o p e of th e M A P e x ce ssiv e ly b ro a d , sin c e it e n c o m p a s s e d c o u n trie s th a t h a d n o t s ig n e d th e p a c t. Tom C o n n a lly (D-Tex.), c h a irm a n of th e c o m m itte e , w o rrie d th a t a g r a n t of a rm s w o u ld e n c o u ra g e m o s t of th e N o rth A tla n tic allies " to sit d o w n a n d fo ld th e ir h a n d s " u n til th e U n ite d S ta te s s e n t tro o p s as w e ll as a rm s to E u ro p e . H . A le x a n d e r S m ith (R-N.J.), a s u p p o r te r of th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, q u e s tio n e d th e n e e d fo r m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e . S in c e th e M A P w a s " a m ilita ry m o v e w h ic h w e k n o w is n o t a d e q u a te ," S m ith s u g g e s te d in s te a d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s re ly o n th e p a c t itself to d e te r a S o v iet in v a s io n .53 T h e c o m m itte e 's re a c tio n u p s e t th e a d m in is tra tio n 's sc h e d u le fo r th e p re s e n ta tio n of a rm s le g isla tio n to C o n g re s s . S ta te D e p a rtm e n t offi­ cials, w h o h a d p re v io u s ly h o p e d to s e n d th e M A P bill to C a p ito l H ill b e fo re th e e n d of A p ril, a b ru p tly re v e rs e d th e ir p o s itio n . C o n c e rn e d a b o u t je o p a rd iz in g a p p ro v a l of th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, T ru m a n ac­ c e p te d o n 12 M a y A c h e so n 's re c o m m e n d a tio n to d e la y tra n s m is s io n of th e a rm s le g isla tio n u n til a fte r ra tific a tio n of th e p a c t. W h e n S e n a te d e lib e ra tio n s d r a g g e d o n in to la te J u n e , T ru m a n , w o rrie d th a t C o n ­ g re s s w o u ld n o t h a v e tim e to act o n th e bill b e fo re a d jo u rn m e n t, re c o n s id e re d h is d e c isio n . B ut leg isla tiv e le a d e rs d is s u a d e d h im . Vand e n b e rg w o r r ie d a b o u t p la c in g th e tre a ty " in th e w r o n g lig h t to th e c o u n try " b y m a k in g it s e e m " a m e re p re lu d e " to th e a rm in g of W e ste rn E u ro p e . Vice P re s id e n t A lb e n W. B arkley, T ru m a n 's p rin c ip a l lia iso n w ith th e S e n a te , a lso c o u n s e le d delay. B o w in g to th is a d v ic e, T ru m a n re a ffirm e d h is e a rlie r d e c isio n o n 1 Ju ly to w a it u n til th e S e n a te h a d c o n s e n te d to th e tre a ty .54 Finally, o n 25 July, h o u rs a fte r ra tify in g th e N o rth A tlan tic Treaty, T ru m a n s e n t th e F o re ig n M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e A ct of 1949 to C o n g re s s . Like th e T itle VI le g isla tio n o n w h ic h it w a s b a s e d , th e d ra ft bill p r o ­ p o s e d a n e n o rm o u s g r a n t of p o w e r to th e p re s id e n t. U n d e r its te rm s , th e c h ie f e x e c u tiv e h a d th e a u th o rity to a rm th o se c o u n trie s "w h o s e

222 • Arming the Free World in c re a s e d a b ility to d e fe n d th e m s e lv e s a g a in s t a g g re s s io n is im p o rta n t to th e n a tio n a l in te re s t o f th e U n ite d S ta te s" a n d to f u r n is h su c h a s s is ta n c e o n te rm s h e d e e m e d a p p ro p ria te . FACC p la n n e r s c o n s id ­ e re d th is e x p a n siv e la n g u a g e n e c e s s a ry fo r flexible u s e of th e c o n ­ tin g e n c y f u n d . In a d d itio n , th e bill sp e c ifie d o n ly th e to ta l a u th o riz a ­ tio n , $1.4 b illio n , n o t th e a m o u n ts th a t e a c h c o u n tr y w o u ld re c e iv e .55 A d m in is tra tio n officials o m itte d th is in fo rm a tio n to av o id d isc lo sin g th e ir p la n s to a rm A u s tria a n d to fo re sta ll c o m p la in ts fro m n a tio n s th a t felt s lig h te d in th e a llo c a tio n of f u n d s .56 T h e se p ro v is io n s s u r p r is e d a n d a n g e r e d in flu e n tia l le g isla to rs a n d h e lp e d p re c ip ita te , a c c o rd in g to S e n a to r C o n n ally , th e g re a te s t s tr u g ­ gle o v e r fo re ig n p o licy le g isla tio n sin c e th e e n a c tm e n t of le n d -le a se . P a rtic u la rly v e h e m e n t w a s a b ip a r tis a n g ro u p of in te rn a tio n a lis ts w h o fa v o re d a n a rm s p ro g ra m b u t c o n d e m n e d th e a d m in is tra tio n bill. L ed b y V a n d e n b e rg , w h o h a d b e e n T ru m a n 's m o s t im p o r ta n t c o n g re s s io n a l s u p p o r te r of th e N o rth A tla n tic Treaty, th e y d e n o u n c e d th e p r o p o s e d le g isla tio n fo r c o n fe rrin g u p o n th e p r e s id e n t u n d u ly b ro a d p o w e rs to a rm a n y n a tio n o n w h a te v e r te rm s h e c o n s id e re d a p p ro p ria te . "It's a lm o st u n b e lie v a b le in its g ra n t o f u n lim ite d p o w e r to th e C h ie f E x ecu ­ tiv e ," h e fu m e d in a le tte r to h is w ife a fte r re a d in g th e tex t. " It w o u ld v irtu a lly m a k e h im th e n u m b e r o n e w a r lo rd of th e e a rth ." V a n d e n b e rg m a d e sim ila r c o m m e n ts b e fo re th e F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e o n 29 Ju ly a n d u r g e d a s w e e p in g re v is io n of th e le g isla tio n , b e c a u se fa ilu re to p a s s a n a rm s bill w o u ld b e a " s u p r e m e tra g e d y ." Jo h n F o ste r D u lles, th e R e p u b lic a n e x p e rt o n fo re ig n a ffa irs a n d n o w a s e n a to r fro m N e w York, a g re e d w ith V a n d e n b e rg a n d w a r n e d A c h e s o n th a t th e a d m in ­ is tra tio n m ig h t d e s tro y b ip a rtis a n c o o p e ra tio n o n fo re ig n p o licy issu e s s h o u ld it p u s h fo r p a s s a g e of th e bill in its c u rr e n t fo rm . A n g e re d a n d e m b a rra s s e d b y s u c h c ritic ism s, A c h e so n , w h o h a d o n ly g la n c e d at th e bill, v e n te d h is w r a th o n h is s u b o rd in a te s . " E v e n a c h ild ," A c h e so n sa rc a stic a lly to ld h is staff, " w o u ld h a v e p ic k e d u p th e w e a k n e s s in th e . . . le g is la tio n ." 57 T ru m a n a n d A c h e s o n a c te d q u ic k ly to a c c o m m o d a te th e ir critics. B oth re a liz e d th a t c o m p ro m ise w a s e s s e n tia l to th e a p p ro v a l of a n a rm s bill; b o th w e re a n x io u s a b o u t th e e ffects o n E u ro p e a n m o ra le of a le n g th y d e la y in im p le m e n tin g th e M A R T h e re v is e d le g isla tio n , w h ic h T ru m a n s e n t to C o n g re s s o n 5 A u g u s t, w a s fa r m o re re stric tiv e in its g r a n t of e x ec u tiv e p o w er. It e m p o w e re d th e p r e s id e n t to p ro v id e m ili­ ta r y a s s is ta n c e o n ly to specific c o u n trie s in sp ecific a m o u n ts : $1,160.9

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m illio n fo r th e N o rth A tla n tic c o u n trie s ; $211.4 m illio n fo r G re e c e a n d T urkey; a n d $27.6 m illio n fo r Ira n , K o re a, a n d th e P h ilip p in e s . D e sp ite s w e e p in g c h a n g e s in th e la n g u a g e of th e le g isla tio n , th e o n ly m a jo r re v is io n s in th e M A P w e re e lim in a tio n o f th e e m e rg e n c y f u n d a n d of a id to A u s tria . A n d e v e n th o u g h it o m itte d th e c o n tin g e n c y fu n d a n d lim ite d th e s c o p e of th e p r e s id e n t's a u th o rity to f u r n is h m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e , th e re v is e d bill e m p o w e re d th e c h ie f e x ec u tiv e to sell m ili­ ta r y e q u ip m e n t to a n y n a tio n " w h ic h h a s jo in e d w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s in a collective d e fe n s e a n d re g io n a l a rra n g e m e n t." V a n d e n b e rg n e v ­ e rth e le s s f o u n d th a t th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t h a d "to ta lly s u r r e n d e r e d o n e ig h ty p e r c e n t of m y c ritic ism s" a n d p r o n o u n c e d th e n e w bill " re a lly p r e tty g o o d ." 58 R e g a rd le s s of th e s e c o n c e s s io n s , th e a d m in is tra tio n still fa c e d a n u p h ill fig h t. U n d e r p r e s s u r e fro m R e p u b lic a n c o n se rv a tiv e s w h o o p p o s e d h e a v y s p e n d in g o n fo re ig n a s s is ta n c e , V a n d e n b e rg a n d D u lle s a s k e d fo r f u r th e r m o d ific a tio n s in th e a d m in is tra tio n 's p la n s . F e a rfu l th a t th e M A P w o u ld e n c o u ra g e th e u n c o o rd in a te d e x p a n s io n of n a tio n a l a rm ie s ra th e r th a n th e in te g r a te d d e fe n se of E u ro p e , th e y u r g e d th e a d m in is tra tio n to scale d o w n its r e q u e s t to a n in te rim p r o ­ g r a m - o n e th a t m e t o n ly th e m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s —u n til th e N o rth A tla n tic C o u n c il c o u ld a d o p t d e ta ile d stra te g ic p la n s . A c h e s o n trie d to e x p la in to th e s e n a to rs th a t h e w a s p r o p o s in g p re c ise ly th e s o rt of p r o g r a m th a t th e y d e m a n d e d : a n in te rim e ffo rt a im e d o n ly at a rm in g fo rce s a lre a d y in e x iste n c e a n d th a t w o u ld c o n trib u te to a n y c o n c e iv ­ a b le p la n fo r th e d e fe n s e of E u ro p e . B u t w h e n S e c re ta ry Jo h n s o n d is c lo s e d th a t d e liv e rie s of m ilita ry s u p p lie s u n d e r th e p r o p o s e d M A P w o u ld s tre tc h o u t o v e r tw o y e a rs, critics d u g in th e ir h e e ls. S tu b b o rn ly , th e y d e m a n d e d c lo se r c o o rd in a tio n b e tw e e n th e M A P a n d th e N o rth A tla n tic d e fe n s e m a c h in e ry a n d re s tric tio n of a u th o riz a tio n to o n ly th o s e f u n d s th a t c o u ld b e s p e n t d u rin g th e c u r r e n t fiscal y e a r.59 O n c e a g a in I r u m a n a n d A c h e s o n y ie ld e d to c o n g re s s io n a l p r e s ­ s u re . A d m in is tra tio n officials re c o g n iz e d th e n e e d fo r f u r th e r c o m p ro ­ m ise w h e n th e H o u s e p a s s e d th e a rm s le g isla tio n o n 15 A u g u s t 1949 a fte r s la s h in g a s s is ta n c e fo r th e N o rth A tla n tic allies b y o n e-h alf. R a th e r th a n fig h tin g fo r th e fu ll a m o u n t in th e S e n a te —a fu tile e n d e a v o r—th e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t fo rm e d a n in fo rm a l allian ce w ith V a n d e n b e rg a n d D u lle s. T he tw o s e n a to rs in tro d u c e d a se rie s of a m e n d m e n ts a im e d at in s u r in g th a t th e M A P w o u ld b e " o n ly a n in te rim p ro g ra m , to b e g e a re d in to th e in te g ra tin g p ro c e s s e s of th e

224 • Arming the Free World N o rth A tla n tic T reaty at th e e a rlie s t p ra c tic a l d a te ." F o llo w in g th e ir le a d , th e S e n a te o n 15 S e p te m b e r trim m e d th e a u th o riz a tio n fo r th e N o rth A tla n tic c o u n trie s to $1 b illio n , h a lf of w h ic h c o u ld b e u s e d w ith o u t re s tric tio n a n d h a lf of w h ic h c o u ld b e o b lig a te d d u rin g th e c u r r e n t fiscal year, u n d e r c o n tra c ts fo r th e p u rc h a s e of m ilita ry s u p ­ p lie s, b u t n o t a c tu a lly s p e n t u n til fiscal y e a r 1951. In a d d itio n , th e u p p e r c h a m b e r re s e rv e d all b u t $100 m illio n of th is a s s is ta n c e u n til th e p r e s id e n t a p p ro v e d a llie d d e fe n s e p la n s fo r " a n in te g ra te d d e fe n se of th e N o rth A tla n tic a re a ." 60 FACC p la n n e r s a c c e p te d th e s e m o d ific a ­ tio n s w ith little re m o rs e sin c e , as V a n d e n b e rg a n d D u lle s n o te d , th e y w o u ld n o t " d e la y b y a day, o r s u b s ta n tia lly re d u c e in sc o p e , th e p r e s e n t p ro g ra m ." M o re re lu c ta n tly , th e H o u s e a c c e p te d th e s e S e n a te te rm s in th e fin a l v e rs io n o f th e bill, b u t o n ly a fte r T ru m a n m a d e th e sh o c k in g a n n o u n c e m e n t th a t th e S o v ie ts h a d e x p lo d e d th e ir first ato m ic d e v ic e .61 A fa r m o re a c rim o n io u s d is p u te a ro s e o v e r th e o m is sio n of C h in a fro m th e M A P. T h e v e h e m e n c e of th e s e c o m p la in ts s u r p r is e d S ta te D e p a rtm e n t officials. O n ly a few m o n th s earlier, A c h e so n h a d p a rrie d th e e ffo rts of S e n a to r P at M c C a rra n (D -N ev.), w h o p r o p o s e d a n e w C h in a a id bill of $1.5 b illio n . A c h e s o n h o p e d th a t th e re le a s e o n 5 A u g u s t of a le n g th y official e x p la n a tio n of a d m in is tra tio n policy, c o m p le te w ith e n o rm o u s d o c u m e n ta r y a p p e n d ix e s , w o u ld fu rth e r s tr e n g th e n th e a d m in is tra tio n 's c ase th a t a d d itio n a l m ilita ry a id to th e n e a rly d e fe a te d N a tio n a lis t a rm ie s of C h ia n g K a i-sh ek w o u ld b e u s e ­ less. " N o th in g th a t th is c o u n tr y d id o r c o u ld h a v e d o n e w ith in th e re a ­ s o n a b le lim its of its c a p a b ilitie s" w o u ld h a v e sa v e d C h ia n g , A c h e so n d e c la re d in th e in tro d u c tio n to th e C h in a W h ite P ap er. T h e N a tio n a lis t d e fe a t " w a s th e p r o d u c t of in te rn a l C h in e s e fo rce s, fo rce s w h ic h th is c o u n tr y trie d to in flu e n c e b u t c o u ld n o t." Yet C h ia n g 's c o n g re s s io n a l s u p p o r te r s fo u n d in th e W h ite P a p e r e v id e n c e th a t c o n firm e d th e ir a n tith e tic a l in te r p r e ta tio n s of T ru m a n 's C h in a policy. S e n a to r H . A lex­ a n d e r S m ith , fo r e x a m p le , th o u g h t th a t th e r e p o r t p ro v e d th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d " le t d o w n " C h ia n g .62 L ed b y S e n a to r W illiam F. K n o w la n d (R -C alif.) a n d R e p re s e n ta tiv e W alter H . Ju d d (R -M inn.), a g ro u p of le g isla to rs c la m o re d fo r m ilita ry a id to th e N a tio n a lis ts . Ju d d tu r n e d th e h e a rin g s o n th e M A P in th e F o re ig n A ffa irs C o m m itte e in to a n in q u e s t in to th e d e a th of th e N a tio n a lis t g o v e rn m e n t in C h in a , o n e in w h ic h h e s o u g h t to d e m o n ­ stra te , at th e v e ry le a st, th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n w a s g u ilty of m a n s la u g h te r. In th e S e n a te , K n o w la n d , a n u n y ie ld in g fo e of th e

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a d m in is tra tio n 's E u ro p e -firs t stra te g y , p r e s s e d fo r a p p ro v a l of $175 m illio n in m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e fo r th e N a tio n a lis ts . W h ile A c h e so n p u b ­ licly o p p o s e d th is d e m a n d , h e p riv a te ly to ld T ru m a n o n 18 A u g u s t th a t h e w o u ld n o t o b je c t to th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a c o n fid e n tia l f u n d of $100 m illio n fo r u s e in A sia . R e p re s e n ta tiv e J o h n M . V orys (R -O hio), a n a rd e n t s u p p o r te r o f th e N a tio n a lis t C h in e s e , c o n d e m n e d s u c h a n a c c o u n t as a n " a n y th in g y o u p le a s e p ro p o s itio n " a n d u r g e d re s tric tio n s o n th e p r e s id e n t's d is c re tio n . B ut b o th h o u s e s u ltim a te ly a p p ro v e d a n u n v o u c h e re d f u n d of $75 m illio n , w h ic h th e p r e s id e n t c o u ld e x p e n d in th e " g e n e ra l a re a " of C h in a . S u c h flexibility a p p e a le d to m a n y leg isla ­ to rs b e c a u se it w o u ld e n a b le th e p r e s id e n t to f u r n is h c o v e rt a id to a v a rie ty of a n ti-C o m m u n is t fo rce s in C h in a . In a n y e v e n t, n o n e of th e m o n e y w e n t fo r th a t p u r p o s e . In s te a d , T ru m a n u s e d m o s t of th e c o n fid e n tia l f u n d fo r th e first d ire c t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e to h a lt c o m m u ­ n is m in I n d o c h in a . Ironically, a C o n g re s s s u s p ic io u s of b ro a d e x ecu tiv e p o w e r to a rm fo re ig n n a tio n s g r a n te d th e p r e s id e n t e x c e p tio n a l a u th o r­ ity to p u r s u e m ilita ry c o n ta in m e n t in S o u th e a s t A s ia .63 T ru m a n , th e n , h a d g o o d r e a s o n to b e p le a s e d o n 6 O c to b e r 1949 w h e n h e s ig n e d th e M u tu a l D e fe n se A s sis ta n c e A ct. C o n g re s s h a d n o t r u b b e r - s ta m p e d h is m ilita ry a id p ro p o s a ls , b u t n e ith e r h a d it fo rc e d s w e e p in g c h a n g e s . In s p ite of th e ru m b lin g s of fiscal c o n v e rsa tio n s . C o n g re s s a p p r o p r ia te d $1.314 b illio n , a lm o s t th e e n tire s u m T ru m a n r e q u e s te d . D e sp ite c o m p la in ts a b o u t ex cessiv e e x ec u tiv e p o w er, T ru m a n s e c u re d w id e la titu d e to d is trib u te a rm s in E a st A sia w ith o u t a n y a c c o u n tin g to C o n g re s s . T he D u lle s-V a n d e n b e rg a m e n d m e n ts re q u ir e d of th e a d m in is tra tio n n o m o re th a n it o rig in a lly in te n d e d : th e a rm in g of E u r o p e a n fo rc e s th a t c o u ld c o n trib u te to a n y p o ss ib le N A TO d e fe n se p la n .64 Still, p e r h a p s th e a d m in is tra tio n 's m o s t sig n ific a n t v ic to ry w a s o n e th a t few, if any, c o n te m p o r a r y o b s e rv e rs re c o g n iz e d . R e g a rd le ss of its critical re v ie w s o f th e M AP, C o n g re s s d id n o t p ro b e d e e p ly in to so m e of th e la rg e r is s u e s th a t th e p ro g ra m s u g g e s te d . L e g isla to rs a rg u e d a b o u t h o w m u c h m ilita ry a id to e x te n d a n d h o w to a p p ly it m o s t effectively, b u t a lm o s t n o o n e in q u ire d a b o u t h o w to e v a lu a te th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss o r u ltim a te ly to c o n tro l a n a rm a m e n ts p ro g ra m th a t a im e d m o re at p s y ­ ch o lo gical th a n m ilita ry g o a ls. A t a tim e w h e n m ilita ry a ssis ta n c e w a s still a s e c o n d a ry a n d e v e n so m e w h a t n o v e l in s tr u m e n t of n a tio n a l policy, C o n g re s s d e m a n d e d fro m th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n o n ly a s u p e rfic ia l ju stific a tio n of its p re fe re n c e fo r larg e -sca le a rm s a id to

226 • Arming the Free World a c c o m p lish its fo re ig n g o a ls. T h e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n , in s h o rt, s e c u re d p a s s a g e of a b illio n -d o lla r a rm s bill, o n e th a t w a s a d m itte d ly th e first o f se v e ra l a n n u a l in s ta llm e n ts , w ith o u t e v e r h a v in g to e x p la in h o w th e p ro v is io n of a rm a m e n ts w o u ld ra ise fo re ig n m o ra le o r h o w lo n g th e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h a v e to k e e p f u r n is h in g s u c h h e lp to s u s ta in th e w ill to re s is t c o m m u n is m .65

Epilogue I think that one of the great problems is . . . can we ever stop once we start[?] —John O. Bell, Assistant Director, Mutual Defense Assistance Program , 3 D ecem ber 1949

I n th e la s t h a lf of 1949, th e re w a s a g o o d d e al of c o n fu s io n a n d u n c e r ta in ty w ith in th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n a b o u t th e fu tu re of th e M ilita ry A s s is ta n c e P ro g ra m . Top p o lic y m a k e rs k n e w th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s w a s o n ly b e g in n in g to s tr e n g th e n th e d e fe n s e s of W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d b u ild u p th e m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts a n d in te rn a l se c u rity fo rc e s in Turkey, Ira n , a n d e ls e w h e re , b u t th e y w e re u n s u r e a b o u t th e m a g n itu d e a n d d u ra tio n of A m e ric a n a s s is ta n c e . A p p e a rin g b e fo re th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m itte e , S e c re ta ry of D e fe n se L o u is J o h n ­ s o n p re d ic te d th a t th e M A P w o u ld la s t fo u r o r five y e a rs a n d re q u ire p ro g re s s iv e ly s m a lle r a p p ro p ria tio n s . A t a lm o s t th e sa m e tim e , F ra n k Pace, Jr., th e d ire c to r of th e B u re a u of th e B u d g e t, a s s e rte d th a t th e p r e s id e n t h a d a p p ro v e d th e M A P " a s a 'o n e - s h o t' o p e ra tio n ." 1 T h e se c o n flic tin g a s s e s s m e n ts c a m e b e fo re th e N a tio n a l S e c u rity C o u n cil in m id-1949 w h e n T ru m a n o rd e re d a re v ie w of n a tio n a l se c u rity e x p e n d itu re s in a n tic ip a tio n of "se rio u s fiscal a n d eco n o m ic p ro b lem [s]" d u rin g th e c o m in g year. H o p in g to m in im iz e a p ro je c te d b u d g e t deficit. Pace th o u g h t th e n e x t b u d g e t s h o u ld c o n ta in o n ly $200,000 fo r th e M A P a n d a h o s t of s m a lle r fo re ig n a id p ro g ra m s . T h e S ta te D e p a rtm e n t o b je c te d v e h e m e n tly . So d id th e Jo in t C h ie fs of Staff, w h o w o rrie d th a t s u c h a d ra s tic c u t w o u ld so w d o u b ts a b o u t A m e ric a n le a d e rs h ip a n d t u r n th e N o rth A tla n tic allies in to m ilita ry liab ilities. T h e N S C u lti­ m a te ly re c o m m e n d e d , a n d T ru m a n fin ally d e c id e d to se e k , a n e w a n n u a l a p p ro p r ia tio n of b e tw e e n $1 b illio n a n d $1.5 b illio n fo r th e M A P in o rd e r to " b o ls te r th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l a ttitu d e s a n d m o ra le of o u r allies a n d m a k e th e m w illin g to striv e m o re e n e rg e tic a lly to w a rd th e o b jec ­ tiv e s w e d e e m e ss e n tia l." T he logic th a t ju s tifie d th e c re a tio n of th e M A P in 1949 s u p p o r te d its c o n tin u a tio n in 1950 at th e sa m e level of e x p e n d itu r e s .2

227

228 • Arming the Free World P la n n in g fo r lo n g -te rm a rm s a id c a u s e d e v e n g re a te r p ro b le m s . In A u g u s t 1949 th e Jo in t M u n itio n s A llo c a tio n C o m m itte e (JM AC) o u t­ lin e d a lo n g -ra n g e m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p r o g r a m th a t w o u ld e n a b le th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d its allies to d e fe n d W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d e v e n tu a lly d e s tro y th e "w ill a n d c a p a c ity " of th e S o v iet U n io n to re s is t s h o u ld w a r o c c u r in 1957 To a c c o m p lish th e s e g o a ls, th e c o m m itte e re c o m m e n d e d a n e n o rm o u s s u m , $21 b illio n , to b e s p e n t d u rin g th e n e x t e ig h t y e a rs to a s s is t fifty c o u n trie s . B e y o n d th e s e p re lim in a ry e s tim a te s , w h ic h th e y c o n c e d e d w e re " e s s e n tia lly s p e c u la tiv e ," th e JM A C p la n n e r s m a d e n o f u r th e r p ro g re s s . T he Jo in t C h ie fs ta b le d th e e x te n d e d p la n in D e c e m b e r 1949, a lth o u g h th e y d id a g re e th a t th e o v e ra ll m ilita ry g o a l of th e M A P s h o u ld b e to im p ro v e th e a b ility of th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d its allies to a c h ie v e th e ir w a r a im s a g a in s t th e S o v iet U n io n . R a th e r th a n try in g to d e v e lo p a d e ta ile d p la n to a ch ie v e th is g o al, th e Jo in t C h ie fs in s te a d s h ifte d th e ir fo c u s to p r e p a r in g a m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e p ro g ra m fo r th e c o m in g fiscal y e a r.3 E v e n less cle arly d e fin e d w a s th e lo n g -te rm a rm s a id p ro g ra m p r o p o s e d in N S C 68. T h is fa m o u s r e a s s e s s m e n t of n a tio n a l se c u rity policy, p ro d u c e d b y a jo in t S ta te -D e fe n se ta s k fo rce in e a rly 1950, p r o p o s e d d ra s tic c o u n te rm e a s u re s to d e a l w ith a S o v iet U n io n b e n t o n w o rld d o m in a tio n . U s in g in c e n d ia ry la n g u a g e , th e a u th o rs of N S C 68 d e p ic te d th e S o v iet U n io n as a "sla v e so c ie ty " w h o s e le a d e rs re q u ire d " th e d y n a m ic e x te n s io n o f th e ir a u th o rity " to a c h ie v e th e ir " f u n d a m e n ­ ta l d e sig n ." H a v in g e x p lo d e d th e ir first ato m ic d e v ic e in 1949, th e S o v ie ts w o u ld re a c h atom ic p a rity w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s in 1954, at w h ic h tim e th e y w o u ld b e p r e p a r e d to risk w ar. T h e U n ite d S ta te s w o u ld h a v e " n o b e tte r choice" in m e e tin g th is th r e a t " th a n to c a p itu la te o r p re c ip ita te g lo b a l w a r," u n le s s it u n d e rto o k "a m o re r a p id b u ild -u p of p o litical, e co n o m ic , a n d m ilita ry s tr e n g th a n d th e re b y of c o n fid e n c e in th e fre e w o rld th a n is n o w c o n te m p la te d ." A rm s a id w a s a n e s s e n tia l c o m p o n e n t of th is m o b iliz a tio n , n o t o n ly b e c a u se it w o u ld h e lp d e te r a n d , u ltim ately , d e fe a t S o v iet a g g re s s io n b u t a lso b e c a u se of its " p s y ­ ch o lo gical im p a c t—th e rev iv a l of c o n fid e n c e a n d h o p e in th e fu tu re ." A lth o u g h N S C 68 p ro v id e d n o e s tim a te o f th e c o st of s u c h a m ilita ry a id p ro g ra m , o r e v e n a lis tin g o f p o te n tia l re c ip ie n ts , it clearly c a lle d fo r a v a s t e x p a n s io n of A m e ric a n a rm s tra n s fe rs , p e r h a p s a m o u n tin g to as m u c h a s $25 b illio n o v e r th e n e x t se v e ra l y e a rs. U n w illin g as y e t to s a n c tio n s u c h a d ra s tic c h a n g e in n a tio n a l se c u rity policy, T ru m a n

Epilogue • 229 te m p o ra rily d e fe rre d a n y a c tio n o n N S C 68 u n til h e re c e iv e d f u rth e r in fo rm a tio n a b o u t th e p ro b a b le c o sts of th e p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m s .4 E v e n lo n g -ra n g e N A TO d e fe n s e p la n s re m a in e d u n fo rm u la te d , u n re a lis tic , o r u n c le a r a n d th e A m e ric a n c o n trib u tio n to th e m u n s p e c ­ ifie d o r u n c e rta in . S om e p r o g r e s s to w a rd a c o m m o n d e fe n se d id o c c u r d u rin g la te 1949, w h e n th e N o rth A tlan tic D e fe n se C o m m itte e a p p ro v e d a s tra te g ic c o n c e p t th a t calle d fo r th e U n ite d S ta te s, in th e e v e n t of w ar, to c a rry o u t stra te g ic b o m b in g m is s io n s a n d to s h a re w ith G re a t B rita in th e ta s k of s e c u rin g th e A tla n tic se a la n e s , w h ile th e E u ro p e a n m e m b e rs of th e a llian c e p ro v id e d th e b u lk of th e g ro u n d fo rc e s. A lth o u g h th is s tra te g ic c o n c e p t sa tisfie d th e r e q u ire m e n t in th e M D A A fo r in te g r a te d d e fe n s e p la n n in g , it left u n d e c id e d v ita l m a tte rs a b o u t h o w to e s ta b lis h th e n e c e s s a ry fo rce s. M o re d e ta ile d w a s th e N A TO M e d iu m T erm D e fe n se P la n fo r a w a r in 1954. B ut, b e c a u se of a lack of critical in fo rm a tio n fro m th e m e m b e r c o u n trie s a b o u t m ilita ry p ro d u c tio n a n d m a n p o w e r, th e re w a s n o w ay of k n o w in g in e a rly 1950, a s S e c re ta ry of S ta te D e a n A c h e s o n p riv a te ly c o m p la in e d , w h e th e r th e p la n w a s "p ra c tic a b le of a c c o m p lis h m e n t o r r e p r e s e n ts w is h fu l th in k ­ in g ." A n y re a listic p la n fo r th e d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e , A m e ric a n e x p e rts e s tim a te d , w o u ld re q u ire $30 b illio n of s p e n d in g o n a rm a ­ m e n ts b e y o n d c u r r e n t b u d g e ta r y lev els d u rin g th e n e x t five y e a rs. B ut d u rin g th e s p r in g of 1950, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id n o t p re s s N A TO c o m m itte e s to c o n s id e r h o w th is s p e n d in g m ig h t b e a p p o r ­ tio n e d —b e tw e e n A m e ric a n a rm s a id o r a d d itio n a l E u ro p e a n m ilita ry s p e n d in g —fo r fe a r th a t th e s u m m ig h t s e e m so v a st th a t m e re d is c u s ­ sio n of th e is s u e w o u ld u n d e rm in e th e c o n fid e n c e in th e f u tu r e th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d so c a re fu lly c u ltiv a te d d u rin g th e p re v io u s year. In s te a d , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n e la b o ra te ly p u b lic iz e d th e first s h ip m e n ts of M A P m a te rie l to E u ro p e a n d c a re fu lly a v o id e d a n y m e n tio n th a t th e s e w e re to k e n a m o u n ts a n d th a t d e liv e rie s w o u ld s tre tc h o u t o v e r tw o y e a rs. A t th e sa m e tim e , th e a d m in is tra tio n s o u g h t a n a d d itio n a l g r a n t of $1 b illio n in fiscal y e a r 1951 fo r m ilita ry a s ­ sis ta n c e to N A TO e v e n th o u g h , o n c e a g a in , th e p la n n in g th a t u n d e rla y th is r e q u e s t w a s n o t tru ly in te g ra te d b u t s im p ly th e c o n s o lid a tio n of n a tio n a l e ff o r ts .5 So m u c h d id n a tio n a l s e c u rity officials ta k e as a m a tte r of fa ith th a t A m e ric a n a rm s a id fo s te re d fo re ig n c o n fid e n c e a n d d e te r r e d a g g re s ­ sio n th a t th e y w e re w illin g to p ro v id e a n o th e r a n n u a l in s ta llm e n t

230 • Arming the Free World w ith o u t s e ttlin g th e m o s t v ita l is s u e s a b o u t th e p ro g ra m 's u ltim a te o b je c tiv e s. A fte r le a v in g th e g o v e rn m e n t, A c h e s o n c o n c e d e d th a t th e a d m in is tra tio n 's th in k in g " re a lly w e n t in a circle." H e a n d h is col­ le a g u e s p ro m is e d C o n g re s s th a t A m e ric a n a id w o u ld c o n trib u te to a n in te g ra te d d e fe n s e of th e N o rth A tla n tic " a t a c o n s id e ra b le o v erall sa v in g " a n d " a t a c o st w h ic h th e E u ro p e a n s c o u ld s u p p o r t in tim e , w ith o u t a id fro m th e U n ite d S ta te s." B ut " th a t all d e p e n d e d o n w h a t w a s g o in g to b e se t u p ," A c h e s o n re fle c te d , a n d "o f c o u rse left th e th in g v a g u e ." 6 A m a jo r r e a s o n fo r th e s e d iffic u ltie s in fo rm u la tin g a lo n g -te rm p r o g r a m of a rm s a id th a t c o u ld s tr e n g th e n W e ste rn d e fe n s e s w a s th a t th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n h a d fa r g re a te r e x p e rie n c e w ith u s in g m ili­ ta r y a s s is ta n c e as a p o litica l a n d p sy c h o lo g ic a l in s tr u m e n t. A lth o u g h th e first m ilita ry a id p r o g r a m s cle arly h a d m ilita ry p u r p o s e s —th e d e fe a t of th e g u e rrilla s in G re e c e , th e m o d e rn iz a tio n of th e T u rk ish a rm e d fo rc e s, th e p ro m o tio n of a collective d e fe n se of W e ste rn E u ro p e —th e y h a d o v e rrid in g p o litical o b je c tiv e s, s u c h as c u ltiv a tin g g o o d w ill o v e rs e a s, ra is in g fo re ig n m o ra le , a n d stiffe n in g th e w ill to re s is t c o m m u n is m . E v e n p ro je c ts th a t th e se rv ice d e p a r tm e n ts s p o n ­ s o re d , s u c h as th e W e ste rn H e m is p h e re D e fe n se P ro g ra m , a im e d f u n ­ d a m e n ta lly a t p o litical e n d s . N o t o n ly d id g o v e rn m e n t officials b e lie v e th a t m ilita ry a s s is ta n c e w o u ld s tr e n g th e n th e fib e r of th e re c ip ie n ts, b u t a lso th e y h o p e d th a t it w o u ld re a s s u re fo re ig n n a tio n s of A m e ric a n d e te rm in a tio n to c o n ta in S o v iet e x p a n s io n , if n e c e ssa ry , w ith s tro n g e r m e a s u re s . In s h o rt, b u ild in g fo re ig n c o n fid e n c e b y s tre n g th e n in g fo r­ e ig n m ilita ry e s ta b lis h m e n ts w a s th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n 's p rim a ry c o n c e rn d u rin g th e late 1940s. B ecau se of th is p re o c c u p a tio n w ith th e m o ra le of th e re c ip ie n ts , th e g iv in g of m ilita ry a id w a s m o re im p o r ta n t th a n th e sp ecific p u r p o s e s to w h ic h th e a id w a s p u t. T h e e x te n s io n of a rm s a s s is ta n c e w a s a sy m b o lic act; it r e q u ire d f r e q u e n t re p e titio n , le s t th e c e s s a tio n of a id d e s tro y th e fo re ig n c o n fid e n c e th a t th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d so se d u lo u s ly trie d to n u r tu r e . D u rin g S e n a te h e a rin g s in 1949, K e n n e th S. W h e rry (R -N ebr.) d e c la re d th a t o n c e th e U n ite d S ta te s b e g a n to f u r n is h a rm s a id it w o u ld b e " m o ra lly b o u n d to c o n tin u e th o se a p p ro p ria tio n s ; a n d if w e c u t th e m off n e x t y e a r . . . m y o p in io n is th a t w e w o u ld b e w o rs e off, as far as th e m o ra le of th o se fo rce s a re [sic] c o n c e rn e d , if w e d id n o t c o n tin u e it th a n if w e h a d n e v e r s ta rte d ." E v e n th o u g h W h e rry w a s a s ta u n c h foe of th e M AP, a d m in is tra tio n officials s h a r e d h is re a s o n in g . D u rin g

Epilogue • 231 p la n n in g c o n fe re n c e s in la te 1949 fo r th e c o n tin u a tio n of th e MAP, S ta te D e p a rtm e n t a n a ly s ts a s s e r te d th a t it w o u ld b e m o re " d a n g e ro u s " to r e q u e s t s m a lle r a p p ro p r ia tio n s in th e c o m in g y e a r th a n in th e c u r ­ r e n t o n e b e c a u se a n y re d u c tio n w o u ld in d ic a te a " w e a k e n in g " of A m e ric a n in te re s t in th e N o rth A tla n tic a llian ce. A n x ie tie s a b o u t fo r­ e ig n re so lv e a n d A m e ric a n re lia b ility th u s n o t o n ly in s p ire d th e M A P b u t a lso d e fin e d o b je c tiv e s th a t w e re u n m e a s u ra b le , o p e n -e n d e d , a n d q u ite p o s s ib ly u n a tta in a b le .7 T h e e x p a n siv e ju stific a tio n fo r a rm s a id th a t e m e rg e d d u rin g th e late 1940s h e lp s e x p la in th e r a p id g ro w th of th e M AP. R e s p o n d in g to a d m in is tra tio n w a rn in g s a b o u t th e d a n g e r s of re d u c e d a rm s a id e x p e n ­ d itu r e s , C o n g re s s p ro v id e d a n a d d itio n a l a p p ro p r ia tio n fo r th e M A P in fiscal y e a r 1951 of $1,222 b illio n . A n e n o rm o u s in c re a se in m ilita ry a id fo llo w e d th e o u tb re a k of th e K o re a n War. A m o n g th e first c a su a ltie s of th e N o rth K o re a n in v a s io n w e re th e b u d g e ta r y re s tra in ts th a t T ru m a n h a d im p o s e d o n n a tio n a l s e c u rity s p e n d in g a n d th a t s e rv e d as th e p rin c ip a l b a rrie r to a m a ssiv e in c re a s e in a rm s a id . T ru m a n a p p ro v e d a re v is e d v e rs io n of N S C 68 o n 29 S e p te m b e r 1950, o n ly d a y s a fte r h e h a d s e c u re d fro m C o n g re s s a $4 b illio n s u p p le m e n ta l a p p ro p r ia tio n fo r th e M AP. A p p re h e n s iv e th a t th e N o rth K o re a n a tta c k w a s th e p re lu d e to f u r th e r C o m m u n is t m ilita ry a ctio n , th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n c o n ­ s id e re d th e s e f u n d s n e c e s s a ry to a cc e le ra te th e e q u ip p in g of N A TO fo rce s as w ell a s to fo rtify c o n ta in m e n t e ffo rts in E a st A sia . A t a n y ra te , b e c a u se th e P e n ta g o n g a v e p rio rity to e q u ip p in g A m e ric a n tro o p s , little a d d itio n a l e q u ip m e n t a c tu a lly re a c h e d th e N A TO c o u n trie s e v e n a s la te as th e e n d of 1951.8 C o n s e q u e n tly , th e m a in effect of th e s u p p le ­ m e n ta l a p p ro p r ia tio n w a s to c alm E u ro p e a n a n x ie tie s a b o u t NA TO d e fe n s e s a n d w a rn th e S o v ie ts of A m e ric a n re so lv e . T h e c o n c e rn s a b o u t fo re ig n m o ra le a n d A m e ric a n re so lv e a n d th e g ro w th of th e M A P w e re in s e p a ra b le .9 In th e la te 1940s so m e A m e ric a n officials re c o g n iz e d th a t th e im p e ­ tu s b e h in d th e g ro w th of th e M A P w o u ld b e d iffic u lt to c o n tro l. Paul G . H o ffm a n , th e E co n o m ic C o o p e ra tio n a d m in istra to r, w o n d e re d w h e th e r th e M A P w a s " th e b e g in n in g of a n e n o rm o u s ly c o stly p ro g ra m th a t w ill g o first to E u ro p e a n d th e n p e r h a p s to A sia a n d th e n to S o u th A m e ric a n [sic] a n d w h e re d o e s it s to p ? " L ik ew ise, Jo h n O . Bell, a s s is ta n t d ire c to r of th e MAP, a v e rre d th a t "if w e in d u lg e in e ith e r s ta r tin g o r c o n tin u in g p ro g ra m s w ith o u t h a v in g p r e tty clearly in m in d w h e re w e w a n t to s to p a n d w h e n w e w a n t to s to p a n d w h a t w e are

232 • Arming the Free World tr y in g to d o , th e n w e c a n v e ry e a sily g e t in to a la rg e se rie s of ra th o le s w h ic h a re b o th c o stly a n d d a n g e ro u s ." D e sp ite th e s e p ro p h e tic w a r n ­ in g s, th e T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n d id n o t clearly d e fin e its g o a ls o r e s ta b lis h c rite ria fo r g a u g in g th e e ffe c tiv e n e ss of m ilita ry a id . P ro g ra m s d e v o te d p rim a rily to p sy c h o lo g ic a l a n d p o litical p u r p o s e s —a lte rin g th e p e rc e p tio n s of a d v e rs a rie s a n d th e w ill of a llie s—h a d n o in h e re n t lim its. " C a n w e e v e r s to p o n c e w e sta rt[? ]" Bell w o n d e r e d in 1949. T he T ru m a n a d m in is tra tio n n e v e r a n s w e r e d th a t q u e s tio n , a n d b e c a u se it d id n o t it left as a leg acy a m o m e n tu m fo r a rm s a id th a t its su c c e ss o rs c o u ld n o t r e s is t.10

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

AG ASA Asst. SecDef FM A Budget C-3 CM H C/S Compilation Book

DOHP

Records, A djutant G eneral's Office, National Archives Records, A ssistant Secretary of the Army, National Archives Records, A ssistant to the Secretary of Defense for For­ eign M ilitary Assistance, National Archives Records, Bureau of the Budget, National Archives M inutes, M eetings of the Com m ittee of Three, N ational Archives C enter of M ilitary History, W ashington, D.C. Records, Office of the Chief of Staff, War D epartm ent G eneral and Special Staffs, N ational Archives "Com pilation of Studies and Policies Pertaining to Countries U nder Consideration for Military Assis­ tance," [January 1949], file 092 Top Secret (1/8), G-3. John Foster Dulles Oral H istory Project, Seeley G. M udd Library

DSB

Department of State Bulletin

EUR

Records, Office of European Affairs, D epartm ent of State, National Archives Records, Secretary's Daily M eetings, D epartm ent of State, National Archives FACC and MAP D ocum ents, A ssistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), National Archives

ExecSecretariat FACC-MAP FRUS

G-3 G-4 ISA JCS OPD

Foreign Relations of the United States

Records, D eputy Chief of the United States Army, G-3, N ational Archives Records, A ssistant Chief of the United States Army, G-4, N ational Archives Records, A ssistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, National Archives Records, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives Records, O perations Division, War D epartm ent G en­ eral and Special Staffs, National Archives

233

234 • Notes to Pages 3-8 PCA P&O PP PPS PSF S/A (Gray-Pace) S/A (Royall) S/D SecNavy State SWNCC WHCF

Records, Policy Com m ittee on A rm s and A rm am ents, N ational Archives Records, Plans and O perations Division, U nited States A rm y Staff, N ational Archives Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman

Records, Policy Planning Staff, D epartm ent of State, N ational Archives President's Secretary's File, Truman Library Records, Secretary of the Army, G ordon Gray and Frank Pace, Jr., N ational Archives Records, Secretary of the Army, K enneth C. Royall, N ational Archives Records, Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Archives Forrestal Papers, G eneral Records of the D epartm ent of the Navy, N ational Archives General Records, Department of State, National Archives Records, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Com­ mittee, National Archives Confidential File, W hite H ouse Central Files, Truman Library

INTR O D UCTIO N

1. Report of the Secretary of Defense, 92-99. 2. JCS 2032/3, 6 A ugust 1949, file JCS Papers, G-3. 3. Pach, "M ilitary A ssistance and A m erican Foreign Policy," 137-38; Agency for International D evelopm ent, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, 4; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 43: 469, 477. 4. Kemp, "Dilemmas of the Arm s Traffic"; Gelb, "Arms Sales"; Farley, Kaplan, and Lewis, Arms Across the Sea, 34-37; Washington Post, 20 April 1977. 5. Transcript, Princeton Sem inars, 10 O ctober 1953, reel 1, track 1, p. 4, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. CHAPTER 1

1. M em orandum , Shephard to Alm ond, 30 May 1946, folder C46, series 39.1, Budget. 2. DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2:372; Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports, 174-75; Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemi­ sphere Defense, 208-9; Harkavy, The Arms Trade, 146-47; Kemp, "The Arms Transfer Phenom enon," 15-25; H uston, The Sinews of War, 394-97; Field, Amer­ ica and the Mediterranean World, 311-13. For a discussion of the legal bases for the transfer of military equipm ent to foreign nations, see m em orandum . Leva to Forrestal, 16 Septem ber 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 14, JCS. 3. Herm es, "Survey of the D evelopm ent of the Role of the U.S. Army M ilitary Adviser"; Wright, United States Policy Toward Egypt, 72-83; Field, Amer­ ica and the Mediterranean World, 389-91; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 4. 4. 41 Stat. 1056; 44 Stat. 565.

Notes to Pages 8-12 • 235 5. Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports, 37-115, 157-68; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, 33, 153; R. Sm ith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 224; M unro, The United States and the Carib­ bean Republics, 163, 219, 292; DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy, 52-53; Tulchin, The Aftermath of War; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 178-211, 236-63. 6. Q uoted in H erring, Aid to Russia, 3. 7. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 108-13; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 226-32; Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 46-52; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 30-36. 8. 54 Stat. 396. The legislation bore the nam e of Senator Key Pittm an, Democrat of Nevada, C hairm an of the Foreign Relations Committee. 9. Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 131-32; Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act, 52-53; Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, 90. 10. 55 Stat. 31. 11. Q uotations from Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roo­ sevelt, 16:354; Rosenm an, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 9:643; Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act, 53, 91-133; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 252-60; M artel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War, 1-6; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 816; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 145-61, 166-68; Brown and O pie, American Foreign Assistance, 544; Coakley, "Roosevelt and LendLease." 12. See Stettinius, Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory. 13. M em orandum , M atthew s to D unn, 23 June 1944, folder International O rganization for Security and Peace, EUR; m em orandum for record by Gilmour, 8 May 1945, file 400 Top Secret (7), OPD. 14. Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 818-19; Vigneras, Rearming the French, 334-36, 362-63; D epartm ent of Commerce, Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 86-88. 15. "Lend-Lease as of Septem ber 30,1945," 1299. 16. Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, 204-14, 223-38; A. Miller, Search for Security, 67-71, 122-49; Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, 46-61, 70-80; Gormly, "K eeping the Door O p en in Saudi A rabia," 189-205; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 644-52; "Lend-Lease as of Septem ber 30, 1945," 283-89; letters, Hull to Leahy, 25 May 1943; Leahy to H ull, 3 June 1943; H ayter to Ailing, 4 December 1943; Ailing to Hayter, 15 December 1943; and H ayter to Ailing, 22 December 1943; all in FRUS: 1943, 4:1-4, 915-16, 917-18, 920; m em orandum , Stettinius to Roosevelt, 22 De­ cem ber 1944, FRUS: 1944, 5:757-58; m em orandum , Byrnes to Truman, 31 January 1946, FRUS: 1945, 8:999-1000. 17. Letter, Leahy to Hull, 30 December 1943, FRUS: 1944, 7:87-92. See below, chap. 2. 18. JCS 771/18, 5 Septem ber 1945, folder G en. Marshall-Col. Byroade Dec. 1945, JCS-SWNCC Papers, M arshall Mission; m em orandum , Crowley to Truman, 6 July 1945, 800.24/7-645, State. 19. H erring, Aid to Russia, 155-56, 181-236 (quotation from 192-93); Pater­ son, Soviet-American Confrontation, 159; Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 53-54; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 254; M artel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War, 7-24; Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership, 142-48,182-85.

236 • Notes to Pages 12-19 20. Q uotation from m em orandum for Roosevelt, 28 December 1944, e n d . to SWNCC 17/1, 10 M arch 1945, file SWNCC 17, SWNCC; SWNCC 4/10, 7 July 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:251-54. 21. NSC 14/1,1 July 1948, FRUS: 1948, 1: pt. 2, 586. 22. Q uotation from m em orandum , JCS to Hull, 11 O ctober 1944, e n d . to SWNCC 17, 5 February 1945, folder SWNCC 17, SWNCC; CCS 636,1 A ugust 1944; CCS 653, 22 A ugust 1944; JCS 1039, 8 Septem ber 1944; JCS 1039/1, 28 Septem ber 1944; and CCS 653/1, 10 Septem ber 1944, all in file CCS 400 (7-30-44), JCS; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 709-12. 23. Q uotation from m em orandum , Stettinius to Roosevelt, 28 December 1944, 851.24/1-345, State; m em orandum . G rew to Roosevelt, 21 M arch 1945, 851.24/1-845, State; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 712-15. 24. Brief accounts of dem obilization can be found in Sparrow, "Demobiliza­ tion of the U nited States Arm y after World War II"; and Coakley et al., "Résum é of A rm y Roll-Up Following World War II." 25. M em orandum , Crowley to Truman, 6 July 1945, 800.24/7-645, State; m em orandum concerning S. 1975, n.d., 800.24/5-645, State; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 215-19. 26. See Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, chap. 1; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 131-37. 27 For State D epartm ent planning, see Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Prepara­ tion. For Leahy's views, see m inutes, 177th m eeting of the Com bined Chiefs of Staff, 29 Septem ber 1944, file CCS 400 (7-30-44), JCS. For the creation of the SWNCC, see letter, Stettinius to Forrestal, 29 November 1944; and letter, Stim son and Forrestal to Stettinius, 1 December 1944, both in FRUS: 1944, 1:1466-68; Etzold, "American O rganization for National Security," 1-6. 28. Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 140-41. 29. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 60-61, 238-39; Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, 204-5; Goldberg, A History of the United States Air Force, 29; M ason, The United States Air Force, 74-75; R Sm ith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 104-6. 30. For detailed discussions of proposed air assistance to Latin America and China, see below, chaps. 2 and 3, respectively. 31. Q uotations from m em orandum , Lovett to McCloy, 16 January 1945; and m em orandum , M cCarthy to McCloy, 3 January 1945, both in folder SWNCC 17, SWNCC. 32. Converse, "U nited States Plans for a Postwar O verseas M ilitary Base System ," 80-97; H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, Selected Execu­ tive Session Hearings, 7:11-23; Rogow, James Forrestal, 175-78; Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 140-41. 33. Q uotations from m em orandum SWN-4096, JCS to Byrnes, 29 March 1946, FRUS: 1946, 1:1166; Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, 234-36. 34. Q uotations from JPS 633/4,18 July 1945; JCS 1496/2,17 Septem ber 1945; and JCS 1518, 19 Septem ber 1945, all in file CCS 381 (5-13-45) sec. 1, JCS; Sherry, Preparing for the Next War, 198-205. 35. Q uotations from JCS 1518, 19 Septem ber 1945; and H arbutt, The Iron Curtain, 153-54; JIC 329, 3 November 1945, file ABC 336 Russia (19 Aug 43), P&O; Poole, "From Conciliation to C ontainm ent," 12-15; Stoler, "From Continentalism to G lobalism ," 312-21; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 95-96; Gormly, The Collapse of the Grand Alliance, 39-54. 36. JCS 1496/2,17 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) sec. 1, JCS.

Notes to Pages 19-26 • 237 37 JCS 1518,19 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) sec. 1, JCS. 38. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearings, 7:12-13. See also m em orandum SM-5233, JCS to SWNCC, 12 M arch 1946, folder SWNCC 276, SWNCC. 39. Q uotation from JPS 633/4,18 July 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) sec. 1, JCS; Leffler, "The Am erican C onception of National Security," 350-51. 40. M inutes of the 167th m eeting of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, 13 Novem ber 1945; m em orandum SC-169b by Secretary's Staff Committee, 16 Novem ber 1945; and SWNCC 282, 27 M arch 1946, all in FRUS: 1946,1:1118-28, 1160-65; O 'B rien, "N ational Security and the New W arfare," 50-51. 41. Q uotation from "Special Inform ation for the P resident," 13 April 1945, folder Secretary of State Edw ard R. Stettinius, Subject File, PSF; notes for conference w ith the president, 3 July 1945, folder Foreign—M emos for the President, 1945-1949, Subject File, PSF; m em orandum , Hickerson to SWNCC, 29 Novem ber 1945, 851.24/10-1545, State; letter, Byrnes to Patterson, 10 December 1945, 851.24/11-2745, State; m em orandum , McCabe to Clayton, 7 December 1945, 851.24/12-745, State; aide-memoire to the French Embassy, 20 December 1945, 851.24/12-2045, State; m em orandum , Elliott to Brown, 31 M arch 1949, 851.24/3-1949, State; m em orandum , Cleveland to C um m ins, 2 July 1946, e n d . to PCA M-6, 3 July 1946; and PCA S-6, 3 July 1946, both in PCA; DSB 21 (26 Septem ber 1949): 48; Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan, 35-38. 42. Q uotations from Messer, "Paths Not Taken," 304, 309; DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence, 155-69; H arbutt, The Iron Curtain, 154-55; Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, 338-40. 43. Chern, Dilemma in China, 194-95. 44. M em orandum , Lincoln to Joint Staff Planners, 19 O ctober 1945, file 400.3295, OPD. 45. M em orandum SWN-3276, Secretary of SWNCC to SWNCC, 3 O ctober 1945, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC; JCS 1448/1, 31 A ugust 1945, folder G en. Marshall-Col. Byroade Dec. 1945, JCS-SWNCC Papers, M arshall M ission. 46. JPS 765/1,11 December 1945, file CCS 400.3 (10-20-45), JCS. 47. In a related action, the SWNCC recom m ended that the State D epartm ent use surplus p roperty as a m eans of acquiring overseas bases and sites for legations. See SWNCC 179/1,10 December 1945, folder SWNCC 179, SWNCC. 48. SWNCC 202/1, 24 January 1946, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC. 49. 58 Stat. 765. 50. SWNCC 202/1, 24 January 1946, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC. 51. M em orandum by Ludlow, 12 February 1946, ibid.; m em orandum , Blaisdellto M atthew s, 28 January 1946, 800.24/1-2846, State. 52. O n the disposal of surplus property, see m em orandum , H oopes to Leva, 3 Decem ber 1948, file CD 19-2-10, S/D; m em orandum . Lutes to Lemnitzer, 8 June 1949, file MISC 400.703 (Surplus Property), CMH. 53. SWNCC 202/2, 21 M arch 1946, FRUS: 1946, 1:1145-60. 54. SC/R-184, 5 February 1946, ibid., 1141-42. 55. PCA M-4, 19 June 1946; and PCA M-6, 3 July 1946, both in PCA; letter, Clayton to Byrnes, 12 Septem ber 1946, FRUS: 1946, 7:210. 56. Messer, The End of an Alliance, 161-81; H arbutt, The Iron Curtain, 159-82; Thomas, Armed Truce, 481-86. 57. SWNCC 202/2 stated that while the adm inistration expected that Swe­ den w ould purchase m ilitary equipm ent prim arily from G reat Britain, favor-

238 • N otes to Pages 26-31 able consideration should be given to specific requests for a limited num ber of aircraft. 58. Telegram no. 428, Johnson to Byrnes, 6 M arch 1946, 858.24/3-646, State; telegram no. 555, Byrnes to Johnson, 20 M arch 1946, 858.24/3-646, State; m em ­ orandum , H ickerson to Acheson, 30 April 1946, 858.24/3-1646, State; note. State D epartm ent to Counselor, Swedish Legation, 10 May 1946, 858.24/ 3-1346, State; m em orandum , Acheson to Hickerson, n .d ., FW 858.24/3-1346, State; m em orandum , C um m ing to Hickerson, 18 April 1946, 858.24/3-1346, State; telegram no. 1592, Acheson to Ravndal, 9 O ctober 1946, 858.24/5-646, State; m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 13 A ugust 1946, 858.24/ 8-1346, State; m em orandum , C um m ing to Hickerson, 16 A ugust 1946, 858.24/ 8-1346, State; m em orandum , Acheson to Clayton, 28 Septem ber 1946, FW 858.24/9-1646, State; telegram no. 5469, Acheson to Jacobs, 11 O ctober 1946, 858.24/10-1146, State; PCA M-10, 5 A ugust 1946; and PCA M-17, 23 Sep­ tem ber 1946, both in PCA. 59. Q uotation from H ouse Com m ittee on International Affairs, Selected Executive Session Hearings 7:12, 24-31; Hess, The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 217-28, 244-50; Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 110-55; Shalom, The United States and the Philippines, 14-32; Schirmer and Shalom, The Philippines Reader, 96-100. 60. Q uotations from SWNCC 201, 2 O ctober 1945, folder SWNCC 201, SWNCC; and Congressional Record 92: 10336; letter, M urray to H enderson, 9 O ctober 1945, 891.20 M issions/10-945, State; m em orandum , "Proposed A m endm ents to Legislation," 21 November 1945, folder MAG—A greem ent, M arshall Mission.

CHAPTER 2

1. M em orandum by Dreier, 13 M arch 1945, 810.24/3-1445, State. 2. M em orandum SM-5062, M cFarland to SWNCC, 21 February 1946, file CCS 092 United States (12-21-45) sec. 1, JCS. 3. SWNCC 4/10, 7 July 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:251-52. 4. The best study of U nited States policies tow ard Latin America prior to and during World War II is Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy. See also Fagg, Latin America, 795-99; Connell-Sm ith, The Inter-American System, 110-24; Lan­ ger and G leason, The Challenge to Isolation, 129-36, 272-80, 607-37, 688-702; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 147-69, 593-624; Davis, Finan, and Peck, Latin American Diplomatic History, 222-42; M echam, The United States and Inter-American Security; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 175-77, 233-36; Child, Unequal Alliance, 16-62. 5. O n G erm an penetration and Roosevelt's reaction, see Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere; Friedlander, Prelude to Downfall, 3-30, 105-12; 225-28; Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South America, 12-50; Reynolds, The Crea­ tion of the Anglo-American Alliance, 40-42; Grow, The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay, 25-41. O n propaganda and cultural diplomacy, see Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 24-49; H aines, "Under the Eagle's W ing," 373-88. O n economic and trade relations, see M cCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 148-75. O n the inter-A m erican conferences, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 601-11, 688-92, 821-29,1143-50.

Notes to Pages 32-36 • 239 6. M anuscript prepared by Am erican Theater Section, OPD, "H istory of Latin Am erican M ilitary C ooperation in the War Effort," [Septem ber 1944], file 336 Latin America (42), OPD; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, 190-91; C onn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, 173-74, 184-85; H aglund, Latin America and the Transformation ofU.S. Strategic Thought, 146-222. 7 C onn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, 178-79. 8. Ibid., 207-37; Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 53-54; Stim son Diaries, 32:57-58 (reel 6), Yale University Library; M cCann, The BrazilianAmerican Alliance, 204-9. 9. Q uotation from "S tatem ent of War D epartm ent Policy as Regards Supply of Lend Lease M aterials to Latin Am erica," 6 A ugust 1943, file 400.3295 (26), OPD; Hilton, "The U nited States, Brazil, and the Cold War," 599-601. By the en d of the war, the U nited States furnished $492.5 million of military and naval supplies to Latin America, about 1 percent of total lend-lease expenditures. Because of its failure to cooperate w ith the United States in m easures of hem ispheric defense, A rgentina was the only Latin A m erican nation that did not receive lend-lease arm s. See Child, Unequal Alliance, 48. 10. Lieuw en, Arms and Politics in Latin America, 192-95; Furniss, "American Wartime Objectives in Latin Am erica," 260-71; Estep, United States Military Aid to Latin America, 19; M cCann, "Brazil, the United States, and World War II," 59-76; G ellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 136-38. 11. Q uotations from "Statem ent of War D epartm ent Policy as Regards Supply of Lend Lease M aterials to Latin Am erica," 6 A ugust 1943, file 400.3295 (26), OPD; and "Report by the Joint Arm y and Navy Advisory Board on A m erican Republics," n .d ., FRUS: 1944, 7:87-92. 12. Q uotation from JCS 629 17, 27 A ugust 1944, file CCS 400.3295 (12-16-43) sec. 2, JCS; letter, Leahy to Hull, 30 December 1943; letter, Stettinius to Leahy, 29 February 1944; "Statem ent of Policy. . . C oncerning the Supplying of LendLease M aterials to the Am erican Republics," 24 June 1944; and m em orandum by M cGurk, 4 A ugust 1944, all in FRUS: 1944, 7:87, 93-96, 97-99; transcript, H ertford oral history, 12-13, Truman Library. 13. Q uotation from m em orandum by Chalm ers, 29 February 1944, 810.248/91, State; m em orandum , Johnson to Bonsai, 10 M arch 1944, 810.248/92, State; letter, H ull to Forrestal, 17 A ugust 1944; and m em orandum , H ull to Roosevelt, 28 A ugust 1944, both in FRUS: 1944, 7:101-2; m em orandum by Dreier, 6 Septem ber 1944, 810.24/9-644, State; m em orandum . Dreier to Lockwood, 2 January 1945, 810.24/1-1145, State; m em orandum , Leahy to Stim son and Forrestal, 5 Septem ber 1944; SWNCC 4, 9 January 1945; SWNCC 4/1,19 January 1945; SWNCC 4 /3,4 April 1945; and SWNCC 4/4,16 April 1945, all in file CCS 400.3295 (12-16-43) sec. 2, JCS; m em orandum , Johnson to M atthew s, 18 April 1945, 810.24/4-1845, State; Stamey, "The Origin of the U nited States M ilitary A ssistance Program ," 152-53. See also FRUS: 1944, 7:1504-14. 14. S um m ary sheet, H ull to M arshall and Stim son, 2 November 1944, file 336 Latin America (26), OPD. 15. Q uotation from m em orandum , Braden to Johnson, 4 A ugust 1944, FRUS: 1944, 7:111-12; letter, H ull to Leahy, 24 A ugust 1944; letter, Stim son and Forrestal to Hull, 20 Septem ber 1944; m em orandum , A rm our to Hull, 5 O ctober 1944; m em orandum , Stettinius to Roosevelt, 1 November 1944; m em orandum by Armour, 3 November 1944; and m em orandum and annex.

240 • Notes to Pages 36-40 A rm our to Stettinius, 7 December 1944; all in ibid., 7:113-15, 121-23, 126-30; m em orandum , Spears to H orne, 28 A ugust 1944; sum m ary sheet. H andy to M arshall and Stim son, 16 Septem ber 1944; m em orandum for record by Edw ards, 3 Novem ber 1944; and m em orandum of conference by Edw ards, 28 Novem ber 1944, all in file 336 Latin America (26), OPD. 16. Q uotations from letter, Brett to Handy, 28 O ctober 1944, file 336 Latin America (26/20), OPD; and Caribbean Defense Com m and, "Bi-Lateral Staff C onversations," 102; m em orandum , M cG urk to Rockefeller, 14 December 1944, 810.20 Missions/12-844, State; despatch no. 291, Briggs to Hull, 5 Sep­ tem ber 1944, FRUS: 1944, 7:1021-25; Stim son Diaries, 51:193-94 (reel 9), Yale University Library; Tillapaugh, "From War to Cold War," 282. 17. Q uotation from m em orandum by Edw ards, 13 November 1944, file 336 Latin America; sum m ary sheet. Sm ith to OPD, 14 Septem ber 1944; and m em orandum for record by OPD officer (unsigned), 30 O ctober 1944, both in ibid.; m em orandum of conversation by Johnson, 11 A ugust 1944, 810.248/8-1144, State; m em orandum of conversation by Johnson, 30 November 1944, 810.20 Missions/11-3044, State; Stamey, "M ilitary Assistance Program ," 147-48. 18. Q uotation from m em orandum . H andy to the A ssistant Secretary of War, 10 January 1945, file 336 Latin America, OPD; m em orandum , Walsh to Handy, 26 December 1944, 810.248/12-2844, State; m em orandum , Edw ards to Stim son and Forrestal, 6 February 1945, file 336 Latin America (89), OPD; Stamey, "M ilitary Assistance Program ," 150. 19. Q uotations from letter, Brett to Handy, 28 O ctober 1944, file 336 Latin America (26/20), OPD; and m inutes, m eeting of Com m ittee of Three, 11 December 1945, C-3; m em orandum , Walsh to Rockefeller, 26 December 1944, 810.248/12-2844, State; m em orandum , H andy to A ssistant Secretary of War, 10 January 1945, file 336 Latin America, OPD; Caribbean Defense Com m and, "BiLateral Staff Conversations," app. 2. 20. JCS 1496/2, 17 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) sec. 1, JCS; m em orandum of conversation by Johnson, 11 A ugust 1944, 810.248/8-1144, State; Stim son Diaries, 49:2 (reel 9), Yale University Library; P. Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 105-6; G reen, The Containment of Latin America, 180-81, 260. 21. Q uotation from letter, Stim son to Hull, 20 Septem ber 1944, FRUS: 1944, 7:120-21; JCS 629/13,15 O ctober 1945, file CCS 400.3295 (12-16-43) sec. 3, JCS; "Instructions for Staff Conversations w ith M ilitary and Naval Representatives of the O ther A m erican Republics, " n.d., FRUS: 1944, 7:106-11; Sherry, Prepar­ ing for the Next War, vii-ix, 191-232. 22. M em orandum , Vincent to Grew, 23 O ctober 1944, 810.24/10-2344, State. O n the broader problem of regional security in Latin America, see Tillapaugh, "Closed H em isphere and O pen World?" 25-42. 23. Q uotation from m em orandum by Dreier, "C om m ents on M ilitary and Naval Objectives in the O ther American Republics," 13 M arch 1945, 810.24/3-1445, State; m em oranda. Strong to Stim son, 5 January 1945 and 22 January 1945, both in file 400.3295 (37), OPD; despatch no. 589, Briggs to Stettinius, 20 December 1944, FRUS: 1944, 7:131-33. 24. M em orandum of conversation by Bohan, 29 January 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:72-73; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 16-18; Rabe, "The Elusive C on­ ference," 280-84; Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 202. 25. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, 16; H ilton, "The United States,

Notes to Pages 40-44 • 241 Brazil, and the Cold War," 599-605; Bohlin, "U nited States-Latin American Relations," 30-31. 26. SWNCC 4/10, 7 July 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:251-54. 27. Caribbean Defense Com m and, "Bi-Lateral Staff Conversations," 63, 112-13; m em orandum , Wooten to Hull, 5 A ugust 1945, file 400.3295 (38), OPD; despatch no. 2186, Berle to Byrnes, 26 July 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:600-606. 28. Q uotation from JCS 629/13, 15 O ctober 1945, file CCS 400.3295 (12-16-43) sec. 3, JCS; "Brief of W estern H em isphere Defense Program ," 12 November 1946, folder M iscellaneous Papers, W estern H em isphere Defense Program , Lend-Lease, etc., G-4. 29. Q uotations from JCS 629/14, 30 O ctober 1945; and JCS 629/16, 10 November 1945, both in file CCS 400.3295 (12-16-43) sec. 3, JCS; Gellm an, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 129-30, 139-40. Because of King's objections, the Joint Chiefs agreed to reconsider the program of naval assistance and to approve the program s of arm y and air force assistance for planning purposes only. 30. Q uotation from Forrestal Diaries, 14 November 1945,621, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum , Edw ards to Forrestal, [November 1945], ibid., 639; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 20 November 1945, C-3; m em o­ randum , H ull to M arshall, 20 November 1945, file 336 Latin America, OPD; m em orandum . Dreier to Briggs, Butler, and Braden, 15 December 1945,810.24/ 12-1345, State. 31. Letter, Stim son to Byrnes, 4 Septem ber 1945; m em orandum , Vittrup to Briggs, 30 O ctober 1945; and m em orandum for record by Shaw, 30 O ctober 1945, all in file 336 Latin America (89), OPD. 32. Braden was appointed assistant secretary on 25 A ugust 1945 and for­ mally took u p his duties tw o m onths later; Briggs was nam ed director of ARA on 22 O ctober 1945. Register of the Department of State, 1946,152,155. 33. Q uotations from m em orandum , Spaeth to Braden, 9 November 1945, 800.24/11-945, State; and m em orandum for the Secretary's Staff Committee, "International Em bargo on the Export of A rm am ents," 3 November 1945, FW 810.24/11-645, State; m em orandum , Jarvis to M organ, 8 O ctober 1945, 810.20 Defense/10-845, State; m em orandum . Bell to Jarvis, Latchford, and M organ, 18 O ctober 1945, 810.20 D efense/10-1845, State; m em orandum , Jarvis to M organ, Latchford, and Bell, n .d ., FW 810.20 Defense/10-1845, State; m em orandum , C ochran to Erwin, 31 O ctober 1945, 800.24/10-3145, State; m em orandum . Barber to Briggs and Braden, 18 O ctober 1945, 810.24/10-1845, State; m em o­ randum , Barber to Braden, 28 Novem ber 1945, 800.24/11-2845, State; New York Times, 30 O ctober 1945. 34. Q uotation from letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 7 December 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:258-59; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 11 December 1945, C-3; m em orandum , Wooten to Hull, 5 A ugust 1945, file 400.3295 (38), OPD; C aribbean Defense Com m and, "Bi-Lateral Staff Conversations," 112-13, 130,137,138. 35. M em orandum of m eeting by Dreier, 22 January 1946, FRUS: 1946,11:91. 36. The State D epartm ent excepted Brazil and Mexico because of special com m itm ents made to these nations during World War II. See m em orandum , Chalm ers to Braden, 5 January 1946, 810.20 Defense/1-546, State. The depart­ m ent's restriction on the provision of bom ber aircraft applied specifically to the B-25s and the A T -lls—advanced training planes used in the instruction of bom ber pilots—scheduled for transfer in the interim program . 37. Q uotation from letter, Acheson to Royall, 4 January 1946, FRUS: 1946,

242 • Notes to Pages 44-46 11:86-87; m em orandum , Briggs to Acheson, 19 December 1945, 810.24/ 12-1945, State; letter, Acheson to Patterson, 19 December 1945; and telegram no. 2618, A cheson to H arrim an, 21 December 1945, both in FRUS: 1945, 9:261-63. 38. Letter, Royall to Byrnes, 31 December 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:263-64; letters, Royall to Acheson, 6 January 1946, and Braden to Royall, 9 January 1946, both in FRUS: 1946, 11:87-89; m em orandum , Briggs to Acheson, 18 January 1946, 810.24/1-1846, State; Arnold, Global Mission, 601-6. 39. The navy subm itted its interim program to the State D epartm ent on 30 M arch 1946, and Byrnes approved the allocations on 9 April, w ith the excep­ tion that no vessels should be offered for the time being to A rgentina, the D om inican Republic, Haiti, N icaragua, and Cuba. M em orandum , Hidalgo to Forrestal, 29 M arch 1946, file 81-1-27, SecNavy; letters, Acheson to Forrestal, 9 April and 1 July 1946, both in FRUS: 1946,11:97-98. 40. Q uotation from Forrestal Diaries, 2 April 1946, 954-57, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum by Sullivan, [probably February 1946], folder SWNCC 246, ASA; m inutes, m eetings of the Com m ittee of Three, 11 December 1945 and 24 January 1946, C-3. 41. M em orandum SM-5062, M cFarland to SWNCC, 21 February 1946, file CCS 092 U nited States (12-21-45) sec. 1, JCS. 42. Q uotation from m em orandum , H ertford to Eisenhower, 22 April 1946, file 091 Latin America (1946), CIS; letter, Eisenhower to Acheson, 2 February 1946, in Galam bos, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 7:821-23. 43. Q uotation from Intelligence Research Project no. 1713, "Soviet-Commu­ nist Penetration in Latin America, " 24 M arch 1945, M ilitary Intelligence Ser­ vice, War D epartm ent G eneral Staff, file 336 sec. 2, OPD; letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 4 O ctober 1945, file 091 Latin America Top Secret (1945), C/S; m em o­ randum prepared in the State D epartm ent, "Foreign Policy of the U nited States," 1 December 1945, file CCS 092 United States (12-21-45) sec. 1, JCS; Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids, 533-34. 44. Caribbean Defense Com m and, "Bi-Lateral Staff Conversations," 104; telegram no. 10694, Byrnes to W inant, 10 December 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:260; telegram s, no. 66, Bowers to Byrnes, 16 January 1946, no. 68, Bowers to Byrnes, 17 January 1946, and no. 710, Byrnes to Acheson, 21 January 1946, all in FRUS: 1946, 11:561-63. 45. M em orandum , Hickerson to D unn, 11 December 1945, 810.20 Defense/12-1145, State; m inutes, m eetings of the Com m ittee of Three, 11 December 1945 and 24 January 1946, C-3; telegram no. 13285, W inant to Byrnes, 19 December 1945; and aide-memoire. State D epartm ent to the British Embassy, 15 November 1945, both in FRUS: 1945, 9:260-61, 555-57; m em oran­ dum , Bevin to Byrnes, 14 January 1946, 810.20 Defense/1-1446, State. 46. Q uotation from letter, Braddock to Pawley, 27 December 1946, 810.24/12-2746, State; m em orandum , Briggs to Acheson, 18 April 1946, 800.24/4-1846, State. 47 PP: 1946, 233-35; m em orandum , Elliott to Johnson, 8 A ugust 1946, FRUS: 1946, 11:296; m em orandum . Sm ith to Brynes, 2 May 1946, 810.20 Defense/5-246, State; m em orandum , W arren to Acheson and others, 30 July 1945, 810.20 Defense/7-3045, State; m em orandum of m eeting by W arren, 6 A ugust 1945, 810.20 Defense/8-645, State; m em orandum , Briggs to Butler, 13 February 1946, 810.20 Defense/2-1346, State; m inutes, m eetings of SWNCC, 7 February 1946, 14 February 1946, and 18 April 1946, file SWNCC—Agenda

Notes to Pages 46-51 • 243 and M inutes of M eetings, SWNCC; m em orandum SM-4674, McFarland to SWNCC, 8 January 1946, file CCS 092 (1-18-45) sec. 1, JCS; m em orandum , Lincoln to Petersen, 6 February 1946; m em orandum SWN-3867, 13 February 1946; m em orandum for record, m eeting of the Latin American Subcommittee of SWNCC, 14 February 1946; SWNCC 246/2, 22 M arch 1946; and SWN-4204, 26 April 1946, all in folder SWNCC 246, ASA. 48. D uggan, The Americas, 186-89. 49. Q uotation from m em orandum . D reier to Briggs, 8 July 1946, 810.20 Defense/7-846, State; H ouse Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 1946; m em orandum , Elliott to Johnson, 8 A ugust 1946, FRUS: 1946, 11:296; m em orandum , N orstad to Ordway, 27 A ugust 1946, file 091 Latin America, P&O; PCA M-8, 19 July 1946; and PCA M -ll, 10 A ugust 1946, both in PCA. 50. Q uotation from m em orandum , Braden to Byrnes, 16 December 1946, FRUS: 1946, 11:108-10; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 28 A ugust 1946, C-3; letters, Forrestal to Byrnes, 12 November 1946, and Patter­ son to Byrnes, 5 December 1946, both in file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em o­ randum , Braden to Acheson, 9 December 1946, 810.20 D efense/12-946, State; letter, Braddock to Pawley, 27 December 1946, 810.24/12-2746, State. 51. M inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 18 December 1946, C-3. 52. Ibid. 53. Letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 18 December 1946, file 091 Latin America (16/7), P&O. 54. O n this point, see E. May, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics' A pproach," 150-54. 55. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions, 1:11. 56. Q uotation from letter, Patterson to M arshall, 24 January 1947, file 092 Top Secret (23/3) P&O; letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 18 December 1946; and letter, M arshall to Patterson, 7 February 1947, both in file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em orandum , Acheson to M arshall, 7 February 1947, 810.20 Defense/2-747. State. 57. M em orandum , H ickerson to D unn, 11 December 1945, 810.20 Defense/12-1145. State. 58. M em orandum , Maxwell to C om m anding G eneral, Army Air Forces and C om m anding G eneral, A rm y Service Forces, 1 M arch 1946, file 091 Latin America (26 Feb. 46), CIS; disposition forms. Lutes to N orstad, 20 December 1946; O rdw ay to Lutes, 30 December 1946; O sborne to P&O, 13 January 1947; and m em orandum , Lincoln to Petersen, 7 April 1947, all in file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em orandum by Dreier, 22 November 1946, FRUS: 1946, 9:106-7; letter, Forrestal to Truman, 19 December 1946, folder N avy—1946, WHCF. 59. M em orandum , Braden to Byrnes, 16 December 1946, FRUS: 1946, 11:108-10; letter, Forrestal to Marshall, 26 February 1947, file 81-1-27, SecNavy; letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 2 January 1947, file 092 Top Secret (23/3), P&O; disposition form, Lutes to P&O, 26 December 1946, file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em orandum , Braden to M arshall, 22 January 1947, FW 810.20 Defense/1-2247. State. In his m em oirs, Braden stated that he repeatedly asked the services about the costs of the standardization program before he finally received an estimate for accessory equipm ent, which am ounted to $1,066,000,000 over ten years. 1 have not been able to find either in War or State D epartm ent records any State D epartm ent inquiry about the costs of standardization before Byrnes

244 • N otes to Pages 51-54 raised the issue at the m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three on 19 December 1946. Patterson furnished an estim ate on 2 January 1947. Braden was probably referring to this statem ent of costs in his memoirs, but the figures he cited do not correspond exactly to any of the estim ates that I have seen. Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 365-66. 60. Letter, Acheson to Patterson, 19 M arch 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:105-6; "Interim Report on Financial A spects of Participation by Latin American C oun­ tries in the Inter-A m erican Arm s Program U nder H.R. 6326," file 092.2 (25 July 1946) Inter-A m erican M ilitary C ooperation Act, AG; Q uirös, "U nited States Reactions to the Costa Rican Counter-Revolution," 13. 61. Q uotations from letter, Patterson to Acheson, 27 M arch 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:106-9; sum m ary sheet, N orstad to Patterson, 25 M arch 1947; and chit by Eisenhower, n .d ., both in file 092.2 (25 July 1946) Inter-A m erican Military Cooperation Act, AG. For Forrestal's reaction to the State D epartm ent's report, see his letter to Acheson, 31 M arch 1947, ibid., 109-10. 62. PP; 1947, 178-79. 63. SWNCC 360/1, e n d . B, 12 May 1947, FRUS: 1947,1:743. 64. ORE 16,10 April 1947, folder Central Intelligence R eports—ORE, 1 9 4 7 No. 15-39, Intelligence File, PSF. The State D epartm ent Intelligence O rganiza­ tion dissented from ORE 16 because it exaggerated the im m ediate Soviet danger in Latin America. 65. Q uoted in Fairchild, "The US Arm y and the M ilitary A ssistance Pro­ gram, " chap. 2, p. 5. 66. Letter, Patterson to Acheson, 27 M arch 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:108. See also Kaplan, "U.S. A rm s Transfers to Latin Am erica," 407-12. 67 Cable WOC 19, Cham berlin to N orstad, 27 M arch 1947, file 091 Latin America, P&O. 68. Q uotations from handw ritten note by Truman, n .d ., folder G eneral File—A, PSF; m em orandum for the president, 26 M arch 1947, ibid.; and m em orandum , Ridgway, Jones, and W eyland to Secretary, Presidential Staff, C harged w ith Legislation, 30 M arch 1947, folder Inter-A m erican Military Cooperation Act, WHCF. 69. For a different analysis, see Rabe, "Inter-A m erican M ilitary C oopera­ tion," 140; Tillapaugh, "From War to Cold War," 290. 70. Q uotations from m em orandum , O rdw ay to N orstad, 10 April 1947, file 091 Latin America (16/16), P&O; m em orandum , O rdw ay to Norstad, 8 April 1947, ibid.; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 2 April 1947, C-3; m em orandum , Braden to Acheson, 4 April 1947, 810.20 Defense/4-447, State; m em orandum , Braden to Acheson, 28 April 1947, 810.24/4-2847, State; Braden Diplomats and Demagogues, 367; m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 23 April 1947, file 334 Com m ittee of Three, SWNCC; m em oran­ dum , Allen to Acheson, 21 April 1947; FW 810.20 Defense/4-447, State; m in­ utes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 1 May 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:113-15; Fairchild, "The US Army and the M ilitary Assistance Pro­ gram ," chap. 2, p. 6. 71. H ull quoted in E. May, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics' A pproach," 132; Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment, 8-10. 72. Telegram, Byrnes to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, 14 Novem ber 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:167-68; S. Spector, "U nited States A ttem pts at Regional Security," 142-59; Acheson, Present at the Creation,

Notes to Pages 54-57 • 245 187-90; telegram no. 2066, Braden to Byrnes, 4 Septem ber 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:406-8; Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment, 205-6. 73. Braden quoted in Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 111; Stiller, GeorgeS. Messersmith, 231; Gellm an, Roosevelt and Batista, 198-220. 74. Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 316-38; m em orandum by Acheson, 29 Septem ber 1945, FRUS: 1945, 9:159; Trask, "The Impact of the Cold War on U nited States-Latin Am erican Relations," 274-77; "C onsultation A m ong the A m erican Republics w ith Respect to the A rgentine Situation," n .d ., folder A rgentina (2), Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m em oranda, Acheson to Truman, 12 July 1946, and Truman to Acheson, 22 July 1946, both in FRUS: 1946,11:270-78, 282; PP: 1946, 257; New York Times, 23 O ctober 1946. 75. Letters, M essersm ith to Byrnes, 15 June 1946, and M essersm ith to Truman, 16 A ugust 1946, both in folder A rgentina (2), Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; letters, M essersm ith to Byrnes, 12 O ctober 1946 and 15 O ctober 1946; M essersm ith to Acheson, 16 O ctober 1946; and M essersm ith to Truman, 16 O ctober 1946 and 23 O ctober 1946, all in folder A rgentina (3), ibid.; m em o­ randum , A rm our to M arshall, 17 July 1947, file 123 M essersm ith, George S., State. O n the Braden-M essersm ith conflict, see Braden Diplomats and Dema­ gogues, 358-64; Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 450-58; Tillapaugh, "From War to Cold War," 261-63; E. May, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics' A p­ proach," 153-55; Trask, "Spruille Braden versus G eorge M essersm ith," 69-95; Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 228-63. 76. Q uotation from letter, Vandenberg to Gilmore, 25 February 1947, folder correspondence—February 1947, Vandenberg Papers, Bentley Historical Library; Connally, M y Name is Tom Connally, 319; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 182-241; J. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948,106-8. 77. Q uotation from m em orandum , Eisenhower to JCS, 18 February 1946, in Galam bos, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 7:877; Forrestal Diaries, 7 Febru­ ary 1947, 1470, Naval H istory Division; SWNCC 360/1, e n d . B, 12 May 1947, FRUS: 1947, 1:742-44; m em orandum , Trueblood to Briggs and Braden, 13 November 1946, 810.20 Defense/11-1346, State; H ertford oral history, 40-42, Truman Library. 78. Letter, Vandenberg to H ow ard, 12 O ctober 1945, folder C orre­ spondence, O ctober 1945, Vandenberg Papers, Bentley Historical Library. 79. Q uotation from SWNCC 360/1, e n d . B, 12 May 1947, FRUS: 1947, 1:743; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 239-40; H ertford oral history, 40, Truman Library. See also despatch no. 1874, 21 February 1947, M essersm ith to M ar­ shall, file ABC 400.3295 (15 M arch 44), sec. 1C, P&O. 80. M em orandum , Dreier to Byrnes, 14 January 1946, 810.20 Defense/1-1446, State; aide-memoire from the British em bassy to the D epart­ m ent of State, 16 July 1946; and aide-memoire from the D epartm ent of State to the British embassy, 26 A ugust 1946, both in FRUS: 1946, 11:278-79, 307-9; m em orandum of conversation and annex by Acheson, 27 January 1947; and letter, Inverchapel to M arshall, 21 May 1947, both in FRUS: 1947, 8:171-72, 224-25. 81. Forrestal Diaries, 7 February 1947, 1470, Naval H istory Division. 82. Q uotation from notes on Cabinet m eeting, 7 February 1947, folder Cabinet M eetings, Jan. 3-Dec. 19,1947, Connelly Files; m em orandum , Braden to M arshall, 4 February 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:218-19. 83. M em orandum , Braden to Acheson, 10 February 1947; and telegram no.

246 • Notes to Pages 57-60 252, Acheson to M essersm ith, 2 April 1947, both in FRUS: 1947, 8:176-78, 186-87; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions, 1:11. 84. Q uotation from m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 27 January 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:171; m em orandum by Briggs, 20 May 1947; and letter, Inverchapel to M arshall, 21 May 1947, both in ibid., 221-25; m em oranda, M arshall to Bevin, 17 May 1947, and Acheson to Truman, 19 May 1947, both in folder A rgentina (3), Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 85. Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues, 369-70. The W hite H ouse announced that M essersm ith had resigned, but the president actually had fired him . O n 6 June, M essersm ith cabled to M arshall, "As I have not subm itted any resigna­ tion to the President, has my 'resignation' been accepted by him?" Telegram no. 687, file 123 M essersm ith, G eorge S., State. 86. PP: 1947, 261; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 19 June 1947, C-3; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 26 June 1947, FRUS: 1947, 8:225-26; m em oranda, Crain to H illdring, 14 July 1947, and H illdring to Lovett, 4 A ugust 1947, both in folder Policy Com m ittee on Arm s and A rm a­ m ents (2), ISA; PCA M-53, 25 July 1947, PCA; Forrestal Diaries, 27 June 1947, 1696, Naval H istory Division. 87 Telegram no. 147, M arshall to Embassy in Dominican Republic, 1 A ugust 1947; m em orandum and annexes by Sohm, 4 A ugust 1947; letter, Lovett to Royall, 22 A ugust 1947; and m em orandum by Dreier, 4 November 1947, all in FRUS: 1947, 8:116-21, 125-27, 648; PCA M-52, 18 July 1947; PCA M-54, 1 A ugust 1947; and PCA S-69, 14 November 1947, all in PCA; sum m ary of m eeting betw een representatives of State, War, and Navy, 11 Septem ber 1947, folder R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC (1), ISA; Register of the Depart­ ment of State, 1948, 136, 312. 88. H ouse Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 1947, 7. 89. Letter, Acheson to Patterson, 5 M arch 1947, FRUS: 1947, 5:94-95; SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, FRUS: 1947, 3:204-19; SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, FRUS: 1947, 1:725-33. 90. "Appreciation of Foreseeable Foreign N eeds for U.S. Military Assistance D uring the Next Three to Five Years, " report by the R earm am ent Subcommit­ tee of the SWNCC to the Special Ad Hoc Com m ittee, 10 July 1947, folder Foreseeable Military Assistance to Foreign N ations for Next 3-5 Years, ISA. 91. PCA M-37, 7 M arch 1947; SWNCC 360/1, e n d . B, 12 May 1947; and PCA S-49, 20 June 1947, all in FRUS: 1947, 1:722-24, 734-50, 759-60; m em orandum , Eisenhower to JCS, 10 May 1947, in Galam bos, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower 8:1700-1703. 92. Q uotation from m em orandum , Sandifer to M arshall, 10 June 1947, 810.20 Defense/6-1047, State; m em orandum , O rdw ay to N orstad, 11 June 1947, file 091 Latin America, P&O. 93. PP: 1947, 255-57; m em orandum , Webb to M arshall, 20 May 1947, 810.20 Defense/5-2047, State; m em orandum and e n d ., Ridgway, Jones, and Weyland to Secretary, Presidential Staff, C harged w ith Legislation, 9 June 1947, folder Inter-A m erican M ilitary Cooperation Act, WHCF; m em oranda, Lincoln to N orstad, 11 June 1947, and Franklin to Ordway, 13 June 1947, both in file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em orandum , Sandifer to M arshall, 19 June 1947, 810.20 Defense/6-1947, State; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 81-82; H inson, "Plans of the United States for Postwar M ilitary Assistance to Latin America, " 277-82; J. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948,110.

Notes to Pages 60-65 • 247 94. Pogue,

G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll: S t a te s m a n ,

388-93. O n the b o g o ta z o , see Braun,

T h e A s s a s s i n a t i o n o f G a itâ n . '

95. Letter, M arshall to Eaton, 26 May 1948; and m em orandum . A rm our to M arshall, 4 June 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 9:213-15; m em orandum . Wood­ w ard to Tewksbury, 20 April 1948, 810.20 Defense/4-2048, State; m em oran­ dum , Bohlen to W oodward, 29 April 1948; 810.20 Defense/4-2948, State; m em ­ orandum of m eeting by W oodward, 4 May 1948, 810.20 Defense/5-448, State; m em orandum of telephone conversation betw een Ruffner and Muir, 24 May 1948, file 091 Latin America, P&O; m em orandum . Dreier to Daniels, 2 June 1948, 810.20 Defense/6-248, State. 96. For a detailed discussion of the im plem entation of the interim program , see Fairchild, "The US Arm y and the M ilitary Assistance Program ," chap. 2, pp. 6-19; and Pilgert, "The H istory of Foreign Surplus Property Disposal, 1945-1949," 2: pt. 10, 23-37, 46-58, 89-99. For reports on the status of the interim program , see m em orandum , Braden to Clayton, 18 June 1946, 810.24/6-1846, State; m em orandum , McCabe to Clayton, 21 June 1946, 810.24/6-2146, State; letter, Forrestal to Truman, 19 December 1946, folder N avy—1946, WHCF; m em orandum of conversation by Hickerson, 18 February 1947, folder m em oranda of conversation, 1947-48, EUR; letter, Patterson to Truman, 3 M arch 1947, folder War D epartm ent (4), WHCF; m em orandum , K ingm an to Dreier, 27 May 1947, 810.24/5-2747, State; m em orandum , Carney to Forrestal and N im itz, 16 June 1947, folder N avy—1946, WHCF; m em oran­ dum , Spencer to Daniels, 7 O ctober 1948, 810.24/10-748, State; D S B 21 (26 Septem ber 1949): 480-81. 97. Cable, C rittenberger to Wedemeyer, 15 December 1947; m em orandum , O rdw ay to Dreier, 28 January 1948; sum m ary sheet, W edemeyer to Eisen­ hower, 3 May 1948; m em orandum . Freem an to Swett, 27 May 1948, all in file 091 A rgentina, P&O; m em orandum , Royall to Sosa Molina, 4 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 9:322; m em orandum , Royall to Truman, 3 June 1948, file 400 (22 July 1949), S/A (Gray-Pace); m em orandum , "M ilitary A ssistance for A rgentina U nder the Act of June 15, 1940," n .d ., unsigned, folder "M iss Thiel's file," Lend-Lease Records, 1945-1953, G-4. 98. Despatch, M arshall to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, 30 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 9:218-20; m em orandum , M addocks to Daniels, 28 June 1948, file 400 Latin America (1 June 1948), S/A (Royall). 99. Eisenhower to JCS, 10 May 1947, in Galam bos, T h e P a p e r s o f D w i g h t D . E i s e n h o w e r 8:1700-1703.

CHAPTER 3

1. M em orandum , Vincent to Byrnes, 12 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7 : 615. 2. Q uoted in Dallek, F r a n k lin D . R o o s e v e l t a n d A m e r ic a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 355. 3. Schaller, T h e U . S . C r u s a d e in C h in a , 96-99. O ther useful accounts of w artim e Sino-A merican relations are: Dallek, F r a n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt a n d A m e r ic a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 328-31, 354-58, 382-92, 397-99, 485-502; Thorne, A l l i e s o f a K in d , especially chaps. 6, 12, 19, and 26; Tsou, A m e r ic a 's F a ilu re in C h in a ; Feis, T h e C h in a T a n g le; Tuchman, S t i l w e l l a n d th e A m e r ic a n E x p e r ie n c e in C h in a ; and Varg, T h e C lo s in g o f th e D o o r.

4. Romanus and Sunderland,

S t i l w e l l ' s M i s s i o n to C h in a ,

153-57; Romanus

248 • Notes to Pages 65-69 and Sunderland,

3-5; Coakley and Leighton, 532-35. 5. Sunderland, "The Secret Em bargo," 75-80; Davies, D r a g o n b y th e T ail, 289-90; Ringwalt oral history, Truman Library. 6. Tuchman, S t i l w e l l a n d th e A m e r i c a n E x p e r ie n c e in C h in a , 264-66, 304-7, 314-16; Liu, A M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y o f M o d e r n C h in a , 143-52; Romanus and S un­ derland, S t i l w e l l ' s M i s s i o n to C h in a , 33-37; m em orandum , Davies to Gauss, 9 M arch 1943, F R U S : 1 9 4 3 , C h in a , 25-29; Sheridan, C h in a in D i s i n t e g r a t i o n , 183-206, 209-13. 7. Chennault, W a y o f a F ig h te r , 212-16, 222-24; Dallek, F ra n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt a n d A m e r i c a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 383-88; Romanus and Sunderland, S t i l w e l l ' s M i s s i o n to C h in a , 277-83; Coakley and Leighton, G lo b a l L o g is tic s a n d S tr a te g y , 7TJ-, Sherry, T h e R i s e o f A m e r ic a n A i r P o w e r, 159-60. 8. Stilwell quoted in Tuchman, S t i l w e l l a n d th e A m e r ic a n E x p e r ie n c e in C h in a , 394; Romanus and Sunderland, S t i l w e l l ' s M i s s i o n to C h in a , 384-85; Romanus and Sunderland, S t i l w e l l ' s C o m m a n d P r o b le m s , 49-82; Matloff, S t r a te g ic P la n n in g f o r C o a litio n W arfare, 326, 373; Coakley and Leighton, G lo b a l L o g is tic s a n d S t r a t ­ e g y , 730-31. 9. Q uoted in Thorne, A l l i e s o f a K i n d , 427. 10. Romanus and Sunderland, S ti l w e l l ' s C o m m a n d P r o b le m s , 316-28; 379-84 (quotation from 384); Elsey, R o o s e v e lt a n d C h in a , 34-41; R. Spector, E a g le A g a i n s t th e S u n , 364-67. 11. Q uotation from Stim son Diaries, 3 O ctober 1944, 48:114 (reel 9), Yale University Library; Romanus and Sunderland, S t i l w e l l ' s C o m m a n d P r o b le m s , 413-42; Tuchman, S t i l w e l l a n d th e A m e r ic a n E x p e r ie n c e in C h in a , 470-502; Dallek, F ra n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt a n d A m e r i c a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 491-99. 12. Cam pbell and H erring, T h e D ia r ie s o f E d w a r d R . S t e t t i n i u s , Jr., 210. 13. Dallek, F ra n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt a n d A m e r i c a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 499-502, 535-36; Schaller, T h e U .S . C r u s a d e in C h in a , 177-80. 14. M em orandum by Davies, "Will the C om m unists Take O ver China?," 7 November 1944; m em orandum by Davies, "American-Chinese Relations D uring the Next Six M onths, " 15 November 1944; m em orandum by Service, 10 O ctober 1944, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 4 , 6:670-71, 695-97, 708-11; Service, T h e A m e r a s i a P a p e r s , 136 ff.; Davies, D r a g o n b y t h e T a il, 361-64, 370-72; U.S. D epart­ m ent of State, U n ite d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 564-76. 15. U nnum bered telegram , H urley to Stettinius, 24 December 1944, F R U S : 1 9 4 4 , 6:745-49; telegram no. 141500 NCR 6810, H urley to Roosevelt, 14 January 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:172-77; Buhite, P a tr ic k J. H u r l e y a n d A m e r ic a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 162-87; Service, T h e A m e r a s i a P a p e r s , 100-114; Davies, D r a g o n b y th e T ail, 383-84; Schaller, T h e U . S . C r u s a d e in C h in a , 202-7; Ringwalt oral history, Truman Library. 16. Q uotation from m em orandum , Vincent to Grew, 29 January 1945; m in­ utes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 16 January 1945, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:34, 37-39. 17. M em orandum by Vincent, 1 March 1945, ibid., 247-49; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 122-24. 18. The full text of the em bassy despatch is in Service, A m e r a s i a P a p e r s , 109-12; m em orandum . G rew to Roosevelt, 2 M arch 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7 : 254. 19. Dallek, F ra n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt a n d A m e r ic a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 516-18, 523; Buhite, P a tr ic k J. H u r l e y a n d A m e r ic a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 187-94; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 125-28; Kahn, T h e C h in a H a n d s , 150-60. S t i l w e l l ' s C o m m a n d P r o b le m s ,

G lo b a l L o g is tic s a n d S tr a te g y ,

Notes to Pages 70-73 • 249 20. In February 1945 the War D epartm ent approved an interim program of assistance to the Chinese air force. It was to be com pleted in May 1946 and aim ed at the establishm ent of four-and-one-half air groups consisting of 199 aircraft. In 1943 the War D epartm ent approved the creation of a ChineseA m erican Com posite Wing, com prising one bom ber and two fighter groups, as part of Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force. Letter, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 17 February 1945; and m em orandum , adjutant general to Wedemeyer, 26 Febru­ ary 1945, both in file 336.2 Top Secret sec. 1, OPD; Craven and Cate, T h e A r m y A i r F o rces in W o r ld W a r II, 4:438-41, 529-36. 21. SWNCC 83/D, 3 April 1945, file CCS 452 (4-3-45) sec. 1, JCS. 22. Q uotation from ibid.; P. Smith, T h e A i r F o rce P la n s f o r P ea ce, 105-6. W edemeyer also pointed out the beneficial effects of such assistance on the Am erican aircraft industry. See his letter to M arshall, 24 January 1945, file 336.2 Top Secret sec. 1, OPD. 23. "M em orandum C oncerning United States Post-War M ilitary Policies w ith Respect to C hina," by the State D epartm ent, 3 April 1945; and m em oran­ dum , M atthew s to Stettinius, 29 May 1945, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:74-79, 116-17; JCS 1330, 27 April 1945; and JCS 1330/1, 5 May 1945, both in file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 1, JCS. 24. By V-J Day, approxim ately one-third of the equipm ent u n d er the thirtynine-division program had been delivered to C hinese forces. JCS 1330/3, 27 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 1, JCS. 25. "The C hina Theater," report by W edemeyer to Eisenhower, February 1946, folder 228.03 Perm anent, Geog V. C hina 319.1, Wedemeyer, A. C. LTG, CMH. 26. M em orandum and e n d .. G rew to Truman, 27 April 1945, folder Secre­ tary of State Edw ard R. Stettinius, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 27. Directive, Truman to Mac Arthur, 15 A ugust 1945; u n n um bered tele­ gram , W edemeyer to M arshall, 19 A ugust 1945; and telegram no. 1514, H urley to Byrnes, 4 Septem ber 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:530-34, 549-50; m em oran­ dum SM-2964, JCS to SWNCC, 21 A ugust 1945, file 336 Top Secret (133/17), OPD. 28. "H istory of the C hina Theater," chap. 15,1-60. 29. Gallicchio, T h e C o ld W a r B e g in s in A s i a , 95-100. 30. Telegram no. WARX 47513, JCS to Wedemeyer, 10 A ugust 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:527-28; Gallicchio, T h e C o ld W a r B e g in s in A s i a , 82-83, 100; Feis, T h e C h in a T a n g le, 362-67; Schaller, T h e U . S . C r u s a d e in C h in a , 263-74; Rose, R o o ts o f T ra g e d y , 154-55; "U nited States G overnm ent Economic, Financial, and M ilitary Aid to C hina Since 1937," folder K14-1, series 47.3, Budget; m em orandum and e n d ., Truman to Pepper, 1 February 1946, folder P(l), G eneral File, PSF. 31. Q uotation from telegram no. 1330, H urley to Byrnes, 11 A ugust 1945; letter and e n d ., Forrestal to Byrnes, 27 A ugust 1945; and telegram no. 1505, H urley to Byrnes, 2 Septem ber 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7 : 529-30, 538-39, 546-47; m em oranda, Soong to Truman, 30 A ugust 1945, folder F o re ig n China, 1945, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 32. "H istory of the C hina Theater," chap. 17. 33. M em orandum , Leahy to Truman, 5 Septem ber 1945, folder F o re ig n China, 1945, Subject file—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 34. M em orandum , Forrestal to Truman, 24 A ugust 1945, folder Navy, 1945, WHCF. 35. Q uotation from telegram CFB 6817, W edemeyer to War D epartm ent,

250 • Notes to Pages 73-78 3 Septem ber 1945, e n d . to JCS 1330/2,11 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 452 China (4-3-45) sec. 1, JCS; m em orandum , V andenberg to Arnold, [approx. 20 A ugust 1945], file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 2, JCS; m em orandum for M arshall, 30 A ugust 1945; and m em orandum , Eaker to M arshall, 30 A ugust 1945, both in file 336.2 Top Secret (24/6), OPD. 36. W hile there was no record of Roosevelt's ninety-division pledge in the files of any governm ent agency, H arry H opkins, an assistant to the form er president, confirm ed that Roosevelt had made such a statem ent to Chiang. He told W hite H ouse officials in Septem ber 1945 that "if the C hinese w ere now trying to hold the U.S. to President Roosevelt's verbal agreem ent at Cairo, President Truman should reply that he could find no record of it." Truman accepted this advice. See m em orandum , Elsey to Vardaman, 3 Septem ber 1945, folder Foreign—China, 1945, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m em o­ randum , H ull to Tïum an, 3 Septem ber 1945, ibid.; m em orandum of conversa­ tion by Acheson, 7 Septem ber 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:551-52. 37 Q uotation from m em orandum and e n d ., Acheson to Truman, 13 Sep­ tem ber 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:559-62; SWNCC 83/2/D, 4 Septem ber 1945, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 1, JCS. 38. M inutes of the 221st m eeting of the Joint Staff Planners, 10 O ctober 1945; and JCS 1330/7,15 O ctober 1945, both in file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 2, JCS; unnum bered telegram W edemeyer to M arshall, 19 A ugust 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:531-34; Varg, T h e C lo s in g o f th e D o o r, 217-19; Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 28-29. 39. JCS 1330/9, 22 O ctober 1945, folder G en. M arshall-Col. Byroade Dec. 1945, JCS-SWNCC Papers, M arshall M ission; JCS 1330/10, 22 O ctober 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:590-98. For a detailed description of the proposed advisory group, see JCS 1330/15, 22 Novem ber 1945, folder G en. Marshall-Col. Byroade Dec. 1945, JCS-SWNCC Papers, M arshall M ission. 40. M em orandum , Vincent to Byrnes, 12 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:614-17. 41. Telegram no. 23, M eyer to Byrnes, 30 O ctober 1945; telegram no. 1920, Robertson to Byrnes, 4 Novem ber 1945; and telegram no. CFB 13529, W edemeyer to M arshall, 5 Novem ber 1945, all in ibid., 599, 601-2, 603-5; Schaller, T h e U n i t e d S t a te s a n d C h in a in th e T w e n tie th C e n tu r y , 109-12; "H istory of the C hina Theater," 61-67,123-32. 42. M inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 6 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:606-7. 43. Ferrell, O f f th e R e c o r d , 74. 44. Telegram no. CFBX 13955, W edemeyer to M arshall, 9 November 1945; and telegram no. CLO 672, W edemeyer to M arshall, 14 November 1945, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:611-13, 627-28; SWNCC 224/D, 16 November 1945, file SWNCC 224 series, SWNCC; "H istory of the C hina Theater," 65. 45. Q uotation from telegram no. 84904, Eisenhower to Wedemeyer, 19 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:644-45; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 108-9. 46. M inutes, 222d m eeting of the Joint Staff Planners, 17 O ctober 1945, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 2, JCS. 47. Stueck, "The M arshall and W edemeyer M issions," 93-96. 48. W edemeyer's reports quoted in the previous three paragraphs are in telegram no. CFBX 15120, W edemeyer to Eisenhower, 20 November 1945; telegram no. CFB 15452, W edemeyer to Eisenhower, 23 November 1945; and

Notes to Pages 78-82 • 251 telegram no. CFBX15676, W edemeyer to Eisenhower, 26 November 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:650-60, 662-65, 679-84; Wedemeyer, W e d e m e y e r R e p o r ts ! , 344-51. 49. The m em orandum was prepared in the Strategy and Policy G roup of the War D epartm ent O perations Division and revised to fit McCloy's views. See m em orandum for record by Lincoln, 24 November 1945; and m em orandum for record by Dupuy, 25 November 1945, both in folder G en. Marshall-Col. Byroade Dec. 1945, JCS-SWNCC Papers, M arshall M ission. 50. M em orandum , Patterson and Forrestal to Byrnes, 26 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:670-78. 51. M em orandum by Vincent, 19 November 1945, ibid., 639-43; Acheson, P r é s e n t â t th e C r e a tio n , 139-40; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 135-38. 52. M inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 27 Novem ber 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:684-86; m inutes, m eeting of the Committee of Three, 20 Novem ber 1945, C-3; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 140; Feis, T h e C h in a T a n g le, 404-5; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 138-39; Schaller, T h e U .S . C r u s a d e in C h in a , 286-87. 53. Q uotation from J. Blum, T h e P r ic e o f V is io n , 519; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 113; Buhite, P a tr ic k J. H u r l e y a n d A m e r i c a n F o re ig n P o lic y , 260-72; Byrnes, A l l in O n e L if e tim e , 328-29; letter. H urley to Truman, 26 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:722-26. Hurley, who was nothing if not erratic, told Presidential Press Secretary Charles G. Ross on 9 January 1946 that his resignation had no political implications w hatsoever and that he was eager to serve Truman in any way possible. See m em orandum , Ross to Truman, 9 January 1946, folder "HfH z," G eneral File, PSF. 54. J. Blum, T h e P r ic e o f V is io n , 520. For a discussion of American anxieties over Soviet intentions in China, see Levine, "A New Look at A m erican M edia­ tion in the Chinese Civil War," 349-75. 55. M em orandum by Vincent, n .d .; m em orandum , M arshall to Leahy, 30 Novem ber 1945; m em orandum prepared in the State D epartm ent, "U.S. Policy Towards C hina," 8 December 1945; and m em orandum , H ull to M arshall, 8 December 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:745-51, 754-59; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 142. 56. Q uotations from m em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 11 December 1945; m em orandum of conversation by Hull, 10 December 1945; and m em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 14 December 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:761-63, 767-69, 770; m em orandum , Leahy to Truman, 11 December 1945, folder Foreign—China, 1945, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m em o­ randum , Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, n .d ., in compilation book for G eneral Wedemeyer, file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O; Cohen, A m e r ic a 's R e s p o n s e to C h in a , 184-86; Chern, D i l e m m a in C h in a , 190-91. 57. M em orandum , Truman to Wallace, 25 January 1946, folder F o re ig n China, 1946, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 58. M em orandum , Vincent to Byrnes, 9 December 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 7:759-60; m em orandum , Ariyoshi to Wedemeyer, 27 November 1945, folder Yenan O bserver Group, M arshall Mission; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 140-42; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 142. 59. For M arshall's negotiations, see Pogue, G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll: S ta te s m a n , 37-143; Varg, T h e C lo s in g o f th e D o o r, 238-52; Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 69-82, 91-98; M arshall, M a r s h a ll's M i s s i o n to C h in a , 1:6-49. 60. Q uotation from m em orandum , Shepley to Truman, 28 February 1946,

252 • Notes to Pages 82-84 folder Foreign—China, 1946, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; telegram CFBX 25549, W edemeyer to War D epartm ent, 13 M arch 1946, folder G round Forces, M arshall M ission. 61. M em orandum OSE 418, Caughey to Fischer, 4 Septem ber 1946, folder U.S. A ssistance to China, M arshall M ission. 62. The thirty-nine-division program existed after World War II only for bookkeeping purposes. U nder this program , supplies were issued to the N ationalist forces on the basis of operational necessity. No attem pt was made to equip thirty-nine specific divisions, even though the N ationalist forces received the equivalent in equipm ent. M em orandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, n .d ., folder MAG—M iscellaneous, M arshall M ission. 63. Am erican officials did not know the total am ount of equipm ent in the West C hina stockpiles, although the am ount was considerable. The am m uni­ tion involved in this sale, for example, was sufficient to supply thirty-nine divisions for 120 days of combat. See telegram no. CFBX 19018, Wedemeyer to War D epartm ent, 4 January 1946, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 4, JCS. 64. Q uotations from Forrestal Diaries, 14 July 1946, 1152, Naval H istory Division; and notes on C abinet m eeting, 2 A ugust 1946, folder Cabinet M eet­ ings, 1946, Connelly Files; notes by Patterson on C abinet m eeting, 2 A ugust 1946, folder Basic (Policy), M arshall M ission; J. Blum, T h e P r ic e o f V is io n , 608-9. Patterson and Truman expressed approval of Acheson's views. 65. M em orandum for Petersen, 3 January 1946, folder SWNCC 83/14—Part 2, SWNCC; telegram no. 170200Z, Lincoln to Hull, 17 January 1946; and telegram no. CFBX 25154, W edemeyer to Eisenhower, 8 M arch 1946, both in folder A rm y Advisory Group, M arshall M ission. 66. SWNCC 83/16, 5 January 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:810-11. See also m em o­ randum , Vincent to Acheson, 8 April 1946, ibid., 825-27. 67. Wedemeyer reported to the War D epartm ent that Chiang had told him confidently that the Soviet Union and G reat Britain had offered to establish m ilitary advisory groups in China. Telegram no. 20766, Wedemeyer to Eisenhower, 21 January 1946, ibid., 811-16. 68. Because of the failure of Congress to enact necessary legislation and because of intram ural service disputes, a joint m ilitary advisory group was not established in C hina until 1 November 1948. In the m eantim e separate army, navy, and arm y air force (and, later, air force) groups rendered advice to the Nationalists. See m em orandum . Boité to Bradley, 10 A ugust 1949, file 091 China Top Secret, G-3. 69. SWNCC 83/17, 13 February 1946; m em orandum , Vincent to Byrnes, 19 February 1946; and m em orandum and annex, Byrnes to Truman, 21 February 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:817-20, 820-23; telegram no. WAR 93194, Eisenhower to M arshall, 16 January 1946, in Galam bos, T h e P a p e r s o f D w i g h t D . E is e n h o w e r , 7:762-64. 70. M inutes of the 222d m eeting of the Joint Staff Planners, 17 O ctober 1945, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 2, JCS; m em orandum of conversation by Sweeney, 25 November 1947, 893.24/11-2547, State. 71. M em orandum , Arnold to Truman, 29 November 1945, G eneral M arshall Personal C hina File, M arshall M ission; m em orandum , M arshall to Wede­ meyer, 9 January 1946; and m em orandum , M cConnell to M arshall, 26 October 1946, both in folder Chinese Air Force, ibid.; m em orandum , Byrnes to Patter­ son, 12 February 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:769-70. 72. M em orandum , Trezise to Ring wait, 22 January 1947, 893.24/1-2247,

Notes to Pages 84-90 • 253 State; "U nited States G overnm ent Economic, Financial, and M ilitary Aid to China Since 1937," 9 M arch 1950, folder K14-1, series 47.3, Budget; m em oran­ dum , Bissell to Lincoln, 12 O ctober 1945, file 336 Top Secret (219), OPD; Chassin, T h e C o m m u n i s t C o n q u e s t o f C h in a , 43-52; Khrushchev, K h r u s h c h e v R e m e m b e r s , 238; m em orandum , Wilbur to Rice, 19 M arch 1947, 893.24/3-1947, State; Forrestal Diaries, 9 July 1946,1133-35, Naval H istory Division. 73. Q uotation from Forrestal Diaries, 9 July 1946, 1133-35, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum , Shepley to Truman, 28 February 1946, folder For­ e ig n -C h in a , 1946, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 108-34; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 144; U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S t a te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 214. 74. Q uotation from telegram no. 995, M arshall to Truman, 26 June 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 9:1201-3; m inutes, m eeting betw een M arshall and Chou, 30 May 1946; m eeting betw een M arshall and Chou, 3 June 1946; and m eeting betw een M arshall and Chou, 21 June 1946; all in ibid., 925-26, 952-63,1132-33. 75. M em orandum OSE 418, Caughey to Fischer, 4 Septem ber 1946, folder U.S. A ssistance to China, M arshall Mission. 76. Telegram no. 1164, M arshall to Carter, 22 July 1946; telegram no. 95280, C arter to M arshall, 23 July 1946; and telegram no. 1173, M arshall to Carter, 24 July 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:753, 754-55; H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 7:109-51. 77. Telegram no. 95249, C arter to M arshall, 23 July 1946; telegram no. 1181, M arshall to Carter, 26 July 1946; letter, Acheson to Littlejohn, 6 A ugust 1946; and letter, Acheson to Littlejohn, 20 A ugust 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:753-54, 755-57; M arshall, M a r s h a ll's M i s s i o n to C h in a , 1:394-403. 78. Q uotations from letter, Truman to Koo, 10 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:3; and U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S t a te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 688; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 151-52; Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 29. 79. Q uotation from telegram no. 86246, C arter to M arshall, 23 November 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:559; telegram no. 1891, M arshall to Truman, 28 December 1946, ibid., 661-65; Iriye, T h e C o ld W a r in A s i a , 142-47; Borg and Heinrichs, U n c e r ta in Y ears, 3-12, 282-83. 80. Truman quoted in J. Blum, T h e P r ic e o f V is io n , 520; Gaddis, T h e L o n g P ea ce, 77-79.

CHAPTER 4

1. P P : 1 9 4 7 , 178-79. 2. Telegram no. 4122, Acheson to Byrnes, 15 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 841. 3. M em orandum by H enderson, 21 O ctober 1946, ibid., 894. 4. Report by the C oordinating Com m ittee of the D epartm ent of State, 2 May 1945; and m em orandum and e n d ., Acheson to Byrnes, 9 O ctober 1945; both in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:34-39, 43-48; Baram, T h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e in th e M i d d l e E a s t, 53-61, 106-15; Lenczowski, T h e M i d d l e E a s t in W o r ld A f f a ir s , 689-93. For the evolution of wartim e oil policy, see Painter, O i l a n d th e A m e r ic a n C e n tu r y , 1-95; also, Feis, S e e n f r o m E . A . , 93-190. 5. M em orandum and annexes, H enderson to Byrnes, 13 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:11-18.

254 • Notes to Pages 90-92 6. The Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and N eutrality of 17 December 1925 was to expire on 7 November 1945 following its denunciation by the Soviet Union on 19 M arch 1945. Telegrams nos. 835 and 853, H arrim an to Stettinius, 19 M arch and 21 M arch 1945, both in ibid., 1219-20,1221-23. 7. Q uotation from telegram no. 916, Wilson to Grew, 5 July 1945, F R U S : T h e C o n fe r e n c e o f B e r lin , 1 9 4 5 , 1:1041-42; telegram s no. 817, Wilson to Grew, 18 June 1945; no. 844, Wilson to Grew, 22 June 1945; and no. 893, Wilson to Grew, 2 July 1945, all in ibid., 1020-22,1024-26,1033-34; telegram no. 1252, Wilson to Byrnes, 25 Septem ber 1945; telegram no. 3488, K ennan to Byrnes, 8 O ctober 1945; and telegram no. 3547, H arrim an to Byrnes, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:1248-49, 1252-53; Forrestal Diaries, 17 July 1945, 401, Naval H istory Division; SM-2610, 17 July 1945, F R U S : T h e C o n fe r e n c e o f B e r lin , 1 9 4 5 , 2:1420-22. 8. The M ontreux C onvention was signed on 20 July 1936 by Bulgaria, France, G reat Britain, Greece, Japan, Rum ania, Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The United States was not a party to the agreem ent. For a thorough discussion of the M ontreux Convention, see H ow ard, T u rk ey, th e S t r a i t s , a n d U S . P o lic y , 130-60. 9. Telegram no. 1049, Byrnes to Wilson, 30 O ctober 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:1265-66; "M em orandum Regarding the M ontreux C onvention," 30 June 1945; and m em orandum , Allen to D unn, 15 July 1945, both in F R U S : T h e C o n fe r e n c e o f B e r lin , 1 9 4 5 , 1:1013-15, 1053-54; State D epartm ent m inutes. Sev­ en th Plenary Session, 23 July 1945; and "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference," 1 A ugust 1945, both in F R U S : T h e C o n fe r e n c e o f B e r lin , 1 9 4 5 , 2:301-5,1496-97; Alvarez, B u r e a u c r a c y a n d C o ld W a r D ip lo m a c y , 54-66. U nder the M ontreux C onvention w arships of the Black Sea pow ers could pass the straits in tim e of peace. But during wartime Turkey had the right, under certain conditions, to deny passage to w arships. 10. State D epartm ent m em orandum , "The Problem of the Turkish Straits," 19 December 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:801-4; telegram no. 1412, Wilson to Byrnes, 3 November 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:1271-73. O n Soviet propaganda, see telegram no. 3228, H arrim an to Byrnes, 10 Septem ber 1945; and telegram no. 1604, Wilson to Byrnes, 22 December 1945, both in ibid, 1245-46, 1285-86; telegram no. 73, Wilson to Byrnes, 15 January 1946; telegram no. 161, Wilson to Byrnes, 2 February 1946; and telegram no. 195, Wilson to Byrnes, 13 February 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:808-9, 813-14, 815-16. O n the troop m ovem ents, see telegram no. 1371, Wilson to Byrnes, 27 O ctober 1945; and telegram no. 1399, Wilson to Byrnes, 1 November 1945, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:1260-62,1268. 11. M em orandum and e n d ., H enderson to Byrnes, 5 January 1946, 711.61/1-546, State; Kuniholm, T h e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld W a r in th e N e a r E a s t, 298-302. 12. Q uotations from Rubin, T h e G r e a t P o w e r s in th e M i d d l e E a s t, 83-84; and m em orandum , H enderson to Byrnes, 23 A ugust 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:399-400; Lenczowski, R u s s i a a n d th e W e s t in I r a n , 263-76; Motter, T h e P e r s ia n C o r r id o r , 240-41; Rubin, P a v e d W ith G o o d I n t e n t i o n s , 19-28; M ark, "Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947," 51-63. 13. Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," 126,129-30. 14. Telegram no. 768, M urray to Byrnes, 25 Septem ber 1945; m em orandum of conversation by H enderson, 20 November 1945; m em orandum , H enderson to Byrnes, 28 November 1945; telegram no. 1134, M urray to Byrnes, 15 December 1945; letter. M inor to H enderson, 17 December 1945; telegram no. 4262, H arrim an to Acheson, 23 December 1945; and telegram no. 4311, Har-

Notes to Pages 92-96 • 255 rim an to Byrnes, 28 December 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:417-19, 435, 461-62, 496-97, 501, 510-511, 517-19; Byrnes, S p e a k in g F ra n k ly , 118-121; Kuniholm, T h e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld W a r in t h e N e a r E a s t, 274-79. 15. M em orandum by H enderson, [approx. 28 December 1945], F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:1-6; DeSantis, T h e D i p l o m a c y o f S ile n c e , 198-201. 16. Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 233. 17. Q uoted in Messer, T h e E n d o f a n A llia n c e , 165-67, 262. 18. Gaddis, T h e U n ite d S t a te s a n d th e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld War, 282-96. 19. Diary, 17 December 1945, Ayers Papers, Truman Library; Truman, M e m o i r s , 1:551-52; Ferrell, O f f th e R e c o r d , 53. 20. Messer, T h e E n d o f a n A llia n c e , 156-65; diary, 27 February 1946, Ayers Papers, Truman Library. 21. Telegram no. 40, Rossow to Byrnes, 5 M arch 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 340. See also telegram s nos. 41 and 42, Rossow to Byrnes, 6 March 1946 and 7 March 1946, both in ibid., 342-43, 344-45. 22. Ibid., 347. 23. Byrnes, S p e a k in g F ra n k ly , 304; Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," 132-42; G ad­ dis, T h e U n i t e d S ta te s a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld W ar, 309-12; Allen, "M ission to Iran," 8-12, Allen Papers, Truman Library. For a detailed account of the con­ frontation over Iran, see H arbutt, T h e Iro n C u r ta in , 217-66. 24. JCS 1641/3,13 M arch 1946, file CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6, JCS. See also JCS 1641/1,10 M arch 1946, ibid. 25. Schnabel, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S t a f f a n d N a t i o n a l P o lic y , 1:158-60; Rosenberg, "The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil in a Future War," 54-55; Herken, T h e W in n in g W e a p o n , 219-24; m em orandum , Lincoln to Hull, 12 M arch 1946, file 350.05 Top Secret (State Dept. Red File), P&O; JPS 789, 2 M arch 1946; and JWPC 432/2, 27 April 1946, all in file CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 1, JCS; JCS 1641/5,11 April 1946, file CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6, JCS. 26. Forrestal w anted to send elem ents of the Eighth Fleet, norm ally based in Atlantic waters, into the M editerranean to accompany the M i s s o u r i . Byrnes agreed w ith his proposal on 28 February, but after the start of the Iranian crisis he suggested a postponem ent, for fear that the dispatch of such a task force m ight seem a provocative act. Forrestal, however, made arrangem ents for two cruisers from the Eighth Fleet to join the M i s s o u r i on its M editerranean cruise. See m inutes, m eetings of the Com m ittee of Three, 28 February and 6 March 1946, C-3; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 141,144-45; V. Davis, P o s t w a r D e f e n s e a n d th e U .S . N a v y , 223-24; Xydis, G r e e c e a n d th e G r e a t P o w e r s , 156-59,175-76; Steel, W a lte r L ip p m a n n a n d th e A m e r i c a n C e n tu r y , 427-28. 27. F P I30, m em orandum by SWNC Subcom m ittee on Foreign Policy Infor­ m ation, "Public Inform ation Program on U nited States Aid to G reece," 4 M arch 1947, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 1, JCS; letter, D iam antopoulos to Taylor, 20 A ugust 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:233-34. 28. A leading student of the Second Round (December 1944-February 1945) of the G reek civil w ar has w ritten, "W hatever their motives and deeds, the G reek C om m unists w ere truly their ow n agents and not Moscow's. Nev­ ertheless, it m ust be recognized that had they perchance succeeded in seizing pow er once the battle started, it is difficult to see how they could have avoided becom ing Stalin's helpless wards." Iatrides, R e v o lt in A t h e n s , 279. 29. For Churchill, see Cam pbell and H erring, T h e D ia r ie s o f E d w a r d R . S t e t t i n i u s , Jr., 231-32. For discussions of Greece during World War II and im m ediately afterw ard, see Iatrides, R e v o lt in A t h e n s ; and McNeill, T h e M e t a -

256 • Notes to Pages 96-99 65-79. For background on the G reek arm ed forces, see G ardner, "Civil War in Greece." 30. Telegrams B and C, Jackson to Lehm an, 28 O ctober 1945 and 27 O ctober 1945; telegram s nos. 4015 and 4042, Kirk to Byrnes, 2 November 1945 and 4 Novem ber 1945, and telegram no. 1136, Byrnes to MacVeagh, 2 November 1945, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:247-55. 31. M em orandum , H enderson to Byrnes, 10 Novem ber 1945; m em oran­ dum , Byrnes to Truman, 10 November 1945, both in ibid., 263-67, D S B 14 (20 January 1946): 79; Paterson, S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n C o n f r o n ta tio n , 183-85. 32. M em orandum , Acheson to Truman, 7 A ugust 1946; and telegram no. 1002, Acheson to MacVeagh, 14 A ugust 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:187-88, 190-91. 33. Q uotation from despatch no. 2002, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 15 December 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:284; telegram no. 64, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 11 January 1946; and despatch no. 2100, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 19 January 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:91-92, 97-99; Iatrides, A m b a s s a d o r M a c V e a g h R e p o r t s , 685-98. 34. The Export-Im port Bank loan to Greece was approved in January 1946, the surplus p roperty credit in May 1946. Between O ctober 1944 and June 1947 G reece also received from the United N ations Relief and Rehabilitation A dm in­ istration $416 million in aid, $312 million of which was contributed by the United States. Turkey received tw o Eximbank loans, one for $3.060 million in Septem ber 1945 and another for $25 million in July 1946. The surplus property credit of $10 million for Turkey was approved in May 1946. See Paterson, S o v i e t A m e r ic a n C o n f r o n ta tio n , 185, 187, 191; U.S. D epartm ent of State, U . S . F o re ig n A s s i s t a n c e , 43, 45, 53; "Foreign Aid to G reece," 1 April 1950, folder A ppoint­ m e n t-A m b a ssa d o r to Greece, G rady Papers, Truman Library. O n Iran's effort to secure American aid after World War II, see Ram azani, Ira n 's F o re ig n P o lic y , 154-59. 35. M em orandum , Acheson to Byrnes, 9 O ctober 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:43-48; m em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, 4 June 1946; and m em oran­ dum , Luthringer to H enderson, 20 June 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:7-9,10-14. 36. Q uotation from telegram no. 220, Hull to Dreyfus, 21 A ugust 1942, F R U S : 1 9 4 2 , 4:247-48; letter, Stim son to Hull, 23 June 1944; and telegram no. 497, Stettinius to Ford, 14 A ugust 1944, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 4 , 5:412-13, 425-26; letter, Byrnes to Patterson, 17 O ctober 1945, F R U S : 1 9 4 5 , 8:534-36; letter, H andy to Ridley, 24 Septem ber 1942; m em orandum , Ridley to Hull, 8 No­ vem ber 1944; and m em orandum for Sm ith, 19 May 1945, all in folder Ridley M ission, file 091 Iran Top Secret, P&O; Motter, T h e P e r s ia n C o r r id o r , 461-80. 37 SC/R-184, 5 February 1946; and SWNCC 202/2, 21 M arch 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 1:1141-42,1145-60; telegram no. 318, M urray to Byrnes, 12 March 1946, 891.24/3-1246, State; m em orandum , Ludlow to Exton, 19 M arch 1946, 891.24/3-1246, State; telegram no. 236, Byrnes to Murray, 22 M arch 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:372-73; m em orandum no. 864/110, Turkish chargé to Acheson, 5 July 1946, 867.24/7-546, State; m em orandum , Acheson to Turkish chargé, 6 A ugust 1946, 86724/7-546, State; airgram no. A-207, Wilson to Byrnes, 11 Septem ber 1946, 86724/9-1146, State. 38. Q uotation from telegram no. 856, Wilson to Byrnes, 12 A ugust 1946; m em orandum , O rekhov to Acheson, 7 A ugust 1946; telegram no. 853, Wilson to Byrnes, 10 A ugust 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:827-29, 834-35, 836-38; Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 810-11. m o r p h o s is o f G r e e c e ,

Notes to Pages 99-100 • 257 39. M em orandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Patterson and Forrestal, 23 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:857. 40. Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 191; Forrestal Diaries, 14 A ugust 1946, 1201-3, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum , Jones to H enderson, 9 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:830-33. 41. Telegram no. 4122, Acheson to Byrnes, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 840-42. 42. Q uotations from ibid. Acheson w rote about an incident that took place during this m eeting as follows: "G eneral Eisenhower asked me in a w hisper w hether I had made it sufficiently clear that the course we had recom m ended could lead to war. Before I could answer, the President asked w hether the G eneral had anything to add. I repeated his question to me." Truman then delivered, according to Acheson's account, a lecture about the strategic implica­ tions of the N ear East, which left no doubt that he understood the conse­ quences of the recom m endations. W hile som eone may have w hispered that question to Acheson, it could not have been Eisenhower, who was in Mexico City that afternoon and did not return to W ashington until four days later. G eneral Thomas T. Handy, the deputy chief of staff, represented the arm y at the m eeting. Eisenhower, however, clearly did not share the view that the U nited States should use force to defend the Dardanelles. He m et w ith Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the chief of naval operations, and Forrestal on 21 A ugust, and according to the latter's account: "M uch to N im itz's surprise and my own, he [Eisenhower] added . . . that neither could he conceive Russian occupation of a part of the D ardanelles area being an occasion for war." Forrestal curtly dism issed Eisenhower's views as an example of "the A rm y's inability to grasp the im portance of control of the seas and their lack of appreciation of strategy in the broadest geographic term s." See Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 195-96; m em orandum . H andy to Eisenhower, 15 A ugust 1946, file 092 Top Secret (76/5), P&O; Galam bos, T h e P a p e r s o f D w i g h t D . E is e n h o w e r , 9:2345; Forrestal Diaries, 21 A ugust 1946, 1217-18, Naval H istory Division. An account of the Eisenhower incident similar to Acheson's also appears in J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 63-64. 43. Q uotations from telegram no. 4122, Acheson to Byrnes, 15 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 840-42; and Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 192; m inute by Elsey, 12 July 1946, folder 1 (Foreign Relations-Russia), Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 44. Q uotation from m em orandum , Vandenberg to 'h um an, 24 A ugust 1946, folder Central Intelligence—m em oranda, 1945-1948, Intelligence File, PSF; CIG Special Study No. 4, 18 Septem ber 1946, folder Central Intelligence R eports—CIG, Intelligence File, PSF; m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 2 O ctober 1946, 767.68119/10-246, State; telegram no. 589, Acheson to Wilson, 16 A ugust 1946; m em orandum , Acheson to Orekhov, 19 A ugust 1946; telegram no. 912, Wilson to Byrnes, 22 A ugust 1946; telegram no. 1035, Bursley to Byrnes, 26 Septem ber 1946; telegram no. 1785, Acheson to Sm ith, 8 O ctober 1946; and despatch no. 1187, Wilson to Byrnes, 19 October 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:843-44, 847-48, 852-55, 860-66, 874-75, 879-93; H ow ard, T u rk ey, th e S t r a i t s , a n d U . S . P o lic y , 244-60. 45. O n 7 September, the navy obtained the State D epartm ent's perm ission to station indefinitely the carrier F ra n k lin D . R o o s e v e lt in M editerranean waters. O n 30 Septem ber, Forrestal announced that the navy w ould m aintain a perm a­ n en t force in the M editerranean. Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 211; m em oran­ dum of conversation by Riddleberger, 7 Septem ber 1946, folder M em oranda of

258 • Notes to Pages 100-102 Conversation 1946-1947, EUR; Albion and Connery, F o r r e s ta l a n d th e N a v y , 187-88. 46. M em orandum , JCS to Patterson and Forrestal, 23 A ugust 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:857-58. For a different interpretation, w hich stresses the strategic im perative behind A m erican m ilitary assistance to Turkey, see Leffler, "Strat­ egy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 812-15. 47. Q uotations from letter, Clayton to Byrnes, 12 Septem ber 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:209-13; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 11 Septem ber 1946, C-3. 48. Telegram no. 4787, Byrnes to Clayton, 24 Septem ber 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:223-24. 49. Telegram no. 5007, Byrnes to Acheson, 5 O ctober 1946, 740.00119 C oun­ cil/10-546, State; letter, Patterson to Clayton, 12 Septem ber 1946, file 091 Turkey (12 Sept. 46), C I S ; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 192; m em orandum , JCS to Patterson and Forrestal, 23 A ugust 1946; and m em orandum by the British Embassy in Greece to the Am erican Embassy in Greece, 5 November 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:857-58, 913-15; E. May, "L e s s o n s " o f th e P a s t, 41-42. 50. Clifford based his report, in part, on m em oranda on Soviet-American relations that he solicited from the State, War, and Navy D epartm ents and from the president's senior foreign policy advisers. Clifford's principal assistant, George M. Elsey, conceived of the report as a "great all-inclusive evaluation + definition of policy." M inute by Elsey, 19 July 1946, folder 1 (Foreign Relations— Russia), Clifford Papers, Truman Library. For background on the Clifford report, see Yergin, S h a tte r e d P e a c e , 241-45; Donovan, C o n f lic t a n d C r i s i s , 221-22. 51. The Clifford m em orandum is reprinted in Krock, M e m o i r s , 419-82. (Q uotations from 477, 479). 52. Gaddis, T h e U n ite d S t a te s a n d th e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld War, 284. See also Powers, "W ho Fathered C ontainm ent?," 526-43; McLellan, "W ho Fathered C ontainm ent?," 205-26. 53. At a m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three on 25 September, Forrestal and Patterson endorsed a new State D epartm ent arm s policy that perm itted tran s­ fers of military equipm ent to nations whose independence and territorial integrity w ere im portant to the security of the United States. Byrnes gave his consent five days later. State D epartm ent officials prepared a m em orandum for Truman asking his approval of the policy as well, b u t there is no indication on the copy in the State D epartm ent records w hether the m em orandum was actually presented to the president, and if it was, w hether he consented. But on 28 October, Byrnes and his advisers apparently changed their m inds and decided to am end SC/R-184 to provide the secretary of state w ith new authority to make exceptional arm s transfers. The departm ent's decision not to adopt a new general arm s policy at that time may have been made because the Policy Com m ittee on A rm s and A rm am ents had been preparing a new statem ent of policy since July and planned to subm it its recom m endations shortly. M inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Three, 25 Septem ber 1946, C-3; Forrestal Diaries, 25 Septem ber 1945, 1274-75, Naval H istory Division; telegram no. 4906, Byrnes to Clayton, 30 Septem ber 1946, 740.00119 Council/9-3046, State; m em ­ orandum for the president, 8 O ctober 1946, 800.24/10-846, State. 54. Q uotation from m em orandum , H illdring to Acheson, 29 O ctober 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:255; telegram no. 5007, Byrnes to Acheson, 5 O ctober 1946, 740.00119 Council/10-546, State; m inutes, m eeting of the Committee of Three, 6 November 1946, C-3.

Notes to Pages 103-6 • 259 55. Policy and Inform ation Statem ent Prepared in the D epartm ent of State, 15 July 1946; and telegram no. 1293, Allen to Byrnes, 30 Septem ber 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:507-9, 518-20; Pfau, "C ontainm ent in Iran," 359-72; PCA M-15, 9 Septem ber 1946, PCA. 56. M em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, 8 O ctober 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:523-25. 57. M em orandum , SWNCC to Hilldring, 12 O ctober 1946, ibid., 529-32. 58. Q uotations from telegram no. 1400, Allen to Byrnes, 22 October 1946; and m em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, 18 O ctober 1946, both in ibid., 539-40, 533-35; Allen, "M ission to Iran," 37-39,109-25, Allen Papers, Truman Library; letter, Ala to H enderson, 15 O ctober 1946, FW 891.51/10-1546, State; telegram no. 1447, Allen to Byrnes, 8 Novem ber 1946, FW 891.51/11-846, State; and telegram no. 948, Acheson to Allen, 14 November 1946, 891.51/11-846, State. 59. M em orandum , H illdring to Acheson, 29 October, 1946; telegram no. 976, A cheson to Allen, 22 November 1946; and telegram no. 263, S utton to Byrnes, 12 December 1946, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:255, 546-47, 561-62; Hess, "The Iranian Crisis," 143-44; Pfau, "C ontainm ent in Iran," 369-72; Kuniholm, T h e O r i g i n s o f t h e C o ld W a r in th e N e a r E a s t, 383-95; Allen, "M ission to Iran," 51-65, Allen Papers, Truman Library. 60. The A m erican advisory m ission took no part in the occupation of Azerbaijan. See letter. Grow to Stokes, 10 June 1946, folder M /G R. W. G row — Iran, Fairchild Working Papers, C enter of M ilitary History. 61. Q uotations from m em orandum and annex by H enderson, 21 O ctober 1946; and letter, Acheson to W ilson, 8 November 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:893-97, 916-17; Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 814-16. 62. M em orandum to H enderson, [approx. 20 November 1946], file 337 Top Secret (1), P&O; m em orandum of conversation in H enderson's office, 18 Novem ber 1946, 86720/11-1846, State; m inutes, m eetings of the Committee of Three, 6 Novem ber 1946 and 13 Novem ber 1946, C-3; telegram no. 1180, Wilson to Byrnes, 10 Novem ber 1946; and letter, H enderson to Wilson, 12 November 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:917-19. 63. Letters, Wilson to Acheson, 7 December 1946; and Wilson to H ender­ son, 7 December 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 920-22; telegram no. 15, Byrnes to Wilson, 10 January 1947; and telegram no. 38, Wilson to Byrnes, 17 January 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:3-4, 7-8; telegram no. 27, Byrnes to Wilson, 20 January 1947, 868.24/1-2047, State. In the m eantim e, Turkey continued to subm it requests for m ilitary aid. See, for example, despatch no. 70/14, Wilson to Acheson, 16 January 1947, 867.24/1-1647, State. 64. Q uotation from Alexander, T h e P r e lu d e to th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 205-24; telegram no. 1384, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 11 O ctober 1986, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7 : 233-35; telegram no. 1500, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 2 November 1946, 868.00/11-246, State; ORE 6/1, 7 February 1947, folder Central Intelligence Reports, ORE—1947, Nos. 1-14, Intelligence File, PSF. 65. Djilas, C o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h S ta lin , 181-83. The best account of the begin­ ning of the Third Round of the G reek civil war is in W oodhouse, T h e S t r u g g l e f o r G r e e c e , 169-202. See also O 'Ballance, T h e G r e e k C i v i l War, 121-35. 66. M em orandum by McCormack, 6 Septem ber 1946, file 092 Top Secret, P&O. See also m em orandum , War D epartm ent Intelligence Division to Eisenhower, 29 A ugust 1946, file 091 Greece (29 A ugust 1946), C I S ; and m em orandum , Bonesteel to Lincoln, 6 December 1946, 868.00/12-646, State.

260 • Notes to Pages 106-10 67. Telegram no. 1307, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 30 Septem ber 1946, F R U S : 7:227. 68. M em orandum prepared in NEA, 21 O ctober 1946, ibid., 240-45. This NE A m em orandum was a revised version of M cCormack's m em orandum . 69. W oodhouse, T h e S t r u g g l e f o r G r e e c e , 185-87; telegram no. 1659, Mac­ Veagh to Byrnes, 30 November 1946, 868.00/11-3046, State. 70. Xydis, G r e e c e a n d th e G r e a t P o w e r s , 434; m em orandum , Cham berlin to N orstad, 13 December 1946, file 400 Top Secret (39), P&O; telegram no. 1721, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 16 December 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 7:282-83; m em orandum , Byrnes to Truman, 20 December 1946, 868.00/12-2046, State; telegram no. 10186, G allm an to Byrnes, 20 December 1946, 868.24/12-2046, State. 71. Telegram no. 6, MacVeagh to Byrnes, 3 January 1947, 868.24/1-347, State; m em orandum , N orstad to Cham berlin, 17 December 1946, file 400 Top Secret (39), P&O; briefing paper. Sparrow to Eisenhower, 13 January 1947, file 092 Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum . Bastion to State D epartm ent, 24 February 1947, file 400 Top Secret, P&O. 72. M em orandum , Jernegan to H enderson, 30 December 1946, 868.24/ 12-3046, State; PCA M-34, 7 February 1947, and enclosed m em oranda, H en­ derson to Acheson, 4 February 1947, and Crain to Baxter, 5 February 1947, PCA. 73. Telegram no. 237, MacVeagh to M arshall, 19 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:27-28; m em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, 20 February 1947, 868.00/ 2-2047, State; Xydis, G r e e c e a n d t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , 432-36, 472-74. 74. Letter, Porter to Clayton, 17 February 1947; and telegram no. 232, Porter to M arshall, 19 February 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:17-22, 26. 75. Telegram no. 227, Ethridge to M arshall, 17 February 1947, ibid., 24. 76. Telegram no. 243, MacVeagh to M arshall, 20 February 1947, ibid., 28. 77. M em orandum , Acheson to M arshall, 21 February 1947, ibid., 29-31; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 131; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 217. 78. Aide-memoires, British em bassy to the State D epartm ent, both 21 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:32-37. 79. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f t h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 3-4; Xydis, G r e e c e a n d th e G r e a t P o w e r s , 243, 317, 332, 351; telegram s nos. 684 and 1130, G allm an to M arshall, 31 January 1947 and 19 February 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:13-14, 26-27; Dalton, H i g h T id e a n d A fte r , 206-7; Watt, "W ithdrawal from G reece," 103-25; Byrnes, S p e a k in g F ra n k ly , 300; H enderson oral history, 80, Truman Library; Alexander, T h e P r e lu d e to th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 240-44; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 64-66; Louis, T h e B r i t i s h E m p ir e in th e M i d d l e E a s t, 91-102. 80. Q uotation from H enderson oral history, 80, Truman Library; "M em o­ randum [by H enderson] Regarding Proposals C ontained in British notes of February 24 Relating to Greece and Turkey," n .d ., FW 868.00/2-2447, State; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 217-19; m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 25 February 1947; and m em orandum and annex, M ar­ shall to Truman, 26 February 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:56-60. 81. Q uotation from Acheson, P r e s e n t a t t h e C r e a tio n , 218; m inutes, first m eeting of the Special Com m ittee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 24 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:45-47; H enderson oral history, 80-82, Truman Library. 82. Q uotation from m inutes, first m eeting of the Special Com m ittee to 1946,

Notes to Pages 110-13 • 261 Study A ssistance to Greece and Turkey, 24 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:45-47; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 130; K ennan, M e m o i r s , 313-14. 83. Q uotations from u nnum bered telegram . Porter to Truman, 3 March 1947, folder C orrespondence and M em oranda, 1946-47, Porter Papers, Truman Library; and letter, MacVeagh to Acheson, 6 March 1947, 868.00/3-647, State. 84. Sum m ary sheet, Cham berlin to Eisenhower, 24 February 1947, file 091 Greece (24 February 1947), C I S ; m em orandum , Lincoln to Patterson, 26 Febru­ ary 1947, file 092 Top Secret, sec. 6A, P&O; m em orandum , Arnold to Eisen­ hower, 6 M arch 1947, file 091 Greece Top Secret, P&O. 85. Q uotation from FPI 30, "Public Inform ation Program on U nited States Aid to G reece," by SWNC Subcom m ittee on Foreign Policy Inform ation, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 1, JCS; m em orandum , Lincoln to Patterson, 26 February 1947, file 096 Top Secret, sec. 6A, P&O; H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 6:349. 86. K ennan, M e m o i r s , 316-17. 87. M em orandum , K ennan to Acheson, 6 M arch 1947, 868.00/3-647, State, J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 154-55; m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:109-10. 88. M em orandum , JCS to Patterson and Forrestal, 13 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:110-14. 89. M em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, n .d ., ibid., 52. O n Congress, economy in governm ent, and foreign aid, see Gaddis, T h e U n ite d S ta te s a n d th e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld W ar, 341-46; Freeland, T h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 75-81; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 90-91; H artm ann, T r u m a n a n d th e 8 0 t h C o n g r e s s , 11. 90. Q uotations from Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 219; m em orandum and annex, M arshall to Truman, 27 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:60-62. The best account of the W hite H ouse m eeting is in J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 138-42. Jones's know ledge of that m eeting came prim arily from conversations w ith Acheson. See "JMJ Notes on Acheson's Presentation to D ep't W orking Group," 28 February 1947, folder 'Birman D octrine—Im portant, Relevant Papers, Jones Papers; and m em orandum for file, 12 M arch 1947, folder Drafts of Truman Doctrine, Jones Papers, Truman Library. 91. M inutes, m eeting of the SWNC Subcom m ittee on Foreign Policy Infor­ m ation, 28 February 1947, folder Truman D octrine—Im portant, Relevant Papers, Jones Papers, Truman Library. 92. FPI 30, "Public Inform ation Program on U nited States Aid to Greece," by SWNC Subcom m ittee on Foreign Policy Inform ation, 4 M arch 1947, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 1, JCS. 93. Notes on C abinet M eeting, 7 M arch 1947, folder C abinet M eetings: Jan. 3-Dec. 19, 1947, set 2, Connelly Files; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 152-53. For accounts of the drafting of the president's m essage to Congress, see ibid., 148-70; and Iselin, "The Truman D octrine," chap. 11. 94. M inutes, m eeting of SWNC Subcom m ittee on Foreign Policy Inform a­ tion, 28 February 1947, folder Thim an D octrine—Im portant, Relevant Papers, Jones Papers, Truman Library. A poll conducted at the en d of March 1947 did reveal some opposition to the extension of m ilitary aid to Greece and Turkey. A m ong those who raised objections to the adm inistration's proposals, opposi­ tion to m ilitary aid was the fifth m ost frequently expressed criticism. O ther objections included the failure to act through a multilateral organization (men­ tioned by 14.8 percent of the respondents); the establishm ent of a precedent

262 • Notes to Pages 113-17 for endless foreign aid (12.6 percent); the possibility of aid increasing chances of war (11.7 percent); the belief that domestic needs were m ore im portant (10.4 percent); and a dislike of m ilitary aid (9.6 percent). Overall, 51.0 percent of the respondents expressed some objection to the president's proposals; 62.3 p er­ cent expressed full or qualified support; and 24.2 percent expressed complete or qualified opposition. Roper, "A Study of W hat People Say in Describing their Reactions tow ard the Truman Proposal for Aid to G reece and Turkey, " April 1947, folder State D epartm ent C orrespondence, 1946-47, WHCR 95. Q uotations from P P : 1 9 4 7 , 176-80; "Foreign Aid to G reece," April 1950, folder A ppointm ent—A m bassador to Greece, G rady Papers, Truman Library. See also Brown and O pie, A m e r i c a n F o re ig n A s s i s t a n c e , 129. 96. Q uotation from subannex to m em orandum , H ow ard to Acheson, 4 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:85; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 158-59; m inutes, m eeting of the R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC, 5 M arch 1947; and m em orandum for record by Sparrow, 6 M arch 1947, both in folder Rearm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA; m em orandum and e n d ., Acheson to Truman, 6 M arch 1947, folder Foreign A id—Truman D octrine (Greece-Turkey), Elsey Papers, Truman Library. For the text of the bill that the adm inistration subm itted to C ongress, see H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n s H e a r in g s , 6:417-18. 97. Q uotations from K ennan, M e m o i r s , 320; "The President's M essage to Congress on the G reek Situation, Revised Draft 3/6/47," e n d . to m em oran­ dum , K ennan to Acheson, 6 M arch 1947, 868.00/3-647, State. 98. Bohlen, W itn e s s to H i s t o r y , 261; Pogue, G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll: S ta te s m a n , 165. 99. M em orandum , Elsey to Clifford, 8 M arch 1947, folder Truman Doctrine Speech 3/12/47, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 100. P P : 1 9 4 7 , 176-80; m inutes by Elsey, n .d ., folder Truman Doctrine Speech 3/12/47, Elsey Papers, Truman Library; Truman, M e m o i r s , 2:105. 101. Excerpts from telephone conversation betw een Vinson and Forrestal, 13 M arch 1947, speech file, folder speech to C ongress on Greece, 3/12/47, Clifford Files, Truman Library. 102. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 128. See also Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 342-43. 103. H artm ann, T r u m a n a n d th e 8 0 t h C o n g r e s s , 64; J. Campbell, T h e U n ite d S ta te s in W o r ld A f f a ir s , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 4 8 , 34-48; H ouse Subcom m ittee on A ppropria­ tions, S u p p l e m e n t a l A p p r o p r i a t i o n B ill f o r 1 9 4 8 , 1105-386; H enderson, "C on­ gressm an John Taber of New York," 331-33. The Senate approved the GreekTurkish Aid bill on 22 April by a m argin of 67 to 23, the H ouse on 9 May by a tally of 287 to 107. 104. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 10. 105. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u tiv e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 6:403-10. 106. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 54, 95. 107. Ibid., 128. 108. Q uotations from 61 Stat. 572; Acheson, P r e s e n t a t th e C r e a tio n , 224; and m em orandum , "Public O pinion Survey of Reactions to President Truman's Proposal Regarding Greece and Turkey," [April 1947], State Dept. C orre­ spondence, 1946-47, WHCF; Roper, "A Study of W hat People Say in Describ-

Notes to Pages 117-20 • 263 ing Their Reactions Toward the Truman Proposal for Aid to Greece and Turkey, " April 1947, ibid.; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 13-17, 101-17; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 90-92. 109. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, A s s i s t a n c e to G r e e c e a n d T u rkey, 1947, 7. 110. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f th e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 17. 111. Q uotation from Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, A s s i s t a n c e to G r e e c e a n d T u rk ey, 31; Freeland, T h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 102-14; Gaddis, "Was the Truman D octrine a Real Turning Point?" 390-91. 112. Q uotation from m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 26 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:58; m em orandum , H enderson to Acheson, n .d .; m inutes, m eet­ ing of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 26 February 1947; m em orandum , Crain to Jernegan, 4 M arch 1947; and letter, Acheson to Patterson, 5 March 1947, all in ibid., 47-48, 56-57, 81-84, 94-95; J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 137-38. 113. For the genesis of SWNCC 202/2, "Policy Concerning Provision of U nited States G overnm ent M ilitary Supplies for Post-War A rm ed Forces of Foreign N ations," 21 M arch 1946, and SC/R-184, "Policy of the [State] D epart­ m ent Regarding D isposal to Foreign G overnm ents of Military-Type Surplus E quipm ent," 5 February 1946, see above, chap. 1. 114. Q uotation from PCA M -l, 3 June 1946; PCA M-6, 3 July 1946; PCA M-15, 9 Septem ber 1946; PCA M-27, 13 December 1946; and PCA M-28, 20 Decem ber 1946, all in PCA; m inutes of the 206th M eeting of the Secretary's Staff Com m ittee, 20 December 1946; and SC-208, m em orandum by the Secre­ tary's Staff Com m ittee, 20 December 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 1:1185-96. 115. At the request of the State D epartm ent's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, SWNCC 202/4 contained no reference to the approved program s of military aid to China. These program s had been suspended in A ugust 1946 at the request of G eneral G eorge C. M arshall and w ould be resum ed only w ith the approval of the secretary of state. M inutes, 206th M eeting of the Secretary's Staff Commit­ tee, 20 December 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 1:1185-88; PCA M -2 7 ,13 December 1946, PCA. 116. Q uotations from SWNCC 202/4, 8 January 1947, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC; m em orandum , C um m ins to Crain, 11 February 1947, folder Rearma­ m ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA; and United N ations G eneral A ssem ­ bly Resolution, 14 December 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 1:1100. 117. M em orandum , Wooten to Connelly, 21 January 1947, folder Rearma­ m ent Com m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA; PCA D-13b, 25 February 1947, PCA. 118. M em orandum , Mosely to Raynor, 22 M arch 1946, FW 800.24 FLC/3-2246, State; m em orandum of conversation by Exton, 29 M arch 1946, 800.24 FLC/3-2946, State; letter, Patterson to Byrnes, 1 July 1946; and m em o­ randum for record by Twitchell, 14 A ugust 1946, both in folder ABC 400.3295 (15 M arch 1944), sec. 1C, OPD. 119. U nder the term s of the Surplus Property Act, the War D epartm ent could not be reim bursed for these expenses. Funds received from foreign governm ents for these services w ere deposited in the Treasury as m is­ cellaneous receipts and not credited to departm ental appropriations. See D epartm ent of the A rm y presentation to JCS committee, "M ilitary Assistance to Foreign Powers," 3 Septem ber 1948, file 320, sec. 3A, pt. 1, P&O. 120. Q uotation from SWNCC 202/5/D, 8 January 1947, folder SWNCC 202,

264 • Notes to Pages 120-24 SWNCC; sum m ary sheet, N orstad to Patterson and Eisenhower, 20 December 1946; m em orandum , Lincoln to Petersen, 20 December 1946; sum m ary sheet, N orstad to Patterson and Eisenhower, 23 December 1946; letter, Littlejohn to Patterson, 16 January 1947, and letter, Acheson to Patterson, 21 January 1947, all in file 400 Top Secret, sec. 2, P&O. 121. PC A D-13b, 25 February 1947, folder R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA. O n the m ilitary's penchant for formulaic policies, see Betts, S o ld ie r s , S ta te s m e n , a n d C o ld W a r C r is e s , 157. 122. M em orandum , Elliott to Crain, 13 February 1947, folder Rearm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA. O n 13 February, the Security Council passed a resolution that instructed the Com m ission on Conventional A rm a­ m ents to subm it recom m endations for the reduction of arm am ents and arm ed forces and for effective safeguards to insure international compliance w ith any such reduction. In the debate on that resolution, A m erican representatives em phasized that conditions of international security w ould have to prevail before there could be any m eaningful lim itations on arm am ents and arm ed forces. See F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:327-415. 123. Q uotation from m em orandum , C um m ins to Crain, 11 February 1947; m em orandum , Dreier to Crain, 5 February 1947; report by the Rearm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC, 26 February 1947; m inutes of the M eeting of the R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC, 5 M arch 1947; and m em orandum , Crain to Sparrow, 19 M arch 1947, all in folder R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC #1, ISA. 124. Q uotations from letter, Acheson to Patterson, 5 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:94-95; and J. Jones, T h e F ifte e n W e e k s, 200, 201; m em orandum by H illdring, 17 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:198-99; SWN-5231, 18 M arch 1947, folder SWNCC 382, SWNCC; B. Smith, T h e S h a d o w W a r r io r s , 134; Gimbel, T h e O r i g i n s o f th e M a r s h a l l P la n , 9. 125. Q uotations from SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:204, 219; SWNCC M em orandum for Inform ation No. 78, "Appreciation of Foreseeable Foreign N eeds for U.S. M ilitary A ssistance Through Fiscal Year 1948," 22 April 1947, file 334 R earm am ent Committee, SWNCC. 126. Q uotations from SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:217; Paterson, S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n C o n f r o n ta tio n , 208-9; McLellan, D e a n A c h e s o n , 126. 127 SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:725-26. 128. Q uotations from SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, ibid., 3:208. 129. M em orandum , Eisenhower to JCS, 10 May 1947, in Galam bos, T h e P a p e r s o f D w i g h t D . E is e n h o w e r , 8:1701; cable W O C 19, Cham berlin to Bonesteel, 27 M arch 1947, file 091 Latin America, P&O. See also letter, Patterson to M arshall, 11 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:105-7 130. The SWNCC Com m ittee assessed Soviet intentions in the seven coun­ tries that m ight require em ergency assistance as follows: dom ination of Greece, Turkey, Iran, and A ustria; establishm ent of a Com m unist governm ent in Italy, w hich was tantam ount to Soviet control; predom inant influence over all of Korea; neutralization of France; and strengthening of the French Com m u­ nist party as the basis for a pro-Soviet regime. SWNCC 360, annexes C, D, and E to app. A, 23 July 1947, file SWNCC 360-360/2, pt. 1, SWNCC. Also SWNCC 360, 21 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:725-33. 131. F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:726, 732-33. 132. The Joint Chiefs listed the following priorities for assistance based on urgency of n eed and im portance to A m erican security: 1. G reat Britain;

Notes to Pages 124-31 • 265 2. France; 3. G erm any; 4. Italy; 5. Greece; 6. Turkey; 7. Austria; 8. Japan; 9. Belgium; 10. N etherlands; 11. Latin America; 12. Spain; 13. Korea; 14. China; 15. the Philippines; 16. Canada. 133. SWNCC 360/1,12 May 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:734-50. 134. Eisenhower quoted in Kolodziej, T h e U n c o m m o n D e f e n s e a n d C o n g r e s s , 56-65; P P : 1 9 4 7 , 55-68. 135. Q uotation from disposition form. Lutes to N orstad, 3 May 1947, file 092 Top Secret, P&O; sum m ary sheet. Hall to Norstad, 19 May 1947, file 400 (19 May 47), C I S ; m em orandum , N orstad to Lutes, 7 May 1947, file 400 Top Secret, P&O. 136. N ations that "m ight" need arm s aid were Iraq, Egypt, A fghanistan, India, Burma, the N etherlands East Indies, Thailand, and Palestine. 137 "Appreciation of Foreseeable N eeds for U.S. M ilitary Assistance during the Next Three to Five Years," report by the R earm am ent Subcom m ittee of SWNCC to Special A d H o c Committee, 10 July 1947, folder Foreseeable Military A ssistance to Foreign N ations for Next 3-5 Years, ISA. 138. Q uotation from State D epartm ent Press Release, 4 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:237; G addis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?," 390-91. O n the origins of the M arshall Plan, see three articles by H ogan: "The Search for a Creative Peace," 267-85; "Paths to Plenty," 337-66; and "American M ar­ shall P lanners," 44-72; also, Gimbel, T h e O r i g i n s o f th e M a r s h a l l P la n ; and Arkes, B u re a u c ra c y , th e M a r s h a l l P la n , a n d th e N a t i o n a l I n te r e s t. 139. SWNCC 382, 5 A ugust 1947 file SWNCC 382 series, SWNCC. 140. Q uotations from report by R earm am ent Subcom m ittee for Special A d H o c Com m ittee, 10 July 1947, folder Foreseeable M ilitary A ssistance to Foreign N ations for Next 3-5 Years, ISA; sum m ary sheet, N orstad to SS&P, 7 May 1947, file 400 Top Secret (39), P&O; sum m ary sheet, N orstad to Eisenhower, 9 June 1947; and m em orandum for record, 18 June 1947, both in ibid.; m em orandum for record by Sibley, 6 June 1947; and m em orandum . Lutes to Eisenhower, 1 A ugust 1947, both in file 400 (154), P&O. 141. SWNCC 360/2, 30 June 1947, file SWNCC 360-360/2, Pt. 1, SWNCC; SWN-5602, 30 July 1947, file SWNCC 382 series, SWNCC; SANA 5827, 19 November 1947, ibid. 142. Q uotation from SWNCC 202/4, 8 January 1947, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 231.

CHAPTER 5

1. M em orandum , Sparrow to Wedemeyer, 31 O ctober 1947, file 337 Top Secret, P&O. 2. NSC 14/1,1 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1: pt. 2, 587 3. See, for example, staff study no. 3736 by the War D epartm ent Intelligence Division, 15 May 1947, file 350.05 Top Secret, P&O; speech by Kennan, "Problem s of U.S. Foreign Policy After Moscow," 6 May 1947, folder speeches, articles, and lectures, unpublished—1947, April to May, K ennan Papers, M udd Library; m inutes, 46th m eeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 21 A ugust 1947, PPS. 4. M em orandum by the A dvisory Steering Committee, 29 Septem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:475.

266 • Notes to Pages 132-37 5. CIA 1, 26 Septem ber 1947, Intelligence File, PSF. 6. PPS 6, 14 A ugust 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:361; Ulam, E x p a n s io n a n d C o e x is ­ te n c e , 459-61; Paterson, O n E v e r y F r o n t, 59-62. For background inform ation on the European Recovery Program , see especially H ogan, T h e M a r s h a l l P la n ; also, Wilson, T h e M a r s h a l l P la n , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 1 ; Arkes, B u re a u c ra c y , th e M a r s h a l l P la n , a n d th e N a tio n a l I n te r e s t; and Price, T h e M a r s h a l l P la n a n d I ts M e a n in g . 7. M em orandum and annex, Bohlen to Lovett, 2 Septem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:761-65. 8. PPS 13, 6 November 1947, ibid., 770-71; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 340-42. 9. Yergin, S h a tte r e d P e a c e , 328. 10. Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 378; letter, Vandenberg to Zim m erm an, 9 December 1947, folder correspondence, Nov.-Dec. 1947, Vandenberg Papers, Bentley Historical Library. 11. 91 Stat. 934. 12. P P : 1 9 4 7 , 515-29; Freeland, T h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 187-200; H artm ann, T r u m a n a n d th e 8 0 t h C o n g r e s s , 116-20. 13. CIA 2, 14 November 1947; and CIA 3, 17 December 1947, both in CIA Collection, M odern M ilitary Branch, NA; m em orandum , H illenkoetter to Truman, 7 November 1947, folder Central Intelligence M em oranda, 1945-48, Intelligence File, PSF; ORE 64, 31 December 1947, folder Central Intelligence R eports—ORE—1947, ibid.; PPS/13, 6 November 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:771. 14. Q uotation from m em orandum , Livesay to Griswold, 21 A ugust 1947, file 091 Greece Top Secret, P&O; A m en, A m e r i c a n F o re ig n P o lic y in G r e e c e , 130-44; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 223-31. 15. Q uotations from m em orandum , MacVeagh to H enderson, n .d .; and report by C ham berlin to Eisenhower, 20 O ctober 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:375-77, 385-86; and report, Cham berlin to Eisenhower, 20 O ctober 1947, file 091 Greece Top Secret, P&O; telegram no. Amag 222, Griswold to M arshall, 15 Septem ber 1947; and m em orandum , Souers to N ational Security Council, 30 O ctober 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:337-40, 391-93; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n te r ­ v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 233-34. 16. M em orandum for record by Arnold, 13 Novem ber 1947, file 091 Greece Top Secret, P&O; Wittner, A m e r i c a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 234-35; H. Jones, "A N e w K i n d o f W a r /' 107-8. 17. Q uotations from m em orandum , H enderson to Lovett, 15 O ctober 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 5:368-70; h andw ritten note by Truman on m em orandum by Leahy, 18 July 1847, Leahy Files, no. 123, JCS; and ORE 51, 20 O ctober 1947, folder Intelligence R eports—ORE—1947, Intelligence File, PSF; m em orandum , Livesay to Griswold, 21 A ugust 1947, file 091 G reece Top Secret, P&O. 18. Q uotations from NSC 5, 6 January 1948; and m em orandum , H enderson to M arshall, 9 January 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4 : 2 - 7 , 9-14; PPS 8, 18 Septem ber 1947, PPS; and JCS 1826/8,1 April 1948, file 091 Greece Top Secret (13), P&O; JCS 1798/1, 15 O ctober 1947, file JCS Papers, P&O; ORE 69, 9 February 1948; and ORE 10-48, 5 April 1948, both in folder Intelligence R eports—ORE—1948, Intelligence File, PSF; m inutes of the m eeting of the N ational Security Council, 12 February 1948, folder NSC M eeting No. 6, Subject File, NSC-M eetings, PSF; NSC 5/2,12 February 1948; and NSC 5/3, 25 May 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:46-51, 93-95. 19. For background on the economic situation in Italy, see SWNCC 360, 23 July 1947, folder SWNCC 360-360/2, pt. 1, SWNCC; despatch no. 677, D unn to

Notes to Pages 137-41 • 267 M arshall, 7 May 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:897-901; m inutes, 18th m eeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 13 June 1947, PPS; J. Miller, T h e U n ite d S ta te s a n d I ta ly , 205-10. 20. M em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 16 May 1947; m em orandum of conversation by M atthew s, 20 May 1947; telegram no. 726, M arshall to D unn, 20 May 1947; and telegram no. 1322, D unn to M arshall, 28 May 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:904-10, 911-13; Kolko and Kolko, T h e L i m i t s o f P o w e r, 348. 21. M em orandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 24 Septem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:977 22. Q uotation from telegram FX 75414, M organ to Com bined Chiefs of Staff, 8 M arch 1947, ibid., 872-73; SANACC 390, 23 December 1947, folder SANACC 390, SWNCC; m em orandum , Tim berm an to Wedemeyer, 26 January 1948, file 091 Top Secret, P&O. 23. Q uotation from telegram no. 1634, D unn to M arshall, 19 June 1947; telegram no. 726, M arshall to D unn, 20 May 1947; and letter, Taff to Del Vecchio, 21 July 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:909-10, 926, 939-41. 24. Q uotation from letter, M arshall to Patterson, 1 July 1947; and letter, Petersen to M arshall, 30 July 1947, both in folder 400 Italy (7-30-47), Projects File, S/A (Royall); letter, Patterson to M arshall, 23 June 1947; telegram no. WARX 81070, N orstad to Lee, 27 June 1947; and telegram no. 2718, D unn to M arshall, 11 Septem ber 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:927-28, 929-30, 967-69; Kolodziej, T h e U n c o m m o n D e f e n s e a n d C o n g r e s s , 56-64. 25. Special Evaluation no. 20 by the Central Intelligence Group, 16 Sep­ tem ber 1947, file 091 Italy Top Secret (1), P&O. 26. Q uotation from m em orandum , N orstad to Eisenhower, 18 Septem ber 1947, file 091 Italy (18 Sept. 47), C I S ; m em orandum for record by Sparrow, 24 Septem ber 1947, file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O. 27. Q uotations from report by U nited States A rm y Survey G roup to Italy, 13 O ctober 1947 (em phasis in original); letter. Sparrow to Verbeck, 3 O ctober 1947; and m em orandum , ASGI to record, 8 O ctober 1947, all in file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O; telegram no. 3185, 10 O ctober 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:989-91. O n the Venezia G iulia dispute, see Rabel, "Prologue to C ontainm ent," and J. Miller, T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d I ta ly , 162-66,198-200. 28. NSC 1,15 O ctober 1947, file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O. 29. JCS 1808/1, 23 O ctober 1947; and JCS 1808/2, 29 O ctober 1947, both in file CCS 092 Italy (10-2-47) sec. 2, JCS; m em orandum , Tim berm an to Wedemeyer, 26 January 1948, file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O; NSC 1/1, 14 Novem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:724-26; C ondit, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S ta ff, 2:64-68. 30. Q uotations from telegram no. 3957, D unn to M arshall, 7 December 1947; and NSC 1/1, 14 Novem ber 1947; m em orandum , Reber to Lovett, 28 November 1947; and telegram no. 3918, D unn to M arshall, 5 December 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:724-26, 727-29, 736-37, 738-39; m em orandum , Eisen­ hower to Forrestal, 9 December 1947, file 400 Italy (12/9/47), S/A (Royall); Forrestal Diaries, 9 December 1947,1969, Naval H istory Division; J. Miller, T h e U n i t e d S t a te s a n d I ta ly , 240-41. 31. Telegram no. Telmar 70, Lovett to M arshall, 11 December 1947; and telegram no. M artel 71, M arshall to Lovett, 12 December 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:746, 748-49; J. Miller, T h e U n i t e d S t a te s a n d I ta ly , 236-39. 32. The CIA's director. Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, however, told Forrestal that he doubted that the C om m unists w ould risk a coup d'état. Forrestal Diaries, 9 December 1947,1970, Naval H istory Division.

268 • Notes to Pages 141-43 33. Q uotations from CIA 3, 17 December 1947, CIA Collection, M odern M ilitary Branch, NA; and telegram no. 3957, D unn to M arshall, 7 December 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:738-39; telegram no. 3918, D unn to M arshall, 5 December 1947, ibid., 736-37; m em orandum , C ham berlin to Eisenhower, 2 December 1947; and m em orandum , Cham berlin to Eisenhower, 4 December 1947, both in file 350.05 Top Secret, P&O. 34. M em orandum for record by Schuyler, 9 December 1947, file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O. 35. M em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall, 10 December 1947, file 400 Italy (12-10-47), S/A (Royall); m em orandum for record by Sparrow, 11 December 1947; and m em orandum , Royall to Souers, 17 December 1947, both in file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , Souers to SANACC, 18 December 1947, file SANACC 390, SWNCC; m em orandum , Forrestal to M arshall, 11 December 1947; and m em orandum , W edemeyer to M arshall, 13 December 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:743-44, 749-50. 36. Q uotations from telegram no. 261, D unn to M arshall, 20 January 1948; and telegram no. 473, D unn to M arshall, 4 February 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:757, 764; m em orandum , Reber to Lovett, 16 December 1947; and telegram no. 4181, D unn to M arshall, 27 December 1947, both in ibid., 750-51, 754; m em orandum , Reber to Arnold, 18 December 1948, file 091 Italy Top Secret (1/11), P&O. 37. SANACC 390/1,16 January 1948; and m em orandum , Souers to Truman, 12 February 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:757-62, 769-70; letter and attach­ m ents, Stilwell to Byroade, 25 February 1948, 865.24/2-2548, State. 38. In 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt invoked his "plenary powers as C om m ander in Chief and as the head of the state in its relations w ith foreign governm ents" to authorize the transfer of destroyers and other m ilitary equip­ m ent to G reat Britain in return for rights to establish m ilitary and naval bases. W hile the justification for the destroyer-bases deal was similar to the one for the transfer of arm am ents to Italy, it was m ore circum scribed. Roosevelt relied on an opinion of his attorney general that predicated his action on statutory law as interpreted by the Suprem e Court, "rather than solely on the Constitution." Truman invoked plenary pow ers in the absence of specific legislative authority. M em orandum , Leva to Forrestal, 16 Septem ber 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 14, JCS. 39. Telegram no. 461, M arshall to D unn, 19 February 1948; and letter, Truman to Forrestal, 10 M arch 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:771-72, 781; J. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves, " 48; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, n .d ., folder Foreign—Italy, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m inutes of the m eet­ ing of the National Security Council, 11 M arch 1948, folder NSC M eeting No. 7, Subject File, NSC-M eetings, PSF. 40. NSC 1/2, 10 February 1948; NSC 1/3, 8 M arch 1948; and telegram no. 1062, D unn to M arshall, 12 M arch 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:765-69, 775-79, 784; J. Miller, T h e U n i t e d S ta te s a n d I ta ly , 243-49. 41. M em orandum , Cook to Eisenhower, 20 February 1948, file 091 Italy (20 Feb. 48), C I S ; m em orandum , Tim berm an to Royall, 10 M arch 1948, file 400 Italy (3-10-48), Projects File, S/A (Royall); m em orandum by Ware, 28 April 1948, file 091 Italy Top Secret, P&O; telegram no. 677, M arshall to D unn, 12 M arch 1948; telegram no. 680, M arshall to D unn, 13 M arch 1948; telegram no. 1195, D unn to M arshall, 18 M arch 1948; telegram no. 1347, D unn to M arshall, 26 March 1948; and telegram no. 1558, D unn to M arshall, 6 April 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 ,

Notes to Pages 143-48 • 269 3:784-88, 789-90; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 5 M arch 1948, 840.50 Recovery/3-548, State. 42. CIA m em orandum ORE 47/1,16 February 1948, file 091 Italy Top Secret (FW 5), P&O; NSC 1/2, 10 February 1948; and letter, Lovett to Forrestal, 17 February 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:765-70. 43. M em orandum for record by Parker, 9 January 1948, file 092 Top Secret, P&O; report by D epartm ent of the Arm y A d H o c Committee, [approx. 1 April 1948], folder 400 Jan.-D ec. 1948, Projects File, S/A (Royall). 44. Transcript, Achilles oral history, 10, Truman Library. See also Reid, T im e o f F ear a n d H o p e , 36. 45. The Treaty of Alliance and M utual Assistance betw een the U nited Kingdom and France, signed at D unkirk on 4 M arch 1947 and ratified on the following 8 September, obligated the tw o contracting parties to "collaborate in m easures of m utual assistance in the event of any renewal of G erm an aggres­ sion" for a period of fifty years. Carlyle, D o c u m e n t s o n I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s , 194-97 46. Q uotations from P a r lia m e n ta r y D e b a te s (Commons) 5th ser., 446 (1947-48): 402, 407-8; British m em orandum of conversation, n .d ., F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 2:815-17; G ladw yn, T h e M e m o i r s o f L o r d G l a d w y n , 209-11. 47. Q uotations from m em orandum , Hickerson to M arshall, 19 January 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:6-7; and transcript, Achilles oral history, 8-9, Truman Library; transcript, Achilles oral history, 3-4, DO HP; transcript, Hickerson oral history, 506, DOHP; m em orandum of conversation by Hickerson, 21 January 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:9-12. For Dulles's views on the crisis in Europe, see notes by Dulles, 8 January 1948; and draft statem ent, 12 January 1948, both in folder European Recovery, Dulles Papers, M udd Library. 48. M em orandum , K ennan to M arshall, 20 January 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:7-8. 49. K ennan, M e m o i r s , 408. 50. Transcript, Achilles oral history, 11, Truman Library; Reid, T im e o f F ear a n d H o p e , 37. 51. M em orandum by Achilles, 20 January 1948, 840.00/1-2048, State. 52. K ennan, M e m o i r s , 408-9. 53. Remarks by K ennan, "Preparedness as Part of Foreign Relations," W ashington, D.C., 8 January 1948, folder Jan.-A pr. 1948, K ennan Papers, M udd Library. 54. Q uotations from m em orandum of conversation by Hickerson, 7 Febru­ ary 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:21-23; letter, M arshall to Inverchapel, 20 January 1948; letter, Lovett to Inverchapel, 2 February 1948; and letter, Inverchapel to Lovett, 6 February 1948, all in ibid., 8-9,17-18,19-20 . 55. PPS/13, 6 Novem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:773. 56. Q uotation from M. Truman, H a r r y S . T r u m a n , 359; Yergin, S h a tte r e d P ea ce, 343-50; Ulam, E x p a n s io n a n d C o e x is te n c e , 421-22. See also Adler and Patterson, "Red Fascism," 1046-64; and note, Elsey to Clifford, n .d .. Speech File—3/17/48, Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 57. Telegram no. 88, Bay to M arshall, 19 February 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:24-26; F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:759-76; Kaplan, T h e U n ite d S ta te s a n d N A T O , 62-64; Riste, "Was 1949 a Turning Point?," 130-41. 58. Q uotation from telegram no. 107, M arshall to Embassy in Norway, 12 M arch 1948; and aide-memoire, British Embassy to State D epartm ent, 11 M arch 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:46-48, 51-52; letter, Embassy in London to

270 • Notes to Pages 148-50 Hickerson, 13 M arch 1948, 840.00/3-1348, State; H enrikson, "The Creation of the N orth Atlantic Alliance," 11-12; Folly, "Breaking the Vicious Circle," 67-68. 59. Carlyle, D o c u m e n t s o n I n te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s , 227. 60. P P : 1 9 4 8 , 184. 61. Q uotation from m inutes, second m eeting of the United States-U nited K ingdom -C anada Security Conversations, 23 M arch 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:65; telegram no. 1110, Caffery to M arshall, 2 M arch 1948, ibid., 34-35; letter, Bidault to M arshall, 4 M arch 1948, 840.20/3-448, State; Wiebes and Zeem an, "The Pentagon Negotiations." The French did not participate in the Pentagon talks ostensibly because the United States considered them security risks, but p erh aps also, as Wiebes and Zeem an point out, because they had been uncooperative in previous negotiations over Germany. 62. J. Sm ith, T h e P a p e r s o f L u c iu s D . C la y , 2:568-69. Clay's telegram may have been sent prim arily to help the services secure increased defense appropria­ tions from C ongress. 63. M em orandum , Irw in to Bradley, 4 January 1949, file 381 Top Secret, C/S. 64. Q uotations from CIA Special Evaluation No. 27, 16 M arch 1948, file 350.05 Top Secret (82), P&O; and ORE 22-48, 2 April 1948, file CD 12-1-26, S/D; m em orandum , C ham berlin to Bradley, 14 M arch 1948, file 381, C/S; m em oran­ dum , H ickerson to M arshall, 8 M arch 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:40-42; m em oran­ dum , Blum to Forrestal, 23 December 1948, Forrestal Diaries, 2706-8, Naval H istory Division; Leffler, "The American C onception of National Security," 356-75. 65. This estim ate did not represent any change in thinking about Soviet capabilities. For approxim ately tw o years, intelligence analysts had thought that the Soviets, in the event of war, could quickly seize W estern Europe, except perhaps Iberia and part of the M iddle East. See, for example, "Intelligence Estim ates . . . as of 1 January 1947, 1 July 1948, and 1 July 1951," by the War D epartm ent Intelligence Service, 25 June 1946, file 350.05 Top Secret (120), P&O; and telegram no. MA-50602, U.S. m ilitary attaché, Moscow to C ham ­ berlin, 26 June 1946, folder-Foreign Relations, Russia, 1946 Report (1), Elsey Papers, Truman Library. 66. Q uotations from ORE 22-48, 2 April 1948, file CD 12-1-26, S/D; m em o­ randum , C ham berlin to Bradley, 14 M arch 1948, file 381, C/S; report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, A m erican Embassy, Moscow, 1 April 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1: pt. 2, 555. 67. Q uotations from CIA 3-48, 10 M arch 1948, CIA Collection, M odern M ilitary Branch, NA; and m em orandum , Hickerson to M arshall, 8 March 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:40; m em orandum , P&O to Collins, 20 M arch 1948, file 381 Europe Top Secret (15), G-3. C anadian officials view ed the crisis in Europe m uch the same as A m erican policymakers. Lester B. Pearson, the U nder­ secretary of State for External Affairs, w rote to Prime M inister W. L. Mack­ enzie King on 12 April, "Russia's allies in W estern Europe now are not so m uch the C om m unists as the forces of despair, apathy, doubt and fear." M unro and Inglis, M ik e , 2:47. 68. Q uotations from letter and e n d ., Caffery to Hickerson, 26 June 1948, 840.00/6-2648, State; m em orandum of conversation by Achilles, 15 April 1948, 840.00/4-1548, State; m em orandum of conversation by Nolting, 11 M arch 1948; telegram no. 230, Marvel to M arshall, 12 M arch 1948; m inutes, first m eeting of United States-U nited K ingdom -C anada Security Conversations, 22 M arch 1948; and NSC 9, 13 April 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:43-44, 51, 59-61, 85-88;

Notes to Pages 150-53 • 271 m em orandum , W edemeyer to Bradley, 18 M arch 1948, file 091 France (22 Mar. 48), C/S. 69. Q uotation from m em orandum , P&O to Collins, 20 M arch 1948, file 381 Europe Top Secret (15), P&O; m em orandum Byroade to Wedemeyer, 18 M arch 1948, file 092 Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum by Denfeld, 9 March 1948, file 334 War Council (January-June 1948), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , Cham berlin to Bradley, 14 M arch 1948, file 381, C/S. For a different analysis of the military's motivations, see Freeland, T h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 282-85. 70. Truman quoted in Rearden, T h e F o r m a tiv e Y ears, 312. 71. M inutes, m eeting of the National Security Council, 12 February 1948, folder NSC M eeting No. 6, Subject File, N SC—M eetings, PSF. 72. Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 3 7 4 - 7 7 . 73. Webb quoted in Rearden, T h e F o r m a tiv e Y ears, 326. 74. Ferrell, O f f t h e R e c o r d , 134. 75. Q uotation from "Statem ent by the President to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Three D epartm ents, and the Three Chiefs of Staff, " 13 May 1948, folder M ilitary—President's Program —Army-Navy-Air A ppropria­ tions Data, PSF; speech by Webb, "The United States in the World Today," 4 M arch 1948, Speech File, Webb Papers, Truman Library; Donovan, T u m u ltu o u s Y ears, 56-59. For accounts of the dispute over the supplem ental appropriation, see Rearden, T h e F o r m a tiv e Y ears, 309-30; Pollard, E c o n o m ic S e c u r i t y a n d th e O r i g i n s o f th e C o ld War, 153-56. 76. M em orandum , Forrestal to Royall, 7 M arch 1948, Folder R, Forrestal Papers, M udd Library. See also m em orandum , Forrestal to G ruenther, 25 M arch 1948, folder G, ibid. 77. This was a sore point for the arm y because the peculiarities of the Surplus P roperty Act and other legislation often prevented the arm y from obtaining reim bursem ent for rehabilitating equipm ent for foreign nations and preparing it for shipm ent overseas. See m em orandum , A urand to Royall, file 400, S/A (Royall). 78. Report by D epartm ent of the Arm y A d H o c Com m ittee, [1 April 1948], file 400 (Jan.-Dec. 48), Projects file, S/A (Royall); m em orandum , Wedemeyer to Royall, 26 M arch 1948, file 400 (3-26-48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 8 April 1948, file 400 (4-8-48), S/A (Royall). 79. Q uotations from H ouse Report 1585, 20 M arch 1948, in H ouse Commit­ tee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 3:177-80; JCS 1845, 10 M arch 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 4, JCS; Title VI, n .d ., folder N orth Atlantic Pact—Foreign M ilitary Assistance Act of 1949, Clifford Files; FMACC D -l/1, 4 January 1950, file FMACC vol. 3, FACC-MAP. 80. Q uotation from m em orandum , Hickerson to Lovett, 8 M arch 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:390-91; m em orandum of conversation by Swett, 17 M arch 1948, 800.20/3-1748, State; m em orandum , Surrey to Bonesteel, 30 M arch 1948, 800.24/3-2448, State. The Foreign A ssistance Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 137) autho­ rized economic assistance to W estern Europe, military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, economic and unrestricted assistance to China, and aid to the International C hildren Emergency Relief Fund of the U nited N ations. 81. JCS 1845/1, 2 April 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 11, JCS. 82. Q uotation from m em orandum , Hickerson to Lovett, 8 M arch 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:390-91; m em orandum , Butler to H um m elsine, 14 April 1948, 800.24/4-1448, State; m em orandum , Butler to H um m elsine, 21 April 1948,

272 • Notes to Pages 153-57 800.24/4-2148, State; m inutes, 150th m eeting of the Policy Planning Staff, 5 April 1948, PPS. 83. Q uotation from m em orandum . Leva to Forrestal, 5 May 1948, file CD 6-2-46, folder 1, S/D; m em orandum , Leva to Forrestal, 4 May 1948, ibid.; N e w Y ork T im e s , 30 April and 1 May 1948; m inutes by Elsey, 30 April 1948; and note by Elsey, 5 May 1948, both in folder Foreign Policy—W estern Union, Elsey Papers, Truman Library; notes on C abinet m eeting, 30 April 1948, folder C abinet m eetings Jan. 9-Dec. 31, 1948, set 1, Connelly Files; Millis, T h e For­ r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 427-28; m em orandum , Bohlen to Surrey, 4 May 1948, 811.20/ 5-448, State; Rearden, T h e F o r m a tiv e Y ears, 491. 84. M em orandum and e n d .. Leva to Clifford, 10 May 1948, folder N ational M ilitary E stablishm ent—M iscellaneous, Clifford Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum . G ross to Executive Secretariat, 7 May 1948, 800.24/5-748, State; m em orandum , Forrestal to Lovett, 18 May 1948, 810.20 Defense/5-1848, State; Forrestal Diaries, 11 May 1948, 2246, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum , Lovett to Forrestal, 21 May 1948, 810.20 Defense/5-1848, State. 85. Telegram no. 204, Lovett to Marvel, 5 April 1948; m em orandum of conversation by Achilles, 5 April 1948; and NSC 9, 13 April 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:75-78, 85-88; m em orandum , Roseman to Webb, 27 April 1948, ser. 47.3, folder MS-9, Budget; PPS 27/1, 2 April 1948, PPS; m em orandum for the president, 21 May 1948, folder M emos for President—M eeting Discussions, 1948, PSF. 86. H udson, "V andenberg Reconsidered, " 46-63. 87. Q uotations from m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 11 April 1948; and m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 27 April 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:82, 105; m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 18 April 1948, ibid., 92-96; m em orandum of conversation by Dulles, 27 April 1948, folder M arshall, G eorge C., Dulles Papers, M udd Library. 88. Q uotation from Senate Resolution 239 (Vandenberg Resolution), 11 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:136; Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 399-412; C o n g r e s s io n a l R e c o r d 94: 7845-46. 89. Q uotations from NSC 9/3, 28 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:141; and NSC 9/4, 20 July 1948, NSC Collections, M odern M ilitary Branch, NA; telegram no. 2765, M arshall to Embassy in the U nited Kingdom, 16 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:188. 90. Q uotation from m em orandum , A urand to Draper, 19 M arch 1948, file 092 Foreign Aid (3-19-48), ASA; m em orandum , A urand to Bradley, 19 March 1948, file 400 (154), P&O; m em orandum , A urand to Wedemeyer, 14 May 1948, file 092 Top Secret (128), P&O; m em orandum , A urand to P&O, 1 June 1948, file 092 Top Secret, P&O. 91. M em orandum W edemeyer to A urand, 30 April 1948, file 092 Top Secret (128), P&O; m em orandum , W edemeyer to A urand, 30 April 1948, file 400 sec. 9, P&O. 92. Conversely, the State D epartm ent made clear to Sw edish officials that they could not expect to receive A m erican arm s if they did not adhere to the prospective N orth Atlantic security agreem ent. See M atthew s oral history, Truman Library; C um m ing oral history, 9-10, DOHP; and Lundestad, A m e r ic a , S c a n d in a v ia , a n d th e C o ld War, 220-30. 93. Q uotations from m em orandum , W edemeyer to Hickerson, 21 June 1948, file 091 D enm ark Top Secret, P&O; and m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 12 July 1948, file 091 Norway (7-12-48), Projects File, S/A (Royall); m em orandum .

Notes to Pages 157-63 • 273 W. H. G. to Wedemeyer, 13 April 1948, file 091 D enm ark Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , A urand to Bradley, 18 June 1948, file 091 Norway (5 May 48), C/S; J C S 1846/2, 21 May 1948, file 091 Norway Top Secret (1), G-3. 94. The SANACC proposed that any new military assistance legislation contain the following term s: all transfers of military equipm ent w ould be w ithout cost to the U nited States, except w hen Congress made specific ap p ro ­ priations; the president w ould have the pow er to determ ine the form and am ount of any reim bursem ent; the N ational M ilitary Establishm ent w ould have the authority to m anufacture in any installations u nder its control or procure from commercial sources m ilitary equipm ent for transfer to foreign governm ents; and the accounts of any departm ent or agency of the govern­ m ent could be reim bursed from funds received from foreign governm ents for providing m ilitary assistance. 95. Q uotations from SWNCC 360/4, 29 December 1947; and SANACC 360/5, 27 February 1948, both in folder SANACC 360/4-SANACC 360/11, Pt. 2, SWNCC. 96. Q uotation from SANACC 382/6,18 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1: pt. 2, 579; SC/R-184, 5 February 1946, F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 1:1141-42; SWNCC 202/4, folder SWNCC 202, SWNCC. 97. Q uotation from letter, Royall to Stim son, 21 April 1948, file 092 (4-21-48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall, 16 April 1948, file 091 India (16 Apr. 48), C/S. 98. NSC 14/1,1 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1: pt. 2, 585-88. 99. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

1. Q uoted in Ferrell, G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll, 90. 2. P P : 1 9 4 7 , 178-79. 3. M em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 7 February 1947; m em orandum , Sprouse to Vincent, n .d ., both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:786-93; m em orandum . Ringwait to Vincent, 11 February 1947, 893.24/2-1147, State; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 153-54. 4. M em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 7 February 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:789-93. 5. Ibid., 791. 6. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n s , 1:10. 7. Q uotations from m inutes of the m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12 February 1947; and letter, Patterson to Acheson, 26 February 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:795-97, 799-803; m em orandum . C arter to M ar­ shall, 12 February 1947, ibid., 794-95. 8. M em orandum , M arshall to Vincent, 27 February 1947, ibid., 803-4; letter, Truman to Pauley, 24 February 1947, folder China, 1947, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 9. Letter, M arshall to Patterson, 4 M arch 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:805-9; SWNCC 83/21,13 M arch 1947, folder SWNCC 8 3 /1 4 -, Pt. 2, SWNCC. 10. Q uotation from m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 12 February 1947; m inutes of conference concerning China, 20 February 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:796, 946-50.

274 • Notes to Pages 163-65 11. Notes on C abinet m eeting, 7 M arch 1947, folder C abinet M eetings: Jan. 3-Dec. 19,1947, set 2, Connelly Files. 12. SW NCC 360, 21 April 1947, folder SWNCC 360-360/2, Pt. 1, SWNCC. For State D epartm ent proposals for economic aid to China, see Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 41. 13. "Report of the Special A d H o c Com m ittee of the State-W ar-Navy C oordi­ nating Com m ittee," 21 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 3:209. For the im portance of credibility in shaping Am erican policy tow ard C hina and Korea, see Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n .

14. Q uotation from Vandenberg, T h e P r iv a te P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e rg , 5 2 2 23; Ferrell, G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll, 90-91. Vandenberg's views were influenced by his correspondence w ith Claire Chennault. See Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n fr o n ta tio n , 42. 15. H ouse Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, A s s i s t a n c e to G r e e c e a n d T u rk ey, 16-18, 47-50 (quotation from 49). 16. Tsou, A m e r ic a 's F a ilu re in C h in a , 447-50; Freeland, T h e T r u m a n D o c tr in e , 109-12; Westerfield, F o re ig n P o lic y a n d P a r ty P o litic s , 241-47. For Judd's back­ ground, see Stuhler, T en M e n o f M i n n e s o t a , 169-74. For a lengthy exposition of Judd's views on A m erican security interests in Asia, see Judd oral history, Truman Library. 17. M em orandum AXO 30, Tim berm an to Butterw orth, 5 July 1947, folder AXO vol. 1, M arshall M ission. For similar criticisms of the N ationalist m ilitary leadership, see m em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 5 June 1947; and m em oran­ dum , Lucas to Stuart, 28 June 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:166-67, 860-63. 18. Q uotation from telegram no. 1235, Stuart to M arshall, 7 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:173; War D epartm ent Intelligence Service, project 3766, sec. 2G, "Analysis of the C urrent M ilitary Situation," 30 June 1947, file 350.05 Top Secret (FW 62), P&O; Chassin, T h e C o m m u n i s t C o n q u e s t o f C h in a , 114-21; F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:130-217. For Chiang's hope for a speedy victory, see despatch no. 613, Stuart to M arshall, 4 April 1947; telegram no. 916, S tuart to M arshall, 28 April 1947; and m em orandum . Ringwalt to Vincent, 3 June 1947, all in ibid., 91-95, 824-25, 836-37 19. Colonel David D. Barrett, the assistant m ilitary attaché at Peiping, rep o rted that while the N ationalists w ere short of American am m unition, they had adequate supplies of Japanese and C hinese m unitions, as well as the necessary arsenal facilities, to sustain lim ited operations against the Com m u­ nists indefinitely. M em orandum by Barrett, 28 April 1947, folder Navy, Wedemeyer M ission. 20. Telegram no. 698, S tuart to M arshall, 31 M arch 1947; m em orandum AXO 9, Tim berm an to B utterw orth, 22 April 1947; and telegram no. 916, Stuart to M arshall, 28 April 1947; all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:811-13, 821-22, 824-25; "Status Report of A m erican W eapons," 2 April 1947; and "Requirem ents for A m m uni­ tion for 39 Divisions for 180 D ays," n .d ., both in folder U.S. Assistance to China, M arshall Mission; War D epartm ent Intelligence Service, project 3766, section 2G, 30 June 1947, file 350.05 Top Secret (FW 62), P&O. 21. M em orandum , Ringwalt to Vincent, 2 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:813-14; telegram no. 95249, C arter to M arshall, 23 July 1946; and m em orandum , C um m ins to Wang, 23 A ugust 1946, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 6 , 10:753-54, 757 22. PCA M-42, 18 April 1947, PCA; m em orandum . Exton to Cum m ins, 15 February 1947, FW 893.24/2-747, State; oral m essage from Canadian embassy, 30 April 1947, FW 893.24/2-1147, State; telegram no. 223, M arshall to Kirk, 24 February 1947; telegram no. 397, Acheson to Kirk, 25 M arch 1947; telegram no.

Notes to Pages 165-69 • 275 491, Kirk to M arshall, 28 M arch 1947; and telegram no. 553, Kirk to M arshall, 4 April 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:798, 810-11, 816-17. 23. Telegram no. 773, A cheson to Sm ith, 2 April 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:814-15. 24. Kenny to B utterw orth, 23 June 1947, folder U.S. Assistance to China, M arshall M ission; m em orandum for inform ation by A ustin, 11 July 1947, folder Navy, W edemeyer M ission; m inutes of conference concerning China, 20 February 1947; telegram no. 1408, Sm ith to Acheson, 16 April 1947; and m em orandum , Wooldridge to Vincent, 28 April 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:946-50, 959-60, 962-63. 25. M em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 23 July 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:877-79; m em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall, 23 December 1947, file 400 China Top Secret (FW 59/6), P&O. 26. Q uotation from m em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 8 May 1947; telegram no. 1373, Sm ith to Acheson, 15 April 1947; m em orandum . Ring wait to Vincent, 5 May 1947; m em orandum by Vincent, 26 May 1947; m em orandum by Ringwalt, 28 May 1947; and m em orandum of conversation by Ringwalt, 29 May 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:819-20, 831-33, 833-35, 835-36, 1115; PCA M-47, 6 June 1947, PCA; m em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 26 May 1947, 893.24/4-347, State; m em orandum . Ringwalt to Carter, 27 June 1947, 893.24/6-2747, State; D S B 1 7 (6 July 1947): 49-50; m em orandum . Ringwalt to Muir, 28 May 1947, folder U.S. A ssistance to China, M arshall Mission. 27. M em orandum SM-8388, 9 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 838-48. 28. Ibid. 29. Q uotation from m em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 20 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 849; SWNCC 360/1, Enel. B, 12 May 1947, ibid., 1:744-45. 30. M em orandum , Vincent to M arshall, 20 June 1947, ibid., 7:849; G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 158-59. 31. For sum m aries of the m ilitary situation, see especially telegram no. 1^56, S tuart to M arshall, 20 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 192-93; War D epartm ent Intelligence Service, project 3766, sec. 2G, 30 June 1947, file 350.05 Top Secret (FW 62), P&O. 32. Millis, T h e F o r r e s ia l D ia r ie s , 285-86. 33. M em orandum , M arshall to Lovett, 2 July 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 635. 34. Telegram no. 821, M arshall to Stuart, 3 July 1947, ibid., 213. 35. War D epartm ent Intelligence Service, project 3766, sec. 2G, 16 June 1947, file 350.05 Top Secret (FW62), P&O; m em orandum , Ringwalt to Vincent, 3 July 1947; and m inutes, m eeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 26 June 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:214-15, 850-51; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 286. 36. Q uoted in Tsou, A m e r ic a 's F a ilu re in C h in a , 460. 37. Lilienthal, J o u r n a ls , 2:201. 38. Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 285-87 See also notes on C abinet meeting, 27 June 1947, folder Cabinet M eetings: Jan. 3-Dec. 19,1947, set 2, Connelly Files. 39. M em orandum , M arshall to Lovett, 2 July 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 635-36; Wedemeyer, W e d e m e y e r R e p o r ts ! , 382-83; Judd oral history, DOHP. Judd later made the exaggerated claim that he was solely responsible for the dispatch of W edemeyer to C hina. 40. M em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 8 July 1947; and directive to Wedemeyer, 9 July 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:639-41. For a detailed study of the W edemeyer m ission, see Stueck, T h e W e d e m e y e r M i s s i o n . 41. M em orandum , Forrestal to M arshall, 8 July 1947, folder Wedemeyer M ission, M arshall M ission; Vandenberg quoted in G. May, C h in a S c a p e g o a t, 167.

276 • Notes to Pages 169-74 42. Ferrell, G e o r g e C . M a r s h a ll, 204; JCS 1721/6, 26 June 1947, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 7 pt. 1, JCS. 43. M em orandum , W edemeyer to M arshall, 2 July 1947; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 8 July 1947; and directive to Wedemeyer, 9 July 1947; all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 636-38, 639-41; E. May, T h e T r u m a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d C h in a , 21; Stueck, T h e W e d e m e y e r M i s s i o n , 12. 44. Telegram no. 34, W edemeyer to M arshall, 29 July 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:682-84; Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 226-30. 45. Cable, Taylor to Wedemeyer, 25 A ugust 1947, file 091 C hina Top Secret (1), P&O. 46. Telegram no. 57, W edemeyer to M arshall, 8 A ugust 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:712-15. 47 Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 285; notes on C abinet m eeting, 27 June 1947, folder Cabinet m eetings: Jan. 3-Dec. 19,1947, set 2, Connelly Files; m em oran­ dum AXO 30, Tim berm an to B utterw orth, 5 July 1947, folder AXO vol. 1, M arshall M ission; telegram no. 34, W edemeyer to M arshall, 29 July 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 682-84. 48. Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 226. 49. Telegram no. 57, W edemeyer to M arshall, 8 A ugust 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:712-15. 50. "S um m ary of Remarks Made by L ieutenant G eneral A lbert C. W edemeyer Before Joint M eeting of State Council and All M inisters of the N ational G overnm ent," 22 A ugust 1947, U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 758-63. 51. Q uotation from telegram no. 1789, S tuart to M arshall, 24 A ugust 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:759-61; telegram , Davis to M arshall, 2 Septem ber 1947, U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S t a te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 815-16. 52. Report, W edemeyer to Truman, 19 Septem ber 1947, U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n i t e d S t a te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 774-76, 779, 809. 53. Ibid., 808-14 (quotations from 810, 811, 814). 54. Ibid., 767; m em orandum , Butterw orth to M arshall, 24 Septem ber 1947; m em orandum . C arter to H um elsine, 25 Septem ber 1947; m em orandum , Butterw orth to Lovett, 26 Septem ber 1947; m em orandum , H um elsine to Lovett, 28 Septem ber 1947; and letter, Wedemeyer to M arshall, 29 Septem ber 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:776-81; Senate A rm ed Services Committee, N o m in a tio n o f G e n e r a l o f th e A r m y G e o r g e C . M a r s h a l l , 22-23; Wedemeyer, W e d e m e y e r R e p o r ts ! , 396-98; E. May, T h e T r u m a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d C h in a , 23. 55. Telegram no. 2068, Stuart to M arshall, 14 O ctober 1947; despatch no. 1064, Stuart to M arshall, 22 O ctober 1947; telegram no. 2149, Stuart to M ar­ shall, 28 O ctober 1947; telegram no. 2169, Stuart to M arshall, 31 O ctober 1947; and telegram no. 1332, Lovett to Stuart, 31 O ctober 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 325-26, 331-35, 343, 350-52. 56. K ennan, M e m o i r s , 373-74; CIA 1, 26 Septem ber 1947, Central Intel­ ligence Reports, Intelligence File, PSF. 57. M em orandum by Bohlen, 30 A ugust 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:763-65. See above, chap. 5 58. P P S 13, 6 November 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 1:770-77. O n the Truman adm in­ istration's assessm ent of its overseas interests, see Gaddis, R u s s i a , th e S o v i e t U n io n , a n d t h e U n i t e d S ta te s , 184-89; and Etzold, A s p e c t s o f S in o - A m e r ic a n R e la ­ tio n s S in c e 1 7 8 4 , 102-6.

Notes to Pages 174-76 • 277 59. M em orandum by M arshall, 10 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:90; Feaver, "The C hina Aid Bill of 1948, " 107-9. 60. Letter, Patterson to M arshall, 23 July 1947; letter, M arshall to Royall, 28 July 1947; telegram no. 1629, Stuart to M arshall, 1 A ugust 1947; m em orandum , Ringwalt to Penfield, 7 A ugust 1947; telegram no. 1021, Lovett to Stuart, 14 A ugust 1947; telegram no. 1902, Stuart to M arshall, 11 Septem ber 1947; letter, Royall to M arshall, 15 O ctober 1947; letter, Lovett to Royall, 20 O ctober 1947; m inutes, m eeting of the Com m ittee of Two, 3 November 1947; and letter, Lovett to Royall, 31 December 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:879-82, 887-88, 896-98, 908-12, 938-39; m em orandum . C arter to M arshall, 9 July 1947, envelope— "Top Secret M arshall and S tuart," M arshall M ission; letter, Saltzm an to Royall, 30 Septem ber 1947; and m em orandum for record by Seedlock, 7 O ctober 1947, both in file 400 (154), P&O; m em orandum . Boité to Bradley, 10 A ugust 1949, file 091 C hina Top Secret, G-3. 61. Q uoted in m em orandum . Boité to Bradley, 10 A ugust 1949, file 091 C hina Top Secret, G-3. See also m em orandum of m eeting held in the secre­ tary's office by McWilliams, 21 O ctober 1947; and m em orandum , Schuyler to Draper, 31 O ctober 1947, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 899-900, 902-4. 62. M inutes of m eeting of the Com m ittee of Two, 3 November 1947; m em o­ randum of conversation by B utterw orth, 16 December 1947; and letter. Butterw orth to Whitney, 16 December 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:908-12, 930-32; m em orandum of conversation by Ringwalt, 4 November 1947, 893.24/11-447, State; m em orandum , Mayo to Arnold, 21 November 1947, file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O. 63. M em orandum of conversation by Rice, 22 O ctober 1947, 893.50 Recov­ ery/10-2247, State. 64. M em orandum , Magill and Sprouse to Butterw orth, 2 February 1948, 893.24/2-248, State. 65. Q uotation from m em orandum of conversation by B utterw orth, 13 November 1947; m em orandum of conversation by Ringwalt, 10 December 1947; and m em orandum of conversation by Butterw orth, 16 December 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:925-27, 930-31,1214-17; "Extent to W hich Recommendations of the W edemeyer Report Have Been Carried O u t," n .d ., 893.50 Recovery/4-248. State; telegram no. 1501, Lovett to Stuart, 2 December 1947, 893.24/12-247, State. 66. M em orandum , Lucas to N orstad, 18 A ugust 1947; m em orandum , Lucas to N orstad, 8 Septem ber 1947; and m em orandum for record, 19 Septem ber 1947, all in file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O; letter, Lucas to Stuart, 28 June 1947; m em orandum . Ringwalt to Carter, 20 A ugust 1947; letter, Lucas to Stuart, 5 Septem ber 1947; letter, Stuart to Lucas, 6 Septem ber 1947; and m em oran­ dum , W edemeyer to Ringwalt, 13 O ctober 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 860-63, 883-86, 892-93. 67 Q uotation from m em orandum of conversation by Butterworth, 13 Novem­ ber 1947; m em orandum , Butterworth to Marshall, 15 October 1947; telegram no. 1302, Lovett to Stuart, 24 October 1947; and telegram no. 1436, Lovett to Stuart, 28 November 1947, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:895-96, 901, 923,1214-17; m em orandum for record by Seedlock, 23 October 1947, file 091 China Top Secret, P&O. 68. Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 238; m em orandum for record by Taylor, 16 January 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (37), P&O; telegram no. 2284, Stuart to M arshall, 22 Novem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:921-22.

278 • Notes to Pages 177-80 69. Q uotation from telegram no. 1436, Lovett to Stuart, 28 November 1947, m em orandum , Tim berm an to Wedemeyer, 27 April 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (11), P&O. 70. Draft letter, Royall to Bridges, [approx. May 1948], file 091 C hina Top Secret (6), P&O; letter, Lucas to Stuart, 4 December 1947, file 400 Top Secret, P&O. 71. Senate Com m ittee on A ppropriations, T h i r d S u p p l e m e n t a l A p p r o p r i a t i o n s B ill f o r 1 9 4 8 , 128-32. 72. M em orandum , W edemeyer to Eisenhower and Royall, 23 January 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (10), P&O; Millis, T h e F o r r e s ta l D ia r ie s , 383. 73. M em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall, 28 November 1947, file 400 (12/6/47), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall and Eisenhower, 15 December 1947, file 091 C hina (12/1/47), ibid.; "List of U rgent Supplies N eeded by the C hinese Air Force," FW 893.24/11-447, State; m em orandum of conversation by Sweeney, 25 November 1947, 893.24/11-2547, State; m em oran­ dum , Ringwalt to Butterw orth, 30 January 1948, 893.24/1-3048, State; m em o­ randum , Ringwalt to B utterw orth, 3 February 1948,893.24/2-348, State; m em o­ randum , Ringwalt to Butterw orth, 24 M arch 1948, 893.24/3-2448, State; letter, Royall to M arshall, 23 January 1948; and letter and e n d ., Royall to M arshall, 24 February 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:4-6,18-22. 74. M em orandum , Schuyler to Blum, 3 January 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (6), P&O. 75. Q uotation from m em orandum , Forrestal to Royall, 26 February 1948, file 091 C hina (2/26/48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , O hly to Byroade, 12 January 1948, file 091 China Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , O hly to Souers, 15 January 1948, file 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 7 pt. 1, JCS. 76. NSC 6, 26 M arch 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:44-50. 77 Telegram no. MARTEL 28, M arshall to Lovett, 7 April 1948, ibid., 52-53. 78. JCS 1721/8, 27 M arch 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O. 79. M em orandum , W edemeyer to Forrestal, 29 M arch 1948, file 091 China Top Secret (14), P&O. W edemeyer also w arned that C om m unist gains in East Asia w ould ruin A m erican efforts to make the Japanese economy selfsufficient. 80. M em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 22 M arch 1948, file 091 China, Projects Files, S/A (Royall). Royall also w orried that further m ilitary aid m ight lead to the com m itm ent of A m erican troops to China. See m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 21 February 1948, ibid. 81. H ouse Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, E m e r g e n c y F o re ig n A i d , 239. 82. Tsou, A m e r ic a 's F a ilu re in C h in a , 462-70; Westerfield, F o re ig n P o lic y a n d P a r t y P o litic s , 262-64; J. Campbell, T h e U n ite d S t a te s In W o r ld A f f a ir s , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 4 8 , 197-99; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, I n t e r i m A i d f o r E u ro p e , 7, 43. For Judd's views, see also m em orandum of conversation by Butterw orth, 11 Novem ber 1947, F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7:917-18; m em orandum , Sprouse to Butterw orth, 24 December 1947, 893.24/12-2447, State; Judd oral history, 89, DOHP; Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 53-56. 83. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 7:166. 84. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, F o re ig n R e l i e f A s s i s t a n c e A c t o f 1 9 4 8 , 363, 448. 85. P P : 1 9 4 8 , 144-46. 86. Q uotations from Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, F o re ig n R e lie f F R U S : 1 9 4 7 , 7 : 923;

Notes to Pages 180-86 • 279 433; and m em orandum , B utterw orth to Thorp, 30 December 1947; m em orandum , Butterw orth to Lovett, 3 January 1948; m em o­ randum by Magill, n.d .; and m em orandum , Butterw orth to Lovett, 21 January 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:442-44, 445-46, 448-50, 454-57; m em orandum , Magill and Sprouse to B utterw orth, 2 February 1948, 893.24/2-248, State. 87. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u tiv e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 7:159-68. 88. Ibid. 89. Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 54-58; Feaver, "The China Aid Bill of 1948," 118. 90. Telegram no. ZX 40728, Mac A rthur to Eaton, 3 March 1948, folder China, S/A (Gray-Pace). 91. H ouse Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, U n ite d S ta te s F o re ig n P o lic y f o r a P o s t- W a r R e c o v e r y P r o g r a m , 2066-76. 92. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 7:241-68. 93. H ouse Report 1585, 20 M arch 1948, in H ouse Com m ittee on Interna­ tional Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 3:216-18; "Legislative H is­ tory of the C hina Aid Program , " e n d . to m em orandum , Butterw orth to Moore, 20 April 1948, 893.50 Recovery/4-2048, State. 94. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, F o re ig n R e l i e f A s s i s t a n c e A c t o f 1 9 4 8 , 341-67, 420-23, 433-87, (quotations from 422, 423, 464, 469); Pach, "M ilitary A ssistance and A m erican Foreign Policy," 139-40. 95. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, F o re ig n R e l i e f A s s i s t a n c e A c t o f 1 9 4 8 , 439, 442-43, 447, 459, 469-87; Fetzer, "Senator Vandenberg and the Am erican C om m itm ent to China, " 292-97. 96. 62 Stat. 158. 97. Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 524. 98. H ouse Subcom m ittee of the Com m ittee on A ppropriations, F o re ig n A i d A p p r o p r i a t i o n B ill f o r 1 9 4 9 , 2:352-449, esp. 412-15; Senate Com m ittee on A ppro­ priations, E c o n o m ic C o o p e r a tio n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 470-72; m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 12 May 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , Royall to Bradley, Wedemeyer, and Draper, 7 June 1948, file 091 China, Projects Files, S/A (Royall); m em orandum , B utterw orth to M arshall, 14 June 1948, 893.50 Recovery/ 6-1448, State; m em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 7 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:84-88. The C ongress appropriated only $275 million of the $338 million in economic aid that had been authorized. 99. Q uoted in Tsou, A m e r ic a 's F a ilu re in C h in a , 473. 100. Telegram no. 1264, Stuart to M arshall, 12 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 7:348-51. 101. ORE 45-48, 22 July 1948, file 350.05 (FW 354), P&O; letter, Clark to Butterw orth, 12 June 1948; despatch no. 273, Stuart to M arshall, 14 June 1948; despatch no. 312, S tuart to M arshall, 17 July 1948; and m em orandum , Butterw orth to M arshall, 27 July 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 7:294-301, 365-68, 379-81; Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 268-71. 102. Q uotation from letter, Clark to Butterw orth, 12 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 7 : 294-98; Liu, A M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y o f M o d e r n C h in a , 249-57. 103. Telegram no. CYF 317 OAGA, Barr to Wedemeyer, 8 June 1948, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 7 pt. 2, JCS. 104. Telegram no. 091101Z, Badger to Denfeld, 9 June 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:254-56.

A s s is ta n c e A c t o f 1 9 4 8 ,

280 • Notes to Pages 186-89 105. Telegram no. 1044, Stuart to M arshall, 9 June 1948, ibid., 7:282-83. 106. M em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 11 June 1948, ibid., 8:90-99. 107. For inform ation on the establishm ent of the joint m ilitary advisory group, see C ondit, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S ta ff, 2:448-54; F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:256-69; and file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) secs. 8-10, JCS. 108. M em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 19 July 1948, file 091 China (7-19-48), Projects Files, S/A (Royall); study by P&O, 28 July 1948, file 091 China Top Secret (6/27), P&O; NSC 22, 26 July 1948; and NSC 22/1, 6 A ugust 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:118-22,131-35. 109. M em orandum , H illenkoetter to Truman, 20 July 1948, folder Central Intelligence M em oranda, 1945-48, Intelligence File, PSF. 110. M em orandum , Butterw orth to Lovett, 15 April 1948, 893.50 Recovery/4-1548, State; m em orandum by Sprouse, 11 May 1948; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 14 May 1948; letter, Truman to M arshall, 2 June 1948; and letter, M arshall to Forrestal, 17 June 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:74-76, 79-80, 99. 111. Letter, Bridges to M arshall, 28 June 1948; letter. Bridges and Taber to Truman, 1 July 1948; m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 9 July 1948; m em orandum , Sprouse to Butterw orth, 16 July 1948; m em orandum , M arshall to Truman, 21 July 1948; and letter, Truman to M arshall, 28 July 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:102-3, 107-8,109-11, 113-14, 115-16, 124-25; m inutes of m eet­ ing by Jenkins, 8 July 1948, 893.24/7-848, State; m inutes of m eeting by Jenkins, 14 July 1948, 893.50 Recovery/7-1148, State. 112. The pricing policy was the same for all program s of foreign m ilitary aid. The source of the item s in the arm y inventories determ ined their cost to the program . The arm y charged replacem ent prices for item s below the m inim um retention level, procurem ent (1945) prices for item s above the m inim um but below the m axim um retention level, and 10 percent of procurem ent prices for item s above the maxim um retention level (excess). Sum m ary sheet, Wedemeyer to Bradley, 20 O ctober 1948, file 400 (20 O ctober 48), C I S . 113. O n priorities, see letter, Royall to M arshall, 24 July 1948; and letter, M arshall to Royall, 9 A ugust 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:116-17,135-36; letter, Royall to M arshall, 6 A ugust 1948; and letter, M arshall to Royall, 23 A ugust 1948, both in ibid., 1: pt. 2, 601-2, 614-15. O n the arm y's involvement in the aid program , see "H istory of the C hina Aid Program , " [approx. 1 November 1948], file Foreign—China, 1948, PSF; letter, Wedemeyer to Yang C hitseng, 31 A ugust 1948; and m em orandum for record by Gilchrist, 1 Septem ber 1948, both in file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O. 114. Telegram no. 96, Clubb to M arshall, 25 February 1948; despatch no. 287, Stuart to M arshall, 30 June 1948; and telegram no. 1239, Stuart to M ar­ shall, 30 June 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 7:115, 328-30, 344-45; telegram no. 1536, S tuart to M arshall, 19 A ugust 1948, ibid., 8:138; Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta ­ tio n , 64. 115. Q uotations from letter, Clark to Butterw orth, 27 A ugust 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:139; and telegram no. 06005Z, Badger to Denfeld, 6 Septem ber 1948, ibid., 144-46; telegram no. 030045Z, Badger to Denfeld, 3 May 1948; letter, M arshall to Forrestal, 28 May 1948; letter and e n d ., Forrestal to M arshall, 17 June 1948, all in ibid., 310-11, 319-21; Condit, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S ta ff, 2:454-58. 116. Letter, Clark to Butterw orth, 27 A ugust 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:139-42; Melby Diary, 19 July 1948, Melby Papers, Truman Library. 117 Q uotation from letter, Clark to Butterw orth, 7 Septem ber 1948; tele-

Notes to Pages 189-92 • 281 gram no. 1614, S tuart to M arshall, 1 Septem ber 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:142-43, 165-67; Hawes, T h e M a r s h a l l P la n f o r C h in a , 84; Stuart, F if ty Years in C h in a , 206-8. 118. M em orandum , Cleveland to Hoffman, 1 Septem ber 1948, 893.50 Re­ cover y /9-148, State. 119. Q uotations from m em orandum , B utterw orth to Lovett, 18 O ctober 1948, FW 893.50 Recovery/10-1848, State; and m em orandum , Johnson to Sprouse, 26 O ctober 1948, 893.50 Recovery/10-2648, State; m em orandum , Cleveland to M oore, 31 July 1948, 893.50 Recovery/7-3148, State; Hawes, T h e M a r s h a l l P la n f o r C h in a , 84-87; U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 319. 120. Telegram no. 1614, Stuart to M arshall, 1 Septem ber 1948; telegram no. 060027Z, Badger to Denfeld, 6 Septem ber 1948; telegram no. 060005Z, Badger to Denfeld, 6 Septem ber 1948; and letter, Clark to Butter w orth, 7 Septem ber 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:142-46, 164-67; m em orandum , Timberman to Wedemeyer, 24 Septem ber 1948, file 091 China Top Secret, P&O. 121. Letter, M arshall to Forrestal, 13 A ugust 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:137-38. 122. Letter, Kenney to Royall, 21 O ctober 1948, file 091 China Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum for record by Gilchrist, 28 Septem ber 1948, both in file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O. 123. Letter, M arshall to Forrestal, 17 Septem ber 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:174; JCS 1721/14, 31 A ugust 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret, P&O; "H istory of the C hina Aid Program ," folder Foreign—China, 1948, PSF; "Requirem ents under 7 A rm y and 3 Division Program ," n .d ., app. 1 to annex 6 of Final Report of the Joint U nited States M ilitary A dvisory G roup to the Republic of China, 28 February 1949, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45), BP pt. 1, JCS. 124. M em orandum , Koo to Truman, 28 Septem ber 1948; and letter, Truman to Chiang, 16 O ctober 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:174-75,180; letter. Steelm an to Wedemeyer, 13 O ctober 1948; m em orandum , W edemeyer to Steelm an, 20 O ctober 1948; m em orandum , Truman to Royall, 20 O ctober 1948; and m em o­ randum , Royall to Truman, 22 O ctober 1948, all in folder 13, State D epartm ent C orrespondence, 1948-1949, WHCF; m em orandum , Acheson to Truman, 10 M arch 1949, folder foreign—China, 1949, PSF; m em orandum . Freem an to B utterw orth, 12 O ctober 1948, 893.50 Recovery/10-1248, State. 125. M em orandum , Schuyler to Wedemeyer, 13 November 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (20), P&O; telegram w hite no. 28, Lovett to Clifford, 12 Novem ber 1948, folder C hina (2), Clifford Papers, Truman Library; telegram no. 608, Clubb to M arshall, 29 December 1948; and airgram no. A-67, Clubb to M arshall, 31 December 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 7:699-700, 723-25; letter, Lovett to Forrestal, 19 November 1948, ibid., 8:206-7. 126. Q uotation from U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n i t e d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 358; Chassin, T h e C o m m u n i s t C o n q u e s t o f C h in a , 183-99; Forrestal Diaries, 22 Novem ber 1948, 2665, Naval H istory Division; m em orandum and e n d ., B utterw orth to M arshall, 6 December 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:226-27; tele­ gram no. 2117, S tuart to M arshall, 6 Novem ber 1948; telegram no. 1561, Lovett to Stuart, 7 November 1948; and telegram no. 531, Ward to Marshall, 8 November 1948, all in ibid., 7:543, 545-46, 548-49. 127. U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , 891-94. 128. Telegram no. MARTEL 115, M arshall to Lovett, 8 November 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:195-96. 129. Q uotation from notes, m eeting of the National Security Council,

282 • Notes to Pages 192-97 3 Novem ber 1948, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 11, JCS; m em orandum of conversation by M arshall, 25 O ctober 1948; telegram no. MARTEL 111, M ar­ shall to Lovett, 6 November 1948; m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 11 Novem ber 1948; telegram no. TELMAR 155, Lovett to M arshall, 12 November 1948; and telegram no. 1608, Lovett to Stuart, 12 November 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:183-84, 193, 199-200, 201-3; telegram no. TELMAR 174, Lovett to Caffery, 18 Novem ber 1948, ibid., 7:588-89; Purifoy, H a r r y T r u m a n 's C h in a P o lic y , 97-102. 130. Q uotations from PPS 45, 26 November 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:214-20; and notes on Cabinet m eeting, 26 November 1948, folder Cabinet M eetings, Jan. 9-Dec. 31,1948, set 1, Connelly Files; Forrestal Diaries, 26 November 1948, 2669, Naval H istory Division; Paterson, "If Europe, W hy Not China?," 35-38. 131. For a different point of view, see Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 54-67 132. M em orandum ORE 27-48, 3 Novem ber 1948, file 091 C hina Top Secret (19/5), P&O; NSC 22/2, 15 December 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:231-32; m em oran­ dum for record by Folk, 20 Decem ber 1948, file 092 Top Secret, P&O. 133. Q uotation from Melby, T h e M a n d a t e o f H e a v e n , 274; telegram no. 2575, Stuart to M arshall, 18 December 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:235-36. 134. Telegram no. 871 OAGA, Barr to M addocks, 18 December 1948, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 7 pt. 3, JCS. 135. M em orandum , B utterw orth to Lovett, 16 December 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 8:233-34; m em orandum and e n d ., Souers to NSC, 17 December 1948, folder NSC m eeting no. 29, 12/16/48, PSF; m em orandum on C hina Aid Program, n .d ., folder Foreign—China, 1949, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF. 136. Q uotation from JCS 1721/18, 4 January 1949, file 091 C hina Top Secret, G-3; and m em orandum , "C hina Aid Program ," n .d ., folder Foreign—China, 1949, Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 26 January 1949, file 091 C hina Top Secret, G-3; notes on C abinet m eeting, 31 December 1948, folder C abinet M eetings, Jan. 9-Dec. 31,1948, set 1, Connelly Files. 137. Q uotation from telegram no. C67574, Royall to Forrestal, 3 February 1949, file 091 C hina (12-1-47), Projects File, S/A (Royall); m em orandum , M ad­ docks to Royall, 2 February 1949, file 091 China Top Secret (7/1), G-3; m em o­ randum by Acheson, 4 February 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, Jan.-Feb. 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; notes on C abinet M eeting, 4 February 1949, folder C abinet M eetings, Jan. 3-Dec. 30,1949, set 1, Connelly Files; NSC 22/3, 2 February 1949; and editorial note, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 9:479-83. 138. Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 530-31. 139. M em orandum by Acheson, 7 February 1949; and m em orandum by Souers, 8 February 1949, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 9:486-87. 140. Letter, Truman to D urant, 7 November 1951, folder "D", G eneral File, PSF. 141. Lilienthal, J o u r n a ls , 2:525. 142. Borg and Heinrichs, U n c e r ta in Y ears, 61-77 See also D ingm an, "Strate­ gic Planning and the Policy Process," 6-21. 143. Lilienthal, J o u r n a ls , 2:525; Levine, "A New Look at American M ediation in the Chinese Civil War, " 375. 144. For a defense of the opposite conclusion, see Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n , 54-58.

Notes to Pages 198-201 • 283 CHAPTER 7

1. "Statem ent on the United States M ilitary A ssistance Program ," by the D epartm ent of State, 22 May 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:299. 2. Transcript, M ilitary A ssistance Discussions, State D epartm ent, 20 April 1949, file N7-1 vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA. 3. Q uotations from NSC 14/1, 1 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1: pt. 2, 587; and m em orandum , A urand to Wedemeyer, [October 1948], file 092 Top Secret (118/72), P&O; m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 6 A ugust 1948, file 474 (8-6-48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall and Bradley, 9 A ugust 1948; and m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 15 Septem ber 1948; m em orandum , Forrestal to Royall, 26 Septem ber 1948; m em orandum , A urand to Wedemeyer, 24 Septem ber 1948; m em orandum , Wedemeyer to A urand, 7 October 1948; and m em orandum , W edemeyer to A urand, 2 November 1948, all in file 092 Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , Royall to Forrestal, 13 October 1948, file 400 (10-13-48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , A urand to Royall and Forrestal, 28 O ctober 1948, file 400 (3-26-48), S/A (Royall); m em orandum , W edemeyer to Royall and Bradley, 29 O ctober 1948, file O il, P&O; m em oran­ dum for Struble, N orstad, and G ruenther, 15 Septem ber 1948, file CCS 092 W estern Europe (3-12-48) sec. 6, JCS. 4. Q uotations from JCS 1868/6,17 May 1948, file 092 Top Secret (118), P&O; JCS 1868/1, 17 A pril 1948, file CCS 092 W estern Europe (3-12-48) sec. 1, JCS; NSC 14/1,1 July 1948; F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 1, pt. 2, 585-88. For the strategic concept in the event of a w ar during fiscal year 1949, see JCS 1844/4,19 May 1948, file CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 13, JCS. 5. Q uotations from JCS 1868/20, 17 Septem ber 1948, file CCS 092 W estern Europe (3-12-48) sec. 6, JCS; JCS 1868/13, 12 July 1948, ibid., sec. 4; JCS 1868/16, 5 A ugust 1948, ibid., sec. 5; JCS 1868/18, 3 Septem ber 1948, ibid., sec. 6; JCS 1868/29, 12 Novem ber 1948, ibid., sec. 10; JCS 1868/42, 31 December 1948, ibid., sec. 13; m em orandum by Bradley, n .d ., ibid., sec. 14A, JCS; m em orandum , W edemeyer to Bradley, 20 A ugust 1948; and m em orandum , W edemeyer to Bradley, 10 Septem ber 1948; both in file 092 Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum SM -79-49,14 January 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 16, JCS. 6. Q uotation from JCS 1925/1, 2 Septem ber 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 14, JCS; SANACC 360/11, 18 A ugust 1948, file SANACC 360/4-SANACC 360/11, Part 3, SWNCC. 7 Q uotations from m em orandum , Shaub and Sheppard to Webb, 6 A ugust 1948; and letter, Webb to Lovett, 10 A ugust 1948, both in folder S6-7, series 47.3, Budget; letter, Lovett to Webb, 28 July 1948, ibid.; m em orandum , "H ighlights of N ational Defense C eilings," 12 July 1948, file O rganization and A dm inistra­ tio n -W h ite H ouse, folder The President, Webb Papers, Truman Library; D S B 19 (15 A ugust 1948): 211; m em orandum , A urand to Webb, 3 June 1948, file 091 Iran (6/3/48), Projects File, S/A (Royall); m em orandum for record, 30 A ugust 1948, file 091 Iran Top Secret, P&O; m em orandum , Schwarzwalder to Miles, 6 A ugust 1948, folder International Program s—G eneral—GAROIA, MAP, MSP, series 47.8a, Budget. 8. Q uotations from unnum bered telegram , H arrim an to M arshall, 14 July 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:183-84; m em orandum of conversation by Draper, 19 July 1948, folder Secretary of the Army, Subject File, PSF; m em orandum , Hillenkoetter to Lovett and Forrestal, n .d ., Forrestal Diaries, 2603, Naval H istory Division.

284 • Notes to Pages 202-6 9. Letter, H arrim an to Lovett, 12 November 1948, file N7-l(3)-A vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em oranda of conversation by G ruenther, 10 and 11 November 1948, folder Secretary of Defense—Report Data, Subject File, PSF; notes on Cabinet m eeting, 26 Novem ber 1948, folder Cabinet M eetings, Jan. 9-Dec. 31, 1948, set 1, Connelly Files. 10. Forrestal Diaries, 10 O ctober 1948, 2556-57, Naval H istory Division. 11. M em orandum of conversation by G ruenther, 10 November 1948, folder Secretary of D efense—Report Data, Subject File, PSF; Forrestal Diaries, 11 November 1948, 2637, Naval H istory Division. 12. Q uotation from m em orandum , H ickerson to Labouisse, 12 O ctober 1948; telegram no. 3781, Caffery to M arshall, 20 July 1948; telegram no. Toeca 358, Bruce to H offm an, 14 Septem ber 1948; policy statem ent of the D epartm ent of State, 20 Septem ber 1948; telegram no. 5173, Caffery to M arshall, 20 O ctober 1948; and telegram no. 5590, M arshall to Lovett, 28 O ctober 1948, all in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:639-42, 649-59, 661-62, 666-68, 673-74; ORE 53-48, 2 A ugust 1948, folder Central Intelligence R eports—ORE 1948, No. 48-57, Intelligence File, PSF; Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic D im ensions of the M arshall Plan," 291-92. 13. Q uotations from m em orandum , Hickerson to Labouisse, 12 October 1948; telegram no. 5220, Caffery to M arshall, 5 O ctober 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:662-64, 666-67 14. Q uotations from m em orandum , Hickerson to Labouisse, 12 October 1948; and letter, Labouisse to N itze, 27 O ctober 1948; m em orandum , Labouisse to M oore, 16 O ctober 1948, all in ibid., 666-67, 668-72. 15. Q uotations from policy statem ent of the D epartm ent of State, 20 Sep­ tem ber 1948; and telegram no. 5220, Caffery to M arshall, 5 O ctober 1948, both in ibid., 651-59, 662-64; Leffler, "The U nited States and the Strategic D im en­ sions of the M arshall Plan," 291-94. 16. Letter, Lovett to H arrim an, 3 December 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:306. 17. M inutes of the third m eeting of the W ashington Exploratory Talks on Security, 7 July 1948; m inutes of the fourth m eeting of the W ashington Talks, 8 July 1948; m em orandum of the third m eeting of the Working G roup par­ ticipating in the W ashington Talks, 15 July 1948; m em orandum of conversation by Lovett, 20 A ugust 1948; m em orandum , "W ashington Exploratory Conver­ sations on Security," 9 Septem ber 1948, all in ibid., 155-60, 163-69, 186, 214-21, 239-40. 18. Q uotation from letter, H ickerson to Caffery, 24 A ugust 1948, 840.20/ 8-2448, State; letter, H ickerson to Caffery, 17 November 1948, 851.24/11-1048, State; aide-memoire from the French governm ent, 31 A ugust 1948, FW 851.20/8-3148, State; m em orandum of conversation by Achilles, 30 Septem ber 1948, 851.24/9-3048, State; JCS 1868/23, 8 O ctober 1948, file CCS 092 W estern Europe (3-12-48) sec. 9, JCS; JCS 1868/30, 13 November 1948, ibid., sec. 10. 19. Q uotation from JCS 1868/58, 9 February 1949, file 092 Top Secret, G-3; telegram no. DELWU 80, Kibler to P&O, 21 O ctober 1948; and telegram no. WAR 91426, W edemeyer to Kibler, 25 O ctober 1948, both in file CCS 092 W estern Europe (3-12-48) sec. 9, JCS. 20. Q uotation from m em orandum , Jernegan to Satterthw aite, 16 November 1948, 868.00/11-1648, State; State D epartm ent m em orandum , 18 November 1948, folder Policy Com m ittee on A rm s and A rm am ents #3, ISA; m em oran­ dum and e n d ., Forrestal to JCS, 17 November 1948, file CCS 092 (8-22-46), sec. 15, JCS; JCS 1868/47, 7 January 1949, file 092 Top Secret (5/3), G-3; m em oran-

Notes to Pages 206-11 • 285 dum , "Foreign Aid Council," n.d., file N7-l(4)-A, Asst. SecDef FMA; letter, Forrestal to M arshall, 16 December 1948, 811.20/12-1648, State; m em orandum SM-74-79, 14 January 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 16, JCS; m em orandum for Ohly, 21 Septem ber 1948, CD 6-2-46 folder 1, S/D; D S B 20 (9 January 1949): 59; F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:250. 21. M em orandum and e n d ., Sherm an to Royall, 24 January 1949, folder 400 (January 1949), S/A (Royall); SM-74-79, 14 January 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 16, JCS; m em orandum , Marcy to Peurifoy, 2 December 1948, 840.20/ 12-248. 22. "Balancing the Budget," 6 November 1948, folder Budget, National, FY 1950, Law ton Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum , Peurifoy to Lovett, 8 December 1948, 840.20/12-848, State; FACC M-2, 5 February 1949, folder FACC A genda, M inutes, S um m ary of Actions, FACC-MAP; m em orandum by Lemnitzer, 10 February 1949, file N 7-l(l)-B , Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum of telephone conversation by Carter, 7 February 1949, folder M emos of Conversa­ tion, Jan.-Feb. 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; transcript, Princeton Sem inars, 10 O ctober 1953, reel 1, track 1, pp. 5-6, ibid. 23. JCS 1868/24, 14 O ctober 1948, file 092 Top Secret, P&O; FACC D-8, 11 February 1949; and FACC D-8/2, 14 April 1949, both in file FACC D ocum ents, vol. 2, FACC-MAP; JCS 1868/58, 9 February 1949, file 092 Top Secret, G-3. 24. Q uotation from JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; JCS 1868/57, 9 February 1949; and JCS 1868/58, 9 February 1949, both in file 092 Top Secret, G-3; C ondit, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S ta ff, 2:422-27 25. JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS. 26. JCS 1844/4,19 May 1948, file CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 13, JCS; JSPC 877/59, 26 May 1949, ibid., sec. 32; m em orandum , Tim berm an to Wedemeyer, 5 A ugust 1948; and report by Plans and Policy Group, 27 Septem ber 1948, both in file 381 Top Secret, P&O; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS. 27 Report by D epartm ent of the Arm y C oordinating Committee, 9 February 1949, file 381 Top Secret (52), G-3; m em orandum , M addocks to Bradley, 26 January 1949; and JCS 1769/16, 1 M arch 1949, both in file 092 Top Secret (1), G-3; Princeton Sem inars, 10 O ctober 1953, reel 1, track 1, pp. 6-8, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. 28. Q uotation from NSC 28/1, 3 Septem ber 1948, folder NSC M eeting No. 19, NSC File, PSF; transcript, m eeting betw een Acheson, Lange et al., 11 February 1949, 840.20/2-1149, State; m em orandum by Acheson, 10 February 1949, folder M emos of Conversation Jan.-Feb. 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; JCS 1929/4, 28 January 1949, file 091 Norway Top Secret (7/9), G-3; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; Lundestad, A m e r ic a , S c a n d in a v ia , a n d t h e C o ld War, 309-19. The Joint Chiefs recom m ended that Norway receive only a "token" am ount should it not join the N orth Atlantic Treaty. 29. NSC 2/1, 25 November 1947, e n d . to JCS 570/102, 28 A ugust 1948, file CCS 360 (12-9-42) sec. 32, JCS; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092(8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS. 30. "M ilitary A ssistance Program for FY 1950," 1 February 1949, file N 7-l(l)-E .3 A rm y vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA. 31. Q uotations from m em orandum by K ennan, 24 November 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:286; m em orandum by Acheson, 2 M arch 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:141-45; m em orandum of conversation by A nschuetz, 14 January 1949; and Army

286 • Notes to Pages 211-15 D epartm ent Study, 26 January 1949, both in Compilation Book; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; E. Sm ith, "The Fear of Subversion," 150-55. 32. Q uotations from D epartm ent of State Policy Statem ent on A ustria, 20 Septem ber 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 2:1349; and MAP D-G/42, Draft No. 1, 25 July 1949, MAP D ocum ents vol. 6, FACC-MAP; telegram no. 771, Reber to M ar­ shall, 27 February 1948; and telegram no. 884, M arshall to Reber, 10 M arch 1948, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 2:1468-69, 1474-75; m em orandum by P&O, "Mili­ tary Aid for A ustria, " 26 January 1949, Compilation Book. 33. Q uotation from m em orandum by Thielen to Boité, 17 May 1949, file 092 Europe Top Secret, (35/3), G-3; letter, Lovett to Forrestal, 7 December 1948; m em orandum . D raper to Forrestal, 31 December 1948; m em orandum , Collins to Royall, 13 January 1949, all in file 400, Jan.-D ec. 48, S/A (Royall); JCS 1868/62, 7 March 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS. 34. PPS 44, 24 November 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:202. 35. Q uotations from ORE 28-48, 17 November 1948, folder Intelligence Reports-ORE 1948, No. 21-24, Intelligence File, PSF; telegram no. Amag 1652, G rady to M arshall, 22 Novem ber 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:187-91; and JCS 1826/12, 7 O ctober 1948, file 091 Greece Top Secret (13), P&O; telegram no. G am a 1336, M arshall to Grady, 26 Novem ber 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:205; letter, Roundtree to McGhee, 14 January 1949, folder G reece—C orrespondence, 1946-51, G rady Papers, Truman Library; transcript, discussion betw een Royall and Forrestal, 4 January 1949, file 020 Secy of Army, S/A (Royall); G ardner, "Civil War in Greece"; Wittner, A m e r ic a n I n t e r v e n t i o n in G r e e c e , 242-53. 36. SANACC 358/8, 24 Novem ber 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 4:191-92, m em oran­ dum , Jernegan to Thurston, 11 O ctober 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 6:1-8; m em oran­ dum , McBride to D epartm ent of the Army, 14 December 1948, file 091 Turkey Top Secret, P&O; Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War," 818-23. 37. State D epartm ent study, "M ilitary A ssistance for Iran," 12 January 1949; m em orandum of conversation, "Armament Program —Iran," 18 January 1949; and D epartm ent of Arm y Study, "Iran—Foreign A id," 27 January 1949, all in Compilation Book. 38. Q uotations from m em orandum , "M ilitary Assistance to Korea," n .d .; m em orandum of conversation by A nschuetz, 14 January 1949; and m em oran­ dum by International Group, P&O, "K orea," 25 January 1949, all in Compila­ tion Book; m em orandum , Swett to Saltzm an, 23 February 1949, folder Policy Com m ittee on A rm s and A rm am ents #4, ISA; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; Gaddis, "Korea in A m erican Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy," 277-98; Cum ings, T h e O r i g i n s o f th e K o re a n War, 169-78. 39. Q uotation from m em orandum by P&O, "M ilitary Assistance to the Republic of the Philippines," 26 January 1949; m em orandum , "Military A ssistance Program for the Far East," 12 January 1949; m em orandum of con­ versation by A nschuetz, 17 January 1949, all in Compilation Book; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS; Hess, T h e U n ite d S ta te s ' E m e r g e n c e a s a S o u t h e a s t A s i a n P o w e r, 342. O n the im portance of American prestige and credibility in East Asia, see Stueck, T h e R o a d to C o n f r o n ta tio n . 40. Q uotations from m em orandum . D reier to Cum m ing, n .d .; m em oran­ dum of conversation by the D epartm ent of State, 18 January 1949; m em oran­ dum , Freem an to Daniels, 19 January 1949, all in Compilation Book; m em oran­ dum , Skidm ore to Schuyler, 1 February 1949, file 092 Top Secret (1/8), G-3; JCS 1868/62, 7 M arch 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 20, JCS.

Notes to Pages 215-19 • 287 41. Q uotations from m em orandum , "M ilitary Assistance for the Far East," 12 January 1949; and m em orandum of conversation by A nschuetz, 17 January 1949, both in Com pilation Book; table, "Proposed M ilitary Assistance Pro­ gram ," A pril 1949, file N 7 -l(l)-B .l vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum of conversation by H ickerson, 27 A ugust 1948, F R U S : 1 9 4 8 , 3:223-24; m em oran­ dum of conversation, "Armament Program —Norway, Sw eden, and D enm ark," Compilation Book; UM D-20, [approx. 1 April 1949], ExecSecretariat; m em o­ randum , Daniels to Webb, 2 M arch 1949, 810.24/3-249, State. 42. Table, "Proposed M ilitary A ssistance Program ," April 1949, file N 7-l(l)B .l vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; FACC D-10, 17 February 1949, file N 7-l(l)-B .l, Asst. SecDef FMA; telegram no. 627, Acheson to Douglas, 24 February 1949, 840.20/2-2449, State. 43. FACC D-3, Draft No. 8, 7 February 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:254-55. 44. Q uotation from report by the Office of the Special Representative for ECA in Europe, [approx. 30 March 1949], file N7-l(4)-B ECA, Asst. SecDef FMA; telegram no. 170, Nitze to Lovett and Gross, 13 January 1949, file N7-1 Foreign Military Assistance vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum , Tannenwald to Lemnitzer, 13 January 1949, file N7-l(2), Asst. SecDef FMA; telegram no. 346, Holmes to Acheson, 29 January 1949, file N7-l(3)-A Western Union vol. Ï , Asst. SecDef FMA; telegram no. 1214, Douglas to Acheson, 26 March 1949, file N7-l(7), Asst. SecDef FMA; MAP D-D/6, Revision No. 3, 28 July 1949, file MAP Docum ents vol. 3, FACC-MAP; m em orandum , Nitze to Foreign Assistance Steering Committee, 31 January 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:54-60; telegram no. TOECA 1174, Siegbert to Hoffman, 20 June 1949, file N7-l(3)-A.5, Asst. SecDef FMA. 45. Q uotation from speech by Nourse, "The Impact of Military P repared­ ness on the Civilian Economy," 5 April 1949, file N7-l(l)-F.4, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum . Council of Economic Advisers to the President, 7 De­ cem ber 1948, file Daily Diary, 1948-34, Nourse Papers, Truman Library; m em o­ randum , Pace to Truman, 28 M arch 1949, folder M utual Defense (1), WHCF. 46. Q uotations from m em orandum for Lemnitzer, 19 April 1949, file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 23A, JCS; and notes for use by Johnson, 6 April 1949, ibid., sec. 23; letter, Nourse to Truman, 2 April 1949, file Daily Diary, 1949-40, Nourse Papers, Truman Library; letter, Truman to Nourse, 5 April 1949, file Daily Diary, 1949-41, ibid.; note, McNeil to G ruenther, n .d ., file CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 26, JCS; m em orandum , G oodrich to McNeil and Leva, 13 April 1949, file CD 6-2-46, folder 3, S/D. 47. "Proposed M ilitary A ssistance Program ," April 1949, file N 7-l(l)-B .l vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum for M addocks, 8 April 1949, file 092 Top Secret (1/30), P&O; m em orandum , Lem nitzer to Johnson, 8 April 1949, file N7-1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum , Lem nitzer to G ruenther and others, 27 April 1949, file N 7 -l(l)-B .l, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum for the FACC, 3 May 1949, file MAP D ocum ents vol. 1, FACC-MAP; m em orandum , "Brief of Budget C om m ents," n .d ., file N 7-l(l)-B .l, Asst. SecDef FMA; m em orandum . Pace to Truman, 20 April 1949; and m em orandum , Acheson to Truman, 20 April 1949, both in folder M ilitary—D epartm ent of Defense, Subject File, PSF; "S uggested Rem arks for Mr. Pace," 7 April 1949, FW 840.20/4-749, State; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 39-40. 48. FACC D-3, Draft No. 8, 7 February 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:250-57; m em o­ randum , FACC to Foreign A ssistance Steering Committee, 25 M arch 1949, file N 7-l(l)-F.2, Asst. SecDef FMA; MAP D-D/14, Draft No. 4, 22 June 1949, folder M ilitary A ssistance, 25 July 1949, Lloyd Files.

288 • Notes to Pages 219-22 49. MAP D - G 17, 1 July 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:347; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, T h e V a n d e n b e r g R e s o lu tio n , 213-16; ORE 41-49, 24 February 1949, file N 7-l(l)-E .8, Asst. SecDef FMA. 50. Q uotation from ORE 48-49,10 May 1949, file 350.05 Top Secret (16), G-3; m em orandum , N itze to Foreign A ssistance Steering Com m ittee, 31 January 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:56; McLellan, D e a n A c h e s o n , 157-64; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, R e v i e w s o f th e W o r ld S itu a tio n , 21-22. 51. Q uotations from FACC D-12/4 Revision No. 1, 11 July 1949, file FACC D ocum ents vol. 3, FACC-MAP; and U.S. D epartm ent of State, T h e M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 40; MAP D-G/27, Draft No. 1, 23 July 1949, file MAP D ocum ents, vol. 5, FACC-MAP. 52. Q uotation from telegram no. 2187, Douglas to Acheson, 5 June 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:302; telegram no. 2619, Bruce to Acheson, 23 June 1949, file N7-l(3)-A.2, Asst. SecDef FMA; telegram no. 532, Baruch to Acheson, 22 June 1949, file N7-l(3)-1.3, ibid.; telegram no. 466, Bay to Acheson, file N7-l(3)-B.7, ibid.; telegram no. 480, Sparks to Acheson, file N7-l(3)-B.8, ibid. 53. Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, T h e V a n d e n b e r g R e s o lu tio n , 211-49 (quotations from 233, 237); transcript, "M ilitary Assistance Discus­ sions," 20 April 1949, file N7-1 Foreign M ilitary A ssistance vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; "Record of D iscussions at the M eeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, W ashington, April 21, 1949," F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:288-91; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 42. 54. Q uotation from m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 24 June 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, June 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 13 April 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, April 1949, ibid.; m em orandum of m eeting w ith the president by Acheson, 12 May 1949; m em orandum of m eeting w ith the presi­ dent by Acheson, 27 June 1949; and m em orandum of m eeting w ith the presi­ dent by Acheson, 30 June 1949, all in folder M emos of Conversation, M ay-June 1949, ibid.; m em orandum of conversation by Berkner, 1 July 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, July 1949, ibid.; note by Lloyd, 30 June 1949, folder M ilitary A ssistance, July 25, 1949, Lloyd Files; m em orandum . G ross to Acheson, 3 May 1949, 840.20/5-349, State; m em orandum , M arch to Gross, 27 May 1949, 840.20/5-2749, State; telegram no. TELAC 56, Webb to Acheson, 3 June 1949, 840.20/6-349, State; "Present Time Schedule," 1 April 1949, folder 16, State D epartm ent C orrespondence, 1948-1949, WHCF; m em orandum , Acheson to Truman, 12 May 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:298-99. 55. Truman had previously requested an interim appropriation of $50 mil­ lion to prevent any interruption in aid to Greece and Turkey. 56. Q uotation from S. 2341, 27 July 1949, copy in Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 633; FACC D-14, Draft No. 1, 9 M arch 1949, file N 7-l(l)-B .3, Asst. SecDef FMA; P P : 1 9 4 9 , 395-400. In his m essage to C ongress transm itting the arm s bill, Truman m entioned every nation to w hich he planned to furnish m ilitary assistance except Austria. 57. Q uotations from Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 503-4; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 1-18; and sum m ary of daily m eeting w ith the secretary, 3 A ugust 1949, folder M inutes of Secretary's Daily M eetings—1949, ExecSecretariat; m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 26 July 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:361-64; speech by Dulles, 21 Septem ber 1949, folder M ilitary A ssistance Program , Dulles Papers, M udd Library; N e w Y ork T im e s , 29 Septem ber 1949,14; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f

Notes to Pages 222-27 • 289 46-47; R. Blum, D r a w i n g t h e L in e , 129-30. This section on congres­ sional consideration of the MAP appeared in condensed form in Pach, "Mili­ tary A ssistance and A m erican Foreign Policy," 140-42. 58. Q uotation from Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 508; S. 2388, 5 A ugust 1949, copy in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 648-63; notes of telephone conversation by Battle, 3 A ugust 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, A ugust-S eptem ber 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum to Senator Smith, 1 A ugust 1949, unm arked folder. Box 99, Sm ith Papers, M udd Library. 59. M em orandum of conversation by Gross, 19 July 1949, file N7-l(7), Asst. SecDef FMA; letter, A cheson to Bruce, 26 July 1949, folder M emos of Conversa­ tion, July 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum of conversa­ tion by Acheson, 26 July 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:361-64; Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 509-12; Senate Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 19-125; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 45-46. 60. H.R. 5895, 19 A ugust 1949, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, M i l i ­ t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 681-82. 61. "Explanation of A m endm ents . . . to the M ilitary Assistance Bill," n .d ., folder M ilitary A ssistance Program , Dulles Papers, M udd Library; m em oran­ dum of telephone conversation by Acheson,. 22 A ugust 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, A ugust-S eptem ber 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; Vandenberg, T h e P r i v a t e P a p e r s o f S e n a to r V a n d e n b e r g , 513-14. 62. Q uotations from U.S. D epartm ent of State, U n ite d S ta te s R e la tio n s w i t h C h in a , xvi; and Sm ith Diary, 8 A ugust 1949, 256, Sm ith Papers, M udd Library; G. Sm ith, D e a n A c h e s o n , 112-21. 63. Q uotation from H ouse Com m ittee of International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 5:187-207, 225-42, 452-60; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m , 515-50; m em orandum of con­ versation by Acheson, 18 A ugust 1949, folder M emos of Conversation, A ug u st-S eptem ber 1949, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; Stebbins, T h e U n ite d S t a te s in W o r ld A f f a i r s , 1 9 4 9 , 82-83; Cohen, D e a n R u s k , 39-44; JCS 1721/43, 16 January 1950, file CCS 452 C hina (4-3-45) sec. 7, pt. 7, JCS; m em orandum by Ohly, 1 June 1950; and m em orandum , Webb to Truman, 21 June 1950, both in F R U S : 1 9 5 0 , 6:98-100, 103-5; R. Blum, D r a w i n g th e L in e , 129-42. 64. H ouse Com m ittee on International Relations, S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s , 5:438-49, 575-80; P P : 1 9 4 9 , 485; 63 Stat. 714. 65. Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 48-49; transcript, Princeton Sem inars, 10 O ctober 1953, reel 1, track 1, pp. 9-10, Acheson Papers, Truman Library. I n te r e s ts ,

EPILOGUE

1. M em orandum , "Budget Review (Agency Ceilings) 1951," 23 June 1949, folder Bureau of the Budget—Budget Recommendations, FY 51, Book 1, WHCF. 2. Q uotations from NSC 52, 5 July 1949; and NSC 52/3, 29 Septem ber 1949, both in F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 1:350, 389; NSC 52/1, 8 July 1949, folder NSC M eeting No. 46, NSC File, PSF; JCS 2032/3, 6 A ugust 1949, file JCS Papers, G-3; JCS 2032/5, 22 A ugust 1949, file 092 Top Secret (36), G-3; ORE 74-49, 22 Septem ber 1949, folder Central Intelligence Reports, ORE—1949, Intelligence File, PSF.

290 • Notes to Pages 228-32 3. Q uotation from JMAC 73/2,18 A ugust 1949, file 092 Top Secret, G-3; JCS 1920/1, 6 May 1949, file CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 28, JCS; m inutes, m eeting of O perations D eputies, 9 Septem ber 1949; and S M 1802-49,9 Septem ber 1949, both in file 092 (8-22-46) sec. 28, JCS; C ondit, T h e J o in t C h ie f s o f S ta ff, 2:303. 4. Q uotations from NSC 68,14 April 1950, F R U S : 1 9 5 0 , 1:238, 240, 264, 282, 284; Pollard, E c o n o m ic S e c u r i t y a n d t h e O r i g i n s o f t h e C o ld War, 237-40; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 79-83. 5. Q uotation from letter, Acheson to Johnson, 24 M arch 1950, file CD 6-2-46, S/D; m em oranda. Gray to Johnson, 3 M arch 1950 and 11 April 1950, ibid.; m em orandum , Acheson to Truman, 3 January 1949 [1950]; and m em orandum . Pace to Truman, 26 January 1950, both in folder M utual Defense (2), WHCF; "Relationship of Economic Recovery to Defense Effort," [approx. April 1950]; and letter, Bonesteel to Ohly, 29 M arch 1950, both in folder 5th M eeting, 5/6/50, of the E uropean C oordinating Com m ittee, H arrim an Papers, H arrim an Resi­ dence; JCS 2099/6, 11 May 1950, file JCS Papers, G-3; D.C. 6/1, 1 December 1949, F R U S : 1 9 4 9 , 4:352-56; m em orandum by Bell, 17 November 1949, ibid., 1:407-9; Pach, "Arming the Free World, 1945-1950"; Ireland, C r e a tin g th e E n ta n ­ g l i n g A llia n c e , 158-68; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 71-79, 85-90. 6. Transcript, Princeton Sem inars, 10 O ctober 1953, reel 1, track 1, pp. 9-10. 7. W herry quoted in Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 48; FMACC M-42, 3 December 1949, file FACC A gendas, M inutes, Sum m aries of Action, FACCMAP. 8. Equipm ent valued at only 5 percent of the fiscal year 1951 MAP appropri­ ation for NATO countries had been delivered to the recipients by late 1951. M em orandum and e n d ., Law ton to Truman, 15 November 1951, folder Bud­ g et-M ilitary, 1945-1953, Subject File—Agencies, PSF. 9. M em orandum , Lem nitzer to Burns, 17 July 1950, folder Defense, Secre­ tary of. Subject File—Foreign Affairs, PSF; m em orandum of conversation by Acheson, 31 July 1950, folder M emos of Conversation, July 1950, Acheson Papers, Truman Library; m em orandum , Webb to Truman, 21 Septem ber 1950, folder State, Secy of (2), Subject File—Agencies, PSF; NSC 68/2, 30 Septem ber 1950, F R U S : 1 9 5 0 , 1:400; Kaplan, A C o m m u n i t y o f I n te r e s ts , 104-7 10. Transcript, "M ilitary A ssistance D iscussions," 20 April 1949, file N7-1, vol. 1, Asst. SecDef FMA; m inutes, m eeting of the Foreign M ilitary Assistance C oordinating Committee, 3 December 1949, file OMA 337 (3 Dec 49), FMACC vol. 1, FACC-MAP.

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4 vols. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1962-64. R e p o r t o f th e S e c r e ta r y o f D e f e n s e F ra n k C . C a r lu c c i to th e C o n g r e s s o n th e A m e n d e d F Y 1 9 8 8 / F Y 1 9 8 9 B ie n n ia l B u d g e t. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Print­ ing Office, 1988. U.K. Parliam ent. P a r lia m e n ta r y D e b a te s (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 446 (1947-48). U.S. Congress. H ouse. Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs. A s s i s t a n c e to G r e e c e a n d T u rk ey. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. ---------. E m e r g e n c y F o re ig n A i d . 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947 ---------. I n te r - A m e r ic a n M i l i t a r y C o o p e r a tio n A c t . 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946. ---------. I n t e r - A m e r ic a n M i l i t a r y C o o p e r a tio n A c t . 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. ---------. U n i t e d S ta te s F o re ig n P o lic y f o r a P o s t- W a r R e c o v e r y P r o g r a m . 80th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1947-48. U.S. C ongress. H ouse. Com m ittee on International Relations. S e le c te d E x e c u ­ t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s o f th e C o m m itte e , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 5 0 . Vol. 3, F o re ig n E c o n o m ic A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m s , Part 1. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1976. ---------. S e le c te d E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n H e a r in g s o f th e C o m m itte e , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 5 0 . Vol. 5, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m s , Part 1. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1976. ---------. S e le c te d E x e c u tiv e S e s s io n H e a r in g s o f th e C o m m itte e , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 5 0 . Vol. 6, M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e P r o g r a m s , Part 2. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1976. ---------. S e le c te d E x e c u tiv e S e s s io n H e a r in g s o f th e C o m m itte e , 1 9 4 3 - 1 9 5 0 . Vol. 7, U n ite d S ta te s P o lic y in th e F ar E a s t, Part 1. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1976. U.S. Congress. H ouse. Subcom m ittee of the Com m ittee on A ppropriations. F o re ig n A i d A p p r o p r i a t i o n s B ill f o r 1 9 4 9 . 2 parts. 80th Cong., 1948. ---------. S u p p l e m e n t a l A p p r o p r i a t i o n B ill f o r 1 9 4 8 . 80th Cong., 1947. U.S. Congress. Senate. A rm ed Services Com m ittee. N o m in a tio n o f G e n e r a l o f th e A r m y G e o r g e C . M a r s h a l l to b e S e c r e ta r y o f D e fe n s e . 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1951. U.S. Congress. Senate. Com m ittee on A ppropriations. E c o n o m ic C o o p e r a tio n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948. ---------. T h i r d S u p p l e m e n t a l A p p r o p r i a t i o n s B ill f o r 1 9 4 8 . 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. U.S. Congress. Senate. Com m ittee on Foreign Relations. A s s i s t a n c e to G r e e c e a n d T u rk ey. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. ----------E x e c u t i v e S e s s io n s o f th e S e n a te F o re ig n R e la tio n s C o m m i t t e e ( H is to r ic a l S e r ie s ). Vol. 1, 80th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1947-48. W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1976. ----------F o re ig n R e l i e f A s s i s t a n c e A c t o f 1 9 4 8 ( H is to r ic a l S e r ie s ). W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1973. ---------. I n t e r i m A i d f o r E u r o p e . 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. ----------L e g is la tiv e O r i g i n s o f t h e T r u m a n D o c t r i n e ( H is to r ic a l S e r ie s ). W ashington, D.C.: G overnm ent Printing Office, 1973.

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SECONDARY WORKS Books

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Index

Acheson, Dean, 47, 103, 117, 121, 221; assesses military aid planning, 6; and Soviet intentions, 21; and surplus ar­ maments sales, 25; and military aid to Latin America, 43-44, 51, 52-53; and U.S. policy toward Argentina, 58; urges coalition government in China, 79; assesses China's role in East Asia, 86; and Turkish straits crisis, 99-100, 257 (n. 42); and military aid to Greece, 104; and U.S. policy toward Turkey, 104-5; and planning of Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 109, 112-14; on U.S. interests in Greece, 112-13; on significance of China Aid Act, 184; supports Italian membership in NATO, 211; concern about European morale, 219; at Coun­ cil of Foreign Ministers, 219-20; criti­ cizes staff work on MAP legislation, 222; and China White Paper, 224; and in­ clusion of China in MAP, 224-25; on NATO defense plans, 229-30 Achilles, Theodore C , 146 Additional Military Production Fund, 216 Ala, Hussein, 94-95 Allen, George V., 94-95, 103-4 American Republic Affairs, Office of, U.S. State Department, 20, 37; and lend-lease to Peru, 35; and Good Neighbor Policy, 39; opposes InterAmerican Military Cooperation Act, 47-53; changes in leadership of, 58-59; and inclusion of Latin America in MAP, 215 Anderson, Clinton P, 80 Appropriations Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 184 Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate, 177, 182 Argentina: neutrality during World War II, 53-54; Nazi influences in, 53-57; U.S. policy toward, 53-58; denied U.S.

311

military aid, 53-58, 239 (n. 9); and lift­ ing of embargo on U.S. arms sales, 58 Army, Department of the, U.S., 139-42, 149, 157 Army Air Forces, U.S.: and mobilization, 15-16; and postwar military aid, 15-16; and military aid to Latin America, 3638; and military aid to China, 70-71, 73 Arnold, Archibald V, 113 Arnold, Henry H.: urges surplus arms sales to foreign nations, 16; and mili­ tary aid to Latin America, 36-37, 44; and military aid to China, 70 Arnold, W. H., 27 Aurand, Henry S.: demands reform of military aid policy, 156-57, 199; and aid to China, 188 Austria, 211-13 Azerbaijan. See Iran: separatist move­ ment in Badger, Oscar C., 185-86, 189, 191 Barkley, Alben W., 221 Barr, David G.: named commander of army advisory group in China, 176; fa­ vors U.S. operational advice to Nation­ alist army, 185; and aid to Fu Tso-yi, 190; criticizes Nationalist military lead­ ership, 191-92; and delivery of U.S. aid to Nationalists, 193-94 Barrett, David D., 274 (n. 19) Bell, John O., 231-32 Berlin blockade, 205-6 Bevin, Ernest K.: and Gentlemen's Agreement on arms transfers to Argen­ tina, 46, 56-57; and aid to Greece, 1012, 108; and aid to Turkey, 104-5; and Western European security, 144-45; fears Soviet expansion, 148 Black Sea straits, 98-100 Blue Book, 55

312 * Index Bogota Conference, 60-61 Bogotazo, 60-61 Bohlen, Charles E., 21, 132, 205 Braden, Spruille, 44; criticizes military interference in foreign policy, 36; op­ poses interim arms aid to Latin America, 42; appointed assistant secre­ tary, 42, 241 (n. 32); opposes Western Hemisphere Defense Program, 47-53; background of, 54; and Perön, 54-55; resignation of, 58; estimates cost of Western Hemisphere Defense Pro­ gram, 243-44 (n. 59) Bradley, Omar N., 186, 200 Brazil, 33 Brett, George H., 36-37, 38, 41 Bridges, Styles, 164, 179, 187 Briggs, Ellis O., 39, 42, 58-59, 241 (n. 32) Bruce, David K. E., 203 Budget, Bureau of the, 3; and defense spending, 124-25, 151-52; weighs com­ mitments for foreign aid against re­ sources, 201; and MAP budget, 207, 217-18 Butterworth, W. Walton, 175, 180, 187 Byrnes, James E, 42, 55, 75, 91; diplo­ macy with Soviets, 21, 25-26, 93-95; approves interim arms aid to Latin America, 43-44; and Gentlemen's Agreement on arms to Argentina, 4546; reservations about Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 48-49; and Braden, 49; supports retention of ma­ rines in China, 76-77; and Chinese civil war, 79; and removal of Soviet troops from Iran, 94-95; and U.S. policy to­ ward Greece, 96-97; and U.S. aid to Near East, 101-2; authorizes military assistance to Iran, 104; and military aid to Lahn America, 242 (n. 39); approves new arms aid guidelines, 258 (n. 53) Caffery, Jefferson, 20; concern about French morale, 150; and French politi­ cal instability, 203-4 Cairo Conference, 66, 72 California Arabian Standard Oil Com­ pany, 10 Carlucci, Frank, 3, 6 Case, Francis H., 115 Central Intelligence Agency: on Soviet threat to Western European security, 131-32; on Communist strength in Western Europe, 133; assesses political

importance of Greece, 136; warns of Communist coup in Italy, 141; on pos­ sibility of Soviet military action, 149; assesses U.S. interests in China, 17374; warns of Nationalist collapse, 187; on psychological effects of MAP, 219; on Soviet peace offensive, 220. See also Central Intelligence Group Central Intelligence Group: on Soviet in­ tentions during Turkish straits crisis, 100; analyzes weaknesses of Greek government, 106; warns of Communist coup in Italy, 138-39. See also Central Intelligence Agency Chamberlin, Stephen J., 151; favors U.S. military aid to Greece, 106; on Greek guerrilla strength, 110-11, 196; calls for operational advice to Greek army, 135; on Soviet intentions, 149 Chang Chun, 81 Chapultepec Conference, 54 Chennault, Claire L., 65-66, 69, 182 Chiang Kai-shek, 16, 20, 71, 78, 79, 81, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 169, 175, 196, 197, 224; leadership of, 63, 68, 70, 77, 84-85, 166, 168, 180-81, 183, 184-85, 187, 192, 195; dissatisfaction with lendlease, 64; conflict with Stilwell, 65-67; and U.S. equipment for ninety Chinese divisions, 72-73; and Nationalist occu­ pation of Manchuria, 76, 80, 84-85; and Marshall Mission, 81-86; predicts victory in civil war, 85; desires addi­ tional U.S. aid, 165-66; and Wedemeyer Mission, 170-72; blames Yalta accords for Nationalist difficulties, 173; desires U.S. operational advice to Na­ tionalist armed forces, 176-77; and Fu Tso-yi, 190; campaigns for all-out U.S. aid, 192; requests speedup in delivery of U.S. military aid, 192; relinquishes presidency, 194 China, 252 (n. 67); in World War II, 6471; organization and equipment of Na­ tionalist armed forces, 65-6 1, 274 (n. 19); Communist strength in, 67-68, 86-87; weaknesses of Nationalist gov­ ernment, 67-68, 170, 184-85, 190-91; U.S. policy toward, 71, 75-81, 161-62, 166-69; civil war in, 71, 75-81, 165, 170-71, 185, 191-92; Nationalist Alpha units, 71, 165, 168-69; Marshall Mis­ sion to, 81-86; Wedemeyer Mission to, 169-74. See also Marshall, George C ; Military Assistance, U.S.—to China;

Index • 313 Wedemeyer, Albert C. China Aid Act, 119, 123; passage of, 17984; bill submitted to Congress, 180; Marshall's defense before Congress, 180-82; provisions of, 183; appropri­ ations for, 184; and U.S. global inter­ ests, 184; implementation of, 186-95 China White Paper, 224 Chinese-American Composite Wing, 249 (n. 20) Chou En-lai, 81, 85 Churchill, Winston S., 12, 26, 90-91 Chu Teh, 71 Clark, Lewis, 189 Clay, Lucius D., 148-49 Clayton, William L., 101 Clifford, Clark M., 100, 114; report on Soviet-American relations, 102, 258 (n. 50); and Truman Doctrine speech, 115 Columbia, 60-61 Cominform, 131 Committee of Three, 168; and U.S. policy toward China, 75-76, 79; and military aid to Greece and Turkey, 109; ap­ proves new arms aid guidelines, 258 (n. 53) Congress, U.S., 3, 4, 88; and Pittman Resolution, 9; and lend-lease, 9, 11-12; and aid to Philippines, 27; and mis­ sions bill, 28; and Inter-American Mili­ tary Cooperation Act, 46-47, 60-61; and Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 112-17; and Foreign Aid Act of 1947, 133, 179; and U.S. operational advice to Greek army, 135; and Marshall Plan, 152-53; and Title VI, 152-53; and Vandenberg Resolution, 155; and China Aid Act, 179-84; and Mutual Defense Assis­ tance Act, 221-26. See also Foreign Af­ fairs Committee; Foreign Relations Committee Connally, Tom: urges normalization of re­ lations with Argentina, 55; criticizes Byrnes, 93; and China Aid Act, 183; and MAP, 221 Connelly, Matthew, 57 Coolidge, Calvin, 8 Council of Foreign Ministers: London (1945), 93; Moscow (1945), 93; London (1947), 144, 175; Paris (1949), 219-20 Crain, James K., 109-10 Cummins, Elmer T, 120 Czechoslovakia, 143, 147, 212

Dalton, Hugh, 108-9 Davies, John Pa ton, Jr., 67-68 De Gasperi, Alcide, 204; excludes Com­ munists from government, 137; fears Communist coup, 140-41; expands government, 141; and emergency U.S. aid to Italy, 142-43 De Gaulle, Charles, 202 Democratic League, 173 Denfeld, Louis E., 151, 189 Denmark, 158, 210-11, 215 Dewey, Thomas E., 179 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: U.S. air base at, 11 Dreier, John C , 39 Dulles, John Foster, 145, 223-24 Dunkirk Treaty, 145, 269 (n. 45) Dunn, James C., 143; arranges for sur­ plus armaments for Italy, 138; fears po­ litical consequences of Italian aid bill, 139- 40; warns of Communist coup, 140- 41; assesses Italian armed forces, 141- 42 Eaton, Charles A., 135 Economic Assistance, U.S.: to Latin America, 39-40; to Greece, 96-97, 134, 256 (n. 34); to Turkey, 97, 256 (n. 34); emergency aid to Western Europe, 126, 179; relationship to military aid, 127; and European stability, 133-34, 143, 150; and omnibus foreign aid legisla­ tion, 152-53; to France, 202-4. See also Marshall Plan Economic Cooperation Administration, 190, 206 Einaudi, Luigi, 143 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 13, 120, 177; and military aid to Latin America, 45, 46, 47, 60; opposes Braden on Argentina, 56; assesses strategic importance of Latin America, 61; favors use of mili­ tary aid to forestall foreign crises, 123; and defense spending, 125; sends sur­ vey mission to Italy, 139; during Turk­ ish straits crisis, 257 (n. 42) Elliott, John C , 120 Elsey, George M., 100, 114, 258 (n. 50) Ethridge, Mark F, 107, 110 European Affairs, Office of, U.S. State Department, 140, 141, 205-6 European Recovery Program. See Mar­ shall Plan Export-Import Bank: and loan to Greece,

314 • Index 96-97, 256 (n. 34); lacks funds for Tur­ key, 105; and loan to Turkey, 256 (n. 34) Farrell, Edelmiro, 54 Finland, 147 Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives: and Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 47; and Title VI, 152-53; compares aid to China and Greece, 180; and China Aid Act, ISO82; and MAP, 223-24 Foreign Aid, U.S., 4; global priorities for, 174, 184. See also Economic Assistance, U.S.; Military Assistance, U.S. Foreign Aid Act of 1947, 133 Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, 271 (n. 80). See also China Aid Act; Mar­ shall Plan Foreign Assistance Correlation Commit­ tee: established, 206; and MAP budget, 207; revises JCS plans for MAP, 215; and psychological goals of MAP, 219; public information program for MAP, 220-21

Foreign Liquidation Commission, 20-21, 26 Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1949, 221-22. See also Military Assistance Pro­ gram; Mutual Defense Assistance Act Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Sen­ ate, 57, 135, 227; and Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 117; and China Aid Act, 18283; and MAP, 221-24 Forrestal, James V, 115, 177; and U.S. aid to China, 16; fears Soviet postwar in­ tentions, 18; and Western Hemisphere Defense Program, 42, 44; and U.S. military interests in Latin America, 48; and U.S. military aid to Argentina, 55, 57; and U.S aid to Nationalist Chinese, 73, 78, 169, 178; fears Soviet intentions in Turkey, 90; during Turkish straits cri­ sis, 99-100; and military aid to Turkey, 112; and U.S. aid to Italy, 141; and de­ fense spending, 151-52; advocates re­ form of military aid policy, 152; sup­ ports general military aid legislation, 153-54, 199; and U.S. policy toward China, 162; favors Wedemeyer Mis­ sion, 169; supports U.S. military aid to Austria, 212; and U.S. Navy in Medi­ terranean, 255 (n. 26), 257 (n. 45); on strategic importance of Turkish straits, 257 (n. 42)

France: lend-lease to, 13-14, 20-21; and interest in Latin America, 49; Commu­ nist activity in, 133-34, 202-3; morale in, 150; political conditions in, 202-4; exclusion from Pentagon talks, 270 (n. 61). See also Military assistance, U.S.— to France Fu Tso-yi, 188-91 Gaitân, Jorgé Eliécer, 60 George II (king of Greece), 105 George, Walter E, 183 Good Neighbor Policy, 39-40, 55 Grady, Henry E, 213 Great Britain: transfer of U.S. armaments to, 8, 26-27; lend-lease to, 9-10; and conflict with United States in Saudi Arabia, 11; postwar rivalry with United States, 18; and arms sales to Latin America, 45-46; and arms sales to Ar­ gentina, 56-58; and aid to Greece and Turkey, 88-89, 101-2, 105-7, 108; and troops in Greece, 96; foreign aid expen­ ditures in Near East, 104-5; proposes establishment of military advisory group in Nationalist China, 252 (n. 67) Greece: U.S. policy toward, 48, 95-97, 106, 108-9; British troops in, 96; civil war in, 96, 105-6, 134-37, 213, 255 (n. 28); Communist guerrillas in, 96, 106, 134, 255 (n. 28); economic prob­ lems of, 96-97; deficiencies of govern­ ment in, 96-97, 105-6, 135-36; possible dispatch of U.S. troops to, 136-37. See also Greek National Army; Greek-Turkish Aid Act; Military assistance, U.S.— to Greece Greek National Army, 114; strength of, 11; organization and training of, 106-7; effectiveness of antiguerrilla cam­ paigns of, 134; U.S. operational advice to, 134-35; improvements in leader­ ship of, 213 Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 5, 128-29, 134, 139, 141; passage of, 115; Congress and, 115-17; and United Nations, 116; as precedent, 117 Greenland, 210 Grew, Joseph C , 69 Griswold, Dwight R, 134, 135 Gross, Ernest A., 206

Index • 315 Hall, Charles R, 125 Handy, Thomas T, 257 (n. 42) Harding, Warren G., 8 Harriman, W. Averell: and U.S. military aid to Western Europe, 201-2; assesses European morale, 204-5, 216; urges prompt implementation of MAP, 22021 Havana Conference (1940), 31 Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Company, 58 Henderson, Alexander I., 206 Henderson, Loy W.: fears Soviet attack on Turkey, 91; warns of impending cri­ sis in Near East, 92-93; criticizes Greek government, 97; urges aid to Near East, 97; and U.S. military aid to Iran, 103-4; and U.S. aid to Greece, 107, 109; on prospects for congressional ap­ proval of Greek-Turkish aid, 112; favors dispatch of U.S. troops to Greece, 136 Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 183 Hickerson, John D.: and U.S. aid to Italy, 143; and Western European security, 145; on Western European morale, 150; and Title VI, 153; criticizes De Gaulle, 202; on French political instability, 203; and Italian membership in NATO, 211 Hilldring, John W., 53 Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H., 187 Hitler, Adolf, 92 Hoffman, Paul G., 231 Hoover, Herbert C., 8 Hopkins, Harry, 250 (n. 36) Hukbalahaps, 27, 215 Hull, Cordell, 35, 53-54 Hull, John E., 36 Hurley, Patrick J., 72; background of, 68; supports Chiang, 68-69; resigna­ tion of, 79-80, 251 (n. 53) Ibn Saud, 10 Ingram, Jonas H., 41 Inter-American Defense Board, 33, 52 Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 58, 119, 123; provisions of, 46; pro­ posed to Congress, 46-47; dies in Sev­ enty-ninth Congress, 47; State-WarNavy conflict over, 47-53 Inverchapel, Lord, 146 Iran: Soviet troops in, 26, 91-95; Soviet threat to, 88-89; anti-British sentiment in, 91-92; U.S. policy toward, 91-92, 214; U.S. advisory missions in, 97-98, 259 (n. 60); separatist movement in.

102-4, 259 (n. 60). See also Military as­ sistance, U.S.—to Iran Italian Peace Treaty, 137 Italy: Communist party in, 133-34, 137, 140-41; reorganization of government in, 137, 141; economic problems in, 137, 143; U.S. policy toward, 137-44; com­ pared to Greece, 139; inclusion in NATO, 211. See also Military assistance, U.S.—to Italy Ivanessevich, Oscar, 57 Javits, Jacob K., 116 Jernegan, John D., 113 Johnson, Edwin C , 116 Johnson, Louis A., 217, 221, 223, 227 Joint Army and Navy Advisory Board on American Republics, 34-35, 41-42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 66; and mili­ tary aid spending, 3-4; and lend-lease, 10, 11; and planning for postwar mili­ tary aid, 13-14; and postwar armed forces in Europe, 13-14; defense plans of, 17-19; role of arms aid in prepared­ ness, 17-19; and U.S. military aid to Latin America, 19, 37-38, 44, 59-60, 215; and U.S. military aid to Philip­ pines, 19, 214-15; and hemispheric de­ fense, 29; on Communist strength in Latin America, 52; urge hemispheric solidarity, 55-56; and military aid to Nationalist Chinese, 70-71, 74-75, 16667, 179, 186-87, 194, 196; support cre­ ation of military advisory group to China, 83; on strategic significance of Greece and Turkey, 89; oppose Soviet demands for Turkish bases, 90; fear So­ viet desire to dominate Middle East, 95; and military aid to Turkey, 100-101, 111-12, 213-14; and arms aid to Iran, 103, 213-14; and SWNCC 360, 124; and priorities for U.S. military aid, 124, 264-65 (n. 132); oppose sending U.S. troops to Greece, 136-37; and military aid to Western Europe, 156; and mili­ tary aid to Norway, 157, 210; and Wedemeyer Mission, 169; weigh mili­ tary aid against domestic rearmament, 199-200; criticize breadth of MAP, 200201; and military aid to France, 205; and planning of MAP, 208-15; and military aid to Western Union, 209-10; and military aid to Denmark, 210; and military aid to Italy, 211; and military

316 • Index aid to Portugal, 211; and military aid to Austria, 212; and military aid to Greece, 213; and military aid to Korea, 214-15; and future of MAP, 227 Joint Intelligence Committee, 18 Joint Munitions Allocations Committee, 228 Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 200 Joint War Plans Committee, 22-23 Jones, Joseph M., 114 Judd, Walter H.: criticizes Truman's China policy, 164-65, 179; and origins of Wedemeyer Mission, 169; and China Aid Act, 187; demands inclusion of China in MAP, 224 Kennan, George E, criticizes Byrnes, 93; and military aid to Turkey, 111; objects to rhetoric of Truman Doctrine, 116; and Western European security, 145; and Czech coup, 147; assesses U.S. in­ terests in China, 173-74; and inclusion of Italy in NATO, 211 King, Ernest J., 17, 42 Knowland, William E, 224-25 Koo, V. K. Wellington, 175, 176 Korean War, 6, 231 Kuomintang, 68, 84, 184-85. See also Chiang Kai-shek; China, civil war in Labouisse, Henry R., Jr., 203-4 Lapham, Roger D., 190 Latin America, 16; U.S. military aid to, 89, 29-62 passim, 215; lend-lease to, 11, 33-36; as market for U.S. armaments industries, 17; strategic significance of, 29, 44-45, 49-50, 55-56; Axis penetra­ tion of, 31-32; U.S. military staff talks with, 32, 35-36, 41; and standardiza­ tion of armaments, 34, 47-48, 50-51, 215; seeks U.S. economic aid, 39-40; Soviet influence in, 44-45; British arms sales to, 45-46; communism in, 52 Leahy, William D., 136; and military aid to Nationalist Chinese, 73; on Moscow meeting of Council of Foreign Minis­ ters, 93; compares U.S. policy toward Greece and China, 160 Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 156, 205, 206 Lend-lease: origins of, 9-10; value of aid, 10; to Saudi Arabia, 10-11; to Latin America, 11, 33-41; curtailment of, 1112, 14, 239 (n. 9); to China, 64, 70-71,

72, 84, 249 (n. 24); to Iran, 91; denied to Argentina, 139 (n. 9); as model for MAP, 156 Leva, Marx, 154 Li Chi-shen, 185 Lilienthal, David E., 195-96 Lincoln, George A., 22, 74 Li Tsung-jen, 184-85, 188, 194 Livesay, William G., 134, 135 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 185, 221 Lovett, Robert A., 16, 155; and military aid to Italy, 141-42; and proposed Western union, 146; and aid to Nation­ alist Chinese, 192, 193; and military aid to Iran, 201; emphasizes psychological goals of military aid, 204; and military aid to Western Union, 205; and military aid to Austria, 212 Lucas, John P, 176, 177 Ludlow, James M., 24-25 Lutes, LeRoy, 125 MacArthur, Douglas, 182 McCarran, Pat, 224 McCloy, John J., 16, 75-76 MacVeagh, Lincoln: and military aid to Greece, 96-97, 106-7, 110; assesses So­ viet role in Greece, 106; favors U.S. op­ erational advice to Greek army, 134-35 Maddocks, Ray T, 194 Magill, Robert D., 175 Mann, Thomas C , 58-59 Mao Tse-tung, 68 Marshall, George C , 27, 64, 66, 115, 117, 141, 142, 144; and Inter-American Mili­ tary Cooperation Act, 49-50, 53, 60; and U.S. policy toward Argentina, 57; on hemispheric security, 59; named special representative to China, 80; mission to China, 81-86; and embargo on arms to Nationalist Chinese, 85, 162, 166; as secretary of state, 87; and military aid to Greece, 107; and Truman Doctrine speech, 114; and economic aid to Europe, 126; and balance of power, 132; opposes sending U.S. troops to Greece, 136; and exclusion of Communists from Italian government, 138; and military aid to Italy, 138; and military aid to Western Europe, 146-47; urges Norway to resist Soviet pressure, 148; on U.S. military capabilities, 151; and general military aid legislation, 153; and Title VI, 153-54; and U.S. se-

Index • 317 curity interests in China, 160-61, 168; limits U.S. involvement in Chinese civil war, 163, 174-84; limits U.S. mili­ tary aid to Nationalist Chinese, 168-69; sends Wedemeyer to China, 169-70; suppresses Wedemeyer report, 173; approves ammunition transfer to Na­ tionalists, 174-75; doubts Chiang's cooperativeness, 176-77; opposes operational advice to Nationalist army, 176-77; criticizes Chiang's leadership, 180-81; on psychological effects of military aid to Western Europe, 202-4 Marshall Plan, 131, 146, 149, 170, 179, 205, 207, 209; origins of, 126; and con­ tainment, 133-34; and aid to Italy, 139; passage of, 150; as model for MAP, 151, 155; and aid to China, 182, 195; value of aid, 184; effect of MAP on, 202; and France, 202-4 Martin, Joseph W., 179 Martins, Carlos, 40 Masaryk, Jan, 147 Mavromichalis, Petros, 106 Melby, John E, 176, 189 Messer, Robert L., 21, 94 Messersmith, George S., 55, 58, 246 (n. 85) Military assistance, British: to Argentina, 56-58; to Greece, 105-7, 108; to Italy, 137; to Norway, 147 Military assistance, U.S.: and U.S. credi­ bility, 3, 5, 108, 160-61, 162, 164, 180, 186-87, 192-95, 196, 204-5, 220-21, 227; psychological objectives of, 4, 5, 111-12, 149-50, 167, 178, 204-5, 218-19, 225-26, 227; and containment, 4, 23, 28, 78, 88, 98, 100-102, 108, 117-28, 130-31, 143-44, 157-59, 163, 172, 19596, 218-19, 225-26; spending on, 4, 48, 51, 243-44 (n. 59); bureaucratic divi­ sions over, 5-6, 20, 30-31, 34-39, 4152, 63-64, 70-71, 75, 78-81, 82-83, 8687, 116-20, 129, 162-64, 166-69, 177-79; uncertainty over future of, 6, 210, 22730; general plans and policies, 13-22, 89, 102, 117-28, 130-31, 144, 152-59, 198-226 passim, 234 (n. 2), 258 (n. 53), 268 (n. 38), 273 (n. 94), 280 (n. 112); and postwar preparedness, 19, 37-39; base rights and, 23, 32, 37, 211; priori­ ties, 59-60, 123-24, 127-28, 174, 188, 264-65 (n. 132); Truman Doctrine and, 89, 113-15, 121-29, 131; relationship to economic aid, 127-28, 203-4, 216; Title

VI, 152-55; and long-range planning, 228-30. See also Military Assistance Program —to Argentina, 56-58, 61 —to Austria, 211-13, 217, 288 (n. 56) —to Brazil, 241 (n. 36) —to China, 16, 63-87 passim, 160-97 passim, 224-25, 249 (n. 20), 252 (n. 62); State-War-Navy differences over, 20, 63-64, 70-71, 75, 78-81, 82-83, 86-87, 162-64, 166-69, 177-79; compared to aid to Latin America, 63-64, 86-87; during World War II, 64-71; air force equipment, 70, 73, 83-84; transporta­ tion of Nationalist armies, 72, 75, 82, 85; and Marshall Mission, 80-86; U.S. marines and, 72, 75-76, 78, 82; value of, 72, 82; U.S. military advisory group, 74-75, 82-83, 186; and contain­ ment, 78, 163, 172, 195-96; embargo on, 85, 161-63, 166; and U.S. credibil­ ity, 160-61, 162, 164, 180, 186-87, 19295, 196; psychological goals of, 167, 178; and Wedemeyer Mission, 171-74; pri­ ority for, 174, 188; and transfer of am­ munition from War Department stocks, 174-75; proposed operational advice to Nationalist army, 176-77; China Aid Act, 179-84; appropriations for, 184; delivery of, 191-95 —to Denmark, 157, 210-11, 215 —to Egypt, 7 —to France, 12, 26-27, 201-6; from U.S. inventories in Germany, 199; and U.S. exasperation over, 205-6 —to Greece, 88-89, 98, 106-7; compared to Latin America and China, 89; under Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 108-17; psy­ chological goals of, 111-12; shift of eco­ nomic aid funds to, 134; operational advice to Greek army, 134-35; and MAP, 213 —to India, 158 —to Iran, 98, 119; and suppression of Azerbaijan separatists, 102-4; equip­ ment shortages and, 201; and MAP, 213-14 —to Italy, 137-44; and legislation for, 138-42; State-War-Navy differences over, 138-42, 144; presidential powers and, 142; delivery of, 142-43; com­ pared to aid to Greece, 143-44; and containment, 143-44 —to Korea, 7-8, 60, 214-15 —to Latin America, 8, 9, 12, 16, 29-62

318 • Index passim, 215, 241 (n. 29); State-WarNavy differences over, 20, 30-31, 3439, 41-52; and standardization of arma­ ments, 30, 34, 37, 38; and base rights, 32, 37; Western Hemisphere Defense Program, 41-42, 44-46, 158; interim program, 42-44, 58, 241 (n. 36); and In­ ter-American Military Cooperation Act, 46-53, 60-61; cost of, 48, 51, 24344 (n. 59); revision of U.S. policy, 5859; priority for, 59-60; effect of Cold War on, 61-62 —to Mexico, 241 (n. 46) —to NATO countries, 3-4 —to Norway, 147-48, 157, 210-11, 215 —to Philippines, 7-8, 27-28, 214-15 —to Portugal, 211, 217 —to Sweden, 26-27, 210-11, 237-38 (n. 57) —to Turkey, 88-89, 98; compared to aid to Latin America and China, 89; autho­ rized, 100-101; difficulties of provid­ ing, 104-5; under Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 108-17; bureaucratic divisions over, 111-12, 213-14 —to Western Europe, 144-59 passim; and morale, 149-50, 201-5 —to Western Union, 146, 155-56, 206, 208-10 Military Assistance Program, 4-6; and U.S. defense plans, 199-200; and West­ ern Union, 206, 209-10; psychological goals of, 206, 222; planning of, 206-19; budget, 207, 216-17; effect on strategic raw materials, 207-8; and Denmark, 210-11, 215; and Norway, 210-11, 215; and Italy, 211; and Portugal, 211, 217; and bases, 211, 219; and Austria, 21113, 217; and Greece, 213; and Turkey, 213-14; and Iran, 213-14; and Philip­ pines, 214-15; and Korea, 214-15; and Latin America, 215; relationship to Marshall Plan, 216; and European mili­ tary production, 216, 217; administra­ tion of, 217-18; and containment, 21819, 225-26; and U.S. defense indus­ tries, 219; and European economies, 220; and public information campaign, 220-21; and U.S. credibility, 220-21; congressional action on, 221-26; and NATO, 223-24, 229-30; and Soviet atomic bomb, 224; and China, 224-25; future of, 227-32; and long-range plan­ ning, 228-30; deliveries under, 231; ex­ pansion of, 231-32. See also Military

assistance, U.S.; Mutual Defense As­ sistance Act Military Intelligence Service, U.S., 45 Missouri (U.S.S.), 95-96, 255 (n. 26) Mobutu Sese Seku, 4 Monroe Doctrine, 30, 32 Montgomery, Bernard L., 106 Montreux Convention: revision pro­ posed, 90-91, 98-100; signatories, 254 (n. 8); provisions, 254 (n. 9) Mundt, Karl E., 28, 116 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 4, 5-6; signing of, 198; provisions of, 198, 225; congressional action on, 221-26 National Defense Corps (Greek), 134 National Liberation Front (EAM), 96, 97 National Military Establishment, U.S., 151-52, 154, 199 National Security Council, U.S., 13; and general military aid legislation, 131, 158-59; recommends operational ad­ vice to Greek army, 135; on sending U.S. troops to Greece, 136; and mili­ tary aid to Italy, 140; and presidential powers for transfer of armaments, 142; and policy toward Western Europe, 150, 155; and aid to China, 178-79, 193-95, 196; and effect of military aid on U.S. military programs, 200; and MAP budget, 227; and NSC 68, 228-29, 231 National Security Resources Board, 207-8 Navy Department, U.S., 5; and early postwar military aid, 16-17; and U.S. policy toward Argentina, 55-56; and U.S. aid to Nationalist Chinese, 16364. See also Forrestal, James V; StateArmy-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee; State-War-Navy Coordi­ nating Committee Near East: Soviet threat to, 88-89; stra­ tegic importance of, 89-90, 95, 257 (n. 42). See also Greece; Iran; Turkey Near East and African Affairs, Office of, U.S. State Department, 96; warns of potential war in Near East, 90; policy statement on Iran, 92, 103-4; during Turkish straits crisis, 99; policy state­ ment on Greece, 106 Nimitz, Chester W., 47, 257 (n. 42) Nitze, Paul H., 219 Norstad, Lauris, 125 North Atlantic Council, 223

Index • 319 North Atlantic Defense Committee, 229 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 3-4, 204, 207, 221; planning for, 148-51, 205; ratification of treaty, 221; defense plans, 229-30 Norway, 147-48, 157, 210-11, 215 Nourse, Edwin G., 216-17 Operations Division, U.S. War Depart­ ment, 56 Pace, Frank, Jr., 217, 227 Padilla, Ezequiel, 40 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, 91, 214 PALMYRA (U.S. plan for aid to China), 73 Panama Canal, 49, 50 Paris Peace Conference, 101, 108 Patterson, Robert R, 42, 120, 169; and military aid to Latin America, 38, 43, 44, 48-49, 51-52; and aid to Nationalist Chinese, 78, 162-63, 169, 174-75; dur­ ing Turkish straits crisis, 99-100; and arms aid to Turkey, 111; and military aid to Italy, 138 Pepper, Claude R., 116, 155 Perön, Juan D., 55 Petersen, Howard C : and military aid to Latin America, 52; and U.S. military advisory group to China, 83; and gen­ eral military aid legislation, 120; on re­ lationship of economic and military aid, 127 Philippines, 19, 27, 215 Philippines Military Assistance Act, 27 PINCHER, 95 Pittman, Key, 235 (n. 8) Pittman Resolution, 9 Plans and Operations Division, U.S. De­ partment of the Army: and aid to West­ ern Europe, 150; and containment, 150-51; and military aid to Nationalist Chinese, 178, 186 Policy Committee on Arms and Arma­ ments, U.S. State Department, 26, 53; and arms sales to Latin America, 58; denies armaments to Iran, 103; revises SWNCC 202/2, 118 Policy Planning Staff, U.S. State Depart­ ment: and European stability, 132; assesses Communist intentions in Western Europe, 133-34; opposes sending U.S. troops to Greece, 136;

and U.S. policy toward China, 192 Porter, Paul A., 107, 110 Potsdam Conference, 94 Qavam, Ahmad, 103-4 Queuille, Henri, 202 RAINBOW (U.S. war plans), 32 Reagan, Ronald, 3 Rearmament Subcommittee, State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee, 14-15, 120, 128 Ridley, Clarence S., 97 Rio de Janeiro Conference: in 1942, 31; in 1947, 58, 60, 170 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 257 (n. 45); and United States as arsenal of democracy, 8-9; and lend-lease, 9-10; and interAmerican relations, 31-33, 35; and China policy, 64-69, 250 (n. 36); relief of Stilwell, 66-67; and presidential powers to transfer armaments, 268 (n. 38) Roper, Elmo, 116 Ross, Charles G., 251 (n. 53) Royall, Kenneth C , 44, 61, 177; and mili­ tary aid to Italy, 140, 141; supports re­ forms of military aid policy, 157; and military aid to contain communism, 158; and U.S. aid to Nationalist Chi­ nese, 179, 184, 186, 194, 278 (n. 80); and general military aid legislation, 199 Russell, Francis H., 113 Saka, Hasan, 98 Saudi Arabia, 110-11 Schuman, Robert, 133, 202 Schuyler, C. V. R., 178 Schwarzkopf, Norman H., 97 Secretary's Staff Committee, U.S. State Department, 19, 25, 46, 47 Service, John S., 67-68 Smith, H. Alexander, 116, 221, 224 Soong, T. V, 73, 74, 84 Soviet Union: and Eastern Europe, 18; in­ tentions of, 18-19, 21-22, 270 (n. 65); troops in Manchuria, 77; and Near East, 88-89; seeks concessions from Turkey, 90-91, 98-100, 254 (n. 6); and Iran, 91-92, 95; and Greek guerrillas, 106; and pressures on Scandinavia, 147; and possibility of military action.

320 • Index 148-50; and aid to Chinese Commu­ nists, 171; peace offensive of, 220; and aid to Nationalist Chinese, 252 (n. 67) Spaeth, Carl B., 42-43 Sparrow, H. G., 130 Spears, W. O., 35 Sprouse, Philip D., 175 Stalin, Josef V, 12, 18, 66, 92, 94, 110; at Potsdam Conference, 90; and Greek civil war, 106 State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, 128, 159; and aid to Italy, 141-42; and general military aid legisla­ tion, 157-58, 273 (n. 94); and arms aid as instrument of containment, 158; and scope of MAP, 200-201. See also StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee State Department, U.S., 5; and postwar military aid plans, 13-14, 19-22, 25-27; conflict with War and Navy depart­ ments over control of foreign policy, 20, 35-42; and aid to France, 20-21, 201-5; and Soviet intentions, 21-22, 149; and general military aid policy, 2526, 118-20, 258 (n. 53); cooperation with British on Latin American policy, 45-46; and Inter-American Military Co­ operation Act, 46-53; and Argentina, 53-58; revises policy on military aid to Latin America, 58-59; conflict with War and Navy departments over U.S. policy toward China, 63, 68-69, 70-71, 83, 163-64, 167-68, 178-79; on strategic importance of Near East, 89-90; and re­ moval of Soviet troops from Iran, 9295; and aid to Greece, 96-97, 106, 107, 108-17; and advisory missions to Iran, 97-98; restricts arms aid to Near East, 98; and military aid to Turkey, 101-2, 105; on use of arms aid to contain com­ munism, 143-44; and Western Euro­ pean security, 145-46, 150, 154-56; and general military aid legislation, 152-54; and Wedemeyer report, 173-74; pro­ longs delivery of U.S. aid to Nationalist Chinese, 194; and planning of MAP, 206-7, 217-19, 221-25; and symbolic im­ portance of Korea, 214. See also Acheson. Dean; American Republic Af­ fairs, Office of; Byrnes, James F; European Affairs, Office of; Marshall, George C.; Near Eastern and African Affairs, Office of State-War-Navy Coordinating Commit­ tee, 12, 14-15, 20, 98, 130; and postwar

military aid planning, 14-15, 22-25, 28; and U.S. policy toward Latin America, 30, 40-41; and aid to China, 70-71, 83, 163-64; and aid to Greece, 111; and general military aid policy, 118-20, 12124, 125-26, 156; and Soviet intentions, 264 (n. 130). See also State-Army-Navy Coordinating Committee; Rearmament Subcommittee Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 20, 34 Stilwell, Joseph W., 64-67, 170 Stimson, Henry L., 66, 67, 158 Stuart, John Leighton, 165, 168, 186, 189 Stueck, William, 181 Surplus armaments, 24; disposal after World War I, 7; transfer to Britain, 8-9, 26-27; policy on, 25; transfer to France, 26-27; shortages of, 50-51, 119-20, 130, 144; sales to Latin America, 61; sales to Italy, 137-38; transfers to China, 175, 177-78, 252 (n. 63). See also Surplus Property Act of 1944 Surplus Property Act of 1944, 24, 42, 119, 128, 144, 263 (n. 119), 271 (n. 77). See also Surplus armaments Sweden, 26-27, 210-11 Taber, John, 115, 187 Taft, Robert A., 28, 60 Title VI (of Foreign Assistance Act of 1948), 153-54, 159, 221 Togliatti, Palmiro, 137, 140-41 Trieste, 139 Trujillo, Rafael, 36 Truman, Harry S., 3-4, 7, 20, 41, 52, 55; limits lend-lease, 11-12; and Soviet Union, 25-26, 90-91, 93-94, 100; and military aid to Latin America, 44, 46, 52-53; lifts embargo on U.S. military aid to Argentina, 57-58; and Chiang Kai-shek, 64, 71, 74, 81, 160-61, 197, 250 (n. 36); on China's role in World War II, 76; on Hurley's resignation, 80; and aid to Greece and Turkey, 88-89, 109; and Truman Doctrine speech, 113, 114, 115; and defense spending, 12425, 151-52, 216-17, 228-29; on emer­ gency aid to Europe, 132-33; approves U.S. operational advice to Greek army, 134-35; on failings of Greek govern­ ment, 135-36; defers decision on send­ ing U.S. troops to Greece, 137; delays withdrawal of U.S. troops from Italy, 140; and presidential powers for trans-

Index • 321 fer of armaments, 142, 268 (n. 38); compares Stalin and Hitler, 147; sup­ ports Western Union, 148; and MAP planning, 153-54, 159, 218, 222, 227; implements China Aid Act, 184, 18788, 191; signs Mutual Defense Assis­ tance Act, 198, 225; favors Italian mem­ bership in NATO, 211; and general military aid policy, 258 (n. 53). See also Truman administration; Truman Doc­ trine Truman administration: and military aid spending, 3; concern over credibility, 5, 180, 192-95, 204-5, 220-21; emphasizes psychological goals of military aid, 5, 225-26, 230-32; and future of MAP, 6, 210, 227-30; and postwar military aid plans, 7; and containment of Soviets, 25-26, 93-95, 102, 219-20, 258 (n. 50); and military aid to Latin America, 4053, 59-62; revises policy toward Argen­ tina, 57-59; abandons hopes for pas­ sage of Inter-American Military Coop­ eration Act, 61; divisions over aid to Nationalist Chinese, 74-81, 160-97 passim; and Turkey, 90-91, 98-100, 108-17; and Greece, 95-97, 108-17, 13437; and defense spending, 124-25, 216-17, 228-29, 231; and Western Euro­ pean security, 131-34, 144-59; and emergency aid to Italy, 138-44; com­ pares situations in Italy and Greece, 139; and foreign aid priorities, 174, 195-96; limits intervention in Chinese civil war, 174-84; implements China Aid Act, 184-94. See also Military assis­ tance, U.S.; Truman Doctrine; Truman, Harry S. Truman Doctrine, 52, 59, 61-62, 157, 184; proclamation of, 88-89, 113-14; drafting of speech, 113-15; congres­ sional reaction to, 115-17; and public reaction, 116-17, 261-62 (n. 94); and SWNCC 360, 121-23; and military aid planning, 121-29, 131, 197; and U.S. policy toward China, 163-65. See also Greece; Military assistance, U.S.—to Greece; Military assistance, U.S.—to Turkey; Truman, Harry S.; Turkey Tudeh party (Iran), 91, 102-4 Turkey: and Soviet demands for conces­ sions, 90-91, 254 (n. 6); and Black Sea straits crisis, 98-100; strategic impor­ tance of, 99-101, 104; U.S. policy to­ ward, 90-91, 98-101, 104-5, 108-17. See

also Greek-Turkish Aid Act; Military as­

sistance, U.S—to Turkey; Truman Doc­ trine United Nations, 18, 19, 21, 24-25, 43, 99, 147; and Soviet troops in Iran, 95; and Greek-Turkish aid, 116-17; and regula­ tion of arms transfers, 118, 264 (n. 122) United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 96, 256 (n. 34) Vandenberg, Arthur H., 50; opposes Braden, 55; on Communist threat in Latin America, 56; postpones action on Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 60-61; on U.S. policy toward So­ viet Union, 93, 133; and Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 113, 115-17; and U.S. opera­ tional advice to Greek army, 135; and Title VI, 153-54; and military coopera­ tion with Western Europe, 155; sup­ ports Nationalist Chinese, 164, 195; and Wedemeyer Mission, 169; and China Aid Act, 183; and MAP, 222-24. See also Vandenberg Resolution Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 100, 200 Vandenberg Resolution, 155, 216 Van Fleet, James A., 213 Venezia Giulia, 139 Venezuela, 42 Vincent, John Carter: and lend-lease to China, 68-69; and U.S. policy toward China, 75, 79, 83, 167; and embargo on U.S. arms transfers to Nationalists, 161-62, 166 Vinson, Carl, 115 Vorys, John M., 225 Wallace, Henry A., 81 Walsh, Robert LeG., 37 War Department, U.S., 5, 73; and plans for postwar military aid, 15; and mili­ tary aid to Latin America, 32-39, 49-50; and U.S. policy toward Argentina, 5556; and U.S. aid to China, 73-77, 78-81, 163-64; advisory missions to Iran, 98; objections to SWNCC 202/4, 119-20; and U.S. aid to Italy, 138-39. See also Army, Department of the, U.S.; Patter­ son, Robert P; Stimson, Henry L. Webb, James E.: and defense spending, 124-25, 151-52; opposes general mili-

322 • Index tary aid legislation, 154; concern over scope of MAP, 201 Wedemeyer, Albert C , 69, 83; succeeds Stilwell, 67; assesses lend-lease to China, 71; and intervention in Chinese civil war, 72, 75, 76-78; and develop­ ment of air facilities in China, 73; on Soviet influence in China, 77, 171, 179; and military aid to Denmark, 157; mis­ sion to China, 169-74; report of, 171— 74; and aid to Nationalist Chinese, 17778, 182, 184; and military aid to Philip­ pines, 214 Welles, Sumner, 32-33, 55 Western Europe: U.S. military aid to, 13; Communist pressures in, 131-34; sta­ bility of, 131-34, 201-2; security of, 144-59; defense of, 199-200, 209, 22830; MAP and, 208-15. See also Military assistance, U.S.: to Denmark; France; to Italy; to Norway; to Western Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Western Union

Western Hemisphere Defense Program, 30, 63, 119, 158, 230; origins of, 31; di­ visions within Truman administration over, 41-53; cost of, 51; and Argentina, 58; end of State Department opposition to, 58-59; failure to enact, 59-61; effect of Cold War on, 59-62. See also InterAmerican Military Cooperation Act; Larin America; Military assistance, U.S.—to Larin America Western Union, 199; formation of, 148; deficiencies of request for U.S. military aid, 206; MAP and, 208-10. See also Military assistance, U.S.—to Western Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ tion; Western Europe Wherry, Kenneth S., 230 Wiley, Alexander, 183 Wilson, Edwin S., 90, 98-99, 104-5 Wooten, Ralph H., 41 Yalta Conference, 69