Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays on the Commentary Tradition (Artistarium: Supplementa) (English, Latin and French Edition) [Multilingual ed.] 9070419424, 9789070419424

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ARISTOTLE'S PERI HERMENEIAS IN THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics EDITORS L. M. de RIJK

H. A.G. BRAAKHUIS

Leiden

Nijmegen

&

&

E. P. BOS

C. H. KNEEPKENS

Leiden

Groningen

ARTISTARIUM SUPPLEMENTA

x

ARISTOTLE'S PERI HERMENEIAS IN THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES Essays on the Commentary Tradition

EDITED BY H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

&

C.H. KNEEPKENS

Groningen - Haren Ingenium Publishers 2003

ISBN 90 70419 42 4 Copyright 2003 by lngenium Publishers, P.O. Box 131, NL-9750 AC Haren, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this book may reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publishers PRINTED by KRIPS REPRO MEPPEL, THE NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents Preface Introduction Iwakuma, Y., William of Champeaux and the Introductiones

v

vii ix-xli 1-30

Sten Ebbesen, Questions and Sophismata: Tracking Peter ofAuvergne

31-49

Alan Perreiah, Orality and Literacy in the De interpretatione Tradition

51-66

Robert Andrews, The Modistae and John Duns Scotus 's Quaestiones super Perihermeneias 67-83 Claude Panaccio, Debates on Mental Language in the Early Fourteenth Century 85-101 Joel Biard, Le statut des enonces dans !es commentaires du Peri hermeneias de Gautier Burley 103-118 M. Kaufmann, The Discussion on the Nature of the Concept in Ockham 's Perihermeneias Commentary 119-133 Mieczyslaw H. Markowski, Der Kommentar des Peter Wysz von Polen zu De interpretatione des Aristoteles 135-147 Gino Roncaglia, Mesina de Codronchi 's Discussion on Syncategoremata and Mental Language in his Quaestiones on De interpretatione 149-163 Irene Rosier, Variations medievales sur ! 'opposition entre signification "ad placitum" et signification naturelle 165-205 L.M. de Rijk, The Logic of Indefinite Names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito 207-233

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI

Judith Dijs, Radulphus Brito 's Use of Intentio in Quaestio 9 of His In Peri hermeneias 235-256 Christian Strub, Propositio una I multiplex in Abelard: A Note on the Relationship of Dialectic and Grammar 257-273 Joke Spruyt, The Semantics of Complex Expressions in John Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard and John Buridan 275-303 F. Beets, Theories of Prediction from Boethius to Thomas Aquinas

305-319

Allan Back, Aquinas on Predication

321-338

Andrea Tabarroni, The 10th Thesis in Logic Condemned at Oxford in 1277 339-361 C.H. Kneepkens, Aristotle's Transposition and the Twelfth-Century Commentaries on De interpretatione, 20bl-l 2: An Exploratory Study 363-41 l Simo Knuuttila, Truth and Falsity as Modal Notions: Some Medieval Comments on De interpretatione, 12, 22al3 413-427 Elizabeth Karger, John Buridan 's Theory of the Logical Relations Between General Modal Formulae 429-444 Indices

445-483 index locorum

447-461

index nominum

462-467

index rerum

468-482

Manuscripts mentioned

483-484

Bibliography

485-509

PREFACE The majority of the twenty essays of the present volume were originally delivered at the Xth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics held at Nijmegen, 22 - 26 June, 1992, that was devoted to the tradition of Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Circumstances made it impossible to publish the proceedings immediately after the symposium. Since the editors were, nevertheless, aware that the material presented was extremely important for further studies on the history of medieval logic, semantics and philosophy of language, they decided, some time ago, to ask the contributors to update, revise or rewrite their essays in preparation for the publication of this collection. Although some authors have partially drawn on material found in this collection for publications elsewhere, most of the information contained in these essays remains new, including the many detailed descriptions and editions of unedited works that will constitute a greatly appreciated resource in the study of medieval philosophy. In addition to the essays, the volume includes a lengthy introduction, three indexes, a list of manuscripts mentioned, and a general survey of the books and articles to which references are made. The editors are grateful to the contributors for their willingness to update their essays, as well as for their patience and endurance.

H.A.G. Braakhuis Catholic University of Nijmegen

C.H. Kneepkens University of Groningen

INTRODUCTION H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

& C.H. KNEEPKENS

Aristotle's Peri hermeneias, 1 traditionally the second work in the collection of his logical writings known as the Organon, has a long commentary tradition beginning in Antiquity and running through the Middle Ages and Early Modem Period to the most recent times. These continuous scholarly reflections have not led, however, to a unanimously accepted, overall perception of this work. The high level of abstractness of its subject matter, (i.e. the relationship between language, thought and reality discussed in Aristotle's semantics) and the extremely concise wording with which one is confronted in this booklet have time and again compelled its readers to reconsider the text, along with the author's intentions. Nowadays, it is commonly accepted that the Stagirite's work focuses on the representation of thoughts by means of words and, in particular, statements2 or, as Whitaker formulates it more broadly, language.3 Briefly, in the Peri hermeneias, Aristotle discusses the relationship between language and reality as we conceive it, especially the relationship between statements and our thoughts about extra-mental reality. 4 The position of this work in the development of Aristotle's philosophical thinking has been subject to some debate. 5 Similar indecision also characterises

I In this introduction, the transliteration of the Greek title Ilepi epµT]VEta LFp The second is that if a future event is not necessary, it is impossible to make a definitely true prediction for it: Si potest non fieri, non potest definite vere praedici. 24

[3] Fp&-LFp: => UttxFP => -D

iv. Boethius 'Answer to Aristotle's Puzzle These different consequences of the notions of true assertion and definitely

true assertion gives Boethius the opportunity to escape from Aristotle's puzzles. Let us for instance have a look at how he solves the puzzle of 18b35-37. This solution may be reconstructed as the following theorem: Theorem: [4] UttxFp&Uttv-Fp&l(is T) => -D&-D Presuppositions: [P 1] I(is T) =der[D(is T)vD(is T)] [-D( is T) & (B => A)]=i-D( is T) [P 2] [P 31 D( is T) => D Demonstration: [a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f] [g] [h] [i]

Li] 24

UAxFP & UAv -Fp & l( is T) L(pv-p) L (Fp v -Fp) (Fp & Uttx Fp) v (-Fp & Uttv - Fp) ( v => Fp => -Fp -D( is T) -D( is T) -D( is T)

(Hyp.) (Excluded Middle) (b,p/Fp) (a, c) (d, TA) (from TA) (from TA) (from a, P 1) (from a, P 1) (from h, P 2)

Boeth., In De interpr., ed. Ia, rec. Meiser (1877), 114, 21-2: "If it is possible that it will not happen, it cannot be definitely and truly predicted."

313

THEORIES OF PREDICTION

-D( is T) -D & -D

[k] [l]

(from h, P 2) (fromj, k, P 3 ) QED

This demonstration is as close as possible to Boethius' argument. Here is the list of his different assertions and the lines to which they correspond: [a]

[b] [c] [e,f] [e,g] [h]

[l]

"nam quod dicimus Alexander lavandus est, id si alius neget dicatque Alexander non lavandus est."( ... ) "sed non ut definite quaelibet earum vera sit, altera falsa definite." "necesse enim est ut aut adfirmatio vera sit aut negatio ... " "totum quidem hoc necesse est evenire, ut aut lavetur aut non lavetur." "aut adfirmationem, si lotus fuerit" "aut si non lotus fuerit, negationem" "sed non necesse ut definite adfirmatio vera sit, idcirco quod in huiusmodi rebus poterit evenire negatio. sed nee umquam definitum est, ut negatio vera sit, falsa adfirmatio, idcirco quoniam potest non evenire negatio." "ut autem definite una vera sit, altera falsa definite, sicut in his quae sunt praeterita quaeque praesentia, nulla rerum ratione possibile est. " 25

3. The Modality ofPrediction in Boethius' Second Commentary a. Definite Truth and Knowability At first sight, Boethius' Second Commentary seems to resort to the same logical apparatus as the first, except for some minute changes. Indeed, some of these changes have no important consequences. For instance, the pair of notions definite/indefinite, does not take its arguments solely from among the truth-value of sentences, but also from among the events or states of affairs that are related to these sentences. A more significant change is that the notion of definite [D'] is now described in terms of knowledge. What is definite can be known: 26 [D'] D'(

is T) = cterMKxP

25 26

Boeth., In De interpr., ed. la, rec. Meiser (1877), 106, 30 - 107, 16.

Lewis (1987), 90 writes that for Boethius: " ... the determinate is what can be known by us by certain 'natural' methods." cf. Boeth., In De interpr., ed. Ila, rec. Meiser (1880), 192, 3-5; 193, 15-21, 225, 1-3, 243, 9-10, etc.

314

F. BEETS

In fact, m spite of its epistemic flavour, this definition will range over exactly the same set of sentences as in the First Commentary, since what Boethius means here by cognoscible is known to nature. Sentences like "the number of the stars is odd" or its converse has a definite truth value, even if it is impossible for a man to know whether it is true or false. According to Boethius, its truth is "known to nature". 27

b. The New True Assertion and its Consequences

The third and important change is that the former distinction between true assertion and definitely true assertion now collapses. In Boethius' Second Commentary, true assertion [TA'] has the same characteristics as definitely true assertion in the first: [TA']: cteif>'(

is T)&UttxP This new definition entails some obvious consequences. For instance, that if some event occurs out of necessity, it was true to predict it: [5] p&PLFp&PUttxFP

::::i

P()

si ex necessitate contingit id quod evenit, verurn fuit dicere quoniarn erit. 28

or that if some event does not occur out of necessity but contingently, it was not possible to predict the event, but only to predict that its future occurrence is contingent: [6] MFp&M-Fp&UttxMFp&M-Fp

::::i

27

When I read this paper, Prof. L.M. de Rijk objected that Boethius' appeal to 'knowability' has not to be taken seriously. Boethius is indeed an adept of the variatio, and here 'knowability' may well be just a lexical substitute for 'necessity'. I think that, even if 'knowability' is indeed a synonym for 'necessity', it is still significant that this variatio appears only in Boethius' Second Commentary. 28

Boeth., Jn De interpr., ed. Ila, rec. Meiser (1880), 211, 29 - 212, 1: "If what occurs occurs out of necessity, it was true to say that it will be."

THEORIES OF PREDICTION

315

si ex necessitate non contingit, sed contingenter, non potius verum fuit dicere quoniam erit, sed magis quoniam contingit esse ... 29

But the most interesting characteristics arising from the new definition of true assertion are the following. First that if someone makes a prediction, he introduces some necessity in the event he predicts: [7] :::i qui di cit erit, ille quandam necessitatem in ipsa praedictione ponit. 30

The immediate consequence of [7] is that if some event is truly predicted, it is necessary for this event to occur: [8] :::i LFp si vere dicat futurum esse id quod praedicitur non possibile sit non fieri, hoc autem ex necessitate sit fieri. 31

Another consequence is that if someone predicts an event among the things that are contingent, he is lying: [9] MFp&M-Fp&UttxFp:::i -