Anthology of the Works of Ugo Spirito (Value Inquiry Book / Values in Italian Philosophy, 344) 9004425551, 9789004425552

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Anthology of the Works of Ugo Spirito

Value Inquiry Book Series Founding Editor Robert Ginsberg Editor-​in-​Chief J.D. Mininger

volume 344

Values in Italian Philosophy Editor Daniel B. Gallagher

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​vibs and brill.com/​vip

Anthology of the Works of Ugo Spirito Edited and annotated by

Anthony G. Costantini

Translated by

Anthony G. Costantini and Alicia Moran

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Photograph of Ugo Spirito, taken at the Conference of Social Studies organized by Confindustria, Napoli 5–​6 November, 1962. Serie Documentazione fotografica, b. 4, fasc. 40. © 1962 Fondazione Ugo Spirito e Renzo De Felice. Used with permission. The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at https://​catalog.loc.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 0929-​8 436 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 2555-​2 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 2562-​0 (e-​book) Copyright 2022 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Dedicated to my nieces, Diana Salerno and Annalisa Salerno

∵

Contents  Foreword xi Daniel B. Gallagher  Foreword xv Giovanni Dessì  Preface xvii  Introduction Ugo Spirito: A Profile 1 1  A Life-​Long Passion for Truth 10 1.1  Introduction 10 1.2  “Autobiografia Filosofica”. In Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 11–​25) [Translation] 11 2  Positivism 18 2.1  Introduction 18 2.2  “Verso il nuovo idealismo”. In Il nuovo idealismo italiano (pp. 7–​9) [Translation] 20 2.3  “Il concetto di Scienza”. In Scienza e filosofia (pp. 104–​105) [Translation] 21 3  Pragmatism 22 3.1  Introduction 22 3.2  “L’antinomia non risolta”. In Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (pp. 118–​127) [Translation] 24 4  Actual Idealism 29 4.1  Giovanni Gentile’s Actual Idealism 29 4.2  Ugo Spirito and Giovanni Gentile 31 4.3  “Giovanni Gentile”. In Giovanni Gentile (pp. 13–​36) [Translation] 34 4.4  “Attualismo costruttore”. In Scienza e filosofia (pp. 35–​43) [Translation] 47 5  Criminal Law 53 5.1  Introduction 53 5.2  Storia del diritto penale italiano. Da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni (1974, pp. 224–​229) [Translation] 55

viii Contents 6  Fascism 59 6.1  Introduction 59 6.2  “Lo sviluppo del fascismo” (pp. 315–​320) [Translation] 61 7  Corporativism 66 7.1  Introduction 66 7.2  Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (pp. 172–​176) [Translation] 66 7.3  Ugo Spirito’s Corporativism 69 7.4  “Individuo e Stato nell’economia corporativa”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 3–​15) [Translation] 71 7.5  “Il corporativismo come liberalismo assoluto e socialismo assoluto”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 27–​44) [Translation] 81 7.6  Interpretation of a Programmed Economy 93 7.7  “L’economia programmatica corporativa”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 113–​127) [Translation] 94 8  Problematicism 104 8.1  Introduction: Birth of Problematicism 104 8.2  La vita come ricerca (pp. 7–​18) [Translation] 107 8.3  Life as Art 113 8.4  La vita come arte (pp. 17–​18; 20–​21) [Translation] 115 8.5  Aspects of the Problematic Life 116 8.6  Il problematicismo (pp. 44–​50) [Translation] 117 8.7  Life as Love 120 8.8  La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (pp. 32–​36) [Translation] 121 8.9  Theory of Omnicentrism 123 8.10  Inizio di una nuova epoca (pp. 275–​280) [Translation] 126 9  Communism within Problematicism 130 9.1  Introduction 130 9.2  “Comunismo russo”. In Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (pp. 6–​23; 34–​44) [Translation] 133 9.3  “Comunismo cinese”. In Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (pp. 63–​64; 70–​78; 86–​97) [Translation] 144 10  Science within Problematicism 155 10.1  Introduction 155 10.2  “Il problema della scienza”. In Atti del ix Convegno del Centro di Studi filosofici ta professori universitari (pp. 40–​42) [Translation] 156

Contents



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10.3  Attempts to Overcome Problematicism 159 10.4  “L’avvenire della scienza”. In Inizio di una nuova epoca (pp. 132–​149) [Translation] 160 10.5  Science and Metaphysics 165 10.6  Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 49–​53) [Translation] 165 10.7  Dal mito alla scienza (pp. 24–​34) [Translation] 168 10.8  Observations on Science and Technology 173 10.9  “Scienza e tecnica nel mondo d’oggi”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 43–​56) [Translation] 174

11  Democracy within Problematicism 182 11.1  Introduction 182 11.2  “La funzione della democrazia”. In Critica della democrazia (pp. 202–​218) [Translation] 183 12  Culture within Problematicism 192 12.1  Introduction 192 12.2  “Significato del nuovo umanesimo”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 37–​40) [Translation] 193 12.3  “Critica dell’educazione dell’uomo europeo”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 79–​83) [Translation] 195 12.4  “Cultura per pochi e cultura per tutti”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 87–​93) [Translation] 198 13  Antiscience in the New Problematicism 203 13.1  Introduction 203 13.2  Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 118–123) [Translation] 206 14  End of Communism 208 14.1  Introduction 208 14.2  Il comunismo (1979, pp. 74–​75) [Translation] 209 14.3  End of Communism 210 14.4  “Tramonto del comunismo”. In La fine del comunismo (pp. 30–​34) [Translation] 211 14.5  “La fine del comunismo”. In La fine del comunismo (pp. 42–​46) [Translation] 214 14.6  A Reconsideration of Programmed Economy 217 14.7  Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (pp. 55–​59) [Translation] 217

x Contents 15  End of Self-​Awareness 221 15.1  Introduction 221 15.2  “La fine dell’autocoscienza”. In Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 167–​178; 180–​184; 186) 221 16  Positivism Revisited 229 16.1  Introduction 229 16.2  “Il positivismo non è finito”. In Giornale critico della filosofia italiana (pp. 15–​25) [Translation] 230 17  State of Unawareness 239 17.1  Introduction 239 17.2  “Il metodo della mia ricerca”. In Che cosa sarà il futuro (pp. 13–​17) [Translation] 240 17.3  “L’incoscienza”. In Memorie di un incosciente (pp. 27–​28; 38–​43); “State of Unawareness”. In Memoirs of the Twentieth Century (pp. 27; 33–​34) [Translation] 243  Appendix 247  Works Cited 252  Bibliography 258  Index 267

Foreword Philosophy has never been in the business of solving problems and moving onto others without any thought of the old. There are two reasons for this. First, philosophical questions are perennial in that if you wish to reflect on them you must reflect on them for yourself. Others cannot do it for you. Secondly, in reflecting on these questions, you must rely on a tradition that has articulated them and which will guide your search for answers. Whenever we think, we cannot but think within some specific context, and in philosophy that context is generally supplied by a body of literature that embraces and pursues perennial questions in a systematic way. One of the most fundamental questions that arise in any system concerns action. Philosophers not only ask why something ‘acts’ in a certain way, but why anything ‘acts’ at all. What does it even mean ‘to act’? Rather than offer a clear-​cut answer to the question, actual idealism turns the question back on itself. It asserts that praxis reigns supreme at every level of human existence, and that we can only understand reality by collapsing the distinction between being and becoming, thought and reality. Actual idealism claims that we do not enjoy an intuitive grasp of being since metaphysics is by its very nature abstract. Giovanni Gentile proposed an ‘ontotectic’ or ‘cosmogenic’ idea of knowledge according to which the knower is productive of the noetic object. Thought is thus identified with practice, and, rather than achieving conformity between mind and object, the task of thinking is to produce an object precisely as an object of knowledge. In effect, Gentile dispenses with one side of the Kantian subject-​object divide by placing the entire burden on the ‘I’, so that the totality of the real is identified with the subject in the very self-​development that begins and ends with the ‘I’. Not only is thought act, but act thought. Actual idealism effectively completes the reduction of being (esse) to logic that began with nihilism. At the same time, actual idealism is ‘perennial’ in that it continually returns to the Parmenidean problem. It is a philosophy of becoming and therefore a philosophy of spirit opposed to traditional metaphysics. In place of transcendental esse or esse commune, it proposes a doctrine of utter immanence and the absolute primacy of praxis. Intellectually, it is as revolutionary as the Nietzschean project. But whereas the latter formulated a powerful argument for the inversion of morals, the former boldly proposes the inversion of all metaphysics. It begins with Gentile’s anthropological axiom that “the spirit is no longer intellect, but will.”1 The ‘I’ understands itself by its sheer capacity 1 Giovanni Gentile, Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere. Vol. 1 (Florence: Le Lettere, 1917), p. 43.

xii Foreword to transform itself, and more fundamentally by its starting point: autoctisis, “which means that the only true thing that can be posited is the subject that posits itself as such; and in positing itself, it posits every reality in itself as its own element.”2 In this vein, the similarities between actual idealism and Nietzschean nihilism are brought to the fore, especially with their shared focus on the will. The exaltation of the will entailed that thought, as pure act, cannot be measured by ends, objects, ethics, or values. It is rather the sole determining entity in the realm of praxis. Ugo Spirito was a leading thinker in this actual idealistic line. His philosophy both disarms and disconcerts. He fell out of the limelight with the collapse of fascism, but if we want to understand the philosophy of the twentieth century, we must examine his presuppositions and conclusions more carefully. We cannot dismiss actual idealism as narrow provincialism or a mere instrument of fascism. Its influence on Italian philosophy has been enormous and therefore begs for re-​examination. This is why it is as important to read Spirito as it is to read Croce and Gentile. Anthony G. Constantini’s anthology thus finds a natural home in the Values in Italian Philosophy series. Historical-​critical studies of actual idealism—​and, more generally, of the neo-​idealistic legacy—​abound in English, but translations of its basic texts are few. They are necessary not only for historical purposes but for grasping Italian philosophy today. It is easy to forget that Gentile groomed his students to think philosophically in a radically new way. He produced a ‘context’ within which they were challenged to confront perennial philosophical questions anew. Spirito was perhaps Gentile’s most original and promising student on both a speculative and practical level. He was a protégé of Gentile not only in philosophy but in pedagogy, forming students in and out of the classroom, expanding the ‘context’ of philosophy even while rendering it more aristocratic in scope and substance. Spirito was faithful to Gentile’s intellectual project and remained his principle collaborator in editing the Enciclopedia Italiana but he took actual idealism in an entirely new direction. He staunchly opposed private property and thus alienated himself from those who had the power to advance his academic career. He continued to lean further and further to the left as a fascist without severing his ties to the regime. Even though institutional fascism crumbled, Italian philosophy continues to evolve. Most striking is its return to classical sources, especially Aristotle, a trend that began under Gentile and Spirito. Nevertheless, just as it is tempting

2 Giovanni Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (Florence: Le lettere, 1916), p. 104.

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to focus solely on the political causes and consequences of Aristotle’s philosophy, so is it tempting to focus solely on the political causes and consequences of Gentile’s and Spirito’s actual idealism. There is little doubt that Gentile was well acquainted with the absolutism of fascism and that his work tried to give it form and substance. Indeed, his rejection of individual autonomy is highly problematic. Yet, like any philosophy, the reasonability of actual idealism must ultimately be judged on the soundness of its arguments or lack thereof. Emmanuel Lévinas commented that to set Heidegger’s philosophy in motion it was enough to observe that our encounter with trees, fields, and rocks is more fundamental than our encounter with persons. The identification of knower and thing known is, in a certain sense, retained by Heidegger, as well as the aspect of otherness. With Gentile and Spirito, however, identification of knower and thing known overcomes and suppresses otherness.3 The transcendental ‘I’ is pure process and act. Their actual idealism represents a critical crossroads at which we are forced to re-​examine the Aristotelian doctrine of nous and the idea that the knowledge of being is based on some kind of judgment that individual things exist. I hope this volume of the Values in Italian Philosophy series will help readers assess the extent to which actual idealism resembles and differs from philosophical currents in the English-​speaking world. British and American philosophers would particularly profit from a comparison between the kind of idealism that made its way into their universities and the kind of idealism Spirito set out to reform. We can neither ignore the historical circumstances out of which Spirito’s actual idealism was born nor dismiss it as sheer politics. He did more than anyone else to disseminate Gentile’s ideas yet he also radically changed their course. His arrival at existential nihilism is logically consistent with that of many English-​speaking philosophers who have studied Nietzsche intensely and rediscovered metaphysics through him. Analytic philosophers have acknowledged the perils of philosophical fragmentation and compartmentalization and are turning to continental philosophy to remedy the situation. By rebelling against Kantian and Enlightenment intellectual dualisms, Italian neo-​Hegelians tried to unify what they believed Kant had pulled asunder: thought and feeling, subject and object, man and nature, ought and is, the citizen and the state, nature and God, spirit and matter. This raises the question whether Spirito’s actual idealism was not only epistemological but metaphysical. After all, one of the claims of actual idealism is that reality is ultimately 3 Ibid., p. 16.

xiv Foreword a spiritual, organic unity. An organic unity, in turn, implies necessary relationships among its various parts, such that if any part is changed the entire organism is altered. This concept was central to the idea of a fascist nation-​state: a state more real and valuable than its individual citizens. Politically the idea proved abominable, but philosophically it may have been consistent. If philosophy were simply the business of solving problems and moving on to new ones, there would be no reason to read Spirito. But philosophy is not that and Spirito needs to be read. Moreover, the reader cannot help but read him within a specific context. Perhaps the plethora of contexts will shed light on what Spirito was up to philosophically then and where we are going today. Daniel B. Gallagher, Editor Values in Italian Philosophy Special Series Rome, Italy

Foreword In Italy, Ugo Spirito is known for two reasons: (1) he was one of the young intellectuals who followed Giovanni Gentile’s philosophical beliefs of actual idealism and political adherence to fascism; (2) between the end of the decade of the 1930s and the years following World War ii, he elaborated a philosophical doctrine known as “problematicism.” This doctrine became the focus of Italian philosophical debate and profoundly influenced the entire culture of the nation for quite a few years. During his youth, Spirito was an idealist. His thinking first coincided with Gentile’s ideas, but in time, became progressively independent. By 1937, Spirito concluded that Gentile’s idealistic theories, with their goals of rationalizing and humanizing society, had run their course and were mostly false or out of reach. He was in a state of disbelief and doubt, looking for a new investigative direction to realize what he had considered to be the heart of Gentile’s philosophy. In his La vita come ricerca (1937), Spirito placed doubt and not reason at the core of his investigation. He believed that it was impossible to resolve the problems afflicting society in a rational way. As a result, Spirito abandoned Gentile’s ideas and developed his theory of problematicism, which was argued in Il problematicismo (1948). As a young man, Spirito believed in the proposition that one could explain the world rationally and humanize it, but in the course of time, he realized that one could always find either a breaking point in any, all-​inclusive philosophical system, or an element that would not fit into the rational vision of reality. Henceforth, Spirito’s thought centered on the impossibility of affirming absolute truth. As a result of these new positions, Spirito’s influence on Italian philosophical thought increased exponentially. His teachings stimulated investigation to look for new interpretative principles of reality that would challenge traditional approaches and beliefs while at the same time remembering to place those same principles under rigorous scrutiny. In 1949, Spirito was appointed Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Rome, which housed the most prestigious department of philosophy in the country. His ideas provoked intense debates at philosophical conferences involving the most recognized Italian philosophers of the time, namely Emanuele Severino, Guido Calogero, Gustavo Bontadini, and Augusto Del Noce. At the same time, new generations of Italian philosophers modeled themselves on Spirito’s teachings and some of them, such as Lucio Colletti, achieved distinction both at home and abroad.

xvi Foreword The English-​speaking reader will find the study of Spirito’s thought useful for two reasons. First, as indicated, observing the complex interplay between Spirito and Gentile, the reader will have a less ideological understanding of Gentile’s philosophy and its importance within the broader spectrum of Italian culture. One would understand why a young man, soon after World War i, could accept Gentile’s version of idealism and share his political views. In fact, Spirito showed greater interest in Gentile than in Benedetto Croce, the other major representative of Italian idealism. What Spirito found more attractive in Gentile was a philosophy with an ethical dimension and a tension capable of influencing the social realities present in the aftermath of World War i. The reader will also find interesting the broad impact that Spirito’s thought had on Italian philosophy roughly from 1945 to 1979, when he dealt with the hotly debated themes concerning science and antiscience, communism and democracy, metaphysics and relativism. Spirito confronted the validity and the limitations of ideologies just mentioned and he did it without ever displaying any sense of absolute authority. Giovanni Dessì Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata Rome, Italy

Preface The purpose of the present work, Anthology of the Works of Ugo Spirito, is to expand on the translation of Ugo Spirito’s Memorie di un incosciente (1977a) (Memoirs of the Twentieth Century, 2000a), the only book of the philosopher that can be read in English. Memorie di un incosciente is both a chronicle of Spirito’s relationship with major Italian political and philosophical figures of the past century (Benito Mussolini, Giovanni Gentile, Benedetto Croce, etc.) and a summary of his philosophical activity as related in the initial two chapters (“Witnessing a Century” and “The State of Unawareness”). In them, readers discover how Spirito’s faith in philosophy as the cognitive path to follow in order to reach truth and the absolute evolves into a negation of the philosophical activity itself: ‘self-​awareness’ becomes ‘unawareness.’ To help them expand their knowledge of Spirito, I compiled an anthology of selected chapters and excerpts taken from his most important works with the intention of reconstructing the various phases of his life-​long philosophical and intellectual activity. Presenting an anthology of selected material means that other material, which might be considered equally, or even more important than that selected for the anthology, is not included. This process implicitly reflects the interpretation of the editor. While I am fully cognizant of the limits associated with the anthological format, I hope that this modest work will contribute to the dissemination of Spirito’s ideas in the English-​speaking world. To help readers follow the atypical, if not tortuous development of Spirito’s thought, I have provided an introduction of general information at the beginning of each chapter and before several of the translated pieces with the purpose of shedding some light on Spirito’s philosophical and cultural convictions at a specific moment of his intellectual activity. Therefore, these informative notes are in no way exhaustive. On the contrary, in their briefness, they show their limits. In Spirito’s works, the intellectual interest of the philosopher is never separated from his own human experience. Two of his books, in fact, have autobiographical titles: Memorie di un incosciente and Storia della mia ricerca (1971a) while Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a) is a reconstruction of the evolution of his philosophy presenting a strong autobiographical tone. Consequently, Spirito’s quest for truth and the absolute is at the same time the history of a personal self-​discovery that evolves for almost sixty years. There is always the sense of emotional participation by the philosopher in the rendering of his ideas. The result is prose that is never dry or impersonal; on

xviii Preface the contrary, it is rich in internal modulations, where the polemic and sarcastic tones spontaneously interact with the evocative and, at times, the lyrical. Moreover, the systematic use of the antinomy through which the thoughts are filtered generates a constant internal tension wherein opposite positions find only elusive conclusions. In my attempt to render in English Spirito’s unique style, I tried to remain faithful to other aspects that are an essential part of it, such as the use of the following adjectives ‘positivistic,’ ‘idealistic,’ ‘intellectualistic,’ etc., with which Spirito captured the philosophical nuances within each of these major schools of thought as well as the adoption of the upper case for Nation and State when the original text demands it. As in Memoirs of the Twentieth Century, I also kept the non-​hyphenated form in most of the words beginning with ‘anti’ as in ‘antiscience,’ ‘antisocialist,’ ‘antifascist,’ ‘anticommunist,’ ‘antibourgeois,’ etc. However, in few others, such as in ‘anti-​positivist,’ ‘anti-capitalism’ and ‘anti-​ proletariat,’ I opted for today more accepted hyphenated form. Spirito’s books were written before the appearance of the movement in scholarly English to replace male-​gendered words with gender-​neutral language. In preparing this anthology, I tried whenever possible to strike a balance between the respect for today’s standards and the rendering of the character of Spirito’s language. Compared to Memoirs, this anthology contains a more detailed presentation of Spirito’s relevance in the Italian and European philosophical world, incorporating in the process the opinions of various scholars, as well as an updated list of Spirito’s publications and of publications of others on his many books. Lastly, some introductory notes reflect closely concepts expressed in the presentation of Memoirs. However, appropriate modifications were made when required. The preparation of this anthology took some time, and its format has undergone several modifications. From an initial project limited to Spirito’s early philosophical activity, this work has expanded to include the many stages of the evolution of the philosopher’s thought. It has been a work in progress that allowed me to benefit from the feedback on the translation that came from family members, friends, and colleagues who became interested in discovering Spirito’s philosophy. Besides my two nieces, Diana Salerno and Annalisa Salerno, who have been voices of encouragement throughout, I am particularly grateful to Alicia Moran, the person with whom I shared the initial thought of putting together this anthology. Special consideration goes to Prof. Karen J. Abramowitz, whose passion for Italian culture motivated her to explore Spirito’s philosophy and whose suggestions were incorporated in the anthology. I also take pleasure in mentioning my friend, Ellen E. Lockwood,

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and Jonathan H. Todd, both of whom found time to read sections of the anthology, as well as my two ex-​colleagues, Brian Castronovo and Pat Miller, who perused only few random pages. Finally, I would like to thank Bryan Collins for formatting this work. At this point, I would like to acknowledge the role played by the Ugo Spirito e Renzo De Felice Fondazione located in Rome in the realization of this work. As in the case of the translation into English of Memorie di un incosciente, this institution, in the person of its director, Dr. Giuseppe Parlato, not only has granted me the permission to translate any selection of books and articles by me chosen but has also assisted me in consulting original copies of magazines where some of the pieces translated were published. Within this context of Italian relations, I would like to express my gratitude to both Dr. Daniel Gallagher and Dr. Gianni Dessὶ. The former wrote the “Editorial Foreword” while living in Rome and the latter the “Guest Foreword” as faculty member of the Università degli studi di Roma Tor Vergata, thus enriching the anthology with broader cultural references. Anthony G. Costantini

introduction

Ugo Spirito: A Profile Ugo Spirito (1896–​1979) is considered one of the most original Italian minds of the twentieth century. His writings span almost six decades, covering many of the most important philosophical and ideological problems that developed in Italy from the advent of fascism to 1977/​1978, the years of the publication of Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), La fine del comunismo (1978a), and Vilfredo Pareto (1978b). During his long career, Spirito became both “protagonist and critic of his time;”1 “an innovator who was able to capture the new, that which was emerging; an anticipator rather than a witness.”2 The image of Spirito as a mere disciple of Giovanni Gentile is, therefore, restrictive although it can be applied to the first period of his long philosophical activity when he became Gentile’s favorite assistant. Spirito’s interest in philosophy was sparked by a “metaphysical demand,” almost a “religious need,” to find what he called in his philosophical autobiography, Storia della mia ricerca (1971a), “incontrovertibility” or a “statement of any kind that we cannot doubt.”3 According to him, incontrovertibility would lead to the discovery of a principle capable of unifying the multiple manifestations of reality and to the attainment of truth and the absolute. The “­question of incontrovertibility”4 caused his thinking to constantly evolve, alternating between moments of conviction and certainty and periods of doubt and uncertainty. As a result, Spirito’s philosophical work assumed an antinomic and contradictory quality, which, while it possibly confused the reader, revealed at the same time an inherent strong sense of authenticity typical of those intellectuals who were not afraid to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy of the time. Whether referring to his early stages of positivism and neo-​idealism or to his more mature and prolonged stage of problematicism, Spirito’s iconoclastic freedom of thought

1 Hervé A. Cavallera, “La Partecipazione al divenire del reale: l’immagine della pedagogia in Ugo Spirito,” in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990), p. 261. 2 Hervé A. Cavallera, “L’occhio del pensiero di Ugo Spirito tra gli anni 60 e gli anni 70,” Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito (1990), p. 27. 3 Ugo Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), p. 16. The four short quotations are located in the same page. 4 Ibid., p. 17.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_002

2 Introduction transformed his philosophical journey into one of the most original interpretations of the complex intellectual condition of contemporary thinkers. In his early high school years, this intellectual vocation manifested itself in an intuitive manner when a quite young Spirito began to face the problems of responsibility, guilt, free will, and determinism. As a university student, the intuitive approach to problems was supplanted by the scientific method of positivism, or philosophy based on facts. Because positivist philosophy avoided the “world of opinions typical of the other forms of knowledge”5 and imposed a language that reflected the certainty of the immediacy of facts, he felt he had reached incontrovertibility and the absolute, and “[his] soul found satisfaction in a certainty that could not be doubted.”6 He observed that while many religions and philosophies existed, there was only one scientific knowledge. Later, as he studied the characteristics of human sciences,7 especially criminal law and political economics, he developed serious doubts about the validity of positivism in elaborating universal laws that would produce incontrovertible certainties. However, positivism—​and scientific interest in general—​remained a permanent component of his future philosophical work. In 1918—​soon after receiving his Law degree—​Spirito attended Gentile’s lectures on actual idealism at the University of Rome. In those lectures, he discovered the theory of the “thinking in act” (or “spirit in act”)8 according to which the human spirit created all aspects of reality in the moment it thought of them. Nothing, therefore, existed outside the thinking of the spirit, which transformed every fact and idea into the history of its internal realization. For him, actual idealism and truth became one and the same. Convinced of the veracity of that doctrine, he became Gentile’s most loyal disciple. When a decade later he concluded that Gentile’s theory of the “thinking in act” was becoming a sterile concept in the mind of many other actual idealist philosophers, he transformed actual idealism in “constructive actual idealism”—​a theory that incorporated sciences in the cognitive process leading to truth. For him, by realizing the identity of philosophy and science,

5 Ibid., p. 19. 6 Ibid., p. 20. 7 Spirito refers to the traditional positivist sciences (political economics, criminal law, etc.) as human sciences rather than social sciences. Section C of Chapter Sixteen has the title “Positivism of Human Sciences”. 8 Herbert W. Carr, The Theory of Mind as Pure Act (London: Mcmillan, 1922), pp. 1–​9. English translation of Gentile’s Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro.

Ugo Spirito: A Profile

3

“constructive actual idealism” not only would regenerate actual idealism but also lead the way to a more profound identity of philosophy and life. For Spirito, as for Gentile, reason was the way to the attainment of truth, and philosophers were the voice of this truth in society. Like Gentile, he did not remain in the isolation of the ivory tower, as many other philosophers had done in the past, rather he immersed himself in the cultural and political life of the fascist regime and grew into one of its most provocative voices, especially after his formulation of the theory of “corporative ownership,”9 which promoted to the abolition of private property. He soon realized, however, that there would always be a gap between what philosophers envisioned and how their goals were perceived. His own participation in the development of the corporative ideology promoted by Benito Mussolini turned out to be a disappointment on both the existential and the intellectual level. Indeed, when his theory of “corporative ownership” was rejected by important members of the fascist hierarchy, that public action forced him to reconsider his ideological beliefs as well as the validity of his faith in actual idealism. Whereas Gentile remained firm in his conviction of having reached the incontrovertible truth once and for all, Spirito instead placed reason under scrutiny, thus depriving it of the century-​old function that Western civilization had bestowed upon it: that of finding sure answers to the fundamental questions of life. This new approach to problems brought forth in his analysis the elements of doubt and negation with antinomy as the most important element of the cognitive process. His own “constructive actual idealism” underwent a profound re-​evaluation and succumbed to the process of verification. “To think means to object,”10 he wrote in the initial statement of La vita come ricerca in 1937, a book that opened a new way of thinking and generated a long period of philosophical inquiry known as problematicism. In problematicism, everything was open to question and to intellectual probing because of Spirito’s loss of faith in reason to find permanent solutions. The publication of Il problematicismo by Spirito in 1949 marked another important step in the elaboration of his view of philosophy within problematicism. In that book, the awareness of living a life characterized by doubt and negation assumed the dimension of a personal existential drama because he felt that he was trapped by the antinomic tension: “Here, the conscience of the drama reaches the highest expression of the risk of degeneration.”11 Il problematicismo 9 10 11

Chapter Seven clarifies the nature and function of corporativism. Ugo Spirito, La vita come ricerca (Florence: Sansoni, 1937), p. 7. Ugo Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (Florence: Sansoni, 1976), p. 29.

4 Introduction placed Spirito at the forefront of Italian philosophy and in concert with the prevailing European intellectual trends. Spirito’s position of relevance in Italian intellectual circles during the early 1950s was also recognized by the most important philosophers of the time regardless of their ideological stance, and many of them began to publish articles in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, of which he had become the director. From 1953 to 1955, Spirito published three important books, Vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (1953a), Note sul pensiero di Giovanni Gentile (1954), and Il significato del nostro tempo (1955), each engaging the attention of the Italian cultural world. According to Dessì, “during the early years of the 1950s, Spirito was considered a major point of reference with whom to argue”12 by both younger thinkers (Lucio Colletti) and older and more known philosophers (Gustavo Bontadini or Augusto Del Noce). For example, following the publication of Vita come amore, several Italian philosophers of Catholic formation, such as Cornelio Fabro, Raimondo Spiazzi, and others, engaged Spirito in one of the most intense philosophical debates of that time. They refused to accept Spirito’s restrictive understanding of Christian love because, according to him, it was based on a judgmental attitude that separated humanity in two groups: the believers who were rewarded and the sinners who were condemned. Spiazzi even asked rhetorically if it was possible to live and not to have judgments involving values. He argued that Spirito himself “did not refrain from expressing several judgments in his book, including the one on Christianity”13 while at the same time affirming that one needs to “reject nothing nor to judge.”14 In challenging Spirito’s positions, he brought to the front of the debate the goodness present in the Christian message in which God “creates, elevates, redeems, and saves the human race.”15 From then on, Spirito’s philosophical activity oscillated between positions that implied a non-​solution and affirmations of the possession of the incontrovertible truth and the absolute, thus generating a permanent state of tension in his thought and a sense of uneasiness in the reader forced to constantly reassess the shifting views of his thought process. The intensity of this activity has been identified by a series of phases each characterized by a specific content: art, love, omnicentrism, communism, science, antiscience and, lastly, unawareness or inability to know. 12

Giovanni Dessì, Ugo Spirito. Filosofia e rivoluzione (Milan: Luni, 1999), p. 165 and following pages. 13 Raimondo Spiazzi, “La critica di Ugo Spirito al cristianesimo in La vita come amore,” in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988), p. 199. 14 Ibid., p. 200. 15 Ibid.

Ugo Spirito: A Profile

5

Spirito made two major attempts to overcome problematicism itself: one involving communism and the other the metaphysics of science. His faith in communism—​enhanced by his two trips to the USSR (1956) and China (1961)—​ gradually faded with the realization of the irreversible process of bourgeois assimilation that the proletarian class was experiencing as economic conditions continued to improve in the whole Western world. He understood that capitalism, morphed into neo-​capitalism, had once again won the ideological and economic battle. The attention dedicated by Spirito to the relationship between science and philosophy had equally deeper cultural roots. We have already considered the novelty of his theory of “constructive actual idealism” within actual idealism where he postulated the identity of the two terms. To overcome problematicism, which emerged as a result of a subsequent separation of philosophy and science, Spirito affirmed again their identity. To this purpose, he found in science a totally immanent metaphysics rooted in the consensus that scientists reach in their investigation. However, even this result was overturned by the critical attitude of his mind with the consequence that at the end of his life he denied not only that identity but affirmed a state of total unawareness about truth. Throughout his long career, Spirito was not afraid to constantly re-​evaluate his philosophical, intellectual, and political positions, thus reaching conclusions that negated his previous ones. In this manner, he managed to recalibrate the function of the philosopher and that of the intellectual in general. If during the years of his actual idealist faith, he, as a philosopher, felt he could affect society in a positive way, at the end of his life he concluded that he had no control over his personal life let alone society, sadly admitting that luck had determined the course of his destiny. At that point, he also realized that he had nothing else to say and that his philosophical quest had come to an end. Despite the disillusionment that characterized the last stage of his philosophical activity, Spirito left a durable legacy as an original interpreter of actual idealism, as a promoter of an orthodox form of corporativism, and as a thinker who offered unique answers to the unpredictable tensions, beliefs and values that emerged in Italy and Europe during the second part of the twentieth century. After his death, interest on his works increased exponentially in part facilitated by the journal Annali founded in 1989 by the Ugo Spirito e Renzo De Felice Fondazione16 with the specific goal of promoting the dissemination of Spritio’s works. Since then, Annali published a variety of meaningful articles, 16

Fondazione Ugo Spirito, established in 1981, became Ugo Spirito e Renzo De Felice Fondazione only recently. Articles listed in the section “Bibliography” of this anthology

6 Introduction each covering a particular aspect of the vast intellectual activity carried out by the philosopher, thus contributing to the making of Spirito a familiar name in the Italian cultural world. Important in this sense was the publication of the two volumes of Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (1988/​1990) by the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. Finally, in the past thirty years, several books have been added to the list of works on Spirito’s multifaceted thought. In them, one can immediately notice how Spirito’s name was increasingly associated with other major European thinkers. For example, Lino Di Stefano, in Profili di pensatori contemporanei (1984), made important connections between Spirito and Karl Popper, claiming that the Italian philosopher anticipated some of the most valuable ideas of Popper’s thought. He wrote that contemporary epistemology and Popper’s epistemological studies in general found easy acceptance in today’s culture, becoming the leitmotif that nourished generations of intellectuals. Other thinkers, such as Spirito, had maintained, and with originality, the same Stand-​punkte, even if without the fortune of the trendy philosophies.17 In an article published in 1988, Vittorio Frosini elevated “Spirito’s philosophical figure to that of an Italian [Herbert] Marcuse.”18 After having pointed out affinities and, differences in scrutinizing the themes of love and sexual liberation, of the arts and the characteristics of the new generations, and, above all, of the function and impact that technology had in contemporary society by the two thinkers,19 he recognized that Spirito was the only author who, for the complexity of the intellectual interests and for the unbiased critical approach, could be considered paradoxically the anti-​Marcuse in contemporary philosophical landscape.”20 George Uscatescu, in “Estetica y cultura planetaria en el pensamiento de Ugo Spirito” (1990), linked Spirito’s thought to that of Martin Heidegger because

carry only the original name because they were published before the change of name of the institution. 17 Lino Di Stefano, Profili di pensatori contemporanei (Palermo: Ila Palma, 1984), p. 45. 18 Vittorio Frosini, “Ugo Spirito interprete della società contemporanea,” in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988), p. 214. 19 Ibid., p. 215. 20 Ibid.

Ugo Spirito: A Profile

7

both philosophers aimed at developing “a planetary civilization from the point of view of the possibilities of a dialogue among cultures.”21 Besides, both of them considered technology “the unifying force of the cultural, artistic, and scientific world.”22 In referring to the European cultural landscape of the 1920s, where the presence of German influence was particularly felt and Heidegger played a fundamental role in it, he added: This [cultural] landscape also includes the thought of Ugo Spirito, the Italian thinker so different from Heidegger yet animated by the general vision of the function of culture and of the art that one can find in the noble and prolific thought of the maestro of Friburg.23 Giovanni Dessì, in his book Ugo Spirito. Filosofia e rivoluzione (1999), placed Spirito on the same level as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, philosophers of the post-​World War ii intellectual crisis that gripped European culture, confirming the validity and originality of the Italian philosopher’s thought: The theme of the crisis of post-​World War ii is the historical datum from which Spirito begins his analysis: the upheavals tied to the war, the retaliations on the helpless population, the civil war, the useless cruelties as the marks of a profound crisis which involves the ultimate principles of thought and action. The events are not a simple chronicle for Spirito; they challenge the very same principles of culture and life of modern Western civilization. In this sense, Spirito’s statements mirror the positions of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno expressed in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) during the same time period. … [since they too] in different countries, captured the dramatic rethinking of the fundamental tenets of European culture.24 By the same token, Dessì also found major differences in the solutions proposed by them. According to him, while the two German philosophers postulated a

21

George Uscatescu, “Estetica y cultura planetaria en el pensamiento de Ugo Spirito,” in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990), p. 570. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 572. 24 Giovanni Dessì, Ugo Spirito. Filosofia e rivoluzione, pp. 157–​158.

8 Introduction totally other absolute, Spirito envisioned possible solutions first in the advent of communism and later in the development of a metaphysics of science.25 The growing importance of Ugo Spirito at European level was affirmed by Hervé A. Cavallera who, in his book Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile (2000), presented Spirito as an anticipator of postmodern philosophy. He wrote: In the omnicentrist phase, Spirito talked of postmodern to define a world that is beginning, a world that no longer has a center . … that is, that condition of life that expresses as its most important aspect the logic of coexistence and of the recognition of diversity, pursued by those societies defined as complex for promoting racial, cultural, religious, and ethnic diversities. Once again, Spirito identified the characteristics of the new times before everyone else, becoming in this manner the philosopher of postmodern.26 Spirito as anticipator of postmodern philosophy was also asserted by Daniela Coli in her essay “Il problematicismo di Ugo Spirito,” (2007): In Il problematicismo, it clearly appears that Spirito’s discourse, which he started in La vita come ricerca, is not related to the problems scrutinized by [Oswald] Spengler in The Decline of the West (1918), rather it anticipates problems discussed in the philosophy of both Michel Foucault and Franҫois Lyotard. For Spirito, the crisis of the twentieth century is a crisis that goes back to the origins of modern world, “it is the crisis of a great general conception of the world and of life, . … historical crisis as metaphysical crisis, epilogue of modern thought.” According to the philosopher, the crisis is an epistemic crisis of philosophy and of the modern life that places at the center of the universe a new figure, that of the subject.27

25 26 27

Ibid., p. 158. Hervé A. Cavallera Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile (Fornello: seam, 2000), p. 89. Daniela Coli, “Il problematicismo di Ugo Spirito,” in Hervé A. Cavallera e Francesco S. Festa, Ugo Spirito tra attualismo e postmoderno (Rome: Biblioteca Scientifica/​Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 2007), p. 91.

Ugo Spirito: A Profile

9

Considering the number of articles and books that continue to be written on Spirito’s thought, one can safely foresee that the philosopher’s intellectual and academic importance both in Italy and Europe will proceed to expand. Consequently, comparisons with other important representatives of contemporary European culture will become the norm rather than the exception. Since Spirito has been able to interpret through his unique problematic approach the shifting cultural needs of Italians during decades of intense intellectual life, most likely he will be considered alongside Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile as an unavoidable point of reference, a sort of cultural lighthouse for future generations of scholars, both Italian and non-​Italian, who aspire to understand the evolving spirit of a turbulent twentieth century.

­c hapter 1

A Life-​Long Passion for Truth 1.1

Introduction

During the last decade of his philosophical activity, Ugo Spirito published three books, Storia della mia ricerca (1971a), Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a), and Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), in which he offered a detailed reconstruction of the evolution of his thought from the initial positivism to the last stage of problematicism while stressing the most important moments of his quest for truth and the absolute. In them, he reaffirmed theoretical concepts and convictions, subsequently rejected them, and afterwards reconceived and reintegrated them into new philosophical settings, generating a constant and unpredictable alternation of views. Spirito was conscious of the ever-​changing nature of his philosophy. For him, truth was never a sure possession; yet he could not live without trying to satisfy this elusive dream. The inability of his thought to acquiesce in a definitive conclusion was the stimulus for what became an endless search. While this inconclusiveness might suggest the sense of a superficial philosophical vocation, a more careful analysis reveals that he was motivated by a deep metaphysical need, “a religious quest for the absolute,”1 a tension to reach the incontrovertible truth in order to find a durable “meaning to our lives.”2 The many books written by Spirito to appease this internal tension are a confirmation of the philosopher’s own intellectual restlessness. In Storia della mia ricerca, he recognized that his continuous publications created confusion and uncertainty in readers because “each new book [was], to some degree, a revision of the previous one.”3 He attributed this unsettled intellectual condition to the antinomic nature of his thought process. Hence, the need to write philosophical autobiographies that clarify this process, assuring readers that “beyond the diversity”4 of his many philosophical positions, there was “a fundamental unity underlying it.”5 In the hands of Spirito, this autobiographical approach became an active philosophical discovery unto itself in which his 1 Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), p. 16. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 13. 4 Ibid., p. 15. 5 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_003

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11

questioning about his own past beliefs brought about not just a deepening of his own present thought but the discovery of a wider philosophical world to which his own was tied. The first chapter of Storia della mia ricerca, here translated in its entirety, reveals the dramatic tension at the heart of Spirito’s philosophical activity. 1.2

“Autobiografia Filosofica”. In Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 11–​25) [Translation]

The historian, who wants to become familiar with the thoughts of a philosopher and capture the true meaning of the conclusions he has reached, knows well that it is impossible for him to satisfy this goal if he does not trace from the beginning the philosophical journey of the author being studied. The results of his research must be enlightened by the process of formation of the author, which allows his work to acquire concreteness and meaning. Recently, the need to determine the origin of the problems of a philosopher in order to capture the fundamental demands that characterize the development of his thought to the last stage, has become more urgent and necessary. Knowledge of a philosophy coincides with the knowledge of the history of that philosophy. Upon these considerations, I shifted my attention from the study of a certain philosopher to the study that the author himself can perform about his own thought with the intention of becoming more aware of the journey until then completed and the direction to take in the next stage of his work. In this case, one tries to better understand not only an investigative process, but also to come to a better understanding of the needs and stimuli that motivated the author to come forth with a more profound elaboration of his intellectual needs. At this point, the work of the historian and that of the philosopher are fused into a single analysis that is also the history of himself and the affirmation of a new self. The autobiographical moment understood in a philosophical way has always been considered a necessary part of the exploration of the philosopher. In each new work, he always proceeds from some considerations about his own past. However, one thing is the implicit understanding, and another is the explicit understanding that derives from a systematic rethinking of the journey until then accomplished. The revelation of his reflection about the process of his own formation constitutes an element of historical interpretation that he offers to the reader with the purpose of facilitating his effort of comprehension and judgment. Because of this conviction, being in the process of exposing the most recent conclusions that I have arrived at and following the direction

12 

Chapter 1

established in my book Dal mito alla scienza (1966), it is my intention to write a philosophical autobiography to explain the emergence or re-​emergence of demands that have so far remained unfulfilled, notwithstanding repeated efforts to clarify and possibly find a solution for them. I write to understand myself better and have others understand me better: that is, we take one more step together along a journey for which I still envision no end. My journey began fifty years ago, and it has been progressively enriched by the fruits of so many experiences of both theoretical and practical nature. However, I am aware that it is a journey without a point of destination, and this book cannot provide it. In a way, the destination remains even more elusive, although it does not interrupt the intensity and serenity of my life. This observation constitutes a motive for me to write an autobiographical preface to my thought.

…

A more fundamental reason convinced me to give this book the character of a philosophical autobiography. This reason comes from the consideration of the ongoing changes and instability of my thoughts documented in my publication. Appearing irreducible to a single philosophical center, these publications prevent the reader from reaching definitive conclusions. Each new book is, to some degree, a revision of the previous one, the result of which is the manifestation of my thought in ever new ways. This instability has generated criticism mixed with irony, and it is often clearly negative criticism. Critics who go overboard view my instability as a sign of superficiality and improvisation. To this, one needs to add the confusion experienced by readers, who are constrained to redouble their efforts. It is, indeed, a voyage without a destination. I am not challenging the validity of the criticism here. I am simply reviewing my life experiences with the intention of understanding the reasons for so many changes in my revisions. I believe, above all, that the main reason for the changes must be viewed through the forma mentis that characterizes my work. I think this reflects the keen awareness I possess of the antinomic quality of my ideas expressed in La vita come ricerca (1937). The intellectual drive and the sense of logic that motivate my effort usually convince me of the viability of a certain philosophical solution to the point that I feel completely fulfilled by my work. The efforts I made to reach that solution have been so intense as to absorb all my energy. Even the objections raised by my critics are approximately the same as those I raised in advance and to which I answered exhaustively. All this persuades me to stick with a certain solution for long time. However, slowly but surely, from within the solution itself, doubt and the antinomic position begin to emerge.

A Life-Long Passion for Truth

13

The understanding of the limits of my position becomes clearer and, at the same time, more profound, thus generating a process of radical revision of the entire system of thought. This critical process develops progressively and with the same effort and sense of logic utilized in the elaboration of the system. Consequently, a new philosophical position—​which is more comprehensive and convincing, even if discards the most essential aspects of it—​appears. The negative and polemic moment takes over, but in doing so, it sacrifices the elements already acquired. Considering the pace of my thought process, the significance that a philosophical autobiography can assume becomes evident. On the one hand, such an autobiography must explain the constant change affecting my thoughts by discovering beyond its diversity the fundamental unity underlying it. On the other, an autobiography must look for those elements that are progressively sacrificed during various polemical phases and recover them to achieve a vision that becomes more critical and comprehensive. Regarding the first point, I have never denied the need for turning the metaphysical question into an essential and necessary part of my philosophical quest. To me, thinking has always meant converting diversity into unity. It follows that thinking also means looking for the meaning of unity or the principle of reality. In this sense, it can be said that my philosophical journey was driven by a religious quest for the absolute. Life can acquire meaning only by rising from the finite to the infinite. Today, it is fashionable to reject this drive and look to traditional philosophy with irony when it takes the metaphysical form. On the other hand, I have always tried to demonstrate the naïveté and the contradictory character of such a position because it reduces life to the most superficial and trivial nonsense. The need for religious convictions has never eluded my consideration, and this need has become for me a theological problem. This is the first basic proof of the continuity of a thought totally geared to a precise and unmistakable direction. To understand the peculiar aspect of this continuity, it is necessary to reflect on the criterion I have followed in my effort to include the religious quest. I have always posited metaphysical questions as queries dealing with incontrovertibility.6 They can be phrased as follows: is there a statement or assertion of any kind that cannot be doubted? If there is, it represents the lever that would allow us to lift the world and give meaning to our lives. If not, life remains

6 Spirito uses the italicized form to stress the importance of a given word. However, he does not apply this use consistently as in the case of the word ‘incontrovertibility.’ Whenever possible, I limited myself to a faithful rendering of the original.

14 

Chapter 1

suspended on a principle that escapes us and does not allow us to consciously control it. Modern thought begins with Cartesian doubt and it becomes progressively critical until it reaches a radical form of criticism, namely denying a full answer to the question I posited. All religions and philosophies that history records contain the answers that allow humanity to obtain the necessary criteria to reach the absolute certainties that guide our lives. Today, doubt is so widespread that it excludes from life any secure orientation and any certainty of absolute values. As this critical and antidogmatic attitude spreads, we are forced to proceed without taking responsibility for our actions. As a result, our journey becomes extremely difficult, and life tends to disintegrate.

…

It is this question of incontrovertibility that caused my thinking to continuously change, driven as it was by the need for constant renewal. No matter how radical, my doubt was always followed by moments of certainty. The realization that there is a world that lives without disintegrating, hence connected to an order deemed of necessity essential, compels us, in some forms, to acknowledge a common reality and to render absolute the values of which we have only partial knowledge. On the other hand, doubt has become so widespread that it has gained full acceptance, thus denying us any opportunity to challenge it. At this point, hesitations that concern certainty come to the forefront and the search for incontrovertibility becomes inevitable. The philosophical process ceases when the illusion of having reached a moment of certainty prevails, for thought commits itself to the task of systematizing the temporary results. However, the critical process takes over again, and antinomy resurfaces with renewed strength, forcing me to restart my journey and to gain new hope. Critical thought and antinomic thought become one while doubt maintains its relentless pace. The reason for constant change becomes evident and the spectacle of a thought that does not change is seen as proof of persistent dogmatism. Only those who have ceased doubting and philosophizing stick to their beliefs; only those who have reached incontrovertibility can wonder about the intellectual instability of those involved in philosophical analysis. However, those who are seriously immersed in genuine understanding pursue this goal because they are not satisfied with any of the infinite incontrovertible truths that abound in the field of philosophy. Confronted with the many solutions offered by theology, critical thought begins its journey anew without any hope of ever coming to an end.

…

15

A Life-Long Passion for Truth

The search for incontrovertibility that characterized the entire development of my thought from the very outset, even before I realized it, made me doubt religious and philosophical manifestations. The multiplicity of religions and philosophies convinced me to pursue a knowledge that was more unified and stable. This is the reason why, since the beginning, the form of scientific knowledge and the conviction that science could give me the absolute certainty that in vain I had been looking for outside of it, prevailed in me. In the unity of scientific knowledge, I could hope to find that incontrovertibility about which I felt an unavoidable demand. On the other hand, my very initial opening to the world of thought took place in an atmosphere that immediately educated me to the hypostasis of science, even if, far from devoting my attention to a specific science, I approached science through the philosophy of positivism. However, the philosophy of positivism spoke to me with the language of peremptory certainty, which was tied to the empirical fact proven by experiment. The world of opinions, typical of the other forms of knowledge, ceased to have any validity, and its place was taken by the world of facts before which everyone had to bend and accept. Still lacking any philosophical experience, it was impossible to challenge the evidence of facts and their irresistible attraction as lived in actual experience. Independently from any reflection on the philosophy of positivism, it was the presence of common sense that imposed its logic on me. Incontrovertibility was given to me without any intellectual effort on my part. After the rejection of my religious faith, my soul found peace in a certainty that could not be touched by any form of doubt. There was nothing else to do but take note of the third phase of Auguste Comte’s philosophical system and to set about to work within a science.

…

The sciences to which I devoted my attention as a law student were political economics and criminal law. My professors were Maffeo Pantaleoni and Enrico Ferri, both positivist thinkers. Almost all the other professors of the department were followers of positivism so that I was not exposed to other points of view. As far as political economics, the so-​called pure economics based on ophelimity and the most radical selfish individualism, stimulated me in taking into consideration as its antithesis the socialist demand that I dealt with corporative economics. For the moment, my reaction remained inconsequential and such as not to directly influence the philosophy of positivism in which I was educated. It was Ferri’s teaching on criminal law, criminal anthropology, and criminal sociology that stirred in me the consciousness of the insolvable antinomies

16 

Chapter 1

within the philosophy of positivism. The problems of guilt, freedom, social defense, punishment seen as measure of security, social responsibility tied to the crime, and so on, began to form in my conscience with more compelling force and urgency. At the same time, those problems became less and less solvable with the theories of a science that no longer was able to elevate itself to an exhaustive view of reality. Problems magnified proportionally, and as I proceeded from problem to problem, I dealt with questions that science—​considered from the limited perspective of positivism—​could not confront or even less resolve. The metaphysical and religious demand that emerged from those problems could not be satisfied within a philosophical position considered superficial and unsophisticated. Ferri himself, and even more Salvatore Ottolenghi, who taught criminal anthropology and who brought us to visit jails and mental hospitals, exposed us to incontrovertible facts. However, those facts needed to be interpreted so that results that corresponded to a unified vision of social reality could be drawn. I felt the need for an in-​depth philosophical analysis of the problems that were arising in my mind, and from the scientific study of political economics and criminal law I turned to the philosophy of neo-​idealism. We were living during the years of the greatest affirmation of neo-​idealism, and from 1918 on, I followed Giovanni Gentile’s lessons, who that year was transferred from his teaching post in Pisa to the University of Rome. Naturally, in philosophy I was looking for an answer to the queries that I was not able to clarify through science. I continued to be interested in the two disciplines to which I had dedicated so much time. Philosophy, far from keeping me away from them, led me to consider them with an even greater scientific attitude. The first philosophical publications were followed by those dealing with criminal law, Storia del diritto penale (1925a) and Il nuovo diritto penale (1929a), and by those dealing with political economics, La critica dell’economia liberale (1930); I fondamenti dell’economia corporativa (1932a); Capitalismo e corporativismo (1933c/​34), reprinted as Il corporativismo (1970). In 1927, the journal, Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica, began its publication with the clear intent of rethinking such sciences in the light of an explicit philosophical demand. Science and philosophy became the inseparable connection that drove my life-​long intellectual activity, representing the double demand of the experience of incontrovertibility and the metaphysical necessity. A connection that has characterized my entire philosophical journey, renewing itself through internal antinomies and leading, according to the situation, either to dualism or to monism. The ideal that I pursued was that

17

A Life-Long Passion for Truth

of the identity of science and philosophy. However, this ideal was substituted repeatedly by the opposite demand, transforming itself into new formulations.

…

The search for incontrovertibility calmed down for several years by virtue of my faith in actual idealism since this philosophical school had satisfied my metaphysical need for the absolute because it gave this need a theoretical foundation by far more critical and more persuasive than the one offered by positivism, limited to the achievement of a scientific certainty rooted on common sense. So, actual idealism remained within scientific knowledge but with a metaphysical awareness that gave to awareness itself that absolute value that positivism had not been able to guarantee. On the other hand, actual idealism—​considered from a scientific perspective and at the same time acting on the concept of its achieved identity of knowing and doing—​transfigured itself as constructive actual idealism where the certainty of self-​awareness assured that absolute value of which I felt a profound need. My scientific investigation, supported by the philosophical awareness of actual idealism, lasted until 1935, the year in which Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica ceased publication. In the meantime, from within actual idealism substantial doubts occurred. With time, they assumed ever larger dimension to the point of colliding with both scientific and philosophical certainty. However, this time, doubts could not be overcome by turning to another metaphysics as had happened after the positivistic experience. From the positivistic view I had moved to the actual idealistic one through a critical process that seemed to me logically rigorous and irrefutable. Scientific certainty and philosophical certainty were identified while incontrovertibility had taken an absolute dimension. At this point, with the crisis of the new metaphysics, the sense of emptiness became dominant. Consequently, the hope of a new absolute certainty could not be reasonably nurtured by the situation that had developed. The antinomy that had emerged from the crisis took on an exceptional dimension, and the process of dissolution that followed reached the roots of all types of faith. Positive incontrovertibility was replaced by negative incontrovertibility.

­c hapter 2

Positivism 2.1

Introduction

After the rejection of his Catholic upbringing, Spirito turned to science to find an answer that would fulfill his need to reach both the incontrovertible truth and the absolute. As a university student living in a cultural atmosphere that considered science as the only form of knowledge that deserved to be pursued, he found in positivism the immediate solution to his early existential queries dealing with the problems of freedom and determinism. Indeed, unlike the traditional philosophy grappling with metaphysical issues, positivism was fully demonstrable through the immediacy of facts, “represent[ing] a common-​sense truth”1 that did not need further affirmation. Besides, positivism, by its own nature, was rooted in the observation of natural phenomena and their properties, thus rejecting any influence of a spiritual nature. For Spirito (and many others of his generation), “more than a philosophy, positivism was a deep conviction that extended itself throughout all levels of society,”2 so that “even a Franciscan like Father Gemelli, was forced to think like a positivist.”3 Young Spirito’s major intellectual interests were human sciences (criminal anthropology, criminal sociology, and experimental psychology, in addition to criminal law and political economics), as he wrote several decades later in the three autobiographical books previously mentioned. In them, he also described the process of his transition from positivism to Gentile’s actual idealism in the wake of his realization that the various human sciences—​in particular, criminal law and political economics—​while moving from the same scientific needs generated different results. According to Spirito, positivism failed to develop universal laws that resolved the antinomies emerging from within each individual science and in their reciprocal rapports. It became necessary for him to search for more rigorous theoretical

1 Ugo Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente (Milan: Rusconi, 1977), p. 14. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

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foundations that would allow those sciences to achieve a unified vision of reality and avoid conflicting results: I had to resolve the problems related to the theoretical principles of criminal law and political economics with which I became familiar during my four years of studies at the university. Philosophy appeared to my eyes the way to reach results pursued without success through other means. Criminal law and political economics were not secondary topics of my investigation, rather the essential goal of my intellectual efforts. It is true that the philosophical problem in its superior unity was the presupposition of everything. It is also true that I found this unity in the concreteness of the consequences that derived from it. To seek in philosophy the founding principles of two social sciences meant only that I was looking for the theoretical interpretation of a particular that needed to be elevated to the universal, which each discipline taken individually could not reach without advancing to a superior level.4 However, in Spirito’s philosophy the discovery of actual idealism did not cause a total break from positivism, although it left that impression. Positivism continued to play an important role in Spirito’s subsequent activity in the form of attention to science both through his writings in Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica (1927–​1935) and through his books and articles published during the long period of philosophical exploration that goes under the name of problematicism (1937–​1979). A final confirmation of positivism’s necessary function is to be found in two of his last articles, “Nascita e storia delle scienze umane” (1977d) and “Il positivismo non è finito” (1978c/​1979). At the end of his philosophical activity, Spirito claimed: “In conclusion, I was and remain a positivist and an idealist at the same time.”5 An early reference to the nature of positivism is present in Il nuovo idealismo italiano (1923). In subsequent articles written during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Spirito clarifies for us the philosophical underpinnings of positivism. In addition, Spirito’s own recollection of his understanding of positivism is recounted in Chapter Sixteen.

4 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 165. 5 Ugo Spirito, “Il positivismo non è finito,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, i-​i v, 1979, p. 23.

20  2.2

Chapter 2

“Verso il nuovo idealismo”. In Il nuovo idealismo italiano (pp. 7–​9) [Translation]

The new Italian idealism identifies itself with the thought of Francesco De Sanctis and Bertrando Spaventa, that is, with the modern idealism that stems from Kant and Hegel, and finds in Croce and Gentile its most important representatives. Idealism emerged as the strongest school of philosophy to the extent that it challenged positivism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Positivism represented the metaphysics of the scientist viewed as the most rigorous expression of his intellectualistic attitude toward the natural world considered as a series of data to investigate. For the positivist, the function of science is to examine the natural world, discover the laws that govern it and determine its fundamental principles. Scientists embark on their investigation with the firm conviction that nature, with its essence, its characteristics, and its laws, achieved its integrity and fullness before scientists set out to study and understand it. A proponent of positivism would emphasize that the true value of positivism does not lie in a dogmatic attitude toward nature, but in the immanent (and therefore idealistic) tension implicit in the concept of experience. This idealistic tension is for us indisputable since it shows us the continuity of the thought process and the historical development that marked the transition from positivism to idealism. However, it would not clarify the process of differentiation taken by the same process: that is, to establish the nature of the progress that idealism has achieved when compared to positivism. To understand this progress, we need to look instead at the metaphysics of positivism, and more specifically, at the hypostasis that positivism makes of data, objects, and nature before which the subject would entirely disappear through rigorous logical inference. In this sense, positivism remained within the rigid tenets of realism, and therefore, in the antithetical position of idealism, which in Italy reached the radical elimination of every naturalistic reference and affirmed the absolute immanence of reality in the spiritual act. This immanence was against all other forms of transcendence: it opposed the transcendence of the object versus the subject; it refuted the plurality of the subjects individually conceived; and finally, it rejected the theistic transcendence that presupposed the existence of God before the subject. Thinkers from various trends of idealistic philosophy have made many attempts to free themselves from all forms of transcendence, which are yet to be fully eliminated. This lack of understanding has generated, in many instances, theories that are supposedly idealistic, but in fact are a mild form

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of realism. Those thinkers may adhere to a pluralist theory or adopt a theistic and mystic position. Lastly, they often embrace a position that lies halfway between transcendence and immanence while also adopting characteristics resembling skepticism. 2.3

“Il concetto di Scienza”. In Scienza e filosofia (pp. 104–​105)6 [Translation]

With positivism, the religion of idea is substituted by the religion of fact while the philosophical monism is substituted by the scientific monism. In their abstract contraposition, both Hegelianism and positivism tend to resolve the same problem; that is, the unification of science and philosophy by the same logical process. Hegelianism materializes itself as philosophical encyclopedia; positivism finds its realization in sociology with the result that the former reduces science to philosophy while the latter reduces philosophy to science.  However, both schools want to free themselves of those antinomies left unresolved in Kantian philosophy, thus overcoming the dualism of the cognitive sources. As opposite is the criterion developed to resolve the same problem, opposite is also the mistake present in the solution.  By sacrificing science to philosophy, the possibility of moving in a concrete way from the idea to the particular is lost in Hegelianism while in positivism the possibility of moving from the particular to the idea and to the systematic principle of the multiplicity of facts is also lost since philosophy is sacrificed to science. The two solutions reveal themselves to be insufficient, and the problem is left unresolved. In the critique following both the Hegelian and positivistic conceptions, the conviction that the monistic solution was not possible starts to emerge. Hegelianism and positivism failed because their aim was utopian: science and philosophy respond to two criteria that cannot be resolved into one since both are indispensable for an effective understanding of reality. 6 Ugo Spirito, “Il concetto di scienza,” in Scienza e filosofia (Florence: Sansoni, 1950), pp. 104–​ 105. From now on, we will refer to this edition. Initially, this article appeared as “Scienza,” in Enciclopedia italiana. Vol. xxxi, pp. 154–​156.

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Pragmatism 3.1

Introduction

Spirito’s interest in pragmatism, as well as his passion for actual idealism, emerged from a personal necessity to seek an alternative to the solutions offered by positivism concerning his quest for truth. He wrote: It was my way of scrutinizing the international philosophical horizons to gain a knowledge of other types of studies and solutions.1 The numerous authors analyzed by him (from Julius Henry Poincaré to John Dewy, from William James to Ferdinand C. S Schiller) confirm the intensity of his philosophical interests. His first book, Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (1921), was the required thesis for his B. A. in Philosophy and was directed by Giovanni Gentile and Bernardino Varisco, both actual idealist philosophers. In it, Spirito reported new elements that originated from the pragmatist school, such as the anti-​positivist attitude, the importance of the subject in the cognitive process, the connection between science and philosophy, and finally, the presence of antinomy as a philosophical element. For him, pragmatist philosophers’ most important accomplishment was the rejection of intellectualism, that is, a mental attitude according to which truth is “immutable and eternal”2 because it is rooted in the objective nature of scientific observation. Spirito also noted flaws in pragmatist philosophy, one of which was the inability of pragmatists to consider the subject as the creator of itself and the world, a characteristic firmly asserted in the actual idealist thought. In pragmatism, the subject was relegated to an ambiguous status where its function remained vague and unspecified. He asked: What is then the subject? A true answer to this question cannot be found in any of [William] James’ books whether of psychological or philosophi-​ cal content; in those books where we were supposed to find it. … The

1 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 163. 2 See initial paragraphs of the translated chapter “L’antinomia non risolta.”

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notion of the subject will remain always vague in all pragmatists. Such a vagueness will always be source of a continuous contradiction and perplexity.3 This lack of a clear conceptual definition of the subject affected the understanding of the content of the object, which remained equally blurred. Both subject and object “became elements of an indistinctive and sterile notion.”4 Consequently, “a true gnoseology was no longer possible.”5 Without those basic conceptual certainties, any attempt by pragmatist philosophers to find a coherent and comprehensive solution to the relationship between science and philosophy—​an issue that will become the centerpiece of Spirito’s philosophical quest few years later—​generated only questionable results. More than a philosophy, pragmatism turned out to be, as James wrote, only a “method,”6 “lacking any intrinsic value because it can lead to diverse and contradictory results.”7 In Spirito’s life-​long philosophical activity, pragmatism stands as an important transitional step leading to a fully accepted interpretation of phenomena based on the thinking activity of the subject, of which actual idealism represents the culminating moment. In the translated chapter “L’antinomia non risolta” (“The Unresolved Antinomy”), Spirito deals with the issue of antinomy in Western philosophy, considering it a secondary aspect of philosophy. Only after he detached himself from actual idealism, antinomy acquired a major role in his philosophy, helping him to express a world that by now was dominated by doubt and ­negation. The adoption of antinomy as the dialectic element that conveyed his antithetical thinking allowed at the same time the unfolding of a lively style rich in argumentative rigor and internal tension.

3 Ugo Spirito, Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (Florence: Vallecchi, 1921), pp. 36–​37. As reference in a footnote, Spirito added the Italian translation of William James, The Principles of Psychology (Henry Holt and Company, 1890) (Principi di psicologia) (Milan: Società Editrice Libraria, 1901). 4 Ibid., p. 37. 5 Ibid. 6 Williams James, Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures on Philosophy. New York/​London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907, p. 54. 7 Spirito, Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea, p. 51.

24  3.2

Chapter 3

“L’antinomia non risolta”. In Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (pp. 118–​127) [Translation]

The main reason for the existence of pragmatism is to fight any form of intellectualism. The need to react to any form of intellectualism is rather common to many currents of contemporary thought: human beings feel the deep need to reaffirm themselves, no longer considering themselves mere spectators of the world that surrounds them and is antagonistic to them. [Ferdinand C. S.] Schiller, by identifying his philosophy as Humanism, uses a word that can clearly express the spiritual demand that motivated the birth of this new philosophical movement. For intellectualism, the main characteristic of truth was its objectivity and, therefore, its immutability and eternity. Because of its very nature, human intellect could do nothing else but verify the truth and bow to it. Pragmatism is the antithesis of this position: truth and reality itself are only functions of the subject, and consequently manifestations of a continuous becoming. For pragmatism, to think that truth can be something eternal transcending subjectivity is the worst of absurdities. Subject has its own interests and goals to pursue. Only in view of these interests and goals does it make sense to us to talk about truth in general, or of more truths and not the truth, which is pure abstraction. Therefore, it is absurd to think we can arrive at a definitive philosophy—​to that philosophy that gives us the key to understanding the world, incorporating in a rigid system the entire intelligible universe. The most important goal of pragmatism is to fight this absurdity: to contrapose subject to object; progressive truth to the permanent one; the reality of doing to the reality done; the world of becoming to the world of being; pluralism to monism. All this makes up the goal of pragmatism, the end of which the followers of this philosophical school hope to achieve. The anti-​intellectualistic character of pragmatism above all manifested itself as opposition to the very same concept of philosophy as a closed and definitive system. This is precisely the main aspiration of contemporary thought from Kant onward. After Hume’s philosophy roused Kant from his dogmatic dream, the problem of the value of human thought became the main concern of the investigative efforts of the philosophers. Throughout the centuries a system was followed by another system, a dogmatism by another dogmatism. Each new philosopher had the illusion of having finally reached the absolute truth, and these believed absolute truths followed one after the other continuously contradicting and overcoming the other. What hope and faith could a philosopher today have in his philosophy when he looks back to the destiny of all other philosophies that preceded him?

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Whoever reflects on the history of human knowledge—​says [Ferdinand C. S.] Schiller [in Etudes sur l’humanism]—​cannot help but wonder about the instability of opinions, mobility of beliefs, vicissitudes of science; in brief, the instability of that which is, or believed to be, the truth. In spite of the vain presumption of those who elaborated Platonic systems, pretending to erect monuments more durable than bronze, the universal flow of reality moves the world of ideas in a faster and more visible manner than the world of things.8 And in the same book, Schiller insisted: In the actual state of facts isn’t a show of infinite vanity and stupefying ignorance of the history of thought to feed the illusion that of all the philosophical systems only one of them is bound to gain universal consensus and find correlation in another soul without undergoing a minimum of modification?9 Trying to reach a definitive philosophy is the most foolish of all utopias, concludes the pragmatist. Such a philosophy will solely be an individual product, not true philosophy; it is instead art and, as such, a lyrical expression of the subject.10 This statement encloses most of the meaning of pragmatism as well as the most important aspect of its anti-​intellectualism.11 If the main aspiration of pragmatism is that of fighting any form of intellectualism, how then did pragmatism try to overcome intellectualism in an effective manner? Which form has its reaction taken? And which valid result did it reach? Pragmatism is nothing but the pure and simple opposite of intellectualism: the antithesis of thesis; the abstract affirmation of the subject versus the object; becoming versus being. With its anti-​intellectualistic attitude, pragmatism neglected the immutable idea of the very thesis it was challenging. Given the fact that intellectualism has been the main characteristic of all 8 9 10

11

Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, Études sur l’humanisme (Paris: Alcan, 1909), pp. 262–​263. Spirito used this French edition. Ibid., p. 23. Spirito also added in a footnote Schiller’s following thought: “Philosophical systems will be more numerous and varied than before. However, they will present a more brilliant and attractive form since they must be presented and recognized as works of art carrying the mark of a soul that is unique and individual.” Ibid. p. 25. William James. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York/​ London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1987), pp. 17–​23; in Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures on Philosophy, p. 51.

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philosophies, and that the so-​called Platonism has endured since the birth of philosophy, we can say that intellectualism is a manifestation of the fundamental human need to seek a truth that cannot be denied rather than a meaningless mistake that has misled human thought for so many centuries.12 A philosophy that truly wants to consider itself anti-​intellectualistic, however, must not stop at the mere negation of intellectualism or at being the antithesis of the intellectualistic thesis, but must look for a solution to the antinomy. While it is true that thought has never been able to arrive at the possession of truth, it is also true that human mind cannot stop searching for a universal, absolute, eternal truth. We cannot think without acknowledging that our thought has an absolute value; we can doubt anything except our doubting; finally, we can deny everything, yet, in doing so, we acknowledge the absolute value of our negation. This is an old argument that still merits consideration. Such is this antinomy that we must resolve: becoming versus being; subject versus object; thesis versus antithesis. We must understand the reciprocal necessity of these forms by affording them enough consideration to understand their relationship. Pragmatism sees instead only one side of the antinomy, forgetting, in the process of disputing the abstract position of the other term, its equally unquestionable value. Pragmatism takes the opposite abstract position, which is no less incoherent or insufficient than other positions. Undoubtedly, the subject has its requirements: it makes no sense to talk about an independent, extra subjective truth. On the other hand, to deny truth any objective, universal quality by making the subject—​considered in its individuality, in its specificity, and in its subsequent arbitrariness—​the only judge of truth itself since it supposedly possesses the criteria to judge, is something that in the end cannot help but minimize the importance of the same subject by depriving it of every meaning and every reason of being. The same can be said of becoming. The ideal of knowing the being, as pure being, is no longer an ideal for anyone. Human beings want to live, and in life they find the fulfillment of their needs. The ideal of a thought that no longer needs to think because all aspects of knowledge have been discovered and all problems resolved is an ideal that no longer lures humankind. The study of the history of philosophy and of the development of thought has been from this point of view quite fertile. The world has no definite meaning, and we cannot capture 12

William James’ following observation is related in a footnote: “Are we going to accept it and sustain it? Or are we going to consider it as a manifestation of our own weakness, of which, if possible, we need to free ourselves? I sincerely believe that this last method is the only one to follow as men of thought.” Ibid., p. 19.

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this meaning once and for all. The world lives and its meaning is found in this life. On the other hand, we can be fully pleased with the concept of the world based on becoming since we embrace this becoming with our thought; we do so by giving it a certain value and a certain form. A becoming understood only as a pure becoming, that is, without a reason for being, is sterile and, strictly speaking, cannot be conceived as such. This view was recognized in ancient philosophy when the antinomy between being and becoming was posited by Parmenides and Heraclitus. The latter, who had viewed the world in its becoming as perpetual motion or as a river that never ceases to flow, also understood that this becoming had to adhere to a law, even if this law coincided with the very same law of becoming. Above the total instability of the world and as its reason for being, he posited Λογος.13 Pragmatism stops, or believes it can stop it, at the stage of pure becoming. However, to stop at pure becoming without investigating its reason amounts to giving up the possibility of finding a solution to truly philosophical problems and, therefore, to philosophy. In this fashion, pragmatism reaches absurdity. The path it undertook is skepticism—​the gnoseology of the pragmatist is that of the skeptic, and Protagoras is the teacher of both. Assuming that pragmatism reached the logical consequences of its premises and went no further, today it would be more or less a theory of skepticism.14 In reality, it went further. Just as skepticism fell into a form of dogmatism as soon as it reached its highest degree of understanding of itself, pragmatism eventually assumed its dogmatism when it did not end its reasoning at the level of negation. On the contrary, it sought to reach the highest affirmation: it recognized the full creativity of the human mind, challenged individuals to reach the highest ideals, and established a philosophy of action based on negation. It is clear from these statements that pragmatism contradicts itself. On the one hand, it is the weakest philosophical system, generating a smile of condescendence on the part of the professional philosopher; on the other, we need

13 14

In Spirito’s writings, one can find this word written both in Greek and Italian—​both in lower and upper cases—​according to the necessities of the expressed thought. I remained faithful to the original. Spirito reported in a footnote another of Schiller’s thought: “In this fashion, our faith in the absoluteness of our truth gradually weakens and approaches a state in which it becomes an irrational instinct to the point that, in our most lucid moments, we come to doubt that our ‘truth’ is something more than our human way of conceiving phantoms.” Schiller, Etudes sur l’ humanisme, p. 264.

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not stop at the consideration of its internal incongruity, but we must search for the reason behind it. Only then we will be able to capture the drama of this position, which symbolizes the spiritual anguish of our time. Human beings feel the need to find a stable value for their lives and do not exactly know what to base this value on. Pragmatism tries to resolve this problem knowing it is an illusion, and in this resides its greatest merit. Unfortunately, this is also its weakness. After the infatuation wears off and we recognize the lack of foundation of its construction, pragmatism’s effort collapses, revealing its own emptiness. Without making an accurate comparison between the theories of pragmatism and those of ancient stoicism,15 we can nevertheless recognize the ­similarity of the two philosophical positions, since each requires a desperate affirmation of that which, because of their cognitive premises, had been denied. Even stoicism implies a strong philosophical approach since it repeatedly contradicts its own physics and its logic to arrive at powerful assertive statements. Like pragmatism, stoicism opposes the demands of the subject to the objectivism of Greek philosophy and, in the abstract affirmation of the demands of the subject, it becomes sterile and ineffective. Both skeptical at the core, the stoic and the pragmatist try not to be skeptical. In the absurdity of this position, they reflect the psychological moment in which they live. 15

This comparison, though in another sense, was made by the first of the pragmatists, C. S. Pierce, in “Pragmatism,” Dictionary of Philosophy (1901) by Baldwin.

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Actual Idealism 4.1

Giovanni Gentile’s Actual Idealism

At the beginning of the twentieth century, neo-​idealism or neo-​Hegelianism emerged in Italy as a byproduct of the theoretical works of Croce and Gentile. In 1903, through their journal La Critica, both philosophers promoted an ongoing intellectual effort to undermine positivist scientific tenets that, according to them, were limited to the understanding and classification of a reality already existing outside the world of the spirit (‘I’ or subject).1 They characterized this passive positivist mentality as intellectualism and, at the same time, emphasized the creativity of the spirit that acted with infinite liberty, constantly ­generating new and unpredictable manifestations of reality. Consequently, philosophy assumed a highly subjective orientation where the individual mind played a fundamental role in the creative process. Of the two thinkers, it was Gentile who resolved every aspect of reality into a manifestation of the thinking activity of the spirit. Indeed, according to him, the whole reality exists to the extent that it is thought. To presuppose a reality independently of the thought that thinks of it, would be a contradiction because, in that case, reality would require a thought that presupposes it. In his view, each thinking moment constitutes the history of the spirit’s internal realization rather than the discovery of an external world. The spirit, which is what it thinks, reveals itself through the thinking activity of the mind of the empirical subject that acts according to a perennial dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to which correspond the three moments of the spiritual life: art, religion, and philosophy.2 By incorporating simultaneously 1 In this short introduction on Gentile’s actual idealism, the prevalence of the use of ‘the spirit’ over ‘I’ and ‘subject’ is in concert with the content of the two translated chapters where this word appears constantly. In Spirito’s other books and articles, ‘I’ prevails. Indeed, Spirito identifies Gentile’s actual idealism as “the metaphysics of the ‘I’”. Giovanni Gentile (Florence: Sansoni, 1969), p. 169. 2 Gentile excludes science from the dialectic of the spirit because, according to him, each science deals with a particular object and, therefore, can offer only a partial vision of reality. He claims that only philosophy possesses universal principles that allow the elaboration of a comprehensive interpretation of phenomena. The dialectic process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which constitutes the supporting structure of the idealist and neo-​idealist philosophy, takes place also at the higher spiritual level of Spirit. In the first translated chapter, Spirito offers an in-​depth analysis of both Hegel’s and Gentile’s dialectic.

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art and religion, philosophy becomes the manifestation of the full actualization of the spirit, that is, truth. In this manner, the traditional dualism of spirit and matter, subject and object, thinking and action, that fueled much of past philosophical speculation, is thus eliminated. There exists only the reality that the thinking subject creates. For Gentile, the activity of the spirit allows Spirit3 (also Absolute Spirit or Transcendental ‘I’)—​the initial principle of all reality—​to reveal its own perennial ability of reinventing itself as a never-​ending becoming, a constant doing. The creativity of Spirit becomes the supreme expression of freedom since it manifests itself as tension to achieve what is not yet. At the same time, without the concrete “act of a thinking subject” that posits Spirit, Spirit cannot become aware of itself and understand its own existence as an ongoing spiritual process (“theory of self-​awareness” or “theory of self-​consciousness.”)4 By tying the life of Spirit to that of the empirical subject, Gentile denies the existence of an absolute Spirit that lives in its own world and with no connection with the present reality. For him, Spirit is totally resolved in the daily life of the individuals and of the world, generating the most rigorous form of immanentism5 and of monism in modern European idealist philosophy. According to Spirito, Gentile’s philosophy represents “the epilogue of modern thought.”6 By presupposing nothing and positing everything through the “act of thinking,” Gentile identified his philosophy as actual idealism.

3 Readers will find the word ‘Spirit’ in upper case only when it is referred to the Absolute Spirit just as in the Italian text. 4 Gentile dedicated considerable attention to the concept of self-​awareness, which he linked to Socrates’ famous expression “know thyself.” By doing so, he was affirming the subjective character of knowledge. Among the numerous statements on the matter, we find the following: “Now, if such is knowledge, knowledge of human beings (“know thyself”) is a privileged knowledge, whose peculiar character needs to be considered carefully as of now. We know everything by bringing it back into us . … If awareness is the knowledge that the subject has of its object, then the knowledge that the subject will have of itself as subject, must be called awareness of itself . … The true ‘I’ is the unity of self-​awareness and awareness: that unique act, that living unity, which is said to be the act of knowledge. The ‘I’ is the self-​awareness of awareness, and it can also be called the act of awareness, since the active principle, immanent in it, is precisely that subjectivity in which self-​knowledge finds its consistence.” Giovanni Gentile, Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica. Vol 1. Pedagogia generale (Florence: Sansoni, 5th edition, 1959), pp. 15–​17. 5 Giovanni Gentile, L’atto del pensare come atto puro (Florence: Sansoni, special edition, 1937), pp. 29–​30. Initially, this very short book was published in the first volume of Annuario of Biblioteca filosofica di Palermo in 1912 as a summary of several philosophical presentations made by Gentile in the city of Palermo. 6 Spirito, Giovanni Gentile, p. 163.

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31

Ugo Spirito and Giovanni Gentile

As a student at the University of Rome, Spirito embraced actual idealism with great enthusiasm, fascinated by the power of the ideas it was promoting and by the profound ethical dimension of its principles that privileged liberty and creativity over determinism. He lived his initial actual idealist experience passionately. In recalling this experience, he used words of a neophyte: In idealism, I found the necessary force to control myself and to be my own master. It was the true metaphysics by virtue of which my life would be redeemed. It was the metaphysics of freedom.7 Thanks to his close relationship with Gentile, Spirito became an active collaborator with journals and organizations linked to fascism. From January 1923 to July 1924, he was the director of L’educazione nazionale, the journal of the National Institute of Culture; in 1925, he was chosen as editor-​in chief of Giornale critico della filosofia italiana. In that same year, he also signed the Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti (Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals) of which Gentile was the promoter, a public act of his fascist beliefs; the following year, he was called by Gentile to collaborate to the Enciclopedia Italiana. In rethinking those years, Spirito wrote: My adhesion to [actual idealism] took the form of a total orthodoxy. They were years in which, after the positivist experience, a new light had inundated my spirit, without any doubt or reservation.”8 However, that adhesion was not limited to the discovery of a new philosophical school and to the appreciation of new principles considered in abstract. It carried within itself a profound scientific demand that young Spirito needed to satisfy. Actual idealism was the new path that would lead to the solution of the conflicts concerning the two sciences of criminal law and political economics that positivism had left unresolved. As he wrote: “It was always a scientific investigation, but of a science elevated to philosophy and identified with it.”9 Positivism was not annulled, rather absorbed in a new philosophical entity. Consequently, positivism and actual idealism converged in creating a synthesis in which the identity of science and philosophy would take place in 7 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 22. 8 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 79. 9 Ibid. p. 166.

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a natural fashion since the main characteristic of actual idealism was that “of denying nothing and to transpose everything into a new truth.”10 By grounding the various human sciences in more definite and profound philosophical principles, they became the concrete manifestations of the spirit in its individual determinations. Spirito’s scientific interest was reinforced by his active collaboration with the Enciclopedia Italiana, which was also a scientific enterprise, and by his own founding of the journal, Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica (1927), whose main goal was that of overcoming the negative view of science that was promoted by the journal, La critica, since its inception in 1909, and later by Gentile’s Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, which, according to Spirito, was created with the specific goal of buttressing the concept of science as a lower form of knowledge since “philosophy and science do not constitute a single form of knowledge, but stand in absolute contraposition.”11 The most important aspects of Spirito’s philosophical activity from 1927 to 1935 (the year of the closing of Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica) were the reversing of the condition of inferiority of science vis à vis philosophy and the parallel theoretical effort made to achieve their identity. More specifically, this identity meant that actual idealist philosophy had to become one with the various sciences and realize itself as “constructive actual idealism,” that is, an idealism that acts in the daily reality and becomes one with life. He wrote: 10 Spirito, Giovanni Gentile, p. 115. A. James Gregor clarifies the meaning of truth in Spirito’s works to a non-​Italian audience in the following manner: “Some of the difficulties that attend any effort to communicate Spirito’s views to a non-​Italian audience turns on his stipulative use of some critical terms—​one of the most important of which is the neo-​ idealist notion of ‘truth.’ It seems evident that the characterization ‘true’ was used by Spirito, as it appears to have been used by neo-​idealists in general, to identify ‘definitive,’ ‘ultimate’ and ‘universal’ propositions. He regularly spoke of ‘truth’ as being characterized by unconditional ‘universality.’ It is clear that in such instances Spirito was not speaking of mathematical or logical universalities. He was speaking of determinate and substantive affirmations concerning ‘reality.’ Anything else was not identified ‘truth.’ ” In “La vita come ricerca: Ugo Spirito and the Concept of Science,” Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1990, p. 415. 11 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 80. Few pages later, he wrote: “Actual idealism reached the peak of its theoretical development in 1918, the year in which Gentile began his teaching at the university in Rome. It was then that Giornale critico della filosofia italiana began its publication. At the heart of the program of this journal there was the relationship between science and philosophy as Gentile had formulated it at the beginning of his philosophical inquiry. Giornale critico contraposed itself to the scientific investigation, declared incompatible with the goals of the journal. This was actual idealism in 1919. … The history of Italian neo-​idealism was totally inspired by a radical critique of science in both Croce and Gentile’s systems.” Ibid, p. 88.

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Not only identity of philosophy and science, but also identity of science and experience, or of science and life. Science itself was considered the awareness of the realization of history in its totality. History became praxis, better politics, and in politics the meaning and value of the actual idealist conception was brought into focus.12 In Spirito, “constructive actual idealism” coincided with the possession of truth and the absolute while the figure of the philosopher emerged as the privileged guide indicating the direction to follow in the cognitive process and in the creation of a better society. Spirito’s writings in Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica not only became his fundamental intellectual experience at this stage of his philosophical activity but also revealed how his relationship with Gentile was not just a passive assimilation of concepts elaborated by his maestro. Thus, a dialectical tension of ideas began to emerge between the two philosophers. Spirito’s re-​evaluation of science became the occasion that allowed Gentile to modify his own understanding of the function of science after he had resisted for years Spirito’s reasoning in support of the identity of science and philosophy.13 In his speech “Concetto della natura nel moderno idealismo” at the then famous Congresso di Trento e Bolzano (Congress of Trento and Bolzano) in 1930, Gentile came close, but not quite, to confirming what Spirito had expressed at the Congresso Nazionale di Filosofia (National Congress of Philosophy), held in Rome in 1929, about the identity of philosophy and science. According to Lino Di Stefano, the Sicilian philosopher (Gentile), though sharing with Spirito the concept that science is philosophy and vice-​versa, introduces in science a duality of roles: the “science in act,” and the so-​called science of the scientist. The first coincides with philosophy, the second is only a moment of the particularity; “the science in act” is concrete while the science of the scientist is abstract since it remains in the sphere of the abstract logos.14

12 Spirito, Scienza e filosofia, p. 18. 13 More specifically Spirito wrote: “In 1926, I began to question [Gentile’s view on science]. The relationship between science and philosophy now assumed an entirely different meaning for me. That is, science and philosophy constituted a single form of knowledge . … Gentile, the chief editor of the Enciclopedia Italiana, resisted my reasoning for years. In the end, though, he explicitly acknowledged my reasoning and, most importantly, recognized the close relationtioship between science and philosophy, so perfectly exemplified by the Enciclopedia.” Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 57. 14 Lino Di Stefano, Giovanni Gentile e l’attualismo (Palermo: Edizioni Thule, 1981), p. 35.

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Notwithstanding the efforts made in integrating Spirito’s theory of the identity of philosophy and science in his philosophical system, Gentile failed to erase completely his antiscientific biases and “resolve the two terms into a single entity in a comprehensive manner.”15 In the ensuing years, the intellectual relationship between Spirito and Gentile began to diverge until they reached the breaking point with the publication of La vita come ricerca in 1937. While Gentile remained faithful to his actual idealist certainties and continued “to proclaim absolute truths,”16 Spirito’s rethinking of the same actual idealist principles led him to view philosophy as a perennial search. Problematicism was born. 4.3

“Giovanni Gentile”. In Giovanni Gentile (pp. 13–​36)17 [Translation]

Thus far, we have examined Benedetto Croce’s philosophical journey, which thinkers influenced him most, and the essential nucleus around which his philosophy evolved [the historic and aesthetic aspects]. We will now see how a similar analysis of Giovanni Gentile’s thought reveals an essential difference between him and Croce. This difference, which has emerged in the past few years, refutes the old belief that Gentile was merely developing Croce’s thought, or even worse, that he was simply a follower of Croce.18 Compared to that of Croce, Gentile’s work betrays the historical development of his thought—​the origins of which are profoundly Italian—​yet it embraces the key elements of European philosophical thought. He takes the lead from [Bertrando] Spaventa’s historical investigation because he realizes that the same development of thought, the same demands, and the same problems that constitute the essence of his philosophy are tied to the philosophical tradition that proceeds from [Giordano] Bruno to [Giambattista] Vico, to [Vincenzo] Gioberti, 15 Ibid., p. 38. 16 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 21. 17 In the chapter “Giovanni Gentile,” which appeared in Il nuovo idealismo italiano (1923) and was subsequently included in Giovanni Gentile, Spirito credits Gentile with eliminating all intellectualistic residue that was until then present in Italian idealism; transforming Hegel’s dialectic of thought into a dialectic of thinking; affirming the metaphysics of the ‘I’ and the infinity of categories, and finally, identifying philosophy with ethics and pedagogy, and lastly, with life. The passionate yet methodical way with which Spirito presented his mentor’s philosophical thought revealed his own faith in that philosophy. 18 See the two editions of Guido De Ruggiero, Filosofia contemporanea (Bari: Laterza, 1912 and 1920); also Giuseppe Prezzolini, Benedetto Croce (Naples: Ricciardi, 1909). Bibliographical data in this chapter reflect closely the ones found in the Italian text.

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to Spaventa, or, similarly, from Spinoza to Kant, to Hegel. To discover the leitmotif of Gentile’s philosophy, we need to follow the line of thought that originates in the Renaissance, continues with Bruno, and is fully developed by Spinoza. To acquire a full appreciation of Gentile’s thought, it is essential to understand the significance of Spinoza’s system of thought in the context of the history of philosophy. Only then will it become evident that Gentile’s idealism represents, on the one hand, the highest endorsement of Spinoza’s philosophical belief and, on the other, a complete recantation of the intellectualistic position where those same requisites were stifled by Spinoza. In some ways, Spinoza’s system of thought can be considered the point of convergence of philosophy from Thales onward as well as the solution to the problem with which the Greek and Christian philosophical inquiries concerned themselves: the unification of the world of being with that of becoming. Parmenides and Heraclitus represented the antithesis between the extremes of pure being and pure becoming. At the same time, they, alongside the other pre-​Socratic philosophers, felt the need to pursue the unification of these two extremes. To this end, a series of dissimilar attempts—​from the theories of the atomists and of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, up to Plato—​took place. The antithesis, however, was not resolved. Plato stressed the contrast between the two worlds and elaborated the intellectualistic vision which, under the name of Platonism, was perpetuated throughout the subsequent developments of Greek and Christian philosophies. According to this theory, if being is, then becoming has no reason to exist. If the universal exists, dwelling perfectly in its pure universality, then the particular is a non-​being, that is, evil. If God exists before the world as well as without the world, then the world itself has no reason to exist. Aristotle was, after Plato, the first to become aware of this problem and saw the need to unify matter and form, potency and act, and define them as having life only in their synthesis: in their sinolum. Aristotle, however, never reached a true synthesis, but posited the pure act (or immovable mover) beyond the infinite syntheses, falling into Platonism by again dividing the two worlds. The same problem reappeared in a variety of manifestations in the post-​ Aristotelian philosophies such as skepticism, stoicism, etc., until it took the form of a new and profound conception in the philosophy of Neoplatonism. Consequently, for the first time the concept of the triad emerged, according to which, One generates multiplicity, which then returns to One. Through some form of emanation, all the world of becoming originates in One, and its only aspiration is to return to One. Life coincides with this process, and from it life acquires its meaning. However, if the triad explains the ascension from multiplicity to One, it does not equally explain the emanation of multiplicity from One. In the meantime, Platonism remained a mystery.

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This same mystery is found in Christianity. Indeed, on the one hand, Christianity arrives at the humanization of God and the spiritualization of human will. As a consequence, this will becomes true will and, in fact, freedom. On the other, this very same conquest is stifled by the lingering dualism of God and Humanity or two worlds and two freedoms that cannot fail to mutually negate each other. Time and again this negation resulted in a bedlam of contradictory thoughts that have been expressed through the works of all Christian thinkers, from St. Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and beyond. In our [Italian] Humanism and Renaissance, the unification of the two worlds, God and humanity, and God and nature, began with Bruno. This unification found its completion in Spinoza’s pantheistic monism, in which God’s being is the same as his own becoming: natura naturans (nature naturing) and natura naturata (nature already created). Hence, the question posited by ancient philosophy is finally resolved. The rift between God and the world, between being and becoming, is replaced by the conception of a God who does not create a world separate and distinct from Himself, but a world expressed in the infinity of its forms and attributes. When Spinoza arrived at this marvelous conclusion, resolving the Platonic dualism of the world of ideas and the material world, he was only able to achieve this unification by remaining outside of it while contemplating it through intellection. In Spinoza’s philosophy, the world, with its two attributes of thought and space, remained frozen in its being and in its very same becoming, which is also being. This world consisted entirely of nature, and Spinoza described and examined it by remaining outside of it. According to him, the world is substance and not subject. The dualism of being and becoming, that seemed resolved by Spinoza’s theory, was replicated at a higher level, where the subject—​although left in the shadow but already revealing its presence—​ was opposed to the object. The task faced by the modern schools of philosophy is the transformation of the object into the subject. Various schools have found in Spinoza’s philosophy their entire meaning, and on the other end, in the naturalist position of the same Spinoza, the intellectualistic residue to overcome. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Spaventa sought to solve the same problem: to subjectivize reality. However, not having fully succeeded in that effort, European philosophy remains linked to Spinoza. The most important meaning of Gentile’s philosophical speculation lies in his awareness of this residual Spinozan element in modern philosophy and in his ability to overcome any intellectualistic position he encountered.

…

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From the foregoing, admittedly brief, account of Gentile’s philosophy in the context of modern philosophy, it is possible to catch a glimpse of his innovative thought, which stems from and is strengthened by a new powerful synthesis of the historical process. This synthesis, in which Gentile showed with extraordinary evidence how the entire history of thought converges, is the most meaningful contribution to the theory of actual idealism, that is, the identification19 philosophy with the history of philosophy. The intellectualistic residue, Spinozan in nature and present widely in modern idealism, had found its raison d’être in the old intellectualistic concept of philosophy. Although that concept was greatly altered following Kantian critique, it was not able to shed its metaphysical character. In substance, philosophy had always been considered as the knowledge of a reality already materialized and, therefore, always different from the philosophy that recognized such a reality. The history of philosophy up to Spinoza was based on the knowledge of reality as object, of reality as the presupposition of thought. With Kant, however, the philosophy of the object was converted into a philosophy of the subject. This subject or thought was still regarded as object, or as a pensiero pensato (thought thought) rather than as pensiero pensante (thought thinking). The intellectualistic attitude persisted, and one moved from the naturalism of the object to the naturalism of the subject. To truly overcome every form of intellectualism, it is necessary to view philosophy from a fresh angle. Philosophy must consist of the knowledge of the subject as no longer a subject opposed to the thinking that conceives it, but rather as the same conceiving subject, a subject in act. Philosophy, as a concept of reality, must be substituted by philosophy as a self-​concept. The concept of philosophy as self-​concept may seem familiar. In Hegel’s Encyclopedia [of the Philosophical Sciences] (1969/​1830), for example, philosophy is already considered as the awareness that Idea acquires of itself. Philosophy is only a grade of the spirit and not the entirety of Spirit. However, for philosophy to be truly a self-​concept, it is necessary that every spiritual moment, every part of reality, in other words, the entire reality be a self-​concept. If it were possible to imagine even the tiniest fragment of reality as not being a self-​concept, then philosophy could no longer call itself a self-​concept. At the very least, it could certainly not call itself only a self-​concept because, besides being a concept of itself, it would also be a concept of that tiny

19

Spirito uses both ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ in his writings on Gentile’s works when dealing with the relationship between philosophy and science or philosophy and life. I remained faithful to the Italian text.

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fragment, of that other which is different from itself, of that object or matter considered opposite to the subject or the spirit. The identification of philosophy with reality consequently leads not only to the identification of philosophy with the history of philosophy, but also to the identification of reality with its history, since all are synonyms of that unique reality called Spirit.20

…

I will try to illustrate the importance of this radical transformation of the concept of philosophy and its consequences through a short presentation of Gentile’s fundamental works. I will begin with La riforma della dialettica hegeliana (1923a), which clarifies the main innovation made by the new idealism with respect to Hegel. Gentile’s goal was to demonstrate how Hegel’s dialectic remained the dialectic of thought, and how the dialectic of thinking would have to replace it. Hegel’s greatness rests on having elaborated Kant’s concept of synthesis a priori, and consequently, in identifying reality with thought, in attempting to capture the very life of thought as thought rather than what has been thought. However, Hegel did not even realize the importance of his achievement and, therefore, incorrectly set up the problem of the deduction of the categories. After both the purely empirical deduction attempted by Kant and Fichte’s demonstration of the real necessity for a truly a priori deduction, Hegel sought to achieve a complete and systematic deduction of the categories, always trying to reconcile multiplicity with absolute unity. However, this reconciliation could not successfully occur because Hegel’s problem remained implicitly the same as Kant’s: the listing of the categories, which cannot be achieved without considering a category as thinking rather than as thought. It is true, then, that Hegel, in listing the categories, tried to overcome the issue of multiplicity by including it in the only concrete category: absolute idea. Gentile summed up the entire meaning of his Riforma when he said:

20

“Less than accurate, it seems to me, is the observation that Croce makes in a note to his Logica (1909) and subsequently in Contributo a una critica di me stesso (1918), that he arrived at the identification of philosophy and history of philosophy thanks to Gentile; but Croce also points out that it was he who realized the identity of philosophy and history. In my estimation, there is little doubt that Gentile’s achievements in this area are far superior to Croce’s contribution, and they will remain so as long as history or philosophy will be perceived only as a grade of the spirit.”

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The question lies in the dialectical process in which reality is not only mediated, but also incorporates an intrinsic ideality; that is, a moment that has been overcome and kept within itself. This process, which is the concrete foundation or realization of the idea, is not multipliable from a transcendental point of view, but only from an empirical or historical one. For this process to be further mediated, as in Hegelian logic, it must evolve by chance from the process of thinking into the process of what has been thought.21 The resulting consequence is that the Hegelian deduction, by resolving itself in an empirical deduction, far from being the deduction of the categories, a case among infinite possible cases of deduction—​or better, a fragment or moment of the eternal deduction—​in which not only the history of thought is contained, as it is commonly understood, but the history of the world itself.22 The categories cannot be determined because thought is continuous self-​ determination. Moreover, the categories cannot be deducted because thought is always deduction. Therefore, the categories cannot be listed because they are innumerable (or infinite). It is necessary to consider closely the meaning of this infinity. It cannot be understood as an infinite change or a pure sequence of infinite thoughts. This would be a false infinity or a mere multiplicity without unification. Instead, the multiplicity of the categories is only apparent since it is the multiplicity of all that is thought resolving itself in the concrete unity of thinking. Indeed, all acts of thinking, when they are not considered as mere facts or looked at from the outside, constitute a single act. To conclude, the categories are infinite in number as categories of thinking that sees itself as thought, that is, history. These categories constitute a single infinite category: the category of thinking in its actuality.23 This new meaning of the category summarizes the whole La riforma della dialettica hegeliana and, in general, Gentile’s entire philosophy. After having criticized the number of the categories and affirmed a single category as the spiritual act in which the multiplicity of the infinite categories is resolved, Gentile’s first task consisted of denying every phenomenology that implied a distinction in the grades of the spirit. The entire criticism of the first part of the Sommario di pedagogia (1923b) is based on this concept. 21 22 23

Giovanni Gentile, La riforma della dialettica hegeliana (Messina: Principato, 2nd edition, 1923), p.11. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 15.

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According to traditional psychology, the psychic process takes place in distinct grades considered in a monadic manner, even after abandoning the concept of the faculties of the soul. Sensation, for example, is something different from perception in the same way that representation differs from conceptualization, and knowledge differs from volition, etc. But if the spiritual act is truly one, it is evident that such a distinction does not hold true because it is based on an analytical conception of the human soul. Consequently, the human soul can be viewed alternatively as sensation, perception, representation, and conceptualization only insofar as it is considered opposite to us as a fact and crystallized in moments in which each of them remains outside the other. If, instead, we try to imagine the spiritual act as thinking instead of thought, every multiplicity by necessity would disappear and all grades of the spirit would be resolved in a single act. Since sensation is the whole spirit, sensation is also perception, representation, conceptualization, judgment, knowledge, and will. By the same token, all these grades are nothing but one thing: sensation. However, we should not believe that Gentile, by denying every system of phenomenology that aims to find its foundation in the distinction of grades of the spirit, intended to deny the concept of phenomenology or nullify the spiritual process in the immediacy of sensation. If such were the case, we would not have a dialectical reform but only a pure and simple negation of it. To clarify this problem, it is helpful to focus on the difference between sensation and perception. In psychology, there exists an essential difference between sensation and perception: the former is purely passive and therefore unconscious, while the latter is the consciousness of sensation. The unconscious, a pure passivity, as such cannot be truly conceived of as subject, which is act, but only as object since it confronts us and is transformed into nature. Rather than being a grade of the spirit, sensation is the antecedent of both spiritual life and nature. By falling out of spiritual life, which is the only reality, sensation becomes inconceivable. Sensation is either the consciousness of feeling and, therefore, perception, or it is nothing. There is a legitimate difference between sensation and perception, however. It is upon this difference that the new concept of phenomenology is structured. Every spiritual act is a more profound consciousness of an anterior act of consciousness, which can be considered the substance of a previous spiritual act that, in turn, is also its form. The subsequent act can be considered as the consciousness of what was previously the unconscious. However, this unconscious also being act, cannot be considered unconscious, but conscious in relation to a previous unconscious act. At the same time, the present conscious will become the unconscious of a subsequent conscious. Every act of

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conscience can be called, if one chooses, perception of a preceding sensation, which, because it is a spiritual act, was also perception. The true transition consists of moving from perception to perception, or from sensation to sensation, which is the same thing. This transition from sensation to sensation must not be understood objectively so that we may consider each sensation truly antecedent to the other and, therefore, different from the other. “The sensation-​content is inside the sensation-​form, resolved and absorbed in the actuality of the latter.”24 Consequently, sensation is really one: the spiritual act in its internal mediation. The spiritual act, being an eternal mediation, is a development through infinite moments (or infinite sensations) that manifest themselves as pure multiplicity when we attempt to present them as facts. However, these infinite sensations resolve themselves in the concrete unity of the act that lives precisely because of their infinity.25 The concept of phenomenology as a development through a series of typical grades is, consequently, replaced by a phenomenology that is the same as the history of the spirit, a history that is dialectical development (or a transition from sensation to sensation), and a continual overcoming of sensation into sensation in an eternal drama that becomes a continual victory.26 However, as a result of this continual overcoming and victory, this dialectical process of the spirit necessarily implies a continuous overcoming: of the evil immanent in good; the pain immanent in joy; the multiplicity in unity; death in life; the object in the subject; the non-​being in the being; the empirical in the transcendental; and nature in the spirit. In the Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (1924), we find Gentile’s most complete and most organic demonstration of the dialectical life of Spirit and the clarification of this dialectical process in all its aspects. Reality, that is, the spiritual act, is conceptus sui, a concept that posits itself (autoctisis). This positing is concrete positing, not immediate being. It is an affirmation that resolves in itself the negation. Consequently, if the spirit is unity, it cannot be a mere unity, which would be an empty unity or nothingness, but rather a unity with its opposite, which is multiplicity. Unity without multiplicity is static unity because it necessarily excludes every development from itself. For development to exist, it is necessary for unity to become a

24 25 26

Giovanni Gentile, Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica. Vol. 1. Pedagogia Generale (Bari: Laterza, 3rd edition, 1923), p. 39. Ibid., pp. 60–​63. Ibid., p. 20.

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dialectical process, a unity that multiplies itself while simultaneously being a multiplicity that unifies itself. The problem of nature resolves itself in the same way. To say unity lives as the continual resolution of multiplicity is the same as saying that the spirit lives in the continual overcoming of nature. Consequently, the spirit cannot evolve if it does not continuously deny its opposite, which is nature. However, nature is not an entity, and being the opposite of the spirit, is instead the spirit’s essential dialectical moment and, therefore, is itself the spirit. Likewise, evil, pain, and error are revealed as the non-​being of the being, which is the spirit, part of the eternal moment of the process of good and truth. If truth were once and for all unchangeable ab aeterno, error would be inconceivable. If, however, we think of truth as the becoming of truth, it must continuously overcome itself in its development since it finds error within itself. Error and truth, then, as well as evil and good, are not two distinct things in such a way that one can exist without the other; they are two moments of a synthesis, which is “error in truth, as its content resolved in the form [and is] evil from which good nourishes itself in its absolute formalism.”27 Through this same dialectical concept, Gentile proceeds to analyze those absolute forms of the spirit or, better, absolute moments of the spirit: art, religion, and philosophy. Art is a synonym for subjectivity. It is pure subjectivity and, therefore, abstract self-​awareness, which affirms itself in the free creation of a fantastic world in which creative subjectivity wanders infinitely in the absolute absence of limits. The perfect antithesis to art then would be religion, which is a moment of pure objectivity, an exaltation of the object in its abstract opposition to knowledge and, therefore, an abstract awareness of the object before which the subject nullifies itself. The person who prostrates himself before God is the subject who feels its own nothingness before the infinite object, which is the whole. There cannot be a history of art and of religion. If indeed the unique characteristic of art is that of pure subjectivity, then every work of art would be an absolutely individual world that lives in complete abstraction with regard to other works of art, all of which would be equally individual worlds considered in an atomistic manner. The history of art, therefore, cannot be considered true history but rather the juxtaposition of monographs about single artists or, better yet, about single works of art, since each of them would be a separate world concluded in itself.

27

Giovanni Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (Bari: Laterza: 4rth edition, 1924), p. 213.

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For the opposite reason, there cannot be a history of religion as such since religion has neither history nor development because it is the absolute negation of subjectivity and, therefore, the annulment of every form of life in the absolute immobility of the object. Stating that art and religion cannot have a history means that they are not concrete reality but simple moments of reality. This is the fundamental point we need to keep in mind to fully understand the meaning that Gentile attributes to the absolute forms of the spirit. Unlike Croce’s philosophy, where there exist different grades of the spirit, Gentile maintains that art and religion are not distinct but opposite and, as such, are not concrete but only moments of the concrete. Again, art and religion, considered in their pure forms, cannot be dialectical in nature because they experience no development and are not part of a process. Accordingly, they have no concrete reality because reality—​as we have shown—​is a synonym for history. Pure art and pure religion in effect do not exist, as shown by the fact that both become dialectical aspects of the historical process, denying themselves as distinct. Viewed in this light, neither does art remain a pure abstraction nor does religion stand in its inconceivable immutability. Instead, they evolve and have their own history, each discovering their concreteness and reality. This history, which does not exist alongside other histories, is the only possible history, thus being the history of the entire dialectical development of the spirit called philosophy. This is but a summary of the main aspects of Gentile’s concept of dialectic. To complete our discussion, it is necessary to turn our attention to Gentile’s Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere (1922/​1923) in which the same concept is further developed by the opposition-​synthesis of the abstract logos to the concrete logos. In dealing with logic, Gentile again confirms the profoundly historical character of his philosophy. According to him, Aristotelian logic has been the target of continued criticism in modern times. Moving from the realization of the absolute sterility of this logic, critics concluded that such logic could no longer be justified. Indeed, founded on the principle of identity, so that A=​A, Aristotelian logic merely moves within the closed circle of syllogism, where the conclusion is found to be one and the same with what was already present in its own premises. On the other hand, this same logic, based on the naturalist conception of truth that is considered as the presupposition of thought and therefore, already fully completed in an immutable system, can be nothing else but what it is. The main characteristic of this ancient logic must necessarily be that of simple apodicticity. Gentile, who developed the most decisive criticism of every form of naturalism, created a new logic in contraposition to the ancient conception of logic. Whereas ancient logic found its presupposition in the concept of logos

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understood as what has been thought, Gentile’s logic rested upon the concept of reality as thinking in act; therefore, concrete logos replaces abstract logos. It is at this point that the historical nature of Gentile’s philosophy emerges: the new logic of the concrete eliminates the old abstract logic, and, therefore, rather than denying it in absolute terms, recognizes it as a necessary moment of the new logic. Posited this way, the entire historical process of the concept of logic is resolved by identifying itself with a new dialectical concept. The logic of the abstract is the logic of thought. The logic of the concrete is the logic of thinking. Thinking, however, can neither exist nor develop without thought, except through the dialectical process by opposing itself as thought. Thought, as we understand it, lives only in the dialectic of thinking, and taken by itself can have no reality, so that the logic that concerns it cannot be the logic of the concrete as the old logic presumed, but can only be the logic of the abstract. This does not mean, however, that the logic of the abstract is void in the same way that thought is nothing compared to thinking, or the object compared to the subject. Rather, it means that the logic of the past finds its reality only in the logic of the concrete and as a necessary degree of it.28 Indeed, the logic of the concrete, wanting to disengage itself entirely from the abstract logos, that is, from thought itself (objective logos) in order to capture thinking in its pure subjectivity, could never consider this subjectivity unless it was outside every dialectical mediation, that is, as an immediate subjectivity. As such, it is not the subject but rather the simple object that presupposes the subject as a result. The logic of the concrete would identify itself in this manner with the logic of the abstract, presupposing, therefore, always a true logic of the concrete.29

…

It is evident from this brief assessment of Gentile’s system that its importance rests on a fresh concept of philosophy and on how this new concept fully manifests itself in the dialectical process. However, to understand the full importance of the speculative revolution carried out by Gentile, we need to look at the ethical aspect of his philosophy. Once he effected the liquidation of the old intellectualistic meaning of logic, he affirmed it as identical to life, as the very value of life. Gentile’s philosophy is wholly Ethics, or better, Pedagogy. This is a philosophy that is not a concept of reality, but rather a self-​concept that can 28 29

Giovanni Gentile, Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere. Vols. 1 and 2 (Bari: Laterza, 2nd edition, 1922/​1923), pp. 47 and continuing; p. 121 and continuing of vol. 1. Ibid., p. 21 of vol. 2.

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no longer be regarded as a theory; it is not a contemplation of the world, but only action and a creation of the world itself. This action is not one based on immediacy, but on the awareness of the same—​one which we may call a self-​ concept of that action—​and it is an ethical one: in short, one which is both action and education. This action is not an immediate doing, but an awareness of doing, a self-​awareness of action. It is not only a doing, but an ethical doing, an action which is education. By being a mediated action, this action becomes universal by denying in the process its particularity, thus affirming itself as an act of Spirit. Whoever understands the meaning of the universal process of the spirit will also understand how Ethics resolves itself in Pedagogy and the latter into the former. Indeed, my action can be good only when it ceases to be the action of the empirical self, which finds its raison d’être and its finality in the sphere of its abstract empirical nature and becomes an action of the most profound self, nurtured by the reality of everyone and of everything and, thus, resolving the reality within itself by resolving itself within that reality. This most profound self—​the only self that really exists, since the other is only the limit being continuously overcome by the profound self—​is the unique reality of myself and of others, and the reaffirmation of the unity in which the contraposition of the self to other beings is continually resolved through the realization of the one and only life. To perform good actions means to systematically affirm this unity by continually erasing every opposition that exists between oneself and other beings and sharing that same spiritual life with them. This idea warrants the need for an education that does not consist of educating others, only because they are others. Rather, self and other beings are all recognized as part of the same reality, becoming an eternal self-​education process. The will of the teacher who establishes discipline is pure love before it becomes love for the pupils: it is the common spirit of love shared by teachers and pupils. Love is spiritual unity, pure and shared life, harmony, intimacy, freedom, and spontaneity. The souls that are charmed by love do not feel in their reciprocal relationship the limit of expression that usually exists when one soul is not compatible with the other. Not feeling limited in their relationships, such souls do not regard a given situation to be an obstacle; instead, they see it both as a help and as an advantage in the unfolding of their spontaneous aspirations, their intimate self-​absorption, and in the achievement of a total satisfaction of the spirit feeling its own infinity. All of this is possible in the communion with others, but only when it is already present in one’s own spirit: in short, when a true and genuine personality has emerged in our spiritual

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life, the self-​awareness, instead of finding continuous distraction in the flow of the activity of the conscience, remains constantly at the center of life, where all our thoughts are gathered and unified. The teacher who possesses a lively personality and has a soul (as they say) also captivates the attention of the students. They enter his spiritual life for no other reason perhaps than that trite and proverbial reason that love generates love. This is to say that love generates love not because it rejuvenates itself or compensates the benevolent dispositions of others for their actions toward us, but for that same reason that Dante Alighieri’s Divina Commedia [Divine Comedy] generated infinite ‘Divine Comedies’ for those who shared Dante’s spirit, which is a manifestation of the universal spirit. It is not my personal self against others, but others and I who have become one: it is the I that has no plural.30 To educate means to educate oneself. It is the ethical process of an I that has no plural and yet is universal. However, to understand the ethical nature of the process, it is necessary to be convinced that the unity and the universal dimension of the self are not the pure spirit, almost part of its nature: they mean rather the ‘ought to be’ of the spirit in a continual process of unification and universalization. The life of the spirit is the affirmation of an ever-​ evolving finality. It is, therefore, the conception and will of an ever-​greater world in whose reality and active infinity the spirit truly acquires full awareness of its freedom and ethical value. Until the identification of awareness and self-​awareness—​which is to say the unity of life and philosophy—​was fully achieved, humanity had to accept an insurmountable limit to its personality: human beings must have thought that they had to submit to demands that transcended their will—​demands that pertained to a reality that could not be resolved through an act of self-​awareness. Finally, they had to give up their freedom and blame the world, which they did not believe to be their own, for the evil that they perpetrated. In Gentile’s philosophy, the spirit nullifies every otherness and affirms itself in its infinite creativity. Human beings become totally responsible for their own lives. They look at the world and see their own creation. The evil in the world is the evil that humanity is guilty of perpetrating and from which it must redeem itself. While pessimists—​who can be regarded as such only when they renege on their freedom and give up every hope—​impotently yield to a disposition

30

Giovanni Gentile, Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica. Vol. 2. Didattica (Bari: Laterza, 3rd edition, 1923), p. 45.

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that becomes progressively worse as they increasingly view their condition in a positive light, idealists go through life happily, combating evil that they regard only in a negative light and which they accuse lacking positive will. 4.4

“Attualismo costruttore”. In Scienza e filosofia (pp. 35–​43) [Translation]

There are two ways to understand actual idealism, its results, and its future: (1) as a conception of the theory of the spirit as pure act; (2) as the conception of pure act as the theory of the spirit. In the first case, theory has become one with the spirit, or life; in the second, the act has become formula, which is an evident and ridiculous contradiction in terms. To arrive at a complete resolution of every transcendence in the absolute creativeness of the act through a critique of all the realist philosophies and through the development of a historical understanding of the progressive spiritual evolution of the world is an achievement that has brought about a feeling of exaltation and triumph. In this cultural climate, there emerged a new school of philosophy made up of individuals of faith who divulged a doctrine fraught with problems that contradicted even common sense. Even though this philosophical achievement, attained first by one person and then by a few others, had entailed considerable intellectual work and had demanded the creative efforts theorized by the philosophy of the act, it nevertheless degenerated into a mere formula—​at least on the surface—​once it became popular. Faced with a theory of the act, the new philosophical school became totally absorbed by the need to understand that theory and it exhausted itself in that effort, degenerating into sterile intellectualism. This academic frame of mind, oppressive and harmful in any case, assumed a rhetorical position within the philosophy of creation and expressed itself through the roles of repeater, overcomer, and historian. The repeater reduced the act to the most worthless deed possible by mechanically repeating, with the purest virtuosity, that the world is not made up of matter: it is neither spirit nor matter; rather, everything is absolutely spirit. The overcomer, on the other hand, began by haughtily expressing doubts and reservations about one or another aspect of the theories of actual idealism. He was only able to sporadically capture the residues of a much-​debated intellectualism, making the first corrections to Gentile’s dialectic and touching up the theory of the Transcendental I. He did the same with the relationship between the logic of the abstract and the logic of the concrete, with that of the forms or moments of the spirit, etc. The overcomer shared his view with the same pretentious

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superiority that characterizes those who can evaluate the past and for the future. These efforts were worthwhile only to the extent that they shed light on the intellectual and moral weakness of those who carried them out: those who—​once they were confronted with new and infinite horizons opened by the actual idealists—​narrowed their objective to a few considerations, convinced that they could transform the universe. The results were deplorable and mostly limited to embryonic attempts marked by radical intentions, which proved redundant and lacking in substance and faith. The third expression of academic actual idealism appeared in writings of a historical nature. Those writings caused much expectation, and some even remarked that it was the best path to be taken by those who wanted to seriously pursue the field of philosophy. Even then, the results were worse than expected because the traditional way of proceeding had too often succeeded in stiffening in lifeless and narrow schemes the great historical vision of philosophy upon which actual idealism was founded. The reason for this sterility can be traced to the fact that actual idealists, convinced of the identity of philosophy and history of philosophy, had forgotten the fundamental identity of ­philosophy and life. Consequently, there emerged a historiography in which philosophical thought remained mostly detached from historical life and limited to certain forms and technical expressions that were completely inadequate to clarify the process. Although a new concept of philosophy was elaborated, actual idealists continued to write the history of that old understanding of philosophy, albeit with the inevitable consequence of misinterpreting history and effectively denying this innovative principle. The identity of philosophy and history of philosophy, however, instead of being considered a methodological criterion, was seen as a goal to be demonstrated in historiographical writings. The principle of intelligibility was used to underline the importance of that goal. In addition, what was considered life in actual idealism became self-​repetitive, and the theories of the various philosophers were studied with the sole aim of confirming the existence of a general thesis through the analysis of a specific case. Once the philosophical activity was reduced to an academic exercise, both the examined philosophers and the philosophy they proposed lost their relevance.

…

Repeaters, overcomers, and historians were not able to examine closely the meaning or values of a philosophy that called for creative action. The terms creation, spirit, act, becoming, and overcoming—​initially all words of faith and at the same time targets for incompetent critics—​ended up irritating both

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those who listened to them and those who expressed them because so sterile was the continuous dialectical game with which they deluded themselves in order to keep the spirit of the terms alive. As a result, the repeaters began to keep quiet, the overcomers began to convince themselves that they did not know how to continue, and the historians began to lose all desire to determine how and in what measure actual idealism was perceived by this or that philosopher. Indifference, annoyance, and skepticism resulted, followed by the disappearance of a pseudo-​actual idealism, whose supporters believed that it was their duty to make public the act itself, thus demonstrating to amazed spectators how the mechanism worked. Such a pseudo-​actual idealism, however, could not be brought down by the critics who tried in vain to demonstrate its presumed absurdities. In fact, their efforts only contributed to making its followers even prouder and more certain of the inevitability of their triumph. The critics, drawn into the logical ground of dialectic, were defeated as predicted because this type of actual idealism, though it transformed itself into its own negation, was theoretically true. A good analogy would be someone who, while always remaining seated, proclaims that true life consists of walking while also disdaining the critics who try to show him the opposite. Such a person would be claiming to speak the truth while not living by that truth, in much the same way as those actual idealists who wound up empty-​handed after they had exchanged actual walking for the theory of walking. There is still, however, another interpretation for actual idealism. There are those who seriously believe in the identity of philosophy and life and who have tried to act in order to become aware of the act. As a result, from abstract theory, namely a theory that has become abstract because it was reduced to pure theory, we have moved to concrete experience. True philosophy has been reconnected to politics, pedagogy, law, economics, art, and whatever else life tells us to abandon of the old schemes and sterile methods. The theory of actual idealism proclaimed that everything was a manifestation of the spirit with the purpose of giving the spiritual implication of the ‘ought to be’ to the being. What became clear was the need to bring to light the whole present in all things, to seek the category in the infinity of categories, and to bring to fruition what was preached and repeated with so much conviction. However, when the philosophers of actual idealism finally tried to make the transition from mere theoretical concepts to their applications to the reality of life, it became obvious that the transition was much more difficult than they had anticipated. The so-​called key that would open all doors did not actually open any due to the simple fact that both locks and doors were missing. What was really needed was to find a new direction to follow. At this point in time,

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philosophers became aware of the real meaning of the assertion that “an act cannot define itself because it is the agent that defines,” and understood the futility of the efforts made by those critics who sought to refute actual idealism with the criteria of the scholastic logic. There were those who deluded themselves by continuing to create all kinds of possible formulas to define the universe by dissolving the particularities of all problems into a single problem. There were also those who sought to reduce the categories of science into a vague and arid casuistry; those who, by distinguishing empiricism from philosophy, made the mistake of hypostatizing particular philosophical categories and reducing the others to elements of a formal game. These simplistic expedients exhausted themselves rather quickly, though not without experiencing a sense of ridicule. The problem arose again with renewed and unforeseen difficulties. Actual idealism, having revealed itself in its truest form, freed from all intellectualistic structures, appeared transfigured.

…

Those who believe in the death of actual idealism think that a specific philosophy has died with it, not realizing that what disappeared was nothing more than the old idea of philosophy. Indeed, actual idealism has taught us that it is futile to try to capture once and for all the reality of the world by encapsulating it into all-​inclusive definition. The whole cannot be defined because we cannot encompass it while remaining outside of it. Therefore, if by philosophy we mean the definition of the whole, philosophy cannot exist. The whole can only be known from the inside, and obviously such knowledge has a completely different meaning from the perspective that can be gained from someone who remains outside of it. This new understanding of philosophy is no longer awareness of that which is, but rather the creation of that which is not, making the whole present in the part. Unity, whose totality actual idealism defines for us, is no longer a unity-​object that, as such, would be just as much a part of the whole as the most infinitesimal particle, but is rather a principle of life that manifests itself by living in a conscious manner. Philosophy, however, after having carried out a critical analysis of itself through actual idealism and having expressed the desire to resolve itself in the cycle of life; after having demonstrated the need of conceiving its knowledge as the only knowledge, that is of having identified the knowledge of the part as knowledge of the whole; after having perceived the whole as principle of life and not as being, did not have the strength to continue to exist within an actual ‘transvaluation’ of itself. Satisfied with its achievements, it did not go any further.

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The identification of the concept of life with a conscious life—​the point at which philosophy had arrived—​became a limitation and crystallized itself into a defining concept. From this crystallization, a philosophy of the object emerged again, even though the object was called act. Initially, actual idealists were pure philosophers, men who did not demonstrate the concept of act by acting, but reduced action to an abstract reflection on the concept of act. Reflection on the concept of act is certainly also an action. Therefore, in a certain way, it is both concrete and creative because it criticizes intellectualism and conveys the need to transcend it. However, the action became less concrete and less creative as the critique of intellectualism, having exhausted its function as a critical demand, ended up at the same level of intellectualism so that its attempt to overcome it became nullified in the process of revealing itself. If we assume that actual idealism has become that kind of philosophy, there is no question that it is finished or at least on the way out. However, the end of this presumed actual idealism makes it possible to understand the full meaning of true idealism as one that celebrates the dissolution of the other form of actual idealism. In that dissolution, actual idealism confirms the end of the old philosophy it sponsored. With the death of that presumed actual idealism dies the last residue of a mythological attitude that had reduced itself to the position of merely contemplating the deified act. Yet, later, actual idealism renewed itself. As a result, the danger it had faced afforded it enough new strength to move ahead and bring to life its actual needs. Actual idealism regained vigor, no longer afraid of the empirical experience. In this shifted conception of the empirical experience, actual idealism saw the justification of its action. This ‘transvaluation’ of the empiric no longer exhausted itself as before in the formal and generic elevation of multiplicity to the level of the abstract philosophical category. On the contrary, by recognizing the categorical nature of the empirical, actual idealism rendered it absolute while respecting its particularity. In short, the new actual idealism was not afraid of becoming a particular science. On the contrary, actual idealism looked for concreteness of unity in the specificity of the scientific investigation by regarding the particular as the center of reality. The result was a genuine philosophy infused with a different richness of life. In this manner, philosophy was reborn from within science itself as philosophy of immanence. Accordingly, a particular taken into consideration was gradually linked to numerous other particulars until they became one organic system. This system has proved to be the beginning and the end of the analysis, namely science and philosophy being one and the same. Associating science with philosophy has led to a fruitful kinship between philosophy and the

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history of philosophy—​a history of philosophy, no longer interpreted in the old technical and intellectualistic way, but rather as the history of life in the unity of all elements, captured through each individual science. The concept of philosophy as the history of various philosophical systems persists, but only by becoming one with the greater and truer history. Enriched by a new life and a new experience, actual idealism could now look back to its origins and truly understand itself.

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Criminal Law 5.1

Introduction

Spirito’s initial intellectual interest was law; above all, criminal law. As he wrote in Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), he entered law school for practical reasons not for the love of the academic discipline: I entered law school chiefly because I was afflicted with a serious disorder that limited my potential. However, law school at that time, was an easy-​ going course of study that entailed no risks.1 Nevertheless, his studies in criminal law became fundamental for his transition to philosophy because they generated intellectual and moral problems that remained unresolved even after the four years spent in law school. Culturally shaped by the principles of positivism dominating the Italian school system, young Spirito found those principles inadequate to offer sure answers to the problems of “guilt, freedom, social defense, punishment seen as measure of security, and social responsibility tied to the crime,”2 that were troubling his conscience. He realized that the issues dealing with criminality could not be explained only through a deterministic vision of human behavior. He recognized that human beings were also shaped by a spiritual dimension that was not taken into consideration by those who limited their explanations of phenomena to mechanical forces. On several occasions, he clarified that the reason why he embraced the studies of philosophy was to find more convincing foundations to the studies of criminal law and political economics. The new idealist orientation, of which [he] became acquainted through Gentile’s teaching, gave [him] the certainty to face with greater consciousness the problems that [he] had not been able to resolve at the juridical level.3

1 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 33. 2 Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, p. 21. 3 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_007

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Gentile’s philosophy of actual idealism offered him a system of beliefs that centered on the human spirit and conceived individuals as creators of their world, of the entire world. In this context, individuals act freely by choosing a form of behavior over another while taking responsibilities for their action. No longer shaped by determinist forces, they become moral agents willing to undergo punishment as a form of correction leading to redemption. In this manner, the criminal act is transformed into an experience of self-​education, of knowledge of oneself, and the criminal is reintegrated into society. Spirito’s interest in criminal law continued throughout his life and resulted in the publication of books and articles. He even wrote on the Soviet Union’s criminal legislation (“La nuova legislazione penale sovietica,” 1964e), thus distinguishing himself as one of the few Italian philosophers with such a variety of intellectual interests. Considered as a whole, his publications constitute a substantial contribution to Italian criminal law studies during fascism. Spirito’s most important work on criminal law are the volumes of Storia del diritto penale Italiano. 1. Da Beccaria a Carrara and 2. Dalle origini della scuola positiva al nuovo idealismo (1925a/​1974). These writings derive from his studies in criminal anthropology and sociology made during his university years. The issues discussed are many and complex, requiring an analysis that goes beyond the scope of the anthology. I limit my considerations to the rapport that Spirito establishes among the three major schools of law (the classical school, the positive school, and the more recent actual idealist school) when dealing with the problem of crime and punishment in Italy. According to him, of the three schools, actual idealism incorporates the philosophical principle that allows the overcoming of the antithetic positions concerning criminal responsibility as expressed by the classical and positive schools of criminal law. In the classical school, crime is considered an event willfully committed by a criminal without any connection with the surrounding social conditions. On the other hand, the positive school sees crime as being also related to the social life of the criminal. However, this school is unable to go beyond a determinist view of the possible motivations leading criminals to commit the crime, thus diminishing their responsibility for the act. In actual idealism, instead, a crime is considered an act that is freely committed by a single person while occurring within the context of society but without the intervention of determinist elements. As a result, punishment is viewed as redemption, and it assumes an ethical value that brings the criminal to a higher state of moral sensibility and responsibility with the potential reintegration into society. The study of criminal law had another fundamental effect on the development of Spirito’s philosophy: that of making science the other necessary

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element for the subsequent evolution of his tought as the publication of several of his own articles in Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica. confirms. From then on, the ever-​changing relationship Spirito established between science and philosophy enriched the many phases of his problematicism. In the following translated excerpt, Spirito sheds light on the differences between the classical and positive schools. 5.2

Storia del diritto penale italiano. Da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni (1974, pp. 224–​229) [Translation]

The problem of the positive school, reduced to its fundamental principle, is included in this statement: crime must not be judged in isolation nor at the time it took place, but in terms of its history. We cannot understand a crime and inflict pain if we refuse to take into consideration the events that led to the crime. The history of crime cannot be limited to the last phases in which it materialized: it embraces the whole natural and social world converging in each criminal action. I am not exaggerating when I say that a revolution has occurred in the field of criminal law, a revolution that undermined the traditional concepts of responsibility and punishment. Life is history; process; system. Every human action and, therefore, every criminal action cannot be considered outside that system as an absolute arbitrary act that finds its value or non-​value within itself. If we consider human actions to be arbitrary, that is, one action not related to the other, history is a noun without meaning and the world an unintelligible chaos. Each positive or negative action cannot be understood as such without including in itself the entire world in relation to which each individual action identifies and determines itself. If, in this moment, I am writing what I write, this is made possible only because an entire historical process took place by virtue of which my writing has meaning and, therefore, value or non-​value. An entire history of Italian language, literature, and criminal law had to develop; the entire world connected to these manifestations had to materialize, that is, the entire universe as it developed—​so that I could be placed in a position to express the content of my discourse. If all of this is true, in what sense can this discourse be said to be mine? In what sense can I say that I am the author and the only person responsible for it, when the entire world has contributed to its composition? This problem is not even posited by the classical school, which considers the individual as a world unto itself and totally foreign to other individuals. According to this school, the criminal act is viewed as an arbitrary act of will whose reality has the same boundaries as the crime in which it materializes

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and within which it is considered and judged. The accusation of abstract objectivity directed by the positive school to the classical one is based on this need to reject any evaluation of a criminal act that disregards its history, which is a universal history. The positive school posits the problem in clear terms and considers the world as the product of a sequence of historical events. It finds in history the meaning and value of each human act as well as the resulting social phenomena. The crime is unintelligible in itself; it does not have an independent reason for being, and therefore, it has neither a value nor a non-​value. Crime is neither logical nor illogical, neither good nor bad. It is a fiat that develops from nothingness to be nothingness. If we want to consider a crime as such, we need to transcend its particularity and see it as a manifestation of the world in which it becomes a reality and from which it takes its meaning. To judge a criminal action means to judge the world; to anticipate it and condemn means to modify and correct the whole human reality. This is the great intuition of the positive school. However, the positive school was not able to give its intuition a truly spiritual, therefore, ethical meaning, and was consequently forced to stifle it in a universal determinism that nullified every reason for its being. Regarding the world as a systematic organization, the positive school saw it as dominated by the principle of cause and effect, that is, reduced to sheer mechanism. It saw history as natural history, as sociology. From its perspective, the entire world contributed to the crime, but as an infinite cause of a very small effect. The effect resulted in a nothingness that totally resolved itself into the system of causes. In this manner, human freedom was annulled. Consequently, not only criminal law, but the entire reality was reduced to an absolute contradiction and to absolute unintelligibility. For the positive school, crime is necessarily determined by all the causes that converge in it: it is, therefore, simply a result, the sum of its causes, and, as a sum, is no more than its addends, so crime is nothing more than its causes and it is reduced to them. Crime, and in general every human action, is nothingness, as the point at which two or more straight lines intersect is nothingness. The positive school holds that to judge a crime, one needs to consider its entire historical context. Subsequently, it considers history as an absolute antecedent of a crime and ends up judging history without judging the crime. The act of the delinquent is a result: to the positive looking only for causes, the act itself is of no concern. Only causes are real; effects are only a result. The delinquent, therefore, lacks responsibility and his subjectivity is considered irrelevant—​a nullity; his freedom and his will are nouns with no sense or meaning. While the horizon expands from the individual to history, the individual is nullified in

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history. While the classical school limited its considerations to the crime itself, that is, to the actual actions committed by the delinquent, positive school looks at the factors that may have contributed to the criminal behavior of the delinquent. But neither school considers the delinquent as such. The subject, the true subject, has not yet been identified in its essence. What then is the subject? If it is not found in the factors of the crime nor it is in the fact itself, where is it? The answer is evident. We can find the subject neither in the elements nor in the fact simply because factors and crime are included in the subject. Subsequently, we need to turn the terms of the question around to accomplish the famous revolution that Kant talked about: to find the first principle of all factors and of all facts; that is, the center of that systematic universe whose sistematicity, though perceived by positivists, was afterwards disregarded by them due to a lack of a center in their system. Then, we need to find the first principle of the universe: the one for which the entire universe becomes the ethical content of the spiritual act and for which the spiritual act is infinitely responsible because it acts as the infinite free creator. From the concept of sociology, we finally proceed to that of history, in the context of which the demands of the former find their concrete realization. For sociology, reality is completely resolved in the object: its manifestations are manifestations of a nature of which we are a part, just as animals, plants, and inorganic beings are. The most fundamental human characteristics, and thought itself, can demonstrate that a person possesses a greater complexity of aspects and a greater degree of development than other entities. However, these characteristics are not sufficient to contrapose humanity to nature, of which they are part, or to find in them a principle that isn’t the very law of nature. If they are nothing other than nature, the concept and value of their individuality must completely disappear and be replaced by a mechanistic conception of reality according to which human action finds its essence and goals outside of itself, in the reality and in the mechanism that transcends it. Sociology has again linked humanity to nature even though this occurred at the expense of their individuality and their ethical worth. It has reunited them with nature but stifled the presence of their spirit in nature. Instead, idealism, having demonstrated the absolute inconceivability of a nature that is only nature, has also noted how nature has become one with the spirit, and thus has arrived at a spiritual conception of history for which the whole human and natural process is identified with the process of the spirit. The latter, in turn, is identified with the specific individuality of the act. It is true that each human action includes the entire universe so that it cannot be conceived and judged without conceiving and judging the universe simultaneously. However, the universe is not a condition or a determining cause of human action so as

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to transcend it; instead, it is conditioned or generated by the act itself; even better, it is generated and generating at the same time, as the universe in its actualizing itself freely as self-​awareness and self-​creation. If history does not constitute the antecedent of human civilization, but instead their reality, and if the universe is not the antecedent of the act, but, instead, the act itself, it is clear that the individual truly becomes the subject—​that is, the author of his act—​thus assuming individual and universal responsibility for the act in which the universe realizes itself. … The new concept of responsibility that emerges allows for the elaboration of a truly coherent criminal law. The old classical school conceived the responsibility of the delinquent in a totally empirical manner. By limiting the consideration of the crime solely to the empirical objectivity of the act, it viewed the delinquent solely as the one morally responsible for it, and for which he should be punished. For the classical school, the problem of the relation of that fact with the world did not exist. When this problem came to the attention of those who follow the classical school, they considered it as a secondary problem. They judged the individual without judging the world so that nature remained separated from the spiritual dimension. The positive school, instead, understood that the problem of criminal law consisted of that relation and tried to create a criminal system that proceeded from the principle of the inseparable unity of the individual and the world. Having resolved the problem by dissolving the individual in the world and the spiritual dimension in nature, the concept of moral responsibility disappeared as a result. Responsibility fell only on nature and not on the individual—​from this developed the so-​called immorality of the positive school. In its immorality, though, the positive school paved the way to a high concept of morality and responsibility. In challenging the abstract position of the classical school, it opposed the inhuman manner with which a criminal is isolated in his responsibility and repudiated as radically alien by the selfish conscience of the so-​ called honest people. The positive school affirmed that the entire society is responsible for the crime. Consequently, the criminal must not be despised, rather understood and helped. Unfortunately, responsibility as understood by positivists is nobody’s responsibility since, after all, human beings are not responsible for their actions: in each one of them nature acts and drudges them towards the unknown. We need to feel compassion for the criminal, but at the same time, feel the same for ourselves since we are children of the same necessity for better or worse. Positivism denies its claims at the same time it affirms them.

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Fascism 6.1

Introduction

Spirito became a fascist after his discovery of actual idealism. For him, as for many others young students of his generation who absorbed Gentile’s theory of the spirit that acted in the daily reality at all levels, becoming culturally and politically involved with fascism was a logical consequence. Therefore, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that he, consumed by the desire to find a new faith that validated his metaphysical needs, embraced fascism with religious fervor. In rethinking this experience, he wrote: The dual concept of fascism and actual idealism was unquestionable for me. … My fascism and actual idealism coincided without boundaries or limitations.1 There are various articles that record Spirito’s involvement with Italian cultural life during the early years of fascism. In them, besides defending Gentile‘s school reform—​defined by Benito Mussolini as the most fascist of all reforms and considered by Gentile the most important means to create a national conscience that had remained elusive since the unification of the country in 1861—​he portrayed fascism as a revolution in progress, thus taking positions that coincided with the radical wing of the Fascist Party. After Giacomo Matteotti’s death at the hands of fascists in 1924, while Gentile quit the government post, he defended fascism from those who demanded Mussolini’s removal. Later, he opposed the Vatican Agreements signed by Mussolini himself and Cardinal Pietro Gasparri for the Holy See. This political treaty not only confirmed Catholicism as the official religion of the Kingdom of Italy but also affirmed the teaching of Catholic religion in the secondary schools, denying the Fascist State full control over the education of the students. For him, as for Gentile, the State was above all a religious and educational institution since it contained all values, including the spiritual and ethical ones. From 1927 to 1932, he wrote a series of books and articles of economic nature, with which he participated in the national debate on corporativism, trying to 1 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 49.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_008

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influence both public opinion and the fascist regime. For him, the solution to classical liberalism was not socialism where the State “remained in a transcendent position in relation to individuals,”2 rather the corporative organization of the Fascist State in which individuals would become totally integrated into its life to form a single entity with it. At the Congresso di Ferrara (Congress of Ferrara) in 1932, he gave a speech on “corporative ownership,” in which he promoted the abolition of private property, thus presenting a radical version of corporativism. Because of his vigorous promotion of fascist ideology, Spirito was considered an inspirational leader by those young intellectuals who “were trying to find alternatives to a certain lack of revolutionary aspirations in the fascist regime.”3 He eventually strayed from Gentile’s actual idealism, and politically from fascism, when he became aware that it was impossible to achieve a complete realization of theory and practice in the political arena where compromises and bad human decisions defeated the best intentions. He was particularly disappointed when Mussolini signed the Vatican Agreements and later when important members of the fascist hierarchy (Giuseppe Bottai, Achille Starace, and Cesare M. De Vecchi) rejected his theory of “corporative ownership” because they considered it too radical, ineffectual, and remarkably close to Bolshevism. In 1935, the year in which his journal Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica was forced to close, Spirito started a slow process of revision of both his philosophical beliefs and his fascist ideology. Years later, he wrote: By 1937, the publication of La vita come ricerca, which marked my criticism of actual idealism, also marked the end of my fascism. The two faiths, born of the same raison d’être, were now ending for the impossibility of overcoming two very profound crises.4 After the fall of Mussolini in 1943, he was brought to trial for his supposed apology of fascism (June 1944) and momentarily stripped of his teaching credentials. Acquitted for lack of proof, he was reinstated as professor of philosophy (May 1945). From then on, his political writings centered for the most part on communism.

2 Ugo Spirito, Capitalismo e corporativismo (Florence: Sansoni, 3rd edition, 1934), p. 34. 3 Renzo De Felice, “Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito e la politica tra le due guerre,” in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito, (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990), p. 25. 4 Ugo Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 25.

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Since his early involvement with fascism, Spirito proved to be a keen observer of Italian politics. In the translated article “Lo sviluppo del fascismo” (1925b), he did not hesitate to spell out the shortcomings of the fascist revolution while promoting his own vision of what fascism should do and become. 6.2

“Lo sviluppo del fascismo” (pp. 315–​320) [Translation]

Anyone who considers the trajectory of fascism from the March on Rome to the present time must recognize that the ideas of fascism have gradually taken on a meaning that even those who are least insightful about the future would have never been able to foresee in October 1922. I am not referring to the work done by the government in the past three years that brought radical innovations in every aspect of Italian life. This progress, no matter how great it may seem, is less important to those who look to the future. What is most important is the new mentality that has gradually emerged along the course undertaken by fascism and the new demands that it has generated as part of the plan for the future. Today, we are finally seeing the rise of an adequate understanding of the revolutionary spirit of fascism. People have discussed at length whether the March on Rome was a true revolution. Both positive and negative answers (and both equally irresponsible) have been offered. However, this lack of possession of a sure consciousness of its value—​somewhat justifiable if we consider that this political movement sprung up almost spontaneously—​not only has slowed the implementation of fascism but even forced it to deviate from its course. Its nearly bloodless beginning—​compared to other revolutions—​has given even its most faithful supporters a feeling that this revolution was somehow not that important. The immediate constitutional regulation of the revolutionary fervor—​if it saved the country from new bloodshed after World War i, allowing a gradual maturity regarding political life—​also allowed an insufficient understanding of the historical meaning of the March on Rome, too often viewed as an unimportant, though violent, episode of a simple administrative polity. However, the opponents were not alone in misunderstanding the meaning of the March on Rome. If that were the case, the misunderstanding would have had little or no consequence. I repeat, the leaders of both the Fascist Party and the government misunderstood the March on Rome to the point of irremediably compromising the outcome of the revolution. The followers of fascism cannot help but be angry over the danger to which fascism was exposed from

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June 1924 to the beginning of January of this year [1925].5 The fact remains that most people in the Party were ignorant of the true value of the fascist movement, and thus placed more faith in the importance of the lingering influence of the opposition. From October 1922 to January 1925, fascism focused on an undertaking more absurd than risky by utilizing men of the old political school or, at least, establishing with them a modus vivendi rather than bringing in new people. The agreements signed with the fiancheggiatori6 and the virtually unattainable goal of normalizing the political situation were gnawing at the roots of fascism, which was gradually sinking to the same low level as the opposition. Getting rid of all the fiancheggiatori and all the former prime ministers was the first true manifestation of the revolution. Once they became part of the opposition, fascism rid itself of its old political ways and began to implement its significant revolutionary agenda. Because of his Spenserian mentality, even [Antonio] Salandra, the former prime minister with the closest ties to fascism, who was in charge of the Nation7 when Italy entered World War i, could not help but represent a contradiction in the life of the Nation. Revolutions know no compromise. Having cleansed itself of the fiancheggiatori, fascism focused more on the revolutionary task to be carried out and began to see its place in history in a less confusing way. While the fight against Bolshevism became less important, the fight against liberalism escalated. As fascism’s strength widened to include all levels of political life, its revolutionary essence emerged, giving way to a new social era. This vision of the future of fascism at this point is shared by many, including the less educated men of the Fascist Party who followed along out of sheer intuition. The more the issues of reform and innovation are discussed, a greater and more enthusiastic consensus begins to emerge in the country. However, even if we are on the right path, we no longer need to create illusions that are dangerous, and we should think that a lack of political consciousness and the superficial attitude of many fascists continue to persist alongside the clearest 5 Spirito is referring to the long political crisis (June 1924-​January 1925) that almost overwhelmed fascism following Giacomo Matteotti’s murder. 6 Fiancheggiatori were supporters of fascism who shared some elements of its political agenda, not necessarily its ideology. 7 The upper case for the word ‘Nation’ in Spirito’s writings was mostly used by him in association with Italian fascism. The institution of Nation was a key element of the fascist ideology and carried an extraordinary inspirational weight. In the works published after World War ii, that word was written in the lower case unless it was referred to the fascist period. I respected the Italian text.

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vision of the ideals of fascism. It is the kind of consciousness that needs to mature slowly, and we are still far from reaching maturity. It is painful to see how the valuable energies of fascism are spent in bickering with the opposition to which we give too much importance. We must build, for the political struggle against liberalism can only be won by building a new life and not by arguing with the liberals. The opposition represents the past: let us not ascribe to it a life it does not have; let us not get distracted by the demands that are no longer our own; and, finally, let us not diminish the vision of our commitments by constantly referring to the life of a political belief that is waning. Those who have read even the most important and successful fascist newspapers published in Italy cannot help but notice how strictly polemical is their attitude. The fascist press has kept the same slant it had at the time of the March on Rome: the need to counter the opposition. In this manner, it has become boring and predictable. It is fair to say that the fascist press has yet to produce a great newspaper, worthy of the important service it must perform. Certainly, this is one of its most serious and inexcusable flaws. Those who are aware of the important role that the press plays in the life of a modern Nation and those who know the educational and formative influence that the press has on the masses must consider that the success of a political movement such as fascism depends, in an absolutely indispensable fashion, on one or more newspapers in whose pages, on a daily basis, journalists who are most knowldgeable of the new ideals will be telling Italians and foreigners what fascism is and how they can further its ideals. Once the struggle against the opposition is brought to an end, fascism must face a much more difficult problem: the opposition from within. We are not dealing here with the tendency to dissent. From this perspective, no other political movement was more homogenous and disciplined than fascism. We can find examples of brave politicians, illustrious thinkers, and scientists who dissented in some political fashion, yet have complied with governments’ policies every time. However, I am not referring to this dangerous practice, but to another not so apparent—​hence more dangerous—​practice which is more difficult to eradicate because so many fascists either have no fascist soul or are still attached to the old ideological and political concepts. All the shortcomings of Italian political life are still found in fascism, which in its most profound nucleus is still made up of a small avant-​garde today. So, what are these shortcomings? The traditional flaws of Italian life, which everyone knows, but no one has the strength to fight. For example, there is the inherent and persistent habit of engaging in rhetoric. This century-​old Italian tradition has resurfaced in fascism as the main obstacle to overcome.

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Truly, Italians must learn to be more serious! Thankfully, fascism has done a lot to educate its people in becoming more responsible citizens. The fact that fascism has projected the model image of a hard-​working institution has had an enormous influence in rebuilding the country after the anarchy of post-​ World War i. Unfortunately, the revolutionary atmosphere in which we live, together with other elements I will not discuss at this time, have contributed a lot to the stupid habit of being rhetorical, a sign of emptiness and superficiality. This is especially true of those who live in the countryside, who in their ignorance, identify fascism with the Roman salute and the word Duce. Additionally, there are corrupt politicians who talk nonsense from morning until night and accomplish nothing all day. Lastly, we have the never-​ending propagandists who spend their time talking about nothing, believing that the office they hold does not require any real work. It is time for the Party to reprimand them. Everyone working in the Party should be held accountable for the work they claim to do month after month and be promoted only according to the progress they have made in every field of industry, commerce, and culture. It is necessary for everyone to develop the conviction that politicians are no different from anyone else, and that their political activity should be, above all, work. The class of do-​nothing politicians, which thrives only on politics, must be eliminated in Italy. We live in a poor country that needs continuous productive work to make up for the lack of natural resources: we cannot afford to pay for the rhetoric of politicians. Another persistent problem of Italian life is the presence of clientelism,8 which found its most impressive manifestations in parliamentarianism and freemasonry. Fascism has attacked both, but it is not enough. In fascism, there is still too much parliamentarianism, and there are still too many freemasons or individuals who identify with freemasonry. At this point in time, this condition can be tolerated because fascism cannot be expected to change everyone’s opinions at once. For the most part, freemasons, democrats, and disguised politicians live in the countryside. New clans and new gangs have emerged, and we need to break them up. This is an exceedingly difficult task since we cannot create a new breed of Italians out of thin air, especially when we are in the process of shaping this new breed and we also must deal with the low lives that remain. Even so, we must try to become a better people. To transform Italy into a truly fascist Nation, we need to purify the fascism of the provinces. 8 Clientelismo is the political phenomenon of awarding contracts to friends and political cronies. While this behavior can be found in any area of the globe, clearly it has deep roots in the Italian political system, a practice that continues to this day notwithstanding continued efforts to root it out.

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Another dangerous situation that should be brought to the attention of young fascists is the mania of social climbing. As with the case of many other social plagues afflicting contemporary Italian society, social climbing—​considered in its most blatant manifestations—​is the state of mind of our youth caused by World War i. Away from school or a place of work for many years, young people have not been inclined to receive new training, and thus they have been persuaded to improvise to be members of a social position—​a situation that has led to the mania of social climbing. By bringing Italian life back to normal, fascism has challenged this tendency. However, as in any revolution, this change has also brought along other problems, such as the stratagem of many new political appointments. Some control must take place to avoid making costly mistakes. A new order must be established, and a new relationship with work, discipline, and responsibility must be achieved. Italy has immense tasks to perform.

­c hapter 7

Corporativism 7.1

Introduction

Spirito’s interest in laissez-faire economics dates back to his university years when he studied with Maffeo Pantaleoni, a strong defender of laissez-​faire economic principles and a vociferous opponent of socialism. His studies in political economics coincided with those in criminal law. Both academic disciplines defined his cultural world and contributed to the intellectual process that led him to embrace actual idealism and, through actual idealism, achieve the identity of science and philosophy. The result of this long process also engendered an evolution in his own economic thought, which progressively became one with the fascist economic solution of corporativism; furthermore, Spirito adopted an even more radical iinterpretation of corporativism that he called “corporative ownership.” The following excerpt from Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a) highlights the importance that the science of economics had in Spirito’s formulation of the identity of science and philosophy. 7.2

Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (pp. 172–​176) [Translation]

The recollection of my intellectual activity dedicated to the discipline of criminal law inspired me to turn my attention to political economics, the other interest that motivated me to embrace philosophy after the degree in Law. Besides, the time devoted to the theory of sciences and the identification of science and philosophy enriched the economic science with a wider scope, that of being considered in political terms. This new dimension proceeded from the theory and praxis of fascism, which began to promote and implement its first corporative initiatives. As in the case of criminal law, I found the starting point for the new scientific investigation in the historical analysis of the economic science, from the Enlightenment onwards. The first problem that I needed to resolve was the legitimacy of the scientific characteristics of political economics as it had been theorized. The historical critique of the traditional science of economics is expounded in La critica dell’economia liberale (1930) and in the essays, “La scienza

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_009

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dell’economia” (1926), “Vilfredo Pareto” (1927), and “Prime linee di una storia delle dottrine economiche” (1932b). However, my analysis begins with Hegel’s thought and ends with Benedetto Croce. The historical critique of the traditional science of economics is rooted in the affirmation of the duality of individual and State,1 which characterizes the fundamental principle of this science. On the one hand, there is the individual who performs an autonomous activity; on the other, there is science, which recognizes such an autonomy and contemplates it. The conclusion is that the individual, split from the organism, is anarchic while his own arbitrary and subjective will cannot help but become the norm of his life. In this case, science cannot teach him anything because, for him, traditional science has only the meaning expressed by the dogma of free competition. To the State, traditional science says: “Don’t intervene;” to the individual: “Do what pleases you.” This is the essence of classical economics. The dismissal of the traditional science of economics involves the whole science and promotes the need for a global theoretical revolution. The transition from economic liberalism to the new economic system contains a radical contraposition between two totally heterogenous economic conceptions. Within this context, the identity of philosophy and history elevates the problem to a level that has no meaning if we don’t accept the entirety of the unity of the historical discourse. A world dies and another emerges, distinct from the previous one. It is a turning point that gives a new foundation to a science that has proven to be inconsistent. The science of economics, that is science of the individual without being science of the State, cannot survive as science. We need to start anew and recognize that the new science, founded on the program,2 will overcome the abstract entity of the individual. Thus, the new

1 I adopted the upper case for ‘State’ to conform to the word ‘Stato’ in Ugo Spirito’s books and articles of the fascist period, referring to both the Italian and Russian political systems. However, Spirito adopted the lower case for the adjective ‘statale’ (‘state-​run’) and for the word ‘statismo’ (‘statism’) since they referred to a general characteristic of any state rather than only to the Fascist State. In all other writings published after World War ii, he used the lower case unless he was referring to the Fascist State. I remained faithful to the Italian text. The institution of the State was the central element of fascist ideology. 2 Spirito used interchangeably the words ‘program’ and ‘plan’ to identify the economic system being developed in Russia when he wrote: “The [Russian] revolution was founded on the abolition of private property and on the transfer of the means of production to the State. Its next step was to create a system that would allow the State to organize and manage productivity in the entire Soviet Union. In this manner, the idea of substituting the program of free enterprise economy with a national plan or program began to emerge.” Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, pp. 87–​88. He also suggested the adoption of a national program by the fascist

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science of programmed economics is born, which the last representatives of economic liberalism will oppose vehemently.

…

The identity of history and philosophy, which permeates all my activity in a multitude of directions, in the case of the economic science assumes a particularly important value for the future direction of my investigation. I was a student of Maffeo Pantaleoni who led me to the study of pure economics. Was it a continuation of a journey or the beginning of a new one? It was an experience that began to emerge in 1926 and was related to the publication of the journal, Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica (1927–​1935). In 1926, I published “La scienza dell’economia,” an essay in which for the first time I formulated the identity of the science of economics and philosophy. In the speech, “Conoscenza filosofica e conoscenza scientifica,” that I gave at the vii Congresso nazionale di filosofia (Seventh National Congress of Philosophy) in May 1929, I framed the concept in more detailed terms. In that presentation, I said: The growing uneasiness, which characterizes the meetings between philosophers and scientists, is a manifestation of the necessity that both groups feel about reaching an identification of their goals. However, they are still unable to identify a clear concept of the meaning: scientists consider philosophy a Sphinx; philosophers consider science only a form of knowledge. Scientists don’t have the courage to open themselves to a world that they repute too different from their own, philosophers don’t have the strength to deal with a particular science and face the related problems. Everybody talks of collaboration, but nobody understands that to collaborate means to perform similar work.3

regime: “After 1932, even the anticommunist regimes began to consider the adoption of both annual and long-​term economic plans. In Italy, this need was felt rather late because of the strength of our traditions and the presence of an individualistic attitude that informs both thought and action. Consequently, the elaboration and approval of the first national program were quite difficult. … However, Italians are finally taking the problem seriously, and the first results are expected sooner than later.” Ibid. p. 89. 3 Spirito, Scienza e filosofia, p. 69. Initially, Spirito’s speech “Conoscenza filosofica e conoscenza scientifica” was published as “Scienza e filosofia,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana,” x, nn. 3–​5, 1929, pp. 430–​444.

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I attempted to resolve this conundrum through the historical analysis of the science of economics. Subsequently, I expanded my exploration by including the teaching of Maffeo Pantaleoni, my maestro. …

…

The new journal, Studi di diritto, economia e politica that I founded with Arnaldo Volpicelli, included in its title a political reference, along with law and economics. It was another manifestation of my desire to define more concretely the concept of science by tying it to political life. During that time, political life began to include demands related to corporativism. My studies in economic liberalism were ­followed by those dedicated to socialism. The latter allowed me to expand the historical investigation by incorporating the social problems neglected by the supporters of economic liberalism. In the meanwhile, the socialist demands, considered in the light of the communist take cover in Russia, became more compelling. The first important step taken by the fascist government in integrating socialist demands in its economic system took place in 1932, when it promoted the concept of programmed economy. Other manifestations of social advancement were included in the elaboration of the Carta del Lavoro (Labor Charter) (1927). This new journey began with great faith and with an equally great commitment. Communism represented demands that needed to be clarified and possibly accepted. The USSR was not a persuasive example, but the new course it had taken could not be disregarded. … Corporativism immediately appeared and revealed all its potentialities. Corporativism was the seed expected to bloom, not a finished work. For our generation, it instantly arose as the good we had to pursue with conviction. The problem that we had to tackle was the relationship between communism and corporativism because both ideologies presented themselves as the two fundamental experiences of the century, and we were compelled to choose. … The concept of corporativism was known but only in its general terms. This it is not the place for a reconstruction of the events surrounding its inception and subsequent development. The Congress of Ferrara garnered a powerful meaning because of the theory of corporative ownership. Discussions about the communist characteristics surrounding such a concept can still be felt today and continue to generate both celebrations and condemnations. 7.3

Ugo Spirito’s Corporativism

Spirito’s speech, “Individuo e Stato nell’economia corporativa” (1932c), delivered at the Congress of Ferrara, generated an intense controversy among those

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fascist delegates who were grappling with the nature and function of corporativism because it offered a radical view of a corporativism that would abolish private ownership—​the theory of “corporative ownership.” According to this theory, the State, by performing an ever-​expanding function in the economy through the transfer of the means of production from private hands to designated corporations, would ultimately abolish private ownership entirely.4 As Spirito wrote in Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), it was Giuseppe Bottai, Minister of Corporations, who publicly disavowed it for being too radical and out of the boundaries of corporativism, even though both he and Benito Mussolini initially went along with that theory.5 Those who were not pursuing radical changes, such as the Fascist Party and the business community, also perceived Spirito’s brand of corporativism economically and socially disruptive, and considered the philosopher an extremist. The fascist establishment eventually abandoned him to his destiny, and he remained isolated and looked at with suspicion. According to him, this change of mind with regards to his function in the intellectual world, contributed to his removal from the teaching post he held as Professor of Corporative Studies at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa6 and to his reassignment to a teaching position in philosophy at the University of Messina, in Sicily, as a sort of academic exile.7

4 Several decades later, he characterized “corporative ownership” as “the most advanced theory of communism until then affirmed by a fascist.” La fine del comunismo (Rome: Giovanni Volpe, 1978), p. 39. 5 In rethinking Giuseppe Bottai’s position regarding the theory of “corporative ownership,” Spirito wrote: “All my writings on fascism, and especially on corporativism, reveal what I expected from Bottai. Moved as I was by revolutionary faith, I gave fascism a communistic interpretation, which found its highest expression in my proposal of “corporative ownership” at the Congress of Ferrara in 1932. I expected Bottai’s collaboration on this proposal, even though I was aware of the limits imposed by a quite difficult political situation, dominated by capitalistic forces, and, above all, by both a liberal and conservative cultures. … At the Congress of Ferrara, Bottai deemed my conclusions on corporativism completely incorrect.” Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 190. About his meeting with Mussolini (March 22, 1932) right before the Congress of Ferrara (May 1932) to clarify his revolutionary position, he noted: “The discussion centered on the relationship between fascism and socialism, in particular between fascism and Bolshevism. My view was that fascism had to become a super-​Bolshevism; capital and labor had to come closer; and it was necessary to direct the workers’ interest away from private ownership. I thought that this was the direction “corporative ownership” should take.” Ibid., p.111. 6 The Scuola Normale Superiore is an institution of higher education linked to the University of Pisa, currently attended by undergraduate and postgraduate students. It was founded by Napoleon Bonaparte to educate elementary and high school teachers in 1810. 7 Cesare Maria De Vecchi, the minister of National Education (1935–​36) imposed Spirito’s transfer to the University of Messina because he found out that years before Spirito had won

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In “Individuo e Stato nell’economia corporativa,” Spirito clarifies the fundamental elements of corporativism as well as the concept of “corporative ownership;” in “Il corporativismo come liberalismo assoluto e socialismo assoluto” (1932d), he demonstrates how corporativism was the realization of both liberalism and socialism. 7.4

“Individuo e Stato nell’economia corporativa”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 3–​15)8 [Translation]

In Article vii, the Carta del lavoro affirms that the private organization of production, which is a function of national interest, makes each company’s CEO responsible to the State for the productivity of his enterprise.9 This statement in the charter undermines the liberal conception of ownership and encompasses the entire political, moral, and religious meaning of the fascist revolution as the foundation of the new science of economics. If we were to think of fascism as a revolution and attribute to it a historical meaning that would transcend the duration of the government as well as the very borders of our Nation, we could only do so by comparing fascism to the French Revolution of the eighteenth century, which transformed the ideological and practical life of the world. That revolution marked the liberation of the individual from an oppressive State, perceived as an entity that was antagonistic to its citizens. Fascism expressed the conscious will to institute a State that would be one and the same with the organic life of the Nation, such that the goals of the organism and those of its elements coincided perfectly. The process leading to the identification of the two institutions manifests itself through the metamorphosis of the institution of ownership. On the one hand, the French Revolution had identified its individualistic principles with the competition to teach philosophy at that university. Dissatisfied with Spirito’s “distorted corporativism,” De Vecchi enforced that original designation. Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 83. 8 For the translation, I used the mentioned 3rd revised edition of 1934. First edition in 1933. 9 The Carta del Lavoro, in Lavoro d’Italia, April 23, 1927. This document contains the economic program of fascism. It was approved on April 21, 1927 by the Fascist Grand Council and published in the Official Gazette, Lavoro d’Italia, two days later. It consisted of thirty articles embodying the general guidelines of labor relations, employment, and social welfare program.

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the selfish and anarchic claims of that institution; on the other, the fascist revolution affirmed its superior ethical values by transforming ownership into a social institution. However, the unification of both private and public goals in the management of property raised many social and technical problems in the fields of economic science and economic activity, which are still awaiting a suitable solution. These are precisely the problems of economic freedom and private enter-​ prise that classical economics had posited since the time of the physiocrats. There are also problems related to collective or state-​run management, economic justice, and the negation of private ownership about which socialist economic theories and the other anticlassical approaches (national economy, historicism, sociology, Catholicism, etc.) have concerned themselves from the middle of the past century until the present. In a historical sense, fascism represents the solution to all the antinomies that have emerged from the clash of these different tendencies, and it indicates the progressive liquidation of all those institutions and ways of living linked to the old ideologies. Nevertheless, the solution is a progressive one; one that history is teaching us daily. Without it, abstract reformism would take the hand of the legislator and lead him to sterile—​if not ruinous—​experiments. Our historical consciousness does not allow us to yield to the attraction of theories and ideologies. Today, we may even exaggerate the diffidence surrounding the implementation of such innovative methods. At any rate, the solution to the problem must necessarily be gradual and follow a logic that completely adheres to the reality of life—​regardless of what we might think about the speed with which the solution was adopted. Science studies the process of that solution and fulfills its task by not only charting its direction but by anticipating it. When dealing with the necessary eclecticism of the spurious political life, science has the duty to clarify the internal logic of events and their necessary outlets as deviations and corrections occur. Where will this lead us? Once the cornerstones of this revolution have been established, what will their impact on the life of tomorrow be? These are the questions regarding the revolution that the science of economics must try to answer today. Returning to the concept of ownership and drawing some fundamental conclusions from the doctrines of the past that deal with it, we can now classify the different points of view into two major objections: an individualistic economy and state-​run economy. It has been argued that private economic productivity, entrusted to the will of the individual and responding to his specific needs is, of necessity, an inorganic system and is irreconcilable with the goals set by the State. In such a system, national unity breaks into a multiplicity of specific economies and lacks the center of reference necessary for an organic

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system. On the other hand, it also has been argued that, in the state-​run or collectivistic economy where productivity is entrusted to public institutions whose representatives are interested in running it in an indirect way, such an economy is, of necessity, inferior to the one that favors private interest and in which its citizens are in charge of running a private economy. These two objections have raised a serious and unavoidable antinomy that economists and politicians have long endeavored to resolve. Different types of solutions, based on various speculative foundations, aim either toward a ‘modified’ individualism or a moderate statism where the modus vivendi of eclecticism triumphs in both theory and practice. As we know, such eclectic solutions, while temporarily useful in the short run, are only half-​measures and result in muddying or aggravating the situation. In fact, it is evident and worrisome that such half-​measures lack clear orientation in both theory and practice. Every expert in the social sciences must be aware of this as he tries to find new paths for the investigation. From a theoretical point of view, the direction this investigation should take has been already pointed out in a previous scenario: both an individualistic economy and a state-​run economy must merge and become one. This investigative principle shines more clearly when confronted with reality, and this reality must be clarified in its present institutions and activities in order to discern its intrinsic demands and the presence of traditional needs.

…

If we look at today’s reality without any biases, we need to ask this question: “Does today’s economic life respond to an individualistic principle, to the collectivistic one, or to both, and, if so, in what sense?” If we reflect upon the economic characteristics of the last years, we cannot help but notice the progressive enlargement of firms and the prevalence of the productive collective organisms over individual ones. Within the economic life, which represents the budget of the State, made up of provinces, municipalities, other public institutions and government-​controlled organisms, as well as of private organizations, such as firms, banks, and cooperatives, there is a boom of organic institutions to the demands of which the individual must increasingly surrender his arbitrariness and personal interests. In fact, economic life is rapidly transforming itself from an individualistic and inorganic structure into a collectivistic and organic one. Atomistic individualism, which had been for the most part eliminated, can be said to be surviving in the most rudimentary forms of industry and commerce. This means that life has anticipated science by denying the axiomatic ideological presuppositions of science.

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Consequently, the organizational process betrays its empirical character, thus revealing extremely dangerous contradictions, which, after all, are the result of the unconscious coexistence of the opposite spheres: the public and the private. There is no new synthetic economy that will overcome the contradictions of both private and collectivistic economies, but there are rather two economies united in an equivocal quid medium in which the errors and shortcomings of both economies are summed up into one. In fact, if we consider the nature of the present economic organisms, it is possible to observe a continuous oscillation between the state-​run and capitalist systems of production as well as the strange way in which they inadvertently interact. On the one hand, there are public institutions in which productivity is entrusted to the bureaucracy with all the disadvantages for which such a form of management has been justly reproached. Those disadvantages can be summed up by the fact that a bureaucrat manages something that not only does not belong to him, but toward which his interest is only minimal, as any possible increase in productivity does not really benefit him because there is no sameness of goals between public and private interest. On the other hand, there are private economic organisms in which public interests are not only adequately respected, but where the very same private interests clash with each other in the most disruptive way. For instance, we can look at joint-​stock firms that today represent the majority of industrial and credit institutions as a typical example of what happens when conflicting economic principles are not resolved. So long as such firms operate within clearly defined limits, with a small capital base and a small number of shareholders, the private character prevails, and their laws coincide with the law of private economy. The CEO of the board remains, for the most part, the major shareholder and runs the enterprise as if it were his own, making his own interests and those of the enterprise coincide while the rules of private economy prevail. However, modern life does not stop at this type of enterprise because, conversely, all the large industries and banking institutions increasingly tend to transform themselves into trusts or stock-​based firms that require enormous capital and a great number of shareholders. Consequently, the firms begin to drift away from their figurehead, thus weakening the character of the private enterprise and of the individualistic economy. As firms grow in time and space, the role of the administrator radically changes since his interest as a private citizen no longer coincides with the interest of the firm. In a large joint-​stock firm, the administrator finds himself on the fringes between capital and labor without identifying himself with either, and is

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actually free to take advantage of both in order to satisfy his personal needs. Instead of merging into one, these conflicting interests tend to detach and split off. Capital finds itself in the hands of the shareholders who, since they do not manage their own property, know only what is supplied to them in reports or budgets prepared by their administrators. In other words, the work is carried out by workers who are not shareholders and, consequently, hold no interest in the company for which they work. Since they are not directly interested in increasing productivity, they tend to antagonize the administrators. Finally, the administrators, by placing themselves between capital and labor, end up exploiting both, thus constituting their private ownership as a byproduct of the social economy while avoiding any risk for themselves. These administrators, whose interests directly coincide with those of the firm, end up distancing themselves from the firm by perpetuating the kind of deceptive mentality typical of those who manage an institution but do not own it. Indeed, the function of being a shareholder in the firm is not enough to eliminate the difference between private and social interest. It goes beyond saying that all of these elements become a heavy burden for those particular firms, such as banks, in which the capital of both the shareholders and creditors is managed by the same administrators. Here, the difference between the economy of the collectivity and the private economy of the administrators becomes manifest, leading to the tragic consequences that almost unavoidably end up in bankruptcy. It is useless to argue that dishonesty is not the general rule, because it is not a matter of dishonesty but rather the lack of shared interests between the administrator and the thing being administered. The ruin of a banking institution does not necessarily imply the ruin of its administrator. This means that between the private economy and the social economy there is a substantial lack of continuity that obviously jeopardizes the economic life of the organism. The more the organism grows and extends itself, the more the lack of continuity increases, so that the firm gradually distances itself from the traditional form of privately owned companies. The dualism between private and public interests increases with the growth of the collectivity’s interest in social life. For this reason, the State must increasingly intervene in failing companies to safeguard the interests of the collectivity. Thus, the State nationalizes the losses of privately held companies, whose owners are not directly responsible for bad administration and often ignore the risks their properties run until the moment of their bailout. In this manner, the State intervenes in the so-​called private economy only to render their losses public.

…

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This is the reality of our present economic situation during this current period of transition from the old individualistic organization to the new corporative one. Private and public, individual and State, all have intertwined interests while the distance between them has increased. As the firm expands, the capitalist is distanced from the capital, the entrepreneur from the firm, and the worker from his job, thereby eliminating any direct economic or sentimental interest that, in the smaller firm, links the worker to the owner. To progressively eliminate these contradictions, it is necessary for capital and labor to collaborate more with each other and gradually become fused. Fascism has understood the nature of the problem and has put unions and corporative organizations at the foundation of its program as the first great experiment in economic conciliation. It has understood that to increase production, it is necessary for capital and labor to collaborate more with each other and that class struggle must evolve into reciprocal understanding. Having placed capital and labor on the same level, fascism has tried to achieve unity within the corporation, that is, within the organism where the conflicting interests of the classes come together by recognizing the superior interests of the Nation. However, having emerged from class conflict, and recognizing the need for an immediate resolution to such conflict, corporativism has only been able to take a first step, the meaning and value of which can only be understood in the light of future developments. For the time being, we cannot say that corporativism has been fully achieved since it coexists with trade unionism. This means that the gaps between classes have not been completely overcome. On the contrary, with the legal recognition of the trade unions—​the last vestige of the millennial tradition from the ancient caste system to the Three Estates of the eighteenth century—​a limit has been set and legalized. Eventually, the distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker is destined to disappear. It is already becoming difficult to define the roles of the entrepreneur or the worker since it is difficult to find an entrepreneur who does not work or, alternatively, a worker who, even with only small savings or as a simple consumer, does not generate jobs. The future task of corporativism must include a process of fusion and the progressive elimination of the last classist phenomena. Indeed, in its beginning, to bring order and to define the roles, corporativism lent itself to over-​schematization, establishing again the distinction even within those economic forms such as cooperatives, where capital and work are already in the process of merging. The main attribute of the corporative order—​founded on trade unionism and, therefore, on classist dualism—​is conciliation. No one can be so

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ingenuous as to think that corporativism is merely limited to its role as a conciliator. Besides, it is sufficient to reflect upon the activity of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Corporazioni (National Council of Corporations) to understand the positive and regenerative value of the new institution. However, it is also true that the main problem of corporativism remains the defense of interests of the trade unions and the composition or prevention of disputes. In its initial stage, the first step is the elimination of conflicts. Once the order is guaranteed, the next more constructive step can be undertaken. Yet, it is necessary to consciously look at this last goal in order to explain the antinomies that have remained unresolved up to this point. In this manner, it is possible to explain how corporativism, having focused on the problem of classes, still remains at the margins of the issue of private enterprise. Private enterprise and corporativism continue to operate in two separate worlds; the only relation existing between the two is one in which the entrepreneurs are differentiated from the workers. Due to the interest it places on the productive aspect, private enterprise shuns corporativism, mostly by leaving out the State. The State only intervenes indirectly through other venues, often when it is too late. Private enterprise, trade unions, corporations, State: four entities that have not yet a center.

…

What will the future hold? The logical solution to the problem, as it has been presented, appears to be corporative ownership and the corporates, shareholders of the corporation. Such a solution, at least on paper, resolves the above-​ mentioned antinomies, unifies capital and work, eliminates the dualistic system, fuses firm and work, and finally allows for the effective and immediate merging of the private economic activity with the State’s enterprise. If we could indeed imagine the transformation of a big firm into a corporative institution, we could immediately envision the radical changes that would ensue with regard to all economic relationships, and thus the possibility of achieving a truly harmonious system. Capital would shift from the shareholders to the workers, who would become owners of that part of the corporation directly linked to their activity within the hierarchy of the corporation itself. This would cause a shift in interests by the corporates so that they would not feel duty-​bound, for example, as union members would, to defend their rights at the margins of the economic life, being easily prey to manipulation by bad politics. They would instead be united by the bond of joint ownership through which the corporation acquires an organic consistency and full awareness of its own economic and political function. The capitalist would no longer be

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estranged from his property nor would he be unaware of how it was managed; rather, he would manage it himself and, in doing so, his role would coincide with that of the worker. The worker, on the other hand, would become immediately interested in the profitability of his own work, insofar as it is converted into increased revenues of his own capital. The entrepreneur, then, would no longer be at the margins of capital and labor but would move to the summit of the corporate hierarchy by following the same process as the other members of the corporation. In addition, the State would no longer feel the need to control or intervene as an outsider. The State would continue to be ever-​present since the corporation is one of its own organs, and it is an organ that is grafted upon the organism through the National Council of Corporations. The State would no longer serve as a conciliator nor function as rescuer, but it would be the mirror image of the corporation within the national system. Once the class system has been overcome, the administrator reconnected to the management, and the outside intervention of the State—​previously blamed for political corruption—​eliminated, corporative ownership would then resurface as the logical solution and the foundation for a future reality. The transformation of the economic world ensuing from such a process would be so profound that it would almost be a vain attempt to try to predict its far-​reaching consequences. To get an idea of the complex consequences and advantages of such a change, just imagine the transformation that would occur in the credit system, the banking system, and the government’s fiscal policy. Those ideas cannot be built on paper alone, where the scenarios imagined only occasionally can endure the daily challenges of reality. The historic perspective, which has strongly influenced my generation, should raise our consciousness of the gap existing between an abstract utopia and the more concrete and multifaceted realities of life. If not taken as just another utopian dream, the principle of corporative ownership can at least shed some light on the path so far taken in corporative entrepreneurship, making us more conscious of the possible goals to be reached. Once we follow that path, we can do so with the awareness that even if tomorrow we should find ourselves reconsidering some of those presuppositions and we modify our direction, or in the event that new and unforeseen demands should arise, forcing us to make perhaps radical changes to the ideal to which we aspire, we would still have benefited from that experience. Today’s knowledge will be the foundation for tomorrow’s awareness. This awareness will eventually turn into a political program. Such a program would thus keep the ideals of corporative ownership in the background while gradually incorporating new and specific measures that are aimed at satisfying

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more modest demands. Once the need for economic reforms is voiced in accordance with those ideals, we could proceed by promoting those economic forms that would adhere to the spirit of corporative ideas. Once the principle of rapprochement is established between capital and labor, it would be possible to favor those economic forms that partially or entirely already realize this union. At this point, we would be able to delve into the productive activity of the organisms of private enterprise—​in particular, the firms. Economic methods would then be implemented from within, thus resolving any possible conflicts of interest arising between owner and worker, the public and private sectors, and between the interests of the individual and those of the State. Those methods would emerge as a result of day-​to-​day experience, helping dissipate existing antinomies. This would establish a closer relationship between firms and the State, and between firms and workers. With regard to the relationship between the firm and the State, we could, for example, mandate that firms, once they surpass a certain amount of capital, include a State representative on their board of directors. By the same token, with regard to the relationship between workers and firms, laws could be passed entitling workers to profit-​sharing and stock ownership in addition to their wages. Additionally, the workers themselves could be represented by an administrative council that would collaborate in the decision-​making and policy-​building process regarding worker-​related matters. This process of bringing together two sides would help us to overcome not only the concept of class struggle, but the very concept of class itself.

…

Because this historical interpretation of the next stage of fascism could generate some objections from those who perceive fascism as containing ideas too similar to those embraced by socialists and Bolsheviks, it would be appropriate to anticipate and eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding. Fascism is too respectful of history to deny outright the contribution made by socialism, which acted as the leaven that enriched political life for so many decades. On the contrary, fascism claims the meritorious honor of having incorporated within its own philosophy the most vital demands of the socialist movement: the legal recognition of the unions and the placement of capital and labor at the same level. It would be ludicrous to express shock at the mention of socialism when one has placed one’s faith in a regime that had the necessary strength to not only embrace socialism but to endorse and validate it. It would be erroneous

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to contrapose fascism to Bolshevism, in the same way we would contrapose good to evil or truth to error. Today, we are the only Nation who can calmly stand back and make a fair evaluation of the Bolshevik revolution because we are also the only Nation that has already absorbed and made the best of it. Without bias or extrinsic limits, we can continue to incorporate all the positive elements of the great Russian experience. The superiority of the fascist revolution over the Bolshevik counterpart is apparent in the nature of each: the first has a historical nature, the second a more ideological one. The foundation of Bolshevism was built on the ruins created by negation and destruction, while fascism historically found full expression in overcoming and enriching itself through the reincorporation of all that pertains to spiritual tradition. However, being different does not imply being the opposite since both have endeavored to incorporate all the positive aspects of European and world politics of the last century. Looking back at Bolshevism, being more critical of all its vulgar proceedings, deviations, and retractions, we can now consider the materialistic and positivistic principles at its roots, its bureaucratic and State-​worshiping methods, and specific concept of class dictatorship, all of which have been overcome. By the same token, we need to recognize how much vitality is still hidden in these manifestations as they shed some of the initial rigid presuppositions. On the other hand, the very same historicistic spirit that molded the fascist revolution must give us a sense of the future, a future in which the diverse forces operating today will come together and overcome one another. Although the new political orientations of today are fascism and Bolshevism, clearly the political future will belong to neither of these two regimes if one denies the other, but rather the future will belong to the one that has been able to incorporate and overcome the other. Nothing can be more dangerous to the achievement of this overcoming than to insist upon the abstract contraposition of the two, devaluating fascism before the sympathizers of the socialist and Bolshevik movement and magnifying the Bolshevik ideal in the eyes of those who are looking for the new. Fascism has the duty to convey the message that it represents a constructive power that will transform itself into the historical avant-​garde, therefore leaving socialism and Bolshevism behind after having absorbed them both. This message is important for all rebels and dissatisfied individuals throughout Europe who portray fascism as a reactionary movement and who look with open or hidden satisfaction at the events in Russia. It also must be directed to young people, who are always looking toward the future seduced by the attraction of a more radical experience.

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“Il corporativismo come liberalismo assoluto e socialismo assoluto”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 27–​44) [Translation]

To understand the essence of corporativism, clarify its original meaning and, therefore, its revolutionary value, it is necessary to provide a detailed explanation of its relationship with liberalism and socialism. An analysis of this sort has often been attempted, but the results have been neither clear nor incontrovertible enough to provide a sound theoretical and practical orientation. If today those regarded as leaders in the sciences and in the arena of economic policy still harbor much skepticism and uncertainty regarding corporativism, the main reason may be due to the suspicion—​and often the deep conviction—​that corporativism is too vague and hybrid to be organized around a systematic principle that clarifies its historical boundaries. In other words, corporativism is seen as an empirical attempt to mitigate the limitations of a liberal system while controlling the negative consequences of socialist ideology. Since corporativism arose as an immediate reaction to post-​war anarchy, simultaneously fueled by both liberalism and socialism, it initially failed to adequately verify its own premises and thus based its initial actions on negative motivations. Corporativism has, above all, become both antiliberal and antisocialist, fighting against destructive elements rather than presenting itself as a new systematic construct. We need to move from abstract negation, which is the first stage of a revolution, to a more profound understanding of the socio-​political system we aim to overcome. Rather than rejecting all the unfulfilled demands of the revolution, we need to deal with them at a higher level, transforming them into positive elements of a new creation just as synthesis follows antithesis. A corporativism conceived as opposition to liberalism and to socialism is substituted by a corporativism conceived as both true absolute liberalism and true absolute socialism. Corporativism should be understood a priori as the new term representing the absolute essence of liberalism and socialism since these two terms oppose each other only in an abstract sense. Because so many different types and so many intermediary and eclectic forms of liberalism and socialism have emerged, it is difficult—​and maybe even impossible—​to choose the one model upon which we can base our discussion. In an effort to clarify these concepts and the antithesis that we want to overcome, let us consider liberalism as a synonym for individualism, and socialism as a synonym for statism. The arbitrary nature of these definitions should not prejudice the conclusion we want to reach, since it is not our purpose to challenge specific liberal or socialist thinkers and regimes, but rather to precisely clarify the opposing demands of

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these two systems and possibly find new synthesis for them. If there is truly a liberalism and a socialism that have—​either partly or at least in theory—​overcome the abstract antithetical position, this simply means that they are closer to the solution of the concrete synthesis: corporativism.

…

Since the eighteenth century, in opposition to the transcendent and autocratic State that dictated the activities of the citizenship from the outside, political and economic liberalism has reclaimed freedom for the individual. Freedom does not mean pursuing an objective imposed by others, but one that is chosen in accordance with one’s own goals. It does not mean converting one’s work and goods into the wealth of others, but rather being able to create wealth for oneself without any kind of limits. In the pursuit of this goal, liberalism denies the State, or reduces its role to a minimum, especially in the economic arena. In this context, individuals are totally responsible for their economic world, whereas the maximum aim of the liberal is the creation of a society in which the State no longer has a reason to exist. While being in the negative and abstract revolutionary stage, one does not think very seriously about the socio-​political reality being destroyed. For if someone should think seriously about this reality, and took this thinking to its logical consequences, he would surely end up advocating the need to return to the state of nature. In this state of nature, the individual can only obtain freedom by breaking every tie, by destroying all relationships with others, and by freeing himself from every duty and social right. A man, who is unaccountable for his actions, cannot expect assistance from others and must therefore be self-​sufficient in finding food to feed himself, in making the bed on which he sleeps, in creating weapons to defend himself against wild animals. To become socially accepted, he must talk when he meets with other people, he must come out of their isolated world to unite with others, he must live according to agreed-​upon rules, and he must adhere to the discipline of human language. He must at least talk to understand, and to understand to be able to collaborate. No longer satisfied with primitive life, he must unite with others if they intend to create together what he cannot create alone. The civilized world emerges in the same logical order as the evolution of dwelling, from cave to hut to house to palace. In the same way, men relate to each other and organize their various tasks as the goals to which they aspire become ever more complex, generating the progress of civilization. With the emergence of civilization, the arbitrary behavior tends to decrease while the rule of law imposes

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itself. Society becomes a mechanical organism in which the stopwatch triumphs. The higher the position a man occupies in society, the more numerous and complex are his social links and the more disciplined he becomes in his daily life. This is the rule of civil life, and every attempt to avoid it for fear of the mechanism associated with it is futile. If we think about it, though, this well-​thought-​out mechanism is the essential condition of true liberty: the more rigorous the mechanism becomes, the fuller and richer the freedom of the individual becomes. In fact, the only reason why I can sit this long at my desk writing, thinking, and reflecting on these problems, and at the same time living a rich, serene, and free spiritual life, is because I am part of a social organism that binds me to an ever more rigorous discipline. This discipline has freed me from necessities (such as going hunting) that had burdened the primitive man. Even the humblest person—​the same one who still must go out and kill the animal needed for his food—​is freed by this social system from endless inferior tasks and is lifted to a higher spiritual life. In this manner, the development of the social mechanism and the development of spiritual freedom become related terms. Above all, the social mechanism frees and removes us from the world of matter in yet another sense, which derives from and is intrinsically connected to the previous one. The ties that link us to the social organism will free us from those activities of a lower nature, thus allowing us to perform activities of a superior social nature. In other words, the mechanism frees us from those lower-​level activities and leads us to those of a higher quality. These superior ties, however, that bring us to that higher level, are not actually a bond, but an instrument of freedom connecting us to others, broadening our horizons and giving our actions an effectiveness that transcends our individual lives by adding to our sense of duty the possibility of affirming our individuality through the social relationships to which we are tied. While living within the narrow boundaries of a single individual, the lack of bonds with others seems to exempt me from dependence on other people, but in reality, it actually prevents me from interacting with them and from giving spiritual value (a true freedom) to my actions. The more linked I am to others, the more I can influence them, win them over to my own ideals, and achieve the recognition that will give a sense of real worthiness to my actions. Certainly, if I were as isolated as a hermit, I could perform the arbitrary actions that are forbidden living among others; such actions would die out in that hermitage, and I would vanish without having made any difference in my world. However, because I am linked to the world in such a way that I am one with it, my word resounds universally, and this word is only as strong as the person who expresses it. My slavery is the necessary condition of my freedom. The mechanism in which

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the action of the individual seems to lose itself is the wire that conducts, multiplies, and strengthens its effects.

…

Individualistic liberalism proclaims freedom of thought and action, free competition, private enterprise, and, above all, the holy and inviolable character of private property. All of this, though, is not enough to achieve true freedom. Freedom thrives on the foundation of collaboration and on the achievement of attainable social aims and social discipline. The most evident recognition of the sterility of pure individualism can be evidenced in the economic field, whereby primitive atomism is followed by the creation of enterprises of ever-​increasing dimensions: the srl, the cartel, the trust, the cooperative, the trade union, etc. A man freely establishes bonds with other men and freely submits to the rules of collectivity. Therefore, the liberal has no objections with respect to these non-​individualistic economic forms because they themselves are the fruit of competition. The emergence and prosperity of these economic forms are signs that they respond to a real need and that they comply with a more suitable economic law. The one thing that the liberal cannot tolerate is the fact that, through its arbitrary and transcendent actions, the State favors these economic forms. He sees the State only as an outdated organism discarded by the revolution and considers its intervention as an unnecessary intrusion in social life. These economic forces freely and spontaneously organize to determine the breadth and limits of each of its various organisms so that any institution trying to regulate those organisms from the outside cannot help but violate the intrinsic laws that regulate them. Of course, by virtue of this logic, liberalism is already in the process of resolving this problem. Rule, discipline, and collaboration are no longer rejected, nor is the unlimited free will of the individual any longer claimed. On the contrary, the necessity of creating an economic organism is openly admitted. Liberalism still negates the State, but for a different reason and with a different reasoning. In reality, if the liberal, having arrived at the recognition of the legitimacy of trust and other economic groups, applied to these groups the same reasoning that he used to legitimize individuals, he would realize that the same spontaneous and, therefore, legitimate laws that motivated individuals to free themselves from their state of arbitrariness and become part of a group, could be used to motivate those economic groups to escape their sterile individuality and form a single economic body. This reasoning must not stop here without losing its raison d’être. If the individual perceives his freedom as enhanced rather than diminished when he unites with others, it is difficult to understand

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why a different attitude should prevail with regard to the incorporation of groups into the State. Having overcome the concept of freedom as arbitrariness, and having seen in the synthesis of freedom and law the true satisfaction offered by the demands of liberalism, the totalitarian solution would emerge, allowing the individual to choose freely and spontaneously an economy run by the State. Finally, the individual would ultimately realize that in the process of achieving true freedom, he could not satisfy himself with the mere intermediate, hybrid forms of freedom, because if he did, he could not stop the consequences of the conflict that would arise among the diverse arbitrary forces. It would have to create rationally, therefore freely, an absolute correspondence between his own goals and those of the State. As a consequence, the liberal would no longer need to sing the praises of private enterprise and ownership, since private and public enterprise and ownership would be one and the same, and the demands made by liberalism would not be considered contrary to those made by the State. The State, no longer being an organism apart and above the individual, would fulfill those same demands made by liberalism. Liberalism would become absolute liberalism and would come to be called corporativism.

…

In contrast to the primitive abstract sense of liberalism of the past century, socialism has arisen not in opposition to the demand for freedom, but in opposition to the results of a false interpretation of it that liberalism concocted and made evident by the rapid development of capitalism. Since, in effect, the weak were indeed at a disadvantage, the economic struggle, preached by liberals, had to lead inevitably to the contraposition of the strong against the weak, or—​to use a more brutal terminology—​exploiters against the exploited. The process of capitalization, born as a result of the difference in beliefs about human values, was solidified through the implementation of inheritance laws, heightening the initial battle over economic issues. Socialism arose in response to this inequality, proclaiming itself as the defender of freedom against the dictatorship of capitalism. The working class organized itself against the ruling class to establish a State based on equality and justice. Socialism placed the State above the individual, but, at the same time, conceived it with functions that once were performed by the capitalists, that is, by the arbitrariness of powerful individuals. At this point, the socialist State was still understood as a liberal entity. The position of the individual with regard to the State was only reversed in the sense that under liberalism the individual believed that he was able to defend his own freedom by negating the State

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that violated it. Currently, under socialism the individual can expect the State to defend him against other individuals. The State is still understood as liberal because it remains in a transcendent position in relation to individuals since it is conceived as a regulatory organism that differs from and regulates society, even if only from the outside. In other words, the State is bureaucratic and paternalistic and must therefore operate for the individual by substituting itself for them. Such a State can in no way respond to the trust that is placed upon it nor defend freedom or administer justice for the simple fact that, being only a part rather than the whole, it cannot recognize nor achieve the goal of every single individual. Liberal economic literature commonly affirms that the State is a bad administrator and, therefore, that the State’s management of the economy is anti-​ economic. This criticism, leveled at the State as a liberal entity, is indisputable if we consider that the bureaucrat can neither have the same interest in public affairs nor function as competently as the individual in dealing with his own private affairs. Even if we did not take into consideration the quality of the bureaucrat’s moral values, this criticism about the way in which the bureaucracy is established and operates in the life of the Nation would be irrefutable. Bureaucracy is a class, the minority, the center. It is the center even when extending itself to the periphery, since, in the context of that periphery, it remains as the center of the peripheral areas. From the perspective of that position, one cannot see and know with that sense of concreteness characterizing the point of view of someone who incorporates the entire surface. Besides, in the center there are only few people compared to the many who live on the outside. Even if we admitted that these few people represent the elite of the Nation, this elite could neither understand nor supervise the various things that many on the outside would know and supervise one at a time. Individual problems would lose their peculiar characteristics and take the form of larger problems, while their solutions would become totally generic and therefore inapplicable to specific cases. Even if it were possible to eliminate the inadequacy existing between the part and the whole, that is, the State with regard to the Nation, or even if it were feasible that the State could perfect itself as an organism by reaching a comprehensive knowledge of the life of the Nation down to its most minute ramification, this knowledge could not be translated into a spiritual direction or discipline. It would be abstract knowledge, since it would remain on the outside of the known reality, generating a plan of action corresponding solely to the will of the person with knowledge. The State as a bureaucratic organism would organize the goals of the entire Nation around itself and the Nation would simply become a mechanical instrument of the State. The life

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of the organism would be as mechanical as the life of a machine with each man in his pre-​established position and each worker engaged in an imposed task responding to the needs of the devised scheme. The individual would get lost in the general mechanism. Freedom, personality, and individual enterprise would become senseless words. The objective to achieve justice would eventually level off, and the individual would become insignificant before the State.

…

In reality, socialism in its best theoretical formulation does not respond to such a narrow conception of the State, and its reaction to liberalism does not confine itself to such materialistic terms. The principles of collaboration and solidarity begin to gradually manifest themselves in the creation of various social institutions with a political connotation. The formation of cooperatives, leagues, and trade unions corresponds to an initial attempt to bring together the will of the individual with that of the social organization. In the same manner that the initial atomistic individualism with a liberal orientation is followed by institutions of collaboration and associations (even if capitalist in character), the abstract socialism of the State is in contraposition to the theories and social forms that better adhere to the demands of the individual and his personal morality. The necessity to overcome the distance between the State and the individual is obvious. Individuals are invited to spontaneously unite with each other, to discipline themselves, and to organize without waiting passively for direction from the top to make decisions about conditions and rules that concern their life. People begin to gain an immanent sense of the reality of the State and of the unity of the social organism. As the initial vulgar ideology becomes more refined, the individual proceeds from the State with the purpose of enhancing the value of his personal enterprise. Socialist theories, influenced by liberalism, thus emerge; theories that challenge the miraculous side of revolution by affirming the necessity to respect the forces of history; theories that are not afraid to reconcile opposite demands and qualify socialism with attributions that before were considered as expression of its absolute negation. This is an avoidable aspiration from which socialism was unable to escape in the past and will certainly not escape in the future. Socialism must realize that the State from which it expects justice cannot also be the State against which liberalism had fought and triumphed. It cannot be a part that does not coincide with the whole, that is, a bureaucracy as a class into itself, arbitrarily ruling the Nation and substituting its will for the will of the Nation, subordinating the activity of individuals to its own activity. Socialism must realize

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that the State cannot violate the freedom of the individual because it cannot separate itself from the individual. Instead, the State must see its goal as the realization of the goals of the individuals it must discipline. Only then will the State effectively satisfy the demands that generated the need for socialism. Only then will the individual find his own raison d’être within the State, in addition to the unavoidable condition that is needed for his own realization. Only then will the State reveal itself in the value of its universality, and socialism will become absolute socialism and called corporativism.

…

To understand the historical task of corporativism vis-​à-​vis the problem of liberalism and socialism, the point of departure must be the recognition of the basic needs of both individualism (freedom and personality) and statism (authority and social organism). In the pre-​corporative phase of fascism, the national-​liberal ideology had the upper hand. In it, the economic program corresponded almost exactly to the economic program of pre-​war nationalism.10 The need to combine the demands of both ideologies was incorporated by the fascists and translated into the empirical form of juxtaposition. The reciprocal autonomy of both the individual and the State was respected and the subordination of the former to the latter was permitted only in the case of a conflict of interests. The search for a middle road between the two extremes led to the choice of eclecticism as the solution to the problem. Eclecticism, however, revealed itself an illusory and contradictory solution because the extrinsic placement of the individual next to the State only produced an unholy marriage of liberalism and socialism with all the defects of both. The individual was granted freedom but limited only to his right to private enterprise—​an autonomous sphere of action in which the will of the old individualism could prevail undisturbed. Likewise, the State was granted its own form of initiative above and beyond that of the individual, thus substituting itself for the individual as necessary. The individual and State were in opposition to each other. The individual was granted free will, but only to a certain extent. The State, therefore, was free to occasionally intervene in the life of the individual and deny him his free will. In this manner, the two most important demands made by each side were invalidated. Indeed, if at the core 10

Spirito is referring to the economic and social program elaborated by the Terzo Congresso dell’Associazione Nazionalista (Third Congress of Nationalist Association) that was held in Milan, in 1914.

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of the demand for freedom by the liberals was free will, then the solution of compromise led to a negation (albeit partial) of such a freedom. In the same way, if we admitted the validity of the socialist demand in which the State is regarded as an entity with absolute values, then we would end up on the opposite end of it, thereby disabling the reality of the State by placing alongside it a partially autonomous and individual sphere. The two demands, far from taking hold, diminished themselves by converging into a modus vivendi that has been at the heart of liberalism. It is true, I repeat, that an attempt was made to overcome both the dualism and the compromise by subordinating one part of reality to the other which had previously been divided in two. However, because this division took place, the State remained in front of the individual. Once it was decided to proceed with the subordination of the individual to the State, this action was obtained through an arbitrary and exceptional intervention on the part of the transcendent State. The State remained outside the individual as a will before another will, as an end before another end and, therefore, one arbitrariness before another arbitrariness. This theoretical eclecticism had practical consequences in the crisis generated by the clash of individual interests and in the resulting imbalance from the occasional intervention of the State.

…

In the most corporative phase of fascism that began with the creation of the National Council of Corporations, the compromise is gradually being set aside and the problem is being resolved in a more logical and comprehensive way. The overcoming of the antinomy is sought in a conception that goes beyond liberalism and socialism. In this conception, corporativism becomes more liberal than liberalism and more socialist than socialism. For liberalism, the needs of the individual are absolute. Corporativism, therefore, declares itself to be antiliberal only because it does not believe that the individual—​as defined by liberalism—​is the true individual, nor that arbitrariness means real freedom. According to corporativism, liberalism ends up denying the same individual whose rights it claims to protect. In essence, corporativism is antiliberal not because it wants to deny or diminish freedom but because it wants to strengthen it and achieve true liberalism. Corporativism says to socialism that the need to search for true freedom and justice in the organic life of the State is undeniable, but also declares itself to be antisocialist only because the State of socialism is not the true State. In other words, the State, not coinciding with the organized Nation, cannot reach the goal of solidarity for which it was meant to be instituted. In conclusion, corporativism

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affirms to be antisocialist in order to bring about the kind of State that socialism cannot create since it is not yet absolute socialism. Thus, liberalism and socialism are both accepted and interpreted in their most profound meaning and coherence: from the individual to the State and from the State to the individual by a process leading to the identification of law with freedom and to the unity of the organism with the multiplicity of the people who make it up. Corporativism contraposes the concreteness of the individual who freely recognizes in the State his own goals and raison d’être and the concreteness of the State, which has spiritual value only insofar as it is alive in the mind and in the will of the citizen, to the two abstract and opposing claims of the individual and the State. This is an ideal identification, defined in rigorous and absolute terms by thought, to which the historical process of political life must always remain adherent. The greatness of the fascist revolution is the clear intuition of this need for identification and for the ever-​intensifying conscious effort to satisfy it by creating and perfecting the corporative system.

…

To reach the ideal identification presented above, corporativism had to understand that it was necessary to overcome the dualism of State and individual, to bridge the abyss created by these two terms, and to try to find another dialectic middle ground that would allow for the continuous and concrete movement from one extreme to the other. This middle ground was conceived as a concrete reality in which the State and the individual would meet or, better yet, would be born to a true spiritual life: the corporation. There emerged between the State and the individual, the group, a limited collectivity that could more easily adhere to the will of the individual while maintaining the unity of the whole. The significance of this social group can be understood in two ways so that the effective value of the corporation as an intermediate group between the State and the individual can be found in the precise separation of the two concepts. If we consider all social groups to be on the same level, somewhere between the State and the individual, it is clear that the problem has only shifted but not been resolved. These social groups will find themselves before the State in the same situation as the atomistic multiplicity of individuals finds itself vis-​à-​vis the State. Consequently, the dualistic relationship that needs to be overcome will resurface with the same terms. A similar gap will exist among the various groups, just like the one that exists among individuals. The resolution of the differences between them will come about through the transcendent action of the State. To avoid this situation from happening and to assure

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that the dialectic process is truly instituted, it is necessary to view these groups not as parallel entities, but as groups within groups in a hierarchic structure. Each group must be unique within its own kind—​actual unity or State unionism—​in a coordination-​subordination relationship with the other groups and should never be in competition or conflict with them. Only in this manner can we exclude the need for a superior exterior unity to regulate conflicts. On the other hand, a superior unity can affirm itself by managing—​from the inside—​ the inferior groups. Only in this way can the fundamental presuppositions of the classic or individualistic economic system be overcome The State moves through the chain of groups involved link by link, from the center outward to the periphery, finally coinciding with the entire Nation. The State, no longer considered a superior entity, a part, a class, or a bureaucracy, does not impose a will or a law to be accepted passively; rather, it expresses the will of the Nation as an organic system. Corporativism, having overcome the materialistic concept of democracy that linked the will of the people with the idea of majority rule, identifies in it the usual dualism that divides the Nation between a ruling class and a governed class. It also affirms the need for a totalitarian State in which everyone has a proper place and from which they can express their will by contributing to the government of the entire system. From link to link, the individual proceeds from the periphery to the center, climbing in the State hierarchy. The individual no longer exhausts his freedom and spirit of enterprise in the narrow sphere of private free will, but exercises and affirms them within the entire social organism. Since the lowest link that he can occupy is the most peripheral of the groups, by contributing to the molding of his group the individual can—​although only to a very minimal degree—​transform the entire system. As his value is progressively recognized, he moves up link by link, enlarging his sphere of action and making his mark in the life of the Nation through his personality. There is no limit to his freedom since it is now strengthened even more by the organism to which he is tied. Such is the essence of corporativism: a hierarchical communism that denies both the State in its role of equalizer and the anarchical individual. It denies bureaucratic management by bureaucratizing the entire Nation, thus making a civil servant out of every citizen. Corporativism also denies private management by attributing everyone a value and a public function. The various wills are forged into a single will, the goals into a single goal, and the whole social life becomes rational. The economic world evolves into a unified organization, allowing for a pragmatic economy that makes possible the overcoming of the chaotic conditions of traditional liberalism. Although this ideal rationality will probably never be reached, nevertheless it is a light that illuminates the way and directs the efforts of people of good

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will to thrive in both the fields of science and political action. Science and politics must concentrate all their attention on creating those institutions, those methods, and those relations that can bring reality closer to the ideal.

…

The peculiarity of the new corporative concept with regard to liberalism and socialism is most apparent in the international field. If the term international implies relations among Nations, it is possible, without any doubt, to affirm that only corporativism allows for serious discussion regarding a true internationality. Up to this moment, international liberalism and international socialism manifested themselves as antinational institutions. The truth of this statement can be specifically verified by the evidence gained in the economic field, where problems arose, and different solutions were tried. The liberalism of traditional science has denied national boundaries and, therefore, the existence of Nations. This is at least true in so far as economic life is concerned. For the most immediate, concrete, and visible interest of every citizen, the word Nation has no meaning. “International commerce,” says one of the most illustrious and coherent theoreticians of liberal economics, “is made by individuals, not by the Nation: individuals who are debtors or creditors of other individuals, as opposed to a Country or a Nation which is debtor or creditor of another Country or Nation.” Individuals must be free to pursue their personal extra-​national interests so that their economic life can prosper. The abstract negation of the State, which is an element of the liberal ideology founded on individualism, cannot lead to any other result. However, the opposite abstract statist demands of socialism lead to the same result. Indeed, the State which the citizen trusts to obtain justice and freedom is the State that equalizes individuals, and with individuals, Nations. Socialists scream, “Proletarians of the whole world, unite! Deny Country for humanity! Deny the States for the State and you will find your redemption!” Fascism, on the contrary, recognizes the value of the universalistic demand, the foundation of the so-​called international ideology of liberalism and of socialism, and proclaims the necessity for a true international nationalism. From the individual to the State, from corporation to corporation, we arrive at the national corporation. In the face of the narrow interpretation of nationalism affirming the dogma of economic independence—​the last residue of liberalism and manifestation of the individualistic and anarchic conception of freedom—​and recognizing protectionism as its only weapon, fascism has understood that the true success of corporativism is obtained through the triumph of the corporative idea throughout the world. Even though fascism uses

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protective tariffs as the present conditions demand, it fights against customs tariffs and the selfish limitations of international commerce. This battle is not fought to promote the advent of anarchic and individualistic liberalism but to set up a regime of collaboration among Nations. According to this regime, each Nation, by organizing a state-​run economy upon a program, would take into consideration the contemporary organization of the other Nations and come to an agreement with them regarding the coordination of various programs. The development of corporativism (in its progressive inclusion of corporations) cannot stop itself, nor can it be stopped at the borders of the Nation without denying itself. On the contrary, this process would go from the national corporation to the international corporation wherein the various Nations would find the conditions for their major economic and spiritual development. While not being an organism that promotes equality of all individuals, corporativism respects the uniqueness of the various Nations. As corporativism would recognize that each individual has his own place and the right and the duty to affirm his free personality within the national organism, so would it recognize that each Nation has a peculiar function with respect to the creation of a new civilization in the international arena. 7.6

Interpretation of a Programmed Economy

In “Economia programmatica” (1932e), Spirito introduced the concept of a programmed economy. He was dissatisfied not only with liberal economic policies but also with the results achieved by the fascist government through its inconsistent and disarticulated economic solutions. He saw in the implementation of the program “the new path that must be taken and pursued.”11 Fascism needed to overcome the antinomy derived from a continuous oscillation between liberal forms of production and attempts to expand the presence of a centralized and regulated economic system capable of satisfying the true needs of the citizens. For him, program meant a systematic vision of all economic forces and their function in the organism [of the Nation]; determination of the economic goals to be reached; and finally, program meant a preventive budget.12

11 Spirito, Capitalismo e corporativismo, p. 105. 12 Ibid., p. 103.

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In “L’economia programmatica corporativa” (1933b), he expanded the analysis of the ideological and economic characteristics presented in the previous article, producing an even more rigorous and detailed view of what a programmed economy is. 7.7

“L’economia programmatica corporativa”. In Capitalismo e corporativismo (pp. 113–​127) [Translation]

The expression programmed economy is generally related to a regulated or guided economy. This type of economy incorporates both the productive forces and the authority that regulates or controls them. The potential consequences of such a theoretical and practical way of understanding the programmed economy increase on a daily basis, generating the most illogical and unfounded reactions even against the most profound and unquestioned value of the new direction. The most serious confusion arises from the fact that the regulating authority was sought and found again in the old bureaucratic State, which was opposed by the supporters of the classical economic policy. Today, however, many scholars and politicians demand a return to mercantilism, as if two hundred years of history could simply brush aside the great experience of liberalism. Anyone with minimal historical and cultural knowledge would turn against the programmed economy when confronted with the problem presented in such terms. The critique of the transcendence of the bureaucratic State together with the demonstration of its incompetence, its arbitrariness, and the consequent disparagement of free enterprise, has not been carried out without consequences and has brought about changes which we cannot ignore. State socialism has been an attempt to minimize the dualism and relative transcendence of the State. In socialism, control is conceived as a partial solution coexisting with a rather broad sphere of freedoms and initiatives of the individual. This compromise, when considered in relation to the economic action of the State, does not limit the validity of the critical positions taken by liberalism to the extent that this action is allowed and considered necessary. It reveals at the same time the incongruence of the antinomy of two wills and two different economic goals (the private and the public one) from which the perfection of a single organism should derive. No wonder that, when confronted with the concept of programmed economy, anyone in his right mind is perplexed. Mercantilism and State socialism are ideologies and political criteria of the past; scholars must find a solution to resolve the ambiguity.

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Remaining within the traditional terms of the problem, we can emerge from the confusion in two ways. In the first, we return to a totally private enterprise interpretation of economics, therefore denying any intervention by the State in the economy, instead placing trust in a presumed organic spontaneity of the economic actions of the individuals. The second option is to place responsibility in the hands of the State, presuming its omniscience so that it can attend to the minutest details in matters of production, distribution, and consumption. The simple enunciation of the two solutions makes one become aware of their inadmissibility. If the historical anachronism of mercantilism and the compromise of the State socialism are found to be contradictory, the ‘rational schematisms’ of both the individual’s and State’s arbitrariness are equally utopian. The problems associated with a programmed economy are intimately affected by this situation, which is full of antinomies and paralogisms. Consequently, it is not possible to find a valid solution without a radical change in the meaning of its terms or of its essential concepts. Corporativism is trying to bring about this reform in Italy in a way that prevents any possible return to the past or any illusory eclecticism.

…

To overcome the antinomies, it is necessary to set aside the concept of regulating or guiding authority and examine the notion of program more closely. The problem of economic policy can only be resolved in the scientific and technological arenas. Obviously, no economic organism can prosper or function without a program, which is the fundamental assumption for any further study. What is needed now is to pinpoint the specific conditions that are necessary for the logical elaboration of an economic program. Let’s distinguish four hypotheses: (1) individualism or liberalism; (2) State socialism; (3) comprehensive socialism; and (4) comprehensive corporativism. (1) In an individualistic regime, every productive firm formulates its own program exclusively based on projected prices of the economic market determined by free competition. In such a case, in order for the program to have a logical structure and have a chance to succeed, it is necessary for the firm to be aware of the abilities and the will of those who compete in the market within the time frame the action of the firm will operate. If this happens, the free-​ market regime can hold; if not, the liberal regime must be abandoned as being technically absurd. As long as the economy is primitive, meaning that the market is restricted, firms are small, programs are approximately uniform, and the forecasted data easily calculated, then the liberal regime, or better yet the regime with a

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liberal tendency, can be relatively successful. In this context, its economic programs can materialize notwithstanding the mistakes about the forecasts that, although relevant, are not serious enough as to compromise the general trend of the historical development. On the contrary, when the economy becomes more complex—​the market unrestricted, firms larger, programs progressively more various and detailed—​it is not possible for the individual firm to foresee with adequate approximation and during a rather long period of time the prices that are established by the competition. Consequently, the program fails because it lacks sufficient logical foundations. The economy then becomes, in a more relevant way, either fortuitous or casual; and the mistakes related to the forecast grow to the point of compromising every form of development, forcing the crisis to become general and insurmountable. (2) To survive a crisis in a liberal regime, people call for the ‘protective’ intervention of the State. On the one hand, those who own the means of production—​terrified by the failure of their own forecast—​call on the State to correct the market prices so that the new prices correspond to their programs; on the other, the State—​worried about the disastrous conditions in which large corporations find themselves—​considers its duty to make those programs at least feasible by means of expediency. This way, State socialism—​the modus vivendi of the most important Nations of the world—​recognizes some of the inherent faults in the system of private, individual enterprises, and occasionally intervenes to fix these market defects, thereby making long-​term decision and planning for private firms and investors. Indeed, if it was once difficult for private investors to foresee market prices before the State’s intervention, it is now even more difficult—​if not impossible—​to foresee the volatility of the entire market when it is influenced by a partial intervention of the State. State socialism is the economic regime that can be programmed the least or, even better, the most illogical economic program one could imagine. (3) In a government in which there is total State control of the economy (integral socialism), where the concepts of free competition and the free market are eliminated, the program is formulated by the State, which determines in a totalitarian fashion the production, distribution, and consumption of all goods. This program is formulated keeping in mind the welfare of all citizens, who are thereby placed upon an even financial playing field. Nevertheless, such a program functions logically only from an abstract point of view since it lacks the spiritual dialectical principle that transforms it from a static to a dynamic idea. For individuals to reach equality, they must first be reduced to the lowest economic level, according to the Marxist principle of reducing all work to manual labor measured by time. On the other hand, the State, seen as a central bureaucratic institution with inevitable limitations, is compelled to

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enforce the system of general equality, thus disregarding the infinite complexities found in society. The program becomes schematic and uniform, moving inexorably to a presumed static perfection while leaving aside the differences that make life appear more real. Therefore, all the diversity stressed by liberalism both in theory and in practice, far from being implemented and strengthened, ends up being eliminated. It is not surprising that this harmful social leveling field that runs the program seems illogical and ‘crashes’ when confronted with insurmountable technical and political difficulties. (4) The materialistic ideal of communism takes on a spiritual dimension through the concept of hierarchy inherent in an integral corporativism. Consequently, the logical value of State unity is enriched through the dynamic characteristics of free enterprise. The State, no longer the central bureaucratic institution, coincides with the entire chain of authority associated with the corporative organism; that is, with the Nation structured hierarchically. The State shows its true will through corporativism, realizing the program that it alone can fulfill. Certainly, at the center of the Nation there will be an institution from which the program will emanate in a thorough and systematic way. This institution, however, will represent the hierarchy of the Nation. Thus, the program will issue from the infinite contributions that arrive through the hierarchical channels of the productive units. Once the program has been elaborated, it will then be implemented through a common set of tasks carried out by the same organisms that fashioned it. These organisms will make sure that the program will continue to be implemented for years to come as an ever-​ dynamic system.

…

The consequences of the corporative programmed economy can be easily pinpointed since they reveal the originality and fruitfulness of the new conception. Only by having a corporative economy can we speak assuredly of a national economy. Conversely, by leaving the management of the program to private citizens, liberalism was unable to achieve economic unity in the Nation and, consequently, was incapable of distinguishing the contribution to the economy by citizens of different areas of the world. From an economic point of view, the little that transcended the sphere of individual interest and constituted a state-​run economy was conceived as a marginal political necessity against the backdrop of a real-​world economy that by definition was individualistic and, therefore, extra-​national. By the same token, socialism could not justify the economic unity of the Nation because, being the abstract opposite of individualism, it aimed at achieving a vacuous

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and undifferentiated social unity through the convergence of the proletariat of the entire world. If the liberal individual is outside the Nation, then so is the generic society of socialism, which, by denying free enterprise and putting a cap on the economic and social growth of the individuals, also put a cap on the development of various Nations, thus annulling their functional dialectic. Corporative economy, however, coincides with the national economy, its national character being realized by the program itself. On the other hand, if there were no program, the definition of national economy would make no sense. Even in the present form, which is far from integral corporativism, the little in Italian economic life that coincides with the new principle is programmatic in nature. As an example, one can point to the efforts to increase grain production, the demographic policy to encourage population growth, the campaign for the drainage of land, and the hydroelectric production of energy, to name just a few. But it is also clear that this initial programmatic phase is becoming more and more systematic and totalitarian; moreover, it will lose its bureaucratic character once corporativism is fully implemented. All the economic forces of the Nation will need to be coordinated to reach the economic objectives envisioned by the program. We should not believe, however, that we will be able to achieve this objective by simply staying within the boundaries of a Nation or that the ideals of corporativism coincide with those of the closed economy. Corporativism is not nationalism. On the contrary, nationalism is regarded as materialistic as socialism even though the conception of nationalism is abstractly opposed to that of socialism. Nationalism echoes the individualistic and egotistical qualities of liberalism. Consequently, the economic science that can derive from it has the same lack of logical principles that are found in the market economy. Lastly, to win the fight against free marketers, nationalism uses the strategy of protectionism. If we agree that a term cannot be valid unless it fuses and strengthens itself in synthesis with another, then, by being truly national, a corporative economy is therefore truly and inevitably international. Accordingly, corporativism, by contraposing itself to liberalism and protectionism, has managed to develop political agreements and exchanges among Nations, thereby creating a prelude to a more organic and internationally programmed economy. It is absurd to think today—​as a consequence of the development achieved by the international economy, with all the technological improvements, de facto unity of world markets, and interdependence among the most dissimilar economies—​that a self-​sufficient national economy could be implemented if we take into account the materialistic nature of these terms. Even if we could, such a goal would be achieved at the cost of an enormous impoverishment of

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the economic system and the loss of possible human and technological enrichment that derives from the complexity of international relations. Once we recognize the undeniable need for the integration of both national and international economies, the implementation of an integral corporativism becomes subordinate to the transformation of the entire world economy in a corporative sense. All the objections directed at State socialism and at the uselessness of a dualistic system, which is made up of free enterprise and State intervention, must also be applied to the dualistic system of a programmed national economy and an international liberal economy. In both cases, for the program to be rational and ready to be implemented it must be unique. This implies that the organic system of the economy of a Nation must not be conditioned by the fortuitous or interested game played by other forces of the world markets. The program must be based on reliable data. However, if the economy of a Nation relies for its stability only on internal factors, thus excluding outside ones, it runs the risk of weakening both itself and the outside economy, to the point that the program itself will lose consistency. To avoid this situation, it is necessary to establish control over all the economic elements so that they acquire a universal dimension, thus allowing the creation of stable and continuous agreements between Nation and Nation or program and program.

…

Another fundamental consequence of the programmed economy deals with the terrible phenomenon of unemployment. Unemployment is a typical product of free competition, which constitutes the materialist concept upon which this economic aspect is founded. For unemployment to materialize, human beings must be considered as merchandise or raw material and accepted or rejected according to the needs of production. A worker is not the citizen with which the State identifies itself and in whom the goals of the individual and the State coincide. The worker is the instrument for the achievement of the economic goals of the owner and, therefore, is conditioned by the events involved in reaching those goals. Consequently, he is discarded as soon as they have been met or considered no longer feasible. As a result of this brutal mechanism, the liberal system eliminates workers, basing its decision on the same logic and the same indifference with which it eliminates merchandise, without considering the problem of the legitimacy of the equivalence of the two terms that are so obviously different. Instead, the corporative economy, by conceiving the economic phenomena in terms of politics and ethics, decisively rejects the equivalence of the worker to the raw material. Before anything else, it sees the citizen in the worker and

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elevates the individual to the level of the State so that he becomes one with the life of the State. Consequently, it considers unemployment to be not only an effect of an economic crisis, but also the result of an inconsistency in a political regime and a demonstration of its moral inferiority. The corporative economy can consider people as ‘underemployed’ or ‘overemployed’ but not as employed or unemployed. If, in Italy, unemployment has not yet completely disappeared—​though its number is lower than anywhere else—​it is only because of the influence of certain international conditions and internal traditions that do not allow us to reach an integral corporativism. Abroad, the competition created by the markets of the liberal economies and the slowness in the reception of our initiatives, such as the establishment of the forty-​hour work week, place limits on our radical transformation. Domestically, further limits are imposed by the pronounced residue of an old capitalist individualism so that the area of influence of the programmed economy remains restricted. Consequently, the area of reintegration of workers is also restricted—​almost exclusively the area of public works whose denomination reveals the dualistic residue of public and private opposed by corporativism. When the corporative structure completely adheres to the Nation as an economic entity, each citizen will have his duty and his right recognized, and no crisis will be able to deny this conquest except by the individual’s own fault.

…

[In the next three pages, Spirito deals with the problem of economic crises which, according to him, are linked to a liberal economy. He believes that the origin of a crisis stems from either a process of improvement of the economic productive system by substituting old technological instruments with new ones as a consequence of new prevailing demands of life and the refinement of needs, or through an arrest or discontinuity of the productive system itself. In both cases, a liberal economy cannot find adequate solutions. In the first case, the liberal economy favors the sudden and violent substitution of the old with the new and does not take into consideration the destruction it creates since the economic life is abandoned to the inhuman mechanism and blind forces of automation. In the second case, the fault of the liberal system is even more serious because the error is inherent in the system itself. Individuals, left to their personal judgment, ignore each other, and tend to speculate on the errors made by others. For Spirito, the solution in both cases is the programmed corporative economy with its character of universality. In the first case, it would dominate the process of transition from the old to the new so that the renewal could take

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place with the least sacrifice and highest utilization of the old. In the second case, the character of ‘organicity’ of the programmed economy allows for the regulation of production as a function of consumption and vice versa. In this way, the crisis as a casual inequality of the dislocation of products and their ability to be consumed is virtually erased. There will always be some mistakes made, but they will be mistakes internal to the program and no longer mistakes made for lack of a program].13

…

When confronted with the indisputable merits of the programmed economy, the various objections against them have truly little value. Naturally, the main critical objections from the liberal side can be summarized as follows: rigidity of the program (and consequent neutralization of innovative forces); the elimination of individual initiatives; and finally, the reduction of men to mechanical instruments. We have already answered these objections by distinguishing the programmed corporative economy from the bureaucratic or socialist one. However, it is opportune to return to the subject and clarify the various aspects of the problem. Regarding the aspect of rigidity implicit in the concept of program, we need to eliminate a rather common misunderstanding: rigidity is not typical of the program as such because, as we have seen, no economy can survive without a program. Each firm has its program, but the liberals do not criticize them for it. In addition, only the existence of a well-​structured program allows for its radical renovation and contributes to the acceleration of the historical process. In a liberal economy, where the common program breaks down in many individual programs, each innovation is challenged by the consolidated interests or by the selfishness of those who have no strength to undergo a process of renewal. Besides, innovation is conditioned by the limitations of the particular forces that try to implement it. When this phenomenon involves the shifting of interests that are too big—​that is, when the innovation is too important and radical—​it becomes unfeasible or too slow to materialize. Instead, in the programmed economy, even the cost of transformation is divided and shared so that the process can be faster and more effective. For a program to have a degree of flexibility and become the reason for a faster realization of itself, it must be formulated in a way that it does not 13

The two paragraphs are a summary of the pages 121–​124 of Capitalismo e corporativismo.

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become an obstacle to action. However, this is what distinguishes the corporative programmed economy from other programmed economies. In corporativism, everyone participates in the formulation of the program on a daily basis or prepares the elements for an organic and quick renovation of it. The program does not become a limit, rather, a stimulus, since it is not a law imposed dogmatically from above. Consequently, it becomes the main instrument for collaborative work that involves everyone’s personality. We can now proceed to answer the other objection dealing with private enterprise. If we consider the program as a rigid presupposition of the economic activity of single individuals, it is certain that private initiative is nullified. In this case, program means the establishment of criteria of production, of the limits of consumption, and of the modality of saving—​that is, of all the economic elements—​so that if imposed on individuals, no margin is left for their freedom. However, for corporativism, the program is not presupposed; rather, it is proposed by individuals who manifest their freedom in the formulation of it. Clearly, freedom is not only respected but infinitely strengthened. Indeed, if in liberal and private economies, the initiative of the citizens is conditioned by the limits imposed by the environment, then, in a programmed economy there is no other limit to the realization of an idea except the one implicit in the intellectual and practical capacity of the person who champions it. Initiative and freedom both establish deeper roots and expand to include the entire economic organism, moving from the minuscule particularity of the single small firm and its zone of influence to the universality of a world made explicitly systematic

…

Understood in this deeply spiritual sense, a programmed economy overcomes all the antinomies of both the old science and the old economic policy. It avoids the contradictions of the old science, in which the economists lost their way because they no longer have to, nor are able to search for the objective laws when subjective wills meet, that is, to search the rationality of that which is defined as irrational. Now science can look at the economic world moving from the rational presupposition of agreement and collaboration and subsequently can start the investigation of the laws concerning this agreement, thus preparing the ground for the elaboration of programs that are progressively harmonious and systematic. With reference to economic policy, a programmed economy allows a continuous action whose goals can be achieved with certainty and clarity and without the vacillation and empirical corrections of an occasional intervention.

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Finally, with regard to both the old science and the old economic policy, a programmed economy allows the incorporation of the vital demands of classicism, liberalism, historicism, and socialism, and the elevation of economics to the superior level of ethics beyond every eclecticism and middle-​of-​the-​road solution. This programmed economy is neither a dream of poets nor an abstract system envisioned by rationalists and ideologues. Above all, it is not one of many possible paths to follow. Rather, it is the only unavoidable and, therefore, the certain one. This is a truth of which we can be easily convinced only if we reflect upon its most profound principle. We can discuss this or that detail, this or that consequence, but we cannot discuss the direction of the human journey, the aims of which have always been those of achieving more comprehensive forms, richer and more complex realities, and more logical and coherent organisms. If a programmed economy means a more rational system of economy—​ order that overcomes disorder, an organism that disciplines scattered and contradictory energies, laws that bring order to anarchy, solidarity that triumphs over brutish selfishness, and provision and preparation for tomorrow instead of relying on the immediate satisfaction of contingent needs—​and if, finally, a programmed economy means an economy that is more conscious of the unity of the world and of the functions of its elements, simultaneous action of people and Nations in order to achieve a welfare where duty is not separated from interest, then to deny it, or to have doubt about it, would be the equivalent of denying or doubting that the world progresses and that history has a value.

­c hapter 8

Problematicism 8.1

Introduction: Birth of Problematicism

As noted in Chapter One, Spirito revealed in Storia della mia ricerca (1971a) the intellectual restlessness of his forma mentis and the “antinomic quality of [his] ideas.”1 From within the certainty of the possession of truth of his actual idealist convictions, slowly doubt surfaced, provoking a profound revision of their validity. La vita come ricerca (1937) established a new direction in Spirito’s philosophy while generating that long period of intellectual inquiry known as problematicism. Yet, he claimed that the book was more a “psychological document” than a conscious rendering of a widespread intellectual and spiritual condition: That my book corresponds to a state of mind and wants to be above all a psychological document, is clearly stated in the same book.2 This psychological aspect is mirrored in Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a) where Spirito confirmed that he was not fully conscious of the true meaning and consequences of his perceptions. In fact, “In La vita come ricerca [he] talked of problems and problematicity but never of problematicism.”3 Only in the book Il problematicismo (1948a), he used the word problematicism because by then he envisioned the ‘problematic’ condition as a manifestation of the crisis of values of post-​World War ii Europe. Although a departure from actual idealism, problematicism maintained links with it: it shared the same desire to arrive at the discovery of truth, but by a different path the direction of which Spirito did not yet know. In Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, he asserted that between actual idealism and problematicism there [was] a transition, but in a negative sense; however, the continuity of the discourse was not explicitly interrupted.4 1 Ugo Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, p. 13. 2 “Ugo Spirito, “Lettera a Giovanni Gentile,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vi, n. 2, 1938, p. 147. Reprinted in Scienza e filosofia, p. 298 and in Giovanni Gentile, p. 300. 3 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 19. 4 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_010

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In this sense, previous moments of positivism and actual idealism flowed into the new philosophical phase contributing in various degrees to the subsequent evolution of problematicism itself that materialized as a series of stages, each covering the prevailing subject of interest at that specific moment: art, love, communism, omnicentrism, science, antiscience, and unawareness. Trying to define problematicisim—​an intellectual condition that lasted some forty years—​is rather difficult. One can only offer a general interpretation of it. Briefly said, problematicism is a view of life no longer founded on sure principles that offer a systematic organization of the multiple aspects of reality. In this view, there is the consciousness that the efforts made by actual idealist philosophy to build a world based on the creativity of the human spirit did not produce a universal truth and a harmonious society. Since philosophy no longer possesses “absolute criteria by virtue of which we can judge, affirm or deny,”5 everything becomes open to question so that the opposite of any established truth can claim the merit. The expression “I don’t know” becomes the foundation of a critical attitude that overturns the actual idealist certainty based on the dialectic solution of the opposites. Consequently, positive and negative are equal on the scale of thought while a sense of uncertainty and doubt becomes a permanent condition of Spirito’s mind. From this perspective, life itself is considered a sequence of problems that multiply to infinity, problems that philosophy can scrutinize but not resolve. As the title of the book suggests, philosophy becomes a life-​long search for a truth that actual idealism failed to define in absolute terms. “With La vita come ricerca, [Spirito] began a difficult, tortuous life, full of alternatives and hesitations,”6 generating along the way the drama that characterized the entire experience of problematicism: the continuous tension that emerged between the necessity of overcoming the condition of doubt and negation and the inability to settle on a definitive conclusion. To express this new and tormented spiritual condition, Spirito in this book not only made systematic use of antinomy but conceived life itself as antinomy. He stated: The mystery of life is not an unknown but an antinomy. If the mystery of life were only about the unknown, individuals could abandon themselves to the bliss of ignorance; however, confronted by antinomy, they have no rest. Even so, I cannot become aware of a thesis without being conscious

5 Ibid. p. 21. 6 Ibid. p. 28.

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of its antithesis. This problem compels me to look for a solution even though I am conscious that this solution will turn into the thesis of yet a new antinomy, one that demands a new antithesis and a new solution. Nevertheless, this is not the solution of another problem but the real solution to the first problem, which is not true because it is a solution that posits itself as a new thesis, which is only conceivable apart from every other antinomy. Unless we can break this series of antinomies once and for all, the solution to the first problem, no matter how elementary or obvious it may appear to us, cannot be considered a solution. The first problem turns into the last one and it vanishes into indistinct vagueness.7 This passage reveals the antinomic nature of Spirito’s dialectic, a characteristic that had already appeared at the outset of his philosophical activity, when he wrote about antinomy in Il pragmatismo (1921): [Antinomy] was an old motif that had accompanied me since my thesis on pragmatism, in which a chapter was devoted to the unresolved antinomy. A motif that had marked my attention even if initially I had no idea about its further development. But in 1937 the consequence of it came to light even if I was not able to render the true meaning of it. Antinomy meant the end of philosophy.8 Spirito implied in the last sentence that with problematicism the traditional view of philosophy as possession of an absolute knowledge had ceased to exist and was substituted by a philosophy as a perpetual search for truth. However, this new understanding of philosophy did not suggest that attempts to once again find the incontrovertible truth and arrive at the possession of the absolute would not be successful. When it was published, La vita come ricerca, was like a “little earthquake”9 shaking a quiet intellectual pond. Since the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, Italian philosophy had flowed mostly peacefully within the banks of neo-​idealism. The rivalry that developed between its two major representatives, Croce and Gentile, was viewed as a theoretical conflict within the broader neo-​idealist school not involving a debasement of the central function of Spirit in the creation of reality. At the same time, other European

7 Spirito, La vita come ricerca, p. 12. 8 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 20. 9 Gennaro Sasso “Una lettera aperta di Guido Calogero a Ugo Spirito,” La Cultura, 2, 1937, p. 269.

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philosophical trends such as phenomenology, existentialism, or spiritualism had yet to become popular enough to constitute a serious alternative to neo-​idealism. No wonder that the book generated a strong debate among the most well-​ known Italian philosophers, including Gentile, who characterized it as “fundamentally wrong”10 and “lacking that vigorous faith which always enlivens every book that is profoundly inspired.”11 In La vita come ricerca, the image of the philosopher leading society in the acquisition of truth and creating the conditions for the development of a better humanity suffered tremendously. Spirito presented himself as the philosopher of the crisis, as someone who no longer felt in tune with the prevailing cultural and political values promoted by actual idealism and looking for new but uncertain venues regarding the direction to take. In this sense, the introductory statement of the book (“To think means to object”) is revealing. This lapidary sentence is a rebuff to almost three decades of neo-​idealist philosophical certainties and a strong statement issued on behalf of the open nature of philosophical activity. 8.2

La vita come ricerca (pp. 7–​18) [Translation]

To think means to object. The naïve person listens and believes: his gullible mind accepts words much like his eyes receive light. No sooner the first shadow of doubt issues from his soul, and he progressively becomes aware of it, dogma is replaced by the problem, thought comes forth. He is no longer a passive listener but reacts and speaks. The first word that enlivens his discourse also nourishes his personality; yet that first word, which defines and asserts his personality, is a terrible monosyllable: but. Antithesis overcomes thesis, doubt overcomes faith, and antinomy overcomes conclusion, giving rise to discourse with others and with oneself, to the desire to persuade others and himself, to resolve the problems that continually reappear, and to answer the objections that always turn into new objections until, finally, this process comes to a stop. Individuals either show disappointment for not being able to reach a solution, or they are satisfied for having achieved it: but the result is that in both cases, thinking stops, and when all objections are exhausted, discussion ends. 10 11

Giovanni Gentile, “Nota alla recensione di Delio Cantimori: La vita come ricerca,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, v, 1937, p. 356. Reprinted in Scienza e filosofia, p. 297 and in Giovanni Gentile, p. 299. “Lettera al Prof. Ugo Spirito,” in Scienza e filosofia, p. 300 and in Giovanni Gentile, p. 302.

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In its historical development, human thought not only is incapable of putting an end to the debate, but takes it to the extreme, multiplying the antinomy by an infinite number of antinomies: an endless series of subsequent buts. I look around and observe a multiplicity of things that have a history, and only within the context of that history can I understand them. However, history tells me what happened yesterday and the day before yesterday, when none of today’s things existed. As well, other things that exist today did not exist then. Afterwards, history tells me nothing more than that the initial chaos existed. I can look at tomorrow and think about the modifications that today’s things will undergo; at the day after tomorrow when today’s things will have ceased to exist and others that I can only force myself to imagine will have come into being. Finally, I stop imagining and everything gets lost in that distant vagueness. So many civilizations have flourished and disappeared. What will the future of our civilization become? Progress can be identified as an ascent of a parable, which subsequently descends. Even the industrial civilization may begin to fade and, little by little, airplanes and skyscrapers will disappear into the void just as all things that once existed inside [the ancient city of] Ninive or within the Chinese walls have passed out of existence. Even human beings and our planet—​of which our astronomers strive to measure the past and future ages from that of fire to the glacial one, from the origin to the end of the solar system—​will vanish someday. Caught in this fatal succession of birth and death of everything, retreating into that microcosm that is my conscience, I cannot help but consider life as nothingness. Everything becomes, while the infinite flow of things nullifies all that exists in its incessant motion, without me being able to preserve anything of the world or of myself. In the meantime, this flow is powerful and the world that surrounds me is full of wonders; if I fully open my eyes, I cannot help but remain stupefied. Our civilization will be destroyed someday. However, it continues to live with an even faster rhythm while its complexity becomes even more structured. Everything will be ‘in vain,’ but the reason of the flow itself—​of such a wonderful flow—​cannot be ‘in vain.’ Moreover, the same thinking the ‘in vain’ implies the thought of that which ‘in vain is not,’ and it cannot be different. If something is preserved from the eternal becoming, and with it the reason of its being, the whole becoming is also preserved, and nothing can be thought of if not absolutely necessary. Both the walls of Ninive and those of China are elements of our civilization just as the entire history, pre-​history, original chaos, and the future that we need to determine with our daily creativity and with our most profound ideals are elements of it. Anyone who delves into the multiplicity and variety of things and, above all, into the logical structure of certain partial organisms, cannot doubt the logic

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of the entire organism. Though swept by the desperation of not being able to conclude the discourse, we can still affirm that everything is merely appearance. Afterward, we are blocked by the thought that such a complex appearance must carry a meaning and must have a reason behind it; and the reason for the existence of appearance cannot be appearance. Variation implies that which varies; appearance that which appears; becoming that which is: there is, therefore, a principle, a reality, a value, a reason for everything and for myself. I deny and affirm. I reduce the world to the void and the void itself reintroduces the world as even more complex and rich. I deny life, and I realize that the negation itself is an act of life. However, if I want to affirm something, moved as I am by the conviction of not being able to negate everything, just before any affirmation, but reappears inexorably and the problem renews itself in the same antinomic manner. The problem renews itself from the time a philosopher’s activity was recorded and continues to renew itself for anyone who thinks even if advanced in age and philosophical knowledge. The antinomy that we previously mentioned and captured in its most immediate and elementary form, more or less the way it may reveal itself to a more naïve and uneducated spirit, is the antinomy that manifests itself in the most difficult problems of contemporary dialectic. This seems to be anachronistic to those who are familiar with the history of philosophy. Yet it is found at the root of the philosophical inquiry of every true thinker and in a manner ever more radical and primitive as he is more profound and sincere. Sincerity generates in him the need to free himself from every superstructure, from all the knowledge that distracts him, by showing him many other paths and problems. This need leads him back to the point of departure, producing in him even the illusion of liberation from all kinds of experiences. However, he cannot be completely free, because he cannot free himself from himself and because he feels the need to return to the initial formulation of the problem since he acquired a progressively greater awareness of the many antinomies that derived from it. For example, he wants to conceive the world as good and considers love as its law, but he also realizes the presence of evil and hatred that divides. He affirms the existence of God and cannot help but think of him as the principle of goodness. At the same time, he searches in the world for the rationality underlying the development of that principle. However, as he discovers resistance that does not bend to the logic of this rationality, he turns in despair to the affirmation of the principle of evil. He is conscious of his autonomy and enjoys the freedom that allows him to be and to want, to realize himself in the world and to transform the world. Soon after, the philosopher considers the infinite whole that transcends him and believes that he is at the mercy of a force, of a system of causes that acts

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in him, from which he is unable to differentiate himself or to resist. He turns to God as a guarantor of his freedom, and freedom becomes the result of God’s grace. He denies God as will and infinite freedom to save his will and freedom, only to see God resurrected as a materialistic principle excluding by definition any manifestation of spiritual life. He needs to believe in his immortality with the purpose of finding a meaning for his life, but he sees death before him and is unable to truly overcome it so that being and becoming, unity and multiplicity, spirit and matter, absolute and contingent, goodness and evil, whole and nothingness remain as a permanent condition that he has to face. The world becomes split in two, taking the form of a system of dilemmas, of a single great dilemma, and our soul continues in its perennial questioning from which it is not capable of escaping. The mystery of life is not an unknown but an antinomy. If the mystery of life were only about the unknown, individuals could abandon themselves to the bliss of ignorance; however, confronted by antinomy, they have no rest. Even so, I cannot become aware of a thesis without being also conscious of its antithesis. This problem compels me to look for a solution even though I am conscious that this solution will turn into the thesis of yet a new antinomy, one that demands a new antithesis and a new solution. Nevertheless, this is not the solution of another problem but the real solution to the first problem, which is not true because it is a solution that posits itself as a new thesis, which is only conceivable apart from every other antinomy. Unless we can break this series of antinomies once and for all, the solution to the first problem, no matter how elementary or obvious it may appear to us, cannot be considered a solution. The first problem turns into the last one and it vanishes into indistinct vagueness. If I think, I cannot help but return to the first step. The airplane is the solution of an immense series of antinomies. However, the beginning of the αρkή of the airplane is still today Thale’s problem. This is so true that there are those who, after having flown and gone around the world and found the solution to uncountable problems, desperate or strongly convinced of themselves, in order not think anymore or to think more, to live without God or to find God again, return to a life in the woods. They return there to remain if inertia takes over them the same way inertia could have kept them in the vortex of the mechanical civilization. However, if energies don’t let them down, they will come out of it again and, then, they will take new paths and reach new goals in a continuous alternation of a beginning and an end constantly converting one into the other and constantly separate: from war to peace and from peace to war, from work to rest and from rest to work in a Faustian state of mind that never calms down.

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The antinomy of thought corresponds to the same antinomy of nature since both are products of the antinomy existing between nature and thought. In the same way, just as my mind is constantly oscillating between problem and solution, so my body constantly passes from need to satisfaction and vice versa. Entangled as I am in the antinomy of their relationship, I am not able to separate the problem of the mind from the problem of the body. At a certain point, when thought vacillates and gives in to the inertia that follows effort, this antinomy shifts to the center of the other antinomies, making my body the only priority. My pen stops, my heart closes up, my generous hand withdraws, and I give in to hunger and sleep. I experience the pleasure of breathing, eating, sleeping, having sex, moving my muscles, and all the other joys of animal life. I feel great happiness, and I realize that humanity has considered it as its greatest joy. I also realize that only a saint has the strength to overcome this happiness by enduring the punishment of the flesh. The saint can overcome this joy because he has resolved the antinomy, and he believes in God.

…

To resolve the antinomy, indeed, means to find God. However, no matter how hard I try, I can only think of God as the solution to all antinomies: as knowledge fulfilled. Yet, if such a theory were true, and I knew for a fact that God really existed, with this certainty I would resolve all my problems, and I would be one with God: for knowing the existence of God would mean to be assured of the essence of God, which is knowledge. The problem, of which the revealed religion had an intuition, has been resolved through the testimony of the word of God, of the logos. Consequently, without this testimony religion would collapse. The believer is not capable of overcoming the positivist base of his faith constituted by the fact of revelation. The unbeliever may not place himself on a different plane and consequently accept the religious positivism—​that is, the criterion of the fact of revelation—​and notice that this fact does not exist because the presumed divine word is not the whole divine word and it cannot therefore reveal the divinity by remaining particular. From this point of view, the historical criticism of revelation is superfluous, and all documentation placed as foundation of religion can be considered accepted as true. What one questions is the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God with the fact of revelation understood in the traditional sense. Even if that fact repeated itself today before my eyes and I were sure of not dreaming, faith could not emerge in me in a rational way. That fact would be a phenomenon that is added to the infinite other phenomena which I experience, miraculous

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and mysterious as the others, even if, different from the others, is absolutely new for me. If a being with or without human features appeared and resuscitated the dead or stopped the course of the sun, I would certainly find myself before a new problem. However, I would not be able to place it on a level different from the one involving the problem of birth, growing up, and death of a person. If this being talked and revealed itself to be God, I could not give that God other meaning than that of being different from us, more powerful than all other human beings; I could attribute to him all the powers conceivable as supernatural but not for this reason I could recognize him as God and see in him the realization of the world. The antinomy would remain unresolved as the fact that in the same soul of the religious person at times resurfaces the perennial but, and consequently, next to God, other gods are placed or against God the devil grins. The gods are seen as the multiplicity in which the unity of God is divided while the devil represents the antithesis of the thesis, the illusion before reality, the resurface of the antinomy that seemed resolved. In order for doubt not to reappear and for me to be sure that I am before God and not before the devil, I would need God to talk to me and reveal the solution to all my problems, to give me all his knowledge, which will dispel my doubts so that no other antinomy can emerge until I know the reason for my and God’s existence, the reason for our relationship, and the rules that should guide my actions. Only then will I know that God really exists and that I am no different from him because his wisdom will be my wisdom. Otherwise, I have no knowledge and I limit myself in believing in a God who talked, who gave laws wrapped in dogma and mystery. The God in whom I believe, and who should represent the greatest spiritual value of all, that is, spirit itself, becomes nature and, therefore, a problem—​just like everything else in nature. As my God, he tells me: do not kill unless you wish to lose your soul; as fire, he tells me: if you get too close, you will burn. I am a slave of God in the same way I am a slave of nature, and just as I stand before nature, I am either resigned or rebellious. My enslavement only ends when I succeed in loving God to the extent that God becomes everything for me: spirit, value, goals. God is no longer a problem but a solution, peace for my soul and the solution to a series of antinomies that would give no rest to my thoughts. Such a love, which is not merely the blind passion of a weak soul, can only be imagined by me as the shadowless light of pure rationality. If this light is out of reach, my faith becomes yet another fact to be placed alongside other facts about me, like the color of my hair or the strength of my muscles: a mere fact of my conscience, not unlike my instinct of self-​defense, the pleasure to satisfy my body, love, hatred, and all the other passions. I don’t know why I must not kill. If I knew, I would not kill even without God’s Commandment. God either commands me

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like a slave or he must explain the reason of this Commandment by explaining the world to me. This is the antinomy of religion, and I don’t see how I can overcome it. Above all, I don’t understand what the merit of the believer may mean. In reality, the admiration that is reserved to religious people is directed to the effort that they make to find the true God by rejecting the contingent solutions or by moving from antinomy to antinomy toward the achievement of the final solution. In this manner, faith of having found with faith and the anxiety of finding are intertwined in human judgment. If we understand God as the principle or the essence of the world, we cannot deny this principle without denying the world so that the difficulty is not to admit it rather to admit it as solution or as problem. Religious people who have faith in revelation believe that they can admit it. However, they recognize that the revelation is not complete, that the antinomies are not all resolved, and that the dogma or mystery persists. Consequently, solution proves to be apparent, and the true God resurrects in their soul as dogma or mystery, that is, as problem. If revelation is the presupposition of religion, I cannot be religious because God did not reveal himself to me. If revelation is not necessary, the more religious I am, the more intensely I posit God’s problem, and the more I try to find a solution. As far as the partial revelation that we assume present in a particular religious myth, I have no reason to reject it since the whole world that surrounds me is a miracle, is partial revelation, and being such, transforms itself into antinomy. What I don’t understand is how this partial revelation can be used as orientation since it does not lose its partiality or its problematicity; how its word can acquire for me a meaning that overcomes materialism and becomes a spiritual value. Being, value, and God are still far away while antinomy reaffirms itself relentlessly. … 8.3

Life as Art

In La vita come arte (1941), and later in La vita come amore. Tramonto della civiltà cristiana (1953), Spirito shed light on other manifestations of the ‘problematic’ condition that he had begun to explore in La vita come ricerca. He wrote: The fundamental problem remained the same, but it found a different articulation so that the continuity among the three books is explicitly revealed in the introductions.”12 12 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 31. The introductory chapters have respectively the titles of “Dalla vita come ricerca alla vita come arte”(“From Life as Search to Life as Art”) and “Vita come ricerca, arte, amore” (“Life as Search, Art, Love”).

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Here, the philosopher tried to verify if the immediate life, that is, a life grounded on “instinct, impulse, passion, and sense,”13 included a comprensive vision of life capable of overcoming the antinomies that philosophy failed to resolve. For him, such a life was antagonistic to the mediated or philosophical life, which was based on the rational understanding of human actions. He made it clear that while awareness corresponded to the immediate life, self-​awareness characterized the mediated life. Consequently, he claimed that “awareness [could] only be life while self-​awareness ha[d]‌to be absolutely philosophy.”14 At the same time, he linked the concept of immediate life to art as in “life as art.” In this context, the meaning of art was not limited to the traditional aesthetic values that referred to “taste, imagination, intuition, fantasy, and genius,”15 but expanded to include all that which throughout the centuries had been considered outside rationality (and therefore, philosophy), including dream and unreality. However, he also recognized the limits associated with this view: If the conception of life as art is founded on the contradiction of art and philosophy, synonyms of awareness and self-​awareness, the definition of life as a dream, so many times repeated by poets and philosophers, will not appear strange. When human thought tried to understand the difference between dream and awakening and attempted at the same time to clarify the concept of unreality and reality, which seems to be constitutive aspects of them, it was forced to recognize the character of continuity, organicity, and wider comprehensiveness to philosophy.16 For a philosopher like Spirito who was looking for new certainties, “life as art,” although possessing cognitive values, could not bring awareness to the level of self-​awareness, thus failing to satisfy the demand of the absolute unity of all the aspects of reality that typically is entrusted to philosophy since only the latter could generate an all-​comprehensive interpretation of life due to the rational foundations of its principles. At most, “life as art” could be interpreted as life of an “awareness yearning for a self-​awareness that remained elusive.”17 At the same time, Spirito reminded us that even philosophy had not been able to attain true self-​awareness, as in the case of Gentile’s actual idealism and 13 14 15 16 17

Ugo Spirito, La vita come arte (Florence: Sansoni, 1941), p. 16. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., pp. 21–​22. Ibid., p. 21.

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of his own “constructive actual idealism” that generated problematicism. He added that truth and the absolute would be reached again when self-​awareness became the solution of the antinomy: “Awareness and self-​awareness are two forms of awareness until true self-​awareness, which is the solution of the antinomy, is not reached.”18 The antinomy between art and philosophy was not resolved, and the tension in Spirito’s mind remained unchanged, leaving him with an intellectual anxiety that needed to be further examined. 8.4

La vita come arte (pp. 17–​18; 20–​21) [Translation]

Common sense attests, in the most varied and necessarily unforeseen ways, to the affirmation of human life through the forces by which one feels its presence without having the possibility of knowing its origin or dominating its development. Therefore, it is necessary to render this assertion more explicit so that we can accept it or reject it after we have clarified the difference that exists among the various human actions, considered the expression of such forces, and the action characterized by our total control. If we call immediate the first manner of action and mediate the second, we need to specify what we mean by the process of mediation. It is enough to pose the problem in this way so that the two terms can be transformed into many analogical couples: particular and universal, sensation and reflection, illogical and logical, fragmentary and systematic. Mediation becomes the synonym of reason, and the control of our action implies its rational motivation. I dominate my action as I frame it in the system of my actions, I carry it out in a coherent relationship with all other actions and I demonstrate the need for it. … Having clarified in detail the distinction between immediate and mediated, awareness and self-​awareness and obliged to admit the existence of the first term (due to our inability to resolve the metaphysical problem) and to exit the stage of pure inquiry, we need now to examine life outside the sphere of philosophy in order to define its characteristics and the reasons that prevent us from raising this consideration to the level of philosophy, that is, to the level where awareness becomes self-​awareness. The two terms are commonly understood as opposition between nature and spirit. Not ruled by thought, the immediate is a life not different from the animal level. There is no doubt that an animal possesses a certain degree of consciousness, but its life is natural 18

Ibid., p. 30.

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rather than spiritual because its conscience, incapable of reaching self-​analysis, never arrives at a rational level. This interpretation of the immediate life arises from the presupposition that self-​awareness can manifest itself and that reason can become one with the universal. This vision also implies that spirituality is synonymous with rationality. The person who is unable to recognize the rational dimension of his own experiences is forced to extend the meaning of the immediate life to include all that lies outside the realm of rationality and cannot be reduced to the animal world. Therefore, being neither a logical act nor a philosophical one, the immediate life can still perform creative and cognitive actions and be capable of exercising judgment. Our inquiry must be directed to what is considered different from thought and, depending on the situation, is identified as sensibility, taste, imagination, intuition, fantasy, and genius. Although the immediate life goes beyond the realm of the animal world, it does not reach the level of logical reality or explicit self-​awareness. If we define this as nature, it is then the nature that lifts itself from the animals and the trees up toward the greatness of the genius. This nature reveals itself as nature of God. This human world outside the realm of philosophy, is given the name of art. 8.5

Aspects of the Problematic Life

Il problematicismo stands as a moment of reflection within the evolution of Spirito’s philosophy. In this book, the philosopher associated problematicism with the widespread European crisis of values that World War ii made even worse: Economic crisis, political crisis, social crisis, crisis of the arts, of science, of faith, that is moral crisis or crisis of all values that enlightens life.19 The philosopher went even further and identified the crisis with “the epilogue of modern thought,”20 which he held was rooted in the metaphysics of the ‘I’, characterized by the “methodic doubt, by the analysis of one’s conscience, by the desire to possess one’s own self and, through it, the world.”21 He expressed the ‘critical’ nature of this metaphysics in the following terms:

19 20 21

Ugo Spirito, Il problematicismo (Florence: Sansoni, 1948), p. 11. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 18.

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From pre-​criticism [of Humanism and Renaissance] to hypercriticism, modern thought undertakes, between hopes and disappointments, the long and tormented path of doubt. Human beings progress continuously by saying ‘I’, and every time they utter this word, a solution is transformed into a problem, and the crisis emerges. They affirm this word in religion, and, from Reformation to modernism, heresy corrodes institutions and faiths; they affirm it in philosophy, and antinomy of subject and object no longer gives to thought while the sense of reality is lost. At the present, they begin to affirm it in science, and science reveals the first symptoms of subjective indefiniteness. … In trying to find in themselves the guarantee of truth, they could not stop at any statement that would give them the certainty of the definitive, and they ended up by giving up the definitiveness as if such a renunciation were a conclusion.22 Lastly, he envisioned problematicism as the contemporary manifestation of the failure of idealist philosophers to hold to any of the metaphysical certainties that they had been asserting from Kant to Gentile’s actual idealism. Indeed, antinomy re-​emerged right from within Gentile’s claim of having resolved all dualities through its reform of the dialectic. According to him: This means that the dialectic process, far from generating conclusions, remains the problem of life captured in its antinomic dramatic form. Problematic dialecticism contraposes itself to metaphysical dialecticism.23 For Hervé A. Cavallera, “Problematicism is undoubtedly the highest expression of awareness of the crisis of the time in Italy.”24 In this translated piece, Spirito clarifies the ‘problematic’ condition. 8.6

Il problematicismo (pp. 44–​50)25 [Translation]

Idealists believed to have established a new concept of philosophy by identifying philosophy with history, and through such an identification, they 22 Ibid., p. 32. 23 Ibid., p. 48. 24 Cavallera, Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile, p. 159. 25 The translated excerpts from Il problematicismo and La vita come amore follow closely the anthological selection of excerpts of Spirito’s works made by Hervé A. Cavallera in the previously mentioned book.

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formulated, in the most rigorous way, the idea that knowing and action are one and the same. However, once we recognize that the purely contemplative moment cannot be eliminated, we fall back through it on the old concept of philosophy, thus reaffirming the demand of realism. The debate on intellectualism wanes; consequently, the presumed definitive overcoming of realism comes to represent one of the many intellectualistic forms of modern thought. Victory has proven to be an illusion, and the crisis of thought reappears with even greater intensity. In fact, the crisis reaches extreme proportions because the principle of intellectualism as contemplation of a presupposed reality confronts itself with the becoming, the process, and the emergence of the subject. In short, spiritual activity is affirmed by idealists as something that can never be presupposed because it constitutes the only unique positing of reality itself. The most obvious contradiction takes over the whole thought so that the culminating point of anti-​intellectualism transforms itself in the culminating point of intellectualism. This intellectualism makes the subject the object of contemplation and defines the spirit the same way it defines nature. The infinite, in becoming an entity, identifies itself once again with the whole, which is again likely to be defined, and the vicious cycle reaffirms itself in the most absurd way. The attempt to avoid the logic of reasoning against skepticism fails miserably, and this reasoning resurfaces mercilessly against the philosophy of idealism as well as against any system that claims to identify the whole remaining outside of it. Having reached the most extreme form of intellectualism, modern criticism posits itself as problematicism. This problematicism finds itself confronted once again with the argument used against skepticism and with the full awareness of the inability on the part of all the other philosophies (whether skeptical or not skeptical) to overcome it. The historical observation upon which awareness is founded does not allow for any kind of wishful thinking. The scientific ideal of modern thought—​excluding any gratuitous statement and abiding to what has been proven—​remains uncontested. When the problem is posited in this fashion, it becomes clear that, from the start, the only thing that is proven is the very problem itself, the legitimacy of which is attested by the need to reach the scientific ideal. The one thing I can affirm without the fear of being proven wrong is that I feel the desire to conclude my discourse, removing from it any contradiction that would make the conclusion impossible or self-​serving. As long as I am in such a predicament, trying to get out of this situation while not really feeling as though I have truly come out of it, the critical quest turns into any sort of dogmatism. Problematicism becomes incontrovertible, and, as I said, one with criticism. …

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Moving from these observations and from the historical awareness thereby implied, problematicists cannot give to their conclusions the same meaning that they give to other conclusions. They must take it outside the level in which all other conclusions find themselves, and for which all are susceptible to a single confutation. This change of level occurs when problematicists explicitly recognize the contradiction of their own conclusion. Indeed, unlike all other conclusions, that of the problematicists is no longer neglected, but confirmed by observing its contradictory nature. … The consequence that derives as a historiographical criterion is that no philosophy can be considered definitive, and every conclusion reveals itself as either conclusive, non-conclusive, or contradictory. If the contradiction were not implicit in the conclusion, it would not be open to further development and it would conclude the spiritual process, marking the end of life. Having become conscious of the dialectic process of life, the followers of dialectic hypothesize life in the form of a conclusion that, unlike the others, places itself outside the process, thus becoming its guarantor. This is the conclusion that defines the Absolute26 and reaffirms being vis-​à-​vis becoming. The followers of problematicism, however, having realized the dialectic process of life, don’t believe that they have the authority to take the necessary steps to see the essence of reality in the very same dialectic process. They also claim that those steps are illegitimate and contradictory because they lead to a conclusion that is not dialectic. This means that the dialectic process, far from generating conclusions, remains the problem of life captured in its antinomic dramatic form. Problematic dialecticism contraposes itself to metaphysical dialecticism. While the first is forced to postulate a non-​dialectic Absolute, which empties of meaning the metaphysical assumption to ­confirm itself, the second leans toward a non-​dialectic Absolute without knowing whether it is compatible with the very same dialectic. The difference between the two positions needs to be clarified so that the confutation of the former has no impact on the latter. By recognizing that the contradiction was not raised to a metaphysical plane, problematic dialecticism has no reason to reject the accusations directed against itself. Anytime we observe, for example, that the nature of inquiry implies a certain knowledge of what is being looked into; anytime we notice that the need for a yet to be possessed Absolute already reveals the conscience we have of the Absolute; anytime we object that problematicism is revealed through a logical discourse that presupposes a criterion of truth 26

The use of the upper case for ‘Absolute’ conforms to the original text.

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and a faith in reason; and anytime we object that a philosophy understood as inquiry is still a philosophy or a system that exists alongside others affirming its superiority; and anytime we consider that these similar forms of criticism are directed at problematicism, we have to recognize that they are accurate and that the contradictions of problematicism have been disclosed. However, such an admission is not enough to overcome the phase of inquiry because it represents one side of the problem, which has another side with a completely antithetical meaning. Then the followers of problematicism, though recognizing that the search for the Absolute implies the concept and the possession of the Absolute, are not capable of explaining it and do not go beyond a demand whose indefiniteness they vainly attempt to eliminate. By the same token, if they are forced to admit an implicit logical faith in their reasoning, they are not able to translate in explicit terms what is implicit in it and to develop a logic that satisfies them. And if they finally agree that the status and nature of inquiry is philosophical, they cannot see it as a point of arrival but only as a hope. Therefore, they are unable to rebuke the accusation of being in contradiction or have the possibility of deducting the consequences that critics would like to derive from it. 8.7

Life as Love

In La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana, Spirito embarked on a new attempt to overcome problematicism. He could not remain in the state of doubt and negation because the need for a positive solution to the antinomy kept re-emerging in his mind. A new thesis caught his attention and momentarily absorbed all his intellectual energies. If “life as art” was not the venue to overcome the ‘problematic’ condition, then, perhaps, the social dimension of life, that is love, could integrate the individual into society, thereby creating a superior synthesis where ‘mine’ became ‘yours.’ According to Spirito, neither the Christian nor the Marxist concept of love could identify ‘mine’ with ‘yours.’ Both were manifestations of the ‘I’, the former involving a judgment of value that resulted in the division of humanity between those who condemned and those who were condemned, while the latter led to a class conflict that placed proletarians and bourgeois against each other. In both, the duality between subject and object and between ‘self’ and ‘others’ remained. Spirito, instead, based his understanding of love on “not knowing,” on the denial of the value judgment, and on the abolition of the class conflict. This new vision of love would lead to a complete incorporation of the ‘self’ into the ‘object.’ Consequently, he proposed

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a society of individuals who don’t judge, and who refuse to be subjects; a society of objects. Object is God, object is others, object is the self.27 This solution implied the rejection of the centrality of the ‘I’, and with it, the overcoming of Christian civilization upon which the ‘self’ was anchored.28 Notwithstanding the philosophical effort made in elaborating this new theory of love, Spirito’s solution remained short of overcoming the antinomy it was meant to resolve. The philosopher realized that his understanding of love could live only in an idealized world, while in the reality of daily life the prevailing system of values denied the very meaning of “not knowing.” La vita come amore remained only a proposal that failed to offer a definite solution to his internal tensions. In the following excerpt, Spirito portrays the non-​judgmental character of love that allows individuals to know each other and live without any prejudices. 8.8

La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (pp. 32–​36) [Translation]

Outside the windows, birds sing and leaves rustle in the wind. I feel happiness and melancholy in my soul. If I think it over, I realize that happiness and melancholy share the same fullness of life that the singing of the birds and the rustling of the leaves do. They cannot help but confirm the realization of the harmony of the reality that surrounds me—​and of which I am a manifestation—​as well as the infinite majesty of the universe. Yet, I am also aware of my inability to capture that infiniteness, represented by the singing of the birds, which I can hear both within me as well as coming from outside. Even though I try hard to interpret their singing and through their singing, their life, their flying, their participation in the system of nature, I admit that I am incapable of understanding their uniqueness or even singing their song. However, I do not tire of listening to them. On the contrary, I progressively try to understand them and dissolve the fine boundary that separates them from me just as it

27 28

Ugo Spirito, La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (Florence: Sansoni, 1953), p. 296. In reconsidering in Dall’attualismo al problematicismo this moment of his philosophical inquiry, Spirito added the following observation: “If Cristian civilization is fading, it does not happen because love is disappearing, but only because the Christian conception of love is fading. True love must be different, and its roots must adhere to present reality. If we give up Christian love is only because we want to set up a different civilization that can root the feeling of love at a level infinitely higher.” P. 33.

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separates me from the rustling of the leaves. I am keenly aware that between the birds and the leaves there is an even finer boundary than that existing between them and me, and I ask myself if this is because I have closed my heart to true understanding by substituting judgment for understanding. An A is an A, a bird is a bird, a leaf is a leaf, and I am here, enclosed in my finiteness, restricting both birds and leaves to their own finiteness. Do not judge. Do not seclude yourself by shutting others out. Try to see things by becoming one with them. Things are no longer seen as just things, but rather as leaves, birds, and people. Above all, men have become others, the others. The flock of birds that circles above the sky becomes a single entity, miraculously changing direction, turning and returning in perfect unity. We have called this miracle instinct, and everything has been stifled in a definition. In the army square, as we marveled at the synchronized movements of the soldiers, we thought about the unity of it all. However, this unity immediately appeared as both external and superficial: every soldier in their marching was an isolated entity, separated from the other by an abyss. The fact is that we do not understand each other, and we do not understand each other because we are focused on judging each other. On the one side, there is you and on the other, me. I am the judge, and you are the judged one. I am good and you are bad. The dialogue that we establish among ourselves is always restricted to this initial presupposition so that the sound of your words can be used to confirm my judgment. Sometimes, however, the dialogue leads to a deeper understanding, and the otherness is toned down. Suddenly your words, as if through a spell, take on a different meaning. Your actions acquire a different interpretation, your viciousness softens, and we find each other on the same level, embracing one another to become we. We against the others. We are the judges, and the others are the judged ones. We are the good ones and the others are the bad ones. This is what life teaches us every day; however, the teaching does not make us aware of the initial error—​the error of our vain, judgmental attitude. Our objective should be to get close to the other to understand and establish a dialogue without any initial prejudice so that the sense of otherness will finally disappear. This change in attitude constitutes life as an art enriched by the desire to understand. It remains to be seen, however, if this effort we made to understand others qualifies as love, for love defined in this manner defies all its previous rhetorical meaning. Currently, as soon as we finish pronouncing the word love, our mind immediately turns to the Christian conception of love. This, in turn, generates the demand for a confrontation of positions that becomes the condition for the next stage of the journey. The coincidence of the word cannot be only a

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semantic factor that excludes the complexity of the problem. The problem remains the same. It changes the manner of presenting it. The identity of the problem is established by the anti-​intellectualistic demand typical of Christianity, which understood that between knowledge and love there is the same distance that intervenes between finite and infinite and that the reason for the irreconcilability of the two terms stems from our need to judge. Christianity explicitly admonished not to judge. Yet, if all this implies the identity of the problem, then the consequences will be quite different and will lead to two opposing and reciprocally exclusive conceptions. Christianity, despite the thou shall not judge, contains an explicit metaphysics that cannot help but offer a wholly different meaning to both thou shall not judge and the love that should qualify it. Because there is a metaphysics, there is also a criterion of judgment and, therefore, the possibility of making a judgment. Admonition cannot be stifled in a moral precept without running the risk of being altered in its most profound meaning. If there is a metaphysics, then there is also a criterion, and there is also a law. Christianity revolts against law and, for the same reason, law resurrects, and with law, the judgment. Thou shall not judge becomes a law that presupposes judgment. The thou shall not judge of life as love, instead, is the non-​judgment of the one who cannot judge because he does not know. This has nothing to do with law, with precept, or with duty, but with impossibility. Unlike Christianity, not to judge is not founded upon a metaphysics, but on the lack of a metaphysics, which is not purposely contradictory. 8.9

Theory of Omnicentrism

Spirito was always very conscious of the difficulty of overcoming the ‘problematic’ condition. In Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, he wrote: The history of problematicism has been marked by the disappointment that follows every step of my journey. I am always aware of being able to extricate myself from it, and constantly doubt reappears stronger than before, forcing me to make new efforts to overcome it and satisfy new illusions. This explains why I was never able to overcome La vita come ricerca or, at the same time, to explicitly confirm it. Above all, this explains why the philosophical activity never stops while generating new certainties and new faiths. The contradiction, always recognized and confessed, is

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unable to take the upper hand and is continuously giving way to the possibility of reaching positive conclusions.29 The next attempt to find a solution to problematicism coincided with the formulation of the hypothesis of omnicentrism, as expressed in Inizio di una nuova epoca (1961b) and reprinted in the previously mentioned book (pp. 43–45): Another hypothesis within problematicism is omnicentrism, developed in concert with the relativistic currents of contemporary thought. According to this hypothesis, relativism is intrinsically right, but represents only an implicit necessity. Its most evident truth consists of the hypothesis of the positivity and centrality of each thing, of every point of the universe. The Copernican revolution was not yet understood in its metaphysical dimension and [Giordano] Bruno’s thought, in the Renaissance, must be reconsidered and developed beyond its historical realization. In the essay dedicated to the transition “Dal problematicismo all’onnicentrismo,” in Inizio di una nuova epoca, the demands of La vita come ricerca are reaffirmed, and none of the conclusions is rejected. The results of the philosophical exploration elaborated by problematicism for more than two decades have been considered essential. “La vita come ricerca is followed by La vita come arte, that is, by the concept of a life lived in its immediacy contraposed to the mediated life and to the self-​ awareness of philosophy. Subsequently, this immediacy had to be represented in conformity to a logic that derived from the object of the very same inquiry, and more precisely, from the explicit consciousness of that object. When such a consequence emerged in unequivocal terms, “life as art” became “life as love,” that is, effort made to understand otherness, unifying subject and object.”30 Indeed, this transition convinced some people to think that problematicism had ended and that my philosophy had become again metaphysical and dogmatic. This objection was not valid for the simple fact that ny inquiry implies that the new journey would take a certain direction. “I cannot envision how one could do differently. At this point, we can ask: “If we take a certain direction, does it imply a definitive closing to all the other directions? Problematicists believed that they could answer

29 30

Ibid., p. 43. Ugo Spirito, Inizio di una nuova epoca (Florence Sansoni, 1966), p. 263.

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in two ways, rooted in the same principle. They affirmed that the choice of the direction had been made only in relation to a hypothes is to be proven until it consented a certain hope. However, this hypothesis could be substituted as soon as it revealed itself to be ephemeral and inconclusive. Secondly, they added that the hypothesis was coneived in a way that it reconciled itself with the demand of infinite directions, and therefore, with the most profound meaning of problematicism.31 At this juncture, the transition from La vita come amore to omnicentrism began to emerge. The notion of “I don’t know,” which was the foundation of [problematicism] was replaced by the question if it was possible to doubt and “not to know.” The answer was categorical: “Life, that is, the word, is a radical act of affirmation because it allows me to doubt everything and everyone. However, I cannot doubt the criterion by which I doubt, thus raising doubt itself to the dimension of absolute knowledge. Therefore, I know; there is no way I cannot know. Consequently, the fundamental principle of problematicism finds itself overturned. And the journey starts again as an explicit and unquestionable beginning.”32 The new starting point manifests itself through the splitting of the word into a word that one utters and the uttered word. When I talk, I cannot help but give an absolute value to all that I say. Soon after, I can also doubt what I said and even totally negate it. However, both situations are true and indisputable. This is the reason why each philosopher is certain to tell the truth, even if history denies it. My all life has been this way. Now, I cannot act differently. I cannot help that my yesterday’s word appears relative to me, while the word that I am uttering possesses the certainty of the absolute. However, if tomorrow I doubt today’s word, how can’t I doubt today? No matter the effort I can make, I cannot utter a word that doubts its own meaning. We are dealing with two observations which I can’t ignore and that force me to express the antinomy of problematicism in terms different from the original ones.33 At this point, the omnicentrist hypothesis is born. According to this hypothesis, each word—​just like every other aspect of the universe—​ is a manifestation of the whole implicit in it: the unification of the microcosm with the macrocosm.34 Expressed in these terms, the omnicentrist hypothesis seems to repeat the principle of today’s relativism 31 Ibid., p. 265. 32 Ibid., p. 268. 33 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 45. 34 Spirito, Inizio di una nuova epoca, p. 278.

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for which everything is relative. For relativism to become coherent, it is necessary that it overturns its fundamental principle by transforming it from negative into positive while affirming that not everything is relative, rather that everything is absolute.35 For Spirito, each hypothesis acquires the same importance, and each can be considered the center of the universe, due to the “principle of non-​exclusion,” which allows omnicentrism to manifest itself. This principle is based on the two conflicting aspects of exclusion (“each hypothesis ignores every other hypothesis while asserting itself”)36 and inclusion (“each hypothesis includes all the other hypotheses, accepting, among others, even the one that represents its very negation”).37 Therefore, the “omnicentrist hypothesis” leads simultaneously to the possession of truth and to its negation, thus denying the possibility of reaching a definitive result. By failing to prove that there is only a single expression of truth, the omnicentrist hypothesis does not overturn the principle of relativism that affirms the existence of an infinity of points of view to which corresponds an equally infinity of subjective truths. In Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, Spirito made it clear that omnicentrism was a hypothesis and only a hypothesis that “could not be overcome or verified.”38 In the translated excerpt, Spirito clarifies the concepts of “omnicentrist hypothesis” and relativism. 8.10

Inizio di una nuova epoca (pp. 275–​280) [Translation]

In the history of philosophy, antinomy, not only has not yet found a solution, but expanded its presence to every aspect of life. Nobody can talk without attributing absolute value to his own word and, at the same time, nobody can hope that the absolute value attributed to his own word might be recognized by others. If tomorrow I doubt of today’s word, why not express doubts about it? One can become more knowledgeable of the characteristics of antinomy by moving from the consideration of the history of human thought to that of the history of one’s thinking. I am here writing what I am writing, and I am living 35 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 45. 36 Spirito, Inizio di una nuova epoca, pp. 285. 37 Ibid., pp. 285–​286. 38 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 46.

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according to the conviction of my statements. If when I write, I have doubts, I would express them. However, in expressing them, I would also transcend them because I am aware of their absolute certainty. Therefore, I am living the absolute. Nevertheless, even yesterday I wrote in the same way and with equal commitment. Today, as I read again what I wrote, I have doubts about it and, consequently, I notice its limits and even renege on it or destroy it. Yesterday and today: two words expressed with the same conviction and with the same awareness of the absolute—​one relative and ephemeral, the other absolute and assertive. This is my concrete experience. All my life has been like this. Now, I cannot act differently: I cannot help that my yesterday’s word appears relative to me, while the word that I am uttering possesses the certainty of the absolute. If I talk, my word becomes the joy of the world and resounds in me with sure evidence. I can also admit that tomorrow I will doubt it, but for now this word is my entire life and to express doubt has no meaning. The antinomy has become part of my conscience. Now, I can no longer laugh about the certainty with which philosophers talk about prophets: I also talk, and I cannot help but talk in the same manner, even if day after day, and even hour after hour, I become the witness of the congealing of my word, its progressive restriction and, finally, its resolving into another word. If all philosophers delude themselves, so I deluded and continue to delude myself. I have totally internalized the problem and I cannot help but deal with it. If the certainty of my word is an illusion, I also need to find an explanation for it. I can no longer attribute naïveté or folly to philosophers from Talhes [of Miletus] on. I must look for a word, a way of expressing myself that reflects awareness of the illusion of the absolute. It is necessary that the consciousness of tomorrow—​which is different from that of the present—​removes from today’s word its unlimited presumption of truth. No matter the effort I can make, I cannot utter a word that doubts its own meaning. The observation of the antinomy that goes hand in hand with the entire history of my thought is not strong enough to stop me and to eliminate the apodictic dimension present in my discourse. I will continue to express myself with absolute conviction and at the same time experience the decay of my word from absolute to relative. The awareness of this fact and the impossibility of changing it are the only elements at my disposition that make me conscious of the situation in which I find myself. However, if the recognition that the certainty of my statement amounts to only to an illusion and yet does not permit me to change my attitude, it means that at least it is an illusion sui generis, whose peculiarity must induce me to structure the problem ex novo, in more adequate and non-​contradictory terms. It is necessary to see if, far from

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being an illusion, the terms of the antinomy are both valid, and if the antinomy is not just a pure appearance since thesis and antithesis can and must coexist without excluding each other.

…

At this point, the omnicentrist hypothesis is born. According to this hypothesis, each word—​just like every other aspect of the universe—​is a manifestation of the whole implicit in it: the unification of the microcosm with the macrocosm. In the act of uttering a word, my entire reality—​and, therefore, all the reality of which I am a manifestation—​exists in that word and in that word only, so that, being nourished by the whole, it cannot help but have absolute value, being itself one with the absolute. On the contrary, once that same word is uttered, it becomes the object of a new consideration which centers itself on a new word, as the previous word becomes peripheral, a word among others, all parts of a different absolute center. Words are always absolute and yet always relative: always absolute in relation to the center and relative in relation to the periphery. It is not surprising then that my word as the center—​by the mere utterance of it—​is, and cannot help but be, aware of its own absoluteness. Then my word becomes relative in relation to a different word, transforming it into its object as an element of the universe that finds its own center. All philosophers, in truth all men, talk with an absolute voice since they are the absolute in the infinite determinations of reality that they represent. However, all their philosophies, even all their words, are arranged within the context of any other philosophy and of every other word in relation to the different perspective that each one of them constitutes. Expressed in these terms, the omnicentrist hypothesis appears to be a lot like common relativism. Indeed, even relativism claims the infinity of perspectives, and with it, the infinity of truths to which these perspectives correspond. Relativism, however, by claiming that everything is relative, is either limited to affirming nothing or to detaching the affirmation of relativity itself from its own criteria. This leaves us either with an inconclusive discourse or with a discourse that, by making itself absolute, contradicts itself at the very same time it attempts to affirm itself. Relativism constitutes the most salient aspect of contemporary thought. The most pressing preoccupation of every new philosophical current is that of avoiding the accusation of dogmatism conceived as metaphysical absolutization. Relativism has been viewed and continues to be viewed as a critical stance against any conceivable absolute. The whole anti-​metaphysical polemics is reduced to the interpretation of relativism as opposition to the

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absolute. In the meantime, relativism, notwithstanding its many attempts, failed to substantiate its position and free itself of its inherent contradiction. This is the reason for the continuous failure of anti-​metaphysics and for our constant finding out the dogmatic character of any philosophical current that aims to interpret anti-​metaphysics. The Achilles’ heel of anti-​metaphysics can always be found in the insurmountable vicious cycle of every skepticism, that is, in the necessary absolutist attitude of those who want to exclude the absolute. Contemporary relativism cannot have a plausible outcome along this path even if it continues to form the foundation of most of the philosophical inquiry today and, above all, of the spiritual atmosphere of our society, increasingly intolerant of rigid presuppositions and schemes. For relativism to become coherent and bear fruit—​thereby truly representing the revolutionary state of mind of our time—​it is necessary that it overturns its fundamental assumption by transforming it from negative to positive, thus freeing it from the necessity of contradicting itself. Not everything is relative, rather everything is absolute: the whole is in everything and, therefore, nothing is in vain.

­c hapter 9

Communism within Problematicism 9.1

Introduction

In La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (1953), Spirito included Marxism as part of his analysis of the nature and content of love. Further scrutiny of Marxism and communism in general brought him to the realization that if communism went beyond class struggle preached by Marxism, it would become a valid intellectual exploration leading to the negation of problematicism. Faith in the ideology of communism accompanied Spirito for most of his life until historical events demonstrated its impracticability. Indeed, strongly felt communist ideals were already incorporated in his fascist beliefs: At the Congress of Ferrara in 1932, I had to choose between fascism and communism. I chose fascism, which in its essence included communism. My fascism was my communism.1 The negative reception that his theory of “corporative ownership” received at the Congress of Ferrara and the closing of his journal Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica effected his gradual detachment from official fascism and his increased attention to communism. In Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), he wrote: “When fascism fell [July 1943], I was left only with my communism.”2 After having survived a trial organized by the Purge Committee for his past defense of fascism in 1944, Spirito slowly became associated with the communist ideology although, supposedly, he never became an official member of the Italian Communist Party. In fact, his relationship with Palmiro Togliatti, head of the party, was quite tense, if not confrontational. As a radical intellectual who opposed compromises and hidden maneuvers, he disliked Togliatti’s practical approach to Italian politics, since that approach, while allowing the adoption of fascist principles and clauses of the Vatican Agreements in the new Italian Constitution of 1946, put a damper on the revolutionary spirit that

1 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 63. 2 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_011

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had inspired Italian youth during the war against the German occupation at the end of World War ii. With time, he realized that culturally, communism was gaining ground steadily and was receiving a great deal of consents. There was a different world to discover.3 He followed that discovery. He visited Russia in 1956 and China in 1961, approving both Stalin’s type of planned economy and Mao Zedong’s radical economic solution of people commune. The international success of communism gave him the confidence that he had found in the implementation of anti-​capitalistic economic programs “other types of answers and suggestions,”4 that would help him to overcome the ‘problematic’ condition. In this sense, the interpretation of Marxism as the ideology that divided societies between proletarians and the bourgeoisie could no longer be considered valid if in the Soviet Union the class struggle had been eliminated and the division between private and public no longer existed. Valentina Meliadὸ observed: Spirito’s enthusiasm for what he saw in the USSR in 1956 was the enthusiasm of someone who had made a choice and meant not to give it up, notwithstanding the critical approach he used in the analysis of international socialism and of the dead people that had been and continued to be ‘necessary’ for the construction of the new society.5 Spirito evidenced the same enthusiam to the Chinese experiment. In the chapter “Comunismo Chinese” in Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (1962), he claimed that the Chinese proletariat was creating a totally new economic system based on the institution of commune and on a communism built on scientific principles. Several years later, he placed this experience in the context of his problematicism: When I returned from China, I also wrote about that new experience. I participated in many conferences in various Italian cities, reducing to the minimum the reasons for my perplexities. My problematicism tended to diminish the negative aspects. However, the hope in a new world arose 3 Spirito, Dall’attalismo al problematicismo, p. 34. 4 Ibid., p. 47. 5 Valentina Meliadὸ, “Ugo Spirito il rivoluzionario: dall’attualismo al problematicismo, Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito xx-​x xi (2008–​2009), p. 133.

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by virtue of states of mind, included those of sentiental nature. My search seemed to have found the first simpthom of a renewed faith. After the disappointment with fascism, my heart opened to new hopes. In particular, my consensus went to what I defined the Chinese humanism, which I conceived as having a profound universality. The meeting I had with Mao Zedong reinforced in me such an opinion.6 At the same time, in rethinking his communism, he referred to it as a metaphysics. In answering his own question about the content of this metaphysics, he wrote: My communism had been my metaphysics. If this same metaphysics was the metaphysics of actual idealism, then the communism had clearly been the communism of actual idealism. It had developed through the logic of idealistic thought in the same way as fascism. It had been the path of not only Marx but also of Hegel. From Kant onward, actual idealism had developed in relation to dialectic thought of which it had become the most advanced point in the history of idealism. … My communism, therefore, was a methaphysical communism, which placed itself on the same level of that idealism I had followed until 1935 or 1937. Then, for me, fascism ended, and with it, actual idealism. At this point, crisis became unavoidable. Yet problematicism was still capable of overcoming such a crisis, as a consequence, my philosophical position was enhanced from time to time by new metaphysical impulses. As a result, communism continued to attract me as much as it had when I was thinking as an actual idealist. In the immediate postwar period, the worldwide affirmation of communism and the success of the new regimes, recreated the illusion of a new order based upon the triumph of communism.7 Until the middle of the 1960s, Spirito’s optimism about the future of communism remained high even though he could not help but observe a weakening of the revolutionary spirit in the working class of the economically advanced European countries. In the first translated chapter, “Il comunismo russo” in Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese, Spirito held hopes for the future of communism. While visiting the Soviet Union with other left-​wing Italian intellectuals, he discovered

6 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 39. 7 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, pp. 71–​72.

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in Russian conviviality a human and social aspect that characterized communism in that part of the world—​a place where the phenomenon of lack of communication, so widespread in the Western world, did not exist due to the convergence of private and public aspect in Russian daily life. However, he also expressed concern about the process of détente initiated in 1956 after Stalin’s death. For him, that process would contaminate Russian communism with bourgeois values, thus paralyzing the revolutionary process. 9.2

“Comunismo russo”. In Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (pp. 6–​23; 34–​44) [Translation]

Moved by the desire to turn my attention to the future, I have written these observations in order to understand it and contribute to its realization. In them, I have collected not only my reflections and my study of communism, but also the benefit I gained from my direct experience of having spent nearly a month (from the end of September to the end of October in 1956) in the Soviet Union, visiting regions of both Russia and Central Asia. Prior to my trip to the Soviet Union, I had dealt many times with the question of communism and its future, and I did so by making a distinction between Russian and Western communism. I could only offer an intuitive evaluation of the two forms of communism since I lacked the direct experience, the details, and the nuances that would allow me to capture the true meaning of Russia’s spiritual reality. I spent almost a month in the Soviet Union, traveling constantly in order to capture as many aspects of Russian communism as possible by visiting regions unknown to me. The time spent there was clearly not enough to reach a real understanding of that vast and complex country. Though brief, the trip helped me to clarify a few fundamental ideas I had developed about communism, intent, as I was, on becoming acquainted with the peculiar characteristics of a revolution that was carried out in a country with customs and ­traditions different from my own. The information available through the Western media—​whether communist or anticommunist—​was not useful in helping me understand Russia’s revolution. The anticommunist information was too ideologically motivated in describing the situation in the Soviet Union as being characterized by squalor, sadness, and failure—​a situation that only a counter-​revolutionary process could redeem. On the other hand, the communist propaganda was also unenlightening. With their eyes closed to historical reality, the members of the pro-​communist press sought to convince the public that Russian communism should not only be seen as a model for the

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West, but one that could be transplanted through an analogous revolutionary process. In reality, no counter-​revolutionary power could destroy, in the Soviet Union, the people’s faith in communism and the will to defend it at any cost. At the same time, no revolutionary action in the West—​no matter how it was carried out—​could establish a socio-​political structure similar to the one existed in the Soviet Union. Any information or any action based on unilateral criteria has no chance of clarifying the situation and becoming a new path to the future. At any given moment, militant politics, which is always a politics of partisanship, must be nourished with values of a different political source. Without them, politics cannot but lose its sense of reality and will wind up acting without purpose, even contradicting its defined objectives. At present, Western communism and anticommunism live in an abstract world, creating unpredictable and deceitful programs. This behavior is chaotic on both sides, feeding itself with ordinary clichés aimed at imaginary targets that will diminish the same causes that were meant to be defended. Culture is the only political source that can function—​now more than ever—​in such a chaotic situation. Culture, understood as a source of thought and action outside of the political factions, enriches and absorbs those factions after having clarified their principles, thus enabling them to become more effective in society. Unfortunately, intellectuals have allowed themselves to be manipulated by both sides of the political spectrum to the point that they are unable to embrace a serene and more comprehensive vision of reality. They are thus impeded beforehand from reaching a higher level, which would allow them to expand their horizons and to discover new interpretative criteria leading to a unifying belief. In addition to being able to attack or defend their own beliefs, for the fight to be worthwhile, intellectuals need to understand and appreciate the core values of the opposing beliefs beyond the interference of destructive passions. After forty years of Soviet revolution, the theses of the communists and those of the anticommunists in the Western world have become completely useless and inapplicable. If we are to make an effective historical assessment, we must get to the root of the problem—​that is, consider the profound differences existing between Russian and Western communism. If we continue to consider the problem as though the two communisms had identical natures, we will close the door to any possibility of understanding it and, therefore, foreclose the possibility of taking effective political action to resolve it. Russian communism and Western communism are not only different, they are so heterogeneous that it is impossible for them to share the same historical destiny. A careful examination of the heterogenous nature of the two different forms of communism reveals that the path of Soviet communism is totally closed off to the West.

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If we wish to define in a single word the fundamental characteristic of Russian communism and its peculiarities in contrast to Western communism, we might use the term conviviality. It is a word descriptive of both the Russian as a person and a communist: it is the indissoluble bond that links the Russian soul with a communist regime that shares its nature and has accepted its identity. Conviviality is a term that is not easy to define in its various aspects, but the most familiar meaning can be easily illustrated. It denotes the atmosphere that develops around the table as people enjoy food and conversation, simultaneously satisfying physical and spiritual needs without distinguishing between the two of them, in a form of coexistence that transcends the reality of the individual, lifting everyone and everything to a higher plane. The importance that sitting at the table has for the Russian is not easily understood in the West. A Russian sees the table as a symbolic community, an anchor where anything from business transactions to games is carried out, and a table is revered as much for the conversation that takes place there as for the food itself. In essence, dialogue lies at the core of the Russian personality. That dialogue is still possible among Russians because they have not yet reached the Western existential drama, which is the lack of communication. Their sense of responsibility and their honesty are based on the sincerity of their spoken word and on the trust they place in it. The Russian approaches everyone with a smile, indicating an openness toward communication. Russian children are not shy around adults, not even around foreigners; they display a natural ease that can only be explained as the result of a continuous educational process emphasizing trustworthiness and confidence. Dialogue is possible because everyone trusts each other and because their socio-​political system fosters reciprocal understanding. This mutual assumption of trust explains the surprise and pain that a Russian feels when he faces someone who does not reciprocate. For example, in order to understand the Russian mindset with respect to Stalin, it is necessary to reflect on the drama produced by the certainty that Stalin lied. It is wrong to think that the Russian reaction to Stalin was due to his harshness, ruthlessness, or the sacrifices imposed upon them by his regime. To the Russian people, Stalin represented the truth, so all of his actions were readily accepted. Even the worst measures that he imposed were accepted as necessary. During his regime, they could not admit that Stalin was a liar. When the revisionist trials proved that he had indeed lied, his myth crumbled. The Machiavellian reality could justify Stalin to the West but not to the Russians. Of course, this faith in the truth and this reciprocal trust can only be understood within the context of a fundamental naїveté. Anything that to our sophisticated Western eyes might immediately appear as deceitful would be viewed by the Russians as indisputable truth if articulated by someone

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regarded as truthful. For instance, to nearly all Russians, Pravda is truly the Pravda (that is, the truth). Those who can’t grasp the concept are incapable of understanding Russian communism. From the humblest farmer to the most educated academician, the truth for a Russian exists as it is given to them. Let the experience I had among the most culturally sophisticated mem-​ bers of Russian society serve as testimony of this love for truth that the Russians cherish. During a visit at the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Moscow, I inquired about the teaching of philosophy in secondary schools and the universities. I was told that the fundamental subjects taught there were historical materialism, dialectical materialism and, at times, Marxism-​ Leninism. I inquired whether and in which sense there emerged a diversity of interpretations and a variety of currents in the study of Marxism. This ­question, which I repeated many times in other settings and at other universities, seemed to appear strange to them and I received very broad if not ­incomprehensible answers. Initially, I had the impression they were trying to evade the question. Later, I became convinced that the question I posited had no meaning for them. The proof was the sense of bewilderment I saw on their faces when I answered their query as to how philosophy was taught in Rome. I answered that my colleagues had many interpretations with regard to Marx-​ ism. With a sense of awe they would ask me, “Who teaches objective truth?” (Quid est veritas?) I replied by hinting at problematicism. Unfortunately, they could not understand my answer, and I became aware that the academicians felt a sense of pity for me.

…

There is no room for philosophical subtleties in Soviet society, but there is a definite place for objective truth and the faith that keeps it alive. This is the great secret of Russian communism. Dialogue is possible because there is a faith that unites everyone in spiritual communion, forming a strong church, I may add, that includes everyone—​a church on whose members one can count when there is a call to action. The Russian is a believer to the point of fanaticism; his faith unites him to his brethren with a power that allows for miracles It is a dogmatic faith which, despite its unbending discipline, has followers who are willing to make whatever sacrifice is required of them. Notwitstanding their suffering, the Russian people are fundamentally optimistic and happy. It is their spirit of collectivity that sustains them in their harsh battle for the future. No one feels isolated, and as a result of reciprocal support, each person gains the strength to continue his journey despite the pain. To live together for

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the good of the community: this is the lived (rather than theorized) motto of Soviet life. The first societas (society) is formed within the family nucleus where one is educated to become part of society at large. Indeed, a family functions in a productive environment without isolating itself as a monad with a life of its own. The factory, kholkos, and sovkos, together constitute the largest com-​ munity structures in which the humanity of the family realizes itself. The factory and the kolkos are not just economic organisms that partake of the workers’ lives, allowing the rest of their life to develop independently from those organisms. They are instead centers of life unto themselves and the focal point around which workers’ and farmers’ entire lives revolve: the house where they live, the market, the kindergarten, the hospital, the school, the cultural center, the library, the movie house and, the theater. They include everything that strengthens every aspect of human activity and offer an organic unity that does not distinguish between what is private or public, independent or of common interest. Life is no longer divided into two spheres; the sphere of the worker and that of the person. Work, family, culture, good times, and relaxation converge into a substantial unity that shares the same roots and character of family nuclei, of which these elements are an integral part. It is obvious that all this has not yet been implemented everywhere or to the same extent. However, we can find shining examples everywhere. What is important is that this ideal can come about and that the results achieved are not illusory. Indeed, it is one thing to build an artificial environment where all the various aspects of a community are gathered together and juxtaposed, but another to be able to fuse them together in an organic fashion where they spiritually respond to one another while moving toward the same common goals. Actually, there are already many signs of this coming together that attest to achievements that have surpassed all expectations. Our skepticism is destined to disappear in the face of the evidence of certain facts that cannot be denied; if anything, they encourage one to continue in this direction. To understand the validity of the journey until now completed, our attention must be turned to the most decisive forces that have contributed to the affirmation of such ideals and played a significant role in the reality of the Soviet Union. We need to consider the true myth and the true reality toward which the new faith of the people of the Soviet Union has been channeled, finding their most evident manifestation in the plan.

…

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After forty years of communism, it can be said factually that the Russian revolution is a definite reality based on Marxist ideas. In a strict sense, there is not—​nor can there be—​a counterrevolutionary political force in Russia today for the simple reason that representatives of such a political class cannot be found, due to the conspicuous lack of interest in seeking change. After all, life in the Soviet Union has been transformed so radically that it is no longer possible to imagine that the means of production will return to the private sector. The new productive technology makes such an idea seem absurd. Those who have embraced the current industrial and agricultural system and way of life will no doubt share this conclusion. However, since the Russian revolution has now achieved its objectives, one could think that the revolutionary process has lost its strength and will tend to stagnate. We know that all revolutions tend to fade rather quickly, and the faster their goals are achieved, the faster that happens. Historically, those who help to carry out a revolution tend to become conservative and support the status quo. However, in the Soviet Union the revolutionary push did not have the same outcome and will continue to strongly influence the life of those people. The reason for this is found in the never-​ending renewal of the plan, which is what differentiates the Russian revolution from other revolutions. The Marxist victory, now taken for granted, has become the instrument for a new life that still remains to be defined and, in fact, is redefined every five years, sometimes even from year to year in the context of a five-​year plan. Marx is a vestige of the past, and the future is outlined in a concrete way by a program of action in which the intelligence and the will of everyone are involved. The revolutionary drive has moved forward thanks to the enduring will of the Russian people to create a different future. Naturally, this five-​year plan involving all of Russia and the other republics of the Soviet Union underlies the collective life of more than two hundred million people. Initially, the fully-​defined program progressed from the center and extended itself to the periphery. Now the program has moved in both directions, from the center to the periphery and from the periphery back to the center, and is shaped by the collaboration of those involved before it is finalized. In the process of carrying out the plan, every factory elaborates and discusses its own program of production and creates opportunities for its own development. Next, the program is submitted for approval to a hierarchy of authority within a given industry and is then coordinated with all other programs until it becomes the plan for that industrial sector. Because it is developed this way, the plan eventually returns to the factory where it is again discussed, and the workers pledge to carry it out and even to exceed the established goals. Year after year, in meeting the plan’s objectives, the best interests, the honor and pride of the factory, even before the best interest of workers, are at stake. Ultimately,

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every worker develops a personal, even emotional attachment to their plan. Indeed, it becomes the main object of their lives. This way, the factory offers a feeling of ownership to every worker, so much so that the difference between public and private ownership is progressively reduced to the minimum. This reduction, however, would not be so drastic were the plan to cover only the economy and exclude the non-​economic aspects of society. Despite their differences, the private and public sectors are able to coexist in a bourgeois society because their dualism is similar to the dualism that exists in life between the individual and society at large. But it is clear that when the two are intrinsically and inevitably linked together to a single way of life, the distinction has no reason to exist or to be imagined. The plan focuses on the factory because the factory is the center of life in the Soviet Union. In other words, within the plan the production of grain, scientific investigation, and artistic works are calculated in the same manner. The demands of the factory are fulfilled along with the needs of the family and the school. In other words, the plan is the focal point where all aspects of Russian life converge. It is a concrete union of individual interest and collective need, of worker and individual, of today’s reality and tomorrow’s ideals. Everyone in the Soviet Union has the means and the opportunity to progressively better himself through that plan, from the factory level to the regional, and from there to the national scene where he reaches the highest level of recognition. When we think about the real meaning and the real value the plan assumed in Soviet life, only then one can understand how farfetched is the accusation leveled at the collectivistic economy and how false is the supposed superiority of private enterprise. The absence in Russia of private competition and adver-​ tising, which are the main instruments of private enterprise, affords life in the Soviet Union a uniformity that appears to support the thinking of those who favor the bourgeois economic system. The truth of the matter, however, is that in a bourgeois society the producers show no concern for the public interest. As society moves progressively from craftsmanship to small industry, to small business, to very wealthy corporations, to public and semi-​public institutions and, finally, to the state and its gigantic productive system, we realize that the so-​called free enterprise becomes a total anachronism. What interest can an employee of the state have in the state’s goods, which are not his? What interest can a worker show toward the anonymous factory, which he can’t wait to leave behind to return to his private world? In what ways are office and factory more private for a worker than they are in the Soviet Union? Clearly the dualism between private and public domain persists only in a bourgeois society and tends to increase as more technology, developed to

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satisfy the needs of the masses, leads large economic complexes to overwhelm smaller ones. From a competitive point, it is easy to see how the cost of adver-​ tising cuts into a private economy, how it is opposed by huge corporations, and, lastly, how it disrupts social unity by becoming an obstacle to social harmony and collaboration. On the other hand, we should not believe that an economic system based on a plan lacks the elements of competition. Indeed, to achieve the goals required by the plan, each factory tries to outdo the others by producing and delivering more and better products than expected and pursues its own interests and those of society. Even at an individual level, the initiative does not just belong to the capitalist or to the entrepreneur or the inventor. It also belongs to all the workers of the factory so that the head of the factory has a built-​in interest to include workers and technicians in his decisions, conscious of the fact that he and his workers share the same interests. On the other hand, the workers, who are committed to the functioning of the factory, discuss among themselves opportunities for improvement, such as proposing upgrading the structures, better distribution of services, and a better performance of the machinery. Management and workers have no reason to be in conflict; rather, they feel compelled to establish a stronger collaboration because both groups know that their welfare depends on the ability to come together in the realization of their goals. This is not a utopia, but it does represent a reality that can be validated by anyone who wants to understand the optimal functioning of the factory and the debates that take place in factory councils. Those who continue to fantasize about the benefits of private enterprise live on memories and nostalgia. They confuse the private enterprise of a few individuals with that of thousands of workers or employees, forgetting that the motivation of the few cannot be similar to the motivation of thousands.

…

Competition, emulation, and achievement are what fulfill the objectives of the plan. The plan belongs to every person and to all in the same way as faith, hope, and happiness belong to a community that sees itself as one entity. … We now have all the elements needed to clarify the fundamental differences between Russian and Western communism and, consequently, we are able to explain why the Soviet experience is impossible in the Western world. Russian communism is rooted in the reality of a people who recognize the value of the community as part of their life. Therefore, community and faith constitute the fundamental characteristics of Soviet communism to the point that political life requires the same depth of understanding and moral engagement that one associates with religion. A people can be asked to sacrifice the present for a

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better future without running the risk of compromising their willingness to persevere. This myth can be projected into the future while allowing it to retain the propulsive strength necessary to become an achievement. After forty years, we can still talk about the paramount importance that heavy industry continues to have in the Russian economy and, thus, feeding hope, even the certainty of realizing a better world. The condition of Western communism presents, instead, different and opposite characteristic. In it, the feeling of community is truly missing. Per-​ sonal gain is the main, perhaps only, motivating incentive to pursue politics. Social life is inspired by the same metaphysics that conditions the bourgeois mentality, which was strongly influenced by the Enlightenment. Thought and action are characterized by radical individualism, extreme subjectivism, and an anarchic hypercriticism that permeates every theoretical and practical attitude, thus erasing any effort to reach an agreement and, even less, a common goal. Dialogue becomes progressively fruitless while spiritual life takes on forms of speculative and practical solipsism. Under such conditions, a political program can only aim at personal gain, and is therefore unable to stir up energies directed at generating public trust. The various socialist and communist parties understand this: they have left behind all ideological principles, seeking instead higher salaries and more bourgeois rights. The points of departure and arrival are always the recognition of more rights for the workers and the elimination of economic differences: take from the rich and give to the poor while extending to everyone the right of ownership. This has been already affirmed by the Catholic Church in its interpretation of social justice, which supports equality rather than community. The Church wants the removal of differences that feed the class struggle, thus progressively improving the conditions of the proletariat and its ultimate assimilation to the bourgeoisie. To fully understand the situation in which Western communism finds itself, we need to know that it is a product of a bourgeois mentality that continues to thrive in terms of ideology and politics under the continuous direction of leaders with a bourgeois background. This means that our communism is the last stage of the bourgeois revolution; hence it cannot offer a new revolution, even less an antibourgeois revolution. This constitutes a moment in the internal evolution of the bourgeoisie, which seeks to assimilate the proletariat. Equality of rights and democracy are the two terms that identify this transformation, which remains within the boundaries of the Revolution of 1789. Marxism itself remains chained to the metaphysics of that revolution, ambiguously living between Enlightenment and positivism, unable to satisfy the fundamental requisites of Hegelian and post-​Hegelian idealism.

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When we consider the bourgeois nature of Western communism, we can understand why it cannot flourish where the proletariat has greatly benefited from the development of the bourgeoisie. In the Anglo-​Saxon and Scandinavian countries, in Switzerland and Germany, communist parties are unable to become an effective force because the proletariat has adopted middle-​class values and rejected the revolutionary approach. If we consider Italy as an example, we see that communist influence is felt to a lesser degree where the proletariat has achieved higher standards of living and is enjoying bourgeois creature comforts. Marxism has been defeated by the bourgeois mentality and not vice versa. Western communism, while having some influence in some countries with a depressed economy and in some backward proletarian quarters, does not constitute a new philosophy or a new faith, or a new conception of life. It does not interrupt the process that leads to solipsism; rather, it strengthens the process by extending it to the proletariat. The inability of Marxism to overcome the bourgeois mentality can explain how Western communism has imposed upon the proletariat the worst aspects of bourgeoisie ideology: individualism and personal interest. Far from educating the proletariat about love and sense of community, Western communism promotes the notion that individuals have rights to personal property. Proletarians will hate the bourgeoisie and, at the same time, will love other proletarians less because their hatred for the bourgeoisie has educated them to exclude the concept of otherness and seclude them in their private world. When we say that today’s worker or farmer is not as class-​conscious as before, we are confirming the truth that they have been corrupted by bourgeois individualism and by the bourgeois communist party that supposedly educated them to hate the bourgeoisie; in reality, the party was teaching them to love bourgeois life. Today, the proletariat dreams of being part of the world it hates, therefore, not destroying it to establish a new world with different ideals and values.When the proletariat becomes full-​fledged bourgeois, communism will have exhausted its mission.

…

These considerations demonstrate the limits and the internal antinomies of our communist party. The most evident limit consists of the dualism between party leaders and the mass; that is, between bourgeois and proletarians. The former, for the most part, present interests that are completely different from those of the followers. They are notoriously bourgeois interests. Consequently, there is no possibility of a shared life. What the two groups have in common is only a reciprocal instrumentality. Their interaction is mostly external and

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artificial so that their lives remain separated. The leasders continue to live as bourgeois in a bourgeois environment and with bourgeois tastes. The fundamental consequence that draws from this situation is that the communist leaders are no longer compelled to pursue revolutionary goals, rather to consolidate their status in the organization of the so-​called revolutionary party. With time, proletarians acquire bourgeois habits because their leaders have watered down the revolutionary program to guarantee to the most advanced of their followers that the subversive revolution will no longer take place. In this manner, the party will take a more reformist character that leads first to socialism, subsequently to social democracy to end up as a centrist or right-​wing party. The end of this general political situation will be marked by the presence of only two political parties following the American or British model, more American than British. This is the destiny of our communist party. Its function is that of accelerating the process leading to the bourgeois transformation of the proletariat if for no other reason than that the party is directed by leaders with bourgeois background. Consciously or unconsciously, the party becomes the strongest allay of the bourgeoisie in general and of capitalism in particular. It is a matter of eliminating class conflict without compromising the interests and ideals of the bourgeosie, thus allowing the emergence of extreme manifestations of individualism. Collaboration between capitalism and communism in many European countries is stronger than expected even if the motives and interests at the root of this rapport are not oriented in this direction. Being such the situation, it is clear that our communist party has nothing to do with Russian communism; on the contry, it constitutes the most radical anthitesys. The reality of Russian communism is quite different because the goals it wants to reach are different. Our communism is the least communist, that is, the least anti-​individualistic. The two parties took opposite direction and there is no possibility that they can meet. The Italian Communist Party may depend on all aspects on the Russian equivalent, but it will always differ for its decively anticommunist character. If we want to clarify the reason of the radical opposition between the two communisms (Western and Russian), we only need to adopt for Russian communism the same reasoning used for Western communism. Within Russian communism there is no room for the bourgeoisie. There is no room for a middle class because in Russia, unlike the West, the bourgeois revolution never materialized and so was unable to merge with the proletarian class or function as its guide. The proletarian class remained uncontaminated through the revolution, and the present governing class is proletarian as well. As a result, there is no dualism between the managerial class and the workers because promotion in the social hierarchy comes from the ranks of the

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proletarian class, and the starting point is the same for everyone. In fact, it is possible to recognize in every high official the face of a farmer or that of an ex-​worker. The dialogue between those who govern governed is made possible by the originality and effectiveness of cohabitation. As the separation between the Third and the Fourth Estate never took place in Russia, different customs and values never materialized, and social development emerged as a common path for everyone. Clearly the permanence of the original unity cannot but correspond to the permanence of the original values and, most importantly, to the faith in their final destiny. The genuineness of the Russian people prevented the influence of hypercriticism and skepticism identified with the bourgeoisie. The crisis of the Western world could not influence the evolution of Russian society, which has basically remained foreign to the exasperated forms of intellectualism. This fact explains not only the homogenous nature of the Russian society and its possibility of achieving a real communism in the truest sense of the word, but, above all, the revolution’s sense of humanity. This sense made it possible for the revolution itself to integrate backward and nomadic people by recognizing a spiritual affinity with them and, at the same time, allowing them to pursue together the same ideals. Western colonialism, another aspect of the dualism that exists between the bourgeoisie and the proletarian class, could have never taken root in a country where no such dualism exists, and, as a result, it could not have emerged in the Soviet Union. The historical absence of the bourgeois revolution in Russia constitutes the indispensable premise which enables us to fully understand the communist revolution. By liquidating the Czarist system and the way of life associated with that system, the Russian revolution has reached the objectives of the Third and Fourth Estate without having enough time to verify the different goals pursued by the two social classes. Accordingly, neither the figure of the bourgeois intent on exploiting the proletarians, nor the egocentric and classist mentality of a capitalist minority could emerge. Therefore, the necessary requisites for the birth of an individualism destined to corrupt the social unity and hinder the realization of a true communism failed to materizialize. 9.3

“Comunismo cinese”. In Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (pp. 63–​64; 70–​78; 86–​97) [Translation]

The first question with which we must deal if we wish to understand the peculiarities of Chinese communism is the one that addresses its derivation from Russian communism. Clearly, the Russina revolution constituded a very

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important factor in the outbreak of the Chinese revolution, but it is not clear whether the adoption of Soviet communism by China merely expanded the horizons of Russian ideology and its practices or, instead, created its own diverse form of communism. This is the problem I focused on during my recent trip to China (September–​October 1960), for it is a complex one that manifested itself in a myriad of other problems destined to enlighten the future of communism in every part of the world. My attempt to reach a conclusion [about Chinese communism] by positing questions to prominent Chinese intellectuals and politicians did not yield any significant results. Their answers were always rather evasive and did not seem to offer any deep insight or new approaches. Their discourse was equally sterile as they appealed to nationalistic pride, according to which a people with a centuries-​old tradition could not adopt an ‘imported’ brand of ideology without modifying it substantially. There was nothing new in their political discourse, and they would not go beyond affirming that Marxism-​Leninism was based on a universal and eternal truth, which needed to be applied to specific situations in time and space. The difference in the implementation of this theory was conceived as something contingent and, as such, did not affect the meaning and value of revolutionary ideal. Once I excluded the possibility of getting autonomous, direct answers, the problem could only be addressed by relying on my personal experiences, which attested to wide differences between Russian and Chinese communism. …

…

In confronting Chinese and Russian communism, we realize that any consideration of the problem of Chinese communism needs to be based on completely different terms. Chinese communism is a totally different world, in which various aspects of Western life are only partially comprehensible and even less applicable. Russia is still European and has many elements in common with European cultures, being rooted in Greek and Roman civilization. Russians inherited from Christianity certain elements that became fundamental to their lives. It was not difficult for them to approach Marxism without feeling too much of a fundamental difference in language and ideals. China, on the other hand, is not related to Athens, Rome, or Christ. All attempts that were made to convert that country to Christianity have failed. Europe is nearly as unknown to China as China is unknown to us, being two worlds, two mentalities, two completely different cultures. Although it is diffi-​ cult to make an accurate account of the differences between the two cultures in question, what stands out the most is the fact that the Chinese never showed

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a deep religious need for a unifying faith. The Chinese people are the most secular on earth. Even so, religion did play a role in their millenary history and influenced their traditions in some ways. The many religions that coexisted in China interacted with each other and brought to the forefront the philosophical and ethical dimension rather than the metaphysical aspect of faith. In this regard, Confucianism cannot really be considered a religion as we know it, and Taoism and Buddhism only marginally meet the requirements of religions. Finally, the Chinese revolution had a role in doing away with the little that remained of those traditions; after all, there is no such thing as a crowded temple in China. To understand the in-​depth meaning of Chinese communism, we need to consider the secular nature of Chinese culture. Unlike Russian communism, Chinese communism does not have a religious character. There exists no communist faith in China, only a communist conviction. The fact that there is no communist faith in China is very important because it leads us to understand the past and the future of the Chinese revolution. In traveling through China and observing the mills, institutions, schools, bureaucratic organisms, and customs and rituals introduced by revolution, we cannot help but be impressed by the similarities with what has been achieved in the Soviet Union, particularly with the minute and detailed ways in which the Chinese adhere to the Soviet models and methods. On the other hand, however, this is not so surprising if one takes into account that the Chinese revolution was directed and carried out by Russia. Indeed, a large number of Russians were sent to China to build or develop the major industrial centers as well as to advise the new elite class about the new political and economic organization to follow. In marveling at such similarities, we must not, however, fail to notice the equally important practical and theoretical differences between the two forms of communism. We need, as a consequence, to keep in mind that most profound humus (soil) informing the traditional Chinese reality—​what some have called ‘secularism’—​to see what the two revolutions share, and see them in the light of different criteria of evaluation.

…

The blind fervor the Russians displayed for their revolution, which can be attributed to the religious and transcendental interpretation of Marxism, could have never existed in a country such as China, where religion has a minimal presence. The Chinese proletariat could never subscribe to a new future reality entailing the sacrifice of the present. Given their secular character, the

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Chinese could not renounce their Epicurean idealism. The idea of living well is deeply rooted in the wisdom and ethos of China even though the geographical and historical conditions of the have only minimally permitted that ideal lifestyle. The love of the Chinese people for flowers, for example, and their need to cultivate, care for, and cherish them, serves to show how strongly this aesthetic expression contrasts with a life often marked by misery and suffering. Another example is reflected in the Chinese culinary tradition, which strives to make life in the present so pleasant. Though poor and lacking the essential comforts, the Chinese reveal a sense of refinement, sensibility, and taste that is in sync with their capacity to understand the importance of living in the present, and to know how to enjoy whatever their environment has to offer. The Chinese could never subscribe to the principle of sacrificing the well-​ being of the present generation for the next generation of children and grandchildren. Such would be regarded as false advice that no one would take or understand. It is true that the Chinese revolution took place under Russian guidance and that the problem of the heavy industrialization was so pressing that everything had to be subordinated to it, yet, even such a basic need did not involve a religious faith and did not acquire an absolute character. The achievements of the Soviet Union were so indisputable and convincing that the Chinese could not help but follow their example, especially when the young generation was quite receptive to enjoying the eventual fruits of industrialization. However, this type of industry would not absorb a large share of the energies and activities of the majority of people, but would bring a better and more complex life capable of meeting the needs of all members of society. It would not only produce goods that would yeld a better tomorrow, but it would meet today’s needs of an immediate increment of consumer products without having to wait for a future golden age. Since its inception in 1950, the Chinese revolution was based on such principles as balance and transition. The widely accepted slogan about the need to stand on one’s own two feet found its main realization in the scenario of industrialization. This transition was made easier by the fact that the great majority of China’s population of seven hundred million farmers neither could be absorbed by the industries nor could live without them. Increasingly, the need to follow a different course from that set by the Russian revolution became clear. China saw the need to find a system of production capable of transforming the lives of the farmers by making them more prosperous and more self-​ sufficient. Thus emerged the agricultural commune (the urban commune is still in its experimental stage), overcoming once and for all the Soviet dualism of agriculture and industry by linking the two activities in a productive and satisfactory manner. Today in China, all industries—​small, medium or large—​can

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coexist, satisfy present and future needs, and raise the standard of living of all citizens. Conversely, the commune, which over the course of just a few years has spread throughout most of China (in number exceeding 25,000 units), has provided communists with a more communist way of life, enhancing the quality of life of the members of the commune, enriching their perception of reality, and deepening social interactions among themselves on a daily basis. The life of the commune emerges as a progressively complex differentiation of work: the fields, workshops, mills, schools, cinemas, theaters, dining halls, hospices, stadiums, and recreational places. Families separate in the morning because their members, from the very young to the old, are an integral part of a bigger social nucleus, and each of them performs a specific task. After work and school, they recompose the family nucleus and share the experiences of which they were part, thus enriching everyone’s life. Communism takes on the concrete dimension of an institution in which public and private meet and harmonize in a more profound unity comprised of seven hundred million Chinese and twenty five thousand communes. Each commune has its own plan, integrated into more complex plans, until they become an integral part of the entire country’s plan. From the whole to the individual, through a dialectic already established in its essential elements, the life of the Chinese has evolved into a regular rhythm allowing bigger and better results eleven years after the revolution.

…

The true originality of the Chinese revolution is exemplified by the commune, not so much because of its productive efficiency—​the balance established among the various forms of production and consumption, and the harmony existing between industry and agriculture—​but on account of how communism is institutionalized there, in conformity with the millenary tradition of a civilization that always honored the value of collectivism above the individual. With the commune, China found a different identity by transcending the influences of both European and Asian civilizations as well as going beyond the models of communist regimes already implemented. The first commune was set up in 1958 and, notwistanding the crisis of 1959, materialized with unprecedent quickness. It was the result of a Chinese idea and was realized in years in which the Chinese people took control of their life without outside interfirences. If we go over the history of China of the last one hundred twenty years, from the opium war on, we can easily notice that only today Chinese are truly free. Initially, Europeans came to China from the sea and spred their civilization along the coastal arears and the banks of the great rivers. They

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created religious missions, industries, commerce, schools, and universities. In the meanwhile, European culture started to slowly impose itself. However, the relationship between Europeans and Chinese went pregressively sour and tension grew exponentially while the historical situation became complicated. The wars of this century contributed to sharpen this tension. The USSR began to exercise its influx on China while Japan first started the process of industrialization of Manchuria and subsequently invaded the country. However, few years later, by the end of 1949, China was finally free. …

…

What still remains to be seen is whether the convergence of Western and Eastern cultures can be integrated into the teaching of Marxism-​Leninism, which constitutes the basis of Chinese education. Marxism has been the subject of rather lengthy conversations at Chinese universities, with many discussions taking place among the professors in newly established departments of philosophy, which were intent on pursuing only intellectual objectives. It is not easy to understand why the Chinese insist on instituting new departments of philosophy, since what they consider to be philosophy is Marxism-​Leninism associated with the names Engels and Stalin, with Mao added to the mix. If we were to ask the Chinese to illustrate what they see as the connection among the afore-​mentioned men, they would probably answer that each one of them contributed to the formulation of a universal truth regardless of the fact that they were influenced by a variety of circumstances tied to the time and locale. If we were to query them about the possible variations in the interpretation of the various doctrines or on the possibility of contrasts in the same process of interpretation, they would answer that such contrasts are not possible since there is only one interpretation and only one objective truth. Everywhere, the prevailing orthodox attitude prevents a deep exploration of the true meaning of the various doctrines. One can affirm without any fear of being refuted that, in China, no one even speculates on the true historical meaning of Marxism. Under the label of Marxism, a collection of the fundamental principles related to the Chinese revolution is taught. On the other hand, it could not be any different since Marxism is a historicistic doctrine born in the West and linked to a tradition that began with Judaism and Christianity, Enlightenment and Hegelianism, historical and intellectual traditions that concentrate on the analysis of the economic structures represented by industrialization and capitalism, which, in turn, transformed the European societies. The fact that there have been translations of Hegel’s works in recent years and that efforts have been made to promote the tenets of his

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philosophy may mean nothing at all to a Chinese citizen. In fact, these efforts cannot help but yield mediocre results because so many of the principles that are necessary to reach a clear understanding of Hegel’s and Marx’s thought are still missing. The knowledge of both is limited to only the most easily comprehended fragments and then extrapolated from the context about which the works were written. The Chinese communist revolution after all, can only indirectly be linked to the original Marxism or to Russian Marxism because it developed against the background of the so-​called imperialists and against all the invaders of the country and the major landowners. The Chinese revolution was a nationalist and agricultural revolution that manifested itself outside every ideological scheme or Marxist logic. For the Chinese, Marxism meant the liberation of 1949, even if it materialized with the help of the Russians. One needs only to go to the movies to confirm this observation. Movies, which either show an episode of rebellion against foreigners, starting from the opium war, or a legendary event related to any dynasty of any century when farmers revolted against property owners, generate approval and applause from everyone. This is the Chinese tradition that continues to express itself outside any direct ties to Marxism.

…

Not even the experience of Marxism can make one comprehend the ideals that have inspired recent Chinese generations and produced a new humanism which, incidentally, is nothing like the concept of Western humanism. What matters is whether the revolution or liberation has generated a new consciousness about the individual and has initiated a new spiritual movement similar to our modern thought. Thus far, there is no evidence that such similarities exist. If Chinese communism is nothing like Marxism, it has even less with in common with individualism or the bourgeois mentality, the latter representing only a bad memory of all illnesses introduced by Western behavior. Individualism, however, is not even a consideration since the Chinese have never been individualists and have never abandoned their collectivist tradition. The Chinese are and always have been Confucianists. At the political level, a Chinese may admit to being anti-​Confucianist, yet the reality is that Confucianism still remains as the metaphysical and ethical foundation of his life. For thousands of years, the Chinese have been taught to act collectively and in unison, in accordance with a doctrine that teaches the subordination of individual life to social life and to think, act, and live as one. This is the

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ideal of the Chinese. This explains why our Western individualism is a historical creation so alien and incomprehensible to the Chinese. Strange indeed if we consider how different from the Chinese experience was the journey of Western thought in arriving at the actual concept of the individual: a journey that begins with the Greek tradition of man as philosopher and as artist; the tradition of private Roman Law with its unicuique suum (to each his own); the tradition of Christianity that conceives the individual as eternal spirit and in direct relation with God; the tradition of a Humanism and a Renaissance that exalts the individual activity of the artist and the creation of the Prince; the tradition of an Enlightenment that extends sovereignty to every citizen, and the hypostatized concept of freedom as the essence of spiritual life. All this was completely unknown to the Chinese. The Western world chose the exaltation of the self within the confines of an abstract world, which led to spiritual isolation and solipsism. The Chinese, however, chose (and continue) to live as a family, as a group, as a commune, as a republic rather than living as a single person who values independence and pursuit of egocentric pleasure. Perhaps this can explain the fact that a Westerner who withdraws in solitude suffers from anguish and neurosis, while in China these problems are nearly non-​existent. If we regard communism as an ideal that transcends the Enlightenment and, instead of equality, chooses a life lived collectively, then it becomes clear that no group more than the Chinese is closer to achieving that ideal.

…

The search for ideals by the new generation of Chinese has yielded no results when compared to the Western humanistic perception of life. This does not mean, however, that other ideals are not present, nor can one discount other forms of humanism that are equally as significant as those that inspire our lives. In order to understand the meaning and the values of Chinese humanism, we must examine their school system, which is based on the scientific principles we have yet to consider. Let us, for instance, look at a second grade Chinese chemistry class. About forty pupils are seated two per desk in a classroom equipped with two faucets: one for water, the other for gas. Students are provided with test tubes and other instruments needed to carry out experiments. In another room, there is a microscope on each table according to the theory of ‘to know in order to act, and to act in order to know. Students go to work, and each of the factories has its own school where students and professors study and work with unified intentions so that they are both workers and

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creators. Chinese people do not understand the value of acquiring knowledge without applying it. In China, an engineer does not earn a degree merely by attending a school of engineering; no, the degree requires the experience of working in a factory. At a university campus, professors and students dorm and live side by side, working in both the laboratories and the fields. In China, science and technology are tied together everywhere. School is not more important than life, but school is life and vice versa. Today, all Chinese children go to school not only to learn how to read and write, but to apply what they have learned. The effort to link science to life contributes to the transformation of the spiritual meaning of science and technology, placing the problem of achieving a new humanism in different terms. If religion and philosophy exist alongside science, then science plays only a minor role with regard to a knowledge that expresses the supreme values of life. In the Western world, therefore, even though science is placed at the foundation of the transformation of reality, it still remains subordinate to the ideals and goals that men seek to achieve. There is a scientist and there is the individual; what does not exist is an individual wholly dedicated to science. Only a limited understanding of scientific knowledge emerges from this posture as well as the exaltation of humanistic knowledge that is in contrapositon to it. In China, however, the situation is radically different because of the secular spirit that always prevails. Traditional empiricism, which characterized the life of the Chinese, can now be translated into a specific science and into a specific technology, and one does not exclude the other. Since science does not have a religion or a philosophy to contend with, we cannot deal with it as though it were practical knowledge. The only thing left to consider is whether or not scientific knowledge can substitute humanism in every aspect. Assuming there is more than one form of knowledge, however, it is obvious that science cannot satisfy all human needs. On the one hand, were science the only type of knowledge, would it be capable of carrying out the functions that historically religion and philosophy have performed? This question represents the most essential meaning of Chinese communism and its future in the world.

…

Granted that science and technology were responsible for setting in motion the process of industrialization in China, it is also true that science and technology have European roots and, as such, symbolize the bourgeois capitalist society that is unifying the world. It is a historical fact that there has been a

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lack of similarity between East and West—​a factor that has allowed the East to resist the waves of cultural influence from the West. Today, that is no longer a problem. Both civilizations have found common ground in their industrial transformation that involves the sharing of the same lifestyle beyond religious, philosophical, and political differences. Let this be a starting point in understanding the impact that science and technology have—​and may continue to have—​in Eastern civilizations. While in the Western world traditional religions and metaphysics do not allow science to express itself to its fullest extent, the situation in China is quite the opposite in the sense that it allows diverse and far-​reaching solutions. Since science came to China as a knowledge that is not instrumental in reaching other goals, it must satisfy material and spiritual needs, such as religion and philosophy. Science must express an implicit faith and a metaphysics capable of overcoming Western dualism. What has yet to be determined is which religion and which philosophy are implicit within science, and how they will materialize into the knowledge and actions of a people who have not developed other criteria for life. This question was discussed at length in my Inizio di una nuova epoca (1961b). In the context at hand, I will mention the coming conclusions I reached with regard to metaphysics and the consequent ethics of science. These conclusions involved the overcoming of Marxist communism with one based on scientific principles. Therefore, one can understand how the type of communism with which the Western world conquered the East can apparently only be tied to the ideology and metaphysics of Marxism, while it was the communism of science and technology that started the process of industrialization of China. This scientific vision was already present in Marx. However, it was overwhelmed by the dualism in which the entire modern philosophical activity is immersed. Even the Soviet Union had great difficulty in embracing scientific communism because the Russians were attached to traditional religion and their mystical vision of life forced the persistence of dualism and the need for faith and metaphysics. The Chinese, on the other hand, did not have to deal with the same dilemma. Hence, they were easily able to develop a new vision of life and a communist praxis that provided an answer to all their philosophical and religious needs. It is now possible to explain the most important ideal of the new Chinese generation and the meaning of its humanism. It is a scientific humanism which incorporates the concept of the total autonomy of science, revealing the internal metaphysics of science through facts. Science becomes faith, philosophy, and morality, thus satisfying all the needs of a person in a coherent and unitary way. In order for science to become spiritual wholeness, it is necessary for it be

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transformed into action according to Mao Zedong fundamental principle of the identity of knowing and action. Mao said: “Cultivate science.” Chinese people believe in science, crave science, and in the name of science are overcoming their entire past by transforming every tradition according to the tenets of scientific communism. …

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Science within Problematicism 10.1

Introduction

In Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a), Spirito wrote: “In the history of problematicism, a faith that constantly reappeared was the scientific faith.”1 In the exploration of the scientific path, he hoped to acquiesce the antinomic tension of his thought and achieve new metaphysical certainties. La vita come ricerca (1937) had been the result of his rejection of the identity of philosophy and science in the wake of his realization that actual idealism had failed to harmonize all dualities and achieve the unification of knowledge. For him, a new identity of the two terms would be possible if philosophy became science while science discovered within itself a metaphysical dimension. Therefore, he envisioned: a philosophy no longer characterized by the metaphysical principle of the science of the whole, but rather a philosophy conceived as a science of the part tending to the whole, in the same way as every other science.2 Philosophical inquiry was clearly identified with science. The intellectual journey leading to the acquisition of a metaphysical dimension by science materialized through several writings before finding full articulation in the early 1960s. In “Il problema della scienza” (1953a), a speech given at the IX Congresso di studi di Gallarate (Congress of Philosophical Studies in Gallarate), Spirito made references to the metaphysical nature of science by placing both philosophy and science on the same metaphysical plane so that scientists cannot help but be metaphysical; that is, they cannot avoid making universal the content of their own investigation with the purpose of understanding it. In the same way, philosophers cannot help but be scientists insofar as they affirm their own demand for the absolute in the particular problem.3 1 Spirito, Dall’attualismo al problematicismo, p. 47. 2 Ibid. 3 Ugo Spirito, “Il problema della scienza,” Atti del IX Congresso del centro di studi di filosofia (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1954), p. 41.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_012

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However, he did not clarify yet how science would acquire a metaphysical dimension and how scientists would make universal the content of science: Science is and cannot help but be philosophy and, like philosophy, is also metaphysical. What we need is to find out what the metaphysics of today’s science is and to take a position regarding this metaphysics.4 His were only brief observations that expressed the direction of his future search. 10.2

“Il problema della scienza”. In Atti del ix Convegno del Centro di Studi filosofici ta professori universitari (pp. 40–​42) [Translation]

I would like to quickly come to the point. When discussing science and philosophy, it is necessary to consider two previously accepted aspects of the methodology used to evaluate the relationship between them. First, I ask, at what point is it possible for scholars of philosophy who have no direct experience in a specific field of scientific investigation to discuss science? In recent philosophical literature, definitions of and opinions about science have too often appeared showing a radical misunderstanding of the concrete spiritual position of the scientist. These references point to a fantastic type of science that does not exist, and to attributes of such science that exist only in the hypothetical realm. In the first speeches of this Conference, it is already possible to perceive the emergence of this misunderstanding. Therefore, if we continue along the same path, we will be keeping up a discussion based completely upon unfounded premises. My preconceived attitude regarding this belief comes from personal experience following my investigative journey from science to philosophy rather than from philosophy to science. Due to an internal crisis that I suspect it existed within science itself—​a crisis that was as much philosophical as it was scientific—​I felt the need to make a change and move forward with philosophy. This was the crisis of positivism that was manifesting itself in all aspects of culture, even if at different times and with varying degrees of intensity. The once obvious scientific conclusions began to appear dubious and, above all, more or less unfounded. This crisis forced the scientist to scrutinize everything

4 Ibid.

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and to challenge the boundaries of his own science to guarantee a solid foundation for the future. While on the one hand there is a scientific process that takes place within a definite science, based only on passively accepted premises and conclusions, on the other, there is the true scientific investigation that the scientist pursues to define the scope of his science and establish the underlying principles that will shed light on its future development. This approach is valid for both science and philosophy. In addition to the creator of new systems and the visionary, there is also the person who constantly focuses his attention on a specific investigation within accepted and unchallenged boundaries. It is clear, however, that the true meaning of science or philosophy will be revealed in the work of those who rise to the challenge of the task before them while keeping their attention fixed on their inquiry. Once science is viewed from within the context of a concrete experience that pursues the achievement of a complete organic structure rather than viewing it from the outside as a philosopher would, the effective identity of the spiritual positions of science and philosophy will become evident. Consequently, the myth of the difference between science and philosophy will collapse. The scientist cannot help but be metaphysical; that is, he cannot avoid making universal the content of his own investigation to understand it. In the same way, the philosopher cannot help but be a scientist insofar as he affirms his own demand for the absolute in the particular problem. Why then is the conviction of the substantial dualism between science and philosophy so widespread and persistent? In truth, this dualism was not always evident in the history of philosophy, nor was the image of the philosopher ever separated from that of the scientist. The separation between science and philosophy dates back to the beginning of modern thought, specifically from the times of Leonardo [Da Vinci], when science began to be regarded as a challenger of faith, disseminating knowledge that was totally humanistic and secular. This separation did not imply, however, a dualism between science and philosophy; rather, it gave way to a new type of dualism where science—​elevated to the level of true philosophy—​was placed in opposition to metaphysics, which was identified as a false philosophy. This situation became increasingly clear with the rise of modern empiricism until the time when positivism explicitly identified science with philosophy. Even post-​Cartesian idealism (in particular, Hegelian idealism), which incorporated science or the philosophy of nature in the encyclopedia of philosophical sciences, failed to reach any new conclusions. It was not until the movement of reaction to positivism that the dualism between science and philosophy reaffirmed itself. The equivocal character of this reassertion,

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however, mistook science for positivism itself. By refusing positivism, philosophy estranged itself from science. Now, if it is true that modern science was first empirical before becoming positivist, it is also true that science today is suffering from its own crisis as a crisis of both empiricism and positivism and is inclined to look upon these philosophies with a critical eye, evolving away from them. The influence of Kantian and post-​Kantian idealism is evident in science as we perceive it today. Although the prejudices generated by the anti-​ positivist debate continue to feed the illusion of that dualism, this influence shows an essential unity in thought and investigation.

…

Science is and cannot help but be philosophy and, like philosophy, is also metaphysical. What we need is to find out what the metaphysics of today’s science is and to take a position regarding this metaphysics. From this, I (Spirito) derive my second prejudicial position that I would like to place before the participants of this Conference. What is the relationship between the metaphysics of today’s science and Christian metaphysics? This is the fundamental problem that Christian philosophers should confront and discuss. This problem runs along the entire history of Christianity. A case in point is St. Augustine, who, in writing the Confessions, explicitly asked the question of whether the science of the astronomer was reconcilable with Christian knowledge, or if it could at least add something to it. He concluded that science could add nothing to Christian knowledge and that it afforded only the danger of the sins of pride and distraction. When the Protestant thinkers of the Reformation revisited Augustine’s writings in order to move forward in his path, they increasingly began regarding science as diabolical and as one of the greatest threats to the Christian soul. Today, Christians should reflect upon the seriousness of this problem and try to find a definitive solution capable of orienting the world. Indeed, in the world in which we live, the metaphysics of science has reached its greatest triumph by permeating all aspects of life. In the first half of this century, science and technology have transformed our entire society, have created new needs and new ideals, have profoundly modified our customs, have corroded traditional faith, and have reached the soul of the masses with their truths. It is this science that needs to be discussed, since this is the new philosophy that is gaining more followers each day. Science and technology have created a new vision and new experiences of time and space, together with a fast-​moving and comfortable society. Is this the demonic manifestation of which Father Ferdinando Castelli spoke?

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I cannot see how some philosophers who claim to be Christians can separate themselves from the dramatic urgency of these topical questions. Our present times are turned upside down because of the terrible atomic threat that looms over us like a nightmare. These are the consequences brought on by the metaphysics of modern science and by the hunger for power that goes with it. So, what does a Christian say about all this? For me, the problem does not exist, and if it does, it has a totally different meaning. From a problematic point of view, one that is open to all possible investigative directions, the ideal of today’s science is only one of the many directions to follow, one experience to live out in the hope of finding a solution. For those who believe that they do not possess the metaphysical truth, everything is science, everything requires investigation, and consequently the demonization of science is meaningless. Philosophy must come face to face with the question of its own etymological meaning: interpreting the hopes of all human beings through an identification with life itself. 10.3

Attempts to Overcome Problematicism

In “L’avvenire della scienza” (1961a), included as a chapter in Inizio di una nuova epoca (1961b), Spirito continued his analysis of the relationship between science and philosophy, clarifying this time the meaning of the metaphysics of science. He identified the metaphysical dimension in the consensus that scientists reach in their investigation: a metaphysics totally immanent in science due to a lack in the scientific process of any principles not related to experience. In this contest, the different points of view within the scientific community are not considered true dissent, for they lead to a higher degree of truth since the hypotheses upon which the scientific investigation is based, eventually are either validated or disproved. Consequently, the difference between the truth of the scientists and that of the philosophers is that “philosophers presume to possess the truth without creating it, while scientists know and create the truth”5 since they can verify it through experimentation. Consensus, therefore, is “proof of true knowledge, while the presumed philosophical truth, insofar as it does not result in consensus, is not truth.”6 While philosophy divides,

5 Spirito, Inizio di una nuova epoca, p. 132. 6 Ibid., pp. 135–​136.

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science “unifies the life of the world, allowing different people to realize common experiences.”7 Philosophy, having lost the role of interpreting the whole, becomes meaningful only if it transforms itself into a particular science, and if, as one of the many sciences, it investigates that part of the whole present within itself and according to its own peculiarities. In this manner, philosophy is identified with science and together they bring about the unification of knowledge. In “L’avvenire della scienza,” Spirito reached again that incontrovertible truth and absolute that had eluded him for more than twenty years, thus mitigating the ‘problematic’ tension of his intellectual condition. In the following excerpt, he clarifies the metaphysical aspect of science and the rooted moral and intellectual prejudices that scientists need to surmount in order to achieve full investigative autonomy. 10.4

“L’avvenire della scienza”. In Inizio di una nuova epoca (pp. 132–​149) [Translation]

From a cognitive point of view, reaching a consensus [among scientists] is of paramount importance since it paves the way for inter-​subjectivity to overcome relativism. However, that importance is even greater when inter-​subjectivity can transform itself into objectivity. Now, the realization that the world can come to the same understanding regarding science and technology confirms the objective nature of scientific truth. However, objectivity can only be achieved when the cognitive plane reaches the metaphysical plane, and when consensually scientists are able to find the first principle of metaphysics immanent in science. That principle is already present in Da Vinci’s scientific speculation, and it is implicit in his concept of experience, where true knowledge coincides with action. If scientists can agree and philosophers are not able to do so, it is because scientists know and create truth while philosophers presume to possess truth without having created it. As I have said, the cognitive level can also be thought of as metaphysical since the identity of knowledge with action is only possible in an immanentist conception of reality. The whole history of modern thought, in which action is given an ever-​greater importance until it is recognized as having the leading role, is there to confirm that the identity of knowledge with action has acquired a metaphysical meaning. When it is understood 7 Ibid., p. 131.

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in a coherent way, the path leading to action is also the path to immanence. Modern thought, pervaded as it is by the immanentist demand, is destined to strengthen the concept of knowledge as experience, and the realization of this experience through action. Proof of this is the fact that Leonardo’s ‘action’ is immediately followed by [Niccolò] Machiavelli’s ‘effectual truth,’ and, thereafter, from empiricism to Kant, from [Giambattista] Vico to Hegel, from Marxism to pragmatism, and from positivism to absolute actual idealism, it is a sequence of philosophical conceptions whose informing principles are linked to the concrete formation of the truth. …

…

This history of identifying knowledge with action in modern thought lends logical and metaphysical value to the consensus demanded by scientific truth. Consensus is proof of true knowledge, but the presumed philosophical truth, since it never reaches consensus, then is not the truth. Both the method and metaphysics of immanence find their true realization in science. Is this metaphysics? The use of this term is linked to that of the absolute, the opposite of which is relativism. It is mainly due to the crisis of metaphysics that modern thought has privileged the concept of relativism. The same meaning has been assigned to the scientific theories of relativity that have primarily characterized physics in this century. Truth, however, is altogether something different. Indeed, between philosophical relativism and scientific relativism there exists an irreducible antithesis. According to philosophical relativism, truth is relative and, therefore, there is no absolute truth. However, ­relativism in the process of demonstrating this position reveals obvious internal contradictions. This in turn can only help to assess a certain degree of coherence of the principle that has been affirmed, but not to change its meaning. The real goal of scientific relativism is to demonstrate the relativity of the various phenomena in their reciprocal relations—​a demonstration needed to illustrate the criteria transcending the relativity of the phenomena and their laws. In other words, the goal of scientific relativism is the absolute control of the relative. This explains why scientists try to achieve a consensus and are now able to interpret the initial relativistic theories in the field of astronomy through concrete scientific trials, looking beyond conflicting hypotheses. Absolute truth and, therefore also, true metaphysics shift from philosophy to science progressively asserting themselves as the goal of the search. Science only now finds in itself the awareness of its absolute and universal value after having in vain tried to find a metaphysics that justifies its content through empiricism, Kant, idealism, and positivism. Science is no longer subordinated

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to philosophy because philosophy is simply another type of knowledge. Philosophy can only serve science if it is considered a science among other sciences. The unification of the two forms of knowledge is achieved once the true reason for scientific consensus is understood in its deepest metaphysical essence.

…

The metaphysical character of science cannot be doubted, if nothing else because it informs, and appropriately so, the history of modern philosophy and its relations to modern science. However, this acknowledgment alone is not sufficient to regard it as an essential criterion of life except for what concerns the domain of a specific scientific investigation. We need to redefine the metaphysical content of science in such a way that science acquires a fresh identity capable of becoming systematic referent of reality. In other words, we need to show the consequences that derive from the principle of absolute scientific truth when it is perceived as an immanentist truth. The first consequence issues from the need to understand transcendence as what is still to be known and still to be done; in short, as the content of a program. A transcendence understood in these terms eliminates every concept of ‘positive’ negation. Evil is that which has not yet materialized, and therefore it cannot be given a substance. … If we were to define in some way the meaning of the scientist’s attitude toward reality, we would only need to adopt the precept of thou shall not judge found in the Gospels. The scientist must continue to investigate, analyze, reflect, and judge. However, his judgment must be positive or directed to understanding. If a judgment is negative, leading to a condition of detachment or to exclusion, it is in itself antiscientific. The position of the scientist should be one of rejecting nothing and including everything. A scientist should always ask why, a why conceivable only at the level of rationality and positive judgment. Condemnation belongs to a different kind of evaluation, implying a dualism of completely heterogeneous judgments. The judgment of condemn-​ ation is always one of refusal, rather than one of understanding because it divides rather than unifies. Of course, the scientist’s attitude toward reality, besides satisfying a cognitive criterion, should also adopt an ethical standard that he maintains throughout his life. If metaphysics is to be recognized as immanent in science, it should include a moral conception of reality. The scientist reveals his morality when the criterion of understanding is geared toward human reality, and

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the thou shall not judge becomes the foundation of the social sciences. In this field, the unification of science and philosophy becomes living proof of the transformation that takes place when relating knowledge with action. The traditional attitude regarding morality changes radically when human beings become an object of scientific investigation and the relationship between two persons is grounded on different values. The non-​scientific concept of morality is founded upon the presupposition that there exists an archetypal value against which every human action is measured. Moral judgment of an individual will be based upon the results of the observation of his behavioral response to the value which is hypothesized as absolute. The individual will be judged as good or bad depending on his ability or inability to respect the norms. When scientific morality substitutes religious or philosophical morality, the foundation of judgment must be found somewhere else. The judgment of an action implies understanding the reason behind it. Consequently, the process leading to the formulation of a judgment comes about along a path unmarked by any previously accepted value. … A clear metaphysics and a morality are immanent in science. Science possesses the capacity to become a criterion for living, that is, a criterion for every form of knowledge and action. Science no longer needs to borrow from other sources like philosophy, which enriches science with methods and principles, but is not scientific. However, when scientists lack the courage to assert their autonomy, they also become unable to bring to their respective sciences the necessary breadth and strength to elevate them to a satisfactory level of totality. Above all, they come across as not believing in the intrinsic metaphysics and morality of their knowledge. Behind this inferiority complex, there persists a dualism between science and philosophy which forces the scientist to bow to the authority of a knowledge whose secrets are unknown to him. The reverence that the scientist almost always pays to religion and philosophy is the residue of an attitude that comes from a transcendental vision of reality. Because its content has not yet been resolved into experience, this vision imposes itself on him in an irrational way, impeding him from freely carry out his investigation. The dualism of science and philosophy materializes as a ‘double’ metaphysics and as a ‘double’ morality in the life of a scientist. On the one hand, the scientist lives with the understanding that the metaphysics is immanent in science, and through it, he acquires the universality of a knowledge, which is the only true knowledge. In this manner, he realizes the identity of knowledge with action that constitutes the morality of understanding, made up of facts and sincerity. On the other hand, however, he freely accepts the imposition of

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a religion or heterogeneous metaphysics that separates him from his habitual critical attitude and renders him passive vis-​à-​vis the authority of transcendental norms. Sincerity thus evaporates and is soon replaced by a compromised morality which substitutes facts with empty words, resulting in verbose rhetoric. Double metaphysics and double morality. Since scientists have passively accepted this dualism, metaphysics, and morality immanent in science have been and remain sacrificed to the advantage of traditional metaphysics and moralities. Consequently, the prejudicial belief that true metaphysics and true morality exist outside science first emerged and then became consolidated. From this angle, science can only perform an instrumental function and live at the service of heterogeneous ideals, conceived as the true and only ideals or values. The relationship between science and philosophy has been envisioned as a relationship of subordination of the former to the latter, as a means to an end, or as pseudo-​knowledge with regard to true knowledge. The life of the scientist has been broken in two so that, between the scientist and the person, there emerged a gap that can be overcome only through an unintelligible leap from one metaphysics to the next. The confusion created by such a dualism goes hand in hand with the entire history of science and even more with the development of technology in the modern world. The bourgeois, capitalistic, and individualistic ideals that characterize the metaphysics of the last centuries have prevented the scientist and the technician from producing those fruits tied to the new conception of knowledge. Consequently, science and technology have remained within the goal of functionality that stifles its intrinsic and truest energy. The lifeless humanism of an anachronistic religious and philosophical tradition still presumes to represent the true values, blocking the way to the affirmation of the more profound humanism that science and technology can develop. However, this dualism is destined to exhaust itself. The unification of the world that science and technology is accelerating no longer allows for multiple religions and philosophical systems to continue to exploit new knowledge. Before the eyes of the scientist, religions and schools of philosophies begin to reveal their intrinsic relativism and the consciousness of the superiority of scientific consensus vis-​à-​vis the conflicting state of the other faith slowly leads to the understanding of the intrinsic value of science. Scientists progressively free themselves from prejudices that feed their inferiority complexes and acquire a full consciousness of their whole autonomy. Science and life finally can identify themselves.

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Science and Metaphysics

In Dal mito alla scienza (1966), Spirito continued to delve into the complex relationship between science and metaphysics, explaining how metaphysics was also science. To this end, he expounded concepts only briefly hinted at in “L’avvenire della scienza,” such as that of science understood as “hypothetical truth,” which he transformed into “hypothetism”—​the theory according to which every scientific statement is hypothetical because it is founded upon the limited experience of the part. The second involved the process through which philosophy appropriated the claim of hypothesis held by science, forming with it a single form of knowledge. In Storia della mia ricerca, he wrote: The presumption to possess truth represents the dogmatic form of knowledge to which the critical form typical of scientific investigation is opposed. The entire post-​problematic development of my thought is somehow tied to this consciousness of the critical superiority of science that progressively increases and characterizes the tendency to hypothesize science as a superior form of knowledge and action. … From myth one arrives to science, and in science the value of the present and the past is found.8 Until the end of the 1960s, Spirito continued to believe, even if with some reservations, that he had reached again incontrovertibility and that he had found a solution to his ‘problematic’ condition. In the two translated excerpts, one from Storia della mia ricerca and the other from Dal mito alla scienza, he clarified the concept of metaphysics as science and the hypothetical nature of science. 10.6

Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 49–​53) [Translation]

The theory of the identification of science and philosophy, as emerged after problematicism, finds its most convincing expression in the Conference of December 1959, “L’avvenire della scienza” (in Inizio di una nuova epoca). In it, I affirmed the first principle of the metaphysics implicit in science. It is the identity of knowledge and action (Verum and Factum Convertuntur) from

8 Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, pp. 48–​49.

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which one can draw the consequences of a metaphysical system both on a gnoseological and moral level: One needs to articulate the metaphysical content of science through a subsequent clarification that can be transformed into a systematic conception of reality. In other words, we need to show the consequences deriving from the principle of the absoluteness of scientific truth conceived as immanent truth.9 And further on: In science, a metaphysics and a morality, which can be indicated in clear and precise terms, are inherently present. Science contains within itself an evident criterion of life, that is a criterion of every knowledge and every action.10 In my volume, Dal mito alla scienza, the metaphysical problem is no longer treated with the same certainty. The demand that led me to use the term hypothetism to represent the scientific conception of reality leads me now to be more cautious about affirming the possession of the absolute truth through its identification with science. For even hypothetism is a metaphysics, metaphysics as a science. Having affirmed the impossibility of discarding the metaphysical condition and that man is a metaphysical animal, it is necessary to declare that metaphysics is also science. Viewed in historical terms, the problem posits Kant and post-​Kantian idealism as the necessary premise to argue that metaphysics is a science because it entertains both a scientific and a hypothetical method: Metaphysics is a science because it is hypothetical, and it is hypothetical because it is founded on the principle of non-​exclusion, a criterion required by scientific metaphysics. No metaphysical statement can be absolute; all statements in this regard must be subject to negation, for even the least exception to this rule would invalidate its scientific nature. In fact, the very absoluteness of this conclusion must not represent any contradiction, for that would imply the possibility of its negation, thus negating metaphysics as a science. Having defined metaphysics as a

9 Spirito, Inizio di una nuova scienza, p. 137. 10 Ibid., p. 146.

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science in this manner, it follows that the proof of scientific character is achieved through the transformation of all philosophies into a single philosophy. Given the fact that chemistry, physics, and biology are individual sciences that developed through the work, research, and hypotheses of all philosophers, collaborating with the same goals in mind. The multiplicity of philosophies previously supported by the presumption of the philosophers about having the exclusive possession of the truth has ceased due to the extension of the scientific method of hypothetism to philosophy.11 I came to this conclusion to avoid falling back into the hypostasis of science as dogmatic metaphysics. This critical process became even more selective in order to avoid the rebirth within science of a knowledge that goes beyond science itself. The constant effort to arrive at a consensus, based on the idea of hypothesis, is considered an essential objective. Ironically, it is that same hypothesis that at a one point will end up becoming problematic, thereby placing at risk the entire philosophical system. “What is the discourse on hypothesis? Obviously it is a discourse about the whole which qualifies it and in a way defines it.”12 Now, even scientific metaphysics posits itself as being in possession of truth, therefore denying the differences that would contrapose it to traditional values. This contradiction appears so insurmountable that it fails to reach the goal it sets out to achieve. Because faith in science does not allow for a return of philosophy back to the antinomy, we try once again to affirm the superior critical quality of scientific metaphysics: This metaphysics, as opposed to the old metaphysics, claims on the one hand to possess the truth while on the other denies it. If the only difference between this and the old metaphysics was the possession of the truth, then it could be a metaphysics alongside other metaphysics, and it would follow their destiny. However, claiming to be at the same time a negation of the possession of the truth, it acquires a sui generis quality that we need to analyze in a careful manner. In claiming not to possess the truth, metaphysics is now to be considered metaphysics as a science.13

11 12 13

Ugo Spirito, Dal mito alla scienza (Florence: Sansoni, 1966), pp. 359–​360. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 44.

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The problem dealing with scientific metaphysics becomes extremely confusing and requires further clarification. How is scientific metaphysics at the same time possession and non-​possession of the truth? By having possession of the truth, the metaphysics of hypothesis claims to know that the truth or truths are decidedly hypothetical and that they could become definitive only through the cognitive possession of the whole. In the same way, the metaphysics of the hypothesis affirms the existence of a part-​whole relationship that can be defined more precisely (for example, the theory of omnicentrism and that of the identification of the whole with the part). However, scientific metaphysics being conclusive in this sense becomes as dogmatic as any other conception of the whole. Those scientists or philosophers whose works are grounded in hypotheses are dogmatic theoreticians like everyone else, thus affirming the superiority of their own position over others. In claiming the non-​ possession of the truth, however, the situation of metaphysics as a science changes radically and goes beyond its admitted dogmatism because the concept of hypothesis now is present in every statement, beginning with one that coincides with the same hypothesis.14 10.7

Dal mito alla scienza (pp. 24–​34) [Translation]

The attempt to ascertain the real difference between religion and philosophy, on the one hand, and science, on the other, can start with the previous assertions by juxtaposing the two positions. Scientists are able to find common ground on this matter whereas philosophers and theologians are incapable of doing so. That means there is a need for further clarification. If the difference does exist, one would think that it is possible to effect an internal distinction between dogmatism and metaphysics. There is no doubt we are dealing with two absolutist propositions. However, it is equally true that the two absolutes bring forth results that fundamentally limit their equation. Let us see then whether it is possible to compare the two sides to demonstrate that one position is inclusive of the other and the second is not inclusive of the first. If that is indeed the case, we will be able to explain how the more comprehensive of the two positions will lead to a consensus, while the other will exclude it. The option to choose the most 14

Ibid., pp. 44–​45.

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comprehensive one will still be dogmatic in nature, and in some way, it would be justified, at least as a path to further investigation. To pursue the matter further, we need to examine more closely and in detail the characteristics of the scientific data and the dissent that can emerge among scientists regarding such data. A scientific proposition is based on the examination of certain relations among given phenomena. For instance, when a scientist used to say that the sun rotated around the earth, he based his assertion on certain evident relations that could be verified through everyone’s experience. It seemed impossible to doubt it and, consequently, it was impossible to think otherwise within the realm of certain observations shared by others. Doubt could emerge only by widening the sphere of the experimental relations and organizing them into a more comprehensive picture of the observed reality. Such being the nature of scientific truth, the possibility of varying truth, by widening gradually the scope of relations already examined, becomes a tentative effort resisting a definite conclusion. For a scientific proposition to become a definitive truth, the infinite series of relations among the phenomena of reality would have to be exhausted. Obviously, this is unthinkable, given the present state of human knowledge. It follows that scientific truth is always relative or, to put it differently, is partial knowledge. A part of the whole is just that, a part, and it can be truly known by knowing the whole. Once we exclude the knowledge of the whole, the true knowledge of the part is also excluded. When man thought he had found true knowledge, he actually found a part of the whole and devised a system of knowledge in which the parts are subsumed into one unit. A typical example is the Aristotelian system, conceived as an exhaustive system of reality in which metaphysics and physics are joined together and reveal their identity. In time, man lost his ability to achieve the absolute and recognized the transcendence of the unknown. At that point, the nature of truth changed, and it became a structure of parts subject to scientific study. Thus, man’s presumption to achieve absolute knowledge waned or was postponed to an indefinite future. As a result, each science broke down into sciences, and each limited itself to narrow pursuits. Each such part aspiring to the truth turned inward to seek limited objectives and thus lost its claim to being unquestioned and absolute.

…

When the meaning of scientific truth is defined in these terms, it becomes possible to determine its essential characteristics. Scientific truth, considered as such only in relation to a particular series of relations, can be changed and, in

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fact, it changes continuously with the widening sphere of relations and with the reciprocal linkage of the various sciences. Scientific progress involves the transition from the domain constituted by a series of relations to one made up of increasingly larger series of relations. However, because it is impossible to reach the totality of such relations, the scientist’s search for truth can only reach a certain point, even if his attention is directed at reaching a totality that eludes him. The scientist is unable to reveal the unknown. However, the efforts he makes to discover it take him progressively beyond the unknown through a constant effort to anticipate a given experience by means of hypotheses. Therefore, resting on limited and partial experience, scientific truth is always and only hypothetical truth. Going beyond the realm of hypothesis would mean superseding partial experience and reaching the whole. The common understanding of what constitutes scientific truth is quite the opposite of what I have just pointed out. It is thought instead that a given truth meets the requisites of scientific truth when it becomes definitive and indisputable. On the other hand, the general consensus that accompanies a large part of scientific results is seen as evidence of absolute truth. It is assumed that there is a part of science which is still hypothetical and awaits to be confirmed or rectified. But we also have a whole series of conclusions that have been solidified over time and cannot be modified. In other words, there is a definitive science and a science in fieri (ongoing) being developed and perfected. Yet, the illusion of the difference between the definitive and the transient emerges from the fact that, in a certain historical situation, the experience gained through a specific series of relations is sufficiently valid to allow the scientist to move from such experience and continue to hypothesize beyond that experience in search for new relations and new scientific truths. Only later, and only when the new truths have gradually widened the range of experience and acquired sufficient strength to assert themselves to the point of imposing the revision of results that appeared definitive, does the system enter a state of crisis and reveals its fundamental relativity. Scientific revolutions, such as those of Nicolaus Copernicus and Albert Einstein, emerge in this fashion and erode the foundations of traditional knowledge to the point that even established truths prove to be false and inconsistent. The concept of what is definitive becomes progressively problematic and remains within the confines of time and space, which are fairly large but always relative. The new hypotheses overturn the sense of acquired knowledge, thus rendering everything equally hypothetical. This movement is well understood by the scientist who aspires to see the breakdown of even the most solid and incontrovertible truths. Every truth which is disputed opens new avenues of investigation. Contrary to the attitude of a religious person or a philosopher, the scientist has no particular

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truth to defend to the bitter end; he lives to discover new truths which will replace those that have faded away.

…

The concept of scientific or hypothetical truth allows us to understand what it means to identify science with philosophy. Philosophy becomes science when its tenets acquire the consciousness of their hypothetical nature. Such consciousness constitutes the necessary condition that allows every other science to assimilate philosophical content. It is sufficient to analyze the traditional content of each philosophical system to be convinced of the fundamental homogeneity about the objective of every branch of knowledge. The object of philosophy is the whole, and it is precisely in relation to such a universal quest that philosophy has distinguished itself from science, which seeks partial knowledge. But what is this whole sought by philosophy? The answer to the question is twofold. If by knowledge of the whole we mean actual knowledge of a system of reality, its principle and unity, then we are dealing with the traditional concept of philosophy, of which Aristotle represents the most meaningful example. On the other hand, if by knowledge we mean the study and analysis of the whole, then philosophy becomes a science like any other and with the same content. We have seen how every science seeks totality and it does so to the point of hypothesizing the nature of everything—​finite and infinite, life and non-​life, matter, energy, consciousness, numerology, evolution, and so forth. It is true that every science identifies itself with a search for partial knowledge and, as such, it operates within the boundaries of its specific pursuits. However, each science cannot perceive its partial nature without experiencing its limitations and the boundaries that define it; that is to say, it cannot survive without transcending itself in order to truly understand itself. For its part, philosophy assumes as its primary objective the problem of totality, and it cannot but address the whole as the raison d’être of its own probing. However, totality can be studied as a problem posited in certain terms within a specific historical and scientific context, within the scope of an experience that philosophy seeks to transcend, hoping to find a solution even if it remains elusive not only to the philosopher but to the physicist, the biologist, and the mathematician. The whole studied by a philosopher is but one part of the same whole examined by every scientist. The answer the scientist is seeking is the same that the physicist is searching for when he asks himself whether the universe is finite or infinite, or the linguist when he wonders whether reality is represented by language, or the psychologist when he asks himself whether the only reality is human consciousness.

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Should we wish to associate every science with minor problems, then we will have to agree that philosophy too can be defined in terms of problems, be they the problems of logic, cosmology, ethics, and so forth. Using such criteria, it is impossible to delineate the boundaries of philosophy and the other sciences in the same way it is not possible to delineate exactly the boundaries between physics and chemistry or between physics, chemistry, and biology. Now that philosophy has become a particular area of knowledge, its specific concern will undoubtedly be the problematic questions associated with metaphysics. But such questions will be pursued within a frame that is substantially the same as any other discipline; moreover, shared knowledge will yield a common discourse with other scientists. The metaphysical question, which is to say, the ultimate question, will not be the domain of philosophers alone but will be shared by others; as a result, the philosopher cannot claim a special privilege. If every person interested, by nature, in a question in its totality can be called a student of metaphysics, then the philosopher, who turns a natural interest into a specific object of study, will no longer be called an expert in metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysics, reduced by the philosopher to a specific object of investigation, could well assume in the person of the philosopher an intellectualizing activity less apt to be experienced in its fullness. If everyone is, of necessity, metaphysical, not everyone can be a philosopher because only philosophers, confined to the specificity of their discipline, can become accustomed to confusing the tension in discovering the totality of a subject with the term “whole.” In so doing, they slide into intellectualism and verbalism… Accordingly, the whole is known, hypothetically, as is the part, precisely because the whole, being the object of cognition, finds itself in the necessary position of being defined and broken down into its constituent parts. Religions and philosophical systems must be considered as hypotheses which historically have been formulated and based on the nature of the whole. As such, they have become objects of scientific investigation together with new hypotheses that are gradually enunciated. We cannot negate philosophy, only unscientific philosophies that are enclosed into systems and not based on hypotheses, which stand in the way of investigation. The whole becomes the object of scientific investigation in philosophy when it is treated as a specific problem and, as a particular problem, it can be considered only as a tension that goes beyond the part. This is the reason why the whole as object of philosophy cannot be distinguished from the part as the object of every other science. The path to knowledge is always the same, and it is the knowledge of the part leading to the whole, pursued in such a way that the result of every inquiry is partial or hypothetical until it becomes the exhaustive knowledge of the whole. The conventional belief regarding the difference between philosophy and

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science—​based on the notion that the former is knowledge of the universal, and the latter knowledge of the particular—​is destined to become an illusion as soon as it is realized that the cognitive process does not end. Accordingly, whole and part may not be considered on different planes, they need to be regarded as partial objects of the same inquiry. Seeking to understand the part or the whole means to pursue the same end: to transcend the parts to reach the whole. Philosophy and science become identical because both identify themselves as whole and part. 10.8

Observations on Science and Technology

Spirito was a keen observer of cultural phenomena. Like other thinkers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger or Emanuele Severino, he was attentive to the importance that technology had assumed in the contemporary world. Even though he never wrote a book dedicated only to technology, one can find a plethora of references about this aspect in his writings. His discourse on technology was always tied to that of science since the latter constituted the theoretical backbone that allowed technology to thrive. He asserted that “the discourse on technology. … must start from science with the purpose of achieving a persuasive result.”15 Spirito was a great admirer of the continuous improvements that science and technology brought to everyday life. According to him, these improvements were the result of the collaboration that scientists had established in their never-​ending investigation. Among them, the unification of the world—​achieved through the implementation of continuous technological innovations that shortened distances while allowing simultaneous forms of communication among people of different nations—​was the most visible and consequential accomplishment realized by science and technology, since millions of people, excluded for centuries from the social and cultural life, became active contributors to the development of their respective national history. For Spirito, the function of science and technology could no longer be confined to the traditional role of being only a supporting instrument of the higher cultural manifestations represented by “literature, art, religion, and philosophy.”16 On the contrary, by promoting “unity and consensus,”17 science 15 16 17

Ugo Spirito, Critica della demorazia (Florence: Sansoni, 1963), p.11. Ugo Spirito, Nuovo umanesimo (Rome: Armando Editore, 1964), p. 37. Ibid., p. 39.

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and technology were creating goals of their own that aimed at developing a new humanism affecting all aspects of life. With time, the new emerging values would become “supreme spiritual values in which all the others would be resolved,”18 thus creating a “superior humanity for now represented by the international scientific community.”19 In “Scienza e tecnica nel mondo d’oggi,” a chapter of Nuovo umanesimo (1964), Spirito expresses the conviction that science and technology have been preparing the world of the future by creating new collective values capable of regenerating all aspects of life, including the artistic ones. 10.9

“Scienza e tecnica nel mondo d’oggi”. In Nuovo Umanesimo (pp. 43–​56) [Translation]

In today’s daily conversation, we hear people referring to this century as the century of science, and even more, as the century of technology. People say it with a sense of admiration for all the advancements that human beings have made, for the increase in comfort, and for all the transformations that life has undergone. People are referring to it as the triumph of mechanization, as a risk, and as an exacerbation of an interest until now considered subordinated and merely functional, even if it has its own importance and merit. According to the public opinion, indeed, science and technology are, on the one hand, expression of human creativity and of our civilization; on the other, they are considered secondary insofar as they are subordinated to the so-​called ‘spiritual’ values of religion, art, and literature. People think that no matter how great the world of science and technology may be, there exists another world, the world of values, in relation to which science can only be an instrument, a means for the achievement of superior ideals. Even if our culture is characterized by these convictions, even if this is the opinion shared by the same scientists and technicians, who once are outside their laboratory, cannot help but think that artists, philosophers, and religious figures are representatives of needs that are more profound than their own, and even if this is the most recurrent theme of our daily conversation, I believe, instead, that this opinion contains a fundamental misunderstanding. The problem must be faced in a different manner: science and, above all,

18 Ibid., p. 40. 19 Ibid.

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technology, must become the path to new conceptions of life, leading to radical transformations of religion, philosophy, and even art itself. I would like to demonstrate that today, based on the development of science and technology during the twentieth century, the world is undergoing a process of transformation within the sphere of values that seem to go beyond them. I said science and technology of the twentieth century to imply that these two cultural aspects, besides having nourished the life of this civilization, during the last century have been increasingly detaching themselves from their millenary tradition, becoming forces that will usher in a new world. Why are science and technology breaking free from tradition? Because during the twentieth century they performed the unprecedented miracle of increasing—​almost to infinity—​velocity, which was the characteristic of civilization for thousands of years. Before this century, humankind had not experienced the velocity created by steam, motor, electricity, and now the atomic bomb. The transformation produced by velocity represents the transformation undergone by the world. Science and technology, which have been able to increase velocity to incredible levels, now have the possibility of transforming the same conception of the world. Velocity is the dominating event of our century, the one that is transforming our entire civilization. We are referring to the velocity of the means of transportation that allows us to reach the two poles within twenty-​four hours, and above all, to the velocity of audiovisual communication, for it allows us to talk and see simultaneously. We can be informed immediately about events happening everywhere in the world: print, radio, and television have become echoes of what happens everywhere in the world. The globe has contracted and the whole human experience can be shared by everyone. The experiences of the village, city, province, region, nation, and continent have become a single collective event involving our entire civilization. This is the great transformation produced by technological instruments, which have allowed all people, including the primitive ones, to arrive at a greater level of awareness. Let’s consider the farmer of few decades ago. He had no other experience than that of his own land that he worked together with his entire family. He believed in his land, believed in his relationship with the owner of the land, believed in the values associated with the land, believed in traditional religion without any questioning and in the morality at the foundation of his own action. He knew that he was living according to values that could not be questioned because his own world was self-​sufficient and tied to certain spiritual categories that had remained unchanged for centuries. This happened until the time of the youth of my generation. Then, because of the technological transformation, the world totally opened in front of his eyes. The farmer saw

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cars speeding close by his land and, through the car, he realized the existence of a world he had ignored until then. Then, he went to the movies, listened to the radio, watched tv, and the entire world little by little became familiar to him. No longer was his knowledge limited to his land only. It included first the land of the entire nation and afterwards that of the entire world with its practices, customs, and manifestations of art, philosophy, and civilization. He communicated with the population of all the continents, each person expressing the values typical of his own continent. The life of the planet had made a sudden and unexpected appearance in his small and, until then, closed piece of land.

…

This farmer has begun to realize that his was a very limited experience, that his religion was a religion among so many others, that customs that seemed unchangeable were instead lived differently from country to country. His mind has begun to reflect, to doubt, not to place too much trust in what was the substance of his life. Because he began to doubt, a progressively more radical crisis has emerged in his soul. This crisis, which is also common to the worker, to the Italian as well as to the foreigner, to the primitive person as to the refined one, is the crisis of our civilization, gripping little by little our whole soul through a transformation of customs and habits. The result is the shattering of everyone’s life. What values are the true values? What is the true morality? What is the true religion? Once a crisis begins, it progresses. Today, we realize that it is difficult to find someone with true faith, devoid of selfishness and hypocrisy. Everywhere one has the sensation of a lack of faith, of falseness, and of equivocation both in our national and international political life. This is the main characteristic of the life of today and it is a characteristic against which it is vain to rebel. This is the way life must be today for the simple reason that we are living in a phase of transition, from a closed to an open lifestyle, from the life of a single country to the life of the entire world. This crisis reaches both the old generation, which still believes in the past but lacks the strength of the past, and the new generations—​even the very youngest one—​who in vain ask the older generations for help in finding lasting values. Old people don’t know how to talk to the young anymore, and the young, being left on their own, enter into that terrible crisis from which only a few

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chosen ones are spared but into which are drawn the sentiments of the majority of the so-​called ‘rebels without a cause,’ no longer able to dream big. However, we don’t need to be skeptical nor disheartened since this youth is the youth of the transition from the generation of yesterday to that of tomorrow. Indeed, we can begin to see beyond today’s crisis the dawn of a better world.

…

It is not easy to identify the main feature of this new world. However, in order to find the starting point whose effectiveness no one can doubt, we need to turn to science and technology, whose values are considered by many people belonging to an inferior category. Science and technology are together ushering in the world of tomorrow by elevating themselves from relativism to a new absoluteness of values. The current crisis can be defined as a crisis generated by relativism: everything is relative, everything is indifferent, and everything is equal. The values we are embracing are new absolute values, different from the absolute values of the town, of the city, of the nation, and of the farmers. By overcoming the relativistic crisis, the new absolute values can unify religion, philosophy, art, and morality. Today, the password is unification; and technology is the cause of it. I look around and I become aware that I am living in an extremely different way than the one I was living in my childhood. I have seen the birth of the car, plane, and phone; I have witnessed the birth of all the inventions that are considered necessary for life today. These changes are not phenomena involving only Rome or Italy. I can land in any continent, and I notice that airports function according to the same technological laws; I can go to any hotel in any area of the world and find the same things; and everywhere stadiums unify people through the same sports experience while everywhere cinema has become the fundamental educational experience. Above all, cinema allows us to talk to the entire world by offering the same expression of life and art through technological unification. A film spreads from one continent to the next, and in each speaks through the language of the local inhabitants. The language has multiplied, and through the dubbing, each film reaches the heart of every citizen of the world. Cinema brings about this unification, which is not only technological but, above all, spiritual, since it places before the eyes of the spectators the life of the entire world, so that each one of us begins to feel as our own the tastes and needs of everybody else. In this manner, each one of us begins to share

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common values. Little by little, cinema can establish the same way of thinking, of feeling, of taste, of art, and even of religious life and philosophical interest.

…

Let’s start with religion, the first value of human conscience and essence and foundation of the spiritual life. If we turn on the radio or the tv, if we go to the movies, or if we travel from continent to continent, we realize that the church is no longer one, neither the Christian Catholic Church nor the Church of the other Christian confessions, that is, the Protestant Church. We can notice the walls and the structures of Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist or Taoist temples, and we have immediately the sensation that there is a world that lives with a religion that is different from ours. It is the technological instrument that places us in immediate contact with the religious lives of other people and allows us to realize that Buddhists live a profound spiritual life and that Muslims live with an absolutist faith. Consequently, we Christian Catholics, used to considering our religion as the only true one, begin to consider the existence of a wider spiritual horizon and feel that all religions are worthy of respect . … Various churches open their doors to one another, and they become united in a religious sentiment that goes beyond the positive, particular confession of each of them, thus elevating them to a sense of the divine that transcends every particularity. This is the first great miracle of the unification of the world, which is, after all, the same one that is taking place in philosophy. Philosophers begin to use the same language through diverse traditions, through the growing numbers of interpreters, and through their continuous contacts in every continent, and they cannot help but keep in consideration all that is being said and thought everywhere, thus expanding their experience. Religion and philosophy are the highest manifestations of thought and spiritual life of a civilization, and at this level we quickly proceed in the direction of the unification of the world. Nothing is foreign to us any longer; human races are progressively closer; conversations become more homo-​geneous; our reality is more and more the reality of everyone else. This is the miracle produced by technological progress, unifier of the world. Having arrived at this point, we could think that this miracle is being brought about through technology but not by virtue of the spirit of technology. We could think, that is, that technology is only an instrumental means which is unable to inspire the content of the new spirituality. Well, even here, I would like to demonstrate that this is not true. Technology, as an expression of science, harbors in its bosom a religious, philosophical, and

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artistic content that belongs to science as such. To validate this statement, we need to resort to the experience of the life of the scientist, which is a life different from that of the philosopher or that of the religious person, and, above all, that of the ideological or political person, since it possesses within itself a religious, and above all, a moral conscience typical of the scientist as such. A scientist manifests this characteristic when confronted with other people such as ideologues or religious believers or even metaphysicists: he is used to collaboration, whose spiritual tone is given by consensus. Scientists understand each other since they speak the same language, collaborate, and live without the mask while involved in their investigation. This is the greatness of science: the achievement of consensus. Two and two are four; the internal angles of a triangle are equal to two rectangular angles; H2SO4 is the formula of sulfuric acid: scientists agree, even if one is Catholic and the other is Muslim and even if one is communist and the other is anticommunist. The Iron Curtain, if it divides from a religious, philosophical, and political point of view, does not divide from a scientific perspective. While living on both sides of the Iron Curtain, scientists speak the same language, carry out the same experiences, and reach the same goals. They understand each other, speak the same language, and get along with each other. It is true that scientists are also divided, but their division is a division fundamentally different from that of the philosophers, religious people, and politicians, since their differences involve only the agenda or inquiries of tomorrow, not the results of yesterday. All scientists agree when they are confronted with the results: if they were not in agreement, if science were not one and did not proceed from a collaboration, the missile could not lift itself to reach the moon. If this miracle happens, it is because throngs of scientists and technicians have collaborated, have believed in the same truths, and have helped each other. If they have disagreements, their disagreements involve their hypotheses. Science grows and the investigation is an investigation rooted in a procedure that begins with a hypothesis and ends with a verification. Scientists can disagree on the hypothesis but are never in disagreement with the verification. If we can look at the other face of the moon, there is no scientist who could deny it. However, there can be disagreement on the hypothesis, and indeed there is disagreement. However, scientists continue their investigation by contraposing hypothesis to hypothesis and discussing their diversity. We are dealing with hypotheses, and one does not kill for a hypothesis. Scientists collaborate and try to find the solution for the hypothesis: one’s hypothesis is the instrument and stimulus even for the scientist who does not share its premises. For this reason, the various hypotheses become part of the

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same effort of collaboration, thus transforming themselves into vehicles of tomorrow’s truth. This is the dissent of science, a dissent that emerges from consensus and that in turn leads to consensus. Religions, instead, have always represented in the history of civilization an element of division, and if we consider the matter well, all fights for civilization have been fights of religion. If we today pay attention to what happens and try to understand the reason why the world is divided by a cold war that prevents us from believing in a future, this reason cannot be found in science but in the world of politics, of religion, and of metaphysics, where ‘anticommunist’ and ‘communist’ mean ‘Western religion’ and ‘oriental ideology,’ the contraposition of traditions, history, and mentality. We are heading toward a future where religiosity and the metaphysical dimension will be lived ‘univocally’ through the scientific and technological awakening. Even if today the risk of a world-​wide catastrophe continues to exist, this must be attributed to metaphysics and religion immanent in the scientific investigation. There is a logic in the productive system of the world that is progressively unifying the world. Even if we still witness capitalism on one side and socialism and communism on the other, and if there is an antithesis that seems insurmountable, the world productive system, unifying through technology all the means of production in the life of factories and in the life of trade, cannot help but restore a life that is unique even on the level of political faith. We are imperceptibly moving toward a political unity of the world which is adjusted to this scientific and technological unity. For this reason, all our values must be renewed through the spirit of science and technology.

…

To complete our presentation, we need to consider that value which seems totally unrelated to science and technology: the value of art. We can say that science and technology are creating a new beauty and a new artistic activity, since they are imposing the same process of collaboration typical of the scientific investigation even to the arts. Consequently, they overcome the individualism of the artist and help to express the collective condition of individual living in a more unified world. We cannot believe that we can go to the moon without being conscious that behind this project there is a complex and extensive laboratory supported by workers and by a communal life upholding the enthusiasm of workers, technicians, and scientists alike. Do you believe that we can establish this new reality in the atomic era without

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elevating the aesthetic experience from the individual to the level of the mass and incorporating provocative and daring artistic initiatives? If we consider Renaissance art, we can see that the discovery of the new world was an event that inspired an entire civilization in which art found its greatest works of genius.

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Democracy within Problematicism 11.1

Introduction

Spirito began to write about political ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, socialism, and communism beginning in 1925 when he published the article “Lo ­sviluppo del fascismo (1925b).” The last ideology that he addressed in a systematic way during the late 1950s and early 1960s was democracy. He claimed that democracy was the only political value in the Western world that had not been subjected to the close examination of critical thought. Critica della democrazia was published in 1963. According to him, the book was the result of a long period of research on the democratic system with the purpose of elaborating an interpretation of it that [was] both historical and rational.1 In it, the philosopher challenged the prevailing view of democracy that was handed down from the end of World War ii. According to this view, “to be democratic meant to be against the dictatorship,”2 that is, to be antifascist. Consequently, the entire world proclaimed itself to be democratic both in the old and newly-​formed countries and on both sides of the Iron Curtain [so that] no matter what the religious faith, philosophical certainty, or political ideology, the myth of democracy [was] accepted a priori and with a sense of pride.3 Spirito also remarked that the general acceptance of democracy by all sorts of political, ideological, and religious affiliations implied a strong dose of uncritical conformism that elevated democracy to “an absolute myth that could not be discussed.”4 The intent of his book was, therefore, the debunking of that 1 Spirito, Critica della democrazia, p. 7. 2 Ibid., p. 10. 3 Ibid., p. 8. 4 Ibid., p. 9.

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myth since democracy was a system guided by the elite just as any other system, including dictatorship, and it was founded on a misunderstood interpretation of the institution of majority rule, and nurtured by the metaphysics of the ‘I’; that is, by the notion of the pre-​eminence of the function of the individual in the development of social and political values. As an alternative, Spirito envisioned a new type of democracy, based on the new majority rule made up of workers who, having experienced poverty, would eventually gain power through class struggle and the implementation of a planned economy directed by experts with scientific and technological experience. 11.2

“La funzione della democrazia”. In Critica della democrazia (pp. 202–​218) [Translation]

The concept of democracy is strictly linked to the principle of majority [rule], ultimately becoming completely identified with it. To understand the function and limits of the democratic regime, it is necessary to determine what values can be attached to the principles of majority. The first observation that issues from this determination is that the criterion of the majority is not tied to the concept of expertise since one cannot assume that those who make up the majority are also the most capable individuals. The criterion of majority is only a quantitative principle according to which a given number is equated with strength and power. However, in a society that follows the path of scientific and technological principles, the use of excessive force must never be elevated to a principle identified with governance and must be placed under strict control. Therefore governance, based on majority rule, must be substituted by another form of governance that excludes excessive force. What we have said about science and technology leads us to acknowledge that consensus is the informing principle of social life, and where scientific discourse prevails, unanimity becomes the ideal we must achieve progressively. Let us consider an example taken from university life where the scientific standard usually prevails. A commission overseeing a competitive examination for a teaching post is made up of five members. To select a winner, three panel members must reach a consensus. The scientific discourse—​in this case the process of selecting the winner—​may involve a unanimous decision that expresses consensus based on an explicitly scientific evaluation. However, it is also possible that the commission will never reach unanimity. In that case,

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the commission would remain divided into a majority and a minority with the consequence that the decision of the former most likely will prevail. Experience has proven that the failure to reach unanimity is not usually related to scientific reasons—​though they may still be present—​since the committee members may not only have an inadequate scientific preparation for the task, but they may also be affected by interference from their contrasting political opinions (as in the conflict between secular people and Catholics) or even by their personal differences. The decision-​making process then shifts from a scientific discourse to one based on coercion. When the scientific principle fails, it is necessary to rely on the majority principle, which represents the last stage of an immature social development. The need to substitute the criterion of unanimity with that of majority is increasingly being felt in present-​day society while the paths to achieve it continue to multiply. At first, the commission tries to continue the discussion in a thorough fashion with the purpose of finding explicit reasons that could lead to a final decision. Afterward, the commissioner asks each member if he can explain his opinion to ensure that every member takes the responsibility for his own judgment while simultaneously developing methods to reduce the necessity of using forceful means. For example, the right of the minority to appeal the decision to a higher authority is recognized, and, in certain cases, even the right to veto any decision that has not reached unanimity is granted. Yet, beyond the various methods utilized to reduce or eliminate the power of majority, the threat of force is gradually reduced by educating members about the importance of reaching a well-​reasoned consensus. Thus, the act of counting votes becomes less and less necessary, except in the case of organizations with strong political links, where the criterion of expertise has yet to be adopted. Politics still relies on force.

…

At this point, the problem of democracy emerges in its entirety. What was the function of democracy during the centuries? Has it only represented a limit imposed by social life? Those who struggle with a historical reality, whatever that may be, are sure that they are performing a positive function. There is much validity to the statement affirming that “what is real is rational,” and that is a point of reference for the historian who tries to understand the true role of democracy. If democracy represents a recurring value in the political life of the people, then it has served a valuable function in the history of civilization. While we can

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state that democracy is now in the process of exhausting itself, we can never say that it did not fulfill a valid function. The search related to the function fulfilled by democracy cannot overlook the conclusions that we have already reached. These conclusions can be sum-​ marized by the statement that the majority bases its decisions on numbers instead of expertise; that the function of majority is irrational because it is derived from the multiple ideas or interests of individuals. This implies that the positive function attributed to democracy must be compatible with the power of majority even though irrational, and we can study the problem even further. To resolve this problem, we must determine whether the majority, or the quantity per se, possesses a unique value of its own. If we can demonstrate the existence of this specific merit, the contradictions within the above-​mentioned conclusions would diminish and the value of democracy could be restored. However, beyond the various forms in which the action of the majority manifests itself, there is a fundamental experience shared by its members: poverty. Humanity has always been divided between rich and poor, and history, through the centuries, has been characterized by the conflict that has arisen as a result. First and foremost, majority is identified with the will of the poor to overcome the condition of inferiority in which they find themselves. This is their resource and is a historically valid principle responsible for motivating the masses. If the majority had been comprised of rich people, the democratic principle would have never arisen. The consideration that the idea of the majority has been applied to a sphere which goes beyond the specific experience of poverty and has become the informing principle of social life, represents in itself the negative side of democracy—​exactly the side that will be the cause of the degeneration and exhaustion of the regime as the distinction between poor and rich people gradually disappears.

…

The claims of the majority, which derive from the experience of poverty and are founded on the psychological state of being exploited, are naturally an experience sui generis with no possibility of manifesting itself through consensus. Rich people and poor people cannot come to an agreement because the former do not accept the idea of dialogue and the latter often do not know how to adequately verbalize their ideas. From within the majority, then, emerge minorities who begin to take charge and speak on their behalf. These minorities then talk with the majority, but only to a point, that is, without going beyond the specific experience of the majority, which is that of poverty.

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Eventually, that dialogue ends with a recourse to what the majority holds: size and strength made of poverty. The situation then becomes one of rebellion, of violence, and strife. We don’t want to be poor and exploited any longer. The unique character of such experience also stems from the fact that it is neither an ideology nor a conception. The ideologies—​such as socialism or communism—​will be elaborated by intellectual minorities who do not come from poverty, who will use these ideologies for idealistic reasons or personal interests but will not strike a chord in the conscience of the poor except to give them an immediate sense of inferiority and pain. These ideologies manifest themselves as opposing forces that show the willingness to destroy the present and to create a better future. Historically, the disparity between rich and poor resulted in different forms of mass rebellion, reflecting the time period and the countries in which they appeared. After the French Revolution, for example, the conflict manifested itself as an example of class struggle involving the Third and Fourth Estates, whose members eventually centered their attention on the problem of wealth. The proclamation of the rights of men and the elimination of privileges were followed by the desire to eliminate the last of the remaining privileges: private ownership. Rich and poor are clearly divided about the institution of private ownership, and they oppose each other as two distinct classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. “Workers of the world unite!” Unite and create a revolution. Understand your strength and violently unshackle yourselves from the chains with which the exploiters keep you bound. The democratic institution of majority satisfies this historical function, but, at a certain point, relinquishes its position to the more energetic and resolute revolutionary method. When the revolution, through mostly violent means, is carried out, the distinction between classes, and the class struggle it generates, comes to an end. The specific power tied to the condition of poverty begins to diminish until it slowly fades away, and the notion of strength is no longer viable and only represents the return to oppression when there is no other way to reach an agreement.

…

After one has rediscovered the roots of democracy and its essential function, it is easier to understand that it is founded on a partisanship. The idea of political parties can only extrinsically be called political parties because they are mainly classes. Democracy and class struggle represent the elements of an inseparable equation that society tries to conceal with varied and ambiguous superstructures. The real problem lies in the class struggle, which will continue until such struggle is completely resolved.

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It is indisputable that the struggle is moving towards a resolution, and it is being resolved obviously through a drastic use of force. The most radical manifestations of class struggle take place in countries where the revolutionary process has reached the heart of the social organism through the establishment of various forms of communist regimes. In these countries, even though there is a vague awareness that the democratic system is being overcome, new institutions based on the recognition of the various social structures are emerging to replace the old ones. The theoretical and practical tradition of democratic methods continues to persist, but it is progressively reduced. The abolition of the class structure in the Western world, however, is less clear. However, even here, through a less revolutionary method, the will of the poor conquers the resistance of the rich by eliminating the biggest difference among them. The procedure followed in these countries manifests itself in a form that is opposite to that of the countries behind the Iron Curtain because, far from representing the triumph of the proletariat over the bourgeois class, this method involves the progressive transformation of the proletariat into a middle class. Even though neither procedure has reached a similar conclusion, both are moving in converging paths and both mark the eventual end of class struggle. Even in the Western world, the raison d’être of democracy is reaching the point of exhaustion. Here, however, tradition is stronger, and the critical thought process has not taken into consideration the consequences of the social transformation, so that the journey appears slower and remains nearly imperceptible. Yet, the transfer of power to experts and technicians of every kind continues to increase, while the importance of the old institutions diminishes progressively. The idea of economic planning is gaining ground, and the social transformation that derives from it is beginning to reach the heart of the democratic system.

…

The problem of democracy is still alive in those countries in which the class struggle continues because of the presence of strong communist parties or other parties supporting communism in general. Among those countries is Italy which, in a certain way, merits the epithet of ‘underdeveloped.’ In our country, notwithstanding appearances, there is a difference between areas where the class struggle is disappearing and areas in which economic and structural conditions allow for huge inequalities among classes. It is not surprising, then, that misconceptions about democracy continue to have a more serious impact in Italy than everywhere else, and that the road toward the future will be longer

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and more difficult. Social classes and political parties continue to hold rigid positions, thus preventing a dialogue. Moreover, the lower standards of education and the declining literacy on the part of the population produce political amateurism, empty talk, and rhetorical demagoguery, which thrive here more than anywhere else. Lastly, we need to add to this equation the power held by the clergy, which alters the process of class struggle by slowing it down or, even worse, by preventing it from reaching its goals. Conformism is persuasive, and the suspicious crossover between Christians and communists pretending to be democrats, leads to a babel-​like ideological confusion and to a general lack of consciousness. Amid this confusion, Catholics and communists can get along and proceed together along the same path. Therefore, communism, having lost both hope and the will to carry out its revolution, assists the so-​called Christian democracy in its revisionist and reformist process of transforming the proletariat into the middle class. By yielding to socialism and social democracy, communism digs its own grave. On the other hand, the country’s progress reduces the distance between it and other more advanced countries. The specific Italian problem appears to be more of a common problem. The subsequent path becomes clearer, since both communism and Christian democracy now follow a common logic. Democratic methods continue to function poorly while the demand for a planned economy begins to assert itself, opening the doors to scientists and technicians.

…

If the end of the class struggle is the elimination of democracy, the present historical period will be considered only as a transitional phase in which the old political institutions resist the efforts to transform Italian society. Slowly, new institutions are erected with the purpose of replacing or modifying the more traditional institutions. The process of renewal is neither easy nor organic. Within those institutions, heterogeneous ideas that we can neither clarify nor unify continue to exist. Institutional disorder arises as a necessary consequence of conceptual disorder and cannot be identified without a precise awareness of the new order. This awareness clarifies the tasks that are needed to be carried out in order to go past the transitional phase. These talks will serve on a practical level, as an investigation and realization of new initiatives and new methods more in tune with the needs of the future. Anyone reflecting upon the current state of political affairs cannot help but realize the seriousness of the situation. The limits of political activity, which have always been felt throughout the course of civilization and have always resulted in

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overt skepticism and mockery, have become evident to everyone. In fact, these limits have led to a radical devaluation of political activity. Today, it is common to disdain and condemn politics while the number of people who choose not to participate in the political process is increasing. Politicians are not highly regarded, and political activity has become ordinary and vulgar. Partisanship and the ‘personality cult’ rule uncontested, and the most monstrous compromises are accepted without serious opposition or causing a scandal. Democratic institutions are slowly crumbling, and an atmosphere of hypocrisy stains even the noblest political intentions. Any judgment we render on this political situation cannot be limited solely to the identification of its negative aspects. It must also include the conviction that it refers to a transitional phase in which the destructive aspects are more seriously felt than the constructive ones. Out of destruction comes reconstruction as well as the need to prepare for the future.

…

Once we consider the present simply as a moment of transition, then it is up to scientific investigation to carry out the construction of tomorrow’s society. First, we must recognize the exceptional character of the transition. Indeed, if it is true that every historical period can be defined as a transition from the past to the future, it is also true that the difference between the past and the future can be rather relevant. At the present time, this difference is more noteworthy than at any previous time in history. We are at the dawning of a new era characterized by a change that does not only concern one or two countries or continents but the entire earth. For the first time in history, a process of unification is fusing various histories into a single history beyond any limit or boundary. This observation is enough to make us realize the revolutionary character of this process. Those who reach the conclusion that the world has become unified because of the triumph of science and technology will understand that the transitional phase will appear as the transition from religious and philosophical knowledge to science. Reality becomes unified because religions and philosophies remain in the background while people gather around a different form of knowledge and a new faith in truth. If this is the case, we need to agree that it is time to acquire a new mental habit in order to face the problems of today’s reality responsibly. Above all, we need to convince ourselves that the transformation of concepts and institutions cannot be superficial but must involve the fundamental principles of our ways of thinking and behaving. It is useless to appeal to age-​old values from

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the traditions and experiences of whole civilizations because the problem of unification involves the overcoming of all the traditions of all countries and all continents. If Western and Eastern worlds must begin a life together, it is necessary that we go beyond all that distinguishes them, and that the same manner of reasoning be placed in charge so that the diverse opinions will be given due consideration. Religions, philosophies, and political ideologies cannot be of any use. Consequently, all the problems must be taken to the level of a knowledge that resolves in itself the particular characteristics of all the other types of knowledge and, before everything else, of the various metaphysics. We need to be able to discover in science a metaphysics that exists within itself and that is emerging in a more positive way.

…

The problem of democracy can be faced only if we have a soul totally opened to the present and to the future. Today’s conformism and confusion are manifestations of the end of an ideology that is fading away. Therefore, we need to get to the root of the problem and make a critically impartial assessment. The intellectual and moral degeneration of democratic ideology is not something temporary, tied to the present time; rather it is the consequence of a new way of living and of thinking that cannot be contained in the traditional political forms. It is not a problem that involves modification and correction to the system but rather of total and absolute incompatibility. The hypocrisy and tendency to lying, now dominant, will be eliminated only when we look seriously at reality and call things for what they are. We need to have the courage to recognize that we continue to live off myths already defunct and that the apparent homage that we pay to them is at the root of the falsity of our lives. While courage is the indispensable condition for this social renewal, it is also necessary to have the capacity to see, to distinguish, and to rescue the concept of democracy from its confusion and vagueness. We need, that is, to perform the work of a scientist by leaving the narrow field of ideology and, therefore, overturning the ideal of democracy. It should not appear strange to us that the myths that need to be debunked are, first of all, those dealing with the concept of democracy, since it is just the democratic tradition that keeps alive a view of the human being that prevented until now the unification of humanity. This view sees the human being as an autonomous part and as a whole unit, which science today has shown to possess limits that cannot be overcome. Democracy has performed and will continue to perform, though marginally, the task of maintaining with violence the dualism between rich and poor. However, this function is destined to fade rather quickly. To become

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aware means to begin to put ideas in order and start thinking about how to solve problems that seem to be incomprehensible.

…

We have so far discussed the principal myths related to democracy. Now, we need to relate them to the one myth that generated them all: the myth of the individual that the democratic thought was never able to define as it was never able to define the concept of freedom tied to it. The new concept of the individual no longer has a limited meaning; rather it will place the human being within the problem of the whole. Consequently, the concept of freedom loses its vagueness and will be defined in its true meaning. Free is the individual who does not distinguish himself from all the others but see himself as an expression of the whole. Free is the individual who does not distinguish himself from the others and feels his worthiness as expression of all of humanity. He has been freed by the society in which he lives from all that gets in the way to the realization of his specific qualifications: that is, he is freed from all the other tasks that other members of society execute for him—​procurement of food, roof, clothes, means of transportation, welfare, etc.—​with the condition that his freedom be exercised to his limits in the field of his abilities. The freedom to dedicate all his energies to an activity that contributes to his own welfare and to the welfare of the others is the only freedom that can represent the right identified with duty. The other type of freedom linked to the so-​called autonomous individual cannot help but have a contradictory sense. The idea of allowing this concept of freedom to carry out the task of resolving the most important problems of civil life implies the substitution of free will to freedom and the personal view for the collective one. The absurdity of letting the majority to decide if two and two make four or five is no less serious than the absurdity hidden under the veil of democratic freedom. All problems are problems related to expertise and all are referred to scientific truth. There aren’t and neither can be two ways of being free. Individual, freedom, majority, part or minority. Today’s people still live by such myths in a conformist way, even if they don’t feel good about it and cannot help but notice the negative effects. Above all, they still cannot persuade themselves that the distinction between minority and majority involves violence, and that violence, beyond the historical limits in which it fulfills its function, cannot be the constructive principle of a world that wants to be unified and that has already taken that path.

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Culture within Problematicism 12.1

Introduction

Nuovo umanesimo (1964d), is a collection of essays written by Spirito between 1958 and 1964 during the years in which the philosopher overcame the ‘problematic’ condition. These essays attest to his efforts to include in his relentless intellectual inquiry a variety of aspects, that while all are not related to philosophy as a specific discipline and therefore not part of its internal dialectic (the second and third translated articles), they still enlighten us about his drive to reach a comprehensive interpretation of reality. By placing science at the center of his philosophical activity, Spirito attempts to formulate a new humanism whose fundamental principles coincide with the values of cooperation and consensus that scientists bring to the forefront during their work. He declares that science and technology are no longer dependent on ideologies, religions, and metaphysics, rather they represent the supreme values in which all the other values are resolved and unified,1 and goes on to state that this new humanism conflicts with the traditional humanism—​ still dominant in Italy—​ that views science and technology merely as supporting elements of higher spiritual values, such as the ones tied to the literary and artistic world. As an Italian, Spirito voices his displeasure over the state of inferiority in which Italian culture finds itself because it has remained anchored in the traditional literary and philosophical values of the Greek and Latin civilizations; in the Catholic Church that made those values constitutive elements of its own traditions; in an unshakable rhetorical and sophistic attitude transmitted through the centuries; and, lastly, in an individualistic interpretation of the arts and the function of education that since the time of the Renaissance became the backbone of the bourgeois mentality of the country. The stubborn persistence of these anachronistic cultural and historical influences, he contends, did not allow science and technology 1 Spirito, Nuovo umanesimo, p. 40.

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to play any role in the mentality and attitude of the Italian elite during the previous centuries. As a counterpart to the Italian humanist tradition, Spirito views positively the more universal cultural manifestations tied to scientific progress and the new humanism it contains. He maintains that if today’s world is inextricably linked, it is due to the velocity of the means of transportation that allows the continuous movement of people from one place to another and, above all, in particular, to the simultaneous transmission of news and artistic manifestations through the media—​television, radio, and cinema—​that makes everyone in the world part of the same shared cultural experiences. Supported by these convictions, Spirito sees a future in which the culture founded on the individualism of the bourgeois elite will completely give way to the new scientific culture that encourages everyone to unite and collaborate at all levels. Each of the three essays here translated, “Significato del nuovo umanesimo” (1964a), “Critica dell’educazione dell’uomo europeo“ (1964b), and “Cultura per pochi e cultura per tutti” (1964c), deals with a particular cultural aspect involving both Italy and the Western world. Together with the other essays of the collection involving the problem of censorship, knowing how to live, learning how to be cheerful, teacher’s preparation, Gentile’s humanism of work, not only do they reveal the variety and depth of Spirito’s cultural interests but also allow the reader to become familiar with the moral dimension of Spirito’s personality. 12.2

“Significato del nuovo umanesimo”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 37–​40) [Translation]

In Italy, more than in any other place, the humanistic tradition has deep roots, and thus it influences in a pervasive way the culture and mentality of the middle class. The scientific and technological progress of the modern world (especially that of the last century) failed to change our spiritual culture. Consequently, today we can still recognize the existence of a deep gap between humanistic and scientific endeavors. Science and technology are seen mostly as functional instruments vis-​à-​vis the true spiritual values represented by literature, art, religion, and philosophy. Even scientists do not object to those values since, for the most part, they believe that they are seeking higher values only when they leave the laboratory. Such a belief in the secondary and instrumental function of science has negative effects on our civilization in the sense that it slows down the process

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of discovering the differences between modern and past values. The truth is that science and technology are transforming our understanding of life in a profound way and are creating a reality that transcends traditional values. The innovative principle of this process can be called ‘unity’ or ‘unification.’ The miracle, in fact, produced by the development of science and technology during the last decades, caused the overcoming of relativism, which was very popular toward the end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, and the unification of tastes, needs, convictions, and customs to the point that they no longer belong to a single group of people but to all the continent, beyond differences of race, religion, and traditions. Relativism, which had quickly spread everywhere, can be traced to the initial phase of the technological advancement that, in time, unified the world. People were brought closer together by the speed of new means of transportation and even more by the speed of audiovisual communication. They ­discovered each other in their diversity of mentalities, religions, habits, and customs. Values that the citizens of a country thought to be absolute turned out to be relative and contingent. Skepticism became widespread as faiths crumbled. Still today, the prevailing aspects of Western civilization are agnosticism and indifference. Gone is the notion of the absolute that used to elicit certainty. The crisis in our society, which we have witnessed for many years and has now become drastic and harmful, is a consequence of the prevalent state of cultural uncertainty that has generated moral disorientation. The relativism of every perspective demonstrates that everything is worthless; therefore, it makes no sense to commit oneself to any endeavor that entails a sacrifice. However, the crisis cannot go beyond a certain point; in fact, we are already seeing the signs of a different spiritual attitude. Overcoming the crisis becomes possible because science and technology will gradually win over relativism—​ scientific relativity is not relativism—​by progressively eliminating the differences that characterize the multiplicity of perspectives and religious faiths. Indeed, the various means of production, international commerce, architectural structures, transportation by land, sea, and air as well as radio, television, and cinema, that is, everything that touches the lives of various peoples becomes a common experience. It is obvious that this process of unification cannot influence lifestyles without reaching sooner or later the highest expressions of thought, religion, art, and philosophy. Unity proceeds from science and technology, and from them it extends itself to the entire human race, thus transforming radically the very nature of the human being. Science and technology do not represent an instrumental value. On the contrary, they constitute a determining value even though often they are looked upon with an attitude of superiority by those who are still defending

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a humanism conceived within the limits of an anachronistic tradition. A new and more profound humanism is blossoming everywhere, and its fruits will soon materialize.

…

Already we can foresee, to some extent, what those fruits will be. Political ideologies, religions, and different philosophies have until now divided peoples and countries by pitting one against the other. On the other hand, science and technology are generating unity and consensus everywhere. How can anyone deny this fact and its future benefits? Organization and collaboration are the new goals that humanity wants to achieve. Science and technology will constitute the reason and the guarantee of a true community of interests and ideals. This event is already taking place, and it will acquire an even faster pace if we persuade ourselves that science and technology are not values that serve ideologies, religions, and metaphysics, rather that they represent the supreme spiritual values in which all the other values are resolved and unified. Today’s civilization, which is heavily influenced by technology, can continue to yield marvelous achievements only when individuals—​having developed full cognizance of science and technology—​understand one another, collaborate, and are agreeable with each other in a way that is bound to involve a common faith and common ideals. Already today we can see the emergence of a superior humanity that is represented by the international community of science. We have already a continuous dialogue among the scientists of the world that transcends any barriers of a political, racial, and religious nature. Consequently, scientists have been living in a higher domain free of hatred, and their sole interest is the search for truth and collaborative activity. It is necessary that they acquire a greater awareness of their spiritual superiority and their real autonomy, thus leaving behind the prejudices of a humanism that has become false, presumptuous, and detached from new and evolving realities. 12.3

“Critica dell’educazione dell’uomo europeo”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 79–​83) [Translation]

The ideal of the European man, which is being discussed at this Conference, can be considered the product of a fundamental equivocation that I will try to clarify in its various aspects. The confusion stems from the fact that the concept of Europe is still too vague and generic. Even if we limit ourselves to a simple geographical and anthropological notion, it is extremely difficult to come

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up with an exact definition of what Europe is. For example, the Soviet Union is a Euro-​Asian entity that cannot be divided in two without losing its own peculiarity. England has no meaning without the Commonwealth, and Latin America is closer to the European countries of the Mediterranean Sea than the German or Anglo-​Saxon ones. The United States is intrinsically tied to England by tradition and language. The boundaries of Europe are generic and fluctuating to the point that they have no effective meaning or value. Regarding customs and ways of life, we can say that most of the European countries have been totally influenced by American culture, thus accentuating the unity of the Western world. Having set aside the geographical criterion, we need to see whether Europe can at least be defined as a cultural and historical entity. During this Conference, it was said that we need to reclaim our classical and humanistic tradition because it holds the most significant meaning of the European ideal. It seems to me that, even from that standpoint, the problem cannot be put in those terms since classical and humanistic ideals originated in the Mediterranean area and not in Europe. In fact, those ideals began to experience a crisis during the Renaissance when, of the discovery of America, the center of civilization moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, marking the birth of Europe in the current sense of the term. The Mediterranean civilization has always been intercontinental, cosmopolitan, and enriched by the contributions of all the people who live along the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea, which is to say the people of three continents. Until the sixteenth century, their history was also the history of Europe. Before becoming European and global in nature, Christianity was a Mediterranean, extra-​European entity. Our cultural and civic traditions have always maintained a decisively universal character, which is incompatible with borders and limitations of any kind. To reject these characteristics and talk about European education is a very serious mistake.

…

In the meantime, Europe as a concept has become fashionable; indeed, every day that goes by Europe comes to represent a display case of our culture and our politics. We need to see how this development can be explained and what its remote or near origins are. As I have pointed out, these origins go back to the discovery of America when the inhabitants of the coastal areas of the Mediterranean basin began to gradually emigrate. The decline of those great countries that made history stopped with the opening of the Suez Canal, which somehow enabled the Mediterranean to re-​establish its intercontinental role. Civilization assumed a character that was increasingly less Latin

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and more German and Anglo-​Saxon. Gradually Europe became functionally Euro-​America. As far as the origins of the European myth that followed, we must not forget the important contribution made by Germany, which is located in the heart of the European Continent and has consistently demonstrated expansionist aspirations. We need to reflect on the spiritual conditions that developed in that country soon after World War i. when, having lost its colonies and having to limit the aspirations to its borders, Germany found itself to be only a European country. The colonialism of the other European countries, whose aim was to unify the world by expanding their rule to the farthest lands of every continent, was strictly denied to Germany; as a result, the country was left with no other vital space outside its boundaries. Should it be surprising then that the concept of Mittel Europe was identified with Europe and thus generated or reinforced the ambiguity of the German myth?

…

Now, if we examine closely the real European ideal, we need to recognize that its German origin represents a fundamental component. It is a myth that plays into the hands of Germany, which considers itself as the center of Europe and tends to become its leader. The small Europe is already quite important in this sense, even though the progressively tighter Franco-​German alliance allows, for the time being, a two-​state leadership. And what about us? Why then are we part of this game, and what is our role in it? There is no need here to insist on national motives and interests. I have mentioned it only to call attention to the precise aspects of the situation. What is noteworthy is that the path we are following with respect to the education of the European man is completely wrong and counterproductive. Today, the European man is the equivalent of a wounded individual who limits his activities in accordance with unjustified and dangerous preconceptions. As always, we must reclaim our vocation to universality and our cosmopolitan ideals, beyond every boundary and every continent. We must go beyond both the European and the Western civilizations since the problem that we must face and resolve is the unification of the West with the East. Our culture, more than any other, must be receptive to all the voices of today’s world and be at the vanguard in the process of unifying all cultures and traditions. In this sense, indeed our objective is to oppose a humanistic tradition limited to a rhetorical classicism and to strengthen the necessity of achieving a fuller and deeper sense of humanity. We need to educate the citizen of the world keeping in mind that the world is in the process of unifying

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in accordance with the new metaphysics of science and technology. In this light, a humanism that rejects such a metaphysics is destined to lose meaning and value. The problem with today’s unification is the necessity to re-​examine the concepts of classicism and humanism from a perspective that will reconsider all the values that have been taught to us. Those values must be incorporate into a more comprehensive system that includes numerous other values, which can only be ignored at the risk of rendering sterile what we pretend to save. These are the reasons why I cannot agree with those who preceded me in the discussions at this Conference. Besides, I do not believe that a Conference can be dedicated solely to a topic of this kind. The truth is that this topic, far from being taken for granted, is problematic, controversial, and capable of generating confusion and dangerous misunderstandings. 12.4

“Cultura per pochi e cultura per tutti”. In Nuovo umanesimo (pp. 87–​93) [Translation]

The concept of culture has been generally associated with, more or less, an exclusive elite, which is to say that culture is the spiritual value of a few privileged people. Educated individuals separate themselves from others and are able to live in a world which is different and of a superior quality. However, the distinction between educated and uneducated individuals has also acquired a political and social meaning which has alienated the two groups, with the result that they are estranged from one another to the point that a reciprocal and productive understanding, beyond practical and contingent needs, is quite impossible. Their division has become a class division, and the educated class can be regarded as a class in itself in the same way we would speak of the capitalist or the bourgeois class. In fact, genuine culture is identified with the bourgeois class stemming from the quality of education offered in schools available to and favored by the bourgeoisie. The typical example is the humanities-​based high school where the ideal of culture identifies itself with the highest ideal of the bourgeoisie. In defining culture in this manner, the boundaries of its world have been clearly delineated. The book has become its fundamental instrument, excluding from its fruition the mass of analphabets. The written language has detached itself from daily language, thus leading to a different language spoken by restricted groups of elites. Consequently, there are two classes and two languages with no communication between the representatives of the two classes. The bourgeois does not converse with the proletarian because

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he neither knows how to talk to him nor what to tell him. The proletarian can only be an instrument, and any conversation with him can only occur at that level. The situation changes radically when the proletariat begins to claim the rights of the bourgeoisie and wipes out the class dualism in order to benefit from bourgeois institutions, including the cultural ones. The proletarian begins to read, and the separation between the educated and the uneducated person is diminished. The process expands quickly, and through industrialization made possible by the development of science and technology, new instruments of culture that go well beyond books (newspapers, journals, cinema, radio, television) are utilized. Suddenly, everyone can have access to an experience that covers every manifestation of reality. The artistic, musical, literary, and scientific patrimony of humanity is available to everyone, and a new educational process emerges, one that goes beyond the school systems and their differences. School becomes the same for everyone and partakes directly of social life. Culture assumes such diverse forms that it ceases to be the privilege of one social class and becomes a shared experience. In fact, the new expressions of culture allow both the proletarians and the bourgeois to be side by side in movie houses, theaters, and sport stadiums and enjoy the same experience. We have gone from the elites to the masses to demonstrate that the collaboration of all social beings becomes necessary even in the domain of cultural activities.

…

Confronted with this situation, which was created by the rapid process of unification of the social classes, the problem of the level and character of the new culture emerges. Everywhere, one hears of the low level of culture such that some people refuse to read magazines, listen to the radio, watch tv, or even go to the movies. This is identified as mass culture, which is to say, subculture. It is a reaction that occurs in good faith, without political or class-​inspired intentions. What the reaction does reveal is the weight of a cultural tradition based on class and on the presumed superiority of the aristocracy, both of which make us lose sight of the true meaning of the cultural change that has taken place. To solve this problem, we need to ask whether we are only dealing with lower standards due to the lower expectations from large numbers of people still marginally educated, or whether the phenomenon of quantity does involve a qualitative transformation and, therefore, an entirely different perception of culture.

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When I go to the cinema and watch a movie with a strong tragic or comic plot that betrays the mediocrity of both the director and the actors, I notice how culturally naїve and inexperienced spectators thoroughly enjoy a show that I deem substandard. However, there is another type of experience that can satisfy both the most refined critics and the least educated people. There is culture for everyone, and there is a culture for the few. Which of the two is the authentic culture? Christians believe that the Kingdom of God is open to both the learned and the ignorant. True wisdom is quite different from what we normally identify as such. The capacity to understand and love each other is what makes the difference. The individualistic culture of those who do not know how to talk to children, to primitive people, and to uneducated persons is nothing but an empty ostentation, typical of those who have lost contact with reality, and hence, they are unable to capture the human wealth present in some individuals. It is a culture lacking universality and, consequently, an expression of self-​absorbed hedonism. The great movie directors who attempt to reach general consensus must be able to look deep into the soul of the most refined person as well the most ignorant; they must be able to find a point of contact in which the language is accessible to everyone and avails itself of everyone’s experience. It is not by accident that the language of cinema is the language of the average person. First and foremost, we need to eliminate the dualism of the language. The bourgeois class separated its own language from that used by the proletariat and scorned it as being inferior. Now it needs to reconnect with the dialect and rediscover those expressions of taste and inventiveness which its members had unduly neglected or suppressed. The attention that is increasingly being paid to the artistic expressions of children, primitive peoples, and lost civilizations is a fresh testimony of the widely felt need to live a shared experience, without boundaries and discriminations of any kind. The great movie that succeeds in engaging the spectators of every continent is the best example of what is the true cultural ideal of the present era.

…

Is this a culture leveled to the maximum common denominator? Yes and no, provided we know how to understand the common denominator. If I watch television and react negatively to insipid programs, it is because I don’t find in them a common denominator. We consider the masses as those who live outside the world of the elite. In this case, the [common] denominator is that of the masses. The producer of the program is the one who must not fail to reach the appropriate common denominator, which can be raised to limitless heights. Culture belongs to everyone, and each of us must enrich it with our own resourceful

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and ingenious contributions. Anybody can aim very high and achieve a great deal. However, if a person empathizes with the great expectations of his society, he will respond and remain attached to that society, which is to say that he will refuse to live in a secluded world of his making where he can enjoy the good life only for himself. The process of transforming culture, as I sketched it out, takes place at an increasingly faster pace above all in those countries where radical political and social changes are occurring. Of course, the results are more remarkable when the proletarian class reaches the standards of living enjoyed by the bourgeoisie. Those results are being reached in two different but concurrent ways. First, school attendance is required until a student obtains the high school diploma. In this way, the so-​called general culture is made available to everyone, thus determining the premises for a dialogue in which all can participate in equal manner. Second, we should emphasize scientific and technological instruction, through which everyone can reach a threshold at a level where knowing is identified with action—​the latter demanding general collaboration on a large scale. It is a type of education that goes hand in hand with technological skills to the point of becoming one with it and is capable of progressively freeing the worker from less intelligent manual labor. The processes of mechanization, automation, specialization of labor, organization of work in the factory and so forth are raising the work of the proletariat to a higher level of technological expertise and, with it, to an effective collaboration in the management of the workplace.

…

Not taking part in the process are those who are nostalgic for the old ideals, unwilling to come out of their shell and face the new demands. Their culture is the expression of a world they refuse to leave behind: the world of private property, individualism, and bourgeois selfishness—​in short, that Western world that is unable to renew itself by going beyond the Iron Curtain and getting acquainted with the East and Far East. They do not understand that the culture of an era needs to react constructively to certain historical needs that can be neither ignored nor neglected without drying up the very roots of culture. Culture will remove itself from reality to live in a rarefied atmosphere in which the residue of an anachronistic world is consumed. At best, it will be a super-​culture, where the attribute super stands for pseudo-​intellectual artifice. The educated persons, artists, and art critics must be convinced that true culture must overcome the boundaries of social classes and their best works will be those that can reach the masses. Artists and critics should not scorn

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television programs; they should rather contribute (directly or indirectly) to the making of television programs in which the new culture can satisfy all kinds of demands. With their collaboration and their critical attitude, they should bring to light the requisites that will reflect a culture not resembling that of yesterday but the one of tomorrow. This new culture will be better and more apt to fashion a common language and common experiences. The resulting changes will represent the difference between a dying culture and one which is newly born.

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Antiscience in the New Problematicism 13.1

Introduction

Spirito’s faith in science came under scrutiny when he became aware of the persistence of non-​scientific beliefs, that is antiscience, in the daily life of Italians. In the introductory paragraph of “Scienza e antiscienza” in Storia della mia ricerca (1971a), he wrote: Faith in science, which is at the root of Dal mito alla scienza (1966), faces a crisis when, considering the same science, it posits the problem of anti-​ science. Science and antiscience become the terms of a new antinomy that nobody can resolve. It emerges from the recognition of the dogmatic character of science and from the necessity to find an alternative to the world of science.1 The philosopher went on to state: We need to recognize that the alternative [to science] is not purely theoretical and does not represent only a future possibility; on the contrary, it already functions next to science and against science. The alternative involves a dual vision of reality and incorporates an objective value which one cannot doubt. To understand today’s world, it is necessary to discover not one but two conflicting principles that dwell in it and cannot be consolidated into a unit. Antinomy lives as the essence of present society, unable to extricate itself from it. The crisis, of which one feels the presence, is exactly the expression of this antinomic state. … Even those who are convinced of the inevitability of the triumph of science in the creation of a new society become uncertain when confronted with the success of the opposite tendencies [of antiscience] and end up adapting to the juxtaposition of heterogeneous criteria. One lives with the antinomy [of science and antiscience] and, consequently, with an indefinite series of compromises.2

1 Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, p. 71. 2 Ibid., pp. 71–​72.

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Then he identified two major manifestations of the crisis: the spiritual malaise of the Catholic Church, which was experiencing a profound doctrinal revision of its principles due to the pressure brought about by continuous scientific inventions,3 and the persistence of an individualism that rejected the collective character of a society that had embraced scientific principles. The following two observations define the conflicting positions present in the second aspect: As the images of the scientist and of the technician emerge as representatives of an evolving specialization [within the work force], human beings become progressively part of the social organism, that is, part of a whole that absorbs and subordinates them to the interest of community. … As science continues to develop and the process of specialization advances on a more scientific and technical level, human beings become elements of an organism that totally transcend them. … [Consequently], science aims at organizing and controlling life both in its totality and in its individual manifestations, by regulating every human activity to the point that it would be exceedingly difficult for anyone to extricate from it. The interdependence of social phenomena forces the behavior of every individual to gain public relevance.4 The individualistic belief system of the whole of modern thought, including the Enlightenment, is contraposed to the pronouncements and practical transformations generated by science with the same conviction and decision. There is a whole movement of reaction that claims the autonomy of individuals, particularly in the sphere of their private life. Both in theory and in practice, there is an insistence on claiming the importance of this aspect not only as a factual reality but also as a superior ideal upon which the entire educational process of one’s personality should be based. … Private life represents a sacrosanct reality in which the sum of all values of the individual is realized.5 Spirito’s awareness of the state of crisis pervading the Italian social and cultural life, generated a new stage in the evolution of his thought, called “new 3 “The example of the [Catholic] Church is probably the most important and serious expression of the antinomy of science and antiscience. The extremely fast pace of scientific development keeps pressuring the Church to face conclusions that are at odds with its previous affirmed statements. Consequently, this institution is forced to proceed with greater difficulties and take extreme antinomic positions.” Ibid, p. 74. 4 Ibid., pp. 74–​78. 5 Ibid., pp. 81–​82.

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problematicism”6 or “scientific problematicism,”7 which though rooted in the previous problematicism, yet presented a different set of beliefs and values. In clarifying both problematicisms, Spirito observed that the first emerged from the negation of the identity of science and philosophy that had created the illusion of possession of the incontrovertible truth and the absolute; the “new problematicism,” instead, was the result of the conflict that emerged between science and philosophy on the one hand and antiscience on the other. He claimed that in the “new problematicism” science underwent a process of expansion of its meaning by incorporating all those expressions of thought and experience that before were excluded, such as the religious or superstitious ones.8 According to him: The ‘problematic’ philosopher is no longer facing the antinomy between science and philosophy and does not need to distinguish the two terms. Consequently, he is facing problems that are scientific insofar as they are also philosophical because they contain immanently that scientific metaphysics that establishes values and objectives for every science. His inquiry involves a science that includes the totality of the experience and renews continuously its interests, opening new paths and positing new objections. … The concept of inquiry is freed from the limits established by a specific investigation as expressed in the first problematicism—​ totally concentrated on the solution of the antinomy between science and philosophy—​and at the same time, it is strengthened by any possible experience that comes from any possible direction.9 The broadening of the original meaning of science brought about manifestations of antiscience that materialized also as negations of the attributes

6 Ibid., p. 114. 7 Ibid., p. 123. 8 “The manifestations of superstitions are many and of every kind, from those shared by an entire population to those limited to a person. Nothing can exclude that even superstition can acquire an international character and become a necessary component of the social world. If superstitious conventions are for the most part tied to traditional uses and customs that are transmitted through accidental venues, there are already signs that some more explicit and common manifestations are being accepted in a systematic manner. One has only to think about the horoscopes and astrological forecasts, by now indispensable newspaper column. This phenomenon has become so widespread that it responds to a fundamental human need. It is science itself that generates antiscience. Antinomy has spread to the popular level.” Ibid., pp. 67–​68. 9 Ibid., pp. 125–​126.

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of science itself, as the translated excerpt from Storia della mia ricerca clarifies. By incorporating aspects until now neglected, Spirito’s inquiry on the one hand reinvented itself, and on the other, by not excluding anything, it did not exclude an eventual future negation of the philosophical inquiry itself. Antinomy emerged again as the essence of Spirito’s philosophy. 13.2

Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 118–123) [Translation]

In the new problematicism, instead, the antinomy is no longer between science and philosophy but between science and antiscience. Regarding the relationship between science and philosophy, the demand of the unity of knowledge does not allow the separation of the two. The identification of the two terms materialized again, and philosophy has itself become science. The new antinomy occurs as a revision of the concept of science, which after the crisis of actual idealism has assumed a quite different meaning. … A new antinomy has emerged: the antinomy of science and antiscience. This antinomy calls for a concept of science more receptive to the demands of antiscience. What meaning and what content should this antiscience assume? It is rather difficult to define this concept for the simple reason that it emerges from within science itself as its negation and, consequently, as a definition of negation, it dissolves itself into vagueness. In this case, the negation is necessary because it helps us to redefine the concept of science as the catalyst for the contradictions that appear in the redefinition of such a concept. The negation addresses all the attributes of science and their opposites. For example, if science recognizes the reality of hypothetical knowledge, antiscience affirms the superior validity of non-​hypothetical knowledge, that is, of those forms of knowledge (such as religion, philosophy, ideology) that regard themselves as holding the truth. While science may be conceived as knowledge that leads to consensus and the unification of the world, antiscience defends the multiplicity and the dialectical diversity of beliefs. But if science is seen as a necessary process of continuous specialization, antiscience denies specialization while affirming the synthetic and intuitive quality of knowledge. If science considers the individual as a member of a social organism, focusing on its objectivity, antiscience affirms its subjective and personal attributes. While science privileges the concept of social responsibility, antiscience insists on the affirmation of individual responsibility. As science postulates the necessity of a social plan, antiscience defends private enterprise. Finally, while science fosters the foundation of peace and collaboration among people, antiscience proclaims the need to fight and to go to war. The most radical negation embraced by

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antiscience, however, is the prediction of a society that has abandoned the scientific ideas and recognizes the superiority of extra-​scientific ideals.

…

When the concept of antiscience is framed in these terms, we can understand how the antinomy of science and antiscience informs the new problematicism. We are no longer dealing with an antimony that would force us to abandon the field of science, but one which is receptive to clarifying its limits and broadening the concept of science. This would involve bringing the antiscientific problems into the scientific realm and honoring the principle of non-​exclusion by incorporating the scientific forecast into the antiscientific reality. The concept of science elaborated in my book, Dal mito alla scienza (1966), issues from the belief in a scientific future of the world with characteristics defined by technological progress. The fading of the old world and the definitive waning of traditional values assured the advent of a new world and new values governed by scientific criteria and their consequent conclusions. The antinomic concept that emerged no longer allowed sure scientific predictions. On the contrary, by considering extra-​scientific events also to be foreseeable, it excludes neither negation nor the total abandonment of scientific methods. It is evident that, in the wake of the expansion of the concept of science, both the concept of hypothetism and the principle of non-​exclusion are reinforced. At the same time, it is also equally clear that scientific knowledge acquires a meaning and a content that are profoundly more problematic and as such involving the formulation of a new problematicism that could be defined as scientific problematicism.

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End of Communism 14.1

Introduction

The acts of rebellion that were slowly unfolding simultaneously in the Iron Curtain countries as a reaction to the Soviet Union’s dictatorship, and the loss of popular support for the communist parties throughout Europe during the 1970s, helped Spirito to realize that communism was failing as a valid economic and political alternative to capitalism and to Western democratic systems. Fifty years after the Russian Revolution, communism had created only oppressive regimes that denied fundamental freedoms and basic human rights to the citizens of the USSR and Eastern European countries. At the same time, the proletarian class of Western Europe was embracing the bourgeois values of freedom, democracy, and economic improvements as something inevitable. He understood that capitalism and the traditional democracies were winning, and nothing could stop them from remaining the prevailing economic and political reality of the Western world. Less than twenty years after his trip to Russia, his hopes for a continuous expansion of communism faded away. His vision of Marxism as the driving revolutionary force of such an expansion suffered a severe blow. Consequently, for Spirito the only conceivable civilization was still the Western one while communism remained in the realm of utopia, unable to transform itself into a viable system. Powerless to inspire the new generations by offering them a new revolutionary vision, communism was about to be overtaken by neo-​capitalism, whose distinctive characteristic was the growing intervention of European governments in their respective economies to strike a better balance between economic growth and the expansion of social programs. In this manner, neo-​capitalism allowed non-​communist governments “to somehow satisfy the needs of the proletariat while eliminating at the same time class conflicts or at least attenuating them.”1 1 Spirito, La fine del comunismo, p. 68. Few lines after, the philosopher added: “It is an undisputable fact that the old capitalism was a system essentially private in which the concept of exploiters played a fundamental role. In neo-​capitalism, capital becomes progressively more social by expanding the importance and function of the state-​run entities and of the public organizations, cooperatives, and consortia. The transformation process is fast and affects the economic world in a profound manner.” Ibid. p. 69.

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Spirito’s writings on Marxism and communism, with specific references to the conditions of the Italian Communist Party throughout the 1970s, proved that his conclusions came remarkably close to historical reality. Twelve years after his death in 1979, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Italian Communist Party underwent a series of structural changes that brought about its demise. In the translated short piece, Spirito faults Marxism for its failure to retain “metaphysical values”2 capable of inspiring true communists. 14.2

Il comunismo (1979, pp. 74–​75) [Translation]

At this point in history, a true communist can only be someone who comes from a middle-​class background or one who has the willingness to denounce his social class. Certainly, not the typical bourgeois who embraces communism only to find his place in the bourgeois hierarchy and satisfy his a­ mbitions. Historically, Western tradition abounds with communists of such make-​up, individuals who thrive on the rhetoric of proletarian ideals with the most anti-​ proletarian spirit possible; we need not linger on that but must move on. In a way, it can be said that they make up the hierarchy of the left-​wing parties. Such individuals are mostly bourgeois rebels who intellectually are communists, but in practice are still psychologically tied to the lifestyle of the bourgeoisie. They are the representatives of a process of self-​criticism that, even if it can reach the level of a logical demonstration, is not enough to transform the bourgeois into proletarians or to change the human fabric significantly. This is the most serious limitation of a Western communist, and this is, after all, the most evident limitation of Western communism, born and grown in the heart of the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding this initial limitation, only those bourgeoisie members—​ or anyone like them with unlimited spending power—​can be communist, since only they are able to affirm their faith. The proof of faith one offers entails an act of renunciation of material goods, and such an act takes place solely in his conscience without any other agenda. This is the only true revolutionary act that can be called communist. It is an act that can only be carried out with a faith strong enough to overcome the desire for immediate satisfaction. On the immanent level, however, that faith implies a metaphysical certainty founded on logic and a philosophy that recognizes the absolute value to the criterion of life. In that context, communism proposes as its necessary 2 Ugo Spirito, Il comunismo (Florence: Sansoni, 3rd edition, 1979), p. 75. First edition in 1965.

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presupposition the realization that there exists in the Western world a movement of thought capable of resisting the criticism and hypercriticism that is so prevalent in the West today. Unfortunately, such a philosophy has yet to appear on the horizon while the Marxist doctrine did not find the strength to renew itself enough as to guarantee its metaphysical values. No wonder then that the communist ideology is not capable of overcoming its bourgeois mentality and instill in the proletarian consciousness a faith that transcends all claims to basic rights. 14.3

End of Communism

La fine del comunismo (1978a) is a book consisting of a series of articles and essays on communism that appeared in various Italian periodicals from 1976 to 1978. In this work, Spirito linked the process of disintegration of communism both in Italy and other Western nations to the ability of capitalism to morph into neo-​capitalism. Without any doubt, his observations on communism turned out to be more accurate than those made by many other progressive intellectuals who continued to celebrate the greatness of the USSR well into the 1980s. As an example, in 1984 John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that the Soviet Union has made great material progress in recent years is evident both from statistics (even if they are below expectation) and, as many have reported, from the general urban scene. One sees it in the appearance of the solid well-​being of people on the streets, the close to murderous traffic, the incredible exfoliation of apartment houses, and the general aspects of restaurants, theaters, and shops.3 Besides, the dissolution of communism found correlation in Spirito’s personal experience when he wrote in Che cosa sarà il futuro (1977c): “I am no longer a communist.”4

3 Quoted in Washington Times (January 15, 1992). Also, in M. Stanton Evans, The Theme is Freedom (Washington, D. C.: 1994), p. 10n. In the same note one can read: “Likewise, economists Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, in the 1989 edition of their standard text: “The Soviet economy is proof that, contrary to what many skeptics had earlier believed, a socialist command economy can function and even thrive.” Quoted in Mark Skousen, Economics on Trial (Business One Irwin, 1991), p. 208. 4 Ugo Spirito, Che cosa sarà il futuro (Rome: Cadmo, 1977), p. 13.

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The following two articles, “Tramonto del comunismo” (1977b) and “La fine del comunismo” (1976c), present in their conciseness, a bleak picture of the comatose state of communism 14.4

“Tramonto del comunismo”. In La fine del comunismo (pp. 30–​34) [Translation]

1976 was an important year because it witnessed a profound crisis in the ideology and practice of international communism. The crisis was marked by a series of events, and beyond those, by new mental attitudes of politicians, intellectuals, and a large mass of people. Traditional beliefs were placed in doubt. Short of negating communism, different questions about its identity began to emerge, and the burning one was posited: “We want communism, yes, but which one?” Honestly, communism never existed. True, some communist regimes came into being. However, even where the most radical forms of revolution succeeded, the followers did not have the courage to call themselves communist. They thought that a necessary period of transition, in which socialism would precede the messianic idea that one day communism would lighten up the horizon, was necessary. In the Soviet Union, communists preached that their generation had to sacrifice on behalf of future generations so that, someday, people would enjoy a social paradise. Communism, the ‘true’ communism never existed. If it lives on in the minds of people, it does only as an ideal. Sixty years after the Russian revolution the so-​called communists looked around to realize that communism was still far away—​especially in the Soviet Union, which by now seems to be on a reactionary path.

…

So, if communism isn’t yet a reality, how much political weight does it have? And, what are the communist regimes anyway? At present, they are anticipations of what will materialize someday, aspirations of what we lack. In other words, they are expressions of compromises that will grow and affirm themselves when the new and the old join to form an eclectic reality. The world cannot help but be one—​where all the countries share a common reality and common objectives. They will become one organic entity reflecting a universal lifestyle. In fact, for the past sixty years the borders have been disappearing,

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making collaboration indispensable. Communist and anticommunist regimes are fatally bound to grow closer, and, consequently, anticommunism, transient communism, and tomorrow’s true communism will end up becoming one international regime with nearly indistinguishable differences. The past is disappearing to make way for a necessary process of unification. In my analysis of neo-​capitalism, I pointed out that neo-​capitalism and neo-​communism would, in the end, be quite similar. Neo-​capitalism is already present as an inevitable component of communist economies. In recent years, the coexistence among nations has become an important achievement, indeed a unified form of collaboration. The rapid speed of transportation and communications has reached such a degree of sophistication as to impose a lifestyle that is essentially subordinated to advanced technology and its inherent purposes. What, then, will the future of communism be? If communism does not exist and if the future holds universal equality, it will become clear that communism will have disappeared due to a historical past in which it failed to become established and a future in which it will never be a viable reality. The year 1976 marks a milestone because it was the year in which the problems of communism took a final fatal turn. In short, true communism, died before it was born.

…

The demise of communism will materialize in a variety of forms, in accordance with the conditions of each country and the international relations that each one of them has established at a given time. The path to unity needs to diversify according to the environmental and cultural conditions tied to the geography of each country in question. The goal will be the same: the assimilation of all the international lifestyles; but, the equality of the goals will be accompanied by a process of acceptance of a common law. As far as the destiny of communism is concerned, we can only follow, carefully and with a sense of participation, the rhythm of transformation of the world in its unforeseeable progression toward a future increasingly subordinated to a logic which is dictated by events that we cannot control. Progressively more spectators than actors, we will live in accordance with the laws of a cosmic dimension through which reality takes shape beyond all hopes and all the programs. In order to illustrate what is taking place in Europe and particularly in our country, we should ask what happened to our communism in 1976. The answer can be included in the list of all other international analyses. If the

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disappearance of communism is taking place everywhere, how is this process of disintegration materializing in Italy?

…

In Europe in 1976, a new word, Eurocommunism, was coined to designate the end of communism. Neo-​capitalism was not mentioned because Europeans manifested the desire to remain faithful to the revolutionary tradition. However, the word for communism by itself was no longer used; the change was intended to vindicate a great many attributes opposed to Marxism. Neo-​capitalism was also excluded to remain faithful to the principles that are considered antagonist to capitalism. The term Eurocommunism was chosen as though limiting communism to Europe would convey, at least in name, the continuity of communism. By now, the main qualifications of Eurocommunism are known to everyone. A short summary would include the following: pluralism, the end of proletarian dictatorship, the end of class struggle, the end of a tight fist; in short, the end of Marxism as articulated in [The Communist] Manifesto of 1848 by Marx and Engels. A fundamental problem arises at this point: “Can one still call communism a way of life that identifies itself explicitly with those attributes? Can it be that the new reality marks the total renunciation of revolutionary principles?” There is no answer yet, at least not a definitive answer. There was even a conference in Russia in 1976 to clarify this matter, but even in that context no clear answer emerged. Communism and anticommunism have fused into a terminology which the conference participants did not wish or did not know how to address it. A year has passed. A year has gone by and nothing new has been said. If we move from the ideological plane to political reality, we need to consider whether the Italian Communist Party is still communist.

…

Considering the initial point of departure of our inquiry, it is evident that we no longer abide by the definition of communism found in the Manifesto. We are no longer in the opposition. Consequently, if we want to establish an accurate date of the fading of communism in Italy, we need to go back to June 20, 1976, when the party experienced the illusion of the victory. Exactly then, it ceased to exist as opposition force and established the historical compromise5 both 5 In 1973, Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the Italian Communist Party, coined the expression, “compromesso storico,” (“historical compromise”) to indicate a possible political

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at the administrative and national levels. On that day, the Italian Communist Party began to share the power of governance. The struggle was over, and it surrendered in a passive fashion. Indeed, following the so-​called victory, the party delivered to the nation a government run only by the Christian Democratic Party’s members. Many people have yet to understand that communism disappeared when it abandoned its long standing as the opposition party. The logic of political power does not forgive. Political reality entails that events go beyond the intentions of people and its steps are virtually impossible to retrace. Togliatti was conscious of it: indeed, he willed it. The only thing left is the same old way. To be realistic, what other path could the party take if it remained as the party of the opposition? At this time, we are forced to accept the neo-​capitalist solution and recognize that our historical experience with Marxism has come to an end. There is no other solution on the horizon. Togliatti was right. 14.5

“La fine del comunismo”. In La fine del comunismo (pp. 42–​46) [Translation]

The most significant affirmation of international communism took place after World War ii, precisely after the Chinese revolution. However, a process of critical review—​which took various forms depending on the country and situations—​has been developing over the past fifteen years. In the Soviet Union—​ the first communist regime—​the crisis has taken on far-​reaching dimensions. A revolution, after sixty years of life, inevitably loses its revolutionary character and becomes a mere reactionary regime. Little by little, as the pre-​bourgeois character of Russian communism began to appear, it became clear it would be impossible to overcome the totalitarian phase of a socio-​political order controlled by the police apparatus even if it was strongly condemned by the brightest young men who clamored that true communism was something else. The crisis of Soviet communism spread to the international communist community when [President Richard M.] Nixon visited the Soviet Union and China in 1971. The process of global unification took on a momentum that resulted in the joint venture of space cooperation. Neo-​capitalism and communism are unified by the sharing of industrial and agricultural projects, making economic collaboration an essential element for progress in general. If we collaboration between the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party in order to govern a chronic unstable Italy. Indeed, the collaboration took place but lasted only three years, from June 1976 to January 1979.

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shift our observation of the crisis from the Eastern to the Western perspective, the crisis is even more evident in the field of scientific investigation where no new voices or new ideas are offered. Marxism does not show any innovative energy and it is becoming instead repetitive and superficial. Communism remains tied to the old formulas and ideas, unable to be revitalized by today’s human sciences to meet contemporary needs and expectations, and their literature is static and dogmatic. Quite similar are the conditions of Western governments which are increasingly turning to neo-​capitalism and are displaying an anticommunist attitude that has reached the masses. It has become difficult to move toward communism and other ideologies that go beyond socio-​democratic aspirations. There are no communist parties that can gain power in the most industrialized countries: not only do they not exist but show no signs of leadership for the future. Confronted with this crisis, international communism can only be seen as a political phenomenon coming to an end. In this light, we need to turn to the present condition of Italian communism, which is involved in the so-​called historical compromise. What is this type of communism and what is its future? Italy has the largest communist party in the West. Industrialization has come late to the country and on a relatively small scale. Its socio-​economic structure is in a state of transition, destined to adopt neo-​capitalist policies. Accordingly, the inevitable fate of Italian communism is to abandon the revolutionary ideology. It is an assured fatal journey, one that cannot be hindered. The Italian Communist Party understood this reality before its adversaries did and has tried to prepare the ground to survive. However, the other parties did not understand the new situation and continued to fear communism as an imminent disaster. The proof of the party’s full awareness of its future is confirmed by the fact that, following the demise of fascism, Italian communists gave every impression to the Italian people that they had no revolutionary aspirations. They would say: “We will not take up arms; we are not against the monarchy; we will walk hand in hand with the Pope.” Such was the strategy adopted by the Italian Communist Party. When the time came to prove their intentions, Palmiro Togliatti supported the initiative of including the Vatican Agreements in the Italian Constitution, in their integral and dogmatic form, which was not only accepted, but proposed by Benito Mussolini. So began the new life of the Italian Communist Party soon after it assumed power. The young people, who were waiting for a new revolution, were not only disappointed but they felt pushed aside and abandoned. There was nothing one could do but continue the same path. But the worst part was the

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realization that holding the status quo meant supporting the worst aspects of fascism, which survived in the forms of passive rhetoric and antifascist slogans. The Vatican had no choice but to accept such a situation, all the while mistrusting the communists.

…

The most recent stage of this journey is the proposal of the so-​called historical compromise. It is a stage based on the conviction that communism is finished. We need to create a single Catholic-​Communist Party that accepts co-​existence and moves in the direction of neo-​capitalism. Mistrust on both sides continues, and the secretary of the Christian Democratic Party openly denies the agreement. People fail to understand that the reason for which this is happening leads, unquestionably, to the end of communism. The Vatican has won the last battle of the fascist century and looks with satisfaction to the prospect of a Catholic Italy. It is obvious that we are experiencing a process that reflects a necessary historical logic. Even so, we should remember that the basic principles informing that logic coincide with those principles that characterize the end of the values of all ideals. If we turn our attention to Italy after the fascist regime, we need to recognize that the Italian Communist Party has failed to instill in the new generations of Italians a revolutionary will, that is, has deprived them of any ideal content. Certainly, this alone does not explain the failures of today’s youth, but neither can one ignore the impact that historical events have had on our young people. What is worse is the absurd compromise of two faiths that no longer exist and contradict each other. Only in Italy can one find a Catholic communism (cattocomunismo). In the rest of the world this problem does not exist because it could not have taken place elsewhere. We are the first country to declare, officially, the end of communism.

…

Today in Italy one can find the so-​called left-​wing, extra-​parliamentary groups that are not connected with the Italian Communist Party and operate independently. Yet one may ask what they may represent beside their demonstrated aggressive modus operandi. Clearly their protests are justified because they still have some faith in communism, but how much hope can they have? Communism connects with the masses, who tend to have a passive outlook on life. Without leaders and ideas, no progress can be made. The official political structure of the party, with its norms and regulations, must prevail and win in a lopsided contest. Communism has failed even in such a residual form.

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What is left of communism is the socialist demand integrated into neo-​capitalism increasingly identified with the transfer of capital from the private to the public sector. This will become the fundamental law of the future. 14.6

A Reconsideration of Programmed Economy

Like all other ideas elaborated by the Western mind and by Spirito himself, even the concept of programmed economy, so dear to him in his idealist and communist phases, revealed its limits when it was subjected to an intense scrutiny grounded in the principles of problematicism, as shown in the following excerpt from Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a). 14.7

Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (pp. 55–​59) [Translation]

Problematicism had emerged in Italy after that the programmed economy was successfully implemented in the Soviet Union. The example of Russian revolution and the hopes generated by communism nourished a new faith that was in contraposition to problematicism. The leaders of the Russian revolution elaborated the program that would transform society; a program that couldn’t be ignored since it represented the will of an autonomous regime that was forging a new reality. The content of the program was dictated by the very same reason that brought about the revolution. It was now time to implement the regime foreseen by Marx and his followers leading up to Lenin. The goals that needed to be reached were clearly stated and implemented in various walks of life in the Soviet Union. The goals and the means to implement them were imposed by the system already in place, and the results could not be challenged. Theoretical principles and practical applications were converging into one political reality. Communism and problematicism arose from two different standpoints which opposed each other. On the one hand, there was a new regime with a well-​established structure and results; on the other, it was becoming clear that the solutions that characterized the past were no longer able to satisfy the demand of the day. Faith in a programmed economy did not find fertile ground in Italy due to the strong opposition by the supporters of traditional economy. The science of economics materialized as the so-​called pure economics, and it could not be reneged overnight. Programmed economy came across as a utopia to be discarded outright.

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In time, however, the principles of a programmed economy began to take hold in both communist and neo-​capitalist regimes. It became necessary to establish order and discipline in an economy that was progressively run by the state. All budgets controlled by the state were becoming so large that could no longer be left to chance. But, could all expectations of the programmed economy ever be met? Could the same institutions continue to function once communism was abandoned?

…

The contrast between communism and problematicism began to emerge openly at this point. There was no clear-​cut distinction between the political system and the economic system; the two had to accept the same solution. But could such a solution be led by the communist regime, or instead involved a much bigger problem? The premises of the Soviet Union’s programmed economy were validated by the principle of an absolute control of political life by the regime. The Soviet Union promoted a limited, self-​contained economy with the purpose of achieving a condition of total self-​efficiency. Even international relations were carried out down to the minutest details. However, as programmed economy became widespread and gained international implementation, it experienced a great deal of change to the point of altering the entire system. Between the implementation of the programmed economy in the Soviet Union and the one that occurred worldwide, there emerged a gap between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world to the point that the same logic and the same consequences no longer applied. In order to understand such a gap, we need to keep in mind that in the Soviet Union programming is carried out by a single programmer with absolute powers whereas in the international communities, the programmers are many, and it is therefore impossible to ever reach a consensus. Partial agreement can only be reached among a group of nations capable of establishing a limited market, such as the one developed by the original nine countries of Europe. In either case, a plan acceptable even to those programmers who did not contribute with their own program must be developed. The economic self-​ sufficiency of the group cannot be absolute and must be reconciled with the needs of the other economies. The plan, therefore, must directly or indirectly become world-​wide and must be the result of everyone’s participation. Programming cannot help but end up being a world’s single plan fashioned by the representatives of all countries.

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It is enough to hint at this conclusion to understand that the transition from Russia’s program to the international program constitutes a type of revolution totally unlike the first. Our purpose here is not to underline the consequences that result from it, but to emphasize the dissimilarities between the two plans. We must ask ourselves what the conditions are that will enable us to fashion a world-​wide plan.

…

A world-​wide plan implies the knowledge of the world and calls for experts from all over the world. To know the world also means having the capacity to foresee possible future developments. The single program requires the ability to foresee and establish the next regulation. Here, therefore, lies the big question of the new science: are we truly capable of leading the world into the future? We are not referring here only to the leadership that pertains to some phenomena, but to the leadership that involves reality in all its manifestations. An extensive knowledge is required to pattern every situation to a single principle. In other words, it is necessary to adhere to a single religious, philosophical, or political principle from which we can draw inspiration in order to balance each thought and action. If such a principle were to be missing or if it did not include the whole humanity as a single will, there would be nothing else to do but to turn to scientific investigation in order to reach a consensus. This is what is happening at the present. Due to the progressive specialization of the sciences, we cannot properly anticipate the future, and therefore, no valid conclusion can be reached because we have only fragmented information to rely on. Consequently, a program founded upon synthetic knowledge to help predict the future does not and will never exist. Everything becomes problematic and problematicism becomes unstoppable. If until now foreseeing and programming were made possible by the faith in a superior principle and by the synthetic knowledge of what is happening, now this is no longer possible because both the principle and the synthesis are missing. Everything becomes problematic and problematicism knows no boundaries . The history of science of the past decades has taught us the impossibility of figuring out the future. We can imagine and we can fantasize, but we cannot take a common path of action to reach a common goal. We don’t have the means to know and we don’t have the capacity to will the future. We are surprised each day by the reality of forces we cannot control. A unified world is

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much too large to become the object of a ‘will’ that wholly contains it. Its ever-​ changing aspects leave us with nothing to do but contemplate it. And so problematicism gains the upper end. One cannot foresee a revolution let alone forecast a revolutionary economic program. The term revolution has lost its meaning because there is no ‘will’ to represent it. Once the old myths disappear, no one can imagine how others may emerge to replace them. As we wait, we can expect anything. Without a vision of the future and without a program, problematicism manifests itself in the most extreme forms. Hypercriticism has affected every faith to the point that we no longer understand what ‘universal’ means. Just as we thought the world was becoming so intelligent and so transparent, we found ourselves doubting. We believed in what everyone believed, but today everything is leveled by the idea of equality which eliminates the possibility of any one from standing out in any way. We want to believe, but we no longer have the ability do it. Nothing can stand up to that but from which problematicism emerged and tried to distance itself to find some solace and to renew hope. If we want to draw a balance sheet of the entire movement of problematicism and ask ourselves what is left of it, we must reach the conclusion that the results are mostly negative. Discussing a period in Storia della mia ricerca (1971a), I focused my attention on the stupefied expectation with which the dualism between humanity and the world was established. That passage was immediately followed by a conclusive assertion: Stupefied expectation is a question without an answer, I wrote. But even that passive expectation, when interpreted in this fashion, constitutes an expanding horizon. Those who need a faith to believe in return to their inquiry with renewed fervor.6 6 Spirito, Storia della mia ricerca, p. 202.

­c hapter 15

End of Self-​Awareness 15.1

Introduction

From 1970 until his death in 1979, Spirito elaborated his philosophical considerations within the “new problematicism” that antiscience generated. In Storia della mia ricerca (1971a), where the idea of antiscience is affirmed, one can also find a chapter entitled, “La fine dell’autocoscienza (1971b), that is, the denial of the value of the concept of “know thyself” as acknowledged by Western thought for more than two thousand years and was strongly restated by the philosophy of actual idealism, considered the epilogue of the history of know thyself, that is, the most radical form of self-​awareness as conscience of oneself and of reality.1 In addition, Spirito observed that with the birth of social sciences in the second part of the nineteenth century, philosophy underwent a transformation: no longer viewed as a metaphysical search, it was considered a scientific investigation. Consequently, the ‘I’ was placed under scientific scrutiny, thus losing “its ability to recognize itself as the self-​aware subject,”2 that is, as the source of all manifestations of reality. In Spirito’s philosophy, the negation of self-​awareness led to his rejection of actual idealism and to the birth of problematicism. 15.2

“La fine dell’autocoscienza”. In Storia della mia ricerca (pp. 167–​178; 180–​184; 186)

The forma mentis that has emerged through millennia of history of civilization is represented by the certainty of self-​awareness and by the control that people exercise upon their thought and actions, that is, upon themselves. It is a forma mentis whose foundations have never been questioned and from whose bosom have emerged the concepts of guilt, responsibility, and freedom. Individuals

1 Ibid., p. 203. 2 Ibid. pp. 171–​172.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_017

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are autonomous, and in autonomy they find the justification for their own individual personality. If we look around and try to understand the reality of which we are part, we need to recognize that such a concept of humanity is at the foundation of our society and that all value judgments that within it are expressed presuppose the validity of these statements. The problem today that we try to resolve involves the certainty of a tradition that is universally recognized and has been consistent throughout the centuries. Is it true that individuals have or can have such an autonomy and can truly be judged as such? The question is so profound and revolutionary as to represent a total transformation of the reality in which we live. If the answer were to be negative, the history of this world would change radically in all its manifestations. We are not dealing with a particular and narrow problem, but with a principle that involves the evaluation of each of our mental and practical attitudes. … The first thing we need to clarify is the concept of self-​awareness as it developed from ancient, medieval, and modern thought. Socrates’ well-​known dictum know thyself is considered to be the origin of the problem as it contains both the formulation of and solution for such a dictum. Indeed, know thyself implies both the certainty of knowledge and its realization into an essentially categorical imperative that concerns thought and action: you can and must know thyself. The fact that you may know is a belief that is not supported by reliable concrete evidence. If we wish to trace the roots of that belief, we need to consider the experience of introspection. It was thought that since I alone can enter my own conscience, it follows that I am the only person who can understand my true reality. Others can analyze me from the outside and infer who I am through similarities, analogies, and other various clues. At one point, the religious element comes into the picture and tries to bring into the analysis mystical and theological arguments: “In interiore homine habitat veritas” (Inside the human conscience resides truth) and, “Est Deus in nobis” (God is within all of us). The light is within me, and I can rediscover its presence with my power. Introspection leads the way, a path science cannot challenge. With time the religious demand assumes exceptional importance in the development of know thyself. Greek tradition, which goes back to Socrates and even before him, had elaborated a moral imperative that implied the concept of liberty and responsibility. With Christianity, this religious demand reaches a further development since the problem of responsibility becomes more explicit and more compelling. Consequently, the need for introspection becomes a daily necessity leading to the sacrament of confession with the revelation to the priest of the process resulting in self-​discovery. Besides being

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philosophical and moral, the problem becomes also soteriological, implying a constant confrontation of one’s thoughts and actions with the divine norms that need to be followed. The boundaries of this problem acquire a special meaning through the sacrament of the Eucharist, which can be considered the crowning moment of the process of self-​analysis. As a result, the imperative know thyself becomes even more complex and meaningful when penance, contrition, and penitence are added to the process.

…

In modern times, the problem of self-​awareness assumes a very different meaning. With that change begins a new chapter in the history of philosophy, and the new philosophy can be interpreted as an ongoing effort to understand reality through knowledge of oneself. It is true that such knowledge has faced many challenges, yet the doubt that ushers the new history of modern thought has no chance of slowing down the process of self-​awareness; consequently, all modern thought can be defined as the metaphysics of the ‘I’, and it can affirm itself nurturing the illusion that it rests on a self-​awareness that relates both to the self and the world. Modern thought seeks to become the apotheosis of the ‘I’; it is centered on the effort to create a humanism in which the ‘I’ becomes one with absolute humanism. The certainty of being able to possess a method to know and dominate reality comes to an end with the philosophies of idealism and positivism. Then the crisis moves in and, with it, the same doubt that marked the inception of modern thought assumes new dimensions, becoming the rationale for a new investigative process. The doubt that emerged in the early stages of empiricism and rationalism reinforced the faith in the potential of humanity. The new doubt, instead, acquires a different metaphysical dimension and its object becomes the hypostatized ‘I’. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a different type of awareness emerged, one that can no longer be identified with true self-​awareness. The ‘I’, once placed on a pedestal, has no longer the ability to acknowledge itself as a self-​aware subject and becomes instead an object of scientific investigation, better understood, albeit in a different way, than it was in the past. Modern thought indoctrinated us with myths of the sovereign citizen, the dignity and responsibility of the individual, metaphysical freedom, civic and political equality, and mastering reality. Now reality is elusive and the miracles of science cannot be contained in a synthetic form that can offer us a precise meaning and destiny.

…

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Having reached this point, the question can be posited in the following terms: if all this finds confirmation in today’s reality, what occurred in the second half of the past century that initiated such a radical and profound revolution? The response cannot be expressed in a concise fashion because it entails a vision that is radically different from reality. The second half of the nineteenth century experienced the beginning of a process of dissolution and renovation which today’s philosophical activity can barely define. We are witnessing an orientation so profoundly different that we are at a loss to give an accurate account of the events that have occurred. To summarize the meaning of what has happened, we can state, generally speaking, that we are seeing the transition from a metaphysical to a scientific conception of humanity. Briefly, the transition in question concerns a changed conception of the human being as subject to one of being an object of inquiry. This being only an approximation, I will offer a concrete historical account that will shed light on its complexity. To clearly understand the problem, it is necessary to recall the discovery that [Cesare] Lombroso made in 1870 when he opened the skull of [Giuseppe] Vilella, a seventy-​year-​old farmer who was found guilty three times for robbery and arson. In the place of the occipital crest, he found a median occipital hole that is only found in quadrumanes. According to Lombroso, the presence of that hole constitutes the birth of criminal anthropology and, with it, the recognition of physical abnormality as a source of delinquency. Thus, a precise date identifies the beginning of criminal anthropology and its journey toward a new conception of humanity according to which the relation between physical and psychic facts takes a new dimension. It is the period in which experimental psychology is born. For this new science, the psychophysical unity of human reality becomes the new fundamental and indispensable problem, one that needs to be resolved with new investigative criteria. Should we wish to identify accurately the novelty of this discovery, we need to return to the concept of self-​awareness which has informed the history of thought from Socrates onward and has represented the core of religious philosophy. We have already discussed the meaning held by the Christian regarding introspection and internal truth revealed by divine light. This self-​awareness becomes of enormous value and gives meaning to the norm of know thyself in its purest form. It is in the human conscience that God’s presence becomes a reality and where humankind is able to hear His true voice. Self-​awareness is a clear and coherent concept that does not leave room for reluctance or second-​guessing. However, this concept is based on a fundamental presupposition that we cannot relinquish without compromising everything. This presupposition is found in our faith in the eternal and autonomous principle that corresponds to the definition of the soul, and it transforms individuals into

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free and responsible beings before themselves and before God. As a result of Lombroso’s discovery and the birth of criminal anthropology, we are placed in a position to ask ourselves whether the concept of self-​awareness can maintain its traditional meaning and continue to be the foundation of traditional ethics. It is a question that demands a precise answer.

…

The answer contains an issue of principle that involves the entire reality of humankind and, in particular, the transformation of the cognitive process. We need to insist upon this aspect of the problem to understand its seriousness and its revolutionary importance. If human beings are made of soul and body, and if the soul has a life that goes beyond the body, the problem of self-​awareness can be clearly stated. Even the internal process manifests itself in unambiguous and identifiable terms. The problem, instead, takes a new dimension when we no longer believe in the existence of a soul seen in its extracorporeal nature and we begin to analyze the relation existing between soul and body as a relation between two realities that condition each other in a reciprocal way. For a person, the process leading to knowledge of his spiritual world may acquire a precise conceptual meaning. However, to become conscious of an activity that is both psychological and physical implies a different level of understanding that can deny the validity of any previously valid concept. If judgment is limited to the internal reality of a being that can be totally true to itself, the traditional logic of know thyself continues to hold true in a coherent fashion. However, if the world of the soul is considered to be united with that of the body, the cognitive process of synthesis demands knowledge of natural sciences that one cannot simply presume to possess. What does a self-​awareness that is at the same time possession of the self and possession of the body mean? In what fashion can the two forms of knowledge coexist and form a single entity? In what sense can one give the know thyself an unambiguous and responsible meaning? It is sufficient to ask these questions to become aware of the crisis that—​ with the birth of criminal anthropology—​emerges in the context of self-​ awareness. Knowledge of the psychical world and that of the physical world posit each other as two heterogeneous realities that are intrinsically connected by the same logic. We are dealing with objects related to different cognitive criteria that need to become one through the same process of evaluation and judgment. The diversity of criteria reflects the diversity of mental activities needed to formulate a judgment. The assumption that diverse skills can coexist and can actually be fused into one is baseless since it is not supported by

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any presupposition that is considered indispensable. On the other hand, the skills necessary for the knowledge of the human body is so problematic as not to leave any space for reliable verification. What meaning could the occipital hole have for Vilella?

…

The psychophysical unity of a person that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and gave birth to criminal anthropology and experimental psychology constitutes the principle upon which scientific revolution transformed the centuries-​old conception of freedom and responsibility. Then a new philosophy or a new science emerged, which we need to develop in all of its aspects. It is clear, however, that the old concept of self-​awareness has vanished, and with it, the world tied to the presupposition that a human being, considered each individually and autonomously, may be understood and judged according to a tradition found to be inconsistent. The individual viewed as singularly unique does not exist and cannot exist. We need to move from an individualistic conception to a strongly rooted social view in which humanity is linked to the system of cosmic reality of which it is an expression. …

…

The various stages of the scientific revolution taking place in the nineteenth century acquire new meaning with the initial acceptance of the new science of psychoanalysis—​a science that addresses solely and directly the question of self-​awareness, thereby compromising, with altogether different means, its foundation and validity. Human beings cannot know themselves because their reality is comprehensible only at a certain level; hence, they cannot guarantee their own being with certainty. The self-​awareness that comes to the forefront at a certain point is so partial and conditioned that it excludes the possibility of revealing any meaning or of having any value. At the roots of awareness live the subconscious and the unconscious, which withhold any credibility that would appear to be evident. Our reality escapes us and can only somehow be reached through a process that can discover that which lies in the most hidden parts of our being. Psychoanalysis is the only science that is capable of descending into the deep, and we must entrust ourselves to it so that we will catch sight of who we truly are. Today, it is not easy to state how effective this science is and what definitive results it has achieved. We are at the first stage of a very long journey. Whatever level of reliability has been achieved by the new science, the conclusion it has reached about human nature—​that there

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is a relationship among each one of us to the world of which we are an expression—​is unquestionable. Our life experience begins with a phase of our being of which we have no recollection. This is the subconscious and unconscious phase when human beings begin to realize themselves in a way that will be definitive for the development of their lives. In fact, the rest of our life will be affected by what took place without mediation, which in turn makes us marginally aware of our reality. The subconscious and unconscious find their roots in a life which is even more remote—​the embryonic or uterine stage—​and in which awareness cannot be determined. In this initial phase of life, in which the hereditary elements of both parents meet, the two biological components are integrated and interact with the reality of the species through the various stages of its history. From the species, one cannot help but consider the reality—​of which the species is a part—​since it represents the condition of the world as a unified entity. This is what psychoanalysis has affirmed and continues to do. Its metaphysical vision of life is confirmed and clarified by the biological sciences in which the problem of heredity is scrutinized at its most profound roots.

…

One of the reasons psychoanalyses is unable to progress is because the entire hereditary process cannot be ascertained through a narrow documentation of the subject matter in question. The individual under analysis offers only vague testimony that cannot acquire definitive results, so any conclusions based on it are only vague, uncertain, or even equivocal. Therefore, a judgment on the present state of psychoanalysis would involve serious reservations in terms of its scientific results. And yet the certainty that today is taking hold of the validity of psychoanalysis shows that it has a clear scientific basis. People feel rather strongly that psychoanalysis is on the right track even though they are not sure about the validity of its practical application. The individual feels, in a more or less obscure way, that he is not fully conscious of his own self, and consequently, can neither know nor control himself. Thus, the Socratic imperative has no meaning to the individual who goes to the psychoanalyst asking for a portrait of himself and looking for self-​knowledge. For him, this is the equivalent of a confession. This confession is precisely the opposite of religious confession. It is no longer an expression of awareness, self-​control, nor self-​improvement. Confession is now the affirmation of one’s own inability to know oneself and the need for help to arrive at an understanding of oneself. The psychiatrist is invoked as the savior, and one confesses in the psychiatric sessions without any restraint. I am

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a sick person and I need to be healed. I want to be healed from a sickness that I do not know and for which I am not responsible. It is a mental illness that can be compared to a physical illness. The implied accountability is similar to that of a body organ. Since this accountability is of a corporeal nature, it involves the doctor—​ the psychiatrist—​not the person morally responsible for its actions. We need to reflect on the methods and criteria used for the diagnosis. Just as a doctor learns from the patient about the symptoms of the patient’s illness, so does the psychiatrist learn from the patient’s confession. The psychiatrist considers less the conscious aspects of the confession than the subconscious and the unconscious aspects of the patient. A search is made for the true nature of the patient’s illness in those symptoms that remain obscure to the patient since they are rooted in the most hidden part of the personality. Do you want to know thyself? Well, I will help you out by introducing you to a world unknown to you. I will try to give you a piece of your self-​awareness. …

…

A close analysis of the reasons pertaining to self-​awareness by contemporary scientists has demonstrated unequivocally that self-​awareness cannot manifest itself in the traditional forms. Scientific conditions become integrated into a complex vision in which different perspectives meet and complement each other both from the physical and psychic standpoint. The psychophysical unity of a person constitutes the unequivocal conclusion that dismisses from its foundation the concept of the autonomous individual, leading to a scientific revolution whose consequences are still far from reaching their unavoidable climax.

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Positivism Revisited 16.1

Introduction

Among Spirito’s last philosophical considerations, one can find two long articles on positivism, his faith of his early university years. By returning to the roots of his initial intellectual probing, Spirito seems to indicate that his philosophical journey had come full circle and that he had nothing more to say. At the age of 81, he published “Nascita e storia delle scienze umane” (1977d) in which he reconsidered the impact that human sciences had on Western culture. The following year, he wrote “Il positivismo non è finito” (1978c/​1979b). In it, he revisited the demise of positivism in Italy, caused by Gentile’s anti-​positivist stance, as well as the resurgence of the importance of scientific interests in Gentile’s philosophy; his own complex relationship with positivism, which even during the years of his actual idealism could not be erased, remaining a source of inspiration for his subsequent search for truth. According to him, the continuous presence of positivist influences in his thought was tied to his continuous interest in the two social sciences of political economics and, above all, of criminal law, that culminated in the publication of the two chapters of “Antropologia e sociologia criminale” and “Crisi del diritto penale” in Storia della mia ricerca (1971a) and in the reprinting of Storia del diritto penale. Da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni (1974). At the end of his career, Spirito could affirm that he was a “positivist and an idealist at the same time”1 and that “positivism [was] still alive”2 because it had morphed into new forms, affecting all aspects of reality. The two mentioned articles, “Nascita e storia delle scienze umane” e “Il positivism non è finito,” besides confirming the impact that positivism continues to have in today’s society, are also a reservoir of information for those who want to gain a deeper knowledge of both Gentile’s and Spirito’s intellectual contribution to the Italian culture of the first part of the twentieth century.

1 Spirito, “Il positivismo non è finito,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, i-​i v, 1979, p. 23. Initially, this article appeared in La Voce della scuola libera, December 31, 1978, pp. 3–​5 (first part) and February 28, 1979, pp. 5–​7 (second part). 2 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_018

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“Il positivismo non è finito”. In Giornale critico della filosofia italiana (pp. 15–​25) [Translation]

16.2.1 Manifesto of Anti-​positivism The history of positivism lasted more or less a century. It has been a history of extraordinary importance. It inspired all social strata and became a metaphysics of the masses. We all have been positivists, including those who were considered its most rigid opponents. Positivism has exhausted its function by now or at least this is a widespread conviction. There are no more positivists. Nobody claims to be one, and it seems that nobody is willing to pursue a positivist program. However, occasionally the word positivism resurfaces in the strangest ways, and references to names and doctrines tied to positivism become more frequent. Is positivism truly over? Or are there ideas that never die and continue to pop up in different guises? To offer a valid answer, we need to consider the history of such metaphysics from its birth in the nineteenth century to its death. Above all, we need to bring to the forefront the work of the philosopher who brought positivism to its apparent final crisis with his rigorous reasoning. [Giovanni] Gentile’s criticism of positivism was both definitive and radical. This criticism—​which was one of the fundamental motifs of the new idealist philosophy—​found many different formulations but all converging toward the same goal. One could even find some indications of a program that could be assumed as the ‘manifesto’ of anti-​positivism. It is in this direction that we can now capture the fundamental speculative need represented by Gentile’s thought.

…

Among many of Gentile’s works dedicated to the rejection of positivism, there is a document that stands out as the most meaningful source of inspiration of the new idealism: “Proemio” (“Preface”) that bears the date of October 10, 1919—​coinciding with Gentile’s transfer from the [Scuola Normale di Pisa] to the University of Rome in 1917–​1918—​was published in the first volume of Giornale critico della filosofia italiana (1920). With this document, Gentile elaborates for the young generation of Roman students—​considered the avant-​garde of his ideals—​the program for a new philosophical revolution. According to Gentile, positivism had come to an end because of the radical antithesis it had created within the realm of thought. Science and philosophy were presented as two realities that exclude each other: therefore, they could not be integrated into a common work. It is noteworthy at this

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point to single out that neo-​idealism is antiscientific in both Gentile’s and in Croce’s works. Here is the definition of the two forms of knowledge in which we can find the most daring expression of the ideals that identify the new metaphysics. It can be considered as the ‘manifesto’ of anti-​positivism, perhaps the most important document of the new historical period. Never as today, contrary to the appearance, the need to believe and therefore to philosophize was so profoundly felt in the human spirit; never a spiritual disposition was more favorable to intellectual inquiry. This inquiry was resurrected both in Italy and Europe after the Napoleonic Wars as religious faith and philosophy. It is re-​emerging—​and surely it will continue to do so—​in our generation as a consequence of a similar spiritual movement. Religion and philosophy are made of ideals, that is, of faith and the creative energy of the spirit. Science and criticism represent one realm of thought, while religion and philosophy represent another. What distinguishes the first group from the second, among other things, is faith—​ordinarily ascribed to religion. Science is the analysis of a pre-​ existing object; it is, therefore, an intellectualistic knowledge, not actually directed to the imagined object presumed to exist before knowledge itself, but to the object as it is already known: that is, our prior knowledge appears naïve and instinctive vis-​à-​vis that of science. Science makes this prior knowledge the object of a destructive analysis and of a subsequent synthesis incapable of recreating that destroyed life. We call it science, whether it is natural science, psychology, logic, theory of knowledge, or criticism of all that can be criticized. Science takes the position of someone who is inactive as it looks with curiosity upon those who act. Lifeless science, if it could truly manifest its ideal, would be completely dead and, therefore, not exist. It is an arrogant form of criticism whose intent is to observe life while remaining outside of it. Science demonstrates all that it states and does not admit anything that has not yet been demonstrated. For science, nothing is new under the sun. What is, is what has always been and will always be: law, which is the fact itself fixed as invariable substance. Miracle, on the other hand, which would constitute the unexpected event in the world, is as absurd for science as a consequence that does not derive from the premises in which it is implicit and contained. In nature, science sees only facts; in thought, it sees only ideas. These ideas themselves are already determined or are determinable, which is the same. Besides facts and ideas, there is nothing else. By limiting itself to facts and ideas, science is either nothing or something that cannot be

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defined insofar as what it is, where it is, or what it does. Faith, instead, has no fact to observe, nor ideas to demonstrate. It does not concern itself with objects waiting to be recognized. It does not presuppose, it states; it does not look, it creates; it does not analyse; therefore, it lives. It is not an abstract theory, but a theory that is also practiced. Therefore, it is said that religion recreates and regenerates the spirit. It brushes aside the illusion that a world already exists and the only thing expected of it is to contemplate and enjoy it. Religion places itself in front as the true reality, springing from its own bosom. True philosophy does the same, with the difference that it knows its own power while religious faith does not. Philosophy knows no other reality than the one it creates, which is also a concept created by a human being. Water, air, numbers, fire, indefinite material or indeterminable atom, idea, act, one, God-​Creator, substance, thought, however a philosophical reality is defined, this reality is not a given, is not empirically observable nor rationally thinkable outside an activity that realizes it in the same rational world of thought.3

… This is the Gentile’s new definition of philosophy; a philosophy that is on the verge of awakening in order to influence the world. This is the beginning of the new life for Italians that was announced in 1919, four years before the March on Rome. It presents itself as having a sure destiny and at the same time as a revolution that cannot be avoided. Gentile feels that a new reality is about to begin. The positivism and historicism of the second half of the nineteenth century—​the positivism “that we opposed and overcame during the last decade of the same century and the first twenty years of the present”4—​has given birth “to a historical actual idealism, that is, to an anti-​Platonic and immanentist spiritualism”.5 This is the true act, the pure act in its concreteness; better yet, it is the ‘I’ in its effective reality, history in the vivid presence of the conscience. Actual idealism is conceived as the beginning of a historical action des-​ tined to transcend any passive attitude of the spiritual life. Positivism and the new idealism are defined in terms of a metaphysics that fades and a metaphysics that emerges. Science and philosophy represent the dualism of two realities 3 Giovanni Gentile, “Proemio,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana. Vol. 1 (Messina: Principato, 1920), pp. 2–​3. 4 Ibid., p. 4. 5 Ibid.

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that are in opposition to each other. Positivism and actual idealism have found the criteria to carry out their individual journey. However, will Gentile continue to maintain this position, or will he undertake a profound process of revision?

…

Today we possess documents which allow us to understand the next phase of actual idealism. A deeply felt process of reconsideration of the dualism of science and philosophy slowly motivates Gentile’s philosophical inquiry. While we cannot specifically discuss the resurfacing of positivist principles, it is obvious that a deep transformation emerges in him in the years following 1926. Suddenly, the two terms of science and philosophy are examined again, and their opposition begins to be denied. The reasons behind the new attitude become clear and evident. They can be summarized in two explicit situations that can be supported by undisputed documentation, one metaphysical and the other historical. The first situation was the result of the re-​emergence of a different investigative attitude due to the overcoming of anti-​positivism itself. The positivist principles that held so much importance were in essence consciously set aside. The conviction that positivism had faded was generally held. There was no need to spend more time on it or worry about a defeated enemy. Gentile, who had claimed for himself the direct responsibility for the intellectual destruction of positivism, did not want to continue a fight that had already been won.

…

At one point the historical situation integrated with the metaphysical one in explaining the psychological change that occurred in Gentile. Indeed, when work on the Enciclopedia italiana [Italian Encyclopedia] began in 1925, con-​ tinuous contacts between Gentile and the many collaborators, both Italian and foreigners, were established. The Enciclopedia was open to the whole world, generating a progressively tighter human and personal relationship among the collaborators. Sciences acquired a new concreteness while at the same time absorbing humanistic needs. The initial dualism of philosophy and science slowly faded until it disappeared. This transformation soon produced astonishing effects. The antiscientific judgments of 1919 were slowly abandoned until they were explicitly rejected in 1930. On September 11, 1930, in a speech at the Congresso di Scienze (Congress of Sciences) held in Trento and Bolzano, Gentile advocated a new form of collaboration in the world of scientific investigation when he stated:

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Allow me to make an initial statement of clarification. I believe that this event should be hailed as the joyous beginning of our Association. At these annual meetings, we now see the participation of philosophers, while until yesterday, philosophers and scientists felt the need to look at each other with mistrust, as if they could not approach the others’ field of investigation without risking the deformation or adulteration of it. Both groups were convinced that they were speaking different languages and they were thinking with different and irreconcilable mentalities. In the meanwhile, our Association, where scientists are in the great majority, has seen fit to go against the division between science and philosophy by creating a new section devoted to philosophy. The majority of scientists agree that to separate science and philosophy is an absurdity because the reality that the mind is trying to capture is really one, even though this reality may have different aspects. The work of the mind consists of justifying and systematizing all of these aspects and, therefore, of unifying this reality into a single definitive concept: philosophy.6

… This was Gentile’s position in 1930, and in the Giornale critico of the following year, he wrote a long essay “Filosofia e scienza,” in which he clearly redefined his position vis-​à-​vis the journal Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica. It is clear that during these years the anti-​positivist attitude fades. This becomes more explicit when he proceeds to the elaboration of his humanism of labor, understood as the foundation of the modern concept of culture. Before culture meant above all artistic and literary culture, which neglected the vast segment of humanity… that labors at the foundations of human culture, where man is in contact with nature, and works. There man labors as man, aware of what he is doing with the consciousness of himself and of the world in which he is incorporated. … The farmer labors, the artisan labors, and so does the master craftsman. Equally labors the artist, the scholar, and philosopher. Gradually the material through which individuals put themselves to the test in their labors becomes lighter and is dematerialized; so the spirit is released to fly freely in its own air, outside of space and time. But matter is already conquered when the hoe 6 Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Gentile. Opere filosofiche (Milan: Garzanti, 1991), p. 833.

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bites into the earth, breaking up the ground and making it play its part in the pursuit of human ends. … It was necessary that the high dignity, which man by thinking had discovered in thought itself, should be also accorded to the ‘worker.” It was necessary that thinkers, scientists, and artists join hands with the workers in this consciousness of the universal dignity of humanity. There is no doubt that the social changes and the parallel socialist movement of the nineteenth century have created this new humanism, the actual organization of which in concrete political terms is the task and the concern of our century.7 This is the humanism of labor and this is the concept of State understood as corporative State. With the elaboration of the humanism of labor and with Genesi e struttura della società (1946), published posthumously, Gentile’s philosophical activity comes to an end. One can ask if this activity can still be defined as anti-​positivism or rather can be considered as the introduction to a new corporativism with socialist and communist roots. From the end of the last century to his tragic death, Gentile’s journey has been long and difficult. However, the works he left behind enable us to reach a clear definition of his philosophy. The terms of positivism and anti-​positivism are insufficient to define his philosophy and his politics. 16.2.2 My Positivism Before I met with Gentile in 1918, I was a convinced positivist to the point of being dogmatic and unable to find another path to follow. All my investigative interests were confined to criminal law and political economics, fields related to positivist metaphysics. My professors were Enrico Ferri and Maffeo Pantaleoni. However, the most compelling problems I had to resolve were those tied to an individualism that was conceived empirically. From criminal anthropology to criminal sociology and pure economics, my horizon coincided with the horizon of the traditional social sciences. I could not be satisfied with the prevailing scientific solutions, but I could not see a way out. The metaphysical world that surrounded me was equally monotonous. My education rooted in positivism conditioned me completely. Consequently, I became a dogmatic positivist. After my meeting with Gentile, my thinking took a revolutionary turn. The metaphysical superiority of actual idealism became immediately evident and conquered me day after day until I was completely taken by it. Positivism could 7 Giovanni Gentile, Genesi e struttura della società (Florence: Sansoni, 1946), pp. 111–​112.

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not compete with the new philosophical needs. My investigative attitude became intransigent to the point of exasperation. In the meanwhile, this attitude did not emerge from nothing. My positivism could not be rejected without a critical process involving those problems that had fueled my interests for so many years. I had to take into consideration the solutions offered by my previous belief. The old [scientific] problems could not be abandoned. On the contrary, they required a revision in accordance with my new points of view. The horizon remained the same. However, the journey had to take a different direction since I could not abandon either criminal law or political economics. Everything I had believed in had to be re-​examined and transformed. I had been a positivist but now I was an idealist. Although the problems remained the same, I needed to continue my journey.

…

How could I continue my journey? Between the positivism that I had abandoned and the idealism that was demanding all my attention, what was the new path of my new journey? A precise answer could not emerge from the speculative situation of the moment since initially I had no clear view of the new specific positions to take. On the other hand, the problems were the same and I could not avoid them pretending that they did not exist. I was fueling the urge to make some precise decisions. The true answer was not found then. Essentially, I can say that while my idealism was total and intransigent, my positivism could not be denied. In conclusion, I was and remain positivist and idealist at the same time. I have never abandoned the studies on criminal law. Indeed, after so many years I could write Storia della mia ricerca (1971a) and reprint Storia del diritto penale (1974a). I was a positivist and an idealist. My positivism is still being felt and it cannot die. However, it is no longer the same as it was at the beginning and neither is actual idealism. Yet, while being a convinced actual idealist, I continued to pay attention to problems that I had inherited from positivism. My Storia del diritto penale needed a conclusion and I presented it in the last chapter “Antropologia criminale e sociologia criminale” (“Criminal Antropology and Criminal Sociology”). It was not certainly a positivist conclusion, but not yet an idealist one. The problems that I dealt with were those related to the theories of [Cesare] Lombroso and Ferri. The solutions I offered were mostly new, but the ideals were the old. I brought the chapter to Gentile who published it in Giornale critico in 1925. The situation continued to be the same: positivism or idealism? It is difficult

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to come up today with a precise answer. Back then, it was even more difficult for me to be aware of the issue. All what I wrote then, I lived it as a total experience. Gentile accepted the chapter without any reservation. My attitude was no different with regard to political economics—​a discipline treated with a criticism involving a complete scientific and speculative autonomy. The breaking point and the awareness of the change were not explicit and, as such, they did not cause any personal drama. There has been a continuous process of growth totally devoted to the reality being construed. The philosophical principles remained in the background. Storia del diritto penale has covered the life of my thought through a sixty-​year-​old journey. 16.2.3 Positivism of Human Sciences8 Positivism found another occasion for a new life with the birth and develop-​ ment of the so-​called human sciences. This new expression is now commonly used and its origin is linked to experimental psychology and criminal law, sciences that began to emerge around 1870. My initial studies dealt with criminal anthropology and coincided with the history of this century. This does not involve a new orientation, rather it is the same continuation of the positivist theories. From Auguste Comte on, one can find only continuity. Even if positivism is no longer mentioned, nothing is contraposed to positivism as a metaphysics of a different kind. Human sciences are a typical expression of the same positivist process as it developed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nor does there exist any other attempt worthy of being mentioned that stands as an effort of differentiation from positivism. Anyone interested in finding out the origin and the name of human sciences will reach the same conclusions. Aside from the absurdity of the name identifying such sciences, there is no way that we can demonstrate the originality of the origins and the goals of their scientific methods. They are positivist sciences that find their founders in the forerunners of the scientific investigation of the nineteenth century. A new philosophy that can claim different programs and different methods has yet to appear. The paths followed are the same, and no other metaphysics could claim a more effective paternity. Naturally, the destiny of human sciences has no way to distinguish itself from the destiny of other traditions of thought that followed Comte’s sociology. The new sociology possesses only the pretension of continuity. At this point, the question dealing with the destiny of the old positivism emerges with

8 Ugo Spirito, “Nascita e storia delle scienze umane,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, lvi, n. 2, 1977, pp. 149–​166.

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a renewed scientific necessity. Nobody can deny that positivism has not yet run its course. It is still alive through the new manifestations that marked its long journey. If we were to choose one word to better describe today’s philosophy, from a metaphysical and scientific point of view, no other term would be better suited than positivism. As a matter of fact, to give history the respect it is due, when speaking of today’s Italian positivism, we should really call it neo-​positivism or experimentalism. They are terms of a distant past and as such they should be definitively rejected or condemned. In reality, we don’t go much beyond them because we lack the courage to revise today’s philosophical trends. Surely, there are many other philosophies that are still fashionable and continue to strive for a popular acceptance. Although nobody talks about positivism any longer, just as no one calls human sciences by that name, it is obvious that we mean positivism. The truth is that today’s history is wholly absorbed by a single metaphysics of the masses, which is the metaphysics of positivism. Reality presents many aspects just as there are many philosophies. However, one philosophy above all stands out to dominate the field because its dogmatism has been more or less accepted without having undergone a serious critical examination.

…

Although it has taken new forms and new directions, positivism is still alive and the crossover between idealism and positivism is as relevant as ever, taking, however, into account that the new philosophy of problematicism has emerged from idealism and positivism. The objective of problematicism was to achieve a more radical antiscientific metaphysics, one in which the old conflicting philosophical trends could coexist. Problematicism eliminated the idea of myths, thereby overriding every new possible investigative dogmatism. Today problematicism is neither idealism nor positivism, but an attitude of doubting and of waiting. Equating science with philosophy has resulted in a new endless search.

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State of Unawareness 17.1

Introduction

During his years as an actual idealist, Spirito envisioned the grandiose project of becoming not only the interpreter, but also a contributor to a new philosophical reality capable of influencing history and creating a better future. At the end of his life, he considered himself the recorder of broken dreams and failed intellectual systems. In Che cosa sarà il futuro (1977d), he rejected the role of the philosopher for that of the historian, whose only function was to develop a new method that could possibly interpret the complex world of established facts. According to him, such a method was strictly linked to the rejection of the “idealist assumptions of modern epistemology”1 in which “logic and theology were identified: to see what it was [and] that it conformed to truth.”2 Consequently, the past should not be manipulated to conform to pre-​established principles even when it revealed new aspects. The historian’s activity should be limited to a possibly objective rendering of facts. Furthermore, in Memorie di un incosciente (1977a), Spirito could only offer a bleak image of his own self: a product of forces such as luck3 that remained outside his own ability to understand, let alone challenge through the power of reasoning. He asserted that the main feature of his life was represented by the sense of unawareness that accompanied his personal experiences since his high school years, and over which he had no control. At the end of his long intellectual journey, characterized by a corrosive ‘problematic’ attitude that forced him to challenge any established truth (religious, positivist, neo-​idealist, scientific, and communist), he sadly confessed that he had witnessed the “destruction of all faiths”4 and that he had “nothing more to say nor anything else to teach.”5 By denying human reason the possibility of establishing universal principles valid for all, and therefore, of reaching truth; by recognizing that philosophy was no longer able to know the being nor the ‘I’—​at most, philosophy 1 Spirito, Che cosa sarà il futuro, p. 15. 2 Ibid., p. 16. 3 Spirito, Memorie di un incosciente, p. 36. 4 Ibid., p. 40. 5 Ibid., p. 41.

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could express a condition of existential crisis; by dissolving the ability of individuals to shape their destiny within the framework of history, Spirito assumed skeptical, if not nihilist, positions that were shared by the postmodern European philosophers. From the early certainties of positivism and actual idealism to the state of ‘unawareness,’ Spirito’s philosophical journey had completed its long trajectory, reversed its premises, and exhausted its function. 17.2

“Il metodo della mia ricerca”. In Che cosa sarà il futuro (pp. 13–​17) [Translation]

I would like the reader to understand that the objective of my investigation has been the analysis of today’s society. I seek to understand it and explain its internal logic. I erased the past as I have known it in order not to be conditioned by it or at least to be only influenced by the part I cannot eliminate. To achieve that, I have also put aside all my previous beliefs and preferences, considering myself neither communist nor anticommunist. Every thought process lacks a clear conclusion; hence, I do not expect it to be shared or rejected. It remains on a hypothetical plane, having no need of approval or disapproval. Naturally, all this could be true or not. To speak means to do so with absolute conviction. In addressing a problematic subject, one asks a question expecting a reply, but each question may or may not contain an answer. If I insist on this point it is only because I wish to reaffirm the true intention of my writing, which is not to support a thesis of my liking, but to lend credence to a hypothesis that I have fancied. Of course, it will be a hypothesis taken to be true although I am fully aware of the fact that it may be possible rather than true.

…

The fundamental elements of my investigation are facts. I come from the old school of positivism and I still believe in the importance of facts. I wait for the future because I cannot create it by relying on my faith; furthermore, I no longer have any intention of building it the way I would want to see it built. My personal situation is this: I am no longer a communist and I am curious about the future. I have no preferences of any kind and I am here waiting and imagining. I have no interest in anything else. As to facts, what are they? To me, facts are what I experience because they appear to my mind when I least expect them. They come to me out of the blue. As the reader will see, I did not foresee until recently what I know now and

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have written about, which is to say, the result of what took place during my long life. Yet, when I thought I had seen everything, life continuously presents me with new discoveries. It is not easy to explain these discoveries. What I can say is that they are not mine: they are constituent elements of today’s objective reality being realized, and they will be realized. My writing will have value because the facts I describe will become a reality. In other words, they are objective, not subjective facts. I am discovering a reality that is here or about to be here. I am no longer a revolutionary, only a historian.

…

To be a historian means to connect oneself to the past and relate it to the present. The objectivity one finds in the past flows into the present. Half of it is observation and the other half anticipation, but anticipation must issue from the logic of the past and be accepted without question. To anticipate the future, I must go beyond the facts of the past, neither denying nor affirming them. The reality is the past and only the past. When I ask myself what the future will hold, even though the answer can only come from a suitable interpretation of what took place, I have to accept that answer whether I like it or not, as I accept everything that history hands down to me. My investigation will follow this criterion. I expect nothing except to understand. As I sit down to write what I have in mind, I can say that the conclusions I have reached differ from my ideals: they stir impatience and displeasure. In other words, I wish my foresights will be proven wrong. I will call the reader to this seminal observation. When I was a believer, I sought the achievement of my ideals; now, I await what will happen and what form it will take.

…

The transformation that takes place in my spiritual attitude, which informs my search, offers a faithful reflection of the process I will follow in this essay. Any effort at seeking a consensus is out of the question because a fundamental dualism emerges between myself and reality. I can be informed, become cognizant, but I choose not to deal with it. Facts are what they are, and I see them clearly and intuitively. The idealist principles of modern epistemology are abandoned, and my passive behavior takes over completely. To explain my new spiritual condition more clearly, I would say that my life is split in two without any link in between. On the one hand, I observe facts; on the other, I am cognizant of my hopes and desires. Since I don’t like facts, I am always

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hoping that they will change some day. I expect to wake up and find new facts to address with fresh energy and a new interpretation. Facts that interest me are those that I can single out, and I attend to them with a promptness that surprises me. Suddenly, a completely unintended change of perspective comes to my mind and leads me to a higher knowledge of them. The temporary nature of my viewpoint can almost guarantee that it will change, and with it, will change all the consequences tied to the interpretation of facts. The hypothetical nature of my investigation will assert itself by eliminating every form of conclusive evidence to my contingent results.

…

I felt it necessary to inform the reader of my method to clarify the limits of my objectives—​something that I would not have imagined doing a few years ago. As a man of faith, the logical process I always relied on was one in which logic was identified with metaphysics: to see what it was and that it conformed to truth. I no longer believe, and between truth and reality there emerged a dualism that I cannot overcome. I simply express my opinions, which is a form of daydreaming, and I can continue dreaming as much as I want. What I have lost is an objective to fight for. If I say that I found an objective—​which is that of understanding—​my affirmation takes on the explicit value of the object of my investigation. However, this object is void of any meaning because the content itself has no meaning. While I retain the thought process and the work of the historian, what I am missing is the meaning of what I seek to understand. Everything becomes problematic to the point of losing its substance At this point, the method of my investigation has no more justification because it has no foundation. The discourse continues, but it is gradually reduced to a multiplicity lacking connections. Like any discourse on the crisis of a world without faith, it can be of value, or may simply contain unknown values.

…

What will the future hold? Everyone feels this is today’s fundamental question for which an answer must be found, yet because there is no answer forthcoming, the consequence of that void takes on the form of frightening dimensions. An answer is needed, but it can never be a real answer. So what then? If we want to give the term answer a more suitable meaning, that meaning can only be an absolute answer, a metaphysical answer capable of defining for

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us important terms such as absolute, whole, truth, value, and so on. But today we lack that opportunity, so we stop looking for an answer. We can anticipate problems, but we are unable to solve them. Philosophy is dead. If readers of these pages are looking for a definitive answer, they will be disappointed. The author is incapable of offering an answer, for his intent is only to confirm the terrible truth that he knows nothing, and therefore has nothing to teach. Even so, this confession is worth of reflection, and we should pause to consider its meaning. For even this seemingly negative statement can open the way to a miracle by turning this negation into an affirmation. Even if the journey is represented by a patchwork of affirmations and negations that constantly contradict each other, we should follow this path even with that little faith that continues to be present in those who believe they have no faith. In other words, we should continue with a faint hope against hope, which is the sign of our life, taken in its immediacy. Indeed, the only thing we can assure is that we are always engaged in a search accompanied by both optimism and pessimism, always striving to reach the only objectives worth pursuing. 17.3

“L’incoscienza”. In Memorie di un incosciente (pp. 27–​28; 38–​43); “State of Unawareness”. In Memoirs of the Twentieth Century (pp. 27; 33–​34)6 [Translation]

Witnessing the events of an entire century was the prerequisite for a mental state characterized by the uncertainties of an entire lifetime. It has been a century that made itself available to an infinite number of experiences without polarizing into any of them. Anyone who has followed the manifestations of its history with the desire to benefit from them has been overwhelmed by the depth of their revelations. The multifaceted nature of the experiences has precluded any willful exclusion. The dominating characteristic of my attitude has been an absolute openness to all types of experiences and a curiosity about everything and everyone. The methodology has been delineated by a series of questions aimed at reaching some sort of truth. We want to know and we want to understand; nothing else can form the foundation of our search. Curiosity, wonderment, openness, broad-​mindedness, and, ultimately, the accumulation of experiences have been the fundamental elements of my journey. I did not invent myself; instead, I was formed by the world that surrounded me. If I were to name this transcendent force, which has provided the content 6 Reprinted with permission of Rodopi, now Brill.

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of my personality, I would say that it was luck. It was always with me, offering me a gift that exceeded my every desire. I have been shaped by reality and have been under the illusion that I possess the ability to shape reality myself. The essential trait of my personality, channeled through a transcendent force, was the unawareness through which I came to recognize the different, unexplained components of my being that I did not myself will into existence. All that I have been and that I am was born in me at various turning points of my life, leaving in me only a few occasional marks. … Until a few years ago, my life was permeated by faith in self-​awareness. From the certainty of self-​awareness, I then moved to the ascertainment of unawareness. So, what does such a passage mean? And what can we expect from it? These questions can be examined closely only if we are certain that their foundations are secure. If unawareness is, in fact, an illusion, then the problem clearly would not exist. Re-​examining the experiences of my life, a life wholly dedicated to such an investigation, means transporting myself to a different level, one which would change the nature of the conclusions. To transport myself to the level of a new and non-​traditional metaphysics means to move from the state of awareness to unawareness and requires a decisive leap. It involves a most radical change. Therefore, I must first emphasize the state of mind of someone who tries to analyze the hypothesis of unawareness, which I developed. True, we are dealing with a new metaphysics, but we need to match this new metaphysics with the old and then draw conclusions from this comparison. I have always believed in the old metaphysics. I have always been able to devote myself to an ideal and live my life according to it. I reached my first metaphysical belief through an exposure to the principles of positivism, a faith that lasted many years and was destined to create a substantial legacy. This was the basis for my embracing neo-​idealism and actual idealism. Actual idealism then evolved into fascism and corporativism. I understood corporativism in the communist sense of the word, and this opened the door of the postwar period. At the end of the process, from 1927 onward, I began to develop problematicism. It was a long, tiring, and destructive journey. The hope of divorcing myself from actual idealism was renewed day after day. The history of this process is narrated in my book Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (1976a), but, little by little, it became increasingly negative until it resulted in the destruction of all faiths. … Now, I have nothing more to say nor anything else to teach. This is not to say that my activity has ended or that my words have nothing more to express; on the contrary, I continue to express my thoughts, and many young people

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come to me with some hope of being enlightened. I still see shining, curious eyes that are both anxious and trusting, but I also feel that the end results are not what they were. The enthusiasm that I can still generate soon fades. I can create some illusions, but only superficially. This is my actual situation. The drama of the unawareness begins here. Its intensity only increases. Having nothing else to say now, after consistently having had something to say for decades, is a terrible epilogue. But in the final analysis, when faith is gone, what remains? I have not yet retired into complete silence because the past still weighs on me, although it is also true that the past is, quite literally, past. It has the faded color of that which has ended. It has the dramatic force of something that has expired without the possibility of being resurrected. It needs to be brought back to life. The problem is: how? The drama of unawareness has not yet been adequately expressed. It is a situation without precedent, which cannot be linked to previous historical experience. From the certainty of self-​awareness to the certainty of the end of of self-​awareness, I was never able to confirm what exact state of mind led me from the transition of one to the other. But does it truly involve a transition that can be identified? Here the problem begins again and takes on a new form. In effect, if we wish to revisit the path followed in order to reach the end of self-​awareness, the logical process is only problematic and has no permanent value. The new metaphysics cannot be completely destructive. If it were so, it would merely be another traditional metaphysics, just one more conclusion similar to all the others. Instead, the new metaphysics does not destroy but rather points to the need for more research by indicating a new direction to be followed. The new metaphysics is no longer a faith, nor even the destruction of a faith. It is instead a reality in motion, enriched by the historical content present in our awareness. Assuredly, we have little to say to those who look to us for knowledge. We can express our version of the facts, but people expect much more, and we do not have the answers. We can relate our century of experiences and remain open to the future with the same unexhausted curiosity. For this generation, the drama of unawareness has already begun, and we cannot see a way to end it. If we ask ourselves what the dimensions of this drama are, it is difficult to give a precise answer. We can only say that it deals with an extremely profound historical turning point. The problem of unawareness remains in the background of our philosophical speculation, but its consequences are already looming with decisive force. The drama is felt worldwide, even if it has not yet reached its ultimate form. It cannot yet be perceived as something verifiable, but today we cannot figure out how to avoid this crisis that is manifesting itself

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in thousands of negative ways. To speak of unawareness may seem arbitrary and paradoxical, yet this expression only represents an increasingly imminent reality. The conclusiveness of the problematic form can be challenged, but this challenge does not leave room for any other affirmative position.

Appendix

Persons and Events Mentioned in the Text bottai giuseppe (1895–​1959). Politician. Bottai was the founder of the fasci di combattimento (fighting squads) and was a leader of Roman fascism. Editor of the journal La critica fascista in 1923, he later became Minister of Corporations. Bottai was a member of the Fascist Grand Council from 1923 to 1943. In the last meeting of the Council on 24–​25 July 1943, he voted against Mussolini and for the end of fascism. He was condemned to life imprisonment in absentia after World War ii. Bottai returned to Italy in 1948 after he was granted amnesty. bruno giordano (1548–​1600). Philosopher. He entered the order of St. Dominic, but soon he found himself at odds with the principles of the order and Catholicism in general for being intolerant towards established truths. Accused of heresy, he wondered from city to city lecturing on a variety of philosophical topics and related subjects, such as “memory retention,” but without finding peace. He lived in Lyons, Geneva, Paris, Oxford, Germany, and finally Venice where he was handed to the Inquisition. Before then, he had been ex-​communicated by the Calvinist Church in Geneva and the Lutheran Church in Germany. In Rome, he was held in jail for six years before being burnt at the stake in Campo dei Fiori. His system of thought was based on materialistic pantheistic principles: God and the world are one; matter and spirit are of the same substance; the universe is made of an infinity of worlds. cantimori delio (1904–​1966). Historian. A follower of Giovanni Gentile’s actual idealism, Cantimori developed a historical approach based on secular, anticlerical, nationalistic principles with which he re-​interpreted the periods of Middle Ages and Humanism. Later in life, he embraced Marxism and contributed with articles and essays to Rinascita (1944) and Società (1945–​1962), journals linked to the Italian Communist Party. castelli ferdinando. Gesuit and professor of literature at the Pontificia Università Gregoriana. Editor of La civiltà cattolica, he wrote articles and books where he tried to capture the religious and ontological dimension of poets and writers. croce benedetto (1866–​1952). Philosopher. He is considered the most important Italian intellectual of the first half of the twentieth century. Croce’s thought influenced generations of Italians in the fields of philosophy, history, aesthetics, and literary criticism. After an initial support for Benito Mussolini, he became an antifascist and the major promoter of the Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti [Manifesto of Anti-​Fascist Intellectuals] after the assassination by fascists of Giacomo Matteotti (1895–​1924), leader of the Italian Socialist Party. Never silenced by the regime, Croce was also a convinced anti-​Marxist to whose ideology he was introduced in his youth

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004425620_020

248 Appendix by Antonio Labriola (1843–​1904). After World War ii he was elected Senator of the Italian Republic as a classical liberal. His famous philosophical relationship with Gentile stimulated Italian culture during fascism. Croce transformed Hegelian idealism into a personal system whose major points were the concepts of absolute historicity of reality, the dialectic of the ‘distincts,’ and the coincidence of philosophy and history. In aesthetics, Croce is remembered for his interpretation of art as pure intuition and individual expression. de vecchi achille (1884–​1959). Lawyer and politician. De Vecchi became an early supporter of the fascist movement. In 1921, he was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies and became one of the four quadrumvirs who organized the March on Rome (October 1922). He was Minister of the Finance and later of the Education Department. Appointed to the Grand Council of Fascism, De Vecchi voted for the deposition of Mussolini and the end of the fascist dictatorship on 25 July 1943. Condemned in absentia during the Verona trial against the conspirators, he managed to escape to Argentina. He returned to Italy in n1949 and died in Rome. ferri enrico (1956–​1929). Sociologist and philosopher. Ferri was a student of Roberto Ardigò (1828–​1920)—​the most important Italian positivist philosopher—​ during his high school years in Mantua. He studied at the University of Bologna where he received a degree in sociology. He became professor of Criminal Law at the Universities of Bologna, Siena, Pisa, and Roma. He was a member of the Socialist Party and Director of its daily newspaper, L’Avanti. Like many other socialist leaders, Ferri favored neutrality during World War i, but later became a follower of Mussolini and was elected to the Italian Senate. An early scholar of criminal sociology, Ferri is considered one of the major representatives of the positivist School of Criminal Law. gasparri pietro (1851–​1934). A Roman Catholic Cardinal and diplomat. He presided over the Commission for the Codification of the Canon Law. However, his major achievement was the signing of the Vatican Agreement because it ended the sixty-​year conflict between the Vatican and the Kingdom of Italy. gentile giovanni (1875–​1944). Philosopher. Gentile founded the philosophy of fascism. In 1922, he joined Mussolini’s cabinet as Minister of Public Education. While he was in office, he tried to reform the entire public education system. In 1924, following the assassination by the fascists of Giacomo Matteotti (1885–​1924), Gentile resigned his post as Minister. In 1925, he became the Director of the Italian Encyclopedia. In that same year, he issued the Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti [Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals]. Although he did not show any enthusiasm for the fascist racial laws, his faith in fascism never wavered. In 1943, he proclaimed his support for the Republic of Salò. He later was killed by left-​wing antifascist groups on April 14, 1944. gioberti vincenzo (1801–​1852). Priest and philosopher. He contributed to the unification of Italy through Il primato morale e civile degli italiani [Moral and Civil Superiority of Italians, 1843], a book in which, through the splendor of the papacy, he

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presented the Church as the foundation of moral and social values essential to the Italian unification. lombroso cesare (1835–​1909). Psychiatrist and anthropologist. After analyzing the skull of Giovanni Vilella, a famous criminal, he developed the theory of “atavism” according to which the criminal presents characteristics that are typical of an earlier stage of human evolution. He became famous with his book on criminal anthropology, L’uomo delinquente (Criminal Man), published in 1876. matteotti giacomo (1885–​1924). Lawyer and a socialist politician. He became active in organizing the working class. Elected in the Italian Parliament in 1919, he emerged as one of the most informed members in the economic and financial matters. After the advent of fascism, Matteotti became quite critical of the emerging dictatorship. He was killed by the fascists on 10 June 1924, a few days after he delivered a powerful speech in the Italian Parliament, asking for the annulment of the previous April election. mussolini benito (1883–​1945). Politician and journalist. Politically motivated at the young age, he became an active member of the Socialist Party as a worker organizer and writer for L’Avanti, the main voice of the party. Expelled from the Socialist Party for advocating Italy’s intervention in wwi, he founded his own daily, Il popolo d’ Italia. He enlisted in the army, went to war, and was wounded. When the war ended, Mussolini’s ideological position became closer to that of the Nationalist Party, even though he continued to sympathize with the poor. This ideological ambivalence was more the result of a calculated opportunism than of profound convictions. Consequently, he found himself politically aligned with the rich agrarians and capitalists, who provided financial support for his fascist organizations. Mussolini was elected to the Italian Parliament and earned the nickname of ‘Duce,’ the only leader capable of resolving the nation’s enormous problems. After the March on Rome in 1922, he became Prime Minister and in 1925 he established the fascist dictatorship. The following years saw the consolidation of Mussolini’s personal prestige and his ascent to dictatorial power. Following the Ethiopian War in 1936, which gave Italy a “place in the sun,” he moved closer to Hitler taking his side in wwii. Mussolini was killed by partisans at Dongo, Lombardy, in 1945. pantaleoni maffeo (1857–​1924). Lawyer and economist. Pantaleoni taught economics at the University of Rome. A fervent nationalist, he fought for the intervention of Italy in wwi. In 1923, Pantaleoni was elected to the Italian Senate. He contributed to the resurgence of the studies of economics in Italy with both his theoretical analyses and his empirical programs. He became an advocate of the concept of utility based on the psychological dimension of monetary values. Pantaleoni was the first economist to attempt an appraisal of Italy’s wealth in 1884. salandra antonio (1853–​ 1931). Conservative politician. He attended the University of Naples and later became professor of Administrative Law at the

250 Appendix University of Rome. He served as Prime Minister of Italy from 1914 to 1916. After World War i, Salandra moved further to the right and endorsed Mussolini’s ascent to power in 1922. severino emanuele (1929–​2020) was considered one of the most influential thinkers of the Western world. He taught philosophy in various Italian universities, including the Università Cattolica in Milan from which he was expelled for his views on values and goals of human life, considered incompatible with the Catholic doctrine. One of his most important books, The essence of Nihilism, was published in 1972 right after is expulsion. spaventa bertrando (1817–​1883). Philosopher. Spaventa promoted Hegelian philosophy in Italy. His interpretation of Hegel stressed the creative activity of the knowing subject, thus anticipating the birth of actual idealism. starace achille (1889–​1945). Starace joined the fascist movement in 1920 and participated in the March on Rome (October 1922). Named secretary of the Fascist Party, he became one of the most fanatic supporters of Mussolini, advocating the personality cult of the Duce. Captured my partisans in Milan in 1945, he was shot to death after a quick trial. togliatti palmiro (1893–​ 1961). Important Italian political figure. Togliatti entered political life as an adolescent. He became a member of the Socialist Party in 1914. He joined Antonio Gramsci and Ignazio Silone in the creation of the Communist Party in 1921. During the fascist repression of both communist and socialist activities in Italy, he escaped to the Soviet Union. After the fall of fascism, Togliatti returned to Italy and became minister in various transitional governments in the biennium 1946–​48. He also served as head of the Italian Communist Party until his death. varisco bernardino (1850–​1933). Philosopher. Initially a positivist, Varisco was influenced by Giovanni Gentile’s actual idealism, becoming one of his closest followers. Subsequently, he developed his own brand of Christian existentialism. vatican agreements were diplomatic agreements reached by Benito Mussolini for the Italian State and Cardinal Pietro Gasparri of the Holy See (Vatican), which put an end to the division between the Italian State and the Vatican that took place after the Italian army conquered Rome on September 20, 1870. The Vatican Agreements recognized the existence of the Kingdom of Italy with Rome as capital; as well as Vatican City as a true and sovereign State. The many prerogatives granted to the Catholic Church by the Italian State include the teaching of Christian doctrine in all public elementary schools. vico giambattista (1668–​1744). Philosopher. Vico is credited with the invention of the philosophy of history though the term cannot be found in his texts. His entire philosophical system rotated around the principle of verum and factum convertuntur—​truth is the same as action. Truth consists of becoming aware of one’s actions rather than one possessing clear and distinct ideas as Descartes postulated. In brief,

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Vico stated that to know something, one had to experience it. In 1725, he wrote the Principi di una scienza nova [Principles of a New Science]. vilella giuseppe Delinquent and bandit. He was born in Calabria at the beginning of the nineteenth century and died in 1874. He was found guilty of robbery and arson. While in jail, he was visited by Cesare Lombroso (1835–​1909), a scholar of anthropology and criminal law. After his death, the study of his skull inspired Lombroso to develop the theory of “atavism.” volpicelli arnaldo (1894–​1968). Philosopher. Volpicelli taught law and philosophy at the University of Rome. He translated Kant’s and Hans Kelsen’s books.

Works Cited Cantimori, Delio. (1937) “La vita come ricerca” (“Life as a Search”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, v, pp. 356–​370. Carr, H. W. (1922) The Theory of Mind as Pure Act. London: Mcmillan. Translation of Giovanni Gentile’s, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro. Cavallera, Hervé A. (1990) “La partecipazione al divenire del reale: l’immagine della pedagogia in Ugo Spirito” (“Participation to the Becoming of Reality: The Image of Pedagogy in Ugo Spirito”), in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Ugo Spirito’s Thought). Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, pp. 261–​276. Cavallera, Hervé A. (1991) “L’occhio del pensiero: Ugo Spirito tra gli anni ’60 e gli anni ‘70” (“The Eye of Thought: Ugo Spirito in the Late 1960s and the Early 1970s”), in Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, pp. 27–​41. Cavallera, Hervé A. (2000) Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile (Ugo Spirito: The Search for Incontrovertibility). Fornello: Edizioni seam. Coli, Daniela (2007) “Il problematicismo di Ugo Spirito” (“Ugo Spirito’s problematicism”) in Ugo Spirito tra attualismo e postmoderno (Ugo Spirito Between Actual Idealism and Postmodern). Rome: Biblioteca Scientifica/​Fondazione Ugo Spirito, pp. 87–​106. Costantini, Anthony G. (2000) Translation of Ugo Spirito’s Memorie di un incosciente. Milano: Rusconi, 1977 as Memoirs of the Twentieth Century. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Croce, Benedetto. (1909) Logica come scienza del concetto puro (Logic as Science of Pure Concept). Bari: Laterza. Croce, Benedetto. (1915). Contributo alla critica di me stesso (Contribution to a Critique of Myself). Naples: Ricciardi. De Ruggiero, Guido. (1912) Filosofia contemporanea (Contemporary Philosophy). Bari: Laterza. Dessì, Giovanni. (1999) Ugo Spirito. Filosofia e rivoluzione (Ugo Spirito. Philosophy and Revolution). Milan: Luni Editrice. Di Stefano, Lino. (1981) Giovanni Gentile e l’attualismo (Giovanni Gentile and Actual Idealism). Palermo: Edizioni Thule. Di Stefano, Lino. (1984) Profili di pensatori contemporanei (Profiles of Contemporary Thinker). Palermo: Ila Palma. Frosini, Vittorio. (1988) “Ugo Spirito interprete della società tecnologica” (“Ugo Spirito Interpreter of Technological Society”), in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, p. 213–​225. Garin, Eugenio. (1991) Giovanni Gentile. Opere filosofiche (Giovanni Gentile’s Philosophical Works). Milan: Garzanti. The book includes, though in a partial version, Giovanni Gentile’s speech “Il concetto della natura nel moderno idealismo”

Works Cited

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(“Concept of Nature in Modern Idealism”) delivered at the Congresso di Trento e Bolzano (Congress of Trento and Bolzano) on September 11, 1930, pp. 830–​833. Gentile, Giovanni. (1920) “Proemio” [“Preface”] Giornale critico della filosofia italiana. Vol. 1, pp. 1–​6. This volume was published in Messina by Principato. Gentile, Giovanni. (1922/​1923) Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere (System of Logic as Theory of Knowing). Vol. 1 and vol. 2. Bari: Laterza. First edition, Florence: Le Lettere, 1917. Gentile, Giovanni. (1923a) La riforma della dialettica hegeliana (Reform of Hegelian Dialectic). Messina: Principato. First edition, 1913. Gentile, Giovanni. (1923b) Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica. Vol. 1 Pedagogia generale (Summary of Peagogy as Philosophical Science. General Pedagogy). Vol. 2. Didattica (Didactic). Florence: Sansoni, 3rd edition. First edition (1913 vol. 1/​1914 vol. 2), Bari: Laterza. Second edition (1920 vol. 1/​1922 vol. 2); mentioned in footnotes, the fifth edition of vo1.1, 1959. Gentile, Giovanni. (1924) Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (The Theory of Mind as Pure Act). Bari: Laterza, fourth edition. First edition, Florence: Le Lettere, 1916. Second edition, Pisa: Spoerri, 1918; third editions published by Laterza in 1923. Translation in English by Wilton Carr as Theory of Mind as Pure Act, London: Mcmillan, 1922. Gentile, Giovanni. (1930) “Il concetto della natura nel moderno idealismo” (“Concept of Nature in Modern Idealism”), in Atti, second series, 1930, organized in a single volume, Milan, 1931, pp. 250–​262. Reprinted in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xii, 1931, pp. 1–​14 and later also (though in a shorter version) in Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Gentile. Opere filosofiche. Milan: Garzanti, 1991, pp. 830–​833. Gentile, Giovanni. (1937/​1938) “Nota alla recensione di Delio Cantimori, La vita come ricerca” (“A Note to Delio Cantimori’s Review of Life as a Search”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, v, p. 356 and “Lettera al Prof. Ugo Spirito” (“Letter to Professor Ugo Spirito”) in Scienza e filosofia (1950), pp. 297–​305, and Giovanni Gentile (1969), pp. 299–​307. Gentile, Giovanni. (1946). Genesi e struttura della società” (Genesis and Structure of Society), Florence: Sansoni. Published postmously. Translated in English by H. S. Harris and published by Illinois University Press, Urbana, 1960. Gregor, A. James, (1990) “La vita come ricerca: Ugo Spirito and the Concept of Science” (“Life as a Search: Ugo Spirito and the Concept of Science”), in Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Ugo Spirito’s Thought), Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, pp. 411–​418. Hegel, G. W. F. (1969) Enzyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences). Hamburgo: Felix Miener, (orig. 1830). Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor (1947) Dialektic Der Aufklarung (Dialectic of the Enlightenment). Amsterdam: Querido Verlay N.V.

254 

Works Cited

James, William. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890. James, William. (1897) The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York/​London: Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted in Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures on Philosophy. New York/​London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Meliadὸ, Valentina (2008/​2009), “Ugo Spirito il rivoluzionario: dall’attualismo al problematicismo,” (“Ugo Spirito: From Actual Idealism to Problematicism) in Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito xx-​x xi, p.133. Pierce, Charles S. (1901). “Pragmatism,” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Edited by James Mark Baldwin. New York: Macmillan. Prezzolini, Giuseppe. (1909) Benedetto Croce (Benedetto Croce) Naples: Ricciardi. Schiller, Ferdinand C. S. (1909) Études sur l’humanisme (Studies on Humanism) Paris: Felix Alcan. Ugo Spirito used this French edition. Spangler, Oswald. (1918) Decline of the West. Translated by Charles Francis Atkinson. New York, A. A. Knopf. Spiazzi, Raimondo. (1988) “La critica di Ugo Spirito al cristianesimo in La vita come amore,” (“Ugo Spirito’s Critique of Christianity in Life as Love”), in Il Pensiero di Ugo Spirito (Ugo Spirito’s Thought). Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, p. 193–​201. Spirito, Ugo. (1921) Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (Pragmatism in Contemporary Philosophy). Florence: Vallecchi. It contains the translated chapter “L’antinomia non risolta” (“The Unresolved Antinomy”). Spirito, Ugo. (1923) Il nuovo idealismo italiano (The New Italian Idealism). Rome: De Alberti. It contains the translated piece “Verso il nuovo idealismo” (“Towards the New Idealism”). Spirito, Ugo. (1925a) Storia del diritto penale Italiano. Vol. 1. Da Beccaria a Carrara. Vol. 2. Dalle origini della scuola positiva al nuovo idealismo (History of Italian Criminal Law. Vol. 1. From Beccaria to Carrara. Vol. 2. From the Origins of Positivist School to the New Idealism. Rome: De Alberti. Reprinted as Storia del diritto penale italiano. Da Cesare Becccaria ai nostri giorni. (History of Italian Criminal Law from Cesare Beccaria to Present Time) (1932/​1974). Spirito, Ugo. (1925b) “Lo sviluppo del fascismo” (“Development of Fascism”), Educazione politica, 3, n. 7, September, pp. 315–​320. Spirito, Ugo. (1926) “Scienza dell’economia” (“Science of Economics”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vii, n. 3, pp. 286–​300. Spirito, Ugo. (1927) “Vilfredo Pareto,” (“Vilfredo Pareto”), Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica, n. 1, November, pp. 24–​25. Spirito, Ugo. (1929) Il nuovo diritto penale (The New Criminal Law). Venice: La Nuova Italia. Spirito, Ugo. (1930) La critica dell’economia liberale (Critique of Economic Liberalism). Milan: Treves.

Works Cited

255

Spirito, Ugo. (1932a) I fondamenti dell’economia liberale (Foundations of Economic Liberalism). Milan: Treves. Spirito, Ugo. (1932b) “Prime linee di una storia delle dottrine economiche,” (“Outline of a History of Economic Doctrines”), Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica, v, n. 1, January-​February, pp. 12–​28. Spirito, Ugo. (1932c) “Individuo e Stato nell’economia corporativa” (“Individual and State in Corporative Economy”), Atti del secondo convegno di studi sindacali e corporativi, Ferrara, May 5–​8. Rome: Tipografia del Senato, pp. 179–​192. Reprinted in Capitalismo e corporativismo (1934), pp. 3–​15. Spirito, Ugo. (1932d) “Il corporativismo come liberalismo assoluto e socialismo assoluto” (“Corporativism as Absolute Liberalism and Absolute Socialism”), Nuovi Studi di diritto, economia e politica, v, n. 6, November-​December, pp. 285–​298. Reprinted in Capitalismo e corporativismo (1934), pp. 27–​44. Spirito, Ugo. (1932e) “Economia programmatica” (“Programmed Economy”), Nuovi studi di diritto, economia e politica, v, nn. 3-​4-​5, June-​October, pp. 145–​153). Reprinted in Capitalismo e corporativismo (1934), pp. 99–​110. Spirito, Ugo. (1933a) “Attualismo costruttore” (“Constructive Actual Idealism”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xiv, pp. 24–​29. Included in the first (1933) and second edition (1950) of Scienza e filosofia, both published by Sansoni, Florence. For the translation, I used the second edition, pp. 35–​43. Spirito, Ugo. (1933b) “L’economia programmatica corporativa” (“Programmed Corporative Economy”), Nuovi Studi di diritto, economia e politica, vi, n. 3, May-​July, pp. 98–​109. Reprinted in Capitalismo and corporativismo (1934), pp. 113–​127. Spirito, Ugo. (1933c/​1934) Capitalismo e corporativismo (Capitalism and Corporativism). Florence: Sansoni. For the translation, I used the third edition of 1934. Spirito, Ugo. (1937) La vita come ricerca (Life as a Search). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1938) “La vita come ricerca. Lettera a Giovanni Gentile,” (“Life as a Search. Letter to Giovanni Gentile”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vi, pp. 147–​148. Reprinted in Scienza e filosofia (1950), pp. 297–​305 and in Giovanni Gentile (1969), 299–​307. Spirito, Ugo. (1941) La vita come arte (Life as Art). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1949) “La crisi della civiltà” (“Crisis of Civilization”), Congresso nazionale di filosofia (Messina, 24–​28 September, 1948). Messina: D’anna, 1949, pp. 51–​72. Reprinted in Significato del nostro tempo (Florence: Sansoni, 1955), pp. 3–​37. Spirito, Ugo. (1950) Scienza e filosofia (Science and Philosophy). Florence: Sansoni. First edition in 1933. The second edition has an Appendix, “Giovanni Gentile. Dall’identità di scienza e filosofia a La vita come ricerca” (“Giovanni Gentile from the Identity of Science and Philosophy to Life as a Search”), whose third section is dedicated to the heated exchange of opinions between Gentile and Spirito following Delio Cantimori’s review of La vita come ricerca in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana,

256 

Works Cited

v, 1937, p. 356–​370. This book also contains the article “Il concetto di scienza”(“Concept of Science”), pp. 95–​108, which initially appeared as “Scienza,” in Enciclopedia Italiana. Vol. xxxi, 1929–​1936 (Rome: Istituto Giovanni Treccani), pp. 154–​156 and the translated chapter “Attualismo costruttore” (“Constructive Actual Idealism”). Spirito, Ugo. (1953a) La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana (Life as Love: Sunset of Christian Civilization). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1953b) “Il problema della scienza” (“The Scientific Problem”), speech given at the Convegno del centro di Studi filosofici (Congress of Philosophical Studies) held in Gallarate and published in Atti del IX Convegno del Centro di Studi filosofici tra professori universitari a Gallarate. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1954, pp. 40–​42. Spirito, Ugo. (1954) Note sul pensiero di Giovanni Gentile (Notes on Giovanni Gentile’s Thought). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1955) Significato del nostro tempo (Meaning of Our Time). Florence: Sansoni. It contains “La crisi della civiltà” (“Crisis of Civilization”), Congresso nazionale di filosofia (Messina, 24–​28 September, 1948), Messina: D’anna, 1949, p. 51–​72. Spirito, Ugo. (1959) “Dal problematicismo all’onnicentrismo” (“From Problematicism to Omnicentrism”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xxxviii, n. 1, pp. 56–​75. Reprinted in Inizio di una nuova epoca (1961), pp. 257–​287. Spirito, Ugo. (1961a) “L’avvenire della scienza” (“The Future of Science”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xl, n. 1, pp. 1–​14. Reprinted in Inizio di una nuova epoca (1961), pp, 119–​158. Spirito, Ugo. (1961b) Inizio di una nuova epoca (Beginning of a New Era). Florence: Sansoni. It contains “Dal problematicismo all’onnicentrismo” (“From Problemati­ cism to Omnicentrism”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xxxviii, n. 1, pp. 56–​75 and “L’avvenire della scienza” (“The Future of Science”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, xl, n. 1, pp. 1–​14. Spirito, Ugo. (1962) Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese (Russian Communism and Chinese Communism). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1963) Critica della democrazia (Critique of Democracy) (Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1964a) “Significato del nuovo umanesimo” (“Content of the New Humanism”), Nuovo umanesimo (1964), pp. 37–​40. Spirito, Ugo. (1964b) “Critica dell’educazione dell’uomo europeo” (“Critique of the Education of the European Man”), Actes de la VIéme Recontre Internationale. Bolzano, 1962, pp. 153–​155. Reprinted in Nuovo umanesimo (1964), pp. 79–​83. Spirito, Ugo. (1964c) “Cultura per pochi e cultura per tutti” (“Culture for Few and Culture for All”), I problemi di Ulisse, vol. 7, 41 (1961), pp. 21–​24. Reprinted in Nuovo umanesismo (1964), pp. 87–​93. Spirito, Ugo. (1964d) Nuovo umanesimo (New Humanism). Rome: Armando Armando Editore.

Works Cited

257

Spirito, Ugo. (1964e) “La nuova legislazione penale sovietica” (“The New Criminal Legislation in the USSR”), Critica Storica, iii, 6, November 30, pp. 715–​727. Spirito, Ugo. (1965) Il comunismo (Communism). Florence: Sansoni. The third edition was published in 1979. Spirito, Ugo. (1966) Dal mito alla scienza (From Myth to Science). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1969) Giovanni Gentile. This book has an Appendix whose third section is dedicated to the heated exchange of opinions between Gentile and Spirito following Delio Cantimori’s review of La vita come ricerca. It also contains the translated chapter “Giovanni Gentile.” Spirito, Ugo. (1970) Il corporativismo (Florence: Sansoni). Spirito, Ugo. (1971a) Storia della mia ricerca (History of My Search). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1971b) “Fine dell’autocoscienza” (“End of Self-​Awareness”), Giornale cri­ tico della filosofia italiana, L, pp. 14–​35. Reprinted in Storia della mia ricerca (1971), pp. 167–​202. Spirito, Ugo. (1974) Storia del diritto penale italiano da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni (History of Italian Criminal Law from Cesare Beccaria to Present Time). Florence: Sansoni. This edition contains a new “Introduction.” Spirito, Ugo. (1976) Dall’attualismo al problematicismo (From Actual Idealism to Problematicism). Florence: Sansoni. Spirito, Ugo. (1976b) “La fine del comunismo” (“End of Communism”), Il Giornale d’Italia, March 22, p. 3. Reprinted in La fine del comunismo (1978), pp. 42–​46. Spirito, Ugo. (1977a) Memorie di un incosciente (Memoirs of the Twentieth Century). Milan: Rusconi. It contains the translated portion of the chapter “L’incoscienza” (“State of Unawereness”). Spirito, Ugo. (1977b) “Tramonto del comunismo” (“Sunset of Communism”), Il giornale d’Italia, May 13, p. 3. Reprinted in La fine del comunismo (1978), pp. 30–​34. Spirito, Ugo. (1977c) “Nascita e storia delle scienze umane” (“Birth and History of Human Sciences”), Accademia dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienza e di culcultura, 23, pp. 1–​17. Spirito, Ugo. (1977d) Che cosa sarà il futuro (What Will Future Hold). Rome: Cadmo. Spirito, Ugo. (1978a) La fine del comunismo (End of Communism). Rome: Volpe. Spirito, Ugo. (1978b) Vilfredo Pareto (Vilfredo Pareto). Rome: Cadmo. Spirito, Ugo. (1978c/​1979) “Il positivismo non è finito” (“Positivism Persists”), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, i-​i v, pp. 15–​25. Initially it was published in two segments in La voce della scuola libera, December 31, 1978, pp. 3–​5 and February 28, 1979, pp. 5–​7. Uscatescu, George (1990) “Estetica y cultura planetaria en el pensamiento de Ugo Spirito” (“Aesthetics and Planetary Culture in Ugo Spirito’s Thought”), in Il Pensiero di Ugo Spirito, (Ugo Spirito’s Thought). Rome: Istituto della filosofia italiana, pp. 569–​581.

Bibliography

Part One: Books by Ugo Spirito

Spirito, Ugo. Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea [Pragmatism in Contempo­ rary Philosophy]. Florence: Vallecchi, 1921. Spirito, Ugo. Il nuovo idealismo italiano [The New Italian Idealism]. Rome: De Alberti, 1923. Spirito, Ugo. Il pensiero pedagogico di Gaetano Filangieri [Gaetano Filangieri’s Pedagogycal Thought]. Florence: Vallecchi, 1924. Spirito, Ugo. Storia del diritto penale Italiano. Vol. 1. Da Beccaria a Carrara. Vol. 2. Dalle origini della scuola positiva al nuovo idealismo [History of Italian Criminal Law. Vol. 1. From Beccaria to Carrara. Vol. 2. From the Origins of Positivist School to the New Idealism]. Rome: De Alberti, 1925. Reprinted as Storia del diritto penale italiano. Da Cesare Beccaria ai nostri giorni. [History of Italian Criminal Law from Cesare Beccaria to Present Time]. Florence: Sansoni (1932/​1974). Spirito, Ugo. Il nuovo diritto penale [The New Criminal Law]. Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1929. Spirito, Ugo. L’dealismo italiano e i suoi critici [Italian Idealism and Its Critics]. Florence: Le Monnier, 1930. Spirito, Ugo. La critica dell’economia liberale [Critique of Economic Liberalism]. Milan: Treves, 1930. Spirito, Ugo. I fondamenti dell’economia corporativa [Foundations of Economic Corporativism]. Milan: Treves, 1932. Spirito, Ugo. Scienza e filosofia [Science and Philosophy]. Florence: Sansoni, 1933. Reprinted in 1950. Spirito, Ugo. Capitalismo e corporativismo [Capitalism and Corporativism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1933. Reprinted in 1934; as Il corporativismo in 1970. Spirito, Ugo. Il corporativismo nazionalsocialista [National-Socialist Corporativism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1934. Spirito, Ugo. La vita come ricerca [Life as a Search]. Florence: Sansoni, 1937. Spirito, Ugo. Dall’economia liberale al corporativismo. Critica dell’economia liberale [From Economic Liberalism to Corporativism. Critique of Economic Liberalism]. Messina: Principato, 1939. Spirito, Ugo. La vita come arte [Life as Art]. Florence: Sansoni, 1941. Spirito, Ugo. Machiavelli e Guicciardini. [Machiavelli and Guicciardini]. Florence: Sansoni, 1944. Spirito, Ugo. La filosofia del comunismo [Philosophy of Communism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1948. Spirito, Ugo. Il problematicismo [Problematicism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1948.

Bibliography

259

Spirito, Ugo. Scienza e filosofia [Science and Philosophy]. 2nd ed. Florence: Sansoni, 1950. Spirito, Ugo. La vita come amore. Il tramonto della civiltà cristiana [Life as Love: Sunset of Christian Civilization]. Florence: Sansoni, 1953. Reprinted in 1970. Spirito, Ugo. Note sul pensiero di Giovanni Gentile [Notes on Giovanni Gentile’s Thought] Florence: Sansoni, 1954. Spirito, Ugo. Significato del nostro tempo [Meaning of Our Time]. Florence: Sansoni, 1955. Spirito, Ugo. La riforma della scuola [Reform of the School System]. Florence: Sansoni, 1956. Spirito, Ugo. Il pensiero pedagogico del positivismo [Positivism and Pedagogy]. Florence: Sansoni, 1956. Spirito, Ugo. Cristianesimo e comunismo [Christianity and Communism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1956. Spirito, Ugo. Inizio di una nuova epoca [Beginning of a New Era]. Florence: Sansoni, 1961. Spirito, Ugo. Comunismo russo e comunismo cinese [Russian and Chinese Communism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1962. Spirito, Ugo. Critica della democrazia [Critique of Democracy]. Florence: Sansoni, 1964. Spirito, Ugo. Nuovo umanesimo [New Humanism]. Rome: Armando, 1964. Spirito, Ugo. Critica dell’estetica [Critique of Aesthetics]. Florence: Sansoni, 1965. Spirito, Ugo. Il comunismo [Communism]. Florenec: Sansoni, 1965. Spirito, Ugo. Ideale del dialogo o ideale della scienza [Ideal of Dialogue or Ideal of Science]. Rome: Edizione dell’Ateneo, 1966. Spirito, Ugo. Dal mito alla scienza [From Myth to Science]. Florence: Sansoni, 1966. Spirito, Ugo. Giovanni Gentile. [Giovanni Gentile]. Florence: Sansoni, 1969. Spirito, Ugo. Il corporativismo [Corporativism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1970. Spirito, Ugo. Storia della mia ricerca [History of My Search]. Florence: Sansoni, 1971. Spirito, Ugo. Il fallimento della scuola italiana. [Failure of the Italian School System]. Rome: Armando, 1971. Spirito, Ugo. L’Avvenire dei giovani. [The Future of Young People]. Florence: Sansoni, 1972. Spirito, Ugo. Due false scienze. Sociologia e psicanalisi. [Two False Sciences: Sociology and Psychoanalysis]. Rome: Bulzoni, 1973. Spirito, Ugo. Dall’attualismo al problematicismo [From Actual Idealism to Problematicism]. Florence: Sansoni, 1976. Spirito, Ugo. Che cosa sarà il futuro [What Will the Future Hold]. Rome: Cadmo, 1977. Spirito, Ugo. Memorie di un incosciente [Memoirs of the Twentieth Century]. Milan: Rusconi, 1977. Spirito, Ugo. La fine del comunismo [The End of Communism]. Rome: Volpe, 1978. Spirito, Ugo. Vilfredo Pareto [Vilfredo Pareto]. Rome: Cadmo, 1978. Spirito, Ugo. Ho trovato Dio [I Found God]. Rome: Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1989. Published posthumously.

260 Bibliography Spirito, Ugo. Guerra Rivoluzionaria [Revolutionary War]. Rome: Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1989. Published posthumously. Spirito, Ugo. La filosofia della grande civilizzazione [Philosophy of the Great Civilization] Milan: Luni, 2019. Published posthumously.



Part Two: Works with Others

Spirito, Ugo. Brocard, L., et al. L’economia programmatica [Programmed Economy]. Pisa: Scuola di Scienze Corporative della R. Università di Pisa, 1933. Spirito, Ugo. Pirou, G., et al. La crisi del capitalismo e il sistema corporativo [Crisis of Capitalism and the Corporative System]. Pisa: Scuola di Scienze Corporative della R. Università di Pisa, 1933. Spirito, Ugo, and Augusto, del Noce. Tramonto o eclissi dei valori tradizionali? [Sunset or Eclipse of Traditional Values?]. Milan: Rusconi, 1971.



Part Three: Works by Others

Baldassarre, Fausto. “La crisi radicale e la fondazione della società dell’amore” [“Radical Crisis and the Foundation of the Society of Love”]. In Hervé A, Cavallera e Francesco Saverio Festa. Ugo Spirito tra attualismo e postmoderno [Ugo Spirito Between Actual Idealism and Postmodern Philosophy]. Rome: Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 2007, pp. 165–​184. Bellezza, Vito A. Dal problematicismo alla metafisica naturalistica. Saggio sul pensiero di Ugo Spirito [From Problematicism to Naturalist Metaphysics: Essay on Ugo Spirito]. Rome: Bulzoni, 1979. Bontadini, Giovanni. “Ugo Spirito e la dissoluzione del problematicismo” [“Ugo Spirito and the Dissolution of Problematicism”]. Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 3 (1953), pp. 198–​228. Breschi, Danilo. Spirito del novecento. Il secolo di Ugo Spirito dal fascismo alla contestazione [Spirit of the Twentieth Century: Ugo Spirito from Fascism to Rebellion]. Catanzaro: Soveria Mannelli: 2010. Breschi, Danilo. Sognando la rivoluzione [Dreaming About Revolution]. Florence: Mauro Pagliai Editore, 2008. Calabrὸ, Gaetano. “Machiavelli e Guicciardini secondo Ugo Spirito” [“Machiavelli and Guicciardini According to Ugo Spirito”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, vi (1994), pp. 11–​13.

Bibliography

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Calogero, Guido. Una lunga amicizia” [“A Lasting Friendship”]. In AA. VV. L’ipotesi di Ugo Spirito [Hypothesis According to Ugo Spirito]. Rome: Bulzoni, 1973, pp. 9–​35. Cantimori, Delio. “La vita come ricerca” [“Life as a Search”]. Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, v (1937), pp. 356–​370. Cantoni, Remo. “La dittatura dell’idealismo” [“Dictatorship of Idealism”]. Il Politecnico, 38 (1947), pp. 10–​13. Cantoni, Remo. “L’estetismo fatale di Ugo Spirito” [“Ugo Spirito’s Fatal Aestheticism”]. Studi filosofici, 3 (1942), pp. 121–​128. Capizzi, Antonio. “La filosofia della scienza” [“Philosophy of Science”]. In Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988, p. 203–​211. Cappelletti, Vincenzo. “Ricordo di Ugo Spirito” [“Recollection of Ugo Spirito”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, i (1989), pp. 361–​362. Cappelletti, Vincenzo. “Ugo Spirito e l’Enciclopedia Italiana” [“Ugo Spirito and the Italian Encyclopedia”]. In Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988, pp 7–​20. Carlini, Armando. “Per una difesa del problematicismo di Ugo Spirito” [“For a Defense of Ugo Spirito’s Problematicism”]. Il Saggiatore, 2 (1955), pp. 243–​260. Carlini, Armando. “Cristianesimo e problematicismo nel pensiero di Ugo Spirito” [“Christianity and Problematicism in Ugo Spirito’s Thought”]. Responsabilità del sapere, 35–​36 (1953), pp. 323–​360. Carlini, Armando. “Il problematicismo” [‘Problematicism”]. Giornale di metafisica, 5–​6 (1948), pp. 517. Carlini, Armando. “La critica dell’economia liberale” [“Critique of Economic Liberalism”]. Leonardo, 2 (1931), pp. 354–​355. Cavallera, Hervé A. (2000) Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile (Ugo Spirito: The Search for Incontrovertibility). Fornello: Edizioni seam. Cavallera, Hervé A. “L’idea di Roma nel pensiero di Ugo Spirito” [“The Idea of Rome in Ugo Spirito’s Thought”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, iii (1991), pp. 11–​25. Cavallera, Hervé A. L’azione e il dubbio. Pedagogia e metafisica nel pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Action and Doubt. Pedagogy and Metaphysics in Ugo Spirito]. Bologna: Magistero, 1988. Cavallera, Hervé A. “Presente e futuro nel pensiero di Ugo Spirito” [“Present and Future in Ugo Spirito’s Thought”]. Ethos, 3–​4 (1982), pp. 12–​33. Cavallera, Hervé A. Il primato della pedagogia nella formazione del pensiero di Ugo Spirito [“The Preminence of Pedagogy in Ugo Spirito’s Formation]. I problemi della Pedagogia, 3 (1981), p. 261–​281. Cavallera, Hervé A. “La costruzione del futuro nel problematicismo di Ugo Spirito” [“A Vision of the Future in Ugo Spirito’s Problematicism”]. Nuovi studi politici, 3 (1980), pp. 23–​58.

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264 Bibliography Mathieu, Vittorio. “Unità d’ispirazione del pensiero di Ugo Spirito” [“Unity of Inspiration in Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, i (1989), pp. 13–​47. Meliadὸ, Valentina. “Ugo Spirito il rivoluzionario: dall’attualismo al comunismo” [“The Revolutionary Ugo Spirito: from Actual Idealism to Communism”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, xx–​x xi (2009), pp. 95–​134. Miano, Vincenzo. “Verità e libertà [“Truth and Freedom”]. Orientamenti Pedagogici, 7 (1960), pp. 469–​472. Miano, Vincenzo. “Un maestro problematicista: Ugo Spirito” [“Ugo Spirito: A Philoso-​ pher of Problematicism”]. Orientamenti pedagogici, 5 (1958), pp. 51–​73. Mondolfo, Rodolfo. “La filosofia come problematicità e lo storicismo” [“Philosophy as Problematicity and Historicism”]. Dialogo (October 1958), pp. 43–​64. Negri, Antimo. “Saggezza e Cosmo (ricordo di Ugo Spirito)” [“Wisdom and Cosmos: A Recollection of Ugo Spirito”]. I problemi della pedagogia, 4–​5 (1979), pp. 347–​360. Negri, Antimo. G. Gentile. Sviluppi e incidenza dell’attualismo [G. Gentile: The Rise and Development of Actual Idealism]. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1975. Negri, Antimo. Dal corporativismo comunista all’umanesimo scientifico. Itinerario teorico di Ugo Spirito [From Communist Corporativism to Scientific Humanism: The Theoretical Itinerary of Ugo Spirito]. Manduria: Lacaita Editore, 1964. Negri, Antimo. “Descrizione dell’arte e fenomenologia estetica” [“Description of Art and Aesthetic Phenomenology”]. Dialogo, 4 (1959), pp. 52–​73. Nowicki, Andrzej. “Il contributo di Ugo Spirito alla filosofia dell’incontro” [“Ugo Spirito’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Encounter”]. In Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990, pp. 293–​302. Paci, Enzo. “La vita come amore” [“Life as Love”]. Aut-​Aut, 3 (1953), pp. 150–​156. Paci, Enzo. “Spirito e la filosofia dell’esistenza” [“Spirito and the Philosophy of Existence”]. Meridiano di Roma, 32 (1940). Parlato, Giuseppe. “Il convegno italo-​francese di studi corporativi, 1935” [“The Italian-​ French Congress on Corporative Studies, 1935”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, i (1990), 46–​115. Parlato, Giuseppe. “Il carteggio Bottai-​Spirito 1924–​1932” [“Correspondence Between Spirito and Bottai”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, vi (1994), pp. 103–​126. Parlato, Giuseppe. “Ugo Spirito e il sindacalismo fascista (1932–​1942) [“Ugo Spirito and Fascist Unionism (1932–​1942)]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988, pp. 79–​124. Paternὸ, Maria Pia. “Libertà, autorità, indipendenza: ipotesi per un altro giusnaturalismo” [“Freedom, Authority, Independence: Hypothesis for a Different Natural Law”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, xx-​x xi (2008–​2009), pp. 233–​260. Pavesi, Matteo. La contraddizione nel problematicismo di Ugo Spirito. [Contradiction in Ugo Spirito’s Problematicism]. Lulu.com, 2011.

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266 Bibliography Spiazzi, Raimondo. “La critica di Ugo Spirito al cristianesimo ne La vita come amore” [“Critique of Christianity by Ugo Spirito in Life as Love”]. In Il pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1988, pp. 185–​192. Stella, Vittorio. L’aspetto dell’arte. Vita come arte e critica dell’estetica nel pensiero di Ugo Spirito [The Artistic Aspect: Life as Art and Critique of Aesthetics in Ugo Spirito]. Rome: Cadmo Editore, 1976. Stella, Vittorio. Aspetti e tendenze dell’estetica italiana odierna (1945–​1963) [Aspects and Tendencies in Contemporary Italian Aesthetics]. Naples: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1963. Tamassia, Franco. Presentazione dell’opera di Ugo Spirito [Presentation of Ugo Spirito’s Works]. Rome: Fondazione Ugo Spirito, 1986. Tamassia, Franco. “Le idee giuridiche e politiche di Ugo Spirito tra scienza e filosofia” [“Ugo Spirito’s Juridical and Political Ideas Between Science and Philosophy”]. Rivista di studi corporativi, 7 (1979), pp. 1–​33. Truffelli, Matteo. “L’antipolitica, ombra della politica moderna” [“Anti-​Politics: Shadow of Modern Politics”]. Annali della Fondazione Ugo Spirito, xx-​x xi (2008–​2009), pp. 211–​232. Valitutti, Salvatore. “La vita come ricerca di Ugo Spirito” [“Ugo Spirito’s Life as a Search”]. In Il Pensiero di Ugo Spirito [Ugo Spirito’s Thought]. Rome: Istituto della Enciclo­ pedia Italiana, 1990, pp. 531–​547.

Index Absolute  non-​dialectic 119 search for the 120 absolute  a. actual i. 161 and contingent 110 and incontrovertibility 2, 3 and truth 1, 8, 10, 115 can be found in self-​awareness 115 creativity of the act 47 forms of the Spirit in Gentile 43 find the absolute in the particular problem 157 idea in Hegel 38 implicit faith in 120 live the absolute 127 man lost its ability to find the absolute 170 metaphysical need for 19 quest for 11, 13 vs. becoming 119 accountability 228 achievement 140 act(ion)  creative spiritual 57 determining cause of 57 individual and universal responsibility for creative 58 need to consider context of 55 administrators  between capital and labor 74–​75 Adorno, Theodor 7 affirmation  denial and 109 anachronistic tradition 195, 201 Anaxagoras 35 Anglo-​Saxon nations 196 communist parties in 142 anthropology  criminal 15, 16, 18, 54, 224, 235–​236 antinomies 72, 77, 79, 95 a. overcome by programmed economy 102 between science vs. antiscience 206 antinomy 22–​28, 107, 112, 120–​121 God as resolution to 111

in problems of contemporary dialectic 109 of thought and nature 111 antiscience 203–​207, 221 arbitrariness 73, 84–​85, 89, 95 art 116, 122 Augustine of Hippo 36, 158 autobiography  philosophical 10–​17 awareness 17, 33, 35, 42, 109, 175, 244 aw. and self-​awareness are two forms of aw. 115 actual idealism is metaphysical 17 of the absolute 127 philosophy is no longer 50 yearning for self-​awareness 114 banking system 78 banks  capital of shareholders and creditors managed by same administrators 75 becoming xi, 48, 118 unification with being 35 vs. being 24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 110, 119 being xi, xiii evil, pain, and error as the non-being of the being 42 vs. becoming 24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 36, 110, 119 Bolsheviks 79 Bolshevism 62, 80 Bontadini, Gustavo 4 Bottai, Giuseppe 60, 70, 247 bourgeoisie 141–​144 education offered to 198 mentality of 141–​142, 150 Bruno, Giordano 34, 35, 36, 247 Buddhism 146 bureaucracy 86 Nation ruling 87 business community 70 Calogero, Guido xv, 4 capital  fusion of labor and 76 rapprochement between labor and 79

268 Index capitalism 85, 143, 149, 180, 208, 210, 213 neo-​c. 5, 208, 210, 212–​217 neo-​c. and communism sharing the industrial and agricultural products 214 Capitalismo e corporativismo (Spirito) 16, 71, 81, 94 capitalization 85 Castelli, Ferdinando 158, 249 Catholic Church  interpretation of social justice by 141 Catholicism 72 Cavallera, Hervé A 8, 117 certainty  metaphysical 209 China 145–​146, 148–​149, 151–​153 agricultural population 147 attempts to convert C. to Christianity 145 C. culinary tradition 147 engineering education in 152 industrialization in 152 liberation of 1949 150 secular nature of C. culture 146 Christianity 121, 123, 145, 151, 158, 196, 198, 222 as a Mediterranean, extra-​European entity 196 intellectualistic approach of 123 civilization 82, 93 c. that has flourished and disappeared 108 Christian 121 negative effects of science on 193 class(es)  and democracy 186 c. consciousness 142 c. struggle 76, 79, 130, 141, 183, 186, 188 humanisim influence on middle 193 rapid progress and convergence of 199 social c. and communism 209 Coli, Daniela 8 Colletti, Lucio xv, 4 commerce  international 194 Italian 64 commune, Chinese 147–​148 communism 4, 5, 8, 69, 105, 130, 132–​133, 136, 138, 143–​145, 151–​152, 209–​218

affirmation after wwii 214 anti-​ 134 bourgeois nature of 142 Chinese 144–​154 Chinese vs. Russian 146 end of 211–​217 hierarchical 91 Italian 187, 215–​217 limitations of Western 209 Marxist vs. scientific principles 153 materialistic ideal of 97 Russian 133–​144, 214 Russian vs. Western 135, 140–​141 scientific 153–​154 social classes and 209 Spirito’s communism was metaphysical 132 Western 133–​134, 141 community  common goals in 137 competition 84, 91, 95–​96, 99–​100, 140 Comte, Auguste 15, 237 Comunismo russo (Spirito) 133, 144 confession  religious vs. psychoanalytic 227 Confucianism 146, 150 Congress of Ferrara 60, 70, 69, 130 conscience  resides in truth 222 consciousness 223, 228 consensus  among scientists 120, 159, 160, 162, 164 as inspiring principle of social life 183 as proof of knowledge 159 based on the idea of hypothesis 167 dissent in science leads to 180 metaphysics rooted in scientists’ consensus 183 Consiglio Nazionale delle Corporazioni (National Council of Corporations) 77 contrition 223 conviviality 133, 135 corporation  national 92 corporativism 66–​103 anti-​liberal 89 as absolute liberalism 81, 85 as absolute socialism 81, 85

Index c.’s economic reform in Italy 95 hierarchical communism in 91 hierarchy inherent in an integral 97 in international field 92 limiting factors 100 over-​schematization of 76 progressive inclusion of corporations 93 realization of liberalism and socialism 71 role of c. as conciliator 77 vs. nationalism 98 vis-​à-​vis the problem of liberalism 88 credit system 78 crime 55 causes of 56 classical vs. positivist view of 55 criminal law 15, 53, 55 anthropology and 15 classical school of 54–​57 positive school of 54–​57 sociology and 15 Critica dell’economia liberale (Spirito) 22 Critica dell’uomo europeo (Spirito) 195 Croce, Benedetto xii, xvi, xvii, 9, 20, 29, 32, 34, 38, 67, 106, 247, 248 culture 134 c. diversity 199 c. elite 198 c. lacking consciousness of humanity 200 cosmopolitan European 197 duty to enrich 200 East–​West differences of 153 Italian 64 leveled to maximum common denominator 200 Dall’attualismo al problematicismo 10, 66, 104, 123, 126, 155, 217 Dal mito alla scienza (Spirito) 12, 165, 166, 168, 204, 207 Da Vinci Leonardo 157 Del Noce, Augusto 4 democracy 182–​191 antifascism and 182 class struggle and 186 vs. planned economy 187 debtors  individual vs. national 92 delinquency  physical abnormality as source of 224

269 democracy 182 as antifascism 182 as myth 182 based on majority rule 183–​186 collapse of democratic institutions 189 in d. there is dualism between rich and poor 190 made up of workers 183 De Sanctis, Francesco 20 Dessì, Giovanni 4, 7 De Vecchi, Cesare M. 60, 70, 248 Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer/​ Adorno) 7 dialecticism  problematic vs. metaphysical 117, 119 dialogue 135–​136 at base of Russian personality 135 discourse 107 Di Stefano Lino 6, 33 diversity  relativism discovered in 194 dogmatism 118 doubt 107–​108, 112, 115 Cartesian 13 economic freedom 72 economic life  individualistic vs. collectivistic 73 economic theories  ophelimity 15 socialist 72 economics 71–​72, 103 conflicting e. principles 74 e. principles 66 liberal 92 liberal e. literature 86 private enterprise interpretation of 95 economy  corporative 97–​101 dualistic system of programmed national and international liberal 99 e. crises 100 individualistic 72–​73, 91 individualistic vs. corporative 76 national economy 72, 97–​98 need for integration of national and international 99 programmed 93–​103, 187–​188 synthetic 74

270 Index economy (cont.) totalitarian State control of 96 understood in a spiritual sense 102 education 70, 188, 196, 198, 201 combined with technical training 201 backbone of bourgeoisie 192 Chinese 149 European 196–​197 in Gentile’s philosophy 45 Spirito’s education rooted in positivist 235 elites 198, 200 empiricism 158 in Chinese life 152 emulation 140 Engels, Friedrich 149 Enlightenment 67, 141, 149, 151, 204 enterprise  individual 87 entrepreneurs 76, 78 Eraclitus 27 Estate, separation between Third and Fourth 144 Eucharist 223 Europe 5, 7, 80, 104, 145, 208, 212, 213, 231 concept of 195–​197 Eurocommunism 213 Germanic component of 197 European cultures  rooted in Greek and Roman civilization 145 experience  cross-​cultural common 194 Fabro, Cornelio 4 factory, Soviet 138–​139, 152 focal point of workers’ lives 137 management and workers’ common goals 140 family 139, 151 Chinese 148 educates for society 137 fascism/​fascist 59, 61, 63, 65, 76, 80, 92 as solution to antinomies 72 cleansing of fiancheggiatori 62 construed as revolution 71 corporative phase of 89 Fascist Party 59, 61–​62, 70 fascist revolution 71–​72, 80, 90

fight against liberalism 62 Italian f. newspapers 63 Oct. 1922–​Jan. 1925 62 opposition from within f. 63 pre-​corporative phase of 88 revolutionary agenda of 62 revolutionary spirit of 61 similarity to socialists and Bolsheviks 79 true value of f. movement 62 vision of future of 62 Ferri, Enrico 15 fiancheggiatori 62 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 36 firms  characteristics by size 74–​75 relationship with State 79 relationship with workers 79 first principle 57 Foucault, Michel 8 free enterprise  dualistic system of State intervention and 99 free market 96 freedom 82, 84, 87 as arbitrariness 85 enhanced by unification with others 84 Freemasonry, Italian 64 French Revolution 71, 186 Frosini, Vittorio 7 Galbraith, John Kenneth 210 Gentile, Giovanni xi, xii, xiii, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 20, 23, 29–​52, 106, 107, 248 Croce and 2, 29–​34 Spirito and 2, 31–​34 G’s actual idealism 2, 34–​47, 60, 117 G’s anti-​positivism 29, 229–​235 G’s school reform 59 Germany  communist parties in 142 Gioberti, Vincenzo 34, 248 Giovanni Gentile (Spirito) 34 Giovanni Gentile e l’attualismo (Di Stefano) 33 God  Christian believe in the Kingdom of 200 as object 121

Index as within us 222 before the subject 20 existence of 112 knowledge is essence of 111 happiness 111, 121 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 20, 35, 36, 132, 149–​150, 161 tried to achieve a systematic deduction of categories 38 Hegelianism 21, 35, 149 neo 29 Heidegger, Martin xiii, 6, 7, 173 Heraclitus 27, 35 heredity 227 historian  Spirito as historian 10, 241 historicism 72, 103, 232 historicistic spirit 80 history 55 common h. of Europe and Mediterranean countries 196 h. compromise 215–​216 nullification of individual in 57 Horkheimer, Max 7 humanism 151, 195, 198 Chinese 150, 151–​153 Chinese vs. Western 150 foundation of new 193–​195 Gentile’s 193, 234 Italian 117, 151, 192–​193 originated in Mediterranean area 196 science and technology create a new 164, 174 scientific knowledge substituted for 152 Spirito formulates a new 133 humanity  ethical worthiness of 57 potential of 223 social nature of 83 superior h. represented by science 195 transition from metaphysical to scientific conception of 224 hypercriticism  anarchic 141 of modern world 117 hypothetism  theory of 165–​173

271 idealism 37, 38, 57, 118, 161, 221, 223, 238 actual i. 3, 17, 19, 23, 31, 32, 37–​52, 57, 60, 104, 105, 107, 118, 132, 161, 232, 233, 235, 240, 244 constructive actual i. 3, 33, 115 Epicurean 147 Gentile’s new idealism 130 Hegelian 157 Italian 20 neo-​idealism 2, 16, 29, 106, 107 neo-​i. was antiscientific in both Gentile’s and Croce’s philosophy 231 post-​Cartesian 157 post-​Hegelian 141, 158 Spirito’s embracing of actual idealism 31–​34 identification of  law and freedom 90 philosophy and reality 38 science and philosophy 67, 68, 165, 167, 206 the concept of life with a conscious life 51 identity of  philosophy and history 117 philosophy and history of philosophy 48, 49 philosophy and life 33, 48, 49 science and philosophy 2, 33, 34, 156, 160 I fondamenti dell’economia corporativa (Spirito) 22 Il comunismo (Spirito) 209 Il corporativismo (Spirito) 22 Il nuovo diritto penale (Spirito) 16 Il nuovo idealismo italiano (Spirito) 20 Il positivismo non è ancora finito (Spirito) 229 Il pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea (Spirito) 23 Il problema della scienza (Spirito) 156 Il significato del nuovo umanesimo (Spirito) 193 incontrovertibility 13, 14–​15, 17 individual  i.’s reason d’être 88, 90 is absolute in liberalism 89 relationship of i. with State 91 subordination of the i. to the State 89

272 Index individualism  modified 73 not consideration in China 150 See also liberalism 81 sterility of pure 84 individuality 57 Individuo e stato nell’economia corporativa (Spirito) 71 Individuo e Stato nella concezione corporativa (Spirito) 69 industrialization  in China 147 industry, Italian 64 inheritance laws 85 Inizio di una nuova epoca (Spirito) 124, 126, 153, 159, 160, 165 innovation  limits on 101 intellectualism  anti-​ 118 opposite of pragmatism 25 interest  individual 97 interests  conflicting 75–​76, 79 investigation 110 pure 115 Italy 54, 68, 110, 117, 142, 177, 187, 191, 197, 210 communist influence in 142 Fascism in 61–​65 Italian culture 231 problems in 64 James, Henry 22, 23 Judgement  Christian view of 123 nonjudgment 123 justice  Catholic Church interpretation of social 141 Kant, Immanuel 20, 24, 35, 36, 37, 57, 117, 123, 125, 132, 152, 161, 166, 190, 206, 207 knowledge 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 32, 40, 42, 50, 54, 68, 78, 86 actual idealism remained within scientific 17

consensus as a form of 159 in China K. is seen as instrument to reach other goals 153 in St. Augustine Christian k. not reconcilable with science 158 k. of history coincides with k. of the history of philosophy 17 not-​Knowing 121 philosophy and science do not constitute a single form of 37 program based on synthetic 219 scientific k. 155–​181 scientific k. as exaltation of humanism 152 unification of 160 labor 75–​76, 78–​79, 100 Marxist reduction of all work to manual 96 La critica dell’economia liberale (Spirito) 67 La fine del comunismo (Spirito) 1, 210, 211, 214 La riforma della dialettica Hegeliana (Gentile) 39 La vita come amore. Tramonto della civiltàcristiana (Spirito) 4, 113, 121, 125, 131 La vita come arte (Spirito) 113, 115, 124 La vita come ricerca (Spirito) 1, 2, 12, 32, 34, 60 104, 105, 107, 113, 123, 156 L’avvenire della scienza (Spirito)  language  of bourgeoisie vs. proletariat 200 written language /​detached from daily 198 Latin-​America 196 law  criminal 15, 53, 55–​56 L’economia programmatica (Spirito) 93–​94 left-​wing parties 209 Leninism  as Marxism L. 136, 145, 149 liberalism 81, 84–​85, 87–​92, 94–​95, 97–​ 98, 103 absolute 81, 85 abstract sense of 85 anti-​ 81 crisis in l. regime 96

Index denies national boundaries 92 diversity stressed by 97 fascism vs. 62 fight against State in 87 individual is absolute in 89 individualistic 84, 93 international ideology of 92 marriage of socialism and 88 needs of individual are absolute 89 negation of State by 84 opposition to autocratic State 82 political struggle against 63 synonym for individualism 81 liberty 83, 222 life  antinomic dramatic form of 117, 119 as an art 122 dialectical process of 119 mediated and immediate 114–​115 life, mystery of 105, 110 logos 27 abstract 33, 45 abstract l. and concrete 43–​44 God as 111 Lombroso, Cesare 224–​225, 236, 249, 251 Lo sviluppo del fascismo (Spirito) 61, 182 love 109, 112, 122–​123, 130, 147 as nonjudgment 123 Christian and Marxist concept of 122 to overcome problematicism 120 Lyotard, François 8 Machiavelli, Niccolò 161 effectual reality of 161 Machiavellian reality in Stalin 135 management  collective/​state 72 Manifesto  of Anti-​Fascist Intellectuals 248 of Anti-​positivism 230, 231 of Fascist Intellectuals 31, 248 The Communist 213 March on Rome 16, 61, 63, 232 Marcuse, Herbert 7 Marxism 130–​131, 141–​142, 145–​146, 149, 153, 213–​215 as metaphysics of revolution 141 in China 150

273 inability to overcome bourgeois mentality 142 Judeo-​Christian roots 149 Russian 150 Marxism-​Leninism 136, 145, 149 foundation of Chinese education 149 Matteotti, Giacomo 59 meaning  world m. found in life 27 Mediterranean countries 196 melancholy 121 Memorie di un incosciente (Spirito) 1, 11, 53, 70, 130, 239, 243 Memoirs of the Twentieth Century (Spirito) 130 mercantilism  historical anachronism of 95 metaphysics 156–​164, 166–​169, 172 of science vs. Christian 158 of the ‘I’ 223 scientific 167 Mittel Europe 197 Mussolini, Benito 3, 59, 60, 70, 71, 215, 249 myth  European 197 Nation 71, 76, 80, 86–​87, 89, 91, 97–​98, 100 conditions for major economic and spiritual development of 93 economic forces of 98 economic unity of 97 hierarchy of 97 meaning of N. for individual 92 organic system of the economy of 99 State’s abstract knowledge of 86 unable to achieve economic unity in 97 National Council of Corporations 77–​78, 89 National Government 61 nationalism 88, 92, 98 nature  human beings contraposed to 57 needs, human 26 Nixon, Richard M. 214 Note sul pensiero di Giovanni Gentile (Spirito) 4 Nuovi studi di diritto, di economia e politica  16, 17, 19, 32, 33, 55, 60, 68, 130, 244 Nuovo umanesimo (Spirito) 174, 192

274 Index objection  characteristic of thinking 107 objects 121 omnicentrism 126, 168 One  multiplicity and 35 organism  logical structure of 109 otherness  proletarian exclusion of 142 Ottolenghi, Salvatore 16 ownership 70–​72, 75, 85 corporative 77–​78 private 72 Pantaleoni, Maffeo 15, 25, 66, 68, 69, 249 paralogisms 95 Parmenides 27, 35 pedagogy  in Gentile’s philosophy 45 penal law, Italian 54 penitence 223 personality 87–​88, 91, 93, 102 philosophers  Greek and Christian 159 philosophy  anti-​intellectualistic 26 demand for absolute in problems 155, 157 dualism between science and 157 etymological meaning of 159 historiographical criterion of 119 history of 26 intellectualism in 26 life outside sphere of 115 plan 67, 137, 138, 140, 148 in the commune in China 148 in the Soviet Union 218–​219 workers attached to the plan 139 Plato 35 Elaboration of Platonic system 25 Platonism 26, 35 Poincaré, Julius Henry 22 politics  militant 134 Popper, Karl 7 positivism 2, 10, 18–​21, 31, 55, 156–​157, 161, 229–​240 challenged by idealism 20

metaphysics of 20 reaction to 157 realism and 20 transition to idealism from 20 pragmatism 22, 27 as abstract philosophical position 26 as a contradiction of itself 27 as anti-​intellectualism 22, 24, 25, 26 ends at becoming 27 self-​contradiction in 27 skepticism and 27 Pravda (truth) 136 private enterprise 72, 79, 84–​85, 88, 95, 102 vs. corporativism 77 problematicism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 19, 34, 55, 106, 117, 119–​120, 124, 125, 131, 132, 136, 155, 165, 206, 217, 219, 220, 221, 238, 144 as modern criticism 118 as neither idealism nor positivism but attitude of doubting and of waiting 238 aspects of problematicism 116 birth of 104–​107 confronted by argument used against skepticism 118 love to overcome problematicism 120 Marxism as positive negation of 130 science and 104, 156 science overcoming 159 Spirito and 104–​107, 113–​115, 116–​117, 120–​ 121, 123–​126, 238 production 194 Profili di pensatori contemporanei (Di Stefano) 6 program 67, 76, 78, 88, 200, 217, 219 and corporativism 93–​101 flexibility in 101 in Russia 138–​141 organizing a state-​run economy on 93 progress 82, 108 as positive universal cultural manifestation of 193 technological 178, 193 USSR made material progress 210 proletarian consciousness 210 proletariat 131, 141, 144, 146 anti-​p. spirit 209 attempts to claim rights of bourgeoisie 199 benefited from bourgeoisie 142

Index hatred for bourgeoisie 142 Italian 142 property  rights to personal 142 Protagoras 27 Protestant Reformation 158 psychoanalysis 226 impeded by hereditary factors 227 public and private sectors, conflict between 79 punishment 55 redemptive element in p. 54 rationality  affirmation of existence of God and 109 realism 20 idealism vs. 21 reality  harmony of 121 immanence of 20 relativism  conception of relativism within problematicism 124–​161 omnicentrism and 125, 128, 129 science and 177, 194 today’s relativism 126 Renaissance 35, 36, 117, 124, 151, 181, 196 responsibility 54–​55, 206, 222–​223, 226 revolution  Chinese 145–​150 negative, abstract r. stage 82 Russian 138, 146–​147, 208 scientific 226, 228 Soviet 134 rhetoric  Italian r. 63 Roman Law 151 Rome  fascist March on 61, 63, 232, 248, 250 Russia  five-​year plan 132–​133, 138–​139, 143–​146 ideology of 145 R.’s spiritual reality 133 Salandra, Antonio 62 Scandinavian countries  communist parties in 142 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 36 Schiller, Ferdinando C.S 22

275 science 193, 195 antiscience and 203–​207, 211 as incontrovertible truth 160 containing a metaphysics and morality 163–​164 determining value of 194 dubious or unfounded s. conclusions 156 faith in science 156 hypostasis of 15 identity of philosophy and 17 metaphysics and 153–​173 philosophy and 15–​16, 156, 160 religion and philosophy alongside 152 metaphysics of science and t. 198 science and t. started the process of industrialization in China 153  s. and t. created a new vision of space and time 158 s. and t. are creating unity and consensus everywhere 195 s. and t. don’t represent an instrumental value 194 scientific certainties and philosophical certainties 17 technology and 173–​181, 183 transformative effects of 194 Scienza e filosofia (Spirito) 21, 33, 47, 68, 104, 107 self  centrality of 121 Western exaltation of 151 self-​awareness 30, 45, 50, 58, 114, 115, 116, 124, 206, 223–​226, 228, 237, 244, 245 analysis leading from awareness to 115 in ancient, medieval, and modern thought 222 self-​criticism 209 Severino, Emanuele xiv, 173, 250 shareholders 74–​75, 77 Significato del nostro tempo (Spirito) 4 skepticism 21, 49, 81, 129, 137 influenced bourgeoisie 144 problematicism vs. 118 s. vs. absolute 129 s. vs. sure cultural beliefs 194 social climbing, Italian 65 social groups  on level between individual and State 90

276 Index socialism 79–​81, 87–​90, 92, 94–​99, 103 abstract s. of State 87 abstract statist demands of 92 anti-​ 81 attempt to minimize the dualism and relative transcendence of State 94 called corporativism 88 expectation of justice from State by 87 false liberal interpretation of 85 State above individual in 85 socialists 79 society 83, 134, 136, 144, 152 bourgeois 139 economic and non-​economic aspects of 139 formed within family 137 private-​public sector dualism 139 socio-​democratic aspirations 215 sociologism 72 sociology 21, 56–​57, 72 criminal 15, 18, 24, 54, 235, 236 history vs. 57 Comte’s 237 Socrates 222, 224 Sommario di pedagogia (Gentile) 39 soul 224 soul-​body relationship 225 Soviet society  objective truth in 136 Soviet Union 133, 137–​139, 144, 146–​147, 153 opportunity for personal betterment in 139 transformation after revolution 138 Spaventa, Bertrando 20, 35, 36 Spengler, Oswald 8 Spiazzi, Raimondo 4 Spinoza, Baruch 35, 36 Spirit/​spirit 29–​30, 106, 109–​110, 112, 115, 118 Absolute S. 11, 30 nature one with 57 Spirito, Ugo 1–​9, 10–​11, 18–​19, 22, 31–​34, 53–​ 55, 59–​61, 66, 69–​71, 104–​107, 116–​117, 120–​121, 123–​126, 155–​156, 159–​160, 165–​ 168, 173–​174, 182–​183, 192–​193, 203–​206, 221, 229, 235–​237, 239–​240 actual idealism and 31–​34 Chinese trip of 144–​151 communism and 60, 210, 240 Gentile and 31–​34

positivism and 2, 10–​17, 18–​19, 229–​238, 244 Professor of Corporative Studies at the Scuola Normale (Pisa) 70 Soviet Union travels of 133–​144 the historian 241 spiritual life 151 Stalin, Joseph 133, 135, 149 Russian reaction to 135 Starace, Achille 60, 250 State  coordination-​subordination relationship with the other groups 91 immanentistic sense of the reality of 87 management of the economy 86 protective intervention of 96 relationship of s. to nation 86 S. employees’ interest in S. goods 139 solidarity goal of 89 universality of 88 stoicism 27, 28, 35 Storia del diritto penale italiano (Spirito) 16, 22, 54, 55, 230, 236, 237 Storia della mia ricerca (Spirito) 1, 10, 11, 104, 165, 203, 206, 220, 232 as autobiographical book 12–​13 structures  urban and architectural 194 subconscious 226, 228 subjects 121 Switzerland  communist parties in 142 Taoism 146 technology 7, 138, 152, 139, 152, 164, 166, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 183, 192, 193, 194, 199, 212 determining value of 194 metaphysics of science and t. 198 science and t. started the process of industrialization in China 153 s. and t. created a new vision of space and time 158 s. and t. are creating unity and consensus everywhere 195 s. and t. don’t represent an instrumental value 194 transformative effects of 194 Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro (Gentile) 41

277

Index Thales 35 The Decline of the West (Spengler) 8 thinking in act 2, 44 thought  continuity of 20 critical 14 development of 26 historical development of 108 modern thought 116, 117, 118, 160, 161, 204, 222, 223 scientific ideal of modern 118 truth and 26 Togliatti, Palmiro 130, 214, 215, 250 trade unionism 76–​77, 87 Tramonto del comunismo (Spirito) 211 transcendence  attempts to free from 20 theistic 20 transportation 194 trust (economic form) 84 truth 42, 105, 115, 126, 149, 159, 171, 180, 194, 206 absolute 161, 166, 170, 243 common-​sense t. in positivism 18 faith in truth 189 idealism and t. becomes one and the same 4 incontrovertible truth 4, 10 Marxism-​Leninism based on objective 136, 145 objective 136, 149 philosophical t. is not the 161 possession of 4, 32, 33, 167, 168, 205 scientific 161, 162, 166, 169, 170, 191 search for truth 195, 229 spirit as 30 Russian love for 135–​136 subjective t. in pragmatism 24–​26 t. in conscience 222 Ugo Spirito. La ricerca dell’incontrovertibile (Cavallera) 8

Ugo Spirito. Filosofia e rivoluzione (Dessì) 4, 7 unilateral criteria  information or action based on 134 United States  intrinsically tied to England 196 unity (unification) 194 in diversity 10 philosophy as absolute unity of all aspect of reality 114 psychophysical 226 Uscatescu, George 6, 7 USSR 5, 69, 131, 209, 210 Influence on China 149 value 109, 112 values  traditional v. contraposed to scientific metaphysics 167 Varisco, Bernardino 22 Vico, Giambattista 34, 161, 250, 251 Vilella, Giuseppe 220, 224, 249, 251 Vilfredo Pareto (Spirito) 1, 67 Volpicelli, Arnaldo 69, 251 Western World 153, 187, 193, 194 and Russia 133–​144 workers 76, 78–​79, 87, 99–​100 conflicts between owners and 79 not citizens with which State identifies 99 viewed as equivalent to raw material 99 working class  organized against ruling class 85 World War i 61, 62, 64, 65, 197 Italy’s entry into 62 post-​w wi anarchy 64 World War ii 7, 62, 67, 105, 132, 182, 214 Zedong, Mao 131, 132, 149, 154