117 7 20MB
English Pages 208 [216] Year 2023
Peace and Hope in Dark Times
Value Inquiry Book Series Founding Editor Robert Ginsberg Managing Editor J.D. Mininger
volume 385
Philosophy of Peace Editor Danielle Poe, University of Dayton
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/vibs and brill.com/pop
Peace and Hope in Dark Times Edited by
Andrew Fiala and Sahar Heydari Fard
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Cover illustration: Photo by Andrew Fiala (2021). The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at https://catalog.loc.gov lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023002156
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0929-8 436 isbn 978-9 0-0 4-5 4114-6 (hardback) isbn 978-9 0-0 4-5 4159-7 (e-book) Copyright 2023 by Andrew Fiala and Sahar Heydari Fard. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.
Contents 1 Hoping With: an Editorial Introduction 1 Sahar Heydari Fard
PART 1 Peace, Hope, and Truth 2 Peace and Hope in Dark Times 15 Barry Gan 3 Reconstruction after Trump: Restoring Health, Truth, and Democracy 30 Paula Smithka 4 Hope as a Moral Perspective: a Performative Language for Peace Activism in a Dark Time 50 William Gay
PART 2 Authoritarianism and Resistance 5 Authoritarian Ideology and the Saving Power: Finding Hope in Black Lives Matter and the Youth Climate Movement 69 Casey Rentmeester 6 The Dilemma of Domestic Fascism 83 Garret Merriam 7 The Moral Pathway Forward for Resisters in a Genocide 94 Paul E. Wilson 8 Does Civil Resistance Rely on the Justice of the Opposing Regime? 104 Stephen C. S. DiLorenzo
vi Contents
PART 3 Current Issues 9 Fake News in the Information Age: the Challenges It Poses for Peace 117 Dakota Layton 10 Feminism and the Need to Confront White Privilege 131 Danielle Poe 11 Broadening the Category of Moral Injury to Better Grasp the Wrong of Violence 144 Sanjay Lal 12 Josef Pieper’s Defense of St. Thomas Aquinas on Peace 157 Rashad Rehman
PART 4 Practical Applications 13 Building Peace, Repairing Hope: Restorative Mediation, an Effective Approach 173 Negin Tahvildary 14 Spaces for Action: Opportunities for Hope in Dark Times 184 Anna Taft 15 On Giving Birth to Hope in Darkness 195 Andrew Fiala Index 207
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Hoping With: an Editorial Introduction Sahar Heydari Fard Hoping for a better collective future can be a form of relating to others. In fact, in times of crisis, when there is a need for collective power to overcome hardship, an invitation to hope, hoping together, is essential. Social movements are one of the many social mechanisms by which we can hope together. As put by Patrisse Cullors, a founder of the Black Lives Matters movement the goal of constructive movements is to “provide hope and inspiration for collective action, to build collective power, to achieve collective transformation.” Sometimes such transformation is rooted in grief or even rage, but the glue is the hope that it is possible to reach for our visions and dreams together. But hope, collective or otherwise, is a complex phenomenon with different manifestations at different times and contexts. This volume is a collection of reflections about hope and peace in times of crisis and struggle. It is a scholarly result of hoping with others through the shared project of philosophical reflection. The essays that follow here were originally presented at the annual meeting of Concerned Philosophers for Peace. They reflect upon hope while also demonstrating the importance of hoping with (and thinking about hope) in the company of others. 1
The Urgency of Hope
The urgency of rethinking hope and peace in response to present socio-political struggles stems from various sources. But to start the conversation, let me consider one aspect related to many of our most important problems: our newly found and unmatched ability to influence many others and be influenced by them with minimal effort. This ability originates from advancements in technology and our consequent heightened level of connectivity to others, which comes with an unparalleled set of problems and novel opportunities. The list of such problems includes but is not limited to the covid 19 pandemic, growing mistrust in democratic institutions and the associated January 6th insurrections, the widespread presence of misinformation and conspiracy theories, and the complexities of dealing with imminent climate change disaster.
© Sahar Heydari Fard, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_002
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One might ask what any of these problems have to do with our connectivity levels. Well, we can take, for instance, the global spread of covid-19. While it is true that this highly contagious virus requires minimal contact to infect a new person, explaining how fast this virus generated a pandemic involves attention to the ease and frequency of transportation worldwide. Thus controlling the spread of the virus required manipulating the frequency of our social interactions supports the importance of degrees of connectivity. Similarly, when it comes to spreading other socially contagious phenomena, the importance of social connections becomes salient. With the popularity of social media, our virtual social relationships, up to sixth degrees of separation, can shape our exposure to various social disorders. Network theorists analyze the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories (Weatherall & O’Connor, 2019), the increase in hate crimes and radicalization (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010), or even the resistance to public health or environmental interventions (Luke & Stamatakis, 2012) to the topology of our networks and the frequency of our interactions with others. Technology allows us to be more interconnected than ever before, and this is not all bad. Relying on others to solve complex problems is an effective tool for solving complex social issues. One novel factor, however, is the scale at which we can expand our social networks compared to any time before. This access to a much broader network can be confusing and dangerous, but it can also be constructive. Our closest experience with constructively exploiting higher connectivity levels at a mass scale comes from social movements. We have a lot to learn from past and present movements and their ability to use social connections to bring about sustainable change. In the United States, the Black Lives Matter movement and the #Metoo movement exemplify movements that amplified their momentum by exploiting what social media had to offer in terms of social connections. Now the question is, in a world where both insurrections and constructive movements are possible and more likely than ever before, how should we hope for a better future. Let me start the discussion about hope by reflecting on the idiosyncratic challenges of living in the age of pandemics, insurrections, and social movements. My goal is to help us see the importance of social connections to social change in even our conceptual toolbox regarding social transformation. I compare and summarize two discussions about the political value of hope: one in Western modern political thought and the other in non-violent movements and their subsequent philosophy. I follow Michelle Moody-Adams’ conviction that visionaries and intellectuals of constructive social movements ground political hope in collectives rather than in individuals, as Western political
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philosophy tends to do. However, I suggest that the proper interpretation of a collectivist hope requires attention to the people with whom we hope. 2
Hope, Stability, and Individualism
Modern Western political philosophy takes hope to be the pillar of any stable political system. Philosophers like Thomas Hobbes ground political hope in individuals and their self-oriented desire to avoid conflict, violence, and death. They explain the connection between hope and stability by emphasizing individuals’ willingness to maintain a political system that satisfies this basic necessity.1 However, striving for stability does not exhaust the political value of hope. Hope can also destabilize political systems and do so constructively. In fact, the history of various peaceful and non-violent social movements proves the significance of hope in destabilizing oppressive social and political systems. These movements persuade their participants that hoping for a better collective future is a necessary ingredient for progress and growth. Hope in this sense is a relationship of trust that brings and keeps us together. In addition to their focus on the destabilizing capacity of hope, social movements diverge from the Hobbesian approach by grounding hope in collectives rather than individuals. I call this kind of hope “collective.”2 But before discussing collective hope, let me elaborate the sense in which hope for Hobbes is grounded in individuals. For Hobbes and many of his successors, individuals’ hope to avoid violence and conflict is the reason for their willingness to cooperate. Even those like Hume and Spinoza who avoid such a doleful picture of humanity agree that social and political systems are stable only if they satisfy our hope to avoid the state in which trust and cooperation are impossible and everyone has the incentive to use violence. This effort of avoidance, they argued, makes a stable political system, even an oppressive or a tyrannical one, desirable for everyone regardless of their social position or relative benefits they derive from the system. Hobbes characterizes hope as simply individuals’ “expectation of good to come” (Elements, 9.8). In his account, hope is
1 Here I focus on Hobbes, but this description also applies to Hume, Rousseau, and many others. For instance, Hume does not worry too much about a war of all against all. Instead, he believes that coordinating our actions or norms of cooperation can do the work. But even for Hume, there is a worst-case scenario, in which we mis coordinate, and we all want to avoid at all costs. A similar story can be told about Rousseau. 2 I am borrowing this distinction from Michelle Moody-Adams’ recent book Making Space for Justice.
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constitutive of trust which is simply a “passion proceeding from belief of him from whom we expect or hope for good, so free from doubt that upon the same we pursue no other ways” (Elements, 9.9). Hobbes’s approach merits the label of individualism because it relies on individuals shared, yet independently and naturally formed, hopes and fears. Nothing about one’s social position, history, experience, relations, etc. changes such fundamental needs. Moreover, such shared hopes and fears are self- oriented, which is both a virtue and a vice for Hobbesian political philosophy. It is a virtue in the sense that it assumes very little about individuals yet provides a coherent explanation. It is also a vice because it fails to explain how other- oriented or contingently formed shared hopes can be politically important. Hobbes’s understanding of political hope is also reductive. He reduces the hope’s instrumental value to a narrow and static conception of stability. However, most lasting political systems are indeed very fluid and constantly changing. They evolve and adapt to endogenous and exogenous changes and find ways to avoid degeneration in times of crisis. More importantly, such adaptivity sometimes requires destabilizing institutional, political, or cultural practices that hinder flexibility and growth. Social movements are critical social mechanisms through which such adaptivity, growth, and change are possible (see Anderson, 2014; Tilly, 2006). One way these movements implement change is through altering the networks of social relationship and trust (Della Porta & Diani, 2020). They bring together people who were previously separated and merge their networks of cooperation. These movements give people reasons to hope together and see each other as potential sources of political opportunities or likely allies for collective action. It is worth noting that unlike Hobbes’s hypothetical state of nature, constructive social movements often start from a stable, even resilient, oppressive system in need of change. Although these oppressive systems avoid the war of all against all, they do so by exposing a smaller fraction of their population to various harms of oppression.3 As Iris Young argues, such harms involve violence, marginalization, exploitation, powerlessness, and cultural domination4 (Young, 1988). Thus, even though the collapse of such an oppressive system is in no one’s best interest the status quo can be utterly unbearable for the oppressed. An expansive analysis of such stable social systems, one that 3 For a similar discussion see King’s analysis of “obnoxious peace”. 4 She calls this cultural imperialism which indicates the dismissal of the concerns of the oppressed groups in the evolution of cultural practices. It also means that the existing cultural practices and norms that guides the life of the oppressed can be used to further their marginalization and be a tool for further violence.
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matches Hobbes’ conception of stability at the expense of a marginalized group, is Charles Mills depiction of “the racial contract” (1997). Mills provides a historical account, one that allows for various contingencies, that explains the likely emergence of such polity, its resilience, and its stability. In what sense can hope be collective? In an oversimplified model of an oppressive system, one might argue that the oppressed share a collective sense of hope for, say, liberation. This hope is obviously not a shared and natural feature of all involved parties, as Hobbes’s individualistic hope requires. Not only do the oppressors not share the hope for change, but the hopes and desires of the people who bear the burden of oppression are as heterogenous as they are. The facts that different social groups experience oppression differently and that we are simultaneously members of multiple social categories can even further complicate this picture about common hopes (Young, 1988). Also, different levels of access to social and material resources can alter what would be the proper object of hope among the oppressed. For instance, the experience of oppression among women of color is likely to be meaningfully different from the experience of oppression among white women, even controlling for income and education (for similar arguments see Davis, 2003; Khader, 2016; Crenshaw, 1989). This difference in experience implies different struggles as well as different hopes or strategies for change (Combahee River Collective, 1986). Despite the heterogeneity of individuals and their hopes or fears, sustainable forms of social and political progress happen. More importantly, a social movement almost always supports every instance of social moral progress (Crutchfield, 2018).5 If hope is the motivator for such change, as social movements activists and intellectuals suggest, then we need an alternative account of hope that accounts for such heterogeneity and fluidity of hopes and dreams. A famous example of an alternative approach to hope is Martin Luther King’s Jr. distinction between finite and infinite hope when he states, “We must accept finite disappointment but never lose infinite hope.” One way to understand infinite hope, in Moody-Adams’ interpretation, is something that “persists in spite of experiences that might be expected to extinguish hope if we assume (wrongly) that the only kind of hope that makes sense is hope that seeks empirical evidence for reasons to persist” (2022, p. 233).
5 Take for instance the Abolitionist Movement, the Civil Rights Movements, the Women Suffrage Movement, etc.
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Moody-Adams suggests that infinite hope is an instance of collective hope. She emphasizes that the key to understanding collective hope is attention to shared identities, shared stories, and shared goals. We can appeal to people’s capacity to accept a shared social identity; when we encourage the readiness to interpret important episodes and events in light of that identity; and when we assist efforts to articulate shared goals and then to collaborate on collectively imagining what the world might look like if those goals were realized. (p. 233) Moody-Adams is correct in her conviction that when they exist, homogenous shared identities that allow their members to merge their interpretations and coalesce their goals are undeniable engines of social change. However, in the age of social media and the internet, it seems more clear than ever that heterogeneous and fluid identities with members who cross the boundaries of multiple social identities still create change. That is so even when there is no single narrative, unified goal, or homogenous social identity on which we can rely. 3
Collective Hope
The non-individualism of collective hope, or in King’s words, infinite hope, is best understood in contrast to its individualistic alternative. For instance, for Hobbes, the object of political hope is shared among all individuals, while very little might be found constant and shared among the members of any organic social collective. Thus, mapping the object of collective hope to individuals leads to a relation of one to many. It is unclear whether there is any unified object for collective hope or whether there needs to be one for hope to serve its destabilizing function. The same goes for collective goals. Despite the intuitive appeal of ascribing a unified goal to collectives, scholars of social movements suggest that such goals bear no explanatory value in the change process (Gamson, 1989). Also, when unified goals or locally shared hopes are present, they are highly contingent and responsive to circumstances. Finally, collective hope is distinct from its individualistic alternative since it is not formed independently of others. It is formed in virtue of connections with others and is sensitive to the contingencies of those connections. The heterogeneity and fluidity of the content, its contingency, and its interdependence make collective hope indispensable to our analysis of social change. It is impossible to replace collective hope with what happens in individuals’ minds and explain its role in motivating change or destabilizing social
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systems. At least, this is impossible without extensive empirical data about the contingencies of individuals’ desires or decisions at each moment. This irreducibility of collective hope is enough to expel the charge of individualism. However, the irreducibility argument can imply that there is no meaningful connection between the content of individual hopes that can motivate change. Thus, there is a disconnect between individuals and collectives, and there is no unifying prescription about hope such that following it can inspire change. Needless to say, King’s invitation to resist despair does not match this conclusion about collective hope. 4
Hoping That vs. Hoping With
The disconnect between individuals and collectives disappears when we focus on the relation of hope in addition to its object. In other words, although there might be nothing that we all hope for, one thing we can all do to resist despair is to stay and hope together. In a very minimal sense, one stands in a relation of hope with others when one allows the contingencies of their connection to influence the object or target of one’s hope. We alter who we hope with by managing our social interactions or the modes through which we relate to others. By reframing the conceptual space, we can go beyond the dichotomy of individuals’ psychology and groups with their seeming independence from their members. Participants and scholars of social movements support breaking this dichotomy by urging attention to social ties and relationships. For example, Charles Tilly argues that instances of political action such as social protests “often consist[s]not of (just) living breathing whole individuals but of groups, organizations, bundles of social ties, and social sites such as occupations and neighborhoods” (2005, p. 62). Even though King did not frame it this way, the invitation to not surrender infinite hope is more than an urge for a psychological commitment one maintains in isolation. It is also an invitation to maintain our connection with people with whom change is a real possibility. Accepting this invitation results in a change in the broader network of social relations and is a significant step towards change. The power of social movements to destabilize oppressive systems comes from their ability to alter social networks (Heydari Fard, 2022). With the right level of connectivity, even small contributions or acts of disobedience can have significant effects (for example, see Fithian, 2019). We achieve this level of connectivity when we provide access to our networks of trust, cooperation, and communication by associating with various collectives (Diani & Mische, 2015).
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The #Metoo movement exemplifies a case in which changing our social connections destabilized oppressive norms. Arguably, the legal, political, and conceptual reframing of sexual harassment and its harms in the 1970s, although very important, failed to provide a safer space for women in the workplace. But as Catherine MacKinnon (2019), a legal scholar and activist, rightly points out, real change happened only with the collective social intervention of the movement. In harmony with MacKinnon, empirical evidence suggests that women’s willingness to report instances of harassment significantly increased after the #MeToo movement.6 The change that facilitated this was that victims had a new assurance that their network would not retaliate or tolerate retaliation against them. Empirical data also suggest a greater rate of arrests in response to such reports before and after the movement (Levy & Mattsson, 2019). One might argue that ultimately, movements like the #Metoo or Black Lives Matter have a clear goal and an ideal to hope for. However, it is important to note that such conformity in goals is the byproduct of networks of trust and solidarity not vice versa. At best there is a feedback loop between the emerging goals and the birth of solidarity and alliance networks. Over time and in different contexts these goals and the successful strategies to achieve them vary significantly. For instance, in the United States, cities or neighborhoods with the most active and well-connected participants experienced the greatest increase in the use of body cameras after the protests in 2020. Active locations had an additional 15% to 20% decrease in police homicide before and after the Black Lives Matter protests (Campbell, 2021). In fact, the larger and more frequent the protests, the wider the gap between the homicide rates before and after the protests (Campbell, 2021). Another potential concern is that without attention to the content of hope or the goal of movements constructive and destructive movements can be indistinguishable. In other words, the goal for which they are fighting is the most salient difference between Black Lives Matter or #Metoo and the January 6th insurrection. But again, the goal of these movements is not independent of the networks of social relationships in which they are embedded. Black Lives Matter is a response to the fragmentation in the networks of trust, care, and protection. This fragmentation allows for the isolation of people of color to the extent that their experience of violence has had little effect on the rest of society. Thus, the significance of the movement is its ability to reorient our focus and expand our networks of care and protection such that harm to these
6 According to Levy & Mattsson (2019), there was an increase in reporting of sexual crimes by 10% in the first six months after the movement which persisted over time.
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communities would not go unnoticed. Thus, given the democratic ideals of inclusion, this movement’s network structure and its process of expansion are very much positive. The same, however, cannot be said about the January 6th insurrection or its participants’ insistence on exclusion and the supremacy of an already dominant racial group.7 5
Conclusion
Social marginalization and exclusion from networks of support and cooperation is at the heart of many forms of oppression. Thus, constructive social movements are the ones that fill the structural holes and reconnect marginalized individuals and communities to the rest of the society. This reconnecting can involve various hopes, goals, or tactics that might not be shared among those who desire change. In fact, there might be very little to be said about the content of our hopes that would meaningfully result in a sustainable social or political progress. But, one thing that we can do and has a meaningful effect beyond our individual contribution is to be mindful of people with whom we hope for a better future. Without saying much about how we should identify the right people to hope with, in this chapter I argued that making a difference requires attention to the relational aspect of hope. 6
Precis of the Volume
The upcoming chapters are philosophical reflections on the distinctive problems of our time. Each of these chapters is an original paper in response to what came before the insurrectionary riot of January 6th through the lens of peace and non-violence philosophy. The contributors engage with the ideas of hope and peace in light of concrete problems such as the spread of misinformation and fake news, growth of authoritarian ideology, threat and response to genocide, public health crises, and various threats to peace around the world. But conceptually, the following chapters are divided into four parts. The first section of this volume includes original work by eminent American scholars of peace and non-violence. Barry Gan, in Chapter 2, contextualizes the darkness of the present time in a broader historical narrative. He also urges
7 For a more detailed discussion about ways to distinguish movements see Anderson, 2012, 2014 and Heydarifard, 2022.
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us not to forget the role that both we individuals and the United States play in this more comprehensive narrative. In Chapter 3, Paula Smithka centers her analysis on the spread of misinformation and its role in generating political turmoil. She suggests that critical thinking and other seemingly obvious personal habits can bolster our ability to remain close to the truth. In Chapter 4, William Gay elaborates on ways through which the language of hope can promote peace and justice. The second section focuses on ideas of authoritarianism and resistance. Rentmeester, in Chapter 5, brings our attention to polarization in our social networks and its interaction with ideology. He discusses the role of social movements in addressing problems resulting from the ideological fragmentation of society. In Chapter 6, Merriam discusses conflicting interests at the national and global levels for maintaining peace and the resulting dilemmas for resisting authoritarianism. Chapter 7 focuses on moral and pragmatic constraints on the mode and intensity of resistance. Wilson suggests a path forward despite these constraints. In Chapter 8, DiLorenzo examines the interactional aspects of resistance between the authoritarian regimes and the participants of civil-resistance movements. The third section of this volume engages with various current domestic and global issues. In Chapter 9, Layton discusses the threat to peace resulting from the spread of misinformation and fake news. Layton also lays out ways citizens can resist this threat by encouraging epistemic responsibility. In Chapter 10, Poe highlights the relationship between privilege and injustice and the need for introspection and accountability or even hoping for a better future. She emphasizes the heterogeneity of a social category like women in terms of their experiences and struggles. Lal, in Chapter 11, brings back our attention from the social and political back to individuals’ most inner peace and hope. Finally, in Chapter 12, Rehman traces a relational notion of peace in medieval philosophy. The final section of this volume includes reflections from practitioners committed to hope, peace, and non-violence. In Chapter 13, Tahvildary discusses the practical benefits of restorative meditation in building peace and repairing collective hope. In Chapter 14, Taft shares her experience with transnational non-profit organizations in Mali and Ecuador, making space for action and hope. She argues in favor of a procedural and relational approach to creating organic hope in the face of hardship. She draws from Hannah Arendt to discuss the dangers of evaluating human relationships in terms of their utilities, even when they serve a greater good.
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References
Anderson, E. (2014). Social Movements, Experiments in Living, And Moral Progress: Case Studies From Britain’s Abolition of Slavery. The Linday Lecture (pp. 1–24). Lawrence: The University of Kansas. Anderson, E. (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology 26 (2): 163–173. Combahee River Collective. (1986). The Combahee River Collective statement: Black Feminist organizing in the seventies and eighties. Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139–167. Crutchfield, L. (2018). How Change Happens: Why Some Social Movements Succeed While Others Don’t. Wiley. Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. Studies in conflict & terrorism, 33(9), 797–814. Davis, A. (2003). Racism, birth control and reproductive rights. Feminist postcolonial theory: A reader. Feminist Postcolonial Theory: A reader, 353–367. Della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2020). Social Movements: An Introduction. Wiley & Sons Ltd. Diani, M., & Mische, A. (2015). Network Approaches and Social Movements. In D. Della Porta, & M. Diani, The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements. Oxford University Press. Fithian, L. (2019). Shut It Down: Stories from a Fierce, Loving Resistance. Chelsea Green Publishing. Gamson, W. A. (1989). Reflections on The Strategy of Social Protest. In Sociological Forum, 455–467. Heydari Fard, S. (2022). “Strategic Injustice, Dynamic Network Formation, and Social Movements,” Synthese. Hobbes, T. (2019). The elements of law: natural and politic. Routledge. Khader, S. (2016). Do Muslim Women Need Freedom? Traditionalist Feminisms and Transnational Politics. Politics & Gender, 727–753. Luke, D. A., & Stamatakis, K. A. (2012). Systems science methods in public health: dynamics, networks, and agents. Annual Review of Public Health, 33, 357. Mills, C. (1997). The Racial Contract. In The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press. Moody-Adams, M. (2022). Making Space for Justice. In Making Space for Justice. Columbia University Press. Tilly, C. (2005). Identities, boundaries, and social ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
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Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2006). Contentious Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. Young, I. M. (1988). Five Faces of Oppression. Philosophical Forum. Weatherall, J. O., & O’Connor, C. (2019). The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread. Yale University Press.
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Peace and Hope in Dark Times Barry Gan 1
Part One –Dark Times
It’s winter. Where I live, the ground is frozen. The trees are bare. No flowers bloom outdoors. The air is cold. The skies are often gray. My wife and I are hunkered down, sheltering ourselves from the current covid epidemic as much as possible. We are fearful of the virus. We do not venture out much. Summer has faded, autumn has passed, and winter is here. The fields, brown, are now snow covered, leaves have fallen from the trees, and warmth has left the earth. Times appear darker, and such times especially call for reminders about how one might best cultivate nonviolence.1 Donald Trump’s ascendancy to the Presidency and the sycophancy and unquestioning loyalty of so many of his supporters resulted in eroded faith in the election system, eroded faith in the health system, elimination and reduction of many environmental protections, suppressed voter rights, an alteration for at least a generation of the likelihood of a progressive Supreme Court, increased violent expressions of racism and xenophobia, and, as we saw on January 6, 2021, an insurrection led by U.S. citizens and their President against their own government of 231 years. The attack on the Capitol was unimaginable four years earlier. Even people like Senators McConnell and Vice-President Pence, who sided with Trump for four years but resisted him in his final month in office, then faced death threats from irate Americans. Student debt has doubled in the last ten years and is now over $1.6 trillion.2 The disparity of wealth—the gap between rich and poor—is greater than at any time in our history, including the days of the robber barons. While top ceo salaries have increased about 1000% in the last 32 years, since the advent of the Reagan administration, typical worker wages have increased by 12%, roughly 1 This paper was a keynote address at the 2021 Concerned Philosophers for Peace conference by the same title: “Peace and Hope in Dark Times.” Although “the times they are a-changin’,” they are still dark, indeed. 2 Abigail Johnson Hess. “How student debt became a $1.6 trillion crisis.” cnbc. June 12, 2020. . Accessed December 7, 2022.
© Barry Gan, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_003
16 Gan one-hundredth as much.3 Now almost half a million people in the U.S. have died in one year from covid-19 because the U.S. favors, as those on the right say, autonomy over authoritarianism. It might better be called license over life. Times are indeed dark. But these data represent a very distorted view of the total picture.
…
At this very moment we sit in our homes in front of computers and smartphones connected to wireless networks, communicating almost instantaneously across the earth with one another in manners unimaginable fifty years ago. Our shelves are stocked, our stomachs full. Our homes are heated. We await vaccines that within a year may make possible a resumption of normal lives interrupted by a plague that in other times might have decimated millions more people. That we might even think to call these times “dark” smells of privilege. To call these times “dark” is a narrow view. It’s a narrow view because for over two centuries, the U.S. itself has been a major contributor to dark times for others throughout the world. History.com sums up part of this story: From the time Europeans arrived on American shores, the frontier—the edge territory between white man’s civilization and the untamed [sic] natural world—became a shared space of vast, clashing differences that led the U.S. government to authorize over 1,500 wars, attacks and raids on Indians, the most of any country in the world against its Indigenous people. By the close of the Indian Wars in the late 19th century, fewer than 238,000 Indigenous people remained, a sharp decline from the estimated 5 million to 15 million living in North America when Columbus arrived in 1492.4 Furthermore, although the U.S. officially abolished slavery over 150 years ago, it still engages in racist practices that a third of its voting population wishes to deny or rationalize. And while the U.S. bemoans its Vietnam War death count 3 Lawrence Mishel and Julia Wolfe. “ceo compensation has grown 940% since 1978.” Economic Policy Institute August 14, 2019 . Accessed January 16, 2021. 4 Donald L. Fixico. “When Native Americans Were Slaughtered in the Name of ‘Civilization.’” October 25, 2021. History.com. . Accessed on 7 December 2022.
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of roughly 60,000, the death count among the Vietnamese has been estimated at between 1.5 and 3.5 million.5 The death count for the U.S. and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan stands at roughly 17,000 and at one or two hundred for the Gulf War, but the death count for Iraqi and Afghan civilians and fighters in those wars has been estimated in hundreds of thousands,6 and closer to a million if one counts the years of embargo on Iraq during the 1990s. From 1798–2020, the United States used its armed forces abroad in all but twenty- two years of its history.7 If one includes armed force against Native Americans and during the Civil War, then the U.S. used its armed forces against peoples of other nations in every year of its history but three—1947, 1957, and 1961. However, even during those three years the U.S. was busy building and testing nuclear weapons.8 Also, people in the U.S., often with the government backing them, have regularly engaged in still other forms of persecution that violate that country’s own ideals of political freedom. Perhaps the most blatant instance of these persecutions were the McCarthy hearings of the early 1950s, but the practice continues and is longstanding. Former U.S. President Trump regularly verbally attacked several of his political opponents for espousing socialist ideals as they campaigned against him for President. Many on the right-wing side of the political spectrum verbally attack leaders of Black Lives Matter for having Marxist ideals. Charlie Chaplin, Alexander Berkman, and Emma Goldman were all deported in the twentieth century for espousing socialist ideas. Eugene Debs was sent to prison for speaking against war during wartime, an action that remains a crime today under the infamous Espionage Act. Daniel Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act for informing the American people of the deceptions involved in the government perpetrating the Vietnam War. Edward Snowden and Julian Assange are today both fighting extradition to the United States for alleged violations of the Espionage Act, despite their actions having informed the American public of major abuses of power and violations of law by the U.S. government—and despite the fact that Assange isn’t even a 5 “Vietnam War Casualties.” Wikipedia. . Accessed January. 2, 2021. 6 Neta C. Crawford. “Costs of War.” Watson Institute November, 2018. . Accessed January. 2, 2021. 7 Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2020.” . Accessed December. 24, 2020. 8 “List of United States nuclear weapons tests.” . Accessed December. 24, 2020.
18 Gan U.S. citizen or resident! The chair of the Republican Party, Ronna McDaniel, at her recent re-election as chair of the Republican party, continued Donald Trump’s divisive and stridently anti-socialist tone, saying, “I am mad and I’m not going to let socialism rule this country and I’m going to work with every single one of you to make sure we squash it and we take back the House and take back the Senate. So Democrats, get ready, buckle your seatbelts. We’re coming.”9 More warlike rhetoric, just two days after the right-wing assault on the Capitol. In short, to think that we must merely set a new course from these past four years is to miss the larger, more accurate picture: dark times are omnipresent, and the U.S. has been a major player in contributing to dark times for many peoples throughout its violent history. Other nations, of course, have also contributed to darkness and continue to do so; individuals of all stripes also contribute to darkness; and the U.S. has been a refuge for many oppressed peoples throughout its history. But none of this can hide the facts: to borrow some of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s language, the U.S. is and has been one of the leading purveyors of violence and dark times in the world. The point of this long recap of violence in U.S. history is simply to illustrate that dark times are not suddenly upon us, brought to us by one person or one party. They have long been part of the fiber of the U.S. 2
Part Two –Fear and Insecurity
Oddly, for all of this violence that the U.S. has perpetrated, ostensibly in the name of defending itself, advancing democracy, or promoting its economic interests, the U.S. as a nation today feels less secure, perhaps, than ever before. The political divide within the U.S. is greater than at any time in my lifetime. Democrats genuinely believe that Republicans are a threat to the well-being of the country. Republicans feel similarly about the Democrats. The numbers of white supremacists in police forces across the U.S. has risen substantially.10 The number of firearms sold in the U.S. this past year is the greatest annual number
9 10
Paul Steinhauser, “rnc chair Ronna McDaniel reelected to steer gop for another 2 years.” January 8, 2020. . Accessed January 8, 2020. Michael German. “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcemen”. Brennan Center. August 27, 2020 Accessed December. 24, 2020.
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on record.11 Universities and the students within them refuse to allow this speaker or that speaker on campus, fearful that exposure to extreme or merely different ideas will help to perpetuate or increase violence against others. And while many people have become more vocal in their public expressions—an attorney supportive of Trump recently called for a homeland security official either to be drawn and quartered or taken out and shot12—others, like myself, have grown fearful of speaking out. I can’t speak for others, but I have censored myself in local media and on social media for fear of physical reprisals by those who don’t like my ideas. I never felt this fear before. A former student of mine, a right-winger, has purchased more weapons recently, and he has railed against proposed limits on ammunition. He’s not upset because he feels his target practice is threatened. He’s upset because he genuinely believes that his home is threatened by Democrats wanting to move low-income families into his neighborhood. And he speaks as if he’s ready to do something about it, just as protesters in D.C. earlier this month morphed into insurrectionists with zip ties and weapons, sporting t-shirts and hoodies calling for civil war on January 6 and thereafter. Other indicators of U.S. insecurity abound. In 2019, the U.S. through its Special Operations Command (socom) had troops deployed in 141 countries, and funding for socom in the last twenty years has quadrupled to $13 billion annually.13 In most of these instances the reason for these deployments and the nature of these deployments is kept from the general public. For decades the U.S. has by far sold more weapons and spent more money on its military than any other country in the world. Today the U.S. maintains approximately 800 military bases in over seventy countries,14 and it shares with Russia the dubious distinction of possessing about five times as many nuclear weapons each as the rest of the world combined, namely about 5500 –6500 nuclear 11
Lois Beckett. “Americans have bought record 17m guns in year of unrest, analysis finds.” Accessed December. 23, 2020. 12 Luke Barr. “Trump campaign lawyer calls for fired dhs elections security official to be ‘shot.’”abc News. December 1, 2020. < https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-campaign -lawyer-calls-fired-dhs-election-security/story?id=74479123> . Accessed on January 17, 2021. 13 Nick Turse. “US special operations troops are getting busier, and concerns about their behavior have only gotten worse.” TomDispatch. Apr 6, 2020. Accessed December 7, 2022. 14 David Vine.“Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?” Politico. Accessed December. 24, 2020.
20 Gan weapons, each nation with about one-third of them deployed.15 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons became international law on January 22, 2021, binding on all signatories. None of the nuclear powers has yet signed the treaty. So, however powerful the U.S. may think itself, economically or militarily, the U.S. does not feel more secure; it feels less secure. This holds whether one is a Democrat, a Republican, a Trumpist, a conservative or a socialist. The U.S. wallows in fear. In the 1920s it was fear of communism. In the 1930s it was fear of fascism. In the 1950s it was fear of communism, again. Even as the violent crime rate dropped in the 1990s in cities across the nation, it was fear of domestic crime. At that time Congress and President Clinton increased funding for police, allowed police to purchase discarded military hardware, and stiffened penalties for undocumented and documented immigrants, removing from them even the right of habeas corpus.16 The nation began to focus on all forms of abuse—in homes, at school, at work. Advertisements peddling drugs to cure this illness or that disease multiplied on media. Concerns about bullying evolved into workshops, policies, and blame directed at bystanders. The Tea Party and those who underwrote it capitalized on white fears of an African American as President. The defeat of the U.S. in the Vietnam War, the attacks of 9/11, and the nearly two-decade long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan have only punctuated the truth that military power neither secures a nation nor soothes a nation’s fears and insecurities. Military power doesn’t reduce fears and insecurities for several reasons. First, military training creates in soldiers a mindset of “kill or be killed.” It’s a mindset conducive to increasing fears and insecurity. Second, family members of people in the military experience fears and insecurities about whether their family member will be deployed, about whether their family member, if deployed, will die or be injured. Third, a trillion-dollar-per-year defense budget takes vast sums of money away from services and infrastructure that might otherwise improve the health and well-being of the population as a whole. Fourth, even soldiers returning alive from combat often suffer permanent war wounds, physical and psychological, that add to stress, increasing fears and insecurities. Finally, military action in other parts of the world increases animosity among all the groups against whom the military fights, and the deaths, injuries, and 15 16
“World Nuclear Weapon Stockpile.” Ploughshares Fund.. Accessed Dec. 24, 2020. Dara Lind. “The disastrous, forgotten 1996 law that created today’s immigration problem.” April 28, 2016. Vox.com. Accessed on January 17, 2021.
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other harms inflicted by the military increases that animosity exponentially via family members and friends of those afflicted. This animosity helps generate further fears and insecurities among those in the nation responsible for that animosity. So how can a nation soothe its fears and insecurities? 3
Part Three –Addressing Fear and Insecurity through Nonviolence
A little over ten years ago, in an address as President of cpp, I delivered a talk called “Peacemaking.” In that talk I outlined four aspects of nonviolence, of peacemaking and peacekeeping. The first of these is that peace can only be sought by peaceful means. The second is that peaceful means may not entail making anyone worse off. The third is that peacemaking entails prudent planning and crisis prevention. And the fourth is that acting nonviolently requires a creative tension between improving oneself and improving the world. I’ve since identified a fifth aspect, that nonviolent action must be local and replicable. These five aspects of nonviolence are tied together by a theme that I did not address ten years ago, the idea of cultivation. Cultivation is a process that occurs over time. It’s not a single action. It’s not a single achievement. One cultivates one’s musical talents. One cultivates one’s garden. One cultivates friends. One cultivates one’s temperament. Cultivation is a series of actions, carried out steadily and somewhat religiously over time. It is a thread that runs throughout these five aspects of nonviolence. So let’s look at these five features of nonviolence through the lens of cultivation. The first aspect, a point driven home to me years earlier by Robert L. Holmes, is that it is not enough to work toward peace: one must consider the means by which one works toward peace. Gandhi makes the point exceptionally well in a statement that, of all his statements, is my favorite: “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.” I swim daily. I set a goal for myself each day of swimming a set number of strokes, and on some days I get in the pool and try to swim fast to finish up quickly. I don’t enjoy those days as much, and of late I’ve learned to focus more on each stroke, counting without a set number of strokes in mind. I have found that when I do that, I swim more relaxedly, I don’t grow as tired, and I often swim farther. I achieve my goals more often and more readily by focusing on the means, not the end. Richard Taylor, a philosopher with whom many of you are acquainted, once told me that the first thing he did each early morning was to write at least one page of philosophy. He said that at the end of a year
22 Gan he usually had enough written that he could edit it into a book. He focused on the means. Or, in the words of A.J. Muste: “There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.” Or, to quote Muste again, “We cannot have peace if we are only concerned with peace. War is not an accident. It is the logical outcome of a certain way of life. If we want to attack war, we have to attack that way of life.”17 I cultivate my swimming by focusing on the means, not the end. Taylor cultivated his writing in the same way. And Muste is urging us to cultivate our desire for peace in the same way. The second aspect is that nonviolent means must entail not aiming to make anyone worse off. As Socrates says in The Republic, “The injuring of another can be in no case just.”18 As Jesus said, “Do good to them that hate you.”19 We may not justifiably engage in violent preemptive actions. Such actions involve making judgments about decisions that others might make, not about actions that they are now carrying out. Most of us, of course, are not regularly engaged in making people worse off. We are just carrying on with our lives, and we are often surprised to learn that in the course of doing so, we have hurt others. Not making others worse off requires paying attention to what it means to do violence to others, to harm others intentionally or negligently. It means recognizing that when I get in a car and drive somewhere, I should be aware that I am going to be squashing dozens or hundreds of insects. It means that when I purchase meat in a supermarket, I should be aware that I am paying someone to raise and kill animals for me. It means that I should be aware that when I speak quickly, reacting to something I don’t like to hear, I may needlessly antagonize or hurt the person to whom I am responding. Thus, not making others worse off requires, at least in my case, changing some of my habits, and this requires cultivating new habits. What new habits must be cultivated in order not to make others worse off? Specifically, one must be sensitized to what constitutes violence, and even more specifically, what constitutes harm. When we bother to think about it, we are usually pretty adept at determining when we are making someone else worse off. The difficult cases are where we disagree most often. For example, a husband and wife might disagree on whether or not to punish a child in this way or that. The husband may feel that punishment itself makes the child worse off. The wife may feel that punishment will teach the child that there are 17
“A. J. Muste Quotes.” Brainy Quote. . Accessed on March 26, 2021. 18 Plato, The Republic, I, 335e. 19 The New Testament, Matthew 5:44.
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consequences for misbehavior. Similarly, Jews may disagree on whether a two- state solution makes Israel and Palestinians worse off or better off. The settlement of such disputes is extremely complicated; the point, however, is that as long as one is sensitizing oneself to the question of whether one is making people worse off or better off, one is engaged in cultivating peaceful approaches to problem-solving. Sometimes, not making others worse off is as simple as making a decision. Vegetarianism is a decision. It’s a decision I’ve gone back on several times in my life, but in the end it is simply a decision. It’s a decision not to kill animals. Gandhi recognized that it is impossible to live without being violent, but he also recognized that it is possible to minimize the violence we do to a much greater extent than we are usually willing to acknowledge. And our culture is a violent culture because of many actions that we have made, actions that we could cease with a simple decision, a decision that either moves us toward a new habit or helps to fossilize an old habit. The third aspect is that peacemaking entails prudent planning and actions that anticipate crisis situations. Such planning and action minimize or reduce the likelihood of future violence. That is, acting nonviolently means acting for the long term, not relying upon the ability to respond in crises. In my classes I require students to turn in a minimum number of questions and comments on reading assignments. I can tell at the outset of the semester who will be earning an A in the class and who will be doing worse by noting how many questions have been turned in at the end of the first three weeks. The students who earn the lowest grades in class are those who wait until there are only enough classes left to meet the minimum requirement of questions submitted. And then, invariably, some issue arises, and they can’t meet the minimum. Students who wait until the last minute to write papers often end up plagiarizing. The circumstances have become crises, but they could have been addressed earlier and not become a crises. This is a matter of planning, of anticipation, of being willing to invest more early on. Governments, in the name of keeping taxes low, are usually not willing to invest more early on, and then when a crisis arises, the solutions become extreme. These behaviors run contrary to concept of cultivation. An example of careful planning was my own residential street, a brick-paved street that hadn’t been repaired in over one hundred years. The city was eventually going to tear up all the bricks have and pave the street because it had become so bumpy, but before it came to that, I circulated a petition among all residents on the street, lobbied our city council with many neighbors, and worked over a period of about three years to convince the city that it was in the interest of taxpayers to reinvest in the brick-paved street. The city investigated, found grants for which they could apply, and ended up replacing all the
24 Gan sidewalks and water and sewer lines. And now we have a beautiful brick-paved street, with the original bricks, newly planted trees, newly installed sidewalks and driveway aprons, that will last perhaps another one hundred years. People from other neighborhoods in the city have asked me: “Why won’t they do that with my street.” And I tell them to organize and lobby. But they don’t. They don’t cultivate. The fourth aspect was that acting nonviolently requires a creative tension between working on oneself while working to make the world a better place. The demands that the current pandemic have placed upon us have enabled us to spend more time with ourselves, and these demands have made it possible for each of us to develop further the talents that we take pleasure in developing, from physical conditioning to cooking, from reading and writing to sewing and practicing a musical instrument, from organizing social activities online to gardening. In the final analysis, all any of us seeks is a world where each person is free to develop one’s talents to their greatest potential, in ways that may enhance everyone’s life. To the extent that we cultivate our talents, all the while sensitizing ourselves not to engage in behaviors that make others worse off, we improve ourselves and the world. A fifth aspect of nonviolence, one that I did not discuss ten years or so ago, is crucial to nonviolent political action, and that is that actions must be local and replicable. A national movement is not a million-man or -woman march on Washington or Moscow or Cairo. It is a local action that can be replicated nationally. Occupy Wall Street is an example of such an action though it lacked specific goals. What the Republicans have done with local and state legislatures beginning in the late 1970s is a better example. They cultivated leaders locally, nourishing and breeding them for offices higher up over decades. It is also what the Communist Party did in China in the 1920s and 1930s, leading to its culminating revolution in 1949. And it is, to a lesser degree, what the Tea Party began in 2010 that has, unfortunately, morphed into QAnon. But these were local movements that became national. This is what needs to be happening now among progressives. And why do they have to be local movements? Because national movements are too large to be managed nonviolently. When one works locally, focusing nonviolently on means rather than ends, those with whom one disagrees are hard put to be angry or distrustful. I have local acquaintances whose political views are 180 degrees different from mine. They have gone on cruises that feature Rush Limbaugh, really. We used to write op-eds that jabbed at each other at each other. I don’t do that anymore, incidentally. And these folks regard me as a good person, and I think of them the same. We’re not merely polite with one another. We’re friendly toward one another, and we actually like each other. I know their local work, and they know mine. They’ve seen me plan local events and projects such as the re-bricking of my
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street. They’ve seen me with my children, walking the street, attending local festivals. I’ve seen them do the same. I shop in their store. We have mutual friends. We’ve developed trust, something we could not have done if we were both busy with large, national actions. Cultivation, from raising children to teaching students to shaping public policies reduces fear and resentment in others. This reduction is a by-product of the aspects previously discussed. It is an end that is realized through the practice of cultivating a focus on means, on not making others worse off, on addressing problems before they become crises, on developing oneself steadily, and on developing local, replicable movements. To treat others violently, even in minor ways such as belittling another or unkindly criticizing another, builds resentment and, in the case of children, fear as well. These emotions, as Nietzsche well understood, are reactive emotions. They are poisonous, and nonviolent practice helps drain such poisons from our lives. Nonviolence thus nourishes better relationships with others. 4
Part Four –Conclusion
Too often those of us engaged in what we think are nonviolent approaches to political circumstances become bewitched by the tactics of nonviolence and forget about addressing the roots of the problems that nonviolent tactics seek to address. For example, the very title of a prominent online journal on nonviolence—Waging Nonviolence—suggests that nonviolent activists are engaged in a war. And perhaps they are. But too often people become the targets of that war when the true targets of anger, fear, resentment, and hatred are ignored. Nonviolence is not nonviolent if it is directed against people. For example, a recent article by Maria J. Stephan in Waging Nonviolence suggested that we “exploit the fact that the Capitol attack backfired.” She calls for holding people accountable and for expelling one hundred members of Congress for their role in denying the validity of the recent U.S. Presidential election. Then she urges that we address the fear that many of us are feeling. She calls for people to hang banners from bridgeways, bang pots in the streets, and show unity against hatred. And she also calls for long-term solutions to the deep-seated divide in the country.20 20
Maria J. Stephan. “We need to prepare for ongoing insurrectionary violence and address its root causes.” Waging Nonviolence. January 14, 2021. . Accessed on January 20, 2021.
26 Gan Some of these tactics are helpful, to be sure. But it is not just the fear and anger of those on the left that must be addressed. I know that I have fear. I confess that, given my local notoriety among Trump supporters and former Tea Party members, I nowadays make sure that my window shades are closed as soon as it is dark out. But doing more damage is the anger, driven partly by fear, that people on the right and the left direct at each other. The people on the right who invaded the Capitol, and those supportive of such efforts, are also angry and afraid, and one of the best ways to address their anger and fear, that resentment and hatred, is not to punish but repair. So how does a nonviolentist address violent lawbreakers, people who engage in seditious actions and threaten others? Although nonviolence does not countenance penalizing people who have done wrong, dangerous people should be locked up and not allowed access to weapons. And many of the Trumpists are dangerous and angry and have access to weapons. But I want to draw some lines here. We are all entitled to beliefs, and we are all entitled to voice our beliefs. But we are not entitled to act on our beliefs in ways that aim to overturn a government through deliberately harmful means. So while I am not suggesting that we imprison people who have ideas that differ from ours, I am suggesting that society needs to address responsibly but with kindness people who are angry enough and dangerous enough to harm or threaten the well-being of others. That they are angry and dangerous does not warrant their being punished. The U.S. needs to break free of its desire to do violence to others, to make worse off those whom it regards as enemies. So those who do wrong, as Plato said, should be re-educated. Some of this education might entail training in citizenship—civics—and training in critical thinking. The Quakers used to provide prisoners with garden plots, and that’s a good idea. Gardening teaches patience, planning, hope, and care. Some of it should entail training in self- governance. Some of it should entail repairing the infrastructure of this country. In this way, people will learn how to improve themselves by developing their skills; they will learn planning and patience; they will learn greater tolerance of others; they will, in short, learn cultivation, of themselves and others. Many on the right would call this “brainwashing.” It’s not. There is a difference between truth and fiction, and people need to be taught how to distinguish truth from fiction, good evidence from bad, rhetoric from reasoned argument. Such an approach might easily be abused, but what is crucial to such an approach is that it be undertaken with good will, something difficult for many opponents of Trump to muster. Kant famously said that the only intrinsically good thing is a good will, for anything else considered good could be used malevolently. Cultivating these five aspects of nonviolence cannot be
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done jointly without a good will. Jointly, I believe, they are necessary and sufficient conditions for a good will. And a good will drains poison, elevates oneself and others, nourishes better relations with other. Protests in the streets need to stop. They invite provocation. They invite violence. They can’t be controlled. People on social media need to call out verbal attacks on others, in much the same way that Mothers Against Drunk Driving mounted a national movement called out drunk driving and helped make designated drivers part of our culture. We cannot tolerate among ourselves the bashing of those with whom we disagree. We can bash the ideas, civilly, but we need, as U.S. President Joe Biden said in his inaugural address, to end this “uncivil war.” And, as he also said, we need to end it not “by the example of our power but by the power of our example.”21 Adopting an attitude of cultivation entails hope. One can’t plant, can’t plan, can’t practice, can’t cultivate in despair. These very actions require hope, an expectation that something good can come from what one is doing. However, to hope without acting is futile and contributes to despair. But it is especially when times are dark that one must prepare soil, gather seeds, plant them, and create an environment in which the seeds can grow. One trusts without guarantees that nature will take care of the rest, that, during the dormant period, energy is building within those seeds, and that the cycle of nature will continue, enabling the seeds to sprout in the warmer weather and burst forth to provide sustenance and beauty in a world previously dark. The seeds must be planted in children, and we must be doing more to make our schools places that students and their parents value for what they learn there. This hasn’t been the case for much of the population of the United States for a couple of generations. I end with a Chinese allegory from Meng Zi, called, “Ba Miao Zhu Zhang,” or “Pulling Up the Seedlings to Help Them Grow.” A farmer worried that his seedlings were not growing fast enough. So one day, he pulled up the [shoots throughout the field] to make them look taller. Returning home . . . very tired, the farmer told his family what he did. His son ran immediately to the field to find all the [shoots] had withered.22 21 22
Joseph R. Biden “Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.” The White House. Accessed on March 26, 2021. “Patience Helps New Words Grow.” China Daily. November 18, 2006. . Accessed on January 18, 2021.
28 Gan Thus, we must cultivate, especially in dark times, these five aspects of nonviolence. The elimination of fear and resentment, the reduction of the poison in ourselves and in others, will come with time only if we can cultivate— especially in ourselves, by way of example—peace and hope in dark times. These things can’t be hurried.
References
Luke Barr. “Trump campaign lawyer calls for fired dhs elections security official to be ‘shot.’” abc News. December 1, 2020. < https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump -campaign-lawyer-calls-fired-dhs-election-security/story?id=74479123>. Accessed on January 17, 2021. Lois Beckett. “Americans have bought record 17m guns in year of unrest, analysis finds.” The Guardian. October 30, 2020. Accessed December 23, 2020. Joseph R. Biden. “Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.” The White House. . Accessed on March 26, 2021. Neta C. Crawford. “Costs of War.” Watson Institute. November, 2018. . Accessed January 2, 2021. Donald L. Fixico. “When Native Americans Were Slaughtered in the Name of ‘Civilization’.” History.com. October 25, 2021. . Accessed on 7 December 2022. Michael German. “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement”. Brennan Center. August 27, 2020. Accessed December 24, 2020. Abigail Johnson Hess. “How student debt became a $1.6 trillion crisis.” cnbc. June 12, 2020. . Accessed December 7, 2022. Dara Lind. “The disastrous, forgotten 1996 law that created today's immigration problem.” Vox.com. April 28, 2016. Accessed on January 17, 2021. Lawrence Mishel and Julia Wolfe. “ceo compensation has grown 940% since 1978.” Economic Policy Institute. August 14, 2019. . Accessed January 16, 2021. Plato, The Republic, I, 335e.
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Paul Steinhauser. “rnc chair Ronna McDaniel reelected to steer gop for another 2 years.” Fox News. January 8, 2020. . Accessed January 8, 2020. Maria J. Stephan. “We need to prepare for ongoing insurrectionary violence and address its root causes.” Waging Nonviolence. January 14, 2021. . Accessed on January 20, 2021. Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis. “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020.” Congressional Research Service. March 8, 2022. . Accessed December 24, 2020. Nick Turse. “US special operations troops are getting busier, and concerns about their behavior have only gotten worse.” TomDispatch. Apr 6, 2020. . Accessed December 7, 2022. David Vine. “Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?” Politico. July/August 2015. . Accessed Dec. 24, 2020. “Patience Helps New Words Grow.” China Daily. November 18, 2006. . Accessed on January 18, 2021. “World Nuclear Weapon Stockpile.” Ploughshares Fund. . Accessed December 24, 2020. “List of United States nuclear weapons tests.” Wikipedia. . Accessed December 24, 2020. “Vietnam War Casualties.” Wikipedia. . Accessed January 2, 2021. “A. J. Muste Quotes.” Brainy Quote. . Accessed on March 26, 2021.
c hapter 3
Reconstruction after Trump: Restoring Health, Truth, and Democracy Paula Smithka 1 Introduction1 1.1 The Dark 2020 was a “dark year.” We suddenly found ourselves in the midst of a Coronavirus pandemic, a pandemic which we are, sadly, still dealing with. The Coronavirus pandemic has taken its toll on health and life worldwide, but in the United States, our numbers have been higher than they need have been, especially with safe and effective vaccines that were rapidly developed and have been widely available since April 2021 at no cost to vaccine recipients. As of February 1, 2023, there are 102 million cases of covid-19 infections and 1.12 million deaths. The economic turmoil that has been the fallout of the pandemic has been devasting for individuals and small businesses, particularly those in the service industry. And, while the economy has begun to recover, people and industries are, indeed, still suffering, partly as a result of the recent emergence of the Delta and Omicron variants of the Coronavirus. But in addition to dealing with the Coronavirus, we have been combatting other and sometimes deadly viruses; I’m talking about “mind viruses.”2 Mind viruses are complexes of conformity-inducing memes, which are information-bearing units, analogous to genes, which are bearers of genetic information, that hamper a host’s ability to rationally consider other points of view, additional 1 A version of this paper was presented as the Presidential Address at the conference of Concerned Philosophers for Peace, January 30, 2021 whose theme was “Peace and Hope in Dark Times”. Some references to these concepts are retained in this version. 2 This essay employs ideas from three of my previous works: Paula Smithka, “How Mind Viruses and Rhinoceroses Promote Tyranny,” in Civility, Nonviolent Resistance, and the New Struggle for Social Justice, Amin Asfari, ed. (Leiden: Brill/Rodopi, 2020), 181–202, Paula Smithka, “The Lies of the Land: Post-Truth, the Erosion of Democracy, and the Challenge for Positive Peace,” in Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, Sanjay Lal, ed. (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2022), 170-195, and Paula Smithka, “Stoking Anger and Weaponizing Untruth: How Mind Viruses Undermine Social Justice” in The Ethics of Anger, Court D. Lews and Gregory L. Bock, eds. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), 179-197.
© Paula Smithka, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_004
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evidence or counter-evidence to one’s position. They are effective at fostering intolerance and are sometimes manifested in violent behavior. These mind viruses have been fueled by the flagrant disregard for the nature of truth, exhibited within the Trump administration during his tenure as President, but more broadly with the promoting of a false equivalence between truth and lies. We have observed the undermining of facts in the form of science denial and the presentation and defense of so-called “alternative facts.” Mind viruses have spread widely via “fake news” and social media which have stoked anger, fostered and reinforced racism, as evidenced by the brutal police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, among others, and the recent rise in Anti- Asian sentiment in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic. Mind viruses undergird and fortify political polarization. Under the Trump administration, these mind viruses became even more virulent and wide-spread. Crucially, they have contributed to an erosion of the foundational principles of democracy. There is hope now for overcoming the coronavirus with the wide availability of safe and effective vaccines; but what about mind viruses? 1.2 Hope: Coming Back into the Light 2020 was not only a dark year because of the pandemic, it was a year of much discord. Violence erupted in what should have remained peaceful and socially significant Black Lives Matter protests. There was the continued hateful political and personal rhetoric between members of the polarized political parties—each demonizing the other side, which unfortunately, remains ongoing, hampering much of any progress by Congress to do the work of the American people. In that Presidential election year, the political differences between family members and friends turned personal when there should have been a rational discussion of ideas concerning candidates and polices; those divides have persisted through 2021 and 2022, and into 2023. Dangerous hate- speech, lies, and conspiracy theories promulgated on social media and in “fake news,” continued to escalate, spreading mind viruses that culminated in the insurrection on January 6, 2021 when the Capitol building was stormed, leading to destruction of property, injuries, and deaths. And then there were the disputes over wearing masks that sometimes became violent in 2020, taking place in stores and in public ground transportation. When airline travel began to resume in 2021 with travel restrictions due to covid being lifted, those violent disputes over masks were taken to the air, causing injury to several airline attendants. With the pandemic raging, people were suffering and dying (sadly, they continue to do so) and businesses were thrust into economic hardship or ruin (many still are) and at that time, the election outcome was uncertain and mired in hateful and violent rhetoric; hope was a difficult thing to come
32 Smithka by in 2020. But, there were a few bright spots that offered glimmers of hope. There was good science being done to rapidly develop a vaccine against the coronavirus, and it was the 100th year anniversary of the ratification of the 19th amendment—that could be celebrated. Today, however, we have more cause to be hopeful. With the successful development of safe and effective covid- 19 vaccines and their global distribution underway, there is hope for a restoration of health, (despite the problems with vaccine compliance and slower than desirable distribution). And, there was the election and subsequent inauguration of a history-making Biden-Harris administration—history-making because Kamala Harris is the first female Vice-President ever, made possible, in part, because of the passage of the 19th Amendment, and she is also non- white; she’s of African-American and Asian descent. With this administration, the United States has both a President and Vice-President who are sensitive to the need for, and are advocates of, social justice. Whereas Trump and many Republicans in Congress had no moral qualms about lying, in fact, lying was normalized and untruth “weaponized,” with the Biden-Harris administration, there is hope that the distinction between truth and lies may again re-emerge. Recognizing what is true and what is not and “genuine facts” from “alternative facts,” will help to diminish the overt attack on truth that has fostered the spread of mind viruses which have contributed to the undermining of social justice and the democratic principles which are the foundation of our nation. There is, at least now, a path of reconstruction in the wake of the Trump presidency wherein we can find hope for the restoration of health, truth, and democracy. Unfortunately, mind viruses are much more difficult to treat than even a novel Coronavirus because we simply cannot go in the lab and develop a vaccine to be administered as a shot in the arm (or head). So, let’s talk about mind viruses. 2
Mind Viruses and Their Spread
2.1 Mind Viruses What are mind viruses? In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins introduced the notion of memes as cultural information-bearing units. Genes are bearers of genetic information transmitted via replication within populations of organisms. Memes are analogs of genes and are, likewise, information-bearing units which are transmitted from one brain to another. Dawkins characterizes memes in the following way: Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in
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the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process, which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.3 Memes move from brain to brain through various means of communication: in discourse, letters, books, radio, television, emails, social media, etc. When memes are transmitted, those who receive memes have their neurological patterns altered. This has been shown by studies in neuroscience.4 Dawkins quotes his colleague, N.K. Humphrey, a neuropsychologist, on this point: memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically. When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell. And this isn’t just a way of talking—the meme, for, say ‘belief in life after death’ is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual [people] the world over.5 Even though memes are not coded in our dna, what is significant is that they produce biological alterations in brains; they are not merely metaphorical concepts. Just as genes are successful in transmitting their genetic information when they replicate, so also the success of memes depends upon the spread of their information-content. And, like genes that produce phenotypic effects in organisms, memes manifest themselves “phenotypically” in behavior which then can be imitated by others. Jeffrey Gold and Niall Shanks build on Richard Dawkins’ concept of memes as cultural informational units transmitted from mind to mind, in “Mind Viruses and the Importance of Cultural Diversity.”6 They contend that mind viruses are parasitic conformity memeplexes that shut down the host’s ability to rationally consider other points of view, including additional evidence or counter-evidence to one’s position. As a result, mind viruses tend to foster 3 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 192. 4 See for example, Juan D. Delius, “The Nature of Culture,” First published in The Tinbergen Legacy, ed. by M. S. Dawkins, T. R. Halliday and R. Dawkins. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1991); uploaded by the author to https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233820866 and David Eagleman, Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain (New York: Vintage Books, 2011). 5 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192. 6 Jeffrey Gold and Niall Shanks, “Mind Viruses and the Importance of Cultural Diversity,” in Community, Diversity, and Difference: Implications for Peace, eds. Alison Bailey and Paula J. Smithka, (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2002), 187–199.
34 Smithka dogmatism and intolerance and ultimately can be detrimental to the well-being of their hosts, and, as a result of the behavior of a host, detrimental to others as well. What is crucial here, is that mind viruses disrupt a person’s cognitive, intellectual homeostasis. Homeostasis is that relative balance maintained in organisms whereby they are capable of withstanding both internal and external perturbations in order to survive and remain healthy. For example, when the body becomes too hot (an external perturbation), one sweats in order to restore a relative balance. When one catches a cold (an internal perturbation), the immune system responds to rid the body of the virus. If such a relative balance fails to be restored as in the case of some cancers, the organism may die. If one’s cognitive homeostasis is disrupted by mind viruses, one’s ability to think critically and rationally becomes compromised, failing to consider other points of view or evidence, as Gold and Shanks argue. Like genes, conformity memes typically work within “complexes.” Examples of gene-complexes include those groups of genes that work together to produce teeth, claws, digestive systems, etc. in organisms.7 Some examples of meme- complexes (or memeplexes8) are religious and political ideologies.9 But there are culturally harmful conformity memeplexes that engender homogeneous ways of thinking that stifles diversity and fosters intolerance to difference, thereby undermining cultural heterogeneity. Examples of culturally harmful conformity memeplexes include racist, sexist, homophobic, etc. ideologies. Not all memes are deleterious, however. We might really enjoy that catchy tune or really like the recent fashion-or foodie-trend. We might even argue that memes that promote individual liberty, free speech, and tolerance are just the sort of memes that democratic society should espouse and propagate because they provide the foundation for a peaceful, civil society. Thus, not all memeplexes become mind viruses because they don’t disrupt the ability to consider various points of view or new evidence; that is, one’s cognitive homeostasis is not compromised. Granted, that catchy tune that gets stuck in one’s head can definitely perturb cognitive homeostasis (“I just can’t get that song out of my head!”), but eventually other thoughts take over and that relative balance is restored. Nevertheless, the sorts of conformity memeplexes cited above have the potential to become mind viruses. Mind viruses are detrimental to their hosts because they “arrest aspects of cognitive development” leading to a kind of “cognitive paralysis” where the host assumes “infallibility” and fails to “utilize 7 Gold and Shanks, 190. 8 Hokky Situngkir, “On Selfish Memes: Culture as Complex Adaptive System,” Journal of Social Complexity 2, no. 1 (October 2004): 20–32. 9 Gold and Shanks, 190.
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their own powers of judgment and discrimination.”10 Instead, dogmatism- inducing mind viruses disrupt cognitive homeostasis by curtailing free thinking, free speech, and tolerance. This kind of homogenized thinking threatens civility and peaceful co-existence between people who hold differing views. People holding different views are not considered to be “worthy opponents” but are, instead, “enemies.” On a larger scale, homogenized thinking in society produces factions, or tribes, where allegiance is more important than facts or truth, and where divergent views are censored or even silenced sometimes by violent means. So, how do mind viruses spread? 2.2 Spreading Mind Viruses The key to successful meme transmission is repetition. The more a catchy phrase is replayed in the media, the more brains hear that phrase. One might here think of Donald Trump’s “Build the wall!” campaign slogan or his frequent ad hominem mantra against Hillary Clinton: “Crooked Hillary.” Or the repetition of lies, like “the 2020 election was stolen.” The more brains that hear the repeated phrases, the more neural pathways are altered; and the more times the phrases are heard, the more that neural pathway is habituated, so the meme or memeplex spreads successfully. It is the endless repetition of phrases, claims, and lies that not only create new neural pathways in first-time hearers but reinforces those pathways in previous hearers, creating habitual use of those pathways. Neuroscientist David Eagleman calls this “the-illusion-of- truth effect.” Essentially, people tend to believe things which they have heard before, whether or not the claims are true. Eagleman states: [Y]ou are more likely to believe that a statement is true if you have heard it before—whether or not it is actually true. … [Experimenters] found a clear result: if subjects had heard a sentence in previous weeks, they were more likely to now rate it as true, even if they swore they had never heard it before. This is the case even when the experimenter tells the subjects that the sentences they are about to hear are false: despite this, mere exposure to an idea is enough to boost its believability upon later contact. The illusion-of-truth effect highlights the potential danger for people who are repeatedly exposed to the same religious edicts or political slogans.11
10 11
Gold and Shanks, 192–193. Eagleman, 65.
36 Smithka What is significant is that even when the subjects were told that something was false, they were more likely to rate it as true. Media outlets and particularly social media platforms are primary vectors of meme and memeplex transmission. Even when the media outlets are respectable and reliable, they often contribute to the spread of deleterious memes, memeplexes, and ultimately, mind viruses by repeating those memes and memeplexes over and over. Consider Trump’s repeated claims regarding the effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine as a preventative for, and the treatment of, covid-19, even when it was discounted by doctors as causing higher risk of serious heart arrhythmias. An Arizona couple focused on the ‘choloroquine’ part of ‘hydroxychloroquine’ and ingested chloroquine phosphate. The husband died and the wife ended up in critical condition.12 But Trump’s assault on truth helped to create nothing short of a manufactured political epidemic deliberately contributing to the spread of dangerous mind viruses. 2.3 The Attack on Truth President Trump made 30,573 false or misleading claims during his tenure in office, according the Washington Post’s Fact-Checker Blog (final count January 24, 2021).13 Politicians lie and mislead at times; the public knows this and accepts this, but Trump’s lying was unprecedented. Trump knew that his words, as The President, matter, and he used those words to manipulate the citizens of the U.S. into believing “his reality.” Authoritarians tend to “bend reality” in order to demonstrate they have control over truth itself; this is key to effective propaganda. According to historian Timothy Snyder, one step toward tyranny is “the open hostility to verifiable reality [on the part of leaders], which takes the form of presenting inventions and lies as if they were facts.”14 Trump did this—a lot. In his article, “Trump Isn’t Hitler. But the Lying …”, Charles M. Blow characterizes Trump’s strategy as:
12
13 14
Erika Edwards and Vaughn Hillyard, “Man dies after taking chloroquine in an attempt to prevent coronavirus” (March 23, 2020), accessed December 31, 2020, (https://www .nbcnews.com/health/health-news/man-dies-after-ingesting-chloroquine-attempt-prev ent-coronavirus-n1167166). Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo, and Meg Kelly. “Trump’s False or Misleading Claims Total 30,573 Over 4 Years,” Fact-Checker, The Washington Post, accessed January 26, 2021, (Trump’s false or misleading claims total 30,573 over 4 years–The Washington Post). Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017), 66.
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Tell a lie bigger than people think a lie can be, thereby forcing their brains to seek truth in it, or vest some faith in it, even after no proof can be found.15 Trump’s lies were a deliberate strategy for attaining political ends. Blow characterizes this as the “weaponizing of untruth.”16 We clearly saw this in Trump’s repeated claims that the November 3, 2020 election was rigged, despite having no evidence of election fraud. This lie was perpetuated even after courts had dismissed his law suits, growing into the “Big Lie”—that Trump won the election by a landslide and the election had been “stolen” from him. The Trump- era has been an era of post-truth, where emotion and personal belief are more important in shaping public opinion than objective facts. Lee McIntytre characterizes ‘post-truth’ as a time when “truth has been eclipsed—that it is irrelevant.”17 Indeed, truth had been eclipsed—… the truth regarding the election was irrelevant. And the weaponization of this untruth culminated in the storming of the Capitol Building by rioters on January 6, 2021 when Congress was conducting its business of counting the electoral votes to ratify the election of Joe Biden. That day will be another day that will live in infamy. Elections are a sacred institution of democracies; undermining fair elections through the weaponization of untruth is an attack on American democracy itself, as is the inciting of insurrection. But it is through the media, and particularly social media platforms, that facilitate the propagation of untruth and the spreading of mind viruses. Thus, the endless repetition of deleterious memes and memeplexes in the form of lies, etc. together with the promulgation of fake news and unfounded conspiracy theories (like those of QAnon) is an effective, and sometimes dangerous, means of spreading mind viruses which can create fear, stoke anger, promote incivility, and in some virus hosts, lead to linguistic and physical violence. 2.4 Examples of Dangerous Mind Virus Transmission Mind viruses that are deliberately and effectively transmitted via fake news and social media outlets essentially parasitize the brains of their hosts, stoking 15
Charles M. Blow, “Trump Isn’t Hitler. But the Lying …” New York Times (October 19, 2017), accessed October 24, 2017, (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/trump-isnt-hit ler-but-the-lying.html). 16 Blow. 17 Lee McIntyre, Post-Truth. (Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 2018), 5.
38 Smithka anger and fostering discrimination, sometimes even leading to physical violence. Two cases that effectively illustrate that persons on both sides of the political spectrum can be infected with mind viruses are “Pizzagate” (the attack directed against Democrats) and the James Hodgkinson shooting incident (the attack directed against Republicans). Recently, in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, mind viruses have fostered racism against Asians leading to open acts of discrimination and racist assaults on Asians. I address each of these in turn. In Pizzagate, Edgar Welch fired a weapon in the Comet Ping Pong pizza restaurant in Washington, DC, on December 4, 2016. Welch was acting in response to Internet rumors about Democrats harboring child sex slaves at the restaurant in a child-abuse ring allegedly led by Hillary Clinton and her manager, John D. Podesta. Another case of violence was carried out by James Hodgkinson. He shot Steve Scalise, House Majority Whip, on June 14, 2017 while Scalise and others were practicing for a Congressional baseball game, which is an annual charity event at Eugene Simpson Stadium Park in Alexandria, VA. Hodgkinson was a Bernie Sanders supporter who vehemently opposed Trump. Both Welch’s and Hodgkinson’s cognitive homeostasis was disrupted by the grips of dogmatic thinking; I contend they were infected by mind viruses whose phenotypic manifestation were acts of physical violence. The Coronavirus pandemic has provided the context for the stoking of anger by anti-Asian racist and xenophobic mind viruses, manifesting in hate speech and violent attacks against Asians.18 For example, an Asian woman, who was wearing a face mask, was called a “diseased b****” and was assaulted by a man in a New York subway station on February 2, 2020. He hit the woman on the head.19 Cases of linguistic and physical violence against Asians are not restricted to the U.S.; they are happening around the globe. Human Rights
18
Politicians, such as President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have directly or indirectly contributed to the spread of these mind viruses by calling the coronavirus “the China virus” and the “Wuhan virus,” respectively. See Allyson Chiu, “Trump Has No Qualms About Calling Corona Virus ‘the Chinese Virus.’ That’s A Dangerous Attitude, Experts Say,” The Washington Post (March 20, 2020), accessed May 19, 2020, (https://www .washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/20/coronavirus-trump-chinese-virus/) and Craig Graziosi, “Coronavirus: Mike Pompeo Insists G7 Use ‘Wuhan Virus’–But World Officials Refuse,” Independent (March 25, 2020), accessed May 20, 2020, (https://www.independ ent.co.uk/news/coronavirus-g7-wuhan-virus-mike-pompeo-trump-a9426261.html). 19 Holly Yan, Natasha Chen, and Dushyant Naresh. “What’s Spreading Faster than Coronavirus in the US? Racist Assaults and Ignorant Attacks Against Asians,” cnn, (February 20, 2020), accessed May 18, 2020. (https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/us/coro navirus-racist-attacks-against-asian-americans/index.html).
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Watch reports that “assaults, verbal harassment, bullying and discrimination against people of Asian descent” have taken place in Italy, the U.K., and Australia. In Spain, a Chinese-American man was so badly beaten he was in a coma for two days.20 These instances of linguistic and physical violence are behavioral manifestations of hosts infected with racist mind viruses. The racism and anger are stoked, in part, perhaps by fear of covid-19, but they are also fueled by the misinformation promulgated in social media that has increased the virulence and spread of such racist mind viruses. U.N. Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, has characterized the recent anti- Asian discrimination and the verbal and physical attacks on Asians during the coronavirus pandemic as “a virus of hate.” He said that governments need to “act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate.”21 Indeed, something needs to be done against such a mind virus. Our nation now has some hope of “lowering the temperature”22 with the new Biden-Harris administration and with vaccines against covid-19 being distributed. I will say more about this below; however, there is one more layer of dark times under the Trump administration during his four-year tenure to address, and that is the attack on democracy. I have shown how mind viruses can contribute to linguistic and physical violence, but how do they undermine democracy? 3
The Attack on Democracy: the Danger of Mind Viruses
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in their book, How Democracies Die, outline what they call a litmus test for autocrats. Their four key indicators are: 1. Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game. 2. Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents. 3. Toleration or encouragement of violence. 4. Readiness to curtail civil liberties or opponents, including media.23
20 Human Rights Watch, “covid- 19 Fueling Anti- Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide: National Action Plans Needed to Counter Intolerance” (May 12, 2020), accessed May 20, 2020, (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti -asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide). 21 Human Rights Watch. 22 Lauren Feiner, “Read Joe Biden’s First Speech as President-elect,” cnbc, (November 7, 2020), accessed 12/ 29/ 20, (https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/07/read-joe-biden-accepta nce-speech-full-text.html). 23 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, (New York: Crown Publishing, 2018), 23–24.
40 Smithka Associated with these four key indicators are a series of questions. They show that Trump has met all four. Here, I will address the first and the third. With respect to the first indicator—rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game—Levitsky and Ziblatt ask the following question of the presidential candidate: “Do they attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, for example, by refusing to accept credible electoral results?”24 Recall, that Trump cast doubts on the electoral process and raised questions about whether he would accept the results of the election if he were to lose; that was in 2016. In the 2020 Presidential race, Trump claimed wide-spread voter fraud and that the election was rigged. Having lost to Biden, he launched several legal challenges to the election which have been settled or dismissed.25 Then, on January 3, 2021, the Washington Post published a story and audio recording of President Trump’s January 2nd phone call to Brad Raffensperger, the Georgia secretary of state, in which he pressures Raffensperger to “find” enough votes to overturn the presidential election urging him to “recalculate” the results. Trump threatened both Raffensperger and Ryan Germany, the secretary of state’s general counsel, that they would be legally liable if they don’t find thousands of ballots to have been destroyed in an attempt to block investigators—an allegation for which there is no evidence. Bob Bauer, Biden’s campaign lawyer characterized the recording as “[capturing] the whole, disgraceful story about Donald Trump’s assault on American democracy.”26 The third indicator, toleration or encouragement of violence, has two relevant questions asked by Levitsky and Ziblatt of the candidate. They are: “Have they tacitly endorsed violence by their supporters by refusing to unambiguously condemn it and punish it?” and “Have they praised (or refused to condemn) other significant acts of political violence, either in the past or elsewhere in the world?”27 Levitsky and Ziblatt point out that “Partisan violence is often a precursor to democratic breakdown.”28 Trump tolerated violence from supporters and failed to condemn, and instead encouraged, violence against 24 25 26
27 28
Levitsky and Ziblatt, 65. Jake Horton, “US election 2020: What legal challenges remain for Trump?” bbc Reality Check (December 23, 2020), accessed December 31, 2020, (https://www.bbc.com/news /election-us-2020-54724960). Amy Garner, “‘I just want to find 11,780 votes’: In extraordinary hour-long call, Trump pressures Georgia secretary of state to recalculate the vote in his favor,” Washington Post (January 3, 2021), accessed January 3, 2021, (https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit ics/trump-raffensperger-call-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/d45acb92-4dc4-11eb-bda4-615aaef d0555_story.html). Levitsky and Ziblatt, 66. Levitsky and Ziblatt, p. 62.
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protesters by his supporters, and even offered to pay legal fees for a supporter who punched and threatened to kill a protester at a rally in Fayetteville, nc.29 And then there was the inciting of insurrection at the “Stop the Steal” rally on January 6 where the “Big Lie” was repeated, spreading mind viruses, where Trump said, “You’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to be strong.” Then there was Giuliani suggesting “trial by combat” and Donald Trump, Jr. saying, “We’re coming for you” regarding those in Congress who were not “with them.” As a result of the deliberate and continued promulgation of the “Big Lie” and the intentional call for strength and combat at the rally, five people were killed and dozens were injured at the Capitol. The intentional spreading of infectious mind viruses can be dangerous. David Brooks of the New York Times said of Trump that he has “smashed through the behavior standards that once governed public life.”30 But the Trump-era Presidency is over.31 The American people elected a new President, Joe Biden. With a Biden-Harris administration the path to reconstruction of American democracy can begin in the wake of the genuine threats to it by the Trump presidency. 4
The Path of Hope: Reconstruction Begins
4.1 Restoring Heath: Covid-19 Vaccines Advancements in genetics within medical science have allowed the rapid decoding of the virus and new gene techniques such as crispr made possible the creation of a mRNA vaccine. This is one of the best examples of human ingenuity and joint ventures between science and governments. And, we have immigrants to thank for developing vaccines. The vaccines are the result of global cooperation. Hungarian-born scientist Katalin Karikó “is a senior vice president at BioNTech, the company that partnered with Pfizer to make the first covid-19 vaccine to get emergency authorization in the United States. BioNTech is a company based in Germany and led by immigrants from
29
30 31
Michael Finnegan and Noah Bierman, “Trump’s Endorsement of Violence Reaches New Level: He May Pay Legal Fees for Assault Suspect,” Los Angeles Times (March 13, 2016), accessed March 31, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-trump-campaign-prote sts-20160313-story.html. Quoted in Levitsky and Ziblatt, 193. At least for the present. Should Trump be elected again in the future, truth and democracy will again be threatened by lies and authoritarian tendencies.
42 Smithka Turkey.”32 This is an important lesson to be learned: that global crises require cooperation and innovation which transcend national borders. The Biden administration formed a covid-19 task force and has worked on a distribution plan. The U.S. has rejoined the World Health Organization (who), after Trump had pulled the U.S. out of who over the summer of 2020 in the midst of the pandemic. Furthermore, Biden has claimed that his administration will listen to what the scientists have to say, unlike the previous administration, and will follow the recommendations of the cdc. 4.2 Restoring Truth and Diminishing the Virulence of Mind Viruses Lee McIntyre contends that facts have a way of asserting themselves. Perhaps this may be more possible without an American President who averaged more than 50 false or misleading claims per day.33 The distinction between truth and lies must be restored. The repetition of true claims is necessary to undermine the false allegations that continue to be promulgated in the media and especially social media, because people tend to accept what they have heard repeated the most. It is the moral responsibility of the media and politicians to ensure that genuine facts are repeated, to call out the liars, identify fake news and mere propaganda in order to depoliticize facts so that truth can be restored in political discourse. As Senator Daniel Moynihan once said, “You are entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts.”34 The mind viruses that foster anger and hyper-polarization will not disappear easily; sadly, no vaccine can be developed in a laboratory and distributed to combat mind viruses, unlike the Coronavirus. What is needed to help reduce their virulence is a message that emphasizes the need for cooperation and a sense of respect for worthy opponents in order to bring some civility back into society and politics. One socially significant example of civility across the political divide was the Utah gubernatorial race in 2020. Republican Lt. Governor, Spencer Cox, and Democrat, Chris Peterson, political rivals for the office, released a joint ad on October 20, 2020 where Peterson says, “We can debate issues without degrading each other’s character.” Cox follows: “We can disagree without hating each other.” “And win or lose, in Utah, we work together,” Peterson continues. “So let’s show the country that there’s a better 32 33 34
Joel Rose, “If Covid-19 Vaccines Bring an End to the Pandemic, Americans have Immigrants to Thank,” npr, accessed 1/2/2021, (https://www.npr.org/2020/12/18/947638959/if-covid -19-vaccines-bring-an-end-to-the-pandemic-america-has-immigrants-to-thank). Fact-Checker Blog, The Washington Post, accessed December 29, 2020, (https://www.was hingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/?utm_term=.79e776a80ebd). Quoted in McIntyre, 163.
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way,” Cox concludes.35 This ad was a refreshing reminder that opponents can remain respectful and not see each other as “enemies.” 4.3 Restoring Democracy President-elect Joe Biden’s acceptance speech on November 7th, 2020 was an effort to reintroduce civility. Biden stated: It’s time to put away the harsh rhetoric. To lower the temperature. To see each other again. To listen to each other again. To make progress, we must stop treating our opponents as our enemy. We are not enemies. We are Americans.36 The harsh rhetoric together with lies and disinformation spread on social media sites needs to be countered with truth, facts, and messages of civility in an effort to reduce the homogenized “tribal” thinking that fosters the view of the “other” as enemy which too often leads to linguistic violence and sometimes physical violence, as seen in the recent cases of anti-Asian racism in the wake of the pandemic. A significant way of “lowering the temperature” would be to move away from the “politics as warfare” stance, characterized by Newt Gingrich in a speech to young republicans in 1978.37 When he was Speaker of the House (in 1994), the gop adopted a “no compromise” approach, which undermined the notion of worthy opponents in favor of seeing members of the other party as enemies who are immoral or evil. This fueled hyper-polarization of the political parties and helped to create a dysfunctional Congress. Instead, what is needed is a return to civility and mutual toleration in politics in order to restore a democracy that works for the betterment of all Americans. Biden’s inaugural speech reflects this commitment: Today, on this January day, my whole soul is in this: 35
36 37
Maura Hohman and Scott Stump. “Utah politicians who united for ad say Americans are ‘hungry for decency’,” Today, October 20, 2020/Updated October 22, 2020, accessed January 22, 2021, (https://www.today.com/news/utah-candidates-governor-unite-joint-ad -t195476). Lauren Feiner, “Read Joe Biden’s First Speech as President-elect,” cnbc, (November 7, 2020), accessed December 29, 2020, (https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/07/read-joe-biden -acceptance-speech-full-text.html). Newt Gingrich, “1978 Speech by Gingrich,” Frontline, pbs, accessed March 31, 2019, (https:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newt/newt78speech.html).
44 Smithka Bringing America together. Uniting our people. And uniting our nation. I ask every American to join me in this cause. Uniting to fight the common foes we face: Anger, resentment, hatred. Extremism, lawlessness, violence. Going on, he suggested that we can “right wrongs” and “deliver racial justice.” Some wrongs, like slavery, can never be righted. However, efforts to diminish institutionalized sexism and racism can be taken, as seen with the ratification of the 19th Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Nevertheless, with the Supreme Court’s invalidating key parts of the Voting Rights Act in June 2013 where government oversight was lifted on nine states where discrimination had been prevalent, as in the slave-holding states in the south, as well as several municipalities and counties in other states,38 has made possible the recent assault on voting rights by state legislatures restricting access to voting. The Brennan Center for Justice in a June 2021 update to their Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021 report that: Between January 1 and December 7, at least 19 states passed 34 laws restricting access to voting. More than 440 bills with provisions that restrict voting access have been introduced in 49 states in the 2021 legislative sessions. These numbers are extraordinary: state legislatures enacted far more restrictive voting laws in 2021 than in any year since the Brennan Center began tracking voting legislation in 2011. More than a third of all restrictive voting laws enacted since then were passed this year.39 These voting laws unduly affect voters of color.40 To counter these restrictive new laws, the Biden administration with Democrats have introduced The Voting Rights Bill, however, that bill is being met with stiff partisan resistance 38 39 40
Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Invalidates Key Parts of the Voting Rights Act,” New York Times (June 26, 2013), accessed January 13, 2022. (https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26 /us/supreme-court-ruling.html). Brennan Center for Justice, “Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021,” accessed January 13, 2022, (https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roun dup-december-2021). Brandon Tensley, “How Republicans and scotus Are Shrinking the Power of Voters of Color,” cnn (July 2, 2021), accessed January 13, 2022. (https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/22 /politics/voter-suppression-race-deconstructed-newsletter/index.html).
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by Republicans, and even a few Democrats will not support the bill. The political hyperpolarization remains firmly entrenched in Congress. The recent attempts to change the rules regarding the filibuster in the Senate in order to aid in getting the bill passed has brought criticisms of Biden’s claims that he will work to unite America; instead, the support for changing the rules is being called divisive. And, indeed, Biden has historically supported the filibuster in the Senate. So, changing the rules is “reasonable” when one’s own party is in power; but this is not new in politics. However, it doesn’t help to diminish the polarization in Congress, or as Senator Kyrsten Sinema called it, “the disease of division.”41 In addition to these voting rights issues for “delivering racial justice,” extremist groups remain active on social media and the “Big Lie” remains a popular meme that is believed by too many. In fact, according to a Yahoo News/YouGov poll of 1,552 U.S. adults, from July 30 to August 2, found that 66 percent of Republicans continue to insist that “the election was rigged and stolen from Trump,” while just 18 percent believe “Joe Biden won fair and square.” Twenty- eight percent of independent voters also said they think Trump was the rightful winner of the 2020 election, as did a small 3 percent of Democrats.42 The “Big Lie” is part of a virulent mind virus that has infected far too many hosts and is undercutting the democratic values of America by casting doubt on the integrity of elections, which are at the core of American democracy, despite evidence to the contrary that the 2020 election was one of the most secure elections in history.43 Overcoming the polarization and finding “vaccines” to battle mind viruses won’t be an easy task for the Biden-Harris administration or for Americans more generally. And, sadly, it won’t be nearly as speedy as finding a vaccine for covid-19, but at least in the wake of the Trump administration, reconstruction can begin to take place.
41
42
43
Rebecca Shabad and Sahil Kapur, “Biden Voices Uncertainty About Passing Voting Rights Bills After Meeting with Democrats,” nbc News (January 13, 2022), accessed January 13, 2022. (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/biden-make-direct-appeal-senate -democrats-pass-voting-rights-legislation-n1287407). Caitlin Dickson, “Poll: Two-thirds of Republicans Still Think the 2020 Election Was Rigged,” Yahoo! News (August 4, 2021), accessed October 27, 2021, (https://news.yahoo .com/poll-two-thirds-of-republicans-still-think-the-2020-election-was-rigged-165934 695.html). The Brennan Center for Justice, “It’s Official: The Election Was Secure,” (December 11, 2020), accessed January 13, 2022 (https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/resea rch-reports/its-official-election-was-secure).
46 Smithka 5
Conclusion
The path of reconstruction will begin to provide a restoration of health in the administering and distribution of a covid-19 vaccine, though people must get vaccinated. Although it will be a difficult path, the Biden-Harris administration will help to begin the process of restoring truth to the claims made by the person holding the Office of the President and, with “genuine” news being repeated rather than “alternative facts,” about politics and vaccines, hopefully there will be some attenuation in the spread and virulence of mind viruses. Finally, and crucially, the Biden-Harris administration will help to begin the process of restoring the fundamental principles of American democracy and move away from authoritarian tendencies. But that administration is only one piece of the restoration process. Members of Congress need to realize or recall that they are the gatekeepers of democracy. Levitsky and Ziblatt contend that “Democratic institutions depend crucially on the willingness of governing parties to defend them—even against their own leaders.”44 No such strong defense had been given by the Republican party when Trump was President, but neither has there been one since. Liz Cheney has been the exception; she has stood up against the “Big Lie” and her gop colleagues who have attempted to “whitewash” the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. The Republican party needs to reclaim its conservative principles and relinquish its status as “the Party of Trump” if it wants to uphold democratic principles. But we are beginning to come back into the light from dark times. In the concluding words of Amanda Gorman: When day comes, we step out of the shade aflame and unafraid. The new dawn blooms as we free it. For there is always light. If only we’re brave enough to see it. If only we’re brave enough to be it.45 Amanda Gorman’s words are a call to all of us to be brave enough to see and identify the untruths, conspiracy theories, and authoritarian tendencies that constitute mind viruses and foster their infectious spread of intolerance and hate, which can lead to linguistic and physical violence by hosts infected with them. Her words are also a call for us to be brave enough to be a part of the “front line workers” in the attempt to “inoculate” others against mind viruses, 44 45
Levitsky & Ziblatt, 188. Amanda Gorman, “The Hill We Climb,” Inaugural Poem, (January 20, 2021), accessed January 22, 2021. (https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/20/amanda-gormans-inaugural-poem -the-hill-we-climb-full-text.html).
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by countering untruths with truths and “alternative facts” with genuine facts. This can be difficult and sometimes even dangerous for those who undertake this task, as is fighting the effects of covid-19 infections for those front-line workers in hospitals. Yet, “step[ping] out of the shade aflame and unafraid” is what is necessary for the path of hope and reconstruction, restoring health, truth, and democracy, as we begin to emerge from dark times.
Bibliography
Blow, Charles M. “Trump Isn’t Hitler. But the Lying …” New York Times, October 19, 2017. Accessed October 24, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/trump -isnt -hitler-but-the-lying.html. The Brennan Center for Justice, “It’s Official: The Election Was Secure.” December 11, 2020. Accessed January 13, 2022. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/resea rch-reports/its-official-election-was-secure. The Brennan Center for Justice. “Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021.” Accessed January 13, 2022. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/vot ing-laws-roundup-december-2021. Chiu, Allyson. “Trump Has No Qualms About Calling Corona Virus ‘the Chinese Virus.’ That’s A Dangerous Attitude, Experts Say.” The Washington Post. March 20, 2020. Accessed May 19, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/20/coro navirus-trump-chinese-virus/. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Delius, Juan D. “The Nature of Culture.” In The Tinbergen Legacy, edited by M.S. Dawkins, T.R. Halliday and R. Dawkins. London: Chapman & Hall, 1991. Uploaded by the author to researchgate.net. Accessed July 11, 2017. https://www.researchg ate.net/ publication/233820866. Dickson, Caitlin. “Poll: Two-thirds of Republicans Still Think the 2020 Election Was Rigged.” Yahoo! News. August 4, 2021. Accessed October 27, 2021. https://news .yahoo.com/poll-two-thirds-of-republicans-still-think-the-2020-election-was-rig ged-165934695.html. Eagleman, David. Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain. New York: Vintage Books, 2011. Edwards, Erika and Vaughn Hillyard, “Man Dies after Taking Chloroquine in an Attempt to Prevent Coronavirus.” nbc News. March 23, 2020. Accessed December 31, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/man-dies-after-ingesting -chloroquine-attempt-prevent-coronavirus-n1167166. Fact-Checker Blog. The Washington Post. Accessed December 29, 2020. https://www .was h ing tonp o st . com / graph i cs / polit i cs / trump - cla i ms - datab a se / ?utm _ t e rm =.79e776a80ebd.
48 Smithka Feiner, Lauren. “Read Joe Biden’s First Speech as President-Elect.” cnbc. November 7, 2020. Accessed 12/29/20, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/07/read-joe-biden-acc eptance-speech-full-text.html. Finnegan, Michael and Noah Bierman. “Trump’s Endorsement of Violence Reaches New Level: He May Pay Legal Fees for Assault Suspect.” Los Angeles Times. March 13, 2016. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-trump -campaign-protests-20160313-story.html. Garner, Amy. “‘I Just Want to Find 11,780 Votes’: In Extraordinary Hour-Long Call, Trump Pressures Georgia Secretary of State to Recalculate the Vote in his Favor.” Washington Post. January 3, 2021. Accessed January 3, 2021. https://www.washing tonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger- call- georgia-vote/2021/01/03/d45ac b92-4dc4-11eb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html. Gingrich, Newt. “1978 Speech by Gingrich.” Frontline, pbs. Accessed March 31, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newt/newt78speech.html. Gold, Jeffrey and Niall Shanks. “Mind Viruses and the Importance of Cultural Diversity.” In Community, Diversity, and Difference: Implications for Peace, edited by Alison Bailey and Paula J. Smithka, 187–199. Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2002. Gorman, Amanda. “The Hill We Climb.” Inaugural Poem, January 20, 2021. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/20/amanda-gormans-inaugu ral-poem-the-hill-we-climb-full-text.html. Graziosi, Craig. “Coronavirus: Mike Pompeo Insists G7 Use ‘Wuhan Virus’ –But World Officials Refuse.” Independent. March 25, 2020. Accessed May 20, 2020. https:// www.independent.co.uk/news/coronavirus-g7-wuhan-virus-mike-pompeo-trump -a9426261.html. Hohman, Maura and Scott Stump. “Utah Politicians Who United for Ad Say Americans are ‘Hungry for Decency’,” Today. October 20, 2020/Updated October 22, 2020. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.today.com/news/utah-candidates-gover nor-unite-joint-ad-t195476. Horton Jake. “US Election 2020: What Legal Challenges Remain for Trump?” bbc Reality Check. December 23, 2020. Accessed December 31, 2020. https://www.bbc .com/news/election-us-2020-54724960. Human Rights Watch. “covid- 19 Fueling Anti- Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide: National Action Plans Needed to Counter Intolerance.” May 12, 2020. Accessed May 20, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fuel ing-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide. Kessler, Glenn, Salvador Rizzo, and Meg Kelly. “Trump’s False or Misleading Claims Total 30,573 Over 4 Years,” Fact-Checker, The Washington Post. Accessed January 26, 2021. Trump’s false or misleading claims total 30,573 over 4 years –The Washington Post. Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018.
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Liptak, Adam. “Supreme Court Invalidates Key Parts of the Voting Rights Act,” New York Times. June 26, 2013. Accessed January 13, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06 /26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html. McIntyre, Lee. Post-Truth. Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 2018. Rose, Joel. “If Covid-19 Vaccines Bring an End to the Pandemic, Americans have Immigrants to Thank,” npr. December 18, 2020. Accessed January 2, 2021. https:// www.npr.org/2020/12/18/947638959/if- covid-19-vaccines -bring-an- end-to -the -pandemic-america-has-immigrants-to-thank. Shabad, Rebecca and Sahil Kapur. “Biden Voices Uncertainty About Passing Voting Rights Bills After Meeting with Democrats.” nbc News. January 13, 2022. Accessed January 13, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/biden-make-dir ect-appeal-senate-democrats-pass-voting-rights-legislation-n1287407. Situngkir, Hokky. “On Selfish Memes: Culture as Complex Adaptive System.” Journal of Social Complexity 2, no. 1 (October 2004): 20–32. Smithka, Paula. “How Mind Viruses and Rhinoceroses Promote Tyranny.” In Civility, Nonviolent Resistance, and the New Struggle for Social Justice, edited by Amin Asfari, 181–202. Leiden: Brill/Rodopi, 2020. Smithka, Paula. “The Lies of the Land: Post-Truth, the Erosion of Democracy, and the Challenge for Positive Peace.” In Peaceful Approaches for a More Peaceful World, edited by Sanjay Lal, 170–195. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2022. Smithka, Paula. “Stoking Anger and Weaponizing Untruth: How Mind Viruses Undermine Social Justice.” In The Ethics of Anger, edited by Court D. Lewis and Gregory L. Bock, 179–197. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020. Snyder, Timothy. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017. Tensley, Brandon. “How Republicans and scotus Are Shrinking the Power of Voters of Color,” cnn. July 2, 2021. Accessed January 13, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2021/07 /22/politics/voter-suppression-race-deconstructed-newsletter/index.html. Yan, Holly, Natasha Chen, and Dushyant Naresh. “What’s Spreading Faster than Coronavirus in the US? Racist Assaults and Ignorant Attacks Against Asians.” cnn, February 20, 2020. Accessed May 18, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/20/us /coronavirus-racist-attacks-against-asian-americans/index.html.
c hapter 4
Hope as a Moral Perspective: a Performative Language for Peace Activism in a Dark Time William Gay Hopefulness empowers us to continue our work for justice even as the forces of injustice may gain greater power for a time. bell hooks1
∵ Dark times occur for individuals, families, societies, and even the world community. They can occur for a variety of reasons when the present seems very difficult and the prospect for a better future seems remote. A bleak medical diagnosis or the sudden loss of a loved one can initiate a dark time even for persons not generally prone to depression. For many people, the Great Depression was a dark time. For people within Jewish communities, the Holocaust was a profoundly dark time. More recently, for the global community, the Covid pandemic initiated a very dark time. For some in the United States, the protests by supporters of Donald Trump who did not accept that he was not certified as winning reelection as President exacerbated the dark time of current political polarization. During dark times, many people lose hope. An analysis of the negative and positive language during dark times is revealing. For example, an analysis of the language used by Donald Trump just prior to the “march” on the Capitol and subsequent “events” of January 6, 2021 would focus on terms like “incite,” “provoke,” and “trigger.” For those opposed to his efforts to claim he was cheated out of reelection, such words exacerbated the sense that we were in dark times. At the same time, for Trump’s devoted (if not fanatic) followers such words “permitted,” “authorized,” or even “commanded,” the subsequent storming of the U.S. capitol building and prompted fear among many other Americans about what could have occurred then and what might 1 bell hooks, Teaching Community: A Pedagogy of Hope (New York: Routledge, 2003), xiv.
© William Gay, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_005
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yet occur. Such times and others when polarization or fear is widespread may divert us from words and actions of hope. I will pursue an analysis of ways that the prompts of the language of hope can be distinctive and helpful, especially when connected to a moral perspective oriented to nonviolence and advancing peace and social justice. Now—as in any personal, national, or global dark time—our language will make a difference. In order to advance my effort to forge a discourse for peace activism for our current dark time and for likely future ones, I will support discourse that presents hope as a moral perspective. In particular, I will give attention to philosopher Stephen Fishman who turns to John Dewey and, more narrowly, relates his views on hope to a moral perspective. I will expand on this view by addressing discourse about hope as a distinctive and meaningful language game that includes performative discourse that can be forged to aid in motivating and sustaining work for social justice. Hope is distinct from faith and knowledge, and hope is neither blind nor set in stone. Etymologically, in Greek the word πίστις (pistis) is used for both “faith” and “belief,” while “knowledge” uses the word ἐπιστήμη (episteme) or γνῶσις (gnosis). “Hope,” by contrast, is ἐλπίς (elpis) and is closer in meaning to expectation. Logically, this expectation is based on possibility and often with action in solidarity with others who have come before or may come after us. Hope, from this perspective, lies between denial and resignation, between views of the unthinkable or the unavoidable, the impossible or the inevitable. Otherwise, our action is irrelevant; so, we might as well do nothing since to do anything would seem to be a vain effort or an unneeded activity. Hope, based on possibility, makes action relevant; our actions have some chance of success, but this chance is not certain. The probability is greater than 0 and less then 1. I illustrate these points in Table 1 that also includes some of the positions and terms used in various language games that deal with the prospects for hope. The section of Table 1 below that deals with contingency and hope illustrates how the contingency of events makes action relevant, including action arising from hope. Nevertheless, while possibility can ground hope, it does not necessarily sustain hope. While I am specifically interested in expanding on a philosophical model, I am also aware of the value of more popular and literary approaches. In particular, I commend and briefly comment on recent texts by Rebecca Solnit and by Terry Eagleton. Then, I give some attention to the philosophical texts of Paulo Freire and Richard Rorty before ending with the work of Steve Fishman on Dewey and moral hope and with connections of my own
52 Gay Table 1
The logic and language that precludes or facilitates hope
>0% Some chance Possible
Contingency and hope Do something Action relevant
. Viking, New York. Lorde, Audre (1997). “The Uses of Anger,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 25(1/2): 278–285.
c hapter 11
Broadening the Category of Moral Injury to Better Grasp the Wrong of Violence Sanjay Lal Violence, among a significant segment of peace theorists, is conceived in terms of actions that impede the ability of others to thrive. While I do not dispute the viability of this conception I will seek to draw attention to complications brought about for it by Stoic thought. Specifically, I will discuss the above conception in regard to the standard Stoic notion that what others do can never really impact one’s own well-being and thus her ability to thrive. I take the development of the traditional Stoic quality of equanimity to be central to creating a peaceful social order. For me this kind of order is one which is conducive to developing inner peace and hopefulness—qualities of obvious value especially during the so-called dark times—within its members. However, I also wish to preserve the aforementioned understanding of violence (an understanding which clearly implies that events beyond the inner control of the individual are capable of impacting her well-being). In my synthesis below I will incorporate insights provided by certain bio-centric environmental philosophers that relate to different categories of welfare. Ultimately, I hope to show that applying a kind of bio-centric framework to understanding harm holds great promise for attempts to bolster arguments of peace philosophers. 1
Some Preliminary Clarifications
In what follows, I will be using certain terms in a manner that some readers may find overly vague and improperly conflated with others. For instance, I will use the words “violence” and “harm” interchangeably even though it can be claimed that one can be harmed without experiencing violence. An anonymous reviewer of this chapter offered the example of discrimination in making just this point. It is worth noting though that discrimination can be plausibly classified under rubrics like “interpersonal” and “structural” violence. Ultimately, I do not think it is problematic for my purposes in this chapter to treat the concept of violence to be synonymous with that of harm.
© Sanjay Lal, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_012
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I will therefore largely ignore possible conceptual distinctions regarding those terms. Additionally, when referring to “thriving” I have in mind the notion (which I take to align with our everyday understandings) of being unimpeded in the quest to continually attain that which can correctly be seen as necessary for either well-being or greater levels of fulfillment (or both). My arguments are predicated on the understanding that a living thing has been harmed, and has thus experienced violence, when that living thing has been thwarted in their attempt to continually attain that which can correctly be seen as necessary for either their well-being or greater levels of fulfilment (or both). I find the above distinctions to be adequate for clearly understanding my arguments below. Additionally, I will presuppose that both harm and violence can be experienced in varying degrees even among those whose overall welfare level is so high that it is difficult for us (given our conventional understandings) to regard them as victims of either violence or harm. For me this notion follows from conceiving overall welfare in such a way that the concept is free of any inherent limits. I see no problems for maintaining that the level of welfare attained by any finite being on earth (in contrast, say, to an eternal, all-perfect God) can always be, at least partially, increased or reduced depending on what actions others do or do not undertake. Notably, it is not so clear that an all-perfect being cannot be harmed in the sense I have in mind. Such is implied by John Rist in his explication of Epicurus’ view that without friendship not even the gods can have complete happiness: “Not that the gods would be ‘incomplete’ without friendships, or devoid of any perfection of well-being, but probably because, like men who reflect on the gods, they derive pleasure (presumably kinetic) from the contemplation of one another and from their conversations.”1 Thus, on my understanding, if somehow the all-perfect gods where deprived of friendships it would follow that they too have been harmed as well as endured a kind of violence. To take another example that helps to clarify my understanding of both harm and violence, when one’s interests and individual sense of autonomy are not properly acknowledged at her prestigious, high paying job then her need to be recognized as a full member of the moral community is (to a very real extent) going unfulfilled. It would follow then that her overall welfare is not as high as it can be. This is also the case, but to an obviously greater degree, for a political prisoner who is being tortured on the orders of the brutal regime she lives under. Both individuals can plausibly be thought of as experiencing harm 1 Rist, John. “Epicurus on Friendship” Classical Philology (Vol. 75, no. 2) April 1980 p. 122.
146 Lal (in the sense that their ability to fully thrive has been unjustifiably impeded) and also as being the recipients of violence but just not to the same extent. To reiterate, as the above examples indicate (and in keeping with a hierarchical conception of human needs) I will discuss both harm and violence in a way that supposes they exist and are experienced in different levels. While it would clearly be worthwhile to schematically demarcate, categorize, and elaborate upon these various levels such a project is beyond the scope of my central objective here—to reconcile conflicting intuitions concerning harm and violence. To achieve this objective, I only need acknowledgment that harm and violence do, in fact, exist and are experienced to greater and lesser degrees. I hold that individuals can have differing levels of welfare and that the particular level of welfare reached by any individual is significantly contingent on how they are treated by those around them. This point is underscored by the obvious different experiences had by those in different situations (e.g., someone whose moral standing is recognized and someone who is not regarded to be part of the moral community). Beyond this claim, however, I will not spend much time discussing the different kinds of harm that can be experienced. That violence and harm are experienced at different levels is not a conclusion readers should find controversial given (among other reasons) the widely shared belief among peace theorists and activists that perfect nonviolence is impossible for anyone to realize in this world. 2
On the Connection between Nonviolence, Peace, and an Understanding of Harm
In exploring the idea of nonviolence within the context of global history, Robert Holmes illuminates the connection that idea has with the notion of harm. Holmes notes that Socrates implores us to harm no one and that this teaching is also the core idea of the ancient Eastern doctrine of ahimsa (a term taken to be synonymous with nonviolence). We read: The idea that it is never right to harm another person … prompts the question: What constitutes harm? Socrates does not answer this, but the rudiments of an answer are provided by Plato in Book I of the Republic … There Plato reasons … that to harm a person is to make him less perfect— that is, to make him less just. This is central to understanding the notion of harm. You have not been harmed by something—however much pain
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or suffering it may entail—if you have not been made worse off by it. To be hurt is not necessarily to be harmed.2 Notably, Holmes’ prized student Barry Gan includes, within his characterization of violent behavior, the provisos “(1) we aim to deprive other living things of their ability to thrive … or (2) if we through negligence reduce another’s ability to thrive …”3 Thus, Gan’s characterization of violence has clear affinities with Holmes’ description of harm insofar as both emphasize actions that make others worse off. Given this understanding of harm, it is specifically in regard to the question of whether one can ever morally harm another that Holmes notices complications brought about by the Stoics (among others): (One) can also be made worse off morally if one has been made a worse person or if one’s ability to function fully as a moral agent has been impaired. Socrates … alludes to this third kind of harm when he pleads that, since no one would want to be surrounded by bad people, either he did not corrupt the youth of Athens … or he did not do so intentionally. Whether it is even possible to harm a person morally in this sense is … an open question. Not only the Stoics, but much of Eastern thought suggests that it is not possible. Be that as it may, the idea of moral injury … has come to be a recognized category of harm in the treatment of war veterans in the 21st century.4 When we consider these words in conjunction with a notion commonly espoused by exemplary moral figures, including Gandhi, that moral harm is the only significant harm certain complications for peace theory ensue. Ultimately, however, it seems that Stoic thought presents problems for the above understanding in ways that go beyond moral injury. This can be seen by the famous Stoic Epictetus’ declaration “What disturbs men is not events but their judgments on events.”5 Beyond succinctly summarizing Stoic philosophy Epictetus’ words here serve to undermine the notion that others are capable of ever truly injuring us (be it morally, psychologically, or physically). After all, 2 Cicovacki, P., K. Hess “Nonviolence As a Way of Life” History, theory and practice 1 (2017): 157–158. 3 Ibid 2: 387. 4 Ibid. 5 Epictetus in Epictetus: The Discourses and Manual, reprinted in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (5th ed.). Cahn, Markie (eds.) Oxford: University Press 2012 (p. 204).
148 Lal if it is not events but judgments that disturb us than it cannot (or so it seems) be the case that the actions of others are what actually bring us harm. Instead Epictetus, in keeping with a dominant tendency of Stoic thought, is asserting that trouble only befalls us as a result of how we have chosen to interpret a given situation. This assertion is in-line with Plato’s teaching that even a man who is enslaved to another can remain happy as long as his soul is healthy. Somewhat ironically, this aspect of Plato’s teachings led the ruler Dionysius I to sell him into slavery. Plutarch captures Dionysius’ thinking by noting that since Plato holds one’s enslavement should be a matter of indifference to that person “Plato would, of course, take no harm of it, being the same just man as before; he would enjoy that happiness, though he lost his liberty.”6 Dionysius’ act indirectly reveals a seemingly serious problem for the Socratic view that only someone who has been made morally off worse by another has genuinely experienced harm. The clear implication of this view, after all, is that the so- called violent actions that others direct toward us and that we direct toward others never truly cause harm since it is ultimately up to the agent herself whether she will be made morally worse off by another. The surprising conclusion then seems to follow that even the most obviously brutal actions inflicted on another do not really violate the doctrine of ahimsa! We should remember here that ultimately, for the Stoics, our reason and intelligence (what Epictetus refers to as “the right use of appearances”7) is what comprises our kinship with God. Accordingly, it is because of this divine kinship that Stoicism says we are capable of controlling that which should be most important to us—namely, our own reactions. This control, moreover, gives us the means by which we can attain a kind of immunization from the harms the violent acts of others are thought to bring about. It is notable that regarding the supposed wrongness of violence the above points seem to present a problem for peace theorists that is the direct reverse of the one that has faced the most ardent practitioners of ahimsa (e.g. Jains). Since it is doubtful that many (perhaps most) of the living beings these individuals avoid harming (micro-organisms for instance) have the advanced levels of consciousness tied with experiencing pain it has been questioned whether such life forms can really be harmed. The problem for peace theorists brought about by Stoicism that I’m discussing here can be summarized thusly: Humans, by and large and in the vast majority of cases at least have such an advanced degree of consciousness that they can always control their impressions which 6 Quoted in “Plato in Sicily” Romeo, Tewskbury in https://aeon.co/essays/when-philosopher -met-king-on-platos-italian-voyages. Accessed on March 25, 2021. 7 Ibid, 203.
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(the Stoic maintains) is ultimately the source of our harms. Therefore, given facts about human psychology, it seems that so much of the behavior others inflict on us that is classified as violent can never actually harm us (insofar as such behavior is the direct cause of human harm). Thus, it is difficult to understand what it is exactly that makes this behavior not only morally objectionable but also a legitimate target of peace activism. 3
The Value of Stoicism for Peace Theorists
For me it is axiomatic to claim that the best external displays of non-violent principles are found in those situations in which individuals respond in a non- hostile and even cheerful fashion to the violence inflicted on them. I think this point sufficiently indicates that core elements of Stoic philosophy are indispensable for any viable peace theory. After all, only one who has adequately developed Stoic tendencies in regard to the wrongs others have committed toward them can respond in the manner described above. Consider the famous description offered by American war correspondent, Webb Miller, in 1930 of the satyagrahi protestors at Salt Works near Dandi: Police officials ordered the marchers to disperse under a recently imposed regulation which prohibited gatherings of more than five persons in any one place. The column silently ignored the warning and slowly walked forward. I stayed with the main body about a hundred yards from the stockade. Suddenly, at a word of command, score of native police rushed upon the advancing marchers and rained blows on their heads with their steel- shod lathis. Not one of the marchers even raised an arm to fend off the blows. They went down like tenpins. From where I stood I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their breaths in sympathetic pain at every blow. Those struck down fell sprawling, unconscious or writhing in pain with fractured skulls or broken shoulders. In two or three minutes the ground was quilted with bodies. Great patches of blood widened on their white clothes. The survivors without breaking ranks silently and doggedly marched on until struck down.8 8 Cited by Idiculla and Naik https://scroll.in/article/875150/opinion-why-are-indians-imm une-to-reckless-police-brutality-against-protestors. Accessed on March 25, 2021.
150 Lal Clearly, insofar as the protestors described above refused to allow what others had done to dictate their own actions, they exhibited fealty to core Stoic principles. Furthermore, the descriptions above show that the nonviolent nature of the Dharasana Salt Works protests is undeniable. In a similar vein, consider journalist David Halberstam’s eyewitness account in 1963 of the senior and, now famous, Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc’s act of protest during the height of the Vietnam war. As is well-known, after sitting in a meditative position and having a colleague pour gasoline on his head Quang Duc lit himself on fire in a busy section of Saigon. Halberstam’s account, viscerally captured in Malcom Brown’s famous photo, reads “As he burned he never moved a muscle, never uttered a sound, his outward composure in sharp contrast to the wailing people around him.”9 Philosopher Amod Lele remarks, “To all outward appearances, at least, Quang Duc was not mentally affected by literally being on fire. Perhaps it was not the case that Quang Duc thought only happy thoughts, but his negative thoughts and feelings were weak enough to make him appear completely serene while being ‘set on fire like an oil lamp’”.10 If we take the practice of nonviolence to entail freedom from negative thoughts and feelings (like, say, anger) then Quang Duc’s act can be understood as exemplifying not just a Stoic mind-set but also one of nonviolence. In spite of prima facie appearances it is difficult however to think that the protestors in the above examples were genuinely harmed (in the sense identified by Holmes and Gan) by the suffering they allowed to have inflicted upon them. While the violence endured by Quang Duc can be thought of as self- inflicted it is clear that he was reacting to what he saw as moral wrongs taking place around him. Moreover, given our conventional understandings, it can be said that he was willing to endure harm even though what he experienced does not fit with the description of harm given above. If, after all, we take the preserving and maintenance of the body’s health as an important component of someone’s overall ability to thrive it would indeed follow that Quang Duc was engaging in an act of self-harm and this harm continued at least until his body no longer existed. Surely, though, it seems that those who have developed the ability to maintain such steadfast adherence to moral principles in the face of the kind of intense and unspeakable suffering described by Miller and Halberstam cannot be morally injured by the violent acts of others or even ones they inflict on 9
Cited by Amod Lele in http://indianphilosophyblog.org/2019/07/07/the-importance-of -being-thich-quang-duc/#more-3947 Accessed on March 25, 2021. 10 Ibid.
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themselves. Moreover, according to the words of some of the greatest exemplars of nonviolence (from Socrates to Gandhi11) moral injury is the only genuine kind of injury. Thus, from this perspective, it is difficult to understand how the Dharasana Salt Works protestors were actually on the receiving end of violence (if violence is understood to be synonymous with the harm associated with moral injury). Moreover, it is hard for many of us to imagine that whatever the actions were of those Quang Duc directed his protest toward (it has been questioned whether he was actually seeking to make a statement against the Vietnam War) those actions could have really been more injurious to him than literally being set on fire (regardless of how intact he kept his moral integrity). Let us now broaden the category of moral injury, however, to include acts not on the basis of whether they impair one’s ability to function as a moral agent but on whether they fail to recognize one’s standing in the moral community or take away from one’s ability to achieve serenity in a manner unimpeded by inherently painful physical sensations. By doing this we can better comprehend the violence endured by the Dharasana Salt Works protestors as well as that Quang Duc inflicted on himself. Consequently, we are in a better position to grasp the general wrongness of violence—generality being integral since the complicated matter of whether Quang Duc’s actions in particular were wrong (given that they were violent) is beyond the scope of this discussion. 4
Differences in Welfare as Instructive
At this point, it is helpful to consider distinctions bio-centric environmental philosophers have drawn between different categories of welfare that living beings can experience. It has been declared (see Singer12) that sentience is both necessary and sufficient for granting an organism moral consideration. Thus it seems there is no real basis for becoming like Jains and attempting to include all life (even those living beings like micro-organisms that seem incapable of feeling pain) in the moral community. Alternatively, bio-centric theorists
11
12
This point is underscored by Gandhi’s paraphrasing of Socrates’ words in The Crito dialogue to be “I do not think it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse ….” Quoted in “Influence on Thoreau and Emerson in Gandhi’s Satyagraha” Hendrick, George in Gandhi Marg, Vol. 3 1959. Additionally, in advising Europeans on how to deal with Hitler the Mahatma states “in the end I expect it is moral worth that will count. All else is dross.” See The Gandhi Reader, Homer, J.A. (ed.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1956 (p. 338). Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. (New York: Harper Collins, 1975).
152 Lal maintain that being alive (not having sentience) is sufficient for inclusion in the moral community. Accordingly, a significant segment of bio-centrists identify distinctions among categories of welfare.13 More specifically, while they would agree that not all living beings are sentient (and thus capable of realizing a hedonic welfare) these theorists emphasize the universality in nature of biotic welfare. It thus follows from their reasoning that even beings that are incapable of feeling pain can be harmed (or experience the infliction of violence) since they have goods of their own that are thwarted by what others do. Similarly, I wish to argue that (given distinctions among types of welfare) even those humans whose ability to function morally is not impaired by the violent acts of others can nonetheless be thought to be harmed by these acts insofar as these acts reduce their overall welfare. Ultimately I maintain that, given their overall objectives and values, it is both unproblematic and morally significant for peace activists and theorists to conceive of the harm of violence not as an intrinsic (or even derivative one) but as comparative given the alternative possibilities that fail to attain due to its presence. 5
Different Categories of Welfare as Applicable to Human Beings
Given the varied and complex human needs, preferences, and capacities that all relate to our ability to flourish a consideration of different categories of human welfare is most instructive for a better understanding of the kinds of harm we can endure. Moreover, while—in keeping with some of the great exemplars of nonviolence—we can maintain that our ability to morally function is our highest good the distinct categories of human welfare can help us to better understand why certain situations are unacceptable even when they do not jeopardize our moral standing. To better illustrate this point, we should consider the example of two different Stoic sages. While both of these sages are identical in their ability to exemplify great Stoic ideals (even in the situation of being tortured on a rack) one of them requires the use of an artificial lung to perform her basic respiratory functions. Thus her biotic welfare is not as high as that of the other sage and therefore it would follow that her overall welfare is also lower. Ultimately, it is clear that to the extent a human’s natural biological needs are more easily met her overall welfare is increased. Likewise, it would follow that efficient
13
Nolt, J. (2014). Environmental ethics for the long term: An Introduction. Routledge. Pp. 178–180.
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satisfaction of any of the natural needs and preferences (whether they be biological, psychological, aesthetic, moral, etc.) that help to characterize human existence enhance human welfare. From these points, we can more clearly see why the violence inflicted on the satyagraha protestors above had wronged them in spite of the high level of moral functioning they were capable of displaying—their natural human need to be recognized as part of the moral community was not being fulfilled so easily and thus their overall welfare was not as high as it could have been. Additionally, they (like all of us) had basic physical needs that, when fulfilled, enhanced their biological welfare. It is clear that when a person receives skull cracking blows the fulfillment of such physical needs is impeded. What’s more is that we can understand the protestors to have been wronged even though their overall welfare was quite high (a fact their moral purity could significantly account for). Also instructive here are insights bio-centric theorists have provided regarding the comparability of different states of welfare. It has been argued that, for a bio-centric system, the incomparability of such states is only a problem when considering among the better options. When our choices, however, include some options that yield lower welfare than others we can at least rule those lower values out. Thus, John Nolt concludes: A broad bio-centric choice imperative that avoids (the) problem (of having no way of drawing objective and intelligible comparisons) … is: Avoid actions that are, on the whole, objectively worse for life. More precisely: avoid doing what would produce less aggregate objective welfare for living beings than other possible actions would.14 It is helpful for my purposes to apply this imperative when considering what actions produce less aggregate objective welfare, not for different lifeforms, but for individual members of human societies. More specifically, application of this imperative can help illuminate for us instances in which violence has been inflicted on someone. Ultimately, in making such a determination the central issue to consider regarding an action is whether it can reasonably be said to make one’s life objectively worse (even if that life will remain a good one regardless of whether the action is performed) than it would be otherwise 14
Ibid. 181.
154 Lal or does it tend toward producing that effect? If either part of this disjunction is true it would follow that violence has been committed against someone. By proposing a formulation of violence that emphasizes whether one has been made objectively worse off (and not simply less able to function morally) we can more exactly capture the underlying problem with acts of violence. Crucial to the understanding I’m putting forward is the notion that given our rich capacities humans can always have ever greater levels of welfare. Thus, we can be harmed physically, psychologically, morally, and in probably many other untold ways. To revisit the conception of violence Holmes puts forward, it is not problematic to think a person’s ability to morally function has become impaired when the actions of others have the tendency of making it unnecessarily more difficult for her to perform this function than it would otherwise be. In other words, it is sensible to maintain that when another has unnecessarily impeded the satisfying of any of our basic human needs (whatever they may be) they have invariably made it more difficult than it should be for us to properly morally function. It can be said then that to the extent it has become needlessly more difficult for a person to morally function that person is experiencing violence. Clearly, as is evident in so many cases of someone’s proper moral status not being recognized, this violence can be experienced even when the violent actions of others have had no impact on a person’s ability to maintain the moral worth of her actions. Rosa Parks, for example, obviously had violence inflicted upon her even though the suffering she was made to endure after refusing to give up her seat did nothing to reduce her moral standing. The suffering, after all, served to unnecessarily hamper her ability to morally function which, in turn, can plausibly be understood as something that lowered her overall welfare. 6
When the Ability to Morally Function Is Unnecessarily Hampered
At this point, it may be helpful to offer clarification of when I think one’s ability to morally function has been unnecessarily hampered. To reiterate, it seems clear that any events which impair natural human abilities to function (in whatever way) necessarily entail the needless hampering of the human ability to morally function. This conclusion would follow for one who takes an integrated and holistic view of the person that is in line with Gandhi’s declaration that “Man is neither intellect nor the gross animal body, nor the heart or soul alone. A proper and harmonious combination of all three is required for the
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making of the whole man. …”15 This declaration illuminates why it is problematic to hold that those who cannot be morally injured are incapable of being wronged when others inflict violence upon them. Such a view is predicated on a conception of human nature that is erroneously non-integrated and narrow. This kind of view, after all, clearly suffers from the presupposition that humans are only intellectual beings. To consider my conclusion from a different angle we should consider the concept of gratitude. For many of us, it is intuitively obvious that possessing gratitude is a character virtue. Additionally, it is not implausible to maintain that no one is so bad off that there is nothing in their life for which they can feel some gratitude. On one (superficial) level it may seem that the second conclusion undermines the first since it implies no matter what particular loss an individual may experience it should not take away from her ability to live a life of gratitude. Thus, the view that no one is so bad off that there is nothing in their life for which they can feel gratitude seemingly leads us to conclude that any particular loss someone goes through (no matter how devastating) is not actually bad. After all, regardless of what the specific nature of one’s loss may be her life has not been so negatively impacted that it is without something for which she can be grateful. The problem with this reasoning, as it is for the argument that concludes that if a person cannot be morally injured then she cannot be wronged by the violence of others, is that it ignores considerations of aggregate welfare. One who experiences certain kinds of losses has clearly had her overall objective welfare reduced in ways that someone who has not undergone such losses can be said to. This would be the case even if no loss that can be experienced is so great that it could rob someone of her ability to feel gratitude. In other words, that one situation may afford a person a greater basis for gratitude than another situation is not inconsistent with the notion that whatever situation one experiences she can find at least something to be grateful about in it. 7
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to resolve an apparent tension between two intuitions widely held by philosophers of peace. By emphasizing overall welfare, we can synthesize the thesis that acts of violence should be opposed 15
The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. New Delhi: Indian government publications division. Vol. 65 p. 74. See also 450 Vol. 73, p. 235.
156 Lal because they impede someone’s ability to thrive with the antithesis that genuine exemplars of nonviolence cannot truly be harmed by the actions of others. Ultimately, I see no basis for peace philosophers to abandon either the belief that some acts really can impact the well-being of individuals or the value of Stoic equanimity as both that belief and the promotion of that value should be affirmed as essential elements of all genuine peace work.
Bibliography
Cicovacki Predgrag, Hess Kenny (eds.) Nonviolence as a Way of Life: History, Theory, and Practice (vols. 1–2). (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2017). Epictetus in Epictetus: The Discourses and Manual, reprinted in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (5th ed.). Cahn, Markie (eds.) Oxford: University Press 2012 (p. 204). Gandhi, M.K., The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. https://www.gandhiashrams evagram.org/gandhi-literature/collected-works-of-mahatma-gandhi-volume-1-to -98.php Access date: Feb 8 2023. Indian Philosophy Blog, http://indianphilosophyblog.org/ Access date: Feb 8 2023. Homer, J.A. (eds.) The Gandhi Reader. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). Mukherjee, Subrata, Sushila Ramaswamy (eds.) Non-Violence and Satyagraha. (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998). Nolt, John. Environmental Ethics for the Long Term: An Introduction. (London: Routledge, 2015). Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. (New York: Harper Collins, 1975).
c hapter 12
Josef Pieper’s Defense of St. Thomas Aquinas on Peace Rashad Rehman This chapter has two aims.* First, it exegetes Aquinas’ notion of peace (pax) in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John (14:7), which is centred around the definition, kinds and possibility of a perfected peace, as well as how love (amor) is the cause of peace. Second, rather than defending Aquinas’ position at length, I take the more humble task to defend one attractive, plausible feature of Aquinas’ position, showing how it reveals Medieval wisdom for the establishment of modern peace. The position is two-fold: First, Aquinas’ position –at least how Josef Pieper (1904–97) reads him –that love is essentially the affirmation of the goodness of the existence of the other person. I read this as an empirically-supported, plausible source of peace. This thesis also reiterates Aquinas’ rejection of monadic theories of peace which hold that peace need only be outward (exterius) e.g., establishing socio-political peace by fighting for human rights, and not inward (interius) e.g., peace with oneself by cultivating the inner life (14, 7, 1962). Second, Aquinas’ position that love, and not other candidates e.g., tolerance, as the cause of peace, is an alternative, plausible position that merits critical attention. 1
Introduction –What Is Peace? The New Struggle
To modern readers, the statement “love is the cause of peace” is apt to be regarded either as a pithy, sloganeered truism of a more hopeful, distant past where, in a world not able to destroy itself by its own devices, we were able to speak of love and peace in the same breath; or, instead, we view it as the bedrock upon which a just society is built.1 Again, it might be questioned whether in a * This work was supported by the Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society at the University of Toronto. 1 Specific references to Aquinas’ Commentary on the Gospel of St. John (hereafter cgj) appear as (Chapter, Lecture, Section Number), general references appear as (Chapter, Lecture) and Biblical references appear as (Chapter, Line Number). Unless specified otherwise, I will use the translation of Fr. Fabian Larcher, O.P in Commentary on the Gospel of John. 2. Vols.
© Rashad Rehman, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_013
158 Rehman pluralistic society we will agree on what “love” and “peace” mean, and whether – therefore –these various, conflicting meanings could –even in principle –have effective socio-political application. To the one who simply rejects the legitimacy of love and peace in the modern world (either descriptively or normatively), it should be noted that talk of peace is not avoidable, for ordinary English is saturated with what we might call “peace-talk” e.g., “peaceful protests”, “religions of peace”, “peaceful politics”, “making peace with someone”, “peace offerings”, et cetera. Notwithstanding possible reactions evoked by “love is the cause of peace”, it might surprise the modern reader that the quote which began and entitles this chapter is from the Latin Medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (hereafter ‘Aquinas’) in his cgj and is consequently a translation of Aquinas’ Latin: “amor … est causa pacis.” (14, 7). This chapter has two modest aims. First, it exegetes Aquinas’ notion of peace (pax) in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John (14:7), which is centred around the definition, kinds and possibility of a perfected peace, as well as how love (amor) is the cause of peace. Second, rather than defending Aquinas’ position at length, I take the more humble task to defend one attractive, plausible feature of Aquinas’ position, showing how it reveals Medieval wisdom in the establishment of modern peace. The position of Aquinas’ is two-fold: First, Aquinas’ position –at least how Josef Pieper (1904–97) reads him –is that love is essentially the affirmation of the goodness of the existence of the other person. I read this as an empirically-supported, philosophically plausible source of peace. This thesis also reiterates Aquinas’ rejection of monadic theories of peace which hold that peace need only be outward (exterius) e.g., establishing socio-political peace by fighting for human rights, and not inward (interius) e.g., peace with oneself by cultivating the inner life (14, 7, 1962). Second, Aquinas’ position that love, and not other candidates e.g., tolerance, as the cause of peace, is an alternative, plausible position that merits critical attention. 2
Aquinas’ Commentary on the Gospel of St. John 14:7
In his cgj (c. 1269–72) Aquinas writes that “love … is the cause of peace” (amor … est causa pacis) (14, 7).2 In context, Aquinas is commenting on The Gospel of (New York: The Aquinas Institute, 2018). Throughout the chapter I will use Pieper’s German from “Über die Liebe” in Gesammelte Werke. Vol. iv. Ed. Berthold Wald. (Hamburg: Felix Meitner Verlag, 2008), 296–414. However, in most places I adopt and modify the standard English translation “On Love” in Faith, Hope, Love. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston and Sister Frances McCarthy. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997, 2012), 139–281. 2 For the purposes of space, I will not interact with Aquinas’ article on “peace” (pax) in the Sum, ii-i i, q. 29.
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St. John 14:7 in the New Testament in which Jesus says the following: “Peace I leave with you, my peace I give to you, not as the world gives do I give to you. Let not your heart be troubled, nor let it be afraid.”3 The (Koine) Greek for peace operative here is the (feminine) noun εἰρήνην, a term which appears, in various morphologies, approximately one hundred times in the Greek New Testament.4 Among its translations are terms ordinary English uses and adopts frequently: peace, one(ness), quiet and rest. For the purposes of clarity, I will stick to the more frequent translation of “peace”, although the Greek accentuates other features of peace that Aquinas’ Latin highlights. Aquinas’ commentary on 14:7 reveals an important investment in the theory of peace, for what the Greek New Testament authors designated as εἰρήνην became pax in Latin. I will now explicate a brief exegesis of the cgj, 14, 7. Aquinas’ definition of peace or the gift of peace (donum pacis) is as follows: “Peace [pax] is nothing else than the tranquility arising from order [tranquilitas ordinis], for things are said to have peace when their order remains undisturbed.” (14, 7, 1962). For Aquinas, within human beings there is a threefold order (triplex ordo): a person to themselves, a person to God and a person to their neighbour (14, 7, 1962). Hence, tripartite order within a person implies the possibility of a tripartite peace (triplex pax): interior peace (peace with oneself) i.e., settled faculties (cf. 14, 7, 1962), peace with God (conformed to His direction (ordinatio) and peace with neighbours (with all human beings) (14, 7, 1962). To understand Aquinas’ threefold order, it is important here to make two distinctions: first with respect to the definition of peace and the second with respect to characterizing the constituitive elements of peace. First, the distinction between a privative and positive definition of peace. A privative definition of peace is a theory of peace which defines peace in negative terms e.g., lacks, privations, et cetera. For example, a theory of peace which specifies the absence of war, strife, oppression as the definition of peace. Contrarily, a positive theory of peace holds that peace is constituted by a present, positive feature of reality. In Aquinas’ case, peace is defined by the presence of tranquility which arises on the basis of a threefold order. Second, the distinction between a monadic and tripartite constitution of peace. The former holds that peace is composed of one essential feature that constitutes the presence or existence of peace. By contrast, the latter holds that peace is composed of three essential
3 Εἰρήνην ἀφίημι ὑμῖν, εἰρήνην τὴν ἐμὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν· οὐ καθὼς ὁ κόσμος δίδωσιν ἐγὼ δίδωμι ὑμῖν. μὴ ταρασσέσθω ὑμῶν ἡ καρδία μηδὲ δειλιάτω. 4 For the purposes of brevity, I will not explore in any detail the Jewish context of the Greek writers’ use of εἰρήνην. For such an analysis, see Daniel C. Arichea Jr.’s “Peace in the New Testament” The Bible Translator 38.2 (1987): 201–206.
160 Rehman elements that jointly, necessarily and sufficiently constitute peace. Aquinas, naturally, is a tripartitist. Aquinas then writes that the human person is ordered in the following way: the ordering of our intellect (intellectus), will (voluntas) and sense appetency/appetite (appetitus sensitivus) (14, 7, 1962). The will should be led by reason (ratio) or mind (mens), and the sense appetency should be led by the intellect and will. This is a normative position held and defended within the Greek philosophical tradition cf. Phae. 245c-249d; ne, vii. 1–10, as well as Aquinas’ primary authority Augustine (whom the former quotes): “… peace is a calmness of mind [serenitas mentis], a tranquility of soul [tranquilitas animae], a simplicity of heart [simplicitas cordis], a bond of love [amoris vinculum] and fellowship of charity [consortium caritatis].” (14, 7, 1962). As Aquinas reads Augustine, the former sees his position mapped onto the latter’s: calmness of mind refers to our (free) faculty of reason, tranquility of soul refers to sense appetency which is not constrained by our emotional states, simplicity of heart refers to our will set towards God (the proper object of the will), the bond of love refers to our neighbour, the fellowship of charity to God. It is here that Aquinas distinguishes imperfect (imperfectus) from perfect peace (perfectus). He calls the peace of this world imperfect peace (imperfectus). Aquinas writes that its imperfection consists of a disturbed peace with ourselves, neighbour and God.5 On the other hand, perfect peace (perfectus), the peace that is enjoyed in heaven (in patria) that the saints (sanctorum) enjoy, will be enjoyed in the future and will not involve the fragmented, imperfect peace of this world. Aquinas then writes that Jesus was clear to His disciples what kind of peace He would leave with them: a present peace in this world (for defeating the devil and loving others) and eternal peace (in the future). For Aquinas, without Christ there is no peace in either the former or latter. With respect to present peace, the author is Christ via. His example, and in future peace, it is through Christ’s strength and power ( … do pacem meam … potestate et virtutem). Aquinas then sets out to distinguish the specific ways in which imperfect peace is distinct from perfect peace (14, 7, 1964). First, the purpose or intention (intentionem) is different. Imperfect peace’s goal or purpose is the calm enjoyment of temporal things, which oftentimes facilitates wrongdoing (peccatum) i.e., Wis. 14: 22. Perfect peace is ordered towards eternal goods (bona aeterna). Second, imperfect peace is a simulated peace (simulatio) since peace with one’s neighbour is a poor criteria of peace e.g., it can often mask a lack of 5 For Aquinas it is by definition imperfect in a post-lapsarian world. See Aquinas’ st, i-i i, q. 82.
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peace within oneself or with God i.e., Ps. 27:3. However, perfect peace, which is true (verum) and not simulated peace, has a threefold order that, when present, constitutes real peace. Third, perfect and imperfect peace differ with respect to perfection (perfectio). Imperfect peace only concerns itself with externals (exterius), it is not within and without (interius et exterius) i.e., Is. 57: 21. However, “the peace of Christ brings tranquility both within and without” (… pax Christi quietat interius et exterius) (14, 7, 1964). Aquinas therefore rejects that we should think of peace as only an exterior act e.g., fighting for peace by fighting for universal human rights; instead, we should think of peace as the experience of tranquility arising from the other within us, with my neighbours and with God.6 Instead of defending Aquinas’ position at length, I want to defend a plausible, socio-politically effective feature of Aquinas’ account which does not (necessarily) rely on his theological presuppositions, and which can therefore be instantiated within a pluralistic society.7 3
Medieval Wisdom for Modern Peace: Amor est causa pacis (14, 7)
Aquinas’ on peace in cjg refers to an articulation of a tripartite definition of peace in which the threefold order of the human person maps onto to a threefold peace, the latter constituting jointly necessarily and sufficiently the existence of peace. However, what we do not receive from the cjg is what Aquinas means by love (amor). It is the task of the reader of Aquinas, then, to make sense of Aquinas’ theory of love as the basis upon which they predicate to him a particular thesis regarding the cause of peace. While Aquinas is often read as espousing a theory of love as essentially “willing the good of the 6 For two reasons this paper does not address the specific sense in which peace –as Aquinas understands it –is a foundational value for a pluralist, liberal democracy. First, Aquinas’ position on perfect peace is inconsistent with a ‘pluralism’ which by definition places values not hierarchically, but horizontally (to borrow an image from G.K. Chesterton). For Aquinas, God is the supreme, foundational ‘value.’ Second, my argument is not that Aquinas’ position is de facto or a foundational value for a pluralist, liberal democracy. My argument is normative: it is a plausible foundational value in itself and relative to the alternative foundational values. 7 Two notes here. First, by arguing for a feature of Aquinas’ position independent of his theological justification, I do not mean to thereby commit myself to rejecting the theological justification; instead, my question concerns whether, in a pluralistic society, there is a plausible, effective feature of Aquinas’ that might facilitate the establishment of modern peace. Second, I am aware that even within pluralistic societies, many values are not religiously- neutral (even if adopted by proponents of secularism) e.g., the democratic (Judeo-Christian) belief in the equality, dignity and inviolability of all human beings.
162 Rehman other”,8 I source Aquinas’ fundamental contention elsewhere. A defender of the thesis that Aquinas sources his fundamental contentions about love elsewhere is found in Pieper’s 1972 Über die Liebe (hereafter ul). To appreciate why Pieper sources it elsewhere, background will prove useful. In ul, Pieper sets out to explicate a (Thomistic9) theory of the heterogeneity of love, that is, an account of the common element in experiences of love which explains its various expressions and manifestations e.g., familial, friendship, romantic, et cetera: “But if the recurrent identity underlying the countless forms of love does exist, how can it be more exactly described?”10 In Pieper’s case, I take him to be inquiring into the cognitive heterogeneity of love, namely, a specification of what cognitive feature, if any, is common to all experiences of love. Pieper surveys various theories of love, concluding that “all these attempts to describe phenomenologically what love is really about ascribe to it the power to sustain existence (keeping the beloved in being; conferring the right to exist; giving existence; and even annulment of death and mortality).”11 There are two aspects that are involved in these theories, and the former encompass a plausible answer to the heterogeneity of love. Love is the affirmation of the goodness of the existence of the other: “In every conceivable case love signifies much the same as approval.”12 This means that “loving someone or something means finding them or it probus, the Latin word for “good”. It is a way of turning to them or it saying, “It’s good that you exist; it’s good that you are in this world.””13 As an expression of the will (voluntas), love therefore means “I want you (or it) to exist!”14 It is a “purely affirmative assent to what already is.”15 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
15
st, ii-i i, q. 27, a.2. Aquinas’ source being Aristotle’s Rhe. Bk.ii i.e., amare est velle alicui bonum. Pieper’s defense is contrasted against this specific reading of Aquinas. See Eric Silverman, The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 43. I use ‘Thomistic’ rather loosely here since Pieper rejects the term. See “What is Thomism? in The Silence of St. Thomas. Translated by John Murray, S.J., and Daniel O’Connor. (Southbend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1957), 80–85. Pieper, “On Love” in Faith, Hope, Love, 163. See also David Oderberg, “The Order of Charity” zemo (2021). Ibid., 170. My italics. Ibid., 163. Ibid., 164. Ibid., 164. For historical context, this thesis on love may not be original to Aquinas. It is historically attributed to Augustine’s saying “amo: volo ut sis”, “I love you: I want/will you to exist” (citation source unavailable). The attribution is from Martin Heidegger, which is then later quoted by Hannah Arendt. It is also found informally in other writers e.g., Mahatma Ghandi’s 1929 autobiography. However, the novelty of Pieper’s reading of Aquinas is that he does not appear aware of this Augustinian attribution, and yet affirms its plausibility in Aquinas. Ibid., 165.
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I will offer three motivating arguments for Pieper’s position. First, by a disjunctive syllogism, that is, relative to other candidates for the heterogeneity of love, affirmation –in its many forms –approval, acceptance, what sometimes is called ‘being an ally’ (which is not morally neutral as it is often used, but nevertheless expresses a form of unconditionality in one’s acceptance of another) –is the most plausible act that is common to all experiences of human love (for Aquinas, and his Catholicism more generally, it is unconditional e.g., Matt. 5:44; 22:37–39; Jn. 3:16; Act. 10:34). There appears to be no other feature, cognitive or otherwise, which is present in all forms of love. Although emotions, for example, appear to be a strong candidate, they are not a good criteria since they are not present in many experiences of love. Second, the presupposition of many existing forms of love is a primal act of the will which expresses (if only implicitly) affirmation. While I cannot defend this position at length, consider non-intuitive cases like ‘tough love.’ This is the act of loving someone by what appears to be harsh means: telling them the truth about something that may hurt their feelings, exposing a person to the reality of the consequences to their actions, enforcing loving discipline to correct prodigality, et cetera. In tough love, there exists an implicit affirmation of the goodness of the other inasmuch as the tough lover regards the beloved as a worthy recipient of tough love who will (ideally) be better off than before. Finally, Pieper’s thesis has empirical support. For example, there is an entire psychotherapeutic practice which has as its core the metaphysical presupposition that the client with whom a professional psychotherapist is in interaction with, is fundamentally, ontologically good (and this is explicitly affirmed within practice).16 With respect to socio-political application, I argue that there are three reasons why it is applicable.17 First, it directly (not indirectly) addresses the explicit presence of hatred in contemporary socio-political discourse, much of 16
17
See Alexandra Parvan’s “Beyond the Books of Augustine into Modern Psychotherapy” in Augustine Beyond the Book: Intermediality, Transmedality and Reception. (Leiden, NE: Brill, 2012), 313–338; “Changing Internal Representations of Self and Others: Philosophical Tools for Attachment-informed Psychotherapy with Perpetrators and Victims of Violence” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology (2017) 24.3: 241–255; “Metaphysical Resources for the Treatment of Violence: The Self-Action Distinction” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology (2017) 24.3: 265–267. This paper will not offer concrete political examples inasmuch as I do not want an example (of a particular political persuasion) to incline the reader to discredit Aquinas’ position. This paper aims at providing a theoretical basis for peace which is, even if politically significant (as I hope to show), apolitical. I leave it to readers more politically-audacious than myself to think of and consider their own examples.
164 Rehman it taking place on social media platforms. By arguing for a substantive concept of love, it provides a corrective to the various manifestations of hatred that disestablish peace. Second, it also provides a corrective to implicit forms of hatred in which opposite sides of the political spectrum regard one another as undeserving of listening, attention and discussion, each of these predicated, in their best forms, on the underling premise that the other is affirmed ontologically (even if disagreed with fiercely). Finally, Aquinas’ position pushes for socio-political, direct action for peace without itself embodying and perpetuating an attitude of undue cancelling, indifference and hatred.18 In many ways, it is the same philosophical justification for Dr. Martin Luther King Junior’s nonviolent direct action.19 However, Aquinas’ position is not the only model for thinking about what causes peace. An alternative to his position may not appeal to love as the cause of peace, but of tolerance as the cause of peace.20 While a full discourse on tolerance would be beyond the scope of this paper, I offer a reconciliatory model of how Aquinas would appropriate tolerance into his thesis that love is the cause of peace. 4
Modern Wisdom for Modern Peace: Tolerantia est causa pacis
Although contemporary discussions disagree on the exact meaning of “tolerance”, each position shares a heterogenous problem in connecting “tolerance” to “peace.” Contemporary discussions of tolerance tend to postulate (at least) three necessary components of the concept: (1) Objectionability: the object tolerated (e.g. habits) is considered objectionable and wrong or bad by the “tolerator.”21 18
See Dr. Martin Luther King’s (mlkj)’s 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” and its use of Matt. 5:38–48. 19 Ibid. 20 For instance, see Rainer Forst, “Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice” Philosophical Explorations 4.3 (2001): 193–206, as well as his “Toleration and Democracy” Journal of Social Philosophy 45.1 (2014): 65–75. 21 I would here like to clarify that I reject a cultural relativist model of tolerance. The claim of cultural relativism is empirically (historically) false and philosophically mistaken. Empirically (historically), humanity has held universally shared, natural law moral beliefs e.g., beneficence, justice, duties to elderly and children, mercy, magnanimity, faith, veracity, et cetera, documented in the writings of ancient Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Babylonians, Chinese, Norse, Indian, as well as from Christians and Jews. See C.S. Lewis’ “The Abolition of Man” in The Signature Classics of C.S. Lewis. (New York: HarperOne), 731–738. Philosophically, see James Rachel’s “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism” in The Elements of Moral Philosophy. (New York: Random House, 1986), 616–623.
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(2)
Acceptability: the “tolerator” has positive reasons that outweigh his negative judgement of the tolerated object in a certain context. (3) Rejectability: the conditions under which toleration is limited (if at all).22 Consider (1)-(3) under one of the most plausible positions of tolerance: the “respect” view of tolerance. On this view, tolerance is defined as a form of “respect” owed unto the other.23 The problem is that whether tolerance achieves respect is irrelevant: to respect out of tolerance presupposes a disapproval of some vice another has, and the existence of such conflict is plausibly inconsistent with peace. As Aquinas stated (14, 7, 1962), peace cannot exist if there is either inner or outer conflict; as such, tolerance can only exist if there is something that one disapproves of and yet endures it (recall the etymology of tolerance from the Latin tolerantia, an enduring). Tolerance achieves a greater good by way of avoiding conflict, but the mere avoidance of conflict is insufficient, on Aquinas’ view, to establish peace. Although Aquinas appears to unqualifiedly reject tolerance (st, ii-i i, q.11, a.3), he qualifies this by approving tolerance as a virtue in some circumstances (st, ii-i i, q. 10, a.11). In what follows, I offer a model of tolerance as a sub-divisional virtue which is subservient to peace, though not the cause of it. Human beings cannot be objects of tolerance; however, often it is more precisely the habits, values, customs, practices, beliefs and so forth of others or groups of people that are the object of toleration. From the standpoint of Aquinas, tolerance presupposes some evil or vice of toleration in the hope of its being replaced by some good –the specifics of which is here irrelevant. Tolerance cannot be a virtue in and of itself i.e., a habitual activity culminating in a good character, since it is only contextually good i.e., tolerance can be good or bad depending on the object of toleration.24 Through this philosophical lens can we begin to appreciate the illogical foundation of paradoxes, such as that of the “tolerant racist.” Suppose one were to believe that a particular race R is inferior or bad, yet this individual decides to exercise virtue in tolerating said individuals belonging to R. Are we to call this a virtuous act or an instance of virtue realized? No. If tolerance presupposes a perceived vice that ought to be endured in hope of it being replaced by some good, then to
22
See Section 1 “The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes” of Rainer Forst’s “Toleration” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url= . 23 Ibid., Section 2 “Four Conceptions of Toleration.” 24 See Loretta M. Kopelman, “Female Circumcision/Genital Mutilation and Ethical Relativism” Second Opinion 20.2 (1994): 54; Morayo Atoki, “Should Female Circumcision Continue to be Banned?” Feminist Legal Studies 3 (1995): 223–35.
166 Rehman tolerate a particular race is to in fact presuppose that said race is not merely inferior, but evil.25 Indeed, tolerant racists make no sense simply because race is not the kind of thing that ought to be tolerated, for a particular race is not, and simply cannot be, evil in and of itself. In cases such as these, tolerance as I conceptualize it provides a ready foundation to solve such paradoxes while preserving the term’s etymological roots. Tolerance, then, is a virtue insofar as (i) it allows an evil for a greater good, (ii) it allows an evil to prevent a further or worse evil, and (iii) it is part of the virtue of patience. Since (i) and (ii) are less controversial than (iii), I devote my analysis here to (iii). “Patience is said “to have its perfect work” in tolerating evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge …, not only hatred …, not only anger …, but it also excludes inordinate sadness, which is the root of all the foregoing. Hence patience is more perfect and greater because it destroys the root in such matter.”26 Tolerance is an imperfect type of patience, where it does not engage the root or foundation of the relevant evil, but still “endures” it. Now if patience is a part of fortitude, and tolerance is a part of patience, then tolerance is a subdivisional virtue of fortitude. As Pieper explicates Aquinas’ position: “… [t]he brave man suffers injury not for its own sake, but rather as a means to preserve or to acquire a deeper, more essential intactness … [t]he nature of fortitude is not determined by risking one’s person arbitrarily, but only by a sacrifice of self in accordance with reason, that is, with the true nature and value of things.”27 Fortitude, then, is characterized by a personal sacrifice which aims at peace. Though tolerance certainly does share in the sacrificial aspect of fortitude, for enduring an evil for the sake of some good or prevention of further evil is something that requires sacrifice, it still fails to satisfy the aim of 25
By way of metaphysical side-note, this can be put in more strict metaphysical terms. Following the neo-Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition of metaphysics, it is held that being and goodness are treated as ontologically identical: what is, is good (omne ens est bonum). Things that are are matter-form composites –a view dubbed ‘hylomorphism’ – and it is this principle that grounds the notion of essences. Concretely, if an individual human being x is essentially a matter-form composite, then part of the essence of x is their body. This necessarily includes x’s race R. Thus, if being is identical to goodness, R is the proper material constituent of x, who is a being and therefore intrinsically good, then to tolerate R is to categorically misidentify a good with an evil –hence the paradox. For more on the relevant metaphysics see David Oderberg, Real Essentialism. New York: Routledge, 2007, as well as his The Metaphysics of Good and Evil (2020). 26 St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues. Trans. J.A. Oesterle. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 156. 27 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. (San Diego, Harcourt: 1965), 119, 124.
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acquiring a “more essential intactness.” For instance, to tolerate one believing in a falsehood so as to avoid them believing in even more falsehoods entails sacrificing the truth, and its proclamation, for the sake of truth. However, there always remains the conflict of said sacrifice, whether internal or external. It is precisely for this reason that tolerance is an imperfect virtue, for it is imperfect patience. Tolerance must presuppose conflict, and as such is metaphysically insufficient and unnecessary for peace. In Aquinas’ view, just as God tolerates the vices of every individual to bring about greater goods e.g., the greatest being perfect, beatific union with Himself, so human beings tolerate each other with the ideal of eventually being intact with one another and God. 5
Conclusion
This chapter had two modest aims. First, it performed an exegesis of Aquinas’ notion of peace (pax) in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John (14:7), which is centred around the definition, kinds and possibility of a perfected peace, as well as how love (amor) is the cause of peace. Second, rather than defending Aquinas’ position at length, I took the more humble task to defend one attractive, plausible feature of Aquinas’ position, showing how it reveals Medieval wisdom in the establishment of modern peace. The position is two-fold: First, Aquinas’ position –at least how Pieper read him –that love is essentially the affirmation of the goodness of the existence of the other person. I read this as an empirically-supported, plausible source of peace. This thesis also reiterates Aquinas’ rejection of monadic theories of peace which hold that peace need only be outward (exterius) e.g., establishing socio-political peace by fighting for human rights, and not inward (interius) e.g., peace with oneself by cultivating the inner life (14, 7, 1962). Second, I argued that Aquinas’ position that love, and not other candidates e.g., tolerance, as the cause of peace, is an alternative, plausible position that merits critical attention. In the end, readers here might raise two worries with my thesis. First, it might be objected that I have simply overlooked an obvious candidate for procuring peace that does not rely on love and/or tolerance: (social) justice, the project of disestablishing manifestations of false peace in search for a more just, equitable and inclusive society. Whether or not contemporary social justice advocates in fact achieve this end, in his st, ii-i i, q. 29, a. 4, Aquinas writes the following: “Peace is the work of justice indirectly, insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is a unitive force as Dionysius says
168 Rehman (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations.”28 This also highlights, albeit explicitly, Aquinas’ rejection of justice between persons i.e., neighbours, as the basis of peace. Second, another objection to my thesis concerns whether I have successfully motivated a secular defense of Aquinas’ explication of peace. In brief, I offer two replies. First, to clarify, while I have given a secular defense of a feature of Aquinas’ position, the primal justification for his position is (and remains) theological. As stated above, motivating secular reasons to adopt Aquinas’ position does not logically entail a rejection of theological reasons. Second, even if I have not successfully shown that Aquinas’ position can be accepted on fully secular grounds, it is nevertheless argued for on fully secular premises: even if, on further investigation, the thesis implies a theological conclusion e.g., the existence of perfect peace. After all, a paradigmatic image of perfect peace might not be so bad to have.
Acknowledgment
Thank you to Krishna Santhakumar in the development of this paper.
Abbreviation of Ancient/Biblical Works
Biblical
Act. Acts Is. Isiah Jn. John Matt. Matthew Ps. Psalm Wis. Wisdom
Ancient Aristotle
n e. Nicomachean Ethics Rhe. Rhetoric
Plato
Phae. Phaedrus
28
Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, modified.
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Medieval Dionysius
Div. Nom. Divinis Nominibus
St. Augustine
St. Thomas Aquinas
lvd.
c gj. s t.
Libro De Verbi Domini
Commentary on the Gospel of St. John Summa Theologiae
References
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on the Gospel of John. Translated by Fr. Fabian Larcher, o.p. 2. Vols. New York: The Aquinas Institute, 2018. Aquinas, St. Thomas. Treatise on the Virtues. Translated by J. A. Oesterle. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Arichea, Daniel C. Jr. “Peace in the New Testament” The Bible Translator 38.2 (1987): 201–206. Forst, Rainer. “Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice.” Philosphical Explorations 4.3 (2001): 193–206. Forst, Rainer. “Toleration” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url=. Last accessed: January 10th, 2023. Forst, Rainer. “Toleration and Democracy.” Journal of Social Philosophy 45.1 (2014): 65–75. Parvan, Alexandra. “Beyond the Books of Augustine into Modern Psychotherapy” in Augustine Beyond the Book: Intermediality, Transmedality and Reception. (Leiden, NE: Brill, 2012), 313–338. Parvan, Alexandra. “Changing Internal Representations of Self and Others: Philosophical Tools for Attachment-informed Psychotherapy with Perpetrators and Victims of Violence” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 24.3 (2017): 241–255. Parvan, Alexandra. “Metaphysical Resources for the Treatment of Violence: The Self- Action Distinction” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 24.3 (2017): 265–267. Oderberg, David. “The Order of Charity” zemo (2021). Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism. New York: Routledge, 2007. Oderberg, David. The Metaphysics of Good and Evil. New York: Routledge, 2020. Pieper, Josef. “Über die Liebe” in Gesammelte Werke. Volume iv. Edited by Berthold Wald. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008. 296–414.
170 Rehman Pieper, Josef. “On Love” in Faith, Hope, Love. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston and Sister Frances McCarthy. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997, 2012. 139–281. Pieper, Josef. The Silence of St. Thomas. Translated by John Murray, S.J., and Daniel O’Connor. Southbend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1957. Pieper, Josef. The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temeprance. San Diego: Harcourt, 1965. Silverman, Eric. The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover. Langham: Lexington Books, 2010.
pa rt 4 Practical Applications
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c hapter 13
Building Peace, Repairing Hope: Restorative Mediation, an Effective Approach Negin Tahvildary Restorative mediation enables participants to develop mutually acceptable measures for cooperative problem-solving. Aimed to increase the effectiveness and sustainability of conflict engagement efforts, the restorative approach encourages innovative thinking and new solutions by addressing the needs and wants of parties involved in conflict. As an academic discipline, Peace and Conflict Studies (pacs) has historically focused more on the theoretical elements of peacebuilding approaches than on putting theory into action. In recent years, the discipline has undergone a shift as peace educators have directed considerable attention to incorporating restorative practices into collective and collaborative academic settings. Learning how to approach conflict from a restorative perspective has empowered students to create lasting, positive social change. Restorative practices learned in small group settings are applied to widening circles of civic engagement. This article provides a general framework for understanding mediation on interest-based versus positional-based negotiations, which ultimately generates hope among the stakeholders through self-fulfilling prophecies. Using a structural functionalist lens, I argue that this collective hope will, in turn, entail more socially desirable elements such as unity and solidarity to foster peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping efforts. I further argue that peace education that is built upon a practical foundation of active engagement is essential to the creation and development of positive social change. 1
Mediation and Modern pacs Education
As the field of restorative practices has grown extensively during the latter part of the last century, it is increasingly important to teach and nurture respectful conflict management skills in youth and future professionals through direct instruction, guided practices, and cross-age mentoring relationships. Furthermore, some scholars consider “peace education as a successful conflict-solving process in which the decline of violence is to be detected by
© Negin Tahvildary, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_014
174 Tahvildary a measurable promotion of schools’ efficiency and productivity” (Cairns and Salomon, 2011, p. 176). Traditionally, pacs has been committed to providing students with an overview of themes, approaches, and theories within the discipline. This focus on the transmission of knowledge often overlooked a critical component of education: hands-on experience. Proper knowledge and professional didactic are at the core of conflict management, however, there is a need for a more practical, systematic solution than the classical peace education can provide; in other words, for a restorative philosophy, practicing should be persistently ahead of theory. For instance, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s [unesco’s] work on Education for Peace and Non-Violence recognizes the “two fundamental concepts of peace education as respect and skills.” The document continues: “Respect refers to the development of respect for self and for others; and Skills refer to specific communication, cooperation and behavioral skills used in conflict situations” (unesco, 2008,p. 3). u nesco’s stance on peace education echoes a shift in the approach to peace education across the globe, as pacs teachers are increasingly promoting awareness of the need for initiating more immersive educational practices through hands-on experiences and service-learning activities. Providing such opportunities to students is gradually becoming a major part of the educational development of pacs. There is an evolution from traditional peace education within the discipline to a more active, skills-based peace education that seeks to move forward into a challenging global future. Consequently, peace education in its modern form is beginning to consist not only of teaching fundamental concepts related to the use of force and violence, but also, of building a framework to implement relevant conflict management activities. Peace education needs to be less performative and more transformative. 2
Implementing Restorative Practices
Sociologist Talcott Parsons is credited with adding significantly to the evolution of structural functionalist theory. Parsons helped solidify the understanding that socialization is an essential element of restorative mediation. Describing the requirements for a successful, functioning society, Parsons explains that a society can only function when “a sufficient proportion of its members perform the essential social roles with an adequate degree of effectiveness” (Parsons, 1948, p. 159). The theoretical framework of structural functionalism
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is useful for evaluating and understanding the connection between peace education, civic engagement, and community empowerment; students who are provided with respect and skills-based peace education become the citizens of tomorrow’s society. Restorative practices, such as mediation and peace coaching programs, are practical options for such pedagogical framework. Community partnership is an effective way to approach this pedagogy to motivate K-12 and higher education stakeholders into investing their time and treasure in restorative practices. In the words of Australian criminologist, John Braithwaite: this process depends on human capital (the skills of people) and social capital (skills in interacting with others). For children whose families lack endowments of human and social capital, we rely on state-funded education systems to compensate. Yet we quickly run up against the limits of the capabilities of formal education bureaucracies to make up for deficits that are profoundly informal. (Emancipation and Hope, 2004, p. 89) Educating individuals on effective means of conflict resolution skills at the personal level can translate into a society that is better educated and prepared to approach conflict from a victim-based position at the macro-level. Scholar Rob Gildert argues that “the pedagogical aspects of restorative justice –its mechanisms for teaching peace –must be implemented. This is accomplished through dialogue and understanding” (Gildert and Rothermel, 2011, p. 92). Informal types of conflict management such as restorative circles, peace coaching, interest-based dialogues, cooperative problem-solving, restorative mediation, and conferencing can be carried out through a network of community partners. Drawing on local knowledge from a diverse group creates solutions that are indeed sustainable, practical, and effective. Incorporating school-community and professional-public partnerships for problem-solving will consequently empower the school system in educating responsible citizens. Such informal networking can provide youth and victims of crime with a social support circle that can also foster civil discourses. An example of such community collaboration is the peace coaching through cross-age mentoring offered as a university-public school partnership, where college students from pacs courses implement peer mediation in local schools. One concrete example of peace coaching in action is the Mediator Mentors Program at California State University, Fresno. Participating students report that their experiences within the program assist them in understanding
176 Tahvildary children’s conflicts, and developing a more effective and professional approach to communication. (Tahvildary, 2019, p. 3). Restorative dialogues should undeniably be the foundations of school mediation programs. The interest-based framework suggests practical guidance for peace coaches and mediators to facilitate conversations from minor school disputes to bullying, and even more serious problems. Instead of targeting isolated individuals and labeling them as troublemakers, restorative practices in educational settings establish a community of students, peers, and college mentors who benefit from the perspective that conflict can be constructive. By adopting a holistic approach to managing behavioral and educational problems, the young generation is empowered, and schools are introduced to alternatives to traditional methods of punishment. While assessing the youth development circles, John Braithwaite witnessed that: “being a beneficiary of emancipatory care when one is young may be the best way to learn to become compassionate democratic citizens who support the emancipation of others as adults” (J. Braithwaite, 2001, p. 246). The cross- age mentoring program is also beneficial to the mentor in the sense that it is part of their citizenship obligation to be a supporter of at least one child. Moreover, “the experience of the emancipation-hope cycle is hypothesized as a key to revitalizing citizenship and democratic participation—a hypothesis that is the best hope tradition” (2001, p. 246). Regularly offered at a college level as service-learning opportunities, such extracurricular activities enhance self-appreciation, societal and civic awareness, and inspire a lifelong commitment to being an engaged citizen. Similar to the theory of youth development circles, the peace coaching program “establishes an institutional infrastructure to foster the emergence of peer support, […] this institutionalization would build citizenship obligation to participate in the dialogues, take ownership, and provide peer mentoring and support” (2001, p. 245). During restorative mediation, peace circles, and other types of restorative practices, parties can share how the perpetrated harm has affected their lives, receive answers to lingering questions, and be directly involved in repairing the harm, as every party is held accountable for 6 their actions. Such efforts can contribute to building a culture of peace through dialogue and action, while encouraging respect and inclusion. On a societal level, “forms of problem-solving or negotiation assistance provided vary significantly depending on the parties’ characteristics, relationships, histories, dynamics, issues in dispute, needs and interests, structural constraints, their cultures, and a range of other factors” (Moore, 2014, p. 26). Just as mediation affects society, society can affect the success or failure of
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mediation efforts; it is important for communities to take a multi-pronged approach to building peace through conflict resolution and transformative action. According to the Norwegian sociologist and father of modern pacs, Johan Galtung, mediation fails “when it is not implemented in conjunction with other approaches and methods of conflict transformation through local resources and actors at a community and grassroots level” (2014, p. 235). 3
Participating in Interest-Based Mediation
Scholars tend to emphasize the dysfunctional perspective of conflict when conducting analyses, highlighting its disruptive aspects by focusing on how it prevents growth, development, and social progress. However, a community- based mediation offers a more eufunctional perspective, centered on how the conflict can serve an overall positive role for its participants. Therefore, sociologists believe that for conflict to be effective it must produce “increased internal cohesion”. To that end, two conditions must be met: “1) power must be sufficiently centralized to allow the governing [leaders] induce group members to act in a unified fashion; 2) there must be a minimal consensus among group members that the policies adopted by the leaders (in our case mediators) are capable of managing the conflict in a satisfactory way” (Kyriacos and Cohn, 1982, p. 89). So, if conflict is defined per what Wilmot and Hocker describe as “an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals and interference from the other party in achieving their goals” (2011, p. 11), then the process of mediation on both the individual and societal levels should be framed around the context of interests and mutually inclusive dialogues and “away from positions of incompatibility and opposition towards a dialogue” (Galtung, 2000, p. 234). On this account, the methodology used in the restorative mediation process is explicitly interest-based. For a productive evaluation of needs, the help of a neutral third party as mediator (or facilitator) is indeed crucial. In a more collaborative approach, co-mediation can involve more trained community volunteers, improve the quality of assessment, and help the parties process their emotions, while getting educated on each other’s needs and specific wants. Based on a volunteer approach, hope is consequently not imposed by the mediators or other participants in the restorative dialogues. Such teamwork usually illustrates a 360-degree panoramic view of the issue compared to a centered positional- based view. Multisite studies over the years have consistently highlighted the prime importance of direct dialogue that focuses on peacemaking rather than
178 Tahvildary resolution (United States, Dept. of Criminal Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime, 2000, 6). 4
Building Hope through Dialogue
Once the commonalities of the parties have been identified, the discussion then turns to how these common interests can be deployed to achieving each participant’s nominated goals and identifying the needs that require support from one another. In other words, instead of a positional bargaining, parties develop mutually acceptable solutions that meet their individual and joint interests. And it is the mediators’ responsibility to create a safe zone for parties to comfortably process their emotions over the incident, the impact of the harm on their relationship, and the consequences of their actions. Therefore, the focus of such procedure resides on dialogue and any written settlement is of secondary importance. According to mediation pioneer, Christopher Moore, “Mediation, through careful data collection and option generation can often help parties build integrative solutions […]. It challenges disputants to overcome apparent barriers to a settlement that would require them to settle for less than they could attain if they developed a truly integrative solution” (2014, p. 399). The goal is to provide a space for 1) a civil dialogue, 2) negotiation of needs and wants, 3) critical thinking, and 4) the intention to practice problem-solving. Such methodology lays the ground for a more humanistic approach where the focus is on the process of exchanging interests, rather than merely reaching an agreement, which might not be even reflective of all parties’ needs and wants, and is hence, at risk of failure in the future. In fact, during a positional-based bargaining, the flame of hope fades as parties get too involved in a competitive structure of a single-sided settlement and a win- lose situation. So, when parties are stuck in their positions and their preferred type of solutions, mediators play an essential role in shifting the discussions towards a cooperative interest-based negotiation. Although many other types of restorative practices are largely settlement- driven restorative mediation is primarily dialogue-driven. In this way, a resolution is not guaranteed, and the process is more transparent and does not provide illusionary hope. Rather, the dialogue itself serves as a healing process. In a restorative setting, hope is built through the different stages of mediation and the focus is, therefore, more on the process than the outcomes, or, as law professor Peter Drahos describes it: “hope goes beyond mere wishing for an outcome” (2004, p. 18).
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There is then no surprise that the recent peace education literature has presented new terminologies such as conflict management or conflict transformation, in lieu of conflict resolution: while the parties’ desire to achieve positive results from their mutual engagement, the end goal is not just to resolve the case. On this account, the hope for a resolution will not convert into despair in case of a final disagreement. Instead, the process of civil discourse is the central goal of restorative mediation, reflected in the hope that parties will feel empowered to voice their ideas in other future arenas as responsible community members, be it in the classroom, the neighborhood, or on the global stage. In a collaborative setting, individuals experience the hope building process of engaged communication, and learn what social theorist Valerie Braithwaite calls hope’s social etiquette—which she describes as “empower[ing] others through the gift of hope and [.]empower[ing] ourselves through receiving the hope that others offer” (2004, p. 6). There are of course obstacles to this process, such as when the parties cannot identify or articulate their primary interests and sometimes intentionally hiding them by the fear of losing the game. In the case of an unintentional blockage of interests, mediators’ open-ended questions can help the parties dive deeper into the issue at hand as they search for the underlying causes of the conflict. Every mediator should learn the often-repeated formula of peace coaching programs: 1) ask different questions and 2) ask questions differently. The practical approach when parties are unwilling to share their interests is then based on motivational interviewing. Building trust through active listening skills of reframing, reflecting, and summarizing, encourages the parties to take ownership in the process of decision-making. Approaching conflict with a goal of fostering trust allows mediators or negotiators to help parties evaluate the conflict from a needs-and-interest-based perspective. This approach is also useful beyond the individual level; it can be effectively employed at the societal level as well. Creating a more understanding society is important, especially because, as Moore asserts, “a significant obstacle in high-tension conflicts on the state-level is that negotiators are often more familiar with advocacy of positions or solutions to problems and are unaccustomed to thinking in terms of needs and interests, or unaware of procedures for identifying and discussing them” (2014, p. 370). Too much concern for arriving at a resolution instead of focusing on understanding the needs and wants of parties involved in conflict can indeed distract from the repairing of harm and the healing process. Johan Galtung marks another difficulty on the state-level that is often overlooked:
180 Tahvildary the belief that those in positions of leadership will be able to guarantee compliance to the agreement and to deliver the support of their respective communities. […]. While bringing leaders together for an agreement may be sufficient to […] a ceasefire or peace agreement, it does not deal with the damaged relationships or the human suffering which conflicts engender. The capacity of one conflict to create new conflicts, and to explode into further violence, is left unaddressed. (2000, pp. 236–237) Drahos finds a similar pattern at the societal level of negotiations “when the private hopes of a majority of individuals within a society become less and less linked with state institutions, [that is when] the prospects of a society maintaining or achieving well-functioning institutions become slimmer and slimmer. [When] institutions become cut off from the individual initiatives that help hopeful thinking, their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances is reduced” (2004, p. 31). This is, in fact, how reality is shaped through a self- fulfilling prophecy for that community. Hope is a significant factor in community cohesion, and its ability to shape reality is a power that should not be underestimated. Sociologist Michelle Lueck expands on the connection between hope and progressive social change, stating that “negating the possibility for change through the individual or activist group by eliminating hope creates an emergence of pessimism and self-fulfilling prophecies that are incapable of positive change” (2007, p. 260). Lueck explains that “[h]ope is a vital part of the feedback loop between planning, action, and outcomes that generate or alter expectations and hope” (2007, p. 252). Positive change results in communal harmony and growth. Hope is the driving force behind communal change and progression. However, during a restorative conferencing, unlike the negative thinking that leads to self-fulfilling prophecies, mediators do not start the process assuming that the resources are limited or that parties have entirely incompatible interests, but rather adopt a humanistic, nonjudgmental approach and invite the parties to join them in this process. 5
Finalizing Mediated Agreements
Describing the attitude of an interest-based negotiator, restorative practitioner Moore compares it to “when two people work together on a puzzle. The parties sit side by side and attempt to develop a mutually acceptable picture” (2014, p. 174). Reflecting on the “Skills” mentioned by unesco as foundation for
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peace education, I propose that conflict management is indeed an art and as Lederach illustrates it: transformative moments in conflict are many times […] the moments of the aesthetic imagination, a place where suddenly, out of complexity and historic difficulty, the clarity of great insight makes an unexpected appearance in the form of an image or in a way of putting something that can only be described as artistic […]. These are not moments defined by the analytical endeavor. They are deeply intuitive—short, sweet, and synthetic to the core. What they synthesize are the complexities of experience and the challenges of addressing deep human dilemmas. When they happen, it is almost as if you are gazing at a piece of art, listening to a piece of music, or hearing a line of a poem […]. These are moments when all involved feel a collective ah-hah. (2005, pp. 69–70) Advocates for restorative practices emphasize that in the last phase of mediation, reaching an agreement (or even just a possible agreement), the solution must be one that comes from the parties to the conflict themselves, and cannot be forced upon them by others, even by the mediators, as their task is just to carefully facilitate the conversation and help parties formulate creative solutions inclusive of mutual interest. Since restorative mediation focuses on volunteer participation, demands engagement by setting obligations and responsibilities for all parties, and addresses the psychological needs and willingness of all parties, I argue that restorative mediation falls under the category of what social scientist and philosopher Victoria McGeer considers the art of “hoping well” which, in an individual context, can be “extended to hope at the collective level” (2004, p. 112). “While the individual must assume responsibility for articulating his or her own hopes, the process of hoping well involves interacting with the hopes of others” (V. Braithwaite, 2004, p. 12). McGeer reminds that “through investing in the hopes of others, in helping make these hopes meaningful and realistic, a sense of agency and trust in one’s own capacities grows” (2004, p. 112). Of course, like other restorative programs, restorative mediation may not be appropriate for every conflict; and therefore must be adapted to the specific situations based on the needs, wants, and willingness of the parties involved. However, similar to Valerie Braithwaite, I argue that “through learning the skills of setting goals and plucking up courage to actively and responsively try different pathways that might lead to the achievement of these goals, individuals can improve problem-solving capacity” (2004, p. 7). According to Braithwaite, “for a society to hope well, it must do the hard yards of forging collective hope
182 Tahvildary out of individual hope and not take the easy road of skating on public hope” (8) and, as she continues, “the key element is the cultivation and celebration of strengths—of individuals in this case but, by extension, of collectivities” (2004, pp. 10-11). In line with this philosophy of Collective Hope, Lueck also insists that “being involved in collective hope, individuals are less likely to lose individual hope and slide into despair and self-fulfilling prophecy” (2007, p. 253). Ultimately, restorative practices can “uncover a path to linking micro accomplishments” such as school-university peace coaching “to more macro, more universal approaches to confronting the big threats to a society. Learning about possibilities for macrosocietal transformations by monitoring micro collaborations is the hopeful message of democratic experimentalism” (J. Braithwaite, 2004, p. 92). 6
Concluding Remarks
Restorative mediation is a hope-filled process that enriches the lives of individuals and communities. From a structural-functionalist perspective, interest- based restorative mediation is a component of successful conflict resolution that is essential to the creation of an enduring social system. The restorative approach to conflict has the power to teach community members how to engage in restorative efforts, which gives individuals the hope they need to attempt to create positive social change. Although pacs has historically focused on theory over practical application, the modern efforts to center peace education on active participation through hands-on experience are more successful at instilling peacebuilding values in students. Such an education empowers students to hope for a better world, and to see themselves as agents of societal change. The world is rife with conflicts of all kinds. Continuing to build an educational foundation of restorative peace efforts will allow the benefits of restorative mediation to be applied to social systems in an ever-widening ripple effect that will bring the power of hope and the action of civic engagement together to create peaceful worldwide societal transformation.
Works Cited
Braithwaite, John. “Emancipation and Hope.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 592.1 (2004): 79–98. Braithwaite, John. “Youth Development Circles.” Oxford Review of Education 27.2 (2001): 239–52.
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Braithwaite, Valerie. “Collective Hope.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 592.1 (2004): 6–15. Cairns, Ed, and Gavriel Salomon. Handbook on Peace Education. Taylor and Francis, 2011. Drahos, Peter. “Trading in Public Hope.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 592.1 (2004): 18–38. Galtung, Johan. et al. Searching for Peace : the Road to transcend . London: Pluto Press in association with transcend, 2000. Gildert, Rob, and Dennis. Rothermel. “Remembrance and Reconciliation.” Amsterdam : Rodopi, 2011. Lederach, John Paul. The Moral Imagination. New York: Oxford Up, 2005. Lueck, Michelle A. “Hope for a Cause as Cause for Hope: The Need for Hope in Environmental Sociology.” The American Sociologist 38.3 (2007): 250–261. Markides, Kyriacos C, and Cohn, Steven F. “External Conflict/Internal Cohesion: A Reevaluation of an Old Theory.” American Sociological Review 47.6 (1982): 88–98. McGeer, Victoria. “The Art of Good Hope.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 592.1 (2004): 100–127. 15. Moore, Christopher W. The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass & Pfeiffer Imprints, Wiley, 2014. Parsons, Talcott. “The Position of Sociological Theory.” American Sociological Review, . 13, 2, [American Sociological Association, Sage Publications, Inc.], (1948): 156–71. Tahvildary, Negin. (2019). Ancillary Unit Annual Report: Mediator Mentors Program [Unpublished manuscript]. Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fresno. unesco. unesco’s Work on Education for Peace and Non-Violence: Building Peace Through Education. unesdoc Digital Library, 2008. United States, Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime. “Executive Summary.” The Restorative Justice and Mediation Collection, by Mark S. Umbreit, 2000. ovc Bulletin. Wilmot, William W. Hocker, Joyce L. Interpersonal Conflict. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 2011.
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Spaces for Action: Opportunities for Hope in Dark Times Anna Taft Times of horror and disaster –plagues, massacres, approaching ecological doom, political mayhem, increasing economic inequalities –may seem self- evidently “dark,” but there is another sense in which darkness can refer more to the lack of light by which these distressing realities can be seen and comprehended than to the horrors themselves. In her preface to Men in Dark Times, Hannah Arendt describes this latter kind of darkness. Dark times, she suggests, have less to do with disastrous realities than with the failure of the public realm to shed light on events and to provide space in which people can show who they are. She argues: If it is the function of the public realm to throw light on the affairs of [people] by providing a space of appearances in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who they are and what they can do, then darkness has come when this light is extinguished by “credibility gaps” and “invisible government,” by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet, by exhortations, moral and otherwise, that, under the pretext of upholding old truths, degrade all truth to meaningless triviality. arendt Men in Dark Times 5
This kind of darkness, surely, is evident in contemporary times, if not to the extreme degree it was in the totalitarian regimes Arendt wrote so much about. While re-illuminating an entire national public realm is a daunting task, there are possibilities for creating and strengthening smaller spaces of appearance, which in turn can offer opportunities for hope. One modern tendency that dims the light by which we ought to be able to see each other is the propensity to approach human affairs as though we could make them. In the mode of making or fabrication, we begin with given material and an image of the object that is to be made. This predefined idea serves as the end of the process, determining and organizing the necessary means. Approaching other people in the mode of fabrication collapses the
© Anna Taft, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_015
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space in which we could appear to each other. If we approach each other as material out of which to craft a certain kind of world, we cannot see who, but only what, each other are, and we lose the chance to reveal ourselves in the light of a public space. This approach replaces the expressiveness of action with the instrumentality of making, which has several dangerous consequences. First, it means that any means are justified if they serve the chosen ends. Second, it justifies violence, as things are made out of original material, which must be violated. There is violence not only in the making, but also in the only kind of unmaking that can be done from within the mode of fabrication. Third, treating human affairs as though they could be fabricated is unrealistic, and the attempt to make them more predictable encourages reductions in freedom. Fourth, the fabrication process centers expertise, excluding many voices. Treating human interactions instrumentally also corrupts relationships. Finally, applying instrumental thinking to human affairs inhibits the emergence of meaning. Drawing from my own experiences with a transnational non-profit organization, I will show how we can create and strengthen spaces of appearance that allow the light of mutual recognition to reveal who we are and what we do. When we approach human affairs primarily in the mode of action, we find opportunities for hope. How we act becomes more important than achieving predetermined ends. The mode of action brings its own possibilities for repairing mistakes, such as forgiveness, and allows us to value freedom and the unpredictable responses of other people. We find encouragement to include everyone affected in decision- making processes, as human relationships expand and flourish. Finally, there are opportunities for meaning to arise, as the light of a public space reveals who we are and the actions we take so that stories can emerge. 1
Hazards of Applying the Mode of Fabrication to Human Affairs
The mode of fabrication, while essential in the sphere of making things, becomes dangerous when it is applied to human interactions. Frustration with the risks of action, combined with the modern belief that we can know only what we make led to elevation of the mode of fabrication as the highest ideal and to its generalization to the realm of human affairs, which more appropriately would be approached in the mode of action. Arendt suggests that, “the modern age’s conviction that [people] can know only what [they make]” elevated the “toolmaker and producer of things, and therefore could overcome the deep-seated contempt and suspicion in which the tradition had held the
186 Taft whole sphere of fabrication” (The Human Condition 228). Evident in the modern outlook are the attitudes of fabrication: instrumentalization of the world, … confidence in tools and in the productivity of the maker of artificial objects; … trust in the all-comprehensive range of the means-end category, … conviction that every issue can be solved and every human motivation reduced to the principle of utility; … [the] matter-of-course identification of fabrication with action. ARENDT, The Human Condition 305–306
These attitudes –evident today in so many trends, ranging from the focus on stem education to the drive to plan social change using data –illustrate the degree to which fabrication has become the dominant mode. If we treat each other, and thus ourselves also, as material from which desirable societies can be made, we snuff out the light that could shine in a space where we might act and speak in freedom, revealing ourselves and leaving behind stories. The extension of the instrumental framework of fabrication to the realm of human affairs has several dangerous consequences. First, it entails that any means are justified if they serve the chosen ends; “As long as we believe that we deal with ends and means in the political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody’s using all means to pursue recognized ends” (ibid. 229). This consequence is unavoidable, because “to make a statement about ends that do not justify all means is to speak in paradoxes” (ibid.). Second, it justifies violence. Fabrication requires violence, “precisely because something is created, not out of nothing, but out of given material which must be violated in order to yield itself to the formative processes out of which a thing, a fabricated object, will arise” (Arendt On Revolution 200). Not only is there violence in the making, but also in the only kind of unmaking that can be done from within the mode of fabrication: one of the great dangers of acting in the mode of making and within its categorical framework of means and ends lies in the concomitant self- deprivation of the remedies inherent only in action, so that one is bound not only to do with the means of violence necessary for all fabrication, but also to undo what [one] has done as [one] undoes an unsuccessful object, by means of destruction. arendt, The Human Condition 238
A third danger of approaching human affairs as though they could be made is that it is unrealistic, and its failures in turn promote increasing control.
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Arendt argues, “The idea that only what I am going to make will be real –perfectly true and legitimate in the realm of fabrication –is forever defeated by the actual course of events, where nothing happens more frequently than the totally unexpected” (ibid. 300). Approaching action as though it were fabrication leads to frustration because of the unpredictability inherent wherever a plurality of people, and thus of aims and motivations, is involved. However, for those who view action through the lens of fabrication, there is the temptation to make their theories more realistic by reducing freedom. Elizabeth Minnich explains: Hannah Arendt used to say that the real problem with strict behaviourism (or any social ‘science’ that mimics knowledge about things) is not that it is not accurate but that it could become so. She would then note that those who take the proof of their theories to lie in their ability to predict human behaviour have a very dangerous stake in increasing predictability—that is, in reducing freedom –in the real world. minnich, “To judge in freedom” 135
Approaching human affairs as though they can be made is frustrating because it ignores the reality of human plurality, and this frustration encourages efforts to make human activity more predictable by curtailing freedom. Furthermore, treating human affairs as though they could be fabricated makes involvement in them the purview of experts rather than a right of members of a community. When human affairs are addressed as though they could be made, “the statesman is understood to be competent to deal with human affairs in the same sense as the carpenter is competent to make furniture or the physician to heal the sick” (Arendt, Between Past and Future 111). Only experts are then considered qualified to make decisions that shape our collective life. Applying the approach of fabrication to human affairs also corrupts human relationships. Arendt explains that replacing acting with making “can destroy the very substance of human relationships,” and illustrates with an example from Aristotle concerning a benefactor and a recipient: The benefactor, according to Aristotle, loves his “work,” the life of the recipient which he has “made,” as the poet loves his poems … In this instance, it is perfectly obvious how this interpretation … actually spoils the action itself and its true result, the relationship it should have established. ARENDT, The Human Condition 195–196
188 Taft Thinking of the act of beneficence in terms of making corrupts the act and makes a fully human relationship between the benefactor and the recipient impossible. Finally, treating human affairs as though they could be made limits the opportunities for meaning. As Arendt explains, “The trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship between means and end on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context” (ibid. 154). Ends become means until we are, “caught in the unending chain of means and ends without ever arriving at some principle which could justify the category of means and end, that is, of utility itself. The ‘in order to’ has become the content of the ‘for the sake of’; in other words, utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness” (ibid. 155). Though perennially tempting and the dominant approach in modernity, the attempt to deal with human affairs as though they could be fabricated is fraught with many dangers. 2
Forming and Strengthening Spaces of Appearance
The Tandana Foundation is a transnational non-profit organization I founded fifteen years ago that collaborates with communities in Mali and Ecuador on a variety of initiatives that respond to community priorities. Some of these initiatives strengthen existing spaces of appearance or establish new ones. While small in scale, these spaces shed light on who we are and offer hope for reclaiming meaning. When we form or maintain a public space in which we can speak and act freely, we give ourselves an opportunity to see and to be seen. It is as if a light shines in the darkness, revealing us to each other. In Dogon villages in central Mali, it is customary to hold village assemblies to discuss challenges, plans, and decisions that affect the village. However, traditionally only elder men were permitted to speak in these meetings. Housseyni Pamateck from Sal-Dimi, Mali recounted, “Before the interventions of Tandana, at a meeting, women sat in the back, and only the elders spoke. Not everyone could speak. The women were there, but we didn’t give them a chance to speak. If one did speak, other men would tell her husband to correct her behavior.” However, through a series of programs that create spaces where women can speak, gain experience, and gain confidence in their ability to participate in public affairs, this situation is changing. First, Savings for Change groups offer an opportunity to meet weekly with a group of women, saving a set amount each week to build up a fund and then taking loans from this fund. During their
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meetings, women discuss and decide on rules for the group, elect leaders, and also have an opportunity to talk about other concerns. Next, these groups can request literacy classes, during which they learn basic literacy and numeracy skills, meeting five days a week over nine months. Then, each literacy class group delegates some members to participate in women’s leadership workshops. During these ten-day workshops, participants learn how to form and lead women’s associations, while also exchanging stories, forming relationships, and discussing their involvement in local government. These workshops offer a temporary space of appearance in which women are encouraged to speak and share their stories. Kessia Kouriba from Kansongo, Mali recounted: When Oumou told her story, there were many women who said that, really, they are behind. If we look, women are more numerous than men. If women work together, we can support someone to get to the mayor’s office. … Aissata also told her story. Lots of women said she is really courageous. They said that courage is good, but many of us wouldn’t have the courage to do what she did. They were impressed. Every time there was a story told, for 30 seconds there was silence, and they were really thinking about it. This situation is reminiscent of one Adriana Cavarero describes that was created by women near Milan: “a shared, contextual, and relational space is created by some women who exhibit who they are to one another” (59). In this case, “the narrated story that produces the reality of the self then regards, first of all, the revealing quality of political action, or regards the process of narrating this life-story as if it were already a political action. Surprisingly, it is” (ibid.). Women in these workshops generate a lighted space in which they reveal themselves to one another. Through these experiences, women develop greater abilities to participate in public affairs, while, at the same time, men, through experiences with other projects, change in their understanding of how public discussions should work and who should be included. One important feature of many initiatives Tandana coordinates with Malian communities is that they involve setting up a management committee to oversee the ongoing functioning of the project. For example, if a grain bank is created, it needs not only an initial stock of millet and a building to house it but also a committee to manage its operations, selling the millet at a stable price and then using the proceeds to restock the bank for the next year. The members of this committee are selected by the village assembly and report to the entire assembly. Pamateck explained:
190 Taft The training is not just for women. When we train a management committee, we invite everyone, and everyone learns how to speak in front of others and to let everyone speak, and not to be afraid. Everyone has the right to ask questions, and the response you have to give according to the data. So, the men have understood as well. If the activity is for everyone, it concerns everyone, so everyone has the right to ask questions, to know the difficulties, to know if it is working. Women bring the experience and confidence they have developed in public spaces among women to mixed-gender spaces. They begin to speak up and to demand inclusion in larger spaces of appearance, such as township meetings with mayors. Pamateck affirmed, “Even at the mayor’s office, there were women who took the microphone and told everyone that now we have training and are doing these activities, and you need to inform us of everything and involve us.” The experiences that both women and men gain through participation in these kinds of initiatives strengthen the existing public spaces at both the village and the township levels by encouraging wider participation and larger discussions. Many initiatives also involve instituting an ongoing but small space for action that can contain the instrumentality of the projects within a human frame. The women’s leadership workshops lead directly to the formation of women’s associations, which constitute an ongoing space where women can speak, act, and appear to each other. Kouriba affirmed, “They didn’t know how to hold a simple meeting. Now in all the villages where the Foundation has worked there are associations.” Another important initiative that Tandana has supported is the formation of the Olouguelemo Environmental Association. This association, which began with eight villages, now brings together representatives of 30 villages to discuss, deliberate, and make collective decisions about the protection of their shared environment. Most other initiatives that Tandana supports in Mali involve the formation of a committee that is to manage the project in an ongoing way. While they have a specific task outside of the domain of action—to effectively manage the cotton bank, well, indigo bank, or whatever it may be –they also serve to provide a space for action that can contain the administration and acknowledges the plurality of wills involved. Committee members typically meet monthly to discuss how the project is going, share the difficulties that have arisen, and propose solutions to the challenges. Then they report to the village assembly on the state of the project and lead a discussion on any changes they propose. Some committees include a Secretary of Conflicts, institutionalizing the expectation that conflicts arise
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frequently in a web of relationships and that through speech and action they can often be resolved. The formation of these spaces for action, whether they are associations or management committees, is largely an act of fabrication. The committee must be made and the code of regulations written. However, even the forming of these groups involves action as well, since there is discussion, deliberation, and group decision-making about how they should work, who will participate, and what the rules should be. As the structure is made, there is also space reserved for action—for discussion and deliberation in the village assembly about how to set up the project, as well as the formation of a committee that can continue to discuss, debate, resolve challenges, and bring questions back to the general assembly. In this format, the modes of fabrication and action are combined in a way that responds to the characteristics of each and applies each in its appropriate domain. 3
Opportunities Afforded by Spaces of Appearance
When we create and maintain spaces of appearance, we are subject to the inherent risks and limitations of action, but we also open up opportunities. In action, we cannot exactly speak sensibly of means and ends, but what in fabrication would be called the means are dominant. Thus, we are not required to ensure a particular outcome, which we are unable to do anyway, but can focus on how we act toward others. When we approach others in the mode of action, we also can avoid the violence that is inherent in fabrication. Instead of treating other people as material that can be known in advance, as we treat the stone from which we might construct a building, we can recognize the degree to which we do not know them and remain open to what they may express of themselves. Instead of bringing a preconceived plan to change their reality, we discuss with them and reach agreements on shared ends. The mode of action also offers an important remedy when things go awry: forgiveness. Because we have access to this remedy in the context of human relationships, we do not need to rely on the violence that is necessary to destroy something that has been fabricated. Pamateck explained that if committee members, “make a mistake, they will apologize. They learn not to listen to critics, but to give the correct information in [their] report. Then when people realize [they] are doing a good job, they will apologize for criticizing [them].” Furthermore, if we approach human affairs as action, we can allow for the unexpected and promote freedom. If we expect different people to have
192 Taft different views, we create opportunities for discussion and deliberation. This is precisely what project management committees do, and the position of Secretary of Conflicts offers a constructive way of responding to the conflicts that are inevitable when a plurality of wills is involved. Ousmane Tembiné of Kansongo pointed out, “the understanding of everyone is not the same. … The difference is that the Foundation integrates with the people and, hand in hand, we work together to overcome conflicts and to have peace.” When we prioritize the space for action, we can also apply expertise within its appropriate sphere without excluding the opinions and voices of the people who will be most affected by any given project. Expertise is important within the domain of fabrication, and it would be foolish to try to build a health center without the direction of expert masons. However, long before the building process begins, there are ample opportunities for everyone involved to share their opinions, discuss, and make collective decisions about what should be made. Yabiemo Tembiné of Kansongo explained that the Foundation “requires informing everyone and transparency. Nothing is hidden. It is for the community.” The mode of action also allows human relationships to form and flourish. Arendt points out that, “Action, moreover, no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (The Human Condition 190). Because they are not treated as mere means to other ends, the relationships that form are seen as respectful human relationships, rather than exploitative, corrupted ones. Moussa Timbiné, Tandana’s Savings for Change Coordinator, described “the mutual respect between the women and me. When I go to the villages, when the women see me, they greet me, and also when I see them, I stop to greet them, so there is mutual respect between us.” Finally, if we approach what we do as action, there are opportunities for meaning to emerge. Action can be meaningful because it can reveal who the agent is and because it can be recounted in stories. Arendt argues that it is “the revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce stories and become historical, which together form the very source from which meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human existence” (The Human Condition 324). For Arendt, “it is the desire to excel which makes [people] love the world and enjoy the company of their peers, and drives them into public business” (On Revolution 111). This seems to be the case for members of the various committees that manage initiatives in Mali. These posts do not come with remuneration, but they offer an opportunity to distinguish oneself and earn the recognition of one’s peers. Anouh Tembiné of Kansongo affirmed, “I love it, and that is why I am on so many committees.”
Spaces for Action: Opportunities for Hope in Dark Times
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Candlelight
These experiences from one very particular context illustrate the opportunities that open up when small spaces of appearance are formed. In these small, yet public, spaces, light shines on those who take the risk of appearing, and speech relates to realities that are visible to all. In these spaces, power can be generated. For Arendt, “Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities” (The Human Condition 200). Furthermore, many kinds of non-profits, as well as businesses and institutions, could create spaces of appearance to contain the instrumental aspects of their work. Organizations can ensure that their representatives and their partners share ideas, discuss, deliberate, and then agree on particular ends before pursuing those together. Once a goal is agreed upon, the mode of fabrication can organize the work toward that particular end. For example, to build a community center, means are required that include materials, technical knowledge, and work, and these must be organized according to an effective plan. However, the end of the building itself need not be permitted to take precedence over the relationships that make it possible. If communication breaks down or commitments to each other are not fulfilled, work on the building can pause and be resumed only if, and when, a new agreement can be reached between the parties to the relationship. Typically, there is not a clean separation between the action and fabrication regarding a project, and it is important not to ignore the instrumental concerns involved in making something, yet the ongoing web of relationships must remain as a container for the mixture of craftsmanship, deeds, speech, administration, and behavior that may come together in the realization of a project. We can form spaces for action that contain fabrication, limiting it to serving ends that are mutually agreed upon through discussion. Each of these spaces shines a candlelight on whoever acts in it, revealing people to each other. If institutions to hold open such spaces can be formed, they may succeed in illuminating ways for us to live together in peace. In dark times, the light of one candle may make a great difference.
References
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
194 Taft Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition, 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. Arendt, Hannah. Men in Dark Times. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1968. Kindle Edition. Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. Kindle Edition. Cavarero, Adriana. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. Translated by Paul A. Kottman. London: Taylor and Francis, 2000. Kindle Edition. Kouriba, Kessia. Personal interview. December 11, 2018. Minnich, Elizabeth. “To judge in freedom: Hannah Arendt on the relation of thinking and morality” in Gisela T. Kaplan and Clive S. Kessler eds., Hannah Arendt: Thinking, Judging, Freedom. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989. Pamateck, Housseyni. Personal interview. December 11, 2018. Tembiné Anouh. Personal interview. December 6, 2018. Tembiné, Ousmane. Personal interview. December 6, 2018. Tembiné, Yagouno. Personal interview. December 6, 2018. Timbiné, Moussa. Personal interview. December 11, 2018.
c hapter 15
On Giving Birth to Hope in Darkness Andrew Fiala In 1968, Hannah Arendt offered a collection of essays that focused on “men in dark times.” That was the same year that Martin Luther King, Jr., was killed. King was, of course, an advocate of hope and light, especially the hopeful and creative power of nonviolence. It was King who wrote: “Darkness cannot drive out darkness, only light can do that.”1 King’s nonviolent movement is a beacon or a sign, that there can be hope in the darkness. Hope played an important systematic role in King’s nonviolent movement for social justice. King said in that same text, with reference to the Black American struggle for liberation and equality, “Our most fruitful course is to stand firm, move forward nonviolently, accept disappointments and cling to hope.”2 And: “The only healthy answer lies in one’s honest recognition of disappointment even as he still clings to hope, one’s acceptance of finite disappointment even while clinging to infinite hope.”3 The kind of hope that King appeals to here is religious and metaphysical. This is the hope behind King’ famous claim that the “arc of the moral universe bends toward justice”—a phrase that appears, in a collection of his writings called A Testament of Hope. King explains this idea by appealing to the metaphor of light and dark. He writes: When our days become dreary with low-hovering clouds of despair, and when our nights become darker than a thousand midnights, let us remember that there is a creative force in the universe, working to pull down the gigantic mountains of evil, a power that is able to make a way out of no way and transform dark yesterdays into bright tomorrows. Let us realize the arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice.4 Humanists and philosophers may have good reason to object to this kind of metaphysical hope. But it is possible to understand hope without appeal to a creative force in the universe. The important idea here is the active nature 1 Martin Luther King, Jr. A Testament of Hope (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1986), 594. 2 King, A Testament of Hope, 584. 3 King, A Testament of Hope, 584. 4 Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, 252.
© Andrew Fiala, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004541597_016
196 Fiala of hope that we find in King’s life and work. King’s ideal is not merely a passive faith that clings desperately to metaphysical hope. Rather, King’s hope is accompanied by firm resolve and systematic, nonviolent action. Perhaps King mis-spoke when he suggested that one must cling to hope. It might be better to say that hope is a beacon or a motor (as Bill Gay suggests in his contribution to the present volume). The point is this: we don’t merely find the light in the darkness. Rather, that light is produced by us. The light must be generated by the courageous and creative work of the human spirit. It is up to us to give birth to the light. This theme can be found in different ways in Arendt’s work—and also in the work of the great advocates of nonviolence such as Gandhi and King. Gandhi is famously quoted as saying “be the change you want to see in the world.”5 We might also say “give birth to the light you want to see.” This is the point of hope, after all: to shine a light in the darkness. The light is kindled when we speak out, take action, and begin to move in the direction we want to go. And in giving birth to light in this way, the way forward is illuminated. 1
The Ubiquity of Darkness
This is not to say that the light of hope will be bright and unopposed. Indeed, the beacon of hope is often dim and the motor of hope risks running out of fuel. Such are the challenges of “dark times.” But these challenges are common—and the cure is well known. Before turning to the cure, let’s consider the ubiquity of darkness. Arendt introduced her volume by saying, dark times are “not only not new, they are no rarity in history.”6 As a Jew who emigrated from Germany during the Nazi time, Arendt was actively involved in trying to understand violence in light of ongoing war and social turmoil. The year she wrote those words, 1968, is remembered by some as one of the low points of recent history. That was the year, in the midst of the Vietnam War, when Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy were both assassinated. The streets erupted in political violence. But that year was also the year that the Civil Rights Act was passed,
5 Gandhi never quite put it this way exactly. The idea is a paraphrase of ideas implicit in Gandhi’s work. See Christian Soschner, Gandhi Didn’t Actually Ever Say, “Be the Change You Want to See in the World.” Here’s the Real Quote …, in: illumination-Curated via Medium (4 April 2021), published at https://medium.com/illumination-curated/gandhi-didnt-actua lly-ever-say-be-the-change-you-want-to-see-in-the-world-d65b92cf5db. 6 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), ix.
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as well as the year that Apollo 8 orbited the moon. History is like that: there are low points and high points—and often they intermingle. And yet there are times when the darkness seems to have the upper hand. As we complete the present volume, Peace and Hope in Dark Times, it is appropriate to return to a theme that Barry Gan and others have addressed here, which is that discussions of “darkness” are often narrowly focused. Darkness is, in a sense, a matter of perspective—as is the question of what it is that we should be hoping for. Gan suggests that those of us who think that the Trump era and the Covid-19 pandemic are “dark times” may suffer from a narrow perspective that, as he puts it, “smells of privilege.” Trump created challenges for the American constitutional system, to be sure. And he was not an admirable man. But Trump was no Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot. And the system worked, preventing him from consolidating power. As I have argued elsewhere, Trump was only a would-be tyrant.7 A similar problem holds with regard to the disruptions we have endured during Covid-19. The pandemic was a shock to the system. But it was not the Black Plague. And the economic dislocation of the pandemic was not nearly as brutal as the Great Depression. But we are biased toward the present: these crises affected our lives and they represent “darkness” in comparison to what we have experienced before and in relation to what we expect in terms of normality. Gan’s accusation of “privilege” cuts deep. Gan reminds us that for many around the globe, there has often been too little light. Indeed, the dream of the enlightenment has typically come at the expense of those who are “sitting in darkness,” as Mark Twain put it in 1901. Twain’s point was that the dream of spreading enlightenment (known as “the white man’s burden”) was often an excuse for outright imperialism undertaken in the name of “the Blessings of Civilization.” Gan reminds us that the supposed purveyors of light have often actually been spreading darkness. As Gan writes, “dark times are omnipresent, and the U.S. has been a major player in contributing to dark times for many peoples throughout its violent history.” Indeed, such darkness was ubiquitous during past centuries. While there is some light to be found in the American founding, the U.S. Constitution was tainted from the start by slavery. This darkness was only eradicated after a brutal Civil War. Mark Twain’s era was marked by this kind of darkness, as well as wars against the American Indians, the Spanish-American war, and other imperial misadventures. A hundred years ago, the world was rocked by the senseless violence of the First World War. This era included a terrible global 7 Andrew Fiala, Tyranny From Plato to Trump (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022).
198 Fiala flu pandemic and a genocide against the Armenian people. It gave way to further global crises, especially the Great Depression, the Second World War, the Holocaust, other genocides, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Gan is right to suggest that the present generation is privileged in comparison with the past. 2
Complicity and Posterity
In 1939, surely a low point of history, Bertold Brecht wrote a poem translated as “To Posterity” (An die Nachgeboren), which used the memorable phrase, “dark times.”8 Brecht begins the poem as follows: Wirklich, ich lebe in finsteren Zeiten “Really, I live in dark times,” he says. The German word “finster” resonates with more than just darkness. It also means, gloomy, sinister, and uncanny. In 1939, the times were ominous, threatening, and unenlightened. Brecht himself was on the run, escaping from Hitler’s Germany, while he waited for a visa to relocate to the United States. On Brecht’s telling, the sinister nature of the times is a product of both the pervasive sense of injustice that is at large in the world and the strange silence about injustice that lurks in the darkness. In Brecht’s poem, there is also a sense of guilt and helplessness. Brecht had escaped the worst. But he knew that by escaping he left others behind. He begged that posterity would not judge his generation too harshly. These were times of weakness and injustice in which it was impossible to be kind. But of course, we do judge Brecht’s generation harshly. We also judge other past generations. These are iconoclastic times. In response to racial injustice, we have re-evaluated American icons, torn down statues, and renamed buildings. And so, of course, will our own generation be judged, just as we cannot help but judge the generation of 1901, 1914, 1939, and 1968. These exercises in creative remembering are productive. It is appropriate to learn from the past by shedding light on its darkness. Of course, this is the easy part: past generations are no longer able to defend themselves against our critiques. From the vantage point of the present, it is easy to cast aspersions on darkness past. We wonder at the heartless brutality
8 Bertolt Brecht, “To Posterity” H.R. Hays translation at https://allpoetry.com/To-Posterity; German original here: https://www.lyrikline.org/de/gedichte/die-nachgeborenen-740.
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and bloody hypocrisy of the slave masters, the Indian killers, and the imperialist powers. We wonder how those Germans, Austrians, and Vichy French could have willingly submitted to the genocidal militarism of National Socialism. We wonder about the cruelty and indifference of European accomplices to genocide. We wonder how the American and Allied bombers could have dropped fire bombs on German and Japanese cities, while also using atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We also wonder about the generation of racists who opposed Rosa Parks and assassinated Martin Luther King, Jr. We wonder how our parents and grandparents so easily accepted a system of apartheid and white supremacy. We also wonder about the atrocities great and small of patriarchy, militarism, and plantation capitalism. And on and on it goes. The “wonders” of history mentioned here are confined within a certain Euro- American frame of historical reference. But there are other sinister wonders at large in the history of the world. The Romans, the Huns, the Vikings, the Aztec, and the Inca were rapacious and cruel. And as civilization grew, the result has been devastating to the earth’s biosphere. Megafauna have been hunted to extinction. Old-growth forests and coral reefs have been destroyed. The seas have been emptied of fish and filled with plastics and other garbage. The earth has been ravaged and the atmosphere clogged with heat-trapping gases. Again, we wonder how the past generations could have been so rapacious, so stupid, so ignorant, so … well, unenlightened. But this crisis is also our own. History is still unfolding around us. Future generations will look back at us and wonder how Americans of this generation could have elected a tyrannical personality such as Donald Trump. They will wonder how we allowed racial injustice and economic inequality to fester and grow. They will be amazed at how we muddled through and mismanaged the Covid-19 pandemic. They will scratch their heads and ask why we permitted nuclear weapons to proliferate, why we accepted an economy based on fossil fuels, and why conspiracy theories and authoritarian ideologies festered and spread on our watch. Perhaps our only response to the questions of the future is that “we are them.” This is the same response that the past might give to us: “they are us, too.” Human nature contains this darkness: this greed, this selfishness, this short- sightedness. The question of darkness will always be with us. The Christians called it sin. But we need not wax metaphysical to identify it. It is found in our near-sighted egoism, our indolent indifference, and our complacency in the face of evil. Of course, once we recognize this, we can fix it. We do have some freedom, after all, despite the winds of history that buffet us. And here Brecht’s poem is instructive. One reason to resist the darkness is so that posterity will not judge
200 Fiala us harshly. In his poem, Brecht offers a vision of wisdom, peace, happiness, and nonviolence. He writes: I would gladly be wise. The old books tell us what wisdom is: Avoid the strife of the world Live out your little time Fearing no one Using no violence Returning good for evil — Not fulfillment of desire but forgetfulness Passes for wisdom. I can do none of this: Indeed, I live in the dark ages! The challenge Brecht poses here is that in dark times, the vision of wisdom and peace seems to evaporate. In the darkness, we are tempted to retreat to selfishness, complicity, fear, and violence. Brecht suggests that in his dark ages—in the darkness of the Nazi-time—there was no choice but to give in. As he says: “Alas, we who wished to lay the foundations of kindness could not ourselves be kind.” This may be the most hopeless result of living in darkness. The darkness seems to render us unable to do the right thing, unable to be kind, and unable to attain wisdom. But this is only true if we give in to the darkness. There is an alternative: to refuse to be unkind, to refuse to be complicit in wrongdoing, and to remain steadfastly committed to justice and to wisdom. This is what it means to shine a beacon of hope. This is what it means to give birth to hope. 3
On Giving Birth to Hope
Brecht’s poem inspired the title of Arendt’s book, Men in Dark Times. Her account of Brecht’s wandering and struggles shows us just how dark the times were in the middle of the 20th Century. He bore witness to the despair of that time in the suicide of his friend Walter Benjamin. Brecht fled Germany and eventually landed in Hollywood, where he was caught up in the anti- communist mania of the House un- American activities committee. He returned to Germany, ending up in East Berlin, where he lived and eventually died uneasily in the shadow of Stalinist occupation. Brecht realized how difficult it was to live “in dark times.” But on Arendt’s telling the key to his survival
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was compassion linked with stoic distance from suffering. This is paradoxical to be sure. But it seems right. To survive in dark times, we must find some way to retreat to the inner citadel without also losing our sense of compassion. Those without compassion retreat too far from the darkness, while those who are swept away by compassion can be ripped apart by the gloom. This leaves us with a tenuous balancing act: between tender-mindedness and tough-mindedness (as William James might say). But from within this balancing act, it is possible to give birth to something new. This is what poets like Brecht do. It is also what activists like King do. They refuse to retreat from the moment, inspired by hope to put words on paper and feet on the ground. This process of creative engagement requires great courage when it is undertaken in the face of darkness, hate, and evil. As Brecht said in his poem “When Evil Comes Like Falling Rain,” one of the worst problems of evil is the silence it creates. The poet writes: The first time it was reported that our friends were being butchered there was a cry of horror. Then a hundred were butchered. But when a thousand were butchered and there was no end to the butchery, a blanket of silence spread. When evil-doing comes like falling rain, nobody calls out ‘stop!’ When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible. When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no longer heard. The cries, too, fall like rain in summer.9 Brecht’s pessimism is palpable here. The butchers’ gruesome pile mounts and nobody says anything. The blood and the crimes flood the world. And even the cries of the victims are washed away and evaporate, like summer rain. And yet, there is the poet’s voice and the outrage of the activist in the street. This is a different kind of rain—persistent and pleading. This protesting rain can be a powerful force against what King called “the gigantic mountain of evil.” That mountain of evil is eroded one slow drop at a time. With this invocation of evil let’s return to Arendt and see whether there are grounds for hope in all of this darkness. Arendt is famous for giving voice to the phrase “the banality of evil.” Evil can be blatant and explicit. The sadist, the racial supremacist, and the fascist are overtly wicked. They seek cruelty and domination for its own sake. This is the heart of the mountain of evil, the cruel 9 Huck Gutman, Bertolt Brecht –“When Evil-Doing Comes Like Falling Rain”, in: Poetry Letters by Huck Gutman, published at https://www.huckgutman.com/blog-1/bertolt-brecht-when -evil-doing-comes-like-falling-rain.
202 Fiala granite at the core of hate and injustice. But there is another type of evil, that is not overtly cruel. This is the evil of indifferent complicity. This is the topsoil of complicity that gives a veneer of normality to evil. Sometimes those who are complicit are ignorant. But often this ignorance is feigned and hypocritical. Arendt’s example was Adolph Eichmann, whom she portrayed as a thoughtless bureaucrat, a mere functionary who happened to mastermind the mechanisms of Holocaust. Scholars of the Holocaust have debated whether Arendt’s portrait of Eichmann is too lenient. But the phenomenon she was describing is familiar. This is the silence of the white majority that Martin Luther King, Jr. described as hiding “behind the anesthetizing security of stained-glass windows.” This is the problem of complicity in slavery and racism that runs throughout Twain’s Huck Finn. This is the indifference and ignorance of those who fail to speak out and fail to take action in a world that involves cruelty, inequity, and injustice. This is the futile effort of avoidance and self-preservation that stops up its ears to the cries of the oppressed. But this points us toward a solution—and a source of hope. We must give voice to suffering. We must open the floodgates and let the rain do its work. We must unstop our ears. And turn on the light. And we must take a step in the right direction. At the very least, we must make sure that we are not agents of darkness and concealment, who keep our lights off and thereby give cover to evil. The model of this work of enlightenment and voice is ancient. Socrates spoke truth to power. So did Jesus. A more modern example is Thoreau, who refused to pay his taxes to a system that supported slavery and imperialistic wars—and wrote an essay that inspired Gandhi. He imagined that in his refusal he was being a “counter-friction” to the machine. King and his movement built upon this idea, with further inspiration from Gandhi and other liberationist movements of the 20th Century. This movement runs parallel with the work of Arendt’s generation of anti-Nazi and anti-Totalitarian scholars and activists. We should include here the efforts of those who, like André Trocmé and Edouard Theis, were engaged in nonviolent subversion of the Nazi regime. There are complicated questions here about whether and to what extent nonviolent resistance can work in the face of outrageous evil—and when and to what extent violence may be justified. But let’s return to a point made by Gan in his essay, which is that violence is often found in the heart of the darkness. Violence causes fear, insecurity, and more violence. Gan suggests that it is with nonviolence that this dark cycle is broken. This point was also made, of course, by Gandhi and King. King wrote (in a passage that refers to the darkness):
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Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that.10 King continued: Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. The beauty of nonviolence is that in its own way and in its own time it seeks to break the chain reaction of evil. These phrases have often been quoted and repeated—and so have sometimes themselves become banal. But let’s pull these inspiring words apart in order to reveal the truth they contain. On the one hand, the imagery that King employs resonates with a kind of Christian metaphor that extends and morphs through the European enlightenment. It is Christ, after all, who is the light of the world. On one telling of the Christ story, the Christian dawn ushers in a new kingdom: a world where peacemakers are blessed, the mighty are brought low, and the meek inherit the earth. This idea of a new dawn or a new dispensation was familiar to King and to other Christian advocates of nonviolence. And for Christians, this is not merely a metaphor—it is also metaphysics. But one need not be a Christian to understand the power of the metaphor of birth. Another useful source is Arendt. As Anna Taft has pointed out in the present volume, one of the solutions is for us to see the way that violence appears in what Taft calls (following Arendt) “fabrication.” A significant problem for modern humanity is our tendency to view human life as a process of fabrication, with human beings as the raw materials of a vast mechanical process of production. This tendency to view human life in merely instrumental terms lies at the heart of much violence and darkness. It was at work in the trains that led to Auschwitz. It was present in the technological mindset that sought to maximize killing power with the creation of the atomic bomb. And it can be seen today in the way that human minds have become raw material for social media and pathways for the flow of “mind viruses” and fake news (see the Paula Smithka’s essay in this volume, as well as Dakota Layton’s). The solution to these problems must include active resistance to those paradigms of social and political life that focuses on manipulation, coercion, conformity, and violence. One important part of that resistance is found in Arendt’s idea of “natality”—the act or process of giving birth and creation. In The Human Condition,
10
Martin Luther King, Jr. Where Do We Go From Here? Chaos or Community (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968/2010), 65.
204 Fiala Arendt offered an affirmative view of life that emphasized the capacity for birth, labor, and creative activity. Arendt explains in a pregnant passage (pun intended): Labor and work, as well as action, are also rooted in natality in so far as they have the task to provide and preserve the world for, to foresee and reckon with, the constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as strangers. However, of the three, action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, thought.11 Arendt does not connect natality directly to hope. Perhaps “hope” is too metaphysical for what she has in mind. Hope has often been connected with a kind of Leibnizian optimism that dreams of completion and fulfillment in the coming Kingdom of God. Rather, Arendt connects natality to labor and action. And in her brief discussions of hope, she approaches the concept phenomenologically. For Arendt, hope is a feature of human temporality that unfolds in tension with fear and remembrance. She says, for example: Man lives in this in-between, and what he calls the present is a life-long fight against the dead weight of the past, driving him forward with hope, and the fear of a future (whose only certainty is death), driving him backward toward “the quiet of the past” with nostalgia for and remembrance of the only reality he can be sure of.12 And: Every hope carries within itself a fear, and every fear cures itself by turning to the corresponding hope. It is because of their shifting, unstable, and disquieting nature that classical antiquity counted both among the evil gifts of Pandora’s box.13
11 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 9. 12 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (London: Harcourt, 1978), Vol. 1 p. 205. 13 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2 p. 35.
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We might extend this phenomenology of hope a bit further, connecting it with ideas discussed above. Fear (along with hate, violence, and cruelty) are states of mind that prowl the darkness. Nostalgia (and related aspects of remembrance such as grief and regret) are static states that keep us wedded to the past. But hope is a kind of light and dynamism. It is an expectant and bright opening toward the future. It is not passive; it is active. It is not quiet; it is vocal. It is not afraid of the darkness. Rather, it offers courage and encouragement. Although Arendt does not make this connection, it is easy to see that hope is connected to the concept of natality. Natality names a condition of action that is not merely fabrication. To create and to give birth are active verbs. And these actions lean toward the future with open expectation. The crucial point here is that for things to change, for the light to arrive, for the rain to wash away the mountain, we must take action in a bright mood of expectant anticipation. This is not a violent imposition on the world or on others: it is not coercive or manipulative. It is in action, labor, work, and natality that new things happen. This is how old patterns and cycles of violence are overcome. This is how justice and liberation arrive. As Arendt suggests, natality is what we experience when newcomers arrive. This includes visiting strangers (immigrants, new ideas, and new dreams). It also includes the future generation—those who will judge us. And here we might conclude with another source of hope, which is found in the vitality of the human spirit. Human beings are prolific. Even in the darkness, we are creative. We love, produce, innovate, and reproduce. The very fact that there will be a future generation, gives us reason to hope—and a reason to do our part. It is sobering to imagine how the future will judge us. The future will condemn us if we contribute to the darkness: hate and cruelty do not fare well in the eyes of future history. But the future will also judge us harshly if we remain static and succumb to fear and regret, which are often excuses for inaction and complicity. Rather than this, a glance to the future can inspire us to get to work, to build and to create. There is no certainty with regard to the future. But we can be sure that if there is going to be a light at the end of the tunnel, it is up to us to give birth to it.
References
Bertolt Brecht, “To Posterity” H.R. Hays translation at https://allpoetry.com/To-Poster ity; German original here: https://www.lyrikline.org/de/gedichte/die-nachgebore nen-740.
206 Fiala Bertolt Brecht, “When Evil-Doing Comes like Falling Rain” in Poetry Letters by Huck Gutman, published at https://www.huckgutman.com/blog-1/bertolt-brecht-when -evil-doing-comes-like-falling-rain. Andrew Fiala, Tyranny from Plato to Trump (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022). Christian Soschner, Gandhi Didn’t Actually Ever Say, “Be the Change You Want to See in the World.” Here’s the Real Quote …, in: illumination-Curated via Medium (4 April 2021), published at https://medium.com/illumination-curated/gandhi-didnt -actually-ever-say-be-the-change-you-want-to-see-in-the-world-d65b92cf5db. Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968). Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (London: Harcourt, 1978), Vol. 1. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Martin Luther King, Jr. Where Do We Go From Here? Chaos or Community (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968/2010). Martin Luther King, Jr. A Testament of Hope (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1986).
Index ahimsa 146–8 Althusser, Louis 70–73 anger 25–6, 38–40, 131–42 Aquinas, Thomas 157–62 Arendt, Hannah 70–3, 76, 79–80, 184–8, 192–6, 200–5 Aristotle 124, 187 authoritarianism 46, 69–80, 86, 122, 199 Biden, Joseph 27, 32, 37, 39–46, 59, 78 Black Lives Matter 2, 8, 17, 31, 69–80 Black women 132–6 Brecht, Bertolt 198, 200–1 care ethics 58–63 Chenoweth, Erica 104–5 civil resistance 104–13 civility 35, 42–43 climate change 1, 72–9 collaboration/collaborative problem solving 177–79 collective hope 3, 6–7, 173, 181–2 communism 20, 71 compassion 141, 201 complicity 132, 198–205 conspiracy theories 1–2, 31, 37, 46, 199 Covid-19 1–2, 16–17, 31–32, 36, 39, 41–42, 45– 47, 51, 74, 197–99 democracy 18, 30–47, 57, 69, 91–92, 117 despair 7, 27, 53, 57, 179, 182, 195, 200 Dewey, John 51–2, 55–8, 61, 124 dignity 72, 94–103 education 26, 55, 77, 173–5, 179–82 Eichmann, Adolph 202 empathy 99, 132 fabrication 184–93, 203–5 fake news 31–42, 72, 118–28 fascism 20, 83–92, 122 fear 18–28, 37–39, 51, 63, 96, 133, 200–5 feminism 131–42 Fishman, Stephen 51–61 Freire, Paulo 55–58
Galtung, Johan 76, 177–9 Gandhi, Mohandas K. 21–23, 104, 108, 111, 147, 151, 196, 202 genocide 94–103, 198–9 Gorman, Amanda 46, 62 gratitude 155 harm 22, 26, 73–4, 80, 97, 106–11, 119–20, 138–42, 144–52, 176–79 harmony 75, 180 Hitler, Adolf 36, 70, 79, 83–88, 197 Hobbes, Thomas 3–6 Holocaust 50, 83, 94–99, 198, 202 human rights 104, 118, 121, 157–58, 161, 167 hypothetical imperative individualism 3–7 insecurity 18–25, 202 international relations 85, 91 interpellation 70–80 journalism 91–2, 117, 120 just peace 85 just war theory 99, 106 justice. See social justice Kant, Immanuel 26, 52, 95, 100 King, Jr., Martin Luther 18, 59, 85, 90, 101–2, 108–11, 164, 195–6, 199, 202 language of hope 51–63 liberty 34, 70–80 linguistic nonviolence 52–63 love 157–67, 192, 203, 205 love of truth 125 Mali 188–92 mediation 173–82 militarism 199 military 19–21, 83–90, 99, 106 moral hope 51–63 moral injury 144–55 natality 203–5 Nazism/Nazi Germany 70–71, 83, 93, 196–202
208 Index negative peace 75–79 nonviolence 15, 21–27, 102, 146–56, 195– 6, 202–3 nuclear weapons 17–20, 198–99 Nussbaum, Martha 96 Obama, Barack 117 pacifism 56 peace activism 50–63, 149 peace education 173–182 performative discourse 50–63 Plato 22, 26, 124, 146–48 positive peace 70–79 pragmatism 56 propaganda 36, 42, 71–80, 83 racism 16, 77–78, 31, 38–9, 43, 107, 133–9, 202 responsibility 42, 139, 178, 181 restorative justice/practices 141–2, 173–82 right to life 70–79, 96–102 Rorty, Richard 52–58, 69, 80 sanctions (economic) 88–90 self-fulfilling prophecies 173–82 sexism 44, 133, 136, 139
social justice 32, 51–63, 70, 75, 77, 136, 167, 195 social media 2, 19, 27, 31–45, 73, 117–21, 164 social movements 1–10, 70 social networks 2–10 socialism 17–20 spaces of appearance 184–93 stability 3–5 Stoicism 96, 144–56 structural functionalism 173–76 structural injustice 131–35 structural violence 75, 144 Thunberg, Greta 77–8 tolerance/toleration 26, 34–5, 43, 118, 157–67 tranquility 159–61 Trocmé, André 202 Trump, Donald 15–19, 26–7, 30–47, 50, 69– 79, 117, 197–9 truth decay 117–28 virtue 4, 56, 79, 99, 125, 155, 165–7 Walzer, Michael 104–9 wealth 16, 107 welfare 144–55 white privilege 131–42