Anglo-Swedish Commercial Connections and Diplomatic Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Northern World, 96) 9004512330, 9789004512337

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Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Connections and Diplomatic Relations in the Seventeenth Century

The Northern World north europe and the baltic c.400– 1700 ad peoples, economies and cultures Editors Jón Viđar Sigurđsson (Oslo) Piotr Gorecki (University of California at Riverside) Steve Murdoch (St. Andrews) Cordelia Heß (Greifswald) Anne Pedersen (National Museum of Denmark)

volume 96

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​nw

Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Connections and Diplomatic Relations in the Seventeenth Century By

Adam Grimshaw

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: A colourised map of Northern Europe with Sweden in full focus. The map was originally created by Swedish cartographer Anders Bure (Andreas Bureus). This version was later colourised and published in Amsterdam by Willem Janzsoon Blaeu in 1635. ©Reproduced courtesy of The National Library of Sweden (Kungliga Biblioteket). The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at https://​cata​log​.loc​.gov lc record available at https://​lccn​.loc​.gov/2023031086

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 1569-​1 462 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1233-​7 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 4977-​7 (e-​book) doi 10.1163/9789004549777 Copyright 2024 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For Joseph, the greatest inspiration

∵

Contents  Acknowledgements ix  List of Illustrations xi  Abbreviations xiii  Stylistic Conventions xiv  Weights, Measures and Money xv  Introduction 1 1  An Insignificant Trade? 1603–​1641 21 1  Perspectives on Existing Historiography 22 2  The Union of the Crowns and Its Effect on Baltic Trade 24 3  The Tudor Period 28 4  Anglo-​Swedish Commerce in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century 30 5  The Scottish Connection 43 6  John Coote and Nascent Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Networks 46 7  Anthony Knipe and the English Company of Gothenburg, 1635–​1637 54 8  The Shift towards Sweden 67 9  Conclusion 70 2  The Codification of a Relationship, 1642–​1659 72 1  The Rise of Swedish Exports and the English Market 75 2  Difficulties in the Import Trade 85 3  The Impetus for Reaching the Swedish Market 88 4  Commercial Perspectives on Anglo-​Swedish Diplomacy 94 5  Commercial Organisation: the Role of the State 102 6  Commercial Organisation: the Role of Merchants and Agents 107 7  The English East India Company and the Swedish Africa Company: Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Connections in Colonial Trades 113 8  Conclusion 117 3  Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–​1671 119 1  Establishing Permanent Diplomatic Representation 123 2  England Becomes a Vital Trading Partner 140 3  Circumventing the Sound 153 4  Sweden Emerges Unchallenged 161

viii Contents 5  Commercial Policy and the Demise of the Eastland Monopoly 174 6  Abraham Kock-​Cronström, Copper, and the English Mint 179 7  Conclusion 183 4  Mixed Fortunes, 1672–​1688 185 1  Attempts at Finding Accord 188 2  English Trade Scales New Heights 191 3  The Problem of Payment 224 4  Conclusion 234 5  Commercial Dominance and Diplomatic Disruption, 1689–​1700 238 1  Diplomacy at War 241 2  The Only Stable Market 247 3  Anglo-​Swedish Disputes: Outstanding Debts and the Expulsion of Foreign Merchants 276 4  Conclusion 285  Conclusion 288  Bibliography 293  Index 313

Acknowledgements This book is the culmination of a number of phases and several years of research and I am indebted to many people for their help along the way. Firstly I would like to thank the archivists and staff at Stockholm City Archives, Gothenburg Provincial Archives, The National Archives at Kew, the National Archives of Norway in Oslo, Derbyshire Record Office in Matlock, The British Library in London and the National Archives of Sweden and the Military Archives in Stockholm for their assistance and expertise. Thank you to Edgar Abs at Lempertz Kunsthaus, Petri Heinonen at Crafoord Auktioner, Katharina Fahlstedt at Auktionsverket and Lisa Olrichs at the National Portrait Gallery for assistance with images. For help with specific sources I would have otherwise missed or not been able to use thank you to Dr Charlotta Forss, Dr Cathleen Sarti, Dr Kaarle Wirta, Dr Kathrin Zickermann and Henri Hannula. Your contributions have made this study so much richer. Much gratitude goes to my thesis examiners Professor Leos Müller and Dr Jacqueline Rose for straightening out the very first draft of this book. Thank you to my proofreaders Jack Abernethy, Dr Otso Kortekangas and Dr Kieran McConaghy who also tackled some messy early drafts. Thank you to Dr Claire McLoughlin for reading the first draft of the opening chapter. In Manchester thank you to Dr Rosamund Oates who took the time to set me on task at the beginning of my history studies. Thank you to Dr Meghan Healy, Rowan Malpas, Lucas Wright, Kirsty Henderson and Ian Jones for your friendship and a place to stay. In St Andrews thank you to Professor Guy Rowlands for making my studies in Scotland possible. In Gothenburg thank you to Annie Andrén (who has a lot to answer for), and of course to Josef “Koffalo” Landberg, David Johansson and Lina Jutvik for constant encouragement and much needed accommodation. In Stockholm thank you to Samuel Hemmilä and Kristian Östberg; to Oscar Lindberg and Matin Modarres; to Simon Bengtsson and Barry Nairne; to Nicholas Albert, Benjamin Smith and Patrick Corkery; to Francesco “Fenn” Martelli, Mauro Angelantoni, Valerio Pierantozzi, Alessandro Caverni; to Erik Svensson and Lenny Lindbäck; to Dr Ebba Hedén Blomqvist; to Björn Nordgren, Dr Martin Skoog, Dr Lisa Hellman, Dr Ale Pålsson, Dr Carl Mikael Carlsson and Dr Olof Bortz; to George Ellem, Natalie Hall, Veronica Bäckström, Nils Adler, Andreas Lundin, Werner Müller-​Schell, Hanna Poutanen and Sofie and Louie Seitamo-​Mijac. Thank you to Oscar Carlsson, Eskil Kvarnström, Jacob Ljunggren and Jens Öberg for the flexibility that aided the completion of this book. Thank you to Franziska Rönisch, Shmuely Slater, Ryan McDowell and Dr Rune Blix Hagen. Thank you to the University of St Andrews and the ahrc for the funding and belief that

x Acknowledgements this was a study worth supporting. Thank you to Dr Kate Hammond for bringing me on board at Brill, the entire production team at Brill and especially to my editor Marcella Mulder for her patience, understanding and expertise. A big thanks has to go to Dr Alexia Grosjean and Professor Steve Murdoch who have guided me from the start to the finish of this project. Not only has their work paved the way for this book but they have always been present, positive and of invaluable help. Finally, thank you to my family Anna, Gunnar, Mam, Dad, Andrea and Joseph. Thank you for the patience in times of stress, the financial support that has allowed a working class to tread this path, and most of all the encouragement and belief in me that I could get this done.

Illustrations Maps 1  Main centres of Anglo-​Swedish trade xvii

Figures 0.1  A view of Gothenburg, 1709 xviii 0.2  A view of Stockholm, 1693 xviii 0.3  Stockholm’s järngraven (iron-weighing and export station), 1674 12 0.4  An excerpt from the Stockholm customs accounts, 1670 14 0.5  Value of exports from Stockholm to England, 1636–​1690 18 0.6  Value of imports from England and in English ships from third party ports into Stockholm, 1636–​1686 19 0.7  Value of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1638–​1700 20 1.1  Exports from Stockholm to England, 1604–​1640 32 1.2  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1638 38 1.3  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1641 40 1.4  Top exporters from Gothenburg to England, 1638 and 1641 42 1.5  A list of participants in the English Company of Gothenburg, 1635 62 2.1  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1649 79 2.2  Comparative overview of commodities exported from Gothenburg to England by value, 1649 and 1655 83 2.3  Comparative overview of exports from Gothenburg and Stockholm to England by value, 1655 84 2.4  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1655 111 3.1  Henry Coventry, Ambassador Extraordinary to Sweden, 1664–​1666 and 1671–​ 1672. By Edward Harding 125 3.2  The coat of arms of Johan Barkman Leijonberg, the first Swedish Resident to England, 1661–​1691 129 3.3  John Robinson’s An Account of Sweden, 1694 131 3.4  Festivities in Stockholm to commemorate Karl xi receiving the Order of the Garter from Charles ii by Wenceslaus Hollar, 1669 139 3.5  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1660 142 3.6  Development of export commodities from Stockholm to England, 1650–​1660 143 3.7  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1660 144

xii Illustrations 3.8  Points of origin and top importers of salt into Stockholm on board English ships, 1660 150 3.9  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1660 153 3.10  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1666 159 3.11  Points of origin exiting the Baltic in Anglo-​Baltic trade, 1670 162 3.12  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1670 166 3.13  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1670 167 3.14  Home ports of freighters responsible for conveying goods from Stockholm to England, 1670 169 3.15  Composition of imports from England to Stockholm, 1670 172 3.16  Top importers from England into Stockholm, 1670 173 4.1  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1675 192 4.2  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1675 193 4.3  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1675 195 4.4  Value of imports into Stockholm according to point of origin, 1675 197 4.5  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1680 205 4.6  The balance of trade between England and Stockholm, 1655–​1686 213 4.7  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1686 216 4.8  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1686 219 4.9  Gothenburg export markets by value, 1675 221 4.10  Gothenburg export markets by value, 1685 223 5.1  Total traffic exiting the Baltic, 1688–​1700 249 5.2  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1690 251 5.3  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1690 254 5.4  Destination of Swedish tar and pitch exports to England, 1700 259 5.5  Total traffic entering the Baltic, 1688–​1700 261 5.6  Composition of exports from Riga to England, 1690–​1700 264 5.7  English tobacco imports into Narva, 1675–​1700 266 5.8  Exports from Narva, 1690–​1700 268 5.9  Development of Gothenburg export markets by value, 1685–​1700 273

Abbreviations apc bl cc cspd da dra dsp eeic gca gla hca kra lta odnb pc sak sbl sca sh sp sra srp ssa ssp ssne stro swb tna uub

Acts of the Privy Council of England (45 vols., London, 1890–​1964) British Library (London) Court of Chancery Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: First Series, 1547–​1625, (13 vols., London, 1856–​1892) Second Series, 1625–​1649, (23 vols., London, 1858–​1897) Third Series, 1649–​1660, (13 vols., London, 1875–​1886) Fourth Series, 1660–​1685, (29 vols., London, 1860–​1939) Fifth Series, 1685–​1689, (3 vols., London, 1960–​1972) Sixth Series, 1689–​1702, (11 vols., London, 1895–​1937) Diplomatica Anglica Danmarks Rigsarkiv (Copenhagen) [The National Archives of Denmark] Danish ship pounds English East India Company Göteborg stadsräkenskaper /​Gothenburg customs accounts Göteborg Landsarkiv (Gothenburg) [The Provincial Archives of Gothenburg] High Court of Admiralty Krigsarkivet i Stockholm (Stockholm) [The Military Archives of Sweden] Lokala tullräkenskaper /​Local town accounts Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Privy Council Registers Svenska Afrikakompaniet /​The Swedish Africa Company Svenskt biografiskt lexikon /​Swedish Dictionary of National Biography Stockholm stadskamrerarens arkiv räkenskaper /​Stockholm customs accounts Svea Hovrätt /​Svea Court of Appeal State Papers Svenska Riksarkivet (Stockholm) [The National Archives of Sweden] Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll /​Minutes of the Swedish Council of the Realm Stockholm Stadsarkiv (Stockholm) [The City Archives of Stockholm] Swedish ship pounds The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database Sound Toll Registers Online Database Stockholms vågböcker /​Stockholm weighbooks The National Archives of England and Wales (London) Uppsala universitetsbibliotek (Uppsala) [The University Library of Uppsala]

Stylistic Conventions The names of Swedish monarchs and members of state have been rendered in their Swedish versions. The Swedish spelling of place names has also been used, unless a common and accepted English equivalent exists. For example, ‘Gothenburg’ is used instead of ‘Göteborg’. The only exception is ‘Skåne’. British names in Swedish sources have been spelt in their English equivalent, and when it is not absolutely clear what contemporary English spelling would have been used, an educated guess has been taken. Swedish and other nationalities that appear in Swedish sources where there is more than one variant of a person’s name have been standardised into modern Swedish. Names with one consistent spelling and no variants where there is no commonly accepted modern equivalent have been retained in their contemporary spelling. Swedish names in English sources have been rendered into a modern Swedish equivalent. Swedish Baltic ports and non-​Swedish Baltic ports have been spelt in their original Germanic forms in order to avoid confusion. For example, ‘Danzig’, ‘Königsberg’ and ‘Reval’ have retained their contemporary spellings instead of using the modern day ‘Gdansk’ ‘Kaliningrad’ and ‘Tallinn’. This has also been applied to ports such as Viborg and Nyen which are now in modern day Russia. Dating of archival and printed primary sources has been left as they were found in the original. The one exception is that January has been counted as the beginning of the new year. Therefore, where a date might have originally stated 16 February 1695/​96, this has been rendered as 16 February 1696. As England and Sweden’s relationship overwhelmingly focused on the Swedish trade area, and given that the main body of commercial sources consulted in this study are from Sweden, in this study the use of “exports” refers to the export of goods leaving Sweden or the Baltic. Similarly, here the use of “imports” signifies goods being imported into Sweden or the Baltic.

Weights, Measures and Money Original weights and values have been retained in this study. Where an English source quotes in Pounds Sterling (£) or refers to weight in pounds (cwt.), tons, or lasts etc. this has not been altered. A similar method has been used for Swedish commercial statistics and other sources. Original weights and values have been converted where it has been deemed necessary to clarify for the benefit of the reader. A variety of weights and measures were used for different commodities in the Baltic and these could differ from port to port. The Swedish ship pound or skeppund (ssp) varied in weight depending on where in Sweden you were. The export skeppund or skeppund stapelstadsvikt is what was used in contemporary commercial sources and the statistics of this study reflect that measurement. A skeppund was equivalent to 299–​300 English pounds (cwt.) and 136 kilograms.1 In the seventeenth century Sweden had a complex monetary system based on the riksdaler with both copper and silver mints operating concurrently (daler kopparmynt and daler silvermynt), as well as other systems based on gold.2 The Swedish commercial sources that form the backbone of this study frequently recorded value in daler silvermynt or silver riksdaler, here simply noted as “riksdaler” for ease unless stated otherwise. The English used Pounds Sterling, with each pound consisting of 20 shillings or 240 pence. Although exchange rates fluctuated widely between English and Swedish markets, a ratio of 4:1 in favour of the Swedish riksdaler on the Pound Sterling has been used. This is based on Alexia Grosjean’s calculation used in her study.3 It is also possible to discern the use of specific exchange rates through mercantile correspondence and contemporary court cases. Unfortunately, due to the impossibility of consisting all sources across the period, a standard ratio has been adopted. Where precise exchange rates have been quoted in sources utilised by this study, their reckoning has been used.

1 The weights and measurements used in this study are based upon those found in Carlsson, Albert W., Med, mätt, mått: svenska och utländska mått genom tiderna, lt, Stockholm, 1989. The Sound Toll Registers Online Database weights and measures guide “Measurements in str” has also been utilised. Available from: http://​soundt​oll​.nl​/​. Accessed March 2020. 2 For an in-​depth study see Edvinsson, Rodney, ‘Early Modern Copper Money: Multiple currencies and trimetallism in Sweden, 1624–​1776’, in European Review of Economic History, Vol. 16, 2012, pp. 408–​429. 3 Grosjean, Alexia, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden, 1569–​1654, Leiden, 2003, xi–​x ii.

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xvi 

Weights, Measures and Money

Common Weights and Measures Found in This Study and Their Modern Equivalents

Aln: 1 Aln =​0.59 centimetre (cm) –​ Used to measure textile goods. Textile goods could also be measured in pieces or dozens (12 pieces) Danish ship pounds: 1 dsp =​159 kg –​ Slightly heavier than the Swedish export ship pound (136 kg) Decker/​däcker: 1 decker =​10 pieces Dusin (dozen): 1 dozen =​12 pieces –​ Not to be confused with the English textile “dozens” imported into Sweden en masse Groß/​gros/​gross =​144 pieces Kanna/​kannor: 1 kanna =​2.617 litres –​ Used to measure liquids, usually smaller amounts of wine. Defined in 1665 as the above measurement Kista (chest) –​Undeterminable measurement found in contemporary sources Last/​läst: 1 last =​12 barrels for tar and pitch unless otherwise stated –​ Other amounts were used for different commodities and have been specified accordingly Oxhuvud: 1 oxhuvud =​90 kannor or 236 litres –​ Used to measure larger amounts of wine or other liquids such as spirits imported on a large scale Skeppund (ship pound/​s sp): 1 ssp =​136 kilograms (kg) –​ Commonly used for bulk goods such as iron and copper Tolfter/​Tolffter (twelfth) =​A dozen or twelve pieces Tunna/​tunnor (barrel): 1 tunna =​125.62 litres

map 1  Main centres of Anglo-​Swedish trade

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Figure 0.1  A view of Gothenburg, 1709 reproduced courtesy of the national library of sweden (kungliga biblioteket). ©the national library of sweden

FIGURE 0.2  A view of Stockholm, 1693 reproduced courtesy of the national library of sweden (kungliga biblioteket). ©the national library of sweden

Introduction In December 1679, Hamburg-​born merchant Abraham Wolters complained to his commercial associate that all English traders in the Swedish capital were “inexperienced young idlers who spend whole days in wine and tobacco houses”.1 A member of the Stockholm burgess community, Wolters was a formidable commercial operator who was heavily invested in a variety of import and export trades in the Swedish capital.2 He had much to fear from the incursions the English mercantile community had made into the commercial life of Sweden. A fierce critic of English traders and their country’s commercial practices, the Swedish emigré was speaking at the close of a particularly intense period for Anglo-​Swedish trade relations. (Figure 0.1) Over the course of a generation Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact had progressed from being an unremarkable and inconsistent association to becoming the most significant commercial relationship for both nations. By the mid-​ 1670s English traders dominated Swedish commercial affairs which became a significant cause of concern for the likes of Wolters, his peers, and the Swedish government alike. By and large, the intensity under which Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact had developed was predicated on the surging demand for Swedish exports. Iron was of particular interest, but tar, pitch, copper, brass and a variety of timber goods were also in demand in England. In response, England’s merchants and shippers clambered to find viable markets for their own goods in the face of a continually rising demand for Swedish goods. The purpose of this study is to trace the nature and extent of commercial association between England and Sweden across the course of the seventeenth century. It analyses the exchange of commodities that underpinned the commercial interaction between the two nations, while evaluating their diplomatic relationship and how far this impacted commercial undertakings. The activities of merchants who were involved in the trade is framed as a central consideration in order to assess the development of trends over the period, as well as to determine the experience of those engaged in Anglo-​Swedish trade. The study traces the significant development of England and Sweden’s commercial 1 Roseveare, Henry, Markets and Merchants of the Late Seventeenth Century: the Marescoe-​ David Letters, 1688–​1680, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 171. 2 Wolters is noted as being from a prominent Hamburg merchant family. In 1680 he was the most substantial exporter from Stockholm to England. His export account was worth 122,530 riksdaler, which was around double the value of his nearest direct competitor. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680; Boëthius, B., “Abraham Cronström” in sbl: https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​/mobil​/Arti​ kel​/15710​. Accessed 28 February 2020.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_002

2 Introduction relationship throughout the period, revealing how it became the central commercial engagement of both nations’ wider ambitions. Although England’s borders have remained unchanged since the seventeenth century, Sweden’s contemporary political boundaries were very different from what they are today. The seventeenth century saw Sweden embark on an aggressive policy of expansion outside of its Scandinavian borders that comprise modern day Sweden. This period can often be referred to as stormaktstiden in Swedish historiography, which can be roughly translated as the age of empire or the era of great power. The process of expansion actually began much earlier with the acquisition of Finland. However, territorial consolidation across the Baltic region continued into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the additions of Estonia, Livonia, Karelia and Ingria, as well as the islands of Gotland, Dagö and Ösel. Sweden also gained territories in modern day Germany. After the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, Western Pomerania, Bremen-​Werden and Wismar all became part of Sweden’s dramatic expansion. Sweden’s current borders were fixed with the acquisition of the provinces of Skåne, Halland and Bohuslän in 1658, once a part of Denmark-​Norway. Sweden was to lose the majority of its non-​Scandinavian territories during the Great Northern War (1700–​1721), and the rise of Russia from this point onwards saw its dominance within the Baltic recede. Sweden also acquired territory outside of Europe. It held control over a number of forts on the coast of Western Africa (in present-​day Ghana and Togo) during the period 1650–​1663, and established New Sweden in 1638 (present-​day Delaware), although this latter colony had been lost to the Dutch by 1655. The consequences of this territorial growth were numerous. An immediate effect was the increasing commercial control that Sweden began to attain over Baltic commodities which were vital to any nation with aspiring naval ambitions. By gaining control of ports such as Riga, as well as Reval, Narva, Viborg and Nyen around the Gulf of Finland, in addition to Finnish territory, Sweden assumed control over export harbours and their hinterlands that were key production areas of naval goods. In tandem with this development, domestic exports began to increase, with Stockholm and Gothenburg seeing a significant upturn in the export of iron and other goods around the middle of the century.3 (Figure 0.2) 3 For the processes that led to Stockholm becoming a key domestic export harbour in the first half of the seventeenth century see: Sandström, Åke, Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam, Stockholm, 1990. More specifically on exports see pp. 311–​317, 323–​370. The most complete study of Gothenburg’s foreign trade during the seventeenth century is Dalhede, Christina, Handelsfamiljer på stormaktstidens Europamarknad: resor och resande i internationella förbindelser och kulturella intressen, 3 Vols., Warne förlag, Partille, 2001.

Introduction

3

Although the book does briefly consider commercial connections during the Tudor period, the general starting point for this study is the accession of James vi of Scotland to the English throne in 1603. English trade did occur prior to this date, but remained largely unchanged until the 1620s-​1630s. James I’s reign saw a number of fundamental changes to how England interacted with the Baltic, particularly with the introduction of a Scottish diplomatic corps in directing the nation’s foreign affairs as representatives of the Stuart monarchy. The end of the seventeenth century not only represents a convenient juncture to close the study, but marks the end of an era in Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction. The beginning of the eighteenth century saw Sweden’s entry into the Great Northern War which ultimately ended Sweden’s supremacy in the Baltic with the rise of Russia. This changed the nature of Anglo-​Swedish relations. The closing period of this book’s focus also witnessed an expulsion of English merchants from Sweden in the 1690s. Therefore, the seventeenth century represents a unique period in Anglo-​Swedish commercial association. The relationship moved through a number of phases, and viewing the development of events over the period of a century allows the study to adequately address the changing nature of England and Sweden’s relationship during this initial period of heightened commercial contact. During the seventeenth century, England was transformed from a peripheral trader into a commercial heavyweight. London rose to become one of the main centres of world trade, particularly at the expense of the Dutch Republic.4 In this period England expanded its naval capabilities, and managed to diversify its economy to include the re-​export of colonial goods.5 In this respect, the sweeping studies that have sought to affirm the rationale behind the economic movements of the early modern period have thus used England’s development as an archetypal model.6 A major aspect of England’s character during this period, particularly in regards to how it is perceived today, has been based on its commercial expansion and the development of its trade and colonies across the globe. This focus has led to a rich historiography of studies on several arms of English trade, particularly those of transoceanic commerce. It is still the case today that a healthy share of scholarly output is being directed towards 4 Ormrod, David, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650–​1770, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 6, 11–​12, 59. 5 Lipson, E., The Economic History of England. The Age of Mercantilism, Vol. 2, (Fifth Edition), London, 1948; pp. 269–​314, 352–​359, 363–​371. 6 Braudel, Fernand, Civilisation and Capitalism, Vol. 3, London, 1984, pp. 235–​265, 352–​386; Heckscher, E. F., Mercantilism, Vol. 1, London, 1996, pp. 221–​325, 373–​455, Vol. 2, pp. 181–​261; Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World System ii: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the World Economy, New York, 1980, pp. 75–​127.

4 Introduction enriching our understanding of England’s transoceanic ventures. However, the foundation of England’s naval might, as well as its colonial and commercial expansion, has been overlooked and remains under-​appreciated. Much like the Dutch before them, the growth and diversification of England’s economy, as well as the means to protect its shipping, and ultimately to wage war, had its foundations in the Baltic. This expansion could not have been achieved without the goods that were supplied from northern Europe. In contrast, historians of the Dutch Republic have been much readier to appreciate the value of commercial relations with the Baltic and Scandinavia to their history, development, and as a central cog in their world trade system.7 A brief comparison of Dutch and English historiography on Baltic trade is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, these two nations considered one another as adversaries for a large portion of the seventeenth century. Secondly, as a consequence of this maritime rivalry, England and the Dutch Republic have been considered to be the two western maritime powers who most relied on the Baltic. “Moeder alle handel” or ‘The Mother of all Trades’ is the term the Dutch conferred on its Baltic trade. It provided the foundation for their wealth, commercial prowess and the expansion of their colonial empire over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.8 It is possible that this discrepancy in the value placed on the Baltic by historians of England and the Dutch Republic is a direct consequence of the manner in which contemporaries viewed the trade. The Dutch role in the Baltic (and thus Swedish trade) was different to that of the English. Like the English, the Dutch engaged in the export of Baltic commodities for use in their own shipbuilding and armaments industry. However, the Dutch had long come to play a central role in the freighting of Baltic goods to third party markets and this activity was a cornerstone and foundation of their commercial system.9 The Dutch were not only able to utilise Baltic exports to build their maritime fleets, but also to make a profit from the carrying trade. In contrast, the English held a near-​constant deficit with Baltic exports. Whether trading to Prussian, Russian, Polish, Courlandish or Swedish ports, the demand for traditional English commodities such as cloth struggled to match the demand that the English had for goods from the Baltic. This trade deficit would 7

Israel, Jonathan I., Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–​1785, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989; van Tielhof, Milja, The ‘Mother of all Trades’: the Baltic grain trade in Amsterdam from the late sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries, Brill, Leiden, 2002. 8 Van Tielhof, The ‘Mother of All Trades’: The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century, pp. 1–​3. 9 Ibid.

Introduction

5

grow over the course of the century, particularly in regard to Swedish trade.10 Even as the English economy began to diversify into the re-​export of colonial goods, the demand in the Baltic market for English goods simply would not suffice.11 Furthermore, the English found it difficult to make a concerted inroad into the freight trade. Carrying goods to Baltic ports from third party ports such as in southern Europe was one method which could help alleviate commercial imbalances. Therefore the deficit had to be made up in credit, or even more worryingly to contemporary English economic writers, in the export of precious metals. A central element of economic theory in the seventeenth century was mercantilism with the notion of balancing of trade, and holding onto stocks of precious metals.12 English economic writers consistently lambasted the drain this trade inflicted on the English economy.13 Furthermore, the Baltic and Russia were the only realistic source of naval goods, as well as iron, that could serve the consistent annual demand from England. Failure to ensure that England’s American colonies could produce these goods led to a reliance on the Baltic.14 As Sweden came to play an increasingly dominant and almost monopolistic role over the export of a wide array of Baltic goods, the English

10 11 12 13

14

It has been stated that the only vital import for Sweden was salt. Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges Ekonomiska Historia från Gustav Vasa, Vol. 2, Stockholm, 1935, p. 687. Wilson devoted considerable attention to the development colonial re-​exports through English harbours. Wilson, Charles, England’s Apprenticeship, 1603–​1763, London, Longman, 1967, pp. 160–​183. For wider treatises on this topic of contemporary economic theory see: Heckscher, Eli F., Mercantilism, 2 vols. London, 1994; Appleby, Joyce Oldham, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-​Century England, Princeton, 1978. For examples of contemporary attitudes see: Violet, Thomas, A True Discoverie to the Commons of England, How they have been Cleared of almost all the Gold and Silver Coin of this Nation, London, 1651; Child, Josiah, A New Discourse of Trade, London, 1698. For a historiographical debate on mercantilism see: Heckscher, Eli F., ‘Multilateralism, Baltic Trade and the Mercantilists’, in The Economic History Review, Vol 3.2, 1950, pp. 219–​228; Wilson, C., ‘Treasure and Trade Balances: The Mercantilist Problem’, in The Economic History Review, 2.2, 1949, pp. 152–​161; Wilson, C., ‘Trade and Treasure Balances: Further Evidence’, in The Economic History Review, 1951, pp. 231–​242. For a recent survey of English and Dutch contemporary mercantilist ideology see: Rommelse, Gijs, ‘Mountains of Iron and Gold: Mercantilist Ideology in Anglo-​Dutch Relations (1650–​1674)’ in Onnekink, David and Gijs Rommelse (eds.), Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–​1750), Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, pp. 243–​266. For more touching this subject see: Albion, R. G., Forest and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652–​1862, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1926; Malone, J.J., Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England, 1691–​1775, New York, Arno Press, 1979; Pool, Bernard, Navy Board Contracts 1660–​1832: Contract Administration Under the Navy Board, London, Longmans, 1966.

6 Introduction began to resent their reliance on the Swedish trade area. It is perhaps the pejorative attitudes of contemporary writers towards the Baltic that led to the modern lack of focus on the Anglo-​Swedish commercial relationship. It must also be noted that Baltic trade often appears to be considered a much less glamorous field of study than inquiry into England’s transoceanic trades. In contrast to studying the development of England’s commercial relationship with its colonies, investigating the Baltic trade requires an element of multilingualism. The bulk trades in goods sourced from the Baltic, Scandinavia and even the Arctic were perhaps not seen as the most desirable avenue for contemporaries to follow either. There are examples of merchants who began their careers based in the Baltic trading area returning home to invest in potentially more lucrative trades elsewhere. Per weight Baltic exports were less financially remunerative than goods that could be brought from the east or from the Americas for example. This was a concern for shippers and merchants alike who would often have to make two or three sailings into the Baltic on an annual basis. In many areas of the Baltic, particularly in Sweden’s commercial area, English traders were faced with a hostile local mercantile community who were unwilling to undertake business on English terms. These aforementioned considerations have perhaps coloured the way in which contemporaries and present day scholars have viewed the Baltic trades despite their importance to England’s history. English commercial history has not been the only field to sidestep the importance of England and Sweden’s relationship during the seventeenth century. Diplomatic historians of these nations have largely ignored relations between the two powers and the significance of their interaction. Only three studies prior to the closing years of that century consider England and Sweden’s direct diplomatic relationship. One of these predates the serious growth in commercial interaction to focus purely on the military negotiations surrounding the Thirty Years’ War.15 The second and third studies largely centre on the political negotiations surrounding the embassies of the 1650s.16 Historians of England’s 15 16

Heimer, August, De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Sverige och England: 1633–​1654, Lund, 1892. Carlbom, J. L., Sverige och England 1655–​1657, Gothenburg, 1900; Roberts, Michael (ed.), Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell’s Court, 1655–​1659: the missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde, Royal Historical Society, London, Camden Fourth Series, Vol. 36, 1988. Alexia Grosjean’s final chapter of her unpublished Ph.D. thesis covered the ascendancy of the English in directing diplomatic affairs as the influence of the Scottish diplomats was curbed over the 1650s and 1660s. See: Grosjean, Alexia, N. L., ‘Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611–​1660’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1998. Her monograph places less emphasis on those decades although it does contain some concluding remarks, Grosjean, Alexia, An Unofficial

Introduction

7

diplomatic engagements during the seventeenth century have also played a role in omitting England and Sweden’s diplomatic relationship. There is hardly a single study dedicated to this subject the prior to Nine Years’ War (1689–​97). Those that have covered Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic relations have failed to consider the commercial role and focused purely on geopolitical elements.17 In fact, one historian who was the first to open the subject of Anglo-​Swedish relations as an important consideration in England’s wider international foreign policy stated that prior to the Nine Years’ War, relations between England and Sweden were of ‘no great import’.18 Aside from diplomatic studies, Swedish historiography has failed to tackle the role that England played in Sweden’s development. Sweden’s rise during the seventeenth century as the preeminent power in the Baltic was in part fuelled by the migration of various peoples that contributed industrial and mercantile expertise, as well as capital. Some of the main migrant groups were Wallonians who brought industrial knowledge and technical innovation that helped to dramatically improve the production of Swedish iron, as well as the Dutch and Germans who brought credit and entrepreneurial expertise to Sweden.19 An influx of Scottish migrants facilitated Sweden’s connections with the British market, and played a considerable role in boosting Sweden’s military prowess.20 Correspondingly, this has resulted in a greater emphasis and Alliance, Scotland and Sweden 1569–​1654, Brill, Leiden, 2003. There are also two publications by Bulstrode Whitelocke that detail diplomatic negotiations during his embassy as well as a wider coverage of English diplomatic affairs during the period. Whitelocke, Bulstrode, Memorials of the English Affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles the First to the happy restoration of King Charles the Second, 4 Vols, Oxford, 1853; Memoirs, Biographical and Historical of Bulstrode Whitelocke, London, 1860. 17 Roberts, Michael, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, in English Historical Review, Vol. 76, 1961, pp. 402–​446; Feiling only mentions brief treaty negotiations, Feiling, Keith, British Foreign Policy 1660–​1672, pp. 183–​194. Roberts, Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell’s Court, London, 1988. 18 Chance, J. F., British Diplomatic Instructions. Vol. 1.1. Sweden, London, 1922, ix. 19 Douhan, Bernt, Arbete, capital och migration: valloninvandringen till Sverige under 1600-​ talet, Uppsala, 1985; Nergård, Maj-​Britt, Mellan krona och marknad: Utländska och svenska entreprenörer inom svensk järnhantering från ca. 1580 till 1700, Uppsala, 2001; Wubs-​ Mrozewicz, Justyna, ‘Interplay of Identities: German settlers in late medieval Stockholm’, in Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 29.1, 2004, pp. 53–​67. For a wider study on immigration into Sweden see: Svanberg, Ingvar and Tydén, Mattias, Tusen år av invandring: en svensk kulturhistoria, Dialogos förlag, Stockholm, 2005. 20 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, Scotland and Sweden 1569–​1654; Grosjean and Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in 17th Century Gothenburg’, in Grosjean, Alexia and Steve Murdoch (eds.), Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period, Brill, Leiden, 2005, pp. 191–​ 220; Murdoch, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert

8 Introduction acceptance of the international impact and the nature of Sweden’s expansion during this period. Although the English never migrated in any considerable numbers, they did play a crucial role in facilitating the commercial association of the two nations. This was achieved through the direct presence of English merchants in Swedish ports, as well as in providing credit advances that were vital to sustaining native production.21 However, the recognition that has been applied to these various migrant groups and the role they played in facilitating Sweden’s rise during the seventeenth century has not been extended to the commercial role that England played as an export market. Historians of Sweden have long been enamoured with the contribution made by migrants from the Dutch Republic to Sweden during this period. A number of their merchants and entrepreneurs settled in Sweden in the early seventeenth century. Entrepreneurial magnates such as Louis de Geer and the Momma-​Reenstierna firm left their estates in central Stockholm and the Swedish countryside.22 Migrants from the Dutch Republic have thus left tangible reminders of their contribution to Sweden’s development during this period. The English have not, due to the fact that the English never constituted a permanent migrant community, but also because their contribution in terms of buying and supplying of credit is intangible. Thus their names have been struck from the record. Contemporary Swedish attitudes towards England and the English were not favourable. Similarly, the English held a disdain for their commercial reliance upon Sweden and its commodities. It is possible that this contemporary Swedish attitude has permeated through the ages, and may go some way to explaining why the English contribution has not been recognised like that of their Dutch counterparts. This lack of regard for England’s commercial impact on Sweden has been perpetuated in historical studies. For example, one of Sweden’s eminent economic historians Eli F. Heckscher claimed that

21

22

Association in Northern Europe, 1603–​1746, Brill, Leiden, 2006; Murdoch, ‘Community, Commodity and Commerce: the Stockholm-​ Scots in the Seventeenth Century’, in Worthington, David (ed.), British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–​1688, Brill, Leiden, 2010, pp. 31–​59. The importance of supplying English credit to the Swedish market was appreciated by contemporaries and in part a result of the Swedish system of förlag. tna, sp 95/​ 14, pp. 418–​422. John Robinson to William Trumbull. Stockholm, 21 December 1695; Heckscher, Eli F., An Economic History of Sweden, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, ma, 1954, pp. 97–​100. Both Louis De Geer’s and Jacob Momma-​Reenstierna’s properties still exist within a mile of one another on Södermalm in Stockholm. It is important to distinguish that neither Louis De Geer or the Mommas were ethnically Dutch but migrated to Sweden through the Dutch Republic.

Introduction

9

Sweden’s most important treaties concluded during this period were with the Dutch Republic.23 The first breakthrough in wider Anglo-​Baltic commercial history came in the late 1950s and early 1960s when R. W. K. Hinton published The Eastland Company and the Commonweal. This was the first scholarly work to solely consider the impact of the Baltic trade as part of England’s seventeenth century commercial narrative. Hinton focused on the first half of the century, when the Eastland Company was more prevalent. This was a period when the company prioritised trade to its original heartland in the southern Baltic. Hinton angled his study to view how Baltic trade impacted domestic trade conditions and commercial organisation. An invaluable study to the history of English commercial interaction during the first half of the century, it is lacking in regard to its consideration of Swedish trade due to the aforementioned parameters.24 In the early 1960s, Finnish historian Sven-​Erik Åström followed on from Hinton’s work to provide the first study to fully consider Anglo-​Baltic commercial history as a whole. As a Swedish speaking Finn, Åström was the first scholar in this field to possess the language skills necessary to utilise Swedish sources. His initial study concentrated on the politico-​economic relationship of England and Sweden during the period 1675–​1700, and remains the only study until now to develop its investigation along both diplomatic and commercial lines.25 Åström continued to expand the parameters of his research in a second publication that largely departed from diplomatic and political considerations to prioritise specifically commercial developments with the use of English and Baltic sources. His work was ground-​breaking in terms of its source utilisation, as well as in identifying the general trends in commodity exchange and commercial organisation across the period. Åström was the first historian to consider the development of direct trading between English and Swedish markets that developed over the middle decades of the century.26

23 24

Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges Ekonomiska Historia från Gustav Vasa, Vol. 2, p. 687. Hinton, R. W. K., The Eastland Company and the Commonweal in the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1959. 25 Åström, Sven-​Erik, From Stockholm to St Petersburg: Commercial Factors in Political Relations between England and Sweden, 1675–​1700, Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki, 1962. Åström himself registered his surprise that neither English nor Swedish historians had previously latched onto the interaction of the two nations in order to complete a wide-​reaching study. 26 Åstrom, Sven-​Erik, From Cloth to Iron: The Anglo-​Baltic Trade in the Late Seventeenth Century. Part 1. The Growth, Structure and Organization of the Trade, Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki, 1963; Åström, Sven-​Erik, From Cloth to Iron: The Anglo-​Baltic in the

10 Introduction However, Åström widened the scope for his following publication in order to view English commercial interaction across the entirety of the Baltic. This reduced the coverage of political and diplomatic affairs, especially in regards to their impact on commerce, which had been a central consideration of his first study. Furthermore, Åström never fully considered the role of ‘unofficial’ trading with Sweden, that is, those merchants who were not aligned with the royally-​sanctioned monopoly, the Eastland Company. It was merely taken for granted that merchants were members of, and loyal to the Eastland Company, despite its decline and its seeming lack of contact with the Swedish market. Both Hinton and Åström’s works were vital to developing a greater understanding of both Anglo-​Baltic and Anglo-​Swedish trade during the seventeenth century. Without these studies it would not be possible to push forward enquiries into the subject even further. Unfortunately for Åström, he was unable to analyse the activity of merchants engaged in Anglo-​Swedish trade on an individual basis due to a lack of awareness of the existence of merchants’ accounts. Since the 1960s, the discovery of the private accounts of traders engaged in Anglo-​Swedish trade have generated two studies. The first study dealt with the experience of a smaller, northern English merchant, and the second study contrasted that experience by focusing on a larger mercantile firm which was involved in several arms of English foreign trade and based in London.27 Both studies drew on Åström’s conclusions and have greatly enriched our appreciation of how commerce with Sweden was undertaken at ground level during this period. The topic remained untouched until Leos Müller’s more recent study of Anglo-​Swedish commercial relations. Müller was able to utilise his research of the Stockholm based Momma-​Reenstierna firm and his analysis of Stockholm commercial statistics in order to provide the most in-​depth evaluation of English trade and commercial interaction with Stockholm to date.28 This study takes into account the conclusions that were reached by the likes of

27

28

Late Seventeenth Century. Part 2. The Customs Accounts as Sources for the Study of Trade, Finnish Historical Society, Helsinki, 1965. Riden, Philip, ‘An English Factor at Stockholm in the 1680s’ in The Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 35.2, 1987, pp. 191–​207; Roseveare, Henry, Markets and Merchants of the Late Seventeenth Century: the Marescoe-​David Letters, 1688–​1680, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991. Müller, Leos, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640–​1800: a comparative study of early-​ modern entrepreneurial behaviour, Uppsala, 1998; Müller, Leos, ‘Britain and Sweden: the changing pattern of commodity exchange, 1650–​1680’, in Britain and the Baltic: studies in commercial, political and cultural relations, 1500–​2000, University of Sunderland Press, Sunderland, 2003, pp. 61–​76.

Introduction

11

Hinton, Åström, and Roseveare, seeking to challenge some of their assertions through the consultation of previously unutilised commercial records. Further advances that have impacted the study of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction have originated not in studies of England or Sweden itself, but in studies of Scotland’s European relations and the Scottish diaspora of this period. In contrast with English historical studies over recent years, there has been a growing awareness of Scotland’s relations with Europe. Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch’s corpus of work has dealt with commercial, diplomatic, military and migratory aspects of Scotland’s relationship with Scandinavia. This has warranted a reappraisal of the status and commercial organisation of English trade with Sweden, particularly in regard to the role of the Scottish community in Sweden and their institutional and commercial impact.29 This comes in light of Grosjean and Murdoch’s discoveries of the influence and penetration of Scottish migrants in Sweden, particularly in Stockholm and Gothenburg. The sheer wealth of research undertaken on Scotland’s European relations is a clarion call for the potential of English historiography to follow in a similar trend.30 This book is the result of a number of years’ worth of archival research across Britain and Scandinavia. It incorporates a range of previously unutilised commercial, diplomatic and judicial sources as well as personal and official 29

30

Grosjean, Alexia, N. L., ‘Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611–​1660’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1998; Grosjean, Alexia, An Unofficial Alliance, Leiden, 2003; Grosjean, Alexia and Steve Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in 17th Century Gothenburg’, in Grosjean, Alexia and Steve Murdoch (eds.), Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period, Brill, Leiden, 2005, pp. 191–​220; Grosjean and Murdoch, ‘Scottish Involvement in the Swedish Riksdag of the seventeenth century: the period from Parliamentarianism to Absolutism, c. 1632–​1700’, in Parliaments, Estates and Representation, Vol. 34.1. pp. 1–​21; Murdoch, Steve, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–​1660: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis, East Linton, 2000; Murdoch, Steve, ‘Diplomacy in Transition: Stuart-​British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603–​1618’, in MacInnes, A. I., T. Riis, and F. Pedersen, (eds.) Ships, Guns, and Bibles in the North Sea and Baltic States, c. 1350-​c. 1700, East Linton, 2000; Murdoch Steve, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Association in Northern Europe, 1603–​1746, Brill, Leiden, 2006. Other examples include: Bajer, Peter Paul, Scots in the Polish-​Lithuanian Commonwealth, 16th-​18th Centuries, Brill, Leiden, 2012; as well as various articles found in Grosjean, Alexia and Steve Murdoch, (eds.) Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period, Leiden, 2005, and Worthington, David, (ed.), British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–​1688, Brill, Leiden, 2010; McLoughlin, Claire, ‘Scottish Commercial Contacts and the Iberian World, 1581–​1730’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014; Zickermann, Kathrin, Across the German sea: early modern Scottish connections with the wider Elbe-​Weser region, Brill, Leiden, 2013.

12 Introduction

FIGURE 0.3  Stockholm’s järngraven (iron-weighing and export station), 1674 reproduced courtesy of stockholm city archives. ©stockholm city archive (stockholm stadsarkiv), stockholm

correspondence in order to plot the course of Anglo-​Swedish trade during the seventeenth century. Five sets of commercial records have provided the basis on which the central thread of the study operates. The Swedish local town accounts for Stockholm, Gothenburg’s various antecedents and other provincial towns in Sweden (1561–​1636), the Stockholm customs accounts (1636–​1700), the Gothenburg customs accounts (1638–​1700), and the Sound Toll Registers Online (1567–​1700) help to build the largest and most consistent statistical appraisal of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact ever undertaken. The Stockholm weighbooks (1637–​1700) have also provided a supplementary source.31 (Figure 0.3) 31

Direct translations of contemporary customs sources from Swedish into English have been not been used in order to provide more consistency and ease of use for the reader. For example “Göteborgs stadsräkenskaper” (Gothenburg town accounts) have become “Gothenburg customs accounts”. The same has been done for Stockholm. A comparison between translations used and their original form can be seen in the abbreviations section.

Introduction

13

The consistency and accessibility of Swedish commercial sources has been a motivating factor in choosing to base the statistical foundation of the study in these archival sources.32 The local town accounts that recorded foreign trade emerged at various points during the sixteenth century. In the case of Stockholm they date from the 1560s. Significant gaps occur in this archival collection due to the leasing out of the collection of customs to private individuals and records from these periods appear not to have survived. The existing accounts prior to the 1630s provide an adequate overview of foreign trade conducted with Sweden during this period. Extensive administrative reforms in Sweden’s government and its organisation were implemented across the mid-​1630s.33 This resulted in the amendment of notarial practices leading to a greater oversight of town finances, including taxation from citizens and trade. Records were compiled on an annual basis, resulting in the establishment of more consistent town account books. Many of these records have survived for Stockholm and Gothenburg and provide a rich overview of the trade moving through each port. The format of the customs accounts can differ in particular instances but remain mostly consistent for the majority of the century in question. This allows for a greater degree of analysis, particularly of a comparative nature. Both sets of records for Stockholm and Gothenburg record trade on a ship by ship basis. A lading docket was compiled at the customs house for both incoming and outgoing trade. Each docket records information up to and including: the name of the ship’s skipper, the date of entry or exit, the size of the ship, its origination and destination point, a comprehensive list of cargo attributed to each consigning merchant, the value of goods and the toll exacted on said goods. (See Figure 0.4). The extensive wealth of information recorded has warranted a selective use of the records. The study utilises the Stockholm and Gothenburg records on a five year incremental basis and has been aligned where availability has permitted. This method has been extended to further commercial sources in order to provide the best foundation for a comparative study across different geographical areas under Swedish control where deemed necessary.34

32

33 34

Åström utilised English sources such as the Port Books extensively and exhaustively, whilst also finding considerable gaps and additional difficulties in attempting to wield them for an extensive appraisal of Anglo-​Baltic trade. See: Åström, Sven-​Erik, “The Reliability of the English Port Books” in The Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 16.2, 1968, pp. 125–​136. The original act can be found at sra, Statsrättsliga handlingar, 19. 1634 års regeringsform, Stockholm 29 July 1634. Where applicable. Despite their range and depth some years are missing or have been put out of commission to researchers.

14 Introduction

FIGURE 0.4  An excerpt from the Stockholm customs accounts, 1670 reproduced courtesy of stockholm city archives. ©adam grimshaw

Introduction

15

The creation of the Sound Toll Registers Online (stro) has been a revelation for studies of Baltic and northern European trade. It is a resource which will undoubtedly fuel many areas of historical enquiry in the coming years.35 The Sound Toll was administered and exacted by the Danish state as early as the fifteenth century. The collection of tolls at the confluence of the primary entry and exit point of the Baltic had grown to become a significant source of income and power for Denmark. By the seventeenth century control of the Sound had become a key factor in the balance of power in the Baltic, and Sweden’s acquisition of lands bordering the Sound after 1658 proved a major coup for Swedish interests. Where possible the stro have been utilised in order to draw conclusions on the provincial Swedish mainland trade outside of Gothenburg and Stockholm. They have also been employed, as far as possible, to examine trade with other ports and areas under the control of the Swedish Empire such as Estonia, Livonia and Ingria. Unfortunately the original Sound Toll Registers do have drawbacks. At least in regards to English trade with the Baltic there are a large number of either incomplete years or those which either partially or wholly omit English shipping. Furthermore, a complete overview of trade on an annual basis does not appear to be possible until after 1668 when the records become more consistent and complete. Additionally, Swedish shipping was exempt from declaring cargoes into the 1660s and onwards. Therefore it becomes impossible to reconstruct a complete analysis of Anglo-​Swedish trade during years where Swedish shipping carried a larger proportion of cargo. Finally, where the Stockholm and Gothenburg customs accounts allow for a comparative reconstruction of commercial trends according to value, it is sadly not possible to come to a valuation of goods listed in the Sound Toll Registers This book is organised chronologically into five chapters. The first chapter tackles the timeframe 1603–​1641, which marks the period from the accession of James i to the outbreak of the English Civil Wars (1642–​1651). The chapter highlights the realities and difficulties of attempting to evaluate Anglo-​ Swedish commerce during the first four decades of the seventeenth century. It assesses the impact of the Union of the Crowns and the position of Scottish merchants in regards to Anglo-​Baltic commerce after this union. Due to the fragmentary nature of commercial statistics during this period, two previously unknown case studies concerning English merchants trading with Stockholm and Gothenburg have been selected in an attempt to reach conclusions and

35

The Sound Toll Registers Online database is available at: http://​www​.soundt​oll​.nl​.

16 Introduction detail the experience of English trade with Sweden during the initial decades of the century. The second chapter covers the period 1642–​1659. This period, spanning the English Civil Wars, ended in England’s transition into a republic and coincided with the last phase of Sweden’s aggressive expansion. The chapter covers the trends that saw the two nations emerge as commercial and diplomatic partners. It analyses the first treaties concluded between the two nations, as well as the role of the state in directing England’s trade with Sweden. The role of merchants and agents in sourcing Swedish goods during this initial boom in exports to England is also considered. Finally, the chapter assesses the unique engagement between England and Sweden’s colonial markets in the late 1650s and how this impacted their political and commercial relationship. The third chapter covers the years between 1660 and 1671. Despite the reaffirmation of England and Sweden’s relationship under their respective new regimes, diplomatic ties became more strained and the chapter seeks to explain why this occurred. The two treaties that were concluded during this period are used as a basis to assess the commercial policy of both nations. The fate of the Eastland Company and its position in regard to Swedish trade is considered against the backdrop of the newly concluded Treaty of 1661. Swedish merchant Abraham Cronström’s conclusion of a copper contract with the English Crown provides a case study to demonstrate an unresearched area of commercial engagement, and a rare example of commercial organisation at the highest level of government. Chapter four details the 1672–​1688 period and assesses both the diplomatic difficulties encountered during this time as well as the growth of England’s role in freighting goods to the Swedish market by harnessing their neutral status. It considers potential impacts of the Swedish-​Dutch Treaty of 1679, signed just as England entered an era without a treaty in place for the first time since 1654. The chapter draws on a number of case studies in order to detail some of the difficulties English merchants encountered when trading with Sweden, a feature of trade left unremarked upon in previous studies dealing with Anglo-​ Swedish trade. The fifth and final chapter covers the period 1689–​1700, which was dominated by the exigencies of the Nine Years’ War. A brief sample sketch of the type of Anglo-​Swedish negotiations that characterised the inherent difficulties of these years is offered. Commercial disputes between England and Sweden reached a peak during this period. The chapter situates the effects of England’s predatory commercial policy in the context of the difficulties its merchants faced in Sweden when their community began to be used as a point of

Introduction

17

retaliation and as a political pawn. This is an element of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact that has hitherto remained unexplored. In summary this study represents the first dedicated research into Anglo-​ Swedish commercial and diplomatic relations across the seventeenth century. It provides the first consistent statistical overview which facilitates the analysis of developing commercial trends between England and Sweden. It is the first investigation of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy to consider the seventeenth century in its entirety. The study is also the first to detail and assess treaties between the two nations. This allows for an opportunity to question how diplomacy impacted trade and vice versa. Isolating specific events through case studies has permitted the investigation of the real actors that undertook and developed trade between two nations. It serves to highlight a commercial association that has hitherto remained under-​appreciated, and in many respects misunderstood.

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

10,252

1640

24,323

1636

915,333

1,288,444

1645

7296

1,657,938 1,6 1,65 57, 7,9938

1650

12,576

1,1,784,682 1,7 784,6 4,6882

1655

150,542 1660

1666

1670

494,620

1,908,038

331,009

Year

444,665

1,501,5002 1,501,502 1,501,5

1,982,431

Total Stockholm

2,454,638

England

1675

1680

879,983 745,482

1,711,764

2,491,047

1686

1,176,974

1690

1,020,045

2,408,720

2,582,980

­f igure 0.5  Value of exports from Stockholm to England, 1636–​1690 sca, ssa, sca, vol. 1, 1636; vol. 3, 1640; vol. 11. 1645; vol. 16. 1650; vol. 21. 1655; vol. 27, 1660; vol. 29. 1666; vol. 32. 1670; vol. 41, 1675; vol. 59, 1680; vol. 74, 1686; sca, vol. 87, 1690

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

3,000,000

newgenrtpdf

18 Introduction

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

1636

30,026 0

0

1640

17,752

1645

2,797 0 0

1650

7,809 1655

29,145 0

Imports direct from England

Year

1660

212 1670

1666

194,420

9,250 0

237,296

271,833

1675

205,402

246,997

1680

177,471

426,668

Imports from third party ports in English ships

1686

15,705

313,018

1,723,667

1,994,214 1675 1686

2,472,973

2,368,145

1670 1680

1,432,010 2,226,065

1666

2,572,540

1655 1660

1,714,169 1,609,181

1645

1,730,560

1640 1650

555,158

1636

Year Value of trade

Total Stockholm imports by value

­f igure 0.6  Value of imports from England and in English ships from third party ports into Stockholm, 1636–​1686 sca, ssa, sca, vol. 1, 1636; vol. 3, 1640; vol. 11. 1645; vol. 16. 1650; vol. 21. 1655; vol. 27, 1660; vol. 29. 1666; vol. 32. 1670; vol. 41, 1675; vol. 59, 1680; vol. 74, 1686

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

500,000

newgenrtpdf

Introduction

19

0

250,000

500,000

750,000

1638

29,771

204,387

1641

44,742

306,939

1645

1,740

162,892 1649

30,612

331,324

1655

118,034

1660

116,360

386,033

515,754

Year

1665

156,634

486,890

1670

139,639

487,941

1675

447,739

563,519

Total Gothenburg

1685

1690

1695

388,892 388,892

560,111

237,670 261,106 237,670

490,862

834,947

1700

299,666 299,666

534,974

­f igure 0.7  Value of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1638–​1700 sources: gla, gca, vol. 799. 1638; vol. 804. 1641; vol. 819. 1649; gla, gca, vol. 833. 1660: vol. 844. 1665; vol. 852. 1670; vol. 862, 1675; vol. 875, 1685; vol. 879. 1690; vol. 884, 1695, vol. 889, 1700; lind, ivan, göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1 920, pp. 128–​1 31

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

1,000,000

England

newgenrtpdf

20 Introduction

­c hapter 1

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–​1641 Relations between Britain and Sweden during the first half of the seventeenth century were dominated by military considerations. The majority of contact between the Stuart and Vasa Crowns centred on Swedish requests for levies of British troops over numerous conflicts.1 The Stuarts played an important diplomatic role in mediating Swedish conflicts during the early part of this period, helping to foster positive relations, despite the Stuart Crown’s official alliance with Sweden’s northern neighbour, Denmark-​Norway.2 The question of direct British military involvement in relation to the formation of a Protestant alliance, coinciding with Sweden’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War, ensured that communication between the nations continued during the reign of Charles i.3 Contemporary sources from England and Sweden confirm that military as well as international diplomatic affairs prevailed in this period.4 Instances of commercial considerations in contemporary sources are scant due to the small numbers of vessels engaged in direct trade between the English and Swedish markets during this period. This chapter will therefore demonstrate the nature 1 Sweden participated in a number of armed conflicts during the period in question, namely: several campaigns against Poland-​Lithuania (1600–​1629), the De La Gardie campaign in Russia (1609–​11), the Ingrian War (1610–​1617), the Kalmar War (1611–​1613) and a number of campaigns during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–​1648). For example, during the period 1630–​1632 over 1800 soldiers are listed on board ships departing Britain for southern Baltic ports such as Colberg, Elbing, Rostock, Stralsund, Wismar, Wolgast and towards Russia. The majority of these voyages are listed for the King of Sweden. This is just a fraction of the 78 voyages listed between 1603–​1632 departing Britain with soldiers listed onboard. Unfortunately the majority of voyages have no destination point specified. stro search: Great Britain to The Baltic, 1603–​1634. 2 See for example the diplomatic negotiations by British ambassadors who helped negotiate an end to the Kalmar War (1611–​1613) discussed in Steve Murdoch, ‘Seventeenth-​Century Scandinavia: The Evidence in the State Papers’ published on State Papers Online, 2011, consulted online at: http://​gale​.ceng​age​.co​.uk​/state​-pap​ers​-onl​ine​-15091​714​/ess​ays​.aspx​. Accessed 20 February 2015. 3 See Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance for a full treatment. For Britain’s relationship with Denmark-​Norway during this period, see Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart. 4 Major collections of printed primary source literature such as: apc, cspd, and srp confirm discussions in both nations’ governments in regard to one another. Diplomatic collections such as tna, sp 95 (Sweden) and relevant folders in sra, da are dominated by military affairs.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_003

22 

Chapter 1

and extent of trade between England and Sweden, as well as the conditions under which it operated, in a period where the subject has previously received almost no attention. 1

Perspectives on Existing Historiography

The perceived ancillary position of commercial affairs between England and Sweden during this period is reflected in existing studies of Anglo-​Baltic commerce. Previous scholars have dismissed England’s trade with Sweden as insignificant. Their works have sought to focus on the wider and more active aspects of England’s Baltic trade. Studies centred on Anglo-​Baltic trade focus their attention on the main spheres of activity of southern Baltic ports such as Elbing, Danzig and Königsberg. These ports dealt with the bulk of England’s imports and exports to the Baltic in the first half of the century. Any Swedish trade occurring during these years has come at the expense of this focus.5 Previous studies concerning Baltic trade have situated the activities of the Eastland Company and its domestic impact on English economic and social history. This involves specific attention placed on the company’s internal organisation and governance.6 The common trend within Anglo-​Baltic studies is not only to place primary importance on general trends, but to also view the fluctuations in the geographical orientation of the import-​export market. Existing historiography has thus facilitated a strong understanding of the general organisation of commerce, both through the official channel of the Eastland Company, as well as pertaining to the general fluctuations in commodity flows. However, this has been to the detriment of an appreciation of other areas of Baltic trade. For example, little has been said of the activities of individual merchants and the organisation of their trade at ground level, especially in regards to viewing extant commercial networks in place. Nevertheless, these two issues have been tackled in more recent works on Scottish trade with the Baltic and Scandinavia.7 Questioning the status and role of Scottish traders operating outside the control of an established monopoly organisation (such as the Eastland Company), has exposed the need for a reappraisal of the status of England’s commercial activity with the Swedish market. 5 Hinton, The Eastland Trade, pp. 38–​52; Lipson, E., The Economic History of England, Vol. 1, pp. 315–​323; Millard, A. M., “The Import Trade of London, 1600–​1640”; Åström, S. E., From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 29–​45. 6 Hinton, The Eastland Company; Sellers, Maud, Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company. 7 Murdoch, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Association in Northern Europe.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

23

Ultimately there are two realities that must be acknowledged when attempting to view commercial activity between England and Sweden in this period. Firstly, British relations with Sweden were dominated by Scotland. Scottish diplomats representing a British king oversaw England’s interests with Sweden during the first half of the seventeenth century.8 Scottish communities within Sweden were already well established. Scottish migrants were becoming a key component of Swedish military activity, while beginning to occupy influential roles in the Swedish government.9 Sustained contact from Swedish-​based Scottish migrants who saw potential in the Swedish export market helped to facilitate direct commercial activity between Scotland and Sweden.10 Therefore, Scotland’s interaction with Sweden during the first half of the century completely overshadowed England’s relationship with Sweden diplomatically, commercially and militarily. Secondly, England’s commercial relationship with the Baltic at this juncture was firmly directed towards ports in the southern Baltic. The activities of English merchants were concentrated on the import of native, English cloth into these ports.11 Where commercial considerations took a back seat in British-​Swedish diplomacy, it was quite the opposite in relations between the British and the Polish Crowns. Aside from interfering in Baltic politics, the prime consideration for Britain during these years was to secure a favourable and consistent trading platform for its merchants.12 Therefore, any attempt to assess the status of Anglo-​Swedish commerce during this period must navigate between the two dominant strands of British affairs in the Baltic –​one which overlooks the role of England, and the other whose geographical focus lies elsewhere. It is to view the minority, rather than the majority. It is further complicated by the fact that, where trading statistics 8

Murdoch, Steve, ‘Diplomacy in Transition; Stuart-​British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603–​1618’ in A.I. MacInnes, T. Riis and F.G. Pedersen (eds.), Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and Baltic States, (East Linton, 2000), pp. 93–​138. 9 The impact of Scottish migrants in Sweden’s military and naval circles, as well as their rise in status and influence can be consulted in: Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 74–​111 and pp. 112–​135; Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years’ War, pp. 33–​91 & 145–​179. 10 Murdoch, Network North, pp. 127–​ 248; Murdoch, ‘Community, Commodity and Commerce: The Stockholm-​Scots in the Seventeenth Century’ in David Worthington, (ed.), British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603–​1688, Brill, Leiden, 2010, pp. 31–​66. 11 Hinton discusses the role of Baltic imports into England, although by 1605 the emphasis was on selling English exports. Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 42–​43. 12 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the early seventeenth century, pp. 45–​46, 133–​134, 146–​147, 150–​151.

24 

Chapter 1

exist, they are mostly fragmented or incomplete, therefore rendering it difficult to develop wider and more complete statistical conclusions. 2

The Union of the Crowns and Its Effect on Baltic Trade

The accession of James vi of Scotland to the English throne in 1603 brought profound changes to England’s foreign policy. War with Spain came to an end in 1604 as part of a wider attitude towards encouraging peaceful relations with Europe. The beginning of James’s English reign also marked a turning point in British relations with the Baltic. In contrast to the anti-​Catholic fervour that had characterised the Elizabethan period, James sought to repair relations with Catholic nations. Not only did the first years of his English reign see peace with Spain, but relations with Poland were also encouraged with James seeking a more active relationship than his predecessor. Domestic motivations as well as personal inclinations have been cited as incentives for this outreach towards Poland.13 British diplomats and embassies from the town councils of Danzig, Elbing, and the Polish Crown intermittently visited one another’s courts throughout the period to maintain consistent contact.14 However, despite an initially successful Polish embassy to James I’s court in 1604, a series of setbacks throughout the period led to the gradual deterioration of diplomacy and commerce with these ports.15 James preferred to leave his affairs with Poland in the hands of merchant consuls rather than resident ambassadors.16 This both emphasised the second tier status attached to the Commonwealth by the Stuart Court, and at the same time revealed the need to retain commercial agents within Sigismund Vasa’s dominions. Stuart relations with the two key powers in the region (Poland and Sweden) were spearheaded by Scots.17 Scots not only oversaw their own nation’s affairs, 13 14 15 16 17

Domestic motivations aimed at appeasing Catholics at home to ease the accession have been cited, as well as James’s own personal views towards favouring Sigismund’s claim as the legitimate heir to the Swedish throne. Fedorowicz, pp. 44–​46. Fedorowicz, p. 17. Fedorowicz, p. 132. Though Fedorowicz does connect this policy to the existence of the Scottish community in certain trading centres. Fedorowicz, pp. 14–​21. The only exceptions to the more common appointments of Scottish diplomats and envoys sent by the Stuart Crown to engage with Sweden and Poland were Sir Thomas Roe and Sir Henry Vane; Murdoch, ‘Diplomacy in Transition’, pp. 93–​138: Strachan, Michael, Sir Thomas Roe, 1581–​1644: A Life, Salisbury, 1989; Smuts, R. Malcolm, ‘Sir Henry Vane, 1589–​ 1655’, odnb, accessible at: http://​www​.oxford​dnb​.com​/view​/arti​cle​/28085?doc​Pos=​1​. Accessed on 20 August 2020.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

25

but now had a strong influence over those of their English neighbours. The Union of the Crowns and the impetus of James i saw the creation of a Scottish-​ led, but Stuart-​British diplomatic corps, particularly active in the northern European sphere. The question has arisen as to how far the amalgamation of the crowns into one unit became a wholly ‘British’ undertaking. Certainly, James i sought to further the notion of a united ‘Britain’, if merely for political pragmatism.18 Hamburg is perhaps the main stage on which to examine the effect of the Union on the political attitudes of the English and Scottish in Europe. After the Union, the English and Scottish residents within the city now found themselves as subjects of the same monarch. Kathrin Zickermann has demonstrated how the competing offices and prerogatives of English and Scottish officials in the city led to both conflict and subsequently to a degree of cooperation.19 The English monopoly company trading to the Low Countries and Germany, the Merchant Adventurers, based their headquarters in Hamburg from 1612. The company was the dominant element of the English community in the city and their leader Joseph Averie held office from 1612 to 1638. However, the arrival of a senior Stuart ambassador in 1627, Scotsman Robert Anstruther, marked the beginning of a period of British diplomatic presence in Hamburg. Anstruther held seniority over Averie, which led to confusion amongst merchants over which official they should direct their affairs and concerns towards. English merchants began to bypass Averie and look to Anstruther for assistance.20 In addition to the confusion it brought to those English trading from Hamburg, many Scottish soldiers began to arrive in the city, leading to disagreements between the English merchants and Scottish military men.21 Averie himself distinguished between his role as an ‘Englishman’ and his connections with the Scots, who he described as his ‘countrymen’.22 Eventually the English and Scottish elements in the city began to cooperate, with Averie and Anstruther serving both nations under the Stuart Crown. It is possible that the coming 18

19 20 21 22

However, this was hastily voted down in 1607 after being debated over three years. For more on the arguments for Union see: Galloway, B. R., and B.P Levack (eds.), The Jacobean Union: Six Tracts of 1604, Edinburgh, 1985; McGinnis, P. G., and A. Williamson (eds.), The British Union, Aldershot, 2002. Zickermann, Kathrin, ‘“Briteannia ist mein patria” Scotsmen and the “British” Community in Hamburg’, in Grosjean, Alexia and Steve Murdoch (eds.) Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period, pp. 249–​273. Zickermann, “Briteannia ist mein patria”, pp. 253–​255. Zickermann, “Briteannia ist mein patria”, p. 256. Zickermann, “Briteannia ist mein patria”, p. 255; tna, sp 75/​10, p. 346. John Averie to? Hamburg, 25 December 1629.

26 

Chapter 1

together of these two separate communities and nations and the resultant cooperation was the establishment of a truly ‘British’ expatriate community in Hamburg.23 The question still remains as to how far the ascendency of a Scottish king to the English throne, and the merging of these two crowns, actually affected England’s trade with Sweden. It is a difficult question to attempt to answer due to the scant amount of information currently available that directly focuses on Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact in this period. However, it is possible to view Britain’s commercial experience in Poland to suggest how this pivotal shift in England’s royal leadership might have affected trade with the Swedish market. The Union of the English and Scottish Crowns brought together two opposing methods of commercial organisation. Official English trade to the Baltic was organised through the Eastland Company’s monopoly, where Scottish trade had long occurred without the direction or oversight of a mercantile monopoly company.24 Both systems had their benefits. Commercial organisation under a company could legitimise trade, with official recognition from royal authority and the appointment of diplomatic officials to tackle commercial issues abroad.25 Likewise, the lack of an established monopoly meant Scottish traders were free to act under their own auspices, without answering to an official, central body. It allowed Scottish traders to distance themselves from the wider political machinations of their government at home.26 The difficulties in bringing together these two contrasting commercial systems can first be glimpsed when difficulties with the Eastland Company in Poland broke out in 1604. The company was already experiencing complications in seeking ratification of their privileges from the Polish Crown, as well as an ongoing and harmful battle for their trade between Elbing and Danzig. The Scottish traders created additional problems for the company by rebuffing the company’s attempts at bringing Scottish commerce under English company jurisdiction. Luckily for the Scots, the British envoy in Poland at this point was a Scotsman, William Bruce. Bruce sided with his countrymen, claiming their 23 24 25 26

Zickermann, “Briteannia ist mein patria”, p. 273. The Convention of Royal Burghs was the body responsible for directing Scottish overseas trade. See McLoughlin, Claire, ‘The Control of Trade in Scotland during the Reigns of James vi and Charles I’ in Northern Studies, Vol. 45, 2013, pp. 46–​67. For specific examples of British diplomatic intercession in commercial affairs in Poland see Fedorowicz, pp. 132–​157. If Scottish merchants settled abroad, acting on their own account or as agents of a principal merchant they were free to act as individuals. However, if they were sent to act by a burgh they were not. McLoughlin, ’The Control of Trade’, pp. 46–​67.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

27

right to continue their trade outside of the monopoly company.27 Scottish merchants began to visit the English staple port and Baltic headquarters of the Eastland Company at Elbing in increasing numbers after the Union. However, many still continued to ply their trade through Danzig, as they were legally entitled to do so in contrast to their English counterparts.28 The Scottish traders’ position in relation to the Eastland monopoly was never formalised and Scots were able to remain unattached or to take up membership with the company whichever way benefitted them the most.29 The fact that nothing more was mentioned on the Scottish issue with Bruce in Poland perhaps shows the strain and difficulties the company was experiencing elsewhere.30 No further documentation has mentioned the position of the Scots in relation to the Eastland Company. This issue remained absent in the reconfirmation of the company’s charters issued by subsequent British monarchs. The Union of the Crowns thus brought the Scots further into the sphere of Anglo-​Baltic commerce by allowing their traders to join the Eastland Company monopoly. However, the company’s inability to bring them under its legal jurisdiction in the early years of James I’s English reign, as well as the lack of formalisation of their specific status thereafter, awarded the Scottish merchants an ambiguously advantageous position.31 The Scottish traders were not regarded as English natives, and were therefore not forced to obey the monopoly of the Eastland Company; nor were they regarded as foreigners, and thus escaped the penalties foreign traders had to submit to in order to trade 27

Fedorowicz, p. 136; Kalinowska, Anna, ‘“Pardon me my Lord, that I wrytte to your honor in Scottish …”’: William Bruce as the first Stuart diplomatic agent in the Polish-​Lithuanian Commonwealth’ in Devine, Tom and David Hesse (eds.), Scotland and Poland: Historical Encounters, 1500–​2010, Edinburgh, 2011. 28 Under Eastland Company privileges, their traders were allowed to trade across the Baltic and Scandinavia, providing they either redirected their goods through the staple port at Elbing, or sailed unbroken from the port of departure through the Sound and directly home to an English port. The 1579 Eastland Company charter was intended for English merchants and drawn up during the time of Elizabeth i. There is nothing contained within it pertaining to Scottish merchants, and nothing issued at the time of the Union to suggest the Scots were incorporated into the regulations placed upon Englishmen. For the original charter see: Sellers, The Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company, pp. 142–​150. 29 Ibid. 30 The company found itself in the middle of a competing struggle for its trade but also at the whim of its own unruly and renegade merchants, such as Richard Lewis. Fedorowicz, pp. 134–​138. 31 Preuß details the participation of both English and Scottish traders in Elbing. Preuß, Hans, Elbing als ehemaliger englischer Handelsplatz, Published by the Municipal Government of Elbing.

28 

Chapter 1

in Baltic commodities with the English market. The Union of the Crowns thus gave Scottish traders a ‘British’ loophole when engaging in commerce with the English market in relation to the Eastland monopoly. As shall be seen, this feature would prove useful in a variety of ways, not just for Scots, but also when English merchants wanted to engage with the Swedish market. 3

The Tudor Period

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, English commercial actors plying their trade in northern Europe could claim a tentative familiarity with the Swedish market. Although only fragmentary commercial records survive from this period, they reveal that English ships frequented the harbours of Swedish ports and ports across the Baltic that were to later fall into Swedish hands from at least the 1560s. From as early as 1567 skippers from London, Newcastle, Great Yarmouth, King’s Lynn and Hull visited Narva to engage in trade with the Russian market.32 The Narva trade saw bouts of prolific activity. Over twenty English ships visited the port with frequency during the late 1560s. The English continued to ply their trade, albeit in more modest numbers throughout the remainder of the century.33 For the first time it is possible to state that English traders visited ports in mainland Sweden with a degree of frequency by the mid-​sixteenth century. Although the trade itself was not particularly large in terms of value, direct trade between England and Sweden was taking place as early as 1561. Direct trade connections with Stockholm were first recorded when skipper William Anderson arrived in May 1561, importing both English and Scottish kerseys (heavy, coarse woollen cloth) as well as dried fruit. The following year, Robert Ellison imported similar goods, although whether any Swedish exports were transported on both return voyages remains to be discovered. How far the impetus for commercial engagement with the Swedish domestic market lay with the English has yet to be determined.34

32 33 34

stro search: England to The Baltic, 1560–​1603. Narva was overrun and subsequently formally ceded into Swedish possession in the early 1580s. Frost, The Northern Wars, p. 144. How far this is in a full and accurate representation of actual trade is debatable. The Sound Toll Registers do not provide consistent information regarding destination points until the late 1660s. sra, lta Stockholm, Vol 308, 1561; Vol. 310.3, 1562.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

29

The first recorded instance of the direct export trade of Swedish goods between Stockholm and England occurred in 1571 when one ship left for England loaded with a variety of goods such as wrought and osmund iron, tar and flax, as well as a number of timber products. Exporting merchants were listed as Scotsman James Klerck and a partnership between Rolf Gienisson & Gåffwerdt Rödt. It demonstrates how at this juncture it was left to non-​English merchants to facilitate the handling of Swedish goods.35 Further examples of direct trade between England and Stockholm are recorded intermittently over the course of the later sixteenth century, with English ships visiting the port in 1585 and 1586. However, a significant gap in the archival sources occurs until evidence of direct trade with England reappears in 1600 and 1601. That the import and export records do not appear to be entirely synced in terms of demonstrating both legs of an inbound and outbound journey creates a problem in attempting to reach any concrete conclusions about the balance of trade at this point in time. By the turn of the century trade from Stockholm to England had expanded. Exports of Swedish goods were handled by a variety of English merchants, Scottish merchants and Swedish merchants. Indeed, Queen Elizabeth i is listed as an exporter in 1585, demonstrating how problematic it can be to determine which merchants were actually conducting trade on the ground in Sweden.36 The variety of names appearing in court cases almost two decades later, including John Coote, William Greene and Henry Wilde, indicates that English trade with Stockholm might have been better established than contemporary commercial records actually reveal.37 Anglo-​ Swedish trade during the Tudor period was not restricted to Stockholm. Records show the precursors of Gothenburg, the settlements of Nya Lödöse and Älvsborg also engaged in direct trade with the English market during the late sixteenth century. During the late 1580s three separate instances of commercial engagement with the English market can be traced.38 An unclear association between a John Ellyesson of Norway and an English skipper Marmaduke Lager from Hull involved imports of a combination of textiles and fish, demonstrating the links between the British markets and ports

35 36 37 38

sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 314.4, 1571. Elizabeth is noted as exporting 62 ssp of raw copper as well as 35 lasts of tar, copper plates and wrought iron. sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 336. 1585. For example: sra, sh, B ii a, Vol. 1. 1614; Vol. 2, 17 November 1619, f. 131; Vol. 2, 27 June 1620, f. 144. sra, lta Älvsborg and Nya Lödöse, Vols, 335, 336, 337.1, 337.2, 337.3, 1585.

30 

Chapter 1

across the North Sea.39 During the same period, skippers listed as arriving at the Göta River from England include Randall Butler, Thomas Armstrong and John Sandiman. All skippers imported a variety of English and Scottish goods. Although there is no current evidence of a Swedish export trade, it is now possible to determine that direct trading with the British Isles was already established on Sweden’s west coast by this juncture.40 Similarly English links have been uncovered with ports on the Swedish mainland. As early as 1579 there is evidence of trade with Kalmar. Records show one voyage by a Rasmus Allen of London who departed the port on 20 September loaded with osmund iron and tar. It provides a glimpse of the potential for provincial ports to furnish traditional Swedish goods to the English market.41 Taken together it demonstrates that, although direct Anglo-​Swedish trade was not consistent or particularly extensive, the English and Swedish markets had established definitive connections already by the close of the sixteenth century. 4

Anglo-​Swedish Commerce in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

It is apparent that during the reigns of James i and Charles i England began to appreciate that reliance on one primary export commodity to the Baltic market, namely textiles, was to place its economic security into a precarious and unstable position.42 Intermittent disruptions in native production and merchant buying due to plague; abortive and damaging commercial restructuring; and political strife, which eventually led to the Civil Wars of the 1640s, were all harmful domestic factors that played their part in unsettling England’s trade to the Baltic. Furthermore, a developing continental cloth industry was bringing increased competition. War in central and eastern Europe destroyed potential buyers’ markets, and, as a result, currency manipulations, particularly in those areas, all served as external factors that led to the decline in importance and level of commercial interaction with England’s traditional export bases in the southern Baltic.43 39

sra lta Älvsborg and Nya Lödöse, Vol. 509, 1587–​1589. John Ellysson is listed as burgess operating out of “Berend” which could be Bergen in Norway. 40 Ibid. 41 sra, lta Kalmar, Vol. 487, 1579. 42 Supple, B. E., Commercial Crisis and Change in England, 1600–​1642, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964, p. 34. 43 Supple, pp. 73–​84, 120–​131.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

31

The composition of existing commercial records enables the tracing of Stockholm’s import and export trade with England from several vantage points. Firstly direct trade between England and Stockholm can be glimpsed for certain years during the first half of the seventeenth century. Another method is to consider that indirect trade may have passed through intermediaries and that Swedish goods potentially reached England through ports such as Danzig or Lübeck.44 Investigating the export activity of Stockholm’s Scottish merchants is necessary to analyse whether their commercial undertakings included carrying goods to intermediary markets in the Baltic. A further potential outlet for Swedish goods to the English market was through Scotland itself. During the first decades of the seventeenth century there were sporadic instances of direct Anglo-​Swedish trade. Swedish goods exported to England were as likely to consist of wooden products, tar and pitch, and even foodstuffs, as they were to include iron or copper.45 This represents a marked difference in commodity composition later in the century where goods such as timber, tar and pitch were included in cargoes as a complement to bulkier and more frequent shipments of iron. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, exports to England from Stockholm became increasingly more metal-​based from around the period 1612–​1622. Consignments of iron and copper were on the rise, with tar and pitch following in importance.46 It appears that direct trade between the English and Swedish markets at this juncture was fairly evenly balanced. This contrasts with subsequent periods of the seventeenth century where England’s demand for Swedish goods far outweighed the English ability to import their own goods into the Swedish market to reach a comparable economic value.47 For example, in 1610 the goods shipped out of Stockholm to England consisted of iron and tar, while traditional exports such as English beer and clothing travelled in the opposite direction. Additionally English merchants handled a variety of re-​exports such as sugar, raisins, paper, dyed textiles as well as French and Spanish wine. In 44

Although the Eastland Company situated its Baltic base at both Elbing and Danzig at various points in the early decades of the seventeenth century, no evidence of British exporters shipping Swedish goods to Elbing has been found in the Swedish archives up until this point. The Stockholm customs accounts for 1636 and 1640 show that the Dutch Republic, Danzig and Lübeck were three of the main destinations for Stockholm’s trade which is consistent with findings from previous research. See: Sandström, Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam: en undersökning av Stockholms roll som förmedlare av varor i regionala och utrikeshandel, Stockholm, Stockholms stad, 1990, pp. 331–​337. 45 sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 377.2. 1604; Vol. 380.3. 1609; Vol. 381.2. 1610; Figure 1.1. 46 sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 403.2. 1621, Vol. 404. 1622. Figure 1.1. 47 See Chapter 4.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

17

1604

228

1609

18 1610

50 72 38 1612

Iron (SSP)

1613

582

1620

1044

Tar (Barrels)

44 1621

156

Pitch (Barrels)

1622

271

1536 1042

1636

1059

2287

423

1640

466

786

­f igure 1.1  Exports from Stockholm to England, 1604–​1640 sources: sra, lta stockholm, vol. 377, 1604; vol. 380.3, 1609; vol. 381.3, 1610; vol. 384.2, 1612, vol. 387.1, 1613; vol. 402.1, 1620; vol. 403.2, 1621; vol. 404.4, 1622; sca, ssa, sca, vol. 1, 1636; vol. 3, 1640

Amount of exports

2500

newgenrtpdf

32  Chapter 1

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

33

essence this was bilateral trading at its most basic level, a simple exchange of goods for goods. How far either side was responding to market pressures based on informed knowledge of supply and demand is uncertain.48 Thanks to the introduction of consistent commercial records more definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding English trade with Stockholm in 1636. English imports seem to have peaked in 1636, although this may simply be due to the fragmentary nature of records prior to this point. Importers included both British merchants and Swedes.49 William Robertson imported traditional, domestic goods such as woollen products, textiles and clothes. He also oversaw the re-​export of colonially-​produced goods from England such as tobacco. This is perhaps the earliest example of the link between England’s colonial output with the demand for tobacco on the Swedish market. Swedish merchant Anders Matsson also imported similar products, demonstrating that access to English goods was not limited to British merchants. William Merser, noted as residing in Denmark as a naturalised merchant, was the largest importer of English goods into Stockholm. Merser also imported tobacco and textiles, revealing the link between the English market and the Scandinavian kingdoms’ respective commercial spheres. As Merser was most likely Scottish in origin, it demonstrates just one instance of how Scottish merchants were able to utilise a number of political affiliations afforded to them. This enabled Scots a potential competitive commercial advantage over other merchants. Merser was able to take up dual rights as a Danish citizen –​according to the political agreement arising out of James vi of Scotland and Anna of Denmark’s marriage in 1589 –​while simultaneously being able to access the English market as a native merchant following on from the Union of the Crowns in 1603. These

48

49

No records documenting trade have been uncovered for the period 1623–​1635, coinciding at a point when the Swedish Crown entrusted private individuals to oversee the collection of customs and tariffs imposed on foreign trade. Sandström, p. 35. This experience was also mirrored in Gothenburg over the period 1622–​1634 which is a likely justification as to why contemporary records have not survived for these years. Dalhede, Handelsfamiljer på Stormaktstidens Europamarknad, Vol. 2, pp. 237–​238. Unfortunately no evidence of trade has been found in the stro for the period 1623–​1635. However, this should not serve as a definitive indication of a lack of commercial interaction between the two markets due to the paucity of Sound Toll records from this period. Men such as Alexander Jack, John Kinnemond, George Gardiner are known Scottish merchants who resided in the town. John Dixon could have either been English or Scottish. Skippers Albrecht Bennett, Jacob Brun and William Robertson could all arguably be of British extraction, while skipper Rejer Arentz had connections to the Dutch market and may have been from the Dutch Republic himself. sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 406.1. 1636; sca, Vol. 1. 1636.

34 

Chapter 1

were in addition to trading connections devolving through his own native Scottish ethnicity.50 The total value of goods imported into Stockholm in 1636 amounted to 555,158 riksdaler. Imports reaching Stockholm from England totalled over 30,000 riksdaler. This equated to just over 5% of the total import value of goods making their way into the city from overseas.51 This figure perhaps represents the highest level of English imports attained in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction to this point. Over the course of 1640 these imports arriving in Stockholm dropped to a value of 10,252 riksdaler and, following the onset of the civil wars that consumed the British Isles over the remainder of the decade, imports of English goods into Stockholm did not peak again in value until the 1650s. Exports dispatched to England from Stockholm in 1636 totalled 24,323 riksdaler. As can be seen from Figure 1.1 this was a peak value for exports during this period. Despite 1636 constituting the only year where imports into Stockholm from England outperformed Swedish exports in terms of overall value, the potential the English market held for Swedish exports, even by the mid-​1630s is still demonstrable. Stockholm’s exports for this year totalled 915,333 riksdaler, rendering England’s overall share market at just over 2% of the total overall export value of the town. Nevertheless, England was still Stockholm’s fifth most valuable export destination. Exports to England occurred over seven separate sailings, ranging from the middle towards the end of the traditional Baltic sailing season which usually ran from March and into the winter, weather permitting. The freighting of Swedish goods to England appears to have been shared evenly between English and non-​ English skippers. Edward Crossley, Albert Bennett and William Haliburton could be singled out as of English origin. Johan Sibranz and Reyer Arentz who are also listed as making sailings to the Dutch Republic, are more likely to be non-​English or even of Dutch origin.52 The participation of foreign trading vessels in Anglo-​Swedish trade is in stark contrast to the years following the passage of the first Navigation Act in 1651. This act sought to bar the freighting of goods to and from the English market by skippers and ships who were either not English in origin or from the producing country in 50 Murdoch, Network North, p. 138. 51 ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. 52 It is difficult to come to any concrete conclusion on the nationality or home ports of the skippers as names are rendered in seventeenth century Swedish, often with multiple variants of a single spelling. Original rendering of skippers’ names appear as Ewärt Cråssle, Albrecht Bennet, and Wellam Hellebortz. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

35

question and it saw a marked degree of success.53 The passing of the act reveals that prior to this foreign freighters were able to participate extensively in direct trade between England and Sweden. The majority of merchants involved in shipping exports directly to England were Scottish in origin and handled the lion’s share of exported goods. Established Scottish merchants settled in Stockholm, such as Peter Duwall, George Gardiner, Robert Rind, William Davidson and James Jack, and all exported goods to England in 1636. Other merchants of an undetermined British origin can also be added to this group of exporters. Merchants such as John Dixon and Albert Smith sent several consignments of wrought iron as well as tar and pitch during the trading season.54 George Gardiner was the single largest exporter to the English market, exporting 7,532 riksdaler worth of goods in 1636. This included 331 ssp of wrought iron, 900 barrels of tar, a number of copper kettles and also cannonballs.55 Other exporters of note included high-​ranking Swedish officials and members of the nobility such as Johan Skytte, a member of the Council of Realm (Riksråd). Skytte dispatched two separate consignments of wrought iron to England in June and August.56 Another noteworthy exporter of Swedish origin was nobleman and senior member of the Swedish Treasury (Kammarkollegiet) Mårten Wewitzer Rosenstierna. Rosenstierna was one of the larger exporters to England in 1636, sending two separate consignments of copper in November that were worth a collective 3,200 riksdaler. Rosenstierna was one of the largest exporters in Stockholm with a total export trade worth 22,641 riksdaler in 1636.57 Rosentierna and Skytte’s activity reveals the existence of commercial networks within the highest echelons of the Swedish government. Solitary instances of export activity such as this, as well as their incongruous role as exporters, could indicate a sourcing of goods through personal channels in England. It may point at a link

53 See Chapter 2. 54 ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. Those Scottish merchants who held burgess rights to trade in Sweden and were official members of the Stockholm mercantile community can be viewed in the town’s trade council records. ssa, Handelskollegiet, A I Protokoll, Huvudserien. 55 ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. 56 This example of Skytte’s commercial links with England may reflect his own personal connections there. They were perhaps established during his diplomatic visit to London in 1610 to offer a marriage proposal to Elizabeth Stuart, or on a subsequent visit later in the decade. Sellberg, Erland, “Johan Skytte”, in sbl, [https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​/Prese​ ntat​ion​.aspx?id=​6037]​. Accessed 2 August 2020. Skytte already had extensive links to Britain through Scottish associates. It is probable these interests converged. Murdoch, Network North, pp. 59–​60, 99, 259, 272. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. 57 ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636.

36 

Chapter 1

to influential members of the English government which would signal wider knowledge of what Sweden would have to offer as an export market. By 1640 England’s exports from Stockholm had diminished to a value of 10,252 riskdaler, equating to a decrease of more than half the total value from four years earlier. Conversely Stockholm’s overall export trade swelled from 915,333 riksdaler in 1636 to 1,288,444 riksdaler in 1640. Therefore goods exported to England decreased to a mere 0.80% of the overall market value. The portion of Stockholm’s goods exported to the Dutch Republic remained significant, while Lübeck, Danzig, and even Denmark’s share of the Stockholm export market all increased. Shipments to destinations within the Baltic and to western markets grew in most cases except for exports to the British Isles. This perhaps indicates that market factors in England were responsible for the downturn in England’s own trade. That goods shipped to Scotland likewise decreased from four years prior could bolster this line of thought.58 Only two ships departed on a direct route towards England during 1640. Both skippers –​Hans Kiöpman and Stefan Melander –​are unlikely to have been English in origin, while no English merchant is present in the export records.59 Downturns in both the import and export markets with England, and the omission of England’s merchants and skippers in the trade itself could indicate that interests lay elsewhere in the British Isles. Political tensions were at breaking point, while civil war raged in Scotland. Stockholm’s Scottish merchants continued to play a major role in conveying Swedish goods to the English market. Merchants William Merser, William Petrie, James Maclean and John Halliday all played their part in exporting commodities such as iron and tar.60 Many of the more influential Scottish merchants who were key players in the export of goods to England just four years earlier continued to export goods in considerable numbers to a variety of destinations on both sides of the Sound. However, the records show that in 1640 many of these larger Scottish merchants had no involvement in the export trade to England. Perhaps England’s declining demand from 1640 was an indication that the market was heading toward a severe depression. 58

59 60

The Dutch Republic’s trade swelled by nearly 20,000 riksdaler to 658,543 riksdaler in 1640, although their overall market share had decreased from 69% to 51%. Both Lübeck and Danzig also vastly increased the amount of exports out of Stockholm. Scotland’s own value of exports decreased by over 5000 riksdaler from 74,644 riksdaler in 1636 to 69,371 riskdaler in 1640. ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640. Hans Kiöpman could easily be anglicised as “John Merchant” but according to the pattern of how English, Scottish and names of other origin tended to be rendered into Swedish in contemporary sources this seems unlikely. ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

37

Scattered documents relating to the trade of Älvsborg, a forerunner to Gothenburg, reveal that trade with England was slight during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. Trade was largely based on the export of timber and tar.61 Despite the geographical proximity of Älvsborg to England, it saw fewer tar exports than those from Stockholm during the same period. In contrast to Stockholm, Älvsborg at this stage appears to have primarily been utilised by English traders as a source for timber, which came to be a standard feature of England’s trade during the remainder of the century. As consistent commercial records began to appear in 1638, trade with England on the Göta älv seems to have expanded considerably to a value of 29,771 riksdaler. This represented a similar, although slightly higher value of trade than witnessed in Stockholm two years earlier. It demonstrates newly-​ established Gothenburg’s position as a commercial centre.62 By this juncture England represented a key market for that town, being of comparable importance to Hamburg as an international outlet for its goods. In 1638 exports to England were equivalent to almost 15% of Gothenburg’s overall export trade. However, exports to the Dutch Republic were the firm outlier. At a value of 90,272 riksdaler, Dutch exports represented around 45% of Gothenburg’s export trade, just over three times the value exported to England.63 As Figure 1.2 shows, a more obvious feature of Gothenburg’s trade with England in 1638 was the clear emergence of iron as a major export commodity. This is in contrast to the export structure at the turn of the century. At a total weight of 1,151 ssp the amount of iron exported to England was equal to the level seen in Stockholm records two years earlier. However, due to the higher retail price of wrought iron in Gothenburg, at around an average of 10 riksdaler per ssp, the overall value of iron was higher per weight, totalling 12,124 riksdaler. Iron was equivalent to around 40% of overall trade to England in 1638.64 Another of Gothenburg’s high value export commodities was tar. The total value of 6,574 riksdaler was equivalent to roughly half the overall value of iron. With an export of 2,191 barrels it was comparable to levels witnessed in Stockholm two years earlier.65 Where Gothenburg’s trade continued to diverge from Stockholm was in its importance as an outlet for timber goods intended for the English market. 61 62 63 64 65

sra, lta Älvsborg, Vol. 513, 1604–​05, Vol. 514. 1606–​1607, Vol. 515. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638. Iron exported from Stockholm to England typically retailed at just over 7 riksdaler per ssp in 1636. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638; ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638.

38 

Chapter 1

Pitch 3.4% Misc 5.4% Masts 10.1% Wrought iron 40.7%

Various timber 18.4%

Tar 22.1%

­f igure 1.2  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1638 sources: gla, gca, vol. 799. 1638

As can be seen from Figure 1.2, when grouped collectively, timber products were the second most valuable export commodity in English trade with a total value of 8,462 riksdaler. This was equivalent to around 28% of the total goods exported to England. Amongst these goods were a variety of different sorts of timber products including boards, spars, balks, as well as firewood. The most highly prized and voluminous timber goods exported to England were masts. Achieving the appropriate shape and dimension of the wood itself meant masts were a more specialised timber product and consequently more difficult to source than other types of timber. At a total number of 516 individual pieces, Gothenburg was one of only a handful of ports that could facilitate the export of masts alongside, perhaps, Riga.66 Where explicitly recorded, it is possible to conclude that the majority of trade appears to have been directed towards London. The English capital absorbed 45% of Gothenburg’s export trade with England. Hull and Newcastle were the only remaining destinations listed specifically in the customs accounts,

66

For more on specific markets within the timber trade see: Albion, Forests and Sea power: the timber problem of the Royal Navy, 1652–​1862, Cambridge, ma, Harvard University Press, 1926; Tveite, Sten, Engelsk-​norsk trelasthandel, 1640–​1710, Universitetsforlaget, 1961.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

39

although trade to northern ports seems to have been smaller. However, with nine ships of the total twenty that departed for England remaining unspecified, it is difficult to account for how much of Gothenburg’s overall trade was destined to provincial ports in England, or if London actually absorbed more than is listed.67 England’s pre-​Civil War trade with Gothenburg signalled a marked increase in line with the town’s overall growth in the export trade. As Figure 0.7 demonstrates, by 1641 the value of Gothenburg’s export trade had increased by around a third of its 1638 figure to just over 300,000 riksdaler. Likewise, England’s trade significantly increased from a value of 29,771 riksdaler to 45,457 riksdaler. This not only made Gothenburg the largest port in Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction, but reveals the consistency with which commercial operations were now being undertaken between England and Gothenburg before civil war would rupture England’s international trade.68 The increasing value of English trade did not lead to a correspondingly greater traffic between England and Gothenburg. In total 21 ships departed Gothenburg for England in 1641 compared to 20 three years earlier. Instead the average value per ship increased by around 1,000 riksdaler, although this was not necessarily a uniform increase. As can be seen from Figure 1.3, iron continued to be the predominant export commodity and its share of exports to England increased from around 40% of total exports in 1638 to just over 50% of the total trade value in 1641. Iron boosted the value of English trade with Gothenburg in two ways. The average price of iron had shifted from just over 10 riksdaler per ssp to 12 riksdaler per ssp. This was a feature not particular to retail prices in regard to English trade but a price increase seen across the entirety of Gothenburg’s trade. Secondly, overall iron exports increased from a weight of 1,151 ssp in 1638 to 2011 ssp. This demonstrates there was already a growing demand for Swedish iron in England by the early 1640s, and Gothenburg possessed the ability to meet this demand. England’s total iron exports had thus increased in value by double, from a total of 12,124 riksdaler in 1638 to 24,132 riksdaler in 1641.69 Tar, pitch, masts and other timber goods continued to be exported to England. Concurrently there was a considerable rise in the value of skins and leather goods. Timber continued to be an important export product, available in a greater variety and specialisation. Figure 1.3 also reveals the mast trade

67 68 69

gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638. gla, gca, Vol. 804. 1641. gla, gca, Vol. 804. 1641.

40 

Chapter 1

Misc 2.7% Skins and leather 2.9% Tar 3.1% Pitch 4.4% Other timber 14.0%

Wrought iron 53.1%

Masts 19.8%

­f igure 1.3  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1641 sources: gla, gca, vol. 804. 1641

showed signs of growth to become the second largest commodity exported to England in 1641. This equated to a growth in value from under 3,000 riksdaler in 1638 to over 9,000 riksdaler in 1641. Like iron, this increase in value was reflective of an upturn in the average price of masts alongside a growth in the amount of individual pieces exported. In actuality the export of masts had grown from 516 pieces in 1638 to 686 pieces in 1641. The only export commodity that showed a significant decrease in the amount exported to England was tar, which had receded from over 2,000 barrels in 1638 to just 369 barrels in 1641.70 One of the most striking features of Gothenburg’s trade with England was the passivity of the settled merchant community in regards to trade with England. As Figure 1.4 shows, in 1638 the collective export of skippers and crew on ships bound for England was actually higher than that of a number of exporters belonging to the Gothenburg merchant community. However, it was the appearance of one-​time English export agents, and merchants specifically denoted as foreign operators who were responsible for exporting a large amount of goods to English ports. Some merchants appear to have been acting as export agents for individual ships. Their names subsequently disappear 70

gla, gca, Vol. 804. 1641.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

41

entirely with no further evidence of connections to the Gothenburg merchant community. Darsie Katz, Francis Porter and George Borrett, all denoted as Londoners, were just such operators. In October 1638, Katz was responsible for the exportation of 924 barrels of tar, as well as 2,628 individual boards to London, alongside other goods on William Tunn’s London-​based ship. That Katz was the sole exporter listed in connection with Tunn’s ship could suggest he was specifically tasked with the role of sourcing goods for export from Gothenburg and departed with the ship therefrom. Likewise Francis Porter was a merchant accredited with the exportation of goods on a single ship, but in this case to Newcastle. Porter exported around 300 barrels of tar on board Henry Hart’s Newcastle-​based ship on 18 August 1638 and then disappeared from the records altogether.71 Foreign merchants involved in the trade to England in Gothenburg were not limited to singular visits. George Borrett was listed as a foreigner in 1641 and made repeat visits to Gothenburg. He appeared as an exporter in both 1638 and 1641. On 23 June 1638 Borrett was listed as exporting a large number of masts, boards of various sorts, firewood, juniper and 24 ssp of wrought iron on board John Ellison’s ship bound for London. In 1641 Borrett again appeared exporting masts, a variety of timber products, and a small amount of wrought iron and tar as the sole exporter on board Roland Noble’s London ship homeward bound. Likewise, other English merchants whose settled status in Gothenburg remains in doubt operated over longer periods. John Wright, noted as “from London”, made four such shipments in both 1638 and 1641. As Figure 1.4 shows, Wright became one of the most significant merchants in the English export trade. Wright appears to have mainly dealt in the export of timber, particularly masts, and over both years was responsible for a large portion of mast exports from Gothenburg. However, in 1638 Wright consigned shipments of tar, pitch and wrought iron. Similarly, Samuel Harvey exported goods on a total of seven ships bound for England in 1641. Despite being listed as a foreigner, Harvey appeared as one of the largest exporting merchants to England in 1641. His total export account was equivalent to 18% of total trade to England. Harvey likewise limited his trade specifically to masts, and exported goods on seven ships relatively early in the season. Foreign agents such as Wright, Harvey, and others including Thomas Leslie and Robert Manly, were responsible for conveying nearly 50% of Gothenburg’s export trade with England in 1641.72

71 72

gla, gca, Vol. 804. 1641. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638; Vol. 804. 1641.

42 

Chapter 1

Top exporters from Gothenburg to England, 1638 #

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

Skippers & Crew

4844

Various

Various

2

John Wright

4039

Timber (masts)

England (London)

3

Darsie Katz

3027

Tar, timber

England (London)

4

John Maclean

2436

Iron

Scotland

5

John Carnegie

2431

Timber, skins

Scotland

Top exporters from Gothenburg to England, 1641 #

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

John Maclean

8802

Iron

Scotland

2

Samuel Harvey

8132

Timber

England (London)

3

John Wright

5341

Timber

England (London)

4

Robert Manly

2860

Various

England

5

Thomas Leslie

1846

Various

England?

*Value in Swedish riksdaler

­f igure 1.4  Top exporters from Gothenburg to England, 1638 and 1641 sources: gla, gca, vol. 799. 1638, vol. 804. 1641

Therefore a degree of specialisation can be witnessed in the trades of foreign agents, whether it was in regard to dealing in a specific commodity or in conveying goods to a particular port. Members of the settled community also demonstrated a degree of specialisation in their trade, particularly in regard to the wrought iron trade. John Maclean, a significant trader and burgess of the town, was the foremost exporter of iron to England in both 1638 and 1641. He focused the majority of his English trade on exporting iron. Maclean was the largest exporter of goods to England by value in 1641.73 Maclean was joined in the export trade to England by a number of Scottish merchants such as Alexander Merser and John Carnegie. As will be shown, the Scottish communities of Gothenburg and Stockholm did much to facilitate Anglo-​Swedish trade during this period. 73

John Maclean attained burgess status as early as 1639. Långström, Göteborgs stads borgarelängd 1621–​1864, pp. 16, 22; ssne, “Maclean, John” [1631].

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

43

In Gothenburg’s early trade with England, foreign merchants and those not belonging to the naturalised Swedish mercantile community were not only allowed the freedom to operate, but were permitted significant influence. This tendency to bypass contemporary commercial laws relating to foreign operators could have been motivated by the Swedish Crown’s desire to foster continuous trade with England in Gothenburg. This will be dealt with later in the chapter. 5

The Scottish Connection

Scotland was by far the most significant area in Britain when it came to direct trade with the Swedish market during much of the first half of the seventeenth century. Scottish merchants on the ground in Swedish ports, who had settled in the country and were embedded into the commercial, civic and institutional life in towns such as Stockholm, Gothenburg and Norrköping, played a major commercial role in facilitating the import of foreign goods into Sweden. However, they were also fundamental in providing the conduit for Swedish goods to a variety of European export destinations, not just Scotland or England. The true value of Scotland as an export market for Swedish goods during this period has hitherto gone underappreciated. For Stockholm, Sweden’s largest export harbour, Scotland was the second most valuable export market in 1636 and the fourth largest in 1640.74 This comes in contrast to previous research that has overlooked the importance of Scotland during this period as a substantial export market for Swedish goods. While the Dutch Republic, Danzig and Lübeck played a significant role in the commercial life of Stockholm, previous studies have failed to see Scotland as a key destination point for Stockholm’s exports.75 In 1636 the amount of goods directly exported to Scotland from Stockholm amounted to 74,644 riksdaler. This was more than triple the value of goods exported to England in the same year. Despite a small contraction in trade to Britain, similar trends occurred four years later in 1640. Scotland’s exports totalled 69,371 riskdaler, almost four times the amount exported to England in the same year. Concurrent patterns can be seen when viewing the value and amount of goods imported into Stockholm from Britain. In 1636, imports from

74 ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636; ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640. 75 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 35; Sandström, Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam, p. 323.

44 

Chapter 1

England totalled 30,026 riksdaler where imports from Scotland amounted to a value of 48,518 riksdaler, almost a third higher. In 1640, British trade as whole, in terms of both imports into and exports from Stockholm, suffered a reduction. However, the resilience of the Scottish market in importing their domestically produced goods into the town is clear. Where the value of English goods directly imported into Stockholm contracted by 40% over four years from 30,026 to 17,752 riksdaler, Scotland’s own imports into Stockholm were considerably less affected. During the 1636 to 1640 period Scotland’s own trade only contracted by 16% from a total of 49,518 riksdaler worth of goods to 41,405 riksdaler.76 Out of the 300 merchants who are listed as exporters in the customs accounts in 1636, no fewer than forty Scottish merchants were involved in the Stockholm export trade. It is therefore unsurprising that Scotland itself should have been such a viable market for Swedish goods.77 The value of goods that were moved by Scottish merchants was of similar significance. In 1636, Scottish merchants were responsible for importing a total of 94,087 riksdaler worth of goods from a variety of ports both inside and outside the Baltic, in addition to trade with the British Isles. This figure equated to just over 16% of Stockholm’s overall import trade. In 1640, though slightly fewer in number, their total import trade had swelled to 173,037 riksdaler. This equated to around 10% of the town’s overall import trade.78 The strength and significance of the Scottish merchant community’s role in Stockholm’s export trade follows a similar pattern. In 1636 Scottish merchants were responsible for exporting 95,997 riksdaler worth of goods, equating to around 10% of Stockholm’s total export trade. In 1640, exports handled by Scottish merchants swelled to 151,133 riksdaler. This was a value equivalent to over 11% of Stockholm’s overall export trade.79 The Union of the Crowns in Great Britain not only gave Scottish merchants access to the English market, but also the potential to usurp English monopolistic commercial structures at the epicentre of English trade in the Baltic. The Scots’ strength lay in the multitude of political affiliations they held. This has already been demonstrated in the case of William Merser, who is listed in the Swedish records as a naturalised Danish citizen. Merser’s compatriots, who had taken up burgess rights and naturalised in Sweden, seemingly availed themselves of three national affiliations when conducting commerce. Firstly, they were Scottish; secondly, as British subjects, they had access to English trade; 76 77 78 79

ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636; ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636; ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

45

and thirdly, they were Swedish, ostensibly enabling them to participate in commerce with all three spheres as native operators. Moreover, their strength also lay in their ability to tap into extensive commercial networks throughout northern Europe.80 These connections facilitated trade within and outwith the Baltic. It has been possible to quantify how many Scottish merchants were actively engaged in trade from Stockholm at this juncture. Furthermore it is conceivable to pinpoint the exact role that Scottish merchants played in regards to directing the Swedish capital’s trade to and from England. However, the Stockholm-​Scots also maintained extensive commercial interactions with some of the primary trading hubs in northern Europe on both sides of the Sound, such as Lübeck, Danzig, and ports in the Dutch Republic. Given these extensive commercial associations, the presence of a Scottish merchant community in Stockholm could have been a substantial facilitator in helping to convey Swedish goods to the English market through intermediary ports. The majority of Scottish merchants residing in the city, were involved in trade to ports outside of Britain. In 1636 the total amount of goods handled by British merchants imported into Stockholm amounted to a total of 94,097 riksdaler. Most of these goods were imported from the Dutch Republic, Danzig, and Lübeck. In comparison, around 13,756 riksdaler worth of goods were sent to ports outside of Britain.81 Patterns viewed in the export trade are of a similar nature, with a large number of active Scottish merchants engaging in trade to a number of additional ports. Exports from Stockholm handled by Scottish merchants in 1636 amounted to a total value of around 24,804 riksdaler. This demonstrates just how strong the commercial associations of Stockholm-​Scots were to ports outside of Britain, particularly to the Dutch Republic, Danzig and Lübeck.82 On the whole Scotland’s import and export trade outpaced England during the first half of the seventeenth century.83 The presence of Scottish merchants in Sweden provided the fundamental foundation for trade to flow from Stockholm to their home market. However, the Scottish mercantile community in Sweden also facilitated a vital role in trade with England. Scottish merchants based in Stockholm participated in a large trade to third party markets such as the Dutch Republic, Danzig and Lübeck. These ports may 80 81 82 83

More on Scottish commercial networks in northern Europe can be found in Murdoch, Network North, pp. 127–​250. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636. sra, lta Stockholm, Vol. 377.2. 1604; Vol. 380.3. 1609; Vol. 381.2. 1610; Vol. 403.2. 1621, Vol. 404. 1622; ssa, sca, Vol. 1. 1636; Vol. 3. 1640.

46 

Chapter 1

have provided an intermediary point for the English market to gain access to Swedish goods, although currently the extent to which remains inconclusive. The Scottish connection proved to be of fundamental significance, more so than any other commercial outlet, in facilitating the links between the English and Swedish markets during the first half of the seventeenth century. It was not until the 1650s that the English market came to play a greater role in trade with Sweden than that of its northern neighbour. As will be shown, Scottish merchants continued to play a primary role in the growth and facilitation of Anglo-​Swedish trade. 6

John Coote and Nascent Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Networks

Investigating John Coote’s trade with Sweden allows for a number of significant points of enquiry to be raised whilst challenging certain orthodoxies surrounding English merchants who engaged in trade to the Baltic in the early seventeenth century. Through the consultation of archival sources in both England and Sweden it has been possible to construct a formative picture of this English merchant trading with Sweden across the first two decades of the century. This is a much earlier point in time than has previously been considered when analysing the activity and exploits of merchants engaged in this trade. Court cases that stretch past Coote’s death and into the early 1620s, as well as correspondence with British diplomat in Sweden Sir James Spens, detail the networks, mercantile associations and the commercial organisation of trade in which he engaged. Additionally the court cases consulted exhibit some features of the commodity exchange undertaken by Coote and his associates. By combining legal records with evidence of diplomatic and royal petitions, it is possible to demonstrate what forms of appeal were available to merchants at this point in time. Little is known of John Coote or his trade outside of the aforementioned documentation. At present he appears to be the longest active English merchant who traded with Sweden during this earlier period of enquiry. Previous studies of Anglo-​Baltic commerce in this period have focused on the broader features of trade, in the process largely excluding the activity of individual merchants at ground level.84 No known records for this earlier period detail Coote’s membership of the Eastland Company, which would have clarified his

84 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century; Hinton, The Eastland Company and the Commonweal; Millard, “The Import Trade of London”.

An Insignificant Trade? 1603–1641

47

position as a Baltic trader who belonged to an established English monopoly trading company. The first mention of John Coote is found in the Stockholm customs records at the turn of the seventeenth century, revealing Coote to be engaged in both the import and export trade. He imported paper into Sweden and exported a number of goods vital to shipbuilding and weapons production. This included unworked osmund iron, sulphur, as well as tar. He also exported elk skins and foodstuffs such as salmon and butter. A portion of the osmund iron is noted as being bought from the Swedish Crown through a merchant named as Petter von Benning. Both Petter von Benning and John Coote are listed as immigrants, intimating that they did not hold naturalised status in Sweden but were still permitted to trade in the town. They serve as a further demonstration that foreign operators without naturalised status in Sweden could still cooperate as traders.85 The commercial records that exist for this period do not reveal any additional activity undertaken by John Coote, although court cases do suggest he was active in Swedish trade for a much more sustained period. There is mention of a Thomas Coote trading with Sweden found in the diplomatic instructions given to James Spens on his embassy to Sweden in 1612. An appendage at the close of the document instructs Spens to do his utmost to ‘obtain reliefe’ from any ‘cause of grievance’ experienced by English or Scottish merchants during his service in Sweden. It is not currently known whether Thomas was a relation of John. In this request, there is specific mention of Thomas Cootes, as well as ‘other Subjects of London’ who complained to the British Crown that the late Karl ix of Sweden had been indebted to them. The debt remained outstanding and Spens’s instructions in this regard were to provide satisfaction for these merchants.86 No further information is given on Thomas Cootes, and no additional records of him in England or Sweden have presently been uncovered. In terms of John Coote the records remain silent until 1614. Coote then appears as the main subject of a petition sent from the Privy Council of England to the Swedish Council of the Realm.87 A deeper understanding of the nature of trade and the merchant’s role outside of the superficial information gleaned from commercial statistics can be glimpsed through court cases involving John Coote. Petitions subsequently submitted by his widow also shed light on Coote as an example of

85 86 87

sra, lta, Vol. 367.1, 1600. The osmund iron in question is labelled as “af Cronan”. sra, da, Vol. 5, 29 April 1612. tna, pc 2/​27, f. 226, October 1614.

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early Anglo-​Swedish trade. These disputes range over a period from 1614 to 1623. They involved a number of English merchants based both in England and Sweden, a Scottish migrant in Sweden, and other merchants of unknown origin, who were also based in Sweden. The court cases involving John Coote were heard before the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea Hovrätt), the highest judicial body for the eastern part of Sweden.88 It is likely therefore that the bulk of Coote’s trading activity with Sweden was itself focused on Stockholm which lay under the court’s geographical jurisdiction.89 John Coote’s legal disputes began in 1614 when Coote was ordered to pay 150 riksdaler to the Ewertson brothers.90 It is possible that the letter sent from the English Privy Council shortly after the judgement in Sweden could relate to this case in some way.91 The court case establishes that Coote was continuing to trade directly to Sweden, and thus confirms that English and Swedish markets were connecting without the use of intermediary ports. In addition, the case reveals that Coote was directing trade from England, presumably with agents operating on his behalf in the Swedish capital. Coote was not present at court but rather opted to appoint a representative, which came in the form of Scottish military officer, Patrick Rutherford.92 The appearance of Rutherford demonstrates how the English and Scottish were willing to support one another’s interests abroad. This ‘British’ cooperation also highlights evidence of the association between British commercial and military spheres. The cooperation of Scottish military servicemen and Scottish merchants in Sweden in this period is already well known. In some instances, Scottish soldiers took up mercantile careers in Sweden after completing their military service.93 Coote reappeared in the Swedish courts in 1619 regarding a separate dispute. On this occasion, Coote had been charged with owing money to the late merchant ‘Johann Willz’, whose estate had been seized by the Swedish 88 89 90 91 92 93

For more information on the court consult: Korpiola, Mia, (ed.), The Svea Court of Appeal in the Early Modern Period: Historical Reinterpretations and New Perspectives, Rättshistoriska studier, Vol. 72, 2014. Although Coote’s name appears in the Stockholm commercial records it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that he was engaged in trade with additional destinations in Sweden. sra, lt, Vol. 367.1. 1600. sra, sh, B ii a, Vol. 1. 1614. Thank you to Dr Mia Korpiola for this reference. tna, pc 2/​27, f. 226, October 1614. Rutherford is noted as Coote’s ‘fullmechtig’ or representative. There are three Patrick Rutherford’s present in the ssne database. It is currently not known which one of these men represented Coote. See ssne entries: “Rutherford, Patrick” [4351], [6633], [6676]. Grosjean, Alexia, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 4–​5.

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Crown and his heir ‘Henrich Wiliz’ was now pursuing the case.94 By law, the Swedish Crown was legally allowed to seize estates or assets if the deceased was indebted to the Swedish authorities, or if they were a foreign merchant residing in Sweden. The provision for this kind of seizing was outlined in a trade act from 1617, and it became a cause of great merchant unrest and diplomatic anxiety for the British over the coming century.95 It is highly likely that the heir ‘Henrich Wiliz’ is the same merchant in Sweden, ‘Henry Wilde’, who is referred to in a subsequent English court case by Coote’s widow and was described as an associate of her late husband.96 Henry Wilde was most likely related to John Wilde (Johann Willz), an English merchant who had been commercially active in Stockholm from at least 1600.97 It is possible to speculate at this juncture that some form of active English commercial presence existed in Sweden on a more permanent basis, alongside the already well established Scottish emigrant community. Henry Wilde was seeking reparations from Coote for money Coote obtained from John’s estate after his death. The court proceedings note that when the Swedish Crown had previously seized John’s estate, Coote produced several justifications as to why he had been allowed to claim the money owed from the estate. Coote obtained the funds after the Swedish Crown took possession, but before they sealed the estate.98 It is pertinent that Coote was known to have held direct commercial relations with the King of Sweden and that the Swedish Crown was listed as a debtor of Coote in a subsequent, posthumous court case. This association with the Swedish monarch may have played a role in why Coote was allowed to obtain funds from the seized estate.99 94 95

96 97

98 99

sra, sh, Huvudarkivet, B ii a, Vol. 2, f. 131. 17 November 1619. A brief summary of the 1617 act appears in: sra, 1. Kommission angående främmande köpmäns handel och vistande i riket, 7 January 1681. The matter was still a sticking point in negotiations for a proposed treaty between England and Sweden. A provisional copy exists in English: tna, co 390/​1. tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7, reply of widow Mary Coote, c. 1623. John Wilde is noted as ‘Johan Wildh, ‘engelskmann’ (Englishman) in the records for this year. sra, lta, Vols. 367.1 and 367.2. 1600. The Wilde family was still actively importing into Stockholm in 1640. “Johann Wilde” is listed as importing 700 pounds of tobacco as well as 5 dozen hats and 5 dozen hat ribbons on 20 November 1640 from Lübeck. It is not currently known whether this tobacco was connected to English colonial re-​exports or exactly what relation the 1640 “Johann Wilde” is to the original found a generation earlier. ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640. sra, sh, 17 November 1619. tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. It is stated that the King of Sweden was indebted to John Coote for 7,000 riksdaler. As early as the 1590s, Karl ix employed an agent on the ground in England during his time as a duke. His agent was English merchant Thomas Fish and one

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Henry Wilde contested this state of affairs and tasked the Crown with relinquishing the funds as they were in possession of the will and the estate. The court stated that the Swedish Crown was not responsible for any reparations and that the matter must be taken up with Coote. John Coote was in Sweden at this point and present at court. This is clear because nobody is listed in the court documentation as serving on his behalf. Furthermore, a subsequent English court case involving his widow, Mary Coote, noted that he had been in Sweden prior to his death in 1620.100 Coote defended himself by stating that he could obtain evidence from England as to why he was entitled to the money from the Wilde estate. The court ordered that his papers should be presented to them before 1620 and should be signed and sealed by the Swedish Crown.101 The final mention of John Coote in the Swedish court records appears in June 1620, shortly after his death. Coote’s passing in Sweden would later bring complications for his widow due to the seizure of his assets there, much in the same vein as Wilde before him. The Swedish court received an official letter from the English Privy Council to inform them that Mary Coote was the executrix of the will. Mary was unable to attend and was represented by local merchant Peter Plåman. As prior evidence was never submitted relating to John Coote’s previous stipulation, the court ordered that the Coote estate was indebted to heirs of the Wilde estate for a sum of 200 riksdaler.102 John Coote’s Swedish affairs spilled over into the English Court of Chancery in June 1621. Elizabeth Greene, the widow of a fellow London merchant trading to Sweden, William Greene, sought money from Coote’s widow Mary. Elizabeth stated that her husband had died while attending to his business in Sweden and had sought out John Coote to supervise his affairs. Elizabeth further stated that after his passing she also had contact with Coote for the same ends. On both counts she conceded that there was no receipt or account of an agreement being made. She accused Mary of embezzling money that was repatriated back to England from Sweden on behalf of Greene. Mary sought to defend and refute these claims. The record of the case consists of of his known commercial associates was John Coote. Wikland, Erik, Elizabethan Players in Sweden, 1591–​1592, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 27, 76. Many thanks to Dr Alexia Grosjean for making me aware of this study. 100 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. Coote’s widow, Mary, stated that ‘he laye sicke of a dead palsey in Swethen a whole yere & fower monthes before his death which was in Anno Domini 1620’, putting his arrival in Sweden at sometime before 1619. It is possible Coote was in Sweden longer. Elizabeth Greene, complainant in the case stated that Coote was taking payment in Sweden between 1617–​1619. 1 01 sra, sh, B ii a, Vol. 2, 17 November 1619, f. 131. 102 sra, sh, B ii a, Vol. 2, 27 June 1620, f. 144.

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one complaint from Elizabeth from June 1621 and a defence from Mary from sometime in 1623.103 The case offers pertinent information surrounding the commodities and networks involved in Anglo-​Swedish trade at this juncture. Both women provide extensive information relating to both John Coote’s and William Greene’s commercial dealings. Their activities, from this superficial vantage point, seem fairly similar, although it is unclear whether these men were involved in an active partnership together. Some of the more personal instances of the court proceedings reveal that Mary and Elizabeth did have some form of prior relationship to the court case itself, although it is uncertain whether this relationship dated from the deaths of their husbands. Both Greene and Coote primarily sold broadcloth to the Swedish market, although the other ‘dyverse commidities’ they exported are not specified. It is not known whether the entirety of their outgoing cargoes landed in Sweden on a direct sailing. At the very least, the majority of their cargo, consisting of English-​produced exports of broadcloth, were traded directly, as revealed by Mary’s statement that the King of Sweden was indebted to Coote for ‘dyverse cloathes [and] redye moneyes’.104 The English cloth arrived in Sweden directly, but the debt of cash could be an indication of other commodities acquired through some form of multilateral trading. That their debtor is referred to as the ‘Kinge of Swethen’ confirms they were selling directly to the Swedish Crown and thus engaging in commercial undertakings at the highest level of Swedish society. This statement matches James Spens’s earlier diplomatic instructions regarding the difficulties the English merchants trading to Sweden were having in receiving payments from the Swedish Crown as early as 1612. Both Greene and Coote’s motivations for travelling to Sweden (that ultimately ended in both of their deaths) involved resolving these debts and procuring payment. It demonstrates that trade with Sweden was not without risk. Regardless of whether a merchant engaged in trade with individual operators, mercantile firms, or even the Swedish Crown, payment for goods was not guaranteed. Problems arising from non-​payment for goods delivered were experienced by numerous English merchants trading with Sweden throughout the course of the century.105 1 03 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. 104 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. “Diverse clothes” could be interpreted as any form of unfinished textile materials that were frequently exported to the Baltic from Britain, as well as finished and ready to wear garments such as kerseys and dozens (another type of common English exported textile). “Ready money” is almost certainly intended to mean hard currency. 105 See Chapters 5 and 6.

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The court case provides pertinent information relating to commercial organisation and the commodities involved for returning shipments to England during this period. Mary provides details of the final shipment John Coote sent from Sweden, stating that ‘parcels of copp[er] were shipped to Lübeck, where it was sold and the rest of the trade accounted for by bills’.106 As has been suggested, ports in the southern Baltic acted as intermediaries in the exchange between western markets and the Baltic. This perhaps occurred on an even more significant scale during the first half of the century. Coote’s export trade from Sweden demonstrates that English merchants were fully capable of utilising the southern Baltic as an intermediary juncture between the English and Swedish markets and on their own account. It is pertinent that Coote sold his goods at Lübeck. At this point the Eastland Company’s headquarters were based in Elbing. It is not known whether his decision to sell goods away from the Eastland Company’s base was simply motivated by garnering a higher price at Lübeck, or whether he was attempting to divert his trade away from the gaze of English officials. That Mary was willing to give up this information either points to her ignorance of this questionable tactic of evading the English monopoly for Baltic trade, or that there was nothing sinister to hide in the first place. Despite the Privy Council sanctioning Coote’s trade through their letter of appeal in 1614, it is unclear whether Coote or Greene were aligned with the Eastland monopoly. Thus far it appears they traded independently. A brief point to consider is what the various sources reveal about the monetary value of Swedish trade in this period. Elizabeth states that the King of Sweden was indebted to William Greene for 7000 Swedish riksdaler, noted in the source to be £1050. Likewise, Mary states that the Swedish king was indebted to John Coote for ‘dyverse greate somes of money’.107 The profit that made its way back to Mary from the parcels of copper that were sold in Lübeck totalled £600, not counting the worth of the bills of exchange. It seems that for a bulk trade, trading to Sweden, possibly in contract with the Swedish government, was a potentially lucrative undertaking, as long as payment was forthcoming. This highlights the importance of consulting a variety of sources to come to an estimation of the potential value of Anglo-​Swedish trade at this juncture. The scattered commercial statistics, in comparison to estimates of 1 06 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. 107 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. It is not specified exactly when John Coote’s trade took place with the King of Sweden so it is unknown whether the debtor was Karl ix or Gustav ii Adolf, or whether money owed for trade with the Swedish Crown as an institution itself in this instance was deemed null and void upon the death of a monarch.

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Coote’s overall trade glimpsed from court cases, paint a very different picture of the potential wealth that was to be gained from trade with Sweden at such an early date. A final point to consider is the commercial, political, and diplomatic networks which underpin these records. Coote, like his counterpart Greene, was an established merchant who dealt directly with the Swedish market for an extended period. The diplomatic instructions of 1612 demonstrate that there was also a body of London-​based merchants trading to Sweden and that there were allies and associates among their fellow Stuart subjects, the Scots. From the detail given in posthumous court records, it does not appear that John Coote had been to Sweden on a regular basis for some time, and most likely conducted his trade from London.108 The appearance of Patrick Rutherford as a stand-​in for Coote would point to this. It is bolstered by Mary’s statement that John, ‘in hope of obteyninge his said debt from the Kinge of Swethen did for that purpose to his greate charge Travell out of England into the Kingdomes of Swethen’.109 Not only is cooperation between the English and Scottish shown in Coote’s business, but English merchants such as Coote also dealt extensively with local merchants. An example of this is the appearance of Petter Plåman, who represented Coote’s widow in Swedish court after his death.110 Plåman is later referred to by both women as a source of information for their husbands’ accounts. Plåman appears in the English court case as ‘Peter Plagman’.111 The English court case also refers to a Francis Burger, ‘whoe had longe resided in the Kingdome of Sweathen’. Burger was alleged to be dealing directly with Elizabeth Greene in England, and was duly called to the Court of Chancery in London. However, he disappeared abroad before he could be tracked down.112 Finally, and perhaps of most significance, Coote’s

108 Court records from Stockholm have recorded John Coote at various points as in Sweden over the period 1600–​1613. Both John Coote and William Greene drop out of the Stockholm court records after this point. Stockholms tänkeböcker, Vol. 3, 16 July 1600, pp. 93–​94; Vol. 4, 19 August 1601, pp. 92–​93; Vol. 5, 16 June 1604, p. 240; Vol. 6, 13 and 14 August 1606, pp. 121–​ 123, 150–​153 and 12 October 1607, pp. 264–​265; Vol. 7, 16 November 1613, p. 297. 109 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. 110 There are two other known instances of Coote’s potential trade with Swedish merchants which can be glimpsed from the Stockholm court records. Stockholms tänkeböcker, Vol. 6, 14 June 1606, p. 120–​122 and 11 August 1606, p. 150–​151. 111 Similarly Mary Coote’s letter to Sir James Spens dated 2 December 1621 refers to “Peter Plagman”. However the Swedish records state his surname as Plåman, so this spelling has been given precedence. Thank you to Professor Steve Murdoch for making me aware of this source. 112 tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7.

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affairs indicate a potential English commercial presence in Sweden in the form of ‘Johann Willz’. The seizure of the two Englishmen’s estates without penalty suggests they were not naturalised Swedes.113 That the two estates were treated separately further suggests that they were not merely agents of Coote, but were conducting trade on their own account. English trade with Sweden has been confirmed at a much earlier time than previously thought. Additionally, Coote’s commercial affairs provide a more incisive glimpse into the nature of trade at this point. Furthermore, tentative approaches towards confirming the existence of an English presence in Sweden from at least the 1590s can be suggested. Coote’s activity also reveals insights into the nature of the appeal system that merchants had at their disposal, as well as the networks that were in place to undertake trade. Traders such as John Coote were far from peripheral agents. They conducted trade with the Swedish Crown and had the ear of senior diplomats such as Sir James Spens, charged with representing their interests abroad. Indeed, deeper insights into commercial organisation as well as commodity flows through intermediary markets emerge. Further information pertaining to the monetary value of Anglo-​Swedish trade can be obtained where fragmentary commercial records have fallen short. 7

Anthony Knipe and the English Company of Gothenburg, 1635–​1637

The English Company of Gothenburg, established in 1635, is a little-​known commercial entity in the history of Sweden, and one that has been completely overlooked in England. The fact that the company’s failure followed almost immediately from its conception is probably the main reason for it being overlooked. Little trace of the company has survived aside from scattered references in contemporary correspondence, local legal documentation and royal missives. Archival perseverance has led to the recent uncovering of a list of participants in the company for the years 1635 and 1636.114 The story of the English Company of Gothenburg is valuable to more than just the commercial history of Sweden. Due to the varied nature of its ethnic 113 In November 1613, both Coote and Greene are noted as ‘gester’ or guests, which would imply they held no Swedish trading privileges or form of Swedish citizenship. The sole mention of a ‘Jahann Weils’ in the same records in connection with Coote in 1606 fails to mention Wilde’s status. Stockholms tänkeböcker, Vol. 6, 13 August 1606, p. 150; Vol. 7, 13 November 1613, p. 292. 114 sra, Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 51, ‘Engelska Companiet Göteborg’.

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composition it also serves as a contribution to the history of immigration to Sweden. Furthermore, the English Company was the first Swedish-​based commercial venture to be directed to the English market, with both English and Scottish merchants at its core. Due to the limited evidence available at present, it is currently difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the precise nature of the English Company’s connection to England. However, its sanction at both the local and national level demonstrates the association between the British expatriate community in Gothenburg and governmental authorities in Sweden. That the English Company ever existed reveals a lot about the nature of Anglo-​Swedish commerce. The recent discovery of documentation surrounding the exploits of English merchants trading with Sweden in the early decades of the century has raised questions on the nature of official and unofficial trading practices.115 It is peculiar that the Swedish authorities sanctioned the creation of the company, as is the fact that there is no mention of its existence in British royal, diplomatic or commercial documentation. Neither has there been any extant correspondence uncovered with the English Eastland Company, which held a monopoly over English trade to Scandinavia. The absence of recorded negotiations with official English political and commercial bodies could suggest that the British mercantile community in Sweden and the Swedish Crown likewise had designs on becoming the core stimulus for trade between England and Sweden. Therefore, empowering merchants based in Gothenburg, who had native knowledge of the intended market, could be seen as a key move in shifting the focus to their own shores, and under their own auspices. The impetus for the creation of the company probably came from the British merchants in the town, eager to make use of contacts in their homeland as well as their knowledge of the English market. From the outset regulations approved by the Swedish Crown were issued which specified that merchants of any nationality would be free to join.116 Catering for non-​British merchants in this manner perhaps suggests that the initial petitioners could have been

115 See prior case study surrounding the affairs of London merchant John Coote. sra, da, Vol. 5, 29 April 1612; tna, pc 2/​27, f. 226, October 1614; sra, sh, Huvudarkivet, B ii a, Vol. 2, f. 131; tna, cc, C2/​JasI/​G9/​7. 116 srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​134, 16 August 1635. Regulations regarding the establishment of the English Company before the Council of State, specifically point five. A similar copy of unknown origin is in, sra, Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 51, ‘Effterfolgender Puncter anlage ded Engelshe Compani’., undated. This copy contains only seven points, whereas the former has eight.

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British, or at the very least, that most were British. The Swedish authorities probably sought to generate greater inclusivity of ethnic groups to be more representative of Gothenburg’s mercantile population. The English Company of Gothenburg should be seen as part of a wider economic movement that was gaining prevalence in Sweden at this time –​the establishment of nationally recognised monopoly companies for the advancement of the nation’s trade. This process gained momentum during the first half of the seventeenth century. In another respect, the foreign initiative behind the establishment of the English Company is similar to how the Dutch-​led Swedish companies Söderkompaniet, Skeppskompaniet and Svenska Västindiskakompaniet, originate.117 Ultimately the draw of the English market was the greatest incentive for all parties interested in setting up the English Company. Contemporary trading records from around the time the company was founded demonstrate how important the English market was for the town’s commercial survival as has been shown. In 1638 England was the second most significant export destination for Gothenburg’s goods after the Dutch Republic, and in 1641 it was third most valuable after the Dutch Republic and Hamburg. In both instances exports to England accounted for around 15% of the town’s total export trade. England represented both a considerable and consistent outlet as an export destination vital for the fledgling town’s survival. In 1635, Gothenburg was only fourteen years old, and flanked on both its southern and northern borders by Denmark and Norway respectively. The opportunities for growth under the right conditions may have had decisive consequences.118 In addition to merchants, both the Swedish Crown and the local town government of Gothenburg had distinctive ends to gain from the company’s

117 One of the first Swedish monopoly companies was established to handle exports of tar in 1619. Other Swedish monopoly companies founded under the impetus of foreign merchants included the Swedish West India Company and the Swedish South Company. Keen, Gregory B. And Odhner C. T., ’Professor C. T. Odhner’s Account of Willem Usselincx and the South, Ship, and West India Companies of Sweden’, in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 7:10, 1883, pp. 268–​270; Murray, John J., ’Robert Jackson’s Memoir on the Swedish Tar Company’, in Huntington Library Quarterly, 10.4, 1967, pp. 419–​428; Nováky, György, Handelskompanier och kompanihandel: svenska Afrikakompaniet 1649–​1663, Uppsala, 1990; Wirta, Kaarle, Early Modern Overseas Trade and Entrepreneurship: Nordic Trading Companies in the seventeenth century, London, Routledge, 2022. 118 gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638 and Vol. 804. 1641.

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success. The crown anticipated financial returns and had hopes of making Gothenburg a staple port for the import and export of English goods.119 The Swedish Crown’s eagerness to make its only western-​facing port a staple for the English market can be seen through the process of the company’s establishment. The initial catalyst is likely to have originated through British merchants who were already well established in Gothenburg, and thus used their influence to petition the local authorities. Their requests would likely have passed through official channels. The town council had the authority to further proposals for vetting at national level. The founders appear to have entered into discussions with the town council sometime around March 1635.120 By August, the crown had granted official status to the merchants, and the English Company of Gothenburg came into existence.121 Although the Swedish Crown’s desire for a staple port has been noted in prior historiography, the weight of its significance has been under-​appreciated.122 Indeed, the trading privileges granted to the merchants involved in the English Company must be seen as a natural extension of the town’s founding charter and the ethos that lay behind it. The 1621 founding charter of Gothenburg aimed to offer the most advantageous trading conditions to draw experienced and capital-​rich foreign merchants towards the town. Settlers in Gothenburg were granted a sixteen-​year tax exemption on trading, providing they were willing to remain on a permanent basis and assume Swedish burgess privileges (burskap), binding them to local and national obligations including, but not l­ imited to, taxation, primarily aimed at attracting British, Dutch and German merchants to Gothenburg.123 Aside from financial incentives the founding charter awarded political representation for the various ethnic groups it intended to attract. The charter ensured that a minimum number of seats was allocated to each key ethnic group on every town council. This was a fundamental condition 1 19 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, p. 233. 120 Ibid. Almquist’s text has a defined narrative concerning plans with the town council, but, as of yet, no record to support his statements have been uncovered in the minutes of the town council. 121 sra, Riksregistratur, 1635, 18 and 20 August 1635. 122 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, p. 233. Further proposals for Gothenburg to become a staple port in English trade were outlined thirty years later in the Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1665. 123 This was the same process undertaken by Scottish merchants already discussed in Stockholm. For a comprehensive list of burgesses resident in the town see: Långström, Erland, Göteborgs stads borgarlängd 1621–​1864, Göteborg, 1926. More on the town’s founding charter and the privileges therein can be found in Fröding, Hugo, Berättelser ur Göteborgs äldsta historia, Vol. 1, Gothenburg, 1908, pp. 27–​28.

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in fostering the growth and development of the town. British representation was enshrined through a provision of a minimum of two seats guaranteed to Scottish citizens at any one time the town council congregated.124 There are distinctive parallels in the granting of citywide privileges in 1621 and those awarded to the merchants of the English Company in 1635, particularly evident in respect to the commercial exemptions and regulations outlined in the company’s charter. In fact, the culture of tax deduction and tax exemption in Gothenburg was to some extent replicated with the company’s very foundation. Points three and four of the company charter allowed participating merchants a 1% deduction in customs rates for the first two years of trading. Additionally, the English beer they imported was taxed differently from beer originating from elsewhere. The English Company secured a similar 1% deduction on customs duty on imported beer that they consumed, while the imported beer they sold remained at the standard rate.125 This particular concession may have reflected the British merchants’ prioritising of imported beer for their own consumption. However, there were also additional liberties. Possibly the greatest tax concession outlined in the charter allowed the English Company to oversee the taxation of its own goods. This privilege appears to have been granted on the condition that the company paid its taxes to the crown in silver minted riksdaler, as opposed to the copper alternative.126 This point in particular was most likely motivated by the fact that the Swedish Crown at the time was in constant need of a steady cash flow to fuel its war machine.127 The silver stipulation was to have direct and disastrous consequences for the company. On the surface, it now seems reckless for the crown to have entrusted the company merchants with taxing themselves. In reality, the central authorities were probably taking a more pragmatic approach, as communications between Stockholm and Gothenburg were poor, and in the early years the city was notoriously lawless.128 It is possible that the crown’s 124 It has been shown that the Scottish aspect was actually more fluid, catering for anyone of British ethnicity in the town, meaning that English citizens could occupy a Scottish seat under the same rights. Grimshaw, Adam, “Aspects of ‘British’ Migration to Sweden” in Facing Otherness in Early Modern Sweden, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2018, p. 179. 125 srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​34, 16 August 1635; sra, Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 51. English Company stipulations, 18 August 1635. 126 Ibid. 127 Heckscher, Eli F., The Economic History of Sweden, 1954, pp. 79–​81. 128 Many of the court minutes and details in court cases from this period display specific incidences of violence and a general view of lawlessness. lva, Göta hovrätt, Vols. 1–​6, 1635–​41; For trade and communication in this period see, Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges ekonomiska historia, Vol. 1.2, pp. 533–​564.

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desperation for silver bullion fuelled the stance that any silver gained through company taxation was sufficient for the time being. The English Company charter also contained restrictive and obligatory clauses, one of which stated that the company must always be headed by an English national.129 It has been suggested that the initiative for this request originally came from the merchants in their discussions with the town council, and that the local authorities were uneasy at granting such power to a foreigner.130 However, the primary motivation for the authorities to entrust the direction of the company to an ‘Englishman’ made sense on their part. If they were going to devolve such a level of liberty in regard to taxation and oversight it was important for a person familiar with the English market, culture and mercantile practices to oversee its commercial development. The company enjoyed the privilege of trading directly with the nobility as well as being permitted to engage in some aspects of the retail trade. These were features of domestic commodity exchange that were closely regulated by the authorities. However, the English Company was obligated to purchase a warehouse to store its goods. It is likely that the stipulation for the central storage of goods was to aid inspections in terms of payment of customs duties, should the need arise.131 The company was also bound to respect the laws regarding staple and non-​staple towns outlined in the Trade Act of 1617. Merchants who were members of the company were to ensure that no foreign merchants who did not hold Swedish burgess rights were to move away from Gothenburg to engage in direct trade with native merchants in other ports.132 It is likely that the core British merchants wanted to establish an organisation to somehow extend their own Swedish commercial privileges to create a

129 srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​34, 16 August 1635. Whether or not the term ‘Engelshe’ was held to be mutually interchangeable with ‘Skotske’, or whether both were to denote a British subject remains a matter of conjecture. The town charter provided two seats for ‘Skotske’, but it has been established from consulting court attendance lists that Englishman Anthony Knipe initially occupied a ‘Skotske’ seat. However, before this appointment, Englishman Anthony Knipe was an obscure figure while there were many senior Scottish traders active in the town. This would support the notion that when the Crown stated ‘Engelshe’ they meant ‘English’. 130 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, p. 233. 131 srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​34, 16 August 1635; sra, Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 51. English Company stipulations, 18 August 1635. 132 The Trade Act of 1617 was intended to concentrate the collection of customs duties to a few ports, whilst restricting access to production areas inland and funnelling raw materials as well as the finished product to selected ports. The two major staple ports were Stockholm and Gothenburg. Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges ekonomiska historia, pp. 672–​675.

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more favourable position for their British counterparts in their home market. However, the exact relationship the company held with other merchants connected to the English market outside of Sweden is unclear. No contracts, correspondence or commercial records have yet been discovered relating to how the English Company conducted trade from Gothenburg. The silence on the part of English records creates more problems than solutions. The only hint that can be gleaned from the charter regarding foreign activity and participation is the mention of English credit. The charter vaguely states that if English credit should fail, the company members should still enjoy the same privileges as burgesses of Gothenburg.133 The mention of credit from England suggests two things. Firstly, that English credit, and thus English or British merchants, financed the establishment of the trading company in Gothenburg, or at the very least that the Swedish authorities expected this to be the arrangement. There is no record or mention of the Swedish Crown or any other Swedish governmental or institutional body part-​financing the company. This form of commercial organisation should not be seen as departing from established practice. Advances of credit from actors and markets in western Europe would become a consistent feature of Swedish commercial organisation and production throughout the course of the century.134 Secondly, this clause in the charter suggests that English and British merchants were allowed to participate in the company, possibly even as fully-​fledged members with complete company privileges. If this was the case, then ‘foreign’ members of the company, that is those who had not taken up burgess privileges, were potentially allowed a vital opportunity and inroad into engaging with the retail trade in Gothenburg. In essence, that gave a merchant direct access to the entire Swedish market, to buy and sell from the city itself and most importantly, to engage in commercial activity with the nobility, and thus the biggest merchant house of all –​the Swedish Crown.135 In essence the Swedish authorities were using the same principle methods in attempting to establish Gothenburg as a staple market for English goods, and attracting British merchants to the city, as they had done fourteen years earlier to encourage a wider body of foreign merchants and their credit to the

1 33 Ibid. 134 The main commodities that were produced and exported from mainland Sweden were largely reliant on the förlag system that needed advances of credit to fund production. See: Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges ekonomiska historia, Vol. 1.2, pp. 565–​601. 135 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1., p. 234. The existence of a John Wright in the founding charter and a John Wright listed as a foreigner in customs records from around the same time furthers this notion.

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town. It is pertinent to note that the initial sixteen-​year tax exemption, provided through the new city charter of 1621, was soon coming to an end when the company was established in 1635 plunging Gothenburg’s very security into doubt with the threat of a merchant exodus from the city. Does the timing of the company’s establishment reflect the Swedish Crown’s business plan for the town? Furthermore, was it a commercial strategy that was inherently tied to the English market and financed through English credit? Perhaps it was a coincidence, but perhaps not. Little is known about the specific organisation or of the participants of the company save for the head of the company who was an English merchant named Anthony Knipe. He was appointed to the position by the Swedish Crown in August 1635.136 Knipe was already well established in Gothenburg and although no commercial records regarding Knipe’s trading activities have currently been uncovered, he must have been active and knowledgeable given his appointment over a variety of well-​known Scottish merchants also resident in the town. Knipe was present as a representative (fullmechtig) of the company when the Council of the Realm finalised the regulations and confirmed the company’s charter in August 1635.137 Knipe appeared before the council alongside Mårten Wewitzer Rosenstierna, a member of the nobility and someone with proven ties to the English market. Rosenstierna exported a number of goods from Stockholm to England the following year. It is possible that Rosenstierna, a capital-​rich merchant based in Stockholm, saw the potential of developing links with England and using mercantile connections, as well as native English acumen, to develop the Gothenburg project.138 Those involved in the company from the outset are revealed in a two-​part customs list covering the period 1635–​1636. The document reveals both the consigners of goods and who their principal shippers or contacts were in obtaining the goods (See Figure 1.5). The list contains many English and Scottish names, but some prove a little more obscure as the document is written by a Dutch hand.139 The document also demonstrates the participation of Swedish

1 36 137 138 139

sra, Riksregistratur, 1635, 18 and 20 August 1635. srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​34, 16 August 1635. srp, Vol. 5, 1635, pp. 132–​34, 16 August 1635; Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, pp. 233–​237. sra, Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 51. For example, in 1635: Thomas Horner, Jan Mesterthonn (John Maisterton), Welomb Winter (William Winter), Joris Watkens (John –​or George? –​ Watkins), Anderss Richardssonn (Andrew Richardson), Thomas Knipen (Knipe), Wellom Halli (William Halliday). From 1636: Jann Wilkennssonn (John Wilkinson), ‘Jacob Almond af Londen’ (James Almond), Jann Wricht (John Wright), Rodhgir Robertsson (Roger Robertson), Thomas Kueper (Thomas Cooper), etc.

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FIGURE 1.5  A list of participants in the English Company of Gothenburg, 1635 reproduced courtesy of the national archives of sweden (svenska riksarkivet). ©adam grimshaw

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and Dutch merchants, pointing to the fact that the company was multi-​ethnic, although the majority of merchants involved were British in origin.140 The English Company was only active for two trading seasons. By 1637 it appears the merchants had to default on their customs payments. The customs list reveals that the company owed the Swedish Crown over 3000 riksdaler.141 The amount of customs owed indicates just how valuable the company’s trade was at this juncture. It appears that the company was barred from trading because they could not make good on their customs payments. As outlined in the last point of the company’s founding charter, the company’s very existence was dependent on the merchants involved meeting the requirements set out in relation to customs. It is likely the crown failed to back the company, instead pushing it into insolvency. It has been claimed that the crown seized the company’s property due to abuse of privileges in the city. The matter lay unresolved until 1641, and the city’s court registers are peppered with cases relating to the company.142 By May 1641 the former head of the company Anthony Knipe brought his grievances before the Swedish Crown, stating that he had still not been reimbursed for business trips to Stockholm on the company’s behalf. On 1 September, with the company’s 3000 riksdaler debt still outstanding, the crown instead ordered the company to transfer their debt to Knipe for his service to the company to fulfil what he claimed he was owed.143 The only known success story to come out of the English Company’s brief existence appears to be the Englishman, Knipe, who was appointed to oversee the venture. However, Knipe’s subsequent Swedish career took a tumultuous turn that similarly ended in disgrace. Anthony Knipe first emerges in contemporary records in the marriage registers of Gothenburg’s German Church in 1631 when he married Maria Langer, the relative of an influential Gothenburg citizen.144 Nothing concrete can be determined regarding his prior activity or of his origins before his arrival in

1 40 For example, in 1636: Peder Larsson, Hans Rommelsson, Randolph Kröger/​Kreuger. 141 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, pp. 233–​237. 142 lva, Göta hovrätt, Vol. 6, 1641. 143 sra, Riksregistratur, May 1641. The Swedish Crown to ‘Giötheborgs Magistrat för Rådzfördwaltern Anthonio Knip’. 144 Berg, Samlingar till Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, p. 3; Dahl, Olga, Göteborgs tomtägare, 2004, 4.111, states that Langer was the daughter of Holstein-​born burggreven (governor-​general), Daniel Lange. While this would somewhat explain Knipe’s later rise through the ranks, it is more likely that she was the daughter of some relation of Dutch/​Flemish burgess Peter Langer. The spelling in the surnames is more consistent and it would explain Knipe’s ties to the Dutch market.

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Gothenburg at this current juncture. A letter sent to Knipe in Sweden from his cousin Isack Knipe in late 1646 regarding his father’s death and his inheritance, reveals that Anthony had been away from England for quite some time.145 In order to prove their familial ties, Isack lists the names of their relatives and that his brother Timothie had married the daughter of Baron Hadellstone. Isack urged Knipe to return home to claim his inheritance stating, “I shall willinglie attend you into the North”, perhaps indicating that Anthony Knipe belonged to a family of moderate influence in the north of England. The letter is dated in London where Isack resided.146 It is not until 1635 that Anthony Knipe consistently emerges in contemporary Swedish records. There are ubiquitous references to Knipe in the city’s legal records, the first occurring at the beginning of 1635 when extant records re-​emerge. Knipe’s appearance in legal cases continued throughout the 1640s until his expulsion from Sweden in 1647.147 Knipe was a controversial figure and came to be involved in a stream of disputes with members of the British community in Gothenburg, as well as other foreign nationals in the town. His court cases feature well-​established merchants and even powerful members of the local civic population.148 The variety of nationalities, as well as the status of individuals with whom he associated, is perhaps a testament, not only to the diversification of his commercial and civic activity at this point, but to the level of influence he probably held in the town. It is possible that his marriage could have elevated his status. The Gothenburg town council minutes from 10 September 1635 reveal that Knipe occupied one of the seats allocated to members of the town’s British community, alongside Scottish merchant John Young.149 Knipe’s elevation to

145 “Your dep[ar]ture from our Countrie was in my infancie”. sra, Biographica, K, K I, K 10, Isack Knipe to Anthony Knipe, 28 December 1646. 146 Isack Knipe goes on to state Anthony’s father was Samuell Knipe and his uncles were Tobias and Anthonie Knipe also. sra, Biographica, K, K I, K 10, Isack Knipe to Anthony Knipe, 28 December 1646. 147 1647 is the point at which Knipe’s appearance in the Gothenburg court records, as well as his correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna found in sra ceases. It coincides with the point at which he begins to appear in Norwegian primary sources. Statholderskabets Ekstraktprotokol af Supplicationer og Resolutioner, 1642–​1652, Vol. 2, J. Chr. Gundersens Bogtrykkeri Christiania, 1906, pp. 5, 75, 145. Anthony Knipe to Hannibal Sehested, June 1647, July 1648 and September 1648. 148 lva, Göta hovrätt, Vols. 1–​6, 1635–​1641. For example, Jacob Gården (James Gordon), a Scottish merchant; Willem Godtfriedh (William Godfrey), likely an Englishman; Tomies Pawelsson and President Nils Börgesson, a member of the town council. 149 lva, Göta hovrätt, Vol. 1, 1635, 10 September 1635. See also ssne id: “Young, Hans” [4689].

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the council was royally sanctioned following his appointment as President of the English Company in August 1635. Despite the company’s eventual failure, Knipe’s influence in Sweden was on the rise beyond the confines of Gothenburg’s local government. Knipe first made his appearance on the town council as president of one the newly designed boards that were sanctioned to govern the city’s affairs. This was part of the national realignment of government brought about under Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna during the 1630s. Knipe was appointed as Gothenburg’s President of Commerce (Handelspresident) and represented Gothenburg at the Council of the Realm in Nyköping in 1640.150 The precise details relating to Knipe’s role as President of Commerce are obscure, although some of his activity can be glimpsed from meetings of the Swedish Council of the Realm. For example, in 1642, Knipe made suggestions to the council for improving the city’s salt trade, and was further instructed to provide information for the development of the city’s fleet in relation to the mast trade.151 However, the biggest insight into Knipe’s management of the city’s commercial affairs comes from his scattered correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna. A lack of evidence from the Gothenburg customs records of the period has previously made it difficult to pinpoint Knipe’s exact commercial role. At first glance, his absence from the town’s customs accounts seems at odds with his rise in influence through a wave of successive high-​profile commercial appointments. His correspondence with Oxenstierna reveals that Knipe was acting as a senior import agent for the Swedish Crown. Knipe’s correspondence further shows how he engaged in the saltpetre trade with merchant contacts in Amsterdam, as well as directing Gothenburg’s salt trade, primarily with Lisbon.152 Although some aspects of Knipe’s commercial role as an import agent are accessible, his direct connection to the English market aside from the English Company remains more obscure. Another of Knipe’s central commercial roles was in the mast trade. He rented a substantial part of the river’s shoreline to prepare and ship masts for export.153 Masts were one of Gothenburg’s primary exports, and were a safer and more convenient alternative for British skippers than sailing into the Baltic to acquire Riga masts. The English market was particularly keen for masts. During the 1660s, Francis Sheldon, English shipbuilder 150 lva, Göta hovrätt, Vol. 5, 1640, 18 April 1640; sra, Riksregistratur, May 1641. ‘Götheborgs Magistrat för Rådzförwaldtern Anthonio Knip, 12 May 1639; Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, pp. 85–​87. 151 srp, Vol. 9, 1642, 12 February 1642 and 4 May 1642, pp. 133, 262. 152 sra, Oxenstierna samlingen, E 636, Anthony Knipe to Axel Oxenstierna, 21.12.1640. 153 Almquist, Göteborgs historia, Vol. 1, p. 619.

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for the Swedish Navy, acted as an agent and shipper for the English Navy during his residency in Gothenburg.154 Knipe possibly fulfilled a similar role regarding masts, a central facet of the town’s export trade with England by the 1630s. Over 500 individual pieces worth around 3,000 riksdaler were exported to English harbours in 1638 alone.155 After becoming involved in a substantial number of disputes in Gothenburg Knipe gradually fell out of favour to the point that not even his close ally Axel Oxenstierna could protect him. He was eventually expelled from Sweden, although this did not mark the end of his career. Knipe moved onto pastures new by serving under the crown of Denmark-​Norway. He was appointed Chief Customs Officer of Norway (Generaltoldforvalter) from 1647–​1654, but was ultimately accused of embezzlement and fell out of favour with his employers once again.156 Knipe does not reappear in contemporary sources until 1660, when he was appointed to the English Admiralty as part of a new wave of Royalist commissioners under the service of Lord General Monck after the Restoration. Knipe’s letter of gratitude informs Monck of his service under both crowns in Scandinavia, emphasising his knowledge of commerce, specifically in relation to the Eastland Company.157 The establishment of the English Company of Gothenburg thus exposes several unexplored avenues of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction during this period. Although there is evidence of trade between the two markets on the Swedish west coast much earlier than 1635, the main impetus for this contact came from British merchants residing in the newly established city. However, the English Company also reveals that some parties were anxious to establish a lasting connection with the English market. This extended from the local government to the Swedish authorities in Stockholm, as well as capital-​ rich merchants from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. The company is fundamentally woven into the fabric of Gothenburg’s early history. It highlights the precarious nature of the early city’s position, and, how in all likelihood, the authorities at both the local and national level sought the association of the British merchants and connections to the English market, to stave off a potential exodus of merchant capital from the town. The company is an important marker in the history of Swedish immigration. The ethos of its foundation, the ethnic variety of its participants and the array

1 54 155 156 157

cspd, 1668–​69, pp. 185, 345. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638. Wiesener, A. M., ’Anthony Knip’ in Norsk biografisk leksikon, 1936, p. 431. tna, pro, 30/​24/​3, Part 1. Anthony Knipe to General Lord Monck, 30 March 1660.

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of opportunities it offered, provide an instructive impression of the multicultural composition of both Sweden and Gothenburg in the early seventeenth century. Commercially, the English Company should be seen as an extension of Swedish national economic policy of the time using a tried and tested tactic from fourteen years earlier. Furthermore, the establishment of monopoly trading companies was itself a feature of the period. The initiative was most likely British, and parallels can be drawn with other monopoly ventures of the period that were forwarded by Dutch immigrants in Sweden. The lack of contemporary commentary from English sources poses questions regarding the English Company’s own relationship with the main body of control for England’s own trade with the Baltic and Scandinavia, the Eastland Company. It is currently unknown whether the Swedish venture was ever officially sanctioned by the English government, or whether there was a relationship between the two companies. The Swedish Crown’s desire to see Gothenburg become a staple port for the English market was intended as an outcome of this undertaking and could have been viewed as a potential threat in England. Anthony Knipe’s role serves to outline how it was possible for Englishmen to attain a high level of influence in early modern Sweden. Knipe was able to combine favour brought about through an influential marriage with business acumen that elevated his status in government both at a local and nation level. Knipe also courted the favour of Sweden’s preeminent statesman, Axel Oxenstierna. In addition, his status as an Englishman, with connections to the English market, probably assisted his rise. Although more is known about his contacts outside of England, Knipe was evidently able to utilise a wide reaching mercantile network through which he provided the Swedish Crown with the essential commodities it needed from his base in Gothenburg. His high-​status appointment as a naval commissioner to the English Admiralty in 1660 seems to confirm that he was held in high regard as a commercial agent and facilitator. 8

The Shift towards Sweden

Previous studies have revealed that during the 1630s a period of reorientation in Anglo-​Baltic commerce began to occur. This trend would eventually see Sweden assume the role of England’s primary trading partner in the Baltic.158

158 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 29; Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, pp. 126–​127.

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Increased commercial interaction led to Sweden becoming the focus of English diplomacy in the latter half of the century in what became a mutually dependent yet uneasy relationship for both parties. A process began whereby the English moved from an economy based on exports of cloth to one primarily driven by the import of naval goods and ever-​ increasing quantities of iron. Previous scholars have outlined this as the decisive shift in the make-​up of England’s commercial interaction with the Baltic, ultimately leading to the development of commerce with Sweden.159 The growth of the English navy and the need for shipbuilding materials has been a traditional explanation for a shift in activity towards the Swedish trade area.160 The existing literature on Anglo-​Baltic trade, as well as histories of the English Navy, indicate that there were three separate waves of naval building that helped fuel the initial desire for Swedish exports of iron, copper, tar, hemp and a variety of timber products. The first occurred during the reign of Charles i, the second during the course of the 1650s, and third after the Restoration.161 The shift to an import-​driven economy based on a desire to build England’s navy is a worthy explanation. However, there were more factors at play. Over reliance on figures as a means to quantify commercial shifts can breed a tendency to view the process of moving towards the Swedish market as more naturally inclined than it actually was. A variety of causes were involved in leading the English to turn towards Sweden. One presiding factor was the unhappy and deteriorating state of commercial relations in Poland that served as an impetus for merchants to uproot themselves from those established markets. English cloth had traditionally found a market in the southern Baltic, thereby providing English merchants with a commodity to trade in return for cash and small amounts of naval goods. Without a viable export market for English goods, and the sudden realisation that the southern Baltic could no longer cater for their changing needs, English merchants increasingly turned to the Swedish market. It is not surprising that English merchants began to move away from traditional ports such as Danzig and Elbing. England’s commercial position along the Polish coast had always been precarious. English traders were caught in the

159 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 29, 31, 48–​49; Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, Table 5.3, p. 78; Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 96–​101. 160 Hinton, The Eastland Company, p. 96. 161 For naval building in the reign of Charles i see: Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea, pp. 381–​ 382, and for a wider survey of Charles i’s Navy see Thrush, Andrew Derek, ‘The Navy under Charles i, 1625–​1640’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 1991. The two subsequent waves of building that sealed England’s shift to the Swedish market from the southern Baltic will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

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middle of a damaging and violent tussle between the two ports throughout the period. Furthermore, the Polish Crown refused to fully recognise the status of English traders or safeguard their interests. From the latter years of the 1620s, their position became increasingly untenable due to complications resulting from conflicts between Poland and Sweden.162 This placed pressure on the relationship between the British and Polish Crowns, and eventually led to the complete collapse of their diplomatic relationship in 1640.163 A combination of unfavourable trading conditions, the declining relevance of their import-​ export relationship, and the lack of official representation due to the deterioration of diplomatic ties were the push factors that led English merchants to seek other markets. The onset of the English Civil Wars in 1642, just two years after the diplomatic rupture in Poland, greatly reduced the operational capacity of English trade. It is possible that this commercial break served to essentially wipe the slate clean when trade began to gain pace again during the 1650s. Although England emerged from the Civil Wars intact, Poland’s own internal strife during the 1640s had completely destroyed the foundation for production of their staple export market, rendering it useless to England even if their interests were still to have aligned.164 One aspect of the shift toward Sweden that has perhaps never fully been appreciated was the growing control Sweden had over its own production and export market towards the latter half of this period.165 The prevailing pattern for much of the first half of the century had been that ports in the south Baltic acted as intermediaries for Swedish goods to the west.166 Was it coincidence that Sweden should gain control over the full production process relating to its own key exports as southern Baltic ports began to wane? Or did Sweden capitalise on the opportunity to gain autonomy over the principal export goods vital to its own economy and act shrewdly? Sweden’s territorial thrust across the Baltic and into the melee of continental warfare placed heavy financial burdens on the state, leading to a reorganisation of the entire Swedish economic system to be geared for war.167 It is

1 62 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, pp. 175–​187. 163 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 249–​251. 164 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 254. 165 Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia, Vol. 1.2, pp. 462–​468; Hildebrand, K. G., Svenskt järn: Sexton och sjuttonhundrårtalen, Stockholm, 1987, pp. 9–​14; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 33. Factors lying behind this shift have been stated as government regulation, the import of Walloon technological innovation and foreign capital. 166 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 29–​45. 167 Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden, p. 79.

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possible that this impetus also drove Swedish production of its raw materials into a new era. Sweden began to depend on its natural resources like never before. First and foremost, it needed to expand its trade to meet the cost of warfare, and specifically to generate sources of foreign exchange.168 By 1640, Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna was able to boast to the Swedish Council of the Realm that because Sweden took control over its own exports, it left the iron-​hammer forges of Danzig virtually empty.169 It is therefore possible to trace key push and pull factors that played a distinctive role in redirecting Anglo-​Baltic commercial activity to the Swedish market: the demise of Poland encouraged English merchants to seek alternative avenues, while the exigencies of the Swedish war machine and its effect on encouraging Swedish commercial autonomy drew English merchants into its own harbours. 9

Conclusion

British diplomatic and official English commercial overtures were focused on alternative power bases during this period. For the first time it has been possible to reveal the existence, as well as the extent, of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact. It is clear that English and Scottish merchants in both Stockholm and Gothenburg worked to facilitate trade between England and Sweden at this juncture. Furthermore, concrete conclusions can be drawn on exactly who was involved in directing commerce between the English and Swedish markets, as well as which commodities were traded and how valuable English trade was during this period. Investigating the export patterns of Scottish merchants based in Stockholm allows for the speculation as to whether Baltic ports such as Danzig acted as intermediaries for Swedish goods and were thus controlled by British traders from the source. English merchants were fully capable of procuring Swedish goods at the source in two ways. One method was to establish a network of contacts while the merchant remained in his homeland (in the case of John Coote). Anthony Knipe and his associates established another method which was to assume native privileges in the

168 Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden, pp. 84–​85. Foreign capital had a transformative effect on the financial reorganisation of the iron industry. The foreign element in its essence made the industry more geared to export than ever before. Nergård’s study of entrepreneurs in the Swedish iron industry focused in part on the influx of foreign capital into Swedish production. Nergård, Mellan Krona och Marknad, particularly Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 169 srp, Vol. 8, 1640, p. 100, 11 July 1640.

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producing country and facilitating trade closer to the source of production and point of export. It is not currently possible to trace the commercial development between the England and Swedish markets in any consistent manner. Fragmentary commercial statistics do allow for a glimpse at several instances in which direct Anglo-​Swedish trade did occur. Direct Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction can be shown to have its roots in the later sixteenth century and to have developed therefrom. The Swedish market was a minor concern in terms of the wider picture of Anglo-​Baltic trading for much of the first half of the seventeenth century. However, from the onset of the mid-​late 1630s, Swedish exports to England began to increase in number, particularly in the case of the more geographically proximate though fledging port of Gothenburg. One consistent trend established at this early juncture which would continue for the rest of the century was that English trade with Sweden was primarily conducted through the principal ports of Stockholm and Gothenburg. The familiarity between the English and Swedish commercial markets was yet far from its peak. Though direct trade had increased in value substantially from the beginning of the century towards the end of the 1630s, it was by no means a clear and linear development. The commodity structure of Swedish exports significantly shifted also. Both Stockholm and Gothenburg emerged as ports initially sought out for exports of tar and timber but subsequently became significant sources of iron. This was a feature of trade that would increasingly guide England and Sweden’s commercial and diplomatic relationship.

­c hapter 2

The Codification of a Relationship, 1642–​1659 The period 1642–​1659 was marked by war and regime change for England and Sweden. Both nations embarked on a revision of their previous commercial policies during the initial years of the 1650s. This phase of English history is particularly well known for the onset of the civil wars, leading to the regicide of Charles i and the creation of an English Republic in 1649. Oliver Cromwell became Lord Protector in 1653, but the new regime crumbled over 1659–​1660, resulting in the reinstatement of the Stuart monarchy and Charles ii recovering his throne. Despite the Republic’s failure, it oversaw a period of pivotal change, with England emerging as one of the leading European and maritime powers for arguably the first time. England was able to assert itself more aggressively on the international stage through the systematic enlargement and centralisation of its navy under the auspices of the state.1 Sweden underwent regime changes of its own, albeit without the domestic upheaval witnessed in Britain and Ireland. Until 1644, Sweden was governed as a regency under the stewardship of Axel Oxenstierna. Queen Kristina would come to the throne in 1650 but would eventually abdicate in favour of her cousin, who became Karl x Gustav in 1654. Karl x’s reign ushered in a period of almost constant warfare until his death in 1660. Despite these potentially disruptive events, the succession of the royal line was kept intact with the ascendancy of Karl x’s son, Karl xi in 1660, thus ushering in another period of regency government.2 During the 1640s and 1650s Sweden made a number of systematic territorial gains and its borders reached their greatest territorial extent. War with 1 Davies, J. D., Pepys’s Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649–​1689, Barnsley, Seaforth, 2008, pp. 16, 25; Glete, Jan, Navies and Nations, Warships, navies, and state building in Europe and America, 1500–​1860, Vol. 1, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1993, pp. 179–​180; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649–​1815, London, Penguin, 2006, pp. 43, 46. 2 For wider coverage of the events of the period from the point of view of Swedish history see: Asker, Björn, Karl x Gustav: en biografi, Lund, 2009; Masson, Georgina, Queen Christina, New York, 1969; Roberts, Michael, Essays in Swedish History, London, 1967. For foreign policy covering the years from 1648 until the establishment of a regency in 1660, see: Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 41–​122; Olofsson, S. I., Efter Westfaliska freden: Sveriges yttre politik, 1650–​1654, Stockholm, 1957; A specific study of Karl x’s policy can be found in Göransson, Sven, Den europeiska konfessionspolitikens upplösning 1654–​1660: religion och utrikespolitik under Karl x Gustav, Uppsala, 1956.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_004

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Denmark (1643–​45, 1657–​58 and 1658–​60) saw Sweden consolidate its domestic territory in mainland Scandinavia through the incorporation of the southern provinces of Halland and Skåne, as well as strategic gains within the Baltic Sea itself through the inclusion of Gotland. By the close of the period, Sweden’s modern-​day borders in Scandinavia had been established. In addition to the territorial gains made at the expense of Denmark, the closing of the Thirty Years’ War, resulting in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, granted Sweden possessions in continental Europe. Sweden assumed control over territory in Pomerania and Bremen-​Verden, enabling Sweden access to key, strategic ports on either side of the Jutland peninsula. England and Sweden’s commercial interaction moved between two phases. Direct Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction was underway since at least the time of the Tudors. During the reigns of James i and Charles i, direct trade between the two nations remained relatively small-​scale and peripheral in contrast to other Baltic trades. Commercial connections were facilitated by the role of Scottish merchants based in Sweden. The 1640s was punctuated by severe commercial depression in England brought on by the onset of armed conflict leading to a near stoppage of direct trading between England and Sweden during the middling years of the decade. However, quantitative improvements in trade with both Gothenburg and Stockholm during the later years of the 1640s gave way to an enormous increase in trade between by 1655. Scottish merchants based in Sweden continued to play a pivotal role in the sourcing of goods bound for England during the course of both decades, demonstrating both resilience and continuity, despite such a seismic increase in direct trading. The 1650s also marked the appearance of English merchants in Stockholm intent on sourcing goods for the English market as a response to the onset of large-​scale and direct trading. Another important development was the establishment of the first diplomatic treaty between England and Sweden. As the Swedish market became the primary supplier of naval goods to fuel England’s growing navy, both nations became increasingly entangled and co-​dependent. Although England’s native exports such as cloth were initially less vital to Sweden, England provided an important, alternative western market for Swedish exports. England’s emergence allowed Sweden more freedom from Dutch influence and interference in their commercial affairs. As England and Sweden’s relationship became codified in the mid-​1650s, England assumed an important position in representing Swedish interests. This is most notably seen when England played a part in the establishment of a Swedish presence along the Sound, leading to Sweden

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acquiring the province of Skåne from Denmark in 1658.3 Although the situation was more complicated and less satisfying for Sweden in actuality, England and Sweden from this point on remained either direct allies or were engaged in extensive and purposeful treaty negotiations for the rest of the century. Simultaneously, as England moved closer to Sweden, a process began whereby the influence of the Dutch Republic over the economic and political life of Sweden declined in comparison to its role in the first half of the century.4 Despite such developments in England and Sweden’s commercial relationship existing studies have done little to connect the role that Swedish goods played in relation to England’s emergence as a naval power. England contributed a small, albeit piecemeal, role in influencing the outcome of Baltic affairs before this point, particularly through the mediation and consultation of Stuart diplomats.5 It was not until the 1650s that England sought to assert itself more aggressively in the Baltic, without actually resorting to outright, armed conflict.6 Historians have spoken of England’s engagement with regard to England’s increasing attentiveness to maintaining a balance of power between Denmark and Sweden.7 The stimulus identified behind England’s interest in Baltic power politics, particularly where Denmark-​Norway and Sweden were concerned, has been casually linked to commercial considerations and is certainly apt. However, little research has been undertaken to comprehend the intricacies behind England’s commercial goals. Åström rightly saw a breakthrough in trade, but was more interested in tackling questions involving commercial organisation and overlooked

3 Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic, p. 87; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, The fleet and the English Revolution 1648–​1660, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 106–​ 113; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 29–​32. 4 External factors outside of England’s increasing commercial influence also sought to push the Dutch further from Sweden such as the conclusion of the Dutch-​Danish treaty on 13 August 1645 at Kristianopel. Laursen, L., and Carl S. Christiansen (eds.), Danmark-​Norges Traktater 1523–​1750 med dertil hørende Aktstykker, Vol. 4: 1626–​1649, Copenhagen, 1907, pp. 476–​499. 5 England participated in the negotiations for the Treaty of Altmark in 1629, through their diplomat Sir Thomas Roe. Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, pp. 188–​206; Brown, Michael J., Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1970, pp. 173–​185. 6 In response to the arrival of a Dutch fleet at the Sound in autumn 1658, Richard Cromwell dispatched an English fleet of 20 ships, whilst simultaneously allowing Sweden to recruit English seamen to aid their position against the Danish-​Dutch alliance. Both the Dutch and the English sent fleets to the Sound the following year. Capp, Cromwell’s navy, pp. 107–​109. 7 Roberts, Michael, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, English Historical Review, Vol. 76, Issue 300, 1961, pp. 415, 432; Grosjean, A. N. L., ‘Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611–​1660’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1998, p. 241.

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investigating the precise motivations behind the development of Anglo-​ Swedish commerce.8 Hinton’s study into the Eastland Company focused primarily on discussing the political motivations behind the downfall of the organisation.9 Müller’s survey on English trade with Stockholm did much to quantify iron exports and name some of the primary actors in the trade. However, this study did little to provide detail on the circumstances that led to increased direct trading.10 Scholars of naval history have rightly pointed to the significant and unrivalled enlargement of the English navy during the civil wars, and even more so during the following decade.11 However, this was more of a commentary on the quantity of enlargement, the nature of enlargement in regard to building organisation, as well as the political machinations that led to an increase in naval power. Explicit clarifications as to why the shift in trade towards Sweden occurred precisely at this point in time still remain unexplored. 1

The Rise of Swedish Exports and the English Market

From at least the mid-​1630s nascent Gothenburg engaged in consistent commercial connections with the British market. Despite such promising beginnings at the start of the new decade, the 1640s would be a tumultuous period for English trade on the Swedish west coast. Although Gothenburg’s geographic proximity to England in comparison to Swedish ports in the Baltic made it more appealing, the town’s commercial association with England was not spared the effects of economic upheaval in Britain brought about by the civil wars. As can be seen from Figure 0.7, 1645 represented a nadir for Gothenburg’s trade with England. Only one ship departed the port, arriving late in the trading season, when Peter Hewitt sailed to London on the 24 November. His ship was loaded with a cargo of masts and various other timber products at a total value of 1,740 riksdaler. While it shows how severely depressed trade had become, Hewitt’s cargo, in particular the export of masts, does demonstrate that there 8 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 46–​68, 77–​102. 9 Hinton, The Eastland Trade, pp. 122–​137. Although it must be stated that these early works provided an important foundation that has made it possible to expand research further. 10 Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, p. 61. 11 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 2–​3, 4, 66–​68; Glete, Navies and Nations, pp. 177–​184; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 2, 3, 32, 41, 43. It should also be acknowledged that a process of hiring ships for naval service took place concurrently until 1664, Davies, J. D., Pepys’s Navy, p. 57.

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was still a small demand for shipbuilding materials in the south of England during the middling years of the civil wars.12 In contrast, Scotland’s trade with Gothenburg was more resilient despite also experiencing domestic upheaval. Scotland’s trade actually rose by almost 10,000 riksdaler from four years earlier in 1641. Exports to Scotland from Gothenburg amounted to 28,132 riksdaler, making Scotland the third largest export market after the Dutch Republic and Hamburg. Exports to Scotland accounted for around a 17% share of Gothenburg’s total export value.13 Despite disruptions to key export markets, Gothenburg’s total export trade came to be consistently valued at around 300,000 riksdaler per annum by the 1640s. However, 1645 proved to be a difficult year for Gothenburg’s mercantile community. The town’s trade suffered a decrease of almost 50% in its export trade. A total export market worth 306,939 riksdaler in 1641 amounted to just 162,892 riksdaler in 1645. While it would perhaps be excessive to overstate the English market’s importance to Gothenburg’s export trade by this point, the significant decline in business from England certainly did play a role in the steep downturn of Gothenburg’s overall export figures for 1645. Likewise, England’s trade with Stockholm experienced difficulties during the 1640s. Stockholm was affected by the same market factors that stalled English demand, leading to a decrease in exports from Gothenburg. While the beginning of the decade had seen a steep rise in exports to England in Gothenburg, in contrast Stockholm’s trade with England underwent a marked decline from the 1630s. Mirroring events in Gothenburg, Stockholm’s export trade to England would reach its lowest point in 1645. Only one ship departed Stockholm en route to England in 1645. On 3 December skipper Petter Bruesse left Stockholm alongside two Scottish ships, potentially in convoy. The cargo contained weaponry dispatched by the Swedish Crown to an unspecified recipient, alongside 7,000 riksdaler worth of wrought iron, flax, tar and copper kettles. The weapons package comprised 1,000 pistols, 2,000 muskets, 2,000 bandoliers, as well as 400 ssp of cannonballs and projectiles. The identity of the intended recipient remains elusive with no destination port and no consignee listed.14 However, consultation of additional sources has revealed that a Petter Bredsche of Lübeck passed the 12 13

14

gla, gca, Vol. 813. 1645. Ten ships departed Gothenburg for Scottish harbours over the course of the 1645 trading season. Although not every ship destination is covered in detail, where specified every destination port listed was on the coast of Fife, namely Pittenweem, Crail and Anstruther. gla, gca, Vol. 813. 1645. ssa, sca, Vol. 11, p. 751.

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Sound on 20 April 1646 complete with a similar cargo listed when departing Stockholm.15 Petter Brusche of Lübeck is then listed as passing the Sound again on 29 July, some four months later outbound from Newcastle.16 Determining whether the Swedish Crown’s consignment of weaponry was intended for the Parliamentarians or the Royalists becomes problematic given that Queen Kristina and her government were undecided in terms of which side to back over the course of the mid-​late 1640s.17 However, the Lübeck skipper’s departure from Newcastle likely signals that the Swedish Crown was officially delivering arms to support the Covenanters who occupied the town at this point against Royalist forces. The presence of Scottish ships departing Stockholm at the same time bolsters this view.18 As civil war continued unabated in Britain following the execution of Charles i in 1649, the demand for Swedish goods continued to be impacted by fraught domestic conditions. Nevertheless, Gothenburg first enjoyed an upturn in English trade already by 1649. Exports from Gothenburg can be valued at 30,612 riksdaler in 1649. This figure equated to around 9% of Gothenburg’s total export trade for that year. In a wider context, England became the third most valuable export market behind the Dutch Republic and Hamburg. A resumption of trade meant a renewed demand for Swedish goods from England to a value of around two-​thirds of its pre-​civil war value seen in 1640. Such rises were not witnessed in Stockholm or other domestic Swedish ports in the Baltic indicating that the need for Swedish goods emanated from England. Gothenburg remained resilient as an outlet for those goods, maintaining its connection to the English market in a way not seen elsewhere in the Baltic.19 The onset of the civil wars in England thus deeply affected the demand for Swedish exports. Trade reached its lowest ebb in both Gothenburg and Stockholm at the midpoint of the decade. The civil wars were the single most disruptive domestic event to have an impact on trade between England and Sweden during the course of the seventeenth century. Despite regular trade seriously faltering during this time, it appears direct military support arrived from Sweden to aid the Covenanter army in Newcastle. The extent of this

15 16 17 18 19

stro id: 801745. stro id: 802151. To follow the course of Sweden’s governmental discussions during the civil wars as well as attempts at bringing about a tri-​partite confederation between Sweden, Scotland and England see Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 200–​213. Murdoch and Grosjean, Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–​1648, pp. 134–​142. gla, gca, Vol. 819. 1649; Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920, pp. 127–​128.

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military support is difficult to determine, but the discovery of this connection alters how the Swedish Crown’s official stance toward the civil wars should be viewed. Although trade with England lagged some way behind the Dutch Republic and Hamburg, England was the most significant destination for Gothenburg’s tar and pitch in 1649. Tar and pitch exports to English ports accounted for 50% of England’s total trade, and 35% of Gothenburg’s total market export of those products. It perhaps reflects the resurgence of an active shipbuilding industry in England at this point. Pitch was by far the larger of the two commodities in amount traded. Gothenburg exported 1,185 barrels of pitch worth 7,412 riksdaler to England in 1649, while tar exports amounted to 391 barrels worth 1,832 riksdaler.20 However, as Figure 2.1 shows, iron was by far the most valuable of Gothenburg’s export commodities dispatched to England this year. Gothenburg exported a total of 17,132 ssp of wrought iron in 1649, equating to a value of 204,250 riksdaler. The 1388 ssp of iron worth 19,344 riksdaler that was exported to England amounted to almost 10% of Gothenburg’s total iron exports. Although the town’s total export of iron was significantly less than witnessed in Stockholm, Gothenburg was England’s primary source of iron by this point.21 In 1650 Stockholm’s trade with Britain was in contraction in comparison to its positions in 1636 and 1640. While Scotland’s trade with Sweden had appeared to weather the course of the civil wars better than its southern neighbour, exports from Stockholm by this point receded to just 6658 riksdaler worth. For the first time in a long while Scotland only registered one ship departing Stockholm’s harbour.22 Exports from Stockholm to England in 1650 were limited to just three ships. All three ships’ export destinations are vaguely listed as England during the first week of October. However, cross referencing with additional documents reveals they originated out of the north of England, probably Newcastle or Hull.23 That all three ships assembled their consignments of iron and copper from similar sources could indicate they were working in tandem. Tar was the most prominent commodity, equating to approximately 2,300 barrels. This 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Alexander Carmichael departed Stockholm on 8 November towards an unnamed Scottish port. ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650. 23 The Stockholm import registers state two of the ships originated from Newcastle while the stro record all three came from Hull. ssa; sca, Vol. 1650; stro searches: Home Ports from England and Wales to unspecified, 1650–​51; Home Ports from England and Wales from Sweden and Finland, 1650–​51.

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Masts 0.5% Timber without masts 5.7% Tar 6.0%

Pitch 24.3%

Wrought iron 63.5%

­f igure 2.1  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1649 sources: gla, gca, vol. 819. 1649; lind, ivan, göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1 920, pp. 128–​1 29

figure vastly eclipsed the total exports for Gothenburg the previous year. Pitch, iron and small parcels of copper comprised the remainder of the cargoes.24 It is probable that the skipper William Richs trading to Stockholm in 1650 is the same trader glimpsed trading in Gothenburg a year earlier.25 If so, it would demonstrate that at least a proportion of English skippers were familiar with more than one port in the Swedish trade area. It suggests that English skippers had a greater knowledge of what goods, prices and quantities could be furnished from both Gothenburg and Stockholm respectively, which could, in turn, lead to informed decisions regarding which Swedish ports to source goods from in any given trading season. It could indicate a number of further points. Stockholm’s export market was significantly larger than Gothenburg. In 1649 Stockholm is said to have been responsible for 68% of Sweden’s overall exports, while Gothenburg’s share was much lower at around 9.5%.26 It is possible that sourcing specific quantities of 24 25

26

ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650. A skipper by the name of Wellam Raikes of Hull appears trading to Gothenburg from Hull in 1649. Records from Stockholm the following year describe a Wihelm Richs and William Rekes trading with the town, while the Sound Toll Registers list a Willum Richs of Hull departing Stockholm. gla, gca, Vol. 819. 1649; ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650; stro id: 773982. Boëthius and Heckscher, Svensk handelsstatistik 1637–​1737, lvii.

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goods, particularly in the case of tar and pitch, was much easier in Stockholm. Stockholm’s geographical proximity to the main tar-​producing areas around the Gulf of Finland facilitated greater exports of tar from the Swedish capital. It could also indicate that sourcing goods in Stockholm, though considerably longer in travel time and loaded with more potential risks and costs, became worthwhile due to favourable price differences in key commodities in both ports. If prices for tar, pitch and wrought iron are compared between Gothenburg in 1649 and Stockholm in 1650 it is easy to see why the geographical proximity of Gothenburg could be trumped by other advantages in Stockholm. In Gothenburg in 1649 the wholesale price of one ssp of wrought iron was approximately twelve riksdaler, while for the following year in Stockholm it was much lower at seven riksdaler per ssp. Price differences also occurred for tar and pitch. In Gothenburg in 1649 a barrel of tar was sold for between four and five riksdaler per barrel and pitch at six riksdaler per barrel. The price differences for the following year in Stockholm show that tar wholesaled at two riksdaler per barrel and pitch at five riksdaler per barrel.27 Although the three English ships that visited Stockholm in 1650 exported negligible amounts of goods in terms of the overall Swedish trade, the potential price differences between ports was substantial. By viewing just one consignment of wrought iron exported in Andrew Rich’s ship on 8 October, the wholesale price for 200 ssp of wrought iron in Stockholm was 1,400 riksdaler at seven riksdaler per ssp. If this same amount of iron had been bought at Gothenburg prices which were fixed at twelve riksdaler per ssp, it would have cost a total of 2,400 riksdaler, accounting for a difference of 1,000 riksdaler.28 The importance of sourcing goods at the cheapest possible rate becomes even more acute when viewing English tar exports across the English ships that visited Stockholm in 1650. Tar was one the main export commodities at a total of 2,360 barrels. Wholesaling at approximately two daler per barrel, the total cost of tar exports taken to England from Stockholm amounted to 4,732 riksdaler. In contrast, if bought in Gothenburg the previous year at its lowest approximate price of four riksdaler per barrel, the total price would have been double29 The potential motivations behind English skippers’ choices for sourcing goods in Swedish ports begins to emerge. Pricing in particular could be acutely different from port to port and determined the financial outlay of individual

27 gla, gca, Vol. 819. 1649; ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

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traders. Obtaining a favourable price would have been of huge significance in terms of small-​scale traders’ and skippers’ operating margins. However, the sheer scale of goods that were exported from Sweden further demonstrates the important impact that pricing and knowledge of the markets had on where goods were sourced. The First Dutch War at the beginning of the 1650s stifled the potential for increased trade with Stockholm. Although Sweden remained neutral, the Danish-​Dutch alliance effectively closed off access to the Baltic for English merchant shipping until late 1654.30 Following the end of hostilities and the reopening of the Baltic to English shipping, Sweden exported a record amount of goods to England. As Figure 0.7 shows, between 1649 and 1655, exports to England from Gothenburg increased from a total value of 30,162 riksdaler to 118,034 riksdaler. This represented an increase in value of over 385%. Similar shifts occurred in the Baltic, with an even more acute rise seen in Stockholm’s export figures to England. As Figure 0.5 demonstrates, the value of exports rose from 12,576 riksdaler in 1650 to 150,542 riksdaler in 1655. This represented the single highest export figure in the history of Anglo-​Swedish trade to date and an increase of 1,197% on the total value exported just five years earlier. In Gothenburg, England had risen to become the most important export market for the first time in history. Exports to England now accounted for 30% of the port’s overall export trade, superseding both the Dutch Republic and Hamburg, who had traditionally been market leaders. Scotland’s exports had also swelled to double their 1649 value, making Scotland now the fourth most valuable export destination, garnering just over 8% of Gothenburg’s total export trade. Collectively it meant that by 1655 an increase in demand for Swedish goods led British ports to consuming almost 40% of Gothenburg’s total exports. The value of Gothenburg’s own overall export market steadily increased during this period from 331,324 riksdaler in 1649 to 386,033 riksdaler in 1655. In actuality this represented an increase in iron, timber and pitch exports, but a slight decrease in tar exports through the port. England became the main

30

The Danish King Fredrik iii undertook to close the Sound and the adjacent belts to all English ships, including merchant shipping, in league with the Dutch Republic under the proviso that Dutch subsidies would pay for a fleet of 20 ships to enforce this. The Baltic remained closed to English shipping until after peace was concluded between England and Denmark in September 1654. This left much of the available trading season of 1654 out of reach for the English mercantile interests in the Baltic. See: Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic, pp. 71–​73.

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exporter of wrought iron, tar and pitch in 1655. In terms of market share this represented a 63% share of total tar exports, 47% of pitch exports, and 37% of Gothenburg’s total iron exports.31 As can be seen from Figure 2.2, in 1655 the commodity composition of goods exported to England had not diverged from 1649, but merely increased in volume and value. England’s export of wrought iron swelled to over five times the 1649 amount, increasing from an export of 1,388 ssp to 6,975 ssp in 1655. This represented a substantial increase in value from 19,344 riksdaler in 1649 to 86,088 riksdaler in 1655. Similarly tar and pitch exports increased, particularly in the case of tar from 391 barrels in 1649, to 1,463 barrels in 1655. Pitch exports rose from 1,185 barrels in 1649 to 1,623 barrels in 1655. Across both commodities it represented a substantial increase in expenditure from 9,244 riksdaler at the close of the 1640s to 16,452 riksdaler by 1655. Another substantial increase seen in England’s export of goods from Gothenburg was in timber, not least beams, planks, boards, sparrs, pipeholts, clapholts, staves and deals. Meanwhile, the most significant rise seen in timber exports was that of masts, which had almost increased seven-​fold. It is more difficult to calculate the total value of mast exports as different sizes and lengths retailed for a variety of prices, but in practice England’s import of masts from Gothenburg had increased from just ten in 1649 to 68 in 1655, itself perhaps a rough indication of how thirsty England’s shipyards were for key shipbuilding goods.32 It demonstrates that England’s attraction to Gothenburg had not changed between 1649 and 1655, but that the demand for goods was significantly greater. 1655 represents the first point in which Stockholm saw a marked increase in England’s export of Swedish goods. For the first time, the value of exports dispatched to England accounted for 10% of the total value of Stockholm’s outgoing trade. England rose to become the third most important export destination.33 As can be seen from Figure 2.3, mirroring the experience of Gothenburg, the sharp rise in the value of Stockholm’s exports to England was almost wholly attributable to the sheer increase in demand for iron. Iron equated to 112,842 of the total 150,542 riksdaler value of England’s exports from Stockholm. This equated to 12,797 ssp of iron which was almost double the amount that was shipped from Gothenburg. Tar and pitch were the next most numerous

31 Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920, pp. 130–​131. 32 Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920, pp. 130–​131. 33 England was still some margin behind the two largest export destinations, the Dutch Republic and Lübeck who had a combined 70% share of the market. ssa, sca Vol. 16. 1650.

0

25,000

50,000

75,000

Wrought iron

19,344

86,088

10,218

Pitch

7,412 Tar

6,324

Commodity

1,832

1,736

9,726

Combined timber without masts

1655

1,712 Masts

156

­f igure 2.2  Comparative overview of commodities exported from Gothenburg to England by value, 1649 and 1655 sources: gla, gca, vol. 819. 1649. lind, ivan, göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1 920, pp. 128–​1 31

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

100,000

1649

newgenrtpdf

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0

25,000

50,000

75,000

100,000

Wrought iron

86,088

112,842

Pitch

10,218 8439 Tar

1,885 Timber

11,438

Stockholm

Commodity

6,324 6,537

Gothenburg

Brass

10,822

­f igure 2.3  Comparative overview of exports from Gothenburg and Stockholm to England by value, 1655 sources: lind, ivan, göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1 920, pp. 130–​1 31; ssa, sca, vol. 21, 1655

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

125,000

Copper

9,104

newgenrtpdf

84  Chapter 2

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commodities exported to England from Stockholm, followed by brass and copper. The latter two were of a significantly higher value by weight than all other Swedish export commodities. There was only one recorded shipment of 100 ssp of copper which equated to 7,000 riksdaler in 1655. Total tar exports for the year numbered 3,268 barrels and exports of pitch were at 1,534 barrels. The amount of tar exported to England from Stockholm was double that of Gothenburg’s contribution, while pitch carried comparable figures. The majority of timber products exported in Stockholm were different in character to that of Gothenburg. Most timber products exported from Stockholm consisted of firewood or simple boards and deals. They were often ancillary to the sourcing of other more valuable products. In this respect Gothenburg, with its significant mast trade, as well as the sheer variety of its timber exports, was more representative of a Swedish port where the English sourced timber, while Stockholm predominantly served as a source of iron and tar. The shift that occurred during the mid-​1650s, highlighted in the study of 1655’s trade, represented a pivotal moment in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact. The growth in England’s desire for and export of Swedish goods from these ports was one of the most significant and poignant economic shifts of the seventeenth century. In a Swedish context it should be viewed as the single most important economic development, alongside the demise of Danzig as a substantial export market for iron during this period. The increase in direct commercial interaction between the English and Swedish markets perhaps did not take on an immediate, paradigm shifting form by this point, as other markets still held a significant share of trade, particularly in Stockholm. However, England’s greater participation in the Swedish market by 1655 signalled its emergence as a commercial partner that was to have great consequences for Sweden’s economic prosperity well into the next century. By 1655 England had become the most important export market in Gothenburg, superseding the Dutch Republic in particular, and began to play a pivotal role in the town’s commercial survival and prosperity. The English market became the main consumer of goods from Sweden’s principal west coast port for the remainder of the century. Likewise, England’s emergence as a serious export destination in the Swedish capital would have a fundamental impact on Sweden’s overall economic independence. 2

Difficulties in the Import Trade

The goods imported into Sweden from English ports were generally a mixture of domestically produced linens, textiles and finished clothes. Most of the coal

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and lead arriving at Swedish ports originated in northeast England. Domestic goods were occasionally supplemented by re-​exports of southern European foodstuffs, wines and spirits, and even occasional instances of colonial re-​exports such as tobacco. The majority of goods imported into Swedish harbours during this period were linens and were of much lesser value and strategic importance than Swedish commodities that were prized as naval stores moving in the opposite direction. In this respect market demands originating out of England for naval supplies that saw a vast spike in the export of Swedish goods from the late 1640s in Gothenburg and from the mid-​1650s in Stockholm were not reflected by Swedish demand for English goods. That being said, the import of goods into Sweden from England formed a fundamental part of the overall commercial relationship between the two nations, and was vital in the attempt to balance trade deficits that resulted from such growing demands for Swedish exports. This was particularly applicable and more immediately apparent to the skippers and small scale traders actively engaged in trade on their own accounts. Perhaps the foremost commentator on the goods that were exported from England into the Baltic over the 1640s and 1650s was R. W. K. Hinton. The statistical basis of his study relied on the use of the Sound Toll Registers. Hinton valued the import of English goods –​mostly cloth –​into the Baltic in 1646, at the height of the civil wars, at 563,091 Danish riksdaler. For a period that both contemporaries and historians have described as a time of crisis, Hinton’s figures are surprising. This is because he estimated that the value of English goods entering the Baltic was not too dissimilar to the figures quoted for 1625 and 1635, which were valued at 573,940 and 577,662 Danish riksdaler respectively.34 Hinton’s figures show that the average yearly import covering the years 1641–​46 was 22,000 pieces of cloth, reflecting a reduction from the previous two decades by around a third.35 From 1647 the amount of English goods reaching the Baltic experienced further decline and was said to have never fully recovered after this point. Hinton’s figures extend to 1657, when the standard import into the Baltic as whole was said to be less than 15,000 pieces, with the exception of 1654 at 26,000 pieces.36 Mirroring trends seen in the export market, Figure 0.6 shows English goods imported into Stockholm in 1645 fell to their lowest figure in the entire 34 Hinton, The Eastland Trade, p. 35. 35 Hinton, The Eastland Trade, p. 84. 36 Ibid. Unfortunately, Hinton was unable to provide any destination point for these figures and it is therefore difficult to come to any exact conclusions regarding the import of English goods into the Baltic and their ultimate destination during this period.

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century. Only one ship arrived in Stockholm from England, skippered by Peter Geritzson en route from Newcastle.37 However, further consultation of contemporary Swedish records in 1645 has revealed that while direct trade was almost non-​existent, domestically-​produced English goods did find their way to Stockholm through intermediary freighters and merchants. Coates’s study of how the civil wars impacted on the economy of London suggests that, particularly in the case of the capital, established merchants in the city were to some extent successful in redirecting shipments of goods to alternative destinations on the continent.38 Direct imports from England only amounted to 2,797 riksdaler. In contrast, the value of English textiles imported through intermediaries outstripped the value of direct trade from England in 1645. English textiles arrived in Stockholm fairly steadily on non-​English ships throughout the trading season through ports such as Danzig and Lübeck. Stockholm’s Scottish mercantile community in particular played a key role in sourcing these goods. For example, David Fife imported 3,642 riksdaler worth of English kerseys and other textiles on Claes Börtkie’s ship arriving from Danzig in November 1645. Similarly, just a month earlier, William Petrie imported a large consignment of English and Spanish textiles to the cost of 8170 riksdaler from the same port on Abel Erichson’s ship. Likewise, John Halliday sourced a consignment of English baize (a type of coarse woollen or cotton cloth) and Scottish kerseys. David Weyms also imported a number of English stockings from the Dutch Republic on Leue Jonges ship in June.39 Although it was by no means a considerable trade, English staple commodities still found their way to Stockholm via intermediary routes at the height of economic depression in England, and actually outstripped direct imports from England in terms of value. Though direct imports of English goods had not recovered to pre-​civil war levels, by 1650 the direct import of domestically-​produced goods was evident.40 Recovery in England’s import trade with Stockholm continued on an upward trajectory in 1655. Though import values had yet to attain the pre-​Civil War levels seen two decades earlier, directly imported goods arriving from England reached a value of 29,145 riksdaler. The most substantial import commodities were textiles, linens and items of finished clothing such as such as kerseys,

37

Coates speaks of the difficulties in attempting to adequately reconcile the customs receipts of the 1640s in regards to exports from England due to the outsourcing of customs collection and higher rates which were levied by the exchequer. Coates, The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642–​50, p. 164. 38 Coates, The Impact of the English Civil War on the Economy of London, 1642–​50, pp. 164, 179. 39 ssa, sca, Vol. 11. 1645. 40 ssa, sca, Vol. 21. 1650.

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dozens, baize, socks and gloves. There were also a number of skins and textiles of Scottish origin. English textiles as a group constituted a total of 17,067 riksdaler in import value, which was almost 60% of the value of England’s total import trade into the Swedish capital. Foodstuffs were the second most valuable group of commodities, roughly equating to over 2,000 riksdaler in value. Ships arriving from England carried a variety of goods, including English beer and cheese, salt of unspecified origin, herring, salmon, dried fish and even liquorice. The third most valuable commodity imported from England was coal and, where specified, was mostly exported from the northeast. Other commodities imported from England included a number of whetstones, as well as lead.41 The range of goods imported by England’s traders into Sweden in the 1650s was not dissimilar to the beginning of the century. In both Gothenburg and Stockholm, imports were centred around domestic goods such as textiles and coal, and were supplemented by a small amount of re-​exported products such as salt, wine and tobacco. The import of goods by English traders floundered in comparison to demand for Swedish goods as England reorientated its trade to Sweden in order to source Swedish goods that were of particularly more significance in strategic and monetary value. It would take another generation for English goods to reach a sizeable level in both amount and value. 3

The Impetus for Reaching the Swedish Market

Previous studies have discussed the results of England’s shift in trade toward Sweden. Historians have paid particular credence to the increase in demand for Swedish exports, an altered organisation of trade in the Baltic, as well as the arrival of English merchants in Stockholm.42 These discussions have done much to advance knowledge of the events after such increases in commercial interaction occurred. However, questions surrounding precisely why and how closer commercial relations developed between England and Sweden at this juncture have never been fully addressed. The primary factor that significantly increased direct Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction was the English demand for goods related to naval building. Behind this desire lay a number of more intricate points that facilitated

41 ssa, sca, Vol. 21. 1655. 42 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol 1, pp. 36, 137–​138, 139; Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, pp. 61, 62, 68–​69.

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the meeting of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interest at this specific point in time. The fact that the English Republic expanded its navy during the 1650s is well known, and has been one of the key topics of discussion for naval historians of this period.43 The expansion of the navy has been said to have led England into becoming a formidable maritime force and a leading international power.44 Although overshadowed by the unprecedented building scale of the 1650s, the development of the English navy actually began during the civil wars of the 1640s. Over the period 1646–​50, more than forty ships were added to the fleet. The new additions were a combination of bought, built and captured ships.45 The renewed energy invested in strengthening the navy directly correlates to the period of transition that saw a number of Swedish exports reach England from Stockholm over the later 1640s. After the displacement of Charles i at the end of the initial phase of the civil wars by 1645, the navy was needed to assist with the Parliamentary push towards assuming power during the latter half of the 1640s. Parliamentary control of the navy played an important role in preventing a Royalist blockade of London, and the economic pressure against Parliament could have been a decisive factor in the outcome of the war and the shift of power.46 When Parliament assumed control of the navy in the 1640s, it already included a number of Charles I’s warships. Therefore, many of the newer additions were smaller ships to augment what had been taken from the previous regime.47 By 1649, the navy consisted of 39 ships, four more than Charles i had in his fleet at the beginning of the wars in 1642.48 However, it must be remembered that some of Charles I’s ships left to follow the Parliamentarian cause, accounting for the slight increase of ships that were built during this period. The navy’s second major objective was helping to protect and consolidate the new regime’s position vis-​à-​vis its foreign enemies, with many of Europe’s powers enraged at the regicide of Charles i in 1649. This international hostility, plus the threat of Royalist retaliation, considerably increased the role of the navy in ensuring the nascent regime was to survive its infancy. These challenges

43 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 66–​72; Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 173–​186; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 1–​49. 44 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, p. 72. 45 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 179, 184. 46 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 2–​3, 66–​68. 47 Glete, Navies and Nations, p. 181. Rodger has characterised these ships as the ‘core of the fleet’. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 50. 48 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 3.

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encouraged a further development of the fleet, which needed to be stronger than its predecessor of the 1640s.49 By 1655 the English were said to have built a total of 49 ships. This could in part account for the significant increase in exports seen leaving Gothenburg already by 1649 and the developments that had occurred in Stockholm by the close of the 1655 trading season.50 Bearing this in mind, a multitude of other factors led to links between the English and Swedish markets during this period. Supply from Sweden exploded due to four primary reasons, which can be summarised as: demand, precedence, consolidation and centralisation. The first and most obvious point to consider is that of demand. As already shown above, the development of England’s navy fuelled an increased need for naval stores. Historians have singled out two factors that led to the building of the navy: the first was the need to defend itself against Royalists and foreign powers alike, while the second was to protect its trade.51 Jan Glete proposed a third motivation relating to demand. The 1650s saw a change in the manner in which the new government viewed the ownership of a standing fleet. There was a shift from the practice of hiring ships to augment existing ships owned by the state towards outright ownership of a full-​scale navy belonging to the state itself.52 Those that assumed power at the expense of the monarchy wanted a state navy for protection against their enemies. Owning a navy instead of relying on private initiative provided security, power and peace of mind –​all of which were especially important to a new and unsettled regime. It is therefore possible to see how the very nature of building a standing navy instead of reverting to the practice of hiring private vessels fuelled the building of new ships. This triggered a wave of demand for goods. Aside from naval-​building, Karl-​Gustav Hildebrand suggested a number of potential factors that fuelled demand for Swedish iron. Hildebrand postulated that geography regarding the location of blast furnaces in England as well as the specific uses that Swedish iron possessed due to its unique chemical composition could have played a role in affecting the demand for Swedish iron in England.53 Hildebrand also suggested that the dearth in availability of forestry

49 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 4. 50 The export of masts from Gothenburg offers a rudimentary measure of the rate of shipbuilding in England. In total 68 masts of varying sizes were exported in 1655. Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920, pp. 130–​131. 51 Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 2–​3, 66–​68. 52 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol 1, p. 178. 53 Hildebrand proposed that the regional pattern of export was more consistently geared towards east coast English ports rather than their west coast counterparts and was in

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resources, as well as the cost of labour, played their parts in the English turning toward Sweden for a steady supply of iron.54 Despite being plausible explanations, just how far Swedish iron was put to use for extra-​naval purposes in England has yet to be fully determined.55 The second factor to consider is precedence. The previous chapter has shown that English traders had been visiting Swedish harbours as early as the 1560s. England had a long-​standing, if somewhat intermittent and small-​scale, connection to the Swedish market. Therefore, at least a minority of English traders knew of the Swedish market and the goods it had to offer. Swedish exports comprised a fairly homogenous group. Sweden therefore had little more to offer than a select group of goods that also happened to be vital for shipbuilding purposes. It follows that, due to these long standing connections and the enduring composition of Swedish export commodities, when the English sought more of the same naval goods they knew from whom and where to acquire them. The third point to consider is that of accumulation. Sweden increasingly gained control over the export of shipbuilding goods during this period both in terms of geographical market area and the various stages of the production process itself. Over the course of the 1560–​1660 period, Sweden gained an unprecedented wave of territory across the Baltic, Scandinavia and modern day Germany. This led to the creation of a pan-​Baltic Swedish Empire. The accumulation of territory enabled Sweden to control vast hinterlands of production areas for naval goods, as well as the ports that controlled the flow of exports. Particularly within the eastern Baltic, Sweden was able to benefit from consolidating areas involved in tar export around the Gulf of Finland, and further south with masts, hemp and flax from Riga and Reval. The capture of Narva allowed Sweden oversight of the lucrative transit trade between western European markets and Russia. This process of consolidation happened

54

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line with the location of native blast furnaces in the west of the country and Wales. Hildebrand, Swedish Iron in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Jernkontoret, Stockholm, 1992, pp. 37–​38. The recession of effective woodlands for a variety of production purposes had been evident to the English since at least the time of Tudors, particularly to the Admiralty and naval builders. Hildebrand, Swedish Iron in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, p. 36; Albion, Forests and sea power: the timber problem of the Royal Navy, 1652–​1862. Similarly while domestic demand could well have fuelled the desire for Swedish iron, there was a distinctive potential for re-​export to England’s growing colonial empire. How far Swedish iron was funnelled through English ports for re-​export during the course of the seventeenth century is yet to be clarified.

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at the same time as Sweden’s domestic exports of metals such as copper and iron grew in significance.56 The potential of Sweden’s accumulated production areas was maximised by the economic decline of Danzig.57 Danzig’s waning control of some key export markets had a direct effect on Sweden’s capacity to tighten its grip, particularly in the case of iron. Danzig had previously acted as an intermediary port for the export of Swedish goods, but had also often facilitated the final production stages for Sweden’s export of unworked iron. As early as 1640 Axel Oxenstierna was able to boast that the Danzig yards for smelting Swedish iron ore were empty due to Sweden’s control over its own domestic production of raw metal ore.58 Perhaps Oxenstierna’s assertion was more confident than in actuality as the Stockholm customs accounts reveal Danzig to have remained a major export destination for Swedish iron at this juncture.59 It nevertheless demonstrates another edge to Sweden’s growing control and accumulation of natural resources that led to the production of naval goods. England simply had no other choice than to move toward Sweden if it wanted to acquire the necessary commodities to realise its own naval ambitions. The final factor to consider is centralisation. Over the course of the late 1640s and early 1650s, the English government began to reorganise and centralise the administration of the navy. Centralisation of the administration has been cited as the leading factor behind the standardisation of warship design during the period.60 Centralisation of the admiralty and in turn, its decision-​making processes, can also be extended to how it sought to supply goods for the navy. It is likely that an increasingly centralised bureaucratisation meant navy commissioners focused their energy towards a single market. Although it is true that

56

Kotilaine, Jarmo, Russia’s Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century: Windows on the World, Brill, Leiden, 2005, p. 15; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 40–​41, 43, 51. Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, pp. 45–​46. Sandström’s figures detail this growth. See Sandström, Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam, pp. 399–​400. 57 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, p. 251–​255. 58 ‘Vi haffva ruinerat järnhandelen här uthi Östersiön’, Axel Oxenstierna, srp, Vol. 8, 1640, p. 100, 11 July 1640. For a fuller coverage of the development of Sweden’s iron production, see Heckscher, Eli F., Svensk Ekonomisk Historia, Vol. 1.2. For the importance of advanced capital and technology in relation to mining, see pp. 369–​376. For wider developments in mining, see pp. 438–​506. Hildebrand’s Swedish Iron in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, provides an excellent overview of the subject in English. 59 Danzig was the third largest export destination in 1640 and 1645. In 1640 total exports were valued at 101,693 riksdaler which rose to 215,270 riksdaler in 1645. ssa, sca, Vol. 3. 1640; Vol. 11. 1645. 60 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 177.

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not everything the navy needed could be acquired from Sweden and its Baltic provinces, sourcing goods from a single supplier did have its benefits. The contents of shipments seen in the Stockholm customs accounts certainly bolster this argument, demonstrating how it was potentially cheaper to acquire a variety of commodities from a single port on individual sailings rather than visiting a number of ports in turn. Cargo dockets seen in the customs accounts repeatedly show various commodities were grouped together. By the mid-​1650s it was rare for an outbound ship from Gothenburg or Stockholm to England to contain a single commodity. Ships transported a number of products produced both domestically in Sweden, while other goods originated from a variety of territories across the Swedish Empire. The Stockholm customs accounts demonstrate that over the course of the first half of the seventeenth century Stockholm’s intra-​Baltic trade, particularly with ports under Swedish control, grew exponentially. Stockholm’s role as a colonial re-​export entrepôt was vital to the success and growth of the Swedish capital and should be acknowledged in this respect.61 A further factor that led to the centralisation of imports of naval stores into England was the expulsion of the English Muscovy Company merchants from the Russian market in 1649. Following the execution of Charles i, the Russian Tsar Alexis i expelled the Muscovy Company merchants and rescinded their privileges to trade with Russia.62 The significant effect that this had on Swedish trade was that it blocked English access from obtaining Russian goods from the Arctic. The only remaining point of access for the English to trade with the Russian market was through intermediary Swedish ports in the Baltic, and the potential to purchase alternative supplies from Russia was thus reduced. Therefore it is possible to see that a number of varied and complex factors lay behind England and Sweden’s growing mercantile connection. There were a number of preconditions as well as shifting events in the course of both 61

62

For example in 1640 no incoming ships from Riga were recorded in the Stockholm accounts, where just five years later imports to the town from Riga amounted to 60,808 riksdaler. This made the Livonian town the fifth most valuable import harbour after ports in the Dutch Republic, Lübeck, and Portugal. Swedish Pomeranian ports such as Stralsund, Greifswald, Stettin and Wismar also grew a considerable trade with the capital. ssa, sca, Vol. 11. 1640, Vol. 16. 1645, Vol. 21. 1650. For a fuller treatment of English trade with Russia, see: Willan, T. S. The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–​1603, Manchester, 1956. For a wider discussion of Russian trade with Europe during this period, see: Kotilaine, Russia’s Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century. For a study on the attempts of the northern powers to gain control of the Baltic, see: Attman, Artur, The Struggle for Baltic Markets: Powers in Conflict 1558–​1618, Gothenburg, 1979.

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nations’ histories around the middling decades of the seventeenth century that encouraged Anglo-​Swedish affairs to come together. The growing territorial ambitions of both nations during this period would bring about the greater need for diplomacy, security and ultimately, alliance. 4

Commercial Perspectives on Anglo-​Swedish Diplomacy

The influence of Scottish diplomats in directing English affairs in the Baltic during the first half of the seventeenth century began to lessen, eventually ending with the fall of the Stuart monarchy. Now England’s own representatives were directing their own diplomatic affairs in the Baltic. Another important development during this period was the shift in focus of England’s Baltic diplomatic policy away from Poland in favour of Sweden, mirroring the changing pattern of England’s commercial strategy. It has been stated that England’s and Sweden’s main interests began to align during this period in conjunction with the worsening of Swedish-​Dutch relations.63 This is useful as a rudimentary overview to understand the contemporary power politics between western Europe and Scandinavia but masks some serious intricacies. It is true that England and Sweden allied during this period, while, from 1645, the Dutch Republic moved towards Sweden’s enemies Denmark.64 Despite the shifting status of European alliances, it would be shortsighted to claim that England and Sweden were in complete alignment. Although the two nations first codified the mutual aims of their relationship in 1654 and 1656 respectively, their aims were not always completely agreeable. One of England’s primary concerns with Sweden as its foremost trading partner in the region was to ensure favourable commercial terms for a steady supply of naval goods. Relative to these interests was the English desire to ensure a balance of power in the Baltic. The status of the Sound was a significant cause of concern for England, and a worry vindicated when the Danish-​Dutch alliance blocked access for English merchant ships during the First Dutch War. Despite Sweden acting as England’s major Baltic trading partner, it was the Danish control of the Sound and their powerful Dutch backers that created the main obstacle for an outright and unhindered Anglo-​Swedish friendship.

63 64

Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, pp. 65–​66. Laursen, L., and Carl S. Christiansen (eds.), Danmark-​Norges Traktater 1523–​1750 med dertil hørende Aktstykker, Vol. 4: 1626–​1649, Copenhagen, 1907, pp. 476–​499.

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One of the principal incentives for Sweden to seek friendship with England was the desire for a powerful western ally to help support their military and naval ambitions in the Baltic.65 Following the accession of Karl x Gustav in 1654, Sweden sought particular assistance from England in two forms: either indirectly through financing for military campaigns or recruitment of English forces for Swedish service. A point that is often ignored in regard to Swedish commercial considerations of this period was the aspiration to cultivate an alternative, major western export market for its goods. An additional trading partner meant greater leverage in commercial matters in the west. Despite their firm commercial alliance England and Sweden did not share major interests. It was the conflicting interests of both nations that led to protracted negotiations, eventually producing the uneasy treaties of the 1650s. Nevertheless, as long as Sweden was intent on moving away from the overbearing influence of the Dutch Republic, and England was in the ascendancy towards becoming a principal maritime power through the utilisation of Swedish goods, England was Sweden’s most natural ally in the west. Commercial, strategic and religious matters likewise pushed the English towards Sweden in this period.66 The growing Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction during the late 1640s and 1650s would certainly have increased familiarity between the two nations at ground level. However, it was not direct trade that was responsible for the resumption of Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic interaction. The actual catalyst for the reestablishment of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy was a result of England’s predatory search and seizure policy towards foreign ships off the British coast. Action against Swedish ships began as early as 1647, albeit the policy was not codified until the passage of the English Navigation Act of 1651.67 These procedures continued to escalate after the outbreak of the First Dutch War. Despite Sweden and their shipping remaining neutral in the conflict, a number

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Swedish overtures towards England were nothing new and had been sought after during the reign of Gustav Vasa. Andersson, I., Erik xiv s engelska underhandlingar: studier i svensk diplomati och handelspolitik, H. Ohlssons boktryckeri, Lund, 1935. 66 For the religious factors behind Anglo-​Swedish relations see: Roberts, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’; For a wider view of Sweden’s religious concerns in the realm of foreign policy during this period, consult Göransson, Den europeiska konfessionspolitikens upplösning 1654–​1660: religion och utrikespolitik under Karl x Gustav, Uppsala, 1956. For a detailed study of the religious underpinnings that guided the English Republic’s foreign policy, see Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–​1668, Cambridge, 1998. 67 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 239–​40.

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of Swedish vessels were seized over the period 1652–​54. The total number of Swedish ships taken and the value of their goods are unknown, but archival information has revealed 46 cases of Swedish ships that were seized and taken into port by the English during this period. A further four belonged to third party nations whose ships held a significant amount of Swedish cargo.68 England’s aggressive policy led to the meeting of English and Swedish representatives in both London and Stockholm but it has been ignored by historians of England, despite its significance in fostering diplomatic contact between the two states. Despite approaches from both England and the Dutch Republic, Sweden was steadfast and remained neutral during the First Dutch War. Axel Oxenstierna showed more hostility towards the English and was wary of their growing naval power. However, Queen Kristina was less disposed to this view and refused Dutch requests that Sweden cease to provide England with naval goods.69 Much of the initial impetus for diplomatic assurances came from Sweden, who wanted to seek restitution for their shipping. However, over time, the English were beginning to realise they needed commercial assurances from Sweden due to their growing desire for Swedish export goods. The discussions of the early 1650s did little to provide financial satisfaction for Swedish seizures. The Dutch War only served to exacerbate the situation. By April 1653, Cromwell had assumed his role as Protector and Anglo-​Swedish relations entered a new phase with the appointment of an English embassy to Sweden headed by Bulstrode Whitelocke.70 The English were now beginning to realise how important Swedish friendship was in order to maintain and strengthen their position internationally. The English approach was influenced by two primary concerns. Commercial considerations came first and foremost. Seeking terms in which to protect and enshrine England’s developing commercial ties to Sweden was therefore important in its own right. However, in light of ongoing negotiations with the Dutch Republic to bring the war to a close in 1653, England needed commercial reassurances regarding its Swedish trade.71 Secondly, Cromwell and the English wanted to seek assurances that Sweden would not provide support to Charles ii and Royalist factions that were still plaguing the new regime. The English were well aware of the still powerful and

68

Murdoch, Steve, ‘Breaching Neutrality’: English prize-​taking and Swedish neutrality in the First Anglo-​Dutch War, 1651–​1654, The Mariner’s Mirror, 105:2, 2019, pp. 134–​147. 69 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, p. 242. 70 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, p. 247. 71 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, p. 246–​7.

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influential Scottish elements in Swedish society and this provided an added urgency with which to assert their own agenda.72 Whitelocke arrived in Gothenburg in November 1653. His skill as a diplomat and negotiator led to the eventual establishment of England and Sweden’s first diplomatic treaty, completed at Uppsala on 11 April 1654. Although the treaty was to be ratified under the Great Seal in August 1654, this had still not been done by July 1655.73 Given that this timeframe coincided with Queen Kristina abdicating in favour of her cousin, who assumed the Swedish throne as Karl x Gustav in June 1654, this may well have been the cause for the delay in ratifying the treaty. It is easy to see all these events in a negative light. However, the treaty itself represented huge advances in Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy, and in the commercial relationship between the two nations. Despite the ill-​feeling that had been produced over the preceding years, Whitelocke had made the initial breakthrough with Sweden. The English regime’s aims had been to manoeuvre themselves ahead of the Royalist causes whilst also securing surer ground on which to operate commercially.74 The formation of the Treaty of 1654, though initially unratified, represented the success of the former motive, and a serious step towards the latter. The Treaty of 1654 represented the first instance in which Anglo-​Swedish concerns, desires, and mutual expectations had been fixed in writing. Article 1 of the treaty stipulated that there would be ‘perpetual peace and amity’ between the two nations from this point on. Article 2 stated furthering assurances of security, whereby each nation would seek to ‘promote the advantage of one another’.75 Aside from more general assurances, the focus of the treaty 72

73 74 75

The potential and immediate dangers have already been demonstrated through the shipment of weapons outlined early in this chapter. Scotland had long maintained a relationship with Sweden through the service of Scottish soldiers in Swedish armies, not to mention the growing influence of Scottish merchants resident in both Gothenburg and Stockholm who were still active during this period. For a wider discussion of the intricacies of the Royalist cause and Scottish influence during this period, see: Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 214–​239; Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart, pp. 158, 166–​186. Whitelocke’s memoirs detail his embassy to Sweden. Memoirs of Bulstrode Whitelocke, London, 1860. For his time in Gothenburg see: pp. 250, 325. England had several reasons for wanting to conclude an agreement with Sweden, one of them was to ensure Sweden would not provide assistance to Charles ii in Scotland. Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 246–​247. Printed in Jenkinson, Charles (ed.), A Collection of all the Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce between Great Britain and other Powers, Vol. 1, 1648–​1713, (3 vols.) New York, 1909, pp. 69–​70.

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was almost wholly directed towards strategic considerations of trade and the protection of trade, rather than any specific terms concerning pricing or stipulations toward specific commodities. Article 3, in particular, shows the Swedes’ desires to bring a swift conclusion to England’s search and seizure policy, demanding that all ‘impediments’ to shipping be removed.76 This was reinforced by Article 5, which was aimed at putting an end to stoppages and seeking the protection from the will of ‘private persons’. This was most likely aimed at English privateers who the Swedes evidently thought were acting with impunity in regards to their shipping. Article 13 was aimed at bringing about a restitution of damages wrought by each nation on the other during the Dutch War.77 The wording of these articles was purposely ambiguous, so that the clauses could also be applied to English shippers in Swedish waters. However, considerations of protection and restitution certainly remained more immediate Swedish concerns. Perhaps the most important breakthrough for the English was in Article 4, which stipulated that the subjects of both nations were to have the same rights as any other foreigners trading in the other’s ports. This consideration was especially important for English traders who were in constant competition with Dutch as well as other merchants in Swedish ports. Although the Navigation Act of 1651 had banned the Dutch from participating in the freighting of Swedish goods to the English market, their merchants still benefited from lower freight rates, which could in theory have freed up cash or capital to spend on the Swedish market if the two were competing for goods in the same marketplace.78 Moreover, the Dutch had previously overseen a large cultural and commercial influence in Sweden’s development and their merchants had enjoyed the position of ‘most favoured nation’. In essence this had previously ensured that Dutch commercial interests would hold a preeminent position over other foreigners in Swedish trade. Article 4 of the Anglo-​Swedish treaty now ensured that no other nation could hold greater privileges than the English.

76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 When Sweden and the Dutch Republic concluded the Treaty of Elbing in September 1656, reconfirming prior commercial agreements, the treaty did not impinge on English interests due to the Anglo-​Swedish treaties of 1654 and 1656 ensuring English rights in Swedish trade. The prior Swedish-​Dutch commercial agreements from 1640 and 1645 can be viewed in Hallendorff, C (ed.), Sveriges traktater med främmande magter: Vol. 5.2, 1632–​ 45, Stockholm, 1909, pp. 453–​461, 665.

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Many of the remaining articles were strategic considerations regarding potential difficulties in trade that could arise, specifying freedom of travel for both nations’ subjects and protection of shipping in harbours. To summarise, Article 15 stipulated that the main intention of the treaty was to ensure both nations assisted one another in all areas of commerce.79 The Treaty of 1654 was a general commercial treaty that was intentionally vague. It provided a foundation aimed at ensuring that Anglo-​Swedish commerce develop as freely as possible, and that Swedish shipping, regardless of destination, could continue unmolested by the English. Both parties were interested in building on the foundation they had established in 1654 for their own respective ends. In November 1654, Karl x dispatched Peter Coyet to London, who began initial contact before the arrival of the more highly esteemed Christer Bonde the following summer. The main negotiations, though not without their difficulties, primarily hinged on commercial considerations for the English, as well as Karl’s immediate desire for military aid.80 Commercially, the English wanted more precise commercial privileges in Sweden. However, after only recently concluding peace with the Dutch Republic, and with the English navy plunged into a costly war with Spain, the English had their reservations about making too forward-​reaching commercial dealings with Sweden in fear of immediately provoking the Dutch Republic.81 Nevertheless, the lasting success of the Swedish embassy was to be the ratification of a wider reaching and more precise treaty based on the initial Treaty of 1654. The Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1656 expanded on its precursor, with the inclusion of more detailed commercial and military considerations. This reflected the desires of both parties.82 Article 8 was the most significant in regard to English commercial considerations. The article extended the 1654 agreement

79 80

81 82

Existing Swedish trade ordinances barred foreigners from travelling outside of the port in which they were conducting trade, ensuring it was forbidden to visit inland production areas or to undercut pricing. How far this article was an overriding factor is unknown. The military considerations that underpinned Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy during this period are given full coverage in Grosjean, A. N. L, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, pp. 242–​ 43. Even maintaining basic contact between the Swedish embassy and the English government proved difficult and frustrating for the Swedes. Administrative channels were rigid, Cromwell was absent and Coyet and Bonde felt like prisoners under house arrest, Roberts, Michael, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, pp. 410–​412. Roberts, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, pp. 420, 421–​22. Article 1 deals specifically with the raising of troops and the particular limitations imposed on this. Much like the restitution of goods and protection of shipping outlined in 1654, this could primarily be seen as a Swedish concern. Printed in Patterson, F. A. (ed.), Milton State Papers, Vol. 8, New York, 1937, pp. 566–​591.

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whereby the English were to be considered equal to subjects of any other foreign nation, ensuring English merchants were to be given primary footing in Swedish trade areas.83 An added specification was that were Sweden to extend any commercial privileges to other nations then the new treaty would bind Sweden to extend the same privileges to the English as well. The expectation provided in the article was that the Swedish Crown would do its best to meet any further specifications desired by the English in the future.84 The article also extended the same privileges to Scottish merchants. Although trade to the Scottish market had declined as the principal export destination in Britain for Swedish goods, the Scottish merchant community in Sweden was still very much active, and Swedish exports still reached Scotland in considerable numbers.85 Although it is not possible to specify how this treaty and this article in particular affected the Scottish merchants exporting to the English market from Sweden, it certainly would not have put them at any disadvantage. Many of the Scottish merchants that were naturalised in Sweden not only possessed Swedish privileges in trade, but now held assurances from this improved Anglo-​Swedish treaty. Many of the remaining articles contained in the Treaty of 1656 added more specific regulations toward Anglo-​Swedish trade. This extended to specifying the nature of and content of passports and certificates to ensure legitimate trade took place between the two nations, as well as to prevent the carrying of contraband to third parties during war. Article 7, in particular, demonstrates that the English still had not honoured issues of restitution for seizures during the Dutch War. It was specified that a special committee, consisting of three English and three Swedish delegates, was to meet in London the following January of 1657 to close the matter once and for all, with no further appeal permitted after the decision had been reached.86 The outcome is currently unknown, but with the appointment of a small retinue by the sak (Swedish Africa Company) in 1657–​1658, it seems restitution was never received, at least not in full. The treaty was ratified in Westminster on 17 July 1656. The Treaty of 1656 marked an important watershed in Anglo-​Swedish relations. Despite some setbacks, their relationship had been committed to writing, and a measure of their commercial and military desires had been accounted for. Although restitution of Swedish damages for losses dating back to 1647 had 83 84 85 86

Ibid; Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, p. 245. Patterson, F. A. (ed.), Milton State Papers, Vol. 8, New York, 1937, pp. 566–​591. In 1655 exports to Scotland from Stockholm and Gothenburg had a combined value of over 60,000 riksdaler. ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1655. Patterson, F. A. (ed.), Milton State Papers, Vol. 8, New York, 1937, pp. 566–​591.

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still not been resolved, after the ascendancy of Karl x Gustav, military considerations began to obscure the issue. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of 1656, England began to play an increasing role in Sweden’s military and strategic welfare. Far from being outright supporters of Sweden’s aggressive military policies, England, like their Stuart predecessors, preferred to mediate rather than provide direct support.87 A testament to England’s increasing reliance on Sweden for goods related to naval building, and thus its wider interest in Baltic politics as a whole, can be seen in their mediation of the conflict between Sweden and Denmark that led to the Treaty of Roskilde in 1658. The English contribution to the brokering of the agreement itself, as well as the significance of dispatching a fleet to the Sound to pressure negotiations, has not gone unnoticed and has received attention from a number of areas.88 The commercial and strategic considerations behind these moves are not immediately apparent, but were to indirectly favour English trade to Sweden thereafter. The strength of Sweden and the support garnered from England allowed Sweden to claim land adjacent to the eastern side of the Sound. This relinquished full control of the waterway from Denmark. In turn, England managed to establish a balance of power over the entry and exit point of the Baltic. The assistance the English were able to provide their allies in mediating and dispatching a fleet was tempered due to the prevailing international system of alliances. The Dutch Republic were allies of Denmark and England allies of Sweden.89 It was no secret that both western powers had direct interests warranting oversight in the Baltic.90 Therefore, a situation had presented itself whereby both powers could back their respective allies indirectly, under the guise of establishing peace.91 However, the English had as much to gain in establishing their Swedish allies on the Sound as they did in tempering the

87

There is some evidence of direct English contribution to Sweden’s wars, such as the dispatching of English troops to Riga in 1658. Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, p. 253. 88 Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic, pp. 77–​88; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 29; Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 113–​114; Albion, R. A, Forests and Sea power: the timber problem of the Royal Navy, 1652–​1852, pp. 165–​66. 89 It has been said that by this point Denmark had an uneasy relationship with the Dutch Republic due to their lack of immediate support in their conflicts with Sweden in 1645 and in the late 1650s. Kelsall, Philip, ‘The Changing Relationship between Denmark and the Netherlands in the latter half of the seventeenth century’, in Brand, Hanno and Müller, Leos, The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North Sea and Baltic Region: In the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period, Dordrecht, 2007, p. 206. 90 Roberts, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, pp. 414–​415. 91 Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, pp. 242, 255–​256.

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influence of a hostile Denmark and their Dutch counterparts. The memory of the Sound closed to England and the difficulties in maintaining access to naval goods during the First Dutch War as a direct result must still have been readily acute.92 England’s diplomatic policy towards Sweden should therefore always be viewed from this cagey and pragmatic perspective. The English had as much to gain in establishing favourable relations with its primary trading partner in the Baltic as they did in trying to gain an advantage commercially to temper a growing Swedish monopoly over the vital goods they so desired. The developing diplomatic relations during this period came as a direct result of Sweden’s desire for restitution of its shipping, protection of its trade, and later support for its military ventures. For England, the primary motivations were commercial in nature in an attempt to secure more favourable and safer conditions for a developing trade that had been on the rise since the mid-​ 1640s.93 By the end of the decade, after wrangling negotiations, it is possible to conclude that the objectives of both parties had at least been partially met whilst both nations’ governments assumed the responsibility of protecting and advancing their respective commercial goals. However the conclusion of treaties and the assumption of active diplomatic ties playing a role in commerce was not the only feature of an increasingly active role of the state in commercial affairs. 5

Commercial Organisation: the Role of the State

The state gained greater oversight in matters regarding Anglo-​Swedish commerce during this period. Both England and Sweden established organisations within their governmental structures specifically intended to handle commercial affairs. The major legislation of the period that followed the establishment of the English Board of Trade was the Navigation Act in 1651. One of the main purposes of the act was to limit the freight of goods to the English market either to English shipping or shipping from the country of origin of the commodities in question. A direct result of this shift in policy was the conflict brought about

92 Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart, p. 132; Roberts, ’Cromwell and the Baltic’, pp. 414–​415. 93 Contemporaries were certainly aware of the direct connection between diplomatic and commercial affairs. Sir Robert Anstruther, long time Stuart ambassador to the Danish court stated in 1630, ‘Both matters of state and the trade of the land are intermixed and cannot be well separated’, Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart, p. 135; tna, sp 75/​11, f. 70. Anstruther to Dorchester, 24 April 1630.

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with the charters of the monopoly trading companies. Before this juncture the monopoly companies had been responsible for enforcing shipping regulations in their respective spheres. The founding principle of the Navigation Act of 1651, to regulate the freighting of goods to the English market, was not a wholly ground-​breaking idea. A number of initiatives had been aimed at tackling middlemen since before the time of the Tudors.94 The regulation of shipping was a vital arm of commerce and had been discussed at length throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. The negotiations to revise navigational legislation came about in 1649, when the Council of State informed Parliament that there was a desire within several of the merchant companies, including the Eastland Company, for ‘some restraint to the general liberty of trade’.95 These desires were met in the creation of the Council of Trade, which, after protracted and contentious negotiations from rival commercial interests, led to the creation of the Navigation Act.96 Much has been made of whether the act was a representation of national interest, or simply pandered to the various self-​seeking commercial voices of the powerful trading companies.97 Regardless, the passage of the act represented a considerable loss to the Eastland Company, who had previously held the privilege of administering trade to Scandinavia and the Baltic. The role of the state in regard to the Eastland monopoly will be considered later. Now it is pertinent to assess how the legislation directly affected trade with Sweden. As stated, the acts’ main effects on European trade was the imposition of limitations on the origin of shipping engaged with the English market. This effectively limited the carriage of Swedish goods to English ships, domestic Swedish ships or to any ships with home ports in the wider Swedish Empire. It is difficult to assess the immediate success of the Navigation Act in regulating shipping in regards to Swedish trade.98 However, its long-​term effectiveness is 94 Harper, The English Navigation Laws: a seventeenth century experiment in social engineering, New York, 1939, pp. 19–​33, 34–​43. 95 cspd, 1649–​50, p. 462; Harper, The English Navigation Laws, pp. 39–​40. 96 Harper, The English Navigation Laws, pp. 39–​47. 97 Harper saw this as a mixture of the two. He stated it was the interests of shipping and complaints of trading companies which furnished the impetus, but national antagonism toward the Dutch that pushed it through. Harper, The English Navigation Laws, p. 49. 98 The Gothenburg records of the late 1630s and 1640s have revealed instances of third party nationalities conducting trade between England and Sweden. For example, Lübeckers such as Hans Winberg and Paul Möller in 1638 or Albert Grubbe in 1649. It was precisely this form of foreign shipping that the Navigation Act of 1651 sought to eradicate to benefit English freighters. gla, gca, Vol. 799. 1638; Vol. 819, 1649. The Sound Toll Registers do

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clear. Non-​English and non-​Swedish shipping was a rarity in Anglo-​Swedish trade for the remainder of the century. Its immediate impact was felt politically. The very nature of the Navigation Act brought it into contention with the prevailing system of commercial organisation in England’s Baltic and Scandinavian trade. This was a form of oversight that had existed since the latter decades of Queen Elizabeth’s reign.99 Up until the passage of the act in 1651, the Eastland Company had been responsible for enforcing all of England’s laws surrounding commerce and shipping with the Baltic and Scandinavia. Queen Elizabeth had sanctioned their charter and privileges to govern Baltic trade in 1579. Their charters had been reconfirmed by both James i and Charles i subsequently. However, the ascendancy of a new regime in England meant the company’s status became precarious.100 Little is known of the company’s position during the final years of the civil wars. By 1649 the company appealed to the Council of State for the new government to provide a reconfirmation of their old charter. They used fear as a motivator, citing assurances that otherwise Dutch traders would gain control of shipping to the English market. The company also emphasised their ability to resolve the unease that was brewing at their base in Danzig due to the king of Poland’s harsher attitude to tax enforcement.101 The new government must have been unconvinced of the company’s necessity as the passage of the Navigation Act sought to assume the policing of trade previously practised by the company. Control of English trade in northern Europe now came under the guidance and oversight of the state. Where the monarchy had preferred to defer the enforcement of economic regulations to the quasi-​private initiative of the monopoly trading companies, the new regime wanted to have a greater degree of influence in commercial affairs.102 not often declare destination points before the late 1660s making it difficult to view non-​ English sailings with any certainty. 99 Sellers, Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company, pp. 142–​150; Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 86–​94, 187–​194. 100 England’s trading companies were not exempt from political scrutiny and questions of loyalty during this period –​even in an international context. Joseph Averie’s commercial negotiations with Denmark on behalf of the Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg demonstrate the difficulties that England’s merchants faced and the potential plurality in jurisdiction. Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-​Norway and the House of Stuart, pp. 133–​138; Zickermann, ‘Briteannia ist mein patria’, pp. 262–​265. King James i did not renew the company’s charter upon his accession but much later in 1622. Sellers, Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company, xxxviii, xxxix. 101 Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 86–​87. 102 The Eastland Company submitted two unsuccessful requests for a charter during the period of the English Republic. Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 187–​194.

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An important reason behind the Eastland Company failing to receive a reconfirmation of its charter can be explained by the shift that occurred due to market focus. This saw Anglo-​Baltic trade based on English exports of cloth to the southern Baltic reposition to the Swedish market focused on conveying goods from Swedish ports to England. Despite this deviation in commercial focus, English trade with the Baltic appeared to progress unhindered without the company. The swift move to the Swedish trade area occurred precisely at a juncture when the role and status of the Eastland Company was coming into question. The original Eastland Company charter specified that they were to maintain monopoly control over English merchants trading to Scandinavia and the Baltic.103 The company had established bases at Elbing and Danzig, where its commercial connections and value of its trade were greatest. However, its reach was limited, and as discussed in the previous chapter, it is likely that their ability to enforce their will on trade outside the immediate area of the company’s base was limited to non-​existent. It follows that with the shifting of trade to ports in the Swedish trade area during a period of political strife, the company was powerless to act. To what governmental authority could they turn to reconfirm their jurisdiction over Sweden just as trade to Swedish ports was on the rise towards the end of the 1640s and into the 1650s? England was distracted. Aside from these legislative considerations, the company was slow to act in moving its base of operations to Swedish shores. Whether a shift in focus was ever considered is unknown, as no records of Eastland Company meetings or contemporary discussions appear to have survived. The company’s existence on the southern Baltic coast was precarious and relied on tenuous agreements with the local and Polish ruling elite.104 Relocating recognised authority and a viable company base to Sweden would have entailed negotiations that, at best, would have produced a similarly insecure and problematic situation. The establishment of the Swedish Board of Trade (Kommerskollegium) and the protracted negotiations involved in Anglo-​ Swedish treaties during the 1650s demonstrate Sweden’s desire to maintain the control over its own export trade.105 The treaty negotiations undertaken by representatives of the state were unable to secure much in the way of commercial concessions. It is therefore unlikely that, even if empowered by the state, the Eastland Company would have been more successful in their efforts

1 03 Sellers, Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company, pp. 142–​151. 104 Fedorowicz, England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century, pp. 36–​38, 132–​134, 145–​157. 105 Grauers, ‘Sverige och den första engelska navigationsakten’, p. 200.

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against a steadfast and stubborn Swedish government. Moreover, the company had to consider the wider concerns of its merchants who traded across a wide and varied geographical area which would have inevitably impeded a shift towards Sweden. Independent merchants who focused their activities solely on Swedish trade had little else to consider than themselves. Considering the royal privilege bestowed on the Eastland Company of having the sole right to English trade with Scandinavia, the history of the Eastland Company’s involvement in Sweden is virtually non-​existent. It is difficult to trace any form of Eastland Company association with England’s earlier merchants who engaged in trade with the Swedish market. There is one instance of a petition from an English merchant trading to Sweden, John Coote, in 1614, lodged under the authority of the English Privy council. It was left to diplomats such as James Spens to pursue the demands made to the Swedish Crown from English merchants.106 It would therefore appear the company did little, if nothing to ensure representation and protection to English merchants who were active participants in Swedish trade. That trade with Sweden did increase considerably over the course of the first half of the century may have demonstrated to the new regime that those vital commodities could and would be pursued regardless of company organisation and action. Therefore the shift to the Swedish trade area and the ability of the merchants involved to meet demand essentially negated the need for a monopoly organisation that could potentially stifle commercial competition in a growing market. The final factor to consider is the company itself. It is possible that the new regime had seen the company for what it really was –​largely inconsequential. From its very inception the Eastland Company had found it a serious struggle to tackle the multitude of problems it faced to conduct a consistent and profitable trade in the Baltic.107 It was a flawed entity. Historians have presented their research in such a manner to suggest that the company was the archetypal form of organisation for England’s northern European trade.108 However, the company should more likely be seen as the exception to the rule. It was 106 tna, pc 2/​27, f. 226, October 1614; sra, da, Vol. 5, 29 April 1612. The previous chapter has also shown how Anthony Knipe and the English Company in Gothenburg directed trade with the English market from Sweden, and held the backing of the Swedish Crown, with no evidence of any involvement from the Eastland Company. 107 The company had problems with its own merchants acting outside of the company’s laws in Poland, Fedorowicz, pp. 134–​135. Since its inception a core of company members in London sought to exclude provincial merchants in the northern and western ports and consequently experienced a backlash, Sellers, xiv, xvii–​x viii, lx. 108 Both Hinton and Åström failed to adequately detail the significance and role of organised trade outside of the Eastland Company monopoly.

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a short-​lived entity that for much of its existence operated in only a limited area of its privilege, and was of little consequence outside of its immediate Baltic base. The very existence of the company was to regulate and police English trade with the Baltic and Scandinavia. Whereas trade had previously been open to any willing Englishman, from 1579 the Eastland Company treated those outside of its membership as interlopers. It is true that the Eastland Company did not stand still. There is evidence that they attempted to react to changing conditions. They should be credited with their attempt to seek privileges almost immediately as the new government could seat itself. The company’s two formal appeals in 1649 and 1656 demonstrate they sought to respond to commercial shifts that were occurring. The 1649 appeal for a reconfirmation of their charter stated that they intended to take sole responsibility ‘to furnish this land with a constant supply of corn and other needful commodities of the East, at reasonable rates’. However, the 1656 version of their appeal read, ‘to furnish this land with a constant supply of naval and other needful commodities of the East, at reasonable rates’.109 Unfortunately for the Eastland Company, it was too little too late. The Navigation Act of 1651 appears to have served its purpose over the longer term in protecting England’s commerce with Sweden from the interference of middlemen. Moreover, the Swedish customs accounts have more than demonstrated how merchants on the ground in Sweden were successfully sourcing and delivering goods from Sweden which were becoming so highly sought after in England. State-​sanctioned diplomacy was now active in concluding agreements to ensure protection for England’s growing trade with Sweden, rendering the company’s interference in this respect unnecessary. It appears that that the government never engaged in an outright campaign against the company, but failure to recognise their charter was enough to do damage to the company’s interests. The company’s previous activity had proven them to be ill-​equipped, and the continuation of trade with Sweden left them unnecessary.110 6

Commercial Organisation: the Role of Merchants and Agents

An increase in the number of English merchants trading to Sweden during the 1650s was a direct consequence of the developing interaction between

1 09 Printed in Hinton, The Eastland Company, Appendix A9, pp. 187–​194. 110 Hinton, The Eastland Company, p. 125.

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the English and Swedish markets. However, one overlooked aspect of merchant behaviour that led to the conveying of goods between the English and Swedish market was the enduring involvement of Scottish merchants residing in Gothenburg and Stockholm. Although Scotland would eventually be superseded as the main export destination for Swedish goods in Britain in the 1650s, Scottish merchants continued to uphold a wide and lucrative trade. In 1645, Scottish merchants were responsible for the import of 180,992 riksdaler worth of goods from Stockholm, equating to around 10% of the town’s overall import trade. Similarly, the figures for 1645 demonstrate that Scottish merchants oversaw the export of 141,963 riksdaler worth of goods from Stockholm, accounting for around 8% of the town’s trade.111 Over 1645–​1650 two levels of Scottish merchant existed who were involved in the Stockholm export market. The principal merchants or wholesalers were the most prevalent group, handling the largest amounts of goods. Merchants such as Albert Strang, Alexander Buchanan, John Kinnemond and David Lyall exported thousands of ssp of iron as wholesalers.112 However, by 1655 there was also another emerging group of Scottish merchants that were buying from Scottish and other naturalised Swedish wholesalers and exporting on their own accounts. Merchants such as James Semple and William Smith provide two prime examples. The appearance of this emerging group foreshadowed the explosion of non-​wholesaling British (mainly English) merchants who emerged five years later.113

111 The majority of the goods imported by Scottish merchants were not from Britain, but rather ports in the Dutch Republic, the southern Baltic, across the Swedish Empire and even from Portugal. ssa, sca, Vol. 11. 1645. 112 Evidence has been found in the Stockholm town council records relating to trade that list around 20 prominent Scottish merchants who were registered as silk and cloth merchants in the town already by 1639. These figures often utilised their commercial privileges as burgesses in the town to extend their trade further than their principal textile businesses to purchase at a wholesale level and participate extensively in the import and export trade. ssa, Handelskollegiet, A I Protokoll, Huvudserien, Vol. 2. 1638–​1639, “Handels Partition uthi Stockholm 1639”. ssne entries: “Buchan, Alexander” [815]; “Kinnemond, John” [1630]; “Lyall, Adam” [6493]. 113 Scots became equal citizens on par with Englishmen under the Protectorate and then the Commonwealth. It allowed the Scots to trade more freely with England as citizens and the ability to continue to exploit their position and status in Sweden by combining it with their new legal status in the English Republic. For Scottish political representation, see Casada, J. A., ‘The Scottish representatives in Richard Cromwell’s Parliament’, Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 51, No. 152, Part 2, October, 1972; Pinckney, P. J., ‘The Scottish representation in the Cromwellian parliament of 1656’ in Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 142, Part 2, October, 1967, pp. 95–​114. Cromwell even defended Scottish merchants

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Before the export of goods to England from Stockholm took on greater significance in 1655 there were two ways that goods could be sourced for export. The single instance of direct trade from Stockholm to England in 1645 has already revealed it was possible to approach the aforementioned group of Scottish wholesalers who were resident in the town. These merchants would secure goods and duly dispatch them to the desired destination. The experience of English traders in 1650 reveals that trade could also be undertaken by the skipper and crews of ships arriving in Stockholm no matter how slight the trade. All three English ships that arrived from the north of England in 1650 have been revealed to piece together goods such as iron, tar, pitch from a variety of sources in Stockholm. Skippers William Richs, Andrews Richs and Leonard Coward, as well as their crews, sourced goods from wholesalers not limited to naturalised Scottish merchants in the town. It demonstrates the first instance that trade was undertaken largely under the auspices of a ship’s crew members without a commercial agent or career merchant exporting in their place.114 The significant increase in the export trade to England from Stockholm just five years later signalled the largest number of participating merchants in English trade ever. It also represented a change in the composition of the exporters. Over the course of the 1655 trading season it is possible to single out 47 exporters. A variety of nationalities including English, Scottish, Swedish, various Germans, Dutch, Flemish and a French Huguenot migrant were involved in exporting goods to England demonstrating how demand was being met from a variety of points within the Stockholm merchant community.115 It also reveals that demand was being met from both inside and outside the Stockholm merchant community. One of the common threads that can be seen when viewing the composition of the Stockholm exporters to England in 1655 is the enduring role of the Scottish merchant community which had long played an active role and dominant role in England’s Swedish trade. The likes of Alexander Russell, James Semple, William Strang and the brothers David and James Lyall and Alexander Buchan all exported goods to England in 1655.116 However, it must be said that on the whole, with the exception of James Lyall and James Semple who were the second and fourth largest exporters of goods against Danish attack, dra, England A1 (1602–​1714), Brev fra Oliver Cromwell til Fredrik iii, 12 May 1657. Thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for making me aware of these sources. ssne entries: “Semple, Jacob” [6345]; “Smith, William” [7165]. 114 sra, swb, Vol. 11.3. 1650; ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650. 1 15 ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1655. 116 ssne entries: “Lyall, David” [824]; “Lyall, James” [4934]; “Strang, William” [807].

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to England, the majority of Stockholm’s Scottish community, though active, tended to export in much more modest figures. Rather than specialising exclusively in the export of goods to Britain, the Scottish mercantile community in Stockholm continued to export goods universally to a variety of destinations.117 The biggest change in the composition of the mercantile community exporting to England was the arrival of English merchants and agents. Such individuals travelled to Stockholm with the sole intent of sourcing vast quantities of Swedish goods at the point of export. Merchants such as John Clavering, William Blackett, Edward Bodham and William Sykes were the first generation of English merchants who would journey to the Swedish trade area to play a prominent role in fuelling England’s increasing interaction with the Swedish export market.118 As can be seen from Figure 2.4, John Clavering was the single largest exporter of goods bound for England, shipping out 29,255 riksdaler worth of goods, far superseding any other active merchant also exporting to England. In comparison, the two Scottish merchants James Lyall and James Semple who came in second and fourth handled 18,992 and 12,492 riksdaler worth of goods respectively. Clavering’s export consisted of 2,462 ssp of iron, 1,800 barrels of tar and 384 barrels of pitch. This made Clavering the largest iron exporter, the second largest tar exporter next to the Swedish Tar Company, and one of the largest pitch exporters. Clavering sent his consignments across a total of eleven voyages and was active throughout the trading season.119 Such activity in regards to a lack of commodity specialisation and active trading throughout the year, would become commonplace among the more substantial English merchants in Sweden in the coming years. The likes of William Blackett, a native of the northeast, had a much more modest trade at this point. The majority of his business focused on exporting tar to Newcastle, but he was also involved in the iron trade.120 Edward Bodham and William Sykes, two recent English arrivals to Stockholm both exported considerable amounts of tar. The English merchants primarily focused on securing iron as well as shipments of tar, a distinctive indicator of how considerable the demand for shipbuilding materials were at this juncture. This 117 Scottish merchants continued to ship goods to all of Stockholm’s major export markets such as the Dutch Republic, Lübeck, Danzig and elsewhere. ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1655. 118 ssne entries: “Blackett, William” [7759]; “Sykes, William” [8320]. 119 ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1655. 120 Although little to date has been made of Blackett’s Swedish exploits he would go on to have a multifaceted and illustrious career. Blackett’s experience in Sweden would have been vital in his training as a commercial operator. Blackett-​Ord, Mark, “Blackett, William, first baronet (1621–​1680)”, in odnb. Available at: [https://​doi​.org​/10​.1093​/ref:​odnb​/61542]​. Accessed 15 October 2020.

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Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

John Clavering

29,255

Iron, tar, pitch

England

2

James Lyall

18,992

Iron

Scotland

3

Hans Ludwig’s Heirs

13,247

Brass

Scotland

4

James Semple

12,492

Iron

Scotland

5

William Sykes

8560

Iron, tar, pitch, copper

England

6

Swedish Tar Company

7083

Tar

Various

7

Jacob Rebeldy

7000

Copper

Unknown

8

Hindrich Thun

6384

Iron

Sweden

9

Edward Bodham

4628

Iron, tar

England

10

Alexander Buchan

4242

Iron

Scotland

*Value in Swedish riksdaler

­f igure 2.4  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1655 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 21. 1655

comes in contrast to merchants of other ethnic backgrounds who were largely focused solely on exports of iron.121 As can be seen from Figure 2.4, British merchants held seven of the top ten positions for largest export value in Stockholm in 1655. Due to the presence of an experienced Scottish mercantile community, supplemented by the recent arrival of English merchants, British merchants came to be the dominant force in conveying Swedish exports to their home market. However, it was far from a one sided story. As two distinctive groups, English and Scottish merchants were responsible for a similar share of the export market at around 30% apiece. Combined, the two groups constituted the first example of a truly British commercial community in the city and were responsible for around 60% of total exports. However, there was a larger group of native merchants residing in Stockholm from a variety of different ethnic backgrounds who were also involved in the trade to England. The likes of Hans Ludwig’s heirs, Hindrich Thun, Adam Raddou, Jacob Rebeldy, Morten Buloh and others were responsible for the remaining 40% share of goods exported to England in 1655. The explosion in demand that led to a vastly elevated export figure to England 121 ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1655.

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and its satisfaction could not have been achieved without a large and varied portion of Stockholm’s native and ethnically varied mercantile community.122 It should not be understated that with such a sharp rise in demand, England’s merchants arrived in Stockholm in number almost immediately. England and its traders were determined to oversee the export of goods under their own auspices and had singled out Stockholm as the main centre of their trade. English posturing in port would cause intense friction with the local mercantile community as English trade grew over the remainder of the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, in Gothenburg, the export trade to England was already on the rise by 1649. At only a fifth the size of exports from Stockholm just five years later, trade was more modest and thus the number of exporters considerably fewer in number. Despite such increases in trade there was no discernible English mercantile community that arrived in the town to oversee an expanded trade as was the case in Stockholm after the First Dutch War. The only English participation in the export of goods came from the small contribution made by the crew members of English ships freighting to England. There were however common features with the Swedish capital. The existence of a Scottish mercantile community in Gothenburg played a huge role in sourcing and exporting goods to England. Prominent merchants such as Alexander Young, John Maclean and to a lesser extent John Spalding and Francis Barker, all oversaw the export of multiple consignments of wrought iron, pitch, tar and various timber products.123 Alongside the Scottish community were a larger number of merchants from a varied ethnic background who were active exporters to England. Native Swedish merchants such as Hans Jöransson, Börge Bengtsson and Nils Börgesson, conducted their trade alongside their Scottish peers. Merchants from further afield or of ambiguous ethnic origins such as Ollrich Steinkamp, David Amya, and Jöran von Lengerken, all held burgess rights in the town, as did their Scottish counterparts. It does not appear as if there was any degree of merchant specialisation among the export community of Gothenburg in regards to the English at this juncture. A Scottish, Swedish, or German merchant it seems were equally likely to export iron, pitch, tar or timber products.124

122 Non-​British merchants were larger in number as a group but tended to handle smaller amounts of goods per exporter. ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1655. 123 ssne entries: “Barker, Francis” [4680]; Maclean, John [1631]; “Spalding, John” [4677]; “Young, Alexander” [7164]. 124 gla, gca, Vol. 819. 1649.

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The total share of the export trade was fairly evenly distributed between the Scottish merchants actively exporting from Gothenburg in 1649 and then the remainder of the town’s mercantile community. Scottish merchants were responsible for exporting 515 ssp of iron at a value of roughly 6,180 riksdaler, while the remainder of the community exported 563 ssp of iron, equivalent to around 6,756 riksdaler. A fairly even distribution in tar exports was split between the Scottish and the remainder of the merchant community at around 122 barrels exported by the former and 152 barrels by the latter.125 In terms of pitch exports, non-​Scottish merchants were more dominant with 114 barrels exported versus 48 barrels from the Scottish. However, it must be noted that at this juncture the Gothenburg Scottish merchant community only appears to have comprised five active exporting merchants, four of which were involved in direct export to the English market. Common trends emerge in the experiences of Gothenburg and Stockholm. A significant portion of trade was undertaken by the mercantile communities in both towns who held naturalised burgess status. Also, Scottish, Swedish and more ethnically ambiguous merchants all participated in exporting goods to England. In Gothenburg the vast majority of the trade was in the hands of these locally based traders. In contrast, the Stockholm mercantile community began to face considerably more competition for trade with the English market, following the arrival of English merchants seeking to control this expanding trade. The scales and potentials of the Stockholm and Gothenburg markets may have played a factor in fostering such competition. 7

The English East India Company and the Swedish Africa Company: Anglo-​Swedish Commercial Connections in Colonial Trades

The meeting of England and Sweden’s colonial spheres is an often overlooked, if an almost unknown event in the history of seventeenth-​century Anglo-​ Swedish commercial interaction. During the latter years of the 1650s, the English East India Company (hereafter eeic) and the sak were poised to enter into negotiations that would result in an official agreement linking two arms of England and Sweden’s respective colonial trades.

125 It appears that Alexander Young was the sole merchant exporting tar to England during this trading season. gla, gca, Vol. 819. 1649.

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Sweden’s attempt to procure restitution for damages inflicted on its trade by the English resulted in the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two nations. It also led to the union of eeic and sak interests.126 By 1657 the Swedes had failed to achieve satisfaction for their demands. The Swedish Board of Trade appointed a special commission to specifically handle unresolved claims arising from English privateering in the autumn of 1656. The actual appointment of the commission was the result of an article concluded and inserted into the Treaty of 1656, stating that during the following year, a joint Anglo-​Swedish commission would meet in London solely to discuss the effects of English privateering to reach a conclusion in relation to seized Swedish vessels.127 The delegates that made their way to England in early 1657 at the behest of the Swedish Board of Trade must have been this Swedish delegation. The Swedish Board of Trade selected Joachim Pötter and Johan Claesson Prytz to travel to England to represent Swedish interests. Pötter was born in Nyköping, the son of a German immigrant, who had earned his commercial experience in Rotterdam as a teenager. Pötter was a prominent merchant in Sweden and had commercial ties to England at various points during his career.128 Pötter’s commercial acumen was no doubt one of the founding reasons for his selection as part of the delegation, while Prytz, a burgess councillor in Stockholm and acting as a senior town councillor in the city from 1652, was a prominent member of the civic community, probably himself with mercantile interests. The third representative was Johan Barkman, who subsequently spent thirty years serving as Swedish Resident to England from 1661–​1691.129

126 Swedish efforts to claim compensation for ships taken by English privateers during the First Anglo-​Dutch War were unsuccessful. Nováky, György, Handelskompanier och kompanihandel: Svenska Afrikakompaniet 1649–​1663. En studie in feodal handel, Uppsala, 1990, p. 139. 127 Additional clauses. Printed in Patterson, F. A. (ed.), Milton State Papers, Vol. 8, New York, Columbia University Press, 1937, pp. 566–​591. 128 Högberg, Staffan, ‘Joachim Lillienhoff’, in sbl. Available at [https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​ /Prese​ntat​ion​.aspx?id=​10358]​. Accessed on 30 September 2020; Müller, Merchant Houses of Stockholm, pp. 87, 96, 103–​104, 113–​114, 182, 186, 230. Pötter was later ennobled “Lillienhoff” and his house still stands to this day as a central fixture of Medborgarplatsen in central Stockholm. 129 Johan Barkman’s signature appears on a number of letters sent to the Swedish Crown from their visit. sra, da, Vol. 514, Brev från svenska agenter etc. 1560–​1657, London, 10 July 1657. It is possible that Barkman was related to the merchant and burgess J. Barkman, who was active in Stockholm’s export trade during the first half of the century. Barkman’s appointment is a further example of how specific issues between the two nations could provide the incentive for increased contact.

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There was overwhelming bias in prioritising the sak’s interests at the expense of all other mercantile parties who had suffered at the hands of the English. Pötter was only instructed to attend to company interests upon leaving Sweden.130 The commissioners stopped at Amsterdam and Hamburg en route to England in March 1657 to meet Henrich Carloff and Laurens de Geer.131 The commissioners may have stopped there to discuss any additional commercial interests.132 That the Swedish government only appeared to be interested in representing the sak’s interests perhaps demonstrates that only the most powerful and influential merchants, such as Laurens de Geer and his company associates, could expect the Crown or government to act on their behalf. Although there were initial setbacks, and negotiations in London did not begin until August 1657, it is highly likely that initial contact between the two trading companies came during the earlier negotiations concerning Swedish restitution for damages inflicted by English privateering activity. Although it is not known who the English commissioners were, it was not merely a matter of seeking restitution for damages and further expenses from the English state. There were other powerful interests involved that both parties had to consider. One of those interests was Nicholas Crispe who held the patent for the English Guinea Company and the privilege to trade to West Africa. Pötter seemed to be shaken enough that he recommended damages for the captured sak ships should no longer be pursued.133 By December 1657, Crispe’s patent for the right to trade to the African coast had been taken over by the eeic.134 The eeic’s assumption of permission to land their ships on the West African coast removed the impediment of Crispe and his organisation. This provided the eeic the potential to establish a provisional station for their journeying back and forth to India. A contract between the eeic and the sak was concluded by Pötter and eeic representatives as early as February 1658.135 With the Swedish delegates 1 30 Nováky, Handelskompanier och kompanihandel, p. 187. 131 Ibid. 132 Carloff had also been in England during the first delegation that attempted to treat with the English over the restitution of ships. An extensive treatment of Carloff’s activity with the sak can be found in: Wirta, Kaarle, Early Modern Overseas Trade and Entrepreneurship: Nordic Trading Companies in the Seventeenth Century, Routledge, London, 2020, pp. 61–​66, 74–​81. 133 Nováky, Handelskompanier och kompanihandel, p. 187. 134 The eeic were to have a six-​year patent that allowed their organisation to assume control over the fort at Cormantin. 135 Copies of the original contracts can be found at uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1, ff. 330–​333. Thanks to Dr Kaarle Wirta for bringing these documents to my attention.

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present in London since at least April 1657, it is possible that the eeic administration saw potential for an agreement, and the arrival of the Swedes could have prompted the transfer of the patent for Cormantin from the Guinea Company. The eeic not only saw strategic potential in utilising the coast as a base, but also to link up with the sak to provide considerable commercial rewards. The first contract was drawn on 16 February 1658 and hinged on the premise of the eeic purchasing Swedish-​African gold and ivory, in exchange for cash and credit in Europe.136 Goldsmiths Edward Blackwell and John Brent committed themselves to buying the gold and ivory from the Swedish and delivering it to Falmouth, Plymouth and Dover. The contract was valid until May 1658, and was either intended to be a purely one time, short term offer, or a precursor for a more permanent arrangement. The eeic is not explicitly mentioned in the contract, but payment was undertaken by eeic Commissioner Charles Marescoe.137 Negotiations between Pötter and the eeic continued and a second contract was agreed upon. The new arrangement was to begin in May 1658 and continue over the course 1659 and 1660.138 The contract itself contains twelve points that centre on commodities and price arrangements, as well as the methods of putting the exchange into practice. Articles 1–​3 stipulated that the eeic ships would take delivery of goods on the coast at four Swedish forts. They were to sail eastward biannually, once in spring and once in autumn, with the Swedes being expected to deliver as much gold as they could yield up to the agreed amount. Article 6 stated that the sak agreed to provide the eeic with £5,000 worth of gold every six months, or £10,000 per year. Article 4 handled payment for the Swedish goods, stating that the English would pay £3.12 per ounce.139 It was stipulated that when the eeic deputies had received the gold and loaded the goods, they were to present five bills of exchange. Half of the credit was to be drawn from the Bank of Amsterdam, and the other half from the Bank of Hamburg. Therefore, remittance of credit through intermediaries in the respective cities was not just a feature of merchant-​to-​merchant interaction in the trade for domestic Swedish goods. The contract demonstrates that it was

1 36 uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1 ff. 322–​327; Nováky, p. 188. 137 This demonstrates another arm of Marescoe’s early trade. It is unknown whether Marescoe’s already established connections to the Swedish market played any role in the matter. 138 uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1 f. 330. Article 1. 139 The specifics based on the carats of gold were outlined in Article 8. uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1, ff. 330–​331.

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also intended to be a feature of inter-​company trade in colonial commerce. There were similar conditions relating to the sale of ivory, which was to be conducted in the same manner. The contract represented a victory for the eeic against the statesmen and economic polemicists of the day who argued that colonial trades among others were seeping precious metals out of England. Through this agreement with the Swedes the eeic had a system whereby they could purchase gold to be used in the east, backed by their credit in Europe. For the sak it meant the risk of moving their gold back to Europe, which had been a serious concern beforehand, had now been resolved. Furthermore, the eeic agreed to provide a certain amount of provisions for the coast which further relieved the sak of burdens in transport for victuals.140 Whether the contract was ever acted upon, or to what extent, is currently unknown. This little known venture has never before been contextualised within the wider arena of Anglo-​Swedish relations. Regardless of impact in actuality, the negotiations held, and the contract itself, represented a victory for the commercial relations of England and Sweden during this period. Precisely as the treaties of 1654 and 1656 had emerged from the negativity of a predatory English policy that was a serious burden to Sweden’s commerce, the contract that unified elements of both nations’ colonial commercial spheres should be viewed in the same light. The contract itself is strikingly balanced, seeking to benefit both sides in a way that the treaties between England and Sweden were never entirely satisfactory for either party, but particularly so for Sweden. 8

Conclusion

The conclusion of the eeic-​s ak contract was born out of a developing Anglo-​ Swedish relationship that, despite its drawbacks, was beginning to reap rewards for both nations. During the course of this period Sweden had emerged with a tighter grip over the production of a variety of goods that were in high demand amongst a number of markets in western Europe. In England, Sweden had found a powerful western ally that had assisted its establishment along the Sound by providing naval assistance in the 1658–​1660 period. Furthermore, it also provided a vital export market and important commercial alliance that reduced Sweden’s reliance on the Dutch markets and Dutch buyers. In addition to providing a rudimentary overview of English demand for Swedish 140 uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1, ff. 331–​332.

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commodities in England, it has been possible to reveal a number of intricate factors were at play which brought English and Swedish commercial and diplomatic interests together precisely at this point in time. The two decades spanning the 1640s and 1650s were a transitional phase for England and Sweden’s commercial relationship. By utilising Swedish commercial records it has been possible to pinpoint more precisely the overarching commercial trends that Anglo-​Swedish trade underwent during the course of this period. It has demonstrated that, after an initial decline in trade that reached its nadir in 1645, trade began to resume tentatively. Gothenburg enjoyed increased traffic, reaching a peak in exports to England already by 1649, while a new era of trade in exports from Stockholm commenced after the conclusion of the First Dutch War. Both record figures for Swedish exports in Gothenburg and Stockholm were recorded in 1655 which can be seen as the marker point for the increase in Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction that was to span the course of the century and beyond. Already by 1655 England had become Gothenburg’s most important export market. The increase in the demand for Swedish goods brought with it severe disruption in the established pattern of Anglo-​Baltic trade, seeing a shift northwards toward Sweden, as the epicentre of Baltic trade for England’s merchants. With these changing trends the impetus for directing England’s Baltic trade began to be enveloped by the state, leading to codified relations for the first time in history between England and Sweden. The treaties of the 1650s set to enshrine both nations’ mutual political and commercial importance, whilst also disenfranchising the Eastland Company monopoly in favour of unofficial trading in a growing and competitive marketplace for Swedish goods.

­c hapter 3

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–​1671 The dawn of a new decade brought changes to the governing regimes of both England and Sweden. In May 1660, Charles ii was restored as king of the British kingdoms. The death of King Karl x Gustav in February 1660 also saw regime change in Sweden, which entered into a twelve year period of regency government. Although Karl x had left an heir, his son Karl xi was only a child when he inherited the throne. The governance of Sweden was entrusted to the Queen Mother Hedwig Eleonora along with a small group of the higher nobility who had been nominated in accordance with Karl x’s wishes in the event of his death. Both Charles ii and the Swedish Regents inherited nations wrought with economic difficulties that were to influence their own direct relationship, as well as the policies which were pursued during the following years. France’s emergence as a burgeoning maritime power, in addition to its existing military standing, complicated the prevailing system of alliances in regard to northern and western European power politics. Over the course of the 1660s and the beginning of the 1670s the English, French and Dutch sought alliances to form partnerships against the remaining third party. The domestic political situation that Charles ii inherited at the Restoration in 1660 was far from ideal. The treasury, army and navy all remained unpaid, and the nation’s religious settlement was fractious, and went unresolved in government until 1662.1 A precarious balancing act within domestic power politics and the crushing of dissent were to remain features of Charles’s reign.2 Although Parliament had granted Charles an annual subsidy and passed key commercial measures such as the repackaged Navigation Act almost immediately, many other domestic issues remained unsettled.3

1 Lachs, Phyllis S., The Diplomatic Corps under Charles ii and James ii, New Brunswick, 1966, vii; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 95. 2 Southcombe, George and Tapsell, Grant, Restoration Politics, Religion, and Culture: Britain and Ireland, 1660–​1714, New York, 2010, pp. 20–​37. 3 The financial settlement that was reached in 1660 presented a problem for the monarchy. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, viii; Southcombe and Tapsell, Restoration Politics, pp. 8–​9. A further discussion of what settlements were reached can be found in Southcombe and Tapsell, pp. 6–​19. For the relationship between the monarchy and the church, see Rose, Jacqueline, Godly Kingship in Restoration England: The Politics of the Royal Supremacy, Cambridge, 2011.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_005

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One of the central bodies that found itself adversely affected due to the prevailing domestic political situation was the navy. Although England remained one of the strongest maritime powers at the time of the Restoration, financial difficulties and suspicion of the king’s designs on the navy occasionally stalled funding.4 Domestic difficulties hindered the financing of the navy, but it was the increased activity of the Dutch Republic and France that eventually eclipsed England’s naval building output. The English had instigated the naval race over the course of the 1650s, but its own renewed naval building programme under the Restoration did not gain significant traction until the later 1670s.5 Charles not only had difficulties on the domestic front, but also inherited the hostilities the English Republican government had cultivated abroad. Despite regime change, England followed a foreign policy along similar lines to those of the 1650s. In fact, the ensuing system of political alliance among the western European powers as a whole remained largely unchanged.6 Charles regained his throne without the direct assistance of a foreign power in the process, meaning there were no impositions on his sovereignty to influence which direction the country turned when seeking foreign alliances. The threat of domestic rebellion remained, and continued to be one of the leading concerns for the monarchy throughout the period, alongside other dynastic and commercial considerations.7 Given these pressing considerations, the Stuart regime at first sought a peaceful policy abroad. Charles ii’s marriage to Catherine of Braganza cemented favourable Portuguese relations and English interests in Iberia, albeit at the expense of provoking Spain.8 Favourable terms were settled with France by failing to ally with Spain and rescinding England’s claim to Dunkirk by selling it in 1662.9 Moreover, strategically commercial treaties with both Denmark-​ Norway and Sweden were secured in 1661. As time progressed, entrenched 4 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 190; Israel, Jonathan I., Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–​1740, Oxford, 1989, p. 270. 5 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 190. 6 Black, Jeremy, A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy, 1660–​1793, Harlow, 1991, p. 120; Lachs, The diplomatic corps under Charles ii & James ii, viii. 7 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, 1660–​ 1672, pp. 10–​ 11; Various forms of dissent existed. Southcombe and Tapsell, Restoration politics, pp. 20–​37. 8 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 65–​66; Belcher, G. L., ‘Spain and the Anglo-​Portuguese Alliance of 1661: A reassessment of Charles ii’s foreign policy at the restoration’ in The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 15, 1975, pp. 67–​88. 9 It has been suggested that Charles could only manoeuvre between the power of France or Spain at this juncture. Southcombe and Tapsell, Restoration politics, pp. 58–​59.

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hostile attitudes toward the Dutch Republic began to raise their head, and pro-​ war voices inside the government brought the Stuart kingdoms into war once again.10 The latter half of the period saw Charles ii return to a peaceful policy, partially determined by financial restraints. However, international power politics during the 1667–​1672 period were dictated by shifting alliances following the close of the Second Dutch War (1665–​1667) and France’s renewed aggression on the continent. From 1668 onwards Britain was officially a part of the Triple Alliance with the Dutch Republic and Sweden.11 Concurrently, Charles concluded his own secret alliance with France in 1670, drawing Britain into a pluralistic foreign policy and thus adding further complications to an already uncertain foundation in Europe. Meanwhile Sweden’s regency government experienced years of financial strain as the state attempted to adjust economically after nearly half a century of functioning under a war economy. The country was war weary after the exigencies of Karl x’s reign. The regency, unwilling to secede power to the army, was reluctant to commit the country to an expensive and potentially damaging war.12 In some respects, the composition of the regency itself prevented decisive action in this respect. Jealousies among the higher nobility within the government were so pronounced that two rival factions came into being, a state of affairs that would dominate Swedish politics for the remainder of the period in question.13 Simultaneous treaties were concluded with Denmark-​Norway, Poland and Russia as Sweden entered into a brief period of relative peace lasting just over a decade.14 Decades of warfare had fuelled the building of a pan-​Baltic Swedish 10 Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? pp. 237–​239; Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 66–​67. 11 An original copy states that the treaty was made under the title of ‘Magna Britannia’. sra, da, Vol. 530, Fördrag mellan Sverige och England, 1654–​1808. 25 April 1668. 12 Lundkvist, Sven, ‘Experience of Empire: Sweden as a Great Power’ in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness: 1631–​1718, London, 1973, p. 23. For wider coverage of Sweden’s foreign policy during the regency, see Falhborg, Birger, Sveriges yttre politik 1664–​ 1668, Stockholm, 1949 and Sveriges yttre poltiik 1668–​1672, Stockholm, 1961. 13 Rystad, Göran, ‘Magnus de la Gardie’ in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness: 1631–​1718, London, 1973, pp. 209–​11. British diplomats writing from Stockholm were consistently wary of the factionalism present in Swedish governmental circles and warned to proceed with caution in this matter. Dispatches throughout the mid-​1660s to the early 1670s demonstrate the delicate political and often tense political climate. tna, sp 95/​6 and sp 95/​7. 14 Larsson & Österberg ‘Krig och utrikespolitik’, Behre, Göran, et al, Sveriges historia 1521–​ 1809: Stormaktsdröm och småstatsrealitet, pp. 119–​120. The only exceptions were Sweden’s skirmishes on the continent to maintain control over its German possessions.

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Empire that had been a cornerstone of the Swedish economy. Now the country had to look for an alternative source of revenue outside of war to stabilise the country’s finances. Whereas Sweden had previously maintained an aggressive attitude to expand its territory, its outlook was now geared toward the maintenance and consolidation of the territories already under its immediate control.15 Swedish territorial gains had reached their apex over the course of the 1650s, with numerous treaties signed in concord with its neighbours providing much needed security. However, Sweden still had one bond to break. They wanted to ensure the demise of the Dutch freight trade in the Baltic with regard to the enduring sway it held over their own economic ambitions.16 The Dutch Republic, who had been Sweden’s traditional allies during the first half of the century, had fallen out of favour since the conclusion of the Dutch-​Danish treaty at the end of the Torstenson War in 1645. Since this rupture Sweden had been seeking out an alternative ally in the west, intent on breaking its commercial dependence on the Dutch and the Dutch hold on the Baltic freight trade.17 Over the course of the 1660s, the western maritime powers, who were already beginning to appreciate the importance of Swedish exports, now began to realise just how intent the country was on obtaining financial subsidies in line with its new policy of peace.18 Sweden was courted by no less than Britain, the Dutch Republic, France, Spain and Austria. England, recognising Sweden’s commercial significance, continued to seek favourable terms with the kingdom. The English market had become firmly established in Sweden over the previous two decades and was now a vital consumer of Swedish goods. Likewise, Sweden were aware of England’s importance as a crucial trading partner. However, Sweden’s desire for a powerful western ally had become more acute now that Sweden had evolved a less expansionist policy.19 Both nations now sought the other’s friendship with commercial concerns at the forefront. However, questions of geopolitical and strategic 15 With the exception of the Scanian War (1675–​1679). Frost, The Northern Wars, pp. 208–​214. 16 For more on alliance politics during this period see: Lundkvist, ‘Experience of Empire: Sweden as a Great Power’, p. 34. 17 This process is often referred to as ‘balanspolitik’. Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 123–​174. 18 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken pp. 153–​174. See Sweden’s negotiations for the Triple Alliance and later agreements with France and England in the early 1670s; Norrhem in particular points to the importance of France’s influence and Swedish attempts to secure French subsidies in peacetime, Mercenary Swedes, pp. 34–​37. 19 Larsson & Österberg ‘Krig och utrikespolitik’, Behre, Göran, et al, Sveriges historia 1521–​ 1809: Stormaktsdröm och småstatsrealitet, p. 119.

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importance grew for both parties over the course of the 1660s. England’s status as a first-​rate maritime power could be vital to maintaining Sweden’s position in northern Europe. Sweden was a secondary power that became disproportionally significant due to its commercial importance through the domestic production of iron and copper as well as the grip it held over territories that furnished additional shipbuilding commodities. Moreover, Sweden played an important role in waging a diplomatic war against France and the Dutch Republic, thus maintaining England’s foothold in the north. Although commerce was still the most vital strand of the Anglo-​Swedish relationship, an increasingly active diplomatic corps began operating in both London and Stockholm over these years, demonstrating the growing importance of wider political considerations. Despite the importance of both commercial and political factors, the two elements of England and Sweden’s relationship remained almost wholly separate. England’s diplomatic activity was primarily focused on Sweden’s importance as an ally. English diplomats during this period barely mention commerce in their official dispatches sent to the secretaries of the Northern Department for foreign affairs in London.20 At least in an official context, Sweden’s diplomats were also primarily concerned with England’s strategic importance, albeit their commercial concerns were more immediate and thus feature more prevalently in their diplomatic engagement with the English. 1

Establishing Permanent Diplomatic Representation

The historiography of Restoration foreign policy is scant.21 This comes in stark contrast to the preceding period, where studies of Cromwellian foreign policy have received significantly more scholarly attention.22 Many of the previous studies that touch on British foreign relations during this era almost wholly ignore northern European affairs. They disregard Sweden despite extensive 20

The subject matter of correspondence sent to England from English diplomats in Sweden mostly focused on political matters at the Swedish court, as well as gossip relating to international alliances. tna, sp 95/​6, Henry Coventry and Thomas Thynne, 1666-​March 1668. 21 The two central works that tackle foreign policy for this period fail to place relations with northern Europe in the foreground. Black, A System of Ambition: British foreign policy 1660–​1793 and Feiling, British Foreign Policy 1660–​1672. 22 Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, pp. 246–​254; Grosjean, ‘Scots and the Swedish State’, pp. 241–​270; Roberts, ‘Cromwell and the Baltic’, in English Historical Review, Vol. 76, 1961, pp. 402–​446; Roberts, Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell’s Court, London, 1988; Venning, Timothy, Cromwellian Foreign Policy, New York, 1995, see pp. 190–​217.

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diplomatic exchanges and Swedish goods being of growing commercial importance to England’s global expansionist ambitions.23 This historiographical silence on Sweden is quite surprising as the 1660s were actually a watershed moment for Anglo-​Swedish relations. If the previous period can be considered significant for the establishment of the first diplomatic treaties, then the 1660s were the era of increased and sustained contact between the two nations. From at least 1661, Sweden maintained a permanent diplomatic presence in England, posting Johan Barkman Leijonberg as its first resident to the kingdom.24 Nils Brahe’s embassy in 1661 appears to have been the first of the period, whose retinue travelled to London to reconfirm the Anglo-​Swedish alliance under the new regimes.25 The English did not reciprocate with an embassy until Henry Coventry (See Figure 3.1) was sent to Sweden in 1664 to pursue renewed treaty negotiations ahead of the Second Dutch War. Coventry was later joined by Sir Thomas Clifford.26 Charles Howard, Earl of Carlisle then visited Sweden on his return journey from an embassy to Russia. That England felt three high-​profile figures were worthy of representing them indicates the value they placed on Sweden’s strategic importance around the time of the Second Dutch War.27 Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic activity during this period can be roughly divided into three phases. The first phase, 1661–​1663, was marked by the reconfirmation of alliance through Nils Brahe’s embassy to England. Little is known of diplomatic relations following the Treaty of 1661 due to the scarcity of surviving documentation. However, the treaty itself was significant, and was to provide the foundation for Anglo-​Swedish relations for the remainder of the century. The second period spans 1664–​1667, which coincided with the Second Dutch War. English diplomatic policy in 1664 and spring of 1665, immediately 23

British relations with Sweden during this period have been covered in regards to privateering activities during the Second Dutch War. Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? pp. 237–​254. 24 Leijonberg’s correspondence from London encompasses a period of thirty years from 1661–​1691, covering some 79 volumes. sra, da, Section 13. Residenten Johan Barckman-​ Leijonberg, 1661–​1691. Vols. 36–​115, 1661–​1691. 25 tna, sp 95/​7, p. 167. John Werden to Joseph Williamson. Stockholm, 8 July 1670. 26 Feiling, British foreign policy, p. 188. Coventry’s correspondence does not begin in the State Papers until January 1666 although he had been in Sweden for some months by this point. tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 1–​2. Henry Coventry to Arlington. 3 January 1666. 27 Feiling, British Foreign Policy 1660–​1672, p. 191. Bell, G. M., A handlist of British diplomatic representatives, 1509–​1688, London, 1990, pp. 276–​277; A contemporary account of Carlisle’s journey can be seen in Miège, Guy and Carlisle, Charles, Earl of, A Relation of Three Embassies from Charles ii to the Great Duke of Muscovie, the King of Sweden, and the King of Denmark, Performed in the Years 1663 and 1664 by the Earle of Carlisle, London, 1669; Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik, 1664–​1668, Vol. 1, pp. 61–​66.

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FIGURE 3.1  Henry Coventry, Ambassador Extraordinary to Sweden, 1664–​1666 and 1671–​1672. By Edward Harding reproduced courtesy of the national portrait gallery.©national portrait gallery, london

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preceding the outbreak of war, was dictated by the necessity to seek alliances in the north with the Scandinavian powers. England was hoping to win Denmark as an ally in to avoid a repeat of the closing of the Sound and the blocked supply of vital naval goods from Sweden during the First Dutch War.28 This tactic ultimately failed and Denmark eventually entered the war in favour of the Dutch in early 1666.29 Although Denmark’s value to England’s war effort was more immediately necessary, a Swedish alliance was perhaps more vital over the longer term. The Swedes were important for two reasons. Commercially, England relied on Swedish exports to maintain its naval power. Despite the possibility of a Danish blockade, Swedish goods would be needed after the conclusion of war in any case to rebuild damaged forces. Although a secondary factor, it was hoped that the Swedes would be induced into a defensive alliance. The Swedish navy could be of use in fighting enemies in the Baltic, and the Swedes maintained an armed presence on the continent due to their German possessions of Pomerania, Stade and Bremen, the latter immediately adjacent to the Dutch Republic.30 The third phase that Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic relations entered into occurred between the closing of the Second Dutch War and the beginning of the Third Dutch War (1672–​1674). Diplomatic negotiations during these years centred on the strategic Triple Alliance of England, Sweden and the Dutch Republic.31 Discussions for the treaty took place in London and The Hague. Although English diplomatic representatives to Sweden remained in Stockholm and were not directly involved in the conclusion of the treaty itself, their correspondence offers glimpses of contemporary reactions to ongoing political machinations, as well as Swedish anxieties with regard to the treaty. English representatives in Stockholm worked hard to provide the Swedish government with assurances offered from London, to tap into the political intrigue of an increasingly factional regency government, and to combat pro-​French

28

Schoolcraft, H. L., ‘England and Denmark, 1660–​1667’, in The English Historical Review, Vol. 25, pp. 457–​479. 29 Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? pp. 237–​254; Rommelse, Gijs, The Second Dutch War (1665–​1667): Raison D’état, Mercantilism and Mercantile Strife, Hilversum, Verloren, 2006. 30 For wider information on the Swedish navy during this period and its operations, see Glete, Swedish Naval Administration, pp. 175–​196, 418–​423; Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia 1521–​1809, p. 119. 31 Copies of the 1668 Triple Alliance found in the Swedish archives specifically state the alliance as concluded by England and not Britain. In Swedish ‘England’ and in Latin ‘Anglia’. sra. da, Vol. 530. Fördrag mellan Sverige och England, 1645–​1808.

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political forces in Sweden. They also sought to provide London with intelligence on Swedish dissatisfaction.32 The lack of surviving contemporary material renders it difficult to interpret the diplomatic intrigues of Anglo-​Swedish politics during the first years of the 1660s. Otto Wilhelm von Königsmarck visited England in early 1661 and his correspondence largely focuses on political developments of the Stuart Restoration. It is likely von Königsmarck was posted to England to oversee the regime change and to provide intelligence of the political climate in England.33 His correspondence details meetings with various ambassadors, speaking of the Portuguese marriage alliance, and mentions key figures in the nascent government such as Lord General Monck, Duke of Albemarle.34 At this juncture, Sweden had just cause to be interested in English politics. The treaties concluded with Cromwell’s government in 1654 and 1656 that had provided assurances and support from a valuable western ally were now null and void following the change of regime.35 Königsmarck’s reports could have contributed to the decision that guided Sweden to re-​ally with England. Whether Königsmarck had a direct connection to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1661 Sweden’s embassy headed by Nils Brahe is unknown. In late 1661, a Swedish delegation was sent to meet with representatives of the new regime in London, eventually leading to the conclusion of the Anglo-​ Swedish treaty that year. The embassy is obscure, with no known surviving documents relating to it. The treaty was concluded remarkably quickly over a period of only three weeks. It is therefore likely that discussions had taken place between governments or appointed representatives beforehand.36 Historians have largely overlooked the significance of the Treaty of 1661.37 The treaty formalised and reconfirmed the Anglo-​ Swedish alliance that 32

tna, sp 95/​6, Henry Coventry and Thomas Thyne, 1666-​March 1668; tna sp 95/​7, Thomas Thynne, Thomas Ross and John Werden, 1668-​April 1671. 33 sra, da, Vol. 35, Envoyén Otto von Königsmarck to km, 1661; sra, da, Vol. 533. Förhandlingar, 1661–​1679. Fraser notes the presence of Swedish diplomats at the coronation ceremony in the gallery at Westminster Abbey on the 23 April 1661. Fraser, Antonia, King Charles ii, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979, p. 200. 34 sra, da, Vol. 35, Envoyén Otto von Königsmarck to km, 1661. Letters dated London: 12, 26 April 1661 and Stockholm: 17 June 1661. 35 Carlbom, Sverige och England, p. 152. 36 Nils Brahe is only mentioned as the head of the embassy in scattered documents, such as subsequent references to Swedish ambassadors in later documents. tna, sp 95/​7, p. 129; sra, da, Vol. 533. Förhandlingar 1661–​1679. There are drafts of the treaty in a rushed Swedish hand that do not widely differ from the final version. 37 An exception would be Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? pp. 265–​266, 268, 270–​271, in relation to prize law and privateering during this period. The field of maritime law has paid particular attention to the treaty.

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had first come into existence between Cromwell’s government and Queen Christina in 1654 and subsequently expanded by Karl x Gustav in 1656. Given the two new regimes, it was necessary to reconfirm the treaty, albeit the revisited treaty was more than a simple repackaging of the former. The Treaty of 1661 included several more articles that sought to acknowledge the rights of the confederates’ subjects within the other’s territories, as well as building on existing commercial concerns. The main continuities from the Treaty of 1656 were the outline of terms for mutual defence, conduct during war and assertions of sovereignty that were to become a standard feature of Anglo-​Swedish treaties. Additional articles outlined subjects’ rights to travel unhindered without the need for special passes as required from other nationalities.38 A special clause was included to allow for transit to another nation, regardless of enemy status to the ally.39 Allied subjects were also given the right to a fair trial and protection under law.40 These additions perhaps resulted from the increasing presence of commercial representatives, particularly English merchants in Swedish trade areas. They were a reaction to the difficulties they were experiencing, and the need for protection that had arisen over the previous years of burgeoning trade and direct commercial contact. The treaty also took into consideration commercial matters, which will be dealt with later on. The treaty was significant for three key reasons. Not only did it reconfirm the earlier Anglo-​Swedish alliance, but it enhanced the terms on which the two nations operated. Furthermore, it provided the foundation on which the relationship was to function until the end of the century and was, of course, commercially significant.41 Indeed, the Treaty of 1661 led indirectly to the establishment of a permanent Swedish Resident in London, which continued uninterrupted until 1691. The treaty itself provides no mention of the posting of a resident diplomat, and because the negotiations or minutes for the meetings hitherto remain undiscovered, it is unknown whether it was directly connected. However, the continuation of Anglo-​Swedish relations guided by the reestablishment of a diplomatic treaty, with England acting as 38 39 40 41

Hertslet, Lewis (ed.) A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions at Present Subsisting between Great Britain & Foreign Powers, ii (2 vols.), London, 1820, pp. 324–​333. Article 4. Ibid. Article 10. Ibid. Article 8. Feiling argued that the survival of a number of Cromwellians in the Restoration government sympathetic to Sweden was the defining factor in the conclusion of an alliance. While a strong point that probably helped to positively influence proceedings, commerce was certainly the defining factor. Feiling, British Foreign Policy, p. 184.

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FIGURE 3.2  The coat of arms of Johan Barkman Leijonberg, the first Swedish Resident to England, 1661–​1691 reproduced courtesy of the swedish house of nobility (riddarhuset)

a primary destination for Swedish exports, and with Sweden choosing to rely on England as a political ally in the west, demonstrate why consistent elations were needed. Swedish Resident Johan Barkman (ennobled Leijonberg in 1658) had been in England since at least 1653.42 A fishmonger’s receipt billed to ‘Mr Barkman Secretary to the King of Sweden’, dated 20 January 1655, covering a period from September 1654 and a letter from a clerk at Whitehall addressed to ‘Lord Ambassador Extraordinary’ from 16 September 1656 prove that Leijonberg had been acting in an official diplomatic capacity since the mid-​1650s.43 Leijonberg had been working for the Swedish government in an 42

43

Johan Barkman was ennobled with the title ‘Leijonberg’ in 1658 after several years’ service in the employ of the Swedish Crown serving their interests in England. He was elevated to the status of friherre in 1687 (See Figure 3.2). Anon, ‘Leijonbergh, släkt’, in sbl, Vol. 22, 1977–​1979, p. 456. Available online at [https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​/Prese​ntat​ion​.aspx ?id=​11148]​. Accessed on 28 January 2021. sra, da, Vol. 115. Beskickningshandlingar, 1655–​1687.

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attempt to bring about restitutions for Swedish ships that had been captured by the English during the First Dutch War. He was in semi-​regular correspondence with the Swedish Board of Trade and continued his correspondence into the 1670s.44 Leijonberg was therefore an experienced diplomatic operator with a background in commercial affairs and a member of the minor nobility, holding solid credentials to serve as a permanent resident in England.45 Although a ‘resident’ was considered to be the least senior of the diplomatic titles during the seventeenth century, Leijonberg’s presence was vital in ensuring that the relationship between England and Sweden remained continuous.46 His role was supplemented by higher-​ranking officials sent from Sweden at times of crisis or of particular importance. Although historians have paid heed to the work of Dr John Robinson in his diplomatic service in Sweden with much enthusiasm, Leijonberg’s service has been completely overlooked.47 This is in part fuelled by Anglocentrism, as the majority of Leijonberg’s undertakings are to be found in Swedish archives. However, historians of Sweden are in part also to blame for their lack of renewed scholarship on Sweden’s diplomatic relations during the course of the seventeenth century, particularly in the case of England’s diplomatic relationship with Sweden.48 In the autumn of 1664 the first embassy of Charles ii’s regime arrived in Sweden. It was headed by Henry Coventry.49 In anticipation of a war with the Dutch Republic, the embassy formed part of a combined effort to induce the Scandinavian powers into separate, individual alliances with England. Sir Gilbert Talbot had been sent to Denmark on the same ship as Coventry and the two went their separate ways upon arrival at the Sound. Talbot’s objectives would eventually fail in Denmark and he was replaced by Sir Thomas Clifford. Clifford thought he had succeeded when the Danish agreed to sign a treaty in

44 45 46

sra, da, Vol. 104, Brev från Kommerskollegium (to Leijonberg). Anon, ‘leijonbergh, släkt’, in sbl, Vol. 22, 1977–​1979, p. 456. For information detailing the varying statuses of diplomatic representatives during this period, see Lachs, The diplomatic corps under Charles ii and James ii, pp. 3–​25. 47 Hattendorf, John B. John Robinson’s Account of Sweden, 1688, Karolinska förbundets årsbok, Stockholm, 1996; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, pp. 43–​53 (See Figure 3.3). 48 Greater focus has been paid to the importance of France and the Dutch Republic in studies of Sweden’s diplomatic history during this period. Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken; Fahlborg, Birger, Sveriges yttre politik, 1664–​1668, Stockholm, 1949; Falhborg, Birger, Sveriges yttre politik, 1668–​1672, Stockholm, 1961. British historians have also sidestepped issues relating to Sweden. Chance, J. F., Diplomatic Instructions, Vol 1: Sweden, 1922. 49 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, p. 189; Handley, Stuart, ‘Henry Coventry, 1617/​18–​1686’, in odnb, [http://​www​.oxford​dnb​.com​/view​/arti​cle​/6477?doc​Pos=​1]​. Accessed 8 February 2021.

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FIGURE 3.3  John Robinson’s An Account of Sweden, 1694 reproduced courtesy of crafoord auktioner. ©crafoord auktioner, lund

October 1665, but they were using the English to stall for better opportunities and ultimately declared war on England the following year.50 Coventry endured a troublesome time in Sweden. Like their Scandinavian neighbours, Sweden had a firm grasp of the prevailing political climate in anticipation of a war between England and the Dutch Republic. Although Sweden had shown favour to the English in 1661, it was no foregone conclusion 50 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 184, 188. The Danes also managed to receive French subsidies, a prize that the Swedish coveted and thus a factor that had stalled English negotiations in Stockholm. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic, pp. 101–​103; Schoolcraft, H. L., ‘England and Denmark, 1660–​1667’, p. 471.

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that they would confirm an alliance under changing conditions involving war. Despite difficulties, the following months led to the drafting of a renewed Anglo-​Swedish treaty. Although influenced by strategic and political considerations, as reflected in the articles of the treaty, both powers took the opportunity to expand the commercial aspects of their relationship. The enduring importance of commerce in their relationship is evident in the treaty, but the strategic necessity dictated by the prevailing international political situation in the face of aggression is also present. This is marked by the increase of articles from fifteen in 1661 to thirty two in 1665. Sixteen separate articles focused on the specifics of mutual defence and third party allies. Articles 4, 5 and 7–​11 specified the ability of either confederate to levy troops or call on naval assistance from the other. Mutual defence had become a standard aspect of these treaties, but Article 6 included a clause that obligations to assist the other party became void if that party was the aggressor in a conflict. This could have been either a Swedish or English initiative. The Swedes were well aware of England’s long standing resentment toward the Dutch, whereas the English knew of the Scandinavian powers’ propensity to go to war with each other.51 Another, newer feature can be seen in Articles 28 and 29, which provided for the potential inclusion of Denmark, or another third party upon mutual agreement of England and Sweden. The closing articles dictated the pretext for further relations, both being original clauses in the treaty. Article 29 stated that if any of the preceding articles were broken by either state the treaty itself would become null and void. The final article, Article 31, stated that the treaty was to last for a decade, with an option for a renewal at that juncture. This was the first instance in which an Anglo-​ Swedish treaty had included set time limitations.52 The treaty was drawn up in March 1665 and sent back to England where Charles ii completed the ratification process. The posting of simultaneous embassies and the swift conclusion of a renewed and improved treaty suggest two key aspects of Anglo-​Swedish relations at this juncture. Firstly, the new regimes of England and Sweden were eager to establish contact and conclude favourable terms with a principal, valuable ally. Secondly, the new treaty reflected the extent to which both parties viewed the other as important. A number of years of codified relations with

51

It is interesting that Article 26 obligated the English to help enforce the Swedish-​Danish commercial contract from 1660. tna, sp 103/​69, ‘Articles made for a treaty between Great Britain and Sweden, 1664/​65’. 52 Ibid.

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previous governments had shown that commerce and mutual protection were of utmost importance and were accordingly enforced. Thomas Thynne replaced Henry Coventry as the English representative to the Swedish court in Stockholm in September 1666.53 Thynne provided an eight-​page summary of the Swedish mood towards war and England’s place in their considerations after two months in his post.54 His treatise is perhaps the most detailed and lucid judgement of the two kingdoms’ relationship at this juncture. Thynne touched on several points including: Sweden’s inability to go to war, Sweden’s animosity towards France and Denmark, the split in opinion between the burgess community and government in regard to alliances, the inclination of Sweden to England, and potential effects of Sweden moving closer to England. Despite the predominant contemporary opinion of the Swedes as warmongers, Thynne provided two reasons why Sweden was not capable of going to war.55 One reason centred on the debts left by Karl x, ‘till they can either lay up a considerable sume of money or recover credit to make new debts by paying the old, they are not prudentially to affect a new war or indeed undertake one’.56 This position was inexorably linked to their altered foreign policy centred on peace and the desire to acquire subsidies. Thynne spoke of a split between the commercially inclined burgess community in Sweden who favoured the Dutch, ‘some joint interest in Commerce with the Burgesses & Merchants of Swede may have procured some affection amongst them’. He furthered with the caveat that many were bound to the Dutch by debt.57 Thynne touched upon the feeling of the Swedish regency government, stating that, ‘none in power are for Holland, they are in many sense very obnoxious [towards the Dutch]’. He listed several reasons for their displeasure at the Dutch all primarily connected to alliances against Sweden. Firstly how the Dutch purposely turned Brandenburg against Sweden. That they encouraged Danzig to move against Sweden. They then instigated Denmark into breaking peace and attacking Sweden while Karl x’s armies were in Poland. Finally, during recent negotiations with France they backed Denmark.58 Despite the 53

tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 59, 81. Coventry departed in May 1666 and English merchant George Shuttleworth was used as a temporary correspondent until Thynne’s arrival, tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 73–​74. 54 tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 101–​109. Thynne’s letter does not include a recipient, but states it as being requested by Charles ii. 55 tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 101–​109. Undated. Sweden has ‘long lived in and by war, and are still generally in the world believed to desire it’. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

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English envoy’s obvious bias, the motivations he stated for Swedish animosity toward the Dutch were all based on fundamental principles. It is possible that at this point, Swedish relations with the Dutch Republic had never been at a lower ebb. In spite of these realities, the alliance system that had formed against England by February 1666, consisting of the Dutch Republic, France and Denmark, combined with the uncertainty on the question of English subsidies, had eventually worn down the Swedes. It was enough to convince Sweden that closer ties of mutual defence with the English were not to their benefit.59 Because of these harsh realities, the Swedes felt better placed to act as mediators in the closing of the conflict.60 It was probably in Sweden’s best interests to remain neutral, although England still remained their closest commercial and political ally. Thynne’s embassy reflects the importance in possessing an able and fervent diplomat who was active at court, even in regards to a principal ally such as Sweden. Thynne’s commentary provided significant political context to help in the formation of English foreign policy towards Sweden approaching war. Having knowledge and familiarity with factionalism in Swedish politics would become a cornerstone in the role of England’s diplomats in Stockholm. International geopolitics and alliances would impact the various power groups in Sweden towards the later 1660s and early 1670s. It has been said that the causes of the Third Dutch War (1672–​74) derived from the conclusion of the Triple Alliance between England, Dutch Republic and Sweden in the later part of the 1660s.61 The Triple Alliance was formed to oppose the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. England wanted to check French power after losing to the Dutch in 1667. Concurrently England aimed to ensure the two remaining maritime powers did not form a union against them.62 Sweden’s interests in the alliance were twofold. Firstly, it had to protect territory in northwestern Germany, and allying with the Dutch against the French was thought to provide the best opportunity to keep both powers 59 60

tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 15–​16. Thynne to Arlington, Stockholm, 14 February 1666. Sweden had initially sent an embassy to England in 1666 which had displeased the French and looked promising for a further alliance, but external factors proved too great. tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 15,16, 39, 48–​49. The Scottish privateering campaign did not help to placate the Swedes. The Swedes believed Scotland was bound under the Treaty of Whitehall, 1661, and duly made reference to it, although the Scots’ real position remains unclear, Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas?, pp. 264–​278. 61 Rowen, Herbert H., The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669–​1671, The Hague, 1957, p. 18. 62 Ibid.

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in balance.63 Sweden’s commitment to England was already in place under the treaties of 1661 and 1665, while a pact with the Dutch Republic would provide another powerful ally to raise financial support for Swedish military forces.64 In contrast to all of the previous Anglo-​Swedish treaties, the Triple Alliance had no commercial basis. Its purpose was to serve as a strategic alliance to repel French power in mainland Europe, and ultimately to prevent their ascendancy. However, the alliance itself did entail further protracted negotiations between Sweden and the various confederates as they stalled over the question of financial subsidies. Swedish hesitancy kept English diplomats in Stockholm busy as they made reassurances to the Swedish government, and sent information back to London on Swedish political opinion. Already by December 1667 alliances were shifting following the Dutch War and the beginning of French aggression on the continent. Thynne reported back to England that the Swedish government was coming to blows over the question of with whom to ally. He stated that the French ambassador in Stockholm was pushing fiercely to bring Sweden into an alliance and Chancellor de la Gardie had already been swayed. A faction of councillors had emerged against the Chancellor, and Thynne named them as Sten Nilsson Bielke, Knut Kurck, Claes Rålamb and Mattias Biörnklou, who together occupied many of the senior positions in Swedish government.65 Ultimately, commercial considerations influenced the Swedes to make their choice. The English and Dutch piled on diplomatic pressure, and as Sweden’s two main trading partners, the decision was made in their favour.66 The matter was all but decided when Sweden was guided into a joint alliance with England and the Dutch Republic. However, French overtures and promises of financial inducement to stay neutral were touted by the French ambassadors in Stockholm and the Chancellor pushed their agenda in court.67 As the Swedes stalled on ratifying the treaty before subsidies were paid to them, fear was struck into the English representatives whose reports abounded with intelligence on the French.68

63 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 150–​158. 64 Lundkvist, ‘Experience of Empire: Sweden as a Great Power’, pp. 23, 25. 65 tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 242–​243, 11 December 1667. Thynne to Arlington. 66 tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 253–​254. Thynne to Arlington, Stockholm, 8 January 1668. English commercial preference was obvious, but Thynne also cited Dutch debt as a major incentive for the Swedes, the Dutch having ‘soe large debts in the Swedish books’. 67 tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 280–​281, 300–​301. 68 tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 1–​2. Thynne to Arlington, 8 April 1668. Thynne reported that de la Gardie ‘privately entertaineth a strict correspondence with France; and that the Alliance with Holland hath more of artifice then sincerity’.

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The question of subsidies for the Swedish army first seriously raised its head when troops were dispatched to Bremen in the wake of French aggression.69 The issue raged on until 1670 as the Swedes stalled for money. Despite formal agreement to enter the treaty, the Swedish signature remained unratified for some time. Over the course of 1669–​1670, with the Swedes still stalling, Spain began to take centre stage on the question of ensuring Sweden would move against France.70 The English began to take a secondary role and it was becoming increasingly clear that Sweden would see no financial assistance from England.71 Contemporary diplomatic correspondence does not suggest that English back-​pedalling over payment had an immediate effect on their relationship. The mistrust that it sowed would come to bear later on. Sweden’s military involvement was more an immediate concern for the Dutch and Spanish whose territories lay in mainland Europe, and the payment was at least partially undertaken by them in 1670.72 This particular incident demonstrates the divergence in diplomatic policy between the various western powers in regard to Sweden. France lent heavily towards providing financial inducements through the payment of subsidies. These subsidies were usually linked to maintenance of a military presence on the continent and toward active engagement. That England reneged on paying subsidies to Sweden despite such advanced negotiations was in part motivated by a lack of such territorial concerns. It also revealed England’s true intent in its relationship with Sweden which was commercial. Lofty promises of financial assistance could be made in codified alliances but England’s primary concern was in ensuring commerce with Sweden remained unhindered. Meanwhile, the English were preparing a mission of considerably higher esteem than the diplomatic embassies that had been sent to Sweden beforehand. Shortly after Thynne had returned from Stockholm in December 1668, the Earl of Carlisle was preparing for a journey to deliver the Order of the Garter to a fourteen year-​old Karl xi.73 On his trip to Sweden, Carlisle stopped 69

tna, sp 95/​6, pp. 296–​270, 276. For studies on the French army and their campaigns during this period, see Rowlands, Guy, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis xiv. Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661 to 1701, Cambridge, 2002; Zickermann, Across the German Sea, pp. 170–​175. 70 Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War, pp. 94–​106. 71 The secret Treaty of Dover was concluded in June 1670, in which Charles ii brought himself closer to the French and muddied the waters of British foreign policy. 72 Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War, p. 100. For a wider treatise on Sweden’s relationship with subsidies see Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes. 73 Carlisle sent a letter from The Hague en route to Sweden. tna, sp 95/​7, p. 95. Carlisle to Arlington, The Hague, 9 February 1669.

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in Copenhagen. Visiting the Danish court seems to have been ordered by Charles, as Carlisle wrote that he fulfilled his instructions by meeting with officials in the Danish government. He stated that he put forward the case for British merchants to be able to trade in Danish kingdoms under the conditions set by the Anglo-​Danish Treaty of 1661.74 It is unclear whether Carlisle himself met with the Danish king, but he had extensive discussions with the king’s son Ulrik Gyldenløve, Viceroy of Norway.75 Gyldenløve recommended Carlisle to the king, stating that Denmark wished to be on favourable terms with England. Carlisle’s stay in Copenhagen was a public relations exercise to demonstrate friendly relations to the Danish, rather than a statement of preferential intent in regards to wider considerations of foreign policy for the English in northern Europe. The general picture that emerges from his correspondence suggests Carlisle’s stay in Sweden was not an enjoyable one. Some English diplomats resented their posting to Stockholm due to poor conditions, harsh climate and a general lack of attention from the Swedish government. As a high ranking noble, Carlisle was the appropriate choice for the mission in terms of prestige, but being sent to Sweden in winter certainly did not equate to the standards of living he was accustomed to at home. The Swedish government had not sent an adequate arrival party befitting a member of the nobility of their closest allies who was carrying their highest royal honour, the Order of the Garter. Their ship put down anchor thirty English miles outside of Stockholm in the archipelago. Swedish peasants helped them onto land, but it was only with the appearance of English merchants who came to greet the party with their horses that Carlisle managed to acquire transport into the city, leaving most of his retinue behind. Not only did the Swedes not appoint anyone to meet with him, but it was also left to the English merchants and a Scottish officer, Major Barkley, to assist him and arrange accommodation.76 Carlisle did not have a good first impression of the Swedes. He hoped to conclude business quickly due to the expense of the mission, which he mostly paid for out of his own pocket. He complained that Scandinavia itself was expensive, and stated that the funds he was given nowhere near covered expenses.

74 75 76

tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 107–​108. Carlisle to Charles ii. Copenhagen, 2 April 1669. tna, sp 95/​7, p. 101. Carlisle to Sir John Trevor. Hamburg, 5 March 1669; p. 105. Carlisle to Arlington. Hamburg, 16 March 1669. tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 113–​114, 115–​116. Carlisle to Joseph William and to Arlington. Stockholm, 14 and 15 April 1669; Potentially the same William Barclay as recorded in ssne entry, “Barclay, William” [1611].

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It apparently had cost him half a year’s income.77 Carlisle was further unimpressed with Chancellor de la Gardie and his preference for the French, stating ‘nothing is donne heer but by the Chancellor, who hath not ban a forward man in the affayre of the Triple Alliance’.78 A further insight into the mission was revealed when Carlisle commented that Charles had ‘many irons in the fire’. This might indicate that the English were pursuing alternative diplomatic avenues away from Sweden. However, Carlisle’s letters may simply have reflected his resentment, witnessed by him showing a disproportionate amount of preference for the Danish. This attitude increased during his stay in Stockholm.79 Regardless, Carlisle successfully delivered the Order of the Garter to Karl xi after which lavish celebrations to mark the occasion were undertaken with considerable pomp in the centre of Stockholm as recorded in a copper engraving by Wenceslaus Hollar (see Figure 3.4).80 In contrast to previous English embassies to Sweden, Carlisle’s mission was more ceremonial rather than intent on achieving any tangible political outcome. The embassy’s importance in fostering enduring relations between the two royal houses should not be dismissed, however. The posting of a high-​ ranking English noble and politician amid intensive preparations on the part of the English was received with considerable celebration in Stockholm. The timing of the Order of the Garter was intended to ensure that a potentially impressionable young king would look fondly on England and the House of Stuart when he was to come to power just four years later. The embassy and the Garter represented another, soft-​power facet of English diplomacy towards Sweden. This came at a time when commerce was expanding and England was becoming increasingly reliant on Swedish trade in the face of rival western powers such as the Dutch Republic and France.

77

78 79 80

Carlisle complained, ‘I find it very deer heer’ stating he had to pay 100 Swedish riksdaler extra a month in Stockholm for similar accommodation in London. tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 120–​ 121. Carlisle to Arlington. Stockholm, 14 May 1669; pp. 132–​133. Carlisle to Arlington. Stockholm, 14 July 1669. tna, sp 95/​7, p. 115–​116. Carlisle to Arlington. Stockholm, 15 April 1669. tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 113–​114. Carlisle to Williamson. Stockholm, 14 April 1669. Fireworks mounted on barges were set in the harbour in Stockholm with a lavish ceremony at the royal residence attended by high-​ranking members of the nobility, demonstrating the importance with which receiving the Order of the Garter was met in Swedish circles. A detailed survey of festivities can be found in Ashmole, Elias, The Institution, Laws & Ceremonies Of the most Noble Order Of The Garter. Collected and digested into one Body By Elias Ashmole of the Middle Temple Esq; Windesor Herald at Arms. A Work furnished with variety of matter, relating to Honor and Noblesse, London, 1672.

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FIGURE 3.4  Festivities in Stockholm to commemorate Karl xi receiving the Order of the Garter from Charles ii by Wenceslaus Hollar, 1669 reproduced courtesy of stockholms auktionsverk. ©stockholm auktionsverk, stockholm

The next English diplomat to follow Thomas Thynne was John Werden, whose arrival in early September 1670 briefly overlapped with Carlisle’s stay.81 Werden arrived at a time of uncertainty in Anglo-​Swedish relations and shrewdly made use both of English merchants and Scottish officers based in Stockholm. Moreover, he courted members of the Swedish government such as Samuel von Pufendorf, who was said to be a supporter of the English. Werden divulged that the Swedes, though still positive to the English, were worried about the English abandoning the Triple Alliance and moving towards France. He stated that this nervousness had been the result of foreign diplomats spreading ‘misintelligence’.82 As England hurtled towards the Third Dutch War, Sweden and the western maritime powers continued to deliberate. Although Sweden had ratified the

81 tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 173–​175. Werden to Arlington. Stockholm, 7 September 1670. 82 Ibid.

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Triple Alliance in 1670, uncertainty reigned at the Swedish court. Diplomatic relations were in fact more constant than they had been in the 1650s. The Treaties of 1661 and 1665 reconfirmed their alliance, and codified commercial and strategic principles in more depth. The 1660s and early 1670s established continuous diplomatic and consular representatives. However, the Third Dutch War and wider international power politics increasingly interfered and threatened to derail Anglo-​Swedish relations. 2

England Becomes a Vital Trading Partner

From the vantage point of official missives sent by English representatives in Stockholm, Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy at this juncture appeared largely intent on securing geopolitical goals. However, the strength and basis of England and Sweden’s interaction still remained firmly in the commercial sphere. Thomas Thynne wrote back to London from Stockholm in 1666 noting that trade between England and Sweden was mutually beneficial and stated, ‘both Our Countrys are very proper to receive the Comodities of one another wee their brasse, iron, hemp, tar … they our cloath, tobacco, sugar & very many of our manufactures’.83 The total value of Stockholm’s export trade had increased considerably between 1655 and 1660. Overall value had swelled from around 1.5 million riksdaler in 1655 to almost 2.5 million in 1660. This rise was in part aided by a slight increase in the price of copper and iron, but also due to the amount of iron that was exported from Stockholm. Exports of iron increased from 102,200 ssp exported in 1655 to 156,081 ssp in 1660.84 Concurrently the price of wrought iron in Stockholm rose steadily over the course of a ten-​year period. This began at around 7 riksdaler per ssp in 1650, rising to between 8–​9 riksdaler in 1655, and further increasing to 10 riksdaler per ssp in 1660. By 1660 and over the course of the 1660s prices for wrought iron began to stabilise so that by 1670 prices were still fixed at 10 riksdaler per ssp. The price of copper had risen more exponentially from around 60 daler per ssp to 70 daler over the course of the period. However overall exports of copper had receded from 9,554 ssp in 1655 to 8,184 ssp.85 The 1660 trading season marked a peak year for exports to both England and Scotland. Exports of goods from Stockholm to England during this year 83 84 85

tna, sp 95/​7, p. 104. Undated. c. December 1666/​January 1667. sra, swb, Vol. 13. 1655; Vol. 15. 1660. ssa, sca, Vol. 16. 1650; Vol. 21. 1655; Vol. 27. 1660.

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experienced another remarkable leap as they had done just five years prior. Their overall value jumped from a total of 150,542 riksdaler in 1655 to 444,665 riksdaler in 1660. Likewise, the market share of Stockholm’s exports England now commanded had risen from around 10% in 1655 to over 18% in 1660. This represented a 295% increase in the overall value of exports to England. When placed into a wider context it shows that the value of English exports from Stockholm over the course of the decade had risen an incredible 3,500% from the values recorded in 1650 to those witnessed in 1660.86 Figure 3.5 shows wrought iron continued to be the predominant export commodity for English trade during the 1660s and into the 1670s. A total of 28,475 ssp of iron of varying types was exported in 1660, equivalent to a total value of 292,541 riksdaler. This was an increase of more than double the amount exported from Stockholm just five years earlier from 12,796 ssp at a value of 112,842 riksdaler in 1655. Iron thus equated to around 65% of England’s total export value for Stockholm in 1660. Tar was the second most voluminous export commodity at around 16% of England’s total Stockholm trade. This equated to 28,703 barrels at a value of 71,758 riksdaler. Pitch was the third most valuable export commodity at around 10% of England’s total export value. Pitch exports equated to 8186 barrels or 682 lasts with a total value 45,023 riksdaler. As Figure 3.6. shows, each of these key export commodities witnessed exponential growth in comparison with the figures from five years earlier. Tar exports had increased in value from 6,537 riksdaler to 71,758 riksdaler in 1660, rising from 3,268 barrels in 1655 to 28,703 barrels in 1660. Tar exports had thus increased by over 1,000% in the space of just five years. Similarly, exports of pitch from Stockholm grew at a remarkable rate, from 1534 barrels in 1655 to 8186 barrels in 1660. This represented an upward swing of 533.51%. Unlike iron, from 1655 the price of pitch and tar stabilised at 2.5 riksdaler per barrel and 5.5 riksdaler per barrel respectively. This remained the case throughout the course of the decade and into the 1670s. Iron, tar and pitch accounted for 92% of England’s exports from Stockholm in 1660. The remaining 8% of exports to England consisted mainly of copper, which were exported in a number of varieties at varying prices. Exports of copper equated to a value of around 9,000 riksdaler.87 During the 1650s the majority of top exporters to England had shown a degree of product specialisation. By 1660 such was the expansion of the market that many of the largest operators had a hand in conveying all top three

86 See Figure 0.5. 87 ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660.

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Misc & unspecified 2.3% Timber 3.6% Pitch 10.1%

Tar 16.1% Iron 65.8%

­f igure 3.5  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1660 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 21, 1660

commodities of iron, tar and pitch. The mid-​1650s saw the arrival of a wave of English merchants to Stockholm who were quick to play a significant role in the export market. Alongside their Scottish counterparts, they collectively handled around 60% of total exports that were sent to England in 1655. In 1660, English merchants began to arrive in greater numbers to participate in the Swedish export market. While it is difficult to determine exactly who was English at this juncture, at a conservative estimate there appear to have been at least 24 active English merchants in Stockholm during the 1660 trading season. This marks the first point in which a sizeable English community was present in Stockholm. However many English merchants played a diminished role in the overall export of goods. The majority of English merchants only recorded a small handful of export consignments over a limited period of the year. This could perhaps indicate that many English merchants acted as one-​time or temporary export agents, as had been a feature of trade in Gothenburg twenty years earlier.88 English merchants were becoming more commonplace on the streets of Stockholm by 1660 and a core group began to emerge in the city’s export 88

ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. The English merchants mentioned here constitute those who are listed as exporting more than one consignment of goods in contrast to instances where individual crew members on a single English ship have been mentioned by name e.g. “Johan Båtzman” or “John Boatsman”.

0

100,000

200,000

4180

1650

2033 4728 900

112,842

Tar

1655 Year

1885

Timber

6537 8439

Pitch

­f igure 3.6  Development of export commodities from Stockholm to England, 1650–​1660 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 16, 1650; vol. 21, 1655; vol. 27, 1660

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

300,000

Iron 292,541

45,023

1660

75,758 15,870

newgenrtpdf

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#

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

John Cooper

92,966

Iron, tar, pitch

England

2

William Blackett

81,788

Iron, tar, pitch

England (Newcastle)

3

John Clavering

67,044

Iron, tar, pitch

England

4

Tar Company

40,179

Tar, pitch

Swedish/Various

5

Skippers & Crew

23,830

Timber

Various

6

Hindrich Thun

21,301

Iron, tar, pitch

Sweden

7

James Lyall

14,969

Iron, tar, pitch

Scotland

8

Samuel Lee

10,688

Iron

England

9

Daniel Sykes

9941

Iron, copper & brass

Scotland

10

Isaac Bex

7623

Iron

Liège

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 3.7  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1660 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 27. 1660

market. This group oversaw the bulk of goods exported to England. As Figure 3.7 shows the top three exporters from Stockholm to England in 1660 were all Englishmen. John Cooper, William Blackett and John Clavering were alone responsible for 50% of the exports sent to England in 1660. These three merchants were by far the outliers of the Stockholm export merchant community. A new face in Stockholm, John Cooper was the leading exporter of goods to the English market by some margin, with a total of 92,966 riksdaler worth of goods sent to England. Present in Stockholm since at least 1655, William Blackett weighed in at second position with 81,788 riksdaler to his export account alone, increasing his trade from a more modest figure of 1535 riksdaler five years earlier by over 80,000 riksdaler. John Clavering, the leading exporter from 1655, was still a considerable player in the marketplace. Although he had relinquished his leading position from five years earlier, his own trade had swelled by an impressive 63,711 riksdaler.89 Although Cooper, Blackett and Clavering were by far the dominant actors, there were other English merchants who enjoyed a respectable share in Stockholm’s export trade also. Merchants such as Samuel Biddall, Samuel Lee and Daniel Sykes all played a part in directing a considerable amount of goods 89

ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. ssne entry: “Cooper, John” [7760].

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towards English ports. The latter two were ranked among the top ten exporters for 1660. Responsible for exporting between 7,000 to 10,000 riksdaler worth of goods, Biddall, Lee and Sykes represented a middling status of English merchant in Stockholm. When compared to just five years earlier those merchants exporting the equivalent amount of goods were much more likely to be settled members of the Stockholm merchant community, whether Scottish in origin or of a more ambiguous ethnicity belonging to the wider emigré community in the town.90 The English mercantile community in Stockholm expanded to such a degree that it had become more stratified, encompassing a number of merchants of vastly different means. Furthermore, it represents the first instance in which English traders in Stockholm were able to challenge members of the settled Stockholm mercantile community in directing exports to England. Scottish merchants still had a hand in exporting goods to England. However, in 1660 they played a smaller role in shipping goods to the English market. James Lyall was the only Scottish merchant amongst the top merchants in 1660, despite being the second largest exporter to England in 1655. Although his trade to England had declined it was still larger than those English merchants of middling status. Lyall and other established Scottish merchants in Stockholm who had prior involvement in English trade, such as James Semple, William Strang and William Guthrie, all witnessed a decline in their trade to England in 1660. Scottish merchants had meanwhile continued to diverge their business activities to focus on alternative export markets. For example, Semple’s English trade amounted to a value of 6,657 riksdaler, while trade with Scotland and more significantly Danzig and Lübeck totalled a more considerable value of 44,432 riksdaler.91 How far Scottish merchants diverted their export activities away from England as a reaction to the growing influence of English merchants has not yet been determined. Despite being newer arrivals in Stockholm substantial English merchants such as Cooper, Blackett and Clavering also conveyed a considerable number of goods to destinations outside of England. In addition to the 92,000 riksdaler worth of goods sent to English ports, England’s largest exporter John Cooper dispatched 20,565 riksdaler worth of goods elsewhere. William Blackett’s and John Clavering’s additional trading was even larger with accounts totalling 33,073 and 32,361 riksdaler. Although England was not at war at this juncture, all three leading English merchants were responsible for sending a considerable

90 91

ssa, sca, Vol. 21. 1655; Vol. 27. 1660. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660.

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amount of Swedish goods to rival maritime powers such as France and the Dutch Republic.92 Cooper, Clavering and Blackett’s export trade to Dutch and French harbours demonstrates the potential influence that English traders could already hope to exert in the Stockholm marketplace in such a short amount of time. It also suggests how some English merchants were opportunistic and apolitical operators. How far the authorities in England were aware of their trade in supplying rival maritime powers with goods from Sweden remains unclear. The role of Stockholm’s own ethnically diverse mercantile community had severely diminished in the wake of the arrival of larger numbers of English merchants. Only Isaac Bex and Hindrich Thun were exporters of note. The Swedish Tar Company also played a part as the largest exporter of tar and pitch with a total export of 17,480 riksdaler worth of tar, equivalent to around 7,000 barrels. The company had the highest share of tar exports to England at around a quarter of the total market share and an even larger percentage of the pitch export market to England at almost 40% of the overall total exported to English harbours. Their export of tar was only rivalled by William Blackett and John Cooper. Where previously the Tar Company had concentrated exports to the Dutch Republic this represents the first instance in which a Swedish monopoly trading company can be seen acting as a significant direct export agent in English trade. It is currently unclear how private English merchants were permitted to operate in the tar and pitch trades in the face of this monopoly. The 1660 trading season in Stockholm saw a considerable number of English merchants arriving to participate in a growing and increasingly lucrative export trade. Participation of members of the Stockholm mercantile community in the export of goods to England also swelled. In total this represented an increase from 20 exporters in 1655 to over 70 in just five years. Furthermore, the list of exporters had become wider and more stratified, particularly in regard to English merchants. However, it was those at the top who now stood most to gain and consolidated a vast proportion of England’s trade for themselves. The top three exporters accounted for over 50% of the total export trade to England at a value of almost 250,000 riksdaler when combining their export accounts. The top ten exporters shipping to England in 1660 now accounted for 83% of total exports, leaving a smaller proportion of opportunity for other merchants.93 Given how far the overall value of trade had expanded, this goes 92 93

All three merchants exported tar and pitch to France on a number of occasions. Cooper and Clavering both shipped large amounts of copper to the Dutch Republic. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660.

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some way to demonstrating just how much influence only a few actors were exerting in this sector of the export market. That the permanently settled, Stockholm-​based merchants did not hold a larger share of exports could perhaps indicate that they were edged out of the market. Stockholm’s connection to England in terms of goods exported had been on the rise already by the mid-​1650s. However, England struggled to make equivalent gains in its ability to off-​load its own goods onto the Stockholm import market. At a total value of 29,145 riksdaler, imports from England into Stockholm in 1655 were only just managing to reach their 1636 level. They accounted for barely a fifth of the total goods exported in the opposite direction. However, 1660 marked the point at which the English began to seriously assert themselves in an extremely competitive import market in Sweden’s capital.94 In tandem with the developments seen in the export market, Stockholm’s overall import trade had also seen a significant rise since 1655. Where imports of goods had been valued at approximately 1.7 million riksdaler in 1655 they had now risen to a 2.5 million riksdaler, a figure comparable to the total export value of goods. Although Stockholm’s overall trade balance still remained at a deficit of around 100,000 riksdaler, 1660 represented both a peak year for imports and exports in the capital.95 Two significant developments had occurred in 1660 in regard to England’s relationship with the Stockholm import market. The first was the sheer increase in the value and amount of goods imported to Stockholm from England. Imports arriving from English harbours alone reached a value of 271,833 riksdaler, marking an exponential increase of 932% on the import value of goods from England in 1655. For the first time imports from England had begun to arrive in considerable quantities, and were commanding a 10% share of Stockholm’s overall import market by value. The second development was in England’s dual role as a major freighter of non-​English goods into Stockholm. This is a feature of trade that has hitherto gone unnoticed by scholars of Baltic commerce.96 England’s merchant marine now began to play a major role in

94 See Figure 0.6. 95 ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. 96 England’s role as a major freighter of goods with the Swedish market during the 1670s has previously been remarked on by a number of scholars including: Bjurling, Oscar, ‘Stockholms förbindelser med utlandet under 1670-​talets växlingar’ in Forum Navale, Vol. 51, Uppsala, 1951, pp. 3–​37; Bjurling, Oscar, ‘Swedish shipping and British-​Dutch competition during the 1670s and 1680s’ in Economy and History, 14:1, pp. 3–​26; Roseveare, Markets and Merchants and the Seventeenth Century, pp. 170–​171; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 139–​140.

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supplying the Swedish capital with a wide range of goods. This included a large amount of necessity goods as well as a smaller number of luxury commodities. English skippers freighted goods from a variety of destinations across northern and southern Europe, including Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Hamburg, Stralsund, Danzig and Norway, to a total value of 237,296 riksdaler. This represented just over 9% of Stockholm’s total import trade. Therefore by 1660 English ships were responsible for supplying around 20% of Stockholm’s total import trade. Only Lübeck and the Dutch Republic were accountable for larger imports of goods into Stockholm. The development of England’s import trade into Sweden represented a significant shift on the part of the nation’s traders and shippers to meet a growing trade deficit as the demand for Swedish export commodities in England exploded.97 Textiles and clothing accounted for the majority of goods arriving into Stockholm from English domestic harbours. Valued at 95,435 riksdaler, textile imports comprised around 35% of England’s direct imports into Stockholm during the 1660 trading season. Traditional English textiles such as dozens, baize and kerseys were without a doubt the most common forms of textiles imported into Stockholm from England. Woollen stockings, gloves and lambskins were also a prevalent group of imports.98 Metals and mined goods, such as lead, aluminium and coal, were also prevalent, although in some cases it can be difficult to discern exactly where they originated. For example, Anthony White shipped 516 barrels of coal and 14 ssp of lead on William Blackett’s account in October 1660, but is only listed as incoming from “England”.99 The second most valued commodity and the most prevalent group of goods the English imported were foodstuffs including spices. Foodstuffs were present on all ships importing goods into Stockholm from England or on English ships arriving from elsewhere. Domestically produced foodstuffs included butter, cheese, hops, Scottish herring and oysters. However, the majority of those imported directly from England were re-​exported goods such as wines and spices that had likely originated in the Mediterranean, Levant or even further afield.100

97 98 99

ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. Only one example of coal imports has a specific point of origin when Johan Drouritz imported 1080 riksdaler worth of coal aboard Abraham Dixon’s ship from Newcastle. Out of 14 consignments of lead only one has a specified point of origin aboard Francis Noble’s ship from Hull. The remaining imports of this variety are simply listed as originating in “England”. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. 100 ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660.

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French, Spanish and even to some extent Rhenish wine were some of the most prevalent goods imported directly from England and elsewhere. It is difficult to state exactly how much wine was imported into Stockholm as a whole through English mediums, but overall wine imports equated to a value of at least 56,265 riksdaler. Imported across 90 separate consignments, the English imported wine from as far afield as France, Spain and Portugal, but also through Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Malmö, and directly from English ports such as London, Ipswich, Hull and Newcastle. This made wine one of the most commonplace commodities, not just in direct English trade, but also in England’s growing freight trade into the Swedish capital.101 However, salt was by far the most significant commodity in both arms of England’s import trade. In total the English were responsible for importing 236,414 riksdaler worth of salt during 1660. At approximately 5 riksdaler per barrel this equated to over 47,000 barrels of salt imported into Stockholm, representing a hefty 10% of the town’s total import value. British merchants on the ground in Stockholm were responsible for importing 60% of all salt imports into Stockholm through English ships. Although it is difficult to ascertain the initial impetus for how English traders came to be involved in the Swedish salt trade, their position and role in Stockholm was already evolving. English merchants who had only recently arrived in Stockholm to convey Swedish exports to England were now realigning themselves as intermediaries in trade conducted with other markets. As can be seen from Figure 3.8, they began to play a crucial role in supplying Sweden with vital goods such as salt. English traders in the town were able to utilise their contacts with English skippers and their knowledge of the Swedish market to fulfil an important purpose whilst also capitalising for their own gain. How far the English in Stockholm developed and utilised contacts in the Mediterranean to acquire goods from the source remains uncertain. These commercial connections cannot be discredited given the presence of an established English community in Portugal which was a major source of export for salt shipped to Sweden.102

1 01 ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660. 102 Whether the conclusion of the Anglo-​Portuguese alliance relating to the marriage of Charles ii and Catherine of Braganza aided English merchants in acquiring salt for the Swedish market is yet to be determined. Shaw’s work on the English mercantile community largely focuses on the political and diplomatic machinations overarching English trade in Portugal rather than with the strict undertaking of trade itself. Shaw, Trade, Inquisition and the English Nation in Portugal, 1650–​1690, Manchester, Carcanet Publishing, 1989.

Points of origin Miscellaneous harbours 1.9% France Hamburg 2.9% 5.2% Portugal 42.2%

Dutch Republic 22.6%

England 25.2%

Point of origin

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

Portugal

99,720

England

59,599

Dutch Republic

53,583

Hamburg

12,636

France

6780

Misc. harbours

4276

Top Importers of Salt #

Merchant

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

1

John Clavering

48,890

2

William Blackett

43,932

3

John Cooper

38,728

4

“Kiöpman” (”Merchant”)

27, 550

5

Tar Company

18,045

6

Niklas Keder

11,545

7

John Maclean

10,260

8

“N. N” (”Unnamed”)

10,125

9

Petter Werhusen

2660

10

Laurens De Geer

1175

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 3.8  Points of origin and top importers of salt into Stockholm on board English ships, 1660 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 27, 1660

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The English breakthrough in the carrying trade with Sweden signifies the extent to which both traders and shippers had penetrated the Swedish market by the early 1660s. England’s traders were keen to assume the role of freighters to bring about a proper balance of their trade to Sweden as the export of iron and other goods picked up pace. The more varied commodities they were able to carry into Sweden, the higher the likelihood they could profit from this arm of trade. However, England’s role in the freighting of third party goods to Sweden was by no means secure, and their position almost immediately began to wane. Although England’s traders faced serious, entrenched competition, the experience of the early 1660s demonstrated to Swedish commercial circles the ability of England to fulfil a role when necessary. This would become vital to Sweden in the following decade. Despite its geographical proximity, England’s commercial relationship with Gothenburg did not mirror the same levels of growth seen in the Swedish capital where a significant English mercantile and diplomatic presence facilitated access to the Stockholm export market in order to undertake commerce on preferential terms. Whether England’s traders specifically favoured Stockholm by this point is unknown. The likelihood is that if these traders had a preference for Stockholm it was simply a matter of supply and demand given that the capital exported larger amounts of key products. In peacetime Gothenburg’s overall export capacity tended to peak around 300,000 riksdaler in value, whereas Stockholm’s tended to push considerably higher towards the 2 million riksdaler mark.103 By 1660, Gothenburg’s export market had swelled to a value of 515,754 riksdaler, equating to around a 133% increase from five years earlier. This reflected an increase of more than twenty additional ships departing Gothenburg’s harbour compared to just ten years earlier.104 However, England was not responsible for the spike in Gothenburg’s overall export trade in 1660. England’s own export trade from Gothenburg had stabilised since the considerable increase witnessed in the mid-​1650s. Exports to England in 1660 now amounted to 116,360 riksdaler, a slight decrease on their 1655 equivalent. This corresponded to approximately a 22% share of Gothenburg’s overall export trade, itself a decrease from the 30% share it held previously. This resulted from an increase in the town’s overall export trade value. Hamburg and the Dutch Republic 1 03 See Figure 0.5 and Figure 0.7. 104 Iron production had increased from 18,382 ssp in 1655 to 26,471 ssp in 1660. Timber exports had swelled across the board, while tar and in particular pitch had increased by well over half their 1655 level. gla, gca Vol. 833. 1660; Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920, pp. 130–​131.

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outstripped England as the primary destinations for Gothenburg’s exports. Both destinations each held around a 28% share of Gothenburg’s export market with comparable values of 148,522 riksdaler and 145,388 riksdaler respectively. In third place, England was still a considerable outlet for the town’s export market and considerably surpassed that of France and Portugal which were the next most valuable export destinations.105 As shown in Figure 3.9, iron exported from Gothenburg to England accounted for almost 70% of the total value of England’s exports at around 80,956 riksdaler. This was equivalent to about 6,715 ssp of almost exclusively wrought iron. In contrast to Stockholm, tar and pitch played a negligible part in exports to England from Gothenburg. The value of tar exported from Gothenburg only amounted to around 200 barrels at a total value of just 630 riksdaler, equivalent to just 0.54% of total exports. This marked a considerable downturn in Gothenburg’s tar and pitch trade to England from five years earlier. Similarly, pitch declined from over 10,000 barrels exported from Gothenburg just a few short years earlier to just over 6,000 barrels in 1660. This represented just over 5% of the total value of trade to England. It is possible that English traders and merchants had turned to Stockholm to meet their demand for these goods. Where Gothenburg did hold sway, however, was in the export of timber. Timber exports to England in 1660 amounted to a value of 21,344 riksdaler. This was approximately 18% of the total export value of goods to England. The majority of timber exports to England consisted of boards and deals. Boards and deals equated to a worth of 12,683 riksdaler. This was equivalent to around 10% of England’s total export trade from Gothenburg and amounted to over 66,000 individual pieces of timber exported in just one season to England. Masts, which had long been a feature of England’s trade with Gothenburg and one of the town’s major export commodities, had increased from 68 individual pieces to 91. This equalled a total value of around 1,818 riksdaler. Gothenburg’s mast trade therefore had undergone a significant depression in comparison to figures recorded from earlier years.106 Despite such a clear desire for Swedish goods and Gothenburg’s favourable geographical proximity it is difficult to adequately assess why England’s share of Gothenburg’s total trade had stagnated. Pricing likely played its part as many commodities that Gothenburg exported could, at times, be found for a cheaper wholesale price in the Swedish capital. It is possible that the lack of

105 France exported just under half of England’s total value at 50,702 riksdaler, while goods sailing to Portugal were valued at around 9000 riksdaler. 106 gla, gca Vol. 833. 1660. See Chapters 1 and 2.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

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Miscellaneous 5.1% Tar 0.5% Masts 1.5% Pitch 5.7% Timber excluding masts 18.2%

Iron 68.9%

­f igure 3.9  Composition of exports from Gothenburg to England, 1660 sources: gla, gca, vol. 833. 1660

an active English mercantile community also had an impact on the market in Gothenburg. The influence that English merchants were beginning to collectively exert in Stockholm in just a few short years has already been observed. Meanwhile, the majority of active traders in Gothenburg were non-​British. There were only three British traders of any repute by the beginning of the 1660s in Gothenburg who were actively engaged in trade. Englishmen John Coote and Thomas Remmington, and Scotsman John Maclean, constitute the only British names actively exporting in 1660. Gothenburg continued to be a major point of commercial contact between the England and Swedish markets in the 1660s. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Figure 0.7, the export trade to England did not keep pace with the town’s overall commercial output. The value of goods dispatched to England remained relatively similar to what was established in 1655. Although not conclusive, it is highly likely that the penetration of England’s traders into Stockholm could have been a factor in measuring Gothenburg’s export of goods to English ports. 3

Circumventing the Sound

By the 1660s England had risen to become one of Sweden’s foremost trading partners. The Second Dutch War was a crucial time for England’s commerce

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with Sweden. Never was it more important to ensure that a steady stream of goods arrived from Sweden than in preparation for a seaborne war or in wartime. The constancy of trade was of paramount importance to both England and Sweden. England needed to ensure supplies continued to flow from Swedish harbours, and Sweden was becoming increasingly reliant on England’s continuing business.107 During hostilities English ships employed in trade with Sweden were at serious risk when trying to move their cargo through North Sea waters. Another immediate concern for England’s Swedish supply lines was in its dealings with Denmark. England needed to ensure Denmark did not close access to the Baltic for English shipping. Gothenburg had become a vital port for England, but access to Stockholm and Riga also remained crucial for supplies of naval goods. The Danish-​Dutch alliance and closure of the Sound to English shipping during the First Dutch War denied the English access to Baltic ports and had crippled their Swedish trade. In the years immediately after the conclusion of the First Dutch War and under the new regime in the 1660s, English-​Baltic foreign policy had made significant strides to assert its favour with both Denmark and Sweden.108 This was a concerted effort to ensure that the closure of the Sound was not repeated, or that at the very least a means of keeping Swedish supply lines open was put in place. At the commencement of the Second Dutch War, England’s relationship with both Scandinavian powers was encouraging. Having successfully interceded to end hostilities and broker an agreement between Sweden and Denmark at the close of the 1650s, Charles ii’s new regime had also managed to conclude vital treaties in the north. It provided the political basis for England’s trade in the Baltic to flourish, particularly in regards to Sweden. However, whatever favour the Danish king Frederik iii was contemplating towards the English was undone after the failed English attack on the Norwegian port of Bergen, where the Dutch East India fleet lay waiting for escort. This occurred in August 1665 just five months after war broke out between England and the Dutch Republic. The English failure to secure the East India fleet as prize and to deliver Frederik iii his share of the spoils encouraged Denmark towards an alliance with the Dutch Republic. Frederik was heavily indebted to the Dutch Republic and assurances his debts would be rendered null and void led to the

107 Rommelse, The Second Anglo-​Dutch War, pp. 135–​137, 152. Thanks to Ryan McDowell for helping me obtain this source. 108 English diplomacy had been successful insomuch as it enabled the establishment of treaties with both Scandinavian powers during the course of the 1660s.

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successful conclusion of a Danish-​Dutch alliance on 1 February 1666.109 For the second time in little over a decade, England’s aggressive stance towards the Dutch Republic and an inability to sway the favour of Denmark, led to the closure of the Sound. This threatened to throttle vital Swedish supply lines once more. Despite the outbreak of war with the Dutch Republic in March 1665, English trade with Gothenburg reached a new apex that year. England once again moved into a position of primacy in the town’s export market. England’s export trade was now worth 156,634 riksdaler which represented an increase of around 40,000 riksdaler from five years earlier and accounted for nearly a 33% share of the total Gothenburg export market. In contrast, the export trade of the Dutch Republic slid well behind that of Hamburg and France.110 The majority of England’s trade with Gothenburg was undertaken by English ships which were confined to two short bursts of activity between August and September, and then October and November.111 Most arrived in ballast with only three of the ten ships importing goods into Gothenburg. The balance of trade overwhelmingly rested on the Swedish side, even more so than was typical under peacetime conditions. The primary motive behind English skippers deciding to undertake the hazardous journey across the North Sea was to acquire vital shipbuilding materials. English imports into Gothenburg only totalled a value of 3,384 riksdaler which was a significant contraction from five years earlier and just 2.16% of the value of outgoing goods shipped to England.112 The ten English ships that arrived in Gothenburg over the course of August departed just a few short weeks later in September to make their return voyage for Harwich, the location of the Royal Navy shipyards. Indeed, the majority of England’s exports for this year were directly destined for Harwich. Over 53% of exports went to Harwich, while London was responsible for 35%, and Hull absorbed the remaining 11% of England’s export trade from Gothenburg.113

109 Jones, J. R., The Anglo-​Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century, p. 26; Rommelse, The Second Anglo-​Dutch War, pp. 119, 152; Hattendorf, John B., ‘Competing navies: Anglo-​Dutch naval rivalry, 1652–​88’, in Ormrod, David and Gijs Rommelse (eds.), War, Trade and the State: Anglo-​Dutch conflict, 1652–​89, pp. 107–​108. 110 gla, gca, Vol. 844. 1665. Hamburg was the second most voluminous destination for exports at 111,254 riksdaler, while French trade had swelled considerably to 109,319, increasing from 17,463 in 1655. 111 Rommelse, The Second Anglo-​Dutch War, p. 152. 112 gla, gca, Vol. 844. 1665. 113 gla, gca, Vol. 844. 1665.

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The mobilisation of English merchants and shippers to acquire shipbuilding goods can be seen in the appearance and dominance of English shipbuilder cum merchant Francis Sheldon in 1665. Sheldon initially arrived in Sweden some years earlier. At the outbreak of war Sheldon was actually in the employ of the Swedish Crown as a master shipbuilder at the Masthugget shipyard on the southern banks of the Göta älv. English sources reveal Sheldon’s commercial connection to the London-​based timber magnate Sir William Warren towards the later 1660s.114 Additional consultation of Swedish sources has revealed that by 1665 Sheldon was already utilising his expert knowledge on what necessary shipbuilding materials were needed for the English. His role and the access afforded him as a master shipbuilder in Sweden facilitated his activities as a commercial buyer for contacts in England, potentially even directly for the Royal Navy. Francis Sheldon assumed around a 50% share of the total goods that were dispatched to England during 1665. This was equivalent to a total value of 77,884 riksdaler and spread across a total of nine sailings. Another British merchant, William Hardistie was responsible for supplying goods to the value of 34,171 riksdaler. Both Sheldon and Hardistie dealt in all the major Swedish export commodities.115 The explanation for Sheldon’s rise as central exporter to England in tandem with the disappearance of a number of previously active English merchants from the Gothenburg customs accounts could also be rooted in the financial constraints suffered by the English Navy Board. Already by autumn 1665 it appeared that the course of the war was turning against the English. It was proving difficult to secure funds to fit out the fleet for the campaign the following year. When Parliament convened in October 1665 in Oxford due to plague in London, Charles ii was intent on acquiring additional funding for the original £2.5 million that was initially levied. Ultimately Charles was successful in amassing an additional £1.25 million of funds, but problems of supply were already becoming apparent. Many merchants were refusing to supply the Navy Board with goods due to the failure of official channels to allocate payment for their services.116 Whether the additional funds set out by Parliament fuelled England’s later stage autumnal trade with Gothenburg has not been definitively shown. By 1666 funding issues were once again rearing their head. Charles had to borrow £50,000 to cover dues to the East India Company and

114 Grimshaw, ‘Aspects of “British” Migration” to Sweden in the 17th Century’, in Naum and Ekengren (eds.), Facing Otherness in Early Modern Sweden, p. 180. 115 gla, gca, Vol. 844. 1665. ssne entry: “Hardistie, William” [7257]. 116 Rommelse, The Second Anglo-​Dutch War, p. 154.

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other merchants who were levying higher fees following the Navy Board’s move to purchasing on credit.117 There is no doubt that the majority of England’s Gothenburg trade in late 1665 was earmarked for naval enterprises but problems of securing viable funding to fit out the fleet may have pushed the Navy Board to turn to previously unutilised suppliers such as Sheldon. Sheldon’s unique position in Sweden probably enabled him to secure more favourable credit terms than other English merchants who had hitherto been involved in supplying the Navy Board from Sweden. Sheldon and Hardistie were vital in ensuring that supplies of iron and other goods helped fuel England’s war drive. Their involvement demonstrates the connection between official channels within the Royal Navy in England and British commercial networks that were in place in Swedish ports. The appearance of Sheldon in facilitating the supply of naval goods from his position as a senior shipbuilder in the Swedish navy reveals the duality of roles and allegiances such individuals sometimes held, lending them an advantageous position outside of their home country. There was a considerable decline in England’s trade with Stockholm during the initial year of the Second Dutch War. The number of active English and British merchants in the iron trade dwindled considerably, as had the number of skippers departing Stockholm’s harbour. However, a semblance of an English commercial presence is still discernible in the Swedish capital, demonstrating the durability of Anglo-​Swedish commercial connections by this juncture. Established English merchants, such as George Shuttleworth, John Mitford, David Walker, Joseph and William Sykes, Thomas Cutler, and John Weatherall, were all still active in the Stockholm market place in the purchasing of iron for the English market.118 Despite the aforementioned difficulties the English had two factors working in their favour when it came to conducting commerce in Stockholm during the war. Despite temptations from rival powers, Sweden had remained neutral. Furthermore, England and Sweden’s relationship was significantly stronger than it had been during the First Dutch War just over a decade earlier. The establishment of active diplomatic treaties, ongoing diplomatic discourse and England’s standing as a primary trading partner all came to positively impact their commercial relationship. Regardless of these obstacles, by the following year England was once again conducting a considerable trade with Stockholm. Exports of iron had increased

1 17 Ibid. 118 sra, swb, Vol. 17. 1665.

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by some 16,000 ssp from a year earlier but were still below their equivalent 1660 value. However, the export trade with England was still worth over double its peak rate of 1655 at 331,009 riksdaler.119 Likewise Stockholm’s overall trade had decreased from around 2.4 million riksdaler to just below 2 million riksdaler, demonstrating the enduring impact of war on Swedish trade in general.120 Given the circumstances, the export trade to England had proved remarkably resilient, maintaining a relatively stable 16.70% share of Stockholm’s overall trade value. The market share of goods exported to England decreased by just 2% in comparison to peacetime figures from 1660. By 1666 a greater commercial familiarity between the two nations had been bolstered by codified commercial agreements. It ensured not only the continuance of active trade with Stockholm, but had consolidated England’s position as one of Sweden’s most stable and valuable commercial associates. Sweden’s primary motivation for remaining neutral in the war was its financial considerations, but no less self-​preservation. For the Swedes the war was a considerable source of revenue if supply lines could remain open. The continuance of trade was of considerable benefit to the country’s producers, merchants, shippers as well as the Crown gaining funds from customs revenue. Despite the resilience of the English commercial community just a year earlier, by 1666 those same merchants largely ceased trading in export commodities. They were replaced by native operators who belonged to the Stockholm burgess community. Likewise, Swedish shipping was able to benefit from neutrality. They became primary carriers in their own import and export trade which were vacated by the various merchant marines of England, the Dutch Republic and others who would have fallen prey to the exigencies of war. Swedish vessels recruited from all over the Swedish Empire were ubiquitous in Baltic, North Sea and even Atlantic shipping lanes during the trading season of 1666.121 This led to both Swedish shipping and the merchants of Stockholm being able to flourish virtually unencumbered by foreign competition.122 It was not just Swedish shipping that was playing a significant role in supplying England with much needed supplies to fight its second war with the

1 19 sra, swb, Vol. 15. 1660; Vol. 17. 1665. ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. 120 ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. 121 ssa, sca, Vol. 29.1666. This included ships from Swedish Pomeranian ports such as Greifswald, Stralsund and Wismar, as well as from farther afield such as Portugal, France, Bergen and Amsterdam. 122 Entries in the stro reveal that voyages made by Swedish ships during the course of 1666 were around double made during the year just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. stro search: home ports for Sweden and Finland: 1664–​1665, 1666–​1667.

159

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671 #

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

The Mommas

44,353

Iron, tar, pitch

Aachen/Dutch Republic

2

Adam Lyall

23,385

Iron

Scotland

3

Margaret Patillo

18,804

Iron, boards

Scotland

4

Isaac Bex

17,163

Iron

Liège

5

Abraham Kock

17,110

Iron, tar, copper

Liège/Sweden

6

James Semple

14,506

Iron, tar, pitch

Scotland

7

Thomas Anderson

12,385

Iron

Unkown

8

Claude Roquette

12,000

Brass wire

France

9

William Guthrie

11,843

Iron

Scotland

10

Daniel Young

10,777

Iron, tar, pitch

Scotland

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 3.10  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1666 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 29. 1666

Dutch Republic. The absence of the English from the Stockholm export trade afforded the Stockholm burgess community the chance to swiftly assume responsibility for exporting goods to England. Of the 50 strong merchant community engaged in trade to England, the only English merchant trading in 1666 was Gothenburg-​based Francis Sheldon.123 As Figure 3.10 shows, Scottish merchants once again came to play a considerable role in the English market after a brief hiatus. The Lyall family was represented by Adam, David and James, supplemented by James Semple, Daniel Young (ennobled Leijonancker in August of the same year), as well as William Guthrie, William Halliday, James Watson, Henry Davidson, and Margaret Pattillo (noted in the records simply as “Willam Strang’s widow”). This meant that the Scots were one of the most influential and distinctive groups supplying England with goods during the course of the Second Dutch War.124 It demonstrates the resilience of a group of commercially-​involved individuals 123 Sheldon’s trade was slight, exporting just three lasts of tar and some timber in late October. ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. 124 ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. For biographies of each exporter visit ssne: “Davidson, Henrik” [6342], “Guthrie, William” [798], “Halliday, William” [787], “Lyall, Adam” [6493], “Lyall, David” [824], “Lyall, James” [4936], “Pattillo, Margaret” [6495], “Semple, James” [6345], “Young, Daniel” [4206], “Watson, Jacob” [7426].

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who held long and enduring ties to the English market. These merchants had never relinquished their interest in trade with England but had either chosen to focus their business elsewhere or were pushed out of the market by a large and capital-​rich English mercantile community. Other merchants of significance were Isaac Bex, Abraham Kock (ennobled Cronström) and French Calvinist emigré Claude Roquette (ennobled Hägerstierna), who were all major players in Stockholm’s mercantile community. This was attested to by the fact that the latter two were ennobled by the Swedish Crown. Bex, Kock, and Roquette were all instrumental in exporting iron and copper to the English market and were among the top ten exporters that year.125 It was, however, a merchant firm with only tenuous, prior connections to the English market that shipped the largest amount of goods to England during 1666. The Momma firm, comprised of sons of Aachen industrialists who had immigrated to Sweden in the 1640s, had grown to hold significant interests in the production and exportation of some of Sweden’s most vital commodities. While evidence of their connections to English-​based traders has been uncovered, the Mommas had mostly focused their commercial efforts outside of England up until this point.126 The absence of a significant portion of the English community in Stockholm allowed the Mommas to step in and assume direct responsibility for exporting goods. At a total of 44,353 riksdaler the Mommas played a considerable role in the iron trade, but they were also the top exporters of pitch and tar to England in 1666. So large was their export of tar and pitch that they superseded the Swedish Tar Company in terms of the amount and value they exported. This is surprising given the Tar Company held a monopoly over the export of tar and pitch. The Momma firm exported 5,205 riksdaler worth of tar, equivalent to just over 2,000 barrels, more than double that of the Tar Company. Their pitch exports, valued at 8,976 riksdaler, were equivalent to around 1,600 barrels and were over five times the total value of pitch exported by the Tar Company to England.127 125 For more on Roquette and the Huguenot mercantile community in Stockholm see: Bedoire, Fredric, Hugenotternas värld: från religionskrigens Frankrike till skeppsbroadelns Stockholm, Stockholm, Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2009, pp. 157–​181. 126 Evidence of their role as wholesalers in supplying London-​based merchant Charles Marescoe has already been discussed in Chapter 2. Müller provides the most wide-​ reaching study on the activities of the Momma-​Reenstierna firm. Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm. Further work on their activities can be found in Grimshaw, Adam, ‘The Momma-​Reenstiernas Revisited: The family’s trade through the lens of the Stockholm customs accounts’ in Hellman, Lisa, Hanna Hodacs, Aryo Makko and Steve Murdoch (eds.), Connected Oceans, Lund, Universus Academic Press, 2022, pp. 17–​35. 127 ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. Two of the Momma brothers, Jacob and Abraham were ennobled in Sweden with the title “Reenstierna”.

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161

Despite a number of seemingly insurmountable obstacles England was able to keep its supply lines to the Swedish capital alive and functioning in spite of the closure of the Sound to English shipping. Various segments of the Stockholm merchant community were more than willing and capable of assuming the role formerly taken by English merchants who had relinquished their grip on the export market. Furthermore, Swedish shipping, some in semi-​official capacities, such as those ships hired by the Västervik Shipping Company and other senior Swedish officials, directly participated in the export of Swedish goods to England. Despite the consensus among current scholarship, the supply lines of export goods from Sweden were very much alive and well at this juncture in both Gothenburg and Stockholm. A variety of operators on the ground in Sweden continued to work tirelessly to supply English harbours with a considerable amount of goods throughout the course of the Second Dutch War. Direct trading from major Swedish ports to England actually surpassed that of England’s main maritime rivals.128 Far from being dealt a hammer blow, English commercial interests in Sweden were resolute, with England rising to become Sweden’s main commercial partner by the mid-​1660s. This was true in both of Sweden’s primary ports in the Baltic and in the North Sea. England and Sweden’s commercial accord as well as the level of association its markets had undergone over the previous decade helped to ensure that a throttling of its trade to the Baltic had been overcome. This came in stark contrast to the experience of the First Dutch War and was primarily owing to England’s commercial standing with Sweden as well as the extant networks of merchants who were eager to facilitate Anglo-​ Swedish trade which were now firmly held in place. 4

Sweden Emerges Unchallenged

Anglo-​Swedish commerce weathered the storm and a return to peacetime conditions ushered in a process that saw greater levels of commercial interaction with Swedish and Swedish-​controlled ports through the Baltic. Figure 3.11 shows that Sweden became the dominant supplier of goods from the Baltic to the English market by 1670. Of the 194 ships that departed the

128 Shortages in shipbuilding supplies have been cited as occurring already by early 1666. How far Sweden’s ability to supply a sufficient number of goods to equip England’s naval forces lies outside the scope of this study. Current conclusions mask the level of trade occurring between the two nations during the war. Hattendorf, John B., ‘Competing navies: Anglo-​Dutch naval rivalry, 1652–​88’, p. 108.

162  Other Baltic ports 8.2% Swedish Estonia 0.5% Swedish Pomerania 1.0%

Chapter 3

Stockholm 22.7%

Vyborg 2.1% Narva 3.1% Other Swedish ports 13.9%

Danzig 16.5%

Königsberg 15.5% Riga 16.5%

­f igure 3.11  Points of origin exiting the Baltic in Anglo-​Baltic trade, 1670 sources: STRO search, The Baltic to England, 1670–1671

Baltic for England, the majority originated in ports across the Swedish Empire with Sweden proper, above all Stockholm, the most prevalent port of origin. Stockholm was the largest point of departure with 44 voyages, followed by Riga and Danzig jointly at 32, while Königsberg recorded a total 30 voyages to England. Further sailings from the Swedish Baltic, included a single journey from Reval, four from Vyborg and six from Narva. Stettin was the only port in which a departure was registered from Swedish Pomerania.129 It is also possible to glimpse how the domestic Swedish export market was geographically distributed in regards to English trade. Karlshamn on the southern Swedish coast was the second largest domestic Baltic port in Sweden proper, closely followed by Norrköping, Kalmar, Sölvesborg, Visby on the Swedish island of Gotland, and Malmö on the eastern banks of the Sound. A total of 27 voyages were made from domestic Swedish ports excluding Stockholm. Stockholm’s dominance as Sweden’s primary export harbour is clear to see.130 Not only was Stockholm the single largest port in Anglo-​Swedish trade but also in the entirety of Anglo-​ Baltic trade. Departures from domestic ports in Sweden totalled 71 voyages, more than those that departed Danzig and Königsberg combined, the two largest ports outside of Swedish control in the Baltic. Ports outside Sweden

1 29 stro search: The Baltic to England, 1670–​1671. 130 stro search: Sweden and Finland to England, 1670–​1671.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

163

proper were also well represented with 45 total ships. Combining domestic ports and voyages made from the Swedish Empire demonstrates just how dominant Sweden had become in regards to England’s Baltic trade. Of the 194 ships that journeyed to England, 116 departed Swedish-​controlled ports, which was well over half of England’s total Baltic trade.131 It is clear to see that by 1670 a longer term shift had occurred in the focus of England’s Baltic trade towards Swedish ports across the Baltic which saw previous centres of commerce, such as Danzig, marginalised. Due to exemptions secured in the Treaty of Copenhagen (1660), Swedish ships departing and entering the Baltic at the Sound were exempt from Danish customs inspection. The cargo of Swedish ships was not recorded in the Sound Toll accounts, rendering it impossible to come to a true appraisal of Swedish trade in the wider Baltic. However, it is possible to glimpse the types of goods which were being exported from various Swedish ports and carried in English ships. The majority of English ships departing provincial ports on the eastern and southern coasts of Sweden mainly appear to have focused on the export of timber. Timber products were often supplemented by small amounts of pitch, tar or iron.132 Norrköping appears to be the only Swedish port that was active in the export of a considerable value of iron and copper goods outside of Stockholm itself. English skippers such as Abraham Redhead of Newcastle exported a variety of brass goods, wrought iron, tar and timber from Norrköping in the summer of 1670.133 Cross referencing contemporary commercial sources shows that Norrköping had strong connections to Stockholm. A number of ships that had departed Stockholm were registered as having their home ports in Norrköping. At least three of six ships that left Norrköping are listed as having previously departed Stockholm.134 English ships departing Riga were almost exclusively bound for London in all but three cases, with one voyage apiece recorded headed to Yarmouth, Hull and Newcastle. The main commodities exported to England from Riga were flax and hemp, although it is hard to come to a precise tally as the two are often grouped together and listed as one commodity. In total non-​Swedish ships conveyed 4,618 Danish ship pounds (dsp) of flax and hemp combined, 1,431 dsp of flax as an individual commodity, and 130 dsp of hemp.135 A considerable amount 1 31 132 133 134 135

stro search: The Baltic to England, 1670–​1671. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England, 1670–​1671. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England, 1670–​1671. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England, 1670–​1671; ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670. stro search: Livonia to England, 1670–​1670; At 159 kilograms a Danish ship pound was slightly heavier than a Swedish ship pound weighted at export harbours (ssp). The

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of timber was shipped to England from Riga as well as potash. The amount and weight of timber were often unspecified but included oars, pipestaves, as well as masts. Riga was therefore the primary port in Swedish trade for flax, hemp and potash exports by some margin, and one of the main export ports to source masts alongside Gothenburg. Narva also specialised in exporting flax, hemp, tar and potash although to a considerably lesser degree than Riga.136 Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the contribution of other Swedish ports such as Reval, Vyborg or Stettin because cargoes were not recorded as the ships engaged in this trade were Swedish. Therefore it is possible to reveal just how commanding the Swedish trade area had become by 1670. Domestic ports such as Stockholm, Gothenburg and even Norrköping were ready to furnish metalworks and timber goods such as pitch and tar, and wooden products, while ports in the wider Swedish Empire supplemented domestic ports with a further variety of shipbuilding commodities such as potash, hemp and flax. Danzig and Königsberg were the Swedish trade area’s nearest rivals but both presented little direct competition for the goods that Sweden was exporting to western markets. In 1670, Danzig’s own export market was varied. However, the only goods that overlapped with the Swedish market were potash, timber products, as well as a small amount of iron and steel. England’s interest in Danzig by this point seems largely to have been for exports of Polish linens and amber among other goods of non-​shipbuilding value. Königsberg’s export market was much more specialised in that it was geared to exporting a considerable amount of timber, flax and hemp. It could be argued therefore that Königsberg was the single instance where its export trade overlapped Swedish interests in that it presented itself as a rival in the Baltic at this juncture, particularly in the case of Riga.137 The Swedish iron trade between Stockholm and England had surged during the 1660s and by 1670 registered the largest export of iron hitherto. Stockholm’s total export of iron had declined by approximately 30,000 ssp from a decade earlier.138 This partially accounts for the dip seen in Stockholm’s overall

Swedish equivalent was 136kg. See Weights and Measurements crib sheet compiled by stro available from [http://​www​.soundt​oll​.nl​/index​.php​/en​/]​. Accessed March 2020. A full list of Swedish measurements used during this period can be found in Carlsson, Albert W., Med mått mätt: svenska och utländska mått genom tiderna, Stockholm, 1989. Specifically p. 58. 136 Exports of flax and hemp were less than a quarter of that exported from Riga. stro search: Narva to England, 1670–​1671. 1 37 stro search: The Baltic to England, 1670–​1671. 138 sra, swb, Vol. 15. 1660; Vol. 19. 1670.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

165

export value from around 2.4 million riksdaler in 1660 to 1.9 million riksdaler in 1670.139 Despite this shortfall in production, England’s own trade was not adversely affected. On the contrary, overall exports to England during 1670 represented a new peak at a value of 494,620 riksdaler. This was almost a 150% increase on the total value of goods exported to England during 1666, and an increase of around 50,000 riksdaler on the previous peak year of 1660, when trade had reached 444,665 riksdaler in value. England ranked only second to the resurgence of the Dutch Republic in terms of Stockholm’s overall share of exports. England’s share of the town’s export market had actually increased by over 7% from ten years earlier, demonstrating England’s growing importance as an export market from Stockholm.140 Iron once again registered as the largest commodity exported to England. As can be seen from Figure 3.12, iron now equated to over 78% of the total value of exports to England. Exports of iron to the English market now increased to 39,002 ssp, which was over 10,000 ssp more than the previous peak year ten years earlier. The value of iron exported from Stockholm in 1670 was worth 386,716 riksdaler, equivalent to 32% of total exports. Iron exported to England alone comprised 20% of Stockholm’s overall trade by value. Copper, pitch and tar were the remaining export goods of note. By 1670 copper had risen to become the second most valuable commodity exported to the English market and had increased by around 45,000 riksdaler in value from 1660 to a total worth of 55,428 riksdaler. In contrast, the amount of tar and pitch exported from Stockholm to England in 1670 had receded quite considerably.141 Copper was exported in a number of varieties, including brass wire, raw, unworked copper, and even copper plates, kettles and pans. Varieties of copper exported amounted to a combined weight of around just 828 ssp. However, at a value of 87 riksdaler per ssp, copper held a considerably higher value per ssp than the equivalent for iron. The amount of pitch and tar being exported was still considerable, at almost over 5,000 barrels of pitch and almost 9,000 barrels of tar, worth 28,004 riksdaler and 22,561 riksdaler respectively. Stockholm was still the main port for English supplies of pitch and tar, but the value and amount exported in 1670 had lessened considerably since 1660, roughly by around two-​thirds its previous value.142 1 39 ssa, sca. Vol. 21. 1660; Vol. 32. 1670. 140 The former adversaries held a similar share of the export market with exports to the Dutch Republic equating to 25.98% of the market and England’s own share valued at 25.92%. ssa, sca. Vol. 32. 1670. 141 ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670. 142 ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670.

166  Tar 4.6%

Chapter 3

Pitch 5.7%

Copper 11.2%

Iron 78.2%

­f igure 3.12  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1670 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 32. 1670

The size of the mercantile community that was now active in the Stockholm export market remained consistently large in order to meet the increased demand for Swedish goods in England. Repeat exporters now numbered over sixty individuals. The return of English merchants and agents since the exodus during the Second Dutch War was a marked feature of the 1670 trading season with the British export community in Stockholm numbering over thirty individuals. English exporters alone were responsible for shipping around 47% of the overall value of goods from Stockholm. Demonstrated by Figure 3.13, of the top ten exporters to the English market in the town in 1670 six individuals were English and one Scottish.143 However, English merchants active in Stockholm found they would have to learn to cede a larger percentage of their trade. Local merchants who assumed trade during the Second Dutch War were understandably reluctant to relinquish their share of a valuable export trade. A marked difference from ten years earlier was the less dominant share of trade assumed by the leading exporters.144 A larger amount of overall trade trickled down throughout the pyramid, with a number of English merchants

1 43 ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670. 144 Leading exports in 1670 typically handled around 30,000 riksdaler worth of goods less than their equivalents from ten years earlier. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660; Vol. 32. 1670.

167

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671 #

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

William Cooper

58,405

Iron, pitch, brass wire

England

2

Abraham Wolters

55,189

Copper, brass wire

Hamburg

3

Adam Lyall

30,215

Wrought iron

Scotland

4

Tar Company

28,985

Tar, pitch

Various

5

John Eden

19,729

Iron

England

6

William Smith

13,279

Iron, timber

England or Scotland

7

Isaac Bex

13,006

Iron

Liège

8

Urban Hall

11,806

Iron, pitch, tar, copper

England

9

John Strother

10,318

Iron, timber

England (Newcastle)

10

William Hyde

9412

Iron

England

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 3.13  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1670 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 32. 1670

such as Samuel Sowton, Isaac Chesire, Joshua Olly, John Green, Thomas Hutton, Thomas Friar and George Shuttleworth all registering export accounts in the region of 10,000 riksdaler.145 It demonstrates that not only was Swedish trade expanding but it was becoming more accessible to English merchants of more modest means. This was likely in order to serve the sheer necessity in demand. The enlarged role of the Stockholm burgess community in the export market was not the only developing feature of Stockholm’s ongoing trade with England. Since Swedish shipping had come to the rescue of the English after the closure of the Sound during the Second Dutch War, Swedish freighters continued to play a more marked role in Anglo-​Swedish trade than ever before. Of the 47 ships that departed Stockholm for England during the 1670 trading season, a total of 37 were Swedish ships. Swedish freighters were solely responsible for conveying goods to English harbours during the early stages of the trading season with the first English trading ship only departing in the second week of June.146

1 45 ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660; Vol. 32. 1670. 146 ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670.

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Swedish-​based merchants, as well as Swedish ships had proven themselves more than willing (and capable) of assuming a senior role in the export trade to England. As can be seen in Figure 3.14, Stockholm was the most common home port of Swedish ships active in English trade with a total of fourteen ships. However, a number of vessels exporting from Stockholm in 1670 had their home ports in a number of ports across the Swedish Empire. Freighters who originated in Swedish Pomerania, in particular, played a considerable role in shipping goods between Stockholm and England. Merchants’ ships from Stralsund and Wismar were responsible for making a total of ten voyages to England, which was equivalent in number to the total number of English ships involved in the export trade from Stockholm to England. Gothenburg, Kalmar, Norrköping and Marstrand all contributed a single vessel, meaning that Sweden proper fielded the largest number of ships in the freight trade between Stockholm and England in 1670.147 The extensive territory of the Swedish Empire allowed for Sweden to acquire a near monopoly status over a variety of Baltic goods. Controlling a variety of ports across the Baltic provided Sweden with the ability to utilise a larger base of shipping for its export markets, particularly in relation to English trade. This is one facet of Anglo-​Swedish trade during this period which has hitherto gone unremarked in previous scholarship. It became particularly significant in adhering to English commercial policy. The English Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 stipulated that foreign goods could only be imported into England either by English ships or by those from the country of origin. Therefore it was particularly advantageous for Sweden to utilise ships from across its empire to move vast quantities of goods produced in the mining regions of central Sweden to the tar producing centres of Finland. Stockholm acted as a central entrepôt for intra-​Baltic trade between various ports in the Swedish Empire since the 1650s. With a ready supply of shipbuilding goods flooding into Stockholm from all corners of the Swedish Empire, the next step for the Swedes was to employ native shipping to maximum effect. Even if those goods were produced in Sweden proper and freighted on ships from Swedish Pomerania they still fell in line with contemporary English commercial legislation.148 Even at a purely superficial level this loophole in the English legislation in regards to ships originating in Swedish territory allowed Swedish shipping a distinctive numerical advantage. 1 47 ssa, sca. Vol. 32. 1670. 148 There was an exponential increase in intra-​Baltic traffic with Stockholm, particularly from Swedish Estonia, Swedish Livonia and Swedish Pomerania. ssa, sca, Vol. 16.1650; Vol. 21. 1655; Vol. 27. 1660; Vol. 29. 1666: Vol. 32, 1670.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

Stockholm

196,410

Unspec. Swedish

106,423

Stralsund

55,492

England

46,934

Landskrona

27,187

Home Port

Wismar

30,871 11,945 Marstrand

­f igure 3.14  Home ports of freighters responsible for conveying goods from Stockholm to England, 1670 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 32. 1670

Collective Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

200,000

Kalmar

9725

2193 Gothenburg Norrköping

7440

newgenrtpdf

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

169

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The effects of the Second Dutch War were, then, still being felt years after its conclusion, particularly in the organisation of and the impetus driving Anglo-​ Swedish trade. Codified commercial ties and the familiarity of mercantile networks had provided for the continuance of trade but the war itself had dislocated some English traders and shippers from active participation. The entry of local Swedish traders and the thrust of Swedish shipping to meet England during the mid-​1660s continued into 1670 thus altering the prevailing state of Anglo-​Swedish trade well into peacetime. England’s import trade into Sweden had suffered considerably during the Second Dutch War. In 1660 imports that came into Stockholm from England were at a peak value of 271,833 riksdaler.149 Due to the closure of the Sound, domestic strife caused by plague, and war with the Dutch Republic, English imports into Stockholm during 1666 receded by 96% from 1660. Ships departing Swedish harbours for England were largely making their outbound voyages and returning with cargoes from elsewhere. Although some English merchants were actively importing goods into Stockholm, their trade was slight and largely not focused on English imports.150 Likewise in Gothenburg, English imports were heavily hit over the course of the 1660s. From a peak import figure of 30,148 riksdaler in 1660, to just a fraction of that in 1665 at 3,384 riksdaler. Many ships arrived late in the season in ballast, with the sole intention of acquiring goods before the trading season drew to a close. Unfortunately for English domestic production the balance of trade continued to remain largely in the favour of Swedish exports. More than half of the ships recorded arrived in ballast. The total value of English imports was 13,794 riksdaler, just 3.51% of the total import value for Gothenburg as a whole. The majority of England’s trade centred largely on domestically produced textiles, such as kerseys and dozens, as well as staple foodstuffs, such as malt, hops and beer, with some imports of salt and Spanish wine.151 England’s import trade into Stockholm fared considerably better with the return to peacetime. From a value of just 9,250 riksdaler during 1666, imports rose exponentially to 194,420 riksdaler in 1670. Although imports from England had recovered considerably they were still trailing their previous peak value by

149 This figure takes into consideration imports arriving directly from England and excludes goods imported by English freighters from third-​party harbours. 150 George Shuttleworth, Benjamin Ayloff, Henry Dickinson, Samuel Sowton and Thomas Mitford all appear in the Stockholm customs records but imported goods from across the Swedish Empire, Amsterdam and Danzig among other ports of origin. ssa, sca, Vol. 29. 1666. 151 gla, gca, Vol. 844. 1665.

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around 77,000 riksdaler from ten years earlier. In contrast to before, by 1670 textiles had become the predominant import commodity. As shown in Figure 3.15 textiles now accounted for over 78% of the total market share of imports arriving from England. In comparison to 1660 this represented an increase in value from 95,435 riksdaler to 152,037 riksdaler in 1670. Raw cloth, clothes and varieties of additional textiles had long been a staple of English imports into the Baltic but had hitherto failed to penetrate the Swedish market. By 1670 imports of textiles vastly outstripped any other commodity imported into Stockholm from England. Imports of dozens alone were worth around 40% of the total value of English imports into Stockholm for the year at around a value of 78,614 riksdaler. Dozens were ubiquitous and were included in most cargoes that came from England. The import value of dozens was followed by kerseys, which were imported to roughly half the value of their counterpart at around 37,678 riksdaler. This in itself made the total import value of kerseys equivalent to around 20% of total English exports.152 The second most valuable commodity into Stockholm from England was cash itself. Hard currency was imported into Stockholm from England in over 57 instances during the trading season to the value of approximately 8,500 riksdaler. The majority of instances where cash was involved were as a complement to large shipments of goods. This could have been used by English merchants on the ground in Sweden as a means to balance between import and export deficits, or even as a method to manage in-​port expenses. Skippers and crew members of ships imported currency into Sweden with regularity, likely as a way to fund their own export trade or the purchasing of goods while in port. However, it is also possible to discern larger sums of cash imported by Swedish merchants and commercial organisations. For example, the Swedish Sugar Company (Svenska sockerkompaniet) imported 850 riksdaler worth of cash aboard Steffan Stenort’s Swedish ship in July 1670. Similarly, Tyresö Glove Factory imported 300 riksdaler worth of cash in October 1670 on Lionel Ripley’s English ship arriving from Hull. A number of locally-​based Stockholm merchants also frequently imported currency. Stockholm-​Scot Alexander Waddell repeatedly imported currency in 1670 approximately during the same period in which he was struggling financially.153 It was not uncommon to see other Stockholm citizens importing coin from England, whether they were members of the burgess community such as Scotsman David Fife, Swedish merchant

1 52 ssa, sca, Vol. 1670. 153 For more on Alexander Waddell’s exploits in Scandinavia and the Baltic see ssne entry: “Wadell, Alexander” [835] and Murdoch, Steve, Network North, pp. 156, 163–​164.

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Misc goods 7.2% Tin 2.2% Lead 2.4% Coal 2.5% Foodstuffs 3.2% Cash 4.3%

Textiles 78.2%

­f igure 3.15  Composition of imports from England to Stockholm, 1670 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 32. 1670

Thomas Perman, or even master shipbuilder Francis Sheldon, resettled to the Swedish capital in the later 1660s.154 Other English imports of note included mined goods such as tin, coal and lead, the latter encompassing imports of a number of lead bullets. In each instance these commodities represented a value which equated to roughly 2% of the total import value of English imports equating to around 4–​5,000 riksdaler apiece. Lead was imported from Newcastle, London and Hull, while tin was exclusively imported from London. Coal was much cheaper per pound and was imported in considerably larger amounts than tin and lead. Imports of coal mostly originated in Newcastle but are also present in consignments arriving from London. A not inconsiderable amount of coal was sourced and imported directly by Nacka and Vällinge brassworks, demonstrating that English imports were directly sought after to fuel production for key Swedish exports such as brass.155 Imports from England were handled by a much smaller group of merchants. As can be seen from Figure 3.16 all top ten importers of goods arriving from England were of British origin. The majority of merchants involved in the import trade from England also had a considerable stake in the Swedish

1 54 ssa, sca, Vol. 1670. 155 ssa, sca, Vol. 1670.

173

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671 #

Merchant

Value*

Commodity

Origin

Value of export trade

1

William Cooper

25,986

Textiles

England

58,405

2

Adam Lyall

24,848

Scotland

30,215

3

Simon Storie

23,156

England/Scotland

5585

4

James Mann

20,762

Textiles, cash

England

623

5

George Shuttleworth

15,713

Textiles, fish, lead, cash

England

6056

6

William Smith

13,907

Textiles, cash

England/Scotland

13,279

7

Isaac Cheshire

10,955

Textiles, cash

England

4818

8

Thomas Friar

6895

Textiles

England

8097

9

William Hayes

6352

Textiles

England

9412

10

George Crowley

6140

Textiles

England

9372

Textiles, chalk, tin, cheese, Spanish wine Textiles, tin, cheese, Spanish wine

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 3.16  Top importers from England into Stockholm, 1670 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 32. 1670

export trade. William Cooper, for example, was the leading merchant in both the import and export market with England in Stockholm. However, many of the top English importers conveyed goods worth considerably more in value than they exported during the same trading season. For example, George Shuttleworth imported a variety of textiles to the value of 15,713 riksdaler, while his export trade was only worth 6,056 riksdaler. Similarly Simon Storie, with an import trade valued at 23,156 riksdaler, only had an export account value of 5,585 riksdaler.156 While the majority of Anglo-​Swedish trade was focused on the export of Swedish goods, many English merchants were advancing the trade in domestic English goods. Previous research that touches on Anglo-​ Swedish trade has failed to highlight this significant aspect of commercial relations between England and Sweden in this period. The English import trade into Sweden was more adversely affected by the onset of armed conflict than the Swedish export trade. The balance of trade 156 ssa, sca, Vol. 1670. ssne entries: “Shuttleworth, George” [1438]; “Storie, Simon” [7425].

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lay with Swedish export commodities which held a significantly higher strategic value. This warranted the realignment of existing organisational structures in order to facilitate a continuance of trade when English traders were rendered unable to participate. As Swedish traders gained control of trade English imports suffered considerably. Thus the stimulus for driving the import of goods from England into Sweden was undertaken by English merchants. In 1670, the majority of importers were of British extraction and had successfully reoriented to push forward imports of domestic goods which had previously only played a secondary role. This breakthrough was of considerable value to English domestic industry and the absence of their goods in returning cargoes can point towards their success, particularly in regard to textiles. 5

Commercial Policy and the Demise of the Eastland Monopoly

The establishment of a new Council of Trade under Charles ii and the continued activity of the Swedish Board of Trade provided the official driving force in regulating and promoting their nations’ respective commercial wellbeing. The only active commercial diplomacy that appears to have been undertaken with any vigour, however, was on the part of Sweden. The diplomatic correspondence of Swedish Resident Johan Leijonberg, in particular, shows that he was working extensively towards commercial ends from his base in London.157 The reintroduction of the Navigation Act in 1660, along with the establishment of the Council of Trade, was the underpinning legislation that directed England’s trade. The Navigation Act of 1660, a more practical improvement on its predecessor, was introduced almost immediately with the newly instated royal regime. Over the course of the 1660s, the act and its amendments strengthened England’s ability to utilise its own commercial markets through the regulation of re-​exports. The Navigation Act of 1660 applied the regulation that exports from British colonies had to first pass through Britain before being exported to a foreign port. The Navigation Act of 1663 applied this feature in reverse, whereby foreign goods had to pass through British ports before they could be re-​exported to British colonies.158 The Navigation Act of 1660 prescribed the terms under which Anglo-​ Swedish trade took place, although there was another interest group who 1 57 Johan Leijonberg’s correspondence can be found in the sra, da, Vols. 17–​21, 36–​115. 158 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 95. For a fuller treatise of the English Navigation Acts and Baltic trade see: Åström, Sven-​Erik, ‘The English Navigation Laws and the Baltic Trade, 1660–​1700’ in Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 8.1, 1960, pp. 3–​18.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

175

was vying for the opportunity to regulate trade with Sweden. The Eastland Company had been the official body empowered under royal authority to oversee and direct trade to the Baltic and Scandinavia in the first half of the century. They were disenfranchised under the rule of Cromwell and the Commonwealth, and sought their chance for reinstatement under the new regime of Charles ii. The company submitted their first petition to the newly appointed Council of Trade on 13 November 1660.159 The petition requested the backing of royal authority in order for the company to enforce their privileges to direct, regulate and oversee trade to the Baltic and Scandinavia. Their precise position at this point is unclear. It seems that Charles had given them ‘confirmation’ of their charter but they wanted to ‘add furtherance and expedition’. It is possible that Charles had granted them permission to exist and to act as an organised body of merchants, but had not extended to the company the sole right to oversee English trade in northern Europe. Monopoly over trade was an essential prerequisite for the company. Without the reinstatement of its monopoly, other merchants who were not members of the Eastland Company could still participate in Swedish trade and there was nothing the organisation could do to prevent it. In turn, the company would not have the right to exact any additional tolls on trade to justify the financial basis of their existence. The company emphasised their ability to organise trade in such a way as to maximise the export of cloth and the import of coin.160 They reiterated their ability to import naval goods, an argument that dated back to their failed petition of 1655. This argument was a reaction to changing commercial conditions in Anglo-​Baltic trade.161 In truth, the company had never overseen the import of naval commodities on any considerable scale. The commercial shift that led to England’s increased desire for naval goods had occurred during the 1640s and 1650s. This had been a period when the Eastland Company had not only been disenfranchised, but also a point when commerce had shifted to the Swedish trade area where they held little to no authority. The company stated that over the preceding period, English shipping had suffered as a result of their charter either being ignored during the civil wars or cast aside during the Commonwealth. This in turn rendered them without authority to act and remedy the situation. This statement in itself is interesting because it directly clashes with the intention of the Navigation Act of 1651,

1 59 tna, co 388/​1, Eastland Company petition to the Council of Trade, 13 November 1660. 160 Ibid. 161 Hinton, The Eastland Company, p. 96.

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which was given credence in its very renewal in 1660. However, the company’s main complaint was against the ‘intension and unrestrained trading of foreigners & interlopers’. They blamed these groups for ‘debasing English manufactures consequently diminishing their vent abroad’ and in ‘augmenting the Price of foreign commodities both there & here’.162 The company then charted its troubles geographically, stating the problems that had arisen in each distinct area because of the wavering of its authority. In Denmark, they lauded the capabilities of their diplomatic and commercial commissioners who in turn had been funded and instructed by the company. They claimed it was their diplomats who had been able to remove some of the customs duties levied at the Sound, and that during their absence, the customs had been reinstated.163 In regard to Sweden, the company spoke of ‘exorbitantly high’ customs charged on Swedish goods exported in English ships. In contrast, those exported in Swedish ships had to pay lower customs, and were exempt from paying tolls at the Sound. They claimed that this was one of the features that had ruined English shipping.164 Furthermore, the Eastland Company touched on problems that had arisen because of Swedish commercial law, particularly in regard to the storage of foreign goods and goods ready for export. They stated that even after the relevant customs had been paid on goods, the English ‘are not masters of their owne Goods which are opened … and then carryed by their Officers to a Packhouse of their appointing & there detained’. The company also remarked on the injustices placed on English merchants in the Swedish Baltic provinces, where they were forced by local authorities to sell their goods at lower prices than they desired. They were also impeded when they either wanted to obtain storage to sell at a later opportunity, or prevented from shifting unsold goods to another port.165 The Eastland Company’s petition concluded by stating that with their authority restored to direct Baltic and Scandinavian trade, the ills they had described would be remedied. The company’s petition was answered by the Council of Trade on 20 November 1660 with the promise that it would be sent to the king.166 It seems that they never received any favourable response as

1 62 tna, co 388/​1, Eastland Company petition to the Council of Trade, 13 November 1660. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. The company specifically mentioned the injustices in the English salt trade in Swedish Livonia, most probably at Riga. 166 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 7–​8 Council of Trade response to the Eastland Company’s and Merchant Adventurers petitions of November 1660.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

177

a duplicate of the petition was resubmitted on 14 February 1661.167 Possibly in conjunction with this resubmission, the company also sought access to the king by appearing in front of the Privy Council on 6 March 1661. The company cited similar motivations, and the Privy Council stated that the company wished ‘(among other things) to hinder the tradeing of unfree men and to leavy moneyes on the Goods exported & imported to & from the parts of their Priviledges’.168 Their approach must have had an effect because by December 1661 the company’s privileges had been authorised in full, leading the company to submit a case against merchant Theodore Goodyeare to the Privy Council on 6 December. The company sought action against Goodyeare as he was not a member of the company and had been trading in Baltic commodities without their consent. Just weeks earlier Goodyeare would have avoided complications, but the case reveals that Charles ii had authorised their ‘patents granted by Queene Elizabeth & lately Confirmed by His Majestie whereby (amongst other things) all persons, not free of that Company, are prohibited to intermeddle in the Eastland Trade’. It appeared the Eastland Company had won its battle, and at least in principle, it held the right to enforce its privileges over English trade to the Baltic and Scandinavia.169 However, the legal foundation for the company to unconditionally enforce its will remained unclear even after royal authority had been granted. The company had intended to attack the liberty of foreigners and interlopers to trade with England in Baltic goods. In the case of the former, the Navigation Acts actually protected foreigners in their rights to trade with England, provided this trade was in their own country’s goods and in their own country’s ships. Swedish subjects actually had another layer of protection in the form of the Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1661. The matter came to a head in May 1663, when Eastland Company officials unloaded and detained the cargo of two Swedish ships, the Jupiter and the Mars. On 8 May, Johan Leijonberg quickly interjected by presenting an account of the events, as well as a copy of the Anglo-​Swedish treaty to the Privy Council. Secretary of State to the Northern Department, Sir William Morice was tasked with handling the affair. Both parties, along with the Governor of the Eastland Company, were instructed to appear before the Privy Council to resolve the matter.170 The case was quickly brought before the Privy Council on 13 May. Under Article 4 of the 1661 treaty, the Swedes were granted the right to the restoration of their goods in case of seizure. It was 1 67 168 169 170

tna, co 388/​1, pp. 11–​14. tna, pc 2/​55, pp. 83–​84. 6 March 1661. tna, pc 2/​55, p. 241. 6 December 1661. tna, pc 2/​56, p. 204. 8 May 1663.

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declared that, in line with the treaty, the Eastland Company would from this point on be rendered unable to, ‘give any hindrance or molestacion unto any Swedish built ships’ and that ‘in all full measure [they] injoy the freedome & Liberty of Trade & Commerce’ that the treaty had provided and intended.171 Some days later, the Privy Council again proclaimed the Eastland Company must reinstate the goods to the Swedes, although in this instance they were to retain the duties that had been paid.172 The law had been set for the Eastland Company and they were now forbidden to interfere in Swedish trade when in the hands of the Swedes themselves. As alluded to in the company’s petitions, Swedish shippers had more customs advantages than the English, both in the Swedish trade area and at the Sound. Now there was the additional advantage in England and the company was barred from levying its own customs. The Eastland Company had been barred from exacting customs on a large proportion of the Baltic’s most lucrative trades. It provides an additional causation as to why English shipping had a dwindling role in Swedish trade. English shippers were simply undercut by their Swedish counterparts who could operate at cheaper costs. It therefore follows that English exporters’ preference to use Swedish shippers witnessed in contemporary records was merely a practical reaction to the realities of contemporary freight charges and reasonable business practice. In order to receive a reconfirmation of its status, the Eastland Company had initially promised to remedy the high level of customs enacted by the Swedes in their ports, as well as ensure the liberty of English merchants over their own property.173 Despite their incapacity to act when trade was in Swedish hands, the company was still fully capable of taking measures to ameliorate the position of English traders in Sweden as they had promised. Official English diplomacy appeared to do little to take care of English commercial concerns in Sweden, and there is no evidence to suggest the Eastland Company pushed to act either. Earlier in the century when England’s main commercial focus in the Baltic was toward Elbing and Danzig the Eastland Company had facilitated the positioning of diplomats or representatives in Poland and Prussia to oversee their interests.174 Now that the impetus behind English diplomacy came

1 71 tna, pc 2/​56, p. 205. 13 May 1663. 172 tna, pc 2/​56, p. 209. 20 May 1663. 173 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 3–​4. Article 3, Eastland Company petition to the Council of Trade, 13 November 1660. ‘In Sweden the Customes are Exorbitantly High & Arbitrary’ and ‘The English even after payment thereof are not Masters of their owne Goods’. 174 Hinton, The Eastland Company, pp. 5–​6, 67–​69. Company complaints advised the Crown on what issues needed to be addressed. See, for example, the negotiations of Sir Thomas

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

179

from the Secretary of State and the office’s authority to work for the interests of the Crown, it placed an additional barrier for Eastland Company to exert influence. Therefore the Eastland Company could do little for the English merchant participating in trade with Sweden, either on British or Swedish shores. The only action the Eastland Company undertook was to levy an additional fee when goods were transported in English ships.175 It is not surprising that English merchants as well as their agents preferred to employ Swedish ships. The agent in Sweden was out of reach of the Eastland Company, who had no representation there, and utilising Swedish ships masked direct English involvement, making their goods exempt from additional customs fees.176 6

Abraham Kock-​Cronström, Copper, and the English Mint

Trade between England and Sweden was not only handled by English merchants and agents operating out of the Swedish trade area on the impetus of primaries back in England. Other forms of commercial organisation occurred during this period. One of the most significant and under-​appreciated was that of the Swedish entrepreneur Abraham Kock-​Cronström who had dealings with the English Crown and the English Mint during the 1670s. Kock was primarily involved in the export of Swedish copper from Stockholm. Copper played a crucial role in Sweden’s foreign policy and its commercial interaction abroad, particularly during the first half of the seventeenth century. Copper fuelled Sweden’s growth and its war machine in two ways. The growth of the copper Roe in 1629 and 1639, as well as the Earl of Leicester in 1632. A motivating factor behind the establishment of an organised monopoly company came from fear of external threats, and the company had previously provided funds for the appointment of a royal ambassador. 175 The Eastland Company had two rates of imposition: one against freemen and the other against unfreemen. It had no right to levy duties against foreigners who were importing goods produced in their own country (in line with the Navigation Act. Hinton, The Eastland Company, p. 142. 1 76 The Eastland Company continued to appoint a Deputy Governor in Danzig, to oversee trade as it had done in the first half of the century. Hinton, The Eastland Company, p. 148; Sellers, Acts and Ordinances, xxvi. Patrick Lyall and John Paul served as official representatives of the Stuart Crown in Denmark, acting as part of a network facilitating commercial interaction between the British Isles and Sweden. The Eastland Company was not responsible for their appointment or supervision. Murdoch, Network North, pp. 140, 153–​161, 237–​238, 245, 351. For further evidence of John Paul’s activities in aiding Swedish diplomats and assessing the validity of English and Swedish traders, see tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 210–​211, 329–​331.

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industry at the beginning of the century and the subsequent expansion of mines at Falun and Stora Kopparberg provided Sweden with a much-​needed injection of cash, with exports peaking by 1650.177 Copper was also used as a vital form of remittance for the Swedish state, not only to pay its armies but to pay war debts, such as for the redemption of Älvsborg from the Danes in 1613 to re-​establish a Swedish presence along the western coast.178 Copper had long been utilised by the Swedish Crown as a valuable commercial asset, although its potential was never fully maximised due to the mishandling of the trade itself.179 By the time Kock was cultivating contacts in England in 1664, the Swedish Crown had already long been engaged in seeking foreign copper contracts itself. The Crown was involved in striking a number of agreements with various Amsterdam merchants during the 1620s-​1650s and, at a later point, with Swedish-​based merchants during the 1660s to facilitate selling its copper abroad.180 The Crown had a lengthy history as one of the main manufacturers and exporters of Swedish copper, but during the latter years of the 1660s, Abraham Kock and his brother Isaac became the largest exporters of copper from Stockholm.181 Copper giants such as the Crown and entrepreneurs such as the Kocks were not the only active exporters during the 1660s. British exporters were also involved during this time, although their copper exports were dwarfed by other operators. On the whole copper played a diminished role compared to iron in English trade, although copper exports were on the rise by 1670.182 The British were not confined to buying and exporting copper in the retail trade at the dockside. A number of Scottish migrants in Sweden participated in the production of copper at its very source. Peter Cahun owned a copper mine at Falun as early as the 1630s.183 Daniel Young Leijonancker had made a supplication to Queen Kristina in 1652 in the hope that he could break into the copper industry.184

1 77 Heckscher, Eli F., The Economic History of Sweden, p. 85. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid, pp. 85–​88. 180 Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, pp. 100–​101. 181 Ibid. 182 For example in 1660, British exporters only handled around 6% of the overall Stockholm market share of copper. sra, swb, 15.1. 1660. The total value of copper exported to England in the same year was valued at 9085 riksdaler in contrast with the 292,541 riksdaler value of iron exports. Exports of copper had however risen to by over five times their 1660 value to 55,428 riksdaler by 1670. ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660; Vol. 32. 1670. 183 Murdoch, Network North, p. 184. 184 Murdoch, Network North, p. 184; srp, Vol. 15, 1651–​1653, p. 302. Supplication of Daniel Young, 24 March 1652.

Commercial Ascendancy, 1660–1671

181

Around the same time that Kock was hoping to land lucrative copper contracts with the English market in the 1670s, Alexander Strachan and James Thomson held interests in the Swedish copper industry.185 Kock’s first contact with the English market occurred during a visit he made to England in 1664. It is unclear whether commercial motivations were the primary reason for Kock’s trip. Of his own admission he utilised his stay in England to arouse interest in the potential for Swedish copper to be exported to England as ‘blanks’, meaning unmarked coinage.186 Between his return to Sweden and the negotiations for his copper contract in 1671, Kock rose to hold a number of influential positions in addition to his status as a leading copper exporter. From 1665–​1668, he held the position of Mint Master for Sweden and was ennobled with the title ‘Cronström’ in 1667. He was involved in the forming of commercial policy in the Swedish Board of Trade from 1668–​1671. To complete his role as an influential copper entrepreneur, Kock-​Cronström also became part owner of Avesta copper works in the 1670s. Now the stage was set for his push into the English market.187 Sometime during the period 1671–​1672, Kock-​Cronström left Sweden and travelled to England.188 It was at this point that negotiations for a copper contract with the English Mint appear in English sources. The proposal first appears in 1671 when Kock-​Cronström was noted as appealing for ‘terms for the furnishing the King with copper blanks for farthings’.189 By 1 August the following year, the Officers of the English Mint were appealing to the Earl of Shaftesbury and Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Henry Coventry. The appeal requested ‘an order for £500 on their Privy Seal of £15,000’ to be paid to Kock-​ Cronström’s account. The contract was concluded on 17 August 1672 and drawn up between Kock-​Cronström and James Hoare, Comptroller of the Mint, specifically stating the quality and measurements desired by the Mint.190 It bound Kock-​Cronström to deliver ‘yearly thereafter unto the said James Hoare as long as he shall desire it and at any hazard of the seas allways considered. Twelve 1 85 Murdoch, Network North, pp. 184–​185. 186 Boëthius, B., ‘Abraham Cronström’, in sbl, [https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​/Prese​ntat​ ion​.aspx?id=​15710]​. Accessed 28 April 2015. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 cspd, 1671–​1672, p. 53. Undated, 1671. 190 James Hoare the Elder was appointed Comptroller of the Mint in 1661. Hoare, Edward, ’The Copper Coinage of 1672–​1673’, The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Numismatic Society, New Series, Vol. 14, 1874, p. 113; bl, Add ms 34358, f. 45 [Tracts of the Mint], ‘Articles of the Agreement made between Abraham Cronstrom of Stockholm in the Kingdome of Sweden on the one part And James Hoare the Elder of London’, 17 August 1672.

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thousand pounds worth of the said copper Blants or peeces’.191 It was stipulated that delivery was to be split so that copper blanks were to be delivered monthly: £4,000 worth in June, £1,200 worth every month between July and November and £2,000 worth in December.192 This was not an easy feat considering the difficulty of sea passage in northern climes during the winter. Kock-​ Cronström was, however, in a favourable position as one of the preeminent ship owners of Stockholm.193 The contract and subsequent undertakings are significant because it is the only known commercial exchange in the history of Anglo-​Swedish trade of this nature. It involved the bypassing of traditional avenues of commercial engagement between the two markets, and saw trade enacted at the highest level between a principal Swedish entrepreneur and wholesaler, and the English Crown itself. Not only was the contract of considerable value, but its importance to Kock-​Cronström, who was already a commercial giant and influential member of the Swedish government, can be seen through his willingness to journey to England to conclude the contract. This is the only known instance of a member of Sweden’s commercial elite travelling to England purely to undertake commercial negotiations, and not serving in an alternative capacity, such as being part of a diplomatic retinue. According to Henry Roseveare, who undercovered a letter from Isaac Cronström to London merchant Jacob David, Kock-​Cronström’s contract with the English Mint continued until at least the mid-​1670s. He delivered over 2,000 barrels of copper farthings to England which Abraham Kock-​Cronström himself stated earned him more than 50,000 riksdaler annually.194 To put the value of Kock-​Cronström’s copper contract into perspective, he was set to earn on a yearly basis almost a 10% equivalent of the value of Stockholm’s overall export trade to England in 1670.195 Furthermore, Kock-​Cronström’s venture is said to have been the first instance where Swedish copper production in regards to minting for western markets was successfully wrestled from the hands of Hamburg and Lübeck, although it is difficult to ascertain on what grounds this claim has been based.196 Finally, Kock-​Cronström’s copper, which was to be minted into English farthings, represents a watershed in the history of English coinage. Kock-​Cronström’s

1 91 bl, Add ms 34358, f. 45. 192 Ibid. The copper was exempt from customs. 193 Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, p. 182. 194 Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, pp. 493–​494. No. 384. Isaac Cronström to Jacob David. Skultuna brassworks, 8 March 1678. 195 Boëthius, B., ‘Abraham Cronström’; ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670. 196 Boëthius, B., ‘Abraham Cronström’.

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Swedish copper was the first copper coinage ever to be minted and circulated in England.197 7

Conclusion

England and Sweden’s relationship operated on two levels during this period. One aspect concerned the political and strategic concerns of both crowns, which was conducted through direct diplomatic representation. Their relationship came under strain at various points and had to manoeuvre between the labyrinth of international alliance systems, alternate avenues, and false promises. Nevertheless, England and Sweden’s diplomatic relationship and their alliance remained intact. The other aspect of English and Swedish interaction was commercial and it continued to be the foundation for their relationship. From more humble beginnings towards the later 1640s, England’s interest and subsequent entry as a major force in the Swedish export market had taken it to new heights. At various points during the course of the 1660s England’s total export of Swedish goods reached new peaks, with England becoming the primary market for Swedish goods from both Gothenburg and Stockholm at one time or another. Already by 1660 English merchants had come to dominate the export of Swedish goods to their homeland on the ground in Swedish ports, but had to concede their dominance to Stockholm’s settled merchant community during the years of the Second Dutch War. Swedish merchants and shippers facilitated the continuous and extensive commercial contact with the English market despite the closure of the Sound and other hindrances, demonstrating how entrenched and important a market England had become to Sweden’s success. After the war had reached its conclusion, a return to peacetime conditions saw England’s trade and its merchants come to further the value and extent of Swedish exports to England. English merchants re-​emerged in Swedish trade areas to play a vital role in conveying Swedish goods, although their position increasingly had to be shared with members of the local mercantile community. The strength of England’s import trade had, albeit in peacetime, grown exponentially, particularly in the case of Stockholm. This can be linked to English economic interests grappling to find viable markets to balance the weight of trade with their desire for Swedish exports. By 1660 England’s merchants in 197 Hoare, p.113.

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Sweden were active in providing vital goods such as salt and other commodities to the Swedish market. These goods were both imported directly from England as well as by English shippers who played a considerable role in the import trade into Sweden using third party markets as far afield as the Mediterranean. They were even able to exploit saturated markets such as the Dutch Republic to provide Sweden with much needed foreign goods. The exigencies of war proved to hit England’s traders hard and English shipping, in particular, found it difficult to match the advantages that their Swedish counterparts had in assuming an ever growing amount of trade between the English and Swedish markets in their own right. Nevertheless, by 1670 domestically produced English goods flooded into the Swedish capital, reaching new heights in collective value as English merchants added a significant arm to their import trade, particularly in textiles. England and Sweden’s commercial and diplomatic relationship thus emerged from the 1660s tightly bound. It was enshrined in successive commercially and strategically significant treaties that provided a basis for the continuance of trade amidst war between hostile belligerents such as France, Denmark and the Dutch Republic. Furthermore, the sheer value of trade with England had played its part in ensuring Swedish neutrality, fostering and encouraging native Swedish commercial interests to participate, and even expanded trade in key goods. England had risen to become Sweden’s most vital commercial and diplomatic partner by the close of the 1660s. Nevertheless, their relationship was always subject to favourable economic and geopolitical conditions, which would prove more complicated over the course of the 1670s and 1680s.

­c hapter 4

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–​1688 During the 1670s, both England and Sweden experienced periods at war. England engaged in another costly naval conflict with the Dutch Republic (1672–​74), and Sweden was embroiled in the Scanian War (1675–​79) war with Denmark, the Dutch Republic and Brandenburg-​Prussia. The Scanian War represented the only departure point from Sweden’s mostly pacifist foreign policy that had been actively pursued since 1660. Following their respective conflagrations, both nations entered into several years of unbroken peace. From the conclusion of the Third Dutch War in February 1674 until the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678–​79, England benefited from maintaining a neutral status in contrast to much of the rest of Europe. England’s gains were both political and commercial, as ‘all of Europe’ was said to court England’s favour.1 England made hitherto unprecedented strides in providing the link between Europe’s northern and southern trades, an area which it had begun to make initial forays towards during the 1660s.2 One of the most significant expressions of this development was in Swedish trade. Sweden experienced a period of domestic political upheaval that affected both its commercial and geopolitical relationship with foreign powers. 1672 marked the end of the twelve-​year regency government as Karl xi ascended to the Swedish throne.3 Factionalism at court became particularly volatile during the early-​mid 1670s over the question of how to steer Swedish foreign policy.4 Sweden did not possess the requisite funds to adequately defend its overseas possessions in the Baltic and on the continent.5 Thus the focus of 1 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 132–​135. 2 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, for earlier research that touches on this aspect of England’s commercial ventures see: Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, pp. 66–​67; Bjurling, Oscar, ‘Stockholms förbindelser med utlandet under 1670-​talets växlingar’ in Forum Navale, Vol. 51, Uppsala, 1951, pp. 5, 18. 3 English diplomatic representatives were in Stockholm to observe the negotiations and attend the coronation ceremony. tna, sp 95/​8, pp. 127–​128, 145–​146. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 19 October 1672; and tna, sp 95/​8, pp. 130–​131. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 18 December 1672. 4 Rystad, Göran, ’Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie’ in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness, pp. 213–​215. 5 For a history of Sweden’s relationship with its German possessions during the seventeenth century, see Fiedler, Christine-​Beate, Die Verwaltung der Herzogtümer Bremen und Verden in der Schwedenzeit 1652–​1712: Organisation und Wesen der Verwaltung, Stade, 1987.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_006

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Swedish foreign and commercial policy was to secure revenue streams with the minimum amount of reciprocal commitment, to maintain control at home and abroad. Economically this focused on maximising the potential for active, undisturbed trade whilst also pursuing foreign subsidies.6 Chancellor Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie won this battle and his pro-​French faction led Sweden into a defensive alliance in 1672. The agreement gave Sweden the finances to maintain a standing army on the understanding that in return it would provide France with support in the event of a continental war. That war came swiftly, and during the course of 1675–​79 Sweden battled the anti-​French alliance. Despite the difficulties of factional court politics, England’s diplomats were increasingly turning their attention to commercial matters. From this viewpoint commercial considerations are revealed as often being less a basis for factional dispute than other political matters. For example, pro-​French Chancellor de la Gardie was quick to support and grant the English a preferential tar contract through resident Stockholm-​Scottish merchant James Semple in 1672.7 This came in spite of prevailing pressure from the Swedish Board of Trade who were, at that time, hostile to the English, and still seeking to gain retribution for prior seizures of shipping.8 Despite Sweden’s courtiers often having private interests in foreign trade, their factional tendencies appeared to give way to pragmatism in commercial matters. As English diplomatic Secretary William Allestree remarked in 1673 from Stockholm, ‘as long as wee had monyes, nothing would be hard to be procur’d’.9 War had the hardest impact on Swedish financial and foreign policy. The subsidy crisis of the late 1660s and early 1670s had led Sweden into an unwanted and unnecessary war.10 It proved that reliance on foreign funds with presupposed military obligations could have serious setbacks. Karl xi and his ministers sought to remedy this situation by altering the country’s financial policy to focus on domestic sources of income, as well as bringing Swedish commercial policy under direct royal control.11 From 1680, the Swedish Crown underwent the process of reclaiming royal lands that had been ceded to the

6

Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia 1521–​1809, p. 120; Frost, The Northern Wars, p. 209. The most comprehensive study of Sweden’s relationship with French foreign subsidies during this period is Svante Norrhem’s Mercenary Swedes: French Subsidies to Sweden 1631–​1796. 7 tna, sp 95/​8, pp. 88–​89. Werden to Arlington. Stockholm, 1 June 1672. See ssne entry: “Semple, Jacob” [6345]. 8 tna, sp 95/​8, pp. 186–​187. Wood to Arlington. Stockholm, 16 April 1673. 9 tna sp 95/​8, pp. 215–​216. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 5 July 1673. 10 Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes, pp. 34–​38. 11 Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia 1521–​1809, pp. 122.

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

187

nobility over the course of the century, known in Sweden as the reduktion.12 The intention was to better enable the Swedish Crown to defend its borders under its own impetus, with less reliance on an influx of foreign revenue, and the external interference that came with it.13 The historiography of seventeenth-​century Anglo-​Swedish commerce is perhaps the most detailed for this period as scholars have traditionally considered this to be a breakthrough era for Anglo-​Swedish commerce.14 Åström placed particular emphasis on the development of the iron trade in the 1680s.15 Basing his conclusions on Åström’s previous research, as well as his own in-​depth study of London-​based merchant Jacob David’s Swedish connections, Roseveare concluded that the close of the 1670s marked ‘the end of an epoch’ in Anglo-​Swedish trade.16 Müller added that there was a shift in the ethnic composition of the primary exporters in Stockholm. In his analysis of key exporters, Müller saw a traditional core of naturalised merchants focusing on the Dutch market, shifting to the primary activity of Englishmen exporting to England, specifically during the years 1677–​1680.17 Given that they had zoned in on what they perceived to be an increase in the level of trade between England and Sweden during the 1670s, these previous writers are all generally correct. However, previous research has failed to illustrate the more consistent development of Anglo-​Swedish trade in this period. This is true across the century but especially for a period which has been so elevated in previous research. This chapter will demonstrate that far from being the end of an epoch, Anglo-​ Swedish commercial interaction and diplomacy took on new features. It posits the relationship between faltering official alliances and the growth of commerce. The chapter also utilises contemporary trade records to bring forth the 12

The most in-​depth survey of Karl xi’s reduktion policy in English is Upton, A. F., Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, 1660–​1697, Cambridge, 1997. Robert Frost discusses the reduktion in relation to Sweden’s war strategy. Frost, The Northern Wars, pp. 216–​220. 13 Åström discusses the financial implications of the reduktion in comparison with the previous subsidy-​based financial policy. Åström, ‘The Swedish Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great Power, 1632–​1697’, in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness: 1631–​ 1718, pp. 88–​99. Upton places reduktion into the wider context of Karl xi’s absolutist rule. Upton, A. F., Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, 1660–​1697, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 51–​70. 14 Hinton, The Eastland Trade, pp. 106–​108; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 25. 15 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 144. 16 Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, p. 171; Roseveare, ‘Vicissitudes of Anglo-​Swedish Shipping 1650–​1680’ in Britain and the Northern Seas, Minchinton, Walter (ed.), Lofthouse, Pontefract, 1988, pp. 30–​31. 17 Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, p. 89; Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, p. 70.

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first statistical investigation of England’s forays into the Swedish import trade to understand the extent of and nature of England’s strides in that sphere. Finally, the role of the merchants and their experiences are brought into full focus in order to elucidate the activities as well as difficulties involved in propelling England’s trade with Sweden to unforeseen heights. 1

Attempts at Finding Accord

The 1670s-​80s witnessed an increase in diplomatic activity as England and Sweden sought to find common ground. England wanted to maintain strong, codified relations with its primary commercial partner. Despite English ambitions, Sweden courted alternative allies in the west. This was a result of two factors. Firstly, by this period, Sweden’s commercial reliance on England was starting to become a point of concern for Swedish policy makers.18 The situation was exacerbated during the mid-​1670s, when England ended its war with the Dutch Republic leaving the English free to act as a commercial conduit between those European states still at war. This allowed England to exploit its position to become the main freighter of imports into Sweden as its shipping was less likely to be targeted by enemy privateers and warships.19 Sweden therefore sought to counteract these developments by searching for an alternative power base to counter growing English influence.20 Sweden’s attempts to reposition itself geopolitically were also rooted in response to England’s conduct within its treaty agreements with Sweden during the previous period. Sweden’s entry into the Triple Alliance of 1668 with England and the Dutch Republic was motivated by a desire to secure foreign revenue through subsidies to maintain its armed forces. England had shown Sweden that, despite the alliance, they were unwilling to provide direct financial support to help fund Sweden’s military presence on the continent.21 The conclusion of the Treaty of Dover in 1670 brought the Triple Alliance to an end and broke existing financial agreements. Sweden’s position remained unchanged.22 France was able to capitalise on the void left by England’s 18 19

tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 97–​108. William Allestree’s memo. Stockholm, September 1676. Although, there were some official complaints of targeting by Brandenburg privateers within the Baltic. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 150–​151. 20 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken, p. 190; Müller, ‘Britain and Sweden’, p. 66. Sweden’s negotiations with England, France and the Dutch Republic was in itself an expression of their desire to balance the influence of the maritime powers. 21 Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War, pp. 94–​105. 22 Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia 1521–​1809, p. 120.

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

189

negligence and concluded a defensive alliance in 1672 which lasted until 1679. However, the subsidies that Sweden received resulted in a disadvantageous and expensive war.23 A distinctive and vocal opposition seeking to avoid war contested the French agreement.24 The historiographical focus on Swedish political factionalism in relation to the French agreement has led to a lack of recognition for Sweden’s other foreign relations and treaty negotiations. Sweden engaged in negotiations for an alliance with England during the course of 1674–​75, perhaps as a response to the ramifications and uncertainties of the French agreement. The Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1665 had been intended to span a decade and was soon coming to an end. Per Sparre was dispatched to England in 1674 to negotiate a new deal. A new agreement was concluded with Johan Leijonberg and signed not long after.25 The treaty arrived in Sweden for ratification by November 1674 and Envoy Edward Wood was able to proclaim ‘You cannot imagine what this renewed Treaty of Alliance with us hath putt into them, & how much they value themselves upon it to theyre susspected neighbours’.26 The Swedes were eager to close the deal and the ratification was sent back to England by 20 December 1674.27 The agreement provided a two-​year extension of the existing treaty. Article One outlines this fact, ‘That the Treaty outlined in Stockholme the 1st day of March ’64 be continued for 2 years’. The deal was to be renegotiated after its new expiration date in 1676.28 Articles Two and Three reveal the Swedes’ primary motives, as terms for mutual defence were accounted for. However, when the Swedes sought assistance from the English during their war, the English declined to act, stating that Sweden had been the aggressor in its conflict,

23

24 25 26 27 28

A list of the subsidies received can be found in Åström, ’The Swedish Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great Power’, in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness, p. 95; Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia 1521–​1809, p. 120. More detail on specific negotiations with France can be found in Norrhem, Mercenary Swedes, pp. 35–​38, 203–​218. Rystad, Göran, ‘Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie’ in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness, pp. 211–​214. tna, sp 103/​70, ‘Abstract of the Treaty Concluded between His Majesty & The Crown of Sweden’, 30 September/​10 October 1674; uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1, p. 14. Sweden’s treaty with England. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 23–​24. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 7 November 1674. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 28–​29. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 20 December 1674. tna, sp 103/​70, ‘Abstract of the Treaty Concluded between His Majesty & The Crown of Sweden’, 30 September/​10 October 1674; uub, N430. Diplomatica Svecanica, Vol. 1, p. 14. Sweden’s treaty with England.

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thus nullifying any obligation on England’s part. Both powers began to enter a period of mutual distrust. Sweden felt spurned after a second act of English non-​compliance in their treaty arrangements, the first of which had occurred during the Triple Alliance some years earlier.29 English distrust grew because they were aware the Swedes were involved in negotiations with the Dutch Republic. Edward Wood reported back to London that Per Sparre had been ordered to, ‘do his best to stirre up Our Master against Holland and to see what favour he will doe Sweden; if it break its last Treaty with Holland … and so the Treaty is to be sold to him that will bid the most for it’.30 Although negotiations continued between England and Sweden, nothing was achieved in terms of a concrete agreement. England’s primary motive while war continued in Europe was to avoid any binding treaties or alliances that would threaten its neutrality.31 It was not initially necessary for England to alter that position, as they were directly benefiting from war through increased trade and shipping as a neutral third party freighter with the Swedish market. However, when peace was concluded in the later 1670s, England attempted to re-​establish codified commercial ties with Sweden after the expiration of their previous treaty in 1676. Ultimately these negotiations ended in failure. Sweden felt an increasing wariness towards England which led to the conclusion of a commercial treaty with the Dutch Republic in 1679.32 Moving into the 1680s with no Anglo-​Swedish treaty in place, it left England’s position in regards to Swedish trade, as well as that of its merchants in the Swedish trade area, potentially exposed. Treaty negotiations between England and Sweden continued into the 1680s, but with no conclusive result. There were a number of overtures during the period immediately following the Swedish-​Dutch treaty in 1679 until after Philip Warwick’s arrival in Stockholm in 1681, but neither side seemed committed or aligned enough to fully agree on terms.33

29

England and the Dutch Republic promised to provide military subsidies to Sweden for their participation in a joint alliance some years earlier. The alliance was concluded, but England reneged on payment. Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War, p. 95. 30 tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 3–​4. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 3 May 1676. 31 Even in 1683, Charles ii refused to become embroiled in the Franco-​Spanish war, despite the treaty with Spain involving promises of mutual defence, Black, A System of Ambition, p. 133. 32 Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, pp. 34–​36. 33 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 107–​108. 20 June 1679; tna, pc 2/​68, p. 139, 19 June 1679; tna, pc 2/​69, p. 147, 19 May 1681; co 389/​11, 13 June 1681, Late 1681.

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

2

191

English Trade Scales New Heights

England had emerged from the 1660s in a commercially advantageous position regarding Swedish trade. By the mid-​1670s, after the closure of their third war with the Dutch Republic, England found itself at a unique point in history in regards to Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction. With roles reversed, now it was Sweden and the Dutch Republic who found themselves at war. In contrast England entered a protracted period of peace. War effectively halted the commercial activities of the Dutch and Swedish merchant fleets. In many cases the English merchant marine became the only viable freight option in serving the Swedish market.34 Figure 4.1 reveals the growing influence of English trade on the Swedish market and as seen in Figure 0.5, the overall value of Stockholm’s export trade declined from the 1660s. The explanation for this decline is likely rooted in war. Both France and the Dutch Republic, major western markets for Swedish goods, were at war and so was Sweden itself. Exports to the Dutch Republic from Stockholm in 1675 declined by three quarters from their 1670 equivalent. Although French trade had been growing steadily over the course of the 1660s, by 1675 France failed to register as an export destination from Stockholm.35 In contrast to prevailing trends elsewhere, exports from Stockholm to England and Scotland increased at an exponential rate. The export value of goods from Stockholm to England in 1675 reached an all-​time peak at a collective worth of 879,983 riksdaler. This represented a 51% share of the total Stockholm export market, itself a record figure, and an increase of 178% on figures recorded in 1670. Likewise, Scotland’s own trade in Swedish exports had also risen, albeit to a much lesser extent. Figures recorded show the value of exports from Stockholm to Scottish harbours increased from almost 60,000 riksdaler in 1670 to 71,247 riksdaler five years later. Therefore total exports to the British Isles in 1675 stood at a combined value of 951,230 riksdaler, equivalent to a 55% share of the Stockholm export market. In 1675, Scotland had risen to become the fourth largest export market for Stockholm’s goods. English ships began to swarm Stockholm’s harbour, with a total of 91 ships departing over the course of the 1675 trading season.36 These figures alone, when viewed in 34 35 36

tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 105–​106, 131–​132. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 5 May 1675, 16 June 1675; Roseveare, ‘Vicissitudes of Anglo-​Swedish Shipping, 1650–​1680’, in Britain and the Northern Seas, p. 29. ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. Exports handled by Hamburg, Lübeck and Danzig had also declined. Similar to France, exports to Portugal also disappeared. ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675.

0

250,000

500,000

750,000

England

879,983

Lübeck

244,376

Export Destination

Dutch Republic

138,384

Danzig

108,119

Scotland

71,247

192 

­f igure 4.1  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1675 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 41, 1675

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

1,000,000

newgenrtpdf

Chapter 4

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

193

the context of other markets seen through Figure 4.1, demonstrate the importance with which England was now held by Swedish trade. Not only had trade to England risen considerably over the course of the previous generation, but by the mid-​1670s British export harbours were assuming added significance as alternative export markets declined. As can be seen from Figure 4.2, iron continued to be the predominant commodity exported from Stockholm to England. Iron not only comprised a larger share of England’s overall export profile from Stockholm, but increased significantly in value. Iron comprised 78% of English exports in 1670 and rose to command 89% of exports in 1675. In actuality this represented an increase from 39,002 ssp worth 386,716 riksdaler in 1670, rising to 79,185 ssp, worth a total of 784,758 riksdaler just five years later. While the thirst for iron continued unabated, other exports leaving Stockholm for England did not exhibit such a marked expansion. Copper exports remained at a fairly stable value of 59,110 riksdaler in 1675. This was equivalent to around 845 ssp of exported copper, marking a slight increase from 1670. A comparison of copper exports with figures exported during the 1660s, demonstrates a marked and consistent increase in the demand for Swedish copper, particularly in the form of brass during the 1670s. Exports of tar and pitch actually receded in 1675. Tar remained more stable at an export of 8,550 barrels, which was equivalent to a value of 22,561 riksdaler. Pitch exports from Stockholm in 1675 actually receded by over a quarter of their previous Timber and misc Tar 1.4% 1.9% Copper and brass 6.7%

Iron (assorted varieties) 89.2%

­f igure 4.2  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1675 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 41. 1675

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figure, from around 5,091 barrels to 1,327 barrels, and decreased in value from 28,044 riksdaler to just 6,639 riksdaler.37 By 1675 those engaged in the export of goods from Stockholm to England comprised as many British as non-​British operators. Non-​British merchants numbered 22, while British merchants including English and Scottish numbered 19 individuals. However, the bulk of exports were handled by the British.38 Mostly English, but also Scottish merchants, were responsible for an export of 618,110 riksdaler worth of goods, equating to a share of 70% of total English exports. Non-​British exporters, on the other hand, were responsible for 220,754 riksdaler worth of exports. Furthermore, the commercial reach of particular English exporters had begun to extend beyond their base in Stockholm. There was a core of British merchants who had emerged over the 1660s who had become a standard fixture of the Stockholm export trade by the mid-​ 1670s. As can be seen from Figure 4.3, of the top ten exporting merchants to England in terms of overall value, a total of eight merchants were British. The top exporters were beginning to tighten their grip on the market. The largest exporter, Urban Hall, was responsible for exporting goods worth a value of 104,434 riksdaler. This was almost double the amount handled by the largest exporter of five years earlier.39 Similarly, William Smith, James Lyall and John Strother also commanded trading accounts of over 80,000 riksdaler in value.40 By 1675, English merchants in Stockholm began to extensively engage in trade to markets outside of England, which was their traditional sphere of influence. William Smith oversaw a large trade across the Swedish Empire, to Gotland, Riga, and Narva, the latter having connections to the Russian market. Smith also maintained consistent connections to Lübeck and the Dutch Republic. Similarly, Urban Hall, the largest exporter to England, maintained an 37 38 39

40

ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. This includes counting the monopoly Swedish Tar Company as a sole, non-​British exporting merchant. ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. When combining the value of their exports, it could be argued that the Lyall family constituted the largest exporters to England. Adam (1,570 riksdaler), Henry (48,765 riksdaler), James (83,405 riksdaler) and Peter Lyall (14,102 riksdaler) were active exporters during 1675 and commanded a combined total of 147,842 riksdaler. However, as the customs accounts record their exports as separate actors they have been considered individually. ssne entry: “Hall, Urban” [394]. The day to day export of goods by certain merchants began to become so frequent that English merchants were now being recorded in the customs accounts by abbreviated versions of their names. Gilbert Heathcote appears regularly simply as “Gilbrecht” as does John Strother as “Stroder”. There is only one instance of this happening previously with George Shuttleworth appearing simply as “Schüttelwortz” in earlier accounts. ssne entry: “Strother, John” [8344].

195

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688 #

Merchant

Value*

Commodity

Origin

Equivalent value of same position in 1670

1

Urban Hall

104,434

Iron, brass

England

58,405

2

William Smith

86,708

Wrought iron

England/Scotland

55,189

3

James Lyall

83,405

Wrought iron, brass

Scotland

30,215

4

John Strother

82,819

Iron, brass, hemp, boards

England

28,985

5

Anthony Beckwith

50,516

Wrought iron

England

19,729

6

Henry Lyall

48,765

Wrought iron, brass

Scotland

13,279

7

Samuel von Breda

38,942

Wrought iron

Hamburg

13,006

8

Gilbert Heathcote

37,685

Wrought iron

England

11,806

9

Ashton Nuttall

37,210

Wrought iron, brass

England

10,318

10

Thomas Perman

27,520

Brass

Sweden?

9412

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 4.3  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1675 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 41. 1675

export trade to the Dutch Republic, Danzig, Lübeck and Hamburg, as did John Strother with the Dutch Republic and Hamburg. The majority of their extra-​ English trade was focused on providing steady quantities of wrought iron to the various markets. Although, in the case of William Smith, he also ensured that imports of English lead were intended for re-​export to Narva, and for further passage to the Russian market.41 It demonstrates how many of the more established, top-​level merchants within the English community in Stockholm began to exploit further opportunities in the extraneous political circumstances of the mid-​1670s. England’s more established merchants in Stockholm began to take advantage of their nation’s beneficial geopolitical position in order to expand the range of their commercial activity. The establishment of an entrenched English mercantile community in Stockholm from the 1660s and their knowledge of Swedish export markets provided them the opportunity to secure such an advantageous position at this juncture. 41

Smith exported wrought iron and English lead to Narva and onto Russia in Magnus Berg’s Swedish ship on the 12 October 1675. Smith is not listed as importing lead into Stockholm but could have worked in tandem with other English merchants or ships’ crews importing lead from Hull during the season. ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675.

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The benefits of England’s neutral status and the position of English merchants in facilitating a deeper role in the Swedish market can also be witnessed in regard to Stockholm’s import trade. War against Denmark-​Norway made the Sound too dangerous for Swedish ships to pass whereas the ongoing conflict with Brandenburg-​Prussia presented a serious privateering threat within the Baltic Sea. Already by April 1675, Edward Wood in his correspondence to Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Sir Joseph Williamson, declared the potential possibilities that were opening up for English shipping. He stated that ‘most of the greatest Swedes & Holland Marchants here, are broke, so that if there be warr by sea & Our Shipps passe the Sound free, it must be, I humbly conceive very advantagious for us’.42 Although by June, the English were uneasy as the Swedish Board of Trade had already issued over thirty passports for Dutch ships to procure vital goods that Sweden needed in the event of war.43 However, later that month the Dutch declared war, and the advantages that the English merchants and diplomats had anticipated were being realised.44 Imports into Stockholm continued to arrive directly from England in large quantities. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, for the first time England became the largest foreign importer of goods into Stockholm.45 Direct imports from England reached a value of 246,997 riksdaler which equated to around 12% of the city’s total imports. Imports from the Dutch Republic and France suffered

42

43

44

45

tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 94–​95. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 7 April 1675; Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, p. 153. Roseveare charts a steady rise of English ships in the Baltic from 1674. The war also had an effect on Anglo-​Danish commercial interaction. English merchants increased their activity in Denmark due to the war. Kelsall, Philip, ‘The Changing Relationship between Denmark and the Netherlands in the latter half of the seventeenth century’, in Brand, Hanno and Müller, Leos, The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North Sea and Baltic Region: In the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period, 2007, p. 211. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 118–​119. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 2 June 1675. It is difficult to assess how far the Swedish Board of Trade were seeking Dutch freight assistance due to necessity or preferment and whether that potential preferment was motivated by political or practical factors in regard to the English. In his correspondence Wood complained that Swedish blockades hindered some forty English ships from leaving port until October 1675. However, contemporary Swedish commercial records note a steady stream of English shipping clearing customs throughout the later summer months and into the autumn. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 162. Wood to Williamson, Stockholm, 6 October 1675; ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. Imports from across the Swedish Empire, including Estonia, Livonia, Pomerania and other ports around the Gulf of Finland, accounted for around 53% of all imports into Stockholm. At a value of 298,925 riksdaler, Reval’s trade was the only instance in which the value of English trade was eclipsed.

0

100,000

200,000

Reval

298,925

England

246,997

Wismar

228,844

Portugal

209,436

Lübeck

148,775

Import origin

Stralsund

163,991

­f igure 4.4  Value of imports into Stockholm according to point of origin, 1675 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 41. 1675

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

300,000

Riga

125,104

Narva

100,244

Danzig

82,025

Dutch Republic

81,147

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in particular, while imports from Lübeck, Danzig and Portugal continued to reach Stockholm in large numbers. England’s booming import trade with Sweden can be explained by two main factors. The first was England’s neutrality, which came at the expense of other western powers and the Swedish mercantile community. The other factor that facilitated such increases in the import trade was self-​reliance on the part of the English. All 65 ships carrying imports directly from England were English.46 One commodity which was to play an increasingly dominant role in England’s direct import trade with Sweden was salt. English ships transported salt to Stockholm en masse from both England and southern Europe. Salt accounted for 22% of England’s direct import trade, and was the primary import commodity in England’s freight trade to Stockholm. Salt comprised just over half of the import value of England’s import trade. Imports of salt arriving from English, as well as third party harbours, reached a value of 253,852 riksdaler. This equated to 63,463 barrels of salt imported into Stockholm on English ships alone. At a value of 164,856 riksdaler, salt from Portugal accounted for about 65% of all salt imported into Stockholm during 1675. During the course of 1675, English shipping was responsible for the transportation of over 90% of imports from Portuguese harbours and salt was the largest commodity imported from Portugal. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, Portugal was the second largest origination point for imports into Stockholm in 1675. Of the 209,436 riksdaler worth of goods imported into Stockholm from Portugal, English ships were responsible for 190,556 riksdaler of this total figure. Although England’s third party freight trade was heavily focused on Portugal, English ships arrived from a variety of destinations across Europe. English ships freighted around 35% of all imports from the Dutch Republic. In the case of France the figure was considerably higher, with English ships importing over 75% of French goods into Stockholm. Both French and Dutch re-​exports in English ships were focused heavily on salt.47 Therefore, English carriers facilitated the importation of goods from the two largest foreign markets in 1675, as shown in Figure 4.4. English shippers were also instrumental in importing goods from two other major foreign markets, namely the Dutch Republic and France. A large part of this activity was geared 46 47

ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. At a total of 81,147 riksdaler, English skippers were responsible for 27,975 riksdaler of trade from the Dutch Republic. Imports from France were traditionally of lower figures in regard to Stockholm’s overall import trade. English carriers were responsible for importing a value of 18,226 riksdaler worth of the 24,088 riksdaler total of French goods.

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to facilitating the import of salt into Stockholm. It demonstrates the ability to which English traders were able to capitalise on the unique geopolitical landscape of the mid-​1670s to expand their engagement with the Swedish import market. Although the rise in England’s involvement in Stockholm’s import trade has appeared in previous scholarship, the extent of England’s relationship with a number of third party harbours, as well as its facilitation through its own ports, has gone unnoticed. Another area in which previous scholarship has failed to appreciate how England encountered such a steep rise in the Swedish import trade was the role of elite members of the English mercantile community in the Swedish capital. The majority of Stockholm’s English merchants continued to focus the majority of their trade on traditional avenues such as textiles. However, William Smith and John Strother, two outliers in the community, turned their focus towards the salt trade. Both merchants had been importers in Stockholm five years earlier. Over the course of that period both Smith and Strother significantly increased their status in the town’s import trade. For example, John Strother’s import account rose from 3,144 riksdaler in 1670 to the value 99,970 riksdaler in 1675. Similarly Smith’s import trade expanded from a value of 13,907 riksdaler in 1670 to 114,618 riksdaler in 1675. This extensive growth was due to their ability to pivot away from traditional markets centred on textile imports to focus the majority of their activity on salt imports. This was in contrast to other members of the wider British mercantile community. British merchants such as Adam Lyall, Ashton Nuttall and Simon Storie handled considerably less value by primarily trading in textiles. By providing a deeper analysis of their activity the extent of their foray into the Swedish salt trade becomes apparent. As the largest English salt importer William Smith imported a total of 99,690 riksdaler worth of salt during 1675. At a fixed price of four riksdaler per barrel of salt, this equated to almost 25,000 barrels of salt, representing 87% of his total 114,618 riksdaler import account in Stockholm. Similarly, John Strother manoeuvered himself into a prime position to import salt into Stockholm. As the second largest English importer of salt, Strother handled a total of 91,808 riksdaler, equivalent to around 23,000 barrels of salt. This represented 92% of his overall import trade. Both merchants imported exclusively on English ships, the majority of which arrived directly from Portugal. At a value of 48,828 riksdaler, Smith’s Portuguese salt trade was worth 50% of his overall salt import value, while Strother’s represented a larger portion at 72% of his overall salt trade, reaching a value of 66,116 riksdaler. Smith and Strother both utilised ships incoming directly from England as the second most numerous source of salt importation. A large amount of the salt

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imported directly from England was a mixture of Spanish, French and some Scottish salt. Smith’s salt imports from England were valued at 21,174 riksdaler, roughly 22% of his overall salt imports, while Strother’s were higher at 33,048 riksdaler, equivalent to 36% of salt imports from England. Smith was the only one of the two newly founded English salt barons who utilised sources in the Dutch Republic and France.48 Although Smith and Strother acted in contrast to the rest of the English community, their activity demonstrates the ability to which English merchants in Stockholm could reposition their activity towards profit in new avenues. English merchants in Stockholm worked in tandem with English shippers to facilitate their entry and influence over one of Sweden’s most vital import commodities. English forays into the Swedish salt trade reveal how shifting geopolitical circumstances could shape commercial organisation at ground level. It also demonstrates how the availability of resources such as English merchant shipping and readily poised English merchants in Stockholm allowed these advantageous steps into new trades. However, the entry of England as the primary carrier of goods into Stockholm required added orchestration from governmental bodies in England and Sweden. This cooperation made use of the existing framework of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy to facilitate increasing English involvement in the Swedish import trade. The salt trade had long been vital to Sweden, and both Karl xi and the Swedish Queen Mother, Hedvig Eleonora, played a role in directing England to the needs of Sweden’s import trade.49 In addition, Johan Leijonberg, Swedish Resident in London, coordinated Swedish efforts to acquire English ships for the Swedish salt trade by reaching out to English merchants and shipowners in London engaged in Swedish and Baltic trade.50 The English Envoy in Stockholm Sir Edward Wood acted as an intermediary between England and Sweden by actively discussing commercial matters with the Swedish Crown and the Swedish Board of Trade. This helped to ensure that “English shipps bringing into Sweden salt from St Ubes (Setúbal) should enjoy the very same Priviledges in and out as Burgers vessels bringing in that commodity had

48 ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. 49 Karl xi issued a proclamation granting English ships freedom from customs in 1676 and the Queen Mother herself spoke to Envoy Wood asking if the English would take on the salt freight in April 1675. tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 101–​102. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 28 April 1675. 50 tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. “Monsr. Leyonberg, contracted with some of our Eastland Merchants for the bringing that commodity into this country; Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, p. 154.

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formerly done now”.51 Ensuring that favourable and equal freight and customs rates on par with local merchants in Sweden was the key to unlocking English potential. This made participation in the salt trade financially viable, but also profitable for the English. It demonstrates how enmeshed the various strands of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy had become to facilitate commercial engagement. The main forces of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy negotiated the basis for trade agreements but now were able to orchestrate trade itself. As the 1675 trading season drew to a close, the Swedes became apprehensive for the next year’s supply, knowing war would continue. The English were worried Sweden would grant commercial concessions to the Dutch Republic and repossess their nascent and lucrative trade. Sweden entered negotiations for a restricted, short-​term commercial treaty with the Dutch to limit the impact of war. Wood stated, ‘Wee English shall be the great sufferers by this Treaty for it will certainly take a growing & flourishing trade from us, to putt into the hands of the Hollanders’.52 However, by the summer, Swedish negotiations with the Dutch had stalled and Sweden allowed English shippers the right to freely import grain, subsequently granting the English complete freedom to import any goods without customs duties.53 English merchants once again enjoyed an enhanced role in the import market for 1676. William Allestree, the Secretary to English Envoy Sir Edward Wood, issued a report to Secretary of State Williamson and the English Council of Trade proclaiming England’s successes in detail.54 Allestree stated that 150 English ships arrived in Stockholm that year. Larger ships carried salt from Portugal, and smaller vessels focused on importing salt from England and the Dutch Republic.55 Sweden’s navy met intense fighting from a combined Danish-​Dutch force at the Battle of Öland in the summer of 1676, leading to the conclusion of a Swedish-​Dutch commercial agreement in September. This signalled the end of England’s grip on Stockholm’s import trade.56 Leos Müller has stated that the Dutch enjoyed a resurgence during the late 1670s, but this 51 52 53 54 55 56

tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. Wood stated that this new commercial arrangement ran from 1675. tna, sp 95/​9, p. 192. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 16 November 1675. tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 18–​19, pp. 67–​68. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 17 May 1676, 1 August 1676. tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 137–​143. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 15 November 1676. tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 137–​143. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 15 November 1676. ‘our trade … hath been very different from it us’d to be … wee have had here this summer an hundred fifty and one in our owne names, and many of them shipps of great burthen’. tna, sp 95/​10,, pp. 91–​92. 20 September 1676; Frost, The Northern Wars, p. 212; Larsson & Österberg, Sveriges historia, p. 122; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 63–​64.

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was only partially the case. The English were not fully excluded, and the number of English merchant ships engaged in Stockholm’s import trade was consistently larger after the close of the war years in 1679 than it had been before. The Dutch never fully recovered their position following this point.57 England once again enjoyed another season as central players in the import freight trade in 1677 despite renewed competition.58 Whether or not actions on the part of English shippers were partly to blame for the Dutch return to the Swedish market is unclear. During the latter years of the 1670s Sweden began negotiations for a commercial agreement with the Dutch Republic, which was eventually concluded in 1679. One of the expressed intentions of this accord was to return a certain level of commercial favour to Dutch shippers and traders. During the period where the English enjoyed an increase in Swedish import trade trades, in their enthusiasm they had glutted the Swedish market with goods and driven down prices of key commodities such as salt. The appearance of so many English ships and the intense competition for cargoes also caused consternation amongst the wholesale merchants of the burgess community in Stockholm which in turn reduced the price of iron to their disadvantage.59 However, from the vantage point of the English, Edward Wood considered it a resounding success, especially in regards to the efficacy with which the English were able to impact the import trade into Sweden. In 1677 he stated, “whereupon the number of vessells bringing in that merchandize was much augmented, to the great content of both nations. For as the great quantity of salt which was by that means brought in, caus’d its cheapnesse, and thereby permitted the Swedes to furnish their whole country with it, at a better rate then ever they had done, during the time of their own Trade”.60 Members of the Stockholm merchant community were less than pleased, claiming English traders, aware of their uncontested position, charged exorbitantly high rates. A senior Stockholm merchant named Abraham Wolters declared that English merchants in Stockholm were ‘inexperienced young idlers who spend whole days in wine and tobacco houses’.61 How far this was a popular view in Swedish circles is not known. It is significant that Wolters was a leading merchant in Stockholm. It was his very livelihood that was stood to be negatively impacted by the significant breakthroughs being made by the English merchants. Although both Edward Wood’s and Abraham Wolters’ 57 Müller, The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, p. 90. 58 Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol 1, p. 64. 59 Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, p. 155. 60 tna, sp 95/​11, p. p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. 61 Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, p. 171.

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words should be taken with a degree of circumspection, Wolters’ declaration nevertheless perhaps demonstrates the anxiety felt in Swedish commercial circles at being subject to whims of a single, key trading partner. Attempting to bring about a return of Dutch commercial contact to counteract this dependence on England for their import trade was one of the chief motivations behind the shift in Swedish attitudes during the late 1670s. Concluding a commercial treaty and attempting to grant Dutch traders concessions in the Swedish marketplace was a reversal of the same conditions which led Sweden into codifying their first commercial agreement with England a generation earlier. The Peace of Nijmegen and subsequent Peace of Lund in 1679 lifted the dangers that had restricted Swedish and Dutch merchant shipping during war. English shippers thus faced the prospect of renewed competition. Furthermore, a serious restructuring of Sweden’s trade undertaken by the governmental authorities also threatened to undermine England’s commercial interests. Edward Wood outlined his concern citing two primary causes. Wood’s first issue was that responsibility for commercial policy had now been positioned away from the Swedish Board of Trade and under the more direct control of the Crown and Treasury. Wood argued this change directly and negatively impacted the current state of affairs on which favourable trade relations were based. He stated, “his Majesty having of late taken that Power from the Commerce College and invested it in his Treasury as a thing regarding his Revenue; these new Masters have taken another course”.62 More specifically Wood outlined how English traders, who had recently paid comparable customs duties to local, Stockholm burgesses, would now be subject to a different levy. This would severely impinge on the gains made in the Swedish import market. This new commercial structure threatened to revert England’s trade with Sweden back to levels not seen since a decade prior. As shown in Figure 0.6, during the peak of England’s enhanced customs arrangements in 1675, the value of direct and third-​party imports into Stockholm carried on English ships reached similar levels at 246,997 and 205,402 riksdaler respectively. This helped to foster a greater balance of trade to mediate against the soaring export of iron to English harbours. Now Wood outlined the new state of affairs brought into place after the 1677 customs reforms and restructuring. Here the Swedish Crown and Treasury sought to bring about more protective measures to increase customs revenue, and presumably to counteract growing English influence over its commerce. The new customs arrangements saw 62

tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677.

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the Swedes counter pose the customs value of imported goods brought into Sweden against their own export commodities. It represented an attempt to bring about the balance of their own trade.63 In practice this meant that the export of one ssp of iron was correspondingly measured and equivalent to the import of one barrel of salt. Similarly the export of one ssp of brass wire was equivalent to the import of six and a half barrels of salt. One ssp of copper corresponded to 1614/​15 barrels of salt. Furthermore, where English shippers and merchants had formerly enjoyed relaxed customs duties on a number of foodstuffs, particularly in relation to grains such as corn and malt, the tax on these commodities had risen. Wood predicted these new measures would seriously impinge on trade and profit. However, he also admitted it should not completely halt English trade with Sweden.64 Despite Edward Wood’s concerns, by the beginning of the 1680s, English trade continued to be the main force in Swedish commercial affairs. Stockholm’s own export trade had recovered considerably after a return to peacetime conditions. As can be seen from Figure 0.5, for the first time since the 1660s the total value of the export trade surpassed 2 million riksdaler to a value of 2,491,047 riksdaler. The return of significant numbers of Dutch merchants to Stockholm and a resumption of exports to France played a large part in boosting the value of exports. As shown in Figure 4.5, exports to the Dutch Republic were worth 611,143 riksdaler, making it the second most valuable export destination. Exports to Lübeck increased in value from 244,376 riksdaler in 1675 to 332,890 riksdaler in 1680. While exports to France had completely ceased in 1675, they rose to 152,520 riksdaler, a figure comparable to peacetime values seen ten years earlier.65 England’s own trade with Stockholm continued unabated despite gloomy predictions from just three years prior. Although there was an 18% decrease in the value of goods exported to English ports in 1680, at a value of 745,482 riksdaler, it represented the second most valuable export season in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction. The reappearance of competitive western markets makes this figure all the more significant. The presence of Dutch and French traders does not seem to have encroached upon English commercial interests in Stockholm. Although England’s share of Stockholm’s 63 64 65

tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. “They have proceeded to a Regulation, according to which every thing is to bee ballanc’d.” tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. “compar’d with what wee formerly enjoy’d, have considerably abated the profit arising for our Trade, yet wee could continue to carry it on to reasonable advantage”. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680.

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

England

745,482

Dutch Republic

611,143

Lübeck

332,890

France

152,520

Danzig

78,605

Export Destination

Scotland

89,780

Hamburg

57,149

Riga

31,570

Stralsund

30,220

Wismar

23,357

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­f igure 4.5  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1680 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 59. 1680

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

800,000

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205

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total trade decreased from 51% in 1675 to 30% in 1680 goods exported to England still maintained a consistently high level.66 English activity continued to focus on sourcing and exporting iron. Exports of iron totalled 67,015 ssp equivalent to a value of 672,659 riksdaler. Wrought iron was the dominant type of iron exported to England, totalling 342 consignments, in contrast to just sixteen consignments of steel and other varieties of iron. Iron, steel, and its derivatives accounted for around 90% of total exports from Stockholm to England in 1680. Brass wire continued to play a larger role in the composition of exports to England. It was the second most valuable commodity with an export of 548 ssp, equating to 45,493 riksdaler. As with copper, brass was a considerably more valuable commodity averaging at around 83 riksdaler per ssp. This made it the most expensive Swedish export commodity per weight. Copper played a more diminished role than it had hitherto over the course of the 1670s, with an export of just 93 ssp at a total value of 5,279 riksdaler.67 Tar and pitch exports continued to be bottlenecked due to difficulties with the Swedish Tar Company. Exports now numbered around 5,862 barrels of tar, worth a value of 29,312 riksdaler. Exports of pitch amounted to 1,024 barrels, at a total value of 6,143 riksdaler.68 Despite the overall value of tar and pitch increasing from their 1675 level, problems with the Swedish Tar Company continued. This suggests that Edward Wood’s lamentations on the lack of a viable contract with the Tar Company still seriously hampered English trade in Swedish tar.69 Although tar and pitch were mainly produced from the hinterlands around the Gulf of Finland, they were primarily shipped to Stockholm which acted as the Tar Company’s central base to oversee re-​export operations.70 English traders began to source tar and pitch elsewhere, probably in

66 67 68 69

70

ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. A combined, average price for iron exports from Stockholm, including wrought iron, steel and other derivatives, saw the base price of iron at around 10 riksdaler per ssp. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. Edward Wood’s treatise on trade with Sweden outlined the difficulties the English encountered with obtaining tar and pitch due to the expiry of the Swedish Tar Company’s contract with Samuel Sowton in 1675. The Tar Company attempted to conclude a similar contract with other English merchants in Stockholm it deemed suitable but none would take sole responsibility. The Tar Company therefore failed to prioritise sales to the English market from that point on until a satisfactory contract could be concluded. tna, sp 95/​11, pp. 17–​18. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. Commercial organisation of tar exports from Swedish trade areas were focused on Stockholm but tar production quotas for export were allocated to other towns in Sweden, Finland and further afield also also. Åström, From Tar to Timber, pp. 20–​23.

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direct response to the disagreements with the tar monopoly authorities in Stockholm. In 1675 and 1680 English shippers journeyed to the outer edges of the Baltic to the ports of Vyborg and Trångsund (Vysotsk). In 1675, English traders also sought tar and pitch from domestic Swedish ports outside of centralised control in southern and southeastern areas such as Barösund, Västervik, Kalmar, Kristianstad, Malmö, and Dalarö. To a lesser extent tar and pitch was exported to England from other major ports across the Swedish Empire such as Riga, Reval and Narva. Put into context, a total of 8,632 barrels of tar and pitch were shipped to England from sources outside of Stockholm. This was a figure lower than what was exported from Stockholm under the auspices of the leading Tar Company officials in the capital.71 Similarly in 1680, English traders continued to venture further afield for tar and pitch. Vyborg and Trångsund continued to play the largest role with a combined export of 3,068 barrels of tar and pitch. At this point Narva had become the second largest port outside of Stockholm to supply England with tar, with a total of 1,638 barrels exported to England. Domestic Swedish ports such as Malmö, Dalarö and Västervik exported a combined 695 barrels, while Reval also played its part. At a total of 5,818 barrels in comparison to the 6,886 barrels exported from the Swedish capital, the wider Swedish trade area served as a serious and vital alternative export outlet to Stockholm for both tar and pitch exports. Whether English tar traders were looking to circumvent the Swedish Tar Company monopoly by turning to alternative ports beyond the direct gaze of the metropole’s authorities is currently unknown.72 Nevertheless, despite both internal and external challenges, English commercial knowledge and capital was demonstrably capable of circumventing obstructions to acquire the necessary goods. It also shows the option of using the wider Swedish trade area as an alternative source of supply outside of Stockholm, particularly for tar and pitch. Although England was the primary destination for exports from Stockholm, the extent to which English traders had the capacity to trade during the course 71

72

stro searches: The Baltic to England and Wales, 1675–​1676; Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1675–​1676; ssa, sca, Vol. 41. 1675. The majority of shipments were tar. Vyborg and Trångsund were the largest suppliers with 3770 barrels of tar. Narva furnished 819 barrels of tar, while domestic Swedish ports provided 4043 barrels. Kristianstad provided the only example of pitch exports. Sven-​Erik Åström publishes a number of figures based on collated information on exports of tar from across the Swedish Empire for the periods 1673–​79 and 1684–​87 principally intended for oversight from central authorities. Åström, From Tar to Timber, pp. 23–​24. stro searches: The Baltic to England and Wales, 1680–​1681; Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1680–​1681. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680.

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of 1680 is questionable. The resurgence of local merchants in the export trade to England was palpable. Only a handful of British traders such as William Smith, John Strother, William Mauld and Adam Lyall could lay claim to an export account of any significance. The remainder of their English counterparts struggled to participate in the export trade despite their expertise and their presence in Stockholm. Ashton Nuttall, Gilbert and Josiah Heathcote, Robert Coward and John Bowyer, who had all handled a considerable amount of goods in previous year, had been edged out of the market by local traders. Thomas Cutler, an experienced English merchant, was almost completely absent from the export market, instead only consigning a handful of Russian carpets and some small quantities of iron to London on board Robert Lawton’s ship in early September 1680.73 The level of frequency as well as the lesser value of the individual consignments English merchants were shipping to England reveal a merchant community struggling to compete against native competition.74 This was an incredible turn of fortune in the space of just five years when the British mercantile community themselves had handled over 70% of the market share of exports.75 It marked the first time when England had been at peace that locally based merchants were able to supersede their English counterparts in the export market to England. England had become the largest market for Swedish goods and although an experienced and eager local community had always played a significant part in the trade, they had hitherto largely played a secondary role to the wider British community. Local operators more than demonstrated their capacity to handle the trade. The value and amount of goods shipped to England in 1680 was the single largest peacetime export in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction. Despite the shifting fortunes of the Stockholm export community to the detriment of English merchants, England’s thirst for Swedish goods, namely iron, was still being adequately satisfied. What then was the reasoning behind the adverse fortunes of England’s merchants in Stockholm? Edward Wood had forewarned of the potentially negative impacts of trade in 1677 as the English began to lose their access to the native customs

73 74 75

Cutler’s overall trade was valued at just 1961 riksdaler. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. Four settled Scottish traders who held native privileges namely Adam Lyall, David Fife, George Marjoribank and James Mestertoun were responsible for exporting 64,269 riksdaler worth of goods to England. The lion’s share was on Adam Lyall’s account who was the sixth largest exporter with an export account worth 60,745 riksdaler. Exports by Scottish traders were mostly limited to wrought iron. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680.

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privileges that had propelled Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction during the mid-​1670s. However, the agreement reached between England and Sweden had been a watershed moment in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact and was unique to this specific period. Prior to that juncture English ­merchants had successfully plied their trade without such favourable and encouraging conditions. Therefore, the removal of such customs privileges should not have been a problem for English merchants trading in ports across the Swedish Empire, particularly in Stockholm. The dearth of activity on the part of England’s merchants in Stockholm in 1680 could be explained by the lack of a viable Anglo-​Swedish treaty in place. For the first time in a generation, English merchants were operating in the Swedish trade area without an extant commercial treaty underpinning their activity. Not since prior to the landmark Treaty of 1654 had Anglo-​Swedish commercial undertakings failed to be accounted for under the protection of a ratified diplomatic agreement between the two nations. By 1680 English traders had been operating without such a treaty in place for some years, once the ten-​year long Treaty of 1665, and its subsequent two-​year extension, had failed to be renewed. The provisional agreements struck between England and Sweden during the mid-​1670s as the treaty had become null and void, eroded the immediate necessity for a treaty. As outlined by Edward Wood in his foreboding memorial dispatched from Stockholm, the Swedes had once again changed the conditions under which English exporters conducting business in the Swedish Empire were to operate by bringing about a new system of customs aimed at balancing their own trade.76 However, this was not the first occasion on which English merchants at home and abroad had complained of the Swedish customs system, even while an Anglo-​Swedish commercial treaty was in place. Such grievances can be glimpsed from petitions to the English Council of Trade during the 1660s, as dealt with in the previous chapter. There was nothing to suggest that prior Anglo-​Swedish commercial agreements provided more favourable customs conditions in Swedish trade. There were never any clauses present in Anglo-​ Swedish commercial treaties that sought to ensure the English were guaranteed a lower or particular rate of duty on Swedish exports. These treaties were largely designed to protect English trade in Sweden against other foreign incursions. Such clauses typically granted the English the right of “first nation” which sought to ensure the equal status of English traders in respect of other active foreign traders. This ensured that their commercial activities were not 76

tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677.

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placed at a disadvantage to any other foreign nation when concurrent treaties were concluded by Sweden. The root of the problem may lie in the fact that for the first time in 26 years the English had no treaty in place while the Dutch Republic concurrently had successfully concluded its own commercial agreement with Sweden in the autumn of 1679.77 However, commercial statistics clearly show that English trade as a whole had not suffered in Sweden. Despite Sweden and the Dutch Republic officially aligning their commercial interests under a new agreement, England was still both a larger importer and exporter of goods than the Dutch Republic.78 Therefore in order to appreciate the changing nature of England’s trade in Stockholm at this juncture it is necessary to distinguish between the prosperity of England’s trade as a whole, and the wellbeing of England’s traders. Treating these as two separate entities is critical. In 1680, Anglo-​Swedish trade continued apace and a new core of non-​English traders bore the responsibility in the export market. It must be stressed that those traders in Stockholm who supplanted English merchants were not Dutch traders. Rather they were burgesses of Stockholm who were adept and experienced exporters.79 This situation most likely arose due to the shift in customs policy following the transfer of responsibility of commercial affairs to the Swedish Crown and Treasury. The fact that English merchants were still active participants in Stockholm, but trading at such a depressed rate, perhaps demonstrates that they were simply priced out of the market by local merchants who had more favourable rates in regard to customs duties. Despite the introduction of a new commercial system to favour the balancing of Swedish trade, English traders continued to exert considerable influence. As can be seen from Figure 0.6, the combined value of England’s direct and third-​party import trade represented a peak year for total imports arriving 77

78

79

More information on the commercial agreement concluded in 1679 and ratified in 1681 can be found in Hannula, Henri, ‘Commercial Diplomacy from Below: Dutch Baltic Merchants as an Economic Interest Group in Dutch-​Swedish Relations 1675–​1688’, in Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis, 16, 2021, pp. 48–​49. Thank you to Henri Hannula for helping me with information regarding this treaty. In respect to both of Sweden’s two largest domestic ports. In 1685, trade to England comprised 48% of Gothenburg’s outgoing trade, while exports to the Dutch Republic were equivalent to 10% of the town’s export trade. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680; gla, gca, Vol. 875. 1685. Information pertaining to burgess affiliation within Stockholm’s mercantile community can be found in Haasum, Emilie A. (ed.), Register öfver Borgare i Stockholm 1601–​1650 & 1650–​1688, 1689–​1750, 1919.

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in Stockholm in connection with English trade. At a combined value of 604,139 riksdaler, imports arriving on English ships had reached a higher level than previous peak years in 1660 and 1675. Imports brought into Stockholm by English traders from ports outside of England actually depreciated around 13% in value from 205,402 riksdaler in 1675 to 177,471 riksdaler in 1680. In contrast, direct imports from England rose from 246,997 riksdaler in 1675 by 42% to 426,668 riksdaler in 1680. The 1680 trading season marked the first point at which England became the highest direct importer of goods into Stockholm. Imports from England accounted for 18% of the total Stockholm import market.80 The combined, ongoing activity of English traders in importing goods from England and other ports in Europe demonstrates the resilience of England’s import trade into Stockholm despite altered commercial conditions. In his letter to Secretary of State Williamson three years prior, Edward Wood bemoaned the difficulties in achieving a balance of trade in Swedish trade. Sourcing iron remained the primary motivation for English merchants to journey into the Baltic. The amount of goods being exported from Sweden were simply not being matched by the level of imports being brought in to help balance payments for goods. This had been a feature of Anglo-​Swedish trade since the 1650s and 1660s and had been exacerbated to unforeseen levels by the 1680s. Speaking of the import trade in particular, Wood stated: For during the Peace of This Realm few English shipps were seen in these Ports and particularly in this of Stockholm, seldom exceeding tenn in a whole year … And indeed as all the merchandize the English in those dates caus’d to come hither consisted almost in cloth … Besides this commodity wee brought sometimes a small vessel or two with coals, Tobacco, or spices. Now because our exportation at that time was much more great then our Import, and consequently these few little vessels could not by much suffice for the carrying to England those great quantities, of Iron, Pitch, Tarr, wyer, copper, & which were necessary for the service of our country.81 Perhaps Wood was somewhat exaggerating the situation with regard to the amount of imports reaching Stockholm on English ships. As has already been shown, English imports into Stockholm were steadily on the rise over the

80 81

England edged just ahead of direct imports from the Dutch Republic and Lübeck who imported goods at a value of 414,512 and 415,353 riksdaler. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. tna, sp 95/​11, pp. 15–​16. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677.

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course of the previous two decades, particularly during the 1670s. However, with England’s growing appetite for Swedish export commodities proving unmatched, the discrepancies in the balance of trade in favour of Swedish exports grew exponentially. This occurred even with England’s efforts to increase the level and variety of goods brought into Sweden and Wood was therefore right to raise such concerns. The balance of trade was an issue in both Gothenburg and Stockholm but it was particularly worrisome for the English in regards to trade with the Swedish capital. This was where the lion’s share of goods were exported to England. Only once over the 31 year period between 1655 and 1686 did English trade achieve a preferential balance of trade. From Figure 4.6. it is clear that England’s trade deficit in Sweden was a serious and consistent problem. Only in 1660 did English trade with Stockholm operate in favour of English goods at a value of 57,464 riksdaler. England’s trade deficit failed to drop below the 120,000 riksdaler mark on every other occasion from the point of established and consistent trading between England and Stockholm in the 1650s. Despite England’s increasing ability to release its goods into the Stockholm’s marketplace, during the 1660s and 1670s the thirst for Sweden’s exports increased markedly. This led the trade discrepancy to surpass 300,000 riksdaler in both 1666 and 1670. Despite favourable trading conditions during the mid-​1670s that saw English traders import vast amounts of goods from England and elsewhere, 1675 actually represented an all-​time peak for the imbalance of trade in commercial dealings with Stockholm. This was marked by an incredible 427,644 deficit in favour of Swedish exports. The trading season of 1680 saw the trade imbalance alleviated by around 67%, largely thanks to the performance of imports arriving from England. Imbalances would go on to reach critical peaks some six years later at a record deficit of 863,956 riksdaler.82 Despite such imbalances in trade, England had made significant inroads within the import trade in Stockholm by 1680. England’s ability to peddle its goods had been growing since the 1670s. Maintaining a strong import trade still

82

Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the balance of English trade in Stockholm into the 1690s due to the lack of extant commercial records for both the import and export sides of trade. It becomes even more problematic to provide a consistent appraisal of the balance of trade between England and Gothenburg due to the lack of viable commercial records for Gothenburg’s trade in many sample years. Records for 1660, 1665 and 1670 demonstrate that Gothenburg had a particularly diminished desire for goods from England, and the balance of trade overwhelmingly fell in favour of Sweden at a deficit of 86,212 riksdaler, 153,250 riksdaler, and 125,665 riksdaler to the detriment of the English in these years respectively. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686.

–500,000

0

500,000

1,000,000

1655

–121,297

150,542 29,145

1660

57,464

502,129 444,665 9250

1666

–321,759

331,009

Import value

192,632

Year

1670

–301,988

494,620

Export value

452,339

1675

–427,644

879,983

Balance of trade

1680

–141,343

745,482 604,139 313,018

1686

–863,956

1,176,974

­f igure 4.6  The balance of trade between England and Stockholm, 1655–​1686 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 21. 1655; vol. 27. 1660; vol. 29. 1666; vol. 32. 1670; vol. 41, 1675; vol. 59, 1680; vol. 74, 1686

–1,000,000

Value (Swedish riksdaler)

1,500,000

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helped to alleviate some of the adverse pressure brought on by the demand for such vast quantities of Swedish exports. This occurred in three primary ways. Firstly, the level of domestically-​produced goods, in particular imports of textiles, had grown significantly over the previous two decades. From a total value of 95,435 riksdaler imported in 1660 (and to similar levels in 1675), imports of textiles from England into Stockholm had more than doubled to reach a record figure of 218,924 riksdaler.83 Another way in which the import trade from England developed was in the diversity of its overall import portfolio. While textile imports had grown considerably they still only equated for just over half of overall imports from English ports. The remainder of imports included a more varied range of goods. Foodstuffs and re-​exported wines continued to play a large role. Malt, in particular, was one of the leading imports when it came to foodstuffs, and represents the first juncture at which it was imported in considerable numbers with a consistency across the course of the trading season. Mined goods such as coal, lead, tin and zinc ore became a larger part of England’s import trade.84 Despite English traders losing their customs privileges, the salt trade continued to be a cornerstone of the English import trade. At a total value 198,814 riksdaler, equivalent to an actual import of around 50,000 barrels, salt arriving on English ships still played a considerable role in Stockholm’s overall salt import trade. Salt imports from France and Portugal, at a combined value of 156,894 riksdaler, represented a significant section of England’s total 177,471 riksdaler trade value. The ability of English freighters to exchange salt for Swedish exports considerably improved England’s ability to balance its trade in Stockholm.85 According to Sir Edward Wood’s appraisal of the new customs arrangements put forward by the Swedish Crown and Treasury, salt played a major part in Sweden’s new “Regulation, according to which every thing is to bee balanc’d”.86 Although it is difficult to say with certainty how this worked in practice, Wood led his superiors to believe that imports of salt could be either directly exchanged in kind, or at the very least represent a bargaining chip in regard to customs tariffs.87 In comparison, English exports of iron represented

83 84 85 86 87

ssa, sca, Vol. 27. 1660; Vol. 41. 1675; Vol. 59. 1680. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680. tna, sp 95/​11, p. 17. Wood to Williamson. c. 1677. As outlined earlier, Wood stated that one barrel of salt was akin to one ssp of iron, 6 ½ and barrels of salt akin to one ssp of brass wire and just over sixteen barrels of salt to be matched against one ssp of copper.

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a total of 67,015 ssp in 1680, where English freighters imported 49,703 barrels of salt. Whether marking a direct exchange in kind or helping to alleviate the pressures of customs tariffs, it is clear to see how large a role salt could play, and perhaps explains why the English sought to maintain influence in such a potentially crucial trade. Salt was a strategically valuable commodity in Swedish trade and this only grew with the new customs regulations. It is possible to see how England and its traders could have pursued an import policy geared towards balancing its own trade in line with the newly founded customs conditions. Although the value of imports did not match the export value of goods leaving Sweden, England’s traders demonstrated their ability to participate in the import trade significantly. This was achieved by the expansion of domestic trades, particularly in textiles. It was also facilitated through the continued competitive edge England was able to maintain in the third-​ party freight of goods from southern Europe, such as salt. Although England’s third-​party freight trade would falter moving into the mid-​1680s, imports from domestic harbours continued to arrive in considerable amounts. Anglo-​Swedish trade continued to expand in the mid-​1680s. While this was occurring, Stockholm remained the predominant export destination in Sweden. As trade began to grow in numbers of shipping and overall trade value, it did not proliferate to an increased interaction with provincial ports. For example, in 1686 a total of 103 ships departed Sweden’s domestic ports in the Baltic. Only seven of these voyages originated outside Stockholm. A preference towards the larger ports of Gothenburg and Stockholm had been a consistent feature of Anglo-​Swedish trade as it expanded from the 1650s and would continue for the rest of the century.88 The growth of iron, as well as the tar and pitch trades, drove English commercial expansion in Sweden, particularly in Stockholm. As Figure 4.7 shows England continued to be the largest outlet for exports from Stockholm, and broke through the 1 million riksdaler mark in value for the first time in history. At a total value of 1,176,974 riksdaler, English trade eclipsed its nearest rival, the Dutch Republic, by a considerable margin. Exports to England represented just under 30% of the total value of Stockholm’s export market in 1680 and this rose to just over 45% by 1686. Not only had England risen to become the largest commercial outlet for Sweden by this point, but was also the most consistent. Figure 4.7 reveals that Stockholm had only two major foreign markets in England and the Dutch Republic. Other export harbours such as Lübeck and Danzig either stagnated or failed to expand in kind. Furthermore, 88

stro search: Sweden to England and Wales, 1686.

0

250,000

500,000

750,000

1,000,000

648,970

England Dutch Republic

1,176,974

Danzig

106,891

Scotland

100,411

­f igure 4.7  Major export destinations from Stockholm, 1686 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 74, 1686

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

1,250,000

Stettin

77,800

Export Destination

Riga

90,499

Lübeck

62,648

Wismar

54,825

Stralsund

42,564

Königsberg

29,907

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England was of continued significance because it was the only expanding market.89 Despite rising prices, England continued to absorb increasing volumes of Swedish iron during the 1680s.90 By 1686, iron exports to England from Stockholm had reached their greatest extent yet, and had increased from 67,015 ssp in 1680 to 75,758 ssp. Once price increases are factored in this represented an even greater financial outlay from 672,659 riksdaler in 1680 to 915,098 riksdaler in 1686. English demand for iron outstripped all of its competitors by the mid-​1680s. Iron exports to England represented 35% of Stockholm’s overall export market in 1686. The export of iron to England was alone worth 266,128 riksdaler more than the total value of all goods shipped to Stockholm’s second largest export market, the Dutch Republic. This represented a 10% larger share of trade in its own right than total exports to that market.91 Disputes over the status of contracts with the Swedish Tar Company during the 1670s and 1680s led to a significant decrease in exports of pitch and tar to England. The 1686 trading season saw the largest export of tar and pitch from Stockholm since 1660. Exports of tar to England increased from 5,852 barrels in 1680 to 23,075 barrels. This equated to an increase in value from 29,312 riksdaler in 1680 to 61,777 riksdaler in 1686. Pitch exports to England likewise saw a significant increase. From a total export of just 1,024 barrels in 1680, this figure rose by over ten times to 11,817 barrels. Accordingly the total value of pitch increased from 6,143 riksdaler in 1680 to 66,445 riksdaler in 1686.92 The removal of the Tar Company as a monopolistic driver and exporter of tar is the likely reason why exports to England were able to resume near peak figures in 1686. The Tar Company itself sustained repeated attacks at two separate meetings of the Council of Realm in both 1678 and 1680, and had been the subject of a Crown memorial relating to concerns regarding their monopoly of the trade. Karl xi announced the end of the Tar Company’s monopoly

89

90 91 92

A comparison between Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.7 shows that although exports to the Dutch Republic were considerable it failed to develop as an outlet for Swedish goods. Factoring in price increases for iron, the amount of exports shipped to the Dutch Republic actually declined between 1680 and 1686. The retail price of Stockholm iron increased from 10 riksdaler to 12 riksdaler per ssp by 1686. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686. While the value of pitch per barrel remained more stable at between five and six riksdaler between 1680 and 1686, the average price per barrel of Stockholm tar decreased from five riksdaler to just over 2 riksdaler. This explains why the overall value of tar exports had not increased at a more substantial rate. ssa, sca, Vol. 59. 1680; Vol. 74. 1686.

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in October 1680 and the company had been dismantled by November 1682.93 Those that assumed a new role in exporting tar and pitch were members of the English merchant community in Stockholm. They were responsible for exporting almost the entirety of tar and pitch exports, ranging across nearly two hundred separate consignments over the 1686 trading season.94 English merchants were not just responsible for the bulk of tar and pitch exports. By 1686 the English mercantile community in Stockholm had successfully made a resurgence in the export trade to England. Rising prices, the expansion of the iron and tar and pitch trades, as well as the contraction of the size of the export community, afforded merchants still active in English trade the ability to absorb a larger share of trade. The fifteen English exporters who were active in 1686 were responsible for directing 827,076 riksdaler worth of goods toward England, equivalent to around 70% of English trade. In a wider context, England’s exporters assumed responsibility for around 32% of Stockholm’s overall export trade. As can be seen from Figure 4.8, merchants such as Henry Moxon, Thomas Nisbett and William Hester were responsible for exporting of 563,745 riksdaler worth of goods. Their combined trade was equivalent to almost half of total exports to England, and around 22% of the overall Stockholm export trade.95 These three leading operators eclipsed all other traders, although the emergence of a small, core group of English exporters was not particularly unique to Stockholm. These market leaders did not exhibit any features of commodity specialisation. Their success was built on trading in every available commodity and to any destination seeking demand. They focused on sending the bulk of their trade to London and Hull, the traditional centres of Anglo-​Swedish trade. Their activity was ubiquitous and consistent throughout the course of the year. Each merchant regularly handled large iron consignments alongside considerable amounts of tar and pitch on the majority of ships they utilised. It was not uncommon for these merchants to consign parcels of wrought iron upwards of 1,000 ssp at a time.96

93 94 95 96

Hallberg, “Tjärexport och tjärhandelskompanier”, pp. 126–​128; Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia, pp. 435, 598–​599. Of the fifteen tar exports and eighteen pitch exports engaged in these trades to England, only two exporters, Hans Moback and Anders Dysingh, were not of English origin. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686. Nisbett may possibly have been Scottish although current research has found this to be inconclusive. Other individuals with the same surname found in ssne were Scottish. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686.

219

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688 #

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

Thomas Nisbett & William Hester

227,501

Wrought iron, brass wire, pitch, tar

England

2

Henry Moxon

230,453

Wrought iron, brass wire, pitch, tar

England

3

Thomas Nisbett

105,791

Wrought iron, pitch, tar

England

4

Jonathan Rodham

61,728

Wrought iron, pitch, copper, tar, boards

England

5

Abraham Wolters

61,286

Wrought iron, brass wire

Hamburg

6

Hindrich Hillebrand

46,483

Brass wire

Sweden

7

Thomas Cutler

45,912

Brass wire, wrought iron, pitch

England

8

Robert Hayward

43,991

Wrought iron, tar

England

9

Henry Lyall

33,913

Wrought iron

Scotland

10

Hindrich Oppendorf

26,692

Wrought iron

Unknown

*Value in Swedish Riksdaler

­f igure 4.8  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1686 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 74, 1686

Not only were English traders resurgent in handling goods to their home market but, despite the expansion of trade, the number of operators actually contracted. This elevated a few core operators to previously unscaled heights in terms of export value. In a wider context it becomes apparent that the majority of significant advances in English trade were initiated by the exertions of English traders in Stockholm’s port. This was the case during the initial expansion of trade to England in 1660, as well as the largest market share of the capital’s export trade in 1675, and when export value reached its apogee in 1686. Members of the Stockholm mercantile community competed fiercely to gain control of trade with England. However, these merchants were never consistently successful in being able to dominate the English market in contrast to exports dispatched elsewhere. Stockholm’s settled merchant community fulfilled a vital role in ensuring quotas were met during potential crises such as war. They were also able to assume the majority of English trade in 1680, and by 1686 were still responsible for a not insignificant 30% of the export trade. Overall, the drive came from the English community itself. The options for comparing the experience of English trade with Gothenburg with Stockholm during this period is severely limited due to the paucity of

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surviving material. Unfortunately, it is not possible to reflect on the import trade of Gothenburg as there are no extant records for the town’s import trade for the corresponding years in question. An appraisal of the export trade is only possible for 1675 and 1685. As can be seen from Figure 0.7, the value of goods dispatched to England from Gothenburg significantly increased between 1670 and 1675. The value of exports to England increased in value by 308,100 riksdaler, from 139,639 riksdaler in 1670 to 447,739 riksdaler in 1675. This corresponded to an increase of over 300% and represented almost 80% of Gothenburg’s total export trade in 1675.97 England benefited from the exit of other major powers as well as the inability of the Swedish merchant marine to participate in trade during a period of war. Figure 4.9 demonstrates, the extent to which Gothenburg’s export market had almost entirely pivoted towards England. How far this rise in export value and market share was attributable to England’s role as an intermediary freighter to third-​party markets remains inconclusive. As was the case in Stockholm, in every instance contemporary records declare that English skippers were bound for English ports.98 The resurgence of English merchant shipping in exporting goods to the English market was another feature of trade that was witnessed in both Stockholm and Gothenburg at this point. Further, Gothenburg was unique as demand was so great for goods that ships from Scotland and Ireland were drafted in to freight from Gothenburg to England. This becomes particularly significant considering Scottish freighters remained relatively segregated in regards to the English market. While Scottish merchants on the ground in Sweden willingly participated in the export trade to England, Scottish skippers almost entirely engaged in Scottish trade. Scottish shipping saw a return to normal practice after 1675. The increase in the average base price of wrought iron from around 13 riksdaler per ssp to 16 riksdaler per ssp was a factor that increased the value of Gothenburg’s trade. However, it was the exponential rise in the amount of iron exported that was the primary driver in England’s increased trade in Gothenburg. Exports of iron rose from 3,954 ssp in 1670 to 21,994 ssp in 1675. The sheer growth of iron exports and its central place in England’s trade with Gothenburg is comparable to what occurred in Stockholm during the same trading season. Such was the extent of England’s iron trade that exports of wrought iron were equivalent to around 79% of England’s total trade value. 97 98

gla, gca, Vol. 852. 1670; Vol. 862. 1675. There are only three examples where English ships departed Gothenburg for ports outside of England. gla, gca, Vol. 862. 1675.

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

England

447,739

Hamburg

61,296

Scotland

15,457 Dutch Republic

11,311

Denmark

4,861

Export Destination

Lübeck

4,920

Portugal

4,009

Swedish Pomerania

3,272

Riga

1,761

Rostock

1,045

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

­f igure 4.9  Gothenburg export markets by value, 1675 sources: gla, gca, vol. 862, 1675

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

500,000

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221

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Chapter 4

Iron exports to England alone comprised 63% of Gothenburg’s export value in 1675.99 In a wider context, the export of iron to England in 1675 eclipsed Gothenburg’s total iron trade to all markets prior to this point.100 The reopening of trade to England’s rivals such as the Dutch Republic and France coincided with a reduction in England’s involvement in Gothenburg’s export trade. As Figure 0.7 shows, the overall value of Gothenburg’s trade had stabilised at a total of 490,862 riksdaler. This was a level reminiscent of trade recorded in both 1665 and 1670. It was partly because the average price of iron fluctuated more widely in Gothenburg. In contrast to the rise in prices witnessed in Stockholm, the average price of iron exported from Gothenburg decreased from 16 riksdaler per ssp in 1675 to around 10 riksdaler per ssp in 1685. The re-​entry of rival buyers to Gothenburg not only helped curb the grip the English had previously held on the market, but may have facilitated the greater desire for Gothenburg iron. Total iron exports from Gothenburg increased by around 26,000 ssp in 1675 to over 32,000 ssp ten years later.101 Despite increased trade to Hamburg, the Dutch Republic, and elsewhere, England still remained the primary export destination by some margin. As Figure 4.10. shows, England commanded a market share of 48%, representing a total export value of 237,670 riksdaler. Their closest rivals were Hamburg, responsible for around 20% of exports, and the Dutch Republic, which absorbed around 10% of Gothenburg’s total export trade. England’s exports from Gothenburg continued to focus on sourcing iron, which still comprised over 70% of goods shipped to English ports. At a total value of 166,845 riksdaler, iron exports to England were equivalent to 16,630 ssp. While this represented a decrease of 5,000 ssp seen ten years earlier, the figure itself represented an export level that far outstripped its competitors, as well as the amount that was being exported to England some fifteen to twenty years earlier.102 When placed in context, the iron trade and the demand for Swedish exports from Gothenburg mirrored the experience of Stockholm. On both sides of the Baltic, English trade was stronger than ever during years under peacetime conditions. 99

Other export commodities also witnessed significant increases. Gothenburg’s mast trade to England rose from a value of just 586 riksdaler in 1670 to 12,314 riksdaler in 1675. This equated to an export of 602 individual pieces in 1670 to 602 pieces five years later. Pitch exports more than doubled between 1670 and 1675. Total exports of pitch were valued at over 40,000 riksdaler in 1675. gla, gca, Vol. 862. 1675. 100 For example, Gothenburg’s previous highest figure for total iron exports across all markets occurred in 1670 when the town export 21,324 ssp of iron. Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920. 1 01 gla, gca, Vol. 875. 1685; Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart, 1637–​1920. 102 gla, gca, Vol. 875. 1685.

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

England

237,670

Hamburg

98,686

Dutch Republic

49,322

Year

Scotland

31,338

France

16,962

Danzig

10,790

Portugal

10,562

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

­f igure 4.10 Gothenburg export markets by value, 1685 sources: gla, gca, vol. 875. 1685

Value (Swedish Riksdaler)

250,000

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223

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Chapter 4

The unique political conditions of the mid-​1670s served to benefit a ready English mercantile community in relation to Sweden’s foreign trade in the Baltic and North Sea. Both Gothenburg and Stockholm witnessed huge surges in English trade with other export markets adversely affected. Iron played a considerable role in this increased trade with England in both Gothenburg and Stockholm. England absorbed around 50% of Stockholm’s total export trade by value in 1675, which was a significant share of the overall market. However, this figure was even larger in Gothenburg, where exports to England represented around 80% of the total value for that year. This was because Stockholm’s relationship with ports in the Baltic such as Lübeck and Danzig created more avenues for trade. As can be seen from Figure 4.9, contrastingly, the majority of Gothenburg’s foreign trade outside of England faltered considerably with minimal export opportunity elsewhere. The re-​entry of rival buyers and export markets witnessed from the mid-​ 1680s impacted England’s overall share of Gothenburg’s trade, which mirrored what occurred on the opposite side of the country in Stockholm. Another trend that impacted on trade in Sweden’s two primary ports across the period was the wholesale growth in English trade. England became the uncontested, largest market for Swedish goods in Gothenburg, as had occurred in Stockholm. 3

The Problem of Payment

While Anglo-​Swedish commercial interaction was experiencing new heights there were a number of English merchants that experienced prolonged issues with acquiring payment for goods imported into Sweden. Diplomatic relations during the 1660s failed to prioritise commercial matters and instead largely focused on the concerns of strategic alliance building with Sweden. During the 1670s and 1680s a shift occurred. English diplomats in Sweden and the Council of Trade in London began to actively pursue the grievances of merchants involved in Swedish trade. The relationship between England’s diplomatic processes and commercial affairs was becoming reciprocal. George Shuttleworth, an English merchant in Stockholm, had acted as an unofficial diplomatic agent in between the appointment of official embassies during the 1660s. This provided the Secretary of State in London with information on developments in Sweden, although commercial issues appear to have been largely sidestepped.103 By 103 tna, sp 95/​7, pp. 97–​98. George Shuttleworth to Arlington. Stockholm, 23 February 1669.

Mixed Fortunes, 1672–1688

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the 1670s, English merchants began to act more consistently as commercial consultants.104 Cooperation on commercial matters between experienced English merchants in Sweden saw the English authorities seek their advice during ongoing treaty negotiations and in return Edward Wood presented their grievances to Swedish Chancellor de la Gardie.105 One persistent problem for merchants was in receiving payment. In an effort to keep their merchants engaged in trade, English diplomats, the Council of Trade, the Privy Council and the Crown all provided official backing in an attempt to rectify financial difficulties.106 The problem of payment had been a factor of conducting trade with Sweden for some time. The protracted difficulties that John Coote had experienced at the beginning of the century are a clear representation of this struggle.107 It is difficult to ascertain whether this was a persistent or sporadic problem as trade with Sweden became more consistent and intensive during the 1650s and 1660s. Nevertheless, the problem was so acute in 1675 that diplomatic secretary William Allestree said of Swedish merchants that ‘wee knowing Merchants here to bee the most ready undertakers for the delivery of such things, and the slowest Performers’.108 Thus by the 1670s and 1680s obtaining payment was obviously a well-​known and acute problem for contemporaries engaged in trade with Sweden. By studying English complaints found in the Council of Trade and diplomatic records a picture emerges of the contemporary appeals process at work. It also highlights the inherent difficulties in conducting trade with Sweden. The first known petition concerning Swedish trade occurred at the beginning of July 1680. London merchants John Jeffryes and Jacob Lucy had sold tobacco to the Swedish Tobacco Company, the entity that held a monopoly

104 tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 53–​54, 58–​59. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 13 January 1674 and 20 January 1674. 105 tna, sp 95/​9, pp. 195–​196, 250–​251. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 17 November 1675 and 19 January 1676. 106 Not only were the English merchants in Sweden being consulted by their government on political events in Sweden (see above and Chapter 3), but documents in the Council of Trade records reveal that merchant grievances regarding Swedish trade were being heard from the 1670s. There is also evidence to suggest that these complaints could inform and influence the direction of English commercial policy when negotiating subsequent treaties with Sweden. The impetus for this cooperation appears to have come from the merchants themselves. See tna, co 388/​1, pp. 107–​122, during 1679, pp. 157–​161 during 1680, pp. 170–​176 during 1681. 107 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed account of John Coote’s trade. 108 tna, sp 95/​9, p. 119. Allestree to Williamson. Stockholm, 2 June 1675.

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over tobacco imports into Sweden at this juncture. In 1674, Jeffryes & Lucy had delivered their goods to Andrew (Anders) Onkell, a merchant of Stockholm.109 The Londoners alleged that Onkell received £10,000 of their goods, and ‘doth now not only refused to pay the same … but neglects to give any account of it’.110 The merchants feared that without royal intervention the debt would go unpaid and petitioned Charles ii to send a royal letter to Karl xi. The king agreed and the Council of Trade, along with Secretary of State Leoline Jenkins, subsequently informed English diplomatic representatives in Sweden of the situation.111 The merchants’ bookkeeper William Hartman was made to swear on oath that Onkell did in fact owe the petitioners the stated sum.112 By the end of the month royal letters had been drawn up and dispatched to Sweden. Legal proceedings had now begun against Anders Onkell. Unfortunately, the majority of petitions concerning non-​payment cannot currently be traced further than their original supplications in England. The Anders Onkell and Swedish Tobacco Company case is the only current example of its sort to have emerged in Swedish archives. A number of documents relating to the affair have been discovered in the Swedish Tobacco Company’s collection of letters to Karl xi.113 The original Tobacco Company letter to the Swedish Crown appears to be an explanation absolving the company of any culpability or wrongdoing in the affair after the initial English complaint had been raised in Sweden. The company stated that a Swedish skipper named Lorentz Östersson imported 5½ large barrels of English tobacco in 1674. The company then stated that Anders Onkell was acting as ‘Company Ombudzman’ at the time of the affair, although the implication is that he was no longer involved with the company itself. The Swedish Tobacco Company continued, noting that it was an unusually large shipment which in this particular case had been arranged by Onkell and Östersson in cohort to be imported in secret.114 A disagreement then occurred 109 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 162–​163. 07/​19 July 1680. Onkell’s name often appears as ‘Vukell’ or ‘Virkell’ in the English sources. In Swedish sources it is often rendered as ‘Onkell”, although can also appear as ‘Unkell’. Onkell first appears in the Stockholm customs records as an exporter to England in 1670 and subsequently appears as importer of goods from England in both 1670, 1675 and again as an exporter in the Stockholm weighbooks in 1676. ssa, sca, Vol. 32. 1670, Vol. 41. 1675; sra, svb, Vol. 19.3. 1676. 110 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 162–​163. 07/​19 July 1680. 111 tna co 388/​1, pp. 166–​167. 21 July 1680. 112 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 166–​167. 21 August 1680. 113 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. The Swedish Tobacco Company to the Swedish Crown, undated. 114 Ibid.

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between Onkell and Östersson as to who would pay the freightage and customs fees at the Sound, as Onkell and the English merchants involved both refused to do so. Östersson then took up his case to Swedish Councillor, Ebbe Ulfeldt, who sided with the skipper against the company. It is unclear what Ulfeldt’s role was in the matter, but he utilised his influence to strike a deal for a two-​part payment to Östersson for the goods.115 Three fees were set forward by Ulfeldt and his representative. Firstly, a payment of 4,000 Swedish Riksdaler, then a final payment of 6,000 riksdaler, with the remaining 319 riksdaler seemingly forwarded to Ulfeldt as some form of bureaucratic fee. However, the deal was aborted when a complaint from England stated that the goods were worth much more than the 10,319 riksdaler agreed upon in Sweden. If Jeffryes & Lucy and their bookkeeper are to be believed, the £10,000 fee was closer in equivalency to 40,000 riksdaler, or even higher.116 An enquiry was undertaken to determine the truth and a number of depositions were made. Those called forth included Hindrich Berg, the customs warehouse inspector at the time, as well as the notary ‘Torschely’ and even Anders Onkell himself.117 Inspector Berg concluded that the English tobacco was worth £10,010 and the shipment consisted of 1,067 rolls of tobacco.118 The next move came on 13 November 1676, when the President of the Swedish Board of Trade, Knut Kurck was asked to pass down his judgement on the case.119 Kurck ordered that Onkel pay the 10,319 Riksdaler fee that was initially mentioned by the Tobacco Company.120 However, the enquiry continued, remaining unresolved, and influential figures, such as the Treasury official Bartold Ruuth and even former Chancellor

1 15 Ibid. 116 Unfortunately, a precise figure of exchange is elusive as conflicting contemporary sources present widely fluctuating reports on currency values during the period in question. Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain precisely what the 10,319 riksdaler payment was intended for. The Swedish Tobacco Company stated that the payments were to be paid in riksdaler and so a base figure of four riksdaler to one pound sterling as based on the calculations made by Alexia Grosjean have been duly applied here. See: Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance, xi. 117 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. ‘Extract af Packhuus Rächningen’, No. 1 and No. 2. 118 Ibid. While scattered references to tobacco imports appear with a degree of frequency in the Stockholm customs accounts due to the tobacco trade operating under a monopoly contract, imports of tobacco often pass toll free and their values remain unrecorded. Furthermore, a variety of sorts of tobacco and weights and measures are often applied making it difficult to ascertain the specifics pertaining to exact amount of tobacco imported at any one point or even collectively. 119 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. President Knut Kurck’s judgement, 13 November 1676. 120 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. 20 May 1677.

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Magnus de la Gardie were called upon to help out.121 A wider list of creditors to whom the Swedish Tobacco Company was indebted in Sweden was drafted during the summer of 1681 with the requisite figures. Nothing is mentioned of the debt to Jeffryes & Lucy.122 The final extant document relating to the case is an accounts sheet from 1 December 1681 revealing the operational value of the Swedish Tobacco Company at that juncture to be 14,330 riksdaler. Nothing is said of any payments to be directed towards England, English merchants or even any Swedish agents on the behalf of Anders Onkell or the Swedish Tobacco Company. The very mention of the fact that the goods originated in England and an official complaint had been lodged therefore disappears from the enquiry after its initial mention in the first Tobacco Company letter to the Swedish Crown. From that point onward Swedish government officials and the Tobacco Company itself seemed more concerned with settling their own accounts domestically. The discovery of these documents shows that it was possible for merchant complaints to find their way to Sweden and to be discussed in official circles. English goods and English complaints raised concerns not only in commercial institutions and within the mercantile community itself, but also at the highest level of government in England. However, it also reveals the truth behind Swedish priorities. Swedish merchants and government officials were more concerned with settling their own affairs rather than ensuring merchants in England were properly recompensed. It is probably not a coincidence that the last Swedish document relating to the case dates from 1681 and the official complaint in England was lodged not long before this juncture. It is likely that Jeffryes & Lucy had made a complaint through commercial channels prior to seeking official help from England and were able to keep track of events in Sweden. It is likely when they discovered compensation was not forthcoming they took matters to Charles ii.123 At a value of £10,000 for a single consignment, the Jeffryes & Lucy tobacco debacle demonstrates how valuable this particular commodity could be for English trade with Sweden. The appetite for tobacco in Sweden must have been particularly strong if native merchants like Anders Onkell were prepared to commit such a hefty and risky case of financial malfeasance to import such 1 21 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. 1 June 1681 and 1 December 1681. 122 sra, Skrivelser till Kungl. Maj:t, Vol. 801. 30 June, 16 August, 1 September 1681. 123 tna, co 388/​1, p. 168. 21 July 1680. Confirmation for a letter to be written and dispatched from Charles ii to Karl xi “intreating him not to protect one Andrew Virkell a Merchant of Stockholme who had possessed himself of a large sums of Money the property of the Petitioners in order that legal processes may be established against him”.

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large and valuable amounts whilst seeking to avoid customs duty. The very existence of a monopoly company contract over the import of a single commodity demonstrates how far an appetite for profit was seen in Swedish circles. Speaking of the tobacco trade in 1677 and its potential to be expanded in English hands, Edward Wood noted, “the Swedes commonalty passionately love that herbe”.124 It can be troublesome to trace the amount and value of the English tobacco trade with Sweden. Contemporary Swedish sources often fail to disclose the presence of tobacco due to its position under monopoly contracts. This was the case for both tobacco and sugar entering Stockholm for much of the later seventeenth century. However, around the same period the Jeffryes & Lucy case was taking place the Danish Sound Toll Registers reveal the extent of the English tobacco trade in the Baltic. In 1675 alone a total of 378,700 Danish pounds of tobacco was imported into the Baltic by English ships across 40 voyages. This was equivalent to around 84% of the total tobacco import trade entering the Baltic.125 During the same trading season English ships controlled around 50% of all tobacco imports into ports under Swedish control. In 1675, all nine shipments imported into Stockholm were on English ships.126 English dominance in the Baltic tobacco trade was not isolated to 1675, but was a trend that occurred over a longer period.127 It demonstrates the significance of the tobacco trade for the English operating in the Baltic. It was a commodity which experienced less competition than elsewhere and comprised a key element of England’s import product portfolio in Swedish trade. The

124 tna, sp 95/​11, p. 20. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, c. 1677. The context in which Wood was talking of tobacco was to demonstrate to his superiors at home in England the potential tobacco had for English trade in Sweden if its import was to be solely in English hands and wrestled away from the Swedish Tobacco Company whom Wood believed hindered the trade. “And as the Swedes commonalty passionately love that herbe, so the custom, arising from the large quantity which by a free permission would bee brought in and consum’d besides the convenience of his people would bee infinitely more considerable to his Majesty then all the company can, or will ever present him.” 125 The Danish “pund” was equivalent to around 0.5kg. See stro “Measurements units”. The stro on the whole record tobacco in Danish pounds although some alternative, ambiguous measurements such as cases or chests do appear occasionally. stro search: Unspecified to The Baltic, 1675. “Toback” and “ Tobach”. 126 In 1675 Stockholm imported 69,300 Danish pounds of tobacco, which was equivalent to 15% of all Baltic imports of tobacco. stro search: Unspecified to The Baltic, 1675. “Toback” and “ Tobach”. 127 For example, English traders handled 85% of imports of tobacco entering the Baltic in 1680 and 1686. stro search: Unspecified to The Baltic, 1680 and 1686. “Toback” and “ Tobach”.

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Jeffryes & Lucy case not only reveals the importance of this commodity on a personal level to particular English traders, but shows how Swedish merchants could seek to avoid fulfilling their contracts for tobacco in light of omissions in contemporary customs records. The Jeffryes & Lucy case set a precedent to demonstrate to Swedish traders that failing to pay for English tobacco would result in English diplomatic intervention. English merchants who were attempting to find viable export markets in Sweden faced further difficulties trying to receive timely payment for their goods. This was not limited to just tobacco. The second petition which has been discovered concerning debts in Sweden came the following year after the Jeffryes & Lucy tobacco case. Another London merchant trading to Stockholm named Paul Darby was involved in the cloth trade. Sometime in the late 1670s to early 1680s, Darby sold ‘severall Goods of Cloaths amounting to a considerable Sume of money’ to Niklas Prinz, a merchant of Stockholm. Prinz in turn sold the goods to the Swedish Admiralty. The goods were valued at 13,405 Swedish riksdaler.128 Darby’s petition is the only current example in which English cloth can be linked to providing clothing for the Swedish Navy.129 Although no extant contracts or orders from official Swedish ministries or authorities can as of yet be pointed to, it does suggest that there was a link when necessity provided opportunity. Before soliciting help through official channels by petitioning the Council of Trade, Darby initially sent his ‘Atturney and Factor’ Jacob van Swindern in Stockholm to pursue Printz for payment. In contrast to Jeffryes & Lucy, Darby shows that it was possible to reach out to associates on the ground in Sweden before official litigation was undertaken. Darby then requested royal intervention to receive payment for his goods. An additional document, potentially a copy of a letter sent to Sweden, is signed by ‘John van der Hagen’, an established merchant of Stockholm, who may have also acted as an associate or representative of Darby.130 The English Privy Council engaged with Darby and 1 28 tna, co 388/​1, p. 191. 25 July 1681. 129 Åström spoke of an ‘Abraham Darby’. Scrutiny of his sources has revealed this to be the same case. Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 64. For reasoning behind the limitations imposed on English cloth in Sweden, see the partisan actions of Daniel Young Leijonancker in 1672. Murdoch, Network North, p. 177. 130 tna, co 388/​1, p. 196. 10 December 1681. Both Swindern and Van der Hagen appear in the Stockholm customs records as trading with England at various points. Johan van Swindern first appears as a small scale exporter of iron to England in August 1675. Likewise Johan van der Hagen appears as both an importer and exporter of goods in connection with the English market. Van der Hagen exported iron to England on various occasions during 1675 and imported Canary wine and cheese from London in January 1675. ssa, sca, Vol. 41.

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recognised that he had concluded a contract with the Swedish Admiralty to be delivered and received through Printz in Stockholm to the sum of 13,405 riksdaler.131 What became of Darby’s petition is unknown. The existing documents contain two dates, 1678 and 1681, so it is possible that Darby first opened the case in 1678 and had still not received satisfaction and thus lodged an additional complaint in 1681. Darby’s case was officially recognised by the Privy Council, but there is no evidence as to whether he ever found satisfaction. The final case to consider is that of Robert Blome and William Smith, who imported rye into Sweden on the English ship the Batchelour Adventure sometime during the winter of 1675. Similar to Darby, the case was revisited years later in 1681. The case represented a potentially delicate diplomatic situation as Karl xi himself was implicated. Joseph Hanson, the skipper of the ship, successfully sailed to Gothenburg where he was then detained in port upon the order of the king. The Swedish king was on campaign against the Danish army in the west of Sweden, and the ship’s cargo of corn was deemed vital for the supply of the Swedish military.132 Blome and Smith must have presented the case to the authorities in a similar manner to the aforementioned petitions, as Charles ii ordered the Secretary of State to delegate the issue to English Envoy Edward Wood. The case is unique in the respect that it presents the role of the diplomat in attempting to bring about restitution for English merchants in Swedish trade into full focus. Previously the appeals process and the governmental machinery in place from the English side were clear to see, but whatever role English diplomatic representatives may have played in the aforementioned cases is not known due to a lack of extant sources. Wood acted with diligence and immediately visited the king’s closest advisor Johan Gyllenstierna, who was reputed to be pro-​English.133 Wood also had the opportunity to speak with one of the king’s secretaries. He presented Blome and Smith’s contract that had been concluded by an unnamed Swedish committee in the king’s name. The contract provides another example of English 1675. For more on the van der Hagen family’s exploits in Sweden see: Anon, “Hagen, van der, släkt” in sbl, [https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/sbl​/Prese​ntat​ion​.aspx?id=​13502]​. Accessed 21 July 2021. 131 tna, pc 2/​69, June 1680-​May 1683 pp. 194–​195. “Paul Darby to be recommended to the King of Sweden,” 4 December 1681. 1 32 tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 22–​23, 24–​25. Wood to Williamson. 29 May and 31 May 1676. Frost, The Northern Wars, p. 212. Consultation with the Gothenburg customs accounts has revealed further information regarding this case. It is possible this is the same William Smith who was listed as an importer in the Stockholm customs accounts. 133 tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 22–​23, 24–​25. Wood to Williamson. 29 May and 31 May 1676.

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merchants exporting goods intended for military supply. Their contract differs in that it appears to have been concluded with the government itself, and not through the intermediary of a Swedish merchant like Prinz, as in the example of Paul Darby. The case had not been resolved by November that year, and to further aggravate matters, royal orders kept the ship detained in Sweden. It is not known whether this occurred as part of a general blockade, similar to the enforced hold on English shipping that was implemented in Stockholm the previous year.134 The case must have represented a difficult diplomatic situation for English merchants at home and abroad, as well as their diplomatic retinue in Sweden. Their merchants and shippers were enjoying a second season freighting goods to Sweden at lower customs rates and with minimal competition. There was a continuing threat that Swedish hostility towards the Dutch would end as negotiations for a Swedish-​Dutch commercial agreement were already underway. English fears were justified when it appeared negotiations were concluded that year and the Dutch looked set to resume their once lucrative freight trade.135 The English representatives do not seem to have pushed that hard after their initial inquiries. The misfortune of one merchant ship could have been sacrificed in view of the wider gains open to the English. The raising of a petition with the Council of Trade in November 1681 and the reopening of the case shows that English diplomatic efforts had failed its merchants and contain conflicting information. While a contract was spoken of and presented to the Swedes by Envoy Wood in 1676, the 1681 documents state that Skipper Hanson was forcibly driven into the nearby port of Marstrand and forced to sell his goods at a rate barely profitable to the English merchants.136 Another incident involving Smith that occurred in 1678 was spoken of. While residing in Stockholm, he sold 10,000 barrels of rye worth £7,000 to Karl xi to be used for military purposes.137 Similar to the case involving the Swedish Tobacco Company, this represented a huge sum of money. Whether the Swedish Crown ever made payment, or if any form of restitution was given, remains unclear.

134 The Gothenburg customs accounts for 1676 do not show any evidence of a blockade for this year, when English ships exported record amounts. gla, gca, Vol. 867, 1676. 135 tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 43–​44, 119–​120. Wood to Williamson. Stockholm, 28 June 1676 and 20 October 1676; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 63–​64. 136 tna, co 388/​1, pp. 198–​199, 201–​202, 5 and 12 November 1681; co 389/​11, 12 November 1681. 137 Ibid.

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The aforementioned cases represent one of the major difficulties facing English merchants when engaging in trade with Sweden. They demonstrate that at times there was a high demand for a variety of English goods for large sums of money. Regardless of what commodity was exported from England, English merchants could sometimes be left unpaid. This is especially resonant considering the differing forms of commercial organisation involved in these transactions. Jeffryes & Lucy were trading in tobacco, a commodity that was monopolised by the Swedish Tobacco Company. They consigned their goods to merchant Anders Onkell in Stockholm, who was listed at the time as an ‘ombudsman’, a representative of the company, and the case came to involve some of the most influential figures of government and the Swedish elite. Similarly, Paul Darby consigned his parcels of cloth to merchant Niklas Prinz. Imports of cloth into Sweden differed to tobacco, as they were not controlled by a monopoly syndicate, although the import of foreign cloth was often banned or heavily scrutinised to promote native Swedish industry and production.138 Blome & Smith traded directly with the Swedish Crown, although inconsistencies surrounding a potential contract do exist. The danger English merchants were exposed to when selling their goods to Sweden was not only at the mercy of the individual merchant, or the mercantile monopoly companies, but could even involve the Swedish Crown. Regardless of how Swedish law dictated who could handle particular imports, or how contracts were concluded, English merchants took massive risks when importing goods into Sweden. These merchant petitions demonstrate the extent to which English goods had penetrated the Swedish market. They all reveal how English merchants sought official assistance in attempting to receive payment for their goods. By soliciting business partners or acquaintances to apply pressure in Sweden, Darby’s case demonstrates that it was possible to use one’s own network to attempt to obtain satisfaction. However, this method exacted no known results, and all the aforementioned English merchants sought royal letters that implored English representatives in Sweden to exert diplomatic pressure. If these cases were in fact left unresolved, they are indicative of the harsh reality that English merchants risked potential ruin by exporting their wares to Sweden. Nevertheless, these instances show that by the 1670s the English Crown, English governmental offices, and diplomatic agents at home and abroad, had come to the service of English traders who were regularly involved in dealings with Sweden. The problem of payment was to continue into the 1690s, and as will be shown, was to be used as a pawn by Sweden in their battle 138 Heckscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia, Vol. i.2, p. 680.

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against an increasingly aggressive English foreign policy during the course of the Nine Years’ War (1688–​1697). 4

Conclusion

Commercially England was able to build on the gains made during the 1660s to assume a greater share of Sweden’s export market. This occurred in both of Sweden’s principal ports on the North Sea and the Baltic, Stockholm and Gothenburg. The English market became of increasing importance to Sweden as English merchants and their local counterparts vied to play a part in the only export market to witness consistency and growth. England’s role in importing goods from third-​party harbours continued although obstacles were put in place. This occurred in spite of the re-​entry of Dutch and resurgence of Swedish mercantile shipping toward the beginning of the 1680s, as well as the less favourable customs conditions brought about by Karl xi’s direct handling of Swedish commercial policy. Although this resolve was eventually broken by the mid-​1680s, England’s import trade had grown from humble beginnings in the 1650s to make significant breakthroughs by the 1670s. Domestically produced goods, in particular textiles, played a large role. However, England’s overall import portfolio expanded considerably to include a vast range of goods. Colonial re-​exports, commodities from southern Europe, as well foodstuffs and mined goods were all present. Despite serious growth in England’s import trade to Sweden, imbalances of trade between English imports into Sweden and Swedish exports to England reached their apex. Likewise, England’s own merchant community in Sweden experienced mixed fortunes. Greater participation in both the export and import trades in the 1670s gave way to difficulties on the ground in Sweden that saw English merchants displaced as the main conduit of goods, particularly in regards to Stockholm. However, by the mid-​1680s not only was England still the primary buyer of Swedish goods, but their merchants also regained their position as the main handlers of the trade. Contrasting experiences underpinned the organisation of trade to England in Sweden’s main centres of trade. Gothenburg’s export trade only harboured a small number of English merchants despite a stable trade. Exploring previously unutilised archival material has uncovered the wider commercial trends as well as the prevailing organisation of trade. It also led to the exploration of case studies that highlight the difficulties that English merchants engaged in Swedish trade had in obtaining payment for the goods

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they imported into Sweden. The intensive difficulties and inherent risks for English merchants trading with Sweden in obtaining payment from individual merchants, Swedish monopoly companies, and the Swedish Crown alike, was previously an unknown aspect to historians. The problem of payment was such a serious issue that English diplomats and the English Crown itself were jolted into action in an attempt to gain restitution for their merchants. This not only demonstrated how English diplomats were becoming more active in commercial affairs but perhaps indicates the growing importance of Anglo-​ Swedish trade in governmental circles. Historians of this subject have been right to single out the 1670s and 1680s as a special period for Anglo-​Swedish relations, although not always for the right reasons. Far from it being the ‘end of an epoch’, the English commercial machine emerged from the 1670s stronger than ever.139 English merchants had retained and strengthened their control over the Swedish export market to England by the end of the period. Instead of viewing the diplomatic divergence of England and Sweden from the mid-​late 1670s as the primary aspect of the relationship, it is more pertinent to place commercial interaction in the foreground. In spite of official Swedish attempts to bestow preference upon the Dutch Republic through commercial agreements from 1679, the growing importance of the English market continued unabated. Although England and Sweden had previously been allied, their treaties never represented complete cooperation in commerce or in the geopolitical arena. This demonstrates that to study treaties as the fullest representation of a relationship between two nations in the seventeenth century, or even that commerce hinged on them, is naive. England’s continued and extensive commercial activity in the face of Sweden’s official shift in favour of the Dutch Republic from 1679 onwards proves this line of enquiry. The period has previously been characterised as the breakthrough point for England, both in regard to its merchants assuming control of the English export market and as a breakthrough for exports of iron.140 However, as has been demonstrated earlier, England assumed control over its own supply of Swedish commodities through the activities of their own merchants already by the 1660s.141 The 1670s and 1680s represented a period when England and its

139 Roseveare, Markets and Merchants, pp. 170–​171; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 34; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, p. 66. 140 Hinton, The Eastland Trade and the Commonweal, p. 106. 141 See Chapter 3.

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merchants consolidated this control on a larger scale, albeit not with the most consistent of trajectories. As a direct consequence of this growing commercial entrenchment, Sweden sought to distance itself from England diplomatically and to find alternative allies. It became economically perilous for Sweden to rely on a single predominant export market. Historians have often focused on Sweden’s close ties with both the French and the Dutch during this period. This is a direct consequence of the conclusion of the French subsidy agreements from 1672, and the commercial agreements with the Dutch from 1679. The resulting factional furore in domestic politics that followed French alignment has done much to add weight to this focus. However, to judge Sweden’s geopolitical stance on the basis of treaties is superficial. Even contemporaries viewed Dutch and French influence in Sweden as predominant, so it is not surprising that this mode of thought has endured. In 1676 when discussing the prevailing political sympathies at Swedish court, diplomatic secretary William Allestree was baffled as to why there was both a French and Dutch faction at court, but no equivalent in support of the English. He stated: it appear there is such a thing in this court as a French and an Hollands party, yet there is no such thing as an English one to bee found … nor amongst the whole number of Senatours is there anyone (who may be thought) inclin’d to oblige our traders or dispos’d to advance those councells which type the two crowns in a more then usuall allyance142 This political situation that Allestree bemoaned was a direct result of English commercial weight in Sweden’s export market, as well as its cavalier attitude to Sweden’s friendship. The French subsidies had provided Sweden with the ability to finance an army, but came with far-​reaching and damaging consequences. Commercial treaties with the Dutch Republic did little to curb English commercial growth and the Dutch themselves were past their most influential and powerful period.143 If viewed superficially and without knowledge of the commercial trends, the diplomatic relationship between England and Sweden may give the impression that this was a disruptive period with regard to Anglo-​Swedish interaction. The inability of England’s diplomats to reach a codified settlement with their Swedish counterparts was actually of little consequence in its ability to affect the commercial aspect of the relationship.

1 42 tna, sp 95/​10, pp. 97–​108. William Allestree’s memo. Stockholm, September 1676. 143 Israel, Jonathan I., Dutch World Primacy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 299.

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Trade grew regardless, and the two markets became more entwined than at any point before. However, the precarious position of England’s merchants in the Swedish trade area soon came to the fore. The effect of market pressures and external actions relating to foreign policy would eventually lead to diplomatic ruptures as a result of growing frustrations felt by both parties which were birthed during this period.

­c hapter 5

Commercial Dominance and Diplomatic Disruption, 1689–​1700 William of Orange ascended to the thrones of England and Scotland, shortly before both kingdoms plunged into the Nine Years’ War (1689–​1697) with France. The war was to have pivotal effects on England’s relationship with Sweden. It was to be the most testing time for Anglo-​Swedish relations in their short history. England declared war on France in May 1689 (followed by Scotland in August) and entered the Grand Alliance with the Dutch Republic and Austria in the same month. English relations with the Dutch were secured through the reconfirmation of the Anglo-​Dutch alliance of 1678.1 A basis for strong relations with the Dutch Republic was enshrined in the person of William himself, and a codified alliance ensured England a powerful ally on which to base its further international relations.2 As Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic and King of England and Scotland, William’s main goal was to prevent further French influence and power on the continent. His intention was to restore France to the borders that had been outlined in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659).3 Domestic concerns were also a factor behind England’s war with France. William needed to vilify pro-​French and Jacobite opposition at home in order for Parliament to vote to award money to his cause.4 England, seeking greater security vis-​à-​vis France, looked for additional allies to the Dutch Republic.5 The two major neutral states were Sweden and Denmark. Not only were the Scandinavian states a potential source of additional naval and military aid, but they held the key to stemming the flow of naval stores to the enemy. They were thus highly prized as potential allies. Both the English and Dutch failed to win them over. Due to the Anglo-​Dutch policy

1 The alliance had been renewed under James ii in 1685, Clark, G. N., The Dutch Alliance, p. 8; Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas?, p. 284. 2 Black, A System of Ambition, p. 137; Clark, The Dutch Alliance, p. 8. 3 It has been said that William saw England as an ‘integral part of the European system’, Black, A System of Ambition, p. 137. 4 Black, A System of Ambition, p. 138. 5 Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions. Vol. 1.1. Sweden, London, 1922, x.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_007

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of commercial warfare against French trade and their tactics to suppress it, they risked provoking the Scandinavian powers into an alliance with France. This situation was exacerbated by the consistent seizures of their shipping.6 Although Sweden and Denmark remained neutral during the conflict, English relations with Sweden were at their lowest ebb ever. The Nine Years’ War precipitated the largest naval race at that point in history. Both the size and quantity of ships being produced by the various maritime powers had hitherto been unmatched.7 In the 1680s, England had largely embarked on a campaign of fleet maintenance, but after defeat by France at Beachy Head in July 1690, naval building once again began at pace.8 Over the period of 1691–​95, France built 100,000 in tonnage, and the English and Dutch both built 70,000 apiece. As France started to feel the burden of financial crisis in 1694, the English accelerated their efforts.9 A total of 47 new battleships were launched between 1691–​95 and a further 80 gun ships were authorised to combat French firepower. The English Parliament voted for funds to commission 29 ships in 1690, of which 17 were 80-​gun ships, while 10 were designed to be around 60-​gun ships.10 Thus, the demand for naval goods from all maritime powers skyrocketed during this period. Sweden continued to follow the strategy that had dictated its economic and foreign policy undertaken during the 1680s, as discussed in the previous chapter. Karl xi’s recognition of the Truce of Ratisbon in 1684 cleared any potential hostility with Louis xiv of France over the territorial claims of foreign powers on the continent.11 After Louis had shown he had no intentions of honouring the truce, Sweden reacted by entering the League of Augsburg in 1686. The League ended hostility with Brandenburg and provided Sweden with an important

6

Murdoch has noted that between the period of 1689 and December 1693 at least 80 prize cases involving Swedish vessels are recorded in cases appearing before the English Admiralty Court. Murdoch, Steve, ‘Neutrality at Sea: Scandinavian Responses to ‘Great Power’ Maritime Warfare, 1651–​1713’ in Davies, J.D., Alan James and Gijs Rommelse (eds.), Ideologies of Western Naval Power, c. 1500–​1815, Routledge, 2019, p. 251; Clark, pp. 3, 6; Rodgers, The Command of the Ocean, p. 157. 7 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 220. 8 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 223. 9 Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 220–​223. 10 During the war years, attempts were made to build smaller ships with cruising ability. 29 Fourth Rates were built, 31 Fifth Rates and 19 Sixth Rates. Davies, J. D., Pepys’s Navy, p. 275; Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 1, p. 223. 11 ​Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken, pp. 228–​232; Upton, Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, 1660–​1697, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 201–​202.

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bulwark against potential hostilities on the continent.12 Continuity in Sweden’s foreign policy also extended towards its western allies. The Swedish-​Dutch alliance from 1686 and the Anglo-​Dutch Union of 1689 strengthened Sweden’s position with two of the major maritime powers.13 Anglo-​Dutch cooperation in regard to Sweden was exhibited through the alliance’s status as guarantors at the Treaty of Altona (1689). Sweden had long fought for Holstein-​Gottorp’s independence against Danish hostility and this act paved the way for favourable relations between England, the Dutch Republic and Sweden.14 Despite such encouraging signs, Anglo-​Dutch attacks on Swedish shipping during the Nine Years’ War reduced any goodwill felt through Altona and negated any positive relations gleaned from the recent past. Sweden’s situation became so dire that an agreement to jointly convoy their ships was reached with Denmark.15 However, entrenched hostility between the Scandinavian neighbours, as well as the issues over the Danish provinces lost in 1660 and Holstein-​Gottorp, meant full cooperation was never extended beyond this nascent agreement.16 Aside from the more tangible effects felt against Swedish shipping, the prohibitive Anglo-​Dutch commercial policy gravely affected Swedish domestic politics and led to the continuation of factionalism at court. From 1689–​90 until 1692–​93, two factions proposed differing policies. One faction, led by Chancellor Bengt Oxenstierna, pushed forward agendas to remain either neutral or move closer to the Grand Alliance. The opposing faction, headed by Nils Bielke, proposed a move closer towards France and for third-​party mediation in league with Denmark.17 The French faction wanted to secure neutrality for Sweden and its shipping in the wake of seizures by the English and Dutch. France already had a foothold in Scandinavia thanks to their alliance with Denmark and realised an opportunity to strengthen their position in the 12 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitiken, pp. 233–​235; Upton, Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, pp. 201–​202. 13 Larsson & Österberg, p. 175. 14 Larsson & Österberg, p. 175. 15 Kulsrud, Carl J., ‘Armed Neutralities to 1780’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 29.3, 1935, pp 423–​447; Malmborg, M., Neutrality and State-​Building, New York, 2001, p 31; Ufkes, Tonko ‘Nederländska skeppare på stockholmska handelsskepp, 1685–​1700’, Forum navale, Vol. 56, 2001 pp 35–​59. 16 Oakley, Stewart P., War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560–​1709, Routledge, London; New York, 1992, pp. 106–​107. 17 Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 243, 245–​248; Stille, Å, Studier över Bengt Oxenstiernas politiska system och Sveriges förbindelser med Danmark och Holstein-​Gottorp 1689–​1692, Uppsala, 1947, pp. 53, 55, 59, 90; Upton, Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, pp. 205–​207.

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north by dispatching an agent to Sweden in December 1689.18 France’s agent was instructed to offer Sweden 300,000 riksdaler to encourage an alliance with Denmark but the offer was rebuffed. Bidal’s activities not only failed to sway the Swedish king but his attempts at winning over Bengt Oxenstierna angered the French faction at court who wanted France to help bring about the Chancellor’s downfall.19 By 1692, Bengt Oxenstierna was able to claim victory. His policy was founded on the belief that Sweden should move towards the western power that it had the most common interest with.20 Ultimately, this was England (and the Dutch Republic) who were Sweden’s largest trading partners.21 1

Diplomacy at War

Aside from the period under Cromwell and Karl x Gustav, diplomatic relations between England and Sweden from 1689–​1700 have received considerably more coverage than other periods during the seventeenth century. This reflects the significance of the Nine Years’ War and the negative impact the conflict had on diplomatic relations between England and Sweden. Anglo-​Dutch attempts at prohibiting French trade severely impinged on Swedish commerce. As a neutral state Sweden demanded the right to maintain trade with whomever it desired. It was this development that underpinned England and Sweden’s relationship during the final decade of the seventeenth century. Both countries’ diplomats sought to bring accord between the two powers under such conditions. Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic relations over 1689–​1700 can be divided into three phases. Phase One (1689–​1692) was characterised by English attempts

18

Lieutenant-​Colonel Bénoit Bidal was sent to Stockholm under the auspices of handling private affairs in Sweden. Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, p. 244; Oakley, William iii and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Years’ War, 1689–​1697, p. 105. 19 Oakley, William iii and the Northern Crowns, pp. 106–​107. 20 Although imports of French salt were important, alternative and more significant markets were available in Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the commercial incentives France could offer were no match against the English and the Dutch. Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, pp. 245–​248; Upton, Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, pp. 207–​208. 21 In 1690 England and the Dutch Republic accounted for over 80% of exports sent from Stockholm, while exports from Gothenburg to England accounted for 54% of the town’s overall trade. In contrast, joint exports from both ports to France amounted to little over 10,000 riksdaler in value. ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690; gla, gca, Vol. 879. 1690.

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to negotiate a treaty of alliance with Sweden, headed by John Duncombe, who was dispatched in 1689. The two nations wrangled with the damaging effects of England’s privateers as Sweden attempted to claim restitution. Phase Two (1692–​1697) was perhaps the most intense and uncertain period, as Swedish attempts to claim restitution for seized neutral shipping went unrealised. Swedish frustration over these unresolved claims bled into unmitigated outrage as seizures continued. The reintroduction of the Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1661 as the basis for commercial relations in 1693 was an inadequate attempt to resolve differences over the status of Swedish shipping to France. It was reinstituted to provide a legal basis on which the commercial status of the two nations could be reconciled since the expiration of the last official Anglo-​ Swedish agreement in 1677. As diplomatic discussions deliberated over the precise legal definitions of articles, the use of the Treaty of 1661 was to create disputes of a different nature. The Treaty of 1661 was an outdated and insufficient agreement that could not stand up to the rigours of problems created by the Nine Years’ War. Sweden’s right to convoy was a key issue for England during this phase, which only served to intensify the former’s collaboration with Denmark. The attitude of the English increasingly soured as Sweden began to take retaliatory measures against British merchants in Sweden. Phase Three (1697–​1700) was a calmer period for Anglo-​Swedish relations, following the conclusion of peace treaties between the various belligerents of the war. England and Sweden began to enter more regular peacetime protocol akin to earlier years of their relationship, with both parties at various points expressing their desire for some kind of official accord. A new Anglo-​Swedish concord was eventually concluded in 1700. Upon the commencement of war, England attempted to augment its position internationally by seeking additional allies in the north. William Duncombe was appointed as England’s representative in Sweden after war broke out and was to act concurrently with Robert Molesworth in Copenhagen.22 Duncombe was already in Stockholm by July 1689, when he reported that the Dutch ambassador had offered assistance to him, a clear indicator of the

22

Dual diplomacy in Scandinavia had been a tactic employed by England previously, most notably in the early 1660s in the build up to the Second Dutch War. Molesworth used his experience as Ambassador to Denmark during this period to publish a treatise on the contemporary state of the kingdom. Molesworth, Robert, An Account of Denmark, as it was in the year 1692, London, 1694; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 46; Pincus, ‘Absolutism, Ideology and English Foreign Policy: The Ideological Context of Robert Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark’, in Onnekink, David and Gijs Rommelse (eds.), Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern Europe (1650–​1750), Farnham, 2011, pp. 29–​54.

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Anglo-​Dutch alliance in practice.23 Duncombe’s first official duty was to make Sweden aware of the Anglo-​Dutch policy of commercial prohibitions against France by immediately acquiring a private audience with Karl xi.24 Over the autumn and winter of 1689, Duncombe was preparing himself to negotiate for a treaty. In September, he consulted English merchants residing in Swedish ports to inform himself of the key issues that were to underpin the commercial aspect of the treaty.25 By this point, Duncombe had made contact with Bengt Oxenstierna, President of the Chancery and senior foreign policy advisor to the king.26 It is not clear exactly when Duncombe made an official presentation of a treaty. He received official authority to negotiate a treaty by October 1689, and by December, Sweden had submitted their counterproposal.27 The Swedish rejection of the English proposal marked the end of a fleeting period of negotiations concerning a potential Anglo-​Swedish alliance that would not be revisited until 1695. The cessation of treaty negotiations by 1690 demonstrated the hostility and injustice Sweden felt about England’s predatory tactics towards neutral shipping during the first period of the war. However, diplomatic contact between the two powers did not cease. Brushing alliance negotiations aside, diplomats began to focus on more immediate commercial issues revolving around the problems experienced by Swedish commerce.28 At The Hague, Gabriel Oxenstierna was ordered to acquire compensation for Sweden’s shipping. Oxenstierna worked closely with English officials in an attempt to establish a scheme whereby England would purchase additional portions of Sweden’s exports under the proviso that the Swedes committed to barring exports to France. However, negotiations continued for months and it became clear that England could not afford to undertake such a purchase.29 23

tna, sp 95/​13, William Duncombe to Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham. Stockholm 17 July 1689. 24 Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions. Vol. 1.1. Sweden, pp. 1–​2. Instructions are dated 6 June 1689. 25 tna, sp 95/​13, Duncombe to Nottingham? Stockholm, 19 September 1689. 26 Ibid. 27 tna, sp 95/​13, Duncombe to Nottingham? Stockholm, 19 September 1689; tna, sp 95/​ 13, Duncombe to Mr Warre. Stockholm, 28 December 1689; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 47. 28 Duncombe became increasingly nervous as his attempts to placate the Swedes failed, stating ‘they begin to be impatient to know, what resolutions you have taken concerning them and their trade … Cunning then I am, in concealing those things which Your Lordshipp knows very well, I am ignorant of’’. tna, sp 95/​13, pp. 153–​154. Duncombe to Nottingham. Stockholm, 29 May 1690. 29 Clark, The Dutch Alliance, p. 100.

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It is uncertain whether the English were negotiating with intent to purchase the entirety of Sweden’s export goods or if it was limited to specific types of products. Calculations made from the customs accounts in Stockholm and Gothenburg demonstrate that exports to France were negligible during the following trading season. Whether or not England and their Dutch counterparts had a hand in this is uncertain.30 By May 1690, England was becoming concerned that Sweden was issuing false passes and claiming shipping intended for France was actually destined for Portugal. They believed this was a tactic used to escape the predatory actions of the English in a bid to quell exports to French harbours.31 The combined value of Swedish exports from Stockholm and Gothenburg to Portugal amounted to around 170,000 riksdaler in 1690 although the majority of this trade appears to have occurred later in the season, months after the English raised their suspicions. Comparisons between customs accounts from the mid-​ 1680s demonstrate a sharp upturn in exports to Portugal from both harbours. Trade from Gothenburg almost tripled, increasing from a value of 10,652 riksdaler in 1685 to 29,188 riksdaler in 1690. Trade from Stockholm rose in value by over twelve times its 1686 figure, from 10,817 riksdaler to 139,440 riksdaler in 1690.32 If this tactic was employed, it is difficult to estimate the true value of Sweden’s trade to France during this period. However, policy makers in London felt it necessary for William Duncombe and John Robinson to provide information on the nature of France’s most recent exports from 1687–​88. Robinson’s report notes that France handled £37,580 of exports from Sweden in 1687. This was a fraction of England’s £201,500 and exports to the Dutch Republic valued at £172,750. The highest value goods were copper and wire, which would most likely have been exported from Stockholm. Over 4,000 barrels of pitch and tar valued at £2,500 and a further 70 or 80 ships were recorded for this year as exporting various wooden goods to France.33 Going by the information gleaned from the Swedish customs records, in light of contemporary suspicion it becomes difficult to assess how justified British seizures of Swedish shipping

30 31 32 33

Exports to France from Stockholm amounted to a mere 1020 riksdaler in 1690 and had failed to register a single shipment just four years earlier. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686; Vol. 87. 1690. tna, sp 95/​13, Robinson to? Stockholm, May 1690. gla, gca, Vol. 875. 1685; Vol. 879. 1690. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686; Vol. 87. 1690. tna, sp 95/​13, p. 128. ‘Goods exported yearly from Sweden and the Provinces belonging to it’.

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were, and how many Swedish ships (or Swedish flagged ships) were carrying exports to France by this point.34 By 1692, the situation had become graver for Sweden. English predatory tactics were now beginning to affect vital French imports into Sweden, such as salt and wine. The Swedes complained that it was one thing to seize exports of naval goods en route to France, but it was even more unjustified to deprive Sweden of its necessities. Duncombe forwarded a Swedish complaint in April 1692 stating the Angel Gabriel had sailed in ballast to France, and was on its return voyage to Sweden when taken into Plymouth.35 Seizures like this demonstrate how the situation was becoming untenable for Sweden. Attempts by the Scandinavians to act against Anglo-​Dutch seizures led to an agreement to organise joint-​convoys for their merchant ships. This in turn made England nervous that further cooperation would follow, although these agreements never produced any additional cooperation or alliance.36 An Anglo-​Dutch treaty was signed with Denmark in June 1691, but the settlement with Sweden had to wait until spring 1693.37 A convoy agreement with their Scandinavian neighbours would not suffice, and the Swedes were in search of more concrete assurances. They tried to remedy the situation at the source of the problem, by attempting to accord with England and the Dutch Republic.38 No existing commercial agreement or treaty of alliance was currently in place between England and Sweden, meaning no codified measure existed to adequately limit England’s predatory activity. There was a severe disagreement between the two kingdoms as to whether a treaty was actually still in place.39 Sweden claimed that the Treaty of 1661 was still valid, whereas England stated that no agreement remained active. Swedish Resident in London Johan 34

It was reported in September 1690 that 100,000 riksdaler worth of hemp and cordage was sitting in Danzig waiting to be exported to France, waiting for Swedish ships to freight the goods. tna, sp 95/​13, p. 180. ‘Extract of a Letter from Dantzig dated the 2nd of Sept[ember] 1690 new stile’. 35 tna, sp 95/​13, pp. 252–​253. Duncombe to Nottingham. Stockholm, 7 April 1692. 36 Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions. Vol. 1.1. Sweden, xi–​x ii; Oakley, War and Peace, p. 107; Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 48. 37 The Danish treaty was intended to last for five years and renewed in 1696. It provided an outline and definition of what were considered contraband goods and the conditions for carrying naval stores. However, it did not last. Clark, The Dutch Alliance, pp. 111–​113; Kulsrud, Carl J., Maritime Neutrality to 1780. A History of the Main Principles Governing Neutrality and Belligerency to 1780, Boston, 1936, p. 237; Harding, R., Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650–​1830, London, 1999, pp. 158–​159. 38 An independent agreement was signed by the Dutch whereby they agreed to pay 76,000 riksdaler in damages in 1693. Clark, The Dutch Alliance, p. 113. 39 Oakley, William iii and the Northern Crowns, pp. 131–​132.

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Leijonberg argued the ‘Alliance and Friendship which is and hath always been between Sweden and England’ was still in place and thus demanded liberty for captured Swedish vessels.40 Meanwhile, English diplomat John Robinson attempted to clarify the situation by including a brief diplomatic history of England and Sweden in his correspondence to Sir William Trumbull in May 1695. His words demonstrate the English belief that no treaty had been in place before that juncture.41 Anglo-​Swedish negotiations had failed to achieve a settlement since the expiration of their last active agreement in 1677. The subsequent flurry of negotiations directed by the English during the 1680s would seem to confirm there was no active diplomatic agreement. By this point Sweden was desperate, as English privateers essentially acted with impunity against their shipping until 1694, when seizures temporarily ceased. Under Swedish pressure, the Anglo-​ Swedish Treaty of 1661 was eventually temporarily renewed to provide a legal foundation to protect Swedish commerce.42 The reinstatement of the 1661 agreement would lead to additional problems, particularly relating to the status and form of passports and papers documenting the contents of ships’ cargo. The Treaty of 1661 explicitly stated that passes had to be used for English and Swedish shipping. The treaty provided justifications for these measures, as well as a specific template for their usage and the authorities that were permitted to issue them. Nonetheless, seizures of Swedish ships continued. English privateers now justified their actions by reasoning that Swedish passes were not legitimate against the provisions outlined in the treaty. This led to a wave of Swedish complaints, coupled with legal wrangling from both sides as to the specific legal nature of the treaty articles. It served to further justify Swedish hostility towards England.43 English actions against Swedish shipping were eroding any good will that had come from the previous forty years of amicable 40 41

42

43

sra, da, Vol. 523, 12 November 1690. The document is in Leijonberg’s handwriting in English, but contains no addressee. ‘The Commerce between the Two Nations is founded upon the Treaty made at London Anno 1661, which for a time was superseeded by that of 1664/​65, but upon its expiration took place again, and has been declared by both sides to be a subsisting Treaty’. The statement was made after the agreement to reinstate the Treaty of 1661 in the mid-​1690s. tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 303–​304. Robinson to Trumbull. Stockholm, 29 May 1695. Contemporary confusion surrounding this matter and the opposing views of both countries’ diplomats still prevents the forming of an accurate representation of England and Sweden’s diplomatic status at this juncture. The Treaty of 1661 was temporarily instated and was superseded by agreements in 1698 and 1700. Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, p. 48. For example, an English naval ship broke a Swedish convoy and seized merchant ships under the proviso that their passes had not been issued by the Swedish Board of Trade,

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Anglo-​Swedish cooperation. Swedish diplomats and statesmen focused on attempting to gain restitution for damages already incurred, and negotiations for any further accord or improvement on commercial agreements stalled. No further agreement could be reached until these issues were rectified and the 1661 foundation was to be in place for the remainder of the war. Sweden’s attitude towards England after the end of the war naturally tempered as peacetime trading conditions were reinstated. Latent attempts at negotiations for an improved treaty in 1695 led to naught, but provided a basis for renegotiation in 1697. The Treaty of 1661 still served as the de facto commercial and political agreement between England and Sweden. After the death of Karl xi in early 1697, Sweden became eager for an alliance complete with defensive principles in view of the increasingly hostile Danish attitude towards them.44 After discussions with Robinson, Bengt Oxenstierna was able to confirm to the government that England also wanted a more current and relevant agreement in place. Nevertheless, the English were not as eager as their Swedish counterparts and negotiations proceeded slowly.45 Sweden now began to establish a system of alliances commencing with a renewed agreement with the Dutch Republic in February 1698 and entered into discussions with France the following month.46 The British defensive alliance was the final treaty put into place in the immediate build up to the Great Northern War (1700–​1721). It was concluded in January 1700, and similar to the existing agreement, was based on a prior agreement from 1665 which was outmoded and unsatisfactory.47 The failure of England and Sweden to conclude satisfactory agreements reflected the level of mistrust that had crept into their relationship over the course of the latter decades of the seventeenth century. 2

The Only Stable Market

In contrast to the stalling and fraught diplomatic undertakings that characterised the Anglo-​Swedish diplomatic relationship, commerce continued to flow unabated during the final decade of the seventeenth century. Previous studies

but by the Stockholm Magistrates Court instead. tna, sp 95/​14, p. 5. Robinson to Sir John Trenchard. Stockholm, 28 February 1694. 44 Oakley, War and Peace in the Baltic, p. 107. 45 Åström, From Stockholm to St Petersburg, pp. 49–​50. 46 tna, sp 95/​15, pp. 25–​26, 33–​34. Robinson to Williamson. Stockholm, 26 February and 23 March 1698. 47 tna, sp 103/​70.

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that have considered commercial statistics regarding English trade with the Baltic during this period have largely been reliant on the Sound Toll Registers. Indeed, the stro has made it possible to reach a more consistent and definitive conclusion on English trade with the Baltic during the Nine Years’ War and toward the close of the century. As Table 5.1 shows, exports from the Baltic to England largely followed the general trends witnessed from overall Baltic trade. The peacetime share of traffic from Baltic harbours to England in 1688 is recorded at 322 vessels of a total 2,143 sailings, equating to around 15% of the total Baltic export trade. Shipping to English harbours then dipped to just below 200 vessels of a total 1,668 sailings the following year, as outbound traffic during the opening year of war impacted shipping. This was equivalent to 11.87% of total outbound traffic from the Baltic. Despite the ill effects of war being immediately felt in 1689 and into 1690, traffic out of the Baltic showed signs of recovery already by 1691 and 1692. It then experienced a larger flow of shipping in 1693 than its previous peacetime figure just five years earlier. A downward trend once again occurred toward the latter stages of the Nine Years’ War during the 1694 to 1697 period, reaching its lowest ebb at 1,332 sailings out of the Baltic in the final year of conflict. This was immediately preceded by a significant recovery of overall traffic departing the Baltic, of which vessels bound for English harbours similarly increased. However, despite England’s central role in the conflict, outbound shipping through the Sound to English harbours remained relatively resilient in line with overall commercial trends. As Figure 5.1 shows, on average throughout the period between 1688 and 1700, outbound traffic destined for England accounted for almost 13% of all outbound Baltic trade. On only two occasions did this share of trade drop below 10%. Taking 1690 as the first year to analyse in greater detail, outbound traffic from the Baltic sank by around 500 vessels from its previous peacetime figure of 2,143 in 1688 to 1,626 vessels. Consistent with figures witnessed in the previous period of this study, total trade from Swedish ports and ports in the Swedish Empire amounted to almost 52% of all shipping activity leaving the Baltic that year. Sweden’s largest trading hubs continued to be Stockholm and Riga. Traffic from Sweden and Finland accounted for around 55% of trade originating in harbours within the Swedish Empire, while Swedish Livonia and its predominant port Riga registered around 25% of Swedish trade. Narva, Reval and ports in Swedish Pomerania also contributed to the Swedish Empire’s overall trade but to a significantly lesser degree.48 48

stro searches: Sweden and Finland to unspecified, Livonia to unspecified, Estonia to unspecified, various Pomerania ports to unspecified, 1690–​1691.

0

1000

2000

1688

2143

322

198

1689

1668

1690

1626

207

1691

1816

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1692

1959

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2340

223

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2041

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From the Baltic to England & Wales

1695

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1696

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228

1697

126 1332

Ships exiting the Baltic

1698

1997

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1699

2116

317

1700

1444

290

­f igure 5.1  Total traffic exiting the Baltic, 1688–​1700 sources: stro searches. the baltic to unspecified, 1688–​1 701; the baltic to england and wales, 1688–​1 701

Number of ships

3000

newgenrtpdf

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Total trade to Britain originating from Sweden and Finland accounted for around 20% of all shipping in 1690. England assumed around 17% and Scotland almost 3% of this traffic. This was comparable to the 19% of traffic which was destined for ports in the Dutch Republic. In actual terms this represented around a total of 82 vessels departing Swedish harbours for England, of which 73 originated in Stockholm.49 Sailings from provincial ports in Sweden originated out of Gävle, Halmstad, Kalmar, Norrköping, Västervik and Visby. With the exception of George Hoyle’s ship en route from Gävle to Hull, all sailings were bound for London.50 Aside from this more rudimentary overview it is difficult to account for a more detailed picture of Swedish provincial exports to England as the majority of ships were Swedish and their cargoes went unrecorded at the Sound. The Stockholm customs accounts for 1690 are one of the last surviving records of the seventeenth century found in this specific archival collection. The majority of the customs accounts for the 1690s have unfortunately not survived, remain undiscovered, or are incomplete, rendering an overview of trade impossible. In 1690 62 ships departed Stockholm bound for English ports. As Figure 0.5 shows, comprising a total value of 1,020,045 riksdaler, 1690 was the second most valuable trading season in the history of Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact. This figure fell just short of those recorded from Stockholm just four years earlier at a value of 1,176,974 riksdaler. With Stockholm’s total export value registered at around 2.4 million riksdaler, the export trade to England accounted for over 42% of Stockholm’s total market export value. As an export market for goods, England was the significant outlier. In comparison, trade to the Dutch Republic, which was the second most valuable export destination at a value of 391,419 riksdaler, was equivalent to around 16% of the total export market. Shipping to England vastly outstripped its competitors. The combined number of ships bound for the Dutch Republic, Lübeck, Portugal and Danzig equalled those departing for England in terms of the amount of shipping employed.51 The bulk of England’s export trade from Stockholm continued to be focused on iron. As Figure 5.2 shows, total exports of wrought iron were equivalent to almost 90% of England’s total export value from Stockholm in 1690. England’s significance as a consumer of Stockholm iron can be demonstrated by the fact that iron exports to England equated to 37% of Stockholm’s total export 49

stro search: Sweden and Finland to Great Britain, 1690–​1691. No vessels were recorded departing Finland directly for English ports. 50 Ibid. 51 ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690.

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Timber & misc goods 5.5% Copper 0.6% Pitch 1.7% Tar 3.1%

Wrought iron 89.2%

­f igure 5.2  Composition of exports from Stockholm to England, 1690 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 87, 1690

market value.52 The price of wrought iron stabilised during the mid-​1680s, at a wholesale price of 12 riksdaler per ssp, allowing for an easier comparison of figures from the previous recorded totals in 1686. In actuality, the amount of iron exported was comparable between the previous trading season of 1686 when England had been at peace. Exports of iron to England remained stable at around 75,000 ssp, increasing from 75,758 ssp in 1686 to 75,964 ssp in 1690. Exports of iron increased as exports of copper and brass wire, which had reached their peak during the 1680s, began to recede by the beginning of the 1690s. Only 89 ssp of copper and 131 ssp of brass wire, worth a combined 19,405 riksdaler, were shipped from Stockholm. The majority of shipments were split between Hull and London. In contrast to what occurred four years earlier, the total value of brass wire shipped from Stockholm to England had receded by an incredible 120,831 riksdaler. This equated to a difference of 1,066 ssp which was the major shift in the

52

This figure represented an increase from 1680 and 1686 where the value of iron exports to England equated to 35% and 27% of Stockholm’s total export market value in those years respectively.

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composition of exports from Stockholm to England during this period. Exports of tar and pitch had also declined although to a much lesser extent than copper and brass wire. Tar exports had decreased by well over half their 1686 equivalent from just over 23,000 barrels to 10,155 barrels in 1690. This figure equated to a total value of 27,773 riksdaler, which was a total decrease in value by around a third. Pitch exports similarly decreased by around three-​quarters of their 1686 equivalent from almost 12,000 barrels to just 3,439 barrels in 1690. In terms of value this represented a decrease from over 66,000 riksdaler to 16,912 riksdaler. In total, combined tar and pitch exports only amounted to around 5% of the total market value of total exports sent from Stockholm to England in 1690.53 It demonstrates that despite war English traders continued to utilise Stockholm as a source of iron more than ever before. Not only was iron the most prevalent commodity in trade with England but it was also the most consistent. Other export commodities ebbed and flowed but the demand for iron from Stockholm was remarkable for its amount and consistency throughout the period in question. English exporters continued to direct the majority of exports from Stockholm to England in 1690. However their total share of the market decreased from around 70% in 1686 to 53% in 1690. This can almost be entirely explained by the growth of participation in the export of goods to England. 73 exporters operated across the trading season in regard to English trade alone. This represents the highest list of active participants in one single trading season in the history of Anglo-​Stockholm commercial interaction. In contrast, the 1686 trading season records just 37 active operators in the export market to England, while the 1680 season recorded the previous peak in participation at a total of 63 exporters. The flood of new exporters can be attributed to the eagerness of the Stockholm burgess community’s desire to participate in the town’s most lucrative and stable export market. The viability of other traditional export markets available to Stockholm merchants had been significantly depleted with the advent of war in Europe the previous year. Exports to the Dutch Republic receded considerably, which may have provided a significant push factor in redirecting the activities of many of the city’s merchants towards the English market.54

53 54

Prices of tar had remained fairly stable while the market price of pitch had slightly increased from around four riksdaler per barrel in 1686 to just over five riksdaler per barrel in 1690. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686; ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690. Exports to the Dutch Republic receded from 648,970 riksdaler in 1686 to just 319,419 in 1690. Lübeck and Portugal remained the only exports market that witnessed growth but to around a tenth of the value of exports to England. ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686; ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690.

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The majority of non-​British participants in the export market to England traded in smaller amounts of goods and in a more haphazard manner than their British counterparts. Regardless, the contribution of these merchants should not be discredited. Such was the wide array of participating merchants outside of the top ten largest exporters that collectively they were accountable for directing around 46% of the total exports to England. The marketplace had expanded so rapidly, such was the demand for Swedish iron in England, that even merchants of more humble means were able to participate in the export of goods. In previous times participation in the export trade to England had simply not been a possibility for smaller operators. The trade had formerly been dominated by a core group of largely English merchants and traders of more substantial means from the Stockholm mercantile community. The fact that an increasing number of Swedish skippers were now responsible for freighting goods from Sweden likely enabled Swedish merchants with financially more limited means a greater degree of organisational control over shipping goods. For example, a small-​scale trader such as Petter Dahlström was able to conduct a modest trade in wrought iron towards the last quarter of the 1690 trading season. Dahlström consigned a total of 601 ssp of wrought iron on board four separate ships over the course of August to November. His trade with England was worth 7,215 riksdaler, and could have been the cornerstone of his livelihood. Small scale Swedish traders such as Dahlström had in many ways become the lifeblood of Anglo-​Swedish trade in Stockholm.55 As seen in Figure 5.3, only three traders of non-​English extraction traded to the extent that they registered in the top ten largest exporters. It represented a considerable shift in the fortunes of the larger traders of the Stockholm mercantile community when compared to a decade earlier. One of these principal exporters was the reformed Swedish Tar Company who were responsible for conveying the bulk of tar and pitch exports to the value of 30,727 riksdaler. The largest non-​British supplier was Johan Lohe, a private individual who concentrated the majority of his trade on the export of wrought iron. Other Swedish operators of note were Johan Hammarström, Hindrich Hillebrand, Hans Moback, Anders Onkel, Abraham Wolters and Johan Zedritz, all of whom had significant experience in the exportation of Swedish goods to the English market.56 55

56

Dahlström consigned wrought iron on the following ships: Thomas Reesen of Stockholm, 13 August 1690 (200 ssp), Hindrich Hansson of Stockholm, 18 October 1690 (155 ssp), Lorens Mathieson of Stockholm, 25 October 1690 (150 ssp), Gierdt Gierdtson of unknown origin, 14 November 1690 (96 ssp). ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690. ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690.

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#

Merchant

Value*

Main Commodity

Origin

1

Henry Moxon

100,803

Wrought iron, brass wire

England

2

Moxon & Jackson

97,500

Wrought iron, brass wire

England

3

Thomas Nisbett

90,868

Wrought iron, timber

England

4

William Hester

72,134

Wrought iron, brass wire

England

5

Jonathan Rodham

40,524

Wrought iron, tar, pitch

England

6

Nisbett & Forster

35,015

Wrought iron

England

7

Johan Lohe

34,440

Wrought iron

Jever

8

Tar Company

30,727

Tar, pitch

Various

9

Hindrich Hildebrand

27,088

Wrought iron

Wolfenbüttel

10

William Joye

25,607

Wrought iron

England

*Value in Swedish riksdaler

­f igure 5.3  Top exporters from Stockholm to England, 1690 sources: ssa, sca, vol. 87, 1690

Although a significantly smaller group, English merchants were the most substantial operators in the Stockholm marketplace in 1690. In contrast, their Scottish counterparts who had held a significant degree of influence in the export of goods beforehand, had receded significantly. Merchants such as Adam and Henry Lyall were still active but to a much lesser extent than seen before. No other Scottish merchants of note appear to have taken part at this point.57 Henry Moxon was the largest exporter of note in 1690. Moxon exported goods in excess of 100,000 riksdaler on his private export account. Moxon also traded in partnership with Robert Jackson where the firm exported goods worth 97,500 riksdaler. Moxon was a weathered and experienced commercial operator, having traded out of Stockholm for at least a decade. In this respect Moxon represented a new generation of English merchant, who, by the latter decades of the seventeenth century, had decided to stake their claim in the Swedish market. Moxon’s trade had risen from a modest value of 1,181 riksdaler in 1680, to become the largest exporter in Stockholm just six years later. At a value of 230,453 riksdaler Moxon’s export account in 1686 was the largest in the 57

Adam Lyall exported goods worth 3,600 riksdaler and Henry Lyall exported goods worth 3,899 riksdaler. The two Lyalls remain the only obvious Scottish merchants of note operating in English trade. ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690.

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history of Anglo-​Swedish trade. Although his own private trade had receded by over half this value to 100,803 riksdaler, he still remained the most substantial operator in English trade in Stockholm. As can be seen from Figure 5.3, Moxon’s trade was further bolstered through his partnership with Robert Jackson.58 Other leading English merchants exporting goods from Stockholm to England in 1690 belonged to the same category of career merchant as Moxon. Thomas Nisbett, William Hester and Jonathan Rodham had long been active in Stockholm, and had cemented positions among the largest exporters from four years earlier. The likes of Robert Jackson, the Sykes family, Thomas Cutler and others all fit this same pattern of long-​term operators in Sweden. These merchants were specifically focused on engaging with the English market although they exported more modest amounts of goods. The previous generation of English merchants in Sweden tended to participate in trade over a more limited period and had eventually been supplanted by Stockholm’s own mercantile community at the turn of the 1680s. In contrast this new core of English merchants appear to have taken a vested interest in Swedish trade. They based their careers and their livelihoods with specific intent to export goods from Sweden over the long term. Despite England’s participation in war at this juncture, the export trade to England had remained starkly resilient in contrast to other export destinations. The stability of the market as well as its sheer growth in value over the mid-​late 1680s helped facilitate this new generation of merchants investing their careers in Swedish trade in a way that their antecedents simply deemed improbable or less attractive. In 1695 traffic from Sweden and Finland to England had regressed from five years earlier, dropping from 82 recorded voyages to 68. This was roughly equivalent to around 15% of the traffic recorded originating from these areas for that year. Outbound voyages from Sweden and Finland had actually stabilised when comparing both years and so these figures represented just a 2% decline in overall traffic to England from Sweden and Finland. The majority of traffic was outbound from Stockholm with London, Hull, Newcastle and King’s Lynn the predominant ports of destination. As a large number of vessels were Swedish it is difficult to account for the type and extent of commodities traded during 1695. To reach a greater understanding of trade it is necessary to turn to the Stockholm weighbooks, which though a reliable source, are unfortunately largely limited in scope to viewing the iron and copper trades.59

58 59

ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690. stro search: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1695–​1696.

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The weighbooks record a total of 42 ships exporting from Stockholm during the 1695 trading season, which, when compared with the stro, is 26 ships less than recorded departing Stockholm when passing the Sound. There are a number of potential explanations for this discrepancy although it is unlikely smuggling was the major root cause. It could be explained by the fact that the remaining ships were carrying goods not recorded in the weighbooks, such as pitch, tar or timber. While it is not unlikely that commodities such as tar and pitch could make up the entirety of cargoes of a single vessel, the Stockholm customs records usually denote a mixture of goods contained on the lading dockets of outbound vessels from Stockholm. Furthermore, this explanation would have required a significant increase in tar and pitch exports from exiting the Swedish capital from what was witnessed in 1690. In contrast, the trend towards the early 1690s showed a downward spiral of tar and pitch exports, although the necessities of war could certainly have fuelled a surge in exports.60 The 1695 weighbooks reveal a slight decrease in the amount of iron exported to England in comparison with 1690. 68,746 ssp of iron was exported to England in 1695, roughly equating to 34% of the total amount of iron exported from the town. This reflected a decrease of around 8,000 ssp from what has been established in 1690. Both the customs accounts for 1690 and lading dockets found in the customs accounts for 1700 detail that the wholesale price of wrought iron was 12 riksdaler per ssp. Extrapolating the amount of iron recorded in the weighbooks against the prevailing wholesale price of iron found in the extant customs accounts would suggest iron exports in 1695 were valued at 824,952 riksdaler.61 Two broad trends seem to emerge in English trade for 1695. Firstly, England continued to be the primary export destination for iron with around 34% of total iron exports from the town.62 However, the resurgence of iron exports to the Dutch Republic was significant. At a total of 63,099 ssp the Dutch share of the iron trade from Stockholm was just short of England’s own at around 32% which reflected a value of 757,193 riksdaler. Secondly, English exporters continued to exert a considerable influence on the market but had renounced a sizeable portion of trade to members of the Stockholm mercantile community once more. More substantial English merchants continued to appear amongst the top exporters but the amount of English operators had declined significantly. 60 61 62

sra, swb, Vol. 36. 1695; stro search: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1695–​1696. sra, swb, Vol. 36. 1695; ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690; Vol. 125. 1700. This is in comparison to 37% of total iron exports recorded in the Stockholm customs accounts for 1690. ssa, sca, Vol. 87.1690.

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English traders of more modest means largely disappeared altogether. Just a handful of more substantial English traders remained and were responsible for exporting around 38% of total iron exports to England. The merchant firms of Joye and Mitford, Forster and Tomlinson as well as Robert Jackson appear to have been the only consistent operators with English backgrounds at this juncture.63 This represented a reduction in overall market share witnessed from five years earlier which was assumed by non-​English operators. This development is unsurprising given the growing opposition towards English merchants in Sweden, which will be detailed later. Despite the difficulties faced by the English community in Sweden during the 1690s, by the beginning of the new century English merchants were once again commanding a predominant share of the export market to England. In 1700 iron exports, following the close of the Nine Years’ War, once again increased, beginning to reach towards their 1686 and 1690 equivalent. A total of 73,811 ssp was exported to England in 1700, equivalent to a value of 885,740 riksdaler. England was once again the predominant export market for Swedish exports. This trend continued in tandem with the reduction of iron exports to the Dutch Republic, where England absorbed 45% of the market. In contrast exports to Dutch ports decreased to under half that figure with just over 20% of the Stockholm market for iron.64 The more modest operators who had once been a feature of England’s mercantile community in Stockholm do not appear to have recovered from the difficulties experienced during the middle of the decade. England’s larger exporters continued to participate in abundance. In 1700 those remaining English merchants in Stockholm almost doubled their export of iron from five years earlier, from a combined total of 26,366 ssp to 42,310 ssp. This came at the expense of the Stockholm merchant community whose total exports dwindled. The English community had not experienced a significant injection of new operators since the expulsion of its merchants some years earlier. However, the increase in export values was aided by the appearance of a few merchants such as Robert and William Forrest, Samuel Cooper, the Tomlinsons, and Edward Bell all of whom joined the already established partnerships witnessed five years earlier. The arrival of a new wave of merchants perhaps demonstrates that despite the difficulties faced previously, the political climate towards the English in Sweden was relaxing.65 The Swedish market

63 64 65

sra, swb, Vol. 36. 1695. sra, swb, Vol. 39. 1700. sra, swb, Vol. 39. 1700.

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was obviously still a considerable draw to English merchants looking to participate in the iron trade. The negotiations and the conclusion of a new treaty at the beginning of the new century were a distinctive and positive overture for Anglo-​Swedish commercial operations.66 England’s freighters also enjoyed a renaissance in Swedish trade. English ships assumed their largest share of trade with the Swedish mainland since the exceptional commercial conditions of the mid-​late 1670s. 103 ships departed Swedish harbours for England, which was roughly equivalent to 32% of total traffic from Sweden. Of those 103 ships departing Swedish harbours, 97 were English, demonstrating the complete role reversal in fortunes for England’s shippers.67 A large amount of shipping activity continued to take place along the Stockholm-​London route, particularly in the case of trade outbound from the Baltic. Of the 103 ships outbound from domestic Swedish harbours, 86 of these vessels were carrying goods from Stockholm which was equivalent to about 83% of trade. All of Sweden’s Baltic trade originated around a cluster of easterly-​lying ports. Ports such as Barösund, Gävle, and Västervik were also supplemented by single voyages departing Norrköping, Nyköping, and Kalmar, in what represented a shift from a small amount of provincial traffic originating on the Swedish southern coast.68 By 1700 around 60% of outbound traffic from Sweden was focused on the English capital which was equivalent to 62 vessels. Traditional centres of commerce on the east coast of England such as Hull and Newcastle both registered ten ships from Sweden. A trickle of trade was directed toward provincial ports along the south and west coasts. Plymouth, Southampton and Bristol were supplemented by Liverpool’s growing participation in trade with the Swedish mainland. Vessels with home ports recorded in smaller provincial centres on the east coast of England often departed their own port for Sweden but were regularly redirected towards London on the return voyage. This concentrated the delivery of Swedish goods in the English capital.69 In contrast, vessels which were registered in larger provincial centres such as Hull or Newcastle were just

66

67 68 69

“Defensive Allyance between Great Britain & Sweden signed 6/​16 January 1700. Ratifyed by the King of Sweden at Stockholm 10 March 1700”. Many of the commercial articles were still based on the Treaty of 1661 but the new treaty implicated a stronger mutual defensive alliance between the two nations. tna, sp 103/​70. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. For example, King’s Lynn, Scarborough, Lowestoft or Whitby. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701.

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Plymouth 1.4% Whitby Hull 2.3%

1.9%

Bideford Yarmouth 2.3% 3.1% King’s Lynn

3.0 Sunderland 5.2% Newcastle 6.8% London 55.6%

Bristol 17.4%

­f igure 5.4  Destination of Swedish tar and pitch exports to England, 1700 sources: stro search. the baltic to england and wales, 1700–​1 701

as likely to engaged to engage in bilateral trading, departing and returning to their home port to fulfil local demand.70 Of the total 103 voyages between Sweden and England in 1700 consignments of tar appeared on 41 vessels and pitch on 31. Aside from two instances, the majority of tar and pitch originated from Stockholm. A total of 15,648 barrels of tar and pitch were exported from Sweden to England at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This figure is comparable to tar and pitch exports reckoned from 1690 of which just over 13,000 barrels left the Swedish capital.71 As Figure 5.4 demonstrates, at a total of 8,592 barrels, the majority of tar and pitch were directed towards London, representing around 55% of total exports from Sweden. Despite only the three departures from Sweden destined for Bristol, the western-​lying port absorbed around 17% of the total Swedish tar and pitch trade to England at 2,688 barrels. The majority of English ports featured in the Swedish export trade demonstrated a demand for tar and pitch, although its proportions were heavily weighted in favour of London, likely as a central source for adjacent ports engaged in the shipbuilding industry.72

70 71 72

stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701; ssa, sca, Vol. 87. 1690. stro search: Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701.

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The re-​entry of English shipping into Swedish trade by 1700 permits a proper appraisal of the English import trade into Stockholm and Sweden’s provincial Baltic ports at the turn of the century. As Figure 5.5 shows, England’s trade into the Baltic had ebbed and flowed in a similar manner to what had occurred with shipping seen exiting the Baltic during the same period (see Figure 5.1). The amount of trade entering the Baltic from English ports had peaked when England was at peace, only registering above 200 vessels passing the Sound into the Baltic in 1688, 1698, 1699 and in 1700. The latter trading season had actually represented a peak of English freight into Baltic as overall shipping had retracted. Vessels departing England numbered 246 of a total 1,413 which was equivalent to just over 17% of total traffic. In contrast, during the war years trade from English ports reaching the Baltic had only averaged just over 8% of all traffic, reaching its nadir during 1695 at just over 6%. During the Nine Years’ War, Sweden’s neutrality allowed its merchant marine to dominate shipping in Anglo-​Swedish trade. At the beginning of the war shipping from England suffered.73 A total of 82 outbound journeys from Sweden to English ports were made, with just 27 returning to Swedish ports during the same trading season. The potential for English goods to reach Swedish markets was further diminished by 1695 with 68 vessels departing Swedish ports for English harbours and just seventeen bound to Swedish ports in the opposite direction that year. The obvious conclusion is that Swedish skippers were exporting goods to their primary export market but journeying onward to other ports for return cargo or simply returning in ballast.74 England’s ability to peddle its goods on the Swedish market significantly increased during the 1670s and 1680s. Despite England again being at peace by 1700 and the renewed participation of England’s merchant marine, there were a large number of ships sailing to Swedish ports in ballast. This was not limited to interactions with provincial ports but also with the capital Stockholm also. The number of ships sailing to Stockholm in ballast from England had gradually reduced over the preceding decades but then increased significantly during 1700. A total of 20 ships sailed in ballast to Swedish ports, 15 of which were en route for Stockholm. Curiously a number of ships with home ports along the north eastern coast of England such as Hull, Newcastle, South Shields and Whitby departed London but with no consigned goods on board. Despite the

73 74

stro searches: The Baltic to England and Wales, 1690–​1691; England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1690–​1691. stro searches: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1690–​1691; Sweden and Finland to England and Wales, 1690–​1691.

0

1000

2000

1688

2124

278

1689

1690

1558

1691

1681

1725

117

178

174

1692

158 1992

1693

2332

172

Year

1694

136 1902

From England & Wales to the Baltic

1695

1843

124

1696

148 1372

1697

123 1342

Ships entering the Baltic

226

1698

2981

270

1699

2066 246

1700

1413

­f igure 5.5  Total traffic entering the Baltic, 1688–​1700 sources: stro searches. unspecified to the baltic, 1688–​1 701; england and wales to the baltic, 1688–​1 701

Number of ships

3000

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majority of sailings operating along the London-​Stockholm route, actual goods leaving London were slight.75 Imports of tobacco into Sweden, particularly into Stockholm, had grown considerably. Tobacco appeared on a total of ten ships and total imports reached 301,880 Danish pounds. This was a significant increase in the amount of tobacco absorbed into domestic ports in Sweden. Previously a large portion of the English tobacco trade had been directed toward other ports in the Swedish Empire, most notably Riga and Narva.76 That the tobacco trade expanded to such an extent was not the only remarkable feature of this trade. The increased participation of provincial ports also proves significant. London was the outlier in the tobacco trade with a total of 261,600 Danish pounds across five shipments. However, tobacco was imported into Stockholm from Liverpool (5,200 dsp), Plymouth (12,800 dsp), Cowes on the Isle of Wight (11,000 dsp), Sunderland (60,800 dsp) and Southampton (440 dsp). It demonstrates the extent to which tobacco had become a viable export commodity across England by this juncture.77 Goods such as lead and coal boosted a lively trade between Newcastle and a number of Swedish ports such as Karlskrona and Stockholm. Meanwhile, the distinctive absence of textile goods was one more notable feature of English trade with Sweden in 1700. Textiles in a variety of forms had helped boost the status and efficacy of the English import trade into Stockholm but are largely absent at this juncture. Cargoes of herring, dried fish and salt were more numerous than imports of traditional English textile manufactures. Dozens and kerseys, two of leading varieties of English textiles favoured in Sweden during the later seventeenth century, were only present on a handful of ships. How far the fact that Sweden was at war, from the beginning of 1700, influenced the changing nature of England’s typical commodity composition is currently unknown.78 The status of English trade with Swedish Livonia, namely the port of Riga, was also severely impacted by the onset of the Nine Years’ War. In contrast to Swedish trade, commercial contact with Riga was largely in the hands of English shippers, as it had remained since the decade prior. Another trend which continued from at least the mid-​1680s was the imbalanced nature of English trade 75 76

stro search: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1690–​1691. Only 440 Danish pounds of this total were imported outside of Stockholm, in this instance to Kalmar from London in October 1700. stro search: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1690–​1691. stro id: 623248. 77 stro search: England and Wales to Sweden and Finland, 1690–​1691. 78 Ibid.

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with Riga. The number of ships departing English ports appear to have almost entirely arrived in ballast. For example, in 1690 only two ships, both of which departed London, passed the Sound bound for Riga with any discernible cargo. Only Johan Martens of Bremen who was transporting 18,000 Danish pounds of Brazil wood and Benjamin Doncaster of Ramsgate who carried a variety of tin, tobacco, leather, skins and textiles, had any cargo on board.79 The remaining ships all arrived in ballast. This was a feature of the Riga trade that continued well into the Nine Years’ War. Of the 35 ships that departed English harbours for Riga in 1695 only eight ships had a viable cargo. Around 45,000 pounds of tobacco was shipped to Riga in three instances. Salt, tin and a variety of textiles also made an appearance. All remaining ships arrived in ballast. Sweden’s entry into the Great Northern War by the turn of the century is likely the reason behind why not only English trade to Riga, but all commercial interactions with the town were severely impacted.80 This imbalance of trade had proved to be one of the more negative hallmarks of the Riga trade for the English. It becomes clear by the close of the decade that trade with this Baltic port continued to be driven by the thirst for its export products, namely hemp and flax. The war had severely impeded the ability of England’s freighters to participate in trade at Riga. In 1686 74 ships in total departed Riga for English harbours, all filled to capacity with a mixture of flax, hemp and various timber products. Just four years later this number had dwindled by a quarter. Where English shippers had entirely dominated the trade, now vessels from across the Swedish Empire began to participate in conveying Riga’s exports to English ports. Around two-​thirds of the merchant fleet in the export trade from Riga remained English, making it possible to develop a reasonable picture of the extent of trade at this juncture. As can be seen from Figure 5.6, exports from Riga were almost entirely focused on the sourcing and exportation of hemp and flax. Although it can sometimes be difficult to adequately examine the exact extent of each commodity due to the method by which each commodity was recorded or grouped, exports of hemp remained the dominant feature of trade until its near collapse after the onset of the Great Northern War. The ubiquity of hemp, in particular, can be seen when viewing the individual lading dockets of each exporting ship. When examined at the Sound only a handful of the English ships present 79

80

It can sometimes be difficult to anticipate the extent of the English coal trade into the Baltic, especially from Newcastle, where the Sound Toll often record “coal as ballast” (Steenkuhl till ballast) on many occasions. Coal was often used as a viable ballast makeweight but also had significant commercial value. For an example see stro id: 625534. stro search: England and Wales to Livland, 1690–​1691.

0

2000

4000

6000

4725

1690

783

1564

206

Hemp (DSP)

6481

822

Flax (DSP)

325 1695

4128

Hemp (Lasts)

0

Hemp & Flax (lasts)

­f igure 5.6  Composition of exports from Riga to England, 1690–​1700 sources: stro searches. riga to england and wales, 1690–​1 691, 1695–​1 696, 1700–​1 701

Amount

8000

68 1700

1070 116

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in this investigation were not carrying at least a small consignment of hemp. There is only one ship skippered by Jacob Baess of Windau who fits this exception. Baess was carrying a cargo entirely of clapholt timber and sturgeon.81 Ancillary goods which were present in Riga’s export trade with England were various types of yarn such as cable yarn and flax yarn as well as a smattering of iron. Masts, which had been a relatively consistent feature of Riga’s trade with England and a prized, specialist product appear to have ceased entirely.82 Trade with Narva, another focal point of English commercial interests in the Baltic, had likewise been affected during the 1690s due to war. Total ships en route to Narva from English harbours had decreased from the numbers seen during the 1680s when England had been at peace. Just eleven ships visited Narva directly from England throughout the 1690 trading season and only four of those ships were actually carrying goods. Textiles and tobacco continued to play a large role in what the English could offer to Narva and remained the only enduring feature of this faltering trade during England’s participation in the Nine Years’ War. As shown in Figure 5.7, tobacco imports reached 87,880 Danish pounds. These were carried over two shipments from London and by a York skipper operating out of Hull. The extent to which Narva could act as a viable market had been demonstrated in the 1680s, when at its peak the English were able to move the majority of the 250,600 Danish pounds of tobacco imported into the town. Despite there being a significant recession in trade from this point, English imports of tobacco had significantly increased from their 1686 equivalent, from a total of 44,600 Danish pounds in 1686 to 87,880 Danish pounds in 1690. This increase demonstrates that where other English commodities lost their viability there was still the potential for English ships carrying tobacco to reach this eastern market to advance their trade. Otherwise the paucity of English trade into Narva appears to have continued for the duration of the Nine Years’ War.83 By 1695 there were some small signals that trade with Narva was improving, if not in the number of vessels frequenting the eastern reaches of the Baltic, but in the variety of goods being carried. As can be seen from Figure 5.7, tobacco imports from England continued to be the predominant feature of trade and had increased significantly to 236,600 Danish pounds. Despite the

81 82 83

Jacob Baess passed through the Sound on 5 September 1690 although the extent of his cargo of clapholts is not specified. stro id: 1619119. stro search: Livland to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. stro search: England and Wales to Narva (and derivatives), 1695–​1696.

0

200,000

400,000

1675

116,400

1680

240,800

1686

44,600

Year

1690

87,880

1695

236,600

1700

529,500

266 

­f igure 5.7  English tobacco imports into Narva, 1675–​1700 sources: stro searches. england and wales to narva, 1675–​1 676, 1680–​1 681, 1685–​1 686, 1690–​1 691, 1695–​1 696, 1700–​1 701

Tobacco (Danish pounds)

600,000

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disadvantages brought onto English shipping this figure resembled pre-​war rates.84 Although a number of English ships were sailing into Narva in ballast this was now in the minority. Ships departing harbours such as Hull, Newcastle and London were all carrying a variety of mined goods such as coal, lead and tin, extending to textile goods, bullets, and a singular shipment of 3,000 pounds of ginger. This demonstrates that the re-​diversification of English wares was already underway by this point.85 Despite the difficulties endured by the English in their ability to trade goods into Narva, interest in the port was increasingly being fuelled by the readiness in which it delivered commodities that had previously been sourced from Riga. Narva shared a similar export structure to its Livonian neighbour, and though it was still behind Riga in terms of the number of goods exported to England, it provided a significant outlet for flax, hemp and cordage. A comparison between Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8 shows the commodity structure of both ports was relatively similar. At the beginning of the decade Riga was the leading exporter of hemp to England while Narva exceeded its neighbour in exports of flax. By 1695 Narva’s output of flax had grown by over 1,000 dsp, from 3,183 dsp in 1690 to 4,430 dsp. This proved Narva’s ability to provide exports of flax as Riga’s concurrent exports of flax to England decreased by around five times their previous rate. Although Riga still edged ahead of Narva in exports of hemp by a considerable figure, the English market was beginning to increase its interest in hemp exports in Narva. Exports of hemp rose from around 979 dsp and 145 lasts to 5,536 dsp and 190 lasts. Furthermore the English began to significantly increase their exports of iron from Narva which saw a spike from 614 dsp in 1690 to 1,226 dsp in 1695. There was also a growing demand for Russian “juchten” leather from the port, with around 1,000 pieces exported in 1690. This figure then more than tripled to 3,740 pieces just five years later. Exports of raw flax yarn were preferred from Riga while finished cordage was exported from Narva.86 The English had a longstanding interest in Narva, dating from at least the time of the Tudors, and trade had been carried out consistently but to a varying degree from at least the mid-​1670s. The import trade into Narva from England

84

85 86

Tobacco arrived on four separate occasions mostly from London although it was largely thanks to Robert Shutton’s mammoth import of 197,600 Danish pounds in summer 1695 that significantly swelled this figure. stro search: England and Wales to Narva (and derivatives), 1695–​1696. stro id: 660972. stro search: England and Wales to Narva (and derivatives), 1695–​1696. stro searches: Livland to England wales, 1690–​1700; Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales. 1690–​1700.

15000

3183

979

1690

614

Hemp (dsp)

800 996

Flax (dsp)

4430 5336

Iron (dsp)

1695 Year

1226

3740 0

Russian leather (pieces)

8571 4226 48 1700

6830

Krakow linen (pieces)

­f igure 5.8  Exports from Narva, 1690–​1700 sources: stro searches. england and wales to narva, 1690–​1 691, 1695–​1 696, 1700–​1 701

0

5000

10000

Amount

20000

16797

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had struggled throughout the war with the only constant being tobacco, while interest in Narva’s export potential remained significant. After the end of the Nine Years’ War and England’s return to peace, trade between England and Narva was given a significant boost in both arms of trade. Although over half of the ships departing English harbours were still sailing to Narva in ballast, the actual traffic reaching Narva had more than quadrupled by 1700. Tobacco continued to be the largest export and had grown by a considerable number. As Figure 5.7 shows, tobacco imported into Narva from England had reached its peak by this point at 529,500 Danish pounds. This was an increase of over half the amount imported just five years earlier. London shippers were almost exclusively responsible for importing English tobacco into the town at ten of the total twelve shipments, with the remaining vessels arriving from Lancaster and Plymouth respectively. English shipments of salt into Narva by 1700 also increased considerably. The commodity had remained absent in the years immediately prior. London skippers handled the lion’s share of the salt trade, which numbered a total of 2,688 barrels. Other foodstuffs of note included a combined 8,800 Danish pounds of flour arriving steadily throughout the season from Yarmouth and London which was a new and unexpected feature of English trade. Textiles, particularly woollen stockings and leather, had a noted resurgence in 1700. Over 4,000 Danish pounds of “sole” leather were imported into Narva from both London and Yarmouth. Although textiles had remained a feature of trade during the 1690s they underwent a resurgence, and the woollen stockings trade increased by over five-​fold from a decade earlier from just over 600 pairs imported to around 3,700 in 1700. Although London was the predominant point of origin for many goods, northerly east coast ports were particularly successful in participating in the textile trade to Narva.87 Trade between Narva and England continued through the Nine Years’ War but by 1700 with England at peace, trade to English harbours now absorbed around half of all the outbound traffic from the port.88 The number of ships departing English harbours had risen by over half from 33 in 1695 to 72 in 1700. As trade was almost completely in the hands of English skippers it allows for a near complete appraisal of the English export from Narva. With such a large increase in shipping it is understandable that the growth of a number of staple commodities also occurred. As can be seen from Figure 5.8, exports of flax 87 88

stro search: Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. 73 vessels out of the total 147 departed Narva for England in 1700 equivalent to 49% of total outbound traffic. stro search: Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales, 1700–​ 1701; England and Wales to Narva (and derivatives) to England, 1700–​1701.

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almost doubled from their 1695 equivalent from 4,430 dsp to 8,571 dsp and were present in around two-​thirds of cargoes departing Narva for England. Hemp also increased in number as did exports of rope. Skin and textile goods saw a considerable rise with Russian leather exports moving from 3,740 pieces to 6,830 pieces in 1700. Russian leather had been exported throughout the 1690s and was of express interest in the English capital as well as Newcastle. The reappearance of Krakow linen on a number of English ships demonstrated considerable growth. Exports of Krakow linen had registered almost a thousand pieces a decade earlier but had since disappeared during the midpoint of the decade. In the 1700 trading season Krakow linen made a significant comeback. A total of 16,797 individual pieces were exported from Narva to England that year. London was the chief importer of these goods with around half of the total shipments bound for the capital. There was also demand for Krakow linen in the northeast, at Hull, Newcastle and Stockton.89 London was the chief motivator behind the sharp upturn in the level of trade witnessed between Narva and England in 1700 with around two-​thirds of all shipping focused on delivering goods to the English capital. As had been witnessed in other arms of Swedish trade, provincial skippers were often responsible for carrying goods between destinations in the Baltic and the capital itself. In addition to the merchant fleets of Ramsgate and Margate, which were inextricably connected to London, the northern ports of Yarmouth, Newcastle and Hull contributed significantly to freighting exports from Narva to the English capital. Yarmouth in particular contributed ten of its ships to aid London’s trade, around a fifth of all vessels bound for London. Hull and Newcastle contributed four and two respectively.90 As a key port and outpost of the Swedish Empire Narva was plunged into war with Russia at the beginning of the 1700, but despite this fact, trade carried on successfully and unabated for the entirety of the trading season. Over the course of the 1690s Narva had not only proven its viability as a port where English tobacco was in high demand, but its efficacy as a centre of hemp and flax had held true during the 1690s and had significantly increased at the beginning of the new century. Furthermore, the port remained a key access point for eastern markets, most notably seen through the exports of Russian “juchten” leather as well a convenient connection point for Polish linens and even Prussian timber. Unfortunately, 1700 was to be the swansong of the developing commercial association between England and Narva. Shipping to the

89 stro search: Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. 90 Ibid.

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port came to an abrupt halt shortly thereafter when Swedish and Russian troops met at the Battle of Narva in November 1700. Consequently trade was badly affected and by 1704 the Russian army had assumed control of Narva.91 Although a small number of English boats continued to visit Narva, the town’s trade with western markets would not recover to consistent levels until sometime into the eighteenth century.92 The commercial climate at Gothenburg was subject to different conditions compared with other Swedish centres of commerce lying within the Baltic. Shipping exiting the Baltic reached a low point in 1690, while Gothenburg demonstrated growth. As can be seen from Figure 0.7, Gothenburg’s total trade had increased from the mid-​1680s to a value of 560,111 riksdaler in 1690. The overall value of Gothenburg’s export trade then increased exponentially five years later to reach a record 834,947 riksdaler. By 1700 the value of Gothenburg’s export trade had receded and stabilised to a more consistent figure of 534,974 riksdaler in line with general trends witnessed over the preceding half century. It is highly likely therefore that Gothenburg as a port was able to capitalise on its geographical proximity to key western markets when alternative sources within the Baltic were in flux. Ivan Lind’s figures focusing on Gothenburg’s overall export goods reveal that sales of iron through the town grew considerably over the period. Total iron exports initially receded by around 2,000 ssp from their 1685 equivalent to 30,882 ssp in 1690. They then grew exponentially by over 50% to 46,324 ssp in 1695 and again to 48,529 ssp in 1700.93 The base price of iron appears to have remained relatively stable until 1695, which helps to account for the considerable increase in Gothenburg’s overall export value. However, by 1700 the town’s export of iron was still on the rise despite overall trade value dropping considerably, likely owing to a decrease in the value of iron on a per ssp basis.94 Gothenburg’s growing export market was also in part aided by the resilience of English trade. England remained the dominant export market for Gothenburg goods as had been established during the later 1670s and into the 1680s. Comparable to Stockholm since the beginning of the Nine Years’ War, other major western markets for Swedish export goods had remained significantly more vulnerable to severe fluctuations whereas English trade had not. 91 Frost, The Northern Wars, pp. 228–​231. 92 stro search: Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales, 1700–​1800; England and Wales to Narva (and derivatives) to England and Wales, 1700–​1701. 93 Lind, Göteborgs handel och sjöfart 1637–​1920, p. 56. 94 gla, gca, Vol. 879. 1690; Vol. 884. 1695.

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As Figure 5.9 demonstrates exports to the English market were the significant outlier well before, but particularly moving into the final decade of the seventeenth century. Exports to England through Gothenburg remained dominant and consistent whereas other export destinations including France, Portugal, and the Dutch Republic were in a state of constant flux. England’s market share of the export trade in Gothenburg remained relatively stable at around 50% across the decade.95 Iron continued to be the decisive draw factor bringing the English to Gothenburg. Their total export of iron from Gothenburg increased considerably from 19,865 ssp in 1690, to 25,849 in ssp in 1695, representing a considerable share of England’s overall commodity composition at this juncture.96 For example, in 1695 over 130 consignments were shipped across a total of 34 sailings departing Gothenburg during that trading season. This comes in contrast to just nine consignments of pitch, two consignments of tar and 38 consignments of boards and other timber, the latter of which were usually complementary inclusions in a significant number of cargoes. In actuality, the export of iron to England represented 262,108 riksdaler of the total 286,774 riksdaler worth of goods for 1695. Iron exports to England represented 30% of Gothenburg’s overall export value in 1690, rising considerably to 50% in 1695.97 War had severe implications for shipping employed in English trade with Gothenburg. Both the English and Swedish merchant marines had shared the responsibility for conveying goods between the two markets, with little interference from third party actors. The extent to which both nations’ merchant marines carved out a larger share of freight had always been in flux, and one dominant nation only tended to emerge during extraneous conditions of war. In this regard the 1690s were no different, and as a key belligerent, English shipping became severely impinged in its ability to participate in Gothenburg’s trade. In 1690 there were 33 ships employed in Anglo-​Gothenburg trade. The majority were Swedish. In total 25 Swedish ships carried exports to English ports and were responsible for conveying around 67% of the total value of trade. The majority of these ships were local operators with their home ports either

95 96 97

England’s market share is recorded as 47.17% of total exports in 1690, rising to 50.48% in 1695 and recording a further increase to 54.74% in 1700. gla, gca, Vol. 879, 1690; Vol 884. 1695; Vol. 889. 1700. Unfortunately at present it is not possible to provide an overview of the composition of commodities involved in Gothenburg’s trade during 1700. Gothenburg’s customs accounts merely state the overall value of goods and customs per ship. gla, gca, Vol. 889. 1700. gla, gca, Vol. 884. 1695.

0

250,000

500,000

750,000

1685

10,562 49,322 19,962

237,670

490,862

98,686

England

1690

Dutch republic

55,846 8,701 6,223 21,531

261,106

560,111

France

Year Portugal

Hamburg

1695

121,706 51,665 13,866

9,320

388,892

834,947

­f igure 5.9  Development of Gothenburg export markets by value, 1685–​1700 sources: gla, gca, vol. 875, 1685; vol. 879. 1690; vol. 884, 1695, vol. 889, 1700

Value (Swedish riksdaler)

1,000,000

Total

1700

47,758 33,083 48,843 34,183

292,841

534,974

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listed in Gothenburg or in the adjacent province Halland. Of the 25 Swedish merchantmen, sixteen were registered in Gothenburg and were responsible for carrying around 42% of trade. The port of Kungsbacka and other ships from Halland were the next largest group with ships from ports to the adjacent north such as Marstrand also featuring repeatedly. It demonstrates that Gothenburg’s commercial infrastructure was significantly developed enough to be able to call on local resources to facilitate the continuance of commerce when outside actors were unable. English ships were responsible for carrying the remaining 33% share of trade from Gothenburg in 1690. The majority of these ships were engaged in bilateral trading, setting out from their home ports and returning in the matter of a few short weeks. This was particularly the case when it came to provincial trade. In contrast, while Swedish ships did journey to ports such as Weymouth and Stockton, they were responsible for carrying the bulk of trade to London of which the English capital absorbed almost three quarters of total value of exports from Gothenburg. The influence of Swedish shipping continued into the 1690s and began to absorb more of the responsibility for carrying goods to English ports. By 1695 Swedish merchant ships were conveying almost 90% of Gothenburg’s export trade destined for English harbours equivalent to a value of 342,256 riksdaler. This growth meant that Swedish shipping not only continued to export to London but also began to play a major role in shipping to provincial ports along the south and east coasts of England.98 As had been demonstrated in the earlier decades of the century in both Gothenburg and Stockholm, Swedish shipping was more than capable of assuming the responsibility to facilitate the continuance of commerce when England was at war. It was reciprocal when Sweden was plunged into conflict in February 1700. The production and exportation of goods from Gothenburg did not cease due to the conflict and in a complete role reversal from five years earlier the English merchant fleet took over trade. The number of ships employed in the Gothenburg export trade to England more than doubled from 35 in 1695 to 79 in 1700. At a conservative estimate it would appear that Swedish ships made up only three of these instances, carrying a value of just 10,841 riksdaler of the 299,666 total.99 The English import trade into Gothenburg was considerably less developed and certainly less valuable than that of Stockholm. There was a severely

98 99

gla, gca, Vol. 884. 1695. gla, gca, Vol. 884. 1695; Vol. 889. 1700.

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reduced potential for England to vent its goods and large scale trade balances existed as the export of Swedish goods from Gothenburg continued to rise. Furthermore, goods subject to the referral or nederlag system often went unrecorded or their amounts or value left unspecified.100 Where it is possible to trace evidence of the import market from England it appears that the total value of goods reaching Gothenburg during the 1690s was around 5% of the total value of the city’s import market. In contrast to England’s role as the primary export market for the town’s goods it is clear to see that England operated in a considerable trade deficit in Gothenburg and imports from other markets vastly superseded England.101 Imports reaching Gothenburg from England were less uniform than in Stockholm where there was a heavy focus on bulk imports of textiles and foodstuffs. The leading ports that brought goods into Gothenburg were London and traditional centres of exchange further north such as Hull and Newcastle. There was a clear difference in the composition between goods arriving from the capital and more northerly east coast ports. Almost all coal imports into Gothenburg from England came from Newcastle. Coal imports reached 1,805 barrels in 1690 and had doubled by 1695 to 3,651 barrels, making it one of Gothenburg’s primary imports from England. In comparison imports of coal reaching Stockholm in 1686 registered 4,716 barrels. Given the size of Gothenburg’s market in comparison to the Swedish capital, this was a significant figure.102 It is likely that this reduced ability to find adequate markets for English goods severely impeded the development of an established English mercantile community in Gothenburg, contrary to what had occurred in Stockholm over the previous decades. In 1690 and 1695 only a handful of British merchants were importing goods into Gothenburg. In both 1690 and 1695 William Fenwick and Maccabeus Thornton were responsible for importing the largest share of goods from England.103 There appears to be no evidence of commodity specialisation, with both Fenwick and Thornton facilitating the import of a wide range of goods from coal, lead and textiles from northern ports to more 100 The nederlag system allowed for a wide variety of goods to be imported into the town and stored for re-​export or to be sold on at a later date. Goods that underwent this process deferred on paying customs fees at the point of export and thus in many cases it is difficult to account for their value in relation to the wider import trade. For more information on the system in practice see: Wikberg, Alla dessa tull –​en arkivguide, p. 221; Smith, Studier i svensk tulladministration, pp. 269–​270. 101 gla, gca, Vol. 879, 1690; Vol. 884. 1695. 102 gla, gca, Vol. 879, 1690; Vol. 884. 1695; ssa, sca, Vol. 74. 1686. 103 ssne entry: “Thornton, Macabeus” [6120].

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specialist items such as wax staples, rabbit fur hats to glass bottles and even shotgun bullets.104 Thornton and Fenwick were remarkable due to the sheer scale the two merchants operated on as well as the diversity exhibited in their import portfolios. Aside from imports of larger bulk goods such as coal, lead and even t­extiles which was conducted by British merchants as well as larger operators in Gothenburg, the import market from England was slight and seems to have been undertaken largely at a personal level. A wide number of Gothenburg’s mercantile community imported products such as garden seeds, soap, washing liquid, furniture, mirrors, elixirs, tobacco, children’s toys and even bedsheets in smaller consignments in the trading season. There were only a handful of merchants, such as Georg Matsson, who appeared to utilise England as a source of goods to develop a wholesale trade, in this case textiles.105 Although a significant trade deficit existed between England and Sweden’s principal ports for much of the century, by the close of the seventeenth century Gothenburg does not appear to have been a viable market for the export of English goods, and rather served as a source of iron. This does not appear to have stopped a small number of opportune British merchants the ability to establish a small and profitable trade in basic, domestic English exports such as coal, lead and textiles. 3

Anglo-​Swedish Disputes: Outstanding Debts and the Expulsion of Foreign Merchants

England’s prohibitive commercial policy during the Nine Years’ War had serious consequences for their commercial and diplomatic relationship with Sweden. In turn, diplomatic ruptures had a severe impact on the livelihoods of English merchants trading with Sweden. The problem of payment and outstanding debts to English merchants from the previous period were still unresolved by the 1690s. A fresh wave of petitions was undertaken by Duncombe in summer 1692 in an attempt to bring restitution for English merchants. Thomas Cutler, Paul Darby and William Smith’s petitions from the 1680s were revisited, 104 Fenwick and Thornton are named in connection with the majority of ships arriving from England. gla, gca, Vol. 879. 1690; Vol. 884. 1695. 105 During the 1690s England and in particular London appear to have been a centre for the import of various elixirs. This occurred on eight separate occasions during 1690 and were listed in price ranging from between six to upwards to 50 riksdaler. In every instance they were imported from London. gla, gca, Vol. 879. 1690; Vol. 884. 1695.

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and there were fresh petitions from Francis Stratford in Hamburg and Robert Tigh in Helsingör.106 All were for outstanding debts from the 1670s and 1680s. The submission of complaints during this tense period were not likely to be met with a high level of cooperation or favouritism on behalf of the Swedish authorities. During summer 1692, relations between England and Sweden reached a new low after British privateers began to attack vital Swedish imports. It is not known why the decision to submit fresh petitions came at this point. A possible explanation may lie in a common thread in the petitions themselves. Each petition denotes how at various points during the 1680s each case had been referred to an authoritative Swedish body, namely to the Liquidation Board or the Supreme Court (likely the Svea Court of Appeal). The Liquidation Board (Kammarkollegiets Likvidationsakter), operated from within the Swedish Treasury (Kammarkollegiet) and dealt with the claims of corporations and individual persons who had debts to claim from the Crown. The board was established by Karl xi following the Scanian War to determine what debts the Crown had incurred and whom they were payable to.107 Each petition specified how their case had been found legitimate and just by the Swedish authorities. However, after the judgments were made, they were blocked and no payment appeared to be forthcoming thus rendering a diplomatic intervention necessary.108 The authority that blocked merchants’ claims at this point came directly from the highest echelon of the Swedish government –​Karl xi himself. The Swedish king personally involved himself in English merchants’ cases directly after the point when they had been judged positively. Thomas Cutler had been fighting his battle with the Swedish Tobacco Company for nearly twenty years. When his case was presented to the Supreme Court, it was justified and backed by the President of the Court, Håkan Fägerstierna, and Senior Secretary Lars Lilliemark.109 Cutler’s court case was against the widow of a former head of two successive Swedish tobacco companies, Zackarias Reenberg, who had 106 Some of the British merchants present in Stockholm were acting on behalf of associates in London. For example Henry Moxon and Robert Jackson on behalf of Paul Darby’s interests, while Philip Forster was representing Robert Tigh and Francis Stratford. Thomas Cutler petitioned on his own behalf. tna, sp 95/​13, pp. 239–​45, 247, 248, 249, 250–​251. 107 Baltic Connections, Vol. 3, p. 2139. 108 tna, sp 95/​13, p. 248. “The State of the Case of Mr Francis Stratford English Merchant at Hamburgh in behalf of The Heirs of Mr. Jeffrey Nightingale late Marchant of London”. 109 tna, sp 95/​13, pp. 239–​245 (2). Stockholm, 18 March 1692. The judgement was also accompanied by a citation of the law ‘Law 33. Cap. Jord. B’.; Jägerskiöld, Olof, ‘Håkan Fägerstierna’, sbl, Vol. 16, p. 685, 1964–​66. Available at: https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/Sbl​/Prese​ntat​ion​.aspx ?id=​14611​. Accessed on 14 March 2016.

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been given royal mandate to trade under monopoly privileges. The court found that ‘Lady Margrett Beyer’ was to pay Cutler the sum of 141,420 riksdaler. At this point, the Swedish king interceded and nullified the court’s decision, and as Duncombe stated, decided to ‘acquitt the late Intendant Reenberg’s … Lady from all demands of Thomas Cutler’.110 Thomas Cutler’s experience was not the only incident where Karl xi personally interceded against the financial claims of an English merchant. The London merchant Paul Darby, similarly to his compatriot Cutler, was searching for payment of debts from the previous decade. The English merchants Henry Moxon and Robert Jackson oversaw his petition in Sweden. Darby received confirmation of his claim from the Liquidation Board in April 1684, but nothing was achieved beyond this decision. At this point, the king of England and the Privy Council interceded on his behalf.111 Unlike Cutler’s case, the king implicitly acknowledged Darby’s debt in his reasoning for nullifying the actual payment. He stated that because Darby had employed a Swedish factor (Nicklas Prinz of Gothenburg) it was not possible for him to accept Darby as the principal creditor in the matter. Furthermore, because Printz was ‘long since dead’, the Swedish king judged that nothing further could be done.112 Karl interceded in another English commercial petition in 1692. A shipment of corn was en route to Hamburg in 1676 during the Scanian War when it was stopped by the Swedes, taken to Stade in the Swedish Duchy of Bremen and sold by force to the king of Sweden’s army.113 The English merchants were compensated with bills of exchange which were never completely honoured to their full value. Francis Stratford, the petitioning merchant, stated that after the war they took their case to the Liquidation Board. Following more than ten years of pressure their debt was cleared in 1692. After they pushed for payment of the debt with the backing of the Board’s judgement, it was blocked by the king. The reasons stated were that a portion of the original payments were drawn and paid in hard currency, in contrast to the original agreement which was intended to be credit based. The Swedish king deferred payment over this technicality.114 The problem of receiving payment for English merchants exporting their goods to Sweden had been a problem as old as the trade itself. The ascendancy of Karl xi and his quest for absolute power enshrined within

1 10 111 112 113 114

tna, sra, sp 95/​13, pp. 239–​245 (3). Duncombe’s report on the judgement of Karl xi. tna, co 388/​1, pp. 191, 196; tna, pc 2/​69, pp. 194–​195. tna, sra, sp 95/​13, p. 247. ‘The state of the Case of Mr Paul Darby Marchant in London’. tna, sp 95/​13, p. 248. tna, sp 95/​13, p. 248.

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the monarchy had coincided with a considerable deterioration of the conditions for English merchants attempting to receive payment for their goods, particularly in commercial dealings with the Swedish Crown itself. Merchant petitions during the 1680s had gone unheard by the Swedes, even after the intercession of the king of England and his Privy Council. The debts owed to English merchants and the difficulties they faced in receiving payment should be viewed within the wider pattern of Sweden’s financial policy during this period, particularly in relation to the national debt. Karl xi’s sweeping financial reforms employed a number of methods that enabled a considerable portion of the national debt to be cut.115 Nevertheless, by the early 1690s, the Swedish Crown still owed heavy debts. One of the more nefarious methods the Swedish Crown used to tackle debt was to reject the repayment of loans from private individuals and corporations who had assisted the Crown during more pressing times. Major lenders from the nobility and mercantile elite, such as copper baron Börje Cronberg, the Momma-​Reenstierna firm and Joel Gripenstierna, had repayments defaulted by the Crown, proving that regardless of status, influence or wealth, nobody could expect guaranteed repayment.116 By the time of the English petitions in 1692, the Swedish Crown was still heavily indebted and held unpaid salaries to Crown employees totalling 1.3 million riksdaler. An estimation of the national debt in early 1693 shows that the Crown also had further unpaid obligations to a variety of concerns, totalling around 1.35 million riksdaler. A breakdown of this debt reveals that they owed 500,000 riksdaler to two private individuals and another 250,000 riksdaler to a further 19 individuals. In addition, they owed a total of 245,000 riksdaler for shipping, 30,000 to town governmental bodies and a further 330,000 riksdaler to 333 separate smaller ‘lenders’.117 Considering this information, it is not surprising that English merchants who had conducted business with the Swedish Crown (whether knowingly or forcibly) were experiencing difficulties in receiving payment. Their debt was only one facet of a wider multitude of debts the Swedish Crown was seeking evasion from honouring. The key differences

115 Larsson and Österberg, Sveriges Historia, pp. 74–​85, 158–​175; Upton, Charles xi and Swedish Absolutism, pp. 51–​71. 116 Åström, ‘The Swedish Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great Power’, p. 91; Wittrock, G., ‘Börje Cronberg’, sbl, Vol. 9, 1931, p. 181. Available at: https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/Sbl​/Prese​ ntat​ion​.aspx?id=​15669​. Accessed on 16 March 2016; Dahlgren, Stellan, ’Joel Gripenstierna’, sbl, Vol. 17, 1967–​69, p. 329. Available at: https://​sok​.riks​arki​vet​.se​/Sbl​/Prese​ntat​ion​.aspx ?id=​13223​. Accessed on 16 March 2016. 117 Åström, ‘The Swedish Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great Power’, p. 91.

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between these debts and the cases of the English merchants were twofold. Firstly, the English merchants cannot be classed as ‘lenders’ and certainly did not consider themselves to be. Secondly, not one of the petitioning English merchants held Swedish burgess status, or was naturalised as a Swedish subject, and therefore the same obligations and liberties the Swedish Crown could place upon its citizens were not applicable.118 The intercession of the Swedish king in English commercial petitions and the gravity of these actions should not be overlooked. The personal intercession of a monarch in the affairs of merchants, which, in the case of the Swedish Crown, could be considered small amounts of money, was highly unusual. It represented a swift departure in Crown policy towards English claims. During the 1680s, English claims had been deferred to the Liquidation Board, and it was even possible for English merchants present in Sweden like Thomas Cutler to seek restitution within the confines of Swedish law. The positive judgments of Swedish bodies represented working justice. However, according to their petitions, English claims had simply been ignored by the Swedish Crown beforehand. Therefore, the outright nullification of claims, by no less than the monarch himself, represented a considerably hostile and abrupt change of attitude. Given the timing of the judgments in the summer of 1692, it is unlikely that the reasoning behind deferring on payments to English merchants was simply motivated by financial concerns in light of indebtedness of the Swedish Crown, although it was certainly a factor. The decision of the monarch to personally intercede was a message to the English government demonstrating their displeasure towards English commercial policy during the war. In his petition, Thomas Cutler, merchant consul and long-​time resident of Stockholm, stated that he hoped now ‘it may appear how ill the English subjects are treated in Sweden’.119 Little did he know that deferring on debt was just a prologue to the difficulties British merchants in Sweden were about to face. The Swedes had spoken, and predatory measures against their trade would force a policy of continued retaliation against British merchants. In 1694, two years after the intercession of Karl xi in English commercial affairs, Swedish attempts to gain restitution for their lost commerce had largely failed. English predatory actions against Swedish imports from France had led 118 In Robinson’s memorial on reasons against acquiring Swedish burgess status, he alludes to the random and obligatory financial contributions Swedish merchants had to pay to civic bodies as well as the Swedish Crown. tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 424–​426. 119 Thomas Cutler’s original petition. tna, sra, sp 95/​13, pp. 239–​245 (1)., Stockholm, 24 August 1692. sra, da, Vol. 544, lists the figure demanded as 505,957 riksdaler. Thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for this reference.

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to the reinstatement of the Treaty of 1661 in an attempt to provide legal safeguards for Swedish shipping in spring 1693. The failure of the treaty and the steadfast attitude of the English had caused further frustration to the Swedes. In May 1694, Karl xi appointed a committee to examine the claims of Swedish merchants to present the results directly to William iii and his government. After examining their merchants’ accounts, the cost of the damage was estimated at 503,957 riksdaler (£125,898) and copies of the accounts and decisions were sent to both Christoffer Leijoncrona, Swedish Envoy in London, and the English court.120 Bengt Oxenstierna and John Robinson were to act as the intermediaries, and in May 1694, Robinson was invited to the Tre Kronor castle in Stockholm to discuss the Swedish claims. In an act of good faith he was allowed to present his claims for the English merchants.121 By July, reports from Leijoncrona that the English had received the documents had considerably raised expectations in Swedish political and mercantile circles and they felt confident of restitution.122 However, soon after, there were reports of new seizures. The timing could not have been worse, and Swedish optimism crashed. Combined with the news of fresh encouragement for privateering in England in October 1694, the Swedes became alarmed. Seemingly nothing could be done to convince the English otherwise, and the Swedish government embarked on a campaign of retaliation against British merchants in Sweden.123 The following month, on 9 November 1694, all foreign merchants in Stockholm were ordered to appear before the town council of the city and instructed to obey Swedish commercial laws or face punishment and expulsion. The merchants were given the option to become Swedish burgesses, and if they declined they were to be forced to leave two months after the issuing of the Council’s proclamation.124 The authorities were referring to the Swedish Trade Ordinance of 1617. The law, at least in regards to English trade, had largely and gone unobserved until 1673 when it was partially enforced during the Third Dutch War, ‘when England being [at] Warr with the Dutch, & the Scotch Privateers useing the Swedish Ships very hardly, it was reviv’d in shew & intended to abridge the English, but without any reall effect at that time’.125 There were threats to administer the

120 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 45–​46, 46–​47. ‘The demands of the King of Sueden’s Subjects for their Ships & Goods brought up in England’. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 167–​171 (1). Robinson to Shrewsbury. Stockholm, 14 November 1694. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.

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law again in 1687, but it failed to be properly implemented. The Swedes were obviously intent on reviving the same tactic as used before, but now with considerably more force. Robinson fully appreciated the motivations behind the revival of this law, stating that now ‘in a fitt of anger … they have shown their teeth’.126 The English had long been subjected to constraints in their trade with Sweden. Restrictions were imposed upon their ability to have access to their goods in Sweden, and they were forced to store both their imports and exports in warehouses sanctioned by the local authorities who charged a premium for the service. They also had prohibitions on travel and were forbidden to visit areas of production, confining themselves to the first port of entry they arrived at in Sweden. English merchants in Sweden had long bemoaned these restrictions, the earliest evidence of this currently comes from the mid-​1660s. These complaints were originally consulted as a commercial reference in the eventual conclusion of the Treaty of 1665.127 Despite these impositions, the English had always managed to ply their trade in Sweden and remained undeterred. The main issue with the revival of the ordinance of 1617 from both parties was the right of abode of foreign merchants in Sweden. The 1617 ordinance outlined that no foreign merchant who remained unnaturalised, failing to hold appropriate Swedish burgess status, was permitted to remain in Sweden and trade longer than two months or eight weeks.128 While British merchants could circumvent many of the commercial conditions imposed upon them and their trade, the right of abode represented the biggest problem they had faced yet. As witnessed in previous chapters, in order to fulfil the demand for exports of iron many English exporters conducted their business over a considerably longer period than the allotted eight weeks allowed for by the Swedish trade ordinance. The ability to trade their own goods and fulfil the demand for iron exports required a longer time period spent in Sweden, and they often traded throughout the extended commercial season, sometimes from March to November.129

1 26 Ibid. 127 tna, sp 103/​69, various documents, c. 1664–​1665. 128 tna, sp 103/​69, various documents, c. 1664–​1665., ‘Declaration of the Grand Stadtholder, Burgomaster and Councels of Stockholm, 23 May 1687’ (2); sra, Kommission angående främmande köpmäns handel i riket, various documents drawn up by the Swedish commission to outline the history and specifics of trade regulations, 1436–​1664 and 1563–​1673. 129 Such was the bulky nature of iron shipments which were produced in towns further up river, deliveries into export harbours typically arrived throughout the course of the season, thus requiring iron purchasers to be in-​port for a longer period of time.

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The English were determined to fight the law, and by March 1695 it appeared as if the issue could be resolved. The English government remitted two separate payments to Robinson that were deemed an appropriate fee for Swedish shipping in light of the money owed to English merchants in Sweden.130 English hopes were buttressed by the appointment of a committee comprised of the various chambers of government to treat the issue.131 The attack on foreign merchants was not merely a convenient way in which to retaliate against England’s predatory commercial policy by the highest echelons of government. It had significant support from the Swedish burgess community, who had long resented the presence of non-​naturalised merchants in their trading area. The ultimatum issued by the Stockholm Town Council in November 1694 offered a win-​win situation for the native burgess community. If foreign merchants were to be limited to two months a year, they stood to gain a higher degree of control over the valuable export market for the remainder of the trading season when British merchants were not present. If foreign merchants chose to stay in Sweden and assume a naturalised status, the local community would gain by forcing payment of taxes and other obligatory financial contributions at their whim. Since the king’s attack on the nobility through the reduktion, the burgesses stood to gain influence. The burgesses’ political influence in Sweden had indeed grown since Karl xi placed restrictions on the nobility, but it was also connected to the growing wealth of towns in regard to the expansion of foreign trade.132 But the burgesses were far from a homogenous group, encompassing everyone from the smallest retailer to the wealthiest merchants who entered the nobility and diversified their economic interests into domestic production, foreign trade and shipping.133 Entry into the burgess community thus 130 Two receipts were acknowledged for payments of £2,415 and £525. Compared to Swedish demands which were above 500,000 riksdaler, this figure was wholly inadequate. tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 270–​271, 29 March 1695. William Blathwayt, Secretary at War had originally proposed that the issue should be resolved by ‘determining the difference’ between English demands and Swedish demands and that a lump sum should be paid ‘as can be agreed upon by their subjects’,tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 70–​71. Robinson to Shrewsbury. Stockholm, 3 July 1694. 131 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 244–​245. 2 March 1695; sra, Kommission angående främmande köpmäns handel i riket. 132 Dahlgren, Stellan, ‘Estates and Classes’, in Roberts, Michael (ed.), Sweden’s Age of Greatness: 1631–​1718, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 110. Olof Thegnér, leader of the burgesses, was a close ally of Karl xi. 133 Dahlgren, ‘Estates and Classes’, pp. 110–​112. There were conflicts within the group itself because of the wide differences in financial status and influence, particularly between retailers and wholesalers.

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had many potential beneficial elements, such as wide access to a variety of commercial avenues and political influence. In contrast to their English counterparts many Scottish immigrants, particularly in the first half of the century, had entered the burgess community and had risen with varying degrees of success, although their influence and participation, at least in regard to Anglo-​ Swedish trade, had waned and given way to other naturalised Swedish merchants by this point.134 English merchants in Sweden had always been reluctant to naturalise and join the burgess community thereby committing their futures and livelihoods to Sweden. The commercial records of Stockholm and Gothenburg have shown how there was a steady replenishment of English traders engaged in the Swedish export market throughout the period. English merchants plying their trade in Swedish harbours generally preferred to return home to continue their careers and so were succeeded by others.135 The discussion of the differing attitudes and motivations between English and Scottish merchants to settling in Sweden is not immediately relevant here, but Robinson was able to provide a host of reasons that dissuaded the English from becoming Swedish burgesses. Robinson outlined the key reasons as restrictions on their personal liberties, such as foregoing the right to freedom of religion and mandatory conversion to Lutheranism. There were also a number of financial burdens involved with being a Swedish burgess. For example, they were obliged to contribute financially to the burgess community, and the Crown had the right to levy contributions at a whim. Furthermore, if they retired or passed away, they would be forced to pay a third of their estate to the city.136 However, difficulties also faced the merchants if they were to leave. They would be forced to employ Swedes as agents for the remainder of the trading season that was barred to them. Robinson admitted that it was possible for merchants to sell their goods in the time allotted, but only for cash, which ‘neither is practicable, nor can ever be expected’. Robinson furthered this by saying ‘The Swedish Traders are for the most part unsincere, & very apt to over-​reach those that trust them, & ever backward to pay their Debts’.137 Robinson conceded that the only potential inducement to stay concerned those who had families,

134 Grosjean and Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in 17th Century’ Gothenburg, pp. 191–​ 220; Murdoch, ‘Community, Commodity and Commerce: the Stockholm-​Scots in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 31–​59. 135 Riden, Philip, ‘An Englishman in Stockholm’, pp. 191–​205; Åström, From Cloth to Iron, Vol. 1, pp. 161, 163. 136 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 424–​426. Robinson to Trumbull. Stockholm, 28 December 1695. 137 Ibid.

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and that a key right of burgess status was the ability to have lodgers, which could be useful to future English merchants and visitors.138 An added difficulty was presented to those merchants who were seeking repayment of their debts, such as Thomas Cutler. The English merchants had failed to capitulate and had resubmitted petitions in 1694.139 A requirement of acceptance as a burgess was that half of any current debts to the king had to be conceded. However, as Robinson admitted, being restricted to only reside in Sweden for a portion of the year essentially constituted to foregoing their demands.140 Furthermore, merchants like Cutler who had been ruined and unable to find the financial means to continue trading would not have been able to return each season to fight for their debts. Despite several attempts by Robinson and the English government to remedy the situation, the Swedish Commission implemented the trade ordinance and British merchants without burgess rights in Sweden were forced to leave the country. Robinson appealed the decision but not long after, the king backed the council’s decision.141 The implementation of the Swedish trade laws represented the end of an era of freedom for British merchants trading in Swedish ports. From the vantage point of the available commercial records the composition of the British community of exporters does not appear to have been replenished by 1700, and a dwindling core of British exporters were encroached upon by an ever increasing number of Swedish merchants, to a level not previously seen. 4

Conclusion

Diplomatic relations between England and Sweden became dictated by war. The extreme circumstances brought about by the predatory commercial tactics England chose to follow placed a strain on their relationship. It was the toughest test in the history of Anglo-​Swedish diplomacy. Several factors prevented a complete severance of ties. One was Sweden’s steadfast adherence to a policy of neutrality. Both the combination of a powerful Anglo-​Dutch union and England’s dominant role over Sweden’s export market prevented the possibility of Sweden seeking alternative allies as it might have attempted 1 38 Ibid. 139 tna, sp 95/​14, p. 28. 25 April 1694. Petition of several merchants: Thomas Cutler, Henry Moxon, William Smith, Philip Forster. 140 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 424–​426. Robinson to Trumbull. Stockholm, 28 December 1695. 141 tna, sp 95/​14, pp. 554–​555, 556–​557. 25 May 1696, 29 May 1696.

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in earlier times. Finally, deteriorating relations with Russia forced Sweden to keep Britain close as an ally. Ultimately, British exporters paid the price for an English commercial policy that was enacted in the war against French trade. Privateering had been the main contention point in Anglo-​Swedish relations since the First Dutch War in the early 1650s. Sweden had shown its potential to enforce disadvantageous laws in 1673 due to English privateering, but eventually reneged. However, the Nine Years’ War was one of the most intense periods for predatory acts against Swedish shipping. Combined with the burden of a heavy national debt in the face of English claims, Karl xi utilised this conflict for his own financial benefit. The second phase of retaliation against the English led to the expulsion of their mercantile community, and sought to extinguish the last vestiges of liberty to which they had clung. Finally, the Swedish Crown was able to placate the native burgess community, who had grown stronger over the century, assisting them in their attempt to realise their dreams of autonomy over foreign trade. Although the status and expulsion of the British merchant community in Sweden at this time has been briefly discussed by previous scholars, this study has been able to show these events in the context of the wider political arena. It has been demonstrated how the Swedish state used the British merchant community as both a political and commercial pawn to achieve its domestic aims and apply pressure diplomatically. Despite these overtures, by the turn of the new century Anglo-​Swedish commerce had continued unabated, and a small core of English merchants were once again active in key Swedish ports. Given that it occurred under such hostile circumstances, the expansion of English trade with Sweden demonstrates the enduring strength of their commercial association by this period. England proved to be the only stable market for Swedish goods as other major export markets fluctuated intensely. As a result, native merchants and shippers clambered for control of the lucrative trade to England while external pressures mounted on English traders. Nevertheless, England’s share of Gothenburg’s export trade reached new peaks and exports from Stockholm continued to flourish despite the reduced oversight of English operators. England’s commercial association with both Riga and Narva was sustained, and in the case of the latter, expanded significantly. Regardless of who was the primary mercantile force undertaking trade, one consistent feature witnessed was the reduced ability of England to trade their goods into Swedish-​controlled ports. The demand for Baltic exports assumed increasing focus and trade in England’s own products had receded from the gains they had made during the previous two decades. Perhaps the one exception to this trend was tobacco. The imbalance of trade was increasingly remedied by the necessities of triangular

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trading, particularly in the case of Swedish skippers based out of Gothenburg and Stockholm. It serves to demonstrate that despite such imbalances the drive for Swedish exports in England still dominated their commercial association, perhaps more than ever. Regardless, whatever facilitatory measures that had to be undertaken to ensure a steady flow of goods from Swedish ports reached England, could be and would be done.

Conclusion It is impossible to ascertain what England’s early seventeenth-​century merchants who engaged in commerce with Sweden would have made of their nation’s trade almost a century later. Many of the goods would have appeared familiar. The exchange of cloth for iron, and perhaps tobacco for tar and pitch remained recognisable. The competition for goods with Dutch and German speaking counterparts was unchanged. What no doubt would appear shocking to them would have been the sheer scale of the trade. The ubiquity of English ships and their Swedish counterparts loading goods destined for England’s harbours came to play a primary role in Sweden’s principal domestic ports. Under no circumstances did England look to dominate the export trade at the beginning of the century or even thirty to forty years later. At the beginning of the century England’s trade in the Baltic largely bypassed Swedish ports. The establishment of a staple port on the shores of the Baltic, sometimes at Elbing or Danzig, by the Eastland Company honed the focus of England’s commercial ambitions during this period. For a large portion of the first half of the century English activity was concentrated in ports in the southern Baltic. English merchants hoped to find viable markets for cloth, while seeking commodities such as flax and hemp, foodstuffs, and to a lesser extent tar, pitch and iron in return. At this juncture England’s commercial interest in Sweden was piecemeal and was altogether ignored by the Eastland Company, despite the royally-​sanctioned commercial body holding sole right for English trading with Scandinavia. Nevertheless, unofficially sanctioned, direct trade between the English and Swedish markets was undertaken at the turn of the seventeenth century by a specialised group of traders and showed signs of growth during the course of the first decades of the period in question. The exchange of goods was facilitated by English and Scottish traders, both on the ground in Sweden and from their commercial bases in England. Furthermore, English traders were able to penetrate the highest echelons of governance in England and Sweden to exert influence. John Coote of London conducted consistent trade with Sweden over a number of years across the first decades of the century and called on the Swedish Crown as a debtor. These debts would eventually lead him to supposition the government for assistance who directed the British ambassador Sir James Spens to effect a campaign for payment for goods. Further, British networks were also at play in Sweden for Coote, who was able to call on Scotsman Patrick Rutherford to stand in his absence before the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004549777_008

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The facilitation and encouragement of commercial links between England and Sweden was also affected from within Sweden. English merchant Anthony Knipe came to head the hastily assembled English Company of Gothenburg, seen as a financial lifeline to the newly-​established town which sat precariously on the Swedish coast during its infancy. Likewise Knipe had access to influential circles and would call on Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna as one of his main associates. Knipe would go on to hold prestigious positions in early Gothenburg and was a representative of the town at the Riksdag of 1640. Early pioneers such as Coote, Knipe, and the existence of a commercially influential Scottish community helped facilitate access to and garner knowledge of the Swedish market. This proved vital when England’s shifting commercial intentions pivoted towards Sweden as a producer and provider of goods it so readily desired. The First Dutch War provided an unlikely catalyst that would reposition England and Sweden’s interests toward one another. A wave of predatory actions wrought on Swedish shipping by English privateers during the war facilitated an unprecedented wave of diplomatic correspondence and interaction between the English and Swedish governments. Blockages at the Sound by Sweden’s Scandinavian enemy Denmark, who sided with the Dutch Republic in the war, cut off the Baltic from English shipping. A drought in vital naval goods from bases in the Baltic clearly signalled to the English that the necessity for greater oversight and a potential ally in the north was vital. The first Anglo-​Swedish treaty emerged from the ashes of war in 1654 to help remedy some of the lessons learned during this conflict. The treaty was followed by another, improved agreement two years later which sought to encompass wider commercial considerations as England’s interest in Swedish exports started to peak. Over the course of the 1650s Anglo-​Swedish commercial contact saw an accelerated rise, largely based on the increasing export of Swedish goods to English ports. Stockholm and Gothenburg, in particular, witnessed a larger presence of English traders and ships journeying to these ports, recording the largest numbers ever achieved. The value of goods exported from Stockholm to England had increased by over 3,500%, and exports from Gothenburg rose in value by almost four times during the course of the decade. England and Sweden’s geopolitical and commercial relationship became codified, their respective colonial spheres were entwined through joint agreements between the English East India Company and the Swedish Africa Company. Indeed, England’s presence as a powerful western ally helped the Swedes to gain the provinces of Halland and Blekinge as part of the Swedish Realm toward the close of the decade. This established a Swedish presence at the Sound and aided in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Baltic.

290 Conclusion The turn of a new decade brought with it regime change in England and Sweden. The strength of the relationship was enshrined in a fresh and wider ranging treaty a year later in 1661. Trade had increased more than ever. The English were making serious inroads into the Swedish import trade in an attempt to balance their export of Swedish goods. Domestically-​produced goods were arriving en masse and English shippers began to participate in the freight trade, facilitating the import of goods into Sweden from the Dutch Republic, Hamburg and southern Europe. Although the Second Dutch War brought an abrupt end to the English import trade, the flow of Swedish exports continued unabated, largely due to the readiness of the Swedish commercial community to respond to severe market changes that rendered English operators paralysed. These responses to war showed the strength of the two nations’ commercial accord in a manner that was not present during the First Dutch War. Furthermore, the English market had become too precious a source of finance to fail, and a willing Swedish mercantile community was more than ready to steal the English trade from the grip of a pervasive English commercial presence in Sweden. Market familiarity, commercial accord and economic necessity would ensure that the flow of Swedish goods would continue under subsequent wartime conditions, namely in the Third Dutch War and the Nine Years War, demonstrating just how vital a pipeline of goods to England had become. The facilitation of trade between the two nations’ merchant marines was reciprocal. When Sweden was embroiled in conflict the English sprang into action to ensure the flow of goods from the Swedish trade area remained unaffected. In fact, the mid-​late 1670s represented perhaps the greatest level of penetration into the Swedish market for the English in the history of Anglo-​ Swedish commercial contact. English merchants on the ground in the Swedish capital imported vital goods such as salt and other foodstuffs, in concert with English skippers to ensure Sweden was kept well-​supplied. Such was the tenacity of English efforts that a glut of goods into the Swedish marketplace heavily impacted the price of their export commodities much to the frustration of local producers and wholesalers alike. The level of influence the English were now beginning to exert over Sweden’s commercial life was becoming worrying and in part influenced the conclusion of Swedish commercial agreement with the Dutch Republic. The efficacy of England’s supply lines likely in part fuelled the altered customs conditions that were established through Karl xi’s requisitioning of customs affairs. A combination of these factors in tandem with the difficulty of securing payment for goods delivered, sought to severely impinge on the English import trade into Sweden.

Conclusion

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The centre of activity in Anglo-​Swedish trade since the upturn of direct trading in the 1650s had always rested in Swedish ports. The influx of successive waves of English merchants and agents who arrived to source Swedish goods for export swelled an already influential Scottish commercial community who had once held its grip on a growing and lucrative trade. Although English operators often sourced and exported the vast majority of goods there was also an extensive number of the Stockholm mercantile community who participated in trade to England also. This native group of merchants rarely superseded their English rivals unless under extraneous conditions such as war but had always sought to play a significant role. Tension between the respective English and Swedish mercantile communities consistently fizzled and often led to diplomatic rapprochement or active judicial conflict. English traders held crucial lines of credit which made it difficult for Swedish traders to compete, and often flouted local laws that sought to curb foreign actors, much to the detriment of the native mercantile community. These difficulties came to a head during the mid-​1690s, eventually resulting in the expulsion of the British community from Swedish ports. However, wider geo-​political reasoning aided this fracture. Codified diplomatic accord had been allowed to slide during the course of the 1670s and subsequent attempts at reaching an agreement had stalled. This had left Anglo-​Swedish trade without a supporting treaty, but such was the demand for Swedish goods in England that trade continued to flourish. Despite the outbreak of the Nine Years’ War and England’s role as a key belligerent, England remained the only stable market for Swedish exports. This came in the face of rival markets fluctuating violently and increasingly Sweden’s merchant marine came under the employ of English trade. Concurrently Swedish politicians and their mercantile community became enraged at a resumption of predatory attacks on Swedish shipping, particularly in its trade with southern Europe. The Swedish Crown was forced to play its hand and expel England’s merchants. Despite these serious overtures, trade continued and England’s traders returned albeit in smaller numbers by the turn of the new century. The commercial association between England and Sweden is a, if not the, key mercantile relationship of the seventeenth century. Yet it is one so readily sidestepped in the historical discourses of both countries. Sweden as a sovereign state in the far reaches of Scandinavia and the Baltic does not fit the rhetoric of England’s colonial expansion and the commercial and territorial gains made therefrom. England, as a key western ally that played such a large role in the commercial foundation of Sweden’s great power period, often gets ignored as there are very little, if any tangible traces left in contrast to other foreign influences from this time.

292 Conclusion The joint-​ascension of England and Sweden was by no means an accident, and in many ways the two nations became inextricably entwined, much to the chagrin of political contemporaries. Commercial considerations gave way to diplomatic representation. What were essentially two disparate states before this juncture heralded the meeting of traders and diplomats that brought a level of association never before seen. The journey that the two nations encountered was one fraught with difficulties. Trade was the central and underpinning foundation of their association. However, commerce was constantly interrupted by wider geopolitical machinations. Western powers sought to check the balance of power in the Baltic between the various sovereign states. Likewise, Sweden attempted to ensure it did not come to be subjugated under the influence of any single one of the western European maritime powers. The Swedish Crown often sought to court the likes of England, the Dutch Republic and France concurrently. Ultimately these overtures, though considerable and at times effectual, failed to impact the course of Sweden and England’s commercial reliance on one another. Over the course of the century the two nations were firmly in each other’s gaze and although the broad strokes of this often difficult and unusual relationship have been outlined, there remain many more avenues left to discover.

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Index Aachen 159–​160 Act of Trade 1617 (Sweden) 59, 281–​282 Acts of Navigation (England) 34, 95, 97–​98, 102–​104, 119, 168, 174–​177, 200 Admiralty 66–​67, 92 agents. See merchants Alexis i of Russia 93 Allestree, William 186, 201, 225 alliance politics 119–​123, 125–​126, 130, 133–​136, 154–​155, 183, 185–​189, 199–​200, 238–​239 alliances. See treaties Almond, Jacob 61n aluminium 148 American colonies 5 Amsterdam 65, 115, 149, 158, 170n Bank of Amsterdam 116 Amya (Amia), David 112 Anderson, Thomas 159 Anderson, William 28 Andersson Fägerstierna, Håkan 277–​278 Anglo-​Dutch cooperation 241–​243, 245, 285–​286 Anglo-​Dutch Wars  First Anglo-​Dutch War 81, 94–​95, 97, 102, 112, 130, 154, 157 Second Anglo-​Dutch War 124, 126, 153–​ 157, 159, 161, 166–​167, 170, 183 Third Anglo-​Dutch War 126, 134, 139, 185 Anna of Denmark 33 Anstruther, Sir Robert 25, 102 Arctic 6, 93 Arentz, Rejer 33n, 34 armaments industry 4, 47 armaments trade 76–​77, 172, 276 Austria 122 Averie, Joseph 25 Ayloff, Benjamin 170n baize 87–​88, 148 ballast 155, 170, 245, 260, 263, 267, 269 Baltic  commodities 2–​3, 5 exports. See commodities

geopolitics 7, 15, 81n, 94, 101, 126, 133, 154, 163 historiography 9 trade (general) 3, 15, 21, 23n, 28, 30–​31, 34, 45–​46, 52, 65, 67–​69, 73, 86, 93, 118, 154, 158, 161–​163, 171, 175, 200, 215, 248–​ 250, 258, 261, 271 Barker, Francis 112 Barkman Leijonberg, Johan 114, 124, 128–​ 130, 174, 177, 189, 200, 245–​246 Barösund 207, 258 Beckwith, Anthony 195 bedsheets 276 beer 31, 58, 88, 170 Bell, Edward 257 Bengtsson, Börge 112 Bennett, Albert (Albrecht) 33n, 34 Berg, Hindrich 227 Bergen 154, 158 Beyer, Margaret 278 Bex, Isaac 144, 146, 159–​160, 167 Bidal, Bénoit 241 Biddall, Samuel 144–​145 Bideford 259 Bielke, Nils 240 Bielke, Sten Nilsson 135 bills of exchange 52, 116 Biörnklou (Björnklou), Mattias 135 Blackett, William 110, 144–​145, 150 Blackwell, Edward 116 Blathwayt, William 283n Blome, Robert 231–​234 Bodham, Edward 110–​111 Bohuslän 2 Bonde, Christer 99 Borgesson, Nils 64n, 112 Borrett (Barratt), George 41 Bowyer, John 208 Brahe, Nils 124, 127 Brandenburg-​Prussia 4, 178, 239–​240, 270 brass 1, 85, 140, 159, 163, 167, 172, 193, 204, 206, 219 Brazil wood 263 Bremen-​Werden 2, 73, 126, 136, 263, 278 Brent, John 116 Bristol 258–​259

314 Index British Civil Wars 15–​16, 30, 34, 36, 69, 72, 77–​78, 86–​87 Brun, Jacob 33n Bruce, William 26–​27 Bruesse (Bredsche), Peter 76–​77 Buchanan (Buchan, Alexander 108–​109, 111 Buloh, Morten (Mårten) 111 Burger, Francis 53 burgess communities  Gothenburg 40, 42, 55, 57, 59, 112, 153, 276 Stockholm 1, 53, 87, 109–​111, 113–​114, 145–​ 147, 158–​161, 166–​167, 171, 187, 202, 208, 210, 219, 253–​254, 256–​257, 280–​285 burskap. See citizenship butter 47, 148 Börtkie, Claes 87 Cahun, Peter 180 capital. See financial capital Carlisle, Charles Howard, Earl of 124, 136–​139 Carloff, Henrich 115 Carmichael, Alexander 78n Carnegie, John 42 carpets 208 carrying trade (the). See shipping cash 116, 171, 173, 175 Catherine of Braganza 120, 149n chalk 173 Charles i of England and Scotland 21, 30, 68, 72–​73, 77, 89, 104 Charles ii of England and Scotland 72, 96, 119–​121, 130, 132, 139, 156, 174–​175, 200, 228, 231 cheese 88, 173 Cheshire, Isaac 167, 173 citizenship 26–​28, 33, 41–​42, 44–​47, 49, 54–​ 55, 57, 59–​60, 64, 70, 97, 99–​100, 103, 109, 112, 283–​284 Clavering, John 110–​111, 144, 145, 150 Clifford, Sir Thomas 124, 130–​131 cloth 4, 30, 51, 85–​86, 104, 108n, 140, 171, 175, 230, 233 clothes. See textiles coal 85–​86, 88, 148, 172, 211, 214, 262, 263n, 275–​276 Colberg/​Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) 21n colonial goods. See colonial trade

colonial trade 3, 5–​6, 16, 33, 49n, 86, 91, 113–​ 118, 123–​124, 168, 174 Commonwealth. See English Republic commercial organisation. See trade, organisation of commercial privileges. See citizenship competition 113 Covenanters 77 Cooper, John 144, 145, 150, 163, 167, 173 Cooper, Samuel 257 Coote, John 29, 46–​54, 70, 106, 225 Coote, John (Gothenburg merchant) 153 Coote, Mary 50–​53 Coote, Thomas 47 Copenhagen 137 copper 1, 29n, 31, 52, 58, 68, 76, 78–​79, 84–​ 85, 92, 111, 140, 159, 165, 167, 179–​183, 193, 204, 206, 211, 219, 244, 251 cordage 245n, 270 Cormantin 116 corn 107, 204, 231, 278 Courland 4 court cases 29, 46–​53, 58, 63–​64, 277–​ 278, 288 Court of Chancery 53 Coventry, Henry 123n, 125, 130–​133, 181 Coward, Leonard 109 Coyet, Peter 99 credit. See financial capital Crispe, Nicholas 115 Cromwell, Oliver 72, 96, 241 Cronberg, Börje 279 Cronström, Abraham 16 Crossley, Edward 34 Crowley, George 173 Currency 30, 52, 140, 181–​182 customs 58–​59, 61, 63, 66, 176–​178, 201, 203–​ 204, 209–​210, 214–​215, 234 Cutler, Thomas 157, 208, 219, 255, 276–​ 280, 285 Dahlström, Petter 253 Dagö 2 Dalarö 207 Danzig (Gdańsk) 22–​23, 26, 31, 36, 43, 45, 68, 70, 87, 92, 105, 110n, 145, 148, 162, 164, 170, 178, 191n, 192, 196, 205, 216, 223, 245n, 250

Index Darby, Paul 230–​231, 276–​277 David, Jacob 182n Davidson, Henry 159 Davidson, William 35 debt 47, 49–​51, 133, 135n, 171, 224–​234, 276–​285 deficits. See trade deficits de Geer, Laurens 115, 150 de Geer, Louis 8 de la Gardie, Magnus 121n, 135, 138, 186, 225 Delaware 2 Denmark-​Norway 2, 15, 21, 29, 33, 36, 56, 73–​74, 94, 101, 126, 130, 133, 136–​138, 154–​ 155, 176, 185, 201, 221, 231, 239–​245 Dickinson, Henry 170 Diplomacy 6, 16, 21n, 23, 46, 51, 53–​54, 69–​ 70, 73, 94–​97, 101–​102, 107, 114, 123–​140, 176, 178–​179, 183, 187–​188, 201–​203, 224–​ 225, 231–​233, 241–​247, 281–​286 Dixon, Abraham 148n Dixon, Peter 35 Dover 116 dozens. See also cloth 51, 88, 148, 167, 171, 262 Drouritz, Johan 148n Duncombe, John 242–​244 Dunkirk (Dunkerque) 120 Dutch  Dutch Republic 3, 34, 36–​37, 43, 45, 56, 76–​78, 81, 85, 93–​94, 96, 99, 101, 119–​ 120, 123, 126, 131, 134–​136, 138, 146, 150, 155, 165, 170, 187–​188, 191, 195, 221, 236, 239–​241 Dutch-​Baltic trade 1, 3, 122 Dutch-​Swedish trade 33n, 73, 85, 97–​98, 110n, 117–​118, 133, 148, 158, 197, 201–​205, 215, 217, 221–​223, 250, 256–​257, 272 merchants 63, 104 migration 8, 67 people 2, 3, 7 Duwall, Peter 35 East India Company 113–​118, 156–​157 Eastland Company 9–​10, 16, 22, 25–​28, 31n, 46–​47, 52, 55, 66–​67, 75, 103–​106, 118, 174–​179 Eden, John 167 Ekman Gripenstierna, Joel 279

315 Elbing (Elbląg) 21n, 22, 26–​27, 31n, 52, 68, 105, 178 elixir 276 Elizabeth i of England 27, 29, 104, 177 Ellison, Robert 28 Ellyesson, John 29 Elsinore (Helsingör) 277 embezzlement 50, 66 England  Board of Trade (Council of Trade) 102, 174, 201, 209, 224, 232 commercial history 6, 22, 55, 85, 187 commercial policy 16, 25–​27, 30, 55, 86, 92, 101–​104, 123–​124, 154, 168, 174–​179, 201–​203, 209–​210, 241–​247, 276–​277 contemporary economic theory 5n, 103 Council of State 103 diplomats 94, 124, 132–​134, 190, 224–​225, 241–​247, 277–​285 economy 4–​5, 86 expulsion of English merchants 3, 16–​17, 257, 276–​285 foreign policy 24, 72, 74–​75, 96–​97, 101, 120–​126, 136–​140, 154, 188–​189, 241–​248 governance 72, 119–​121, 176–​177 merchants (as a group) 8, 10, 16, 22–​23, 25, 33–​34, 36, 40–​42, 47, 55, 57, 60, 68–​71, 88, 91, 108–​112, 128, 142–​146, 152–​153, 156–​157, 159, 166–​167, 172–​173, 183, 194–​195, 199–​201, 204, 208, 218–​219, 225–​234, 253, 256–​257, 275–​276 Privy Council 47–​48, 50, 106, 177, 225, 230–​231, 279 ships 34 English Civil Wars. See British Civil Wars English Company of Gothenburg 55–​ 67, 106n English Crown 16, 104 English Republic 72–​73, 89, 95n, 96, 103–​ 104, 108n, 119, 123, 128, 175 English Mint 181 Erichson, Abel 87 Estonia 2, 15 factor. See merchants (general) factionalism. See also Sweden, governance 121, 126–​127, 134–​135, 185–​ 186, 189, 240

316 Index Falmouth 116 Falun 180 Fenwick, William 275–​276 Fife, David 87, 171 Finland 2, 168, 248–​250, 254 financial capital 7–​8, 60–​61, 70, 98, 115–​116 fishmonger 129 flax 76, 163, 263, 268–​271 Flemish 109 France 31, 119–​120, 122–​123, 133, 135–​136, 138–​139, 146, 149–​150, 155, 158n, 186, 188–​189, 191, 200, 204–​205, 214, 223, 236, 239–​245, 272 Frederick iii of Denmark 81n, 154 free agents. See trade (unofficial) freight. See shipping Friar, Thomas 167, 173 fruit 28 fish 29, 173, 262 Fish, Thomas 49n forestry 91–​92 förlag. See trade organisation Forrest, Robert 257 Forrest, William 257 Forster, Philip 254, 257 Gardiner, George 33, 35 Geritzson, Peter 87 German Church (Tyska Kyrkan, Gothenburg) 63 Germany 2, 7, 25, 91, 126 Ghana 2 glass 276 gloves 88 Godfrey, William 64n gold 116 Goodyeare, Thomas 177 Gordon, James 64n Gothenburg 2, 12–​13, 15, 29, 33n, 36–​43, 54–​67, 70–​71, 73, 75–​85, 93, 97, 103, 112–​ 113, 151–​156, 161, 164, 168–​170, 180, 183, 212n, 215, 219–​224, 232, 234, 241n, 244, 271–​276, 286 Gotland 2, 162, 194, 250 Great Northern War 2–​3, 247, 259, 263, 269–​270 Great Yarmouth 28, 163 Green, John 167

Greene, Elizabeth 50–​51, 53 Greene, William 29, 50 Greifswald 93, 158n Grubbe, Anders 103 Guinea Company 115 Gulf of Finland 2, 80, 91, 206 Gustav ii Adolf of Sweden 52n Guthrie, William 145, 159 Gyldenløve, Ulrick 137 Gyllenstierna, Johan 231 Gävle 250, 258 Hadelstone, Baron 64 Hall, Urban 167, 194–​195 Halland 2, 73, 274 Halliburton, William 34 Halliday, John 87 Halliday, William 36, 159 Halmstad 250 Hamburg 25–​26, 56, 76–​77, 104, 115–​116, 148–​ 150, 155, 182, 191n, 195, 205, 221–​223, 278 Hammarström, Johan 253 Hans Ludwig’s Heirs 111 Hanson, Joseph 231 Hardistie, William 156–​157 Hart, Henry 41 Hartman, William 226 Harvey, Samuel 41–​42 Harwich 155 hats 49n Hayes, William 173 Hayward, Robert 219 Heathcote, Gilbert 194n, 195, 208 Heathcote, Josiah 208 Hedwig Eleonora 119, 200 hemp 68, 140, 163, 245n, 263, 270 herring 88, 148, 262 Hester, William 254 Hewitt, Peter 75 Hillebrand, Hindrich 219, 253 hinterlands. See production areas Hoare, James 181 Hollar, Wenceslaus 138–​139 Holstein-​Gottorp 240 hops 148, 170 Horner, Thomas 61n Hoyle, George 250 Huguenot 109

Index Hull 28–​29, 38, 78n, 148n, 149, 155, 163, 171–​ 172, 218, 250, 255, 258–​260, 270 Hutton, Thomas 167 Hyde, William 167 Ingria 2, 15 Ingrian War 21n inheritance 64 Ipswich 149 iron 1–​2, 29–​32, 36–​40, 47, 68, 75–​77, 79, 81–​85, 90, 92, 110–​113, 140–​142, 144, 152, 157–​159, 163, 165, 180, 193, 202, 206, 217, 219–​222, 251–​253, 256, 268–​269, 271–​ 272, 276, 282 Isle of Wight (Cowes) 262 ivory 116 Jack, Alexander 33n Jack, James 35 Jackson, Robert 254–​255, 257, 278 James i of England & iv of Scotland 3, 15, 24–​25, 30, 33, 73, 104 Jeffryes, John 225–​230 Jonges, Leue 87 Jöransson, Hans 112 Joye, William 254–​55, 257 Kalmar 30, 162, 207, 250, 258, 262n Kalmar War 21n Karelia 2 Karl ix of Sweden 49n, 52n Karl x Gustav of Sweden 72, 97, 99, 119, 121, 128, 133 Karl xi of Sweden 119, 136, 185, 187, 217–​218, 226, 232, 234, 243, 247, 277–​286 Karlshamn 162 Karlskrona 262 Katz, Darsie 41–​42 Keder, Niklas 150 kerseys. See also cloth 28, 51, 87, 148, 170–​ 171, 262 King’s Lynn 28, 255, 258n Kinnemond, John 33n, 108 Kiöpman, Hans 36 Klerck, James 29 Knipe, Anthony 54–​67, 70, 106n Knipe, Isack 64 Knipe, Timothie 64

317 Knipe, Tobias 64n Knipen, Thomas 61n Kock Cronström, Abraham 159–​160, 179–​183 Kock Cronström, Isaac 182 Kopparberg 180 Krakow linen 268–​270 Kristianstad 207 Kristina of Sweden 72, 77, 96–​97, 128, 180 Kungsbacka 274 Kurck, Knut 227–​228 Königsberg (Kaliningrad) 22, 162, 164, 216 Lager, Marmaduke 29 Lancaster 269 Langer, Maria 63 Langer, Peter 63n Lawton, Robert 208 lead 86, 148, 172–​173, 195, 214, 262 League of Augsburg 239–​240 leather 39–​40, 263, 268–​269 Lee, Samuel 144–​145 Leijonberg. See Barkman Leijoncrona, Cristoffer 281 Leslie, Thomas 41–​42 Liège 144, 159, 167 Lilliemark, Lars 277 liquorice 88 Lisbon 65 Liverpool 258, 262 Livonia 2, 15 lobbying. See petitioning Lohe, Johan 253 London 3, 10, 22n, 28, 30, 35n, 38, 41, 47, 53, 75, 87, 96, 100, 123, 126–​127, 134, 140, 149, 155–​156, 163, 200, 208, 218, 250, 255, 258–​260, 265, 270, 275 Louis xiv of France 239–​240 Lowestoft 258n Lyall, Adam 108, 158–​159, 167, 173, 199, 208, 254 Lyall, David 109, 159 Lyall, Henry 194–​195, 219, 254 Lyall, James 109–​110, 144–​145, 159, 194–​195 Lyall, Peter 194n Lucy, Jacob 225–​230 Lübeck 31, 36, 45, 52, 76–​77, 87, 93, 110n, 145, 148, 183, 191n, 192, 195–​198, 204–​205, 211n, 216, 221, 250

318 Index Maclean, James 36 Maclean, John 42, 112, 148, 153 Maisterton, John 61n Malmö 162, 207 malt 170, 204, 214 Mann, James 173 Marescoe, Charles 116 Margate 270 Marstrand 168, 274 masts 38–​40, 42, 65, 75, 79–​84, 90n, 91, 152, 222n, 265 Matsson, Georg  Mauld, William 208 Melander, Stefan 36 mercantile communities. See burgess communities mercantilism 5n Merchant Adventurers 25, 104 merchants (general) 16, 43, 86, 116 Merser, Alexander 42 Merser, William 33, 36, 44 Mitford, John 157, 170n migration 7–​8 military affairs 6–​7, 21, 23, 58, 99n, 100–​102, 136, 186, 231, 262, 270–​273 Mitford, John  Moback, Hans  Molesworth, Robert 242 Momma  Momma-​Reenstierna firm 8, 10, 159, 279 Momma, Jacob 8 money 51 monopoly 5, 22, 25–​28, 47, 52, 55–​56, 59, 67, 103–​106, 146, 168, 174–​179, 207, 217–​218, 225–​230, 235, 277–​278 Monck, George 66, 127 Moxon, Henry 218–​219, 254, 278 Muscovy Company 93 Möller, Paul 103 Nacka and Vällinge brassworks 172 Narva 2, 28, 91, 162, 164, 194–​196, 248, 262, 265–​266, 269–​271, 286 naturalisation. See citizenship naval goods 5, 68, 86, 96, 123, 154–​155. See also Baltic commodities naval race 239

Navy  English 68, 73–​75, 89–​90, 120, 155–​157 Swedish 66, 126, 157, 201, 230–​231 nederlag 275 networks 35, 45, 46, 51, 53, 61, 73, 87, 170 neutrality 157–​158, 191, 196–​197, 238, 240–​ 241, 260 Newcastle 28, 38, 41, 77, 78n, 87, 110, 149, 163, 172, 255, 258, 260, 262, 270, 275 New Sweden 2 Nine Years’ War 7, 16, 238, 240, 248, 257, 260, 262, 265, 269, 271, 286 Nisbett, Thomas 218–​219, 254 nobility 35, 59–​60, 119, 121, 130, 283 Noble, Francis 148n Noble, Roland 41 Norrköping 43, 162–​164, 168–​169, 250, 258 Nuttall, Ashton 195, 199, 208 Nya Lödöse 29 Nyen (Nyenskans) 2 Nyköping 65, 114, 258 Olly, Joshua 167 Onkell, Anders 226–​230, 253 Oppendorf, Hindrich 219 Order of the Garter 136–​139 oysters 148 Oxenstierna, Axel 64n, 65, 70, 72, 92, 96 Oxenstierna, Bengt 240–​241, 281 paper 31, 46 Parliament. See English Republic Pattillo, Margaret 159 Pawelsson, Tomies 64n Peace of Lund 203 Peace of Nijmegen 185, 203 Peace of the Pyrenees 238 Peace of Westphalia 2, 73, 23 petitioning 46–​54, 57, 107, 225–​234, 276–​280 Perman, Thomas 172, 195 Petrie, William 36, 87 pitch 1, 31, 32, 38–​40, 78–​84, 110, 112, 141, 144, 152, 160, 163, 165, 193, 206–​207, 217–​218, 222n, 244, 251, 256, 272 Plymouth 116, 245, 258–​259, 262, 269 Plåman (Plagman), Peter 50, 53 Poland-​Lithuania 4, 11n, 21n, 23–​26, 68–​70, 104, 106n, 133, 164, 178

319

Index Pomerania 2, 73, 93n, 126, 158n, 162, 168, 221, 248 Porter, Francis 41 Portugal 93, 120, 127, 148–​150, 196–​200, 214, 223, 242–​244, 250, 272 potash 164 Prinz, Nicklas 278 privateering 95–​96, 100–​101, 114n, 115, 129–​130, 134n, 177, 196, 240–​248, 277, 281, 286 producers 158, 233 production areas 59, 69–​71, 233 Protectorate. See English Republic Prussia. See Brandenburg-​Prussia 4, 178 Prytz, Johan Claesson 114 Pötter, Joachim (Lillienhoff) 114–​115 Raddou, Adam 111 Ramsgate 263, 270 raisins 31 Rebeldy, Jacob 111 Redhead, Abraham 163 reduktion 187, 283 Reenberg, Zackarias 277–​279 Reenstierna. See Momma religion 284 Remmington, Thomas 153 Restoration 66, 69, 119–​120, 123, 127, 200 Reval (Tallinn) 2, 92, 162, 164, 196, 248 ribbons 49n Rich, Andrew 80 Richardson, Andrew 61n Richs, Andrew 109 Richs (Raikes/​Rekes), William 79, 109 Riga 2, 38, 65, 92, 93n, 101, 154, 164, 196, 205, 216, 221, 262–​266, 286 Rind, Robert 35 Ripley, Lionel 171 Robertson, Roger 61n Robinson, Dr John 8n, 130–​131, 244, 246, 280–​285 Rodham, Jonathan 219, 254 Roe, Sir Thomas 24n Roquette Hägerstierna, Claude 159–​160 Rostock 21n, 221 Rotterdam 114, 149 Royalists 77, 89–​90, 96–​97 Russell, Alexander 109

Russia 2–​5, 21, 91, 93, 124, 194–​195, 270, 285–​286 Ruth, Barthold 227 Rutherford, Patrick 48 rye 231 Rålamb, Claes 135 salt 65, 88, 148–​150, 170, 198–​204, 214, 241n, 262–​263, 269 saltpetre 65 Scandinavia 2, 6, 22, 33, 67, 73, 92, 106 Scanian War 122n, 277 Scarborough 258n Scotland  diplomats 3, 6n, 7, 11n, 23–​25, 46, 51, 94 goods and commodities 28–​29 migrant group 7, 23, 25, 43, 48, 57–​58, 87, 96–​97, 112–​113, 284 merchants 8, 11n, 15, 25, 26, 31, 33, 35–​36, 42–​45, 48, 55, 57, 60, 70, 73, 87, 100, 108–​113, 142, 145, 166–​167, 191, 194 role in Swedish government 23–​24, 96–​97, 108 trade 22, 31, 33, 35–​36, 42–​44, 51, 76–​78, 81, 87–​88, 105, 134n, 191–​192, 205, 220–​ 221, 223, 250 seeds 276 Sehested, Hannibal 64n seizure of goods 54, 230, 231, 244 Semple, James 109–​111, 145, 159, 186 Sheldon, Francis 65, 156–​157, 159 shipbuilding 4, 47, 65, 68, 75–​76, 88–​89, 92, 95, 101–​102, 104, 123, 156–​158 shipping 4, 15, 34, 61, 87, 98–​99, 102–​104, 112, 120, 151, 154–​155, 161, 167–​171, 176, 190–​191, 196, 198–​201, 203, 211, 214, 220, 241–​243, 249, 258, 260, 272–​273, 283 ships’ crews 80, 109, 142n, 149, 171 Shuttleworth, George 157, 167, 173, 194n, 224 Sibranz, Johan 34 Sigismund, King of Sweden 24 silver 58 Skeppskompaniet (Swedish Shipping Company) 56 Skins 39–​40, 42, 88, 263 Skultuna brassworks 182n Skytte, Johan 35 Skåne 2, 73–​74

320 Index Smith, Albert 35 Smith, William 167, 173, 194–​195, 199, 208, 231–​232, 276–​277 soap 276 Sound, Sound Toll 15, 33n, 77, 79n, 81n, 94, 126, 154, 161, 163, 170, 183, 196, 227, 248–​ 250, 263 Southampton 258, 262 South Shields 260 Sowton, Samuel 167, 170n, 206n Spain 24, 31, 87, 99, 120, 122, 136, 200, 241 Spalding, John 112 Sparre, Per 189 specialisation 42, 141–​142 Spens, Sir James 46, 51, 54, 106 spices 148, 211 spirits 86 Stade 126, 278 staple ports 27, 56, 59 steel 206 Steinkamp, Ollrich 112 Stenort, Stefan 171 Stettin 93n, 162, 164, 216 Stockholm 2, 10, 12–​13, 15, 28–​29, 31, 32, 34–​ 36, 43–​45, 47–​48, 58, 63, 66, 70–​71, 73, 76–​80, 85–​87, 89, 93, 96, 108–​112, 123, 126, 135–​137, 140–​149, 151, 157–​158, 161–​ 164, 168–​171, 182–​183, 191, 194–​208, 210, 212–​215, 219, 234, 241–​244, 250–​261, 286 Stockholm Town Council 283 stockings 87, 269 Stockton 270, 274 Storie, Simon 173, 199 Strachan, Alexander 181 Stralsund 21n, 93, 158n, 169, 196, 205, 216 Strang, Albert 108 Strang, William 109, 145, 159 Stratford, Francis 278 Strother, John 167, 194, 199, 208 Stuart, Elizabeth 35n Stuarts (House of) 21, 24–​26, 94, 120, 235 subsidies 119, 136, 186, 236 sugar 31, 140, 229 Sunderland 259, 262 Svea Hovrätt (Svea Court of Appeal) 48, 277 Svenska Afrikakompaniet (Swedish Africa Company) 100–​101, 113–​118

Svenska Sockerkompaniet (Swedish Sugar Company) 171 Sweden  administrative reform 13, 33, 65 commercial law 49–​50, 59, 65, 280–​286 commercial policy 16, 54, 56–​57, 60–​61, 69–​70, 72, 73, 85, 92, 102, 105, 114, 118, 121, 186, 202–​203, 257 diplomats 6n, 99, 123, 127, 281 economy 35, 73, 85, 92, 121–​122 foreign policy 3, 7, 92, 95–​96, 101–​102, 118, 121, 127, 131, 133–​135, 188–​189, 236, 239–​240, 241–​247 governance 23, 35, 57, 65, 72, 77, 94, 119, 126, 133, 135, 140, 185–​186, 200 historiography 7 Kammarkollegiet (Treasury) 35, 203, 209, 214, 227, 277 Kammarkollegiets Likvidationer (Swedish Liquidation) 277–​280 Kommerskollegium (Board of Trade) 105, 114, 130, 174, 186, 196, 200, 203, 227 merchants 29, 108, 194–​195, 225. See also burgess community, Stockholm Riksdag 11n, 47 Riksråd (Council of the Realm) 35, 47, 61, 65, 70, 217 territory and expansion 2, 8, 16, 24, 28, 72–​73, 91–​92, 103, 121–​122, 133, 158, 175–​ 176, 207 trade (general) 4, 22, 25, 28–​29, 31, 34, 42–​43, 53, 56, 59, 69, 71, 93, 97, 99, 103, 140–​141, 147, 149, 151, 153–​154, 157–​158, 164–​165, 180, 183, 186, 196–​210, 241–​246, 248–​250 trade area 6, 13, 28–​29, 91–​93, 97, 105, 110, 128, 175, 206–​207, 209, 248–​250, 263–​271, 286 Swedish Crown 33, 43, 47, 49, 51, 54–​57, 59n, 60–​61, 63, 65, 67, 76–​78, 91, 114, 156, 158, 180, 186, 200, 210, 214, 226, 233, 278–​279, 284, 286 Sykes (merchant family) 255 Sykes, Daniel 144–​145 Sykes, Joseph 157 Sykes, William 110–​111, 157 Sölvesborg 162

321

Index Söderkompaniet (Swedish South Company) 56 Talbot, Sir Gilbert 130–​131 tar 1, 29–​31, 32, 36–​42, 47, 68, 76, 78–​85, 110–​113, 140–​141, 144, 152, 159–​160, 163–​ 165, 168, 193, 206–​207, 211, 217–​219, 251, 256, 259 Tar Company 110–​111, 144, 146, 150, 160, 167, 206, 217, 253–​254 tax 58, 61 textiles (unspecified) 31, 85, 87–​88, 148, 170–​ 171, 199, 214, 262, 265, 275 third party ports 5 Thirty Years’ War 6, 21, 73 Thomson, James 181 Thornton, Maccabeus 275–​276 Thun, Hindrich 111, 144, 146 Thynne, Thomas 123n, 133, 135–​136, 139–​140 Timber 31, 36–​37, 39–​42, 68, 75, 79, 81–​85, 112, 142, 144, 152, 156, 163–​164, 193, 244, 251, 270 tin 172–​173, 214, 263 tobacco 33, 49n, 86, 88, 140, 202, 211, 225–​ 233, 262, 265–​267 Tobacco Company (Swedish) 225–​230, 277–​278 Togo 2 Tomlinson (merchant family) 257 Torstenson War 122 toys 276 trade  balance of 5, 151, 155, 173–​174, 203, 212–​ 214, 274–​275 deficits  4, 86, 147, 213 legal jurisdiction 27–​28 organisation of 8, 22, 33, 43–​44, 48, 52, 54, 56, 60, 68, 87–​88, 99, 103, 106, 116–​17, 149. 161, 174–​179, 200–​204, 209, 211 unofficial trade 10, 46–​47, 52, 54–​55, 67, 118 transoceanic trade. See colonial trades travel 53 treaties  Anglo-​Danish Treaty of 1661 120, 137 Anglo-​Dutch Union of 1689 240

Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1654 (Treaty of Uppsala) 73, 97–​99, 117 Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1656 99–​101, 114, 117 Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1661 (Treaty of Whitehall) 16, 120, 124–​125, 127–​128, 135, 140, 177, 242, 245–​247, 258n Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1665 132–​133, 135, 140, 189, 209, 282 Anglo-​Swedish Treaty of 1700 242, 247, 258n negotiations 74, 105, 190, 201, 209, 243–​ 247, 258 Danish-​Dutch Treaty of 1645 81, 94, 122 Danish-​Swedish Treaty of 1658 (Treaty of Roskilde) 101 Danish-​Swedish Treaty of 1660 (Treaty of Copenhagen) 163 general 16 Swedish-​Dutch Treaty of 1656 (Treaty of Elbing) 98 Swedish-​Dutch Treaty of 1679 16, 190, 200–​202 Swedish-​French Treaty of 1672 (Treaty of Stockholm) 186 Treaty of Altona 1689 240 Treaty of Dover 1670 (England and France) 121, 188 Triple Alliance of 1668 (England, Dutch Republic, Sweden) 121, 126, 134, 139–​ 140, 188–​190 Truce of Ratisbon 239 Trumbull, William 8n, 246 Trångsund (Vysotsk) 207 Tyresö Glove Factory 171 Ulfeldt, Ebbe 227 Union of the Crowns 15, 25, 27–​28, 33, 43 Vane, Sir Henry 24 van der Hagen, Johan 230 van Swindern, Jacob 230 von Benning, Peter 47 von Breda, Samuel 195 von Königsmarck, Otto Wilhelm 127 von Lengerken, Jöran 112 von Pufendorf, Samuel 139 Vyborg/​Viborg 2, 162, 164, 207

322 Index Västervik 207, 250 Västervik skeppskompaniet (Västervik Shipping Company) 161 Västindiskakompaniet (Swedish West Indian Company) 56 Waddell, Alexander 171 Wallonian 7 warehouses 59 Warren, Sir William  Warwick, Philip 190 Watkins, George 61n Watson, James 159 Weatherall, John 157 Werden, John 139 Werhusen, Petter 150 Wewitzer Rosenstierna, Mårten 35, 61 Weymouth 274 Weyms, David 87 whetstones 88 Whitby 258n, 259–​260 Whitehall 129 Whitelocke, Bulstrode 7n, 97 wholesale 108–​109, 152, 276 Wilde, Henry 29, 49–​50 Wilde, John 49, 54 William iii of England and Scotland 238, 279, 281

Williamson, Sir Joseph 196, 201, 211 Wilkinson, John 61n Winberg, Hans 103 wine 31, 86, 88, 148, 170, 173, 202, 214, 244 Winter, William 61n Wismar 2, 21n, 93, 158n, 169, 196–​197, 205, 216 Wolgast 21n Wolters, Abraham 1, 167, 202–​203, 219, 253 wood. See timber Wood, Edward 189–​190, 196, 200, 202, 206, 208–​209, 211, 214, 225, 229, 231–​232 wool 33 Wright, John 41, 60n, 61n Yarmouth. See Great Yarmouth yarn 265 Young Leijonancker, Daniel 159, 180 Young, John 64 Zedritz, Johan 253 zinc ore 214 Älvsborg. See Gothenburg Ösel 2 Östersson, Lorentz 226