Israel and the World Powers: Diplomatic Alliances and International Relations beyond the Middle East 9780755611522

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For Hillel, Pinchas, Uriel, Amitai, Racheli, Goldie and Yoav Whoever teaches his child, teaches not alone his children, but also his children’s children – and so on to the end of all generations. (Babylonian Talmud)

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ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has had a long period of gestation. The idea behind it gradually crystallised in the aftermath of a conference, ‘Israel and the Great Powers’ at SOAS, University of London in March 2008. The prospect of elucidating the relationship between Israel and a specific country – tortuous or otherwise – lent itself to individual scholars writing a dedicated chapter. It allowed them to marry their expertise of two countries and to produce an overview often stretching back into the nineteenth century. For some states, the relationship began with anti-Jewish stereotypes of fin de siècle Europe during the period of the Dreyfus affair. For others it commenced with the rise of Israel in May 1948. For still others, it started with the downfall of the USSR, the election of Yitzhak Rabin and the Oslo accord in the early 1990s. Each chapter therefore is a stand-alone history, evaluation and analysis. Yet it will undoubtedly lead the reader to an inquisitive reading of the other chapters to view the entire picture of Israel’s international relations. It has not been an easy task to coordinate the efforts of thirteen busy scholars worldwide. Yet all have unstintingly given of their time. My personal thanks to all of the contributors who have felt that this is a worthwhile project. I must finally express my gratitude to Maria Marsh of I.B.Tauris who continually drew my attention to the smallest of details and who has been the guiding force behind this book. As usual, none of this would have been possible without the support of my better half, Jean, who provided space, support and comment. Colin Shindler London

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NOTES ON CONTR IBUTOR S

Samuel Feldberg is Professor of International Relations and Senior Research Fellow at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. His paper, The Breakdown of the Middle East was published in the Brazilian edition of Foreign Policy in January of 2013. He comments regularly on the Middle East for the printed and audiovisual media in Brazil. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Baltimore Hebrew University and is currently Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. His recent publications include: Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record (2007) and Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations (2012). He is currently completing a book on Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Jonathan Goldstein is Professor of East Asian History at the University of West Georgia, USA, and a research associate of Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. His publications include Stephen Girard’s Trade with China (2011), China and Israel 1948–98 (1999), The Jews of China (1999) and America Views China: Then and Now (1991). P. R. Kumaraswamy lectures on the contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is the author of India’s Israel Policy (2010) and the revised edition of Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (forthcoming). Since 2010 he has served as the Honorary Director of the Middle East Institute at New Delhi. Francois Lafon is Professor at the University of Paris I PanthéonSorbonne and a specialist in post-war French socialism. His book, Israël

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autour de 1967 dans la revue Esprit: Une polémique significative entre Marc Jarblum et Jean Marie Domenach in Les intellectuels français et Israël, (dir Denis Charbit) was published in 2009. His chapter, ‘Guy Mollet et la gestion de la crise de Suez’ will appear in the forthcoming publication Les Occidentaux et la crise de Suez: Une relecture politico-militaire, (dir Robert Frank). Neill Lochery is Professor of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Studies at University College London. He is the author of several books on Israel and recently published Lisbon: War in the Shadows of the City of Light, 1939–1945. He has served as an advisor to several political leaders and heads of state. He is also a frequent contributor to leading media outlets including The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, The National Post (Canada) and United Press International. Amikam Nachmani is the Chair of the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel. He specializes in the modern history, politics, culture and society of the East-Mediterranean and Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in particular His latest publications include Europe and its Muslim Minorities: Aspects of Conflict, Attempts at Accord (2009) and Jacob Talmon: Combining Histories and Presents (2012). Sasha Polakow-Suransky is an international opinion editor at The New York Times and the author of The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa (2010). He was previously a senior editor at Foreign Affairs magazine. His articles have appeared in The Boston Globe, Foreign Policy, The International Herald Tribune, Newsweek, The American Prospect and The New Republic. Suzanne D. Rutland is Professor in the Department of Hebrew, Biblical and Jewish Studies, University of Sydney and coordinator of the program in Jewish Civilisation, Thought and Cultures. Her recent publications include ‘The Asia-Pacific Region and Australian Jewry’, in Manfred Hutter (ed.), Between Mumbai and Manila: Judaism in Asia since the Founding of the State of Israel (2013) and ‘Jews and Muslims “Down Under”: Emerging Dialogue and Challenges’ in Michael M. Laskier and Yaacov Lev (eds), The Divergence of Judaism and Islam: Jews and Muslims in a Changing World – Interdependence, Modernity and Political Turmoil (2011). In 2008 she received the Medal of the Order of Australia for services to Higher Jewish Education and interfaith dialogue.

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Raffaella A. Del Sarto is Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, where she directs a research projects on ‘Borderlands’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC). She is also Adjunct Professor in Middle East Studies and International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Europe. She has published on EU policies towards North Africa and the Middle East, EU-Israeli relations, Israeli politics and society, and Middle East politics. Her latest article, ‘Defining Borders and People in the Borderlands: EU Policies, Israeli Prerogatives, and the Palestinians’, will be published in the Journal of Common Market Studies. Yitzhak Shichor is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Asian Studies at the University of Haifa and Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A former Dean of Students at the Hebrew University and Head of the Tel-Hai Academic College, his recent publications include: Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations (2009) and Missiles Myths: China’s Threat to Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective (2008). He is the Chief Editor and contributor of All Under Heaven: A History of the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, II (2011, 2013). David Andrew Weinberg recently completed a PhD in political science at MIT and has since become a non-resident fellow at UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development. He previously served as a Democratic professional staff member for Mideast issues at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is working on a book that documents the efforts of US presidents’ to mediate in Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics. Michael Wolffsohn is Professor (retired) of Modern History, University of the German Armed Forces, Munich, Germany. The eighth updated edition of his Israel: Geschichte, Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft will be published in 2015. His recent publications include Über den Abgrund der Geschichte hinweg: Deutsch-jüdische Blicke auf das 20. Jahrhundert. OlzogVerlag (2012), Deutschland, jüdisch Heimatland (2010) and Juden und Christen (2008). He is a regular commentator in the German media on Jewish History and Policies, Israel and the Middle East.

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Introduction ISR AEL AND THE WOR LD POWER S Colin Shindler

Since the idea for this book was first mooted, back in 2008, the concept has evolved considerably. The world has moved on. Barack Obama was then a marginal outsider for the presidential prize. Thus, the ideas at the heart of this book have gone through an extensive process of being reformulated, updated and fully developed. It is intended that this collection will prove to be an accessible work for the specialist and the student, the serious reader and the plainly curious. The relationship between Israel and a particular country is governed by a multitude of factors – some worthy and beyond politics; others are in turn self-serving, cynical and anchored firmly in the national interest. Outside of polemics, this is interesting because any study of Israel, regardless of views, is stimulating, often controversial and poses new questions. Indeed Zionism – in its socialist definition – gave rise to a workers’ republic in May 1948. Its emergence was unacceptable to the American far right, feudal Arab kingdoms and those who hankered after the good old days of British imperialism. Zionism was unique theoretically – and proved difficult to fit into conventional Marxist theory. This mirrored the problem of enlightened Europe to emancipate fully the Jews. As Max Nordau commented in 1897: The philosophy of Rousseau and the encyclopaedists had led to a declaration of human rights. Then this declaration, the strict logic of men of the Great Revolution, deduced Jewish emancipation.

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They formulated a regular equation: Every man is born with certain rights; the Jews are human beings, consequently the Jews are born to all the rights of man. In this manner the emancipation of the Jews was pronounced, not through a fraternal feeling for the Jews, but because logic demanded it. Popular sentiment rebelled, but the philosophy of the Revolution decreed that principles must be placed higher than sentiments. Allow me an expression which implies no ingratitude. The men of 1792 emancipated us only for the sake of principle.1 The rise of modern anti-Semitism persuaded Jews in fin de siècle Europe that a new way had to be found. They understood that they had to take matters into their own hands – auto-emancipation rather than emancipation by others. This led to a plethora of solutions to the Jewish problem and in its territorialist answer spawned a host of Jewish homelands – from Angola to Tasmania, from Kimberley to Uganda. And of course Palestine where the Jewish odyssey traditionally began. Such a move to channel the lessons of the Enlightenment into a specifically national direction did not endear the Jews to liberals, universalists and utopianists. Why, they asked, did the Jews have to separate themselves? Why could they not devote themselves to repairing the world? Many therefore said Zionism was simply wrong. Many Jews responded that it was not wrong, it was different. A difference generated by the reality in which the Jews found themselves. This difference was inherited by the State of Israel. Its birth was further complicated by a host of factors. The late emergence of Jewish nationalism had coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism in an epoch of national liberation struggles against colonial powers. Palestinian Arab nationalists had therefore to struggle against both Zionist Jews and British rule. In addition Arab socialism did not fully develop and gave way to Arab nationalism and Islamism. Indeed Israel was excluded from the first conference of the non-aligned nations in Bandung in 1955 because of the threat of the Arab world not to attend if an Israeli representative was present. Nehru and Tito were thereby forced to include the feudal kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen, excluding social democratic Israel, which would have, under other circumstances, seemed to many to be a more natural ally. The empowerment of the Arab states through their oil revenues in the 1970s persuaded many newly independent states in Africa to break their diplomatic ties with Israel – even though

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cooperation in many areas continued below the radar. One consequence was to push Israel unwisely into the arms of apartheid South Africa. Israel’s isolation extended to Eastern Europe. Whereas it had been in the Soviet Union’s national interest to relegate the Leninist approach to Zionism to a lower rung and support the emergence of a state of the Jews in 1947, twenty years later it was not. It therefore broke off diplomatic relations, following Israel’s military victory over several Arab states in June 1967. Many East European states dutifully followed suit. However, the popular sentiment in Warsaw was that ‘our Polish Jews have vanquished the Russian Arabs’. This anti-Soviet sympathy for Israel even persisted after 1991 during the post-Soviet period. Such isolation by the Arab world, the developing world and the Soviet bloc pushed Israel closer towards the Americans and into numerous alliances with unsavoury regimes. Moshe Sharett’s desire to remain unaligned and to support neither East nor West was still-born. The dream of making the African desert bloom was marginalised and regarded now as irrelevant – as Israel’s national interests took over. This was one factor in the demise of labour Zionism and the rise of an overt nationalism under Menachem Begin. Yet this isolation was magically broken through a concatenation of events – the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the election of Clinton in the US and Rabin in Israel as well as Arafat’s weakened position, following his calamitous praise for Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The success of the Oslo Accords in 1993 opened up the floodgates as far as diplomatic relations with Israel was concerned. The new Russia, China, India, many Arab states, new countries such as Slovenia and Slovakia – all rushed to establish ties with Rabin’s Israel. Since the end of the peace process of the 1990s, the outbreak of violence and the stagnation of politics generally, there has been a real frostiness in relations between Israel and many a country, including the Obama administration. The expansion of settlements on the West Bank has cemented a distancing from Israel. During a period of economic hardship, there has been a resigned acceptance of a situation where there is no apparent light at the end of the tunnel. A multi-faceted, changing situation has therefore been described and documented by the contributors to this book.

The Imperial Powers and Germany Neill Lochery and François Lafon write about the vexed relationship between the imperial powers, Britain and France, and Israel. Britain,

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of course, was the Mandatory power and took months to come to the inevitable decision to recognise Israel. In general, the UK was always prepared to sell arms to the Arabs, but not to Israel. The British Foreign Office was popularly regarded as being institutionally anti-Israeli. Neill Lochery indicates that the situation was in fact more complex. While Britain identified strongly with the survivors of the Holocaust, it could not circumvent the fact that trade with and the import of oil from the Arab world was in British national interests. By the mid-1970s, the UK’s thirst for oil was acute. The basic line, exemplified by the Craigium Dictum, was that British national interests lay with the Arabs, but Israel’s security should not be compromised. Moreover Britain had to cope with the underlying feeling that many Arab states blamed the UK for the establishment of the state. Different British Prime Ministers tried to balance their personal approach to Israel with what was perceived as the national interest. Wilson and Thatcher were viewed as sympathetic while Heath and Callaghan remained cool towards Israel. Neill Lochery shows that the traditional picture of Thatcher’s sympathy for Israel whilst the Foreign Office was antagonistic is in fact rather superficial. The Venice Declaration of June 1980 was the first time that the Europeans had spoken about the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. This was the culmination of the move of the British Foreign Office towards such a position. Following the Lebanon war in 1982, Mrs Thatcher moved towards a more critical approach. Ironically she was closer to Labour’s Shimon Peres than to Prime Minister Menachem Begin. In terms of identifying with Israel’s situation, Tony Blair was seen as a second Harold Wilson. Even so, following the decision to send British troops to Iraq in March 2003, the UK had to be more sensitive to Arab concerns. François Lafon begins his overview by detailing the responsibility of historians to both the subject they are examining and to their readers. He also documents the remarkable fluctuations in official French attitudes. France has always felt an obligation to supervise the affairs of Palestine. Indeed the rivalry between Britain and France was utilised by Chaim Weizmann to persuade the British to support the Zionist experiment in Palestine and to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917. By the early 1920s France had to accept that its mandate only extended over Syria and Lebanon while the British ruled a swathe of territories to their south including Palestine. Since Napoleon first landed in Egypt in 1798 in the hope of locating the splendour of the lost civilisation of the Ptolemies, France believed

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that it had a special mission in the Holy Land. From this flowed the argument that it therefore had to have privileged relations with the Arab world. Yet other factors intervened, such as the persecution of French Jews by the Vichy regime and the deportations to the East by the Nazi occupier. Significantly France voted for UN Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947 in support of a two-state solution while Britain abstained. Leon Blum and Jean-Paul Sartre passionately advocated the cause of a progressive Israel in the immediate post-war period. France moved much closer towards Israel when Nasser was perceived as aiding the FLN. Under Guy Mollet, Israel clandestinely received vital weapons during the Soviet arms build-up in 1955. A year later, it colluded with Israel in the amateurish deception practised at Suez. De Gaulle was brought back to the Elysee Palace to solve the Algerian question. His fiercely anti-British attitude was partly responsible for a rapprochement with the Arab world. And, of course, his seemingly defamatory description of Jews as ‘an elite people, sure of themselves and domineering’ was seen as insensitive and offensive. This alignment with the Arab world was continued under his successors Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. As with Britain, the questions of trade and oil imports loomed large. The coming to the fore of the Palestinian cause in the 1970s also began to influence public opinion. Thus France assisted in the construction of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The election of the socialist François Mitterand in 1981 saw a move away from an automatic pro-Arab stance, yet the warmer relationship with Israel was conditional on the policies enacted by right-wing Israeli governments. The ambiguous nature of French policy was reflected in the refusal to sell arms to Israel, but to do so to Hafez Assad’s Syria. Since 2000, the changes in French policy have become even more dramatic. Whereas Jacques Chirac espoused closer ties with the Arab world as a result of the al-Aqsa Intifada, his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy advocated the same with Israel. Yet as François Lafon points out, Sarkozy’s Mediterranean region policy initiative collapsed with the advent of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in late 2010 and early 2011, and the historic French cultivation of relations with Ghaddafi and Assad now became an obvious embarrassment. While François Hollande has acted very quickly to condemn attacks against Jews by home-grown Islamists, when it comes to policy towards Israel, he seems to be following the British approach of offending neither side while promoting French national interests. As Michael Wolfssohn succinctly points out in his contribution, Germany is the most special of special cases in terms of a country’s

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relations with Israel. The Holocaust and the merciless Nazi persecution of the Jews has always been a factor in Israeli-German relations. Yet as Germany moved out of the Nazi era after-effect, there was also the question of German national interests, the desire for sovereignty and reintegration into the international community. Konrad Adenauer recognised this even in the early 1950s in the context of the reparations negotiations. Some 44 per cent of the German public actually opposed such restitution. Even more interestingly, the Communist German Democratic Republic rejected any reparations because Communists, they argued, were also persecuted by the Nazis. The worst tensions always occurred when an SPD administration was in power in Germany and a Likud government in Israel. The Herut movement, led by Begin as the Irgun Zvai Leumi in politics, initially refused to have anything to do with post-war Germany. Begin participated in the attack on the Knesset by angry protestors in 1952 and indeed egged on his supporters by his incendiary rhetoric. Michael Wolffsohn draws attention to the Hallstein Doctrine which stated that Federal West Germany would not have diplomatic relations with states recognising the GDR. West Germany was always worried that the Arab states would recognise the GDR. This threat prevented the West Germans from fully recognising Israel. However it was the visit of the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, to Egypt in 1965 that finally pushed the West Germans to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel a few months later. German-Israeli relations have always been different to the rest of Europe. There was a secret agreement in June 1962 for a German military arms sale to Israel and an economic agreement in 1966 which provided low interest loans. By the time Angela Merkel assumed the position of Chancellor, there was a strong commitment to Israel’s security and to the export of German arms to Israel. Merkel was also instrumental in the opposition to the UN declaration of a Palestinian state in the autumn of 2011. Even the German Left – as distinct from the European Left – has always been circumspect in language and action in condemning both Israel and its government.

The Dominions and the New Europe Post-war Europe was a continent which struggled to secure a coherent identity. Two world wars had left behind ruin and disaster in unimaginable

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terms. The desire to prevent catastrophe from striking a third time was a motivating factor in developing a union of European countries, bound together by common interests. Beginning in 1950 with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union evolved into a twenty-seven member-state group in the post-Soviet era. In 2012 it symbolically won the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet the transition from empire to continental affiliate was often an arduous and sometimes long drawn out process. The process of decolonisation was sometimes bloody and of course Ho Chi Minh’s victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was the classic example of an independence movement overcoming the will of their colonial masters. In the post-World War II period, the British, it seemed on the surface, were more amenable to decolonisation. Commencing with India in 1947 and Palestine a year later, the post-war shrinking of the British Empire proceeded throughout the second half of the twentieth century. There were significant signposts on the way – Gold Coast (1957), Rhodesia (1980) and Hong Kong (1997). Even the complex situation of apartheid South Africa which had left the Commonwealth in 1961 had been overcome by Nelson Mandela and the ANC in the 1990s. Golda Meir had made a virtue out of helping impoverished African states, now free of the ravages of colonialism, during the 1960s. Israel saw itself as part of an international of social democratic parties whose desire was to help newly established states in the developing world to literally get on their economic feet. As Sasha Polakow-Suransky points out, South Africa had been selling uranium to Israel as early as 1965 – presumably to feed Israel’s secret nuclear programme. It was originally not an easy relationship since the Prime Minister at that time was Hendrik Verwoerd who was known for his dislike of Jews and pro-German sympathies in the 1930s. The Jewish community in South Africa strongly supported the sole progressive member of parliament, Helen Suzman, today lionised as an iconic member of the anti-apartheid struggle. As liberal as the Jewish community was, there was also a desire not to rock the boat too strongly and to maintain a relationship with Israel. The Israelis themselves had been vocal in their attacks on apartheid in the early 1960s. Moreover the armed struggle against apartheid was disproportionately populated by mainly Communist Jews. All this did not incline the Afrikaaner nationalists towards a benevolent attitude to either Jews or Israelis. Yet as Sasha Polakow-Suransky demonstrates, everything had changed diametrically within a decade. The growing diplomatic, economic and

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political isolation of Israel especially after the Yom Kippur war forced Israel into some difficult decisions. The blossoming of a militaryindustrial complex in these circumstances provided the basis for a close relationship between Israel and South Africa. While the Arab states spoke about ‘a Zionist invasion of Africa’ which had now been stemmed in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, Shimon Peres, then Minister of Defence and an inheritor of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine of realism, visited South Africa secretly. Peres offered to sell ‘Chalet’ missiles to the South Africans which were capable of carrying nuclear loads. He told the South African leadership that their cooperation was based on ‘the unshakeable foundations of our common hatred of injustice and our refusal to submit to it’. In the 1970s under the Labour government of Rabin and Peres, Israel began to sell arms to unsavoury regimes such as Mobutu’s Zaire and to hand over tritium, an isotope of hydrogen, to apartheid South Africa – a necessary ingredient to increase the power of thermonuclear weapons. This trend was accentuated when Labour lost the 1977 election and Likud’s Menachem Begin came to power. He had fled from the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 and ended up in the Soviet Gulag a year later. His experiences before and after 1939 developed a fierce antiCommunism in his approach. He therefore shared with South Africa a survivalist mentality and was less concerned about the anti-apartheid movement than his Labour predecessors. In 1979 the Islamic Revolution in Iran deprived Israel of another partner in missile development and dented its belief in its strategy of allies on the periphery. The Israeli military turned from the Shah to an even closer relationship with South Africa. Yet the 1980s bore witness to a rising wave of protest against apartheid – and particularly in the United States. The US Jewish community were overwhelmingly liberal, with over 75 per cent voting for the Democrats in most of the post-war presidential elections. Recalling their collective role in the civil rights’ struggle, American Jews felt strongly about apartheid as well – and this led to increasing criticism about Israel’s links with South Africa. Indeed AIPAC which fought for the Israeli government’s approach within the American political arena became concerned that this was actively diminishing support for Israel. As Sasha Polokow-Suransky notes, it was the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act in 1986 which contained a clause that the US would cut off military assistance to any country violating the embargo. This shocked the Shamir-Peres government and created a sea change in Israeli policy.

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All this did not impress the ANC. Since Mandela and his successors have been in power, the new South Africa’s relations with Israel can be characterised as being ‘correct’ rather than being ‘warm’. Another British dominion, Australia, pursued a whites-only policy for the first half of the twentieth century. Unlike South Africa, it moved towards a multi-ethnic society in the post-war period. Australia had always been positive in its attitude towards Jews and Jewish nationalism. As Suzanne Rutland points out Australia together with the other white dominions Canada, New Zealand and South Africa all voted in favour of a two-state solution at the UN on 29 November 1947, while the mother country Britain abstained. Moreover Australia extended immediate recognition to Israel despite British objections. Indeed during the Suez campaign Australia opposed the US at the UN in rejecting a call for an immediate ceasefire. Yet Australia too began to develop ties with the Arab world in the mid-1960s. Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labour Party were elected in December 1972. This heralded the end of the ‘white Australia’ policy and the advent of multiculturalism. In a period of decolonisation Australia, like Europe, began to express remorse about the legacy of colonialism. The treatment of the native peoples of Australia was invoked. Moreover Australia began to reach out to the developing world in the Asia-Pacific region. The question of the Palestinians fitted in much more easily in an age of decolonisation than did that of social democratic Israel. The settlement drive on the conquered West Bank after 1967 accentuated this sentiment. Moreover as Suzanne Rutland indicates, Australian foreign policy, particularly in the wake of the increase in oil prices, now adopted a balanced policy towards the Israel-Palestine conflict which reflected national interests. There was also a movement away from identifying with Britain towards the US. Mirroring many other social democratic governments in Europe, Labour governments in Australia tried to avoid getting sucked into the arguments about the conflict while maintaining national interests in the Arab world. Bob Hawke therefore was extremely enthusiastic about Israel while in opposition but became more ambivalent when in office between 1983 and 1991. Under Paul Keating, Australian policy moved towards a deeper identification with the developing world and closer regional ties with countries such as Indonesia. Suzanne Rutland argues that even during the years of the Oslo Accords, the Keating Administration propagated a pro-Palestinian position. The Liberal party’s John Howard,

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Keating’s successor as prime minister and ideological rival, immediately identified with a pro-Israel position. This mirrored a strong support for the White House of George W. Bush and by extension for Israel. With the return to power of the Australian Labour party in 2007, a more nuanced, critical approach of Israeli policy ensued. In the twenty-first century, support for Israel often became a dividing line between the Right and Left in many a country. The Australian experience reflected the emerging picture in Europe. Ironically, yet understandably, the new State of Israel had deep reservations about a relationship with a continent where the abandonment of the Jews had taken place a short time before. It was therefore, as Raffaella Del Sarto points out, with a certain degree of reticence that Israel established an office in Brussels to liaise with the newly established European Communities following the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Modern Zionism was, of course, born in Europe and reflected faithfully the ideas of nineteenth-century European nationalism. Its intellectual leadership had congregated in cosmopolitan Odessa which was conceived as Russia’s trading window on the West. Despite this, Israel’s reservations about Europe were deepened at what was perceived as Europe’s inactivity prior to the Six Day War. In a period of decolonisation, Europe’s unquestioning fidelity to Israel was undergoing subtle adjustments. Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the EU issued a statement which argued for legitimate Palestinian rights. This was followed by the instigation of a Europe-Arab dialogue in view of the threat by OPEC to stop oil exports to European countries. The Venice Declaration of 1980 called for the ‘association’ of the PLO in future peace negotiations and spoke about settlements in ‘occupied Arab territories’. The PLO at that time officially wanted a state in all of mandatory Palestine. The EC repeatedly took a critical line on all issues (e.g. the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the first Intifada in 1988, the settlement drive). All this was in stark contrast to US policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict. EU policy was modified when the Likud was ousted in the elections of 1992 and Yitzhak Rabin came to power. Significantly, as Raffaella Del Sarto points out, an ongoing critical attitude towards Israel in the realm of foreign and security policy did not impair cooperation in other fields. The first trade agreements between the EU and Israel were signed in 1970 and in 1975. By 1996 Israel had become the first non-European power to participate in the EU’s research and development framework. In 2008 Israel joined the academic programmes Tempus and Erasmus Mundus. In the same year, Israel requested an upgrading in its relations with the EU and even asked

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for participation in the EU’s council meetings. The EU agreed to regular meetings between Israel’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and their counterparts each year. As Raffaella Del Sarto notes, the EU today remains Israel’s largest trading partner with an annual trade volume of around €25 billion.

The New Turkey Yet despite this, non-political relations retreat from the public gaze if there is a flare-up in the Middle East such as Israel’s assault on Gaza during Operation Cast Lead in 2009. In the political arena, the EU continues to be critical of Israeli policy during the twenty-first century – from the building of the separation barrier to the expansion of West Bank settlements. Its approach has tended to align itself with Palestinian nationalism rather than Palestinian Islamism – agreeing with the United States to oppose contacts with Hamas when the movement achieved power. Yet there have also been quiet if unofficial contacts with Hamas and a greater willingness to engage with Islamists generally following the uprisings of late 2010 and 2011. The question of Turkey’s admission to membership of the European Union has been an undecided question since its application to join in 1987. The controversy has revolved around the basic question of Turkey as partner and Turkey as member. There is the historic fear, kindled by the memory of the Turkish armies at the gates of Vienna in 1683, which paints potential Turkish membership of the EU as a threat to the European project. Although there are in the region of five million Turks in Europe at present, many Europeans shy away from the possibility of enlarging the Muslim population of Europe in an era of Islamism and pervading distrust of Muslims themselves. Such critics point out that only 3 per cent of Turkey is situated within the continent of Europe. Such prevarication has created both frustration and impatience in Turkey, and the sentiment both to embrace Europe and to repel it. In many senses this is a microcosm of Turkey’s desire to face both to the East and to the West simultaneously in the twenty-first century. This has led to often convoluted positions. As Hussein Agha and Robert Malley have commented, in record time Turkey has evolved from having zero problems with its neighbours to nothing but problems with them. It has alienated Iran, angered Iraq and had a row with Israel. It virtually is at war with Syria. Iraqi Kurds are now Ankara’s allies, even as it wages

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war against its own Kurds and even as its policies in Iraq and Syria embolden secessionist tendencies in Turkey itself.2 Amikam Nachmani details the dramatic changes in Israeli-Turkish relations during the last decade. In one sense this has reflected the dramatic changes within Turkey itself. From a country which was once 70 per cent rural and less than 30 per cent urban, the balance has changed to 25 per cent rural and 75 per cent urban. In general, until the end of 2000, the opinions of the rural migrants into the big cities were not taken into account as far as Turkey’s foreign policy was concerned. This policy as well as policies in other areas, was determined by a number of small elites, with the Turkish military at their head. A condition for Turkey’s entry into the EU has been the demand for democratisation. But as in the Arab world, the military has not been displaced by a Western oriented liberal intelligentsia, but by the Islamists. As Amikam Nachmani points out, ‘the Turkish Spring’ began in 2003 with the election of Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an and his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. The AKP was also successful in elections in 2007 and 2011. The new urban elites increasingly supported Erdog˘an and he clearly reflected their sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Turkey has therefore become one of the leading countries to denounce Israel in international forums. While almost certainly reflecting popular feeling, the Erdog˘an administration used it as well to bolster its position as a leading power in the Middle East and as a means of circumventing its rival, Egypt. Indeed Egypt was not keen on a proposed Erdog˘an visit to Gaza. In 2010 and 2011, Turkey opened twenty-two new embassies in African capitals, five in Latin America, and three in East Asia, the Caucasus and Iran. The United States, however, needs Turkey as an ally on almost every difficult problem in the Middle East, as well as in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this respect the determining factor is American national interests. The White House is therefore prepared to countenance anti-Israel criticism and actions on the part of Turkey, provided that when it comes to the relations between Ankara and Washington, the former acts in accordance with US interests. As Amikam Nachmani succinctly points out: ‘The crisis in the relations between Israel and Turkey is dwarfed by the benefit gained from improved relations between Turkey and the US.’ Moreover like the EU, trade between Turkey and Israel up to 2012 was unscathed by the bitterness of the political fallout.

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The ongoing row between Israel and Turkey has catalysed a rebirth of relations between Israel and Greece. The historical memory of Ottoman colonisation remained potent in many countries. Above all, the defeat of Byzantine in 1453 and the wholesale expulsion and flight of the Greek population during the early Atatürk years remained within living memory. In addition Greece, of course, has been in the most parlous economic position of all the European states during the current crisis. Indeed the twentieth general strike in Greece since 2010 took place in October 2012. The discovery of oil reserves off the coast of Cyprus and Greek Cypriot-Israeli cooperation to exploit them annoyed the Turkish Cypriots and brought outraged condemnation from Ankara.

China and India: Emerging World Powers Erdog˘an’s popularity has been forged in part due to the development and expansion of the Turkish economy. Trade is a consideration which must feature strongly in any relationship with Israel. The remarkable changes in China and its emergence as an economic superpower is a case in point. From Mao’s chaotic last years to the suited capitalist leadership of the Chinese Communist party of the early twenty-first century, such an amazing transformation was as unimaginable as the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world has changed. Yet such changes coincided historically with the defeat of the Israeli Right and the elections of Clinton in the US and Rabin in Israel. Ironically – as Yitzhak Shichor points out – Israel was the first country in the Middle East to recognise China. Yet it took another forty-two years to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moshe Sharett’s attempt to steer a middle path between East and West was due in part to Ben-Gurion’s reticence but also because of US pressure and the advent of the Korean War. Israel therefore did not immediately offer to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China. By 1955, when Nehru and Tito established the non-aligned movement at the Bandung conference, China was not interested anymore in developing ties with Israel. On the contrary, Zhou. Enlai’s stringent stand against social democratic Israel at the conference was appreciated by even the most reactionary and feudal Arab states. Unlike the Soviet Union, China saw itself and was seen by others as a leader of the developing world. This became accentuated by the Sino-Soviet split and the war in Vietnam. Indeed a PLO office was established in Beijing very early on after its formation.

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According to Mao, Israel and Formosa (Taiwan) were two imperialist concoctions, yet this did not prevent the Chinese from turning to Israel during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. With Deng Xiaoping at the helm amidst a thaw in Maoism, an Israeli defence industry delegation visited China in 1979. As Yitzhak Shichor notes, there were also clandestine meetings of the Foreign Ministers of China and Israel at the UN during the late 1980s. The US opposition to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 created problems for Israel’s arms sales to China and it had to cancel a Phalcon Awacs system due to the pressure of the White House. Yasser Arafat, free from US entreaties, sent a congratulatory telegram to the Chinese leadership, following the crushing of the protest. By 1991, China was impressed with Israel’s refusal to respond to the Skud attacks from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. It was also a salient lesson that China was unable to attend the Madrid conference at the end of 1991 because it did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Even so, since the demise of the peace process after the failure of the Camp David conference in 2000 and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada a few months later, China has imitated other nations in maintaining an ongoing criticism of Israeli policies and actions while maintaining good trade links. Indeed China is Israel’s leading economic partner in Asia and its second source of imports after the US. Moreover Putin’s Russia has now become a central supplier of arms to China. China, itself, had also become more self-reliant and has developed its own arms industry. During the 1980s China supplied both Iraq and Iran during their decade long war. It is often the Iranian adaptation of such Chinese missiles that are the ones that periodically reach Hezbollah and Hamas. In 2006 during the second Lebanon war, an Israeli frigate was hit by such a missile, the C-701. Despite the fact that Israel has been somewhat cold-shouldered by China, the US tried to prevent Israel from involving itself in the security arrangements for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. India too has an interesting history of relations with Israel. It took a leading role in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. From the eleven nations that constituted UNSCOP, India expressed the greatest number of reservations about its conclusion to partition historic Palestine into two states. India, Iran and Yugoslavia instead compiled a minority report which called for a federal single state of Palestine, comprising of Jewish and Arab states. As P.R. Kumaraswamy

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indicates, India also campaigned against Israel’s admission to the UN. India clearly had to take into account the views of its Muslim minority. Moreover it also had to compete with Pakistan for the allegiance of the Arab world. Nehru was not unsympathetic to the aspirations of Israel’s founders. Both derived a certain ideological pedigree from the British Labour party. Nehru attempted to secure Israel’s place at the founding conference of the non-aligned nations at Bandung but, given a choice of either Israel or the many countries which comprised the Arab world, he not unsurprisingly plumped for the latter. The Suez conflict in 1956 and the Israeli defeat of Nasser’s forces placed Nehru in a difficult position since his close partner in the non-aligned movement was the Egyptian leader. Moreover the collusion with the UK and France profoundly antagonised Nehru. Yet Israel supplied India with arms in its wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965). Even so, India voted for the ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution at the United Nations and the Israeli Consul in Bombay was expelled during Operation Peace for Galilee, the Lebanon war of 1982. As P.R. Kumaraswamy elucidates in great detail, the normalisation came about through the collapse of the USSR, India’s close ally. India instead aligned itself with the US to secure funding from the IMF and the World Bank. In 1992 India became the last non-Islamic country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. During the last twenty years, Israel has emerged as a major arms supplier to India. In 2007, the two countries signed a $2.5 billion joint anti-missile defence system agreement. Yet India has continued to safeguard its national interests. For example, it was originally guarded about blaming Iran for the bomb attack on the wife of an Israeli diplomat in February 2012.

On Brazil and Japan Brazil too is an emerging major economic player in the twenty-first century. It too has repeated patterns, regarding its relations with Israel, which have paralleled China and India. Any Brazilian government has had to contend with an influential Syrian-Lebanese community whose natural sympathies lie with the Palestinians as well as theological objections over Jerusalem from the Vatican. And despite pro-German sympathies in Brazil before and during the war, as Samuel Feldberg points out, if it had not been for Oswaldo Aranha, a former Foreign Minister, the vote in the United Nations in November 1947 may not have gone in favour

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of a two-state solution. Brazil performed a balancing act – it recognised Israel but abstained when it came to supporting its admission to the United Nations. The semblance at even-handedness was sorely tested in the 1970s when Brazil became very dependent on imported Middle East oil. It initiated a pro-Arab phase of foreign policy in which diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia were established and Brazil voted for the ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution. Despite Brazilian protests about Israeli conduct during the conflict, trade, both commercial and military, has flourished. Israel has exported agricultural technology and fertiliser products to Brazil which have helped to develop its northeast region. Recently agreements were signed whereby Israel became involved in the modernisation of the Brazilian armed forces as well as sales such as the Hermes drone. This will be used during the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. During the last decade, Iran has made great efforts in its determination to strengthen and influence Latin American governments as part of its strategy to cultivate anti-American sentiment. This has been most overt in approaches to Venezuela and Bolivia, as well as including civilian and military cooperation agreements with Ecuador and Nicaragua. Even former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has defended Iran’s right to continue with its enrichment programme. Moreover as Samuel Feldberg notes, Lula compared Iranian opposition protesters against the Khamenei regime to English football hooligans. Whilst on the one hand, Lula was the first Brazilian head of state to visit Israel, nevertheless, in September 2011 under President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil voted for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state at the UN. Another major player in economic affairs is Japan. Yet Japan can hardly be considered to be ‘an emerging power’. Indeed it established diplomatic relations with Israel – the first in the Middle East – as far back as 1952. But as Jonathan Goldstein notes, the relationship with Jews goes back to fin de siècle Europe when Jacob Sieff, the American Jewish banker, underwrote almost $200 million in loans during the RussoJapanese war of 1904–05. Sieff was outraged at Tsarist anti-Semitism. His action prevented the collapse of the Japanese economy and no doubt was a factor in Japan’s eventual victory over Imperial Russia. Japan also supported the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Yet pro-Zionist ardour in Japan cooled even before World War II due its trade with the Arab world. This, of course, was accentuated by Japan’s alliance with Hitler who before the final solution wanted to transfer unwanted Jews to both

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Japan and Japanese-occupied China. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was translated into Japanese in 1924 and the belief that US Jews categorically exercised an inordinate and disproportionate influence lingered. On the other hand, the intervention of the Japanese consul in Kovno (Kaunas), Sugihara Chiune, facilitated during the Holocaust the evacuation of the Mir yeshiva (seminary) from Lithuania thus saving its members from the fate that awaited other yeshivot. Sugihara was not thanked by the official face of Japan for his efforts, and there were numerous Japanese military people who also helped Jews to settle in their region. The post-war Japanese economic recovery after the catastrophe of defeat in 1945 was predicated therefore on profound national interest. Japanese governments found themselves pressured by the anti-Zionist far Left and pro-boycott multinational corporations at the same time. As Jonathan Goldstein records, Japan was the only country in the Western camp at that time which did not vote against the ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution. It abstained instead. Many Japanese companies refused to trade with Israel, but instead operated through dummy companies or third countries. The dialogue between Japan and Israel began to pick up during the mid-1980s and particularly when Iraq attacked Japanese oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq-Iran war. In September 1985 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Japan and addressed the Keidanren, the Japanese manufacturers association. In February 1989 President Chaim Herzog attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito – a controversial decision since Hirohito’s Japan was an ally of Hitler. After the Oslo Accords, Japan replaced the UK as Israel’s second largest non-military trading partner. In the major changes of the early 1990s a new relationship was initiated between Japan and Israel. Major Japanese investments in Israel included a $50 million joint venture between Mekorot, Israel’s national water carrier, and Tomen, one of Japan’s leading multinational companies specializing in water desalinisation. Despite the precarious balancing act that Japan maintains between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the boycott of previous years seems to be much reduced in significance and effect.

The New Russia and the Old America Russia, however, is no emerging power in the sense that China is. It is the twenty-first century successor to the Soviet Union and hopes to regain former influence and prestige by involving itself in international affairs.

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In an attempt to cement its position in the Middle East, Vladimir Putin has befriended Turkey and courted Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. In January 2005 Bashar Assad visited Moscow and Putin agreed to write off nearly three-quarters of the $13.4 billion debt to Russia. It also signed an agreement to explore oil and gas deposits in Syria and to sell Assad air to surface missiles. The following month Putin agreed to supply nuclear fuel for Iran’s Bushehr reactor. Moreover Russia’s prevarications delayed discussions about sanctions directed at Iran by the UN. Russia has continued to provide short range surface to air missiles to the Iranians and supplies arms to Assad in the bitter Syrian civil war. Together with China it has steadfastly defended Bashar Assad at the United Nations. Furthermore, Russia denounced the publication of the Danish cartoons in 2005 depicting Mohammed and invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow shortly after its election victory in 2006. As Robert Freedman points out, Russia at the same time has maintained good relations with Israel. Trade between the two countries was more than one billion dollars in the early years of the twenty-first century. Moreover Israel has a diasporic feel in the corridors of the Kremlin. More than one million Soviet citizens departed the USSR between 1968 and the beginning of the twenty-first century. A Russian language subculture has developed in Israel, and around 50,000 tourists from Russia visit Israel each year. Moreover Putin and Medvedev wanted to deepen the strong cultural ties between Russia and Israel in order to utilise high-tech know-how to develop the Russian economy. Medvedev in particular wanted to establish the equivalent of a Silicon Valley outside Moscow. In addition there has been cooperation on arms sales. A five year agreement on military cooperation was signed in 2010. Israel sold drones to Russia and even agreed to build a drone factory in Russia. This followed Israel’s agreement to cease selling arms to Georgia, following its war with Russia in 2008. The common Islamist enemy has further persuaded Israel to offer cooperation with Russia on counter-terrorism. The picture is therefore more complicated today than it was when Russia’s official ideology was Marxism-Leninism. In the 1920s thousands of Zionists were persecuted and sent into Siberian exile. Yet it can well be argued that the Soviet national interest was the motivation behind Stalin’s desire to promote a two-state solution in 1947. While the Soviet Union was the midwife at the birth of the State of Israel, Zionists were simultaneously being arrested in the USSR. It was one thing for Jews to fight in 1948 for Israeli independence with Czech arms, care of the Soviet

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Union. It was another to request leaving the USSR to join that fight. The Soviet Union quickly returned to its pro-Arab stand, its support for Israel having served its purpose of ejecting the British from the Middle East. Indeed the last years of Stalin famously discovered ‘Zionists’ amongst the leadership of the Communist parties of the East European peoples’ democracies. In January 1953 the Kremlin claimed to have uncovered a plot by mainly Jewish doctors to poison the Kremlin leadership. Within weeks of Stalin’s demise, his successors proclaimed that it had all been a huge mistake. Under Bulganin and Khrushchev the USSR took a proArab position during the Suez crisis in the hope of spreading its influence throughout the developing world. Under Brezhnev, this approach became even more accentuated, though the USSR did not support its Arab allies militarily during the 1967 war. As Robert Freedman suggests, Moscow began to pay more attention to the PLO after 1967. Arafat visited the USSR as part of an Egyptian delegation in 1968. The Soviet Union subsequently recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974. The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six Day War and also enforced the cutting of ties by its satellites in Eastern Europe – with the exception of Ceausescu’s Romania. As in 1956, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on the Arab side during the Yom Kippur war in 1973, but when Anwar Sadat switched Egypt’s allegiance to the US, Moscow began to develop ties with the more radical Arab states, Syria, Iraq and Libya as well as with the PLO. Mikhail Gorbachev changed Soviet policy profoundly toward the Israel-Arab conflict as well as toward the developing world. He told both Assad and Arafat that a political rather than a military solution had to be found. As Robert Freedman shows, by 1996, the Russian-Israeli honeymoon ended with the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet era hardliner, as Foreign Minister. Putin has attempted to maintain an even handed approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict while continuing good relations with Turkey, Iran and Syria. For example, Putin wanted Arab investment to develop Russia’s oil and gas industries. There have therefore been periodic protests about the settlement expansion on the West Bank.

The Last Superpower The United States remains the last remaining superpower of the twentieth century. Regardless of the political complexion of a US administration,

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Israel is considered to be a friend and an ally. In part this relationship is historical, both the United States and Israel fought for their independence against the same colonial master, Britain. The citizens of both countries believed that they were building a different society from the ones they had left. Many Americans – and in particular its evangelical community – consider Israel to be an inheritor of the Judeo-Christian heritage. Indeed the United States under President Truman was the first country to extend de facto recognition to the new State of Israel. Yet it could also be argued that without Stalin’s support, the State of Israel would never have come into existence. This stimulated a debate within Israel about an alignment with East or West. In 1949 the proSoviet Mapam party was the second strongest group within the first Knesset. It believed that the USSR had finally come to its ideological senses and recognised the truth of Marxism-Zionism. Mapam believed that it was the Kremlin’s real representative in Israel – and not the Israeli Communist party. Moshe Sharett on the other hand believed that it was possible for Israel to choose neither and remain non-aligned. Ben-Gurion by inclination and through American pressure aligned Israel with the US during the early 1950s. But as history records, the Eisenhower administration stopped the Suez operation in its tracks in 1956. Israel was forced to withdraw from Gaza in early 1957. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, perceived Israel to be a millstone around the American neck. Yet by 1962 President Kennedy resurrected the warm relationship between the two countries when he told Golda Meir that Israel and the United States possessed a ‘special relationship’. Hawk missiles were exported to Israel in the same year. President Johnson sold Skyhawk fighters to the Israelis as a means of not becoming entangled in the Israel-Palestine imbroglio while the war in Vietnam was still raging. In the 1970s the US expanded military aid to Israel ten-fold. There has been $3 billion per annum in aid since 1988. There has been $109 billion in aid since 1945. As David Weinberg points out, there is a profound intertwining between Israeli society and American society. Some 20 per cent of active Peace Now members in Israel are of American origin. Conversely over 100,000 Israelis have emigrated to the US and have assisted in cementing Netanyahu’s relations with the US Congress. Moreover US soft power has had cultural and economic influence in Israel. Yet most US Jews are staunch supporters of the Democrats and tend to be liberals in support of the peace camp in Israel. They are outnumbered 10:1 by Christian

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evangelicals who tend to be conservative Republicans and are more disposed to laud the Israeli Right and its settlement policy on the West Bank. Whereas Barack Obama finally visited Israel in March 2013 at the start of his second term in office, Mitt Romney, the losing Republican candidate in the 2012 election, was feted by Netanyahu in Jerusalem the previous summer. Since the late 1980s, there has been a close technological cooperation particularly in the development of missile warfare between the Israelis and the Americans. The first President Bush authorised the use of Patriot missiles to be deployed on Israeli soil against Saddam’s scuds. The US has effectively paid for the development of the Iron Dome system which was deployed against the missiles of Hamas, fired from Gaza in 2012. The possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons has concentrated the minds of both Israelis and Americans. The use of the Stuxnet computer virus in 2010 alerted the public to the use of cyberwarfare. Stuxnet infiltrated the computer system of the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, 8 metres underground and surrounded by a 2.5 metre wall. The Iranians were believed to be working towards the production of 500 kg of weapons grade uranium annually. The Stuxnet virus caused the centrifuges at the nuclear facility to go spinning wildly out of control. Stuxnet and other viruses were the product of close cooperation between Israel and the United States at the highest level. This then sketches the outline of this book and its content – and hopefully elucidates some of the singularities and repetitions that occur in the relationship with Israel. Clearly some will argue about the definition of ‘a world power’. Others will dispute the inclusion or omission of one or more countries. However, all the contributors hope that this will be a useful addition to the literature on Israel and its links to the main international players in an evolving twenty-first century.

Notes 1. Max Nordau, ‘Speech to the First Zionist Congress’, The New Palestine 26 January 1923. 2. Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, ‘This is not a Revolution’, The New York Review of Books 8 November 2012.

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1 ISR AEL AND BR ITAIN: TIPPING THE SCALES OF BAL ANCE Neill Lochery

During both the British Mandate in Palestine and the first three and a half decades of the State of Israel the British Foreign Office (from 1968 known as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) was the major force in the formation and implementation of British foreign policy in the Middle East region.1 The Foreign Office, in controlling, to a large extent, Britain’s diplomatic relations with the Arab states and Israel, saw its major role as helping to define British interests in the region and implementing policies that helped safeguard these interests. Of great importance to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict was the point that the Foreign Office’s role also included an effective veto over British arms sales to the region, which it used on a number of occasions to block arms sales to Israel that had been previously approved by the Ministry of Defence in London. The ability of the Foreign Office to stop potential arms sales to Israel was a very powerful political tool, and its near total dominance over other government department’s on this key issue became a central feature of wide ranging powers. It is difficult to find an example when the Foreign Office did not have the final say on whether or not to sell weapons to Israel at any point during the early decades of Israel’s existence. The history of the Foreign Office’s relationship with Israel has been controversial and, at times, provoked ill feeling on both sides.2 Foreign

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Office officials have reflected that the Israelis were paranoid about the designs of the British government, and the Foreign Office in particular, whose Machiavellian hand it was claimed was seen by Israel in every unwelcome development to the Jewish state.3 This paranoia, however, appeared to be a double-edged sword with, at various times, the Foreign Office suspecting that behind Israeli action lay a plan to apply pressure to get something out of the British.4 It is true, however, that the most widely held viewpoint of generations of the Israeli political leadership is that the Foreign Office has been institutionally anti-Israeli ever since Israel’s creation in 1948. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, often disdainfully referred to those ‘Arabists’ in the Foreign Office, and the vast majority of subsequent Israeli leaders have continued to view it with varying degrees of suspicion.5 A closer examination of the key documentary sources on the history of the Foreign Office’s positions on Israel and the Arab Middle East, however, reveals a much more complex picture than the Israeli charge of systematic Foreign Office bias against it suggests. As previously stated, the central focus of the Foreign Office has been the identification of British interests in the Middle East and the protection of them. Defining British interests in the Middle East, however, was never a completely scientific process, but by 1976 they largely centred upon maintaining the supply of oil and after 1973 the avoidance of a second Arab sponsored oil embargo.6 In terms of Anglo-Israeli events and issues, the period following the creation of Israel was dominated by three core issues: the fall out from the 1948 War, the question of British recognition of Israel, and the securing of British interests in the region (the preservation of oil supply and military bases). Regarding the first of these there were two major incidents which damaged Anglo-Israeli relations: the assassination of the UN Mediator for Palestine, Count Bernadotte (allegedly by Jewish gunmen from Lehi, the Stern Gang) and the direct military action on the Negev-Sinai border between the Israeli Air Force and a squadron of the Royal Air Force based in Egypt. The assassination of Count Bernadotte in Jerusalem was an undisputed disaster for the Provisional Government in Israel. It reduced much of the goodwill that the new state had garnished from non-Aligned countries as a result of the Holocaust, and led to Ben-Gurion clamping down on the dissident groups. In the Foreign Office there was a degree of scepticism over whether the large scale arrests and the passing of

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anti-terrorist legislation were inspired by a genuine attempt to ‘root out the terrorists’ or simply the authorities putting on a show.7 Relations between Britain and Israel reached a low point during Israel’s War of Independence, when in January 1949 Israel shot down five RAF planes that had been sent to protect Egyptian sovereign territory from a rapidly advancing Israeli army that had reached the border between the Negev and the Sinai Desserts.8 At that stage, there was a very real danger of this incident turning into something more dangerous. The decision by the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, to withdraw Israeli forces from the area was taken in part to avoid a potential escalation of the conflict. The British Government granted Israel de facto recognition on 29 January 1949, and on 17 May of the same year His Majesty’s Legation arrived in Israel.9 The arrival of Sir Alexander Knox Helm, who was eventually to become the first British Ambassador to Israel, was cautiously welcomed in Israel.10 The local English language newspaper, the Palestine Post acclaimed Helm’s arrival as a visible sign of British acceptance of a new relationship with Israel.11 The paper, however, went on to warn that it would depend primarily on the British Foreign Office whether this relationship developed, as Israel wished, into a wiping out of recent memories and a renewal of fruitful Anglo-Jewish understanding, or into the continuation of the British ‘Cold War’ against Israel.12 Conversely, Helm’s first impressions of Israel were equally insightful. To start with Helm was not particularly taken with Tel Aviv and its somewhat regimental avenues and stark buildings. In his first major dispatch back to the Foreign Office, Helm speculated as to whether there could be a less attractive town in the world than Tel Aviv.13 He added that it combined the worst features of the East and the West and had all the appearance of a prosperous new fifth grade Midwest town on fair day.14 The buildings, he claimed, were new and ugly, the narrow streets jammed with pedestrians and uncontrolled traffic, and that there was noise everywhere.15 The greatest trial, however, he argued, were the open-air café orchestras, gramophones and loudspeakers that blared out at the highest volume from 5 p.m. until midnight making conversation quite difficult and reading impossible.16 At this time in Israel there was a growing feeling that the Arabs, and in particular Egypt, were preparing for a second round of confrontation with Israel.17 From time to time, this belief was talked up in diplomatic circles in order to try to secure concessions on the key issue of the day,

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which was the question of arms sales. Much of the diplomatic games and bad feeling between Britain and Israel centred upon this issue. Indeed, the issue of arms sales came to dominate the diplomatic agenda in AngloIsraeli relations from the first part of 1950 onwards.18 From an Israeli perspective there was a lack of comprehension as to how the British government could sell arms to the Arabs that went far beyond what they needed or internal security measures.19 Israeli officials cited the sale of bomber aircraft, fighter aircraft and tanks by Britain and other countries to primarily Egypt and Iraq, but to other Arab states as well. The Israelis argued that these weapons were of no use against potential attack by the Soviet Union, or in dealing with the problem of internal disorder, therefore they might be wanted for a second round against Israel.20 To make matters worse for the Israelis, a senior Foreign Office official, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir William Strang had indicated that the British government would not be prepared to supply Israel with arms until peace had been reached between Israel and its neighbours.21 Israel charged the British government with double standards, wondering why this condition was applied to Israel and not to the Arab states. In November 1950, Foreign Officials claimed that virtually the only question outstanding between Britain and Israel was the question of the supply of arms.22 In truth, however, the relationship between the Foreign Office and Israel during the 1950s continued to be complicated by the experience of the British Mandate in Palestine, and by the conflict that led to the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948. This remained the case until 1958 despite the previously noted modest improvements in Anglo-Israeli relations at start of the decade and the collusion over the Suez War. As the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union deepened and the Middle East became an increasingly important theatre of the conflict, Israel looked more and more to Britain in its quest for Western allies, and most importantly, despite its initial disappointments, still courted it as a major supplier of arms.23 There were concerns in Israel about America.24 Israel was said to distrust American policy and looked upon Britain as a safer and more reliable ally and wanted to restrain what Richard Crossman labelled ‘the wild men of Washington’.25 There was, as the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv put it, a whiff of anti-Americanism in the air, particularly in the Israeli press.26 Opinion in Israel, the Ambassador went on, was resolutely anti-McCarthyism and was much

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concerned about the influence of the Republican Party there. Israel, as a result, became more and more favourably disposed towards Britain.27 British policy towards Israel, however, was naturally still shaped by national self-interest. In practical terms, this policy revolved around the regional defence system between Britain and the Arab states, which was under increasing threat with the start of Soviet penetration into the region.28 With the rise of the Soviet threat to British interests, Israel was accredited a degree of strategic value to Britain but this value was deemed to be not as significant as that of the Arabs, who many officials at the Foreign Office identified might, with the right inducement, cross over into the Soviet camp.29 The same officials argued that Israel, with its European democratic institutions and outlook, would not do so.30 Israel, of course, did not have any oil, and the maintenance of the supply of oil from the Arabs to the British was never far from the minds of Foreign Office officials.31 By the end of 1952, it was also clear to the Foreign Office that the Soviet Union had given up any hope of bringing Israel into the Communist orbit.32 The period of Anglo-Israeli relations from 1955 until the end of 1958 remains one of the most fascinating in recent British diplomatic history. Within a relatively short period of time the Foreign Office’s world was turned upside down by the anti-imperialist polices of President Abdul Gamal Nasser in Egypt, the resulting threat to British interests in the Suez Canal Zone which led to the Suez Crisis and eventually to the Suez War of 1956. The Suez War remains an almost universally accepted disaster for Britain and its interests in the Middle East. Questions remain, however, as to extent that Suez was a turning point for British interests in the region. On balance, it is fair to say that the decline of Britain and its empire had its origins in World War II. The Suez War, to some extent speeded up this decline, and perhaps more importantly served as a wake up call to those remaining British Officials, many of whom staffed the Near Eastern and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office, that British power and influence was in a slow, but unalterable, decline. This decline, however, was not as spectacular or rapid as many people suggest. Though, following Suez, Britain and France were largely replaced by the United States and the Soviet Union as the two dominant outside powers in the Middle East, Britain still retained strong national interests in the region and was not completely without influence, though over time this influence became more related to Britain’s close ties with the United States.

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The Foreign Office initially struggled to come to terms with the changed post-Suez strategic world, and this was to a large degree reflected in its continued difficulties with Israel. These difficulties were compounded by the fact that the expectations of the Israeli government, and its people, in terms of Anglo-Israeli relations, were raised by Suez. When, during the post-Suez months, the Foreign Office resorted to attempting to pursue what amounted to pre-Suez policies towards Israel, particularly in the area of arms sales, there was a great deal of bitterness and resentment in Israel. It was not until 1958 that Anglo-Israeli relations settled down and became warmer and more productive. Put simply, the 1956 Suez War had little strategic impact on Anglo-Israeli relations, and specifically on the attitude of the British Foreign Office towards Israel. The deal between Britain and Israel in 1958 over allowing British planes to flyover Israel on their way to Jordan to help King Hussein of Jordan helped transform Anglo-Israeli relations in the short to medium term for the better. The period following the over-flight deal between Britain and Israel in 1958 was one of the most open, with Britain sharing information with Israel regarding its problems and on-going issues on a much more regular basis. Confirmation of this new openness came on 10 February 1959 when the Secretary of State Selwyn Lloyd met with the Israeli Ambassador to London Eliahu Elath.33 During the course of the meeting, Lloyd was happy to brief the Ambassador on the state of the on-going financial negotiations between Britain and Egypt, information that would most certainly not have been shared with the Israelis during the dark months of the immediate aftermath of the Suez Campaign.34 The exchange of diplomatic and intelligence information between London and Jerusalem became much more common during this period. Soon after the 1964 British General Election, which led to the return of the Labour Party to power after over a decade of rule by the Conservative Party, Israeli officials from Embassy in London approached the Foreign Office and asked whether it expected that there would be any big changes in British Middle East policy. The Foreign Office gave a guarded reply that they expected that there would be changes, but not big ones as they argued the main lines of British policy towards the region were largely dictated by interests and circumstances that had not changed.35 In truth, the Israeli government hoped that there would be a shift away from the British policy of balance and even-handedness towards Israel and the Arab states towards a new policy of a close relationship with Israel.36

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In reality, British interests, as defined by the Foreign Office at the start of 1965, continued to be the maintenance of peace, the preservation of the East-West balance and resistance to Soviet penetration, and finally the promotion and protection of British material interests in the region.37 Naturally, the Arab-Israeli conflict was deemed to be the most serious threat to peace and by this point Britain, and the other Western powers, believed it had a moral obligation to stand by Israel if it were ever threatened with being overrun and destroyed.38 Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, oil continued to be a central feature of British policy and the protection of the routes of supply were of optimum importance to the British. With regard to the Arabs the realisation that in the eyes of the Foreign Office they were both volatile and undependable had struck home long before, but was increasingly seen as complicating Anglo-Arab relations.39 That said, either was also a very clear realisation that British interests lay in maintaining the best possible links with the Arab world. President Nasser was seen as a troublemaker whose policies were adverse to Britain and whose efforts at developing influence in the Arab world were seen as extremely threatening to British interests. The period between the arrival of the new British Conservative government led by Edward Heath in 1970 and the October 1973 ArabIsraeli War was one in which many in the Foreign Office thought could best be characterised by the phrase ‘creeping sanctions and creeping occupation’.40 In spite of the personal coldness of Edward Heath towards Israel, Anglo-Israeli relations remained on one level extremely cordial with Abba Eban and his British counterpart, Alec Douglas-Home, doing their best to paper over the growing cracks in the relationship. On a deeper level, however, at the centre of much of the discord on the Israeli side was the active British diplomatic effort at the United Nations to secure a settlement, which the Israelis felt was primarily motivated by British efforts to secure its interests in the Arab world at the direct expense of Israel.41 The Israelis once again used the issue of arms sales from Britain to Israel as the litmus test for the state of Anglo-Israeli relations. It is often said that Israelis have long memories, and its government remained concerned over the failure of the previous British government to sell them tanks. This remained true, despite the fact that the Israelis eventually concluded that they no longer actually wanted to purchase the tanks and bought them from America instead. This decision was eventually

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confirmed in a meeting between the Ministry of Defence and General Zvi Tsur, advisor to Moshe Dayan on 17 November 1970.42 General Tsur had already made it clear to the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv during the summer that this would be the case.43 Although General Tsur dropped the request for the tanks he raised another issue, which became central to the arms question over this period. The issue at hand was Israel’s request to develop and buy mini-submarines from Vickers, possibility in collaboration with the Germans.44 In the period prior to the Yom Kippur War, the Foreign Office continued its on-going dialogue with the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Bernard Ledwidge. The issue at hand continued to be the attitude of the Foreign Office towards Israel and the Arabs. The dialogue took place amidst a further rise in tension between the Foreign Office and its Israeli counterpart, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was part of the wider deterioration in Anglo-Israeli relations that took place in the months leading up to the war. The worsening of Anglo-Israeli relations continued both during the war itself and in the period following it. Two issues were at the heart of Israeli anger towards Britain, and to the Foreign Office in particular. The reimposition of an arms embargo on sales of weapons from Britain to Israel and the failure of the British Government, in the eyes of the Israelis, to identify correctly the true aggressors in the war. From the perspective of the Foreign Office, its main point of contention continued to be what it saw as Israel’s inflexibility on both the terms and methods of negotiations with the Arabs, which had directly resulted in Anwar Sadat’s decision to move towards the military option. The period of the aftermath of the October 1973 War was characterised by major political change in Israel with the resignations of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan and the ushering in of a new generation of Labour Party leaders such as Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. In Britain, there was also a change of power in 1974 with Harold Wilson and the Labour Party defeating the Conservative Party in the two General Elections. The central feature of the post-war period, however, as the nightmare scenario that the Foreign Office had feared would materialise, was the use of the oil weapon by the Arabs in order to attempt to gain political advantage. The oil embargo imposed by the oil producing Arab states was viewed by the Foreign Office as confirmation of the need for Britain to further distance itself from Israel and move ever closer to the Arab Middle East.

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Anthony Parsons laid out the bottom line in the Foreign Office’s relations with Israel. He argued that Israel’s survival and independence could not be compromised, but that because of Britain’s interests in the Arab world, it had to be more sensitive to Arab attitudes than to Israeli ones.45 There was also a sense that British interests in the region were more exposed than any of the other powers. At the heart of the reasons for this exposure was the fact, in simple terms, the Arabs blamed Britain for the establishment of the State of Israel due to the Balfour Declaration and the decision to hand over the Mandate to the United Nations in 1947.46 Parson’s argument about British interests moving closer to the Arabs became known as the ‘Craigium Dictum’ after its author James Craig.47 In essence, Ledwidge, the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, accepted the policy, but he argued that Israeli interests and attitudes should not be ignored.48 In meetings with Israeli officials the Foreign Office continued to try to reassure the Israelis that there had been no change in British policy towards it or the Arabs.49 The Israelis, however, found this hard to swallow and were keen to list a series of instances in which it felt that the British were becoming increasingly hostile to Israel. Some of these examples were relatively minor issues, such as the visits to the West Bank by the British Council representative in Amman, while others were more significant such as the attitude of the British towards the Mediterranean in the European Economic Community (EEC).50 The Israelis had effectively joined the dots and argued that this was proof of a shift in British policy away from it and towards the Arabs. Not content to rest with this assessment, the Israelis employed its litmus test to measure the state of Anglo-Israeli relations, with a request for arms supplies for the British. The Israelis did not expect a positive response to this request from the Foreign Office. This was soon confirmed when Parsons outlined the standard policy of the day that Britain would not agree to supply either side with any items, which in the judgment of the Foreign Office, would enhance the likely risk of further hostilities, or to lessen the prospects of a peaceful settlement.51 In traditional accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflict 1977 is considered to be the year of transformation.52 The man that Foreign Office officials referred to as the ex-terrorist – or the viper – and whose very presence in government they believed would substantially increase the risk of another Middle Eastern war, Menachem Begin, came to power, in what Israelis referred to as an electoral earthquake, after 29 years of leading

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the Opposition. It was also the year of the diplomatic breakthrough with President Sadat’s visit to Israel and his address to the Knesset. There is a strong case, however, in terms of the Foreign Office’s relationship with Israel anyway, to suggest that 1976 was at least as significant if not even more important than 1977. In 1976, along with a highly active series of diplomatic contacts, the Foreign Office conducted a major review of its Middle Eastern policy, and specifically its options towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The timing of this review by the Foreign Office was opportunistic. The surprise resignation of the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and his replacement by James Callaghan led to a major Cabinet reshuffle, which led to the arrival of a new Secretary of State as well as two new junior ministers at the Foreign Office. The reports were prepared under the cover of briefing papers for the new ministers. Many of the policy recommendations that were included in the report on British policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict were drawn from the reports of British Ambassadors serving in the Arab world. These Ambassadors had for a number of years called for British policy in the region to reflect increasingly the concerns of the Arab world towards Israeli settlement building in the Occupied Territories. The decision of Foreign Office ministers to adopt some of the findings of the reports compiled by their officials meant that British Middle East policy evolved over the next decade into taking a much more critical line with Israel. Within this policy framework criticism of the various Israeli governments of the day was voiced, mainly over the question of the increased pace in the construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. The philosophy behind the policy, and the methods used in its implementation, remained fairly static. Initially, it was thought that the arrival of Margaret Thatcher in power in 1979 would lead to an improvement in Britain’s relations with Israel. The superficial narrative of the Thatcher era in terms of foreign policy was more often than not defined in simple black and white as being pro-Israel and anti-Arab, pro-America and anti-Europe, and within Whitehall of being anti-Foreign Office. In the way that most clichéd narratives go, this pro and anti list is only a partial reflection of the true picture. In the case of Thatcher, Israel and the Foreign Office, the real story was very much more complex and reveals contradictions within the wider published doctrines, just as in the same way Northern Ireland was the exception to the rule in economic politics.

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After assuming power in May 1979, Thatcher initially heavily depended on the Foreign Office and her Foreign Secretary Lord (Peter) Carrington to brief her for key meetings.53 Despite her already deep suspicion of the Foreign Office as a ‘bastion of complacency’, she was politically astute enough to know that she needed it, and in particular its Rolls Royce of briefing statements and background information on the Foreign leaders, many of whom she was meeting for the first time.54 The major development of the first term of the Thatcher Government was the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980, which marked the first time that the nine members of the EEC community agreed to talk of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.55 On top of this, the nine considered that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all parties could create a climate of confidence in the area.56 The declaration did not go down well in Israel, whose settlements were described as constituting a serious threat to the peace process in the Middle East.57 For the Foreign Office, the Venice Declaration represented something of a triumph. It effectively ended the threat of the fears expressed by the British Ambassador to Egypt, Willie Morris, in 1976 that Britain would be singled out at the head of the queue for Arab retaliation over the Arab-Israel conflict if it did not adapt a more critical approach to Israel.58 The Venice Declaration was also very much in line with the Foreign Office internal reports on the subject, which were produced in 1976 and called for Britain to fall into line with the policy of the other members of the European community and also for a stronger line on the question of Palestinian rights.59 The signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978 and the full peace treaty in 1979 changed much of the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the question of the Palestinians, which was supposed to be linked to the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, was still up in the air.60 It was the 1982 Lebanon War, however, that finally broke Thatcher’s patience with the Likud-led Government in Israel.61 In this respect her views were very much in line with the Foreign Office, whose wings she had tried to clip following the Falklands War. The Foreign Office saw the war as ‘Begin’s blunder’.62 The British Ambassador in Damascus argued that President Hafez Asad of Syria had played his hand well in minimising any Israeli military and political gains in Lebanon.63 Thatcher wrote to President Reagan urging America to do more to deal with the Lebanon tragedy.64 Thatcher also suggested that America

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and Britain should consult closely on the Lebanon situation and others in the Middle East, something that President Reagan was in full agreement about.65 From this point on President Reagan and Thatcher were in regular correspondence about the situation in the Middle East, with the President welcoming the Prime Minister’s input and her apparent good relations with King Hussein, whom President Reagan viewed as essential to his peace initiative.66 On 28 March 1983, President Reagan received a letter from Thatcher urging him to ‘weigh in the Arabs’ to reinforce the message that America was fully committed to its peace initiative.67 From this point onwards, Thatcher took a more critical approach towards Israel and pressed the Americans to do likewise. The fall from power of Margaret Thatcher in December 1990 had a profound impact upon British foreign policy and the role of the Foreign Office in its formation and implementation. It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the arrival of the diplomatically inexperienced John Major into Downing Street led to a return of the glory days for the Foreign Office. Thatcher’s departure (and with it all her anti-Foreign Office baggage) did, however, turn the clock back slightly in favour of giving the Foreign Office greater influence in the arena of British policymaking towards the Middle East. Major was heavily reliant on his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, and later Malcolm Rifkind, both of whom were both widely regarded within Whitehall, and on the international stage, as a safe pair of hands. On the surface, the ten years of the Blair era starting in 1997 would appear to have been characterised as a time of generally positive developments in Anglo-Israeli relations. There remain certain parallels between the premierships of Blair and the second brief period in office of Harold Wilson (1974–76). While both Blair and Wilson can be regarded as two of the most pro-Israeli Prime Ministers, the Foreign Office during both periods was not as keen to shift the balance of British Middle East policy towards Israel. The Craigium Dictum of the early 1970s clearly remained an important factor, particularly as the Oslo Peace process collapsed and the threat of major new hostilities in the region increased from 2000 onwards. The Craigium Dictum argued, in essence, that Israel’s survival and independence could not be compromised, but that because of Britain’s interests in the Arab world it had to be more sensitive to Arab attitudes than to Israeli ones.68 With Blair’s decision, along with the United States, to launch a military invasion of Iraq in 2003 the need to be even more

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sensitive to Arab attitudes increased, particularly on the question of Palestine. This need was reflected, at various times, in both the Foreign Office’s thinking and Downing Street’s. Overall, on a deeper level it is clear that for much of Israel’s existence the Foreign Office’s set of balancing scales have been tilted towards the Arabs. The identification of British interests laying the Arab world, fears over oil supplies and Arab hostility to any sign or signal of deepening Anglo-Israeli ties saw to that. Israel was, as a result, a pretty poor second, when it came to efforts by the Foreign Office to win friends and influence people. Arab Ambassadors were fond of reminding Foreign Office officials that the Arab world held Britain responsible for the creation of the Israeli problem, citing the Balfour Declaration and the British decision to hand over the Mandate to the United Nations in 1947 as the prime cause of the creation of the State of Israel. ‘You caused it, you fix it’, was their rather crude message to the British in the period up to the Six Day War in 1967. This fact quite naturally made the Foreign Office rather nervous and at times prone to over-compensation towards the Arab cause. Following the debacle of the Suez Operation in 1956 Britain largely withdrew from the Middle East preferring to adopt a low-key approach to diplomacy. During this time, and with the notable exception of the thorny question of arms sales to Israel, Anglo-Israeli ties developed towards a degree of normalisation hitherto unseen before. It was only after the Six Day War in 1967 and the subsequent conquest of land by Israel during that war that relations started to become more complicated. Almost from day one of the post-1967 War period, the Foreign Office believed that in order to secure peace Israel would have to return all the lands it had conquered over to the Arabs. In its dealings with Israel, particularly up to 1974, the Foreign Office dealt with a highly impressive Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the difficult diplomatic hand that its officials had to play the Ministry between 1948–74 remained one of the most impressive in the world. Relations between the Foreign Office, both direct and via the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, and the officials of the Ministry were interesting. Over the years the Foreign Office has had its preferred list of Israeli officials and also those who it regarded as being dogmatic. Of all Israelis it would be fair to say that Abba Eban was perhaps the only Israeli that the Foreign Office liked dealing with: ‘a triple first from Cambridge and all that’. Eban’s enjoyment and knowledge of cricket also

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helped. Even here, however, the Foreign Office was acutely aware that while they almost regarded Eban as one of their own, in Israel he was seen for the same reasons as something of an outsider. Of the latter day Israeli leaders, Yitzhak Rabin was admired and respected (even during his difficult first term in office, 1974–77). Shimon Peres from the late 1970s onwards was viewed, to use Thatcher’s line, as ‘a man with whom to do business’. The four Likud Prime Ministers (Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon) were all treated with great suspicion by the Foreign Office. Even after Begin signed the peace agreements with Egypt, he was still treated with a degree of suspicion and at times contempt by the Foreign Office. Shamir, in simple terms, was seen as an unmovable roadblock to peace, while Netanyahu was seen as scheming and distrustful. Sharon was never able to shed the image of a warmonger despite his later efforts to dispel this. Israeli diplomacy with the Foreign Office until the mid-1970s was to a large extent dominated by the issue of trying to persuade it to sell arms to Israel and if this was not possible, to convince the British to stop selling arms to the Arab states at the very least. At various times, Israeli diplomacy was successful in this respect, but in the vast majority of cases it failed. Today, as the critics of Israel beat their drums about continued arms sales to Israel, the reality is that these annual sales constitute only 0.1 per cent of Israel’s total arms imports.69 At the time, the Foreign Office had to override the objections of other Whitehall departments who were keener to sell arms to Israel. Over the years it had several disagreements with the Ministry of Defence, where Israeli lobbying tactics had proved much more successful. Overall, there has been a tendency to be over critical about the state of Anglo-Israeli relations. There have been difficult moments in the relationship caused either by policy differences, personality clashes or a combination of the two. Revelations that Menachem Begin apparently armed Argentina in the Falklands War of 1982 against the British as a result of his strong anti-British sentiments do not fit with the general pattern of the relationship.70 During countless trips to Israel, I have discovered a strong bond of admiration that Israelis have for the British and their political institutions. More than Sixty five years after the establishment of Israel, bilateral relations are on an even-keel. Naturally, the Arab world with its oil and large market for British exports will remain more important for the British than Israel with its population of just over seven million.

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Notes 1. Historians of twentieth-century British diplomatic history differ slightly on the exact point that the Foreign Office lost its dominant role in foreign policymaking. Most, however, agree that the Falklands conflict of 1982, and Margaret Thatcher’s use of the war to set up her own foreign policy unit in Downing Street, marked a key point in the decline of the Foreign Office. See, Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000) pp. 413–4. 2. On this see, Neill Lochery, Loaded Dice: The Foreign Office and Israel (Continuum Books: London and New York, 2007). 3. Public Records Office (PRO), National Archives, Kew, London, FO/371/82506, Report on the State of Israel 1949, p. 4. 4. PRO/ FO/371/82526/ British Labour Party’s Delegation Visit to Israel. 5. PRO/FO/371/ Cable No. 168/ From Helm, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, Report of Conversation with David Ben-Gurion, 29 June 1950. 6. PRO/FCO/93/132/ 3909524/ Correspondence from A. Parsons, Foreign Office to B. Ledwidge, Tel Aviv, 15 February 1973. 7. PRO/FO/371/71686/ Israeli Government’s Investigation into the Stern Gang’s Assassination of Count Bernadotte. 8. PRO/FO371/82506, p. 4. 9. PRO/FO/371/82506/ Report on the State of Israel 1949, p. 2. 10. PRO/FO/371/75205/ Cable No.14 from Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 19 May 1949. 11. PRO/FO/371/75205/ Cable No. 15 from Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, Summary of Israeli Press, Palestine Post, 19 May 1949. 12. Ibid. 13. PRO/FO/371/75205/ Cable No.3 from A. K. Helm to Ernest Bevin, 23 May 1949. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. PRO/371/FO/82529/ Brief for Secretary of State on Israel and Future of UK Policy to Israel, Prepared by Furlonge, 1 November 1950. 23. Orna Almog, Britain, Israel and the United States 1955–58: Beyond Suez (Frank Cass: London and Portland, 2003) p. 34. 24. PRO/FO/371/ 91716/ 1092/1/51/ from Helm to Furlonge, Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 8 January 1951, p. 3.

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25. Ibid. 26. PRO/FO/371/ 91716/ 1092/1/51/ from Helm to Furlonge, Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 8 January 1951, p. 2. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. PRO/FO/371/98251/ Confidential Report on the Re-establishment of the British Position in the Middle East, undated, point 19. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. PRO/FO/371/104733/ Annual Review for Israel 1952, p. 2. 33. PRO/FO/371/142304/ Record of Conversation between Secretary of State and the Israeli Ambassador, 10 February 1959. 34. Ibid. 35. PRO/FO/371/180865/ Minute from Morris on Anglo-Israeli Relations, 12 January 1965. 36. Ibid. 37. PRO/FO/371/180865/ United Kingdom’s Relations with Israel, Crawford, Under-Secretary of State, 1 March 1965. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. PRO/FCO/17/1749/3909268/ Foreign Office Minute, Craig, 12 December 1972. 41. Behind much of the Israeli thinking on this issue was that Britain was a power in decline in the Middle East. In other words, in order to gain favour or influence in the Arab world Britain would pay with by using Israeli currency (working towards pressuring Israel into making political concessions to the Arabs). In the past Britain had bought favour with the Arabs using economic inducements along with defence treaties. Clearly Britain at the start of the 1970’s was no longer in a position to use these to tired and tested methods. The Israelis believed that selling Israel down the river in order to curry favour with the Arabs must have been very tempting to the British Government. 42. PRO/FCO/17/1308/3909190/ Record of Meeting between Minister of State for Defence and General Tsur, 17 November 1970. 43. PRO/FCO/17/1299/3909124/ Cable No. 38, from Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 15 July 1970. 44. PRO/FCO/17/1308/3909190/ Record of Meeting between Minister of State for Defence and General Tsur, 17 November 1970. 45. PRO/FCO/93/132/3909524/ Correspondence from Parsons, Foreign Office to Ledwidge, Tel Aviv, 15 February 1973. 46. Ibid. 47. PRO/FCO/93/132/3909524/ Correspondence from Ledwidge to Parsons, 24 January 1973. 48. Ibid.

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49. PRO/FCO/93/132/3909524/ Record of meeting between Parsons and Ruppin, Israeli Embassy, 9 February 1973, p. 1. 50. Ibid. 51. PRO/FCO/93/132/3909524/ Record of meeting between Parsons and Ruppin, Israeli Embassy, 9 February 1973, p. 4. 52. See for example: Martin Gilbert. Israel: A History (Doubleday: London, 1998). 53. John Campbell, Mrs Thatcher: The Iron Lady (Jonathan Cape: London, 2003) p. 56. 54. Ibid. 55. MTF/ Statement by Mrs Thatcher to House of Commons on Venice Declaration, 16 June 1980. 56. Ibid. 57. For the full text see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/decl/index. htm. 58. Willie Morris viewpoint was mirrored among the senior members of the Near East and North Africa Department in the Foreign Office. 59. PRO/FCO/93/954/4499763/ Report of Arab-Israel, Part Three: UK Interests and Policy, Weir, 27 July 1976. 60. On this see: Neill Lochery, The View From the Fence: The Arab-Israeli Conflict from Its Present to Its Past (Continuum Books: London and New York, 2005). 61. John Campbell, Mrs Thatcher, p. 337. 62. FCO/NFY/014/1/ The Annual Review for Syria for 1982. 63. Ibid. 64. Reagan Library (RL), F96/107/129/ Correspondence from President Reagan to Thatcher, 18 June 1982. 65. Ibid. 66. RL/F96/107/173/ Correspondence from President Reagan to Thatcher, 7 March 1983. 67. RL/F96/107/183/ Correspondence from Thatcher to President Reagan, 23 March 1983. 68. PRO/FCO/93/132/3909524/ Correspondence from Parsons, Foreign Office to Ledwidge, Tel Aviv, 15 February 1973. 69. Statistics supplied by the Foreign Office, Middle East Peace Process: Israeli Issues and Actions, http://www.fco.gov.uk/. 70. See, The Jerusalem Post, 21 April 2011.

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2 ISR AEL AND FR ANCE: R EL ATIONS FROM 1948 TO TODAY François Lafon

I shall start with three preliminary remarks. Firstly, while truth is a matter for philosophy, the historian is obliged simply to analyse the facts and interpret them in increasingly complex networks of causality. He or she should resist both over-simplification (what Poliakoff called ‘diabolical causality’1) and obedience to dominant discourses considered politically correct at the time. In this sense, historical research can never be other than ‘revisionist’,2 in the sense that American political philosophy attributes to the term. As new sources become available, what was considered historically true may change, and careful historical research will always be involved in a process of revaluation.3 This is a particularly important point when studying Israel, which generates more than its fair share of moral and ideological comment, and where analyses tend to identify a victim – a priori Palestinian – and a guilty party – a priori Israeli. For my part, I tend to reflect on the words of Albert Camus concerning the distinction between drama and tragedy: in dramas, it is easy to tell the good from the bad, whereas the essence of tragedy is that even when Antigone is right, Creon is not wrong. A second preliminary remark follows from this: how accurate can the historian’s perspective be when he or she addresses the recent past and becomes something of a commentator on contemporary events? The risk is that critical distance and balance are replaced by emotion and

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ideology, particularly, in this context, due to the massive dissemination of images of Palestinian suffering. Lastly, beyond these general statements, French attitudes to Israel are incomprehensible if one does not take into account France’s ‘pro-Arab policy’ and the way it has changed radically over the period we are considering. This particular orientation in French foreign policy goes back several centuries, at least to the sixteenth century and even to the Crusades, and its continuities are more significant than its fluctuations. It is based on the idea that France has a special mission to carry out in the Holy Land and that France must develop privileged links with the Arab world.4 To turn now to my analysis of Franco-Israeli relations, I will concentrate on political relations to the detriment of economic or cultural ones, which are also important, for example the influence of Francophone culture in Israel, conveyed through, among many other things, Yossi Banai’s translation into Hebrew, and performance of, the songs of Georges Brassens and Jacques Brel. To return to our main theme, the relations between France and Israel can be seen to fall into roughly three periods between 1948 and today.5 The first phase, which lasted from the foundation of the State to the beginning of the 1960s, was a period of friendship between the two countries; the major protagonists in Franco-Israeli relations – and particularly Shimon Peres – use the term ‘honeymoon’ to characterise it. The second period, by contrast, from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s, was marked by what may be called France’s traditional ‘pro-Arab policy’. A third, contradictory, period started in 1981, with the presidency of the Socialist François Mitterand, in which renewed friendship with Israel existed alongside recognition of Palestinian legitimacy. This gave way, under the dual influence of Jacques Chirac’s presidency and the failure of the peace process, especially after the summer of 2000, to a strong anti-Israeli tendency. Since 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to create a new impetus and to stress the importance of Franco-Israeli relations. He made them part of his policies in the Mediterranean Region, but ultimately he failed, partly at least because he backed both the Assad and Ghaddafi regimes at the beginning of his presidency, before supporting the Arab revolutions. And, of course, it is too early to analyse whether – and how – the victory of François Holland in the presidential election in May 2012 will initiate a new stage in this relationship.

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From 1948 to the End of the 1950s The history of Franco-Israeli relations does not, strictly speaking, start with the creation of the State of Israel. Immediately after World War I there were already a number of French political groupings that supported the right of Jews to build a national home. Several socialists became prominent in this movement, which was centred around Leon Blum and members of the Radical Party6 such as Julien Godart.7 Ilan Greilsammer, in his major biography of Blum, was the first to draw attention to the importance of Blum’s Zionist commitment.8 Blum became a friend of Weizmann in 1922 and, at his request, attended numerous international meetings of Zionist organisations in the course of the 1920s. For Blum, there was no incompatibility between living as an assimilated Jew in the French Republic and Zionism, despite the fact that he was the target of anti-Semitic attacks from both the Left (Communist and Pacifist),9 and the Right – attacks which often took the same form. He was, for example, accused both of belonging to the haute bourgeoisie and of writing pornography, when he dared to advocate the sexual liberation of young women in his essay ‘On Marriage’.10 Significantly, he very rarely reacted to any of these provocations. His world view is best summed up in a speech he gave in 1925 at a banquet organised by the French branch of the Keren Hayesod in honour of Weizmann. He stated that: A Jew can assimilate, adapt himself entirely, be totally a Frenchman and yet have to no degree, in no way, severed his ties with the Jewish community . . . Zionism . . . was born of the feeling, generated by circumstances, that it had become necessary for millions of Jews, for the vast majority of the Jewish people, who had been denied normal conditions of adaptation and assimilation in other countries, to be guaranteed a corner of the world in which they could find what in dipomatic circles is called a ‘national home’; such a home had to be found for them, since the countries in which they were living obstinately refused, by means of legislation or without it, to provide them with one.11 Chaim Weizmann, confident that he would be backed by Blum, made this support a cornerstone of his strategy in creating an ‘enlarged Jewish Agency’, in 1929. Leon Blum was at the centre of a network of socialist supporters of Zionism, among them the major figure of International

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Socialism, Emile Vandervelde. Vandervelde, in particular through the Socialist Committee for a Workers’ Palestine, popularised the Jewish struggle for a national home. He encountered opposition to Zionism in international socialist circles, spearheaded by Karl Kautsky,12 as well as by the Eastern European Socialists, who were close to Bundist positions.13 Blum and the Socialist Committee for a Workers’ Palestine were also opposed to British policy in Palestine under the Mandate, particularly the Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald’s decisions following the violent Arab uprisings of 1929. They further suggested to Weizmann that he and his network of supporters could help him to obtain French support in Syria and the Lebanon. In the wake of World War II, the Zionist commitment of these various Socialist currents was further strengthened. French public opinion was almost unanimous in its support for the creation of the State of Israel. Even before the end of the British Mandate, the political and military leadership, who were heirs to the French Resistance, declared their strong support for the State.14 This backing came from across the political spectrum: the French Communists understood the motivations of the Irgun militants via the French Resistance group FTP (Francs tireurs et partisans),15 which was close to the French Communist party; while the Christian Democrats also supported Israel, especially through the policies of Georges Bidault, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1947 and 1948. But the strongest support came from the Socialist party, the SFIO, which at the time of the creation of the State occupied a central position in the French political system. The Socialists had a strong presence in the Home Affairs Ministry, which proved important for Aliyah Bet (a wave of clandestine Jewish immigration to Palestine). The party also held the important posts of Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister almost continuously from the resignation of De Gaulle in January 1946 to the resignation of the Prime Minister Paul Ramadier at the end of 1947. Leon Blum’s influence was, moreover, decisive. Although he did not have any official function in the French parliament (except briefly from December 1946 to January 1947), Blum successfully devoted his energies to persuading the French President, his friend and Socialist colleague Vincent Auriol, not to abstain during the UN vote on partition of 29 November 1947. Many French diplomats, including the French Ambassador to the UN, Alexandre Parodi, wanted him to follow the British example by abstaining. In this instance, Blum was absolutely faithful to his Zionist commitment.

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And indeed, for this generation of socialists, Zionism and Socialism were indissociable because they were part of the same ideological family.16 Until the 1970s, most French socialists were convinced that the Israel of the kibbutz – like Tito’s Yugoslavia – was one of the very rare examples of the successful construction of a socialist society which had managed to combine freedom with democracy. The empathy between France and Israel was also expressed in the actions of the French Home Affairs Minister, the socialist Edouard Depreux, during the scandalous episode of the Exodus. François Mitterand, who at the time was the youngest member of Paul Ramadier’s cabinet, recalled this episode when, as French President, he made a speech to the Knesset in 1982. And Blum stressed at the time that the Jews who had survived the camps in Germany had the legitimate historical right to ‘seek their homeland in the land of the Bible, which is the place of their history’.17 Blum defended this position to the very end. In 1950 he published an article in an American Jewish journal, The Jewish Daily Forward, in which he condemned the proposal to internationalise Jerusalem and instead upheld Israel’s historic right to make Jerusalem its capital: Israel has taken by storm and conquered, at the cost of the blood of its dearest children, its historic capital. The UN must come round to the only solution which, by a rare good fortune, corresponds both to the demands of reality and to the dictates of justice. I shall now make a few supplementary points concerning this period around the creation of the State of Israel. First, French public opinion did not consider the creation of Israel to be some sort of compensation for the tragedy of the Holocaust. It was viewed as the endpoint of a process which had started long before and as part of the implementation of international legislation as it had been codified at various conferences after World War I. The massacre of the Jews by Nazi Germany was viewed simply as a supplementary element which militated for the creation of the State, whose legitimacy had been approved previously and was not in question. Secondly, it should be noted that, paradoxically, one of the only sections of French society to have reservations about the creation of the State was the Jewish community itself. Already at the commemoration ceremonies after World War II at the major Paris synagogue of La Victoire, the Jewish victims of Nazism were commemorated as French rather than

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specifically as Jewish. Although the French Chief Rabbi Jacob Kaplan viewed Israel’s rebirth as a ‘divine miracle’,18 nevertheless the majority of French Jews were more concerned to secure their position again as Jews within French society after the War. Of course, the French Communist Party, despite the fact that it was not in the government after May 1947, backed the creation of the State of Israel, in total conformity with Stalin’s approach.19 In the same way, the PCF followed Stalin’s line after 1950 and supported the campaign against ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ which culminated in the Doctors’ Plot. There is another point worth mentioning, highlighted by the Israeli historian Meir Zamir, who drew upon the newly-opened archives of the French Foreign Ministry.20 In 1945, De Gaulle was fiercely anti-British and keen to settle accounts for French loss of influence in Syria and Lebanon. Significantly, at a reception hosted by the International Trade Union Congress in Paris, he told Marc Jarblum (close to Blum and the representative of the Histadrut) that the Jews, like Lebanon – admittedly understood as Lebanese Christians – needed protection from the British, and that France alone could play this role.21 It is clear that when the historian examines in detail the attitude of key figures, disagreements emerge because of different assessments of the situation. This partly explains the contradiction between the immediate de facto recognition of the State of Israel in May 1948 and France’s delayed de jure recognition, in 1949. The stakes involved in recognising the State of Israel should, as Frédérique Shillo has argued, be placed in the context of France’s ‘threefold identity’:22 as a Humanist power and heir to the Resistance, as a Mediterranean power and as a Christian power. The last two characteristics throw light on two determinant, but largely unspoken, aspects of French foreign policy: that France’s ‘pro-Arab policy’ was, in fact, more of a ‘Levantine policy’ (Lebanon and Syria), even if decolonisation changed the terms employed; and as Henry Laurens has argued, France was convinced of its special mission in the ‘Holy Land’.23 To return to our historical analysis, the Franco-Israeli rapprochement of this period was reaffirmed at several decisive moments in Israel’s history, and particularly in 1956. Due to the initiatives of the circle around David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and above all the young civilian director of the Ministry of Defence, Shimon Peres, close ties were made, from 1954 onwards, with the French political, military and industrial establishment.24 But the decisive moment came in early 1956 when

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the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, Guy Mollet, became Prime Minister. Not only did France at this time help arm the State of Israel – in order to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s arming of Egypt from 1955 onwards (via Czechoslovakia) – but Guy Mollet’s government went so far as to conclude a substantial but secret military pact with the fledgling State of Israel.25 Contrary to received wisdom, this military alliance was made before the Suez crisis, in June 1956, although the Suez crisis naturally reinforced it.26 It is clear that at that time the French leadership considered that it had the same interests as Israel in bringing about the collapse of Nasser’s regime. France accused it of orchestrating the actions of the Algerian National Liberation Movement (Front de Libération Nationale or FLN). France even held Nasser responsible for the failure of the negotiations entered into with the FLN in March 1956. To a certain extent, therefore, the French were convinced that Algeria’s capital was really Cairo. And there is now not a shadow of doubt that Nasser did indeed assist the FLN, even if the amount of help may have been overestimated for ideological reasons relating to Nasser’s self-designation as ‘leader of the Arab world’.27 The interception by the French Navy off the Libyan coast of the cargo boat The Athos carrying Egyptian military equipment for the FLN convinced the French leadership that its interpretation was correct.28 In the second half of the 1950s, there was therefore basically a convergence of interests between France and Israel: Israel needed arms and France wanted to get rid of Nasser. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a convenient pretext. This convergence of interests was to have major consequences, especially for Israel’s nuclear programme, which it helped to boost, in secret. Moreover, the alliance with Israel was a convenient way for France to put pressure on Great Britain. It became clear to Guy Mollet and his closest civil and military associates at the beginning of September 1956 that Israel was determined to launch a preventive military campaign against Egypt even if it had to act alone. This helps explain Guy Mollet’s visit to Anthony Eden in September 1956, to force the hand of the British, who declared their opposition to Nasser’s aggression, but in practice did not want to see a military operation. Mollet’s strategy led to the secret agreements of the Sèvres Conference (22–24 October 1956). It is worth noting that in order to avoid the scrutiny of the Foreign Ministry, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau took over this portfolio personally, and was in this respect a very atypical

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Minister for Foreign Affairs. Clearly at the time Franco-Israeli policy was largely determined by the personal relations of Guy Mollet and the Defence Minister, Bourgès-Maunoury. In this light, the relations between France and Israel during this period could be described less as a honeymoon than as a convergence of interests. But, the French socialist party was afflicted by a moral crisis due to its policy in Algeria. It led to the secession of the Parti Socialiste Autonome, in September 1958, which became the PSU at the begining of the 1960s. Gathering various currents of the Christian Left and some groups of the far Left, this new party became radically an anti-Israeli entity after the Six Day War. With the return to power of General de Gaulle in 1958, and even more so after the Six Day War, this period of closeness came to an end, and more conflictual relations emerged.

From the Fifth Republic up to 1981 De Gaulle’s policy towards Israel is a complex subject that would require a much more detailed exposition. His attitude in 1967, in particular, has given rise to a great deal of debate. His political vision, which was essentially nationalist, could not easily entertain the interpenetration of interests between France and Israel which had developed by the end of the 1950s. After bringing the Algerian War to a close in 1962, France, quite logically, returned to its traditional pro-Arab policy, particularly with respect to Nasser’s Egypt, after the interval between 1948 and 1957. Moreover, as already mentioned, the French President and the Foreign Ministry considered France to have a special mission in the Holy Land; in other words, de Gaulle and the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, like the papacy, had great difficulty conceiving that the Holy Land was henceforth called Israel. The Six Day War exposed the tensions in Franco-Israeli relations. First, in an episode that has come to be part of French mythology, de Gaulle warned Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban: ‘Do not attack first’. This was followed by the famous phrase: ‘The Four Powers must be left to resolve the dispute’. This offended President Johnson, who said: ‘The Four Powers? So who are the other two?’. More importantly, we must understand de Gaulle’s change of attitude in 1967, particularly since he seemed to have confirmed an alliance with Israel on the two visits that he received from David Ben-Gurion

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in 1960 and 1961. A particular remark of de Gaulle’s is often cited as exemplifying this change: at a press conference on 22 November 1967, he qualified ‘the Jews’ – thus amalgamated with Israel – as ‘from time immemorial an elite people, sure of themselves and domineering’. The rest of this speech is also revealing, since at points it challenges the very legitimacy of Israel: The establishment, between the two World Wars – for we must go back as far as then – the establishment of a Zionist homeland in Palestine, and then, after the Second World War, the establishment of the State of Israel, gave rise to a certain amount of apprehension at the time. For the question arose, even among many Jews, as to whether establishing this community on land which had been acquired in more or less justifiable ways, (my emphasis) in the midst of Arab peoples who were fundamentally hostile to them, would not lead to continual and unending frictions and conflicts. Some even feared that the Jews, who had lived dispersed until then, and had remained what they had been from time immemorial, an elite people, sure of themselves and domineering, would, once brought together on the site of their former grandeur, transform the moving pleas they had uttered for nineteen centuries into a fierce desire for conquest: next year in Jerusalem. This remark cannot be explained simply by the pro-Arab policy of France, even if we reduce the latter to the French desire to renew relations with the Arab World after the Suez Crisis and the Algerian War, not to mention the politics of crude oil. One explanatory hypothesis that I shall develop here, without referring to other aspects of de Gaulle’s diplomacy,29 was suggested to me after reading the biography of Shimon Peres by Michael Bar Zohar. Bar Zohar believes that de Gaulle reacted very badly to Israel’s refusal to abandon its nuclear programme in 1962.30 It is not that de Gaulle did not want Israel to have the nuclear bomb, but rather that he feared that if Israel completed its nuclear programme, thanks to French assistance, the French nuclear programme would suffer. In this light, 1967 was an opportunity for de Gaulle to take revenge on Israel. Moreover, France’s Foreign Minister remained unchanged between 1958 and 1968: Maurice Couve de Murville, a tireless opponent of Israel, sought to restore the traditional French pro-Arab diplomatic line.

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As the former French Ambassador to Egypt (1950–54) and former financial expert to the Vichy regime,31 he was at the opposite end of the spectrum from the Resistance fighter Christian Pineau. According to Bar Zohar, Shimon Peres and Couve de Murville had serious clashes over the issue of returning the nuclear fuel to France, which de Gaulle had demanded of Israel. Peres managed to win the day by threatening to make this affair public, something which France, with its pro-Arab policy, naturally wished to avoid. This was the context in which de Gaulle accused Israel of being the aggressor in the Six Day War, despite Nasser’s actions. Not only had Nasser repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel but his decision to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping was interpreted by Israel to be a casus belli. If one were to retain but one symbol of France’s pro-Arab stance in this period, it would perhaps be the tendentious French translation of the English version of the UN Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The English stipulates ‘Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’, implying some or all territories; whereas the French version, ‘Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit’, implies withdrawal from all territories. The French Ministry for Foreign Affairs claims that the French translation is the authoritative version. However, as David Pryce-Jones notes, international law ‘considers that when an international agreement is issued in several languages, it must be interpreted in the sense of the first version’.32 UN Resolution 242 was adopted after a Soviet text, which proposed withdrawal up to the 1949 line, that is, ‘withdrawal from all the territories occupied’, had precisely been rejected. The new text, which was adopted following the rejection of the Soviet text, was based on a draft drawn up by the British representative to the UN, Lord Caradon. Later, under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs persuaded the European Community to accept the French version of UN Resolution 242, in the context of anti-Israeli pressure from oil-producing countries. After 1967, France became increasingly critical of Israel. Such an attitude persisted without the slightest change, from the last years of de Gaulle’s presidency and throughout the two following presidencies, to that of Georges Pompidou and of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. This continuity is in evidence firstly in the French embargo of Israel. While in theory all the parties involved in the conflict were under an embargo, in reality the embargo targeted only Israel. For example, in January 1970,

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the French President Georges Pompidou authorised a contract for 50 Mirage V planes to be delivered to Libya, planes which had initially been promised to Israel and which Israel had paid for. Certain key sectors of the French armaments industry, including Marcel Dassault, attempted to circumvent the embargo.33 The embargo also generated scenes worthy of a James Bond film, such as the Cherbourg warships affair in December 1969. The Yom Kippur War further fuelled anti-Israeli sentiment. Michel Jobert, the French minister for Foreign Affairs, made the following highly significant declaration to journalists before announcing the official French position at the UN: ‘Can one really call trying to return home, to set foot in one’s own land again, an act of aggression?’ This clearly amounts to justifiying the Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel. Two factors contributed to strengthening the French pro-Arab policy. The first was the oil crisis after the 1973 war. France under Valéry Giscard d’Estaing embarked on a policy of rapprochement with the Arab states as it became aware of the pressure the oil states could exert on the French economy. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister at the time, had a first meeting with Saddam Hussein in September 1974, before the latter came on an official visit to France a year later. Far from being perceived as a dictator, Saddam Hussein was shown round the nuclear research centre of Cadarache in the South of France, after which a treaty of cooperation was signed in November 1975. This led to the construction of the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak, destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in June 1981. The second factor was the emergence of the ‘Palestinian cause’, which was unknown prior to 1967. It mobilised large sections of the French population, bringing together part of the Far Left with the Far Right, in a joint hostility to Israel. An attitude which can be considered emblematic was adopted by a certain Joseph Krasny, a Trotskyist journalist who justified the murder of Israeli athletes by the Black September group at the Munich Olympics in September 1972 in the following terms: The actions of Black September put an end to the mascarade of the Olympics and the accommodating arrangements which the Arab reactionaries were planning to make with Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people. No revolutionary can fail to show solidarity with Black September, as though it were a question of separating the good revolutionary wheat from the chaff. On the contrary, we must defend the militants of this organisation unconditionally against any repression.34

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Some twenty years later, this same Joseph Krasny, under his real name of Edwy Plenel, was to become one of the key opinion formers in France, in his role as Editor-in-Chief of the French newspaper Le Monde. The editorial line of Le Monde during the failure of the peace process and then afterwards during the second Intifada put the blame on Israel, without analysing the Palestinian part in this failure. At the same time, and there again as a consequence of the Six Day War, French Jews whom, as we have seen, had until then defined themselves firstly as French, began to identify with Israel. Raymond Aron has shown that de Gaulle’s attitude in 1967 was a key determinant in this shift.35 The Jewish community had been doubly traumatised by the outcome of the Algerian War and by the foreign policy of de Gaulle, Pompidou and then Giscard d’Estaing towards Israel. Its identification with Israel was henceforth to become central to Franco-Israeli relations. More rarely during the 1970s, some sections of the French population, apart from the Jewish community, expressed a certain form of admiration for Israel, for example François Mitterand as leader of the Socialist Party. This was the case when the Entebbe Rescue Mission was carried out in July 1976, when Israeli commandos freed the hostages of a hijacked Air France Airbus which had taken off from Tel Aviv and was held on the Entebbe airstrip in Uganda. However, certain European Foreign Ministries, including France, did not hesitate to deplore the risks taken by the Israelis while diplomats were intending, at least in principle, to find a negotiated solution to the crisis. The gap between France and Israel widened still further during the last two years of Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency, from 1979 to 1981. First, France was extremely dubious about the rapprochement between the new Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; France preferred inclusive negotiations in the Camp David process.36 François Mitterand was one of the very few French political leaders to approve the agreements. Secondly, on 3 October 1980, the prime minister Raymond Barre gave a prepared speech following the bomb attack on the rue Copernic synagogue in Paris, in which he distinguished ‘innocent Frenchmen’ (that is, non-Jewish) from other victims.37 A few months earlier, on 9 May 1980, Barre had issued a directive according to which France accepted the terms of an Arab boycott, which would affect any member of the international community to have economic links with Israel.38

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In this context, France’s relations with Israel became a keenly felt issue in the French presidential elections of 1981, despite the fact that there was not really a ‘Jewish vote’ in France (except in the inflamed imaginations of the Far Left and the Far Right).39 The relationship with Israel was evoked notably in the televised debate held in May 1981 between the Socialist presidential candidate François Mitterand and the outgoing President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Mitterand asked Giscard d’Estaing why he had simply observed Israel through binoculars rather than actually visiting the country. After Mitterand became French president in 1981, a new chapter opened in Franco-Israeli relations, marked by the equivocal attitude of France, both positive and negative, towards Israel.

From 1981 to 2007 The third phase of Franco-Israeli relations comprises a contradictory phase under the Socialist Presidency of François Mitterand, followed by the deterioration of relations under the presidency of the right-wing Jacques Chirac. On the one hand, François Mitterand explicitly declared himself to be a friend of Israel during his Presidential campaign, and his Middle East policy was marked by a renewed warmth in Franco-Israeli relations. This was especially clear during the visit to Israel of the newly elected President. In his speech to the Knesset in March 1982 (just nine months after his election), after recalling his actions in 1947 concerning the Exodus, he reminded his audience that, in 1978, he was the only head of a major French political party to support the Camp David agreements. Also, in June 1981, just after taking office, he ordered his Prime Minister to reduce France’s participation in the Arab-led boycott of Israel which Barre had decreed in May 1980.40 It was in the name of this friendship between Mitterand and Israel that Shimon Peres convinced Prime Minister Menachem Begin to delay the planned bombing of the Iranian nuclear reactor at Osirak. This was initially due to take place on the day of the French presidential elections but was put off in order not to lessen François Mitterand‘s chances. Nevertheless, the boycott on military equipment was maintained, except for spare parts for old equipment, and was even reinforced during the Lebanese war of 1982. The Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens evoked this with his French

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counterpart, Charles Hernu, during his visit to the Salon du Bourget, the major military aircraft trade fair in France, in June 1983. Moshe Arens stated how astonished he was that while Israel was under a boycott France was prepared to sell modern arms to Syria, including ‘Milan’ anti-tank missiles and ‘Gazelle’ helicopters. It was not until 1994, and the visit of the right-wing Minister of Defence François Léotard to Yitzhak Rabin, that a new phase of cooperation with Israel was inaugurated in the field of defence research and development between the two countries.41 On the other hand, the ambiguity of François Mitterand’s position is clear not only in the pro-Arab stance of his Foreign Affairs minister Claude Cheysson, but also in the assistance given to the PLO from 1982. As early as 1980, Mitterand had called for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. The most striking symbol of this contradictory attitude was France’s actions to save Yasser Arafat in Lebanon and ensure his safe passage to Tunis.42 People in Mitterand’s circle readily compared the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla to the massacres perpetrated by the Nazi SS division ‘Das Reich’ in the French village of Oradour-sur-Glane in 1944. The Editorial of the Socialist weekly L’Unité of September 1982 referred to an ‘Oradour’ perpetrated by a ‘fanaticised military riffraff’ and praised the French President’s decision to send troops to Lebanon. In the same issue, the Socialist intellectual and writer Max Gallo wrote in his column entitled ‘Let us not forget the others’: ‘A civilisation may be measured by the respect shown to the dead. But the dead in the balance must be equal. Those of the Holocaust and those of Shatilla, those of the rue des Rosiers43 and the children dying of hunger’. In fact this analysis was made by Mitterrand speaking off the record, with some close advisers. Despite the fact he knew perfectly well that the Sabra and Shatilla slaughter was carried out by Phalangist Christians, Mitterrand pointed to the moral responsibility of Israel. At the opposite end of the French political spectrum one can find a similar contradiction with Jacques Chirac. On the one hand, as François Mitterand’s Prime Minister, it was Jacques Chirac, in 1987, who was the first Prime Minister ever to visit Israel, as Dominique Trimbur points out.44 And as soon as Chirac was elected President in 1995 he immediately declared, without the slightest ambiguity, that the wartime Vichy government, far from being essentially illegitimate, bore the full weight of national responsibility for the deportation of the Jews of France: ‘France, birthplace of the Enlightenment and of human rights, land of welcome and asylum, France, on that day, committed the irreparable.

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She broke her promise and delivered to their persecutors those under her protection’.45 But on the other hand, the stalling of the peace process, the surprise defeat of Shimon Peres in the elections following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995, in the context of an unprecedented spate of Palestinian terrorist attacks, and the election of Benyamin Netanyahu as prime minister, all contributed to the deterioration of Franco-Israeli relations, which changed from the ambivalent to the frankly hostile. New tensions arose when Jacques Chirac made a trip to Israel in October 1996 and provoked an incident with security personnel in Jerusalem. There was nevertheless still hope for a peace treaty, especially after Ehud Barak won the Israeli elections in May 1999. Also, Lionel Jospin, Socialist Prime Minister from 1997 to 2002 under Chirac’s presidency, considered himself to be, like Mitterand, a friend of Israel. His statement that Hezbollah was a terrorist organisation caused a riot during his visit to the University of Bir Zeit in February 2000. However, the launch of the Second Intifada after the failure of the Camp David summit created a rift between France and Israel which would prove difficult to repair. There were several reasons for this: first, internal French politics and notably the rivalry between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin in the race for the French presidency in 2002. Secondly, Jacques Chirac attributed the failure of the peace process exclusively to Israel, despite Barak’s proposals at Camp David. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the conflict in the Middle East had been ‘imported’ into French society. As a consequence, Jospin’s government from 2000 to 2002, traumatised by the incidents at Bir Zeit and unwilling to alienate second-generation North African voters,46 toed the line of Jacques Chirac, who was broadly more hostile towards Israel. Chirac often publicly sided with Yasser Arafat against Israel. He appeared on prime-time French television on the steps of the Presidential Palace to put the blame for the outbreak of the Second Intifada onesidedly on Ariel Sharon (who was Israeli opposition leader at the time) and his visit to the Temple Mount. Several accounts, both French and Israeli, suggest that Chirac was also extremely critical of the way Ehud Barak’s government repressed the Intifada, and that he made this clear to Ehud Barak on an official visit to France. This marked the end of a very strong personal bond between the two men in 1999–2000, according to Avi Pazner.47 Chirac’s bias was also clear when, much to

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Madeleine Albright’s horror, he advised Arafat not to sign the ceasefire agreements which had been drawn up in Paris in the autumn of 2000 in a last attempt to secure peace (under her aegis).48 The same sympathy for Arafat was in evidence when Jacques Chirac agreed to have him hospitalised at the French military hospital at Percy, where he died in November 2004. Consequently, when the Second Intifada started, significant sections of French public opinion viewed Israel as a priori the oppressor, ‘an Apartheid State’. Anti-Semitic acts which escalated in France during the years 2000 and 2001 were first denied, then systematically underestimated. In February 2001, the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced that he considered France to be a country rife with antiSemitism. And calls for boycotts have indeed multiplied, including in the French University sector. Despite the political evolution of Ariel Sharon, who had moved closer to Shimon Peres,49 left the Likud, founded Kadima and then initiated the process of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the French establishment and many intellectuals obstinately refused to see in Sharon anything other than the major (or even the sole) person responsible for the failure of the Oslo Process, without ever considering what part the Palestinians may have played in that failure. Despite a calmer climate between the two countries since 2004, symbolised by the visit of President Katzav and the visit of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2006, it was not until the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2007 that fresh impetus was given to Franco-Israeli relations.

The Contradictions of Nicolas Sarkozy When he first took office, the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy made no secret of his sympathy for Israel.50 Whereas Jacques Chirac had a profound respect for the Jewish people, some have argued that he nonetheless thought of the State of Israel as a temporary episode. For Sarkozy, the State of Israel was a non-negotiable fact, and this informs his analysis of the Iranian threat and its nuclear programme. These are the terms in which, during his state visit to Israel, Sarkozy formulated the French position: There is a deep friendship between Israel and France which has withstood all the turbulence of history for 60 years. This friendship is due not only to the vitality of the Jewish community of

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France and of the Francophone community in Israel, which form a bridge between our two countries. It is also due to something deeper. This friendship is due too to the way in which Judaism has influenced, nourished and enriched French culture, to the inspiration the founding fathers of Israel drew from the values of French universalism. It’s due to the close economic, scientific, cultural, technical and intellectual ties, and also quite simply the human ties which our two peoples naturally forged so well together. I have come to renew this friendship solemnly on behalf of the French people, and I’m delighted to see the warmth and fraternal enthusiasm with which the Israeli people respond to it . . . we can’t tolerate anyone in the world saying he wants to wipe the State of Israel off the map. Today this threat has taken the form of terrorism. No people can live under the threat of terrorism. There are no grounds for terrorism. Terrorism can’t be justified. Terrorism has to be fought! France is fully engaged in the fight against terrorism alongside its allies and friends. France knows what is at stake here, it is our values and our civilisation that are targeted. Yes, France is Israel’s friend, and France will always stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel when her security and existence are threatened. I will never compromise on this. And those who call scandalously for Israel’s destruction will always find France in their way, blocking the path. So that things are clear and there is no ambiguity, I want to say that Iran’s military nuclear program demands an extremely firm response by the entire international community. Israel must know that she is not alone! France is determined to pursue with her partners a policy of increasingly tough sanctions and, if Tehran were to choose to comply with its international obligations, of openness. But I will say this forcefully: an Iran with nuclear weapons is unacceptable for my country! Never will France compromise on the security of Israel. (Speech to the Knesset, 23 June 2008) Sarkozy’s vision of the future of Franco-Israeli relations has another dimension, namely that of peace not only with the Palestinians, but also with the Arab powers, in the context – and this seems to be a sine qua non – of the Union for the Mediterranean which he instigated: France will do everything in her power to make a success of the Union for the Mediterranean which she has proposed to all the peoples of Europe and the Mediterranean. The stakes are crucial

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since the aim is to offer a shared destiny to all these peoples. On 13 July, the Paris summit for the Mediterranean will perhaps raise the hope that what separates us will one day end up becoming less strong than what unites us. Israel, like the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria will find her place there alongside Egypt, Jordan and all the Arab Maghreb countries ... So, my dear friends, perhaps we’ll be able to hope that one day the children of the Mediterranean will stop hating each other; and their children will not from birth be taught the desire to avenge their fathers’ misfortunes. The Union for the Mediterranean was placed under the joint authority of the then Tunisian President Ben Ali and the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. From the outset it proved extremely difficult to set up, especially since the tensions between Israel and Hamas gave rise to Israel’s military campaign ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009). On the one hand, this revived anti-Israeli feeling. A sign of this climate, in which the State of Israel is recurrently delegitimised, is the success of the infamous book by Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People.51 On the other hand, there is the Arab Spring, which has led to an element of radicalisation in traditionally more moderate Arabs states such as Tunisia and Egypt. Yet Nicolas Sarkozy decided to back the Libyan uprising, despite the fact that he had personally invited Colonel Ghaddafi when he was in Paris – after he had also invited Bashar Assad. Clearly this new Mediterranean policy failed completely. A new kind of French anti-Semitism became evident during the 2012 presidential campaign. In March 2012 acts of terror actions took place in Montauban and Toulouse which targeted both French soldiers back from Afghanistan and the Jewish community. These were perpetrated by a young second generation French jihadist. These events occured in a climate of radicalisation during the electoral campaign when close advisers of Sarkozy chose to build ties with the Far Right electorate of Marine Le Pen. Following these attacks and the dismantling recently of an Islamist network, the new French government has tried to strengthen the links with the Jewish community, as indicated by the meeting between President François Hollande, who took power in 2012, and the leaders of the French Jewry. This historical perspective suggests that both recent upheavals in the Arab world and the radicalisation of some parts of the French Muslim community will inevitably raise further questions and bring uncertainties into what is already a world of fluctuating and ambivalent relations between France and Israel.

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Notes 1. Léon Poliakoff, La causalité diabolique, 2 vols (Calmann-Lévy: Paris, 1980, 1985). 2. We of course distinguish between ‘revisionism’ and ‘negationism’. 3. A good example of this historical revaluation is Renzo de Felice’s work on Italian fascism or Pierre Milza’s biography of Mussolini (Mussolini, Fayard: Paris, 1999), which takes account of de Felice’s work. See also the debates on the Algerian War in France. I address such issues further in my biography of Guy Mollet (Guy Mollet, Fayard: Paris, 2006). 4. See, David Pryce-Jones’s otherwise questionable work, Un siècle de trahison, la diplomatie française et les Juifs, 1894–2007 (Denoël: Paris, 2008). The works of the well-know French historian Henry Laurens are fundamental here. See, his La question de la Palestine, 3 vols: vol 1, L’invention de la Terre Sainte (1999), vol 2, Une mission sacrée de civilisation (2002), vol 3 L’accomplissement des prophéties, 1947– 1967 (2007) (Fayard: Paris). 5. It is of course impossible to summarise Franco-Israeli relations adequately in such a short space. Dominique Trimbur has taken up the challenge in his article ‘Les relations franco-israéliennes, 1948–2004’, in Outre –Terre « Israël en Israël », ERES, 2004, p. 405–417, to which I refer the reader. 6. The Parti radical (Radical Party) bears little relation to the sense of the term in English. It was the core Republican party in the Third Republic. See Serge Berstein, Histoire du Parti Radical, 2 vols. (Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1980). 7. On the French Zionism of this period, see Catherine Nicault, La France et le sionisme (1897–1948). Une rencontre manquée ? (Calmann-Levy: Paris, coll. « Diasporas », 1992); and the relevant issues of Archives Juives, of which she is the Editor-in-Chief. 8. Ilan Greilsammer, Blum (Flammarion, 1996). See also my Habilitation à diriger des recherches thesis (supervised by Professor Robert Frank, Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne University), « Pour une mise en perspective historique des relations historiques entre la gauche française et le sionisme: l’exemple de Léon Blum et de son entourage jusqu’à la Seconde Guerre mondiale », December 2010. 9. See Michel Dreyfus, L’antisémitisme à gauche (La Découverte: Paris, 2010). 10. As Prime Minister of the Front populaire coalition he had a new edition of this work published in the Autumn of 1936, a defiant gesture in the face of the anti-Semitic hatred of which he was the target. 11. Speech published in La Revue juive, 15 March 1925. 12. Karl Kautsky’s opposition to any kind of recognition of the right of Jews to be part of international socialism was first indicated at the congress of Stuttgart (1907), during the Second International debate of ‘war and colonization’. He argues that Jews were not a national movement, but a religious current. 13. See Mordechaï Schenhav, Le socialisme international et l’Etat juif (1891–1973) (Connaissances et Savoirs: Paris, 2009). Splits in the international socialist

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14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

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movement had already became apparent at the 1907 Congress, when the admission of the ‘Territorialist’ current to the International Socialist Congress was debated. David Lazar, L’opinion française et la naissance de l’Etat d’Israël, 1945–1949 (Calmann-Lévy: Paris, 1972). In fact the Communists understood the choice of a military uprising by the Irgun since they associated it with the French Resistance which had made a similar choice. Mitchell Cohen, Du rêve sioniste à la réalité israélienne (La Découverte: Paris, 1990) and ‘Préface à l’étude de la pensée politique juive moderne’, in Raisons politiques 2002- 3, no.7. In Le Populaire, ‘Le drame de l’Exodus’. David Shapira, Jacob Kaplan 1895 1994, un Rabbin témoin du XXème siècle (Albin-Michel: Paris, 2007). On the attitude of the French Jewish community, see the memoirs of the former Israeli Ambassador to France, Jacob Tzur, Prélude à Suez. Journal d’une ambassade (Presse de la Cité: Paris, 1968). Laurent Rucker, Staline, Israël et les Juifs (Presses universitaires de France: Paris, 2001) p. 380. See Meir Zamir, ‘Britain’s Treachery, France’s Revenge’, Ha’aretz 4 February 2008. His findings are in the process of being published. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Fonds Marc Jarblum, CZA A 303. On Marc Jarblum, see my ‘Pour une mise en perspective historique . . . ‘, op. cit. Frédérique Schillo, La France et la création de l’Etat d’Israël, 18 février 1947–11 mai 1949 (Ed Artcom: Paris, 1998). See also her doctoral thesis at the IEP (Paris) supervised by Professor Maurice Vaisse, ‘La politique française à l’égard d’Israël, 1948–1959’ (2010). See the works of Henri Laurens cited above. Michael Bar Zohar, Shimon Pérès: The Biography (Random House: New York, 2007). See my Guy Mollet, Itinéraire d’un socialiste controversé (Fayard: Paris, 2006). Motti Golani, La Guerre du Sinaï, 1955 1956 (Editions du Rocher: Paris, 2000). See Charles Robert Ageron, in CEHD (dir. Maurice Vaïsse), La France et l’opération de Suez de 1956 (ADDIM, 1997). The cargo ship was also carrying a group of Egyptian-trained frogmen. In his article cited above, Dominique Trimbur convincingly links De Gaulle’s position as expressed in 1967 with the withdrawal from the integrated command of Nato, and De Gaulle’s speeches in Phnomh Penh in 1966 and in Quebec in 1967 (p. 411). Op. cit. Bar Zohar recalls the less than friendly conversations on the subject of nuclear fuel between Shimon Peres and Maurice Couve de Murville. In this role, Maurice Couve de Murville was responsible for ‘reducing Jewish influence’ in the French economy. See Renaud de Rochebrune, Jean-Claude Hazera, Les Patrons sous l’Occupation (Odile Jacob: Paris, 1995) p. 285.

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32. David Pryce-Jones, op. cit., p. 123. 33. This is how a clone of a Mirage entirely made in Israel came into being; the prototype can be seen in the Israeli Airforce Museum in Beer Sheva. More generally, a gap opened up between French military circles, generally sympathetic to Israel, and French diplomatic circles, generally pro-Arab. 34. See Philippe Raynaud, L’Extrême gauche plurielle, Entre démocratie radicale et révolution (Autrement, Cevipof, 2006), p. 89 et sq. The citation of Plenel-Krasny can be found in note 15, p. 90, which states that it comes from an article entitled ‘La sainte alliance’, in Rouge, no. 171, 16 September 1972. Raynaud notes that another Trotskyist organisation (Lutte Ouvrière) had published a communiqué on 6 September 1972 in which it denounced the murder of the Israeli athletes as an ‘idiotic action’. However, at the same time it also published articles exonerating the kidnapping and murders, on the grounds that such ‘reprisals’ were legitimate. 35. Raymond Aron, De Gaulle, Israël et les Juifs (Plon: Paris, 1968). 36. The strategy of inclusive negotiations was submitted by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to the European Council at Venice, which approved it at its sessions of 12 and 13 June 1980. 37. In a prepared speech given on the steps of his official residence, the Prime Minister Raymond Barre referred to: ‘This odious attack which sought to strike at Jews on their way to the synagogue and struck down innocent Frenchmen’ (3 October 1980). When asked on national French radio whether he regretted these words, Raymond Barre confirmed that he did not regret or retract (France-Culture, 1 March 2007). 38. This supplemented a directive adopted already in 1974. 39. Sylvie Strudel, Votes juifs. Itinéraires migratoires, religieux et politiques (Presses de Sciences Po: Paris, 1996). 40. François Mitterrand was elected on 10 May 1981 and took office on 21 May. 41. For this point, see Eliezer Palmor, Une amitié à l’épreuve (les relations politiques francoisraéliennes sous François Mitterrand) (Carmel: Jerusalem, 1998 (in Hebrew)). 42. On this episode, and more generally on François Mitterand’s position on the Palestinian question, see Jean-Pierre Filiu, Mitterrand et la Palestine (Fayard: Paris, 2005). 43. A reference to the terrorist attack on the rue des Rosiers, the major street of the Jewish quarter in Paris, which was bombed on 9 August 1982. 44. Dominique Trimbur, article cited, p. 412. 45. Speech of 16 July 1995. 46. As made clear by the note sent by Pascal Boniface to the First Secretary of the Socialist party, François Hollande. On this subject, see my critique of Pascal Boniface, Peut-on critiquer la critique d’Israël? in l’OURS, July 2003, no. 330. In my biography of Guy Mollet, I evoke the syndrome of a generation of French intellectuals and politicians who, because they entered politics as opponents

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47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

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of the Algerian War, consider that everything must be done to secure FrancoAlgerian reconciliation. It is in this light that we should interpret the organisation of a football match between France and Algeria in 2001. It was characterised by significant unrest, and interrupted by thousands of young supporters of the Algerian team invading the pitch. The event gave rise to much political commentary. Interview with Avi Pazner at the conference ‘Témoignages des Ambassadeurs de France en Israël et des Ambassadeurs d’Israël en France’ on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of Israel, Round Table chaired by Gérard Benhamou and François Lafon, Tel Aviv University, May 2008. Madeleine Albright describes the events as follows: just after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, in September 2000, she organised a meeting in Paris between Arafat and Barak. Despite Arafat’s reticence, the two men were about to sign a ceasefire agreement at the American Embassy. But Jacques Chirac phoned Madeleine Albright, demanding that French protocol be respected and that everyone assemble at the Presidential Palace. Albright thought it was for dinner. But in fact, without telling anyone, Chirac had organised a further round table of negotiations with, among others, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the United Nations. Arafat took advantage of the situation to remind the audience, on air, that an international inquiry was to determine who had triggered the Intifada; he then slipped away without signing the agreement. ‘I couldn’t exactly run after him through the Elysée Palace!’, declared a furious Madeleine Albright. This is all reported in the award-winning documentary film series ‘Israel and the Arabs, Elusive Peace’ (2006), written by Norma Percy and Brian Lapping, in which they reconstitute six years of the Israel-Arab conflict (1999–2005). Jacques Chirac denied this version when, recently appointed as Ambassador to France, Elie Barnavi came to present Chirac with his letter of credentials. When describing Ariel Sharon’s political career, people often overlook his friendship with Ben-Gurion in the 1950s and with Itzhak Rabin in the 1970s. Ariel Sharon was also the only right-wing Israeli leader whom Leah Rabin agreed to receive at her home after Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995. Although it is difficult for a historian to comment on very recent events, see the exceptionally well-documented analyses of Tsilla Hershco, Researcher at the Begin-Sadat Centre at the University of Bar Ilan. Claude Klein dismantles the strategies of this invented invention in Les Temps modernes, no. 655, October 2009; see, also Mireille Hadas-Lebel in Le Débat, no. 158, January-February 2010.

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3 ISR AEL AND THE UNITED STATES: AN ALLIANCE LIKE NONE OTHER* David Andrew Weinberg

The United States and Israel maintain a relationship that is remarkable in its closeness. Never has the State of Israel had a more active sponsor, and only rarely has America gone to such lengths to ensure the survival and power of a security partner. Although the United States has not stationed troops on Israel’s territory in the same way it defended friends in Europe or East Asia throughout the Cold War, Washington has taken a broad range of other steps in the diplomatic, fiscal and strategic realms to backstop its ally’s position. This chapter provides a general survey of the US-Israel relationship, addressing a variety of questions about the historical sources and consequences of American support for Israel.

Historical Background As one expert observer explains, the United States and Israel maintain a ‘special relationship’ that is typically characterized by ‘high levels of friendship, amity, trust, and political and military cooperation’.1 Yet the two nations did not get off to such a strong start. President Truman did make America the first nation to extend de facto recognition to Israel’s government when Zionist leaders declared independence in 1948.2 But despite rhetorical claims to the contrary, American support was quite limited for the following two decades.

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John F. Kennedy told Golda Meir in 1962 that the two countries had a ‘special relationship’, but his comment was more of an ingratiating expression of personal affect than a reflection of current realities. His predecessor’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, alluded to the ‘special importance’ that the US ascribed to bilateral ties, but the fact that Dulles perceived Israel as a millstone around America’s neck hints at the tactical nature of such remarks.3 Throughout the early Cold War, American officials sought to minimize visible gestures toward Israel that they feared would abet Soviet influence by alienating Nasserite Egypt and other Arab states.4 This state of affairs changed dramatically over subsequent decades. The United States gradually overcame its reluctance to sell arms to Israel, resulting in agreements over Hawk missiles in 1962, Patton tanks in 1965 and Skyhawk jets in 1966.5 Starting in 1970, American officials expanded military aid to Israel more than tenfold after concluding that the state could act as a useful proxy for American power; this occurred after Israel maneuvered its forces to help prevent Soviet clients (Syria and Palestinian groups) from toppling the pro-Western government in Jordan.6 These developments coincided with the gradual rise of religious Zionism and hardline settler nationalism in Israel, culminating in a decade-and-a-half of general political dominance for the Likud Party from 1977 to 1992.7 Although the Likud eventually undertook farreaching concessions over the Sinai, it remained decidedly against taking such steps in the West Bank. During this period, however, American aid continued to flow. Aid levels climbed to new heights after Washington brokered bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt over the following decade, and the Reagan team transformed most of this aid from loans to grants during the 1980s, despite prolonged stagnation of talks over how to resolve the status of the West Bank. Despite a collapse of the shared Soviet threat that had animated much of the alliance, the persistence and even resurgence of radical extremism in the Middle East has provided a justification for continued cooperation and support. Economic aid has been phased out in favor of increased military assistance, and overall aid has remained steady at about $3 billion per year since 1985. Such support has been justified by the executive branch to ‘ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge over potential threats . . . [to] prevent a shift in the security balance of the region . . . [and] ensuring for Israel the security it requires to make concessions necessary for comprehensive regional peace’.8

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Consequently, Israel has become the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign assistance since World War II.9 As of fiscal year 2010, this has included over $109 billion in American aid, roughly 85 per cent of which has been outright grants.10 American support is not limited to fiscal aid, although it is certainly a dominant component. Other forms include diplomatic backing at the United Nations and in other settings, economic privileges and access to advanced military technology. America also provides certain security guarantees short of a formal defense treaty, a subject that will be dealt with in more detail below.

Rationale for Relations The rationale for American relations with Israel is divided into two main parts: a moral case and a strategic case. The moral case came first, and some suggest that it has always been the predominant rationale for relations.11 But as the defense relationship expanded and Israel’s capabilities for power projection grew, an argument driven by strategic calculations also emerged. Although the Nixon team began in earnest to consider Israel in strategic terms, the concept of Israel as a ‘strategic asset’ was not popularized until it was invoked for political advantage by Ronald Reagan as a candidate for office.12 Although these concepts have generated criticism, their general thesis seems to be widely accepted in Washington politics. The sections below outline arguments that typically comprise the moral case, the strategic case and the skeptical critique.13 The Moral Case The moral argument for US-Israel relations typically involves some permutation of seven different claims: respect for self-determination, redress for historic suffering, contemporary humanitarianism, respect for democracy, rewarding a responsible actor, reflecting cultural-religious affinities, and honoring US public opinion. Although I consider skeptical rebuttals to these arguments below, for now I focus only on the most optimistic interpretations of tight ties. First, commentators have often argued that the Jewish people deserve a state and that Americans are ethically bound to ensure at least the basic survival of that nation. This perspective sees the State of Israel as the embodiment of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and culmination

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of the Balfour Declaration, also noting parallels between the American Revolution and Zionism’s struggle for termination of the British Mandate. The second and third points – redress for historic suffering and contemporary humanitarianism – added enormous impetus to this argument. In particular, the horrors of the Holocaust and the pressing challenge of how to resettle Jewish refugees weighed heavily on Truman’s ultimate decision to back statehood for the Zionists. This theme of refugeeism was again reflected in the subsequent exodus of Jewish people from Arab lands, Ethiopia and the former USSR. Fourth, supporters have argued that America is duty-bound to support Israel as ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’.14 This argument rests upon the notion that democracies are inherently righteous in conduct, both domestically and militarily. A similar, fifth argument claims Israel deserves rewards for being a scrappy but responsible underdog, willing to fight but ostensibly pursuing peace at every turn. Sixth, some advocates cite the two countries’ Judeo-Christian heritage as a reason for alignment, especially in light of their common struggle against radical Islamic terrorism. This perspective is especially popular among evangelical Christians. Seventh, proponents of the relationship often point to the steady backing that Israel has among the American body public, who support its existence and tend to sympathize with it on average more than with Arab causes.15 The Strategic Case The strategic logic for relations focuses on broad common interests and areas for mutual gain. The core notion is that America and Israel face similar threats and that helping Israel to achieve its aims therefore safeguards the United States.16 Advocates for the relationship point out that Israel fights to contain America’s enemies of its own accord (e.g. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and previously Iraq). Israel also quietly pursues limited cooperation to protect the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.17 Advocates suggest that US support ensures American interests by deterring Arab war-making and by reassuring Israel’s leaders in ways that encourage concessions for peace as well as restrained behavior in war.18 Proponents of the strategic asset model also point to a range of defense ties that can be advantageous for American interests. Israel has frequently

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shared intelligence with the US on actions by mutual adversaries.19 In more recent years, this has taken the form of intelligence sharing on rogue states and on terrorism. Other forms of defense cooperation include joint military exercises, shared expertise on homeland defense and on development of unmanned aerial vehicles, prepositioning of US equipment for regional contingencies, and using Israel as a testing ground for technological programs to defend against rocket and missile attacks.20 Finally, the Stuxnet computer virus that temporarily disabled many of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges seems to point to burgeoning Israeli-American cooperation in the realm of cyber cooperation against shared threats.21 The Skeptical Perspective Critics of the alliance question most of these claims. On the moral side, they assert that the Palestinians currently suffer more for lack of self-determination or humanitarian aid than do the Jewish people. Palestinians also suffer disproportionately from refugeeism, regardless of how much responsibility Arab leaders may bear for the current state of affairs. As I explore below, such critics argue that support for Israel in public opinion may be broad, but it is also shallow. Skeptics emphasize that Israel is an imperfect democracy that discriminates against its Arab citizens, let alone against residents of the West Bank and Gaza.22 Similarly, the singular nature of Israeli democracy is under new pressure in the region given that some of its neighbors are no longer stable dictatorships and may be starting to liberalize since the Arab Spring. Whereas prominent advocates for Israel used to cite the authoritarian nature of its neighbors as a justification for American support,23 this argument is apparently now on weaker ground. Israel’s status as a strategic asset is also a subject of debate. The volume of aid itself is considerable, and skeptics worry that these costs are prohibitive. Looking back in time, some even believe that aggressive Israeli actions played a part in pushing its neighbors toward the Soviet orbit in the first place.24 They argue that Arab actors have made repeated overtures for peace that the prevailing wisdom has tended to gloss over and that Israel has, for its own reasons, often rejected or discouraged such overtures.25 Critics claim that present Israeli help against Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas is also of questionable value because America’s threat

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perceptions in the region may be colored by its preexisting commitment to Israel. They suggest that these actors pale in terms of GDP compared to the United States and have limited capabilities for projecting power across the Atlantic, that these actors’ hostility toward the US must be driven by support for Israel, and that American casualties at their hands were mostly incurred in support of Israel. They argue that Israel should seek to deter a nuclear Iran rather than asking the United States for help with preemption.26 Finally, critics argue that Israel’s behavior is not responsible. They claim that American backing encourages reckless behavior in war and makes Israel’s government impervious to many pressures for peace.27 They even suggest that in some regards Israel has behaved similarly to Iran or Syria: meddling in Lebanon, pursuing nuclear weapons and waging disproportionate or preemptive strikes. They also focus on the few that Israel has attacked American servicemen and facilities in the Lavon affair and on the USS Liberty in the 1950s and 1960s and tried to conduct quiet dealings with American opponents such as Iran in the 1980s and China since the 1990s.28 Finally, they also stress cases where Israel has conducted military and economic espionage in the US, most notably in the Pollard Affair.29 Critics typically conclude that support for Israel must be an irrational foreign policy pursued for domestic political reasons.30 Some of these arguments do not hold up to scrutiny. Early fears that support for statehood would cause America to lose its bases and oil concessions in the region proved premature. Moral arguments against Israel are undermined in part by the dismal human rights records of the country’s neighbors and by continued Arab support for the intentional murder of Israeli civilians. Although the absence of peace may feed radicalism, such extremism is also an entrenched part of intellectual and political currents in the area and unlikely to disappear in the event of downgraded US-Israel ties. Lastly, Washington still garners security cooperation from Arab allies in spite of supporting Israel.

Current Attitudes It is often suggested that support for Israel in the United States is reflexively deep and broad, an intrinsic feature of public opinion. For example, commentators claim that ‘the American public has a deep regard for Israel, shown in poll after poll’ and ‘solidarity with Israel is an abiding

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feature of American public opinion. Because the American people are pro-Israel, the American government is pro-Israel’.31 There are certainly elements of truth to these claims. American public opinion consistently expresses more sympathy toward Israel than toward Arab states or the Palestinians, usually by a margin of two or three to one.32 Israel receives sympathy by much greater margins among Americans than in comparable Western democracies, even relative to those nations where public opinion also favors Israel, such as in Germany, Canada or the Czech Republic.33 However, American public backing is finite. A report prepared for the president of Brandeis University in 2002 found that public support was ‘moderately high’ but ‘relatively shallow’.34 Support for Israel declines once one narrows down the question wording to specify the proposed level of backing. Whereas ‘sympathy’ for Israel often reaches 50 per cent, levels declined to 43 per cent for ‘support’ of Israel, to 36 per cent for identifying more closely with the Israeli position than no position, and down to 15–25 per cent when asked if the respondent identified as ‘highly sympathetic’ or ‘very favorable’ toward Israel in the manner suggested by the commentators quoted above.35 Polls by the Anti-Defamation League and Brookings Institution show that between two-thirds and three-quarters of Americans advocate taking neither side in the conflict, whereas support for taking Israel’s side tops out between one-eighth and a quarter.36 American Jews Support for Israel in the American Jewish community is enthusiastic but also nuanced. Roughly three-quarters report feeling very or fairly close to Israel in repeated surveys by the American Jewish Committee or by the Jewish Federation. Approximately two-thirds feel as though the destruction of Israel ‘would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies of my life’, and three-quarters agreed that ‘caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew’.37 Nevertheless, these results vary by religious practice and involvement when it comes to close forms of attachment. Whereas 68 per cent of Orthodox respondents described their level of emotional attachment to Israel as ‘very attached’, the figures for those who identify as Conservative, Reform and Just Jewish decline to 49 per cent, 21 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. Strong attachment also declines to

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20 per cent among respondents who are not actively involved in Jewish communal organizations.38 Even as connectivity to Israel remains steady, Israel’s image and relative importance to American Jews has come under considerable strain since 1967. Relevant factors include the occupation of majorityPalestinian territories, the rise in Israel of nationalist and religious parties, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and massacres at Sabra and Shatila, the Pollard affair and Knesset debates over ‘who is a Jew’.39 Some researchers have found a decrease in the importance of Israel for American Jews, including a precipitous decline in the proportion of communal donations directed toward Israel.40 In past years, American Jews have reported holding conflicting beliefs about Israelis, considering them industrious, peace-loving, democratic and heroic but also militaristic and excessively nationalist; large pluralities also described Israelis as racist and religious extremist.41 Younger Jewish Americans feel more detached from Israel today than in the past, the popularity of free Birthright tours notwithstanding.42 A recent New York University survey of 1,596 non-Orthodox respondents found that the declining political importance of Israel for American Jews may also be reflected in voting behavior. Compared to their counterparts aged 65+, barely half the number of participants aged 21 to 34 reported that their vote choice in the 2008 presidential election would be influenced by candidates’ positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If Jewish Americans ever were single-issue voters before, they increasingly are not today.43 The General Public As Walter Russell Mead points out, public support for Israel is largely determined by the beliefs of America’s gentile majority, not its Jews.44 Support from this sector is also quite complex and fluid. Support for Zionism in the first decades of Israel’s existence came mainly from the left side of America’s political spectrum.45 These sentiments tapped into a range of progressive concerns: aiding Jewish refugees after the Holocaust, the Zionist movement’s struggle against British colonialism, and its commitment to both kibbutz collectivism and social democracy. AfricanAmericans sympathized with Jewish suffering under Nazi race laws and may have appreciated the Jewish community’s longstanding support for basic civil rights in the United States. But with Israel’s victory in 1967, American liberals felt diminished concern for Israel’s survival and increased

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indignation over its policies in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as sympathy for the Palestinian campaign to achieve a homeland of their own. And while public support for Israel among Democrats has remained steady since the end of the Cold War, backing among conservatives has escalated.46 Some Americans naturally identify with a foreign policy than emphasizes unilateralism, swift reprisals and the primacy of force in world affairs.47 This community tends to empathize with Israel when it adopts a comparable approach and focuses increasingly on rogue states and terrorism since both 9/11 and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Evangelical Christians have become an even more prominent source of conservative support for Israel. This group not only outnumbers American Jews more than ten to one, it has drastically cut into the influence of mainline Protestantism in the United States.48 Israeli conquest of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Shareef in 1967 has played into the group’s fascination with apocalyptical end times and belief in a clash of civilizations between Islam and Judeo-Christendom.49 Furthermore, evangelicals are more supportive of Israeli settlement behavior and indefinite Israeli control over Jerusalem than any other religious group, including American Jews.50 This feature has encouraged Israel’s Likud Party to build institutional linkages with the group, but such ties produce considerable nervousness on the part of many American Jews, who see the Christian Right as a source of anti-Semitism, a threat to US civil liberties, and an overall, clashing vision for the role of America’s government both at home and abroad.51

Societal Points of Contact Immigration and Tourism Points of contact between the two countries are by no means confined to the purely political. For instance, people-to-people contacts have historically been quite robust. Immigrants to Israel from the United States have been small in number (amounting to only about 1 per cent of Israel’s total population), but they are disproportionately represented in both Jerusalem city life and in protest politics on the right and left wings. One leader of Peace Now estimated that roughly 20 per cent of active members were Israelis born in the United States.52 Also, well over 100,000 Israelis have emigrated to the United States over the years in search of economic opportunity and a different kind of lifestyle.53

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Tourism is another form of people-to-people contact. It has been said that there are two kinds of Israelis: those who formed opinions about the United States while visiting the country themselves and those who formed their opinions while visiting America with their families. Although this saying certainly underestimates the extent to which individuals may be disinterested or incapable of traveling to the United States, it hints at an underlying cultural connectivity. Meanwhile, American tourism to Israel has grown by leaps and bounds since its foundation. Even accounting for population growth, the proportion of American tourists per year has grown relative to the population in Israel approximately nine-fold.54 Today, average US tourism to Israel stands at nearly half a million visitors per year, although this figure is slightly inflated due to repeat visitors.55 These individuals make up more than one-fifth of total tourists to Israel, comprising the most frequent country of origin and also the country of origin whose tourists spend the most money during the course of their visit.56 Historical Legacies This legacy of social relations dates back to the early days of the Israeli state and even prior to that. Throughout the nineteenth century, American missionaries played a key role building institutions in the region. Later, when statehood was declared, US laws prohibiting tax-free donations to foreign governments influenced the Zionist movement’s decision not to fold certain Yishuv organizations into the new government: instead, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund remained ‘quasistate institutions’, occupying an ambiguous place between formal and informal spheres.57 Pressure from the American Jewish community – whose leaders feared accusations of ‘dual loyalty’ at home – soon drove the new state’s premier to scale back his calls for massive emigration from North America and to renounce claims to the political loyalties of Jews in the Diaspora.58 American society often served as an important economic and cultural resource for communal leaders under the Yishuv. Golda Meir (then Meyerson) rose so ably through the ranks of the Zionist movement in part due to her ability to interface with sympathetic donors in the United States.59 Although Judah Magnes and Henrietta Szold were both severely rebuffed in their calls for a binational solution, their interest in the idea was tied to their grounding in American political values. Furthermore, their prior stature was due to resource networks inside the US and their

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success at shaping the institutional direction of the new state in the realms of health and education.60 Economic Relations and Soft Power The US has served as a sponsor of Israel’s economy in ways that go beyond simply providing infusions of aid. In 2010, Israel imported $6.7 billion in American goods and exported $18.5 billion worth of goods to the United States. This makes America Israel’s largest single trading partner, although Israel’s trade balance with the EU as a whole is much larger.61 The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, America’s first FTA and Israel’s second. Israel’s current economic stability is in part attributable to a major American-backed bailout and restructuring agreement that year to help it escape chronic hyperinflation. Investment in both directions is substantial (especially in high-tech), and governmental endowments exist to promote joint investment in agriculture, industry and scientific research. Israel also began in the 1980s to jettison its social welfare-state legacy in favor of a deregulated, Reaganomics-style, free-market economy, and it would be interesting for future scholars to explore to what extent US interactions such as the bailout package, FTA or other capital flows may have contributed to these developments. American soft power also flows from its cultural and economic influence in Israel. This includes a spate of chain stores and restaurants, television programs, influences in language and fashion, and acceptability of the dollar for large financial transactions inside Israel.62 Such influence also elicits some backlash inside Israel, especially from religious sectors that reject cultural influences seen to promote moral degradation and rampant consumerism. American soft power extends into the political realm as well. Israeli campaign managers increasingly model their tactics after American marketing techniques, send candidates to the United States to solicit informal campaign donations, and bring in high-paid American consultants to fine-tune their strategies.63 Ironically, it seems that the design for Netanyahu’s 2009 campaign website was copied from Barack Obama’s site from the previous year.64

Peculiarities of the Relationship Three critical features of Israel’s relationship with the United States are especially distinctive and are surveyed in this section. First, it explores

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how the issue of American security guarantees has featured in Israeli calculations over a range of strategic circumstances. Second, it addresses the question of leverage – specifically, how much influence US backing elicits from Israeli decision-makers. Third, it outlines sources and limits of the pro-Israel lobby’s influence. Security Guarantees Although Israeli leaders have occasionally turned to other partners to bolster their country’s defense – and at one point relied predominantly upon France – they have typically placed higher priority on seeking direct backing from America, the strongest possible outside guarantor. The United States has loomed paramount in Israel’s search for external support.65 However, Israelis have also been reluctant to surrender their autonomy in matters of self-defense in exchange for such guarantees, and Americans have only been willing to grant them in exchange for extraordinary Israeli concessions. These are the principal reasons that the special relationship has not culminated in a legally-binding mutual defense pact, although the idea has resurfaced over the years. Instead, arms transfers, military aid and defense cooperation have accumulated over time to comprise an expansive but de facto alliance. In hopes of decreasing the appeal of Soviet overtures to Arab states, the Truman administration issued a Tripartite Declaration with Britain and France in 1950 agreeing to limit Middle East arms sales and to endorse the armistice borders of area states. And although Israel initially explored the possibility of non-aligned status between East and West, its leaders soon became convinced that their best interests lay in trying to align with the forces of the West.66 Fearing a rising Egypt, Israel sought security guarantees from the US under Eisenhower. In 1955, David Ben-Gurion told the new American ambassador that he desired a mutual defense pact with the United States.67 But since Israel would not disavow its policy of frequent military retaliations against its neighbors, the most Washington would offer was a vague restatement that Israel should not come to harm under the Tripartite Declaration. Israel instead turned to France and Britain, who planned a joint attack on Egypt in 1956, and away from America, which had tried to discourage the Israelis from warring with Cairo.68

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The story of bilateral relations over the next decade followed a similar pattern of Israeli officials trying to elicit a US security guarantee and American officials being squeamish about the whole idea. During Eisenhower’s second term, the US beat back renewed requests for a formal guarantee when Israel haltingly permitted US and UK overflights to bolster Jordan’s rulers against internal unrest.69 It did make a limited commitment in 1957 supporting Israel’s right to navigate the Straits of Tiran but only weakly enforced this promise less than a decade later.70 After Egypt, Syria and Iraq agreed to a vague union in 1963, a panicked Ben-Gurion wrote to Kennedy calling for a bilateral security agreement and joint superpower commitments to defend all states in the area from territorial aggression. However, the US did not share his threatening perception of a flimsy Arab federation and would only have bartered over guarantees, had Israel explored major concessions toward peace with the Arabs or safeguards on its nuclear program.71 In 1966, the Johnson administration sold Israel Skyhawk planes partly as a means of avoiding political pressure to make a formal commitment to Israel’s security.72 Johnson’s conduct during the 1967 War was heavily dictated by a desire to keep the US from getting entangled in Israel’s defense while war in Vietnam raged on.73 Eventually, the United States came to see security guarantees as a critical incentive for getting to a peace agreement. During the early stages of the 1973 War, both Kissinger and Nixon envisioned using an American defense treaty as an incentive to generate big Israeli concessions once the war was over.74 At various points during the Carter administration, both American and Israeli officials floated the idea of a formal defense treaty, but the two sides could not see eye to eye on the sorts of concessions this treaty should elicit.75 When he first visited Ronald Reagan in the White House, Menachem Begin proposed a dramatic new Strategic Cooperation Agreement, not just to expand areas of cooperation but to emphasize the relationship’s status as a mutually beneficial security alliance. However, the agreement was whittled down by a reluctant Pentagon and temporarily suspended just days after being signed because Begin’s government annexed the Golan Heights.76 Two years after, strategic ties were back on track, with the foundation of joint working groups for political-military dialogues. Reagan’s administration also declared Israel a ‘major non-NATO ally’ for purposes of weapons development and procurement, but none of these

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measures constituted a commitment to defend Israel that carried the legal force of treaty. Despite frayed relations, the George H. W. Bush administration took the unprecedented step of actually defending Israel against foreign attack in 1991 when it used six Patriot batteries on Israeli soil against Iraqi Scud missiles to persuade Israel to stay out of the Gulf War.77 Bill Clinton tentatively agreed to conclude a mutual defense treaty provided that a permanent status agreement was reached between Israel and the Palestinians, and Ehud Barak’s team handed Clinton’s aides a draft treaty at Camp David in 2000.78 While George W. Bush did not officially extend America’s nuclear umbrella to include Israel, he did state that the United States ‘would defend our ally’ against an Iranian attack ‘no ands, ifs, or buts’.79 In spite of America’s increasing list of security commitments, Israeli officials have not always been satisfied with prevailing levels of US support. For instance, Israeli ambassador to Washington Michael Oren, wrote an op-ed less than a year before assuming office that was effectively a laundry list of instances in which America’s backing seemed disappointingly thin.80 Israel’s defense minister during the Gulf War, Moshe Arens, argues that his country’s restraint at the time was achieved through evasive American behavior and even duplicity.81 The fact that Israel relies heavily upon US support – and that the two countries’ strategic assessments frequently diverge – helps explain why even such high levels of assistance from Washington often fail to satisfy the desires of Israeli analysts and politicians. American Leverage One might expect American leverage to be commanding given the power imbalance between the two countries and the enormous amount of arms, aid and diplomatic cover that it provides. However, this does not appear to be the case.82 Instead, US leverage appears to have declined since the Eisenhower administration, when an American president used the threat of sanctions to force Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai.83 In part, this is due to the asymmetry of interests involved. Naturally, Israelis care more deeply about Middle East matters that bear directly upon their security than do Americans, whose nearest neighbors are friends on two sides and fish on the others.84 Israel’s leaders often feel offsetting pressures to prioritize accountability to domestic constituencies

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or ideological goals instead of prioritizing foreign ties. American officials are sometimes dissuaded from testing their leverage over Israeli officials.85 Finally, there is only so much the American government can credibly threaten to cut off support in light of its genuine desire for the defense and survival of Israel. Israel has often rejected American appeals when its leaders felt core interests or ideals were at stake. Israel has rejected or evaded a range of US peace proposals such as the Johnson Plan, the Rogers Plan, the Reagan Plan, the Shultz Plan and the 2011 Obama Parameters on territory. Although US officials may have intimated a green light for limited operations in Lebanon during 1982, Israel’s government instead confronted Washington with a full-scale invasion as a fait accompli.86 A tense aid standoff under Gerald Ford did not elicit Israeli concessions to pull back from Egypt. Instead, the largest concessions under the subsequent Sinai II agreement were American.87 Then again, at times US leverage does matter. Israel has sought Washington’s approval – at least tacitly – before engaging in certain military operations. This played a large part in persuading Israel not to preempt the 1973 October War.88 American efforts during the Gulf War did persuade Israel not to retaliate against Saddam Hussein’s missile attacks. President Carter’s private threat of an arms embargo persuaded Begin to withdraw American-supplied personnel carriers from Lebanon in September of 1977.89 The US persuaded Israel to cancel large defense contracts with the People’s Republic of China in 2000 and 2005. In the latter case, the American effort involved excluding Israel from key weapons development projects and suspending some regular strategic dialogues from 2003 to 2005.90 America has also been moderately successful at persuading Israelis to conclude agreements on the peace process when it combines the right mix of persnasive diplomacy and steady reassurance.91 Pressure and support each played a role in helping to clinch the disengagement agreements; Egyptian-Israeli accords in 1978 and 1979; the Madrid Conference of 1991; certain Israeli-Palestinian agreements in the 1990s; the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access; and the 2007 Annapolis summit. However, just as often the US has dropped the ball through insufficient follow-through or simply been unable to bridge the gaps between reluctant parties. Finally, other elements of American influence operate either unintentionally or on a passive basis. Israel’s current territorial boundaries

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were in large part shaped by President Johnson’s decision not to fight the Israelis to give up territorial gains from 1967 because he felt Eisenhower’s decision to do so in 1956 decreased the Arab incentive to pursue full peace.92 Although Washington failed to persuade Israel to accept serious constraints on its nuclear program, these efforts unexpectedly helped produce Israel’s nuclear doctrine of amimut, or ‘opacity’.93 The Pro-Israel Lobby On no aspect of the relationship have claims varied more starkly than pro-Israel lobbying in the United States. On one hand, both critics and members of the lobby have an incentive to exaggerate its impact. On the other hand, many who sympathize with Israel seek to dismiss the lobby’s role altogether. But once one disaggregates by issue area and branch of government, the picture that emerges is much more complex.94 It appears that the pro-Israel lobby is the most well-organized and influential (mostly) ethnic lobby on foreign policy issues in US politics. What influence it wields is felt most heavily in the legislative branch. The most effective body in the pro-Israel community, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), focuses its efforts on Congress, practicing an informal division of labor by which it leaves many executive branch efforts to another body, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. Massing points out that the average, uninformed American Jew stands somewhat to the left of these groups, which represent the active, concerned public instead.95 Soon after he became prime minister in 1992 Yitzhak Rabin purportedly upbraided AIPAC’s leadership for actions he felt had been too supportive of his rivals to the Israeli right.96 The pro-Israel lobby’s other pathways for influencing the executive branch are actually much weaker. Although American Jews make up a greater proportion of voters than average in some swing states (such as Florida and Pennsylvania), their share of the population in those places is typically still too small to swing the outcome of most presidential elections even if they wanted to do so.97 Such a possibility is also extremely unlikely: Jewish voters are consistently liberal on most policy issues for demographic and cultural reasons and have voted Democratic by over 60 per cent in every election but one since 1928, usually by even larger

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margins.98 It has yet to be proven that pro-Israel sentiment among Christian voters plays a decisive role in voting behavior. Direct donations to presidential campaigns by identifiably pro-Israel individuals or PACs have been remarkably small as a proportion of total campaign expenditures (to be fair, most data does not take into account the role of soft money in US elections).99 Leaving aside how much sway the lobby actually exerts over Congressional decision-making, its diminished impact over the executive branch translates into a differentiated profile with regard to issue areas. In the areas where Congress’s institutional privileges grant it more leverage over policy outcomes, US foreign policy seems to track more closely with the lobby’s preferences.100 American law requires the president to reach consensus with Congress on most arms sales abroad. This institutional resource has enabled members of Congress to use Arab arms sales as a point of leverage over the executive branch and to block outright certain transfers that the lobby considers worrisome.101 Additionally, Congress’s prerogatives over fiscal appropriations enable its members to shape policy outcomes with regard to aid for Israel as well as the Palestinians. Members frequently boost Israeli aid beyond administration requests and impose extra hurdles on executive plans to aid the Palestinians.102 To be sure, it is difficult to disentangle just how much the pro-Israel climate in Congress is attributable to public sentiment, deep-seated beliefs of legislators or activities of the lobby. Still, it is remarkable that – unlike other foreign assistance accounts – aid to Israel displays a ‘coat-tail’ effect, encouraging reluctant members of Congress to endorse spending bills once amendments are attached that increase aid to Israel.103 The lobby has also been quite effective at encouraging Congress to impose economic sanctions on Iran, as well as Syria and Iraq in past years. But in areas where the Congressional authority is weaker, the proIsrael lobby’s influence is also diminished. This is especially important with regard to peace process diplomacy. The main determinant of America’s diplomatic posture is how top decision-makers interpret strategic realities and interact with regional actors. Often, domestic politics can moderately discourage efforts to resolve the conflict ab initio, or can provide added incentive to abandon a peace initiative that seems to be floundering, but they rarely deter executive action when a president or secretary of state is genuinely determined to push for progress.104

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Personal Insights One final area where the executive branch rules supreme involves US decision-making toward Israel’s internal politics. My own research finds that the sensitive nature of meddling in a democratic ally’s internal politics means that presidents and their closest advisors obscure their true intentions while doing their best to find other pretenses for bolstering the peace camp in Israel.105 America is not the only country to intervene in Israeli politics, nor is Israel innocent of such behavior toward its Arab neighbors or the US.106 However, the phenomenon’s generalizability does not mean that this particular case is not remarkable – in its scope, persistence and lack of exploration in the literature. In the wake of attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah, the Clinton administration scrambled to support Shimon Peres in 1996 against his Likud rival. Clinton campaigned in Israel for Peres, urgently pledged new aid, and coordinated messages with the Prime Minister’s campaign staff. This effort also included a multilateral conference against terror for which ‘the be all and end all’ was to bolster Peres.107 In 1992, the United States worked to squeeze Yitzhak Shamir out of office, clearing the way for Rabin and for Oslo. Washington crafted its policies toward housing loan guarantees, peace talks and Jerusalem with Rabin in mind so as to boost his chances of winning Israeli elections that June.108 American efforts also followed similar patterns in other cases as well, seeking to affect the timing or outcome of general elections in Israel. Then again, not all instances of partisan intervention by the US have been quite so stark. In other cases, Washington has sought to change the balance of forces within the Israeli cabinet or even an Israeli political party. Examples include trying to boost Rabin’s hand within the unity government in 1989109 or to shape intra-Likud politics by marginalizing Ariel Sharon in the 1980s110 and boosting him in 2004.111 In many of these instances, it seems that US efforts did have some contributory impact, although its magnitude can be difficult to quantify and sometimes attempts to meddle can actually backfire. For instance, in 1996 Bill Clinton made strenuous efforts to strengthen Shimon Peres. Toward the end of the election, he issued several statements of support that his aides thought went beyond the bounds of what the Israeli public would stomach. By the time of Israel’s vote, the mere mention of Clinton’s name elicited boos at Likud rallies. Both Dennis ross and Martin Indyk

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believe that Clinton’s last gestures looked too much like interference and produced a backlash against Peres.112

Expectations for the Future What does the future hold in store for US-Israel relations? The $3 billion question is whether Washington will continue to extend military assistance indefinitely at current levels. During his February 2013 trip to Israel, President Obama seemed interested in extending US military aid to Israel for an additional decade, with measured increases to keep pace with inflation.113 One’s perspective on how sustainable this aid will be over the long term likely depends upon two crucial parameters: (a) whether or not one agrees with the ‘strategic asset’ hypothesis explained above; and (b) whether or not one believes the United States is undergoing a precipitous geostrategic and economic decline. Even a cursory read of the American political scene suggests that the most common answer to both of these questions is likely to be ‘yes’ for some time to come. Meanwhile, the internal basis for massive American support remains steady. Despite the foundation of J Street, a lobbying group designed to sustain a peace constituency within the pro-Israel community, the new group has quite a distance to go before it may ever come to rival the stature of other, more established pro-Israel organizations. Further, the increasing interest of evangelical Christians in Israel policy has changed the foreign policy dynamics of party politics in the US. Historically, pro-Israel domestic pressures were felt most keenly by the Democratic Party. American Jews are a stolid (if numerically small) constituency of the party, and an overwhelming majority of direct proIsrael campaign donations continue to go to Democratic rather than Republican candidates.114 However, the most recent Republican presidential primaries suggest that now soft money from major pro-Israel donors such as Sheldon Adelson can also affect races on the right and that these candidates feel encouragement to voice enthusiastic support for policies of Israeli conservatives.115 And while Tea Party isolationism does have a following, exemplified by steady grassroots support for Ron Paul’s candidacy Republican Party’s traditional policies, this faction has yet to cut into the 2012 rejectionism by Israel. Meanwhile, current trends in Israel today suggest a continued support for the Israeli right. Prime Minister Netanyahu has found

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himself in an advantageous position, and his main rivals on the left and center struggle with parties in disarray.116 Demographic realities favor a continued shift toward conservative positions on defense, Jerusalem and settlements.117 Efforts to reframe political coalitions around socioeconomic issues appear to have failed, and dramatic pro-peace gestures from the Palestinians are unlikely as long as the Palestinian Authority leadership is convinced its survival depends upon reconciliation with Hamas. On the other hand, no American president has actually liked Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank, and such behaviour means continued troubles for the bilateral relationship at top levels. Barring a concerted Israeli decision to pursue at least a limited agreement on borders that defuses the controversy of West Bank settlement activity while deferring Jerusalem and refugee issues, some friction between the United States and Israel appears inevitable. On the other hand, neither President Obama nor the Republican party seem inclined to prioritize the peace process at this moment in time, making Secretary of State John Kerry’s job that much harder. But for the time being it seems relations are in for more of the same: occasional barbs between Israeli and American officials with little to show in the way of progress toward peace. Meanwhile, security ties may continue on automatic pilot, divorced from the struggling political process.

Notes * Many thanks to the following individuals for their feedback or other support on this project: Benjamin Afshani, Peter Krause, Scott Lasensky, Jeremy Pressman, Colin Shindler, Jonathan Snow, and Steven Spiegel. 1. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘The United States and Israel since 1948: A “Special Relationship”?’, Diplomatic History 22, no. 2 (Spring 1998) p. 231. 2. Formal, de jure recognition followed on 31 January 1949. 3. For the ‘special importance’ quote, see Peter L. Hahn, ‘Special Relationships’, Diplomatic History 22, no. 2 (1998) p. 271. For Dulles’s ‘millstone’ remarks from 1953 and 1958, see Isaac Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960 (University Press of Florida, 1993) p. 75; Avi Shlaim, ‘Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12, no. 2 (May 1999). 4. This did not preclude behind-the-scenes efforts such as quietly encouraging Western European states to provide Israel with arms and allowing American

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economic aid to partially finance these purchases. However, it imposed a rather finite limit on public support. Abraham Ben-Zvi, ‘Influence and Arms: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, 1962–1966’, Israel Affairs 10, no. 1/2 (2004) pp. 29–59. Kissinger and Nixon believed that Israel had played a critical role in helping to foil Soviet advances in the region. However, it is unclear whether they were correct to ascribe so much of the outcome in 1970 to Israeli actions. William B. Quandt, ‘Chapter III – The Jordan Crisis: September 1970’, in Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (University of California Press, 1977), pp. 105–127; Bar-Siman-Tov ‘Special Relationship?’ pp. 240–246; L. Dean Brown, ‘Review: Decade of Decisions’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978) pp. 477–479. The years in which Labor held the premiership under a national unity government with the Likud from 1984 to 1986 represent a slight exception to this pattern. For some sources of the Likud’s rise leading up to its first full victory in 1977, see Colin Shindler, ‘Chapter 6: The Rise of the Right’, A History of Modern Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp. 123–146; Amos Perlmutter, ‘Cleavage in Israel’, Foreign Policy, No. 27 (Summer 1977) pp. 136–157. Jim Zanotti, ‘Israel: Background and U.S. Relations’ (Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress, Report RL33476, 14 February 2011) p. 27. Ibid. Ibid., p. 28. For instance, see Shai Feldman, ‘The Future of U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation’ (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996). This section focuses primarily upon American justifications for the relationship in order to explain the provision US foreign assistance to Israel. Another possible cause could be domestic politics, but I deal with those elements of the relationship farther below. For a related argument that the alliance is driven first and foremost by shared norms, see Michael N. Barnett, ‘Identity and Alliances in the Middle East’, in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia University Press, 1996) pp. 432–445. Ronald Reagan, ‘Recognizing the Israeli asset’, Washington Post, 15 August 1979. This text draws upon three recent waves of debate, especially on the strategic asset concept. For the first wave in the 1980s, see Ibid.; Joe Stork, ‘Israel as a Strategic Asset’, MERIP Reports 105 (May 1982) pp. 3–13; Steven Rosen, The Strategic Value of Israel (American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1982); Andrew Killgore, ‘Israel: No Strategic Asset’, Journal of Palestine Studies 14, no. 2 (Winter 1985) pp. 222–224; Harry J. Shaw, ‘Strategic Dissensus’, Foreign Policy 61 (Winter 1985–86) pp. 125–141. For the second wave at the end of the Cold War, see Steven L. Spiegel, ‘U.S.-Israel Relations after the Gulf War’,

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14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

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Jerusalem Viewpoints (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) 117 (15 July 1991); Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, ‘Interests vs. Principles: Reassessing the U.S. Commitment to Israel’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (1991) pp. 84–98; A. F. K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (Columbia University Press, 1991). For contemporary debates, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘Chapter 2: ‘Israel: Strategic Asset or Liability?’ and ‘Chapter 3: ‘A Dwindling Moral Case’, in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 2007) pp. 49–77, 78–110; Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Chapter 2: Israel’, in A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House, Inc., 2009) pp. 24–49; Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, ‘Chapter 11: The U.S.-Israeli Alliance: Counterweight to Radicalism in the Middle East’, in Myths, Illusions, and Peace (Penguin Group, 2009) pp. 268–288; Scott McConnell, ‘The Special Relationship with Israel: Is it Worth the Costs?’, Middle East Policy 17, no. 4 (Winter 2010); Robert D. Blackwill and Walter B. Slocombe, ‘Israel: A Strategic Asset for the United States’ (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011). Incidentally, this argument has often emerged as an irritant in US-Turkish relations. This subject is explored in greater detail below. Organski, $36 Billion Bargain; Martin Kramer, ‘The American Interest: A Realist Case for the U.S.-Israel Alliance’, Azure 26 (Fall 2006); Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, Myths, Illusions, and Peace (Penguin Group, 2009), chap. 11. Notable instances include Israel’s War of Independence and Jordanian upheavals in 1958, 1963 and 1970, although often the Hashemites have also had reason to be concerned about Israeli depredations. See Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Clarendon, 1988). Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 2008); Ariel Ilan Roth, ‘Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel’, International Studies Perspectives 10 (2009) pp. 378–393; Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Israeli-American Relations and the Peace Process’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 4, no. 2 (June 2000) pp. 38–53. Some especially notable Cold War deliverables included a copy of Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘secret speech’ denouncing Stalin as well as data on the battlefield performance and captured models of Soviet equipment. Gayle S. Putrich, ‘U.S. Deploys Radar, Troops to Israel’, Defense News, 26 September 2008; Adam Entous and Caren Bohan, ‘Obama seeks $205 million for Israeli rocket shield’, Reuters News, 13 May 2010. William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, ‘Israeli test on worm called crucial in Iran nuclear delay’, The New York Times, 15 January 2011.

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22. For instance, see Sammy Smooha, ‘Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype’, Israel Studies 2, no. 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 198–241; Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, Israel’s Palestinians: The Conflict Within (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 23. For instance, see Netanyahu’s speech to Congress in 1996 as well as Sharansky’s book on the same topic. ‘PM Netanyahu’s Speech to U.S. Congress’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 1996); Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New Leaf Publishing, 2006). 24. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (W.W.Norton & Company, 2001), 123–129; Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 52–53. 25. For some examples, see Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the ZionistArab Conflict, 1881–1999 (Random House, Inc., 1999); Itamar Rabinovich, Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003 (Princeton University Press, 1999); Shlaim, The Iron Wall. 26. On this last point, see Barry R. Posen, ‘We can live with a Nuclear Iran’, Audit of the Conventional Wisdom (MIT Center for International Studies) (2006). 27. Inter alia, see Milton Viorst, Sands of Sorrow: Israel’s Journey from Independence (I.B.Tauris, 1987); Shaw, ‘Strategic Dissensus’. 28. The USS Liberty was an American surveillance ship attacked by Israeli forces during the 1967 War, although Israeli officials claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity. The Lavon Affair was a botched 1954 secret operation by Israeli intelligence assets in Egypt, striking American and British targets in the country to strain ties between Egypt and the West. For a more recent accusation, see Mark Perry, ‘False Flag: A Series of CIA Memos Describe How Israeli Mossad Agents Posed as American Spies to Recruit Members of the Terrorist Organization Jundallah to Fight Their Covert War Against Iran’, Foreign Policy (online), 13 January 2012. 29. For the less high-profile topic of economic espionage, see Duncan Clarke, ‘Israel’s Economic Espionage in the United States’, Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (Summer 1998) pp. 20–35. 30. See Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert, 40–41. 31. Quotes are, in order, from Kramer, ‘Realist Case for the Alliance’; Jeff Jacoby, ‘America Takes Side of Israel’, The Boston Globe, 26 March 2006. For a fuller picture of this perspective, see also Walter Russell Mead, ‘The New Israel and the Old: Why Gentile Americans Back the Jewish State’, Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4 (August 2008); Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 1994); Eytan Gilboa, American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Lexington Books, 1987). 32. See Gallup polling figures on this question since 1988 at ‘Middle East’ (Gallup Polls), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1639/middle-east.aspx (Accessed 3 January 2012). Sometimes these figures spike even higher or lower, but such effects are crisis-driven and tend not to last.

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33. For comparative findings, see ‘Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey’ (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 27 June 2007); ‘A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe even Higher, Muslim Anger Persists (A Nine-Country Survey)’ (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 16 March 2004). 34. Benjamin Phillips, Eszter Lengyel, and Leonard Saxe, ‘American Attitudes toward Israel (Prepared for the Office of the President, Brandeis University)’ (Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis University, 22 November 2002), pp. 109–110. 35. Ibid., pp. 36–37, 74. 36. Shibley Telhami, ‘University of Maryland 2010 U.S. Public Opinion Survey’ (Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 9 December 2010) p. 6; ‘American Attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East: An AntiDefamation League Survey’ (The Martile Communications Group, March 2005) p. 13. 37. Cited in Phillips, Lengyel, and Saxe, ‘American Attitudes Toward Israel’, pp. 13–17. Similarly, political scientists have shown that being Jewish in America has a drastic impact on one’s feelings of favorability toward Israel on a 100-point ‘feeling thermometer’. The impact of being Jewish is ‘enough to boost the average American’s near-neutral 55-degree rating of Israel . . . to an extremely warm rating of 85-degrees, higher than the general-public rating for any country or leader in the world’. Benjamin I. Page and Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get (University of Chicago Press, 2006), 94. Data is from quadrennial surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. 38. ‘National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) 2000–01, Report 12: Israel Connections and American Jews’ (United Jewish Communities, August 2005), pp. 27, 33. Figures surpass a majority in all categories once the criteria are broadened to include those who feel ‘somewhat attached’, but this is not the sort of staunch support asserted by political actors quoted far above. 39. Steven T. Rosenthal, Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel (Brandeis University Press, 2003). 40. Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? The Waning of the American Jewish Love Affair with Israel’, Israel Studies 10, no. 1 (Spring 2005) pp. 210– 215; Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 233–236. 41. ‘1991 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion’ (American Jewish Committee (AJC)). As Perlmann points out, this question has not been included on AJC surveys except on one occasion, roughly two decades ago (perhaps because of the unflattering content of the results). See Joel Perlmann, ‘American Jewish Opinion about the Future of the West Bank: A Reanalysis of American Jewish Committee Surveys’, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 526, December 2007, p. 45.

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42. Steven M. Cohen and Ari Y. Kelman, ‘Beyond Distancing: Young Adult American Jews and their Alienation from Israel’ (The Jewish Identity Project, Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies, 2007). 43. The figures for these groups were 29 per cent versus 54 per cent. Steven M. Cohen and Sam Abrams, ‘Israel off their Minds: The Diminished Place of Israel in the Political Thinking of Young Jews’ (Berman Jewish Policy Archive at the NYU Wagner School of Public Service, 27 October 2008). 44. Mead, ‘Gentile Americans’. 45. Ibid. 46. Lydia Saad, ‘Americans Maintain Broad Support for Israel’ (Gallup Polls, 28 February 2011); Spiegel, ‘The American-Israeli Relationship: Past and Future’, The Israeli Journal of Foreign Affairs 2, no. 3 (2008) pp. 19–24. 47. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002), pp. 218–263. 48. ‘Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation, Diverse and Dynamic’ (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, February 2008) p. 5. The Pew report puts membership in evangelical Protestant churches at 26.3 per cent of the country’s population, just barely comprising a majority of American Protestants. 49. Colin Shindler, ‘Likud and the Christian Dispensationalists: A Symbiotic Relationship’, Israel Studies 5, no. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 153–182; Gershom Gorenberg, End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount (Free Press, 2000). 50. Jeremy D. Mayer, ‘Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East: Israel’s New Best Friends?’, Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 3 (September 2004) pp. 695–712. Indeed, even after one controls for political, social, and demographic factors, statisticians have shown that evangelical religion causes support for Israel to jump from 47 per cent to 67 per cent and significantly impacts beliefs about whether or not Islam is a violent religion – see Jody C. Baumgartner, Peter L. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris, ‘A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 2008) pp. 171–179. Also, in 2002 evangelicals expressed opinions on a 100-degree feeling thermometer that were 20-degrees more favorable toward Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon than the general public. Page and Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect, p. 95. 51. Shindler, ‘Symbiotic Relationship’; Midge Decter, ‘The ADL Vs. the “Religious Right”’, Commentary Magazine, September 1994; James Q. Wilson, ‘Why Don’t Jews Like the Christians Who Like Them?’, City Journal, Winter 2008. 52. Avi Kay, ‘Citizen Rights in Flux: The Influence of American Immigrants to Israel on Modes of Political Activism’, Jewish Political Studies Review 13, no. 3/4 (Fall 2001). 53. Yinon Cohen and Yitzchak Haberfeld, ‘The Number of Israeli Immigrants in the United States in 1990’, Demography 34 (May 1997).

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54. Uzi Rebhun and Chaim Isaac Waxman, ‘The “Americanization” of Israel: A Demographic, Cultural, and Political Evaluation’, Israel Studies 5, no. 1 (Spring 2000) p. 77. 55. ‘Summary Data on Tourism to Israel, 2009’ (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, January 2011) p. 62. 56. Ibid., pp. xxvii and 62. This is provided that EU countries are counted separately, not as one unit. 57. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine under the Mandate, trans. Charles Hoffman (University of Chicago Press, 1978) pp. 194–195. 58. Charles S. Liebman, ‘Diaspora Influence on Israel: The Ben-Gurion/Blaustein “Exchange” and its Aftermath’, Jewish Social Studies 36, no. 3/4 (October 1974) pp. 271–280. 59. Michael Brown, ‘The American Element in the Rise of Golda Meir, 1906– 1929’, Jewish History 6, no. 1/2 (1992) pp. 35–50. 60. These efforts were also informed by egalitarian American activism borne of progressive-era values. Daniel P. Kotzin, ‘An Attempt to Americanize the Yishuv: Judah L. Magnes in Mandatory Palestine’, Israel Studies 5, no. 1 (Spring 2000) pp. 1–23; Michael Brown, The Israeli-American Connection: Its Roots in the Yishuv, 1914–1945 (Wayne State University Press, 1996) chap. 5. 61. ‘Summary of Israel’s Foreign Trade by Country, 2010’ (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 17 January 2011). 62. Rebhun and Waxman, ‘The Americanization of Israel’, p. 18. 63. For instance, see Dafna Linzer, ‘U.S. campaign tactics helping Barak’, Associated Press, 13 May 1999; ‘Israeli candidates mine U.S. for money’, The Palm Beach Post, 9 May 1999. 64. Ethan Bronner and Noam Cohen, ‘Israeli candidate borrows a (web) page from Obama’, The New York Times, 14 November 2008. 65. This section focuses upon Israeli attempts at bilateral security guarantees from the US but does not touch extensively on relations with Europe or pertinent multilateral campaigns, such as Ben Gurion’s efforts to forge an trilateral alliance with America and the UK in 1951 or to pursue an association agreement with NATO in 1957. For these two cases, see David Tal, ‘The AmericanIsraeli Security Treaty: Sequel or Means to the Relief of Israeli-Arab Tensions, 1954–55’, Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 4 (October 1, 1995) p. 830; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 190. 66. For an explanation of these debates, for example, Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948–1956 (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 67. Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 132. 68. Shlomo Slonim, ‘Origins of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East’, Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 2 (April 1, 1987) pp. 135–149; Tal, ‘The American-Israeli Security Treaty’; Zach Levey, ‘Israel’s Quest for a Security

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70.

71.

72. 73. 74. 75.

76.

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Guarantee from the United States, 1954–1956’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 1–2 (1995) pp. 43–63. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960, vol. XIII (Arab-Israeli Dispute, United Arab Republic, North Africa) (State Department Office of the Historian, 1992) pp. 56, 67–79, 82–87, 95–97. Isaac Alteras, ‘Eisenhower and the Sinai Campaign of 1956: The First Major Crisis in U.S.-Israeli Relations’, in The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East, ed. David Tal (Tel Aviv University & Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) p. 38. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963, vol. XVIII (Near East, 1962–1963) (State Department Office of the Historian, 1995) pp. 51–52, 60–61, 481–482, 484–486, 540–541, 562, 648, 650–655, 705–708, 720–722. See also Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press, 1998) pp. 99–154; Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance (Oxford University Press, 2004). Ben-Gurion simultaneously requested guarantees from France – albeit of a less expansive degree than he asked of the United States. See Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 214–215. Zachary Levey, ‘The United States’ Skyhawk Sale to Israel, 1966: Strategic Exigencies of an Arms Deal’, Diplomatic History 28, no. 2 (2004) pp. 255–276. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (University of California Press, 1977) pp. 60–63. Ibid., pp. 171–173; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 1973 (State Department Office of the Historian, 2011) pp. 324–337. William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Brookings Institution Press, 1986) pp. 59, 75, 129, 193, 217–218, 242; Mansour, Beyond Alliance, pp. 124–134. Samuel W. Lewis, ‘Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis’, 9 August 1998, pp. 109–110, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), Library of Congress; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (Hyperion Books, 1995) pp. 199–207. James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995) pp. 385–390; Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (Diane Pub Co, 1994) pp. 223–225. See below for more on this episode, including critiques. Bruce Riedel, ‘Camp David: The US-Israeli Bargain’, Bitter Lemons, 15 July 2002. Also, for a listing of security cooperation measures added under Clinton’s watch, see Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘The United States and Israel since 1948’, pp. 258–259. ‘Bush: We’d defend Israel in event of Iranian strike’, Ha’aretz, 5 January 2008. See also similar remarks in The Public Papers of President George W. Bush, ‘The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel – May 23, 2006’ (Government Printing Office) pp. 993–1000. Michael B. Oren, ‘Israel is now America’s closest ally’, The Wall Street Journal, 7 May 2008.

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81. Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel (Simon & Schuster, 1995) pp. 140–217. For a broader academic analysis of the episode, see also Pressman, Warring Friends, pp. 109–114. 82. Nitzan Nachmias, Transfer of Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (Greenwood, 1988); Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (Columbia University Press, 1993); Pressman, Warring Friends; Roth, ‘Reassurance’; Thomas R. Wheelock, ‘Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage’, International Security 3, no. 2 (Fall 1978) pp. 123–137. 83. Ben-Zvi, Limits, pp. 75–76. 84. My thanks to Harvey Sapolsky for this insight. 85. Jeremy Pressman, ‘The Primary Role of the United States in Israeli-Palestinian Relations’, International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 2 (May 2003) pp. 191–194. 86. Inter alia, see Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon and Schuster, 1985). 87. The next ambassador to Israel argues that Kissinger’s concessions in Sinai II were ‘transformed into a straitjacket for American diplomacy in the late 1970s and 1980s’: Samuel W. Lewis, ‘The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance’, Middle East Journal 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999) p. 367. For Ford’s decision to end ‘reassessment’, see Steven L. Spiegel, The Other ArabIsraeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (University of Chicago Press, 1986) pp. 290–305. 88. Roth, ‘Reassurance’; William Burr, ed., ‘Memorandum of Conversation Between Dinitz and Kissinger – October 7, 1973, 8:30 Pm’, 7 October 2003, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Box 25, Cat C, 1974, Arab-Israeli War, The Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library via the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/#doc18. 89. Pressman, Warring Friends, pp. 105–106; Quandt, Camp David, pp. 103–104. 90. Carol Migdalovitz, ‘CRS Report for Congress – Israel: Background and Relations with the United States’ (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Report RL33476, 6 June 2008) p. 30; Pressman, Warring Friends, pp. 114–117. 91. Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami, The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (US Institute of Peace & Cornell University Presses, 2012); Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (Bantam Books, 2008). 92. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 64–68. 93. Avner Cohen, ‘Stumbling into Opacity: The United States, Israel, and the Atom, 1960–63’, Security Studies 4, no. 2 (1994) pp. 195–241. 94. For debates over the role and impact of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, see Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Lawrence Hill, 1984); Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict; Rubenberg, The

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National Interest; Organski, $36 Billion Bargain; Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits of Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy (Transaction Publishers, 1991); Mansour, Beyond Alliance; Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Israeli Lobby’, London Review of Books (10 March 2006); Michael Massing, ‘The Storm over the Israel Lobby’, The New York Review of Books 53, no. 10 (2006); Walter Russell Mead, ‘Jerusalem Syndrome: Decoding the Israel Lobby’, Foreign Affairs 86 (2007); Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy; Robert C. Lieberman, ‘The “Israel Lobby” and American Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (January 2009): 235–257; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Blind Man and the Elephant in the Room: Robert Lieberman and the Israel Lobby’, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (2009) pp. 259–273; Robert C. Lieberman, ‘Rejoinder to Mearsheimer and Walt’, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (February 2009) pp. 275–281. Michael Massing, ‘Deal Breakers’, The American Prospect 13, no. 5 (March 2002). David Horovitz, Shalom, Friend: The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin, (Newmarket Press, 1996) p. 189. The most obvious exception might have been the 2000 presidential election, but that contest was so close that any number of factors could have changed the outcome. Further, the Democratic candidates for president and vice president that year were actually quite ingratiated with the pro-Israel community. Lieberman, ‘The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics’, pp. 245–247. Steven M. Cohen and Charles S. Liebman, ‘American Jewish Liberalism: Unraveling the Strands’, Public Opinion Quarterly 61, no. 3 (Autumn 1997) pp. 405–430; Ira N. Forman, ‘The Politics of Minority Consciousness: The Historical Voting Behavior of American Jews’, in Jews in American Politics, ed. Louis Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Rowan and Littlefield, 2001) p. 153. For instance, Lieberman points out figures from the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics suggesting that donations by identifiably pro-Israel groups or individuals comprised barely five one-hundredths of one per cent of the Bush and Kerry 2004 campaign budgets. Lieberman, ‘The “Israel Lobby” and American Politics’, p. 245. Still, one family’s $10 million in donations to Newt Gingrich’s Super PAC in January 2012 highlights the appeal of soft money channels for pro-Israel support. And before the Citizens United ruling legalizing Super PACs, some major Israel supporters gave directly to parties. Matt Negrin, ‘Behind Gingrich’s Rise, Billionaire Pal Sheldon Adelson’, ABC News (online), 25 January 2012. This is a point most systematically argued in Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict.

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101. Of course, there are exceptions to this pattern. For instance, the Reagan administration’s 1981 sale of AWACS radar systems to Saudi Arabia is but one of a range of examples that suggest the president may outmaneuver the pro-Israel lobby on arms sales if he is particularly determined. 102. Yet legislators rarely can impose wholesale changes on policy toward the PA. For examples from the 1990s, see Scott Lasensky, ‘Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of Economic Inducements’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 6, no. 1 (March 2002). 103. Marvin C. Feuerwerger, Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969–1976 (Greenwood Press, 1979). 104. Quandt, Decade of Decisions; Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict; Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Macmillan, 2004); William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 3rd ed. (Brookings Institution Press and the University of California Press, 2005); Miller, The Much Too Promised Land; Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (US Institute of Peace Press, 2008); Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle. 105. David A. Weinberg, ‘American Intervention in Israeli Politics: Past Experience, Future Prospects’, Strategic Assessment (Institute for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University) 14, no. 3 (October 2011) pp. 91–103; David Andrew Weinberg, Playing Favorites: Washington’s Meddling for Peace in the Politics of Israel and the Palestinian Authority’ (MIT Doctoral Dissertation, 2012). 106. For a brief summary of Israeli efforts to shape internal Arab politics, see Zeev Maoz, ‘Chapter 9: Israeli Intervention in Intra-Arab Affairs’, in Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 2009) pp. 361–385. For documentation of some similar interventions into Israeli politics by Britain, France, Egypt, and Jordan, see Weinberg, ‘American Intervention’, p. 100, endnotes 7–15. See also David Andrew Weinberg, ‘What Netanyahu’s Meddling in US Elections Means for Obama, Romney and Diplomacy,’ Christian Science Monitor, 27 September 2012. 107. Quote is from Amb. Martin S. Indyk, ‘Interview with the Author’, 10 April 2011. See also Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, pp. 246–249; Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East (Random House, 1998) pp. 286–289. 108. Bruce O. Riedel, ‘Interview with the Author’, 9 April 2011; James A. Baker, ‘Points for Husseini’, February 20, 1992, Box 111 / Folder 1 / 1992 February, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; James A. Baker, ‘Peace Process: Hussein Meeting’, 12 March 1992, Box 111 / Folder 2 / 1992 March, Baker Papers; Dennis Ross, ‘Public Position on Israeli Loan Guarantees’,

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110.

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21 February 1992, Box 193 / Folder 3 / Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, Baker Papers. Brent Scowcroft, ‘Schedule Proposal’, 9 May 1989, Folder ‘Presidential Visit with [Israeli Defense] Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin – May 24, 1989’, Box ‘OA/ ID CF01404’, Series ‘Haass, Richard N., Files’, Collection ‘National Security Council’, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library; Richard N. Haass, ‘Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft – Statement following President’s Meeting with Rabin’, 23 May 1989, Folder ‘Presidential Visit with [Israeli Defense] Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin – May 24, 1989’, Box ‘OA/ID CF01404’, Series ‘Haass, Richard N., Files’, Collection ‘National Security Council’, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America’s Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (William Morrow, 1993) pp. 309–313; James A. Baker, ‘Memorandum for the President’, 24 April 1991, Box 193 / Folder 3 / Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, Baker Papers. Former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel C. Kurtzer, ‘Interview with the Author’, June 2011; Elliot Abrams, Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Bush’s ultimatum to Shamir’, The New York Times, 17 January 1992; Akiva Eldar, ‘Obama is letting Netanyahu off the hook’, Ha’aretz, 30 May 2011. Ross, The missing peace, p.257, Indyk, ‘Interview with the Author’. Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘US Israel to Negotiate Military Aid Extension’ Defense News, 24 March 2013. This ratio is still nearly 2:1. ‘Pro-Israel: Long-Term Contribution Terms’ (The Center for Responsive Politics), http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals. php?cycle=2012&ind=Q05 (Accessed 8 January 2012). Amy Gardner and Philip Rucker, ‘Gingrich calls Palestinians an “invented” people’, The Washington Post, 9 December 2011; Glenn Kessler, ‘Rick Santorum’s claim that “no Palestinian” lives in the West Bank’, The Fact Checker: The Truth behind the Rhetoric, 5 January 2012. Jeffrey Heller, ‘Analysis: Netanyahu Gallops on While Peacemaking Stumbles’, Reuters, 5 July 2011. Haim Malka, ‘Chapter 2: Demographics and Politics in Israel’, in Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2011) pp. 19–40.

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4 ISR AEL AND INDIA: ISR AEL’S NEW FR IEND P.R. Kumaraswamy

The belated Indian decision in January 1992, shortly after the Madrid Conference, to establish full diplomatic relations was a major milestone for Israel. This action by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao completed a process that began in September 1950 when India granted formal recognition to the Jewish State. Nearly two decades after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Israel continues to draw widespread interests, attention and is commented upon in India. The prolonged absence of relations has been compensated by increased political, economic, cultural and above all military cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. Countries with whom India has enjoyed long political, economic or energy relations often do not evoke a fraction of the interest that Israel has managed to corner since 1992. Indeed for a very long period, Israel has been the most controversial and deeply divisive aspect of India’s foreign policy. Both before and after the formation of the State of Israel, India had adopted a policy that came under widespread criticisms. Ironically, the official Indian attitude towards Israel was in sharp contrast to its historical hospitality towards the Jewish people. The leaders of the Indian National Congress, especially Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, were unable and unwilling to recognize, admit and support the Jewish longing for statehood and sovereignty. Numerous domestic and international concerns and developments inhibited India and its leaders from adopting a friendlier policy towards

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Israel. While Israel has persisted with its friendly attitude towards India, the latter was unable and unwilling to reciprocate. For most of the time, the absence of relations governed the bilateral ‘relations’ and until normalization it would even be difficult to describe them as ‘relations’. Hence, the bilateral relations are more a function of Indian actions, responses and initiatives and using/assigning the nomenclature – India’s Israel Policy1 – would be more appropriate than bilateral relations. Since 1992, however, relations have improved and expanded considerably. While expediency inhibits India from intensifying political contacts with Israel, other aspects of relations have expanded rapidly. Israel is India’s major trading partner in the wider Middle East and the bilateral trade far exceeds India’s trade with countries like Egypt with whom it has had friendlier ties since 1947. The level of socio-cultural interactions with Israel far exceeds similar interactions with many other countries, including India’s immediate neighbourhood. Unlike other countries, Israel has also attracted the attention of state governments. And in the military-security arena, both have developed a niche which is bound to expand in future. However, in order to contextualize the rapid momentum since 1992, one has to examine the historical background of India’s Israel policy and its prolonged non-relations. Without this, it would be difficult to understand and appreciate the nuanced changes and shifts in India’s policy on Israel and its implications for the latter.

Historical Background The roots of India’s Israel policy can be traced to the early twentieth century when the Indian nationalists empathized with the Arabs of Palestine. Coming in the midst of the Khilafat struggle2 which sought to shore up support for the decaying Ottoman Empire, the Indian nationalists viewed the problem of Palestine through an Islamic prism. Both sides found a common cause in their shared opposition to British colonialism and imperialism. The support for the Arabs of Palestine had become an article of faith for the Congress party which at that time was also competing with the Muslim League for the support of the Indian Muslim population. The net result of these developments was an indifferent Indian attitude towards Jewish political aspirations. The Indian approach ranged from indifference towards the Yishuv to unfriendliness and even hostility towards Israel.

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The pro-Arab position of the Indian nationalists was concretized when the newly founded United Nations deliberated the future of Palestine. After weeks of deliberations, on 15 May 1947 the first special session of the UN General Assembly formed an eleven-member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and India was elected to this body. Both at the Special Session and later during the deliberations of the UNSCOP, India exhibited its distinct preference for the Arabs. Dissenting from the majority which preferred partition as the solution for Palestine, in the UNSCOP India came out with a Federal Plan.3 Granting internal autonomy to the Jews, it proposed the creation of one unified federal state of Palestine.4 Unfortunately for India, the Federal Plan had the dubious distinction of being rejected by both contending parties: the Arabs rejected it because it gave more to the Jews and the latter also rejected it because it gave limited civil rights when they were aspiring for political rights and sovereignty. Reflecting on this, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru lamented: [The Arab states were] so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of at any rate preventing partition or preventing a twothirds majority in favour of partition, that they did not accept our suggestion. When, during the last few days, partition somehow suddenly became inevitable and it was realized that the Indian solution was probably the best . . . a last-minute attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution not by us but by those who wanted a unitary state. It was then too late.5 Furthermore, although the federal solution was recommended, even the Congress Party was not prepared to accept a federal solution and the Indian sub-continent was divided along communal lines. However, in continuation of its traditional position, on 29 November 1947 India joined the Arab and Islamic countries and voted against the partition plan.6 A couple of years later, India even voted against Israel’s admission into the UN.7 The establishment of Israel in 1948, its recognition by a number of countries including the rival blocs of the Cold War and its eventual admission into the UN forced India to re-examine its erstwhile stand. Moreover, having accepted a communal partition, India could not remain indifferent to Middle Eastern realities. After months of deliberations and internal debates, in September 1950 India extended recognition to the

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State of Israel.8 There are definite indications that India was keen to have formal diplomatic ties with Israel including reciprocal resident missions. In the early years of independence, budgetary constraints and absence of personnel prevented India from opening new missions in different parts of the world including the Middle East. Concerned over the delays, in early 1952 Israel sent Dr Walter Eytan, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to India to fathom out the situation. During the visit he met a number of Indian ministers and officials and discussed the issue of normalization. The highpoint of this visit was his meeting with Prime Minister Nehru on 4 March over lunch. During the meeting the Indian leader accepted the principal of establishing formal ties including the establishment of diplomatic missions in New Delhi and Tel Aviv and even asked the Ministry of External Affairs to prepare the budget for an Indian mission in Israel. Nehru assured Eytan that the exchange of diplomatic relations was a foregone conclusion and that a formal decision would be made after the conclusion of the first Lok Sabha elections that were underway.9 This however did not happen smoothly. Both Indian10 and foreign11 observers have blamed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Nehru’s cabinet colleague and close confidante and a former president of the Congress party. According to them, Azad feared that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel would send a wrong message to the Indian Muslims who agonized over the communal frenzy that followed the partition of the sub-continent. Azad also warned that Pakistan would capitalize on the relations with Israel to undermine India’s interests in the Arab world especially when the Kashmir issue was being debated at the United Nations. The decision on normalization was hence deferred. Nehru endorsing the Arab demand to exclude Israel from the Afro-Asian meeting in Bandung in April 1955 indicated that India was moving away from its commitment to normalize relations with the Jewish State. According to V. K. Krishna Menon, a close confidant of Nehru, ‘an invitation to Israel with an explanation to the Arab states that the presence of Israel’12 committed them to nothing: Nehru, wishing to avoid dissension even on the question of the composition of the conference, ‘agreed with reluctance that an invitation to Israel should be extended only if Arab countries agreed to it’. It was the Suez Crisis of 1956 that brought some focus and urgency into India’s Israel policy. Prime Minister Nehru was infuriated by Israel joining hands with erstwhile imperial powers, Britain and France, in waging a war against a fellow member

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of the emerging non-aligned community. By then the Indian leader had forged a close personal friendship with Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. This culminated in India reacting negatively towards Israel. In a statement before the Lok Sabha Nehru declared that it was not an appropriate time for the normalization of relations.13 Subsequently, ‘time-is-not-ripe’ became the standard Indian mantra vis-à-vis Israel. At the same time, there were some minor exceptions. Even while delaying formal ties India allowed the establishment of an Israeli Consulate in Bombay (now Mumbai) which started functioning from 1953. In times of national crisis Nehru and his successors did not hesitate to seek and secure critical military supplies and assistance from Israel. This trend was noticeable during India’s war with China in 196214 and with Pakistan in 1965.15 Despite the absence of political ties, India even forged closer intelligence cooperation from the late 1960s.16 In the political arena, however, the relations were anything but amicable. While a certain degree of diplomatic courtesy was maintained during Nehru’s tenure, things afterwards began to deteriorate gradually. Lack of sympathy gradually turned to indifference, unfriendliness and at times outright hostility. In times of conflicts and tension in the Middle East, the Indian position became sharper. Indeed, on 25 May 1967 the Indian government called Israel ‘the aggressor’.17 This was ten days before the outbreak of the June war. The anti-Israel crescendo reached its nadir in November 1975 when India joined hands with other Third World countries and endorsed the notorious General Assembly Resolution 3379 that equated Zionism with racism.18 The minimal Israeli representation in India became problematic and following a controversial interview in 1982 the Israeli Consul in Mumbai was declared persona non grata and was asked to leave the country within 48 hours.19 In short, by the mid-1950s it was clear that the normalization of relations was not around the corner. India soon emerged in the forefront of anti-Israeli rhetoric. Normalization was possible only under far reaching international changes. While the Cold War was not the reason for the absence of relations, by the time Nehru left the scene, the issue was sucked into growing Indian proximity with the Soviet Union. Nothing short of far reaching international changes could bring about that critical Indian step towards Israel. As the Middle East spiralled into conflict and violence, normalization became increasingly distant. Only far reaching structural changes in the world could alter the status quo and this

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happened in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant end of the Cold War.

Normalization and After The end of the Cold War brought new challenges to India. Orphaned by the sudden demise of the USSR, it was forced to come to terms with a new international order dominated by the US. The erstwhile ‘natural ally’ of the non-aligned movement was in ruins. Finding itself on the losing side of the Cold War divide, India was forced to seek an accommodation with the US. There was also an economic dimension to this dilemma. The financial crisis and acute shortage of foreign exchange reserves meant India needed large doses of international financial aid and assistance, especially from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Indeed, in 1991 India had the dubious distinction of having to fly out and mortgage national gold reserves in London in order to pay for two-week imports of essential commodities. While India was ready to devise necessary structural adjustment programmes and make economic reforms, the support of the US was a precondition for the influx of international assistance. India needed to convince the outside world, more particularly the US, that it was making a clean break from the past and was prepared to pursue a new path that would be different from its Cold War positions. What could be a better illustration than a clean break with its Israel policy? More than any other economic or political initiative, it was the normalization of relations with Israel that marked and signalled that India was breaking with the past. Domestic political compulsions forced Prime Minister Rao to describe normalization within the traditional Indian paradigm: continuity-andchange. However, normalization was undoubtedly the most visible, critical and far-reaching foreign policy decision India had taken since the end of the Cold War. It was not accidental that the formal decision was announced by Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit literally hours before Prime Minister Rao left for New York to attend the summit meeting of the UN Security Council.20 When Prime Minister Narasimha Rao decided to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992, he completed a process that began in September 1950. This came four decades after Nehru’s promise to Eytan. By so doing, India became the last major non-Islamic country to establish full diplomatic relations with the Jewish State. Through

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normalization, Rao put an end to the Indian policy of treating its ties with Israel as a zero-sum game. No longer would India assume that support for the Arabs and Palestinians had to be accompanied by the total absence of formal ties with Israel and that even a modicum of relations would be a betrayal of its commitments to the Palestinians. During the Cold War, India was unable to delink its bilateral relations with Israel from the wider problems of the Middle East. In its assessment, the furtherance of its interests in the Arab world demanded not only distancing itself from Israel but even treating the latter as an outcast. By not establishing formal ties with the Jewish State, India sought to promote its interests in the Middle East. It was unable to make a distinction between bilateral relations and multilateral differences. It did not appreciate the art of conveying its disagreements with the policies of Israel even while maintaining formal ties. It is often forgotten that even those Indian parties that clamoured for normalization of relations were equally critical of the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands following the June 1967 war. This fundamental shift was possible largely because of the end of the ideological divide in the international arena which enabled India to revisit and reorient its Israel policy. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Kuwait crisis meant that the international community, especially the Middle East, became less hostile to Israel. For the vast majority of the Arab and Islamic countries, there is no military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In practical terms it was no longer an ‘either/or’ question. Unlike the past, India could maintain cordial relations simultaneously with Israel and the Palestinians. Normalization should also be seen within the wider context of farreaching changes that were happening within India. For decades the domestic Muslim opinion has been held responsible for the prolonged absence of relations. While secularism remained the official rationale regarding Israel, many Indian leaders including Nehru highlighted the Islamic factor in impeding India’s Israel policy. References to domestic Muslims figure prominently in a number of conversations that the Indian leaders had with Israeli as well as American leaders, officials and diplomats.21 While the acceptance of the Muslim factor at a public event in Jerusalem in July 2000 earned a sharp rebuke for the then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh,22 even Nehru was not free from this trend. As and when the official papers are made available by the National Archives of India, one would find many such references by Indian leaders and officials.

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It was under these circumstances that Prime Minister Rao brought about a fundamental shift in India’s Israel policy. Before examining the contours since 1992, it is essential to clarify one major issue. Was the normalization an anti-Muslim, anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab policy? Did India signal an abandonment of the Palestinians in favour of Israel?23 Contrary to the views among a section of the Indian intelligentsia, normalization did not signal any radical departure on the official approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. India continues to maintain its traditional pro-Arab position on various issues concerning the peace process such as settlements, refugees, the border, Jerusalem, etc., and it has not embraced the Israeli position on various dimensions of the problem. On the contrary, it has continued to side with the Palestinians in many multilateral forums such as the UN and non-alignment. Though a paradigm shift, normalization was not a U-turn nor can it be seen as a surrender to external forces. Prime Minister Rao’s decision did not dilute India’s position on the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. India continues to support the Palestinian statehood as an effective component of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Nor was normalization an endorsement of the Israeli claims vis-à-vis the political rights of the Palestinians. Israel and the State of Palestine co-existing side by side continues to be the Indian objective in the Middle East. India continued to receive Yasser Arafat and subsequently Mahmoud Abbas as heads of state. Through normalization, Rao was however suggesting that support for Palestinians does not mean isolating Israel. Such a posture would be untenable and counter-productive after the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference whereby the Palestinians agreed to secure a negotiated political settlement with Israel.24 What was the need for Rao to be more Palestinian than PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat? Indeed, the prolonged reluctance to establish diplomatic relations did not mean that India endorsed the Arab calls for the destruction of the Jewish State. Its refusal to normalize relations was often accompanied by its willingness to accept and reiterate Israel’s right to exist. This was so even when it endorsed the Arab-sponsored resolution concerning Zionism in 1975 as well its studied silence over extremist Arab rhetoric. Indeed, in 1947 Nehru was equally opposed to the unitary plan proposed by the Arab and suggested a federal plan as an alternative. Even when his idea did not get any attention in the UN, Nehru refrained from endorsing the unitary plan. One can notice the same after 1992 when India refused to be drawn into

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various anti-Israeli statements of Iranian leaders, particularly those of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Meaningful changes in India’s Middle East policy could be noticed in three areas. First and foremost, India had abandoned its one-sided criticism of Israel. Until 1992 it was in the forefront of various anti-Israeli resolutions and political boycotts. Isolating Israel, the Indian leaders believed, would further India’s interests in the region, especially among the Arabs. For example, India joined the chorus against Israel following the Entebbe operation while remaining indifferent to the hijacking that proceeded it. Under the guise of supporting national liberation, in the 1970s, it tacitly endorsed wanton killing of civilians by various Palestinian groups. This one-sided approach underwent a complete overhaul following normalization. This was true for both the BJP-led NDA and Congress-led UPA governments. The Israeli policy of targeted killing of Palestinian leaders received only a mild rebuke from the BJP. Likewise, in the summer of 2006 the Congress government was equally critical of the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers that eventually culminated in the second Lebanon war.25 The same trend was visible during the Gaza war where the Indian government also urged restraint on Hamas. Such nuanced balance was unheard off and unimaginable before normalization. Secondly, India had delineated the bilateral relations from the vagaries of the Middle East peace process. In the past, continuation of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and an elusive ‘just and honourable’ solution to the Palestinian problem prevented India or were used by India to negate normalization. The end of the Cold War and the new Middle Eastern realities forced India to recognize that waiting for a just and comprehensive settlement might not just be eternal but would undermine India’s interests in the region. At the same it was not ready to abandon a path that had strong historic, political, moral and above all domestic roots. Hence, it settled for a middle path: delink normalization from the vagaries of the peace process. Rao embarked upon pursuing bilateral ties without abandoning India’s support for the Palestinians regarding aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. That is how one can explain India’s refusal to support Israel on various international forums or adopt positions that are closer to Israel on key issues of the conflict. Thirdly, India has taken a back seat in defending Palestinian rights. As far back as in 1947 Nehru urged India’s representative to the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly that while India was ready to support them, it was up to the Arabs to make the case for Palestine.26

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Over the years this was given a go-by and the Palestine question became a battleground for India’s rivalry with Pakistan. Support for Palestinians became a pawn in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry for Arab support. Since 1992, India has consciously avoided being the cheerleader for the Palestinian cause. Much to the annoyance of some within the country, India avoided sermonizing Israel regarding the peace process. While it was not prepared to endorse the Israeli position, it was not ready to issue a clarion call for the Palestinians. In its view, it was primarily up to the two parties concerned to resolve their dispute through negotiations and without violence or unilateralism. Hence, while endorsing the need for a Palestinian statehood, India has adopted a cautious approach towards the unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence. What then are the contours of the bilateral relations since 1992? There are considerable political, economic, cultural and military relations between the two countries. Though the state visits between them have been one-sided, the relations have improved considerably. Domestic pressures result in India not favouring any high-profile political contacts with Israel. While it hosted more visitors, India’s ministers have been coy in making reciprocal visits to Israel. In the name of pragmatism even national parties, which at times adopt a pro-Palestinian position, have been actively engaging with Israel at the state level. The attitude of CPM and Janata Dal (Secular) highlight this political flexibility. At the national level both parties were critical of Israel, especially following violent outbursts in the Middle East. At times they were demanding India to cool its close relations with Israel. Both were in the forefront of public protests when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited India in September 2003. Following the Lebanese war of 2006 both demanded strong measures against Israel. At the same time, if the central leaders were reluctant to travel to Israel, various state Chief Ministers have been visiting, cooperating and benefitting from Israel. Israel was the first foreign destination that Deve Gowda chose as Karnataka Chief Minister in February 1995. As Prime Minister he hosted Israeli President Ezer Weizmann in December 1996January 1997. Again in 1997, during the Davos Economic summit he met and interacted with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The same duality could be noticed in the attitude of the Indian Left. In the summer of 2000, Jyoti Basu the West Bengal Chief Minister led a large economic delegation to Israel. This was his last foreign visit as Chief Minister and signalled a national consensus on the bilateral relations. Not to be outdone,

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his Communist Party of India (Marxist) colleague Somnath Chatterjee led an industrial delegation to the Jewish State. Indeed despite the hostile rhetoric in New Delhi, the communist-ruled West Bengal has emerged as the prime destination of Israeli investments. Arjun Singh, a senior Congress leader and one-time aspirant for premiership is another notable example. In January 1992, he was identified as the lone voice against normalization. According to the then Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit, Arjun Singh felt that normalization of relations with Israel would alienate the Congress party from the Muslim population.27 A couple of years later, Singh became the most senior Indian cabinet minister to visit Israel.28 This dichotomy is not confined to politicians. Reflecting the Cold War approach towards Israel, in 2002 historian Mushirul Hassan took pride in not ‘stepping on Israeli soil’.29 However, as part of the delegation of Vice-Chancellors of Central Universities, Professor Hassan, then the Vice-Chancellor of the Jamia Millia Islamia, visited Israel in July 2008. Furthermore he made a second visit in January 2010 after relinquishing office. Since 1992, bilateral relations have improved considerably and both countries have cooperated in fields such as agriculture, horticulture, medicine, science and technology, infrastructure building and the space industry. Two-way trade had jumped from under US$100 million in 1991 to an estimated amount of over US$5 billion in 2010. However, the most notable cooperation can be found in the militarystrategic arena. Within a short time, both countries have forged closer ties that have become the envy of many others. Israel is seen as the second largest arms supplier to India after Russia, despite Israel not exporting expensive platforms such as aircraft, tanks and ships. For its part, India has emerged as the principal destination for Israel’s arms exports. Besides arms exports, border management, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism have emerged as the principal areas of cooperation. Both countries have established joint working groups on terrorism and defence that meet periodically. Its emergence as a principal arms supplier has enhanced Israel’s image in India. Its supply of critical small arms and ammunition during the Kargil conflict of 1999 has been highlighted as an example of Israeli commitment and reliability. In July 2007, both countries entered into a US$2.5 billion joint anti-missile defence system agreement and, a few months later, India launched an Israeli spy satellite. Some of the

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major defence deals since 1992 include the procurement of Barak antimissile system; drones; production of fast attack craft; upgrading of ageing MiG fighter planes; and procurement of Phalcon airborne early warning systems. The bomb attack on the vehicle of the wife of an Israeli diplomat in February 2012 did raise some serious questions. While Israel was quick to blame Iran for the terror attack, India opted to wait for the conclusion of the investigation. The caution was also borne by India’s closer energy-ties with Iran and its desire to avoid being caught in the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Reflecting this nuanced Indian position the UNSC statement issued on 24 February condemned the attacks on the Israeli diplomats in New Delhi and Tbilisi but did not blame Iran or any other country. If the United States responded positively, the Middle East has been equally accommodating of India’s newly found friendship with Israel. With the exception of Egypt, the Arab countries have not made Israel an issue in their bilateral relations with India. Likewise, Iran had not made the Israel factor a hostage to its growing political and energy relations with India. Though disappointed, the Palestinians come to recognize the shifts in Indian priority.

Current Trends While the seeds of elevation and intensification of the bilateral relations were sowed when the BJP-led National Democratic Government (NDA) was in power from 1998 to 2004, the return of the Congress party to power in 2004 has ushered in the third phase of the Indo-Israeli relations. Until 1992 it was a zero-sum policy whereby pro-Arab credentials were to be measured by the absence of relations with Israel. In the second phase since 1992, India pushed for a parallel track whereby it sought closer ties with Israel as well as the Palestinians. Since 2004, however, India had begun a more complex non-parallel approach to its relations with Israel whereby India began differentiating the bilateral relations from its differences over the peace process. Stronger criticisms of Israel over the peace process are often accompanied by robust bilateral linkages and interactions. In a reflection of the Yishuv’s position during World War II, India promotes bilateral relations with Israel as if there is no peace process and disagrees over the peace process as if there are no bilateral relations.

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Notes 1. For a detailed discussion see, P. R. Kumaraswamy, India’s Israel Policy (Columbia University Press, 2010). 2. Towards the end of World War I, Indian Muslims rose in support of the Ottoman Empire whose Sultan was also the Caliph (religious head and successor to Prophet Mohammed according to the Sunni Muslims). This is commonly known as the Khilafat Movement and continued until 1924 when the office of the Caliph was abolished by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk. A detailed discussion of the struggle can be found in Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1999). 3. Iran and erstwhile Yugoslavia endorsed the Indian position, while a sevenmember majority supported the partition plan. Australia refused to support either of the plans. 4. M. S. Agwani, ‘The Great Powers and the Partition of Palestine’, in Studies in Politics: National and International, ed. M. S. Rajan, (Vikas: New Delhi, 1971) pp. 348–368. 5. India, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 1, Session II, 4 December 1947, col. 1261. Emphasis added. 6. Cuba and Greece were the other two countries that voted against the partition plan and the remaining ten were Islamic countries. 7. On 11 May 1949, India joined 12 others to oppose Israel’s membership; out of this the erstwhile Burma was the only other non-Islamic country to vote against Israel’s admission. Greece and Turkey which voted against the partition plan in 1947 abstained this time while Cuba voted for Israel. 8. P. R. Kumaraswamy, ‘India’s recognition of Israel, September 1950’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 124–138. 9. Walter Eytan, New Delhi Diary, Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2383/21. 10. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru (Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1979ff), Vol. 2, p. 170. 11. Michael Brecher, New States of Asia: A Political Analyses (Oxford University Press: London, 1968) p. 130. 12. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.2, p. 232. 13. Lok Sabha Debates, Series I, Vol. 9, part II, 20 November 1956, col. 595 14. Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, (Bombay, 1970) p. 385; Mohammed H Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen (Doubleday: New York, 1973) p. 297; and Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India and the Middle East (British Academy Press: London, 1994) pp. 161–162.

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15. Personal interviews with Reuven Dafni who served as Israeli consul during this period. Jerusalem, 1992. 16. B. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (Lancer: New Delhi, 2007) p. 127. 17. Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla’s statement in the parliament, Lok Sabha Debates, Series 4, Vol. 3, 25 May 1967, pp. 871–876. 18. In December 1991 India joined the majority in revoking this resolution. This was seen as a sign of an impending Indian decision on normalization. 19. The controversial remarks appeared shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and accused India of competing with Pakistan to ‘curry favour amongst the Arabs’. 20. According to Professor M. S. Agwani, the doyen of Middle Eastern studies in India, the establishment of ‘full diplomatic relations with Israel was a correct decision . . . but to do so under American pressures was unwise’, Agwani, ‘Inaugural Remarks’, in Postwar-Gulf: Implications for India, ed. K. R. Singh (Lancer: New Delhi, 1993) p. 3. 21. In November 1949 speaking to Elath, Israel’s ambassador in the US, Nehru attributed India’s Muslims as a reason for the delays in recognition. Elath to Moshe Sharett, 14 November 1949, Documents of the Foreign Policy of Israel, (Israel Government Press: Jerusalem, 1981ff) Vol. 4, pp. 547–548. 22. Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘When Jaswant Singh took Indian politics to foreign shores’, The Hindu, 16 September 2006. 23. Among others see, Punyapriya Dasgupta, ‘Betrayal of India’s Israel policy’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Bombay) Vol. 27, nos. 15–16, 11–18 April 1992, pp. 767–772; and Mani Shankar Aiyar, ‘Chutzpah’, Sunday (Calcutta), 6 June 1993, pp. 14–17. 24. For details see, ‘India and Israel: Prelude to normalisation’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 19, No. 2, winter 1995, pp. 53–73. 25. When domestic pressures compelled various Arab leaders to rally around Hezbollah, New Delhi also changed its stand and abandoned its criticisms against Hezbollah’s attack against Israeli civilians. 26. This however was not adhered to by Asaf Ali and earned a mild rebuke from the Prime Minister. 27. J. N. Dixit, My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi, 1996) p. 311. 28. Not all were happy with the shift either. For example see, A. K. Pasha, India and OIC: Strategy and Diplomacy, (New Delhi), pp. 52–3. 29. According to him ‘ . . . many of us have consciously refrained from stepping on Israeli soil will someday see you (that is, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat) in Jerusalem presiding over the destiny of an independent state of Palestine’, Mushirul Hassan, ‘To Arafat, in anguish’, The Hindu, 9 April 2002.

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5 ISR AEL AND CHINA: MUTUAL DEMYSTIFICATION IN CHINESE-ISR AELI R EL ATIONS Yitzhak Shichor

Introduction On 24 January 2014, China and Israel celebrated 22 years since the establishment of full diplomatic relations, something that followed over 40 years of estrangement and occasional hostility. This anniversary provides an opportunity to offer a 60-year balance-sheet evaluating both the positive and negative implications for the two countries, countries which are so different in terms of size, culture and politics and geographical situation. The differences between these two have, to a large extent, been based on misperceptions, illusions and myths that have been more soberly rationalised, internalised, addressed and rectified only lately. One tends to overlook the fact that on 9 January 1950, Israel was the seventeenth in the world, the seventh in the non-communist world, and the first in the Middle East to recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC). When at long last China and Israel did establish official diplomatic relations on 24 January 1992 – 42 years later – Israel was the 144th in the world and the last in the Middle East to have been recognised. Nothing to do with bilateral conflicts, this delay had much to do with prejudice, ideological twists and the influence of third parties on both sides. While Israel’s overtures toward Beijing had been blocked by the United States, China’s interest in Israel was extinguished well

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before the mid-1950s by its preference of an Arab-Muslim option and the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations. Thus, a gulf developed between the two countries, mainly at China’s instigation. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s these obstacles had been removed and the gap was to some extent bridged. New and beneficial incentives emerged, thereby paving the ground for renewed Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations. Both had high expectations and reached understandings that in a retrospective view can be seen to reflect the misunderstandings under which both sides had hitherto laboured. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, both countries had to some extent rectified this situation, reassessing their relationship in a more rational light. It may therefore be concluded that their ‘normal’ relations have just begun. Building the bridge was one thing, crossing it – quite another. This chapter surveys the first three decades of Sino-Israeli ‘nonrelations’, from 1950 to 1980, analysing the reasons for and considerations of the two sides that prevented official diplomatic ties for so long. Next, it deals with the 1980s that proved to be a transition period (in more senses than one) that paved the way for reconciliation between the two countries. While Israel had been ready to establish official relations as early as the 1970s, if not before, this chapter examines the reasons behind Beijing’s change of strategy and its positive response towards Israel in the early 1990s. What had been the rationale and the expectations of the two sides behind this step and to what extent – if at all – have they been accomplished? And what is the future of these relations? These and additional questions are explored in this chapter.

Forging the Gap Unlike most of the countries dealt with in this volume, whose relations with Israel go back for decades, if not more, China is a relative newcomer in Israel’s international relations network. Both proclaimed their existence in the same time period, Israel in May 1948 and the PRC in October 1949. But, for a variety of reasons to be discussed below, they failed to establish official diplomatic relations until January 1992. Historical precedent and geographical situation provided little to expedite such relations. Located at the two ends of Asia, Israel and China represent different civilizations, religions, languages, social and political structures, not to mention their enormous difference in size. Chinese historical records do specify a number of West Asian countries that had

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maintained ‘tributary relations’ with China, but these do not include any reference to the People of Israel or Jews, although Jewish communities had existed in China and contributed to its administration.1 No Chinese community existed in pre-modern Israel or, for that matter, in the Middle East, and the rare mention of ‘China’ (Sin) in the Bible and other Hebrew scriptures refers, probably without exception, to other places. China and Israel were terra incognita to each other. By the end of the nineteenth century, as China had become more integrated in world affairs, knowledge about the People of Israel increased. Along with notions of anti-Semitism, infiltrated from abroad, Chinese intellectuals became aware of what they perceived as similarities between the persecution of Chinese and Jews. Translated Jewish writings were published in China and, by the time the Republic was proclaimed in 1912, Jews had already migrated to China creating communities in Harbin, Shanghai, Hong Kong and other places. Soon, Zionist organisations were set up and in April 1920 Sun Yat-sen, leader of Chinese nationalism, expressed his sympathy for the movement.2 The meaning of ‘Zionism’ as the Jewish national movement was clear to the Chinese who translated the term as Youtai fuguo zhuyi, literally ‘doctrine of the Jews returning to their country’. The Nationalists, however, were not the only ones in China interested in the Jews. Mao Zedong had become aware of Zionism even earlier, before he joined the not-yet established Chinese Communist Party and long before he assumed its leadership. In a piece published on 14 July 1919, entitled ‘So Much for National Self-Determination’, he made the crucial link that was to govern Beijing’s perception of Zionism until his death in 1976, saying: ‘The desire of the Jews to restore their nation in Palestine will not succeed because it is of no great concern to the Allied powers’.3 Nevertheless, he later planned to include a chapter on ‘The Jewish National Liberation Movement’ in a volume he entitled Collected Writings on the National Liberation Movement (19 May 1926).4 While the chapter (and the book) was never written, the Chinese have never lost their awareness of the Jewish problem, underlined by the influx of some 20,000 European Jewish refugees who finally found a safe haven in Shanghai (then under Japanese occupation) in the late 1930s and early 1940s.5 After the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the Chinese frequently mentioned the hospitality extended to the Jews during the war. It was in those years that Chinese communism, long before taking over the mainland, revealed an initial interest in the Middle East. Discussing

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for the first time Arab-Jewish hostilities in Palestine, commentators were less familiar with the internal roots of the conflict and more concerned about its external implications as an excuse for the Western powers – primarily (then) England and France (that had allegedly fabricated and exacerbated the conflict to maintain their presence in the Middle East). They were even more alarmed about the German plans to gain a foothold in the Middle East as a springboard for their advance towards East Asia and China, to join forces with Japan.6 For many years, until the 1970s (and perhaps even today), the Chinese have regarded a foreign presence in the Middle East as a crucial link in a strategic attempt to encircle China. This anti-imperialist perspective was to govern China’s policy towards Israel from then on. Beijing’s attitude towards the establishment of Israel should be understood as being cautious, yet positive. While most Arab countries were still accommodating the West, Israel – according to the Chinese interpretation – had managed to throw off the yoke of (British) imperialism. Moreover, the early Israeli governments were perceived as being ‘socialist’ and as friendly to the Soviet Union. Moscow had not only supported the establishment of Israel but was the second – on 17 May 1948 – to offer Israel de jure recognition (Washington’s recognition, the first, was only de facto). The Soviet backing (and weapons supplied by Czechoslovakia) made Israel ‘kosher’ and worthy of relations once the PRC was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. As mentioned above, Israel – which had never maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC)7 – was quick to recognise the PRC, well before many other countries. This decision was based on legal considerations (Chinese communist control of the mainland); political considerations (the ‘leftist’ nature of the coalition government ruled by the Labour Party); and international considerations (attempts to pursue ‘non-alignment’ between the two blocs that had quickly formed after the end of World War II). However, Israel withheld diplomatic relations, officially for financial reasons. Unofficially, Israel did not consider the PRC that important.8 Furthermore, in June 1950 the Korean War broke out and while the Chinese did not intervene until October, Israel had to take sides. Washington made it clear that this was not the right time for establishing relations with Beijing, and under this indirect yet firm pressure, Israel conceded.9 It was only in 1955, after the Bandung Conference, that Israel offered China diplomatic relations. By that time it was too late and the offer was politely rejected.10

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China had lost interest in relations with Israel at least two years earlier, for three main reasons. One relates to Israel’s submission to US pressure and its growing association with the West, a West that had condemned China as an aggressor in Korea. Another reflected the deterioration of Soviet-Israeli relations in 1953 and the suspension of their diplomatic ties. Finally, and most important in the long run, the Chinese had become aware of the importance – in quantity as well as in quality – of the Arab and the Muslim countries in the ‘struggle against imperialism’. Recently declassified PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents demonstrate that already in 1953, while Israel’s Ambassador to Burma was urging Jerusalem to offer Beijing diplomatic relations as soon as possible, China had already decided to prefer relations with the Arabs and the Muslims.11 The April 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung – from which Israel had been excluded – provided the first meeting ground for the leaders of China and the Arab states. Yet, although the Chinese delegation, headed by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, tried not to alienate Israel and ignored Arab condemnations (Ahmad Shuqairy, future PLO leader was a member of the Syrian delegation), the conference marked the end of Maoist China’s interest in official relations with Israel. In 1956 Egypt became the first country in the Middle East to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. In a retrospective view, both countries’ explorations had been based on illusions. For its part, Israel believed that it could steer a middle course between East and West.12 But Israel had no choice but to rely on the West, more specifically, on Washington. This belief that reliance on the US would still enable relations with Beijing was another illusion. For its part, China expected that Israel – ‘liberated from imperialism’ with Soviet support – could become part of the international united front as one of the socialist countries.13 This was also a misperception. Similarly, China’s belief, at that time, that it could maintain diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Arabs was another illusion, reflecting a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict at that time. By the mid-1950s, the prospect for Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations diminished. In the next years the two countries grew further apart. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the US offensive in Vietnam left China internationally isolated from both East and West. Beijing was now forced to turn to the Third World, cultivating national liberation movements, revolutionary organizations and people’s wars. In the absence of political,

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economic and military capabilities, this was China’s main – or practically only – advantage over both Washington and Moscow. Beijing used this advantage in promoting relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and with other Palestinian organizations from the mid-1960s – inevitably at the expense of its relationship with Israel. In March 1965 Mao allegedly told the first PLO delegation to China: ‘Imperialism is afraid of China and the Arabs. Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in Asia. You are the front gate, and we are the rear. They created Israel for you and Formosa for us’.14 For a while, China even doubted Israel’s right to exist,15 and any relations were out of the question. Determined by regional and global developments, Chinese radicalism abroad also corresponded to Chinese radicalism at home as the Cultural Revolution was initiated in an attempt to sweep away traditional policies, structures, procedures and mechanisms.

Bridging the Gap The ground for eventual Sino-Israeli relations began to be laid in the late 1960s. For one thing, by 1968, the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution had begun to dissipate and the Chinese began to restore order, rehabilitate the Party and the Foreign Ministry system, and resume normal and formal international relations.16As the Sino-Soviet dispute had degenerated into armed clashes along their shared border, the Chinese began to perceive a growing threat to their national security from this and other quarters. It is under these circumstances that Mao was ready to welcome, though still implicitly, the conciliatory explorations coming from the US. Even before he was elected president in November 1968, Richard Nixon had pledged not only to withdraw from Vietnam but also to improve relations with China. Keeping both promises, this historical about-face provided for China’s admission to the United Nations – and as a permanent member of the Seucrity Council – in October 1971, at the expense of Taiwan.17 Along with the majority of UN members, Israel voted for the PRC, something that Beijing apparently appreciated, though not to the point of changing its policy. In the 1970s, as China began to open up to the international community, many leaders were flocking to Beijing. Some of them had been commissioned by Israel to raise the issue of diplomatic relations with China, but resounding response to this proposition was that the Chinese were not yet ready. China put up three conditions for such relations: a complete

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Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories including Jerusalem; the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; and cessation of Israel’s ‘aggressive’ policies.18 Still, China was careful to distinguish between Israel’s ‘peace-loving people’ and ‘aggressive government’ and, furthermore, implicitly expressed its satisfaction with the Israeli ‘contribution’ to checking Soviet ‘expansionism’ into the Middle East. There is also some evidence that in the 1970s, if not before, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was watching – and studying – Israel’s military achievements. In a few years, these achievements would provide the initial bridge, ultimately leading to a normalisation of Sino-Israeli relations. This process originated in the late 1970s when a number of developments converged following Mao Zedong’s death. In the wake of Mao’s death, a number of economic policies were launched with the aim of developing the Chinese economy, opening it up for international investment. Another important development in this period is that after a few years of unofficial relations, PRC-US diplomatic relations were finally established in early 1979. Also, the Middle East situation was about to change as the Egyptian-Israeli peace process was concluded – with China’s implicit approval. Finally, China’s humiliating failure ‘to teach Vietnam a lesson’ exposed its military weakness. All these developments lessened China’s hostility towards Israel, which was to be gradually overcome within the next ten years. China’s resumed interest in Israel was initially triggered by military needs. China had been cut off from external sources of military supply for 20 years, from 1960 to 1980. Perpetual upgrading and reverseengineering, not to mention the neglect of China’s conventional force in favour of non-conventional weapons and the domestic political upheavals, could not but leave the PLA hopelessly obsolete, as proved during the brief Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Unwilling and unable to spend money (which they did not have anyway) on costly Western arms, the Chinese turned to Israel. Israel had a number of advantages which the Western countries did not have: it was ready to sell lower cost military technology which the Chinese could use in producing their own weapons; its military technology was not only one of the most advanced in the world but also based on rich experience of fighting Soviet weapons (which China was facing); and finally, with no (political) strings attached, any alliance with Israel could not be painted as a form of colonial dependence. Nor could it descend into the kind of reliance that, given the lessons of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, China wanted to avoid.

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An Israeli delegation representing its leading defence industries arrived in Beijing for the first time in early 1979. Kept secret for many years, this visit led to a series of Israeli sales of arms and military technology to China. These sales – which conformed to American interests at the time,19 aimed at strengthening China at the expense of the Soviet Union – had nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Still, they undoubtedly improved the climate between Israel and China and created a lobby in the Chinese military establishment committed to continued and strengthened relations with Israel. Viewed retrospectively, it is clear that Sino-Israeli military relations reflected a particular international situation and a rare window of opportunity when the interests of China and the United States converged. However, this honeymoon was over by the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the Tiananmen Square massacre did a lot to sour relations between the US and China, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the initial and key incentive behind the nascent (but as yet undeclared) Washington-Beijing alliance. Sino-Israeli relations – primarily military – were as a result, and indeed inevitably, harmed. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s, Israel and China had already managed to develop relations in many other fields, first unofficially and subsequently officially. Most important amongst these relations were agreements in the realms of agriculture, science and technology and tourism. Israelis were allowed to visit China first with foreign passports, then with collective Israeli visas and finally with Israeli passports, inaugurating preliminary economic relations. Political explorations were initiated in the latter half of the 1980s when the foreign ministers of China and Israel met at the annual United Nations sessions in New York for the first time. These meetings, reluctantly admitted by Beijing, nevertheless pushed the Chinese towards a decision on diplomatic relations with Israel. Now, in the late 1980s, the question was no longer if or why, but when? Beijing was looking for the right moment. The Israeli rationale for relations with China was obvious. Israel had been seeking to cement relations with China since the early 1970s, if not before. By the early 1990s China had undergone far-reaching reforms led by committed political leaders and based on economic foundations that (although few could have anticipated it then, least of all the Chinese themselves) would turn China into a major global economic and political power. At that time, China was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council with which Israel did not have diplomatic relations. An indication of Israel’s interest was the opening of a Hong Kong consulate

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in 1985 based on Beijing’s pledge that foreign consulates would stay in Hong Kong after its reunification with China, scheduled for 1 July 1997. Evidently, Israel had many reasons to seek relations with China. However, rejecting any relations with Israel for so many years, what was Beijing’s rationale for changing its mind, and for the timing of this change? To begin with, Beijing’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel reflects a fundamental transformation of Chinese foreign policy. Based primarily on ideological, revolutionary and security considerations, in Mao’s era, China promoted instability and unrest in the Middle East so as to undermine the presence and interference of external powers in the region and thereby to disrupt a perceived attempt to encircle China. Beijing’s relations with Middle Eastern governments were determined by these considerations and were consequently exclusive: for many years Beijing refused to have official relations with countries considered proWestern (such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel) – and vice versa. In the post-Mao era, China’s foreign policy has been turned upside down. According first priority to economic growth, development and modernisation, Beijing could no longer afford to promote instability and unrest. Determined by these new considerations, China’s relations with the Middle East have become inclusive: no country would be rejected. And Israel would not be an exception. About the size of a medium-sized Chinese town, Israel is ostensibly of little value for China. Yet, Beijing could by no means ignore Israel’s regional and international importance and, although the Chinese explicitly criticised and condemned Israel, at the same time, they implicitly appreciated its achievements. Also, the Chinese believed that Israel had the ability to influence the United States. Chinese people have been fascinated by Jews and, when meeting Israelis and Jews, usually mentioned the names of Marx, Einstein and Freud and what they understood to be common denominators shared by both the Jewish and Chinese civilisations. The belief that the Jewish community could be helpful in promoting China’s interests, economic as well as political, in the United States, may have played some role in the Chinese decision to establish relations with Israel.20 With Beijing wanting to play a greater role in the world, Israel came to be seen to be key to this aspiration. So why did it take so long to change policy? The answer has to do not just with Maoist revolutionary theory but perhaps much more with China’s lack of confidence (though the two must be intertwined). Once post-Mao China began to gain self-confidence, it

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could also overlook the potential, or actual, opposition of the Arab countries, the Palestinians and Iran to the institutionalisation of Sino-Israeli relations. The fact that some Arab countries, notably Egypt, signed a peace treaty and established official diplomatic relations with Israel, gave China the impetus to do the same. Still, Beijing could not establish diplomatic relations with Israel before such relations were established with other Middle Eastern countries. By mid-1990, China had official relations with all Middle Eastern countries (including the Palestinian ‘State’, set up in 1988) except Saudi Arabia.21 For many years Beijing had regarded Saudi Arabia as an archaic Islamic state, with much of its foreign and economic policy covertly dictated by the United States. For Riyadh, China was seen as an atheistic communist state committed to revolution and subversion. By the late 1980s relations between the two countries had begun to improve, culminating in a sale of Chinese DF-3 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in 1988 that facilitated the establishment of Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations – at the expense of the ROC – on 21 July 1990.22 Oil, still exported by China in those years, was not one of its motivations. The path to Sino-Israeli relations was now clear, and would become more so thanks to Saddam Hussein. Twelve days after the establishment of Sino-Saudi relations, on 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, an act which, in an odd way, may have expedited Sino-Israeli relations. The invasion demonstrated for Beijing that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only one, perhaps not even the most serious, in the Middle East. The Chinese must have appreciated the fact that Israel did not retaliate after having been targeted by over 40 Iraqi conventional SCUD missiles that caused damage and fatalities. An Israeli retaliation could have led to the expansion of the war and to increased instability, thereby undermining Chinese interests in the region as well as those of the US-orchestrated Arab coalition. A precondition of this coalition had been that as soon as the Gulf War was over, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be dealt with at an international meeting. China, as an upcoming power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, wanted to take part in the meeting. To do this, it was essential to establish official relations with Israel. The last push was given by the Madrid Conference that opened on 30 October 1991. Co-sponsored by Washington and Moscow, the conference tried to reignite the peace process not only between Israel and the Palestinians but also between Israel and Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Having no official

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relations with Israel, China could not yet participate in these discussions. It was agreed that the next step would involve multilateral negotiations, scheduled to begin in Moscow on 28 January 1992. These would be concerned mainly with issues of water, the environment, arms control, refugees and economic development. Beijing wanted to participate in the meeting. On 24 January 1992, China and Israel finally established diplomatic relations. The bridge finally was built. Now it had to be crossed.

Crossing the Gap One thing about not having diplomatic relations is that life is relatively simple, lacking many complications and confusion. Israeli arms sales to China were affected first – not because of any bilateral Sino-Israeli problems but because of changes in the international situation and especially in Sino-American relations. By the late 1980s, the honeymoon between the US and China, based on their common opposition to the Soviet Union and on Washington’s presumption that China’s market economy and growing ‘liberalisation’ would expedite democracy, was over. In June 1989 the US was shocked by Beijing’s bloody suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations and realised that, unlike its economic system, China’s communist-authoritarian political system was not going to change soon. US political exchanges and military transactions with China were immediately suspended. Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union collapsed and with it the rationale for the undeclared Sino-American ‘alliance’. Strategically, China had become not only expendable as an ally but, moreover, a rival and even a threat. These developments undermined Israel’s military transfers to China in two ways. The most significant was Washington’s growing criticism of Israel’s arms sales to China that culminated in forcing Israel to cancel them and stop further deliveries and any security exchanges. In the early 1990s, US circles blamed Israel for transferring to China American-made Patriot missile technologies, without providing hard evidence, at least not in public. By the mid-1990s Washington had begun to express its dismay about the Israeli sale of a Phalcon AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), a purely Israeli development installed on a foreignmade platform (Boeing, or, in the China case, Ilyushin-62). If satisfied with the sale Beijing planned to buy three more, at an estimated cost of US$1 billion. Officially, Washington’s objection to the sale had been based on its claim that the deal would upset the military balance over

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the Taiwan Strait and, in case of Sino-US confrontation, would cause American fatalities. Given the fact that the Phalcon is primarily a defensive military system, there is credence to the opinion that this claim should be doubted. Unofficially, Washington’s objection may have derived from bureaucratic in-fighting among different departments as well as from commercial competition (while the US could not sell similar weapons to China, the Phalcon sale could have given the Israelis an advantage in other markets). Consistently ignoring America’s reservations, Israel went on with the sale that seemed to proceed when PRC President Jiang Zemin was paying an exceptionally long visit to Israel in April 2000. Three months later, in July, Washington lost its patience and forced Israel to cancel the deal and to improve its arms export supervision through a special parliamentary law and the creation of a new department in the Ministry of Defence whose director had to resign. In order to placate the Chinese, Israel paid them US$350 million (including US$250 million prepaid by China) in compensation, but still had to cope with the subsequent cooling in Sino-Israeli relations – less because of the cancellation of the deal but much more because of Jiang Zemin’s loss of face and public humiliation. Arriving in Beijing just after the cancellation, the unfortunate new Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Shelef, was practically ostracised by high-level Chinese officials throughout his term. Later, Washington tried to prevent Israel from upgrading China’s Israeli-made Harpy UAVs (Unmanned Airborne Vehicle), bought in the 1990s, and from participating in the security arrangements for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Indeed, the US is the main reason for Israel’s practical exclusion from China’s arms and security market. Another reason for this exclusion is that Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s reconciliation with Beijing, has become China’s main arms supplier. This has to some extent been inevitable: state-of-the-art Russian weapons are compatible with Chinese weapons (based on earlier Soviet models) and are easier to integrate, maintain, train and supply. Moreover, China now has the money that the crumbling Russian economy needs. Russia and the US, for different reasons, pushed Israel out of the Chinese arms market. Over the last 20 years China has managed to upgrade its military R&D and production capabilities significantly. Increasing defence expenditures and improving science and technology education, China could now equip its military with advanced home-made weapons thereby undertaking a ‘great leap’

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towards self-reliance. Although the road is still long and complete independence is still far away, all indications suggest that in the future China’s achievements will be greater, and Israel’s role as a potential military supplier even smaller. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that early Sino-Israeli relations were based on mutual illusions and misunderstandings concerning the fundamental long-term interests of those involved – both directly and indirectly. But no one could have predicted in the 1980s that the Sino-American honeymoon and the Sino-Soviet hostility – which facilitated Israel’s arms sales to China – would last no more than a decade. The two partners, Israel and China, believed they could continue their military relations despite the deterioration of Sino-US relations, ignoring Washington’s objections. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, both China and Israel learned that this could not be the case. Israel realised that, even if it thought that the US was mistaken in its foreign policy, due to its dependency on the US, any challenge would have its quite sizeable costs. China reached the same conclusion: as a younger brother, Israel had no choice but to submit to the US – its elder brother. The so-called powerful Jewish lobby turned out to be, in many ways, a myth. China also realised it had alternatives. Abroad, it could now buy advanced weapons and military technology from Russia; at home it could develop and produce its own advanced weapons. Israel’s economic exchanges with China have undergone a similar experience. Begun in the 1980s even before the establishment of official relations, the flow of Israeli exports to China still reflected the myth of the ‘unlimited’ Chinese market and the ‘backwardness’ of the Chinese economy. In those years, few in Israel were fully aware of the difficulties of doing business with China, or how to do it. In 1990 the value of Israeli exports to China was US$7.8 million while Chinese exports to Israel stood at US$0.2 million. In the following decade, trade activities gathered momentum leading in 1994 to a surplus in China’s exports that has increased ever since. In 2000 China’s exports to Israel amounted to US$602.3 million, while imports from Israel were US$261.6 million. In 2011 China’s exports to Israel totalled US$5.450 billion while imports from Israel were at US$2.706 billion – more than ever before for both (see Table 1).23 China is Israel’s leading economic partner in Asia and its second source of imports (about 8 per cent) following the United States (11.3 per cent).

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Table 1. Sino-Israeli trade, 1990–2010 (million US dollars). Year

Israeli Export

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

7.8 22.8 54.4 54.7 59.3 81.3 82.9 71.3 129.6 190.3 261.6 349.6 426.6 612.6 786.9 747.9 958.8 1,040.6 1,293.5 1,044.6 2,046.9 2,706.5 2,742.3

Israeli Import 0.2 0.0 5.0 32.7 80.2 134.0 166.8 206.0 289.8 400.3 602.3 737.3 793.3 1,008.1 1,418.4 1,888.3 2,427.7 3,476.9 4,243.7 3,521.1 4,736.9 5,450.5 5,322.3

Total 8.0 22.8 59.4 87.4 139.5 215.3 249.7 277.3 419.4 590.6 863.9 1,086.9 1,219.9 1,620.7 2,205.3 2,636.2 3,386.5 4,517.5 5,537.2 4,565.7 6,783.8 8,157.0 8,064.6

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

Israel’s trade with China is but a drop in China’s overall economic relations. Yet, some countries, about the size of Israel or even smaller (and not including oil exporters) still manage to export to China much more. Thus, in 2009 Swiss exports to China were 4.5 times those of Israel; those of Singapore nearly 12 times; those of Norway over twice. On the one hand, Israel has a number of advantages: reputation, creativity, innovation and flexibility (especially in the areas of the diamond trade, hi-tech industries, chemicals, security, optical and medical equipment, and agriculture). Also, Israel’s small size, its lack of a history as a colonial power and its relations with the US in general and Jewish companies in particular are an additional advantage. But on the other hand, Israel has a number of disadvantages. For one, its financial capabilities are limited and its smaller companies have found it hard to compete with the huge

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multinational corporations that are active in China. For another, the relatively narrow business community in Israel lacks the patience, culture and resources for long-term investment – not to mention the language barrier, the geographical distance and non-existent Jewish communities on which it could have relied. By 2004, approximately 85 per cent of the Sino-Israeli Joint Ventures (the common economic transaction) were losing money. Nevertheless, Sino-Israeli trade has been steadily growing not only in absolute terms but in relative terms as well. For example, while Egypt’s population is over ten times bigger than Israel’s, its trade with China is smaller than that of China’s with Israel. Israeli exports to China are double those of Egypt.24 Still, Israeli illusions about the ‘limitless’ Chinese market have gradually evaporated in favour of a more realistic outlook: Israel may be able to offer China quality goods and technologies but cannot compete in terms of quantity. Moreover, as China’s economic modernisation proceeds, it may be able to reach a higher degree of selfreliance (a Maoism ideal transformed) and Israel’s economic role in China may decline. Unlike its wishful thinking on expecting military and economic benefits, Israel has never had any illusions about political benefits from China. From the behaviour of China, one can deduce that Beijing needed diplomatic relations with Israel in order to secure its entry ticket to the prestigious elite club playing the Middle East great power game – and consequently the world’s. Beijing has undoubtedly wished to belong to this club, though in a symbolic, official and passive sense, instead of active involvement. Indeed, China’s contribution to the resolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict has so far been marginal, at best. Sidestepping the call of international – and Middle Eastern – leaders to become a ‘responsible shareholder’, Beijing prefers to abstain in crucial votes and avoid taking sides that could alienate allies and friends, Israel, Iran, the Arabs and the Palestinians. Walking a tightrope, Beijing advised the Palestinians – in private – not to pursue an independent state: ‘Palestine’s UN bid could become a new source of tension . . . further fuelling animosity in the Middle East’,25 contrary to China’s interests. In public, however, Beijing supported an independent Palestinian state. Still, considering that China has for so many years been closely associated with the Arabs and the Palestinians, many in Israel’s diplomatic circles still do not regard Beijing as a real partner in the Middle Eastern peace negotiations, and definitely not as a substitute to Washington or Western Europe. While trying

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to avoid as much as possible a clear-cut identification against Israel, in most confrontations (such as the Jenin campaign, Gaza and the Turkish flotilla) Beijing almost instinctively criticises Israel – yet continues its relations with Israel as if these criticisms had never been uttered. Furthermore, China’s consistent backing of Iran’s nuclear programme and its reiterated attempts to block or delay international sanctions while supplying Iran with refined oil, can be seen to be undermining Israel’s interests. Notwithstanding their public statements that Iran’s nuclear programme is peaceful, the Chinese must be aware of its military potential. Still, they consistently protect Iran’s sovereign rights and reiterate that the crisis should be settled by negotiations. Also, perhaps unwillingly, Chinese made or designed weapons, mainly short-range cruise missiles and rockets earlier delivered to Iran, Syria, Yemen and Sudan, reached organisations considered as terrorist (though not by Beijing) such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and fired against Israel. An Israeli Navy corvette was hit. Embarrassed, Beijing asked Israel not to pursue this matter publicly. Chinese banks are on trial in the United States for transferring funds to terrorist organisations in the Middle East.26 Visiting China, Israeli leaders have tried to make the Chinese aware of their contribution to Middle East instability, contrary to their own interests, with limited success.

Conclusion The prospects of the relations between China and Israel will depend on a number of variables. Most important among them is China’s impressive economic growth rates that, as experts predict, may continue at least for two or even three decades (even though at a slower pace), making China an enormous economic power that could – and will – affect Israel in several ways. One is the shift of Israeli industrial production to China, taking advantage of the lower Chinese wages and growing Chinese investment in the Israeli economy. Both processes have already begun.27 Another is Beijing’s increased dependence on Persian Gulf oil, an essential element of China’s accelerated economic growth. Such dependence could be detrimental to Israel, though not necessarily. As mentioned above, China has enough self-confidence, if not arrogance, to withstand anti-Israel pressures and has been clever enough to create counterdependencies and thereby increased its flexibility, leverage and room for manoeuvre. There is little doubt that, along with the experience of other

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countries, the share of China in the Israeli economy will increase – and hopefully, at least for the Israelis, vice versa. The second variable is Sino-US relations. Because of Israel’s close association with the US, the future course of Sino-US relations will inevitably affect Sino-Israeli relations as well. Sino-Israeli relations are expected to expand and diversify as long as Sino-US relations remain stable and steady. However, based on past experience, deterioration in Sino-US relations, not to mention confrontation (over Persian Gulf oil resources or over the Taiwan Strait) could impose limits also on Sino-Israeli relations – not only in military fields (which is obvious) but also in other fields (e.g. science and technology, communications or diplomacy). Not less important is the third variable – a settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. Interested in stability in the Middle East (and elsewhere), the Chinese would welcome the achievement of peace in the region as beneficial to their economic expansion and pursuit of raw materials, primarily energy. Peace may also lessen Israel’s dependence on the US and lead to additional opportunities in China in fields that were so far restricted. It may also enable Beijing to become friendlier and more sympathetic to Israel. Still, the prospects of such a settlement – in which China’s role would be marginal anyway – are slim. Consequently, the future of Sino-Israeli may still be an outcome of acrobatic manoeuvre among different direct and indirect actors.

Notes 1. Michael Pollak, Mandarins, Jews, and Missionaries: The Jewish Experience in the Chinese Empire (Philadelphia: the Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980); Irene Eber, Chinese and Jews: Encounters between Cultures (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2008); Jonathan Goldstein, The Jews of China, Vol. I: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, Vol. II: A Sourcebook and Research Guide (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 2. Jonathan Goldstein, ‘The Republic of China and Israel’, in Jonathan Goldstein (Ed.), China and Israel, 1948–1998: A Fifty Year Retrospective (London: Praeger, 1999), pp. 1–35. 3. Quoted in: Stuart R. Schram (Ed.), Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912–1949, Vol. I: The Pre-Marxist Period, 1912–1920 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 337. 4. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, Vol. II: National Revolution and Social Revolution, December 1920-June 1927 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 382. These are the only references to Zionism or Jewish nationalism in Mao’s writings, though later on he mentioned Israel (see below).

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5. David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews: the Jewish Refugee Community in Shanghai, 1938–1945 (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1976). 6. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949–1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 9–16. 7. On 1 March 1949 the ROC officially recognised the State of Israel but by that time Nationalist (Guomindang) rule over the mainland was already been slipping and Israel never reciprocated. Goldstein, ‘The Republic of China’, p. 15. 8. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘My Heart Is in the West and I Am at the Ends of the East: Changing Israeli Perceptions of Asia’, in: The World Facing Israel: Israeli Facing the World: Images and Politics, (Berlin: Frank & Timme), pp. 239–257. 9. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘The US Role in Delaying Sino-Israeli Relation: Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd’, Jewish Political Science Review, Vol. 22, Nos. 1–2 (Spring 2010), pp. 7–32. 10. Moshe Yegar, The Long Journey to Asia: A Chapter in the Diplomatic History of Israel (Haifa: University of Haifa Press, 2004), p. 248, in Hebrew. 11. Xia Liping, ‘Cong waijiaobu kaifang dangankan 20 shiji 50 nian Zhong Yi jiechu shimo’ [Sino-Israeli Contacts as Seen from Declassified Foreign Ministry Files], Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies], Vol. 12, No. 3 (May 2005), pp. 76–77. 12. Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 13. The CIA reached a similar conclusion for a while: CIA Special Estimate, ‘Probable Developments in the World Situation through mid-1953’, 24 September 1951 (declassified 10 June 1997), EO-1993–00518, p. 20. 14. Quoted in: John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September: the Story of the Palestinian Arabs (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 176. 15. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘The Palestinians in China’s Foreign Policy’, in: Chün-tu Hsüeh (Ed.), Dimensions of China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 156–190. 16. See: Melvin Gurtov, ‘The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution’, in Thomas W. Robinson (Ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 313–366. 17. James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage, 2000). 18. ‘Situation in the Middle East after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty’, XINHUA (New China News Agency), 20 April 1979, quoted in: Yitzhak Shichor, ‘“Just Stand” and “Just Struggle”: China and the Peace Process in the Middle East’, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 5 (January 1981), pp. 39–52. 19. Washington would have preferred that Israel would be the one to supply China. See US Department of Defense Memorandum X13803, ‘Potential Munitions and Commodity Export Cases to China’ (10 April 1981), and CIA National Foreign Assessment Centre Memorandum (Secret), ‘Prospects for US Sales of Defense Related Equipment to China’ (12 May 1981), declassified.

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20. For recent Chinese studies, see: Cao Yin, ‘Lun zhongyi guanxizhongde “meiguo yinsu” ji qi dui zhongguo guojia liyi de yingxiang’ [On the ‘American Element’ in Sino-Israeli Relations and Its Impact on China’s International Interests], in: Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu [International Relations Studies], Vol. 17, No. 2 (September 2010), pp. 183–194; Luo Jun, ‘Youtai shetuan yu meiguo waijiao zhengce’ [Jewish Communities and US Foreign Policy], ibid., pp. 303–324. See also: Xie Lichen and Han Xiaodong, ‘Lun meiguo dui yisilie de qianjiu yu zhipei wenti’ [On the Issue of the US Accommodation with and Domination of Israel], Xibei Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Northwest University], Vo. 38, No. 6 (November 2008), pp. 69–73. 21. China established diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria and Yemen (in 1956), Iraq, Morocco, Algeria (1958), Sudan (1959), Tunisia (1964), South Yemen (1968), Kuwait, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, Cyprus (1971), Jordan (1977), Oman, Libya (1979), United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar, Palestine (1988), and Bahrain (1989). 22. Yitzhak Shichor, A Multiple Hit: China’s Missiles Sale to Saudi Arabia, SCPS Papers, No. 5 (Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Centre for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1991). Idem, East Wind Over Arabia: Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal, China Research Monographs No. 35 (Centre for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1989). See also: Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Sweet and Sour: Sino-Saudi Crude Collaboration and US Crippled Hegemony’, International Conference on Resource Diplomacy under Hegemony, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, 19–23 January 2011 (unpublished paper). 23. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 24. China Statistical Yearbook 2010, pp. 238–239; China Statistical Yearbook 2011, pp. 228–229. 25. Editorial, ‘Palestinian Statehood’, China Daily, 16 September 2011. 26. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick: Non-Traditional Chinese Threats and Middle Eastern Instability’, in Herbert Yee (Ed.), China’s Rise: Threat or Opportunity? (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 101–123. 27. Just before the end of 2010 it was reported that China National Agrochemical Corporation (part of the ChemChina Group) was to buy 60 per cent of the Israeli Company Makhteshim-Agan (a leading producer of crop protection solutions) for US$2.4 billion.

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6 ISR AEL AND RUSSIA: JERUSALEM AND ITS R EL ATIONS WITH MOSCOW UNDER PUTIN Robert O. Freedman

After a decade in which Russia, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, was preoccupied with economic crises, an uprising in Chechnya, political instability and a foreign policy focus on the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the United States, Moscow, under its new President, Vladimir Putin, especially in his second term (2004–08), began to refocus Russian attention on the Middle East. To be sure, Russia did not totally neglect the region during the Yeltsin era. Both Turkey and Iran, which bordered on the FSU, did get Russian attention, albeit more from a defensive point of view than from an effort to expand Russian influence, while the Arab-Israeli conflict greatly receded in importance to Moscow, compared to what it had been in Soviet times.

The Soviet Era Initially, during the rise of the Communist Party to power in Czarist Russia, the Communist leadership under Lenin was strongly anti-Zionist because the Zionist movement, which called for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, was, in Lenin’s view, trying to divert the attention of Jewish workers from Communist efforts to undertake world

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revolution. In addition, after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the fact that Britain, a major enemy of the USSR during the interwar period, was instrumental in fostering the growth of the Zionist community in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate over Palestine, only reinforced Moscow’s antipathy toward Zionism. There was, therefore, a great deal of surprise when the Soviet Union, then led by Joseph Stalin, not only supported the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state in 1947 at the United Nations, but also gave Israel both diplomatic support and military aid (via Czechoslovakia) when the Arab states invaded Israel on 15 May 1948, and condemned the Arabs for the invasion. The primary reason for Soviet support for Israel was that Moscow perceived the Israelis as fighting against a pro-British bloc of Arab states which would, along with Britain, be weakened if Israel won the war.1 In the latter part of the Stalin era, however, Soviet-Israeli relations deteriorated, in part because of increased anti-Semitism in the USSR and in part because Israel backed the United States’ position during the Korean War of 1950–53. The USSR severed relations with Israel in 1952. Moscow’s deteriorating relations with Israel, however, did not lead to an improvement of relations with the Arab states or with the Palestinians (then under Egyptian and Jordanian rule), until after Stalin’s death in 1953. While relations were restored with Israel by Stalin’s successor Georgy Malenkov in 1953 as part of the post-Stalin ‘thaw’ in Soviet foreign policy, Moscow strongly condemned Israel, along with Britain and France, for their tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. Following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, there was an even stronger tilt toward the Arab position on the Arab-Israeli conflict by Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Brezhnev, leading to a severing of the Soviet Union’s diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel took over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moscow was, however, criticized in the Arab world for not providing military aid to the Arabs during the conflict. Following the 1967 war, and the sharp rise in the PLO’s importance in Arab politics, Moscow paid increasing attention to that organization, and Yasser Arafat, who had become the leader of the PLO, came to Moscow as part of an Egyptian delegation in 1968. The real change in Moscow’s relations with the PLO was to come after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which Moscow, in addition to sending arms to both Syria and Egypt, threatened to militarily intervene on the side of Egypt when the fighting turned against it. Moscow’s changed position

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was the result of two developments. First, the Arabs themselves recognized the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the Palestinian people in 1974, thus giving the Palestinian organization increased legitimacy. Second, Egypt, which had been Moscow’s primary ally in the Arab world, and a country on which Moscow had lavished billions of roubles of economic and military assistance, had switched its allegiance to the United States. Therefore, in addition to cultivating Syria, Iraq and Libya, Moscow began to develop ties with the PLO as well. Thus, in the summer of 1974 the PLO was allowed to open an office in Moscow, and following the successful completion of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at Camp David in September 1978, Brezhnev announced that the USSR supported the right of the Palestinians to create their own independent state. There were, of course, problems in the Soviet-Palestinian relationship during the Brezhnev era (1964–82). From the Soviet side there was criticism of the terrorist actions of the PLO, and from the Palestinian side there was deep disappointment that Moscow did not provide them with significant support during their war against Syria in Lebanon in 1976 or during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Moscow was also criticized by the PLO and the Arab World for allowing tens of thousands of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel in the 1970s and early 1980s. Still, on balance, the Brezhnev era can be seen as a positive one for SovietPalestinian relations, and a negative one for Soviet-Israeli relations. This situation was to change when Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985. Indeed, the Gorbachev era, which lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, was perhaps the most revolutionary in Soviet foreign policy since the Communist revolution of 1917.2 Gorbachev radically changed Soviet foreign policy, both in the ArabIsraeli conflict and towards the United States as well. Gorbachev’s plan was to revitalize the moribund Soviet economy and he realized, particularly after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986 and the sharp drop in oil prices that took place the same year, that an end to the US-Soviet Cold War was necessary for the Soviet Union’s economy to develop. This required, among other things, the pull-out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a sharp cut in the size of Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe, and changes in Soviet behavior in the Third World. Among these changes was the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, first at the consular level, and then after the failed coup against Gorbachev in September 1991, the establishment of full diplomatic

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relations. Gorbachev also permitted hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel in the 1988–91 period, an action that not only helped Israel in the demographic competition with the Palestinians, but which also greatly augmented Israel’s scientific and military power since many of the emigrating Soviet Jews had worked in the USSR’s militaryindustrial complex. Perhaps of equal importance was Gorbachev’s admonition both to Syrian leader Hafez Assad and to PLO leader Yasser Arafat that their conflicts with Israel had to be settled politically and not by war – a signal to both Arab leaders that the time had come to negotiate with Israel, and a not so-subtle indication that they could not expect Soviet aid if they embarked on a war against Israel.3

The Yeltsin Legacy The Arab-Israeli conflict was only of tertiary interest to Yeltin’s Russia, a situation very much unlike that in the Soviet era when, as noted above, successive Soviet leaders from Khrushchev to Andropov, sought to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to increase Moscow’s influence in the Middle East. Russia let the US take the lead in Arab-Israeli diplomacy during the period when Andrei Kozyrev was Russia’s Foreign minister (1991– 95), as Moscow endorsed the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) agreements between Israel and the Palestinians as well as the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Meanwhile, on a bilateral basis Russian-Israeli relations flourished, economically, culturally and even militarily as Russia and Israel signed an agreement to produce an AWACS radar aircraft (Israel supplied the avionics and Russia the airframe) for sale to counties such as India. For its part, Israel was happy that Moscow continued to allow Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel, and hoped that the rapidly developing cultural relations between Russia and Israel, based on the one million Russian-speaking immigrants from the FSU residing in Israel by 1991, would lead to closer political relations between Moscow and Jerusalem.4 By 1996, however, the Russian-Israeli honeymoon had ended, as Yeltsin, under increasing pressure from right-wing forces in the Russian Duma (parliament) and following the US intervention in Bosnia, took a tougher position in world affairs. Kozyrev was replaced by Soviet-era hardliner Yevgeny Primakov who displayed an increasingly critical attitude toward Israel, and a more sympathetic position toward the Arab

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states and the Palestinians. Thus during the Spring 1996 fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah, Primakov and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (who had succeeded the assassinated Yitzhak Rabin) openly clashed. However, underlining the diplomatic impotence of Russia, it was American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and not Primakov, who succeeded in bringing the fighting to an end.5 Peres’ successor, Benyamin Netanyahu, sought to improve relations with Russia, even giving Moscow a $50 million agricultural loan during a visit in March 1997 and stating that Israel would consider buying Russian natural gas. In addition, bilateral relations continued to develop as the Israeli food manufacturer Tnuva filmed a ‘milk in space’ commercial aboard the Russian Space Station Mir. However, Moscow was critical of Netanyahu’s policies, especially his expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. For his part, Netanyahu was critical of Russian military and economic aid to Iran, which included building the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, because Iran was an avowed enemy of Israel. Indeed, Netanyahu later canceled discussions of the natural gas deal with Moscow because of Russia’s supply of missile technology to Iran.6 However, one of Netanyahu’s ministers, Ariel Sharon, gained favor in Moscow by backing the Russian position on Serbia during the US-Russian clash over Kosovo in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, by the late summer of 1998 Russia had become enmeshed in a near disastrous economic crisis, which effectively limited Russia’s freedom of action in the world, including in the Middle East, and this situation was to continue until a sick, and frequently intoxicated, Yeltsin suddenly resigned as Russia’s President, to be succeeded by Vladimir Putin in January 2000.

The Putin Era: Part One (2000–04) Consolidating Power When Vladimir Putin became Russia’s Prime Minister in the fall of 1999 and Acting President in January 2000 (he was formally elected Russia’s President in March 2000) he had three major objectives. The first was to restore Russia’s prestige in the world so as to prevent the United States from unilaterally dominating the world. Putin’s second objective was to rebuild the Russian economy so that Russia could again become a great power. The third objective was to curb Muslim, and

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especially Middle Eastern, aid to the Chechen rebellion that had erupted again in 1999, so that Moscow could more easily suppress it. In order to accomplish these tasks, Putin had to consolidate his power in order to end the near anarchy that had pervaded much of the Yeltsin era. To do this Putin all but eliminated the political influence of oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky and took over their media outlets. He replaced Yevgeny Adamov, head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom, now Rosatom), who attempted to make nuclear deals with Iran not approved of by the Kremlin, with Alexander Rumantsev, who in November 2005 was, in turn, replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko. The powerful gas monopoly, GASPROM, heavily involved in Turkey and Central Asia, had its director, Ram Vakhirev, replaced by Alexei Miller, while the Defense Ministry had its leader, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, replaced by the Secretary of the National Security Council, Sergei Ivanov. Two other holdovers from the Yeltsin era were also removed during Putin’s first term. Russia’s Prime Minster Mikhail Khazyanov was replaced by Mikhail Fradkov and Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, was replaced by Sergei Lavrov. Putin also changed Interior ministers, set up plenipotentiaries to oversee Russia’s 89 regions, and consolidated Russia’s arms sales agencies into Rosoboronoexport, in an effort to gain greater control over a major source of foreign exchange – and to prevent unauthorized foreign arms sales. Putin also put a great deal of emphasis on improving Russia’s economy, not only through the sale of arms, oil and natural gas (the Russian economy has been blessed with high oil and natural gas prices during most of his years in office) but also by selling high tech goods such as nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia’s business ties abroad. Indeed, business interests were to play an increasingly significant role in Putin’s foreign policy. Making Putin’s task easier was the support he received from the Duma, especially from his United Russia Party in contrast to the hostile relations Yeltsin had with the Duma from 1993 until his resignation as Russia’s President in December 1999. Indeed, in the Duma elections of December 2003, Putin greatly increased his support, weakening both the Communist and Liberal Democratic parties which were his main opponents, and he scored an overwhelming victory in the 2004 Presidential elections.

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Russia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Putin’s First Term As US-Russian relations chilled following the US invasion of Iraq, so did Moscow’s relations with Israel. At the same time, there was a clear improvement in Russian-Palestinian relations. Moscow’s tilt to the Palestinians became evident after the Israeli re-entry into the cities of the West Bank following a series of Palestinian terrorist attacks in 2002. A secondary goal of Moscow’s pro-Palestinian tilt was to curb Arab support for the Chechen rebellion. Still, even while shifting more towards the Palestinians, Putin periodically uttered soothing remarks about how much he valued the bilateral Russian-Israeli relationship and the role of Russian émigrés living in Israel. However, on issues of substance such as Russian aid to Iran, and Israel’s construction of a security fence, Russia and Israel had opposing positions. To be sure, Putin did have a point about the continuing strength of the bilateral RussianIsraeli relationship. By the early 2000s trade had risen to more than $1 billion per year, cultural relations continued to develop, 50,000 Russian tourists were visiting Israel annually, and Russia and Israel signed an agreement under which Russian rockets would put Israeli satellites into orbit.7 Nonetheless, these areas of bilateral cooperation were increasingly overshadowed by diplomatic conflicts. By the time of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to Moscow in September 2003, the growing diplomatic differences between Russia and Israel had become increasingly evident. While Sharon was in Moscow, Putin promised to take Israeli concerns into account while introducing a UN Security Council resolution codifying the Diplomatic Quartet’s ‘Road Map’ for peace. However, following the visit, when Moscow introduced the resolution, it was without the Israeli reservations. As far as Yasser Arafat was concerned, by 2002 Israel had refused to talk to the Palestinian leader, blaming him for the wave of terrorist attacks which were occurring during the Al-Aqsa intifada. By contrast, Putin continued to assert that Arafat was still politically relevant.8 On the issue of Israel’s security fence, Russia joined the majority of EU states in voting to support a UN General Assembly (non-binding) resolution condemning Israel for building its security fence and calling on Israel to comply with the majority decision of the International Court of Justice to tear down the fence. The United States and six other countries opposed the resolution. By September 2004, however, Russia may have wished that it had constructed a security fence of its own separating the rest of the Russian

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Federation from Chechnya, after a series of Chechen terrorist attacks culminated in the seizure of a Russian school in Belan that led to the deaths of 332 people, many of them children. This may have prompted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on a visit to Israel as part of a post-Beslan Middle East tour during which Russia sought world support against Chechen terrorism, to accept an Israeli offer to cooperate in the area of counterterrorism. The Israeli offer included the sharing of information on safeguarding critical installations, the training of counterterrorism specialists, and the exchange of intelligence data.9 Still, any hope that Israel may have had that Moscow would adopt a more pro-Israeli stand in Israel’s conflict with Palestinian terrorists as a result of the security agreement quickly faded. In October 2004, just one month after the Russian-Israeli agreement, Moscow supported a United Nations Security Council Resolution (vetoed by the United States) to condemn Israel for its military incursion into Gaza that was aimed at rooting out as many Hamas terrorists as possible before the Israeli Knesset vote on Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan.10 This Russian policy was in sharp contrast to Putin’s early policy on Hamas when a visiting Israeli delegation to Moscow at the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the fall of 2000, was told by Sergei Lavrov, then head of Russia’s Security Council, that the terrorism that Israelis were facing in Gaza and the West Bank was exactly what Moscow faced in Chechnya.11

Putin Goes on the Offensive in the Middle East (2004–08) By 2004, with his domestic political opponents under control, overwhelmingly reelected to a second term as Russia’s President, the Russian economy improving, and with oil prices rapidly rising, Putin was ready to move ahead with his three major objectives for Russia: (1) restoring Russia’s status as a great power, thereby ending American dominance of the post-Cold War world; (2) developing the Russian economy, especially in the high tech area; and (3) further limiting foreign aid to the Chechen rebels who were continuing their struggle against Russia. Unfortunately, for Putin, two events in the September-November 2004 period – the Chechen seizure of the school in Beslan that led to the loss of 332 Russian lives in a bungled rescue operation, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine which brought to power a Ukrainian president whom Putin had publicly opposed – made both Putin, and Russia, look weak. To counter this image Putin decided to formulate a new strategy for Russia

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in the Middle East, a region where the United States’ position was rapidly weakening due to the growing insurgency in Iraq and the revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Seeking to exploit the weakened US position, Putin after a visit to Turkey moved first to court the leading antiAmerican and anti-Israeli rogue states and movements in the region – Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Subsequently, he was also to court the leading Sunni powers in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates while still trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel. Aiding the Radical anti-Israeli Middle East States and Forces Syria was a target of opportunity for Russia as it sought to rebuild its position in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2005 Syria was under heavy pressure on two fronts. Not only had the UN Security Council condemned its activities in Lebanon but the US was complaining that Syria had become a conduit for foreign Jihadists fighting in Iraq. Consequently, when Moscow, during Bashar Assad’s visit to Moscow in January 2005 agreed to write off 73 per cent of Syria’s $13.4 billion debt to Russia, Putin demonstrated strong support for an increasingly isolated Syrian government.12 Then, in March 2005 Russia and Syria signed an agreement for Russia to develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria13 and in April, just before Putin arrived in Israel, Russia signed an agreement to provide short-range surface-to-air missiles to Syria – a further sign of support for Syria which was under increasing pressure because of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.14 Indeed under heavy international pressure, spearheaded by France and the United States, Syria was compelled to pull its troops out of Lebanon by the end of April 2005. Then, the special commission investigating the assassination of Hariri, under the leadership of the German police officer Detlev Mehlis, issued an interim report in October 2005 implicating high-ranking members of the Syrian government, and noting that the Syrian regime had obstructed cooperation with the commission. At the same time, a committee under Terje Larsen issued a report to the UN that stated that Syria, despite pulling its forces out of Lebanon, had continued to supply Lebanese and Palestinian militias in Lebanon with weaponry.15 Upon the release of the two reports, the US, Britain and France, acting jointly, called for UN sanctions against Syria. As in the case of Iran, Moscow sought to prevent the sanctions and succeeded

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in somewhat watering down the UN Security Council Resolution criticizing Syria. Nonetheless the resolution, UNSC 1636, did condemn Syria for trying to mislead the Mehlis Commission by following a policy of ‘cooperating in form but not in substance’, and demanded Syria expand its cooperation with the investigation or face ‘further action’.16 While Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praised UNSC Resolution 1636 for taking Russia’s views into account, and did manage to prevent an immediate referral of Syria to the UN Security Council,17 Moscow may face some difficult choices once the final report on the Hariri assassination is issued, given the close tie between Hariri and Saudi Arabia which Putin was also trying to court. Meanwhile, after the arms deal with Syria, and the change of Russian policy toward Iran in February under which Moscow finally agreed to sign the long-delayed agreement to supply nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor (see below), Putin journeyed to the Middle East, visiting Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian territories in what was clearly a ‘show the flag’ visit to demonstrate that Russia was again a factor in the Middle East. Indeed, during his visit, Putin called for a Middle East Peace Conference to be held in Moscow. In the Palestinian territories, Putin promised the newly elected Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas, 50 armored personnel carriers for his security forces, while telling the Israelis that he would do nothing to hurt their country and for this reason he had turned down an agreement to sell advanced Iskander ground-to-ground missiles to Syria. Most Israelis doubted him, however, given the surface-to-air missile sale to Syria and the nuclear agreement with Iran. Indeed, as Moscow stepped up its aid to Iran throughout the remainder of 2005, Russian-Israeli relations deteriorated. Putin clearly realized as he set out to rebuild Russia’s position in the Middle East that in order to cement the relationship with Iran, which he saw as a foreign policy priority, he had to finalize the nuclear fuel agreement. Consequently in late February 2005, Russia signed the final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor.18 Under the agreement all spent fuel was to be returned to Russia, thus, in theory at least, preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. Perhaps emboldened by the agreement with Russia, Iran’s then chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, warned that Iran would never permanently cease enriching uranium, and if the US sought sanctions at the UN Security Council, ‘the security and stability of the region would become a problem’. Rowhani also stated that Iran was not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU-3, and threatened to end the negotiations if there were no progress.19

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Then, following the election of the outspoken Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in July 2005, Moscow did its best to delay even the discussion of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council that the US was advocating because of Iran’s decision to renew enrichment of uranium, and its refusal to supply the International Atomic Energy Agency with information about its atomic programs. Making matters worse, Ahmadinejad called for wiping Israel off the map and denied the Holocaust. Nevertheless, in November 2005, Moscow signed an agreement with Tehran to provide it with sophisticated short-range Tor surface to air missiles, which could be used to protect its nuclear installations against a possible Israeli or American attack.20 By moving to help Iran to protect its nuclear installations, Moscow appeared to send a clear signal that it would stand by Iran, irrespective of its nuclear policies. As Putin was increasing Russian support for Iran, he also tried to prevent the Arab and Moslem worlds from aiding the rebellion in Chechnya. Thus he obtained for Russia observer status in the Islamic Conference (OIC), and took the opportunity to side with the Muslim world by denouncing the Danish cartoons which were seen by Muslims as insulting to Islam. For the same reason, he pursued an improved relationship with Saudi Arabia, an effort that bore some fruit as the Saudi government, distancing itself from the Chechen rebels, promised to help in the reconstruction of Chechnya. Then, following the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Putin called the event ‘a very serious blow’ to American diplomacy in the Middle East, thus appearing almost to return to the ‘zero-sum’ influence competition that characterized Soviet-American relations until the advent of Gorbachev. Soon after the election he invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow, asserting that Hamas was not on Russia’s terrorist list, and hence not considered a terrorist organization – a clear change from Russia’s policy in 2000 when, as noted above, a visiting Israeli delegation after the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was told that the terrorism Israel was facing in Gaza and the West Bank was exactly what Russia was battling in Chechnya.21 By inviting Hamas to Moscow, Putin undermined the consensus of the Diplomatic Quartet (the US, Europe, UN and Russia) which was not to have anything to do with Hamas until it recognized Israel, renounced terrorism against it, and accepted all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. When the Hamas delegation came to Moscow, Putin had a number of objectives. First, by inviting Hamas, he associated Russia with the then Arab consensus which was to give Hamas time to change its policies, and in the

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meantime to work with a Hamas government and not to sanction it. Russia was at that time widely praised in the Arab world for its invitation, which also bestowed a modicum of legitimacy on Hamas – much to the anger of Israel which saw Hamas as a terrorist enemy seeking to destroy it. Another goal for Putin was to get Hamas, an Islamist organization, to downplay the Chechen issue, and the Hamas delegation complied, with delegation leader Khalid Mashal stating after a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that the Chechen separatists were an internal problem of Russia. The comment drew a bitter reaction from the Chechen rebels which called Hamas’s decision to visit Putin’s Russia, which had killed so many Chechen Moslems, not only regrettable but also ‘un-Islamic’.22 Another blow to Russian-Israeli relations occurred six months later when war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Not only did Moscow look the other way when Syria transferred some of its Russian weapons to Hezbollah, Russia also opposed sanctions against Syria, then Hezbollah’s main sponsor, at a meeting of the G-8, and criticized Israel for its overreaction to the kidnapping. In the aftermath of the war, Russia sent a group of engineers to rebuild some of the bridges destroyed in the conflict, but did not offer troops for the expanded UNIFIL contingent in southern Lebanon, whose mission, at least in theory, was to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah. In the face of Israel’s deteriorating relationship with Russia, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert journeyed to Moscow in October 2006, perhaps hoping to secure a reversal of some of Russia’s anti-Israeli regional policies. Olmert had three issues to discuss with Putin: (1) Iran; (2) Syria’s transfer of arms to Hezbollah; and (3) Russia’s diplomatic support for Hamas. A secondary list of priorities focused on Russian-Israeli bilateral relations, including trade, especially the potential purchase of Russian natural gas, and Russian-Israeli cooperation in arms sales to third countries. For his part, Putin had a more limited list of goals for Olmert’s visit. First came his desire to have Russia recognized as a major player in Middle East diplomacy, and Olmert’s visit helped confirm this. Second came Putin’s efforts to rebuild the Russian economy which was an element in Moscow’s efforts to regain great power status and trade with a high-tech country like Israel, especially in the area of nanotechnology, and which would help Moscow achieve that goal. Given the results of the meeting, it appears that Putin fared far better than did Olmert. Thus on Iran, Russia made no concessions, with Lavrov, after Olmert’s

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visit, saying that Moscow was still opposed to sanctions against Iran.23 Moscow also played down the issue of weapons transfers,24 and as far as Hamas was concerned, Lavrov stated, following the departure of Olmert, ‘demanding now that Hamas fully accept the Quartet’s conditions such as the recognition of Israel, the denunciation of violence against Israel, and acceptance of all existing agreements is unrealistic at this time’.25 If Olmert got very little satisfaction from his Russian hosts on issues of major importance to Israel, he proved willing to accede to Putin’s goals, perhaps hoping that if bilateral relations improved further, Russia might change its anti-Israeli regional policies. Thus Olmert agreed with Putin to raise trade from the then $2 billion annual level to $5 billion, and Olmert agreed to discuss the possibility of Israel’s purchasing natural gas from Russia by way of a pipeline from Turkey, thereby reversing the stand on natural gas purchases adopted by Netanyahu in 1997. That seemed to be a mutually advantageous deal for both Russia and Israel, because Turkey in 2006 had failed to use the amount of gas it had contracted with Russia to purchase, and Israel which in addition to the natural gas it purchased from Egypt had planned to purchase natural gas from a field off of Gaza, but because of the rise of Hamas, saw the Gaza project as an unlikely possibility.26 The one concrete agreement to come out of the Moscow talks was the setting up of a working group to coordinate arms sales to third countries.27 While Russia and Israel have cooperated in the production of such weapons systems as the AWACS, the two countries competed for contracts to refurbish old Soviet equipment like MIG-23 aircraft. Courting the Sunnis Meanwhile, however, Russia’s backing for Iran and its allies Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah came into conflict with Putin’s goal of improved ties with the Sunni states of the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt, which particularly after the IsraeliHezbollah war had become increasingly suspicious of Iran and its allies, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Consequently, as a concession to the Sunni Arabs prior to visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan in February 2007, Russia in December 2006 finally agreed to UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, albeit very limited ones. Then in March 2007, following the trip, Putin agreed to additional very limited sanctions. During his visit to the Gulf states, Putin sought major investments in

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Russia’s banking and space industries, weapons sales, and joint investment projects in oil and natural gas (Putin was to have similar goals during a visit to Libya in 2008). The energy deals were especially important to Moscow because its own production of oil and especially natural gas appeared to have almost peaked.28 During the spring and summer of 2007, as part of Putin’s efforts to court the Sunni Gulf states, Russia also conspicuously delayed sending Iran the promised nuclear fuel, making the dubious claim that the rich Persian Gulf country had not made the necessary payments, and a November 2007 visit by Putin to Iran didn’t change the situation. However, following the ill-conceived US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran of December 2007, which erroneously argued that Iran had given up its nuclear weapons program, and hence was not an immediate threat, Moscow, perceiving diminishing pressure from the Gulf Arabs and the US on this issue went ahead with the sale of the nuclear fuel, and the shipments had been completed by February 2008. Ironically, even as Moscow was helping Iran develop its nuclear capability, Putin, seeking business for Russia’s nuclear industry, offered to build reactors for the Gulf Arabs, Egypt and Jordan, as the Arab states sought to keep up with their rival, Iran. For their part the Sunni Arab states, increasingly unhappy with US policy toward Iraq, which strengthened the Iraqi Shia, and indirectly Iran, welcomed Russia as a counterweight to the United States. The one major problem Moscow encountered in the Arab World in 2007 dealt with the Palestinians. In June of that year Hamas seized power in Gaza, killing a number of Fatah officials working there. With Fatah and Hamas now at loggerheads – Abbas fired the Hamas Prime Minister and replaced him with one of his own appointees, Salam Fayyad, who had a reputation for fiscal honesty and was close to the Western financial community – Moscow faced a difficult problem of choice. Making matters worse for Moscow was that Hamas turned increasingly to Iran for support, thereby alienating key Sunni states and making Moscow’s legitimization of Hamas problematic for Russia. In reacting to this problem, Moscow stepped up its efforts, first announced during Putin’s visit to the Middle East in 2005, to convene an international peace conference in Moscow. In addition, Moscow increased its backing for the Arab Peace Plan, which had been first introduced in 2002 and then reintroduced in 2007. Perhaps most important of all, Russia called for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah as a necessary precondition for the peace conference to take place.

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Thus, at the time of the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Russia was following a policy of encouraging the main anti-American and anti-Israeli forces in the Middle East – Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran – while at the same time trying to cultivate the major Sunni Arab states of the Middle East, and seeking to draw them away from their alignment with the United States, and also trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel. The invasion of Georgia, coming as it did in the midst of the Russian diplomatic offensive in the Middle East, was to impact on Putin’s Middle East balancing act, especially with regard to Syria and Israel.

The Impact of the Russian Invasion of Georgia on the Middle East Syria In an almost classic case of political opportunism, Syrian President Bashir Assad seized upon the Russian invasion of Georgia – and the fact that Israel (along with Germany, France, the United States and Turkey), had provided military equipment and training to the Georgian military – to try to convince the Russians to sell Syria the weapons they had long wanted and that the Russians had so far proved unwilling to sell them, especially the short range, solid fuel Iskander-E ground-to-ground missile that could reach virtually every target in Israel; Mig-31 combat aircraft, and the SAM 300 anti-aircraft missile system, which if installed in Syria near Damascus, could control most of Israel’s airspace. As Assad told the Russian newspaper Kommersant, on the eve of his visit to Moscow when Georgian-Russian hostilities were still going on: ‘I think that in Russia and in the world, everyone is now aware of Israel’s role and its military consultants in the Georgia crisis. And if before in Russia there were people who thought these [Israeli] forces can be friendly, now I think no one thinks that way’.29 It is clear that Assad was referring to Putin who on repeated occasions stated that he had denied the Iskander missiles to Syria because they could harm Israel. In backing the Russian intervention in Georgia – one of the few countries in the world to do so – Assad was repeating the policy of his father Hafez Assad whose Syrian regime was one of the few in the world to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.30 While Assad senior was richly rewarded with Soviet military equipment for

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his support of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, it remained to be seen what Bashar Assad would get. All Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would say after the Assad visit was that Moscow would ‘consider’ Syria’s appeal for new weapons sales and that in any case Russia would not sell any weapons that would ‘affect the Middle East strategic balance’.31 Since sale of both the Iskander-E and SAM-300 systems would definitely affect the regional military balance, Syria appeared unlikely to get these weapons. It should also be noted, however, that Moscow has developed a habit of holding up arms sales to Syria and Iran to try to squeeze concessions from Israel, and should Israel not behave in the way Moscow wanted, it risked the possibility that these arms sales would be implemented. Israel Since the Olmert visit to Moscow in October 2006, Russian-Israeli relations continued their schizophrenic nature with good bilateral relations in clear contrast to Moscow’s siding with Syria and Iran. Thus on the eve of Bashar Assad’s visit to Moscow in August 2008 Russia’s new President, Dmitry Medvedev, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had a telephone conversation. Amongst the topics broached were IsraeliSyrian relations and the situation in Georgia. At the time, trade between Russian and Israel exceeded $2.5 billion a year, much of it in the hightech sector, which Putin needed to develop the Russian economy so that it would not be dependent primarily on energy exports – cultural ties thrived and Moscow established a cultural center in Tel Aviv, the two countries signed a visa-waiver agreement to facilitate tourism, negotiations were completed for the return to Russia of Czarist property in Jerusalem, and Israel’s Kadima Party signed an agreement with Putin’s United Russia Party to establish party-to-party relations.32 While some in the Russian military such as Russia’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Anatoly Nogovitsyn publicly complained about Israeli aid to the Georgian military,33 Foreign Minister Lavrov went out of his way to praise Israel for stopping arms sales to Georgia.34 What then explains Russia’s continued bifurcated policy toward Israel and how will the Russian invasion of Georgia affect it? It appears clear that Russia has three goals vis-à-vis Israel. First, it is the homeland of more than a million Russian-speaking citizens of the Former Soviet Union, and Russia sees Russian speakers abroad as a source of its world

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influence. Hence the emphases on cultural ties between Russia and Israel, in which Israelis of Russian origin play the dominant role. Second, as noted above, Putin is determined to develop the Russian economy, and high-tech trade with Israel especially in the area of nanotechnology35 is a part of his plan. Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major issue in world politics, and Putin would very much like to play a role in its diplomacy, if not in finding a solution to the conflict. For this reason he continued to call for an international peace conference in Moscow and he wanted Israel to attend, so as to build up the role of Russia as a world mediator. By early 2009, perhaps in an effort to convince Israel to attend a Middle East peace conference, and perhaps because it was growing increasingly disenchanted with Hamas, Moscow tilted a bit toward Israel in the Israel-Palestinian conflict or at least away from Hamas. Thus during the Israeli-Hamas war of December 2008-January 2009, Russia took a rather even-handed view of the conflict, instead of giving strong backing to Hamas. Moscow also praised the long-delayed August 2009 Sixth Fatah Congress, with Russia Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko asserting, ‘the restoration of Palestinian unity on the PLO platform and on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative is an integral part of lasting peace’.36 Putin, at the time Russia’s Prime Minister, although considered by most analysts to still be Russia’s most powerful leader, was even more explicit in his praise for Fatah, as he stated in greetings to the Congress, ‘Fatah, the core of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, steadily defends the interests of Palestinians, primarily their right to form a sovereign and viable state’.37 The Russian support was in clear contrast to Hamas which denounced the Fatah Congress. In May 2009 Israel’s new Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, himself an immigrant from the FSU, announced during a visit to Moscow that Israel had agreed to attend the international peace conference in Moscow, long desired by Putin and also called for a strategic dialogue with Russia. This may have been the price Moscow was demanding for holding off on the delivery of SAM-300 missiles to Iran as well as sophisticated missiles and military aircraft to Syria. Lieberman was followed to Moscow both by Israeli President Shimon Peres and Israel’s new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, evidently concerned that Russia was about to consummate the sales.38 Perhaps as further incentive for Moscow, Israel agreed to sell it reconnaissance drones, something Russia very much needed, given the poor performance of Russian surveillance

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equipment in the Georgian war.39 Meanwhile, Russia was having difficulty managing its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as was made clear by Moscow’s flip-flop over the Goldstone report which condemned both Israel and Hamas for actions taken during the Israeli invasion of Gaza. In the UN Human Rights Committee, Russia – seeking to win Arab support – voted to approve the report which had been bitterly criticized by Israel. However, in the UN General Assembly vote to send the report to the UN Security Council, Moscow abstained, perhaps wishing to assuage Israeli anger or, perhaps, because it might itself be accused in international fora of killing civilians during Russian military operations in the North Caucasus.40 As 2010 dawned, there were two primary issues in the RussianIsraeli relationship, as far as Israel was concerned. The first related to Iran – would Russia finally be willing to support more serious sanctions against Iran, which was coming under increased criticism from the IAEA for interference with IAEA inspections and for continuing to refuse to answer questions about its suspected nuclear weapons program? In addition, there was concern that Moscow would go ahead with the sale of Sam-300 missiles to Iran, a development that would greatly complicate any Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear installations. A related arms sale concern related to the possibility that Russia would go ahead with the sale to Syria of SAM-300s, MIG-31s, ISKANDER ground to ground missiles and Yakhont ground to sea missiles. A second set of issues revolved around the Russian attitude to the Arab-Israeli peace process, which had stalled at the beginning of 2010, despite Netanyahu’s agreeing, in November 2009, to a partial settlement freeze, one that did not, however, include Jerusalem. In addition, although Moscow had leaned a bit away from Hamas in 2009, it continued to maintain contact with it, something that angered not only Israel, but also Palestinian authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. Meanwhile, from Moscow’s perspective, the priorities were first to continue to appear to play a major role in the peace process, both through its contacts with Hamas and through the membership in the Diplomatic Quartet, as it continued to seek to hold a Middle East peace conference in Russia. In addition as far as Israel was concerned, the Russian leadership continued to seek high-tech military equipment, especially in the area of drones, to modernize its army. Russian arms sales were a major preoccupation of the Israeli leadership throughout 2010. Beginning with Netanyahu’s February 2010 visit,

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where he not only opposed arms sales to Iran and Syria, but also called for ‘crippling’ economic sanctions against Iran, something Moscow publicly refused to do,41 there was a steady stream of Israeli leaders traveling to Russia in an effort to prevent such sales. Israel had one success in its efforts. In September 2010, several months after the United Nations Security Council had voted its latest set of sanctions against Iran in June (see below), Medvedev announced that Russia had determined that the UN sanctions prevented the sale of the SAM-300s to Iran, a decision that made the Iranians furious.42 However, Israel was not as fortunate as far as Russian arms sales to Syria were concerned. Possibly confirmed during Medvedev’s visit to Syria in May, Moscow announced in September, several days before announcing the termination of the SAM-300 deal with Iran, that it had decided to provide the Yakhont ground to sea missiles to Syria.43 Israel was incensed, fearing that, as in the past, these weapons would be transferred to Hezbollah and used against Israel in a new war. Not only Israel, but also the US was angered by the sale – after all, the US Sixth Fleet could be endangered by the 200 mile range missiles – and it was perhaps for this reason that, after Russian spokesmen had gone back and forth since June over the possibility of the sale of the SAM-300s to Iran (the weapons had not been mentioned in the June 2010 Sanctions resolution), Medvedev finally canceled it. As far as the sanctions were concerned, US and EU pressure built up on Russia throughout the first half of 2010. Meanwhile, it appeared that Russia was seeking an improved relationship with the West and Medvedev and Obama had signed the START Treaty in April, and Medvedev had journeyed soon after to California to seek support for the Silicon Valley equivalent he was endeavoring to establish near Moscow. In addition, the IAEA under its new director general, Yukiya Amano, was far more critical of Iranian behavior than Mohammed ElBaradai, the previous director had been, and Iran did not help its cause by stonewalling US and EU attempts to get it to reach an agreement to cease enriching its uranium and to answer questions about its suspect weapons program. Indeed, Iran moved in the opposite direction, increasing the amount of uranium which it had enriched to the 20 per cent level. Given this situation, the Russian leadership reluctantly agreed to go along with sanctions, albeit much weaker ones than the US and EU had originally wanted. In this set of sanctions, not only were individual Iranians sanctioned, but some weapons systems were prohibited as well, although initially under a US-Russian agreement, not including the Sam-300s.

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The weakness of the sanctions resolution, however, was the lack of a prohibition on the supply of gasoline to Iran. While the US and EU subsequently imposed additional sanctions on Iran – something protested by Moscow – the fact that Russia and China as well as other countries continued to be willing to be energy partners of Iran meant that it remained unlikely that Iran would be pressured by the sanctions into curbing its nuclear enrichment program.44 While Moscow was willing, albeit reluctantly, to sign off on limited sanctions against Iran, it took a more active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. A far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was concerned, Moscow aligned itself with the Arab, and, increasingly, the international consensus against Israel as Netanyahu’s building program in Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem such as Silwan increasingly isolated Israel and raised questions about Netanyahu’s commitment to the peace process. Then, when after extensive US efforts, the Palestinian Authority agreed to enter into indirect peace talks with Israel in mid-March, with US Vice President Joe Biden in Jerusalem to start formally the process, the decision of the Netanyahu government to build an additional 1,600 new housing units in East Jerusalem caused a crisis, not only in the nascent peace process, but also with the United States, Israel’s main ally. The end result was an international condemnation of the Netanyahu government. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov quickly joined the chorus of criticism, and in speaking to Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa, condemned the Israeli settlement activities as ‘unacceptable’.45 The Quartet, including not only Russia but also the United States, also denounced Israeli settlement construction and asserted that ‘unilateral steps taken by either side cannot prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and will not be recognized by the international community’.46 Although the crisis in US-Israeli relations over Israeli settlement construction was, at least temporarily, to blow over, the strains in RussianIsraeli relations continued. Thus, despite Israeli President Shimon Peres being invited to Moscow to celebrate the 65th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, where he also received an honorary doctorate from the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs, and despite Peres’ lavish praise of Russia for its role in World War II, his impassioned plea to Moscow not to provide arms to Syria appeared to fall on deaf ears.47 Thus despite complaining about Syrian arms transfers of Russian equipment to Hezbollah, he was to prove unable to stop subsequent arms sales to Syria. In addition, while there had been some speculation about

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Russia mediating between Israel and Syria, Peres noted that while Israel was ready for peace with Syria, there was one basic condition – ‘Assad must stop his support for terror [Hamas and Hezbollah] and stop trafficking weapons and missiles to Hizbullah’.48 Soon after meeting with Peres, Medvedev made a state visit to Syria, where not only did he not, at least publicly, try to get Syria to stop transferring arms to Hezbollah, he also met with Hamas leader Khalid Mashal whose headquarters was in Damascus. While during the meeting Medvedev did call for the quick release of imprisoned Israeli POW Gilad Shalit – a request quickly rejected by Hamas49 – the very fact of his meeting with a Hamas official greatly angered the Israelis, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling Hamas ‘a terror organization in every way’ and stating that Israel was ‘deeply disappointed’ that Medvedev had met with Meshal.50 The Russian Foreign Ministry rebutted the Israeli criticism with its own statement which asserted that ‘Hamas . . . is a movement supported by the trust and sympathy of a significant part of the Palestinians. We have regular contact with this movement’.51 Adding insult to injury as far as Israel was concerned, was Medvedev’s call, while meeting with the now anti-Israeli Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdog˘an, for Hamas to be involved in the Middle East peace process, and Moscow subsequently also condemned Israeli actions in the flotilla crisis with Turkey.52 Neither the Medvedev-Mashal meeting, nor Moscow’s call for Hamas to be included in the Middle East peace process, nor even Moscow’s criticism of Israeli policy in the Flotilla crisis served to stop the Israeli government from seeking to improve relations with Moscow. The apparent reason for the continued Israeli efforts apparently was to prevent the situation from worsening to the point that Russia would provide Israel’s enemies with the weapons that it most feared – Sam-300s to Iran and Syria, and Iskander missiles, Yakhont missiles and MIG-31s to Syria. Thus at the beginning of September 2010, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak journeyed to Moscow to offer the Russians help in two areas they needed the most – advance drone technology and cooperation in antiterrorism, the latter necessity brought home to Moscow by the bombing of the Moscow Metro in March 2010 and the continued insurgency in the North Caucasus. As in the Peres visit several months earlier, Barak was lavish in his praise for his Russian hosts, stating ‘Israel regards Russia not only as an important partner but also as a major power which plays a big role in the Middle East’53 – remarks selected to meet one of Putin’s

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goals in the Middle East, which was to reestablish Moscow’s role as a major player there. While Barak was in Russia, Israel and Russia signed a five year agreement on military cooperation. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who was endeavoring to reform the Russian armed forces, noted in commenting on the five year agreement: ‘While reforming the Russian armed forces, it is vital to use the experience and best practices of Israel’s armed forces. We are studying them thoroughly.’54 For his part, Barak said Israel was ready to share with the Russian military its experiences in anti-terrorism and security measures. In addition, following the Bara visit, Israel and Russia signed an agreement to manufacture drones in Russia.55 As was the case following the Peres visit to Moscow several months earlier, the new ‘era of good feelings’ between Jerusalem and Moscow did not last long. No sooner did Barak return to Jerusalem than Russia, as noted above, announced it was going ahead with the sale of 72 Yakhont ground-to-sea missiles to Syria, despite Israeli complaints that these missiles would be transferred to Hezbollah. The Israeli response came from a senior Israeli government official, who, speaking on the condition of anonymity, presumably so as not to further worsen Russian-Israeli relations, severely criticized Moscow, in language far different from that used by Barak when he was in Russia: ‘This decision translates into a very poor demonstration of responsibility by a country which sees itself as influential, and which claims to act in favor of regional stability.’56 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Israel on 25 June 2012 underlines the fact that, three months after being re-elected as Russia’s president, Putin’s Middle East goals have not changed since he last served as Russia’s president from 2001–08. This also means that the relatively moderate policy in the Middle East of Russia’s previous president, Dmitry Medvedev (agreement to serious sanctions on Iran in 2010 and to action against former Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi in 2011) may very well be a thing of the past. Putin’s goals can be seen to be threefold. First, he wants Russia to be acknowledged as a major player in world affairs, and the Middle East with its numerous crises is an excellent place for Putin to do this. Related to this goal is the fact that Putin seeks to replace American hegemony in the world with a multipolar world where Russia is a very important pole. Second, Putin seeks economic gain from Russia’s activities in the Middle East. This includes the sale of high-tech items as nuclear reactors (Iran), major infrastructure projects such as railroads (Libya) and sophisticated armaments (Iran,

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Syria, Libya). In addition, Moscow is seeking to acquire high technology imports, such as nanotechnology, from Israel, to help it set up the Russian version of Silicon Valley near Moscow. Putin also is interested in joint projects to develop oil and natural gas deposits in such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia (and possibly in Israel as well: see below) to replace dwindling Russian domestic supplies of such fuels. Putin’s third goal is to prevent the Middle East from being a source of support for radical Islamists active in the North Caucasus, in regions such as Chechnya and Daghestan. Putin’s policies after regaining the Russian presidency in March 2012, such as protecting the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad from serious international punishment and the Iranian regime from additional UN Security Council sanctions because of its continued enrichment of uranium and suspected weaponization of that uranium, clearly illustrates that he is continuing to pursue his old goals. Unlike Syria and Iran, Russia’s primary allies in the Middle East, Israel is a pro-American and democratic state. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. apparently oblivious both to Putin’s human rights problems in Russia and his support for Assad’s suppression of his population, as well as to Moscow’s arms sales to both Syria and Iran, sworn enemies of Israel, nevertheless warmly welcomed Putin to Israel. Why did he do this? There are four main answers to this question. First, unlike in Soviet times, Israel and Russia enjoy excellent bilateral relations, however problematic to Israel Russian support of Iran, Syria and Hamas might be. Trade between the two countries is approaching $3 billion a year; there are extensive cultural relations, primarily between Israel’s Russian immigrant population and Russia; a half a million Russian tourists visit Israel every year (where they can feel right at home with Russian language newspapers and Russian language TV readily available); Israel has sold military drones to Russia to help it after its poor military performance against Georgia in 2008; and above all, given Netanyahu’s Zionist ethos, the gates of Russia have remained open for Jewish emigration. A second factor relates to Israeli domestic politics. While polls have shown that the vast majority of Russian immigrants do not want to replace Israel’s American alliance with a Russian one, they do appreciate the fact that because of good bilateral Russian-Israeli relations they can easily fly back and forth between Russia and Israel, both for business reasons and to see family and friends who have remained in Russia. Consequently, maintaining good bilateral Russian-Israeli relations is helpful to Netanyahu as Russian immigrants currently form

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20 per cent of Israel’s population and are an important part of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition both in the Russian-based Yisrael Beiteinu Party, led by Israel’s Soviet-born Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and in Likud itself. Third, following the onset of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and 2011, which has brought Islamists to power in Tunisia and Egypt, both Israel and Russia share an interest in preventing the spread of Radical Islam in the Middle East, and it might be expected that intelligence cooperation on Islam was one of the topics discussed by the two leaders. Finally, Israel is developing its natural gas reserves off of its Mediterranean coast, and the first of the natural gas should arrive in Israel in 2013. This is fortunate for Israel because, following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak as Egypt’s President, numerous explosions in the pipeline from Egypt as it crossed the Sinai led to the severing of Israel’s natural gas agreement with Egypt which, before the fall of Mubarak, had supplied 40 per cent of Israel’s natural gas needs. Moscow’s interest in Israel’s natural gas production is twofold. First, Russia’s state natural gas company, Gasprom, has offered to help develop some of the natural gas fields off of Israel’s coast. Second, although current estimates of Israel’s proven reserves of natural gas are not that high, they could grow and Israel could become a natural gas competitor for Russia in sales of the fuel to Europe. From Israel’s perspective, the main challenge to the development of its natural gas fields is diplomatic, not technological. Turkey, which controls Northern Cyprus, objects to the sea boundary drawn between the Greek-controlled sector of Cyprus and Israel, and has threatened military action to defend its claims. While Turkey, which currently has a host of domestic and foreign policy problems from a Kurdish rebellion in South eastern Turkey, to the unrest in Syria, may just be bluffing; having Gasprom involved in the disputed area may serve as a diplomatic check against Turkey. Consequently, what might come out of the discussions with Gasprom is an informal agreement under which Israel would not sell natural gas to Europe, and Russia would help develop the natural gas in the disputed area. Under this agreement, both sides benefit, and Israel could sell any excess gas it produces beyond its domestic needs to Jordan, which was also badly hurt by the numerous Sinai gas pipeline explosions. Such an arrangement would reinforce JordanianIsraeli relations at a time of increasing domestic turmoil in Jordan as a result of the Arab Spring. Should Israel have any gas remaining after its sales to Jordan, it could sell the gas to Russia to help make up

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for its dwindling supplies which are needed both domestically and for export. While Netanyahu sees a number of benefits from close bilateral Russian-Israeli relations, so too does Putin. By being invited to Israel, an ally of the United States – the ostensible purpose was to help unveil a monument to Soviet soldiers who helped defeat Nazi Germany in World War II – Putin can demonstrate to the world that despite Russia’s lack of popularity in the Sunni Arab World because of its support of the Assad regime, Russia remains a major factor in Middle East affairs. Second, Israel’s Russian Orthodox churches and holy places are not only a major attraction for Russian tourists, they also reinforce Putin’s tie with the Russian Orthodox Church which has become a major supporter of Putin, as the Orthodox Church was to the Russian government during Czarist times. Indeed, in 2008 Putin had persuaded Israel to return Sergei’s House and Courtyard, a nineteenth-century hostel for visiting Russian Orthodox pilgrims, to Russian control. Third, the good bilateral ties enable Russia to draw on Israeli high technology from nanotechnology to military drones. Finally, if negotiations between Gasprom and Israel work out, Israel may become an energy partner for Russia. What was interesting to note in the Putin-Netanyahu talks, however, is that Putin did not appear to make any concessions on Russian policy toward Iran – the number one priority of Netanyanu – or in the supply of Russian weapons to Syria. This would appear to indicate that in the RussianIsraeli relationship, Russia clearly has the upper hand.

Conclusions The first conclusion that may be drawn from this study of Russian policy toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict is that Putin is following what might be called a ‘having your cake and eating it too’ policy visà-vis Israel. In other words, Moscow has been seeking to maintain good bilateral relations with Israel while at the same time providing arms and diplomatic support to Israel’s main enemies – Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah – in order to enhance the Russian position in the Middle East. So far, at least, Israel has appeared to go along with the Russian strategy, if only to prevent some of the most Russian threatening arms deals from being consummated, such as the SAM-300 agreement with Iran – a deal which Moscow canceled, albeit more because of its warming ties to the US, rather because of its relations with Israel – and the Iskander missile

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agreement with Syria. Thus Israel has agreed to attend the proposed Middle East peace conference in Moscow, stopped arming Georgia, and sold sophisticated military drones to Russia and even agreed to build a drone factory in Russia, while also carrying out extensive trade and cultural relations with Russia. Second, Putin has used the Arab-Israeli Conflict to try to thrust Russia back into the center of Middle East diplomacy. By calling for a Middle East peace conference in Moscow, and getting Israel to agree to attend, Russia can demonstrate it is again a factor in Middle East diplomacy. While given the current split between the Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah, each of which rules a separate section of Palestinian territory (although Fatah control is limited by the Israeli occupation), and the apparent unreadiness of the Netanyahu government of Israel to make any concessions on Jerusalem, the prospects of a successful peace conference in Moscow, if it is held, would appear to be limited. Nonetheless, for Russia, a major role in the peace process itself, rather than the conclusion of a peace agreement seems to be Putin’s primary objective, as he seeks to demonstrate that Russia is again a major factor in world politics. This is part of the reason why Russia maintains ties with Hamas. Third, Moscow has demonstrated a clear interest in expanding economic ties with Israel. Israel is a small, but high-tech country, and is a leader in computer technology and nanotechnology – precisely the areas that both Putin and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev see as critical to help develop the non-energy sectors of the Russian economy. And, these are areas which neither the Arab states nor Iran can be helpful to Russia, although Iran has sought to establish a nanotechnology sector of its economy. Russia has also sought to learn from Israeli experiences as it sees to modernize its army. Finally, there is the area of cultural relations between Russia and Israel. Moscow sees itself as the center of the Russian-speaking world, and Israel has the largest Russian-speaking population outside the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Putin appears to see the Russian-speaking community in Israel, made up of immigrants from the FSU, as a possible lever of influence inside Israel; and the ascension of Avigdor Lieberman, an FSU immigrant, to the position of Israel’s Foreign Minister (however limited his real influence), and Lieberman’s apparent eagerness to work with Russia, may reinforce Putin’s hopes that Israel’s Russian-speaking community will form a pro-Russian lobby in Israel.

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Nonetheless, the current Russian-Israeli relationship is a fragile one. Should Russia provide SAM-300s or Iskander missiles to Syria, as it already has agreed to sell the Yakhont missiles, either because of a new chill in US-Russian relations, or because the defense and arms sales lobbies in Moscow win the arms sales debate, one could expect a sharp deterioration in Russian-Israeli bilateral relations. Whether such an eventuality occurs, however, is a question only the future can answer.

Notes 1. On this point see, Robert O. Freedman, ‘The Partition of Palestine’, in The Problem of Partition: Peril to World Peace, ed. Thomas E. Hachey (Rand McNally: New York, 1972) pp. 204–205. 2. See Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1991). 3. See Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy toward Israel under Gorbachev (Praeger: New York, 1991). 4. These events are discussed in detail in Robert O. Freedman, ‘Russia and Israel under Yeltsin’, Israel Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1998) pp. 140–169. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ruth Sinai, ‘Lift restrictions on Russian tourists Ministers say’, Ha’aretz, 3 January 2005. 8. ‘Road Map with a stop in Moscow’, Trud, 28 November 2003. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Hereafter CDSP) vol. 55, no. 47, p. 18. 9. Grigory Asmolov, ‘Israel’s intelligence community will assist Russia’s’, Kommersant, 7 September 2004, CDSP vol. 36, no. 26, p. 23. 10. Yula Petrovskaya, ‘Russia is a collateral victim of terror in the Middle East’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 October 2004, CDSP, vol. 56, nos. 40–41, p. 3. 11. Cited in Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse of The Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin (Henry Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington: Seattle, 2001) p. 55. 12. Nabi Abdullaev, ‘Assad praises Russia, wins debt deal’, Moscow Times, January 25, 2005. 13. RIA, ‘Russian company signs oil, gas exploration deal with Syria’, March 21, 2005 [FBIS-RUSSIA March 22, 2005]. 14. Steve Gutterman, ‘Putin defends missile sale to Syria’, AP Report, The Moscow Times, 29 April 2005. 15. The two reports are found on the United Nations website.

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16. Cited in Resolution 1636 (2005), 31 October 2005, United Nations website, Security Council, 31 October 2005. 17. Interfax, ‘Lavrov voted for Syria resolution because her [Russia’s] views [were] taken into account’, 31 October 2005, FBIS-RUSSIA. 18. Scott Peterson, ‘Russia fuels Iran’s atomic bid’, Christian Science Monitor, 28 February 2005. 19. Cited in Nazila Fathi, ‘Iran says it won’t give up program to enrich uranium’, The New York Times, 6 March 2003. 20. These events are discussed in detail in Robert O. Freedman, Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record (The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College: Carlisle, Penna, 2006) pp. 20–35. 21. For a study of Russia’s policy toward terrorism, see Robert O. Freedman, ‘Can Russia be a Partner for the United States in the Middle East’, in NATO-American Relations, Ed. Aurel Brann (Routledge: New York, 2008) pp. 125–129. 22. Ibid p. 129. 23. Cited in Yossi Melman, ‘Putin to PM: Using force against Iran could end in disaster’, Ha’aretz, 22 October 2006. 24. Cited in Interfax, ‘Russia’s Ivanov: Issue of Hizbollah’s Russian weapons “closed topic”’, 20 October 2006, FBIS-RUSSIA, 21 October 2006. 25. Cited in Avi Issacharoff, ‘Russian FM calls international demands on Hamas “unrealistic”’, Ha’aretz, 22 October 2006. 26. Li’or Brun, ‘Israeli-Russian talks on planned $2 billion natural gas deal viewed’, Maariv, 19 October 2006, FBIS-MESA, 20 October 2006. The deal however was to fall through, in part because of growing Turkish-Israeli friction and in part because of a natural gas find off Israel’s West coast, north of Gaza. 27. Interfax, ‘Russia, Israel to set up working group on arms trade’, 26 October 2006, FBIS-MESA, 26 October 2006. 28. Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, ‘The Putin Visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan: Business promotion or Great Power Maneuvering’, in Johnson’s Russia List 15, 15 February 2007 (available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007–39–39.cfm). See also Russian and CIS Relations with the Gulf Region, ed. Mawat Terterov (Gulf Research Center: Dubai, 2009). 29. Mikhail Zygar, ‘Interview with Syrian President Al-Asad’, Kommersant, 20 August 2008, FBIS: MESA, 21 August 2008. 30. For a discussion of Soviet policy toward Syria during the Hafez Assad era, see Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991) 31. Cited in Vesti TV, ‘Russian Foreign Minister on Syrian Ties, NATO and Georgia’, 22 August 2008, FBIS-RUSSIA, 22 August 2008.

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32. Lili Galili, ‘Russian PM to Open Party Branch in Israel’, Ha’aretz, 21 August 2008. 33. Cited in ‘Russia Accuses Israel of Selling Arms to Georgia’, The Jerusalem Post, 20 August 2008. 34. Itar-Tass, ‘Russian FM Lavrov Praises Israeli Decision to Refrain From Assisting Georgia’, 19 August 2008, FBIS-RUSSIA, 20 August 2008. 35. Ria-Novosti, ‘Russian Nanotechnologies corporation to get R 54 billion in 2010’, 8 October 2009, World News Connection Middle East (hereafter WNCME) 8 October 2009. 36. Itar-Tass, ‘Russia Wants Lasting Peace in Middle East-Diplomat’, 11 August 2009, WNCME, 11 August 2009. 37. Ibid. 38. Charles Levinson, ‘Netanyahu’s Secrecy Sparks Anger’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 September 2009, Kommersant, ‘Israel: President Peres Interviewed on Mid East Peace Process, Russia Visit’, 18 August 2009, WNCME, 18 August 2009; and Barak Ravid, ‘Medvedev: I’ll Review Decision to Sell Iran Anti-Aircraft Missiles’, Ha’aretz, 20 August 2009. 39. Piotr Butowski and Anne Musquere, ‘Israel: Drone Sale to Russia Provides incentive for Domestic Industry: Russian Drones Evolving’, Air and Cosmos, 22 September 2009, WNCME, 23 September 2009. 40. Barak Ravid, ‘Russians Deal Lieberman “Slap” by Endorsing Goldstone’, Ha’aretz, 18 October 2009, Voice of Israel Network B, ‘Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Criticizes Russia on Gaza Report, Says Efforts to Continue’, 18 October 2009, WNCME, 18 October 2009; and Itar-Tass, ‘Russia Abstains on Goldstone Resolution’, 6 November 2009, WNCME, 6 November 2009. 41. Cited in Herb Kenon, ‘Russia won’t back “crippling sanctions”’, The Jerusalem Post, 25 February 2010. 42. See Agence France Press (hereafter AFP), ‘Ahmadinejad slams Russia for US “sell-out” over missiles’, Turkish Daily News, 3 November 2010. 43. See below p. 29. 44. AP report, ‘Russia to return $166.8 million for Sam-300 cancellation’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 October 2010. 45. Cited in Itar-Tass, ‘Israeli houses in East Jerusalem unacceptable’, 12 March 2010, World News Connection. 46. Cited in Interfax, ‘Middle East Quartet denounces Israel’s plans to build new houses in East Jerusalem’, 12 March 2010, World News Connection. 47. Ben Harman, ‘Did Peres’ “to Russia with love” mission miss the mark?’, The Jerusalem Post, 14 May 2010. 48. Cited in Ben Hartman, ‘Peres: Syria cannot arm Hizbullah and seek peace with Israel’, The Jerusalem Post, 12 May 2010. 49. Ha’aretz Service, ‘Medvedev to Hamas: Work quickly for Shalit deal’, Ha’aretz, 12 May 2010.

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50. Cited in AFP, ‘Israeli blasts Russian talks with Hamas’, Turkish Daily News, 13 May 2010. 51. Cited in Reuters, ‘Russia rebuffs Israeli rebuke over open relations with Hamas’, Ha’aretz, 13 May 2010. 52. Barak Ravid, ‘Israel to Russia: Hamas is like the Chechen terrorists’, Ha’aretz, 12 March 2010. 53. Cited in Interfax, “‘Israel to share experience in fighting terrorism with Russia: Defense Minister’, 6 September 2010, World News Connection, 6 September 2010. 54. Cited in Itar-Tass, ‘Israeli Vice-Premier optimistic over Middle East settlement’, 6 September 2010, World News Connection, 6 September 2010. 55. Cited in Yael Feter, ‘Israel signs $400 million deal to sell spy drones to Russia’, Ha’aretz, 14 October 2010. 56. Cited in AFP, ‘US against Russian missile sale to Syria’, Turkish Daily News, 21 September 2010.

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7 ISR AEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: BET WEEN 1 R HETOR IC AND R EALIT Y Raffaella A. Del Sarto

Israel’s relations to the European Union – and its predecessor, the European Economic Community2 – are complex and complicated. For an outside observer, repeated diplomatic rows and public quarrels seem to dominate the relationship, with both Israeli and European media eagerly reporting on every exchange of accusations. Undoubtedly, the weight of history has remained a major feature of bilateral ties. It tends to resurface in political disagreements and generally affects positions and policies of both sides, albeit to a different extent. A closer analysis of the bilateral ties, however, reveals a wide gap between what Israel’s relations to the EU seem from a detached, and rather diffused, perspective and the practice of this relationship. Focusing on a number of contradictions, this chapter assesses the main patterns that have come to characterise the bilateral ties between the State of Israel and the European Union, discussed here as the collective system that includes community institutions and the member states. Starting with an overview of the development of relations since they officially started in the late 1950s, this chapter will analyse the substance, dynamics and underlying reasons of these patterns. I conclude by reflecting on their implication for the future development of Israel’s relations to the EU.

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Israel and the EU: In the Beginning As has often been observed, the intellectual and cultural origins of the State of Israel lie in Europe. Indeed, the emergence of political Zionism, which ‘in brief, is the product of Europe’ (Laqueur, 2003: 592), at the end of the nineteenth century cannot be understood without considering European Jewish history. The Zionist core belief that only the establishment of a state of the Jews3 would solve the so-called Jewish question was a reaction to, and shaped by, the rise of European nationalism, coupled with the long history of persecution of Europe’s Jewish communities. It was the genocide of European Jewry that provided the most dreadful catalyst for the creation of the State of Israel and its international recognition. Concurrently, the first Jewish immigration waves to Palestine of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries predominantly originated in eastern and central Europe. Constituting Israel’s founding generation they were to leave a deep political and cultural imprint on the new state. This is the historical legacy against which Israel’s relationship with the European Communities (EC), founded in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, developed. The newly created State of Israel had been observing the European integration process with particular interest, and it opened a diplomatic representation to Brussels soon after the Treaty of Rome was signed. The relationship was to develop constantly, albeit not smoothly, in the following decades (see, for example Sachar, 1999; Pardo and Peters, 2012). From the outset, Israel maintained an ambivalent position toward the European Communities. On the one hand, and considering the monstrosity of the Holocaust that had just happened, the newly founded state preferred to keep its distance from ‘Europe’, and in particular Germany. Thus, the signing of the Reparations Agreement with Germany in 1952 occurred amid harsh protests in Israel; it would take another thirteen years until both sides would establish diplomatic relations. On the other hand, Israel was eager to seek cooperation with the newly founded EC, of which Germany was a founding member. The main reason was that the EC was an economic club comprising major European states, thus constituting Israel’s natural trading partner, and Israel was in dire need of trade and aid as it was facing the absorption of the immigration waves of the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, Israel’s quest for international legitimacy and wish to integrate into the organizational and political structures of ‘the West’ against the backdrop of the Arab-Israeli conflict

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motivated its desire to forge close ties with the EC – which at some point even entailed the consideration to apply for full EC membership (Pardo and Peters, 2012: 2–3). In this context, it is also worth recalling that in this period the country maintained excellent relations with another major European state and EC founding member, namely France. Indeed, not only did Israel and France, together with Great Britain, enter an alliance in their attempt to capture the Suez Canal from Egypt in the 1956 War, Paris also provided extensive military aid during this period, including assistance in building a nuclear reactor in southern Israel (Ziv, 2010). However, French policy toward Israel witnessed a reversal with de Gaulle’s ascendancy to the French presidency in 1959. In its dealing with Brussels, Israel aimed at attaining the status of associate member from the outset. It signed its first trade agreement with the EC in 1964, which was rather limited and thus far fell short of Israel’s aspirations (Pardo and Peters, 2012: 53 ff.). The Six Day War of 1967 was the first major incident in IsraeliEuropean relations, seeming to confirm Israel’s history-rooted suspicions toward the Europeans. In the period prior to the start of the war – termed by Israelis ha-hamtana (the waiting) – fears of a possible annihilation of the new state by Arab armies mounted high in Israeli public perception.4 Presuming a special responsibility of the Europeans toward Israel, the country deeply resented Europe’s diplomatic inactivity and its lack of support prior to and during the war. On the European side, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai in the 1967 War marked the starting point of shifting public perceptions of Israel, particularly among the European Left. Instead of supporting Israel as a small and regionally threatened state whose citizens had survived the Holocaust as had hitherto been the case, the country was now increasingly perceived as a colonial power displacing and oppressing the Palestinians. The rise of the Palestinian national movement under Yasser Arafat in the 1960s and its growing popularity in Europe during a period of decolonisation provided the background to the mounting European disenchantment with Israel. Those shifting sympathies may well have been anchored in the refutation of, and outright rebellion against, the imperialism and colonialism of the past of a new European generation. Thus, as Shindler (2011) points out, Israel’s policy towards the territories reinforced a preexisting attitude among the European Left. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the first Palestinian Intifada starting in 1987, which would bring the pictures of throw-stoning Palestinian youngsters confronting

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Israeli tanks into European living rooms, would tarnish Israel’s public image in Europe even further. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 was another major cause of Euro-Israeli disagreement. The government in Jerusalem reacted with bewilderment to the joint declaration of the nine EC member states issued after the war, which stressed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force, Palestinian legitimate rights and the need for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations within the United Nations framework. At that time, these principles were anathema to the government in Jerusalem. Israel also observed with concern the launching of the Euro-Arab dialogue against the backdrop of OPEC’s threats to stop oil exports to Europe. Yet, both sides signed a comprehensive agreement on free trade in industrial goods in 1975. Negotiations on this agreement had already started in October 1968, but it is still noteworthy that the signing of the agreement occurred shortly after the 1973 war, that is in a period of rather strained political ties. But it was particularly the EC’s Venice Declaration of June 1980 that provoked the ire of the Israeli government. The background of this declaration was, on the one hand, the lack of progress in Israel’s autonomy talks with the Palestinians, stipulated in the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords of 1978, together with the intensification of settlement construction in the occupied territories under Menachem Begin’s government. On the other hand, the Venice Declaration clearly reflected the attempts of EC member states to cooperate in the realm of foreign policy, which had started in the 1970s. Asserting the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, the Venice declaration called for the ‘association’ of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in future peace negotiations. It also stressed that the settlements in the ‘occupied Arab territories’, as the declaration termed them, as well as any changes in the status of Jerusalem were illegal under international law (European Council, 1980). Pointing to the terrorist nature of the PLO – at that time, the organization officially still advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state in all of mandatory Palestine, and it would take another eight years until it would formally accept the idea of partition5 – the Israeli government accused the Europeans of a profound anti-Israeli bias. Evoking analogies to European Jewish history, the Begin government claimed that Europe was putting Israel’s security at risk for the sake of Arab oil supplies. In retrospect the Venice Declaration was well ahead of its time, given that its principles were to become the standard of Arab-Israeli

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peace negotiations from the 1990s onwards. However, termed a ‘defining moment in the Israeli discourse and in the public distrust of Europe’ (Pardo and Peters, 2010: 9), the Declaration was to set the tone for political relations between Brussels and Israeli governments for the years to come. Over the following decades the EC would reiterate its positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. And there was no lack of occasions. Those included, for instance, Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, its handling of the first Palestinian Intifada and the continuous settlement expansion in the occupied territories. Governments in Jerusalem, in turn, regularly repeated the conviction that ‘the Europeans’ could not play any role in Middle East peacemaking as long as they embraced such (allegedly) biased positions. Interestingly, former Israeli foreign Minister Abba Eban seems to have coined this line while responding to the EC’s 1973 declaration (Pardo and Peters, 2010: 7). The beginning of the Oslo peace process in the early 1990s entailed a radical change in Israel’s relations with the European Union. The government of the late Yitzhak Rabin had explicitly requested European financial aid in support of Israel’s peacemaking effort, and Brussels was happy to heed these requests (Sachar, 1999: 342). Moreover, much to Israel’s delight, improved political ties prompted the EU to adopt its Essen Declaration in 1994, which stipulated that Israel should enjoy a ‘special status’ in its relations with the EU due to its advanced political and economic features (Council, 1994). The brief honeymoon in the first years of Oslo also resulted in the signing of a new agreement, an Association Agreement, in 1995. Moreover, in 1996 Israel started participating in the EU’s so-called framework programme for research and development, a status it has maintained until the present. This entails that through an Israeli financial contribution to the programme, Israeli research institutes may apply for EU funding for research and development on exactly the same terms as those based in EU member states. In return, Israeli governments became a bit less reluctant to the EU’s political ambitions in the peacemaking arena. For instance, they did not object to the activities of the then EU special envoy Miguel Angel Moratinos, who was frequently shuttling between Jerusalem and Ramallah in those years, promoting peace projects and discussing the present and future of Arab-Israeli peace. Subsequently, however, relations were to become increasingly complex and ambivalent.

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Patterns of EU-Israeli Relations How have relations between Israel and the EU developed over recent decades? Which patterns have become dominant in this relationship? As elaborated in the following, four main features came to define the bilateral relations. Firstly, there is a pronounced discrepancy between excellent economic ties and frequently strained political relations. Relatedly, and secondly, the practice of bilateral relations markedly differs from the rhetoric, with the media of both sides preferring to focus on disputes and quarrels. Thirdly, tense political relations between both sides are usually related to the question of how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian or wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, both sides differ in their preference of whether bilateral relations should be linked to progress in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Whereas Brussels has repeatedly (albeit not coherently) favoured such a linkage, Israel has been insisting on advancing bilateral relations in a sort of political vacuum, stressing its ‘special relationship’ with the EU instead.

Two Different Worlds: Politics and Economics While the initial years of the Oslo process prompted a significant rapprochement between Israel and the EU, the disputes returned the exact moment in which the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations entered an impasse. Most notably, this occurred under the first premiership of Benyamin Netanyahu from 1996 to 1999. Reflecting the belief in European capitals that Netanyahu was not particularly committed to the territorial concessions peacemaking entailed, the EU’s Luxembourg Declaration of 1997 called on the Israeli government to be more flexible so as to save the derailing peace process. Brussels also repeatedly criticised the Israeli government for dragging its feet in implementing further Israeli withdrawals from the occupied territories, such as those stipulated in the 1998 Wye River memorandum.6 The EU also started calling for an independent Palestinian state in its 1998 and 1999 declarations, thus profoundly upsetting the Israeli government. But particularly the Berlin Declaration of March 1999, which referred to Jerusalem as a corpus separatum in accordance with the 1947 UN partition plan, led to a harsh Israeli reaction. Netanyahu and his then foreign Minister Ariel Sharon plainly accused ‘Europe, where one third of the Jewish population perished’, of endangering the State of Israel and of undermining its interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2000).7

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Bilateral relations did not improve considerably in the following years, in spite of a short period of rapprochement following the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1999. Promising ‘a new dawn’ in Arab-Israeli peace making, Barak had withdrawn Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, signalled interest in negotiating with Syria, and resumed talks with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Yet, the expectations raised by Barak in European capitals (as well as in Israel) turned out to be very short-lived. With the outbreak of the second Intifada in late September 2000 and the collapse of the Oslo peace negotiations, tensions between the EU and Israel reached an unprecedented level. Brussels in particular denounced Israel’s harsh military response to the Palestinian uprising, which entailed curfews, closures, extra-judicial killings, house demolitions, administrative detentions, the destruction of infrastructure and, from 2002 on, Israel’s partial reoccupation of the West Bank. The EU’s repeated calls for ending the violence, respecting human rights and resuming negotiations met with a pronounced Israeli contempt for the Europeans’ alleged incapacity, or unwillingness, to understand the nature of the Palestinian uprising. Developing into a major disrupting factor in Israeli life, this Intifada was far more violent than the first one, featuring a massive number of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians that were mainly perpetrated by the Islamist Hamas.8 For Ariel Sharon, who defeated Barak at the polls in March 2001, the Intifada was a local manifestation of a global fight between the free world and (Islamist) terrorism. For him, there would be no peace negotiations ‘under fire’. Israel’s decision to treat the late Yasser Arafat as ‘irrelevant’ and to confine him to his Muqata headquarters also contrasted with the official EU position that Arafat was the elected leader of the Palestinian people. Thus, European officials continued paying visits to the ra’is, much to Israel’s annoyance. Furthermore, Brussels did not cease to underline the illegality of settlement expansion and the need for a two-state solution. For many Israelis, and certainly for Israeli governments, these positions at the height of the Intifada only seemed to confirm that ‘the Europeans’ lived on a different planet. In the best case, they were naïve and failed to understand both Israel’s security needs and the meaning of constantly living with terrorism. In the worst case, they were biased. The European criticism, on the other hand, mainly drew on the heavy toll that Israel’s counter-terrorism policies took from the Palestinians in terms of death and destruction.9 Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005 prompted a slight reconciliation between Israel and the EU. Not that

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Sharon was particularly popular in Brussels (or in other European capitals, for that matter), but the unilateral Gaza withdrawal seemed to entail a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking – erroneously, as it turned out. In support of the initiative, the EU offered financial aid and sent a border mission to the only crossing between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah. While supervising the implementation of procedures to which Israel and the Palestinian authority had previously agreed, the mission was relevant for EU-Israeli relations as the EU for the first time was involved in issues linked to Israel’s security.10 The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections of January 2006 brought Israel and the EU additionally closer, as Brussels aligned itself with the United States – and Israel – in boycotting the Hamas-led government until it would recognise Israel, denounce violence and abide by previous agreements. Yet, Israel’s war on Gaza in the winter of 2008–09 prompted the usual EU-Israeli exchange of criticism and accusations, with Brussels repeatedly seeking to pressure Israel to lift its economic blockade of the Gaza strip and to reach a permanent cease-fire (Tocci, 2009). Similarly, Brussels and the second and third Netanyahu governments, which were in office after the February 2009 and January 2013 elections respectively, do not exactly see eye to eye. EU criticism at the continuous expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the persistence of settler violence against the Palestinian population and the government’s attempts to legalise settlement outposts that are illegal even according to Israeli law11 has continued. In particular Israel’s settlement policies in East Jerusalem became a point of friction between the two sides. Pointing to Israeli policies of restrictive zoning and planning, house demolitions, and eviction of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem, an internal EU report accused Israel of ‘actively pursuing its annexation by systematically undermining the Palestinian presence in the city’ by ‘legal and practical means’ (EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah, 2010: 2). Subsequently the EU officially condemned those practices in its Council Conclusions of 2012 (Council, 2012a). Considering those settlements as legitimate Jewish ‘neighbourhoods’ in East Jerusalem and maintaining that Jerusalem is and will remain the undivided capital of Israel, the Israeli government’s response to the leaked report and the EU’s official position on this issue was, unsurprisingly, less than cordial. Thus, to use a British understatement, political relations were not exactly harmonious. Yet, economic relations between both sides present a completely different picture. With an annual trade volume of around

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€25 billion, the EU remains Israel’s largest trading partner. Even more importantly, economic relations have constantly been improving over the last two decades, entailing that Israel is enjoying a rather exceptional status vis-à-vis the Union and its member states. In fact, Israel is increasingly integrating into the economic rules, practices and programmes of the European Union without being a member state. Particularly the EU’s launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003–04 gave way to a significant deepening of bilateral economic ties. Israel was particularly well-suited to benefit from the new ENP policy, which offered the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours ‘a stake’ in the EU’s internal market, depending on their level of economic development and mutual interests. Moreover, the ENP did not make the deepening of bilateral relations conditional on any progress in Middle East peacemaking – at least not explicitly. This point was particularly very well-received by the Israeli government. Both sides soon started negotiating on the so-called ENP Action Plan, a document that set out a wide range of priorities for the development of bilateral cooperation (Commission, 2004). Considering the usual Israeli suspicion vis-à-vis European policy initiatives, European officials were initially quite surprised about the Israeli fervour to take part in the ENP. This time, there was a favourable constellation of personalities in Israel’s Foreign Ministry, with a group of senior officials seeing the opportunities the ENP offered. As the European offer seemed to come with no political strings attached, these officials pushed for significantly improving the country’s economic relations with the EU and its member states. The rather EU-friendly government of Ehud Olmert (who took over after Ariel Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2006) continued this line, and claiming that the ‘sky is the limit’ (Livni, 2006) in EU-Israeli relations, Olmert’s foreign minister Tzipi Livni soon became the champion of the cause. Further facilitated by the German EU presidency in 2007, EU-Israeli economic relations soon started to take off. So far, results have been impressive. With the EU Commission praising Israel’s role of an ‘active partner’ in the ENP (Commission, 2009), bilateral cooperation on almost every possible economic and financial issue is being discussed between Brussels and the government in Jerusalem – ranging from taxation to energy, money laundering and aviation. A number of important agreements have been signed or initialled. For instance, Israel joined the European satellite navigation programme Galileo in 2004, and in 2007, it joined the EU’s Competitiveness and

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Innovation Programme (CIP) under which the European Commission promotes innovative growth and entrepreneurship of small and mediumsized enterprises. In April 2008 both sides initialled a preliminary agreement on further trade liberalisation in agriculture and fishery, a policy field in which the EU has traditionally upheld protectionist policies.12 Israel and the EU started negotiations on the further liberalisation of services in 2008, and an agreement on liberalisation of aviation that laid the foundation for an open-skies policy was signed in February 2008. An additional agreement on civil aviation was signed in December of the same year, and negotiations on a more comprehensive arrangement resulted in the signing of an ‘open skies’ agreement in June 2013.13 These agreements are the reason of why different airlines, including low-cost carriers, can now fly the routes between Israel and EU airports that had hitherto been the prerogative of national carriers (and a limited number of charter flights). Brussels and the government of Ehud Olmert also signed a Joint Declaration on cooperation in education and training, and in July 2008 Israel joined the EU’s academic programmes Tempus and Erasmus Mundus. These programmes allow for student and staff mobility between universities within the EU and third countries, together with the establishment of joint graduate programmes. As noted above, Israel is already a member of the European research and development programme, entailing that cooperation between Israeli and European academics is increasingly the norm. Israel also became part of the EU’s Copernicus project, which develops satellites for the monitoring of the environment and of borders. It participates in a project of the European Space Agency. And it was invited to join the Single European Sky Research initiative, which works on the development of a management system for air transportation. At least since 2010, an agreement between the Israeli police and Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, has been under negotiation.14 It should be noted that this list is by no means exhaustive. Israel’s increasing integration into the EU’s internal market entails the approximation of Israeli norms and standards to those of the EU in a growing number of fields, such as phytosanitary products and civil aviation, a process that Brussels also supports financially (Commission, 2009: 17). While the adoption of the rather extensive body of EU rules and norms into Israeli legislation is certainly burdensome, it is highly beneficial to Israel. The main reason is that European or third-country companies may now increasingly take advantage of the EU’s single

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market by locating themselves in Israel. This is particularly significant in realms in which Israel has a comparative advantage, such as high tech, phytosanitary products or food-processing (Tovias and Magen 2005: 421; see also Tovias, 2007). Of course, particularly considering Israel’s advanced high-tech and bio-tech sectors, deeper trade relations and cooperation in the field of research and development are in the EU’s interest as well. Altogether, Israel’s increasing participation in the EU’s internal market has entailed a growing institutionalisation of relations as cooperation between Israeli ministries and the European Commission is becoming the norm. In March 2007, Israel requested an additional upgrading of relations, to which Brussels replied favourably in June 2008. Requesting an ‘advanced status’ in the framework of the ENP, Israel demanded to take part in additional EU policies and programmes (Pardo, 2008). Much to the astonishment of European officials, the government in Jerusalem had originally also requested participating in the EU’s Council meetings, the most important decision-making institution representing the governments of EU member states. The more realistic Israeli demand, which Brussels initially approved, included the establishment of ad hoc summits between the Israeli prime minister and his European counterparts, three meetings a year between the Israeli and European foreign ministers, periodic meetings between the Foreign Ministry director-general and his European colleagues, and a continuous dialogue at the professional level on peacemaking, strategic issues, counterterrorism and other topics (The Jerusalem Post, 8 December 2008). The then Foreign Minister Livni believed that the upgrade ‘opens up a new chapter between Israel and the countries of the EU’, which ‘faithfully reflects the strengthening cooperation between the sides based on common values and similar world views’ (quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 9 December 2008). Israel and the EU soon started discussing additional new venues of bilateral cooperation in all the areas under Community competence. A few months after Brussels had given the green light to Israel’s requests, however, the Israeli government started the war on Hamasruled Gaza, termed ‘Operation Cast Lead’. Soon afterwards, Netanyahu formed a right-wing government, following the Israeli elections of February 2009. Netanyahu’s initial refusal to commit to the two-statesolution profoundly irritated European governments and EU officials alike (he would accept the idea of a Palestinian state several months later, at least rhetorically). As a consequence, the upgrading of bilateral

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relations was put on hold – by mutual agreement, as the former head of the European delegation to Israel, Ramiro Cibrian-Uzal, was eager to stress (Agence France Press, 14 January 2009). However, the freeze, on which there is no official document, only concerns the upgrading of bilateral ties agreed upon in June 2008. The development of bilateral relations that was concurred beforehand is not affected. Thus, the bilateral agreement on further liberalisation of trade in agriculture and fisheries mentioned above was signed in November 2009 (The Jerusalem Post, 6 November 2009) and entered into force in January 2010. Concurrently, the Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Transport, Antonio Tajani, visited Israel at the end of January 2009 to discuss Israeli participation in European programmes on transportation, aviation and space (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2009). Israel and Brussels signed an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industry Products (ACAA) in May 2010, which – after some delay in the ratification process in the European Parliament – entered into force in January 2013. Containing a specific protocol on pharmaceutical products, the importance of this framework agreement is that conformity checks performed by the relevant Israeli authorities have the same value as those performed by EU authorities. The entry into force of this agreement constitutes a further crucial step of Israel’s integration into the EU’s internal market. Finally, the annual meetings of the subcommittees established under the Neighbourhood Policy resumed regularly in the winter of 2009, after the anticipated hiatus of, indeed, one year. A Gap between Rhetoric and Practice of Relations The political divergences are easily picked up by the media in both Israel and Europe, partially leading to a distorted picture of EU-Israeli relations. Particularly during Netanyahu’s first premiership in 1996–99 as well as during the first years of the second Intifada, bilateral relations were exceptionally tense with mutual accusations flying high (Dachs and Peters, 2005; Del Sarto, 2007: 66–67). Governments in Jerusalem usually replied sharply to the EU’s repeated calls to stop the excessive use of force, refrain from extra-judicial killings, facilitate humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, and reverse Israel’s settlement policy (see, for example, Council, 2002: 14–15; Council, 2003: 34–35). Besides aiming at the Achilles’ heel of the EU, that is, its political ambitions, Israeli governments also repeatedly accused ‘the Europeans’ of disregarding or outright endangering Israel’s security. According to the government in

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Jerusalem, the EU’s endorsement of the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the separation barrier was an example of such an act (The Jerusalem Post, 23 July 2004). The media also widely reported on the critical statements of EU representatives that, ironically, occurred while economic relations were improving considerably. These included the EU’s public condemnation of Israel’s continuous settlement expansion (Agence France Presse, 14 March 2008) during the EU-friendly government of Olmert and Livni. Similarly, EU officials denounced Israel’s ‘disproportionate use of force’ (Agence France Press, 2 March 2008) after the Israeli army killed sixty-six people in Hamas-ruled Gaza in response to rocket firing into southern Israel in March 2008. The Gaza war triggered an additional round of public quarrels. Initially Olmert had praised European leaders for their ‘extraordinary support for the state of Israel and their concern about its security’ (quoted in Gresh, 2009), but once the extent of the devastation in Gaza became visible, both sides resorted to the usual exchange of accusations. In an article published in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, then EU External Relations Commissioner, criticised Israel’s refusal to lift the blockade on Gaza by stressing that ‘holding a population of 1.5 million Palestinian hostage for acts, however dangerous and illegal, over which they have no control’ was ‘unhelpful’. She also regretted that the EU’s subsistence allowances to the Gaza Strip were blocked because the Israeli government did ‘not allow sufficient cash to enter Gaza’, a measure that undermined the EU’s strategy (Ferrero-Waldner, 2009). In return, Israel’s Foreign Ministry publicly asked the EU to ‘keep a low profile and conduct a quiet dialogue’, threatening (unsurprisingly, at this point) that ‘if these declarations continue, Europe will not be able to have involvement in the peace process’ (Agence France Presse, 30 April 2009). The EU’s initial endorsement of the contentious Goldstone report, which condemned Israel’s military offensive in Gaza and accused both sides of deliberate war crimes, also prompted a public dispute. Similarly, the harsh reaction from Brussels and other European capitals to Netanyahu’s initial refusal to endorse the two-state solution were widely reported in the media. Even after Netanyahu had accepted the idea of two states for two peoples in his speech at Bar-Ilan University in June 2009, Ferrero-Waldner remained critical of Israeli policies, notwithstanding the rhetoric. In this vein she remarked that ‘undermining the viability of a negotiated settlement, in particular by expanding illegal settlements and security perimeters, is unhelpful’ (with ‘unhelpful’ apparently being the ultimate diplomatic expression of EU disapproval).

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The suggestion of former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana of July 2008 to set a deadline for recognising the State of Palestine if negotiations failed to reach an agreement, and Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman’s public bashing of this idea, also attracted much attention. The Israeli media also reported extensively on Israel’s furious reaction to the comment of an EU official at the representative office in East Jerusalem who stated that European taxpayers paid most of the price of Israel’s settlement policy, which helped strangle the Palestinian economy and increased the Palestinian’s dependence on foreign aid instead (see Keinon, 2009). On the Israeli side, an editorial in The Jerusalem Post of June 2008 commenting on the envisaged upgrade of EU-Israeli economic relations tellingly summed up persisting Israeli perceptions of ‘the Europeans’. The editorial stated that the upgrading was important because, firstly, it reinforced Israel’s growing friendship with a number of key European governments and, secondly, it ‘complemented’ the EU’s financial contribution to the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees. Thirdly, the upgrade countered the EU’s ‘problematic engagement’ with the region, particularly its backing of Palestinian and Israeli NGOs that allegedly ‘pursue partisan activities that have a less than benign influence on the conflict’ (specifically mentioning the Israel Committee against House Demolitions and Adalah, the centre for Arab minority rights in Israel). The economic benefits that the upgrade entails for Israel were mentioned only as a fourth point. And finally, according to the op-ed, the upgrade promised a stronger Israeli leverage over the EU [sic] so that the latter would ‘take a firm stand against Hamas and Iran while coaxing Palestinian moderates to temper their demands so as to increase the chances of a bargaining breakthrough’ (The Jerusalem Post, 19 June 2008). While certainly not representing all Israelis, this editorial highlights the negative public perceptions of the EU in Israel while ignoring that reality is far more complex. It is worth noting that the op-ed was written before the Gaza war, that is, during a rather positive period of EU-Israeli relations. A final example of extensive media attention devoted to diplomatic quarrels revolves around the remarks of Catherine Ashton, the current EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, on a shooting incident at a Jewish school in Toulouse in March 2012 that left four people dead. The media widely reported on the ire that Ashton’s comments attracted in Israel, as she mentioned the dead children of Toulouse and those dying in Syria, Gaza and other places in the same sentence, with Israeli politicians

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condemning the comparison of those acts to Israel’s need to fight the terrorism of Hamas in Gaza. Ashton’s clarification that she had only meant to stress the tragedy of young people and children losing their lives, and that she had (allegedly) also mentioned the children of Sderot but was misreported, encountered far less media interest, at least in Israel. Diverging Visions of Peacemaking The discussion so far shows that the disagreements between Israeli governments and EU representatives mainly concern the modalities of peacemaking. The divergences between both sides on this matter may well be anchored in different histories and experiences; location and regional environment obviously also matter. Yet, while the extent of concessions to achieve peace is also disputed within Israel, EU-Israeli disagreements are particularly salient whenever a right-wing government is in power in Jerusalem. Of course governments also change in EU member states, with some being more sympathetic to Israeli positions than others. Interestingly, however, collective EU stances on Middle East peacemaking have not changed much since the EC issued its Venice declaration in 1980. While constantly stressing the commitment to Israel’s security and right to exist, Brussels never recognised the legality of Israel’s control over the territories conquered in 1967. In fact, before officially adopting the term ‘Palestine’ following the UNGA recognition of the Palestinian bid for non-member observer status in November 2012, the EU had publicly referred to the Palestinian territories as ‘Occupied Palestinian Territories’. This includes East Jerusalem, as EU declarations reiterate (Council, 2009; Council, 2012). While affirming the applicability of the 4th Geneva Convention, Brussels also considers the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as illegal under international law (unlike the US, which since the 1980s considers them merely as an ‘obstacle to peace’). Moreover, while explicitly supporting the two-state solution, the EU’s official position is that the separation barrier, where built on occupied land, together with house demolitions and evictions, are illegal under international law, in addition to being an obstacle to peace. It is important to note that the EU and its member states have invested considerably in this vision for Middle East peace ever since the Oslo process started, particularly in financial terms. Back then the EU acted in response to Israel’s request, as noted above, with the positions on peacemaking of both sides converging. The EU and its member states

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subsequently became the largest international donors to the Palestinian territories, financing infrastructure projects, institution building and the Israeli-Palestinian peace project, while also being the largest donors to UNRWA. With the outbreak of the second Intifada, EU humanitarian assistance increased. At the same time, the EU witnessed the destruction of the infrastructure that the EU and its member states had financed during the Oslo process by the Israeli army, such as Gaza airport. After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, and with the EU’s decision to boycott Hamas until it agreed to recognise Israel, abide by previous agreements and renounce violence, the EU set up a financial mechanism that permits the funding of the Palestinian territories while bypassing Hamas. In fact, the money is channelled through the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. Current EU funding also explicitly supports the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan that was presented by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in December 2007. Funds from the European Union thus cover the salaries and pensions of PA officials, support poor Palestinian families and finance projects in the realms of governance, social development, private sector development and public infrastructure. Until 2009, the EU also paid for the provision of fuel for electricity production in Gaza. To give some numbers, between 2000 and 2009 the European Commission sent over €3.3 billion in aid to the Palestinian territories. In 2007, when Hamas took control over Gaza, the annual aid peaked to €563 million. The EU contributes an average of €21 million a month to the salaries, pensions and recurrent expenditures of the approximately 85,000 Palestinian Authority employees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (with the EU also financing those Fatah officials in Gaza who do not work because of rival Hamas rule). In 2009, an additional €10.5 million were committed to institution-building, together with another €18 million for public infrastructure projects. An additional €22 million were earmarked for private sector reconstruction in Gaza. These figures do not consider the contributions of single EU member states.15 In addition to the financial investment, the EU expanded its political and even military role in the region over the last decade or so, starting with the above-mentioned third-party supervision at the Rafah crossing after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza (the mission is suspended since the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in July 2007). In the West Bank, the EU has been training Palestinian civilian police officers, criminal prosecutors and judges in the framework of its EUPOL-COPPS mission and

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other programmes. The expanded European security role is also visible in the revamped UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon following the IsraelHezbollah war of August 2006. Although not an EU mission, European troops now make up the bulk of the UN force. EU officials and European governments have also repeatedly stated that ‘Europe’ would be willing to contribute troops to an international peacekeeping force in the event of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal (see for example Eldar, 2009). Concurrently, however, public opinion in Europe has grown increasingly critical of Israeli policies toward its neighbours, and Israel’s willingness and commitment to genuine peacemaking has repeatedly been questioned.16 According to a Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2007, only 34 per cent of German respondents, 32 per cent of French, and 31 per cent of Slovaks favoured Israel when asked about the side with which they sympathise more in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel or the Palestinians. Only 18 per cent of Swedes and 16 per cent of Britons expressed their sympathy for Israel in the same poll.17 In Spain, Italy and Poland, the percentage of respondents that favoured Israel was even lower, namely 11 per cent for Spain and 9 per cent for both Italy and Poland (although these countries had an exceptionally high percentage of respondents who said they sympathised with neither side).18 Favourable attitudes toward Israel were slightly higher in the Czech Republic, with 37 per cent favouring Israel and 14 per cent sympathising with the Palestinians, while 6 per cent answered that they sympathised with ‘both’ and 26 per cent with neither side (Pew Research Center, 2007: 55). Hence, altogether, the identification with Israel’s position in the conflict with the Palestinians is very low among European publics – and in some cases notably lower than European sympathies with the Palestinian side. It should be noted that the survey was taken between May and April 2007, that is, before the Gaza war, which probably affected Israel’s standing in European public opinion even further – and not for the better. Although governments in Europe, and the EU as a whole, are still far more supportive of Israel than their respective constituencies, this trend is significant, with European academics and public figures increasingly questioning the logic of financing the Israeli occupation with European taxpayer money. The argument is that European aid to the Palestinians is in fact preserving the status quo, including Israel’s continuous settlement expansion. At the same time, EU assistance contributes to the continuous undermining of Palestinian democracy by supporting the autocratic Palestinian Authority whose democratic mandate expired

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several years ago. In this vein, it has been questioned whether the EU’s contribution to the reform of the security sector in the West Bank is compatible with the idea of state-building and the fostering of democratic governance, given that, de facto, there is no state or democracy to begin with (Bouris, 2012). Other critics have pointed out that while keeping the PA alive and the Palestinian population dependent on foreign aid, the EU in fact releases Israel of its responsibilities as occupying power under international law (Le More, 2008; Cronin, 2011). It should be noted that Israeli government officials or public figures (usually those espousing right-wing positions) often denounce the EU for its policies toward the Palestinians, thus adding to the absurdity of the situation. Of course, it is not clear which viable alternatives the EU would have at hand. Hence, it should be no surprise that Israeli governments that do not even pretend to engage in peacemaking according to at least some of the EU’s criteria – which correspond to principles of international law – will find themselves on a collision course with EU officials and European politicians alike. Terrorist attacks in European capitals may well have led to a greater European understanding of Israel’s situation in coping with endless Palestinian suicide bombings during the Intifada. However, statements or actions from Jerusalem that blatantly contradict the EU’s vision for peacemaking are a sure recipe for troubles. These include for instance the continuous undermining of the two-state solution by the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. And neither are the confessed conviction of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman – a settler himself – that Israel’s conquests in 1967 marked the beginning of Israel’s golden age vis-à-vis the Gentiles whereas the Oslo accords signalled the decline of Israel’s international status (Eldar, 2009) likely to contribute to EU-Israeli understanding. The question of Jerusalem remains particularly contested. In this vein, the Netanyahu government reacted with concern to an EU Declaration of December 2009 that stated that East Jerusalem may become the capital of a future Palestinian state (Council, 2009).19 In response, Israel’s Foreign Ministry stressed that Israel ‘expected’ the EU to ‘act to promote direct negotiations between the parties, while considering Israel’s security needs’ (quoted in Ha’aretz, 9 December 2009). Former ambassador to the UN Dore Gold, who now works for a think tank that espouses hawkish positions, was even less diplomatic by stating that ‘Europe seeks to divide Jerusalem’ (Gold, 2009), and Jerusalem’s mayor Nir Barkat repeated the same accusation (Ha’aretz, 9 December 2009). Brussels’

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repeated condemnation of Israeli policies in East Jerusalem under the Netanyahu government mentioned above is a further case in point. Yet, a growing European impatience with Israel’s attitude and regional policies is currently discernible, starting with the decision to suspend the upgrading of EU-Israeli relations of 2008. This decision has not been reversed, although Brussels agreed in July 2012 to further ‘the opportunities still offered by the current Action Plan’ and to pursue ‘update’ relations with Israel under the Current Action Plan, covering ‘60 concrete activities in over 15 specific fields’ (Council, 2012b: 2). However, a previous EU document stipulating this line of action was extremely critical of Israeli policies in the territories, particularly of the use of administrative detention and the settler violence that often goes unpunished (Commission and High Representative, 2012). Brussels has also become increasingly critical of how Israel treats its Arab minorities in the light of a number of recent bills of laws entailing (or cementing) discriminatory practices (ibid.). The contemplations of some European countries to present Hamas with different conditions for ending the boycott – such as the acceptance of the 2002 Saudi peace initiative – further supports the growing European intolerance of Israeli positions and policies. In this context, the EU has also been clear that, unlike the current Israeli government, it would be ready to accept a Palestinian unity government including Hamas. This would still depend on Hamas accepting a number of conditions which are, however, softer than those formulated hitherto (Council, 2011).20 Similarly, it is telling that all EU member states that were permanent or non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in February 2011 voted in favour of an EU resolution condemning Israeli settlement activities and demanding their immediate halt. This included France, Great Britain, Portugal and, most notably, Germany, which is traditionally very supportive of Israel.21 Expressing concern for the viability of a two-state solution, the Conclusions of the European Council on the Middle East Peace Process of 2012 were also rather explicit in their criticism of Israeli policies in the territories. Moreover, for over two years the European Parliament had been delaying the ratification of the 2010 EU-Israel Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) mentioned above, for political reasons.22 Concurrently, positions such as that of former Swedish minister Pierre Schori (2010) that ‘it’s time the EU told Israel that enough is enough’ are becoming more frequent. Finally, it is significant that in spite of massive Israeli lobbying efforts, only one EU member state, namely the Czech Republic, voted against the Palestinian bid for

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non-member observer status at the UNGA in November 2012, with all the other EU members either voting in favour or abstaining. On the Israeli side, there is a growing concern about the European tendency to criticise publicly Israeli policies, thus contributing to what Israeli governments perceive as the delegitimization of Israel.23 To give an example, the government in Jerusalem – and many Israelis as well – denounced the sharp European criticism of Israel’s raid on a flotilla sailing to Gaza to break the Israeli blockade of the Strip in May 2010, which left nine people dead. A common position in Israel is that the Europeans failed to understand that at least some of the alleged ‘peace activists’ on the flotilla had no peaceful intentions at all, but were Hamas supporters aiming at provoking Israel. At any event, governments in Jerusalem – and particularly hawkish ones – were always annoyed by what they consider European interferences into Israel’s internal affairs, and the Netanyahu government is no exception. Lieberman stressed this point in a less than diplomatic manner when he told the French and Spanish foreign ministers during a visit to Jerusalem in October 2010: ‘I do expect you to solve problems in Europe before you come here to teach us how to solve our problems’ (quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 10 October 2011). Linkage between the Bilateral Ties and Middle East Politics The last pattern in EU-Israeli relations is the disagreement over whether the bilateral ties should be conducted independently from regional politics, as Israeli governments prefer, or whether they should be linked to progress in the realm of peacemaking, or at least to the display of Israeli good intentions (since, of course, peacemaking not only depends on Israel). As mentioned above, after the start of the Oslo process the EU stressed Israel’s ‘special status’ in its 1994 Essen declaration – much to Israel’s delight. This development gave way to negotiations on a new free trade agreement, which was to be signed in 1995. Yet, by linking the agreement a posteriori to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process)24 that had just been launched, Brussels demonstrated that it considered economic concessions as a means to increase its influence in the Middle East peacemaking arena. Israel, however, was keen on preventing exactly that, preferring to rely on the US as the only broker instead – which had proved to be much more favourable to Israeli positions than the EU. But whereas the Barcelona Process remained formally separated from the Middle East peace process, developments in the latter

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determined the progress of the regional project de facto, along with the extent of EU-Israeli harmony, as we have seen. However, Israeli governments also saw some advantages in enhancing regional cooperation under an EU umbrella. As analysed elsewhere (Del Sarto and Tovias, 2001; Del Sarto, 2006, ch. 4), regional cooperation defied the position of Arab states that the normalization of relations with Israel depended on a comprehensive peace settlement. Israel’s participation in regional projects thus seemed to increase the country’s legitimacy. However, governments in Jerusalem also insisted on Israel’s ‘special’ status vis-à-vis Brussels, thus constantly lobbying for the separation of bilateral ties from regional politics. This position characterises all Israeli governments, irrespective of their political colour. Israel was accordingly very pleased when Brussels launched the bilaterally oriented European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003–04. The EU’s new policy not only promised to cut the linkage between bilateral ties and peacemaking Israel so much detested. It also offered the country the opportunity to take full advantage of the EU’s offer of a ‘stake in the EU’s internal market’ precisely because of its advanced economic status and well-developed relations to Brussels – as indeed happened. The EU, on the other hand, has been quite incoherent on the question of how to combine its bilateral ties with regional policies in the so-called southern Mediterranean. Nor has it been able to reconcile its political ambitions with its economic interests, particularly against the backdrop of its multiple historical legacies. The ambiguous coexistence of the regional Barcelona Process (now renamed ‘Union for the Mediterranean’) and the bilateral ENP is a case in point. Moreover, even the ENP, which high-ranking EU officials initially presented to Israel as a strictly bilateral policy that was supposed to be unrelated to regional developments (Verheugen, 2003), is not clear on this point. Thus, the main document of the ENP that defined the priorities of EU-Israeli cooperation, the EU-Israel Action Plan of 2004 (Commission, 2004), does refer to the modalities of peacemaking. However, although it specifically mentions the two-state solution and the respect for international law, the document is utterly ambiguous regarding any concrete condition or commitment (Del Sarto, 2007). The document stipulating the upgrade of EU-Israeli relations of 2008 reiterates the same principles of peacemaking, but again without being overly specific (European Parliament, 2008: 2). Some EU member states, most notably Britain, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, subsequently tried to introduce political conditions on which

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the advancement of EU-Israeli ties would depend (Keinon, 2008). As these efforts did not develop into a collective EU position, they remained without consequence. Moreover, after the Gaza war, the EU Commission tried to formulate demands to Israel for ‘unfreezing’ the upgrade of relations, including the commitment to the two-state solution, ‘visible evidence of the new government’s seriousness in pursuing the path of peace’, the lifting of the Gaza blockade and the halt of settlement expansion, house demolitions and evictions in the territories, including East Jerusalem (Ferrero-Waldner, 2009). But again, there was no consensus among the member states on this line of action, with the Czech Premier Topolek openly criticising Ferrero-Waldner’s stance during the Czech EU Presidency (Haaretz, 26 April 2009). The EU’s most recent attempt to reanimate the comatose Barcelona Process, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) initiative launched in July 2008, once more seeks to strengthen the regional dimension of EU policies.25 Israel’s position toward the initiative was predictable: On the one hand, the government in Jerusalem reckoned that independently of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, regional cooperation aimed at fostering economic development was in Israel’s interest as well. Regional cooperation could also increase the country’s legitimacy, particularly since Israel has a considerable experience in the priority fields of UfM projects, such as solar energy and the environment. On the other hand, Israel wanted to avoid that the Arab-Israeli conflict would become a legitimate concern of a Brussels-led regional initiative, possibly entailing a growing political role for the EU. This is also why the government in Jerusalem opposed the participation of the Arab League in the UfM from the outset. Following Israel’s 2008 offensive in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, all UfM meetings were suspended at Egypt’s request. With the UfM as good as irrelevant for the time being, Israel’s relations to the European Union continue to be dominated by excellent economic relations and, with another Netanyahu government in power, mounting political tensions.

Ambiguities and Explanations How can we explain the multiple ambiguities in EU-Israeli relations? One explanation is that economics drive the policy-making process in Brussels (Miller, 2006: 657–659) while politics is secondary. Certainly, much of Israeli industrial production is in high added-value sectors, and EU countries benefit from Israel’s advanced technologies. Israel’s

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participation in the EU’s research and development programmes must be seen in this light. But this is only one part of the explanation. Another reason draws on the set-up and constraints of EU foreign policy making. In fact, economic policies are relatively uncontested within the EU and a wide array of instruments and Community-driven policies are in place. The EU machinery therefore works relatively smoothly on these issues. Moreover, Israel is geographically close to Europe, and its economy is comparable to those of EU member states (it is worth stressing that Israel has recently been admitted to the OECD). The country has also a welldeveloped infrastructure and business environment, while maintaining a wide array of cultural relations with most European countries. All these factors are conducive to an easy development of economic ties. The EU-internal consensus on economics contrasts with the disagreement among EU member states on how much Israel is responsible for the failures of Middle East peacemaking, and how much pressure Brussels should exert. It is important to note that while the EU is obviously not a unitary actor or a state, its foreign policy predominantly necessitates unanimous decisions of all the union’s member states. Although, as noted above, the EU’s collective stance on the principles of Arab-Israeli peace has not changed considerably in the last two decades, they still remain the lowest common denominator among the member states, with some EU states being far more critical of Israeli policies than others. To give an example, in the 2009 voting in the UN General Assembly on the non-binding resolution recommending that the Goldstone report be referred to the UN Security Council, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia voted against the resolution. Malta, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia and Cyprus voted in favour, with the remaining fifteen EU member states abstaining. For some EU members that have been traditionally supportive of Israel, such as Germany and some Eastern European countries, history has remained an important factor influencing their positions. Moreover, the EU’s ambitions to play a greater role in world politics, with the Middle East and North Africa as the EU’s alleged ‘backyard’, must be factored in. Adopting Henry Kissinger’s dictum on Russian foreign policy, the EU’s attempts to find a political role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been termed a ‘cause looking for an opportunity’ (Miller, 2011: 5), with the Union’s instruments and institutional set-up hardly matching those ambitions. Inconsistent policies toward the Middle East and North Africa, such as the (regionally oriented) Barcelona Process and the (bilaterally oriented) ENP, are the result of conflicting aims,

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EU-internal divisions and the gap between EU ambitions and capabilities. These factors also explain the consistent contradictions between EU declarations and concrete policies. The most prominent example here is the inconsistency between the EU’s position that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are violating international law and the lack of resolve in implementing this principle as far as the treatment of Israeli products originating in the settlements is concerned. After many years of EU-Israeli quarrels on this issue, entailing that products from the settlements did enter the EU dutyfree under the 1995 free trade agreement, the EU eventually ‘convinced’ the Israeli side to specify on its export certificates the location in which the product originates. While giving in to Israel’s refusal to distinguish between Israel proper and the territories on the labels of origin, it is left to the EU customs authorities to verify whether that place is located within the Green Line or not. Off the record some EU officials admit that the percentage of detected products ‘made in Israel’ that enter the EU under the free trade agreement but are produced in the territories is relatively low.26 Thus, the EU held on to a technical agreement that lags far behind its declared position on the issue, even though the European Court of Justice (2010) confirmed that goods originating in the settlements (in this case, in the West Bank) do not qualify for preferential customs treatment under the 1995 EU-Israeli Association Agreement. Conversely, Israel’s strategy vis-à-vis the EU has been pretty linear. Due to history, it does not trust ‘the Europeans’ when it comes to ArabIsraeli peacemaking and Israel’s security. In the same vein, it perceives the EU’s political ambitions in the Middle East peacemaking arena as annoying – and partly immature, given the lack of adequate structures. Moreover, Israeli officials are eager to point out that the EU’s loud-voiced declarations on what Israel should and should not do negatively affect its credibility and standing in Israeli public opinion. Finally, governments in Jerusalem clearly perceive the EU of adopting double standards in its Mediterranean policy. Thus, Brussels repeatedly criticises Israel, but at the same time rewards Morocco with economic concessions in spite of the lack of democracy, or pampered Tunisia under Ben-Ali notwithstanding its grim human rights records. Israel’s main preoccupation has thus been to develop its bilateral economic relations with the EU. The country is also ready to concede Brussels some (limited) involvement in Middle East peacemaking, but only provided that the latter shows sensibility to Israel’s security concerns – and stops its criticism.

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Finally, journalists on both sides are visibly more interested in reporting about diplomatic quarrels, disputes and accusations in EU-Israeli relations – particularly if they relate to the highly emotional Middle East conflict – than in explaining the nature and implications of yet another cooperation agreement signed between both sides. The former is, arguably, far more interesting to the public than reports about the extent of Israel’s integration into the EU orbit, no matter that it is the latter that is far more relevant for defining the relationship in practice.

Conclusions and Outlook Israel’s relations to the EU are undoubtedly more complex and ambivalent than any judgement based on media reports alone would suggest. The most remarkable trait in these relations is the discrepancy between excellent bilateral ties and recurrent, and at times rather acid, political disputes. For instance, the calls for boycotting Israeli academia that have repeatedly been discussed among UK institutions of higher education may feature prominently in the news, prompting anger and disbelief on the Israeli side. The reality that is seldom mentioned is, however, that Israel is firmly anchored in the EU’s research and development programmes and that cooperation between Israeli and European academics has almost become the norm. In general, EU-Israeli quarrels over the persistent Israeli-Palestinian conflict are over-reported in the media, often without providing the proper context, whereas other dimensions of Israel’s relations to the EU remain in the dark. Yet, the most important development in recent years has been Israel’s gradual integration into the EU’s internal market. In light of Israel’s growing anchorage into EU rules, norms and practices that this process entails, the economic and political importance of this development cannot be underestimated. Thus, in some respects Israel is already an integral part of the EU’s orbit and flexible geometry, yet without being a member state. While the advanced bilateral ties have become the mainstay of EU-Israeli relations, regional cooperation projects under the Barcelona Process, or in any other format, are only an optional side show. Secondly, the development of Israel’s relations to the EU of recent years clearly demonstrates that Brussels only very timidly and inconsistently, if at all, embraces the use of economic concessions as political leverage. Indeed, political disagreements over Middle East peacemaking accompanied the whole period of deepening bilateral relations. The

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aftermath of the Gaza war, which witnessed harsh European criticism at Israel’s actions, but, with the exception of the freezing of the upgrade, did not affect business as usual, most clearly proves this point. In addition to a basic European schizophrenia vis-à-vis Israel, which is anchored in recent history, the main reason is that the EU is internally divided, which effectively prevents the necessary decision by consensus on any form of conditionality, let alone sanctions. This fact is far more relevant than any highly publicised EU criticism of Israeli policies. Although the EU and some of its member states have become increasingly impatient with Netanyahu’s positions and policies, it is rather improbable that the agreements signed so far, together with the growing institutionalization of relations, will be cancelled or reversed for the time being. By way of speculating about the future of relations, in the short and medium term more of the same can be expected. The modalities of peacemaking, and the degree of a meaningful Israeli commitment to the latter, will continue to be a contested – and well-publicised – issue in EU-Israeli relations, independently of the nature of bilateral ties in practice. Thus, Brussels will continue denouncing Israeli policies in the absence of any significant peace process, but Israel’s integration into the EU’s internal market is most likely to proceed, even if at a reduced pace. However, it is naïve to believe that prolonged EU-Israeli divergences on peacemaking will remain without consequences for bilateral relations in the long run. For one, European publics are increasingly unsympathetic toward Israeli policies, and newer generations may no longer accept the European burden of history. Secondly, the competences of the European Parliament in the EU’s external relations after the reform of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty have grown, with the Parliament being traditionally more sensitive to human rights issues and thus sceptical toward Israeli policies in the territories than EU member states or the Commission. At the same time, Israel’s growing perception that EU criticism is an attempt to delegitimise Israel – which may also serve as a convenient strategy for dismissing and actually delegitimising that same criticism – does not bode well for the future of bilateral relations. Former Israeli ambassador to the EU Oded Eran (2009) argued that in the long term talks with the Palestinians on a two-state solution afford Israel its sole defence against eroding relations with the EU. Former champion of EU-Israeli rapprochement Tzipi Livni (quoted in Eldar, 2009) put it more bluntly: ‘If there is no progress toward an [Israeli-Palestinian peace] agreement, all the commitments we received from the Europeans will go down the tubes’.

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Notes 1. This chapter partly expands on Del Sarto, 2011. 2. Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, followed by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) under the Treaties of Rome in 1957. While from the outset it became customary to refer to the EU’s predecessor as the ‘European Communities’ (or also ‘European Community’), the official merger of the three communities took place in 1967, thus legally establishing the ‘European Communities’ (EC). The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 replaced the European Communities with the ‘European Union’ while further expanding economic integration and cooperation of the by-then 15 member states. 3. The correct translation of Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat is ‘the State of the Jews’, and not ‘the Jewish State’ (as the title is translated into English). Both terms may have very different meanings. 4. Ha-hamtana described the period of rising tension between mid-May 1967, when the first reports of Egyptian troops entering Sinai surfaced, and the start of the war on 5 June 1967. 5. A remarkable shift in the PLO’s position had already occurred in June 1974, as the PLO had declared its objective to establish a ‘fighting national authority’ on any Palestinian soil vacated by Israel. The PLO’s official commitment to the ideas of partition and peaceful coexistence with Israel, however, would occur only 14 years later, with the adoption of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence at the closing session of the 19th Palestinian National Council on 15 November 1988. The declaration for the first time explicitly recognized UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; Arafat also explicitly renounced all forms of terrorism during a press conference following the UN General Assembly of December 1988 (Sayigh, 2011: 322 ff. and 619–625). 6. The Wye River Memorandum contained the Israeli commitment to implement the earlier Oslo II accords. 7. The 1999 Berlin Declaration under the German EU presidency was apparently aimed at ‘compensating’ the Palestinian Authority in return for delaying the envisaged unilateral declaration of an independent Palestinian state, together with substantially increased funding. 8. Around 80 suicide bombings against Israeli civilians were carried out by different Palestinian factions between the end of September 2000 and the end of October 2010. These attacks, together with shooting, stabbing, or the intentional killing by other means, claimed more than 700 Israeli civilian victims in that period. In addition, over 330 Israeli security force personnel were killed in Palestinian attacks, bringing the total number of Israeli casualties to over 1,000. Data from Israel’s Foreign Ministry, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Pale

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

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stinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm and B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Palestinian territories, at http://www.btselem. org/english/Statistics/Casualties.asp; both accessed 15 November 2010. Between early 2001 and January 2006 over 2,900 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces in the occupied territories; more than 1,400 of them did not take part in hostilities at the time they were killed. Another 182 people were the object of targeted killings in that time span. Regarding another 445 Palestinians killed by the Israeli army or police between 2001 and 2006, it is not known whether they took part in the hostilities. Data from B’Tselem, at http://old.btselem.org/statistics/english/, accessed 12 January 2011. Formally, the Palestinians were in charge of the border crossing, but Israeli officials observed the crossing via close-circuit cameras and could request from the Palestinians to detain, or deny entry to, suspected terrorists. In the event of disagreement, European officers made the final decision. The EU border mission has been suspended since Hamas took control of the Strip in July 2007. The vast majority of experts in international law, together with the relevant UN resolutions, maintain that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are illegal under international law. Israel disputes this, claiming that the 4th Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of civilians to occupied territories, is not applicable to the Palestinian territories since they have never been part of an independent state. However, Israeli law is clear in defining the socalled outposts established autonomously by settlers without any authorization of the government, as illegal. Israel is not the only country to have obtained concessions in this field; the EU also signed an agreement with Morocco on trade liberalization in agriculture and fisheries. See the website of the EC’s DG Transport at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ air_portal/international/pillars/common_aviation_area/israel_en.htm The agreement is on hold because both Israel’s Public Security Ministry and its National Police Headquarters are situated in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood in East Jerusalem; EU cooperation with those institutions would thus contradict the official EU position of not recognizing Israeli control over those areas. See Ha’aretz, 3 May 2010. These figures are official EU figures. See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/ neighbourhood/country-cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/occupied-palestinian-territory_en.htm, accessed 21 June 2012; http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/ westbank/eu_westbank/political_relations/index_en.htm#, accessed 9 February 2011; and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/occupied_palestinian_territory/ ec_assistance/eu_support_pa_2000_2009_en.pdf, accessed 18 June 2010. Of course this line of criticism is also voiced from within Israel. 21 per cent of Germans favoured the Palestinians, 3 per cent ‘both’, and 34 per cent ‘neither’; in the case of France the numbers were 43 per cent in favour

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of the Palestinians, 4 per cent favouring ‘both’ and 16 per cent neither. 29 per cent of Swedish respondents expressed their sympathy for the Palestinians, 7 per cent for both, and 28 per cent for neither. 29 per cent of Britons favoured the Palestinians, 9 per cent both sided, and 26 per cent neither. 34 per cent of Spanish respondents said they did not sympathize with either side, 27 per cent favoured the Palestinians and 14 per cent ‘both’. A staggering 50 per cent of Italians did not favour either side; the percentage in favour of the Palestinians was 16 per cent while 12 per cent sympathised with ‘both’. In the case of Poland, 48 per cent of respondents did not sympathise with ether side, 13 per cent supported the Palestinians, and 9 per cent sympathised with both sides. The Israeli government reacted with a particular outrage to a leaked previous draft of the declaration that stipulated the EU’s recognition of East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. These conditions include the following: Mahmoud Abbas will be the representative of the Palestinians in peace negotiations and the new government will be composed of independent figures. The declaration also specifies that the new Palestinian government should uphold the principle of non-violence, and remain committed to achieving a two-state solution and to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel’s legitimate right to exist.’ Interestingly, the declaration states that the ‘EU’s ongoing engagement with a new Palestinian government will be based on its adherence to these policies and commitments’ (Council, 2011: 2, my italics). The US was the only member of the UNSC vetoing the resolution. The European Parliament ratified the agreement in October 2012. On the rather broad definition of what delegitimisation entails, see the report of the Reut Institute (2010), a think tank that is ideologically close to the Netanyahu government. Comprising the EU and originally 15 states on the southern rim of the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process aimed at creating a zone of peace, stability, and prosperity, according to the EU’s solemn declarations. It aimed at developing bilateral trade relations that should subsequently develop into a free trade area, and established regional cooperation projects. For different assessments of the Barcelona Process and its failures see for example Adler et al., 2006. On Israel’s position toward, and role in, the emerging UfM initiative see Del Sarto, 2011. An additional problem is that it has remained difficult for European customs officials to verify whether an Israeli company has indeed its production site in, say, Tel Aviv, as the origin label may state, or possibly in its branch in a settlement in the territories.

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References Adler, Emanuel, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford, and Raffaella A. Del Sarto, eds. (2006) The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bouris, Dimitris (2012) ‘The European Union’s Role in the Palestinian Territories: State-building through Security Sector Reform?’, European Security 21(2): 257–27. Commission of the European Communities (2004) ‘EU/Israel Action Plan, final’, published 9 December 2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_ plans/israel_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, last accessed 3 December 2009. Commission of the European Communities (2009) ‘Progress Report Israel’, Brussels, 23/04/2009, SEC(2009) 516/2 at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/ sec09_516_en.pdf Commission of the European Communities and High Representative of the Euorpean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2012) ‘Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Israel: Progress in 2011 and Recommendations for Action’, Joint Staff Working Document, Brussels, 15.5.2012, SWD(2012) 115 final. Council of the European Union (1980) ‘Venice Declaration on the Middle East’, Venice European Council 12–13 June 1980, 13 June 1980, available at http://unispal. un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/FEF015E8B1A1E5A685256D810059D922, accessed 25 January 2011. ——— (1994) ‘Extracts of the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Essen European Council’, 9 and 10 December 1994, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 2/95, p. 28. ——— (2002) ‘European Council Declaration on the Middle East’, Copenhagen European Council, 12–13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Annex III. ——— (2003) ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Brussels European Council 20 and 21 March 2003. ——— (2009) ‘Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process’, 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 8 December 2009; at http://www.consilium. europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/105545.pdf, accessed 2 February 2011. ——— (2011) ‘Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process’, 3091st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 23 May 2011; at http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122165.pdf ——— (2012a) ‘Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process’, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012; at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/ articles/en/article_12170_en.htm, accessed 1 June 2012. ——— (2012b) ‘Eleventh Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council: Statement of the European Union’, 12938/12, Presse 353, Brussels, 24 July. Cronin, David (2011) Europe’s Alliance with Israel: Aiding the Occupation, London: Pluto. Dachs, Gisela, and Joel Peters (2005) ‘Israel and Europe, the Troubled Relationship: Between Perception and Reality’, in Roby Nathanson and Stephan Stetter (eds.) Reader of the Israeli-European Policy Network, pp. 317–333, Tel Aviv: Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Del Sarto, Raffaella A. (2011) ‘Plus ça change...? Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics 16(1): 117–134.

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——— (2007) ‘Wording and Meaning(s): EU-Israeli Political Cooperation according to the ENP Action Plan’, Mediterranean Politics 11(1): 59–74. ——— (2006) Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, New York, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Del Sarto, Raffaella A., and Alfred Tovias (2001) ‘Caught between Europe and the Orient: Israel and the EMP’, The International Spectator (36)4: 61–75. Eldar, Akiva (2009) ‘Continental Divide’, Ha’aretz online edition, 23 April 2009. Eran, Oded (2009) ‘A Reversal in Israel-EU Relations?’, Strategic Assessment 12(1), June 2009, Tel Aviv: Institute for Strategic Studies, available at http://www.inss.org.il/ upload/(FILE)1244445178.pdf, accessed 1 December 2009. EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah (2010) Report on East Jerusalem, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/10_01_11_eu_hom_report_ on_east_jerusalem.pdf, accessed 31 May 2011. European Court of Justice (2010) Case C-386/08: Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 25 February 2010. European Parliament (2008) ‘Eighth Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council’, Luxembourg, 16 June 2008, Statement of the European Union. Available at http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/association_counc/ association_council.pdf, accessed 24 January 2011. Ferrero-Waldner, Benita (2009) ‘The Offer on the Table’, Ha’aretz, 17 April 2009. Gold, Dore (2009) ‘Europe Seeks to Divide Jerusalem’, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, December. Gresh, Alain (2009) ‘Gaza War Changes Middle East Equation at Israel’s Expense’, Le Monde Diplomatique, online edition, February 2009, available at http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/02gazawar accessed 15 June 2013. Keinon, Herb (2008): ‘Amid Displeasure with UK, Olmert to Go to London’, The Jerusalem Post, 10 December 2008 ——— (2009) ‘Israel Fumes at EU for Saying Its Taxpayers “Bear Settlement Burden”’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2009. Laqueur, Walter (2003) The History of Zionism, London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, third edition. Le More, Anne (2008) International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money, London: Routledge. Livni, Tzipi (2006) ‘Israeli-European Relations’, keynote speech delivered at the international conference on ‘Israel and the European Union in the Enlarged Neighbourhood’, organised by the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society at Ben-Gurion University and the Israel office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Jerusalem, 11 December 2006. Miller, Rory (2006) Troubled Neighbours: the EU and Israel, Israel Affairs 12(4): 642–664. ——— (2011) Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinains since 1967, London: Hurst. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel (2000) ‘Reactions by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Sharon on the EU Statement on Jerusalem, 25 March 1999, in Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, Vol 17: 1998–1999, Document 154, Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1998–1999/, accessed 5 December 2009.

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——— (2009) ‘Vice-President of EU Commission Visits Israel’, 27 January 2009, also available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/ MFA+Spokesman/2009/Press+releases/EU_commissioner_for_transport_visits_ Israel_27_Jan_2009.htm Pardo, Sharon (2004) ‘Narrowing Gaps’, The Jerusalem Post, 2 January 2004, p. 9. ——— (2008) ‘Toward and ever Closer Partnership: A Model for a New EuroIsraeli Partnership’, EuroMeSCo Paper 72, October, Lisbon: IEEI / EuroMeSCo Secretariat Pardo, Sharon, and Joel Peters (2010) Uneasy Neighbours: Israel and the European Union, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. ——— (2012) Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Pew Research Center (2007) ‘Global Unease with Major World Powers: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey’, The Global Attitudes Project, June 2007, at http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/256.pdf, accessed 7 February 2011. Phillips, Leigh (2009) ‘Israel Believes War Won’t harm EU Relations Upgrade’, EU Observer, 7 January. Available at http://euobserver.com/9/27357, accessed 3 March 2010. Reut Institute (2010) ‘Building a Political Firewall against Israel’s Delegitimization: Conceptual Framework’, Tel Aviv, March 2010, available at http://reut-institute. org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf, accessed 25 February 2011. Sachar, Howard M. (1999) Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Sayigh, Yezid (2011) Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993, reprinted 2011, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shindler, Colin (2011) Israel and the European Left: Between Solidarity and Delegitimisation, New York: Continuum. Tocci, Nathalie (2009) Active but Acquiescent: The EU’s Response to Israel’s Military Offensive in the Gaza Strip, Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, May 2009. Tovias, Alfred (2007) ‘Spontaneous vs. Legal Approximation: The Europeanization of Israel’, European Journal of Law Reform, Vol. IX, no. 3, pp. 485–501. Tovias, Alfred, and Amichai Magen (2005) ‘Reflections from the New Near Outside: An Israeli Perspective on the Economic and Legal Impact of EU Enlargement’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 399–425. Verheugen, Günter (2003) Speech Delivered at a Conference on ‘EU Enlargement and Israel’, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 15 June 2003. Ziv, Guy (2010) ‘Shimon Peres and the French-Israeli Alliance, 1954–1959’, Journal of Contemporary History 45(2): 406–429.

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8 ISR AEL AND BR AZIL: AN EMERGING POWER AND ITS QUEST FOR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Samuel Feldberg

Introduction Although Brazil is not a ‘Great Power’, as suggested by the title of this volume, its participation has been of utmost importance in the creation of the state of Israel. Brazil and Israel have not had enough in common to develop a very close relationship. Indeed they are located far apart, have absolutely different scales of size, economy and population, and yet have a rich history of diplomatic relations, mostly related to perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During recent years Brazil has tried to promote its role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, especially in the case of the Iranian nuclear problem, but with very poor results. Relations between the two countries have been mostly influenced by two factors: the ethnic aspect which is derived from the small but very active Jewish community living in Brazil for several decades (centuries if we consider the emigration of Marranos1 during the Portuguese period); the economic interests of Brazil, which were heavily dependent until a few years ago on expensive imported oil and the generating of foreign currency through exports to the Arab world.

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The History The beginning of the relationship between the two countries was initiated during the troubled period that led to World War II, and Brazil’s sympathy for the German Reich before its alignment with the United States. According to Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro, the Brazilian author of Citizen of the World, the governments of Getulio Vargas (1937–45), from the pre-war period up to the end of World War II, and that of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946–51), which covered the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel, showed a dubious moral pattern, occasionally reflected in the action of anti-Semitic bureaucrats that blocked Jewish immigration first from Nazi Germany, then occupied Europe and finally Holocaust survivors. It was not uncommon for diplomatic documents to mention such terms as ‘racial purity’ or ‘Aryanism’ (Carneiro, 2010: 259). As Brazil wished to maintain the image of a ‘democratic country’, most of the diplomatic correspondence dealing with the subject of immigration limits was secret. One such document expressed ‘the fear that Jews will transform Brazil into the Jewish Homeland, something they have been unable to do even in Palestine.’ The position was made selfevident at the Evian Conference2 of 1938 where, in spite of declarations in favour of humanitarian values, Brazil made it clear that it did not want Jews to come. Thus, a country famous for its cordiality behaved as did most countries around the world – a dark chapter that eventually led to the founding of the State of Israel.3 Following the creation of the United Nations, Brazil’s aspirations were based on its participation in the war. As a strategic ally of the US, it permitted the access of American aeroplanes to the North African theatre of war. Its forces fought side by side with the Americans in Italy. Already in 1943 President Roosevelt had invited Brazil to participate in the soon to be created United Nations. However, the first symptoms of the Cold War were already apparent and this would prove fatal for Brazil’s designs. The Soviet Union viewed Brazil as being too much aligned with the United States to merit a permanent seat in the Security Council. As a ‘consolation prize’, Brazil was granted the right to open the UN General Assembly which would be so crucial as this was the session that voted for the Partition of Palestine in November 1947. In spite of the growing international tension that followed the end of World War II, the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union spared the Middle East, at least until the mid-1950s. Both superpowers

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voted for the partition, which influenced Brazil’s vote. Brazil’s foreign policy had been aligned with the US, and always followed American voting patterns in the UN. Indeed in a pattern that was maintained for approximately three decades, Brazil only practised a degree of independence when the balance of forces in the international arena was not at stake. The safe appointment of Oswaldo Aranha4 as chief of the Brazilian mission to the UN, whose declared pro-American tendencies were wellknown, would have a significant impact.5 An extraordinary session of the General Assembly was requested by Great Britain in order to initiate a committee which would prepare a report on the Palestinian Question and submit it. A United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was therefore established with Oswaldo Aranha being instrumental in defining the British proposal as the only one for consideration. He blocked Arab demands for a discussion about the immediate independence of Palestine. Two different conclusions emerged from the Committee’s work, a ‘majority’ one in favour of partition and the creation of Jewish and Arab states, and a ‘minority’ one which advocated the creation of a federal State composed of two political units, Arab and Jewish. The vote on partition was to due to be taken on the afternoon of 26 September, and it was believed that there were not sufficient votes for its approval – a two-thirds majority was required. Oswaldo Aranha’s intervention was crucial. In a very unusual move, he suspended the session at 6.30 p.m. claiming that there was not enough time for all the designated speakers to come forward. There was a holiday on 27 November, and on 28 November France asked for another postponement, which was again accepted by Aranha. By the time the historic session took place on 29 November 1947, the Zionists had managed to accumulate sufficient votes for the approval of UN Resolution 181. This supported the partition of Palestine, the protection of the Holy Places and a United Nations trusteeship over Jerusalem. Brazil voted for partition, and justified its vote saying: ‘whatever the criticism for partition – and they are justified when related to the difficulties in implementation of the political separation and economic unity – it cannot be denied that partition was, among the options, the only viable one’.6 Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, at the time a young third-secretary at the Brazilian mission, declared years later that: ‘Brazil would have preferred a one liberal state solution in which Jews and Arabs could live together. As they could not, it was necessary to recognize that they would have to

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live apart, each one in its own state. These were not the words but the sense behind the vote.’7 But although Aranha’s ability in rationalizing the procedures so as to optimize the probability to approve the plan cannot be questioned, it is not at all clear that his behaviour was related to his personal convictions. Aranha was pro-American and has worked very hard to secure Brazil’s alliance with the US during World War II. President Vargas, however, insisted on ‘pragmatic equidistance’; at the time of his appointment to the UN, Aranha was concerned because Brazilian support for US positions at the UN had brought very little reward. In the initial phases of the Cold War, Brazilian diplomacy at the UN could be a way of restoring the respect that Brazil believed it deserved. So, in spite of allegations of Aranha’s partiality, and the recognition of his effort by Jewish communities around the world, it is reasonable to assume that his main interest was in presenting Brazil in the most favourable light towards the US, cooperating whenever there was not too expensive a price to be paid. The next challenges faced by the new state related to an acceptance of the armistice lines as at least temporary borders, the problem of the proposed return of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Brazil recognized Israel de jure only in May 1949, but abstained in the UN session that admitted Israel as a sovereign member in May 1949, despite its support of universal membership. This can be understood through Brazil’s support for clarifications regarding the administration of Jerusalem and a solution of the refugee question, which had not been answered by Israel. In addition there was the suspicion of members of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry regarding the ‘high incidence of the extreme left in Israel’s government’.8 Brazil’s behaviour can be understood to have been mainly influenced by the issue of Jerusalem, as indicated by the correspondence exchanged during the subsequent two decades between the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its foreign posts around the world. One of the main influences was that of the Vatican, which played a role not only in Brazil but also in the approach of several other Latin American countries. In 1949 Brazil voted in favour of the creation of UNRWA and insisted on the internationalization of Jerusalem, which was accepted by neither Israel nor Jordan. The Brazilian delegation, however, expressed its intention of accepting a plan that could offer a minimum of guarantees to the Sacred Places – free access and freedom to worship. The issue of Jerusalem would characterize the diplomatic relations between the two countries as Israel would try to legitimize its presence

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in the city. By 1963 Israel would unofficially lobby for Brazil to move its embassy to the city, arguing that several Latin American countries (Venezuela, Panama, Uruguay and Guatemala) had all done so. It offered in exchange ‘a suitable building, compatible with the importance of the diplomatic mission’. In spite of some practical proposals to accept the fait accompli and move the embassy, the decision makers at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry decided that accepting the proposal (which had not been implemented by any of the major powers) would mean accepting an imposition of the geopolitical situation. It would contradict Brazilian votes for the internationalization of Jerusalem, which supported the Vatican’s position. Brazil being the largest Catholic country in the world certainly did not wish to antagonize the Vatican – and it was common knowledge that Rome’s position on Jerusalem would not change. But in spite of the refusal to move its embassies to Jerusalem, several countries were facing pressure by Israel to at least conduct part of their affairs in the city. When the ‘Basic Agreement for Technical Cooperation’ had to be signed in 1962, Israel’s ambassador argued that other agreements had been signed by several countries in Jerusalem. If Brazil was unable to do the same, it would seriously jeopardize Israel’s efforts towards acceptance of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.9 The countries that bowed to Israel’s admonitions benefited from some kind of assistance. These were mostly African countries dependent on Israeli agricultural expertise. In the case of the aforementioned agreement, which dealt with atomic research and the peaceful use of atomic energy, Brazil did not want to politicize a technical agreement that would be of benefit to both countries. Indeed by negotiating with Israel, Brazil was automatically reinforcing its recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. Eventually the agreement would be signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1966. The next significant episode affecting both countries would be the Suez War in October 1956. The unexpected cooperation between the US and the USSR in the Security Council during the Suez crisis permitted a swift decision, based on a resolution designed to circumvent the French-British veto. Brazil, having voted during the early stages of the crisis in favour of free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, approved all four resolutions dealing with the cessation of hostilities and the creation of an International Emergency Force. Brazil together with Ceylon, Canada, Colombia, Norway and Pakistan would constitute its members. During the opening of the UN’s 11th General Assembly, the Brazilian representative declared that ‘they would be favorable to a solution that

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guaranteed the interests of the Canal’s users, without violating Egypt’s sovereignty.’10 Egypt managed to maintain the nationalization of the Canal, but accepted the presence of the UN’s emergency force along the Sinai border with Israel, a force that included Brazil as one of its main contributors. The next major event was the military coup in March 1964 that eliminated the democratic government in Brazil for the next few decades. But, in a display of the continuity of policies by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry – with the exception of major themes like relations with Cuba and basic economic matters – relations with Israel and most other relatively unimportant countries were not affected. In 1967, the Six Day War generated a wave of diplomatic activity at the UN and an emergency session of the General Assembly was convened in June-July 1967 to try to convince the belligerent parties to return to the status quo ante. Brazil, with a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, engaged with other Latin American countries in condemning the demand of the Egyptians to withdraw the buffer Emergency Force from Sinai. Brazil had no specific proposal but stated that it would endorse any solution acceptable by the parties. It was a continuation of its inoffensive position at the beginning of June 1967, as expressed in its vote of Resolution 237, in which it requested the Israeli government to respect the rights of the civilian population affected by the conflict and abide by the humanitarian principles as stipulated by the Geneva Convention of 1949. After acting in coordination with Argentina during the following months, Brazil accepted the British proposition of Resolution 242, that linked Israel’s abandonment of the occupied territories to an end of the conflict and the right of all nations in the region to live within recognized and secure borders, as well as the freedom of navigation and the commitment to find a solution for the refugee problem. As we well know, most of these questions have not been solved to this day. The 1970s were defined by the entire world, as well as in Brazil, by the increased dependency on Middle East cheap oil. Brazil therefore developed its relationship with the Arab world, opening new embassies and autonomous missions, many of them dedicated to improving the markets for potential Brazilian exports. The fact that the Arab world contained a population of 90 million and could account for more than ten votes in the UN was an important factor in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy during the following decades. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Egypt and Israel at the beginning of 1973 a visit

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reciprocated shortly afterwards – just a few months before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. A report by the Foreign Ministry pointed to the increasing relations between Brazil and the countries of the Middle East with a rise in oil imports from the region as well as in exports of coffee, sugar and manufactured products. This led to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 1972, 15 per cent of export revenues were allocated to import oil into Brazil. By 1974 this allocation had risen to 40 per cent.11 This created a tremendous impetus to obtain additional foreign currency. Brazil’s foreign policy was also impacted on by a change in its relations with the United States. After years of ‘automatic alignment’ with the US, fortified following the military take over of power in 1964, Brazil revised its approach when tensions arose because of President Carter’s human rights policy and the nuclear agreement signed with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975. During the period of the Geisel government, Brazil’s dependency on oil became very accentuated – with imports accounting for 80 per cent of consumption and draining the countries finances. It led to Brazil’s Foreign Minister in January 1974 receiving a representative of the Arab League and a declaration being issued that ‘Brazil was in favor of the immediate Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, and a solution to the Palestinian question’. Nothing was mentioned about secure borders, freedom of navigation or any of the other items stipulated in UN Resolution 242 (Selcher, 1978: 111). In a speech at the General Assembly in 1974 the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs clarified his country’s pragmatic positions, condemning South African apartheid and the use of force and violent territorial occupation and in calling the international community to take the appropriate measures to solve the problem of Palestinian suffering. The greatest impact of this new positioning was felt when Brazil voted during the 1975 session for UN Resolution 3379 that classified Zionism as racism. It took Brazil some time to realize that the potential benefits of this deviation from its traditional ‘non-alignment’ would not materialize. It certainly guaranteed a constant flow of much needed oil, but only at market prices. Most of the petrodollars, part of which Brazil expected to receive as investments or as payment for an increased demand for its products, ended up in the coffers of the developed countries. On the other side, European countries looked at Brazil with some disdain while the US press focused on Brazil’s authoritarian military regime, violation of human rights and the lack of democratic institutions in the country.

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In trying to justify the Brazilian vote in favor of resolution 3379, President Geisel declared in an interview twenty years later that, It was an expression of cowardice to abstain whenever our position would run against U.S. interests. Brazil should vote according to its convictions and I’m to this day convinced that Zionism is racism. I’m not an enemy of the Jews, especially because in religious matters I’m very tolerant. But how do you define a Jew? When is a person Jewish? When the mother is Jewish? Judaism is transmitted through the mother [sic]. What is this? Isn’t it racism? Why can’t I declare it to the world? (D’Araujo, 1997: 342–3) The Foreign Ministry would justify its vote saying that, It could not be interpreted as being hostile to Jews or Judaism; that there was no commitment to Zionism, and that diplomatic relations with any country did not imply automatic acceptance of ideologies or doctrines that have given historic motivation to the related countries; that they did not accept the identification of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism. The Brazilian vote meant that Zionism is not supported as a racial or exclusivist doctrine, and that it could not claim to be a movement of national liberation.12 The Brazilian position only changed sixteen years later, when the Cold War ended and the resolution was annulled. In the 1970s, Yasser Arafat was received at the UN. The Brazilians voted for UN Resolution 3326 which granted the Palestine Liberation Organization observer status at the General Assembly and at all UN conferences, as well as reaffirming the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty. Already in 1975 Brazil authorized the PLO to maintain a representative in its new capital, Brasilia. In the following years, with the Likud party in power, Israel’s policy was viewed as increasingly aggressive, with incursions into Lebanon and the settlement drive in the occupied territories. All this would drive Brazil and Israel further apart. The end of the Cold War brought some relaxation and the reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait generated the conditions for the Oslo agreements. Brazil continued to support ‘a just settlement’ for all parties involved in the conflict, always maintaining its position on Jerusalem and its

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representation in Tel Aviv. On the other side, the status of the Palestinian representation in Brasilia was upgraded in 1998 to the diplomatic level.

Flourishing Military Relations In spite of all the political disagreements, there has been robust cooperation between Israel and Brazil in the agricultural, medical and military sectors. For many years cooperation in the agricultural field allowed for the introduction into Brazil of many of the modern techniques developed in Israel to cope with the lack of water. Although Brazil is one of the richest countries on the planet in terms of hydrological resources, large tracts of land in the north-eastern part of the country suffer from severe drought which makes it suitable for an intensively irrigated agriculture. Israel’s technology in drip irrigation, as well as in fertilizer products, has helped turn Brazil’s north-east into a large fruit producer. About two-thirds of the commerce flow between the two countries consists of Israeli exports to Brazil, mostly fertilizers, chemicals and military products. The last available figure was $1.6 billion. This consisted of approximately $500 million Brazilian exports of meat and agricultural products. Several Israeli companies have been established in Brazil, producing and distributing drugs and medical equipment, irrigation pipes and valves. In the military equipment field, Israel has specialized in both exporting sophisticated avionics, electronic and communication equipment, as well as supplying various services through subsidiary companies installed in Brazil. An agreement for security cooperation was signed in 2010 through which Israel expected to be able to reach other Latin American markets. Since 2003 the Brazilian Air Force had a liaison office in Tel Aviv. In January 2010 Nelson Jobim, Brazil’s Defence Minister, visited Israel and several arms deals were signed between the two countries. Currently, Israeli companies are involved in the modernization of the ageing Northrop F-5 Brazilian fleet, updating radar equipment, avionics and missiles. They had already cooperated in the production of the Tucano model and supplied avionics for most light planes in the Brazilian Air Force. The Israeli company Elbit was also heavily involved in the equipment of the new generation of Brazilian produced tanks and armoured cars. It is an almost unimaginable evolution since Brazilian industry supplied armaments to Iraq in the 1970s in exchange for badly

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needed oil. Some of these military cars, abandoned by Iraq’s armed forces on Iranian soil, can often be seen in service in Iran. In the latest known deal, the Brazilian army has acquired two UAVs Hermes 450, the state of the art in the field, which are supposed to be the first of a fleet to improve surveillance over the vast unmanned Brazilian land borders. Several other drones have been purchased by the State Police in Rio in order to prepare for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. The operators of this equipment are already being trained in Israel. Another important deal is related to the use of the standard rifle in the Brazilian Armed Forces. Negotiations are already in an advanced stage to build in Brazil a joint venture that will produce, under licence, the Israeli Tavor rifle. Cultural relations have flourished. Brazilian music has been known in Israel since the early 1970s, when a radio show was aired regularly playing the most famous Brazilian singers. The works of the Brazilian author, Jorge Amado, have been translated into Hebrew and movies based on his books have been screened in Israel. Israeli youngsters regularly visit Brazil on their long trips after finishing military service. Young Brazilians have also been going regularly to Israel, participating in various programmes, mostly the ‘Tapuz’ kibbutz experience in the past and in the ‘March of the Living’ in recent years. There is an annual Festival of Israeli Movies and several Israeli authors have been translated into Portuguese, Amos Oz and David Grossman being the best known of them. The Brazilian press covers the events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a mixed fashion: episodes like Sabra and Shatila and more recently the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and the Flotilla incident all made the front page in the main newspapers and weekly magazines, as well as the main news channels. Some vehicles are strictly neutral, some pro-Palestinian, most never present Israel’s point of view. In the universities hostility against Israel is common, mainly when Israel’s position is presented as the aggressor against an indefensible civilian population. The image of the terrorist is generally juxtaposed with that of the ‘freedom fighter’ – acts of terror being justified by desperation and lack of hope.

Brazilian Foreign Policy: The Last Ten Years Brazilian diplomacy has been heavily influenced by President Lula during his eight years in office. The approach was based on Brazil’s attempt to

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build a prestigious international reputation and its desire to be recognized as an emerging power. In a way reminiscent of the 1970s, it asserted its position by repeatedly contesting the hegemony of the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council. The 2010 episode involving Turkey and Iran, and related to Iran’s uranium enriching programme, can be seen as paradigmatic of this attitude. Brazil’s defence of the Iranian right to maintain its nuclear enrichment programme must be analysed by taking into account that Brazil, too, as signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been enriching uranium to supply its nuclear submarine project as well as for medical purposes. In order to keep secret its centrifugation process, Brazil has allegedly refused to sign the additional protocol and open its installations to more invasive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As for the rumours about Brazil supplying uranium ore to Iran, there may have been requests from Iran, as its stockpile of raw material for enrichment, obtained from South Africa decades ago, is coming to an end. But the only serious discussions on the subject have taken place with Venezuela and Zimbabwe – and there is no concrete evidence of any shipments having occurred.13 A secret report was mentioned in an article in the Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz, which stated that both Venezuela and Bolivia have been exporting ore to Iran. While Bolivia’s supply to Iran could well be possible, Venezuela does not yet have the capacity to do so in any significant way.14 During these eight years there were also a series of blunders, typical of President Lula’s spontaneity, such as the declaration he made in Cuba regarding prisoners who had died during a hunger strike despite his own fight against the military regime in Brazil, or his charge that ‘blue eyed blonds’ were responsible for the latest financial crisis. He also opposed the coup d’état in Honduras while supporting Cuba’s and Iran’s political repression. He compared Iranian protesters with English soccer hooligans. Presidential diplomacy has generated a rupture in the tradition of consensual national foreign policy and a turn towards party oriented and ideological policies. There has also been criticism about the sacrifice of national economic interests in favour of neighbours like Bolivia, which got paid in gas that had not been consumed. Argentinian import tariffs were not contested as was the increase in payment of Paraguayan royalties for electricity generated at Itaipu bi-national dam. Most of the criticism is related to a lack of sensitivity towards values that have been promoted since the processes of

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democratization started in the country following the end of the military regime in 1985. These include the protection of human rights, democracy and the fight against genocide and crimes against humanity. The opening for Brazil’s increased participation in the international forum has been made possible by a combination of American unilateralism and the surge of Brazilian commodities for export, coupled with a relative economic stability during the recent financial crisis. Brazilian efforts which have been focused on the UN Security Council, mostly courting south-south relations, have brought no tangible results. On the Middle East front, there have been mixed messages. On the one side, Brazil’s defence of the Iranian position regarding its nuclear programme has been interpreted by Israel as a hostile course of action that does not take into account the perceived threat posed by the possible development of nuclear weapons. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has also been invited to pay a state visit to Brazil, without any preconditions. This has generated significant protests from various sectors of Brazilian society. On the other hand, Lula has been the first Brazilian president to visit the State of Israel, and an Israeli president subsequently visited Brazil for the first time in more than thirty years (the last one had been Zalman Shazar in 1969). A free trade agreement between Israel and Mercosul was signed during Lula’s term. Brazil being the main partner in the South American economic bloc, and Israel being the first country outside of South America to benefit from it. Brazil has also received Avigdor Lieberman, the controversial Israeli foreign minister, in a gesture that most European countries would be happy to avoid. The vote to recognize an independent Palestinian state at the UN in September 2011 also marked a deterioration in relations between Brazil and Israel. Brazil pre-empted the process, declaring its support for it and opening the way for several Latin American countries to follow in its path. The Foreign Ministry official responsible for the Palestinian desk declared that Brazil’s attitude conformed with its beliefs in the validity of the Oslo Agreements and the Road Map for Peace which, according to him, stipulate Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. Brazil also insisted on the necessity of alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the occupied territories, lifting the restrictions imposed on the right to move freely, caused by the existence of exclusively Israeli zones and the continuous expansion of the Jewish settlements. According to him ‘these settlements alter the demographic composition of the Palestinian territories

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and represent an impediment to a peaceful solution of the conflict. The Brazilian government calls for the end of the settlements and a return to the borders of 4 June 1967.’ Furthermore, Brazil supports the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Since it represents a significant part of the Palestinian population, Hamas must be party to any agreement. It is not considered by Brazil to be a terrorist organization. With these positions being openly stated, it is no surprise that the Israeli ambassador to Brazil declared in a recent interview that ‘Brazil cannot act as a mediator since only direct negotiations would prove fruitful. But Brazil could certainly contribute in making the rest of the world aware – and increase the pressure on Iran. It could also clarify the Venezuelan position in respect with respect to Iranian activities in South America’. The international economic crisis and the turmoil in the Arab world projected much more urgent issues to be dealt with – not to mention Brazil’s own internal issues such as the upcoming state and municipal elections and an array of corruption scandals. Both Israel and Brazil, in reality, don’t attach much importance to their relations for they are not as critical as their respective relations with the United States, Europe, Russia or China. Moreover Brazil doesn’t have a veto power in the UN Security Council. But Brazil is becoming an important actor among the world’s biggest economies, its voice is often heard in Latin America. Future Brazilian governments may well be more inclined to deliver profoundly independent policies.

Notes 1. After the Spanish Inquisition, a Marrano was a Jew who professed to accept Christianity in order to escape persecution, often secretly continuing to practice Judaism. 2. A conference convened at the French city of Evian in July 1938 to discuss the issue of increasing numbers of Jews trying to flee Nazi discrimination. It ended in failure to find a safe haven for the persecuted Jews, and indicated to Hitler that he could continue with his policies of persecution. 3. ‘The Evian Conference on Refugees’, Bulletin of International News, Vol. 15, No. 14 (16 July 1938) pp. 16–18 Published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642292. 4. Oswald Aranha was the Brazilian ambassador in Washington from 1934 to 1937 and Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1938 to 1944. He became chief of the Brazilian mission to New York in 1947, and therefore its representative in

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

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the Security Council, which was presided over by Brazil in March 1947. He therefore presided over the extraordinary and ordinary sessions of that year’s General Assembly. One month before the vote on partition was voted the Brazilian Foreign Ministry gave Oswaldo Aranha, (its representative at the UN) the following instructions: ‘We think that on the question of Palestine the best approach would be an abstention due to the Arabs’ position and to the existence of a large Syrian-Lebanese population in Brazil. However, if this abstention impedes the ability to achieve the necessary two thirds majority for the approval of the partition, we should then vote with the Great Powers who will then be responsible for implementing it. Your Excellency should proceed according to your vision, if different from the above indicated, for your access to information is the best placed.’ Instructions to the Brazilian delegation at the UN General Assembly, 20 October 1947, Brazil Foreign Relations Historical Archive (AHI), Brasília. Studies on the Palestinian question: 2–3, 2 June 1967, Brazil Foreign Relations Historical Archive (AHI), Brasília. Available at: http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/historal/arq/Entrevista841.pdf Studies on the Palestinian question, 2 June 1967. Memo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 April 1965. Brazil Foreign Relations Historical Archive (AHI), Brasília. Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r11.htm. Relatório do Itamaraty para o Presidente da República, 1973. Confidential memo from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Brazilian delegation at the UN, 4 October 1977 Brazil Foreign Relations Historical Archive (AHI), Brasília. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929256,00.html http://www.haaretz.com/news/secret-document-venezuela-bolivia-supplyingiran-with-uranium-1.276675

References Carneiro, Maria Luiza Tucci (2010) Cidadão do mundo, São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva. D’Araujo, Maria Celina; Castro, Celso (org.) (1997) Ernesto Geisel, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Lesser, Jeffrey (1995) O Brasil e a questão judaica: imigração, diplomacia e preconceito, Rio de Janeiro: Imago. Selcher, Wayne A. (1978) Brazil’s multilateral relations: between first and third worlds, Boulder: Westview Press.

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9 ISR AEL AND SOUTH AFR ICA: THE R ISE AND FALL OF A SECR ET R EL ATIONSHIP Sasha Polakow-Suransky

Israel and South Africa formed an intimate and lucrative military partnership during the 1970s and 1980s, but the relationship between the two nations was not always so friendly, nor has it been particularly close since the African National Congress came to power in South Africa in 1994. Israel’s ties with South Africa evolved in four distinct phases, during which economic interests and ideology operated in different ways, at times keeping the two nations apart and at others driving them into a close embrace. The first of these phases was characterised by opposing geopolitical interests and ideological hostility (1960–73). During the 1960s, Israel’s foreign policy interests were defined in opposition to South Africa’s. Led by idealistic socialists, Israel sought to win friends and UN support among the newly independent black African states. Moreover, Israel’s economic interests at the time were not so closely identified with the arms industry, which had yet to develop and become Israel’s leading export earner. Golda Meir was inspired by Theodor Herzl’s vision of redeeming the oppressed Africans and she abhorred apartheid, never missing an opportunity to denounce it and, unlike her successors, she backed up her words with deeds. This staunch ideological opposition to white minority rule and strong support of post-colonial African states undergirded Israeli-South African relations during Meir’s tenure as

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Foreign Minister and Prime Minister until the African states abandoned Israel during the Yom Kippur War. During this period, several of the most prominent South African anti-apartheid activists were Jews. This group included South African Communist Party head Joe Slovo and other Jewish activists such as Denis Goldberg, Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, who were arrested along with Govan Mbeki (father of future president Thabo Mbeki) and ANC stalwart Walter Sisulu in July 1963 at Liliesleaf, a farm owned by Goldreich. He and Wolpe managed to escape from prison before the infamous Rivonia Trial of 1963–64 that put Mandela behind bars. They and the other Jewish activists, needless to say, were openly ostracised by the official organs of the South African Jewish community, which disowned them and other activist Jews. The leaders of the Jewish Board of Deputies told a nationalist Afrikaans newspaper after the escape that ‘Goldreich, except at his circumcision, has never again been in a synagogue’.1 The second period (1974–77) was premised on realpolitik. Though Yitzhak Rabin’s ruling Labour party did not share the ethnic nationalist ideology of South Africa’s rulers, the economic impulse for closer ties was overwhelming and networks had formed in military circles allowing the relationship to expand. South African arms purchases breathed life into the Israeli economy after the Yom Kippur War and Israeli arms helped to reinforce the beleaguered and isolated apartheid regime in Pretoria. It was during these years that Israel’s arms industry blossomed and with it the need for export markets. Africa’s diplomatic abandonment of Israel, en masse, in 1973 coupled with Golda Meir’s resignation in early 1974 paved the way for a full-scale realignment. Though her successor Yitzhak Rabin came from the Labour Party, he did not share Meir’s views on Africa or her moral impulses in policy toward South Africa. Rabin’s Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, was a staunch realist and a leading proponent of the Israeli arms export drive. The rise to power of the Labour technocrats coincided with South Africa’s increasing international isolation and accelerated militarisation after the demise of Portugal’s African colonies on its borders. The massive military buildup of the mid-1970s provided Israel’s arms industry with its most significant client and a very lucrative commercial relationship. Moreover, Israel was able to take advantage of unsafeguarded South African uranium to fuel its nuclear weapons program. The third and most important of these periods was defined by the convergence of economic interests and a sense of ideological affinity between

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certain Israeli military leaders and Likud officials and the South African government in Pretoria. Menachem Begin’s new Likud government shared with South Africa’s leaders an ideology of minority survivalism that presented the two countries as threatened outposts of European civilisation defending their existence against communist barbarians at the gates, who wished to erase them from the map. Israelis parachuted with the SADF in Angola and South African generals were invited to join the Israeli Chief of Staff deep inside Lebanese territory during the early 1980s. This shared sense of isolation served to promote Israeli-South African ties before they became a reality and to strengthen the military alliance that already existed when Begin came to power. The fourth and final phase began during the mid-1980s as the political cross-currents of Israel’s National Unity government led to conflicting messages from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and certain elements within the Israeli government openly challenged the alliance with South Africa. Nevertheless, not even American threats and cosmetic Israeli sanctions could fully derail it, and the relationship endured well into the early 1990s. Since that time, diplomatic ties have been cordial but cool and at times criticism of Israel from iconic South African leaders has led to charges of anti-Semitism and self-hatred, respectively. On the surface, the close ties that developed between Israel and South Africa’s Afrikaner leaders during the 1970s and 1980s appear paradoxical. After all, the leadership of the National Party, the political organisation behind apartheid, was full of former Nazi sympathizers. Indeed, South Africa’s Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, who presided over the heyday of Israeli-South African ties, had once proudly declared: ‘We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism . . . you can call such an anti-democratic system a dictatorship if you like. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa Christian Nationalism’.2 Socially and intellectually steeped in Nazism, leaders of the Broederbond, an intellectual precursor to the National Party, had returned to South Africa in the 1930s after studying in Europe. They believed Jews were the group that ‘stands in the way of the Afrikaner’s economic prosperity’, while denouncing ‘Jewish money power’ and ‘British-Jewish capitalism’.3 Broederbond leaders protested against the influx of German Jewish refugees and demanded quotas in the private sector in order to protect Afrikaner jobs that were supposedly being stolen by Jews.4 No matter

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that Jewish immigration had already slowed in the wake of a 1930 law designed to stop Eastern European Jews from flocking to South Africa; anti-Semitic sentiment among Afrikaners continued to grow.5 In October 1936, when a ship carrying German Jewish refugees arrived in Cape Town’s harbor, Die Transvaler editor and future Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd joined the Nazi-aligned Greyshirt movement in protest at the docks. In 1939, South Africa’s future foreign minister Eric Louw introduced yet another immigration bill in parliament, declaring Jews ‘unassimilable’. When the NP came to power in 1948, the same month that Israel became a nation, the country’s Jews – especially refugees from Nazi Germany – worried that they might once again find themselves targeted by an anti-Semitic government. Louw was then known as ‘South Africa’s Goebbels’.6 As a child refugee arriving in Cape Town from Nazi Germany in 1934, Harry Schwarz had looked out from the deck of a ship as anti-Semitic crowds protested against Jewish immigration. ‘If you read some of the stuff that somebody like Eric Louw said in parliament’, says Schwarz, who later became South Africa’s ambassador to the United States, ‘you can’t differentiate between that and what the Nazis said in Germany’.7 Indeed, in early 1945, four months before the fall of Berlin, Louw was still reassuring readers of his newspaper column that Hitler’s Reich would prevail. But the tone in Pretoria began to change in the early 1950s. The NP was charting a new course, firmly rejecting the anti-Semitism of Louw and the Ossewa Brandwag and expanding its tent to include all whites.8 Faced with the challenge of maintaining a minority regime ruling over more than nine million disenfranchised nonwhites, the NP needed every white vote it could get. Under these circumstances, excluding Jews was simply bad politics. When Parliament passed apartheid legislation formalizing the separation of races, Jews were left unaffected. Though they had feared further persecution by the state, South Africa’s Jews were in effect granted the privileges of whiteness under apartheid. Fears among Jewish South Africans subsided further in 1953 when Prime Minister D. F. Malan went to Israel. For Malan, an ordained minister, visiting the Holy Land had been a lifelong dream. He voiced his admiration of the Jews’ ability to maintain their national identity despite centuries of adversity and described the restoration of the Jewish homeland as a momentous historical event.9 Warmer relations between

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Afrikaners and Jews soon followed. As the anti-apartheid South African journalist Benjamin Pogrund recalls, ‘everyone realized they needed each other and they became friends’.10 During the 1960s, Israeli leaders’ ideological hostility toward apartheid kept the two nations at arm’s length. During these years, Israel took a strong and unequivocal stance against South Africa – and the South African Jewish community, fearful of an anti-Semitic backlash and desperate to remain in the good graces of the apartheid regime, was not always pleased with Israel’s moralism. In October 1961, African states opposing apartheid lashed out at Pretoria in the UN General Assembly. The South African government was represented at the time by Eric Louw. Israel voted with the African nations to censure South Africa before a global audience.11 Following the vote, Louw issued a radio statement calling on South African Jews to criticize Israel and express solidarity with South Africa. As much as they despised Louw, the Board of Deputies and its sister organization, the Zionist Federation, panicked and obeyed, denouncing the Israeli government for denying Louw his basic freedom of speech and arguing that Israel should have simply abstained from the vote.12 In the eyes of Israel’s leading diplomat in South Africa, Simcha Pratt, the Jewish community’s reaction was disgraceful. ‘I saw before me panicky people, gripped by fear and without backbone’, Pratt wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem after meeting with Zionist Federation members.13 David Ben-Gurion himself doubted that the Jews in South Africa would be punished and did not want to alienate his new African allies. After a contentious 1961 UN vote denouncing Pretoria, Israel’s founding father declared to critics in the Knesset: ‘We knew the Jews there wouldn’t suffer very much . . . If there would have been pogroms – or if their lives were in danger – then we would have abstained, but we would not have voted in favour, certainly not. A Jew can’t be for discrimination’.14 Prime Minister Verwoerd’s retaliation against South African Jews was actually quite limited. His aide sent a letter filled with thinly-veiled threats to a prominent Jewish citizen and the Finance Ministry suspended special transfer privileges for South African Zionist groups seeking to send funds to Israel.15 Although Jewish leaders in Johannesburg saw restrictions on their ability to send money to Israel as a serious setback,16 most of the frozen funds were in fact eventually used by the Israeli government to buy an ambassadorial residence in Pretoria.17 Meanwhile,

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Israel continued publicly to criticize apartheid, and the anti-Semitic backlash Jewish leaders so feared did not come to pass. In 1963, Foreign Minister Golda Meir told the UN General Assembly that Israelis ‘naturally oppose policies of apartheid, colonialism and racial or religious discrimination wherever they exist’ due to Jews’ historical experience as victims of oppression.18 Israel even offered asylum to South Africa’s most wanted man, the Jewish anti-apartheid activist Arthur Goldreich, after his daring 1963 escape from a South African prison along with fellow Jewish anti-apartheid activist Harold Wolpe. In addition to condemning apartheid, Meir forged close ties with the newly independent states of Africa, offering them everything from agricultural assistance to military training. Many African leaders accepted invitations to Israel and some, impressed with the Israeli army, decided to hire Israeli bodyguards. African states returned the favor by voting with Israel at the UN in an era when the Jewish state had few diplomatic allies. Israel’s charm offensive in Africa went hand in hand with a broader foreign policy initiative known as the ‘alliance of the periphery’, whereby Israel sought close ties with countries just beyond the hostile Arab states surrounding it.19 The brainchild of Mossad leaders Reuven Shiloah and Isser Harel, the periphery strategy was a crucial part of Israel’s plan to check the expansion of Nasser’s pan-Arabism as well as Soviet influence in the region. Things began to change with Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of 1967, which tripled the size of the Jewish State in less than a week. The post-1967 military occupation and the settlement project that soon followed planted hundreds of thousands of Jews on hilltops and in urban centers throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, saddling Israel with the stigma of occupation and forever tarring it with the imperialist brush. Aided by a healthy dose of Arab and Soviet propaganda, Israel’s image as a state of Holocaust survivors in need of protection gradually deteriorated into that of an imperialist stooge of the West. As criticism of Israel mounted and Arab states dangled dollars and oil in the faces of poor African nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Third World countries increasingly switched allegiances. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, all but a few African countries severed diplomatic ties with the Jewish State, and the Israeli government abandoned the last vestiges of moral foreign policy in favor of hardnosed realpolitik.

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Israel may have fended off catastrophe, but its enemies had won the propaganda war. Egypt framed the Yom Kippur War as a Zionist invasion of the African continent, and 20 more African states severed ties with Israel during the fighting.20 The reaction in the Israeli press was swift and furious. Shlomo Shamgar, writing in Yediot Ahronot, denounced the Africans for ‘spitting into the well from which they drank only yesterday’ and insisted that ‘the time for smiling has now come to an end. All that remains is to be sorry for the enormous ditch that we have to dig for the Israel-Africa friendship – our illusion of the sixties when many of us thought the road to Damascus and Cairo winds through Timbuctoo’.21 Meanwhile, as journalists competed to give voice to Israel’s sense of betrayal, South Africa resupplied Israel with spare parts for its damaged Mirage fleet.22 An appreciative Ha’aretz editorial asserted ‘No political fastidiousness can justify the difference between one who has been revealed a friend and one who has betrayed friendship . . . in our hour of fate’. The editors urged the government to establish full diplomatic ties with South Africa as soon as possible.23 South Africa’s Jewish press wasted no time in echoing the Israeli papers’ calls for closer ties between the two countries. Hurwitz’s Jewish Herald beamed that ‘one of the few pleasing by-products of the Yom Kippur War is a noticeable positive change in the attitude of Israel leaders, opinion makers and a wide section of the public towards South Africa’.24 The pro-Israeli American publication World Jewish Review lauded the newfound cooperation, which it saw as long overdue, likening Israel’s honeymoon in Africa to an adolescent romance that had been replaced by something more ‘solid and secure’.25 It was not a shotgun marriage. Ever since the Six Day War, Israel’s alliances throughout black Africa had been tenuous. Calls from the Israeli right to upgrade ties with the apartheid regime, Arab pressure on African leaders to abandon the Jewish state, and clamoring among Johannesburg Jews for closer links to Jerusalem – all this strained Israel’s relationships throughout Africa. Even so, with the exception of Idi Amin, Israel’s network in Africa did hold fast for six years. It wasn’t until after the Yom Kippur War that the African strategy so carefully crafted by Golda Meir and Abba Eban was left in tatters. Military leaders’ doubts about Africa’s strategic value to Israel, the IDF’s clandestine military cooperation with Pretoria that had originated in France, and a widespread feeling of betrayal in the press all contributed to the unraveling of Israel’s Africa policy. Most important, the rising stars of Israel’s Labour

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Party did not see Africa through Meir’s moral prism, and they were perfectly comfortable aligning themselves with the apartheid regime if it enhanced Israel’s national security. As an uneasy peace settled over the Middle East in November 1973, Israeli and South African defense officials quietly began to lay the foundations for a lucrative and far-reaching alliance.26 Israel and South Africa joined forces at a precarious and auspicious time. The alliance began in earnest after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, and shared military and economic interests drove the relationship for the next three years. Though both countries were receiving varying degrees of support from the United States, neither enjoyed a defense pact with Washington and both were wary of relying too heavily on Americans for their survival – especially in the early 1970s, when unconditional US support for Israel was by no means assured. This alliance exposed Israel to great risks in the realm of public relations, especially when the Jewish State’s legitimacy was already under attack at the UN from pro-Palestinian groups and aligning itself with the hated apartheid regime threatened to tarnish its reputation further. The Yom Kippur War left the Israeli economy in shambles, and the arms industry was quickly becoming its biggest export earner. Washington’s refusal to resupply Israel in the opening days of the war convinced the Israelis that they could not rely on their American allies for military hardware, prompting a massive expansion of the domestic arms industry. The war had cost Israel an entire year’s worth of its gross national product, yet the government still managed to increase military expenditures by 40 per cent in 1974.27 Israel’s nascent arms industry brought in much-needed foreign currency, helped redress the country’s severe trade imbalance, and provided work for countless engineers and scientists returning from overseas with advanced degrees.28 It also forced factories to produce in excess of the IDF’s own requirements. Higher volume meant lower costs, and it was only a matter of time before the arms industry had to find export markets to offset research and development costs and absorb its surplus supply.29 Prior to the Yom Kippur War, it had seen only a modest increase in exports, but after the war, production increased and external sales skyrocketed.30 Total exports for all Israeli arms producers would increase nearly fifteen-fold from $70 million in 1973 to over $1 billion in 1980.31 The government even began to push arms exports as the key to resolving Israel’s economic woes, using expanded military budgets to stimulate

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the economy during recessions and election campaigns.32 Selling weapons was not the only source of income for the defense industry; Israel also modernized the aging weapons systems of foreign armies and provided training for soldiers in countries ranging from Colombia and Sri Lanka to Mobutu’s Zaire.33 As Israel’s military-industrial complex grew, an increasingly influential cadre of IDF officers who moved from the battlefield to the boardroom began to lobby for the defence industry at every opportunity.34 It included decorated generals like Moshe Dayan and other prominent defense officials such as Shimon Peres. This ‘security network’ wielded enormous power at the upper levels of government and industry.35 Israel’s economy was plagued by inflation during the 1970s, and the defense sector was a rare bright spot: a highly educated workforce and sophisticated technological base allowed weapons makers and dealers to flourish. Before long, this thriving industry would have an eager new customer. The precarious security situation of the apartheid regime was deteriorating and Pretoria wanted all the arms it could get. To the Israeli Defense Ministry, South Africa seemed the ideal customer: a developing country with a defense-conscious, right-wing government that did not have close ties to the Arab-Muslim bloc.36 It was a perfect match. In November 1974, Shimon Peres came to Pretoria to meet secretly with South African leaders. After the trip, he wrote to his hosts thanking them for helping to establish a ‘vitally important’ link between the two governments. Peres – who routinely denounced apartheid in public – went on to stress that ‘this cooperation is based not only on common interests and on the determination to resist equally our enemies, but also on the unshakeable foundations of our common hatred of injustice and our refusal to submit to it’. On 31 March 1975, leading Israeli and South African defense officials met again. This time, rather than exchanging intelligence, they came to do business, discussing the sale of tanks, missile boats and the joint development of airplane engines. Most significantly, the Israeli delegation discussed the possibility of selling South Africa some of the nuclearcapable Jericho missiles in its arsenal – prompting the South African chief of staff to pen a lengthy memo discussing the benefits a nuclear deterrent would bring to Pretoria.37 South Africa’s leaders yearned for a nuclear weapon – which they believed would force the West to intervene on their behalf if Pretoria was ever seriously threatened – and the Israeli proposition put that goal within reach. Excited by the offer on the

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table, the SADF’s Chief of Staff, R.F. Armstrong, penned an enthusiastic memo analyzing the benefits of nuclear weapons for South Africa’s defense strategy and sent it to his boss later that day.38 Armstrong argued that purchasing the Jericho missiles would provide South Africa with a deterrent if Russia or China became more interested in the southern African conflict and attached maps of the Jericho’s 500-kilometer range and praised its accuracy. He concluded by recommending that South Africa purchase the weapons despite the high cost because, he believed, a nuclear capability would make the West take Pretoria seriously.39 Israel’s offer of nuclear-capable missiles, code-named ‘Chalet’, came up again two months later, on 4 June, when Peres and Botha held a second meeting in Switzerland.40 Now the discussion turned to warheads. Minutes from the June meeting reveal that Botha expressed interest in buying the Jerichos if they came with ‘the correct payload’, and that ‘Minister Peres said that the correct payload was available in three sizes’41 – a phrase Botha most likely intended as a euphemism for ‘nuclear’, given the SADF’s demonstrated interest in nuclear-armed Jerichos, as expressed in Armstrong’s March 1975 memorandum. Eventually Botha backed out of the deal – due to its high costs and the fact that planning for indigenous production of nuclear weapons in South Africa was already in its early stages – and the nuclear transfer never occurred.42 The abortive deal in 1975 was only the beginning of Israeli-South African cooperation on nuclear missile technology, however: a decade later, the two countries would begin work on a secret testing range along South Africa’s rugged Indian Ocean coast. South Africa was growing desperate, and increasingly Israel was the only country willing to help them. In addition to selling existing weapons, the Israelis were also intent on convincing the South Africans to join them in developing new ones. Israel possessed a great deal of scientific expertise and advanced technology, but South Africa had more money and Pretoria was an attractive partner for financing such projects.43 In 1975, Israel encountered a rough patch with its patrons in Washington. Following the Yom Kippur War, the United States had assumed the role France had played until 1967 and began supplying the Israelis with military aid on a large scale; much of it was quickly reinjected into the US economy because the Israelis used it to buy American-made weaponry.44 But Israel remained skittish about relying too heavily on the United States, and these fears proved to be well-founded.

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In early 1975, talks between Israel and Egypt came to a standstill over the question of further disengagement in the Sinai Peninsula, where Israeli troops had remained deployed after the Yom Kippur War as a buffer against future Egyptian attacks. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat argued that Israeli withdrawal was necessary to prove to his people that the 1973 war effort had been as much of a victory as his government had claimed. Despite Henry Kissinger’s urgings, Israel did not budge. President Ford became impatient with Israel’s intransigence and declared in March that he would ‘reassess’ American relations with Israel, claiming the United States ‘would not finance a state of deadlock that would damage its interests’.45 For a period of seven months, Washington halted economic aid and significantly reduced military aid to the Israelis.46 Ford refused to sell them F-15 fighter jets and missiles and expressed fears that a new war in the region could lead to another damaging oil embargo, such as the one imposed by OPEC in 1973. The American move caused Rabin to reconsider his excessive reliance on Washington.47 He resented Ford for signaling to Israel’s enemies that the Jewish State was still dependent on the United States and could be forced to make concessions in order to obtain arms. Meanwhile, the Soviets were re-arming Arab states with no similar strings attached.48 Israeli General Avraham (Abrasha) Tamir believed that the country needed ‘another leg to stand on’ if the United States ever left it out to dry again.49 Israel was looking for a nation that ‘could invest enough in our projects so that they could be pursued independently’, a role that South Africa was beginning to play.50 By the end of September 1975, the crisis had passed. The US-Israeli relationship was now sufficiently strong to survive this kind of diplomatic tiff, and thanks to pressure from Congress and Jewish organizations the flow of American arms to Israel resumed. In the meantime, Rabin’s popularity had skyrocketed. Rather than caving in to American pressure, he had hardened his negotiating position and sought alternative allies.51 Indeed, it was precisely during the months when the Ford administration was ‘reassessing’ its relations with Israel that Shimon Peres was busy meeting with P. W. Botha and leading South African defense officials, negotiating deals that promised to infuse the struggling Israeli economy with more than $100 million.52 When Israel was briefly left out in the cold by the United States, South Africa had enthusiastically welcomed it as a partner.

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South African Prime Minister (and erstwhile Nazi sympathizer) B. J. Vorster arrived in Israel for a five-day state visit in early April 1976 and began his tour at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial.53 The South African leader faced surprisingly little opposition while visiting Israel. Apart from a few mildly critical newspaper articles, Israelis seemed collectively to shrug their shoulders.54 The Jerusalem Post even praised Vorster for ‘recharting his country’s racial and foreign policy’ and being a rare breed of leader ‘who has not flinched from the political perils of re-educating his people in that direction’.55 The Vorster visit may have been hailed as a public relations coup in South Africa, but its primary purpose remained largely obscured. Indeed, much of Vorster’s time in Israel was spent shopping for weapons.56 To facilitate this, Admiral Binyamin Telem – the Commander of Israel’s Navy during the Yom Kippur War – joined Ambassador Yitzhak Unna in showing the South African Prime Minister around Israel. Due in part to the $100 million ammunition contract from the previous year, Israel’s defense industry now had excellent ties with South Africa and Vorster’s visit helped seal a much bigger deal, totaling more than $700 million, Telem recalls. Israel was not only building and modernizing weapons; it was also offering formal advice to the South African military. In 1976, the Israeli Defense Ministry sent Colonel Amos Baram as a special advisor to the Chief of the SADF. Baram viewed the situation as one of friendly cooperation and was happy to advise the South Africans. His attitude was, ‘we have a common interest – security problems. Not just borders, internal problems too’. The challenge was not simply fighting communist troops in Angola, but helping South Africa maintain domestic security. According to Baram, ‘if you know how to defend yourself against an enemy outside the borders you know how to deal [with him] within your borders’. Baram and Telem were often invited to join the army chief, General Constand Viljoen, on trips to the front lines. In the wake of South Africa’s failed 1975 military intervention in Angola, General Viljoen was eager to learn all he could from the Israelis. ‘We flew with his official plane a lot to Angola’, recalls Telem, ‘he used to take us along and ask our opinion on everything’.57 The two Israelis were also taken on a security-oriented helicopter tour of the Mozambican border and afterwards treated to a stay, with their wives, in South Africa’s premier safari destination – the Kruger National Park.58 South Africa’s Army chief Constand Viljoen visited Israel’s occupied territories in the spring of 1977, marveling at the Israeli checkpoint

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system and the searches of Arabs conducted by soldiers at each roadblock.59 ‘The thoroughness with which Israel conducts this examination is astonishing. At the quickest, it takes individual Arabs that come through there about one and a half hours. When the traffic is heavy, it takes from four to five hours’, he observed admiringly.60 Business was thriving, too. The Armscor subsidiary Naschem sent three representatives to IMI to study the manufacturing of bombs, while the South African Air Force flew a team to Israel to work on plans for a new heavily fortified base.61 Armscor and IMI signed two large contracts for bombs and ammunition and tested them together, paving the way for even closer cooperation between the two countries.62 That same month, the South African government entered into final negotiations for yet another massive ammunition contract with IMI, known as Project Décor. After a visit to Israel in late July 1977, Armscor officials reported that they had bargained the contract down from $450 million to $370 million – an amount 15 times greater than the published IMF figure that defenders of Israel used at the time to downplay the extent of Israeli exports to South Africa (the IMF data excluded arms sales).63 It was the biggest infusion of cash ever from South Africa and a major boost to the Israeli economy.64 In July 1976, as South Africa’s black townships convulsed with violence, the Minister of Mines and Labour, Fanie Botha, flew to Israel. He was met by the IDF Chief of Staff, General Chaim Bar-Lev, of the infamous Bar-Lev line that Egyptian forces breached on the first day of the Yom Kippur War. After allowing him a few hours of rest, Bar-Lev drove Botha to the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission for a meeting with its director, Uzi Eilam. From there, Botha was driven south to Yavne, where he had lunch at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center and visited the facility. After Soreq, Botha was whisked away to a meeting with Defense Minister Shimon Peres. In the following days, he dined at the homes of Bar-Lev and Eilam, visited a tank repair facility and an air force base, and met with senior managers at Israel Aircraft Industries. Botha was even granted a one hour audience with Prime Minister Rabin – hardly the itinerary one would expect of a minor cabinet minister.65 In the South African press, the visit was reported as an exploration of cooperative mining ventures and mineral production.66 In fact, it was a sensitive nuclear negotiation focused on the 500-ton stockpile of South African uranium that had accumulated in Israel since shipments began in 1965. The South African uranium was safeguarded, however, under a bilateral agreement that provided for annual

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South African inspections to ensure it was not being used for military purposes. Lifting bilateral safeguards meant that South Africa would no longer have a right to inspect the sealed drums of yellowcake, as it had in the past, nor would it be allowed to verify whether Israel was using the uranium for peaceful purposes. The Israelis could now use the South African raw material as they liked without any contractual obligations hanging over their heads. Botha did not dare second-guess Prime Minister Vorster and, after returning from Israel, he went ahead and lifted the safeguards.67 Botha was told by his counterparts in Israel that the safeguarded yellowcake could be very useful to Israel in the nuclear field and he was not apologetic in 2006 about his decision to lift the safeguards and did not seem to mind that most analysts would interpret his actions as aiding nuclear proliferation and strengthening the growing arsenal of an undeclared nuclear power.68 Sitting in the modest living room of his retirement home, Fanie Botha was remarkably nonchalant about the whole affair. ‘We were good friends’, he said, ‘it was easy for friends to cooperate in this field’.69 In return for the yellowcake and the lifted safeguards, South Africa received 30 grams of tritium, a radioactive substance that, when added to thermonuclear weapons, increases their explosive power by a significant factor.70 Thirty grams was enough to boost the yield of 12 atomic bombs.71 The substance was delivered to South Africa in small installments over the course of a year between 1977 and 1978.72 The atomic weapons South Africa was building at the time were crude Hiroshima-style devices – which derive their power from a fission reaction alone – but Armscor was also planning a new generation of more powerful thermonuclear weapons, which rely on both fission and fusion reactions. These next-generation designs included miniaturized warheads and implosion devices, for which tritium was a potentially useful ingredient.73 As the influence of the SADF grew in the political sphere, so too did the influence of Armscor in the economic sphere. Between 1970 and 1980, the South African defense budget increased more than fivefold. By 1983, it had topped R2.6 billion ($2.1 billion at the time) – 5 per cent of South Africa’s Gross National Product.74 Armscor became one of the country’s three largest companies along with industrial giant Barlow Rand and the De Beers/Anglo-American mining empire, employing an estimated 100,000 South Africans.75

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Unlike Israel, which had large export markets for its arms industry, it was impractical for South Africa – a country with limited numbers of skilled workers and a small internal market for arms – to develop its own jets, missiles and advanced weapons systems. To maintain their edge over neighbors armed with new Soviet weapons, the South Africans desperately needed Western technology.76 More and more, they were turning to Israel to provide it.77 The Labour Party launched the alliance with South Africa for financial and strategic reasons in the early 1970s, but a confluence of interests and similar ideologies pushed the two countries into a more intimate relationship after Menachem Begin’s victory in the 1977 election. Begin and his colleagues were not racists but, like their ideological mentor from the days of their youth in Poland, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, they were nationalists. Although leading Likud figures and military men did not necessarily harbor racist views toward Black Africans, they were much more willing than their Labour counterparts to tolerate xenophobic ideas and politics out of identification with and admiration for a larger nationalist project.78 This shared ideology allowed Begin and other Likud leaders to stomach racist apartheid policies because they were part of a broader ethnonationalist project designed to protect a minority group that believed its survival was threatened. The rightward shift in public opinion which brought Begin to power in 1977 discredited much of the Labour Zionist tradition and entrenched the security establishment’s domination of foreign policy.79 Even Labour stalwarts like David Hacohen – a diplomat and high-ranking party official – were abandoning the legacy of Ben-Gurion and Meir and began to change their tune on South Africa after Begin came to power. Hacohen declared in The Jerusalem Post that granting equal rights to blacks ‘would mean the end of the white minority’, and warned that sanctions and other ‘extremist propaganda aimed at toppling the Republic of South Africa’ would lead to ‘a heap of ruins for both white and black’.80 The primary South African proponent of closer ties between the two countries, Harry Hurwitz, moved to Jerusalem and became an advisor to his old friend Begin. And as military, scientific and industrial cooperation between the two countries increased, Israel’s once resolute opposition to apartheid faded further. Starting in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, leading Israeli generals continued to make frequent trips to South Africa and became close friends with their counterparts in Pretoria, often sharing battle

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plans, weapon designs and advice on ‘defeating terrorists’. The ideological prescription now provided by Likud’s interpretation of Zionism and Afrikaner nationalism was similar: use military force to ensure national survival.81 As Likud’s more militant platform moved from the political wilderness into the mainstream in Israel, the dissonance that had existed between liberal Labour Zionists and South African leaders faded and the worldview of minority survivalism that Likud and the NP regime shared served as the ideological glue for the burgeoning alliance. By 1979 South Africa had become Israel’s single largest customer for arms, accounting for 35 per cent of military exports from Israel, dwarfing other clients such as Argentina, Chile, Singapore and Zaire.82 When François Mitterand’s Socialist Party came to power in France in 1980, the few remaining post-embargo arms sales from Pretoria’s former patron evaporated. The French cutoff also forced the South Africans to turn to Israel for naval cooperation, given that its officers had previously learned French and traveled to France for submarine training.83 Already a major source of arms, the Jewish State had now become a vital partner in combat training and the joint production of weapons. When the 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah of Iran, depriving Israel of its primary partner in missile development and leaving a gaping hole in Israel’s strategy of the periphery, Israeli-South African military cooperation deepened, moving into yet another extremely sensitive area. The generals in Tel Aviv now turned to South Africa for help in developing and testing its arsenal of medium and long-range ballistic missiles – the preferred delivery system for nuclear weapons. In March 1979, Israel conducted a highly secretive test, launching a missile 300 miles westward over the Mediterranean Sea. This new missile was a modernized version of the Jericho system Peres had offered to South Africa four years earlier and the Israelis were keen to show off their new technology and confirm its reliability. In Israel, knowledge of the test was limited to cabinet officials, senior generals and the engineers working on the missile. But as the new weapon was unveiled, the SADF’s head of special operations, I.R. Gleeson, was at the testing range standing beside Israeli Chief of Staff Raful Eitan.84 Magnus Malan, then the head of the SADF, wrote personally to Eitan apologizing that he hadn’t been able to attend the missile test himself and thanked Eitan for allowing his envoy to observe.85 In his report to Malan, Gleeson noted that if the SADF were to acquire or build similar missiles they would only be worth the price if the warhead were

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extremely advanced ‘with a nuclear warhead as the ideal’.86 In the coming years, development of the missile to deliver such a warhead became a major joint project for Israel and South Africa. In 1981, three days after Israel’s surprise attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, Eitan wrote to Malan triumphantly: ‘Well, we did the deed with iron determination not to allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons’. Eitan expected an international outcry but felt it was worth it, melodramatically telling his friend, ‘we are not perturbed by all the “righteous souls” that all the crocodiles in South African rivers could not provide with enough tears to wipe out their hypocrisy . . . I am certain that you understand us very well’.87 Malan praised the attack and encouraged Eitan to disregard UN criticism, referring to the organization as ‘the international platform and propaganda machine of South Africa’s enemies’. He closed by telling his Israeli colleague, ‘it is comforting to know that South Africa does not stand alone in facing criticism from the international community. Our respective countries will have to withstand this in all its many manifestations’.88 Reams of such letters sent back and forth between leading generals recount battles fought and the number of terrorists killed by the SADF and IDF.89 The generals were not simply sharing intelligence and battlefield pointers but acting as advocates for each other on the international stage. Later that year, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited South Africa and publicly urged the West to re-arm Pretoria in its fight against Cuban and Angolan communist forces – a comment that made the pages of The New York Times.90 Malan replied, thanking Sharon for his ‘grave concern over the Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa and that you are prepared to speak up about this’.91 When Viljoen traveled to Israel with his wife, Risti, in July 1981, Eitan showed him video footage of the Osirak operation that he had until then only shared with the Pentagon.92 Just as Viljoen had invited visiting Israeli officers to join him on helicopter flights to Angola, Eitan returned the favor by allowing South African officials unfettered access to highly classified information on Osirak and Israel’s new missile systems. So impressed was Eitan by the South African officers he met that he told Viljoen he preferred to make Israeli instruction available to the SADF over and above any other military force in the world.93 As the Cuban presence in southern Africa grew during the early 1980s, South Africa entered Angola several more times and SWAPO continued its cross-border raids to attack SADF positions in Namibia. By this time,

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South Africa’s air force was getting rusty. The last aircraft from France had come in the early 1970s; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had canceled all orders placed in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s; and the United States, which had enforced the embargo on South Africa earlier than others, forbade the export of aircraft engines. ‘We couldn’t buy any damn aircraft’, said Hannes Steyn, Armscor’s R&D Director in the 1980s.94 Israel therefore became a vital source for the South African Air Force, and it was heavily involved in Pretoria’s quest to maintain air supremacy in Angola, modernizing the aging Mirage-III fleet that Pretoria had acquired from France in the 1960s. ‘Israel was probably our only avenue in the 1980s’, admitted Jan van Loggerenberg, the head of the South African Air Force from 1988–91.95 As David Ivry had warned Viljoen back in 1979, no country could defeat the latest Soviet technology with ‘1968 models’, and so they began two major projects – codenamed ‘Brahman’ and ‘Gate’ – to update the Mirage fleet, giving birth to what came to be known as the Cheetah jet.96 It was a massive investment for South Africa and a huge boon for the Israeli defense industry. By August 1984, two Cheetah prototypes were sent to Israel for upgrades of their weapons systems and avionics – the electronics, communication and navigation capabilities of the aircraft, based on systems used in Israel’s Kfir fighter jets.97 As the updated Cheetahs rolled off the IAI assembly line, the South African Air Force began placing orders for spare parts and requesting training sorties in Israel for South African pilots.98 When the first two Cheetah prototypes returned to Pretoria, the South African company Atlas Aircraft disingenuously presented them to the press and the public as homegrown designs. But their origin was obvious to informed observers. The United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) observed that the ‘Cheetah is an upgraded version of the French Mirage III’, without explicitly pointing to Israel as the contractor.99 Late in 1984, the South African Chief of Staff for Intelligence wrote to SADF Chief Constand Viljoen, requesting his approval for a top secret visit to Israel regarding cooperation on building and testing missiles. The visitor was Armscor’s head of International Acquisitions and Research, B.C. de Bruyn. De Bruyn traveled to Israel with the security manager of the Overberg test range – a military instalation located along South Africa’s rugged shoreline near Cape Agulhas, the continent’s southernmost point. The sleepy neighboring town of Arniston was best known for whale watching,

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secluded beaches and its spectacular natural beauty. Overberg, facing thousands of miles of open sea, was the perfect location to launch a missile.100 Test-firing long-range missiles without flying them over enemy territory was not a luxury Israel had; South Africa, on the other hand, had the space, money and good scientific infrastructure they needed.101 Most important, co-production and joint testing helped offset research and development costs for Israel. The centerpiece of the joint Israeli-South African effort was the Israeli Jericho-2 missile, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 900 miles – much farther than Israel could launch a missile over the Mediterranean Sea, as it had during the 1979 tests that South African observers had attended. In Tel Aviv, de Bruyn and his colleagues focused on security operations. They wanted to make sure information security was tight when Israelis moved to South Africa to work at the missile testing range. The top-secret memo to Viljoen laid out de Bruyn’s mission in Israel: ‘He must evaluate the credibility of existing cover stories and the ability of the new families to live up to them’, and also get to know all those involved.102 In 1985, the year after de Bruyn’s visit to Israel, Prime Minister P. W. Botha was forced to slash the country’s military budget for fear of impending international sanctions. Although he dealt a blow to some of the nuclear program’s most advanced projects by halting research on plutonium and tritium production, he allowed research on implosion technology and boosted thermonuclear warheads to continue.103 Consequently, the Overberg test range and the missiles being tested there were not affected. Quietly, as many as 75 Israelis – who were far more advanced in the field of rocketry than South Africans – came to South Africa during the 1980s to work on the missile program while more than 200 South Africans went to Israel.104 In August 1986, as popular anti-apartheid legislation was making the rounds in the US Senate, a paragraph – known as Section 508 – with far-reaching consequences for Israel crept into the bill. It called for the president to document any arms sales to South Africa and ‘add the option of terminating U.S. military assistance to countries violating the embargo’. In Israel, the national-unity government of Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir disregarded the bill, convinced that it would never pass. In Washington, though, leading AIPAC officials believed that Israel’s ties with Pretoria were tarnishing the country’s image in Congress just as

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the push for anti-South African sanctions was gaining momentum. And they began pressuring the Israeli government to act. Some of AIPAC’s biggest donors were outraged, given that arms sales to South Africa were a major economic windfall for Israel. But unlike the donors, AIPAC’s Beltway insiders saw the bigger strategic picture. In their eyes, the ongoing and increasingly publicized military relationship with South Africa was alienating some of the Jewish state’s staunchest supporters in Congress, who were also committed to the anti-apartheid cause. Pro-Israel lobbyists believed that attempts by anti-Israel groups to paint the Jewish state as an ally of the racist South African regime would eventually sway the American public unless Israel ceased selling arms to South Africa. Despite AIPAC’s pleas, the Israelis still refused to take the threat seriously. In the upper echelons of the Israeli government, there was a widely held belief that AIPAC and other Jewish organizations, as well as friendly members of Congress, would protect Israel. They were convinced that this threat, like other bumps in the road, would soon pass. AIPAC’s lobbyists saw plainly that Israel was shooting itself in the foot, but it would take a few months before this dawned on leaders in Jerusalem. When President Reagan vetoed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act on 26 September 1986, the Israelis felt vindicated. But Congress immediately overrode Reagan’s veto with overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act became law a week later – including the amendment threatening to cut off military aid to Israel. It was a rude awakening for Shamir, who left the foreign ministry to take over as Prime Minister on 20 October. He was forced to apologize to the AIPAC lobbyists, telling them: ‘your president told me I didn’t have to listen to you’. But now, with the anti-apartheid law on the books, he did. Embarrassed by his miscalculation, Prime Minister Shamir had no choice but to impose sanctions of his own. As two leading Israeli journalists argued in The Washington Post, ‘without US military aid, valued at $1.3 billion this year, Israel could soon be defenseless, destitute or both’. Shamir’s government now saw the threat clearly and passed a sanctions resolution on 18 March 1987, vowing to sign no new defense contracts with South Africa. Two weeks later came the dreaded US report on South Africa’s arms suppliers. It named several European countries as occasional violators of the arms embargo, but the focus was on Israel’s arms sales. Damningly, the report’s authors concluded, ‘we believe that the Israeli government was fully aware of most or all of the trade’.

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Suddenly, American Jewish organizations were forced to acknowledge an unsavory relationship they had downplayed and denied for years and defend Israel’s more pressing interest: ongoing military aid from Washington. Pro-Israel organizations such as AIPAC saw the prospect of losing US aid as a much greater threat to the Jewish state than cutting ties with South Africa. As the self-appointed guardians of Israel’s interests in Washington, they told Shamir to make sure Israel’s measures against South Africa were just as strong as those taken in the United States and Western Europe – regardless of export revenues. With Section 508 on the books, American diplomats were speaking openly and disapprovingly about Israeli cooperation with South Africa – a topic that had long been shrouded in secrecy. Having recently signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) along with several other Western nations, the United States was getting serious about stopping missile proliferation.105 In early 1989, US ambassador Thomas Pickering complained to Shamir about Israel’s ongoing aid to the South African missile program and warned him that President Bush was not happy about it. Then, on 5 July 1989, hovering satellites observed a missile fly 500 miles out to sea from Overberg.106 Based on leaks from the US intelligence community, The Guardian had already reported an impending test.107 When it happened, the DIA immediately noted that a shortrange ballistic missile had been launched and that ‘Israel’s connection to the project has been rumored since the mid-1980s’.108 The CIA analysts went into more detail warning that ‘the possibility of a direct transfer of missile components from Tel Aviv to Pretoria’ was likely.109 Israel responded to these accusations cryptically, declaring ‘the defense establishment strictly abides by the inner cabinet decision of 18 March 1987, whereby no new contracts will be signed between Israel and South Africa in the defense realm’.110 This was meaningless, of course, because the missile cooperation at Arniston dated back at least as far as 1984 and was therefore part of an existing contract. President Bush was angry and demanded that the cooperation end.111 The South Africans claimed that the new missile, known as the RSA3, was simply a satellite launch vehicle – an innocuous part of their ‘space program’. But it was well known to all in the field that the same delivery system that launches a satellite into space could also be used for a nucleartipped ballistic missile. In the CIA’s opinion, ‘the program would not make sense unless the missile was intended to carry a nuclear warhead’.112 American intelligence agencies were well aware of South Africa’s nuclear

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capability, and the possibility of a viable long-range delivery system raised fears in Washington. The recent US-brokered negotiations between South Africa and Cuba had put peace in Angola and independence for Namibia within reach. To Bush, an old CIA hand himself, it seemed that Pretoria needed nuclear-tipped missiles less than ever.113 The end of the Cold War dramatically altered the political and strategic landscape of Southern Africa. Cuban troops were already withdrawing from Angola when the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. F. W. de Klerk replaced P. W. Botha as president and embarked on a radically different course that led to the release of Nelson Mandela in early 1990. With the Soviet and Cuban threat gone, South Africa could no longer appeal for Western support by invoking anti-communist arguments, nor could it rationalize repression of the democratic opposition by cloaking apartheid in Cold War rhetoric. Despite the negotiations and plans for a democratic government of National Unity, the formidable arsenal that South Africa had constructed with Israel’s help remained a major concern for the US government in the early 1990s. Pretoria faced pressure from Washington and London to get rid of its nuclear arsenal before a new government came to power. Despite the ANC’s commitment to the principles of nonproliferation, certain US and British officials, as well as some Israelis, feared that sensitive nuclear technology might fall into the hands of ANC allies, such as Fidel Castro and Muammar Ghaddafi, who were hostile to the West. In 1990, de Klerk ordered an end to the South African nuclear weapons program, including the dismantlement of the existing warheads and the destruction of all records associated with the program.114 South Africa knew that it would never be welcomed back into the international community with a covert nuclear weapons program. By signing the NPT, Pretoria could in one fell swoop shed its pariah status and gain a seat at the table in major international organizations dealing with nuclear energy and proliferation, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).115 In 1991, South Africa admitted IAEA inspectors and became a signatory to the NPT. That same year, Israel agreed to abide by the terms of the MTCR. Official pronouncements aside, defense industry leaders in both countries wanted to hold on. On the eve of South Africa’s transition to democracy, a variety of cooperative ventures were still moving forward despite the Israeli sanctions, which forbade new contracts.116 The largest

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was Project Tunny, an agreement with Israel Aircraft Industries to further update South Africa’s Cheetah fleet with advanced avionics.117 The SAAF had sent 38 Cheetah-C aircraft to Israel for weapons system updates and they were scheduled to become operational in 1995.118 Despite this R700 million ($200 million) contract, the number of South Africans in Israel was dwindling.119 Rather than the large teams of officers that had once frequented Israel, the biggest group of South African military personnel arriving in Israel in 1993 was the 12-man boxing team of the Far North Command, including three blacks.120 The new South Africa no longer saw a need for a wartime arsenal and Israel was forced to replace its most important customer with new clients such as China and India.121 Likewise, the demise of NP rule in South Africa and the Labour Party’s return to power in Israel in 1992 removed the ideological glue that had helped hold the relationship together. Rather than turning to Israel, the ANC government fostered friendly diplomatic ties with those who had supported its struggle, namely Ghaddafi’s Libya and the PLO. And although it faced no external threats after 1994, Pretoria turned to European arms manufacturers for a slew of new weapons systems, shunning its old Israeli suppliers.122 The alliance was over, yet extricating themselves from such an intimate relationship remained a challenge for officials in Jerusalem and Pretoria. Israel, hoping to preserve at least some residual commercial ties and prevent its technology from passing into its enemy hands, kept a close eye on the transition. Fears of proliferation were warranted but somewhat overblown. As Israeli officials soon discovered, the pragmatic realists managing Mandela’s transition – future presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma – were open to behind-the-scenes contact with Israeli intelligence agencies; they viewed Israel as competent and experienced in matters of state-building and were happy to seek advice. Even so, the two countries quickly drifted apart as new strategic priorities and diplomatic partnerships took precedence. As Israel found alternative export markets and the new South Africa realigned itself politically with many of Israel’s foes, the alliance that had once been so vital to apartheid South Africa’s defense and Israel’s economy simply disappeared. In recent years, the Israeli-South African relationship has been far less important financially and strategically. The Second Palestinian intifada that began in September 2000 led to growing activism among South Africa’s Muslims and a radicalization of the anti-Israel left – spawning a

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movement favoring boycotts and divestment from Israel that commands increasing influence today. Some of the bad blood can also be traced to the UN’s World Conference Against Racism in 2001, during which members of the United States delegation, led by Colin Powell, famously walked out with the Israeli delegation at their side. The presence of then PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and his strenuous efforts to include a denunciation of Zionism as a form of racism in the conference’s resolution drew the ire of American and Israeli diplomats. The Israeli-Palestinian spat dominated global headlines and obscured many other controversies at the conference – including bitter disputes over African demands for slavery reparations and the Indian government’s attempts to silence a campaign by untouchables, demanding a formal defense of their rights. The US-Israeli walkout was a diplomatic embarrassment to the South African government, which intended the conference as an opportunity to showcase its newfound clout on the global stage. The statements of prominent icons of the antiapartheid struggle have also led to broader criticism of Israel. Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote in The Guardian in April 2002 that seeing the conditions of West Bank Palestinians ‘reminded me so much of what happened to us black people in South Africa. I have seen the humiliation of the Palestinians at checkpoints and roadblocks, suffering like us when young white police officers prevented us from moving about’. His more recent call for the Cape Town Opera not to tour Israel because Palestinians would not have equal access to the performance prompted a petition accusing Tutu of ‘demonizing Israel’ demanding that he step down as a patron of Cape Town’s Holocaust Centre.123 In 2007, the former ANC intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils drew the ire of many of his fellow South African Jews when he wrote in South Africa’s Weekly Mail and Guardian, ‘travelling into Palestine’s West Bank and Gaza Strip, which I visited recently, is like a surreal trip back into an apartheid state of emergency’ and ‘a surreal world that is infinitely worse than apartheid’.124 The boycott movement won one of its largest victories in May 2012, when the South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, called for labels on imported Israeli goods produced in the West Bank to list the origin as the ‘Occupied Palestinian Territories’ rather than ‘Israel’, enraging many South African Jews and Israelis. However, this movement does not draw its support only from radical anti-Israel activists; ambassador Alon Liel – Israel’s envoy during the crucial transition years before Mandela became president in 1994 – publicly backed the

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boycott of West Bank goods in a South African newspaper column125 and Peter Beinart, an American journalist of South African parentage has publicly called on American Jews to do the same thing.126 At an official level, the ANC government has maintained diplomatic ties with Israel but it has also recognized Palestine and its envoys. The ANC’s historic ties to the PLO and memories of Israel’s staunch support for the apartheid regime may have also played a role in making the South African government more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. It is also a function of party politics in Israel; relations have tended to be warmer when ambassadors affiliated with the Israeli Labour Party were residing in Pretoria, and cooler when Israel’s envoys hailed from the Likud Party. In the immediate aftermath of South Africa’s democratic transition, Israel sent a left-wing ambassador from the Mapam Party, Elazar Granot, to Pretoria and he befriended Palestine’s ambassador and socialized with many of the other Arab envoys. Though later ambassadors, such as the South African-raised Tova Herzl, went to great lengths to mend the relationship, it has never been the same. The history of Israeli-South African ties since Granot’s departure has been one of civil but cool relations.127

Notes 1. Jewish Board of Directors (JBOD), ‘Memo from Mr. Saron to Honorary Officers . . .’ 3 September 1963, Public Relations Files, 1960–70. 2. Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era, (Witwatersrand University Press: Johannesburg, 1991) p. 246. 3. H.F. Verwoerd, ‘Die Joodse Vraagstuk Besien Vanuit Die Nasionale Standpunt: ‘N Moontlike Oplossing’, Die Transvaler, 1 October 1937. 4. Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism and the Rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa, 1918–48, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 1989) pp. 148–49. 5. Furlong, p. 51. 6. Benjamin Pogrund, interview by author. Jerusalem, 12 December 2004. Louw served in various portfolios in the 1950s and became Foreign Minister in the early 1960s. By this time, however, he had tempered his anti-Semitism along with the rest of his party. 7. Harry Schwarz, interview by author. Johannesburg, 18 March 2005. 8. Gideon Shimoni, Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa, (University Press of New England: Hanover, NH, 2003) pp. 24–25. This happened when Malan’s Herenigde (Reunited) National Party absorbed the smaller Afrikaner Party.

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9. Shimoni, Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience, 1910–1967, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980), pp. 213–214. And Shimoni CC 26. 10. Benjamin Pogrund, interview by author. 11. Shimoni, Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa, pp. 46–47. Benjamin Pogrund recalls that his assistant editor Lewis Sowden (also Jewish) was in attendance at the UN that day and yelled ‘liar’ from the public gallery during Louw’s speech. 12. Apart from the Netherlands, which voted in favor as well. 13. Shimoni, Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa, p. 47. 14. Ibid., p. 234. 15. The letter made South African Jews nervous. On 2 November 1961, Prime Minister Verwoerd’s top aide wrote a letter filled with veiled threats to a prominent Jewish Cape Town City Councillor. ‘The attitude taken up by Israel in the United Nations Assembly is a tragedy for Jewry in South Africa’, the aide wrote. More threateningly, he added, ‘The fact that during the last Election so many Jews had favoured the Progressive Party and so few the National Party, did not pass unnoticed . . . ’ The letter caused a scandal when it leaked to the press. The Afrikaans press echoed the letter’s tone and criticized Israel for betraying South Africa’s friendship while the English press attacked the letter as a blatant tactic to hold Jews hostage for Israeli foreign policy decisions over which they exerted no control. Eventually, Verwoerd defused the situation by declaring that he did not want to see anti-Semitism return to the South African political landscape. See Shimoni, Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa, p. 50; JBOD, ‘Gustav Saron to Mr. Wiener’, 29 March 1962, Public Relations Files, 1960–70. 16. Shimoni, Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa, p. 51; Shimoni, Jews and Zionism, pp. 316–318. 17. Itzhak D. Unna, As I Remember It, (Unpublished manuscript) p. 101. Unna describes it as ‘an offset arrangement with the SA Zionist Federation, so that the IUA funds, which had accumulated in blocked accounts in South Africa, were used to purchase the residence in Pretoria’. 18. South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), ‘Note on Israeli Attitude Towards South African Issues...’, August 1963, 1/8/3, vol. 2. 19. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world, (Penguin: London, 2000), pp. 192–199. 20. Olusola Ojo, Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspective (Westview: Boulder, CO., 1988) p. 50. 21. Shlomo Shamgar, ‘Over the Grave of an African Elephant’ (Translated), Yediot Aharanot, 19 October 1973. 22. Supreme Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope), ‘The State vs. Johann Philip Derk Blaauw’, 9 September 1988, p. 20. 23. ‘Editorial’, Ha’aretz, 14 November 1973.

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24. Harry Hurwitz, ‘New Phase in S.A.-Israel Relations’, The Jewish Herald, 19 February 1974. 25. Lucretia McCalmont Marmon, ‘Israel and South Africa: The Odd Couple’, Times of Israel and World Jewish Review, 1974. 26. In the upper echelons of the South African diplomatic community, there was a growing fear that closer ties with Israel would alienate the Arab states and Iran, upon whom South Africa depended for oil. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie, telegraphed Fincham warning him that Pretoria’s support for Israel during the war meant that South Africa was ‘widely regarded as one of Israel’s very few reliable friends, a contention which is already giving impetus to an oil boycott against us’. See DFA, ‘Krisis in Israel se Africa Beleid’, 4 July 1973, 1/8/6, vol. 2; DFA, ‘Telegram: S.A. Consul-General, Tehran to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria’, 9 July 1974, 1/8/3, vol. 5. 27. Alex Mintz, and Michael D. Ward, ‘Dynamics of Military Spending in Israel: A Computer Simulation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31, no. 1 (1987) pp. 87–88. 28. Stewart Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry: Foreign Policy, Arms Transfers, and Military Doctrine of a Small State (Holmes and Meier: New York, 1989) pp. 111–112. 29. Ibid., p. xiii.; Aaron S. Klieman, Israel’s Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy (Pergamon Press: Oxford, 1985), p. 58. 30. Ibid., pp. 111–112. Exports increased from $39 million in 1968 to $70 million in 1973. 31. Klieman, pp. 81. This occurred thanks largely to South African contracts. 32. Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, ‘The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel’, American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989) pp. 521–533. 33. Klieman, pp. 124–127. 34. Ibid. 35. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Israel’s “Security Network” and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 2 (2006) pp. 235–261. 36. Klieman, p. 143. 37. Peter Liberman, ‘Israel and the South African Bomb’, The Nonproliferation Review 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004); SAHA, ‘The Jericho Weapon System’, 31 March 1975. The original Jericho memorandum is reproduced in an appendix to Liberman’s article. 38. See South African National Defence Force (SANDF), HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3, especially the notes regarding the third ISSA meeting. Because the offer of Jericho missiles, potentially armed with nuclear warheads, was discussed at two subsequent meetings in June, it appears that the offer first surfaced during the 31 March meeting, prompting Armstrong’s memo and a series of decisions for the matter to be ‘held in abeyance’ until June and then, again, until July 1975. 39. South African History Archive (SAHA), ‘The Jericho Weapon System’, 31 March 1975.

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40. The project’s codename is corroborated by Dieter Gerhardt in his interview with the author and in other documents contained in SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3 41. SANDF, ‘Notes on a Meeting between Minister S Peres and Minister P W Botha...’, 4 June 1975, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3. 42. Indeed, South Africa’s costly clandestine efforts to develop its own indigenous nuclear capability in the following years would have been unnecessary if the Jericho deal had gone through in 1975. Interview by author, Dieter Gerhardt. 43. SANDF ‘Notes on a Meeting between Minister S Peres and Minister P W Botha...’ 44. Mintz and Ward, ‘The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel’, p. 529; Stewart Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry: Foreign Policy, Arms Transfers, and Military Doctrine of a Small State (Holmes and Meier: New York, 1989), p. 136. 45. Abraham A. Ben-Zvi, Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence: The Case of the US and Israel, 1975–1983, (Westview Press: Boulder, CO., 1984) p. 16. For detailed analysis of the reassessment crisis of 1975, see Abraham A. BenZvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1993). 46. ‘The Israeli Connection’, Economist, 5 November 1977. 47. Reiser, p. 130. 48. Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Expanded ed., (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1996) p. 261. Rabin’s views on the causes and consequences of the reassessment crisis are discussed in pp. 253–275. Not surprisingly, he does not mention South Africa, given the secrecy surrounding those ties. 49. Interview by author, Dieter Gerhardt. 50. Iran was involved in developing missiles with Israel prior to 1979. After the fall of the Shah, Israel looked to South Africa to help fund and jointly develop a missile system. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World, (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1994) pp. 452–453; Bergman, ‘Treasons of Conscience’. 51. For a discussion of this hardening see Rabin, p. 256; Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship, pp. 98–99. 52. See SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3. 53. According to most sources, Rhoodie, Mulder and van den Bergh were the masterminds of the visit. However, Rhoodie’s autobiography and a 1983 article suggest that Oscar Hurwitz played a major role in pushing Vorster to go to Israel. See David Braun, ‘Propaganda War Aimed at Israel and Black States: Prominent Jewish Lawyer Played a Major Role in Softening Attitudes Towards S.A.’, The Star, 1 December 1983. 54. See, for example, Naomi Chazan, ‘Israel’s “Shortsighted” Policy on South Africa’, Jerusalem Post Weekly, 20 April 1976. 55. Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, 11 April 1976.

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56. ‘Israel and South Africa: Just Looking’, Economist, 17 April 1976; Terence Smith, ‘Vorster Visit to Israel Arouses Criticism’, The New York Times, 18 April 1976. 57. Interview by author, Binyamin Telem. 58. SANDF, ‘Provision of Transport: Visit of Maj General Holtzhausen and Group’, 28 November 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 2, p. 94. 59. SANDF, ‘C S.A.D.F. (Cape) to C Army’, 4 March 1977, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 1d. 60. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Besoek aan Israeli Weermag Deur Hofleer en Direkteur Beplanning, Leerhofkwartier’, 18 March 1977, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1. 61. SANDF, ‘Visit to Cane: Hoedspruit Communications System’, 29 July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, p. 115; SANDF, ‘Visit to Israel: Air Force Planning Team’, July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, p. 47. 62. SANDF, ‘Drop Tests – Proj Limbo’, 24 June-8 July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, pp. 102–105; Interview by author, Tienie Groenewald (#2). Pretoria, 6 July 2006. 63. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Besoek aan Argus Oor Die Periode 18 Tot 28 Julie 1977’, July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, p. 133. This can be discerned by comparing data from the IMF Department of Trade Statistics, available at http://www. esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/imf/dots.asp, with the totals from AFD, ‘Armscor Confidential Information: Bestel/Verskaffer Report’, 11 July 2006. 64. Ibid., p. 130. 65. ‘Ministry of Defence: Visit of Mr. S.P. Botha, Minister of Labour and MinesS.A. 26–31 July 1976’, (Exhibit B38 from State v. Blaauw). 66. ‘Israel Voer Dalk Uit S.A. In’, Die Burger, 2 August 1976. 67. ‘State v. Blaauw’, p. 22. 68. Fanie Botha, interview by author. Pretoria, 7 July 2006. Although Botha claims that there was no debate within South Africa’s nuclear establishment about his order to lift the safeguards, the AEB officials tell a different story. At the time, the AEB’s chief was Ampie Roux. His protégé, Waldo Stumpf, remembers a pair of threatening letters from Fanie Botha to Roux ordering him to lift the safeguards. Roux was the only official with the authority to do so as head of the agency that sold the uranium and was responsible for inspecting it. ‘I saw that letter’, recalls Stumpf. According to him, Ampie Roux insisted that South Africa ‘should not supply uranium to Israel that could then be used as weapon fuel’. Stumpf recalls a second letter threatening Roux with his job if he didn’t lift the safeguards. ‘I specifically remember those two letters because they vindicated Ampie Roux if anyone ever would like to point a finger at him, he strongly objected and he was just overruled’. Today, the letters are nowhere to be found in the archives. ‘The idea was always that it [the yellowcake] would be strictly under safeguards . . . [But] the politicians started playing and interfering’, Stumpf complains. Whether or not Ampie Roux agreed, he eventually submitted to the pressure and lifted the safeguards. 69. Fanie Botha, interview by author

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70. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ 2002 nuclear weapons appraisal, Israel today possesses a tritium production capability at Dimona. If this was not operational in the 1970s then the material would have come from the Soviet Union or the United States. 71. ‘State v. Blaauw’, 24; Lawyer’s Handwritten Trial Notes: State v. Blaauw, 5. 72. ‘State v. Blaauw’, 24. Both Fanie Botha and Waldo Stumpf see the tritium as the quid pro quo in the deal. However, Stumpf claims it was not needed for the bombs that the AEB was designing at the time, a view shared by André Buys and the head of Armscor’s research and development at the time, Hannes Steyn. 73. Construction even began on a plutonium reprocessing and Lithium-6 facility at Gouriqua in the Western Cape Province. Had it been finished, the plant would have supplied South Africa with its own indigenous supply of tritium. 74. Robert S. Jaster, ‘South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military’, in Arms and the African: Military influences on Africa’s International Relations, ed. William J. Foltz and Henry Bienen (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1985), p. 16; Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984), p. 72. 75. Ibid., p. 84. Armscor itself employed 29,000 people in 1981, the remaining 70,000 worked with its affiliates and contractors.; See also National Security Archive, Washington DC (NSA), ‘D.I.A.: Armscor and the South African Defense Industry (U)’, December 1980. 76. Jaster, ‘South African Defense Strategy’, p. 144. 77. Although other countries were involved with South Africa after the UN embargo, none of these relationships approached the formal state-to-state alliance forged at the highest levels of government between Israel and South Africa. Britain provided spared for the SAAF’s Buccaneer bombers and Japan sold missile components over the years according to Gerhardt. 78. Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1981) pp. 171–180. 79. Ofira Seliktar, New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel, (London: Croom Helm, 1986) p. 182; Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Israel’s “Security Network” and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 38, no. 2 (2006) pp. 235–261. 80. ‘Partition for SA’, David Hacohen, The Jerusalem Post, 8 July 1977, p. 12. 81. A caveat to this interpretation should be noted. Revisionism, in its post-1944 incarnation, was an explicitly revolutionary movement calling for armed revolt. This element of its message was understandably admired by some on the revolutionary left. In South Africa, Menachem Begin’s memoir The Revolt appealed to Nelson Mandela, who read it in prison, while Begin was supporting the government of his captors. 82. Peter L. Bunce, ‘The Growth of South Africa’s Defence Industry and Its Israeli Connection’, Royal United Services Institute Journal 129, no. 2 (1984) p. 44;

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Klieman, p. 152. It should be noted that the dollar amounts in the period 1980–90 are distorted due to the precipitous devaluation of the rand, from a value of more than $1.25 to less than $0.40 against the dollar. Therefore, the actual rand outlays did not drop significantly in the period 1980–83 as the dollar amounts suggest and they increased far more dramatically between 1984 and 1987 than the dollar figures indicate. Due to the volatility of the South African rand over the course of the period in question, all values have been converted to US dollars on an annual basis using the historical exchange rate tables of the International Monetary Fund. Interview by author, Ronnie Edwards. Springs, 1 July 2006. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Spesiale Besoek aan Israel IVM Missielprojek...’, 13 March 1979, HSAW, 520/3/4/6, vol. 1. ‘Magnus Malan to Rafael Eitan (Draft Letter)’, March 1979, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Spesiale Besoek aan Israel IVM Missielprojek...’, 13 March 1979, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1. SANDF, ‘Rafael Eitan to Magnus Malan, June 10, 1981’, MV 56/17, vol. 3. SANDF, ‘Magnus Malan to Rafael Eitan, July 16, 1981’, MV 56/17, vol. 3, 10. See SANDF, AMI 520/2/5/6, vol. 6 and MV 56/17, vol. 3. Drew Middleton, ‘South Africa Needs More Arms, Israeli Says’, The New York Times, 14 December 1981. SANDF, ‘Magnus Malan to Ariel Sharon’, 26 April 1982, MV 56/17, vol. 3, 16. Raful Eitan, A Soldier’s Story, (New York: S.P.L, 1992), p. 234. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Besoek van H S.A.W. en Mev Viljoen...” 21 September 1981, MV 56/17/1, vol. 2. Aanhaengsel A, Byvoegsel, p. 3. Hannes Steyn, interview by author. Jan van Loggerenberg, interview by author. SANDF, ‘Verslag Oor Besoek aan Metro: 28 Oktober Tot 20 November 1983’, 11 January 1984, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 20, pp. 142–143. IAI’s Bedek division was the primary subcontractor for the massive project to overhaul South Africa’s fighter jets Jan van Loggerenberg, interview by author. SANDF, ‘Project Brahman Training in Lanvin...’, 13 May 1985, AMI/DPO 103/3/4, vol. 12, pp. 89–90. NSA, ‘D.I.A.: South Africa: The Effect of Economic Sanctions on the Defense Industry (U)’, December 1986. There is some debate over the range of this system, which probably rests in uncertainty regarding the size of the payload it would carry if used as a ballistic missile. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories calculated that if the Shavit launch vehicle were deployed as a missile, it could travel 5,300 km, the Pentagon estimated 7,200km, and the physicist Steve Fetter

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calculated a range of 4,000km. See: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/missile/jericho-2.htm. Though they have tested before over the Mediterranean. SANDF, ‘Oorsese Besoek: Projek Kerktoring’, 8 November 1984, 520/3/4/6, vol. 22. Albright, p. 45; ‘IAEA: The Agency’s Verification Activities in South Africa: Report by the Director General’, p. 7. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN, 2005) p. 76. Warren Strobel, ‘U.S. Plans Talks with Israel on Project with S. Africa’ The Washington Times, 31 October 1989. Burrows and Windrem, pp. 445–448. Martin Walker, ‘South Africa “About to Test Medium-Range Missile”’, The Guardian, 21 June 1989. ‘D.I.A.: Special Assessment: South Africa: Missile Activity (U)’, pp. 1–2. CIA, ‘South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race?’, 8 December 1989, p. 7. Both reports remain heavily redacted so the full extent of American knowledge of the cooperation remains a mystery. Gordon, 1(A). Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South African’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2005), p. 75. See also William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1994), pp. 448–449. Some observers believe that Bush was angry about the transfer of American parts to South Africa by Israel. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, ‘South Africa: The A.N.C. And the Atom Bomb’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, no. 3 (April 1993) p. 36. As Buys notes, ‘we had a look at the rockets that were being developed for launching the satellites and these could also potentially be used as the means of delivery for a warhead’. However, he adds, ‘it was never approved that we should equip those missiles, it was an R&D program and by the time the program was terminated that decision had still not been taken’. Strobel, p. 7(A). The Pentagon was angry, too, and publicly objected to the sale of two IBM supercomputers to the Haifa Technion, allegedly because of their ability to simulate nuclear explosions. Purkitt and Burgess, p. 120. Princeton Lyman, interview by author. SANDF, ‘Overseas Visit: S.A.A.F.: Project Tunny: Israel...’, 25 April 1994, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 55, p. 40. Other analysts have lined the CAVA project, discussed above, to Project Tunny. The archives confirm that Tunny was an Israeli update of Cheetah weapons and avionics but there is no reference to it prior to the early 1990s. If

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the CAVA project was scrapped in the late 1980s as suggested by Groenewald and Roos then Tunny was simply a less ambitious and less costly program of a related nature. SANDF, ‘Buitelandse Besoek: S.A.L.M.: Projek Tunny: Israel’, 12 May 1993, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 53, p. 97. The total cash flow involved was R700 million in the 1994/1995 fiscal year (approximately $200 million at 1994 exchange rates). SANDF, ‘Project Tunny: Visit to Israel: 1 Jun to 2 Jul 93’, 3 May 1993, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 53, p. 79. SANDF, ‘Boxing Tour: Israel 16–23 January 1994’, 8 November 1993, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 55, pp. 1–4. To a large extent, India has replaced South Africa as a major customer for Israeli arms after a brief period in the 1990s when China was a major purchaser of Israeli arms. See Thomas Withington, ‘Israel and India Partner Up’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 1 (2001) pp. 18–19; Bruce Riedel, ‘Israel and India: New Allies’, Brookings Institution Middle East Bulletin, 21 March 2008, available online at: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0321_ india_riedel.aspx.; Pankaj Mishra, ‘Purification Rites’, The National (Abu Dhabi), 27 March 2009. For more amusing evidence of the current arms trade between Israel and India see the The New York Times online video: http:// thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/israeli-arms-dealer-tries-bollywoodpitch. These weapons were of dubious strategic value to a newborn nation at peace. See Andrew Feinstein, After the Party: Corruption, the ANC, and South Africa’s Uncertain Future, (Verso: New York, 2009). These post-apartheid arms deals planted the seeds of a massive corruption scandal that has poisoned South African politics for the last 15 years and remained the backdrop of the 2009 election campaign. ‘Tutu accused of “demonising” Israel: Petition’, The New Age, 12 January 2011. Ronnie Kasrils, ‘Israel 2007: worse than Apartheid’, The Mail and The Guardian, 21 May 2007. See http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/06/25/alon-liel-don-t-buy-israeligoods-made-in-palestine. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/opinion/to-save-israel-boycott-thesettlements.html. There have been periodic flare-ups at times of violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The apartheid-era friendship between the ANC and the Palestinian leadership has not faded and since Granot’s time Israel has not received equal affection from the ANC although Pretoria has occasionally sponsored conflict resolution workshops for Israelis and Palestinians.

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10 ISR AEL AND JAPAN: FROM ER R ATIC CONTACT TO R ECOGNITION TO BOYCOTT TO NOR M ALIZATION Jonathan Goldstein

The relations between Japan, the Jews, the founders of the modern State of Israel and the state itself after its proclamation on 14 May 1948 have evolved in four distinct phases. The first phase began in the early twentieth century and lasted up to the end of World War II. Relations consisted of a potpourri of erratic interactions: mutual assistance at times of need, especially American Jewish banker Jacob Schiff’s financing Japan’s war effort during the Russo-Japanese War; Japan’s endorsement of Zionism and the principles of the 2 November 1917 Balfour Declaration, which called for a national home for the Jews in Ottoman Palestine, which was by then partially occupied by British troops; Japan’s discovery as early as the 1930s of a vast potential for trade with the Arab and Islamic worlds, a sentiment which could not be easily reconciled with equal treatment for the yishuv, as the much smaller Jewish community of Palestine and later of Israel was then known; the appearance in Japan of philo-Semitic as well as anti-Semitic literature, of defenders as well as detractors of the Jews; and Japan’s alliance with Hitler and, at the same time, a concerted Japanese effort at saving European Jewish lives and evacuating and

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resettling European Jewish refugees in Japanese-dominated regions of China, especially in Shanghai and Manchuria.1 A second phase began in 1945 and lasted through to 1985. The State of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948, and on 15 May 1952 Israel was the first country in the Middle East with which Japan established relations after World War II. Both countries sought international recognition. Nevertheless, because of the Arab world’s far greater trade potential, and especially its vast oil reserves, Japan’s relations with Israel cooled almost from the moment of recognition. Acting on the basis of pragmatism, Japan cooperated extensively with the Arab economic boycott of Israel. Japanese anti-Zionism intensified from both the right and the left, finding its fullest expression in a 1972 Japanese Red Army terrorist attack upon a group of Christian pilgrims at Tel Aviv Airport. Diplomatic relations were nearly severed as a consequence of the 1973 Arab oil embargo; they were retained because US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Tokyo in November 1973 and, along with other American groups, urged Japan not to capitulate to Arab demands. In 1975 Japan was the only major country in the Western camp which abstained, and did not vote against, the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. In 1979, after the Khomeni revolution in oil-rich Iran, Japan maintained its Persian ties despite that nation’s hostility to both Israel and the United States. During a third phase, from 1985 to 1991, the United States, Israel and private American-Jewish groups intensified their appeals to Japan to lessen cooperation with the Arab economic boycott. Japan ultimately discovered, as did China, India, South Korea and many other countries, that normal economic relations with Israel did not preclude good relations with oil-rich Arab and Islamic states. During a fourth phase, between 1991 and 2012, cultural ties between the two countries flourished, the economic boycott was finally relaxed, Israel provided substantial and well-publicized disaster relief to Japan during its 2011 tsunami, earthquake and nuclear disaster, and Japan increased its involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, especially within the framework of the United Nations. In 2012, as both countries celebrated the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship, Japanese-Israeli economic and political relations continued to progress. They were tested by a resurgence of Arab boycott and Palestinian statehood demands and the Iranian threat against Israel.

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Erratic Relations between Japan and the Jews up through 1945 The first significant interaction between Japanese and Jews occurred in 1904. Jacob Schiff (1847–1920), the American Jewish banker who was president of Kuhn Loeb and Company, helped underwrite $196,250,000 in major loans which ensured a Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Loans of this magnitude prevented the Japanese economy from collapsing under wartime stress. In an unusual honor for a foreigner, the Emperor Meiji hosted a luncheon for Schiff where Schiff was presented with one of Japan’s highest decorations, the Order of the Rising Sun, Second Grade.2 According to Takahashi Korekiyo (1854–1936), the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan who negotiated these loans, Schiff saw lending money to Japan as more than an entrée into a potentially lucrative foreign market; he wanted Japan to help the Jews by punishing the Russian government. Takahashi explained what he saw as Schiff’s rationale: He had a grudge against Russia on account of his race. He was justly indignant at the unfair treatment of the Jewish population by the Russian Government, which had culminated in notorious persecutions. He harboured no ill-will toward the Russian people; but he thought the Imperial regime of Russia was utterly antiquated. A system of government which was capable of such cruelties and outrages at home as well as in foreign relations must be overhauled from the foundation in the interest of the oppressed race, the Russian peoples themselves, and the world at large. [In fact it was Japan who attacked Russia, and not the other way around. ed.] For this purpose, it was desirable to admonish the ruling class of Russia with an object lesson. Schiff saw in the war callously embarked on by the Russian government an opportunity for giving effect to his cherished idea. He felt sure that if defeated, Russia would be led in the path of betterment, whether it be revolution or reformation, and he decided to exercise whatever influence he had for placing the weight of American resources on the side of Japan [sic].3 Shortly after World War I, Japan participated in international efforts to endorse British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour’s 2 November 1917 call

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for a national home for the Jewish people in Ottoman Palestine, which was by then partially occupied by British troops. In 1919 Chinda Sutemi, the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, officially notified Chaim Weizmann, who was the head of the British Zionist organization, a member of the World Zionist Executive, and a future Israeli president, that the Japanese Government gladly take note of the Zionist aspirations to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people and they look forward with sympathetic interest to the realization of such desire.4 As American Japanologist Frank Joseph Shulman has noted, Japan’s proZionist sentiments began to cool even before World War II, as Japan cultivated far larger trade surpluses with the Arab and Islamic world than she could ever hope to enjoy with the yishuv, as the much smaller Jewish community of Palestine and later of Israel was then known.5 The Japanese/Jewish relationship became more complex when Japan allied with Hitler in their 25 November 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and 27 September 1940 Tripartite Alliance. On 20 February 1938 Germany in turn recognized Japan-dominated Manchukuo and, on 1 July 1941, the Japanese-sanctioned puppet regime of Wang Jingwei in China. Prior to the January 1942 Wannsee Conference, in which German leaders specified a ‘Final Solution’, i.e. genocide, to the ‘problem’ of European Jewry, Germany was happy to see Central and Eastern European Jews dumped on Japanese shores or in Japanese-dominated regions of China. At that point Germany’s goal was forced emigration and there was no reason for the Germans to urge anti-Jewish policies upon an ally who would accept undesirable Europeans. After Germany’s January 1942 decision for genocide it would have preferred a Holocaust of all Asian as well as European Jewry, but this would have been difficult for the Japanese, and Hitler knew it. Japan had negotiated a non-aggression pact with the USSR in April 1941. It remained intact until August 1945. Not willing to imperil that agreement, Japan dared not persecute any of the thousands of Russian Jews and non-Jews in the regions it dominated in East Asia. As a precaution against sabotage Japan interned and ghettoized stateless individuals and non-Russians from all Western nations at war with the Axis. In principle Japan’s incarceration policies were not unlike the United States’ forced incarceration of Japanese on the US West Coast. Although much harsher than the treatment that Japanese-Americans

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received, Japan’s incarceration policies can in no way be characterized as genocide or even, arguably, anti-Semitism. Germany grumbled but tolerated the incarceration policies of its Asian ally much in the way it put up with Mussolini’s half-hearted attempt to implement anti-Semitic policies from 22 May 1939 on, when he formally allied Italy with Germany in the ‘Pact of Steel’. Prior to January 1942 Japan partook in the rescue of many of Hitler’s Jewish victims with no opposition from the Nazis. In 1937 the Japanese conquered Shanghai, the only place where Jewish refugees from Nazism could travel without a visa. Ultimately, approximately 18,000 Central and Eastern European Jews found refuge there. Japanese intelligence officer Sugihara Chiune (1900–86), stationed in Kaunas, Lithuania, in 1939–40 technically as Vice Consul, was in a position to issue transit visas. In 1940 he was actually head of the Japanese consulate. He worked conjointly with Dutch Ambassador to the Baltic States L. P. J. de Decker, stationed in Riga, and Dutch Consul Jan Zwartendijk, in Kaunas, in a scheme which the Dutch diplomats concocted to help approximately 2,000 Polish and Lithuanian Jews escape via the Soviet Union to Japan. Those Jews initially settled in Kobe. Those who could not acquire visas for elsewhere were relocated to Japanese-controlled Shanghai. This contingent included the nearly-intact faculty and student body of the Mir Yeshiva, one of Eastern Europe’s centers for advanced rabbinical study, plus individuals from other rabbinic schools. Thanks to Japanese intervention, these Jews avoided what would have been, after January 1942, almost certain annihilation at the hands of the Nazis. An additional aspect of Sugihara’s assignment was his primary task of working with Polish Army Lieutenant Leskek Daszkiewicz in observing the movements of German and Soviet forces in the Lithuanian region. To accomplish his task Sugihara had to have the assistance of non-Jewish Poles, some of whom he smuggled out of Lithuania in his private diplomatic vehicle. Sugihara’s help with the Jewish exodus from Lithuania must be seen as a fortuitous consequence of, and perhaps even as a cover-up or diversion for, his major intelligence-gathering mission.6 The head of the Japanese Navy’s Advisory Bureau on Jewish Affairs from April 1939 to March 1942, Captain Inuzuka Koreshige (1890–1965), helped Jewish refugees settle in Japanese-occupied (and Navy-administrated) Shanghai. His army counterparts Colonel Yasue Norihiro (1888–1950), liaison officer with the Jewish community in Harbin in Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo), and Major General Higuchi Kiichiro (1888–1970), chief of military intelligence in

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Harbin from August 1937 to July 1938, also aided Jewish resettlement in that region. According to Hebrew University Japanologist Avraham Altman, Inuzuka, Yasue and Higuchi were ‘using the Jews as tools in [their] government’s efforts to get the U.S. to remain neutral.’7 At a minimum they sought to prevent American economic sanctions and an embargo against Japan. Whatever their motivations, they saved Jews at a time when most of the world was closed to Jewish refugees. Hebrew University Japanologist Ben-Ami Shillony notes ironically that Inuzuka, Yasue and Higuchi all preached an ‘ideological antiSemitism’ and, at the same time, professed a ‘practical friendship’ for Jews who wished to settle in Japanese-occupied parts of China.8 Yasue built upon the anti-Semitic stereotypes which Christian missionaries introduced to Japan and which had been widely circulated as early as 1877, when the first Japanese translation of William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice was published. Japanese officers picked up additional anti-Semitic stereotypes during Japan’s military intervention in Siberia during and shortly after World War I. In 1924 Yasue translated the Czarist anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion into Japanese under the title Inside the World Revolution. In 1932, a year before the Nazis came to power in Germany, the Japanese Navy’s Education Department published Inuzuka’s tract ‘The Secret Purposes of Jewish Societies and the Reality of the Global Anti-Imperial Revolution’. Japanese Army Lieutenant General Shioden Nobutaka (1879–1962) preached notions about Jews which were indistinguishable from those of the Nazis. With an openly anti-Semitic platform, he polled more votes than any other candidate in elections for the 1942 Diet. Other anti-Semitic books published before the war included such home-grown screeds as AntiJapanese Power of the Jews, The Jewish World Menace, The Poison of Sassoon in China, and International Jewish Control of the Japanese Economy. Hitler’s Mein Kampf was first published in Japanese in 1937.9 But within prewar and wartime Japan there were also philo-Semites. Tokyo University faculty members Yoshino Sakuzo and Yanaihara Tadao were unapologetic advocates for Jews and Zionism. The late Japanese literature professor David G. Goodman concluded that these prewar authors ‘defended the Jews and Zionism because they recognized the threat posed to the integrity of Japanese intellectual life by anti-Semitic theories and theorists’.10 Viewed as a whole, then, the purveyors of Japanese antiSemitism and philo-Semitism tended to cancel each other out. Japan’s policy towards Jews in general, and specifically toward Israel since its

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establishment 1948, has been determined more by hard interests of state than by annoying literary caricatures of Jews or by philo-Semitism. What were Japan’s post-1948 hard interests and how have they been pursued?

Diplomatic Recognition, Boycott, Terrorism and Japanese Ties with Iran, 1945–1985 From 1945 through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘Yom Kippur’ War, Japanese popular attitudes towards Jews overall and toward the State of Israel after its establishment on 14 May 1948 were generally favorable. On 15 May 1952 Japanese-Israeli diplomatic relations were established. Almost immediately thereafter political and economic relations cooled. They worsened considerably in the period 1973–85. After World War II, Japan aggressively pursued oil supplies on a worldwide basis to fuel its booming economy. Japan also wished to restore a worldwide market for its exports, with the United States as its major client. Israel, surrounded by hostile Arab states from the moment of its birth on 14 May 1948, sought immigrants and arms, which Japan could not supply, and international recognition and economic development, in which Japan could play a part. Although relations with Japan were never a top foreign policy objective, Israel sought to strengthen its political and economic ties with a nation which, by the 1970s, had become the world’s second largest economic power in terms of non-military spending. The Allied occupation precluded Japan from conducting its own foreign relations until 1952. By then the Japanese Foreign Service had been significantly downsized and the Japanese military had been abolished altogether. Despite the myth that Sugihara Chiune was fired because of the visas he issued, in fact he was promoted after his service in Kaunas, serving in the even more prestigious post of Japanese Consul General in Prague. He and other ‘Jewish experts’ from the Japanese military and Foreign Service were dismissed as result of postwar downsizing. The enigmatic Navy Captain Inuzuka reemerges as the founder of the Nihon Isuraeru Kyokai (Japan-Israel Association), which included many rightwingers and ex-military men. Inuzuka was president of that association until his death in 1965. David Ben-Gurion’s government, for its part, was able to overcome the reluctance of many Israelis and establish relations with a nation which had been Hitler’s preeminent Asian ally. In this respect Ben-Gurion succeeded in the case of Japan as he did in the cases of Italy, Hungary, Rumania and of Germany itself. On

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15 May 1952, one day after the fourth birthday of the State of Israel and two weeks after the Allied occupation of Japan ended, both Israel and Japan, anxious for foreign friends, announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. Israel was the first country in the Middle East with which Japan established relations after the war at a time when Japan found itself confronted by the suspicion and hostility of many Southeast Asian and Eastern European bloc nations. According to Shillony, when the first Israeli envoy to Japan, Joseph I. Linton, presented his credentials to Emperor Hirohito in December 1952, his letter, signed by Yosef Sprinzak, Israel’s acting president, ‘extolled the historic friendship between Japanese and Jews’.11 Tokyo then became the site of Israel’s first legation in Asia and Tel Aviv the location of Japan’s first diplomatic mission in the Middle East. Recognition at the legation level was followed by a downward spiral in relations in which Japan nearly severed all diplomatic ties with Israel. There was almost no Japanese knowledge of the Holocaust and, since Japan was not in the United Nations in 1947, it felt no responsibility for partition or for the creation of Israel. Far more significantly, in the 1950s and 1960s Japanese business with oil-rich Islamic nations grew exponentially, far exceeding any prewar levels. Of Japan’s oil imports 70 to 80 per cent came from Arab states. In 1966 the Arab League opened a Tokyo office with the express purpose of tightening an economic boycott against Israel. A countervailing force which necessitated maintaining minimal relations with Israel was Japan’s wish not to alienate American Jews. As in the 1930s, many Japanese assumed that Jews wielded extraordinary power in the United States, an influence disproportionate to their minute percentage in the American population. American Jews were also prominent importers of Japanese automobiles, cameras and other electronic goods. Other Jews, notably ex-Municher Shaoul N. Eisenberg and ex-Harbiner Misha Kogan, exported to Japan or were agents for importing into Japan American-made electronic goods plus large quantities of such critical raw materials as iron and steel. Therefore, on a pragmatic basis, Japan cared about American Jewish opinion. While never going to the point of severing relations with Israel to placate the Arabs, Japan leaned over backwards to become, in the words of American Middle East analyst David Makovsky, ‘the strictest follower’ of the Arab economic boycott of Israel.12 Technically Makovsky may be exaggerating, as China, India and the Islamic and Soviet bloc nations of the Far East would not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, let alone trade. South Korea

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also based its anti-Israel policies on economic pragmatism. But when one considers the sheer scale of Japan’s refusal to do business with Israel, Japan may have surpassed all other regional boycotting powers combined. Japan’s boycotters included the worldwide industrial giants and trading companies Canon, Casio, Honda, Itohchu, Mazda, Matsushita Electric, Mitsui, Nippon Electric, Nippon Steel, Nissan (Datsun), Shiba Electric, Sumitomo, Suzuki, Toshiba, Toyota and Yamaha Motors Company. El Al Israel air lines was repeatedly denied landing rights in Japan even when that company proposed a 50/50 sharing of all profits, at no economic risk whatever to Japan. Japan Air Lines refused to serve Israel.13 Japanese ships did not dock at Israeli ports. Japanese importers of African iron ore demanded that shipments not be loaded onto Israeli freighters or onto those that had called at Israeli ports, a stringent form of blacklisting. According to Tel Aviv University Japanologist Raquel Shaoul, the Japanese trading firms Marubeni-Iida, Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha and Gosho refused to ship anything on the Israeli-owned Gold Star Line, which serviced Japan.14 In 1969, Mr M. Zaitsu, manager of Nissan’s export division for Europe and the Middle East, summarized the Japanese case for the boycott. He wrote Tel Aviv automobile dealer Itzhak Arditi, who had expressed an interest in importing Nissan vehicles: we are now exporting around 20,000 units a year to the Arabic countries and have already penetrated the market. According to the boycott resolution by the Israel Boycott Committee, the transaction with your country will surely create a total ban of our export to the Arabic countries. Judging from the above mentioned, we would unfortunately decline your proposal at this moment.15 The Japanese argument becomes problematic when one realizes that Japan was simultaneously preaching a doctrine of free and unrestricted trade in the American marketplace. It would take a decade or more of American and Israeli pressure before Japan acknowledged that contradiction and gradually began to rescind its boycott of Israel. Other low points in Japanese-Israeli relations were reached in the late 1960s-1970s when Japanese leftists, alongside their counterparts in China and the USSR, came to view Israel as a ‘running dog of American Imperialism’. The fullest expression of that condemnation came on 30 May 1972, when three Japanese Red Army terrorists, trained in Lebanon by the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, arrived in Tel

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Aviv airport. In the baggage claim area they murdered twenty-four innocent civilians, including senior Israeli scientist Aharon Katzir. Most of those killed were Puerto Rican Christian pilgrims visiting the Holy Land. Two of the terrorists were killed, while a third, Okamoto Kozo, a former Kagoshima University student, was captured and imprisoned until 1985, when he was released as part of a prisoner exchange. Japan’s more moderate Moscow-oriented Communist Party followed the Soviet foreign policy line, briefly supporting Israel’s creation in 1947–48 but thereafter turning proArab. On the subject of Israel the Japanese government found itself in the bizarre position of being pressured in the same direction by leftists as well as by its most conservative multinational corporations. Weighing in the factor of American public opinion which was overwhelmingly pro-Israel and a desire for a strong Japanese presence in the American marketplace, the Japanese government took the minimal step of inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open a Tokyo office in 1975 but not granting it diplomatic status. In February 1977 the PLO’s Tokyo office finally opened. In 1981 the Japanese government allowed PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to visit from October 12 to 15 not as an official guest but as an invitee of the Parliamentarians’ League for Japan-Palestine Relations, established in 1979 and headed by ex-Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio (1909–83). Nevertheless on October 14 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko met with Arafat. Suzuki was the first national leader of the Western democracies to receive Arafat, who visited Japan five times thereafter.16 To make matters even worse for Israel, after the October 1973 ArabIsraeli War, the oil-producing Arab states imposed a partial oil boycott upon Japan until such a time as Tokyo severed all diplomatic ties with Israel. Uemura Kogoro, the president of Keidanren, Japan’s powerful business federation, pleaded with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to do so. Countervailing pressure came from US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who flew to Tokyo in November 1973 and urged Japan not to capitulate to Arab demands. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish organizations and many other American Jewish groups launched similar appeals. Once again, the Tanaka government’s facesaving solution was not to break totally with Israel but rather to issue a pro-Palestinian statement calling on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in June 1967. The Arab oil-producing states were at least temporarily placated and petroleum shipments to Japan continued, albeit at prices that were five times higher than before the crisis. The Japanese economy entered a severe recession – the first since it began its post-World War II economic recovery. To further pacify the Arabs,

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Japanese leaders made frequent visits to Arab capitals and voted alongside Arab states in the United Nations. In 1975 Japan was the only major country in the Western camp which abstained, and did not vote against, the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. In 1982 a group of lawmakers, academics and jurists calling themselves ‘The International People’s Tribunal on the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon’ convened in Tokyo and judged Israel guilty of war crimes. In 1985, a public opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s largest circulation daily newspaper, found that from a list of thirty countries, Israel was considered the least trustworthy. The basis for this claim was unclear, but the perception remained.17 As a final complication for Japanese-Israeli relations in this forty-year period, the Khomeni revolution of 1979 in Iran cut off all Iranian ties with Israel, including oil shipments. This was a non-issue before 1979, as the Western-oriented Shah provided 37 per cent of Japan’s oil and most of Israel’s. Japan invested heavily in Iran, offering generous loans. Japanese firms built an Iranian hydroelectric plant and maintained a petrochemical complex at the port of Bandar Khomeni. After 1979 Iranian oil dropped to less than 10 per cent of Japan’s total imports of petroleum. Israeli appeals to Japan to cease funding a terror-exporting regime altogether have fallen on deaf ears as Tokyo continues to see even the small amount of oil it receives from Iran as part of its strategic reserve.18

Battling and Breaking the Economic Boycott, 1985–1991 Despite a boycott of the Jewish state by most large Japanese firms, others crept quietly into the Israeli market. Even in 1984 Japanese-Israeli trade amounted to $364 million. Technically Sony, Panasonic (National), Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Nippon Electric, Oki Electric, Sanyo, Sharp and Yuasa Battery refused to deal with Israel directly. Instead, they traded through dummy companies and by shipping goods to countries like Switzerland, where they were repackaged and sent on to Israel. Japanese shipyards built oil tankers for Israeli companies. Israeli-owned Zim Lines and El Yam continued to dock in Japanese ports throughout the boycott. Most important in terms of the value of exports, Israel supplied Japan with one-quarter of its imported polished diamonds because, according to historian Shaoul, these gems were ‘less visible’ than other objects. They were ‘not seen as potentially jeopardizing Japan’s economic interests in Arab markets. No special boycott limitations were applied to this particular product’.19

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In 1969, Fuji Heavy Industries, the eighth largest Japanese auto maker, began to export its Subaru vehicle to Israel. Fuji simply chose not to deal with Arab states. For the following decade this car was the most popular automobile on Israeli roads and Subaru’s second largest market, next only to that of the United States. Automotive manufacturers Daihatsu and Suzuki also quietly entered the Israeli market in the early 1980s. Nevertheless the Arab boycott of Israel remained largely intact as late as 1991. That year The Jerusalem Post lamented that ‘the Honda cars sold here are made, every nut, screw, and bolt, in Maryville, Ohio . . . This was Honda’s way of by-passing possible Arab objections to trading with Israel’.20 Other cracks in the boycott began to emerge simultaneously. Japan became more and more fearful of political and economic retaliation in the United States, where Japan argued persistently for free trade. Abraham Foxman, then the Associate Director of the Anti-Defamation League of Bnai Brith, summarized this contradiction in a 16 March 1987 letter to The New York Times. According to Foxman, the Japanese championed free trade in an attempt to forestall United States protectionist legislation. He argued: Japan has violated the principle of free trade in its support of the Arab boycott of Israel more openly than any other major industrial nation. Japan thus subverts the system of international trade that benefits all nations and puts at a disadvantage nations like the U.S. that by law refuse to abet the Arab boycott . . . The Government of Japan refrains from condemning the Arab boycott and is unwilling to do anything to prevent application of the Arab boycott in Japan or to discourage Japanese business cooperation with it.21 Because of Japan’s double standards, and not an evil Jewish conspiracy alleged by Japanese anti-Semites, there was a real possibility that Japanbashing circles within the US Congress might unite with America’s pro-Israel lobby. One consequence would be retaliatory legislation against Japan in its most valued market. In 1986, to expose and discredit Japan’s hypocrisy, the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress joined forces to establish an American Steering Committee on Freedom of Trade with Israel. This Committee had a subcommittee on Japan which petitioned Congress to act.22 Republican Senators John Danforth of Missouri and Richard Lugar of Indiana and Democratic Representatives Stephen Solarz of New York

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and Dan Glickman of Kansas raised the boycott issue with Japanese officials at the highest level, as did Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis.23 These bipartisan representations occurred as Israeli and Japanese officials began a substantive dialogue about the boycott at the highest level. In September 1985, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir paid a state visit to Japan in which bilateral trade was discussed with the Keidanren, the 800+ member Japanese manufacturers association. This was the first time that so senior an Israeli official had been invited to Japan in almost twenty years, since Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s trip shortly before the June 1967 Six Day War. Japan gambled that the Shamir invitation would not jeopardize its importation of Arab oil, and guessed correctly. Shamir’s visit was followed by the Tokyo visits of Israeli Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai and once again Abba Eban, who was a senior member of the Knesset and chairman of the Israel-Japan Friendship Association. Most significantly, on 26 June 1988 Japanese Foreign Minister Uno Sosuke paid a reciprocal state visit to Israel. Uno’s was the first visit of any Japanese cabinet member, let alone a Foreign Minister, to the Jewish state. The boycott issue was raised once again, and high-level dialogue continued in the Tokyo visits of Minister-Without-Portfolio Moshe Arens and Communications Minister Amnon Rubinstein. In November 1987 a delegation from the Keidanren met in Israel with counterparts from the Israel Manufacturers Association. It is unclear if boycott talks were included in Israeli President Chaim Herzog’s two state visits to Japan, but the two trips certainly fostered Japanese-Israeli goodwill. In February 1989 Herzog attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, the largest gathering in history of heads of state, and was warmly received by his Japanese hosts. According to Shillony, ‘the Japanese were aware of the debate that had earlier taken place in Israel, whether to send the president to the funeral of a former ally of Hitler, and they appreciated the decision not to associate Hirohito’s past with the funeral’. Herzog returned to Japan for Emperor Akihito’s November 1990 coronation.24 Despite these high-level discussions, little actual progress was made up to and including a February 1991 meeting in Jerusalem between Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Owada Hisashi.25 In March 1991 Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General for Economic Affairs Ya’acov Cohen, a former ambassador to Tokyo, presented the Japanese Foreign Ministry with a forceful ten-page memorandum ticking off Israeli complaints against the boycott.

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Japanese banks did not provide long term credit to those companies who wished to export to Israel. No Japanese banks or their subsidiaries had offices in Israel. During the first Gulf War Japanese banks lumped Israel together with Middle East combatants and withheld letters of credit to companies who wished to do business in Israel. Most seriously, there was virtually no Japanese investment in Israel nor any joint ventures. There were no research and development agreements between the two countries. Cohen concluded that ‘the policy vis-à-vis Israel [taken by] major Japanese economic firms . . . contradicts the principle of free trade’.26 That same year the American Jewish Committee sent two high-level delegations to Japan to protest the boycott.27 In April 1991 US President George Bush met in California with Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, calling on Kaifu to make a ‘confidence building measure’ for peace in the Middle East by ending all Japanese compliance with the boycott.28 Over and beyond these representations, other developments in the international arena also worked toward the elimination of the boycott. During the 1981–89 Iran-Iraq war, Japan’s adherence to the boycott did not spare the Japanese petrochemical compound at Bandar Khomeni or Japanese oil tankers in the Persian (Arab) Gulf from Iraqi air attack. Japan’s leaders realized that cooperation with the Arabs hadn’t bought them protection. Additionally, Arabs and Israelis had entered into significant negotiations. On 26 March 1979, Egypt, the largest Arab nation, signed a peace treaty with Israel. A pipeline from Egypt began to supply some 60 per cent of Israel’s oil and natural gas needs, with surplus fuel shipped onward to Jordan and Syria. Japan saw no point in being ‘more Arab than the Arabs’. After Palestinians were allowed to form part of the Jordanian delegation to the 1991 Madrid peace conference, Japan voted with a majority in the United Nations to rescind the 1975 ‘Zionism equals Racism’ resolution on which she had once equivocated.29

1991–2012: Normalized Political and Economic Relations and Ongoing Cultural Ties By 1991 the oil-rich Saudis were preoccupied not with Israel but rather with an Iranian challenge to both their domestic rule and regional influence. Japan no longer feared Arab retaliation. In 1991, five Japanese-Israeli joint ventures were undertaken.30 That year Toyota, Japan’s largest car manufacturer, began shipping cars to Israel via a third-country subsidiary. Mitsubishi and Honda began to use Israeli subsidiaries for their

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sales. Direct trade between the two countries reached $1.4 billion. This constituted about 0.3 per cent of Japan’s foreign trade and about 5 per cent of Israel’s non-military foreign trade that year. In January 1992 both China and India established full diplomatic relations with Israel, suffering no repercussions from the Arab world. In the fall of 1992 a delegation from Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry did not hesitate to visit to Israel, followed by a May 1993 delegation representing the nine largest Japanese trading companies. The appearance of both missions removed any lingering trace of the boycott. By 1994 major Japanese investments in Israel included a $50 million joint venture between Mekorot, Israel’s national water carrier, and Tomen, one of Japan’s leading multinational companies specializing in water desalinization. Because of a backlog of orders from Japanese firms caused by the years of the boycott, in 1995 and 1996 Israel became one of the few countries in the world to enjoy a favorable balance of payments with Japan. By 1995, bilateral trade rose to $2 billion. Japan replaced Britain as Israel’s second largest non-military trading partner, after the United States.31 In September 1995 Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi paid a two-day state visit to Israel as part of an eight-day regional tour which also included Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Significantly, Murayama’s visit was the third of a Japanese Prime Minister to the Middle East and the first to include Israel openly.32 According to Shillony, as of 2011 Japan’s ‘economic boycott on Israel does not exist anymore . . . all transactions are now considered on the economic level and there are no political obstacles in these considerations’. Kenneth Jacobson, Deputy National Director of Bnai Brith’s AntiDefamation League, wrote in July 2011 that ‘we work on the assumption that Japan stopped boycotting Israel 15 years ago’. Mazda, which once was a total boycotter of Israel, has surpassed Subaru as the commonest passenger vehicle on Israeli highways.33 The Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) issued the following summary of Japanese-Israeli trade since 2006: Israeli imports from Japan: 2006: 1,206 (million US$) 2007: 1,897 2008: 2,166 2009: 1,145 2010: 1,761

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Israeli exports to Japan: 2006: 834 (million US$) 2007: 900 2008: 915 2009: 816 2010: 833

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In all five of the aforementioned years, the balance of trade has shifted heavily in Japan’s favor. The main Israeli imports from Japan are transport machinery (mainly automobiles) 62.4 per cent; optical, precision and medical instruments 1.4 per cent; electronics 2.9 per cent; and chemical products 5.4 per cent. The main Israeli exports to Japan are electronic instruments and parts 22.1 per cent; optical, precision and medical instruments 14.4 per cent; chemical products 5.4 per cent; and base metals and derivatives 4.0 per cent. As of 2011 there are twentythree Japanese companies operating in Israel. Japan Air Lines began in 2005 to list a representative office in Tel Aviv – Open Sky Limited, at 22 Ben Yehuda Street – in its international timetable, although there are still no regularly-scheduled flights between the two countries.34 Japanese-Jewish and Japanese-Israeli cultural relations have developed significantly since 1991. They never really stopped even during the most intense period of the economic boycott. In 1946, after the war, Otsuki Takeji founded in Nagano the fundamentalist Protestant philo-Semitic sect Sei Yesu-kai (Holy Jesus Society), also known as the Nihon Kurisuchan Isuraeru Tomo-no-kai (Japan Christian Friends of Israel). It contributed money to Israeli universities and established guest houses for Jewish tourists near its Kyoto headquarters and in Tokyo. The inns were called ‘Beit Shalom’ (Hebrew: house of peace), a term which became synonymous with this Christian group. Makuya, a Pentecostal group, sponsored an annual pilgrimage and march though Jerusalem, a Makuya house in Jerusalem, a Makuya forest in the Galilee, and the first Hebrew-Japanese dictionary. About 2,000 Japanese are members of a ‘kibbutz movement’ directly modeled on the Israeli counterpart. The Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra visits Japan often and is one of the most popular orchestras among Japanese music fans. The writings of Anne Frank, Saul Bellow, Martin Buber, Norman Cohn, Lucy Dawidowicz, Max I. Dimont, Primo Levi, Emanuel Levinas, Amos Oz, Isaac Bashevis Singer, Gershom Scholem, Cecil Roth, Philip Roth, H.H. Ben-Sasson, Charles Silberman, Elie Weisel, A.B. Yehoshua and virtually every other significant Jewish author have been translated into Japanese and are widely read. In the postwar period Doshisha Women’s University Professor Masanori Miyazawa became an outspoken critic of the long and perverse history of Japanese anti-Semitism.35 Israelis for their part have taken a serious interest in Japanese films, cuisine, painting, gardening, ceramics and martial arts. The Israel-Japan Friendship Association and Chamber of Commerce was founded in Tel

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Aviv in 1956. Its Jerusalem section was founded in 1965 with Hebrew University ethnomusicologist Ury Eppstein as chairman. While the Tel Aviv branch concentrated mainly on commercial activities, the Jerusalem section focused on cultural interchange. It sponsored performances of Japanese music, dance, theater and tea ceremony without any subsidy from the Japanese Embassy or the Israeli Foreign Ministry. For his achievements in the cultural realm the Japanese government awarded Eppstein its Order of the Rising Sun, the same high decoration Jacob Schiff received many years earlier. Prestigious Japanese awards have also been given to Hebrew University Professor of Comparative Religion Zwi Werblowsky; Japanologists Ehud Harari, Jacob Raz and Shillony; and Eli Lancman, curator of Haifa’s Tikonin Museum of Japanese Art. Japanese professors have taught at the Hebrew University, and vice versa. Since 1958 the Japanese government has been offering scholarships to Israeli students for study in Japan. The first was Eppstein’s. In 1965 Meron Medzini offered the first modern Japanese history course in Israel, at the Hebrew University. In 1990 Shillony’s ‘History of Ancient Japan’ was the most popular course at that school, with 670 students enrolled. In 2012 that university’s Department of East Asian Studies was the second largest in its Faculty of Humanities, with approximately one hundred students enrolled in Japanese language classes. Japanese studies programs in Israel have experienced a shift of center and greater diversity since the establishment of Departments of East Asian Studies at Tel Aviv University in 1994 and at the University of Haifa in 2001. All three departments now offer graduate studies. The first head of Asian Studies at Tel Aviv was Professor Aron Shai, who then became the university’s Provost. Shai’s department became the largest in Israel with approximately seven hundred majors, more than the two other East Asian Studies departments combined. Haifa’s department is second and the Hebrew University’s third. Tel Aviv also has the largest number of faculty members, including five professors of Japanese studies covering a wide range of topics. As of 2012 there are approximately one thousand Tel Aviv students who are not majoring in East Asian Studies and who nevertheless are enrolled in courses on China and Japan. General East Asian and specialized Japanese Studies programs are also being organized at Ramat Gan’s Bar Ilan University and at Tel Hai College in the upper Galilee. On 26 February 2012 the Israel Association of Japanese Studies was established in Tel Aviv in the presence of more than seventy attendees. The co-founders were Haifa University’s Rotem

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Kowner, Tel Aviv University’s Irit Averbuch, and Hebrew University’s Nissim Otmazgin. This development led to even greater national and international exposure for this field.36 In March 2011, in an important humanitarian gesture, Israeli doctors were part of the medical teams sent to aid displaced persons affected by the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis which devastated northeastern Japan. It was the worst natural disaster in Japan since the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake. Israel’s emergency aid was widely reported in the Japanese press.37 As of this writing, wars in the Middle East continue to impact Japanese-Israeli relations. As far back as 1967, Japan pledged in the United Nations its ‘full cooperation’ in efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.38 In 1990 Japan stood solidly behind US President George Bush in the First Gulf War. In 1993 Japan supported the Oslo Accords, the first written agreement between Israel and the PLO. Oslo established the framework wherein all ‘final status’ issues were to be resolved and provided for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority which would administer territories under its control.39 In 1995, in an effort to bolster these accords, Japan participated with Israel and many other donor nations in a Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Amman, Jordan.40 On 15 October 1999, Japan hosted an international donors conference in Tokyo which aimed to improve economic conditions in areas under control of the Palestinian Authority. That conference also included full Israeli participation and a major address by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Nawaf Massalha. In June 2002 Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko visited Israel and reiterated her government’s support for a two-state solution, and, in this sense, Palestinian state building. Emulating China, the EU, the United Nations and the United States, Kawaguchi appointed a special envoy responsible for mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. She also reaffirmed her government’s continued support for the unprecedented presence of soldiers from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. They have served in that capacity since 1996. Kawaguchi’s commitment was reaffirmed during Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s July 2006 visit to Israel, Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni’s January 2007 visit to Japan, Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s August 2007 visit to Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s February 2008 visit to Japan, and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s May 2010 visit to Japan. The troops were only

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withdrawn in 2012 as a result of the deteriorating internal situation in Syna.41 The Japanese government has taken no stance on a proposed Palestinian declaration of statehood. During his 2006 visit to Israel Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi did propose the concept of a ‘Corridor for Peace and Prosperity’, that is to say, the creation of a prosperous region by means of cooperation between Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians in the Jordan rift valley. Japan has delivered on its promised aid to the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. Since 1993 the Government of Japan has contributed about US$491 million to the Palestinian Authority.42 Palestinian sympathizers in the West have simultaneously renewed calls for an economic boycott of Israel, this time in the form ‘BDS’, an acronym for ‘boycott, divestment, and sanctions’. The Japanese government has so far refused to participate in these activities. Nevertheless, some private Japanese educational and financial institutions may find themselves pressured by BDS advocates and be once again on the horns of an Arab-Israeli dilemma. Israel’s long-term conflict with Iran and with Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza continue to complicate Japanese-Israeli relations and were unquestionably under discussion during Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s February 2012 Tokyo visit. While pressed by the United States and Israel for more concrete action against Iran, Japan continues to see herself as dependent on Iranian oil.43

Conclusion Since its creation, Israel has had its ups-and-downs in its relations with many Asian nations. The cases of China and India are described elsewhere in this volume. With respect to China, forty-four years of non-relations due to opposition from the United States evolved into a honeymoon period of good relations at the height of arms deals in the 1990s. Sino-Israeli relations have stabilized today. In the case of India, forty-four years of cautious relations due to India’s concern with its large and restive Muslim population have blossomed into an extensive military and economic partnership.44 Unlike China and India, there were no obstacles to the establishment of Japanese-Israeli diplomatic relations once the Allied occupation ended and Japan became independent. On the other hand Japan has never enjoyed a

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honeymoon period with Israel. Instead, as this chapter has shown, Japan and the Jews and Japan and Israel have had a history of excellent cultural relations but vacillating political and economic ties. Japanese-Jewish relations began, positively enough, with Jacob Schiff’s financing of Japanese participation in the Russo-Japanese War. The relationship continued with Japan’s early support of Zionism but then became more complex with Japanese anti-Semitic polemics, the nation’s alliance with Hitler, and Japan’s rescue nevertheless of many of Hitler’s Jewish victims. Japan’s recognition of Israel was followed by an extremist Japanese group’s brief spat of terrorism against Israel and by an even more serious economic boycott of the Jewish State. Japan justified its surrender to the boycott on the grounds of economic pragmatism, i.e. its vital need for oil and the fact that the Arab world was a far larger marketplace than the Israeli one. However, by the mid-1980s, this began to change, due to the adverse reaction of the US Congress in the context of Japan-US trade friction; Japan’s economic self-confidence as the world’s number two civilian economy; and a peace process whereby Egypt and Jordan recognized Israel and Israel began negotiations with the Palestinians, whom the Japanese have subsequently aided substantially, especially in Gaza. Due to recent pressure from the US and Israel and its own strategic need for Middle Eastern stability, Japan has promised to further decrease its dependence on Iran. The Iranian threat has very recently begun to be considered seriously in Tokyo. In 2012 Israel and Japan celebrated sixty years of diplomatic relations. One should not be pessimistic about the future of this relationship. Trade has been renormalized, cultural cooperation is progressing and Israel provided significant and much appreciated disaster relief to Japan. Japan, for its part, has remained involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities in the Middle East, even though it withdrew its Golan heights peace-keeping contingent as a result of internal turmoil in Syna. The ups-and-downs of Japanese-Israeli relations illustrate the balancing act that Japan has gone through, not very much to its credit, and how Israel has struggled to establish its legitimacy in the world, and still does. Things may get a lot harder for Israel once again, unless there is some kind of unexpected breakthrough with the Palestinians. It is in the interests of both Japan and Israel that Japan intensifies its multilateral peace-making activities, especially its involvement with the Palestinians and Iran, to help resolve the outstanding regional issues which, as shown in this chapter, have exacerbated Japanese-Jewish and Japanese-Israeli relations during the past hundred years.

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Notes 1. Copyright Jonathan Goldstein 2012, used here with the author’s permission. The author greatly appreciates the research assistance of Aron Shai, Peter Berton, Doron B. Cohen, Irene Eber, Ury Eppstein, Rotem Kowner, Isi Leibler, Meron Medzini, Maruyama Naoki, Rochelle Rubinstein, Suzanne Rutland, Yitzhak Shichor, Ben-Ami Shillony, Ada Taggar-Cohen, Cedric Suzman, and Marvin Tokayer,. Final responsibility is, of course, the author’s alone. Jonathan Goldstein (Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania 1973) is a Research Associate of Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a Professor of East Asian History at the University of West Georgia, USA. His publications include Stephen Girard’s Trade with China (2011), The Jews of China (2 vols., 1999 and 2000), China and Israel (1999), America Views China (1991), Georgia’s East Asian Connection (1982), Philadelphia and the China Trade (1978), ‘Edward Sylvester Morse (1838–1925) as Expert and Western Observer in Meiji Japan’, Journal of Intercultural Studies (Osaka) 14 (1987), pp. 61–81, and ‘Motivation in Holocaust Rescue: The Case of Jan Zwartendijk in Lithuania, 1940’, in Jeffry Diefendorf, ed., Lessons and Legacies VI: New Currents in Holocaust Research (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004), pp. 69–87. The term ‘Zionism’, as used in this chapter, may be defined as the movement of Jews and non-Jews, beginning in the 1800s, calling for the Jewish people’s return to the land from which they were exiled by the Romans in 70 CE. 2. This sum was 36 per cent of the $535,000,000 which Japan borrowed overseas to finance a war for which her total cost $860,000,000. In other words, Schiff’s contribution was huge. Gary Dean Best, ‘Financing a Foreign War: Jacob H. Schiff and Japan, 1904–05’, American Jewish Historical Quarterly 61, no. 4 (June 1972), p. 313; Jacob Schiff, Our Journey to Japan (New York: New York Cooperative Society, 1907), unpaginated; Schiff, ‘Japan After the War’, North American Review 183, no. 597 (August 1906), pp. 161–68; Frieda Schiff Warburg, Reminiscences of a Long Life (New York: privately published, 1956), p. 49; and ‘Memorandum of Takahashi Korekiyo to Jacob Schiff’, n. d., approx. 1921, reproduced in Cyrus Adler, ed, Jacob H. Schiff: His Life and Letters, (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928), vol. one, pp. 213–30. On Schiff’s earlier unsuccessful efforts to do business with Japan, see Best, ‘Jacob Schiff’s Early Interest in Japan’, American Jewish History 69, no. 3 (March 1980), pp. 355– 59. The Meiji government also presented awards to other bankers who loaned them money for the war: a First Class Order of the Sacred Treasure to British Lord John Revelstoke of Baring Brothers; Third Class Orders to Cecil F. Parr of Parr’s Bank and to Thomas Jackson of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC); and a Fourth Class Order to HSBC’s A.M. Townsend. Richard J. Smethurst, From Foot Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan’s Keynes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), pp. 167, 193–94;

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A.J. Sherman, ‘German-Jewish Bankers in World Politics: The Financing of the Russo-Japanese War’, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 28 (1983), pp. 59–73). Memorandum of Takahashi, ca. 1921, reproduced in Adler, vol. one, pp. 217–18; see also vol. one, pp. 212, 230–59 and vol. two pp. 33, 43, 117 (on 1903 Kishinev pogrom), 120–31; Best, ‘Financial Diplomacy: The Takahashi Korekiyo Missions of 1904–05’, Asian Studies 12, no. 1(April 1974), pp. 52 ff; and Best, ‘Jacob Schiff’s Early Interest in Japan’, American Jewish History 69 (1980), pp. 355–59. Statement reproduced in Maruyama Naoki, ‘Japan’s Response to the Zionist Movement in the 1920s’, Bulletin of the Graduate School of International Relations I.U.J. no. 2 (December, 1984), p. 29. On 12 May 1920, Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya cabled Shanghai Zionist Association chairman N.E.B. Ezra, ‘Accept my hearty congratulations on the achievement of your two thousand year old aspirations. Have followed with keen interest the progress of your movement for which you now enjoy the well-earned reward’. Maruyama, ‘The SZA, the Balfour Declaration, and Japan’ in Jonathan Goldstein, ed. The Jews of China, vol. one (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 259. For a detailed summary of Japanese-Middle Eastern trade in the interwar years, see Frank Joseph Shulman’s seminal but as yet unpublished 1968 University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies Master’s Thesis ‘The Nature of Japanese Activity in the Middle East: Japanese-Middle Eastern Economic and Political Relations since World War II’, pp. 1–7, 223. Sugihara wrote: ‘It was obvious why the [Japanese General] Staff had insisted that the Foreign Office open a consulate in Kaunas [Kovno]. As a consul in Kaunas, where there was no Japanese colony, I understood that my main task was to inform the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry about the concentration of German troops near the border’. Sugihara Chiune, ‘Report on the Activity in Kovno and on Cooperation with the Polish Forces’ (unpublished report, in Russian), p. 5, cited in Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska and Andrzej T. Romer, ‘Współpraca, Polsko-Japon´ska w czasie II Wojny S´wiatowey’, Zeszyty Historyczne no. 110 (1994), 43 pp., English translation: ‘Polish-Japanese Co-operation During World War II’, Japan Forum (London) 7, no. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 287–88; Leszek Daskiewicz, Placowka wywiadowcza ‘G’ Sprawodania I dokumenty (Polish=Intelligence Agency ‘G’ Reports and Documents), unpublished, England, 1948, cited in Palasz-Rutkowska et. al., “Polish-Japanese,” pp. 292–93; and Jonathan Goldstein, ‘Motivation in Holocaust Rescue: The Case of Jan Zwartendijk in Lithuania, 1940’ in Jeffry Diefendorf, ed. and intro., Lessons and Legacies VI: New Currents in Holocaust Research (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004), pp. 79–80. See also ‘Sugihara Memorial International Symposium to be Held This Fall’, Mizu and Midori (Japanese=‘water and greenery’) (Yabuta, Japan) 3, no. 1 (October 1991), p. 1; ‘Envoy Vindicated in Holocaust Saga’, The Daily Yomiuri, 5 October 1991; Irene Eber, Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012);

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and David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 1988), pp. 477–504. During his September 1995 visit to Yad Vashem, Israel’s national Holocaust memorial, Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi planted a tree in honor of Sugihara, described as ‘the Japanese Schindler’, The Jerusalem Post, 18 September 1995; Rotem Kowner, ‘Tokyo Recognizes Auschwitz: The Rise and Fall of Holocaust-Denial in Japan, 1989–1999’, Journal of Genocide Studies 3, no. 2 (2001), pp. 257–72. According to historian Gerhard Krebs, when queried by Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946) about the number of visas he had issued, ‘Sugihara mentioned 2,132, among them 1,500 to Jews’. Gerhard Krebs, ‘The “Jewish Problem” in JapaneseGerman Relations, 1933–1945’, in Bruce Reynolds, ed., Japan in the Fascist Era. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 118. Letter: Avraham Altman to The Jerusalem Post, 19 May 1982; Ernie Meyer, ‘A present for Purim’, The Jerusalem Post Magazine, 12 March 1982, p. 10. On Inuzuka’s hopes to use the Jews to improve Japanese-American relations, see also the book written by his wife Inuzuka Kiyoko, Yudaya mondai to Nihon no kosaku. Kaigun Inuzuka Kikan no kiroku (=The Jewish Problem and Japan’s Strategy: The Record of the Inuzuka Agency of the Navy) (Tokyo: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha, 1982), pp. 375–80 and Krebs, pp. 113–15, 120, 124–25, 129. On Higuchi, see Maruyama Naoki, ‘Facing a Dilemma: Japan’s Jewish Policy in the Late 1930s’ in Guy Podoler, ed. War and Militarism in Modern Japan (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2009), pp. 22–38. Ben-Ami Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders (Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 1991), pp. 182, 187. See especially pp. 201–207 ‘Israel and Japan’ and Shillony’s article ‘Japan and Israel: The Relationship that Withstood Pressure’, Middle East Review 18, no. 2 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 17–24. The Protocols were reissued in Japanese as recently as 1987 by the Shin-Jinbutsu Oraisha Publishing Company. Letter: David Goodman to The New York Times, 25 March 1987; Goodman, ‘Japanese Anti-Semitism’, The World + I (November 1987), p. 404; Goodman, ‘Sources of Japanese Attitudes Toward the Jews: Foreign and Domestic, Right and Left’, unpublished paper presented at the Japan Society, New York, 11 April 1989; Jacob Kovalio, The Russia Protocols of Zion in Japan (New York: Peter Lang, 2009); and Albert A. Brandt, ‘Banzai Antisemitism: Hitler’s Gift to Japan’, The Menorah Journal, Spring 1944, pp. 113–121. For overviews of pre-World War II and wartime Japanese anti-Semitism see Shillony, ‘The Imaginary Devil: Japanese Anti-Semitism’, in his Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 156–71; Goodman and Miyazawa Masanori, Jews in the Japanese Mind (New York: Free Press, 1995), pp. 128–33; and Krebs, pp. 107–110. Goodman, ‘Japanese Anti-Semitism’, p. 404; Letter: Altman, 19 May 1982; Meyer, ‘A Present’.

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11. Goldstein, ‘Motiviation’, p. 80. For an overview of Japanese-Israeli relations see Rotem Kowner, ‘Sabras and Cherry Blossoms’, Ha’aretz (English edition), 10 May 2002. See also Shillony, Jews, pp. 201–202 and ‘Israel to Open Legation in Tokyo’, The New York Times, 19 May 1952. In October 1956, former Israeli prime minister and foreign minister Moshe Sharett visited Japan as a special emissary of the Israeli Labour Party. He was received by the emperor and Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro. Moshe Sharett, Mi-shut be-Asyiah: Yoman masa (Hebrew, ‘Wanderings in Asia: A Travel Diary’) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1964), In 1962 Foreign Minister Golda Meir visited Japan. Golda Meir, My Life (New York: Putnam’s, 1975), pp. 341–42. In March 1967 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban was received by the emperor, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, and Foreign Minister Miki Takeo. “‘Foreign Minister of Israel Due Today’, The Japan Times, 14 March 1967, p. 9; Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 314; Eban, Personal Witness (New York: Putnam’s, 1992), pp. 314, 347, 417, 639. In 1965 the Nihon Isuraeru Kyokai (Japan-Israel Association) evolved into the Japan-Israel Friendship Association. It included Japanese as well as Westerners, such as its Vice President, industrialist Shaoul N. Eisenberg. It published a bimonthly bulletin. Eisenberg also endowed the construction of Tokyo’s Ashkenazi synagogue, which is technically called ‘The Jewish Community Center’. This edifice is named after his father, Nathan Eisenberg. Japan’s second synagogue, in Kobe, follows the Aleppo ritual because of a significant presence of former Syrian Jews in Kobe’s pearl export business. ‘Japan, Israel Strengthen Ties’, The Japan Times, 4 March 1967, p. 9. 12. David Makovsky, ‘Is Japan making amends?’, The Jerusalem Post, 24 May 1991, p. 6; Representative Joshua Eilberg, ‘The Japanese Continue to Boycott Israel’, Congressional Record 116, no. 181-Part 2 (14 October 1970). After a December 1986 investigative trip to Japan, Michael Cohen, executive director of the Australia-based Asia Pacific Jewish Association, concluded that ‘the Japanese will not countenance business contact with Israel, as their continued relationship with the Arab states is all-important. They consider the Arab oil market essential to their economic interests’, Michael Cohen, ‘Report of Executive Director’, unpublished, 1986, pp. 29–30, courtesy of Mr. Isi Leibler, Jerusalem. On 22 March 1987, Reuven Merhav, Consul General of Israel in Hong Kong, characterized Japan as ‘the flagship and leading power in giving in to the Arab boycott after the 1973 war’, luncheon address to Asia Pacific Jewish Association, Hong Kong, 22 March 1987, courtesy of Mr. Leibler. Leibler Archives, Jerusalem. 13. In 1973 JAL Board Chairman Kobayashi Ataru was simultaneously chairman of the Arabian Oil Company. On US Congressional protests regarding Japan Air Lines, see New York Representative Edward Koch, ‘Boycott of Israel by Japanese Companies’, Congressional Record 119, no. 58 (12 April 1973); New York Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, ‘JAL and the Arab Boycott’,

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Congressional Record, 30 April 1973; Letters: M. Ben-Ari, President, El Al Israel Airlines, to Arnold Foster, General Counsel, Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 14 March 1973; Zev Furster, Middle East Affairs Department, AntiDefamation League, to Marvin Tokayer, 23 July 1973, both courtesy of Marvin Tokayer; Abraham Foxman, ‘ADL Progress Report on the Japanese Boycott of Israel’ and ‘Japan Air Lines and the Arab Boycott’, ADL mimeographed statement, December 1972; ADL press release, 16 July 1973; ‘Japan Air Lines has joined the Arab boycott against Israel’, ADL brochure, June 1973. Isi Leibler, President of Australia’s Jetset Tours, raised the issue of El Al flights to Japan with Mastuyama Midori, President of Tokyo’s Fujita Tourist Enterprises during a March 1981 visit. Leibler also suggested a reciprocal Japan Air Lines’ flight to Paris with a stopover in Tel Aviv, where perhaps 5 per cent of the clientele would disembark. Despite these negotiations, direct flights between Japan and Israel never materialized. ‘El Al and Japanese Tourism to Israel’, unpublished memo of Isi Leilber, March 1981; Letter, Matsuyama Midori to Isi Leibler, 17 September 1981, both courtesy of Mr. Leibler, Leibler Archives, Jerusalem. In a 29 December 2011 email to the author, Leibler added that Japan Air Lines’ refusal to fly to Israel was due to ‘political sensitivity by the Japanese’ but mainly commercial considerations. He wrote that ‘Japan is too expensive for Israeli tourists and the flight would therefore be exclusively dependent on outbound Japanese tourism to Israel. Japanese travel agencies have too much invested in Arab tourism to warrant . . . major promotional support for Israel as a sole destination’. 14. ‘Japanese Firm Accused of Boycotting Israel’, The New York Times, 17 August 1969; Raquel Shaoul, ‘Japan and Israel: An Evaluation of Relationship-Building in the Context of Japan’s Middle East Policy’ in Efraim Karsh, ed. Israel: The First Hundred Years, Vol. 4 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 274; Press release of Avner Manor, President of American-Israel Shipping Co., New York, 16 September 1968; Yigal Kotzer, ‘Japanese shun Israeli shipping’, The Jerusalem Post, 29 May 1991, p. 2; ‘MCA Takeover Raises Arab Boycott Issue’, Atlanta Jewish Times, 7 December 1990; and Makovsky, p. 6. 15. Letter: M. Zaitsu, Tokyo, to Arditi Ltd., Tel Aviv, 9 July 1969, courtesy of Marvin Tokayer. 16. In 1969 George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine established contacts with the Japanese Sekigunha (=Red Army Faction), which sent volunteers to Lebanon to train as a vanguard for world revolution. Adachi Masao, an avant-garde movie director, visited these commandos in Lebanon in 1971 and made a film about them entitled Sekigun-PFLP World War Declaration. Shillony, Jews, pp. 203–04; ‘Resolutely Support Arab People’s War Against Aggression’, Renmin Ribao (Chinese=People’s Daily)(Beijing), 6 June 1967; Bruce Roscoe, ‘The Red Army Threat’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 1985, p. 21. As far back as 1975, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was at

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odds with then-Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s desire to recognize the PLO and grant it a Tokyo office. According to the Foreign Ministry ‘for diplomatic recognition, there must be territories with clear-cut border lines where the inhabitants are effectively ruled by a unified organization, but the Foreign Ministry doesn’t believe that the PLO necessarily satisfies these conditions’, ‘Gaimusho Embarrassed By Miki’s PLO Stand’, Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), 12 February 1975, p. 3; Meron Medzini, ed. Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976- ) (hereinafter abbreviated IFR, followed by the volume number, years covered by the volume, and page numbers of each document cited) vol. 10 (1984–88), pp. 993, 1040. The Prime Minister’s view prevailed. In June 1976 Farouk Qaddumi, Secretary-General of Fatah’s Central Committee and of the PLO’s political department, visited Tokyo. Arafat’s 1981 East Asian tour also included Beijing, Pyongyang, and Hanoi. Arafat made subsequent visits to Japan in October 1989, September 1996, April 1999, October 1999, and August 2000. His first official visit to Tokyo was in October 1989 as a balance to the visit of Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Arens. ‘On the Road with Arafat’, Newsweek, 26 October 1981; Moshe Yegar, The Long Journey to Asia: A Chapter in the Diplomatic History of Israel, (Haifa: University of Haifa Press, 2004) (In Hebrew), pp. 302–303 (for the 1975–81 period), 314 (for 1989). 17. Shillony, Jews, p. 205; Kowner, ‘Sabras’, p. 3. 18. Israeli appeals to Japan to cease funding a terror-exporting regime received their fullest expression in a December 1994 visit and personal appeal from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Jerusalem Post summed up Israel’s deep concern about Japanese involvement in Iran in a 1995 editorial, arguing that ‘every dollar Iran is given frees up another dollar from its domestic coffers for its nefarious projects of subversion overseas’. The Jerusalem Post, 2, 16 November and 13, 14, 16 December 1994; 17 September 1995; and Mike Jacobs, ‘Japan continues to “feed the Iranian kitty”’, The Jerusalem Post, 9 November 1994. 19. Shaoul, p. 275. In the early 1970s Yuasa Battery provided goods to Israel on the condition that its name would not appear on its products. Mitsui initially refused to trade directly with Israel. By the late 1960s, it had set up a wholly-owned subsidiary, Toyo Trading and Engineering, to arrange deals with countries with political sensitivity for Japan. This included Israel. See also Joel and Evelyn Gordin, ‘Tourist tsunami seen on horizon’, The Jerusalem Post, 27 November 1991, p. 7. In 1972, the 35,000 ton ‘Zim New York’ was the largest container vessel ever to enter Osaka and the first to enter Osaka from a Canadian or Eastern United States port. Carmel Hacohen, ‘Zim Container Service Forging Ahead: Future Looks Good for Year-Old Venture’, The Japan Times, 17 July 1973, p. 7. Despite its transshipment of goods to Israel, SONY scrupulously adhered to the boycott. It even excluded Israel Broadcasting Authority’s Kol Yisrael (=Voice of Israel) service from its 1985

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21. 22.

23.

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‘Wave Handbook’ listing of major radio stations operating around the world. SONY listed thirteen other Levantine broadcasters, all of whom were Arab. Letter: Abraham H. Foxman, New York, to Akio Morita, Chairman, SONY Corporation, Tokyo, 25 February 1985, Leibler Archive. Joel Gordin, ‘Honda’s here at last’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 May 1990, p. 5; Gordin, ‘Subaru boosts its image’, 20 August 1991, p. 10; and Gordin, ‘A new Honda – really’, The Jerusalem Post, ll December 1991. See other columns by Gordin, The Jerusalem Post automotive correspondent, on the boycott issue. Letter: Abraham H. Foxman, ‘Support of Arab Boycott’, The New York Times, 25 March 1987. ‘Japan ties to Arab boycott of Israel hit’, The Jewish Week (New York), 19 December 1986, p. 5. In the 1980s, anti-Semitic literature resurfaced in Japan as a result of heightened trade friction with the United States. In particular, Uno Masami, pastor of a Protestant church in Osaka, wrote If You Understand Judea You Can Understand the World and If You Understand Judea You Can Understand Japan. More than one million copies of his books sold in Japan. Echoing earlier anti-Semitic writings, Uno portrayed Jews as connivers and conspirators. He saw a sinister ‘Jewish lobby’ behind Japan trade-bashing in the United States Congress in the 1980s. Goodman, ‘Japanese Anti-Semitism’, pp. 405–07. In June 1986 the Anti-Defamation League passed a strongly-worded condemnation of Japan which had been boycotting Israel ‘more than any other industrialized state’. Wolf Blitzer, ‘Sayonara to the Boycott?’, Hadassah Magazine, January 1987, p. 12. Shillony, Jews, p. 207; ‘Greetings by President Herzog to the Conference on Jewish Solidarity with Israel, 20 March 1989’ in vol. 11 (1988–92), p. 64; and Greer Cashman, ‘Herzog going to Japan’, The Jerusalem Post, 7 November 1990, p. 2. Discussions of the boycott were also held during Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yanai Shinichi’s October 1986 visit to Israel. Israel Foreign Ministry Director General Yossi Beilin noted some progress on the boycott issue when he stated on Israel Television on 26 June 1988 that ‘there is a real problem with the Japanese in regard to the Arab boycott. There has been a change for the better on this topic in recent years. The fact is, however, that in the past, particularly after the Yom Kippur War, they surrendered almost totally to the Arab boycott’, interview reproduced in IFR, vol. 10 (1984–88), pp. 962–63; David Landau, ‘Shamir returning from Japan optimistic about results of visit’, The Jerusalem Post, 11 September 1985; Blitzer, p. 13. Transport and Communications Minister Shimon Peres visited Japan in May 1973. Bernard Halloran, ‘Israel Sees to Widen Japanese Trade’, The New York Times, 28 May 1973. As of June 2011 Keidanren’s membership is 1,603. See www.keidanren. or.jp/english/profile/pro001.html.

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25. On 31 May 1991 Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama visited Prime Minister Shamir in Jerusalem. IFR vol. 12 (1988–92), p. 528; photo, The Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1991, p. 9. 26. Confidential memorandum obtained by The Jerusalem Post and reproduced in Makovsky, p. 6; ‘Tokyo turning point’, The Jewish Chronicle (London), 20 November 1987, p. 3. 27. T. R. Reid, ‘Japan, Israel Improving Commercials Ties’, The Washington Post, 7 August 1991, pp. A17, A22; Reid, ‘Japan Opposes U. N. Zionism Stance’, The Washington Post, 10 December 1991, p. A17. Reid quotes a Japanese official as saying ‘peace talks are underway now, and we think that rescinding this resolution might create a better atmosphere for resolution of the disputes’. See also Tom Tugend, ‘Japan, Korea to support repeal of UN resolution’, The Jerusalem Post, 15 December 1991, p. 10; ‘American Jewish Committee President Alfred Moses to Address Issue of Japan’s Economic Boycotts of Israel’, Center in the City: Monthly Newsletter of the District of Columbia Jewish Community Center 5, no. 1 (January 1992); Jenni Frazer, ‘Trade with Israel soars as Japan shifts away from pro-Arab policy’, The Jewish Chronicle (London), 10 January 1992; and Sue Fishkoff, ‘Japan will stop supporting Arab economic boycott’, The Jerusalem Post, 4 December, 1992, p. 1. 28. Makovsky, p. 6. In November 1991 and May 1992 World Jewish Congress leader Isi Liebler held intensive discussions in Tokyo with top-level officials in the Foreign Ministry and with senior trade officials in an attempt to secure Japanese disavowal of the Arab boycott, ‘Report on World Jewish Congress Mission to Pakistan, 12–16 February 1993’, p. 5, Isi Leibler archive. 29. Other anti-boycott activity included Kuwait’s 1993 assertion that it would no longer comply with secondary aspects of the boycott. In September 1994 the Gulf Cooperation Council followed suit. Similar provisions appeared in the November 1994 Casablanca Declaration and the February 1995 Taba Declaration. Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel on 26 October 1994. Shaoul, p. 280; Daniel S. Mariaschin, ‘Japan revises Israel trade stance’, Washington Jewish Week, 27 January 1994, p. 19; and Shillony, ‘Japan’, p. 21. The eastward shipments of oil and natural gas on the Egyptian pipeline were uninterrupted until the so-called ‘Arab spring’ of 2011, when the pipeline was attacked by terrorists at least six times. As of February 2012 the Egyptians have resumed pipeline shipments. 30. Notable among these ventures was one between Tateho Chemical Industries and Israel Chemicals to build a $23 million plant on the Dead Sea. The factory would produce refractory-grade fused magnesium oxide, an essential ingredient for making steel. Letter: Charles Gans, Atlanta, to the author, 27 December 1991, and Galit Lipkis, ‘Japan firm joins Periclase in new venture’, The Jerusalem Post, 22 November 1991, p. 19.

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31. In 1991–92 Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun both opened offices in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Post, 3 February 1992; 13, 14, 16 December 1994; 18 and 28 July, 18 September and 16 November 1995; Gordon and Gordon, p. 7; and Shaul, pp. 285–6. 32. Foreign Minister Kakizawa Koji and Special Envoy Mutoh Kabun visited Israel in 1994, Prime Minister Murayama in 1995, Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko in 1996, and Foreign Minister Koumura Masahiko in 1999. Shaoul, p. 295. The Jerusalem Post noted the termination of the Japanese boycott with the statement: ‘For the past 40 years Japan’s single-minded preoccupation with commercial prosperity, and its belief that close relations with Israel would threaten regular supplies of Middle Eastern oil and paralyze its industry, militated against the normalization of relations the two countries have now reached’, The Jerusalem Post, 14 September, 1995; see also 17 and 18 September 1995. 33. Shillony, Jews, pp. 207, 212; emails to the author: Ben-Ami Shillony, 11 July 2011; Kenneth Jacobson, 14 July 2011. 34. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) statistics for 2011 available at http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/middle_east/il/basic_01/; JAL International Flight Schedule and Service Guide, September 1-October 29, 2005. 35. Laura Stern, ‘Tokyo Menorah Marks a Zionist Enclave’, Forward (New York), 11 December 1992; The Jerusalem Post, 27 February 1995. See photo of former Israeli President Yitzhak Navon accepting a sapling from the Beit Shalom/ Sei Yesu-kai organization, which also planted trees in a Jewish National Fund forest near Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Post, 8 March 1991, 25 October 1995. As of 2011 the Japanese-Christian Friends of Israel has about 10,000 members and Makuya 60,000. Tezuka Nobuyoshi’s Japan Kibbutz Association (Nihon Kibbutz Kyokai), modeled on the Israeli collective farming experiment, has approximately 2,000 members. Its model kibbutz, Yamagishikai, is located in Mie District, about a three hour train ride from Tokyo. Kusakari Zenzo et. al., The Communes of Japan (Tochigi-ken, Japan: The Japanese Commune Movement, 1977), pp. 1, 3; Letter: Goodman, The New York Times, 25 March 1987; Miyazawa Masanori, ‘“Japanese Anti-Semitism in the Thirties’, Midstream, March 1987, pp. 23–27. On the Christian Zionism of Uchimura Kanzo (1861– 1930), see Doron B. Cohen, ‘Uchimura Kanzo on Jews and Zionism’, The Japan Christian Review 58 (1992), p. 118. 36. Kowner, ‘Sabras’, p. 5; email Aron Shai to the author, 17 March 2012. In 1959, Eppstein was invited by Prince Mikasa, brother of Emperor Hirohito, to give a course in Modern Hebrew at the Nihon Orient Gakkai (Japanese Society for Near-Eastern Studies). The Prince attended the course. Emails: Eppstein to the author, 20 and 21 August 2011; Imai Isao, ‘Students flock to study the Japanese’, The Jerusalem Post, 13 August 1990, p. 4; and ‘Jews and Japanese’, Parade Magazine, 7 October 1990, p. 33; Shillony, Jews, pp. 207, 212. In 1966 Tokyo University archaeologist Ohata Kiyoshi led a ten-

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person archaeological dig at Tel Zrur, between Khadera and the Samaritan hills. ‘Tokyo U. Archaeologists Uncover Bronze Age City’, The Japan Times, 8 September 1966, p. 2. Daily Yomiuri Online, ‘Foreign Aid Workers offer strong support’, 9 April 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110408005848.ht; The Japan Times Online, ‘First Foreign Doctors arrive to help victims’, 28 March 2011 http://search.japantimes/nn20110328a-4.html; jpost.com/international, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel sends aid to Japan’, 26 March 2011; asahi. com, ‘Israel medical team heads home after quake aid’, 16 April 2011, http:// www.asahi.com/english/TKY201104150133.htm. Statement of Japanese Delegate Matsui in UN Security Council Debates, 24 May-3 June 1967, in IFR vol. 2 (1947–74), p. 756. ‘Interview with Defense Minister Arens on Israel Television, 8 August 1990’, IFR vol. 12 (1988–92), p. 369. The Accords were signed at a public ceremony on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993 in the presence of Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. ‘Declaration of the Amman Economic Summit, 31 October 1995’, IFR vol. 15 (1996–96), p. 344. Japanese Defense Minister Kyuma reiterated Kawaguchi’s commitment in a 20 July 1997 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In June 2001 Amaki Naoto, Japan’s Ambassador to Lebanon, helped Israel gather information on Israeli soldiers kidnapped by the Hezbollah movement. ‘Summary of meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Japan’s Defense Minister Kyuma, 20 July 1997’, IFR vol. 16 (1996–97), p. 335; ‘Statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Massalha at the Conference of Donor States, Tokyo, 15 October 1999’, IFR vol. 18 (1999–2001), pp. 99–103; www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle e/israel/index.html; ‘SDF to end Golan Heights Mission’, Japan Times, 21 December 2012; ‘SDF begins pulling out of Golan Heights’, Japan Times, 21 December 2012; and ‘Abe lauds returning SDF troops’, Japan Times, 21 December 2013. ‘Gaimusho Embarrassed By Miki’s PLO Stand’, Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), 12 February 1975, p. 3; IFR vol. 10 (1984–88), pp. 993, 1040; http://www.mofa. go.jp/announce/announce/1999/12/1211.html. The Jerusalem Post, 14 September 1995; Shaoul, p. 291–93. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Mutual Demystification: China-Israel Relations in Perspective’; P.R. Kumaraswamy, ‘India: Israel’s New Friend’. See also Ikeda Akifumi, ‘Japan’s Relations with Israel’ in Sugihara Kaoru and J.A. Allen, eds. Japan in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 155–169.

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11 ISR AEL, TUR KEY AND GR EECE: DR A M ATIC CHANGES IN THE EASTER N MEDITER R ANEAN* Amikam Nachmani

Turkey: Hegemonic Aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean The deteriorating relations between Turkey and Israel, and the current crisis in the relations between Turkey and Syria in the wake of the civil war currently raging in Syria, are two subjects that have been covered extensively by the media. A common element that features in the two crises has been the personal involvement of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, which resulted in personal affronts felt by him and antipathy and contempt towards the leaders of his neighbours, such as when President Assad of Syria reneged on his promise of reforms and persisted on slaughtering Syrian civilians; or when Prime Minister Olmert of Israel launched operation ‘Cast Lead’ assault on Gaza in December 2008. Suffice it to mention the vicissitudes that occurred in Turkish-Syrian relations: during the 2000s Ankara has boosted enormously its commercial and military ties with Syria, the Turkish Prime Minister befriended President Assad, holidayed with him, their cabinets held frequent joint meetings, and the Turkish leader thought of himself as Assad’s tutor. The two neighbours applied visa-free travel between them.1 (Turkey has lifted visa restrictions on neighbouring countries. Europe, in contrast, refuses steadfastly to do

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the same with Turkey.)2 All, however, changed as from 2011, when Turkey became the main military supplier and training centre for the Syrian opposition that is attempting to topple the Syrian president. These are some of the developments currently occurring in the eastern Mediterranean. From the Turkish standpoint, the events in the region express what is happening in the global arena: Europe is ageing, its economy and currency are limping and convulsing; the US is suffering from an economic crisis, and both are on the decline, culturally and politically. Turkey is now a rising power, and is demarcating the limits of its influence: Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans, on the one hand; black Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, on the other. The relations between Israel and Turkey first began to deteriorate after 2006 (the second Lebanon War) and Israel’s ‘Cast Lead’ attack in the Gaza Strip in December 2008–January 2009. Notwithstanding the political tension between Ankara and Jerusalem, it has not profoundly affected the civil trade between the two countries. This reached a peak of $3.8 billion in 2008 (including military products). In 2009 civil bilateral trade dropped to $2.7 billion. It climbed again to $3.5 billion in 2010 and reached a $4.5 billion peak of all time in 2011.3 The common explanation to the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations has been that Israel’s Prime Minister at the time, Ehud Olmert, who was visiting Ankara (December 2008), did not inform his Turkish host about the forthcoming military operation against Hamas in Gaza, thereby embarrassing the Turkish Prime Minister. Erdog˘an welcomed Olmert to Ankara a few days before the operation and held talks with him about brokering an agreement between Israel and Syria. Furious Middle Eastern Arab leaders protested to Erdog˘an that he had hosted Olmert in Ankara just a few days before the latter had massacred thousands of Palestinians in Gaza during December 2008–January 2009. Erdog˘an’s sense of personal affront was supplemented by sharp feelings of frustration, and these were expressed in a series of strong anti-Israel statements he made. This soon turned in the Turkish media and public opinion into anti-Israel and even anti-Semitic manifestations. Turkish Jews, buildings and businesses became targets for ugly attacks (‘dogs, Jews and Armenians are not allowed’, ‘do not buy from Jewish shops’, etc.). Turkish translations of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Henry Ford’s The International Jew became bestsellers in book shops. A TV film (Valley of the Wolves), in which Israeli soldiers and Jewish doctors trade with organs from dead Palestinians and Iraqis, became a hit.

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It has been said that Erdog˘an’s behaviour towards Israel stems from memories of his impoverished childhood vis-à-vis the children of his well-off Jewish neighbours. The reference to ‘a spoilt child’, who has to be disciplined and put in his place, often occurs in statements made by Erdog˘an when denigrating Israel. One way or another, Erdog˘an’s Istanbul background has been described as a factor in his politics: ‘he has never quite shaken off the bullying streak he developed in the mean streets of Istanbul’s Kasimpasa neighborhood. Despite his lofty position, he rarely misses a chance to rub his opponents’ noses in the dirt, often using crude rhetoric unbecoming of a leader who aspires to statesmanship’.4 Another possible reason, perhaps more plausible, for the cold stage in the Turkish-Israeli political relations has been the change, as from the mid-2000s, in the attitudes of American Jewish organizations as regards the Armenian genocide during World War I. The almost automatic support that was given by Jewish lobbies to the Turkish stand that vehemently rejects the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire for the tragic fate of the Armenians during World War I was substituted by wide and growing Jewish reluctance to help Turkey in the US in relation to this issue. The growing global recognition of the Armenian genocide (and Western sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations), and feelings and expressions like ‘Jews who had faced extinction and extermination attempts, can’t ignore a similar genocide experienced by the Armenians’, etc., are all major factors forcing Turks to question the value of their long-standing, pro-Western, geo-strategic commitments, relations with Israel inclusive.5 This Turkish re-evaluation found a parallel in a similar move in Israeli public opinion. Expressions by members of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament (MKs), newspaper articles, parliamentary motions in the Knesset to recognize the Armenian genocide (Reuven Rivlin, the Speaker of the Knesset, commented: ‘my obligation, as a Jew and Israeli, is to grant recognition to the tragedies of other peoples. Diplomatic considerations, important as they may be, do not permit us to deny the existence of the disaster of another people’; ‘we will not be indifferent anymore to the catastrophe suffered by another people because of diplomatic considerations’) – all reflect this Israeli change of mind.6 The 2012 Israel Prize laureate, Jacob Ahimeir, stated: The reason [is]: ‘sensitivity’. That is to say: the sensitive state of Turkish-Israeli relations. For years on years Israeli governments

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and Knessets [parliaments] gave in to Turkish pressure not to grant recognition to the Armenian genocide, committed during the First World War, during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. This shameful capitulation took place during the golden era of the Israeli relations with Turkey. Alas, and strangely enough, it [the capitulation] lasts up until now, during the era of the bad relations. A naïve question: does the Armenian genocide have to be closer to Argentinian parliamentarians, who had granted their recognition to this genocide already in 1985? What about more than 40 states in the US who had granted their recognition to the Armenian genocide?7 From its present confident, political and economic position, and bear in mind the importance that Washington attributes to Turkey, the assistance granted to Turkey in Washington by Israeli and Jewish lobbyists to thwart anti-Turkish motions by Congress in relation to the fate of the Armenians in World War I is perceived as ‘blackmail’. Ardan Zenturk, a Turkish columnist, wrote the following, which apparently rendered obsolete future Jewish/Israeli lobby assistance: Will the Obama administration declare Turkey a ‘committer of genocide’ this April 24 (the anniversary of the so-called genocide)? I don’t know. At a certain point in Turkey’s Middle East policy, those who are pushing the government to turn against Israel might welcome this development, in order to say we told you so. Personally, I wouldn’t care. On the contrary, I would just thank God and be glad that a blackmail which has been imposed on us for so many years had ended. The parliaments of France and Argentina said that we committed genocide, but we didn’t, did we? There’s a [Jewish?] lobby which is ready to exaggerate the news from Washington, but I ignore it, because as far as I can see, there’s no administration crazy enough to turn its back on Turkey.8 Whatever the reason for the Turkish-Israeli ‘winter’, a period of metaphorical sparring between Israel and Turkey began. This included: anti-Israel and anti-Semitic expressions, publications and programmes on Turkish television like the above mentioned Valley of the Wolves; the humiliation of the Turkish ambassador by Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, who

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deliberately placed the former on a low seat in front of TV cameras; the annulment of mutual military accords; Turkey becoming one of the leading countries denouncing Israel in various international forums. The rhetoric of Turkey’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister has become anti-Israel in the extreme. Since the early 2000s, certainly since the Muslim AKP came to power at the end of 2002, Ankara has consistently regarded its relations with Israel as being associated with progress in the Middle East peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, making high-level meetings contingent on progress in that process. This contrasts with the atmosphere in the 1990s, when relations between Turkey and Israel flourished. Since then Ankara has separated itself from Israel and the conditions of the Arab-Israeli peace process. A theory has been expressed in Turkey that in order to enhance its standing in the Arab Middle East it must reach ‘equilibrium’ with Israel. This does not necessarily refer to military equilibrium, but rather to the economic and technological spheres. Apparently, in order to show the Arab world that Turkey can lead it, Turkey aspires to attain the same level of modernity as Israel. If there is to be a political and ideological confrontation between the two countries, Turkey wants to be able to demonstrate that its technological and intelligence capabilities (e.g. spy satellites) are not inferior to Israel’s. It would seem, however, that the deterioration in the relations with Israel is not an objective for Turkey, but rather a means of Turkish foreign policy: Ankara uses its criticism of Israel in order to enhance its standing among other countries. In this way Turkey also makes use of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ to boost its position as well as its political and social system, the role of religion, etc. ‘If they want our help, we’ll provide any assistance they need’, Prime Minister Erdog˘an told TIME magazine, ‘we do not have a mentality of exporting our system’. Perhaps from the negative, one can learn about the positive.9 In this context there were repeated Israeli attempts to convince Western companies and their governments not to sell high-resolution spy satellites to Turkey. A Turkish spy satellite, with the capacity of taking pictures of objects, less than one metre in length (a joint product of the French company Tales, and the Italian Telespazio and Finmeccanica), is scheduled to be launched into orbit by 2013. Israeli apprehension that pictures of its military and strategic sites would be transferred by Ankara to Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah were not allayed by the Turks. On

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the contrary: Ankara refused to limit the satellite to non-Israeli territories only. ‘For years Israel took pictures over Turkish territory by its satellites, why shouldn’t we do the same over their territory?’10 While Turkey’s relations with several Middle Eastern Arab actors improved (Libya, Iraq), in the traditional dispute between Egypt and Turkey (apparently for hegemony in the region, dating back to the 1950s and President Nasser’s rule and ideas of pan-Arabism), and in view of Egypt’s present chaotic internal problems, Turkey is not displeased by the decline in Egypt’s influence in the Arab world. Egypt, as a result, still regards Turkey as a competitor and hence does not relinquish those advantages it possesses. It should be added that while Prime Minister Erdog˘an is currently defined in the Arab world as a hero, as the modern Saladin (in particular in periods when Erdog˘an publicly criticizes Israel), this description is viewed with disfavour by the current Arab leadership in the Middle East. Turkey’s behaviour since the re-election of the AKP to power in 2007, with Erdog˘an serving a second term as Prime Minister, has been characterized by the famous policy of ‘zero problems’ with its neighbours. Although this policy was delineated by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutog˘lu throughout the Middle East, Turkey is currently involved in disputes and quarrels with many of its neighbours (Israel, Syria, Greece, Armenia, Cyprus and the EU). In the second half of 2012 Cyprus presided over the EU for a period of six months, and Turkey threatened to freeze its relations with the EU during that period. Similarly, despite the rosy picture painted by the Turks, Erdog˘an’s visit to Egypt (September 2011) ended in a heated quarrel. Cairo did not allow him to visit Gaza, thus showing that it remains in control when it comes to the subject of the Palestinians. Although Erdog˘an had expressed the wish to speak in Tahrir Square, the Egyptians permitted him to speak solely in the Cairo Opera House, and his speech from there was not broadcast. The following might tell us about a possible Turkish-Egyptian cooperation vis-à-vis Israel: ‘If Erdog˘an intends to incite the Egyptians against Israel, he should be ready to send the Turkish military to quell the demonstrations that will spread in Cairo as a result of this incitement. An outsider will not determine our policy towards Israel, particularly not somebody who himself uses Israeli weapons against the Kurds. As you perfectly know, when it comes to hating Israel, the Egyptians know very well how to do so’.11 The Turkish Foreign Ministry recently announced that Turkey aspires to attain zero problems with the peoples of the Middle East even

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though it may be at loggerheads with the governments and leaders of these nations. ‘One strength of our foreign policy, thus, is the ongoing process of reconnecting with the people in our region’, declared Ahmet Davutog˘lu.12 Also: ‘Governments change, people remain’, a definition that helps justify the sharp shift in Turkey’s foreign policy from support for a given regime to opposition to it.13 One of the results of this Turkish active policy is a greater cooperation on the military and intelligence levels among several countries in the Balkans and eastern-Mediterranean. Turkey’s activism with regard to the Palestinians (as evinced by the flotilla and the Mavi Marmara incident in June 2010 and Erdog˘an’s threats of future action regarding Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip), and the Turkish threat to use its navy to defend future flotillas, is naturally viewed with concern by Israel, but also by Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia (‘The Balkan Alliance’).14 Memories from 500 years of Ottoman occupation (Erdog˘an: ‘of course the empire had some beautiful parts and some not-so-beautiful parts. It’s a very natural right for us to use what was beautiful about the Ottoman Empire today’), and concerns from what is perceived to be Muslim radicalization of Turkey, have brought about military, intelligence and political cooperation among members of the alliance. A declaration by Secretary Davutog˘lu that ‘we considered all people of the region as our eternal brothers’,15 and a comment attributed to him that a football match between Turkey and Bosnia is actually a national rather than international event, was noted and taken with seriousness in the capitals of the eight countries mentioned above, i.e. in ‘The Northern Crescent’.16 Accordingly, an expression from the 1990s has recently re-emerged: ‘Let’s not forget Cyprus’, warned George Papandreou (Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister of Greece): ‘Turkey until today justifies its occupation of Cyprus under the guise that it was protecting the Muslim-Turkish Cypriot population. Who is to guarantee that this will not serve as example for future escapades in the Balkans? Certainly statements . . . which talk of the new emerging Ottoman Empire are no relief to Greek ears’. In this context, a case in point is the use by Ankara of the words ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ when referring to Albanian and Bosnian Muslims.17 The perception therefore is as follows: if that is what Turkey under Erdog˘an and Davutog˘lu is prepared to do for distant Muslim communities, who can guarantee that it will not act more aggressively when it comes to Turkish and Muslim minorities in neighbouring Greece, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Cyprus, etc.?18

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In his recent Forward looking vision for the Balkans statement, the Turkish Foreign Secretary envisioned a different region, a more peaceful and integrated one, but also a place that Turkey (whom he defined as a Balkan state) could represent on international bodies where Balkan countries are not members. The shorba (chorba), that famous Balkan soup or stew (very common also in East European and Central Asian cuisines); the region’s small-minded intellectuals who spread hatred; and the Balkan micro-units that should turn into macro-level ones – these are among the ideas that Ahmet Davutog˘lu presented recently. It is for the eye of the beholder to adopt reasons for optimism (or for concern?) in this vision: This region belongs to the local peoples who have lived there for centuries and will continue to live in this region. All ethnic, sectarian and linguistic groups are an integral part of the region and will remain so in the years ahead. No one should contemplate any expulsion of a population or the exile of a single individual. The nations of the Balkans . . . form one family with dense societal and cultural ties that bind them. This region is like shorba, and it will only taste good if salt and all the ingredients are properly there. If one takes any of these out, the shorba will be tasteless . . . The twentieth century was a century of division. In order to normalize the region to conform to the spirit of the time, policy makers should have the determination to turn the twenty-first century into a century of reintegration in the Balkan region. Instead of micro-level division, we need to bolster macro-level integration. More cultural and intellectual interaction is a sine qua non for any regional cooperation process. Unfortunately, some of the intellectuals in the region are more narrow-minded and inward-looking than the ordinary people; these intellectuals are provoking hostile sentiments that might fuel hatred. Turkey is a G-20 country. As the only Balkan country in the G-20, it could represent the interests of the Balkans there.19 Turkey is concerned about anti-Muslim xenophobia in Western countries, naturally so in the face of Islamophobia directed against Turkish immigrants. As a result Turkey asks for a say regarding the future of Europe and the shape that European democracy takes. Similar concerns are expressed in Turkey as regards its cultural and religious influence

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over Turkish migrants in particular, and Muslims in general (‘Turkey’s brothers’), from Central Asia to Central Europe. These declarations exhibit a clear Turkish inclination to intervene in issues which are clearly beyond its territory. In other words: Turkey aspires to behave like a great power with a right of veto, namely: that the fate of a list of issues outside its borders will not be determined without its consent. Ahmet Davutog˘lu in his Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkish perspectives and insights on Religion and Secularism in the Modern World by Mehmet Gormez, Turkey’s President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet (although a religious matter it is published by the Turkish Foreign Ministry), are given here, respectively. They clearly show a Turkey with global interests and aspirations. Especially, we are concerned about the rising xenophobic views is some Western countries. We will continue to raise awareness about the long-term threats posed by such trends to the democratic and pluralist values of Europe, as well as its immediate effect on people who have migrated to that continent from Turkey, especially considering that xenophobic attacks in some cases cost lives. We believe that we have a stake in the question, ‘Where is Europe heading?’ in terms of its core values and will keep a keen eye on the future of democracy in Europe.20 Turkey’s brothers who are the legacy of Ottoman state in a wide geographical area ranging from the Balkans so the Turkic Republics are struggling for the protection and recognition of their identities and references. They too are in need of the Directorate’s support . . . The Directorate is the protective shield for Turkey’s religious and cultural traditions, both domestically and abroad.21 Politically, perhaps also culturally and religiously, Turkey should be in a conflict with Iran over the hegemony in the Middle East. Still, Turkey’s repudiation of the Kemalist ‘bunker mentality’, which the present AKP government also considered to be linked to the perpetuation of the elites which rule inside the country22 (and the consequent efforts to diminish the influence of these pro-Western elites), brought about an openness in Ankara towards Teheran. Turkey’s growing economy needs Iranian energy, and the vacuum created by the fall of Saddam Hussein produced a threat to Turkey and Iran (and consequently encouraged bilateral cooperation), namely a possible independent Kurdish state that would pose an

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irredentist threat to both Ankara and Teheran.23 The result, as prudently explained by Elliot Hentov, has been that ‘Turks no longer view Iran as a direct security threat, but rather as a regional partner whose victimization by the Western-led international community could be detrimental to Turkish interests’.24 However, Middle Eastern realities are hardly governable or predictable. The justification for the short lived ‘honeymoon’ between Syria and Turkey (started in the early 2000s and cut off when the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 immersed Syria into an ever-increasing state of violence) was the removal of Syria from Iran’s sphere of influence. The vicious civil war currently raging in Syria, the support that Ankara grants to the Syrian opposition, and Iran’s unmitigated support for Syria, would seem to underline Turkey’s failure on the Syrian front but more so on a deep disagreement with Teheran. Moreover, the possibility that Syrian refugees – among them, many of Kurdish origin, a traditional clear target for brutal repression by Syria, particularly in the Kamishli region – will reach Turkey, or that their protest against the regime in Damascus will be taken up by the Kurds in Turkey, undoubtedly causes considerable concern in Ankara. Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition (allegedly the latter’s headquarters is currently located in Istanbul) is an example of intensive Turkish involvement in events taking place at the heart of the Arab Middle East, but also beyond it: before the fighting had completely died down in Tripoli, Libya in 2011, the Turkish Foreign Minister Davutog˘lu had visited it, bolstering Turkey’s political and material support for Libya’s new regime. This has not yet produced fruit: the perception of the Turkish model of a secular state ruled by a moderate Muslim party is not a source of inspiration and imitation, neither in Egypt nor in Libya (let alone that prominent voices in Turkey, like its EU Minister, do not see it as a model to be copied by others).25 ‘[We] didn’t need lessons from the Turk’, retorted angrily the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who reacted to Erdog˘an’s wish that Egypt would have, like Turkey, a secular constitution; the coming to power in Cairo of the Brotherhood’s president, in June 2012, emphasizes this line.26 In Libya the post-Muammar Ghaddafi regime still ponders whether Sharia, the Muslim law, is to become the mandatory prevailing law. Already existing laws that contradict Sharia were repealed. The new Libyan regime cited as examples the law of divorce and marriage that banned polygamy during the days of the deposed leader Ghaddafi; this was scrapped because it contradicts Sharia that permits polygamy. Similarly, the interest on loans was to be

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ruled out in accordance with Muslim prohibition on charging interest.27 Tunisia seems to be different: thus far the regime has refrained, despite growing popular pressures, from enshrining the Muslim law in the country’s new constitution.28 The issue of the Kurds has not been removed from the Turkish agenda. One of the results of the Arab Spring has been the radicalization of the Kurds of Turkey. Their demands today are far more extensive – complete autonomy in south-eastern Turkey, including a separate currency, army, parliament, education system, legal system, etc. The actions of the PKK against Turkey since April 2011 have become more extreme and daring, including taking dozens of hostages on a passenger ferry near Istanbul, an act that might represent a change of tactics for the PKK which frequently carries out attacks on security forces in the mainly Kurdish southeast Turkey.29 Thousands of Turkish-Kurds participated in the funerals of the PKK people who were killed in the battles with the Turkish military.30 Turkey’s response to this Kurdish radicalization has been to become ever more violent, aggressive and pro-active, staging air and ground offensives against PKK hideouts within Turkey and northern Iraq.31 The subject of the Kurds is at the centre of several focal points of unrest, with actual and potential repercussions for Turkey’s security. The Kurdish unrest in Syria as part of the civil war there; the autonomy or actual independence of the Kurds in northern Iraq; the PKK terrorism that has become more daring and vicious; and the unrest among the Kurds of Turkey – all serve to create a situation which was hardly known in Turkey in the past. Under the dictators who ruled in Baghdad and Damascus the Kurds were subjugated in Syria and Iraq. That situation has changed. Turkey will find it difficult to be the ‘hegemonic state in the eastern Mediterranean’ when concurrently the Kurds are rebelling within its borders. ‘Before Turkey can be held up as a role model for the Middle East, it needs to sort out its own domestic conflicts’, concluded Time magazine.32 There is today a pronounced Islamist component in Turkey’s foreign policy, and Ankara is acting to obtain the right of Muslim countries to veto resolutions of the UN Security Council. In this context Prime Minister Erdog˘an did not hesitate to host the ruler of Sudan, Omar al Bashir (January 2008), even though that individual is wanted for war-crimes and genocide committed against minorities in his country; according to Erdog˘an, Muslims are incapable of perpetrating a genocide

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and war crimes.33 Accordingly he questioned reports of massacres in Darfur, Sudan: Sometimes some of Erdog˘an’s remarks drive me crazy, commented Orhan Kemal Cengiz [a Turkish journalist and human rights activist] in Today’s Zaman, 12 December [2009], in a reference to Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an. ‘He said he was in Darfur and he could not see any traces of genocide’, Mr. Cengiz added. ‘What was Erdog˘an expecting to happen? That President Omar Hassan al-Bashir would take him to some place and show him how they butcher people there?’ ‘As if this were not enough’, the columnist continued, ‘he said Muslims do not commit massacres. What is al-Qaeda doing? What happens in Iraq every day? What happened in the past in this country? [i.e. in Turkey]’34 Turkey explains the massacre currently being carried out by President Assad in Syria as being due to the fact that he is a member of the Alawite minority, a religious group which, according to many Sunni Turks, is an apostate, non-Muslim religion, categorized as pagan. (During a September 2003 visit to Germany Prime Minister Erdog˘an defined the Alevis in Turkey, who share some similarities with the Syrian Alawites, as ‘Alevism is not a religion’, their ‘Cem houses’ (places of gathering) are ‘cultural houses’ rather than ‘temples’. Alevis in Turkey complain that the Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, views them as a cultural rather than a religious group and accordingly does not fund their activities.)35 Soner Cagaptay, an old hand at Turkish politics and society, elaborated on this curious distinction between Muslims made by Turkey’s Erdog˘an: The AKP will forgive and even defend the ills of Islamist regimes against fellow-Muslims, such as the Sudanese genocide of Darfuris or Tehran’s suppression of its own population. Likewise, it will support Islamist Hamas and its violent goals, but not the secular Palestinian Authority or the peaceful Palestinian cause. This selective solidarity also applies to ills committed against Muslims by non-Muslims, as long as those non-Muslims are anti-American or anti-European.36 In November 2010, the Turkish Prime Minister received the Ghaddafi International Prize for Human Rights. (A reminder: Ghaddafi defined

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‘any political demands’ by Libyans, apparently including demands for political liberties, as ‘a sin before Allah’.)37 Incidentally, in June 2005 the Jewish American organization Anti Defamation League (ADL) awarded a prize to Prime Minister Erdog˘an on behalf of Turkish diplomats who saved Jews during the Holocaust. The Prime Minister then strongly condemned anti-Semitism and stressed his country’s close relations with the State of Israel.38 Today Turkey’s relations with the US are very close. The US needs Turkey on almost every topic in which the Middle East is involved, as well as in Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkey is perceived in Washington as a valuable ally: its geographical location is mentioned as well as its geopolitical weight in the Middle East and Russia’s southern periphery; its potential contribution to an improvement in US relations with the Muslim world (though its value as a Western role model for the Muslim world has recently been questioned); its contribution to the war on terror; to the stability of Iraq; to NATO’s endeavours in Afghanistan; Turkey’s part in NATO’s anti-ballistic defence shield; and Turkey’s growing importance in the global economy and its role as an energy corridor.39 The US needs Turkish cooperation in particular in light of the declared aim of Turkey to follow its own autonomous path, not one that other powers design for it. In an amazing declaration of principles Turkey is portrayed in what could be perceived as a child who finally thinks first of himself and whose parents will not tell him anymore whom to befriend (Israel?) and whom to turn his back on (Muslim countries? Russia? Iran?). This child might be wrong in choosing his friends, but he is adamant that he has made the best choice for himself. Listen to Foreign Secretary Davutog˘lu and note the many times he uses the word ‘our’: Our foreign policy will be conducted autonomously. We suffer from a perception that other powers design regional politics and we only perform the roles assigned to us. We need to do away with this psychological sense of inferiority which has permeated in many segments of our society and amongst political elites. Today, we determine our vision, set our objectives, and execute our foreign policy in line with our national priorities. We might succeed or fail in our initiatives, but the crucial point is that we implement our own policies. We do not receive instructions from any other powers, nor are we part of others’ grand schemes. In particular, our policies towards neighbors are devised with careful consideration of

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our own evaluation of the situation. As has been the case so far, we will continue to coordinate our policies with those of our Western partners as we see fit, but will never let such partnership negatively affect our relations with neighbors.40 Moreover the Arab peoples should know who is responsible for the fact that the Arab Spring has not reached them earlier, a decade or more ago. As a result, Turkey’s present anti-American stance should bring her more credit among her neighbours. Similarly the Turkish Spring, i.e. the AKP’s decade (2002–12), could have happened much earlier, had there not existed this influence of the Great Powers – a Kemalist symbiosis that preferred stability to the ousting of repressive regimes: All these transitions to democracy should have been achieved in the Middle East in the 1990s as the Cold War downfall was instigating an international wave of democratization. But, unfortunately at the time, the preference of major powers was more for stability than democracy in this region, and archaic regimes continued existence with their backing.41 Consequently, and as things are perceived in Jerusalem, the US is prepared to countenance anti-Israel criticism and actions on the part of Turkey provided that, when it comes to the relations between Ankara and Washington, the former acts in accordance with US interests. Thus, Turkey has agreed to the location of NATO missiles and radar installations in its territory, which is clearly in accordance with Washington’s interests. (Turkey attached a stipulation: information gathered by radar would not be forwarded to Israel).42 The crisis in the relations between Israel and Turkey is dwarfed by the benefit gained from improved relations between Turkey and the US. The subject of Cyprus and the fate of the partitioned island has once again been placed on the regional agenda, with the discovery of gas reserves in the island’s offshore area, where Cyprus alone is entitled to drill (in what is known as its EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone). The cooperation between Israel and Cyprus on the subject of energy (agreement and demarcation of areas in the eastern Mediterranean; future cooperation in discovery; exploiting and marketing natural resources) is regarded askance by Turkey. Ankara disputes the sole right of the government of the Republic of Cyprus to make use of these discoveries or grant drilling rights in the Island’s EEZ. According to Ankara, the

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Turkish-controlled area in northern Cyprus has equal rights to utilize those natural resources. In an agreement signed recently between Turkey and the government of the northern part of the Island, the latter granted drilling rights to a Turkish company. These franchises have been accompanied by threats issued by the Turkish Prime Minister to use the Turkish navy (‘frigates and gunboats’) and air force to protect Turkish exploration ships in the area. Erdog˘an also warned energy companies working with the Republic of Cyprus in searching for gas deposits off the Island to withdraw their bids. Otherwise they would face sanctions and Ankara would prohibit exploration and ban them from the country’s energy projects.43 The Turks claim that no steps should be taken to aggravate the problem of Cyprus and make its solution more difficult; according to Ankara the subject of drilling for energy in the eastern Mediterranean intensifies the problem and prevents its solution before the two sides in Cyprus can reach an agreement. Ankara also claims that some of the gas fields in question conflict with Turkey’s continental shelf, while others overlap with areas that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots plan to explore.44 Be it as it may, the eastern Mediterranean, besides prospects for a better future, thanks to energy discoveries, holds within it the potential to develop into an open conflict. Incidentally the issue of territorial waters threatens the same. According to international law, Athens could extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles. Ankara vehemently opposes such a change in the Aegean Sea, and made it very clear that it would take all measures, including military ones, to prevent this from happening. This constitutes a strong admonition that has been taken very seriously by all Greek governments, writes Ekavi Athanassopoulou, who adds a warning: ‘Were a jingoistic government in Athens to ignore the warning and exercise this right, shouldn’t we expect a crisis between Turkey and Greece? It is only very reasonable for anyone to assume that we should’.45 Ironically, because of the present acute Greek fiscal and economic crisis, the Greek air force less and less sends its jet fighters to participate in mock dog fights to intercept Turkish jets that allegedly violate Greek Aegean air space. (In May 2006 a Turkish F-16 and a Greek F-16 crashed in mid-air during such a mock dog fight.)46

Turkish-Israeli Relations Frequently we hear that meetings between Israeli representatives and their Turkish counterparts – those who present a formula for an Israeli

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apology and payment of compensation for the Mavi Marmara tragedy of June 2010 – may result in better and repaired Israeli-Turkey relations. This might be a misreading of the dramatic changes in Turkey in recent decades, which is reflected by the Israeli-Turkish crisis. It also appears that the special relationship that existed between Turkey and Israel from the mid-1980s to the middle of this past decade have reached (or perhaps passed) their allotted time, in light of these changes. Historically, the Israeli-Turkish breakup should have happened at the beginning of the decade, with the rise of Erdog˘an’s AKP to power in 2002. There is no equivalent in the twentieth century for the internal changes experienced by Turkey. From a country that was 70 per cent rural and less than 30 per cent urban at the beginning of the century, Turkey has changed dramatically to 25 per cent rural and 75 per cent urban. In general, until the end of 2000, these immigrants’ opinions were not taken into account when Turkey’s foreign policy was determined. This policy as well as policies in other areas was determined by a number of small elites, with the Turkish military at their head. The army was perceived as a stable organization upon which the nation was formed. No wonder, because the average term of the Turkish governments (1960–2000) was 14 months. For 80 years, since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a small number of elites – Kemalists, secularists and pro-Westerners – outlined the path taken by the Turks. Separation from Islam, from the Ottoman heritage and from the Arab world and culture, while looking instead to the West, were the keystones of modern Turkey. A consideration of public opinion was simply not part of it. Widespread democratization in Turkey in recent years, partly in response to the requirements of the European Union which Turkey seeks to enter, brought a number of dramatic results: a massive reduction in the authority and influence of the secular legal system, the Presidency of the Republic and of the military; a decline in the prestige of the secularists’ elite; the rise of Islam (a phenomenon that until now was controlled carefully by those elites); looking not only to the West but also to the Arab world, Muslim and black Africa (between 2010 and 2011, Turkey opened 22 new embassies in African capitals, five in Latin America, and three in East-Asia),47 the Caucasus and Iran; in short, the depreciation of Kemalism. (Symbolically and semantically, if not pointing towards deeper changes of substance, the ‘Zero Problems’ policy with Turkey’s neighbours could be interpreted as an anti-military move: with no problems, there is therefore no need for the military.) A fear of association

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with the Arab and Muslim world has dissipated. The opinion of the millions who migrated from countryside to city, which, thanks to democratization have tremendous political power, have begun to be taken into consideration. The years of limited democracy and secular control took no heed of them. No more. Occasionally, these new elites give their support to Prime Minister Erdog˘an and Foreign Minister Davutog˘lu. Crowds meet in town squares to demonstrate in support of government actions, expressing their opinions faithfully; these masses will also take to the town square if their government’s moves are not to their liking. In short: they must be taken into account. Secretary Davutog˘lu described this new phenomenon; theoretically, some would say, yet also practically, as things are not the same between the Turkish state and its enemy (Turkish society): While Turkish governments in the 1990s lagged behind the wave of democratization and failed to embrace universal human rights, in the last decade Turkey has undergone a major domestic restructuring process, fixing many of its shortcomings in terms of its human rights record . . . Turkey has abandoned its erroneous habits of the past, when viewing society as a potential enemy sucked its energy in vicious internal discussions. [Turkey is] no longer driven by fear of internal problems thanks to the expanded scope of basic freedoms.48 It was these changes that prevented Ankara from allowing the transfer of American forces through its territory to participate in the war in Iraq in 2003; it was this that led to deteriorating relations with Israel, while creating warmer ties with Hamas, Syria and Iran. In short, the deterioration of ties with Israel because of the conflict with the Palestinians reflects a considerable part of Turkey’s public opinion. This is not merely the whim of two people (Erdog˘an and Davutog˘lu). It is even possible that public opinion is determining the anti-Israeli moves for the leadership. Alternatively, if the rift with Israel is a government initiative, then the government enjoys massive popular support. The words of Zvi Elpeleg, Israel’s ambassador to Ankara (1995–97), are worthy of attention; his warning is still relevant and valid today. Elpeleg stressed Turkish sensitivity to the Palestinian issue. In his view, a crisis in Israeli-Arab relations would not entail deterioration in IsraeliTurkish ties, but a downturn in relation to the Palestinians would. ‘Their

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sensitivity on that point is almost as great as on the Armenian issue’, Elpeleg warned. ‘Many millions in Turkey are interested in nothing outside their own borders more than the Palestinian issue; no government in Turkey can withstand the pressure of those millions’.49 The anti-Israel stance was recently expressed on several occasions. In early January 2009 (simultaneously with Operation Cast Lead in Gaza), some 3,000 Turkish fans protested inside and outside the Ankara sports centre during the European Cup basket-ball match between the Israeli Bnei-Hasharon team and the Turkish Turk Telecom. The Turkish supporters pelted Bnei Hashron from the stands with bottles, shoes and pieces of seats torn from the stadium. The game was stopped and a 1,000 strong Turkish police force used tear gas to stop and push the fans. The match was not resumed. In May 2011 Israel’s Cameri Theatre was removed from the Antalya Festival when they were scheduled to perform the Israeli playwright Hanoch Levine’s play, Thrill my Heart. The security of the actors could not be guaranteed and a regular schedule of appearances was unlikely. In June 2011 Israeli cyclists were expelled from an international competition, the ‘Cycling Tour of Turkey’, and specifically the Tour of Isparta in Western Turkey. Concern for the riders’ safety was voiced as well as objections from several Arab countries led to their removal. At the end of June 2011 an Israeli jazz musician’s performance at the festival at Akbank Sanat Cultural Centre in Istanbul was cancelled. During the same month an interfaith concert of cantors and imams was cancelled: it was to be held at an open air amphitheatre in Istanbul that holds 5,000 people, but members of the Turkish IHH organization (responsible for the June 2010 Gaza flotilla and the sail of the Mavi Marmara ship) sent hundreds of its members to the front row of the amphitheatre three hours ahead of the concert and prevented it from taking place.50 In early September 2011 the distinction between Israeli tourists and official representatives of the State of Israel became blurred: in what was later described as a local police initiative, dozens of Israelis were stopped and bodily searched in Istanbul Atatürk Airport, their luggage screened and examined for hours before being given the entrance permit into Turkey or boarding passes outside it. On the other hand, Israelis who performed as individuals faced no hostility: a caricaturist, novelists and even a band of actors of Tel Aviv’s Beit Lessin Theatre performed in Istanbul and were greeted with

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friendliness and warmth. Similarly, three Israeli artists and one museum curator exhibited in the friendly atmosphere of the Istanbul Biennale between September and November 2011.51 The Turkish police and authorities could have easily responded to the threats or people participating in public disturbances or in bullying Israelis in Turkey. This was not done; it is unclear today if an action to ensure the orderly appearance of Israeli representatives in Turkey is in line with the present anti-Israel feelings there. These decisions are no longer solely in the hands of decision-making bodies but of far wider circles. These are not new feelings, but ones that were previously kept in check; today it is hard to ignore them. This means that even if future Turkey-Israel political contacts settle down, Turkish public opinion and views of ordinary Turks towards Israel will not return to what they were previously. Simultaneously with this understanding of the changes in Turkish society, there are calls in Israel to realize that a ‘Turkish-free Middle East’ is a matter of the past. An assertive Turkey which intervenes in the Middle East (as is happening now in the Syrian civil war and as happened with the flotilla) is here to stay. The sooner Israel accepts this, the better.52 Since 2010, three consecutive editorials of Israel’s Ha’aretz, perhaps the most important Israeli newspaper, while analysing realistically the present conflict between Ankara and Israel and the share of each side in the deterioration of the relations, clearly called Israel to do its utmost to mend the relations. The titles of the three editorials were identical: ‘Turkey is not an enemy [of Israel]’.53

Greek-Israeli Relations The Turkish Flotilla incident and the disruption of the strategic relationship between Israel and Turkey led to a surprising initiative by two prime ministers: Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and George Papandreou of Greece. It has been reported that personal relationship and chemistry between Papandreou and Netanyahu – both of whom studied in the United States – helped to build the present surprising, renewed and promising relationship between Greece and Israel. It is fitting that Israel’s relations with Greece should have their own raison d’être, and not only as a result of Turkish-Israeli relations. Greece and Israel, so close geographically in the Mediterranean basin (and the

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sole non-Muslim actors there), during the first 40 years of Israel’s existence could not have been farther apart in terms of diplomatic relations. A fear for the fate of the Greek communities in the Arab Middle East prevented Greece from opening an embassy in Israel until 1990. And even when the Greek Diaspora, primarily in Alexandria, was widely scattered as a result of the Suez crisis in 1956, no improvement occurred in relations between the two countries. The emphasis placed in Israel on its relations with Turkey, certainly did not help relations between Athens and Jerusalem. A second opportunity began with the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1990. The relationship has greatly improved since 1990. The membership of Greece and Cyprus in the European Union enhanced the need to have good relations between Israel and the Greek world. Starting in 2010, the third chapter in the relationship between Israel and Greece commenced. There is much in common: no other two nations in the world have suffered so much due to the resurgence of the nation-state (one state for one nation).54 Over a million Greeks who lived for thousands of years in Asia Minor (Western Turkey today) were expelled in the early 1920s. Turkey became a state for Turks only. Greeks who lived for thousands of years in Egypt were expelled by Abed al-Nasser; Egypt became a country for Egyptians only. These historical and national narratives resonate with the Jewish experience. Both Greece and Israel push back attempts at external coercion to resolve the conflicts in which they are involved. Greece and Israel as small states are surrounded by larger countries with larger economies. Occasionally, as a result, the two recognize their limitations. The humiliating financial situation in which Athens finds itself versus the economic giants of the European Union only emphasizes this aspect. The difficulty in dealing with foreign migrants is another issue shared by Greece and Israel. Greece, like Israel on its border with Egypt, is building a wall along its Turkish border to stop thousands of foreign immigrants from entering illegally. Of illegal immigration into the EU 80 to 90 per cent takes place via Greece.55 This is not their final destination but from there illegal immigrants attempt to move to the wealthier EU countries. The thousands of Greek islands, plus their very long shores, make inspection and control of this illegal immigration practically impossible.56 The proximity to very unstable regions in the Balkans and the Middle East;

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the danger of terrorism; the considerable value of religion in public life; the ‘Arab Spring’ and the instabilities it has created; the uncertainties around Turkey’s policies in the region; as well as other challenges and difficulties are additional common grounds for both countries. Both Israel and Greece have strong Diaspora and lobbies in North America, which have recently been very active in bringing these two countries closer. Greece’s interest in the Israeli arms and energy industries, as well as in potential Greek-Cypriot-Israeli energy projects and in the hundred of thousands of Israeli tourists who have replaced Turkey with Greece, indicate the common economic interest and emphasize the potential third phase in the relations of Athens and Jerusalem. There is considerable goodwill on the Greek and Israeli sides for a huge upgrade in the relations between the two countries. Israel and Greece must not miss this third opportunity; Israelis have learned, and more than once, that while strategic alliances are built slowly, their destruction is rapid.

Notes * The writing of this chapter finished before the reapprochments between Turkey and Israel, and Turkey and the Kurds. 1. ‘Turkey’s Davutog˘lu says zero problems foreign policy successful’, Today’s

Zaman, 16 September 2011; Bobbey Ghosh, quoting F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 30. 2. Fadi Hakura, ‘Turkey and the European Union’, in Nicholas Kitchen (Editor), Turkey’s Global Strategy, LSE Ideas, Special Report, May 2011, p. 15. 3. Semadar Peri, Yedioth Aharonot (Hebrew), 11 November 2011; Manufacturers Association of Israel, ‘Israeli–Turkish Economic Relations’, June 2011; Moshe Kimhi, Israel’s Consul General in Istanbul, Yediot Aharonot, 11 November 2011. 4. Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 31. 5. Omer Taspinar, ‘A new era in Turkish foreign policy’, Today’s Zaman,

14 June 2010. 6. Jonathan Lis, ‘Embarrassment to the Turks: [Reuven] Rivlin instructed to commemorate every year the Armenian genocide’, Ha’aretz (Hebrew), 31 May 2011. 7. Jacob Ahimeir, ‘To give recognition to the Armenian genocide’, Ha’aretz 31 October 2011. 8. Ardan Zenturk, Star, 2 March 2009 (Emphasis added). 9. Quoted in Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 27. For a thorough discussion of the applicability of the “Turkish model” to the Arab

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10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

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world see Sinan Ulgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East, Washington DC, The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Europe, December 2011. Yossi Melman, ‘Teheran’s troubles’, Ha’aretz, 10 November 2011. Zvi Barel, ‘Erdog˘an visit to Cairo’, Ha’aretz, 13 September 2011. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, Ankara, Ministry of foreign Affairs, SAM, Center for Strategic Research, Vision Papers, No. 3, April 2012, p. 8 (Emphasis added). ‘Turkey moved from a policy of “Zero Problems” [with its neighbors], to a policy of having nothing but problems with them’, interview with the Cypriot foreign secretary, Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, Ha’aretz, 23 December 2011. Barak Ravid, ‘A new intelligence alliance: Israel, Greece, and Bulgaria against Turkey’, Ha’aretz, 26 November 2010. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, p. 8. ‘The Northern Crescent’ is a definition currently used in Israel. George Papandreou, ‘Greece, the United States and their Mutual Common Interests in the Balkans’, in Theodore A. Couloumbis, Thanos M. Veremis, Thanos Dokos (Eds.), Hellenic Foundation fore European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), The Southeast European Year Book 1993, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1994, p. 19; Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ‘Ankara’s Foreign Policy Objectives After the End of the Cold War’, Orient, vol. 36, no. 2, 1995, p. 273. On the new ‘Balkan alliance’ and the pictured meeting between Boyko Borisov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, and Meir Dagan, Israel’s head of Mossad, see Barak Ravid, ‘A new intelligence alliance: Israel, Greece, and Bulgaria against Turkey’, Ha’aretz, 26 November 2010; Erdog˘an quoted in Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 31. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘A Forward Looking Vision for the Balkans’, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SAM, Center for Strategic Research, Vision papers, No. 1, October 2011, pp. 6–8, 10 (Emphasis added). The G-20 is the group of the world’s 20 major economies. Together they represent more that 80 per cent of the global product and trade, and two-thirds of world population. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, p. 5. Mehmet Gormez, ‘Religion and Secularism in the Modern World: a Turkish Perspective’, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SAM Papers, Center for Strategic Research, March 2012, No. 2, p. 11. Elliot Hentov, ‘Turkey and Iran’, in Nicholas Kitchen (Editor), Turkey’s Global Strategy, LSE Ideas, Special Report, May 2011, p. 29. Elliot Hentov, ‘Turkey and Iran’, in Nicholas Kitchen (Editor), Turkey’s Global Strategy, p. 30.

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24. Elliot Hentov, ‘Turkey and Iran’, in Nicholas Kitchen (Editor), Turkey’s Global Strategy, p. 33. 25. ‘Turkey’s EU Minister Egemen Bagis said that Turkey had no aspirations to be a ‘model’ for the Mid-East’, Anadolu Agency, 8 July 2012, available at: http:// www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/63373--d. 26. Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 27. 27. Elizabeth Tenety, ‘Sharia law for Libya?’ The Washington Post, 24 October 2011; ‘Libya to adopt Sharia law, ends public showing of Gaddafi’s body’, 24 October 2011, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011–10–24/ middle-east/30315748_1_mo-tassim-muammar-gaddafi-misrata. 28. BBC News, 26 March 2012, ‘Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda edges from Sharia’, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17517113. Ennahda, also known as ‘Renaissance’, is a moderate Muslim party, and the biggest party in Tunisia. In the October 2011 Tunisian parliamentary election, the party won 40 per cent of the vote, 89 of the 217 assembly seats, far more than any other party. 29. Reuters, ‘Suspected Kurd militants hijack ferry in Turkey’, 11 November

2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/12/turkeyhijack-idUSL5E7MC00P20111112. 30. Hatem Ete, Eda Bektas, ‘The Political Agenda of the June 2011 Elections’, Ankara, SETA (Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research), Brief 53, June 2011, available at: www.setav.org. See also Aylin Unver Noi, ‘The Arab Spring, its effects on the Kurds, and the approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq on the Kurdish issue’, Tel Aviv, MERIA Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1 July 2012, Summer 2012. 31. David Batty, ‘Turkish forces shoot dead lone hijacker’, The Guardian, 12 November 2011. 32. Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 31. 33. Today’s Zaman, 9 November 2009. 34. Today’s Zaman, 12 December 2009, quoted in Lou Ann Matossian, ‘Erdog˘an’s defense of al-Bashir raises eyebrows in Turkey’, Dateline Democracy: News and views from today’s Turkey, 16 December 2009. 35. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2004, Turkey, available at: http://www.state. gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35489.htm. On Alawi Islam see http://www.globalsecurity. org/military/intro/islam-alawi.htm. 36. Soner Cagaptay, ‘Under the Islamist Erdog˘an government, the country can no longer be considered a western ally’, The Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2010. Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is the author of Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006). 37. Avi Issaharov, ‘Libya takes a new way’, Ha’aretz, 8 July 2012 (Emphasis added).

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38. ‘Prime Minister Erdog˘an Tells ADL That “Anti-Semitism Has No Place in Turkey”’, New York, 10 June 2005, available at: http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ ASInt_13/4730_13.htm 39. Harry Papasotiriou, Efstathios Koutsourakis, Vasileios Lianeris, Styliani Ziopoulou, Theodora Ziopoulou, ‘Allies of a kind: US-Turkish Relations since 2003 from the perspective of US think tanks’, Athens, Panteion University, Centre for Euroatlantic Studies, the Institute of International Relations, June 2012. 40. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, pp.6–7 (emphasis added). 41. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, p. 8. 42. Zvi Barel, Ha’aretz, 7 November 2011. NATO sources deny the existence of a Turkish stipulation against sharing data with Israel. ‘[T]hat’s just not true’. See Bobbey Ghosh, ‘Erdog˘an’s Moment’, Time, 28 November 2011, p. 31. 43. Menas Borders ‘Turkey warns IOCs (International Oil and Gas Companies) against Cyprus gas drilling’, 21 May 2012, available at http://www. menasborders.com/menasborders/news/article/2639/Turkey_warns_IOCs_ against_Cyprus_gas_drilling/. 44. Patrick Goodenough, ‘Cyprus demands international condemnation of

Turkey for threats over offshore drilling’, 29 September 2011, available at

45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52.

http://cnsnews.com/news/article/cyprus-demands-int-l-condemnation-turkeythreats-over-offshore-drilling. Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ‘Turkey and Greece’, in Nicholas Kitchen (Editor), Turkey’s Global Strategy, LSE Ideas, Special Report, May 2011, p. 19. James Sturcke, ‘Turkish pilot rescued after fighter jets crash’, The Guardian, 23 May 2006. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, p. 6; Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy’, TurkishPress.com, 26 September 2011 (published: 6 September 2010), available at: http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352745. Ahmet Davutog˘lu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, pp. 4–5 (emphasis added). Ha’aretz, 30 September 1997 (emphasis added). Gil Hoffman, ‘Not chickening out in Turkey’, The Jerusalem Post Magazine, 9 December 2011, p. 16. Moshe Kimhi, Israel’s Consul General in Istanbul, Yediot Aharonot, 11 November 2011. Beit Lessin performed the Banality of Love by Savyon Liebrecht. Ilya Katz won the second place in a caricaturists competition and was a awarded a prize by Istanbul governor. The novelists Shifra Horn and Alona Kimhi participated in a festival of authors and writers. Dani Gal, Dor Gez, Ala Litvitch, and Li Weinberg participated in the Istanbul Biennale. Shlomo Avineri, ‘To understand Turkey’, Ha’aretz, 3 July 2012.

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53. Ha’aretz, 4 June 2010; 2 November 2010; 4 September 2011. 54. On Greece and nationalism see Mina Rozen, ‘Preface’ and ‘People of the Book, People of the Sea: Mirror Images of the Soul’, in Mina Rozen (Editor), Homelands and Diasporas. Greeks, Jews and their Migrations, I.B.Tauris, 2008, pp. 21–32, and 35–81, respectively. 55. Joanna Kakissis, ‘Tensions Rise Over Illegal Immigrants in Greece’, National Public Radio (NPR), 14 August 2011, available at: http://www.npr. org/2011/08/14/139613525/tensions-over-illegal-immigrants-in-greece-rises 56. Helena Smith, The Guardian, reprinted in Ha’aretz, 12 November 2003.

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12 ISR AEL AND GER M ANY: FROM FOR MER FOES TO DISTANT FR IENDS Michael Wolffsohn

Federal Republic of Germany Although the ‘Endlösung’ took place before the establishment of both Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), it was ever-present in the relationship between the two countries. On the other hand, each side had specific national interests. Germany wanted respectability and sovereignty, Israel needed financial aid to survive. Since the Restitution Agreement of 1952–53, relations improved gradually, but since the Suez Campaign (1956) and the New York meeting of Adenauer and Ben-Gurion (1960) they changed fundamentally. Meanwhile, as seen from Israel, bilateral relations are second in importance only to its partnership with the United States. It is often assumed that Germany’s Israel policies were directed by US demands or wishes. But Germany often directed its relationship with Jerusalem in opposition to US priorities – in 1952, 1956–57, 1965, 1969–82 and 1998–2005. This has been the mutually assumed and accepted axiom: that Federal Germany has and wants to ‘make amends’ for the past. In concrete terms, this has implied that Germany is committed to Israel’s very existence. The definition of this guideline has been open to sometimes conflicting interpretations between both sides. As a general rule it is safe to state that these conflicts have emerged more often between Likud leaders such

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as Begin and Shamir and Social Democrat Chancellors such as Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schröder.

German Democratic Republic Under Soviet guidance the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had a different approach: The GDR was a Communist state. It was therefore presumed that German Communists had similarly been Nazi victims rather than perpetrators. Thus Communist East Germany felt that it did not have to make amends for anything. Moreover, Communist takeovers included the expropriation of any capitalist enterprise regardless of whether it was Jewish or not. From late 1948 to Stalin’s death (March 1953), the non-relationship between Israel and the GDR worsened due to the antiZionist and anti-Semitic campaign in the Communist bloc. Veteran Jewish Communists were eliminated politically or physically or both. Compared with the Soviet Union, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the approach of the GDR authorities was relatively tame. No sentences were meted out to Jews or to advocates of GDR restitution to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, some hundreds – mainly Jews – left the GDR during the first years of its existence. From the 1967 War to the end of its existence the GDR supported the Arab States and mainly Palestinian groups in their fight against Israel. Diplomatic relations were never established between these two states.

Chronology and Developments German-Israeli relations can be divided into the following phases: 1) The reparations question (up to 1953) 2) The difficulties surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations (up to 1965) 3) The beginning of routine relations (until late 1969) 4) Between ‘Ostpolitik’ and the Middle East (the Brandt-Scheel era) 5) The Palestinian question and the oil crisis (1973–1977) 6) Under Begin’s shadow (until the fall of 1983) 7) The Kohl era (1982–1998) 8) The Schröder era (1998–2005) 9) The Merkel era (since 2005) Granted that it is quite possible to suggest another structure, the division into these phases and the dominant personalities listed above is

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convenient because it provides a workable framework for descriptive purposes. There is, of course, some overlapping of phases, but the divisions are maintained for the sake of clarity. On 11 November 1949, CDU-Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876– 1967) announced that his administration was prepared to make reparation payments to the Jewish victims of the National-Socialist regime. Israel was reluctant to even talk to Germany. But in January 1951, due to enormous financial difficulties, David Ben-Gurion decided to undertake indirect negotiations with the Federal Republic. On 12 March 1951 Israel presented a formal note to the four allied powers demanding the sum of $1 billion from West Germany and $500 million from East Germany. While the Soviet Union refused to reply, the Western powers insisted on direct German-Israeli talks. They wanted to reintroduce West Germany as a player into the international community once more. As long as Israel refused to contemplate direct talks, Germany would not admit its responsibility for Nazi crimes. Chancellor Adenauer smoothed the way for negotiations with his statement to the Bundestag of 27 September 1951. In January 1952 the Knesset voted by a margin of 60 to 51 to conduct direct talks with the FRG. This decision was followed by a tumultuous debate and protests both inside and outside the Knesset. The Herut party led by Menachem Begin was bitterly opposed to this initiative. He refused to accept ‘blood money’. Ben-Gurion countered by arguing that the survivors had a national obligation towards the victims. The reparations negotiations, which began in Wassenaar (Netherlands) on 21 March 1952, led to the Luxembourg agreement signed in the capital of the duchy on 10 September. Over a period of twelve years the State of Israel was to receive Mk 3 billion and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany (CC) Mk 450 million. The latter organization represented those Jewish victims who were not citizens of Israel and acted as the claimant for Jewish property where there was no apparent heir. The agreement was ratified by the Bundestag on 18 March 1953. Without the support of the Social Democrat opposition, the divided Adenauer coalition would have suffered an embarrassing defeat. Some Christian Democrats claimed that Germany would not be able to finance both rearmament and restitution and that global priorities (the Korean War and the Cold War) demanded rearmament rather than restitution. This position was supported by the US. Other Christian and liberal Free Democrats rejected collective responsibility out of hand. The West German Communists rejected – like the Communist bloc as a whole – restitution to Jewish as well as non-Jewish ‘Capitalists’. An

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Allensbach poll showed in September 1952 that 44 per cent of the West German public rejected the restitution. In 1953 the West German government was anxious to assume full diplomatic relations, but the Israeli government hesitated. After the Suez Campaign, in 1956–57, it was Israel’s turn to press the issue and Bonn’s turn to side-step it so as not to damage West German interests in the Arab World. Most importantly, the Federal Republic had tied its own hands with its so-called ‘Hallstein doctrine’, according to which the FRG would not maintain diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the GDR. The fear in Bonn was that the Arab states would respond to the assumption of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Israel by recognizing East Germany. In addition to the issue of formal diplomatic relations, three further questions dominated German-Israeli relations in this phase: arms deliveries, National-Socialist criminals and the statute of limitations, and the activities of Nazi-minded German rocket experts in Egypt. In the autumn of 1956, Chancellor Adenauer resisted pressure from the Eisenhower Administration to suspend temporarily reparations payments as a means of forcing an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the Suez Campaign. The manner in which Adenauer stood up to Washington deeply impressed Ben-Gurion. He subsequently approached the Federal Republic with a weapons shopping list. Shimon Peres was his main messenger. The majority of the Israeli cabinet approved these moves in a vote taken on 15 December 1957, the exception being the ministers of the socialist parties Mapam and Ahdut Ha-avoda, which wanted nothing to do with arms from Germany. On 24 December Prime Minister Ben-Gurion declared before the Knesset that only Federal Germany could be relied upon as a long-term supplier of weapons. To cover up its willingness to do this, the West German Government declared on 27 December that it would, as a matter of principle, refrain from delivering weapons to ‘areas of tension’. This well-intended announcement weakened Ben-Gurion internally. He resigned on 31 December. In June 1959 Der Spiegel revealed that the Federal Republic had for some time been buying Uzi machine guns as well as other light weapons made in Israel. This revelation precipitated a cabinet crisis in Israel, as, in the view of Ahdut Ha-avoda, exporting weapons to Germany was even worse than importing German arms. Meeting in New York, Adenauer and Ben-Gurion nevertheless reached an agreement on German military aid to Israel on 14 March 1960. A secret treaty was signed on 8 June 1962. By meeting the Chancellor the Israeli premier wanted to signal

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that despite a previous neo-Nazi campaign in West Germany he had full confidence in Adenauer’s ‘New Germany’. Moreover, he was convinced that those anti-Semitic actions had been organized by the USSR and GDR. East German documents found after 1990 validated his belief. The United States, Great Britain and Italy lent a hand in carrying out the provisions of the arms agreement, which was favoured by West German Defence Minister F. J. Strauss but opposed by Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder. The secret arms deliveries were uncovered in October 1964. On 12 February 1965, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard stated that the Federal Republic would no longer deliver arms to nations in ‘areas of tension’. Bonn’s anger over East German leader Walter Ulbricht’s visit to Egypt (24 February to 3 March 1965) was followed by Kurt Birrenbach’s special mission to Israel, which led to the decision to establish full diplomatic relations. These were approved by the West German government on 5 May and formally implemented on 12 May 1965. For reasons of ‘realpolitik’ rather than ‘moralpolitik’, the Johnson Administration did not support this step. The US wanted to continue using Bonn as the West’s bridge to the Arab World which then continued to perceive Germany as a basically anti-Jewish and therefore an anti-Israel country. Tensions arose between Israel and West Germany over the activities of German rocket technicians in Egypt. This was made public in March 1963 but actually having already been conducted for a considerable time undercover. The Bonn government’s subtlety gently resolved this problem by recalling the specialists to Germany with attractive job offers at home. Israel supported their return by forceful actions. This dual approach was effective. On 12 May 1966, the Federal Republic and Israel formalized an economic agreement including low interest annual loans of Mk 130 million to Israel (later raised to Mk 140 million). The Six Day War unleashed a wave of sympathy for Israel among West Germans, and the government remained formally ‘neutral’. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations on the part of the budding New Left at German universities proved, however, a sign of things to come. The Labour Party-led Golda Meir administration feared that the new German coalition led by Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Social Democratic (SPD) sister party might sacrifice West Germany’s special relationship with Israel on the altar of its ‘ostpolitik’ and would be too soft on Israel’s security issues. During the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972, members of Black September killed Israeli athletes. German inefficiency to combat terrorism was frowned upon and angered Israel. This was understandable. It was also understandable, though, that the 1972 Munich Olympics had

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been planned by the politicians of the ‘New Germany’ as a fundamental contrast to Hitler’s 1936 Berlin Games. A few weeks later the Munich terrorists were conveniently released in exchange for the hostages seized in the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner by Palestinians. In place of the old German nightmare, overwhelming force, incompetence and weakness had been substituted. For the Israelis, this was the worst of bad dreams. In June 1973 Willy Brandt became the first German chancellor to visit the Jewish state. His Israeli hosts repeatedly emphasized that bilateral relations were not ‘normal’. On October 23 1973, a few days before the end of the Yom Kippur War, the Brandt coalition advised the United States that it would no longer be permitted to use German ports for the shipping of war material to Israel. Bilateral relations were at a low ebb. In November 1974 Federal Germany led by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) became the first member state of the European Economic Community (EEC) to call for the self-determination of the Palestinian people before the United Nations General Assembly. As economic (oil) considerations came to dominate Bonn’s foreign policy, the differences of opinion with Israel grew. On 29 June 1977, the European Council endorsed the right of Palestinian self-determination. Increasingly, the Middle East policy of the EEC became dominated by the Paris-Bonn axis of President Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt. This included the EEC Declaration of Venice (13 June 1980) which Israel regarded as one-sidedly proPalestinian. Israel’s anger grew over what it viewed as inadequate German and European support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. In January 1981 Der Spiegel reported that the Bonn government was planning to sell Leopard-2 tanks and other advanced German weaponry to Saudi Arabia, which played host to Chancellor Schmidt at the end of April. Prime Minister Begin’s response took the form of a full-frontal political attack. He spoke of the collective guilt of the entire German people for the crimes of the National-Socialist era and stated that Helmut Schmidt, who had been a Wehrmacht officer in World War II, carried part of the burden of responsibility for war crimes. On 25 May 1982, Chancellor Schmidt announced that no German tanks would be sold to Saudi Arabia. The rest was silence between Bonn and Jerusalem. No European or German counter-effort could prevent the US from leading the West in the Middle East. For this and other pro-US reasons, Helmut Kohl, Helmut Schmidt’s successor since October 1982, harmonized Bonn’s Israel policies with the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations.

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In comparison to Helmut Schmidt, Kohl was a partner rather than antagonistic to US interests in the Middle East and towards Israel. Relations with Israel were improved while those with radical Arab states and especially with the Palestinians deteriorated. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 the Shamir government tried to prevent German unification but after February 1990 faced up to realities and realized that a unified Germany would continue to keep its basic commitments vis-à-vis Israel, first and foremost to its security. Consequently, two submarines which were able to carry and fire nuclear warheads were given by the Kohl-Genscher administration to Israel as a gift. Optimal payment regulations were granted for two additional submarines by the outgoing Schröder SPD-Green administration in late 2005 with the explicit consent of successive Merkel coalitions. Like the previous Brandt and Schmidt administrations, the Gerhard Schröder-Joschka Fischer government had tried to steer a course on Israel and the Middle East more independent of and sometimes in opposition to US priorities. The 2003 Iraq War was such an example. Fischer tried to soften this course but Schröder was Chancellor and the SPD and Green party rank-and-files were at arm’s length towards the US and Israel. Under Merkel, Berlin reharmonized its Israel policies with Washington. A new peak in Germany’s commitment to Israel’s very existence was reached on 3 November 2009. Chancellor Merkel declared in a speech before both Houses of the US Congress that Germany would consider an attack on Israel to be an attack on Germany proper. Thus Merkel granted (unilaterally) Israel quasi NATO-membership status. The alliance did not comment but the congressional ovations certainly indicated US consent.

Trade In 1960, 14 per cent of Israel’s imports came from Germany; in 1992 12 per cent; in 2010 6 per cent. About 10 per cent of Israel’s exports went to Germany between 1960 and 1980; 4 per cent in 1997; and 3 per cent in 2010. Conversely, Germany exported to Israel more than to any other state of the Middle East, except for Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Public Opinion Until 1967 German public opinion vis-à-vis Israel was generally centred somewhere between ‘neutral’ to ‘not hostile’. From 1967 to 1977 it could broadly be considered to be pro-Israeli. The turning point came during

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Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s first tenure in office. His settlements policies and his dispute with Chancellor Schmidt caused a deep and structural, long-lasting decline in Israel’s image in Germany. After Oslo there was a short pro-Israel period under Rabin (1993–95) only to be followed by ostentatious Israel-bashing. Since 1996 Israel has remained in a trio of countries least-liked by Germans. For the majority of Germans, Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians are seen as too tough. Most Germans are not just opposed to Israeli governmental policies but rather to the substance of Israeli policy as such: the legitimacy of force as a political instrument. It may be just a matter of time until negative public opinion will change the positive approach of German administrations towards Israel. Conversely, Germany has become ever more popular with Israelis. Their majority believes in the ‘New Germany’ which they consider to be a ‘normal’ country.

References Documents Documents on the Foreign Relations of Israel, various volumes Die Auswärtige Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various volumes Foreign Relations of the United States of America, various volumes

Public Polls Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie, various volumes Wolffsohn, Michael, Deutsch-Israelische Beziehungen. Umfragen und Interpretationen 1952–1983, Munich 1986 Wolffsohn, Michael, Israel (see suggested reading)

Suggested Reading Hansen, Niels (2002) Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe: Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben-Gurion, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag. Jelinek, Yishayahu A. (ed.) (1997) Zwischen Moral und Realpolitik: Eine Dokumentensammlung, Gerlingen: Wallstein Verlag. ———. (2004) Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965, München: Oldenbourg R. Verlag GmbH. Wolffsohn, Michael (1993) Eternal Guilt? Forty Years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations, New York: Columbia University Press. ——— (2007, 2015) Israel: Geschichte, Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, 7th edition Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 8th edition Leverkusen: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

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13 ISR AEL AND AUSTR ALIA: A MEDIUM POWER ‘PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT’ Suzanne D. Rutland

Colin Rubenstein and Tzvi Fleischer open their overview article on Australian-Israeli relations with the statement that ‘Australian-Israeli relations have been almost consistently warm and robust since before Israeli independence’.1 This statement sums up the conventional view of relations between Australia and Israel, but careful analysis of the policies of the different Australian governments since 1948 indicates that the relationship between the two countries has been much more complex. This supports Chanan Reich’s thesis that the relationship could be described as ‘ambiguous’.2 Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs during the Labor government (1941–49), did play a key role both in the 29 November 1947 United Nations (UN) Resolution 181 for partitioning Palestine into two states – one Jewish and one Arab – and the acceptance of the newly created State of Israel as a member of the UN in 1949. As such he established a pattern of reasonably friendly relations with Israel. Yet, even Evatt’s position is subject to complexities, given his strong support for the internationalisation of Jerusalem. This complexity has continued to be a feature of Australian government policies, both under Liberal and Australian Labor party leadership. This chapter will investigate Evatt’s key role in the creation of the state, the ambiguous 23 years of Liberal rule until 1972, the disconnect of the subsequent Whitlam years, and the ongoing ambiguity towards Israel

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in Australian government policies during the 1980s and early 1990s. It will also analyse the more positive attitudes that have predominated since John Howard was elected prime minister in 1996, apart from the brief period when Kevin Rudd served as foreign minister. Today’s Labor party leadership, including the current Gillard government, uses Evatt’s support of Israel to justify current policies, and also refer to Australia’s military contribution to the defeat of the Turks in Palestine in World War I. Both mainstream parties have also largely been influenced by their staunch support for Australia’s alliance with the United States, apart from the brief period of Gough Whitlam’s prime ministership (1972–75).

Historical Background Australian forces played a vital role in battles waged in Palestine during World War I. Commanded by Sir Henry Chauvel, they contributed to, and often led, the Allied victories over Ottoman and German forces in Palestine. The Australian ‘diggers’ (a colloquial term for Australian soldiers) developed friendly relations with the Jewish pioneers who had arrived in Palestine prior to the war. These relationships were renewed during World War II when Australian troops involved in the campaigns in North Africa and Syria spent time on leave in Palestine.3 During World War II when European Jews fell victim to the Holocaust, Zionist leaders in Australia believed that it was imperative to canvass support from the governing Australian Labor Party (ALP) for the repeal of the MacDonald White Paper and the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.4 A small group of Zionist leaders initiated the groundwork by seeking personal contacts with politicians, especially towards the end of the war. They did this by fundraising for the ALP. These judicious approaches met with a significant response on the part of Evatt.5 In 1944, during the handover of campaign funds in Sydney, Evatt met Max Freilich. They established a personal friendship, with Evatt being invited to Friday night dinners at the Freilich household, where they discussed the need for a Jewish state. Subsequently, Evatt played a central role in the events leading to the establishment of the State of Israel. His pro-Zionist stance was idiosyncratic: other cabinet members, officers of the Department of External Affairs, including the Secretary, and the popular media, on the whole, were unsupportive of the Zionist cause.6 Evatt was an extremely ambitious politician who, in common with many other Australian leaders, imagined Australia’s influence in international

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affairs to be much greater than it was.7 In the immediate post-war years he sought to play a central role in world affairs. As a representative of a small nation, the United Nations was the only agency open to him. His ultimate goal was to become President of the General Assembly. He rightly believed that by playing a central role in the Palestinian deliberations, his ambitions in the United Nations would be furthered.8 He also felt that the Middle East was important for Australian foreign policy, especially as the region was a bridge between Europe and Asia. In February 1947, in the face of mounting unrest and violence, Britain decided to surrender the mandate for Palestine. The United Nations established an investigating committee, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which consisted of representatives of 11 nations, including Australia, represented by John Hood, assisted by Sam Atyeo. After months of investigation UNSCOP was divided about Palestine’s political future: 7 of the 11 representatives recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States; three members endorsed a Federal State structure; and none supported the creation of a unitary state of Palestine. Hood personally opposed the concept of partition, but was instructed by Evatt to abstain in the vote taken by UNSCOP, because Evatt believed the Committee only had an investigative role.9 The UN General Assembly met in September 1947 and decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, consisting of representatives of all member states. Evatt was hoping to be elected President of the UN General Assembly, but had been defeated by Dr Osvaldo Aranha of Brazil. As compensation, he was invited to chair the Ad Hoc Committee, which met at Lake Success, New York. Jewish Labor politician, Abram Landa, member for Bondi in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, accompanied him. Evatt established two sub-committees of nine members each. One was charged with drawing up a detailed plan to implement the partition proposal and the other with drawing up a detailed plan in accordance with the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the recognition of Palestine as an independent unitary state. No plan was prepared for the Federal State recommended by UNSCOP’s minority committee because the idea was unacceptable to both Arabs and Jews. Evatt encouraged full and open debate in the sub-committees and invited statements from both Jewish and Arab representatives.10 Under the partition plan, Jerusalem and the districts around it (including

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Bethlehem to the south) would be a corpus separatum under international control and would not be part of the sovereign territory of either the Jewish or the Arab state. The plan also recommended an economic union between the two states. The Ad Hoc Committee voted on the partition plan and the unitary state plan on 25 November 1947. Whilst a majority favoured partition with 25 for, 13 against, and 17 abstentions, the partition proposal would need a two-thirds majority to be passed by the General Assembly at its plenary session, which was held four days later. Before the plenary session Evatt requested the United Nations Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, to ask the General Assembly President Aranha to ‘intervene in the way he deems best to produce a result with justice to all the parties’.11 Evatt stressed that the situation was dependent on the Latin American votes, arguing that ‘the choice now is between a complete washout and a positive solution’.12 Freilich, who had previously elicited a promise of support from the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, immediately telephoned New Zealand to lobby for a positive vote rather than an abstention, and Fraser reiterated his support.13 In the voting on 29 November 1947, 33 member nations supported the partition proposal, 13 opposed and ten abstained. Although Britain abstained, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa voted in favour. Having acquired the necessary two-thirds majority, the resolution was passed and became UN General Assembly Resolution 181. This was rejected by the Arab leadership both inside and outside Palestine. They initiated a civil war immediately after the vote was taken. In early 1948, in response to the ongoing violence, the United States sought to overturn the decision by proposing a trusteeship for Palestine, but Evatt strongly opposed the American change of heart. He insisted that ‘the decision of a competent international conference should be accepted after there has been a full and fair debate, and a settlement has been reached’.14 Evatt’s pro-Zionist position was a result of the interplay of a number of different factors. The devastation caused to world Jewry by the Holocaust affected his sense of justice and democracy and convinced him that the Jews had a right to a sanctuary in Palestine; his background as a constitutional lawyer and judge indicated that he always showed profound sympathy with the needs of the underdog and he usually sided with those he saw as victims of oppression.15 He was also seen as the champion of the rights of small nations, and for this reason he became a strong advocate of the importance of the United Nations. His policy in regard to Palestine was

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influenced by his belief that Australian foreign policy must be formulated independently from Britain, as well as his faith in the international rule of law in contrast to amoral great power politics.16 On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel an independent state. The new country was immediately faced with a military invasion. The British government placed pressure on Australia not to recognise Israel immediately and diplomatic relations were only established on 29 January 1949 when Australia, against the wishes of the British government, extended both de facto and de jure recognition, even though New Zealand extended de facto recognition only on the same date.17 Britain, itself, only extended de facto recognition a few months later.18 Early in 1949 the question of Israel being accepted as a member of the United Nations was raised. The Security Council recommended the proposal, which then had to be presented to the General Assembly. As the President of the General Assembly at the time, Evatt was a firm advocate of Israel’s membership. He had appointed Landa as a member of the Australian delegation in New York. A week before the vote was taken a dinner was held in New York in support of the proposal, with both Evatt and Israel’s first president, Chaim Weizmann, as key speakers.19 Under Evatt’s leadership, on 11 May 1949, the General Assembly admitted Israel as a member of the international forum of nations. Australia played a crucial role in the establishment of Israel, enabling the subsequent resettlement of Jewish Holocaust survivors in Israel and its admission to the UN. Without Evatt’s effective strategy, it could be argued that the State of Israel might not have come into existence at that time. His achievement was acknowledged by Aubrey (Abba) S. Eban, then Israel’s representative to the United Nations, who wrote to Evatt immediately after Israel’s admission to the UN: We are deeply indebted to the Australian Delegation for its consistent and effective support of our cause in the Assembly and its organs through all the stages of the consideration of our problem by the United Nations. We are grateful to you for the decisive part you played in the proceedings.20 Reflecting on Evatt’s role, Hood and Atyeo later paid tribute to Evatt’s actions from 1947–49, stating that ‘in spite of disagreements expressed at the time . . . never did Evatt act with more acumen, with more sense of history, nor with more conviction, than when he secured the endorsement of the UN of the State of Israel’.21

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In December 1949 a Liberal government was elected to power under the leadership of Robert Menzies, ushering in a 23-year period of conservative government in Australia. Sir Robert Menzies served as Australian Prime Minister for 15 years. In the late 1940s Menzies, who was staunchly pro-British, saw Zionism as inimical to British interests in the Middle East and was not sympathetic at all.22 This unsympathetic attitude was reversed gradually especially during the Suez crisis in 1956. Subsequently Menzies maintained a policy of friendship towards Israel. These policies were continued by his successors: Harold Holt (January 1966–December 1967), John Gorton (January 1968–March 1971) and William McMahon (March 1971–December 1972). After Menzies, Australian foreign policy reflected the anti-Communist, pro-Israel approach of the United States, with Australia participating in the Vietnam War. Despite the relatively positive attitudes of the Liberal government, there were moments of tension. From 1955 the Australian Jewish community was concerned about the sale of Czech arms to Egypt. At a plenary meeting of the Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) held in late January 1956 a resolution was sent to Richard Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, naively requesting that their cable be forwarded on at ‘our expense to Mr Eden and President Eisenhower’.23 External Affairs was unwilling to do this, and one official commented in the margin: ‘I don’t think we should send such telegrams. Why can’t they send them themselves if they want to?’24 During the Suez crisis of 1956, Australian Jewish leaders sought a meeting with Menzies, but he refused. From his perspective, such a meeting was probably superfluous and irrelevant. Due to his pro-British attitudes, Australia joined Britain, New Zealand, France and Israel in November 1956 as the only countries voting against the US sponsored resolution at the United Nations calling for an immediate ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from all conquered territories.25 The Liberal government also failed to resist strongly the Arab League boycott. This applied, in particular, to efforts to enable Qantas to fly to Tel Aviv. The official government position was that this route was not commercially viable, but secret government documents tell another story. They reveal that the bureaucracy was influenced by the Arab boycott. For example, in October 1965, in response to a request from Israeli ambassador, David Tesher, for Australia to oppose Arab boycott demands, a secret government document noted:

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I did not mention, of course, to Mr Tesher that we expect to be holding important talks with the U.A.R. next month when we hope to negotiate an air agreement which will put Qantas services through Cairo on a firm basis and that we have a weak bargaining position in these talks. We would not therefore wish to jeopardise their success by an action from which we stand to gain little or nothing.26 Australia supported Israel during the June 1967 war, although the government rejected Israeli requests for Australian Mirage aircraft and/or spare parts, following the French boycott, because of concerns about Arab reactions and the Foreign Ministry’s desire to expand Australian trade in the Arab world.27 Prime Minister John Gorton continued to maintain a positive policy towards Israel. However, by the mid-1960s, Australia had become more concerned with developing ties to the Arab world. A confidential departmental document stressed: Australia’s problem is essentially to achieve a rather fine balance in relations with Israel on the one hand and the Arab world on the other hand. This is of course complicated for us by the presence of 70,000 Jews in Australia who constitute a considerable pressure group. The report suggests (and we agree) that we should avoid being pressed into too close a relationship with Israel, partly because of the harm it would do our relations with the Arabs and partly because of the inclination of the Israelis to use others in the service of their own interests. Pressures in Tel Aviv can be tiresome, and we should recognise this in our dealings with our post there.28 By the early 1970s the Australian government found it more difficult to maintain that ‘fine balance’ in relations between Israel and the Arab world. This was because of the changing situation. Before the 1967 war, Israel was perceived as the tiny David fighting Goliath, but with its resounding victory in 1967 and conquest of further territory, that image changed dramatically. With Israel’s creation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank after 1967, Israel began to be portrayed by its opponents as the expansionist victor, which refused to surrender the areas conquered in 1967.

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In addition, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which first appeared on the international scene in 1964, began to play a political role in the conflict. For many in the West, especially on the left of the political spectrum, the PLO was a national liberation organisation and their use of terror was a legitimate weapon in their national struggle. Israel was portrayed as a proxy of US imperialism lacking legitimate rights in the area. In response to this shift in attitudes, and the growing concern with Arab power, the McMahon government abstained on some pro-Palestinian resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly.

Gough Whitlam: A Sea Change In December 1972, the ALP was elected to power after 23 years in the political wilderness, and Gough Whitlam became prime minister. His period of tenure, which lasted for less than three years, and included two federal elections in 1974 and 1975, was a time of political turmoil. Whitlam initially assumed the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs.29 In this role, he opened a new chapter in Australian diplomatic history, where he ‘shook up Australia’s diplomatic provincialism’.30 Australia recognised Communist China. Whitlam became the first Australian prime minister to undertake an official visit to the Soviet Union and he ended all Australian involvement with the Vietnam War. He also focused more on Australia’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region and sought to build bridges with third world countries by moving away from Australian reliance on the United States. In addition, although Australia’s White policy had officially been ended in 1965, Whitlam made this a reality by allowing Asian immigrants into Australia, and began to foster multiculturalism. As part of these changes, Whitlam distanced himself from the local Jewish community and, whilst he indicated to the Jewish community that he would raise the issue of Soviet Jewry, he failed to do so effectively because of his concern not to annoy the Soviet leadership. Senator Don Willesee, who took over foreign affairs from Whitlam in November 1973, continued to follow these policies. In regard to the Middle East, Whitlam repeatedly claimed that he was maintaining ‘the fine balance’ between Israel and the Arab World established by his predecessors through his policy of ‘even handedness’. When he was elected to power he already had a good working knowledge of Israel, which he had visited in 1964 and 1966. In August 1967, he criticised the government for failing to facilitate postal and air

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connections with Israel, due to pressure from the Arab governments, and at the time of the 1967 war and subsequently he made supportive statements about Israel. Later, as prime minister, he established a trade commission in Tel Aviv, and claimed that he had hoped to arrange rights for the Australian airline, Qantas, to fly to Israel, but did not succeed.31 However, within the context of his radical foreign policy changes, Whitlam also sought to modify the previous Liberal policy. His ‘even handed’ policy developed during his 1971 trip to Lebanon, where he was exposed to the Arab narrative, as well as his desire to attract the electoral support of Australia’s expanding Arab community.32 In an undated and unsigned confidential departmental memo written in 1974, Australia’s pro-Israel policy over many years was analysed. It was pointed out that there were four main reasons explaining traditional Australian support for Israel: 1) The widespread feeling in the main Australian political parties and in the community at large that the sufferings of the Jewish people entitled them to a national home, and that their right to the peaceful enjoyment of Israel was worthy of support. 2) The political activity of the Jewish community in Australia. 3) The belief that Israel had far more in common with Australia and its like-minded Western friends than did the Arab states, which were generally looked on as unstable, unreliable and backward. 4) On the Israeli side, Australia was regarded as one of the states in which there was a favourable climate of opinion towards Israel and which could generally be relied upon to take a not unsympathetic line towards Israel in relation to that country’s problems with its neighbours.33 The policy document also noted Whitlam’s change of policy and analysed the reasons for this, including the refusal of the Israeli government to withdraw from the occupied territories following the 1967 war, seen as a major obstacle to peace, reflecting ‘a certain arrogance and intransigence’. In addition, economic factors played a role, including the Arab boycott, which could affect Australia’s wheat trade with Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries, and its civil aviation ties with Syria and Egypt. Another key factor was Whitlam’s determination that the United States should not dominate Australian foreign policy. From the time of

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the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 until the 1970s Australia moved from seeing Britain as her key protector to placing her reliance on the United States. After the war, this change was formalised with the signing of two treaties, the Security Treaty of Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) in 1951 and the creation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954.34 Throughout this period, there was strong cooperation between the US and Australia with the United States establishing military bases in Australia, and Australia supporting the United States in the United Nations. The peak of this policy came in 1966 during President Johnson’s visit to Australia when Holt declared ‘all the way with LBJ’ in relation to Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. In contrast, the Labor party strongly opposed Australian involvement in Vietnam and what they saw as Australian subservience to the United States. Another internal government document from 1974 analysed Whitlam’s change of policy towards Israel, stressing: Between the end of 1972 and early 1974, inter-governmental relations between Australia and Israel diminished. The inhibitions were on the Australian side. The drawing back from Israel reflected a desire on the part of the Australian Government to remould Australia’s foreign policy image and to draw closer politically and economically to countries which were hostile to Israel. By early 1974, the drawing back from Israel had reached a point where the Australian Government, and its departments and agencies, tended to avoid the sorts of dealings which we would encourage and pursue with regard to most of the countries with which we have relations and which in no other cases, except perhaps those of South Africa and Chile, do we discourage.35 This ‘drawing back from Israel’ by the Whitlam government manifested itself in a range of decisions, including Australia’s voting patterns in the United Nations, moves to establish an Arab League Office in Australia, establishing contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and permitting its representatives to visit Australia. Each of these actions resulted in the attempts by Australian Jewish community through the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) and the Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) to exert pressure on the government to change its approach. Spokesmen for the growing Arab community in Australia also pressured the Whitlam government to support the Arab position.

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The contrast between Whitlam’s and Evatt’s positions were seen most clearly in 1973, when Sir Lawrence McIntyre, representing Australia, chaired the UN Security Council and supported resolutions critical of Israel’s actions during the 1973 war. At a Press Club luncheon on 8 November 1973, Whitlam sought to defend his position, explaining why he was not prepared to see Egypt as the aggressor. He paid tribute to McIntyre’s contribution as chair of the Security Council and referred to the unresolved problem of the Palestinians.36 Thus, during the Whitlam years the approach favoured by government bureaucrats reigned supreme, and the Jewish leadership experienced a time of frustration, described as the ‘nadir’ of its relationship with the ALP and, indeed, any Australian government.37 In 1975, a left-wing member of the ALP, Bill Hartley, made a number of visits to Arab countries and sought support for the establishment of an Arab League Office in Australia and visits of PLO representatives. When the ALP government refused to grant visas to two Hartley sponsored PLO representatives, a leading Lebanese businessman, Reuben F. Scarf, protested to Whitlam, who responded: I hope that it will soon be possible for the PLO to do so in Australia without producing the hysteria and social dissension, which their recent invitation threatened to provoke. If the PLO wishes to send representatives to Australia, it should make the approach through Australian diplomatic posts and not through a self appointed spokesman like Mr Hartley.38 Scarf replied, endorsing Whitlam’s hope that the PLO would soon be able to visit Australia, without ‘producing hysteria’, which, he claimed, was ‘whipped up by the Zionist propagandists’. He stressed the importance of free speech, and asked to meet with Whitlam. Scarf also took the hint, and organised through the correct diplomatic channels for Gamal Omar El-Surani, director of an Arab League office in Cairo, who was also a member of the PLO, to visit Australia in June 1975, sponsored by the Arab League.39 After the December 1975 election, when the Liberal Party led by Malcolm Fraser defeated the ALP, the Iraqi Loans Scandal became public. This related to Whitlam’s attempts to obtain a loan of US$500,000 from Saddam Hussein’s government for his party’s media electoral campaign, via the medium of Henri Fischer, a former Scarf employee, and a notorious fascist sympathiser and anti-Semite. Whilst

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the ALP did not ultimately receive these funds, as Fischer appears to have diverted the money to himself, the scandal further undermined support for the ALP, especially in the Jewish community.

Liberal Policies: Australia and the Sinai MFO, 1982 Following the return of the Liberal Party to power, Prime Minister Fraser reverted to a more supportive position of Israel. Throughout his eight years as prime minister he was seen as a strong friend of Israel and the Jewish people. He established a close relationship with two leading Jewish figures: Dr Joachim Schneeweiss and Isi Leibler. In 1977 Sir Zelman Cowen was appointed as Governor-General, the second Australian-born Jew to serve in that distinguished office. Thus, Australian Jewry enjoyed a period of close collaboration with the Australian government under Fraser’s leadership. Before the 1975 election, Andrew Peacock, as Shadow Foreign Minister, wrote a position paper on the Middle East in which he stressed his party’s support for the United Nations resolutions 242, passed in 1967, and 338, passed in 1973, as the basis for a peace settlement in the Middle East. He reiterated his party’s strong support of Israel’s right to exist within secure boundaries but also stressed that the problem of the Palestinian people had to be resolved. At the same time, he argued that until the PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist as an independent state and changed their National Covenant they could not be recognised as a negotiating partner. In this respect he was highly critical of Labor policy, which he described as ‘derelict’ in not calling on the PLO to recognise Israel. He also condemned the Labor government for its ‘insincerity’ in claiming to be neutral, stating: It is clear where Labor’s sympathies lie. Yet they maintain the farcical pretence that their stand is non-partisan. Their pathetic façade has fooled no-one, but it has demeaned Australia. Such inconsistency can only damage our international standing and will not contribute to lasting peace in an area where instability can affect the security of us all.40 Welcomed by the Jewish community,41 this criticism appeared to hit a sensitive nerve within the ALP, which has never since reverted to Whitlam’s policies and attitudes towards Israel. Once in government Fraser implemented this Middle East policy. Australia was a firm opponent of the notorious ‘Zionism is racism’ resolution

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passed by the General Assembly in 1975 (and rescinded eventually in 1991). At the opening of the Sephardi Synagogue in Melbourne Fraser stated: My Government has stressed its continued commitment to Israel’s right to exist, and to exercise full international rights. We have consistently opposed attempts to exclude Israel from United Nations activities and the grotesque attempt to link Zionism with racism. I imagine I am giving away no secrets when I tell you that the Israeli Government has expressed particular appreciation for Australia’s understanding and support at recent international meetings including last year’s United Nations General Assembly. It is as old and firm friends of Israel that we express out attitudes on the Middle East dispute.42 In this speech he also endorsed Peacock’s reference to the ‘legitimate rights of the Palestinians’, reaffirming in parliament in June 1976 that the only hope for the future was for the rights of all groups in the region to be recognised. He noted that the present PLO Covenant was ‘totally unacceptable to the Australian Government’. At the same time, he extended Australian diplomatic and trade links with the Arab world. Fraser expressed strong support of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and the government agreed to send troops to be part of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to monitor the area after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. This proposal was passed, despite strong opposition from the parliamentary Labor representatives.43 Difficulties emerged following the Begin government’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in what Israel called ‘Operation Peace for the Galilee’. Fraser was highly critical of the Israeli decision to move beyond its initial, more limited, objectives in this campaign into conquering Beirut by the use of ‘formidable military strength’. On 9 August 1982 he issued a statement condemning Israel’s actions in Lebanon, which he described as ‘shortsighted and foolish’. He stressed that Australia’s voice ‘had been raised in friendship and support of Israel in a way which has been unequalled and unchallengeable.’ He noted that this support gave Australia ‘not only the right but the responsibility to speak our mind bluntly and honestly’.44

Bob Hawke and Israel In the early 1970s, ACTU leader Robert J. (Bob) Hawke emerged as a powerful advocate for both Soviet Jewry and Israel. In 1971, the Jewish community sponsored him for his first visit to Israel in memory of

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Labor Senator Sam Cohen. When Hawke went to Israel he said he had ‘a general knowledge about Israel, but no particular interest’. This visit completely changed his attitude. As his biographer, Blanche D’Alpuget, described it: from the moment of his arrival, ‘Hawke and Israel were en rapport’.45 During that visit he established a deep emotional attachment to Israel and her people, a feeling he conveyed to the Jewish community in his address ‘Masada, Moscow, Melbourne’ on his return.46 Hawke visited Israel again immediately after the 1973 war, and did not mince words in his attack on Whitlam’s position on the war. In an address to the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies, he stated: ‘When a nation of three million such as Israel is attacked on two fronts, on the most holy day of the Jewish Year by 350,000 troops and 4000 tanks and thousands of planes, the concept of balance is merely a slogan which I cannot accept’.47 Throughout the 1970s he maintained this position, although when he visited Israel in 1979, he was not impressed with Menachem Begin. During his term as Labor Prime Minister, from 1983 to 1991, Hawke’s attitude to Israel was much more ambivalent. In 1973 when he had clashed with Whitlam over the Yom Kippur war, Hawke (who was then head of the Australian Council of Trade Unions) had stated in a press interview, referring to Whitlam’s succumbing to the pressure of a possible oil boycott: ‘That’s all right for politicians but I understand what truth and democracy is and I don’t put my knees on the same altar as the politicians.48 While he was president of the ACTU, Hawke could speak out on political issues ‘as a private citizen’. As prime minister, he was faced with a completely different situation. In the light of the pressures from the left wing of his party, and the realities of international politics, he was not able ‘to deliver’ in the perception of the Jewish community. ECAJ president, Isi Leibler predicted these problems. Before the 1983 election he wrote to Moshe Gilboa of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, stating: As you know, Hawke is regarded as one of Israel’s best friends and was also deeply involved in activities on behalf of Soviet Jewry, culminating in a very dramatic visit to Moscow in 1979. Regrettably, I have misgivings as to the ability of Hawke to deliver. I fear that if he is elected to office he will certainly not have the same freedom of action in the Foreign Affairs arena, which Prime Minister Fraser currently enjoys.

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Indeed, there is every possibility that the rank and file of the Labor Party will force Hawke to maintain the present Labor Party policies, which are much closer to the European line than that of Fraser.49 In order to ensure Hawke’s continued support for Israel, Leibler discussed with Labor leader, Shimon Peres, setting up an Australian office of the Israeli Histadrut. After the election Leibler decided that it would be more effective to bring high-flying Israeli Labor figures to Australia, and he extended an invitation to Shimon Peres and his wife to visit Australia at his expense.50 Leibler’s predictions proved to be largely accurate. As Prime Minister, Hawke was constrained by the attitudes of the left-wing of the Labor Party. For the nine years of his prime ministership, he was faced with treading a fine line between the pressures from the Jewish community and those from his party. While in some instances, such as the Nazi War Crimes legislation and support for the campaign to overturn the UN ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution, he was able to maintain his strong humanitarian and pro-Israel position, when it came to other aspects of his Israel policy he was much more restricted. In addition, the Muslim vote in the western suburbs of Sydney played an important role in Labor’s electoral success. Treasurer Paul Keating’s electorate included a large Muslim population as well as the Lakemba mosque located in the western suburbs, the largest mosque in Sydney. Its sheikh, Taj el-Din al Hilaly, entered Australia in 1982 on a three-month tourist visa but remained in Sydney. He served as Mufti in Australia until 2007. Hilaly was a very controversial personality who was strongly anti-Israel. In 1988, he gave an anti-Semitic speech at the University of Sydney in Arabic, when he claimed that the Jews were responsible for all the wars.51 Despite this, he was granted permanent residency in 1990 due to Labor’s desire to appeal to the Muslim electorate. He has continued to express anti-Israel sentiments.52 Hawke’s first Minister for Foreign Affairs was the previous Labor Opposition leader, Bill Hayden, whom Hawke had replaced in February 1983. Hayden had already taken a more pro-PLO line. He had met with Yasser Arafat during an overseas visit in 1980. When Leibler tried to pressure him not to meet with Arafat, he stated to the press: ‘I can’t walk around as though I’m walking on egg shells . . . I can’t allow myself

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to be muzzled by the first protest that came from a particular group’.53 Allegations were made in the media that the Jewish community was endeavouring to ‘intimidate’ Hayden. Thus, it was not surprising that the new Labor government upgraded Australia’s diplomatic contacts with the PLO to acting ambassadorial level. The government also decided to renew the MFO agreement for two further years only, and the Australian forces were withdrawn in April 1986. In the early Hawke years, there were some positive developments. Hayden addressed the ZFA in 1986 (only the second Australian foreign minister) and reaffirmed Australia’s traditional support for Israel. In the same year, Israeli president, Chaim Herzog visited Australia, the first to do so. He extended a return invitation to Hawke, who became the first Australian prime minister to visit Israel whilst in office in 1987. However, the outbreak of the first Intifada in December 1987 and Arafat’s declaration in support of the two-state solution in December 1988, combined with the right-wing leadership of Yitzhak Shamir, changed the political dynamics. Arafat’s statement did not herald an end to the violence. On 7 April 1989 there was rioting on the Temple Mount with stones being hurled from the Al Aqsa Mosque on to the Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall below. Following this violence, Australian UN delegate, Dr Peter Wilenski, delivered a speech, which was highly critical of Israel’s actions, and Australia voted in support of a resolution that condemned Israel for preventing Muslims access to the Temple Mount and Al Aqsa mosque. The period from 1992 to 1995, the Rabin years, was a time of rapid change in the Arab-Israeli situation. Following the signing of the Oslo peace accords in 1993, the Palestinian Authority was created, Israel began to withdraw from sections of the territories and Jordan signed a peace agreement with Israel. The Australian Labor Party continued to support the Palestinian position. In 1992, Paul Keating assumed the prime ministership following Hawke’s retirement and he tended to leave foreign affairs to Evans. Israeli Ambassador, Yehuda Avner, commented that he only had one meeting with Keating, when he presented his credentials on his arrival, but did meet regularly with Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans.54 Evans renewed Australia’s commitment to the MFO in January 1993, with Major General David B. Ferguson serving as commander for three years from April 1994.55 Shortly before Rabin’s assassination in November 1995, Avner retired as Israeli ambassador in Australia, and on his return to Israel,

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he discussed accepting the position as his special adviser. A few days later Rabin was dead. When Paul Keating flew from Australia to attend Rabin’s funeral, Avner was assigned to look after Keating. On the bus to the funeral, Avner related the events of the assassination to Keating. The normally unemotional Keating was visibly moved and held Avner’s hand in the bus en route to Mount Herzl where Rabin was buried.56

Australia and the Rescission of Resolution 3379, ‘Zionism equals Racism’ One aspect where the Hawke government again played a major role in the United Nations related to the 1975 Resolution GA 3379 equating Zionism with racism, an analogy strongly resented by the largely Holocaust survivor Jewish community. In 1985 ZFA President, Mark Leibler, revived this issue, initiating a strong campaign to win support from the Australian government to overturn this resolution. In the middle of 1985, 150 personal letters were sent to prominent politicians and key public figures throughout Australia requesting written support.57 During his 1986 address to the ZFA Plenary, Hayden described UN Resolution GA 3379 as ‘a distortion of fact, inclined to exacerbate religious animosity, obstructive to the cause of a just peace’. Subsequently, on 23 October 1986, the Hawke government introduced a parliamentary motion condemning Resolution 3379. This motion was passed unanimously in both Houses, making the Australian parliament the first in a Western country to condemn the resolution.58 Other Western governments followed Australia’s example. The United States Congress and the Canadian parliament adopted ‘what is now being called the “Australian resolution”’, as did France, Italy and a number of other European countries.59 A campaign was launched to have the resolution overturned in the United Nations itself with the World Jewish Congress under the leadership of President Edgar Bronfman playing a key role. Of central importance was the decision of President George Bush to instruct the American UN delegation ‘to go all out for the repeal of the Zionism equals Racism resolution this session’.60 Again, Australian Jewry was able to contribute to this campaign, particularly thanks to Isi Leibler’s strong connections in the Asia-Pacific region. In November 1991 Leibler visited China as part of a WJC delegation and met with the Chinese foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, as

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well as other key Chinese leaders. They made it clear to the delegation that ‘China today regards the wording of the resolution as a gross distortion of the truth and a slanderous slur on the Jewish people’.61 Following this successful breakthrough, Leibler decided to visit other countries in Asia and the Pacific to canvass those not yet committed to voting against the resolution. With the assistance of the American State Department through Steven Solarz and Australian Foreign Minister Evans’s personal intervention, Leibler gained access to senior leadership in five Asian countries: India, Singapore, Thailand, Japan and South Korea. His meeting with Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, was particularly important.62 These efforts were met with success when the UN General Assembly revoked the motion in December 1991, with all the Asian countries canvassed by Leibler voting in support of the rescission. This was only the second time when the United Nations General Assembly had repealed a political resolution – the first being in 1950 when the General Assembly revoked the 1946 recommendation that Spain, the only Axis nation still under fascist rule after the war, be barred from the United Nations. As such, it was an historic vote of significant importance to Israel.63

John Howard: The Most Pro-Israel Prime Minister In December 1995 the Labor government was defeated and the Howard Liberal government took over the reins of political leadership. The Liberal Party was perceived, on the whole, as being more pro-Israel than its Labor Party predecessor. Colin Rubenstein and Tzvi Fleischer noted that: ‘John Howard’s personal sympathy and regard for Israel, which he first visited privately as a young man in 1964, is something he declares regularly and is reflected in his government’s policy.’64 When he assumed party leadership in 1985, Howard supported the campaign for the rescission of Resolution 3379. Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, also acted as a strong advocate for Israel during this period. In contrast to the Labor Party, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim feelings played a key role in the Liberal Party’s electoral success. This was particularly the case in August 2001, with what became known as the ‘Tampa Affair’, when the government refused to allow the Norwegian vessel, the MV Tampa, with 438 Afghan and Sri Lankan refugees on board, to enter Australian waters. When the captain decided to do so without authority, due to the state of the passengers on board, an

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Australian navy ship was sent to intercept the Tampa. The government made the unfounded claim that the refugees had thrown children overboard in protest of the Australian government’s action and this incident was highlighted in the media. These events were seen as playing a significant role in Howard’s re-election that year and he was able to retain office for a subsequent seven years, playing on the fears and xenophobia of the Australian electorate. Even after his substantial electoral defeat in 2007, after an 11-year term, Howard has continued to be a strong spokesperson for Israel.

Economic Points of Contact In addition to supporting all fundraising efforts, the development of trade with Israel and investment in Israel were also encouraged. In 1959 the ECAJ passed a resolution that the marketing of Israeli products should be encouraged. The Hadera Paper Mills, the first major Australian investment in Israel was organised by Max Freilich. Dr Solomon Goldberg, a medical practitioner who owned a farm in Griffith, developed the interesting project of exporting Australian sheep to Israel. In 1960 Leo Fink of Melbourne established the first all-Australian project in Israel with the Australian Wool Industries. In November 1963 an Australian trade mission went to Israel, led by Baron D. Snider, Member of the Legislative Assembly in Victoria and an active member of the Jewish community. These beginnings led to the formation of the Australia-Israel Chambers of Commerce and Industry, with branches in Melbourne and Sydney, to assist trade development between the two countries. In 1972 Israeli imports to Australia were only worth a few million dollars per annum; in 1977 they were worth 25 million per annum and they were continuing to grow.65 The ECAJ also encouraged regular visits between Israel and Australia. In the early post-war years travel between Israel and Australia was expensive. In 1954 ECAJ President and Labor politician, Sydney David Einfeld, visited Israel for the first time and was very moved by his experience. On his return, he advocated that the ECAJ support organised tours of Israel whenever possible. It was also felt that the Australian Jewish community should encourage visits of top Israeli politicians. In 1958 two key Israeli figures, Pinhas Sapir, Israel’s Minister for Trade and Commerce, and Dr Yosef Burg, Minister for Posts, visited Australia. Efforts were also made to send delegations of members of parliament to visit Israel so that they could understand the country from first hand

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knowledge. One of the first such groups visited Israel in early 1957 when members of the Israeli Knesset hosted them. During Israel’s tenth anniversary in 1958, Dr Evatt, then leader of the Labor Opposition, also visited the country. This was in recognition of ‘his vital role in the establishment of the state by the decision of the United Nations in November 1947, and the admission into the family of Nations, during his presidency of the General Assembly’ in 1949.66 Another important political visit at this time was that of H.F. Jensen, Sydney’s Lord Mayor. In 1976 the first Australian Labor delegation visited Israel, including Jack Birney, Joan Child, Brian Dixon, Ted Innes and the leader of the opposition, Gough Whitlam, as well as Barry Cohen and Liberal Senator Peter Baume, both Jewish. Subsequently, regular visits to Israel by key parliamentarians from the different parties were organised by the community. A second ALP delegation was sent in 1984. From 1980, groups of young politicians were also organised by the Australasian Union of Jewish Students (AUJS). Since the 1980s, there have been frequent visits of politicians, members of the media, influential Australians in the business and cultural worlds organised by different groups within the Australian Jewish community as well as Australian trade delegations to Israel. These visits are seen as very important in cementing ties between Australia and Israel and creating valuable personal contacts and a more intimate, mutual understanding. In 2011, bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to approximately $1 billion, with Israeli exports being around $650 million and the Australian exports $350 million. Close to 50 per cent of the Israeli exports are high-tech related products and services, with other significant items being drip irrigation equipment and know-how, especially through the Israeli company, Netafim, because both countries face similar problems of water shortage. There has also been defence co-operation in the form of intelligence sharing and the sale of cutting edge Israeli defence technology to Australia. In December 2012, the Australian company Woodside Petroleum signed an agreement to acquire 30 per cent of the Leviathan field of the recently discovered Israeli gas reserves, further cementing the economic ties between the two countries. The major exports from Australia are coal and livestock. It is interesting to note that a Sydney municipal council, Marickville, unsuccessfully tried to introduce a policy of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) in December 2010, which called for a blanket boycott on produce and services from Israel and virtually all contacts with any and all Israelis.67 One of the reasons for the resolution being overturned was economic – since the

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computer and high-tech resources used by the Council were supplied by Israeli technology and removing all this would have created a significant cost burden for the Council. There is also significant academic and cultural exchange between the two countries. In 2002 Alexander Downer, the then Foreign Minister, welcomed the formation of the Australia-Israel Cultural Exchange: The link between Australia and Israel has always been warm and strong and the formation of the Australia Israel Cultural Exchange will add depth to this relationship. AICE will foster cultural links between the two countries across a broad range of artistic pursuits that will include literature, film, music, art, visual culture, performing arts and architecture.68 Since then, AICE has sponsored a very active program, holding annual film festivals in both Israel and Australia, and bringing out Israeli artists to Australia. The various Israeli universities also have ‘Friends’ associations in Australia, the most active being the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Technion, fostering ongoing academic exchanges as well as funding initiatives at these universities. The University of Sydney has the Sir Zelman Cowen Universities Fund, which supports joint medical research programmes, as well as student and academic exchange in all disciplines. In October 2011, a University of Sydney Israel Forum was held with eight Israeli professors participating in a one-day symposium and other activities to highlight joint research initiatives. The university’s senior executive decided to go ahead with this initiative, despite isolated calls for a boycott from Associate-Professor Jake Lynch, a former BBC journalist and Director of the university’s Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. The University of Melbourne initiated a similar project with an 11-person delegation from the Hebrew University visiting there in February 2012. This was followed by a further agreement in November to establish a Collaborative Research Grants Program. Monash University Melbourne, also has exchange programmes with a number of Israeli universities.

Representations from the Australian Jewish Leadership In the post-war era, Australian Jewish leadership created a two-tiered system of lobbying the Australian government in relation to Israel with

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the ECAJ and the ZFA. With the growing strength of the Arab lobby in Australia, the Jewish community realised that it needed to strengthen its influence and build ties with the political leaders of all parties. Over the years maintaining active contact with government leaders as well as members of the Opposition was seen as a major task of the ECAJ, mainly in collaboration, but at times in conflict, with the ZFA. As a small group, the Jewish community proved to be a significant lobby group for most of the period since the establishment of the State of Israel. When the community’s goals coincided with the government’s policies, or where the government did not hold a strong position, this lobbying was highly successful. The role played by Evatt in the creation of Israel is a good example of the former. The same applied to the policies initiated by Malcolm Fraser for most of his term as prime minister, and those of Prime Ministers John Howard and Julia Gillard. On the other hand, when the government initiated policies that were inimical to the Jewish community’s perspectives on Israel, this has led to a collision course. This was definitely the case during the Whitlam years, and also for some of the periods during the Hawke and Keating governments. Strong arms tactics were often resented by the Australian political leaders who became even more entrenched in their views when faced with an aggressive approach from the Jewish communal leadership. For example, in 1991, Labor politician and member of the socialist left faction, Brian Howe, at the time Deputy Prime Minister under Hawke, commented when being pressured by a Jewish delegation headed by Mark Leibler over a speech he had given in regard to the settlements: ‘What I don’t like is people putting words into my mouth. I won’t withdraw from my speech’.69 Overall, the Jewish community organisations and specialist lobby groups like AIJAC (Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council) and ADC (Anti-Defamation Committee of B’nai B’rith) have proved to be very powerful. The Australian-Israel Review has been published since 1972, in order to promote support of Israel, initially produced by the Australia-Israel Publications and later by AIJAC. Australian Jewish leaders have usually enjoyed direct access to key government leaders. Post-war Jewish leaders totally opposed the passivist ‘shtadtlanut approach’. With the retirement of Isi Leibler after his fourth term as ECAJ president in 1995, and his brother, Mark, who had served for 12 years as ZFA president, in 1994 an era of Australian Jewish history came to an end. Under the subsequent ECAJ presidents and Dr Ron Weiser’s ZFA leadership, as well as Mark Leibler

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who became national chairman of AIJAC, Australian Jewry continued to advocate strongly for what they saw as Israel’s interests.

Role of Israel in the Australian Jewish Identity Before World War II, most Australian Jewish leaders were opposed to political Zionism, but events in Nazi-dominated Europe, combined with the arrival of pre- and post-war refugees, resulted in a clearer understanding in the Australian Jewish community of the need for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Following the actual creation of the State of Israel in 1948, anti-Zionist sentiment among Australian Jews dissipated. Subsequently, Zionism developed from a movement on the fringe of communal organisation and involvement to a central focus of Jewish identification. By 1960 the claim was made that ‘the Zionist movement of Australia has established itself as the leading organisation in the vanguard of all communal efforts’.70 The move from a situation where the majority of Australian Jews were hostile or apathetic to the Zionist movement to one where the majority were either active Zionist workers or at least sympathetic to the Zionist movement added significantly to the post-war process of diversification. It helped to bring Australian Jewry into the mainstream of global Jewish life. Any anti-Zionist sentiment dissipated during the 1967 war, which created a strong sense of solidarity. These feelings were reinforced by the 1973 war. This change was reflected in the activities of the community’s two main roof bodies – the ECAJ and the ZFA. Thus, since 1967, one of the key features of Australian Jewry has been its Zionist commitment, illustrated in aliyah rates, participation in Zionist youth movements and the level of its fundraising activities. In terms of visits to Israel, around 80 per cent of the community has made at least one visit to Israel, whilst around 30 per cent have undertaken numerous visits. Compared with American Jewry, these are very high rates. The recent Monash University survey undertaken by Professor Andrew Markus indicates that some 80 per cent of the community continues to express strong support for Israel.71

Current Attitudes towards Israel In 2007, the ALP was again elected to power, initially under the leadership of Kevin Rudd. At a Labor Friends of Israel dinner when still

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in opposition, Rudd had paid tribute to Evatt’s role, largely forgotten in the academic literature, in the creation of the state. He also stressed Australia’s common interests with and support for the State of Israel. He reiterated this position at the celebrations of Israel’s sixtieth anniversary in 2008. During the 2008–09 Gaza campaign, Julia Gillard, at the time Acting Prime Minister, publicly supported Israel’s right to self-defence.72 Subsequently in June 2009, she led a delegation of politicians to Israel sponsored by the Australia-Israel Cultural Exchange (AICE), despite efforts from left-wing members of the ALP to pressure her to withdraw.73 Gillard faced intense criticism for her decision to continue with the visit, with detractors claiming that she had been improperly influenced by the fact that her partner, Tim Mathieson, had worked for the property developer, Albert Dadon, who is the major sponsor of AICE.74 In June 2010, Gillard replaced Rudd as ALP leader, and hence as Prime Minister, and immediately called a Federal election. Her government was re-elected and she appointed Rudd as Foreign Minister.75 As foreign minister of Australia, his position on Israel was less clear. He was keen for Australia to be elected to the UN Security Council for 2013–14, a position not held by Australia since the Whitlam period in the 1970s. However, in order to achieve this aim, Australia would need the support of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and other Third World countries. Hence, commentators believed that Rudd was prepared to lessen his party’s support for Israel, in order to win the support of pro-Palestinian factions in the UN.76 A point of tension with Australian Jewry’s leadership occurred in 2010 over the alleged use of forged Australian passports in the targeted assassination of top Hamas terrorist, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, in a Dubai hotel. Subsequently an Israeli diplomat was expelled in May 2010 from Canberra after the Australian intelligence services determined that Israel was indeed responsible for forging Australian passports. Rudd also expressed strong criticisms of Israel’s actions during the Gaza Flotilla incident in 2010, which resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. In addition, in this period, Australia was not always supportive of Israel’s position at the United Nations.77 Gillard has consistently taken a pro-Israel line. During the debate over Mahmoud Abbas’s efforts to have the UN agree to a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state she stated: Ultimately, however, the only durable basis for resolution of this conflict is negotiation. However hard it may be, it is only through

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negotiation between the two sides that final status issues such as borders, security and Jerusalem can be solved.78 After an unsuccessful leadership challenge by Rudd in February 2012, Gillard appointed New South Wales Labor politician, Bob Carr, as foreign minister. Carr had a strong record of support of Israel. He was the founding president of the New South Wales Labor Friends of Israel, played an active role in the Campaign for Soviet Jewry, is very knowledgeable on Jewish affairs, and has visited Israel a number of times. However, since 2000, Carr has been less sympathetic to Israel and in November 2012 he undermined Gillard to ensure that Australia abstained on the Palestine vote in the UNGA.

Conclusions: The Rationale for Relations with Israel As discussed above, Australia has, on the whole, maintained a positive policy towards the State of Israel. In their overview article discussing the affinity between Australia and Israel, Rubenstein and Fleischer quoted Foreign Minister Downer, who visited Israel in 2005 and said: Australia and Israel may lie on opposite sides of the globe, but our relationship is far closer. We share your hopes and aspirations and your anguish at the loss of loved ones at the hands of terrorists. Above all, we admire the strength and courage of Israelis for these are traits Australians see in themselves.79 These positive Australian attitudes as expressed by Downer have led to a fairly constant record of Australian support for Israel since its creation. There are various reasons for this support, including the historical connections of the Australian diggers during the two world wars, Evatt’s role in the creation of Israel, financial support of the ALP, the sense of connections with Israel as a multicultural, immigrant country facing some similar challenges and the fact that for much of its post-1945 history, with the notable exception of the Whitlam era, Australia has seen itself as part of the American orbit and has tended to support the pro-Israel position of most United States governments. Although Australia is a middle-level world power, it has been claimed that it ‘punches above its weight’ in international affairs.80 This was clearly the case in regard to two key milestone events relating to Israel

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and the United Nations. The first of these was the position taken by Evatt as chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Palestine in 1947, and later as president of the General Assembly in 1949. The second key event was the part Australia played in regard to the rescission of Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism, in 1991. While these factors did contribute to positive Australian attitudes towards Israel, most of the governments, both Labor and Liberal, and particularly the Australian foreign office, have been influenced by realpolitik. With the growing influence of the Arab world in the 1950s and especially the 1960s, the then Department of External Affairs opposed developing too close a relationship with Israel in the areas of trade and military co-operation, because of their concern with offending the Arab states. As Palestinian nationalism developed momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, both the political leadership and the Department of Foreign Affairs, became more supportive of the position of the PLO. Liberal Prime Minister, Fraser, was extremely critical of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, whilst Labor Prime Minister Hawke also became increasingly critical with the outbreak of the 1987 Intifada and Shamir’s conservative leadership. Similarly, Rudd followed a more critical line of Israeli policies due to his desire for Australia to have a seat on the UN Security Council. Thus, despite positive initiatives, for most of the history of Australia/ Israel relations since 1948, these have been more complicated than is conventionally portrayed by commentators, academics and politicians.

Notes 1. Colin Rubenstein and Tzvi Fleischer, ‘A Distant Affinity: The History of Australian-Israeli Relations, Jewish Political Studies Review 19:3–4 (Fall 2007), p. 1. , accessed 7 March 2008. 2. Chanan Reich, Australia and Israel: an Ambiguous Relationship (Melbourne University Press: Carlton South, Vic., 2002). 3. Rubenstein and Fleischer, ‘A Distant Affinity’. 4. Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) Minutes, 29 April 1946, in relation to a reception held for Evatt on 16 March 1946 at the Australia Hotel. The ZFA believed that this reception was the culmination of four years of effort and Freilich was thanked for ‘his efforts in bringing about the reception’. 5. There have been a number of scholars who have written on Evatt’s contribution. Key works include: Howard Adelman, ‘Australia and the Birth of Israel: Midwife or Abortionist’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1992) pp. 354–374; Rodney Gouttman, ‘First Principles: H.V. Evatt and

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6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

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the Jewish Homeland’, in W.D. Rubinstein, (ed.), Jews in the Sixth Continent, (Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1987); Daniel Mandel H. V. Evatt and the establishment of Israel: the undercover Zionist (Frank Cass: London; Portland, OR, 2004); Leanne Piggott, ‘An ideal betrayed: Australia, Britain and the Palestine question 1947–1949’, PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 2002; Reich, Australia and Israel; and Alan Renouf, ‘Let Justice be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt’, Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, University of Sydney, 1983. This thesis was published in book form in the same year as it was submitted. Rodney Gouttman, ‘First Principles: H. V. Evatt and the Jewish Homeland’, in W.D. Rubinstein, ed., Jews in the Sixth Continent (Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1987) p. 299. Interview with leading Jewish Labor politician and community figure, Sydney David Einfeld, Sydney, 1987. Einfeld served for four terms as ECAJ president between 1954 and 1965, when he was elected to the NSW Legislative Assembly. Mandel, H.V. Evatt, pp. 16–17. Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 22. H. V. Evatt, ‘Australia’s Part in the Creation of Israel’, Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1961) p. 159. Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice (Angus & Robertson Pty Ltd: Sydney, 1970) p. 219. Ibid. Max Freilich, Zion in Our Time: Memoirs of an Australian Zionist (Morgan Publications: Sydney, 1967) pp. 196–7. Ibid., 9 April 1948. Rutland, Suzanne D. ‘1948 and the Creation of the State of Israel: a watershed period for Australian Zionism’, Australian Journal of Jewish Studies, Vol. XIX, 2004, pp. 97–124. Mandel, H.V. Evatt, p. 49. Freilich, Zion in Our Time, p. 211. Reich, An Ambiguous Relationship, p. 28. Evatt, ‘Australia’s Part’, pp. 166–8. Aubrey S. Eban, Israel Mission to the United States, to H.V. Evatt, 18 May 1949, copy in Box E17, ECAJ Corres. Files, 1948–1949, Archive of Australian Judaica (AAJ), University of Sydney (U.Syd). ‘Letters to the Editor, Nation, 17 June 1967, responding the articles by A.D. Rothman in Nation, ‘Evatt and Frankfurter’, 8 April 1967, pp. 14–15 and ‘Dr Evatt in Apogee’, 22 April 1967, pp. 13–14, and ‘Dr Evatt and Israel’, 6 May 1967, pp. 16–17, in ‘ALP, Jews and Israel’, 794.1/370, IJL Archive, Jerusalem. Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 19. Fink to Casey, 31 January 1955, ‘ECAJ’, Series A10302/1, Item 58/214, National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra.

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324 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

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Ibid, Handwritten comment. Reich, Australia and Israel, pp. 101–102. ‘Qantas/United Nations’, Series A 1838/368 Item, 914/3/2, NAA, Canberra. Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 110. Memo by J.R. Rowland, Acting Senior Assistant Secretary to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 5 November 1964, ‘Australia/Israel Relations’, Series A1838/274, Item: 175/10/1, Part 4, NAA, Canberra. William McMahon changed the name of the department from ‘External Affairs’ to ‘Foreign Affairs’ in 1971 when John Gorton appointed him Minister. Interview with Michael Elizur, Israeli Ambassador to Australia, 1973–79, and 1983, Jerusalem, November 2000. Breakfast Meeting, Chevron Hotel, 9 May 1974, ‘Australian Jewry, ALP, Jews and Israel’, Vol 1. 794.1/370, Isi Joseph Leibler Archive (IJLA), Jerusalem. Whitlam claimed that he did not succeed with Qantas because its management opposed the idea for commercial reasons. Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972–1975 (Viking: Ringwood, Vic, 1985) pp. 124–125. ‘Australian relations with Israel’, marked confidential, no date, no signature, but appears to have been written in mid-1974 by a member of the Australian Embassy in Israel who advocates ‘normal businesslike bilateral relations between the two countries and to avoid an appearance of “stop-go” attitudes’. ‘Australia Israel relations’, Series A1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, NAA, Canberra. Keith D. Suter, ‘Australia’s Policy toward Israel’, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, Nos 2–3, 1986, pp. 40–2. Ibid. 8 November 1973, Prime Minister’s address to Press Club Luncheon, transcript in Australian Jewry, ‘ALP, Jews and Israel’, IJLA, Jerusalem. Sol Encel, ‘Jews and the Labor Party’, in Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Philip Mendes, Jews and Australian Politics (Sussex Academic Press: Brighton, 2004) p. 59. Whitlam to Scarf, 18 February 1975. The letter was signed personally ‘With all good wishes’, ‘Australian Jewry’, ‘ALP, Jews and Israel’, IJLA, Jerusalem. This visit received wide media coverage. When announced on 8 May 1975, some of the headlines were ‘PLO visit deceitful – Fraser’, West Australian, Perth; ‘Jews Furious at P.L.O. Man’s visit, Telegraph, Brisbane 8 May 1975; ‘P.L.O. Head Gets Visa, Advocate, Burnie, Tasmania, 8 May 1975; ‘ Gov approves visits by two PLO leaders’, The Australian, 8 May 1975; Top PLO man given visa to visit Australia, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 1975; ‘Cairns says terror claim no bar to Arabs’, West Australian, 9 May 1975. Andrew Peacock, ‘Foreign Policy Position paper: Middle East Situation’, 3 March 1975, further reinforced in his paper of September 1975, ‘Australia Israel relations’, Series A1838/272, Item: 175/10/1/ Part 12, NAA, Canberra.

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41. Australian Jewish Times (AJT), 9 October 1975. 42. ‘Fraser on Jews and Israel’, Australia Israel Review, 29 March 1977, Vol 2, No 4. 43. For a detailed discussion see Rodney Gouttman, Bondi in the Sinai: Australia,

the MFO and the politics of participation (University Press of America: Lanham, Maryland, 1996). 44. Fraser’s statement, 9 August 1982, ECAJ Corres Files, AAJ, Sydney. 45. Blanche D’Alpuget Robert J. Hawke: A biography (East Melbourne, 1982) p. 246. 46. Ibid, p. 249. 47. The Age, 10 November 1973. 48. The Australian, 26 November 1973, in ‘ALP, Jews and Israel’, IJLA, Jerusalem. 49. Isi Leibler to Moshe Gilboa, Israeli Foreign Office, 15 February 1983, ECAJ Corres Files, AAJ. 50. Isi Leibler to Shimon Peres, 13 April 1983, ECAJ Corres Files, AAJ. 51. Suzanne D. Rutland, ‘Jews and Muslims “Downunder”: emerging dialogue and challenges’, Michael M. Laskier and Yaacov Lev (eds.), The Divergence of Judaism and Islam: Interdependence, Modernity and Political Turmoil (University of Florida Press: Gainesville, 2011) p. 107. 52. Paul Sheehan, ‘Beware the words of a wolf dressed in sheikh’s clothing’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 2010, accessed 22 April 2012, http://www.smh.com. au/opinion/politics/beware-the-words-of-a-wolf-dressed-in-sheikhs-clothing20100606-xn25.html#ixzz1slFljgQN. 53. Russel Schneider, ‘Hazard for Hayden in PLO connection’, The Australian, 7 July 1980. 54. Interview with Yehuda Avner, Israeli Ambassador to Australia, 1992–95, Jerusalem 2000. 55. ‘Australia’, http://www.mfo.org/contingents-Australia.php accessed 6 May 2012. 56. Interview with Yehuda Avner, Jerusalem 2000. 57. Bernard Hyams, The History of the Australian Zionist Movement (Zionist Federation of Australia: Melbourne, 1998) p. 141. 58. Leslie Caplan, President’s Report, ECAJ Annual Report, 1987. 59. Minutes from Meeting with Hawke and Evans, 25 May 1989, p.4, ECAJ Corres Files, Sydney. 60. Israel Singer to Edgar Bronfman, 3 December 1991, IJL Personal file, November – 15 December 1991, IJLA, Jerusalem. 61. Statement by Isi Leibler, co-chair of the WJC’s governing board, in The Jewish Week, Inc, 1–7 November 1991. 62. During a brief trip at the beginning of December, Leibler met with PM Rao in India, Japan’s Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Koji Kubizawa, South Korean Foreign Minister, Lee Sang-ode in Seoul, as well as key representatives in Thailand and Singapore. IJL, Personal File, November-15 December 1991, IJLA, Jerusalem.

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326 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

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The Jerusalem Post, 15 December 1991. Rubenstein and Fleischer, ‘A Distant Affinity’, p. 23. Bernard Ferster, Israel Standing Committee, ECAJ Annual Report, 1977. ECAJ Annual Report, 1959. Anthony Orkin, ‘Potholes in Mayor’s Plan, accessed 17 January 2011, http:// www.abc.net.au/unleashed/anthony-orkin-43036.html. Alexander Downer, ‘Australia and Israel Set up Cultural Exchange’, http:// www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa177_02.html. See for example, meeting with Brian Howe, Deputy Prime Minister, 13 August 1991, ECAJ Corres Files, Sydney. Walter Duffield, ‘Administrative Report’, Nineteenth Zionist Conference, Melbourne, 30 January-1 February 1960, p. 4, AAJ, Sydney. For a detailed discussion, see Suzanne. D. Rutland, ‘Australia’, in Ben-Moshe, Danny and Zohar Segev (eds.) Israel, the Diaspora and Jewish Identity (Sussex Academic Press: Brighton, 2007) pp. 254–267.

72. ‘Julia Gillard refuses to condemn Israeli attacks’, The Daily Telegraph, 5

January 2009, accessed 12 January 2012. http://www.dailytelegraph.com. au/news/gillard-quiet-on-gaza-attack/story-e6freuy9–1111118480528. 73. See Anthony Loewenstein, ‘Australian government out of step with public opinion on Israel/Palestine, Thursday, 18 June 2009, Crikey, http://www.crikey. com.au/2009/06/18/australian-government-out-of-step-with-public-opinionon-israelpalestine/, accessed 12 January 2012. 74. Kirsty Needham, ‘Gillard stands by partner over Israel job link’,

The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 2010. http://www.smh.com.au/ national/gillard-stands-by-partner-over-israel-job-link-20100629-zjcx. html#ixzz1jCqdVHT6, accessed 12 January 2012. 75. Alan Lee, ‘Election Face Off: Labor’s record’, Australia/Israel Review, August 2010, http://aijac.org.au/news/article/election-face-off, accessed 12 January 2012. 76. See, for example, Peter Westmore, ‘Editorial: Behind the bid for UN

Security Council seat: To win a coveted seat on the UN Security Council, Kevin Rudd may need to seek support from countries which are not traditionally Australia’s allies’, News Weekly, 12 April 2008, accessed 22 April 2012, http://www.newsweekly.com.au/article.php?id=3261. 77. Ibid. 78. The Australian, 21 September 2011. 79. Gedaliah Afterman, ‘Here and There: The State of Australia-Israel Relations’, The Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005) p. 14, as quoted in Rubenstein and Fleischer, ‘A Distant Affinity, 2007, p. 28. 80. See Albert Palazzo, ‘The Myth that Australia Punches Above its weight’, in Craig Stockings (ed.), ANZAC’s Dirty Dozen (NewSouth Publishing: Kensington, 2012) p. 10. http://www.smh.com.au/business/media-and-marketing/australiapunches-above-its-weight-20110217–1ay93.html, accessed 6 May 2012.

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INDEX

Reference to notes are indicated by n. 9/11 attacks 69 1967 war see Six Day War 1973 war see Yom Kippur War Abbas, Mahmoud 99, 134, 138, 142, 170, 320 ACAA see Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industry Products Ahdut Ha-avoda 292 Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine 299–300, 322 Adamov, Yevgeny 130 Adelson, Sheldon 79 Adenauer, Konrad 6, 289, 291, 292–3 ADL see Anti-Defamation League Aegean Sea 278 Afghanistan 127, 133, 139–40, 276 Africa 2, 7, 191, 201–2, 224, 265 and Israel 206–8 and Turkey 12, 279 see also North Africa; South Africa African-Americans 68 African National Congress (ANC) 7, 9, 201, 222, 223, 225 Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industry Products (ACAA) 166, 173 Agreement on Movement and Access (2005) 75

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agriculture 71, 113, 129, 191 and Brazil 16, 195 and Europe 164, 166 Ahimeir, Jacob 266–7 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 100, 135, 198 AICE see Australia-Israel Culture Exchange aid 170, 171, 172, 211 and Japan 251, 253 see also military aid AIJAC see Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council AIPAC see American Israel Public Affairs Committee Akihito, Emperor of Japan 246 AKP see Islamist Justice and Development Party Albright, Madeleine 54, 60n.48 Algeria 5, 46, 47 Algerian National Liberation Movement (FLN) 5, 45 Aliyah Bet 42 Amado, Jorge 196 Amano, Yukiya 143 America see United States of America American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 8, 76, 219–20, 221 American Jewish Committee 67, 245, 247

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328

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AND THE

American Jewish Congress 245 American Steering Committee on Freedom of Trade with Israel 245–6 Amin, Idi 207 ANC see African National Congress Andropov, Yuri 128 Angola 2, 203, 212, 217, 218, 222 Annan, Kofi 60n.48 Annapolis Summit (2007) 75 anti-Americanism 16, 25–6, 133, 139 anti-Britishness 5, 35, 44 anti-Communism 8, 237 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 245, 248, 276, 318 anti-Israelism 56, 133, 139, 224 and Germany 296 and Great Britain 23 and India 96, 100 and Turkey 265, 267–8, 277, 280, 281 anti-Semitism 2, 41, 238, 290 and Brazil 188 and China 108 and France 54, 56 and Japan 234, 239–40, 249, 253 and Russia 16 and South Africa 203, 204 and Soviet Union 126 and Turkey 265, 267, 276 and USA 69 apartheid 3, 7, 8, 193, 201–2, 222 and Israel 208, 215, 225 and Jews 204–6 and Peres 209 and USA 220 Al-Aqsa Intifada 14, 131, 161, 170, 223 and France 5, 53, 54 and Russia 132, 135 Arab League 144, 176, 193, 241, 302–3, 306, 307 Arab Peace Plan 138 Arab Spring 5, 40, 56, 65, 148, 284 and Turkey 268, 273, 274, 277 Arab world 1, 2, 29, 206 and Africa 8 and Australia 9, 303, 305, 306, 307, 322

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WORLD POWERS and Brazil 16, 192–3 and China 110, 115 and France 5, 47 and Germany 6, 292, 293 and Great Britain 4, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33–4 and India 15, 93–4, 95, 98, 99, 101 and Japan 16, 235, 237, 241, 243–4, 253 and Jews 64 and Russia 136 and Soviet Union 19, 126, 127 and Turkey 279, 280 see also Gulf states; Islamism; Middle East; Palestine Arafat, Yasser 3, 157, 194, 224 and Australia 311–12 and China 14 and France 52, 53, 54 and India 99 and Israel 161 and Japan 243 and Russia 131 and Soviet Union 19, 126, 128 Aranha, Oswaldo 15, 189, 190, 299, 300 Arens, Moshe 51–2, 74, 246 Argentina 35, 192, 197, 216 Armenia 266–7, 269 arms sales 5, 8 and Brazil 16, 195–6 and China 14, 112, 113, 115, 116–17, 118, 121 and France 5, 45, 52 and Germany 6, 292–3, 295 and Great Britain 4, 22, 25, 27, 28–9, 30, 34, 35 and Greece 284 and India 15, 102–3 and Israel 208–9 and Russia 128, 133, 134, 135, 136–7, 141–3, 151 and South Africa 202, 207, 212, 216, 219–20 and Syria 139–40, 144, 146 and USA 20, 21, 62, 72, 73, 77, 90n.101 see also nuclear power Armscor 213, 214, 218

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INDEX Armstrong, R. F. 210 Ashton, Catherine 168–9 Asia-Pacific region 9, 304, 313–14 Aso, Taro 251 Assad, Bashar 18, 40, 56, 133, 275 and Georgia 139, 140 and Russia 147, 149 and terrorism 144 and Turkey 264 Assad, Hafez 5, 19, 32, 128, 139–40 Association Agreement (1995) 159, 178 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 13, 104n.2 Atlas Aircraft 218 Atyeo, Sam 299, 301 Auriol, Vincent 42 Australasian Union of Jewish Students (AUJS) 316 Australia 9–10, 104n.3, 298, 304, 314–15; see also Evatt, Herbert Vere; Hawke, Bob Australia-Israel Chambers of Commerce and Industry 315 Australia-Israel Culture Exchange (AICE) 317, 320 Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) 318–19 Australian-Israel Review (journal) 318 aviation 164, 166, 195, 302, 303, 305 Avner, Yehuda 312–13 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam 95 Balfour Declaration (1917) 4, 30, 34, 64, 126 and Japan 16, 234, 236–7 Balkans, the 265, 270–1, 283 Bandung Conference (1955) 2, 13, 15, 95, 109, 110 Bar-Lev, Chaim 213 Barak, Ehud 53, 74, 145–6, 161, 252 Baram, Amos 212 Barcelona Process 174, 176, 177, 179 Barkat, Nir 172 Barre, Raymond 50, 51 al-Bashir, Omar 274, 275 Basic Agreement for Technical Cooperation (1962) 191

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329

Basu, Jyoti 101 BDS see Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Begin, Menachem 3, 4, 8, 30–1, 35, 290 and Australia 310 and Europe 158 and Germany 6, 291, 294, 296 and Lebanon 309 and Sadat 50 and South Africa 203, 215 and terrorism 51 and USA 73, 75 Beinart, Peter 225 Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine 56, 178 Ben-Gurion, David 8, 13, 215, 301 and France 44, 46–7 and Germany 289, 291, 292–3 and Great Britain 23, 24 and Japan 240 and South Africa 205 and USA 20, 72, 73 Berezovsky, Boris 130 Berlin Declaration (1999) 160 Bernadotte, Folke, Count 23 Beslan massacre 132 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 100, 103 Bible, the 43, 108 Bidault, Georges 42 Biden, Joe 144 Bir Zeit University 53 Birrenbach, Kurt 293 Birthright tours 68 Black September 49, 293 Blair, Tony 4, 33–4 blockades 162, 167, 176 Blum, Leon 5, 41–2, 43 Bolivia 16, 197 borders 72, 80, 99, 164, 199 Bosnia 128, 270 Botha, Fanie 213, 214, 229n.68, 230n.72 Botha, P. W. 210, 211, 219, 222 Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice 46 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 252, 316–17

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330

ISR AEL

AND THE

boycotts 17, 100, 173, 179 and Australia 302–3, 305 and France 50, 51–2, 54 and Japan 235, 242, 243, 244–7, 248, 252, 253 and West Bank 224–5 Brandt, Willy 290, 293, 294 Brazil 15–16, 187, 189–90 and anti-Semitism 188 and foreign policy 196–9 and Jerusalem 190–1 and military equipment 195–6 and oil 192–3 and Suez Crisis 191–2 and Zionism 193–4 Brezhnev, Leonid 19, 126, 127 Britain see Great Britain British Empire 7, 26 British Mandate 4, 22, 25, 30, 34, 64, 299 and France 42 and Zionism 126 Broederbond 203 Bronfman, Edgar 313 Bulganin, Nikolai 19 Burg, Yosef 315 Burma 110 Bush, George H. W. 247, 251, 294, 313 and missiles 21, 74, 221, 222 Bush, George W. 10, 74 Bushehr reactor 18, 129, 134 Callaghan, James 4, 31 Camp David Accords (1979) 32, 50, 51, 127, 158 Camp David Summit (2000) 14, 53, 74 Canada 9, 67, 191, 300, 313 Caradon, Hugh, Lord 48 Carr, Bob 321 Carrington, Peter, Lord 32 Carter, Jimmy 73, 75, 193 Casey, Richard 302 Castro, Fidel 222 Caucasus 12, 142, 145, 147, 265, 276, 279 ceasefires 9, 54, 162, 302 Ceausescu, Nicolae 19

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WORLD POWERS Central Asia 12, 130, 265, 276 Chatterjee, Somnath 102 Chauvel, Sir Henry 298 Chechnya 125, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 147 checkpoints 212–13, 224 Chernobyl nuclear disaster 127 Cheysson, Claude 52 Chile 216 China 3, 13–14, 109, 223, 241, 304 and Arab world 110–11 and arms sales 116–18 and Australia 313–14 and India 15, 96 and Iran 121, 144 and Israel 66, 75, 106–8, 111–114, 118–20, 248, 252 and Jews 235, 237 and Middle East 115, 120–1 Chirac, Jacques 5, 40, 49, 51, 52–3, 54 Christians 203 and France 42, 44 and Germany 291 and Russia 149 and USA 20–1, 64, 69, 77, 79 Christopher, Warren 129 Cibrian-Uzal, Ramiro 166 cinema 196, 249, 265, 317 civil rights movement 8, 68 Clinton, Bill 3, 13, 74, 78–9, 294 Cohen, Sam 310 Cohen, Ya’acov 246, 247 Cold War 25, 62, 127, 222, 291 and Brazil 188, 190, 194 and India 96, 97, 98, 100 Colombia 191, 209 colonialism 2, 9, 93, 202; see also decolonisation Communism 6, 8, 19, 125–6, 237, 290 and China 13, 108–9 and France 42, 44 and Germany 291 and India 101, 102 and Israel 20, 26 and Japan 243 Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP) 163–4

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INDEX Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986) 8, 220 Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations 76 Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany 291 Copernicus project 164 counter-terrorism 18, 102, 132, 145, 161 Couve de Murville, Maurice 47–8 Cowen, Sir Zelman 308 Craigium Dictum 4, 30, 33 Cuba 7, 104n.6, 192, 197, 217, 222 cultural relations 40 and Australia 317 and Brazil 196 and Japan 249–51, 253 and Turkey 281–2 cyberwarfare 21, 65 Cyprus 13, 148, 175, 177, 277–8, 283 and Turkey 269, 270 Czech Republic 67, 173–4, 177 Czechoslovakia 45, 109, 126, 290 Daihatsu 245 Danish cartoons 18, 135 Darfur 275 Dassault, Marcel 49 Daszkiewicz, Leskek 238 Davies, Rob 224 Davos Economic Summit (1997) 101 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276–7, 280 Dayan, Moshe 29, 44, 209 De Bruyn, B. C. 218–19 De Gaulle, Charles 5, 42, 44, 50, 157 and Israel 46–7, 48 De Klerk, F. W. 222 Decker, L. P. J. de 238 decolonisation 7, 9, 10, 44, 157 defence 80 and China 75, 117 and France 52 and Great Britain 26 and South Africa 209–10, 214 and USA 64–5, 72, 73, 74 democracy 64, 65, 68, 116, 178, 198, 277

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331

Deng Xiaoping 14 deportations 5, 52–3 Depreux, Edouard 43 diaspora 18, 70, 283, 284 Diplomatic Quartet 131, 135, 137, 142, 144 diplomatic relations and Australia 301 and Brazil 187, 196–7 and China 13, 109, 110, 111–12, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120 and Germany 292, 293 and Great Britain 24, 27, 31, 34 and Greece 283 and India 92, 95 and Japan 253 and Russia 141 and Soviet Union 3, 127–8 discrimination 65, 173 Dixit, J. N. 97, 102 Douglas-Home, Alec 28 Downer, Alexander 314, 317, 321 Dulles, John Foster 20, 62 Dutra, Eurico Gaspar 188 East Asia 12, 109, 237, 279 East Germany see German Democratic Republic Eastern Europe 3, 19, 127 Eban, Abba 28, 34–5, 46, 159 and Africa 207, 208 and Australia 301 and Japan 246 ECAJ see Executive Council of Australian Jewry economics 3, 6, 7, 62–3, 116 and Brazil 187, 198 and China 13, 112, 113, 119, 120, 121, 122 and Europe 156, 162–3, 168, 176, 177 and Greece 13, 283 and India 97 and Israel 208–9 and Japan 17, 235, 240, 243, 253 and Russia 18, 125, 129, 130, 132, 136, 141, 146–7, 150 and South Africa 202–3

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332

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AND THE

economics – continued and Soviet Union 127 and Turkey 272 and USA 71 Eden, Sir Anthony 45, 302 education 164, 179, 249, 250–1, 317 EEC see European Economic Community Egypt 4, 32, 56, 148, 207 and Australia 305, 307, 309 and China 110, 120 and East Germany 6, 293 and Europe 162 and Great Britain 24, 25, 27 and India 15, 93, 96, 103 and Israel 72, 73, 75, 112, 115, 211, 247, 253 and Russia 133, 137, 138 and Soviet Union 45, 126–7 and Suez 157, 192 and Turkey 12, 269, 273 and USA 19, 62 see also Nasser, Gamal Abdel Eilam, Uzi 213 Einfeld, Sydney David 315 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 20, 72, 73, 74, 76, 292, 302 Eitan, Raful 216–17 Elath, Eliahu 27 ElBaradai, Mohammed 143 Elpeleg, Zvi 280 embargoes 23, 29, 48, 49 emigration 20, 69, 70, 127, 128 ENP see European Neighbourhood Policy Entebbe Rescue Mission 50, 100 environment, the 116, 164 Eppstein, Ury 250 Eran, Oded 180 Erasmus Mundus 11, 164 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 12, 13, 145, 264, 269, 274–6, 280 and Cyprus 278 and Egypt 273 and Israel 265, 266, 268, 270 Erhard, Ludwig 293 espionage 66, 102 Essen Declaration (1994) 159, 174

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WORLD POWERS EU see European Union EU-Israel Action Plan 175 EUPOL-COPPS mission 170–1 European Coal and Steel Community 7, 181n.2 European Community (EC) 156–9, 181n.2 European Court of Justice 178 European Economic Community (EEC) 30, 32, 155, 181n.2, 294 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 163–4, 165, 166, 175, 177 European Space Agency 164 European Union (EU) 7, 156, 157 and Greece 283 and Iran 143–4 and Israel 10–11, 131, 155, 159–69, 172–4, 175–7, 178–80 and Palestine 10, 11, 170–2 and peacemaking 169–70, 174–5 and Russia 143 and Turkey 12, 269, 271–2, 279 Europol 164 Evans, Gareth 312, 314 Evatt, Herbert Vere 297, 298–301, 307, 316, 318, 320–1, 322 Evian Conference (1938) 188 evictions 162, 169, 176 Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) 306, 310, 315, 318, 319 Exodus 43, 51 exports 71, 118, 119, 178 and Australia 316 and Brazil 187, 193, 195, 198 and Germany 295 and Japan 240, 241, 244–5, 247 and South Africa 224 Eytan, Walter 95, 97 Falklands War 32, 35, 36n.1 Fatah 138, 141, 150, 170, 199 Fayyad, Salam 138, 170 Federal Plan 94, 99 Federal Republic of Germany see Germany Ferguson, David B. 312 Ferrero-Waldener, Benita 167, 176

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INDEX Final Solution 237, 289 Fink, Leo 315 Fischer, Henri 307–8 Fischer, Joschka 295 FLN see Algerian National Liberation Movement Ford, Gerald 75, 211 foreign currency 187, 193 foreign policy 10 and Australia 299, 302, 305–6 and Brazil 16, 189, 196–9 and China 114 and the EU 177 and France 40, 44 and Great Britain 22, 31, 33, 36n.1 and India 92–3, 97 and Israel 201, 206 and Russia 125, 134 and Soviet Union 126, 127 and Turkey 268, 269, 270, 276–7, 279 and USA 66, 69, 77, 79, 118 Former Soviet Union (FSU) 125, 128, 140, 141, 150 Formosa see Taiwan Foxman, Abraham 245 Fradkov, Mikhail 130 France 4–5, 72, 109, 173, 313 and Egypt 15, 45, 46, 126 and India 95 and Israel 41–4, 50, 52–3, 54, 157 and Middle East 26 and ‘pro-Arab policy’ 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49 and South Africa 216, 218 and Syria 133 Fraser, Malcolm 307, 308–9, 311, 318, 322 Fraser, Peter 300 Freilich, Max 298, 300, 315 French Resistance 42, 44 FSU see Former Soviet Union Fuji Heavy Industries 245 Galileo 163 Gallo, Max 52 Gandhi, Mahatma 92

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gas deposits and Australia 316 and Cyprus 277–8 and Israel 148–9 and Russia 18, 19, 129, 130, 133, 136, 137, 138, 147 Gasprom 130, 148, 149 Gaza 20, 21, 65, 126, 206, 252 and Europe 162, 167, 170, 176 flotilla raid 145, 174, 270, 281, 282, 320 and gas deposits 137 and Hamas 138, 142 and India 100 and Russia 132 and Sharon 54 and USA 69 see also Operation Cast Lead Geisel, Ernesto 193, 194 Geneva Convention 169, 192 genocide 156, 198, 237, 266, 274, 275 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 294, 295 Georgia 18, 139, 140, 142, 147, 150 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 6, 290, 292, 293 Germany 5–6, 67, 156, 173, 177, 240 and arms 29 and Brazil 15 and Israel 289–91, 292–6 and Middle East 109 and nuclear power 193 see also German Democratic Republic; Nazi regime Ghaddafi, Muammar 5, 40, 56, 146, 222, 273, 275–6 Gilboa, Moshe 310 Gillard, Julia 298, 318, 320–1 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 5, 48, 49, 50, 51, 294 Gleeson, I. R. 216 Godart, Julien 41 Golan Heights 73, 253 Gold, Dore 172 Goldberg, Denis 202 Goldberg, Solomon 315 Goldreich, Arthur 202, 206

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AND THE

Goldstone Report 142, 167, 177 Gorbachev, Mikhail 19, 127–8, 135 Gormez, Mehmet 272 Gorton, John 302, 303 Gowda, Deve 101 Granot, Elazar 225 Great Britain 3–4, 20, 22–3, 109, 173, 300 and Arab world 26, 27–8 and arms sales 25, 72 and Australia 301 and colonialism 1, 7 and Egypt 15 and European Union 175 and France 45 and Germany 293 and India 95 and Israel 24, 29, 30, 31, 34–5 and Middle East 19, 26 and Palestine 2, 189 and Suez 157 and Syria 133 and Thatcher 32 and two-state solution 9 and UN Resolution 5 see also anti-Britishness; British Mandate Greece 7, 13, 104n.6, 148, 282–4 and Turkey 269, 270, 278 Greyshirt movement 204 Grossman, David 196 Guardian, The 221, 224 Guerreiro, Ramiro Saravia 189–90 Gulf states 137–8, 139, 149 Gulf War 74, 75, 115, 251 Gusinsky, Vladimir 130 Ha’aretz 167, 197, 207, 282 Hacohen, David 215 Hadera Paper Mills 315 Hallstein Doctrine 6, 292 Hamas 21, 56, 78, 80, 161, 162 and Australia 320 and Brazil 199 and China 14, 121 and European Union 11, 170, 173 and Gaza 142

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WORLD POWERS and India 100 and Russia 18, 132, 133, 135–6, 137, 138, 139, 141, 145, 149, 150 and Turkey 265, 268, 280 and USA 64, 65 Harbin 108, 238–9 Harel, Isser 206 Hariri, Rafiq 133, 134 Hartley, Bill 307 Hassan, Mushirul 102 Hawke, Bob 9, 309–12, 313, 318, 322 Hayden, Bill 311–12, 313 Heath, Edward 4, 28 Helm, Sir Alexander Knox 24 Hernu, Charles 52 Herut 6, 291 Herzl, Tova 225 Herzog, Chaim 17, 246, 312 Hezbollah 78, 129, 196 and China 14, 121 and France 53 and Russia 18, 133, 136, 137, 139, 149 and Syria 143, 144, 145, 146 and Turkey 268 and USA 64, 65 Higuchi, Kiichiro 238–9 hijacking 50, 100, 294 Hilaly, Taj el-Din al 311 Hirohito, Emperor of Japan 17, 241, 246 Histadrut 44, 311 Hitler, Adolf 16–17, 199n.3, 204 and Japan 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 253 Hollande, François 5, 56 Holocaust, the 23, 52, 156, 157, 237, 298 and Australia 300, 301 and Brazil 188 and denial 135 and France 43 and Germany 6 and Great Britain 4 and Japan 17, 241 and Turkey 276 and USA 64, 68 Holt, Harold 302, 306 Holy Land 5, 40, 44, 46, 243 and tourism 189, 190

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INDEX Honda 242, 245, 247 Hong Kong 7, 108, 113–14 Hood, John 299, 301 house demolition 161, 162, 168, 169, 176 Howard, John 9–10, 298, 314–15, 318 Howe, Brian 318 human rights 1–2, 52, 66, 147, 193, 198 and European Union 161, 178, 180 humanitarianism 63, 64 Hungary 177, 240, 290 Hurd, Douglas 33 Hurwitz, Harry 207, 215 Hussein, King of Jordan 27, 33 Hussein, Saddam 3, 5, 14, 21, 75 and Australia 307 and China 115 and France 49 IAEA see International Atomic Energy Agency IMI 213 immigration 69, 147–8, 150, 156 and Brazil 188 and Greece 283–4 and South Africa 203–4 imperialism 1, 93, 109, 110, 111 imports 71, 118, 295, 315 India 3, 7, 14–15, 223, 224, 241 and Australia 314 and Israel 92–3, 94–6, 97–100, 101–3, 248, 252 and Palestine 93–4, 100–1 and USA 97 industry 71, 121, 176 and Japan 242, 244–5, 247–8 and Russia 130, 138 infrastructure 146, 161, 170, 177 intelligence 221–2, 270 and Australia 316, 320 and Great Britain 27 and India 102 and Russia 132, 148 and Turkey 268 and USA 64–5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 135, 142, 143, 197, 222

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International Court of Justice 131, 167 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 15, 97, 213 International Trade Union Congress 44 Intifada 10, 50, 157, 159, 322; see also Al-Aqsa Intifada Inuzuka, Koreshige 238, 239, 240 Iran 16, 77, 104n.3 and Brazil 197, 198, 199 and China 14, 115 and India 15, 103 and Islamic Revolution 8, 216, 235, 244 and Israel 66, 100, 252 and Japan 247, 253 and nuclear weapons 21, 54, 55, 121, 142, 143–4 and Russia 18, 19, 125, 129, 131, 133, 134–5, 136–7, 138, 139, 146–7, 149 and Turkey 12, 268, 272–3, 276, 279, 280 and USA 64, 65 Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) 17, 247 Iraq 4, 33–4, 73, 131, 133, 138 and Australia 307–8 and Brazil 193, 195–6 and China 14, 115 and Great Britain 25 and Japan 17 and Kuwait 194 and Palestine 299 and sanctions 77 and Soviet Union 19, 127 and Turkey 12, 269, 274, 276 and USA 64 see also Osirak nuclear reactor Iraq War (2003) 295 Ireland 175, 177 Irgun Zvai Leumi 6, 42 Iron Dome system 21 Islamic Conference (OIC) 135 Islamism 2, 5, 148 and France 56 and Hamas 161 and Palestine 11

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336

ISR AEL

AND THE

Islamism – continued and Russia 18, 147 and Turkey 12, 270, 274–5, 279 and USA 64 see also Muslims Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) 12, 268, 269, 272, 275, 277, 279 Israel 3, 32, 64, 72–4, 78–9, 171 and Africa 201–2, 206, 207–8 and Arab world 24, 25, 65–6 and arms sales 116, 117, 208–9 and Australia 9, 302, 304–5, 306–7, 308–10, 311, 315–22 and Brazil 16, 195–6, 198 and China 13–14, 106–8, 110, 111–14, 118–20, 121–2 and creation of 2, 25, 34, 43, 44, 156, 301, 319 and economics 71 and Europe 10–11, 155, 156–69, 173–4, 175–7, 178–80 and France 41–3, 45–9, 50–1, 52, 53, 54 and Georgia 139, 140 and Germany 6, 289–91, 292–6 and Great Britain 4, 22–3, 27, 28–9, 30 and Greece 282–4 and Hamas 135, 136 and India 14–15, 92–3, 94–6, 97–100, 101–3 and Japan 16–17, 235, 240–1, 242–3, 244–53 and Mediterranean region 56 and peacemaking 169–70, 174–5 and recognition 23, 24, 44, 61, 109 and Russia 18, 128–9, 134, 136–7, 144–6, 147–51 and South Africa 7–9, 202–3, 205–6, 209–10, 211–13, 214, 215–17, 218–21, 223–5 and Soviet Union 18–19, 126, 127–8 and Turkey 12–13, 266–9, 270, 278–9, 281–2 and USA 25–6, 62–5, 66–7, 74–7, 79–80

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WORLD POWERS see also anti-Israelism; Gaza; Holy Land; Jerusalem; West Bank Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) 218, 223 Israel-Japan Friendship Association 246, 249–50 Israel Manufacturers Association 246 Israeli Air Force 23, 49 Italy 177, 238, 240, 293, 313 Ivanov, Igor 130 Ivanov, Sergei 130 J Street 79 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze’ev) 215 Jacobson, Kenneth 248 Jamia Millia Islamia 102 Janata Dal 101 Japan 16–17, 109, 234–5, 243–4, 314 and Israel 240–1, 242–3, 244–53 and Jews 236–40 Japanese External Trade Organisation (JETRO) 248 Jarblum, Marc 44 Jensen, H. F. 316 Jerusalem 80, 99, 150, 189, 250, 299–300, 312 and Australia 297 and Brazil 190–1, 194–5 and China 112 and Europe 158, 160, 172–3 and Russia 140, 142 and settlements 162, 169 and USA 69, 78 and the Vatican 15 Jerusalem Post, The 168, 212, 215, 245 Jewish Agency 70 Jewish Daily Forward, The 43 Jewish Federation 67 Jewish Herald 207 Jewish National Fund 70 Jewish State see Israel Jews 1–2, 47, 290, 291–2 and Australia 9, 302–4, 306, 308, 309–10, 311–13, 317–19 and Brazil 187 and China 108, 114, 120 and Europe 10, 156

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INDEX and France 5, 41–2, 43–4, 50, 52–3, 54–5, 56 and India 92, 94 and Japan 16–17, 234–5, 236–40, 253 and Russia 131, 147 and South Africa 7, 202, 203–6, 207, 224 and Soviet Union 18–19, 127, 128 and Turkey 265, 266 and USA 8, 20–1, 63, 64, 67–8, 69, 70, 76–7, 79, 241 Jiang Zemin 117 jihadists 56, 133 Jobert, Michel 49 Jobim, Nelson 195 Johnson, Lyndon B. 20, 46, 73, 76, 293, 306 Johnson Plan 75 Jordan 27, 56, 62, 128, 148, 247, 252 and China 114 and Israel 64, 73, 253, 312 and Russia 133, 137, 138 Jospin, Lionel 53 Kadima Party 54, 140 Kaifu, Toshiki 247 Kaplan, Jacob 44 Kargil War 102 Kashmir 95 Kasrils, Ronnie 224 Katsav, Moshe 54 Katzir, Aharon 243 Kautsky, Karl 42 Kawaguchi, Yoriko 251 Keating, Paul 9–10, 311, 312, 313, 318 Keidanren 17, 243, 246 Kennedy, John F. 20, 62, 73 Kerry, John 80 Khamenei, Ali 16 Khazyanov, Mikhail 130 Khilafat struggle 93, 104n.2 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 130 Khrushchev, Nikita 19, 82n.19, 126, 128 kibbutz movement 43, 68, 196, 249 kidnappings 100, 136 Kimura, Toshio 243

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Kiriyenko, Sergei 130 Kissinger, Henry 73, 177, 211, 235, 243 Knesset 6, 20, 43, 68, 266–7 and Australia 316 and Mitterand 51 Kohl, Helmut 294–5 Koizumi, Junichiro 251, 252 Kommersant 139 Korean War 13, 109, 110, 126, 291 Kosovo 129, 270 Kozyrev, Andrei 128 Krasny, Joseph 49, 50 Kurds 12, 148, 266, 269, 272–3, 274 Kuwait 3, 98, 115, 194 land conquests 34, 76, 172, 303 Landa, Abram 299, 301 Latin America 16, 190, 191, 192, 198, 279 and Turkey 12 Lavon affair 66, 83n.28 Lavrov, Sergei 130, 132, 134, 136–7, 140, 144 Le Pen, Marine 56 Lebanon 56, 129, 136, 161, 252 and Australia 305 and Brazil 15 and Europe 171 and France 4, 42, 44 and Israel 66 and South Africa 203 and Syria 133 see also Hezbollah Lebanon War (1982) 4, 10, 15, 32–3, 309 and Australia 322 and Europe 157, 159 and France 51–2 and India 100 and Soviet Union 127 and USA 68, 75 Lebanon War (2006) 14, 101, 265 Ledwidge, Bernard 29, 30 left-wing politics 2, 10, 157 and France 46, 49 and India 101–2 and Japan 17, 242–3 and USA 79

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338

ISR AEL

AND THE

Leibler, Isi 308, 310, 311, 313–14, 318 Leibler, Mark 313, 318–19 Lenin, Vladimir 125–6 Léotard, François 52 Levy, David 246 Liberty, USS 66, 83n.28 Libya 2, 49, 56, 146, 223, 273–4 and Soviet Union 19, 127 and Turkey 269 Lie, Trygve 300 Lieberman, Avigdor 141, 148, 150, 168, 172, 174 and Brazil 198 and Japan 251 Liel, Alon 224–5 Likud Party 6, 10, 35, 54, 62, 148 and South Africa 203, 215, 216, 225 and USA 69 Linton, Joseph L. 241 Lisbon Treaty (2009) 180 literature 196, 249 Lithuania 17, 238 Livni, Tzipi 163, 165, 167, 180, 251 Lloyd, Selwyn 27 Loggerenberg, Jan van 218 Lok Sabha 95, 96 Louw, Eric 204, 205 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio 16, 196–7, 198 Luxembourg Declaration (1997) 160 Maastricht Treaty (1992) 181n.2 al-Mabhouh, Mahmoud 320 MacDonald, Ramsay 42 McIntyre, Sir Lawrence 307 McMahon, William 302, 304 Madrid Conference (1991) 14, 75, 92, 99, 115–16, 247 Magnes, Judah 70–1 Major, John 33 Makuya 249 Malan, D. F. 204–5 Malan, Magnus 216–17 Malenkov, Georgy 126 Malta 175, 177 Manchuria 235, 237 Mandela, Nelson 7, 9, 202, 222, 223

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WORLD POWERS Mao Zedong 13, 14, 108, 111, 112, 114 Mapam 20, 225, 292 ‘March of the Living’ 196 Marxism-Leninism 18, 20 Masanori, Miyazawa 249 Mashal, Khalid 136, 145 Massalha, Nawaf 251 Mavi Marmara tragedy 270, 279, 281 Mbeki, Govan 202 Mbeki, Thabo 223 media, the 166, 167, 168–9, 179 and Africa 207 and Brazil 196 and Turkey 265 Mediterranean region 5, 30, 40, 44, 55–6 Medvedev, Dmitry 18, 140, 143, 145, 146, 150 Mehlis, Detlev 133, 134 Meiji, Emperor of Japan 236 Meir, Golda 20, 29, 62, 70, 215, 293 and Africa 7, 201–2, 206, 207 Mekorot 17, 248 Menon, V. K. Krishna 95 Menzies, Robert 302 Mercosul 198 Merkel, Angela 6, 295 Middle East 25, 26, 72, 265 and Australia 299 and Brazil 187, 198 and China 108–9, 114, 115, 120–1, 122 and France 53 and Great Britain 22, 23, 31, 33 and India 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103 and Japan 248, 251, 253 and peacemaking 169, 174–5, 177, 178, 179, 180 and Russia 18, 125, 147 and Turkey 12, 269–70, 276, 282 military, the 12, 16, 23 military aid 210, 211, 220, 221 and China 112–13 and Germany 292 and Russia 146 and USA 20, 62, 79

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INDEX Miller, Alexei 130 Mir space station 129 Mir Yeshiva 17, 238 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 221, 222 missionaries 70, 239 Mitsubishi 244, 247 Mitterand, François 5, 40, 43, 50–2, 216 Mobutu, Sese Seko 8, 209 Modai, Yitzhak 246 Mollet, Guy 5, 45, 46 Monde, Le 50 Moratinos, Miguel Angel 159 Morocco 178, 182n.12 Morris, Willie 32 Mossad 206 Mousa, Amr 144 Mubarak, Hosni 56, 148 multiculturalism 9, 304 multinationals 17, 120 Murayama, Tomiichi 248 music 196, 249 Muslims 11, 135, 273–4 and Australia 311 and France 56 and India 15, 93, 95, 98, 102 and Russia 129–30 and South Africa 223 and Sunnis 137, 138, 275 and Turkey 270, 271, 272, 276 Mussolini, Benito 238 Namibia 217, 222 nanotechnology 136, 141, 147, 149, 150 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 5, 15, 26, 206, 269, 283 and France 45, 46, 48 and Great Britain 28 and India 96 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 100, 103 National Intelligence Estimate 138 National Party (South Africa) 203, 204, 216, 223 nationalism 1, 2, 3

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and China 108 and Europe 10, 156 and India 93–4 and Israel 62, 68, 215, 216 and Palestine 11 NATO 276, 277, 295 Nazi regime 6, 8, 68, 144, 290, 291, 294, 319 and Brazil 188 and France 5, 43, 52 and Japan 237, 238 and South Africa 203, 204 Negev Desert 23, 24 Nehru, Jawaharlal 92, 94, 95–6, 97, 99, 100 and Bandung Conference 2, 13, 15 and Islam 98 neo-Nazism 293 Nesterenko, Andrei 141 Netafim 316 Netanyahu, Benjamin 35, 53, 79–80, 160 and Europe 162, 166, 167, 174, 180 and Greece 282 and India 101 and Jerusalem 144, 150, 172, 173 and Palestine 165 and Russia 129, 137, 141, 142–3, 147–8, 149 and USA 20, 21, 71 Netherlands, the 177 New York Times, The 217, 245 New Zealand 9, 300, 301 Nihon Isuraeru Kyokai (Japan-Israel Association) 240 Nixon, Richard 63, 73, 111 Nogovitsyn, Anatoly 140 non-aligned nations 2, 13, 15, 99 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 168 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 197, 222 North Africa 53, 177, 188, 265 Norway 119, 191, 314; see also Oslo Accords

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340

ISR AEL

AND THE

nuclear power 5 and France 47, 48, 49, 157 and Iran 21, 54, 55, 121, 134–5, 138, 142, 197 and Israel 7, 45, 66, 76, 216–17, 295 and Russia 18, 130 and South Africa 8, 209–10, 213–14, 218–19, 221–3 Obama, Barack 1, 3, 21, 71, 79 and peace process 80 and Russia 143 Obama Parameters 75 occupied territories 31, 158, 159, 160, 169, 173, 178 and Brazil 198–9 and Japan 243 October War see Yom Kippur War oil supplies and Africa 2, 206 and Australia 9 and Brazil 16, 187, 192–3 and China 115, 121, 122 and Cyprus 13 and Egypt 247 and Europe 10, 158 and France 5, 47, 49 and Germany 294 and Great Britain 4, 23, 26, 28, 34 and Japan 235, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246, 252 and Russia 18, 19, 130, 132, 133, 138, 147 Okamoto, Kozo 243 Olmert, Ehud 54, 136–7, 140, 251, 264, 265 and Europe 163, 164, 167 Olympic Games Beijing (2008) 14, 117 Berlin (1936) 294 Munich (1972) 49, 293–4 Rio de Janeiro (2016) 16, 196 OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) 10, 158, 211 open-skies policy 164

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WORLD POWERS Operation Cast Lead (2009) 11, 56, 165, 196, 264, 265 Operation Peace for Galilee see Lebanon War (1982) Oren, Michael 74 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 177 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 320 Osirak nuclear reactor 5, 49, 51, 217 Oslo Accords (1993) 3, 9, 54, 78, 194, 312 and collapse 33, 161 and European Union 159, 160, 169, 174 and Japan 17, 251 and Russia 128 Otsuki, Takeji 249 Ottoman Empire 13, 93, 104n.2, 266, 267, 270, 272 Owada, Hisashi 246 Oz, Amos 196 Pakistan 15, 95, 96, 101, 191, 276 Palestine 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 32 and Australia 9, 298, 299, 300–1, 308, 309, 321, 322 and Balfour Declaration 234, 236–7 and Brazil 15, 16, 188–9, 193, 198–9 and China 109, 112, 115, 120 and Egypt 269 and Europe 157–8, 160–1, 162, 166, 168, 170–2 and France 5, 49, 50 and Germany 293, 294, 295, 296 and India 14, 93, 98, 99, 100–1, 103 and Japan 243, 251, 252, 253 and Mediterranean region 56 and Russia 131, 134, 144, 150 and South Africa 224–5 and Soviet Union 19, 126, 127 and suffering 40, 65 and terrorism 53 and Turkey 12, 270, 280–1 and USA 68, 69, 75, 77 see also British Mandate; Hamas Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 10, 110, 127, 181n.5, 304

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INDEX and Australia 306, 307, 308, 309, 322 and Brazil 194 and China 13, 111 and Europe 158 and Russia 141 and South Africa 223, 225 see also Arafat, Yasser Palestine Post, The 24 Palestinian Authority (PA) 56, 80, 144, 161, 312 and European Union 168, 170, 171–2 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 170 Papandreou, George 270, 282 Parodi, Alexandre 42 Parsons, Anthony 30 Paul, Ron 79 Peace Now 20, 69 peace process 3, 14, 40, 50, 75, 77 and Australia 309 and China 122 and Europe 159, 160 and France 53 and India 99, 100, 101 and Japan 235, 253 and Russia 142, 144, 150 and Turkey 268 Peacock, Andrew 308, 309 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 112 People’s Republic of China see China Peres, Shimon 4, 29, 35, 53 and Australia 311 and France 40, 44, 48, 51 and Germany 292 and Russia 129, 141, 144–5, 146 and South Africa 8, 202, 209, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219 and USA 78–9 Persian Gulf 17, 121, 122 Phalangists 52 pharmaceuticals 166 Pickering, Thomas 221 Pineau, Christian 45–6, 48 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 274 PLA see People’s Liberation Army Plenel, Edwy 49, 50

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PLO see Palestine Liberation Organisation plutonium 219 Poland 3, 8, 177 police 164 politics and Australia 315–16, 318 and China 116 and Europe 165, 166, 169 and Israel 78–9 and Russia 130, 132 and Turkey 279–80 and USA 76–7 see also left-wing politics; right-wing politics Pollard Affair 66, 68 Pompidou, Georges 5, 48, 49, 50 Portugal 173, 177, 202 Powell, Colin 224 Pratt, Simcha 205 Primakov, Yevgeny 19, 128–9 Project Tunny 223, 232n.117 propaganda 206, 207, 215, 307 Protocols of the Elders of Zion, The 17, 239, 265 public opinion 66–7, 68, 171, 295–6 Putin, Vladimir 14, 129–30, 137–8, 139 and Israel 131, 140, 141 and Middle East 18, 19, 125, 132–3, 134, 135–7, 145–7, 149, 150 Qatar 137 Qian Qichen 313–14 Rabin, Yitzhak 3, 10, 13, 29, 35 and Africa 8 and assassination 53, 312–13 and Europe 159 and France 52 and Germany 296 and South Africa 202 and USA 76, 78, 211 racism 68, 215, 224; see also antiSemitism; apartheid; xenophobia radicalisation 56, 62 Rafah 162, 170 Ramadier, Paul 42, 43

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342

ISR AEL

AND THE

Ramallah 159, 162, 170 Rao, Narasimha 92, 97, 98, 99, 100, 314 Reagan, Ronald 62, 63, 73–4, 75, 294 and Lebanon 32, 33 and South Africa 220 refugees 64, 65, 80, 99, 116 and Australia 314–15, 319 and China 108 and Japan 238–9 and Palestine 168 and South Africa 203–4 and Syria 273 reparations 6, 224, 291–2 research institutes 159, 164, 165, 177, 179 Restitution Agreement (1952–3) 156, 289, 291–2 Rifkind, Malcolm 33 right-wing politics 1, 10, 49, 79 Rivlin, Reuven 266 Rogers Plan 75 Romania 19, 240, 270 Romney, Mitt 21 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 188 Rousseff, Dilma 16 Roux, Ampie 229n.68 Rowhani, Hassan 134 Royal Air Force (RAF) 23, 24 Rubinstein, Amnon 246 Rudd, Kevin 298, 319–20, 321, 322 Rumantsev, Alexander 130 Russia 3, 17–18, 129–30 and China 14, 117, 118 and Georgia 139, 140 and Gulf states 137–8, 139 and Hamas 138 and Israel 128–9, 131, 132, 140–3, 144–6, 147–51 and Japan 16 and Jews 236 and Middle East 125, 134–7 and Syria 133–4 and Turkey 276 see also Soviet Union Russian Orthodox Church 149 Russo-Japanese war 16, 234, 236, 253

Shindler_Chapters.indd 342

WORLD POWERS Sabra and Shatilla massacre 52, 68, 196 Sadat, Anwar 19, 29, 31, 50, 211 SADF see South African Defence Force sanctions 74, 133–4, 203, 220 and Iran 18, 55, 77, 121, 134–5, 137, 142, 143–4, 146 Sapir, Pinhas 315 Sarkozy, Nicolas 5, 40, 54–6 Sartre, Jean-Paul 5 Saudi Arabia 2, 16, 247 and Brazil 193 and China 114, 115 and Germany 294 and Palestine 299 and Russia 133, 134, 135, 137, 147 Scarf, Reuben F. 307 Schiff, Jacob 234, 236, 250, 253 Schmidt, Helmut 290, 294, 295, 296 Schneeweiss, Joachim 308 Schröder, Gerhard 290, 293, 295 Schwarz, Harry 204 science 71, 113, 117 Second Intifada see Al-Aqsa Intifada security policy 10, 25 and Israel 161, 162, 166, 169, 178 and South Africa 212–13 and USA 63, 72–4 Security Treaty of Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) 306 Sei Yesu-kai (Holy Jesus Society) 249 Serbia 129, 270 Serdyukov, Anatoly 146 Sergeev, Igor 130 settlement policy 167, 168, 178 Sèvres Conference (1956) 45 Shai, Aron 250 Shalit, Gilad 145 Shamgar, Shlomo 207 Shamir, Yitzhak 8, 35, 290, 312, 322 and Germany 295 and Japan 17, 246 and South Africa 219, 220, 221 and USA 78 Shanghai 108, 235, 238 Sharett, Moshe 3, 13, 20

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INDEX Sharia law 273–4 Sharon, Ariel 35, 53, 160, 161–2 and France 54 and India 101 and Russia 129, 131 and South Africa 217 and USA 78 Shazar, Zalman 198 Shelef, Yitzhak 117 Shiloah, Reuven 206 Shioden, Nobutaka 239 Shultz Plan 75 Shuqairy, Ahmad 110 Siberia 18, 239 Sieff, Jacob 16 Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 309, 312 Sinai Peninsula 23, 24, 62, 74, 148, 192, 211 Singapore 216, 314 Singh, Arjun 102 Singh, Jaswant 98 Single European Sky Research 164 Sisulu, Walter 202 Six Day War (1967) 3, 10, 34, 157 and Africa 206, 207 and Australia 303, 305, 319 and Brazil 192 and France 46, 48, 50 and Germany 293 and Great Britain 28 and India 98 and Soviet Union 19, 126 and USA 68–9, 73 slavery 224 Slovakia 3, 177 Slovenia 3, 177 Slovo, Joe 202 Snider, Baron D. 315 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 6 Socialist Committee for a Workers’ Palestine 42 soft power 20, 71 Solana, Javier 168 Solarz, Stephen 245, 314

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South Africa 197, 203–6, 217–18, 300 and Israel 7–9, 211–13, 215–17, 219–21, 223–5 and nuclear power 209–10, 213–14, 218–19, 221–3 see also apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) 203, 210, 212, 214, 216–17 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 306 South Korea 241–2, 314 South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) 217 Soviet Union 3, 18–19, 20, 25, 206, 290 and Arab world 72, 211 and arms sales 5 and Australia 304 and Brazil 188 and China 110, 111 and collapse of 13, 15, 97, 98, 113, 116 and Egypt 45 and Germany 291 and India 96 and Israel 109, 110, 126–7 and Japan 237 and Jews 64 and Middle East 26, 112 and USA 69 and Zionism 125–6 see also Former Soviet Union (FSU); Russia space 166, 268–9 SPD see Social Democratic Party of Germany Spiegel, Der 292, 294 Sprinzak, Yosef 241 spy satellites 268–9 Sri Lanka 191, 209 Stalin, Joseph 18, 19, 20, 44, 126, 290 START Treaty 143 Stern Gang 23 Steyn, Hannes 218, 230n.72 Straits of Tiran 48, 73, 191 Strang, Sir William 25 Strauss, F. J. 293 Stumpf, Waldo 229n.68, 230n.72

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344

ISR AEL

AND THE

Stuxnet 21, 65 Sudan 121, 274–5 Suez Crisis 9, 157 and Australia 302 and Brazil 191–2 and France 5, 45, 47 and Germany 289, 292 and Great Britain 25, 26, 27, 34 and Greece 283 and India 15, 95–6 and Soviet Union 19 and USA 20 Sugihara, Sempo 17, 238, 240 suicide bombings 161, 172, 181n.8 Sun Yat-sen 108 Sunni states see Gulf states El-Surani, Gamal Omar 307 Sutemi, Chinda 237 Suzman, Helen 7 Suzuki 242, 245 Suzuki, Zenko 243 SWAPO see South West Africa People’s Organisation Syria 56, 73, 121, 247, 252 and Australia 305 and Brazil 15 and France 4, 5, 42, 44, 52 and Georgia 139–40 and Israel 66, 161 and Lebanon 32 and Russia 18, 133–4, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143, 144–5, 146, 147, 149 and sanctions 77 and Soviet Union 19, 126, 127 and Turkey 12, 264, 265, 268, 269, 273, 274, 276, 280, 282 and USA 64, 65 Szold, Henrietta 70–1 Taiwan 14, 111, 117, 122 Tajani, Antonio 166 Takahashi, Korekiyo 236 Taliban 133 Tamir, Avraham 211 Tanaka, Kakuei 243 ‘Tapuz’ kibbutz programme 196

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WORLD POWERS technology 18, 63, 165 and Australia 316–17 and China 113, 117 and South Africa 215 and USA 21, 71 see also nanotechnology Tel Aviv 24, 235, 242–3, 250 Telem, Binyamin 212 Tempus 11, 164 terrorism 24, 78, 131, 135, 284 and China 121 and Europe 172 and France 50, 53, 55, 56, 168–9 and Germany 293–4 and India 102, 103 and Japan 235, 242–3, 253 and Kurds 274 and PLO 127, 158 and USA 64, 65, 69 see also counter-terrorism Tesher, David 302, 303 Thailand 314 Thatcher, Margaret 4, 31–3, 36n.1 Tiananmen Square massacre 14, 113, 116 Tito, Josip Broz 2, 13, 43 Tomen 17, 248 tourism and Australia 315–16, 319 and Brazil 196 and China 113 and Greece 284 and Japan 249 and Russia 18, 131, 140, 147, 149 and USA 70 Toyota 242, 247 trade 4, 5 and Australia 303, 305, 315, 316–17 and Brazil 16 and China 14, 118–19, 120 and European Union 10, 11, 156, 157, 162–3, 164, 165, 178 and Germany 295 and India 93, 102 and Japan 16, 17, 234, 235, 237, 241–2, 244–9 and Russia 18, 131, 136, 137, 140, 147

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INDEX and Turkey 12, 13, 265 and USA 71 Treaty of Rome (1957) 10, 156 Tripartite Alliance (1940) 237 Tripartite Declaration (1950) 72 tritium 8, 214, 219, 230n.70, n.72 Truman, Harry S. 20, 61, 64, 72 Tsur, Zvi 29 Tunisia 56, 148, 178, 274 Turkey 11–13, 130, 148, 264–5, 271–2, 276–7, 278–80 and the Balkans 270–1 and Cyprus 277–8 and Greece 283, 284 and Iran 272–3 and Islam 274–5 and Israel 265–9, 281–2 and Middle East 269–70 and Palestine 280–1 and Russia 18, 19, 125, 133, 137, 145 and USA 82n.14 Tutu, Desmond 224 two-state solution 5, 9, 15–16, 18, 251, 312 and Europe 161, 165, 167, 169, 172–3, 175–6, 180 Uemura, Kogoro 243 Uganda 2, 50 Ukraine 132 Ulbricht, Walter 6, 293 UN see United Nations UN Human Rights Committee 142 UNIFIL see United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 55–6, 176 L’Unité 52 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 133 United Kingdom see Great Britain United Nations 14, 158, 191–2 and Australia 299, 306, 307, 320 and Brazil 16, 188–9, 199 and China 111, 113, 115 and Great Britain 28, 30, 34 and India 15, 99 and Iran 18

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and Israel 63, 94, 301 and Japan 244 and Palestine 6, 169 Resolution 181 5, 42, 189, 297, 300 Resolution 242 48, 192, 193, 308 Resolution 338 308 ‘Road Map’ for peace 131, 198 and South Africa 205, 217 and Syria 133–4 see also ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution (3379) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 136, 171 United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA) 168, 170, 190 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 14, 93, 189, 299–300 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 100 United Russia Party 130, 140 United States of America (USA) 8, 10, 19–21, 70–6, 208, 313 and Australia 9, 10, 298, 305–6 and Brazil 188, 189, 190, 193 and China 13, 14, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116–17, 122 and Egypt 127 and Germany 289, 293, 294–5 and Greece 284 and Gulf states 139 and Hamas 11, 162 and India 15, 97, 103 and Iran 134, 135, 138, 143–4 and Israel 3, 61–5, 66–7, 79–80, 118, 210–11 and Japan 239, 241, 243, 245–6, 253 and Lebanon 32–3 and Middle East 26, 133 and pro-Israel lobby 76–7, 245 and public opinion 66–9 and Russia 129, 131, 143 and South Africa 218, 219–21 and terrorism 65–6 and Turkey 12, 267, 276, 277 and Zionism 1 see also anti-Americanism

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346

ISR AEL

AND THE

university studies 250–1, 317 Unna, Yitzhak 212 Uno, Sosuke 246 UNRWA see United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency UNSCOP see United Nations Special Committee on Palestine uranium 7 and Brazil 197 and Iran 21, 134, 135, 143, 147 and South Africa 202, 213–14, 229n.68 USA see United States of America USSR see Soviet Union Vakhirev, Ram 130 Vandervelde, Emile 42 Vargas, Getulio 188, 190 Vatican, the 15, 190, 191 Venezuela 16, 191, 197, 199 Venice Declaration (1980) 4, 10, 32, 158–9, 169, 294 Verwoerd, Hendrik 7, 204, 205 Vichy France 5, 48, 52–3 Vietnam War 13, 14, 20, 73, 110, 111 and Australia 302, 304, 306 Viljoen, Constand 212–13, 217, 218, 219 violence 3, 161, 162, 312 Vorster, B. J. 203, 212, 214 Wang Jingwei 237 Wannsee Conference (1942) 237 war crimes 167, 244, 274, 294 War of Israeli Independence (1948) 23, 24, 126 Washington Post, The 220 water 116, 195, 248, 316 Weekly Mail and Guardian 224 Weiser, Ron 318 Weizmann, Chaim 4, 41, 42, 237, 301 Weizmann, Ezer 101 West Bank 62, 65, 126, 131, 206, 303 and Europe 170, 172 and reoccupation 161, 162 and settlements 3, 11, 19, 21, 80, 99, 129 and USA 69

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WORLD POWERS Whitlam, Gough 9, 297–8, 304–8, 310, 316, 318, 321 Wilenski, Peter 312 Willesee, Don 304 Wilson, Harold 4, 29, 31, 33, 218 Wilson, Woodrow 63–4 Wolpe, Harold 202, 206 World Bank 15, 97 World Conference Against Racism 224 World Cup (2014) 16, 196 World Jewish Congress 313 World Jewish Review 207 World War I 41, 239, 266–7, 298 World War II 16, 26, 42, 103, 144 and Australia 298 and Brazil 188, 190 and France 43–4 and Japan 237–8 Wye River memorandum (1998) 160 xenophobia 215, 271, 272, 315 Yanaihara, Tadao 239 Yasue, Norihiro 238, 239 Yediot Ahronot 207 yellowcake see uranium Yeltsin, Boris 125, 128, 129, 130 Yemen 2, 121 Yishuv 70, 93, 103, 234, 237 Yisrael Beiteinu Party 148 Yom Kippur War (1973) 8, 10, 28, 29, 193, 294 and Africa 202, 206–7 and Australia 307, 310 and Europe 158 and France 49 and Japan 243 and South Africa 208 and Soviet Union 19, 126 and USA 73, 75 Yomiuri Shimbun 244 Yoshino, Sakuzo 239 Yugoslavia 14, 43, 104n.3 Zaire 8, 209, 216 Zenturk, Ardan 267

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INDEX ZFA see Zionist Federation of Australia Zhou Enlai 13, 110 Zimbabwe 197 Zionism 2, 10, 43, 62, 156, 216 and Australia 298, 302, 319 and Blum 41–2 and Brazil 16 and China 108 and Great Britain 64 and India 15, 99 and Japan 16, 17, 234, 235, 237, 253 and Soviet Union 18, 19

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and USA 68, 70 and workers 1, 3, 125–6 ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution (3379) 15, 16, 96, 193–4, 224 and Australia 308–9, 311, 313–14, 322 and Japan 17, 244, 247 Zionist Federation 205 Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) 302, 306, 312, 313, 318, 319 Zuma, Jacob 223 Zwartendijk, Jan 238

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