An Analysis of China's Attitudes towards ASEAN, 1967-76 9789814377409

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous organisation in May. 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focu sed on the many-faceted problems of modernization and development, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University. appointees from the Government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director, the Institute's .:::hief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom. without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore."

An Analysis of China's Attitudes Towards ASEAN, 1 967-76

by

Khaw Guat Hoon

Occasional Paper No. 48 Inst i tute of Southeast Asian Studies Pri ce :

S $ 7 00 o

Publ icati ons Revie w Comm ittee

Profe ssor Kern ial

s.

Sandh u (Chai rman)

Dr. Coraz on M. Sidda yao (Co-o rdina tor) Dr. Huynh Kim Khanh Mrs. P. Lim Pui Huen Mr. M. Ra Jaret nam Mrs. Chri stine Tan

An·AnaZysis of China's Attitudes Towards ABEAN, 196?-?6 is the forty-eiqhth in the Occasional Papers series published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. This series comprises professional papers issued periodically on a variety of topics of regional interest. The the work Boon and views or

responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Khaw Guat her interpretations do not necessarily reflect the the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

*

*

*

The Institute also publishes books and other papers from time to time in the following series: BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS: specialized sbudies on topics relating to Southeast Asia. SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS: an annual review of significant political, economic and social developments in the region, with emphasis on the ASEAN countries. Contents include analyses in depth of topics of regional concern and of specific issues on a country-bycountry basis. FIELD REPORTS: studies embodying the results of, . and based exclusively on, the Institute's research programme; RESEARCH NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS: contributions which represent the tentative results of ongoing research, and of discussions, printed for the purpose of stimulating further thought on specific subjects. TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: papers and proceedings of Trends seminars held on individual Southeast Asian countries; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: publications based on proceedings of International Conferences sponsored by the Institute itself or in conjunction with other organizations; CURRENT ISSUES SEMINARS: publications growing out of the Institute's Current Issues series of seminars, the objective of which is to bring together knowledgeable and interested people to discuss topics of current concern and importance to the region.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: a i med at wider circulation of Southeast Asian thinking, these publications are original contributions in English of Southeast Asians or translations of their significant papers and monographs appearing in one of the local or national languages of the region; ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME: publications based on the oral memoirs of persons who have made notable contribution to, or have first-hand information to impart on, certain aspects of the development of Singapore and Malaysia; LIBRARY BULLETINS: papers on Southeast Asian librarianship and bibliography. 25 August 1977

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

CONTENTS Page

I:

INTRODUCTION

1

II:

CHINA 'S OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

3

III:

CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE FORMATION OF ASEAN: AN ANALYSIS

5

IV:

CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASEAN, 1967-7 4

23

V:

TOWARDS A MORE POSITI VE APPROACH TOASEAN

30

VI:

CONCLUSION

45

APPENDIX A:

APPENDIX B:

APPENDIX C:

APPENDIX D:

"' TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE 'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA (Hsinh ua News BuZZet i n, 1 June 1974)

51

TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE"' OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE 'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIP PINES (Hs i nhua News BulZe tin, 54 10 June 1975) TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE"' ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE 'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Hsinhu a News BuZZe tin, 2 July 1975)

57

TEXT OF PREMIER HUO KUO-FENG'S SPEECH AT THE BANQUET GIVEN IN HONOUR OF PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW OF SINGAPORE ON 11 MAY 1976 (Hs i nhua News BuZZe tin, 12 May 1976)

60

I:

INTRODUCTION

The formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, lndonesia and the Philippines was severely From criticized by the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). alliance" "military a Peking's point of view, ASEAN was set up by the "reactionaries" ~f the five countries at the behest of "U.S. imperialism 11 ol The Chinese image of ASEAN was certainly contrary to the member-states' perception of the Association. From their point of view, ASEAN was not a military alliance; indeed the ASEAN Declaration did not mention co-operation in military matters. On the contrary, it placed emphasis on co-operation in the "economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields". Peking, however, denied that the primary purpose of the Association was to foster co-operation in these fields; indeed it believed that the Declaration's emphasis on such co-operation was a "lie" and that it was "sheer nonsense" that ASEAN was aimed at accelerating "economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region".2 It, in fact, alleged that behind the facade of economic co-operation, the Association was in reality a "military alliance directed specifically against China".3 Furthermore, it was an instrument which would be used by the Americans to carry out their anti-Chinese policies in Southeast Asia. As the USA was in "collusion" with the USSR, which too was opposed to China, ASEAN was sometimes described as a 4 "tool" of "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet social imperialism". Because of its perception of ASEAN as an anti-Chinese military alliance, a view which it held for several years, China looked with askance at the Association and repeatedly condemned it for its anti-Chinese and anticommunist posture.

1

Peking Review, 18 August 196 7, voL 10, no. 34,

2

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 10 & 12 August 1967.

3

Peking Review, 8 August 1967, vol. 10, no. 34, p . 40.

4

Hsinhua News BulZetin, 13 August 1967; People's Daily, 12 August 1967.

p, 40 ,

2

This negative attitude towards ASEAN, however, gave way to a more positive approach in the mid-1970s. By 1975, China was giving more credence to the assertions of the five member-countries that the primary purpose of the Association was to promote economic co-operation. It, moreover, no longer considered ASEAN to be a "tool" of the "imperialist" powers. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, it began to perceive a growing disaffection on the part of the five Southeast Asian countries with both the USA and USSR. In fact, the Chinese even had words of praise for their efforts in developing and strengthening regional co-operation. Through such co-operation, these countries were "winning victories in the defence of their national rights and interests. "5 The change in Peking's approach towards ASEAN took place in less than a decade. The transformation of attitudes within such a comparatively short period of time raises several questions. What caused China to abandon its critical stand on ASEAN? Why did it decide to give more credence to ASEAN's assertions that its primary interest was economic co-operation when only a few years back it had stated that the Association "deceptively" stressed on such co-operation to disguise the fact that it was a military alliance? What did it hope to gain from adopting a friendlier approach to ASEAN? An attempt will be made to provide explanations for China's initial negative reactions to ASEAN as well as to account for the change towards a more positive approach in later years. Discussion on the subject will be along the following lines; first, a brief comment on China's foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia; secondly, an analysis of Chinese reactions to the formation of ASEAN in 1967; thirdly, Chinese attitudes towards the Association in the years following its establishment but preceding Peking's change in policy and, finally, an analysis of the factors which led to a more favourable approach to the Association.

5 Hsinhua News BuZZetin, 27 December 1975.

3

II:

CHINA'S OBJECTIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In analyzing Chinese attitudes and policies towards ASEAN, it is important to take note of the fact that China's interest in that Assocatio n must be considere d within the broader context of its interest in Southeast Asia as a whole as well as within the context of its overall objective s in the region. Southeast Asia, because of its geograph ical proximity to and its historica l links with China, has always been of interest to Peking. Moreover, the region is one in which China's rivals have attempted to expand and exert their influence . China has always been concerned with these attempts for, from its perspecti ve, its rivals have one common goal: to curtail its activities~d In at the same time expand their inflUence in the region. encourage may them of particula r, it fears that one or more the Southeast Asian countries to adopt anti-Chin ese policies or organize these states into a military alliance aimed at itself. One of its objective s is to convince the Southeast Asian countries that they should adopt a nonaligne d approach in the1r foreign policies. Another is to minimize the activitie s and influence of its rivals in the region. States which refuse to adopt at the minimum a nonaligne d approach but on the contrary are favourabl y disposed to its rivals and welcome especiall y their military presence in the region are considere d unsympat hetic to China's objective s. China has perceived three countries to be its main rivals in the Southeast Asian region - the USA, USSR, and It should, however, be pointed out that although Japan. Peking is wary of the objective s and activitie s of these countries , it has not viewed all three with equal anxiety. At certain times, China seemed to be more concerned with the activitie s of one more than of the others. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was American activitie s in Southeast Asia - and indeed in Asia as a whole - that most By 1969 at the latest, however, aroused Chinese anxieties . disquiet over American activitie s was supersede d by concern with Soviet actions. Japan's thrust into Southeast Asia is of lesser concern to China, focused as its attention has been on the roles of the two superpow ers. This is so because Japan poses a much lesser threat to China than Indeed, the degree to does either the USA or the USSR. which the activitie s of an extraregi onal power meets with Chinese objection seems to depend on the intensity of the threat that power poses to Chinese security. The greater

4

that power is perceived to be a threat, the more virulent is China's denouncemen t of its activities in Asia. Japan is criticized by Peking less for its own activities in Southeast Asia than for its alleged role as supporter of American policies - and sometimes Soviet policies - in the region. Criticisms of Japan have more often than not been aimed at its role as a "lackey" in carrying out the "wishes" of the USA in Southeast Asia and its "collusion" with both the USA and the USSR in containing China. As such, when talking about China's rivalry with extraregion al powers, this paper intends to deal only with its rivalry with the two superpowers . The rivalry between China on the one hand and the USA and USSR on the other has had an influence on Chinese attitudes towards ASEAN. China would, of course, like the Southeast Asian countries, including the ASEAN members, to be favourably disposed to itself and to support its objective of minimizing if not excluding the presence of its two rivals in the region. Moreover, it would prefer these states to support the Chinese position on regional issues such as the war in Vietnam and the Laotian crises in which both itself and its rivals have an interest. This failing, it would be content if they adopt a neutral stand with regard to its rivalry with the two superpowers and to regional issues. Peking, of course, tends to adopt a friendlier approach to countries which are at least neutral and conversely a more critical approach to those which allow themselves to succumb to the influence of its rivals. From its perspective, an association made up of states which are on unfriendly terms with China but are on good terms with its rivals is one opposed to its interests, and hence unacceptable . However, an association a majority of whose are cordial to Peking as well as its rivals is one which can at the minimum be tolerated. In other words, the state of relations between the ASEAN countries and China on the one hand and between these countries and its rivals on the other is a crucial factor in influencing Peking's attitudes and policies towards the Association itself. Moreover, China's perception of the goals and functions of ASEAN is important. Are these inimical to Chinese interests? Is ASEAN a tool of its rivals in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia? Chinese perception of the goals and functions of ASEAN have, as noted, undergone modification s in the course of time and as perception changes, so do Chinese attitudes towards the Association.

5

III:

CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE FORMATION OF ASEAN: AN ANALYSIS

As noted, China's reactions to the formation of ASEAN were negative. Terms such as "counter-revolutio nary alliance", "twin brother of SEATO" and "instrument of U.S. imperial i sm" - all meant by the Chinese to be derogatory - were used with reference to the Association. Although the ASEAN Declaration emphasized on co-operation in nonpol i tical fields - six of its seven listed aims and purposes referred to co-operation in economic, social, scientific, administrative and technical matters with only one vague reference to the promotion of "regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter" - Peking chose to interpret ASEAN 's primary goal to be military co-operation among the five members to oppose "China, communism and the people".6 Indeed, ASEAN was seen to form part of "U.S. imperialism's ring of encirclement around China" for, although set up by the five Southeast Asian countries, Washington was behind the scene "pulling the strings".? The Association, according to Peking, also welcomed American military bases in the Southeast Asian region. Although the ASEAN Declaration in fact noted that "all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned", Peking apparently gave emphasis to the phrase noting that such bases were in these countries with their expressed concurrence and as such interpreted the statement as a "blatant" expression of support for an American military presence in the region. As the Pek i ng Review noted: In its Joint Declaration issued on August 8, this alliance of u.s. stooges openly supported the existence of the u.s . military bases in Southeast Asia, not even bothering to make any excuses for them. All this proves that this reactionary associat~on formed in the name of economic co-operation is a military

6 Psking

Rsvi~,

18 Auaust 1967, vo1. 10, no. 34, p. 39 .

7 Hsin.hua NBrJs Butlstin, 10 Auaust 1967.

6

alliance directed specifically against China.8 From these remarks, it is clear that Peking's hostile reaction to the newly-formed Association was due to several reasons: first, China perceived the ASEAN countries to be anti-Chinese; secondly, they were seen to be on close terms with its main rival, the USA, which, in its policy of containing China, was in collusion with the USSR; thirdly, composed of such states, it was believed that ASEAN itself could not but have unfriendly intentions towards China and be influenced by at least one of its rivals, the USA. In short, the individual members of ASEAN as well as the Association itself were perceived to be hostile to Peking while friendly to the USA whose policies in Asia were regarded as detrimental to Chinese national interests. To understand why Chinese reactions were negative, it is necessary to consider Peking's attitudes towards previous Southeast Asian attempts at regional co-operation. These attitudes, combined with China's perception of the state of relations between the five ASEAN countries and itself on the one hand and between these countrie s and its rivals on the othe~influenced its initial reactions to the Association. Chinese Attitudes Towards Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia ASEAN was, of course, not the first regional association to be established in the Southeast Asian region. Prior to its formation, there had been several attempts at regional co-operation which had led to the founding of such diverse organizations as SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) , ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) and MAPHILINDO. There existed, moreover, some associations of a wider Asian scale such as ASPAC (the Asian and Pacific Council) whose membership included some Southeast Asian countries . Peking's attitude towards ASEAN are partly influenced by its perception of the purposesand functions of the various organizations which preceded it. Of special significance was Chinese perception of SEATO.

8 Peking Review, 18 August 1967, vo1. 10, no. 34, p . 40 .

7

Indeed, it can be argued that the formation of SEATO influenced tremendously Chinese attitudes towards the other regional organization s - including ASEAN. - which were set up in its aftermath. The spectre of SEATO haunted China for many years. Peking believed that these organization s - if they included in their membership countries which were in SEATO - reflected the goals and purposes of SEATO and were hence anti-Chinese . As China's stand on SEATO is fundamental to an understandin g of its attitudes to other regional organization s, including ASEAN, it is necessary to elaborate further on the subject. SEATO, announced Peking, was an alliance rigged up against China9 which was not far removed from the truth for it was indeed aimed at containing China and the expansion of communism in the Southeast Asian . region. Although its members viewed it as a collective defence organization , as far as Peking was concerned, it was Furthermore, the Chinese argued that it ran agg r essive . counter to the provisions in the United Nations Charter with regard to regional organization s for collective In the first place, SEATO could not be said to defence . be a regional organization because "the count.ry which instigated and controls this outfit is the u.s. which lies more than 10,000 kilometres from Southeast Asia."lO Moreover, of its eight members, only two, the Philippines and Thailand, came from the region itself. As the former "The majority Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, said: Southeast not are organization of the members of this according SEATO, Asian countries . "ll In the second place 6 to Peking, did not meet the criterion of a collective defence organization . Such an organization is established for defensive purposes by states which are confronted with a real threat to their security; yet, Peking observed, no threat ,../as posed to SEATO members when that organization The alleged communist threat simply did not was formed. exist o It was in fact used as a pretext by the USA to 12 bring these countries together in a military alliance.

9 People's Daily, 13 September 1954. 10

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 7 June 1955.

11

Peking Review, 19 May 1961, vo1, 4, no. 20, p . 5 .

12

Hsinhua News BuZZetin, 7 June 1955 .

8

Far from being a collective defence organization, SEATO was, argued Peking, in fact formed for aggressive purposes, aimed as· it was against China and national liberation movements.l3 Moreover, it was a "tool of u ., s. aggression" in Southeast Asia.l4 Peking believed that the USA hoped to use that organization to extend its military power as well as pursue its aggressive policies in the Southeast Asian region. In particular, it was alleged that SEATO was intended to facilitate American interference in the Indochinese states. It was noted, for example, that a protocol in the SEATO treaty brought the three Indochinese states under its protection. As Peking interpreted it, the USA, under the Treaty, "could intervene in the domestic affairs of any Southeast Asian country under any pretext and suppress any national liberation movement."lS Given SEATO's objectives which were undeniably anticommunist and given the leading role of the USA in the organization, it was not surprising that China should have reacted with hostility to its formation. It should, of course, be borne in mind that in the 1950s, the USA was regarded by China as its foremost antagonist. As such, American military activities in Southeast Asia were watched with great concern by Peking. Chinese hostility towards SEATO did not abate in the years following its establishment. On the contrary, Peking became more and more agitated in face of what i t considered to be mounting evidence that the organization was being used as a tool by the USA in carrying out its 'aggressive designs" in Indochina. During the Laotian crisis of 1960 for example, China alleged that the Americans were trying their utmost to compel their "vassals" in SEATO to dispatch troops to "invade" Laos, attack the "patriotic Laotian armed forces" and support the "PhourniOum group" .16 Peking believed that the purpose of the SEATO Council Meeting of 27-29 March 1961, which took place in Bangkok, was to prepare for military intervention in Laos. Attention was given to · a Council declaration which noted that if the situation in Laos worsened, 13

Hsinhua News BuZZetin, 31 March 1955.

14

Ibid., 9 December 1955.

15

Ibid . , 3 March 1955.

16

Peking Review, 13 January 1961, vo1. 4, no. 2, p. 14.

9

"members of SEATO are prepared, within the terms of the Treaty, to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstance s. nl7 At the opening session of the Enlarged Geneva Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Laotian Question on 16 May 1961, Foreign Minister Chen Yi criticized SEATO's "aggressive" functions in Southeast Asia. Among other things, he noted that The aggressive SEATO military bloc has become the principle tool of the United States for encroaching on the sovereignty of different countries, interfering in their internal affairs and incessantly creating turmoil in Southeast Asia. This bloc is the root cause of the tensions not only in Laos but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.l8 He then called for the abolishment of SEAT~ arguing that "only by abolishing this bloc can peace and security in Southeast Asia! including Laos, be preserved and consolidated ." 9 SEATO, however, was not abolished. Some of its members continued to intervene in Indochinese affairs. Cambodia, whose government adopted a neutral foreign policy and hence one acceptable to China, was subjected to "subversion , sabotage and military menace b~ certain The member countries of the SEATO military bloc."2 which Vietnam organization also paid attention to South Indeed, the Chinese were too came under its Protocol. extremely sensitive about American attempts to solicit the participatio n of SEATO members in the Vietnamese War. From Peking's point of view, the USA used the SEATO meeting of 13-14 April 1964 to "dragoon" its allies into "going along" with its "adventures" in Vietnam as well as helping it "pull its chestnuts out of the South Vietnamese

17

Peking Review, 7 April 1961, vol. 4, no. 14, p . lL

18

Ibid., 19 May 1961. vol. 4, no. 20, p , 6, speech, see pp , 5-7,

19

Ibid., 19 May 1961, vol. 4, no. 20, P· 6.

20

Ibid., 27 October 1961, vol. 4, no. 43, P• 12.

For text of Chen Yi 's

10

21 Eventually, four members -the Philippines, fire . " Thail an d, Australia and New Zealand - did send troops. From t .he Chinese point of view, therefore, SEATO was a threat to China's national interests and an obstacle to the at tainment of its objectives in Southeast As i a . For its main purpose was containing China and the expansion of its influence in a region which, because of its geographical pos it ion, is considered of importance to the Chinese Government . SEATO moreover allegedly had inten tions of suppressing "national liberation movements", many of which had Chinese support . Through such movements, forces friendly to Peking might come into power and establish governments which would be more favourably disposed t o the Chinese than would the i ncumbent governThe military organization , moreover, appeared to ments. be abetting American policies in Indochina and supporting elements in each of the three states under the SEATO Protocol which were hostile to China and communism. As an ally of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its war with t he Republic of Vietnam, as a friend of Cambodia and a sympat h i zer of the Pathet Lao, China could not look with equanimity at what it perceived to be SEATO intervention in the internal affairs of these states. Hostility towards SEATO was, as noted, carried over to the other regional organization s set up in its aftermath . The inclusion in their membership of countries which were in SEATO or were pe rceived to be pro-American was sufficient to make China susp i cious of Peking repeatedly declared t he i r purposes and functions. linked to SEATO or either were s organization t hat these in their anti-..,Chinese were or SEATO" of other(s) "twin b r they that alleged moreover, Chinese, The orientation. biddin~of the at not if approval, the were se t up with the USA and hence were sympathetic to the goals of "U . S . imperialism" . It was noted, for example , that ASA was "rigged up" by the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia "on direction" from the USA . 22 Two of these states - the

21 Peking Revi ew , 24 April 1964, vol . 7, no. 17, p . 19 . One member, France, r efused to endorse fully the joint communique and dissociated itself from those paragr aphs which dealt with the situation in Vi e t nam . 22

Ibid . , 12 Mar ch 1961, vol . 4, no , 10 , p . 13 .

ll

Philippines and Thailand - were of course members of SEATO . Although Malaysia was not, it was regarded by China as a "satellite of u.s. imperialism".23 Tracing the events which led to the formation of ASA in 1961, the Hs in hua New s BuZZet i n stated that, initially, these countries had "plotted" to form a Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Alliance in an attempt to get the neutral Southeast Asian states involved in an organization which would be "tied up" with the American-controlled SEATO . Burma , Cambodia and Indonesia however were not in t erested in joining the proposed "alliance". As a result, Malaysia, t he Philippines and Thailand had to rest content with a more limited association which became known as ASA . 24 ASA was denounced by Peking as a "substitute for SEAT0" . 25 As such, it, like SEATO, was an "anticommunist alliance" . These negative attitudes towards ASA were naturally carried over to ASEAN which was sometimes viewed as an expanded ASA or an expanded MAPHILINDO . MAPHILINDO whose members were Malaysia , the Philippines and Indonesia also aroused Chinese suspicions. At the time of its formation, Peki ng Rev i e w printed a comment made by D. N . Aidit of the Communist Party of Indonesia whose views were probably shared by the Chinese. He said that "some people in Indonesia feared that MAPHILINDO would become a son of SEATO or a nephew of ASA". According to him, such fears were reasonable because "one of its members, Malaya, adheres completely to Britain's policy, and another, the Philippines , is well-known as a member of SEATO . " He further pointed out that,"Designs intended to drag our country through the front door into the imperialist bloc met with failure. Consciously or unconsciously, we should refrain from entering it through the back door. n26 Later, MAPHILINDO was denounced by Peking as yet another "substitute fo r SEATO" . About a year prior to the establishment of ASEAN, ASPAC was founded. Its founder members were Australia, 23

Peking Review , 17 March 1961, vo1 . 4, no. 11,

24

Hs i nhua News BuZZet in , 3 June 1966 .

25

I b i d , , 27 May 1966 .

26

Peki ng Review , 12 Jul y 1963, vol. 6, no . 28, p . 16 .

p . 13 .

12

Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam and Taiwan. ASPAC was, as can be expected, condemned as an anti-Chinese alliance. All its participants, declared Peking, were "tools" of "U.S. imperialism" or "accomplices, satellites or lackeys of u.s . irnperialism".27 Three of its members -Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand - were to be founder-members of ASEAN in 196 7. In short, the stigma of SEATO hung over these organizations. Any interest the USA took in Asian initiatives for regional co-operation aroused Chinese suspicions about the purposes behind such co-operation. As China began to view SEATO as "inept and ineffective" it became more and more convinced that the USA was trying to set up a new organizations to replace it. And indeed, SEATO was faced with internal problems in the 1960s; doubts were even expressed by some of its member-countries about the effectiveness and utility of the organization. Thailand, doubting its efficacy, wanted a bilateral arrangement with the USA whereby the latter would make a commitment to its security outside the framework of SEATO. France had lost interest in the organization and in fact had, against the wishes of the Americans, established diplomatic relations with China in 1964. Another country, Pakistan, was on good terms with Peking. China believed that the USA, aware of the problems faced by SEATO, had "long" thought of setting up another organization which would be along the lines of SEATO but which would however, be more cohesive and united in its purpose . 28 ASA and MAPHILINDO, argued Peking, were in fact meant to be its "substitutes" but they were "paralyzed" or "disintegrated" at the ve;y outset because of internal and external factors.29 Allegedly sympathetic to American wishes to create an alternative to SEATO, the members of both ASA and MAPHILINDO together with Singapore decided to set up ASEAN which would be a "revamped version of SEATO". 30

27 Hs i nhua News Bulleti n, 1 July 1966.

28

Ib i d., 1 July 1966 .

29

Ib i d . , 4 June 1966 .

30

Peking Revi ew, 18 August 1967, vol. 10, no. 34, p . 40 .

13

The ASEAN Countries ' Relations with China and its Rivals As noted, two other factors must be taken into considera tion if China's negative attitudes towards ASEAN are to be understoo d: the relations of the ASEAN coutries with China on the one hand and with its main rivals on the other . These two will be discussed together. Of importanc e From Peking's is Chinese perceptio n of these relations . y towards unfriendl or friendly perspecti ve, are these states rivals? China? Are they sympathe tic to its It appears that to be considere d friendly, Southeas t Asian states should meet with some if not all of these ll} willingne ss to recognize the governmen t of criteria: the CPR as the sole governmen t of China and to ·establish relations with it on the basis of the Five Principle s of Coexisten ce; (2} disavowal of the concept of two Chinas and concomit antly acknowled gement of or respect for China's positi on that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory ; ( 3} disallowa nce of foreign, especiall y u.s., military bases in their territory ; ~4} repudiati on of American policies in Southeas t Asia in general and in Vietnam in particula r or, at the minimum, adoption of a neutral policy towards the conflict in Vietnam; (5) adoption of a nonaligne d orientati on in their foreign policies. In other words, Peking viewed as unfriendl y states which refused to recognize the governme nt of the CPR as the sole governme nt of China and to establish relations with it based on the Five Principle s of Peaceful Coexisten ce, which pursued a two-China policy and supported American policies in Vietnam and which allowed the establish ment of foreign bases in their territory . As will be seen, from Peking's viewpoin t, the five ASEAN countr1es fell short of the definitio n of a friendly state . Of course, it should be noted that from the perspecti ve of these countries , China was a hostile power, one which posed a Its revolutio nary credo of threat to their security. communis t movements against for support its , war s ' people pursuit of policies which its nts, the incumben t governme they believed would adversely affect not only their own security but the stability of the Southeas t Asian region were, to them, indicatio ns of Chinese hostility . When ASEAN was formed in 1967, four of its five founder-m embers - the Philippin es, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore - neither recognize d nor had diplomat ic relations with the CPR. Only one - Indonesia - had

14

diplomatic relations with China but the relations between the two countries had deteriorated since the Gestapu Affair of 196531 and, as will be seen, were suspended shortly after the establishment of ASEAN. These five countries, moreover, were perceived by China to be pursuing foreign policies which were deemed inimical to its interestse All, for example, were favourably disposed to the USA and were susceptible to its influence; most supported its policies in Indochina while some allowed American bases in their terri tory. As no t ed, of the five countries, only Indonesia had diploma·t ic relations with China at the time of ASEAN' s formation. However, since the Gestapu Affair and the subsequent takeover of power by Suharto, a rapid deterioration of relations had occurred between the two countries. From Peking's point of view, the new leadership was adopting policies which were aimed at destroying the good relations which had existed between itself and Jakarta when Sukarno was in power. Indonesia, moreover, was allegedly abandoning its nonaligned foreign policy for one which was pro-American. At the same time, it appeared to be moving closer to the USSR. Shortly after Suha.rto came into power, an order was issued banning the Communist Party of Indonesia which was pro-Chinese in its outlook. Indeed, the Chinese declared that in the wake of the Gestapu Affair, a violent "anticommunist storm" had swept the country when the "right-wing reactionary forces" launched an "unprecedented" campaign of persecution and suppression against the PKI and other "progressive forces".32 Moreover, "lies and slanders" were made about China and threats and intimidations against Chinese diplomatic missions.33 AntiChinese activities were widespread and included demonstrations in front of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta on 3 February 1966 and a raid into the Jakarta office of the Hsinhua News Agency on 9 March 1966. These actions, carried out 31

The plotters in the Gestapu or 30 September Affair of 1965 attempted to assassinate seven Army generals on the night of 30 September . Six were assassinated while General Nasution escaped. The Army High Command accused the PKI leaders and Communist Chinese agents of parti cipating in the assassination plot . One consequence of the affair was an anticommunist purge in the country and, in early 1966, the PKI and its affiliates were officially banned .

32

Peki ng Review , 1 April 1966, vol.

33

I b i d. , 22 Oc tober 1965, vol . 8, no . 43, p . 5 ,

9, no.

14 ~

p . 22.

15

by "riqht-winq reactionary forces" and "hooliqans ",were purportedly sanctioned by the qovernment itself.34 The Chinese Government handed several notes to the Indonesian Ambassador in Pekinq in protest aqainst such actions. The Chinese Embassy in Djakarta also made protests to the Indonesian Foreiqn Ministry. However, anti-Chinese activities continued to take place.35 The Indonesian Foreiqn Minister's alleqations that China was interfering with the internal affairs of Indonesia furthermore offended Peking. So disaffected were the Chinese with the new Indonesian leadership that their news media began exhorting the Indonesian people to unite and overthrow the "fascist military regime" .36 While relations between Indonesia and China deteriorated , the relations between the former and the USA took a turn for the better, much to Peking's concern. Foreiqn Minister, Adam Malik, in his foreign policy statement of May 1966 declared that Indonesia wanted to improve its relations with the usA37 whose policies in Asia had been much criticized by Sukarno. Such a votte faae, albeit to be expected in view of the change in the top leadership, was nevertheless a blow to the CPR. Shortly after Malik's statement, the Chinese news media beqan to make adverse comments about "U.S.-Indone sian collaboratio n" in the economic and military fields. It was pointed out, for example, that at the bidding of the USA, the "riqht-winq military clique" was attempting to "riq up" an anticommuni st alliance in Southeast Asia.38 These efforts allegedly resulted in the formation of, of course, ASEAN. Decryinq the new Indonesian policy of welcom1nq fore1gn investment, particularly "U.S. monopoly capital", the Bsinhua News BuLLetin noted that under the "Suharto-Nas ution clique", Indonesia was being reduced to the. status of a "U.S. colony".39 34

Bsinhwa News

35

Ibid., 3 April 1966; 11 May 1966.

36

Ibid . , 19 August 1967; PeopLe's DaiLy, 18 August 1967.

37

Bsinhua News BuLLetin, 11 May 1966 .

38

Ibid . , 4 June 1966 -

39

Ibid . , 7 September 1967.

Bu~Zetin,

11 June 1966.

16

Indonesia's improved relations with the USSR also aroused Chinese concern. Peking reacted negatively to Malik's statement of 5 May 1966 that Indonesia desired to have good relations and co-operation with the Soviet Union. The fact that Indonesia was pursuing an antiChinese policy while expressing an interest in fostering friendly relations with the USSR disturbed the Chinese. It was repeatedly alleged that the Soviets were encouraging the new Indonesian leadership in its opposition to China and avidly courting the "right-wing reactionaries" by providing them with various kinds of loans and weapons. 40 Indeed, it was alleged that since Suharto came into power, Soviet weapons had been "streaming" into the country. 41 In short, at the time of ASEAN's formation, Peking was fast losing a valuable friend in Indonesia. At the same time, it appeared that that country was turning to the USA and the USSR which, according to Peking, were in "collusion" against China. The Chinese loss was seen to be a gain for its rivals whose influence was seen to wax while that of China was seen to wane. China's attitudes towards the Philippines and Thailand were influenced by fundamentally similar factors. Both supported the American policy of containing China and entered into an American "military bloc", SEATO. Both had security arrangements with the USA and allowed American military bases in their territories. Both toed the American line with regard to the war in Vietnam and indeed sent troops, at the request of the USA, to South Vietnam. Before Thailand joined SEATO, the Chinese news media had cautioned the Thai leaders not to allow their country to be used as an instrument of "U.S. aggression" in Southeast Asia. Thai·land, it was declared, could either . join that aggressive military bloc or opt for a policy of developing friendly relations with China on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It, however, "deliberately" allowed itself to be drawn into the American camp. In doing so, it rejected the alternative of establishing friendly relations with China. ·•

40

Peking Review, 19 May 1967, vo1. 10, no. 21, p. 23.

41

Ibid . , 9 September 1966, vo1. 9, no. 37, p. 36. However, as Robert Horn pointed out, Soviet-Indonesian relations were not free from tensions. See R. Horn, "The Soviet Perspective," in S. Chawla, M. Gurtov & A.G. Marsot, eds., Southeast Asia Under The New BaZanoe of Power (New York: Praeger Books, 1974), p. 34.

17

Thai policies towards Indochina not surprisingly antagonized Peking which repeatedly noted that Bangkok always sided with Washington in its "aggression" in the three Indochinese states. Furthermore , Thailand allowed its terri tory to be used as a "forward base" by the Americans in their "aggressive policies"42 and indeed became actively involved in Indochinese affairs. When the Thai Government announced on 3 May 1966 its decision to send troops to South Vietnam, Peking reacted angrily.43 The Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the Thai decision in a statement which further noted that

u.s.

imperialism has been using the Thai reactionarie s as tools for its aggression against Vietnam and the other Indochinese states. It has long been directing the Thai reactionarie s to commit naked intervention in Laos and uninterrupte d acts of provocation and aggression against the Kingdom of Cambodia. In particular, Thailand has become an imperialist military base for the u.s. aggressor in the u.s. imperialist war of aggression against Vietnam.44 To assist American "aggression ", Thailand allowed U.S. aircraft to be based in its territory and these were used to strike at targets in the DRV. Moreover, most of the American planes which bombed the "liberated areas" of Laos took off from bases in that country. The Hsinhua News BuLletin (8 May 1966) claimed that the USA was building "airfields" which would be capable of servicing B-52 bombers.45 In fact, only one airfield capable of supporting this aircraft was built in Thailand, the one at Uttapao.

42

Hsinhua News BulLetin, 20 May 1966.

43

China alleged that Thailand had sent ten transport plane pilots and a maintenance crew of seven to Vietnam in 1964. Ibid., 5 May 1966 .

44

Ibid., 14 May 1966.

45

Ibid., 8 May 1966; Peking Review, 15 October 1965, vol. 8, no . 42, p. 8, & 20 May 1966, vol. 9, no. 21, p. 41 .

18

Thai involvement in the internal affairs of Laos and Cambodia had long been criticized by the Chinese. For example, it was alleged that in 1961 Thailand sent no less than six fully-equipped battalions to Laos.46 It, moreover, repeatedly committed "naked intervention" in Laotian affairs. Thai armed forces also made armed incursions into Cambodian territory.47 It was alleged that on several occasions, the Thais, at u.s. command, joined the "puppet regime" in South Vietnam in staging military provocations against that country.48 The Philippine leaders, like their Thai counterparts, were regarded by Peking as "running dogs" of "U.S. imperialism". Indeed, although the Philippines had gained independence in 1946, the Chinese alleged that it continued to remain under American control. 49 That country was of course a founder-member of SEATO; indeed Manila was host to the conference which led to its establishment in 1954. Like Thailand, the Philippines too became a major base for "UoS. imperialist aggression" against Vietnam. It was noted, fof example, that most of the American troops and munitions sent to Vietnam from the USA passed through that country en route. The Peking Review even alleged - unjustifiably - that some of the aircraft which made bombing raids into the DRV and the "liberated areas" of Laos were based in the Philippines.SO Indeed, . the Chinese argued that the American bases in that country played an important role in the Vietnam War for they not only constituted transhipment centres for the airlifting of troops and supplies on a large scale from the USA to Vietnam but provided hospitals and rest houses for American soldiers wounded in the war. Two bases were considered particularly· important: Clarke Airforce Base, the main supplying centre for the American Air Force in Southeast Asia and the u.s. Naval Base at Subic ~ay where ships of the U.S.Seventh Fleet obtained

46

Peking ReviewJ 2 March 1962, vol. 5, no. 9, p. 7.

47

Hsinhua News BuLLetin, 14 May 1966.

48

Ibid., 9 May 1966.

49

Peking Review, 18 November 1966, vol. 9, no. 47, p. 39.

50

Ibid., 18 November 1966, vol. 9, no. 47. p. 39.

19

51 Hsinhua News fuel, ammunitions and replenishme nts. Bulletin had this to say about the Clarke Air Base: "Hardly any U.S. transport planes from the U.s. reached Not South Vietna'In without a stop in the Clarke Base. 11 52 only did the Philippines allow American troops and supplies to pass through its territory on their way to Vietnam and 11 11 perrni t American bases there to be used for aggressive purposes, it even sent some of its troops to that country 11 in support of the American war of 11 aggression • On 11 April 1966, the House of Representat ives passed a bill which provided for the dispatch of over 2,000 troops to Vietnam. In June, the Senate approved the bill which came into force when signed by President Marcos on 14 July.53 There can be little doubt that China's negative attitudes to both Thailand and the Philippines stemmed primarily from the fact that both supported the American policy of containing communism in Southeast Asia: both, moreover, were involved in the war in Vietnam indirectly, by allowing the USA to use its bases in their territories for its operations in Vietnam, and directly, by sending some of their troops to that country. Their participatio n in SEATO was indeed condemned by Peking but it was their support for American policies in Vietnam which most antagonized the Chinese for, as events showed, mere membership in SEATO did not in itself constitute the primary reason for Chinese hostility to either country. In other words, a country, just by being a member of that military bloc,need not necessarily meet with Chinese For example, France was a member of SEATO antagonism. when it established diplomatic relations with China and continued to remain a party to the Treaty while relations between the two countries improved. Pakistan, another member, was on good terms with Peking. Both, however, were not inclined to follow the American policy of containing China and neither supported American policies in Vietnam. It can therefore be argued that their membership in SEATO was not in itself the factor for Peking's negative attitudes to both Thailand and the

51

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 2 June 1966.

52

Ib1d.,

53

Ibid., 29 May 1966 & 14 July 1966.

~June

1966.

20

Philippines . As will be seen, relations between these two countries and China were established when both were still members of that military organization. It seems clear that. it was their support for American policies in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular that .most aroused Chinese displeasure . 54 · Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore neither recognized nor established diplomatic relations with China . Howeverv unlike Thailand and the Philippines, neither joined an Ame.rican-led military bloc nor had bilateral security arrangements with Washington . Both therefore could not be said to fall within the "U . S " imperialis t " camp. However, from Peking 1 s point of view, bot.h were still "U . S. lackeys" . While M~laysia and Singapore did not recognize China, the latter ; on its part, refused to recognize Malaysia or the existence of Singapore as an independent state in its own right on its separation from the Federation in 1965. Indeed ~ Peking looked upon West Malaysia and Singapore as comprising one country - Malaya - and for several years referred to their leaders as the "Rahman-Lee Kuan Yew clique" . The Feder at;ion of Malaysia, which was formed in 1963, was denounced as a "neocolonialist plot" by the Chinese . Chou En-lai, for example, said that Mal aysia is an artificial creation of Britain in collusion with the United Stat.es . . . • It is well known that there exists a Malaya on the globe but no such thing as "Malaysia" . 55 The Federation, moreover, was meant to be an "ant.icommunist bulwark" in the Southeast Asian region. Peking alleged that the USA showed "extraordinary enthusiasm" for its formation as it would serve its interests . It furthermore accused the Americans of wanting to collaborate with the 54

Melvin Gurtov and Frank Langdon, for example, argue t hat China's endorsement of the rebellion in Thailand is due to Thai involvement in the Indochinese war. See M, Gurtov~ China and So utheas t Asia The Politics of Sur'1JivaZ (Lexington, Mass , : Heath Lexington Books, 19 71) , pp . 19ff ., and F . Langdon~ "China's Policy Towards Southeast Asia," in M. Zacher & R. S, Milne, Con fl i ct and S tability i n Southeast Asi a (New York: Anchor Books, 1974) p . 31L $

55

Hsinhua News BuZ.Z.etin, 24 January 1965 .

21

British to suppress "people's national independe nce movements " in its territori es and of having designs to plunder its rich resources and eventuall y put it under their control and use it as a "base for aggressio n" in Southeast Asia.S6 The fact that the "Rahman-L ee Kuan Yew clique" refused to join a U.S.-led military bloc was admitted by the Chinese . However, this by no means spared the Ma.laysian and Singapore an leaders from accusatio ns that they were toeing the Western line in internati onal politics . It was noted, for example, that "Although it LMalaysia ] has not joined the Manila military bloc, it has consisten tly followed the line of the Western countries in internati onal affairs."S 7 It was sympathe tic to American policies in Southeast Asia in general and in Indeed, it supported "U . S . Vietnam in particula r. aggressio n" in Vietnam and in fact served the American war efforts . SB For example, American troops were allowed to spend their leave in Malaysia; u.s. forces as well as the troops of the "reaction ary clique" of South Vietnam were tra i ned in jungle warfare; it even sent "strategi c war materials " to Saigon.S9 Moreover, on an issue which touched d1rectly on China's national interests - the issue of Taiwan - Malaysia allegedly followed the twoChina pol1cy of the Americans . The opening of a Taiwanese consulate in Kuala Lumpur in 1964 was received with much hostility by Peking.60 Singapor e's position on the war in Vietnam too antagon1z ed the Chinese . It was pointed out that the Singapore Governmen t not only supported American policies in Vietnam but suppresse d local demonstra tions which expressed support for the Vietnames e people's "struggle

56

Peop Le 's

~7

Pek~ng

58

Bs i nhua News

59

Peki ng

60

DaiLy~

29 September 1963 .

Review, 3 March 1961, vol. 4, no , 9, p . 6 . BuLLetin~

1 November 1966.

5 January 1965, vol . 8, no . 3, pp . 14-15. Malaysia &ent some police equipment to Sai aon in 1961 which Hanoi denounced as "strateaic war materials" . China's allegations that the equipment was i n fact "strategic war materials" suppor·ted ·the North Vietnamese position . Ibid . , 11 December 1964, vol. 7, no . SO, p. 29 . Review~

22

against u.s. imperialism". 61 Moreover, the island exported steel plates and building materials to South Vietnam which were used by the Americans in their "aggression" against the "people". Although Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had proclaimed Singapore's neutrality with regard to the war in Vietnam, the island was "in reality" a "supply base" for "U.S. aggression".62 In short, China believed that the five membercountries of ASEAN were anti-Chinese and anticommunist. Except for Indonesia, none had ever established diplomatic relations with Peking and even that country, as will be discussed later, suspended its relations in late 1967. None, from Peking's point of view, was neutral in its foreign policy; all, on the contrary, were susceptible to American influence and were sympathetic to the U.S. policy of containing China. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were specifically criticized for abetting, in varying degrees, American policies in Vietnam. China suspected that the influence exerted by the USA over these countries would be extended to ASEAN itself and that their pro-American policies could not but result in ASEAN's adoption of a pro-American stance. At the same time, China was worried about Soviet expansion in the ASEAN region although, for a variety of reasons, the influence of the USSR was not as great as that of the USA. At the time of ASEAN's formation, only two countries had diplomatic relations with Moscow Indonesia and Thailand. However, although the USSR did not as yet have diplomatic relations with the other ASEAN countries, there 'i.v~re signs they were becoming more receptive to Soviet overtures. For example, trade delegations were exchanged with Singapore in late 1965 and in late 1966 with Malaysia.63 It was also envisaged that diplomatic relations would be established in the near future. The Soviets too made approaches to the Philippines. The first Soviet journalist visited that country in late 1966. Thereafter, Soviet-Philippine cultural exchanges

61

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 25 October 1965.

62

Ibid., 20 August 1968.

63

Robert Horn, "The Soviet Perspective," in Chawla et al op. cit. • p. 39.

1

ed.

1

23

increased. As will be seen, there was a further improvement in the relations between the ASEAN countries and the USSR in the years following the formation of the Association. Thus, while all five countries were on good terms with the USA and were at the same time improving their relations with the USSR, all showed little inclination to be on friendly terms with China. Holding as it did the view that the five ASEAN members were antagonistic to itself and friendly to its rivals, China could not but look with misgivings at the Association which was set up by them in 1967. Despite the protestation s made by these countries that ASEAN was aimed against no state or group of states, Peking remained convinced that it was basically anti-Chinese . Although the ASEAN Declaration explicitly stated that the member-stat es' primary interest was co-operation in nonpolitica l matters, the Chinese believed that behind the facade of such co-operation , the five were collaboratin g among themselves and with the USA in military matters to oppose China and communism. Thus, China's attitudes towards ASEAN were partly influenced by the state of its relations with these five Southeast Asian countries and by their relations with its rivals.

IV:

CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASEAN, 1967-74

In the years following the formation of ASEAN up to about 1970-71, China remained basically hostile to the ASEAN countries. This in turn meant that it continued to harbour suspicions about the Association 's purposes and functions . However, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution which ended in 1969, there were indications of a change in the Chinese approach to some of these countries which would result in a more favourable attitude towards ASEAN itself. The factors that led to the change will be It should, however, be noted tnat discussed below. China's more positive approach to some of its members did It was not immediately result in its support for ASEAN. to media, news its through began, China that only in 1975 praise the Association . As noted, up to about 1970, China's attitudes towards the ASEAN countries remained basically negative. This was

24

due primarily to the fact that the relations between these countries and China showed little improvement.64 All five continued to maintain ties with the USA. Moreover, it appeared to Peking that they were gradually ameliorating their relations with the USSR. This state of affairs particularly disturbed China. For, although the Chinese continued to regard the USA as a rival and enemy, there were indications that their fears of the Americans were being super.seded by anxieties over the Soviet threat to their security. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet clashes of March 1969, China had become very much aware of the fact - if it had not been earlier - that the Soviet Union posed a greater danger to its security than the USA. As noted above, China tends . to focus its attention on the Asian activities of the country which is perceived to pose the greatest threat to its security. Peking feared that the Soviets would take advantage of the Nixon Doctrine which called for a lessening American role in Asia to strengthen their position in that continent. It could not but watch with concern what it perceived to be the continued state of good relations between the five ASEAN countries with the USA and their increasing rapport with the USSR. Moreover, four of these countries still refused to recognize Peking while the fifth suspended its relations in late 1967. In October 1967, the Indonesian Government announced the c l osing of its embassy in China and the withdrawal of all its embassy personnel; at the same time, it demanded that the Chinese Government close its embassy in Indonesia, its Consulate-General in Djakarta as well as all Chinese consulates in the country and withdraw all Chinese personnel before 30 October.65 The Hsinhua New s BuZZetin remarked

64

However, an obstacle to an improvement of relations between the ASEAN co untries and China was the latter's hostility to the fo r mer as well as its support for insurgent movements. Thanat Khoman, for one, noted that Thailand was ready to negotiate with China provided it was "ready and sincere enough to seek peace." Yuan-Li Wu, The Strat egi c Land Ridge : Peking ' s ReZations with ThaiZand, MaZaysia , Singapore and Indonesia (Stanford: Hoover Publications 147, 1975), p. 18.

65

Peking Review , 3 November 1967, vol. 10, no. 45, p . 5.

25

the suspensio n of relations was welcomed by China's rivals and that the Indonesia n action was especiall y "applaude d" by the USSR. 66 In the aftermath of the suspensio n of relations , Peking began to make more and more allegatio ns that both the USA and the USSR were tightenin g their grip over Indonesia . It was noted that the "U.S. monopoly capitalis t class" was setting up "huge concerns" to "plunder" the rich resources of the country. Indonesia , Peking again decried, was being reduced to the status of a "U . S. colony".6 7 Apart from economic ties, military ones between the two countries were increasin g. Hsinhua News Bu~Letin stated that the Americans had set up three "military bases" in Indonesia which were located in Sabang in North Sumatra, Bitung in North Sulawesi and Tjilatjap in Central Java. Moreover, under the American military aid programm e, groups of officers from t.he three branches of the Armed Forces were sent to the USA for training. 68 Peking came to the conclusio n that these military ties showed that the Americans were turning Indonesia into a base for their "aggressi on" in Southeas t Asia . 69 In its foreign policy, Indonesia , too, appeared to be toeing the American line. Peking found its change of policy towards Taiwan especiall y disconce rting. Even before diplomat ic relations between Indonesia and China were suspended , the former had shown a friendlie r attitude towards Taiwan and in Septembe r 1967 had invited a trade delegatio n to visit Jakarta. Peking took offence at this and alleged that the country was moving towards an adoption of a two-China policy in conformit y with American wishes. When Indonesia decided in July 1968 to exchange trade represen tative agencies with Taiwan, the Chinese noted that the decision was an important step towards the establishmen. ~ of relations with the "Chiang gang". 70 17 November 1967 .

66

Hsinhua News

67

Ibid . , 3 A1.1gust 1968 .

68

Ibid o,

69

Ibid . , 21 February 1970.

70

Ibid., 17 August 1968; Peking Review, 22 September 1967, vo1. 10, no . 39, p. 29 .

~7

BulZet~n,

November 1968.

26

As noted, the other four ASEAN countries continued to have no diplomatic relations with China. All were still cons .idered by Peking to be "lackeys"of "U.S. imperialism"; all were susceptible to American influence and sympathetic to American "aggressive" policies in Vietnam. Basically, therefore, from the Chinese perspective, there was no change in the policies of these countries towards the USA. However, there was a change in their policies towards the USSR, one which aroused Chinese anxieties for they appeared to be intent on improving their relations with the Soviets. Shortly after the formation of ASEAN, both Singapore and Malaysia established diplomatic relations with the USSR. This was viewed by the Chinese as a triumph for the Soviets who had long courted these countries~ Peking also feared that the establishment of relations might lead to closer relations and even "collusion" between these two ASEAN countries and the USSR. Tun Abdul Razak's visit to the USSR in May 1968 was cited as evidence of "MalaysianSoviet collusion".71 Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Moscow in 1970 and Singapore's granting of berthing facilities to Soviet merchant fleets were, as far as Peking was concerned, indications of Soviet-Singaporean "collusion" " · With regard to the other two ASEAN countries, the USSR too seemed to be making headway in its diplomatic offensive. Aware of the prevailing anticommunist feelings and fears of a communist threat in the Philippines, it took pains to assure Manila that it had no desire to intervene in Philippine internal affairs. In 1970, Marcos sent a three-man mission to Moscow whose purpose was to explore Moscow's willingness to provide long-term economic aid to the Philippines.72 Moscow intimated that it was ready to give aid as soon as President Marcos requested it and was fully prepared to exchange ambassadors. The Philippine President began ~o acknowledge that diplomatic ties with the USSR were "only a matter of time". Although Thailand has had relations with Moscow since 1947, contacts between the two countries were generally limited. In the 1960s, however, talks took place between the two countries about a trade agreement which was finally signed in 1970. In short, from Peking's point of view, the five ASEAN countries were still more favourably disposed to both the 71

Hs 1.- nhua News Bulletin, 29 May 1968.

72.

R. Horn,

P·

t..4

11

The Soviet Perspective, 11 1.n Chawla et al, eds . , op.cit.,

27

USA and the USSR than to itself . The Soviets had especiall y made considera ble diplomati c progress in the ASEAN region for a total of four countries now had Moreover, although the fifth, relations with Moscow. no relations , there were had the Philippin es, still indicatio ns that they might be establish ed in the near future. As noted, Peking was most disturbed about Soviet activitie s in Southeast Asia especiall y in the aftermath of the Guam Doctrine which it interpret ed as an indicatio n of weakening American power in Asia . It believed that the Soviets would take advantage of this as well as American disengage ment from Vietnam to attain for themselve s a predomina nt position in the region. Moreover, it was convinced that they had intention s of pursuing a policy of isolating and containin g China. The Soviet proposal in June l969 of a collectiv e security system for Asia appeared to the Chinese as evidence of their designs to establ1sh an anti-Chin ese arrangeme nt in Asia. Although the Soviet leade~ repeatedl y insisted that the Asian collectiv e system was not aimed at China, which too would participa te in the proposed system, the From Peking's perspecti ve, it latter thought otherwise . was in essence a "reproduc tion but ese was not only anti-Chin of SEATO" for it, like SEATO, aimed at isolating and containin g China. However, while SEATO was rigged up by the "U.S . 1mperial ists", the Asian collectiv e security system was the "brainchi ld" of "Sov1et social imperiali sm". Initially , Peking viewed the proposal as yet another step taken by the Soviet Union "in collusion " with the USA in the pursuit of their common objective of containin g Ch1na . 7 3 Later, however, it took the position that t .he system was a lever used by the Soviets in their struggle with the Americans for hegemony 1n Asia. The suggestio n that the system replace the existing military- political groupings in Asia, some of which included the USA, appeared to the Chinese to constitut e proof that the Soviets indeed had des1gns of replac1ng the Americans as the predomina nt Moreover, it was argued that the system power 1n Asia. would be a tool of the USSR for expanding its control over the Asian countries and China certainly did not relish the thought of Soviet expansion in Asia in the

73

Hsinh~a

News

Bullet~n,

26 June 1969 "

28

wake of what it viewed to be decreasing American influence. When the idea of an Asian collective security system was first mooted in 1969, the Chinese feared that it would meet with the approval of the Asian countries, including the ASEAN members, which had from time to time made statements expressing their anxieties of Chinese expansionism in Asia and Chinese threats to their security. Moreover, in view of the perceived good or improved relations between the ASEAN countries and the USSR, Peking probably believed that they would not be unsympathetic to the Soviet proposal. It could not have foreseen that the Asian collective security system would be met with coolness by all the five ASEAN countries. From about 1971-74, it appeared that China was uncertain about the position to take on ASEAN. On the one hand, it could not but view with disaffection the fact that all these five countries had relations with the USA while four had already established relations with the USSR. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, Peking began to express a greater interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the "bourgeois" governments in Western Europe and the Third World. In this period, four ASEAN countries, on their part, began to reevaluate their policies to China and evince an interest in ameliorating their relations with Peking. Reasons for this change in the foreign policies of both China and these countries will be discussed later. Furthermore, in November 1971, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, ~alaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand issued the ASEAN Declaration on the Neutralization of Southeast Asia which noted their desire for a Southeast Asian "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers." Although China did not immediately express support for the Declaration, it must have considered its implications: a neutralized Southeast Asia would certainly exclude its rivals - the USA and the USSR - from interfering in the affairs of the region and that would be in the interest of China itself. (The ASEAN countries, of course, also wanted to exclude Chinese interference in regional affairs.) If these countries were indeed sincere about their declared wish for a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality", they would have to adopt, sooner or later,

29

a nonalig ned approac h in their foreign policie s. Indeed, one country , Malaysi a, which was the chief propone nt of a neutral ized Southea st Asia, had, in the afterma th of a change in its leaders hip in 1970, declare d its desire to The switch from a predom inantly probe nonalig ned. ~ lestern to a nonalig ned policy on the part of all these states would certain ly be welcome to China. In this period when the ASEAN countri es were cons i dering the concept of a neutral ized Southea st Asia and when some of them were reevalu ating their policie s to Ch i na, it seemed impolit ic to continu e condemn ing Moreove r, Peking' s the Associa tion to which they belong. desire to cultiva te better relation s with these countri es Indeed, it called for a less hostile approac h to ASEAN. from ed refrain China years, these appeare d that in or tool" ialist "imper an denounc i ng the Associa tion as neither , as an associa tion of "reacti onaries ". However d i d it praise ASEAN for althoug h there were indicat ions that some of its members were changin g their policie s to China, none had as yet taken the step towards recogni zing In May 1974 an i t or establi shing relation s with it. AS EAN country , Malaysi a, finally took the lead in establi shing relatio ns with Peking. Ch i na took note of the reactio ns of the other ASEAN countri es to the Malaysi an decisio n to recogni ze and The Hsinhua News BuZZeti n establi sh relation s with Peking. Secreta ry of Public ine Philipp the quoted the comment of n was "an decisio the Informa tion to the effect that The Thai Foreign inspirin g develop ment to this region" . Ministe r was reporte d to have welcome d the move; furtherm ore, a spokesm an of the Thai Foreign Ministr y express ed the view that the Malaysi an decisio n would "help promote underst anding between Thailan d and China and acceler ate the develop ment A stateme nt of of relation s between the two countri es". the Foreign Ministr y of Singapo re noted that the establi shment of relation s between Malaysi a and China "will b:r·ing benefit s to Southea st Asia" and "contri bute to opening up the road to normali zation of relation s between Singapo re Its and China". Only Indones ia was cool in its reactio n. Fo r eign Ministr y declare d that the Malaysi an decisio n came as no surpris e; it noted, however , that it was up to each gov ernment to decide for itself when it wanted to normali ze i ts relation s with China . 74 The reactio ns were therefo re

74 Hsinhua News BuZ Zeti n, 31 May 1974 .

30

favourable on the whole. With the change in the attitudes of these countries to China - made possible by its willingness to normalize relations with these ASEAN members - Peking began to adopt a more positive attitude towards ASEAN itself.

VI:

TOWARDS A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH TO ASEAN

By 1975, a definite change could be discerned in Ch i na ' s attitudes towards ASEAN. No longer was it viewed as a military alliance with anti-Chinese objectives . Indeed, as noted, prior to 1975, the Chinese had stopped accusing the Association of being a "tool of U. S o imperialism". From 1975 onwards, however, they gave explicit credence to ASEAN's averred objectives of promoting co-operation in t he economic field and even had words of praise for the efforts of its member countries in strengthening regional co-operat i on.75 Several reasons can be posited for the change in Chinese attitudes towards ASEAN. One certainly was the overall change in Chinese foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution: Peking, as noted, began to express an interest in having diplomatic relations with more Third World countries. Another was the desire on the part . of some of the ASEAN countries to normalize relations with Peking which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between t .hree of them and China in 1,974 and 1975 . A third was the growing realization on the part of the Chinese that to protect their national interests, the five ASEAN countries might take positions on international issues which were different from those taken by their rivals. Indeed, it appeared that Peking finally realized t hat the five countries neither followed blindly American policy nor had any desire to be absorbed into the Soviet orbit of influence. Furthermore, it began to perceive a growing disaffection on the part of these countries with t he two superpowers .

75 Hs inhua News Bulle t i n , 23 February 1975 & 27 December 19 75 .

31

With the end of the Cultur al Revolu tion in 1969, China began to concen trate on norma lizing its extern al relatio ns which had been disrup ted during the period of intern al unrest . Ambas sadors were return ed to those coun tri es in which Peking had alread y establ ished embas sies. The Chines e, moreov er, evince d an intere st in establ ishing diplom atic relatio ns with more countr ies in both the West and the Third World. The Soviet threat to Chines e securi ty, percei ved to be more seriou s than ever since the clashe s in the Ussuri in March 1969 provid ed the primar y incent ive for norma lizing relatio ns with these states . In intern ationa l affair s, China was seen to be at a disadv antage if compar ed with the USSR becaus e of its isolat ion from and lack of formal ties with many countr ies i n the world . With regard to the Southe ast Asian region , this was certai nly the case. The USSR had diplom atic relatio ns with more countr ies in the region than did China. The former had relatio ns with four ASEAN countr ies while China had relatio ns with none. Circum stance s preced ing and during the Cultur al Revolu ' on were such that the estab li shment of relatio ns betwee n China and these countr ies was not feasib le. Suspic ious of China, percei ving it to have expan sionis t design s in the region , fearfu l of its interv ention in their intern al affair s, the ASEAN member s had no desire of recogn izing or establ ishing rela ions with it. On its part, China showed a greate r i n erest in suppor ting wars of nation al libera tion agains t the "react ionary govern ments .. which did not adopt a neutra l approa ch i n their foreig n polici es than in cultiv ating their friend ship . Howev er, the Ussuri armed clashe s made Peking increa singly aware of the import ance of having the fr~endly relatio ns with states in what it calls ies. countr World .. interm ediate zone .. , that is, the Third It especi allysa w the necess ity of changi ng its approa ch It realiz ed the need t o the Southe ast Asian countr ies. ies had of China, countr to assuag e the fears which these fears which could be exploi ted by the USSR to its own advant age and to the disadv antage of China itself . In view of the percei ved Soviet threat to its own securi ty, the task of offset ting the Soviet diplom atic offens ive Britis h withdr awal East ~ n Asia was partic ularly urgent . of Suez, Americ an diseng ageme nt from Vietna m,as well as the Nixon Doctrin~ furthe r argued for a policy of improv ing relatio ns with its Asian neighb ours and preven ting them from foster i ng close ties with the USSR " As noted, Peking believ ed that the Soviet s were only too eager to fill the

32

vacuum in Asia in the aftermath of what it perceived to be the weakening of American power in the region. An expansion of Soviet influence in Asia would certainly not be to China's interests. As long as the Asian countries - including the ASEAN ones - remained suspicious of China and Chinese intentions, there was a likelihood that they would be susceptible to Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda and amenable to its proposal of an Asian collective security system. Because the Soviet Union was now perceived to pose a greater threat to Chinese security than the USA, China became less perturbed with the latter's activities in Asia and increasingly more concerned wit.h the actions of It indeed became slightly more tolerant about the former. an American presence in Southeast Asia although it still preferred to exclude both the USA and the USSR from the The existence of American military bases was no region . longer as sharply criticized as it had been in the past. The security arrangements between some of the ASEAN countries and the USA no longer constituted an obstacle in the cultivation of friendly relations between the former and China for the Nixon Administration had evinced In an interest in normalizing relations with Peking. 1969, it had announced a series of unilateral acts of reconciliation toward China and in February 1972 1 President Nixon himself had paid a visit to Peking . Moreover, one issue which might have obstructed the improvement of relations between China and the ASEAN countries - the latter's support of the American role in Vietnam - had certainly become irrelevant by 1975 when the war ended in a communist victory in South Viet.nam. Indeed, prior to the defeat of Saigon 1 one ASEAN member, In fact, Malaysia, had established relations with China . since Tun Razak became Prime Minister in 1970, the Federation had adopted a neutral stand in its foreign policy and in fact had established relations with Hanoi in 1973. As noted, some of the ASEAN countries on t .heir part Although began to reevaluate their policies to China. each had its own reasons for doing so, all shared certain common preoccupations which called for a change in their British withdrawal, American disengagement, Ch i na policies . the Ni x on Doctrine and President Nixon's move to normalize relati ons with China were certainly factors taken into In future, each would have to rely consideration by all. mo r e on its own efforts in its external defence . Each

33

would sti l l be confronted with threats to its internal security for communist insurgents would probably continue their activities within its territory" Would not Peking be more prone to encourage subversive movements against those governments which refuse to recognize it or establish relations with it? It indeed might become less inclined to support insurgencies against governments with which it has cordial relations. Would it therefore not be in their interest to adopt a friendlier approach to Peking and perhaps even consider the possibility of a normalization of relations? The Chinese, on their part, were giving indications that they were prepared to adopt a friendlier posture towards the ASEAN countries and would welcome diplomat:ic relations with them. The donation by the Chinese Red Cross of canned food amounting to 200,000 yuan to the victims of a typhoon in the Philippines and its grant of M$625,000 worth of blankets and tinned food t.o Malaysian flood victims in late 1970 and early 1971 respectively were interpreted as signs of China's desire to cu ltivate friendly relations with these countries " The time was thus opportune to consider widening contacts \vi th Peki11g , For reasons of their own, therefore, China and some of the ASEAN countries began making cautious approaches to each other. Delegations representing trade , the medica l profession and sports, and even cons i sting of members of the legislatures of these countries were invited to pay visits to China. The Chinese, on their part, sent trade and sports delegations to these countries. For example, in May 1971 0 a nineteen-member Malaysian trade mission went to China at the invitation of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade.76 The mission in turn invited the Council to send a delegation to Malaysia which it did in August 1971; during its stay in Kuala Lumpur, it was received by the Malaysian Prime Minister . The following year, a group of Malaysian doctors paid a visit to China and in 1973 a Chinese table-tennis delegation was sent to Malaysia. The year 1973 saw exchanges in the field of sports between the CPR and Thailand . 77 In December of that year:, a Thai trade delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

76

Hs i nhua News Bulleti n , 14 May 19 71.

77

Ibid . , 21 June 1973 & 14 August 1973,

34

arrived in China as the guests of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade. A year later, Thailand sent another trade delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Commerce.78 In June 1~75, a Thai delegation consisting of the members of the Thai National Assembly visited China at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.79 The Philippines and Singapore also widened their contacts with the CPR. For example, a group of nineteen Philippine doctors went to China in April 1972. A year later, a Philippine trade mission arrived in Peking. In September 1974, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, wife of the Philippine President, was invited by Chou En~lai to pay a goodwill visit to his country; she went as a special representative of the Philippine President . 80 The following year, the President of the Philippine National Oil Company led a mission to China. A Singapore trade mission visited China in October 1971 at the invitation of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade. In 1972, a Chinese table-tennis delegation was received by Singapore and in 1975, the Singapore Foreign Minister paid a visit to the CPR . The approaches made by China and these four ASEAN countries to each other culminated in the establishment of relations between the former and three ASEAN countries within a period of less than fourteen months. Malaysia was the first country to recognize and establish relations with Peking; the Philippines and Thailand shortly thereafter did likewise. On 21 May 1974, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, announced that Malaysia and China had agreed in principle to establish diplomatic relations and that, at the invitation of Chou En-lai, he would himself pay an official visit to China to formalize the agreement on the establishment of relations between the two countries. The visit duly took place in late May of the same year. ·on 31 May 1974, a joint communique was issued by Chou and the Malaysian Prime Minister which, among other things, declared that their governments had decided upon 11 mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations as from the

78

Hsi nhua News Bulleti n, 22 December 1973 & 22 December 1974 .

i9

Ib i d , , 9 June 1975 .

80

Ib i d . , 18 September 1974 .

35

date this communiqu e is published ."81 Malaysia recognize d the "Governm ent of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal governme nt of China" and acknowled ged the position of the Chinese Governme nt that "Taiwan is an inalienab le part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." Moreover, it would close down its consulate in Taipeh. The communiqu e further stated that the differenc es in the social systems of the two countries should not constitut e an obstacle to the establish ment and developm ent of peaceful and friendly relations between them "on the basis of the principle s of mutual respect for sovereign ty and territori al integrity , mutual non-aggr ession, non-inter ference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existe nce." In other words, both countries would base their relations on the Five Principle s of Peaceful Co-existe nce. The t\vo governments moreover "are opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world." A few months after diplomat ic relations had been establish ed between China and Malaysia , Presiden t Marcos declared at a press conferenc e on 1 March 1975 that the Philippin es would normalize its relations with the CPR within the year and that he might personall y visit Peking for this purpose.8 2 Three months later, it was announced that Prime Minister Kukrit Prarnoj of Thailand would, at the invitatio n of the Chinese, ~ay an official visit to China at the end of June 1975.8 Three months after Marcos' statemen t, the Philippin es became the second ASEAN country to establish diplomat ic relations with China. Presiden t Marcos himself visited China in June and during his stay in that country issued, together with Chou En-lai, a joint communiqu e which noted that their respectiv e governme nts had decided upon "mutual recogniti on and the establish ment of diplomat ic relations at the ambassad orial level effective from the date of signature of this corrununiq ue."84 A few weeks later, the 81

Hsinhua News Buile tin, 1 June 1974,

82

Ibid . , 4 March 1975.

83

Ibid . , 26 June 1975 .

84

Ibid . • 10 June 1975 .

36

Thai Prime Minister also visited China and on 1 July he and Chou issued a communique which declared that the Thai and Chinese Governments had decided upon "mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations as from 1 July 1975."85 Several points noted in the Chou-Razak communique also appeared in the Chou-Marcos and Chou-Kukrit communiques. They touched upon Taiwan, on the principles which should govern the relations between China on the one hand and the Philippines and Thailand on the other, as well as on hegemonism. The governments of these two ASEAN countries not only recognized the "Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China" but declared their position on the issue of Taiwan. The Philippine Government "fully understands and respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese terri tory." It, therefore, would remove all its official representations from Taiwan within one month from the date of signature of the Chou-Marcos communique.86 The Thai Government "acknowledges the position of the Chinese government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, and decides to remove all its official representations from Taiwan within one month from the date of signature" · of the communique.87 The two joint communiques also noted that the differences in the political, economic and social systems should not constitute an obstacle to the development of peaceful and friendly relations between these two ASEAN countries and China. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were mentioned as the principles which should govern the relations of these countries. All these governments moreover declared that they were "opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or spheres of influence in any part of the world." 88

85

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 2 July 1975.

86

Ibid., 10 June 1975.

87

Ibid., 2 July 1975.

88

Point 5 in the Chou-Kukrit joint communique and Point ii 1n the Chou-Marcos communique.

37

The head of government of yet another ASEAN country, Singapore, also paid a visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese. Premier Lee Kuan Yew led a goodwill delegation to that country in May 1976 . Although diplomatic relations were not established, Premier Hua Kuo-feng noted that the visit of the Singapore Prime Minister "will certainly help enhance the mutual understanding and friendly relations between our two countries."89 Only with one country, Indonesia, did China's relations From the Indonesian point of show little improvement . view, China had not shown "goodwill" towards the Suharto Government; on the contrary, it was intent on subverting it. Peking, on its part, remained cr~t1cal of Indonesia o For example, Jakarta's involvement in East Timor was sharply criticized. Chinese representative to the United Nations, Wu Maio Fa, in a speech to the General Assembly on 8 December 1975 stated that "The member states of the United Nations should uphold justice, stop Indonesia's armed intervention and demand that Indonesia withdraw its invading forces and respect the right of the people of East Timo,r to independence."90 Chia.ese Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, noted that after hav1ng waged a "long unyielding and heroic struggle to share off the yoke of Portuguese colonialism", the people of East Timor under the leadership of Fretilin had proclaimed their independence on 2 8 November 1975. However, just as the East Timorese people were celebrating their independence, the Indonesian government, on fabricated pretexts, opposed their struggle for 1ndependence and brazenly launched a largescale armed invasion into East Timor on December 7 in an attempt to put down the patriotic forces and realize its long-harboured ambition to annex East Timor. The Chinese government and people strongly condemn the Indonesian government for this act of aggression . 9l

89

From lila Kuo-F·eng' s speech at the banquet given in honour· of Lee Kuan Yew , For full text. see Hs i nhua News BuLZetin. 12 May 1976.

90

Ib~d

91

lb1d • • 30 December 1976 .

. • 11 December 1975 ,

38

However, although there was little progress towards the normalization of relations between the two countries, China was pleased with what it perceived to be a growing awareness on the part of Indonesia Gf the dangers of superpower "hegemonic and power politics". As will be seen, Peking praised all the five ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, for taking measures to defend their "state sovereignty" and "economic rights" against exploitation by the "imperialists" and "social imperialists". It even supported Jakarta's stand on the issue of the internationalizat ion of the Straits of Malacca, the Chinese news media noting with satisfaction that Indonesia had on several occasions detained Soviet frigates for illegal entry into its territorial waters.92 Thus, although the relations between China and Indonesia showed little improvement, those between the latter and the two superpowers were perceived to be fraught with difficulties and in this China could take some comfort. The fact that,by 1975, three of the five ASEAN members had established relations with China while a fourth had · evinced a greater interest in fostering closer contacts . certainly led to a softening of Chinese attitudes towards the association. It must have appeared to Peking that these four countries were not only moving away from an intransigent anti-Chinese policy but were becoming more sympathetic to its stand on issues which are fundamental to its national interests. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand had recognized the government of the CPR as the sole legal government of China and had either acknowledged or expressed respect for its position that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory. After relations had been established, all three withdrew their consulate or ambassadorial representatives from Taiwan. All stated their opposition to hegemonism and all accepted the principle that differences in social, economic and political systems should not constitute an obstacle to the development of friendly relations between themselves and China. Moreover, certain actions taken by the three countries seemed to reveal their increased sensitivity to past Chinese criticisms of their participation in anticommunist organizations or the presence of foreign troops in their territory. For example, Malaysia decided in 1973 to withdraw from ASPAC, an organization perceived by Peking 92

Hs i nhua News BuZZetin, 9 July 1973.

39

to be anti-Chinese and whose membership included Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam.93 A few months later, Thailand announced that American troops in its territory would be reduced. As a first step, the USA would withdraw about 3,500 troops and 100 aircraft, thus lowering the number of troops to about 38,000 and planes to about 60o.94 In 1974, it was declared that a further reduction of 10,000 troops would take place.95 The Philippines spoke of putting an end to the extraterrito riality of American military bases in its territory and noted that SEATO was no longer in accord with the political realities Indeed, during Prime of the Southeast Asian region. Minister Kukrit's visit to the Philippines in July 1975, a joint communique was issued in which the heads. of governments of the two countries agreed in principle that SEATO would be phased out.95 An ASEAN which includes in its membership a majority of states which evince a greater desire for friendly ties with China and which seem more heedful of Chinese interests is, of course, more acceptable to Peking. Another reason for China's adoption of a more positive approach to ASEAN is its p~rception of a growing estrangemen t between the two superpowers on the one hand and the ASEAN countries on the other. From the Chinese point of view, the five countries were becoming more and more aware of the fact that superpower hegemonism and exploitation were a threat to their "state sovereignty" and economic well-being. Consequentl y, they were beginning to take measures to protect themselves from "U.S. imperialist" and "Soviet social imperialist" encroachmen t. Needless to say, Peking, which had long condemned the "hegemonic" policies of its two rivals, applauded any effort taken by the Southeast Asian countries to protect their national interests. Of course, it can be argued that the Chinese exaggerated the ASEAN countries' disaffection with the two superpowers to suit their own Indeed, it seems that they intentionall y convenience. gave an anti-Soviet and anti-America n connotation to the

9·3

Hsinhua News BuUetin, 14 March 1973.

94

Ibid . , 26 August 1973 .

95

Fa~

Eastern Eaonomio Review, 21 November 1975, vo1 . 90, no. 47,

p. 50.

40

actions taken by these countries to defend and promote their economic interests as well as to their stand on hegemon ism • . As noted, the three joint communiques between China on the one hand and Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand on the other stated that all were "opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world." Indeed, the Chinese praised the three ASEAN countries as well as Singapore for their opposition to hegemonism and expressed support for their attempts to resist superpower expansionism. For example, at the banquet given to the Malaysian Prime Minister, Chou En-lai noted that Malaysia "opposed great-power hegemonism and power politics." Teng Hsiao-ping told President Marcos that the Chinese "will firmly support the Southeast Asian peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and hegemonism."96 After condemning superpower activities in Southeast Asia, he informed Prime Minister Kukrit that he believed that the peoples in the region "will never allow any Superpower to subject their countries •.• to aggression, oppression and control". Moreover, he expressed the conviction that the Southeast Asian people, uniting themselves and persisting in struggle, will smash all Superpower schemes of aggression and expansion and victoriously guard their countries' independence and sovereignty.97 Premier Hua Kuo-feng, in his speech at the banquet given in honour of Lee Kuan Yew, stated that We are pleased to note that more and more countries in Southeast Asia have clearly stated their opposition to the practice of hegemony by any country in any part of the world.9B

96

Hsinhua News Bulletin, 29 May 1974 & 9 June, 1 July 1975, 12 May 1976.

97

Ibid . , 1 July 1975

98

Ibid., 12 May 1976.

41

There can be little doubt that,when the ASEAN countries talked about "great-powe r hegemonism" , they also had China Indeed, the reason for their proposal of a in mind neutralized Southeast Asia was to free the region from bigpower rivalry, or in other words, put an end to Soviet, American and Chinese intervention . Indeed, it appears that they fear Chinese expansionism more than American or Soviet From Peking's perspective , however, presence in the region. only the USA and the USSR were guilty of hegemonlsm; their policies, not China's, were responsible for creating China did not consider instability in Southeast Asia. In fact, it looked upon itself as itself to be hegemonic. banquets given to Razak, Marcos, At country. World Third a Kukrit and Lee, the Chinese hosts stressed that their country "is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World . .. gg Moreove r, it was repeatedly emphasized that "China will never be a Superpower" " As it did not consider itself to be a superpower with hegemonic tendencies, China interpreted the ASEAN countries' opposition to hegemonism as being aimed solely at the two superpowers and not at its elf. Since 1975, the efforts taken by the ASEAN countries their "state sovereignty" from "imperialis t protect to encroachmen t" and their economies from exploitation have been given considerable coverage by the Chinese news media. It was noted, for example, that the internation al economic sys t em worked against the favour of Third World countries to the . benefit of the industrializ ed nations especially the two superpowers which demanded high prices for their manufacture d goods while forcing down the prices of raw Commenting on this state of affairs, the materials. Hsinhua News Bulle tin stated that "ASEAN countries and peoples resent the selfishness of the Superpowers and other imperialists and strongly demand a new internation al economic order to redress the present unreasonabl eness" of the existing situation.lO O Realizing that they could resist imperialist exploitation and promote their economic interests more effectively through combined efforts, they were i ndeed strengthenin g co-operation among themselves. For example, the ASEAN producers of natural rubber agreed to put restrictions on its export to maintain stable prices

99

Hsinhua News Bulleti n, 28 May 1974, 9 June 197 5 , 1 July 1975 , 12 May 1976.

100

Ibid., 27 De cember 1975 .

42

wh i le the thre e t i mbe r-produc ing c o untries of Malaysia, the Philippine s a n d I n do nesia set up the Southeast As i an Timber Producers' Associ at i on in 19 74 to control the export of timber . The Hs i nh ua News Bul letin noted that in shipping too the ASEAN countri e s had taken ste ps t o protect their in terests . The Far Ea st Fre ight Confere nc e (FEFC ) had for yea r s monopol i zed t h e transport of Southeas t Asian exports and had r ai sed fre i gh t c h arge s fiv e time s in the period from February 1972 to Au gust 1974, thereby increasing shipp i ng costs by 44 . 8%. Th e disaffect i on with this state of affairs p r ompted the ASEAN countries to set up the Federation of the Associat i on s o f Southeast Asian Nations 9 Shippers Council to force t h e FEFC to reduce its charges.lOl Moreover, ASE AN had set up a Council of Petroleum to promote co-operation an d mutual assistance in the dev~lopment of petroleum resource s in the ASEAN region . ~02 The close regional economic co- operation of the five countries, Hs i nhua New s Bull etin commented, had dealt a "heavy blow to th·e Superpowers " " 103 As noted, China is currently more concerned with the hegemonic activities of the Sovi e t Unlon than with those of the USA although the l a tt e r is by no means spared from criticism Peking has openly warne d th e ASEAN countries of Soviet threats to the i r s ove r e ignty and regional securi ty . Teng Hsiao-ping not ed th a t one superpower (the USA,of course ) "has f in a lly s uffere d irrevocable defeat under the counter-b low s of the Indo chinese peoples and had to withdraw from Indochi n a" . . Howe ver , it i s noteworthy that the other Superpower with wild ambitions has e x tended its tentacles fa r and wide . It insatiably seeks new milita ry bases in Southeast Asia and send i t s nav a l v essels to ply the Indian and West Pa c if ic Oceans , posing a menacing threat t o t he p eace and secu r ity of the Southeast Asian c o un t ries. The spectre of i t s expans i on i sm now h a un t s Southeast Asia, as it hanke rs f o r c onv ert i ng this region into its sphere o f i n f luen c e some day " 104 101

Hs i nhua News Bulletin , 27 August 1975 ,

102

Ibid . , 19 October 19 75 .

103

Ib i d . , 27 December 1975 .

lQ[:.

Ibid . , 1 July 1975 .

43

Hua Kuo-feng warned that "After the defeat of one Supe r powe in Southeas t Asia, the other Superpow er is rying t o t ake the chance to squeeze in to carry out i nfil t r ation and expansion ·there . nl05 Hs i nhua News Bu lleti n noted that the So iets are casting a "covetous eye on Southeas t Asia, eager to swallow it up at one gul p . " The Southeas t Asian countr1.es are warned that the USSR would take advantage of American disengage ment to "worm" its way in t o the region; as such, they should be careful about "let ting the t.iger in through the back doo r whi e r epelling the wolf through the front gate o" l 06 The Chinese hoped that the ASEAN countries wou l d r e c ogn i ze t he danger::s posed to the1r sovereign ty and take measu es t o thwart Soviet designs to spread its influence Indeed, Peking and br1ng the region under its control. gly awa r e of increasin becoming were they ha be lieved that the USSR noted even Hua . Sovi et hegemon1.c ambitions the of "has been strong l y condemned by the peoples Southeas t Asian countr1es for its scheming activitie s in the area o"l07 The ASEAN countries ' stand on two issues was 1n erpreted by the Chinese ~ evidence of their growing the intercon c ern with Soviet hegemonic ambitions : na 1ona l 1.za i on of the Straits of Malacca and the Asian c o l e c t i ve secur i t y system. Pek1ng has consisten tly looked upon the Soviets' des ire for an 1nternati onalizati on of the Straits of Ma l a c ca as a symptom of their drive to establ1sh hegemony o v er the seas , As it points out, Soviet naval power is spreadi ng i n ~he Black and Mediterra nean Seas, the Indian and Pac ific Oceans . The Straits, connectin g as they do he Indian and Pac i fic Oceans, are strategic al l y important f or the USSR wh ich wants to secure for its Vl~divostok­ based Pa ci fi c fleet free and unencumb ered passage to the Ind1an Ocean . Oppos1 t ion on the part of the li t to r al states to Sov iet des1gns wou l d of cou r se be welcomed by the Ch i nese and indeed two of them - Malaysia and Singapo r e hav e r ejected the proposal that the Straits be int.ernatlona li zed . Both regard them as part of the1r t e rritori a wa t ers and uphold that navigatio n shou l d 105

Hs i nhua News BuUetin, 12 May 19 76 o

106

Ib i d . , 30 Ju y

07

lb i d oi

975 ,

2 May 1976 o

44

conform to the principle of innocent passage . Needless to say, China supports the stand of these two ASEAN countries and interprets it as a rebuff to the Soviet Union . It, moreover, has praised Halaysia and . Indonesia for their determination to defend their territorial waters against Soviet encroachment.l08 As noted, the Asian collective security system was sharply crit i cized by China which believed that i t would be used by the Soviet Union as a "lever" to edge out American influence and establish its own predominance in Asia . Howeve4 because the Asian countries have come to realize the dangers of "letting the tiger in through the black door" while "the wolf retreats through the front", they have rejected "the rubbish ardently ·peddled by the Brezhnev clique".l09 It was noted in particular that the ASEAN countries greeted the Soviet proposal with aloofness. Indeed, the Chinese believed that "the participants in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1973 exchanged views on the ' Asian collective security system' and unanimously rejected" it. llO Far from accepting the system , they stood firm by the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the neutral i zation of Southeast Asia o In short, since the mid 1970s, China has perceived a t ~end in the foreign policies of the ASEAN countries which seems to indicate a growing disaffection with imperialist exploitation and anxiety about superpower p especially Soviet, hegemonism. The actions taken by these five countries to promote their economic interests are interpreted by the Chinese as a rebuff to the imperialist powers. Indeed, Peking argues . that co-operation among them gained momentum as they became increasingly aware of the fact that they must take joint actions if they want to strengthen and defend their economies against the "unjust" economic policies of the two superpowers . Horeover, it looks upon the ASEAN countries' desire for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as evidence of their uneasiness over Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system and the opposition to Soviet ins i stence that the Straits of -

108

Hs i nhua News BuZZetin, 12 July 1974 .

109

Ib i d .

11 0

Ib i d , , 21 Mar ch 1976 .

1

21 March 1976.

45

Malacca be internati onalized were interpret ed as "blows" to Soviet hegemonic designs on the Asian and Pacific region . In short, from China's point of view, because of the "posit ive" actions of the ASEAN countries , the two superpow ers have met with setbacks in the Southeas t Asian region . As the Hsinhua News BuZZetin noted, The [five] Southeas t Asian countries have c ome to see more clearly that the root cause o f disturban ce in this region is the contenti on between the two Superpow ers, the Soviet Union and the United States, particula rly the former's intensify ing attempts at infiltrat ion and expansion in this region.ll l .

VI:

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt tha China's attitudes towards ASEAN have changed considera bly since 1967, the year it was The Asso clation, as noted, is no longer objection able fo unded. Inde ed, since 19 75, the Chinese have praised its to Peking. It member-s tates for strengthe ning economic co-opera tion. a for proposal its for support expressed has fur thermore neutraliz ed Southeas t Asia. The first Summit Conferenc e of the Heads of States and Governme nts of the ASEAN nations, which was held in Bali in February 1976 , received considera ble coverage in the Chinese news media. The Bal i Summi t emphasize d, among other things , the determi nati on of the five c o untries to co-operat e mo r e closely in economic matters and their endorsem ent of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutr a lity." Commentin g on the Confere nce' s deliberat ions on economic co-operat ion , the Hsinhua News Bull e t in expressed the opin ion that such co- operation would indeed be strengthe ned . Moreover , the meeting would lead to "he lghtened" opposi tion on the part of the ASEAN countries to their exploitat ion b y imperi alist powers: The Summit ASEAN Meeting held last February achieved results in strengthe ning regional 1 1 Hs inhua News BuUetin, 5 January 197 5.

46

economic cooperation. The Meeting will play a positive role in furthering ASEAN's opposition to the exploitation and predatory acts of imperialism, col·onialism and hegemonism. It, however, warned the ASEAN countries that the imperialist powers would try to obstruct co-operation: Great store is set to the strengthening of ASEAN economic co-operation by other countries; but it will certainly meet with obstructi on and sabotage by the hegemonists. However, the ASEAN countries and peoples will surely be able to surmount .all difficulties, continue to strengthen their solidarity and cooperation, and win more successes.ll2 The endorsement given to a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" was praised by China which declared that it was a firm rejection of Soviet hegemonist objectives in Southeast Asi.a. As the Pek i ng Review commented, the "Asian collective security system hawked by the Soviet Union has been spurned ."ll 3 As noted, it was the change in perception of the roles and functions of ASEAN that led to Peking ' s adoption of a more favourable approach to the Association , Indeed 6 throughout the years, the way it views ASEAN has been fundamental in shaping its attitudes and policies . As long as ASEAN 1 s roles and functions were perceived to be hostile to Chinese interests, Peking's attitudes were likewise hostile. However, as perception changes, so do attitudes. Initially, as noted, Peking regarded ASEAN as an antiChinese, illlticommunist military alliance " In the 1970s , accusations that the ASEAN countries were, beh i nd a facade of economic co-operation, collaborating in military matters aimed at opposing China and communism were no longer voiced. Greater credence is now given to the stated ASEAN goals of promoting economic co-operation. In fact, as has been mentioned, China has praised these countries for strengthening co-operation and has remarked on the 11 successes 11 achie v ed i n joint efforts . Indeed, it declares that ASEAN will Bulletin~

112

Hsinhua News

113

Peking Revi ew, 5 March 19 76, v al. 19, no . lO, p . 20 o

16 May 1976 .

47

continu e to achieve further success es. That the Chinese are now prepare d to speak about ASEAN economi c co-oper ation in laudato ry terms while at the same time refrain from revivin g accusat ions that the Associa tion is an anticom munist allianc e is indeed a drastic In view of the fact that ASEAN departu re from past policy. is often criticiz ed by interes ted observe rs for its lack of progres s in economi c co-oper ation, Chinese declara tions on its "succes ses" seem a bit exagger ated. Moreove r, at a time when the ASEAN countri es are evincin g a greater ng in~erest in co-oper ation in securit y matters while remaini bas1cal ly anticom munist, it is surpris ing that China has refrain ed from resusci tating its allegat ions that the Associa tion is anticom munist. For example , the Thais and the Indones ians are still co-oper ating with the Malaysi ans to deal with commun ist insurge nts along their borders . Preside nt Suharto told the opening session of the Bali Summit that there was a need for co-oper ation to preserv e nat ional securit y and regiona l stabili ty.ll4 This did not mean that the ASEAN countri es had to establi sh a militar y pact but it meant that they sho ld co-oper ate more closely in securit y matters . True, Thai-M alaysian and .Indone sian-Ma laysian Indeed, co-oper ation occurs outside the framewo rk of ASEAN. the ly precise was it , it has always been so. However ant i commun ist overton es in such co-oper ation that gave rise to Chinese allegat ions that ASEAN was for all practic al Indeed, some noncomm unist purpose s an anticom munist allianc e. ation of "associ an as it observe rs st1ll look upon remains that fact the r, anticom munist states. "llS Moreove in recent years , the Associa tion has taken a . ~reater This has interes t in politic al and securit y matters " ll matters such in ation co-oper that tion given rise to specula that noted r observe Indeed , one will be strength ened .

114

Straits Times, 24 February 1976.

115

Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1976, val. 91, no. 8, p . 27 .

1 6

Briti sh decision to withdraw from the Ma1aysia n-Singapo re region, ~he Nixon Doctrine and American disengage ment were among ~he factors which led the ASEAN countries to stress more on co-opera tion in security matters .

48

In essence, there is no chance that ASEAN will develop into a security pact or a military alliance. But various proposals such as combined ASEAN military exercises - have been suggested. The Philippines has even offered to sponsor an ASEAN defenc~ college. There is increased awareness that ASEAN should develop a greater degree of low-key internal security cooperation, and, ultimately, a joint willingness to identify threats when and if they arise. In time, ASEAN countries may extend such co-operation into something resembling the Five-Power Defence Arrangement between Malaysia, Singapore, Austra li a, New Zealand and Britain . ll7 At a time when observers are paying greater attention to ASEAN co-operation in security matters, · it seems strange that China should refrain from reviving its past a llegations that the Association is a military alliance. This seeming tolerance of such co-operation can' be understood only if the overall change in Chinese attitudes towards ASEAN is taken into account. It has been argued that due to a combination of factors - the growing threat posed by the Soviet Unior. to Chinese security, the perceived weakening of American power in Asia, American disengagement and British withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Chinese fears of expanding Soviet influence in the Asian and Pacific region - China became more aware of the need to cultivate friendly relations with its Asian neighbours ,. For example, it was prepared to adopt a more cordial attitude to the ASEAN countries some of which, on their part, evinced a greater interest in establishing contacts with Peking. It was noted , moreover, that the resolution of some issues touching on China 1 s national interests and those of some df the ASEAN countries facilitated the normalization of relations

117

Harvey Stockwin, "ASEAN Free Trade Zone Gathers Momentum 2 11 Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 November 1975, vol . 90, no o 47 9 p . 51. China was initially critical of the Five Power Defence Arrangement ~.;rhi ch was looked upon as a Briti sh plot to defend its "remnant" co lonial interests in Singapore and Malaysia . Hsinhua News Bulletin, 21 April 1971 .

49

between them . For example, China was prepared to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these Southeast Asian countries. They, on their part, acknowledged its position with regard to Taiwan and ~bandoned their two-China or one China-one Taiwan policies. Moreover, together w1th China, they expressed disapproval of hegemonism. In its rivalry with the two superpowers , especially with the USSR, Peking saw the need to court the goodwill of the ASEAN countries , Besides establishing bilateral contacts with them, one way of pursuing such a policy is It t o suppo rt the Association which they had formed . ties friendly maintain to order in that , moreover appears, diplomatic has now it which with w1th those ASEAN countries relat1ons, t h e Chinese Government is even prepared -co recognize their position that local communist insurgencies are a matter solely within thei.r jurisd.i ction and hence to Thai-Malays ian and be dealt w1th as they deem f1t. Ma l aysian-Indon esian border co-operation could in fact be l ooked upon as efforts towards dealing with domestic commun i st problems within the territories of these Realizing that the SEAN countries 1nsist that countries . the Association is not a military alliancef Peking appears w1lling not to revive i-cs allegations that it is one . In other words , it is currently in the interest of China to It, moreover, can be argued that Peking's support ASEAN . adoption of a more positive approach to the Association is not only due to the factors ment1oned above but to a desire to view it in a more favourable light to suit i ·ts convenience , It appears that factors such as the state of re l at1ons between China and the ASEAN countries on the one hand and bet:ween the latter and the two superpowers on the other will continue to shape Peking's attitudes towards ASEAN . At the same t1me, China's relat1ons w1th Vietnam may a l so play a role 1n influencing its policies towards the Association . These two countries are experienc1ng diff1 c ult.ies in their relations , Vietnam may pursue pol icies which may be deemed by Ch1na to be inimical to its own interests . Moreover, the likelihood of the former l ean i ng towards the Soviet Union is disturbing to Peking, espe ci ally since it has emerged as the strongest military It is not inconceivab le that China power in the region . may v1ew the Association as a possible deterrent to the spread of V1etnarnese influence . I t 1s d1fficult to predict the future developmen-c o f re l a ti ons between the ASEAN coun~ries and China . On the

50

one hand , Malaysia, the Philippines and Thail and - the three countries which have recognized Peking - may maintai n cordial if not warm relations with Ch i na . Moreov er, it is possible that Indonesia and Singapore may in f ut ure normalize their relations with Peking. Howe v er , on Ehe other, it is not totally inconceivable that t he relat ions between the ASEAN countries and China may t ake a t u rn for the worse o Tensions, disagreements and suspicions ma y arise, leading to a resurgence of mutual host i lity . The ASEAN countries may suspect that China is not fully respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity and that i t is intervening in their domestic affairs and supporting local insurgencies. It is also possible that Ch i na in fut ure may raise allegations that these countries are not truly neutra l in their foreign policies and question their s i n c eri t y i n pursuing a neutralization of Southeast Asia . S~ould t hi s happen, its attitudes towards ASEAN may undergo y e t another modification . Moreover, a change in the relati ons b etween Peking and Moscow and between the former and Was hin gton may affect Chinese attitudes towards the Associ at i on for , as noted, China's approach to ASEAN must be v iewed wi t h in the context of Sino-Soviet-American relat i ons. Whether or not Peking continues to mainta i n i t s current positive approach to ASEAN is dependent on i ts evaluation of the requirements of its national interests. If it is to its interest to support ASEAN , it wi ll continue to do so . However, if it decides that its foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia could be better achieved by adopting a more critical approach to the Association or if it reverts to its former position that ASEAN works against its interests, its attitudes may undergo yet another change.

APPENDIX A: TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA (Hsinhua News Bulletin, 1 June 1974) At the invitation of His Excellency Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Tun Abdul Razak bin Datuk Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited the People's Republic of China from May 28 to June 2, 1974. His Excellency Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak was accompanied by representatives of political parties in the government and government officials . During his visit, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak called on Chairman Mao Tse-tung and conveyed to him the They had a best wishes of the Malaysian Government. friendly and frank talk. Premier Chou En-lai, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien and Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak had wide-ranging talks on various subject matters of bilateral, regional and interThese talks were held in a frank and national nature. friendly atmosphere. The two Prime Ministers agree that in recent years the situation in Asia has undergone deep It is changes favourable to the people of all countries. China of in conformity with the interests of the peoples and Malaysia to normalize the relations between the two To this end, the two Prime Ministers have countries. the normalization of relations between announce to decided their two countries by issuing this joint communique. The Government of the People's Republic of China 1. and the government of Malaysia, with a view to promoting the traditional friendship of the two peoples, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations as from the date this communique is published. The two g,overnmen ts held that although the social 2. systems of the People's Republic of China and Malaysia are different, this should not constitute an obstacle to the two governments and peoples in establishing and developing peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for

52

sovereignty and te r rito r ial integ ri t y , mutual non-aggre ssion, non-interference i n each other's i nte rn a l a f fairs , equ a lity and mutual benefit , and peaceful c o - e xistence . The two governments consider all foreign aggres sion , i nterference, control and subversion to be impermiss"ib le. They hold that the social system of a country should only b e chosen and decided by its own people . They are oppo sed to any attempt b y any country or group of countries to es t ablis h h egemony or create spheres of influence in any pa rt of the wo r l d . 3. The government of Malaysia recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and ack nowledges t he position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is an in a lienable part of the territory of the Peoples Republic o f China. The Malaysian Government decides to close down i t s consultate in Taipei. 4. The government of the People ' s Re public of China recognizes the government of Malaysia and res pe cts the independence and sovereignty of Malaysia . 5. The government of the People ' s Re public of China takes note of the fact that Malaysia is a mu lt i - racial country with peoples of Malay, Chinese and o t h er e thnic origins . Both the government of the People ' s Re publi c of China and the government of Malaysia declare th at the y do not recognize dual nationality. Proceeding from t hi s principle, the Chinese Government considers any on e of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acq uire d Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chin ese nationality. As for those residents who retain Ch i n ese nationality of their own will , the Chinese Government , acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will e njoin them to abide by the law of the government of Malay sia , respect the customs and habits of the people t h ere and l ive in amity with them . And the i r proper rights and i n terests will be protected by the gove rnment of China and respected by the government of Malaysia . 6. Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Tun Ab dul Razak agree that the two governments, in conformity with international practice, will provide each other with all necessary assistance for the establishment and performance of the functions of embassies in their res p ective capitals , and that ambassadors will be exchanged as soon as practicable.

53

(signe d) Chou En-la i Premi er of the State Counc il of the Peopl e's Repub lic of China

(signe d) Tun Abdul Razak bin Datuk Husse in Prime Minis ter of Malay sia

Pekin g, 31 May 1974

54

APPENDIX B: TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(Hsinhua News BuZZetin, 18 June 1975) i

The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Republic of the Philippines, desiring to promote the traditional friendship between the Chinese and the Filipino peoples, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level effective from the date of signature of this communique. ii The two governments hold that the economic , political and social system of a country should be chosen only by the people of that country, without outside interference. They maintain that the difference between the economic , political and social systems of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines should not constitute an · obstacle ·to peaceful co-existence and the establishment and development of peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries and peoples in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. The two governments agree to settle all disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the above-mentioned principles without resorting to the use or threat of force. The two governments agree that all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal affairs are to be condemned. They are opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world. The two governments agree to cooperate with each other to achieve the foregoing objectives .

55

iii The Philippine Government recogniz.es· the . government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, fully underst~nds and respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, and decides to remove all its official representations from Taiwan within one month from the date of signature of this communique. The government of the People's Republic of China recognizes the government of the Republic of the Philippines and agrees to respect the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines . The two governments recognizes and agrees to respect each other's territorial integrity. iv The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Republic of the Philippines consider any citizen of either country who acquires citizenships in the other country as automatically forfeiting his original citizenship. v

The two governments agree to adopt active measures for the development of trade and economic relations .. They have agreed to negotiate and conclude between them. a trade agreement based on their respective needs and on the principles of equal i ty and mutual benefit. vi The two governments noted the importance of cultural exchanges in develop i ng mutual understanding and friendship between their two peop l es. vii The government of the People's Republic of China and the g-o vernment of the Republic of the Philippines have

56

agreed to exchange mutually accredited ambassadors as soon as practicable and to provide each other with all the necessary assistance for the establishment and performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their respective capitals in accordance with international practice and on a reciprocal basis. (signed) Chou En-lai Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

(signed) Ferdin and E. Marcos President of the Republi~ of the Philippines

Peking,

9 June 19 75

57

APPENDIX C: TEXT OF THE JOINT COi11\1UNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Hs inhua News Bu l Ze tin, 2 July 19 75) 1. The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Kingdom of Thailand, desiring to revive and strengthen further the traditionally close and friendly relations between the peoples of the two countries and in conformity with the interests and common desires of the two peoples, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations as from 1 July 1975. 2. The two governments reaffirm that only the people of each country have the right ~o choose their own political, economic and social systems, without outside interference. They also share the conv ~ ctiori that, in spite of the differences in the political, economic apd social systems of the People •.s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Thailand, there should be ·no obstacle to the development of peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries and peoples in acc6rdance 'with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's ~nternal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 3. The two governments agreeto settle all disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the above-mentioned principles, without resorting to ~ the uie or threat of force. 4. The two governments agree that all foreign aggression and subversion and ail aetempts · by any country to control any other ' country or to _interfere in its internal affairs are impermissible ·and are · to be condemned. 5. The two governments ~re also opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world.

58

6o The g overnment of the Kingdom of Thailand recognizes the g ove rnment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one China and that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, and decides to remove all its offi cial representations from Taiwan within one month f rom the date of signature of this communique.

7. The government of the People's Republic of China recogniz~s the government of the Kingdom of Thailand and agrees to respect the independence, sovereignty _ and territorial integrity of Thailand . 8. The government of the People's Republic of China takes note of the fact that for centuries Chinese residents in Thailand have lived in harmony and amity with the Thai people in conformity with the law of the land and with the customs and habits of the Thai people . The government of the People's Republic of China declares that it does not recognize dual nationality. Both governments consider anyone of Chinese nationality or origin who acquires Thai nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for those Chinese residents in Thailand who elect to retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the law of the Kingdom of Thailand, respect the customs and habits of the Thai people and live in amity with them. Their proper rights and interests will be protected by the governme nt of China and respected by the government of th e Kingdom of Thailand. 9. The two governments agree to pursue policies for the development of trade, economic and cultural relations between them. 10. The government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Kingdom of Thailand agree to exchange mutually accredited ambassado rs as soon as practicable and to provide each other with all the necessary assistance for the establishment and performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their respective capi tals in accordance with international practice and on a reciprocal basis.

59

(signed} Chou En-lai Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

(signed} Morn Rajwongse Kukrit Prarnoj Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand

Peking, 1 July 1975

60

APPENDIX D: TEXT OF PREMIER HUO KUO-FENG'S SPEECH AT THE BANQUET GIVEN IN HONOUR OF PRIME · MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW OF SINGAPORE ON 11 HAY 1976 (Hsinhua News Bulletin, 12 May 1976) Your Excellency Respected Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee Kuan Yew, Distinguished Guests from Singapore Friends and Comrades, We are very glad that the good-will delegation led by His Excellency Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, has come upon invitation to visit China, bringing to the Chinese people the profound friendship of the people of Singapore. On behalf of the Chinese Government and people, I wish to express our warm welcome to Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee Kuan Yew and the other distinguished guests from Singapore and take this opportunity to extend our cordial greetings to the people of Singapore. Singapore is a young country in Southeast Asia . Her industrious and valiant people, working hard in a pioneering spirit, developed the country and waged a protracted and heroic struggle against colonial rule. Since the independence of the Republic of Singapore , they have carried on an unremitting effort to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty. In international affairs, Singapore opposes hegemonism and power politics, stands for peace and neutrality of Southeast Asia, actively develops relations with other Third w·orld countries, and has contributed positively to promoting economic exchanges and trade among nations. We sincerely wish the people of Singapore greater achievements on their road of advance. Friends and comrades, at present, the international situation is developing in a direction most favourable to the people of all countries but unfavourable to imperialism and hegemonism. The Third 'Vvorld countries ·and peoples, strengthening their unity and supporting each other, have scored one victory after another in the struggle against imperial ism and hegemonism and are playing an ever greater role in international affairs. The superpowers are finding it more and more difficult to muddle along . Their

61

intensified global rivalry for spheres of influence and world hegemony is the cause of world intranquill ity. But no matter how desperately they may struggle, they will not escape their ultimate doom. The people are the masters of history. The future of the world belongs to them, and it is very bright. excellent situation has emerged in Southeast Asia with the historic victories of the peoples of the IndoThe struggle of the peoples in chinese countries. Southeast Asian countries to safeguard independence and sovereignty and combat big-power hegemonism has continued to develop vigorously. The relations between these countries and other Third World countries have witnessed a heartening growth and reinforceme nt. After the defeat of one superpower in So utheast Asia, the other superpower is trying to take the chance to squeeze in, to carry out But as facts have proved infiltration and expansion there. where this superpower reaches its claws, the people there It has will better perceive its expansionis t features. Southeast the of been strongly condemned by the ~oples Asian countries for its scheming activities in this area. We are pleased t o note that more and more countries in Southeast Asia have clearly stated their opposition to the practice of hegemony by any country in any part of the world . This is a far-sighted stand which conforms to the interests of the people of all countries. The first ASEAN Summ i t Conference held not long ago reaffirmed its positive proposal for the establishme nt of a Zone of Peace and Neutrality in Southeas t Asia and achieved significant results in strengthenin g regional economic cooperation . We feel sure that so long as the peoples of the Southeast Asian countries uphold independence and strengthen their unity, they will steadily win new victories in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism. An

China is a developing socialist country belonging The Chi nese Government and people to the Third World. have always maintai ned that all countries, big and small, should be equal. We are firmly opposed to big nations bullying small ones and strong nations bullying weak ones. We hold that the five principles of peaceful co-existence should guide relations between nations and that each people have the right to decide as they wish the social system of their own country. No country has the right to carry out aggression, subversion, control, interference China will never be or bullying against other countries. We will unswervingly a superpower, now or in the future.

62

stand by all oppressed people and oppressed nations of the world and fight together with them against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. Comrades and friends, the struggle initiated and led by Chairman Mao personally to repulse the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts has already won great victories. Marching victoriously along Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and in high spirits, the Chinese ' people are launching a new upsurge of in-depth criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping to repulse the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts and are persisting in grasping revolution and promoting production and other work and preparedness against war. The situation in China is getting better and better. The victory of the current struggle will no doubt greatly raise our people's revolutionary awareness, further consolidate our dictatorship of the proletariat and promote our socialist construction, making China stronger and more prosperous. The people of all nationalities in our country are determined to unite and carry this great struggle through to the end. There is a profound traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Singapore. Sharing a similar historical experience, our two peoples have always sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Our friendship has made new progress in recent years. Our friendly contacts, cultural exchanges and economic and trade relations have steadily increased. The current visit to China by the good-will delegation led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew personally provides an opportunity for a direct exchange of views between leaders of our two countries on matters of common interest. This will certainly help enhance the mutual understanding and friendly relations between our two countries. ~ve wish His Excellency Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the other distinguished guests from Singapore a successful visit.

Now

I

propose a toast

to ·the prosperity of the Republic of Singapore and the well-being of her people, to the continuous growth of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Singapore and the

63

friendly relations between the two countries, to the health of His Excellency Benjamin Henry Sheares, President of the Republic of Singapore, to the health of His Excellency Prime Minister and Mrs . Lee Kuan Yew, t o the health of the other distinguished guests f r om Singapore, and to the health of all friends and comrades present h e r e.

IN TITUTE OF OUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Occasion al Papers 1

Harry J. Benda, Researah in Southeast Asian Studies in Singapcre , 1970. 10pp. Gratis (Out of print)

2

P. Lim Pui Huen, Newspaper s published in the Malaysian Area: With a union list of loaal holdings, 1970. 42pp. Gratis (Out of print)

3

Chan Heng Chee, Nation-B uilding in Southeast Asia: The Singapore Case, 1971. 19pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

4

Eva Horakova, Problems of Filipino Settlers, 1971. 24pp. S$2. 00 (Out of print)

5

Causes and Effeats of Mochtar Nairn, Merantau: Minangkab au Voluntary Migration , 1971. 19pp. s~~.oo (Out of print)

6

Paul Pedersen, comp., Youth in Southeast Asia: A Modified and expanded by Joseph B. Bibliogra phy. Tamne y and others, 1971. 69pp. S$4.00 (Out of print)

7

J.L.S. Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myths, 1971. 26pp. S$2 .00 (Out of print)

8

R.P . Dore, Japanese Industria liaation and the Developin g Countries : ModeL~ Warning or Sourae of Healthy Doubts? 1971. 18pp. S$3.00

9

Michael Stenson , The 1948 Comm unist Revolt in Malaya: A Note of Histori aal Souraes and Interpret ation and 30pp. S$3.00 A Reply by Gerald de Cruz, 1971. (Out of print )

10

Riaz Hassan, Soaial Status and Bureauar atia Contaats Among the Publia Housing Tenants in Singapore , 1971. 16pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

11

Youth in Southeast Asia: Edited Proaeedin gs of the Seminar of 5th- 7~h Marah 19?1. Edited by Joseph 75pp. S$4.00 (Out of print) B. Tamney, 1972.

12

A.W. Stargardt, Problems of Neutrality in South East Asia: The Relevance of the European Experience , 1972. 29pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

13

William R. Roff, Autobiography & Biography in Malay Historical Studies , 1972. 2lpp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Reg i onal Security : Djakarta Conference on Cambodia , 1972. 20pp.

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malays i a Plan 19?119?6: A Critique , 1972. 16pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

16

Harold E. Wilson, Educational Pol i cy and Performance in Singapore ~ 1942 -194 5 , 1973. 28pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

17

Richard L. Schwenk, The Potential for Rural Development in the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Preliminary Background Report, 1973. 39pp. S$4.00

18

Kunio Yoshihara, Japanese Direct Investments in Southeast Asia , 1973. 18pp. S$4.00

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter - insurgency and the Economic Fac t or: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency , 1974. 54pp. S$5.00

20

John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China , 1974. 3lpp . S$3.00

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethnic Marriage i n Singapore: A Study of Interethnic Relations, 1974 . 85pp. S$6.00

22

Tatsumi Okabe, Revival of Japanese Mil i tarism? 1974. 26pp. S$3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership, 1974. 2lpp. S$3.00

24

Peter Carey, The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteenth Century Java: Pangeran Dipanagara ~ a Case Study , 1974. 56pp. S$4.00

25

Chandrasekaran Pillay, The 19?4 General Elections in Malaysia : A Post-Mortem, 1974. 20pp. S$3.00

The S$ 3.00

26

I.W. Mabbett, Displaced Intellectuals in Twentieth Century China, 1975. 45pp. S$4.00

27

J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portuguese Timor: Dilemmas and Opportunities, 1975. 28pp. S$4.00

28

M. Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand, 1975. 27pp. S$4.00

29

Joseph Camilleri, Southeast Asia in China's Foreign 37pp. S$5.00 Policy, 1975.

30

Wellington .' . K. Chan, Politics and Industrialization in Late Imp ~ rial China, 1975. 19pp. S$4.00

31

Leslie E . Sauzon, Philippine Agrarian Reform 1880-1965: The Revolution That Nevew Was, 1975. 2lpp. S$4.00

32

British Paul H. Kratoska, The Chettiar and the Yeoman: Malaya, in Indebtedness Rural and Cultural Categories 1975. 29 pp . S$4.00

33

Morris I. Berkowitz, The Tenacity of Chinese Folk Tradition -Two Studies of Hong Kong Chinese, 1975. 32pp. S$4.00

34

M. Rajaretnarn, U.S. Energy-Security Interests 36pp. S$5.00 Indian Ocean, 1975.

35

Ch andran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Some Foreign Press Reactions, Forces~ 1963-?3: 1975. 25pp. S$4.00

36

Peter Polornka, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of Regional Co-operation, 1975. 16 p p. S$4.00 (Out of print)

37

Sha ron A. Carstens, Chinese Associations in Singapore Society : An Examination o f Function and Meaning, (Out of print) 30 p p . 1975.

38

Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects, 1975. 62pp. S$5.00 (Out of print)

39

Robert 0 . Tilman, In Quest of Unity: The Centralization Theme in Malaysian Federal-State Relations~ 195 ?- ?5 , 1976. 69pp. S$7.00

~n

the

40

Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Tha i Foreign Policy, 1976 . 63pp. S$7.00

41

Somporn Sangchai, Coalition Behaviour in Modern Thai Pol iti cs: A Thai Perspecti ve, 1976. 26pp. S$4.00

42

Richard L. Skolnik, An Introducti on to the Nation-wid e Learn ing System of Sin gapore, 1976. lOOpp. S$7.00

43

. Somporn Sangchai, Some Observatio ns on the Elections and Coalition Formation in Tha i land, 1976. 75pp. S$6.00

44

Robert Orr Whyte, The Asian Village as a Basis for Rural Moderniza tion , 1976. 77pp. S$8.00

45

Justus M. van der Kroef, The Lives of SEATO, 1976. 3 9 pp . s $ 5 • 00

46

David Wurfel, Ph i l i ppine Agrarian Pol i cy Today: Implement at i on and Political Impact, 1977. 4lpp. S$5.00

47

Roderick O'Brien, South China Sea Oil: TuJo Problems of Own ersh i p and Developme nt, 1977. 85pp. S$8.00

48

Kha\