Towards realizing an ASEAN community : a brief report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable 9789812302854, 9812302859

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Reproduced from Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community: A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

TOWARDS REALIZING AN ASEAN COMMUNITY

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administrative officer.

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TOWARDS REALIZING AN ASEAN COMMUNITY A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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First published in Singapore in 2004 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2004 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Towards realizing an ASEAN community : brief report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable. 1. ASEAN. 2. Regionalism—Asia, Southeastern. 3. Asia, Southeastern—Relations. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. II. Title: ASEAN Community Roundtable III. Series. DS525.8 T73 2004 ISBN 981-230-285-9 Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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CONTENTS

Foreword by K. Kesavapany

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THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE Report compiled by Denis Hew, Chin Kin Wah and Lee Hock Guan Session I:

An Overview of Community Building in ASEAN 1

Session II:

The ASEAN Security Community

Session III:

The ASEAN Economic Community

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Session IV:

The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

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Session V:

ASEAN Community: What are the Institutional Implications?

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Background Papers WHAT IS A COMMUNITY? Amitav Acharya

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THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS Hsu Locknie

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Appendix I: Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

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Contents

Appendix II: Recommendations of the High-level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration (Annex to Bali Concord II)

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Programme of the ASEAN Community Roundtable

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List of Speakers, Participants and Chairmen

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FOREWORD

At the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020 (Bali Concord II). This community encompasses three components or “pillars” namely: 1. 2. 3.

The ASEAN Security Community (focusing on regional political and security co-operation) The ASEAN Economic Community (focusing on regional economic integration) The ASEAN Social-Cultural Community (focusing on regional socio-cultural co-operation)

The three components of the ASEAN Community are conceived as being “closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing”. In line with the ASEAN Vision 2020 statement, the creation of an ASEAN Community would ensure closer, more comprehensive and mutually beneficial integration among ASEAN member states and their peoples. It would strengthen the basis for peace, stability, security, development and prosperity within the region as well as enhancing the regional coherence and competitiveness in the face of new challenges unleashed by globalization and the rise of new economic powerhouses in Asia. However, achieving the end goal of the ASEAN Community will be challenging given the region’s cultural diversity, different levels of economic development and variations in strategic outlooks and external affiliations. Translating such diversities into “equitable development opportunity and prosperity” (to which the Bali Concord II also aspires) will not be an easy task.

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Foreword

ASEAN has produced a plan of action on ASEAN Economic Integration, which is annexed to the Bali Concord II. To kick-start the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the plan of action provides numerous policy recommendations to be implemented over the next 1 to 2 years. At the track-two level, research institutes/think-tanks such as ASEAN-ISIS, ISEAS and CSIS (Jakarta) have contributed concept papers on the AEC and the ASEAN Security Community (ASC). Against this backdrop, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) organized the ASEAN Community Roundtable in Singapore on 4–5 June 2004. The main theme of the Roundtable was entitled “Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community”. This Roundtable provided the opportunity for scholars and experts on ASEAN to “brain-storm” in a more comprehensive and integrated manner, the different ideas and proposals underpinning the process of community building that ASEAN is embarking upon. Besides discussing the key approaches, assumptions, modalities and operationalization of the ASEAN Community, the Roundtable examined the inter-relationship of the three basic components. The Roundtable also attempted a stock-taking of the various initiatives since the Bali Concord II and addressed the perception gaps if any, with respect to the different avenues being traversed towards the ultimate goal of an ASEAN Community. This report reflects the conclusions that emerged from the ASEAN Community Roundtable. I hope it is of interest to policymakers and all those who have an interest in the future of ASEAN. K KESAVAPANY Director ISEAS

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THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE “Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community” Report compiled by Denis Hew, Chin Kin Wah and Lee Hock Guan

SESSION I AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ASEAN This Opening Session addressed three important issues for ASEAN as it works towards building an ASEAN Community. The issues related to the points raised by the ASEAN Secretary-General during his Opening Address: 1.

First, is the question of establishing ASEAN as a legal entity. In this regard, an issue that needs to be addressed is whether ASEAN should have a Charter. So far, member countries do not have a statute in their respective national laws to allow for a legal entity called ASEAN. Nonetheless, there is growing recognition among members of the need to address ASEAN’s legal status since representation of the association at the United Nations (UN) has been problematic. This issue is now being deliberated at the ASEAN ministerial meetings.

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2.

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Second, is the issue of financial contributions for ASEAN projects. Given the expansion in ASEAN’s activities across many areas, member states need to think about increasing the budget for the association. This is particularly crucial given the fact that ASEAN’s dialogue partners no longer want to continue with the current arrangement of sole funding for ASEAN projects, and have called instead for cofunding to be a standard feature in future projects. In this regard, there are ongoing discussions regarding the possibility of increasing the financial contributions of more developed ASEAN economies to improve the financial standing of the association. Third, is the need to enlarge the constituencies to build a meaningful ASEAN community. The ASEAN Secretariat is encouraging academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to contribute to ASEAN community building so that it is not monopolized by ASEAN bureaucrats (especially in the foreign ministries). This would include greater public articulation by academics and NGOs — through the media and other means — about ASEAN community building.

The discussions that followed picked up on the points raised by the Secretary-General. With regard to addressing the legal status of ASEAN, a point was made on the need for ASEAN to have a combination of stronger treaty obligations documents accompanied by the existing “soft” law practices (viz. declarations, statements and joint announcements). In particular, the “harder” law treaty options are required if ASEAN were to establish a Charter to give the association the international standing it requires. Treaty documents would also be necessary to set the

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pace and agenda of integration — particularly economic integration — in ASEAN. However, it was felt that many ASEAN countries would not agree to use harder laws for integration until the issue of sovereignty is addressed. It was doubtful whether member countries were willing to cede some sovereignty to meet treaty obligations. In spite of these reservations, it should also be noted that there are already ASEAN treaties where sovereignty has been already compromised such as the Agreement on the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEAWFZ) and Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Looking at lessons from other regional organizations, it was pointed out that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could also be a useful reference. It was significant to note that giving up sovereignty has not been an issue in NAFTA and yet its agreements were legally binding contracts which were enforceable. On the point of making community building in ASEAN more inclusive, one of the participants noted that it would take time to expand the constituencies given the region’s “top-down culture” — and this in turn could hamper the participation of NGOs and other grassroots organizations in ASEAN.

What is the ASEAN Community? The meaning of an ASEAN Community and its implications for ASEAN were discussed. On identifying the difference between the small “c” and big “C” in the process of community building in ASEAN, a point was made that the big “C” was a construct by the ASEAN members

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and a sense of solidarity that was developed to fulfil a regional objective. In building this Community, the constituent members shall retain their national identities but at the same time seek to promote a regional identity. Meanwhile, the small “c” refers to a series of regional activities all geared towards building the ASEAN Community. Regional identity consists of a set of norms and values that would govern the relations among the constituent members of ASEAN; and between them and the rest of the world. It also involves the development of an institutional identity, which consists of rules and mechanisms that would ensure that commitments are implemented. The constituent members are bonded together by a common history or a common destiny or both. The community with a capital “C’ will definitely depend on the depth of this common history and the breadth of the common destiny that is shared, as well as the strength of the institutional arrangements that can be built. In the Bali Concord II, it is explicitly stated this ASEAN Community will be achieved through “closer and mutually beneficially integration among its member states and among their peoples”. But the word “integration” would need to be clearly defined as to whether it covers all fields or just the area of economic integration. And, since there is no ready-made model for the ASEAN Community, among the existing regional communities, the European Community would come closest as the community with a capital “C”. It was noted, however, that ASEAN — as an intergovernmental organization — has not ensured that its regional initiatives and commitments were being implemented. Five factors accounted for this, namely:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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ASEAN has no legal underpinning. The ASEAN agenda is overloaded with too many regional initiatives. The mechanism to implement regional initiatives is too “soft” which leads to a “soft path” to integration. The process remains dominated by national bureaucrats. ASEAN has become so diverse especially since its membership expansion.

While ASEAN member countries are simultaneously engaged in community building at different levels, i.e., ASEAN, East Asia (ASEAN+3) and APEC, all these efforts should be undertaken within the strategy of developing concentric circles of cooperation. This strategy basically uses the ASEAN Community as the core that would then allow it to participate more effectively in wider and wider circles. In this regard, it is imperative that the ASEAN Community should be created now — the year 2020 would be too late. On the key issue of building a common identity in the process of community building in ASEAN, salient questions were raised with regard to shifts in norms in ASEAN. One such question was: to what extent had these norms or constitutive elements changed in the context of the ASEAN Community project with a capital “C”? A point was made that until the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these norms and practices appeared very resilient. However, one could also argue that there had already been changes to these norms and to its constitutive elements and these changes were in fact necessary to enable the development of certain institutions and mechanisms. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out the extent to which these changes in norms would impact on the three-pillar vision of an ASEAN Community.

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Moreover, it was important to examine what this common identity among ASEAN members really meant. Scholars that study community building or identity building have emphasized the process of socialization (one that involved social learning). In the ASEAN context, socialization would include the need to maintain the “ASEAN Way”. Until the region was hit by the Asian financial crisis, it was commonplace to hear about the ongoing processes of building an ASEAN community based on a common identity. However, since the crisis, this enthusiasm for a common identity may have been dampened. Under the streams of political transitions and conflicts that are taking place in the region, doubts have been cast with regard to the aspirations towards the creation of a common identity. It was also pointed out that most of the discourses on the notion of an ASEAN community had come from the political élites (e.g., ASEAN bureaucrats, ASEAN scholars, etc). Given the dynamic political transitions in the region, it was suggested that there was a need to find out the extent to which the notion of an ASEAN Community had filtered down to the vast majority of societies in the region. It was pointed out that there are now organized civil societies that wish to engage their own governments and even ASEAN. These trends had to be examined in order to relate this to the idea of building an ASEAN community. Hence, within the context of understanding the current discourses of ASEAN political élites on the notion of the ASEAN Community and juxtaposing these pronouncements against the dynamics of political transitions, the important issues that had to be analysed were: 1.

The extent to which member states and non-state actors feel that they belong to the ASEAN community. To what

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extent does this sense of belonging affect initiatives and institutions that are going to be developed? Do all members (particularly the new members) find their destiny with ASEAN as part of a community or are they still very much embedded in their own national interests/identities? The extent to which the idea of an ASEAN community had endured over generations in the region. This is an important issue to examine because the social learning that has transpired is essentially limited to the political élites. What happens if there is a change in élites? Who takes over? Do they share the same ideas and norms? The timeliness of this initiative. Given that the region is in the throes of political changes and transitions, is it the right time to push for an ASEAN Community with a capital “C”?

In the efforts to construct an ASEAN Community, it was noted that the existence of the long-standing relationships among different groups of people in the academic community should not be overlooked. In this regard, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Singapore has been an excellent example of being the “hub” for scholars on Southeast Asia. Thus it was important to recognize the potential of ISEAS and other academic communities as representing a vast reservoir of human resources that must be tapped. On the point of making community building in ASEAN more inclusive, it was suggested that this would take time. Given the region’s “top-down culture”, expanding the constituencies of this community would be hampered, and the participation of NGOs and other grassroots organizations in ASEAN would be severely limited. In response, it was argued that there were limits to such

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an approach. Hence, a more pertinent issue to consider was how to complement this “top-down” approach with grassroots efforts in community building that are already in place. In this regard, the ASEAN Secretariat can be the facilitator to tap such informal networks that exist in the region. The importance of education in building the ASEAN Community was also raised. It was suggested that the notion of ASEAN should be introduced in public education starting from primary school level. ASEAN should also be taught as a core course at the university level. The ASEAN University Network (AUN) could be used to promote ASEAN studies. Along with these proposals was also the need to explore how the Southeast Asia Minister of Education Organization (SEAMEO) can be merged with the ASEAN Ministers of Education Meeting to build synergy among the regional educational institutions in the region. Finally, it was pointed out that one of the main incentives for the young to learn more about ASEAN would be to enhance employment opportunities. One suggestion was to offer attractive incentives like adopting an agreement that would allow graduates from ASEAN member countries to be employed for a number of years before they return to their home countries.

SESSION II THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY While the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) has been endorsed by the 2003 Bali Summit, there is scope for giving more coherence to the concept and to the linkages between the ASC and the other two pillars of the ASEAN Community namely, the ASEAN

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Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Social-Cultural Community (ASCC). The concept of a security community (à la Karl Deutsch) has been in the literature for a very long time. To the extent that such a community implies conscious war avoidance in the conduct of intra-mural relations, it can be said that ASEAN is already a security community. However, in the post-Cold War era there is a need to go beyond external threats given the new generation of transnational security challenges (the 1997 regional economic crisis and its aftermath, environmental pollution, the spread of infectious diseases, international terrorism, etc.,) facing ASEAN. Such problems cannot be dealt with by ASEAN acting alone. They require the co-operative efforts of the international community. While external threats are largely dissipated in the post-Cold War regional security environment, internal threats to regimes are real. But how a security community deals with this kind of threat requires careful deliberation considering that the value that is placed on non-intervention in ASEAN. There is a need not only for concerted and co-ordinated action but also for practical solutions to practical problems. In formulating a road map for the implementation of the ASEAN Security Community the following considerations are worthy of reiteration: 1.

2.

There is a need to be realistic in taking account of the urgency and relevance of the many proposals. Not all ASEAN members are at the same comfort level vis-à-vis the specific proposals. Time and patience are essential in getting a broad base of acceptance. The more sensitive elements of the ASC (such as counter-

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terrorism, extradition, intrusive peacekeeping and peace building) should be formulated in a more delicate manner or they will not find acceptance among some ASEAN members. The ASC road map should not be overloaded with initiatives. Also there is a greater need to consolidate existing norms (such as those enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration and SEANWFZ treaty, etc.) than consider new ones. Some of the proposals need to be made explicit and explained clearly, e.g., what is meant by defence white paper, regional arms register, or the Law of the Sea as the basis for maritime security co-operation? Do all AS=}N members share the same interpretation? Bilateral security co-operation will have to be taken into account. Indeed such bilateral co-operation is a very important part of the security building process in ASEAN. Nor does the ASC diminish the significance of bilateral defence linkages between some ASEAN states and extraregional powers such as the United States. These should be seen as complementary to the ASC. The ASC should be outward looking and be related to the ASEAN Regional Forum that provides an arena for the engagement of extra-regional security interests. There is also a need to take account of the global dimension including the global norms and global institutions such as the UN. The concept of comprehensive security should be reemphasized as an important basis for security building within the ASC. Comprehensive security also provides a basis for linking the three pillars of the ASEAN Community.

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The time-frame for the realization of the ASC should be carefully calibrated. It cannot be rushed. In this respect it is useful to look at proposals that can be implemented in the short term, and those that must for practical considerations be relegated to the intermediate and long-term stage. The proposal for an ASEAN peacekeeping force is one that requires careful study given its practical implications for joint training, inter-operability, organizational structure, command and control as well as funding. This is something that should be relegated to the long term. However, it was noted that a peacekeeping training centre as opposed to a peacekeeping force is a short-term possibility in that it does not require a big leap in faith. A security community is not just about avoiding conflict but also avoiding significant organized preparations for war — such as an arms race or competitive arms build up that would undermine trust and confidence. Hence some kind of dispute settlement or crisis diplomacy mechanism within say the High Council of the TAC or involving a revitalized ASEAN Troika will be very useful.

A security community as an end-goal of ASEAN co-operation is laudable. There are nevertheless many avenues through which such a community can be pursued. Time is needed to address the educational and consultative requirements of the various proposals. The implementation of the ASC should be attempted within a realistic and practicable time-frame. Although the ASEAN Foreign Ministers are rightly responsible for implementing the ASC, there is room for drawing upon the inputs and expertise of track II organizations, the private sector and the NGOs.

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SESSION III THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY This session focused on three main issues: 1. 2.

3.

The challenges of deeper economic integration to realize the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Bridging the economic divide between the ASEAN-6 and the less developed member countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). Greater private sector participation on the implementation of the AEC.

Salient issues and proposals with regard to economic integration were as follows: (i) From the Bali Concord II, it was clearly evident that ASEAN leaders were not prepared to establish supranational institutions to co-ordinate economic activities in the region. ASEAN appeared to want the benefits of European-style economic integration without the concomitant commitments. In this light, ASEAN could consider using the NAFTA model where there were legally binding agreements to ensure the successful implementation of economic measures. (ii) ASEAN should not be using economic terms like a “single market” (Bali Concord II, para. B.3) without understanding its full economic implications. Even AFTA was not about free trade on all goods and services — it was just fifteen commodity groups, while non-tarriff barriers (NTBs) had yet to be tackled. (iii) ASEAN countries were not prepared to harmonize tariffs and have a common external tariff policy (as required of a customs

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union). Consequently, this has led to difficulties in ASEAN’s FTA negotiations with China, Japan and India. (iv) ASEAN had agreed to a sectoral approach to economic integration — as reflected in the eleven priority sectors identified by the High-Level Task Force (HLTF). However, the road map to integrate these sectors were not carefully thought out and there were serious concerns whether this project would be successful. The ASEAN Secretary-General had made a request to the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) to keep the road map open-ended to allow for further measures to be introduced at a later stage (when a proper study had been undertaken). (v) To create an integrated ASEAN market, hindrances to the movement of goods must be removed. This would, inter alia, involve improved customs co-ordination and the harmonization of standards and technical regulations. (vi) There were no clear guidelines on the “2+X” approach (which was recommended by the HLTF as a means to expedite integration). In fact, this approach may not be considered a regional initiative (viz., the ASEAN-X principle) because it could be undertaken at a bilateral level. This would mean that “X” country could be bound to whatever had already been agreed by the two original countries. (vii) More participation should be given to professionals — particularly ASEAN-based professionals — in the implementation of the AEC. In the ASEAN-ISIS study on the AEC, it was proposed that “regional units”, staffed by independent professionals, be established to manage economic activities in the region. (viii) Despite the promising start, there were some concerns that the AEC project may already be running “out of steam”. Hence, a champion was needed to drive the economic integration process. It was suggested that the HLTF could be this champion.

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Within the ASEAN framework, there were two mechanisms to assist the CLMV countries in narrowing the development gap which were the ASEAN-Mekong Development Co-operation and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). Thus far, these mechanisms have not been effective in addressing the problem of funding. It was therefore crucial for ASEAN to seek financial assistance either from within or from donor countries. It was proposed that a Fund could be set up to provide easier access to capital in order to finance important development projects in the CLMV countries (viz., agricultural projects). Within the context of the AEC, academics and experts could play a role by generating studies to examine how the CLMV countries could benefit for deeper economic integration. It was generally agreed among the Roundtable participants that private sector involvement in the AEC should also be given some priority. In fact, there will be an ASEAN-Private Sector Roundtable later this year to obtain the views and inputs from the private sector on the AEC. In this Roundtable, it also had to be made clear to the private sector that the AEC will not only benefit MNCs, but also ASEAN companies. Notwithstanding the need for greater private sector involvement, there had been some negative experience in the past. Private sector participation in ASEAN through the ASEANChamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) — which had representation in the SEOM and AEM meetings — were found to be ineffective and disorganized. Therefore, an alternative, and perhaps less formal, approach should be explored in encouraging greater private sector participation in the AEC project. It remained unclear at the end of this session what would be the end-goal of the AEC. One participant envisaged that the AEC would most probably straddle between the highly structured

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European Union (EU) and the less institutionalized (but legalistic) NAFTA model.

SESSION IV THE ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) has received the least attention and is the least developed among the three pillars mentioned in the Bali Concord II. This glaring oversight might impede the development of the AEC and ASC as regional social and cultural integration is integral to advances in the economic and security integration. For instance, an ASEAN social agenda is needed to ensure that poverty, deprivation or social inequities do not undermine the potential of economic growth, and indeed if economic development is threatened by social inequities, it in turn can undermine political stability. At the national level, all ASEAN states evidently recognized the utmost importance of social and cultural integration to their nation-building and economic development projects. Yet, however, the importance of building a socio-cultural community has yet to move beyond the national mindset and boundary to the regional level. As it stands, the ASCC comes across as an afterthought in the Bali Concord II where non-security and non-economic issues are simply relegated. Moreover, it just strings together a lot of words that corresponds to what have by tradition been areas of functional co-operation, i.e., co-operation through projects rather than through policy-based initiatives, and this has been the traditional distinction between functional co-operation and economic cooperation in the ASEAN framework. Thus there is a need to make clearer what the ASCC means and what its objectives are, and below are a few issues for further consideration:

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Unlike the ASC and AEC, the ASCC lacks an academic driver and this explains why the ASCC is both undervalued and underdeveloped. Scholars and researchers should be recruited to help to interrogate, conceptualize and define the concept. This would help policy-makers to better understand the concept and thus to set the socio-cultural agenda of a regional arrangement. Three elements to take into account in drafting an ASCC action plan are: (i) building caring societies to promote equity and human development in a broad sense, (ii) need to manage the social impact of economic integration, and (iii) strengthen the foundation of regional social cohesion and the promotion of ASEAN awareness. Perhaps an ASCC Integration Centre to facilitate the development and implementation of the concept could be established. To build an ASCC invariably would depend on the social and cultural makeup of the member states. Perhaps one reason why the regional socio-cultural integration is overlooked can be attributed to the fact that all the member states are still young nations in search of identities and values to bind their citizens. That different member states have taken different approaches to socially and culturally integrate their own societies would have provided us with a wide range of national experiences as resources to use to advance regional social and cultural integration. Consideration should be given to re-make the best practices used by member states that had successfully contributed to their national integration into the Regional Action Plan. For example, the Malaysian growth with equity model could be

2.

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re-tinkered to address the issue of regional economic growth and income inequalities. While policy-makers will continue to play a key role in deciding the social and cultural issues, frequently, however, civil society organizations have formed transnational networks. These networks deal with issues that the former have neglected or deal with different aspects of the issues raised by the former. Through the formation of a network of NGOs, civil society associations invariably would have help to foster community building via the bottom-up process. Thus, policy-makers would tap the potential of civil society associations as a driver by co-opting and/or co-operating with them. Also, a study is needed to ascertain how extensive is the transnational networking among civil society associations in the region. To help foster awareness of and identification with ASEAN among Southeast Asian citizens, there is a need to develop and disseminate material on Southeast Asian studies and cultures. The teaching of ASEAN (people, culture, language) could be included in national curriculum combined with exchange student, scholar and artist programmes. Promotion of regional publications and films should be encouraged. Also, there is need to work towards the common recognition of educational qualifications. However, an obstacle faced by efforts to initiate and implement social and cultural programmes is the lack of funding. As such an equitable funding system by ASEAN countries should be developed.

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SESSION V ASEAN COMMUNITY: WHAT ARE THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS? At the time ASEAN was formed in 1967, institutional structures were not considered very important by its member states. It was not surprising therefore that it took almost a decade before an ASEAN secretariat was established. Prior to its establishment in 1976, ASEAN affairs were handled essentially by national secretariats in each member state that co-ordinated the various activities outlined in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967. The coordination at national levels continued even after the ASEAN Secretariat was created and it was not until 1992 when the members decided to strengthen the institutional structure and function of the Secretariat. The primary reason for the decision to finally strengthen the Secretariat was the need to administer the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The institutional restructuring of ASEAN was however predicated on clearly defined parameters. 1. 2.

3.

First, regional institutions should not take on any supranational functions. Second, sensitivity should be given to the roles played by the foreign ministers and ASEAN Director-Generals (and their national secretariats) in the development of ASEAN. Third, ASEAN would move at a slow and incremental pace. Furthermore, any changes should be predictable and not require much financial resources.

Notwithstanding these parameters, ASEAN has indicated that it was prepared to move quickly when necessary as shown by the short deadlines adopted in implementing the measures outlined by the HLTF on moving ahead with economic integration.

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To make ASEAN more effective in responding to new challenges, including the need to expedite efforts towards economic integration, several changes to its institutional structures were suggested: (i)

Preparation of an annual report by the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral to be given directly to the leaders instead of the ASEAN Standing Committee. (ii) Giving ASEAN Ministers direct access to ASEAN Heads of Governments (HOGs) during the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. This would enable HOGs to have direct access to recommendations and policy issues prepared by their ministers. (iii) Establishing a committee of representatives from each member country, similar to the UN. Based in Jakarta, this committee would work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat and report to their respective national ministries or coordinating secretariats on relevant issues. This committee comprising ambassador-level representatives would cut down the huge number of existing ASEAN meetings that are organized throughout the year. (iv) Working out a formula where newer members are relieved of the extra financial burden when the question of increasing contributions from member countries would be adopted. This would, however, mean that they would not get the same kind of voting privileges (e.g., the European Union’s qualified majority voting system). (v) Agreeing on a set of norms that would define state behaviour towards its citizens. Besides the existing norms governing inter-state relations, the “new” set of norms could cover issues such as protection from rape, torture, and

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discrimination (on the basis of race or religion), and the non-use of military force for changing regimes. There was some discussion on the institutional implications of the proposals put forward for the ASC. These issues were as follows: (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

With regard to the idea of establishing a forum to address maritime security issues and a centre to generate ideas in this area, member states should discuss how this forum should take shape and whether the centre should be based within or outside ASEAN. Questions were also raised on the modalities of operation and funding. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) should continue to be the primary forum for regional security issues in East Asia — with ASEAN in the driver’s seat. However, there should be an improvement in the quality of ASEAN’s intellectual contribution to the ARF that has have hitherto come from non-ASEAN members. Reviving the idea of an ARFnet website — a website that is partly public and partly confidential — was also suggested. On the issue of enhancing defence co-operation in ASEAN, the areas identified include: military training, exchange of views on military procurement, communication linkages, joint border patrols, exercises on search and rescue and disaster relief. Given the adoption of the Treaty of Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, ASEAN should also look into introducing a chemical and biological weapons conventions for Southeast Asia. ASEAN should reconsider the idea of a regional peace-

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keeping force. This is because peacekeeping operations have gone beyond the traditional function of bringing in peacekeepers. They include post-conflict peace-building initiatives (viz., reconstruction and building of infrastructure and facilities). What legal and institutional structures might be needed or would be useful in the promotion of the ASEAN Community as envisaged in the Bali Concord II? A couple of issues were addressed, using the AEC as a reference point: 1.

A preliminary question that arose was to what degree of economic integration in ASEAN does the Bali Concord II aspire. At one end of the spectrum would be a network of states joined through free trade agreement arrangements (such as AFTA). At the other end, one finds more highly integrated arrangements, such as customs unions, and monetary unions. The institutional implications would, accordingly, vary depending on the level of integration targeted. The Bali Concord II referred to the AEC establishing ASEAN as a “single market and production base”. It also referred to it as a “fully integrated economic community”. An indication of what these mean lies in the goal of the AEC as “an economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020” (para. B.1). The issue therefore was what institutions (which may take a variety of forms, including bodies, measures,

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documentation) were needed to achieve this goal. The Bali Concord II itself envisaged instituting “new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of [ASEAN’s] existing economic initiatives” (para. B.3). A second question was the role of law in building the AEC. ASEAN has used a number of “hard” law instruments such as treaties, and “soft” law instruments such as co-operation arrangements, in its integration process. Given the imperative to build an AEC by 2020, it may now be appropriate to examine whether some further steps towards economic integration need to be “institutionalized” as hardlaw obligations. Already, at the enforcement level, the dispute settlement mechanism for resolving economic disputes between ASEAN was taking a rule-based complexion, with panel and appeal decisions to be based on law rather than political considerations.

It was therefore suggested that institutional needs for ASEAN integration be considered at three levels: (i) decision-making for the AEC; (ii) implementation of steps towards the AEC; and (iii) enforcement of integration rights and obligations. At each level, the question should be asked as to whether existing institutions were appropriate, and whether new institutions may be required. In considering the issue of institutional needs for the AEC, one may look, for instance, to the two differing regimes of the EU and NAFTA, to glean the most suitable practices which may fit the unique needs of ASEAN. The three pillars of the ASEAN Community appear to have different requirements. For example, the economic pillar would need a strong legally-binding foundation to move forward. Meanwhile, the security and socio-cultural pillars could continue

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with the “ASEAN Way” approach. Hence, if the region was to have a Treaty, perhaps it should cover only the economic element of ASEAN. It was further suggested that an ASEAN Integration Research Unit could be set up which would provide an academic platform for scholars to generate creative ideas and drive the ASEAN Community project forward.

THE COMPILERS Denis Hew is a Fellow at ISEAS Singapore. Chin Kin Wah is a Senior Fellow at ISEAS Singapore. Lee Hock Guan is a Fellow at ISEAS Singapore. Roundtable Rapporteurs: Graham Gerard Ong is a Research Associate at ISEAS Singapore. Maghaisvarei Sellakumaran was a Research Associate at ISEAS Singapore. Michael Phoon Chee Kin was an Intern at ISEAS Singapore.

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BACKGROUND PAPERS

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WHAT IS A COMMUNITY? Amitav Acharya

In political science as in the real world of politics, the language of “community” evokes both appeal and apprehension. Leaders often use the language of community (or associated metaphors: family, brotherhood, kinship) to woo their constituents, legitimize their mode of governance and mobilize public support for specific policies. Some disparage the notion of community, which they see as a fig leaf for state dominance at the expense of individual autonomy. But if the concept sparks controversy at the domestic level, it arouses disbelief when applied to international relations. Realists, who dominate both the study and practice of international relations, view the international system as anarchic, in which states exist in perpetual fear and mistrust of each other, and where self-help trumps community-help. In constant pursuit of national security, their best hope is for co-existence, rather than collective fulfilment. Other scholars, admittedly less numerous, accept the possibility of community. They not only recognize the existence of community in international relations, but also claim that community-guided behaviour can reshape security perceptions and even create pacific relations among states. But what is community? A community has two key features. First, it implies a social, rather than purely instrumental, relationship. The key attributes of a community, to use American political scientist Ernst Haas’ words, are “trust, friendship, complementarity, and responsiveness” (Haas 1973, p. 116). Second,

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a community is not just a group of culturally similar people. While people in communities have cultural and physical attributes in common, they are also people who “display mutual responsiveness, confidence, and esteem, and who self-consciously self-identify” (Puchala 1984, pp. 186–87). In a classic formulation, Ferdinand Tonnies distinguishes between two kinds of social relationships. The first describes a kinship or a communal relationship (Gemeinschaft). The other refers to an organized, purposive association (Gesellsschaft). The two are different to the extent that a person cannot simply wake up one morning and decide to join a Gemeinschaft. He/she is either born into it or grows into it through an evolutionary process of adaptation and assimilation. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, connotes a voluntary association based on rational self-interest. The process of entering into a Gesellsschaft is akin to signing a contract, which is an instrumental and practical way of achieving one’s goals. In international relations, one can find a middle ground between the organic and instrumental views of society. Just as one does not have to be born a Malay to become one, community in Southeast Asia’s international relations does not have to be preordained geographically or culturally. Nor does it have to consist entirely of instrumental behaviour. Thus, a regional association may grow into a community through an evolutionary process of socialization and identification. Hence, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, which is often cited as a terminal barrier to a regional community may be less important than conscious efforts at socialization and identity-building underpinned by a common set of objectives. Hence, a community can be socially constructed, combining instrumental logic with habit-forming socialization, norms and

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symbolic identity-building. Moreover, such identity-building is not entirely divorced from cultural and historical ties, but are reinforced by it. Simple proximity, historical ties and shared culture do not a community make. Their outcome can be indeterminate; proximity can lead to either war or peace, historical memories have been associated with war; and cultural ties do not make nations immune to conflict. But they can create the initial impulse for community-building, legitimize co-operation nationally and internationally, and reinforce the rationale for collective action. Communities can be imagined. Ben Anderson spoke of nationalism and the nation-state as an imagined community. He referred to the role of print media, colonial administration and élite socialization in creating a sense of community among disparate and disrupted localities which formed the basis of the nation-state. Just as nations are imagined, so can be regions. Southeast Asia is in many ways an imagined region; its experience of regional identity-building can be likened to a quest for identity. Without forgetting the influence of historical interactions of its constituent units, Southeast Asia could not have been conceived except through the imagination of historians (both Western and indigenous), imperial strategists in the late colonial era, and above all by the élites of ASEAN member states. Hence, S. Rajaratnam exhorted ASEAN members to recognize a “regional existence”, in addition to national ones — a kind of existential community. Others, including nationalist leaders sought to return Southeast Asia to its pre-colonial ties through a regional organization. Here, the actions of ASEAN’s founders were purposive and rational. But they were also underpinned by a sense of history and identity. Its founders were “imagining” themselves to be part of a collective entity, or a region, by drawing upon a shared historical heritage as well as identifying common goals in a contemporary setting.

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The development of a community usually involves a sense of collective identity, which answer to the question who is to be included and who is to be excluded. In most cases, such identitybuilding is an exclusionary enterprise, it is concerned primarily with how the “self” differs from the “other”. But communities, while remaining culturally and politically distinct from outside actors, can also develop a common identity and purpose by attracting and engaging outsiders, rather than excluding or defending against them. ASEAN represents an example of such an approach to community-building, given its long tradition of post-ministerial conferences, its sponsorship of the ASEAN Regional Forum and its engagement approach towards a rising China and India. The ASEAN experience in community-building shows that co-operation can begin initially by developing shared normative assumptions about the need for, and desirability of, unity, despite the presence of many structural disparities and differences. In international relations, the idea of a community is often employed to denote deep co-operation in various issue areas. The most famous of these concepts is that of “security community”. First used by Karl Deutsch, the concept was not about security co-operation among states, at least not in the conventional sense of military security. Rather, a security community is “a group has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable’ certainty over a ‘long’ period of time” (Deutsch 1961, p. 98). Security communities have developed a long-term habit of war avoidance, a sense of a mutual purpose, and a “we feeling”.

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There are two widely-held misconceptions about community, especially security community, that need to be recognized. One is that states or people living in a community are immune to conflict. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The idea of community does not preclude conflict; it only demands that conflicts are resolved peacefully. To quote one scholar: “This process [of security community building] is inherently conflictual; the critical issue is whether the process can be managed peacefully.” (Eberwein 1995, p. 346). There can be communities of sovereign states; sovereignty being an essential component of their group identity. But there must be a dependable expectation of war avoidance, and an attendant preference for the pacific settlement of disputes. The second misconception is that somehow a community must develop a mutual self-defence against those outside the group. Some communities can indeed do so and take on the nature of an alliance. But community is not the same as an alliance. The European Union is definitively a community, both political and security, but it has only recently been speaking of a common foreign and defence policy. A security community may subsume a defence community, but the latter is not a prerequisite for the former. In the economic realm, there exists the concept of a community as well, albeit one built on rationality and reciprocity, although over time it can go beyond instrumental action. In 1961, Bela Belassa defined the trajectory of regional economic integration to consist of five stages: a free trade area, which removes internal tariffs and barriers; a customs union, which harmonizes external trade and sets up internal regulatory institutions; a common market, which adds the removal of all non-tariff barriers and allows free movement of labour and

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business across borders; an economic union, in which members harmonize their economic policies into a monetary union, including a common currency; and a political union, which follows from economic integration. The European Union was until recently known as the European Economic Community (when it was a free trade area), and later as European Community (as a common market). But as in the sociological and political domain, the definition of what constitutes an economic community is ultimately subjective. It can accommodate a variety of relations, and not necessarily in a linear manner. Western Europe had become an economic community in the 1970s. Yet, this did not prevent the members of EEC to take divergent approaches to the Middle East oil crisis and the American technological challenge in the 1970s. Political purpose remains basic to instrumental and technocratic economic integration, in Southeast Asia of today as in Europe of the past. As noted about the generic term community itself, the notion of a “socio-cultural community” does not simply mean recognizing extant social and cultural similarities among societies and states. It requires a conscious desire and effort to engage in interactions in a variety of areas, such as arts, education, tourism, etc., that promote mutual understanding among societies and create a “we feeling”. But who are “we”? True socio-cultural communities need to be bottom-up, rather than top-down. As Andrew Linklater (1990, pp. 150–51) points out, the true meaning of community involves identity among peoples, and not just states. To be a socio-cultural community, a regional organization must shed its élite-driven agenda and identity. People do matter in regional construction. This brings up an especially important challenge for ASEAN. An official ASEAN

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Website for Culture and Information (http://www.aseaninfoculture.org/) claims that “ASEAN cultural co-operation is aimed at the vigorous development of an awareness of regional identity, the preservation of the region’s cultural heritage, and the exertion of efforts to create a strong ASEAN community.” But developing true regional identity would require greater interactions and identifications at the popular level, to make ordinary people in ASEAN identify with the regional entity, and not just national ones (the two can co-exist, however). ASEAN has done little thus far to draw in the citizenry and the civil society into the ambit of regional interactions. Today, there are a variety of associations affiliated with the ASEAN Secretariat which work is relevant to the creation of a regional socio-cultural community: the ASEAN Music Industry Association (AMIA), ASEAN University Sports Council (AUSC), ASEAN Federation of Furniture Manufacturers Association (AFFMA), and the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), to name a few. (Strangely enough, these ASEAN-affiliated groups are listed under “External Relations” in the official website.) There is also the ASEAN Arts Festival, ASEAN Travel Agents Association, and more recently the ASEAN Peoples’ Congress. But the reach of these groups into the hearts and minds of ordinary people remains limited and they have not created a sense of community from below. Hence, if ASEAN is to be true to its vision statement, and develop, by 2020, “an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity”, there needs to be more involvement of functional, professional and non-governmental organizations, including those dealing with transnational issues such as environment, humanitarian assistance and poverty alleviation.

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It is useful to remind ourselves that external material forces, such as superpower deterrence or the America-led regional balance of power, were not the only reasons why ASEAN survived the difficult geopolitical environment in the years following its creation in 1967. The dynamics of Southeast Asian regionalism was far more complex, it included normative socialization and a quest for common identity. Today, in the face of new transnational dangers, ASEAN has adopted the language of “community” and “common regional identity”. These have become key phrases in recent ASEAN vision statements. Yet, ASEAN members appear to remain firmly committed to the principle of state sovereignty. If ASEAN is to become a community in the true sense of the term, then regional interactions would need to be deepened by setting aside purely instrumental concerns linked to state sovereignty when and where transnational dangers are to be handled. They also need to be broadened, so that peoples as much as governments develop a stake in regional endeavours aimed at common security and prosperity.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. ———. The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000. Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Anderson, Ben. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1991. Belassa, Bela. The Theory of Economic Integration. London: Allen & Unwin, 1961. Broom, Leonard, Charles M. Bonjean and Dorothy H. Broom. Sociology Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1990.

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Davis, Kingsley. “Primary Groups”. In Life in Society, edited by Thomas E. Lasswell, John H. Burma and Sidney H. Aronson. Gleview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990. Deutsch, Karl W. “Security Communities”. In International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by James Rosenau. New York: Free Press, 1961. Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter. “The Future of International Warfare: Toward A Global Security Community”. International Political Science Review 16, no. 4 (1995): 341–60. Haas, Ernst B. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing”. In Regional Politics and World Order, edited by Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz. San Francisco: WH Freeman, 1973. Linklater, Andrew. “The Problem of Community in International Relations”. Alternatives 15, no. 2 (1990). Puchala, Donald J., “The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations”. In The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Eugene M. Wittkopf. New York: Random House, 1984.

Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS Hsu Locknie

“Political tasks will be implemented through law”.1

Introduction As ASEAN moves towards a more integrated Community, it is timely to examine its institutional underpinnings, to understand what changes, if any, may be required to facilitate achievement of that goal. This discussion focuses on the question of what legal and institutional structures might be needed or useful in the promotion of the ASEAN Community, as envisaged in the Bali Concord II.2 In particular, it uses the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a reference point. Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, a large number of documents have been signed, and arrangements entered into, at various levels by the ASEAN governments, to promote peace, trade, investment, liberalization, co-operation and related goals.3 At the same time, the Secretariat, which is headed by a SecretaryGeneral and was set up in 1976, has by now become a familiar feature.4 In 1992, the Secretary-General position was conferred the level of status of a Minister.5 Apart from the Secretariat, a number of other committees, sub-committees and working groups have also sprung up. In addition, there are specialized bodies

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which monitor work in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (the AFTA Council) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) (the AIA Council). As the integration process deepens in the direction set by the Bali Concord II, it is questionable whether these documents, arrangements and structures suffice. This paper sets out some important process questions which ASEAN needs to ask to see how to deepen the integration process in a concrete fashion.

Level of Integration and Institutional Needs A preliminary question that arises is what degree of economic integration the Bali Concord II aspires to in ASEAN. As has been pointed out that ASEAN did not at its birth intend for integration.6 Rather, the vision was one of regional co-operation. This has evidently changed through the years, as the Vision 2020 and Bali Concord II documents show. Even so, the level of integration can vary. At one end of the spectrum would be a network of states joined through free trade agreement arrangements (such as AFTA). At the other end, one finds more highly integrated arrangements, such as customs and monetary unions; the EU is an obvious instance of such a highly integrated union. The institutional implications would, accordingly, vary depending on the level of integration targeted. So what level of integration does ASEAN aspire to? The Bali Concord II refers to the AEC establishing ASEAN as a “single market and production base”.7 It also refers to a “fully integrated economic community”.8 An indication of what these mean lies in the goal of the ASEAN Economic Community: “an economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020”.9 The issue

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therefore is what institutions (which may take a variety of forms, including bodies, measures, documentation) are needed to achieve this goal.10 A second question is the role of law in building the AEC. The law can be utilized in a number of ways in the integration process: to set or spell out norms, create institutions, delineate their responsibilities and powers and crystallize workplans into legal obligations. Instruments which give rise to binding legal rights and obligations are generally known as “hard law” instruments. These fulfil the legal requirements of a treaty not only in name but in substance. It is by now clear that while the label applied to a document may help interpret its legal status, it may not be conclusive; international law tribunals examine the substance of the document to find the signatories’ intention.11 In Qatar v Bahrain, the International Court of Justice held that: The Court would observe, in the first place, that international agreements may take a number of forms and be given a diversity of names.12

The Court further observed that such intention was discerned through the actual terms of the document and the circumstances in which it was drawn up.13 Alongside these are “soft law” instruments which do not give rise to clear legal obligations, yet play an important role in political and diplomatic community-building, such as guidelines, initiatives, workplans, recommendations and political declarations. Some writers argue that “soft law” instruments are gaining greater significance in norm-setting in today’s world.14 ASEAN has used both “hard” law treaties and “soft” law instruments such as co-operation arrangements, on its road of integration. Given the imperative to build an AEC by 2020, it is

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appropriate to examine whether some further steps towards economic integration need to be “institutionalized” as hard law obligations. Already, at the enforcement level, the dispute settlement mechanism for resolving economic disputes between ASEAN is taking a rule-based complexion. Prior to the Bali Concord II, the Protocol for Dispute Settlement of 1996 already indicated in its Annex the list of agreements and memoranda of understanding which would be subject to the Protocol. This arguably indicates an intention to be bound — to the extent of enforcement under the Protocol — by these listed documents. In other words, it could be argued that, if there had been any doubts about the binding nature of these documents, the Protocol removed these doubts. Further, the 2003 reforms introduced by the Bali Concord II, shifting towards dispute resolution by panel and appeal decisions based on law rather than political considerations, reinforces this shift to law-bound obligations in ASEAN.15 While there are certain ASEAN documents which more clearly state and show treaty intention, there are others which do not have such clear status.16

Clarifying Objectives and Taking Stock If the AEC is to become a reality in 2020 (or, for optimists, sooner), ASEAN members cannot afford the luxury of being ambiguous about implementation plans. Nor can they ignore the fact that some or all of these may need to be put in some binding form, to ensure that a lack of political will does not allow the process to falter. A similar impetus was given to the then-flagging interest in integration in the period Jacques Delors took over as the European Commissioner in 1985. A number of significant consensus-building steps and documents, providing a great level of specificity to

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implementation, were undertaken, including the landmark report associated with Delors and Lord Cockfield.17 The report contained an annex detailing about 300 specific measures to be addressed in order to remove trade barriers in the European Community, and the timelines for doing so.18 These recommendations eventually crystallized into legal obligations for EU members, through the treaty of the Single European Act, which was signed in 1986 and came into force in 1987. Interestingly, in a relatively short space of time, significant legal and institutional change and impetus were injected into the European integration process. Relating the two questions in the previous section, it can be seen that a clear understanding of the integration level is needed in order to determine the type of institutional adjustment or change needed, if any, in what form, and how the law may serve to support such adjustment or change. The presence of clear objectives enables steps to be taken in developing appropriate institutions. A first step would be to establish more implementation detail to the ASEAN Community. In this regard, AFTA has been a forerunner through its clear timelines and tariff elimination targets. To a certain extent, the AIA has also set relatively clear targets. However, the same clarity is not evident for other areas such as in services (other than financial services), movement of persons and handling of non-tariff measures. Publication of implementation steps for the Roadmap of Integration for ASEAN in all sectors to be integrated would be helpful. Binding these in a treaty-type document would lend legal effect. This would help to clearly identify, and make binding, implementation obligations and timelines. Secondly, a stock-taking of existing binding obligations in ASEAN integration documents and actions needs to be done.

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Where there is an intention to be bound in order to move the integration process forward rigorously, such intention can be made clearer, following the ICJ’s criterion for what amounts to binding treaty obligations, mentioned above. Where such intention is currently not clear, but is intended, new instruments may be needed to achieve this. For a systematic review, the stock-taking can examine three levels of ASEAN integration activity: decision-making, implementation and enforcement. At each level, the question should be asked as to whether existing institutions are appropriate, and whether new institutions may be required.

Moving Forward, But How? As the role of law in ASEAN integration evolves, the “ASEAN Way” of consensus decision-making needs to be reviewed; specific areas which may require a different approach, and what that approach may be, need to be identified. One might venture to say that signs of changes to this “Way” have already emerged: the Bali Concord II approval to transform the Dispute Settlement Protocol system into a rules-based system from the present political process, and the openness to use ways other than consensus.19 These are two significant developments, and may well have introduced what this writer would call, “the evolving ASEAN Way”. The former development is an important one in that it strengthens the mechanism for enforcing integration obligations; however, it should be noted that it deals with the latter end of the dispute process, where obligations are asserted and challenged.20 The starting point of the process, i.e., the establishment of those obligations in clearly enforceable terms, still needs more attention. Otherwise, there may be nothing to enforce, no matter how strong the dispute settlement mechanism becomes. It would be a case of

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the tail wagging the dog. It is in the clear establishment of obligations (which form the subject matter for the dispute settlement mechanism) that the law can play a stronger role in ASEAN. This role can take various forms, such as use of clear language to show intention to be bound, negotiating clear integration obligations on the part of each ASEAN member, and making binding, timelines and road maps for action by members, and perhaps with measurable results. The AFTA obligations and timetables for dealing with tariffs in ASEAN can serve as an example for other areas. The latter development needs to be carried further and areas other than dispute settlement calling for non-consensus decisionmaking have to be identified. Two questions relating to decision-making mechanisms are: whether existing policy and implementation structures are adequate, or need to be re-organized, streamlined or replaced, and if so, whether to do so in a document which sets out clearly each structure’s responsibilities and powers. For instance, the existing Ministerial and officials’ meetings, and Councils in charge of AFTA and AIA need to be considered holistically, to see how they best fit into the overall integration plan. In considering the issue of institutional needs for the AEC, one may look, for instance, to the two differing regimes of the European Union (EU) and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), among others, to glean the lessons which ASEAN can learn from and apply.21 These are two instances of efforts at economic integration using rather different legal models. Both are highly legalized arrangements in that they utilize treaties to establish integration/ liberalization objectives, and to set up treaty-based dispute settlement mechanisms.

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In the case of the EU, the level of integration is deeper, uses a number of landmark treaties and other instruments to establish binding obligations and supranational institutions to legislate, implement and enforce the integration process. The EU system also takes into account differentiation in integration commitments by members, and security and socio-cultural aspects of integration. These are relevant ideas in ASEAN integration and the EU experiences can offer valuable lessons. In NAFTA, the three signatory countries have chosen the instrument of a free trade agreement, namely, a trade treaty which sets out liberalization obligations in goods, services and investment, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, but does not create any constitutional structure or bodies with supranational law-making or governing powers. It relies on the free trade agreement to define the obligations that bind the parties, and does not form a separate organization or legal system as such. Yet it contains a dispute settlement system that covers general disputes and those arising between investors and a NAFTA state. The nonsupranationalist nature of NAFTA mechanisms can, again, offer lessons for ASEAN. For the ASEAN integration experience, it may well be that no single model can provide all the answers. A unique ASEAN model may borrow some suitable practices or institutions from others, as well as devise its own practices and institutions.

Conclusion At this threshold of deeper integration, ASEAN can either vindicate sceptics by failing to deliver significant change, or can seize the opportunity to put the process on a clear, workable and enforceable track, using appropriate legal tools where necessary. For now, it

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is apt to borrow the words of Lord Cockfield in his White Paper report, substituting references of “EU” with “ASEAN”: [We] stand at the crossroads. We either go ahead — with resolution and determination — or we drop back into mediocrity. We can now resolve to complete the integration of the economies of [ASEAN]; or, through a lack of political will to face the immense problems involved, we can simply allow [ASEAN] to develop into no more than a free trade area. The difference is crucial. A well developed free trade area offers significant advantages … But it would fail and fail dismally to release the energies of the people of [ASEAN]; it would fail to deploy [ASEAN’s] immense economic resources to the maximum advantage…22

What is clear is the need for a closer examination of the existing system and to move forward with decisive steps; these steps can take the form of creating a clearer and more coherent legal framework for ASEAN integration and related institutions.

Notes 1. 2. 3.

4

Thomas M.J. Mollers, “The Role of Law in European Integration”, (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 679, p. 709. Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 2003. Documents can be viewed at the ASEAN website, at . Hard-copy versions are available in Volume 1 of the loose-leaf series, Trading Arrangements in the Pacific Rim (Oceana Publications). Vide the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, Bali, 24 February 1976, available at (visited on 23 June 2004).

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5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

45

Vide the Protocol Amending The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992, available at (visited on 23 June 2004). Hadi Soesastro, ASEAN: Regional Economic Cooperation and Its Institutionalization, p. 16. Paragraph B.1, Bali Concord II. Paragraph B.5. Paragraph B.1. The Bali Concord II itself envisages instituting “new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of [ASEAN’s] existing economic initiatives” — paragraph B.3. See Chapter 2, Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2000), discussing what constitutes a binding treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 2(1)(a) of the Convention defines a “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” Generally, the test is one of intention: see Aust, citing the ICJ cases of Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978, and Qatar v Bahrain, 1994. The intention test is also used in relation to unilateral declarations by States: Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v France), 1974, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to consider whether France’s unilateral declaration was capable of creating binding legal obligations. It held: “[w]hen it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking.” — para. 46 of the judgement (emphasis added). It was further held: “With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not a domain in which international law imposes any special or strict requirements.

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12. 13. 14.

(1994) 33 ILM 1461, at pages 1467-8 of the judgement. Ibid. See, for instance, Edith Brown Weiss, Lecture: The Robert L Levine Distinguished Lecture Series: The Rise or the Fall of International Law? (2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 345, p. 352 (emphasis added): “One of the most important sources of international ‘soft law’ is the myriad of guidelines, resolutions, and recommendations that are made by parties to an international agreement in the course of implementing it. The old vision of an international agreement as an unchanging normative document binding upon the parties is obsolete. International agreements need to be viewed as living agreements, into which parties continuously breathe life and to which they give new directions by acting as informal legislatures. The negotiation of legally non-binding instruments is likely to increase more rapidly than the negotiation of formal international conventions, at least in certain areas of international law. This is true because agreement is usually easier to achieve, the transaction costs for governments and even NGOs are lower, the opportunity to set forth detailed strategies is greater, and the ability to respond to rapid changes in scientific understanding or economic or social conditions is better.” See the ASEAN Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, signed 1996, and Bali Concord II, paragraph B.3, which adopts the proposed changes to the Mechanism recommended by a High-Level Task Force. An agreement that shows ASEAN’s intention to be bound by its terms is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. In 2003, external dialogue partners of ASEAN such as China and India also acceded to this treaty. By

15.

16.

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contrast, there are Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) which may need to be examined for such intention to be bound. It should be noted that the Protocol on Dispute Settlement, 1996, does list a number of MOUs as being subject to the Protocol should disputes under them arise. This suggests that ASEAN intends to be bound by at least some of these. On MOUs and their capacity to create binding legal obligations, see Anthony Aust, supra, note 11. 17. “Completing the Internal Market”, European Communities Commission White Paper, 14 June 1985, COM (85) 310 Final. Available at (accessed 19 July 2004). 18. Available at (accessed 19 July 2004). 19. See, respectively, Annex paragraph on Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism and paragraph 14(iv) of the High-Level Task Force Recommendations: “Decision-making process by economic bodies to be made by consensus, and where there is no consensus, ASEAN to consider other options with the objective of expediting the decision-making process”. (Emphasis added.) 20. There have been many remonstrations focusing on the inadequacy of the dispute settlement mechanism of ASEAN, with much less emphasis on the process creating legally binding integration obligations which can be enforced though that mechanism. See, for instance, Narongchai Akrasanee and Jutamas Arunanondchai, “Institutional Reforms to Achieve ASEAN Market Integration”, The 2nd ASEAN Reader, compiled by Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, pp. 509–13 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 21. For a comparison of institutions in NAFTA and OECD, see Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution in Economic Integration: A Contribution to Comparative Institutional Analysis for

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22.

International Economic Organization, (1998) 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 53. See also Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others’ Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional Cooperation in the Face of EC and NAFTA, (1994) 9 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 809. Supra, note 17, “Completing the Internal Market”.

Hsu Locknie is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. She was a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS Singapore.

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APPENDIX 1

DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD II (BALI CONCORD II)

The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region; NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia; CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive

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regional association for the well being of its member states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association’s guidelines in achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them; REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995); COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN co-operation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999–2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA); CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples; REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation;

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REITERATING that the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an effective code of conduct for relations among governments and peoples; RECOGNIZING that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic co-operation and political solidarity; COGNIZANT of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member countries to adopt “Prosper Thy Neighbour” policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region; REITERATING the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable and that contributes towards the pursuit of development; REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony; DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT: 1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security co-operation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural co-operation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region;

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2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient; 3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member Countries and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony; 4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security co-operation, the enhancement of defense co-operation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means; 5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region; 6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security co-operation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further advancing

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the stages of co-operation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region; 7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy to realize an ASEAN Economic Community through a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy; 8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process so as to further draw synergies through broader and deeper co-operation in various areas; 9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration arising from its existing initiatives and those with partners, through enhanced trade and investment links as well as through IAI process and the RIA; 10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common regional identity; DO HEREBY ADOPT: The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community:

A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC) 1. The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN’s political and security co-operation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the

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world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives. 2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy. 3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member Countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs. 4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes. 5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime co-operation between and

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among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community. 6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution. 7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN’s commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully. 8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN’s determination to move forward at a pace comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force. 9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation and co-operation between ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters. 10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational

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crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF. 11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security. 12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and postconflict peace building.

B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) 1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realization of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020. 2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines.

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3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, turning the diversity that characterizes the region into opportunities for business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain. ASEAN’s strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and enhancing ASEAN’s economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall implement the recommendations of the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed. 4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening integration of ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development co-operation in order to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam through IAI and RIA so that the benefits of ASEAN integration are shared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move forward in a unified manner.

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5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and co-operation measures. There is a need to enhance co-operation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC) 1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies. 2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Community shall foster co-operation in social development aimed at raising the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities. 3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The development and enhancement of human resources is a key

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strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socioeconomic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development. 4. ASEAN shall further intensify co-operation in the area of public health, including in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and support joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the Community is enhanced when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of ASEAN are assured of adequate health care. 5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN’s diverse cultural heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people’s awareness of ASEAN. 6. The Community shall intensify co-operation in addressing problems associated with population growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary pollution as well as disaster management in the region to enable individual members to fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit. We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN Community into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement this Declaration.

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Done in Bali, Indonesia, on the Seventh Day of October in the Year Two Thousand and Three.

For Brunei Darussalam

HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Kingdom of Cambodia

SAMDECH HUN SEN Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia

MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI President

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For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic

BOUNNHANG VORACHITH Prime Minister

For Malaysia

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD Prime Minister

For the Union of Myanmar

GENERAL KHIN NYUNT Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President

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For the Republic of Singapore

GOH CHOK TONG Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand

DR. THAKSIN SHINAWATRA Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

PHAN VAN KHAI Prime Minister

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APPENDIX II

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE ON ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (ANNEX TO BALI CONCORD II)

INTRODUCTION 1. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and co-operation measures. The Task Force while focusing its recommendations relating to liberalization and facilitation measures in the area of trade in good, services and investment, acknowledges on the need to enhance co-operation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve among others, human resource development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultations on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 2. As a step towards the realization of ASEAN Economic Community for trade in goods, services and investment, the HLTF took into account the experience of other Regional Trading

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Arrangements (RTAs), ASEAN’s own experience, the development perspective in ASEAN and also the views contained in the following documents: (i)

ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), and RIA; (ii) ASEAN Competitiveness Study; (iii) ASEAN Economic Community: Concept Paper by ISEAS; and (iv) ASEAN ISIS: Towards an ASEAN Economic Community. 3. The HLTF is of the view that the elements of the AEC in the area of goods, services and investment have been elaborated in ASEAN Vision 2020, HPA and RIA, and recommends that the AEC should be: (i)

The end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020; (ii) Characterized as a single market and production base, with free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and freer flow of capital by 2020; and (iii) Approached on a progressive basis with clear timelines by strengthening existing initiatives and building new initiatives to enhance economic integration.

RECOMMENDATIONS 4. Recognizing that not all ASEAN member countries can meet the recommended deadlines, the HLTF recommends that flexibility be allowed in its implementation to enable those member countries that are ready to proceed first.

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CURRENT ECONOMIC COOPERATION INITIATIVES

5. The HLTF recommends that co-operation under the current economic initiatives be further strengthened in the following areas:

A.

Trade in Goods

(i)

By end-2004, finalize the improvement to the CEPT Scheme Rules of Origin (ROO) by: • Making it more transparent, predictable and standardized and taking into account the best practices of other RTAs including the WTO ROO; and • Adopting substantial transformation as alternative criteria for conferring origin status.

(ii)

Ensure transparency on Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) and eliminate those that are barriers to trade: • Establish ASEAN Database of NTMs by mid-2004; • Set clear criteria to identify measures that are classified as barriers to trade by mid-2005; • Set a clear and definitive work programme for the removal of the barriers by 2005; and • Adopt the WTO agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade; Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary and Import Licensing Procedures and develop implementation guidelines appropriate for ASEAN by end-2004.

Customs (i) Ensure full implementation of the Green Lane system for CEPT products at entry points of all Member Countries by 2004;

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(ii)

Adopt WTO agreement on Customs Valuation and develop implementation guidelines appropriate for ASEAN by end2004; (iii) Adopt service commitment (client charter) by ASEAN customs authorities; and (iv) Adopt the Single Window approach including the electronic processing of trade documents at national and regional level. Standards (i) Accelerate the completion and implementation of the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) for the five identified priority sectors (electrical and electronic equipment, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment and prepared foodstuff) within 2004/2005; and other sectors with significant potential for trade; (ii) Set specific targets for the harmonization of standards and technical regulations to trade focusing on sectors with significant trade value and those with potential for trade in the future; and (iii) Develop ASEAN technical regulations, where possible, for national applications.

B.

Trade in Services

(i)

Set clear targets and schedules of services liberalization for each sector and each round towards achieving free flow of trade in services; and AEM to provide specific mandate in every round of services negotiations. The end date to achieve free flow of trade in services earlier than 2020; Accelerate services liberalization in specific sectors earlier than end-date by countries which are ready, through the application of the ASEAN-X formula;

(ii)

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(iii) Complete MRAs for qualifications in major professional services by 2008 to facilitate free movement of professional/ skilled labor/talents in ASEAN; (iv) Promote the use of ASEAN professional services through the establishment of a “Professional Exchange” by 2008; (v) Recognize the AEM as the coordinator for services liberalization across all sectors; and (vi) Each country to be represented by senior officials who are authorized to negotiate on behalf of the government.

C.

Investment

(i)

Speed up the opening of sectors currently in the sensitive list to TEL, using the ASEAN-X formula, beginning 2004; (ii) Encourage and promote companies to relocate within ASEAN and where appropriate, special incentives should be given; (iii) Institute a mechanism to monitor the specific activities and timelines undertaken by each country vis-à-vis their submitted planned actions/activities on annual basis; (iv) Establish a network of ASEAN free trade zones (FTZs) so that companies could structure their manufacturing processes across different ASEAN countries to take advantage of their comparative strengths; and in the process increase intra-ASEAN trade and investment. Special marketing efforts should be undertaken for ASEAN-based companies; and (v) Undertake more effective joint ASEAN facilitation and promotion measures and develop new sources of inward FDI, particularly from potential countries such as China, India and ROK.

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Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)

6. ASEAN IPR co-operation beyond trademarks and patents by including co-operation in copyrights information exchange and enforcement by 2004.

E.

Capital Mobility

7. To facilitate trade and investment flows, expedite the implementation of the Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN in Finance.

II.

NEW INITIATIVES AND MEASURES

Priority Integration Sectors 8. The Special Informal AEM agreed to accelerate 11 priority sectors for integration to be coordinated by the following countries. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Indonesia: Wood-Based Products and Automotives; Malaysia: Rubber-Based Products; Textiles and Apparels; Myanmar: Agro-Based Products and Fisheries; Philippines: Electronics; Singapore: e-ASEAN and Healthcare; and Thailand: Air Travel and Tourism

9. The approach recommended for the integration of these priority sectors be premised on: (i)

Combine the economic strengths of ASEAN Member Countries for regional advantage; (ii) Facilitate and promote intra-ASEAN investments; (iii) Improve the condition to attract and retain manufacturing and other economic activities within the region;

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(iv) (v)

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Promote out-sourcing programme within ASEAN; and Promote the development of “Made in ASEAN” products and services.

10. Roadmap should be developed for each of the priority sectors and be implemented with the active involvement of the private sector, beginning 2004. 11. Possible measures proposed for the goods sector: (i) (ii) (ii)

Zero internal tariffs; Immediate removal of barriers to trade; Faster customs clearance and simplified customs procedures; and (iii) Accelerated development of MRAs and harmonization of products standards and technical regulations. 12. Integration of services sectors be implemented through: (i) Accelerated liberalization of these priority sectors by 2010; (ii) Accelerated development of MRAs; and (iii) Promote joint ventures and co-operation, including in third country markets. 13. Facilitate mobility of business people and tourists through: (i)

Visa exemption for intra-ASEAN travel by ASEAN nationals by 2005 (ii) Harmonizing the procedures for issuing visas to international travelers in ASEAN by 2004; and (iii) Developing ASEAN agreement to facilitate movement of business persons and skilled labour and talents by 2005.

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III. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING 14. To streamline the decision-making process and ensure effective implementation of all ASEAN economic initiatives, the following measures are recommended: (i)

Re-affirm the AEM as the coordinator of all ASEAN economic integration and co-operation issues; (ii) Issues of policy in nature to be resolved by AEM/AFTA Council/AIA Council; (iii) Technical/operational issues to be resolved by SEOM and the various committees/working groups; (iv) Decision-making process by economic bodies to be made by consensus, and where there is no consensus, ASEAN to consider other options with the objective of expediting the decision-making process. (v) By end-2004, establish an effective system to ensure proper implementation of all economic agreements and expeditious resolution of any disputes. The new system should provide for advisory, consultative, and adjudicatory mechanisms as follows: • Establish a legal unit within the ASEAN Secretariat; (Advisory — the legal unit will provide legal advice on trade disputes) • Establish the ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT); (Consultative — the ACT is the ASEAN equivalent of the EU SOLVIT mechanism to provide quick resolution to operational problems) • Establish the ASEAN Compliance Body (ACB); and (Adjudication — modeled after the WTO Textile Monitoring Body and make use of peer pressure)

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• Enhanced ASEAN DSM to make it more practical. (Adjudication — amend the ASEAN DSM to ensure expeditious and legally binding decision in resolving trade disputes) The proposed concept, elements and flow chart of the new system appear as ANNEX 1. (vi)

Enhance the capability of the ASEAN Secretariat to conduct research and analytical studies related to trade, investment and finance.

IV.

OUTREACH

15. To promote better appreciation and understanding of ASEAN economic issues among business/investor community and public sector agencies, the HLTF recommends the following: (i) (ii)

V.

Conduct out-reach programmes annually at both national and regional level; and Consult regularly with private sector representatives at national and regional level to address issues of concern/ interest relating to the implementation of ASEAN economic initiatives.

DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION

16. The recommendations to address the development divide and accelerate economic integration of CLMV: (i) (ii)

Expand the coverage of the AISP products; and Implement IAI projects through mobilization of resources from within ASEAN.

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CONCLUSION 17. The HLTF recommends that a review be made after one year of its implementation and the Secretary General of ASEAN to submit an annual progress report of its implementation to the AEM.

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ANNEX 1

MECHANISM OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

Advisory Mechanism ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT) (i) The ACT is adapted from the EU SOLVIT mechanism. It is a network of government agencies (one from each country) to allow the private sector to cut through red tape and achieve speedy resolution of operational problems encountered, thus helping to create a pro-business environment in ASEAN. (ii) Private individuals and businesses faced with operational problems related to countries’ ASEAN commitments, either at home or in other ASEAN countries, can highlight these problems to the ACT in their country (Host ACT). For problems encountered within the home country, the Host ACT will direct the problem to the appropriate government agencies, and ensure that a proposed solution is sent to the individuals/businesses within 30 calendar days. (iii) For problems encountered in other ASEAN countries, the Host ACT will forward the problem to the other countries’ ACT

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(Lead ACT). The Lead ACT will be responsible for directing the problem to the appropriate government agencies in its country, and ensuring that a proposed solution is sent to the individuals/ businesses via the Host ACT within 30 calendar days. To minimize delays, communication between Host and Lead ACTs should be via electronic means, for instance an online database accessible to all member countries. (iv) If the proposed solution does not resolve the problem highlighted, the private individuals/businesses can request that their government raise this issue to the other dispute settlement mechanisms described below. ASEAN Legal Unit (i) The ASEAN Legal Unit will be staffed by qualified lawyers specialising in trade laws employed by the ASEAN Secretariat. The unit will offer legal interpretation/ advice on potential trade dispute issues upon request from countries. The advice is purely advisory and non-binding in nature. (ii) The ASEAN Legal Unit would play a useful role in screening out issues that are operational/technical in nature which could be resolved through bilateral consultations, rather than being surfaced to the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body or the Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The ASEAN Legal Unit will also be responsible for providing legal advice and secretariat support to the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body and enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

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Consultative Mechanism ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body (ACMB) (i) The ACMB is modelled after the Textile Monitoring Body of the WTO, and makes use of peer adjudication, which is less legalistic and offers a speedier channel, to help countries resolve their disputes. (ii) In cases of non-compliance by one or more ASEAN Member Country/Countries in any ASEAN economic integration agreement, ACMB members from countries not involved in the dispute will upon request, review and issue findings on the case within a stipulated timeframe. The case findings of the ACB are not legallybinding. However, any opinion pointing to non-compliance should lead to the offending ASEAN Member Country/Countries to seriously consider measures to rectify the non-compliance. Moreover the ACMB’s findings would be tabled as inputs to the DSM should the case be raised to the DSM. (iii) Subject to agreement by both Parties, Member Countries who do not wish to avail of the ACMB after going through the ACT can go directly to the ASEAN DSM panel. (iv) AEM had earlier directed SEOM to work out a Terms of Reference for this monitoring body. Conciliation and Mediation Processes (i) Upon mutual voluntary agreement, member countries can at any time, engage in conciliation and mediation procedures to resolve their dispute before it is surfaced for adjudication at the enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

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(ii) Proceedings under these conciliation and mediation procedures, including respective positions taken by parties to the dispute during the proceedings, shall be confidential. (iii) The ASEAN Secretary General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation and mediation procedures. Enforcement Mechanism Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) (i) To ensure that binding decisions can be made based solely on legal considerations, changes should be made to the procedures of the existing ASEAN DSM to depoliticize the entire process. (ii) The enhanced ASEAN DSM would be modeled after the WTO DSM, which have already established a proven track record in resolving trade disputes. It would include the following key features: 1.

2.

having panels of three independent professionals from countries not involved in the disputes (including non-ASEAN countries) to rule on the disputes and administer the appellate process. To ensure de-politicization of the processes, ASEAN should replace the AEM with an appellate body comprising of well-qualified, independent and experienced professionals as the appeal body for the panels’ decisions, and adopt the existing WTO DSM panel selection procedures, including the listing of qualified individuals who can serve as panelists and members of the appellate body (maintained by the WTO Secretariat); strict and detailed procedures and timeline governing each stage of the dispute settlement process (adopted from the

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WTO DSM procedure) to ensure speedy progress towards a fair outcome, and effective mechanisms, including the possibility of imposing sanctions on non-compliant countries, to ensure full implementation of the DSM rulings.

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PROGRAMME

THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE ON “TOWARDS REALIZING AN ASEAN COMMUNITY”

4–5 June 2004 Seminar Room II Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore

Friday. 4 June 2004 8.30 am – 9.00 am

Registration

9.00 am – 9.10 am

Opening Remarks Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

9.10 am – 9.30 am

Keynote Address HE ONG Keng Yong Secretary-General, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta SESSION I

9.30 am – 10.15 am

An Overview on Community Building in ASEAN Chairperson:

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Professor WANG Gungwu Chairman, Board of Trustees, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Director, East Asian Institute, Singapore

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Presentations:

Dr Hadi SOESASTRO Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta Professor SHAMSUL A B Director, Institute of the Malay World & Civilization (ATMA), The National University of Malaysia Dr Mely Caballero ANTHONY Assistant Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

10.15 am – 11.15 am

General Discussion

11.15 am – 11.30 am

Coffee SESSION II

11.30 am – 12.00 noon

The ASEAN Security Community: What are the Practicalities? Chairperson:

Dr CHIN Kin Wah Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Presentations:

Mr Jusuf WANANDI Co-founder and Member, Board of Trustees, and Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta Professor ZAKARIA HAJI AHMAD Coordinator, Strategic and Security Studies Unit, The National University of Malaysia

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Professor Amitav ACHARYA Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 12.00 noon – 1.00 pm

General Discussion

1.00 pm – 2.00 pm

Lunch SESSION III

2.00 pm – 2.40 pm

The ASEAN Economic Community: Concept and Challenges Chairperson:

Dr Denis HEW Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Presentations:

Mr NOORDIN AZHARI Director, Bureau of Economic Cooperation, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta Dr Sarasin VIRAPHOL Executive Vice President, Charoen Pokphand Group, Thailand Mr DAO Viet Hung Department of Development Studies, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Hanoi Dr Linda LOW Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

2.40 pm – 3.40 pm

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Saturday, 5 June 2004 SESSION IV 9.00 am – 9.30 am

The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Chairperson:

Dr LEE Hock Guan Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Presentations:

Dr Carolina T de los Santos GUINA Consultant, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta Professor Dato’ Dr IBRAHIM Ahmad Bajunid Dean, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia Dr Russell HENG Hiang Khng Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

9.30 am – 10.30 am

General Discussion

10.30 am – 10.45 pm

Tea SESSION V

10.45 am – 11.15 am

ASEAN Community: What are the Institutional Implications? Chairperson:

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Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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Presentations:

Tan Sri Dato’ AJIT SINGH Distinguished Research Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya Mr Roldolfo C SEVERINO, Jr Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Assoc Professor HSU Locknie Visiting Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore and Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

11.15 am – 12.15 am

General Discussion

12.15 pm – 1.00 pm

Closing Remarks Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

1.00 pm – 2.00 pm

Lunch

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LIST OF SPEAKERS, PARTICIPANTS AND CHAIRMEN

1.

Professor Amitav ACHARYA Deputy Director and Head of Research Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine 4, Level B4 Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: (65) 6790-6213 Fax: (65) 6793-2991 E-mail: [email protected]

2.

TAN Sri Dato’ AJIT SINGH Distinguished Research Fellow Asia-Europe Institute University of Malaya Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Tel: (02-03) 7967-6929 (DL) Fax: (603) 7954-0799 E-mail: [email protected]

3.

Dr Mely Caballero ANTHONY Assistant Professor Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine, S4 Level B4 Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: (65) 6790-5886 Fax: (65) 6793-2991 E-mail: [email protected]

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List of Speakers, Participants and Chairmen

4.

Dr CHIN Kin Wah Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

5.

Mr DAO Viet Hung Deputy Director Department of Development Studies Institute of World Economics and Politics 176 Thai Ha Str. Dong Da Dist Hanoi Vietnam Tel: (84-4) 857-4286 Fax: (84-4) 857-4316 E-mail: [email protected]/[email protected]

6.

Dr Carolina T de los Santos GUINA Consultant, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta c/o Mekong Department Asian Development Bank 6 ADB Ave. Mandaluyong City 0401 Metro Manila Philippines Tel: (63-2) 632-4018 Fax: (63-2) 636-2227 E-mail: [email protected]

7.

Dr Russell HENG Hiang Khng Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

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8.

Dr Denis HEW Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

9.

Assoc Professor HSU Locknie Visiting Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Faculty of Law National University of Singapore 13 Law Link Singapore 117590 Tel: (65) 6874-3611/6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6779-0979 E-mail: [email protected]

10.

Professor Dato’ Dr IBRAHIM AHMAD BAJUNID Dean Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University Tun Abdul Razak 3rd Floor, UNITAR KLJ2 16-5 Plaza CCL Jalan Perbandaran SS6/12 47301 Kelana Jaya Selangor, Malaysia Tel: (603) 7809-2107 Fax: (603) 7880-1745 E-mail: [email protected]

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11.

Mr K KESAVAPANY Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

12.

Dr LEE Hock Guan Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

13.

Dr Linda LOW Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

14.

Mr NOORDIN AZHARI Director Bureau of Economic Cooperation ASEAN Secretariat 70A Jl Sisingamangaraja Jakarta 12110 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 726-2991 Fax: (62-21) 7398234 E-mail: [email protected]

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15.

HE ONG Keng Yong Secretary General ASEAN Secretariat 70-A, Jl Sisingamangaraja Jakarta 12110 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 724-3340 Fax: (62-21) 724-3348 E-mail: [email protected]

16.

Mr Rodolfo C SEVERINO, Jr Visiting Senior Research Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 E-mail: [email protected]

17.

Professor SHAMSUL A B Director Institute of the Malay World & Civilization (ATMA) The National University of Malaysia 43600 UKM Bangi Selangor Darul Ehsan Malaysia Tel: (603) 8925-0929 Fax: (603) 8925-4698 E-mail: [email protected]

18.

Dr Hadi SOESASTRO Executive Director Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jalan Tanah Abang III No 23-27 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 380-9637 Fax: (62-21) 384-7517 E-mail: [email protected]

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19.

Dr Sarasin VIRAPHOL Executive Vice President Charoen Pokphand Group 313 C P Tower, 29th floor Silom Road Bangkok 10500 Thailand Tel: (66-2) 631-0505 Fax: (66-2) 631-0942 E-mail: [email protected]/[email protected]

20.

Mr Jusuf WANANDI Co-founder and Member, Board of Trustees; and Senior Fellow Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jalan Tanah Abang III No 23-27 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 380-9637 Fax: (62-21) 380-9641 E-mail: [email protected]

21.

Professor WANG Gungwu Chairman, ISEAS Board of Trustees and Director East Asian Institute National University of Singapore AS5, Level 4 7 Arts Link Singapore 116571 Tel: (65) 6775-2033 Fax: (65) 6779-3409 Email: [email protected]

22.

Professor ZAKARIA HAJI AHMAD Coordinator Strategic and Security Studies Unit The National University of Malaysia 43600 Bangi, Selangor Malaysia Tel: (02-03) 829-3647 Fax: (02-03) 829-3332 E-mail: [email protected]

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Observers 23.

Ms Margaret LIANG Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore 248163 E-mail: [email protected]

24.

Dr Satu P LIMAYE Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Honolulu, USA E-mail: [email protected]

25.

Dr Helen E S NESADURAI Nanyang Technological University Singapore E-mail: [email protected]

26.

Dr Ramkishen RAJAN University of Adelaide Australia E-mail: [email protected]

27.

Assoc Professor TAN Lay Hong Nanyang Business School Nanyang Technological University Singapore E-mail: [email protected]

28.

Mr Mathews VERGHESE Singapore E-mail: [email protected]

ISEAS 29.

Mr Rajenthran ARUMUGAM Visiting Research Fellow

30.

Mr Sudhir T DEVARE Visiting Senior Research Fellow

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31.

Professor HE Shengda Visiting Professorial Fellow

32.

Dr LEE Poh Onn Fellow

33.

Ms S MAGHAISVAREI Research Associate

34.

Dr MA Ying Visiting Research Fellow

35.

Dr Sakulrat MONTREEVAT Fellow

36.

Dr K S NATHAN Senior Fellow

37.

Dr OOI Kee Beng Visiting Research Fellow

38.

Mr Gerard Graham ONG Research Associate

39.

Mrs Triena ONG Managing Editor, Publications Unit

40.

Mr Michael PHOON Chee Kin Intern/ RES

41.

Dr SHENG Li Jun Senior Fellow

42.

Mr TAN Keng Jin Head, Public Affairs Unit

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