An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics: A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia [1st ed.] 9783030465186, 9783030465193

Citation preview

An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia

Motsamai Molefe

An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics

Motsamai Molefe

An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia

Motsamai Molefe University of Fort Hare East London, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-46518-6    ISBN 978-3-030-46519-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: PJPhoto69 / Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is my gift to my father Andrew Ndodana Manzana. Thank you for all you have done for me. I am what I am because of your endless efforts to make sure that all is well with me.

Preface

This book emerges as a response to two considerations in the literature concerned with the discourse on personhood in African philosophy. Firstly, a number of scholars have raised serious objections against the moral idea of personhood in the literature. Many of these criticisms pivot on whether the idea of personhood can embody social or even global justice. Some commentators point to its sexist or patriarchal nature; others point to its ageist orientation, others to its homophobic tendency and others point to its speciesism. Ifeanyi Menkiti’s, a pioneer in the discourse of personhood, recent reflections on social and global justice do not even attempt to reveal the robustness or even the plausibility of the idea of personhood by marshalling some kind of defence or response. As a result, questions remain over the plausibility of the idea of personhood. Secondly, Kevin Behrens’ essay—‘Two Normative Conceptions of Personhood’—and Anthony Oyowe’s—‘Personhood and the Strongly Normative Constraint’—make discomforting observations about the idea of personhood in African philosophy. Behrens notes that there are two distinct moral concepts in moral philosophy, namely: (1) moral virtue and (2) moral status. He observes that the first one, moral virtue, is prevalent or even definitive of African moral thought. He also observes that the second idea of moral status is prominent in the Western bioethical context. These are two different moral concepts: the first one deals with evaluating human conduct in terms of excellence and the second one prescribes the duty of respect towards beings that have the relevant moral capacities like rationality or sentience, depending on what theory of it is being proposed or defended. I agree with much of Behrens’ analysis except that it creates vii

viii 

PREFACE

a false impression regarding the African idea of personhood. A careful reading of Behrens’ essay suggests that the African idea of personhood has no resources to tackle bioethical issues or is not useful in such contexts. This book aims to demonstrate that the idea of personhood does have resources and is useful in bioethical contexts. I make the same observation regarding Oyowe’s essay in relation to the idea of personhood. The difference between these two essays lies in the fact that Oyowe is not primarily concerned with bioethical issues per se, but with moral-political ones like citizenship, distributive justice and rights. He observes that the idea of personhood has no moral-theoretical resources to offer a robust alternative model to reflect on the above political issues. He concludes his essay by suggesting that it is the idea of dignity, what he calls the weakly normative notion of personhood, which can offer a robust political discourse. What is worth noting is that he does not appear to contemplate the possibility that the idea of personhood might embody its own conception of dignity that might do the political work that he believes a robust moral concept ought to do. This book speaks to the oversight on the part of Behrens and Oyowe, and the literature in African philosophy in general, regarding the richness of the idea of personhood. These scholars overlook the idea that the African idea of personhood does embody its own conception of dignity, which is relevant, suitable and useful in bioethical and political contexts. To demonstrate the robustness of the idea of personhood and its own conception of dignity, this book will focus, in the main, on two bioethical questions of abortion and euthanasia, and it will tersely reflect on the issues of animals and disabled individuals. The major insight of this book is that the African idea of personhood embodies its own conception of dignity, which makes it suitable to engage in bioethical, environmental and political themes. East London, South Africa

Motsamai Molefe

Acknowledgements

The success of this work was possible because of a number of people to whom I am eternally grateful. Space will not permit to express my gratitude to everyone. First and foremost, I am exceedingly grateful to God for all that He is and has done for and through me. I wish to express special gratitude to Asithandile Zibaya for all the support and love she has given me during the process of writing this book. I wish to thank my friends that stand by me and support me through my academic journey: Sthembiso Khumalo, Sizwe Koom, Tumi Mohotlane, Xolani Msimango, Sihle Khanyile, Dumisani Mbanyele, Otto Matsapula, Kgomotso Moshugi, Promise Aphana, Akhona Mafani, Siyabonga Makwetu and Ps. Gcumeni. I also wish to appreciate the academic brothers and friends that have supported me in this journey: Prof. Metz, Prof. Matolino, Dr. Mutshidzi and my brother Dr. Mpofu. I cannot omit to mention my colleagues at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa [CLEA], Chris Allsobrook and Thina Mnonopi. I would not have been able to write this book without your support and encouragement. This book would not be possible without the generous financial support from the Govan Mbeki Research and Development Centre (GMRDC) special funding at University of Fort Hare. I truly appreciate Prof. Pumla Gqola’s support of my efforts to produce books in the field of African philosophy. I am truly grateful and honoured to have been granted funding by Prof. Gqola, the dean of research. ix

Contents

1 Introduction: Personhood, Dignity and (African) Bioethics  1 The Concepts of Personhood and Moral Status in African Philosophy   4 The Literature Review   9 The Structure of the Book  16 Conclusion  16 References  20 2 Personhood, Morality and Dignity in African Philosophy 27 Introduction  27 Personhood as an Agent-Centred Theory of Value  29 Implications of the Agent-Centred Theory of Value  34 Personhood and Dignity: The Patient-Centred Notion of Personhood  40 Relationship Between Moral Status and Dignity  40 Menkiti’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity  46 Gyekye on Personhood and Dignity  52 Making Sense of the Capacity for Virtue  54 Conclusion  58 References  62 3 Personhood and Abortion in African Philosophy 69 Introduction  69 Statement of Methodology  72 xi

xii 

Contents

Controversial Approaches to the Question of Abortion  75 Horsthemke on Personhood, Abortion and the Young  83 Objections  91 The Objection Against Potential  91 The Case of Rape and Abortion  93 Animals and Mentally Disabled Individuals  95 Conclusion  96 References  99 4 Personhood and Euthanasia in African Philosophy103 Introduction 103 Definition of Euthanasia 105 The Context of the Discussion of Euthanasia in Africa 107 Personhood and a Good Death 111 Elders, Children and the Possibility of a Good Death 111 Virtuous Life and Good Death 114 Refining the Account 115 Personhood and Euthanasia 120 Conclusion 125 References 126 Index131

About the Author

Motsamai  Molefe  is a senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He specialises in African philosophy, applied ethics (bioethics and animal ethics), moral philosophy and social and political philosophy. He is the author of An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) and African Personhood and Applied Ethics [NISC, 2020].

xiii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Personhood, Dignity and (African) Bioethics

This book is a contribution to African philosophy. Like any tradition of philosophy, African philosophy covers a broad range of themes insofar as it deals with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics. The focus of this book will be in the domain of African moral philosophy. Here, we will discuss the confluence of two central concepts in [African] moral philosophy. The primary concept will be the moral category of personhood in African philosophy.1 The second important concept will be the universal value of dignity.2 The idea of personhood embodies an African value system for assessing human lives that are morally excellent or virtuous (Gyekye 1992; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1996). To judge someone [to be] a person, in the moral sense, amounts to appreciating the quality of their moral deportment or character insofar as it exudes virtue or excellence (Ikuenobe 2006a, b; Molefe 2018a; Oyowe 2014). The concept of dignity refers to the intrinsic worth associated with some entity in virtue of possessing certain ontological features (Donnelly 2015; Ilesanmi 2001; Waldrow 2012). Dignity marks something, in virtue of possessing certain ontological features or capacities, as having a superlative rank (Metz 2012a; Waldrow 2012). Different theories of dignity differ in terms of the ontological feature or features they specify to account for it, be they spiritual (the soul, the image of God, vitality) or natural (rationality, autonomy, basic capabilities, the capacity for love, empathy or care) (Metz 2012a; Nussbaum 2008).

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_1

1

2 

M. MOLEFE

The aim of this book is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to contribute to the discourse on personhood and dignity. It will do so by articulating a theory of dignity inherent in the discourse on personhood in African philosophy. In other words, it will articulate an African conception of dignity by drawing on the axiological resource of personhood. The insight here is that there is a moral-theoretical connection between the idea of personhood and dignity in African philosophy. Secondly, the aim will be to apply the novel personhood-based conception of dignity to the discourse of bioethics, thus contributing to the emerging field of African bioethics (Tangwa 1996; Murove 2005; Behrens 2013a). The idea here is: the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy embodies its own conception of moral status [dignity], which is useful to the discourse of African bioethics. The above aim—to contribute to African bioethics through a personhood-­based theory of dignity—is informed by the centrality of the concept of dignity in the discourse of bioethics (see Behrens 2013a; Christiano 2008; Formosa and Mackenzie 2014). In fact, Daniel Sulmasy (2008: 484) informs us that the idea of “dignity has important implications for addressing a variety of issues in bioethics”. For another, Adam Schulman (2008: 4) avers—“the concept of human dignity … has an important role to play in bioethics, both now and especially in future”. I believe that the idea of personhood as initially advocated by leading thinkers such as Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 2004), Kwame Gyekye (1992, 1997, 2010) and Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2009), among others, embodies a robust and under-explored view of dignity, which I aim to unfold in this book.3 I believe that this view of dignity will offer us an interesting African perspective on bioethical themes such as abortion and euthanasia. Put differently, this book is one attempt to realise the vision that Kevin Behrens (2013a: 32), one of the leading scholars of African environmental ethics and bioethics, expresses it in this fashion— One way is for African bioethicists to begin to apply indigenous African philosophy, thought and values to ethical issues. This project is important (i) to restore dignity; (ii) because a bioethics grounded in indigenous ideas is more likely to be accepted by Africans; and (iii) because such ideas can enrich bioethical discourse.

In the light of Behrens’ call, the aim of this book is to single out the indigenous axiological concept of personhood (or, more precisely, a conception of dignity inherent in it) and apply it to the bioethical themes of

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

3

abortion and euthanasia, thus contributing to African bioethics. I think that this project is important for the very reasons provided by Behrens, above. Firstly, this project is important for restoring the dignity of African people, so that their forms of life—their cultures—should be one of the crucial considerations in how we handle pressing practical ethical issues (see Murove 2005). Secondly, African people are most likely to embrace ethical systems that are in tune with plausible interpretations of African thought and values. Finally, reflecting on moral issues in terms of local intellectual and moral resources will contribute to global bioethics discourse by adding to the diversity of bioethical thought (Chuwa 2014). This is important for cross-cultural learning and dialogue, and it provides a platform for the evaluation of our diverse philosophical views. Another reason that informs why this project is important and relevant in African philosophy is that it speaks to the blind-spot or lacuna regarding the idea of personhood. The literature focusing on the discourse on personhood has tended to overlook the possibility that the idea of personhood can embody its own conception of moral status and dignity. This blind-spot in the literature is best exemplified in the writings of Behrens (2013b) and Oyowe (2018). The possibility that the idea of personhood entails its own conception of dignity is implicit in the works of scholars like Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Kwame Gyekye (1992), Mogobe Ramose (2009), but it has not been given the philosophical exposition and justification it deserves. As a result, the possible moral-theoretical contribution the idea of personhood qua dignity can make to bioethical, environmental and political philosophy has escaped the attention of the literature.4 This book is important because it will speak to this deficiency in the literature, by directing us to how the idea of personhood can contribute to bioethical discourses. In this chapter, I provide the reader with a bird’s eye view of this book. I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by clarifying the concepts of personhood that are crucial to this project and their relation to the idea of moral status (dignity) in the literature in African philosophy. The ultimate burden of this section is to suggest how the African idea of personhood embodies its own conception of dignity. Secondly, I give the reader a sense of the status of the aforementioned bioethical themes—abortion and euthanasia—in the tradition of African philosophy. Finally, I discuss the chapters that will constitute the remainder of the book. Immediately below, I discuss the concepts of personhood central to this project.

4 

M. MOLEFE

The Concepts of Personhood and Moral Status in African Philosophy It is common knowledge that the idea of personhood in African philosophy is characterised by ambiguity. Scholars of African thought tend to distinguish between the ontological and normative concepts of personhood (Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2006a, b, 2015, 2016; Matolino 2014; Molefe 2016, 2019a, b; Oyowe 2013, 2014, 2018; Wiredu 1996, 2004, 2009). The ontological idea of personhood deals with the fact of being human, and in analysing it we seek to do a philosophical explication of the descriptive features that constitute human nature (see Gyekye 1995; Kaphagawani 2004; Wiredu 2009; Ikuenobe 2015). I will say something about the normative idea of personhood below. Thaddeus Metz (2013: 13), in his analysis of the debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye, identifies three distinct concepts of personhood, namely: the ideas of (1) being human; (2) moral status; and (3) moral virtue. In my own analysis of the debate between Menkiti and Gyekye, I come to the same conclusion as Metz (except that I identify a fourth distinct concept of personhood in the literature—personal identity). We concur that the debate exhibits a lack of precision regarding which notion of personhood is pivotal in proffering a plausible interpretation of Afro-communitarian moral and political thought (Molefe 2016, 2018b, 2019a, ch. 1). Recently, Kevin Behrens (2013b) and Anthony Oyowe (2018) have further distinguished two distinct normative notions of personhood present in the literature. Behrens talks of the patient-centred and agent-centred notions of personhood. Oyowe, on the other hand, talks of the strongly and weakly normative notions of personhood.5 I take these distinctions to be equivalent in terms of capturing two distinct moral concepts. Going forward, I will use the more common distinction of the patient-centred and agent-centred notions of personhood. I do so because it is important to emphasise that both concepts are moral in nature; however, they play different roles in moral discourse (see Behrens 2013b; Molefe 2019a: ch. 1). In his essay—‘Two Normative “Conceptions” of Personhood’— Behrens (2013b) observes that the agent-centred notion is salient in African philosophy and the patient-centred one in the Western tradition. He points to us what these concepts share in common. The obvious similarity between these two concepts of personhood is that they both draw a distinction between being a member of a biological group, Homo sapiens, and being a person. It is one thing to be human and quite another to be a

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

5

person. Being human is an ontological fact that one is distinct from other kinds of things in the world like tables, stones, grains of sands and so on. Being human is available to ontological elucidations and justifications. One can account for it by appeal entirely to material or even a combination of the material and spiritual properties (see Kaphagawani 2004; Ikuenobe 2016). The above distinction regarding being human and being a person is borne out by Behrens in this fashion: Thus the claim that ‘… [b]eing a person and being a human being are not the same thing’ (Masolo 2010: 154) ought not to sound that strange or unfamiliar to philosophers. Even the idea that we are ‘… born humans but become persons’ (Masolo 2010: 13) has a familiar ring. As far back as 1972, Joseph Fletcher argued for a number of necessary criteria to establish personhood: criteria that excluded not just fetuses, but even infants—arguably for the first few years of their lives—from personhood.

In this quotation, Masolo represents the African view of personhood and Fletcher the Western one. The major difference between the African and Western views of personhood is in terms of the criteria they specify to determine or even account for their respective concepts of personhood. The African view of personhood conceives of it as some kind of moral achievement. To be called a person is to be morally recognised to be living a genuine human life (Metz 2010). The moral agent achieves it relative to the quality of her performance. Scholars of African thought associated the relevant performance with moral “virtue” or “excellence” (Behrens 2013b: 111; Gyekye 1992: 110). Menkiti (1984: 176) explains moral excellence or virtue that captures personhood in terms of “ethical maturity”. African scholars generally understand the idea of personhood to embody a particular moral system (Dzobo 1992; Gyekye 1997, 2010; Wiredu 2004; Metz 2007; Molefe 2019a). Some scholars capture the ethical system embodied by the idea of personhood in terms of a “self-­ realisation” or “moral perfectionism” (Behrens 2013b, p.  118; Metz 2007, p. 331). The essence of this moral system is the requirement that the agent ought to perfect her own humanity. To be called a person is to be morally judged to be living a morally virtuous life. The Western view of personhood, on the other hand, conceives of it in terms of the capacities or ontological properties some being or entity possesses. In fact, Behrens informs us that the Western idea of personhood is

6 

M. MOLEFE

best understood in terms of the technical idea of moral status. To claim that some being has moral status is the same as claiming that its presence warrants moral recognition and attention in virtue of certain facts pertaining to it (DeGrazia 2008, 2013). These facts could revolve around its well-being, needs, rights or whatever is also thought to be morally significant regarding the existence of an entity. The kind of moral attention and appropriate response towards a being of moral status is one of moral respect (Warren 1997). This moral respect could be understood in two related ways. On the one hand, it means certain ways of treating such a being are wrong insofar as they flout some moral principle. On the other, it means that certain ways of treating such a being wrong it insofar as they harm it or make it worse off (DeGrazia 2008; Metz 2012a; Molefe 2017a). The Western idea of personhood is patient-centred insofar as it bases moral value on some capacities of the entity in question. In other words, merely because the entity in question possesses certain onto-moral capacities or qualities, it deserves moral respect. It is crucial to appreciate that it is not the use of such properties, but the mere fact of possessing them that is relevant for moral status, and the respect it engenders. Different theories of moral status will posit different capacities or properties to account for it. Some theories ground it on rationality [Kantianism], sentience [utilitarianism]; basic capabilities [capabilities approach] and so on. These theories will differ in terms of what things count as persons in terms of moral status. If rationality is the basis for moral status, for example, it would imply that foetuses, animals and mentally disabled individuals have no moral status since they lack the relevant ontological property. To summarise this distinction, Behrens (2013b: 111, emphasis original) makes the following point— By now it ought to be clear that the Western bioethical normative conception of personhood and the African notion are completely distinct. Another way of expressing this distinction is to consider the object of the focus of the term ‘personhood’. In Western thought, personhood is concerned with the status of moral patients, whereas the African approach focuses on the character of a person as a moral agent.

The African idea of personhood depends, for its achievement, on the actions and performances of the agent. The Western idea revolves around the properties or capacities possessed by the patient. The respect associated with the agent-centred notion of personhood tracks performance and

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

7

the respect associated with the patient-centred notion tracks ontology. One significant difference regarding these two notions is that the agent-­ centred notion admits of gradations or variations among agents in terms of some individual having more or less or even no personhood at all. As such, the respect imagined here would be proportionate to one’s quality of character [personhood] or lack thereof. On the other hand, the patient-­ centred notion is a function of an “invariant” property one possesses in virtue of which all those that have it are generally owed equal moral regard since respect is a function of possession and not use (Metz 2013: 12). The idea of moral status attributes respect to some entity merely because it possesses relevant ontological features. Typically, in the literature  in moral philosophy ontological features such as sentience, rationality, the soul, life, or basic capabilities have been invoked to generate different theories of moral status (see Bujo 2001; Iroegbu 2005; Nussbaum 2011; Singer 2009). These relevant ontological features are crucial because they are the ones that are central to the entity under consideration being able to lead a decent life, depending on the view under consideration. The reader should here appreciate the distinction between a concept and a conception of moral status. Several comments are crucial to consider regarding the distinction between the patient- and agent-centred notions of personhood. Firstly, Behrens informs us that they both draw a distinction between being human and being a person (2013b: 103–104; see also Metz 2013: 12). The fact of being human, though necessary for the attainment of personhood, does not guarantee it in both senses of the term—being human is necessary for both moral status and moral perfection, but it is not sufficient (Oyowe 2018).6 Secondly, Behrens informs us that the patient-­ centred notion is more dominant in the Western moral tradition—specifically in bioethics and environmental ethics—whilst the agent-centred notion is more prevalent in the African tradition of philosophy (Behrens 2013b: 105; see Metz 2007: 331). Following the tendency in the literature of using these concepts separately, Oyowe (2018) rejects the agent-centred notion (what he calls the strongly normative idea of personhood) and endorses the patient-centred notion of it (what he calls the weakly normative notion of personhood). One implication that follows from Behrens’ distinction of the patientand agent-centred notions of personhood is that only the former is relevant, suitable and useful in bioethics. The major intervention this book seeks to make is to point out that the agent-centred notion of personhood

8 

M. MOLEFE

is relevant and useful in bioethical contexts. This book clarifies that the fact that scholars of African ethics tend to focus on the agent-centred notion and Western scholars on the patient-centred notion is a contingent fact of these traditions of philosophy. The suggestion here is that a more robust approach to the ethics of personhood in African philosophy requires us to appreciate that the two concepts are intrinsically connected. More specifically, the agent-centred notion of personhood [moral virtue] embodies its own conception of the patient-centred notion of personhood [moral status]. That is, the tendency by scholars of African thought to focus on the agent-centred notion of personhood reveals their social proclivity, in their moral philosophising, to be fixated on the one side of the moral coin, instead of appreciating both sides of the moral coin that embodies a robust ethics of personhood in African moral philosophy. I take it to be the case that Behrens is correct to observe that it is the patient-centred notion of personhood [moral status] that is central in bioethical discourses. The major contribution that this book will be making is to rely on the agent-centred notion of personhood to construct African bioethics. It will do so, by demonstrating or deriving a patient-centred notion of personhood, an African theory of moral status, on the agent-­ centred notion of personhood [moral virtue]. The idea that is central in this book is that the agent-centred notion of personhood is grounded on a particular view of the patient-centred notion—one that is usually implicit and not typically clarified or defended in the literature. The idea here is that there is a certain ontological feature of being human—informing the patient-centred notion (moral status)—that is decisive for the very possibility of pursuing the agent-centred notion of personhood (moral perfection) (see Molefe 2019a: ch. 3). As such, the primary aim of this book is to unfold and develop the patient-centred view of personhood—a theory of moral status/dignity that informs the agent-centred view. We can then proceed to employ this theory to reflect on the bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. Whereas Behrens and Oyowe, in different ways and for different reasons, take these concepts to be distinct and diverging moral terms, in this book, I will proceed on the assumption of their moral interconnectedness and interdependence to articulate a more robust ethics of personhood in African philosophy. It is because human beings possess particular kinds of ontological features that we take them to be beings of value (to have moral status) and it is because of these same features that we can rightly expect them to pursue personhood (to lead morally virtuous lives).

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

9

The reader should keep in mind that reference to the patient-centred notion of personhood is the same as talk of moral status. It is the concept of moral status (dignity) that will be central to our approach to bioethics in this book interpreted in the light of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy.7 In the next section, I will consider the literature regarding the bioethical themes that are the focus of this book.

The Literature Review In this section, I wish to consider the bioethical themes that will constitute the focus of this book. Before I turn to these specific themes—abortion and euthanasia—I begin by attending to two clarificatory points. To begin, I clarify how I understand the ideas of ubuntu and personhood, and the relationship that I take to hold between them. I do so, firstly, because I will draw extensively on the literature on ubuntu in the course of this book, and I wouldn’t want to leave the reader confused. Secondly, I do so because I take these two ideas to be continuous, if not synonymous. At least in this book, I stipulate the relationship to be as follows: I take the idea of ubuntu to be tantamount to the idea of personhood. So, to say that someone has ubuntu is the same thing as to claim that they are persons or have achieved personhood. I take this position because the idea of ubuntu is essentially concerned with the idea of personhood—specifically, the agent-centred notion of it. This view is sustained by considering the aphorism that grounds ubuntu ethics. Ubuntu, as an embodiment of an African moral view, is usually explained in terms of the following aphorism—‘A person is a person through other persons’. This aphorism does admit of a metaphysical interpretation, where it specifies an account of personal identity in terms of human sociality or interdependence (Ramose 1999; Louw 2004; Metz 2007). It is, however, the moral connotations of this aphorism that are of interest here. The reader will immediately realise that the idea of a person appears three times in the aphorism, but it is not immediately obvious which concepts of it are captured here (given that we have already specified at least three possible concepts of personhood in the literature). The first reference to a person, in the aphorism above, is about the mere fact of being human—the ontological notion of personhood. The second instance of the word ‘person’ refers to the normative idea of personhood—the goal of morality prescribed by ubuntu ethics. The last instance of it, as captured in the phrase “through other persons”, captures

10 

M. MOLEFE

the importance of social relationships in the pursuit of personhood.8 Put simply, the goal of morality, under ubuntu, is for a human being to pursue a morally excellent character (the agent-centred notion of personhood) and the only way to do so is through participating in particular kinds of social relationships (Metz 2010; Molefe 2019a, b). It becomes less surprising then that we are informed that “the concept of ubuntu … is a statement about being, about fundamental things that qualify a person [human being] to be a person [morally virtuous]” (Dandala 2009: 260). In other words, those interpretations of ubuntu that construe it as embodying a self-realisation moral view are continuous with, or even equivalent to, the idea of personhood present in the works of leading scholars of African thought such as Menkiti (1984, 2004); Gyekye (1992, 1997); Wiredu (1992, 2004); Ramose (1999); Masolo (2010); and Ikuenobe (2006a, b, 2015, 2017).9 It is equally important to recognise that those interpretations of ubuntu that do not take it as a self-realisation view of morality will not necessarily be equivalent to the idea of personhood prevalent in African philosophy (see Etieyibo 2018; Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013; Praeg 2014). My second clarificatory point is to draw the attention of the reader to the overall context within which the bioethical themes to be considered will proceed. Bioethics is concerned with “moral issues in science, technology … medicine” and the natural environment (Andoh 2011: 67; Frimpong-Mansoh and Ceasar 2019). In the context of African philosophy and the post-colonial situation, the overall theme is the growing call to contribute to the emerging field of African bioethics (see Barugahare 2018; Murove 2005; Tangwa 1996). This theme emerges at least motivated by two crucial considerations. On the one hand, it is a direct response to Western ethical imperialism, with the aim of decolonising the subject of bioethics by looking at it from the vantage point of African cultures and moral values (Fayemi and Macaulay-Adeyelure 2016; Murove 2005). Secondly, it is an attempt to think of practical moral problems in the light of traditional or indigenous views. Surely, there are many ways to approach and contribute to African bioethical discourse (see Frimpong-Mansoh and Ceasar 2019; Rakotsoane and Van Niekerk 2017).10 In this book, I will make my contribution by following a suggestion made by Behrens (2013a: 33), who observes that “most bioethics publications related to Africa deal with issues in research ethics, and focus less on applying African values to ethical issues than on applying Western moral systems to the African context”. In this book, my aim is to apply African ethical values qua the

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

11

personhood-based theory of dignity to the select bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. I will say more below regarding why I have selected these themes, after discussing the literature. Let me now focus on the central idea of dignity in the literature in general and in African philosophy. The idea of dignity is among those classified as essentially contested concepts (see Rodriguez 2015). The contested nature of this moral term could be understood in two ways—one extreme and another heuristic. The one view, which I classify as extreme, takes an overly critical or repudiatory view of dignity. This view is summarised in this fashion: The notion of dignity … is frequently criticised for its lack of conceptual clarity and openness to misinterpretation. Often dignity is seen as serving merely as a rhetorical device in political debates, ‘something of a slogan in bioethics’ … and as a camouflage for quite different values in legal documents. When perceived as a ‘mere rhetorical dressing’ … or ‘a simple slogan’, the notion of dignity is disapproved for not being distinctive enough to add much to policy debates and legal reasoning. (Misztal 2012: 107)

This shows that there are scholars that contest the usefulness or even the plausibility of the concept of dignity. I must hasten, however, to add that this is not a dominant view in the literature. The second way of understanding the contested nature of the concept is heuristic. It is a suggestion that the contestations are not so much about the concept of dignity itself—at least not its validity—but about various and conflicting conceptions of it (see Formosa and Mackenzie 2014; Metz 2012b). In other words, scholars tend to agree on the concept of dignity and the value it embodies or represents. Where they differ is on the specification of the substance or details regarding what constitutes it. It is this second approach to the idea of dignity qua personhood that will inform how this book will proceed. I will take the idea of dignity to be valid and generally recognised, but I will proffer what I take to be an African conception of it by employing the idea of personhood (see Deng 2004; Donnelly 1982). The idea of dignity is usually deployed to refer to a property possessed by some entity (usually a human being) in virtue of which we owe it the utmost moral respect (Darwall 1977). Jack Donnelly (2015: 1–2), one of the leading scholars of human rights, defines dignity as signifying “worth that demands recognition and respect. Those with dignity are due

12 

M. MOLEFE

recognition as a result of possessing a particular honorable quality or status. They are also due the respect appropriate to that status or quality.” Put simply, to accord dignity to some being is to recognise it as possessing some ontological property in virtue of which we ought to respect the being in question. Normal adult human beings are taken to be paradigm examples of beings of dignity because they possess the morally relevant ontological features that assign them the honourable quality or status (DeGrazia 2008; Toscano 2011). If this definition of dignity is true, it has the following implications. Firstly, dignity is a property of an individual. In other words, the discourse of dignity (or, the dominant understanding of it) takes it to be individualistic. So, here, dignity is a function of some property or characteristic of the individual (Molefe 2017b). Hence, it is common to read in the literature that dignity refers to “worth that is inherent” or “inalienable” or constituting an “inner, transcendental kernel” (Miller 2017: 113, emphasis mine; Rosen 2012: 9). The upshot of this view is that since dignity is a function of human nature, it is something that is not granted and (in some sense) cannot be taken away, unless one’s nature is fundamentally changed or destroyed (Miller 2017). One has dignity by simply being the kind of thing one is. Secondly, the idea of dignity is best characterised in deontological terms (see Rosen 2012; Toscano 2011). To elucidate the deontological nature of the idea of dignity, we can remember that there are at least two ways to relate to some value: one can either promote or honour it. Consequentialist accounts tend to promote a value, where the agent is required to maximise it insofar as possible (MacNaughton and Rawling 1992). If one takes the value of love as an example of a value to be promoted, then the agent has a duty to make sure that there is as much of it in the world as is possible, even if that can only be achieved by a few unloving acts (ibid.). The deontological attitude of respecting a value is captured in this fashion—“instead the idea is that a thing that has dignity ought to be honored in attitude and action” (Christiano 2008: 108). This means that moral agents have a duty to respect such a being even if doing so does not maximise the good or even when doing so causes there to be less respect for that being in the future (ibid.). Put simply, the presence of beings of dignity demands and deserves unconditional respect. Another facet related to the idea of dignity is that it offers one way to capture social egalitarianism. The idea of dignity accounted for in terms of some “invariant” property of the individual is used to capture equality

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

13

(Metz 2013: 12). On this view, equality among individuals is a function of recognising some fact of their nature—the property that grounds their dignity (Darwall 1977). Individuals that possess the relevant property to a minimum threshold are equal and are owed equal moral regard (Carter 2006). This is the case because dignity is not a function of achievement, but rather of merely possessing the relevant property. It is important for the reader to notice that the scepticism that is sometimes expressed towards the idea of dignity in the Western tradition is generally absent in the literature on African philosophy (see Macklin 2003; Pinker 2008). That is, African scholars are generally committed to the idea and ideals associated with the concept of dignity. Some scholars offer spiritual conceptions of dignity, where they ground it on the possession of life, or life force, or being part of a spiritual community (see Bikopo and van Bogaert 2009; Bujo 2001; Deng 2004; Gyekye 1992; Ilesanmi 2001; Iroegbu 2005; Wiredu 1996). These scholars take some divine feature of God, usually captured in terms of vitality, or Okra—spiritual energy—as the basis for dignity (Deng 2004; Imafidon 2013; Molefe 2018b; Wiredu 1996). On the other hand, you find scholars that take a secular approach to dignity, where they account for it by appeal to some natural property. Some scholars ground it on the human capacity for autonomy, the relational capacity for care, or the capacity to enter into particular kinds of social relationships (see Gyekye 1997; Metz 2012b; Ramose 2009). Recently, and of particular interest in this book, is Polycarp Ikuenobe’s (2017, 2018) account of dignity based on the idea of personhood, which refuses to ground it, as it typically is grounded in moral philosophy, on the mere possession of some ontological feature. Ikuenobe argues that a plausible African view of dignity ought to account for it in terms of how the agent uses her ontological features to attain personhood (moral excellence). He considers the possession of some ontological property to be merely instrumentally good, which means that dignity emerges as a result of how the agent uses it. In this book, I propose an alternative conception of dignity qua personhood that grounds it on the mere possession of the capacity for virtue. I do this after raising serious objections against Ikuenobe’s performance-­ based view of dignity. This is motivated by two considerations. Firstly, I believe that our pioneers on the idea personhood—Menkiti and Gyekye— anticipated that the idea embodies a conception of dignity (a capacity-­ based conception of it) although they never went on to articulate it fully and apply it to various practical moral problems (see Gyekye 1992:

14 

M. MOLEFE

109–110; Menkiti 1984: 171). Secondly, I believe that this conception is robust enough to offer under-explored insights and perspectives on various practical moral problems. I will further employ the view of dignity qua the capacity for virtue to consider the bioethical themes mentioned above. Below, I consider the literature regarding the selected bioethical themes in this book. At this stage, I imagine that one might object to the way I go about discussing the idea of dignity. The major complaint will be that I have not yet invoked any of the African languages (mentioned in footnote 1) to glean a concept or conception of dignity from them. I appreciate this objection. The decision to omit these is deliberate on my part, however. I have no philosophical reason to believe that African words used to capture the idea of dignity embody anything significantly different from what has been said above. I take the concept of dignity to be universal (Palk 2015). In isiZulu, the word used to capture the concept of dignity is isi-thunzi, in seSotho serithi and in isiXhosa isidima. These words are essentially characterised by a vitalist metaphysics (Molefe 2013, 2018b; Shutte 2001). To have dignity, on the metaphysics suggested by African languages, is to possess the spiritual property of vitality (see Metz 2012b).11 In isiZulu, the idea of isithunzi refers to a spiritual shadow (-thunzi) that inheres in and surrounds the individual. The tree has umthunzi, literally translated as a shadow; a human being has isithunzi, literally translated as dignity. The reader will see in the conclusion of this chapter that in my own analysis I stipulate a naturalist or secular interpretation of African moral thought, be it on the idea of personhood or dignity. I believe this to be consistent with the above given definition of dignity. I will not draw from the vitalist (spiritual) interpretation of dignity. For interesting exposition of the ethics of vitality and its conception of dignity, see Shutte (2001), Metz (2012b), Imafidon (2013) and Molefe (2013, 2017c, 2018b). I will leave it in the hands of the reader to assess whether the naturalist conception of dignity to be articulated here is plausible. Let me now turn to a consideration of the bioethical themes germane to this book. I will consider two bioethical themes. I will first discuss the theme of abortion in African philosophy. Typically, African scholars tend to be opposed to abortion for reasons that invoke a controversial metaphysical system. African scholars tend to advocate a tri-logical conception of the human community, where it consists of the (1) unborn; (2) living; and (3) living dead (see Bujo 2001, 2005; Ramose 1999). On this view, the unborn (entities such as zygotes and foetuses) are beings of value, which

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

15

would imply that abortion is impermissible (see Molefe 2015: ch. 6). The difficulty associated with this view is that before we can take it seriously, we must first establish the plausibility of the metaphysical view that there is a ‘community’ of the unborn. Metz (2012a) offers a promising analysis of the abortion question in terms of his modal-relational view of moral status. In his view, abortion is permissible any time before the third trimester because the foetus has not yet developed the relational capacities that would grant it some moral status. The foetus is not yet an object of the morally relevant social relationships of love. In this book, I will consider the status of a foetus in the light of the idea of personhood. Horsthemke (2018; see also Etieyibo 2018) criticises the idea of personhood for failing to grant foetuses a place in the moral community. I will evaluate whether it is true that the idea of personhood denies foetuses any moral standing. The idea of euthanasia is particularly neglected in the field of African philosophy. I am aware that Tangwa (2000) mentions it in his discussion of African bioethics. But no systematic method is proffered to reflect on this serious moral problem in the light of African moral thought. The idea of personhood that Tangwa invokes (an idea he associates with the Nso people of Cameroon) is distinct from the one relevant to this book. It is, furthermore, loaded with questionable and controversial metaphysical considerations that do not clarify the practical issues under consideration, at least in my view (see Tangwa 1996, 2000). In a sense, this chapter will be one of the first in African philosophy to look into this issue in the light of personhood. As the reader is no doubt aware, bioethics is a broad subject and involves many issues. One might wonder how I arrived on the themes of abortion and euthanasia, specifically. I found the bioethical themes related to the beginning of life—abortion—and those related to death—euthanasia—to be largely under-explored in the African philosophic literature, and absent in the light of the moral lens of personhood. These are by no means the only under-explored bioethical themes, but I believe that they will provide an important opportunity to reveal the robustness of the personhood-­ based view of dignity. I also believe that a volume focusing on abortion and euthanasia will be an important addition to African philosophy, and African bioethics in particular.12 Moreover, I am willing to admit that there is an arbitrary element to how these themes were selected insofar as they are included as a result of my interest in them. That, however, should not detract us from keeping in mind that the true value of this book resides in its promise to systematically showcase the robustness of the

16 

M. MOLEFE

personhood-based view of dignity and its ability to contribute meaningfully to the discourse of African bioethics.

The Structure of the Book I divide this book into four chapters. Chapter 2 will discuss personhood as a moral theory. There, I will consider the two facets of personhood as a moral theory, namely: the agent- and patient-centred theories of value. I will observe that the agent-centred theory embodies a perfectionist moral view and the patient-centred theory accounts for dignity in terms of our capacity for virtue [sympathy]. Chapter 3 will apply the personhood-based theory of dignity to the question of abortion. I will argue that this view of dignity forbids abortion because it assigns moral status to foetuses. Foetuses carry this status because they possess the relevant potential to pursue personhood in the future. The final chapter (Chap. 4) will reflect on euthanasia in the light of a personhood-based theory of dignity. I will argue that the personhood-based view of dignity ought to permit euthanasia.

Conclusion To conclude, I bring the following considerations to the attention of the reader. Firstly, this book is a result of the status of African literature on the idea of personhood. Very little philosophical work has been done in pursuing the implications of personhood on a variety of bioethical issues. The literature has tended, on the one hand, to be fixated on the question of human rights (Gyekye 1992; Matolino 2014; Molefe 2016; Oyowe 2014). On the other hand, even the one attempt to extend the literature on personhood to dignity and applied ethics is limited to the problem of human rights (see Ikuenobe 2017, 2018). This book reflects on bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia analysed in terms of personhood as a system of value. This approach, I believe, will provide clues regarding how we could deal with other bioethical themes that are not discussed in this book (such as biomedical enhancement,  assisted reproduction, clinical care  of the elderly and disabled and so on). I also wish to emphasise that the aim of this book is to consider the (moral-theoretical) implications of the personhood-based theory of dignity for the bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. At best, the book aims to give a philosophical interpretation or exposition of dignity and its consequences for bioethics in the light of personhood. That is, it

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

17

seeks to discuss how certain moral issues stand in the light of a robust conception of personhood in African philosophy. It should never, therefore, be construed to be promising that the idea of personhood entails the most plausible conception of morality (dignity) in the African tradition or any other tradition. The aim of this book is a moderate one: to familiarise readers, both in African and other traditions of philosophy, with the idea of personhood and its implications for bioethics. I leave it for another occasion to compare personhood to other salient moral theories such as the ‘capabilities’ approach and Confucian moral views. The expository nature of this book should not come as a surprise. The idea of personhood, just like the tradition of African philosophy itself, is still in its developmental phase. The developmental status of the moral idea personhood is suggested by Wiredu (2009: 15) when he opines that “the philosophical implications of the normative conception of a person are legion, and we will not pursue them here”. I am aware that a lot of research has been produced since when Wiredu made this observation, but this statement is still to a large extent true. Hence, the need to extend this idea of personhood to the discourse on dignity and African bioethics. Before one can argue that personhood entails a plausible moral view, it is reasonable to start by explicating it as a moral theory and considering its implications for a variety of practical problems. When the implications of this moral theory are on the table, then one can pursue the philosophical project of comparison, arguing that it is comparable to or better or worse than other rival moral views in other traditions. The reader would remember that above I said that I prefer (I stipulate) a naturalist or secular interpretation of personhood as a moral theory. I am aware that scholars such as Tempels (1959), Magesa (1997), Bujo (2001) and Molefe (2018b) offer a supernaturalist vision of personhood. In this book, I will stipulate ethical-naturalism as the best way to construe personhood. I do so largely because leading scholars of personhood such as Menkiti (1984), Wiredu (1992) and Gyekye (2010),  Ikuenobe (2015, 2018) among others, tend to take ethical-naturalism as their point of departure. It is not within the scope of this book to resolve the complicated meta-ethical question of whether personhood is best construed in religious (ethical supernaturalism) or secular (ethical naturalism) terms. It is safe, however, to appreciate the fact that ethical naturalism is a salient view in African philosophy (Gyekye 2010; Okeja 2013). I therefore stipulate it in this book. Those that find ethical supernaturalism to be plausible view, may pursue interpretations under that rubric, which would be a

18 

M. MOLEFE

welcome contribution to the literature. For my part, I will be pursuing a naturalist view of personhood, dignity and bioethics. In the next chapter, I offer a philosophical exposition of personhood as a moral theory.

Notes 1. Among the Nguni [Zulu, Xhosa and Ndebele people] of Southern Africa, the word umu-ntu is used to capture the idea of a person. Among the Sotho people that are found largely in Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana, it is mo-tho. The Tsonga people of South Africa and Mozambique capture it as mu-nhu. The Akans of Ghana use the word onipa. It is common knowledge, among African philosophers, that this concept—umuntu, motho, munhu and so on—has both a descriptive and normative dimension (see Gyekye 1992). It is the normative notion that tends to be salient in African moral discourse (Menkiti 2004). 2. African languages use the following words to refer to dignity: isithunzi (Zulu); Isidima (Xhosa); Serithi (Sotho); Hunhu (Shona). I am not aware of a philosophical exposition of dignity from these languages. The word is usually taken to have a relatively stable universal meaning aimed at picking out beings of high value (see Donnelly 1982). For example, leading scholars of African philosophy invoke the idea of dignity without relying on local languages for their philosophical exposition (see Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2017; Ilesanmi 2001; Wiredu 1996). To a large extent I subscribe to this universal approach. My approach differs from that of colleagues in that I insist on a secular view of dignity, whereas they tend to invoke a religiously based view. 3. The view of dignity that has been pursued here was initially suggested by Menkiti (1984) and Gyekye (1992). I will elucidate what I take to be their conception of dignity in the next chapter, or a view of dignity we can associate with their moral philosophy. 4. In my recent book—African Personhood and Applied Ethics—I address questions of social justice in the light of the idea of personhood. In this book, I was offering a defense of the idea of personhood from the criticisms that have been levelled against in relation to the question of patriarchy, ageism, animals and social justice in general (see Molefe 2020). 5. Oyowe (2018) believes that the strongly normative view of personhood is implausible for a variety of reasons, one of which is that it fails to embody an egalitarian political theory. A more plausible understanding of personhood, as anticipated in this book, will demonstrate otherwise.

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

19

6. Though a human infant (foetus) may be a human being, she is not a person in terms of the agent-centred notion and (on some interpretations) she may also not be a person in terms of the patient-centred notion insofar as she may lack crucial capacities such as rationality. I emphasise that patient-­ centred personhood is not achieved; it is a status that one possesses merely because one has the relevant ontological make-up. 7. I hope the reader is not alarmed that I moved from stating that the book is centred on the idea of dignity to saying that it is centred on the idea of moral status. I take the discourse of moral status to be related to that of dignity. I take the idea of moral status to admit of degrees, and the highest degree of moral status is dignity (see DeGrazia 2008; Metz 2012a; Molefe 2017a; Toscano 2011). In Chap. 2, clarify how I understand the relationship between the ideas of moral status and dignity. 8. It is not important at this stage that I be specific about the exact role played by social relationships in the discourse of personhood. It suffices for now to state that social relationships could play either a constitutive or an instrumental role. Thaddeus Metz (2013) defends the view that certain social relationships constitute personhood. I defend the view that social relationships, at best, play an instrumental role (see Molefe 2019a: 56–58; 2019b). 9. These scholars—Menkiti, Wiredu, Masolo—never use the idea of ubuntu in their elucidations of the idea of personhood. 10. One could provide a methodological and conceptual framework for decolonising bioethics (see Tangwa 1996; Andoh 2011). One could also interpret bioethical principles in the light of African values (see Behrens 2018; Metz 2010; Murove 2005). 11. I am aware that Metz (2012b) does attempt to articulate a naturalist rendition of a vitality-based view of dignity. I reject this view since I believe that it fails to distinguish between having dignity qua possessing vitality and a dignified life qua being fruitful, productive, fertile, healthy and so on. Metz’s naturalist view of dignity as vitality reduces it to its consequences, rather than defining it by the mere fact of possessing the relevant property (see Molefe 2017c). 12. I advise the reader that the book will be focused on the bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. The reader will however notice that the theme of animals and mentally disabled individuals will feature, albeit minimally. In Chap. 2, I criticise Ikuenobe’s personhood-based view of dignity for failing to accommodate animals in the moral community, and I could have included in my criticisms how his view fails to accommodate the mentally disabled. In Chap. 3, although the focus is on the question of abortion, to demonstrate the robustness of the idea of dignity inherent in the discourse of personhood, I briefly suggest that it does assign mentally disabled individuals and animals

20 

M. MOLEFE

some moral status. I emphasise that these themes are not the focus of this book, and, as such, will at best be sketchy.

References Andoh, C. (2011). Bioethics and the Challenges to Its Growth in Africa. Open Journal of Philosophy, 1, 67–75. Barugahare, J. (2018). African Bioethics: Some Methodological Doubts and Insights. BMC Medical Ethics, 19(1), 98–106. Behrens, K. (2013a). Towards an Indigenous African Bioethics. South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 6, 32–35. Behrens, K. (2013b). Two ‘Normative’ Conceptions of Personhood. Quest, 25, 103–119. Behrens, K. (2018). A Critique of the Principle of ‘Respect for Autonomy’, Grounded in African Thought. Developing World Bioethics, 18, 126–134. Bikopo, B., & van Bogaert, L. (2009). Reflection on Euthanasia: Western and African Ntomba Perspectives on the Death of a Chief. Developing World Bioethics, 10, 42–48. Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company. Bujo, B. (2005). Differentiations in African Ethics. In W.  Schweiker (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (pp.  419–434). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Carter, A. (2006). In Defense of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 131, 269–302. Christiano, T. (2008). Two Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons. Annual Review of Law and Ethics, 16, 101–126. Chuwa, L. (2014). Indigenous African Ethics and Global Bioethics. New York, NY: Springer Nature. Dandala, M. (2009). Cows Never Die: Embracing African Cosmology in the Process of Economic Growth. In F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics (pp.  259–277). Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press. Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics 88: 36–49. DeGrazia, D. (2008). Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46, 181–198. DeGrazia, D. (2013). Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31, 17–31. Deng, F. (2004). Human Rights in the African Context. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 499–508). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

21

Donnelly, J. (1982). Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights. The American Political Science Review, 76, 303–316. Donnelly, J. (2015). Normative Versus Taxonomic Humanity: Varieties of Human Dignity in the Western Tradition. Journal of Human Rights, 14, 1–22. Dzobo, K. (1992). Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God. In K. Gyekye & K. Wiredu (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp. 223–242). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Etieyibo, E. (2018). Moral Force and the “It—It” in Menkiti’s Normative Conception of Personhood. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 47–60. Eze, O. M. (2018). Menkiti, Gyekye, and Beyond: Towards a Decolonisation of African Political Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 1–17. Fayemi, A. K., & Macaulay-Adeyelure, O. C. (2016). Decolonizing Bioethics in Africa. BEOnline, 3(4), 68–78. Formosa, P., & Mackenzie, C. (2014). Nussbaum, Kant and the Capabilities Approach to Dignity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17, 875–892. Frimpong-Mansoh, A., & Ceasar, A. (2019). Bioethics in Africa: Theories and Praxis. Delaware: Vernon Press. Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and Community in African Thought. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1. Washington DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 101–122. Gyekye, K. (1995). An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. (2010). African Ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2019, from http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics. Horsthemke, K. (2018). African Communalism, Persons, and Animals. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 60–79. Ikuenobe, P. (2006a). Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Ikuenobe, P. (2006b). The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. Philosophia Africana, 9, 117–131. Ikuenobe, P. (2015). Relational Autonomy, Personhood, and African Traditions. Philosophy East and West, 65, 1005–1029. Ikuenobe, P. (2016). Good and Beautiful: A Moral-Aesthetic View of Personhood in African Communal Traditions. Essays in Philosophy, 17, 124–163. Ikuenobe, P. (2017). The Communal Basis for Moral Dignity: An African Perspective. Philosophical Papers, 45, 437–469.

22 

M. MOLEFE

Ikuenobe, P. (2018). Human Rights, Personhood, Dignity, and African Communalism. Journal of Human Rights, 17, 589–604. Ilesanmi, O. (2001). Human Rights Discourse in Modern Africa: A Comparative Religious Perspective. Journal of Religious Ethics, 23, 293–320. Imafidon, E. (2013). On the Ontological Foundation of a Social Ethics in African Traditions. In E. Imafidon & J. Bewaji (Eds.), Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics (pp. 37–54). New York, NY: Lexington Books. Iroegbu, P. (2005). Do All Persons Have a Right to Life? In P.  Iroegbu & A. Echekwube (Eds.), Kpim of Morality Ethics: General, Special and Professional (pp. 78–83). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Kaphagawani, D. (2004). African Conceptions of a Person: A Critical Survey. In Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 332–442). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Louw, D. (2004). Ubuntu and the Challenges of Multiculturalism in post-­Apartheid South Africa. Utrecht: Centre for Southern Africa. Macklin, R. (2003). Dignity is a Useless Concept. BMJ, 327, 1419–1420. Magesa, L. (1997). African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life. New York, NY: Orbis Books. Masolo, D. (2010). Self and Community in a Changing World. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Matolino, B. (2014). Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Matolino, B., & Kwindingwi, W. (2013). The End of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 32, 197–205. Mbiti, J. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. New York: Doubleday and Company. MacNaughton, D. & Rawling, P. (1992). Honoring and Promoting Values. Ethics 102: 835–843. Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction (pp.  171–181). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Menkiti, I. (2004). On the Normative Conception of a Person. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 324–331). Oxford: Blackwell. Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African Moral Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15, 321–341. Metz, T. (2010). Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81–99. Metz, T. (2012a). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 14, 387–402.

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

23

Metz, T. (2012b). African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights. Human Rights Review, 13, 19–37. Metz, T. (2013). Introduction: Engaging with the Philosophy of D. A. Masolo. Quest, 25, 7–17. Miller, S. (2017). Reconsidering Dignity Relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare, 11, 108–121. Misztal, B. (2012). The Idea of Dignity: Its Modern Significance. European Journal of Social Theory, 16, 101–121. Molefe, M. (2013). Critical Reflections on Gyekye’s Humanism: Defending Supernaturalism. In E. Imafidon & J. Bewaji (Eds.), Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics (pp. 121–133). New York, NY: Lexington Books. Molefe, M. (2015). A Rejection of Humanism in the African Moral Tradition. Theoria, 143, 59–77. Molefe, M. (2016). Revisiting the Debate Between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who Is a Radical Communitarian? Theoria, 63, 37–54. Molefe, M. (2017a). A Critique of Thad Metz’s African Theory of Moral Status. South African Journal of Philosophy, 36, 195–205. Molefe, M. (2017b). Individualism in African Moral Cultures. Cultura, 14, 49–68. Molefe, M. (2017c). Euthyphro Problem and African Ethics. Acta Academica, 49, 22–38. Molefe, M. (2018a). Personhood and (Rectification) Justice in African Thought. Politikon, 45, 352–367. Molefe, M. (2018b). African Metaphysics and Religious Ethics. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 1–37. Molefe, M. (2019a). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M. (2019b). Ubuntu and Development: An African Conception of Development. Africa Today, 66, 85–97. Molefe, M. (2020). African Personhood and Applied Ethics. Grahamstown: NISC [Pty]Ltd. Murove, M. (2005). African Bioethics: An Exploratory Discourse. Journal for the Study of Religion, 18, 16–36. Nussbaum, M. (2008). Human Dignity and Political Entitlements. In A. Schulman (Ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council (pp. 351–380). Washington, DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Nussbaum, M. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Okeja, U. (2013). Normative Justification of a Global Ethic: A Perspective from African Philosophy. New York, NY: Lexington Books. Oyowe, A. (2013). Personhood and Social Power in African Thought. Alternation, 20, 203–228.

24 

M. MOLEFE

Oyowe, A. (2014). Fiction, Culture and the Concept of a Person. Research in African Literatures, 45, 42–62. Oyowe, A. (2018). Personhood and Strong Normative Constraints. Philosophy East and West, 34, 783–801. Palk, A. (2015). The Implausibility of Appeals to Human Dignity: An Investigation into the Efficacy of Notions of Human Dignity in the Transhumanism Debate. South African Journal of Philosophy, 34, 39–54. Pinker, S. (2008). The Stupidity of Dignity. New Republic, 28. Praeg, L. (2014). A Report on Ubuntu. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu of Press. Presbey, G. (2002). Maasai Concepts of Personhood: The Roles of Recognition. Community, and Individuality. International Studies in Philosophy, 34, 57–82. Rakotsoane, F., & Van Niekerk, A. (2017). Human Life Invaluableness: An Emerging African Bioethical Principle. South African Journal of Philosophy, 36, 252–262. Ramose, M. (1999). African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Ramose, M. (2009). Towards Emancipative Politics in Africa. In F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics (pp. 412–426). Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Rodriguez, P. (2015). Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Concept. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 4, 743–756. Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schulman, A. (2008). Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity. In The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council (pp. 2–19). Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Singer, P. (2009). Speciesism and Moral Status. Metaphilosophy, 40, 567–581. Sulmasy, D. (2008). Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applications. In The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council (pp.  469–501). Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Tangwa, G. (1996). Bioethics: An African Perspective. Bioethics, 10, 183–200. Tangwa, G. (2000). The Traditional African Perception of a Person: Some Implications for Bioethics. Hastings Center Report, 30, 39–43. Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy (C. King, Trans.). Paris: Présence Africaine. Toscano, M. (2011). Human Dignity as High Moral Status. The Ethics Forum, 6(2), 4–25. Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House.

1  INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 

25

Waldrow, J. (2012). Dignity, Rank and Rights. New  York, NY: Oxford University Press. Warren, A. (1997). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wingo, A. (2006). Akan Philosophy of the Person. In E.  N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/akan-person/. Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  192–206). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Wiredu, K. (2004). Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time. In Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 1–27). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Wiredu, K. (2008). Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27, 332–339. Wiredu, K. (2009). An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality. Research in African Literatures, 40, 8–18.

CHAPTER 2

Personhood, Morality and Dignity in African Philosophy

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to proffer a philosophical exposition of personhood as a moral theory. I intend to capture two facets of the theory of value associated with the discourse of personhood, namely the agent- and patient-centred theories of value. I will argue that the idea of personhood, as an agent-centred theory of value, embodies a perfectionist (self-­ realisation) moral theory. Such a theory posits self-development or personal perfection as the goal of morality. The patient-centred theory of value, by contrast, accounts for moral status or dignity in terms of our capacity for virtue. The tendency in the literature is to consider these two facets of personhood as distinct moral concepts that do not relate to one another at all (see Behrens 2013; Oyowe 2018). In this chapter, I will think of these two facets of the idea of personhood as different sides of the same moral coin. I do so because I believe that integrating these two facets offers a more robust conception of African ethics qua personhood.1 Much of the literature on the idea of personhood in African philosophy has focused almost exclusively on the agent-centred side of the moral coin (see Agada 2018; Eze 2018; Ikuenobe 2006, 2015, 2018; Menkiti 1984, 2004; Wiredu 1992, 2008, 2009). Little attention has been devoted to the exploration of the patient-centred facet of the idea of personhood, that is a personhood-based conception of dignity. This chapter (and book) will largely focus on the theory of value

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_2

27

28 

M. MOLEFE

associated with the patient-centred facet of the moral coin—the idea of moral status or dignity embodied in the idea of personhood. To articulate the two theories of value associated with personhood, or, the ethics of personhood, I will structure this chapter as follows.2 In the first section of the chapter, I will begin by discussing personhood as a moral theory qua the agent-centred theory of value. Regarding this facet of moral theory, I will discuss the following elements. I will first draw a distinction between being human and being a person. Secondly, I will consider the moral content of what it means to be a person. Finally, I will reveal the following implications of the agent-centred theory of value: (1) agent-centred morality; (2) moral individualism; (3) moral egoism and (4) the place and role of social relationships. In the second section of the chapter, I will consider two strategies to ground a conception of moral status or dignity (the patient-centred theory of value) in the light of the idea of personhood. Polycarp Ikuenobe proposes the first option, where he accounts for dignity in terms of how agents use their ontological capacities to pursue and achieve personhood. On this view, dignity is a function of positive moral performance associated with the achievement of personhood. I will offer three reasons why we should reject this view of dignity. I glean the second way to ground dignity on personhood from Menkiti and Gyekye. I construe these authors to ground dignity on a particular ontological capacity of human nature, specifically the capacity for virtue. I will further elaborate on how we should make sense of accounting for dignity in terms of the capacity for virtue. I will observe that the idea of sympathy encapsulates the essence of morality (virtue) in the discourse of personhood, and I will ultimately account for dignity in terms of our capacity for sympathy. I advise the reader to remember that this chapter (and book as a whole) does not operate on the assumption that the idea of personhood (in both its patient-centred and agent-centred forms) promises the most plausible moral view. To reach such a conclusion will require an extensive comparative and evaluative project, which is beyond the scope of this book. I base this chapter, rather, on a humble exploratory and expository approach, where I aim to share the moral-theoretical consequences of taking the idea of personhood seriously in African philosophy. The immediate aim of this philosophical exploration and exposition is to give an African perspective of dignity. My aim for the remainder of the book is to apply this African view of dignity to questions of abortion and euthanasia.

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

29

The reader should also appreciate that this chapter is foundational insofar as the idea of moral status and/or dignity that I will articulate here will inform the subsequent treatment of bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. I begin below by discussing personhood as an agent-centred theory of value.

Personhood as an Agent-Centred Theory of Value There are at least two ways to enter into the discourse of personhood in African philosophy. The first draws from how the appellation of a person is used to refer to individuals that do well, morally speaking, in most African cultures. This tendency is reported to occur among the Akan people of Ghana (Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1996); the Yoruba of Nigeria (Gbadegesin 1991), among the Nguni people—such as the Zulus, baSothos, amaNdebele, amaXhosa—and others (Ramose 1999). Authors such as Gyekye (1992, 2010), Wiredu (1992, 1996), Ikuenobe (2006) and Masolo (2010) offer a useful philosophical disquisition of the normative idea of personhood in the tradition of African philosophy. These scholars of African thought generally agree that to refer to some moral agent as a person is to make a judgement about the quality of their character—that she is morally virtuous (Wingo 2006). In this light, African scholars agree that the idea of a person is morally laden and informative. The second approach relies on the aphorism definitive of ubuntu ethics—‘A person is a person through other persons’. This aphorism embodies an African moral worldview (Eze 2005). At its heart is the normative idea of personhood. This aphorism draws our attention to three distinct components that constitute this moral view, namely: (1) the fact of being human as the basis for morality; (2) the goal of morality and (3) the place and role of social relationships in the pursuit of the moral goal. The first instance of the idea of personhood in the aphorism refers to the fact of being human. Scholars of African moral thought inform us that morality in the discourse of personhood is predicated on the fact of being human. This comment by Ramose (2003: 413, emphasis mine) is suggestive of the relationship between being human and being a person: The concept of a person in African thought takes the fact of being a human being for granted. It is assumed that one cannot discuss the concept of personhood without in the first place admitting the “human existence” of the human being upon whom personhood is to be conferred.

30 

M. MOLEFE

This comment by Ramose makes sense when interpreted in the light of the distinction between the ontological and normative concepts of personhood in African philosophy (Ikuenobe 2006; Oyowe 2014; Wiredu 1996). The ontological notion refers to the fact of being human, which is constituted by certain descriptive features of human nature such as having a body and so on (Kaphagawani 2004). The normative notion refers to the moral process of becoming, where the agent adds dimensions of moral virtue to her own humanity (Eze 2018; Menkiti 2018). Understood in the light of this distinction, the comment by Ramose may be construed to be making the point that the moral discourse of personhood is built on, or assumes the fact of, being human as a point of departure. Oyowe (2018: 784) puts this point appositely when he states that the fact of being human is necessary but not sufficient for personhood. In other words, certain facts of human nature are crucial and decisive for the possibility of pursuing and achieving personhood. There is a facet of human nature or human existence that is necessary for personhood to be possible. It is also crucial to notice that this ontological fact of human nature, in and of itself, does not constitute personhood; something further is required for personhood to emerge. It is important to underscore crucial features associated with human nature in the discourse of personhood. Firstly, in this discourse, human nature is looked at in a positive light. In other words, human beings are not considered to come into the world with a warped or corrupt nature (see Gyekye 1995, 2010). When human beings come into the world, they emerge morally neutral. Moral corruption or guilt is a function entirely of human agency. A human being comes into the world with a nature that can go either way in terms of moral conduct; the direction is dictated largely by the decisions and conduct of the agent. Secondly, the existence and functioning of human beings, metaphysically and morally, is understood in social or relational terms. Human beings can only function and thrive in social relationships. John Mbiti’s (1969) assertion—“I am because we are” best captures the relational nature of being human. The individual, in this discourse of personhood, makes sense of her existence, humanisation (socialisation) and personal identity largely in social or relational terms. Menkiti’s (2004: 324, emphasis mine) comment regarding this maxim by Mbiti illuminates the social dimensions of being human, in this fashion:

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

31

Its sense is not that of a person [human being] speaking on behalf of, or in reference to, another, but rather of an individual, who recognizes the sources of his or her own humanity, and so realizes, with internal assurance, that in the absence of others, no grounds exist for a claim regarding the individual’s own standing as a person.

The crucial point to notice is that one’s status as a human being is predicated on social relationships with others. Without social relationships with others, the very project of being human is jeopardised or rendered impossible. It should not come as a surprise, when Tutu (1999: 35) avers that “my humanity is caught up, [it] is inextricably bound up in yours”. The metaphysical view proposed here is that one cannot imagine her humanity apart from social relations with others. A plausible metaphysical view, embodied in the discourse of personhood, is that we should recognise that we experience our humanity in terms of being-with-others (Louw 2004). Gyekye (1992: 104) accentuates the importance of social relationships when he notes that “the fundamentally relational character of the person [human being] and the interdependence of human individuals arising out of their natural sociality are thus clear”. The above comments are sufficient to secure the importance of social relations, which view further explains the centrality of the family, groups and community in African philosophy (see Wiredu 1980; Paris 1995; Shutte 2001; Mbigi 2005). Above, we elaborated on the metaphysical features that are generally associated with the discourse of personhood. The reader must notice that we have not yet touched on that specific facet of human nature that renders personhood a possibility for human beings. I will only be specific and elaborate this feature when I explore the theory of dignity inherent in the discourse of personhood. For now, it suffices to first note that human nature is believed to have the capacity to grow or diminish morally. This point is captured as follows by Sebidi (1988: 48): For Africans, human nature is capable of increasing or decreasing almost to a point of total extinction. There are actions … that are conducive to the enhancement or growth of a person’s nature, just as there are those which are destructive of a person’s nature.

It is crucial to notice that human nature is conceived in terms of its capacity to morally grow or deteriorate. In other words, we come naturally wired with capacities that make us susceptible to morality or, more

32 

M. MOLEFE

specifically, to pursuing and achieving personhood. It is for this reason that Gyekye (1992: 109) is correct to assert that “much is expected of a person (human being) in terms of the display of moral virtue (achieving personhood)” in African moral cultures. For Gyekye, this moral expectation for human beings to pursue and perhaps achieve personhood (moral virtue) is grounded on his conception of human nature. He holds the view that “the practice of moral virtue is intrinsic to the conception of person” (ibid., emphasis mine). There is a metaphysical view present here that informs the moral expectation that a human being should be able to achieve the status of personhood. To say that the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood (human nature) should plausibly be construed to mean that human beings have the ontological faculties required to lead morally virtuous lives. We should not, implausibly, construe it to mean that it is automatic, or that it is guaranteed for human beings to lead virtuous lives (see Gyekye 2010, see the section ‘Moral Personhood’). In the light of these adumbrations on the fact of being human, we come to the following observations. Human beings come into the world without the burden of inheriting the sins (or, moral liabilities) of their forebears. They come guilt- and praise-free. They come with a nature teeming with moral possibilities and, all things being equal, the agent is ultimately responsible for her own moral destiny. Her moral destiny is in her own hands because she has the ontological capacities and features that make the pursuit of personhood possible. We need to proceed to consider the facet of personhood that is normative; remember,  the ubuntu  maxim—‘a person is a person’. The second reference to a person on the ubuntu maxim points to the goal of morality, which is predicated on some facts about human nature. The goal of morality is to convert the moral possibilities of human nature into moral reality by ‘decorating’ one’s humanity with moral excellence. Menkiti’s (1984: 172) thoughts in this regard are informative: We must also conceive of this [human] organism as going through a long process of social and ritual transformation until it attains the full complement of excellencies seen as truly definitive of man.

Above, Menkiti informs us that the pursuit of personhood is a socio-­moral process of transformation, where the agent espouses and exhibits moral excellence. Notice that the idea of personhood being considered here is normative insofar as Menkiti talks of excellencies seen as truly definitive of a man. The idea

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

33

of personhood refers to human beings that are leading truly human lives (see Metz 2010: 83). It is important to observe that Menkiti refers to the acquisition of personhood as a long process, because it takes a long time to convert raw human capacities to moral realities (Wiredu 2009). The aim of this process must lead to “ethical maturity” or a “widened maturity of ethical sense” (2004: 325; 2018: 165). To achieve moral maturity the agent must be consistently engaged in the process of “self-creation” or the “ingathering of the excellencies” (1984: 172; Agada 2018: 149). As such, to refer to a moral agent as a person is to make a moral judgement about the quality of her moral disposition. It is to judge the moral agent’s character to be characterised by the “practice of moral virtue” or even moral “excellence” (Menkiti 1984: 172; Gyekye 1992: 113). It is also crucial to notice that the language used by scholars of African thought to speak of personhood is the language of virtue, which signals the idea of character (see Van Niekerk 2007, 2013). Note, for example, that Tutu (1999: 35) associates ubuntu with the virtues of kindness, friendliness, compassion, sharing and so on. Roughly the same list of virtues can be seen in Wiredu (1992), Gyekye (1992) and Mokgoro (1998). It is important to notice that the grab-bag list of virtues associated with ubuntu/personhood are relational by nature. In other words, these are other-­regarding virtues with almost no mention of self-regarding duties (see Metz 2012a). As such, we note that a human being characterised by personhood is one who relates positively with others. This positive relation with others takes place in the context of the consistent instantiation of the other-regarding virtues. From the above, it emerges that the idea of personhood presupposes a particular kind of moral theory. Wiredu (2009: 15) captures this insight thus: But such evaluation [that one is a person or a non-person] presupposes a system of values. Since the context of such evaluations is nothing short of the entire sphere of human relations, the system of values presupposed cannot be anything short of an ethic.

In this quotation, Wiredu’s disquisition leads to the conclusion that the normative idea of personhood embodies a certain system of values or ethics. It is important that the reader notices that Wiredu does not proceed to specify the kind of approach to morality that is presupposed by the idea of personhood. He does however inform us that this ethical system regulates all forms of social life and relations. If this system of value is so

34 

M. MOLEFE

pervasive in African moral cultures, it is urgent that we be clear regarding its specific nature and its moral content, so that we can properly understand it. To get an answer regarding the nature of the ethical system embodied by the normative idea of personhood, I find Behrens’ (2013: 111, emphasis mine) analysis of Menkiti’s, Wiredu’s and Masolo’s works on this idea to be extremely useful. Menkiti’s association of the term ‘excellencies’ with personhood also implies that becoming a person is essentially related to developing virtue. Thus, the African conception of personhood could be thought to propose a theory of ethics that brings to mind what Western philosophy calls ‘perfectionism’.

I think Behrens’ conclusion that African scholars tend to associate personhood, as shown above, with moral excellence or a virtuous character, is true.3 In this light, it is safe to observe that personhood embodies a perfectionist moral theory or a self-realisation approach to ethics, where the agent is required to perfect her human nature, to be characterised by moral virtue. The perfection imagined here has to do with character or human excellence, and the ideal character is one that exudes other-­ regarding virtues such as generosity, kindness, friendliness, love, forgiveness and so on (see Mokgoro 1998; Tutu 1999). In the next section, I consider some implications of understanding personhood as a perfectionist moral theory. Implications of the Agent-Centred Theory of Value To help the reader appreciate personhood as a perfectionist moral view, I present four implications associated it. These are: the agent-centred nature of morality; moral individualism, moral egoism and social relationships.  gent-Centred Nature of Morality A The subject matter of modern moral theories tends to be actions (see Pojman 2002). The aim is to posit some norm as the basis to distinguish right from wrong actions. For example, utilitarianism accounts for rightness and wrongness of actions by appeal to the norm of utility, be it construed in terms of pleasure or informed preferences (Kymlicka 1990). On the contrary, the idea of personhood, as we have observed above, makes

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

35

its primary focus the agent herself. The focus of morality revolves around the kind of a human being the moral agent is or ought to become. In this light, we can rightly distinguish between action-centred and agent-centred moral theories (Annas 1992). This distinction is rough, but it is useful for understanding personhood as a moral theory. On this view, it is not that actions do not matter or count at all; it is that they count insofar as they reflexively contribute, emanate from and reflect the quality of character of the agent. This understanding of morality is expressed thus by Gyekye (2010: n.p.): Thus, the inquiries into the moral language of several African peoples or cultures indicate that in these languages the word or expression that means ‘character’ is used to refer to what others call ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’. Discourses or statements about morality turn to be discourses or statements essentially about character. … The implication here is that ethics or morality is conceived in terms essentially of character.

Here, Gyekye considers how some African cultures refer to morality and ethics in their own languages. He concludes that the words or concepts used to refer to morality are essentially character-based. I submit that this observation is also true regarding the idea of personhood. The reason is expressed thus by Menkiti (1984: 171)—“Because the word ‘muntu’ includes an idea of excellence, of plenitude of force at maturation”. The word muntu, in the Nguni languages, translates to ‘person’. It carries both ontological and normative reference (see Gyekye 1992; Ramose 1999). It is the normative reference of muntu that Menkiti associates with moral excellence or maturation (see Behrens 2013). It is also important for the reader to be cognizant of the fact that, in his (1984) essay, Menkiti associates personhood with the idea of (moral) excellence four times. In one instance, he comments in this fashion—“so that what was initially biologically given can come to attain social self-­ hood, i.e., become a person with all the inbuilt excellencies implied by the term” (Menkiti 1984: 172). Menkiti informs us that the term ‘personhood’ implies moral excellence, and, as such, a person is a moral agent that has developed a moral deportment characterised by moral excellence. Hence, to ascribe personhood to some moral agent is tantamount to moral approbation insofar as we will be morally judging her as manifesting moral habits consistent with moral excellence. From the above, I believe that it is clear that idea of personhood as a moral theory embodies a

36 

M. MOLEFE

character-­based morality. Next, I consider the moral individualism associated with personhood. Moral Individualism In several of my previously published articles, I argue in favour of moral individualism (see Molefe 2017a, 2019a, c). I do not use the idea of individualism in the pejorative sense of criticising some individual or culture for being selfish or self-centred. I use it instead as it is used in the context of environmental ethics, where we distinguish between individualism, holism and relationalism (see Behrens 2010; Metz 2012b; May 2014; Molefe 2017b). To claim that a theory is ‘individualistic’ it is to observe that it locates morality in some internal property of the agent, such as rationality, interests, desires and so on. It is crucial to notice that the idea of personhood makes some facet of human nature the basis for morality. The individual is required to perfect her own humanity, or some facet of it. That is, there is an intrinsic feature of human nature that the agent needs to develop or nurture for her to attain the status of a moral exemplar. The argument that the idea of personhood is characterised by individualism is secured by the fact that it is character-centred. The idea that personhood is individualistic is noted by Metz in his analysis of salient theories of African moral thought. One of the theories he considers is that of personhood. In this regard (and regarding other African moral theories) Metz (2007: 331, emphasis mine) makes the following comment—“notice that the above four [theories] ground morality in something internal to the individual, whether it be her life (U1), well-being (U2), rights (U3), or self-realisation (U4)”. I advise the reader to note that Metz uses the phrase self-realisation to refer to personhood (see ibid.: 330–331; see also Molefe 2017a; Wood 2007). I hope the point is clear that the idea of personhood makes some facet of the individual the focus of morality, which implies that it is right to identify this theory as individualistic. This point is important insofar as it captures the view that the highest moral good is associated with the individual herself, and not some social relationship in which the individual is embedded (see Molefe 2017c). Next, I consider the moral egoism associated with personhood.

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

37

Moral Egoism One of the crucial questions we may need to clarify to get a clearer understanding of personhood as a perfectionist moral theory is whether it is egoist or non-egoist. Roughly, the major difference between egoistic and non-egoistic interpretations is that the former make the pursuit of personhood the sole responsibility of the agent herself while the latter extend our duty to include even the perfection of others (see Alison 2010; Wall 2012). It is my considered view that the perfectionism associated with personhood is of the egoistic type (see Molefe 2019a: ch. 3). This view is justified by the fact that scholars of personhood talk of it in a way that suggests moral egoism. Augustine Shutte (2001: 30, emphasis mine) suggests the correctness of this approach in this fashion—“the moral life is seen as a process of personal growth. … Our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human.” Metz (2010: 83, emphasis in original) also notes that: The ultimate goal of a person, self, or human in the biological sense should be to become a full person, a real self, or a genuine human being, i.e., to exhibit virtue in a way that not everyone ends up doing.

The egoistic view of personhood is further corroborated by Menkiti (2018: 165) when he avers that—“my answer here is that God may have created us, but we have to make ourselves into the persons that God wanted us to be”. We can understand Menkiti to be drawing a distinction between ontological completeness and moral incompleteness as features of a human being. As the creations of God, we come and naturally grow to become human beings. The project of personhood involves pursuing and fulfilling moral completeness. God leaves the project of completing ourselves morally in our own hands—we are to pursue the destiny of our human nature. Menkiti cautions us that the project of moral completion should not be understood to be saying that we must conceptually replace “God as the author of our being, but rather that our being as persons in the world is substantially of our making” (ibid.: 166). The point is clear that as human beings, we are created with certain moral potentials, but it is the task of each agent to pursue her own moral self-perfection. To hold an egoistic view does not entail that we may not assist and relate to others as they pursue their own perfection. The egoistic view only insists that the perfection of each individual is ultimately her own responsibility. The community, or surrounding social structures, ought to create enabling conditions for moral agents, but these are not sufficient for

38 

M. MOLEFE

perfection. Perfection must flow from the efforts of the agent to make herself morally appreciable (Gyekye  1997). The non-egoistic view is implausible since it overlooks the fact that there “are serious limits to our ability to bring about the perfection of others” (Wall 2012). It is one thing to create enabling conditions for individuals to be able to pursue personal perfection, and quite another to expect moral agents to be equally responsible for the perfection of others. Non-egoistic interpretations are implausible because they are too demanding. This interpretation holds us responsible not merely for assisting others in the pursuit of their moral perfection, it also holds us partly or entirely responsible for it (see Molefe 2019a: ch. 3; Wall 2012).4 The final implication of the agent-centred theory of value relates to the role of social relationships in the discourse of personhood, to which I now turn. S ocial Relationships in Personhood One of the outstanding and defining features of African moral and political thought is the high prize it places on groups or the idea of community (Gyekye 1992; Mbigi 2005; Paris 1995). It is true that social relationships play a crucial role in the discourse of personhood. It is not entirely clear, however, whether social relationships play a causal or constitutive role in the discourse of personhood (see Metz 2013; Tshivhase 2013). In my view, I take social relationships to play an instrumental role. I have already elaborated this view in other places; as such, I will not offer an extensive defence of it here (see Molefe 2017a, 2019a: ch. 3; 2019c). I believe this quotation from Menkiti (1984: 172, emphasis mine) will suffice for now to secure the instrumental role of social relationships—“during this long process of attainment [of personhood], the community plays a vital role as catalyst and as prescriber of norms”. The two concepts  or analogies employed by Menkiti (those of a catalyst and of prescription) suggest that social relationships play an instrumental role in the pursuit of personhood. A catalyst (a term borrowed from chemistry) serves as a means in the chemical process and never as an end; it accelerates and enhances the process, but it is not part of the final product of the process. The idea that the community also serves as the prescriber of norms implies that social relationships and institutions serve as moral guides. It is, however, the responsibility of the moral agent to internalise and actualise the prescribed values of excellence as a feature of her own moral existence. These two ideas, I

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

39

believe, undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that social relationships play an instrumental role  insofar as they create enabling conditions for the moral agent to thrive. To conclude this section of the chapter, we can take a cue from Metz (2007: 330) who reduces personhood to this theory of right action: An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realises oneself; an act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being.

The essence of this principle is that it specifies the goal of morality in terms of the agent realising (perfecting) her humanity, and this goal can only be achieved through relating positively to others. This theory is at once self-regarding—the individual ought to perfect her own humanity— and other-regarding—the individual can only achieve moral excellence by relating positively to others. To assess the robustness of this moral theory, we can consider how it accounts for the wrongness of kidnapping. On Kant’s account, kidnapping is wrong insofar as it treats the agent merely as a means to an end, by not respecting her humanity—her capacity for autonomy. This act undermines what is most valuable about the individual—her autonomy. It prevents her from choosing where to be, when and with whom, which is an essential feature of being human qua her autonomous nature. Considering the scenario through the lens of personhood, this act is wrong on two levels. Firstly, it is wrong insofar as it does not relate positively with the other—the kidnapped individual. This act violates the crucial means for acting morally and pursuing morality, which is positive social relationships. The second facet relates to the fact that the act of kidnapping does not lead to or is not associated with personal perfection, which is typically attended by kindness, generosity, love, sharing and so on. Kidnapping seems to be characterised by vices such as sadism, cruelty, selfishness and so on. Kinapping is wrong on the grounds of means (fails to foster positive social relationships between the two) and of ends it does not lead to the development of virtuous dispositions of character. Above, we considered the agent-centred theory of value associated with personhood. We noted that it embodies a perfectionist moral view that requires agents to develop their own moral characters. We also noted the implications associated with this way of interpreting personhood as a moral theory—the fact that it focuses on character (on the agent) rather than merely on action(s); that it is individualistic, egoistic and understands social relationships to play an instrumental role in morality. We concluded by considering a theory of right action embodied in the idea of personhood. In the

40 

M. MOLEFE

next section, I consider how the idea of personhood might account for dignity, the patient-centred facet of personhood.

Personhood and Dignity: The Patient-Centred Notion of Personhood The aim of this section of the chapter is to articulate a theory of dignity grounded on the idea of personhood. Before I do so, I will begin by briefly stipulating how I understand the relationship between the ideas of moral status and dignity. Afterwards, I will consider two ways to ground dignity on the idea of personhood. Relationship Between Moral Status and Dignity The idea of moral status identifies entities of moral significance. The moral significance of these entities is a function of the fact that their interests count, morally speaking (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018). Moral agents owe entities with moral status direct moral duties of respect. Scholars of moral status take this idea to admit of degrees; at least I take this view of it (Behrens 2011; DeGrazia 2008, 2013; Toscano 2011). One reason why some scholars suggest that we consider this idea to admit of degrees is the fact that it best explains how we can resolve trade-off cases. For example, consider the case where one has to either drive over a normal adult human being or over a cat. Most would be more morally comfortable driving over the cat. The reason for this is just the fact that a human being is generally considered to have greater moral status than a cat (see Metz 2012b). In this light, it makes sense to draw a distinction between beings that have partial moral status and those with greater moral status (see ibid.). The idea of dignity is taken to be tantamount to the idea of greater moral status. In fact, more accurately, scholars construe dignity in terms of full moral status (Toscano 2011). This comment should not be surprising regarding the concept of dignity as full moral status: The distinctive contribution that ‘dignity’ makes to human rights discourse is associated, paradoxically, with the idea of rank: once associated with hierarchical differentiations of rank and status, ‘dignity’ now conveys the idea that all human persons belong to the same rank and that rank is very high indeed. (Waldron 2012: 201)

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

41

Consider how Rosen (2012: 8, emphasis mine) captures this strategy of elevating every human being to a high moral status of dignity in terms of what he refers to as the “‘expanding circle’ narrative”, in this fashion: From this perspective, the quality of dignity, once a property of a social elite, has, like the idea of rights, been extended outward and downward until it has come to apply to all human beings. This is all part of the great, long process by which the fundamental equality of human being has come to be accepted.

The idea of dignity, historically, is associated with rank and status, which was the reserve of a select few. To think of dignity in terms of moral status amounts to the view that all human beings are special and deserve special moral recognition because of their status qua elevanted rank they occupy as human beings. As such, to say that human beings have dignity it is to specify the high rank of their full (moral) status. Three features constitute dignity construed in terms of full moral status. The first involves the stringent constraints not to interfere, harm, undermine, or instrumentalise a being of high value (Donnelly 2009; Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018; McNaughton and Rawling 2006). The agent-­ centred restrictions associated with beings of dignity are stringent in signalling that there are almost no exceptions to their inviolability (Hurley 1995; Toscano 2011). The second feature concerns the fact that we have strong duties to aid beings of dignity (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018). If we encounter a being of dignity in a situation where she requires our assistance and we can help without a great inconvenience to ourselves, we would have failed to conduct ourselves morally if we do not assist. Beings of dignity attract general duties that moral agents, all things being equal, ought to exercise towards them (Loschke 2018). The last feature is captured in terms of the idea of equality or the “equal wrongness thesis” (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018). The equal wrongness thesis captures the egalitarianism or even the idea of fairness associated with beings of dignity. That is, all things being equal, if a specific act is wrong when performed towards a being of dignity, it must also be equally wrong for another being of dignity. Dignity plays an important role in equalising moral patients. This last facet captures the egalitarianism inherent in the idea of dignity. Now that I have clarified how I understand the relationship between moral status and dignity, I proceed to consider one way to ground dignity on the idea of personhood.

42 

M. MOLEFE

I kuenobe’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity Above, we considered the concept of dignity as one that identifies beings of high value. Below, we proceed to consider grounds that grant some entity moral status or dignity. In what follows, I consider what I take to be an unsuccessful attempt to ground dignity on the idea of personhood in African philosophy. Recently, Polykarp Ikuenobe (2017), in the article The Communal Basis for Moral Dignity: An African Perspective, defends a novel account of dignity (see also Ikuenobe 2018).5 Ikuenobe advances the view that the idea of personhood, salient among African moral cultures, embodies a plausible conception of dignity. Ikuenobe’s project to secure dignity via the concept of personhood is twofold. On the one hand, he repudiates a common theoretical approach to dignity. This approach accounts for it entirely in terms of some ontological property of human nature. On the other hand, he seeks to ground dignity on some kind of moral achievement, and he construes the idea of achievement in terms of attaining personhood. On this view, to have dignity just is to achieve personhood; and to achieve personhood just is to have dignity. Typically, in the literature both in the Western and African paradigms, dignity is a function of possessing a particular ontological feature, be it rationality, basic capabilities, the divine image, Okra, the capacity for relationships and so on (Gyekye 1992; Kant 1785/1998; Metz 2011; Nussbaum 2011; Wiredu 1996). Ikuenobe is not satisfied with this approach because it seems to border on the naturalistic fallacy. The essence of the criticism that Ikuenobe raises against this way of accounting for dignity is that it is not entirely clear how the possession of a certain ontological property renders a being intrinsically and superlatively valuable. For his part, Ikuenobe observes that ontological capacities in and of themselves can only be instrumentally valuable. That is, ontological capacities play a crucial role in the acquisition of dignity, but they do not constitute dignity itself. As such, ontological capacities are necessary—in terms of their instrumental value—but they are not sufficient for the possession of dignity. Dignity, according to Ikuenobe, is a function of “the capacity for, and manifestation of, self-respect and respect for, and responsibility to, others” (2017: 438). In other words, dignity is realised when the agent lives up to the standards of excellence that are consistent with her ontological features, specifically by achieving personhood. Ikuenobe summarises his view of dignity in this fashion (2017: 438):

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

43

My view indicates that dignity is grounded in the idea of moral personhood as one who uses one’s capacity properly to promote harmonious communal living.

The central facet of personhood is the idea of moral conduct or performance exuding with excellence. The idea of dignity defended by Ikuenobe construes it in terms of the quality of the agent’s moral conduct insofar as it is consistent with the norms of moral excellence that promote social goods such as harmonious living and communal well-being. Below, I offer three objections against Ikuenobe’s personhood-based view of dignity. My first objection concerns the inegalitarian nature of the idea of personhood. The second is that Ikuenobe’s idea fails to accommodate the young in the moral community. My final objection is that this view of dignity fails to accommodate animals in the moral community. I kuenobe’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity and Inegalitarianism The defining hallmark of the modern idea of dignity is its commitment to egalitarianism. The idea of dignity offers an attractive and defining vision of a robust polity—that is treating persons as equals or treating them equally (Kymlicka 1990). The egalitarianism of the idea of dignity is captured thus: The modern notion of dignity drops the hierarchical elements implicit in the meaning of dignitas, and uses the term so that all human beings must have equal dignity, regardless of their virtues, merits, social and political status, or any other contingent features. (Brennan and Lo 2007: 47)

This approach to moral-political theorisation about dignity secures the equality of all human beings by grounding it on the mere possession some ontological feature. In other words, human beings have dignity merely because they are the kind of beings that they are. This view of dignity is captured thus in the light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The drafters solved this problem by indicating that human beings have rights because of their intrinsic dignity—because human beings, due to qualities they possess, have a special value or distinctive worth that in each case and without exception should be respected and nourished. (Hughes 2011: 3, emphasis mine)

44 

M. MOLEFE

In other words, human beings are equal and deserve equal moral regard because they possess certain ontological features. The theoretical and practical advantage of grounding dignity on some qualities human beings possess just is the fact that it provides a way to equalise them. The problem with Ikuenobe’s view of dignity is that it repudiates the ontological approach to dignity for a performance-based one, which sacrifices the attractive feature of egalitarianism without indicating what the moral-political advantage of a merit- or achievement-oriented approach is. The moment dignity is a function of moral performance and excellence it means that we will be creating an inegalitarian society where, for example, the vote of a villain will count less than that of a saint (Oyowe 2018). The idea of personhood as a basis for dignity is inegalitarian because it locates respect in moral performance, which will vary from one agent to another. Those that perform worse will deserve less respect. A plausible understanding of dignity construes it as the kind of property “that none of us has by merit, that none of us can receive from others, and that no one can take from us” (Pannenberg 1991: 177). In Ikuenobe’s view, we have dignity by merit, we receive it from others and they can even take it from us depending on our moral performance. The idea of personhood, as used by Ikuenobe, is not suitable to ground dignity because it is essentially inegalitarian. I kuenobe’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity and the Young I reject the idea of dignity defended by Ikuenobe because it fails to accommodate the young in the moral community. In this instance, I use the idea of the ‘young’ to refer to infants, at least normal ones. I accuse this view of failing to include the young because Ikuenobe’s (2017, 461, emphasis mine) conception of dignity insists that “human capacities are only an instrumental good; they are only means for good life.” The upshot of this view is that the possession of a capacity is not sufficient for dignity. Dignity, on this view, requires the actual positive use of the ontological features to achieve personhood. Since infants are in no position to exercise their capacities, it should follow that they have no moral status and no dignity. A possible defence might insist on including infants in the moral community by invoking the fact that they have the potential to use such property in the future. This move does not quite solve the problem because, remember, mere possession of a capacity or even potential is instrumentally good; it is the actual use of the capacity that ‘creates’ dignity. Therefore, even the possession of a potential to use this property does not

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

45

and cannot secure dignity because it arises only in contexts of use, and only if the use is positive. To respond to this objection, Ikuenobe (2017: 464) makes the following argument: The idea of respecting unconditionally those who are not capable of acting to earn respect is supported by the moral principle of ‘ought implies can’, which indicates that you cannot hold people responsible for what is impossible for them.

It is urgent that we consider whether the principle of ought implies can is sufficient to secure the view that we owe unconditional respect to those that are not capable of earning it. I remain unconvinced. It is true that we cannot hold an individual responsible for what they cannot do. However, accepting that fact still does not explain the ground upon which we owe unconditional respect to the young. This is a pressing matter given that we know from Ikuenobe’s view that respect arises only from actual moral action. In a context where moral action is not possible, it is not clear upon what ground we may grant unconditional respect to the young. To clarify my case, consider the following example. If championship is a function only of running and winning a race, then I ought to run and win to be granted the status of a champion. In the event that I have an accident that makes it impossible for me to run, it does not follow that I should be granted the status of being a champion, unconditionally. At best, my fans may feel great pity for me and wish me a speedy recovery. In terms of the rules of the game, however, I am not owed any kind of performance-­based respect, let alone unconditional respect. It seems that the capacity-based view of dignity can secure unconditional respect, which the performance-based view cannot. I kuenobe’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity and Animals The last objection points to the fact that Ikuenobe’s view excludes non-­ human animals from the moral community. This objection will have force against this view of dignity if the intuition that animals do have some moral status is true. I think we have good reasons to take this moral intuition seriously given that many scholars of African moral thought tend to assume that it is plausible (see Behrens 2010; Chemhuru 2016; Etieyibo 2017; Metz 2012b; Molefe 2015). Another strong reason why we should take this objection seriously is the view that we should distance ourselves

46 

M. MOLEFE

from speciesism (Horsthemke 2015, 2018). “The term speciesism, which was coined by analogue with terms such as racism or chauvinism, is usually used as a label for unjustified preference for the human species” (O’Neil 1997: 128). If racism and male chauvinism are morally objectionable, it offers a strong analogical ground to reject what Horsthemke (2018) refers to as species apartheid that is characterised by unfair preference of the human species over animals. I think the view of dignity advocated by Ikuenobe fails to accommodate animals in the moral community because it grounds dignity on moral performance, or on the actual pursuit of personhood. Since animals cannot pursue personhood, it follows that they do not have dignity. As such, the objection against the idea of dignity as construed by Ikuenobe is that it embodies the strong version of anthropocentrism that refuses to grant animals any moral status at all (Norton 1984; Horsthemke 2015, 2018). If a plausible view of moral status or dignity ought to assign animals some moral status, then it follows that Ikuenobe’s view fails this test. Above, I considered one way to account for dignity in terms of personhood. This view accounts for dignity in terms of moral achievements associated with personhood. I repudiated this view by raising three objections against it. Below, I proceed to consider a capacity-based conception of dignity qua personhood in the light of Menkiti’s and Gyekye’s adumbrations. Menkiti’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity Below, I propose to construct an under-explored alternative theory of dignity grounded on the idea of personhood. The virtue of this theory of dignity, in keeping with what I take to be standard and plausible approaches to theorising about dignity, is that it is grounded on some ontological feature. I wish to make it clear that the idea of dignity that I will be considering is already implicitly present in Menkiti’s exposition of the agent-­ centred notion of personhood, although he does not systematically explicate it. This view of dignity is also somewhat explicit in Gyekye’s adumbrations of the agent-centred notion of personhood. Below, I begin by revisiting Menkiti’s thoughts on personhood with the aim of distilling a conception of moral status/dignity from his philosophical elucidations. I remind the reader that in my own philosophical exposition of Menkiti’s analysis of personhood, I identify at least three distinct concepts of personhood (Molefe 2016, 2018a, b; 2019a, b; see also Metz 2013: 13). Firstly,

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

47

I believe that Menkiti begins his analysis by considering the idea of personhood qua personal identity. He defines personhood in terms of the “environing community” (Menkiti 1984: 170). By ‘environing community’ Menkiti has in mind socio-cultural facts and resources necessary for socialising or humanising a human being. Menkiti associates this idea of personhood with an “individual [that] comes to see himself as a man”, develops certain cognitive and conative features that Menkiti refers to as the “constitution of his mental disposition and attitudes” and acquires a particular “language”. The “self-identity which the individual comes to possess cannot be made sense of except by reference to these collective facts” (Menkiti 1984: 172). Metz (2013: 12–13) commenting on this idea of personhood captures it thus: It is worth noting a third, descriptive understanding of personhood, one that is arguably shared by both traditions. This third sense of the word ‘person’ is roughly the idea of an individual aware of itself over time and able to act consequent to deliberation, such that human babies are not yet persons and God is always already a person (on some conceptions). This concept of personhood is ontological, and does not include any moral ideas about values or norms.

One crucial insight to note from Metz’s analysis is that this concept of personhood qua personal identity is ontological. It is ontological insofar as it specifies some descriptive features (cultural facts) as the basis for according personhood to individuals. The second concept of personhood present in Menkiti’s exposition is a moral one. It is what I have been referring to as the agent-centred notion of personhood. Menkiti (1984: 171) conceives of this idea as processual, and he construes the process as one that involves a transformation from merely being human to being an entity characterised by moral excellence. This moral excellence that defines personhood is consequent to the agent having developed “a widened ethical maturity” (Menkiti 1984: 176), which will explain why the agent will be characteristically “generous, hospitable, friendly and caring and compassionate” (Gyekye 1992: 109; Tutu 1999: 35). It is this idea of personhood qua “human excellence or virtue”, Metz (2013) informs us, that is salient “in the sub-Saharan context” (see also Molefe 2019a, b; Wiredu 1992, 2004, 2009). The third notion of personhood present in Menkiti’s work appears in two different ways. In the first instance, Menkiti believes that his notion of

48 

M. MOLEFE

personhood—the agent-centred one—is very close to the one expressed in John Rawls’ moral-political philosophy. Menkiti (1984: 177) reports this association between his and Rawls’ view of personhood in this manner: John Rawls, of the Western-born philosophers, comes closest to a recognition of this importance of ethical sense in the definition of personhood. In A Theory of Justice he makes explicit part of what is meant by the general ethical requirement of respect for persons, noting that those who are capable of a sense of justice are owed the duties of justice, with this capability construed in its sense of a potentiality [sic] which may or may not have been realized.

It is crucial to observe that Menkiti believes that Rawls comes close to recognising the ethical sense in the definition of personhood. I think that Menkiti rightly identifies that Rawls is employing a moral concept of personhood. His observation that it comes close to his own concept of personhood is incorrect, however. Notice that Menkiti’s description of Rawls’ idea of personhood indicates that it is a patient-centred rather than an agent-centred one. He talks of this idea in terms of the ethical requirement of respect for persons. At this stage, we may be confused because the phrase “respect for persons” can be ambiguous regarding what notion of respect is involved: is it recognition or appraisal respect? (Darwall 1977). Menkiti solves this ambiguity by noting that the respect imagined here is one that is owed to entities that are capable of a sense of justice. Importantly, this idea distributes respect merely on the basis of possessing a particular property, without regard to its use. That this idea embodies recognition respect is further endorsed by what Menkiti says next: he notes that this respect is owed to beings capable of a sense of justice. Menkiti notes that the respect imagined here has nothing to do with whether this capability is realised or not. In other words, it is not the use of this capability for justice that matters for respect; it is enough just to be an entity that has this capacity or its potential. The idea of personhood that Menkiti associates with Rawls is what we have been referring to as the patient-centred notion of personhood, which is tantamount to the idea of moral status or dignity. Another crucial piece of evidence that the idea under consideration is that of moral status or dignity is that he associates it with the idea of justice. One of the central features of the discourse of justice is treating people as equals (Kymlicka 1990). It is because the idea of dignity is equalising in nature that it is

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

49

useful in capturing the ideals of justice (see Behrens 2013; Metz 2013: 12). Nothing in the text suggests that Menkiti was aware that Rawls’ notion of personhood is distinct from the one that he rightly considers salient in African cultures—the agent-centred notion. Rawls is dealing with a patient-centred notion of personhood. The patient-centred notion of personhood occurs again in Menkiti’s analysis when he is considering the tendency to extend the moral language of rights or justice to animals. Menkiti (1984: 177) describes philosophical moves that extend moral language and duties of justice to animals as “dangerous tendencies fashionable in some philosophical circles”. He rejects these tendencies because they are “bound to undermine, sooner or later, the clearness of our conception of what it means to be a person” (ibid.). He thinks of this “peculiar philosophy” as one “in which the constitutive elements in the definition of human personhood have become blurred through unwarranted extensions to non-human entities” (ibid.). Menkiti rejects the extension of the moral language to animals because it undermines what he calls “our clear conception of personhood” or the “constitutive elements of human personhood”. The insight that seems to emerge from Menkiti’s adumbrations on personhood is that there is an ontological difference between human beings and animals that makes all the moral difference regarding the extension or denial of rights. In other words, human beings possess particular ontological properties, what he calls constitutive elements, that make them beings towards which we can extend rights, or beings towards which we have duties of justice. The same is not true of animals. The reader may here press me to clarify how ontology may lead to moral differences. The answer is not far to seek. We can merely recognise and appreciate the very nature of the idea of moral status or dignity, or the idea of recognition respect (Darwall 1977). This idea requires us to respect those kinds of entities that have morally relevant ontological properties. If it is true, as Menkiti appears to believe, that human beings, and not animals, have the relevant ontological features, then it is correct to ascribe rights to them. In the light of this exposition of Menkiti’s thoughts on personhood qua moral status, it becomes urgent for us to specify the ontological property that grounds moral status or dignity. Menkiti (1984: 177, emphasis mine) captures this view of dignity in this sense: If it is generally conceded, then, that persons are the sort of entities that are owed the duties of justice, it must also be allowed that each time we find an ascription of any of the various rights implied by these duties of justice, the

50 

M. MOLEFE

conclusion naturally follows that the possessor of the rights in question cannot be other than a person. That is so because the basis of such rights ascription has now been made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense, a capacity, which though it need not be realized, is nonetheless made most evident by a concrete exercise of duties of justice towards others in the ongoing relationships of everyday life.

Through this line of reasoning, Menkiti accounts for moral status or dignity in terms of the human capacity for moral sense. In other words, in the light of Menkiti’s analysis of the agent-centred notion of personhood, it follows that he accounts for dignity in terms of the capacity to pursue or achieve moral personhood, which essentially depends on moral sense. In Menkiti’s view, the possession of moral sense is necessary for a being to be able to lead a life of moral excellence; it is the potential or capacity to pursue such a life that attracts rights ascriptions to human beings and not to animals. I do not mean to be construed here to mean that this is the view of dignity that Menkiti himself subscribes to. It is one that I believe, however, can be read off of his work and is most consistent with his commitment to account for morality in terms of virtue (personhood). I am attracted to this way of accounting for dignity because it is capacity based, which makes it egalitarian in its orientation.6 One way to object to this way of reading Menkiti’s interpretation of dignity in terms of the capacity for moral sense is by pointing to those passages in his work that seem to be anti-essentialist regarding the definition personhood. Remember, Menkiti (1984: 172) rejects what he refers to as the minimalist conception of personhood, which account for it by reference to particular capacities or ontological features like rationality, consciousness, memory and so on. I suspect this might be another reason that motivated Ikuenobe to avoid an essentialist or capacity-exclusive view of dignity, and instead to account for it in terms of moral conduct. I think two responses will suffice to demonstrate that an essentialist interpretation of dignity is possible, plausible and inherent in Menkiti’s moral philosophy. Firstly, I cited instances in Menkiti’s own work where he proposes an essentialist definition of personhood qua a view of moral status or dignity, which he uses to exclude animals from the moral community. For another reference that suggests an essentialist reading of dignity, consider this comment by Menkiti (2017: 18, emphasis mine):

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

51

The individual counts and is ultimately the bearer of intrinsic value. Theorists need to be reminded of this fact, I concur, so that the structures they set up do not wind up sacrificing the individual in the pursuit of abstractions.

The claim that the individual is a bearer of intrinsic value is usually interpreted to mean that there is a capacity, possessed by the individual, in virtue of which she is inherently valued. The point being, the value of the individual depends on the fact of her own existence as an individual. Social structures do not create this value; they only discover it and they ought to respect. I advise the reader to note that it is at this very point that Gyekye (1992: 111) insists that essentialism is an inescapable part of Menkiti’s view of personhood. Gyekye (1992: 111) makes the following comment— at this stage [moral agents] they are capable of exercising their moral sense and thus of making moral judgments. Menkiti, in fact, accepts the characterization or definition of personhood in terms of moral capacities. … This passage surely commits Menkiti to saying that a person is defined in terms of “some isolated static quality”—the quality of moral sense or capacity in the African case—which he thought was a characteristic of Western conceptions of personhood.

The point Gyekye is making regarding Menkiti’s view is that the capacity for moral sense is inescapable in the definition of personhood. The point of the argument is that essentialism is a characteristic feature of accounting for moral status, which in turn explains the commitment to the view that moral agents can and should achieve moral perfection. Finally, I believe that the passage where Menkiti is rejecting essentialism qua the minimalist conception of dignity is ambiguous between whether he is referring to the metaphysical view personal identity or the moral idea of moral status. If one reads Menkiti to reject attempts to account for personal identity in essentialist terms then it should not mean he rejects essentialism en toto. That is, when it comes to personal identity, he rejects essentialism that reduces it to a static quality, but when it comes to moral status/dignity, in the context of discussing questions relating to animals and justice, for example, he espouses it. Now, let me consider Gyekye’s view of dignity, or my interpretation of it.

52 

M. MOLEFE

Gyekye on Personhood and Dignity In my view, Gyekye corroborates the interpretation of dignity qua moral sense or the capacity to pursue virtue elaborated above. The passage I am about to consider emerges from the context of Gyekye responding to Menkiti’s adumbrations on personhood. Gyekye endorses the idea of personhood qua virtue as a central article of African moral cultures (see Gyekye 1992, 1995). In one place, he comments thus regarding personhood—“the judgment, ‘he is a person’, means ‘he has a good character’, ‘he is generous’, ‘he is peaceful’, ‘he is humble’, ‘he has respect for others’” (1992: 110). It is also crucial to recognise that Gyekye (1992) offers three distinct conceptions of dignity in this particular essay. The first account of dignity grounds it in the possession of a particular divine property, either Okra or the status of being a child of God (Gyekye 1992: 110 & 114). In other words, merely because a human being has this divine feature—be it accounted for in terms of being a child of God or the possession of Okra—we owe it equal and unconditional moral regard. The second conception of dignity accounts for it by appeal to the autonomous facets of human nature (Gyekye 1992: 111–113). Gyekye (1995: 67) observes that the fact that human beings possess the capacity for autonomy renders them intrinsically valuable. It is interesting to notice that these two conceptions of dignity are not directly connected to the idea of personhood that is at issue between Menkiti and Gyekye. More precisely, Gyekye does not demonstrate that Okra and autonomy are related to conceptions of dignity and the idea of personhood. It is equally crucial to notice that Gyekye is committed to the view that the idea of dignity is a central plank of the Afro-communitarian moral-political order, while remaining indifferent to assessing which of the views of dignity occurring in his essay is most African, and most plausible as a candidate to ground Afro-communitarianism. The last conception of dignity that emerges in Gyekye’s moral theory is more interesting and relevant in this book since it is directly connected to the agent-centred notion of personhood that is crucial in Afrocommunitarianism. Note the following exposition by Gyekye (1992: 110, emphasis mine) of this view of dignity: The foregoing discussion of some morally significant expressions in the Akan language or judgements made about the conduct of persons suggests a conception of moral personhood; a person is defined in terms of moral quali-

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

53

ties or capacities: a human person is a being who has a moral sense and is capable of making moral judgements.

Gyekye here makes the direct link between the agent-centred notion of personhood (what he refers to as the Akan language or judgements made about the conduct of persons) and the patient-centred notion of personhood (what he characterises as the moral conception of personhood). Gyekye expressly states that the agent-centred notion of personhood that is characterised by moral conduct suggests a moral conception of personhood. We should appreciate the evidence that what he refers to as a moral conception of personhood is the idea of moral status or dignity. The evidence is secured by how he defines “a moral conception of personhood” in terms of moral qualities or capacities. Importantly, Gyekye proceeds to inform us that human beings have ontological features of moral agency (what he calls moral sense) and that he understands human beings in terms of their capability to make moral judgements. The crucial insight here is that the agent-centred idea of personhood is possible because human beings have the capacity for moral sense, which is crucial for moral agents to be able to make moral judgements. In the previous page of the passage above, Gyekye (1992: 109) is even more specific regarding the relationship between the agent- and patient-­ centred notions of personhood. He is also very specific about the nature of the capacity that grounds dignity qua the idea of personhood. Gyekye begins by informing us that “the pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the conception of a person” (ibid.). What does he mean by stating that the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood? One interesting way to understand Gyekye is in terms of the underlying idea of dignity that informs the discourse of personhood. Note that Gyekye observes that “there are moral virtues that the human person is capable of displaying in his conduct. And because he is thought to be capable of displaying those virtues, it is expected that he would.” So, when Gyekye states that the practice of virtue is intrinsic to the conception of personhood, he is bringing to the fore the metaphysical view underpinning the agent-centred view of personhood or expectations relating to its pursuit and acquisition. On this view, scholars like Gyekye believe that a human being is born wired in a particular way. This wiring makes a human being capable of pursuing and achieving personhood. Gyekye (ibid., emphasis mine) is

54 

M. MOLEFE

specific about the nature of the capacity that accounts for dignity in the discourse of personhood. He makes the following comment: It means, further, that the human person is considered to possess an innate capacity for virtue, for performing morally right actions and therefore should be treated as a morally responsible agent.

In this light, we can rightly conclude that the idea of personhood embodies a particular conception of dignity. It conceives of human beings as having moral status/dignity insofar as they have the capacity for virtue. We should respect and treat human beings with utmost moral regard because they have the ability or capability to pursue human excellence. It is the distinctive human capacity for virtue that makes all the moral difference for the very possibility of human excellence.

Making Sense of the Capacity for Virtue The idea of virtue in moral philosophy generally signals the idea of a moral disposition, deportment or even character (Gyekye 2010; Rachels and Rachels 2015). To get a clearer sense of the capacity for virtue that accounts for dignity in the discourse of personhood, it is important that we briefly reflect on how African scholars conceive of virtue. The reader will do well to remember that scholars of personhood/ubuntu usually cite a variety of virtues—care, compassion, friendliness, sharing, generosity and so on—that they associate with personhood. It will shed light on our discourse on personhood and dignity if we can find one central virtue that is generative of all the rest. I stipulate that there is an underlying psycho-­ moral mechanism inherent in the discourse of personhood, which plays a crucial role in accounting for the unity of virtues in African moral thought. I provide three prima facie reasons to believe that such a psycho-moral mechanism exists and accounts for the possibility of morality (under personhood) and the unity of virtues in the first place. Firstly, I believe that Wiredu’s moral philosophy might provide one useful way to make sense of this psycho-moral mechanism. Wiredu (1996) captures his moral theory in terms of sympathetic impartiality, which he explains in terms of our ability to imaginatively situate ourselves in others’ shoes. I believe other scholars of African moral thought have a similar moral insight or even idea when they invoke the “common good”, which embodies “‘duty’ … task, service, conduct or function that a person feels morally obligated to

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

55

perform in respect of another person or other persons” (Gyekye 1992: 118). Masolo speaks of “practical altruism” or “economy of affection” as the first social virtue, which requires “everyone should carry their share of the responsibility for creating humane conditions of life for everyone” (Masolo 2004: 494). The same moral psychology obtains when they cite ideas such as “solidarity” or “harmony” too, which requires being open and responsive to others (Paris 1995: 43; Bujo 2001: 88; Metz 2007: 336). At the heart of all of these moral concepts is the moral insight that the most important feature of African moral thought is the idea of being open, responsive to others and always aware of our responsibilities towards them by creating conditions for human beings to be able to pursue personhood (Molefe 2018a, b). Wiredu reduces this crucial psycho-moral mechanism to the virtue of sympathy. In fact, Wiredu (1996: 71) observes that sympathy is “the root of all moral virtue”. I believe that the analogy of the root signifies the primacy or foundational status of the virtue of sympathy in the discourse of personhood. In my view, all other-regarding virtues associated with personhood are generated from and expressive of the foundational virtue of sympathy. Thus, instead of explaining a virtuous human being in terms of a grab-bag list of virtues like kindness, compassion, friendliness and generosity, as is common in the literature (see Gyekye 1992; Mokgoro 1998; Tutu 1999); we can now account for moral perfection in terms simply of sympathy. In this interpretation of matters, it follows that to possess personhood just is to be sympathetic; and the goal of morality is to develop this moral capacity. This way of interpreting personhood promises a monistic moral theory that posits sympathy as the basic virtue that comprehends all others, and is generative of them. The second reason that endorses or, at least suggests it, can be gleaned from how both Gyekye and Menkiti talk about the capacity for virtue. The language they employ to talk of moral status qua the innate capacity for virtue is that of moral sense. Remember that Menkiti (1984: 177) states that the ascription of rights is “dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense” and Gyekye (1992: 111) states that “a human person [one who has moral status] is a being who has a moral sense”. They both refer to the moral capacity that accounts for moral status (qua the capacity for moral virtue) as a moral sense.7 This phrase is crucial in moral philosophy insofar as it is reminiscent of and anticipates, in my view, moral theories that are related to the sentimentalist approach to moral philosophy in the Western tradition (see Slote 2010). In the sentimentalist approach to

56 

M. MOLEFE

ethics, the idea of moral sense is used to refer to sympathy, which refers to a “kind of concern for another” (see Kauppinen 2018). The third reason that points to the primacy of sympathy is suggested by Menkiti when he reflects on the question of social and global justice in light of African thought.8 Menkiti (2017: 23) points out—“African wisdom and criteriology might come into play to help us get a usable handle on some of these problems of our modern world”. The problems he has in mind are those that revolve around the “the problems of justice” (ibid.). He believes that African wisdom might offer us an “ordering perspective” that will be helpful in dealing with problems of justice. He comments in this fashion regarding this ordering perspective: I begin by calling attention to a certain attitude among the Igbo people of Nigeria, an attitude which, I believe, is also shared by various other African peoples. This attitude is captured by the Igbo-African expression: ‘Ebele umu uwa’, a phrase which I translate, roughly, as ‘pity for the children of the world’—the children of the world, among whom include one’s self. It is this attitude that makes possible the practice of reconciliation on an ongoing basis; makes possible also the acknowledgments that all of us need and can use, so as not to come down too heavily on ourselves at moments of personal error, personal failure, or professional defeat. (ibid.)

The idea of pity is usually understood to be continuous or even the same as that of sympathy. Menkiti suggests that sympathy is a criterion that is essential in handling social problems occasions by questions of justice. As a criterion, it is a moral attitude that allows to engage in personal and social transactions that allows us to create space for possibilities for all humanity. It is crucial to recognise that Menkiti thinks of sympathy as ordering perspective or attitude through which we relate with others in the social and global spaces. The three reasons adumbrated above, I believe, offer us a strong prima facie basis to posit sympathy as the psycho-moral mechanism that constitutes the essence of a moral (virtuous) life. If sympathy is the essence of a moral life then it implies that we ought to characterise dignity in terms of the capacity for sympathy. In this light, the most distinctive moral capacity of human nature, what Menkiti and Gyekye refer to as moral sense, refers to our ability to sympathise with others. I believe that it is generally true that this capacity to connect, to be responsive to the needs of others and to emphasise the importance of social responsibility can best be accounted

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

57

for by appeal to the primacy of sympathy in the discourse of personhood. This, at least, is how I interpret African moral thought. This however does not take us far enough in crystallising how to make sense of the idea of sympathy in African thought. I think some preliminary clarity regarding the nature of sympathy in African thought is crucial, so that we can approximate a clearer picture regarding the moral vision of personhood. Clarifying that moral vision will give us a better understanding of what a virtuous human being is in African moral thought and of the idea of dignity entailed by it, without slipping into the temptation to hastily draw from the Western sentimentalist view of morality (see Slote 2010). One useful way to proceed to unfold an African conception of sympathy is to visit the meaning of the idea of sympathy in (some) African languages. These might provide us with philosophical clues. The analysis of the Nguni (isiZulu, isiNdebele, isiXhosa) and Sotho (South and North Sotho, seTswana) languages suggest that sympathy is a moral emotion. In isiZulu, the word ‘sympathy’ translates to u-zwe-lo. In seSotho, it is kutlwelo-­bohloko. It is my view that these words, in both languages, are strictly equivalent in terms of meaning. The root of these words is -zwa (Zulu) and -tloa (Sotho). These words literally refer to the capacity to hear (being infinitive verbs meaning ‘to hear’). It is also important to notice that the same root -zwa captures the idea of emotions in these African languages. Emotions in these African languages translate as imi-zwa and maiku-tlo. In this sense, emotions are also analogous to our capacity to hear, as if to suggest that emotions are another (biological) sense, a moral sense, which functions in the moral sphere. As such, it is not far-fetched to conceptualise sympathy in terms of our capacity to hear. The Zulu word uku-zwa means ‘to hear’, but u-zwelo (sympathy) has an other-oriented dimension to its meaning, referring to the ability to hear for another. The word u-zwelo is also characterised by an active dimension that is absent from the word uku-zwa, which is passive. In this light, the idea of u-zwelo (sympathy) can be more accurately captured in terms of listening rather than hearing, to capture the active dimension that reveals its other-oriented attention, attentiveness and responsiveness. Hence, we can account for sympathy as a moral sense or moral emotion best understood in terms of our capacity to ‘listen’ to others. We are born with the natural capacity to morally ‘hear’ others, but the goal of morality is to develop this capacity to function at the level of moral ‘listening’ as well. The idea of sympathy thus refers to the human ability or capacity to be sensitive and responsive (to ‘hear’ and ‘listen’) to the

58 

M. MOLEFE

condition of others. In the discourse of personhood, it is this capacity for sympathy qua the moral ability, analogically conceptualised through hearing-and-listening, which is the hallmark of a virtuous individual. Gyekye (2010, emphasis mine) speaks of this capacity as follows: The attitude to, or performance of, duties is induced by a consciousness of needs rather than of rights. In other words, people fulfil—and ought to fulfil—duties to others not because of the rights of these others, but because of their needs and welfare.

Here, Gyekye argues that the other-regarding virtues (duties) come about as a result of our consciousness of the needs of others. The duties we owe to others emerge as a result of our moral sense or capacity for sympathy. In the light of this linguistic analysis of the idea of sympathy as the primary virtue in the discourse of personhood, we can conclude that dignity is a function of our capacity to ‘hear-listen’ to others. That is, a capacity to be conscious of their needs, welfare and their perpetual need of our help (Wiredu 1992). This moral consciousness or sympathy captures the essence of the morality of personhood. In this light, we can observe that the pursuit and success of morality revolves around developing this capacity to ‘hear-listen’ to others, and moral failure revolves around shattering this moral capacity. As such, we note that dignity is a function of our capacity for virtue. The idea of virtue understood in terms of the primacy of sympathy, where sympathy represents our capacity to ‘hear-listen’ to others’ forms the basis of our duties towards them. Sympathy refers to the moral emotion that connects us to the humanity of others through our capacity to ‘hear-listen’, which in turn should trigger us to respond appropriately.9 Hence, we can conclude that dignity is a function of our capacity for moral sense, conceptualised through the foundational virtue of sympathy.

Conclusion In this chapter, I philosophically considered both sides of the moral coin of the idea personhood. On the one side, we considered personhood as a theory of virtue, where it construes morality in terms of moral perfection. Moral perfection is a function of nurturing our capacity for sympathy, which is productive of other-regarding virtues such as compassion, generosity, love, friendliness and so on. We also noted the moral implications

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

59

associated with personhood as a moral theory. We noted the agent-centred nature of this theory; the moral egoism inherent in personhood; the moral individualism to be found in the theory and the instrumental role of social relationships in the pursuit of personhood. The other side of the moral coin focuses on the theory of moral status/ dignity embodied by personhood. I began by rejecting a performance-­ based view of dignity defended by Ikuenobe. I rejected this view of dignity largely because it abandons the egalitarianism that makes the modern idea of dignity attractive and plausible. It also fails to secure the moral status of young children, those not yet of a rational age. I further criticised Ikuenobe’s view for failing to grant animals some degree of moral status. I then continued to consider a view of dignity that can be drawn from Menkiti’s and Gyekye’s adumbrations on personhood. On this view, dignity is accounted for in terms of the capacity for virtue, which we ultimately reduced to the capacity for sympathy. I think this view should be taken seriously for several reasons. Firstly, it assigns dignity through the mere possession of the natural capacity for moral sense [sympathy]. To base dignity on the ontological capacity for virtue (sympathy) secures the egalitarianism that renders this idea suitable to ground a robust polity. This idea of dignity is also promising since it eschews the weaknesses associated with Ikuenobe’s conception of dignity qua personhood. It has the theoretical resources to secure the moral status of the young (infants) by invoking the property of potential; it also has resources to secure the moral status of severely mentally disabled individuals and animals (see, Chap. 3). Another crucial distinction that will help us to appreciate the discourse on dignity requires that we distinguish between some being having dignity and the same being living a dignified life. Some scholars make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic dignity, or intrinsic and achievement dignity (Michael 2014; Miller 2017). To have dignity is just to specify the fact that an entity has such an ontological property and, in virtue of possessing it, is intrinsically valuable. I, for my part, accounted for the intrinsic value of human beings in terms of our capacity for sympathy. A decent or dignified life is a function, in part, of the agent living up to the possibilities of their ontological equipment. In other words, on the view of personhood articulated here, if what makes a human being a possessor of (intrinsic) dignity is their capacity for virtue (sympathy) then a decent life is a function of living a virtuous life. Failure, on the part of the agent to live a virtuous life is not tantamount to a loss of dignity; it is a failure to live a truly human life.

60 

M. MOLEFE

Hence, we do not achieve (intrinsic) dignity; we achieve a dignified human existence. As such, to achieve personhood is tantamount to living a dignified human life, and not the achievement of (intrinsic) dignity itself. I believe that this view of dignity and approach to morality is worth taking seriously because it opens a door for cross-cultural dialogues. Since it is novel and largely under-explored, it provides the opportunity to be compared to feminist conceptions of dignity and can further be compared to other dominant views of dignity such as the dominant Kantian view, the capabilities account and views that are emerging from oriental traditions. The immediate interest and purpose of articulating this African view of dignity qua the capacity for sympathy is to explore some bioethical themes in light of this African view of dignity. The next chapter reflects on the question of abortion in the light of a personhood-based view of dignity.

Notes 1. In fact, the suggestion in this chapter is that the patient-centred idea of personhood informs the agent-centred notion of personhood. 2. I am aware that the reader might wonder why I do not separate these two facets of the ethics of personhood (the agent- and patient-centred) into different chapters. Initially, I thought I would do so. Upon careful consideration, however, I decided to capture these two facets of personhood in a single chapter. My decision is informed by two reasons. The first is philosophical in nature. The tendency in the literature in African philosophy is to discuss these two facets of the ethics of personhood separately, without imagining how they are related and what ethical consequences might ensue from their integration (see Behrens 2013; Oyowe 2018). For example, Behrens argues that the agent-centred notion is prevalent in the African tradition of philosophy and the patient-centred notion in the West. The unintended consequence of strictly associating them with these two philosophical might be to think that the one notion is African and the other notion is Western. The same logic manifests in Oyowe’s (2018) discussion of the strongly and weakly normative notions of personhood. Oyowe endorses the weakly normative notion of personhood, which is the same as the patient-centred notion of personhood (dignity), and he repudiates the agent-centred notion of personhood as implausible. I agree with both Behrens and Oyowe that these are two distinct normative notions, but I hold the view that these two facets of morality joined offer a fuller and more robust conception of the ethics of personhood. As such, to redress the tendency to discuss and imagine these two facets of the ethics of personhood separately, as if to suggest that they belong together in a single system of

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

61

value, I discuss them in a single chapter to evince their interdependence and unity. I use the phrase the ethics of personhood to signal the fact that these two facets hang together in a single system of value. The second reason revolves around the fact that in other places, I have discussed these facets separately (see Molefe 2016, 2018a, 2019a). To keep the chapter’s length reasonable, I will not be exhaustive in my discussion of the agent-centred theory since I have elaborated on it in many other parts of my research (see Molefe 2018a, b, 2019a, b). The emphasis will be on the patient-centred facet since it is under-explored and is relevant to our philosophical quest to reflect on the themes of abortion and euthanasia. 3. Scholars of ubuntu/personhood tend to affirm the view that it amounts to a self-realisation/perfectionist moral view (Lutz 2009; Mokgoro 1998; Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009; Van Niekerk 2007, 2013). 4. I am aware that an egoistic interpretation might lend to the objection that one may kill an innocent individual for the sake of saving their own life, so that one is be able to pursue one’s personal perfection (see Metz 2007). The kind of egoism I associate with the idea of personhood is of a satisficing sort, which requires satisfactory perfection, and not that the agent must go all the way. The justification for this reading is derived from how scholars of personhood are committed to the dignity of every individual in the society, we ought to consider in the pursuit of moral perfection (see Wiredu 1996). Another justification of the satisficing-egoism is suggested by the commitment to social relationships, which implies that one cannot pursue moral perfection in ways that undermines social relationships. For a full discussion of the satisficing logic associated with personhood, see Molefe (2019a: 50). 5. Elsewhere, I offer a more extensive discussion of Ikuenobe’s novel view of dignity and its criticisms (see Molefe 2019b: ch. 6; 2020: ch. 3). In this chapter, I offer the reader a rough discussion of Ikuenobe’s view and its criticism. The major focus should be on the under-explored view of dignity grounded on the idea of personhood, which I associate with Menkiti and Gyekye. 6. One way to object to this way of reading Menkiti’s interpretation of dignity in terms of the capacity for moral sense is by pointing to those passages in his work that seem to be anti-essentialist regarding the definition of personhood. Remember, Menkiti (1984: 172) rejects what he refers to as the minimalist conception of personhood that defines personhood by reference to particular capacities or ontological features. I suspect this might be another reason why Ikuenobe eschews the essentialist definition of dignity, and instead defines it in terms of moral conduct. I think two responses will suffice to demonstrate that an essentialist interpretation of dignity is possible and inherent in Menkiti’s moral philosophy. Firstly, I cited instances in Menkiti’s own work where he proposes an essential view of moral status or

62 

M. MOLEFE

dignity, which he uses to exclude animals from the moral community. For another reference that suggests an essentialist reading of dignity, consider this comment by Menkiti (2018: 18, emphasis mine)—“The individual counts and is ultimately the bearer of intrinsic value. Theorists need to be reminded of this fact, I concur, so that the structures they set up do not wind up sacrificing the individual in the pursuit of abstractions.” The claim that the individual is a bearer of intrinsic value is usually interpreted to mean that there is a capacity, possessed by the individual, in virtue of which it is inherently valuable. The point is that the value of the individual depends on the fact of her own existence as an individual. Social structures do not create this value; they only discover it and they ought to respect it. I advise the reader to note that it is at this very point that Gyekye (1992: 111) insists that essentialism is inescapable if Menkiti is true to how he characterises personhood. Gyekye says—“at this stage they are capable of exercising their moral sense and thus of making moral judgments. Menkiti, in fact, accepts the characterization or definition of personhood in terms of moral capacities. … This passage surely commits Menkiti to saying that a person is defined in terms of ‘some isolated static quality’—the quality of moral sense or capacity in the African case—which he thought was a characteristic of Western conceptions of personhood.” Finally, I believe that the passage where Menkiti is rejecting essentialism is ambiguous between whether he is referring to personal identity or moral status. If one reads Menkiti to be rejecting accounting for personal identity in essentialist terms, then it should mean he rejects essentialism en toto. When it comes to personal identity, he rejects essentialism, but when it comes to moral status, he espouses it. 7. It is crucial to notice that the phrase moral sense occurs at least six times in Gyekye’s adumbration of the idea of moral status that I believe is inherent in the agent-centred notion of personhood. 8. I am grateful to the reviewer for pointing me to the quotation where Menkiti cites pity [sympathy] as a central component of social justice. 9. In future research, the idea of sympathy in African moral thought still requires further philosophical elaboration and refinement to produce a precise theory of value, meta-ethically and normatively. One important suggestion emerging in this chapter is that the direction of our analysis should be towards an African sentimentalist view of ethics, rather than eudaimonism, as some scholars have suggested (Metz 2012a; Shutte 2001).

References Agada, A. (2018). Language, Thought, and Interpersonal Communication: A Cross-Cultural Conversation on the Question of Individuality and Community. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 141–162.

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

63

Alison, H. (2010). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Annas, J. (1992). Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality. Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 119–136. Behrens, K. (2010). Exploring African Holism with Respect to the Environment. Environmental Values, 9, 465–484. Behrens, K. (2011). African Philosophy, Thought and Practice and Their Contribution to Environmental Ethics. Doctoral Dissertation. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Behrens, K. (2013). Two ‘Normative’ Conceptions of Personhood. Quest, 25, 103–119. Brennan, A., & Lo, Y. (2007). Two Conceptions of Human Dignity: Honour and Self-Determination. In J. Malpas & N. Lickiss (Eds.), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company. Chemhuru, M. (2016). The Import of African Ontology for Environmental Ethics. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics, 80, 36–49. DeGrazia, D. (2008). Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal Philosophy, 46, 181–198. DeGrazia, D. (2013). Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 31, 17–31. Donnelly, J. (2009). Human Dignity and Human Rights. Denver: Josef Korbel School of International Studies. Etieyibo, E. (2017). Anthropocentrism, African Metaphysical Worldview, and Animal Practices: A Reply to Kai Horsthemke. Journal of Animal Ethics, 7, 145–162. Eze, O. (2005). Ubuntu: A Communitarian Response to Liberal Individualism. Masters Dissertation. Pretoria: University of Pretoria. Eze, M. (2018). Menkiti, Gyekye, and Beyond: Towards a Decolonisation of African Political Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 1–17. Gbadegesin, S. (1991). African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities. New York, NY: Peter Lang. Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  101–122). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Gyekye, K. (1995). An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. New York: Oxford UP.

64 

M. MOLEFE

Gyekye, K. (2010). African Ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2019, from http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2011/entries/african-ethics. Horsthemke, K. (2015). Animals and African Ethics. New  York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Horsthemke, K. (2018). African Communalism, Persons, and Animals. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 60–79. Hughes, G. (2011). The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Journal of Religious Ethics, 39, 1–24. Hurley, P. (1995). Getting Our Options Clear: A Closer Look at Agent-Centered Options. Philosophical Studies, 78, 163–188. Ikuenobe, P. (2006). Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Ikuenobe, P. (2015). Relational Autonomy, Personhood, and African Traditions. Philosophy East and West, 65, 1005–1029. Ikuenobe, P. (2017). The Communal Basis for Moral Dignity: An African Perspective. Philosophical Papers, 45, 437–469. Ikuenobe, P. (2018). Human Rights, Personhood, Dignity, and African Communalism. Journal of Human Rights, 17, 589–604. Jaworska, A., & Tannenbaum, J. (2018). The Grounds of Moral Status. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/ grounds-moral-status/. Kant, E. (1785). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Johann Frederich Hartknoch. English edition: Kant, E. (1998). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (M. Gregor, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaphagawani, D. (2004). African Conceptions of a Person: A Critical Survey. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 332–442). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Kauppinen, A. (2018). Moral Sentimentalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2019, from https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/moral-sentimentalism/. Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Loschke, J. (2018). Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers: Solving the Puzzle of Partiality. European Journal of Philosophy, 26, 390–410. Louw, D. (2004). Ubuntu and the Challenges of Multiculturalism in post-Apartheid South Africa. Utrecht: Centre for Southern Africa. Lutz, D. (2009). African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 84, 313–328. Masolo, D. (2004). Western and African Communitarianism: In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A Comparison. Companion to African Philosophy. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 483–498.

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

65

Masolo, D. (2010). Self and Community in a Changing World. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. May, T. (2014). Moral Individualism, Moral Relationalism and Obligations to Non-human Animals. Journal of Applied Ethics, 31, 155–168. Mbigi, L. (2005). The Spirit of African Leadership. Randburg: Knowers. Mbiti, J. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. New York, NY: Doubleday. McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (2006). Deontology. In D. Copp (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (pp. 425–458). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction (pp.  171–181). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Menkiti, I. (2004). On the Normative Conception of a Person. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 324–331). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Menkiti, I. (2017). Africa and Global Justice. Philosophical Papers, 46, 13–32. Menkiti, I. (2018). Person and Community—A Retrospective Statement. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 162–167. Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African Moral Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15, 321–341. Metz, T. (2010). Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81–99. Metz, T. (2011). Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal, 11, 532–559. Metz, T. (2012a). Ethics in Aristotle and in Africa: Some Points of Contrast. Phronimon, 13, 99–117. Metz, T. (2012b). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 14, 387–402. Metz, T. (2013). Introduction: Engaging with the Philosophy of D.A. Masolo. Quest, 25, 7–17. Michael, L. (2014). Defining Dignity and Its Place in Human Rights. The New Bioethics, 20, 12–34. Miller, S. (2017). Reconsidering Dignity Relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare, 2, 108–121. Mokgoro, Y. (1998). Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 1, 1–11. Molefe, M. (2015). A Rejection of Humanism in the African Moral Tradition. Theoria, 143, 59–77. Molefe, M. (2016). Revisiting the Debate Between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who Is a Radical Communitarian? Theoria, 63, 37–54. Molefe, M. (2017a). Individualism in African Moral Cultures. Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology, 14, 49–68.

66 

M. MOLEFE

Molefe, M. (2017b). A Critique of Thad Metz’s African Theory of Moral Status. South African Journal of Philosophy, 36(2), 195–205. Molefe, M. (2017c). Relational Ethics and Partiality: A Critique of Thad Metz’s ‘Towards an African Moral Theory’. Theoria, 64, 43–61. Molefe, M. (2018a). Personhood and (Rectification) Justice in African Thought. Politikon, 45, 352–367. Molefe, M. (2018b). Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition. Politikon, 45, 217–231. Molefe, M. (2019a). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M. (2019b) Ubuntu and Development: An African Conception of Development. Africa Today 66: 96–118. Molefe, M. (2019c). Solving the Conundrum of African Philosophy Through. Personhood: The Individual or Community. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10790-019-09683-8. Molefe, M. (2020). African Personhood and Applied Ethics. Grahamstown: NISC [Pty].Ltd. Munyaka, M. & Motlhabi, M. (2009). Ubuntu and Its Socio-Moral Significance. In F. M. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics (pp. 324–331). Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Norton, B. (1984). Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism. Environmental Ethics, 6, 131–148. Nussbaum, M. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. O’Neil, O. (1997). Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism. Environmental Values, 6, 127–142. Oyowe, A. (2014). Fiction, Culture and the Concept of a Person. Research in African Literatures, 45, 42–62. Oyowe, A. (2018). Personhood and Strong Normative Constraints. Philosophy East and West, 34, 783–801. Pannenberg, W. (1991). Systematic Theology (Vol. 2). Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Paris, P. (1995). The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Pojman, L. (2002). What is Ethics? In L. Pojman (Ed.), Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings (pp. 1–7). London: Wadsworth. Rachels, J., & Rachels, S. (2015). The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill. Ramose, M. (1999). African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Ramose, M. (2003). The Ethics of Ubuntu. In P. Coetzee & A. Roux (Eds.), The African Philosophy Reader (pp. 324–331). New York, NY: Routledge.

2  PERSONHOOD, MORALITY AND DIGNITY IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

67

Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sebidi, J. (1988). Towards the Definition of Ubuntu as African Humanism. Private Collection: Paper. Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Slote, M. (2010). Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Toscano, M. (2011). Human Dignity as High Moral Status. The Ethics Forum, 6(2), 4–25. Tshivhase, M. (2013). Personhood: Social Approval or a Unique Identity? Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy, 25, 119–140. Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York, NY: Random House. Van Niekerk, J. (2007). In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 26, 364–368. Van Niekerk, J. (2013). Ubuntu and Moral Theory. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. Waldron, J. (2012). Dignity, Rank and Rights. New  York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wingo, A. (2006). Akan Philosophy of the Person. In E.N.  Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/akan-person/. Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  192–206). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Wiredu, K. (2004). Introduction: African Philosophy in Our Time. In Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 1–27). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Wiredu, K. (2008). Social Philosophy in Postcolonial Africa: Some Preliminaries Concerning Communalism and Communitarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy, 27, 332–339. Wiredu, K. (2009). An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality. Research in African Literatures, 40, 8–18. Wood, A. (2007). Cross-Cultural Moral Philosophy: Reflections on Thaddeus Metz: ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’. South African Journal of Philosophy, 26, 337–348.

CHAPTER 3

Personhood and Abortion in African Philosophy

Introduction In this chapter, I philosophically reflect on the bioethical question of abortion in the light of the idea of personhood in African philosophy. Specifically, the aim is to investigate the question of abortion through the personhood-based view of dignity in African moral thought. I advise the reader that questions of abortion have largely been under-explored and under-considered in the tradition of African philosophy, let alone in the light of the salient discourse on personhood. Much of the discussions regarding the status of abortion, infants and children (those who have not yet reached the age of reason) tend to rely on what I consider to be controversial metaphysical systems that do not illuminate or provide robust ways of thinking about the moral status of foetuses and infants. I will say more on these metaphysical views below. In this chapter, I will attempt to proffer a secular intervention in the tradition of African philosophy when it comes to the question of abortion and the young in general. I include the young in general, infants and children, in the discussion of abortion because I agree with Michael Tooley’s (1972: 37–38) observation that “it seems very difficult to formulate a completely satisfactory … position on abortion without coming to grips with the infanticide issue”. The fate of one [foetuses] seems to have direct implication for the other [infants] given that one is required to provide a non-arbitrary moral difference between a foetus and an infant (ibid, 33). The spelling out of the moral difference tends to prove difficult for those © The Author(s) 2020 M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_3

69

70 

M. MOLEFE

that are committed to the permissibility of abortion, but the impermissibility of infanticide.1 In the final analysis of the question regarding whether abortion (and even infanticide) is permissible or not in the light of a personhood-­based conception of dignity, I will defend the latter position. I will maintain that abortion is impermissible throughout all the stages of pregnancy. I arrive at this conclusion by noting that foetuses, infants and children have moral status since they possess the potential to develop the capacity for virtue (sympathy). In my view, those entities that have the potential for the morally relevant ontological capacity only have partial moral status, which provides a sufficient ground to forbid abortion and infanticide. To reflect on the status of abortion (and the young) in African philosophy and to pursue the view that abortion is impermissible in the light of the personhood-based view of dignity, I will develop my argument by philosophically engaging Kai Horsthemke’s (2018) essay ‘African Communalism, Persons, and Animals’. Three reasons inform my choice to interrogate this essay. Firstly, its focus is on the idea of personhood as it manifests in the philosophical works of Menkiti and Gyekye. It is crucial to keep in mind that it is this idea of personhood that is pivotal in this chapter and in the book, more broadly. Secondly, this essay provides a useful philosophical engagement since it construes Menkiti’s notion of personhood to exclude the young (foetuses and infants) from the moral community, thus implying that Menkiti’s view (of moral status) does not assign it to foetuses and infants. This reading of Menkiti’s view by Horsthemke suggests that it permits abortion and even infanticide. I will dispute this interpretation of Menkiti’s idea of personhood. Finally, this essay provides us with an opportunity to philosophically investigate Menkiti’s (1984: 172–173) onto-moral framework that he describes as an “ontological movement from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’”. It is important for the reader to notice that Horsthemke relies on some interpretation of the ontological progression from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’ to argue that Menkiti’s view of personhood implausibly excludes foetuses and infants from the moral community.2 For my part, I believe that a careful and charitable interpretation of the ontological movement from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’ will be decisive in securing the correct understanding of the question of abortion and infants in African philosophy.3 To defend the view that personhood does include foetuses in the moral community, I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by offering a brief statement regarding the methodology I will be employing to reflect on the

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

71

question of abortion and the young. Secondly, I will consider common problematic approaches to defend the impermissibility of abortion in the literature. I will be considering these approaches to the question of abortion to set them aside since they strike me as implausible. I will account for their implausibility by pointing to their lack of the moral-theoretical virtue of parsimony, among others. I will proceed, in the next section, to consider Horsthemke’s argument that the idea of personhood, among others, excludes the young from the moral community. I will respond to Horsthemke’s argument by proposing a more charitable reading of Menkiti and Gyekye’s views on the idea of personhood, which grants foetuses (and infants), the mentally disabled and animals some degree of moral status.4 I will then proffer what I take to be a plausible view of personhood and its implications for the moral status of foetuses in African philosophy.5 I will argue that a plausible way to construe Menkiti’s view of personhood suggests that he takes the attribution of moral status to be a function of whether the being in question possesses the capacity for moral sympathy (in which case it is afforded full moral status), has potential to develop this capacity (as in the case of foetuses, who have partial moral status) or is capable of being an object of sympathy (as in the case of the mentally disabled and animals, who are afforded lower moral status). This way of reading Menkiti has the upshot of understanding his moral view of personhood as forbidding abortion and infanticide. I will conclude the chapter by considering some objections and interesting cases related to abortion that motivate the view defended here. Firstly, I will consider an objection that attempts to show that the potential to develop the capacity for sympathy is not sufficient to ground the moral status of foetuses. Secondly, I will consider the implications of this moral view in the light of pregnancies that result from rape. Finally, I will briefly consider the case of the mentally disabled and animals. I consider these cases to motivate why we should take seriously the idea of personhood as an under-explored African moral view. They provide an opportunity to reflect on the robustness of the idea of personhood beyond bioethical issue of abortion. At this stage, my focus is to explore the implications of the idea of personhood in this field, rather than definitively establish its plausibility. Below, I elaborate on the methodology I will be employing to approach the question of abortion.

72 

M. MOLEFE

Statement of Methodology In African philosophy, the idea of personhood is ambiguous since it can be interpreted either ontologically or normatively (Oyowe 2014; Wiredu 1996). It is the normative idea of personhood that is relevant in the debate regarding the question of abortion in the moral community.6 The question occasioned by abortion is whether foetuses have value (moral status) that constrains or forbids their termination. It is not whether they are human or not, which, in a crucial sense, is a banal ontological fact (see Tooley 1972; Warren 1997). Instead, the pressing question is whether they are persons in a moral sense, which is usually captured in terms of the idea of moral status and/or dignity. The idea of moral status identifies those beings towards whom we have direct moral duties to consider their needs, interests, welfare or rights (see Toscano 2011; Warren 1997). To claim that some being has moral status implies that certain ways of treating it are wrong—that is, they violate some objective moral principle. The moral principle being violated is specified by a theory of moral status. In addition, to claim that some being has moral status implies that certain ways of treating it can wrong it—that is, that they can make it worse off by undermining its welfare, needs or rights (see Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018; Metz 2012; Molefe 2017). For example, one influential view in the Western moral tradition accounts for moral status in terms of the capacity for autonomy—that is, the ability to self-govern. On such a moral view, what makes a being’s life morally significant is its independence and the pursuit of its own conception of life. Treatment towards a being with autonomy that interferes with its exercise of personal choice and freedom causes it to lead a worse off life, morally speaking. Such interference causes it to lead a life contrary to its moral nature. This idea of moral status and the value it assigns to some entities is a function entirely of the ontological features they possess (see DeGrazia 2008). The idea of moral status specifies the value associated with some beings, which constrains our conduct towards those beings, and which generates, on the part of moral agents, positive duties towards them (ibid.). A theory of moral status specifies the ontological features that render some beings morally significant, or morally considerable. It is in recognition of these ontological facts associated with the being that we owe it some respect—what Darwall refers to as recognition respect (Darwall 1977: 33–34).

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

73

Theories of moral status can take an individualistic, relational or holistic frame (Behrens 2011; Molefe 2019). Individualistic theories accord moral status relative to internal features of the individual, be they life, soul, pleasure and so on (May 2014). Holistic theories accord moral status relative to membership of a group, often without regard to internal features of the individual (Behrens 2011). For example, a holistic theory might say that by merely being a member of the Earth’s ecosystem, one has moral status (Chemhuru 2017). Relational theories ground moral status on some capacity to connect to some other being(s) (see Miller 2017; Noddings 1984, 1992). Some theories of moral status are monistic and some pluralistic (Wolf 1992). A monistic theory of moral status grounds it on a single property, be it rationality, the possession of a soul, sentience and so on (see Behrens 2010; Metz 2012; Singer 2009). This property is taken to be both necessary and sufficient for moral status (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2018). Pluralistic theories of moral status accord that status relative to multi-­ criterial considerations, where more than one feature or capacity is invoked to ground it (Warren 1997). For example, Warren rejects the uni-criterial view that forbids abortion by grounding it on human genetic make-up. She repudiates this view because it will include in the moral community individuals that are severely mentally disabled and those that are permanently comatose. She then defends the permissibility of abortion at all stages of pregnancy by invoking a multi-criterial view of moral status, which grounds it on the possession of consciousness, reasoning, self-­ motivated activity, capacity to communicate and self-concept (Warren 1997). In this chapter, I will argue for the impermissibility of abortion by appeal to a theory of moral status associated with the salient idea of personhood qua moral perfection (excellence). In other words, I think this idea of personhood qua moral perfection (virtue) is grounded on a particular view of moral status or dignity, specifically the view that moral status is a function of our capacity for sympathy (see Chap. 2). Some may object that this approach to considering the status of the young in terms of the idea of moral status is too Western, and that it is likely to be loaded with foreign moral intuitions and assumptions which may represent the extension of colonial morality over African ethical systems. The objector may justify their criticism by appeal to Kevin Behrens’ (2013) essay—‘The Two “Normative” Conceptions of Personhood’—where he distinguishes between the agent-centred (moral

74 

M. MOLEFE

virtue) and patient-centred (moral status) notions of personhood. Behrens submits that the patient-centred notion of personhood (moral status) is dominant in the Western moral tradition and the agent-centred notion in the African tradition. To further corroborate her view, the objector may remind us that Menkiti (1984: 172) is totally opposed to minimalist conceptions of personhood, which account for it by appeal to some static quality like memory, consciousness, rationality and so on. Three responses will suffice to respond to this objection. Firstly, I think the conceptual distinction between the agent- and patient-centred notions of personhood is correct. I believe, however, that it is an accident that one view of personhood is dominant in the one philosophical tradition and not in the other. I believe that a robust philosophical approach should appreciate that both concepts are different sides of the same moral coin, which, when understood in this way, will give a comprehensive theory of value (see Chaps. 1 and 2). Simply put, we will never be able to explain why African societies hold such high expectations of moral agents, in terms of moral conduct, until we unfold the patient-centred view inherent in it— the idea of moral status. In a sense, the idea of moral status is primary insofar as it informs the importance of personhood qua moral perfection. Secondly, a careful analysis of the African philosophy literature will reveal that scholars of African philosophy are committed to something like the idea of moral status or dignity—the patient-centred notion of personhood. Consider, for example, that most scholars of African moral thought ground dignity on some divine property, whether captured in terms of Okra, life-force or being the child of God (Bujo 2001; Deng 2004; Gyekye 1992; Ilesanmi 2001; Wiredu 1996). Others ground it on some natural property like autonomy, or the capacity for relationships (Behrens 2010; Metz 2011; Ramose 1999, 2009). In other words, these scholars subscribe, as I do, to assigning value to some entity insofar as it possesses the relevant ontological feature(s)—that is, they espouse a capacity-based conception of moral status or dignity. Though these scholars do not explicitly use the language of moral status, their invocation of the idea of dignity understood as a function of possessing either a natural or supernatural property endorses the approach I will be using in this chapter to reflect on abortion. Given that a number of these scholars actually use such an approach, it is not correct to say that this approach is not African. For my part, I rely on a personhood-based view of dignity to address the bioethical question of abortion and the young in general.

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

75

Finally, scholars of African thought have started to appeal to the idea of moral status to imagine robust African bioethical and environmental ethics (see Behrens 2010, 2013; Metz 2012; Chemhuru 2018; Chuwa 2014; Rakotsoane and Van Niekerk 2017). These scholars insist that the idea of moral status and/or dignity is central to the discourse of African bioethics and environmental ethics. I am joining this bandwagon of scholars of African thought that invoke the idea of moral status to reflect on bioethical issues. My immediate bioethical focus in this chapter is the question of abortion. I believe that the above reasons, and the philosophical pursuit to find plausible African environmental and bioethical theories, justify the suitability of using the idea of moral status in the context of African bioethics. To argue for the suitability of the idea of moral status to pursue bioethical issues is by no means to suggest that this idea is not open to criticisms in the literature, however (see Sachs 2011; Horta 2017). To insist on the plausibility of this idea also does not suggest that it is the only way to approach environmental and bioethical issues. I use this method because I believe that it is one useful and salient way to contribute to bioethical discourses. I also believe that scholars of African moral thought can also invoke it to reflect and respond to practical moral problems in the continent and globally. In the next section, I consider (what I take to be) controversial and unproductive methods and approaches to the question of abortion (and the young) in the tradition of African philosophy.

Controversial Approaches to the Question of Abortion This section is distinctive (from what one finds generally in the literature) in that it approaches the question of abortion by appeal to the idea of personhood. More specifically, it approaches the question in terms of the idea of moral status associated with personhood. However, before I consider how the idea of personhood may account for the question of abortion, I begin by considering how some scholars have approached the moral issue of abortion in the African tradition. They do so by invoking what I personally consider controversial metaphysical views. These metaphysical views are accepted on the authority of the fact that they are African; they are never justified on philosophical grounds. I begin by considering the

76 

M. MOLEFE

philosophical works of two leading scholars that manifest this problematic approach to the question of abortion. African religious ethics in the tradition of African philosophy is based on a particular metaphysical system (Imafidon 2013; Molefe 2018a; Shutte 2001). At the heart of this metaphysical system is the idea of holism: an idea that construes the world to be composed of natural and supernatural elements (Nel 2008). The defining feature of metaphysical holism is that it understands items that constitute the furniture of the world in terms of their interdependence and connectedness. The world is understood, in part, as constituted by three-dimensional human communities comprising the living-dead (ancestors), the unborn (zygotes and foetuses), and the living (Verhoef and Michel 1997: 396). It seems that all members of these communities are considered to have moral status, which implies that abortion—which involves members of the unborn community—is considered to be a violation of a ‘person’. This view is expressly defended by leading scholars of African moral thought. The first, in no order of priority, Bénézet Bujo (2001: 88–89, emphasis mine),whospecialisesinAfro-centredtheologicalethics,makesthefollowingpoint— Thus, the question of the origins of human life, the object of such lively debates in bioethics, is posed differently than in the West. According to the Black understanding of “person”, the unborn child is already a person in the early stage of development. What Western biology calls a foetus or an embryo is closely related to the community both of the living and of the dead; the embryo, which does not yet have an independent life of its own, is embraced by the love of the visible and invisible community.

From the above, it appears that Bujo is applying his Afrocentric theological ethics to bioethical question relating to the beginning of life, specifically the question of whether zygotes and foetuses have moral status. Regarding the personhood status of zygotes and foetuses, that is, whether they have moral status or not, Bujo seems to secure their moral status by appeal to both direct and indirect moral considerations. On the one hand, he observes that foetuses are ‘persons’ in their own right. That is, they have moral status, which means that we have direct duties of respect towards them. The reader should notice that Bujo insists that foetuses are already persons, that is, they are bearers of intrinsic value. This entails that we owe them moral respect.

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

77

Bujo’s second line of argument seems to invoke indirect considerations. The argument seems to be that we should respect zygotes, though they lack an independent existence, since they are secured by the love of visible and invisible communities. In other words, insofar as the zygotes are objects of the love of these communities, we have duties to respect them. Put another way, the love of the family and ancestors towards zygotes might serve as a sufficient indirect ground to forbid abortion. So, termination of pregnancy might be considered to be immoral insofar as it undermines the visible and invisible communities that have already invested their emotions in the unborn. For another example of this controversial approach to the question of abortion, consider Mogobe Ramose (1999: 62), an expert on African moral thought. He makes the following argument— The third dimension [of the community] is the yet-to-be-born. These are beings of the future. It is the task of the living to see to it that that the yet-­ to-­be-born are in fact born.

I hope it is clear to the reader that the yet-to-be-born dimension of the broader community in Ramose’s thought is equivalent to the community of the unborn in Bujo’s  account. Ramose informs us that the living— which we can take to refer to (moral) agents—have a task towards the unborn or yet-to-be-born. The task imposed on the living (moral agents) requires that they ensure that the unborn actually make it safely into the world of the living. I think it is not an exaggeration or an imposition on Ramose to suppose that the task in question is a moral one. The task in question is presented as a moral necessity, a must; it does not seem to be an optional or light responsibility. In other words, living human beings, moral agents, are taken to have a stringent moral duty to ensure the safe arrival, all things being considered, of the unborn. This moral task to ensure that the young arrive in the world of the living will not be so important if the unborn are not considered to have some moral standing in their own right. If not, why insist on the importance of their arrival? It seems that the duties imposed on the living are generated by the moral status of the unborn in their own right. This view of moral status associated with the unborn can be explained by understanding human life as ‘travelling’ or a ‘journey’ through the various phases of the different human communities. One has to move from the community of the yet-to-be-born to that of the living and from there

78 

M. MOLEFE

to the community of the living-dead. It is important to keep in mind that each of these communities comprises members that have moral status, albeit in different degrees. As such, the unborn have lower moral status than the living and the living have lower moral status than the living-dead. The living, then, have a duty to ensure the safe travel of both the unborn and the living-dead (see Wiredu 1992). Failure to do so is a violation of these communities and ‘individuals’ of value. I do not believe that we should take the above approaches to the question of abortion seriously. I say this because I have serious doubts about the philosophical view that is based on such assumptions as the community of the unborn. Very few of us are convinced that such a community exists. If the status of the existence of such a community is both controversial and dubious, it will be difficult to understand how it might confer moral status. I think Wiredu’s (1980) rejection of ethical supernaturalism applies to the above arguments. Ethical supernaturalism forms part of those cultural facets of our traditional forms of life that are anachronistic and superstitious. I think Wiredu is correct to reject this approach and I think it is correct to reject the views of abortion based on it because such arguments tend to make sense of the moral status of the young—zygotes and foetus—by appeal to a chain of vital force that connects the unborn, the living and living-dead (Bujo 2001: 88). This appeal to the metaphysical property of vitality is also difficult to accept as it rests on a thickly metaphysical system that is often stipulated and never philosophically defended (see Chemhuru 2017; Imafidon 2013; Molefe 2018b). I believe that a naturalist approach is more open and plausible. Basing moral status on a natural property is attractive because it is open to scrutiny and comparison with other such conceptions of moral status. And, naturalist approaches are more likely to be suitable for secular, modern, multicultural and democratic societies (see Metz 2010). For another controversial approach, consider Godfrey Tangwa (2000), one of the leading scholars of African bioethics, who rejects abortion by relying on the idea of ‘personhood’. To consider how African cultures can contribute to bioethical issues, like abortion, he draws from the “perception of personhood” among African cultures (ibid.: 39). He believes this view of personhood is common among most African cultures, and it is distinct from the concept of personhood salient in the Western bioethical context. The idea of personhood that is salient in the Western tradition, against which Tangwa contrasts the African one, is that of moral status—a patient- and capacity-based approach. The Western tradition, Tangwa says

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

79

(ibid.: 40), defines “persons” “as entities who are self-conscious, rational, free to choose, and in possession of a sense of moral concern”. It is crucial to recognise that personhood, in this instance, is defined in terms of some ontological features or capacities of the entity in question. On this view, beings that have these ontological properties (self-conscious, rationality, freedom to choose and a sense of moral concern) are persons, and they are members of the “secular moral community” (ibid.). These properties provide an “objective” basis to ground moral status or to assign intrinsic value to some entities (ibid.). Tangwa is concerned that this conception of personhood (moral status) excludes “foetuses, infants, and the profoundly mentally retarded and the hopelessly comatose” from the moral community (ibid.). He is concerned that it takes a patient-centred approach instead of focusing on the agent and her responsibilities. He proposes an African conception of “personhood [that] is totally different from what is found in the West” (ibid.: 42). This proposed idea of personhood does not specify any particular descriptive features of the entity in question as the basis for determining its moral worth. Rather it “applies to the human being in all its developmental stages and to all its possible conditions” (ibid.). Or, as he puts it in another place—“moral consideration and desert, in the Nso’ conception [of personhood], are indiscriminately due to all human beings, regardless of their individuating characteristics, status, or social rank” (ibid.: 39). The implication of this view is that all human beings, by virtue merely of being human, irrespective of their positive or negative functional conditions, have intrinsic value and should be respected without any discrimination at all. The plausibility of this idea, according to Tangwa (ibid.: 43), is characterised by “an egalitarian impulse and levelling tendency”. In other words, the mere status of being human equalises all moral patients in terms of their moral worth. Secondly, Tangwa believes that this concept of ‘personhood’ is attractive because it ‘refuses’ conceptual clarity and analytic precision (ibid.: 43; see also 1996: 193). In other words, this view of ‘personhood’ does not specify this or that ontological (descriptive) feature as its basis. All conditions that may attend human existence are not sufficient to remove its moral worth and its equality to every other human being—what he calls the ‘egalitarian impulse’. In other words, on the Nso’ view of personhood, human worth is unconditional in the truest sense of the term. On the Nso’ view of ‘personhood’—at least as represented by Tangwa—foetuses and mentally injured individuals, among others, have moral status on the basis

80 

M. MOLEFE

of the fact that they are human and nothing more, without regard to the condition of their capacities. Until now, it seems that ‘personhood’ qua being intrinsically valuable is a function of merely being human. The crucial question we might now consider is: how does Tangwa philosophically justify this conception of ‘personhood’? Above, we noted that he appeals to the plasticity of this term as theoretically attractive. It is not clear, at least not to me, how the lack of conceptual precision and rigidity regarding what it means to be a ‘person’ contributes to its robustness. It is not entirely clear how we may rank, if ranking is permissible at all on this approach, a foetus and her mother in a situation involving a trade-off. This plasticity does not provide us with specific guidelines or clues for deciding such complex moral situations. I personally believe that it is difficult to resolve controversial cases of bioethics or environmental ethics, for example, by appeal to a concept that is loose, plastic and flexible, since it is not clear whether it has the corpus to specify a general guideline. This is because the virtue of this moral category resides in its flexibility. This is a serious problem because the plasticity of this term implies that it avoids providing or even stipulating the moral-­ theoretical details required to deal with moral complexities in the domain of bioethics and environmental ethics.7 The problem of adopting a plastic concept of ‘personhood’ is best exemplified by how Tangwa applies it in some bioethical issues. On the one hand, Tangwa seems to consider all human beings, without regard to any condition attending them internally and externally, to be bearers of intrinsic value. Hence, he informs us that his view of personhood embodies “the absolute equality of all human beings qua human beings and subsequent radical respect of individuality” or “connote[s] the reverential respect with which everything human is approached” (Tangwa 1996: 190, 2000: 39, emphasis mine). As such, it would seem that abortion is impermissible and that children born through incest should also be acceptable because of their status as human beings. Surprisingly, however, Tangwa does not believe that children born through incest have intrinsic value or deserve to be approached with reverential respect. On the one hand, Tangwa believes abortion to be impermissible through all the stages of pregnancy. On the other hand, he believes that children born through incest are abominable and should actually be killed (see Tangwa 1996: 297). This kind of contradiction should not come as a surprise given the plastic and flexible concept of a ‘person’ on this approach. The plasticity of the term betrays its reported

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

81

commitment to the equality of all human beings. That is, whereas it regards all human beings as being equal on the basis of the fact that they are human, it also treats children born of incest with utmost moral disgust to the point of requiring that they be killed. The second problem with this view of ‘personhood’ is that it is justified by appeal to what I consider to be a controversial metaphysical system. Tangwa (2000: 42) points out that “the actual justification for how the African perception of the person is applied has to do with the African world view”. In other words, the African understanding of personhood is better understood when construed in the light of the overall system of reality that informs it. He refers to this metaphysical system and its implications for morality as an eco-bio-communitarian view (see Tangwa 1996, 2000, 2004). This principle, according to Tangwa (2000: 42, emphasis mine), recognises that there are plastic walls between as well as interdependence among human beings, superhuman spirits, nonhuman animals, plants. … Within this world view, transmigration, reincarnation, transformation, and transmutation, within and across species, are believed to be possible.

If such metaphysical transformations are possible, Tangwa argues that we should carefully consider how we treat animals, plants, infants and so on because one could never know that one is not harming their “brother/ sister” or even God (ibid.). Or, as he puts it—“So, you have to be very careful in the way you treat all living creatures, human and non-human … because your own child or parent could transform” (1996: 192). I will not dispute the possibility that this metaphysical view may actually have good consequences for bioethics and other moral issues. The difficulty I wish to present is that before one can take seriously its possible moral consequences for bioethics and environmental ethics, one needs to first believe that such metaphysical transformations and reincarnations are actually possible. To take such metaphysical beliefs seriously enough to allow them to inform our moral beliefs and practices will require more than the authority that they are a feature of African cultures. A philosopher is required to go a step further to offer philosophical justifications for this plastic concept of a ‘person’ and its metaphysical underpinnings. It is anthropologically true that most African societies believe that such ontological transformations are possible. The difficulty is that it is not safe to base morality on such controversial metaphysical views, worse so when

82 

M. MOLEFE

those that express them never offer a philosophical justification for them. If ethics is to prescribe and regulate human life as such, it must attempt to ground its prescriptions and moral consequences on philosophically justified or justifiable premises. As things stand, the view of ‘personhood’ advocated by Tangwa is not justified and, worse, it is grounded on a less-­ than-­appealing metaphysical system that will not be attractive to secular, modern and multicultural societies. For my part, I prefer conceptions of personhood that do not hinge on controversial metaphysics, because they are much closer to our moral intuitions and most suitable in modern, secular and multicultural societies. It is important that I immediately admit that the idea of moral status or the patient-centred approach that I will be employing to reflect on the young is also based on a particular metaphysical view. The only difference with this method, I believe, is that it is one that is less controversial and sits quite comfortably with our common-sense morality. For example, scholars that are committed to this view (the idea of moral status or dignity) invoke some metaphysical properties such as the capacity for sentience, autonomy, care and so on to ground their views. We seem to think that forms of life involving unending pain, being used only as a means, and so on, are not valuable. Hence, to ground a moral theory on these natural properties is parsimonious because we can make sense of what makes life valuable by appeal to these natural human capacities. The African view of personhood I am employing in this chapter invokes the capacity for sympathy as the basis for moral status, which I think makes sense given the relational and other-regarding nature of African moral thought (Behrens 2010; Mbigi 2005; Mbiti 1969). As a way forward, I will not be using Tangwa’s concept of ‘personhood’, which is characterised by a controversial metaphysical load, to address the bioethical question of abortion. It is also crucial that before I move on to the next section I clarify that the idea of ‘personhood’ employed by Tangwa is distinct from the one usually invoked by scholars of African thought qua moral perfection (see Dzobo 1992; Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2006; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 2009). Further, Tangwa is opposed to using the idea of moral status to approach bioethical questions (and possibly other areas of applied ethics). I am convinced neither by his argument nor by his alternative approach to ‘personhood’ to address moral questions. Those that are convinced by Tangwa’s approach may systematically develop this idea to consider its implications for moral practice.

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

83

In what follows, I elaborate and critically reflect on Horsthemke’s treatment of the idea of personhood in African philosophy and its implications for the case of abortion and the young.

Horsthemke on Personhood, Abortion and the Young The central focus of Horsthemke’s (2018) essay—‘African Communalism, Persons, and the Case for Non-Human Animals’—is to consider the place or standing of animals in the light of the idea of personhood in African philosophy. This essay is important in this book because, in it, Horsthemke also considers the question of the young (zygotes, foetuses and infants) in the light of the idea of personhood. The idea of personhood that Horsthemke is relying on is one  that is central in the debate between Menkiti and Gyekye. He understands personhood to be “acquired over time, with increasing moral maturation, seniority, and agency” (ibid.: 60). This view of personhood, according to Horsthemke, is communalist, since it is “determined by social and cultural criteria” (ibid.: 61). In other words, the community plays a crucial role in the process of the acquisition of personhood. This role could be thought of in terms of the community prescribing, guiding and assisting the individual in the process of the acquisition of the status of personhood (moral perfection). It is clear that it is the normative idea of personhood qua moral virtue that is under consideration in Horsthemke’s philosophical discourse. Specifically, it is the agent-centred notion of personhood that is under consideration. He thinks of the normative notion in these terms—it “reveals a person’s [human being’s] social status and involves a judgement of her moral standing” (ibid.: 62). The social status and moral standing, in this context, is essentially a function of “moral maturation”, which itself is a function of the positive use of the “agency” of the individual in the light of the norms prescribed by the community (ibid.: 65; Presbey 2002: 257). The crux of the argument that Horsthemke advances regarding the status of the young, among others, is that the idea of personhood excludes them from the moral community. He captures this view as follows— Menkiti is quite unapologetic about the exclusion [of the young] on the basis of a relative lack of moral personality (and even status) of those in the early stages of “ontological progression” (1984: 173), i.e., infants and young children (2018: 65).

84 

M. MOLEFE

In several other places, he notes that this idea of personhood “excludes human babies” (ibid.: 70). He also observes that “not only can non-­ human animals not be considered persons, but human zygotes, foetuses, babies and even children also fail to qualify” (72). So, from the above, there is no doubt that according to Horsthemke the idea of personhood excludes the young, specifically zygotes, foetuses and infants, from the moral community. By implication we can do towards these as we please without violating any moral code or even harming them since they are not persons—that is, they have no moral status. As far as I can tell, Horsthemke makes two arguments to secure the conclusion that foetuses, among others, are not part of the moral community. Firstly, he relies on a particular interpretation of Menkiti’s talk of ontological progression to arrive at the conclusion that it excludes the young. Menkiti imagines the idea of personhood to function within a particular ontological framework that involves an “ontological progression” from one state to another, which is higher (Menkiti 1984: 172). In my view, Menkiti imagines the quest to pursue personhood to exist between the ontological statuses of two categories of being we refer to as ‘it’. The first ‘it’ is related to the beginning of life. It refers to the infant after it is born but before it is socialised and reaches the status of socio-moral agency. The second ‘it’ status concerns ancestors that are no longer invoked and recalled by living family members. Both these states of conceiving of infants and ancestors as ‘its’ are characterised by lack of incorporation, one before cultural inclusion and moral participation and one by loss of social incorporation through no longer being invoked and remembered by the living. To be called an ‘it’ is to be denied the status of personhood (moral perfection). Going forward, I will limit my focus to the case of the young and will completely ignore the case of ancestors due to the focus of this chapter on the question of abortion. I think it is obvious and not a great philosophical insight to see that for Menkiti, the young—which term I use to include foetuses—are not persons. This statement as it stands can be ambiguous until we are clear about what notion of a person is under consideration in Menkiti’s adumbrations. It is obvious that Menkiti, in the context of discussing the ontological progression from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’, is committed to elucidating the agent-­ centred notion of personhood. The evidence for reading Menkiti this way is captured thus—

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

85

The temptation might be strong in some quarters to retort that either an entity is a person or it is not; that there can be no two ways about it. In response to this misgiving let me note that the notion of an acquisition of personhood is supported by the natural tendency in many languages, English included, of referring to infants as it. (Menkiti 1984: 172, emphasis mine)

In context, Menkiti imagines a counterargument against his classification of the young as ‘its’. It is important to note that it will be otiose to argue about whether the young are persons or not, particularly if what is under consideration is the status of being human or not. There is no debate that the young, genetically speaking, are human. Menkiti, however, is quick to clarify that the idea of personhood he is interested in comes only by way of acquisition. We, in a crucial sense, do not acquire the status of being persons qua being human—this is a given biological fact. One simply needs to be born of human seed to be human. As such, to refer to the young as ‘its’ is not tantamount to denying them the obvious status of being human; it is to deny them the status of being moral achievers that is in Menkiti’s exposition. This is how I read him. I feel that this clarification, on my part, is also trivial since it is obvious that infants are in no position to attain such moral achievements. I believe that it is important that we state it nonetheless with the aim of giving a charitable reading to Menkiti’s view of personhood, so that we can have a correct understanding of the status of the young qua ‘its’ in his moral philosophy. As such, from the above, we can conclude that to refer to the young as ‘its’ is not to deny them the status of being human. If Menkiti were doing so he would be obviously wrong. Secondly, to refer to the young as ‘its’ is to make the obvious claim that the young are not moral achievers yet, and as such are still outside of the journey of ontological progression—one characterised by moral progression to personhood. Before I offer what I take to be a more plausible understanding of the ‘it’ status of the young, I believe that it is important that we first rethink some of the claims or views advanced by Menkiti to amend and to render them more philosophically appealing, guided by the idea and ideal of personhood as moral perfection that he is ultimately committed to. There are claims in Menkiti’s exposition of personhood that can occasion confusion. He observes that in many (African) languages, there is an option to refer to infants as an ‘its’, and he goes on to attach ontological significance to such a linguistic option. He interprets this option to imply that there is an ontological difference between being young and being an

86 

M. MOLEFE

adult. He further reads this supposed ontological difference as explaining why the death of a child is not attended with elaborate grieving, whereas that of an adult is (see Menkiti 1984: 172–174). Well, I think we need to clarify that Menkiti is wrong to believe that there is an ontological difference between the young [infant] and normal adults. But we should do so without abandoning the use of the reference to an infant as an ‘it’. It is an ontological fact that infants are as human as any adult is—only a tyro would dispute this. This is the case because we do not achieve the status of being human, it is a given. Menkiti’s claim regarding the ontological difference between adults and children could be true only if he was expressing a trivial fact to the effect that infants are not yet socialised or have not yet developed  to become  functional  adults. Alternatively, the claim could be that the ontological capacities of the young, such as their mental dispositions, language, emotional competency and so on, are necessary for them to function as normal human beings, and have not fully developed, whereas those of adults have. Interpreted in this sense, the ontological difference Menkiti would be referring to pertains to the metaphysical question of personal identity, which would also be obviously true (see, Molefe 2016, 2019: ch. 2). In this case, Menkiti would be drawing our attention to two distinct ontological facts related to human beings. On the one hand, he would be pointing to the mere fact of being a member of the homo sapiens species; and, on the other, he would be referring to personal identity qua an individual that is conscious of itself over time. It is one thing to be human and it is quite another to be a functional human being. The difference between the two is ontological insofar as being able to function as a human being requires the actualisation of certain ontological features depending on whether one takes an individualistic or relational view of personal identity. The individualistic view of personal identity will tend to emphasise internal (ontological) features of individuals like memory, autonomy and so on. Communal theories will tend to invoke social relationships as the most important ontological consideration to account for personal identity (Neal and Paris 1990). As such, the major ontological difference between the young [infants] and adults is that the latter have been socialised and the young not. It is important to appreciate the fact that the process of socialisation is entirely an ontological one; it does not embody or make any reference to morality at all (Metz 2013: 13). As such, to invoke this ontological difference regarding the issue of personal identity strikes me as beside the point,

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

87

particularly if we already agree that the central concept in Menkiti’s analysis is that of personhood qua moral virtue (Ikuenobe 2006; Metz 2010; Molefe 2019; Wiredu 2009). As such, I believe that the above analysis is sufficient to indicate that Menkiti was wrong to think that there is an ontological difference between the young and old unless he was talking in terms of personal identity—a less than revealing philosophical point. The fact that Menkiti is interested in a moral view of personhood qua moral virtue should dictate our interpretation regarding the ‘it’ status of the young. This, at least, is my view and suggestion of how we should approach Menkiti’s use of ‘it’ as a reference to an infant (see Molefe and Maraghanedzha 2017). Now that I have clarified what I think might occasion confusion, I proceed to suggest an under-explored and charitable reconstruction of Menkiti’s view of the young qua ‘its’. I suggest that we approach the reference to infants as ‘its’ in terms of the idea of moral status (see ibid.) To refer to the young as ‘its’ should be construed to be denying them moral excellence, but it is not tantamount to denying them moral status. It is obvious why we should deny the young moral excellence; the very fact that they are not yet moral agents means that they are not in a position to be morally virtuous. The idea of personhood qua moral status does not assign moral value on the basis of moral performance. Rather, it assigns value—recognition respect—based on the mere fact that one possesses the relevant ontological features. Approaching matters in this way, the question of whether the young qua ‘its’ cannot participate in the moral drama of pursuing personhood becomes quite irrelevant; in fact, it does not even arise in relation to them. The crucial question is whether the young have the relevant ontological feature(s) that ‘qualify’ them to be members of the moral community. I will come back to the question whether the young do possess the relevant ontological properties that would secure their moral status later on in the chapter. We can now consider the second argument that informs Horsthemke’s (2018) view that excludes the young from the moral community in terms of some interpretation of Menkiti’s notion of personhood. He argues that the conception of justice inherent in Menkiti’s view is implausible as it excludes animals and the young, among others, from the moral community. Horsthemke believes that Menkiti advocates the view of “‘justice-as-­ reciprocity’ or ‘justice-as-mutuality’” (ibid.: 72). This view of justice, according to Horsthemke, disqualifies from the moral community “all those who cannot and will never be able to participate in communal life,

88 

M. MOLEFE

to contribute to the good—to reciprocate, as it were” (ibid.: 72). On this view, moral status is a function of possessing the capacity to mutually benefit from others and to benefit them. That is, one must be equally a participant (subject) and a beneficiary (object) in the common good to have moral status. According to this line reasoning, moral status, which embodies one approach to questions of justice, is accounted for by appeal to the ability or capacity to reciprocally contribute to the good of the communal life. Those who do not have or will never have this capacity do not count as members of the moral community. If all we have to go by is this exposition of Menkiti’s understanding of personhood qua moral status, it should follow that a large number of the young are included in the moral community, contrary to Horsthemke’s interpretation of Menkiti’s view. On the logic of Horsthemke’s argument, it is particular kinds of the young, not all of them, that ought to be excluded from the moral community. It is those that entirely lack (now and in the future) the ability to engage in a communal life for the sake of promoting the good of all. By implication, the young, particularly those with the relevant moral potential, should be included in the moral community. I think this interpretation of matters is consistent with Menkiti’s elucidations regarding the idea of moral status probably inherent in his discussion of personhood. The view of moral status that we can associate with Menkiti is found in the context where he excludes animals from the moral community, although I hope the reader will keep in mind that the focus of this chapter is the question of abortion. Menkiti repudiates the extension of the moral language—including rights—to animals on the basis that it fails to cohere with the “clearness of our conception of personhood” (Menkiti 1984: 177). In this instance, by ‘personhood’, he is referring to the patient-­ centred notion, or the idea of moral status. This fact is exemplified in these words If it is generally conceded, then, that persons are the sort of entities that are owed the duties of justice, it must also be allowed that each time we find an ascription of any of the various rights implied by these duties of justice, the conclusion naturally follows that the possessor of the rights in question cannot be other than a person. That is so because the basis of such rights ascription has now been made dependent on a possession of a capacity for moral sense, a capacity, which though it need not be realized. (Ibid., emphasis mine)

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

89

From the above quotation, it is clear that talk of personhood does not easily equate to reference to a human being qua human. Talk of a ‘person’ refers only to those beings that are owed duties of justice or those that should be ascribed certain rights. Menkiti is also very clear regarding what sorts of entities are owed duties of justice or rights: those with a capacity for moral sense. It is crucial to notice that these duties of justice or ascriptions of rights are owed to entities that have a particular ontological feature—a capacity for moral sense. In addition, it is important to recognise that Menkiti believes that rights ascriptions are a function of merely possessing the relevant capacity or having the potential to possess such a capacity. Menkiti points out that for one to have moral status, it is not necessary for such a capacity to be realised or actualised. In other words, the mere possession of the actual capacity for moral sense or even its potential is enough to secure the duties of justice, or moral status. Two safe conclusions can be drawn from this moral view regarding the status of abortion and the young. The first is that merely because the young possess the potential for the capacity for sympathy, they have moral status. As such, they are members of the moral community. Secondly, we can note that Horsthemke is largely wrong to hold the view that Menkiti excludes all the young from the moral community. It seems that the category of the young that might be excluded in the discourse of personhood are those that are severely mentally disabled. I italicise the word ‘seems’ because below I will demonstrate otherwise. In the previous chapter, I argued that Menkiti’s talk of the capacity for moral sense may be construed to amount to a view that grounds moral status on the capacity for sympathy. This view of moral status qua the capacity for sympathy does accommodate the young since they possess the relevant potential for moral status. Gyekye (1992: 110, emphasis mine) endorses this conclusion regarding the moral standing of the young [infants] in this fashion— This conception of a person, however, must not be considered as eliminating or writing of children or infants as persons even though they are not yet considered as moral agents; as capable of exercising moral sense. The reason is that even though children are not morally capable in actuality, they are morally capable in potentiality. Unlike the colt which will never come to possess a moral sense even if it grew into an adult (horse), children do grow to become moral agents on reaching adolescence: at this stage they are capable of exercising their moral sense and thus of making moral judgements.

90 

M. MOLEFE

In context, as discussed at length in Chap. 2, Gyekye is considering the idea of moral status entailed by the agent-centred idea of personhood salient in Afro-communitarian morality. Gyekye actually argues that the idea of assigning personhood relative to a conduct exuding moral excellence implies a view of moral status grounded on the capacity for virtue, or moral sense. On this view, the capacity for virtue (sympathy) is the basis for the very possibility of our commitment to leading and expectation that human beings can lead morally virtuous lives. This capacity for sympathy embodies a theory of moral status or dignity characteristic of our theory of virtue (personhood). It is in this light that Gyekye’s comments, above, should be understood. Gyekye’s view regarding the moral status of infants is unequivocal. He observes that the metaphysical difference between an infant and a colt is that one can pursue personhood and the other cannot. On the one hand, the fact that the colt does not have the capacity or even potential to pursue personhood implies that it has no moral status at all. On the other, the fact that the infant (one can include the foetus here) does possess the relevant potential to pursue personhood implies that it does have moral status. The major difference between the infant (foetus) and horse is captured by the presence and absence of the potential to pursue virtue. It is the potential to pursue virtue that makes foetuses, infants and children possessors of moral status because they will in future be able to participate in the ontological progression of moral perfection, which the colt will not. Thus, we can conclude that the young, foetuses and infants, have moral status because they have the capacity for virtue (sympathy), or, more accurately, the potential for moral sympathy. As such, we can make the following crucial amendment to our theory of moral status qua personhood. Though the young (be they foetuses or infants) have moral status, they only have partial moral status; it is only normal adult human beings that have full moral status. As such, on this view, we can grant the young (zygotes, foetuses, infants and children) partial moral status because they only have the potential for moral virtue; and, we can grant normal adults full moral status—dignity—because they actually possess the capacity for sympathy. On the same logic, we can further observe that a foetus compared to the infant has less moral status given that the potential of the infant is higher than that of the foetus. In other words, in a situation where there is a trade-off between an adult and an infant, all things being equal, we ought to prefer the adult. The same conclusion applies between,

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

91

for example, choosing between a mother and a foetus; all things being equal, we ought to prefer the mother since she has full moral status. In the light of the above philosophical exposition of Menkiti’s and Gyekye’s views of personhood and moral status, we can conclude that foetuses and the young in general, infants and children, have moral status merely because they have the potential to pursue personhood. This reading of Menkiti and Gyekye suggests that Horsthemke’s interpretation of Menkiti and Gyekye is not charitable and is implausible. I believe the above is sufficient to address the objections raised by Horsthemke that the idea of personhood excludes the young from the moral community. Below, I consider objections that might be raised against this view of personhood and some considerations that might motivate why we should take this view seriously.

Objections Below, I consider criticisms or some considerations that could be raised against securing the moral status of foetuses by appeal to their potential to develop the capacity for sympathy. The first objection questions the suitability and sufficiency of the property of potential. The second considers the question of abortion in the light of pregnancies that result from rape. The final objection cites the case of mentally disabled individuals and animals to test the overall plausibility of the idea of personhood. I begin by considering the objection against potential as a relevant moral property to secure the moral status of foetuses. The Objection Against Potential One of the leading scholars of abortion, Warren (1997), argues that abortion ought to be permissible throughout the entire period of pregnancy. She grounds this view on a multi-criterial view of moral status. She anticipates the objection that possibly one could argue that though foetuses lack the actual capacities for moral status, they do, however, possess the potential for it. Once one introduces the property of potential, one can secure the permissibility of abortion throughout the entire period of pregnancy. Warren repudiates this view by using the following analogical argument— Suppose that our space explorer falls into the hands of an alien culture, whose scientists decide to create a few hundred thousand or more human

92 

M. MOLEFE

beings, by breaking his body into its component cells, and using these to create fully developed human beings, with, of course, his genetic code. We may imagine that each of these newly created men will have all of the original man’s abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on, and also have an individual self-concept, in short that each of them will be a bona fide (though hardly unique) person. Imagine that the whole project will take only seconds, and that its chances of success are extremely high, and that our explorer knows all of this, and also knows that these people will be treated fairly. I maintain that in such a situation he would have every right to escape if he could, and thus to deprive all of these potential people of their potential lives; for his right to life outweighs all of theirs together, in spite of the fact that they are all genetically human, all innocent, and all have a very high probability of becoming people very soon, if only he refrains from acting.

I invoke this objection because I believe that it applies equally to the view of moral status associated with the idea of personhood, particularly since it also invokes the property of potential to ground the moral status of foetuses, thus forbidding abortion. The crucial question to consider, then, is whether this case does serve as a useful objection against the view propounded here. I think the above argument, as advanced by Warren, is far from securing the conclusion that potential, in and of itself, is not a sufficient ground for partial moral status. At best, this case demonstrates that potential is less weighty than the moral status of a normal adult. This line of reasoning is suggested by the idea that the right to life of a single adult individual is weightier than a life or lives of potential human beings, no matter their number. We should also note that the argument employed by Warren takes a form of a trade-off situation, where we have to compare and consider which being has greater moral status, the actual human being or the potential one, which explains why most of us are comfortable with the fellow running away to save his life under these circumstances. What she is not considering is whether the property of potential serves as a sufficient ground in and of itself in all circumstances, particularly where there is no trade-off. Compared to the mother, the foetus has less moral status, but it does have some since it possesses the relevant potential. The view of moral status associated with Menkiti, as proposed here, already admits this fact: the idea that the moral status of the mother, for example, is greater than that of the foetus. This fact, however, does not imply that the mother can do as she pleases with the foetus, her conduct is constrained by the partial moral status of the foetus, a status that it has in its own right because it has the relevant potential. In the case, however, of

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

93

a trade-off, where we have to choose to save either the mother or foetus, the moral status of the mother outweighs that of the foetus. I proceed next to consider the case of pregnancy through rape and its implication for abortion. The Case of Rape and Abortion In Warren’s imagined case, we have a duty to encourage the explorer to escape the alien culture because for its scientists to achieve their ends they must unnecessarily murder an innocent human being, which act is morally wrong. I suspect that in using this case, Warren had in mind the case of unwanted pregnancy that comes about as a result of being raped. In the case of rape, the question becomes: should the woman, like the explorer, escape the unwanted pregnancy by aborting the foetus? The pressing philosophical question becomes: how do we adjudicate on the matter of abortions in contexts of unplanned and unwanted pregnancies, specifically those that arise through rape? What would the idea of personhood recommend in this context; would it, under this peculiar circumstance of unwanted pregnancy, permit abortion? Well, we can look at this question from two related points in the discourse of personhood. On the one hand, we can consider whether a foetus has moral status, in its own right, without considering the fact of how it came to be in the woman’s body. If the foetus does have moral status, this fact is sufficient to constrain and limit the options available to the woman. This is not to belittle the fact that being raped is morally disgusting nor the fact that this unplanned pregnancy is an unwelcome inconvenience to her life-plan. These facts, in and of themselves, though regrettable, are not sufficient to obliterate the moral status of the foetus and permit abortion. The point is that reckoning with the fact of the heinous nature of rape is not tantamount to nullifying the moral status of the foetus that came as its consequent. Secondly, the idea of personhood itself morally dictates how the agent ought to act in various circumstances (like rape) or consequent to it (regarding unwanted pregnancy). Personhood requires the agent to develop her capacity for sympathy, that is perfect herself to reach levels where she will exude those virtues associated with sympathy such as care, love, sharing, forgiveness, friendliness and so on. The idea of personhood will require of the woman, in making decisions regarding how to respond to the unwanted pregnancy, that she act in ways that enhance the quality

94 

M. MOLEFE

of her own character. If, indeed, a foetus has moral status then it should follow that an agent that is committed to moral perfection ought to value such a life by preserving it. The moral logic and attitude that informs the moral perfectionism associated with the idea of personhood will constrain the conduct of raped women differently. In liberal cultures where autonomy and personal liberty are paramount goods, it will make sense that the woman’s personal choice will be the most important consideration in deciding the fate of the foetus. The fact of the autonomy of the woman coupled with the fact that a foetus does not have this capacity will justify abortion. The choice and freedom of the woman will differ in the context where the highest good is the pursuit of virtue (sympathy) in a communitarian context, where the family and community are crucial moral considerations (Ramose 2003; Shutte 2001; Wiredu 1980). In fact, in afro-communitarian thought, freedom and autonomy are understood in relational terms. Freedom and autonomy are not centrally concerned about independence and non-interference in pursuit of personal choice (Siame 2000). By now, we also know that sympathy is attended by a huge number of other-regarding duties that moral agents owes towards things that have moral status. The freedom and choice of the pregnant woman will not be abandoned per se, but it will be strongly influenced by considerations related to personal-moral perfection. The stubborn insistence that she does not want or did not plan to have a child, that this pregnancy was foisted on her by rape, will not carry as much weight in a context where other-regarding duties are taken quite seriously in the pursuit of moral excellence. Consider a case that roughly, by way of analogy, attempts to show that some of our duties to others arise in contexts where they were imposed on us by circumstances or by others without our initial consent. There are many cases in South Africa, and surely, in other places as well, where a husband kills himself and his wife. The aftermath of this horrendous decision on the part of the husband results in the older sibling inheriting ‘parental’ responsibility towards her younger siblings and cousins (if we imagine, as if often the case, that caring for the cousins was the responsibility of her father after his sister passed away). Often, in the African context, the older sibling is expected to assume this responsibility over her younger siblings. Surely, this will curtail much of her financial and social freedom, but she takes it as her duty to take care of her siblings, nonetheless. In fact, this is what being a person—being virtuous—involves in terms of taking care of one’s family. It embodies the idea that charity

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

95

begins at home (see Molefe 2016, 2018b; Ramose 2003). This example, I believe, is somewhat analogous to the case of the raped pregnant woman insofar as her pregnancy is the result of circumstances forced on her biologically and socially without her consent. Some may insist that there is a huge difference between these cases by insisting that in the case of rape, the rape may bring about trauma to her, and the child if allowed to be born may be a constant reminder of the of trauma of rape. In the sibling example above, some might say, her siblings may serve as a constant source of consolation and give her a new meaning in life. I do not dispute this possibility, but this may not be the only role and impact the child might play in the life of the rape victim. The child might also bring much joy and relief to the mother’s life, and add a new source of meaning. This is as plausible as the siblings’ lives making the life of the older sibling average and curtailing her ambitions, serving as a constant source of regret and blame. All of these contingencies aside, the fact of the moral status of the foetus and the ideal of moral virtue will serve as a stringent constraint against the termination of a pregnancy that came about through rape. To further motivate the view of moral status developed here, I tersely apply it to cases of animals and mentally disabled individuals. Animals and Mentally Disabled Individuals I suppose that Horsthemke might respond that although this view invokes potential as a way of accommodating the young (foetuses and infants) in the moral community, it still faces some of the objections he raised against the idea of personhood. The reader will remember that Horsthemke cited foetuses, infants, the mentally disabled and animals, among others, to raise his objection against Menkiti’s idea of personhood. If we invoke the property of potential merely to accommodate the young, the question regarding the robustness of this view of moral status qua the potential for moral virtue still stands, since we do not know if it is true that it is ableist and anthropocentric (see Horsthemke 2018; Manzini 2018). I am aware that the question of the moral status of mentally disabled individuals and animals does not fall neatly into a chapter related to the question of abortion. It is important, however, that we roughly and very briefly respond to these issues for the sake of demonstrating the robustness of this moral idea of personhood, specifically regarding its conception of dignity.8 I believe that the idea of personhood can accommodate those that are mentally disabled and animals in the moral community.

96 

M. MOLEFE

The idea of personhood accounts for dignity in terms of the capacity for sympathy. Individuals have dignity insofar as they have this capacity, and individuals are dignified—that is, morally excelling—insofar as they are continuously developing this capacity. An individual that is morally excelling is one who is responsive to others’ needs, well-being and vulnerability. In line with the logic of the idea of personhood qua the actual demonstration of sympathy, we begin to see that we should respond positively towards all sentient beings, be they animals or mentally disabled individuals. Remember the idea of sympathy in African thought is conceptualised through the analogy of ‘hearing-listening’; it should therefore follow that anything that can make a morally relevant ‘sound’—one relating to its needs, welfare, suffering and so on—is deserving of sympathetic  care. There is no non-arbitrary reason to limit the moral emotion and reaction of sympathy to normal human beings only. As such, it would demonstrate an unjustified bias to limit our abilities to ‘hear-listen’ (to have sympathy) only to human beings; our moral ears [moral sense] should not make such arbitrary discriminations. This idea of personhood would assign some moral status to animals and mentally disabled individuals in their own right, albeit only partially. Full moral status will be granted to individuals that have the capacity for sympathy, both as subjects and objects of such sympathetic relations. Those entities that can largely be objects of moral status, like most animals and the mentally injured, will only have partial moral status. In other words, if morality in the discourse of personhood revolves around other-regarding virtues generated by and related to sympathy, it would be strange to limit the value of such a moral emotion and action only to human beings. As such, we note that a thing that can be the object of sympathy has partial moral status. In this light, we note that a careful analysis of personhood shows that it has resources to assign some moral status to animals and mentally injured persons.9

Conclusion In this chapter, I considered the case of abortion (and the young) in the light of the moral idea of personhood. I began by clarifying the method I would be employing to consider the question. I went on to consider problematic ways of considering the question of abortion in African philosophy. I specifically considered the supernaturalist approaches of Bujo and Ramose. I rejected these since they rely on questionable and unjustified

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

97

metaphysical views. I also distanced myself from Tangwa’s use of a peculiar notion of ‘personhood’ in considering bioethical issues, among others. I then considered Horsthemke’s criticisms of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy. He accuses personhood of excluding the young (foetuses and infants), among others, from the moral community. I ultimately argued that the idea of personhood embodies a robust notion of moral status; it accounts for moral status in terms of our capacity for sympathy. I argued that since foetuses have the potential to develop the capacity for sympathy, they have some moral status, which, contrary to Horsthemke’s view, secures their place in the moral community. I concluded the chapter by considering the robustness of this conception of moral status qua the potential to develop the capacity for sympathy. I began by considering the objection that the potential for the capacity for sympathy may not be sufficient to secure the moral status of foetuses. I also considered the rationale that the idea of personhood might offer to deal with a case of a pregnancy that emerges from rape. In the final analysis, on the one hand, it recognises the constraints that are created by the moral status of the foetus; and, on the other, it appreciates how the ideal of moral perfection (virtue) influences and constrains the conduct of the pregnant woman towards the foetus. I suggested that her choices and desires should be constrained by the moral desire for virtue, which will imply that she ought to be kind and compassionate towards the foetus, which is an expression of virtue towards a being of potential virtue—one that has partial moral status. I also roughly suggested that the idea of personhood has resources to account for the partial moral status of mentally disabled individuals and animals. I also remind the reader that a normal adult has full moral status; foetuses, infants and children have partial moral status; and mentally disabled individuals and most animals will have lower moral status. The moral status of the young is greater than that of disabled individuals and most animals because they have the potential to pursue moral perfection, which is the essence of a moral life. In the next chapter, I consider the question of euthanasia in the light of the personhood-based view of dignity.

Notes 1. The case in point is Anne Warren (1997), whereas she believes that abortion is permissible, she rejects infanticide. She struggles, however, to offer a convincing case regarding why one is permissible and the other not.

98 

M. MOLEFE

2. I hasten to clarify that I should not be read as suggesting that Horsthemke operates on the assumption that abortion ought to be permissible (or, even impermissible). Two things are clear from reading Horsthemke’s essay. Firstly, he lists entities that are excluded by the idea of personhood from the moral community, such as the young, women and homosexuals. In this regard, he seems to be merely reporting the practical consequences of the idea of personhood. Secondly, he is, however, committed to criticising this idea for failing to include animals in the moral community. For my part, my interest is just to evaluate whether it is true that the idea of personhood excludes the young, particularly foetuses, from the moral community. 3. Some scholars of African thought have also considered the idea of ontological progression from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’ (see Etieyibo 2018; Matolino 2011). These scholars tend to focus on a metaphysical analysis of the ontological progression. My focus will be on the ethics of abortion that can be read from referring to infants as ‘its’. 4. In this essay, I will also briefly consider the moral candidature of mentally disabled individuals and animals alongside the question of abortion because Horsthemke’s criticism against the idea of the personhood includes them. I touch on these other cases to suggest the robustness of the idea of personhood. The suggestion will be that the idea of personhood, at least its view of moral status, does have the resources to accommodate much more than just the young. 5. It is important that, here, I am considering an idea of moral status entailed by the idea of personhood qua moral virtue. 6. I italicise this word, ‘normative’, to bring the following consideration to the attention of the reader. The reader will do well to note the ambiguity of the normative idea of personhood; it could refer to either a patient- or an agent-­ centred notion of personhood (see Chap. 2). In this particular instance, and, in fact, in this chapter and the entire book, I derive a conception of moral status/dignity (the patient-centred notion of personhood) from the agent-­ centred notion of personhood. 7. We invoke theories because they offer us principles that we can apply to a variety of situations—that is, they are generalisable. The problem of a plastic concept like that defended by Tangwa is that it defies the very logic of having a theory in the first place since it seems to imply that we have to solve moral problems on a case-by-case basis. I take this to be the case because the idea of plasticity rejects the objective rules and rigidity associated with ­theories, instead preferring flexibility as crucial feature. I think the case-bycase approach is the upshot of plasticity in the concept of a person, which betrays its usefulness as a theory. 8. I touch on the question of the mentally disabled and animals, in part, because in Chap. 2 I criticised Ikuenobe’s view of dignity for failing to

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

99

accommodate the young and animals. I think it is only fair to the reader to give her a sense of how this idea can accommodate the mentally disabled and animals, albeit in a sketchy form. 9. In this chapter, I will not be drawn to issues regarding the fact that some animals can be greater subjects of sympathy, to some extent, than infants and mentally injured human beings. The point of this section is to outline a preliminary, and by all means, rough response to questions regarding animals and the mentally disabled. It suffices to appreciate that animals and mentally disabled individuals are secured their moral standing on the basis, at minimum, that they can be objects of sympathy. Even those animals that can be subjects of sympathy can only be so in a limited way since they cannot pursue and develop personhood in the fullest sense of the term.

References Behrens, K. (2010). Exploring African Holism with Respect to the Environment. Environmental Values, 9, 465–484. Behrens, K. (2011). African Philosophy, Thought and Practice and Their Contribution to Environmental Ethics. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg. Behrens, K. (2013). Two ‘Normative’ Conceptions of Personhood. Quest, 25, 103–119. Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company. Chemhuru, M. (2017). The Import of African Ontology for Environmental Ethics. Doctoral dissertation, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg. Chemhuru, M. (2018). Interpreting Ecofeminist Environmentalism in African Communitarian Philosophy and Ubuntu: An Alternative to Anthropocentrism. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1450643. Chuwa, L. (2014). African Indigenous Ethics in Global Ethics. New  York, NY: Springer Nature. Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics, 80, 36–49. DeGrazia, D. (2008). Moral Status as a Matter of Degree? Southern Journal Philosophy, 46, 181–198. Deng, F. (2004). Human Rights in the African Context. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 499–508). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Dzobo, K. (1992). Values in a Changing Society: Man, Ancestors and God. In K. Gyekye & K. Wiredu (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp. 223–242). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Etieyibo, E. (2018). Moral Force and the “It- It” in Menkiti’s Normative Conception of Personhood. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 47–60.

100 

M. MOLEFE

Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  101–122). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Horsthemke, K. (2018). African Communalism, Persons, and Animals. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 60–79. Horta, O. (2017). Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 20, 899–910. Ikuenobe, P. (2006). Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Ilesanmi, O. (2001). Human Rights Discourse in Modern Africa: A Comparative Religious Perspective. Journal of Religious Ethics, 23, 293–320. Imafidon, E. (2013). On the Ontological Foundation of a Social Ethics in African Traditions. In E. Imafidon & J. Bewaji (Eds.), Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics (pp. 37–54). New York, NY: Lexington Books. Jaworska, A., & Tannenbaum, J. (2018). The Grounds of Moral Status. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/ grounds-moral-status/. Manzini, N. (2018). Menkiti’s Normative Communitarian Conception of Personhood as Gendered, Ableist and Anti-Queer. South African Journal of Philosophy, 17, 18–33. Matolino, B. (2011). The (Mal) Function of “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s Normative Account of Person. African Studies Quarterly, 12, 23–37. May, T. (2014). Moral Individualism, Moral Relationalism, and Obligations to Non-human Animals. Journal of Applied Ethics, 31, 156–168. Mbiti, J. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. New York, NY: Doubleday. Mbigi, L. (2005). The Spirit of African Leadership. Randburg: Knowers. Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction (pp.  171–181). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Metz, T. (2010). Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81–99. Metz, T. (2011). Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal, 11, 532–559. Metz, T. (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 14, 387–402. Metz, T. (2013). Introduction: Engaging with the Philosophy of D.A. Masolo. Quest, 25, 7–17. Miller, S. (2017). Reconsidering Dignity Relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare, 2, 108–121.

3  PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

101

Molefe, M. (2016). Revisiting the Debate Between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who is a Radical Communitarian? Theoria, 63, 37–54. Molefe, M. (2017). A Critique of Thad Metz’s African Theory of Moral Status. South African Journal of Philosophy, 36, 195–205. Molefe, M. (2018a). African Metaphysics and Religious Ethics. Filosofia Theoretica, 7, 19–37. Molefe, M. (2018b). Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy. African Studies, 78(3), 309–323. Molefe, M. (2019). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M., & Maraghanedzha, M. (2017). The Function of “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s Normative Account of Personhood: A Response to Bernard Matolino. Filosofia Theoretica, 6, 90–109. Neal, P., & Paris, D. (1990). Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique: A Guide for the Perplexed. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 23, 419–439. Nel, P. (2008). Morality and Religion in African Thought. Acta Theologica, 2, 33–44. Noddings, N. (1984). Caring. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Noddings, N. (1992). The Challenge to Care in Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Oyowe, A. (2014). Fiction, Culture and the Concept of a Person. Research in African Literatures, 45, 42–62. Presbey, G. (2002). Maasai Concepts of Personhood: The Roles of Recognition, Community, and Individuality. International Studies in Philosophy, 34, 57–82. Rakotsoane, F., & Van Niekerk, A. (2017). Human Life Invaluableness: An Emerging African Bioethical Principle. South African Journal of Philosophy, 36, 252–262. Ramose, M. (1999). African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Ramose, M. (2003). The Ethics of Ubuntu. In P. Coetzee & A. Roux (Eds.), The African Philosophy Reader (pp. 324–331). New York: Routledge. Ramose, M. (2009). Towards Emancipative Politics in Africa. In F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. Sachs, B. (2011). The Status of Moral Status. Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 92, 87–104. Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Siame, N. (2000). “Two Concepts of Liberty” Through African Eyes. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 8, 53–67. Singer, P. (2009). Speciesism and Moral Status. Metaphilosophy, 40, 567–581. Tangwa, G. (1996). Bioethics: An African Perspective. Bioethics, 10, 183–200. Tangwa, G. (2000). The Traditional African Perception of a Person. Some Implications for Bioethics. Hastings Center Report, 30, 39–43.

102 

M. MOLEFE

Tangwa, G. (2004). Some African Reflections on Biomedical and Environmental Ethics. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 387–395). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Tooley, M. (1972). Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 37–65. Toscano, M. (2011). Human Dignity as High Moral Status. The Ethics Forum, 6(2), 4–25. Verhoef, H., & Michel, C. (1997). Studying Morality Within the African Context: A Model of Moral Analysis and Construction. Journal of Moral Education, 26, 389–407. Warren, A. (1997). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  192–206). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Wiredu, K. (2009). An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality. Research in African Literatures, 40, 8–18. Wolf, S. (1992). Two Levels of Pluralism. Ethics, 4, 785–798.

CHAPTER 4

Personhood and Euthanasia in African Philosophy

Introduction This chapter philosophically explores the bioethical question of euthanasia. The English-speaking philosophy literature is replete with works focusing on this question. The majority of it, however, reflects and draws from the Western philosophical intellectual culture (see Foot 1977; Lewis 2007; McMahan 2002; Rachels 1986; Singer 1994; Sumner 2011, 2017; Young 2007). The philosophical exploration to be undertaken here draws from African cultures; it will specifically rely on the salient moral category of the personhood-based view of dignity in African philosophy to reflect on the permissibility of euthanasia. For now, we can roughly define euthanasia as mercy killing or a ‘good death’. It occurs where an individual who, for example, is terminally ill requests to be killed (or even commits suicide) to be relieved of a life of unbearable pain and suffering. It is crucial to notice that the question of euthanasia is both a legal and moral one. This chapter will consider both facets, albeit for different purposes. I do not engage on the legal facet with the intention of making a legal intervention on the question of euthanasia in the light of the prevailing jurisprudential ethos on the continent. I, instead, consider the legal facet with the purpose of providing some context for the moral discussions that will unfold in this chapter since the underlying issues are moral in nature. The aim is to give the reader a sense of the legal debates surrounding the question of euthanasia in Africa. I will however limit myself to the context of South Africa. I must emphasise, however, that this chapter will be © The Author(s) 2020 M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_4

103

104 

M. MOLEFE

largely preoccupied with euthanasia as a moral—bioethical—question. The essential aim of this chapter is to offer an African moral perspective on the question of euthanasia. I consider both the legal and moral facets of euthanasia because the concept and value of dignity is foundational in both domains (Alli 2016; Paleker 2016; Schulman 2008). The legal contexts, specifically in South African, tend to draw from the value of dignity as construed in the light of influential Western values, such as autonomy, to intervene on legal issues (see Metz 2010). The central question that confronts us in the moral domain, specifically in bioethics, is whether the personhood-based view of dignity salient in African moral thought permits or forbids euthanasia. I urge the reader to notice that the idea of personhood has not been invoked in the African philosophical literature to reflect on the bioethical question of euthanasia. It has not been used to explore, at the very least, its robustness as a moral view. It is also crucial for the reader to notice that the aim is not so much to consider what African people actually believe or practice in relation to euthanasia—that would amount to a cultural or anthropological investigation. My aim in this chapter is to make a philosophical case by offering a careful exposition and application of a personhood-based conception of dignity to the issue of euthanasia. In the final analysis, I will defend the view that a plausible interpretation of personhood ought to permit euthanasia. The major reason that I will provide for such a view revolves around what the idea of personhood prescribes as the [moral] goal of human existence—the pursuit of personhood—which is the essence of a dignified form of existence. The essence of the suggestion to be made here relies on drawing a crucial distinction between unconditional and conditional forms of dignity, and accounting for the idea of death with dignity by appeal to the latter type. To defend the permissibility of euthanasia, I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by defining crucial terms associated with the moral question of euthanasia. This section will focus on elucidating on the meaning of the idea of euthanasia, the different types of it and the different methods of delivering it in the case where the state considers it permissible. The second section will provide the context of the discussion of euthanasia in (South) Africa by considering the legal literature relating to this question. I will consider two factors in this legal discussion. On the one hand, I will consider the legal recommendation by the Law Commission regarding euthanasia in South Africa. On the other, I will consider emerging legal research on euthanasia, which tends to recommend that it be

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

105

decriminalised and/or legalised. I will conclude this section by considering underlying philosophical issues raised in these legal debates. In the third section, I will start making my theoretical journey towards the problem of euthanasia and its status in African moral thought qua personhood by proffering an account of a good death. I will theorise about the idea of a good death in the light of personhood by considering the case of elders in African cultures. In the final section, I will rehearse the view of dignity associated with personhood and I will apply it to the question of euthanasia, where I will argue that euthanasia is permissible. Below, I define crucial terms.

Definition of Euthanasia The aim of this chapter is not conceptual—I do not seek to give the most plausible characterisation of euthanasia. I admit that such a conceptual project is crucial since its aim is to “develop an adequate definition of euthanasia”, which will have implications for how we think about this subject “in medicine, law and ethics” (Beauchamp and Davidson 1978: 294; see also Wreen 1988). However, I will limit myself to stipulating a non-controversial and a commonly accepted definition of euthanasia, so that I can pursue the philosophical task of articulating an African view of it. Euthanasia is a Greek word constituted by two linguistic elements—eu (well or good) and thanan (death). It is for this reason that this word is understood to refer to a good death (see Kuhse 1993: 294; Ncayiyana 2012: 334). Gonsalves (1985: 207) refers to such a form of dying as good since it is “an easy, painless death” (Gonsalves 1985: 207). This etymological definition is useful but not sufficient to capture the essence of euthanasia. Here are two elements emphasised in the literature regarding the definition of euthanasia. There must be an element of intention associated with the killing or letting die of the patient. That is, such a death must come about as a result of the intention of the medical practitioner to cause it, and not as a result of an accident (Wreen 1988). The second element emphasises that this death must be caused for the benefit of the dying patient. That is, this death must be done for the sake of benefitting the dying individual (Beauchamp and Davidson 1978; Young 2019). There are a variety of ways to conceptualise what it means to act for the sake or benefit of the dying patient. To explain better the idea of acting for the

106 

M. MOLEFE

benefit of another, consider the medical conditions of patients in which euthanasia is usually prescribed or debated. Advocates of euthanasia usually argue that it should be prescribed in contexts where the medical condition of the patient is serious or extreme. The commonly cited instances of extreme medical conditions are: (1) a terminal illness; (2) a persistent vegetative state and (3) protracted unbearable pain with no possible medical intervention (see Benatar 2011; Grey 1999). My focus in this chapter will be on voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. In my discussion, I will consider cases of individuals who are not in a position to make a decision for themselves, like the case of persistently vegetative individuals (non-voluntary euthanasia). I will also consider cases of individuals that are cognitively competent to make such a decision (voluntary euthanasia). I will, finally, touch on cases of individuals who may have refused euthanasia (involuntary euthanasia). I have not yet defined the different forms of euthanasia. We can draw crucial distinctions in the discourse of euthanasia in terms of whether we are focusing on the person making the decision or the method used to carry it out (Dimmock and Fisher 2017: 124). In terms of decision-­ making, we can talk of voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia refers to a situation in which the patient herself requests it. The general consideration of a valid request for voluntary euthanasia emphasises the (cognitive and emotional) competency of the agent, and that the request must be sustained or enduring over time (Brock 1993; Young 2019). Non-voluntary euthanasia is where the patient, for example, is in a vegetative state, and, a proxy, for example, a family member or legal representative, makes the request on behalf of the patient (Grey 1999). Involuntary euthanasia refers to a situation in which the medical practitioners or even the family request or perform euthanasia without the consent or even without considering the refusal of the patient. Most legal practitioners and philosophers find the defence of this final category to be morally implausible, which view will receive a different treatment in the light of African moral thought, or, at least my interpretation of it (Brock 1993). The second distinction hinges on the method used to carry out euthanasia. Here, we draw the distinction between passive and active euthanasia. James Rachels (1975: 78) makes the following comment regarding the “doctrine” that draws a distinction between passive and active euthanasia—

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

107

The idea is that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold treatment and allow a patient to die, but it is never permissible to take any direct action designed to kill the patient.

At the heart of this distinction is the view that there is a difference between withholding treatment and actively causing someone’s death. In the first instance, the medical practitioner merely lets the natural disease proceed to its final stages (death) by switching off the life-prolonging technologies. In the second instance, the medical practitioner actually offers a lethal dosage of medication intended to cause death (Abrams 1978; Garrard and Wilkinson 2005; Shaw 2014; Thomson 1976). This is a distinction between letting die/refraining and killing/doing. For the purposes of this chapter, I will take the distinction to be irrelevant since my central question revolves around whether euthanasia ought to be permissible or not in the first place. If it turns out to be the case that it is permissible then, in my view, it should not matter much how it is carried out, at least if it is true that the distinction between passive and active euthanasia, in some crucial sense, is irrelevant (see Rachels 1975; Shaw 2014).1 In the next section, I situate this debate in the (South) African legal context.

The Context of the Discussion of Euthanasia in Africa The issue of euthanasia is as much a legal question as it is a bioethical one. In the legal context, the crucial question is whether it should be decriminalised and/or legalised. It is important to take note of the fact that euthanasia is illegal in all African countries. The legal positions of most of these countries seem to take it as an overt instance of murder, and not mercy killing. In what follows, I wish to limit myself to the case of South Africa in considering the topic. I do so for two reasons. Firstly, the South African constitution has been hailed globally as one of the most progressive in the world. Its constitution is highly respected for historical and political reasons. It was drafted in the context of a brutal apartheid past. South Africa required political instruments and values that could unite a nation and it aimed to achieve these goals through its constitution. This constitution is progressive since it has been interpreted in ways that recognise the rights of homosexuals, women and children, among others, in a continent that tends to be traditional and conservative in its espousal of patriarchy,

108 

M. MOLEFE

xenophobia, homophobia and so on. Secondly, I consider South Africa because it is characterised by a “dignity-based jurisprudence”, that is it takes dignity to be a foundational value in imagining a just and a good society (Paleker 2016: 32). This is an important consideration as the bioethical debate regarding euthanasia pivots on dignity, or, more specifically, death with dignity (Allmark 2002; Schulman 2008; Sulmasy 2008). I will consider two factors regarding euthanasia in the South African legal context. I begin by considering the South African Law Commission Report titled Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life (Mahomed et al. 1998). The aim of this report was to investigate and make recommendations regarding euthanasia and the artificial preservation of life. The context of this legal investigation is that advances in medicine and technology have made the prolongation of life possible. The report welcomes thesepositivemedicaldevelopments,butitequallyraisesthefollowingconcern— For some patients this signifies a welcome prolongation of meaningful life, but for others the result is a poor quality of life that inevitably raises the question whether treatment is a benefit or a burden. (Ibid.: x)

In particular, the commission is worried about patients that are terminally ill. It defines terminal illness thus— ‘terminal illness’ means an illness, injury or other physical or mental condition that- (a) in reasonable medical judgement, will inevitably cause the untimely death of the patient concerned and which is causing the patient extreme suffering; or (b) causes a persistent and irreversible vegetative condition with the result that no meaningful existence is possible for the patient. (Ibid.: 20)

It is important to note that the report recommends euthanasia in the presence of a terminal disease (as defined) or, unbearable suffering and pain, with no prospect of medical relief (ibid.: 9). It is, however, crucial to appreciate the fact that the report entirely rules out voluntary active euthanasia in favour of the passive variety. The report comments in this fashion regarding passive euthanasia— Although the point was discussed, it should be noted that not one commentator requested that the Living Will should be able to legalise active euthanasia. Furthermore, the possibility of abuse of such a provision in a Living Will is an important factor mitigating against legalising such a provision.

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

109

The Commission is therefore of the view that a Living Will should only be recognised as valid and legally enforceable in so far as it requests a passive form of cessation of life. (Ibid.: 190)

It is important to recognise that since the publication of this report and its recommendations in favour of passive euthanasia, it has not been considered or acted upon by parliament in terms of amending the constitution accordingly, supposing that legislators will agree with its recommendations. Since then, a number of academic works and commentators have weighed in on the legal status of euthanasia in South Africa. For example, I came across several dissertations dedicated to this question in South African universities (Alli 2016; Lukhaimane 1997; Paleker 2016; Strohwald 2014). The dissertations that were researched and published after the commission’s report share at least two features. Firstly, the commission’s report features as one of the central considerations in these research projects. They critically engage it and use it as a springboard to come to their own conclusions. The second key consideration is the significance of the idea of dignity. The idea of dignity and the fact that it is taken as a primary value by the South African constitution features as a pivotal and decisive consideration in their research (Alli 2016: 72–79; Paleker 2016: 39–42; Strohwald 2014: 28–29 and 37–41). All of these dissertations concur that the state has a duty to protect the dignity of its citizens, which extends to end-of-life decisions, and they recommend that (voluntary) euthanasia ought to be legalised. It is interesting to notice that some of the leading legal commentators in South Africa have also advocated for the legalisation of euthanasia (see De Vos 2015; McKaiser 2019; Thipanyane and Makane 2019). Finally, the real value of discussing the above legal consideration is the underlying philosophical considerations that inform them. The crucial question that needs a brief reflection is how these scholars secure the view that euthanasia ought to be legally permissible. The main reason is that the South African constitution, specifically, section 10 of it, invokes the fundamental status of dignity (Paleker 2016; Jacobs 2018; McKaiser 2019). In fact, the constitution states, “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms”  (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).2 Alongside the primacy of freedom, there are other values that stand

110 

M. MOLEFE

out—such as equality and freedom. I believe freedom is primary because it is the first value that is mentioned in the Founding Provisions of the Constitution. I also believe that dignity ought to be primary because it informs that equality of individuals and freedom is valuable insofar as it allows them to unfold and enjoy a life of dignity (Paleker 2016). Although there is global consensus that the concept of dignity and the value it represents is universal, it is crucial to notice that its conceptions may vary from one theorist to another depending on what facet of human nature they consider to be essential and distinctive (Donnelly 1982; Sulmasy 2008). We should observe that what is consistent among these scholars and commentators when it comes to how they defend euthanasia is that they appeal to Kant’s conception of dignity. This is not surprising given that Kant’s conception of dignity is the most influential in moral philosophy (see Rosen 2012; Waldron 2012). On this view, dignity is a function of our autonomous nature—the human ability to self-govern. These legal scholars considered here cite autonomy as the basis for defending euthanasia. Paleker (2016: 49, emphasis mine) comments— Dworkin is one of the many contemporary thinkers who have made the connection between autonomy and dignity. He supports the right of a person to make her own decisions about deeply personal matters, particularly the choice of how to die, a choice he believes to be fundamental to personal dignity and autonomy. (See also Strohwald 2014: 41–42)

For another example, consider this commentary by McKaiser (2019)— I think we should legalise active euthanasia because the moral case for doing so is persuasive. First, we keep claiming to take the value of autonomy seriously. It is central to our Constitution and has been the basis of many social policies we have adopted or chosen to reject. … We must examine our inconsistency here. We respect autonomy more during the earlier stages of someone’s life than we do near the end of their life. Why is that?

One conclusion is inevitable in the light of the above. The conception of dignity central to the legal discourse on euthanasia in South Africa draws from Kant’s moral philosophy. The basic thrust of this argument is that, in the context of a terminal disease coupled with unbearable suffering, to live the end of one’s life out in a condition where the agent no longer truly leads it—that is, where she has lost her agency and control over it—is to be subjected to death with indignity (Allmark 2002). I live

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

111

and die with dignity when I have the power to govern the affairs of my younger and older life, particularly in my dying days. The legal considerations surrounding the debate on euthanasia and the philosophical underpinnings informing them raise, at least, one crucial question that needs to be explored in this chapter. The question is—will the African idea of personhood endorse the practice of euthanasia? This question is important because the idea of personhood does not take autonomy to be the defining feature of morality—even the view of autonomy that features takes a relational form (Ikuenobe 2015). Instead, it posits moral perfection understood in terms of sympathy to be the essence of morality. Before we turn to the discourse of personhood and its implications for euthanasia, I articulate a theory of a good death in the light of African moral thought.

Personhood and a Good Death Elders, Children and the Possibility of a Good Death Is there a possibility in African moral thought of talking of a good death? I am here enquiring about possibilities of thinking of death as a positive outcome in relation to some individual’s life, where it is better to be dead than to continue living. It must be immediately obvious why it is important at this stage to reflect on the question of a good death. The reason for this inquiry is that the death envisaged in contexts associated with the practice of euthanasia is thought of in positive terms, at least for the one who is being killed or allowed to die. This comment by Young (2019, emphasis mine) is illuminating—“the motive of the person who performs an act of euthanasia is to benefit the one whose death is brought about”. Koenane (2017: 1) comments in this fashion—“This [view] suggests that there are cases where dying a dignified and painless death is preferred to living a meaningless life without any hope of getting better”. The suggestion above is that there are medical contexts or conditions were the prescription of death is a far better option than merely remaining alive. Death here is thought of positively as, in some sense, it benefits the one being killed or allowed to die. In some cases, it is to be preferred because it rescues the individual from living a meaningless life of pain and suffering with no hope of medical relief at all. The idea of euthanasia hinges on the supposition that we can meaningfully talk of a good death. Below, I aim to sketch an account of a good death in the light of the idea

112 

M. MOLEFE

of personhood. I will rely on the idea of elders to sketch this account. I hope the relation between the idea of personhood and reaching the status of being an elder will be obvious as we continue in our philosophical exposition. In what follows, I offer a prima facie account (or reason for accepting the idea) of a good death in the African context. To do so, I will rely on the idea of personhood, specifically as it applies to old people that have lived well, morally speaking—I here have the concept of an elder in mind. The idea of an elder is both descriptive and normative in African philosophy. Descriptively it refers to an individual that has lived a long life—the reference here being to age. Normatively it refers to the quality of life the individual has lived. The idea of quality of life should be understood not to refer to well-being per se; however, that term may be understood. Well-­ being might be a non-trivial secondary consideration related to quality of life, though. Primarily, this phrase refers to the good state of the character of the individual, the fact that the individual exudes moral excellence (Menkiti 2004; Wiredu 1980). It is because of the normative dimension of the idea of being an elder that old people are generally held in high regard in African societies (Wiredu 1980, 1996). It is because being an elder is associated with being wise that they are usually consulted on myriad issues affecting individuals and societies, and they tend to be a part of the ruling elite as advisors or strategists in most African societies (Menkiti 2004). The idea of an elder offers us a useful starting point for thinking about a good death in the African paradigm. The death of an elder, particularly if it was painless or occurred when she was sleeping, is usually considered a good one. Such a death qua death of a loved one, friend, neighbour and so on will surely occasion sorrow and grief, which is a universal human reaction. It is important, however, to notice that in African societies, celebration rather than heart-wrenching grief generally attends the death of an elder, under the conditions specified above. Gyekye (1992: 108–109) responding to Menkiti suggests the idea of a good death in this fashion— Menkiti also argues that the relative absence of ritualised grief over the death of a child in African societies in contrast to the elaborate burial ceremony and ritualised grief in the event of the death of an older person, also supports his point about the conferment by the community of personhood status. It is not true that every older person who dies in an African community is given elaborate burial. The type of burial and the nature and extent of grief

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

113

expressed over the death of an older person depend on the community’s assessment, not of his personhood as such, but of the dead person’s achievements in life, his contribution to the welfare of the community, and the respect he commanded in the community. Older persons who may not satisfy such criteria may, in fact, be given simple and poor funerals and attenuated forms of grief expressions. As to the absence of ritualised grief on the death of a child, this has no connection whatsoever with the African view of personhood as such, as alleged by Menkiti.

I think this passage brings out several considerations that are crucial for conceptualising the idea of a good death. The reader should note that there is a difference between the burial of a child and that of an elder. I am aware that Gyekye’s discussion implies that we should distinguish between old people and elders. He associates the latter with the positive assessment made by the community of their conduct and their achievements while alive in social, moral and economic spheres. The point remains, however, that there is a difference between how a child, a merely old individual and an elder are grieved over and buried. The elder’s funeral is elaborate and attended by a celebration of a life well lived. The death of an elder is thought of as a good death. It is for this reason that death is accepted as a welcome visitor and creates an opportunity to celebrate such a life. Tangwa (1996: 195) observes that an “elder who has accomplished his or her mission in life falls sick, s/he would pray that, if her time has come, God take him/her speedily”. The plea of the elder is for a good death, which is free from an “overdue” long life or ceaseless burden and disease (ibid.). In the event that an elder eventually dies then Tangwa informs us “the mood of the grave-diggers was rather joyous and hilarious. Upon inquiry, they were told: ‘They dance with joy because the woman has died is an elder’”. There is no suggestion here, however, to the effect that the elder should be killed before a fatal and excruciatingly painful disease seizes them. Such an eventuality would be considered outright lacking in respect and be considered murder.3 The death of a child, however, in some sense, is considered a bad death, and is not treated with elaborate grieving and burial. This treatment of children is the case, I suppose, for metaphysical and normative reasons. Gyekye specifies the metaphysical reason. He points to the metaphysical belief (some may take it simply as superstition) that grieving over a child might make the mother barren. The normative reasons, I suggest, are associated with the fact that the child never had a chance to pursue a life

114 

M. MOLEFE

of virtue. It is the absence of the “moral record”, of the life of the child, that explains why its life is not celebrated (Menkiti 2004: 325). It would be contrary to the spirit of the morality of personhood to celebrate such a life because the child has not attained any moral achievements. The point, however, stands out that the death of a child is always looked upon as a bad death; it is a regrettable and unfortunate event given the lack of opportunity to participate in the pursuit of personhood. Virtuous Life and Good Death The above discussion relating to the case of an elder is crucial because I believe that it embodies an under-explored account of a good death. Central to evaluating the lives we have considered in the passage above— the life of a child, an old individual and an elder—is what Gyekye refers to as the “person’s [individual’s] achievements in life”. The point here is that a good death is conceptualised in terms of the moral idea of personhood— the agent-centred notion of personhood (see Chap. 2). This idea is agent-­ centred insofar as it accounts for a good life in terms of moral achievements. The achievements embodied in this idea are usually captured in the following way. Firstly, central to the moral discourse of personhood is the idea that it is the agent’s moral responsibility and mission to develop a morally virtuous character (Wiredu 1992: 200). Menkiti (1984: 172) talks of this moral mission as the “in-building” of moral excellence into one’s character. Gyekye (1992: 109) speaks of it in terms of the “practice of virtue”. Wiredu (2009: 16) describes it as resulting in “a morally sound adult”. As such, one dimension of personhood is character-development as the goal of a moral life. The second dimension of these achievements associated with personhood revolves around other-regarding duties, or virtues. The first of these duties are ones the moral agent owes to “household” (Wiredu 2009: 16). As Africans are wont to observe that in the dispensation of our duties, close ties or the family ought to take priority (Metz 2009; Molefe 2016, 2019a; Ramose 2003; Shutte 2001; Wiredu 2009). The second of these duties are owed to one’s immediate community, which is generally composed of distant relatives and other members of the community situated geographically close to the agent. The final layer of duties are universal ones, where the agent reaches as far as she can (Wiredu 1992: 200). It is a life ‘decorated’ by these personal and social virtues that is characterised in terms of personhood, and the status of an elder epitomises such a life.

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

115

The above moral exposition of achievement associated with the acquisition of personhood explains why the death of a child is not afforded elaborate grieving and their death is not celebrated—because they did not have a chance to pursue personhood. As such, we have no moral basis to celebrate their lives. Those individuals that are merely old also do not receive elaborate grieving and burial because they did not achieve either culturally or morally. Therefore, they receive what Gyekye refers to in the quote above as “simple and poor funerals and attenuated forms of grief expressions”. The point is clear, in some sense, a virtuous life is the basis for a good death. In other words, if you die at an old age and you have not been leading a massively good life, yours is not a good death simply by virtue of your age—it is just death. Refining the Account This account of a good death needs to be refined. At this point, at least, we should be clear that the idea of personhood does allow us to talk meaningfully about a good death. To refine this account of a good death associated with personhood we need to clarify two crucial considerations. The first relates to the very concept of death and the second relates to the association between achievements (personhood) and the idea of dignity. We need to be clear regarding which concept of death is relevant in the discourse of a good death.  he Concept of Death T What idea of ‘death’ is crucial to the discourses relating to the idea of a good death in bioethical contexts? In the case of an elder, when we speak of a good death, I think reference is being made to the process before one experiences death as “non-being”. Peter Allmark (2012: 255), in his account of Death with Dignity, distinguishes four senses of the concept of death. He talks of death as (1) non-being—“the mysterious state of being dead”; (2) transition—“the point at which one moves from being to non-­being”; (3) process—“the period leading to death” and (4) the fact of mortality—the “universal truth that attaches to all”. In the African tradition, scholars usually draw a distinction between two senses of death—processual and absolute death (Bujo 2005, 2009; Bikopo and van Bogaert 2009). Absolute death corresponds with what Allmark refers to as non-being. I want to suggest, below, that the idea of death that is relevant in the discourse of a good death is death understood as a process. The idea is that when the individual slips

116 

M. MOLEFE

into the process of death, biologically, that state of decline and deterioration should not be allowed to continue to the extent where it mars and shades the moral achievements of an elder, or any individual for that matter. To make my case, I appeal to the ethic of vitality, not for its own sake, but because it offers a model to think about morality and death as a process, biologically and morally. All we need to do, in employing the ethic of vitality, is eschew its religious overtones, by falling back on the secular idea of personhood. To begin, notice that Bujo (2009: 282) states that— Africans believe life to be most sacred but life is permanently threatened by death. The human person’s task is to identify the enemies of life to defeat death.

On the moral model proposed by Bujo, ethics is conceived as a battle between life and death. The highest moral good is life and the worst enemy is death. Reference to life should not be understood merely as a biological life, but rather as a spiritual property—I will say more on this property below. What should absorb our attention right now is—what sense of the concept of death is operational in Bujo’s exposition of African ethics? I think the quotation above admits of two possible interpretations, one trivial and another morally revealing. The trivial one takes talk of death to refer to non-being or even the fact of being mortal, which is not morally revealing. We have good reason to believe that Bujo is not referring to this sense of death. This interpretation of Bujo is borne out by him suggesting that we should identify the enemies of life, so that we can defeat death. Two suggestions can be read off of this assertion. Firstly, it is pointing to things (enemies of life) that induce or accelerate death. Secondly, it suggests that the death in question is one that can be defeated. It is important that we observe the fact that we cannot, in a crucial sense, defeat death (the fact of being mortal, with death understood as non-­ being)—it is inevitable that one day we will all die. In this light, it is not far-fetched to suppose that the death in question is one that is processual. Such a death can be influenced by our conduct. Understood in this way, we should be able to identify enemies of life and, thus, defeat (processual) death. To properly appreciate this discussion, it is important to appreciate the fact that Bujo takes life, conceived in terms of vitality or vital force, as the highest moral good (2001: 6). By life or vitality, we are referring to a

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

117

spiritual energy that originates from God (Imafidon 2013; Iroegbu 2005; Molefe 2017, 2018; Bikopo  and van Bogaert 2009). Vitality is understood as a property that can be enhanced or diminished. Note Placide Tempels (1959: 30, 32) commenting on vitality and ethics among the Baluba peoples— Their purpose is to acquire life, strength or vital force. … Each being has been endowed by God with a certain force, capable of strengthening the vital energy of the strongest being of all creation: man … the only kind of blessing, is, to the Bantu, to possess the greatest vital force.

On this moral view, the growth or strengthening of vitality is possible only by relating positively with others. Failure to relate positively with others leads to the diminishing of vitality, which captures the essence of processual death. On this moral view, death, conceived as a process of a moral decline, is a function of moral conduct. The point is that a human life abundant with vitality is one that is productive, flourishing and fruitful; and, one that is diminishing is unproductive, depleting and barren (Metz 2012; Shutte 2001). In this sense, when we talk of defeating death, we mean a processual one that is associated with a diminished or diminishing vitality due to the deplorable conduct and character of the moral agent. In this sense, the ‘death’ qua moral decline is the worst moral enemy (see Sakali 2013) For my part, I am in total agreement with this understanding of a human existence in terms of it being open to the possibility of either diminishing or developing in the moral sense (see, Mokgoro 1998; Sebidi 1988). I do not think, however, that what is most valuable about human beings is the fact that they possess vitality or life, construed in either secular or religious terms. I think of the value of human lives in terms of their capacity to morally achieve or fail in terms of character-development, which is conceived in terms of the acquisition of moral excellence (personhood). It is the capacity for moral perfection and how the moral agent uses it that better accounts for the diminishing or development of our humanity. I invoked Bujo’s spiritual ethics, for heuristic purposes, to demonstrate the point that when we talk of death, we should more accurately understand our discussion to be focusing on processual moral decline, which refers to a deterioration in the moral state of the individual.

118 

M. MOLEFE

Death and Dignity The second step in clarifying our account involves considering the relation between a processual death and dignity. It is important that we be clear regarding what we mean when we talk of dignity in this context. Clarity in this regard will add to the quality of our discussion of what we mean by a good death. I suggest that we distinguish two senses of dignity—status and achievement dignity (Miller 2017). Other scholars refer to the same distinction using different terms—one can talk of intrinsic and extrinsic dignity (Michael 2014; Paleker 2016) or one could talk of unconditional and conditional dignity (Sulmasy 2008; Paleker 2016). Intrinsic dignity refers to the dignity we have by merely being the kinds of things that we are. More precisely, the mere fact that we possess relevant ontological capacities renders us beings of intrinsic or unconditional dignity. On Bujo’s account, we have intrinsic dignity because we possess the property of life. The mere possession of this property renders us as beings that are owed high regard or moral respect, which is typically represented in terms of rights or duties (Donnelly 2009, 2015). I prefer Darwall’s (1977) talk of the respect in question when it comes to dignity—he speaks of dignity in terms of recognition respect. Here, we have in mind the respect that emerges as a result of recognising the ontological features that make some being morally valuable. It is the fact of what the entity in question is that generates respect, no action or performance is necessary at all. The second sense of dignity revolves around how the agent conducts itself relative to its possession of valuable capacities. To say that a being has dignity in this sense, it is to convey the idea that such a being is dignified. It is a moral judgement about how that being conducts or handles itself as the kind of a thing that it is. It is a positive moral judgement that appreciates how the entity in question excels in being the kind of a thing that it is—hence, it is called achievement dignity. It is also referred to as conditional dignity because, in a crucial sense, it depends on both personal and external features of human existence. If the individual drags her humanity through the mud and shows no regard for its possibilities, it is correct to speak of such an individual as lacking dignity, in the sense that her deportment and lifestyle are not consistent with her moral capabilities and opportunities in society. In the light of the above distinction, it is crucial to notice that in a sense, intrinsic dignity is inalienable. It cannot be taken away since it is a function of the individuals’ ontological make-up (Feinberg 1978). The only way the individual could lose it is through death or the destruction of

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

119

the relevant ontological features (Miller 2017). It is the other notion of dignity, the extrinsic, conditional or achievement-based conception, that is under consideration when we think of a death with dignity. To talk of a death with dignity means providing the agent with conditions that keep her extrinsic dignity intact, thinking of her dying in ways that do not diminish one’s sense of her achievement dignity. In the light of the above exposition, we can come to the following position regarding talk of good death. We initially noted that the death of an elder is considered to be a good one because the individual would have lived a life associated with achievement through the various stages of life. In other words, this death is good because this person, by the time they recede or transition to (absolute) death, did not live in shame and the quality of their humanity (extrinsic dignity) was not undermined. In this light, a good death is accounted for in relation to extrinsic dignity in terms of personal conduct and circumstances, specifically the idea that by the time the individual dies or during the end of her life, her extrinsic dignity—captured in terms of her record of personal achievement—is not fundamentally threatened and reversed. In a crucial sense, when we think of a good death, we need to keep in mind the idea of processual death at two levels. The first focuses on the moral dimension—is the individual still in a position to pursue a moral life, that is, to pursue a dignified human life, or, at the very least, to be able to retain her reputation and sense of self-worth? The second dimension is biological— where we consider whether the individual lives under conditions characterised by great disease and suffering that undermine her actual or potential achieved dignity. This consideration is particularly apposite in considering the lives and deaths of old individuals. In this light, we can conclude that a good death, morally and biologically speaking, revolves around the potential and actuality of pursuing and preserving one’s extrinsic dignity. As such, when we say that an elder has died a good death, we are referring to the fact that during her last days her achievements were not threatened or reversed by an indecent and shameful form of existence. Shame in African moral thought, is opposed to personhood, as it is characterised by the individual feeling “incomplete and unwholeness”  (Menkiti 1984: 176) Hence, in most African cultures, by appeal to luck, ancestors, spiritual counsellors or even God, the greatest wish is that the elder (or even a dying adult) should die under quiet and peaceful conditions that are not characterised by feelings or conditions of shame. Below, I apply these considerations—the good death—to the idea of euthanasia.

120 

M. MOLEFE

Personhood and Euthanasia What makes a human life distinctive biologically and morally, in terms of the discourse of personhood, is the possibility of pursuing moral perfection. This possibility is predicated on a certain fact of human nature, the ability or capacity for virtue. In the previous chapters, we more systematically accounted for this capacity for virtue, in terms of sympathy. In other words, we concluded that moral agents are able to pursue personhood because they have the capacity for virtue (sympathy). Alternatively, to express this view lucidly, the concept of personhood envisages a moral agent that was able to unfold the moral capacity of virtue. As such, to say of some moral agent that she has achieved personhood is tantamount to the idea that she is characterised by a dignified human existence. The capacity for sympathy refers to intrinsic or status dignity, and the acquisition of personhood refers to extrinsic or achievement dignity. The very point of our biological existence as human beings, with the capacity for sympathy, is to transition to personhood—a dignified existence. It is the pursuit and preservation of a dignified life that renders a human life meaningful and worth celebrating. I propose the view that euthanasia should be permissible in the context where the pursuit and preservation of a dignified life are threatened or stand to be reversed by extreme medical conditions. I first want to consider the case of an individual in a persistent vegetative state. In a context where the individual is in a persistent vegetative state, or some such similar medical situation, I observe that in the light of the personhood-based view of dignity, non-voluntary euthanasia ought to be permissible. The primary reason for this is that such a human existence has reached a state where it is morally pointless, since the agent can no longer pursue or preserve her dignity. To allow such a life to continue defies the very spirit of the ethic of personhood, which, in my view, pivots on the value of sympathy, which is associated with values like care, compassion and so on. If we imagine ourselves in the shoes of a human being who is caught in a pointless form of existence, in the sense suggested above, then we should be able to recommend euthanasia. It is sympathetic to do so, and in keeping with respecting their dignity. One might here point out the possibility that the patient before falling unconscious insisted that she should be allowed to remain alive until she dies. The patient also insisted that all possible medical efforts to keep her alive should be enlisted. I here have in mind a case where the point of

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

121

continuing all medical efforts is deemed futile. In such circumstances, personhood would not be opposed to non-voluntary euthanasia, particularly when we remember that individual choice or autonomy is important but does not have the sovereign status it tends to enjoy in liberal Western moral discourses. In the discourse of personhood, it is the relational version of autonomy that tends to weigh most heavily on matters (Ikuenobe 2015; Molefe 2019b), which in my view seems most compatible with “shared decision making” (Manyonga et al. 2014: 561–562). This talk of shared decision-making should remind the reader of the centrality of the ideas of harmony and consensus in African moral-political thought (Paris 1995; Tutu 1999; Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1996). In a communitarian framework, the goal is to make decisions that tend towards cohesion and unity, and such decisions are reached by means of consensus rather than by means of a vote where the winner takes all. In this context, competent individuals engage in a dialogue until they find a common position that accommodates everyone and facilitates the common good (Gyekye 1992; Matolino 2019; Wiredu 1996). The point is not that the personal choice of the individual will just be set aside. Rather, all considerations raised by the relevant stakeholders affected by the matter, including the wish of the patient, will be considered and a collective decision will be made. One possible decision that may emerge from this collective decision-­ making scheme is euthanasia, which is bolstered by the moral consideration that the life of the patient is pointless and meaningless. In the context of end-of-life decisions, where the individual is terminally ill, suffers unbearable pain and holds out no prospect for medical relief, I suggest that the idea of personhood does permit (some kind) of voluntary euthanasia. I think two reasons secure this view. Firstly, continuing in a state of terminal illness where the suffering leads only to more suffering threatens the individual’s personal sense of worth (extrinsic dignity) which has accrued to her as a result of her moral achievements. Her loss of her moral agency, and with it the ability to pursue moral excellence, slips her into the process of death, both biologically and morally. At this stage her body is enveloped by disease and suffering and her dignity is seriously undermined. For the sake of the integrity of her life, which I conceive of in terms of her achievements, I think the individual may opt for euthanasia. The reason here would be that the condition of her existence is such that it threatens her personhood, that is, her dignified form of existence. In other words, the individual should have a right to choose to protect her extrinsic dignity, particularly if objective and conclusive

122 

M. MOLEFE

evidence exists that she may reach a point where she may not be able to make such choices in future. The above consideration is consistent with two other crucial considerations. On the one hand, there is a general aversion of suffering, particularly in the form of illness, in most African cultures. Tangwa (1996: 195) captures this aversion in this form—“At such ripe old age, the Nso’ fear illness and suffering but not death”. At such an age, think here of the normative idea of an elder, particularly when one had lived well, death is a welcome friend, but illness and suffering are not, since they tend to come with “deformities” that are shameful and embarrassing  (Menkiti 1984: 176). This is the case in particular when the disease is one that is incurable, debilitating and involves “irremediable suffering” (Tangwa 1996:194). On the other hand, this idea should not be uncharitably construed to embody the cowardice of flinching and cowering in the face of disease and suffering. Insofar as the disease is curable or remediable, one of the ways to express a dignified existence is to handle the suffering courageously. To respond courageously to the disease, suffering could actually be one of the deportments that characterises achievement dignity [personhood].4 The second reason revolves around the pointlessness of some forms of human existence. If the point of human existence, according to personhood, just is to pursue a dignified life, then such pursuit is possible because the individual has the capacity to pursue it in the first place. If being terminally ill undermines this capacity in a way that appears irreversible, then the illness is leading her to a form of existence where her life will be pointless and meaningless. In such a state of existence, or, where such a state is imminent, the individual may request euthanasia. The point of life just is to develop and grow morally, and if one’s disease curtails this possibility then the individual may choose to be killed or to be allowed to die in peace whilst she preserves a sense of self-worth and can still relish her personal and social achievements. In choosing euthanasia, the most important thing is not the choice itself, but the moral reason that makes it available and plausible in the first place. Remember, the paramount moral consideration is the capacity to pursue personhood and the actual preservation of one’s dignity. The choice is generated by facts revolving around the capacity for virtue—a capacity which posits the development of a perfect character as the goal of life. Should the terminal disease threaten to reach levels that undermine the possibility of this project of personhood being continued or preserved, then the option becomes abundantly available to the patient. There should be no reason that stops the individual given that the relevant stakeholders

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

123

are satisfied about the medical facts and the threat to the patient’s dignified existence. To illuminate the personhood-based view of dignity and its compatibility with euthanasia, it might be helpful to compare it to the influential autonomy-based conception of it. On the African view, the most important consideration is to avert getting to a point where the dignity of the patient is undermined by reaching a point where she is eternally unconscious, or has become an organism that experiences only endless suffering. At that point, or even just before reaching it, where the patient can no longer pursue or preserve her dignity, her existence is rendered pointless. On the autonomy-based view, the most important consideration is that the medical patient should have the power to govern her life, even on matters concerning its conclusion. The patient’s dignity is a function of making these kinds of choices. Should the patient be denied these kinds of choices about her own life, she would have been treated to an undignified and inferior form of human existence. The view of euthanasia I am proposing here can be objected to since it seems to imply that involuntary euthanasia may also be permissible. Well, in principle, the view being advocated here does not consider it overtly or obviously implausible. In contexts where shared decision-making takes priority, provided of course that we have conclusively satisfied ourselves that the agent has reached the stage where her life is pointless, euthanasia may be proposed even if the patient left a directive opposing it. Some may find this suggestion to be unpalatable because it is fraught with a questionable form of paternalism. I think the problem is deeper than the veneer of paternalism or the importance of personal choice or the wishes of the dying patient, whether terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state. The underlying disagreement is the deep philosophical tension generated by the assumption that a moral view embodies—egocentricism or sociocentricism. Hosking et al. (2000: 438–439) define these two terms in this fashion— Whereas egocentricity is underpinned by autonomy and individualisation, sociocentricity is informed by an interdependence (autonomy is an alien concept), an acceptance of regulating and being regulated.

The egocentric view takes independence and personal choice to be paramount moral goods. Hence, on this view, the worst evil revolves around failing to highly regard the choices and autonomy of the individual. On

124 

M. MOLEFE

such a view, it is assumed that the agent is better positioned to know what is best for her own life. Hence, the common policy is that the individual must be left alone to pursue her own conception of life, even on the question of euthanasia. The African view, which is largely sociocentric or communitarian in nature, prescribes social relationships as the best means to pursue moral perfection. The underlying logic informing the communitarian model is that the wisdom of many heads is to be preferred to that of one, which idea is captured by the primacy of the policy of consensus or the palaver (Bujo 1998, 2001; Matolino 2019; Wiredu 1996). The idea is that the best decision is most likely to come from a community of engagement (hence “I am because we are”). The issue is not whether involuntary euthanasia is right or wrong, rather it is a deep philosophical question over whether we take an egocentric or sociocentric moral standpoint. In my view, a sociocentric approach is not necessarily opposed to involuntary euthanasia, particularly the euthanasia of pointless human existence. Most scholars oppose involuntary euthanasia because they are quick to remind us of Nazi Germany where it was practised with the worst and most immoral consequences (see Brock 1993). One must rather imagine a society that operates on the logic of harmony and consensus, where the creation of enabling conditions for moral perfection is a socio-political priority (Molefe 2018, 2019c). I am here imagining a social order characterised by communities of sympathy, which operates on the logic of helping individuals to pursue or preserve their dignity. Such communities could do a better job of securing the dignity of individuals regarding end-­ of-­life decisions, whether the medical patients are competent to choose euthanasia for themselves, or can no longer do so. An objection could be raised that in my account of euthanasia, I appeal to a moral concept of personhood or an elder. The above exposition suggests that the aim of euthanasia is to secure the extrinsic dignity of an individual—what about euthanasia for individuals that have been moral failures that have no moral achievements? I used the idea of an elder to suggest the possibility of a good death in African moral thought. It should not escape the reader that even a morally defective individual has status dignity because they have the capacity for sympathy. So long as her life has not reached a state where it is pointless, where they can no longer use their capacities, we have duties to respect and continue urging them to aspire for moral excellence. Should the individual, however, reach a position where her existence may be pointless, insofar as she may not be able to pursue moral perfection, then euthanasia is option open for to anyone.

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

125

Conclusion In this chapter, I explored the question of euthanasia in the light of African moral thought. I appealed to the idea of a personhood-based view of dignity to account for the permissibility of voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. I proposed an account of a good death in the light of an idea of personhood by considering the status of an elder. A good death is a function of dying with one’s extrinsic dignity intact, without allowing it to be threatened or reversed by a persistent vegetative states, irreversible terminal disease or irremediable suffering. I specified that at the point where the individual can objectively be identified as reaching an irreversible regression into a state from which they can no longer pursue or preserve their personhood (a dignified form of existence) euthanasia ought to be permissible. We permit it because the individual would be subjected to the prospect of a pointless or meaningless existence. Such an existence would undermine her history and the prospect of a dignified existence. In such circumstances, individuals should be allowed to choose a peaceful, quiet and good death.

Notes 1. I am aware that Abrams (1978) argues convincingly that there is a distinction between the passive and active euthanasia, at least when one considers positive cases that are truly analogous with euthanasia, unlike the negative ones discussed by Rachels (1975) and Thomson (1976). I find this comment to endorse the kind of approach I take in this chapter regarding euthanasia—“Therefore, there does seem to be moral significance to the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. In addition, once death is regarded as a desirable result, the agent should choose that course of behavior (i.e. active euthanasia) in which he will most effectively and with the least suffering cause the positive consequence, and should accept and welcome responsibility for the ‘better’ end” (1978: 263). The point to be taken away from this comment is that, if we come to the position that euthanasia is a positive thing for the patient, then the patient should choose the option, either passive or active, relative to the one that is the best for the patient in terms of securing relief speedily. 2. https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitutionweb-eng.pdf. 3. There is still space for coping with disease with the courage and composure particularly if it is remediable.

126 

M. MOLEFE

4. In their book, Doris Schroeder and Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr (2017) dedicated to the idea of dignity comment about the type of dignity they capture in terms of comportment. They call forth as an example of a talented writer that stopped writing when his daughter drowned and passed away after he wrote a poem that spoke about a person drowning. They make the following comment about this author: According to Paul Auster, those who knew the French author who had lost his daughter looked upon him with awe. This awe stemmed from admiration of his strength to deal with suffering in a dignified manner: to stick steadfastly to his belief that he should no longer write, while carrying his burden with poise. (Ibid.: 14) I think part of being a person or moral maturity involves the strength to deal with suffering in a dignified manner. The quality of one’s humanity is also expressed through the ability to cope with suffering and burdens of life in a poise. This is the case precisely because some suffering offers us an opportunity to strengthen one’s character and it can also serve as opportunity to test the quality of our humanity. We should be suspicious of the strength of character of an individual that flinches and complains over any minor vexations or even major problems in life.

References Abrams, N. (1978). Active and Passive Euthanasia. Philosophy, 53, 257–263. Alli, A. (2016). The “murder or mercy” Debate Surrounding Euthanasia in South Africa: A Discussion of the Current South African Legal Position in the Light of Case Law, a Comparative Study of Foreign Jurisdictions and Recommendations Made by the South African Law Reform Committee. Masters dissertation, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg. Allmark, P. (2002). Death with Dignity. Journal of Medical Ethics, 28, 255–257. Beauchamp, T., & Davidson, A. (1978). The Definition of Euthanasia. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 4, 294–312. Benatar, D. (2011). A Legal Right to Die: Responding to Slippery Slope and Abuse Arguments. Current Oncology, 18(5), 206–207. Bikopo, B., & van Bogaert, L. (2009). Reflection on Euthanasia: Western and African Ntomba Perspectives on the Death of a Chief. Developing World Bioethics, 10, 42–48. Brock, D. (1993). Voluntary Active Euthanasia. Hastings Center Report, 22(2), 10–22. Bujo, B. (1998). The Ethical Dimension of Community: The African Model and the Dialogue Between North and South (C. Namulondo, Trans.). Nairobi: Pauline’s Publications Africa.

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

127

Bujo, B. (2001). Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality. New York, NY: Crossroad Publishing. Bujo, B. (2005). Differentiations in African Ethics. In W.  Schweiker (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (pp.  419–434). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Bujo, B. (2009). Ecology and Ethical Responsibility from an African Perspective. In F. Murove (Ed.), African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics. Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press. Darwall, S. (1977). Two Kinds of Respect. Ethics, 80, 36–49. De Vos, P. (2015). Euthanasia: An Imperative in a Constitutional Democracy. Daily Maverick. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-05-11-euthanasia-an-imperative-in-a-constitutional-democracy/. Dimmock, M., & Fisher, A. (2017). Ethics for A-Level: For AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. Donnelly, J. (1982). Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights. The American Political Science Review, 76, 303–316. Donnelly, J. (2015). Normative Versus Taxonomic Humanity: Varieties of Human Dignity in the Western Tradition. Journal of Human Rights 14, 1–22. Donnelly, J. (2009). Human Dignity and Human Rights. Denver: Josef Korbel School of International Studies. Feinberg, J. (1978). Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7(2), 93–123. Foot, P. (1977). Euthanasia. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 85–112. Garrard, E., & Wilkinson, S. (2005). Passive Euthanasia. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 64–68. Gonsalves, M.  A. (1985). Fagothey’s Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice. St. Louis, MO: Times Mirror Mosby College Publishing. Grey, W. (1999). Right to Die Or Duty to Live? The Problem of Euthanasia. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16, 19–32. Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  101–122). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hosking, M., Whiting, G., Brathwate, C., Fox, P., Boshoff, A., & Robbins, L. (2000). Cultural Attitudes Towards Death and Dying: A South African Perspective. Palliative Medicine, 14, 437–439. Ikuenobe, P. (2015). Relational Autonomy, Personhood, and African Traditions. Philosophy East and West, 65, 1005–1029. Imafidon, E. (2013). On the Ontological Foundation of a Social Ethics in African Traditions. In E. Imafidon & J. Bewaji (Eds.), Ontologized Ethics: New Essays in African Meta-Ethics (pp. 37–54). New York, NY: Lexington Books.

128 

M. MOLEFE

Iroegbu, P. (2005). Do All Persons Have a Right to Life? In P.  Iroegbu & A. Echekwube (Eds.), Kpim of Morality Ethics: General, Special and Professional (pp. 78–83). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Jacobs, K. (2018). Legalising Physician-Assisted Suicide in Africa: Should It Even Be Considered? South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 11, 66–69. Koenane, J. (2017). Euthanasia in South Africa: Philosophical and Theological Considerations. Verbum et Ecclesia, 38, 1–9. Kuhse, H. (1993). Euthanasia. In P.  Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics (pp. 294–302). Oxford: Blackwell. Lewis, P. (2007). Assisted Dying and Legal Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lukhaimane, A. (1997). The Right to Die: Does the Constitution Protect This Right? Master’s Dissertation, University of South Africa, Pretoria. Mahomed, I., Olivier, P.  J. J., Mokgoro, Y., Nhlapo, R.  T., Gauntlett, J.  J., Mojapelo, P., & Seedat, Z. (1998). Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life. Report. South African Law Commission. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj86_euthen_1998nov.pdf. Manyonga, H., Howarth, G., Dinwoodie, M., Nisselle, P., & Whitehouse, S. (2014). From Informed Consent to Shared Decision-Making. South African Medical Journal, 8, 561–562. Matolino, B. (2019). Democracy as Consensus in Africa. Grahamstown: NISC [Pty]Ltd. McKaiser, E. (2019). Why I Support Active Euthanasia. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://mg.co.za/article/2019-07-05-00-why-i-support-activeeuthanasia. McMahan, J. (2002). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction (pp.  171–181). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Menkiti, I. (2004). On the Normative Conception of a Person. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 324–331). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Metz, T. (2009). African and Western Moral Theories in Bioethical Context. Developing World Bioethics, 10, 49–58. Metz, T. (2010). Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81–99. Metz, T. (2012). African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights. Human Rights Review, 13(1), 19–37. Michael, L. (2014). Defining Dignity and Its Place in Human Rights. The New Bioethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body, 20(1), 12–34.

4  PERSONHOOD AND EUTHANASIA IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 

129

Miller, S. (2017). Reconsidering Dignity Relationally. Ethics and Social Welfare, 11, 108–121. Mokgoro, Y. (1998). Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 1, 1–11. Molefe, M. (2016). Revisiting the Debate Between Gyekye-Menkiti: Who Is a Radical Communitarian? Theoria, 63, 37–54. Molefe, M. (2017). Euthyphro Problem and African Ethics. Acta Academica, 49, 22–38. Molefe, M. (2018). Personhood and Rectification Justice in African Thought. Politikon, 45, 217–231. Molefe, M. (2019a). Personhood and Partiality in African Philosophy. African Studies, 78, 309–231. Molefe, M. (2019b). An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality and Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Molefe, M. (2019c). Ubuntu and Development: An African Conception of Development. Africa Today, 66, 85–105. Ncayiyana, D. (2012). Euthanasia – No Dignity in Death in the Absence of an Ethos of Respect for Human Life. South African Medical Journal, 102, 334–335. Paleker, F. (2016). Euthanasia in South Africa: A Normative Analysis and Application of Dignity. Masters Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Parktown. Paris, P. (1995). The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Dis-course. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Rachels, J. (1975). Active and Passive Euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine, 292, 78–80. Rachels, J. (1986). The New England Journal of Medicine 292: 78–80. Ramose, M. (2003). The Ethics of Ubuntu. In P. Coetzee & A. Roux (Eds.), The African Philosophy Reader (pp. 324–331). New York, NY: Routledge. Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sakali, F. (2013). The Contemporary Euthanasia Debate in the Light of African Worldview and Ethics. SEGi Review, 6, 5–15. Schulman, A. (2008). Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity. In The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council (pp. 2–19). Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Schroeder, D., & Bani-Sadr, A. (2017). Dignity in the 21st Century Middle East and West. New York: SpringerOpen. Sebidi, J. (1988). Towards the Definition of Ubuntu as African Humanism (Paper). Private Collection. Shaw, B. (2014). Killing and Letting Die: The Irrelevant Distinction. Honours Thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV.

130 

M. MOLEFE

Shutte, A. (2001). Ubuntu: An Ethic for a New South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Singer, P. (1994). Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. Melbourne: Text Publishing. Strohwald, A. (2014). Dignity in Death: A Critical Analysis of Whether the Right to Human Dignity Serves as Appropriate Justification for the Legalisation of Assisted Death. Master’s Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch. Sulmasy, D. (2008). Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applications. In The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council (pp. 469–501). Washington DC: President’s Council on Bioethics. Sumner, L. (2011). Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sumner, L. (2017). Physician-Assisted Death: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Tangwa, G. (1996). Bioethics: An African Perspective. Bioethics, 10, 183–200. Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy (C. King, Trans.). Paris: Présence Africaine. Thipanyane, T., & Makane, F. (2019). SA Must Take the Lead in Legalising Euthanasia. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://citypress.news24. com/Voices/sa-must-take-the-lead-in-legalising-euthanasia-20190315. Thomson, J. (1976). Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Monist, 59, 20–28. Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York, NY: Random House. Waldron, J. (2012). Dignity and Rank. Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 48, 201–237. Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wiredu, K. (1992). Moral Foundations of an African Culture. In K.  Wiredu & K.  Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1 (pp.  192–206). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Wiredu, K. (2009). An Oral Philosophy of Personhood: Comments on Philosophy and Orality. Research in African Literatures, 40, 8–18. Wreen, M. (1988). The Definition of Euthanasia. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48, 637–653. Young, R. (2007). Medically Assisted Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Young, R. (2019). Voluntary Euthanasia. In E.  N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 30, 2019, from https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/.

Index1

A Abortion, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 14–16, 19n12, 28, 29, 60, 61n2, 69–97, 98n2, 98n3, 98n4 Absolute death, 115, 119 African bioethics, 1–18, 75, 78 global bioethics, 3 African environmental ethics, 2 African ethics, 8, 27, 116 African philosophy, 1–11, 13–15, 17, 18n2, 27–60, 60n2, 69–97, 103–125 Afro-centred theological ethics, 76 Afro-communitarianism, 52 The agent- and patient-centred theories of value, 16, 27 Agent-centred morality, 28 Agent-centred personhood, 4, 6–8, 10, 19n6, 46–48, 50, 53, 60n2, 83, 84, 90, 98n6, 114 Agent-centred theory of value, 27, 29–40

Animals, 6, 18n4, 19–20n12, 43, 45–46, 49, 50, 59, 62n6, 71, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 91, 95–97, 98n2, 98n4, 98–99n8, 99n9 Appraisal respect, 48 Artificial preservation of life, 108 Attitude, 12, 47, 56, 58, 94 Autonomy, 1, 13, 39, 52, 72, 74, 82, 86, 94, 104, 110, 111, 121, 123 autonomy-based conception, 123 B Bad death, 113, 114 Basic capabilities, 6, 7, 42 Behrens, K., 2–8, 10, 19n10, 27, 34–36, 40, 45, 49, 60n2, 73–75, 82 Being human and being a person, 5, 7, 28, 29 Bioethics, 1–18, 19n10, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 104 Biological life, 116

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3

131

132 

INDEX

C Capabilities, 1, 6, 7, 17, 42, 48, 53, 54, 60, 118 Capacity-based conception, 13, 46, 74 Capacity-exclusive view, 50 Capacity for moral sense, 50, 51, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61n6, 88, 89 Capacity for virtue, 13, 14, 16, 27, 28, 54–59, 70, 90, 120, 122 Character, 1, 6, 7, 10, 29, 31, 33–36, 39, 52, 54, 94, 112, 114, 117, 122, 126n3 Chauvinism, 46 Children, 52, 56, 59, 69, 70, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 89–91, 94, 95, 97, 107, 111–115 Common good, 54, 88, 121 Community of the unborn, 15, 77, 78 Communitarian framework, 121 Consensus, 110, 121, 124 Consequentialist accounts, 12 Controversial metaphysical system, 14, 69, 81 D Darwall, S., 11, 13, 48, 49, 72, 118 Death with dignity, 104, 108, 115, 119 DeGrazia, D., 6, 12, 19n7, 40, 72 Degree of moral status, 19n7, 59, 71 Deontological, 12 Dignity conditional, 104, 118, 119 extrinsic, 118–121, 124, 125 intrinsic, 1, 43, 59, 60, 118, 120 unconditional, 12, 45, 104, 118 Dignity-based jurisprudence, 108 E Eco-bio-communitarian view, 81 Economy of affection, 55 Elder, 105, 111–116, 119, 122, 124, 125

End-of-life decisions, 109, 121, 124 Equality, 12, 13, 41, 43, 79–81, 109, 110 Equal wrongness thesis, 41 Essence of morality, 28, 111 Essentially contested notions, 11 Ethical naturalism, 17 Ethical supernaturalism, 17, 78 Ethics of personhood, 8, 28, 60–61n2 Ethics of vitality, 14 Euthanasia legal status of euthanasia, 109 non-voluntary euthanasia, 106, 120, 121, 125 passive euthanasia, 106–109, 125n1 voluntary active euthanasia, 108 Expanding circle narrative, 41 Extreme medical conditions, 106, 120 F Foetuses, 6, 14–16, 19n6, 69–72, 76, 78–80, 83, 84, 90–95, 97, 98n2 Foundational value, 108 Full moral status, 40, 41, 71, 90, 91, 96, 97 G Good death, 103, 105, 111–119, 124, 125 Greater moral status, 40, 92 H Highest moral good, 36, 116 Holism, 36, 76 Holistic theories, 73 Homosexuals, 98n2, 107 Horsthemke, Kai, 15, 46, 70, 71, 83–91, 95, 97, 98n2, 98n4 Human nature, 4, 12, 28, 30–32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 52, 56, 110, 120 Human rights, 11, 16, 40, 109

 INDEX 

I Ikuenobe, Polycarp, 1, 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 18n2, 19n12, 27–30, 42–46, 50, 59, 61n5, 61n6, 82, 87, 98n8, 111, 121 Image of God, 1 Incest, 80, 81 Indigenous axiological concept, 2 Individualism, individualistic, 12, 28, 34, 36, 39, 59, 73, 86 Individualistic theories, 73 Inegalitarian, 43, 44 Infanticide, 69–71, 97n1 Instrumentally good, 13, 44 Instrumental role, 19n8, 38, 39, 59 Intrinsic and extrinsic dignity, 1, 43, 59, 60, 118–121, 124, 125 Intrinsic value, 51, 59, 62n6, 76, 79, 80 Inviolability, 41 ‘Its,’ 84, 85, 87, 98n3 ‘It’ status of the young, 85, 87 K Kant’s conception of dignity, 110 Kant’s moral philosophy, 110 L Legal, 11, 103–111 legal context, 104, 107, 108 Loschke, J., 41 Lower moral status, 71, 78, 97 M Masolo, D., 5, 10, 19n9, 29, 34, 55 Menkiti, Ifeanyi, 1–5, 10, 13, 17, 18n1, 18n3, 19n9, 27, 28, 30, 32–35, 37, 38, 46–52, 55, 56, 59, 61n5, 61–62n6, 62n8, 70,

133

71, 74, 82–89, 91, 92, 95, 112–114 Mentally disabled, 6, 19n12, 59, 71, 73, 89, 91, 95–97, 98n4, 98–99n8, 99n9 Meta-ethical question, 17 Metaphysical belief, 81, 113 property of vitality, 14, 78 reason, 113 Metz, Thaddeus, 1, 4–7, 9–15, 19n7, 19n8, 19n10, 19n11, 33, 36–40, 42, 45–47, 49, 55, 61n4, 62n9, 72–75, 78, 86, 87, 104, 114, 117 Michael, L., 59, 118 Miller, S., 12, 59, 73, 118, 119 Minimalist conception of personhood, 50, 61n6 Modal-relational view of moral status, 15 Monistic theory of moral status, 73 Moral achievements, 5, 42, 46, 85, 114, 116, 121, 124 community, 15, 43–46, 50, 62n6, 70–73, 79, 83, 84, 87–89, 91, 95, 97, 98n2 corruption, 30 egoism, 28, 34, 36–38, 59 enemy, 117 excellence, 5, 13, 32, 34, 35, 39, 43, 47, 50, 87, 90, 94, 112, 114, 117, 121, 124 individualism, 28, 34, 36, 59 perfection/ism, 5, 7, 8, 38, 55, 58, 61n4, 73, 74, 82–85, 90, 94, 97, 111, 117, 120, 124 record, 114 standing, 15, 77, 83, 89, 99n9 virtue, 4, 8, 30, 32, 34, 53, 55, 74, 83, 87, 90, 95, 98n5 Morally considerable, 72

134 

INDEX

Morally neutral, 30 Morally pointless, 120 Multi-criterial, 73, 91 N Naturalist conception of dignity, 14 Naturalistic fallacy, 42 Naturalist or secular interpretation of personhood, 17 Natural property, 13, 74, 78, 82 Normative dimension, 18n1, 112 Normative notion of personhood, 7, 60n2 Nussbaum, M., 1, 7, 42 O Okra, 13, 42, 52 Ontological difference, 49, 85–87 Ontological features, 1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 42–44, 46, 49, 50, 53, 61n6, 72, 74, 79, 86, 87, 89, 118, 119 Ontological notion of personhood, 9 Ontological progression, 70, 83–85, 90, 98n3 Ontological transformations, 81 Ordering perspective, 56 Other-regarding virtues, 33, 34, 58, 96 Oyowe, A., 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 16, 18n5, 27, 30, 44, 60n2, 72 P Parsimony, 71, 82 Partial moral status, 40, 70, 71, 90, 92, 96, 97 Patient-centred personhood, 19n6 Patient-centred theory of value, 27, 28 Perfectionist moral view, 16, 34, 39, 61n3

Perfection/perfectionism, 7, 8, 27, 34, 37–39, 55, 58, 61n4, 73, 74, 82–85, 90, 94, 97, 111, 117, 120, 124 Performance-based view of dignity, 13, 59 Persistent vegetative state, 106, 120, 123, 125 Personal identity, 4, 9, 30, 47, 51, 62n6, 86, 87 Personhood, 1–18, 27–60, 69–97, 103–125 Personhood as a moral theory, 16–18, 27, 28, 35, 39, 59 Personhood-based-conception of dignity, 2, 27, 70, 104 Pity, 45, 56, 62n8 Plasticity, 80, 98n7 Pluralistic theory of moral status, 73 Pointless life/pointlessness of some forms of human existence, 120–124 Positive moral performance, 28 Potential, 16, 37, 44, 48, 50, 59, 70, 71, 88–93, 95, 97, 119 Practical altruism, 55 Processual death, 116–119 Psycho-moral mechanism, 54, 56 Q Questions of justice, 56, 88 R Racism, 46 Ramose, M., 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 29, 30, 35, 74, 77, 94–96, 114 Rank, 1, 40, 41, 79, 80 Rape, 71, 91, 93–95, 97 Rationality, 1, 6, 7, 19n6, 36, 42, 50, 73, 74, 79

 INDEX 

135

Recognition respect, 48, 49, 72, 87, 118 Relational capacity for care/relational form, 13, 111 Rosen, M., 12, 41, 110

Supernaturalist vision of personhood, 17 Sympathy, 16, 28, 55–60, 62n8, 62n9, 70, 71, 73, 82, 89–91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99n9, 111, 120, 124

S Self-development, 27 Self-realisation view of morality, 10 Sentience, 6, 7, 73, 82 Sentimentalist approach, 55 Shared decision-making, 121, 123 Social egalitarianism, 12 Social relationships, 10, 13, 15, 19n8, 28–31, 34, 36, 38–40, 59, 61n4, 86, 124 Solidarity, 55 South Africa(n), 18n1, 94, 103, 104, 107–110 South African constitution, 107, 109 Species apartheid, 46 Speciesism, 46 Spiritual accounts of dignity/spiritual energy, 1, 13, 117 Stages of pregnancy, 70, 73, 80 Status, 2–9, 12, 15–17, 19n6, 19n7, 20n12, 27–29, 31, 32, 36, 40–46, 48–55, 59, 61–62n6, 62n7, 69–80, 82–97, 98n4, 98n5, 98n6, 105, 109, 112, 114, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125 Status dignity, 90, 120, 124 Stringent constraints, 41, 95 Strong duties to aid, 41 Strongly normative, 7, 18n5 Strong version of anthropocentrism, 46 Suffering, 96, 103, 108, 110, 111, 119, 121–123, 125, 125n1, 126n3 Suicide, 103

T Terminal illness/disease, 106, 108, 110, 121, 122, 125 Theory of dignity, 2, 11, 16, 31, 40, 46 Theory of value, 27–40, 62n9, 74 Trade-off cases, 40 Tri-logical conception of the human community, 14 Tshivhase, M., 38 Tutu, D., 31, 33, 34, 47, 55, 121 Two facets of personhood, 16, 27, 60n2 Two senses of death, 115 U Ubuntu, 9, 10, 19n9, 29, 32, 33, 54, 61n3 Unbearable suffering, 108, 110 Uni-criterial, 73 V Visible and invisible communitites, 76, 77 Vitality, 1, 13, 14, 19n11, 78, 116, 117 W Waldrow, J., 1, 40 Warren, Anne, 6, 72, 73, 91–93, 97n1 Weakly normative, 4, 7, 60n2 Wingo, A., 29

136 

INDEX

Wiredu, Kwasi, 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 17, 18n2, 19n9, 27, 29–31, 33, 34, 42, 47, 54, 55, 58, 61n4, 72, 74, 78, 82, 87, 94, 112, 114, 121, 124 Women, 94, 98n2, 107 Wood, A., 36

Y The young, 43–45, 59, 69–71, 73–75, 77, 78, 82–91, 95–97, 98n2, 98n4, 99n8 Z Zygotes, 14, 76–78, 83, 84, 90