American Opinion About Russia 1917-1920 9781487574192

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AMERICAN OPINION ABOUT RUSSIA 1917-1920

AMERICAN OPINION ABOUT RUSSIA 1917-1920

by LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

Copyright, Canada, 1961, by University of Toronto Press Printed in Canada Reprinted in 2018 ISBN 978-1-4875-8563-1 (paper)

NOTE

THIS STUDY originally formed part of eight lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in the spring of 1946 under the general title, "America and Russia, 1917-1933: A Study in Diplomacy and Public Opinion." Since then it has been considerably revised and enlarged on the basis of new research in materials made available since that time. The preparation of the manuscript was helped by a grant for stenographic assistance from the Humanities and Social Sciences Fund of the University of Toronto. Grateful acknowledgment is made of assistance from the Publications Fund of the University of Toronto Press.

L.I.S.

CONTENTS

Note----------------------v Introduction---------------------111.

PART ONE. THE TWO REVOLUTIONS 1 The March R e v o l u t i o n . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 2 The Root Missio

9

3 Shattered Hope

20

4 The November Revolutio

29

PART TWO. INTERVENTION 5 The Peace of Brest-Litovsk-------------5 6 Reluctant Preliminarie 7 Armed Interventio

57 9

PART THREE. WITHDRAWAL 8 An Interlude : The Case of Martens.-----------03 9 At the Crossroads

90

10 Splendid Isolation

109

Conclusiou--------------------121 Bibliography

125

Index

129

INTRODUCTION

IT IS ASSUMED that, in a democracy, public opinion shapes policies, or at least influences them in one way or another. A democratic government, therefore, is bound to listen to the voice of its people, not only at election time, but during the formulation of its policies, both foreign and domestic. At times the people can be "bought" by their government, as during the New Deal in the United States when the late Harry Hopkins is reported to have said: "We will tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect." At other times, as during the Coolidge administration, the people will not heed the warnings of their government that they are heading for disaster. But these were incidents which were concerned with domestic problems. Foreign affairs are a different matter. Usually, foreign policy does not excite the people unless their immediate and material interests are concerned. Perhaps more than any other people Americans in the past not only have not been interested in foreign affairs, but have at times been shortsighted and even plainly ignorant in their treatment of other nations. 1 This attitude of indifference was conditioned, of course, by the socalled spirit of isolationism which was the result of the whole of America's past, including George Washington's pronouncement against entangling alliances, the formulation of the Monroe doctrine, which was based essentially on suspicion of the motives of other powers, and, eventually, the feeling of security on a continent protected by two oceans and bordered on the north by a friendly and militarily weak Canada, and on the south by a weak, though at times troublesome, Mexico. Even at the turn of the century England was still the traditional foe of colonial times; France was the traditional friend; Germany, a country which sent 1. Here is an illustration of this statement. Prince Albert de Ligne, then Ambassador of Belgium to the United States, told this writer that when Hitler was preparing to occupy the Rhineland, the Belgian government asked him to ascertain discreetly what was the reaction of the United States Senate to this move. The ambassador then organized a dinner to which, among other notables, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate was invited. Later in the evening, finding a propitious moment, the ambassador asked: "Senator, what do you think of the problem of the Rhineland?" To this the senator replied: "We are not interested in the Rhineland; we are interested in Nicaragua."

x Introduction to these shores excellent mus1c1ans and industrious immigrants; and Russia-although friendly-a tyranny and an unknown entity, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," as Winston Churchill was to say in our own time. For one hundred years the United States and Russia had lived not only in peace but also in friendship. Russia's withdrawal from the North American continent, from California in 1844 and from Alaska in 1867, removed her from the ranks of potential menaces to the expanding might of the United States. Russia's support of the Union against the Confederacy, manifested visually by a call of Russian naval squadrons at New York and at San Francisco in 1863 (although the real motive for these visits-to protect Russian naval units from the British fleet, as Russia was then almost on the brink of war with England-was not known at that time), was much appreciated by the nation and helped to forge further the bonds of amity. But to the average American she was still an unknown entity and the few Americans who visited Russia extensively and wrote about it, as did George F. Kennan2 in his book on the Siberian exile system (which, by the way, was much more humane than the Georgia chain gangs of that time), did not further any true understanding of the country. Hence, American liberals and intellectuals, Mark Twain, for instance, looked sympathetically on the Russian revolutionary movement. This sympathy was enhanced when at the turn of the century increasing numbers of Russian immigrants (most of whom were of Jewish extraction and who had left Russia illegally in order to avoid military service under the conscription law) 3 reported to Americans tales of persecution and injustices. It was, after all, in the American tradition to support and favour human rights and even privileges for those who were (or, as the case might be, seemed to be) deprived of them. Consequently, Russia was seen as a vast slave camp of lowly peasants and workers and defenceless Jews, all dominated by fierce Cossacks with an ever-ready whip and exploited for the benefit of the few, headed by the Tsar himself. And in the background there lurked the bewhiskered revolutionary of the cartoonists with bomb in hand. The revolutionary upheaval of 1905 seemed only to have confirmed this conception. The great strides which Russia made under the constitutional regime in all phases of its life-political, economic, intellectual and cultural-were largely ignored. When Maxim Gorky, the writer and friend of Lenin, came to New York in 1906 for the ostensible purpose of collecting money for the Russian revolutionary cause, a distinguished committee, headed by Mark Twain, was set up to do him the honours 2. A very distant relative of the present George F. Kennan, former United States ambassador to Soviet Russia. 3. German shipping companies had a virtual monopoly of transporting Russian immigrants to the United States, because they had a well-established organization which smuggled out of Russia anyone who bought passage on one of their ships.

Introduction xi

of the New World. But when newspapermen discovered that the lady accompanying Gorky was not his, but somebody else's wife the distinguished committee promptly ceased to exist, the hotel where Gorky was staying asked him to leave, and what was planned in Bolshevik circles as a successful money-raising campaign in rich but ignorant America ended in a fiasco. Gorky then wrote his famous diatribe, "The Land of the Yellow Devils," meaning, of course, American newspapermen, who clung to such "outmoded" bourgeois morals. Naturally, this piece of Gorky's was neither published nor publicized in the United States, but it could have served to open the eyes of at least some of the "yellow devils" not so much to the state of morality among revolutionaries as to the true state of affairs in a country which, under the leadership of Peter Stolypin, 4 was striving hard and successfully to establish legality and justice where lawlessness and injustice had previously prevailed. Officially, American-Russian relations remained friendly during the first five years of Russia's constitutional period culminating in the visit of the United States Atlantic fleet to the Russian naval base at Kronstadt in the summer of 1911, where the Russians gave the American sailors a gay and generous welcome. But, unofficially, there were forces, led by Jacob H. Schiff, the financier and head of the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, which were determined to humiliate Russia in one way or another for insisting that naturalized American citizens of Russian birth, who had not fulfilled their military obligation before leaving Russia, were to be treated, if and when they returned to Russia, as Russian nationals who had left the country illegally. There had been a number of such incidents, and since they involved the principle of American citizenship, the campaign once started by purely ethnic elements for their own purposes soon found many supporters and adherents among the non-Jewish leaders of the United States. These anti-Russian forces began to agitate for the abrogation of the commercial treaty of 1832 between the United States and the Russian Empire. Consequently a National Citizens Committee for Abrogation was formed, headed by Andrew D. White, former American ambassador to Russia, and William G. McAdoo, and including among its members George F. Kennan, whose publication Free Russia was helped financially by Schiff. But it was masterminded by Jacob H. Schiff himself. At the end of the first week in December, 1911, this committee staged a huge rally in Carnegie Hall. Among those who spoke was Woodrow Wilson, then Governor of New Jersey and a dark-horse candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912. Wilson joined the cry for abrogation and suggested 4. Peter A. Stolypin was Prime Minister of Russia from 1906 until 1911, when he was assassinated. He carried out many important social, economic, and administrative reforms (see Leonid I. Strakhovsky, ''The Statesmanship of Peter Stolypin-a Reappraisal," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXVIl, no. 89, June, 1959, pp. 348-70).

xii Introduction

that only then could the United States consider "upon what terms, if any, of mutual honor our intercourse may be re-established." 5 Ten days later Congress demanded, and obtained, the abrogation of the treaty of 1832. The abrogation was intended, of course, as an act of severe reprimand to Imperial Russia since the trade between the two countries was insignificant. But it created bad blood and the events that followed did not remedy the situation. For one thing the United States recalled its ambassador to Russia and was represented for nearly two years by a charge d'afjaires. Russia did not follow suit, but when America decided to appoint a new ambassador in 1914, who would have to be received by the Emperor, the Russian ambassador in Washington tried to dissuade the nominee from accepting the post, thus showing that Russia was still smarting from what she considered to have been a deliberate insult. Actually, the new American ambassador, George T. Marye (who served at his post until March, 1916), was well received. He developed a strong personal attachment to the Imperial family and was much appreciated in both government and court circles. Then came the war of 1914. Economically speaking, Russia became an important factor as she placed an ever increasing number of orders for war supplies with American manufacturers,6 but politically she still remained suspect and her war contribution, except for the initial exaggerated enthusiasm about her offensive, characterized by cartoonists as "the steamroller," was constantly minimized by the press while her reverses were exaggerated. Russia's internal problems were also reported unfavourably. The inflation and the spiralling of prices, particularly food prices, the long periods between sessions of Russia's legislature (the Duma), the rapid change of prime ministers after 1915, dubbed "the leapfrog of ministers," the slanderous and malicious innuendoes about the influence of the depraved Rasputin in both government and court circles, and, finally, the unwarranted suspicion that the Empress was pro-German in her sentiments since, it was pointed out, she was by birth a German princess ( she was also a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria and had been raised at the English court, but this was forgotten )-all this was commented upon. Russia, definitely, did not enjoy a "good press" in the United States. And as America was becoming increasingly pro-Allied and anti-German, the prospect of eventually fighting on the side of Imperial Russia was becoming more and more distasteful to Americans, who still carried in their minds the distorted picture of that country created over 5. William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New York and Toronto, 1952), p. 78. 6. The average American exports to Russia before 1914 were about $35 million a year, but during the fiscal year 1916-17 they reached $558.9 million.

Introduction xiii a long period. 7 This was particularly true after February 3, 1917, when the Wilson administration broke off diplomatic relations with Germany as the result of the latter's proclamation two days earlier of unrestricted submarine warfare. Such was the state of the American mind and of American opinion toward Russia on the eve of the Russian revolution of 1917. Although it is understandable, it is inexcusable, because it was based on misinformation and on prejudice. And during the crucial four years dealt with in this study, it remained fundamentally unchanged. But since a new important factor had appeared-the war with Germany-Americans were placing unreasoned and unreasonable hopes on Russia's role in it, only to be utterly bewildered by events as they unfolded and unable ( or unwilling) to formulate a realistic policy toward one of the greatest cataclysms in human history. 7. "There was nothing in the traditional American political philosophy to make Americans aware of such virtues as the Tsarist system may have bad or to cause them to doubt that the removal of this system would be followed by rapid progress in the direction of parliamentary democracy. It had never occurred to most Americans that the political principles by which they themselves lived might have been historically conditioned and might not enjoy universal validity." George F . Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, 1956), p. 12.

PART ONE. THE TWO REVOLUTIONS

1 THE MARCH REVOLUTION

of the Russian monarchy was completely unexpected, both in Russia itself and abroad. Causes for grumbling and legitimate complaint were not lacking in Russia. Spiralling prices, shortages, queues in front of food shops, and overcrowding imposed a severe strain upon the urban population, especially the poorer sections. Industrial strife added to the difficulties of the country. Over 1,000 strikes occurred in 1915, and 1,400 in 1916, and while most of the strikes before the outbreak of the war in 1914 had been political in intent, these now were motivated mostly by economic conditions. Yet the country and the government were making renewed efforts to win the war in 1917. At the end of January an inter-Allied military conference met in Petrograd. The British delegation was led by Lord Alfred Milner, a member of the inner war cabinet, with General Sir Henry Wilson and five other generals as military advisers. The French sent Gaston Doumergue, Minister of Colonies, and General Edouard de Castelnau, Chief of Staff. Italy and Rumania were also represented. The conference adjourned on February 21, after completing detailed plans for the 1917 military campaign including a Russian offensive in the spring, for which considerable war supplies, in addition to Russia's purchases in the United States, were provided by Great Britain and France. Following the end of the inter-Allied conference, the Imperial Duma was convoked on February 27, and on March 7 Emperor Nicholas II left his residence at Tsarskoye Selo for the Supreme Headquarters at Mogilyov. Nothing presaged the upheaval at hand. The revolutionary forces seemed to be disorganized. The arrest and trial of the Bolshevik faction of the Duma had failed to arouse the working class. Lenin was living in Zurich, Switzerland; Stalin was in exile in Siberia; and Trotsky, then still an internationalist Menshevik, after having been expelled from several European countries, had finally landed in New York and found a temporary haven in the congenial surroundings of the Bronx. Lenin himself declared in mid-January that there was no prospect of a revolution in Russia in the near future. Then, starting with disorders in food queues on March 8, rioting spread rapidly throughout Petrograd, eventually including the bulk of the garrison. The government found itself

THE FALL

4 Part One. The Two Revolutions

helpless. No one rose in defence of the monarchy and the country placidly accepted the revolution. The Emperor noted in his diary: "Treason, cowardice and deceit are everywhere." When the news of the March revolution in Petrograd, of the abdication of the Tsar, and of the formation of the Provisional Government, with a broadly democratic platform and an avowed aim of prosecuting the war to a victorious end, reached the United States, the government and the people were elated. Here was a new Russia, "a fit partner for a League of Honor" as President Wilson characterized the new regime in his call for a declaration of war against Germany on April 2.1 America was entering a new phase of its national growth, the war was becoming a mission and, characteristically for a democracy, there was now only one villain-the Kaiser and his German people, the "Huns," who had to be brought to heel. 2 Consequently, new hopes of Russia's effectiveness on the field of battle in the war against Germany were raised when, in an editorial entitled "The New Birth of Russia" appearing the day after the revolution, the New York Times wrote: "The Germans will go far astray, they will be guilty of one of their characteristic blunders, if they assume that this revolution will be helpful to them, that it will put Russia 'out of the war.' In truth, if altogether successful, it will put the great Empire of Russia into the war, with a real determination to conquer Germany, with armies better equipped, unhampered by treasonable plots and sustained by a United Russian people.''3 On the other hand, the influential Evening Star of Washington, D.C., sounded a note of caution when it wrote on the same day : "The revolution in Russia, though it promises ultimate control of the Empire to the Russian people .. . in its immediate effect reduces Russia's war efficiency in the struggle with Germany. Russians cannot fight one another without weakening at this time the Russian attack or a defense in the war with Germany." 4 The New York Times was still enthusiastic the next day when it wrote in an editorial under the title "New Russia and the War": Under the Duma's government the aim will be to bring all of Russia's muscles into play and Russia is so strong and great that even if her activity is multiplied only by half it will be the equivalent of a new nation. It will take time, of course, to organize and coordinate for the fullest effectiveness, but it will take no time at all to begin the operations which the Generals at 1. Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace (New York, 1927), I, p. 13. 2. For the policies of the United States Government and the attitudes of Americans then in Russia during this first period of the revolutionary upheaval, see George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 3. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1917, p. 10. Prejudiced as the American people were toward Imperial Russia, they still believed the tales of treason among high placed persons, including the Empress herself, tales which failed to be substantiated by the Extraordinary Investigating Commission set up by the Provisional Government to investigate the "crimes" of the old regime. Yet throughout the brief existence of the Provisional Government the American press reiterated these references to the activities of "secret and open traitors" before the revolution. 4. Evening Star, March 16, 1917, p. 6.

The March Revolution 5 the front have had ready to initiate, and from which they have been held back by the secret and open traitors at Petrograd. The effect of the revolution on Russia herself is incalculable, but its effect on the prosecution of the war by the Allies may well merit the same word. 0

But the Washington Evening Star remained cautious: "Events have moved swiftly in Russia. . . . The proclamation of the Provisional Government shows an understanding and appreciation of the cardinal principles of representative government in agreement with the political conceptions of the American, French and British people. . . . Whether Russia can revolutionize itself and while in the throes of transformation effectively fight Germany remains to be seen.6 Other newspapers were no less enthusiastic than the Times in their welcome of the March revolution. The Dallas News believed the revolution gave "a political and spiritual unity to the alliance of Germany's enemies that has heretofore been lacking, for the reason that democracy was in league with autocracy." Similar sentiments were expressed by the Des Moines Capitol, the New Haven Journal Courier, the Macon Telegraph, and the Springfield Republican. 1 And Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, which at that time represented the majority of organized workers in the United States, voiced the feelings of American workingmen when he hailed the Provisional Government as "The Dawn of Russia'·s Freedom."8 Similar sentiments were expressed in an editorial of the official publication of the Amalgamated Clothing

Workers. 9

Under the circumstances it is understandable why within a week after the establishment of the new regime the United States government formally recognized the revolutionary government of Russia on March 22. 10 This recognition received the quick approval of the American public. In a lengthy editorial on March 23, the Washington Evening Star epitomized the feelings of the nation: The promptness with which the United States has formally recognized the new government of Russia has sent a thrill through the now emancipated land of the ex-tsar. It was appropriate that from the world's great representative republic should come the official greeting to the Russia of popular liberty. Strong ties bind the people of America and those of Russia in sentiment. There has always been the keenest sympathy in this country for the oppressed inhabitants of that great land where tyrannical autocracy ruled so long unchallenged. For the excesses of fanaticism, going at times to the point of assassination, there has been no tolerance, though the American people have understood the violent reaction caused by the systematic prohibition of all S. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1917, p. 12. 6. Evening Star, March 17, 1917, p. 4. 7. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia (Washington, D.C., 1941), p. 42. 8. American Federationist, April, 1917, p. 286. 9. "Russia Free and Powerful," Advance, March 23, 1917, p. 4. 10. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia (Washington, D.C., 1931), I, p. 13.

6 Part One. The Two Revolutions expressions of thought and all forms of popular culture. For Russia in the war with Japan there was genuine sorrow. The spectacle presented by that great people, misled and grafted upon by a dishonest bureaucracy, driven by bad policies into conflict under the most difficult conditions, was viewed with sorrow here. When out of the war came a movement for liberty there was general hope in this country that Russia had at last found a way to freedom through a liberalization of the government. For those steps that were so painfully gained in this direction America rejoiced. When reaction came and some of the ground was lost America sorrowed. A free people naturally wants all the other peoples of the world to be free. It is the American hope that Russia will hold its new freedom, develop it and through it work out a great national destiny. That this revolution, so quickly a.Qd bloodlessly achieved, will have a marked effect upon the world is plain. It has a direct bearing now upon the war raging in Europe, a war which is at this moment drawing the United States into its turmoil and perils. A decided influence may spread from the change in Russia to other lands where democracy is still denied its rights, even in Germany, now the last remaining great autocracy. The readiness and heartiness with which the United States has recognized the new government of Russia cannot fail to make an impression upon the people of Germany, who are already aroused by the action of their neighbors on the east and are asking frankly and pointedly if they are to remain alone of all the great peoples of the world under autocratic rule.11

But soon both the American government and the American public became alarmed at the news of what was happening in Russia, because Russia had in fact two governments-the second being the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies sitting in the halls of the old State Duma in Petrograd and steadily undermining the authority of the Provisional Government. This body, dominated at first by the more moderate socialists-the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries -soon proclaimed as its aim the achievement of a general peace without annexations of territory and without any war contributions. This peace drive of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, ostensibly supporting Russia's military effort in the war, together with a systematic disorganization of the Russian army by means of creating soldiers' soviets in every unit and undermining the authority of the officers, led eventually to Russia's political and military collapse. Few people understood at that time that Russia was in the throes of a social revolution much more far-reaching than the French Revolution; and while the American government and public looked upon the March revolution as an accomplished fact, the revolutionary upheaval created by the abdication of the Tsar continued unabated and its spearhead and spokesman was the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, shifting more and more to the extreme left as time went on. 11. Evening Star, March 23, 1917, p. 6. It is curious, but symptomatic, that the unknown editorial writer still called Germany an autocracy (whereas it had been a constitutional monarchy since its formation in 1870) and did not even mention the Hapsburg realm of Austria-Hungary.

The March Revolution 7

Actually, all those, including this writer, who lived through the troubled months in Russia after the downfall of the monarchy, will testify that there was no authority of any kind either in the capital, Petrograd, or in any other part of the vast sprawling Russian land, since with the fall of the old regime the regular police force, entrusted with the maintenance of law and order, was disbanded and replaced with a citizens' militia, often recruited from among university or even high school students and thoroughly inadequate under prevailing circumstances. This lack of law and order was realized by a few people, but their voices were lost in the general clamour of willing belief. In the meantime, although recognizing to a certain extent the lack of stability of the Provisional Government, the American press minimized the dangers from the left and dangled before the eyes of its readers the bogey of a monarchistic restoration, as witness the following editorial in the New York Times of March 18: Historical analogies are notoriously misleading, for history delights more in the novel and the original than in repetition, but if the present revolution in Russia has an analogue it is not the French Revolution, but the creation of the French Republic out of the ruins of the Empire some eighty years later. . . . Thiers was the leading spirit of France then as Milyukov is in Russia of the present moment. . . . History does tell us that two perils lie across the path of the new government. One is the forces of reaction. . . . The nobility of Russia is not unnumerous, it is still powerful, the greatest majority of its members will probably do their utmost to continue the old regime ... . The other danger seems to be less formidable, but it will have to be faced . It is that the spirit of radicalism and overthrow may get the upper hand. 12

Although aware of Germany's efforts to sow disunity in Russia, the same paper CQmpletely misrepresented the situation two weeks later when it wrote editorially: "Germany is now doing all she can to encourage sedition and rebellion in Russia, and the sole outcome of the success of such manoeuvers must be the restoration of the Romanovs."13 But back of all these editorials, of course, was the pious hope that the new democratic Russia with a rejuvenated army would fulfil its duty and help crush the villain-Germany. Yet the New York Evening Post found it hard "to escape the conclusion that Russian Army discipline has been seriously impaired." 14 Still, the Literary Digest summarized press opinion in these words: "Confidence in the success of the new government of Russia is abundantly expressed by American editors, always hopeful for democracy." 15 A typical example was the following editorial in the New York Times : 12. N.Y. Times, March 18, 1917, Part II, p. 2. The nobility of Russia was not only "unnumerous" but permeated with the liberal spirit right through. Thus some of the members of the Provisional government belonged to the aristocracy, such as Prince G. Lvov, its president, and all were members of the gentry, including Kerensky. 13. Ibid. , March 30, 1917, p. 10. 14. Literary Digest, April 7, 1917, p. 970. 15. Ibid., p. 971.

8 Part One. The Two Revolutions The Russian Position Americans will have great satisfaction in giving all possible aid to the new Russian Government. We were the first to extend recognition, and we have noted with very great pleasure the response of Russia to the President's proclamation to all the world that we enter the war for the defense and triumph of the principle of democracy. Democracy is the very soul of the Russian revolution, the sustaining prin_ciple of the new Government. In the proclamation put forth by Prince Lvov as the President of the Cabinet, there are repeated affirmations of the doctrine of government by the people. It is an exhortation to all Russians to give loyal support to the Government in its determined prosecution of the war. "The deliverance of the country from the enemy which invades our borders," says the proclamation, "constitutes the capital and vital problem before our warriors who are defending the liberty of the people in close union with our allies .. .." . .. There are in Russia some plotters, very likely acting under German instigation, who are seeking to do harm to the new government. One of these organizations is the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of whose anarchistic activities the dispatches have told us so much in the last few weeks. They are denounced in Petrograd as "evincing a desire to insure the defeat of the Russian Army and a dishonorable peace." That is the distinguishing mark of the German propaganda. But these Socialistic agitators are few in number compared with the great mass of Russians who are loyally supporting the new government, and their literary output is thus far the principal evidence of their activity. They are denounced by all loyal Russians, and the recognized labor organizations, the Social Democratic Party and the Duma labor commission, we are told by one of the members of the Duma and of the Cabinet, are combatting their disloyal efforts, and successfully. Neither these men nor the delegates of the German Socialists who have been sent abroad to help in the work of sowing sedition in Russia will have any aid or sympathy from the great Russian people who are faithful supporters of the government, or from the soldiers of Russia.16 Such expressions were obviously wishful thinking motivated by the fact that America was now in the war and Russia's help on the field of battle was deemed essential to winning the war quickly and without too many losses of American lives. But it is strange that such was also the opinion of the American government, which should have been better informed. The fact that it was not is borne out by later words of Secretary Lansing: In spite of the information which came out of Russia as to the political grouping by classes, I do not think that any of us at Washington appreciated the real menace that the bloc system was to the establishment of a republic based upon the principles of representative democracy. I conferred with several men who knew Russia and the Russian people, such men as Charles R. Crane, Professor Samuel N. Harper and Stanley Washburn, and I found them optimistic as to the success of the Moderate or Constitutional Democrats and of their ability to control the situation. 17 So the course was charted and the order was given "full steam ahead" for the support of the Provisional Government. The voice of American 16. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1917, p. 10. 17. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs (Indianapolis and New York, 1935), p. 331.

The Root Mission 9 radicals attacking the Provisional Government as being bourgeois and reactionary was drowned by the patriotic clamour that it was truly democratic. As to rumours that Russia might conclude a separate peace with Germany, they were reported by the press but played down as merely representing another example of German intrigue. 18 But all this was ignoring realities. It seems that the only man who held a realistic approach to the whole situation in Russia was George Bakhmetev, the last Imperial Russian ambassador to the United States. In a conversation with Secretary Lansing on April 11, he stated that the Provisional Government would not last but that the Radical Socialists or Communists would get the upper hand and make a separate peace with Germany. "Unfortunately, [writes Lansing] the Ambassador's belief was justified by subsequent events. At the time of our interview, however, I gave little weight to the prediction because Bakhmetev was an intense monarchist and completely loyal to his imperial master . .. . He declined to receive orders from the new government and on April 17 he resigned his post as Ambassador to the United States." 19 Strangely enough the fears of the Imperial Russian Ambassador were echoed by Professor Petrunkevich of Yale University, who belonged to the opposite camp yet felt "that there is serious danger that the Government may fall, that the social revolutionists may come into control, the army be disorganized and the immense military force of Russia withdrawn from the war." 20 In the meantime, with a view to strengthening the prestige of the Provisional Government and keeping Russia in the war, the American government decided to send a special diplomatic mission to Russia. 18. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1917, p. 12; April 26, 1917, p. 12; Evening Star, April 29, Part 2, p. 4. 19. Lansing, Memoirs, p. 332. 20. N .Y. Times, May 3, 1917, p. 14.

2 THE ROOT MISSION

who first suggested the sending of a mission to Russia. He had received from Ambassador Francis in Petrograd a dispatch cabled on April 10 by Captain Crosley, United States Naval Attache to Russia, in which the latter reported "naval conditions precarious, military not wholly satisfactory. Social circles urging peace and fears are entertained by some that army will be influenced. Desirable that everything possible be promptly done to strengthen situation." 1 On IT WAS SECRETARY LANSING

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers (Washington, D.C., 1940) , II, pp. 325-6.

JO Part One. The Two Revolutions the basis of this, Mr. Lansing addressed a letter on April 11 to President Wilson in which he wrote: I call your attention to the enclosed dispatch just received from Ambassador Francis. It causes me serious concern. I wish we could do something to prevent the socialistic element in Russia from carrying out any plan which would destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers. My suggestion would be that a Commission, say of three men, be sent at once to Russia, if agreeable to that Government, and that one of the Commissioners be Samuel Gompers who would have a very decided influence with the labor element in Russia and prevent in a large measure, I believe, the tendency of the socialists toward a separate peace with Germany. 2 President Wilson approved Lansing's suggestion and consequently the Secretary of State telegraphed to Francis on April 14: "Discreetly ascertain from Milyukov [Minister of Foreign Affairs] if it would be acceptable if this Government should send a commission of distinguished Americans to consult with the Russian Government as to the best means of cooperation and to convey a message of good will from the United States. If such a commission would be acceptable also discreetly ascertain whether it would be wise to have a prominent Hebrew a member of the commission and whether the question as to this Hebrew's being orthodox or unorthodox is material." 3 In the meantime, news of the events in Russia continued to bewilder American editors, but they maintained the optimistic attitude adopted earlier, as evidenced by the following passage from an editorial in the New York Times of April 18: The activities of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies have been very puzzling, chiefly because it is evident that they are freely permitted to send to the outside world their own reports of their plans and aspirations. Their pretensions are not lacking in impudence-it is their most striking quality. They declared the other day that they must have full control over all information sent abroad. Now they coolly propose to take charge of the coming elections of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. In fact, they are but a small group, less than 1,000 in number, and they represent not more than 5 per cent of the workingmen of Russia. The people of Russia, the peasants and the landowners, they do not represent at all; nor do they represent the army as was made clear the other day when a garrison warned the operatives engaged in the manufacture of war supplies that it would be better for them to keep at work and let politics alone. Much as these deputies talk about peace at once, they were compelled or persuaded a week ago to adopt, by a vote of 325 to 55, a resolution against any efforts to weaken the fighting capacity of the army and urging workmen to do their utmost to furnish the fighting forces with needed supplies. 4 Optimism continued to colour also the dispatches of Ambassador Francis, who telegraphed on April 19 the consent of the Provisional Government to the sending of the proposed mission, including a Jew 2. Ibid., p. 325. 3. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, I, p. 107. 4. N.Y. Times, April 18, 1917, p. 12.

The Root Mission 11 whether orthodox or unorthodox, and stated that the Government was "working harmoniously, effectively and to satisfaction of great majority."5 Thereupon President Wilson busied himself with the composition of the Commission to Russia. On April 24, Elihu Root, distinguished Republican elder statesman, former Secretary of State and Secretary of War, accepted the chairmanship of the Commission6 and the appointment was made public on April 27. But the day before this appointment was announced, the New York Times painted a dark picture of what was happening in Russia in a lengthy editorial entitled "Russia's Danger": The Liberal Government in Russia is visibly threatened by a formidable counter-revolutionary unrest, which has not yet mobilized into a movement but is skillfully marshaled by German agents. Many of these agents are Russian Socialists, who act with full knowledge of what they are doing and who is to benefit. Alone they could do nothing, but they have the advantage of a real background. It is a background of ignorance, it is true, but none the less to be reckoned with for all that. . . . The army which has been the mainstay of the revolution, has been trustworthy so far, and if it were left to itself, it could be counted upon. Here is where the German agents are at work. By spreading false reports they seek to confuse the understanding of the soldiers. One particularly ingenious German trick, employed by native Russian agents of Germany who masquerade as Socialists, has been to tell the soldiers that the land was being divided and that they would lose their share if they did not go home at once. This has led to desertions, temporary in character, but numerous enough to be damaging. Meanwhile the Socialists, headed by Lenin, an obvious German agent who was shipped back to Russia by Germany for the purpose, play Germany's hand by glittering catchwords, such as Lenin's "Dictatorship of the working class and democracy of the army," and seek to arouse hostility to the United States by representing her as a capitalist country.... This is the mighty disaster which the broad-minded Liberals now in control in Russia are working with might and main to avert. The heart of all lovers of liberty will go out to them, and this country will give them its help in whatever form it may be most needed. The destruction of Russia's new-found liberty would be a calamity to the human race. 7

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the announcement of Root's mission received wide approval. The Washington Evening Star wrote editorially on April 27: "President Wilson chose wisely in tendering to Elihu Root the chairmanship of the American commission to Russia, and Mr. Root gave evidence of his patriotism by his acceptance of that mission. A more important duty does not lie before any Americans at present than the journey to Russia to strengthen the hands of the new government at Petrograd and to assure continued resistance to 5. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 108. 6. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs, p. 334. 7. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1917, p. 12. Less than a month before, on March 30, Germany, in the opinion of the New York Times, was aiming at the restoration of the Romanov dynasty, but now was supporting Socialists or would-be Socialists. This must have been quite bewildering to the uninitiated American reader.

12 Part One. The Two Revolutions

Germany in the field. . . . It is vitally important that Russia be held in line as Germany's opponent on the east."8 The New York Times echoed these feelings when it wrote the next day: We give the highest possible proof of the depth and sincerity of our interest in the welfare of the new Government of Russia by sending to Petrograd a mission having at its head a statesman of the eminence of Elihu Root.... But Mr. Root will go to Petrograd on no occasion of merely formal ceremony. He is to give the Provisional Government the assurance of our willingness to aid Russia in every way, financially, with our exports of supplies, and with wise counsels should counsel be asked. Russia is passing through a crisis, one of the first and almost inevitable consequences of the revolution. The men of the Government have need of courage and steadiness and of all the wisdom they can command to stem the current of the forces of radicalism which the overthrow of the autocracy was bound to let loose.. • • It is our duty to give aid in that way, if we can give it. It is the duty of all the Allies to strengthen and support the Provisional Government, to fortify it in every possible way against the dangers that confront it. The safety of Russia, her destiny among the nations, the happiness and prosperity of her people depend upon the success of the new Government in resisting reaction on the one hand and radicalism on the other. It is of the highest importance to the cause of the Allies that Russia stand firm. 9

The Chicago Herald expressed the view that "since the first American representative went to France to secure aid for the struggling Republic, no commission from this country has been confronted with a more vital task."10 With scores of other newspapers from the Middle West it also enlarged upon Mr. Root's ability and his diplomatic and administrative experience. But the socialist New York Call declared that the appointment of "Root, the very incarnation of toryism, conservatism and capitalism, was a mortal insult to the Russian people who have just overthrown the sort of thing that Root stands for." 11 Nor was the welcome given by the Russian language press to Root's "commission to Russia" any too cordial. The kindest comments came from the New York Russkoye Slovo, a journal of very moderate tendencies, which was pleased at the inclusion in the mission of the socialist member, Mr. Charles Edward Russell. The more radical New York Russky Golos was convinced that the Commission was nothing but a blind to secure the economic enslavement of Russia, while the New York Novy Mir asserted that the Commission "will make common cause with the Russian bourgeoisie against the working man.''12 To such criticism the New York Times gave a fitting reply when it wrote: 8. Evening Star, April 27, 1917, p. 6. 9. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1917, p. 12. 10. Literary Digest, May 12, 1917, p. 1401. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., June 9, 1917, p. 1774.

The Root Mission 13

We are told that the head of the Commission should be a man acceptable to the Russian radicals, a man gifted with the art of ingratiating himself in those circles of agitation and disturbance which it is believed, or feared, may overthrow the actual Government and establish a Socialist Republic. If the United States were in fact a Socialist Republic such a man would naturally be chosen as its fit representative for this mission to Russia. So long, however, as we have in this country a government of sane people, not of radicals and extremists, we are quite unable to see any merit in the suggestion that we should send to Petrograd a mission not in sympathy with the new Government but with its enemies, or those who may prove to be its enemies. That would be a flagrant impropriety.13

This view obviously reflected also the attitude of the government of the United States, which proceeded to form the personnel of the mission regardless of radical criticism. At the same time the disquieting news coming from Russia about the continued struggle for power on the part of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies prompted the Washington Evening Star to urge the sending of the special mission without delay: "The American Commission headed by Mr. Root should be sent quickly to Petrograd. With its message of American sympathy for democratic Russia and its tender of substantial support of its ally in the world war between democracy and autocracy, the coming of the commission should encourage and strengthen the Provisional Government which represents democratic Russia." 14 Finally on May 12 the completed membership list of the mission was made public. 15 It was broadly representative and included a Jew, a vicepresident of the American Federation of Labor, and a socialist. Nevertheless, its membership was criticized not only by American radicals, but by the Russian socialists as well. Before the Root mission had even started on its journey, the latter group issued on May 15 an appeal "To the Socialists of All Countries" to end the war and to establish a general peace. In vain did Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, try to establish contact with the Russian working class and to convince its leaders of the justice of the Allied cause and of the treasonable folly to seek peace before complete victory over Germany and her allies was attained. Commenting on this, the New York Times wrote in an editorial entitled "A Treasonable Conspiracy": It ought not to be left to Samuel Gompers to fight singlehanded against the organized and treasonable effort now being made to undermine the American Commission to Russia.... To nullify its efforts and frustrate its 13. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1917, p. 14. 14. Evening Star, May 6, 1917, Part 2, p. 4. 15. Elihu Root, The United States and the War-The Mission to Russia: Political Addresses (Cambridge, 1918), p. 92; Schuman erroneously gives the date as May 15 (Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 1917 (New York, 1928), p. 40) and the Congressional Digest as May 14 (Congressional Digest, Oct., 1933, p. 228).

14 Part One. The Two Revolutions aims is the intention, and if it could succeed it would be as serious a blow to the American cause as the defeat of an army in the field. Therefore it is as dangerous as it is treasonable, and it is not to be passed by as merely censurable like some other pacifistic activities. The first move was to poison the Russian mind against Mr. Root, the Chairman of the Commission. The next was an attack on Charles Edward Russell, another member and a socialist who puts America first. A telegram urging him to decline the appointment was sent to him by leading socialists in the name of the Socialist Party, an innocent appearing move which was not at all innocent. It was not to be expected that Mr. Russell would decline, but it was to be expected that the fact of the telegram could be used in Russia to show that he did not represent his party and that therefore he could be disregarded by Russian socialists. Now a similar attack is being made upon James Duncan, Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor, also a member of the Commission, and dispatches from Petrograd indicate that the conspirators have already succeeded in conveying into some Russian minds the idea that he is to be disregarded as unrepresentative of American labor. This despite the fact that Mr. Duncan has been officially authorized to act as a member of the Commission by the Executive Council of the Federation and by the Union of which he is President. "The Kaiser's agents in New York as well as in Russia," says Mr. Gompers in his cable message to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, "carry on a campaign of misrepresentation and villification." . . . It is for an unmistakably treasonable purpose, for the purpose of thwarting the efforts of the American Government to reach an understanding with and aid its Russian ally. The men who are carrying it on pose as socialists and pacifists, but the beneficiary of their efforts will be the Empire with which we are at war. Mr. Gompers has done splendid service in combatting this conspiracy, but the United States Government can and should do something to aid him. A socialist or a pacifist may not be committing technical treason when he argues against conscription, but when he combines with others to frustrate a war measure by giving false information to a prospective ally he is giving aid and comfort to the enemy. 16

To this the Philadelphia North American added a clarification: "A separate peace between Russia and Germany would mean a five year war for the United States, Great Britain and France." 17 By this time many American newspapers shared the belief of the New Republic that "it is vain to expect stability in a government which depends for its authority upon the reconciliation of the radical socialism of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies with the middle-class liberalism of the Duma."18 In some quarters hopes had been raised that a strong man would seize power in Russia and achieve the much desired stability of government, as reported editorially in the Literary Digest: "The man of destiny has not yet appeared in Russia, though many observers are inclined to believe that the advent of a Russian counterpart of Napoleon is inevitable, unless the dominant Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates abates its pacifism."19 But no Napoleon materialized in Russia, 16. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1917, Part II, p. 2. 17. Literary Digest, May 26, 1917, p. 1577. 18. Ibid., p. 1578. 19. Ibid., May 19, 1917, p. 1491.

The Root Mission 15

only a pale and ineffectual imitation of him in the person of Alexander Kerensky. The Root Mission arrived in Petrograd on June 13.20 The first impression was disheartening, and Mr. Root cabled on June 18 to the Secretary of State: Conditions here critical. General St. Petersburg [sic J opinion very pessimistic; industrial and financial conditions bad; Provisional Government seems secure; no visible agitation against it at present. Government very confident of pulling the country through. Fundamental military trouble is: soldiers have interpreted new freedom as meaning that every man could do as he pleased to refuse spoken orders from anyone. Accordingly authority of officers has been repudiated and military discipline practically failed. The soldiers do not understand at all the importance to their country of maintaining the war and all along the line have simply been unwilling to fight. Demoralization has been aided by a tremendous German propaganda through fraternization of troops at the front and thousands of German agents throughout the country who swarmed across the border immediately after the revolution. They are aided by the extreme Socialists who are for peace at any price and very active.21

During their stay in Russia the members of the Mission travelled widely, delivering many speeches, and Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, visited General Brusilov, then Russian commander-in-chief, on June 27, and afterwards spent two days at the front with the troops witnessing the beginning of Russia's offensive in Galicia, which started on July 1.22 This offensive raised new hopes in America that Russia would stay actively in the Allied ranks. In an editorial entitled "Russia Moves Again," the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Today's dispatches state that Kerensky, Russian minister of war, has announced to Premier Lvov that the Russian army resumed the offensive July 1.... The new Russian government will now be tested. . . . If it can keep the ammunition flowing to the front in sufficient quantities there is little doubt that the troops themselves, who are inspired as never before to fight for their own Russia, will do their part to make the third great eastern offensive successful." 23 The next day the New York Times had this to add: "A Washington dispatch says that 'three weeks ago' Minister Kerensky informed this Government that 'a big Russian offensive would take place in the early part of July' (it began on July 1); and Secretary Lansing says that the initial success indicates that Kerensky has 'succeeded in his big task of reorganizing the Russian Army!' " 24 Unfortunately this optimism was not warranted by the real situation in Russia. The new offensive had been going strong for two weeks, 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia, Aug., 1917, p. 4. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 121. Report of General Scott on Russia, July 25, 1917, p. 1. Evening Star, July 2, 1917, p. 6. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1917, p. 8.

16 Part One. The Two Revolutions

leading the Washington Evening Star to write editorially on July 11: "When Russia's offensive began ten days ago the rejoicing that was generally felt was tempered by the fear that this was only a flash and that it would soon be spent, with a long period of inactivity following. Thus far, however, there is no indication of any slackening of the aggressive movement." 25 This enthusiasm was echoed by the Pittsburgh Dispatch, which said: "Russia has come back and proved to doubters and critics alike that she is in the war to stay"; while the New York Times remarked: "The moral effect of this victory will be immense." 26 The true situation was quite different. Actually, only volunteers participated in the attack; the majority of the men did not follow the lead of the officers. After the volunteers had perished in the first onslaught, the offensive died out. As soon as the Germans started a counter-attack, complete catastrophe followed. Whole regiments refused to carry out their military orders and even left the front when they felt tired. Simultaneously with the collapse of the offensive an armed uprising took place in Petrograd. From July 16 to 18, the Bolsheviks led a group of sailors and some of the regiments of the Petrograd garrison in an attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government. 27 They almost succeeded, but then lost courage and missed the opportunity. The Provisional Government summoned a cavalry division from the front and brought the situation under control. All this, however, provoked a crisis in the government. These events were quickly reflected in the American press. Under the title "Russian Troubles,'' the New York Times wrote on July 22: For the moment, the troubles in Petrograd seem to have subsided. A

generous number of arrests, seizures of arms and ammunition, the arrival of new detachments of Cossacks and other trustworthy troops, show the determination of the Government to preserve order; and a German attack in Galicia should serve to strengthen the resolve to follow national instead of class aims. The Russians are perhaps too good natured, but they are not likely much longer to tolerate the German-incited insurrections of the leninites. Some day the "guns that have no doubts" must disperse and quell finally these Reds, whose noise is out of all proportion to their numbers.28

Next day the Washington Evening Star lamented: Russia is again a cause of keen anxiety. Just as the reorganized Russian army had begun to strike effectively . . . dissensions arose at the capital and in the ranks. Entire units of Russian troops refused to obey orders and other parts of the line were affected. . . . Kerensky has gone to the front to try to restore order and to insure discipline. At Petrograd a somewhat better condition prevails, but still the elements of disorder are present and potent. It is evident that Russia is not yet organized on a stable basis. . . . The chief danger today is that the army may not fully realize the necessity of 25. Evening Star, July 11, 1917, p.6. 26. Literary Digest, July 14, 1917, p. 13. 27. George Vemadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven, 1929), p. 238. 28. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1917, Part 2, p. 2.

The Root Mission 17 the strictest obedience to orders. Whether republican or autocratic, Russia must require implicit obedience of her soldiers. If every military unit bas its own ideas as to the plan of campaign, chaos prevails. . . . Russia is now passing through the most severe test. It will be a bitter disappointment indeed if, as the result of a misconception of the new liberty that the revolution has brought, the Russian soldiers fail to recognize the authority of their chieftains and by their insubordination wreck the eastern campaign that a few days ago seemed to have given Germany cause for the greatest alarm. 29 The New York World compared the struggles of the Provisional

Government to maintain itself in power to America's own early difficulties, concluding that "a constituent assembly with a finished constitution as its work is Russia's vital need." 30 Echoing these sentiments and using the same comparison, Samuel Gompers wrote at a later date: "There were blunders; there were internal conflicts; there was refusal to recognize the federal government; there was sectional organization and separatist theories of taxation which often resulted in riots and bloodshed; but the Republic won out in the end."31 But these were pious hopes not based on realities as events ultimately demonstrated. On July 24, the New York Times advocated a dictatorship for Russia in these words: "For deliverance from a state of disorganization and paralysis of authority such as has again befallen Russia, the usual way of deliverance, usually the only way, is through a dictatorship, and if Russia is to have a dictator, Kerensky is probably the best man to exercise the supreme power." 32 On the same day the Washington Evening Star lashed out at Lenin: "It is definitely charged that Lenin, the Bolshevilc agitator and leader, now in flight, has been acting definitely as a German agent. His teachings are the mischievous source of most of the present trouble. The revolution has headed Russia directly toward a republic, but Lenin has wanted more, the expropriation of lands without further delay, even without ceremony, and other things utterly impossible in the circumstances."33 Two days later the same paper wrote : "Russia's military collapse is the greater shock to the Allied world because of the bright promise of the recent advance. . . . A disaster of as yet unmeasured proportions has befallen the Russian army, and the effect upon the campaign of the Allies cannot fail to be most serious." 34 And the following day the New York Times expressed what now seems to have been the prevailing opinion of the time in an editorial entitled "The Russian Danger": The behavior of the Russian troops in Northern Galicia presents the picture of a man in about his lowest degradation. Individual man can bring 29. Evening Star, July 23, 1917, p. 6. 30. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 43. 31. Samuel Gompers, "Russia's Travail for Regeneration," American Federationist, Sept., 1917, p. 745. 32. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1917, p. 10. 33. Evening Star, July 24, 1917, p. 6. 34. Ibid., July 26, 1917, p. 6.

18 Part One. The Two Revolutions himself to the gutter by his vices, but that is a very different matter. Here an entire army either refused to obey the orders of its officers to advance against the enemy, or deserted and fled before the enemy approached, leaving guns, ammunition, immense stores of material of war to fall into the hands of the Germans, and shooting down comrades who attempted to check its flight. This is unsurpassable degradation, because these creatures had lost all sense of shame; they yielded in a body to the solicitation of cowardice, the unpardonable sin for a soldier.... The danger may be averted, the danger may not be beyond repair, but if Kerensky can turn the tide he will prove himself worthy of the hero's crown, he will become one of the world's great men. The danger to Russia, whose revolution came much too soon for her good, is great and obvious, but the disaster to the cause of the Allies is one that can be repaired only by giant efforts and at enormous cost.35 These sentiments were shared by the New York Tribune, which pointed out that "Russian military weakness concerns us closely and vitally," while New York's Jewish press, which had welcomed the Russian revolution, showed a pessimism which doubtless reflected the state of mind of its readers, "who were so largely of Russian origin. " 36 Into such a pessimistic atmosphere the over-optimistic report of the Root Mission, which had returned home on August 8, burst like a bombshell. It is difficult to understand why this report was so optimistically worded and why its principal recommendations were for an extensive informational programme to be carried out with a view to influencing Russian public opinion and for a programme to strengthen the morale of the Russian army through the introduction of recreational activities under the guidance of the Young Men's Christian Association. This was equivalent to a suggestion of pouring a spoonful of syrup to extinguish a blazing fire. The Mission's presence in Russia was marked by numerous festive social engagements, by numerous speeches full of platitudes on both sides. But both socialist members, Duncan and Russell, were very coldly received by their Russian counterparts. Root himself, lacking not only any knowledge of the Russian scene but also any deep interest in it, went to Russia without enthusiasm and did not enjoy the experience. While his public expressions were polite, his underlying attitude was smug and patronizing. "One seeks in vain," writes George F. Kennan, "for any indication that Root's private observations and speeches in the Russian capital had any influence on Russian political circles other than to drive ·home the thought that the degree of American support for the Provisional Government would depend strictly on the vigor of the latter's war effort." 37 But then that was the paramount expectation of both the American people and their government. Commenting on the Mission's report the Washington Evening Star sounded a new note of optimism: 35. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1917, p. 8. 36. Literary Digest, Aug. 4, 1917, p. 24. 37. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 21-2.

The Root Mission 19 Distinct encouragement regarding the future of Russia and the part to be played by that nation in the war is derived from the reports of the American commissioners who reached Washington yesterday .. . . It is true that since they left Petrograd there has been a pronounced and disturbing reaction, but the knowledge they possess of the fundamental conditions in Russia justifies their assertion that the Russian people will progress in their democratic development and remain a strong factor in the conflict. • . . The defections that have so nearly wrecked the Russian campaign are apparently under control.38 Subsequent events have proved bow much Mr. Root and his colleagues were in error. But there were many, even at that time, who held a decidedly grave view of the situation. One of them was Secretary Lansing, who formulated his thoughts and attitude in a memorandum to President Wilson, who had refused to receive Root, dated August 9: The Root Mission, excepting Charles R. Crane, have arrived and I had a long interview with them yesterday preceded by one in the morning with Mr. Root alone. I am astounded at their optimism. I cannot see upon what it is founded. When I expressed doubts as to Kerensky's personal force and ability to carry through his plans in view of the strong opposition developing against him, they assured me that everything would come out all right and that Russia would continue the war against the Central Powers with even greater vigor than under the Tsar. I hope they are right and I presume they know more about it than I do, and yet in spite of what they say I am very skeptical about Kerensky. He compromises too much with the radical element of the Revolution. From the first I have felt that the attempt being made to harmonize the radicals and moderates in Russia would be a failure, but I confess that the confident tone of Mr. Root and his colleagues has shaken, though it has not removed my doubts. .. . I naturally hesitate to set my judgment against so experienced and wise a statesman as Elihu Root, especially after he has been on the ground and has been in contact with the forces at work in Russia, but even taking his statements as accurate I cannot agree in the conclusions which he reached. Nevertheless, as long as there is a chance that he is right and I am wrong, I feel that we should do all that we can to strengthen morally and materially the existing government. If Mr. Root is wrong, nothing that we can do will stay the current which is toward a period of disorder and national impotency. All our efforts will amount to nothing; they will simply be chips swept along by the tide to be swallowed up in the calamity which seems to be in store for Russia. 39 Curiously enough the radical press shared Mr. Lansing's point of view with the difference, however, that it looked upon the eventual victory of the extreme left as a great benefit for the Russian people. But Mr. Root was firm in his convictions and at the New York reception for the members of the Mission said : "There are some newspapers published in this city every day the editors of which deserve conviction and execution· for treason. " 40 38. Evening Star, Aug. 9, 1917, p. 6. 39. Lansing, Memoirs, pp. 337-8. 40. Literary Digest, Aug. 25, 1917, p. 14.

20 Part One. The Two Revolutions The American public still cherished its hopes, so strongly supported now by the Root Mission, that the Russian people having freed themselves of the domination of a tsar would soberly and sanely embark on a path of representative democracy and continue to fight the Kaiser and his "Huns" in order to save American lives and make the world safe for democracy.

3 SHATTERED HOPES

THE DAY BEFORE the Root Mission reached Washington another American mission arrived at Petrograd. 1 It was the American Red Cross Commission headed, nominally, by Dr. Frank G. Billings, a prominent medical man from Chicago, and, actually, by Mr. William Boyce Thompson, a fabulous figure in American business. No news of this commission was reported in the American press, but its activities did inestimable damage to Russia and the United States at that time by misleading both. Never before or since has the insignia of the Red Cross been used for such blatantly political purpose as when the American Red Cross Commission for Russia was organized in June, 1917, and despatched to Russia early in July. The whole scheme revolved around the figure of Thompson. "A copper magnate, stock market operator, and financial promoter, he had amassed a tremendous personal fortune and won himself a unique position in the New York financial world," writes Kennan. 2 A product of the Middle West, without much education or polish, portly, arrogant, believing unquestionably that money would open any door, Thompson became restless after the United States had entered the war. He found promotions and stock operations no longer stimulating for his imagination, his energy, and his ambition, so he approached his friend, Henry P. Davison, head of the American Red Cross, who agreed to set up a Red Cross Commission for Russia at Thompson's own expense, even including the military uniforms of its members since it had already been arranged that Red Cross officials would be nominally part of the military establishment, for the duration of the war, and carry military commissions with appropriate rank.

It was of the highest importance [writes Thompson's biographer] to have a forceful mind on guard in Petrograd in behalf of the United States. The 1. There was one already on the spot-the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts, commonly called the Stevens Commission from the name of its head, John F. Stevens, which had arrived with the Root Mission. 2. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 52.

Shattered Hopes 21 American ambassador's, as it happened, was not that.... Since it appeared impractical to supplant him, the only alternative was to send an individual such as the situation required as an unofficial envoy, to be acclaimed if he succeeded and repudiated if he failed. . . . It was made clear to Thompson that as "the representative of the United States" he would be expected "to undertake any work" which, in his judgment, "was necessary or advisable in the effort to prevent the disintegration of the Russian forces." Edward N. Hurley, a member of the War Council of the Red Cross, journeyed from Washington to St. Paul to impress on Thompson the importance of "strengthening Kerensky's position with the hope that his administration would bring order out of chaos."3

Thus, from the outset the Commission had a purely political aim and had nothing ( or very little) to do with Red Cross functions. Besides, Russia at that time was not in need of medical personnel or medical supplies although it accepted with gratitude the two carloads of medical supplies which the Commission brought. The Commission, which counted about forty colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants, was dubbed by Americans in Petrograd the "Haytian Army," because there were no privates. 4 Ambassador Francis had opposed the Commission from the start and criticized its activities later, but there were too many hands in Washington who tried to stir the Russian witch brew, so that his voice was not listened to. Thompson, now Colonel Thompson, and his alter ego and successor as head of the Red Cross Commission, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Raymond Robins, placed all their trust in the Socialist-Revolutionaries, to which party Kerensky belonged. Two days after his arrival, while the Commission was being received by Kerensky, Thompson undertook to subscribe personally for half a million rubles of the Provisional Government's new loan. A few days later he informed Kerensky, at a luncheon in the American Embassy, that he was sending a cable to New York offering his financial friends the opportunity to form a syndicate of ten, of which he was to be one, to purchase Russian government bonds of one million rubles apiece. Later he paid out of his own pocket a million dollars to Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaya, the so-called "Grandmother of the Revolution" and a veteran Socialist-Revolutionary, for the setting up of a civic committee to carry out propaganda for the Kerensky regime, the war effort and, incidentally, the Socialist-Revolutionary party. Bypassing the American Embassy, Thompson, who was given the use of the code of the American Military Mission, even cabled to Davison: "Breshkovsky Civic Committee only agency through which negotiations should be made and help furnished." 5 3. Hermann Hagedorn, The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His Time, 1869-1930 (New York, 1935), pp. 183-4. 4. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 55. 5. Claude E. Fike, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," Journal of Modern History, XXXl(2), June, 1959, p. 101.

22 Part One. The Two Revolutions

Thompson's way of life in the feverish and uncertain atmosphere of revolutionary Petrograd made him a conspicuous figure. He had a suite in the best hotel in the Russian capital, a French limousine, a wolfhound. He bought Russian antiques on a grand scale, which many formerly well-to-do Russians were willing to sell, seeing, as it may be, the handwriting on the wall. "When he attended the opera," writes Kennan, "he was put in the imperial box and hailed ironically as 'the American Tsar.' " 6 Hence it is not surprising that many persons in Kerensky's government considered Thompson as the real ambassador of the United States to the detriment of Francis. In addition to Thompson, there was present in Russia in those tumultuous months of the summer and autumn of 1917 another unofficial envoy, though a much less conspicuous one than the ebullient financier. He was Arthur Bullard, a free-lance writer, the representative of the American Friends of Russian Freedom which had close contacts with the Socialist-Revolutionary party, and a personal friend of Colonel House, who held him in high esteem and to whom he reported his observations and recommendations from Russia, bypassing the regular diplomatic channels. Like Thompson, Bullard also placed his hopes on the Socialist-Revolutionaries. But this proved to be betting on the wrong horse. What was even more unfortunate for the United States was the fact that both Thompson and Bullard undermined the authority of Ambassador Francis, while all three seemed to work at cross-purposes. The resulting confusion which their often conflicting reports created in Washington is only too obvious. Yet Russia at this time was going through a severe crisis. At the end of August Prime Minister Kerensky organized a National Political Conference in a futile attempt to reconcile the liberal and the socialist elements of the country. The Conference met in Moscow on August 27, 7 and the same day was presented with a message from President Wilson. It read: "I venture to 8 take the liberty to send to the members of the great council now meeting in Moscow the cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the United States, to express their confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals of democracy and selfgovernment against all the enemies within and without, and to give their renewed assurance of every material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united.''9 Although this 6. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 60. 7. George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston, 1936), p. 411 ; but A. J. Sack, The Birth of Russian Democracy (New York, 1918) , p. 434, gives the date of August 26. 8. The words "venture to" are deleted from the text as published by Baker and Dodd (Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace, p: 98), by Sack (Russian Democracy, p. 435), and Schuman (Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy, p. 51). 9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, I, 177.

Shattered Hopes 23 message was greeted with thunderous applause by the assembled delegates and members of the Kerensky cabinet, it had no effect on the course of events. But the New York Times hailed it enthusiastically: Mr. Wilson's message to the Moscow conference yesterday was sent at the right time. It has the right spirit to hearten and strengthen the resistance of the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks, now bent on "a dictatorship of the proletariat," and to all the new "dark forces," extreme radicals, anarchists, leninites. . . . The greeting is appropriate to the idealist nation which Russia is, like the United States, and promises the financial and economic aid, so imperative at present. We believe that the new "dark forces" will be crushed, as were their predecessors. 10 The Conference itself did not achieve anything. It widened further the rift between the more conservative forces, personified by General Komilov, at that time Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, and those of socialism towards which Kerensky and his cabinet were leaning. Nevertheless, the Moscow Conference gained favourable press in America. The Washington Evening Star wrote, on August 27: There is indeed high hope for Russia. Should the process of reorganization be slow there shall be patience. The revolution itself was accomplished so speedily as to amaze the world. Its very quickness gave little chance for organization. If in a year Russia is stable, a wonderful record will have been made. Meanwhile, all the Allies ask is that the armies hold together, even though they attempt no aggressive action, and that the Russian people continue to recognize in separate peace proposals merely the temptations of an enemy that has already proved faithless to obligations and can never be trusted again.11 The New York Times was even more optimistic when it summed up the results of the Conference: The Moscow National Conference has accomplished a good deal, in spite of impatient critics, who complain that it has accomplished nothing and seem surprised that it did not, by some magic process, instantly set Russia on its feet. It was a meeting of men of all sorts of opinions, of all sorts of interests, a Council of Notables and Sansculottes. The state to which socialism and radicalism, government or want of government by a class, the sincere milk of Marxism, has brought Russia, was shown in all its nakedness. . . . The popular welcome to Kornilov, the unsparing painter of the military and economic weakness, the destruction of discipline, the malingering and chaos that prevail, shows the popular impatience. . . . We hear of a military league of landholders, of the many rural races, the Cossacks [sic], Kirgis, Caucasians, uniting to defend their homes and country. We see the real strength of Russia rising to its defense. Whether party leaders or the horde of busybody committees and soviets, magnifying their 10. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1917, p. 6. Curiously enough in Russia at that time the term "dark forces" referred to reactionary elements, but the editorial writer of the New York Times lumped radical and reactionary together. 11. Evening Star, Aug. 27, 1917, p. 6.

24 Part One. The Two Revolutions office and unifying effectiveness, see it or not, inexhaustible Russia is preparing herself. The politicians, the theorists, the irreconcilables, must yield to the national impulse. Russia will be saved. 12 All this, however, was whistling in the dark. The printer's ink was scarcely dry when the Germans opened an offensive in Latvia and on September 3 captured Riga, 13 which the Russian troops hardly defended. Yet the American press retained its optimistic tone. The Washington Evening Star wrote: "Occupation of Riga by the Germans is no novelty in this war. This is the sixth time the city has changed hands since the conflict began . . . .14 But there is no justification for the belief that Russia will utterly collapse as a fighting force. Separate peace does not now seem possible."15 The New York Times also tried to minimize that military disaster: Berlin's somewhat too spontaneous celebration of the capture of Riga, giving evidence of an "accelerated" rejoicing, confirms the belief we have already expressed that the German advance on Russia's lines in that quarter was undertaken with a view rather to political effect than to distinct military advantage. Possibly the Germans might have taken Riga long ago, but they were much occupied on other fronts. The moment came when they knew that the Russians would abandon the city and its defenses without much resistance and they walked in. Many of the Russian troops, still groveling in that extreme of degradation to which they have been brought by influences emanating from the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, left their posts and ran like sheep. Yet military writers of authority gravely present the taking of Riga to the German people as a great military triumph, a victory won by desparate fighting. . . . The Germans intended to make use and are making use of the capture of Riga to put heart into the sore-beset people of the Empire in order that their souls may be sustained through another winter of want and suffering. 16 The fall of Riga led directly to the revolt of General Kornilov, the Commander-in-Chief, who attempted in vain to restore discipline in the army. The storm broke on September 9,17 when Kerensky dismissed the General from his command because he believed that the latter aspired to become a dictator. General Kornilov refused to obey Kerensky's dismissal and ordered troops to move on Petrograd ( in accordance with a previously agreed upon plan with Kerensky), but when it became clear that Kerensky's government would defend the city, Kornilov surrendered rather than plunge the country into civil war. On September 11 the New York Times wrote: Kerensky should at all hazards have avoided a break with General Kornilov. . . . And Kerensky's dismissal of General Kornilov from his 12. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1917, p. 6. 13. Sack, Russian Democracy, p. 475. 14. This statement is historically incorrect. 15. Evening Star, Sept. 4, 1917, p. 6. 16. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1917, p. 8. 17. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Was There a Kornilov Rebellion?", Slavonic and East European Review, June, 1955, p. 389.

Shattered Hopes 25 army command because of the General's demand that the civil and military power be surrendered into his hands is very likely only the beginning of a period of new and perhaps more violent disturbances in Russia. The rupture between the two men occurred at the Moscow Conference upon a question as to which Kornilov was in the right. The General insisted that discipline in the army could be restored only by the re-establishment of extreme penalties for cowardice and treason at the front. . . . Kerensky could not afford to quarrel with Kornilov on such an issue. The comparison of his own achievements with what Kornilov sought to achieve is fatal to his reputation. . . . Since Kerensky has failed and Kornilov did propose measures fundamental and primarily essential to the salvation of Russia, it is difficult to resist the belief that the wrong man has been removed in Russia. 18

The same day the Washington Evening Star lamented: "Russia passes from one dark phase into another. Scarcely has one problem been adjusted before a fresh one develops . . .. Just at present Russia trembles in the balance of civil war. The great pity of it all is that with proper concentration of effort in the great war Russia might be the deciding factor." 19 The next day the New York Times renewed its defence of Komilov when it wrote: "There was no conspiracy. The forces of order were open enough. They wanted Kerensky with them, and showed him their hand. He had his choice to make, and when the test came he preferred to throw his lot in with socialism, with all its demonstrated inability to control the anarchists, rather than with those who want an ordered constitutional democracy like ours." 20 And the Washington Evening Star remarked sadly the same day : "Russia cannot count for much if anything as a war factor for months to come, however the internal strife may end." 21 Two days later, when Kornilov's so-called revolt was ended, the New York Times commented: "If Kornilov's 'rebellion' has ended in failure and surrender it is is still much too early to say whether the defeat of the cause and the purposes he represented is a deliverance or a disaster for Russia. . . . The best news that comes out of Russia contemporaneously with the announcement of Kornilov's defeat is Kerensky's promise to curtail the power of the soldiers' committees, which at least may be a beginning of the rebuilding of military authority. "22 Writing the same day under the title "Kerensky Wins Again," the Washington Evening Star was frankly perplexed: "Kornilov's rebellion against the Provisional Government of Russia was short-lived and apparently has done comparatively little harm to the Russian cause. . .. But Russia is in a state of uncertainty. It is impossible to guess what 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1917, p. 12. Evening Star, Sept. 11, 1917, p. 6. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1917, p. 10. Evening Star, Sept. 12, 1917, p. 6. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1917, p. 8.

26 Part One. The Two Revolutions will happen next."23 But the Literary Digest put its finger on the point when it said editorially: "Nothing Kornilov could do would have helped Kerensky more than his attempt to overthrow him." 24 And it summed up the whole episode in these words: "A comedy of errors, with overtones of tragedy, seems to describe the 'rebellion' of General Kornilov."211 Needless to say, Thompson, Robins, and Bullard had vigorously opposed Kornilov and coloured their dispatches accordingly. In a rather futile gesture, Kerensky, the winner, proclaimed Russia officially a republic on September 15.26 The Washington Evening Star accepted this news bona fide: "The proclamation of Russia as a republic is not unexpected though in view of the difficulties that have been experienced since the revolution it is with a distinct sense of relief that the word is received." 27 On the other hand, the New York Times took this occasion to level a caustic criticism at Kerensky when it wrote: The arrest of General Kornilov did not end the Russian crisis, nor will it end until one of the two contending principles conquers the other. It is the present misfortune of Kerensky that he seeks to occupy a middle ground. Where the life of Russia is concerned, no middle ground can be permanently held, and Kerensky is entitled to admiration for having been able to hold his as long as he has. Every effort he makes at_ reconciliation and compromises merely reveals how deep is the gulf he seeks to bridge. Now he declares the Russian Republic, because, he says, of a memory that has come to him of how all parties were enthusiastically united on that one point when the two mutually incompatible principles met each other face to face at the Moscow Conference and assured themselves of the fact that they could not live together. This declaration, with its reason, sufficiently illustrates how Kerensky, the middle of the road man, is catching at straws. 28

The next day in a vain attempt to strengthen the "catcher of straws," Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, sent the following message to Russia through the American Embassy: The soul of American labor and democracy beats in unison with the spirit and aspirations of Russia's people. Our people and our democratic Republic realize the difficulties with which the Russian people are confronted in establishing a government founded upon the consent of the governed and carrying the aspirations of the people into concrete effect. May I therefore not urge Russia's workers, the Russian people, while insisting upon their rights, protecting and promoting their interests and welfare, they will be patient and forbearing in the effort now being made to give to Russia definite permanent democratic government. 23. Evening Star, Sept. 14, 1917, p. 6. 24. Literary Digest, Sept, 22, 1917, p. 11. 25. Ibid., Nov. 3, 1917, p. 18. 26. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 191; Sack, Russian Democracy, p. 481. The proclamation was dated September 14, but made public the next day (F. A. Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917 (New York-London, 1927), p. 539). 27. Evening Star, Sept. 17, 1917, p. 6. 28. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1917, p. 12.

Shattered Hopes 27 The democracies of the world are united in a life and death struggle to crush autocracy, imperialism and militarism; to make universal justice and international peace the attribute and blessing of humanity. 29 As time went on Russia was veering further to the left and to the inevitable withdrawal from the war. On September 27, dissatisfied with the results of the Moscow Conference, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies convoked an assembly which was called the Democratic Conference.30 This resulted in the creation of a new coalition cabinet, still under Kerensky, but with a predominance of socialists, and in the formation of a Provisional Council of the Republic more commonly known as the Pre-Parliament, which opened its sessions on October 8.31 On the same day Rhett, President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, sent the following message to the Provisional Government: Please convey to the people of free Russia the sentiments of profound emotion and admiration with which the half million businessmen of America represented by the nine hundred commercial organizations composing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States have welcomed the rise of a new and democratic Russia. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is itself a democratic institution whose fundamental policies are controlled absolutely by referendum votes of all its members. . . . This democratic and self-governing organization regards the Russian revolution as an epoch-making event in the world's history and also as the most heartening development of this terrible world conflict. It is now holding a war convention at Atlantic City attended by delegates representing commercial organizations in every state of the United States of America. . . . The delegates at this convention beg . . . to assure the Provisional Government and all the people of Russia not only of the whole-hearted support of the hundreds of thousands of American businessmen whom they represent but also of their confidence in the purpose of Russia to secure permanent victory over the autocratic militarism of Germany and thus assure the triumph of the principles of the revolution in extending democratic ideals throughout the world. 32 The declaration of the new cabinet gratified American public opinion. The New York Times wrote on October 14: "The new Russian Government's announcement of its purpose is gratifying in so far as it promises to 'extend its whole strength in support of the common cause of the Allies,' that is, the checkmating of the German attempt to dominate the world."33 On the other hand, the Annalist, the well-known business publication, inserted a pessimistic though true note when it 29. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 194. 30. Sack, Russian Democracy, p. 486. Although Thompson and Robins bent all

their efforts to pack the Conference with government adherents, they were not successful (Fike, "The Influence," pp. 101-2). 31. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, l, p. 208; Sack, Russian Democracy, p. 488; Golder, however, gives the date of October 4 (Golder, Documents, p. 563),, 32. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 205-6. 33. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1917, Part II, p. 2,

28 Part One. The Two Revolutions wrote: "The Russian industrial worker is a revolutionist through and through. . . . Class struggle for him means no compromise but a battle to the bitter end. He will not be content with the revolution unless it is industrial as well as political, resulting not only in the overthrow of the Tsar, but also in the overthrow of capital and of every other institution allied with it. That is Bolshevism."34 And Bolshevism it was, indeed, approaching at a rapid pace. Yet the information supplied to Washington from Russia was still optimistic. Thompson and Bullard still relied on what they called "the popular appeal" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and slanted their reports accordingly. Their activity, however, was criticized by at least one member of the Kerensky government, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tereshchenko, a no-party man and former wealthy sugar manufacturer, for "mixing in politics to the neglect of their relief work." 35 As for Ambassador Francis, he cabled as late as October 30, that he was uncertain whether any Bolshevik uprising would occur, although in his dispatches of September 6 and October 24 he did mention the possibility of a Bolshevik attempt at seizure of power.36 On November 1, Kerensky gave an interview to a representative of the Associated Press concerning Russia's participation in the war. Based on two preliminary and garbled bulletins, the Washington Post published the story on November 2, under the headline "Russia Quits War." This prompted Secretary Lansing to issue immediately the following statement: There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received by the Department of State from Russia, nor in information derived from any source whatever, to justify the impression created by the Washington Post today, principally by the headline, "Russia quits war," that Russia is out of the conflict. A reading of the full interview with Premier Kerensky of which the paper published only an abbreviated and preliminary account, itself shows that the headline is entirely unwarranted. Our own advices show that the Provisionial Government in Petrograd is attacking with great energy the problems confronting it. Reports from Petrograd by mail and telegraph show that Premier Kerensky and his government, far from yielding to discouragement, are still animated by a strong determination to organize all Russia's resources in a whole-hearted resistance and carry the war through to a victorious completion. At the same time this Government, like those of the Allies, is rendering all possible assistance. 37 Consequently the Washington Evening Star wrote on the same day: "Russia is not out of the war. This is the reassuring word given by Premier Kerensky in an interview at Petrograd. . . . Russia has undoubtedly been a serious disappointment to the Entente in this war.... That Russia, reinvigorated by months of comparative release from the 34. 35. 36. 37.

"Russia, the Paradox of Nations," Part V, Annalist, Oct. 22, 1917, p. 517. Fike, "The Influence," p. 102. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, pp. 216,181,211. Ibid., p. 218.

The November Revolution 29

actual strain of fighting, will eventually strike hard and inflict a damaging blow upon the enemy is to be expected."38 The following day the New York Times was even more optimistic: "The assurance that Russia is still in the war was not necessary from the Premier, for less than two weeks ago he was rekindling the fighting spirit of his countrymen with fiery eloquence; and the Russian people have given so many exhibitions of recuperation and of their will to continue the struggle in spite of political and economic handicaps that we in America have never lost faith in them.•·•39 To offset the dubious impression from his first interview, Kerensky gave another one on November 6, which prompted the Washington Evening Star to write: "Premier Kerensky ... wishes it known that Russia is still doing her utmost to carry on the war and will continue to do her duty.... Russia is not out of the war, and there is no reason to believe she will quit until general peace is declared."·4o But the Provisional Government was doomed, and the next day it was no more. With its downfall Russia ceased to be even a passive factor in the war. The bubble of Kerensky as the saviour of Russia, blown up out of all proportion to the realities of the moment by American public opinion, had burst. 38. Evening Star, Nov. 2, 1917, p. 6. 39. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1917, p. 14. 40. Evening Star, Nov. 6, 1917, p. 6.

4 THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION

of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, startled America. The Washington Evening Star wrote: "Today's news from Petrograd is most grave. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, have seized control of the capital, deposed Kerensky and arrested some of the ministers, and with the aid of the garrison executed a coup d'etat which completely overturns the Provisional Government. It is a new revolution. The most serious aspect of the situation is that the new power in Russia declares for 'an immediate just peace,' which indicates that the German intrigue at Petrograd has succeeded." 1 Writing editorially the next day, the New York Times faintly clung to its former hopes: THE OVERTHROW

The issue which Kerensky postponed he only postponed. It was certain to return to plague, if not to destroy him. When anarchy and order confront 1. Evening Star, Nov. 8, 1917, p. 6.

30 Part One. The Two Revolutions each other there is no possible outcome except a fight to the death. . . . Kerensky has been no more ready of late to recognize the irrepressible conflict than he was at the beginning. He has hoped for a compromise, not understanding that anarchy will have no compromise. . . . We need not point out the disaster to the Allied cause which a Bolshevik triumph in Russia would be.... But the Bolsheviks have not taken Russia, they have only taken Petrograd; and we believe there is enough sense and honor left in Russia to make that only the first step of a long march for them. 2

But the Washington Evening Star continued to be pessimistic: Russia presents an increasingly complex aspect. Nobody can tell just what is happening, or the significance of events at the capital, owing to the censorship, which prevents the dispatch of full accounts of the new revolution . . .. Nothing has happened and nothing seems likely to happen to revive hope for Russia's military rejuvenation . . . . Russia seems headed in the direction of the French revolution of a century and a quarter ago. . . . The truth must be faced squarely: Russia will not be for an indefinite period a war factor.3

Other editorial observers, however, felt no great alarm about the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd and predicted an early collapse of the "rebellion." They admitted, on the other hand, that a Bolshevik success would mean a Russo-German separate peace. "But there is little chance of an immediate peace," declared the New York World, "because there is no government with the authority or power to speak for the Russian people or the Russian nation."4 And the New York Tribune felt that "the reign of Bolshevism would be short" and expressed the hope that "the status of Russia in the war would not be aflected." 5 It was the threat of a separate peace which naturally worried most editorial writers. "The Bolshevik rule in Russia may be temporary," wrote the Washington Herald, "it may not represent the real opinion of the Russian people; but the fact which we and our Allies must face is that such government as the Russian people have or seem able to get is playing into Germany's hands." 6 Consequently a large portion of the American press emphasized the need for immediate action. As to what action to take and how to take it no one had any clear idea. The Government of the United States itself clung to the hope that the Bolshevik seizure of power was only one of the pangs of the revolutionary turmoil in Russia and declared that it would continue to recognize the diplomatic representative of the Provisional Government. The only action taken at that time was the establishment of an unofficial embargo on shipments of supplies to Bolshevik-held territory. On November 10 an editorial of the New York Times expressed hopes for the rise of some strong man in Russia: 2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1917, p. 12. 3. Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1917, p. 6. 4. Literary Digest, Nov. 17, 1917, p. 9.

5. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 43 .

6. Literary Digest, Dec. 8, 1917, p. 15.

The November Revolution 31 Whether the Bolsheviks remain in control of the fluid thing which the Russian Government has become or have to yield it up in short order to some other faction is a matter of mere guessing. It does not seem probable that the amiable and hesitant Kerensky will be the one to take it from them, in any case. He has lost caste with aII sides by trying to please everybody, and he can probably command no such_ confidence as would be necessary in such a struggle.... Yet, though Kerensky has failed, some one else may arise strong enough to take the Government out of the destructive hands of the Bolsheviks. 7

And the usual pessimism of the Washington Evening Star was less gloomy that day: "Nicholas Lenin as premier of the new Russian government at Petrograd does not impress the world as a guarantee for stability. . . . Should he maintain himself as premier a movement for immediate peace between Russia and Germany may be expected. This, however, does not necessarily signify that such a peace will be accepted by the Russian people."8 Two days later, commenting on the report that Kerensky was heading a movement of armed resistance to the Bolshevik government, the New York Times wrote: Russia must either sink into ruin and disruption or rise into a great, democratic nation. Those who tore the reins from Kerensky's too gentle hands are working desperately, whether they know it or not, to bring about the first result. . . . Kerensky thought he was acting for the best when he dallied with Kornilov and then turned against him; he thought he was averting civil war. He only postponed it, and now he himself is obliged to appeal to the weapons with which he would not trust Kornilov in order to save his country. If he succeeds, it is hoped that the lesson will remain with him. 9

Writing on the same day the Washington Evening Star was, probably, nearer the truth than any other publication at that time when it said: "It is unsafe to speculate upon Russian happenings. The mass is in ferment and prediction is fruitless. " 10 In these troubled days Thompson's ebullient personality became considerably deflated. The Bolshevik seizure of power was a great shock to him. Now his money was to no avail. He even feared for his life. He abandoned his sumptuous suite in the Hotel Europe and slept on a cot in the apartment of the Military Mission. Robins recalled later that, at the time of the Bolshevik overthrow of the Kerensky regime, Thompson said to him: "It means if we fail you get shot." And Robins replied: "Colonel, if I get shot you will get hung." 11 By this time the American Red Cross in Russia was deeply involved in the local political situation. 7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1917, p. 12. 8. Evening Star, Nov. 10, 1917, Part I, p. 4. ·9. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1917, p. 12. 10. Evening Star, Nov. 12, 1917, p. 12. 11. Claude E. Fike, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," p. 102.

32 Part One. The Two Revolutions

Besides subsidizing the Socialist-Revolutionaries, it had organized a set of secret agents, "surreptitiously disguised," according to Robins's own words, 12 who were spreading anti-Bolshevik and pro-war propaganda in the local soviets and among the troops on the front. Both Thompson and Robins realized that they were deeply compromised, but they were patriotic, even though misguided, American republicans bent upon the destruction of Imperial Germany, and for this, in their minds, Russia's potential might was all important. Therefore Thompson and Robins reversed their previous stand and "impulsively and enthusiastically embraced the idea of supporting the Bolsheviks"13 as an instrument to combat Germany. It seems, from all the evidence at hand, that Robins, about whom Tereshchenko had said, "I consider that this man has done more harm than anybody to the American cause in Russia," 14 was the real "villain of the piece." While Thompson felt that he was hopelessly compromised and discredited as an individual because of his personal support to the enemies of the new regime and therefore should leave to Robins the task of obtaining Bolshevik support for a continued struggle against Germany, Robins "appears to have shared this view and to have encouraged him to leave Russia." 15 Consequently, Thompson departed from Petrograd three weeks after the overthrow of the Kerensky government, leaving Colonel Robins (recently promoted) in charge of the activities of the American Red Cross, which, unfortunately, continued its political activities, now openly supporting the Soviet regime. It was lucky for Thompson that he left when he did, because Breshko-Breshkovskaya's secretary revealed to the Bolsheviks the amount of Thompson's contribution to the Socialist-Revolutionary cause, whereupon, on December 7, 1917, Pravda, the official newspaper of the Bol~heviks, carried the story, bitterly attacking both Thompson and the "Grandmother of the Revolution" and calling it "not Revolution but Prostitution." 16 But this condemnation, seemingly, did not affect Robins, whom Thompson had dubbed "The Panther." Very soon after the departure of Thompson he established active and almost friendly relations with the Bolshevik leaders, particularly Trotsky, and later, Lenin. In the meantime came the news that the Bolshevik government proposed to initiate immediate negotiations for an armistice. The New York Times commented bitterly: Lenin and his Bolshevik accomplices continue to furnish evidence that they intend nothing less than the absolute ruin of Russia in subjection to Germany. They protest that they do not desire a separate peace with Germany, that they have planned a general armistice, entered into upon the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Ibid. George F . Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 60. Andrew Kalpaschnikoff, A Prisoner of Trotsky's (New York, 1920), p. 81. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 60. Ibid., p. 51 fn.

The November Revolution 33 initiative of the Russian "Government" in the hope that at the end of three months the peoples of the various belligerent countries, if not their Governments, will insist upon peace. What is the value of their assurance that no separate peace for Russia is sought? ... The order to General Dukhonin is conclusive proof of the dishonesty and bad faith of the persons who call themselves the Government of Russia, and should serve as a warning to the Allied nations of the impossibility of having anything to do with them.17

And two days later it added: "The Bolsheviks have put Russia outside the pale of civilized, recognizable Governments." 18 That day, November 25, elections to the Constituent Assembly, called previously by the Provisional Government but not cancelled by the Bolsheviks, took place in Russia. They showed that the Bolsheviks were in a decided minority: out of 703 seats they obtained only 168.19 And on that same day, a new American personality was injected into the feverish bloodstream of life in Petrograd. It was Edgar Sisson, who had been, at various times, city editor of the Chicago Tribune, managing editor of Collier's and editor of Cosmopolitan Magazine. He represented the Committee on Public Information headed by George Creel, who was a personal friend of Woodrow Wilson and hence was able to influence American policy through direct contact with the President, bypassing the Department of State. As the result of some of the recommendations of the Root Commission, this committee, commonly known as the Creel Committee, established in the autumn of 1917 in Petrograd a war cable service, a motion picture service, a lecture bureau, and a pamphlet programme. Sisson's appointment was made on October 23, when Creel took him to see President Wilson. The latter sent Sisson a personal note of instructions the following day, which was written in Wilson's usually vague and general phraseology and said in part: "We want nothing for ourselves and this very unselfishness carries with it an obligation of open dealing. Wherever the fundamental principles of Russian freedom are at stake we stand ready to render such aid as lies in our power, but I want this helpfulness based upon request and not upon offer. Guard particularly against any effect of officious intrusion or meddling and try to express the disinterested friendship that is our sole impulse." 20 Unfortunately for American-Russian relations, Sisson conceived himself to be a personal representative of the President, endowed with the latter's very special confidence. He acted accordingly, supplanting Thompson as an unofficial ambassador to the detriment of Ambassador Francis, whose recall he recommended soon after his arrival in Russia. "Life would have been more peaceful for the other Americans in Petrograd," writes Kennan, "had he never appeared." 21 Sisson drafted into 17. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1917, p. 10. 18. Ibid., Nov. 25, 1917, Part II, p. 2. 19. George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 255. 20. Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven, 1931), p. 9. 21. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 52.

34 Part One. The Two Revolutions his organization Arthur Bullard, who had served briefly in the Creel Committee at the time of its organization in Washington, and established close contact with Colonel Robins. But "instead of working through Ambassador Francis, or even keeping him informed, Sisson and Bullard by-passed the American embassy and reported directly to Creel, to Colonel House, or to the State Department."22 The turbulent events in Russia, complicated by an apparent movement of secession, evoked further comments in the American press. The New York Times speculated editorially on the future of Russia under the title "Will Russia Break Up?": Speculations on the fate of Russia have usually assumed as a basis the continued existence of the country we now know by that name, with its present geographical bounds. It is quite possible, however, that that vast empire will disappear, resolving itself into its constituent elements. The declarations of independence by Finland, Ukraine, and other factors in the empire-the latest such declaration, that of the Caucasus, was reported only yesterday-may be symptoms. Russia is an enormous bundle of nations, which hitherto have been tied together by the string of Tsardom. The string has been cut. The bundle may fall apart. 28

On November 27, Trotsky, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Bolshevik government, attempted to put the blame for a separate peace on the Allies when the following note was handed to the Allied military representatives in Petrograd: 1. As evidenced by all our steps, we are striving for a general, and not a separate armistice. To a separate armistice, we may be forced by our Allies if they will close their eyes before the facts. 2. We are ready, at any moment, with any representatives of the Allies ( of any of the Allies, is the true meaning though literally translated as above-sic) to conduct negotiations for immediate accomplishing of an armistice. We do not demand a preliminary "recognition"; we are recognized by the people. We want business (serious) negotiations. We reserve the right to publish protocols (proceedings) for the information of all. 3. That negative attitude with which our peace initiative is being met, from the side of several of the Allied Governments, cannot in the slightest change the course of our policies. The Allies should answer: are they willing to begin negotiations for immediate armistice aiming at the conclusion of peace on democratic principles? Are they agreeable to support our initiative in this direction? Do they demand other measures? What kind? 4. As long as Allied Governments answer with bare "no recognition" of us and our initiative, we will follow our own course, appealing to the people against the governments. Should the results of this policy bring separate peace, which we do not want, the responsibility will fall completely on the Allied Governments. November 13/26, 1917. Smolny [signed] Trotsky 24

22. Fike, ''The Influence," p. 95. 23. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1917, p. 12. 24. From the papers of the late Colonel E. Francis Riggs. Ambassador Francis cabled to the State Department a somewhat different version (Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, I, p. 250).

The November Revolution 35

This, of course, was mere cant as on the same day, November 27, "a Bolshevik delegation crossed the German lines to take preliminary steps for the negotiation of a separate armistice,'' 25 and returned, bringing with them the official reply of the German supreme command agree~ ing to conduct negotiations and fixing the date of December 2 for the first meeting. 26 This was a severe blow to the Allied cause and to the hopes entertained by the American people. On November 30, after arguing against the possibility of influencing the Bolsheviks to continue the war, the New York Times wrote: "It is only out of Russia itself that the saving help can come, and if the Allies are to exercise any influence there, it will be effective only if it take the form of encouragement to some man or group of men who give promise of being able to restore the reign of order and sanity. " 27 This seems to be the first suggestion for American interference in Russian affairs. The next day, commenting on Trotsky's sly move, the same paper wrote: The pretense that the leninists are not aiming at a separate peace will be rapidly dissolved by events, if they remain in power long enough to permit the demonstration. Krylenko, the ensign whom they have made head of the army, has issued orders to stop fighting on all fronts. If that order is carried out and the Bolsheviks remain in power throughout the duration of the armistice, the spectacle of absolute quiet on the Russian front while Russia's Allies are fighting for their lives will be a powerful object lesson in the sincerity of the Bolshevik disavowals of any intention to negotiate a separate peace. The difference between a separate peace and a separate armistice will be seen to be no different so far as the guilt and the shame of desertion are concerned; and it is apparently to avoid that guilt and shame that the Bolsheviks shrink from using the actual words "separate peace" in disclosing their intentions. 28

And the Houston Chronicle exclaimed: "God knows, the Bolsheviks are as dangerous to organized government as are the Hohenzollems and Hapsburgs, and probably more so."29 On December 2, the day when negotiations for a preliminary armistice with the Central Powers had opened at Brest-Litovsk, Secretary Lansing embodied his ideas on the Russian situation in a lengthy memorandum in which he wrote in part: There are a number of people who are telling us about Russia and advising us as to what the outcome will be and what we ought to do. I have seen several and a number have written me their views. The conclusions and opinions are almost as many as the advisers, and their advice as to our policy is about as harmonious. I have yet to find one, who pinned down to the application of his theory, is able to furnish a plan that is 25. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918 (Princeton, 1937), p. 3. 26. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 251. 27. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1917, p. 12. 28. Ibid., Dec. 1, 1917, p. 12. 29. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 43.

36 Part One. The Two Revolutions practical except one who frankly asserts that the best thing to do is to let things alone as far as it is possible to do so. With this latter policy I am in entire accord. The Russian situation is to me an unanswered and unanswerable riddle. . . . I confess that I do not feel warranted in hazarding even a guess as to what the outcome will be. This makes the adopting of an active policy most difficult... . Of one thing I am convinced, and that is that it would be unwise to give recognition to Lenin, Trotsky and their crew of radicals. We ought to sit tight and wait... . It seems to me that Russia is about to be the stage on which will be acted one of the most terrible tragedies of all history. Civil war seems certain . . .. I believe that the Russian "Terror" will far surpass in brutality and destruction of life and property the Terror of the French Revolution.... I can conceive of no more frightful calamity for a people than that which seems about to fall upon Russia. The only possible remedy would be for a strong commanding personality to arise who would be able to gather a disciplined military force sufficiently strong to restore order and maintain a government. As yet no leader has shown enough strength to organize the Cossacks into an effective army. . .. "Do nothing" should be our policy until the black period of terrorism comes to an end and the rising tide of blood has run its course. It cannot last forever, but Russia will sink lower before better days come.30

In the light of subsequent events, Secretary Lansing's prognostications as to the dark future for Russia were certainly correct, but his advocacy of a policy of "do nothing" seems to have served in the ultimate end neither the interests of Russia nor those of the United States. On December 4, in his address to a joint session of Congress requesting the declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, President Wilson, after adopting the principle of "no annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities" as a basis of the future peace, thus accepting, curiously enough, the Bolshevik declaration on the matter, announced: All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. 31

True to his innate idealism President Wilson speculated again, when action was demanded. On the same day Secretary Lansing submitted to him the draft of a declaration to be issued by the latter. In it he said: This Government has found it impossible to recognize Lenin, Trotsky and their associates as the de facto government of Russia, since there is inadequate evidence that they are the real agents of the sovereignty of the Russian people . . .. Dedicated as the Government of the United States is to the principle of democracy and to a special order based on individual 30. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs, pp. 339--42. 31. Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace, p. 134.

The November Revolution 37 liberty and the supremacy of the popular will operating through liberal institutions, it cannot but consider that the attempt by any class of society, whether distinguished by birth, wealth, occupation or poverty, to arrogate to itself superior political authority to be inimical to democracy.... Holding these views, this Government has watched with deep concern the overthrow by force of the provisional authority representing the revolution at Petrograd, and that on the eve of the popular election of a Constituent Assembly called to establish a constitutional government based on the principle of democracy.... Russia, as the world knows, is overwhelmingly democratic in spirit and purpose, and yet those who today claim to represent the nation threaten to violate treaties made with other free peoples, to make friends with the most inveterate enemy of Russian aspirations, and to abandon the faithful friends of Russia in the great struggle against the Prussian autocracy.a2

President Wilson, however, did not think that it was opportune at that time to make a public declaration of this sort. And on the same day, December 4, Sisson cabled to Creel from Petrograd: "I recommend ... instructions ... for immediate establishment of working, informal contact with de facto power by official representatives." 33 Actually, however, contact with the Bolshevik leaders by official and unofficial representatives of the United States had been already established. The unofficial one was, of course, Robins, who "had seen Trotsky as early as the first two or three days after the Bolshevik coup"34 and had kept in touch with him since through Alexander Gomberg, whom Sisson described as "a New York Jew with melancholy eyes, sensitive features, and a mind crammed with resources."35 Born in Russia, Gumberg came to the United States as a boy. Although naturalized, he moved almost exclusively in Russian revolutionary circles and eventually became the manager of the Russian socialist newspaper Novy Mir ("New World'') published in New York. He had known Trotsky when the latter was in New York in January and February, 1917, and was a contributor to this newspaper. Gomberg returned to Russia after the March revolution, obtained a Russian passport and acted as a Russian citizen. One of his brothers was a Bolshevik official under his party name of Zorin. And Gomberg himself enjoyed excellent and intimate relations with Trotsky, Radek, Peters, and other high Bolshevik officials. In Petrograd Gumberg had served as aide and interpreter for the Root Mission and the Railway Mission. With the arrival of the Red Cross Mission, Gumberg's services were transferred to Thompson and Robins. Later, for a time, he also served Sisson. But he was used most extensively as a go-between by Robins. Following the Bolshevik revolution [writes Kennan] his extensive acquaintance in Russian radical circles and his easy access to many Bolshevik 32. 33. 34. 35.

Lansing, Memoirs, pp. 343-4. Sisson, One Hundred Red Days, p. 89. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 115. Sisson, One Hundred Red Days, p. 94.

38 Part One. The Two Revolutions leaders at any and all times made him an indispensable aide to Americans who had no knowledge of the Russian language and no independent means of access to Bolshevik authorities. His usefulness to the Soviet authorities by dint of these activities was presumably not less than his usefulness to the American. . . . He was the unofficial fixer, it might be said, for all the unofficial envoys.36

The official American representative, who had by now already made contact with the Bolshevik authorities, was Brigadier General William V. Judson, United States Military Attache and Chief of the American Military Mission. Judson was a military man and not a diplomat, and he had already committed the blunder of sending two official communications to the Soviet Chief of Staff, which were transmitted to Trotsky, who considered them to be full-fledged diplomatic communications. Judson fell under the influence of Robins, who had persuaded him that the Bolsheviks were there to stay, that in time they would become more conservative, and that they were actually carrying out an effective antiGerman propaganda. 37 From this the soldier concluded that an effort should be made to persuade the Bolshevik authorities that an undertaking by Germany not to transfer any troops from the Russian front to the West should be included in the armistice agreement then under negotiations. Consequently, through Sisson, Judson asked for and obtained an interview with Trotsky on the afternoon of December 1. "It constituted the first political contact between any responsible official of the United States government and the Soviet authorities!' 38 When the preliminary armistice was signed on December 5, the New York Times wrote under the title "The Traitors" : "The German envoys having emphatically refused the preposterous Bolshevik demand that they agree not to use their troops against the Allies, the Bolsheviks sign the armistice anyhow." 39 This was not quite correct. To begin with the matter concerned only a preliminary armistice designed to end active hostilities. The Bolshevik delegation did insist from the beginning of the negotiations that no German troops should be withdrawn from the Russian front, thus making Judson's efforts rather superfluous, while the Germans, who had already withdrawn about ten divisions40 were trying to find a formula which would satisfy the Bolsheviks and at the same time leave them a free hand. This formula was eventually found by Germany's chief negotiator, General Max Hoffmann, and was incorporated in the final 36. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 66. 37. It was not so much anti-German as revolutionary and pacifist propaganda. Robins, who knew of the type of this propaganda, was obviously misleading the trusting general (Fike, 'The Influence," p. 100) . 38. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 119. 39. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1917, p. 14. 40. Lloyd George wrote: "By the end of November the German strength on the Western Front had risen from 150 to 160 divisions." (David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (Boston, 1936) , V, p. 108.)

The November Revolution 39

armistice text. General Hoffmann recalled in his memoirs that the Bolshevik demand was embarrassing since, even before the armistice negotiations had begun, the order had been issued for the movement to the west of the main body of the eastern army. Consequently, General Hoffmann conceded that "during the prospective truce no German movements away from the front would take place which had not already been ordered or begun at that time." 41 Actually the Germans moved six additional divisions from the Russian front to France between December 16 and 31,42 thus increasing the number of men moved during the months of November and December to one million or more. This made possible their great offensive of March 21, 1918, which brought the Kaiser's armies almost within reach of the Channel ports. 43 It was the fresh and yet untried American Expeditionary Corps which finally stopped the German advance at great sacrifice in lives. It is difficult to find the exact reasons which prompted the Bolshevik authorities to make their "preposterous" demand on the Germans. It seems, however, that at that time they were afraid to become a German pawn and wanted to appear in the eyes of the west as protectors of the Entente interests. But in America the reasons for this manreuvring were not perceived. On December 9, the sedate Washington Evening Star adopted quite a cynical attitude when it wrote editorially: Russia is the greatest moving picture presented in the world today. It is like one of the serial films, which give "episodes" from week to week, with each section ending in a thrilling situation, a dramatic climax to lure the patron on to further indulgence. And this Russian serial is baffling to even the shrewdest guessers. No one can venture to predict the next episode or what the end will be. Were it not for the important bearing of the Russian situation on the general war condition it would stand as a diverting and entertaining spectacle. 44

Then came the news that General Kaledin, who had been elected Ataman of an autonomous Don region, was organizing his Cossacks to offer resistance to the Germans and Bolsheviks alike. Consequently, on December 10, Secretary Lansing wrote the following letter to President Wilson: I have been considering the Russian situation and, although our informa41. Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann (Berlin, 1929), II, p. 192. 42. John Buchan, A History of the Great War (London and New York, 1922), IV, p. 135. 43. General Pershing wrote: "The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, over-ran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilometers. The offensive made such inroads upon the French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face." (Final report of General John J. Pershing, War Department, Annual Reports, 1919 (Washington, D.C., 1920), I, Part I, p. 571.) 44. Evening Star, Dec. 9, 1917, Part 2, p. 2.

40 Part One. The Two Revolutions tion is meager and to an extent confusing, I have reached the following conclusions: That the Bolsheviks are determined to prevent Russia from taking further part in the war. That the longer they continue in power the more will authority in Russia be disorganized and the more will the armies disintegrate, and the harder it will become to restore order and military efficiency. That the elimination of Russia as a fighting force will prolong the war for two or three years, with a corresponding demand upon this country for men and money. That with Bolshevik domination broken the Russian armies might be reorganized and become an important factor in the war by next spring or summer. That the hope of a stable Russian Government lies for the present in a military dictatorship backed by loyal disciplined troops. That the only apparent nucleus for an organized movement sufficiently strong to supplant the Bolsheviks and establish a government would be the group of general officers with General Kaledin, the hetman [sic] of the Don Cossacks. These conclusions present the problem as to whether we ought to take any steps to encourage the Kaledin party, and if so the nature of those steps. I think that we must assume that Kaledin and his Cossacks know less about us and our attitude than we know about them, that through Bolshevik and German sources they are being furnished with false information and very probably have been told that we have recognized the Bolshevik Government and so are coming to the conclusion that further resistance is useless. Of course to have this group broken up would be to throw the country into the hands of the Bolsheviks and the Germans could freely continue their propaganda which is leading to chaos and the actual disintegration of the Russian Empire. A possible way of checking this is to get a message through to Kaledin telling the true state of affairs, and non-recognition of the Bolsheviks and our readiness to give recognition to a government which exhibits strength enough to restore order and a purpose to carry out in good faith Russia's international engagements. It seems to me that nothing is to be gained by inaction, that it is simply playing into the Bolsheviks' hands, and that the situation may be saved by a few words of encouragement, and the saving of Russia means the saving to this country of hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars. I do not see how we could be any worse off if we took this course because we have absolutely nothing to hope from continued Bolshevik domination.411 The next day, December 11, the New York Times expressed very much the same ideas when it wrote under the title "Hope for Russia" : Russia is not to perish without a struggle on the part of the honorable and intelligent elements among her people to save her. That is the meaning of the revolt headed by General Kaledin. . . . It is to be hoped that the Allies are ready to give him whatever support he may need. . . . A victory for Kaledin, who is as certainly our ally as the Bolsheviks are certainly our malignant and unscrupulous enemies, would have vast potentialities. . . . 45. Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, Lansing Papers, II, pp. 343-4.

The November Revolution 41 The mere fear of such an event would arrest the preparations which Germany is making to break through the French lines. 46

Similar opinions were expressed widely through the American press.47 Thus the American people through their government and press expressed the opinion that the Bolsheviks were evil not so much per se ( although the Literary Digest summed up reports from Russia by saying: "The worst excesses of the French Revolution have been equaled and often exceeded in Petrograd in the wild anarchy that ensued when Kerensky's wavering rule came to an end" 48 ) but because they had withdrawn from the war. This became a conviction after the formal armistice was signed on December 15.49 From then on, the policy of the American government and the wishes of the American people were to be directed toward bringing Russia back into the war by supporting, though hesitatingly and ineffectually, any person, group, or movement in Russia which appeared to them to be striving to retain that country as a fighting unit in the war in order to save to America, in the quoted words of Secretary Lansing, "hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars." 46. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1917, p. 14. 41. Literary Digest, Dec. 29, 1917, p. 24. 48. Ibid. 49. Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference (Washington, D.C.,

1918), p. 12.

PART TWO. INTERVENTION

5 THE PEACE OF BREST-LITOVSK

BY EARLY DECEMBER, 1917, the policy of the United States government toward Russia seems to have been formulated on three negative premises: no recognition, no intervention, no dismemberment.1 While the second premise, under pressure of events, was for a time reluctantly abandoned, the other two remained as cornerstones of American policy in the years to come. At that time civil war had already started in Russia as the result of the proclamation of independence of the Don Cossacks on November 16 by their ataman General Kaledin. 2 The Cossack forces were gradually strengthened by the formation of a Volunteer Army under the leadership of well-known Russian generals, such as Kornilov, Alexeyev, and Denikin, all of whom were staunchly pro-Ally and thus warranted support from the government of the United States. However, "the first urgings in this direction did not come from the Petrograd Embassy, where Robins and Judson were openly hostile to the idea and the Ambassador wisely [sic] passive, but from Consul General Maddin Summers in Moscow and from Consul F. Willoughby Smith in Tiflis."3 On the other hand, the chaotic situation in Siberia presented good grounds for urging actual military intervention, 4 which was voiced by John K. Caldwell, United States Consul at Vladivostok, in a cable to the Secretary of State on December 11: "Is still quiet here but conditions are becoming worse. Soldiers' and Workmen's Committee (Soviet) ordering government bank5 and commercial port to turn over charge to them and railway men refusing to run trains because of interference of soldiers. Stevens6 and all consuls consider presence foreign force de1. From a personal statement to the author by the late Boris A. Bakhmetev, former ambassador to the United States of the Provisional Government of Russia. 2. George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia (New York, 1933), p. 28. 3. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 170. 4. For the story of the diplomacy of American intervention in Siberia see: John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950) ; Betty Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920 (Durham, N.C., 1956); and George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, 1958). 5. The decree nationalizing all banks was not promulgated until three days later (Events Pertaining to Russia, Arranged in Chronological Order, State Department Archives). 6. John F. Stevens, head of the American Railway Commission to Russia.

46 Part Two. Intervention

sirable until Allies' attitude decided unanimously. American force is preferred but Japanese better than none despite hostility felt." 7 To this Secretary Lansing answered on December 13: "In view of importance of avoiding hostility it would seem wise to refrain from discussing or considering in any way the question of the advisability of presence of foreign force in Vladivostok at the present time and you may so advise your colleagues if they bring up the matter again." 8 There the question of intervention was to rest for a few months to come. In the meantime formal peace negotiations between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks were opened in Brest-Litovsk on December 22,9 but difficulties arose from the start. Commenting on this, the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Germany is obviously playing for delay in the dealings wi~ the Russians .... So long as Germany can maintain a state of armistice the military advantage resulting from the breakdown of the Russian administration outweighs any political or economic gain to be effected through the writing of a peace treaty ." 10 When on December 29 the meetings were adjourned until January 4,11 and, simultaneously with the adjournment, Trotsky issued an appeal to the "Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries" to join in the peace negotiations, 12 the Washington Evening Star wrote editorially: "No disposition prevails here-and evidently none at Paris or London-to do anything to spare Russia the humiliation of a shameful peace." 13 Then came a new dramatic turn in the events when Germany broke the peace negotiations on January 2, that is, even before the period of adjournment had expired, because of the Bolshevik demand that the negotiations be transferred from Brest-Litovsk, in German-occupied territory, to neutral Stockholm. 14 It was on the same day, January 2, that Francis, believing he could persuade the Bolsheviks to adopt a policy of resistance if not of actual war against Germany, authorized Robins as an unofficial go-between, notwithstanding a previous directive from the State Department that Red Cross officials were explicitly barred from contact with Soviet authorities, to inform Lenin and Trotsky that he would recommend to the State Department a de facto recognition of the Soviet Government "if the Russian armies now under the command of the people's commissars commence and seriously conduct hostilities against the forces of 1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, 11,p. 6. 8. Ibid., II, p. 7. 9. Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, p. 37. 10. Evening Star, Dec. 27, 1917, p. 6. 11. Proceedings, p. 4S. 12. C. K. Cumming and W.W. Pettit, eds., Russian-American Relations (New York, 1920), p. 61. 13. Evening Star, Dec. 30, 1917, Part 2, p. 4. 14. Proceedings, p. 46.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk 47

Germany and her allies." 15 However, nothing came out of this offer as the peace negotiations were resumed on January 8, when the Bolsheviks yielded and returned to Brest-Litovsk. 16 That same day President Wilson delivered an address at a joint session of the two houses of Congress which included the famous fourteen points, the sixth of which dealt with Russia and read as follows: The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy .17 This expression of good will toward Russia had very little effect on forthcoming events, as its idealism was widely misunderstood. While Francis recommended the next day "simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossack Province and Soviet as de facto government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity," 18 Lansing proposed to Wilson the following day, January 10, to issue a statement on America's policy toward Russia. Although this statement was never issued, because President Wilson considered it to be premature, it is such a clear formulation of the attitude of the United States government toward Russia that it is worth quoting in full: In view of the fact that there seems to be some confusion in the public mind as to the attitude of this Government in regard to the present Russian situation it seems to me advisable to make at this time a statement on the subject. Although Russia appears at the present time to be separated or to be separating into distinct political groups, each of which claims authority over a portion of the territory of the nation, the Government of the United States is convinced that the spirit of democracy continues to dominate the entire Russian nation. With that spirit the United States feels a profound sympathy and believes in the ultimate effect of its cohesive power upon the Russian people as a whole. The separate independent authorities functioning in different sections of Russia present a situation to the Government of the United States which causes it to pause before formally recognizing any one of those authorities as the de facto Government of the Russian nation. The evidence of the possession of a right to exercise sovereignty over all Russia by a particular group of citizens must be substantially conclusive before recognition, otherwise a foreign Government might reasonably be charged with exercising through 15. Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, p. 65. 16. Proceedings, p. 51. 17. Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace, pp. 159-60. 18. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 336.

48 Part Two. Intervention

recognition an influence in favor of a group and with improperly interfering with the internal political affairs of Russia. In applying this principle the Government of the United States awaits the full manifestation of the will of the Russian people because it is convinced that it is its imperative duty to avoid any interference or any appearance of interference with the domestic affairs of Russia, denying at the same time that the adoption of this course is in any way influenced by partiality for or opposition to any particular group or body. The determination of an agency to exercise the sovereign power of the nation belongs wholly and solely to the Russian people. As to that they ought to be supreme. With the popular determination of the governmental agency of all the Russian nation, the United States, in accordance with its conception of independence and national sovereignty, has nothing and will have nothing to do. When undoubted proofs of the will of the Russian people are manifest the Government of the United States will gladly recognize the agents of the sovereign people of Russia as the Russian Government and enter into relations with that Government. Even while the question of the governmental agency remains undecided the United States, appreciating the dominance of the democratic spirit in Russia and inspired by the most friendly and unselfish motives, is desirous of rendering such aid as it is able, provided its aid is acceptable to the Russian people, to relieve their reported needs which have unavoidably arisen out of the social and industrial disorganization consequent upon a radical change in political institutions. The United States has only the kindest feeling for Russia. Its policy as to recognition or non-recognition of a government at the present time is founded on the principle that the Russian people are sovereign and have the right to determine their own domestic organization without interference or influence by other nations. Its desire to aid the people of Russia rests solely upon the fraternal spirit which it possesses for a great democracy which has endured so much in its struggle against autocracy both within and without its borders. 19

The friendly attitude of America toward Russia was to be put soon to a severe test. On January 18, the Constituent Assembly was permitted to meet in Petrograd. 20 As it was dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries it was in a position to create difficulties for the Soviet government. Commenting on this, the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Possibly the impatience of the Germans over the hesitation by the Bolshevik peace negotiators at Brest-Litovsk about accepting the terms proposed was based on inside information regarding the state of affairs in Russia. Today's dispatch regarding the opening of the Constituent Assembly would suggest this. With the Bolshevik candidate for chairman of the Constituent Assembly defeated, the outlook for the maintenance of the present government at Petrograd is not particularly bright."21 The Bolsheviks, however, overcame this difficulty by disbanding the As19. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Lansing Papers, II, pp. 349-51. 20. George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 257. 21. Evening Star, Jan. 20, 1918, Part II, p. 2.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk 49

sembly early in the morning of January 20. 22 This act received the following comment of the New York Times: In the Constitutional Assembly farce staged at Petrograd, the whole cast, Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, even the Cadets [ConstitutionalDemocrats], played true to form and character. Nobody supposed that Lenin would permit the newly elected representatives of the Russian people to meet and make a Constitution, unless a majority of the Assembly was Bolshevik; the majority being the other way, of course Lenin decrees that the Assembly is dissolved. Nor did anybody suppose that the delegates to the Assembly would pluck up courage enough to resist the Bolsheviks and their armed Red Guards. The expected happened, and promptly, it was all over in a night. The Soviets continue to be the Government of Russia, and Russia will have no Constitution, unless it is made by men of their choosing. 23

The New York Tribune expressed the same day the fear pervading the hearts of many Americans at that time when it wrote editorially: "Unless a military dictator appears . . . the situation will continue from the Entente point of view to be practically hopeless." 24 As the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was followed by the assassination of two prominent members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the Literary Digest exclaimed editorially: "Deliberate murder is the weapon used by the Bolsheviks to make their brand of 'democracy' safe.".25 There was a sequel to the Constituent Assembly in the Third AllRussian Congress of Soviets, composed of hand-picked delegates completely under Bolshevik domination. At the first session of this body on January 23, three persons appeared bringing what was purported to be greetings from the American proletariat. The first was not really an American, but a Russian-born Jewish revolutionary, by the name of Reinstein, who had lived quite some time in the United States. The second was Albert Rhys Williams, an American of very radical persuasion who was employed at that time by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The third was no other than John Reed, the ex-Harvard man who was eventually buried, after his death, in the Kremlin walls and who was employed at that time not only by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, like Williams, but also, occasionally, by Sisson. All three speakers lauded the Soviet brand of parliamentarianism and expressed confidence in the imminence of a social revolution in the United States. Such statements [writes Kennan] naturally aroused indignation among the large majority of the Petrograd Americans, whose feelings had already been outraged by the events of the past few days and who had noted with horror and dismay the contemptuous suppression of Russia's first and only constitu22. 23. 24. 25.

Vernadsky, History of Russia, p. 257. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1918, p. 10. New York Tribune, Jan. 22, 1918, p. 8. Literary Digest, Feb. 9, 1918, p. 21.

50 Part Two. Intervention tional convention, 26 the brutal murder of two of the most distinguished of its deputies, and the persecution of many others. The events surrounding the episode of the Constituent Assembly served to drive still deeper the growing differences between those Americans who favored collaboration with the new Soviet regime and those who opposed it, increasing the bitterness and depth of commitment on both sides, making it harder than ever for the two parties to find a common language. 27

In the meantime peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were encountering new difficulties. On January 22, they were adjourned until January 30, 28 and on January 23, the Bolshevik government protested by proclamation against German demands. 29 On January 28, E. Francis Riggs, American Assistant Military Attache, noted that there seemed to be a feeling among the Bolshevik leaders "that the three powers-United States, Great Britain, and France-should be tolerated here in order to be used against Germany."30 All this raised new hopes in America for the renewal of military action against Germany in the east. The New York World wrote: "Civilization can be sold out by the Trotskys and Lenius, but they cannot make the delivery." 31 The Literary Digest seemed less optimistic: "When the Russian muzhik trades his machine gun to the Germans for a drink of vodka, as many are doing, he comes near typifying the act of his Bolshevik superiors in giving up their military power for an intoxicating dream of anarchistic liberty. " 32 As the negotiations were again suspended from February 3 to February 7,33 the Washington Evening Star wrote editorially under the heading "Off Again" : "From Petrograd this morning comes word that the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have again been broken off. . . . The spirit of nationality that has been weakened, if not extinguished, by the events of the past eleven months may be revived to a strong flame by German arrogance and aggression . . . and it would not be surprising to find Germany . . . suddenly confronted with a mass of opposition that will upset her plans for a concentrated attack in the west." 34 But then came a new shock. On February 8, the Bolshevik government issued a decree repudiating Russia's debts, and Francis joined his colleaguesallies and neutrals-in protesting strongly against this action. 311 On 26. Although it was such, it was limited in the expression of political opinion, because no monarchist parties, even the very moderate Octobrists (Constitutional Monarchists), were permitted to present lists to the electorate, unlike the French Constitutional Assembly, which established the Third Republic, where Socialists, Republicans, Bonapartists, and Royalists were represented (see Oliver Henry Radkey : The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1950)) . 27. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 360. 28. Proceedings, p. 121. 29. Vemadsky, History of Russia, p. 257. 30. Riggs Papers, Military Note, Jan. 28, 1918. 31. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 43. 33. Proceedings, p. 154. 32. Literary Digest, Feb. 23, 1918, p. 5. 34. Evening Star, Feb. 6, 1918, p. 6. 35. Cumming and Pettit, Russian-American Relations, p. 78.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk 51

February 10, Trotsky announced to an astonished world that while the Soviet government refused to sign a peace on German terms, it considered the state of war as ended and ordered the complete demobilization of the Russian army. 36 Commenting on this, the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Russia declares that no longer a state of war exists between that country and Germany . . . . Simultaneously comes word of the conclusion of peace between the Central Powers and the new republic of Ukraine. . . . There is no disposition here, at all events, to regard the defection of Russia as determining anything save the miserable future of that country.. .. For the withdrawal of Russia from the conflict has been discounted for months." 37 The New York Times added its voice in condemnation of the Bolsheviks when it wrote under the heading "Russia Surrenders": Having failed to budge the Germans from their fixed determination to take so much of Russian territory as might please them; having failed to intimidate them by threats of a social revolution at home, Trotsky throws up his cards altogether. He does not even bother to ask any longer for terms, to seek to save what he can out of the smash. He merely disbands his army, declares the war over, and leaves Germany to work her will. A moment ago he was dramatically standing out against the surrender of Courland and Lithuania; now, with a gesture, he turns over to Germany all of Russia, all that she wants and is able to take, and orders the remains of the Russian army to throw down its weapons and stand by to watch the process.38

The New York World stated: "Trotsky and Lenin have done their best by the Kaiser, whether actuated by money, or lust for power, or the insanity of class hatred." 39 It took the Germans a whole week to decide how to treat Trotsky's ambiguous declaration. Then, on February 17, they declared the armistice at an end and the following day started a general advance into Russia.40 The Bolsheviks were near panic and informed the Germans on February 19 that they were ready to accept their terms.41 Two days later Francis telegraphed : "I earnestly urge that we assume control Vladivostok and British and French take control Murmansk and Archangel in order to prevent supplies thereat falling into German hands." 42 The same day the New York Times wrote that Russia's only hope would be to re-enter the ranks of the Allies in order to destroy German despotism. "It would be a giant task to make the Russians understand that their only hope of present deliverance and future freedom is to be found in their return to the alliance against Germany. Yet that is the only way in which they can establish title to a seat at the peace con36. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

Proceedings, p. 173. 37. Evening Star, Feb. 11, 1918, p. 6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1918, p. 10. Literary Digest, March 2, 1918, p. 16. Proceedings, p. 174. George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia, p. 417. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 384.

52 Part Two. Intervention

ference table."43 The next day, February 22, the Washington Evening Star wrote editorially: "Germany continues to sweep through northwestern Russia with little or no check, capturing immense quantities of supplies and munitions of war.... The Bolsheviks have played fast and loose in the matter of peace, and the present condition is due to their inexpertness, if not their infidelity to Russia. Now the test of their prestige has come. H they can rally Russia to an effective resistance they will have accomplished a marvel commanding the wonder of the world."44 But instead of "commanding the wonder of the world" the Bolsheviks accepted immediately and unconditionally on February 23 the new German peace terms, notwithstanding the fact that they were much more drastic than the ones Trotsky rejected on February 10.411 Commenting on these terms, Francis telegraphed on February 24: "In my judgment terms of peace make Russia a German province with good prospect of becoming ally. I renew my recommendation for immediate possession of Vladivostok, Murmansk, Archangel." 46 Two days later the New York Times urged intervention in Russia in order to compel Germany to withdraw from the Russian provinces she had seized. "It is not alone the rescue of Russia that is involved, it is the safety of civilization."47 In the meantime German troops continued to advance toward Petrograd. Then, on February 28, negotiations were resumed at BrestLitovsk. 48 The Bolsheviks surrendered to sheer military force that they could not oppose, as they had destroyed Russia's military might for political purposes. Yet they were willing to accept western help for the sole purpose of remaining in power. Already on February 22, the Central Committee of the Communist party voted six to five to accept the offer of military assistance from England and France. The decisive vote was that of Lenin, who though absent, sent a note on a slip of paper written in ink in a scarcely legible hand, which read: "I request that my vote be added FOR the acceptance of assistance and arms from the Anglo-French imperialist brigands. Lenin."49 Following this, conversations between the Bolshevik leaders and representatives of the western powers became more lively. On the American side the representatives now included Captain E. Francis Riggs, Assistant Military Attache. 110 Lenin, apparently, was convinced that Germany was bent upon crushing Russia and destroying the Bolsheviks, and while he did not trust the west, he felt that England and France and, particularly, the United 43. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1918, p. 10. 44. Evening Star, Feb. 22, 1918, p. 6.

45. Proceedings, pp. 176-8. 46. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 387. 47. N.Y. Times, February 26, 1918, p. 12. 48. Proceedings, p. 179. 49. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918, p. 6. 50. Riggs Papers, Military Note, Feb. 26, 1918.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk 53

States, would be more sympathetic, faced as they were not only with Germany's still considerable might, but also with Germany's purported plans to restore the monarchy in Russia. Consequently, on March 2, on the eve of the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, he issued the following order: We believe that tomorrow, 3/111, the peace treaty will be signed, but reports of our agents make us expect, taking into consideration all circumstances, that in Germany the military party desiring war with Russia will win within the next few days. Therefore I issue this direct order: to delay the demobilization of the Red Army; to intensify the preparations for blowing up of railways, bridges and roads; 51 to gather and arm detachments; to continue the evacuation rapidly; to transport arms into the interior of the country. President of the Soviet of People's Commissars, V. Ulianov (Lenin). 52

Then came the signing of the treaty on March 3,53 about which the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Signature by the Bolshevik representatives at Brest-Litovsk of a peace agreement between Russia and the Central Powers adds another chapter to the east front story, which has been one of incessant change and shift and surprise from the beginning of the war. That this closes the campaign in the east, however, does not absolutely follow. The Bolsheviks are not necessily guarantors for the entire Russian nation." 54 The New York Times added its voice of condemnation when it wrote: Russia may never regain strength enough to save herself from the foreign master to whom Lenin surrendered her, but she will certainly receive her peace of degradation in a different spirit from that in which she followed him along the path to it, and whatever her future may be, it will not be a future that he can command. When his brief hour ends, he will have the satisfaction of knowing that he did more harm to the human race than was ever done by one man in any such short time since history began to be recorded in the tombs along the Nile. 55

Yet the Literary Digest commented: "'Merely a mirage,' is the verdict which the saner elements in Russia have passed upon the interesting peace which Messrs. Lenin and Trotsky have patched up with the Germans. " 56 And on the same day that the treaty of peace was signed in Brest-Litovsk, Edgar Sisson crossed into Finland carrying a collection of documents obtained from some representatives of the "saner element" 51. American military men participated in this kind of sabotage alongside Red Anny personnel (Report of Lieutenant P. I. Bukowski, Riggs Papers). 52. "Novy Dokument Lenina," Krasnaya Letopis, no. 1(28), 1929, pp. 5-6. 53. By this treaty Russia lost "26 per cent of her total population, 27 per cent of her arable land, 32 per cent of her average crops, 26 per cent of her railway system, 33 per cent of her manufacturing industries, 73 per cent of her total iron production, and 75 per cent of her coal fields" (Buchan, History of the Great War, IV, pp. 148-9). Yet Kennan states that these terms were not "outrageously onerous" (Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 370). 54. Evening Star, March 4, 1918, p. 6. 55. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1918, Part II, p. 2. 56. Literary Digest, March 9, 1918, p. 19.

54 Part Two. Intervention and purporting to show that the Bolsheviks were in the pay of Germany. Controversy about the authenticity of these documents continues to this day. Yet even if these particular documents were forgeries, the fact remains that the Bolsheviks did accept German financial aid. Bullard was convinced of this when he wrote: "The Bolsheviks accepted money from the German Government, whom they hated, . . . with the full intention of betraying their benefactors at first-and everyopportunity. " 57 The signing of the treaty did not, however, completely end the hopes of bringing Russia back into the war, as the treaty had to be ratified first by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party and then by a Congress of Soviets. This led to an increase of contacts between the Soviet authorities and the western powers, including Americans, notwithstanding the previously communicated instructions from the Department of State formally prohibiting such contacts. On March 4, Captain Jacques Sadoul of the French Military Mission, who later became an avowed Communist, arrived in Vologda bearing a message from Trotsky, who was now Commissar of War, to Ambassador Francis. 58 The gist of this message was: ( 1) that the Bolshevik leaders were now convinced that a real peace with Germany was impossible; (2) that the Bolsheviks maintained that even if peace were ratified, this would not be a material fact, as hostilities must break out again in April or May; ( 3) that they wished to know what help they could count on, particularly immediate help from the Allies; ( 4) that they intended to form a new army, which would not be a purely class army since they were ready to enlist the services of all Russians provided they be technically or professionally competent; (5) that they were anxious to have one or more American officers, particularly the military attache, in Petrograd. 59 Thereupon, Ambassador Francis authorized (first verbally and later in writing) Colonel James A. Ruggles, who had succeeded Judson as military attache and chief of the military mission on January 21, after the latter had been recalled from Russia, to proceed to Petrograd with Captain Riggs. The next day, March 5, Robins saw Trotsky, who handed him at his request an unsigned lengthy document in which the latter asked, among other things: 1. Can the Soviet government rely on the support of the United States of North America, Great Britain and France in its struggle against Germany? 2. What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future, and on what conditions-military equipment, transportation supplies, living necessities? 57. Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy-Democracy-Bolshevism (New York, 1919), p. 102. 58. Strakhovsky, The Origins, p. 8. 59. Riggs Papers, Military Note, March 5, 1918.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk 55 3. What kind of support would be furnished particularly and especially by the United States?60

Later in the day Robins saw Lenin, who approved these queries. Thereupon, Robins telegraphed its text to Francis in Vologda, but since he had the use of only the military code and since Ruggles took his cipher with him, the message could not be decoded when it arrived. It was eventually relayed to the State Department through the War Department by Colonel Ruggles, but had no effect on American foreign policy. But regardless of what was to happen, the Bolsheviks decreed on March 6 to transfer the seat of their government, and hence the capital of Russia, from Petrograd, too exposed to the Germans who then held Narva only one hundred miles away, to Moscow. Two days later, on March 8, Ruggles and Riggs, unaware of Robins's previous demarche, had an interview with Trotsky. Captain Riggs reported Trotsky's words in a military note written the same day: "All Bolshevik leaders were of opinion that they must make war on Germany -only differences of opinion were whether it should be tomorrow or to-day. The question of the ratification of peace was really immaterial. The only real point was the amount of effort and enthusiasm put into the formation of a new resistance for the future." 61 Captain Sadoul, who was present at the interview, noted: "The support of the United States has been officially promised." 62 On the same day the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party voted 30 to 12, with four abstentions, to accept the treaty of peace with the Central Powers. 63 These zig-zags in Bolshevik action are explained by a Soviet historian as follows: "After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk an immediate break with the imperialists would not have been profitable from a practical point of view. It was necessary to gain time in order to increase somewhat the capacity for the defense of the republic. Therefore negotiations with the Allies were not broken off."64 (There seems to be a parallel in this with the time in 1939 when Stalin negotiated with an Anglo-French mission while preparing to sign his pact with Hitler.) Then came the evening of March 16, when the Congress of Soviets, meeting in Moscow, was called upon either to accept or to reject the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Robins was present in his American Red Cross uniform. He related later in a most dramatic way to a Senate subcommittee how he was sitting on the steps of the platform on which the Bolshevik hierarchy was assembled; how Lenin beckoned to him and asked whether he had heard anything from his government (presumably an answer to Trotsky's queries), and how, after receiving a negative 60. Cumming and Pettit, eds., Russian-American Relations, p. 82. 61. Riggs Papers, Military Note, March 8, 1918. Italics supplied. 62. Jacques Sadoul, Notes sur la revolution bolshevique (Paris, 1920), p. 259. 63. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace (New York, 1939), p. 281. 64. N, Kornatovsky, "Lenin i Trotsky v borbe s interventami na Murmane," Krasnaya Letopis, no. 3(36), 1930, pp. 8-9.

56 Part Two. Intervention

reply, the Bolshevik leader announced that he was now going to speak for the ratification of the treaty. In view of all that happened since the signing of the treaty, and particularly Trotsky's statement to Ruggles and Riggs that the question of ratification was really immaterial, it is hard to believe Robins's contention that had the United States offered effective help at that time the treaty would have been rejected. In fact, the United States could not offer any effective help at that time in sufficient quantity to prevent Germany from further inroads into Russia if the treaty was rejected. Although Samuel Gompers sent a message to the Congress of Soviets in which he asserted "that the whole American Nation ardently desires to be helpful to Russia and awaits with eagerness an indication from Russia as to how help may most effectively be extended,"65 President Wilson's message sent on March 11 contained among flowery words of good wishes and hopes the statement that "the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render." 66 Consequently, the Congress of Soviets, after Wilson's message was read on March 15, accepted a resolution in which it advocated the overthrow of all bourgeois governments, including that of the United States. Gregory Zinoviev, the first president of the Third International, commented: "We slapped the President of the United States in the face." 67 It is not surprising, then, that the Congress of Soviets ratified the BrestLitovsk treaty in the early hours of March 17 by a vote of 784 to 261.68 Russia was definitely out of the war, but the government of the United States refused to recognize this as a fact. In a statement to the Japanese charge d'afjaires, the Secretary of State said: In the view of the Government of the United States recent events have in no way altered the relations and obligations of this Government towards Russia. It does not feel justified in regarding Russia as a neutral or as an enemy, but continues to regard it as an ally. There is, in fact, no Russian government to deal with. The so-called Soviet government upon which Germany has just forced peace was never recognized by the Government of the United States as even a government de facto. None of its acts, therefore, need be officially recognized by this Government, and the Government of the United States feels that it is of the utmost importance, as affecting the whole public opinion of the world and giving proof of the utter good faith of all the governments associated against Germany, that we should continue to treat the Russians as in all respects our friends and allies against the common enemy. 69

This ostrich-like position was based, of course, on the still lingering hopes that Russia would take some action which would keep the Ger6S. David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy (New York, 1921), p. 230. 66. Wilson, War and Peace, p. 191. 67. Francis, Russia, p. 230. 68. Wheeler-Bennett, Forgotten Peace, p. 304. 69. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 397.

Reluctant Preliminaries 57

mans occupied in the east and relieve the pressure in the west. The reaction of the press is characterized by the following editorial from the New York Times : It is the duty of the Allies to save Russia, not for Russia's sake so much as for the sake of the endangered world. But they must not count on any help from the Bolsheviks in saving Russia. . . . It is not possible to reason with them. No help is to be looked for from them, not because they may not desire to save themselves from the German hoof, but because all their measures are taken with the belief that the universal revolution must come first. Russia must be saved without them, saved in spite of them. 70

It was logical, therefore, that the next step should be active intervention in support of those who were ready to "offer sincere and organized resistance to the German invasion"71 in order not only "to save Russia," but also to save American lives. 70. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1918, Part II, p. 2. 71. Francis, Russia, p. 232.

6 RELUCTANT PRELIMINARIES

FROM THE BEGINNING of the formulation of interventionist plans, the United States government was reluctant to give up its non-interventionist policy. It was the pressure of the Allies and particularly the eagerness of Japan to intervene in Siberia which finally decided President Wilson and the State Department to adopt a "variation" of the original policy. Hence, American intervention in Russia was not only reluctant but actually passive, notwithstanding the fighting with casualties which American doughboys suffered in North Russia. 1 While the British government favoured from the beginning a Japanese intervention in Siberia, the American government had serious reservations concerning such an undertaking.2 American public opinion seemed to be divided, although there was definite apprehension as to the territorial and economic ambitions of Japan lest that power be permitted to act in Siberia alone. "Delicate and momentous questions of Allied diplomacy, charged with the gravest military possibilities, are raised by the proposal that Japanese troops intervene in Siberia," commented the

1. For the complete story of American intervention in North Russia see L. I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918; L. I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel (Princeton, 1944); and Lord Ironside, Archangel, 1918-1919 (London, 1953). 2. For the story of vacillations, indecisions, cross-currents, and reluctant halfmeasures in the policy of the United States government, see George F. Kennan, Decision to Intervene.

58 Part Two. Intervention Literary Digest editorially on March 16, and continued: "In our own press there is a decided conflict of opinion as to the advisability of Japanese intervention."3 Among the leading American newspapers, those supporting Japanese intervention in Siberia were: the New York Times, the New York Globe, the Boston Transcript, the Philadelphia North American, the Atlanta Constitution, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Los Angeles Tribune; those opposing it were: the New York Evening Post, the New York Evening Mail, the Springfield Republican, the Chicago Herald, and the Chicago Evening Post. 4 Thus opinion was divided, cutting across both party and regional lines. But the most impassioned opposition came from the pen of William Randolph Hearst, signed by his own name and published in his various newspapers across the country, warning of the "yellow peril."5 Early in March, attention was drawn to the situation in North Russia. On March 3, the day the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed, formally withdrawing Russia from the war, Admiral Sims telegraphed from London to Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, strongly recommending that a cruiser or old battleship be dispatched to Murmansk without delay. 6 After conferring with the State Department, Admiral Benson replied three days later that the United States would not send a warship to Murmansk for the present. 7 Nevertheless, the British government renewed its request on March 14, this time through diplomatic channels.8 The situation in Murmansk at that time was both complicated and delicate. A tiny settlement, officially named Romanov-on-the-Murman, it came into being as a port and railway terminal after the completion of the Murmansk railway in 1916. As a port, set deep in an inlet similar to the neighbouring Norwegian fjords, it was ice free even though situated over two hundred miles north of the Arctic circle. As a railway terminal it was the only direct link between European Russia and the Allies in winter when Archangel on the White Sea was icebound. Since the end of 1916, England and France had maintained in Murmansk a small naval force, mostly for convoying ships, and a staff entrusted with the handling and supervision of war supplies sent to Russia. RearAdmiral Thomas W. Kemp, who spoke Russian, was the British senior officer, residing on his flagship H.M.S. Glory, an old naval vessel, and his French counterpart was Capitaine-de-Vaisseau Petit, commanding the heavy cruiser Amira/ Aube. After the Bolshevik revolution Murmansk had its local soviet with which the Allied representatives main3. Literary Digest, March 16, 1918, p. 13. 4. Ibid., p. 14. 5. Ibid., p. 15. 6. Navy Department Archives (henceforth N.D.A.), Simsadus to Opnav, March 3, 1918, no. 4638, Very Secret. 1. Ibid., Opnav to Simsadus, March 6, 1918, no. 3532, Very Secret. 8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, II, p. 471.

Reluctant Preliminaries 59

tained formal relations. The United States was then represented by Lieutenant Hugh S. Martin of the American military mission who arrived in Murmansk by the middle of February, 1918. The drastic terms demanded by the Central Powers as a condition of peace, and the resumption of the German offensive on February 18, alarmed the population of Murmansk. On March 1, the Murmansk Soviet sent the following telegram to the Soviet of People's Commissars: The renewal of the offensive by the German imperialists and capitalists endangers the Murmansk region and the railway line. Desirous to defend the railway and the region the Murmansk Soviet proceeds to form a socialist army. Rumors persist that the Finnish White Guards and German irregulars would appear in the neighborhood of the railway. Representatives of friendly powers, the French, American and English missions stationed at Murmansk, continue to show themselves well disposed towards us and are ready to furnish aid ranging from food supplies to active military force, inclusively. Although desiring to save the fruits of proletarian victory, the Murmansk Soviet hesitates to take upon itself the decision concerning the defense of the region and of the railway, and therefore requests instructions particularly in so far as the acceptance of material and military help from the friendly powers is concerned. French and Czech troops, numbering about two thousand, en route to France, are stationed provisionally along the Murmansk railway. 9

The same evening came a reply from Trotsky, then Commissar of War: Peace negotiations are apparently broken off. Danger looms over Petrograd. All measures for its defense to the last drop of blood have been taken. It is your duty to do everything for the protection of the Murmansk railway line. Everyone who leaves his post without fighting is a traitor. The Germans are advancing in small groups. Resistance is possible and obligatory. Nothing should be left to the enemy. Everything valuable should be evacuated, if not possible--destroyed. You are obliged to accept any help from the Allied Missions and to erect all barriers to the advance of the plunderers. Your Soviet must give an example of bravery, firmness and activity. We have done everything possible to obtain peace. The brigands are attacking. We are bound to save the country and the revolution. No. 252. People's Commissar Trotsky. 10

Following these instructions the Murmansk Soviet concluded on March 2 a verbal agreement with the representatives of Great Britain and France for the mutual defence of the Murmansk region and the supplying of its population with foodstuffs. This agreement was submitted to Trotsky, who approved it in unreserved form a few days later.11 At that time White Finns, supported by Germany, were reported to have crossed the border into Russian territory. Consequently, the Murmansk authorities requested the Allied commanders to give them

9. Alexandra Dumesnil, trans. and ed., "L'lntervention des Allies a Mourmansk. Documents," Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, XIV, no. l, Jan., 1936, p. 44. 10. lzvestiya Murmanskago Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov, no. 57, March 2, 1918, p. 1 (author's italics). 11. M. Kedrov, "Nachalo interventsii," Pravda, no. 51, Feb. 21, 1935, p. 4.

60 Part Two. Intervention

active military support. In fulfilment of this request two hundred men of the Royal Marine Light Infantry from the Glory and one hundred French marines from the Amiral Aube were put ashore on March 9.12 This was the first landing of Allied troops on Russian territory after the Bolshevik revolution. It is understandable that in view of all this the British government desired the presence of an American man-of-war at Murmansk, not only to support the meagre Allied forces there but also to show America's solidarity with Great Britain and France in the face of a worsening situation in North Russia. In the meantime, the question of Japanese intervention came once more to the fore. On March 21, Admiral Benson cabled to Admiral Sims: "If for any reasons armed intervention in Siberia is decided upon it is of the first importance that Japan should not be permitted to act alone. This is the one point upon which everybody who knows conditions and sentiment in Russia is absolutely agreed." 13 But the next day Ambassador Roland S. Morris reported from Tokyo that "as a preliminary to any plan of intervention Viscount Motono [Japanese Foreign Minister] requested the British Government to agree that Japan should act alone." 14 On April 5 the first landing of Japanese armed forces took place at Vladivostok15 followed by a small British force.16 That same day Admiral Benson telegraphed to Admiral Sims: "Your 4638 our 3532. Take up with Admiralty. Does necessity for presence of U.S. man-of-war at Murmansk still exist and is it desirable to send vessels there?" 17 To this Admiral Sims replied three days later: "Your 4605. Admiralty believes it desirable that a U.S. man-of-war be at Murmansk for three reasons. First: A force of considerable strength may be needed at any time. Second : Russians of all classes should be impressed with the unity of the Allies. Third: Russian feeling for the United States is somewhat more friendly than for Great Britain so that some difficulties might be avoided if a U.S. man-of-war were present." 18 Consequently, the old cruiser Olympia was dispatched to Murmansk. All through the month of April the British and French exercised all kinds of pressure on the United States government to have it agree to intervention in Russia. Secretary Lansing summed up the position of the United States government when he said to Viscount Ishii, the new Japanese ambassador, on April 29: "It seems to me that the chief purpose of intervention at this time would be to threaten German domination over western Russia to such an extent that no German 12. N. Kornatovsky, "Lenin i Trotzky v borbe s interventami na Murmane," Krasnaia Lietopis, Leningrad, no. 3(36), 1930, p. 36. 13. N.D.A., Opnav to Simsadus, March 21, 1918, no. 4024, Very Secret. 14. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 85. 15. Ibid., p. 100. Schuman erroneously dates it April 4 (F. L. Schuman, American Policy, pp. 83, 86) . 16. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 105. 17. N.D.A., Opnav to Simsadus, April 5, 1918, no. 4605. 18. Ibid., Simsadus to Opnav, April 8, 1918. no. 6214.

Reluctant Preliminaries 61

troops could be withdrawn to take part in the battles in Flanders."19 The same idea was expressed the next day by the Washington Evening Star: "The interests of the Allies as regards Russia lie at this stage solely in the degree to which German troops may be required on the East front to preserve or restore order, or to hold the gains already made there. The paramount necessity of this time is to beat Germany in the West; to the extent that German troops are required in the East that task will be easier. Conversely, to the extent that German troops are needed in Russia, the German thrust in the West, designed to break the Allies, will be weakened. 20 A few days later the New York Times published a lengthy editorial in which it summarized the situation in Russia and advocated Allied intervention: . • . When the revolution occurred, a little more than a year ago, the Russian people were filled with joy. It was like the coming of the millenium. At last, after centuries of autocracy, after innumerable revolutionary attempts, liberty had come. The word "svoboda" was on every lip. Under the Provisional Government and under the Kerensky Ministry there was a nearer approach to liberty than the Russians could have hoped for during the preceding years. But the organizers of Russian liberty were not men of sufficient strength and resolution to guard and maintain it. In a few months they were overthrown, overwhelmed by the elements, not very numerous, but organized and determined, aided all the time and powerfully by the German agents and propagandists that worked among them, who seized the power of the Government and established proletariat control. The new Government was anti-social, it represented the will and purpose of the class struggle, it was not anti-German. It is hardly possible any longer to doubt that Lenin, at least, was acting under German direction, in the German interest. There were many others like him, and their influence was very great in the successive acts and policies, beginning with the disorganization and disbandment of the army and ending in the complete surrender of Russia into the hands of the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, which wrecked Russia as a nation and brought on the dreadful ills which now afflict her. Under the rule of the Bolsheviks and of the local Soviets throughout Russia, the new born liberty has been strangled in its cradle, the Russian people have known no freedom. The Bolsheviks dispersed the Constituent Assembly, a representative body chosen by the people themselves. No meetings are permitted save those of the Bolsheviks, no newspapers are allowed to appear save those which advocate their principles and support their Government. The doors of Russian prisons have closed upon many of the ablest and best men, sincere friends of Russian liberty, true representatives of real Russian opinion. That is not the worst of it. A people may be ruled by a despot and yet be reasonably happy and contended if they are permitted to make a living, if they have enough to eat and the wherewithal to clothe and shelter themselves. That is not true of the Russian people today. The industries of Russia are broken up, practically destroyed. The transportation system is disorganized. Production is at a dangerous minimum --even Germans are complaining that by refusing to plant crops the 19. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 145. 20. Evening Star, April 30, 1918, p. 6.

62 Part Two. Intervention Russians have violated a prov1s1on of the treaty. Throughout large areas of the old Empire the people are dangerously near to starvation, their suffering is so great that intimations are given that in some provinces there is danger of social disorganization, when every man will be forced to look out for himself. Capital, of course, is in hiding or has been seized by the Bolsheviks, as the peasants were persuaded to seize so many of the landed estates. . . . If the Allies could by any means reach the great mass of the Russian people, they could forestall Germany, they could initiate movements that would overthrow the Bolsheviks, they could lay the foundations of a movement that would deliver Russia from the grasp of Germany, and, it may be, ultimately put the Russians in a position to give them important reinforcement and aid in bringing the war to a nearer conclusion. It would be a task of very great difficulty, calling for the highest exercise of Allied statesmanship and diplomacy. Necessarily it would be a work undertaken through channels of civil communication, with military support. The beginnings might bring discouragement, but it is not alone their own interests in the war that the Allies have to serve. It is a work of humanity, of the greatest magnitude, and urgent. Its aims would be the deliverance of the Russian people from both the Bolsheviks and from the Germans. 21

These sentiments were echoed by the Washington Evening Star: "Strong sentiment that the Allied nations should assist Russia in readjusting herself and combat growing Germanic power has been increasing in Russia as well as in Allied capitals. Apparently there is no disposition to cooperate officially with the Bolsheviks. " 22 But Louis Edgar Browne, Moscow correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, advocated recognition and support of the Soviet government in order to bring Russia back into the war.23 And the Boston Herald asked: "Shall the poor Russian kiddling [sic] be left to the fangs of the German wolf?" 24 On May 26 the New York Times published a vigorous editorial entitled "Too late!" : How long are the Allies to sit by and watch Germany win the war? For win the war she will if she establishes her domination of Russia, and the Allies are sitting by and watching her do it. . . . "The war will be won in the west." But if it is won only in the west it will be lost. ... We must help Russia-not the Bolsheviks-because if we do not help Russia we, or at any rate our children, will be lost. And to help her we must cease to suspect each other, cease to get in each other's way, cease to say that we are the only one of the Allies whose motives are pure, when in fact we know nothing of the kind. This great emergency of the world, on which the future of everything we hold dear depends, is one to be dealt with by the tools at hand, whether American, British, French, Chinese, or Japanese, or all together.2s

But there was still a division of opinion as to whether the Japanese should be permitted to intervene in Siberia and whether intervention 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

N.Y. Times, May 4, 1918, p. 14. Evening Star, May 19, 1918, Part 2, p. 1. Literary Digest, June 1, 1918, p. 23 . Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 43 . N .Y. Times, May 26, 1918, Part II, p. 2.

Reluctant Preliminaries 63 should be carried out with the consent of or in opposition to the Soviet Government, as reported by the Literary Digest: "Most of our editors seem to feel that Russian prejudices make Japanese intervention in Siberia inexpedient. A joint military and civil expedition, in which America and Japan can take a prominent part, is widely demanded. But there is sharp division as to whether such a force should act in conjunction with or in opposition to the present Bolshevik regime. " 26 On June 3 the New York Times reiterated its position under the heading "Surrender Russia and Lose the War": It is absurd to suppose that all Russia is complacently given over to anarchy and likes it. No nation ever went unanimously mad. What Russia really is given over to is terror and silence. The spell can be broken. France had the same experience once in the Reign of Terror.... To end this one we do not need to kill any Robespierre; but we do need to speak the word that shall release the tongues and the good right arms of those "great multitudes of men, struck dumb with terror heretofore." We believe that, given a nucleus, they would so rise that the Allied force would have to do very little actual marching and fighting of its own. We believe that unless we supply these multitudes with a rock to rally round, we shall be giving Russia over to Germany. And to give Russia over to Germany means to give the future of the human race over to Germany. 27

In the meantime the Czecho-Slovak Legion rose against the Bolshevik authorities as the latter ordered them to be disarmed. Their units were stretched all along the Trans-Siberian, which permitted them in quick succession to occupy Novo-Nikolayevsk (Novo-Sibirsk), Omsk, and Chelyabinsk in Siberia on May 25, Penza in European Russia on May 30, and Samara (Kuibyshev) on the Volga on June 8.28 And on that day the New York Times wrote: "It is time to act in Russia," says ex-President Taft, writing in the Philadelphia Public Ledger. It is rather more than time. It was time to act in Russia long ago. The question is whether there is still time to act in Russia, and, if there is, how long will there continue to be time to act in Russia. "We must intervene now," says Mr. Taft. "We should at once confer with our Allies, including Japan and agree upon a plan." The Bolsheviks will disapprove, no doubt, but are we to murder Russia to avoid offending the Bolsheviks? . . . Is history to say that the democratic hope of the ages was slain by Germany and the Allies: by Germany with a sword in her hand, and by the Allies with a fat Micawberesque complacency that eternally hoped something would turn up and therefore did nothing at all? 29

The next day, June 9, the Washington Evening Star stated: "German influence is rapidly sweeping over Russia. . . . There is a constantly growing conviction in Entente capitals that the Allies must act at once, and if it is necessary the Bolsheviks must be ousted together with the 26. June 1, 1918, p. 23. 27. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1918, p. 10. 28. Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (London and New York, 1930), I, p. 112. 29. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1918, p. 10.

64 Part Two. Intervention

Germans."30 On the same day there appeared in the New York Times Magazine an article by Senator Poindexter of Washington urging immediate action in Russia in the form of an Allied intervention utilizing principally an army of two million Japanese. 31 The following day, June 10, Ambassador Bakhmetev forwarded to Lansing a resolution of the central committee of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party favouring Allied intervention to be submitted to President Wilson. 32 And on the same day Senator King of Utah introduced a resolution "that a commission be sent to Russia to cooperate with the American Ambassador and other representatives of our Government to overcome and neutralize German propaganda in Russia and to aid in Russia's economic, industrial and political freedom," and "that a military expedition be organized and sent by the United States of America in conjunction with its Allies, including Japan and China, to cooperate with the armies of the Russian people to repel the advance of German arms and to expel from Russia German military power and establish therein the authority of the people and Government of Russia."33 This resolution was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and there buried. Nevertheless, both Senator Poindexter and Senator King were attacked in radical circles, and a series of ·protests reached the White House. Among these was a lengthy memorandum by Joseph Goricar, a former Austro-Hungarian consul of Yugoslav extraction and of Pan-Slav sympathies, who proposed "the sending of an American Army of Peace, that is, an Industrial Army, into Siberia, accompanied by a force recruited from Americans of Slav origin as its protection [sic], with effects of an American peaceful invasion, bringing in its wake all the articles necessary to clothe, shoe and feed the Russian people and to revive their industries and bring into shape their whole railroad system."34 At the same time he proposed the sending of a Japanese expedition of half a million men to the Balkans in order to break through to Southern Russia and establish there a new Eastern Front. Needless to say, very little weight was accorded this and similar proposals. On June 13 the New York Times presented the following argument for intervention and indirectly answered the fantastic proposals of Goricar et al.: Precisely as if they were brand new, precisely as if nobody had ever thought of them or heard of them before, all the old trite arguments against intervention in Russia start up spasmodically the moment the idea begins to show unmistakable signs of gathering weight. Simultaneously there start into life a score of movements of sinister appearance, with Russian Evening Star, June 9, 1918, Part II, p. 4. Congressional Record, vol. 56, Part 11, pp. 11177-11179. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 198. Congressional Record, vol. 56, Part 8, p. 7557. 34. Joseph Goricar, ''The Way of Black Diplomacy," Slavonic Monthly, Dec., 1944, p. S. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Reluctant Preliminaries 65 names back of them, deploring the idea of any effective kind of intervention, and pointing out the great need of sending only money and shoes into Russia-into the hands of Germany. We know enough of Germany's methods to be scant of courtesy with this latter phase; but the first, the uprearing of the old and obvious arguments against intervention as if they were new and weighty, is perfectly honest and deserves respectful treatment. We are told, for instance, that we should offend the Bolsheviks if we sent an army into Russia; and we are further told that the Russian masses would misconstrue it and make common cause with the Bolsheviks. We are told -by the Evening Post-that we have no invitation from the Russian people, and that unless the will of Russia is with us we can accomplish nothing. We are told-the Brooklyn Eagle informs us-that the Kadet Party, which alone invites us, is not known to have any great strength or standing in Russia. We are told that Russia is "wholly mad"-it is The World that tells us this-and that it wants no "assistance from anybody except the apostles of classism, anarchy, confiscation, and repudiation." We will not say that things are true, but we will say that the possibility of their being true was obvious to everybody before the subject of intervention was brought to the front. And we declare that, granting them to be true-which is a thing we do not grant-it is still the duty of the Allies to intervene and save Russia from herself. It is their duty to themselves, to the world, to civilization, to the future, even if we leave Russia out of all consideration as being unworthy as The World thinks she is. We do not deny that the situation is full of complexities; but we do assert that there is one single, simple, utterly uncomplex fact in it. That is the fact that if we let Russia go the way she is headed, the world is doomed. On the salvation of Russia, whether she likes it or not, depends the salvation of all of us . . . . It may be that the will of the Russian people has not expressed itself, but it is not true that we must wait for that will to express itself, unless by that is meant that we should commit ourselves to the idea of never doing anything. For there is no way in which the will of that people can possibly express itself. We are glad to see that the Evening Post, which advances this argument, is not quite easy about it, for it says: A call for intervention has come from sources far other than the "reactionary anJ privileged" classes of Russia. When "Babushka" Breshkovsky, pioneer of Russian freedom, can call for intervention, when Vladimir Burtzev finds himself driven by despair to regret the revolution, when the Social Revolutionaries, organizers of revolution among the peasants, call for intervention, it is plain that something more than imperialistic reaction is at work in Russia. 35 Four days later the New York Times renewed its pleas, this time arguing for intervention in Siberia: In the general demoralization of old Russia there is one spot that has largely escaped. It is Siberia, where there is more of the old Russian spirit than anywhere else. The Siberians are holding out against anarchy and Germany, and General Semyonov's army affords a nucleus for the establishment of a nation that shall be neither Romanov, Hohenzollern, nor Bolshevik. But the nucleus will not be there forever. Time is passing and we are sinning away our day of grace. Are we to make up our minds at last to trust Japan and let her join with us and Semyonov in redeeming Siberia and putting a safety zone between German-ruled Russia and Japan, and are we to make up our minds only to find that, as usual, we have made them up too late?36 3S. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1918, p. 12. 36. Ibid., June 17, 1918, p. 12.

66 Part Two. Intervention It was obvious that the question uppermost in the minds of the American people was not only how to shorten the war but also how to save the lives of American soldiers. The Literary Digest commented: "The Germans are beginning to be worried over the prospects of Allied intervention in Russia." 37 At this time even Colonel House became alarmed over the situation in Russia, and on June 21 he wrote to President Wilson: "I believe that something must be done immediately about Russia, otherwise it will become a prey of Germany. It has become now a question of days rather than months. " 38 The next day, June 22, the New York Times wrote editorially under the heading "Help Russia While There is a Russia to Help": We must "stand by Russia" but are we to stand by Russia only as a bystander? Are we to stand by and look on? There are two ways of standing by a country. One was Lafayette's way of standing by the United States. The other is recorded in the tenth chapter of the Gospel of Luke. It is the way of the levite, who, seeing a man who had fallen among thieves and by them had been robbed, stripped, wounded and left half dead, "came and looked on him," and let it go at that. No doubt the levite "looked on him" sympathetically. The proposal to send troops to Russia is discussed as if the Allied force would have to force its way from Vladivostok to Petrograd all by itself. Whether this kind of discussion is disingenuous or ignorant makes no difference. The Allied force would be nothing more than a nucleus. The work of redeeming Russia would be done by Russians, Russians who would have the sure knowledge of this impregnable unit of support back of them. If Russia today is ruled by "the thug with a rifle," yet Russia has not become a nation of thugs with rifles. Russia is ruled by the thug with a rifle because the individual Russian cannot defend himself against this new despot of his. Give him a rock to put his back against, and he will defend himself fast enough. . . . The Springfield Republican loftily discusses the Times' suggestions as excellent "rhetoric." If it means that they are not ungrammatically expressed, we thank the Republican for whatever of compliment there may be in that. If it means that there is nothing in them but rhetoric, let us see. We propose that a civil commission enter Russia by way of Vladivostok, support Semyonov's demand for the election of a Constituent Assembly, and enable the inhabitants of each community to hold such an election. Is that rhetoric or sense? We propose that an Allied army, not necessarily a large one, shall accompany this commission to serve as a nucleus for the Russians desiring to rid their country of tyrants. We propose that a Red Cross Commission go along, distributing shoes, clothing, and other necessaries, and we propose, of course, that it shall be made clear from the outset that we have no intention of annexing any Russian territory. The alternative to this proposal is to keep on standing by Russia until she is dead. 39

Five days later, on June 27, the British landed their first contingent of 37. Literary Digest, July 6, 1918, p. 29. 38. Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York and Boston, 1928), III, p. 413. 39. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1918, p. 8.

Reluctant Preliminaries 67

troops in Murmansk. 40 And on June 29, the Czecho-Slovaks seized authority in Vladivostok after ousting the Bolsheviks.41 On the same day Senator King proposed an amendment to the National Defense Act to permit the recruiting of a Russian legion on a volunteer basis to be composed of Russian residents in the United States but not citizens thereof. This military unit was to be equipped, armed, and trained in America and then transported to Russia. 42 After debate and some modification in the text, the amendment was adopted, but it did not lead to an actual formation of such a unit. At this time there occurred an incident which clearly illustrated the position of the State Department with regard to Russian affairs. Mr. Sukin, secretary of the Russian Embassy in Washington, informed the State Depratment on behalf of Ambassador Bakhmetev that Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and a few other prominent Russians intended to visit the United States in order to plead the cause of intervention. However, the Assistant Secretary of State, W. Phillips, in giving the official reply of the Department on June 29, stated that Secretary Lansing thought "that it would be wiser for these distinguished Russians not to come to this country at the present time; that if Kerensky and Tereshchenko came over, it would be impossible to refuse the Bolsheviks." 43 Thereupon the matter was dropped. On June 30, Consul Poole telegraphed from Moscow: "The moment is peculiarly ripe for Allied intervention, of the unavoidable necessity for which sooner or later I trust the Department is also convinced." 44 Although Poole's dispatch was similar to many recommendations of this sort at the time, it was echoed in the press. The same day the Washington Evening Star wrote : "The hour approaches when the course of the Allies, insofar as the treatment of Russia is concerned, will be definitely known. It is upon President Wilson that responsibility for the decision undoubtedly will fall." 45 And the Boston Transcript echoed: "It is perfectly plain that the hour has struck for concerted Allied action in Russia." 46 Two days later, on July 2, the Supreme War Council decided unanimously that Allied intervention in Russia was an urgent and imperative necessity in order to save Russia from German domination, to help the Czecho-Slovaks, and to win the war. 47 Whether in response to this or, as some historians claim, independently of it, the plan of intervention (particularly concerning the Siberian angle) was taken up at a confer40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 41.

Strakhovsky, Origins, p. 60. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 239. Congressional Record, 56, Part 9, p. 8480. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 568. Ibid., II, p. 237. Evening Star, June 30, 1918, Part 2, p. 1. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 44. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 241-6.

68 Part Two. Intervention

ence held in the White House on July 6, which was attended by President Wilson, Secretaries Lansing, Daniels, and Baker, General March, and Admiral Benson. This conference adopted the following decision: 1. The furnishing of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition to the Czecho-Slovaks at Vladivostok by the Japanese Government; this Government to share the expense and to supplement the supplies as rapidly as possible; 2. The assembling of a military force at Vladivostok composed of approximately 7,000 Americans and 7,000 Japanese to guard the line of communication of the Czecho-Slovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk; the Japanese to send troops at once; 3. The landing of available forces from the American and Allied naval vessels to hold possession of Vladivostok and cooperate with the CzechoSlovaks; 4. The public announcement by this and Japanese Governments that the purpose of landing troops is to aid Czecho-Slovaks against German and Austrian prisoners, that there is no purpose to interfere with internal affairs of Russia, and that they guarantee not to impair the political or territorial sovereignty of Russia; and 5. To await further developments before taking further steps. 48

Although the decision of the White House conference remained secret, the New York Times wrote editorially on the same day about "Fatal Hesitation": If Russia is rescued from Germany and saved to the Allies, it will be by the sheer hazard of luck, not by action or merit of their own. In the long months since Russia cried to us for help by all the voices she could make heard or which we had a right to heed, she has been in peril of destruction or complete absorption by Germany, and all this time we, her friends of the western nations, have been conjuring up reasons by the score why we could not, must not, give her any help in the only way it could be given, and very much at our ease we have examined these reasons in detail, deliberately turning them over one by one in our minds, while Russia bled and suffered and trembled as her peril increased. Opportunity is extraordinarily indulgent to us. She still invites the Allies to save Russia, she beckons, she cries out, she expostulates, which is not the usual way with Opportunity. And all the time we hesitate, searching our souls for some new reason against "intervention" in Russia. Germany does not hesitate. She has seized upon the Russian Black Sea fleet, she is crushing down opposition to her rule in the Ukraine, where her measures are so rough that even the peasants are in revolt against her, those Russian peasants who, we have been told, were sick of war and would never fight again. Her forces are pressing on into the heart of European Russia and beyond, and she is striking at Archangel and Kola, our only avenue of communication with the Russians this side of the Urals. Meanwhile, in East Siberia, the Czecho-Slovaks are battling loyally against the treacherous and tyrannical Bolsheviks, quite without aid or encouragement from the Allies in whose interest they are valiantly fighting. They are in control of Vladivostok, they have demanded of the Soviet disarmament and surrender. American, Japanese and British naval guards are on duty there, but it is given out at Washington that Allied action was limited to preventing the departure from the 48. Ibid., 246.

Armed Intervention 69 harbor of four destroyers under Bolshevik control. If the Allies had a commission in Vladivostok today with a sufficient military escort, they could save Siberia. To withhold aid from Russia has been one of the most terrible mistakes of the war. And in the apportionment of responsibility among the Allies, our share is by no means the lightest. 49

Also on July 6, three important events occurred in Russia: (1) in Moscow Count Wilhelm Mirbach, German Ambassador to the Bolshevik government, was assassinated by two members of the left-wing Socialist-Revolutionary party, provoking a new wave of Red terror and strengthening the German hold over the Bolsheviks; (2) in far-off Murmansk the Presidium of the Murmansk Regional Soviet signed a special agreement with the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France, which formed the legal basis for Allied intervention in North Russia;50 and (3) at the other extreme, in Vladivostok, the commanders of Allied forces, including Admiral Austin M. Knight, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic F1eet, issued a proclamation to the population in which they said: "In view of the dangers which threaten Vladivostok and the Allied forces here assembled from the open and secret activities of Austro-German war prisoners, spies and emissaries, the city and its vicinity are hereby taken under the temporary protection of the Allied powers and all necessary measures will be taken for its defense against dangers both external and internal."111 Although "for months military intervention in Russia had been demanded by a large portion of the press,"112 the United States government refused to yield to public opinion. It took these unforeseen events to force its hand. Henceforth it was committed to military intervention in Russia, although it refused to acknowledge this fact and so continued to use half measures only. 49. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1918, p. 8. 50. Strakhovsky, Origins, p. 68. For the complete history of this agreement, see ibid., pp. 24-71. 51. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 271. 52. Literary Digest, July 20, 1918, p. 7.

7 ARMED INTERVENTION

ON JULY 7, Ambassador Francis telegraphed to the Department of State: "Crisis precipitated by killing Mirbach renders necessary immediate troops Archangel. Poole1 at Murman with forces wholly inadequate and plans to land Archangel first week in August with 5,000 men.

1. Major General Frederick C. Poole, British commander in North Russia.

70 Part Two. Intervention . .. The Germans will doubtless advance promptly with all force can command. If Allied troops advance, will encourage thousands of Russians who otherwise would remain inactive and permit Germany to restore order and gain secure foothold." 2 The next day the Washington Evening Star wrote that "chief among the considerations to stir this country into action in Russia are: (1) Assassination of Mirbach; (2) Revolt of the people of the Murman coast against the Bolsheviks. " 3 And the following day, July 9, the American Ambassador to France transmitted to the Secretary of State an appeal to President Wilson signed by representatives of the Union of Russians Faithful to their Country and Alliances, the Committee of Russian Republican Leagues, and the League for the Regeneration of Russia in Union with the Allies. It read: "We, Russians, the representatives of different political opinions, in this hour of desperate danger to our country, appeal to you, Mr. President, as the recognized champion of right and liberty, to advocate that the American forces in cooperation with all other Allies at once enter Russia, not to interfere in her internal affairs, but to assist us to expel the Germans from our native land. We do not recognize the Brest-Litovsk treaty and therefore still consider ourselves in a state of war with Germany." 4 The following day the Washington Post wrote editorially: The resurrection of Russia is not the long and heart-breaking task it has been held out to be, if the Allies will undertake it promptly and effect it according to well laid and workable plans. Let the Allies always work with and through the Russians, for the Russians, and they will win. The regeneration should begin in Siberia, where the people are unaffected by Bolshevism and are opposed to separate peace. With Siberia strong and organized, the redemption of Great Russia would follow in spite of German intrigue and German guns.5

Two days later a new argument for intervention appeared in a telegram from Consul Poole, who reported that Milyukov (former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Provisional Government and leader of the Constitutional-Democratic party) was conducting negotiations with the Germans for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and added: "It must be recognized that, if the Germans appear as the champions of a reunited Russia under a reasonable form of monarchy and vigorously put their project into execution, they will find wide support among the intelligent nationalist elements."6 On July 12, Senator Borah of Idaho rose in the United States Senate to say: 2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, II, p. 496. 3. Evening Star, July 8, 1918, p. 1. 4. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p, 272. 5. Washington Post, July 10, 1918, p. 4. 6. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 575.

Armed Intervention 71 Let us not in our wrath against individuals or isolated incidents lose sight of the great principles involved or lose faith in the great cause going forward or lose interest in the struggle of this great, brave people. Trotsky is an incident. Lenin is of no concern in the final adjustment of things. But the Russian people are of supreme concern and entitled to the sympathy, the counsel, and confidence of free peoples everywhere. They are entitled especially to the help and guidance, the unselfish and beneficent leadership, of this Republic .... I am not finding fault. I am adding a word of encouragement for the plans which I understand are being formed .... I have no doubt, from the evidence I have been able to gather, that there is a tremendous force in Russia among the masses of the Russian people who are not in sympathy with the German cause or the Prussian idea. In my opinion, there is every reason to believe . . . that there is a powerful force in Russia which would be perfectly willing to cooperate with any power which it believed to have entered Russia with an unselfish purpose and with a desire alone to aid the Russian cause. In my opinion, the Bolsheviks-that is, the forces of Trotsky and Lenin-represent a very small percentage of the real public sentiment in Russia .... If the United States were to enter upon a program of aid to the Russian people they would find the much larger percentage of the Russian people in harmony with their purposes. 7 The same day, Congressman Helm of Kentucky delivered a lengthy speech in the House of Representatives advocating intervention in which, strangely enough, he came to the defence of Emperor Nicholas II: It behooves the Allies not to forget the valuable service rendered by the Tsar when and as long as he was in position to do so. There has been no overt act on his part, so far as I have been able to ascertain, that justifies the conclusion of bad faith on his part toward his Allies. It is to be hoped that, in so far as it is possible, no opportunity has been neglected to convey to him the sympathy and the utmost assurance of the desire and anxiety of the nations with which he was allied to extricate him from the extremely deplorable situation in which he is now placed. 8

Paradoxically and tragically enough, only five days after these words were uttered the Tsar and his family were murdered at Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk). Two days later the New York Times wrote in a vigorous editorial: Confirmation of the report that the Supreme War Council at Versailles recommended recently that the United States join its Allies in employing military as well as economic forces with a view to rescuing the helpless Russian people from subjugation by Germany is said to have been received in Washington. No official statement is forthcoming, however, while France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan are waiting for President Wilson to decide what the American policy shall be. While they wait, hoping for the best, the Germans are losing no time, not an hour, in exploiting with ruthless energy the Russian people. To vacillate and hesitate is to lose a precious opportunity that will never come again. What possible reason can be given for indecision and delay, except that Bolshevik misrule and chaos are desired by the sorely tried people of Siberia and European Russia? As to Siberia, there is the sufferance, the 7. Congressional Record, 56, Part 9, pp. 9054-5. 8. Ibid., p. 9125.

72 Part Two. Intervention successes of the Czecho-Slovaks to prove that its people yearn for immunity from the Bolshevik menace. And how can it be doubted that if Siberia were made secure from German aggression by forces organized to save and not to subdue, the European Russians, who are between the German devil and the Bolshevik deep sea, would rise to save themselves?9

Finally, on July 17, President Wilson authorized "the sending of an American force to North Russia" 10 and on the same day the Secretary of State communicated to the Allied ambassadors a lengthy aidememoire, written by President Wilson himself. This document constituted the statement of America's foreign policy with regard to intervention in Russia, but because of its ambiguity, contradictions, and compromise, it failed to satisfy anyone and served as the principal source for all the misunderstandings which arose after American troops landed on Russian soil. At first it opposed intervention in the following unequivocal terms: "It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle." 11 But a few lines farther comes the astonishing assertion: "Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance."12 This, then, was a reversal of the previously stated principle, since the Czecho-Slovaks were then engaged in open hostilities with the Bolsheviks and co-operating in their struggle with anti-Bolshevik Russian elements. However, the next paragraph is even more astonishing: "Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense."13 Thus, while admitting the advisability of military action in Russia to help the Czecho-Slovak forces then fighting the Bolsheviks, President Wilson limited this help to the guarding of military stores and to a vague promise 9. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1918, p. 10. 10. L. I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918, p. 98. 11. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 288. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., pp. 288-9.

Armed Intervention 73

of aid to unspecified Russians "in the organization of their own selfdefense." To climax it all the aide-memoire stated that the United States government "feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw those forces, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself."14 But after having issued this threat to the Allies, President Wilson concluded amicably: "The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its associates. " 111 America's participation in the Allied intervention in Russia was further limited by the small number of troops which were to be sent to Siberia and to North Russia. On the same day that the aide-memoire was communicated to the Allied ambassadors, Secretary Lansing telegraphed to the Ambassador in Japan, Roland Morris, that the American government had made "a proposal to Japan that the United States and Japan each send a small contingent of 7,000 men to assist the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia."16 Five days later, on July 22, General March, Chief of Staff, cabled to General Pershing, Commander of American forces in France, that President Wilson had decided to limit American troops to be sent to North Russia to three battalions of infantry and three companies of engineers. 17 Neither of these decisions was satisfactory to the parties concerned. On July 24, the Japanese government announced that "for political reasons it could not bind itself to limit the force to 7,000 as it would be said by the people of Japan, and particularly the opposition, that the limitation was being imposed because of lack of confidence in Japan and its motives. " 18 Later Japan promised to limit its contingents to 12,000,19 but when it learned that the actual American strength in Siberia amounted to 9,014 men, 1,375 of whom, however, were non-combatants, it seized the opportunity given by the Americans, when they exceeded the quota, and speedily increased its own forces to 73,4002° notwithstanding repeated American protests. On the other hand, soon after the arrival of the 4,500 Americans in North Russia, the British and French governments requested the sending of five more battalions, but this request was not granted. 21 In the meantime the general public was unaware of the fact that President Wilson had agreed to limited intervention. On July 22, in a 14. Ibid., p. 289. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 292. Strakbovsky, Origins, p. 102 Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 301. Ibid., p. 330. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, p. 13S. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. S38.

74 Part Two. Intervention

copyrighted article, David Lawrence wrote: "Aid for Russia appears on the horizon at last as a definite and tangible thing. Our own government is not yet in a position to make an announcement." 22 Five days later the Washington Evening Star wrote: "Allied military aid to Russia is still under discussion and an agreement has not yet been reached. " 23 And the Washington Post admonished : "The crisis in Russia admits of no delay for the adjustment of nice points of procedure; the duty now is to proceed, not to stick at procedure." 24 On July 29 Consul Caldwell telegraphed from Vladivostok : "Siberian provisional autonomous government informed Allied consuls they consider essential that before Allied troops are landed here Allied Governments should make public declaration of position and purposes." 25 On August 1, Ambassador Francis queried from Murmansk: "When will American troops arrive here and how many? Think important their coming be expedited with all haste possible." 26 Finally President Wilson's silence had to be broken. On August 2, an inter-Allied force, predominantly British, seized Archangel, 27 and the same day the Japanese government published an announcement to the effect that having been recently approached by the government of the United States with proposals for an early dispatch of a military force to help the Czecho-Slovak troops and "being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission." 28 Consequently, the Acting Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk, issued to the press on August 329 a paraphrase of Wilson's aide-memoire. This was followed by an announcement that the United States and Japan would each send a force not exceeding 7,000 men. Commenting on this the New York Times wrote: Nobody in Russia, we imagine, save the Bolsheviks and other persons or factions acting in the German interest for the ruin of that great country, will resent the landing of the small, the very small armed force which Japan and the United States will jointly send to Vladivostok. There can be no menace to the territorial integrity of Russia in a military expedition of such moderate numbers, all told less than an American division. . . . The sending of these troops marks the beginning of a new period in the relation of the Allies to revolutionized Russia. It marks, too, the end of the long continued and persistent efforts in this country to bring about a recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States . . . . It is evident that the feeling, so long prevailing at Washington, that the sending of an Allied force into Siberia would be dangerous, since it might offend the Russians and move them to Strakhovsky, Origins, p. 103. Evening Star, July 27, 1918, p. 1. Literary Digest, Aug. 10, 1918, p. 14. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 315. 26. Ibid., II, p. 505. 27. L. I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel, p. 21. 28. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 324-5. 29. It appeared in the papers of Aug. 4 (Evening Star, Aug. 4, 1918, p. 1), 22. 23. 24. 25.

Armed Intervention 75 demand the aid of Germans to expel the invaders, has given place to a better understanding of the present temper of the Russian people. Evidence, abundant and convincing, that the Russians would welcome Allied deliverance from their perils has long been accessible to all in this country who would pay heed to it. 30

Other editorial writers supported this view and the Literary Digest summed them up under the heading "New Forces in Russia": "'Siberia is awakening,' notes the Philadelphia Inquirer, and 'the great northern section is arousing itself.' 'On the ruins of Bolshevism,' the New York Tribune sees a new Russia arising. And this new Russia 'which is being born in the northern steppes [sic] is,' it continues, 'a thing of sanity, not of disordered imagination,' 'a true realisation of the hopes of the revolution.' The Boston Transcript likewise now sees 'light in Russia.' " 31 The New York Times felt that "the Allied economic, reinforcing, and rallying expedition to Russia to aid her people to throw off the yoke of Germany and frustrate German designs is one of the most momentous enterprises of the war .''32 In the meantime new events further complicated the situation. On August 5, George Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, handed to DeWitt C. Poole, Acting American Consul General in Moscow, a note in which he protested against the British and French military actions in North and South Russia. 33 But on that very day Mr. Poole closed the consulate in Moscow and entrusted the protection of American interests in Moscow to the Swedish Consul General.34 After this there was not a single American diplomatic or consular office remaining on the territory under the jurisdiction of the Bolshevik government. And soon American troops were to land on Russian soil. On August 16, the 27th Infantry Regiment coming from Manila disembarked at Vladivostok to be followed a few days later by the 31st Infantry Regiment. 85 Commenting on this, the Literary Digest wrote under the heading "The New East Front": From east and north and south the armed forces of the great Allied democracies are approaching the task of redeeming Russia. As the Chicago Evening Post points out, these expeditions, while military in nature, are "moral and psychological" in purpose, for while "they are not sufficiently strong to oust the enemy or to suppress the Bolsheviks," they are doing a mighty work as "torch-bearers, spreading the fire of resistance among the Russian people and lighting the way back to national self-respect and freedom." And the Buffalo Express notes: "Wherever the Allied forces have penetrated, behind them have sprung up free republican governments, chosen by and representative of the local population."86 30. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1918, p. 12. 31. Literary Digest, Aug. 24, 1918, p. 8. 32. N .Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1918, Part II, p. 2. 33. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, pp. 659-60.

34. Ibid., I, p. 658. 35. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Die Diplomatischen Verhandlungen zur Amerikanischen Intervention in Sibirien, 1918-1920," Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, Jahrgang 3, Heft 2, 1938, p. 227. 36. Literary Digest, Aug. 31, 1918, p. 12.

76 Part Two. Intervention Finally, on September 4, the 339th Infantry Regiment, accompanied by a battalion of engineers, a field hospital, and an ambulance company landed at Archangel.3 7 For all practical purposes America was now at war with Soviet Russia and American opinion accepted it as a fact. In a summary entitled "Red Russia as Our Foe" the Literary Digest wrote: We may, says the Brooklyn Eagle, be loathe to declare war against the Soviet regime, "but we are at war with it." We must consider the Bolsheviks, declares the San Francisco Chronicle, "the common enemies of mankind." The time has come, states the Boston Transcript, for the most energetic action "for peace and liberty of Russia" against these "rascals." We must stand against the Bolshevik Government, our editors declare, both because of what they have done or intend to do for Germany, and because of what they have done and are doing to Russia.38 On the whole, the active though limited participation of the United States in intervention in Russia found little opposition, not only in America, but for the time being in Soviet Russia as well. Labour, business, and the general public continued to oppose Bolshevism, and the press reflected this opposition. Some papers, however, such as the Philadelphia Inquirer, felt that too small an armed force had been sent to assure the success of intervention, and others, such as the Philadelphia North American, declared that the delay had been too long and much valuable time had been lost in useless argument. 39 When General March stated that, in his opinion, the idea of trying to re-establish an eastern front in Russia with a little handful of Americans was ridiculous, the New York Times picked up the challenge and wrote: The real object of the cooperative enterprise is not to re-establish an eastern front in Russia, which military men hardly regard as practicable, but to wrench loose the Hun's clutch upon the throat of the Russian people and defeat the purposes of Germany. ... The Germans are working energetically to accomplish their design of exploitation of Russia. It can be foiled only by the military and economic intervention of the western Allies, the purpose of which is to rally Russian freemen to the standard of revolt and independence which has been set up for them by the heroic Czecho-Slovaks. Already the promise of success is very bright. No great Allied force will be required. America can certainly spare her quota. The western front is secure for the present. American reinforcements will keep it secure while Russia is being saved; and ultimately the A11ies will march to a decisive and glorious victory in France.40 Only the radical journals, the New York Call, already mentioned, and the weeklies, the Nation, and the New Republic, vehemently opposed intervention.41 37. Strakhovsky, Origins, p. 104. 38. Literary Digest, Sept. 21, 1918. p. 9. 39. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 44. 40. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1918, p. 6. 41. "Russia and Intervention," Nation, Aug. 24, 1918, p. 192; "Intervention vs. Economic Help," New Republic, Nov. 9, 1918, p. 31.

Armed Intervention 77 As to the Bolshevik government, the landing at Archangel only forced it further into the hands of Germany. Apparently it was informed of the start of the Allied expedition from Murmansk on July 31 for the occupation of Archangel, since Chicherin called on the German Ambassador Helfferich in the evening of August 1 and told him that, in view of the advance of Allied troops from Murmansk, the Soviet government was not interested any longer in its proposition made in Berlin that a combined Germano-Finnish force should attack the Allied troops in Karella. An outright military alliance was out of the question; but parallel action was possible. He told him further that the Soviet government intended to concentrate its troops around Vologda in order to cover Moscow. The proposition meant, in fact, that the Soviet government was asking the Germans to protect Petrograd so that it could concentrate on Moscow. This was confirmed on August 5, after the news of the Allied landing at Archangel had reached Moscow, when Chicherin told Helfferich that the Soviet government had decided to withdraw its troops also from Petrozavodsk, thus leaving the way from Murmansk to Petrograd unprotected, and that it desired the Germans to attack vigorously in that direction. "With this proposal," wrote Helfferich, "the Soviet government had obviously requested a German military intervention in Great Russia. It shows therefore in what deep water the Soviet government found itself then."42 Consequently negotiations were opened in Berlin for a supplementary treaty between the two governments. In the meantime, having learned that only a handful of British and French troops had disembarked at Archangel, the Bolsheviks recovered from their first panic. On August 10, Bruce Lockhart, the British agent, calling on Karakhan, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, found him all smiles and recognized at once that an intervention with inadequate forces would be disastrous to Allied prestige. "It was a blunder," he wrote in his reminiscences. "It raised hopes which could not be fulfilled. It intensified the civil war and sent thousands of Russians to their death. Indirectly, it was responsible for the Terror. Its direct effect was to provide the Bolsheviks with a cheap victory, to give them new confidence, and to galvanize them into a strong and ruthless organism." 41 Although some 200 British and French nationals, including consular officers, were arrested in the morning of August 5, the attitude of the Soviet government towards Americans remained benevolent. It is true that, after learning of the landing of American and Japanese forces in Vladivostok, Chicherin sent a protest to the governments of the United States and Japan on August 22,44 but in the night of August 2~27, some ninety-five American nationals left Moscow on their way to Fin42. Karl Theodor Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1919), III, pp. 466-7. 43. R.H. Bruce Lockhart, Memoirs of a British Agent (London and New York), 1932, p. 308. 44. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 358-9.

78 Part Two. Intervention land, leaving behind only Poole and Allen Wardwell, at that time head of the American Red Cross in Russia,45 and this notwithstanding the fact that on August 27 the "Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Central Powers" was signed in Berlin. Article 5 of this treaty stipulated: Russia will at once employ all the means at her disposal to expel the

Entente forces from North Russian territory in observance of her neutrality. Germany guarantees that during these operations there shall be no Finnis_h attack of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on Petrograd. 46

This, of course, made the Bolshevik government an instrument of Germany in the struggle of the Central Powers against the Allies and the United States. Then, on August 30, two events precipitated a crisis. In the morning, Leonid Kanegisser, a member of a cultured Jewish family and a promising poet who had served as a volunteer in the Russian army, shot and killed Uritsky, the head of the Petrograd Cheka-the dreaded Bolshevik secret police. In the evening of the same day, after delivering a blistering demagogic harangue at a workers' meeting in a factory in Moscow, Lenin was shot twice--once in the neck, once in the chest-by a young Jewish woman, Dora Kaplan, a member of the left wing of the SocialistRevolutionary party. A wave of unprecedented terror spread over the whole country. In Petrograd alone over 500 persons-none even charged with complicity in either of the incidents-were executed within two days, and a raid on the British Embassy building, resulting in the death of Captain Cromie, was carried out on August 31 . This new terror had its immediate reaction in the United States, creating a new wave of anti-Bolshevik feeling. The New York Times proposed that the Bolshevik leaders should be treated as outlaws. And the New York World referred to Russia as "the Judas of the nations."·47 Yet the Soviet government continued to treat Americans in Russia and the American government almost as if it hoped to bring about a cleavage between the United States and the Allies. On September 2, Chicherin, reporting to the Central Executive Committee on the state of Soviet foreign relations, described the deterioration of relations with the Allies, explaining the reasons for internment of British and French citizens, and then declared: "We have adopted a different attitude with regard to the Americans to whom measures of retaliation do not apply. Although the government of the United States has been obliged to consent to intervention, this consent is merely formal." 48 Two days later, Poole, still at liberty and unmolested and on the very day the American contingent landed at Archangel, wrote to Chicherin: "It is impossible for me to believe that you approve of the mad career into which the Bolshevik government has now plunged. Your cause totters on the verge of com45. 46. 47. 48.

George F . Kennan, The Decision to Intervene, p. 460. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 600. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 44. Severnaya Kommuna, Sept. 6, 1918, p. 1.

Armed Intervention 79

plete moral bankruptcy. . . . You must stop at once the barbarous oppression of your own people." 49 This letter remained unanswered. As he felt more and more isolated, Poole followed instructions received in a roundabout way from the Department of State and crossed into Finland on September 20 with the help of the staff of the Norwegian legation, which had now been entrusted to look after American interests in Soviet Russia. Thus ended the de facto diplomatic relations of the United States with the Soviet government. With the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, the whole problem of intervention in Russia, which was directed primarily against Germany, and aganst the Bolsheviks only in so far as they acted as German agents, had to be revised. Yet President Wilson decided to postpone any action until after his arrival in Paris for the peace conference. To an inquiry from Poole, then charge d'afjaires at Archangel, the Acting Secretary of State, Polk, telegraphed on December 4: "Signing of the armistice has created no change in the situation until the question of how further assist Russia, particularly after the withdrawal of German troops from occupied Russian territory, is determined by discussion with the Allied Governments at Paris. The President and Secretary of State have today sailed for France. " 50 Thus President Wilson and Secretary Lansing sidestepped the issue while the press continued to expose Bolshevism. The New York Times appealed to "Stop the Murder of Russians": The opening of the Dardanelles to their ships of war presents the opportunity and brings into view the duty of the Allies to put a stop to the bloody massacres planned and perpetrated by the Bolsheviks in Russia... . It can be stopped. The Dardanelles opens the way .. .. There are Allied warships in the Mediterranean. It is a work of mercy, of the saving of countless lives of men and women exposed to the fury of the wild beasts. It appeals powerfully to every instinct of humanity, to all friends of the true Russian people. The time is short. 51

The St. Louis Star added its voice of condemnation when it described Bolshevism "as the worst menace to democracy that now exists since autocracy has been overthrown." And the New York Tribune warned its readers that "there is more in common, emotionally and psychically, between Russian and German proletarians than has often been clear."52 On the whole, as the Literary Digest said, "beginning with The Wall Street Journal and ending with the San Diego Union, a considerable proportion of the American press is convinced the rocks of Bolshevism loom menacingly ahead." 53 Indeed, the menace of Bolshevism, not in distant Russia, but at home, suddenly loomed as a reality to a startled American people. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, I, p. 683. Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 574. N .Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1918, p. 14. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 44. Literary Digest, Dec, 7, 1918, p. 17.

PART THREE. WITHDRAWAL

8 AN INTERLUDE: THE CASE OF MARTENS

1918 there was a good deal of unrest in the United States as a result of industrial displacement following the end of the war. Pro-Bolshevik propaganda seemed to find fertile ground. Left-wing labour agitation, spearheaded by the Industrial Workers of the World, caused strikes and labour disturbances. Well-attended mass meetings were organized through the country. The war was over and the American people were longing for their peaceful everyday existence. Bolshevik agitators hammered on the idea that the Soviet government stood for peace, but that the victorious Allies were preventing the establishment of a general peace by making war on the Bolsheviks. On December 7, the Literary Digest summarized these happenings under the title "Bolshevik Mutterings Here": TOWARD THE END OF

In a small way that may mean little--or a great deal-Bolshevism, in no essential different from the doctrine behind the "Red Terror" in Petrograd and Moscow, has appeared almost simultaneously throughout the length and breadth of the United States. In New York and in San Francisco, in Chicago and Milwaukee, in Hartford, Connecticut, and in Laredo, Texas, "the red flag has been raised," a writer in the Hartford Courant points out, "as the symbol of a political system not merely in contrast with our own, but in definite antagonism to it." Great meetings in the Chicago Colosseum and in Madison Square Garden in New York, each with an attendance of more than ten thousand, became "glorifications" of that system of "economic and political tyranny, compared to which," in the words of the Omaha Bee, "the utmost despotism of the Tsar was mild and beneficent. " 1

This fear of Bolshevik infiltration led to a new wave of anti-Bolshevik feeling. Newspaper editors felt perfectly justified in expressing this feeling when referring to the Bolsheviks as "assassins and madmen" or "human scum"; or as perpetrators of "an atrocious campaign that shamed even the Germans and made the tyranny of Ivan the Terrible seem benevolent"; or as crime-mad leaders "for whom the noose yearned"; or as "beasts," "drunk from their saturnalia of crime in Russia" and "intent upon the destruction of civilization. " 2 Indeed, the "Huns" of 1917 and 1918 had become benefactors to humanity in comparison with such monsters as these. 1. Literary Digest, Dec. 7, 1918, p. 17. 2. Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 1917, pp. lSS-6.

84 Part Three. Withdrawal This fear was also manifested in the creation by the New York State Legislature of a special committee, under the chairmanship of Oayton R. Lusk, to investigate Bolshevism, and in the holding of extensive hearings on Bolshevik propaganda before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate.3 The latter was created upon a resolution of Senator Walsh of Montana that was adopted without discussion,• and was wholeheartedly supported by the American press which concurred with the Manchester (New Hampshire) Union "that not a minute too soon has the United States Senate authorized an investigation." 11 This subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, composed of Senator Overman as Chairman, and Senators King, Nelson, Sterling, and Wolcott, began hearings on February 11. Commenting on the testimony heard the first day and particularly on that of the veteran revolutionist Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaya, the New York Times wrote editorially the next day: Catherine Breshkovsky, who ought to know something about the Russian Revolution, says that "our greatest, deepest, most immediate need is the creation of conditions under which the Russian people will be able to convoke an all-Russian Constituent Assembly. Russia will never be quiet and satisfied" until that is done. A year ago, she says, the Allies of Russia and the proved friends of the Russian people could have made this possible, but "the opportunity was lost." The opportunity was lost partly because certain elements of public opinion in England and still more in America were persuaded that it would be illiberal to oppose the Bolshevik reign of terror, and partly because our Government feared the influence of Japan in an Inter-Allied expedition in Siberia. The action that was taken achieved the apparently impossible by bringing about almost all the evil results of all the courses that could have been taken. By seeming to make war against the Bolsheviks we incurred their hatred and the hatred of their sympathizers in other countries; by hitting softly we did no good to the greater part of Russia, and such districts as we did save from Bolshevik terrorism we are now about to give up. The Archangel expedition is very far from being successful in the military or political sense; while not all the stories that have been told about it need to be believed, the mere fact that at last accounts there were only 1200 Russians in the Allied army shows that it made no great appeal to Russian sentiment. The Siberian expedition was kept weak for fear of Japan, and according to rumor is soon to be withdrawn, leaving our Russian friends defenseless. If there is anything in the rumor that the Omsk Government, thus deserted, will appeal to Japan alone, those who thought that Japan would be too strong in an expedition of all the Allies may take what comfort they can from seeing Japan do the whole work without any Allied cooperation. It is hard to see what else they can do about it, for certainly the League of Nations is not going to begin by coercing the Russians with acceptance of Bolshevik rule. 6 3. United States Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda Hearings, Feb. 11, 1919, to March 10, 1919. 4. Congressional Record, 51, Part 3, p. 2654. 5. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 44. 6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1919, p. 12.

An Interlude: The Case of Martens 85

As the hearings of the Overman Committee continued to reveal "the ugly face of Bolshevism and its insidious ways," the American press became greatly excited. And when Colonel Robins testified that although in his opinion the Bolsheviks were sincere, their system was "economically impossible and morally wrong," the New York World exclaimed: "Out of the mouths of their favorite witness our parlor Bolsheviks' stand is refuted."7 It seems that the country as a whole really felt threatened. To this disturbing situation a new element was added when on January 2, 1919,8 Ludwig Christian August Karl Martens was appointed Soviet representative to the United States. Martens was born in the town of Bakhmut in southern Russia in 18749 of German parents, but he did not claim Russian citizenship. He served two years in the German army and at the outbreak of the war resided in England. It is not known when and how he met Lenin, but he claimed that he did. In August, 1914, he registered in England as a German alien and as such received a British permit to depart to the United States in December, 1915. He arrived in New York on the S.S. St. Louis on January 2, 1916, and registered as a German. He had lived in New York ever since, although he failed to register as an enemy alien after the United States entered the war. This information was derived from the official records of the London Metropolitan Police and of the United States Customs and Immigration at New York.10 Martens sent his credentials to the Department of State on March 18,11 but they were not even acknowledged. At the same time he sent a letter to Ambassador Bakhmetev, peremptorily demanding the surrender of the embassy building and its contents as well as all the funds of the Russian government. 12 With the approval of the Department of State, Bakhmetev ignored this demand. Meanwhile Martens opened offices in the World Tower Building at 110 West 40th Street in New York, assembled a staff of Communists, including the Finnish firebrand S. Nuorteva, and of fellow-travellers, and embarked upon active Bolshevik propaganda through the publication of a magazine Soviet Russia and through personal appearances. On March 27 he delivered an address before a mass meeting at the Central Opera House in New York in which he said: 7. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 44. 8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia (Washington, D.C., 1937) , p. 133. 9. Letter of May 19, 1919, from Heller, in charge of the commercial department of the Soviet Government Bureau in New York, to Congressman James P. Mulvihill from the files of the former Eastern European Division of the Department of State.

10. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 146-7. 11. Ibid., p. 133. 12. United States Senate, Russian Propaganda Hearings (Washington, D.C., 1920), pp. 32-3.

86 Part Three. Withdrawal Over the head of those who are trying to divide the workers of Russia and the workers elsewhere in the world, your expression of solidarity and affection will reach the Russian workers and give them new strength in their struggle for the rights of labor. ... It will be one of my main objects to place the Russian situation before the people of America in the light of actual facts, and I once more express my conviction that American workers will support my efforts to establish friendly relations between America and Russia. 18

This appeal to the masses over the head of the government aroused many nationally-minded organizations, spearheaded by the Union League Club of New York, to ask the United States government to curb Martens's activities. 14 These by now were extended to lure American businessmen to enter into trade relations with Soviet Russia. Consequently on April 26, the Department of State issued the following press release: "Rumors that American interests have been seeking concessions from the Bolshevik authorities have been called to the attention of the Department of State. As the government of the United States bas never recognized the Bolshevik regime at Moscow it is deemed proper to warn American business men that any concessions from the Bolshevik authorities probably would not be recognized as binding on future Russian governments." 15 Still a considerable number of tentative contracts were made by Martens with American businessmen, amounting to about $30,000,000, but none was executed: first, because the Federal Reserve Board had prohibited on February 14, "the exportation or importation of Russian rubles, or the transfer of funds for their purchase by persons and dealers in the United States,"16 and, second, because the American government refused to grant export licences to Soviet Russia for American goods. 11 But these futile commercial activities of Martens aroused no general comment except another warning to the public from the Department of State in a press release dated May 6, "that Mr. Martens has not been received or recognized as the representative of the government of Russia or of any other government," and that "as the United States Government has not recognized the Bolshevik regime at Moscow as a government, extreme caution should be exercised as to representations made by anyone purporting to represent the Bolshevik Government."18 On the other hand, Martens's political activities, including his appeal to Russians in the United States to organize in order to extend technical aid to the Bolshevik government, 19 and an address at a dinner in the Hotel des Artistes on May 22, when he said that "only the sinister blockade 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Ibid., p. 233. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1919, p. 5. U .S. Department of State, Press Release, April 26, 1919. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 167. Russian Propaganda Hearings, p. 63. U.S. Department of State, Press Release, May 6, 1919. N .Y. Times, May 18, 1919, p. 2.

An Interlude: The Case of Martens 87

prevents you from reaching a full understanding of the real situation in my country, and of the real aspirations of its toiling masses," and added: "I feel convinced that the economic blockade does not have the approval of the American people," 20 led to the introduction of a resolution by Senator King and by Representative Johnson on May 23, for the expulsion of Martens from the United States. 21 As time went on fears grew and tempers rose. On June 12, representatives of the New York State Legislative Committee to investigate Bolshevism, assisted by members of the state constabulary and accompanied by Archibald E. Stevenson, secretary of the Union League Club, who had procured the search warrant, raided the offices of the unrecognized Soviet representative. The offices were closely searched, after which Martens and some of his staff were escorted to the City Hall and examined in secret by the New York State Attorney General, Charles D. Newton. 22 The same day Martens sent to the Secretary of State the following protest: Thursday, June the 12th, about 3 o'clock, P.M., the office of the Representative in the United States of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic was raided by one Mr. A. E. Stevenson and a host of men purporting to represent some authorities. We were refused the right to consult with our attorneys and to communicate with anyone. They took away from our premises all our papers, files and records, and did wanton damage to the property of the Russian Soviet Government. In the name of the RSFSR I most emphatically protest against the indignity to which my office, and thereby the Government and the people whom I have the honor to represent, have been subjected; and on behalf of my Government I hereby reserve the right to proper reparation. Respectfully, L. MARTENS 23

Needless to say this protest and the threat to seek damages were ignored by the Department of State. The following day, June 13, Senator King in a letter to Attorney General Palmer requested the deportation of Martens together with other members of his New York bureau.24 Four days later, on June 17, a meeting to protest the raid took place at Madison Square Gardens, but drew only "a small crowd." 25 Addressing this meeting Martens said: My mission in the United States is an incident in a whole series of efforts on the part of the Soviet Government to persuade the United States to cease the military campaign against her and to lift the blockade by which the Allies are attempting to starve Soviet Russia into submission... . Russia does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countres, although it naturally 20. Russian Propaganda Hearings, p. 235. 21. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1919, p. 2. 22. N.Y. Legislature, Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Revolutionary Radicalism (Albany, 1920), I, p. 20. 23. Department of State, files of the Eastern European Division. 24. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1919, p. 4. 25. Ibid. , June 18, 1919, p. 8.

88 Part Three. Withdrawal entertains friendly feeling towards socialists in all countries... . Propaganda of communism in the United States is not the purpose of my bureau. Its only aim is to establish relations between the United States and Soviet Russia. 26

Martens must have held his tongue in his cheek when making this statement, while his political activity was in flagrant contradiction to it, but then he followed the advice of Morris Hillquit, a native of Russia but at that time an American citizen and practising New York attorney, who was chief counsel of the Soviet Russian Government Bureau. 27 As events developed in that hectic year of 1919, the tide of alarm at the Bolshevik menace whidi had swept the American people rose ever higher. When W. C. Bullitt's testimony before a Senate committee concerning his mission to Russia, in which he recommended recognition of the Bolshevik government, was made public,28 a new wave of indignation spread through the American press spearheaded by the New York Times. 29 Echoing the opinion of most newspapers, the Washington Post characterized proposals to recognize Lenin's regime as "one of the most sinister developments of these strange times."30 On October 10, Senator King renewed his demand for the deportation of Martens. 31 On October 20, Senator James W. Wadsworth, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, asked the Department of State whether the United States government maintained a blockade of Soviet Russia. In a reply Mr. William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, wrote on November 1 : .•. So far as the United States is concerned, no blockade exists. It is the present policy of this Government, however, to refuse export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under Bolshevik control and to refuse clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port. . . . It is the declared purpose of the Bolsheviks in Russia to carry revolution throughout the world. They have availed themselves of every opportunity to initiate in the United States a propaganda aimed to bring about the forcible overthrow of our present form of government. They have at their disposition in Russia a large quantity of gold .. .. It is considered important that the Bolsheviks should not be given the means through commercial transactions to bring this gold into the United States where it could be used to sustain their propaganda of violence and unreason. 32

As this letter was made public at that time, Martens seized the opportunity to deny the truth of its contents. In a letter to Senator Wadsworth of November 5, he said: "The Soviet Government is not attempting to overthrow the American Government by force or otherwise, but the 26. Russian Propaganda Hearings, p. 231. 27. Letter of Heller to Congressman Mulvihill. 28. The Bullitt Mission to Russia (New York, 1919). 29. N .Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1919, p. 6. 30. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 45. 31. N .Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1919, p. 13. 32. Department of State, Russian Series no. 2. Intercourse with Territory under Bolshevik Control (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), 1919.

An Interlude: The Case of Martens 89 Allied and Associated Governments have been attempting to overthrow the Soviet Government. These attempts have resulted in appeals by the Soviets to the peoples of these countries.. . . The State Department by stating that trade relations with the Bolsheviks would strengthen the Soviet Government indicates that it is interfering in the internal affairs of Russia." 33 But his activities belied his assertions. On November 7, the second anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power, Martens addressed a meeting in the Bronx of the Communist Labor Party of America, exhorting the "comrades" to stand by Soviet Russia and to work for the toiling masses. 34 On the same day, in a letter to Boris Brasol, an active Russian anti-Bolshevik, Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington stated: "Instead of eulogies, concessions, and negotiations of, to and with the Bolsheviks they should be denounced and proscribed openly."35 The mood of the country was becoming ugly. Attorney General Palmer now proceeded to organize nationwide raiding campaigns against radicals. Thousands of aliens of radical views were seized throughout the country and sent to New York for deportation. On November 13, the socialist daily New York Call was excluded from the mails by order of the Postmaster General.36 Trying to save his fellow-radicals, Martens wrote to the Secretary of State on November 15, protesting against "the unwarranted persecution and cruel treatment by federal and state officers of many citizens of the Russian Republic" and suggesting that "all those citizens of Russia whose lives are becoming unbearable in the United States were [sic] permitted to depart" with the Soviet government providing means of transportation from the United States to Soviet Russia. 37 On the same day, he was subpoenaed to appear before the New York Legislative Committee and to produce "all documents, letters, and other papers" received from the Soviet government,38 ostensibly those missed in the June 12 raid on his offices. His attempt to have the subpoena vacated failed and Martens did appear before the Lusk Committee on November 15, and again on November 17. Although he refused to divulge all of his correspondence with Moscow, he admitted in his testimony of November 17 that the Bolsheviks aimed at a worldwide overthrow of the capitalistic system. 39 For his refusal to produce all of his papers and to answer certain questions, he was declared to be in contempt and an application was made to the Attorney General for his arrest. On November 18, Martens sent a telegram to the Secretary of State protesting his treatment by the Lusk Committee,40 but to no avail. Neither the government nor the country wanted to have anything 33. Soviet Russia, Nov. 15, 1919, p. 14. 34. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1919, p. 2. 35. Boris Brasol Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 36. Schuman, American Policy, p. 189. 31. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III (Washington, D.C., 1936), pp. 687-90. 38. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1919, p. 1. 39. Ibid., Nov. 18, 1919, p. 1. 40. Soviet Russia, Nov. 29, 1919, p. 17.

90 Part Three. Withdrawal to do with him. Symptomatic of the feeling of the time were testimonials published on November 22 by Struggling Russia, the review supported by Ambassador Bakhmetev's funds, of twenty-seven prominent Americans including Elihu Root, Ambassador Francis, Nicholas Murray Butler, Samuel Gompers, George Kennan, Rabbi Stephen Wise, John Spargo, and Senators Harding, King, Overman, and Sherman, all strongly in favour of the anti-Bolshevik cause. 41 Finally, on December 21, the United States Army transport Buford, dubbed the "Soviet Ark," sailed from New York to Hango, Finland, with the first group of 249 deported Russian radicals on board, including the anarchists Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, 42 who later turned against the Bolsheviks after having spent some time in Soviet Russia. The Literary Digest commented under the heading "Shipping Lenin's Friends to Him" : The old army transport Buford joined the company of the world's famous ships when it sailed out of New York harbor at early dawn on Christmas Sunday with its load of alien anarchists and radical agitators under sentence of deportation from our shores.... Papers in all parts of the country write in congratulating the country on the departure of these unwelcome guests... . Only the Washington Post considers it as a "serious mistake," because it "enables anarchists who were practically harmless here to join the staff of Bolshevik leaders in Russia and to carry on from Russia effective warfare against the existing order in all countries."43

On January 2, 1920, a warrant for the arrest and deportation of Martens was issued by Attorney General Palmer and ordered executed by agents of the Department of Justice. 44 But it was not until December 16 that an order for the deportation of Martens was signed, in obedience to which he sailed from New York on January 22, 1921, on the liner Stockholm together with seventy-five other deportees.45 The case of Martens was closed. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

Struggling Russia, Nov. 22, 1919, pp. 514-47. Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 693. Literary Digest, Jan. 3, 1920, pp. 14-15. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1920, p. 1. Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 480.

9 AT THE CROSSROADS

of the case of Martens, a matter of internal security, the government and the people of the United States had to face many external problems dealing with Bolshevik Russia as well: first and foremost, America's participation in the Allied intervention in North DURING THE DEVELOPMENT

At the Crossroads 91 Russia and Siberia and, second, America's attitude toward the antiBolshevik governments. The war with Germany and her allies was over and the traditional spirit of isolation was gaining strength. The opening gun was fired by Senator Johnson of California who introduced a resolution on December 12, 1918, requesting the Secretary of State to send to the Senate, if not incompatible with the public interest, "all data, documents and information showing or bearing upon our present relations with Russia as to peace or war, so that the Senate and the nation may know why and for what purpose our soldiers are in Russia and what is the policy of the Government in reference to Russia." 1 On the other hand, leading the attack against half-measures in Russia, the New York Times wrote on December 17: Several months ago the Allies had to make a choice about action in Russia. They could go in or stay out; either course involved drawbacks and disadvantages. They chose to go in . . . and the expected and discounted disadvantages appeared. Certain sections of Russian opinion, duly inflamed by the enemy [Germany] reflected distrust of our motives, and the Bolshevik Government declared war.2 All of this was foreseen when the decision was made; we knew that these things would follow, we judged the good to be accomplished was worthwhile. In view of this, it is hard to see why the Allied Governments have so far followed a course which brings all the disadvantages of both alternatives with the benefits of neither. We went in with force enough to make all the trouble possible, but not with enough to give Russia a chance to save herself. . . . Having entered Russia for a purpose, why not carry out that purpose? . . . Sooner or later we shall have to do something with the Bolsheviks. We cannot leave them to continue their rule of murder unchecked; we cannot expect the starved, disarmed and terrorized population of Russia to overthrow them unaided. We shall have to do it some time; and if we wait another year we shall recover only cities of the dead. 3

At the same time, under the title "Troubles of Democratic Russia," the New York Times commented on Admiral Kolchak's interview given to an Associated Press correspondent in Omsk: Kolchak was chosen Supreme Governor of the Omsk Government by a decision of the cabinet which had hitherto had charge of the affairs of that organization, but says that his power is only temporary and that he is leaving civil affairs entirely to his colleagues. His appointment was necessary, he says, because the military situation demanded that power be put into the hands of one man, and because some of the members of the directorate were partisan and used their influences to disorganize the army. That is to say, in a group of five men which represented the soundest combination of democratic influence in Russia, men who realized better than anybody else the necessity of standing together for overthrowing the Bolsheviks before 1. Congressional Record, 51, Part 2, p. 1388. 2. Based on a statement by Lenin on July 29, 1918, at a meeting of the Moscow Soviet behind closed doors that a de facto state of war existed between the Soviet Republic and the Allies (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, I, p. 641). 3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1918, p. 12.

92 Part Three. Withdrawal attempting to get anything else done, there were some who insisted on putting their own political conception to the forefront even if they had to demoralize the strongest anti-Bolshevik army to do it. . . . From this distance it appears that Kolchak's appointment to a sort of constitutional dictatorship was the best thing that could have been done in the circumstances; but suspicion was unavoidable and apparently Semenov and Horvath are still unwilling to cooperate with him. The situation is not unlike that on the other frontier of Bolshevism, where Poles and Ukrainians are at war, Poles and Lithuanians at odds, and Polish parties quarreling among themselves while the Bolsheviks go marching on. It is another instance of the ease with which a fanatical and united minority can make headway against a leaderless and uncertain majority. A faction fighting for Bolshevik principles and by Bolshevik methods has as great an advantage over democracy as did the German Empire; and democracy can beat the one, as it beat the other, only by getting together.4

A week later the same paper advocated the immediate sending of more troops to Russia: Defeated and their form of government at least temporarily changed, the Germans as yet give no satisfactory proof that they have changed their objects or their methods. . . . Now, if the German object today is still what it was two years ago, what would be its principal object? To extend its influence in Russia. What would be the first necessity? To prevent Allied interference, Allied help, in Russia. What would be the first weapon called into use for that purpose? The propaganda. Whence arises this mysterious propagandist effort against interference with Russia, which we find in evidence all about us? We must do nothing, we are told, to offend the Bolsheviks; we must require an affidavit from every citizen of Russia that he wants us before we offer any help or undertake any intervention. Jealousy of one of our Allies is sedulously cultivated by every imaginable falsehood to make it impossible to send an efficient military force into Siberia. We are calmly told that Russia herself must endure starvation this winter, that there is no way of relieving Petrograd "from famine." No way of relieving Petrograd when there are millions of soldiers abroad and we are calling them home by the millions? It is not the means but the will that is wanting .... A military expedition starting at Odessa could even now overthrow our armed enemies at Moscow and save famine stricken Petrograd, and then meet the little force we have put in Murmansk. A sufficient force strengthening the poor little army we have put in Vladivostok can still save Siberia and the Czecho-Slovaks. It is not too late for action. It will be too late if the Allies' Russian policy continues to be strangled by indecision, and we know that there is indecision only because one group of the Allies wants action and another is still hesitating about it. 6

But this point of view was not shared universally. The Chicago Daily News asked, "Might not military intervention strengthen Lenin?" and

suggested na'ively as an alternative that "economic aid on the most generous scale be proferred to Russia, provided the Bolshevik ministry 4. Ibid.

5. N.Y. Times, Dec, 22, 1918, Part 3, p. 1.

At the Crossroads 93 gives way to a coalition government representative of all progressive parties." The St. Louis Globe-Democrat and the Syracuse Herald, among other papers, championed strong military intervention in editorials printed some days before developments sent a wave of doubt as to the efficiency of "armed pacification" over the American press. The Boston Globe, once an advocate of intervention, now reversed its position.6 On the other hand, the parents of the soldiers of the 339th United States Infantry Regiment, predominantly from Michigan, who were fighting the Bolsheviks in North Russia without a declaration of war, demanded either more intervention in Russia, or none at all. Senator Townsend of Michigan, speaking in the Senate "fairly voiced a large body of international opinion in his discussion of the fate of these Americans," in the opinion of the Literary Digest, when he said: "What interests me and interests the people everywhere throughout the United States is why these soldiers are there, and what is this indefinite, speculative problem which has yet to be solved at the peace table by the President of the United States. . . . I receive literally hundreds of letters and telegrams every day from the thousands of parents and friends in Michigan of these soldiers, who feel that their boys and their husbands are in that Godforsaken country practically lost, so far as the United States is concerned."7 On the other hand, part of the American press continued its assault on Bolshevism unabated. On December 30, the New York Times wrote: The fault which the Allies are committing in front of their new enemy, the Bolsheviks, is the same they so long committed in front of their old enemy, the German autocracy. They allowed the enemy all the advantages of the offensive and merely resisted at whatever point the enemy chose in tum to attack. It was not until the Allied command was unified that the Allies could do more than hold the Germans off. Similarly, the Bolshevik assault on civilization has all the advantages of the offensive. The Allies have not yet reached the idea that saved them from the Germans-the idea of a unified command.s

To this was added the voice of the Locomotive Engineers' Journal, the official organ of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, which wrote editorially in its January, 1919, issue: "In Russia, the Bolsheviks are repeating history, both in the beginning and the end. They dethrone autocracy and substitute for it the denial of the liberties of all classes. They kill, confiscate property without warrant of law, moral or written, and by their acts defend the principle that 'Might is Right.' " 9 When President Wilson advanced the idea that Bolshevism could be fought best by furnishing food to the starving people of Russia, American opinion remained divided, as summarized by the Literary_Digest: 6. 1. 8. 9.

Literary Digest, Jan. 11, 1919, p. 14. Ibid., p. 13. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1918, p. 8. Meno Lovenstein, American Opinion of Soviet Russia, p. 10.

94 Part Three. Withdrawal "Bribing Bolsheviks to be good" seems a doubtful policy to some of our editorial observers, who wonder, with the New York Herald, "whether bullets would not be more effective than bread against the spread of Bolshevism." "American opinion is not likely to favor buying off anarchy with subsidies of meat and grain," thinks the New York Evening Sun, while the Jacksonville Florida Times-Union suggests that while starvation may breed Bolshevism, it may also kill it.... In the main, however, we find our papers cordially indorsing President Wilson's plea for what the New York Tribune calls "a food-barrage against the spread of Bolshevism."10

At that time a prolonged debate on American policy toward Russia took place in the Senate. The opening gun was fired by Senator La Follette of Wisconsin, who asked on January 7, why American troops were fighting in North Russia. 11 Answering for the Administration, Senator Swanson of Virginia repeated the old platitude that they were sent there to prevent the establishment of a German submarine base and to guard supplies. 12 Two days later, on January 9, Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in answer to the resolution of December 12, 1918, introduced by Senator Johnson of California, made a formal declaration as to the reasons why American troops were sent to Russia. After reiterating the argument about submarine bases and supplies, he stated as a third reason the need to keep the way open for the travel of diplomats to and from Russia. The fourth reason he gave was the necessity of protecting the Czecho-Slovaks, and the fifth the prevention of the formation of an army of German and Austrian prisoners of war. He assured his colleagues, however, that since most of these reasons were not operative at present, the troops would soon be withdrawn. He said: "I presume that all the troops are coming out of Russia. It is merely a matter of time when that will be done." 13 In the debate that followed, Senator Borah of Idaho, after defending the Soviet government, remarked: "I have not criticized the sending of troops into Russia in the first instance ... and I do not now question the wisdom of having them sent there at that time. I simply say that at the present time I am unable to understand why the fighting should be continued under present conditions." 14 To Borah's defence of the Soviet government Senator Nelson of Minnesota retorted that "the Bolshevik Government is based on false economic principles and is in the hands of treacherous, unscrupulous and corrupt leaders. " 15 A number of other senators participated in the debate on which the New York Times commented editorially as follows: Senator Hitchcock sufficiently explained to the Senate why we had sent troops to Russia but he was not so fortunate in explaining why we had sent 10. Literary Digest, Jan. 25, 1919, p. 12. 11. Congressional Record, 51, Part 2, p. 1101. 12. Ibid., p. 1102. 13. Ibid., p. 1165. 14. Ibid., p. 1166. 15. Ibid., p. 1171.

At the Crossroads 95 so few. He said that the Administration had been criticized first for not yielding to the desire of Britain and France that a large force of troops be sent there, and then for sending any at all, and this, he said, illustrated "the embarrassment that confronted President Wilson in deciding what policy to adopt." Surely this does not properly represent the Administration. Confronted by two opposite criticisms, the President cannot have decided to compromise by trying to please both by sending troops but not troops enough. This is what Mr. Hitchcock implies, and he cannot be correct. The only question before the President was what would be right and necessary, not what would please two irreconcilable sets of critics. Mr. Hitchcock informs the country that we are in Russia in accordance with Marshal Foch's plans. "He insists, I understand, on maintaining the status that is there; in fact, he is anxious to have more done." If the Marshal is "anxious to have more done" it is for military reasons. It cannot be, despite what Mr. Hitchcock hints, that political reasons, a desire to please everybody, to carry water on both shoulders, can weigh against the Generalissimo's judgment of military needs. Senator King of Utah described the work of the troops on the Murman coast as a defensive campaign. "Does that mean," asked Senator Thomas of Colorado, "that the Czecho-Slovaks will be abandoned to their fate?" "I am afraid," replied Senator King, "that is the situation, although I would not want to go that far." He hoped that the Czecho-Slovaks would not be so abandoned. "We cannot find a strong enough term," he said, "to characterize such cowardice." He was not speaking of military cowardice, but of political cowardice. Surely the Allies do not want to incur the reproach that would be theirs if their gallant defenders were thus abandoned. Senator Borah's contribution to the discussion was unworthy of him. He expressed his belief that the Bolsheviks are supported by the people, and that "the Russian people have the same right to establish a socialistic state as we have to establish a republic." The nature of Mr. Borah's constituency does not excuse such an argument as this. It is not because the Bolsheviks have established a socialistic state that the world is afraid of them; it is because they are enemies of society. The attempt to represent the Allies as strangling an innocent republic because it is a socialistic one is one of which Mr. Borah must be ashamed, since he knows as well as anyone what the real state of the case is. Shall we wait for the Bolsheviks to conquer Europe and then carry their despotism elsewhere? Mr. Borah certainly knows that the life of no socialist in Russia is safe if he antagonizes the Bolsheviks, and that the other socialist parties have been suppressed by terror, and yet he unblushingly talks about the regime of anarchy and universal war as "a ~ocialistic state." Mr. Borah must pay the penalty of being known as a man of intellect; the same excuses cannot be made for him that are made for men of less intelligence, among whom are certain United States Senators. 16

Closing the debate on January 14, Senator Thomas of Colorado delivered a long speech on Russia in which he said: "I for one protest against the withdrawal of American troops either from the Archangel coast or from Vladivostok until every American and every dollar's worth of Allied property has been salvaged and returned. The complaint which I make is that the force which we sent to Russia was insufficient."1'1 16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1919, p. 10. 17. Congressional Record, 51, Part 2, p. 1392.

96 Part Three. Withdrawal

In the meantime the big powers at the Paris Peace Conference agreed on a common plan with regard to Russia and accepted, on January 22, the text of a proclamation drafted by President Wilson which was to be sent to all the belligerent groups-Reds and Whites alike-inviting them to stop hostilities and to send representatives to Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmora for the purpose of establishing peace in Russia. 18 This bombshell provoked lively debates in the United States Senate on January 24, when Senators Sherman of Illinois, King of Utah, and Myers of Montana vigorously opposed the idea of inviting the Bolsheviks to a peace conference. 19 The press, on the other hand, as a whole was favourable to the proposal. Although the New York Globe reminded that "those who sup with the devil need a long spoon," and the Boston Transcript stated that "we are not in a situation where we need to parley with murderers and robbers," 20 many American editors, who saw in the proposal another victory for President Wilson, displayed an attitude of more hopeful expectation. The Literary Digest summarized these opinions under the heading "Trying to Tame the Bolsheviks": "This invitation is right in line with sober democratic opinion everywhere," thinks the morning edition of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, which sees in it an "acid test" for Russia. President Wilson, thinks the Chicago Tribune, deserves "unqualified approval" in his treatment of the Russian question, for "surely there is no more sensible way of getting at the heart of the tumult than to meet with representatives of all the Russian revolutionary movements and talk it over." Even if the Russians reject the invitation, or fail to agree after accepting it, remarks the Brooklyn Eagle, "the proposal should still prove beneficial," because "it should remove all doubt of the justice and fairness of the Allied attitude toward Russia." And the Springfield Republican hailed the announcement of the Prinkipo Islands program as "the most hopeful news that has come since President Wilson sailed for Europe." 21

While all Russian anti-Bolshevik groups declined the Prinkipo invitation, the Soviet government accepted it. On February 4, Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments in Paris in which he proclaimed the readiness of the Soviet government to enter into negotiations to bring hostilities to an end and "to purchase such agreement at the price of important sacrifices" in the form of financial and economic concessions to the Great Powers.22 Dissatisfied by his failure to solve the Russian problem, President Wilson had then apparently made up his mind to withdraw American troops from Russia without delay. The reaction of the press was again mixed, as reported by the Literary Digest: 18. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, pp. 30-1. For a complete discussion of the Prinkipo proposal see L. I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel, pp. 139-52. 19. Congressional Record, 51, Part 2, p. 1976. 20. Literary Digest, Feb. 8, 1919, p. 16. 21. Ibid., p. 17. 22. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 39.

At the Crossroads 97 "We are sending Bolsheviks out of the country; and then we send soldiers after them!" pointedly comments the Chicago Tribune on the presence of American troops in Russia. "What a brilliant mess it is!" . .. The demands of Senator Johnson of California that our men be withdrawn are bitterly resented by papers like the Louisville Post, which supports the Administration. . . . Charles Edward Russell, writing in an article in Reconstruction (New York), repeats that the reasons which prompted the United States to consent to intervention were strong, but that the whole situation is now changed. 23 On March 3, Senator Mccumber of North Dakota took the floor vigorously protesting the withdrawal of American troops from Russia,24 but the Springfield Republican declared: "Thus far force has worked very badly as an antidote to Bolshevism. Is it not time to change the prescription?"25 And changed it was to be. On March 29, William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, telegraphed to DeWitt Clinton Poole, then charge d'af]aires at Archangel: "Withdrawal of American troops has not been passed on formally by Supreme War Council. The President however has approved withdrawal when spring conditions permit and his views have been communicated to British, French and Italian Governments." 26 The disaffection of American soldiers in North Russia, where one company of the 339th Infantry Regiment for a time refused to return to duty at the front, only hastened the matter. Commenting on this, the New York Times bitterly assailed the policy of the American government: American soldiers are not often unwilling to fight. There have been regrettable episodes in our military history-three-months' men whose time was up going home on the eve of battle in the Civil War, militia in 1812 refusing to cross the Niagara River to help hard pressed regulars because they could not constitutionally be called into foreign service-but the refusal of troops at Archangel to go back to the front has no parallel since the mutiny of some starving Continentals in 1781. This is a serious infraction of military discipline; there is no need to point out the consequences to the Allied troops at Archangel, or to the British, Americans, and Italians now going to their relief, if all our men should refuse to fight. An army whose officers have to explain to it before each battle whether there is any reason to fight or not is not a very trustworthy weapon for national defense, and the Archangel expedition was begun as a defensive measure, as part of the widespread plan-the other parts of which have been abandoned-to keep Russia from falling into the hands of the Germans. Bolshevik propaganda from the enemy's lines has no doubt been at work, and the Bolsheviks will be much inspired by what they regard as the disintegration of a capitalist army. But the men have something on their side. They pointed out to their officers that "the entire Bolshevik question was the subject of much political debate and indecision in the United States." These soldiers are fighting the Bolsheviks with whom they are not formally at war. While they are fighting under conditions of great discomfort, a fully organized diplomatic and 23. Literary Digest, March 1, 1919, p. 18. 24. Congressional Record, 51, Part 5, p. 4888. 25. Lovenstein, American Opinion, p. 45. 26. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 622.

98 Part Three. Withdrawal economic mission from the enemy with whom they are engaged is in New York sending out its propaganda undisturbed, trying to establish commercial relations with American citizens, and endeavoring to get formal recognition from our Government. Special missions sent into the territory of the enemy whom these soldiers are fighting bring back reports that he is a good fellow after all, and that we ought to make friends with him. Our Government invited him to come and talk it over at Prinkipo. But above and beyond these diplomatic transactions, a thing that must impress the army at Archangel is that we are not fighting this enemy anywhere else. Our Government has expressly refused to fight him or his allies in Central Europe. Our troops have gone into Siberia, but their officers have refused to assist the Japanese in action because "they were not sent there to fight the Bolsheviks." What were the troops in Archangel sent for? They do not know. We have neither peace nor war with Bolshevik Russia, our Government seems totally unable to make up its mind whether it wants peace or war. In the circumstances, soldiers who are engaged in a war which their Government refuses to support on any other front may not unnaturally wonder why they are being made the scapegoats of irresolution. 27

But this irresolution continued even after the fall of Hungary to Bolshevism. In a commentary entitled "Our Hand, or Fist, for Lenin?" the Literary Digest wrote: In this emergency the Paris correspondents are predicting the recognition of Nikolai Lenin as the de facto ruler of Russia-a prediction which the New York Tribune characterizes as "incredible" and "grossly insulting." Thus George Rothwell Brown cables to the Washington Post that "the Paris Peace Conference, at the instance of Great Britain, is disposed to recognize the Bolshevik Government of Russia at an early date, provided popular disapproval of such a step should not stay the hands of the Allied Powers at the last moment." As a Paris dispatch of the Universal Service puts it, "the Peace Conference must either negotiate with the Bolsheviks or constitute a definite front, with trenches and barbed wire, and all the other given indispensables of real warfare, from the Black Sea to the Baltic." Editorially the Washington Post predicts that the American people will not approve the proposal to recognize Lenin. "They are at war with Bolshevism and will not compromise with the enemy for any reason whatever."28

Then came the news that the Big Four at the Peace Conference flirted with the idea of extending de facto recognition to Kolchak in Siberia. The New York Times commented on this editorially under the heading "A Russian Government": If the Allies are about to recognize Admiral Kolchak's Government at Omsk, with which the groups in Southern Russia and around Archangel are affiliated, as the Russian Government, and to give it the material support suggested by Mr. Lloyd George, which will offer to Russians an opportunity to redeem Russia, there is good cause for satisfaction among all friends of the Russian people. In the first place, it is a sign of a Russian policy, and we have almost come to the point of thinking that in dealing with a question of such importance, and against an enemy so capable and uncompromising as Lenin, any policy is better than no policy. But this is much better than "any policy"; it seems to be the best course now possible.29 27. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1919, p. 14. 28. Literary Digest, April 12, 1919, p. 9. 29. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1919, p. 14.

At the Crossroads 99 Other newspaper reactions were reported by the Literary Digest: "The suggested policy of recognizing the Omsk Government pleases important papers like the Boston Herald, Philadelphia Inquirer, New York Times and Tribune, and Detroit Journal. Only the socialist New York Call is openly opposed to it. . . . On the other hand Mr. Fraser Hunt, the Chicago Tribune's correspondent in Russia, finds everyone asking the question: 'If not the Soviet Government, then what?' He believes that in Russia 'there is no organized group capable of taking over the Soviet power.' " 30 At that time the anti-Bolshevik armies both in South Russia and in Siberia gained important military successes. Under the title "Kolchak Advances" the New York Times wrote editorially on April 23: "Altogether, the Russian prospect is more encouraging than it has been for a long time. The recommendation to recognize the Bolsheviks, if it was ever made, has been 'smothered in committee' by the American peace delegation. Dispatches apparently based on good authority give to Secretary Lansing the credit for our decision to support the Kolchak administration, and it may turn out to be one of the soundest of the recent accomplishments of American statesmanship.31 Other newspapers were also elated at the prospect of anti-Bolshevik victory: "It seems to the San Francisco Chronicle that the Bolshevik forces are already a 'beaten army.' Almost daily, the New York Globe reminds us, come reports of Bolshevik defeats on every front. Most important of all in the general estimation is the advance of Kolchak's army in Siberia. . . . It is all especially encouraging to the Brooklyn Eagle, because 'for the first time the Russians themselves seem to be fighting the Bolsheviks successfully,' and 'this is the only way Lenin and Trotsky can be beaten.' " 32 Hopes for Kolchak's success were rising high. On May 10 the New York Times wrote: There begins to be the semblance of government in Russia. The Kolchak movement furnished the nucleus around which has grown all that is practical and enforceable in the movement for a real Russia as against the dismal tyranny which a minority set up after the overthrow of the helter-skelter government of Kerensky. That was better than Bolshevism, but it was hardly more really representative of all Russia than Bolshevism. . .. All this time there have been innumerable Russians crushed under the Bolshevik tyranny, yet, in their disorganization and helplessness, seeing no way out. At first their hope was in the Allies, and there is no doubt that if we had gone to their assistance, as we should have done, the period of agony for Russia would have been shortened. . . . But we hesitated, and perhaps the British hesitated; we know that the French and Japanese did not hesitate. The time went by when outside assistance could have saved Russia.33 30. 31. 32. 33.

Literary Digest, May 10, 1919, p. 15. N .Y. Times, April 23, 1919, p. 16. Literary Digest, May 10, 1919, p. 14. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1919, p. 14.

100 Part Three. Withdrawal During this time the Big Four in Paris were discussing the Russian situation once more. At a meeting on May 7, Ignace J. Paderewski, then Prime Minister of Poland, expressed the fear that a very powerful military Russia might develop under Kolchak. Lloyd George declared that he feared the restoration of an Imperial Russia more than he did Bolshevism, and Clemenceau added that he for one was afraid of both. President Wilson then suggested that they should demand from Kolchak a programme of reform upon the adoption of which would depend their continued material support. 34 And five days later, still optimistic, the New York Times commented editorially: It is apparent that the recognition of the Omsk Government by the Allied and Associated Powers cannot be long delayed. There is a report that before granting recognition Admiral Kolchak will be asked to restate his program, so as to make sure that he will call a Constituent Assembly; and perhaps there is no harm in this, though it seems an excess of caution in view of Kolchak's own declarations and the prominence given to the Constituent Assembly part of the program by those who are authorized to speak for Kolchak in other countries. 311

Following these developments, Senator King of Utah introduced a resolution on May 20, calling upon the United States government to recognize the Kolchak government as the de facto government of Russia and to advance to it credits, war supplies, and economic assistance for the overthrow of the Bolshevik tyranny and anarchy. 36 But this resolution was pigeonholed in the Committee on Foreign Relations as it did r..ot suit the Administration. But on the same day Senator La Follette presented a resolution adopted by the Legislature of Wisconsin for the speedy withdrawal of all American forces, 37 which was followed by a resolution of Senator Johnson of California to find out why 8,000 more American soldiers were to be sent to Siberia, as reported in the press,88 although the newspapers had clearly indicated that these were replacements of volunteers for the drafted men who had been originally dispatched to Vladivostok. To counter these steps, Senator Poindexter of Washington offered a resolution to ask the President why American soldiers were sent to Siberia "whether against the all-Russian Government at Omsk [meaning Admiral Kolchak's government] or the Bolshevik party," and why the number of troops "were so limited and so inadequate."39 Two days later Representative Mason of Illinois introduced in the House a concurrent resolution to withdraw all American troops from Russia. 40 34. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 341-2. 35. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1919, p. 12. 36. Congressional Record, 58, Part I, p. 63. 37. Ibid., p. 51. 38. Ibid., p. 63. This resolution with amendments was adopted by the Senate on June 27, over the protests of Senator King (ibid., S8, Part 2, p. 1864). 39. Ibid., p. 64 40. Ibid., p. 124.

AttheCrossroads 101 On May 26, the well-known note was dispatched from Paris to Kolchak. On June 4, Kolchak sent a carefully worded reply, which was accepted as satisfactory on June 12, by the Paris peacemakers.41 Thereupon the promised Allied military and material aid began to be sent to Omsk, but no recognition was extended. In the meantime the withdrawal of American troops from North Russia was started on June 3, and completed on July 28,42 but the troops in Siberia remained mostly as a counterbalance to Japanese troops. Yet the demands for the complete withdrawal of Allied troops from Russia were becoming louder, particularly because at that time the army of Kolchak suffered serious reverses. In a blistering editorial, entitled "Enemies of Democracy," the New York Times summed up the situation on June 30: What is it that they want, the men who demand a hands-off policy in Russia? Is it possible that they are anxious for a continuance of industrial demoralization and anarchy and the permanent overthrow of democracy? Here is Mr. Arthur Henderson in England announcing to the Labor Conference that British, French and Italian labor representatives have decided to make a general demonstration on July 20 or 21 to protest against Allied intervention in Russia. Here is Senator Hiram W. Johnson in the United States moving heaven and earth to get the few American soldiers in Russia moved out. What is it that they want? At the same time comes the news that the Siberian Army is retreating before a more powerful force of the Bolsheviks. The issue between democracy, which means the government of the whole people by the people, and the rule of one class over all other classes is clear cut. The fate of democracy hangs in the balance. Democracy calls for help. Senator Johnson and these British, French and Italian "labor representatives" call for the denial of that help. If they say that they would let Russia work out her own salvation, it is a fine impartiality they show between democracy and the control of one class over all other classes. Democracy is embodied in the idea of a Constituent Assembly, containing representatives of all classes elected by the people. Looking back, it is easy to see why the Bolsheviks dispersed that assembly. From their standpoint it was the right thing to do; for the Constituent Assembly represented democracy, and democracy is their foe, the thing they are trying utterly to destroy. The Bolsheviks take identically the same attitude toward democracy that was taken by the Tsar, though even the Tsar was willing to put up with a Duma. The Omsk and Archangel governments and General Denikin are fighting for the opportunity to elect another Constituent Assembly. Nothing could be more abhorrent to the new autocracy, which does not intend to allow any other class than its own to occupy other than a voiceless and subservient position. In this struggle between democracy and autocracy it is impossible to be neutral, and it is especially hard for democrats to be neutral. Democracies should help one another. That is what they have been doing for the last four years, with the result that there is only one tyranny left in Europe-that in Russia, the rule of one class over all other classes. 41. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 367-79. For a full story of these negotiations, see B. M. Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920, pp. 149-65. 42. Strakhovsky, Intervention, p. 194 fn.

102 Part Three. Withdrawal We have fought to make the world safe for democracy. Does that mean that it shall be safe for democracy everywhere but in Russia? And what are men who pretend to be democrats doing when they seek to cripple the Russian democracy and aid the Russian tyranny? Senator Johnson is a citizen of a free republic and assumes, we suppose, to be a believer in democracy. How does he reconcile his Americanism with his antagonism to democracy in Russia and his support of class rule? For, however he may disguise it, that is what his attitude comes to. He is proposing, as far as lies in the power of the United States, to cripple the cause of democracy and render aid and comfort to that of the new despotism. 43

But as this "neutralism" exemplified by Senator Johnson and born out of traditional American isolationism spread through the minds of American people, some far-sighted Americans, who saw clearly the danger of Bolshevik power, and some patriotic Russians in the United States joined hands. They organized groups and societies to combat Bolshevism both in the United States and in Russia. Of these the most influential and active were the American Defense Society and its vicepresident Dr. William T. Hornaday, the well-known scientist and director of the New York Zoological Park, the General Committee of Russian National Defense and its vice-president Mr. Boris Brasol, and the American-Russian Committee for the Relief and Salvation of Russia, Inc. and its vice-president J. E. Conner, former United States consul at Petrograd. 44 They issued books, leaflets, and pamphlets, wrote to the press as well as to members of the government and Congress, in an effort to sway American public opinion towards active support of the anti-Bolshevik cause. An example of these activities is the following letter to the press sent by Mr. Brasol in his capacity of vice-president of the General Committee of Russian National Defense and published by the Boston Transcript, New York Globe, New York Times, New York World, Philadelphia Public Ledger, Providence Journal, Springfield Republican, and Washington Post: The recent military reverse of Admiral Kolchak's troops is a matter of vital significance not only to Russia but to this country as well. The loyal Russian troops, under the supreme guidance of Admiral Kolchak, are battling against a world enemy, whose aim it is to destroy modern civilization and the very idea of equity and justice throughout the world. Bolshevism has grown into an international danger. The world's trouble makers, whose only law is anarchy, whose only aim is the Great Divide, have indeed nothing to lose since they never possessed anything. It is one of the fundamental rules of strategy that an endeavor must be made to destroy the very base of the enemy. Therefore, it is in Russia herself that Bolshevism must be hit on its head as hard as possible. With Trotsky and Lenin left out of the game, world Bolshevism would lose its impetus. The retreat of the Siberian forces on a wide front along the Ural Mountains is due largely, if not entirely, to the fact that loyal Russian troops are not adequately equipped. There is a distinct lack in heavy artillery, tanks, and medical supplies. With the war won, with Germany defeated, it should be 43. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1919, p. 10. 44. Boris Brasol Papers.

At the Crossroads 103 very easy for this country to supply Admiral Kolchak's troops with all kinds of ammunition. At the same time, this assistance would be in accord with the decision adopted by the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference. The American people should bear in mind that proper assistance rendered by them at the proper time to loyal Russia would never be forgotten by the latter. An American long-range gun firing in the plains of Siberia against the Bolshevik hordes would certainly appeal to a loyal Russian heart. The thunder of this gun-fire would remind the Russian people that they have real friends somewhere across the ocean, and that those friends are proving, not only by words, but also by deeds, their loyalty to a great people, their sympathy toward the unspeakable sufferings of Russia. 4 "

These sentiments were echoed by the New York Times in an editorial entitled "Half Hearted Wars": It took the Allies a long time to see the need of military unity in the war against Germany, and they never quite attained diplomatic unity. Any sort of unity in the war with Bolshevism seems still far away. For the Russian campaign the military high command seems to have worked out a practicable plan. The Bolsheviks have troops enough to overmatch Kolchak's invasion from Siberia or Denikin's attack from the south, but they cannot stop both at once. Just at present they are driving back Kolchak's forces, but Denikin is using the opportunity to make extensive advances which are bringing a serious threat to the whole Bolshevik organization. The plan now includes operation against Petrograd by Finns, Esthonians and a Russian army under General Yudenich; and when this force gets in motion, acting in cooperation with Kolchak and Denikin, there should be a good chance of success. But success in modern war depends to a considerable extent on war material. Some of the Allies are helping Kolchak; whether we are doing so or not remains a mystery to the general public, but apparently we are not. Meanwhile our Government is insisting that there must be no blockade of Russia. That is to say, if our Government has its way, the Bolsheviks may be allowed, for all of us, to import all the war material they need. This is straddling the fence with a vengeance, trying to be on both sides in the Russian Civil War. The Times thinks that the proper policy for America is full cooperation with the Kolchak Government, which has pledged itself to act only as trustee of Russian freedom and to summon a popularly elected assembly as soon as it regains control of Central Russia. That would be the best policy; the one which we seem to be pursuing is easily the worst. 46

Two days later, on July 19, the Secretary of War sent the following letter to Dr. Hornaday: Replying to your letter of July 7, 1919, I beg to say that every effort is being made by the United States Government to carry out the agreement of the Interallied conference at Paris with regard to the furnishing of war materials to the Kolchak government. Both arms and ammunition are now being furnished in considerable quantities by the United States Government. It should be borne in mind that the United States Government has not yet recognized any existing Russian Government. Yours very truly, NEWTON

45. Ibid. 46. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1919, p. 12.

47. Brasol Papers.

0. BAKER4'f

104 Part Three. Withdrawal When forwarding a copy of this letter to Mr. Brasol, Dr. Hornaday wrote: "I enclose herewith a copy of a confidential letter that I have just received from the Secretary of War. I am sure that it will greatly gratify you and your colleagues who have worked so long and so patiently to secure the end described in the Secretary's letter. The result now being achieved is chiefly due to your efforts, and in behalf of myself and colleagues in the American Defence Society I congratulate you most heartily on the success of your efforts." 48 But it was a Pyrrhic victory, as the aid was too little and too late. While the press still deliberated whether Admiral Kolchak can "rescue Russia from the abyss of Bolshevism and set her on firm foundations of democracy, or is he really attempting the restoration of a Tsarist regime,"49 and Mr. Arthur Bullard of the Committee on Public Information was criticizing him scathingly,110 the fortunes of war turned against him. On August 13, the New York Times commented editorially: There is nothing to surprise anyone in the news of Admiral Kolchak's defeat and the disaster which, unless he is superhuman, is to be expected. It is a defeat for which the responsibility is shared by the Allies. . .. Because of the failure of the Allies to give him help there is danger that the whole of reluctant and protesting Siberia will be turned over to the Bolsheviks . . . . If the Allies had adopted any policy, even a bad policy, the people of Siberia would have known where they stood. But the Allies had no policy at all .. .. The United States alone has been in a position to render help, because the United States alone can transport aid quickly to Vladivostok, the only place through which it can be sent, but the United States has given Kolchak only a shadowy and belated moral support. 111

A week later, on August 20, a new flood of resolutions to withdraw the remaining American soldiers from Russia was released in the House of Representatives, 112 and a few days later a delegation of nine Chicago parents called upon President Wilson and upon the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives urging the immediate recall of drafted men from Siberia. 113 On August 23 the New York Times charged again under the heading "Why Not a Russian Policy?": The Russian civil war is more violent than ever. . . . We are supporting neither our friends nor our enemies. . . . If Kolchak is a bad and undesirable person, then those who are opposing him must be right and we should strive to win their friendship. But we are doing nothing to win Lenin's friendship; and it appears from his own utterances that we could not even if we tried . . . . So recognition of Lenin is out of the question; but we seem still unwilling to recognize Kolchak. That is to say, whoever ultimately wins in the Russian 48. Ibid. 49. Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1919, p. 19. 50. Ibid. 51. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1919, p. 10. 52. Congressional Record, 58, Part 4, pp. 4085 ff. 53. Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy toward Russia since 1917, p. 162.

At the Crossroads 105 civil war, we shall have no friends; our present course is merely breeding distrust and hostility toward America in all Russian parties.114

On September 5 Senator Borah delivered another harangue, demanding the prompt withdrawal of all American forces from Siberia. 55 But the Administration continued to sit on the fence. On September 6, speaking at Kansas City in defence of the League of Nations, President Wilson referred to the Russian situation in his usually ambiguous way: "It does not make any difference what kind of minority governs you, if it is a minority. . . . The men who now are measurably in control of the affairs of Russia represent nobody but themselves.... There is a closer monopoly of power in Petrograd and Moscow than there ever was in Berlin. . . . And I want to say here and now that I am against the control of any minority anywhere."116 The same day, under the heading "Still No Russian Policy," the New York Times wrote: "The Lord only knows why they are in Siberia." The words were uttered by a member of the delegation of fathers and mothers of American soldiers who were heard the other day by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. They are Gospel truth and cannot be denied. No one has yet heard any reasonable explanation of why any American soldiers are in Siberia or of why more of them are not there. The soldiers are entitled to know what is the policy of the United States with regard to Siberia. They are Americans, and all that is necessary to make them ready to fight is to tell them what they are doing it for. So far the utmost they have been told has been that they are to protect the railroad and not take sides for or against the Bolsheviks. If we are not there to fight anybody, but only to protect property, the American people as well as the soldiers will be deeply interested in knowing why. What is "the job in Siberia," as the President once called it? Every one will agree with the President that, whatever it is, it has not been done; but what is it? Many people would like to know. The soldiers would like to know. Admiral Kolchak, most especially, would like to know. The Russians who have retreated before the Bolsheviks, because they bad not been supplied with arms, ammunition, or drilling officers, while the Germans had supplied the Bolsheviks with all the aid needed, would like to know. Even the Bolsheviks would like to know. And the American people would like to know. If there is any discontent among the soldiers, this is the cause of it. They are evidently not slackers: one was entitled to an exemption, but declined to avail himself of it. The father of another smuggled him off to the train, because of the mother's illness. They wanted to fight for a cause they understood. Make them understand what they are fighting for, and there will be no murmurs. But no man likes to fight in a fog without knowing who his enemy is or even that he has an enemy at all. But where the interests of the soldiers are come also those of the American nation. It has interests of a high and honorable kind in Siberia, in all of Russia, European and Asian, and it is entitled to know in what way and by what policy those interests are to be protected, if at all.111 54. 55. 56. 57.

N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1919, p. 6. Congressional Record, 58, Part 5, pp. 4896-902. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 119. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1919, p. 10.

106 Part Three. Withdrawal

As time went on, however, op1mon was swaying more and more toward an end to military intervention in Russia. The Literary Digest commented under the heading "Withdrawing Troops from Russia": Ambiguity and hesitancy still tincture the news regarding Russia, as well as much of the comment thereon, yet, with all due caution, editors are discussing the probability of the total withdrawal of Allied troops from Russia, and a possible new policy of non-interference and even of formal peace negotiations with the Soviet government. . . . In addition to various rumors and intimations there are such pointblank statements as, "the evacuation of the Archangel front by the British is proceeding as smoothly as could be expected." Such information leads editorial writers to discount other more or less indirect news of revolt, famine, desperation, and consequent eagerness for peace at any price in Soviet Petrograd or Moscow, or of "extensive military gains by anti-Bolshevik troops under Kolchak and Denikin."58

Only the Philadelphia Public Ledger now shared the firm stand of the New York Times when it wrote that the "real business of the Allies in Siberia" is "to help hold the Bolsheviks in check" so as to prevent them "sweeping down the coast and coming into contagious contact with the Chinese," while the New York Journal of Commerce advanced the idea of "a possible Russian policy" by supporting the separatist movements. 119 Toward the end of September the anti-Bolshevik Russians in the United States became alarmed by Secretary Baker's statement that war supplies to anti-Bolshevik armies fighting the Bolsheviks were going to be delivered on a cash basis. Thereupon the indefatigable Dr. Hornaday wrote the following letter to Senator Wadsworth, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, on September 29: I am much concerned by the statement recently issued by the Secretary of War to the effect that our government's aid to loyal Russia in munitions of war is on a commercial basis. This condition is also claimed in letters that I have received from loyal Russians in this country who are seeking aid for the foes of Bolshevism in Russia. The Secretary of War has himself assured me that the government has been furnishing military supplies to the Omsk government, but of course we know that if those supplies are limited to what the Russians can purchase and pay for in gold or its equivalent, the total amount will be very, very small, and our government and people will be entitled to no credit whatever in the matter. Deeming it of tremendous importance that the United States should afford extensive aid (and aid regardless of the commercial basis) in supplying arms, ammunition and medical stores to the armies of Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin and General Rodsianko, I now write to ask for this information: Has the Secretary of War authority, without special act of Congress, under the agreement entered into by the Allies at the Peace Conference at Paris, to turn over to the loyal Russian government surplus military and medical supplies left over from our war with Germany and now available? I certainly hope that your reply will be in the affirmative, because to limit 58. Literary Digest, Oct. 4, 1919, p. 17. S9. Ibid., p. 18.

At the Crossroads 107 our aid to the munitions that Russia can purchase of us is extending no aid whatever, and that would be a positive calamity to us as well as to Russia. I regard the crushing of Bolshevism in Russia as only second in importance, for the peace of the world, to the crushing of Germany.60

But the original willingness to implement the decision of the Paris Peace Conference was lost in red tape and imaginary obstacles, and whatever ardour there was at the beginning was now dimmed by further reverses suffered by Kolchak and the beginning of Denikin's retreat. The government in Washington was making up its mind to withdraw from Russian affairs altogether. On October 20, the Third Assistant Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long, informed Ambassador Bakhmetev that no additional American forces, as had been rumoured, would be sent to Siberia.61 The Administration was preparing to get off the fence, not without considerable criticism from certain quarters. In a letter to Boris Brasol of November 7, 1919, Senator Miles Poindexter levelled a finger of accusation against President Wilson and the Democratic Administration: In June, 1918, I published in the New York Times a full page article urging intervention in Russia and the reestablishment of the eastern front That was the time to have acted. I have never favored the vacillating policy of the Allies. I felt quite irritated at the weakness with which they yielded to the influence of the delegates of the United States at the Peace Conference. They seem to have over-estimated the authority of these delegates, although the gentlemen representing the Allied nations at the conference must have been acquainted with the character of the Government of the United States. Through the influence of the American delegates in my judgment great encouragement was given to the Bolsheviks and incalculable harm done to the world. It is unfortunate that European countries represented at the Conference displayed apparently equal irresolution. 62

As to what should be done at that time, Senator Poindexter continued: You yourself say in your letter that the small number of American soldiers in Siberia are not able to, and apparently are under orders not to, render assistance to the Kolchak government. This being so it is perfectly futile to keep them there. They are too few to be of assistance and apparently are not sent for the purpose of being of assistance. Their presence there is a mere source of irritation and a means of humiliation and dishonor to the United States, as indicated by recent incidents. Three or four thoroughly equipped divisions of American troops at the time of the armistice if sent into Russia could have restored peace and order. We have not those troops in Europe now and must adopt other means of suppressing the Bolshevik menace in Russia, which, as you well say, is a menace to the world. There are various ways in which this can be done. The loyal Russian Government should be recognized and every economic assistance should be rendered them. If troops are to be sent they should be in sufficient numbers to accomplish something.68 60. 61. 62. 63.

Brasol Papers. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 220. Brasol Papers Ibid.

108 Part Three. Withdrawal

But such measures were not in the plans of the Administration. While reiterating that "no compromise is contemplated with the Russian Bolshevik Government,"64 it was preparing to withdraw the remaining American forces in Siberia. In fact, it was returning to its original negative policy of non-recognition, non-intervention, and non-dismemberment. At the same time the possibility that not only American, but also Japanese troops might be withdrawn from Siberia alarmed certain segments of American public opinion. "Bitter criticism of the Japanese Government's policy in Siberia is voiced in some sections of the press," wrote the Literary Digest. "H Japan leaves Siberia to its fate," it continued, "the Bolsheviks, who are very strong in Siberia, will have the whole country in their power and will proceed to carry on an active propaganda throughout Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and China proper."65 Then came the long-anticipated news that Great Britain had decided to give no further aid to Kolchak or Denikin and believed that the time had arrived to see whether it was not possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet government. In a cable from Paris of November 29, Under-Secretary Polk reported that Lloyd George told him that "he strongly feels that Europe will be menaced by a unified Russia. On this account he thinks that Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, Finland, and possibly even Siberia, should be independent. "66 To this Secretary Lansing replied on December 4, in a cable to the American ambassador in Great Britain for transmission to Lloyd George, making the position of the United States government with regard to Russia a moral one: . . . The uselessness of reaching a satisfactory understanding with the Bolsheviks has been demonstrated by past experience. The ultimate aims of the Bolsheviks are hostile to all existing governments and any apparent compromise which they may make with these governments is vitiated by their avowed opportunism. . . . It is my conviction that neither Lenin nor his immediate followers will ever give up permanently the dream of a world-wide revolution and loyally enter into friendly relations with governments which are not communistic. . . . The American Government will give no support to the view that the dismemberment of Russia should be encouraged because a united Russia will be a menace to Europe. To take advantage of the present misfortune of the Russian people . . . would be a moral wrong and would pave the way for conflicts in the future. 67

This lofty prognosis left, however, a good deal to be desired, since the American government was not prepared to implement it by action. In a memorandum transmitted to the Japanese ambassador, Shidehara, on January 9, 1920, by the Secretary of State, the United States government announced its decision to withdraw American troops from Siberia 64. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 123. 65. Literary Digest, Nov. 15, 1919, pp. 21-2. 66. Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 126. 61. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

Splendid Isolation 109

"immediately after the leaving of the first important contingent of Czecho-Slovak troops, that is to say, about February tenth," 68 while the press commented: "Having most to fear from the spread of Bolshevism to Manchuria and Mongolia, Japan must carry on the war against Red Russia, no matter what policies of withdrawal may be followed by the Allies."69 This turbulent and chaotic year of 1919, marked by vagaries, indecisions, half-measures, pious hopes on one hand and procrastination and even obstruction on the other, ended in America's decision to withdraw from even semi-active participation in Russian affairs, but not before a militant blast from the New York Times on December 31, entitled "The War Goes On": Mr. Lloyd George has announced that the Allies are going to keep their hands off Russia, but Russia will not keep her hands off us. The next few weeks will undoubtedly see a "peace offensive" from Moscow of the sort that we used to have from Berlin and Vienna, and for the same purpose-an effort to stop the war, to make peace without victory, in order to strengthen forces for a new attack on the Atlantic world. Lenin and his colleagues have said that Bolshevism cannot live in Russia alone, have said it so often that even our Government so hard of hearing ought to have caught his meaning by this time. To succeed anywhere Bolshevism must prevail everywhere.70

But while the country was fighting its own Bolshevism by arresting and deporting alien radicals, the old spirit of isolation, dormant since America's entrance into the war, was asserting itself again. 68. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III,

p. 489.

69. Literary Digest, Jan. 10, 1920, p. 23. 70. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1919, p. 6.

10 SPLENDID ISOLATION

Times predicted, the new year of 1920 opened with a Soviet peace offensive. The reaction of the American press to it was on the whole negative. Under the title, "The Price of Red Peace," the Literary Digest wrote: AS THE NEW YORK

Peace or world victory in 1920, the new slogan of Bolshevik Russia, as condensed from New Year's messages and official statements, seems to some of our editorial observers to present, in the light of recent events, a far from fantastic hope.... It seems to several well-informed writers for the press that the withdrawal of Western nations, either by recognition of Lenin or by adopting a widely advocated "hands-off" policy, would be almost fatal to the cause of democracy. In sum, says Mr. Frank H. Simonds in one of his

110 Part Three. Withdrawal syndicated newspaper articles, "the West has quit its fight against Bolshevism at the headquarters of Bolshevism." .. . "The one enemy of mankind at present is the Bolshevik Government of Russia," the Baltimore American declares. "Make no mistake," the New York Tribune warns us: "peace will be unstable while the cancer of organized Bolshevism remains." ... A policy of neither peace nor offensive warfare, of refusing to deal with Russia under its present rulers unless they mend their ways, and defending the buffer states against Bolshevik arms, meets with more favor here. Two strong barriers against "Red" advances are, it is noted in the press, the Polish army on the west and the Japanese on the east. Poland has her entire army, estimated at about a million men, massed on the Russo-Polish frontier. If properly supported, the New York Times thinks that it can maintain a successful defensive almost indefinitely. The Japanese have officially declared their intention of preventing any further extension of "Red" power in Eastern Siberia. Japan has about 65,000 men in Siberia, the New York Tribune hears, and it believes "she can hold Eastern Siberia without much effort." 1

By that time, of course, Kolchak's armies had disintegrated and Kolchak himself was surrendered by the Czecho-Slovaks into the hands of a pro-Bolshevik group at Irkutsk on January 14.2 At the same time General Denikin's troops were in full retreat, hard pressed by the Red Army. Wrote the Literary Digest under the heading "The 'Red' Peril in Asia" : The truce of the bolshevized bear now walking manfully enough through his enemies to the east and south must either be rejected or accepted by the Western nations. In the absence of any definite recent announcement of American policy toward Russia, our newspapers call attention to the Lansing memorandum on Bolshevism just furnished to Congress. A further explanation of our policy is found in a letter written by Assistant Secretary Phillips to Mr. Desmaret Lloyd. Mr. Phillips says our government has not been the victim of any serious bad faith on the part of anti-Bolshevik Russians. "With respect to the Bolsheviks, however, we have had practically nothing but bad faith." One decision has, however, been made by our government which meets with considerable press approval, i.e., that the last of our forces in Siberia, now numbering about eight thousand men, will be withdrawn perhaps as soon as the end of next month. . . . The defense of Siberia against the Bolsheviks is now left to Japan, whose presence in Eastern Siberia arouses mixed feelings among our editors, some of whom are as emphatic in expressions of confidence in Japan's good faith as others are in expressing distrust. 3

Then a new element was thrust into the difficult Russian problem. On January 16, the Supreme Council in Paris decided to permit trade with Soviet Russia through the Russian co-operative organizations then still in existence.4 The reaction of the American press was again mixed. "The hand that feeds Russia is liable to be bitten," was the opinion of some sceptical editors. The Washington Post called it "Surrender 1. Literary Digest, Jan. 17, 1920, pp. 14-15. 2. George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, p. 316. 3. Literary Digest, Jan. 24, 1920, pp. 13-14. 4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, III,

p. 701.

Splendid Isolation 111

to Bolshevism" and the New York Times: "Peace by Surrender." On the other hand, a fairly large group of newspapers favoured the establishment of trade with Red Russia even on the limited basis proposed by the Supreme Council. These were : the Newark News, Buffalo Express, Philadelphia Press, Pittsburgh Leader, Chatanooga News, Boston Globe, Brooklyn Eagle, New York Journal of Commerce, and the Cleveland Citizen, a labour weekly.11 A group of American businessmen organized the "American Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia," but the American Defense Society, of which Dr. Hornaday was vice-president, pledged all its resources to oppose "this sordid campaign" to trade with "the enemies of civilization." The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce declared that the economic restoration of Russia "can only be accomplished by the overthrow of the forces of destruction which now have her in their grip" and the restoration of the forces of "law, order and property." The American Manufacturers Export Association took much the same position,6 and the American Federation of Labor reiterated its unequivocal hostility to the Soviet regime and vigorously opposed the lifting of the blockade and the establishment of trade relations. 7 The American government adopted a waiting attitude and for the time being still refused the granting of export licences or of clearance for American ships to Petrograd. But the question of trade with the Bolsheviks continued to preoccupy American public opinion. The opinions expressed were summed up by the Literary Digest under the title "Morality of Trading with Lenin": "Morals never count for much in government where profits beckon on the horizon," cynically remarked the Providence News, commenting on the virtual decision of the Allies to establish trade relations with Soviet Russia. . . . In a similar vein of misgiving the Albany Knickerbocker Press warned that if for the sake of gain "we enter into relations with that brutal tyranny" which is Russian Bolshevism, "we shall only be settling it more securely in the saddle." Trade relations involve diplomatic relations, said the Richmond Journal, and that means "recognition of the Soviet Government." . . . "The people of the United States regard the Bolsheviks as enemies and do not care to deal with them, no matter how ingenious the arguments which may be advanced by those who ignore the moral and political questions involved," declared the Washington Post . . . . "We believe that recognition of Soviet Russia would be a repudiation of all that our national life has represented for a hundred and fifty years and all the spiritual ideals for which modem civilization has striven for two thousand years," professed the National Civic Federation in a protest signed by Republicans and Democrats, labor leaders and bankers. . . . On the other hand, the Syracuse Post-Standard spoke for a considerable body of opinion when it urged the lifting of the embargo against Russia. ... And the New York World added: "We are not merely 5. Literary Digest, Jan. 31, 1920, pp. 14-16. 6. Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy, pp. 173-4. 1. Report of the Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor (Washington, D.C., 1920), pp. 367-72.

112 Part Three. Withdrawal hurting ourselves, but we are helping the Soviet Government of Russia as against the Russian people in maintaining the embargo upon trade with that country."8

Then came the tragic news that the valiant but unfortunate Admiral Kolchak was executed by a firing detail in the early morning of February 7. 9 The fate of the anti-Bolshevik movement was sealed and the Red troops took over Siberia. The Literary Digest commented bitterly under the heading "The Allied Muddle in Siberia": "Uniting the people of Siberia in favor of the Bolsheviks and the destruction of Kolchak, the man they supported, is now declared to be the sum total of the achievements of the Allies in Siberia. What is more, the only one of all the Allies to remain in that country is Japan, whose extreme militarist party has cherished for years the policy of domination in eastern Asia. Thus is democracy made safe in the Far East!" 10 But the question of trade with the Bolsheviks predominated in the minds of the American people. On February 27, Senator France of Maryland introduced a resolution calling upon the President of the United States "to communicate at once, through the Department of State, with the Government of Russia" in order to establish "full and cordial relationships of friendly intercourse, trade, and commerce."11 While Senators Poindexter, Moses, and King opposed this resolution, Senator Borah came to its defence, asserting that the Soviet government would "prove to be the foundation upon which a sane, free form of government may be established" and that the fact that the United States traded with the Tsar's Russia and accepted its gold was a precedent for trade with Russia under the Bolsheviks.12 On March 6, the Acting Secretary of State, Polk, cabled to the Ambassador in Paris: The American Government is ready to take any measures which are practical toward hastening the reopening of trade with Russia, but it does not feel that the public interest permits that representatives of the Soviet Government be received by the United States in American territory. On the other hand, the American Government feels that it is no longer warranted in continuing the existing trade restrictions, which originally were invoked purely as a war measure, nor in preventing longer such commerce as private enterprise may be able to effect with persons anywhere in Russia. For this reason the American Government intends soon to remove the restriction which it has imposed hitherto.18

But it took four months before the Administration carried out its intention. In the meantime the last contingent of American troops sailed from Vladivostok on April 1,14 and on April 4, General Baron P. 8. Literary Digest, May 15, 1920, p. 28. 9. Stewart, White Armies, p. 317. 10. Literary Digest, June 12, 1920, p. 29. 11. Congressional Record, SO, Part 4, p. 3554. 12. Ibid., pp. 3S5S-62. 13. Foreign Relations, 1920, III, pp. 703-4. 14. B. M. Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920, p. 183.

Splendid Isolation 113 Wrangel took over the command from General Denikin of the remnants of the White armies in South Russia. 15 Although the United States was at no time involved in the anti-Bolshevik struggle in South Russia, it had since the beginning of 1920 an unofficial representative there. He was Rear-Admiral N. A. McCully, who had previously been commanderin-chief of American naval forces in North Russia. His appointment was somewhat irregular and his mission ambiguous as revealed in the following letter from Secretary Lansing to the Secretary of the Navy of December 23, 1919: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 10, 1919, informing me that the services of Admiral McCully have been placed at the disposal of the Department of State for the purpose of a mission to the south of Russia, and to inform you that instructions have been sent to Admiral McCully through the American Embassy at Paris. Admiral McCully is informed that he is designated a Special Agent of the Department of State and directed to proceed to the south of Russia with a view first, to make observations and report to this Department upon political and economic conditions in the region visited, and second, to establish informal connection with General Denikin and his associates. It is left to Admiral McCully's judgment to determine the places which he will visit and the length of time which he will spend in each. He is informed, however, that his mission is a temporary one and that in the absence of other instructions it is desired that he should not remain in southern Russia longer than is necessary to enable him to form an estimate of the situation and accomplish any particular business which may from time to time be entrusted to him. Admiral McCully is informed that while he is the Special Representative of the Department of State, he is not accredited to any government of Russia nor charged with a particular diplomatic mission nor clothed with authority to commit this Government in any way. Admiral Mccully has been furnished with a code of the Department of State and has been directed to telegraph directly to this Department. Previously [sic] to Admiral McCully's departure from London, the American Embassy there was instructed to draw upon this Department for the sum of $5,000 and to deliver the proceeds to Admiral McCully to be expended by him for the transportation and subsistence expenses of himself and staff and accounted for to the Department. I desire to thank you for your kind cooperation in making Admiral McCully's services available to this Department. I am sure that the public interest is well served thereby. 16

With renewed anti-Bolshevik resistance in South Russia and the outbreak of the Soviet-Polish war at the end of April, hopes rose once more in America that the collapse of the Bolsheviks might still be brought about. But the voice of the advocates of trade relations with, or even of formal recognition of, the Soviet government was still loud enough to dominate public opinion. On May 14, Paul Hanna wrote in the New York Call: lS. General Baron Peter N. Wrangel, Always with Honour (New York, 1957),

p. 146.

16. Navy Department Archives.

114 Part Three. Withdrawal President Wilson is absolutely alone among officials in Washington in refusing to lift the trade blockade against Russia. Within the past week, Secretary Colby and all heads of bureaus in the State Department signed their names to a memorandum in which they informed the President that, in their judgment, the illegal and unauthorized blockade of Russia should be abandoned forthwith . ... Undersecretary Polk, a bitter and long standing enemy of Russia, is among those who informed the President that the time had come to lift the trade ban.11

The lack of any decision on the Russian question on the part of the United States government preoccupied the American public. On June 13, the New York Times published an unsigned dispatch from its Washington correspondent: In view of the diversity of issues which have sprung from the question of official contact with Soviet Russia, either through trade or political relations, there is a strong opinion here that the United States Government should take occasion in the near future to make official announcement of its Russian policy. This view is known to be shared by officials of the Government versed in Russian matters. . . . It is widely felt that the American Government has no specific Russian policy, and that matters pertaining to Russia, business or political, are not handled along the definite lines of carefully considered policy.. .. It is understood that the opinion is largely held in official circles that the Bolsheviks as the governing power of Russia are bound to collapse, but that no time can be set for such an event to take place. 18

Finally the American government made up its mind and on July 8 removed restrictions on trade with Soviet Russia. In a press release of July 7, to be published the next day, the Department of State announced: The restrictions which have heretofore stood in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia were today removed by action of the Department of State. Such of these restrictions, however, as pertain to the shipment of materials susceptible of immediate use for war purposes will, for the present at least, be maintained. Political recognition, present or future, of any Russian authority exercising or claiming to exercise governmental functions, is neither granted nor implied by this action. It should be emphasized, moreover, that individuals or corporations availing themselves of the present opportunity to trade with Russia will do so on their own responsibility and at their own risk. The assistance which the United States can normally extend to its citizens who engage in trade or travel in some foreign country whose government is recognized by the United States cannot be looked for in the present case, since there is no official or representative Russian authority with which this Government can maintain those relations usually subsisting between nations. The action which the United States is now taking in no wise constitutes a recognition of the validity of industrial or commercial concessions granted by any existing Russian authority. American citizens availing themselves of the present relaxation of restrictions are warned against the risks incident to the acceptance of commodities or other values, the title to which may later be brought into question. The situation which at present prevails, relative to travel from or to Russia, 17. N.Y. Call, May 14, 1920, p. 6. 18. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1920, p. 10.

Splendid Isolation 115 will be unaffected by the removal of trade restrictions. Passports for Russia cannot be issued, nor will any change be made in the visa regulations now in force. Since it is not desirable at this time to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Postal authorities, the Post Office Department will be unable to accept mail from or to Soviet Russia. There has never been any parcel post convention between the United States and Russia and this mode of forwarding goods is, therefore, unavailable. 19 This was accompanied by the following simultaneous oral announcement: While the indications are that Russia has but a small quantity of raw materials available for export, that the purchasing power of Russia is very limited, and that for these reasons there will not be any considerable trade, if any, with Russia, this Government, however, does not feel that the lawabiding people in Russia should be deprived of any assistance which can be derived from such trading, as may be possible. The attitude of the United States toward the recognition of any faction in control of Soviet Russia has not changed. This Government is not willing by means of political recognition to lend positive assistance to a faction whose disregard of the principles of democracy is evidenced at home by the maintenance of a minority despotism, and abroad by an insidious campaign of propaganda to subvert popular governmental institutions expressive of the will of the majority.20 Thus while yielding to public demand for the opening of trade with Red Russia, the American government not only warned United States citizens that they could carry on a limited trade with the Bolsheviks only at their own risk, but also reiterated its firm stand of no recognition, even de facto, of the Red regime. The reaction of the press was at first caustic, to say the least. "Washington denounces the devil, but stands ready to do business with him on a strictly cash basis," remarked the Buffalo Commercial. "The action taken during Mr. Colby's absence is an astounding departure, utterly incomprehensible morally and politically," wrote the Washington Post. And the Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch noted: "At any rate, the State Department's announcement indicates that we have a policy; up to this time we seem to have had no policy worthy of the name." 21 And to make its position crystal clear that it intended to remain aloof from any dealings with the Bolsheviks or their agents, the Department of State sent a directive to American diplomatic and consular officers on July 27 which enclosed the text of the announcement of July 7, and which stated: Recognition of the faction in control at Moscow has never been contemplated. Io its announcement the Department has endeavored to forestall any possible miscontruction of its action or any false inferences that might be drawn therefrom. 19. Department of State, Files of the East-European Division. 20. Ibid. 21. Literary Digest, July 24, 1920, p. 18.

116 Part Three. Withdrawal You will, therefore, take no action which, officially or unofficially, directly or indirectly, assists or facilitates commercial or other dealings between American citizens, whether domiciled in the United States or in foreign parts, and any persons, interests or institutions domiciled within that part of Russia now under the control of the so-called Bolshevik authorities, or which may in any way forward the interests of those authorities. 22

But the press, reviewing the situation in Europe where the fortunes of war were turning against the Poles and the Great Powers endeavouring to save Poland through negotiations with the Bolsheviks, felt that Soviet Russia was compelling recognition. The Springfield Union pointed out that, "if an armistice and peace is actually arranged with the Soviet Government, it implies recognition with all that it may imply." Even the conservative Washington Evening Star agreed that "to the Soviet must be at least given the recognition due to the existing power, with whatever loathing its past performances and whatever suspicion its future may be regarded." The New York Sun expressed the opinion that "strange as it may seem, the international vagabond of 1919 has gained the amazing position of being in control of European stability, and perhaps of world stability, in the year 1920."23 Then, on August 10, in a formal reply to an inquiry from Baron Camillo Romano Avezzana, Ambassador of Italy, as to the position of the United States regarding the Soviet-Polish situation, Mr. Bainbridge Colby, the new Secretary of State who succeeded Robert Lansing, defined America's policy toward Russia, reaffirming the three original negative principles adopted early in 1918. The policy of non-dismemberment was restated as follows: The United States maintains unimpaired its faith in the Russian people, in their high character and their future. That they will overcome the existing anarchy, suffering and destitution we do not entertain the slightest doubt. The distressing character of Russia's transition has many historical parallels, and the United States is confident that restored, free and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice. Until that time shall arrive the United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance.... We are unwilling that while it is helpless in the grip of a non-representative government, whose only sanction is brutal force, Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment, conceived in other than Russian interests.

The policy of non-intervention, which came into practice once more after the withdrawal of the last American soldiers from Siberia on April 1, was restated in a declaration of non-interference "in the internal affairs of the Russian people" while hope was expressed "that they will 22. Files of the East-European Division. 23. Literary Digest, Aug. 7, 1920, p. 19.

Splendid Isolation 117 soon find a way to set up a government representing their free will and purpose." Finally the note reaffirmed the principle of non-recognition and stated the reasons for it: It is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none disputes, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law; the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals. 24

The reaction of the American press was again mixed. "A backfire against the Bolsheviks was started when Secretary of State Colby's note to the Italian Ambassador regarding the Polish-Russian crisis was made public," wrote the Literary Digest editorially, while the New York Evening Post exclaimed: "At last we have a clear declaration of policy toward Russia," and the New York Times reminded that the note "is an indictment as well as a declaration of policy." The Washington Post pointed out that the note revealed "the utter incompatibility of American and European interests and aims" and "the spontaneous and enduring friendship between the Russian and American peoples." On the other hand, the Philadelphia Bulletin thought that the President "had thrown a monkey-wrench" into European affairs. A similar attitude was also taken by the New York Journal of Commerce, which maintained that "the United States has no status in the case." The New York Globe looked upon the note as "morally irreproachable, but practically meaningless," while the socialist New York Call dismissed the note by saying that it was "couched in the true Wilsonian verbiage" and the labour Butte Bulletin reminded the Poles that they were the aggressors.211 The reaction of loyal Russians in the United States was overwhelmingly favourable. Speaking for them, as president of the association "Unity of Russia," Boris Brasol wrote in a letter to Secretary Colby on August 21: It was with feeling of deep appreciation that I read your Declaration on the Russian Policy of August 10th, 1920. As a Russian, I was most favorably impressed, mainly by two points clearly brought out in your Declaration. Viz: (a) That the United States is opposed to the dismemberment of the former Russian empire. And (b) That the Federal Government declines both to recognize the so-called Soviet Government and to enter with it into dealings of any kind. 24. Files of the East-European Division. 25. Literary Digest, Aug. 21, 1920, pp. 11-12.

118 Part Three. Withdrawal The very tenor of your Declaration excludes the possibility of its misinterpretation by those who, because of personal, pecuniary or other reasons, may feel inclined to reach a friendly understanding with the Soviet regime of horror. It is highly gratifying that the Government of the United States has taken a definite stand on the Russian problem, which is, at present, the key to the World's situation.26

On the same day, Peter Struve, Minister of Foreign Affairs in General Wrangel's government, which had been recognized by France as the de facto government of South Russia on August 10,27 . that is the date of Colby's note, sent the following cable to Ambassador Bakhmetev: The Commander-in-Chief [General Wrangel] and the Government of South Russia have learned with great satisfaction of the views of the Government of the United States relative to Russia as expressed in the note of the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador. The main principles of this declaration, viz : the repudiation of the Bolshevik regime and the endeavor to safeguard the territorial integrity of Russia, correspond with the aspirations of the Russian national circles. These precepts are fully those which inspire the Government of South Russia and constitute its political program. Will you kindly communicate the above to the Secretary of State and express the most sincere gratitude of the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of South Russia for the valuable support which the United States is giving to the Russian national cause.2s

In transmitting this message to Secretary Colby on August 23, Ambassador Bakhmetev said : "It is needless for me to express to you my gratification of the response which your note received in loyal Russia." 29 Only the Soviet government, naturally, took exception to the note. On October 4, Martens transmitted to the Secretary of State a copy of his letter of the same day to the Italian ambassador which contained Chicherin's protest. After asserting that the note "contains an attack upon Soviet Russia's policy and her political system," Chicherin said: "Soviet Russia cannot leave unheeded these false and malicious accusations of a character quite unusual in diplomacy, and desires to bring them before the bar of public opinion." There followed a lengthy refutation of these "accusations" and then the letter concluded : "The Russian Soviet Government is convinced that not only the working masses, but likewise the farsighted businessmen of the United States will repudiate the policy which is expressed in Mr. Colby's note and is harmful to American interests, and that in the near future normal relations will be established between Russia and the United States. " 30 In the meantime the Department of State had dispatched to Admiral McCully a detailed questionnaire to be answered by General Wrangel as to the general policy of the South Russian government. Admiral 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Brasol Papers. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 254. Foreign Relations, 1920, III, p. 472. Ibid., p. 471. Ibid., pp. 474-8.

Splendid Isolation 119 McCully delivered it on September 6, and the same day received a comprehensive answer to it. "The Admiral, a sincere friend of our cause," wrote General Wrangel, "was simply beaming when he delivered this questionnaire to me. He believed that the American government's request for answers to its questions was a preliminary to America's recognition of the South Russian government.'"3 1 But nothing came out of it, because after an armistice was signed between Soviet Russia and Poland, the Bolsheviks concentrated all their might upon the forces of General Wrangel, which were overwhelmed and thus forced the evacuation of the last remnants of the White armies from the Crimea on November 16.32 The comments of the American press were varied. The Literary Digest summed them up under the title "After Wrangel, What?": Since the Baron has gone the way of the Admiral and his other predecessors, the question that remains to be answered is: after Wrangel-what next? "What next?" first of all, for the Allies who have been pursuing a policy which Colonel Roosevelt would have called "making war feebly." The policy comes in for almost unanimous condemnation from our editors; as the New York Globe speaks for them, "it is long past time somebody put an end to it." There were two paths with regard to Russia, either of which might have been consistently followed, says the New York World. "One was to let Russia alone and permit the Russian people to work out their own problems. The other was to war on Bolshevik Russia as the common enemy." The latter policy would seem to be the one favored by the New York Times and the New York Tribune, but the New York World declares that "a universal war on Russia was an impossible choice." The Brooklyn Eagle joins hands with the World in declaring that the one cool and wise and prudent policy is that laid down by President Wilson in the Colby letter on Poland. It is, as stated by the World: "Let Russia alone. Refuse to recognize the Bolshevik Government while it continues to conspire against the other nations, but respect the territorial integrity of Russia and wait for its people to find themselves." Most of the governments of the world, says the New York Evening World, "have by now either tired or become convinced of the futility of armed opposition to Bolshevism in Russia." But the socialist New York Call believes that "the collapse of General Wrangel's Crimean adventure" is "to presage early opening of relations between the United States and Russia," since "American business interests are anxious that America be not entirely left out of the rich Russian commercial possibilities."83

The election of Senator Harding to the presidency of the United States raised new hopes in Soviet circles as reported by the New York Call: "The Soviet Government believes that recognition will be accorded it by the United States when President-elect Harding assumes office. This is made evident in an article written by Leon Trotsky about a month before the presidential elections, in which he says: 'Neither in America nor in Europe is there anybody who doubts that Wilson is going to be 31. Wrangel, Always with Honour, p. 267. 32. Ibid., p. 32S. 33. Literary Digest, Nov. 27, 1920, p. 14.

120 Part Three. Withdrawal

replaced by Harding, who stands for a renewal of relations with Soviet Russia.' " 8• However, the American government had by now a policy and it was to pursue it even after the change of administration: trade, yes, by private American citizens and at their own risk, but no relations whatsoever with the Bolshevik government. To implement the first, the Treasury Department issued the following press release on December 20: The Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board announce that with the approval of the Department of State and in order to give force and effect to the action of that Department in removing restrictions in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia, as announced by that Department on July 7, 1920, all rules and regulations restricting the exportation of coin, bullion and currency to that part of Russia now under the control of the so-called Bolshevik Government, or restricting dealings or exchange transactions in Russian rubles, or restricting transfers of credit or exchange transactions with that part of Russia now under the control of the so-called Bolshevik Government have been suspended, effective December 18, 1920, until further notice.85

But three days later, on December 23, it warned the United States Mint not to accept gold "to which any possible suspicion of Soviet origin arises. " 36 The American government could not and would not prevent American citizens any more from "dirtying" their hands with Bolshevik gold, but it was determined to keep its own clean. Having pursued a devious and often contradictory policy toward Russia, at times with the support of, and at other times against, expressed public opinion, it was now cloaking itself with the mantle of isolation and this time was wholly supported by the American people through three successive Republican administrations. 34. N.Y. Call, Nov. 24, 1920, p. 6. 3S. Files of the East-European Division. 36. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

arises: Why were American policies and public opinion toward Russia so confused and hence ineffectual? First of all, of course, was the state of mind in which Americans found themselves at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917. They believed firmly that their thinking and their way of life were of a superior quality and would naturally be adopted by any other people as soon as they became free to choose their institutions. Having emerged as a nation following a revolution, they were easily aroused to sympathy toward revolution in states and nations where, in their opinion, democracy, as they knew it, was absent. "We have here," writes Kennan, "perhaps, another manifestation of that curious law which so often makes Americans, inveterately conservative at home, the partisans of radical change everywhere else." 1 This applies not only to the rank and file of the people, but also to their leaders, who are entrusted with the conduct of American foreign policy and the shaping of public opinion. Thus, from the beginning, there was a pre-conditioning which precluded a clear understanding and evaluation of the situation in Russia. In the second place, there were too many sources of information and advice, none of which was adequately reliable. The men supplying the information were all new to the Russian scene, did not know either the history or the language of the country, and were men of inordinate ambition, such as Thompson, men moved by emotion rather than by cold reason, such as Robins and Bullard, men easily influenced by others, such as Judson, or just "babes in the woods," such as Sisson and Ambassador Francis himself. All were amateurs playing most exacting parts in one of the greatest upheavals the world has seen. On this kind of information and advice the American government was supposed to formulate its policy and mould public opinion, if possible, according to it. "Thus there emerges the picture," writes Fike, "of Wilson and House making Russian policy based largely on information from unofficial sources while the official sources were rendered ineffectual by Ambassador Francis's lack of vision and initiative and by various personal factors which left the State Department largely by-passed.''2 ONE PARAMOUNT QUESTION

1. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 13 fn. 2. Claude E. Fike, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," p. 100.

122 Conclusion

It was, after all, Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, and the members of his department who were entrusted with the conduct of American foreign policy. But regarding Russia, there was no policy. What purported to be a policy consisted of makeshift day-to-day decisions which were intended to meet the ever changing situation in Russia. Finally, there was the personality of President Woodrow Wilson. Imbued with sincere idealism, but removed from reality and inexperienced in the affairs of Europe as a whole and of Russia in particular, he was facing the greatest challenge of his political life. Pre-conditioned in his views on Russia, as most Americans of his time were, he seemed not to understand the shaping of events there. Furthermore, he was concerned principally with the war. As William Bullitt testified before the Senate's subcommittee : "Colonel House said to me that he had seen the President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was preoccupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia, and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Colonel House."3 Thus, in the final analysis, Russian affairs were left in the hands of Colonel House, whose principal informant was Arthur Bullard. Together with Thompson, Robins, and Judson, Bullard formed that quartet which first argued for the support of Kerensky, then (in order to continue Russia's war effort) of the Bolsheviks, and "if worst came to worst, of anyone, in fact, but the old officers and the upper classes." 4 Consequently, no real help was given by the United States to the anti-Bolshevik White armies inspired, led, and commanded by former officers of the Imperial Russian Army. The question naturally arises: "Could there have been a positive and realistic American policy toward Russia supported wholeheartedly by public opinion?" Of course, one has to bear in mind that in 1917 and 1918 the United States was at war and hence its policies were dictated by the immediate war needs. Under these circumstances it is understandable that both government and people clung to every thread of hope of inducing revolutionary Russia to continue her effort in the war with Germany whether under the Provisional Government or under the Bolsheviks. It is clear now from all the available evidence that these hopes were ill-founded, but it is also clear that in the early months of its existence the Bolshevik government not only felt insecure, but feared Germany and her power more than that of France and Great Britain and particularly the United States. Some writers, including George F. Kennan, seem to suggest that an early recognition of the Soviet government would have modified the Bolshevik outlook, if not the policies, toward the West. But such a policy would have been extremely unpopular with the majority of Americans who by then were aware, through their press, of the aims and methods of the Bolsheviks. On the other 3. The Bullitt Mission to Russia, p. 73. 4. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 164-5.

Conclusion 123 hand, when there was a chance to throw the West's support to Kolchak's government, which had been recognized as supreme by all the other anti-Bolshevik governments in Russia, the United States was reluctant to do so because Kolchak seemed to represent the "old order" and public opinion was not ready or willing to support such a move. 11 Consequently, no positive and realistic policy was formulated and the attitude of "wait and see" was adopted with its inevitable consequences. 5. In our own time the continued recognition of the government on Formosa as the government of China has the backing of a considerable and influential segment of the population, but times have changed and with them public opinion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. MANUSCRIPT SoURCES Boris Brasol Papers Files of the former East-European Division, Department of State Navy Department Archives Colonel E. Francis Riggs Papers

U. PuBLISHED DOCUMENTS Congressional Digest. Washington, D.C., October, 1933. Congressional Record. CUMMINGS, C. K., and PETTIT, W. W., eds. Russian-American Relations. New York, 1920. Department of State, Intercourse with Territory under Bolshevik Control. Washington, D.C., 1919. GOLDER, F. A. Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917. New York and London, 1927. N.Y. Legislature. Joint Committee Investigating Seditious Activities. Revolutionary Radicalism. Albany, 1920. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers. Washington, D.C., 1940. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920. Washington, D.C., 1936. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia. Washington, D.C., 1931. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia. Washington, D.C., 1937. Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. Washington, D.C., 1918. Report of the Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor. Washington, D.C., 1920. Report of General Scott on Russia. July 25, 1917. Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia. August, 1917. U.S. Senate. Bolshevik Propaganda Hearings. Washington, D.C., 1919. U.S. Senate. Russian Propaganda Hearings. Washington, D.C., 1920. War Department, Annual Reports, 1919. Washington, D.C., 1920. III.

NEWSPAPERS

AND PERIODICALS

Advance American Federationist Annalist Izvestiya Murmanskago Sovieta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov Literary Digest Nation New Republic

New York Call New York Times New York Tribune Severnaya Kommuna Soviet Russia Struggling Russia Washington Evening Star Washington Post

126 Bibliography IV. MEMOIRS, MONOGRAPHS AND SPECIAL STUDIES Die Aufzeichnungen des Genera/majors Max Hoffmann. Berlin, 1929. BucHAN, JOHN. A History of the Great War. London and New York, 1922. BULLARD, ARTHUR. The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy-Democracy-Bolshevism. New York, 1919. The Bullitt Mission to Russia. New York, 1919. FISCHER, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs. London and New York, 1930. FRANCIS, DAVID R. Russia from the American Embassy. New York, 1921. HAGEDORN, HERMANN. The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His Time, 1869-1930. New York, 1935. HELFFERICH, KARL THEODOR. Der Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1919. IRONSIDE, LORD. Archangel, 1918-1919. London, 1953. KALPASCHNIKOFF, ANDREW. A Prisoner of Trotsky's. New York, 1920. KENNAN, GEORGE F . Russia Leaves the War. Princeton, 1956. - - - The Decision to Intervene. Princeton, 1958. LANSING, ROBERT. War Memoirs. Indianapolis and New York, 1935. LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID. War Memoirs. Boston, 1936. LOCKHART, R. H. BRUCE. Memoirs of a British Agent. London and New York, 1932. LoVENSTEIN, MENO. American Opinion of Soviet Russia. Washington, D.C., 1941. RADKEY, OLIVER HENRY. The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917. Cambridge, Mass., 1950. RooT, ELmu. The United States and the War-The Mission to Russia: Political Addresses. Cambridge, Mass., 1918. SACK, A. J. The Birth of Russian Democracy. New York, 1918. SADOUL, JACQUES. Notes sur la Revolution Bolshevique. Paris, 1920. SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. American Policy toward Russia since 1917. New York, 1928. SEYMOUR, CHARLES. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. New York and Boston, 1928. SISSON, EDGAR. One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution. New Haven, 1931. STEWART, GEORGE. The White Armies of Russia. New York, 1933. STRAKHOVSKY, LEONID I. Intervention at Archangel. Princeton, 1944. ---The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918. Princeton, 1937. UNTERBERGER, BETTY MILLER. America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920. Durham, N .C., 1956. VERNADSKY, GEORGE. A History of Russia. New Haven, 1929. - - - Political and Diplomatic History of Russia. Boston, 1936. WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN W. The Forgotten Peace. New York, 1939. WHITE, JOHN ALBERT. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, 1950. WILLIAMS, WILLIAM APPLEMAN. American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947. New York and Toronto, 1952. WILSON, WOODROW. War and Peace. New York, 1927. WRANGEL, GENERAL BARON PETER N . Always with Honour. New York, 1957.

V.

ARTICLES

DUMESNIL, ALEXANDRA. "L'Intervention des Allies a Mourmansk," Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale, vol. XIV, no. 1, January, 1936. FIKE, CLAUDE E. "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American

Bibliography 127 Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," Journal of Modern History, XXXI, no. 2, June, 1959. GoRICAR, JOSEPH. ''The Way of Black Diplomacy," Slavonic Monthly, December, 1944. KEDROV, M. "Nachalo interventsii," Pravda, no. 51, February 21, 1935. KoRNATOVSKY, N. "Lenin i Trotsky v borbe s interventami na Murmane," Krasnaya Letopis, no. 3(36), 1930. "Novy Dokument Lenina," Krasnaya Letopis, no. 1(28), 1929. STRAKHOVSKY, LEONID I. "Die diplomatischen Verhandlungen zur amerikanischen Intervention in Sibirien, 1918-1920," Jahrbllcher /Ur Geschichte Osteuropas, Jahrgang 3, Heft 2, 1938. - - - "The Statesmanship of Peter Stolypin-a Reappraisal,'' Slavonic and East European Review, XXXVII, no. 89, June, 1959. - - - "Was There a Komilov Rebellion?," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXIII, no. 81, June, 1955.

INDEX

.ADVISORY COMMfITEE .ExPERTS, 37

OF

RAILWAY

Alexeyev, General M. V., 4S Allied and Associated Governments, 89, 96 Allied and Associated Powers, 100 Allied: action, 67, 68; ambassadors, 72, 73; attitude, 96; capitals, 62, 66; cause, 13, 30, 3S; command, S9, 93; consuls, 74; co-operation, 84; democracies, 1S; expedition, 1S, 11; forces, 60, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 1S, 16, 77, 79, 84, 97, 101, 106; govern· ments, 34, 74, 79, 91; help, 92; inter· vention, 61, 64-73, 90-2, 101; land• ing, 77; military aid, 74, 101; missions, S9; nations, 33, 62, 107; naval vessels, 68; powers, 10, 69, 98; prestige, 77; property, 95; ranks, 15; recognition of Kolchak's government, 99; representatives, 34, 58; statesman• ship, 62. See also Entente Allies, 12, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 30, 34, 3S, 36, 38, 40, 46, 51, 54, 55, S1, S8, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 91, 91n, 92, 93, 95, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112 America, 6, 15, 32, 38, 39, 41, 48, SO, 63, 67, 76, 84, 10S, 113, 119; busi• nessmen in, 86, 111; cause of, 14, 32; citizens of, 98, 114, 116, 120; and delegates to Paris Conference, 1918, 107; her embassy in Russia, 21, 26, 34, 4S, 113; and exports to Russia, xiin, 86; government of, 6, 8, 9, 14, S4, S1, 13, 14, 78, 86, 97, 108, 111, 112, 114, 11S, 119, 120, 121; inter• ests of, 79, 86, 117, 119; and inter• vention in Russia, 3S, 51, 76; and isolationism, 102; and labour, 26; and nationals in Russia, 33, 77; naval forces of, 111, 113; newspaper edi• tors in, 10, 96; and peace delegation,

99; people of, 6, 20, 3S, 41, 66, 79, 83, 87, 88, 98, 102, 103, 105, 112, 114, 117, 120; policy of, 33, 45, 47, 55, 71, 72, 94, 110, 116, 121, 122; political philosophy of, xiiin; press in, 7, 14, 16, 20, 24, 30, 34, 41, S8, 79, 84, 85, 88, 92, 110, 117, 119; public opinion in, 27, 29, 76, 93, 102, 108, 111, 121; radicals in, 13; soli• darity of, 60; statesmanship of, 99; territory of, 112; troops of, 46, S1, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 94-7, 100, 101, 104, 10S, 107, 108, 112, 116; vessels of, 68, 88; workers in, 5, 86. See also United States American Army of Peace, 64 American Civil War, 97 American Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia, 111 American Commission to Russia, 11, 12, 13, 33, 37 American Defense Society, 102, 104, 111 American Expeditionary Corps, 39 American Federation of Labor, 13, 111 American Friends of Russian Freedom, 22 American Manufacturers Export Asso• ciation, 111 American Military Mission, 31, 38, 59 American Red Cross Commission, 20, 31, 32, 37, 66 American-Russian Chamber of Com• merce, 111 American-Russian Committee for the Relief and Salvation of Russia, 102 Americans, xiiin, 10, 11, 33, 54, 68, 76, 77, 78, 90, 97, 102, 105, 121, 122; in North Russia, 73, 93; of Slav origin, 64 Archangel, Sl, S2, S8, 68, 69, 84, 97, 98, 106; American landing at, 72-9; coast of, 95; expedition to, 97; government of, 101

130 Index Arctic Circle, 58 Austria-Hungary, 6, 36. See also Cen• tral Powers Avezzana, Baron Camillo Romano, 116 Azerbaidjan, 108 BAKER, NEWTON D., 68, 103, 104, 106 Bakhmetev, Boris A., 45n, 64, 67, 85, 90, 107, 118 Bakhmetev, George, 9 Bakhmut, 85 Balkans, 64 Baltic provinces, 108 Baltic Sea, 98 Benson, Admiral William F., 58, 60, 68 Berkman, Alexander, 90 Berlin, 77, 78, 105, 109 Bessarabia, 108 Billings, Dr. Frank G., 20 Black Sea, 98 Bolshevik: action, 55; agitators, 83; arms, 110; assault, 93; authorities, 38, 39, 63, 86, 116; candidate, 48; control, 68, 88; coup, 37; defeats, 99; delegation, 35, 38; demand, 38, 46; domination, 40, 49; faction in Duma, 3; gold, 120; government, 21, 32, 34, 40, 50, 69, 15; 16, 11, 18, 86, 88, 91, 94, 98, 108, 119, 120, 122; -held territory, 30; hierarchy, 55; infiltra• tion, 83; leaders, 32, 37-8, 52, 54, 55, 78, 90; menace, 72, 88, 107; methods, 92; ministry, 92, misrule, 71; nation, 65; officials, 37; organization, 103; outlook, 122; peace declaration, 36; peace negotiations, 48; port, 88; principles, 92; propaganda, 84, 85, 97; question, 97; regime, 63, 86, 118; reign of terror, 84; representatives, 53; revolution, 37, 58, 60; rule, 30, 84; Russia, 90, 98, 109, 119; secret police, 78; seizure of power, 29-33, 89; sources, 40; superiors, 50; triumph, 30; tyranny, 99, 100. See also Soviet Bolsheviks, 16, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 51, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122. See also Russians Bolshevism, 28, 30, 70, 75, 76, 79, 83, 84, 85, 87, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 119

Borah, Senator William E., 70, 94, 95, 105, 112 Brasol, Boris, 89, 102, 104, 107, 117 Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Catherine, 21, 32, 84 Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, 35, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 70 Bronstein, Lev. See Trotsky Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 93 Brown, George Rothwell, 98 Browne, Louis Edgar, 62 Brusilov, General A. A., 15 Bullard, Arthur, 22, 26, 28, 34, 54, 104, 121, 122 Bullitt, William C., 88, 122 Burtzev, Vladimir, 65 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 90

K., 45, 74 Canada, ix Castelnau, General Edouard de, 3 Caucasus, 23, 34 Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party, 52, 54, 55 Central Executive Committee (Tsik), 78 Central Powers, 19, 35, 46, 51, 53, 55, 78 Chelyabinsk, 63 Chicago, 20, 83 Chicherin, George, 75, 77, 78, 96, 118 China, 64, 106, 108, 123 Churchill, Sir Winston, x Clemenceau, Georges, 100 Colby, Bainbridge, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 Committee of Russian Republican Leagues, 70 Committee on Public Information, 33, 34 Communist Labor Party of America, 89 Communists, 85 Congress of Soviets, 54, 55, 56 Conner, J. E., 102 Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) party, 49, 64, 65, 70 Constituent Assembly, 10, 33, 37, 48, 49, so, 61, 66, 84, 100, 101 Coolidge administration, ix Cossacks, 16, 23, 36, 39, 40, 45 Courland, 51 Crane, Charles R., 8, 19 Creel, George, 33, 34, 37 Creel Committee. See Committee on Public Information Crimea, 119

CALDWELL, JoHN

Index 131 Cromie, Captain of the Royal Navy, 78 Crosley, Captain Walter S., 9 Czecho-Slovakia, 72, 76, 92, 94, 95, 110; troops of, 72, 73, 74, 109 Czecho-Slovak Legion, 63, 67, 68 DANIBLS, JOSEPHUS, 68, 113 Dardanelles, 79 Davison, Henry P., 20, 21 Democratic conference, 27 Deniken, General A. I., 45, 101, 103, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113 Doumergue, Gaston, 3 Duma, xii, 3, 101; government of, 4; and labour commission, 8; liberalism of, 14 Dukhonin, General N. N., 33 Duncan, James, 14, 18 EKATERINBURG (Sverdlovsk), 71 England, ix, 3, 14, 52, 58, 69, 71, 84, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 101, 106, 108, 122. See also Allies, Entente Entente: capitals, 63; forces, 78; interests, 39; point of view, 49 Esthonians, 103 Europe, 95, 98, 101, 107, 108, 116, 117, 119 FIKE, CLAUDE E., 121 Finland, 34, 47, 53, 59, 77-78, 79, 103, 108 Flanders, 61 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 95 Formosa, 123 France, ix, 3, 12, 14, 39, 52, 58, 59, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 95, 99, 118, 122; and labour, 101. See also Allies, Entente France, Senator Joseph I., 112 Francis, David R., 9, 10, 21, 22, 28, 33, 34, 34n, 45, 46, 47, SO, 51, 52, 54, 55, 69, 74, 90, 121

GALICIA, 15, 16, 17 General Committee of Russian National Defense, 102 Georgia, 108 Germany, ix, 79, 102, 122; and absorption of Russia, 68; advance of, 39; agents of, 11, 15, 79; alliance against, 51; arrogance of, 50; autocracy of, 6; demands of, SO; destruction of, 32; and efforts in Russia, 7, 8; envoys of,

38; forces of, 46-7: guns of, 70; hands of, 77; instrument of, 78; intrigue of, 29, 70; might of, 53; peace with, 54; plans of, 53; and play for delay, 46; preparations of, 40; proletarians of, 79; propaganda, 8, 15, 38; purposes of, 76; and a separate peace, 32; subjugation by, 71; troops of, 38, 79; U.S. declaration of war against, 4; war with, 70, 72, 91, 103, 106. See also Central Powers Goldman, Emma, 90 Gompers, Samuel, 5, 13, 14, 17, 56, 90; his message to Russian people, 26 Goricar, Joseph, 64 Gorky, Maxim, x, xi Great Britain. See England Gumberg, Alexander, 37 Gumberg, Joe, 37

HANGO, 90 Hanna, Paul, 113 Hapsburgs, 35 Harding, Warren G., 90; as president of the United States, 119, 120 Harper, Samuel N., 8 Hearst, William Randolph, 58 Helfferich, Karl Theodor, 77 Heller, a member of the staff of Martens' office, 8Sn Helm, Harvey, 71 Henderson, Arthur, 101 Hillquit, Morris, 88 Hitchcock, Senator Gilbert M., 94, 95 Hitler, Adolf, ixn, SS Hoffmann, Major General Max, 38, 39 Hohenzollerns, 35, 65 Hopkins, Harry, ix Hornaday, Dr. William T., 102, 103, 104, 106, 111 Horvath, General Dmitry L., 92 House, Colonel Edward M., 34, 66, 121, 122 Hungary, 98 Hunt, Fraser, 99 Hurley, Edward N., 21

IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY, 122 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), 83 Irkutsk, 68 Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, 60 Italy, 71, 97; labour representatives of, 101 Ivan the Terrible, 83

132 Index 6, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 71, 73, 74, 84, 98, 99, 108, 109, 110, 112; government of, 68, 73, 74, 108; and intervention, 58, 60, 63, 64; troops, 46, 51, 60, 64, 68, 77, 101, 108 Johnson, Albert, 87 Johnson, Senator Hiram W., 91, 94, 97, 100, 101, 102 Judson, Brigadier General William V., 38, 45, 121, 122 JAPAN,

KALEDIN, General A. M., 39, 40, 45 Kanegisser, Leonid, 78 Kansas City, 105 Kaplan, Dora, 78 Karakhan, Lev, 77 Karelia, 77 Kemp, Rear Admiral Thomas W., 58 Kennan, George F., x, xi, 90 Kennan, George F., former United States ambassador to Soviet Russia, xn, 18, 20, 22, 33, 37, 49, 53n, 121, 122 Kerensky, Alexander, 7n, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41, 61, 67, 99, 122 King, Senator William H., 64, 67, 84, 87, 88, 90, 95, 96, 100, 112 Kirgis, 23 Knight, Admiral Austin M., 69 Kola, 68 Kolchak, Admiral Alexander V., 91, 92, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 123 Korea, 108 Kornilov, General L. G., 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 45 Kremlin, 49 Kronstadt, xi Krylenko, N. V., 35 LA FOLLETTE, SENATOR ROBERT M., 94, 100 Lansing, Robert, 36, 39, 41, 45, 46, 47, 56, 60, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 79, 87, 89, 91, 99, 108, 110, 113, 116, 122 Latvia, 24 Lawrence, David, 74 League of Nations, 84, 105 League for the Regeneration of Russia in Union with the Allies, 70 Lenin, Nicholas, x, 3, 11, 17, 29, 31, 32, 36, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 61, 71, 78, 85, 88, 91n, 92, 98, 99, 102, 104, 108, 109, 111 Ligne, Prince Albert de, ixn Lithuania, 51, 92 Lloyd, Desmaret, 110 Lloyd George, David, 98, 100, 108, 109 Lockhart, R. H. Bruce, 77

London, England, 46, 113; metropolitan police of, 85 Long, Breckinridge, 107 Lusk, Clayton R., 84 Lusk Committee, 87, 89 Lvov, Prince G., 7n, 8 McAooo, WILLIAM G., xi McCully, Rear Admiral N. A., 113, 118, 119 McCumber, Senator Porter J., 97 MANCHURIA, 108, 109 Manila, 75 March, General Peyton C., 68, 73, 76 Martens, Ludwig Christian August Karl, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 118 Martin, Hugh S., 59 Marxism, 23 Marye, George T., xii Mason, Congressman William E., 100 Mediterranean, 79 Mensheviks, 6 Mexico, ix Michigan, 93 Milner, Lord Alfred, 3 Milyukov, Paul N., 7, 10, 70 Mirbach, Count Wilhelm, 69, 70 Monroe Doctrine, ix Mogilyov, 3 Mongolia, 108, 109 Morris, Roland S., 60, 73 Moscow, 22, 45, 47, 55, 67, 69, 15, 11, 78, 83, 86, 89, 92, 105, 106, 109, 115 Moses, Senator George H., 112 Motono, Viscount lchiro, 60 Mulvihill, James P., 85n Murmansk, 51, 52, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 74, 77, 92; authorities in, 59; railway to, 59; region of, 59; soviet of, 59, 69 Myers, Senator Henry L., 96 NAPOLEON, 14 Narva, 55 National Civic Federation, 111 National Political (Moscow) Conference, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 Nelson, Senator Knute, 84, 94 Newton, Charles D., 87 New York State, x, 3, 14, 19, 20, 21, 37, 85, 89, 90, 98; Attorney General of, 87; Central Opera House in, 85; Legislative Committee of, 87, 89; Legislature of, 84; Madison Square Gardens in, 83, 87 Nicaragua, ixn Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, 3, 4, 71 North Russia, 57, 58, 60, 69, 69n, 72, 73, 75, 78, 90-1, 93, 94, 97, 101, 113

Index 133 Norway, legation of, 79 Novo-Nikolayevsk (Novo-Sibirsk), 63 Nuorteva, S., 85 0CTOBRISTS, 50n Odessa, 92 Omsk, 63, 91; government of, 84, 91, 98, 99, 100, 101, 106 Overman, Senator Lee S., 84, 90 Overman Committee, 85

PADEREWSKI, Ignace J., 100 Palmer, Alexander M., 87, 89, 90 Paris, 46, 79, 96, 98, 100, 101, 110, 113 Paris Peace Conference, 96, 98, 101, 103, 106, 107, 108 Penza, 63 Pershing, General John J., 39n, 73 Peters, Y. K., 37 Petit, Capitaine-de-Vaisseau, 58 Petrograd, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 41, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 55, 59, 66, 77, 78, 83, 88, 92, 103, 105, 106, 111; Cheka in, 78 Petrozavodsk, 77 Petrunkevich, Professor at Yale University, 9 Phillips, William, 67, 88, 97, 110 Poindexter, Senator Miles, 64, 89, 100, 107, 112 Poland, 92, 110, 116, 117, 119; army of, 110; and crisis with Russia, 117 Polk, Frank L., 74, 79, 108, 112, 114 Poole, DeWitt Clinton, 67, 70, 75, 78, 79, 97 Poole, Major General Frederick C., 69, 69n Press, in America. See America Prinkipo, 98; invitation, 96; Island(s), 96; proposal, 96n Provisional Council of the Republic (Pre-Parliament), 27 Provisional Government, 15, 61, 70, 122; assurances to, 12; attempt to overthrow, 16; authority of, 6; consent of, 10; diplomatic representative of, 30; downfall of, 29; formation of, 4; Kornilov's rebellion against, 25; lack of stability of, 7; members of, 7n; message from United States Chamber of Commerce to, 27; new loan, 21; prestige of, 9; proclamation of, 5; radical attack on, 9; resistance of, 23; strengthening of, 13; struggles of, 17; support of, 8, 12, 18

RADEK,KARL,37

Rasputin, xii Red: army, 53, 110; army personnel,

53n; Guard, 49; regime, 115; troops, 112 Red Cross, officials of, 46 Reed, John, 49 Reinstein, 49 Rhett, President of United States Chamber of Commerce, 27 Rhineland, ixn Riga, 24 Riggs, E. Francis, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56 Robespierre, Maximilien, 63 Robins, Raymond, 21, 26, 27n, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 45, 46, 54, 55, 56, 85, 121, 122 Rodzianko, General G. V., 106 Romanov dynasty, lln, 65 Roosevelt, Theodore, 119 Root, Elihu, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 90 Royal Marine Light Infantry, 60 Ruggles, Colonel James A., 54, 55, 56 Russell, Charles Edward, 12, 14, 18, 97 Russia, 58, 63, 68, 70, 71, 77, 100, 103, 105, 112; action in, 91; affairs of, 48; blockade against, 114; change in, 6; citizens of, 89; crime in, 83; danger to, 18; debts of, 50; de facto government of, 36; defection of, 51; and democracy, 7, 13, 37; dismemberment of, 108; disunity in, 7; events in, 5, 10, 11, 34; fate of, 34; feeling for, 48; future of, 19; as Germany's opponent, 12; government of, 22, 33, 49, 112, 113; help for, 8; infidelity of, 52; influence in, 91; information from, 28; interests of, 36; international engagements of, 40; and intervention, 52, 64, 68, 69, 72, 76, 79, 107; labour element in, 10; liberty of, 76; loyal, 106, 118; military rejuvenation of, 30; nobility of, 7; offensive of, 15, 16; participation in the war of, 28, 29, 40; passports for, 115; peace in, 96; potential of, 32; and proclamation as a republic, 26; purchases in the U. S. by, 3; real strength of, 26; Red, 109, 111, 115; rescue of, 52; revolution in, 4, 7; revolutionary government of, 5; sentiment in, 60; and a separate peace, 9; situation in, 15, 61, 72; sovereignty of, 68; spirit in, 48; support of the Union by, x; surrender of, 61; territorial integrity of, 118; unified, 108; vital needs of, 17; war effort of, 4; in war with Japan, 6; workingmen of, 10, 26, 86. See also Bolshevik, Soviet Russian: administration, 46; affairs, 67, 107, 109, 122; anti-Bolshevik armies, 99; anti-Bolshevik elements, 72; anti-

134 Index Bolshevik groups, 96; army, 6, IS, 17, 40, 46, SI, 78, 103; aspirations, 37; authority, 114; Black Sea fleet, 68; Bolshevism, 11 1; campaign, 19, 103; capital, 18; cause, 25, 71; cooperative organizations, 11 0; crisis, 26; democracy, 102; empire, 40, 62, 117; feeling, 60; freedom, 33, 64; friends, 84; front, 3S, 38, 39; government, 10, 31, 48, 8S, 86, 98, 103, 106, 107; happenings, 31; immigrants, x, xn; industrial workers, 28; interests, 116; language, 38; liberty, 61; matters, 114, 122; mind, 14; monarchy, 3; muzhik, 50; nation, 30, 47, 48, S3; national cause, 118; naval squadrons, x; new government, 8, 12, 15, 27, 31, 40, 61; offensive, 3, 15; opinion, 61, 91; parties, 105; people, 8, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30, 36, 48, 49, 61, 62, 64, 6S, 71, 75, 76, 79, 84, 95, 98, 103, 108, 112, 116, 117, 119; policy, 98, 106, 114, 117, 121; political circles, 18; prejudices, 63; prisons, 61; problem, 96, 110, 118; proletarians, 79; prospect, 99; provinces, 52; question, 96, 114; radicals, 90; radical circles, 37; revolution, xiii, 8, 18, 27, 84, 121; revolutionary circles, 37; rubles, 86, 120; scene, 121; sentiment, 84; serial, 39; situation, 35, 36, 39, 47, 86, 100, 111; socialists, 13, 14; territory, 47, St, S9, 60, 66, 72, 1S, 18, 19, 88; Terror, 36; troops, 16, 17, 24, 31, 72, 102; tyranny, 102; workers, 86 Russian Civil War, 103, 104 Russians, 46, 56, 60, 61, 62, 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 1S, 11, 84, 86, 96, 98, 99, 102, lOS, 106, 110 SADOUL, JACQUES, S4, SS St. Paul, Minnesota, 21 Samara (Kuibychev), 63 San Francisco, x, 83 Schiff, Jacob H ., xi Scott, Major General Hugh L., IS Semyonov, General Gregory, 65, 66, 92 Sherman, Senator Lawrence Y., 90, 96 Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, 108 Siberia, 3, 45, 47, S1, S8, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 84, 90, 92, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, lOS, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 116 Simonds, Frank H., 109 Sims, Admiral William S., S8, 60 Sisson, Edgar, 33, 34, 37, 38, 49, S3, 121 Smith, F. Willoughby, 4S Social Democratic Party, 8

Socialist-Revolutionaries, 6, 21, 22, 32, 48, 49, 6S Socialist-Revolutionary Party, 69, 78 South Russia, 64, 1S, 98, 99, 113, 118; government of, 118, 119 Soviet: authorities, 38, 46, 54; brand of parliamentarianism, 49; Chief of Staff, 38; disarmament, 68; foreign relations, 78; government, 46, 47, 48, 51, S6, 62, 63, 74, 77, 78, 79, 87, 88, 89, 94, 96, 99, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119; historian, 55; peace offensive, 109; postal authorities, llS; regime, 50, 76, 111, 118; representative, 87. See also Bolshevik Soviet of People's Commissars, S9 Soviet-Polish War, 113 Soviet Republic, 91n Soviet Russia, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 110, 111, 114, llS, 116, 118, 119, 120 Soviet Russian Government Bureau, 88 Spargo, John, 90 Stalin, Joseph, 3, SS Sterling, Senator Thomas, 84 Stevens, John F., 20n, 4S, 4Sn Stevens Committee. See Advisory Committee of Railway Experts Stevenson, Archibald E., 87 Stockholm, 46 Stolypin, Peter A., xi, xin Struve, Peter B., 118 Sukin, John, 67 Summers, Maddin, 4S Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Central Powers, 78 Supreme War Council, 67, 71, 97, 103, 110, 111 Swanson, Senator Claude A., 94 Switzerland, 3 63 Tereshchenko, M. I., 28, 32, 67 Thiers, Louis Adolphe, 7 Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 49 Thirty-first Infantry Regiment, 1S Thomas, Senator Charles S., 9S Thompson, William Boyce, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27n, 28, 31, 32, 33, 37, 121, 122 Three hundred thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment, 76, 93, 97 Tiflis, 4S Tokyo,60 Townsend, Senator Charles E., 93 Trans-Siberian Railway, 63 Trotsky, Lev, 32, 34, 3S, 36, 37, 38, 46, TAFT, WO.LIAM HOWARD,

Index 135 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 71, 99, 102, 119 Tsarskoye Seto, 3 Twain, Mark, x Twenty-seventh Infantry Regiment, 75 UKRAINE, 34, 47, 51, 68, 92, 108 Ulianov, Vladimir, See Lenin, Nicholas Union League Club of New York, 86, 87 Union of Russians Faithful to their Country and Alliances, 70 United States, 71, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123; Asiatic Fleet of, 69; businessmen of, 118; Chamber of Commerce of, 27; citizens of, 115;Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, 105; Committee on Military Affairs of the House, 104; Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, 84; Customs and Immigration, 85; Department of Justice, 90; Department of State, 33, 34, 46, 54, 55, 51, 58, 67, 69, 79, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121; Federal Reserve Board, 86, 120; government, 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 30, 36, 37, 38, 45, 47, 48, 56, 51, 60, 69, 72, 73, 74, 77, 86, 88, 91, 98, 100, 103, 107, 108, 115, 117, 118; House of Representatives, 71, 104; interests of, 36; Mint, 120; people of, 111; Post Office Department, 115; presidency of, 119; representatives of, 37, 69; Senate, 70, 84, 91, 94, 96; support of, 55; Treasury Department, 120; War Department, 55. See also Allies, America "Unity of Russia," 117 Ural Mountains, 102 Uritsky, M. S., 78

VERSAILLES, 71 Vienna, 109 Vladivostok, 45, 46, 51, 52, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 77, 92, 95, 100, 104, 112 Volga, 63 Vologda, 54, 55, 77 Volunteer Army, 45

W., 88, 106 Walsh, Senator Thomas J., 84 Wardwell, Allen, 78 Washburn, Stanley, 8 Washington, D .C., xii, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 34, 71, 74, 107, 115 Washington, George, ix White, Andrew D., xi White armies, 113, 119, 122 White Sea, 58 Williams, Albert Rhys, 49 Wilson, General Sir Henry, 3 Wilson, Woodrow: as governor of New Jersey, xi; as President of the United States, 4, 10, 11, 19, 22, 23, 33, 36, 37, 39, 47, 56, 51, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 104, 105, 107, 112, 114, 117, 119, 121, 122 Wise, Rabbi Stephen, 90 Wolcott, Senator Josiah 0., 84 Wrangel, General Baron Peter N ., 11213, 118, 119 WADSWORIB, SENATOR JAMES

YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN AssOCIATION,

18 Yudenich, General N. N., 103

ZINOVIEV (APPELBAUM), GREGORY,

Zorin. See Gumberg, Joe Zurich, 3

56