American Journal of Ancient History 9781463206253, 1463206259

Citation preview

American Journal of Ancient History

American Journal of Ancient History

1.1

The American Journal of Ancient History is a peer-reviewed academic journal covering ancient history and classical studies. It was established in 1976 and edited by Ernst Badian until 2001. It is continued by the American Journal of Ancient History: New Series, edited by T. Corey Brennan.

American Journal of Ancient History

Volume 1.1 Edited by

Ernst Badian

gp 2016

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2016 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in January 1976 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܛ‬

1

2016

ISBN 978-1-4632-0625-3

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE

Introduction

OF

CONTENTS

...............................................

Hunter R. RawlingsIII: Antiochusthe Great and Rhodes197-191 B.C... Erich $. Gruen:

1

2

Class Conflict and the Third Macedonian War .........

29

W. R. Connor: Niciasthe Cretan?(Thucydides 2.85.4-6) ............

61

INTRODUCING...

ß.. the American Journal of Ancient History Journalsare sproutingon everycampusand in almosteverydepartment,in this country and elsewhere.They have becomeboth a status symbol and,

throughexchanges and bookreviews,a meansfor scholars to keepup with the increasing strainandcostof keepingup. A newjournalthereforemight seemto needsomejustification.Yet therehaslongbeena needfor ajournal in the field of Ancient History in North America.Despitethe largeand increasingcrop of Classicaland archaeological journals, to which ancient historianscontribute(we are often told) in greaterproportionthan is welcome,there is no journal wholly devotedto Ancient History in America,or indeed in any English-speaking country. Articles in this field, written by scholarsin Canadaand the U.S.A., appearin largenumbersoverseas, again often givingrise to complaints,especiallyas there is at presentlittle reciprocity-none in the caseof scholars not writingin English. The AmericanJournal of Ancient History is meant to fill that need. It will be open to contributionsfrom all countriesand ultimatelyhopesto acceptthem in English,French,German,Italian and Spanish.Contributions will be judgedanonymously,entirelyon their merits-a principlefor which there has also long been a need in our smallprofession.Contributorsare askedto attend strictly to our instructions,in orderto minimisethe editorial work involvedin preserving the anonymityrule. In orderto publishasmuch originalwork aspossible, bookreviews(of whichtherearealreadytoo many) andsurveys of scholarship (of which,admittedly,therearenot nearlyenough) will be excluded.Articlesof any reasonable lengthwill be welcome,asindeed our first issuedemonstrates, but short contributionswill naturallyhavea better chanceof quickpublication. The Journalis beingproducedby historiansfor historians.The only institutionalcooperationwe have had has been from the Departmentof History at Harvard.It provedimpossibleto obtaina subsidyfrom any source, and this may turn out to be an advantage. Althoughit imposesrestrictions on theinitialformat(e.g.,therecanbe no Greekin thetext of articles,except

in transliteration), it alsoensures independence from departments andfunding agencies. And we shallhaveto surviveon ourmerits,asjudgedby our colleagues. Weareprepared to abideby yourjudgment; but we dependonthe full supportof thosewho approve. E.B.

¸January 1976 by E. Badian. All rightsreserved.

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

197-191 B.C.1 For John V. A. Fine

I. The HistoricalBackground On his return in 205/4 from his highly successful expedition to the East,

Antiochus III, nowcalled"theGreat, "2 turnedhisattention westward to the citiesand statesof Asia Minor. During the king'seight-yearabsencein the East his viceroyZeuxisadministeredSeleucidpossessions in AsiaMinor from his residenceat Sardis.It is possiblethat Zeuxisattemptedto extendSeleucid influenceto the coastalcitiesof the Aegeanduringthis periodbut we know of no successes. His primary duty was to consolidateSeleucidrule over the interior of Asia Minor which Antiochushad won from the pretenderAchaius between 216 and 213. But with the victor's return from the East, Seleucid aspirationsin the coastalregionsof Asia Minor could againbe pursued.

Antiochus'intention,seensooftenelsewhere, ½•as to recoverterritorywhich he considered to berightfullythepossession of theSeleucid monarchy. 3 In this effort Antiochus derived considerablesupport from the impressionwhich his easterncampaignhad made on cities throughoutAsia Minor. Polybius (11, 34, 14-16) describesthis effect of the king's eastern successes by sayingthat Antiochusbrought "not only the upper satrapies under his sway but also the cities on the sea and the dynastson this side of the Taurus...; for becauseof thisexpeditionhe seemedworthy of rulingnot only to the peopleof Asia,but alsoto thosein Europe."Until recentlythis assertionseemedexaggerated:it was possibleto believe that the campaign was of propagandistic value in the East, but it seemedimprobablethat it seriouslyaffected the attitude of cities and statesin Asia Minor. Schmitt's

view appearedthe safest:"Die Wirkungauf die 'Meeresst/ii:lte,' d. h. die Griechenst•idte an der kleinasiatischenWestktiste, und auf die Dynasten Kleinasiens,die der Gew•ihrsmanndes Polybios dem Ostfeldzugzuschreibt,

kann nattirlichnur indirektgewesen sein. "4 There was no evidence to indicate any immediateimpact of the easterncampaignon the mindsof men so far west.

Now, however,the recent publicationof new inscriptionsfrom Teos, with the learned commentary of Peter Herrmann, has confirmed and

elucidated theassertion inPolybius. s Fromthenewinscriptions welearnthat in 204 or 203 Antiochus came to Teos, which was at that time under Attalid

control, and earnedthe gratitude of the Teiansby removingcertainfinancial burdensimposedby Attalus. AntiochusreplacedAttalus as master of Teos, apparently with the approval of at least some of the financially pressed Teians.As Herrmannpointsout (p. 108), there had beendiplomaticcontact

prior to Antiochus'actualappearance in Teos: "Die Angabeder Inschrift

(I 8-10), Antiochoshabeschonzu derZeit, alser nochjenseitsdesTauros weilte, der Stadt Teos viele Wohltaten zukommen lassen, l•sst darauf

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

3

schliessen,dassdasErscheinendesK6nigsan Ort und Stelle schondurch eine vorherigediplomatischeAktivith'tvorbereitetwar." From this inscriptionwe thus learn that at least one coastalcity soughthelp from Antiochus even before he crossed the Taurus Mountains, a useful example illustrating Polybius'generalstatement. Herrmann rightly cautionsthat we know nothing of the nature of Antiochus' takeover. It may have been accomplished without recourseto arms; the absence of any indication that Teos' neighborswere similarly

removedfrom Attalidcontrolsuggests a peacefulchange of rulers. 6 Attalus probably acceptedAntiochus'diplomaticvictory as a fait accompli,for we hear of no complaintsin the literary or epigraphicalevidence.Indeed, until the publicationof the new inscriptionstherewas little reasonto believethat

Teoswasno longerin Attalus'possession at theendof the thirdcentury. 7 In all likelihood Antiochus was careful to avoid a conflict with Pergamumon this, his first venture to the western coast of Asia Minor. He was more than

happy to comply with a requestwhich could only serveto extend his influencewestward,but at this point a diplomaticvictorywasenoughfor his purposes.

If, as Herrmann argues,Antiochus receiveda Teian embassywhile he

wasstill eastof the Taurus,it is quite likely that he madeit one of hisfirst concernswhen the easterncampaignwas overto visit Teosand to grant the requestin person.It is, therefore,probablethat Antiochuswasin Teosin the summer of 204. While there he will have learned of the death of Ptolemy Philopator. Whether or not this news was a spur to Antiochus'designs,we know that in 203 (and possiblyasearly as204) the Seleucidkingencroached upon Ptolemaicpossessions in Caria.From the epigraphical sources (our only ones!) it is clear that here too Antiochusproceededcarefully and with leniency: Alabanda praises Antiochus for preservingher damokratia and

eirana; 8 Amyzonasksfor and receivesrelief from the Seleucidarmy's depredations. 9 The king clearlydid whathe could,in Carlaasat Teos,to convincethe Greek citiesthat his rule would be fair and that it represented only a reestablishment of the old Seleucidposition.In 190 at Rome Eumenes

described thispolicyasonethat"alienated citiesfromme",•ø andit isanapt term; Antiochuswas a masterat propagandaand diplomacy,andwe may be certainthat he used them effectivelyduringthe years204 and 203 in Asia Minor.

The king's attention was temporarilydrawn away from Carla in the followingyear by the situationin Egypt, wherethe deathof PtolemyIV had resultedin chaosand fatal weakness.CoeleSyriafurnishedan easytargetfor Antiochus'army which in 200 smashedthe falteringEgyptianoppositionat Panion. It was not until 198 that the Seleucid returned to Asia Minor, on a

campaign whichwe hearof only indirectlyfrom two passages in Livy (32, 8, 9-16; 32, 27, 1). The first summarizesthe speechof ambassadors from King Attalus, who complainsof an invasionof his .kingdomby Antiochus.Since Attalus was assistingRome on her Macedoniancampaignhe wasunable to meet the Seleucidthreat; he therefore askedfor leaveto defendhis kingdom and for Roman

assistance in his effort.

The Senate refused to send forces

against Antiochus, on the ground that he was an "ally and friend of the

4

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

Roman people," but allowed Attalus to return to Asia Minor to defend his possessions.In addition the Senate promised to send an embassy to Antiochuswhich would ask him to withdraw from Attalus' kingdom. The second passagestates that later in the same year Attalus.' ambassadors depositedon the Capitolinea goldencrown and expressedthe king'sgratitude to the Senate because Antiochus, "legatorurn Romanorum auctoritate motus," had withdrawnhis army from Pergameneterritory. Despite doubts by several scholarsabout the authenticity of these reports, doubts based primarily on their annalisticorigin, no cogent or convincing arguments have been brought against them. In particular, Holleaux' objectionshave been shownto be groundlessand severalrecent treatments have served to reinstate these embassiesin the history of the period.• The Livian passages are factual and containnone of the familiar exaggerationswhich characterizethe fabrications found in the annalists.In 198, then, Antiochustook advantageof Attalus' involvementin the Westto

attack Pergameneterritory. His successes in Egypt coupledwith the opportunity presented in Asia Minor by the king's absenceemboldened Antiochus to seek a rapid recoveryof Seleucidterritory in the West. But Antiochus,it seems,was quick to retire when the Romanembassyaskedhim to; he had no intention at this point of causinga major confrontation.The report of Attalus' gift to Rome makes it clear that Attalus suffered no significantlossesasa resultof Antiochus'campaign.It is for this reasonthat I stronglydisagree with Schmitt'sattempt to provethat Antiochustook several

Attalid citieson thiscampaign andevenintendedto attackThracein 198 Schmitt arguesthat the easewith which Antiochus'land army reachedthe Hellespontfrom Sardisin the campaignof 196 suggeststhat it must have proceeded through Seleucid, not Attalid territory. There is no literary testimony indicating that Eumenes(who succeededto the throne in the autumn of 19'7)protestedthe army'smarch or that any battleswerefought. If this territory was indeedSeleucidin 196, Schmitt reasons,it must have been taken in 198, when we know Antiochus led a campaign across Pergamene borders. He concludes that certain Mysian cities, Thyateira, Nakrasa, and part of Hellespontine Phrygia and the Troad had fallen to Antiochusin 198, and that the king must alsohavehad designson Thraceat this earlier date.

Schmitt's argumentsare made strictly from probability and have no basisin our ancient evidence.Indeed, such a reconstructionstrainscredulity and contradictsthe few facts found in our sources.Accordingto the second report in Livy an Attalid embassybrought to Rome a golden crown in gratitudefor the Senate'shelp in makingAntiochuswithdraw.Schmittwould have us believe that this secondembassy- and only this embassy- was an

inventionof the unknownRoman annalistwhom Livy is herefollowing. •a But as BadJanhas pointed out, it is preciselythis passage which is in all likelihood basedultimately on archivalmaterial?4 Not only is the particular gift mentioned,but its exact weightis provided,goodreasonsfor accepting the report asgenuine,especiallywhen it is matchedwith Livy'searlierpassage describingthe first Attalid embassyof 198. If, asseemsnecessary, we accept

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

the secondlegation as historical, it is impossibleto believe that Antiochus made extensiveinroadsinto the Pergamenekingdom in 198, much lessthat he reachedthe Hellespont.Attalus' thanks to the Senatewould in that case be ludicrous.The easewith whichAntiochus'army reachedthe Hellespontin 196 can be explainedon other grounds.We know from Livy (33, 38, 4) that by early 196 Antiochus already had a contingentin Abydus, that he himself had spentthe winter at Ephesus,and that he setout to bringall the statesof Asia within his dominion. Livy informs us that the king was certain that many cities could be brought over without difficulty, owing to their lack of

confidencein their own defenses. He thengoeson to describe the diplomatic and military meansby whichAntiochusconvincedthe doubtersto accepthis sovereignty. We may be certain that Antiochus had laid much of the groundworkfor thisapproachwhile he wasat Ephesusin the winter of 197/6, andthat manycities,impressedby his earliersuccesses, had without hesitation acceptedthe king's terms. A contingentin Abydus provesthis point, asdoes the fact that, as Schmitt himselfhas pointed out. the city of Lampsacus

soughthelpfrom Rome,probablyagainst Ant:.ochus, in the tall of 197)• This precautiontaken by the Lampsacenes makesit probablethat alreadyby this time the king's argumentsand threatshad succeededin causingseveral northern cities to acknowledgehis sovereignty.Most had little choice.The land army may have passedthrough previouslyPergameneterritow, but the citiesput up no opposition.Eumenes,we may imagine,was only too happy to see the army pass without attacking Pergamumdirectly; by this time Antiochushadhiseyeson Thrace,andwaswillingto leavenot only Pergamum, but also Smyrna and Lampsacusin his rear. It was probably in 197, as Schmitt suggests(Antiochos, p. 276), that Antiochus and Attalus came to terms.Antiochus'expeditionof 198 provedto be abortive,then, becausethe Senate choseto intervenewith one ally on behalf of another; the time was

not yet ripe for Antiochusto recoverSeleucidterritow in Europe.The king wanted to remain on good termswith Rome and apparentlysucceeded,for in the same year he sent an embassy to Rome which met with a favorable

reception(Livy 33, 20, 8-9). As BadJanhas observed,"we may now be reasonably certain that it was sent in order to announce to the Senate the

king'sreadycompliance withitsrequest. "•6 In the followingyear (197) Antiochustook anotherapproach,more cautious,with lesspotentialfor a confrontationwith Rome, but with better possibilitiesof reachingEurope. The king led the Seleucidfleet along the southerncoastof AsiaMinor, forcingthe coastalcitieswith Egyptiangarrisons in them to acknowledgetheir new master, while the land army marchedinland to Sardis.His intention was undoubtedly to proceedwestwardat a

leisurelypaceand await newsof developments in Europe:if Philipprovedto be the victor in his strugglewith Rome, Antiochuswould probablyconfine hisexpeditionto thePamphylianandLyciancitiesstill nominallyin Egyptian hands;if, on the otherhand,Flamininus won,thekingplannedto roundthe coastof Lycia,takePhilip'sCarJan possessions withoutdifficulty,andproceed north to the Hellespontand Europebeforethe Romanshad time to mustera diplomaticoffensiveagainsthim. The land army in Sardiswas to await the

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

samenewsand correlateits own actionswith thoseof the king. In the event of a Romanvictory it would be ready to marchquickly to the Aegeancoast and join the fleet for the crossinginto Europe. Antiochus,in other words, intended to put the Roman-Macedonianwar to the best use possible,and playeda waitinggame.Accordingto Livy (33, 19, 11) the king had "the doublepurposeof trying to win over the citieswhich had beenunder the control of Ptolemy alongthe whole shoreof Cilicia,Lycia, andCarla,and of aidingPhilip with his army and navy-for that war had not yet beenended." But this secondmotive is probably falsely ascribedto Antiochusby Livy. As Walbank argues, "... it would be unsafe to attribute this view to P(olybius),who may havegiventhisasa s.uspicion, whichLivy hasconverted into a fact."•?

With little apparentdifficulty the king succeeded in takingseveralcities in Cilicia but he met unexpectedresistance at Coracesium nearthe Pamphylian border. While engagedin a siegeAntiochusreceiveda Rhodianembassy. In an attempt to halt the king's westwarddrive the Rhodiansordered

Antiochus r/ot to passtheChelidonian promontory. •8 TheSeleucid, miffed but unwilling to risk a naval engagementwith the powerful Rhodian fleet, and seeminglyin no great hurry, answeredthat he would send to Rhodes an embassywhich would allay their fearsand clarify his intentions.While this legationwas at Rhodesthe newsof Flamininus'completevictoryoverPhilip at Cynoscephalae wasannouncedto the assembly. This report had an immediateeffect upon the Rhodianultimatumto Antiochus. Livy, our only sourcefor theseevents,tells us that with their fear of Philip dispelled the Rhodians abandonedtheir intention of halting Antiochus' fleet; then in a curious clause he adds: "illam alteram curam non

omiserunttuendaelibertatis civitatum sociarumPtolomaei,quibusbellurnab Antiochoimminebat."The Rhodiansby variousmeans(auxiliis,providendo, praemonendoconatushostis) preservedthe "liberty" of Caunus,Myndus, Halicarnassusand Samos. We get no turther intormation, for here Livy abruptly halts his narrative,sayingthat "it is not worthwhile to recordin detail the eventsin theseplaces,sinceI am hardly able to narratethosethings

whichrel'ateto the Romanwar."•9 WeknowonlythatAntiochus succeeded

in reaching andtakingEphesus bytheendof thisyear?ø Rhodes temporarily dropsfrom this picture;her "heroism"and subsequent changeof planare unmen tioned elsewhe re.

Livy'snarrative,,especially his overdrawnpraiseof Rhodesand her protection of the "freedom" of Ptolemaicpossessions, rings somewhat hollow. Niese in 1899 offered an interpretationof these eventswhich divergedfrom Livy's account.Far from savingPtolemaiccities,.according to Niese,Rhodeshadusedthe opportunitypresented by Philip'sdefeatto divide with Antiochusthe territory in AsiaMinor held by Philip and by Ptolemy. Antiochustook Philip'spossessions, the Rhodiansfreedthe Greekcitiesfrom Ptolemy and increasedtheir own sphereof influence:"Sie beteiligtensich

alsoanderBeraubung .•gyptens, undesmachtdenEindruck, alsohsiesich dariiber mit Antiocnos freundschat'tlich auseinandergesetzt h/•tten. "2• Some

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

thirty yearslater Holleaux came to a similar conclusion.Anxious to proceed north along the coastof Asia Minor before the Romans,now victoriousover Philip, could deter him, Anuochusmadean agreementwith Rhodes,allowing her "to take underher protection(that is her control)Halicarnassus, Myndus, Samos,former Egyptian dependencies, and redeemCaunus'from Ptolemy's

generals.' ,9.9.TheresultwasthatRhodes, withAntiochus' consent, gained a stronginfluenceover the coastalcitiesof southernAsiaMinor, while the king continuedhis northwarddriveunimpeded.. It is not surprisingthat neither of these interpretationsfound

acceptance amonglater scholars; 23 both Nieseand Holleauxneglectedto providesufficientevidencefor their views, and they failed to give good reasonsfor thus repudiatingLivy's account.MagieTMin 1950 followed Klaffenbach 25 in arguingthat Livy's statement,"curamnon omiserunt(sc. Rhodii) tuendae libertatis civitatum sociarumPtolomaei," doesnot imply that the Rhodians declared these cities free. He also refuted Bolleaux' claim

that they were taken under the control of Rhodes.Instead,"the 'defence'of the independenceof these communities... was . . . the assuranceof

protectionagainstany act of aggression suchasthe Kingcommittedin Cilicia andin Lycia."Magiethusreinstated Livy'saccountof Rhodianprotectionof Ptolemaicpossessions againstAntiochus'depredations.This interpretation fits neatly into a broaderpattern. Between201 and 189 Rhodesconsistently favorsRome and the freedomof the Greek city-statesagainstPhilip and

Antiochus? Rhodes' appeal to Rome in 201 and her supportof the Republicat Magnesiaare part of the samecontinuous policy,one whichis aimedat checkingany advancesof the hellenistickingdomsinto the Aegean. The Rhodianresistanceto Philip in 201 and the ultimatum to Antiochusin 197 fit readily into this scheme,which allowsLivy's accountof Rhodes' negotiationswith the Seleucidto standintact. This view has,therefore,much to recommendit and it hasin fact beenacceptedby E. Will in l•is recentand influentialsurveyof hellenistichistory.2? There is, however,considerable evidencesupportingthe interpretations of Nieseand Holleaux,thoughneitherhistorianpresentedit in a conclusive manner. It seemsevident, asI hope to show,that in 197 Antiochusthe Great and the Rhodiansreachedan agreementwhich provedquite beneficialto both sides.By this pact Antiochuscouldproceedinto the Aegeanasfar ashe wishedand perhapsevenreceivedRhodian assistance in his campaign,while Rhodeswas given a free hand in Caria and receivedat least one city asa favor from the kingatter he had capturedit. Suchfriendship,or collusion,with the Seleucidmarks a distinct break in Rhodian foreignpolicy during the 190s, though this should occasion no surprise among students of Rhodes' relationships with Rome duringthe war with Perseusa quartercenturylater. There is need for a reexaminatiOnof Livy's narrativeand his use of sources,

and for a freshlook at the epigraphical evidencerelatingto thisperiod.First, let us reviewthe fragmentaryevidenceavailablefor a study of Antiochus' activities in 197.

HUNTER

R.

RAWLINGS

III

II. Antiochus'Campaignin 197/6 Antiochus' progressin 197 in his expedition to Asia Minor is remarkable;in one campaigningseasonhe subdriedthe coastfrom Mallusat the easternend

of Cilicia to Ephesus,a goodway up the westerncoast? 8 Livy's account makes it clear that many Ptolemaiccities offered little or no resistance? allowingthe king to reachCoracesiumnear the westernborder of Ciliciaby late May.3ø It was while he was besiegingthis city that Antiochusheardthe news of Cynoscephalae, a report which musthavealteredhis timetable.Now that Philip was decisivelydefeatedhis possessions in Asia3• andin Thrace would fall easilyto the Seleucidpresence,aslong as Rome wasnot giventime

to make her own claims,diplomaticor military? It was of the utmost urgency for the king to reach Thrace as soon as possibleto obviate the expected Roman intervention; as long as Flamininus' attention was still turned to Philip and the Greek citieson the mainland,Antiochus'task was relativelysimple. That Antiochuswasmore concernedwith hastethan with the complete military subjugationof every coastalcity is bestillustratedin Livy's account of his activitiesalong the coast north of Ephesus? Thoughmany cities readily acceptedthe king'syoke, Smyrnaand Lampsacus held out for their complete independence.Antiochus, afraid that others would follow their example, sent troops to the two cities. But other, we might add, more expeditiousmeasureswere alsoattempted:"Nor did he seekonly to frighten them by this show of force, but also through the mouthsof his agentsby courteousaddressand mild reproachfor their rashness and stubbornness, to createthe hopethat they wouldsoonhavewhat they desired,but only when it was clear both to them and to everyone else that their liberty had been

granted bythekingandnotattained through meregrasping at opportunity .,,34 Thoughwe lack an accountof Antiochus'progressthroughLycia and Caria, Livy's descriptionof his diplomatictechniquesin the north outlineshis generalpolicy of "peacefulconquest"quite well, and we may safelyapply it to the southernregion.The king waswillingto acceptnominalsubservience in the casesof strongcitiesofferingresistance, aslongashe couldcontinue hisnorthwardcourseunimpededby lengthysieges.Iasusand possiblyXanthus too were examplesof this conciliatory policy, and evidently represented Seleucid successes. Neither Smyrna nor Lampsacuswas persuadedby the king'sarguments. We haveno way of knowingthe eventswhich occurredat Antiochus' arrival at eachcoastalcity;some, especiallythe weaker ones,must

havegiventhemselves up at theapproach of thefleet;35some,likeCoracesium,weretakenby siege; 36 othersclosed theirgates untiltheyobtained concessionsof autonomia for their perseverance;still others,suchasSmyrnaand

Lampsacus, wereleft unconquered aftermilitaryandpoliticalthreats failed? 7 It is noteworthy that we have specificexamplesof towns in the last two categories, especiallysincethey includelargecitieslike Smyrnaand Lampsacus. Antiochusleft them in his rear,wholly or partially unconquered,solelyin the

interestof reachingThracequickly.It shouldbe addedthat the king also refrained from encroachingon Pergameneterritory, though his policy

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

apparentlyaimed at detachingseveralfree cities from the relationshipswith

Pergamum.a 8 III.

Rhodes and the Greek Cities of Asia Minor

With this understanding of the king'ssubsequent policy we may return to the major problem. Antiochus'negotiationswith Rhodesin the early summerof

197. As we have argued,Antiochus'expedition,originallyintendeda•

aggrandizement at theexpense of theweakened Ptolemaic Empire, TMtooka new turn at the news of Philip's decisivedefeat at Cynoscephalae. The Seleucidstoodto gainconsiderable territory in Asiaand a footholdin Europe if he couldfill the vacuumleft by the Macedonian collapse; cleverdiplomacy supportedby the threat of military action would be enough to convince many Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor to submit to the king. But

Rhodespresenied a substantial obstacle to theseplans;her demand that Antiochusnot passthe Chelidonianpromontoryhadbeentakenseriouslyby the king, who had sent an embassyto assurethe assemblyof his good intentions. It was while this legation was at Rhodes that the news of Cynoscephalae arrived.We have seenthe effect it had on Antiochus.What changes, if any, did it causein Rhodianplans?A closelook at Livy (33,20), our only literary sourcefor this episode,is now required. The first Rhodian reaction, as describedby Livy, is clear: "Hoc nuntio acceptoRhodii dempto metu a Philippoomiseruntconsiliumobviameundi classe Antiocho." With the fear of collaboration between the two kings removed, the Rhodians no longer threatenedAntiochus' fleet; indeed, we know that his progresswasswift enoughto get him from Coracesiumin early

June to Ephesusand probablyevenfurther by the end of the campaigning season.Rhodes, then, decided tllat there was no dangerin allowing the king

to enter the Aegeanunchallenged and to proceedup the coast.In Livy's following remarks,however,Rhodian intentionsbecomedifficult to ascertain:

"...illam

alteram

curam

non

omiserunt

tuendae

libertatis

civitatum

sociarum Ptolomaei, quibus bellurn ab Antiocho imminebat. Nam alias auxiliis iuverunt, aliasprovidendoac praemonendoconatushostis,causaque libertatis fuerunt Cauniis, Myndiis, Halicarnassensibus Samiisque. "4ø The chapter concludeswith Livy's excuse for ending his narrative of eastern affairsat this point. In the first place we shouldemphasizethat theseGreek citieswere not

free? but ratherweretribute-paying subjects of the Egyptianking.42 They were undoubtedlyin the samecategoryas thosepreviously(33, 19, 11) identified as "urbes quae in dicionePtolomaeiessent". 43 Under these circumstances there is clearly some exaggerationin Livy's statementthat

Rhodes"preservedtheir freedom". 44 Indeed,it is clearthat Livy'sentire chapter(33, 20), which containsthe highestpraiseof Rhodesfor her actions againstAntiochus in 197, dependson Polybius' account, of which only a fragment(18, 41a, 1) survives. But eventhat smallfragmentfurnishesenough evidenceto giveus the tone of the narrative.It is from the Rhodianwarning

HUNTER

10

R. RAWLINGS

IlI

to Antiochus(cf. Livy 33, 20, 2-3): "... to preventAntiochusfrom sailing past, not out of enmity, but suspecting that, by joining Philip, he might

becomean impediment to thefreedomof theGreeks. "4sThemotivationfor the Rhodian ultimatum is carefully attributed to Rhodes'desirefor Greek

freedom,asopposed to hostilityto Antiochus. Indeed,thefreedomof Greek cities is repeated three times in the chapter: "Romanisliberantibus Graeciam";"tuendaelibertatiscivitatum";"causaque libertatisruerunt[sc. Rhodiil Cauniis,Myndiis,Halicarnassensibus Samiisque." The extraordinarily favorable attitude to Rhodes at the beginning of the chapter and the repetition of libertas throughouthave convincedmost scholarsthat a Rhodian source lies behind Polybius' account, and thus indirectly behind

Liw's.46Theentirechapteris writtenfi-omtheRhodianpointof view,with each Rhodian action or decisionpraisedand explicatedin detail. Note especially therhetoricalexaggeration in thefollowingphrases: egregie; proque universonomineGraecorum;terramarique;nihil magnificentius; non territi tanta mole inminentisbelli. The chapterendsabruptlywhen Livy saysthere is no need for detail in describingeventsin this area! No suchpraiseof Rhodes recurs in Livy's narrative.There is good reasonto suspectthat Rhodianpropaganda has coloredthis accountof Rhodes'negotiations with Antiochus, and that this kind of bias can explain ambiguitiessuchas the Rhodian"protection"of freedomwhichneverexisted.It is natural,I think, to look elsewherefor an explanationof Rhodes'conductandmotivationsin the early summerof 197.

A glanceat bits of evidencefrom varioussourcesprovidesenough information

to evaluate Rhodes' actual transactions with Antiochus the

Great.Thereis,firstof all, a peculiarnoticein Livy(33, 18, 22) regarding the Cariancity of Stratoniceia.This city wasgarrisoned by Macedoniantroops

following Philip's campaign of 201/0in AsiaMinor. a?In 197theRhodians madeaserious attemptto recover theirperaiafromPhilip'stroopswhilePhilip

himself wasoccupied withtheRomans atCynoscephalae. a8Afterdefeating a Macedonian armynearStratoniceia the Rhodians occupied severaltownsof the peraiabut, accordingto Livy, missedan opportunityto take Stratoniceia without a strugglewhen they failed to marchdirectlythereafter the battle. Livy'snext comment(33, 18, 22) is, on the faceof it, obscure."Nequiquam inde obsessaoppugnataqueurbs est, nec recipi nisi aliquanto post per Antiochumpotuit." "The city [Stratoniceia[ wasthenin vaininvestedand besieged,nor was it recovereduntil somewhatlater by the help of Antiochus." There is no explanationin Livy for the seeminglyanomalous situation in which the Seleucid helped Rhodes to recover Stratoniceia. Fortunately a passagein Polybius(30, 31, 6) resolvesthis ambiguityand enlightens us on the statusof Caunusaswell. A Rhodianembassyhascome to Rome in 165 B.C. to protest the Senate'sdecreeorderingRhodesto withdrawher garrisons from Stratoniceia andCaunus.The chiefspokesman,

Astymedes, argues the casefor Rhodianclaimsonthetwocities:"butasfor Caunus,we boughtit from Ptolemy'sgeneralsfor two hundredtalents,and

Stratoniceia wasgivento usasa greatfavorby Antiochus andSeleucus. "•9 ThisinformationexplainsLiw's mentionof Rhodes'recoveryof Stratoniceia

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

"per Antiochum"; it was an outright gift from the king to Rhodesin the 190s?0

What then of Caunus?Accordingto the envoyCaunuswasboughtfrom Ptolemy'sgeneralsfor 200 talents.The purchasewasdatedby Holleauxfirst

to 189,5• following Appian's remarkthat"theCaunians became tributary to Rhodes afterthe war with Antiochus. "52 Later,however, Holleauxpushed thesalebackto 197or 196,andwithgoodreason? a In 30,5, 12,Polybius mentionsthe senatusconsulturnsettingfree all the parts of Carla and Lycia assignedto Rhodesby Rome after the war with Antiochus.At the time of the decreeCaunuswas in revolt. At 30, 21, Polybiusrefers to a later senatorial decreeorderingthe Rhodiansto withdraw their garrisonsfrom Caunusand Stratoniceia.Astymedesin his speechto the Senatein 165 admits that the

Romanscould claimsomejustificationin deprivingRhodesof muchof Lycia and Carla, for they had given these districts to the island as a token of goodwill;now that Rhodeswas an object of suspicion,the gift could be revoked. Then, however, the envoy proteststhe later senatorialdecree orderingwithdrawal from Caunusand Stratoniceia,on the basisthat these cities had not been gifts receivedfrom the Senate.It is clear from this that Rhodes had bought Caunusbefore she receivedLycia and Carla from the Senate.The purchaseshouldbe dated to the period of Egypt'slossesin Asia Minor, when her possessions were systematicallystrippedfrom her by Antiochus. 54 It is fitting that "Ptolemy'sgenerals"and not PtolemyV himself sold the city to Rhodes,for at this point the king had little control over what occurredoutsideof Egypt. Appianrefersnot to the purchaseof Caunus,but to the date when the city was forced by Rhodesto pay tribute. This step would, of course,not have been taken until after Apamea, when much of Carlabecametributary. We thus learn from Polybius that Rhodes receivedStratoniceiafrom

Antiochus asa giftandbought Caunus fromPtolemy's generals. LaterRoman tradition obscured these facts. Valerius Antias, in his account of Rome's

treaty with Philip in 196,55 claimed that "the Rhodianswere given Stratoniceiaand other cities in Carla which Philip had held." Rome is thus giventhe creditfor Rhodes'possession of Stratoniceiaand otherCarJancities. The reason for such fabrication

in the Roman tradition

is not ditticult

to

discover:if the Senatehad beneficentlymadelarge grantsof territory to Rhodesin 196 and in 188, it couldjustify rescinding thesegrantsin the 160s after Rhodeshad actedsuspiciously in the war againstPerseus. All Rhodian acquisitions on the mainlandwere thusassigned to 196 and 188, the datesof the Roman treatiesimposedon the conqueredkings,Philip and Antiochus. To later Roman historians(includingLivy) this made good sensefor two reasons:Rhodesdid in fact receiveconsiderable territoryin Lycia andCarla as a result of Apamea; the Senate'sremovalof Lycian and CarJancities, including Stratoniceiaand Caunus,from Rhodes' control in the 160s now appearedeminently fair. Furthermore,Rhodes'possession of severalCarJan citiesbeforeApameacouldbe explainedas the resultof Romangenerosity. Fortunately,Polybius' accountpreservesthe actual meansby which Rhodes acquiredthe two CarJancities claimedby Astymedessomethirty yearslater.

12

HUNTER

R.

RAWLINGS

III

Most important is the fact that Polybius' information elucidates Livy's account of the Rhodian "protection" of Caunus. It is clear that Rhodes bought the city from the king's generals.We may infer that the other three cities in Livy's list, Myndus, Halicarnassus and Samos,were also at this time freed from Egyptianinfluence,thoughprobablynot by sale.Antiochuswas perfectly willing to allow the growth of Rhodian influencein the southeastern Aegean and may even have assistedthe island in expelling Egyptian

garrisonsfrom thesecities.The king, as we haveseen,wasinterestedmore in diplomatic compromisethan in outright conquest.He gave Stratoniceia to the Rhodiansand possiblyhelpedin other casesaswell; his primary aim was to reach Europe without delay, and this required,aboveall, Rhodian cooperation. We find confirmation of this view in an often discussedinscription

(Syll.3 588)s6 recordinga treaty betweenMiletusand Magnesia in the autumn of 196, the year following Antiochus'campaignin southernAsia Minor. The treaty ended a war between the two neighborsover territory

which Philip had taken from Miletus and given to Magnesiaduring his campaignin 2017 Peacewas concludedby the mediationof Rhodes, Athens, the AchaeanLeague,and eight Asiancities:Knidus,Myndus,Sanlos, Halicarnassus, Caunus, s8 Mylasa,Teos and Cyzicus.Thesecitiesmusthave been at least nominally free at the time they participatedin the treaty; there can be no questionof Egyptiangarrisonsin any of them in 196. Myndus, Samos,Halicarnassus and Caunus,which appeartogetherin the inscription, are the four cities mentioned in Livy 33, 20, 12 as receiving Rhodian "protection." It is clear now that Rhodeshad in 197 not "protected the freedom of cities allied to Egypt," as Livy (or the Rhodian sourcefor Polybius' account) would haveus believe,but had insteadfreed thesecities from any Egyptian influence. We may be sure that Rhodian influence, strongerbecauseof Rhodes'proximity to the cities, took its place.As we have already seen, Rhodes had bought Caunusonly a year before; shewas willing to treat her as an ally and to allow her to play the role of mediatorin 196. Later Caunusis reducedto a tributary city (Polybius 30, 31, 7)and mustsuffera Rhodiangarrison(Polybius30, 21,3). Rhodes'policyof asking for the freedom of Greek cities and then taking control of thesecities was well understood in antiquity. Eumenes, addressingthe Senate in 189, explainedthe normalprocess: For the Rhodianshave come [sc. to the Senatel to promote the interests of their country, with just as much warmth as we at the present crisis plead for our dominions. But at the present crisis, whateverthey sayis meant to givean impressionquite contraryto their real purpose,and thisyou will easilydiscover.For whenthey enterthis housethey will say that 1,heyhave come neither to begfor anythingat all . .., but that they sendthis embassyto plead for the freedomof the Greek inhabitantsof Asia Minor.... Such will be the falseimpression their words will be meant to produce on you, but you will find that their actual intentionsare of quite a different character.When the towns for which they pleadare set at liberty their own powerin Asia

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

13

will be immenselyincreased,and mine will be more or lessdestroyed. For this fine name of freedom and autonomy will, the moment it becomesevident that you have decidedto act so,entirely detachfrom me not only the cities now about to be liberated,but thosepreviously subjectto me, and add them all to the Rhodiandominion.For suchis the nature of things: thinking that they owe their freedom to Rhodes, they will be nominally the alliesof the Rhodians,but in reality ready to obey al! their orders, feeling indebted to them for the greatestof services.s9

We lind evidenceof a similarprocessin 197/6. The four citieswhich Rhodes freed from Egyptian influence inevitably fell under Rhodian

controlri ø The Rhodians, whoarenamedfirstamongthecitiesmediating the treatybetweenMiletusandMagnesia, probablyinitiatedthe peaceovertures and askedseveralof the citieswithin their"alliance"to join the negotiations. Four of the cities were those which only a year before had gained their freedom with Rhodian help. Joint efforts of this nature will havestrengthened the impressionof a "community" of Greek cities acting in concert under Rhodian hegemony. Antiochus takes no part in the proceedings;by now he has reachedLysimacheiaand left affairsin Caria and partsof Ionia to Rhodes' discretion.

IV. The Captureof Ephesus So far we have seen that Rhodes received positive benefits from her agreementwith Antiochus in the springof 197. After expellinga Macedonian garrisonthe king handed over Stratoniceiato the Rhodiansas a gift and allowed

them

to take control

of several cities on the Carian coast. As

Holleaux concludes:"With his [Antiochus'] consent Rhodes gained a preponderantinfluenceover the regionsouth of tile Maeander. TM For his part Antiochusentered tile Aegeanwithout oppositionfrom the powerful Rhodian fleet. That would probablyhavebeenenoughto satisfythe king's needs, but there is an often overlookedbit of evidenceindicating that Rhodianassistance wasnot only of a passivenature.In Book Ili, chapter9 of his Strategematica,Frontinus collected historical exampleswhich illustrate

the stratagemof breakinginto a besiegedcity in an unexpectedplace("De irruptioneex diversaparte,quamexspectamus"). The final example(10) is as follows: "Antiochus adversusEphesiosRhodiis, quos in auxilio babebat, praecepit,ut nocteporturncummagnostrepituinvaderent:ad quampartem omlli lnultitudine CUlll tumultu decul-rente, nudatis defensore reliquis

munitionibus, ipsea diversoadgressus civitatemcepit."Several scholars •2 have identified the king mentionedby Frontinus as AntiochusII and have linked this report with a passage from Polyaenus'Strategemata(5, 18), in which the Athenian Chremonides,servingas nauarchin the Egyptianfleet, is defeatedoff Ephesusby a Rhodianfleet under Agathostratus.A war between RhodesandPhiladelphus is alsomentionedin the Chronicleof Lindus,37. As Momiglianoargues,"it seemsvery naturalto admit that the navalbattle off

14

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

Ephesosand the occupationof Ephesosare two episodesof the samewar."da The view that Frontinus' and Polyaenus'reportsrefer to the sameseriesof eventsin the early 250s may perhapsseemnatural,but in fact thereis little to recommendit. Polyaenusmentionsonly the Egyptian and Rhodianfleets and saysnothing of Antiochusor any cooperationbetweenthe Seleucidand Rhodes;the Chronicleof Lindus similarlyspeaksof a war betweenRhodes and Philadelphuswith no referenceto Antiochus.Frontinus' accounton the otherhandclearlyshowsAntiochusin commandof the operationsat Ephesus while the Rhodiansare alongto help (quosin auxiliohabebat).Thereis no mention in Frontinus of Agathostratus,the Rhodiancommander,who won the victory off Ephesusand was later honoredby the Leagueof Islandersat

Deloswith a statue(Syll.3 455). One wouldexpectsomereference in Frontinusto the seabattle or a remarkin Polyaenusregardingthe captureof Ephesus,but neither appears.We have, then, two disparateaccounts,one describinga seabattle off EphesusbetweenRhodesand Egypt, the other detailingthe captureof Ephesusby an Antiochussupportedby Rhodes. There-is on the otherhand goodreasonto believethat the Antiochus appearingin Frontinus'report is AntiochusIII. Of the six other references in Frontinus'Strategematicato an Antiochus,four (1, 8, 7; 4, 7, 10; 2, 4, 4; 4, 7, 30) refer definitely to Antiochusthe Great, one is AntiochusSidetes(2, 13, 2) andone(3, 2, 9) cannotbe identifiedwith any certainty.AntiochusIII is then by far the most often cited Seleucid(there is no example of a Seleucus)in Frontinus' work, while AntiochusII in all likelihood doesnot appear anywhere in the b'trategernatica.Furthermore we know that Anti-

ochusthe Great capturedEphesusin the autumnof 197.64 A fragmentof Polybius(18, 40a) revealsthe importanceof Ephesusin Antiochus'plans: "King Antiochuswasvery anxiousto get possession of Ephesusbecauseof its favorablesite, as it may be saidto standin the positionof a citadelboth by land and sea for anyone with designson Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont,and is alwaysa most favorablepoint of defenceagainstEurope for the kingsof Asia."6s Antiochus,then, attachedconsiderable importance to taking Ephesusand after its capturelate in the campaigning seasonof 197 he made it his winter quarters.It was natural for the king to summonall availablehelp for a supremeeffort to take Ephesusbeforewinter cameon and a long siegebecamenecessary.Frontinus' report makesit look as if Rhodeswasa mostimportantpartof thathelp.Weagree,then,with Walbank

andBdrchner 66 in assigning Frontinus 3, 9, 10to Antiochus IlI's expedition in 197 B.C. The passagb findsa far betterhistoricalcontextherethanin the 250s,wherethereis no evidencethat AntiochusII capturedEphesus. If this argumentis acceptedwe havean additionalpieceof evidencefor the nature of the negotiationsbetween Antiochusand Rhodesin 197. The agreementcalledfor the activecooperationof both partiesin dividingup the coastof Asia Minor. The vacuumleft by the decisivedefeatof Philip and the weaknessof Ptolemy V was to be filled by the combinedefforts of the Seleucidand Rhodianfleets.The few remainingMacedonianand Egyptian garrisonswere easily expelled or bribed to leave; the Rhodiansassumed supremacyin Caria while Antiochusmoved northward into Ionia where the

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

15

only seriousresistancewas overcomewith Rhodian assistance.In the autumn

of the followingyear(196) Rhodesgainedfurtherpoliticalprominence when at the headof a coalitionof Greekcitiesin AsiaMinorshehelpedto endthe war between Miletus and Magnesia.At preciselythis sametime Antiochus, havingcrossed into Europein the summer,waswinninghisdiplomaticvictory over the Romansat Lysimacheia.There is no need to reviewhere the various

diplomaticweaponsemployedso cleverlyby Antiochusat the conference; Badianhas acutely analyzedthe king's successful defenceagainstRoman

demands forthefreedom of theGreekcitiesin Asia. 67Thereis,however, one pointwhichhelpsbothto clarifyandto supportourarguments for friendship between Antiochus and Rhodes at this time. In Polybius' account of the conference(18, 50-52) Antiochus first counters Roman demandswith traditional argumentsoutlining Seleucidrights to territory in Europe, and then announcesto the unsuspectingambassadors his forthcoming family alliancewith Ptolemy.As Badianobserves: At this stagethe envoyshad few weaponsleft; it appearedthat their

prot•g•s did not need a champion.There was only one hope of reversingthe impression.To brand Antiochus'offer of freedom to the Greek cities as false, they introduced ambassadors from Smyrna and Lampsacusto declaim againsthim and make it clear to the attentive Greek world whom Greek cities really regardedas their championand whom as their enemy. But Antiochuswas againprepared.He cut short the very first harangue,offering to submitall his differenceswith these cities to the arbitration

of -

Rhodes!

A fairer

offer

could

imagined. This Greek city, quite recently hostile to him....

not be

was

traditionallytheenemyof the kings'excessive pretensions? 8 It is of the greatestsign•ticance /or our argumentthat this offer was

madeand that the Romansreceived it in silence; •9 at thispoint, says Polybius,the conference wasbrokenup on a hostilenote. It shouldbe clear from the foregoingdiscussion that Antiochus'offer to submitdisputesto Rhodian arbitration was no bluff, and was not regardedas suchby Rome. Rhodes now stood, temporarily at least, as a friend of the king. She had receivedpositivebenefitsfrom him andhad returnedthem aswell;Antiochus knew that he would receivea fair judgmentfrom Rhodeson the issueof the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Whenthe king interruptedthe Lampsaceneenvoy with "enoughof that longharangue:for it is my pleasurethat our differences should be submitted to the Rhodians and not to the Romans," he was

dramaticallyand publicly recognizingthe new political situation.The king had not only detached Ptolemy from the Roman camp; much more importantly for his aspirationsin the Aegeanand in Europe,he had added Rhodesto his growinglist of friends. Confirmation for this wew of Antiochus' policy towardsRhodesand Egypt comesfrom a passagefrom Porphyry (FGrHist 260 F 47) which provides details on the marriage alliance mentioned by the king at Lysimacheia."Volens Antiochus. . . in Aegyptumquoqueregnumsuum extendere,filiam suamCleopatramper EuclemRhodiumseptimoannoregni adolescenfis, desponditPtolemaeo,et tertio decimoanno tradidit.... "

16

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

Though the dates and motives are erroneous,a gratuitousdetail like the referenceto the Rhodian intercessorshould not be rejected.Indeed, it fits perfectly into the plans outlined by the king to the Roman ambassadors. Evidently the marriagealliancehas already been under discussion,though

Cleopatraand Ptolemy have probablynot yet been formallybetrothed. TM The Rhodian Eucles,acting as Antiochus'agent, played a largepart in the negotiationsand presumably brought them to a successfulconclusion. Porphyry'saccountthus furnishesus with an exampleof the diplomaticuse to which the Seleucidput his newly-wonfriends,the Rhodians.

V. Antiochus

and Rhodes 196-191

At LysimacheiaAntiochusannounced that he preferredto submitdifferences regardingthe Greek cities to the Rhodiansfor arbitration.In the ensuing years before the outbreak of war between the king and Rome, Rhodes appearson severaloccasionsto have servedin the capacityof arbitrator in just such disputes. TM SeveralRhodianswere chosento settle a dispute between Samosand Priene regardinga fortificationcalledKarion and its surroundingland. The decree(Syll.a 599) recordingtheir settlementin favor of Prienesurvivesand hasbeendated to the periodbetween196 and 192.?2 We sawearlierthat Rhodeshad expelledPtolemaicinfluencefrom Samosand that the Samianswere amongthe signersof the peace(Syll.a 588) in 196 betweenMiletus and Magnesia.Prienehad alsoappearedin that treaty asan ally of the Magnesians. Now, shortly after initiating that settlement,the Rhodiansare activeagainasarbitratorsin anotherdisputebetweentwo Greek cities. There is no referenceto King Antiochus,who wasapparentlycontent to leavesomeaffairssouthof Ephesusto Rhodes'discretion. More important for our argument for Rhodian friendship with Antiochusare two inscriptions honoringRhodian"friends"of the king.The first, OGIS 243, from Calvmnos, honors Menelaus, son of Menecrates,a

Rhodian,who "beinga friend of King Antiochus,is favorableto the people of Calvmnos and looks out for all its citizens....

"Several scholarsTMhave

dated this inscriptionto the 190s on historicaland epigraphicalgrounds,

thoughthe datingcannotbe established with certainty. TMIt findsan excellent context, however,in the years following 196, when, as we have seen,Antiochusexpresseda willingness to submitdisputesto Rhodesfor settlement.In this casea Rhodian agent of the king has earnedin someway the gratitudeof the Calymnianpeopleand has receivedthe distinctionof an honorarydecreefor his efforts.Segr•haslinked thisinscriptionwith another, SEG II 536 (Tituli Calymnii XXIII), which, he argues,indicates that Calymnos•n this period obtained its freedom from Cos with Antiochus' help.75 It is possiblethat the Menelausof OGIS 243 wasresponsible for the success of the negotiations.Whateverthe consequences were for Calymnos, we have further evidencein OGIS 243 for close cooperationbetween Antiochus and Rhodes in matters relating to the Greek cities on or near the coast of Asia Minor.

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

17

One further inscription TM from this sameperiod is a decreefrom Myla,a honoring Apollophanes,son of Anaxipolis,a Rhodian, who is describedas "a friend of the King" and as "archidikastesof the court in Carla." The editorsdate this decreeto the secondcentury,duringthe period of Rhodian supremacy,but as Magie argues,"there is no reason... why Mylasa, an independentcity during this period, should have honored a Rhodianofficial, and the descriptionof Apollophanes as'friend of the King' suggeststhat the date may be somewhat earlier and that tile man was an

official of Antiochus. "?? Magie is almostcertainlycorrect in dating the decreeto the 190sbecausethe kingmustbe AntiochusllI. In 196 Antiochus proclaimed to the conference at Lysimacheia that he would submit differencesregardingthe citiesof AsiaMinor to Rhodesfor arbitration;in the following years, consciousof Roman propagandaproclaimingthe "liberation" of the Greeks, the king made certain that freedom in Asia meant freedom grantedby the Seleucids,not the Romans.The first two lines of the

decreeof the Mylasandemosare an almostexact replicaof the beginningof the Calymniandecree(OGIS 243): "X, sonof Y, a Rhodian,beinga friend of King Antiochus ..... "The two decreesfurnisheloquentevidenceof a policy aimed at convincingAsian Greeksthat Antiochuswould treat the citiesfairly - by submitting disagreementsto Rhodiansfor settlement. Calymnos and Mylasawere well pleasedwith thejudgmentsof the royal officials;the results must have also been beneficial

to Antiochus

and to Rhodes because of the

impressionthey left on the Greekcitiesof the Aegean. We may also discusshere the seriesof decrees from Cretan cities

conferringon Teostile privilegeof asyliawhichthat city hadrequested. TMIt was formerly believed that the responsesof the Cretan cities togetherwith thoseof certainmainlandGreek citieswere sentto Teosin the year 193 B.C. The reasonfor this dating was that in that year the praetorperegrinusM.

ValeflusMessalaaddressed a letter to the Teians TMconfirmingthe rightof asylumfor the city of Teosand its territory. It seemedlikely that the other inscriptionsfound at Teosdatedfrom the sameyear; Teoshad sentembassies to most of the Greek world and to Rome at approximatelythe sametime. But in 1898 Wilhelm proved that the responsesfrom the Aetolians, the AmphictionicCouncil, the Delphiarisand the kingsof the Athamanesmust havecomeseveralyearspreviousto 193, in fact ill the lastyearsof the third century.8ø In 1913 Holleaux attemptedto provethat the Cretanresponses also belongedin tile late third century (201) and that the Roman reply was thus a decade or so later than all the others. 8•

But Holleaux'sarguments,thoughinost scholarshave acceptedthem without question, were tenuous and mostly conjectural. The primary argumentwas from probability:"Tandisque rien n'obligefi croire que les r•ponsesdes Cr•tois furent contemporaines de celle du pr•teur Messaria, la raisonveutqu'ellesl'aient •ta, ou fi tr•s peupras,de cellesdesAltoliens,des Amphiktions, des Delphiens, etc. !1 est l•gitime, a priori, de les attribuer, cornroeces demitires,•i la fin du Ill e sit•cle. TM Holleauxbasesmuch of his discussionon the fact that a certain Perdikkas,an ambassadorof Philip V, accompaniedthe Teian ambassadorsto several of the Cretan cities and

18

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

supportedtheir requestsfor asylia. This leadsHolleaux to concludethat the Teians asked for Philip's aid at the time when the Macedoniancontrolled

Teos8a andpart of AsiaMinor,thatis,duringhisexpeditionin 201/0. Philip, carefulto retain the friendshipof Greek citiesin Asia,washappyto comply with the requestand sent alongPerdikkasto aid the Teian cause.Philip's influence in Crete (he had becomeprostatesof most of the islandin 216)84 lent weight to the Teians' argumentsand helped to make the embassya success.

Holleaux'sreconstruction of the eventsis cleverbut his interpretationis weakenedby the secondpart of his argument,as he was ready to admit:

"Dansce quiva suivre,la placefaite :4la conjecture estplusgrandequeje ne voudrais. "8s In three Cretancities, Eleutherna,Rhaukosand Lappa,the Teian ambassadors were joined by a RhodiannamedHegesandros, son of

Eukrates. In thedecree of Eleutherna heisdescribed as"theenvoyfromKing Antiochus sentto endthewar". Antiochus hasdispatched a Rhodianagentto settle a war; we are unfortunately not told which one. Apparently negotiations have been going on for some time, for the decree of Rhaukos refersto a Rhaukianembassyin Teos.Theseambassadors from Rhaukos,and probably envoys from other Cretan cities who are not mentioned in the

decrees,presumably had soughtAntiochus'help in mediatinga dispute,and had passedthroughTeos on their way. Hegesandros had accompanied them on their returnto Creteandhad concludedthe arrangements for peace.While there he also assistedthe Teiansin the requestsfor asylia,as the decrees from Eleutherna,Rhaukosand Lappaindicate It appearsthen that Antiochus,with the help of a Rhodian,playeda major role in ending a war involvingcertain Cretan cities.Whichwar?There are two good candidates: the so-calledKr•tikos polemos, a war between

Rhodesand several Cretancities, 8• a warbetweenGortynandCnossos and theirrespective allies,bothCretanandexternal. 87 Theformerwarbrokeout probablyin 204 B.C.andendedwe knownotwhen. 88 Thelatterbegan in 200 or 199 andendedat sometimein the 190s,probably in 195.89 From the Eleutheran decree it is clear that the Rhodian Hegesandros had been instrumentalin ending "the war". Holleauxwould haveus believethat this war is the Kr•tikos polemos, whose end he places in 201/0. There are, however,severalstrongargumentsagainstthis date, which hasbeenaccepted by most subsequentscholars,and the entire questionof the "Cretan war" needs reexamination.

First, in 201/0 AntiochusIll was leadinga criticalcampaignin Syria againstEgypt and had little time to spare for Aegeanaffairs. It is unlikely that he would havebeen calledupon to mediatea disputebetweenRhodes and somecitiesin Crete. Second,and far more persuasive, is the fact that in 201/0 it is inconceivablethat Antiochuscouldhaveuseda Rhodianagentfor

anything.In the summerof 201 Rhodeshadjoined Pergamumin askingthe Roman Senatefor assistance againstthe "concerted"aggression ot'Philip V and Antiochus.There is good reasonto believethat the "pact" madeby the two kings to divide the spoilsof Egyptianterritory betweenthemselves wasa completefabricationdreamedup by Rhodesand Attalusin orderto convince Rome of the necessityto interveneagainstMacedonbefore it was too late.

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

19

And Erringtonhasshownthat thesupposed agreement probablyhadnothing to do with Rome'senteringthe SecondMacedonian War.søButwhetherthe pact wasa myth or not, andwhetherit hadany effectuponRomeor not, Rhodianhostilityto Antiochusin 201 is absolutely clear.It isimpossible to believethat a Rhodian acted in the king'sinterestsand as his agentat this date.

On the other hand, in light of the evidencefor Antiochus'friendship with Rhodesafter 197, we may presenta far more plausibleanswerto the problem.At Lysimacheia in 196 the Seleucidkingsaidthathe wouldsubmit disputesregardingGreek cities to Rhodesfor settlement.We have seen examplesof this policy.Hegesandros' designation as "the envoysentfrom Antiochusto settle the war" fits the situationafter 196 and is a closeparallel to the other Rhodianagentsof the king. Furthermore,it was in 197 that Antiochusenteredthe Aegeanand beganto play an activepart in Greek, especiallyRhodian, politics. And finally, a year in the middle or late 190s

satisfies the requirements imposed by thedatesof boththeKr•tikospolemos and the war betweenGortyn and Cnossos. The first might, for all weknow, have ended in the 190s and the secondwar almostcertainlyended in 195 or 194. Thus either condition can be met by a date for the Eleuthernandecree in 194 or 193.

It is, in addition,not sodifficult asHolleauxwouldmakeit to placethe decreesof the Cretan cities later than those of the cities on the mainland. The

decreesfrom Crete found at Teos are written in letters exactly like thoseof

the letter from Messalia;they were thus transcribedby the Teiansat the same time. The decrees of the mainland Greeks are written in a different

style. As Holleaux argues,this doesnot necessarily mean that the Cretan decreesarrived at Teos at the same time as the Roman letter; but it certainly

impliesit. And thefact that the decrees of the mainlandGreeksarewrittenin a differenthand certainlyimpliesthat they were receivedby the Teiansat a different time. This is not proof, but it is pointlessto assert,with Holleaux, that the writing style has no importanceat all in datingthe decrees.Finally, we should look more clearly at the letter from Rome. Messallabeginsit by

referringto Menippos,"the envoysentto us from King Antiochus."This ambassador spokeat Romeon behalfof the Teians"with greatzeal" andwas receivedcordially.ClearlyMenipposperformedat Romethe sameservicefor TeoswhichHegesandros had performedat the threeCretancities.Bothwere ambassadors sent from Antiochus. It is unlikely that thesetwo missionswere

eight or more yearsapart when their aimswere so similarand their results were inscribedin exactly similar letters on the walls of the temple of Dionysusat Teos. There is everyreasonto believethat the decreesfrom Eleutherna,Rhaukosand Lappabelongin or near 193. Their mentionof Hegesandros, a Rhodianagentusedby Antiochusto mediatedisputes among Greek cities, confirms our view of Antiochus' relationswith Rhodesat this

period and offers another exampleof how the kh'•g'spolicy worked in individual

instances.

Throughoutthe years 196 to 193 there is no evidenceof Rhodian hostility to Antiochus,though Eumeneswas busy organizingoppositionto

the king in northern Asia Minor. Livy (34, 57, 2) tells us that in 193

20

HUNTER

R.

RAWLINGS

III

ambassadors came from a great part of Asia to Rome but their citiesare not mentioned. Later in the same year a Roman embassymet with the ministers of the king at Ephesus.After preliminarystatementsof positionone of the Romanenvoys"orderedthe embassies of the [Greek] citiesto be summoned,

whichhad previouslybeenpreparedand coachedby Eumenes .... ,,91 After these cities brought their complaintsand demands,the Roman arguments were over. There is again no merition of Rhodian participationat this conference;Eumeneshad now assumedthe role of championof Greek freedomagainstAntiochus.Rhodespresumablyhad nothingto complainof, nor did the cities of southern Asia Minor. We find further evidence for this

distinction between northern and southern Asia Minor, Eumenesand Rhodes,

in a passage in Appian(Syr. 12), whichreportsan offermadeby Antiochusat this same conferenceat Ephesus.Thoughmost scholarshave rejectedthe passageas being unhistorical,I agreewith Badian 92 in believingthat it containsnothing intrinsicallyunbelievable.Indeed, it agreesremarkablywith the evidencewe havejust reviewed.Appian saysthat the king "promisedto leave the Rhodians, the Byzantines,the Cyzicenes,and the other Greeks of Asia independentif a treaty could be made with the Romans,but he would not free the Aeolians and Ionians, since they had for a long time been accustomedto be ruled by the barbariankingsof Asia." Given severalyears of friendshipbetweenRhodesand the king, it is no surpriseto seeAntiochus offering to leave the islandfree; Byzantium and Cyzicus had not been taken by Antiochus and lay within the Attalid sphereof interest. The king laid specialclaim to the Aeolian and Ionian cities, but there is no mentionmade of the Greek citiesfurther south,which were presumablyto be freed. But this was not the "concession"it might have seemed.The cities of Caria were, as far as the king wasconcerned,alreadyfree. Rhodiansupremacyovermost of

the Cariancoastwasopenlyrecognized by Antiochus,while thosecities(such as Mylasa and Iasus)not within the Rhodianspherehad been givenlocal autonomy and could submit their problemsto Rhodesfor arbitration.The Lycian and Pamphyliancities which the king now controlledstill had local autonomyand few, in all probability,had garrisonsin them. On one point, at least, there is total agreementin our sources:neitherAppiannor Livy nor the inscriptionscontain one shred of evidence indicating hostility between Antiochus

on the one hand and Rhodes and the cities of southern Asia Minor

on the other. Rhodessent no embassyto Rome to complainof the king's actions, and neither Rhodes nor any Carian city sent a legation to the conference at Ephesus.It was Eumenes and the northern cities which furnisheddiplomaticsupportfor Rome againstthe king and enabledthe Republic to play the role of liberator. Antiochusmade no claimsupon Rhodes and the cities of Caria, becausehe had already made arrangementsin

the southwhich were suitableto both sides.The king tried, but failed, to win a comparableposition in the north, where Smyrnaand Lampsacus refusedhisdiplomaticovertures andEumenes rejectedhisoffer of a marriage alliance.

In 192 Antiochus

made his fateful decision to cross to Greece. There is

no evidence that Rhodes took part in the eventsleading to the battle at

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

21

Thermopylaein 191. The Rhodianfleet did nothing to prevent the king's crossingto Euboea;we do not evenhear of Rhodianoffers of assistance to Rome. None of the ancientsourcesthen givesus the leastreasonto suspect Rhodian hostility to Antiochus between 196 and early 191. Indeed, the epigraphicalevidenceseemsto suggest considerablecooperation.It wasnot until the summerof 191 that Rhodesjoined the Romanside.The praetorC. Livius led a fleet acrossthe Aegean and, with the help of a Pergamene contingent,defeatedAntiochus'admiral off Corycus.The next day the victors were joined by 25 Rhodianships. øa Finally, after Antiochus'ignominious defeat at Thermopylaeand a navaldefeatin Asia.Rhodesactivelyjoined the Roman side againstthe king. It was not difficult to pick the winner in 191;

we mayconjecture, with HolleauxandSchmitt, 94 thatRhodes wasalready planningan extensionof her power in Asia Minor oncethe victoryhad been won. There was still no reasonfor Rhodesto complainof the king and his policy; considerations of expedience,which had motivatedRhodes'actions from the first, causedher to turn againstthe Seleucid.At ApameaRhodes reapedthe benefitsof the Romanvictory more than any other ally, even Eumenes,and the brief period of cooperationwith Antiochuswas quietly forgotten. Universityof Colorado

Hunter R. RawlingsIII

ChronologicalTable 205/4 204/3 203 202-200

Antiochus III returns in triumph from his great Eastern expedition. Antiochusvisitsand becomeshegemonof Teos. Antiochus wins over Ptolemaic possessions in Carla (Alabandaand Amyzon). Antiochus campaignsagainstPtolemy V in Coele Syria and wins a decisivevictory at Panion.

201

Rhodesappealsto Rome to block supposedpact of

198

aggression betweenPhilip V and Antiochus. Antiochuscampaignsin AsiaMinor, but withdrawswhen Attalus asks Rome to intervenediplomaticallyon his behalf.

Spring, 197

Early May, 197

Antiochuscampaignsby land andseaalongthe southern coast of Asia Minor, detachingseveralcities in Cilicia from Ptolemy. Rhodes warns Antiochus not to pass the Chelidonian

promontory,fearing that he intendsto supportPhilip againstRome. Late May, 197

Newsof the RomanvictoryoverPhilipat Cynoscephalae reachesAntiochus and encourageshim to drive to the

22

HUNTER

R. RAWLINGS

III

Hellespontand Thrace, in order to fill the vacuumleft by Philip's weakness;Rhodes drops her resistanceand

Summer, 197

reachesan agreementwith Antiochus on the divisionof Philip'sand Ptolemy'spossessions in Asia Minor. RhodesreceivesStratoniceia"as a gift" from Antiochus after he has expelledPhilip'sgarrison,and buys Caunus from "Ptolemy's generals;" Rhodes also establishes hegemonial control over Myndus, Halicarnassusand Samos.

Autumn, 197

Antiochus proceedsrapidly up the west coast of Asia Minor, reachingEphesus,which he takes with Rhodian assistance.

Summer, 196 Autumn, 196

Antiochus crossesthe Hellespont,mastersthe Chersonese,and lays claim to the coastof Thrace. At the Conference of LysimacheiaAntiochus offers to submit disputes concerningthe Greek cities of Asia Minor

to Rhodes for settlement.

The Romans make no

reply. Rhodian

196-193

"friends"

of Antiochus

on several occasions

intercedeon his behalf in problemsinvolvingthe Greek cities of Asia Minor 193

and Crete.

At two conferences, one in Rome, the otherin Ephesus, Eumenes

and

Greek

cities

in

northern

Asia

Minor

complain to the Romans of Antiochus' rule and conduct; there is no record of Rhodian participation at either conference,nor are there any legationsfrom the cities of southern Asia Minor.

192-early 191

Summer, 191

Antiochus crossesto Greece and is defeated by the Romansat Them•opylae;Rhodestakes no part in the war andmakesno offer to supportRome'seffort. A Roman fleet crossesthe Aegeanand with Pergamene support defeats Antiochus' admiral off Corycus; the next day, Rhodesjoins the alliesagainstAntiochus.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Professor E. BadJan for several very helpful suggestionswhich he made for an earlier draft of this paper. 2. See H.H. Schmitt, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte A•tiochos'des Grossen und seiner Zeit (1964) [hereafter "A•tiochos"] 92-95, for discussion and bibliography. 3. Cf. Appian, Syr. 1,2; 12, 45. See Schmitt, A•tiochos 86-90 for an analysis of Antiochus' plans to return the Seleucid Empire to its former boundaries.

4.

Schmitt, Antiochos 90.

ANTIOCHUS

(1965)

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

23

5. Peter Herrmann, "Antiochos der Grosse und Teos", Anatolia 22-160. 6. Cf. Herrmann, op. Clt. 113-116.

9

7. W. Ruge, RE, s.v. Teos, toll. 548-549, concluded from the mention of Hegesandros (see p. 18), the Rhodian agent of Antiochus who supported Teos' requestsfor asylia in certain Cretan cities, that Antiochus had gained control of Teos sometime between 205 and 203. 8. OGIS 234, 20 fl. 9. C.B. Welles, Royal correspondence in the Hellenistic period (1934), nos. 38, 39, 40. Cf. Schmitt, Antiochos 246, note 1 for further bibliography and discussion. 10. Polybius 21, 20, 8: &7rrlXXorptcol•vaq&½'•l•cbv 7rbXetq. 11. Cf. Schmitt, Ant•ochos 269-270, with accompanying notes, and E. Badian, Studies in Greek and Roman history (1964) [hereafter "Studies"], 114-115 for positive assessmentsof the evidence. B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea

[hereafter "Geschichte"] 11(1899)607, note,4, andHolleaux, •tudes d'bpigraphieet d'histoire grecques [hereafter "Etudes"] III (1942) 331 ff. were the primary opponents of acceptance of their authenticity. On the Livian passagessee also J. Briscoe, A commentary on Livy, books XXXIXXXIII

(1973) 183 and 219. 12. Schmitt, Antiochos 269-276. 13. Ibid. (276, note 1). 14. Badian, Studies 115. 15. Schmitt, Antiochos 290. 16. Badian, Studies 115-116. 17. F.W. Walbank, A historical co•nmentary on Polybius [hereafter

"Commentary"] 1I (1967) 603. 18. Livy (33, 20) includes an elaborate encomium of the Rhodians' heroic support of Rome, so elaborate that it has led one scholar (Passerini,

Athenaeum N.S. 10 [1932] 117 ff.) to doubt the historicity of the legation entirely. It is better to accept the fact and ask why the exaggeration occurs at this point; for a suggestion, see pp. O-10. BadJan, Studies 116, and Magie,

Roman rule in Asia Minor (1950) [hereafter "RR/I31"]

11755, accept the

incident against Passerini. 19. Livy 33, 20, 13. 20. Livy 33, 38, 1. Cf. Polyb. 18, 41a, 2. 21. B. Niese, Geschichte II 640.

22. M. Holleaux,CAHVIII (1954) 178(of.•'tudesV 364). 23. A notable exception is F.W. Walbank, Commentary 11602. 24. D. Magie, RRAM 11 946. 25. Cf. Klaffenbach, Mitteilungen des Deutschen Arch. Inst., Athenische Abteilung 51 (1926) 32, note 3. 26. Whether or not the two kings' policies were coordinated remains controversial. For bibliography see E. Will, Histoire politique du monde

hetldnistique[hereafter "Histoire"] It (1967) 100-101. Magie's arguments againsta formal treaty dividing Ptolemaic possessions, JRS 29 (1939)21 ff., remain unanswered, and have been recently strengthenedby R.M. Errington, "The alleged Syro-Macedonian pact and the origins of the Second Macedonian War", Athenaeum N.S. 49 (1971) 336-354. In addition, Errington argues persuasively that the supposed pact had nothing to do with Rome's undertaking the Second Macedonian War.

24

HUNTER

27.

R.

RAWLINGS

III

See Will, Histoire II 156. Will has, however, left room for a differ-

ent interpretation of Rhodes' activities: "il se peut qu'un accord garanfft aux Rhodiens le respect de la zone de leurs inter•ts imm•diats." See also Hans-Erich Stier, Roms Auf•tieg zur Weltmacht und die griechische Welt (1957) 136. 28. For detailed accounts of this expedition see Schmitt, Antiochos 285-288, and O. Leuze, "Die Feldztige Antiochos' des Grossen nach Kleinasien und Thrakien", Hermes 58 (1923) 187-229,241-287. It seemsprobable that Antiochus succeeded in extending his influence even further north during the same campaign, perhaps as far as the Hellespont. Cf. Schmitt, Antiochos 289 ff., and E. Will, Histoire II 157. 29. Cf. Livy 33, 20, 5. For a more complete, but less reliable, list of

cities taken by Antiochus, see Porphyry, FGrHist 260 F 46.

30. Cf. Schmitt,Antiochos 286, andHolleaux, •tudesV 157.The chronology is based on the date of the battle of Cynoscephalae, for which cf. Livy 33, 3, 6. 31. These were confined primarily to the Rhodian peraia and included Stratoniceia, Iasus, Bargylia, Euromos and Pedasa. For a detailed investigation

of Philip's conquests,as well as a reliablestu,dy of the statusof the coastal cities before Philip's campaign, see Holleaux, Etudes IV 211-335. 32. As Rome was to do in vain at Lysimacheia, a year too late. Cf. Polyb. 18, 50, 5-7; Livy 33, 39, 4-6. 33. Cf. Livy 33, 38, 1-7. 34. Ibid. 5-6 (Loeb translation). 35. As the king foresaw: cf. Livy 33, 38, 2. 36. Note, however, that Antiochus was in the process of besieging Coracesium when news came of Philip's defeat. Now that speed was imperative such siegesprobably became less frequent. 37. See Schmitt, Antiochos 285-288 for some specific details. Badian, Studies 117 also stresses the king's decision to reach Europe as speedily as possible. 38. Cf. R.B. McShane, The foreign policy of the Attalids of Pergamum. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences 53 (1964) 132-137. McShane (134) argues unconvincingly that "in this campaign, Antiochus was aiming directly

at thefoundation of theAttalidpower ...."See Holleaux, I•'tudes V 364,and G. Cardinali,I/regno diPergamo (1906) 63-65, for a different view. Antiochus' rapid advance to Europe precludes such an aim. 39. Antiochus had decisively defeated Ptolemy's armies at Panion in 200, settling the question of Coele Syria and marking the beginning of the loss of Ptolemaic control over possessionsoutside of Egypt. 40. Livy 33, 20, 11-12.

41. It was not an uncommonusageon,Livy'spart: cf. 31, 24, 1. For a clarification of civitates sociae see Holleaux, Etudes IV 303-305.

42. Cf. The Tehtunis Pap)'ri I 8 ed. (;renfell-Hunt-Smyly (= U. Wilcken, Grundz•ige und Chrestomathie der Pap),ruskunde 1.2, 7-9) for evidence of tribute and taxes from Egypt's possessionsin Asia Minor shortly before Antiochus' expedition in 197. Among others, Lesbos, Lycia and probably Caria are recorded, leaving little doubt that the cities mentioned by Livy paid tribute to Egypt. For Egypt's control of Halicarnassus,cf. ¸GIS 46. Caunus was bought by Rhodes from "Ptolemy's generals" (Polyb. 30, 31, 6), indicating a Ptolemaic garrison.

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

25

43. Both categoriescorrespondto Polybius'phrase "rd;p brrb IlroXel•cdoprarrol•pcop •rbXecop".Cf. Holleaux, Etudes IV 303 with note 3. 44.

Male's attempt to uphold Livy's account (RRAM II 946, note 49)

is rather naive: "The subsequentclaimof the Rhodiansthat they had bou•t Caunus from the generals of Ptolemy V indicates that at least the three Carian cities remained in their 'alliance' with Egypt. The 'defence' of the independenceof these communities-quibusbellurnab Antiocho imminebatwas, accordingly,the assuranceof protection againstany act of aggression such as the King committed in Cilicia and in Lycia." By putting the cities' "alliance" and Rhodes' "defence" of their liberty in quotation marks he admits the difficulty; how does one "prese•e" the "liberty" of a subject city? The exaggerationsresult from •odian propaganda.

45. •XeuOep•g.It is interestingthat Livy followsPolybiusalmostexactlybut c•not refrain from one addition: the Romanrole in the freeingof Greeceis inserted ("et impedimento esseRomanis liberantibus Graeciam"). From this we may guess that Livy has also revised the first words of the chapter:

"Multa egregieRhodii pro fide erga populum Romanurnproque universo nomine Graecorum.... "In all likelihood the italicized phraseis an addition to Polybius' account. 46. Cf. H. •lrich, De Polybii fontibus Rhodiis, Diss. Leipzig (1898) 46 ff.; G. de Sanctis, Storia dei Romani IV. 1 (1923) 121 with note 18; H.H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (1957) 76, note 1; 77 with note 2. H. Nissen,

Kritische Untersuchungen abet die Quellen der vierten und fanften Dekade des Livius (1863) 142, explains the exaggeration in a different way: "Das besondere Lob der Rhodier C. 20 erklhrt sich aus der Vorliebe des Polybios

far diesen Staat." It is possible that Polybius' special liking for •odes prompted him to accept the story, but likely that he got his information from a Rhodian

source.

47. For a carefulstudyof thisexpedition seeHolleaux, •tudesIV 211-355, and for further bibliography see E. Will, Histoire II 108-109. 48. Livy's placing of the Rhodian campaign "at the same time" (iisdem diebus in 33, 18, 1) as the battle of Cynoscephalaesuggeststhat the campai•s were concerted efforts to defeat Philip on two fronts. 49. The last two are Antiochus III and his son Seleucus, who accompanied his father on the expedition in 197 (cf. Livy 33, 41, 4, where Seleucus

is left in chargeof the rtbuilding of Lysimacheia in 196). Niebuhrin his text reads 'Aprtbxoutoo ZeX•O•ou for 'Aprtbxou• ZeXeO•ou,but the changeis unnecessary; in any eventiJ is AntiochusIII who is meant.Cf. Ma•e, RRAM II 879-880, and Holleaux, Etudes V 107, note 6. 50. Whether A*tiochus took the city by force or by persuasionis not

known, nor can the •ating be precise.Cf. Schmitt,Antiochos247, note 7. 51.

Holleaux, Etudes I 418-424.

52. Appian,Mifhrid. 23. 53.

Holleaux, Etudes IV 304-305.

54. Cf. Holleaux, 2tudesIV 304, note3' Niese,Geschichte II 640; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 1II.3. 268. 55. Cf. Livy 33, 30, 11. For a discussion or' the annalistic additions to

the treaty seeHolleaux,"Notessur Tile-Live. 1. Les additionsannalistiques au trait• de 196", RPh 5 (1931)5-19

(Etudes V 104-120).

26

HUNTER

R.

RAWLINGS

III

56. Cf. Wiegand, Milet. Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem J. 1899 I, 3; A. Rehm, Das Delphinion in Milet (1914) 148; F. Mezger, Inscr. Milesiaca de pace inter Mileslos et Magnetes facta (1913). 57. Myus was presumably the cause of the war. Cf. Polyb. 16, 24, 9.

58. The readingof [Kavv]•covis not certain.Most editorsinsert it because of the list in Livy 33, 20, 12, in which Caunus appears with the other cities found in the inscription. 59. Polyb. 21, 19, 3-10 (Loeb translation). 60. Magie, RRAM II 946 criticizes Holleaux' claim that these cities fell under Rhodes' control, but without argumentation. Cf. Schmitt, Rom

und Rhodos, 76, note 3: "nattirlich 'kontrollierte' Rhodos fortan die Gemeinden, zu deren Schutz die alexandrinische Regierung nicht mehr f/ihig war."

61. Holleaux, CAHVIII 178(cf.•tudesV 364). 62. Cf. W.W. Tarn, CAH VII (1928) 713; Magie, RRAM II 932; E. Will,Histoire I 209-210; A. Momigliano, CQ 44 (1950) 113; Niese, Geschichte II 135.

63.

Momigliano, loc. cit.

64. Porphyry (FGrHist 260 F 46) tells us that "eo enim tempore [ca. 197] captae sunt Aphrodisiaset Soloe... et ad extremum Ephesus",and Livy resumes his narrative of Eastern affairs in 33, 38 with "Eodem anno Antiochus rex, cum hibernasset Ephesi.... "For the chronological question see Schmitt, Antiochos 289-295; Will, Histoire II 157. 65. Loeb translation (by W.R. Paton). This is unfortunately the extent of the fragment. I believe it likely that this represents Polybius' preliminary

discussionprior to describingthe capture. The rather full portrayal of motive and purpose was probably intended to explain why Antiochus obtained Rhodian assistancefor his operations at Ephesus. 66. Cf. F.W. Walbank, Commentary II 603; Btirchner, RE s.v. Ephesos, col. 27 94.

67.

Cf. E. Badian, Studies 119-121.

68. It is a peculiar fact that Livy, who up to this point has followed Polybius' account of the conference at Lysimacheia quite closely, with only a few changesin the order of Antiochus' speech, omits altogether the final sectiondealingwith the Lampsaceneenvoysand Antiochus' appeal to Rhodes. This omissionis, I believe,consistentwith Livy's picture of Rhodes' allegiances at this time; there is no hint in Livy of collusion between Antiochus and Rhodes against Rome at any time before the battle of Magnesia.Livy paints a

pictureof total Greeksupportfor Rom,eagainstAntiochusin Asia. 69.

Cf. Holleaux. VIII 187 (cf. Etudes V 374).

70. 'Ire dating of the betrothal is difficult; Jerome (Porphyry), FGrHist 260 F 47, is probably wrong in attributing it to Epiphanes'seventh year. Chron. Pasch. 1.334.18 Bonn, puts it under the consuls"Porphyrius and Marcellus" (196), but this evidenceis worthlessbecauseof the unreliability of Eusebius, who fails to synchronize Olympiads, consul-yearsand royal Egyptian years. We know from Polybius 18, 51, 10 that the marriage alliance was

being negotiated by October 196, the date of the conferenceat Lysimacheia. The terminuspost quem is summerof 197 when Antiochusattackedand took

many Ptolemaicpossessions along the coastof Asia Minor. The vagueness of Polybius' report (dva•/•atbrr•ra ovvr•OeoOat)indicatesperhapsthat the betrothal was not yet finally concluded by the time of the conference. The

ANTIOCHUS

THE

GREAT

AND

RHODES

27

marriageitself was in 194/3 (Livy 35, 13,4). For bibliography on this question see Walbank, Commentary II 623. 71. Cf. H. van Gelder, Geschichte der alten Rhodier (1900) 132, and

Hiller yon Gaertringen,RE Suppl. V, col. 791 for discussionsof this evidence.

72. For the dating,which was for a long time in dispute,seeSyll.3 599, introductory note. 73. Cf. van Gelder and Hiller yon Gaertringen, locc. citt. (above, note

71); M. Segr•, Tituli Calymnii. Ist. Ital. d'Arti Graf. (1952) XVI 26. 74. See G. Klaffenbach'sreview of Segr• in Gnomon 25 (1953) 457. 75. For different treatments of this evidence, see Klaffenbach, loc. tit., and H. Bengtson,Die Strategie in der hellenistischenZeit. M•inchener Beitri•ge zur Papyrusforschungund antiken Rechtsgesch•chte,Heft 32 (1944) 371-372 and 402.

76. SB Akad. Wien, phiL-hist. Kl. 132 (1894) II 12, no. 2 = BCH 22 (1898) 382, no. 23.

77.

Cf. D. Magie, RRAM II 1028, note 74. Hiller yon Gaertringen, RE

Suppl.V, col. 791, W. Ruge,RE 16, col. 1052,andvanGelder,(above,note 71) also date the inscription to the 190s and believe that the king is Antiochus Ill.

78. Only the decrees of the first or older series will come into the discussion: H. Collitz and F. Bechtel, Sammlung der griechischen DialektInschriften III.2 (1905) 5165-5180. Apollodotos and Kolotas were the Teian ambassadors of the first embassy, Herodotus and Menekles of the second. 79. R.K. Sherk, Roman documents from the Greek east (1969), no. 34.

80.

A. Wilhelm, Gdttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen (1898)219-220.

81. M. Holleaux, "Etudes d'histoire hell•nistique: Remarquessur les d•crets des viiies de Cr•te relatifs a l'&ov?•ta de T•os," Klio 13 (1913),

135-159(t•tudesIV 178-203).Seenow P.L. Herrmann(above,note 5), 135-136. The Cretan responsesare in Inscriptiones Creticae I, p. 292, no. 1;

II, p. 161, no. 21;p. 1,97,no. 3. 82.

Holleaux, Etudes IV 183.

83. The evidence for Philip's takeover of Teos has been weakened by the new inscriptions from Teos. See Herrmann (above, note 5), 136, note 206, and D. Magie, "Rome and the city-states of Western Asia Minor from 200 to 133 B.C.," Anatolian studies presented to William Hepburn Buckler (1939)

168, note 3.

84. Cf. Polybius7, I 1, 9; 14, 10. 85.

Holleaux, Etudes IV 191.

86. SeePolyb.13,4, 2 and 13, 8, 2; Diodorus 27, 3;Syll.3 569,1ine 6; 673, lines 7 ff.; and cf. H.H. Schmitt, Die Staatsvertri•ge des Altertums Ill (1969), nos. 551 and 552, both of which are undated but generally understood to be treaties made towards the end of the war. The first scholar to put

together the scanty evidence for this war was R. Herzog, rrb?•ClaOq", Klio 2 (1902) 316 ff. For the now extensive bibliography seeDie Staatsvertri•ge 320.

87.

See Pausanias8, 50, 6; cf. Inscr. Cret. IV 176. For a discussionof

this war and conjectures concerning its many problems see R.M. Errington, Philopoemen (1969) 35-48.

88. There is simply no way of knowing the duration of this war; most scholars (cf. Die Staatsvertrtige [cit. note 86] ) accept 201 or 200 as the last

28

HUNTER

R.

RAWLINGS

III

year of hostilities but there is no evidenceto support either of these dates. The alliances made by Rhodes with Hierapytna and Olus (Die Staatsvertriige, nos. 551 and 552) do not necessarilysignal an end to the war; indeed, H. van

Effenterre (La Cr•te et le monde grec de Platon • Polybe [ 1948] 256-257) seems to think that the alliances, which he dates to 202/1, were made by Rhodes

to weaken

her Cretan

enemies and that she renewed

the conflict

in

the following year. Since the decrees are undated, all solutions are purely conjectural.

89. Errington (Philopoemen 44) argues persuasivelyfor 195 as the end of the war, using Flamininus' treaty with Nabis in that year and Philopoemen's return

90. 91. 92.

to Greece

from Crete in 194 as evidence.

Cf. above, note 26. Livy35, 17, 1. E. BadJan, Studies 138, note 78.

93. Livy 36, 45,,5. 94.

Holleaux, Etudes V 407 f.; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos 79.

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

A sharp differentiationbetween rich and poor plagued ancient Greece throughmuch of her history. In periodsof stress- and especiallyin war time -

social discontents could come to the surface and find outlet.

The rise and

fall of governments,brutality and retaliation, exile and massacresreflect a social dimensionthat supervenedupon political contestsand inter-state rivalries. Warfare on a larger scale, marked with increasedferocity and casualties, prevailedin the later Hellenisticage.And a new elementemerged to complicateand aggravatehostilitiesin the 2rid centuryB.C.: the powerof Rome.

Roman impact upon the social strugglesin Greece has never been satisfactorilysorted out. The evidenceis distressinglymeager.Assumptions and hypotheseshave steppedinto the breach,raisingmore questionsthan they answer.Basic issuesare still unsettled.Did classdivisionsdetermine Hellenic

attitudes

toward

Rome?

Did

social conflict

stimulate

or was it

engenderedby the coming of Rome? Was Roman authority exercisedon behalf of certain socialstratain Greece?Did classconflictsplay themselves out on the stage of international war between Rome and the Hellenistic powers? These matters cannot be resolved here in their totality. But an important test caseneedsto be scrutinized:the Third MacedonianWar.Here,

if ever, there was an event which shouldshedlight on the questionsraised above.Most of the Hellenisticworld wasengulfedin this struggle,whetheron the side of Rome or of Perseusof Macedon - or with divided loyalties, seekingneutrality and endeavoringto survive.The sourcesattest to economic difficultiesprior to the war, internalturmoilandupheavalduringit, crueland violentconsequences in its aftermath.Yet the connectionof socialconflicts with the aims of the major participantsin the war still lacks a critical assessmen t.

A generalhypothesishas prevailedfor nearly a century,dominantin the standardworksand repeatedin more specialized studies:Rome put her weight behind the upper classes in Greece,the wealthy and the noblewho would run their statesin conformitywith the'socialorderin Italy. The Third MacedonianWar is thereforesymptomaticof a larger pattern: aristocratic

elementssided with Rome, the masseslooked to Perseus. • In slight modification of this view some scholarshave urged that not all Greek aristocratsespousedthe causeof Rome - but the lower classes,in any case,

weresolidlyanti-Roman.:Thecommunis opinio,of course, hasprovoked a few dissenters.Some prefer to reversethe hypothesis:Rome, far from backingthe oligarchicelementsin Greece,in this periodencouraged popular

demagogues, would-be tyrants,andtheadvocates of ochlocracy. 3 Or a more pragmaticapproachhas been offered. Classdivisionsdid not themselves determineallegianceto particularforeign powers;but economicgrievances 29

30

ERICH

S. GRUEN

were exploited by Perseusto enhancehis own popularity - and thereby

inadvertently playeda rolein theThirdMacedonian War.4 And,it hasbeen maintained, Rome held no consistentbrief for the upper classes,but supportedaristocratsor demagogues, from time to time, in accordance with

herownparticular interests. s Such are the principalhypotheses. Modernopinionsshowdivergence in detail but proceedfrom a commonpostulate:that the classstructurein Greece inclined men toward or permitted them to be exploited by either Rome or Macedon.The postulateitself has neverbeenseriouslyquestioned. Wherein lies the evidence?

Polybiusremarksthat Perseus,at the outsetof his reign,took painsto ingratiate himself with the Greeks. The new monarch offered amnestyto thoseMacedonians who had beenexiled or imprisonedfor debt andgranted pardonto thoseaccusedof offensesagainstthe crown.An internalmatter essentially,but with external implications.Perseusgavemaximum advertisement to his policy by erectinglistsof pardonedfugitivesin three principal shrinesof the Greek world: Delos, Delphi, and the sanctuaryof Itonian Athena. The publicity move bore fruit, accordingto Polybius.It lifted the spirits of many and rousedhigh hopes among all Greeks in the new

Macedonian king. 6 Butthereisnothing in thisaccount to suggest thatPerseus directedhis appealto the lower classes assuch.Amnestytoward Macedonian debtorsprovidedno relief for the indebtedclasses elsewherein Greece- a relief not in Perseus'power to offer. The recallof fugitives,in fact, probably easedthe burdensof governmentsin variousGreek stateswhere the exileshad soughtrefuge.The maneuver,in any case,wasconceivedto enhancePerseus' image - by contrastwith the unpopularity and aggressive policiesof his

fatherPhilipV. 7 Polybius givesnoindication of class difference in theGreek response to Perseus. 8 In the first year of the war (171 B.C.), Macedonianforcesemerged victorious in a major cavalry engagementat Callinicus.The fortunes of Perseusrose and excitement ran through Greece. Polybius utilized the occasionfor somegeneralmoralizing.Greek sentimentsfor Perseus,hitherto

concealed by most, eruptedwith enthusiasm. 9 It was but a temporary aberration,however - so saysPolybius - like emotional crowdsat a boxing match who cheer the weaker fighter when he gainsthe advantageover his superioradversary.Had they reflectedupon the benefitsbroughtby Rome and the evilsof Macedonand her king, the spontaneous hysteriawould soon

havepassed. •ø The termsemployedhere by Polybiusfor Greekswho welcomed Perseus' victoryaresuggestive: hoipolloi,hoiochloi.TMDoesthis meanthatPerseus stirredthepassions especially of thelowerclasses? • 2 Such may be the impression that Polybiussoughtto convey.But somehesitationis warranted. The tendentiousness of Polybius'accountis plain. The lengthy passage is an apologiafor his fellowcountrymen,an answerto post-warcritics who charged that Greek sympathies for Perseus were tantamount to

ingratitudetoward Rome.•3 Hence it was best to describethe Greek demeanoras irrational emotion broughton by the fervor of the moment -and not indicativeof genuine attitudes. It was also better for Polybius'

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

31

purposesto liken the displayto the behaviorof the masses: soberopinion

wouldeasilyhaveturnedthings around. •4 Onecanhardlytakethepassage as serioussocialanalysis.In particular,Polybiusdrawsno classlineshere. The Greek demonstrationis a general one, not confined to a segmentof the population,not contrastedwith the aristocracy,the wealthy, or the higher

ordersof society. Is It is especially noteworthythatLivy,whois proneto draw suchcontrasts,finds no warrant for it in this selection.He offers a much abbreviatedversion of Polybius' analogy, but his understandingis clear: Greek sentimentsfor Perseusare not thoseof the plebs or the multitudo, but

simply voluntates horninure. •6 Only a singlepassageseemsto provide a clear classdifferentiation amongthosewho sidedwith Rome or Perseus- and that in Livy, not in Polybius.The Roman historianassertsthat, amongfree peoplesin the Greek world, the plebs everywhere were nearly unanimous in leaning toward Macedon, the principes took their own counsel,some for Rome, somefor

Perseus, somefor peaceand a balanceof powers. • The thrustof these remarks is not to be gainsaid.But their accuracyis another matter. The Polybian originalis no longerextant - and it would be rashto assumethat we have unedited translation.Further, Livy's commentarytoo is not to be mistakenfor profoundsocialanalysis. The Greekplebsis an objectfor scorn, an opportunityfor Livy to vent his spleenupon the masses in general:"as usual, they opt for the worse side." Nor are the principes,with whom he contraststhem, equated with upper-classopinion generally. They are individualleadersor politicians,each adoptinga stanceconsonantwith his own interestsor principles.Livy doesnot pretendto tie their actionsto their

socialclass. •8 Anotherfeatureraisesdoubts.The antithesis betweenplebs andprincipes,the one anti-Roman,the other pro-Roman,is a commonLivian device. He applies the same interpretation, with analogouspejorative overtones,to Greek attitudesat the time of Rome'swar with Antiochus.And he offers it, as well, for divisionswithin Italian cities during the Hannibalic

War.•9 Hence,it appears, a stocktheme- not a guarantor of the truth. Finally and most important, Livy seemsto dissentt'romhis own thesis.In a later passage,also derivedfrom Polybius,he repeatsthe categorizationof Greekprincipesinto the threegroups:the pro-Roman,the pro-Macedonian,

andthemediaparswhichalonestoodfor patriotism andindependence. 2ø The last groupreceivesthe bestmarks- asit doesin the earlierpassage. Livy

has,of course,simplyretailedPolybius'verdict:that lastgroupis Polybius' characterizationof his own sentiments. 2 • But anothercommentfollows: the

politicianswho strovefor independence of both sidesearnedgreaterfavor

among theirownpeople, though lessinfluence in foreign parts. 22Therecan be no questionthat that remarkisalsodrawnfromPolybius- a reflectionon the post-warfate of Greekleaderslike himself.And it doesnot concurwith a notion that the Hellenic masseswarmed to the cause of Perseus.

So much for the generalstatementson which modernshaverelied.At best, they furnish only the shakiestsupport for the view that class distinctionsunderlayallegiances in the Third MacedonianWar. It will be appropriate nowto examinetheevidence for thebehavior of individual Greek statesduringthe preliminaries andin the courseof the war itself.

32

ERICH

S. GRUEN

Achaea

In 180 the Achaean politician Callicrates arrived in Rome on an official

missionand delivereda muchcelebratedspeech.For Polybiusit wasa turning point in Roman relations with Greece. Callicratesupbraided the Roman Senatefor its indifferenceto Hellenicpolitics.The result,he maintained,was that pro-Roman politicianswere held up to scornby the populace.Their adversaries,who stood for autonomy and for the traditional laws and constitutionsof their states,flouted Roman requestswith impunity, thereby gaininghigh distinctionsand positionsof power amongtheir fellow-citizens. The speechof Callicrates,so Polybiusmaintains,rousedRome to decisive action. She praised Callicratesto the skiesin letters to Achaea and other Greek states and henceforth put her weight solidly behind flatterers and sycophants,to the detrimentof right-mindedleaders.To Polybius'mind, this move inauguratedruinous developmentsfor Achaea and for the rest of

Greece: thebeginning of theendforHellenic independence. 23 Scholarlydiscussions on this sectionare profuse.Their focushasbeen on an assessment of Callicratesand on the elucidation of Roman policy.

Thoseissues canbemutedhere. TMFor ourpurposes, it ispertinent to observe the languageput by Polybiusinto the mouth of Callicrates.The dominant Achaeanleaders,he claims,have urged ta pl•th• to placelaws, treaties,and oaths above the wishes of Rome. Such an attitude has earned widespread popularity and prevailsen tois pollois. In consequence thereof,pro-Roman

politicians are subjectto disdain paratoisochlois. 2s AndwhenCallicrates returned to Achaea,armedwith the overt backingof Rome, he terrorizedand

crushedtousochlous. •6 Thus,a primafaciecasefor the attachment of the masses to an anti-Romanposture.Is it so? There is much in this accountto causemisgivings.First, Callicratesis not one of Polybius'favorites- the opponentof Polybius'father Lycortas and the man responsiblefor the post-warbanishmentof Achaean"patriots," includingPolybiushimself. Thorough objectivity is hardly to be expected. Callicrates

is made to assert before his fellow

citizens that Achaea

should

obey the instructionsof Rome in preferenceto her own laws, inscribed

decrees - or anything else. • • It isnoteasyto imagine anypolitician takingso extreme a standbefore a gatheringof the Achaeans,especiallyat a time when Roman interference in the internal affairs of Greece had been minimal.28 Further, the depiction of Callicrates'mission is tortuous. Accordingto Polybius,Achaeaadoptedthe line of Lycortas- to maintain the statusquo and to inform Rome that her request(regardingSpartanexiles)was not consonantwith the League'sregulations- and then sentCallicratesand two othersto deliverthe message. Callicrates,therefore,in thisanalysis,not only behavedabominablybut ignoredthe explicit instructionsof the Achaeans-

while his two colleagues presumablystoodby in silence! 29 And upon his return to Achaea he was able to cow the populace,for, Polybiusstates,no one knew what he had saidin the Senate?0 Finally, it is asserted,Callicrates gainedelection as general of the League for the following year and, apart

from other evilscommitted,allowedhimselfto be bribed?1 A gratuitous

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

33

addition by Polybius, surely. The whole account reads like anythingbut

objective reporting. 32 The speechof Callicratesis largelya Polybiancreation.And it doesnot fit the facts. Callicratescomplainsthat politiciansof his persuasionare despisedand disdainedby the Achaean polloi and ochloi, while their adversaries enjoy power and popularity.Yet the Achaeanstrategosin that very year, chosenby the electorateand exercisingauthority before the missionto Rome, was Hyperbatus,a political ally of Callicratesand a man

who,Polybius affirms,shared hissentiments on relations withRome. 33 Nor is it likely to be an accidentthat Callicrateswas appointedto this embassy

andservedasits spokesman. Hispartydoesnot appearto be in disgrace. 34 Similarlydubious isPolybius'implication thatthisembassy turnedeverything around:the populacewas crushed,Callicrates movedinto power,and the Senatethereafterbackedonly pro-Romantoadies.Weknowverylittle about Achaeanpoliticsfor the next decadeor so.But it is noteworthythat the only Achaeanstrategoiwhose namesare preservedfor the period 179-168 are

opponents of Callicrates. 3s Clearlyhisfactionheldno exclusive dominance. The notion that the embassyof 180 marksa decisiveturningpoint is, at the

veryleast,a foreshortening andanexaggeration. 36 In fact, Polybiushas a ratherlargercanvasin mind.Hisvantage-point is 168 or, indeed,146, painful timesfor Achaea- and awkwardeventsfor Polybiusto explain. As is his wont, he preferslong-rangeaitiai to more immediate

causes. Hence the fall of Achaea in 146 is traced to much earlier

developmentsand the treachery of Callicratesin 168 is foreshadowedby actionsa dozen years before. Whateverthe validity of that analysis,it runsa riskof distortingthe situationin 180.The unpopularityof Callicratesreached its height in the yearsafter Pydna,when Achaeasoughtin vain to recoverthe

hostages whohadbeencynically fingered by thatpolitician. 37 Retrojection of his unpopularity to 180, with its concomitant implicationsabout the attitudesof the masses,is illegitimate. Moreover,we do not havehere,any morethanin the previouspassages discussed, a genuineattempt to make a socialdistinction.Polybiusdoesnot

contrastthe upperandlowerclasses vis-fi-vis theirfeelings for Rome.Thisis a contest among politeuomenoi for prestige and influence among the

populace. 38 The villainyof Callicrates, for Polybius, lay in abandoning Achaean traditions andturning thetideagainst "right-thinking" politicians. 39 The polloi, in Callicrates'rhetoric,are simplyinstruments to be manipulated: if Rome makesher wishesknown, Achaeanpoliticianswill switchallegiance

andthepeoplewill followthemlikefrightened sheep. 4ø No hinthereof an anti-Romancommitmenton the part of theplebs.In Polybius'own analysis, tendentiousthoughit may be, the p9pularityof leaderswhom he approves rested on their adherenceto Achaean laws and practises,not on any

opposition to Rome. 4• Nor did Perseusindulge in appealsto the Achaean masses.On the contrary. In 174 he wasparticularlyactivein endeavoringto earngood will

amongGreekcommunities. 42 To Achaeahe senta friendlyandhopeful messageaskingrepeal of the ordinancewhich forbade Macedoniansfrom

34

ERICH

S. GRUEN

crossingthe bordersof Achaea.And the king had usefulbait to dangle:he would restore to the Achaeansfugitive slaveswho had soughtasylumin Macedon.There was initial inclinationamongmany to acceptthe offer. But factional debate ensued,raisingthe issueof Roman reaction; the matter was

deferred,and, when Perseuslater made a secondattempt, his envoyswere

rebuffed. 43 Theimplications forAchaean politics arenotourconcern here. More significantis the segmentto which Perseusdirectedhis bid. The men who stood most to gain and the loudestadvocatesof reconciliationwere the

slave-owning classes. 44 Perseus did not lookfor support fromthe lower orders of Achaea.

Relevantinformationon Achaeafor the immediatelysubsequent years is skimpy in the extreme. When the Third MacedonianWar broke out, the Leaguelinked itself officially to Rome and compliedreadilywith Roman

requests - a prudent, if notanenthusiastic, decision. 4s Of discontent among thepopulace wereceive noword. 46 An Achaeanmeetingof 170/169votedto reinstatedecrees oncepassed in honor of Eumenesof Pergamumand later revoked- a gestureof good

faith towardan ally of Rome.Polybiushimself,hipparchin thatyear,spoke on behalf of the resolutionand describes the mood of the gathering.The ochlos'was at first hesitant and wavering,in the face of anti-Pergamene speeches;but Polybius spoke to the real feelings of the polloi by distinguishing legitimateand illegitimatehonorsconferredupon Eumenes;at last, theplOthosconcurredin hisviewand restoredthe appropriatedecrees. 47 The passageshedsinterestinglight on Polybianlanguage.Clearly termslike ochlos,polloi, and pl•thos need not have pejorativeconnotations,nor any classmeaningat all. They are employedhere, in a strictlyneutralfashion,to denotemajority opinionexpressed at an Achaeangathering.If, asis generally supposed, this is a meetingof the boule,ratherthan the ecclesia,then the attitudeof the populaceis'not at issue.And, evenif it be theecclesia (whose

composition at a particularsession we cannotpresume to know),its decision, in anycase,conformed to the policyof Rome.48 Suspicionsand insinuationsabout anti-Romanfeelingsamongcertain Achaean statesmen,notably the party of Lycortas,were noisedabroad -

suspicions whichPolybius is at painsto refute. 49 Butthecharges, whether valid or not, werespreadby factionalrivals,aspart of a politicalstruggle, and irrelevant for the sentiments of the plebs. The official voice of Achaea's

majorityvoted to offer the League'sfull levy to Rome in the campaignof 169.5ø Another factional contest.arose in the winter of 169/168 over the

questionof despatchingaid to Egypt in her war againstAntiochusIV. Lycortas,Polybius,and othersurged that assistance be sent,the Callicrates group resistedit and preferreda peacemission,arguingthat Achaeashould husband her resources to serve the cause of Rome. The inclinations of the

Achaeanpolloi and pldthos, so Polybius asserts,leaned strongly toward Lycortas'proposal.But a letter from the Romancommander Philippus tipped the scalesand the Achaeans optedfor the peacemission? • Onceagain,the terms polloi and plpthos are neutral, a reference to the majority in an

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

35

assemblynot to the sentiments of the massesgenerally. Nor are those sentimentsrepresentedas anti-Roman. The issue was aid to Egypt; the argumentof Lycortasand Polybiusaffirmedthat suchaid would in no way damagethe Romaneffort againstPerseus. And the letter of Philippusfound the Achaeanscompliantand cooperative.If therewassmolderingresentment among the lower classeswe do not hear of it. The decisionwas made at an

assembly whichconsisted of Achaeans overthirtyyearsof age. s2Thereisno reasonto believe that the youngermen - who might otherwisehave been sentto the Syrianwar- would object to that decision. Rome'svictory over MacedonallowedCallicratesto reap the benefits. He denouncedhis political foes asMacedoniansympathizers. And Romewas now ready to listen. But the men who suffered, of course,wereprincipes, party leaderswho had opposedthe policiesof Callicrates.The one thousand

hostages deportedto Italy werenot drawnfrom theAchaean plebs. S3The theory that Achaeawas divided along classlinesin its attitude toward Rome receives not a whisperof supportfrom tile ancienttestimony.

Aetolia

Civil strife assumedmuch more seriousproportionsin Aetolia. Ill tile 170s fierce fighting broke out among Aetolian factions. Exiles and massacres featuredthe contests. To the cynicaleye of Polybius,nothingseemedto quell

themurderous instincts of theAetolians against oneanother. s4 Wherein lay the roots of this conflict'?

Livy alludesonly to a strugglebetweentwo partiesof principes:there were eighty ilhtstres hc•mineswho were exiled and then deceived and

treacherously slainat tileinstigation of another priucepq civitatis. ss Butmore than a mere aristocraticquarrelwasinvolvedhere. Economicunrestunderlay the situation: debt problemsof substantialmagnitudebeset the Aetolian

polity.s6 The difficulties stemmed perllapsin part fromheavyindemnities exactedafter the Aetolian war of 191-189, aggravated by more than a decade of peace,which allowed no opportunity for booty or for tile hiring out of Aetolians as mercenaries.sv It will not do, however, to reduce this to a strugglebetween social

classes.Debt problemsin Greece are complex and ambiguous.A simple contrastbetweenrich andpooris inapplicable.Contractionof a loan required security,normallybasedon land.Creditorswould hardly find it profitableto deal with an impoverishedproletariate.Tilere call be no questionthat tile indebted included Illell of prope.rty and Illell of influence ill Aetolia. Representatives of the debtorswho servedon embassies to tile Senateand securedhearing before Roman envoyswere surely not from the destitute

masses. s8 Nonetheless, thecontestthat issued fromindebtedness wassavage and divisive. To what extent did Rome and Macedon intercede on one side or the other?

Perseus'relations with Aetolia seem to have been cordial.s9 His arrival

at Delphi,we aretold,stimulated goodwill amongnumerous Greekstates. 6ø

36

ERICH

S. GRUEN

And the king controlled severalvotes in the Delphic amphictyony, as did

Aetolia. 6• That theAetoliansappealed to Perseus for assistance is therefore not surprising. 62 At somepoint in the mid 170sMacedonian aid was

despatched, evidently in theformof a garrison. 63 Later Roman propaganda, of course,allegedeverysort of misdeedon Perseus'part in the Greek world. The chargesare retailedparticularlyin the

tendentious speeches constructed by Livy for Eumenes andfor Philippus. 64 Involvementin Aetolia, however, forms but a small part of the indictment. Eumenes,in fact, does not even accusePerseusof taking the initiative: the

Aetolians areto blamefor calling himin.65 Onlya single linein Philippus' speechholds Perseusresponsible,and that comesin an indecisiverhetorical question:"who else but your agentscan seemto havecausedcivil war and

the murderof principes in Aetolia? "66 Hardlya firm conviction; Roman propagandists obviouslyhad no evidenceagainstPerseuson this score.In Livy'snarrativeof Aetolianevents(as opposedto the speeches)Macedonian involvement is not even noted. Certainly nothing compelsa belief that Perseusintervened on behalf of the indebted - or that he had any other

purpose than to bring about a settlementamong conflictinginterestsin Aetolia.6 7

Rome too, it appears,refrained from taking sidesin the conflict. Representatives from both of the warringAetolianfactionsfelt free to submit their casesto Rome in 174. A senatoriallegationwas despatchedand heard

arguments fromeachcamp. 68 Whatever recommendations theyofferedwere evidently ineffectual.The envoysreturnedwith a pessimistic report: Aetolian

madness is incorrigible. 69 But theAetolians themselves hadnotdespaired of Roman mediation.The next year saw a new missionto the Senateseeking relief from internal dissensions, and another senatorialembassyin return. Once againeachfaction presentedits sidewith vehemence. Rome'sattitude, however,is clear.Her envoy, actingon explicit senatorialinstructions,refused to lighten or to aggravatethe burden on either party. He urged a reconciliationof differencesand an end to discord.A mutual exchangeof

hostages wasarranged - andturmoil,for themoment at least,subsided. 70 The Romanshadmaintaineda strictlyneutralposture:no signof supportfor

a particular socialclass in Aetolia?• The evidenceoughtnot to be forcedinto preconceived categories. War between Rome and Perseuswas far from a certainty - or perhapseven a

probability- in the mid-170s.Economicdistress, aggravated by political rivalries, created deep divisionsin Aetolia. The wearied and frightened participants soughtintermediaries - frombothMacedonandRome.It would be anachronistic and superficialto label the contending forcesaspro-Roman andpro-Macedonian, let aloneto assumethat the richlookedto the oneand the poor to the other. In late 172 tensionsbetweenRome and Macedonpushedto the brink

of war. A Romanembassyto Greecein the fall soundedout potentialallies. That embassyhappenedto be in Aetolia at the time of a specialelectionto replacethe strategoswho had died in office. The new electionreturned Lyciscus,a man describedby Livy as certainto supportthe Roman cause.

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

37

Hence,it is usuallyassumed, theenvoyshada handin theelectoralresults? 2 Not a necessary conclusion.Lyciscushad held the office before,in 178/7,

andhadevidently beena prominent Aetolianstatesman for sometime.73His "pro-Romanism"was a postureadoptedduring and after the war itself, perhapspredatedby Livy. There is, in any case,no indicationthat Lyciscus cameto office asthe championof a socialclass. Once hostilitiesbegan,eventstook on a n6w coloration.Neutrality for Aetoliawouldbe difficult or impossible. Sentimentsweredivided,both in the leadershipand in the populace.The official stand of the state was to cooperatewith Rome'senterprise.A cavalrysquadronfrom Aetoliajoined

the Romanconsulin 171.74 But that didnot preventotherAetolians from hiringthemselves outto Perseus asmercenaries. 7s Lyciscus, likecertainother Greek leaders elsewhere, exploited the situation to his own political advantage.After Perseus'victory at Callinicus, the Roman commander eagerlysoughtscapegoats. Of courseGreeks,not Romans,were to blame: Aetoliansaboveall; they had begunthe flight, drawingotherGreekauxiliaries with them in panic. Lyciscuswas preparedto supplynames:not coincidentally,his principalpoliticalopponents.Five Aetolian statesmen, branded with cowardiceand suspectedof harboringMacedoniansympathies, were

removedto Italy for detention. 76 The validityof thesecharges may be doubted. The men who were deported had fought, howeverunenthusiastically,on the side of Rome. Lyciscus,as strategosof the League,might well havebeenheld responsiblefor the debacleat Callinicus.Better to assert

the culpabilityof others.As in Achaea,thewarallowedshrewdoperators to gainthe upperhandoverpoliticalrivals.Theattitudeof theproletariate was not in question.

A singlepiece of evidencehas been employed to ferret out the sentimentsof the populace.Lyciscus'actionspoisonedthe political atmospherein Aetolia, aggravating suspicions and further dividingthe leadership.In the fall of 170, a Romanembassy sentby the consulmadethe rounds of variousGreek statesto reaffirm Rome'sfides and to test the loyalty of suspecteddissidents.The visit to Aetolia includeda requestfor hostages, thereby to guaranteethe state's good faith. A raucous meeting of the Aetolian assemblyfollowed, markedby fiery speeches and mutual recriminations.Rival politicianshurledcharges of treachery,ingratitude,or servilityat one another. Lyciscus,as usual, endeavoredto implicate his foes in anti-Romanactivities.But when Thoastook up the sameline, a man branded as a turncoatand an ingrate,he wasshouteddownand stonedby the ochloi. The Roman envoys prudently gave up their request for hostagesand

continuedtheir voyageelsewhere. 77 Werethe Aetolianmasses therefore embittered against Rome? 78 Thatis morethancanbe wrungfromthetext. Polybius'personalinclinationsare againrelevanthere.The Aetolianleaders accusedof anti-Romanismmet the samefate to which Polybius fell victim.

Indeed this very Roman embassyhad just come from Achaeawhere a whisperingcampaignwas mountedagainstcertainAchaeanpoliticians,the

historianamongthem. 79 His accountis decidedly favorable to Aetolians traduced byLyciscus - a manforwhomhereserves theharshest verdict? o It

38

ERICH

S. GRUEN

wouldbenaiveto expectanobjective appraisal of Aetoliansentiments. 8• But even if the narrativebe acceptedas written, it does not show that the populacewas anti-Roman. The very leaderswho stirred the ochloi to action

hadstressed theirownservices to Rome. 82 Resentment wasdirected against those who purveyedslursand innuendoesat the expenseof their political foes- in particularthe chameleonThoas.Nor were the peoplewilling to surrenderas hostageschosenleaders convicted of no wrong-doing.The demonstrationcan be read as a reaffirmation of loyalty, rather than the reverse.The yieldingof hostages would imply Aetolianguilt- a proposition

thatthepeople vigorously rejected. 83 Not that Aetolia was whole-heartedlyfor Rome.The exigencies of war and politics determinedmen'sdecisions,in a conflict for which few Aetolians

probably felt a genuinecommitment.The maneuversof Lyciscusand his allies had driven some of their foes into enforced detention

and others into

the campof Perseus. 84 And thepopulace wasasambivalent asitsleaders. Only a smallglimpseis affordedby the sources,but a revealingone. In the campaign of 169 Perseusmoved on the Aetolian strongholdof Stratus,

summoned by invitation. 8s He expected a warmreception, withAetolians pouringfrom everyportal to greethim. But the inhabitantsof Stratuswere

not of one mind. Another faction in the city called.up, on the Roman commanderin their vicinity, who reachedStratus- with a garrison- before Perseus'arrival. The warm welcome was reserved for the first comer; Perseus

foundthe gatesof Stratustightlyshut. 86 At the sametime,the Aetolian hipparcharrivedwith a cavalrycontingent,intending(it is said)to join forces with Perseus.FindingStratusheld by the Romans,however,he swiftly put his troopsat the disposalof Rome. Fortune, not conviction,determinedthe allegiance of theAetolians. 8'• And fortunejustified the policy of Lyciscus.The Romanvictory over Perseushad brutal consequences in Aetolia. Passions stirredduringnearly a decade of civil strife and augmentedin the crisisof war time now found expressionwith unrestrainedviolence.Lyciscusand his friendsunleasheda massacre:five hundredand fifty Aetolian principeswere slaughtered,others were driveninto exile, and the propertyof the victimswas confiscatedwhile Roman soldierssurroundedthe area and enforcedthe grim proceed-

ings. 88 Theexilessought reliefandredress fromAemilius Paullus. Butwhen the Roman commanderconducted an investigationin 167, only a single questionwas relevant:who were the friends of Rome?Perpetratorsof the slaughterwere vindicated,their actionsand policiesstampedwith Roman

approval. 89 Lyciscus employedthe occasion to complete his cleansing operation. A list was drawn up of his remainingfoes, for deportationto

Italy.9ø The blood-bathin Aetolia suggests more than a mereparty struggle.So also the exile of the propertiedand confiscationof their goods.Economic distresswhich plaguedAetolia in the 170s heregainedoutlet in savageryand retaliation.That Rome backedthe Aetolian aristocracyis obviouslyabsurd.it was the principes who suffered in the aftermath of war, their lives or

citizenshipforfeited, their property appropriated.Nor wasRome interested

CLASS CONFLICT

AND

THE THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

39

in a tyrannyof theproletariate. 91 Shehadmaintained neutrality onAetolian debt-problems in the 170s.And in 167 sheattendedonly to the punishment of her opponents- a windfallfor Lyciscusbut hardlyfor the populace. The conclusionof the war brought no internal peace to Aetolia. Dissension,

turbulence, andmurder,the legacyof the pastdecade, persisted) • Butthat was of no concern to Rome.

Thessaly

Informationon Thesssalyis scantyfor theperiodunderconsideration. Hence a long discussion canbe avoided. Much is made of a famouspassagein Livy regardingFlamininus' arrangements in Thessalyafter the SecondMacedonianWar. Chaosand turmoil reignedthere,we are told, engendered by PhilipV and the cataclysms of war, perpetuated by the instabilityof Thessalians who couldnot evenhold a meeting without a near riot. Flamininus thereforeprovideda system wherebya census qualification wasrequisiteIor the councilandofficialsand preponderant weightwas givento that segmentof the communities which stoodfor orderand tranquility)3 The passage is generallytakento imply installationof an oligarchicregimerun by propertiedfamiliesandbackedby Romanauthority) 4 But too many uncertaintiesexist, forbiddinga definitive judgment.We do not know- andoughtnot guess- how comprehensive and lasting this reform was. Timocratic criteria for public officials need not constitutea drasticstep.Livy mentionsrestrictions only for thesenatus and iudices(whoeverthey were).Theremay well havebeena primaryassembly in addition,astherecertainlywasin individualThessalian communities. Wehear ol no limitationson citizenship,nor any restrictivequalificationsplacedon

thosewho electedthe officials.Quite the contrary)5 Flamininus' interventioncamein 194,to stabilize a chaotic situation) 6 Perhaps a short-term, rather than an enduring,arrangement. No recordexistsof censusqualificationsin the - relatively extensive- epigraphicaldocuments.That Rome enforcedFalmininus'settlementor held any brief for Thessaly's upperclasses

in subsequent decadeswould be an unwarrantedassumption. Thessalian institutions werenot seriously compromised) ? Upheavalcame in the 170s. Economicunrestand the claimsof the

indebted whichtormented Aetoliaspread alsoto Thessaly andPerrhaebia. 98 Was Perseusto blame? So Eumenesis made to assertin his frenetic speech

beforethe RomanSenatein 172: Perseus stirredup everyform of mischiefin Thessalyand Perrhaebiaby promisingdebt abolition in order to crashthe

optimaresthroughthe agencyof the indebted. 99 But that self-serving outburstis the only suchassertiofi. It doesnot appearevenamongPhilippus' accusations nor in the list of charges detailedby Rome'sletter to Delphi.And Livy's own narrative of Thessalianproblemsrefrains from convicting

Perseus.1 ooThecomplaint of Eumenes, ashistorical fact,issuspect. If Perseusdid sow dissension amongthe indebtedgroupsin Thessaly, Rome certainlydid not take the part of the creditors.That much can be

40

ERICH

S. GRUEN

stated with confidencefrom the one solid bit of evidencewe possess. Agitation regardingdebt had expandedinto insurrectionand armedconflict within Thessalyby 173. A Romanembassy,by invitation,arrivedin that year to arbitratedifferencesbetweenthe contending interests.Its spokesman, Ap. Claudius,after remonstrating with leaderson both sides,applieda reasonable solution. And it was not to the advantageof the creditors.The most burdensome arrears,aggravated by excessive interestrates,were cancelled,the remainingobligationsto be dischargedover a period of ten years. The

settlement wonapproval (or, at least,agreement) andtheunrestsubsided. • o• No suggestion here for Romanbackingof monied interests.If anything,the Senate leaned in the other direction. In Thessaly,as in Aetolia, Rome drew

backfrom commitmentto an economicgroup. No further recordexists of internal dissensionin this period. Roman envoyssent to Greece in 172 to test supportfor the war found a warm welcome from the Thessalian concilium and multitudo. •ø2 Much of the

fightingwasto take placein their territory.But theThessalians provedto be

loyal andeffectivealliesof Rome.•ø3 Therewasno risingfor Perseus. The usualpost-warallegationswere heard, of course:someThessalianstatesmen accusedof pro-Macedonian sentiments. But the charges(if Polybiusis to be

believed) werefalseandthetestimony vacuous. •ø4 Thessaly hadpresented a united front.

Epirus

Classconflictin Epirusis unattestedfor the yearswhichpreceded theThird Macedonian War.The countryappearsto haveescaped the turbulence which rackedAetolia and Thessalyin the 170s. A relatively tranquil period may have contributedto Epirote prosperity. xøs During Rome'searlierwarsin Greece, the Epirotes consistentlypreferredneutrality - or endeavoredto mark time until it wasclearwhichsidepossessed the biggerbattalions. • 06 There had been no serious breach between Rome and Epirus - nor any

suggestion of Perseus' meddlingin that area.• 07 Friction arose only on the eve of the war. And its stimuluswas a

politicalcontest,not socialupheaval.The youngand ambitiousCharopshad recentlyreturnedfrom Romewherehe had spenthisboyhood,learningLatin and cultivatingconnections. A campaignof vilificationwassoonundertaken against older Epirote statesmen,without conspicuoussuccess.But the outbreakof war affordednew opportunities. Charops,like hiscounterparts in Achaeaand Aetolia, spreadinsinuationsabout pro-Macedonian proclivities,

locatedin the circleof hispoliticalfoes.• o8 WhenRomanenvoysarrivedin Epirus in 172 to gaugepublic opinion,they obtainedan enthusiasticand

unanimous reception. • 09 But theslanderous calumnies of Charops presently shatteredthat unanimity.The targetsof hisinnuendoes beganto take counsel about their own safety. After Callinicus in 171 the fate of Lyciscus' opponentsin Aetolia was a clearlesson.Better to join Perseusthan to suffer internmentin Rome. Polybius'sympathies, of course,are all with Charops'

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

41

victims,notably the statesman Cephalus:not a proponentof Macedonbut a man who preferred peace to war and independenceto servitude,driven

against hiswill by venomous accusations to thecampof Perseus. • •o Andthe portraitof Charopsis the blackestin Polybius'rogues'gallery. • TMBut whateverweightoneplaceson the personal judgments,therecanbe no doubt about the divisiveeffects of Charops'policy. In 170 two Epirote leaders attemptedto kidnap the Roman consuland deliverhim to Perseus, a plot

onlynarrowly foiled.•• 2 A split in the leadershiprapidly took on much broaderscope.The Epirote League broke apart, severedby the war and divided between Macedon and Rome. Cephalus and others succeededin detachingthe

Molossians and bringingthem to the sideof Perseus. • •3 The disaffection wentfurther,intoPhanote in Chaonia andperhaps beyond. • • 4 Elsewhere in

Chaonia andThesprotia the Romans stillfoundfavorandcooperation. •s Epirus,like Aetolia,was sunderedby the exigencies of war. How far thiswas due to the influenceof contendingpoliticiansin differentareasis uncertain. The sourceslay heavy stressupon the impact of certain leadersin the

decisions of particularcommunities. •6 Moderns haveconjectured regional rivalries: resentments in Chaonia andThesprotia against theMolossians. •? Howeverthat may be, thereis no signof zealin thepopulacefor eitherRome or Macedon.When Roman troopsmarchedagainsthostileEpirote townsin 168, the inhabitants,who had previouslydeclaredfor Perseus,were swift to renounceallegianceandwelcomethe Romans.Only a few leadersheld out,

buttheywereoverwhelmed by themultitudo. 118 Romanvictory confirmedandstrengthened the hold of Charops'party. To the victorshe denounced hisprincipaladversaries, effectingthe execution

or deportation of muchof theremaining Epiroteleadership. • •9 Butit was not the politicalfiguresalongwhosuffered.Thedefectionof Epiruswrought a savageretaliation.On ordersof the Senate,AemiliusPaulluslulled the Epirotesinto a falsesenseof security,had themcollecttheirgoldandsilverin the severaltowns, and then gave his troops free rein for plunderand destruction.The walls of seventytowns were demolished,one hundred and fifty thousandinhabitantsenslaved,andproceedsfrom the booty distributed

to Romansoldiers. Muchof Epirushadbeenturnedintoa desert. •2ø The reasonsfor this markedbrutality are not recordedand defy conjecture.A meanswhereby to satisfy restlesstroops who had realizedlittle profit in

Macedonis possible. TM So alsorighteous indignation at Epiroteapostasy from the Roman cause. But the orders had come from the Senate; it was a

matterof policy.The land of Epirusconstituteda principalroute of accessfor Roman forces to the East. Rome would not countenance interference with

that route: the Epirotes, like the Rhodians,would be made an example

of.• 22 In any case,the areassingled out for punishment werethosewhich had opted for Perseus.The Romans,it is clear,drew no distinctionsbetween the upperand lowerclasses of Epirus. Severecivil strife amongEpiroteswas a consequence of, not a motive for, their behavior in the war. The dislocationscausedin the conflict and the

destructionwrought by Rome must have had serioussocialand economic

42

ERICH

S. GRUEN

effects. The extant portions of Polybius dwell only on the villainiesof Charops.But allusionsto internal turbulence,confiscations of property, exiles, and executionstell their own tale.•23 It was the war and its devastationwhich brought about those evils. With Epirus weakenedand

emasculated, Romepaidnoheedto itsinternalstruggles. • 24 Acarnania

In Acarnaniaa curtain of silencepreventsextendedanalysis.Rivalry with Aetolia had had a more telling impact on Acarnanianforeignpolicy than attachmentto either Rome or Macedon.WhenAetolia foughton the Roman side in the 190s, the Acarnaniansgenerally adhered to their Macedonian alliance. And when Aetolia collaborated with Antiochus, the Acarnanians shifted to the side of Rome. In both instances,however, there were divided

loyaltiesin the state- andlittle ardorfor any of the majorpowers.Fearand

expediency weremorepowerful motives. • 2s After theSyrianwar,thehand of Rome was felt but lightly in Acarnania,which, in fact, had benefitedfrom

the outcomeof that conflict]•6 Evidence failsin the sequel:no hint of economicturmoil; and no inroads,not evenattempts,by Perseus. Light dawnsonly during the Third MacedonianWar itself - and then just a brief glimpse.When the Roman missionproceededthroughGreecein

172, Acarnanianrepresentatives hastenedto greetit and asserttheir loyalty. The response wasfirm: Acarnanianow had an opportunityto compensate for

past indiscretions and to earn Romangenerosity. •27 ActiveAcarnanian involvementin the war goesunrecorded,but clearly there was no major defection from the Roman cause.

As elsewherein Greece,the circumstances of war generatedpolitical opportunismin Acarnania.On the occasionof a Romanvisit to Thyrreum in 170, certain politiciansspreadreportsof pro-Macedonianleaningsin high circlesand called for the installationof Romangarrisons. The requestroused dismayin the Acarnanianassembly. Opposingleadersobjected,denouncing their rivalsand claimingthat the garrisonswould be employedto securethe political ascendancyof a faction. The sentimentsof the ochloi were clear, so Polybiusstates:they took strongexceptionto the idea of garrisons. Roman envoys,actingon senatorialorders,respectedthe mood of the meetingand

did not pressthe point.• =9 it wouldbe serious misreading to seein thisa sign of lower-class hostility to Rome.• a0 "Hoi ochloi" is here, as often, a term designating majorityopinionor predominantsentimentat an assembly. It is not an allusionto the social backgroundof the participants.Nor is the expressedattitude tantamount to anti-Romanism.Acarnanian spokesmen protested that their state did not require or merit garrisoning:only the enemies of Rome needed to be coerced; Acarnania's actions were correct and

her loyalty secure. •3• That claimechoessimilarprotestations voicedin Achaeaand Aetolia.• 32 The Acarnanians announcedtheir blamelesshess, not their defection.Whateverresentmentmay haveendured,there is no reasonto locate it in a particularsocialsegmentof the community.

(_'LASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

43

Termination of tile war broughtthe customaryreprisals.The dominant Acamanianfaction, trumpetingits superiorityin adherenceto Rome, singled out political foes for removalas hostages- principesall, not representatives of the lowel- orders.laa Rome flexed her muscles and enforced her wishes.

The islandof Leucaswasdetached from the Acarnanian confederacy. TM Best that the state be weakened and harmless. But the Senate found no cause

for retaliation upontilepopulace or thecountryside. las Boeotia

More complexand more troubledcircumstances affectedthe land of Boeotia. Polybiusfinds disarray on a major scalein the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries:publicandprivateextravagance run rampant,demagogic politicians courtingthe impoverished,tamperingwith the legalstructure,and upsetting the economic

order. The historian's

harsh verdict

is extreme

-

and not

necessarilyreliable. But the divisionsill Boeotiawere real, the scarsnot easily

healed. la• Further,therewasa longbackground of attachment toMacedon, particularlyin Boeotianrulingcircles,datingto the reignsof DemetriusII and

Antigonus Doson. • 3? Boeotian sympathies werewithPhilipV in theSecond MacedonianWar and a contingentof Boeotiantroopsfoughton hisside;the state itself was induced officially to embrace Rome's cause only by

subterfuge and the threatof force. •3a The strength of pro-Macedonian feelingsmanifesteditself againafter the war. The Boeotiansrecalledthose men who had fought with Philip and elected their leader Brachyllesas Boeotarch.WhenBrachytleswas treacherously assassinated at the instigation of his rival Zeuxippusand with, so Polybiusimplies,the connivanceof Flamininus, the enragedBoeotians drove Zeuxippus to exile, and even harassed andmurderedRomansoldiers, incurringtheriskof serious reprisals.

FeelingagainstRomeran high.•39 Antiochusthe Great couldstill benefit from it in the late 190s. He received welcome from Boeotia and endorsement

for his causeagainstRome.The Boeotians, however,were in no positionto deliversubstantive aid and were soonat the mercy of triumphantRoman

legions.• 40 Littlesurvives onpost-war events in Boeotia. Internal wrangling persisted, punctuated by conflictbetweenrich and poor.•4t But on the internationalsceneattachmentto Macedonendured:the partyof Zeuxippus languishedin exile and, though Rome made formal requestfor his restoration,shed•d not follow it up. Boeotianaffairsdid not undulyexercise the Roman Senate.TM 2

Ill view of this background,Perseus'closerelationswith Boeotiacause no surprise.In 174 or 173 tile Macedonian king renewed ties which had bound Boeotia to his ancestorsand concludeda formal alliance.•43 That this

constitutedan anti-Romancoalitionis all unnecessary assumption. Eumenes, of course,represented it assuchill 172.A few Boeotians opposed it, perhaps apprehensive about Rome'sreaction.And Ronlanpropaganda after the fact

usedit aspartialjustification tk)rthe war.144 But thealliance neednot[lave been directedagainstRolne. Perseus felt free to advertiseit openly,with

44

ERICH

S. GRUEN

copies of the agreementdisplayed in three major sites, and his agents

announced it confidently to the Romansenate. '4s It waslittle morethan revival of ancient bonds between Macedon and Boeotia. And certainly nothing suggeststhat Perseusmeddled in internal affairs or catered to the Boeotian

masses.

As war approached,however, the situation in Boeotia becameincreas-

ingly complicated.Severaldifferent and conflicting strandsintertwined, thereby to bedevilthe state in bewilderingfashion:electoraland political contests, internal condemnations, attachment to Macedon, fear of Roman

power,and a separatistmovementwithin the Confederacy.Disentanglement is difficult but essential. The beginningof Polybius'accountis lostand Livy's versionof it repletewith problems.Boeotianaffairs are introducedin the context of Rome's mission to Greece in late 172. Hence, easy to miss one's

way by viewingcircumstances from the Roman vantagepoint. An important item requiresstress.The troubles in Thebes,as Livy himselflets slip, arose from internal political rivalry, quite distinct from the international

situation. '46 Elections of Boeotian officials,evidentlyin 173/2,hadbeen hotly disputedand touchedoff bitter conflict.The defeatedparty refusedto acknowledge the resultsandstampeded a decreethroughtheThebanassembly to reject the newly electedofficials.Turmoil ensued,much condensedby Livy and impossible to reconstructin detail: exile and flight to Thespiae,then

recall,furtherbanishment andcondemnation in absentia.'4 v Hypothetical scenariosmay be suspended.But the issueof Rome or Macedonis not yet in evidence.Rather, rivalry betweenThebesandThespiae,andpoliticalcontests for leadership in Boeotia. Such was the situation when Roman envoys,headed by Philippus, arrived in late 172. The Boeotian exiles, frustrated and under sentence of

death, hastened to take advantage.Their spokesmencynically draped themselves in a cloak of Romanloyalism,appealedfor succorto Philippus, representedtheir opponents,the faction of Ismenias,Neon, and others,as responsible for the Macedonianalliance,and claimedthat they themselves, as well as othersin variousBoeotiancities,had been draggedinto that alliance

without their consentand againsttheir will.•48 Obviouslyan ad hoc maneuver,designedto profit from the windfallof Romanpresencein Greece. It will hardly be taken as evidencefor heartfelt sympathiestoward Rome nor does it suggestthat fundament• divisionsin Boeotia restedon pro- or

anti-Romanfeelings.lsmenias,in fact, also appearedbefore Philippusand, without denyingresponsibility for the Macedonianalliance,offered to place

Boeotiain thefides of Rome.'49 Again,of course,a self-serving gesture but alsoan indicationthat tieswith Macedonneednot imply formalhostility to Rome.

Still another issuenow supervenedto snarl affairs in a fatal manner: inter-state rivalry within Boeotia. Envoys from individual cities in the Confederacy, trom Thespiae,Chaeronea,Lebadeia, and elsewhere,joined Theban

exiles

and

offered

the

services of

their

communities

to Rome.

Philippusmade no secret of his preferencefor individualacts of deditio, as opposedto Ismenias'offer to submitthe Leagueasa whole.It suitedRome's

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

45

interestto fragmenta confederacywhoseloyalty wassuspectand whose attachmentto Macedonwaslong-standing. Ismeniasreceiveda coldshoulder and was soonsubjectto harassment andevenviolenceat the handsof Theban

exiles.Separatisttendenciesin Boeotiawere not of Rome'smaking;but

Philippus wasperfectly prepared to encourage them.• so The Romanattitudeproduceddramaticconsequences. Heateddebate in Thebesdividedthosewho werewillingto offer cooperation to Philippus and thosewho refusedto compromise their alliancewith Perseus. Menfrom Coroneaand Haliartusappearedin Thebesto urge the priority of the Macedonian allegiance. A narrowmarginseparated opinionin the assembly -

which,in theend,camedownonthesideof Rome. • s• Thesequel wasswift and decisive:a Thebanmajorityvotedfor submission to Rome,recalledtheir exiles,and turnedon the factionof Ismenias; with Philippusprovidingfull supportto the exiles,Neon fled to Macedon,Ismeniaswasimprisoned and resortedto suicide.On the requestof Philippus, envoysfromotherBoeotian citiesinstructedtheir governments to offer individualdeditio to Rome. The BoeotianConfederacy wassplintered into fragmentsJ s2 How far did classconflictplay a rolein theseevents?Livy'saccountof the Theban dispute is seductivein this regard:a turba of Coroneansand HaliartiansenteredThebesto uphold the claimsof the Macedonianalliance; but theptJncipesheld firm, insistingon the advantages of joiningRome;by their sensible arguments,the multitudo was at last subdued and Thebes

dissolved her tieswith Macedon]sa So the mobwasinclinedto Perseus, the intelligent leadership to Rome?Suchis the impression delivered by Livy.•s4 But nothing like this in Polybius.Here, where the Polybian text is available for comparison,the distortionsof Livy, whether deliberateor inadvertent, standforth with clarity. There is no phrasecorresponding to the turbafrom Coroneaand Haliartus;Polybiusgivesonly "the Coroneans andHaliartians". Also nothing to justify a contrast betweenprincipesand multitudo. In

Polybius,a speakerfrom Coroneatipped what had been a very narrow balanceto the sideof Rome: thepldthosunderwenta wholesale changeof

mind.•ss Thereference clearlyisto majorityopinion - notto theattitudes of the lower classes.The only indicationof mob behaviorcomesin the sequel,when a crowdnearlylynchedthe leadersof Ismenias'factionandhad

to be restrained by theRomans. • s6 Thatwas,nodoubt,a demonstration for Rome's benefit, not an expressionof heartfelt sentiments. Predominant

Boeotian sympathies hadlongbeenwithMacedon. • s7 Theswitch nowwasa formalone, dictatedby apprehensions andby calculations of advantage. But

notbyanaristocratic triumph overthemasses. • s8 Nor did Boeotia turn to Rome in unison.Feelingsfor Macedonran

deep

and resentment towardsThebesin variousquarters.The envoysof

Perseusfound welcomein Coronea,Haliartus,andThisbae,citieswhichclung to the Macedonianalliance.Their own representatives soughtaid from Perseus, assistance againstthe harassment and pressure from Thebes.Perseus shiedaway from armedsupport,hopingstill to avertan openbreachwith Rome, but encouraged Boeotianresistance to Thebes. • s9 The threecities rejectedThebandemandsand, when war broke out, maintainedfidelity to

46

ERICH

S. GRUEN

their old Macedonianbonds) 60 It was a noble but calamitouschoice: Roman

retaliation provedto bebrutal.Haliartus heldoutwith tenacity against her besiegers, a heroicresistance described in fullby Livybutdoomed to failure. Roman soldiers murdered Haltar,tans at will, both young and old: large numberswere soldinto slavery:the city wasstrippedof all valuablesand then

razedto theground. •6• Coronea alsofellinto Romanhands in thefirstyear of thewar,withunknown consequences. •2 AndThisbae toowasforcedto surrender.Rome made certain to securethe future loyalty of that city:

pro-Roman sympathizers wereinstalled in power,theirpropertyrestored, while that of their opponentswasconfiscated. Furthermeasures may also havebeen taken,but the evidenceis inconclusive. •63 At the war'send, additionalBoeotianleaderswerepointedout by theirfoesasfifth-columnists

and duly shippedto Romefor detention- like so manyotherGreeks branded withthesame expedient andself-serving accusations. 164 Theforegoing,rehearsal of events, lengthy andunedifying, nonetheless affordsan importantcontrolfor our problem.Informationon Boeotian affairsin theseyearsisfullerthanfor moststates. Theagonies, divisions, and results can be followed with some confidence. And nowhere does strife

betweenclasses appearto haveaffectedallegiance in thewar.Strongbonds linkedthemajorpoliticalfamiliesto Macedon - bondsthatdatedbackto the 3rdcentury. AndRomanbehavior in the190shadalienated largesegments of thegeneral populace aswell.AlliancewithPerseus wasnonewdeparture. The fissuresthat came to the surfacein 172 stemmedfrom internal political

dispute,quitedivorced fromforeignaffairs.Contested elections an,dBoeotian inter-staterivalrycreatedturmoil.The comingof theThird Macedonian War allowedRomanenvoysto fish in thosetroubledwaters.Here, as m other Greekstates,ambitiouspoliticianshurriedto fix the labelof anti-Romanism upontheircompetitors. Opportunism andfeardirecteddeliberations. A purge

in Thebes followed. Andthenseparatist tendencies in Boeotia, encouraged by Rome, shatteredthe League.The decisionsof Haliartus,Coronea,and Thisbaewere determinedas muchby hostilityto Thebesas by loyalty to Macedon.And there were dividedallegiances within thosecitiesas well. At the war's conclusion,Rome took vengeance- in Boeotiaaselsewhere- ,lot

on the membershipof a socialclass,but on thosewho had opposedher interests.'6 s

A summation is hereappropriate. Theevidence discussed pertains to all mainlandGreek statesfor which information of any substancesurviveson

this question. •66 And nowheredo we possess clearindicationthat class membership or socialstatusdetermined (;reek attitudestowardRomeor Macedon. An obviousobjectionmaybe voiced:the wholestudyamounts to an argume•tlum ex sile, tio. And what is it worth? Ancient writers,

notoriously, wereunconcerned with tile behaviorandfeelings of the lower orders.Theirfocuswaspoliticsandwar.Socialquestions, economic distress,

('LASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

47

a strugglebetween classesthat may have lain beneath the surfacewere items not consideredworthy of seriousattention.

As a generalpropositionthe claimis irrefutable.But for our question, such a protest fails to carry decisiveness. Polybius, to be sure, showslittle

interestin sophisticated socialanalysis.But struggles betweenrich and poor, internal upheaval,clamor for debt relief, political cateringto the masses, confiscationsof property, the plight of exiles, and depopulationdid not escape his attention. Such matters recur with frequency in Polybian discussions of the 3rd and 2nd centuries,even where the text is preserved

only in fragments. •67 The economictroublesin Aetolia,Thessaly, and Perrhaebiaprior to the Third MacedonianWar and their aggravation in Epirus and Aetolia during its aftermath, as we have seen,are duly recordedin the extant material. Polybius was not blind to those facts. Furthermore, if anything claimed the interest of ancient historians, it was war. And the testimony on Rome's war with Perseus, its background, course, and consequences,is plentiful. Hence, a suitable topic for investigation.The absence of attested connection

between social conflict

and attitudes

toward

or by the major powersis striking.The argumenturnex silentiopossesses some force.

The notion that a fever swept throughGreecein the 170s,affectingall statesequally and in similar fashion, is obviouslyindefensible.The chief proponentof war wasthe Pergamene king Eumenes,and not any stateon the Greek mainland. Greece had her own problems: insecureand unstable economiccircumstances, a growinggulf betweenrich andpoor, an imbalance betweenwagesand prices,population decline,periodiccrisesin the food

supply. 16s Whenthe war came,reactions werediverse, dependent onlocal conditionsand particular decisions.That it was welcomedanywherein Greecemay be seriouslydoubted. Surely not in Aetolia and Thessaly,where

turbulenceproducedby conflict between the creditor classesand the indebted had only recently subsided.The war rekindledbitter strife among Aetolians and can have brought little benefit to Thessalywhose territory

constituted a principalbattleground. 169 And Epiruswhichhad enjoyed stability in the pre-waryearssufferedgrievouslyin its aftermath.The choices made by individual states derived from varied considerations. Thessaly's autonomy required independencefrom her powerful neighborMacedon; hence the Thessaliansnaturally joined Rome en masse.In Boeotia, by contrast,there were old ties with Macedonand somedeep-seated animosity toward Rome which induced certain communities

to resist even in the face of

Roman power. Internal divisions,unrelated to Rome or Macedon, lay in the backgrouud:contestsbetween political factions in Achaea, Boeotia, and Epirus;regionalrivaltieswithin the Epirote and Boeotian confederacies. The war did not createthem;rather,it offereda convenientvehiclewherebythey could play themselves out with unrestrainedfury. New rulingcliquesemerged in most Greek states,capitalizingon opportunecollaborationwith Rome to

drive their opponentsIt) cover:separatistimpulses,aggravated by the war, shatteredboth the Boeotianand the Ep•rote leagues.

48

ERICH

S. GRUEN

In all of this the will of the people defieseasy definition.But there seemsto have been little genuinecommitment to the sideof either Rome or Perseus.Insofaras onemay divinepublicopinion,it restedratherwith peace, detachment,and whatevermeasureof autonomymightbe sustainedin a war between the super-powers. So Acarnaniaopted for Rome but rejectedthe impositionof garrisonswhich might dramatizeher subjectstatus.So too the Aetolian people,who endorsedRome'scausebut wereunwillingto relinquish hostageslest this compromisetheir integrity. And the Achaeansoffered cooperationagainstPerseus,while at the sametime hoping to retain control of their own foreignpolicywith regardto other stateslike Pergamum,Egypt, and Syria. Though most governmentsannouncedofficial allegianceto the Roman enterprise,few providedany substantialassistance. The populacewas not eagerto fight and die in a causenot their own. Attitudes fluctuatedwith the fortunesof war. There may havebeensomerejoicingat Perseus' triumph in the battle of Callinicus- perhapsa hope that the war would be shortly concluded,But the march of Roman legionsbrought swift repentance. Haliartus was exceptionalin its heroic resistance;evenThisbaeand Coronea preferredto yield rather than to subjecttheir citizensto massslaughteror enslavement.Divided opinions in Stratus evoked the summoningof both MacedonianandRoman forces;when Roman troopswon the race to the city, the allegianceof its inhabitantswasforthwith determined.In Epirus,Phanote and various Molossian communities had declared for Perseus; but when

Roman armieswere in the vicinity, the people of those towns scornedtheir leadersand made hasty submissionto the conqueringlegions.Securityand survival were the dominant motives, not classconsciousness. The Hellenic populacehad no reasonto hail the ambitionsof Perseus,let alonethe coming of Rome. The Third Macedonian War, like most international conflicts, was

neither initiatedby norto thebenefitof thecommon man.• 7o Erich S. Gruen

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton/ Universityof California, Berkeley

NOTES

1. See, e.g., G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (2nd ed., Torino, 1969), IV.1.94-95, 109-110, 263-264; T. Frank, Roman imperialism (New York, 1914), 201-203; M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grace, et les monarchies hell•nistiques au Ille sibcle avant J.-C. (Paris, 1935), 228-230; E. Will,

Histoire politique du monde hellgnistique(Nancy, 1967), 11.218;A. Giovannini, BCH 93 (1969), 859-860; R.M. Errington, Dawn of empire: Rome's rise to world power (London, 1971), 202; R. Werner, in Auf•tieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt 1.1 (1972), 559-560; B. Forte, Rome and t/re Romans as the Greeks saw thetn (Rome, 1972), 44-46, 95-96. 2. B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischenund makedonischenStaaten (Gotha, 1903), III. 103, 111-112, 114, 131; A. Fuks, PP 21 (1966),445;J.

CLASS CONFLICT

AND

THE THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

49

Deininger, Der politische Widerstandgegen Rom in Griechenland, 217-86 v. Chr. (Berlin, 1971), 159-164.

3. A. Passerini, Athenaeum 11 (1933), 324-332; M.I. Rostovtzeff, Social and economic history of the Hellenistic world (Oxford, 1941), 610612, 1460-1461, n. 14; L. Raditsa, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der rOmischen Welt 1.1 (1972), 586. 4. P. Meloni, Perseo e la fine della monarchia macedone (Rome, 1953), 104-109, 134, 176,237-238. 5. J. Briscoe, Past and Present 36 (1967), 3-20; cf. Meloni, Perseo 141-142, 198-199, 254-256. Briscoe, unfortunately, offers no discussionof the Third

6. 7.

Macedonian

War.

Polyb. 25.3.1-4. Perseus' deliberate dissociation of himself from Philip's actions,

thereby to earn good will in Greece, was a consistent posture throughout; Livy, 41.22.5-8, 42.5.1 ;cf. Appian, Mac. 11.1.

8. Notice rrokkob••laereoJp•oe- not rob• rrokkob•OaereoJp•oe. And expectationswere arousedrr&otro•q "E2•2•rlotp; Polyb. 25.3.4.' 9. Polyb. 27.9.1: •dXalaCe •aOa•repei½rbp• r&v •oXX&v •pbg rbv Hepo•a bt• eot½rbv •pb robroyxpdvov•t•p•ro•vwv r&v •Xe•orwv. 10. Polyb. 27.9-10.

11. Polyb. 27.9.1 (quoted above);27.10.1' robre b& •apa•X•otop •p n• rb •ara'rbv He•o•a ov•vov •ep• robe'• Xovc; 27.10.4: • r&v •oXX&v eObd•votqro[q•poaayyekkop•vot•. 12. For Deininger, Widerstand 159-160 point - that meaning is unequivocal.

who does not argue the

13. Polybius admits as much in 27.10.5. He wrote this passage•Pa

•

rtc •p[rwc

e[c •xaptorfav bvetbi• role "EXX•ot r•v rbre 6tdOeow.The

tendentiousness was seen by H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen •ber die Quellen der vierten und f•nften Dekade des Livius (Berlin, 1863), 255; cf. Meloni, Perseo 237-238. 14. Polyb. 27.10.2. For similar sentiments - with a different analo• - cf. Polyb. 21.31.8-15.

15. Notice that Polybius here employs the phrase rogq "EXX•ot (27.10.5) as if synonymouswith o[ =oXXogand ol gXXot(27.10.1, 27.10.4). 16. Livy, 42.63.1-2; cf. Diod. 30.8: •oXXo[r&v 'EXX•v. So, riCtly, P. Derow, Phoenix 26 (1972), 308, n. 12. Liw does use the term volgus, but only in the analogy: the crowd at athletic contests. General Greek inclination toward Perseus,not confined to particular classes,is attested elsewhere in Livy: erant autem magnae parris hominum ad favorem eius inclinati animi; 42.5.2.

17. Livy, 42.30.1-7, esp. 42.30.1: in liberis gentibus populisque plebs ubique omnis ferme ut solet deterioribus erat, ad regem Macedonasque inclinata; principum diversa cerneres studia; 42.30.4: ad Persea magis aura popularis iera t. 18. This is quite clear in Livy, 42.30.3-4 - a delineation of various motives that induced individuals to support Rome or Macedon. Deininger's persistent equation of Livy's word principes with the Oberschicht has met with proper criticism; see D. Musti in Aufstieg und Niedergang der rdmischen Welt 1.2 (1972), 1165-1166. 19. On the Antiochene conflict, Liw, 35.33.1 (with reference to Aetolia): multitudo avida novandi res Antiochi tota. erat; 35.34.3: inter omnes constabat in civitatibus principes et optimum quemque Romanae

50

ERICH

S. GRUEN

societatis esse . . . multitudinem et quorum res non ex sententia ipsorum essent omnia novare velle. Deininger, Widerstand 72-73, objects to Livy's schematic assertion about principes, but does not question his - equally

schematic - depiction of the plebs. On the Hannibalic War, Livy, 24.2.8: unus velut morbus invaserat omnes Italiae civitates ut plebes ab optimatibus dissentirent, senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret. Cf. also Livy, 23.14.7, 37.9.1-4. On these passages,see the acute comments of Derow, Phoenix 26 (1972), 307-308. 20. 21. 22.

Livy, 45.31.4. Cf. Nissen, Untersuchungen 249,277. Livy, 45.31.5: his ut major apud suos caritas, ita minor ad externos

gratia erat.

23.

Polyb. 24.8.8-24.10.15.

24. The vilification of Callicrates by some moderns is excessive;e.g. Niese, Geschichte III.59-61; H. Stier, Roms Aufstieg zur Weltmacht und die griechische Welt (K/31n, 1957), 179-184. No more convincing is the effort to seein him a far-sighted statesman whose actions were conducive to the welfare of Achaea; as E. Badian, Foreign clientelae, 264-70 B.C. (Oxford, 1958), 89-91; Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford, 1969), 202-205; Deininger, Widerstand 199-202. A more moderate view in Derow, Essays presented to C.M. Bowra (1970), 12-23, who, however, finds nothing to criticize in Polybius' analysis. 25. Polyb. 24.9.3-7. 26. Polyb. 24.10.14.

27. Polyb. 24.8.6: ot b• 7rep[ rbv 'T•rdpt3arovKa[ Ka3,Xu•pdrrIv •retOo.,oxe•v ro• 7pa•op•vot• •vovv • p•re vbpov p•re ar•X•v p•r' •o •O•v robroum•i•etv •aT•brepov; cf. Polyb. 24.9.2. 28. Note Polybius' own remark about Roman indifference at this time to an item of major concern to the Achaean League - the Messenian exiles: Polyb. 24.10.13. Nor had the Senate shown much interest in the plight of Spartan complainants in 182: a courteous reception to all parties in the dispute and a polite request to the Achaeans - which was ignored with impunity: Polyb. 23.17.7, 24.1.4-7, 24.2.4-5. 29.

Polyb. 24.8.7-9.

30. Polyb. 24.10.14. The hypothesis of G.A. Lehmann, Untemuchungert zur historischen Glaubwardigkeit des Polybios (Monster, 1967), 287, n. 303, that Callicrates spoke in Latin and thereby deceived both his fellow envoys and the Achaeans generally, is imaginative fancy; rightly criticized by Deininger, Widerstand 141-142, n. 28.

31. Polyb. 24.10.14' •p•O• arpar•Tbg, •pbg ro[g•otg

•a•o[g •a[

bwp• o• •0 e&. 32. Lehmann's attempt, Untersuchungen284-296, to defend Polybius' objectivity here providesnothingsubstantial.The best he can offer is Polybius' statement that

Callicrates unwittingly

brought great calamity upon the

Greeks; Polyb. 24.10.8. Some of the incongruities in this account are noted by A.M. Castellani, Contributi dell' Dt. Fil. Class., Univ. Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, 1 (1963), 105-107 - who, however, retains belief in the anti-Roman

sentiments

of the Achaean

masses.

33. Polyb. 24.8.1-6. 34. Cf. Castellani, op. cit. 106-107. The alle•ances of the other two envoys are simply indiscernible. Polybius claims that Rome's subsequent

missiveswNch praised Callicrates made no mention of his colleagues;Polyb.

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

51

24.10.7. Whether they were overawed by Callicrates or concurred in his position is not worth speculating upon. Notice too that Spartan exiles were also in Rome to plead their case, in conjunction with Callicrates (Polyb. 24.10.2), but no representativesfrom the Spartan group in power. A further indication that this mission owed little to the influence of Lycortas. 35. Namely, Xenarchus in 175/4 (Livy, 41.23.4, 41.24.1; cf. Polyb. 23.4.11-14), Archon in 172/1 (Polyb. 27.2.11; cf. 22.10.8; Livy, 41.24), Archon again in 170/169, with Polybius as hipparch (Polyb. 28.6.9; cf. 28.3.7-8, 28.6.7, 29.23.1-3), and Xenon some time before 167 (Paus.7.10.9; cf. Polyb. 28.6.2). 36. Cf. the brief but sensibleremarks of J.A.O. Larsen, Greek federal

states(Oxford, 1968), 459-460. It may be observedalsothat at somepoint in the 170s Achaea revoked decreesand honors previously conferred on Eumenes of Pergamum: Polyb. 27.18.1-2, 28.7.3-5; Livy, 42.12.6-7. So the Achaeans still felt free to deliver an insult to a principal ally of Rome. 37. Polyb. 30.29.1-7; cf. the even harsher assessmentof Callicrates by Pausanias, 7.10.5-8, 7.11.2, 7.12.2, 7.12.8 - who finds the origins of Callicrates' misdeedsand Achaea's misfortunes in 168, not 180. 38. Cf. Polyb. 24.9.6.

39. Polyb. 24.10.4: ro•)qla•V •ara rb [•Xrtorov torap•vov½.Passerini, Athenaeum 11 (1933), 327, erroneously finds social content in this phrase and sees Callicrates as representing ochlocracy against the upper classesin Achaea. The criticisms of Lehmann, Untersuchungen 290, n. 308, are decisive; cf. Deininger, Widerstand 143, n. 33. Passerini'sview is unfortunately still repeated by Raditsa in Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt 1.1 (1972), 586.

40. Polyb. 24.9.6: &rto,llaao[a,rax&o½•al ro•½•roXtrevola•vov½ laeraO•oOcu •Tpb½ rr)v 'Pcol. tCu'cov oi•o6otv,•a[ roO½ •roXXo•½ toOrote•roxoXovO•oetvfit&rbv ½6•ov. 41. Polyb. 24.9.2-7, 24.10.3-4. Precisely the sentiments expressed by Livy in the Polybian passagediscussedearlier: Livy, 45.31.4-5; see above, p. 31. 42. Cf. Livy, 41.22.6-7. 43. Livy, 41.22.8-41.24.20. 44. Cf. Livy, 41.23.4: iis maxime qui praeter spem recepturi essent amissa mancipia. 45. Polyb. 27.2.11-12; Livy, 42.37.7-9, 42.44.7-8, 42.55.10.

46. A single individual is named as a Macedonian sympathizer, and that a Spartan, of royal blood, exiled for his views, if Livy is to be believed,

by a full gatheringof the Achaeans:Livy, 42.51.8 [damnatusfrequenti concilio A chaeorum).

47. Polyb. 28.7' see esp. 28.7.4' 6 p&v bX?•OC i•6•72•oc •lv •7r• rivoc

Orrdpxet•,voJprlc;28.7.8' 6 Ilo?•613toc ... pdXtora rcbv7roXXcbv •,vo31a•Tv; 28.7.14' ro6fib7rX•lOovc e•Sbo•oavro½ ro•cXe•,op•vot½. 48. It will not be profitable here to enter the vexed constitutional questions surrounding the Achaean assemblies.That regular meetings in this period were attended only by the boule was argued at length by Larsen, Representative government in Greek and Roman history (Berkeley, 1955), 75-102, 165-188 - in answer to the thesis of A. Aymard, Les assemblkesde

la conf•dkrationachbene(Bordeaux, 1938), passim,that they were primary assemblies.In the recent analysis of A. Giovannini, MusHely 26 (1969), 1-17, the boule and ekklesia met together in regular sessions,the latter passingon probouleutic recommendations of the former - an idea criticized now by F.W.

52

ERICH

S. GRUEN

Walbank, MusHely 27 (1970), 129-143, and Larsen, CP 67 (1972), 178-185. Resolution of the matter is not essential for our purposes. But, as Giovannini

pointsout, op. cit. 8, termslike rb •rXO0oc,o• •roXXoi,ando[ 'Axato[(not to mention o• •SXXOt, hardly seemappropriate for a boule; Walbank'sreply, op. cit. 142, depends on an ad hoc hypothesis. 49. Cf. Polyb. 28.3.7-9, 28.6.1-28.7.1,28.12.1. 50. Polyb. 28.12.1-3. Whether the offer was genuinely intended is another matter; for varying views, cf. De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani IV. 1.291292; Meloni, Perseo 312-315; Castellani, op. cit. (n. 32), 119-123; J. Briscoe, JRS 54 (1964), 70-71; Deininger, Widerstand 181-182. See also the Argive decree of late 170 or early 169, honoring a Roman envoy: P. Charneux, BCH 81 (1957), 181-202; L. Moretti, Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche (Firenze, 1967), 1.97-100. The embassy is recorded in Polyb. 28.3.

51. Polyb. 29.23-25. On the attitude of the rroXko[and the rrk•0o•, see Polyb. 29.23.9, 29.24.1, 29.24.5, 29.24.9, 29.24.11, 29.24.15, 29.25.1. 52. Polyb. 29.24.6. 53. Polyb. 30.7.5-8, 30.13; Livy, 45.31.5-11; Paus. 7.10.7-11; cf.

esp.Paus.7.10.8: oi bvvaro3raro•rcbv 'Axm&v. 54. Polyb. 30.11.1-6; esp. 30.11.4' •azd rbv •l•½t))•top rr6)•et. top o• k'ortp }5 rCop3etpcbpot)• •rrpo•ap; Livy, 41.25.1-6, 41.27.4, 42.2.2' esp. 41.25.1: Aetolorutn in setnet ipsos versus furor tnutuis caedibus ad internecionetn adducturus videbatur gentetn - from Polybius; Nissen, Untersuchungen 241. 55. Livy, 41.25.3-4; cf. 42.2.2: discordiarutn principes. On the utraque pars see Livy, 41.25.2, 41.25.6, 42.5.11. 56. Livy, 42.5.7: ingentetn vim aeris allertl. A cancellation of debts, or at least an effort in that direction, which provoked stasis and turmoil is attested by Diod. 29.33. 57. Cf. De Sanctis, Storia dei Rotnani IV. 1.263-264; Meloni, Perseo 104-106.

58. Cf. the analogoussituation of 205/4 in Aetolia, when the problem of indebtedness issued in a political contest at the top: Polyb. 13.1-1a; IG IX. 1.70. On the connection between debt and landholding generally in

Greece,seethe remarksof D. Asheri,StudiClassOrient18 (1969), 92-94. This is especiallyclearin the famousEphesiandecreeof the early 3rd century,in

whichdebtorsare regularlyidentifiedas•,ecop•,o•: SIG3 364; cf. Asheri,op. cit. 42-47, 59. 60. 61.

108-114. Cf. Livy, 41.24.10.

Livy, 41.22.5-8, 41.23.13-15, 42.5.1,42.42.1-3. SIG • 636 (178 B.C.). There is no need to seethis, however, as an anti-Roman bloc directed againstRome's ally Thessaly;as G. Daux, Delphes au IIe et au Ier si•cle (Paris, 1936), 304-312; Meloni, Perseo 94-104. The two

seats assignedto Perseusin 178 may simply have been inherited from his father: Giovannini, Ancient Macedonia (Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessalonika, 1970), 147-154. It should be noted that the same passage which attests to Aetolian relations with Macedon in the mid-170s also affirms her ties with Thessaly: Livy, 41.24.10. 62. Livy, 42.12.7.

63. Livy, 42.42.4; Appian, Mac. 11.1, 11.7. The praesidiutn was specificallyin answerto an Aetolian request:Livy, 42.12.7. 64.

Livy, 42.11-13, 42.40.

CLASS CONFLICT

AND THE THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

53

65. Livy, 42.12.7: iam Aetolos quem ignorare in seditionibus suis non ab Romanis, sed a Perseopraesidium petisse? 66. Livy, 42.40.7: in Aetolia bellum intestinum et caedesprincipum per quos, nisi per tuos, factae videri possunt?Cf. Diodorus' statement, 29.33, that the senate "presumed" Perseus' responsibility for disorders in Aetolia. The Roman letter to Delphi after the outbreak of war, preservedon a frag-

mentary inscription, outlines thecharges against Perseus: SIG3 643 (Poretow). But no mention of Aetolia in the extant portions. "The Aetolians" is inserted in two places (lines 20 and 25) by Poretow, but prudently avoided by Colin in his text; both versionsmay be conveniently consulted in R.K. Sherk, Roman documents from the Greek east (Baltimore, 1969), 40 (pp. 233-239).

Nor is there any warrant for the restorationr& rrXr•O•? Ocparrc6cov (line 23, Pomtow)or •'6rrkf?0o•Oeparrebcvp (line 22, Colin). 67. Meloni's assertion,Perseo 106, that he backedthe proletariatehas no basis;similarly, Giovannini,BCH 93 (1969), 859-860. The complaintof Philippusregardingcaedesprincipumis irrelevant,evenif true. Theprincipes fell in a party struggle:Livy, 41.25.3-4. Perseus,in fact, had connectionsin high circles at Delphi; cf. Livy, 42.15.3. 68.

Livy, 41.25.2, 41.25.5-6.

69. Livy, 41.27.4: renutiarunt coercerirabiem gentis non posse.The samein Livy, 42.2.2 - which may be a duplicate,or a similarreport brought by another embassy;cf. Nissen, Untersuchungen,242; Meloni, ?erseo 142143.

70. Livy, 42.4.5, 42.5.10-12: cum certatumutrimque temeritateatque audacia cerneret, decreto quidera suo neutram partem aut levareaut onerare voluit.

71. One need not resort to the conjecture of J. Touloumakos, Der Einfiuss Roms auf die Staatsform der griechischenStadtstaaten des Festlandes und der bzseln im ersten und zweiten Jhdt. v. Chr. (GOttingen, 1967), 36,

that the Senate, otherwiseinclined toward the wealthy, preferredneutrality becauseof Perseus'vast influence with the plebs. 72. Livy, 42.38.2; Passerini,Athenaeum 11 (1933), 328-329; Meloni, Perseo 184; Deininger, Widerstand152. 73.

SGDI

74. 75.

Livy, 42.55.9. Livy, 42.51.9.

2051

and 2135.

76. Polyb. 27.15.14; Livy, 42.60.8-9: quinque principesAetolorum; Appian, Mac. 12; cf. Polyb. 20.11.10, 28.4.6, 28.6.7. On the individuals involved, see Deininger, Widerstand 168-170. 77. Polyb. 28.4.1-13; esp. 28.4.12. An abbreviated version in Livy,

43.17.5-6, with no mention of the populace. The Aetolian meeting was an extraordinary sessionof the assembly,accordingto Larsen, TAPA 83 (1952), 6-7, 11. But information on eligibility for the assemblyis altogetherwanting - an important question to which no answercan be given. 78. 79.

So Deininger, Widerstand 170-172. Polyb. 28.3.7-9.

80. Cf. Polyb. 32.4.1: •-apaxoJ•ov• •Svroq•ai Oopvt3c6bovq; 32.4.3: • cixto•-oc.

81. Quite apart from his own proclivities, Polybius may well have gotten the story from Aetolian exiles with whom he consorted in Italy - i.e. the very men who were victimized by Lyciscus.

54

ERICH

82.

S. GRUEN

Polyb. 28.4.3.

83. Cf. the analogous response of the Achaeans in 172: a rebuke to the Roman envoy for having come at all - as if Achaean loyalty were in question: Livy, 42.37.7-8. 84. At least one such foe, Archedamus, accused by Lyciscus in 170 (Polyb. 28.4.5-8), transferred allegianceto Macedon and collaboratedwith Perseus: Livy, 43.21.9-43.22.1, 44.43.6. Livy mentions another Aetolian, Andronicus, executed by the Romans after the war for taking up arms against Rome: Livy, 45.31.15. Perhaps a mistake for Archedamus? Cf. Deininger, Widerstand 195, n. 18. 85. Livy, 43.21.5, says vocantibus Epirotis - often emended to Aetolis. Not a necessarycorrection. 86. 87.

Livy, 43.22.1-3. Livy, 43.22.4-7; see 43.22.5: mutato deinde cure fortuna animo. Perseus did find reception elsewhere, at Aperantia, where the Aetolian defector Archedamus wielded considerable influence: Livy, 43.22.10-11. On this campaign generally, see Meloni, Perseo 279-284; Larsen, Greek federal states473475; N.G.L. Hammond,Epirus (Oxford, 1967), 281-283,630-631. 88. Livy, 45.28.7; cf. Polyb. 30.11.5 - perhaps with reference to the same

events.

89. Livy, 45.28.6,45.31.1-2: noxa liberati interfectores; exilium pulsis aeque raturn fuit ac mors interfectis. Only the Roman commander who lent troops for the massacresuffered reprimand - a belated effort to suggestthat Rome's

hands were clean.

90. Polyb. 30.13.4-5, 30.13.11; Livy, 45.31.5-9. 91. As Passerini, Athenaeum 11 (1933), 329-330. Cf. Meloni, Perseo 254, who finds the plebs now on the side of Rome.

92. Polyb. 30.11.6: (Stbrrep•p &•pto[a½ •o2 rrapapol. t[a• •a• ½6pov rrX•pr/ r& •ard ri•v AircoXkw.Cf. Polyb. 32.4.1,32.5.1, who seesa cessation of turmoil only after the death of Lyciscus. 93. Livy, 34.51.4-6: a censu maxime et senatum et iudices legit potentioremque earn partera civitatium fecit cui salva et tranquilla omnia esse magis expedieba t.

94. E.g. De Sanctis,Storia dei Romani IV. 1.94-95; Larsen,Representatire government 102-103; Greek federal states 284-287.

95. Eusebius, Chron. 1.243 (referring to the time of Flamininus' activities in Thessaly): Thetalii vero a Romanis libertatem suis legibus acceperunt ... primo anno interregnum erat in Thetalia; deinde vero duces annul ex multitudine deligebantur. The passageis ignored by Larsen. Whatever its value, it is perfectly consistent with Livy's text. See the discussion of Passerini, Athenaeum 11 (1933), 322-324. On the possibility of a primary assembly, cf. Aymard, CP 45 (1950), 105. Livy's statement, a censu maxime et senatum et iudices legit, implies the existence of some organ other than senate and magistrates. 96. Cf. his letter to the Thessalian community of Chyretiae, providing

for restorationof property to rightfulowners;SIGa 593; Sherk,RDGE 33 (pp. 211-213). 97. The continuity of Thessalian institutions, both before and after Roman intervention, is rightly stressedby Touloumakos, Der Einfluss Roms 63-72. Flamininus' regulations are still appealedto by the Thessaliantown of Narthacium ca. 140 in a boundary dispute, and her claims are upheld by the

RomanSenate• SIG3 674; Sherk,RDGE 9 (pp.49-53). Buttheseregulations

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

55

evidently governed territorial matters and arbitration procedures. They are not to be connected with the institutional changes ascribed by Livy to lqamininus in 194. Notice lines 51-54: o})c Vbl. tOVCTiroc Kot'7•rtoc thraroc

&•rbr•c r&v b•a •rpeo•3evr&v 'yvo3/•r•c •'bco•ev,•o2 •ar& bb'•l•aau'•Xr}rov. That is clearly a reference to Flamininus' official actions, in conjunction with the ten commissioners appointed by senatorial decree to arrange the peace settlement in 196: Polyb. 18.44-45; Livy, 33.24.7, 33.30-31. Among other duties, they did make some territorial decisions regarding Thessaly: Polyb. 18.47.7-9; Livy, 33.34.7. The commission broke up thereafter and its members were back in Rome by the beginning of 195: Polyb. 18.48.1-3; Livy, 33.35.1-2, 33.44.5, 34.25.2. Hence, the inscription cannot be used to show the endurance

of Flamininus'

ordinances

of 194.

98. Livy, 42.5.7;Diod. 29.33. 99. Livy, 42.13.9: confudit et miscuit omnia in ThessaliaPerrhaebiaque spe novarum tabularum, ut manu debitorum obnoxia sibi optimares op-

primeret. A vaguer formulation in Appian, Mac. 11.1. Cf. Diod. 29.33, who, be it noted again, says only that the Senate assumed Perseus'guilt: •/

aby•Xr•rocb•r•Xo43ev • too Ilepo•coc7eyov•vatrr}vtrb7xvotv. 100. Livy, 4•.5.7-10. One mightwishto find a hint in Livy'sallusion (42.5.1) to Perseus'promising more than he delivered. Or in the reference (42.4.5) to Thessalianenvoys who reported on quae in Macedonia gererentur. But that would be very restrained subtlety - uncharacteristic of that author. On Philippus' speech, see Livy, 42.40. The letter to Delphi: Sherk, RDGE 40 (pp. 233-239). "Thessalians" has been restored in that inscription (line 25). But even if the restoration is correct, the context is that of Perseus loosing barbarians upon Greek states, not of meddling in internal affairs. Which is plausible. Thessaly had earlier complained to Rome about the Dardanians: Polyb. 25.6.4. 101. Livy, 42.5.8-10. Cf. IG IX.2.1230 - arbitration in Perrhaebia by a certain Glaucus of Gyrton to resolve stasiscaused by debt, probably in this period; cf. Asheri, StudClassOrient 18 (1969), 67-68. The Romans were not the only onessummonedto judge these disputes. 102. Livy, 42.37.4, 42.38.6-7. 103. E.g., Livy, 42.54.7, 42.55.10, 42.58.14, 42.59.4-5, 42.60.10, 44.46.9.

104. Polyb. 30.7.5-8. 105. On the economic circumstances, see Hammond, Epirus 657-671. 106. Cf. their actions•n 192/1: Polyb. 20.3.1-4;Livy, 36.5.3-8:apud regem [Antiochus] gratiam initarn volebant curn eo, ut caverent, ne quid offenderent Romanos. On Epirus in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries, see the discussionsof S.I. Oost, Roman policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the age of the Roman conquest of Greece (Dallas, 1954), 16-67, and Hammond, Epirus 595-625. 107. Whether there was a formal alliance between Rome and Epirus is questionable; for divergent views, see Oost, Roman policy 56; Hammond, Epirus 621. 108. Polyb. 27.15.2-9. 109. Livy, 42.37.4, 42.38.1; cf. Appian, Mac. 11.4. The gathering is designated as conciliu•n Epirotarum, probably the synedrion. Whether the ekklesia still functioned and, if so, who comprised it, is entirely uncertain; cf. Hammond, Epirus 648-652.

56

ERICH

S. GRUEN

110.

Polyb. 27.15.1,

111.

Polyb. 30.12; cf. Polyb. 27.15.6, 32.5-6; Diod. 30.5, 31.31. Polyb. 27.16; Diod. 30.5a. Polyb. 30.7.1; Livy, 43.18.2, 45.26.4-5. Livy, 43.21.4-5, 43.22.9, 43.23.3, 45.26.3; Polyb. 30.15; cf.

27.15.10-16,

30.7.1-4;

cf. Livy, 43.18.2; Diod.

30.5. 112 113 114

Zon.

9.22 115 116

Polyb. 28.8.2; Livy, 43.21.4, 43.23.6, 44.16.2. Cf. Polyb. 30.7.1; Livy, 43.18.2, 43.23.3, 45.26.5, 45.26.10. Similarly for Aetolia: Livy, 43.21.9, 43.22.3, 43.22.11. 117. So H.H. Scullard, JRS 35 (1945), 58, 62; Oost, Roman policy 74-75. The principal opponents of Charops were apparently all Molossians: Polyb. 30.7.2; SGD! 1339, 1352. And Charops' provenanceis at last known. A recently discovered dedication at Dodona, probably by Charops' grand-

father, identifies the family as Thesprotian: Xc[po•bMaxd,ra, ©eorrpcorbq 'Orrarbq.See S. Dakaris,Ergon (1968), 51-53; reported in REG 82 (1969),' 472-473;JHS 89 (1969) [ArchaeologicalReports], 21 ;BCH 94 (1970), 1020. 118.

Livy, 45.26.3-10.

119. Polyb. 30.13.4-7,

32.5.6:

•rrt½cwc•v&v6pc•;

Livy, 45.31.9,

45.34.9: principibus. 120. Polyb. 30.15 ;Livy, 45.34.1-6; Plut. Aem. Paull. 29.1-30.1; Strabo, 7.327. That Paullus performed his duty with reluctance - as Scullard, JRS 35 (1945), 59-60, 64 - may be doubted; cf. Oost, Roman policy 133-134, n. 106. On the booty, see De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani IV.1.341, n. 300; Hammond, Epirus 635, n. 1. 121. Cf. Livy, 45.34.6-7. 122. On Rhodes, see Polyb. 29.19.5. The importance of the line of communications is rightly stressedby Larsen, Greek federal states 481-482.

Cf. Polyb. 29.4.1-2. Scullard's hypothesis, JRS 35 (1945), 58-64, that Charops put the Romans up to this, is unpersuasive;see the criticisms of Oost, Roman policy 134-135, n. 112. Rome had her own reasons. 123. Polyb. 30.12,32.5-6,32.14;Diod. 31.31. 124. There is no evidence and little likelihood that Charops' post-war activities, proscription of wealthy families and terrorization of the populace,

had the blessingof Rome; as Passerini,Athenaeum 11 (1933), 331-332. In fact, when Charops travelled to Rome ca. 160 to gain backing for his regime, he received a cold shoulder from the Senate: Polyb. 32.6.3-9 - for which Passerini must postulate a volte-face on the part of Rome: op. cit. 332-333. 125. Cf., e.g., Livy, 33.16-17, 36.11-12, 38.4.10, 38.5.6, 38.9.2; discussion in Oost, Roman policy 47-56, 60-62, 65-66. 126. Oeniadae was transferred from Aetolia to Acarnania: Polyb. 21.32.14; Livy, 38.11.9; cf. Livy, 42.38.4. 127. Livy, 42.38.3-4: si male meriti clementiam populi Romani experti essent, bene merendo liberalitatem experirentur; cf. Appian, Mac. 11.4. 128. Acarnania remained a safe point of disembarkation for Roman torces: Livy, 44.1.3.

129. Polyb. 28.5.1-6; esp. 28.5.6' Oecopo•'reqrobq •SXXOVq 6voapeorovt•vov•ro2q½povpo2q no2•ovX6pe•.otorotxe• r• r•q ov'¾•Xr•rov •rpoO•oet,ov•naraOg•e•t r,• too Ato'r•ov• •03•,• no2 ov•errm•oa•re• &•r•pap &rrt Aaptor/q. The same account transmitted by Livy, 43.17.7-9' iusta deprecatio haec visa. The meeting is termed an ekklesia: Polyb. 28.5.1.

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

57

But its composition eludes inquiry; cf. Larsen, Greek federal states 94-95, 270-271.

130.

As Deininger, Widerstand 176.

131. Polyb. 28.5.3-4: ob'),tip•q3•7bevyq3povp&v etod7ewe& obbelaLav •rbkw.rabra '),&pimdpXewro•½•'oXe/aLot½ '),evola•votc •at •ara•rokela•70e[otv b•rb'Pw•wv. oOb•vb• •e•ot•btac '•vavac ob• •iovc e[vm•povp•v etob•eoOm •at' obbdvavpdvov.Of course,b 5XXoccan, at times, have a derogatorymeaning in Polybius (cf. 6.44.9, 15.21.1-2, 38.12.10, 38.13.6) often as part of compound words: 5XXo•bvov•a[ b•yaywybv (3.80.3); 5xXa•&v (24.7.2); 5XXo•pavga(6.4.6, 6.4.10, 6.57.9). Elsewhere,however, it can signify simply the rank and file of the soldiery, as contrasted with officers (1.15.4,

1.32.8). And commonly, as we have seen, just a stylistic

variant for ot voXXotor vb vX•0oc; cf. 5.86.10, 11.29.9-11, 15.25.8, 15.30.4, 15.32.4-15.33.10, 18.43.8-9, 21.31.13-15, 24.9.3-7, 24.10.14, 27.2.3, 27.10.1, 28.4.12, 28.7.4, 29.23.4, 38.17.1-2. The recent article by K.W. Welwei, Historia 15 (1966), 282-301, on Polybius' attitude toward the

masses,fails to addressthis questionand assumesthat b 5XXocis equivalent to "mob."

132. See above, pp. 33 fl., 38 f. 133. Polyb. 30.13.4-7;Livy, 45.31.9,45.34.9. 134. Livy, 45.31.12. 135. Internal strife followed in the wake of the peace, discontent - so Polybius presents it - with the ruling faction. But no suggestionof class conflict: Polyb. 32.5.1-2. 136. Polyb. 20.4.1, 20.6.1-6, 20.7.1-2, 20.7.4, 22.4.2; Livy, 36.6.2; FHG (M•ller) II.258; cf. IG VII.21, with the comments of Asheft, StudClass Orient 18 (1969), 61-62. A detailed critique of Polybius in M. Feyel, Polybe

et l'histoire de Bgotie au IIIe sibcle av. notre bre (Paris, 1942), 219-250, 273-306; seealso Aymard, RevHist 196 (1946), 309-315; P. Cloch•, Thbbes de B•otie (Namur, 1952), 240-249. Polybius' account is defended by Lehmann, Untersuchungen 333-340. 137.

Polvb.

20.5.

138. Livy, 33.1-2; Plut. Flare. 6; cf. Polyb. 18.1.2, 18.43.1; Livy, 33.14.5, 33.27.5, 33.27.8; Zon. 9.16. 139. Polyb. 18.43, 20.7.3; Livy, 33.27-29, 35.47.3, 36.6.1. Resentment was strongamongthe populace:Polyb. 18.43.8-9. But evidentlyalsoin the officialdom; cf. Liw, 33.28.14. There was no classdivision here; see Livy, 33.29.1: efferavit ea caedesThebanosBoeotosqueomnesad execrabileodium Romanorum.

140. 141.

Polyb. 20.7.3-5; Livy, 35.47.2-3, 36.6.1-5, 36.20.1-4. Polyb. 22.4.1-3.

142. Polyb. 22.4. On attachment to Macedon as a prevailingmotive,

seePolyb.22.4.6. On eventsin Boeotiagenerallyin thisperiod,seeCloch•, Thbbes de Bbotie 249-257' Deininger, Widerstand 49-58, 88-89, 131-132. 143. Polyb. 27.1.8, 27.1.11; Livy, 42.12.5-6, 42.38.5, 42.40.6, 42.42.4, 42.43.5, 42.46.7, 45.31.'15; Appian, Mac. 11.7. On the date, see Meloni, Pemeo 146, n. 1; Deininger, Widerstand 153, n. 1. 144. Eumenes' speech: Livy, 42.12.5-6; Appian, Mac. 11.7; Roman

propaganda:Livy, 42.38.5, 42.43.5. Philippus even claimed falsely that Perseus' alliance with Boeotia violated Macedon's treaty with Rome: Livy, 42.40.6. Perseus was blamed also for the deaths of two Boeotian principes

58

ERICH

S. GRUEN

who had objected to the allianceand were on their way to Rome to report it: Polyb. 22.18.5; Livy, 42.13.7, 42.40.7 - the chargemay have been included in Rome's letter to Delphi; SIGa 643, lines 17-18; cf. Sherk, RDGE, 40 pp. 234, 236. More likely, they perished in a shipwreck: Livy, 42.41.5. 145. Livy, 42.12.5-6, 42.42.4. Philippus' charge that it was a societas secreta is clearly false: Livy, 42.40.6. 146. Livy, 42.43.7: Thebis magna contentio orta erat ex alio certamine.

147. Livy, 42.43.7-9. The constitutionalquestionsare perplexingand need not be explored here. Livy's phrasecomitia praetoris boetarum has been emended to comitiis praetoriis Boeotorum or comitiis praetoris Boeotarcharum; cf. Niese, GeschichteIII. 114, n. 4; P. Roesch, Thespieset la confgdgration

bgotienne(Paris, 1965), 118-119. Ismeniasis describedas novus praetor (Livy, 42.43.9.); whether at the original electionsor at subsequentones is uncertain; cf. Meloni, Perseo 198, n. 1. Equally uncertain is the Greek original of praetor: usually orpar•?3,6•,but here •pXCOV? Roesch,op. cit. 112-121, even deniesthe existenceof a Boeotianorpar•?'¾6•- unconvincingly. More troublesome still is the identity of the exules at Thespiae: Livy, 42.43.7-8. Are they the group defeated in the elections, later recalled and then responsible for condemnation of their own leaders? Or is this Ismenias' party, temporarily eclipsed only to return triumphant? Better to raise these questions than to attempt answers. 148. Livy, 42.38.3, 42.38.5, 42.43.6, 42.43.9-10. 149. Polyb. 27.1-2; Livy, 42.43.10-42.44.1. 150. Polyb. 27.1.1-6; Livy, 42.44.1-2; cf. 42.38.5, 42.43.5: ibi motus coeperat essediscedentibusa societate communis concilii Boeotorum quibusdam populis. 151. Polyb. 27.1.7-9; Livy, 42.44.3-4. An ektclesia, according to Polybius, 27.1.12; but we do not know the criteria for attendance. On the Boeotian constitution, see Touloumakos, Der Einfiuss Roms 38-47.

152. Polyb. 27.1.10-27.2.10; Livy, 42.44.5-6; cf. Polyb. 28.3.2. According to Pausanias, 7.16.9, the League was dissolved in 146; and he records a boeotarch for that year: 7.14.6. Perhapsa reconstitution in some form after Pydna; for discussion,see S. Accame,II dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto (Rome, 1946), 193-197; Roesch, Thespies 69-71.

153. Livy, 42.44.4: et turba Coronaeorum Haliartiorumque convenerat ad defendendumdecretum regiaesocietatis;sed constantiaprincipum ... victa tandem multitudo ... ut tolleretur regia societasdecrevit.

154. Accepted by Niese, Geschichte Ill. 115-116, whotrargues even

that Livy faithfully transmitsPolybian material omitted by the excerptor in Polyb. 27.1-2; so also,Deininger, Widerstand157-158. A most implausible suggestion.The extant fragments of Polybius are here much fuller than Livy's brief summary. Livy departs not in the information conveyed but in the shapeof the analysis. 155. Note the rather different impressions given by Polyb. 27.1.9:

•'•ver6 rt• 6Xooxep•l•15o•ril•o2 I•er&rrcoot• ro6 •rX•Oov•,and by Livy, 42.44.4:

victa tandem

multitudo.

156. Polybius here (27.2.3) uses the terms rb •rXi10ocand o• •SXXot interchangeably - and with a meaning different from that conveyed by rb •rXilOocin the precedingsection:Polyb.27.1.9. A furtherindicationof the flexibility of those terms.

CLASS

CONFLICT

AND

THE

THIRD

MACEDONIAN

WAR

59

157. That is the import of Polyb. 27.2.7: r•lv rc•v 7ro?t?tc•v 6}3vomv •rpbcr•lv Ma•6bbvcovo&[av - not a referenceto the lower classes. 158. Meloni, Perseo 198-199, rightly doubts the relevance of class divisions in this affair. On Livy's interpretative departures from Polybius' text, see the brief but trenchant comments of Derow, Phoenix 26 (1972), 307.

159.

Polyb. 27.5.1-8;

Livy, 42.46.7-10.

The text of Polybius has

Perseus'envoy go to O•/3ac, as well as Coroneaand Haliartus. Obviouslyan error for ©iol3ac, long ago corrected and now generally recognized;cf. Meloni, Perseo 200, n. 3, with literature cited there. The error was already present in the manuscript consulted by Livy, who then feels obliged to explain Theban behavior: Livy, 42.46.7-8. 160. Livy's snide comment, fayore quodam insito in reges, 42.46.9, may be discounted. Coronea, at least, had long-standing grievances against Rome: Polyb. 20.7.3; Livy, 33.29.6, 33.29.9, 36.6.1, 36.20.2-4. 161. Livy, 42.56.3-5, 42.63.3-12. The city's territory was later given to Athens, a decision much lamented by Polybius, 30.20; cf. Strabo, 9.2.30. References in Pausaniasto the destruction of Haliartus probably belong here: Paus. 9.32.5, 9.35.2; see Meloni, Perseo 245, n. 2. 162. Livy's account of its capture is missing;but see Livy, 43.4.11; cf. Zon. 9.22. Some Coroneans had endeavored in vain to rescue the besieged Haliartians: Livy, 42.63.3. Others had engaged in harassment of Thebes: Livy, 42.67.11. A subsequent senatorial decree, preserved in mutilated form, ap-

parently ,effected the restoration of Roman sympathizersin Coronea: L. Robert, Etudes bpigraphiqueset philologiques(Paris, 1938), 287-292; Sherk, RDGE 3 (pp. 32-33). 163. Livy, 42.63.12, reports the city's surrender, recall of exiles, and sale of property belonging to the anti-Roman party. The locale is Thebes, according to Livy; but here also clearly to be emended to Thisbae. Modern bibliography, unanimous on this point, is collected by Meloni, Perseo 245, n. 3. A lengthy senatorial decree of 170, preserved nearly intact, gives Rome's

responseto appealsfrom the new governmentin Thisbae;SIGa 646; Sherk, RDGE 2 (pp. 26-31), with full references to the scholarship. Former exiles are to recover their belongings, are guaranteed control of Thisbaean offices for a decade, and are permitted to fortify the Acropolis (lines 20-30). The fate of their opponents is uncertain. The pro-Roman group asked for their continued imprisonment or banishment; but the senatorial decree announced only that Roman officials would look into the matter (lines 35-45). Deininger, Widerstand 166-167, too readily assumesRoman acquiescencein all these requests. Rome did not offer carte blanche to the new regime: permission to rebuild the city walls was expressly denied (line 31). 164. Polyb. 30.13.4; Livy, 45.31.9. The Theban Neon who had fled to Macedon was summarily executed: Livy, 45.31.15.

165. SIGa 646, lines36-37: dt'rtve•brrevavri, a to& brllaOO•OtC; •rpd71aaot role;•laer•potc;•al to& •:aor&v e•otv. 166. Relevant data exist also for the island of Rhodes, in even larger quantity. But nothing to challenge the picture drawn here. The matter is discussed elsewhere; see "Rome and Rhodes in the 2nd Century B.C.: A

HistoriographicalInquiry" (CQ 25 (1975), 58-81 ). 167. Cf., e.g., Polyb. 4.17.4 (on Cynaetha); 4.81.2 (on Cleomenesand Chilon); 13.1-1a (on Aetolia in the late 3rd century); 13.6-7 (on Nabis);

60

ERICH

S. GRUEN

15.21.1-2 (on Cius); 20.6.1-6, 22.4.1-3 (on Boeotia in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries); 23.4, 23.17.12, 24.7.2-8 (on 2nd-century Sparta); 24.9.12-13

(on Messenia); 36.17.5-8 (on depopulation);38.11.10-11,38.15.3-11 (on the' Achaean war). Other instances could be cited, as well as items in later authors drawing on Polybius. 168. Cf. W.W. Tarn, in The Hellenistic age (Cambridge, 1925), 108140; W.W. Tarn and G.T. Griffith, Hellenistic civilization (3rd ed., London, 1952), 100-125; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW 603-632; with more detail, Larsen, in T. Frank, An economic survey of ancient Rome (Baltimore, 1938), IV.326--422.

169. See the Thessalian decree, probably of Crannon, which attests to the city's public debt as a consequenceof war and asksfor private contribu-

tions' lines 9-13' •rretbe• •t rrbXtc•v 6ave•ot• rrXetbveootimdpxe• 6t• rbc •reordvra• abr& •rokoaoc•a[ XpbvoceYbe•rkdova• •X•ovOat rd 5dveta. Publishedby Y. B•quignon,BCH 59 (1935), 37-38. The strategosKrateraios should date the decree to ca. 140; cf. Fr. Stfihlin, Philologus 88 (1933), 130-132.

170. A pleasant sojourn at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton offered the benefit of valuable discussions with E. Gabba, P. Kussmaul, and, especially, C. Habicht, to whose advice this paper owes much.

NICIAS

THE

CRETAN?

(Thucydides2.85.4-6)

The peculiaritiesof this passage haveoften beennoted-the failureto identify tOi de komizonti (section5) and ho men labOn(section6), the superfluous Kr•s (section5) or rather the odd double ethnic Kr•s Gortynios,etc. A historicaldifficulty in theselines, however, has receivedmuch lessattention, eventhoughit raisesimportantissuesand compelsconsiderationof a possible emendationand reinterpretationof the text. As it stands,the passageseemsto say that a Gortynianproxenosof the Athenians,one Nicias, urgedan expedition to Crete and receivedauthorization to use againstCydonia the Athenian force which was being sent to reinforce Phormio at the narrows of the Corinthian Gulf. This is surely the

natural readingof the Greek, but it impliesthat the non-Athenianproxenos was in chargeof at least one part of the mission.Sincesuchpowersfor a

proxenosseemunparalleled in thisperiodof Attic history,thesuggestion of many of the commentatorson this passageis attractive,viz. ho men labOn in section6 refersback not to the precedingnominative(Nicias), but to the unnamed,presumablyAthenian,official alludedto in tOi de komizonti in section 5. •

Thisinterpretation is perhaps grammatically possible, •' butit isharsh and still leavesus with the peculiaromissionof the nameof the commander. The first step toward a more satisfactorysolutionwas taken over a century

agoby Cobetwhorecognized Kresasa glosson Gortynios. 3 Thereremains, however,a suspicionof further corruption,sinceThucydides'normalpractice 61

62

W.R.

CONNOR

is to specifythe city whoseinterestsa proxenosrepresents,even when that

city is Athens. 4 Henceoneexpectssomementionof the Athenians, or, followingthe exampleof 8.92.8, 'the city'. But before assumingthat words havedroppedout of the text, the changeof one or two lettersdemandscon-

sideration-for Gortynios readGortyniois or GortynirSnfi Themeasy corruption of dative or genitive plural to nominative singular,followed by the intrusionof a glosson the new nominative,could lead to the stylisticand historical difficulties

we have noticed.

This simpleemendation,on the other hand, leads to interestingand plausibleresults.The 'Cretan'Niciasdisappears andwith him the anomalyof

a foreigner in charge of Athenian forces. 6 Thecommander of theexpedition isnow namedin the passage, and he is a well-knownAthenian,soonto appear in the most significantmilitary roles. The famousAthenian Nicias,to whom the passage must now allude,appearsas the proxenosof a Cretan city. This resultwill not appearsurprising to thosewho rememberthe storyin Diogenes Laertiusthat in the forty-sixthOlympiad(596-593 B.C.) one Niciasson of Niceratustravelled to Crete to bring back Epimenides,so that he could

expiatea plague thatwasafflicting Athens. 7 Wilamowitz pointed outthatthe storyis transparently a pieceof political propaganda fromthetimeof 'der historische tragerdiesesnamens') The storyfits nicelyinto a time of plague, and it stresses the traditionalpiety and benevolenceof Nicias'family. The endingof the storyis especially instructive: The Atheniansvotedhim (Epimenides) a talentin moneyanda ship to convey him back to Crete. The money he declined, but he con-

cluded a treaty of friendshipand alliancebetweenCnossosand Athens.

(DiogenesLaertius1.111, trans.Hicks)

Thus the tale providesa precedentfor Atheniancollaborationwith at least one city on Crete. In the early years of the war Nicias may have been en-

couragingan expansionof Athenianinfluenceon Crete.The islandmarked one of the frontiersof the empire (cf. 2.9.4) and like Melos,which Nicias attackedin 426 B.C. (3.91.1-3), andCythera,againstwhichhe wasoneof the commanders in 424 (4.53 ff.), it was one of the few Aegeanislandsthat had not beenbroughtinto the empire?It is interesting too to noteNicias'wish for Cretanauxiliariesin 6.25.2 (cf. 6.43). The wider strategicobjectivesof the missionto Cretearenot developed by Thucydides,whoseaccountstresses insteadthe dangersof delayingreinforcementsto Phormio(e.g. 2.86.6). The reinforcements arrivejust after the

battle (2.92.7), whereindisasterhasbeenavoidedonly by an unpredictable stroke of goodluck (2.91.4). Our passage, which if theseemendations are

correctis now the firstmentionof Niciasin the History, xø thusserves to foreshadow the hesitationanddelaywhichlater appearascharacteristics of Nicias and as major causesof the failure or' the Athenian escapefrom

Syracuse. x• Thisis a commontechnique of Thucydides: Brasidas' first appearance (2.25.2) helpsestablish hisbraveryanddecisiveness; Alcibiades'

NICIAS

THE

CRETAN?

63

first appearance(5.43) showshis ambition and cleverness. Thus 2.85 is a passage fully in keepingwith Thucydideanhistoriographyand without the

stylistic andhistorical difficulties implicitin thereceived text.•2 Princeton University

W.R. Connor

NOTES

1. This interpretation was first proposed by E. F. Poppo in part III of his Thucydides commentary (Leipzig 1834) 412. It is adopted, inter alios, by Gomme ad loc.

2. The so called 'elliptical' and 'parenthetical'usesof 3,dp are well

known(seeJ. D. Denniston, GreekParticles • (Oxford1954)65 f. and68f.), but I have not found a good parallel to such an abrupt change in subject as is

implied in Poppo'streatment of 3. C. G. Cobet, Variae Lectiones, edition 2 (Leiden 1873) 441. An effort might be made to defend the reading on the basis of double Cretan

ethnicson a few Attic graveinscriptions(IG II/III 2 9087 and 9093), but the

parallelism isnot•recise. ForGortyn, Gortynios alone isnormal andsufficient. See IG II/III 8464 and the inscriptions listed in M. Guarducci's index to Inscriptiones Creticae IV (438). Even if Thucydides feared some confusion with the obscure Arcadian town of Gortys or Kortys, the context (es Krgt•n

... epi Kyddnian) makesKp•C superfluous.Further, asCobet saw,if a clarification wasneeded,one would expect •t• Kp•/rr/c. 4. Note 4.78.1; 5.59.5; 5.76.3; 3.52.5; and cf. 8.92.8; 3.70.3;2.29.1 is a full statement that the Athenians named Nymphodorus of Abdera their proxenos. The sole exception to the pattern: 3.70.1.

5. IIp6•evoc d3v plus the genitive is normal; for the dative see Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon (III) 138. The dative, however, is so rare that Gortyni6n is much to be preferred. Since the lemma of the scholion uses the nominative, the corruption must antedate the current form of the scholion.

The sequenceof endingsIIp6•evoc d3vmay havemisledthe eye of the copyist and resulted in the substitution of the nominative for a genitive, or, as has been suggestedto me, the corruption may be 'psychological', with the scribe

influenced by the following nominatives. 6. The name Nicias, so common in Athens, does not occur on inscriptions from Gortyn published in Inscriptiones Creticae IV. But a GortynJan Nicias who apparently died in Attica in the first century A.D. is attested

on a monument,IG II/III • 8463. 7. Diogenes Laertius 1.110 f. Cf. Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 1 and Plutarch, Solon 12. Plutarch says he was from Phaestus. Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 68b and c, indicates that the tradition that he was from goesback at least to the fourth century B.C. 8. U. yon Wilamowitz-Moellendorf's edition of Euripides' Heratoles (Berlin 1891) 244. G. Huxley, 'Nikias, Crete and the plague', GRBS 10 (1969) 235-9 treats the story less critically. See also W. R. Connor, New politicians of fifth-century Athens (Princeton 1971) 161 f. Neither the plague motif nor the dates given by Diogenesneed be part of the original story. The earlier sourcesvary greatly: Plato, Laws 1.642d; Aristotle, A thenaion Politeia 1.1; Plutarch, Solon 12.

64

W.R.

9.

CONNOR

The presence of Melos on line 65 of column 1 of the re-assessment

decree of 425/4 (IG 12 63; ATL A 9; Meiggsand Lewis, Greek historical inscriptions 69) need not, of course, imply that Melos had joined the Athenian empire. The attack on her seems a clear repudiation of the Periclean advice not to add to the empire (Thucydides 1.144.1 and 2:65.7). It is thus difficult to accept without qualification the view that Nicias was following 'in the footsteps of Pericles' (A. B. West, 'Pericles' political heirs', CP 19 (1924) 134). For Thucydides' assessmentof Nicias see now L. Edmunds, Chance and intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge, Mass. 1975) 109, n. 32; 130;and 140 with n. 70. 10. Thucydides normally gives a patronymic when he first mentions a character in his History. But there are significant exceptions: Themistocles

(1.14.3); Archi•lamus(1.79.2); Hagnon(1.117.2); Alcidas(3.16.3); Athenagoras (6.35.2) - not to mention Thucydides himself (1.1.1). 11. J. de Romilly, Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (Paris 1956) 151, 164 ff. has noted the affinity between the account of the battle of Naupactus (2.86-92) and the battles in the harbor of Syracuse in Book VII. The emendation of 2.85.5 now makes it appear that the phrallelism between the two sectionsis more specific and that Nicias' role is anticipated in Book II. 12. Thanks are due to John Keaney and James Zetzel for helpful suggestionsand criticisms. This does not mean that they necessarily agree with my argument.