African Philanthropy: Philanthropic Responses to Covid-19 and Development Goals in Africa 1803927860, 9781803927862

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African Philanthropy

African Philanthropy Philanthropic Responses to Covid-19 and Development Goals in Africa

Edited by

Bhekinkosi Moyo Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Mzukisi Qobo Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Nomfundo Ngwenya Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Editors and Contributors Severally 2023 Cover image: Photo by Bashar Alaeddin on Unsplash All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023930305 This book is available electronically in the Sociology, Social Policy and Education subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781803927879

ISBN 978 1 80392 786 2 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80392 787 9 (eBook)

EEP BoX

Contents List of contributorsvii Acknowledgementsx 1

Introduction: African philanthropic responses in times of crisis Bhekinkosi Moyo, Mzukisi Qobo and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya

2

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic: types, trends and effectiveness in responding to Africa’s developmental needs Jacob Mwathi Mati

3

The role of philanthropy in supporting development through African multilateral institutions in crisis and non-crisis periods Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya

4

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa Keratiloe Sishoma Mogotsi, Wycliffe Nduga Ouma and Bhekinkosi Moyo

5

When Covid-19 meets philanthropy: the role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana Emmanuel Kumi

6

‘Steering’ or ‘freeing’ civil society? Philanthropy towards social justice campaigns in South Africa during Covid-19 Shauna Mottiar

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Digital solutions and philanthropy: improving coordination between philanthropists, governments, and non-state actors in Africa Oswald Jumira

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22 38

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Comparative multilateral philanthropy: the cases of the European Union Commission and the Asian Development Bank on crisis and non-crisis philanthropic engagements Faten Aggad

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Corporate philanthropy and regional multilateral institutions in Africa Rebecca Mhere

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Improving coordination between multilateral institutions and philanthropists: a view from high-net worth individuals Tendai Murisa

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Challenges and opportunities for improving coordination between multilateral institutions and philanthropies: a view from charitable foundations Geci Karuri-Sebina, Fred Carden and Frederick Beckley

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Orienting philanthropy towards regional solutions Bhekinkosi Moyo and Katiana Sandra Ramsamy

13 Conclusion Bhekinkosi Moyo, Mzukisi Qobo and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya

164 178 194

Bibliography198 Index222

Contributors Faten Aggad currently serves as a Senior Advisor on Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics at the African Climate Foundation (ACF), South Africa. Prior to joining the ACF in February 2022, Faten served as the Senior Advisor to the African Union High Representative on future relations with the European Union. She also served as an Advisor to the Africa Forum under the leadership of former President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique. Frederick Beckley is a researcher at the Wits School of Governance, South Africa and has a Master’s degree in development planning in 2021 from the School of Architecture and Planning. His research interests include smart cities, urban land and gentrification. Fred Carden is an evaluation specialist with over 30 years of experience in evaluating development research and programming, and in the development of evaluation methodologies. He holds a PhD from the Université de Montréal and a Fellowship in Sustainability Science from the Harvard Kennedy School. Oswald Jumira is a digital technology expert with more than 15 years of experience successfully advancing the growth and adoption of digital technology across a number of countries in Africa. He has previously worked for ECONET Group, Mastercard and Mercy Corps. He holds a Master’s in Engineering from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Geci Karuri-Sebina is a Visiting Associate Professor at the Wits School of Governance Tayarisha Centre, an associate of South African Cities Network and the African Centre for Cities, and Vice Chair of Africa LICS (the community of innovation scholars in Africa). She is an architect, planner and futurist with a tech background. Emmanuel Kumi is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Policy Studies, University of Ghana. He holds a PhD in International Development from the University of Bath, United Kingdom. His research focuses on African philanthropy, civil society organisations, NGO management, civic space and the political economy of development. Jacob Mati is Associate Professor and Deputy Director at the Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment (CAPSI), Wits Business School, vii

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University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. He is a multi-disciplinary pracademic with over 20 years of work experience in academia, civil society and consulting in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America. Rebecca Mhere is a senior consultant in corporate social investment and sustainable business practice at Trialogue, a niche research and consulting company focusing on responsible business. Prior to this she worked as a development economist at the South African National Treasury. She holds an MPhil in Justice and Transformation from the University of Cape Town and an undergraduate majoring in Political Science and Economics. Keratiloe Sishoma Mogotsi is Lecturer of African Philanthropy at the Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment at the Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. She is a lean six sigma coach and certified project management professional with the PMI Institute. Shauna Mottiar is Associate Professor of Development Studies and Director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. She holds a PhD (Political Studies) from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Her research and publication areas include social movements and social protest in South Africa. Bhekinkosi Moyo is Adjunct Professor at the Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa and Director of the Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment (CAPSI) at the same institution. He is a writer, author, researcher and thought-leader with keen interest on questions of African resources, democracy and governance. Tendai Murisa is the current Executive Director of SIVIO Institute, Zimbabwe. He holds a DPhil in Sociology from Rhodes University. Tendai has over 20 years of institution building and policy analysis experience, spanning three universities and multiple local and international organisations. He is active in building communities of practice and nurturing institutions that aim to enhance giving by Africans. Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. She is also Managing Director at NXN Analytics. She holds a PhD in International Studies from the University of Cambridge and MSc in Politics of the World Economy from the London School of Economics. Wycliffe Nduga Ouma is a Research Associate at the Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment (CAPSI) at Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. His expertise is in sustainable

Contributors

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finance and investment, social impact investing, socio-economic development, corporate philanthropy, and financial risk modelling. Mzukisi Qobo is Head of School at the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. He also serves on President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Economic Advisory Council. He holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick. Katiana Sandra Ramsamy has extensive knowledge of the geo-political arena in sub-Saharan Africa with specific focus on international relations and conflict resolution through mediation. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Wits University.

Acknowledgements This book project arose from a partnership between the Centre on African Philanthropy and Social Investment (CAPSI) at the Wits Business School (WBS) and the Wits School of Governance (WSG), both at the University of the Witwatersrand. The Covid-19 pandemic moved the two partners to explore what its impact was on different sectors of our society. The project would not have been possible without the generous contribution of the former Open Society Foundations in Africa namely OSISA, OSIWA, OSIA, Open Society South Africa and Africa Program. In particular, we extend our gratitude to Muthoni Wanyeki, Siphosami Malunga, Velaphi Mamba, Levi Kwabatho, Sarah Mukasa, and Nonkululeko Buthelezi for their support and participation in the different stages of the project that included dialogues and technical reviews. We also thank the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, particularly Mamodisi Mohapi and Lydia Molapo. Finally, we express our gratitude for the support received from WSG and the ongoing funding from CAPSI’s donors and partners that include the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, TrustAfrica, Africa Philanthropy Network, Africa Philanthropy Forum, and the East Africa Philanthropy Network. Catherine Elgar’s enthusiasm for this project was a great source of encouragement that we should take it to the end and produce a book manuscript. We would like to thank her and the very gracious team at Edward Elgar Publishing. They have been a pleasure to work with. While this book will contribute towards the growing academic literature on African Philanthropy, we wanted to ensure that the discussions and recommendations integrated the views of practitioners. We therefore thank the multilateral institutions that kindly cooperated by availing their officials for interviews. Special thanks go to Dr John Nkengasong at the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa-CDC) and Dr Désiré Vencatachellum at the African Development Bank (AfDB), both of whom granted interviews. We also express our gratitude to all officials at the African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD) who contributed towards written responses. Given the emergence of African Philanthropy as an academic discipline, we placed much importance on the quality of the content. We therefore prioritised peer review from respected academics in the field. We express our sincere x

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appreciation to the two reviewers who provided in-depth feedback and ensured that the chapters met high academic standards individually and were thematically aligned collectively. The work of the operational support team at CAPSI and WSG was central to ensuring the project’s administration was managed efficiently. Special thanks go to Mesele Seyuba, who meticulously ensured alignment between authors, reviewers and project leads; Odilile Oyidele, who played a pivotal role in initiating contact with the publisher and ensuring that we secured the publishing contract; Phumudzo Mufamadi, who methodically compiled the manuscript; Keratiloe Mogotsi, who helped to bring the different components of reviews and authors’ meetings together; Thandi Makhubele, Itumeleng Nchabeleng, and Humbulani Ndou, who assisted with the contracting and financial administration; Xolani Dlamini, who brought his publishing expertise to bear; and Lerato Mtambanengwe and Kemantha Govender, who convened discussions to validate the research findings. Finally, the success of a multi-authored book requires the commitment of all authors, who sometimes have to contend with a long and tedious process. Since the project began in mid-2020, while much of the world was in lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic, this book required additional effort and patience. We express our sincere gratitude to all authors who stayed the course, despite the many personal and professional challenges that the pandemic presented.

1. Introduction: African philanthropic responses in times of crisis Bhekinkosi Moyo, Mzukisi Qobo and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya The beginning of 2020 was a pivotal moment globally. This is when almost every country began feeling the inevitable effects of the Covid-19 virus, which spiralled rapidly across the world and was soon declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization. It quickly became clear that the pandemic was going to cause major disruptions in every aspect of life. The health sector was the first to be affected and health facilities across the world were inundated and overwhelmed by large numbers of hospitalisations. Rapidly, the effects were felt by the economic sector following the shutting down of economic activities and closing of national borders, which had a huge impact on the movement of people, goods, and services. Thereafter there was free fall – all sectors were seriously disrupted. The Centre on African Philanthropy at the Wits Business School and the Wits School of Governance – both at the University of the Witwatersrand – were curious to know what the impact of the pandemic would be on philanthropy and social investment in Africa. Furthermore, the borderless spread of the pandemic prompted African governments and philanthropies to coordinate their responses through multilateral institutions, most notably the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa-CDC). We were therefore interested to explore how this collaboration between multilateral institutions and philanthropies during a crisis could be harnessed and replicated to address the continent’s developmental challenge in non-crisis periods. While in the beginning, we were more concerned to understand trends on philanthropy in the African continent, literature soon led us to enrich the study by also focusing on country studies, analysing multilateral institutions, and using a comparative approach across sectors and geographies. The pandemic provided an opportunity for a scholarly endeavour to expand our understanding of philanthropic expressions in Africa. Literature on African philanthropy has historically been limited but has seen a steady growth over the last two decades. Very little, however, exists on philanthropy and responses to disasters or crises. Similarly, there is a dearth of literature on 1

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cooperation between philanthropy and African multilateral institutions. How does philanthropy in Africa in general and African philanthropy in particular manifest itself and how does this compare with practices outside of the continent? The research sought to assess not just the specific and narrow types of giving, but multiple ways in which philanthropy is expressed – through High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), civil society organisations, foundations, and corporates, and how it collaborates with intergovernmental and multilateral institutions. The research further explored how philanthropy was affected by the pandemic and how in turn it responded. These enquiries would further expand the frontiers of research on philanthropy in Africa. As scholars and researchers in the African continent coming from diverse fields that include political economy, international relations, history, management studies, and philanthropic studies, we have over the years observed how the African continent has been neglected or understudied when it came to philanthropy. This book contributes to growing the body of knowledge in this field. More importantly, the book is one among many more to be published in this area. The rise in climate philanthropy, for example, will benefit a lot from this book given that climate change is likely to be the next pandemic, yet very little is done in this area, including by philanthropies. The role of philanthropy in crises is therefore given relevance and credence by our study. Africa’s agency is often overlooked, with the continent mostly studied as a recipient of external largesse. As Jacob Mati shows in his chapter and other writers have demonstrated (Aina and Moyo, 2013; Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005), philanthropy has been a constant phenomenon in Africa. Concepts such as Ubuntu and various forms of social capital within communities have demonstrated unique ways in which philanthropy has always been an integral part of Africa’s social geography and political economy. Even the more recent wave of philanthro-capitalism, which we say more about later, has focused attention on billionaires from the West – and to some degree the East – with a few sprinklings of newly minted conscience-driven capitalists in parts of the African continent. The exclusive focus on the elite in much of the observations on philanthropy has cast a shadow over the largesse that has been produced and distributed by Africans themselves. It also ignores the work done by African institutions, to which we devote some attention in this work. We are not making a claim that there is an essentially African forum of philanthropy; rather we highlight that there is much philanthropic activity in the African continent that remains understudied. It is our hope that this volume will contribute to nascent studies on African philanthropy, its contribution to enhancing capabilities and the various ways in which this is expressed in society. African Philanthropy: Philanthropic Responses to Covid-19 and Development Goals in Africa is a product of intense debates and conversations

Introduction: African philanthropic responses in times of crisis

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between scholars, policy experts, and practitioners on the meaning and expressions of philanthropy in the African continent against the ugly backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic. It offers an analytical starting point to examine how African philanthropists (foundations, HNWIs, individuals, and corporates) can be further harnessed towards funding the continent’s development objectives. During the period of the study (between March 2020 and December 2020), the Bridgespan Group (2021) reported that HNWIs responded to initiatives that sought to address pandemics more generously than they had done in the last ten years. The Group found 45 large gifts in three countries that totalled $269 million in value. This was seven times the annual average number of large gifts over the previous decade. This project’s importance lies in the fact that the power of non-state actors such as foundations, HNWIs, and corporates in social change is not fully explored in much of the literature on philanthropy. Michael Porter and Mark Kramer popularised the idea of corporate philanthropy and corporate shared value two decades ago. Since then there has not been much scholarly reflection on the meaning of this phenomenon and how it can be leveraged as a force for change especially in the African continent. This book fills that gap. This edited volume is grounded in interdisciplinary conversations. The study aims to broaden our understanding of the influential role played by non-state actors (such as philanthropists) and multilateral institutions (who convene African governments towards a common purpose) in shaping Africa’s development agenda. More precisely, it assesses how philanthropists, businesses, and continental institutions can forge a social compact that enhances capabilities and well-being in Africa. As the chapters developed, we were made aware of the limited collaborations between African philanthropists and African continental institutions. Much of the collaboration has been between these institutions and international philanthropies. Africa’s multilateral institutions are central to framing Africa’s development objectives. Prominent examples of such institutions include the African Union, regional economic communities (RECs), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). Although these institutions rely primarily on assessed contributions or shareholding from their members, they are constantly on a quest to generate resources that could be channelled to address Africa’s developmental challenges, especially in times of economic strain. As shown by the different chapters, there is a need to improve on relations and partnerships between African philanthropists and these institutions in order to respond to African issues. These institutions have explored the best mechanisms for attracting alternative funding sources, including philanthropic and private sector funds mainly from international sources. The extent to which they can source these additional resources from Africans is still to be explored more in-depth. This

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book offers both analytic and empirical perspectives. It draws on interviews with heads of African institutions, including African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD), AfDB, and Africa-CDC. It also provides some comparative analysis. The various chapters in this book assess African philanthropy before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, focusing on the different types, trends and effectiveness of these activities in responding to Africa’s developmental needs. The role of African philanthropy in supporting African multilateral responses to a crisis is discussed through analysis of the relationships and coordination between these institutions and various philanthropic platforms. Beyond state-centric multilateral institutions, this work shines a bright spotlight on case studies that span civil society organisations in Africa and philanthropic organisations in countries like Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda. This work is divided into 13 chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. In Chapter 2, the author highlights gaps in scholarship on African philanthropy, and how the continent is on the periphery of most studies. The chapter grounds the study of philanthropy in African realities. It also explores various dimensions through which philanthropy is expressed on the continent. It concludes by shining light on institutional processes that could help to strengthen philanthropy in the African context. Chapter 3 looks at the role of multilateral institutions in contributing to philanthropy in crisis and non-crisis periods, drawing on the examples of the African Union and the African Development Bank. This chapter is enriched by interviews with policy makers and the use of case studies to illustrate the positive role multilateral institutions can play in reinforcing philanthropic activities. Various dimensions of philanthropic work are discussed, including by individuals, communities, and the private sector, among others. In its conclusion this chapter proposes ways in which the continental institutions could maximise their developmental role through philanthropy. Chapter 4 assesses the effects of natural and health disasters on civil society organisations in Africa. It fills a gap in the literature on how philanthropists respond to disasters. The chapter leans on social origins theory and focuses on the interplay of the state and associational life. It also combines qualitative and quantitative study – or mixed methods – to shed new light on the impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations. This chapter builds on the strong foundation of EpicAfrica’s (2020) study on the impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations. Chapter 5 is a case study of the Ghanaian health sector and looks at the role of philanthropy in Covid-19 interventions. It brings to light the forms of solidarity that have emerged to complement the Covid-19 National Trust Fund established by the Ghanaian government. Some of the complementary initiatives include the Ghana Covid-19 Private Sector Fund and efforts by HNWIs

Introduction: African philanthropic responses in times of crisis

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to respond to the effects of Covid-19 and enhance capabilities. This chapter offers important insights on the role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of health crises like the Covid-19 pandemic. Chapter 6 reflects on the ways in which government can work closely with civil society organisations (CSOs) to increase a sense of solidarity in society. It first paints a broad canvas of contrasting practices in how various countries structure the relationship between government and CSOs. The chapter focuses in the main on what the author refers to as ‘social justice philanthropy’ in contrast to ‘supervisory philanthropy’, and the various capability constraints that civil society organisations face in undertaking their activities. Chapter 7 discusses collaborative models of philanthropy. It discusses the idea of strategic philanthropy, which is based on collaboration and aimed at aggregating social value. This chapter is rich in empirical examples that express collaborative – or strategic – philanthropy in action. Many of the examples here are drawn from Covid-19 responses by an array of philanthropic organisations outside the continent and those that originate from within the continent. The chapter also discusses the use of technology and digital platforms in delivering services to where they are mostly needed. Chapter 8 is based on the examples of philanthropy by the European Union and Asian Development Bank. It observes how philanthropy increased during crisis periods, notably the 2008 global financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis, where foundations in Europe made enormous contributions to alleviate the impact of the crisis. Similarly in Asia, the decade after the global financial crisis saw a surge of philanthropic activities. Significantly, the chapter discusses the relationship between European and Asian philanthropy and regional multilateral institutions in responding to crisis and non-crisis situations. The chapter brings clarity on the role of politics, values and organisations in the nexus between philanthropy and regional organisations. Chapter 9 looks at the relationship between large corporates and regional multilateral institutions. There is, as this chapter argues, a clear conceptual distinction between corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy. It then focuses on the role that corporate philanthropy can play in stimulating innovation through a combination of funding, expertise, and research capacity to create social value beyond what governments are able to do. The chapter looks at specific examples that demonstrate how cooperation between corporates and multilateral organisations can create value in society in ways that would not have been possible by government action alone. Chapter 10 examines the relationship between HNWIs and multilateral institutions. Notably, it identifies strategies that can help improve coordination of philanthropic activities on the African continent, with institutions such as the African Union playing a pivotal role. This chapter focuses its discussion on emergent ‘billionaire’ philanthropists in Africa and identifies the various

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categories through which their philanthropic activities are directed. It makes a case for collaboration among African philanthropists and for governments to tap into this critical source of value to enhance developmental activities. Drawing on views from charitable foundations, Chapter 11 explores the hypothesis that regional action is crucial from the perspective of philanthropies and how they engage with development on the continent. It articulates a case for regional coordination of philanthropic activities, and also argues that multilateral institutions should be more efficient and effective to enhance prospects for increased collaboration with charitable foundations. This chapter also shines light on the potential role philanthropy can play in driving Africa’s development, but also sets out key characteristics that will enable this. Chapter 12 discusses regional solutions to philanthropy. It also assesses country examples such as those found in Rwanda and Liberia, especially focusing on state policies that promote philanthropic activities. The chapter also covers policy approaches and practices of a wide range of regional institutions, including the overarching African Union, the East African Community, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Southern African Development Community, among others. Like other chapters, the authors here argue that African philanthropy must take a continental approach and transcend narrow national interests. Chapter 13 concludes and brings together the various ideas and recommendations set out in this book and provides a fresh perspective on reorienting philanthropy on the African continent through collaborative relationships between governments, the private sector, HNWIs, and multilateral institutions to achieve greater value in both crisis and non-crisis periods.

2. African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic: types, trends and effectiveness in responding to Africa’s developmental needs Jacob Mwathi Mati INTRODUCTION In the last two decades, African philanthropy has undergone a revolution characterised by a rapid increase in the number of foundations and other philanthropy infrastructure organisations, embryonic changes in the regulatory environment, changes in the volume of African large-scale giving,1 and increased effort towards institutionalised harnessing and channelling of the various African gifting practices in response to myriad humanitarian and developmental needs across the continent and beyond.2 Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to these developments. In addition, existing knowledge on African philanthropy is largely peripheral in global scholarship. For example, Wiepking and Handy’s (2015) edited volume – The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy – completely ignored Africa and Latin America while The Routledge Companion to Philanthropy, edited by Jung et al. (2016), included only a single chapter on African indigenous philanthropy. Voluntas, a leading journal on the third sector, recently published a special issue on ‘global philanthropy’ without a single article on African philanthropy, despite the introductory article claiming that it aimed at pushing the boundaries of research on philanthropy as a global, yet contested social practice (see von Schnurbein et al., 2021). Indeed, only one article in the Voluntas special issue cites a single resource on African philanthropy (see Wiepking, 2021). Even within the African academy, African philanthropy in times of a pandemic is relatively underexplored and therefore ill understood (Mati, 2017; Fowler and Mati, 2019). This chapter addresses some of the existing blank spots and blind spots on African philanthropy, especially in times of a pandemic. The chapter serves two purposes. The first is to offer conceptual clarity on African philanthropy. Second is to demonstrate African philanthropy’s con7

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tributions in previous humanitarian emergencies with a view to foregrounding its potential contributions in alleviating the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the first section below, the methodology employed for this analysis is presented. Next is a discussion on the conceptions of African philanthropy which serves to distinguish and contextualise ‘African philanthropy’ within the broader area of ‘philanthropy in Africa’. Next, attention is drawn to several areas of interest including historical trends, drivers, channels, sectoral spread and quantity of African philanthropy in order to answer the following questions: What are the primary areas of interest for African philanthropic giving? What are the main channels of this giving? What sectors are supported by African philanthropy and why? What is the quantity (value) of philanthropic giving in Africa? These questions help to lay bare the ontological posture applied in the selection of illustrative case studies of mobilisations against past needs presented in the following section. This section further reflects on the lessons learned from such past mobilisations, as well as how these are deployed in mobilisations against the Covid-19 pandemic. The final section – conclusion and recommendations – reiterates African philanthropy’s contributions to African causes, with a couple of recommendations offered to African philanthropies and scholars.

METHODOLOGY The main approach is ontological, involving review and analysis of data and literature from a variety of select sources, first to conceptualise and contextualise ‘African philanthropy’, and then to answer questions relating to historical trends, drivers, channels, sectoral spread and quantity of African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Aware of the breadth of ‘Africa’, a case study approach is applied to demonstrate past philanthropic resource mobilisations to respond to Africa’s development needs. This ontological/historical perspective, with concrete examples, offers a useful counterweight to the dependency narrative commonly applied to the analysis of philanthropy on the continent. Indeed, it demonstrates that Africans have, to some extent, always been steering their philanthropy with a purpose for their own well-being. Data from the East Africa Philanthropy Data Portal by Candid and the East Africa Philanthropy Network, though limited in scope and breadth, is chosen to highlight historical trends, drivers, channels, sectoral spread and quantity of African philanthropy. Further, the literature reviewed is intended to critique the Western conceptualisations of philanthropy and its theorisation, and then set out an alternative conceptualisation of African philanthropy. This alternative conceptualisation is used in structuring the relevance parameters used in picking the cases to illustrate this alternative conception.

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AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY: A CONCEPTUAL RECAPITULATION Before dealing with conceptual aspects, some caution on things Africa, given its diversity, is in order. All social phenomena in Africa come in many hues, forms, expressions, and models. Consequently, practices in African philanthropy as social exchanges stem from a variety of sources including culture, faith and religion, and philosophical worldviews which result in nuanced differences even within countries and subregions of the continent (Joseph, 1989). The result is a plurality of practices, presences, and conceptions, manifesting as informal community networks of support, i.e. horizontal philanthropy, as well as formal top-down/vertical forms that reflect a Western perspective of private giving for public purposes (Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005). Therefore, caution should be exercised in generalising. Even with such caution, persistent generalisations about Africa suggest some bounded regularities and historical connections (Opoku-Mensah, 2007). What, then, are the bounded regularities, historical connections and practices in the constitutive elements of African philanthropy that distinguish it from the broader ‘philanthropy in Africa’ ecosystem or even further from the generic philanthropy? There is a decent amount of literature attempting to address this (cf. Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014; Mati, 2016; 2017; Fowler and Mati, 2019; Mottiar and Ngcoya, 2016). Similar to Payton (1988), these authors treat African philanthropy as the private giving of time or valuables (money, security, property) for public purposes. African philanthropy is distinguishable from contemporary Western conceptions on a number of other fronts. First, while top-down manifestations (and their sometimes egoistic instrumental-rational orientation) abound, African philanthropy is ubiquitously horizontal, involving reciprocal patterns of material and non-material exchanges, contributions of time, skills, knowledge sharing and moral/emotional support among equals, and no member of society is too poor to give. It is ‘practiced by friends and neighbours in particular communities and may include local associations and formal organisations. “Horizontal” philanthropy casts givers and recipients as equal in the philanthropic act’ (Bracking, 2015, p. 4). Second, African philanthropy is grounded in everyday moral-ethical compulsions deeply embedded in obligatory cultures of solidarity and reciprocity that ensure mutual survival and reproduction (Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005). These African traditional prosocial habits formed over several generations and conditioned by environmental socio-economic factors and obligatory cultures of reciprocity (Mati, 2020b) challenge dominant notions that Africans are passive recipients of an external top-down generosity (Mukasa, 2011; Mati, 2016, 2020b; Fowler and Mati 2019). Indeed, across African communities,

10

African philanthropy

low-wealth individuals have, for generations, systemically mobilised resources to address their collective challenges, through self-help and mutual assistance schemes, as have those with more wealth. In Africa therefore, charitable giving is a phenomenon in the worlds of both rich and poor (Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005). Horizontal African philanthropy contrasts with contemporary Western top-down philanthropy’s entrenchment in morally incompatible economic processes that generate great individual wealth for a few, who then give a part of that wealth to others (Fowler, 2016). Consequently, critics charge that mainstream philanthropy cannot adequately address fundamental social-justice issues such as ‘inequitable allocation of resources and access to power’ because philanthropists are both the authors and beneficiaries of the same (Mukasa, 2011; Mati, 2017). Philanthropists instead engage in a top-down philanthropy usually through (poorly accountable) foundations (Giridharadas, 2019) and the self-serving tendencies of corporate social investments (Adanhounme, 2011). African philanthropy’s orientation towards collective well-being, grounded in African philosophical worldviews such as Ubuntu, where ‘recipients will accept [gifts] intending to return or reciprocate in kind but the giver will engage in the action knowing that there may not, in fact, be reciprocation’ is seen as a social justice-oriented antithesis of the top-down philanthropy (Bracking, 2015, p. 4). Some scholars argue that contemporary formal African philanthropy should build on this social justice orientation and pay greater attention to inequity so as to address the root causes of social ills (Aina and Moyo, 2013, p. xv). One pathway is to focus on building strong movements and institutions of the primary duty bearers who ‘define their own agenda and develop appropriate responses that encompass the breadth and depth of the continent’s realities [including] holding the state and other duty bearers accountable’ (Mukasa, 2011). The import here is that philanthropists must recognise the importance of the agency of the so-called beneficiaries by conceptualising them as partners (Swingler, 2020). An additional common feature of the plurality of practices and presences discussed above, and which the case studies later make apparent, is the interweaving of private and public acts in African philanthropy. This is because Africa’s post-colonial, socio-historical conditions have intermeshed with ethno-linguistic and neo-patrimonial systems of governance resulting in a dynamic inter-penetration of polity and state as two ‘publics’ (Ekeh, 1975; Osaghae, 2006), producing both horizontal and vertical saliences of the continent’s philanthropy (Fowler and Mati, 2019). The result is a blurry conflation of the borders of statutory government obligations to citizens with the non-statutory premise of voluntary agency of philanthropy.

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic

11

Towards Conceptual Clarity While there is agreement on commonalities cited above, the plurality of African philanthropy practices and presences has resulted in challenges in ring-fencing the concept, due to ‘scope creep and lack of clearly demarcated conceptual and definitional boundaries’ (Mati, 2016, p. 18). Despite these challenges, it is important to clarify its usage in the current work. As the various cases analysed herein show, African philanthropy encompasses an interplay/mix of private (extra-governmental) and (sometimes) public agency in mobilisation/ harnessing of resources (including money, material goods, time, and labour) by and for Africans to address a public need, interest, or cause (Mati, 2016). This conception brings to light at least two key aspects that the analysed cases attempt to illustrate. One is how, despite the mix of public and private sources of resources, the locus or ‘host’ of practices deemed African philanthropy in the current work is extra-state or inter-state, though sometimes coordinated by the state. Such hosting, as we will see later, serves an identity legitimising purpose. In this regard, the first case is a non-profit/corporates partnership, while the second is a Trust operating under a Pan-African intergovernmental umbrella – the African Union Foundation – incorporated as a non-profit through which African governments and the private sector have been raising resources for continent-wide problems such as Ebola and now the Covid-19 pandemic. The question then is, should such private/public partnerships pass for philanthropy? Evidence suggests they should, insofar as resources are mobilised from both public as well as private voluntary civic sources. However, it makes the philanthropic dimension of the initiative difficult to untangle from public obligations. Applying public/private criteria to case analysis later in this chapter helps us to surface at least three possible criteria for inclusion of these practices into philanthropy: (i) relative proportion of resourcing between public and private; (ii) relative proportion of horizontal non-agonistic/collaborative versus vertical agonistic/competitive gifting (Fowler and Mati, 2019) present in such initiatives; (iii) whether the control and governance of collaborative partnerships rests with the civic or public sector.

AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY PRIOR TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC This section illustrates trends in African philanthropy by answering the following questions: What are the primary areas of interest for African philanthropic giving? What are the main channels of this giving? What sectors are supported by African philanthropy? What is the quantity (value) of philanthropic giving

12

African philanthropy

in Africa? Given the breadth of the phenomenon across 54-odd countries, illustrative examples are offered in this endeavour. Historical Developments While some of its institutions such as awaqf (philanthropic charitable endowments) predate contemporary manifestations of African philanthropy, there has been phenomenal transformation in the last few decades. Specific shifts are traced to, among other factors, the colonial encounter. In adapting to the existential threats and risks from colonial occupation, Africans channelled their prosociality to four broad purposes: ‘risk spreading, reputational maintenance, political resistance and continuity in reproduction’ (Aina, 2013, p. 13). With regards to political resistance, it is the philanthropic agency of ordinary Africans coupled with a ‘romantic humanitarian concern for the peoples of Africa’ by the African diaspora and other sympathisers that successfully mobilised resources to push for the decolonisation agenda (Contee, 1972, p. 14; Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014). After independence, Africa’s decolonisation project was picked up by the Organisation of African Unity through the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, with its special Africa Liberation Fund as arguably the first post-independence Pan-African institution that mobilised resources from both public/government and private sources from within and outside the continent. While evaluations on the efficacy of both the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa and the Africa Liberation Fund vary, there is agreement that these organs were instrumental in the ultimate liberation of the Southern African countries, chiefly due to the material generosity of other Africans as well as friends from beyond the continent (Stokke and Widstrand, 1973). An additional impetus for the transformation in magnitude and organisation of African philanthropy is illustrated by the continuity of colonial era philanthropic organisations offering welfare services across the continent especially in the context of the post-colonial state’s limited capacity to meet citizens’ needs. In addition, a variety of indigenous prosocial collectivist worldviews were adapted as the socio-philosophical leading edge of post-colonial African development, even as the legal frameworks for incentivising formal giving remained underdeveloped. Philanthropy also played a role in defusing the post-colonial governance and development crisis emerging out of the authoritarian regimes, the 1970s oil crisis, and the attendant commodity price collapse. Specifically, beginning in the late 1980s, philanthropy increasingly supported citizens as well as institutions behind the wave of mobilisations for democracy across the continent (Van Rooy, 1998).

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic

13

Drivers and Channels of Giving While African giving behaviour has undergone dramatic institutionalisation over the last few decades, the core agency and structure drivers of generalised giving behaviour are attributed to widespread precariousness and low state capacity to deliver welfare services and public goods, a situation which forces Africans to invest in collective well-being as a form of social insurance (Mati, 2020b). Giving behaviour is therefore both altruistic and self-interested (Aina and Moyo, 2013; Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005; Wilkinson-Maposa and Fowler, 2009; Fowler and Mati, 2019; Mati, 2020b). The performance of African economies over the last two decades is another factor contributing to changes in both giving behaviour and magnitude of the gifts. For two decades now, African economies have been among the fastest-growing in the world. This ‘Africa rising’ development narrative has seen several associated positive social and economic outcomes (August, 2013). First, is the growth of the middle class with disposable income and a willingness to give more (Mati, 2021a, 2020b), as well as High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) (Knight Frank, 2020) whose demonstrable outcome is the emergence of formal infrastructures for giving, especially foundations (OECD netFWD, 2017). In this regard, data from the Community Foundations Atlas for example shows that all but eight out of the 33 community foundations existing in Africa by 2021 were established in the last two decades.3 The emergence of infrastructure organisations has allowed a modest level of coordination in the sector. This has also helped raise the visibility of African philanthropy. Other drivers and channels of giving include faith and its associated institutions. Religious giving, embodied in charitable practices such as tithes in Christianity, Zakaat in Islam, tzedalah among Jews, and dana for Hindus, is ‘often oriented towards giving for its own sake’ because all religions so decree (Mati, 2020b, p. 10). Studies across various African countries report faith-based giving to be most prevalent (see for example Habib et al., 2008). An added impetus for change in some cases, comes from incentives in the legal and regulatory environment (Aina and Moyo, 2013; Mati, 2020b). In South Africa, for example, the King Reports on Corporate Governance and the B-BEE legislation require companies listed at the Johannesburg bourse to engage in and report their CSR (corporate social responsibility) activities (Wachira and Berndt, 2019). As a result, many companies have formed foundations or donate to charities. Similarly, in Mauritius the CSR law requires ‘all profitable businesses in Mauritius to contribute 2% of their profit towards CSR activities (CSR levy)’ resulting in philanthropy-related CSR practices being the norm rather than an exception (Ramdhony, 2017, p. i).

14

African philanthropy

In most African countries, however, there are no clear guidelines on CSR and companies are not obligated. The result is low uptake of philanthropy-related CSR activities as part of business ethos. In countries where CSR is a legal requirement, questions have been raised as to whether such initiatives are altruistic. An important observation here is that given their profit orientation, many CSR initiatives are geared towards corporate self-reproduction with programmes not always aligning to the most pressing needs of communities.4 As a result, there are calls for changes in regulations to increase corporate social investment towards social justice goals and a wealth tax in some of the countries – e.g. South Africa (Swingler, 2020). Even as African economies transform, Africans continue practising generalised horizontal philanthropy as social insurance against collective/shared adversity, while more wealthy individuals respond to the same environmental pressures by giving to the less fortunate (Mati, 2020b). As such, emergent institutions of formal giving coexist with impulsive as well as traditional reciprocal self-help and mutual aid-type prosocial practices. These ‘informal’ giving practices are the most prominent manifestation of African philanthropy (Yetu Initiative, 2018a, 2018b). A CAF (2019) ten-year aggregate of giving behaviour reports that nine African countries were in the top 50 in rankings for philanthropic behaviour of their citizens, with Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the top 20. Even in the midst of Covid-19, a more recent CAF Giving Index report indicated that four out of top ten most generous nations in 2020 were African, with Kenya at position two after Indonesia followed by Nigeria (3), Ghana (6). and Uganda (8) (CAF, 2021). Primary Areas of Interest for African Philanthropy Despite its ubiquity, the extent of horizontal African philanthropy is yet to be quantified. However, existing studies use proxies for determining giving behaviour. The CAF Giving Index for example, asks participants whether they have helped a stranger in the 12 months preceding the survey. Data on channels, sectoral spread, and quantity of African philanthropy is also not readily available. However, emergent data by Candid and East Africa Philanthropy Network (2020) for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania suggest that agriculture, fishing and forestry (in Kenya and Uganda), education (in Kenya), community and economic development (in Kenya and Uganda), human rights, public affairs and health sectors (Tanzania), and community and economic development (Uganda), receive the largest share of funding, while some other sectors do not receive much. This is consistent with other studies that indicate that local philanthropy programmes provide a range of services in education, health services, and even feeding programmes (Mukasa, 2011). Additionally, Candid and East Africa Philanthropy Network data (2020) suggests an inter-

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic

15

esting entanglement and circulation involving grant giving by African grant makers to organisations across the globe (Mati, 2021a, 2021b). In Table 2.1, we present part of this data on the proportion of funding to different development sectors in the three countries as indicative answers to the questions: What sectors are supported by African philanthropy? Are there certain sectors attracting more funds than others? What is the quantity (value) of philanthropic giving in Africa? The table suggests differing funding priorities in the three East African neighbours. The similarities and differences between these countries offer a glimpse of the impact of their post-independence governance and development trajectories. In this regard, Tanzania’s ujamaa5 resulted in the state playing a significant role in health, community and economic development, as well as education (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995). The relatively lesser investments by philanthropy organisations in these sectors in Tanzania may suggest existing continuities. On the other hand, Kenya, which embraced capitalism, has a prominent private sector and communities through Harambee6 resulting in both horizontal and vertical philanthropy. In keeping with an enhanced role of private voluntary initiatives in Kenya’s development trajectory, Kenyan philanthropists have supported education goals far more than their neighbours have. It is also interesting to note that in the region, Uganda’s human rights record in the last two decades has been poorer than its neighbours’. Philanthropists in Uganda have spent only a third of what their neighbours have invested in this concern. This could be a proxy for the existential threat philanthropies and civil society face; many do not dare venture into human rights and social justice issues. Instead, Ugandan philanthropists invest more in community and economic development than their neighbours; perhaps a factor of the years of political instability which destroyed many communities across that country. Tanzanian philanthropists underperform both Kenya and Uganda in the total dollar value of the grants.

MOBILISATIONS AGAINST CONTEMPORARY CRISES/DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES/NEEDS Two case studies are presented here which illustrate the complex web of connections and tensions in the practices, presences, and conceptions of philanthropy on the continent. In addition, they challenge the notion that Africa has been purely a ‘donor recipient’ by pointing to rich traditions of philanthropic practices in Africa (Mukasa, 2011). The first is ‘Kenyans for Kenya’, a country level mobilisation towards interventions in a humanitarian crisis occasioned by drought in Northern Kenya in 2011. The second is Africa Against Ebola Solidarity which illustrates the web of connections between African governments and private voluntary contributions, through a fund established by

494

1354

456

Health

Human rights

Human services

relations

International

Communications

91

100

61

Information and

350

Environment

204

76

66

Education

development

and economic

Community

Arts and culture

forestry

fishing, and

Agriculture,

Kenya

34

8

76

705

113

71

107

58

3

16

Tanzania

Total number of grants

of support

8

7

44

36

28

58

11

231

2

165

Uganda

2,900,000

1,200,000

4,900,000

13,900,000

6,400,000

508,714

18,400,000

15,900,000

492,869

278,966

70,560

1,600,000

15,500,000

2,800,000

1,200,000

1,800,000

769,792

29,380

292,550

($26.7M)

($75M) 18,500,000

Tanzania

Kenya

Total US$ value of grantsa

1,200,000

426,522

1,300,000

5,200,000

920,705

5,000,000

646,839

21,300,000

44,866

1,7,000,000

($35.3M)

Uganda

10

4

13

5

15

10

21

14

7

10

Kenya

1

2

3

3

3

3

4

4

7

3

Tanzania

Total number of funders

1

1

3

2

2

2

2

2

1

2

Uganda

66

54

238

498

160

51

98

123

40

45

Kenya

34

7

68

566

105

66

101

56

3

16

Tanzania

8

7

25

32

23

58

10

210

3

135

Uganda

Total number of grants recipients

Proportion of funding to different development fields/sector in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (2003–2019)

Thematic areas

Table 2.1

16 African philanthropy

291

5

29

Public safety

Religion

Science

Social sciences

Note: Source:

classified

44

5

0

3

0

0

33

99

343

0

0

0

3

43

1

3

1

Uganda

201,850

271,729

613,660

5,753

2,100,000

3,700,000

2,000,000

0

80,970

0

0

1,600,000

1,700,000

5,400,000

5,792

($26.7M)

($75M) 149,689

Tanzania

Kenya

Total US$ value of grantsa

0

0

0

299,345

643,750

25,000

153,533

75,309

($35.3M)

Uganda

3

4

5

4

7

6

5

3

Kenya

0

1

0

1

2

2

2

1

Tanzania

Total number of funders

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

Uganda

15

14

15

1

24

162

150

6

Kenya

0

3

0

0

5

91

304

5

Tanzania

0

0

0

3

4

1

3

1

Uganda

Total number of grants recipients

a The individual grant figures reported in the database do not add up to the aggregate total, suggesting accuracy issues with the source database. Candid and East Africa Philanthropy Network (2020), https://​phileastafrica​.org/​.

Unknown or not

recreation

3

372

Public affairs

Sports and

7

226

Philanthropy

Kenya

of support

Tanzania

Total number of grants

Thematic areas

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic 17

18

African philanthropy

a Pan-African institution. Both highlight a central role of new technological innovations in resource mobilisation, including the value of ‘less than a dollar philanthropy’ (small donations). The 2011 Kenyans for Kenya (K4K) Campaign: The Value of Trust Relationships and Less Than a Dollar Philanthropy The K4K fundraising campaign was in aid of communities ravaged by famine and drought in Northern Kenya in 2011. K4K demonstrates the power of collaboration between private and non-profit sectors especially in contexts where government is slow to respond and provide assistance. Specifically, failure of rains posed existential threats to millions of Kenyans and their livestock from July 2011 in Turkana County. After weeks of images of starving people in the media without the government responding, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) reached out to corporate leaders. Together, they began a corporate-non-profit partnership campaign that functioned without the state, where public trust, transparency, and accountability were pivotal especially for the micro-fundraising strategy of the campaign. The campaign raised over $11 million in both cash and in-kind in less than two months. The K4K initiative was driven by a steering committee comprising representatives from KRCS, Safaricom Foundation, Kenya Commercial Bank Foundation, Gina Din Corporate Communications, and the Media Owners Association. According to the Global Disaster Preparedness Centre (2014), the ‘involvement of Chief Executive Officers of the private sector companies elevated the perceived importance of the campaign and created ownership among the major donors’. Even then, over half of funds raised were donated by individuals giving USD 1 or less, with the initial fundraising target met within the first three weeks of the campaign. The Global Disaster Preparedness Centre (2014) indicates that building public trust was a necessary first step given the diversity of actors, to ensure that the initiative would not be hijacked for political positioning. In the course of the campaign, trust was enhanced through transparency and frequent feedback to the public. Fundraising success was achieved by using diverse methods that made it possible for different stakeholders to contribute. These included voluntary payroll deductions and use of the Mpesa mobile money transfer platform. In the end, it seems K4K succeeded because this partnership was between non-profit – the KRCS – and the private sector. This partnership legitimised the initiative that enabled Kenyans from different political persuasions, ethnicities, and classes to heed the call to rescue their own, despite deep political cleavages that had threatened to tear the country apart four years earlier. The success of K4K is attributed to the value of domestic fundraising, with acceptance of donations as low as less than a dollar (Global Disaster

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic

19

Preparedness Centre, 2014). Another factor was the application of a multiplicity of fundraising strategies, including the use of mobile technology platforms. This demonstrates that investment in the right technologies can yield success in resource mobilisation. An added factor was the role of KRCS in bringing together diverse actors from the private and non-profit sectors which leveraged relationships. Another key factor was sustained accountability to the public which created and maintained public buy-in, as well as the role media played in the campaign, resulting in the K4K campaign winning two awards: the Public Relations Campaign of the Year Award and the Not for Profit Campaign of the Year (Global Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2014). Ebola in West Africa and the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust is an example of African innovation in governance of pandemics. When Ebola struck several West African nations in 2013, the African Union, sensing laxity among the international community to respond, formed the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust under the auspices of the AU Foundation to mobilise resources to send healthcare workers from the continent to the Ebola affected areas. The Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust raised over US$34 million and dispatched 856 African health volunteer workers from 18 African countries to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust partnered with mobile technology companies in running an SMS campaign which allowed ordinary Africans to exercise generosity and take part in this continental effort and give support for this cause (Manlan, 2017). Like in the case of K4K above, the involvement of the African business community in Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust as a financing mechanism changed the narrative about health financing in Africa by harnessing the power of micro-donations from individuals across Africa though an SMS campaign (Manlan, 2017). The response to the Ebola outbreak also facilitated the forging and strengthening of a Pan-African solidarity approach to fighting pandemics with the establishment of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa-CDC) in 2017. This has been the blueprint in the interventions against Covid-19 (Swingler, 2020). Innovations springing from the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity campaign, especially digital platforms and banking innovations allowing micro-donations continue to allow Africans to ‘move money across the continent in a different way’. This has aided the Covid-19 response (Swingler, 2020). These micro-donation platforms offer opportunities for tapping and scaling of existing traditional models of pooling resources needed to weather the Covid-19 storm, but can also help move informal giving into formal space (Swingler, 2020).

20

African philanthropy

African Philanthropy’s Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic: Some Lessons from the Past A couple of observations can be made from past mobilisations. First, previous experiences in the responses to Ebola have informed part of the structuring of the Pan-African level responses. The African Union (AU), through Africa-CDC, established the AU Covid-19 Response Fund in April 2020 as a public/private initiative to mobilise resources to support a sustainable medical response, as well as to provide social welfare support to the most vulnerable populations on the continent (Nkuhlu, 2020; Africanews, 2020). The AU Covid-19 Response Fund also aimed at marshalling African resources and strengthening African solidarity in tackling this pandemic collaboratively (Nkuhlu, 2020). The AU Covid-19 Response Fund went a step further to recruit AU special envoys to help mobilise international support as well as solicit funds for Africa’s efforts (Nkuhlu, 2020). The AU Covid-19 Response Fund brought on board the necessary capital for collaborative procurement of medical supplies crucial to fighting Covid-19. Second, some countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya utilised lessons from the past in structuring their Covid-19 solidarity funds as a hybrid of state centred mobilisation of private resources to respond to the crisis. The African Union has used a similar approach in its establishment of the African Covid-19 Solidarity Fund. Third, past experiences of the use of mobile technologies in both K4K and the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust mobilisations for both large and small donations have been instrumental at both national and Pan-African level solidarity funds mobilisations against the current pandemic.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS African philanthropy is a complex interplay of contradictory practices hinged on voluntary agency. However, in times of crisis, boundaries between ‘pure’ voluntariness and state obligations are blurred especially when government or intergovernmental agencies assume the coordinating and resource mobilisation role. For academics this is an additional resource for interrogating constitutive elements of African philanthropy, especially under stress conditions. In addition, these practices exhibit potential lessons for those studying multi-stakeholder partnership processes for resourcing development such as those envisaged by SDG 17. As African philanthropy transforms, scholarly interest in the same has increased. A key focus of interrogation has been on its manifestations and how to build on traditions of gifting to attain ‘stronger institutional processes that scale up localized forms of giving and ground these in principles of social justice, equality, peace and sustainable development’ (Mukasa, 2011). This

African philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic

21

is because Africa’s ‘growth alone will not lead to inclusive development’ if social, economic and political inequalities and disparities in development processes and outcomes are not addressed (Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014, p. 65). African philanthropies are therefore advised that to be transformative, they need to embrace social justice-oriented investment approaches. Lessons from past experiences, such as mobile money transfers, have been useful in informing Covid-19 pandemic interventions, especially by accelerating fundamental changes in the way Africans give. In addition, they have helped demonstrate Afro-centric philanthropy’s contribution to Africa’s development challenges. A key lesson here is that, given the important role of corporations, philanthropists, and individuals, in catalysing interventions through emergent collaborative partnership models, there is a need to work towards strengthening values of transparency, inclusion and co-creation of the best suitable solutions.

NOTES 1.

2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

A recent report by the Bridgespan Group indicates that 45 large gifts made from March through December 2020 in Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, totalled roughly $269 million, suggesting a sea change in the volume of African large-scale giving (Bridgespan Group, 2021). Examples include the Haiti earthquake (2010), Cyclone Idai (2019), drought in Northern Kenyan (2011/12), Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2014–16) and even the SDGs (Mati, 2021a, Mati, 2021b; Mahomed et al., 2014). Community Foundations Atlas, Foundation Directory, https://​comm​unityfound​ ationatlas​.org/​explore/​#directory​=1​ |decade​=​0|continent​=​Africa (accessed 2 April 2021). Interviews with senior corporate foundations executives by this author in 2020 revealed that for some businesses their CSR programmes while meeting needs of beneficiaries, also play a deliberate self-reproduction role, exhibited in, for example, the in-kind donations of equipment such as computers and cellular phones by telecommunications companies, or banks requiring their beneficiaries to have bank accounts with them (Mati 2020d). Ujamaa was a socialist ideology that underpinned Julius Nyerere’s social and economic development policies in Tanzania. Harambee in Swahili means pulling together and refers to a Kenyan tradition of community self-help initiatives.

3. The role of philanthropy in supporting development through African multilateral institutions in crisis and non-crisis periods Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya INTRODUCTION The growing body of work on African philanthropy has thus far paid little attention to the relationship between African multilateral institutions and African philanthropies. Using the African Union (AU) and African Development Bank (AfDB) as case studies, the primary aim of this chapter is to present evidence on the institutional arrangements for managing relations between African multilaterals and philanthropies. This will lay the foundation for future research and theoretical analyses on the causes of variations in relations during crisis and non-crisis periods. The first section will give an overview of the theoretical approaches to African philanthropy, to define African philanthropy in the context of the topic. Section two will discuss the methodology employed in the research. Sections three and four will focus on the two African multilateral case studies to understand their experiences with African philanthropies in crisis and non-crisis periods. The institutional arrangements that enable or impede robust partnership with African philanthropies will emerge from this discussion. Thereafter, the concluding section will table recommendations on how to address institutional weaknesses through developing strategy, more effective governance, and transparency.

DEFINING AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY African philanthropy is not a new phenomenon, and its practice spans the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods (see Fowler, 2017; Fowler and Mati, 2019). For this chapter, which focuses on post-colonial multilateral institutions, the conceptual framework is located in post-colonial forms of 22

The role of philanthropy in supporting development through multilateral institutions

23

African philanthropy. Mati observes that ‘an emergent theme in some of the more recent works on the conceptualisation of contemporary African philanthropy is the question of its indigeneity’ (2016, pp. 41–42). Fowler (2017, p. 9) acknowledges the influence of external actors over time on the contemporary nature of African philanthropy. African philanthropy has thus become ‘a layered system of gifting that includes mixes and blending of endogenous and exogenous practices’. Given the endogenous and exogenous nature of contemporary African philanthropy ‘refers to philanthropic activities “by and for” Africans and is marked by the mobilization of local, national, and also external/transnational resources by Africans for the benefit of Africans’ (Mati, 2017, p. 42). Indigenous direct forms of African philanthropy or ‘traditional African philanthropy … involve direct giver-to-recipient giving and [are] devoid of institutional intermediation’ (Mati, 2017, p. 4). This can include giving of resources or time and giving is done by rich and poor alike, which is contrasted with formal giving which is done through institutional intermediaries such as foundations, trusts, community chests and corporate social responsibility in African companies. Such giving is an adaptation of Western formal institutional giving (Mati, 2017, p. 4). In this conceptualisation, the flow of giving is from those with economic means to those with less means. The institutionalisation of philanthropy is increasingly gaining traction in Africa. The 2020 Global Trends in Giving Report shows that 80 per cent of donors in Africa volunteer with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is the highest rate of this form of philanthropy in the world. The report further shows that financial givers in Africa give $100 or less (NPTechforGood, 2020). These two findings highlight that individual volunteering and financial contribution are key features of African giving, even if NGOs or other institutions act as institutional intermediaries. A key distinction between Western formal/institutionalised giving and its form in Africa is that with Western philanthropy, ‘in general money is first generated and in addition, due to legislation on how to spend money, the owners are somewhat obliged to then choose a cause to which they can give their money’ (Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014, p. 661). In contrast, African formal/institutionalised philanthropy is driven by a cause that rallies Africans together and leads to a conscious decision to collectively pursue that cause by pooling resources. This feature of African institutionalised philanthropy will become evident in the discussion of the two institutions in this chapter.

METHODOLOGY The study focuses on two African multilateral institutions, the African Union (AU) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). These institutions were

24

African philanthropy

selected since they are the only two continental multilateral organisations whose membership comprises all African countries. Their objectives are therefore the closest that one will find to a continental development consensus. For each multilateral institution, the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak and the ongoing Covid-19 crisis are selected as case studies to understand cooperation in crisis periods. For non-crisis periods, the AU Foundation is selected as a case study since it is to date the only AU institution that was created with the sole purpose of mobilising resources from African philanthropies in non-crisis periods. The African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD) is also a case study because it has a mandate to mobilise resources from partners, including philanthropies, towards implementing the first ten years of the AU’s fifty-year strategy. For the AfDB, partnerships with philanthropies are always handled centrally through the Resource Mobilisation and Partnerships department in the Bank, so the focus will be on the work of that department. Primary sources used include interviews and statutory documents from each institution. For the AU, an interview was conducted with the Africa Centres for Disease Control (CDC), given its centrality in managing health crises. Written responses were received from AUDA-NEPAD. Although numerous attempts were made to secure an interview with the Resource Mobilisation unit of the AU, these were not fruitful. The interview at the AfDB was conducted with the Resource Mobilisation and Partnerships department.

THE AFRICAN UNION The AU was officially launched in July 2002, as a successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Among its objectives is to ‘promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples’ (African Union, 2021a). The funding shortfalls are covered by development partners such as the European Union, the United Nations and non-African countries’ official development assistance (ODA), with the European Union as the biggest contributor. Philanthropies do not contribute to any of the three budget areas. The AU and African Philanthropies in Crisis Periods Cooperation during the Ebola crisis in West Africa The first case of the 2014 Ebola crisis was reported in December 2013 in Guinea but as it spread across West Africa, Europe, and the United States, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Ebola a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 8 August 2014. Subsequently, a military and civilian humanitarian mission comprising medical and military personnel,

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led by the AU, was deployed under the name African Union Support to Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA). Its mission was to prevent local and international transmission and to rebuild health systems (Musabayana, 2016). The AU’s response to Ebola elicited philanthropic responses from the African private sector, foundations, and individuals. The private sector To support ASEOWA, the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust (AAEST) was established by members of the African private sector who had convened a Business Roundtable on 8 November 2014. By registering the Trust in Mauritius with a governance structure that included private sector advisory board members, all funds were channelled through a Mauritian bank account, not through the AU. The total amount pledged to ASEOWA through the AAEST was USD 34,150,000, of which USD 23,150,000 was from the private sector.1 The AAEST to ASEOWA represents 30 per cent of the total funds invested in deploying health workers from other African countries, and it became the single largest contribution to ASEOWA, exceeding those of international development partners (AAEST, 2016, p. 19). Individual philanthropy There were two significant contributions from individual Africans. The first was the contribution of health professionals who volunteered their services from across Africa (Table 3.1). In one of its reports, the AU captured the sentiments expressed by a village elder to a journalist, which reflects that solidarity in the actions of volunteers was not lost on the citizens of the affected countries, ‘I don’t know how to thank you people. It was our African brothers and sisters who came here to look after us. They walked in the bushes to look for us, to treat us and to stop further infection’ (Musabayana, 2016). The second level of individual philanthropy was channelled through the #AfricaAgainstEbola SMS Campaign. The campaign was initiated by the African telecommunications sector in December 2014 and was implemented in 42 countries. Through the campaign, African citizens donated $1 per SMS supporting the AU Ebola response. The telecommunications network companies encouraged donations via AfricaAgainstEbola and used prominent African personalities to endorse it through their own contributions. In total, the campaign generated $34 million, which was channelled to the AAEST (EQUINET, 2015, p. 3). Community giving There is another critical element of horizontal giving that received little recognition until later in the epidemic – the contribution of community organisations (EQUINET, 2015, p. 7). International financial and human resources

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Table 3.1

African health worker volunteers by country Country

Number of volunteers

Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, AU direct recruitment

Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Ghana,

(individual volunteers)

Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania,

88

Uganda and Zimbabwe Seconded volunteers

Democratic Republic of Congo Ethiopia

184

Kenya

170

Nigeria

197

South Africa WAHO/ECOWAS

Source:

82

19

Regional

122

Total

862

AAEST (2016, p. 13).

would have fallen significantly short were it not for the work of community organisations who gave their time towards grassroots mobilising. Overcoming the barrier of social denial and aggression towards volunteers in Liberia is attributed to the groundwork of community volunteers (EQUINET, 2015, p. 7). Epidemiologists recognised community practices like handwashing and safe burial as key in reducing and ultimately eliminating the number of cases reported in all three countries. Popularising these measures involved a range of community leaders. In some cases, such as in Telimele district in Guinea, they organised themselves into crisis committee religious, community and political leaders (EQUINET, 2015, p. 7). Cooperation during the Covid-19 Crisis The first case of Covid-19 was reported in China in November 2019. By March 2020, there were 118,000 cases in 114 countries, 4,291 people had lost their lives, and the WHO had declared Covid-19 a pandemic (WHO, 2020a). In Africa, the first case was reported in February 2020 in Algeria (WHO, 2020b). The AU called for the continent’s response to be ‘based on international solidarity and Pan Africanism’ (African Union, 2020, p. 48). In the same month, African ministers convened and adopted the ‘Africa Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 Outbreak’ to prevent severe illness and death and minimise

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socio-economic disruptions in Member States (African Union, 2020, p. 48). The strategy also positioned the Africa Centres for Disease Control (CDC) at the centre of managing the continental response (African Union, 2020, p. 48). In March 2020, Chinese businessman and philanthropist Jack Ma delivered a sizeable donation to the AU through the Africa-CDC, which included 1.5 million laboratory diagnostic test kits and over 100 tons of infection prevention and control commodities (Africa-CDC, 2020). Reflecting on this donation, the CEO of Ecobank Foundation in Togo, Carl Manlan, lamented that ‘African-based philanthropy lacked not only these resources but the infrastructure to elicit and manage this scale of giving’ (Swingler, 2020). He further called for non-fragmentation of solidarity funds across the continent and instead called for Ebola to be used as a blueprint for a continental response (Swingler, 2020). He observed that the Ebola response had helped link or connect High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) and community involvement. An example of this was the SMS campaign which spurred foundations and HNWIs to look more closely at community involvement through ‘micro-donations’ (Swingler, 2020). What is noteworthy about Manlan’s statement is that it legitimises the role of the AU as a facilitator of pan-African philanthropy and reflects the need for a more centralised coordination platform in response to a problem that transcends national borders. Equally important is that it draws the attention of philanthropic institutions to the significant role of community actors in philanthropy. Through the leadership of then AU Chair President Cyril Ramaphosa, the AU Covid-19 Response Fund was established. To crowd in private sector contributions, the AU contributed $12.5 million seed funding. There is no transparency on the AU or the CDC’s website to indicate how much has been paid into the Fund and who the contributors are. Like the Ebola fund, the Covid-19 Response Fund’s contributions are not channelled directly through the AU’s bank accounts. Dedicated bank accounts have been opened in various African banks. The governing structure that provides oversight is a Board of Trustees appointed by the Bureau of the AU Heads of State and Government, with the Director of the Africa-CDC acting as the secretary and various stakeholders, including philanthropies, represented. The AU and African Philanthropies in Non-Crisis Periods The AU has a fragmented approach to mobilising resources from philanthropies. For example, at least three platforms through which philanthropic resources are mobilised could be identified. The African Union Foundation (AUF) was launched in 2015 to ‘mobilise resources from the private sector, philanthropists, individuals, donors within Africa, the Diaspora and globally’ (AU, 2021b). The Resource Mobilisation unit within the Strategic Planning,

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Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation and Resource Mobilisation Directorate at the AU Commission has the responsibility to ‘mobilise resources from development partners and allocate them for programme implementation’ (AU, 2021c). The AUDA-NEPAD is tasked with ‘brokering partnerships and resource mobilisation for the implementation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063’ (AU, 2021c). Based on responses from both the Africa-CDC and the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), there was no sense that there is a clear, uniform strategy for managing cooperation with African philanthropies among the AU’s agencies. The AU Foundation The most structured approach that the AU has taken to crowd in funds from philanthropy is the African Union Foundation (AUF). In its 2013 decision to create this institution, the AU Assembly of Heads of State called on ‘Member States, private sector, donors, philanthropists, and individuals to contribute towards the Foundation to ensure its operationalization’ (AU, 2013, p. 1). The AUF was meant to convene Member States and African philanthropies to discuss development challenges and define common causes around which to rally giving. From the onset, it was conceptualised as a vehicle to attract different types of philanthropy. The Chairperson of the AU Commission at the time of the AUF’s launch, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, illustrated this vision when she said: The Foundation will strive to more deeply engage Africa’s private sector, African individuals and communities, and leading African philanthropists to generate resources and provide valuable insight on ways in which their success can accelerate Africa’s development. The issue of domestic and alternative sources of funding has been an intrinsic element of the continent’s commitments of the Pan-African values of self-determination, solidarity and self-reliance. (TEF, 2014)

However, the AUF appears to have lost momentum. A flagship initiative that it had pioneered was the Africa Economic Platform (AEP). In his foreword to the report of the inaugural AEP which was held in Mauritius in 2017, the Chief Operations Officer of the AUF, Dumisani Mngadi, wrote, ‘The African Economic Platform (AEP) is an annual platform for frank discussions between heads of state, African business leaders, academics and youth to discuss development across Africa’ (AU, 2017a, p. 3). But the 2017 AEP was to be the first and last of its kind. The AUF was closely associated with Dlamini-Zuma and it lost momentum upon her departure. The failure of the AUF speaks to the challenges of initiatives being associated with the visions of the organisation’s leaders during their terms. The result of the AUF losing momentum is that

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agencies like the Africa-CDC and AUDA-NEPAD must create avenues to access philanthropies. The Africa-CDC This section is based on inputs from the interview with the Director of the CDC, Dr John Nkengasong. The Africa-CDC was officially launched in January 2017 and started drafting its five-year strategic plan in March 2017. Its first philanthropic partner was the Gates Foundation, which did not directly contribute funds but paid for the secondment of strategists from consulting firm McKinsey to assist the CDC Director to formulate its strategy. African philanthropies have yet to come on board as contributors in non-crisis periods. Nkengasong attributes this absence of African philanthropies to insufficient knowledge of the Africa-CDC among these stakeholders. In part, this is due to crises that have consumed the CDC’s time in the short space of its existence. Nkengasong says it is incumbent on the organisation to make its non-crisis work better understood, elevate the critical importance of investment in continental health security, and demonstrate the added value that the CDC can deliver in tackling these health challenges. Prior to Covid-19, the CDC had started discussions with Ethiopian Airlines and plans to actively engage philanthropies across the continent. The CDC was also in the process of undertaking a partners’ mapping exercise before its response to Covid-19 stalled that initiative. It plans to resume this exercise as a way of reflecting more deeply on the value that can be derived from African philanthropies. Based on experiences during recent crises, it sees African philanthropies as being quick to act, with streamlined processes. The CDC is further contemplating developing governance structures that will appeal to African philanthropies and will draw lessons from other institutions like the African Public Health Foundation, which is domiciled in Mauritius but has a secretariat in Kenya. This would harness the interface with the private sector philanthropies to liaise directly and avoid being stuck in the AU’s bureaucracy. AUDA-NEPAD This section is based on written responses that were received from the AUDA-NEPAD secretariat. AUDA-NEPAD sees itself as presenting a platform that philanthropies would not ordinarily have on their own. NEPAD would like to tap more into the potential of CSIs among African corporates. In their view, CSI units often have resources but insufficient ‘evidence-based objectives’, which ultimately leads to low impact. In this instance, multilateral

30

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institutions can give access to ‘an enabling ecosystem’ that gives wider reach and greater impacts. Although AUDA-NEPAD has a long history of partnering with multisectoral partners, partnerships with philanthropies appear limited, even less so with African philanthropies. The examples of partnerships cited in their response were ‘Move Africa’ and the ‘African Medicines Regulatory Harmonisation (AMRH)’ initiative. However, there is only one philanthropic organisation that is a partner in the AMRH, the Gates Foundation. No African philanthropies are present (AUDA-NEPAD, 2021a). For the Move Africa initiative, the partners are the AfDB and the UN (AUDA-NEPAD, 2021b). AUDA-NEPAD does not have a structured engagement with philanthropies for priority setting, although they have ‘strategic consultative and planning meetings’ but these are not necessarily annual or scheduled. It also does not see the need to discuss policy with African philanthropies since AUDA-NEPAD itself ‘does not design policies, it implements the policies and decisions developed by the African Union Commission’. Nevertheless, the Agency sees itself as a resource mobilization platform and a cultivator of partnerships, including philanthropic giving.

THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK Current Mandate The 1963 Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group states that the Bank’s purpose is ‘to contribute to the sustainable economic development and social progress of its regional members individually and jointly’ (AfDB, 2016). This is done through loans, grants, policy advice and technical assistance to African countries (AfDB, 2021a). The Bank lends through non-concessional loans for middle income countries in the AfDB, and concessional loans and grants for low-income countries through the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund. Currently, most of the Bank’s African borrowers – 38 of the 54 African member countries – borrow through concessional instruments (ADF, 2021). Financial Resources The Bank generates financial resources from the capital subscription of its Member States. Each country assumes a percentage of shareholding, depending on its financial capability and availability of shares. As of 31 December 2019, the paid-up portion of the Bank’s capital (capital that has actually been paid) was UA 4.950 million2 (AfDB, 2019, p. 5). It is critical for the Bank to retain a high rating since it leverages the capital raised from its members to

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borrow from the capital markets. The Bank’s current rating is AAA, which allows it to borrow at low interest rates and to on-lend at low interest rates to African countries. Structures and Governance The Bank opened membership to non-African countries in 1984 to increase the number of resources available for lending, although African countries retain majority shareholding to maintain the Bank’s ‘African character’. The highest decision-making body of the Bank is the Board of Directors, which comprises 13 African and 7 non-African Directors. The next section will discuss how the Bank’s mandate and governance impact its engagements with philanthropies during crisis and non-crisis periods. It is based on an interview with the Director for Resource Mobilisation and Partnerships, Dr Desiree Vencantachellum. Crisis Periods Cooperation with African philanthropies during the Ebola crisis The Bank generally ‘leverages its balance sheet to respond to crises’. The AfDB was the third largest donor to the Ebola crisis, after the United States and the World Bank. Then Bank President Dr Donald Kaberuka called for greater philanthropic involvement in the response to Ebola, saying ‘We need medical volunteers to offer their services, we need Africans to pledge financial assistance, or support in whatever capacity that they can in order to help their fellow Africans who are suffering right now’ (AfDB, 2017). However, there is no evidence that the Bank partnered directly with philanthropies on Ebola. Whereas the AU received funds from philanthropies, the Bank was also a contributor to the AU-led ASEOWA mission through its financial pledges to the AAEST fund. Independently, the Bank used its funding instruments to focus on three main areas: building human resource capacity and systems for epidemic preparedness and response, developing infrastructure, and strengthening governance and regional institutions (AfDB, 2014). With a focus on future pandemics, the Bank also contributed towards the establishment of the Africa-CDC. While finances have proven not to be a problem for the AfDB, the importance of horizontal philanthropy has become apparent. An evaluation conducted by the Bank’s Independent Development Evaluation unit (IDEV) on the Bank’s response to Ebola, focused on two key projects for which there was sufficient documentation to conduct an evaluation: technical assistance to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia; and the Strengthening West African Public Health Systems project. Two of the key lessons and recommendations from the

32

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evaluation stand out: (i) active community consultation, engagement, social mobilisation, and proper analysis of the social environment contribute to good project design; (ii) country ownership and empowerment of local organisations through community engagement and social mobilisation are key for the success of any project that operates in the community (AfDB, 2021b, p. 2). Since the Bank is not an implementor of projects and implementation bids are subject to a competitive process, it needs to build the requirement for implementation through community organisations into its bidding requirements. Cooperation with African philanthropies during the covid-19 crisis Like its response to the Ebola crisis, the Bank’s relationship with philanthropies during Covid-19 differed from that of the AU in that the AU crowded in funds from philanthropies while the Bank was the source of funds. In July 2020, it approved a $27.4 million grant to the AU, of which $26.03 million would help to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Africa-CDC to respond to public health emergencies across the continent, while the balance of $1.37 million was contributed to the AU Covid-19 Response Fund (WHO, 2020c). The Bank further initiated other measures from its own resources such as a US$10 billion Crisis Response Facility (AfDB, 2020a), a US$3 billion social bond, and US$2 million towards the WHO for emergency assistance. Cooperation with African Philanthropies in Non-Crisis Periods The AfDB’s engagement with all philanthropies is centralised within the Directorate of Resource Mobilisation and Partnerships. This directorate is responsible for managing all non-concessional lending. In 2012, AfDB management decided to standardise the process of screening and approving new partnerships. This culminated in the creation of the Standing Committee on Partnerships (AfDB, 2012, p. 1). The Bank is a member of the African Philanthropy Forum (APF) but its interaction with those philanthropies has not gained much traction. There are two main vehicles through which the AfDB partners with philanthropies for development projects – trust funds and non-financial cooperation. There are single-donor and multi-donor trust funds. Prior to 2015, philanthropies did not partner with the Bank. This changed when the Bank partnered with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The partnership has grown from an initial amount of $2.5 million in 2015 to $120 million in 2021. Since then, other trust funds have been established with non-African philanthropies such as the Rockefeller and Mastercard foundations. The AfDB does not have any trust funds established with African philanthropic organisations.

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Governance Considerations There are two key considerations for the Bank in its establishment of partnerships with philanthropies: (i) governance standards within the philanthropic organisation and (ii) the willingness of that organisation to allow the AfDB Board of Directors to take decisions without representation of that institution in the decision-making structures of the AfDB. The Bank has historically worked closely with funds channelled through official development assistance (ODA) agencies of Western governments. This has proven less cumbersome as ODA partners channel their resources through the Bank because they are familiar with its track record and reputation for good governance plus top rating. Philanthropies, on the other hand, often want to have a bigger say in how the Bank channels resources. All trust funds must be approved by the AfDB’s governance structures. The director of resource mobilization and external finance observes that part of the challenge for African philanthropies is that most are new, and their systems lack the sophistication of sound financial governance. The problem with poor governance becomes pronounced when the AfDB has to co-finance projects with these institutions. The scrutiny that the Bank faces to maintain its high rating requires the highest level of fiduciary standards, even when it is not the sole project funder. Therefore, the AfDB conducts solid due diligence on their potential partners and some African philanthropies may be found wanting. The Bank requires use of its own reporting processes but where its due diligence demonstrates sound governance on the part of the philanthropic organisation, the Bank may make an exception for that institution’s reporting to be used. Reporting must be in line with the Bank’s reporting and auditing standards. Whereas the trend in partnership with non-African philanthropies has been co-investment, there was a different approach with the Tony Elumelu Foundation, the only existing example of a partnership with an African philanthropic organisation that could be identified . Where the AfDB feels that a philanthropic organisation has a certain comparative advantage in delivering to intended beneficiaries, it will channel resources through that organisation. However, that organisation will have to bid competitively with other potential implementors. For example, the partnership with the Tony Elumelu Foundation is intended to create jobs for youth. Through this partnership, the funds flow from the Bank to the Foundation through a $5 million grant to scale up the outreach and impact of the Tony Elumelu Foundation’s Entrepreneurship Programme. In this case, the Foundation acts as an implementing agency (AfDB, 2019). The Foundation still had to bid to be the implementor, despite also putting its resources towards the initiative. On the Bank’s philanthropic interface with the African private sector, there is no dynamic engagement on corporate social investments (CSI) initiatives.

34

African philanthropy

Private sector projects presented at the Bank often have financial and economic/developmental return on investment (ROI). When evaluating projects, the Bank’s project evaluation committee only scores the projects on financial ROI. The Bank has minimal interaction with philanthropy in the form of CSI. It is usually limited to proposals for bank-funded projects, where companies say that they will allocate a certain portion of their funding to CSI projects. This is often insignificant relative to the total envelope borrowed from the Bank.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION African Union Develop an unfragmented strategy The AU does not appear to have a clear strategy for engaging with African philanthropies. The multiple loci of resource mobilisation portray a duplication of effort that could potentially exhaust philanthropies who may be repeatedly approached by various agencies of the same institution. A strategy that will include a single point of engagement should be considered. Integrate community organisations In their opinion piece for the Econet Foundation, Kalondo and Manlan (2020) wrote, ‘the epidemic redefined the social contract between African citizens, its diaspora as well as its continental leadership. Keeping people safe was only made possible because policy and politics connected to the reality in our communities. Rebuilding trust was at the centre of the response.’ The role of community organisations, including diaspora organisations, needs to be clearly articulated in the AU’s strategy for engaging African philanthropies. Channels for this engagement should also be defined. Tax incentives for pan-African philanthropic giving In some jurisdictions, like South Africa, tax incentives are legislated to increase philanthropic spending from CSI. Lessons can be learned from the European Union’s experience with attempts to extend domestic tax benefits to the continental level. This exercise should be led by African philanthropic organisations. In Europe, philanthropic network organisations have published an advocacy document on the standardisation of continental tax regulations to promote cross-border philanthropy in the region. The principle is that ‘Member States must award equal tax concessions to charities based in other Member States where the foreign charities can be shown to be “comparable” to domestic organisations holding charitable tax status’ (EFC, 2017, p. 5). Unlike the European Union where continental institutions have legislative powers, in

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the African context agreement would have to be reached at the AU Assembly level and ratified at domestic level for implementation. Crisis vs non-crisis periods Through the Ebola and Covid-19 crises, the AU has solidified its credibility as a platform for mobilising pan-African philanthropic responses. A significant component of this is that special governance structures are set up to administer funds, parallel to the existing AU structures. The boards of these funds have representatives from some of the contributing philanthropies and are not channelled through the AU’s bank accounts. This appears to be a result of the governance weaknesses within the AU that do not generate confidence in its systems. As recently as 2021, a forensic audit of the AU confirmed allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement at the AU (Adorboe, 2021). This could explain why it is more difficult for the institution to attract resources in non-crisis periods where the governance structures that are relied on are those of the AU. This is further evident in the Africa-CDC’s consideration to establish another structure where it will have ongoing non-crisis partnership with philanthropies outside of the AU’s governance structures, with a specialised secretariat. While the AU resolves its internal governance issues, the idea of reviving the AU Foundation should be considered. This should be accompanied by similar governance arrangements where philanthropic funding is sought for specific projects, with defined timeframes, agreed reporting with philanthropies, and joint governance at board level. This would instil more confidence among philanthropies that their resources will be well-managed. Reporting and transparency The AU should disaggregate annual reporting and make it public to show trends in the contribution of African philanthropies towards the institution. Such reporting would assist in engagements with non-contributing philanthropies to show annual trends and normalise contributing to the AU. Another area of reporting where the AU needs to improve is in making public the information on the funds received in times of crisis, as well as how they are spent. Lessons may be drawn from the United Nations Development Programme’s Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office live dashboard of funds received, disbursed and remaining. This tool would allow any African, whether an individual contributor through SMS micro-donations or a large corporate, to monitor how funds are spent (UNDP, 2021).

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AfDB Commission study on the African philanthropic ecosystem Although the AfDB has increased its partnerships with non-African philanthropies, it has yet to find a distinguishing rationale for building partnerships with African philanthropies. The Bank should consider commissioning a study on the African philanthropy landscape, its unique characteristics and how these can be complementary to the Bank’s objectives. Lessons can be learnt from other multilateral development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which commissioned a study in 2015 titled Potential and Prospects for Philanthropy in Implementing Post-2015 Development Goals (Chia, 2015). A similar study would assist the Bank to define the conceptual and practical potential of unlocking more resources for funding developmental priorities through African philanthropies. Bringing CSI into project design With the AU’s lending targeted at African companies, this creates room for strengthening African philanthropic giving through project design. While the commercial elements of a project are naturally a priority from a Bank financial sustainability point of view, the developmental case is also critical to measuring the Bank’s fulfilment of its developmental mandate. Therefore, the Bank should consider reviewing its project appraisal weighting. This is particularly important in ADF projects that are targeted at poor countries through concessional financing. The Bank could go even further to leverage its resources as co-financier to scale up some of those projects. For non-concessional borrowing countries, there is also room for using philanthropic resources to crowd in commercial resources. During the interview, Vencatachellum agreed that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation-Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC)’s Principles for Unlocking Commercial Finance provide some useful guidelines on how to do this through blended finance. The OECD defines blended finance as ‘the strategic use of development finance for the mobilisation of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries … [which] includes Official Development Finance as well as private funds that are governed by a development mandate e.g. financing provided by philanthropic organisations’ (OECD, 2018a, p. 4). In the context of the AfDB and African philanthropy, this entails corporates using their CSI budgets or foundations using their grant funding to make grants towards projects that the Bank could finance through further non-concessional loans. Alternatively, the concessional funds from philanthropies could be used towards project preparation (which is usually a minimum of 10 per cent of a project) to bring projects to bankability, which could then crowd in the Bank and other commercial lenders.

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Piloting an African philanthropy trust fund More meaningful participation from African philanthropies can be facilitated through the AfDB, where it can leverage its balance sheet to bring scale and potentially greater impact. The transaction costs of setting up trust funds would not warrant doing so with philanthropies that have small resources. However, the AfDB should consider piloting a multi-donor trust fund that crowds in various African philanthropies. But cooperation should not only focus on financial contributions. Contributions in the form of technical assistance, which falls within the Bank’s mandate, should be accommodated. Conclusion The African Union and African Development Bank represent the largest continental multilateral platforms for forging an African development consensus. However, to secure greater contributions from African philanthropies towards this consensus, these institutions must clearly define a cause that will rally Africans together. The philanthropic contributions of Africans in times of crisis demonstrate that where there is a clear cause, albeit externally defined by an emergency, African philanthropy is amenable to using continental multilateral platforms in the interests of solidarity. What is lacking is a similar consensus in non-crisis periods. The chapter has identified the institutional weaknesses that give rise to this. It has concluded by providing recommendations on how to address these institutional weaknesses through developing strategy, more effective governance and transparency.

NOTES 1. 2.

The balance was from the Africa Export and Import Bank and the AfDB. UA 1: US$1.44.

4. The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa Keratiloe Sishoma Mogotsi, Wycliffe Nduga Ouma and Bhekinkosi Moyo INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND What started as infections in Wuhan, China in late 2019 quickly morphed worldwide causing death, destruction, and changing livelihoods. As of March 2021, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa-CDC) reported over 4 million confirmed cases of Covid-19, and more than 100,000 deaths in Africa. The pandemic led to loss of lives and livelihoods, including losses in income, employment, and many others. Working from home further exposed several disparities in the world. While it was possible for some professions to quickly adjust to the new world, a huge population was either unable or unequipped to work virtually. Advocacy Accelerator (2020) reported that over 75 per cent of advocacy organisations in Africa had to re-strategise and adapt to working virtually. The decline in economic activities across the globe led to initiatives such as the Solidarity Fund in South Africa and ‘M-Changa’ in Kenya to raise awareness and mobilise resources to support communities (CAF, 2020). African economies were predicted to shrink by 1.4 per cent in GDP and experience 5 per cent decline in public revenue losses, with merchandise exports declining by 17 per cent (Gondwe, 2020). Disasters such as cyclones, earthquakes, droughts, and famines, among others, have previously occurred. However, Covid-19 has been evidently different in magnitude of impact. In the past, Africa has battled HIV and the Ebola pandemics, with the latest Ebola cases reported in Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea at the beginning of 2021. Inevitably, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic will take many years to reverse especially for low-income communities in Africa (Ngwenya and Naude, 2016). As with other disasters, there was an increase in giving across the world demonstrating human generosity. At the beginning of the pandemic (end of March 2020), Candid (2020a) reported that philanthropic dona38

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

39

tions were already approaching $3 billion, surpassing responses in previous disasters. Responding to the dearth of literature on how disasters affect civil society organisations (CSOs) especially in Africa (Rogers, 2015; CAF, 2020), the current study investigates the effects of Covid-19 on CSOs in the continent. Public administration and philanthropy literature has largely neglected the contribution of CSOs during disasters (Eikenberry et al., 2007). This study further discusses other developments such as the shifts in funding, changes in processes and policies, use of technology as well as the challenges and opportunities presented by Covid-19.

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES Covid-19 mobilised the third sector in response to the pandemic (EAPN, 2021). A consensus was quickly established that curtailing the spread, saving lives and livelihoods, and providing longer-lasting solutions were major priorities. Although CSOs have responded to pandemics in the past, literature on how these pandemics have affected CSOs is lacking. While the pandemic disrupted CSOs’ conventional practice and operations, it was also a catalytic moment to adopt non-traditional responses. Ranging from small fund drives to large-scale crowdfunding efforts, philanthropy and civil society were involved in several innovations. To this end, the chapter strives to: • evaluate the overall impact of Covid-19 on CSOs, • explore the impact of the pandemic on CSOs’ ability to mobilise resources, and • investigate policies adopted by CSOs to adapt to the new working environment.

CONSTRUCTS, CONCEPTS, AND THEORIES In Africa, CSOs have significantly contributed to the fight against the pandemic. CSOs were widely exposed to the consequences of Covid-19. For example, CSOs in South Africa mobilised food parcels and supported the Solidarity Fund to reach the vulnerable members of communities. In East Africa, 41.9 per cent of CSOs re-focused their activities and funding to Covid-19 responses (EAPN, 2021). The MacArthur Foundation’s Nigeria office contributed more than $900,000 to support various causes targeting Covid-19, ranging from surveillance, prevention, and clinical management, to expanding testing capacity and purchasing personal protective equipment, among others (MacArthur Foundation, 2020).

40

African philanthropy

Covid-19 demanded a swift and strict response to curtail the spread of the virus, prompting many authorities across the globe to institute strict measures. These responses, despite their good intentions had far-reaching ramifications. Previous health disasters in the continent such as HIV, TB, cholera, Ebola, and malaria, among others, provided lessons for the continent’s populace on how to mobilise volunteers and resources towards disasters. Strict measures necessitated by Covid-19 should have been informed by these lessons and the multifaceted nature of problems in Africa (Kluge et al., 2020). As Kluge et al. (2020) report, the presence of these health problems in Africa increased the danger of multi-morbidity in the continent, and concomitantly exacerbated the spread of the virus. However, the delicate socio-economic situation in the continent led to resistance to the closure of economic activities. The unprecedented socio-economic consequences of the pandemic in Africa cannot be adequately mitigated by the public sector only. Several African economies are plagued by budgetary deficits and inefficient allocation of public resources in addressing the population’s needs. The civil society ecosystem plays an integral role in complementing governments in the provision of healthcare, education, and meeting many other basic needs. Many CSOs were hampered in responding to the growing demand for these services during the pandemic by financial constraints. Covid-19 also exposed them to unanticipated interruptions thereby adversely impacting their work with communities.

HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF DISASTERS AND PANDEMICS ON CSOs CSOs are the beacon of hope in helping disaster victims and assisting governments to provide aid (Hartz, 2017). In Africa, local CSOs and international NGOs like Action Aid, Oxfam, and Gift of the Givers, for example, use philanthropic funds to manage disasters and save lives. CSO studies done elsewhere suggest the existence of inefficiencies and waste during disasters (Von Meding et al., 2009). Political leaders and governments as the primary actors during disasters (Mubah, 2013), find it difficult to handle the numerous dynamics. This in turn creates complexities for CSOs to respond (Boin and Lodge, 2016). CSOs struggle to raise funding for reconstruction, relocating and restoring lives (Hidayat and Egbu, 2010). In the USA, Hurricane Katrina not only caused tremendous destruction but also posed bureaucratic challenges for coordination and cooperation between federal, state, local government, private and the non-profit sector (Eikenberry et al., 2007). Any response efforts to a disaster must account for CSOs and plan accordingly as their involvement is inevitable (Eikenberry et al., 2007). Coordination amongst these organisations is also vital (Zakour and Gillespie, 1998). The local politics and cultural differ-

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

41

ences deeply impacted relief efforts during Hurricane Katrina which affected thousands of people (Aeberhard, 2008). In Zimbabwe, during cyclone Idai, aid became politicised resulting in time delays in delivery of goods to people in need (CAPSI, 2019). In South Korea, mistakes by CSOs negatively impacted disaster management as most of the relief organisations were not typically based in the affected areas (Ha, 2016). Communities and the people affected were not integrated well into the relief plans. Some of the reasons for this included budgetary constraints (Ha, 2016, p. 374). The Covid-19 pandemic therefore presented a momentous challenge to many players in the CSO ecosystem. Civil society’s survival is at risk if support is not provided to ensure that CSOs continue to play a crucial role in the post-Covid-19 rebuilding efforts (Bates and Denysschen, 2020). Johnson et al. (2021) argue that the severity of the Covid-19 pandemic critically threatened the ability of the non-profit sector to provide services and generate revenue. Many restrictions imposed by authorities limited the ability of CSOs to raise funds.

THE IMPACTS OF COVID-19 Even though the Covid-19 crisis began as a health threat, it morphed into an economic and political threat (Oldekop et al., 2020; Greer et al., 2020). Therefore, lack of compliance as well as politicisation and polarisation resulting from Covid-19 measures exacerbated the spread and exposed countries to greater risks (Hart et al., 2020; Rothgerber et al., 2020). Other impacts such as an increase in domestic violence (Kofman and Garfin, 2020), and the proliferation of mental health-related problems (Pfefferbaum and North, 2020), among others, have since been reported. African CSOs and Covid-19 CSOs rely on fundraising and donations to carry out their activities. Yet, one of the measures to curtail the spread of the virus was limiting movements and closure of activities. As a result, most CSOs were forced to lay off staff, reallocate expenses to support virtual setups, cut down some operations, and take on Covid-19 related operations (EAPN, 2021). Despite the dangers of this new terrain, some CSOs engineered operations and decentralised their activities by adopting measures such as online conferencing, meetings, and online campaigns among others. While many CSOs focusing on education and school feeding programmes closed their services due to mandatory lockdown restrictions, other organisations operating in health experienced an increase in demand for their services. The FoodClique

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African philanthropy

Support Initiative, a CSO established in Nigeria in 2012 for hunger alleviation and school feeding programmes, pivoted its operations to include access to healthcare for testing and treatment and ensuring social distancing measures. Many of the organisations adapted their operations to include the provision of health services to cope with the urgent needs, and also to attract Covid-19 funds. In Kenya, the Zana Africa Foundation concerned with menstrual health management among teenage girls in schools altered their educational content to include support to adolescent girls while at home. The organisation developed a new behaviour change communications series dubbed ‘Nia at Home’ which offered a set of five educational comics designed to improve the health and resilience of girls throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. Some of the preventive measures initiated by African governments had undesirable effects not just on African societies generally, but also on CSOs across the continent (Transparency International, 2020). The most common challenges include loss of funding, and operational and structural changes. Many CSOs were exposed to external shocks due to their dependence on external financing. One survey indicated that up to 98 per cent of CSOs in Africa reported significant disruption of their operations due to Covid-19 (EpicAfrica, 2020). The report further detailed that over 55 per cent of CSOs in Africa lost funding, while about 66 per cent expected to lose funding in the next three to six months. In East Africa alone, 89 per cent of CSOs experienced disruptions in funding, with 42 per cent suffering from severe declines in funding (EAPN, 2021). Covid-19 also compelled CSOs to adopt technology they had not used before. The EpicAfrica report indicated that over 71 per cent of African CSOs did not have technical measures in place to support work from home. EAPN (2021) reported that 72 per cent of CSOs initiated remote working arrangements with some donors which required expenditures in data and technology. Social Origins Theory Salamon et al. (2000) identify three main bodies of theories for CSOs that elucidate the interplay of the state and associational life. These are the heterogeneity/government failure theory, the interdependence theory, and the social origins theory developed by Salamon and Anheier (1998). Institutions take various forms in society and are highly heterogeneous and civil society is no different in this respect (Mati, 2020a). The study thus needed to be anchored by a theory that encompasses the heterogeneity whilst recognising Afrocentric sensibilities (Obadare, 2005). For this reason, the study is underpinned by social origins theory. Unlike the economic theories of government failure and interdependence, this theory allows crucial heterogeneity to be explained such as the conditions expe-

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

43

rienced by CSOs in Africa. The other two economic theories have a single factor explanation and do not view CSOs as an integral part of a social system (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). The theoretical framework is presented in Figure 4.1.

Source:

Salamon and Anheier (1998, p. 243).

Figure 4.1

Social origins theoretical framework

Social Origins Conceptual Framework In Figure 4.1, four regimes are presented of which the most fitting to African contexts is the statist regime. In this regime, there is low government social spending and a small non-profit sector. This is characteristic of most African economies and thus the framework has been conceptualised as shown in Figure 4.2.

44

Figure 4.2

African philanthropy

Conceptual framework and contribution of the study

The study contributes to social origins theory by expanding on the statist regime to assess how CSOs have been impacted by Covid-19, how their resource mobilisation has been affected, and how their operating environments have adapted to the new environment imposed by Covid-19.

IMPLEMENTATION METHODS The overarching objective of the study is to assess the impact of Covid-19 on CSOs in Africa. Due to the multifaceted nature of the pandemic, a single statistical method would not suffice. The study then follows Hair et al. (1998), who advocated techniques such as convenience sampling, snowball sampling, and homogeneous/group sampling. Homogeneous/group sampling entails choosing individuals who share similar characteristics. An appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is required in order to address the research question (Zikmund, 2003). Although there is no set formula to calculate the sample size in qualitative research, some argue that 12 to 26 people are adequate, as long as the research question is addressed (Isaacs, 2014). This study invited a large pool of representatives from CSOs in Africa. The study conducted 12 interviews with various staff members from CSOs in addition to other methods.

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

45

A survey with predetermined questions from the literature and expert opinion was first administered. Zikmund (2003) supports self-administered questionnaires to allow for privacy, objectivity and reduce information bias. Survey Monkey was used to disseminate questionnaires to various CSO respondents across the continent. The analysis of survey data was then carried out using descriptive design and logistic regression. Descriptive design is suitable where the research is aimed at uncovering features of the phenomena under study. The intended outcome of such analysis is to identify trends and patterns depicting the phenomenon. In some circumstances, the approach also allows for the identification of the causal relationship between the factors under investigation. Tools used include distribution frequencies, measures of central tendency where the emphasis is usually placed on the first two statistical moments, means, and variances. Understanding the interventions taken to address the situation faced by CSOs required a clear diagnosis of the landscape of needs and opportunities. A logistic regression or logit model was employed for this purpose. The model is a supervised machine learning algorithm used for predicting a dichotomous dependent variable in the presence of many independent variables. It predicts the presence or absence of an outcome based on a set of predictor variables or features. In this study, features in the survey such as loss of donor funding, change of existing donor contracts, renegotiation of funding agreements, and shifts of the organisation’s focus to solely perform Covid-19 related activities comprised features in the logistic regression analysis. The logistic regression equation uses the maximum-likelihood ratio to determine the statistical significance of the variables in the equation (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). A simple logistic regression model has the rm (regression model):

  logit Y   ln   1 

     1 X 1   2 X 2 

(4.1)

where π is the probability of the event, α is the Y intercept, β s are the regression coefficients, X s are a set of predictors or independent variables, while α and β s are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method (ML). The event ( π ) signifies the possibility of cutting down on staff because of Covid-19. The ‘cutting down of staff’ is used as a construct to depict any labour related adjustments that took place due to the pandemic. The argument is that if an organisation opted to renegotiate their employees’ contracts, then this construct is appropriate for tracking down the consequences of these changes on the whole organisation. They are then treated as the impact of the pandemic on these organisations.

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As a control experiment, however, there was a single question strictly aimed at determining if the organisations involved recorded any impact on their operations. This line of investigation did not prove fruitful, as the logistic regression results all proved insignificant. Hence the discussion only traced the impact of the pandemic through loss of donor, change of existing donor contracts, renegotiation of funding agreements, and shift of an organisation’s focus to solely perform Covid-19 related activities after staff reduction. The study also incorporated qualitative information to validate the results of the descriptive and logistic regression analyses. This was done through interviews where a small sample of CSO leaders were selected. Qualitative interviews reveal people’s feelings and understanding of a particular phenomenon (Ellis, 2016).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Sample Characteristics The sample characteristics include the type of CSO organisation, the number of respondents per CSO, organisational characteristics and frequency of their distribution. To gain further insights into the operations of the sampled organisations, the areas of their major focus, especially during the period of the pandemic, were also assessed.

Figure 4.3

Frequency of responses per country (%)

According to Figure 4.3, six countries (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia) produced over 85 per cent of total responses. Zambia produced 32 per cent of the total responses. Table 4.1 further details the characterisation of the sample and responses.

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The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

Table 4.1

Sample characteristics of the CSOs

CSO Organisation

Frequency

Percentage

Community-based organisation (CBO)

60

Faith-based organisation (FBO)

15

5

187

59

31

10

Research think tank

5

2

Social movement

4

1

17

5

Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Non-profit organisation

Others

Table 4.2

19

The primary focus of the organisations

Primary focus of organisation Community development Covid-19

Frequency

Percentage 63

20

6

2

Democracy and governance

34

11

Economic development

13

4

Education

35

11

Environmental matters

22

7

Health

35

11

Human rights/activism

26

8

Women/gender

25

8

Youth

22

7

Other

38

12

Table 4.2 shows the diversity of the sample. Eleven per cent of the surveyed organisations indicated that their focus was on democracy and governance, health, and education. Only 2 per cent focused on Covid-19 whereas 4 per cent focused on economic development. Twenty per cent of the organisations focused on community development while 8 per cent focused on human rights and gender. Organisations with no specific area of focus represented 12 per cent. Impact of Covid-19 on CSOs To trace the impact of Covid-19 on CSOs, the changes in labour contracts were used to demonstrate the extent of impact as detailed in Figure 4.4. The four quadrants indicate different questions. Quadrant 1 deals with labour contracts negotiations. This is the focal point of the investigation. Changes such as reduction in staff, new responsibilities, reduced responsibili-

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African philanthropy

Figure 4.4

Impacts of Covid-19 on CSOs in Africa

ties and reduction in remuneration represent the extent to which the pandemic affected the sampled organisations. Quadrant 1 indicates that 44.8 per cent of the sampled organisations reconsidered their contractual agreements with employees, while 33.5 per cent were in the process or deciding what to do with employees given the loss of funding, change of donor agreements, and shift of focus. Quadrant 2 indicates that 73 per cent of the organisations shifted their focus, perhaps to meet the unpredictable demands of the pandemic. However, 26.3 per cent kept their operations unchanged. In one of the interviews, Dikeledi Seleka of Sisters Empowerment provided further insight into the shifting of focus to meet the demands of the pandemic: We were caught so unaware by Covid-19 thus had to find ways to continue virtually. Our work thus grew because we saw new opportunities with working with universities and gathering data from rural communities. This diversified our sources of revenue and we had to leverage on new opportunities. (Interview, 5 February 2021)

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

49

Further, 53.6 per cent of the organisations lost grants, while 46.4 per cent did not experience any loss. Sixty-two per cent of the respondents indicated that their organisations did not receive any grants during the period. For some the reduction in money did not stop their functions. Marwa El Daly of Maadi Community Foundation in Egypt, stated: We had less money, but we managed to increase our services with more local philanthropy interest. We became creative and initiated a campaign in the form of shares to involve local philanthropy to help families that lost jobs. (Interview, 15 February 2021)

Findings revealed that different organisations were affected differently. For instance, Barbara Nost of ZGF Zambia described Covid-19 as a ‘blessing in disguise’ because it enabled them to fast-track diversification of income strategy which had begun long before Covid-19. Jackie Asiimwe of CivSource Uganda indicated that her organisation received all funding as planned and created new revenue opportunities for artists in Uganda: We were very lucky. When the government closed schools on the 18th of March, we immediately decided to close our office and work virtually. We tried the virtual setup before the lockdown so when lockdown happened, we were able to continue our work seamlessly from home. (Interview, 9 February 2021)

In West Africa, Ceesay (2021) found that 44 per cent of the CSOs in Gambia reported reduced or delayed funding from the donors. This echoed the sentiments from other regions of the continent. Logistic Regression In addition to the use of simple descriptive statistical analysis and interviews, the study also used logistic regression. Features in the survey such as loss of donor funding, change of existing donor contracts, renegotiation of funding agreements, and shift of organisation’s focus to solely perform Covid-19 related activities constitute some of the features in the logistic regression analysis. Dataset and Features Table 4.3 shows the primary features used to predict the reduction of staff. The target class is the reduction of staff, that is, whether CSOs reduced their staff, changed employment contracts, or rendered some of their services redundant due to the pandemic.

50

Table 4.3

African philanthropy

Model features and their description

Feature

Type

Description

Cut staff

Boolean (Yes or No)

Has your organisation cut back on staffing because of

Modify agreement

Boolean (Yes or No)

Scaling back

Boolean (Yes or No)

Are you scaling back your operations because of Covid-19?

Impact budget

Boolean (Yes or No)

What has been the impact of Covid-19 on your budget?

Donor loss

Boolean (Yes or No)

Covid? Have you had to change/modify your existing agreement with donors/funding partners?

Have you lost any donors/grants commitments because of Covid-19?

Received grants

Boolean (Yes or No)

Have you received any new/additional grants post-Covid-19?

Shift focus

Boolean (Yes or No)

Have you had to shift your organisation focus towards Covid-19 related needs?

Technology strategy

Boolean (Yes or No)

Has your organisation developed a strategy on technologies and planning for the future of work in the post-Covid-19 world?

A Boolean data type refers to a binary variable indicating the existence of only two options, where it is either yes or no. The validity of the model was measured using sensitivity and specificity. The final sample included 319 responses showing that 160 CSOs reduced staff while 159 did not. To check the contribution of each variable in the model, two models were built. The first model was based on all identified predictor variables and the second model used selected variables from a stepwise selection technique. The success of the logistic model classifier was evaluated using a confusion matrix.1 Sensitivity (true positive ratio) and specificity (true negative ratio) were calculated by using the confusion matrix. The sensitivity value2 (true positive, same positive result as the prediction by the model) was calculated by dividing the true positive by the sum of true positive and false negative. Specificity value3 (true negative, the same prediction from the model) is calculated by dividing the total of true negative by the sum of true negative and false positive. When these were achieved, the first model was constructed to determine which of the features in Table 4.4 influenced staff reduction. From the results of the model, donor loss, impact on budget, modification of agreements, scaling back operations, and development of strategy on technologies were all statistically significant. Receiving grants and shifting focus was not significant. This seems to have been the case with some organisations. Barbara Nost of ZGF Zambia indicated that loss of funding was not a critical concern for their organisation, rather, they were concerned about the lock-

51

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

Table 4.4

Logistic regression model 1: impacts of Covid on staff reduction Estimate

SE

Z stats

P value

OR

95% Confidence interval LCI

UCL

Constant

−2.3686

0.5183

−4.570

4.89e-06

0.0936

0.0339

0.2586

Donor loss (Yes)

1.3204

0.2757

4.789

1.68e-06

3.7448

2.1814

6.4289

Impact budget

−1.0879

0.5653

−1.924

0.0543

0.3369

0.1112

1.0203

1.1032

0.8128

1.357

0.1747

3.0139

0.61279

14.8237

(No change) Impact budget (other) Impact (reduced)

0.7168

0.3036

2.361

0.0182

2.0479

1.1295

3.7131

Modify

0.6600

0.2950

2.237

0.0253

1.9347

1.0852

3.4493

0.6970

0.2994

2.328

0.0199

2.0077

1.1164

3.6106

0.5350

0.2750

1.946

0.0517

1.7075

0.9961

2.9269

−0.2141

0.2856

−0.750

0.4533

0.8072

0.4612

1.4128

0.2452

0.3188

0.769

0.4417

1.2779

0.6842

2.3870

agreement (Yes) Scaling back (Yes) Strategy technology (Yes) Received grants (Yes) Shift focus (Yes)

Table 4.5

Confusion matrix results Predicted No

Actual

Yes

No

113

46

Yes

39

121

downs which made it hard for them to continue paying salaries when people were not productive from home. Evaluation of the Model Performance The confusion matrix is used to evaluate the validity of the survey responses. Table 4.5 shows that out of the 160 organisations that stated that they reduced their staff, 121 (75.6 per cent) were correctly classified and of the 159 who did not cut back staff, 113 (71.07 per cent) were correctly classified by the model. The model is significant and correctly predicts the reduction of staff as

52

African philanthropy

significant with an accuracy of 73.4 per cent and shows non-significance on the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (0.947) at the 0.05 level. This suggests that the reduction in staff best captures the impact of Covid-19 on the sampled organisations. To further evaluate the performance of the model, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and confusion matrix with cut-off point 0.5 was also plotted as shown in Figure 4.5. The AUC score was significant at 0.8015.

Figure 4.5

Receiver operating characteristic (ROC curve)

Stepwise Binary Regression Model The variables used in the logistic regression model were selected using a stepwise regression approach from the available predictors. The following variables were entered into a stepwise binary regression model to identify independent variables that predict whether an organisation will cut back on staffing because of Covid-19: modify agreement, scaling back operations, impact of Covid-19 on budget, loss of donors, additional grants received, organisation shifting focus and development of a strategy. Table 4.6 shows that loss of donor, impact of budget, modification of agreements, scaling back operations, and developing a strategy were statistically significant. They influenced CSOs’ decision to cut back staff or not. CSOs that lost their donors were 3.9093 times more likely to cut back their staffs compared to CSOs that had no donors. The confusion matrix was adopted to check the model performance and the ROC curve as shown in Table 4.7. From the results of this confusion matrix, out of the total 160 that stated that they reduced staff, 122 (76.25 per cent) were correctly classified and from the 159 who did not reduce staff, 113 (71.07 per cent) were correctly classified by the model. In essence, the entire model is statistically significant and correctly

53

The impact of Covid-19 on civil society organisations in Africa

Table 4.6

Stepwise binary regression model Estimate

SE

Z stats

P-value

OR LCI

UCL

Constant

−2.3291

0.4511

−5.164

0.0000

0.0974

0.0402

0.2357

Donor loss (Yes)

1.3634

0.2686

5.075

0.0000

3.9093

2.3091

6.6185

Impact budget (No

−1.1202

0.5599

−2.001

0.0454

0.3262

0.1089

0.9774

0.9999

0.7955

1.257

0.2088

2.7180

0.5716

12.9234

Impact (reduced)

0.7216

0.3033

2.379

0.0173

2.0577

1.1356

3.7284

Modify agreement

0.6648

0.2876

2.311

0.0208

1.9441

1.1064

3.4160

Scaling back (Yes)

0.7297

0.2965

2.461

0.0138

2.0744

1.1602

3.7091

Strategy

0.5619

0.2718

2.067

0.0387

1.7541

1.0296

2.9885

change) Impact budget (other)

(Yes)

technology (Yes)

Table 4.7

Confusion matrix for the binary regression model Predicted No

Actual

Yes

No

113

46

Yes

38

122

predicts the reductions of staff with an accuracy of 73.7 per cent and shows non-significance on the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (0.983) at the 0.05 level.

CONCLUSION Covid-19 has impacted society everywhere, with an unprecedented impact on CSOs in Africa. The reduction of staff members coupled with re-engineering of operations mainly to virtual working significantly affected many of the CSOs. Shrinking funding and the increased demand for services put many of these organisations under pressure. A few CSOs found new opportunities during the pandemic and diversified their sources of revenue. Technology was key in helping CSOs migrate to online work. Through two regression models, a logistic regression and stepwise binary regression, it was found that Covid-19 had a significant impact on the reduction of staff through variables such as loss of donors, impact to budgets, modification of

54

African philanthropy

donor agreements, and development of a strategy. CSOs that lost their donors during the pandemic were 3.9 times likely to reduce their staff when compared to those that had not lost funding. The study also found that 73 per cent of CSOs had to revisit their work and shift activities to focus only on Covid-19. Recommendations Using mixed methods, the study has not only highlighted the factors that significantly impacted CSOs but has also developed a model to isolate specific variables that can be used to predict the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the CSO sector. Given the finding that CSOs that lost donors during the pandemic were 3.9 more times likely to reduce their staff numbers, the study recommends diversification of sources of income by the CSOs. Donor dependency is a threat and a statistically valid influencer. Policy makers are invited to use the model developed in this study to predict the changes to CSOs and enable effective decision-making. The study has implications for both philanthropy researchers and management researchers. The model developed shows CSO-specific factors that have an impact on their existence. This, however, did not include government and the private sector. A study on Covid-19 and its impact on these sectors is recommended.

NOTES 1. 2.

3.

A confusion matrix is used to evaluate the performance of the algorithm. It is used to evaluate how well the model is performing in terms of classification. Sensitivity indicates the proportions of positives that are correctly identified. Then if the model correctly captures the impact of the pandemic on CSOs, the sensitivity value thus is a measure of how accurately the model predicts the proportions of CSOs that cut down staff. Specificity values correctly capture the true negative rates. For instance, if a CSO did not cut down staff, the model then correctly predicts that cutting down the staff did not take place.

5. When Covid-19 meets philanthropy: the role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana Emmanuel Kumi INTRODUCTION This chapter examines the potential role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 by drawing on experiences from the Ghanaian philanthropic sector. Since the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 a global pandemic on 11 March, 2020, there have been concerted efforts by philanthropic organisations on creative ways of addressing its socio-economic impact. In particular, there has been much collective solidarity in fighting the pandemic (Broom, 2020). For example, the WHO set up the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund to mobilise resources from the private sector, individuals and philanthropic organisations (Usher, 2020). There is therefore a growing recognition about the potential role of philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 (Finchum-Mason et al., 2020; Fuentenebro, 2020). Philanthropic actors have, for example, provided personal protective equipment (PPE) and also created Covid-19 response funds (e.g., Covid-19 Africa Solidarity Fund by TrustAfrica). Existing literature suggests that community-led philanthropy has also provided social assistance to marginalised groups (Trautwein et al., 2020). According to some commentators, the mobilisation of philanthropic resources helps in strengthening community through service provision, bolstering the voice of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to engage in active advocacy and addressing the socio-economic cost of Covid-19 (Venkatachalam et al., 2020). Against this backdrop, philanthropic organisations have been called upon to support and complement government’s efforts against Covid-19 through the provision of financial support (Finchum-Mason et al., 2020). According to Candid (2020b), philanthropic funders have provided 21,300 grants totalling US$16.5 billion in response to Covid-19. 55

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In Ghana, as part of crisis responses to mobilise resources in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19, the Government of Ghana enacted the Covid-19 National Trust Fund Bill, 2020 on 3 April 2020 (CitiNews, 2020). This led to the establishment of the National Covid-19 Trust Fund (hereafter, Trust Fund) with the objective of mobilising philanthropic donations to complement the government’s efforts. The private sector also set up the Ghana Covid-19 Private Sector Fund (hereafter, Private Sector Fund) to mobilise GH¢100 million (US$20 million) to support the fight against Covid-19 (Private Sector Fund, 2020). A number of high-net worth individuals (HNWIs), celebrities and faith-based organisations (FBOs) have also demonstrated solidarity and prosocial behaviours through horizontal African philanthropic acts to support the vulnerable in society (Broom, 2020). In this regard, African philanthropy ‘broadly conceived as encompassing extra governmental and private ways through which resources (including money, material goods, time and labour) are mobilised/harnessed by and for Africans to address a public need, interest or cause’ (Mati, 2016, p. 18) has gained a new sense of urgency among policy makers in their quest to tap into its potential for addressing the pandemic. Although African philanthropy has a crucial role to play in addressing crises including Covid-19, this role remains poorly understood, with few empirical studies existing on the topic. Specifically, this chapter addresses this gap and seeks to clarify the potential role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. In doing so, the chapter asks the following research question: How is philanthropy contributing to addressing the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana? To answer this question, the chapter draws on qualitative research involving semi-structured interviews with 35 representatives of philanthropic organisations, NGOs, FBOs and key informants as well as media reviews of key stories pertaining to philanthropy and Covid-19 in Ghana. This chapter focuses on the different dimensions of African philanthropy (i.e., informal/ horizontal, formal/vertical and hybrid philanthropy) (Mati, 2016; Fowler and Mati, 2019; Kumi, 2019) in examining their potential role in the fight against Covid-19. In particular, for horizontal philanthropy, the discussion focuses on community volunteering and religious giving while the vertical philanthropy includes philanthropic activities by corporate organisations through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), philanthropic foundations and trusts. On the other hand, hybrid philanthropy focuses on giving by celebrities, HNWIs, social entrepreneurs and impact investors. This chapter makes two contributions to the emerging literature on African philanthropy. First, it presents rich empirical evidence from Ghana on the role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of health crises like Covid-19. This is particularly useful given that the existing philan-

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thropic literature on Covid-19 is essentially Euro-American and Asian centric which makes it difficult to transfer the practices and understanding of philanthropic contributions to addressing crises into the African context (Trautwein et al., 2020; Fuentenebro, 2020; Finchum-Mason et al., 2020). Therefore, providing empirical evidence from an African-centric stance using the analytical lens of African philanthropy is crucial as this will help in providing a holistic understanding of the potentiality of philanthropy during crises. By doing so, this chapter expands our understanding of the emerging literature on African philanthropy by providing insights into the roles and types of philanthropic activities undertaken by philanthropic actors against existing typology of African philanthropy (see Appendix 1). Second, the chapter sheds light on the varied, complex and multi-dimensional nature of collaboration between government and philanthropic organisations from an African perspective. It provides insights into envisioning the unfolding nature of state–philanthropic relations in the post-Covid-19 era by showing how the pandemic has reinforced the need for better collaboration between the state and philanthropic organisations in addressing national development challenges. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section discusses the research context with focus on Covid-19 and civil society in Ghana. It then discusses the analytical framework of African philanthropy followed by the research methodology. The next section presents and discusses the research findings while the last section of the chapter offers some concluding remarks.

RESEARCH CONTEXT: COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GHANA On 11 March 2020, the WHO declared Covid-19 a global pandemic. The disease which first started in Wuhan, in Hubei Province of China has spread to 220 countries and territories with 195,266,156 confirmed cases and 4,180,161 deaths as of 28 July 2021 (WHO, 2021). In Ghana, the first two cases of Covid-19 were recorded on 12 March 2020. As of 25 July 2021, the country had recorded 103,019 cases with 97,213 recoveries/discharges and 823 deaths (Ghana Health Service, 2021). Following the first two reported cases, the Government of Ghana (GOG) passed the Imposition of Restrictions Act 2020 (Act 1012) and the Imposition of Restrictions (Covid-19) Instrument, 2020 (E.I. 64) as part of measures to manage the spread of Covid-19 (Addadzi-Koom, 2020). On 30 March 2020, the GOG imposed a three-week partial lockdown in Tema, Kasoa, Accra and Kumasi Metropolis. There were also closures of the country’s borders and bans on social gatherings of more than 25 people although marketplaces were allowed to operate (Asante and Mills, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic has had

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negative socio-economic impacts on the Ghanaian economy. For instance, during the lockdown period, there was a substantial decline in employment among informal sector workers (Aduhene and Osei-Assibey, 2021). In addressing the socio-economic impacts of Covid-19, the GOG instituted measures including the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme, absorption of water bills and the provision of subsidies on electricity (Baada et al., 2021). Civil society organisations (CSOs) including philanthropic organisations, NGOs and FBOs have played significant roles in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 through, for example, the distribution of food items. Ghana has a vibrant and diverse civil society sector comprising NGOs, social movements, professional associations, political parties, and FBOs among many others. According to USAID (2021), 10,030 CSOs were registered with the Department of Social Development in 2020. However, there is no comprehensive data on the proportion of the different types of CSOs because they are all registered as Companies Limited by Guarantee under the new Companies Act passed in 2019. CSOs in Ghana enjoy maximum freedom to operate without intimidation from government following the adoption of democracy and multi-party systems in 1993. However, in recent years, the civic space for CSOs in Ghana is rated as narrowed and has witnessed a deterioration in terms of, for example, press freedom (Kumi, 2022; Reporters Without Borders, 2022).

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY This chapter adopts the concept of African philanthropy in understanding the potential role of philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana. African philanthropy is gaining attention in recent years (Mati, 2016; Fowler and Mati, 2019; Kumi, 2019). Notwithstanding, the existing literature tends to prejudicially understand it as ‘traditional’ with relatively little potential for the development of the African continent mainly because African philanthropy is subordinated to ‘external vocabularies and meanings’ (Fowler and Mati, 2019, p. 724). African philanthropy is not entirely new because giving is part of the culture of many African societies (Wilkinson-Maposa et al., 2005). For example, Wilkinson-Maposa et al. (2005) introduced the idea of philanthropy of community based on relations of help among and between the poor in society. This is grounded on principles of collective solidarity, altruism, reciprocity and cooperation between and among the ‘poor’ in society (Mati, 2016; Fowler and Mati, 2019). To this end, the Western understanding of philanthropy as voluntary acts based on altruism and generosity fails to consider how ‘informal giving’ informs individuals to engage in philanthropic acts (Mati, 2016).

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However, the challenge with African philanthropy is that its theorisation, interpretation and conceptualisation have not been adequately developed compared to Western philanthropy (Flower, 2016). This stems, in part, from the domination of African philanthropy by external meanings and vocabularies that have failed to properly account for Africans’ prosocial behaviours (Fowler and Mati, 2019). Some scholars have argued that Western philanthropy has narrowly focused on giving by the ultra-wealthy in society and lacks an appreciation of the importance of gift-giving in many African societies (Fowler, 2016; Mati, 2019). Informed by these concerns, Fowler and Mati (2019, p. 725) have called for the need to replace Western philanthropy with ‘African gifting’ because of its ontological incoherency with the ‘endogenous moral philosophies, worldviews and languages of the African continent’. In conceptualising African philanthropy, Mati (2016) suggests that structurally, African philanthropy can be conceptualised based on spheres of philanthropic practice and underlying motivations. African philanthropy can therefore be categorised into: (i) institutional/vertical philanthropy; (ii) non-institutional/horizontal; and (iii) hybrid philanthropy consisting of a mixture of formal and informal practices. Institutional philanthropy involves giving through institutional intermediation such as individuals, families, and corporate foundations and trusts. On the other hand, horizontal philanthropy focuses on direct giver-to-recipient relationships undertaken through indigenous vehicles such as mutual aid and self-help groups. Examples of horizontal philanthropy include religious giving, individual donations, volunteering and diaspora philanthropy. Horizontal philanthropy focuses on mutuality, solidarity, and communalism of interdependency between people of similar means (Mati, 2016). Hybrid philanthropy consists of a mixture of vertical and horizontal giving practices. Examples include community foundations, social enterprises, and impact investments (Mati, 2016). I draw on the different dimensions (i.e., vertical, horizontal and hybrid) of African philanthropy in exploring the role of philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. The rationale is that using the concept of African philanthropy will help in understanding the diverse philanthropic actors operating within the Ghanaian philanthropic sector and also map their roles.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Research Approach This study employed qualitative research methodology because it allows for a deeper understanding and critical insights into the role of philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana. Qualitative research provided an opportunity to explore participants’ perceptions and

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experiences of the different dimensions of African philanthropy in responding to the pandemic. Data Collection Data collection for this study took place across multiple regions in Ghana between March and November 2020, where thirty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of NGOs, philanthropic foundations, FBOs and key informants with unique experience and expertise in the Ghanaian philanthropic sector. The sampling technique was purposive in nature because the aim was not for representativeness but rather to explore in-depth by capturing diversity of contexts and experiences of the role of philanthropy in fighting Covid-19. The use of open-ended questions in semi-structured interviews gave participants the opportunity for expressing themselves in detail without any hindrances (see Appendix 2 for the interview protocol). The rationale for interviewing NGOs, philanthropic foundations and FBOs was to understand their role in providing support services to intended beneficiaries and communities during the pandemic. It also explored how they responded to the needs of beneficiaries and the challenges encountered. Seven key informants comprising academics and philanthropic experts with considerable experience in the Ghanaian philanthropic sector were interviewed with a view to understanding the nature of state–philanthropic relationships and the enabling environment for philanthropic activities. Data collection for this study was mainly through virtual means (i.e., Zoom platform) because of the social distancing protocols associated with Covid-19. All interviews were recorded with the informed consent of participants. As part of data collection, I also participated in three online discussion forums and webinars on Covid-19, philanthropy, and civil society in Ghana. Extensive notes were taken during the forums and webinars which were incorporated into the final data analysis. The primary data were complemented with insights from media coverage of stories related to philanthropy and Covid-19 in Ghana. In particular, news articles from GhanaWeb, Graphiconline, MyJoy Online, and CitiNews were reviewed in tracking philanthropic donations to the Covid-19 Trust Fund. In total, 520 news articles on philanthropy and Covid-19 were reviewed between March and September 2020. In searching the news articles, a search string consisting of common terms: ‘Philanthropy*’ OR ‘Covid-19*’ OR ‘National Trust Fund*’ and ‘Ghana Covid-19 Private Sector Fund*’ were used. In addition, television programmes such as Beyond the Lockdown by JoyNews TV and Citi TV’s telecast of the launch of STAR-Ghana Foundation’s

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Covid-19 Coordination Platform provided extensive coverage on Covid-19 and philanthropy. Data Analysis The recorded interviews were transcribed and verified against the field notes for data accuracy. The interviews and secondary data from news items were integrated and triangulated for data analysis. The interview data were coded into parent and child nodes using NVivo 12. The nodes focused on the different dimensions of African philanthropy and the role of the various types of philanthropic organisations. The data coding process was inductive and iterative in nature given that adjustments were made due to the emergence of new and modification of old themes. Data analysis involved the use of reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2019). The secondary data were analysed using qualitative content analysis to reveal key themes in the news articles. Content analysis was used to search and describe meanings within texts and also summarising contents in the news articles. Next, I present and discuss the key research findings.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION This section presents and discusses the research findings on the role of African philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana. The analysis of the findings is structured around horizontal, vertical, and hybrid philanthropy. Coordination of Philanthropic Responses and Fundraising towards Covid-19 The empirical evidence from this study indicates that the coordination of philanthropic engagements comprised different approaches and mechanisms by stakeholders involved in the fight against Covid-19. In particular, the coordination of philanthropic donations at the national level was led by the GOG under the auspices of the Trust Fund. The Trust Fund serves as an institutional intermediary between the government and philanthropic actors which represents a key dimension of vertical philanthropy. In fact, as Mati (2016) argues, vertical African philanthropy is characterised by institutional intermediaries such as foundations and trusts that filter giving. According to some interviewees, the Trust Fund played a significant role by facilitating efficient coordination in the mobilisation of donations (in-cash and in-kind) from individuals, corporate, and religious organisations to complement government’s efforts. When asked about the mandate of the Trust

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Fund, a key informant explained that it exists to ‘complement the efforts of government to combat the Covid-19 pandemic by providing an avenue for well-meaning individuals, groups and corporate bodies to contribute by donating resources that will be required to combat the Covid-19’ as well as ‘receive any other monies donated towards the fight against Covid-19’ (Interview, 19 June 2020). As of 30 June, 2021, the Trust Fund had mobilised donations of about GH¢ 57.15 million (US$10.4 million). The Trust Fund utilised an amount of GH¢52.5 million (US$9.5 million) for various programmes including the provision and distribution of PPEs and food items (CitiNews, 2021). Similarly, the Private Sector Fund also coordinated the mobilisation of resources from the private sector in Ghana. Some interviewees explained that in the past, many corporate organisations undertook their philanthropic initiatives in an ad hoc manner without proper coordination. This affected their efficiency and effectiveness. However, as a result of the coordinating role played by the Private Sector Fund, an interviewee explained that ‘it took the burden off our neck as we knew which channel to pass our support for Covid-19 to’ (Interview, 16 June 2020). This is on the basis that private sector support for Covid-19 in the form of CSR has largely been coordinated through the Private Sector Fund. A section of interviewees therefore explained the need for intense coordination among private sector actors in order to achieve their shared goal in fighting Covid-19. The Private Sector Fund also initiated the #10 Ghana Challenge to mobilise resources from individuals and corporate resources. In September 2020, the Fund had mobilised about GH¢ 43.16 million (US$7.8 million) which has been used in establishing Ghana’s first Infectious Disease Isolation and Treatment Facility (Private Sector Fund, 2020). Empirical evidence from this study suggests that corporate philanthropy influences resource mobilisation towards the fight against Covid-19. Although corporate philanthropy in response to disaster is not new, it has assumed a new sense of urgency in addressing the impact of Covid-19. However, the increased involvement of corporate organisations in Covid-19 related philanthropic activities raises concerns about their underlying motives which is largely for reputational and profit-oriented benefits. CSR is also considered by corporate organisations as a way of building their legitimacy and compensating for negative externalities (Manuel and Herron, 2020). Philanthropic foundations such as STAR-Ghana Foundation have also established the Ghana Civil Society Coordination Platform on Covid-19 to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on marginalised groups. Speaking about the coordinating role of philanthropic foundations, an interviewee explained: ‘As a foundation, we have undertaken a number of actions during the Covid-19. One is to enhance coordination amongst civil society actors to ensure that we don’t duplicate our efforts. This has led to the establishment of the Ghana Civil

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Society Coordination Platform on Covid-19’ (Interview, 24 August 2020). As part of STAR-Ghana Foundation’s Covid-19 Response Project, it provided funding of about GH¢ 4,800,000.00 (US$822,000) to a number of CSOs to undertake Covid-19 related projects such as the CSO Covid-19 Response Fund. The CSO Response Fund was established by the Ghana CSO Platform on Sustainable Development Goals. According to an interviewee, the CSO Response Fund ‘seeks to coordinate and harmonise the Covid-19 responses by CSOs in Ghana. Its focus was largely on humanitarian issues and therefore coordination and harmonisation of Covid-19 efforts is crucial for reducing duplication of efforts’ (Interview, 15 July 2020). As of 25 April 2020, the CSO Response Fund had mobilised about GH¢111,962.62 which was used in providing food and non-food items to the vulnerable in society. The empirical findings therefore suggest that philanthropic foundations in Ghana played an essential role in coordinating efforts and also mobilising resources in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. This finding corroborates the observation by Finchum-Mason et al. (2020) that philanthropic foundations played a critical role in collaborating with organisations to address the impact of Covid-19. In addition, the empirical findings on philanthropic foundations in Ghana providing funding for CSOs is in line with what has been reported in the literature (Candid, 2020a). The analysis of the interview data therefore demonstrates the contributions of vertical philanthropy undertaken mainly through intermediaries including foundations in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. Mitigating the Impact of Covid-19 on Vulnerable Groups by Meeting Essential Needs Interview data suggests that philanthropic organisations played a role in providing essential services to vulnerable groups during the lockdown period. Some interviewees explained that the lockdown affected the ability of vulnerable groups to meet their basic necessities of life. Informed by this, it was reported that community philanthropy through collective solidarity and mutual aid played a significant role in responding to the needs of the vulnerable by providing food, healthcare, PPE and in some cases financial support to people. One interviewee, for example, explained this as follows: Community philanthropy has supported in distributing PPEs, sanitizers and nose masks and in some cases has provided cash or palliative support to low-income families, persons with disabilities, the elderly and the unemployed women, young people as well as children. (Interview, 15 July 2020)

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The statement suggests that community philanthropy provided support to the needy by using community responses in addressing the impact of Covid-19. This is an indication that community solidarity is an important mechanism for supporting the vulnerable during crises. Some interviewees explained that although community philanthropy created opportunities for community actions during the pandemic, it has not received the needed attention. One participant described this as follows: ‘Community philanthropy has happened during the pandemic. But I think because it’s informal, usually between individuals or more in terms of the provision of shelter, food, etc., and not financial resources, we sometimes don’t recognise it’ (Interview, 4 July 2020). The statement affirms the argument that while horizontal philanthropy has been part of many African societies, it has received relatively little recognition in philanthropy literature due to its informal nature (Mati, 2016; Fowler and Mati, 2019; Kumi, 2019). Notwithstanding, many interviewees reported that community volunteers supported marginalised groups by contributing unpaid hours to distribute food parcels and essentials in communities. Informal crisis volunteering was therefore the predominant form of volunteering during the pandemic in Ghana. For instance, individual volunteers contributed to the fumigation of marketplaces and places of worship and provided food items across the country. The empirical findings suggest that informal crisis volunteering was ad hoc in nature and the volunteers were motivated by sympathy and empathy for community members (Trautwein et al., 2020). Moreover, FBOs through their religious giving met the basic needs of people which promoted a sense of human dignity. Interviewees explained that at the onset of Covid-19, churches and mosques were among the first actors to respond to the needs of people. For instance, through their faith practices, CARITAS Ghana provided financial and non-financial support to slum dwellers of Old Fadama in Accra. The Church of Pentecost (CoP) also provided donations to the Ghana Prisons Service, Covid-19 patients, and front-line health workers. In addition, the CoP released its 250-acre Convention Centre to the GOG to be used as a Covid-19 Isolation Centre (MyJoy Online, 2020). The Muslim Community also donated GH¢ 130,000 (US$26,000) and other non-financial resources to the Trust Fund and health institutions while a number of churches also provided food items and sanitizers to the needy. In explaining the role of faith-based giving, one church leader asserted: Before the lockdown, the church had a lot of interventions to support the poor in society and Covid-19 made it apparent that we should intensify our efforts. […] We were not only looking at church members but any vulnerable in the society. The church stood on its ground to provide the needed help [because] you cannot say you’re preaching if you don’t take care of the poor and vulnerable in society. (Interview, 10 May 2020)

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FBOs including churches also contributed tremendously to the mobilisation of financial resources for the Trust Fund. In fact, as existing studies have highlighted, religious organisations served as the first line of support for many people in need by providing non-financial resources and psycho-social and emotional support (Plüss, 2020). HNWIs also constitute an important aspect of informal dimension of African philanthropy. In Ghana, HNWIs through their donations met the needs of vulnerable groups during the pandemic. Although giving by HNWIs is not new (see Kumi, 2019), there was a surge in their activities during the lockdown period. For example, NHWIs such as Osei Kwame Despite and Ofori Sarpong made donations of US$100,000 to the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital in March 2020 (Class FM, 2020). Similarly, Kennedy Agyapong made donations to hospitals across the country. Additionally, celebrities also contributed by donating to prisoners and street children during the lockdown (MyJoy Online, 2020). Although philanthropic activity by HNWIs and celebrities demonstrates the significance of shared solidarity, it also raises questions about the underlying motives as they tend to cherry pick their philanthropic activities (Eikenberry and Mirabella, 2018). Information Sharing, Public Education and Awareness Raising about Covid-19 Philanthropic organisations were crucial actors in information sharing and awareness raising about Covid-19 in Ghana. According to some interviewees, at the onset of Covid-19, many Ghanaians denied the existence of the virus and did not adhere to the safety protocols. When asked about the role of philanthropic organisations, one representative of a foundation succinctly explained that: ‘We create awareness on the pandemic because we still have some citizens who don’t believe that Covid-19 is real. So, we are actively engaged in awareness raising campaigns to educate the public’ (Interview, 15 June 2020). Philanthropic foundations therefore served as hubs for information sharing on Covid-19. Interviewees explained that misinformation on Covid-19 causes fear, confusion and leads to greater information avoidance which undermines the adoption of preventive measures. Informed by this, philanthropic organisations contribute to the sharing of accessible and accurate information and prevention campaigns on Covid-19. Analysis of the interview data suggests that in ensuring easy access to information on Covid-19, philanthropic foundations further supported some media houses financially to provide access to information especially for those in rural areas. Foundations were therefore key stakeholders in fighting disinformation and misinformation such as fake news on Covid-19. For instance, STAR-Ghana Foundation provided funding to the Media Foundation for West Africa to implement the ‘Fact Check Ghana’ project aimed at fact-checking

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information and debunking fake news and misinformation on Covid-19. In explaining their role, one foundation representative said that: ‘We provide accessible and responsive information to all sections of the Ghanaian population including addressing fake news on Covid-19 as part of our efforts’ (Interview, 6 July 2020). FBOs also promoted public education on Covid-19. In particular, leaders of churches and mosques in partnership with health officials have provided information and educated their members on behavioural aspects of Covid-19 (Interview, 12 June 2020). Interview data suggests that although places of worship were closed, religious leaders in the Christian faith, for example, resorted to virtual church services and used these platforms to share information and also encourage their members to adhere to Covid-19 safety protocols. In some cases, interviewees shared their experiences by indicating that short video clips of Covid-19 were played in churches and health officials were invited to educate and raise awareness among worshippers (Interview, 26 July 2020). The empirical findings further suggest strong collaborations between FBOs and government institutions such as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) to engage in campaigns and awareness raising about Covid-19. For instance, the CoP donated ten cinema vans to assist the NCCE in sensitising the Ghanaian public. Faith leaders and faith organisations therefore acted as information hubs during the pandemic (Plüss, 2020). As a dimension of horizontal African philanthropy, celebrities including media personalities have also participated in public education and awareness raising on Covid-19 by using their celebrity capital. According to many interviewees, celebrities provided tailored information on Covid-19 in different languages to meet the needs of specific groups through their social media handles, TV and radio platforms to reach out to many people. The empirical findings therefore suggest that celebrity health exemplars have the potential to reduce Covid-19 stigmatisation. Philanthropy and Policy Advocacy during Covid-19 The empirical evidence indicates that philanthropic organisations advocated for policy changes by highlighting the plights of marginalised groups. According to interviewees, philanthropic organisations together with some NGOs like Good Neighbours Ghana advocated for social protection measures for marginalised groups such as head porters: In terms of policy advocacy, we provide concrete feedback to the government in terms of the reality we are seeing on the ground and also ensure that our feedback is evidence-based which helps in informing Covid-19 related social protection policies. (Interview, 25 June 2020)

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In promoting policy advocacy on Covid-19, an interviewee argued that philanthropic organisations ‘must collate their support in order to use that to influence government policies for better social protection’ (Interview, 24 August 2020). The findings indicate that philanthropic organisations are important policy advocates for tackling inequality. However, it is important to recognise that philanthropic organisations may also aggravate absolute inequality (Eikenberry and Mirabella, 2018). Another role played by philanthropic organisations relates to advocating against human rights abuses in the enforcement of Covid-19 legislations by security agencies. According to many interviewees, Covid-19 legislations curtailed and compromised the rights, association and peaceful assembly of citizens (Interview, 25 July 2020). Philanthropic organisations together with some CSOs were directly involved in tracking and documenting human rights abuses: ‘The pandemic has led to the passage of legislations by government which restricts civic space and the rights of citizens. So, we are monitoring the situation and also holding government accountable for its actions’ (Interview, 19 September 2020). Additionally, philanthropic organisations played a role in tracking government’s response and expenditure on Covid-19. For example, STAR-Ghana Foundation through its Covid-19 Response Project funded some CSOs to track government’s Covid-19 related programmes and expenditure as explained by an interviewee: ‘We engage with government and other duty bearers to ensure that their programmes and actions are responsive and the government is accountable to citizens for all the programmes that are rolling out’ (Interview, 4 September 2020). To this end, the Covid-19 Accountability Tracker platform was established to promote accountability and transparency in the use of Covid-19 resources by the government.

CONCLUSION This chapter examines the potential role of philanthropic organisations in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19 in Ghana. The empirical findings show that philanthropic organisations played significant roles including the coordination and mobilisation of resources; meeting the essential needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups; information sharing, awareness raising and public education about Covid-19; and influencing public policy through advocacy. The findings demonstrate how government policies could serve as catalyst for promoting philanthropic acts through collective solidarity during crises. In particular, it shows that the Trust Fund created by the GOG provided opportunities for promoting philanthropic acts. The findings further indicate that Covid-19 has also fostered a strong collaboration between government and

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philanthropic actors and also show how African philanthropy has become an indispensable element in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. The study in this chapter has implications for policy and practice. First, it demonstrates the significance of collaborations between government and philanthropic actors. However, it is unclear whether Covid-19 will in any way change existing state-philanthropic relationships. Although the government recognises the importance of philanthropy to national development in Ghana, at the moment, the enabling environment is weak as there are no policy frameworks to promote philanthropic giving. Second, the findings show how collective solidarity can support individuals during crisis periods. In times of crises, the significance of home-grown sources of support cannot be overestimated. Horizontal African philanthropy has therefore stepped up in addressing the gaps left by governments and international donors, hence there is the need for recognising collective solidarity as an important response mechanism in crisis periods. While the findings reveal that African philanthropy has the potential to support development on the continent, realising this potential requires the development of deliberate policy frameworks for promoting the growth of the philanthropic sector. While this study has offered some useful insights on African philanthropy and Covid-19, it has some limitations which opens up avenues for future research. First, the findings on which this chapter are based are from a single country case study which limits its generalisability. Future studies should focus on cross-national comparison of philanthropic responses to Covid-19. Second, this chapter presented an aggregated analysis of the role of philanthropic organisations in the fight against Covid-19. However, there are differences in the responses of the various categories of philanthropic organisations. For this reason, future studies should focus on disaggregating and documenting the differences and similarities in the responses by the various categories of philanthropic organisations. Third, future studies should explore how the Covid-19 pandemic will influence government–philanthropic relationships in a post-Covid-19 era and the implications of this for national development.

FBOs

NGOs

of CSO

philanthropy/Typology

slum dwellers in Old Fadama in Accra.

3. CARITAS Ghana providing food items to

to the Covid-19 Trust Fund.

2. Donations made by the Muslim community

the Ghana Prison Service.

1. The Church of Pentecost made donations to

Examples include:

Horizontal philanthropy

Covid-19 Trust Fund.

of God and Deeper Christian Life Ministry to the

Gospel Church, the Church of Pentecost, Assemblies

as Ghana Baptist Convention, International Central

Examples include donations made by churches such

Examples include CSO Covid-19 Response Fund

Vertical philanthropy

Hybrid philanthropy

Dimensions of African philanthropy and their contributions to addressing the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana

Dimension of African

Table 5A.1

APPENDIX 1: DIMENSIONS OF AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY When Covid-19 meets philanthropy: the role of African philanthropy 69

Dimension of African

HNWIs and celebrities

Community philanthropy

of CSO

philanthropy/Typology

NGOs in Ghana.

(e.g., Allied Health Professionals) and

nity members to support health institutions

2. Informal crisis volunteering from commu-

Agyapong.

to regional hospitals in Ghana by Kennedy

2. Donations of facemasks, sanitisers and gloves

Hospital.

Despite to the Komfo Anokye Teaching

1. Donations of US$100,000 by Osei Kwame

protocols.

tion on Covid-19 safety

ness and sharing informa-

2. Celebrities raising aware-

prisoners.

Wale making donations to

1. Celebrities such as Shata

Examples include:

the vulnerable in society.

as children’.

community members supporting

Examples include mutual aid by

Hybrid philanthropy

unemployed women, young people as well

Examples include:

Vertical philanthropy

persons with disabilities, the elderly and the

palliative support to low-income families,

and in some cases have provided cash or

distributing PPEs, sanitisers and nose masks

community philanthropy have supported in

1. ‘Philanthropic organisations especially

Examples include:

Horizontal philanthropy

70 African philanthropy

Dimension of African

Fund)

Women’s Development

Foundation, African

(e.g., STAR-Ghana

Philanthropic foundations

Private sector organisations

of CSO

philanthropy/Typology

Horizontal philanthropy

on and fight disinformation on Covid-19.

Foundation for West Africa to raise awareness

funding to media houses such as the Media

5. Philanthropic organisations providing

campaigns to educate the public’.

we are actively engaged in awareness raising

who do not believe that Covid-19 is real. So,

pandemic because we still have some citizens

4. ‘As a foundation, we create awareness on the

3. Covid-19 Accountability Tracker Platform.

Covid-19.

2. Ghana Civil Society Coordination Platform on

1. CSO Covid-19 Response Fund.

Examples include:

Korle Bu Teaching hospital.

University of Ghana Medical Centre and

Memorial Institute for Medical Research,

Ghana making donations to Noguchi

2. Corporate organisations such as Unilever

Disease Isolation and Treatment Facility.

1. Private Sector Fund building the Infectious

Examples include:

Vertical philanthropy

Hybrid philanthropy

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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 1. Could you provide brief information on your organisation with regards to your thematic areas of work? 2. How did Covid-19 inspired legislations such as partial lockdown and social distancing protocols in Ghana affect your projects and programmes? 3. As an organisation, what is your perception about philanthropy in Ghana? 4. From your experience, what potential exists for the mobilisation of philanthropic resources in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic? 5. Are there limits to promoting philanthropic activities during the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana? If any, what are these? 6. During the Covid-19 pandemic, what has been your contribution as a philanthropic organisation in responding to the pandemic? Please support your answers with practical examples. Were your contributions limited to a specific geographical area/region? If Yes, what accounted for this? 7. In your opinion, how does the operating environment (political, cultural, economic, social and legal) affect the ability of philanthropic organisations to contribute towards addressing the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic? 8. In your opinion, do you think the regulatory environment in Ghana incentivises or constrains philanthropic giving in Ghana? 9. As an organisation, to what extent did you work with other philanthropic organisations and stakeholders in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic? 10. How would your describe the relationship between philanthropic organisations and government/state agencies prior to and during the Covid-19 pandemic? 11. How would you describe the nature of collaborations between philanthropic organisations during the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana? 12. Have you witnessed any significant changes in your relationship with stakeholders (e.g. government, private sector organisations, faith-based organisations, NGOs etc.) during the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana? 13. In your opinion, do you think that Covid-19 will significantly change your relationship with philanthropic actors in Ghana? 14. From your perspective, what are the practical lessons you would like to share with stakeholders (e.g. CSOs, government and foundations etc.) in their attempt to harness the contributions of philanthropic organisations and also promote the growth of philanthropy in Ghana? 15. In your opinion, what should be the role of philanthropic organisations in post-Covid-19 recovery efforts in Ghana? How can philanthropy contribute to bringing Ghana out of the pandemic and into a more resilient future?

6. ‘Steering’ or ‘freeing’ civil society? Philanthropy towards social justice campaigns in South Africa during Covid-19 Shauna Mottiar INTRODUCTION Examining the Covid-19 period from the point of view of civil society and civil society organisations (CSOs), Agnes Kover (2021) argues that civil society plays a pivotal role in the alleviation of societal troubles associated with the pandemic as well as a vital role in curbing the virus. Drawing from civil society responses during Covid-19 in the UK, Harris, (2021, p. 38) shows how civil society proved to be responsive, innovative, and flexible by improvising systems for identifying and contacting those in need of support. CSOs also developed volunteering schemes and response networks while simultaneously supporting local government. Kover (2021, p. 1) argues that countries that exploited the potential of civil society reduced the consequences of the pandemic and increased a sense of solidarity in their societies. Countries which adopted the ‘single actor’ (government) strategy created a vertical hierarchical chain of control instead of a horizontal network of trust and cooperation. The Austrian response to the pandemic, for example, reflects a strengthened relationship between government and CSOs with the passing of the Non-Profit Fund created during the pandemic which effectively made this partnership more transparent and stable (Meyer et al., 2021). The Indian response to the pandemic, on the other hand, reflected a crackdown of civil society through silencing voices of dissent and regulating the civic space – this is despite the proven efficiency and commitment of CSOs in responding to the pandemic (Tandon and Aravind, 2021, p. 147). Yuen et. al. (2021, p. 1284) drawing on the Hong Kong and Singapore responses to Covid-19, argue that both countries were relatively successful in containing the pandemic. In Hong Kong, however, low trust in government strengthened civil society-led responses resulting in self-mobilisation and 73

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community mutual help. Whereas in Singapore a state-led response model marginalised civil society and this led to failures such as the failure to contain outbreaks among the segregated migrant population. A survey conducted on civil society in Africa in 2020 reflected that Covid-19 has had dire consequences on the sector (Barnard and Maruru, 2020). The survey was based on understanding the negative impact of the pandemic on the funding and operations of CSOs and the ways in which CSOs coped while still contributing to the national pandemic response. The survey found that 98 per cent of CSOs reported a disruption to their activities owing to the pandemic, while about 70 per cent reported reduced or cancelled operations. Furthermore, 55 per cent of CSOs reported a loss of funding and 66 per cent expected a loss of funding. Restrictions on the movement of staff were a significant challenge for CSOs with 73 per cent reporting restricted movement and 79 per cent experiencing reduced face-to-face community interactions. The survey further revealed that 84 per cent of CSOs introduced new programme activities in response to the pandemic with 71 per cent self-funding these activities. About 85 per cent of CSOs stated that they could have done more if capacity or funding constraints were not a barrier while 71 per cent of CSOs argued that government failed to recognise and utilise local CSO skills, experience, and networks in responding to the pandemic (Barnard and Maruru, 2020, p. 5). The role of civil society as front-line responders and as defenders of human rights during the pandemic is undeniable. A 2020 global civil society alliance CIVICUS report documents the rapid civil society response – often to fill gaps left by states and businesses: ‘civil society met needs, defended rights and forged new paths for civic action’ (CIVICUS, 2020, p. 4). The civil society response to the pandemic included mitigating the impact of state-imposed lockdowns. These affected the most vulnerable and marginalised people who had lost their livelihoods. Those in the informal economy could not access support measures while others struggled with official processes to qualify for state assistance. Civil society worked to mitigate these effects by meeting essential needs and providing support. The civil society response further included defending the rights of those who were made more vulnerable by the pandemic. Women vulnerable to gender-based violence, for example, were at further risk during the lockdown as were racial and religious minorities. The civil society response included monitoring and exposing these rights abuses. Decisions taken by states during the pandemic were a further area of civil society intervention where CSOs worked to demand accountability on issues such as procurement and the allocation of resources. Civil society responses to Covid-19 occurred despite the fact that CSOs were facing their own crisis. This included a disruption of activities, changes in funding and budgets, having to secure the welfare and well-being of staff, and dire restrictions on conventional community outreach and organising as the civic space became restricted. It is

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also noted that ‘many states worked to restrict the ability of CSOs to act while privileging private sector allies’ (CIVICUS, 2020, p. 5).

SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSES In South Africa, civil society has been critical in responding to the pandemic by mobilising to provide food with estimates that civil society has contributed to about half of the food aid initiatives during the pandemic (Surmeier et al., 2020). It has also worked to share information and dispel Coronavirus myths (Pausadela, 2020). Civil society has further been integral with regards to the rollout of personal protective equipment (PPE) (Harrison, 2020). Shining a light on corruption related to the procurement and distribution of essential medicines and PPE has also fallen largely to civil society. In September 2020, civil society organisations including the Nelson Mandela Foundation and the Foundation for Human Rights demonstrated against Covid-19 corruption – the Auditor General reported almost R500 billion earmarked for the Covid-19 response stolen and the Anti-Corruption Alliance expressed concern over the lack of transparency and accountability in the handling of the pandemic fund (Tsunga et al., 2020). Following this the C-19 People’s Coalition made up of 400 CSOs was set up to ensure that the pandemic response was democratic and socially just. Highlighting and monitoring human rights abuses during the pandemic and with regard to pandemic regulations was also largely undertaken by the civil society sector. This is reflected in the work of the Anti-Repression Working Group, a collective of some 300 civil society organisations set up to track human rights violations and abuses by the police, army and other security forces (Human, 2020). Despite the significant role played by civil society during the pandemic, 67 per cent of South African CSOs reported that the effects of the pandemic have been somewhat or threateningly significant to their resilience (Tshikululu Social Investments, 2020, pp. 11–18). Covid-19 has also impacted on incomes, reserves and donor relationships with two thirds of CSOs noting that their income had declined since the lockdown. Forty per cent of them also reported experiencing difficulty raising funds to carry out their operations during lockdown. Fifty-nine per cent of CSOs reported that they had not lost their donors since lockdown and those that had did not lose funding that amounted to more than 50 per cent of the organisation’s income over the period. Twenty-three per cent of CSOs reported having lost donors since lockdown and not having gained any new donors. Further to this, 40 per cent of CSOs experienced fluctuations in their donor base. Sixty-seven per cent of CSOs further reported a decrease in financial reserves since the lockdown with 58 per cent claiming that they did not apply for emergency funding for a variety of reasons includ-

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ing a lack of awareness, not qualifying or being rejected. In terms of donor responses to the pandemic: 40 per cent of CSOs reported relaxed grant conditions; 37 per cent reported receiving Covid-19 funding; 37 per cent reported changes to budget allocations; and 20 per cent reported that they were given ‘top-up’ grants to mitigate against the pandemic. In essence CSOs experienced relatively little relief from donors – the 37 per cent that received Covid-19 specific funding received grants ranging in value from R400 to R4.5 million totalling R37,305, 062 (Tshikululu Social Investments, 2020, p. 19).

SOCIAL JUSTICE PHILANTHROPY IN THE TIME OF CORONA ‘Social justice’ or ‘social change’ philanthropy has been defined as an effort to ‘facilitate the changing of societal institutions so that they don’t produce the very problems that “charity” tries to alleviate’ (David Hunter quoted in Faber and McCarthy, 2005, p. 10). In this sense social justice philanthropy is concerned with the root causes of injustice and transforming power relations which reinforce these injustices. To this end social justice philanthropy stands in contrast to ‘supervisory philanthropy’ approaches which decide what the primary problems are and what the needs of the beneficiaries may be. Subsequently a supervisory approach would then formulate a project or service designed to ‘remedy’ the problem and select the organisation(s) to advocate for or provide these projects/services. With this approach funders ‘steer’ organisations to ‘speak and act on behalf of a community but are not necessarily grounded in the community’ (Faber and McCarthy, 2005, p. 10). ‘Steering’ therefore stands in the way of self-determination. Social justice philanthropy challenges the systemic and structural barriers that bar citizens and communities from participating in the identification of their problems and possible solutions so that they can ‘speak and act for themselves’ (Dana Alston quoted in Faber and McCarthy, 2005, p. 10). Invoking Freirean ideas, social justice philanthropy may be seen as ‘the practice of freedom’ as opposed to ‘the practice of domination’ (Freire, 1993, p. 62).1 The objective of this chapter is to consider the level of social justice philanthropy in South Africa during Covid-19: to what extent is it ‘steering’ and to what extent is it ‘freeing’ through its support of civil society? This question is posed in the context where CSOs are essentially ‘resource dependent’, that is, able to ‘bolster their outputs with the acquisition of necessary resources’ (Berrett and Holliday, 2018, p. 1191). Drawing from social justice philanthropy concepts of transforming power relations and enabling self-determination, the chapter examines the pandemic crisis through the lens of civil society to highlight how a stronger philanthropic response could strengthen the role of civil society towards social justice. The aim is to offer a fine-grained enquiry that gives substantive perspectives and experiences of

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the lived reality of a subset of CSOs.2 In giving voice to activists associated with these CSOs, this chapter attempts to ‘humanise’ the aggregate, macro survey data. However, it is acknowledged that the subset of activist civil society organisations dedicated to social justice, understood as transforming power relations, is atypical of the some 230,000 CSOs registered as Trusts, Non-Profit Companies (NPCs) or Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) in South Africa. This study is not an attempt to generalise across the CSO sector nor to generalise donor behaviour.

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY This chapter is based on a qualitative study applying thematic analysis based on discussions with ten South African activists, five of whom are females and five males.3 These activists are associated with civil society organisations identified as: non-governmental organisations (NGOs) suggesting larger, professionalised bodies; community-based organisations (CBOs) understood as smaller/less resourced collectives; and social movements – connected to a grassroots base. Their organisations receive a mix of international development aid funding as well as funding from locally based and international philanthropic foundations and trusts and in some cases the private sector and the state. Two activists noted that they were part of more than one CSO. The areas in which these CSOs work include socio-economic rights, human rights, political rights, health rights, gender justice, education access, and social cohesion building. The small sample size of activist interviews is acknowledged; however, the insights reflect the views of those who are at the forefront of advocating for social transformation and the CSOs represent a focus on South Africa’s most pressing social challenges. Funders and donor organisations were not interviewed for this study which poses a limitation. The CSOs purposively sampled reflect both local level campaigns as well as national level campaigns and were selected on the basis of their position at the forefront of social justice work in South Africa. This includes work related to advocacy, protest, and policy change. One of the CSOs operates on a regional basis. A number of activists were comfortable to be named but most also requested that the names of the funders they were referring to be kept anonymous. For this reason activists, their organisations, and their funders are not specifically mentioned in this chapter. The interviews with activists took the form of conversations using an interview schedule and were conducted over Zoom during January and February of 2021, each lasting up to an hour. Given Covid-19 necessitating a shift to online platforms there was not an opportunity to visit CSO offices/spaces or engage with other members of the organisations – in this sense activist testimony was given in their personal capacities.

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PROGRAMMATIC SHIFTS The Covid-19 lockdown regulations placed significant restrictions on CSOs’ programmatic activities. Immediate attention was turned to facilitating the switch to working remotely: ‘We had to scramble to get everyone to work from home’ (Activist 3). The switch necessitated laptops, the provision of data and concerns over network connectivity. The incremental easing of lockdown regulations resulted in a proportion of staff returning to the physical working spaces with the required adjustments relating to PPE, sanitising, and social distancing. The various measures incurred costs that were not budgeted for and CSOs dealt with this by re-purposing existing budgets with the approval of their funders: ‘We wrote to our funders individually to brief them – some donors, especially those that have funded us over the long term, were flexible and allowed us to move a travel line item for example to respond to Covid-19’ (Activist 3). Not all funders were open to this, however, and redirecting line items had to be undertaken strategically: ‘We have about twenty donors so we approached those that we knew were likely to be flexible’ (Activist 3). A challenge for a number of CSOs was whether programmatic activities should be scaled back in order to formulate a humanitarian response: ‘We had comrades with no food – what were the ways and means that we could assist informal settlement comrades? Bear in mind that providing a meal during normal mobilisations makes a huge difference to their lives but we can’t do this during Covid-19’ (Activist 8); ‘We worked with community action teams in our areas who are unemployed and hard hit to distribute food and toiletry sets’ (Activist 3). Formulating a humanitarian challenge was a focal point in consulting with donors: ‘It’s been our moral responsibility to have these conversations with funders – funders have to grapple with our reality’ (Activist 8). In some cases donors were open to this: ‘We have been able to successfully appeal to some of our funders’ (Activist 8). Appeals regarding core funding/ general funding budget line items were, however, more successful than funding allocated to specific programmes or outcomes: ‘Some funders are obsessed with seeing tangible results around legislative frameworks or policy change so we had to stick to those contracts’ (Activist 8); ‘Some funders were reluctant to divert or release funds if there were no deliverables – project managers like deliverables!’ (Activist 9). In this sense if deliverables were not met ‘possibly monies will be paid back’ (Activist 9). There was consensus, though, that funders had been flexible and understanding with regards to the scope of activities and reporting obligations during the pandemic (Activists 1, 3, 8, 9, 10). The more professionalised and better resourced CSOs reported opportunities for access to additional funding specifically to respond to the pandemic:

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‘One donor wrote to say they were reaching out to partners to apply for 43 per cent of their current budget for Covid-19 support to assist organisations to remain sustainable and to respond to the pandemic’ (Activist 3). Funding such as this was used to put in place masking, sanitising, and social distancing but was also used to adapt programmatic activities to include information campaigns centred on Covid-19 as well as distributing masks ‘in the communities where we work’ (Activist 3). This ‘made our lives so much easier’ (Activist 3). The funding amounts were not significant across the board, however: ‘We got a funding opportunity for Covid-19 projects for a fixed amount: R50,000’ (Activist 1). CSOs such as those whose core work involved health advocacy did not have to contend with programmatic shifts and took the view that they would not apply for Covid-19 specific funding in order to leave it for ‘organisations better placed to apply’ (Activist 10). New Tactics A critical concern for CSOs during the Corona pandemic was centred on methods to continue their activities: ‘Covid-19 was difficult for us because our work requires that we be in the community … our core work is ensuring basic services in informal settlements. During Covid-19 communities with no water supply turned to us’ (Activist 1); ‘Covid-19 was a spanner in the works because we couldn’t organise from the grass roots. Protests were banned so communities were silenced. We have families with no water who are still expected to wash their hands and families with no roof who are told to stay at home. So how do we exercise our political rights during a pandemic?’ (Activist 8). In this sense much of the organising and advocacy work has been severely challenged: ‘Covid-19 has minimised our abilities … we couldn’t mobilise so we’ve had no impact on lived realities’ (Activist 8). Activities were transformed or scaled back: ‘advocacy and lobbying around gender justice continued but community mobilisation changed’ (Activist 3). CSOs attempted to mitigate this by resorting to online platforms but these have their limitations: ‘Issues affecting refugees were simply not dealt with because we were unable to hold community dialogues or bring political leadership to account through marches and protest. We were limited to writing emails that received no response and trying to connect on Zoom when not everyone has data or connections. Refugees were not given access to food parcels or the Covid-19 relief grant and we were severely limited in our response to this’ (Activist 2); ‘We started a WhatsApp group to pressure the ward councillor to respond to community challenges around lack of service delivery, especially water – but how do you hold someone responsible on a WhatsApp group?’ (Activist 9).

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CSOs also adapted to the situation by engaging with new methods: ‘We set up a WhatsApp group to receive input from people who were having trouble accessing healthcare in KwaZulu-Natal as we couldn’t connect with them door to door like we usually do’ (Activist 5). These new tactics often resulted in an expanded range of responses, however, placing even more pressure on CSO activities: ‘We are not really a service delivery organisation but rather an advocacy campaign – people were using the WhatsApp group to ask for help with food parcels and accommodation for self-isolation so obviously we had to somehow put that on our agenda’ (Activist 5). In the Western Cape townships of Khayelitsha and Gugulethu CSOs interacted with citizens by adjusting their techniques to form small groups of ‘foot soldiers’ going door to door to deliver PPE and also to monitor deteriorating household food situations with the aim of raising funds or resources to support these households (Activist 9). Another tactic manifested as social solidarity networks such as the Community Action Networks (CANs) operating in Cape Town which attempt to pair networks in better off areas with those in poorer areas to ensure essentials are channelled to those in need and also to support the exchange of information and ideas. Networks such as these have been successful in facilitating the exchange of finance, food, other physical resources as well as information about local needs and how best to address them (Hamann, 2020). These networks have also managed to sustain themselves during the pandemic. This was despite facing government controls such as regulations that municipalities vet food parcels for example, which effectively slowed down local responses. Despite the effectiveness of CANs, they have received criticism in that townships such as Khayelitsha and Gugulethu have a number of community-based networks in operation which could have facilitated a pandemic response without the need for new networks: ‘Why not use existing community-based networks – why are we using CANs from middle class areas?’ (Activist 9). The sentiment here is that township community networks operate to deal with poverty and lack of access that is part of everyday life while the ‘middle-class’ CANs are merely a reaction to the pandemic. Also the reach that CANs have is patchy: ‘CANs were effective in Khayelitsha but not in Gugulethu – they were resourceful in middle-class suburbs but didn’t reach the poor’ (Activist 9). CANs were also problematic in that, ‘CAN funding came from individuals which was tricky because there was no organisation account and we had to use someone’s account and credit card’ (Activist 1). Accessible Funding Part of the crisis incurred by CBOs and community networks during the pandemic is that they ‘absorbed’ the work of larger organisations such as the better resourced NGOs. This is because the larger organisations had to deal

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with switching to remote work and finding budgets to do this while adjusting their activities to fit into lockdown regulations: ‘It was challenging for us not to be able to work with our communities because NGOs were not considered an essential service’ (Activist 3). The smaller, less resourced community networks however, because of their close links with communities reacted immediately to the pandemic crisis as well as the crisis invoked by lockdown regulations. Volunteers or supporters of these networks, for the most part, formed part of the affected communities and couldn’t ‘social distance at home’ or ‘work remotely’ because ‘we are not used to sitting back and watching a crisis unfold’ (Activist 9). ‘In Khayelitsha people had no water and in Gugulethu we had to do something about Gogos (grandmothers) collecting their social grants at the mall when they didn’t have masks and where we were concerned about queues’ (Activist 9). The ‘absorbing’ community networks fundraised for food parcels and made masks at home to distribute to communities. They also reached out to organisations in the vicinity which help people in distress often drawing on their own resources or donating until ‘we ran out of money as it began to eat into our personal budgets’ (Activist 9). Responses drew on ‘existing relationships’: ‘We approached the municipality and councillors over water rations and housing issues – which are not yet resolved’ (Activist 9). New relationships proved problematic: ‘We tried to access the People’s Coalition on Zoom but we got kicked out because the Zoom room was full so we gave up and hardly connected with them. Also, very few people from the coalition reached out to us to organise in a decentralised way’ (Activist 9). Responses were further undertaken on the most meagre budgets: ‘The two CBOs I work with received R20,000 and R30,000 respectively to deal with Covid-19’ (Activist 9). This created significant pressure: ‘Just a few of us linking on Zoom cost R1700 so we had to dip into our pockets and into other budgets earmarked for HIV and TB programmes’ (Activist 9). Here funders were ‘understanding’ but also ‘[they] wanted us to indicate what our future plans were regarding our activities during Covid-19 … there were also questions around whether this work should be left to organisations set up to deal with the humanitarian response’ (Activist 9). This bears on discussions around how funders manage CSOs making decisions in reaction to a crisis situation. It was argued that the Corona pandemic may have been ‘a crisis’ in the eyes of funders but for activists and movements crisis situations arise as a matter of course: ‘For example, when the City of Cape Town evicts or shoots people – that’s a crisis. And, it’s difficult for us to respond because we didn’t anticipate it and funders should know that we can’t anticipate a crisis so funding should be flexible to allow response to crisis as our core work’ (Activist 1). According to statistics released by the South African Solidarity Fund (Solidarity Fund SA), as of October 2020, R3.12 billion was received in

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philanthropic funding to support the Covid-19 response effort. The bulk of these funds, R2,955,756,617 came from the corporate sector and foundations. R84,340,929 came from payroll giving and R83,304,534 came from 303,120 individual donors. The funds were earmarked for health interventions, humanitarian relief, and behavioural change. Specifically R75,900,000 was allocated to prevention campaigns and communication measures to flatten the curve; R409,307,645 was allocated to detecting and understanding the virus through supplying testing kits and conducting research; R412,000,000 was allocated to supporting those most affected by the pandemic taking the form of food and shelter provision; and R1,360,931,558 was allocated to the protection of health and medical workers as well as patients through the provision of personal protective equipment. These funds, however, have not reached the smaller, less professionalised or less resourced CSOs who note that they did not apply because of the large amount of ‘red tape’ or the administrative demands that such an application would require: ‘How long would the government application take to be vetted, approved and how long before the funds reach you?’ (Activist 7). For organisations like these, the funding situation was dire: ‘We sent a proposal for community-based activists representing households to get food parcels – but we’ve never heard back’ (Activist 7). Covid-19 therefore meant a halt to activities: ‘We were not able to continue during hard lockdown and have since then struggled to come together because of the scattering of activists at the forefront as they’ve had their own challenges’ (Activist 7). Another challenge, and this pertains to the better resourced CSOs, is the requirement of the Black Empowerment (BE) certificate to access government funding: ‘The BE verification process is difficult as they don’t recognise the work we do in communities because we don’t have invoices for this work’ (Activist 3). CSOs have formed a lobby group to address this but it is currently ongoing. CSOs who had applied for Solidarity Fund donations had yet to receive a response: ‘We applied for our Gender Based Violence programme but have never heard back’ (Activist 3). A lack of clarity around what Solidarity Fund monies were intended for (Activist 1) as well as a perception that civil society would never get the money (Activist 9) meant that many CSOs did not even consider applying for relief from this fund. The general misgivings around state and government corruption proved a further barrier to applying for Solidarity Fund grants: ‘There are existing mechanisms in place to allocate funding to civil society but new mechanisms like the Solidarity Fund were created so that they could get their hands on the money – it is a new pathway for new money and the same people recycling comrades’ (Activist 9). The Solidarity Fund’s governing board is made up of private sector representatives, cabinet members, and trade union representatives (Hassan, 2020). Concerns around corruption with regards to

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the Solidarity Fund were compounded by concerns of incompetence in vetting and administering funding (Activist 3). CSOs did, however, note that they were part of food and PPE distribution projects in partnership with organisations that had been beneficiaries of the Solidarity Fund (Activists 1, 5).

‘STEERING’ VS ‘FREEING’: THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE Evidence from the activist sample suggests that various philanthropic ‘steering’ practices were in place during the Covid-19 pandemic. This occurred subtly – through funders’ queries about activity plans for the immediate future and conversations about which organisations/bodies were best suited to respond to a humanitarian crisis. This also occurred overtly, however, with funders who refused the redirection of programmatic funding leaving CSOs in a state of uncertainty as to whether the funding would be rolled over to the next funding cycle or if it would have to be returned. ‘Steering’ in the form of curtailing CSOs’ ability to prioritise how best to approach the pandemic situation mirrors existing power relations between funders and beneficiaries. In this sense, funding only flows to activities already predetermined by a funding call or contract. CSOs who identified comrades whose income or food access was affected during the pandemic reflected an engagement with their own social reality that should be enabled as it is likely to lead to new and more relevant priorities and tactics. There was evidence, however, of philanthropic ‘freeing’ practices where funders were flexible about switching budget line items to direct funding towards responding to the pandemic. In this case travel budgets which were unlikely to be utilised during the global travel restrictions were redirected to enable working remotely or funding PPE. Funders also appeared to have relaxed reporting and deliverable deadlines in understanding the crisis context. These more modest ‘freeing’ practices were, however, expanded by donors who approached CSOs offering Covid-19 specific funding and in some cases this funding was significant, at almost 50 per cent of the organisational budget. This served to ‘make things easier’ in the sense that CSO operations could continue with fewer disruptions. But these fresh funding opportunities further provided the space for CSOs to adjust their activities in a more self-determined way in order to remain relevant to their constituencies rather than to their funders in the Covid-19/post-Covid-19 context. Drawing from CSO pandemic experiences and their interactions with funders there are clear opportunities to strengthen philanthropic support of civil society. This would remedy the lack of adequate relief from donors occurring during the pandemic (Tshikululu Social Investments, 2020, p. 19) and also facilitate social justice. The first of these involves more flexibility around CSO

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driven programmatic shifts to respond to crisis situations. In this sense CSOs should have input as to how ‘crisis’ is defined – as pointed out by activists in this study sample, CSOs working for socio-economic justice encounter crisis situations regularly (Activist 1). Following from this, it would be useful to have specific funding to support new or adjusted tactics to ensure that CSO activities continue and remain relevant. Again this does not only pertain to formal crisis situations but should allow for CSOs to examine their own realities and systematically adjust their tactics accordingly. Activists (5, 9) in this study sample have demonstrated how new tactics were instituted on a ‘survivalist’ basis and a shoestring/no budget basis highlighting the difference between a well conceptualised response and an ad hoc response. Finally, the Solidarity Fund contributions are proof that responses to the crisis in South Africa have been swift and generous. The funding, however, has not been easily accessible by civil society at the coalface of responding to the crisis. In the case of larger, more professionalised CSOs red tape applying for funds has been a barrier and in the case of smaller, less professionalised CSOs inadequate capacity and resources have been a barrier. Making this funding more accessible by utilising existing structures to fund less resourced CSOs would remove these barriers somewhat. Examples of this include allocating funding to organisations that sub-grant at provincial or local level such as funding that has been allocated for HIV/AIDS work and gender justice work (Activists 3, 9).

CONCLUSION Despite the critical role played by civil society during the pandemic it has received ‘little relief from donors’. CSOs have had to adapt to working remotely and this has curtailed their advocacy, protest, and mobilisation facilities. There has also been significant pressure with regards to switching programmatic activities to include a humanitarian response as many CSO staffers/ volunteers have been directly impacted by a loss of income and suffered socio-economic deprivation during the Corona crisis. CSOs have also been compelled to set in place new tactics to maintain their activities and remain relevant in their context. Philanthropic support for social justice CSOs has varied in the sense that some funders have been flexible in redirecting funding to allow responses to the pandemic. In some cases specific Covid-19 funding has been made available. In other cases, however, only relatively small amounts of funding have been made available to deal with very significant challenges or redirecting line items without reflecting tangible deliverables has not been permitted. Ways by which philanthropy can move from ‘steering’ to ‘freeing’ civil society include: allowing CSO determination with regards to programming and defining ‘crisis’; supporting new tactics; and committing to more accessible forms of funding, especially for CSOs who may not be pro-

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fessionalised or resourced but who ‘absorb’ the work of larger organisations in a crisis such as Covid-19. To quote Activist 9: ‘philanthropy has been part of the failure’ in the civil society response but can be part of the success if the focus is ‘sustainability and solidarity’.

NOTES 1. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1993) Paulo Freire refers to these ideas – freedom and domination – in the context of education. Thank you to two anonymous reviewers for their insight. 2. 3. I am grateful to the activists who gave up their valuable time to be part of this study.

7. Digital solutions and philanthropy: improving coordination between philanthropists, governments, and non-state actors in Africa Oswald Jumira INTRODUCTION Philanthropic activities have evolved from just being a one-to-one dynamic to a collaborative effort (Reich et al., 2016). More so, the positive developmental effects of philanthropic organisations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Mastercard Foundation have seen the uptake of more like-minded activities, usage of various modes of carrying out philanthropic activities philanthropy, and an increase in timely innovations (Sahay et al., 2020). Inadvertently, such activities amongst stakeholders have also resulted in different types of philanthropic strategic models aligned with the inclusion of beneficiaries, collaboration of stakeholders, and disbursement of resources (Horvath and Powell, 2016; Powell et al., 2019; Reich et al., 2016). Some main strategies around philanthropy are shown in Figure 7.1 taken from Menkhoff (2012). Porter and Kramer (1999) asserted that foundations engaged in philanthropic activities have to drive for the creation of social value which goes beyond just the purchasing power of their grants. These strategic partnerships are highly effective when partners collaborate, share expertise, and combine networks increasing chances of success and sustainability. The core elements of strategic philanthropy include clear goal setting, thorough research, systemised problem solving, ongoing learning, and knowledge sharing (Kania et al., 2014; Porter and Kramer, 1999). Besides the strategic changes, philanthropy is now migrating from just being about funding mechanisms to participating in capacity building and infrastructure development (Webb and Ogawa, 2020). Organisations have embraced using approaches that build trust and are mutually beneficial. An example is the Bridging Leadership Approach that aims to ensure that mutually beneficial impactful interactions occur amongst stake86

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Menkhoff (2012).

Figure 7.1

Philanthropic strategies

holders (Webb and Ogawa, 2020). The focus is that of capacity building and building strong relationships between various groups versus just empowering one group (Menkhoff, 2012). Nevertheless, philanthropy is also a form of power that can play a key role in democratic societies and affect the provision of basic services, and the empowerment and political engagement of countries (Reich et al., 2016). Hence, it is important for a country or a region to have autonomy over the in-country philanthropic activities. More so, with the plethora of philanthropic activities that can occur through various stakeholders, this leads to a level of fragmentation with different funders being responsible for various initiatives. This makes it a mammoth task for governments to track and be fully aware of all past and current philanthropic activities which can lead to resource disparities and cases of fraud or even lead to systemic inefficiencies. Such dynamics can cause philanthropic organisations to become territorial about funding sources and utilisation of these funds which can result in political constraints. The usage of technology and platforms in philanthropic engagements has aimed to increase the impact and ease management burden as well as increase trust amongst stakeholders (Cinnamon, 2020). An example is the use of blockchain in supply chains and procurement processes in order to increase the security of projects and fund transfers (Li et al., 2018). Furthermore, if such technologies and platforms are utilised well, they can provide relatively real time feedback through dashboards that assist with visibility on projects and interventions.

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This encourages digital monitoring and evaluation tools that enable timely and efficient pivoting or adjustments. Assessment of philanthropic activities and tools is necessary in order to align goals and value appropriation. This is very important when it comes to disruptive occurrences such as pandemics or natural disasters. The case examples in this study are one step in that direction where the author aligns with moving to a systems approach (Dalberg Advisors, 2020). In the context of digital solutions (platforms) and philanthropic activities, this study explores the aspects that have changed and the dynamics around what are the key attributes, or lack thereof of platforms that have been engaged for various purposes across different sectors in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. It looks at the role of governments and key stakeholders in the systemic processes of the platforms. The onus is to highlight what is distinctive about the platforms ranging from a conceptualisation perspective up to an orientation towards social good outcomes.

COVID-19 AND PHILANTHROPY Pandemics, as abnormal occurrences, drastically affect the systemic processes of philanthropic activities. With pandemics having diverse implications, the level of isolation that has come with Covid-19 is something that has posed challenges in terms of the reach and dissemination of interventions highlighting different crucial aspects to the philanthropic community (Nowski et al., 2020). From the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, current forms of philanthropy were challenged as alternative forms of involvement, volunteering and investing were emerging (Paton, 2020). This has seen the pandemic being described as a catalyst of a global transformational wave around philanthropic activities (Dalberg Advisors, 2020). An example is the Dangote Foundation in Nigeria which through the CACovid coalition assisted in building 39 isolation centres (Webb and Ogawa, 2020). Nevertheless, it is not only the models that are intriguing but the speed and upsurge in collaboration under which these philanthropic activities are being conducted.1 The disruptive nature of the pandemic saw foundations and philanthropists in a rush to reassess strategies, execute emergency plans, and assemble resources (Dalberg Advisors, 2020). Covid-19 has spurred catalytic philanthropy where the funders are primarily responsible for the success of the projects and causes that are supported (Kramer, 2009). Catalytic philanthropists are more geared towards knowledge gathering which informs and motivates their actions. Agility and compliance is key in philanthropic organisations to quickly address civil society needs (Bates and Denysschen, 2020). This has seen a range of community-based rapid response funds, diagnostics and vaccine developments – all aimed at flattening the curve. An important

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consideration was that of addressing systemic inequalities through faster dissemination of funds and initiatives with fewer conditions. Some notable examples include how South Africa introduced stimulus packages and grants which aimed at cushioning the impact of the pandemic on businesses and employees; or how mobile money was successfully utilised in Togo for the dissemination of grants (Gelb and Mukherjee, 2020). Confronted with the global pandemic, individual and institutional philanthropy had to be and has been responsive, engaged, and nimble. One of the key areas for building recovery is support to the public sector through provision of risk capital to support initiatives, and encourage cross-agency activity to solve problems. The five key priorities aligned with Covid-19 have been to do with information dissemination, coordination and geolocation of cases, strengthening health systems, supply of basic services, and supporting the vulnerable population (European Investment Bank, 2021). When it comes to communities, direct impact was felt in the disruption of sources of income, food supply systems, and education. This saw different initiatives look at how to alleviate such concerns and assist governments. Examples of such programmes are the Feed Africa Response to Covid-19 (FAREC) which aims at ensuring continued food security during and after the Covid-19 pandemic. The primary goal is to support African governments, the private sector, small and medium enterprises, and farmers to mitigate the impact of the pandemic (African Development Bank, 2020a, 2020b). The Rockefeller Foundation has also targeted innovative and impactful projects that are aimed at assisting food production systems. On top of direct food distribution, other initiatives are the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition.2 One of the key focus areas is to co-create technology solutions in agriculture through investment consortia across agricultural systems: seeds; fertilisers; extensions; input markets; inclusive finance; and output markets. The strained dynamics of philanthropic activities have been even more rampant when it comes to the dissemination of the vaccine. Though communities such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)3 were formed way back in 2017 aimed at developing vaccines for current and future pandemics, a lot of systemic obstacles have operated to slow down progress. Governments must find ways to reduce the red tape and enact disaster acts or emergency policies which enable them to implement and support a number of initiatives that could take years.4 Though progressive coalitions such as the African Medicines Agency Treaty5 are gaining traction, it is yet to be ratified by most countries. The establishment of such continental regulation is aimed at reducing the complexity of regulatory frameworks which can enhance the timely dissemination of medicines and vaccines. The pandemic has highlighted the need of competent regulatory bodies that approve and monitor innovative

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health technologies in a timely way. Such openness has also affected how philanthropic activities have quickly addressed capacity and infrastructural constraints in different contexts. When it comes to vaccine diplomacy, ideally the dissemination of these vaccines must be grounded in solidarity, not the advancement of geopolitical or market interests. The deals between rich countries and pharmaceutical companies are creating a chasm of inequity. Vaccine manufacturing countries such as India, USA, China, and Russia seem to be subtly using the procurements and disbursement of vaccines for political gains.6 Hence, concerned stakeholders formed The People’s Vaccine Alliance7 to urge that once vaccines were developed that they be made available for all people, in all countries, free of charge. The variants of the Covid-19 vaccines and their effectiveness is also an aspect that is giving opposition parties ammunition against current governments.8 The equitable and timely access to vaccines is important. The Davos agenda echoes this sentiment as it requires donors, pharmaceutical corporations, and research institutions working on Covid-19 vaccines to openly share their technology and intellectual property through the World Health Organization Covid-19 Technology Access Pool. To implement such dynamics this requires the full participation at a governmental level from developing countries and ensuring transparency and accountability of all decisions with a common agenda of aspects such as building long-term vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. Key is addressing the systemic and structural barriers to inequality for there to be lasting success in philanthropic activities. Having organisations such as the African Union play a key role in acquiring vaccines for cash constrained countries is also key. Of note is that though there are a range of digital solutions that can be utilised in carrying out philanthropic activities, this chapter will primarily be looking at digital platforms where stakeholders meet. Due to the complex nature of platforms, understanding their formation processes and how they evolve can also contribute to best understanding how to effectively manage these solutions (Parker, Alstyne and Choudary, 2016).

PLATFORMS/DIGITAL SOLUTIONS AND PHILANTHROPY The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated social distancing and increased the uptake of digital solutions and platforms in service delivery and organisational functions. Whilst on one hand, this has opened a whole plethora of problems such as cyberattacks and overwhelmed platforms, it has also provided opportunities for the use of other tools and solutions across industries. This has seen a need for stakeholders to balance agility, manage risk and regulatory compliance as funds are moved quickly in civil society (Bates and Denysschen,

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2020). Hence, it is important to look at ways that all stakeholders can engage and interact efficiently especially through the utilisation of technology. Thus, learning from cases that seem to have managed to pull together various stakeholders for one cause is important. This is the premise that this chapter is based on and looks to inform ways that stakeholder engagement can be increased whilst at the same time building trust and ensuring accountability. Just as key processes can be streamlined, the key question is how to quickly approve grants and coordinated philanthropic activities reporting in a timely manner – this is where the digital platforms come into play. One of the main barriers that has been highlighted is not cost but collective will and the need for leading foundations collectively to adopt a single platform (Nowski et al., 2020). This is not an easy feat with multiple donors involved with their own strategies. With the possibility of readily established platforms exploiting the pandemic to ‘strengthen their economic and political position in a time of existential threat’ (Cinnamon, 2020, p. 243), then for safety reasons this has seen the establishment of platforms from regulatory, industry bodies, donors and non-governmental organisations. This could be due to a lack of trust, even though these established platforms are trying to change their contentious business models through the perception of creating public value through publishing and sharing data publicly. An example of this was shown by Cinnamon (2020) as he noted how Google Maps through publishing Covid-19 Community Mobility Reports9 is strengthening its position whilst at the same time offering a much needed service during the pandemic. Just as the world has had to rethink processes due to the pandemic, the same factors have affected the philanthropic community. Hence, the key question that is addressed in this chapter is what are the key dynamics or important learnings that can be acquired from the digital solutions that were undertaken to assist in flattening the Covid curve and reaching vulnerable communities. It is imperative to understand how government, private sector, and philanthropy all came together to address these challenges. This is where the aspect of leverage points comes in.

LEVERAGE POINTS FRAMEWORK AND PHILANTHROPY To better highlight the characteristics occurring amongst the actors in the philanthropic initiatives, this chapter will look at the communities as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). A CAS perspective in philanthropy is common due to the societal elements (Mati, 2020a). The overall characteristics which align a CAS with the activities around philanthropy are:

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• Activities usually include a large number of actors – this is regardless of context that the philanthropic activities are engaged in. • The actors exhibit influential behaviour and loops in interactions – what one actor does affects the interest of other stakeholders. • Activities in the system have a historical reference and pattern formation – the activities undertaken in the community have a history and time period with different dynamics that affect and can explain present behaviour. • Self-organisation and adaptability – CAS are deemed unpredictable due to self-organisation (Cilliers, 1998). The ability for an organisational and social structure to behave as a CAS has been associated with the ability to adapt successfully to rapidly changing environments (Eidelson, 1997). This is rampant around philanthropic activities. • Feedback (positive and negative) – the community has feedback loops that arise from the interactions between different actors and resource providers like funders or human capital. Feedback is also in the form of results aligning strategic initiatives and policies with what the community has produced (Eidelson, 1997). • Tipping points, attractors, or leverage points – this is when small changes in the community have exponential effects (Gladwell, 2002; Meadows, 2008). Some aspects are quite clear, but the aspect of leverage points or attractors needs further clarification. A leverage point is a point/place within a complex system where a small change or shift produces big changes (Meadows, 1997, 2008). This was also noted by Malcolm Gladwell as he identified these events as tipping points in a system (Gladwell, 2002). They have the ability to define the behaviour of agents in a CAS and push a system in a different direction that can include death and hence can potentially constrain the choices and actions of the system actors (McDonald, 2009; Nowak et al., 2005). Leverage points capture the interplay between structure and dynamics in a complex system and are the stable conditions that govern socio-technical systems (Hazy, 2011; Nowak et al., 2005). Leverage points or attractors can be technical standards, events, people, or ideas that drive the system towards or away from the funder’s goal (Braa and Nielsen, 2013; Fischer and Riechers, 2019; Nguyen and Bosch, 2013). These are the key points that we aim to highlight in the leverage points that are identified from the leverage framework used in this study. Meadows (2008) outlined that these leverage points or attractors are often not intuitive and outlined ‘places to intervene’ in a system according to increasing order of effectiveness in 12 levels. These grow from outlining the constants and parameters of the system (e.g. tax, subsidies), to abstract ideas of shifting paradigms and mindsets (e.g. the value created by the system). This leverage point outline is shown in Figure 7.2. The greatest shifts in a system are fundamentally in the systemic processes.

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Meadows (2008).

Figure 7.2

Leverage points of a system

The advantages of using a leverage points perspective outlined by Fischer and Riechers (2019) include: • Bridging the causal and teleological explanations in system changes as variables influence each other. • Recognition of explicitly ‘deep’ leverage pointers – which are places that need attention or where interventions are difficult. • Leverage points enable the examination of interactions between shallow and deep system changes. • Leverage points can act as methodological boundaries and provide a way for interdisciplinary academics and societal stakeholders to collaborate. The use of leverage points entails a high level of continuous assessment.

METHODOLOGY There are four case studies that I selected, and in these I consider the formation and functioning of the multi-stakeholder platforms. I use document analysis, website content analysis, and feedback from focus group sessions. This is

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aimed at mapping design choices and dynamics around multi-stakeholder platforms involved in Covid-19 related initiatives. The identification of the leverage points will be outlined from narratives around the key activities of the platforms and the Philanthropy Framework proposed by the Rockefeller Foundation Advisors (Rockefeller Foundation Advisors, 2019). The framework was selected as a guide on what aspects to look for and consider from the platform perspective. This is outlined in Table 7.1. Table 7.1

Outline of the Philanthropy Framework

Framework core element

Key aspect/dimensions

Leverage points

Platform scope Charter (the platform’s scope, form of governance and decision making protocol)

Platform governance Platform culture Platform mission & purpose Time horizon Focal point Accountability

Social Impact (its implicit or explicit agreement with society about the value it will create)

Legitimacy Transparency Direction of influence on society Independence/interdependence Approach to risk Operating approaches Resourcing: buy vs. build Decision-making: centralised vs. decentralizsed Initiative: proactive vs. responsive Flexibility: creative vs. disciplined

Operating Model (the approach to the resources, structures and systems needed to implement strategy)

Programming: broad vs. deep Relationships: networked vs. independent Operating capabilities Talent Financial tools (impact investing, PRIs, grants, etc.) Knowledge and strategic insights Reputation and influence Networks and relationships Project management

Source:

Rockefeller Foundation Advisors (2019).

Identified in the cases

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Though the Rockefeller Philanthropic Framework was initially used for organisations to be able to align resources for maximum impact, the author believes an ecosystem approach is also important. The process of collating the leverage points will be guided by the narratives of the cases, where the leverage points will be identified for the platforms. The study will follow the leverage point identification process outlined by Ngongoni et al. (2020) shown in Figure 7.3.

Source:

Ngongoni et al. (2020).

Figure 7.3

Leverage point/attractor identification process

CASE ANALYSIS The selected case studies are involved in various activities aligned with the fight against Covid-19 across Africa. These are Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP), Trusted Travel, Global Education Coalition, and HealthConnect. An overview of the platforms is shown in Table 7.2. The analysis of the cases below follows the outline of the Philanthropy Framework shown in Table 7.2. Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP) Charter: The AMSP platform is aimed at curbing systemic corruption that is rampant in the public sector supply chains. The platform offers cost effectiveness and transparency as it enables African Union member states to purchase medical equipment and have immediate access to certified and thoroughly vetted manufacturers and procurement partners in Africa and globally. This applies to medical equipment such as diagnostic kits, PPE, and clinical management devices. With the African Union being the facilitator, deals are quickly finalised. For example, with ventilators, there has been a ventilator exchange programme set up with Philips to replace outdated ventilators10 and even getting philanthropic partners such as The Higherlife Foundation

Geographic focus

Facilitator

Description

Aspect

Table 7.2

to offer appropriate distance education to learners affected by the closure of institutions due to Covid-19

health documentation for travellers during entry and exit across borders – particularly PCR test

The Caribbean

Africa

African Union

critical diagnostics and medical equipment

provision of Covid-19-related consumables,

Africa

Global

UNESCO

and exchange amongst stakeholders

simplifies verification of public

African Union

Platform that enables collaboration

Technologic platform that

Online marketplace to facilitate the sale and

#LearningNeverStops

(AMSP)a

Global Education Coalitionc

Trusted Travelb (My Covid Pass tool)

The African Medical Supplies Platform

Overview of case studies

Global

Praekelt.Org

information

assists the dissemination of

WhatsApp services that

alerts utilising USSD and

checks and health worker

offers health alerts, health

Technological platform that

HealthConnectd

96 African philanthropy

Not for profit

Organisation, Microsoft

Baobab Circle, UNICEF, World Health

French government, The Elma Foundation,

Canadian Government, Chinese Republic,

Higher life Foundation, Skoll Foundation,

Unite, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,

The Susan Thompson Buffet Foundation,

Gavi, Mastercard Foundation, JANNGO,

Rockefeller Foundation, MTN, VAYA,

Commission for Africa (UNECA), The

Control (CDC), United Nations Economic

Not for profit

Econet Wireless. PanaBIOS

CAFAC), Technology Partners:

Commission (AFCAC /

African Civil Aviation

Tourism Resilience Council,

Initiative, Global Travel &

(AEZO), The Afrochampions

Economic Zones Organization

Board, AfCTA, African

UNECA, African Tourism

Control (CDC), WHO, ICAO,

African Centre for Disease

Strategic partners:

(AMSP)a

Afreximbank, African Centre for Disease

Trusted Travelb (My Covid Pass tool)

The African Medical Supplies Platform

Notes: a See https://​amsp​.africa/​. b See https://​africacdc​.org/​trusted​-travel/​. c See https://​en​.unesco​.org/​covid19/​educationresponse/​globalcoalition. d See https://​www​.praekelt​.org/​healthconnect.

Financial model

Key partners

Aspect

Johnson, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundations, Patrick J. McGovern, The ELMA philanthropies, Ford Foundation, USAID, OMIDYAR Network, UNFPA Global implementation partners: World Health Organisation, Clinton Health Access, LivingGoods, UNICEF, PATH, World Food Program, VillageReach

Food Programme, ITU, Global Partnership for Education, Education Cannot Wait, the OIF (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie), OECD, Asian Development Bank. Private partners: BBC, Microsoft, GSMA, Weidong Cloud Education, Google, Facebook, Zoom, KPMG and Coursera Philanthropic partners: Khan Academy, Dubai Cares, ProFuturo Digital Education and Sesame Street

Not for profit

of Health, Johnson &

WHO, World Bank, World

Not for profit

South African Department

KPMG, ILO, UNHCR, UNICEF,

HealthConnectd

Multilateral partners:

#LearningNeverStops

Global Education Coalitionc

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to garner and mobilise private sector response to the concerning scenario of outdated ventilators.11 Identified leverage points: centralised decision making. Social impact: The platform is a forum for information on what support is available in terms of Covid-19 as well as who the key partners are in these strategic arrangements. For example, in January 2021, MTN donated USD 25 million to support the AU Covid-19 programme12 and LumiraDx, a point-of-care diagnostic company, was also announced to be providing five thousand portable diagnostic instruments and related Covid-19 antigen tests.13 Though the transparency is evident, it is yet to be seen with feedback from the countries that have utilised the platform. Transparency needs to be both ways where accountability is presented of which countries were assisted and how. Identified leverage points: feedback channels. Operating model: The technology partners are Janngo14 and Vaya.15 Janngo is a social start-up studio that builds digital technology ecosystems across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the USA. Its agility and knowledge of the African tech ecosystem is key in assisting AMSP. On the other hand, Vaya is an Econet Group subsidiary that is focused on transport and logistics. The logistics services range from good to provision of access to emergency services. The footprint across Africa is in Botswana, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Having a partner that is privy to logistics aspects across different African contexts is important in ensuring relevance of the application. Identified leverage points: versatile technology partners; relevant knowledge bases. Trusted Travel – My Covid Pass Charter: The Trusted Travel – My Covid Pass platform is a secure, tamperproof digital application. Currently the primary aim is to ensure that users utilise authentic PCR Covid tests when travelling which can minimise the need for being tested in every country during transit. It has integrated airlines, hotels, taxi hailing companies and access control systems. The attractiveness is in portability as users can download an application and one-click validation of test results to curb forgeries. The application also offers the latest health-related travel advice from the Africa-CDC. Interestingly, the application can be used for disease monitoring and spatial risk factor analysis with databases that are formulated from user information that collates the laboratory tests and gathers data from contact tracing networks. This shows how multifaceted the application is, as it has many applications which can be utilised post-Covid.

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Its current scope is the African continent though it is designed to be transcontinental. Identified leverage points: ease of use; multi-functionality; globalisation strategy. Social impact: Though the application is meant to be utilised across borders, only Kenya has fully onboarded its data and testing facilities onto the platform. With the African Union being the facilitator of the platform, this is expected to improve as the mandate across Africa is sharing critical information to support creation of safe public health corridors across the continent. The true impact of the platform will only be visible once the network effects improve and there are more users as there will be more data available to analyse and interpret. Identified leverage points: government-related facilitator. Operating model: The technology partners are Econet Wireless and PanaBIOS. Econet Wireless is a Zimbabwean telecommunications platform that has a wide footprint across Africa. It also has a substantial cohort of subsidiaries that it can utilise in the implementation of the My Covid Pass application. These include the likes of Liquid Telecom which has a portfolio of both fibre and satellite connectivity which can make accessibility of the application relatively easy as users are in transit and travelling across platforms. PanaBIOS on the other hand is a platform that has a comprehensive digitally-apt suite for predicting and detecting Covid-19 hotspots, tracing contacts, tracking and disseminating the results of Covid-19 tests. The PanaBIOS application is also open to all member states though it is currently being piloted in Ghana. PanaBIOS is built on global partnerships such as with Harvard with a focus on AI technology utilisation. Having such a technological partner makes the platform more structurally sound as some aspects are already sourced or developed by partners. Identified leverage points: versatile technology partners; plug and play strategy. Global Education Coalition Charter: The Global Education Coalition is a consortium of organisations that are committed to ensuring the support of the equitable continuation of learning and access to education and strengthening learning systems. The key focal areas are connectivity, teachers and gender. UNESCO is the facilitator with a substantial presence globally. Identified leverage points: open membership. Social impact: The members on the platform list what their offerings are and UNESCO collaborates on what they might need and identify suitable partners

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that meet those needs. Due to the philanthropic efforts amongst members, this mode even delivers better results as some members are offering services for free. Some results have been Orange offering free internet services through its subsidiaries for access to learning platforms in countries of operation or the formulation of a Ministry Distance Learning Platform by the Ministry of Education of Senegal, UNESCO, Microsoft, and Huawei to support teachers and students to continue learning.16 Identified leverage points: ‘malleable’ product offering. Operating model: The platform is designed to be agile and flexible so that it delivers competent responses that offer continuity and maintain the quality of education for the students. However, it is important to note that the coalition contributions do not aim to replace the national responses by respective countries. The coalition is there to engage new actors that normally would not have been obvious partners, such as technology and media organizations, to complement and support national efforts to ensure continuity of learning. Financing is under the consortium hence lifting the burden from needy recipients. Identified leverage points: complementary offerings. HealthConnect Charter: HealthConnect for Covid-19 is a set of interconnected services which are designed to target various aspects of health crises. It has two applications which are Covid-19 related. Firstly, there was a multi-channel application specifically designed for the South African government. It is called Covid-19 Connect which connected the health system to over 6 million citizens and health workers. Though it was an application for the Department of Health, Praeklt.org were the ones facilitating it. The other application is called HealthAlert and it is for the World Health Organization. Countries and organisations that are using one or a combination of these services include the WHO, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Madagascar, Timor-Leste, and Uganda. Identified leverage points: diverse core network. Social impact: Correct information dissemination is key in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic. HealthConnect went further and even had an element of considering the mental distress that workers were under. This was by the platform: disseminating accurate, timely information to the public via WhatsApp at population scale across multiple languages, offering a health check option which assists in risk assessment and allowing for early detection, mapping and management of Covid-19 cases using USSD and the official HealthAlert WhatsApp Service; and providing psychosocial support and

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official, up-to-date Covid-19 guidance and information to frontline healthcare workers. This is where platforms like HealthConnect came in handy as the information could be trusted. Identified leverage points: diverse product portfolio. Operating model: HealthConnect belongs to a portfolio of predecessors that follow the same technological architecture. One key predecessor is the MomConnect platform which was targeted at information dissemination towards pregnant women to decrease the mortality rate. Hence to quickly come up with a Covid-19 response was not difficult for Praeklt.org and the relationships that had been built with the South African National Department of Health were crucial to the dissemination of the platform. Identified leverage points: experienced core developer.

DISCUSSION Platform usage in philanthropic activities is key. Nevertheless, it seems the trend is that governments are not at the core of the facilitation of these platforms. Yes, even though a key consortium body such as the African Union is the facilitator of key platforms like AMSP and Trusted Travel, it is still up to individual countries to choose to onboard the platforms or use the applications as it requires the countries to share records and health system aspects. Nevertheless, this does not negate the usefulness of these applications. In this study the key leverage points that were identified under each category are shown in Table 7.3. What is key with having African-based facilitators shifts the discourse from the wealthier countries to the developing countries. This also helps in aligning what the governments truly need when it comes to carrying out philanthropic activities. Hence, the development of such platforms with key African partners is a step in the right direction.

CONCLUSIONS This study utilised the Rockefeller Philanthropic Framework as a foundation to assist with identifying leverage points for digital platforms utilised in philanthropic activities. It highlighted 15 leverage points which are expected to either change or increase with the growth of the platforms. This offers a foundational step for further investigations into such platforms. One suggestion would be to incorporate qualitative interviews that would add depth to the identification of key events in the platform ecosystems. Another aspect is that once a substantive list of leverage points is attained it would be valuable to have experts

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involved in philanthropic activities and the curation of such platforms give feedback on the leverage points and rank them. Table 7.3

Identified leverage points

Framework core element

Key aspect/dimensions

Leverage points

Charter (the platform’s

Platform scope

Centralised decision

scope, form of governance

Platform governance

making

and decision making

Platform culture

Ease of use

protocol)

Platform mission & purpose

Multi-functionality

Time horizon

Globalisation strategy

Focal point

Diverse core network

Social impact (its implicit

Accountability

Feedback channels

or explicit agreement with

Legitimacy

Government-related

society about the value it

Transparency

facilitator

will create)

Direction of influence on society

Diverse product portfolio

Independence/interdependence

‘Malleable’ product

Open membership

Approach to risk

offering

Operating model (the

Operating approaches

Versatile technology

approach to the resources,

Resourcing: buy vs. build

partners

structures and systems

Decision-making: centralised vs. decentralised

Relevant knowledge bases

needed to implement

Initiative: proactive vs. responsive

Plug and play strategy

strategy)

Flexibility: creative vs. disciplined

Experienced core developer

Programming: broad vs. deep

Complementary offerings

Relationships: networked vs. independent Operating capabilities Talent Financial tools (impact investing, PRIs, grants, etc.) Knowledge and strategic insights Reputation and influence Networks and relationships Project management

NOTES 1. See https://​www​.mckinsey​.com/​industries/​public​-and​-social​-sector/​our​-insights/​ a​-transformative​-moment​-for​-philanthropy​#. 2. See https://​www​.r​ockefeller​foundation​.org/​news/​the​-rockefeller​-foundation​ -commits​-nearly​-usd​-35​-million​-to​-covid​-19​-response​-efforts​-in​-africa/​. 3. See https://​cepi​.net/​. 4. See https://​www​.r​ockefeller​foundation​.org/​blog/​promoting​-digital​ -transformation​-lower​-income​-countries/​.

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5. See https://​www​.ifpma​.org/​resource​-centre/​call​-to​-heads​-of​-state​-of​-the​-african​ -union​-to​-ratify​-the​-african​-medicines​-agency​-treaty/​. 6. See https://​cherwell​.org/​2021/​02/​24/​vaccine​-politics​-global​-inequality​-during​ -the​-covid​-19​-pandemic/​. 7. See https://​peoplesvaccine​.org/​. 8. See https://​www​.weforum​.org/​agenda/​2021/​01/​philanthropy​-must​-support​ -people​-vaccine/​. 9. See https://​www​.google​.com/​covid19/​mobility/​. 10. See https://​amsp​.africa/​philips​-and​-the​-african​-union​-join​-forces​-to​-create​ -access​-to​-healthcare​-solutions​-for​-covid​-19​-and​-beyond/​. 11. See https://​amsp​.africa/​press​-release​-african​-and​-global​-philanthropists​-team​-up​ -to​-manufacture​-covid​-19​-medical​-equipment​-in​-africa/​. https://​amsp​.africa/​mtn​-partners​-with​-african​-union​-on​-covid​-19​ 12. See -vaccinations/​. https://​amsp​.africa/​global​-partnership​-to​-introduce​-a​-connected​-point​-of​ 13. See -care​-diagnostic​-platform​-for​-covid​-19​-antigen​-testing​-in​-africa/​. 14. See https://​www​.janngo​.com/​what​-we​-do/​. 15. See https://​www​.econetafrica​.com/​company/​vaya​-africa. https://​en​.unesco​.org/​news/​covid​-19​-how​-unesco​-global​-education​ 16. See -coalition​-tackling​-biggest​-learning​-disruption​-history.

8. Comparative multilateral philanthropy: the cases of the European Union Commission and the Asian Development Bank on crisis and non-crisis philanthropic engagements Faten Aggad INTRODUCTION Philanthropic activity is not new in Europe and Asia. In fact, it has a long tradition. But its entry into the regional realm is a recent phenomenon that resulted from the shock of the financial crisis of 2008. Two developments took place in each region following the crisis. Europe witnessed its governments struggle to raise funding for socio-economic recovery. Many European economies, as was seen in Greece and Italy, struggled to cater for their populations’ basic needs. This came at a time when challenges, such as increased inequalities and climate change, entered the political agenda. Philanthropy, particularly charity, subsequently demonstrated its value during the Greek debt crisis for instance with some foundations contributing up to €1 billion in grants (Dracopoulos, 2015). At the same time, Asia was experiencing a different development. Many of its economies boomed in the period following the global financial crisis, giving birth to more High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs). In 2018, ten years after the crisis started, the Asia-Pacific region was contributing the most to the HNWI population growth worldwide (42.4 per cent) and adding 41.4 per cent of the new HNWI wealth in the same year (Rudin, 2018). The region’s HNWI wealth more than doubled between 2011 and 2019, increasing from US$10.75 trillion to US$22.18 trillion, thus exceeding both the US (US$21.73 trillion) and Europe (US$16.70). The latter’s HNWI population was also similar to that of the Asia-Pacific region in 2011 (Capgemini, 2021a). 104

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These dynamics within the two regions formed the backdrop to the evolution of philanthropic cooperation with regional organisations. While the trajectory in terms of engagement with multilateral institutions, especially regionally, is different, the contribution of philanthropy in both regions remains significant. This chapter explores how institutions sought to structure their cooperation with philanthropic organisations and how philanthropies have engaged with multilateral institutions in Europe and in Asia. The chapter will particularly focus on the cases of the European Union (EU) institutions and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The chapter will look at engagement during non-crisis as well as crisis situations. With respect to the latter, focus is placed on collaboration and engagement around responses to the crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic although it also extends the analysis, in the case of Asia, to other prior experiences notably in the aftermath of major natural disasters.

THE STATE OF PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE AND ASIA Philanthropic giving is on the rise in both Europe and Asia. According to the latest available estimates (2017) philanthropic contributions in Europe are estimated at €87.5 billion per annum. The data covers 20 countries. Private citizens remain the main contributors, representing 53 per cent (€46 billion) of total contributions. They are followed by corporations (€21.7 billion), foundations (€16 billion), and lotteries (€3 billion) (ERNOP, 2017). The rise of HNWIs in Asia, estimated at 6.5 million individuals in the Asia-Pacific region with a net worth of US$22.2 trillion (2020) (Capgemini, 2021b), has propelled with it the philanthropic sector in the region. Although no reliable data is available for the latter, figures on philanthropic data by HNWI is available for some countries. For example, philanthropic giving from HNWI in India was estimated at approximately US$5.6 billion in 2016. This is a six-fold increase from the figure of US$934 million in 2011 (Sheth et al., 2017). In Hong Kong, philanthropic giving, 40 per cent of which came through foundations, was estimated at US$110 million in 2017 (Lord, 2019), while in mainland China it reached US$555 million (2017), a significant increase from the US$1.3 in 2005, thus reflecting the economic situation in the country (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2017). Donations by HNWIs complement the less-well documented field of traditional forms of giving covering multiple sectors. While both Asia and Europe have recorded an exponential growth in philanthropic giving, resources were unequally distributed across the regions. In Asia, the economic discrepancies between countries in the region and the different degrees of maturity of the philanthropic landscape resulted in an uneven

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distribution of philanthropic giving (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2017). Similarly, in Europe and specifically among members of the European Union, the distribution of philanthropic giving is uneven. According to a study conducted in 2016 by an umbrella association of philanthropic organisations, Germany has a significantly higher amount of charitable expenditures – approaching €17 billion in 2012. This is 70 per cent higher than the second European country on the list of total expenditures, Italy (McGill, 2016).

ROLE AND MANDATES OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS It is important to analyse philanthropic engagement with regional institutions in the context of the mandate of these regional bodies. This is important not only to understand the nature of engagement between actors operating at the regional level but also to be able to gauge the motives and the limits of philanthropic engagement with regional institutions. The case studies analysed in this chapter cover two institutions that are different not only in relation to their respective mandates but also in the manner in which they are organised to engage with non-members, including with philanthropies. The European Commission (EC) is a central institution of the EU aiming at implementing the European project. It employs 32,000 permanent and contractual staff, of whom more than 21,000 are employed in the Brussels headquarters of the institution (European Commission, 2020b). Its mandate is set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty). Articles 3 and 4 define both the exclusive (to the EC) and shared competencies (with its 27 EU member states) (see Table 8.1). In addition to its mandate, the EC is empowered to initiate action, as long as it supports and is in consultation with member states on areas including: protection and improvement of human health; industry; culture; tourism; education, vocational training, youth and sport; civil protection; as well as administrative cooperation (art. 6, Lisbon Treaty) (European Commission, 2012a). To implement the mandate, the EC benefits from a generous budget. For the period covering 2021–2027, for instance, the EC is expected to manage a budget (staff and programmes) of more than €1.7 trillion of which €750 billion will be dedicated to post-Covid-19 economic recovery (European Commission, 2020a). The budget is divided across the different areas of work of the EC allowing it not only to substantially finance implementations of projects but to co-finance. For instance, in the area of research and innovation (R&I), the multiannual budget amounts to €88.2 billion while external action – an area which, as we will argue later in the chapter, benefits from philanthropic engagement – receives an €85.2 billion budget (European Commission, 2021).

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Table 8.1

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Competencies of the European Commission

Competency

Issue area/sector

Exclusive competency of the EC

Customs union

(art. 3, Lisbon Treaty)

Establishing competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market Monetary policy for the member states whose currency is the euro Conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy Common commercial policy

Shared competency with EU

Internal market

member states (art. 4, Lisbon

Social policy

Treaty)

Economic, social and territorial cohesion Agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources Environment Consumer protection Transport Trans-European networks Energy Area of freedom, security and justice Common safety concerns in public health matters Research, technological development and space (in as far as it does not prevent member states exercising their competence in this area) Development cooperation and humanitarian aid (in as far as it does not prevent member states exercising their competence in this area)

Unlike the EU, which is a regional integration project, the ADB is a regional development bank, consisting of 49 member countries in Asia and the Pacific in addition to 19 countries from outside the region. Its focus is on the eradication of extreme poverty in the Asia-Pacific region including in the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Asian Development Bank, n.d. (a)). The Bank manages financial commitments from member countries to the tune of US$20.8 million (2019) and implements its mandate through multiple instruments such as loans, technical assistance, grants, equity investment and other forms of debt securities (Asian Development Bank, 2019). The capacity, both human and financial, of the ADB to invest in building partnerships is more limited than the EU (Interviewee1, 2021). With a total staffing capacity of 3,092 according to the latest available figures (2016) (Asian Development Bank, 2016) and a rather restricted instruments toolbox to engage philanthropies, engagement takes place within the confines of mandate, instruments, and capacity. As a result, engagement of philanthropic

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organization with the ADB tends to focus on impact investment for those with an interest in such new forms of philanthropy.

WHY DO PHILANTHROPIES ENGAGE WITH INSTITUTIONS? In a Foreword to a report commissioned by their respective organizations and entitled Imagine Philanthropy for Europe, André Wilkens, the director of one of Europe’s oldest foundations with a pan-European purpose, the European Cultural Foundation, and Esra Kücük of Allianz Kulturstiftung for Europe, argued that ‘philanthropy with a European purpose remains unchartered territory’ (Wider Sense, 2020). They continued: ‘The process of European integration seems to have stopped at the doorstep of the European philanthropic sector. There is a handful of small European foundations, and there are some national foundations which engage in European exchange and collaboration or dedicate a fraction of their resources to a European programme, project or to European issues, but genuine European philanthropy is hardly existing, a niche’ (Wider Sense, 2020). Herman van Rompuy, former President of the European Council, the institutional platform bringing together heads of states and governments, seemed to agree on the importance of philanthropy for the European project when he declared that ‘There would be no Europe without philanthropy’ (ERNOP, 2017). However, more cooperation continues to prove difficult. The engagement of philanthropic organisations at the European level is driven by several factors. In a series of interviews with European philanthropic organisations in 2020, one study concludes that the motives of philanthropic engagement at the European level have four dimensions. First is a political dimension, which connects engagement at the level of the EU rather than purely at the national level as a contribution to Europe as a political project. Second is a values dimension whereby philanthropies seek to strengthen common values and sets of rights and principles at the European level. Third is an organisational dimension which reflects the idea that philanthropic organisations with a European purpose ‘embed [the] European purpose in their structures and processes’, for example by incorporating ‘Europe’ in their mission statute or promotion of cross-border learning as an organisational practice (Wider Sense, 2020). In practice, cooperation tends to focus on a pragmatic assessment of what philanthropies can achieve through the EU institutions, including the EC (Interviewee2, 2021). Cooperation is driven by perceptions on the role of regional institutions in the work of philanthropies; that is the European institutions as funders, regulators, or partners. This is reflected in survey results on the role of the EU (see Figure 8.1). Although surveys indicate that only

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a minority (25 per cent) of foundations indicated spending resources at the EU level (European Commission, 2015), foundations do see an important role for the EU in project cooperation and value its role as regulator and facilitator.

Source:

European Commission (2015).

Figure 8.1

What role should the EU play?

As we will argue later, these different expectations have led foundations in Europe to engage with the EU institutions in multiple forms, both structurally and in an ad hoc manner. Such choice also depends on the size and perceived dependence of philanthropies on European institutions (e.g. introduce regulation to facilitate philanthropic engagement). While large philanthropies, European and international, engaged with the EU institutions on an ad hoc basis to implement programmes as we will discuss later, small and medium size philanthropies have focused their engagement on creating an environment that is conducive to their cross-border operations. In Asia, the picture is different. Engagement with institutions such as the ADB is almost absent. The desk study and interviews indicated the lack of appetite by philanthropic organisations in the region to engage with regional institutions like the ADB – with some exceptions as is the case with ASEAN’s cooperation with the philanthropic arm of Google to support small and medium sized enterprises (Google.Org, 2020). Possible reasons advanced include the toolbox of the ADB being perceived as restrictive and requiring a certain maturity in the management of investments on the part of philanthropies in engaging regionally (Interviewee1, 2021).

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FRAMEWORKS AND FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN PHILANTHROPIES AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE LEGAL CONTEXT Advocacy around legal matters has taken centre stage in philanthropic engagement with the EC, triggering a multi-year discussion on the best way to legally structure cooperation. Indeed, philanthropies have argued that the legal environment in which they operate hampers their effective engagement at the EU level. The EC estimates that there are 60+ laws governing foundations in Europe (European Foundation Centre, 2015). This is visible in several areas including the fiscal policies. Tax regimes in Europe are indeed not harmonised due to different definitions of what constitutes a philanthropy of public-good organisation in different EU countries. While philanthropic organisations sought to address the issue through private initiatives such as Transnational Giving Europe (TGE) network (Figure 8.2) – a network, covering 20 countries, created by European philanthropies to facilitate cross-country donations (Transnational Giving Europe, n.d.) – their focus remained on adjusting the legal environment. They have also explored a legal solution to their concerns, notably through the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which handed favourable judgements1 that have implications on the general non-discrimination principle. The judgments could, in principle, allow philanthropies in other parts of the European Union to operate and be entitled to the same tax incentives as comparable domestic philanthropies (European Foundation Centre, 2017; Transnational Giving Europe, 2018). However, barriers to cross-border philanthropy remain high in practice. According to a study conducted by the European Foundation Centre, issues in practice relate to an un-adapted legal context that makes it difficult to establish comparability, and thus assess whether non-domestic philanthropic organisations, even if based in other EU member states, are eligible for tax benefits (European Foundation Centre, 2017; Transnational Giving Europe, 2018). Through umbrella associations, philanthropies called on the European Commission to intervene to improve the fiscal and administrative environment for cross-border philanthropy. Their proposal was for the EC to initiate a revamp of the legal framework governing activities of philanthropic organisations in Europe. Three large EU-based foundations – the Bertelsmann Foundation, ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius and Compagnia di San Paolo – financed a project to draft a Statute for a European Foundation. Another umbrella organization, the European Foundation Centre (EFC), also drafted its own proposal on a European Statute. Subsequently, in 2003 the European Commission announced that it intended to launch consultations that would allow it to ‘take account of the lessons to

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Sources: European Foundation Centre (2017); Transnational Giving Europe (2018).

Figure 8.2

Sectoral distribution of funds channelled through TGE

be drawn from the adoption and use of the other European Statutes, so that it should best take place in the medium term’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Subsequently, in 2012, the European Commission proposed a new legal framework on the Statute for a European Foundation (European Commission, 2012b). In its proposal, the European Commission noted that ‘through their various activities in numerous areas, they contribute to the fundamental values and objectives of the Union, such as respect for human rights, the protection of minorities, employment and social progress, protection and improvement of the environment or the promotion of scientific and technological advances’ (European Commission, 2012b). Interestingly, the proposal was positioned in the context of the single market, arguing that the purpose of the proposal was ‘to facilitate foundations’ establishment and operation in the single market’ and would in turn result in ‘more funding being available for public benefit purpose activities and therefore, should have a positive impact on European citizens’ public good and the EU economy as a whole’ (European Commission, 2012b). The proposal included legal initiatives on the status of foundations in countries, internal governance rules for foundations, audit and

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mandatory disclosure procedures, a cross-border component, and clauses on non-discriminatory tax treatment, among others. The EC argued that its proposal respected the principle of subsidiarity with its member states, even though it touched on the issue of concern to foundations, namely fiscal policy, which is a national competency of EU member states. Arguing its case, the EC noted that ‘the situation demonstrates that the problem is not properly addressed at national level and that its cross-border character requires a common framework to enhance foundations’ mobility. Action by Member States alone would not allow the single market to deliver optimum results for EU citizens’ (European Commission, 2012b). However, this was not enough to convince member states and despite a compromise legislative proposal being reached in 2013, the EC was forced to withdraw its proposal in 2014 due to lack of support from European countries (European Foundation Centre, 2015). In 2019, foundations turned again to the EC to reintroduce a proposal on a European Foundation Statute. Two umbrella associations, the EFC and the Donors and Foundations Networks in Europe (DAFNE), launched the European Philanthropy Manifesto and called on EU policy makers ‘to work towards a Single Market for Philanthropy that includes a better recognition of philanthropy in EU legislation as well as at the national level, supports cross-border philanthropy across the EU, and decreases today’s barriers for philanthropy to leverage the impact of donors’ and foundations’ spending of private resources for public good’ (DAFNE and EFC, 2019). The proposal is supported by some arms of the EU institutions notably the European Economic and Social Council (EESC), which established a Liaison Group to channel demands from the philanthropy sector to other EU institutions (European Economic and Social Council, 2019). A proposal is yet to be reintroduced but this experience speaks to the symbiotic relationship between philanthropic organisations in Europe and the European institutions. Indeed, the desire of the EU to entertain the request to establish a supportive legal environment is also anchored in a belief that, as state resources dry up, philanthropies can act as important gap-fillers to finance the implementation of policies important for the Union (European Commission, 2017). Within Asia, such discussion also exists but it remains embryonic. Reflecting on the venture philanthropy environment between Europe and Asia, Simon Chadwick, a former CEO of the Asia Venture Philanthropy Network (AVPN) put forward the legal mandate of the EU as a key difference. He notes that ‘Europe has institutions and treaties that create legal, political and fiscal convergence’. He contrasts the situation with Asia, where each country ‘has a different legal, regulatory and tax system, and the picture becomes more complicated when you consider a financial return social investment business

Comparative multilateral philanthropy: the EU Commission and the ADB

Table 8.2 Country

113

Primary giving themes in selected Asian countries Primary giving themes

Indonesia

Human rights, community development, environmental management, gender issues

Philippines

Education, training and human resources development, community development, sustainable development, environment

Singapore

Religion, education, health, social services

Thailand

Service delivery, health, environment, watchdog groups and advocacy

model because of the national and cross-border financial regulations that affect “investment” managers and the sales and marketing of investments’ (Chadwick, 2015). Regional institutions such as ASEAN are not empowered to address some of these issues. The choice of philanthropies, as a result, has been to either operate nationally and focus on shaping the legal context domestically or at best seek to create ecosystems of cooperation involving comparable legal contexts for philanthropies within the region (e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore).

TRADITIONAL PHILANTHROPY: AN UNDERUSED POTENTIAL CATALYST AND A FINANCIAL GAP-FILLER The potential of philanthropy in addressing pressing issues within a region can be significant. The contribution of Asian philanthropy to the social sector is significant and covers several areas that could well be useful in attaining the developmental vision set out by regional institutions such as the ADB and ASEAN (see examples in Table 8.2) (Chia, 2015). With the launch of the SDGs in 2014, the ADB commissioned a study on the ‘Potential and Prospects for Philanthropy in Implementing Post-2015 Development Goals’ (Chia, 2015). The study, which also aimed to inform collaborations between the ADB, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in relation to the Millennium Development Goals, mapped the philanthropy landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and highlighted the different approaches adopted by philanthropies to deliver on socio-economic targets. However, in reality, an assessment of the role of the ADB and its value added seems to have shaped its focus – for instance, it limited its engagement to providing technical assistance to its members around best-practice to strengthen cooperation between governments, philanthropy including civil society and the corporate sector on service delivery (Asian Development Bank, n.d. (b)). The picture in Europe is not much different. Across the EU, the contribution of philanthropy to priorities seen by the EU as important is not marginal. The climate change and green transition agenda, one of the EU’s priority policy

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areas, is a case in point. According to the latest estimates (2016), there are at least 87 providers of philanthropic grants for environmental initiatives in the EU, providing collectively €583 million in grants targeting environmental work (European Foundation Centre, 2018). To put this in perspective, under the multi-annual budget of the EU, contributions of the EU to climate action were expected to reach €209.8 million over the full period 2014–2020 (European Parliament, 2019). Foundations also played a role in leveraging EU funding in newer EU member states, thus contributing to regional cohesion. Philanthropies are estimated to have received €29.6 million from the EU institutions through grants, which was largely directed at newer EU member states that joined the EU after 2000 with EU funding representing 48.6 per cent of funding received from foundations for activities in these new member states (European Foundation Centre, 2018). This is in contrast to funding in older, and more advanced economies in the Western part of the EU, where EU funding only represented 5 per cent of sources of income of foundations operating on climate change (European Foundation Centre, 2018). However, the contribution of philanthropy to sectors such as health, education, and social enterprise, among others, remains largely divorced from the EU institutional architecture.

THE RISE OF VENTURE PHILANTHROPY AND IMPACT INVESTMENT Reflecting on the role of philanthropy in research and innovation, the EC argued that although ‘governments are the guarantors of the public good … other public and private actors like the foundations do have a shared role and distribute their financial resources for the public benefit’ (European Commission, 2017). This assessment is not surprising considering that the latest available estimates indicate that philanthropic contribution to the R&I ecosystem of the EU has increased exponentially, reaching an estimated €5 billion per annum of aggregate research funding (European Commission, 2017). As the EC itself recognized, ‘this [annual] figure is about half the average annual budget that the EU will give to researchers and innovators throughout the whole duration of the Horizon 2020 programme [2014–2020]’ (European Commission, 2017). EU member states spent 2.19 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on research and development in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020). Twenty years on, and despite the increase, the EU is yet to meet the target it set itself in 2000 to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ by devoting 3 per cent of its GDP to financing research and innovation by 2010 (European Union, 2000). To date, the EU collectively remains behind countries such as South Korea, which dedicated 4.52 per cent of its GDP to

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R&I (2018), Japan (3.28 per cent, 2018), the United States (2.28 per cent, 2018) and even China (2.06 per cent, 2018) (Eurostat, 2020). Aware of the limits of member states’ financing, the EU aimed to source two-thirds of funding from businesses to meet the 3 per cent target while governments would pay for the remaining third (European Commission, 2003). This commitment was confirmed by the EC in its European Partnership for Growth and Jobs policy document and subsequently by European leaders during their council meeting in the same year (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). Thus, the EC set out to develop the appropriate framework to implement this agenda using, as a mechanism, its research financing instrument, Horizon 2020. According to its action plan on ‘Investing in Research’ (2003), securing private sector financing for its research agenda would require a number of policy adjustments, including on intellectual property (IP), market regulations, competition rules, and fiscal conditions, among others (European Commission, 2003). The EC would then assume the role of regulator and partner. But data was first required. In 2005, the European Commission Directorate General for Research and Innovation, the EC’s arm that is mandated to promote research, science and innovation, set up an independent expert group ‘to invite and facilitate philanthropic foundations and philanthropists to join other partners to foster the impact of the EU’s knowledge economy’ (European Commission, 2018a). Based on the recommendations of the group, the EC commissioned the EFC to develop a mapping methodology and tools that would allow it to collect data on research activities and funding provided by philanthropic organisations within the EU. The EFC piloted tools in four countries (Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden). Subsequent studies were then commissioned by the EC, the latest concluded in 2015, and extended the pilot to 27 countries (European Commission, 2015). This mapping process eventually allowed the EC to estimate the untapped potential of philanthropy in R&I financing in Europe, thus allowing it to build a data ecosystem on which it can start formulating policy and developing partnership frameworks. Besides the regulatory framework question explored earlier in this chapter, one of the recommendations, emerging from a study it commissioned, that the EC is concretely following up on relates to venture philanthropy. Based on estimates that foundations hold an estimated €127 billion in assets, the authors argued that the EU could focus its role as regulator and funder to de-risk investments by foundations when they enter into social ventures. The EU could in this case use institutions such as the European Investment Bank to provide guarantees to foundations. The study also encouraged the EC to map and explore legislative opportunities (and reforms if needed) to allow

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foundations to use their endowments and their grants flexibly (European Commission, 2015). To further explore this option of venture philanthropy, the EC created a 10-member Expert Group on Venture Philanthropy and Social Investments in 2017. The Group is financed through Horizon 2020. In 2018, the Group submitted another list of 19 recommendations, many overlapping with recommendations from previous reports, which largely revolved around the legal framework. As rules around venture philanthropy are being refined, the EC is either financing venture philanthropy through its financing mechanisms (e.g. see Figure 8.3) to promote philanthropic engagement or collaborating on specific initiatives using its different financial tools largely in line with the recommendations of the Expert Group on Venture Philanthropy and Social Investments. Examples include a guarantee of €50 million to Erste Group, a leading financial group in central and eastern Europe, to provide loans for more than 500 social organisations in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia (European Venture Philanthropy Association, 2019). The Commission also partnered with the Ship2B Foundation, providing a €3 million investment to leverage the foundation’s work on social enterprises with high social and/or environmental impact (Ship2B Foundation, n.d.).

Figure 8.3

Examples of financial vehicles of the European Commission to stimulate venture philanthropy

Asia’s philanthropic sector is arguably more advanced than in Europe, especially with respect to venture philanthropy and social impact investment (see Table 8.3). Indeed, Asian philanthropists are active but they largely operate at a national or at best multi-country level rather than through regional institutions. They are partnering with others within their country of operations to launch joint venture philanthropy initiatives. For example, one of Japan’s oldest foundations, Nippon Foundation of Tokyo, which was established in 1962, partnered with Social Investment Partners (SIP), Japan’s first venture philanthropy organization, to jointly launch the Japan Venture Philanthropy Fund (Japan Venture Philanthropy Fund, n.d.). The fund amounting to JPY100 million (approx. US$922,000) is intended to provide mid- and long-term financial support to social enterprises (Japan Venture Philanthropy Fund,

Comparative multilateral philanthropy: the EU Commission and the ADB

Table 8.3

117

Types and evolution of philanthropy

Type of philanthropy

Definition

Giving circles

Giving circles engage a wider group of givers and create multiplier effects in giving while educating givers in philanthropy.

Social-impact investing

Social-impact investing seeks social and financial return, and tends toward lower-risk social or environmental programmes. The funds are managed not by the philanthropists themselves but by profit-seeking organisations.

Venture philanthropy

Venture philanthropists seek social impact and financial return. They provide money and expertise to social-purpose organisations while emphasising accountability and results.

Traditional philanthropy

Traditional philanthropy is values-based and goal-oriented, implements strategic plans, tracks progress, and evaluates outcomes.

Source:

Chia (2015).

n.d.). Their operations are national. Although there are examples of operations in other countries of the region, as is the case for SIP, which also operates in Hong Kong, the landscape remains nationally focused, fragmented and uneven due to economic discrepancies between countries and, arguably, due to the absence of regional frameworks to promote regional cooperation. As noted by the AVPN, ‘Asia is really a series of distinct national markets that each have a different economic and social development history as well as different ways of public and private sector intervention to improve social conditions’ (Chadwick, 2015). Other foundations and philanthropic organisations turned to impact investing, still within their national borders. This is the case for large foundations of member countries of ASEAN. For instance, the Tata Trusts in India, the SK Happiness Foundation in South Korea and the Narada Foundation in China have all deployed action on impact investing and are offering a range of financing instruments for social ventures at different levels of maturity (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2017). This takes place against the backdrop of rising interest in impact investing in the region. In 2018, the Landscape for Impact Investing in Southeast Asia report by the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) noted that impact investing in Southeast Asia increased significantly over the last decade (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2017). In some countries, to take the example of Singapore and Hong Kong alone, the potential of impact investing is estimated at US$2 trillion (Tan and Lam, 2017). Large corporates have also engaged in the social sector through their philanthropic foundations. Yayasan Petronas, the foundation of Malaysia’s oil and gas company, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), created in March 2019, developed programmes in the areas of education, community well-being

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and development, and the environment. Similarly, Thailand’s Central Group, a retail conglomerate, has several programmes supporting micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), community entrepreneurs, and farmers among others (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2017). Cambodia’s telecom operator, Smart Axiata, established a US$5 million venture capital fund, Smart Axiata Digital Innovation Fund, with the aim of boosting the digital ecosystem in the country by supporting social initiatives such as a school enrolment platform and school management system, and providing an agricultural marketplace and financing for farmers and suppliers (Smart Digital Innovation Fund, n.d.). Nonetheless, linkages to regional institutions, including the ADB, remain elusive despite the region’s dynamic ecosystem.

DOMINANCE OF PHILANTHROPY FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION Despite steps to structure engagement with philanthropic organisations, the heavy machinery of the EC and its procedures have proven to be labour intensive for several smaller organisations (European Commission, 2018a), thus limiting engagement to philanthropy umbrella associations (including those leading the advocacy efforts on the legal framework as discussed earlier in this chapter) or large philanthropic organisations, mainly non-European. The latter have experimented with a ‘fund matching’ approach to cooperation with the EU. For instance, in the area of green energy, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the European Commission announced a €100 million fund – Breakthrough Energy Europe – in 2019. The fund, which aims to support European companies to develop and upscale the production of clean energy technologies, is a joint venture benefiting from a €50 million contribution from the European Investment Bank (EIB) InnovFin – an instrument funded through the research and innovation budget of the EC – and €50 million from BMGF-led Breakthrough Energy Ventures (European Commission, 2019). Foundations such as BMGF have also relied on the EU institutions, notably the EC, as a channel to implement their priorities in international development. In addition, the BMGF channelled financing to support the EU’s (initially expected) engagement on a global response to Covid-19 – much to the satisfaction of an EU that wants to prove its continued relevance in global development despite shrinking budgets. The EU has, indeed, for a while been a beneficiary of the BMGF, especially in the area of health and nutrition in international development, thus reinforcing the development aid budget of the EU. For example, in 2018 the EC and BMGF announced a grant of €54 million to the EU’s External Investment Plan (EIP) to finance diagnostic health services activities in sub-Saharan Africa (European Commission, 2018b). The

Comparative multilateral philanthropy: the EU Commission and the ADB

Table 8.4

Project specific co-financing received by the ADB 2000–2019 (US$ million)

Financing partner

Contribution to trust funds

Technical assistance

Total

BMGF

19

3.49

22.49

Climate Cent Foundation

26

 

26

JP Morgan Chase Foundation

 

1.29

1.29

The Rockefeller Foundation

5

 

5

Source:

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Asian Development Bank (2020).

funding is to be disbursed as guarantees of the EIP to leverage investments in laboratory facilities. The international engagement model adopted by the EU is similar to that used in Asia, notably by the Asia Development Bank (ADB). The ADB has structured its cooperation with philanthropic organisations, exclusively international (e.g. see Table 8.4), by offering foundations a palette of mechanisms including through contributions to broad-based single- and multi-donor trust funds, grants, project-specific co-financing, and even technical assistance (Asian Development Bank, 2021).

CRISES AND INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION WITH PHILANTHROPY Globally, the Covid-19 crisis has mobilised an estimated €10 billion from philanthropic organisations (commitments) (McKinsey & Company, 2020). Within the EU, philanthropies have committed €1.1 billion to the Covid-19 response (see Figure 8.4). European foundations launched multiple initiatives early on, both in their own countries and across the EU. These included funding pledges for access to diagnostic and medical technology as well as research and vaccine development, providing financial support to hospitals and care facilities, reducing the social impact as well as lifting some requirements on their grantees.2 However, the response remained fragmented, reflecting the mode of engagement between philanthropies and the EU in non-crisis situations. Indeed, the bulk of foundations responded directly in their local context and providing direct support to their beneficiaries. This is arguably not surprising considering the lack of a pre-existing relationship on which to build and the complex process of cooperation and access to EU institutions. This was in contrast to large (international) philanthropies, which, as argued earlier in this chapter, benefited from pre-existing working relations

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McKinsey & Company (2020).

Figure 8.4

European philanthropies’ commitment for Covid-19 response across the EU

with EU institutions. Internationally, philanthropies such as the BMGF, Open Society Foundation, BBVA Microfinance Foundation, Wellcome Trust, and Bloomberg Philanthropies among others pledged support to global responses such as the WHO Solidarity Response Fund (OECD, 2021). Latin America and Africa appear to be the main beneficiary regions of philanthropic finance (19 per cent and 13 per cent respectively) (OECD, 2021). The financing targeted the health and education sectors as well as other social sectors. Some philanthropies also worked through the EU. Several philanthropies, primarily international, have channelled resources through the EC. This was for instance the case of the Aga Khan Foundation, which opted to channel €10 million through the EC to support the Covid-19 response in Afghanistan (James, 2021). The example of BMGF is also often referenced as a philanthropy that has used its influence, through ‘multi-stakeholder diplomacy’ (Interviewee3, 2021), to act as a catalyst for (coordinated) responses by relying on the EC, among others, on issues such as vaccine development, access and financing (Interviewee3, 2021). As the search for vaccines accelerated, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced that it had engaged with BMGF to provide a $200 million guarantee facility for GAVI, the vaccine alliance, to facilitate countries’ access to vaccines through the COVAX Facility (European Investment Bank Group, 2021). A similar type of collaboration was announced by the EIB involving the Wellcome Trust to provide funding to the Covid-19 Therapeutics Accelerator (European Investment Bank Group, 2021), a philanthropic initiative ‘supporting efforts to research, develop and bring effective treatments against COVID-19 to market quickly and accessibly’ (COVID-19 Therapeutics Accelerator, 2020). It is also noteworthy how large international philanthropies adopted a network approach in their activities, with the EC forming part of that network of institutional actors that philanthropies leverage to mobilise support for their proposals and programmes.

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Unlike philanthropies in the EU, Asian philanthropies have a track record in managing crisis situations. For instance, philanthropic giving played an important role in the humanitarian response to the 2004 earthquake, estimated to have been of a magnitude of 9.1, which hit countries such as Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Philanthropic giving included US$71.8 million from the Hong Kong population, US$3.08 million from the Hong Kong-based Li Ka Shining Foundation, HKD 620 million from the Hong Kong Red Cross, RMB 500 million from the Chinese public, and US$10 million from Taiwanese philanthropies. The potential of philanthropy in disaster management was also apparent in the response to the tsunami in South Asia in 2004, which significantly affected countries like Indonesia. The Hong Kong Red Cross (HKRC) received a total of HK$147 million of donations including HK$4 million from the Emperor Foundation and HK$0.5 million from Wai Hung Charitable Foundation Ltd (Hong Kong Red Cross, 2005). With such a long-standing tradition, the extent of philanthropic mobilisation during the Covid-19 pandemic was therefore not surprising. Response was driven by charitable organisations as well as HNWIs (Asia Venture Philanthropy Network, 2021). For instance, Hong Kong’s Li Kashing is reported to have given HK$250 million ($32 million) in aid, almost half of which to communities in Wuhan. Tadashi Yanai, a Japanese retail sector magnate, contributed $105 million to research and vaccine development by two Japanese universities. Equally, Vietnam’s richest man, Pham Nhat Vuong, donated $77 million to efforts to respond to the pandemic (Forbes, 2020). Strikingly, however, financing was largely channelled without using regional institutions as intermediaries such as the ADB. However, other regional groupings managed to launch specific projects jointly with philanthropies, yet again international. This is the case, for instance, of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Coordinating Committee on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (ACCMSME) and the Asia Foundation, which partnered with the philanthropic arm of Google to ‘broaden participation in the digital economy to include groups that have the most to gain from digital literacy skills and online safety awareness’ (Google.Org, 2020). The support was also framed in the context of the Covid-19 crisis as one of the objectives is to help ‘MSMEs to learn about programs or assistance that can help them continue to operate during the COVID-19 crisis’ (Google.Org, 2020).

CONCLUSION A number of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis provided in this chapter. First, the philanthropy sector is well resourced and extremely dynamic in both regions. Its potential is, however, significantly underused. Second,

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the mandate of institutional actors shaped significantly how philanthropies view their impact and thus the value of engaging through regional institutions. Action targeted at the EU clearly saw value in its regulatory capacity while philanthropies in Asia recognised the primacy of the national system as the primary regulatory authority. Third, while several models of engagement are used, venture philanthropy and impact investing are on the rise and appear to be the most common form of engagement chosen by philanthropic organisations. Most large-scale contributions are in fact conducted through one of these approaches. Fourth, engagement through these models (venture philanthropy and impact investing) is dominated by large international philanthropic organisations. This can be explained by the complex procedures often adopted by institutions when engaging with philanthropies, which may discourage smaller philanthropies that may not have pre-existing well-oiled machinery in this area to engage structurally. Another hypothesis, which the author was not able to fully investigate in this chapter, is that of the role of networks and the ability of larger philanthropies to engage with institutions. In conclusion, philanthropies remain timid and hesitant to engage at cross-border, let alone the regional level, whether in regions with developed, well-resourced and strongly-mandated regional institutions, such as the EU, where advocacy remains the main area of engagement for local philanthropies, or in regions where regional institutions’ role is limited to development financing, as is the case with the ADB, or coordinating structures such as ASEAN.

NOTES 1.

2.

These are: Stauffer: C-386/04 Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer/Finanzamt München für Körperschaften [2006] ECR I-8203; Hein-Persche: C-318/07 Hein Persche/Finanzamt Lüdenscheid [2009] ECR I-359; and Missionswerk: C-25/10 Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV/Belgien [2011] 2 C.M.L.R. 35. A sample of initiatives led by members of one of the main philanthropy umbrella associations can be viewed on the website of the European Foundation Centre (EFC), https://​www​.efc​.be/​news​-post/​how​-are​-efc​-members​-mitigating​-the​ -impact​-of​-covid​-19/​.

9. Corporate philanthropy and regional multilateral institutions in Africa Rebecca Mhere INTRODUCTION This chapter explores the ways in which large corporates in Africa interact with regional multilaterals as part of their corporate philanthropy. It examines the extent to which there is interaction and what form this takes, how it is initiated, and how it develops. While there is some evidence in the media of cooperation between regional multilateral institutions and corporates in response to disasters, there is little information available on cooperation outside times of crisis. This research aims to uncover and document cooperation between these two stakeholder groups during and beyond disaster response. In doing so, the study explores the rationale and incentives for cooperation between these stakeholders, the barriers to cooperation, and the opportunities for enhanced engagement. The hypothesis tested through this research, is that there is a missed opportunity for cooperation and engagement between corporate philanthropy and regional multilaterals beyond disaster response. Methodology This chapter’s findings are based on a desktop review of published information and interviews with three corporates, three regional multilaterals, and three experts. Interviews were conducted in February, March and April 2021 (a list of the participants is given at the end of this chapter). The research is qualitative and exploratory in nature and is framed by a brief review of key concepts and definitions in the literature on corporate philanthropy and related concepts. The limited number of case studies presented are for illustrative purposes, bringing to light existing and potential areas for cooperation between corporate philanthropy and regional multilateral institutions. The desktop-based review consisted of examining available literature on cooperation between regional multilaterals and corporate philanthropy, which 123

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largely comprised press releases from the active organisations, as well as online news articles. Three corporate interviews were held with representatives from Old Mutual, Ecobank Foundation, and Safaricom. The three corporates included in this study are those that made themselves available to be interviewed for this research, following a request sent out to around two dozen corporates with a pan-African presence. Trialogue aimed to interview eight corporates but could not secure these interviews in the time frame available for the field research of this study. Old Mutual and Ecobank are pan-African financial services companies with operations in 14 and 36 African countries respectively. Safaricom is a Kenyan telecommunications and mobile network operator with operations in Kenya only. Repeated attempts were made to interview additional corporates that worked closely with regional multilaterals in the responses to Ebola and Covid-19. In the interviews, corporates were asked about the extent to which they interact with regional multilateral institutions, if at all, and the forms that these interactions take. They were also asked about the mechanisms through which these interactions take place, and the perceived benefits and challenges of working with multilaterals. Representatives from three regional multilateral organisations were interviewed: AU, African Development Bank (AfDB), and AU Development Agency – New Partnership for African Development (AUDA-NEPAD, formerly NEPAD). An attempt was made to interview the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa-CDC) but they were not able to attend the interview. The multilaterals were asked questions around the nature of their cooperation with corporates in their corporate philanthropy – whether this cooperation existed, how formalised it was, and focus areas around which cooperation was based. Multilaterals were also asked what benefits, if any, could be derived from strengthening engagement with corporates around their philanthropy. Interviews were also held with three experts from the NEPAD Business Foundation (a non-profit organization), the Centre for African Philanthropy and Social Investment, and a former executive of the African Union Foundation (AUF). These experts were selected for their involvement and first-hand knowledge of some of the examples of corporate and regional multilateral cooperation that are discussed in this chapter. Topics explored included the chronology of events around corporate and multilateral cooperation, perspectives on why and how these came about, and perceived challenges and opportunities for further cooperation.

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Definitions and Conceptual Framework In this chapter, corporate philanthropy is distinguished from corporate social responsibility (CSR), a closely related concept and one that is often conflated with corporate philanthropy. CSR is defined as an overarching values-based framework that encompasses all social aspects of business operations, ensuring that a company conducts its business responsibly and ethically. It includes all activities and investments aimed at enhancing the social impact of the business, such as employee wellness initiatives, the nature of products and services offered, as well as philanthropic activities. Corporate philanthropy, or ‘corporate social investment’ (CSI), is a subset of CSR and refers specifically to a company’s financial and non-financial contributions to disadvantaged communities and individuals for the purpose of socio-economic development. It is an important part of a company’s CSR framework but is not the primary driver of responsible corporate citizenship. Over the last three decades there has been increasing recognition that the private sector has an important role to play in socio-economic development, through their economic contributions as well as socially responsible and ethical business practices. International and regional multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have all expressed the important role of the private sector in overcoming social challenges.1 For corporates themselves, there are a number of reasons for philanthropic activity. Research by sustainable business consultancy Trialogue identifies the most prominent reasons for South African corporates as the moral imperative to do so, attaining a social licence to operate and for competitive advantage (Trialogue, 2020). Corporate philanthropy has the potential to contribute to society in many ways. It can stimulate innovation by bringing its funding, expertise, and research capacity to bear on development problems in a way that governments and non-profits might not be able to (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Corporates also have unique networks and spheres of influence that can be leveraged by non-profits to increase their reach and influence (Porter and Kramer, 2002). For some practical examples see Mottiar (2015) on the role of corporates in redistribution, innovation, and policy transformation using case studies in the extractive resources sector in Africa. Corporate philanthropy may – and Trialogue believes should – pursue both societal and business benefits by taking a ‘shared value’ approach to corporate giving. Trialogue defines shared value as a management strategy focused on companies creating measurable business value by identifying and addressing social problems that intersect with their business. Corporate philanthropy can

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contribute to the shared value strategy if it is aligned to the business and creates business value as well as social value.2 Philosophical debates about the motivations, benefits, and appropriate role of corporate philanthropy in society notwithstanding,3 implicit in this chapter is that corporate philanthropy can at least contribute positively to the developmental agendas of countries on the continent. However, while corporate philanthropy has a salient role to play in socio-economic development, the extent to which it is carried out, and its impact on development in Africa are under-researched and thus not known.

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY IN AFRICA There is a growing body of literature on the theory and practice of corporate philanthropy, globally and, to a far lesser extent, in Africa. As is the case globally (Liket and Simaens, 2015), research on corporate philanthropy in Africa focuses largely on quantitative spend by companies, with scant evidence of its social outcomes. In an extensive literature review, Liket and Simaens (2015) found that research on corporate philanthropy tends to focus on where the data and information is most readily available – on websites and in corporate annual reports. There is a lack of substantive evaluation of the developmental value of corporate philanthropy globally (Liket and Simaens, 2015). Similarly, there is not much known about the collective scope and quantum of corporate philanthropy in Africa as there has been little formal research on the topic. Some exceptions include annual primary research on between 80 and 100 large companies on CSI in South Africa conducted by Trialogue for more than 20 years, as well as research conducted on CSI in Kenya (Yetu Initiative, 2018a, 2018b). Trialogue also conducted research on corporate philanthropy in Ghana and Kenya in 2017, looking at a total sample of 49 companies in those countries to gauge their level of philanthropic expenditure and understand their approaches to philanthropy (Trialogue, 2017). Mottiar (2015) writes that philanthropy in the resource extraction sector on the continent is significantly under-researched. As a result, not only is the quantum of funding unknown, but so too are the practices around corporate philanthropy in this sector, leaving important issues, challenges, and opportunities unresolved (Mottiar 2015). One of the reasons for the lack of research on corporate philanthropy in Africa could be that it tends to be discretionary, rather than legislated (Yetu Initiative, 2018a), with South Africa being an exception to this. The legislated framework under which corporate philanthropy is conducted in South Africa has driven a formalised practice of corporate giving among large corporates. Corporates in South Africa are incentivised through the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) legislation to give 1 per cent of their net

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profit after tax to socio-economic development. As a result, there is a relatively mature practice around corporate giving in the country. Although some African countries do encourage corporate giving through various mechanisms, it is not as formalised as in South Africa and thus levels and practices of corporate social investment in the rest of the continent are not as consistent or as well documented as in South Africa. The 2017 Trialogue research confirmed that corporate giving in the three countries included in the research was less prevalent, in smaller amounts and relatively charitable, as opposed to strategic, in its approach.

ROLE OF MULTILATERALS IN PROMOTING CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY There is an argument to be made for regional multilaterals to play a role in promoting, advocating, and even influencing corporate philanthropy, particularly in countries where the practice is less prevalent or strategic. Raising additional funding for much-needed development on the continent is one rationale for doing so. Regional multilaterals could also influence corporate philanthropy in the direction of local and regional development agendas. Multilaterals can encourage CSR and corporate philanthropy in several ways including through promotion and advocacy for CSR, by contributing to conducive policy and regulatory environments, and by providing a platform through which business can collaborate on CSI (Vives, 2004). They also have a number of comparative advantages in promoting CSR practices, which include their unique position as ‘honest brokers’ in development, with wide reach and development objectives that overlap with those of CSR and investment (Vives, 2004). Multilaterals also have considerable convening power, existing relationships and networks with both government and the private sector, and financial (in the case of development finance organisations) and technical know-how (Vives, 2004). Multilateral organisations, in their role as promoters of economic development, also stand to benefit from corporate philanthropy, which can be used a means of tapping not only into corporate financial resources for development but also technical expertise and know-how. According to AUDA-NEPAD, the AU’s technical body, beyond the mobilisation of financial resources, African philanthropists, corporates, and foundations can contribute to technology transfer, the development of new products and services, and innovative thinking (Interviewee 3). This view was not shared by the AfDB, however, whose view of corporate philanthropy was that it is peripheral in relation to the Bank’s core business (Interviewee 1). Although this is the case in terms of quantum of AfDB funding for development projects versus corporate philan-

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thropy, there are still opportunities to leverage corporate philanthropy linked to these programmes for greater developmental impact.

RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY ENGAGEMENT WITH MULTILATERALS Engagement in Policy Processes There are numerous reasons why corporates would engage with both regional and international multilaterals as strategic business stakeholders, of which cooperation around corporate philanthropy is just one. Multilateral organisations – whether regional or international – are positioned as leaders in the development of policy and regulation that impacts business. International multilaterals such as the IMF, World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the UN and the International Labour Organization (ILO), to name just a few, are at the forefront of developing global policy norms, standards, and guidance for markets and the corporates that operate within them. Although the multilaterals are often weak in their enforcement of these policies, many large corporates do align with the agendas set by multilaterals and have an equally strong interest in contributing to policy discussions. In the last two decades, international agencies such as the UN and IMF have become increasingly cognisant of the private sector as a key contributor to development, and the importance of cooperation between public, private, and civil society sectors in achieving development goals. Most of these multilateral organisations, as well as other international platforms such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), also have technical working groups around specific policy and regulatory issues and in which corporates are key participants and contributors. Anecdotes from the corporates interviewed for this research confirmed their interest in participating in technical working groups that are relevant to their industry. For example, multilateral engagements allow Old Mutual – a well-known financial services brand – to be part of policy conversations on financial education and inclusion, to contribute to the conversations, and to get a better understanding of the policy frameworks in these areas. According to the Old Mutual, this engagement generates a lot of ideas and interesting thinking around these issues for the business. Similarly, Safaricom views multilaterals as important business stakeholders, as they provide valuable insights into policy developments as well as the opportunity to influence them.

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Mutually Beneficial Partnerships Corporate interest in engaging with multilaterals is for impactful partnerships, where the corporate is not just a funder but can build a relationship that provides mutual benefit to the corporate’s philanthropy and business beyond this. Corporates interviewed have moved away from sponsorships in favour of more meaningful partnerships and engagements but were of the view that some of the regional multilaterals tend to approach corporates primarily as funders. For Old Mutual, the need for brand exposure through sponsorship is eclipsed by their greater need for brand differentiation. Brand differentiation, according to the company, is exposure that sets the bank apart from its competitors and is gained through the types of initiatives that Old Mutual invests in and associates with, as well as the outcomes and impact of such work. The requirements for environment, social, and governance (ESG) reporting are increasingly focused on evidence of genuine outcomes and impact. Similarly, Ecobank Foundation primarily invests in philanthropic programmes that align with and leverage the strengths of the business (Interviewee 6). It is also important for the causes to resonate with and involve its employees. The Foundation’s position is that it must be an enabler of Ecobank’s business because it is ultimately the business that sustains the Foundation. This is the basis on which Ecobank seeks partnerships, but which is reportedly not necessarily understood by multilaterals, primarily regional ones, which approach the Foundation for funding and sponsorships. Access to Development Expertise From a corporate philanthropy perspective, regional multilateral institutions are often closer to the development sector from a policy and programmatic perspective and can provide technical expertise for corporate philanthropists, as well as reach and access to the development sector. The view from AUDA-NEPAD was that ‘while corporates can play an important role in addressing environmental, societal, and economic needs, their CSI programmes often lack clear purpose and evidence-based objectives leading to little impact’. Partnering with regional institutions could provide corporates with ‘guidance and capacity in programme preparation, knowledge and expertise, an enabling ecosystem, a wider reach to achieve a greater impact’ (Interviewee 3). Safaricom Foundation, a corporate foundation funded by the Kenyan telecommunications company has extensive engagement with various agencies of the UN, while cooperation with regional multilaterals has not taken place to date. According to the company, their engagement with the UN is highly beneficial to their work, offering them valuable expertise on programme

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design and implementation, subject matter expertise, and assistance with how technology can be used to solve social issues. The priority projects under the partnership are those in which Safaricom can leverage its ICT capabilities: school connectivity and online learning, public awareness campaigns on child abuse, and information dissemination around Covid-19 prevention and treatment (Safaricom, 2020). Other cooperation with the UN includes guidance on how to align with and measure their programmes with the SDGs. Safaricom Foundation sits on various technical committees and working groups of the UN, gaining insight into development issues and also adding value through its own development experience. Access and Proximity to Those in Need Multilateral organisations, and their specialist agencies, can provide corporates with access and proximity to beneficiaries. Old Mutual for example sees multilateral organisations as partners that can provide reach and capability to implement its responsible business agenda. One of Old Mutual’s main objectives for engaging with regional and international multilateral institutions and their programmatic agencies is their relative advantage in providing access and proximity to those most in need. This is particularly the case for its outreach in African countries outside of its South African headquarters. Credibility and Good Governance Multilateral organisations make for credible partners for corporate philanthropy, given their multilateral development mandate and tendency to have good governance in place. For Old Mutual, a financial institution, it is essential from a values and reputation perspective to partner with organisations that are well established, in good standing, and have good governance in place, which multilateral organisations provide.

MECHANISMS FOR ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN REGIONAL MULTILATERALS AND CORPORATES Of the companies interviewed, engagement seems to be managed not by the CSI or corporate philanthropy function but by functions that are more strategically integrated with the business, such as stakeholder relations or corporate affairs. This is also understood to be the case with MTN and Vodacom South Africa.

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In the case of Old Mutual, relationships with multilaterals are managed by the stakeholder relations function within the business, separate from the Old Mutual Foundation. While there is sometimes overlap with the Old Mutual Foundation, the objectives for engagement are very different. Engagement with multilaterals is managed through stakeholder relations because it is seen as more strategic to the business – the focus is on advocacy, demonstrating thought leadership, and lobbying and policy. In the case of Ecobank, engagement is done through both the business and the Ecobank Foundation. Extensive cooperation between the core business and multilaterals is of a more strategic nature, involving policy and regulatory work. Ecobank Foundation has limited cooperation with regional multilaterals beyond responding to disasters such as Ebola and Covid-19, but extensive cooperation with international multilaterals in many areas. Old Mutual’s engagement with multilaterals, both international and regional, came about after Old Mutual was approached for a sponsorship. Since then, Old Mutual has also worked with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for several years on their financial education and inclusion technical work programmes. However, the lack of policy synchronisation and complex political economy factors have rendered this work relatively slow.

EXAMPLES OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPISTS AND REGIONAL MULTILATERALS For the most part, there is little evidence of ongoing, impactful engagement between corporate philanthropy and regional multilateral institutions. There are, however, some important exceptions, most notably private sector cooperation with the AU through the African Union Foundation (AUF) in response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2015 and 2016, and, more recently, cooperation in response to Covid-19 through various structures of the Africa-CDC and AUDA-NEPAD. There was no evidence discovered through this research that other regional multilateral institutions such as SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have reached out to corporate philanthropy in a similarly strategic and coordinated manner. Disaster Response: The AUF and the 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola Crisis As South African chairperson of the AU from 2012 to 2017, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma actively encouraged AU partnerships with the private sector

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(Interviewee 4). Dlamini-Zuma often led this engagement herself, reaching out to the leadership of corporates, largely in her home country. Her approach was strongly supported by the South African government. Having realised that there was potential for alignment between the social responsibility agendas of corporates and the development programmes of the AU, Dlamini-Zuma invited cooperation with the private sector, establishing the AUF as a platform through which this could take place. AUF was officially established in 2015, with the stated purpose of mobilising resources from the African private sector and individuals for its programmes, specifically Agenda 2063. It formed part of the AU’s objective to mobilise domestic resources and diversify its funding from international donors. At the time, while the operational budget of the AU was funded by member countries, AU programmes were almost fully funded by non-African international donors. AUF was strategic in its approach to partnering with corporates, identifying those with a presence in more than one African country and studying the potential for mutual areas of interest and cooperation. The strategy was not to just seek funds from corporates, but to leverage their business infrastructure, goods and services, as well as technical capacity and know-how (Interviewees 4 and 5). This is the approach that resonates most with the corporates interviewed in this research. The Ebola crisis in 2014–2015 triggered a somewhat unprecedented Africa-led response in which the private sector, coordinated by the AU, played a key role (EQUINET, 2015). In August 2014, the AU formed the AU Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (ASEOWA), with representatives from AU departments, UN agencies, and other development partners. On 8 November 2014, for the first time, the AU convened an African business roundtable on Ebola with Africa’s private sector to mobilise resources for the ASEOWA programme. The roundtable took place at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Corporates in the telecommunications, banking, energy, manufacturing, and services sectors and the AfDB attended, which resulted in pledges of US$31 million (African Union, 2014). The roundtable was also created for the AU to form partnerships and a task force to address the crisis with the private sector. Dlamini-Zuma is reported to have said: ‘When African business gathered in Addis Ababa on 8 November 2014 and pledged to partner us in eradicating this dreadful disease, I requested from them not only cash, but also their competences in project management, logistics, financial management and governance’ (African Media Agency, 2015). Ten days after the roundtable, Dlamini-Zuma announced the following pledges: MTN Group (US$10 million); AfDB (US$10 million); The Dangote Group and Trust (US$3 million); Econet Wireless (US$2.5 million); Motsepe

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Family Trust (US$1 million); Steinbeck Family (US$1 million); African Export-Import (Afrexim) Bank (US$1 million); Coca-Cola Eurasia and Africa (US$1 million); Vitol Group of Companies and Vivo Energy (US$1 million); Quality Group of Tanzania (US$500,000); Old Mutual Group (US$500,000); Nedbank Group (US$500,000); Barclays Africa Group Limited (US$500,000); Syngenta (US$350,000); and United Bank for Africa (UBA) (US$100,000). According to the AU press release, other companies that were present at the roundtable pledged the following in-kind goods and services: Deloitte (audit services to the Fund), Standard Chartered Bank (logistics), General Electric (support to the Africa-CDC), Quality Group (human resources and health outreach), and Coca-Cola and Vivo Energy (logistics). Auditing firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers also provided financial and risk management and fund administration services to the Trust, at a significant discount to their normal fees, as part of their in-kind contribution to the initiative. The roundtable of businesses involved in the response created another vehicle, the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust (AAEST), to collect pledges and mobilise further resources from the private sector. The AAEST was chaired by Strive Masiyiwa, founder and CEO of Econet Wireless, and registered in Mauritius as a charitable organisation. Under a grant agreement between the AU and the AAEST, funds were deployed to support direct costs associated with the ASEOWA response, including the deployment of volunteer African health workers and medical teams to the countries affected by Ebola. In addition to meeting the direct costs of containing the Ebola outbreak, the Trust aimed to support capacity building of the public health sector of affected countries and more general capacity for disease control and health system resilience in Africa (AAEST, 2016). The most innovative part of the initiative was the establishment of a consortium of major telecoms which, in cooperation with some of the large banks on the continent, leveraged their mobile network infrastructure to allow African citizens and diaspora to contribute to the campaign in Africa’s first continental crowdfunding initiative (AAEST, 2016). The AfricaAgainstEbola SMS campaign was launched in Lagos on 3 December 2014 by 13 mobile network companies across the continent and coordinated by the AAEST. Mobile network companies drove the initiative at their own cost, reaching out to their collective subscriber base of almost 300 million people. Mobile network operators that were part of the initiative were Airtel, Econet Wireless, Etisalat, Glo Nigeria, Millicom, MTN, Orange, NetOne, Safaricom, Telma, Tigo, Vodacom, and Vodafone Ghana. The collaboration between the AU, mobile telephone operators, and regulators, made it possible for anyone in the 42 participating countries to contribute US$1 to the AfricaAgainstEbola Fund by sending STOP EBOLA to an SMS code applicable in their country. The AfricaAgainstEbola

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Fund was coordinated by the AAEST. Approximately US$34 million was raised through the SMS campaign (EQUINET, 2015). The initiative was coordinated through a single Memorandum of Understanding signed by the AUF and all companies involved, which was written to pave the way for future cooperation of a similar nature, formalising the working relationship between the private sector and the AU. The private sector, perhaps in recognition of the potential for a mutually beneficial relationship, was receptive and responsive to calls from the AUF, not only in response to Ebola, according to the one of the experts interviewed (Interviewee 3). The AU, through the AUF, developed a strategic approach to lobbying corporates, exploring and identifying areas of overlap for potential cooperation, and utilised its convening power to bring corporates together. AU chairperson Dlamini-Zuma would reach out to company CEOs and chairpersons of company boards in what was for many companies the first time that they had been approached by the AU in this way (Interviewee 3). Corporates began to view the AUF as a vehicle to participate in AU programmes and reach into African markets (Interviewee 3). Involvement in the AU through the AUF could offer them greater footprint and reach, networking and collaboration opportunities, and profiling opportunities. Corporates started to see that Dlamini-Zuma, with the backing and mandate she received from the South African government, could open opportunities for them (Interviewees 3 and 4). Disaster Response: AU Private Sector Engagement beyond the 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola Crisis Based on desktop investigation and experts’ opinions, it appears as if the AU has not leveraged the platforms or momentum gained in the Ebola response for similar cooperation and collaboration with the private sector in Africa. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that there have been some important areas of cooperation even if to a lesser degree. An Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in July 2019 prompted the chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) to announce a forum reconvening AAEST in September 2019 for the purposes of mobilising resources to fight the outbreak. The forum only took place in December 2019, although little is known about what it achieved. The AUC report merely stated that ‘pledges were obtained from some participating agencies and partners’ (Africa-CDC, 2019).

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Disaster Response: AU Private Sector Cooperation in Covid-19 Response The first cases of Covid-19 in Africa were reported in mid-February 2020 and had spread to the whole continent within three months. On 26 March 2020, the AU established the AU Covid-19 Response Fund as a financial instrument to mobilise and manage funds from the private sector to fight Covid-19 in Africa. The Fund is supervised by the Africa-CDC, which is mandated to deploy the funds according to its policy interventions. The first publicly announced donation from the private sector to the Fund was only ten months after its establishment. On 28 January 2021, MTN announced a financial donation of US$25 million to the Fund to be used for its Covid-19 vaccination programme. Prior to this, in October 2020, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa hosted an online fundraising event for the Fund, which at the time had managed to raise US$44 million against a target of US$300 million. The source of the funding is unknown as there are no public records of it. It is only known that Ramaphosa thanked ‘countries on the continent who have contributed, as well as our donor community partners and the continental and international business fraternity’ (RSA Presidency, 2020). At the time of writing, there have been no further public announcements of corporates donating to the AU Covid-19 Response Fund. There is an indication from various public announcements, however, that Vodacom is working with multiple structures of the AU in its Covid-19 response, including the Africa-CDC, AUDA-NEPAD, and the African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team. The Africa-CDC reported having convened tech and telecom executives and multiple government, civil society and academic experts on 26 March 2021 to explore how technology and innovation can strengthen Africa’s Covid-19 response and public health systems. The interaction was jointly sponsored by Econet Wireless and the Africa-CDC and, according to the press release, ‘some key outcomes of the meeting were commitments by leading companies such as Vodacom, Safaricom, Helium Health and several others to work with the Africa-CDC to design common integration points for constructing a pan-African e-health network’ (Africa-CDC, 2021). On 9 April 2021, Vodafone and Vodacom Foundation announced a pledge of €4.2 million for the safe delivery of vaccinations by the African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) established by the AU (Vodafone, 2021). Most recently, on 12 April 2021, Vodacom Group announced that it was partnering with AUDA-NEPAD in the Covid-19 vaccine roll-out. The partnership will offer the mVacciNation digital toolbox – a mobile technology platform that manages vaccination appointments and stock availability in AU member states. The mVacciNation toolbox, already used by South African Department of Health workers, registers health workers on its Covid-19

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Electronic Vaccine Data System, and also manages infant inoculations in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria. In terms of corporate partnerships with the AU Covid-19 Response Fund, only one corporate – Ecobank – is listed as a partner on the Fund’s web page. The private sector is represented on the Board of the Fund by one member – the Executive Director of the Dangote Group – while the other nine board members are representatives of member states. According to Ecobank Foundation, which has been part of the Africa-CDC’s response to Covid-19, including the AU’s Covid-19 Response Fund, the AU has been able to coordinate a response to the pandemic largely due to its experience with the Ebola outbreaks. By their account, the Africa-CDC convened a number of private sector stakeholders in April 2020 to discuss the response to the crisis, including some of the actors that were involved in the 2014–15 Ebola response. At this meeting, multiple workstreams were created with meetings co-chaired by the head of the Africa-CDC. Ecobank and other private companies picked up on tasks based on their capabilities and relative strengths. While there have been numerous points of contact between the AU structures and the private sector, some of which are detailed above, and many of which are not yet in the public domain, the response to Covid-19 appears to lack the coordinated and high-profile nature that characterised the Ebola response. To date, no similar crowdfunding platform has been created to consolidate donations from individuals and companies. However, on 14 April 2021 the Africa-CDC issued a call for bids for the design and development of a crowdfunding platform for the Africa-CDC. The bid is funded by the German international development agency (GIZ). Old Mutual – one of the contributors to the Africans Against Ebola Solidarity Trust in 2014 – has contributed to national responses to Covid-19 in the African countries in which it has a business presence. It has not engaged with any multilaterals in its response to Covid-19, including the Africa-CDC. Part of the reason for Old Mutual supporting national responses, rather than a pan-African response, is that countries were quicker to set these up and call for support, compared to pan-African initiatives which came only much later when Old Mutual had already committed funds to the national Covid-19 responses. This account given by Old Mutual, and a similar account from Safaricom, suggests that Africa-CDC has not mobilised the private sector to the extent that the AU did in response to Ebola. Accounts from interviewees and desktop research similarly indicate that there has not been an equivalent coordinated cross-border response to Covid-19 involving corporate philanthropy. Countries were quick to set up national funds in partnership with the local private sector, whereas calls from the Africa-CDC were relatively slow.

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Cooperation with AU on Broader Development Agenda Aside from engagement around the Ebola crisis, the AU’s efforts to engage corporates in Agenda 2063 culminated in the inaugural meeting of the African Economic Platform (AEP) in Mauritius in 2017. The primary objective of the AEP was to promote partnerships between political and private sector stakeholders on Africa’s development agenda. Although the AEP covered an array of macro issues, including skills development, industrialisation and free trade, it was intended as a networking platform with the potential for corporates to cooperate around philanthropy as well. The intention was for the AEP to be an annual meeting, but it has not been repeated since 2017 – one of a few indications that the momentum gained around AU partnerships with the private sector slowed after Dlamini-Zuma’s term. In an interview with the AU Commission (Interviewee 2), it was said that the organisation had planned on engaging with numerous partners and especially corporates in 2020; however, this was put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Engagement with AUDA-NEPAD According to a written response to this research request from a representative of AUDA-NEPAD, the organisation interacts with corporate philanthropy through the following mechanisms: a fund/foundation with contributions from corporates; jointly funded programmes/initiatives; jointly implemented programmes; disaster relief initiatives; information sharing and advisory on projects; joint research; joint advocacy and conferences, roundtables and discussions. Unfortunately, AUDA-NEPAD did not provide any details or examples of these interactions, and publicly available information on the organisation’s cooperation with private sector philanthropy is relatively scarce.4 Engagement with the African Development Bank According to the AfDB (Interviewee 1), most interaction between the AfDB and philanthropists has been around advocacy and the larger international foundations, like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The AfDB reported that interaction with African corporate philanthropy was relatively small-scale, primarily on a project basis and did not include financial cooperation. In an interview with the AfDB there was mention of a forum in which the AfDB and corporates meet to discuss CSI but the details of this were not forthcoming.

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The AfDB does not foresee that it would co-finance projects with African philanthropists, given the disparity in financial muscle – in the AfDB’s experience, African philanthropists do not have the structures and financial muscle to work with the institution. Community and socio-economic development initiatives are often built into loan agreements between the AfDB and its borrowers as part of the project, but this is often relatively insignificant when compared with the larger project. This, according to the AfDB, includes projects like the building of schools and is relatively ‘run-of-the-mill’ and often not impressive (Interviewee 1).

CHALLENGES WORKING WITH REGIONAL MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS Our research indicates that there is a lack of clear engagement mechanisms and frameworks within which corporate philanthropy and multilaterals can cooperate on continental developmental issues. Two of the corporates interviewed indicated that regional multilaterals have not demonstrated appetite and/or capacity to work with them, except in seeking sponsorships. Another reported not having been approached by any regional multilaterals, despite having a strong working relationship with their international counterparts. According to some of the interviewees, certain challenges of working with some regional multilaterals may be because of misaligned expectations and understanding of each other’s incentives, especially as some corporates have shifted away from wanting to provide lump-sum funding and sponsorships towards more strategic engagement. Cooperation around policy work with regional multilaterals is viewed as more challenging than with international multilaterals, with the latter being relatively more mature in terms of policy synchronisation, technical know-how, and capacity.

OPPORTUNITIES The research for this chapter points to occasions of coordination between corporate philanthropy and regional multilaterals, mainly through the AU as a result of a strong mandate from the leadership of the organisation. Cooperation around the West Africa Ebola crisis, however, is proof that successful and impactful initiatives are possible as a result of cooperation between the two, but that a platform and driving force is needed to build and sustain the momentum seen in this initiative. The Ebola case study demonstrates the way in which ICT companies were able to leverage and bring their core competencies to bear in addressing a health crisis. There is an inherent, natural alignment between some of the

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challenges presented by a pandemic and the comparative advantage that ICT companies have in communication, messaging, and reaching large numbers of the public in real time, as well as crowdfunding ability to raise additional emergency funding through mobile devices. The in-kind contributions of auditing, accounting, logistics, and financial services from the private sector during the Ebola crisis also demonstrated the potential for multilaterals to leverage private sector competencies in solving problems in a crisis. With a more coordinated approach, multilaterals could potentially leverage these competencies, not only during times of emergency and crisis but also in ongoing cooperation for development. The agility of the private sector to gather and pool resources is a key strength and necessary in times of crisis, where a quick response is paramount. Multilateral organisations tend to have complex bureaucratic structures and procedures, which can constrain their ability to quickly mobilise funding and capacity in times of crisis. The three corporates interviewed indicated appetite for further cooperation with regional multilateral organisations, but on the right opportunities. The corporates interviewed engage more on policy and programmes with international multilaterals, mainly through bodies of the UN, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, compared to regional multilaterals. Old Mutual and Safaricom for example have much stronger work programmes with international multilaterals compared to their regional counterparts. There is also an opportunity for multilaterals to advocate for a more robust philanthropic response from corporates through the facilitation of research into possibilities for the national regulation of philanthropic engagements by corporates, such as in South Africa.

CONCLUSION The opacity of information around corporate philanthropy cooperation with multilaterals that emerged through this research process is striking. While this research is in part an attempt to piece together information on selected instances of cooperation, large gaps remain to be addressed. The opaque nature of information raises concerns around transparency, accountability and sustainability of cooperation between the two entities and should be addressed by multilaterals. The exploratory research conducted for this chapter supports the hypothesis that cooperation between corporate philanthropy and regional multilaterals can reap considerable benefits for society and for the companies, in times of crisis but also beyond. Recent history shows that this cooperation is strongest during times of crisis, such as the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014–2016 and the current Covid-19 pandemic, when driven and steered by a coordinating body.

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Although regional multilaterals are theoretically well-placed to take on this role, this research points to a possible lack of resources and capacity to do so on an ongoing and sustained basis. The expressed desire of corporate philanthropy to work strategically with multilaterals on impactful development may represent an opportunity for regional multilaterals to increase the scope and effectiveness of the interventions of both parties. While there are opportunities for further cooperation between corporate philanthropy and regional multilaterals, this is likely to require a proactive approach from regional multilaterals, in the form of establishing platforms and frameworks within which ongoing engagement and cooperation can take place. Regional multilaterals have the opportunity to adopt a more strategic approach to working with corporates and to build strategic and impactful partnerships for development on the continent.

INTERVIEWS Interviewee 1. African Development Bank. 2021. Director of the Resource Mobilization and External Finance Department. Interviewed in a joint interview with the author. 21 January 2021. Interviewee 2. African Union Commission. 2021. Head: International cooperation and resource mobilisation, African Union Commission. Interviewed by the author. 20 January 2021. Interviewee 3. AUDA-NEPAD. 2021. Chief Executive Office, AUDA-NEPAD. Written response to author interview questions. 10 February 2021. Interviewee 4. African Union Foundation. 2021. Former Chief Operating Officer, African Union Foundation. Interviewed by the author. 9 February 2021. Interviewee 5. Centre for African Philanthropy and Social Investment. 2021. Director: Centre for African Philanthropy and Social Investment and Board Member: African Union Foundation. Interviewed by the author. March 2021. Interviewee 6. Ecobank Foundation. 2021. Chief Operating Officer: Ecobank Foundation and Executive Secretary of the Africans Against Ebola Solidarity Trust. Interviewed by the author. 24 March 2021. Interviewee 7. NEPAD Business Foundation. 2021. Founder and former MD of the NEPAD Business Foundation. Interviewed by the author. 13 April 2021. Interviewee 8. Old Mutual. 2021. Stakeholder Relations, Old Mutual. Interviewed by the author. 16 March 2021.

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Interviewee 9. Safaricom. 2021. Senior Manager: Safaricom. Interviewed by author. 23 March 2021.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.

For example: the UN Global Compact (2000); IMF ‘Monterrey Consensus’ (2002). See AfDB (2011). See Porter and Kramer (2011) on the competitive benefits of a strategic approach to corporate philanthropy. For an overview of critiques of corporate philanthropy see Banerjee (2008), Bracking (2015), Mottiar (2015), Sharife (2015), and Visser (2012). The independently established NEPAD Business Foundation set itself up as a platform and facilitator for public/private and civil society collaboration and dialogue on issues related to economic development in Africa in 2002 following a call by former South African President Thabo Mbeki for a greater role for the private sector in economic growth on the continent. Old Mutual was one of the NBF’s founding partners and in January 2009 it donated R1.5 million to the NBF.

10. Improving coordination between multilateral institutions and philanthropists: a view from high-net worth individuals Tendai Murisa INTRODUCTION No one was ready for the Covid-19 pandemic. In some countries Covid-19 was an existential threat. In many instances, societies globally, and especially in Africa, do not have mechanisms to respond to crisis moments caused by natural disasters such as flooding, outbreak of diseases/pandemics and other major disruptions. Africa has had some form of preparation for these challenges from the days of Ebola (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and DRC), flooding (Sierra Leone), and cholera/typhoid (DRC and Zimbabwe). Since the turn of the century, most of Africa’s responses to disasters have also been associated with local resources. There are many instances where Africa’s High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) have lent support at the time of need. In 2012, the Dangote Foundation worked together with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the eradication of polio in Nigeria.1 The same Aliko Dangote-led Foundation also contributed towards the Wellcome Trust’s research on Ebola.2 At the peak of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 the then Chair of the African Union (AU) mobilised a consortium of African HNWIs working alongside the AU to fight the spread of Ebola.3 In 2014 Patrice and Precious Moloi gave US$10 million to the Global Fund (Schwier et al., 2020). In Zimbabwe, Tsitsi and Strive Masiyiwa have become synonymous with emergency responses. In 2018 they led the fight against the spread of cholera and in 2019/20 they made a major contribution in the response to the effects of Cyclone Idai.4 These African HNWIs were also called upon to give in response to Covid-19. However, the response indicates high levels of ad hoc action in responding to disasters and in many instances, philanthropists looking inward, focusing on their home countries. Other studies and expert 142

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opinions have renewed calls for sustainable and predictable giving in response to emerging disasters. The purpose of this chapter is, on the one hand, to shed more light on how HNWIs actually engage in philanthropy and, on the other hand, to understand the extent to which they have collaborated with multilateral institutions (MLIs). It discusses in detail the ways in which HNWIs spread across the continent have collaborated with official processes of development at national and regional level. Furthermore, the chapter will through case study analysis examine the extent to which the AU has and can improve coordination for philanthropic investments. One of the most important questions to raise is what the collaboration between MLIs and Africa’s HNWIs looks like. In this chapter I will examine the current forms of collaboration between HNWIs and MLIs.

BACKGROUND Africa has traditionally been a major recipient of philanthropic support from outside the continent. However, the fact that Africa is donor dependent is a contradiction. It is both the richest continent and also the poorest. Whilst it accounts for 13 per cent of the world’s population it only contributes 2 per cent to the global GDP. Despite its own traditions of giving (which manifest as Ubuntu in Southern Africa, Harambee in East Africa, susu and many other forms of solidarity elsewhere) and numerous philanthropy related initiatives and investments in Africa, the continent remains highly underdeveloped with some regions experiencing fragile peace, high levels of food insecurity, and poverty. Africa has in the past received significant amounts of support for both its liberation and also post-colonial development through philanthropy. There is renewed optimism for Africa – some have already claimed the twenty-first century as Africa’s century popularly coined as ‘Africa Rising’. It is also in this context that we ask: does Africa need philanthropy then – if it is indeed rising? The continent cannot, unfortunately, deliver on her potential alone – she needs a capable midwife. Could philanthropy be that midwife, working towards the birth of the new? However, given the past failures of the philanthropy and development projects, there is a need to rethink how to insert philanthropy into Africa’s change processes. While philanthropy is potentially a force for good, it has its own challenges especially around power relations between the giver and the recipient, predictability, sustainability, conditionalities, and in some cases its relevance. There is a new set of players in the form of Africa’s HNWIs and the foundations they establish. The majority of these foundations were established in the 1990s and have been involved in high profile giving. It is not yet clear if these forms of giving provide an alternative to the mainstream aid mechanisms. Furthermore, the ways in which they engage with the expert institutions that

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have been at the centre of a decades-old battle to help Africa make the leap from underdeveloped to developed have not been adequately examined and discussed. First, it is important to understand how HNWI philanthropy is actually organised. Giving by Africa’s HNWIs has a longer history than previously acknowledged. African societies like many others elsewhere have always been differentiated. The rich African with more land and cattle than others, is a pre-colonial phenomenon (Scoones et al., 2012). Their exploitation of labour (family and hired) to expand their enterprises is well recorded but records of their giving remain anecdotal. Terms such as hurudza (Shona for rich farmer) and inkinsela (Zulu for rich man) suggest that the wealthy have always existed alongside the poor within communities. Studies of rural differentiation have demonstrated the extent to which the wealthier sections of societies provided philanthropic support by creating labour opportunities, providing transportation, and general support. Tsitsi Dangarembga’s novel Nervous Conditions (1988) provides a depiction of how philanthropy was practised by the rich or better off in an African society. In it, she explores the pitfalls of ‘know it all’ approaches that philanthropists are prone to making. Furthermore, ancient African history is replete with legends of the wealthy and their philanthropy. For instance, the fabulous gifts of gold and precious stones that the Queen of Sheba brought King Solomon during her visit to Jerusalem in the tenth century bce grew into folklore about the land of Ophir in Africa (Meredith, 2014). Mansa Musa (1280–1337), king of the Mali empire, is reputed to have been the richest man in history with an inflation adjusted net worth of US$400 billion5 which was higher than John D. Rockefeller’s inflation-adjusted net worth of US$340 billion. He was responsible for a lot of buildings including mosques and madrasas in Gao and Timbuktu – the most famous piece of construction being the Sankore Madrasah (University of Sankore). It is through such narratives that we learn of the existence of extremely rich individuals on the continent of Africa and by extension also assume that they were indeed involved in giving. Thus, instead of pursuing exceptionalism around today’s giving by the wealthy, there is need to view continuities within Africa’s history of philanthropy and to insert these giving practices of rich Africans within a global narrative. Private enterprise in Africa, like elsewhere, has yielded class differences characterised by growing inequalities and just like many other parts of the world some of the rich have given to public causes whilst others have chosen not to. Admittedly we do not have sufficient data to measure their contributions but instead we make the point that the current wave of Africa’s ultra-rich giving to public causes is not necessarily new although the amounts are probably bigger.

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It is perhaps the unprecedented high levels of giving by Africans that herald the arrival of Africans on the philanthropy stage which has led many scholars and observers to believe that this could be the moment for the rise of African philanthropy. Even the African Union has been caught up in the excitement of establishing its own foundation with the goal of reducing dependency on resources from the Global North. Moyo and Ramsamy (2014) argue that this is the time to consolidate on the momentum generated over the last decades specifically for African philanthropy and its role in development. As of January 2021, Africa had 18 billionaires, worth an average of US$4.1 billion. These billionaires are spread across the continent but concentrated in Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. According to Dawkins et al. (2021), the majority of these are first generation billionaires except for Nicky Oppenheimer who inherited a stake in diamond firm DeBeers and ran the company until 2012, when he sold his family’s 40 per cent stake in DeBeers to mining giant Anglo American for $5.1 billion.6 By the close of 2020, there were no female billionaires. The previous list of billionaires included Folorunsho Alakija of Nigeria and Isabel dos Santos. According to Dawkins et al., Folorunsho Alakija who owns an oil exploration company, dropped below $1 billion due to lower oil prices. Isabel dos Santos, who since 2013 has been the richest woman in Africa, was knocked from her perch by a series of court decisions freezing her assets in both Angola and Portugal. Earlier studies carried out by TrustAfrica in collaboration with UBS (a private Swiss bank) in 2015 indicated that giving by foundations established by high-net worth Africans is now around US$1 billion.7 The BridgeSpan (2021) study found 63 large gifts made by Africa’s HNWIs totalling over US$1 billion made between 2010 and 2019 (Schwier et al., 2020). Some of the high-profile gifts made by billionaires include the US$100 million donation made by Aliko Dangote to address malnutrition in Nigeria (Schwier et al., 2020, p. 11). Strive and Tsitsi Masiyiwa also made a combined donation of US$70 million to address the cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe. The discussion in this chapter is not only about the billionaires but other HNWIs as well. These comprise individuals or families who earn at least US$1 million per year or have assets of equivalent value. The AfrAsia Bank’s 2019 Wealth Report provides insights into varying levels of HNWIs spread across Africa. According to the report, there are approximately 140,000 HNWIs living in Africa, each with net assets of US$1 million or more. There are approximately 6,900 multi-millionaires living in Africa, each with net assets of US$10 million or more. There are approximately 310 centi-millionaires living in Africa, each with net assets of US$100 million or more. It is further projected that Africans with assets worth more than $30 million will double by 2025, a growth of 59 per cent over the next ten years compared to the global figure of 34 per cent (Capgemini, 2016). One of the important lessons from the

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previous decades has been that as the number of wealthy individuals /families/ corporations grows there is high likelihood of an increase in the amounts set aside for philanthropic causes. We are thus in the middle of a growing sector which we know very little about. Studies carried out to date (Murisa, 2018; Schwier et al., 2020) have concluded that giving by HNWI is characterised by the following: • donors give mainly within their own countries; • the majority of donations go towards social services and welfare relief; • the majority of the large gifts are directed to the public sector and their own operating foundations; • they prefer to give anonymously, and their religious values play a huge role in determining the causes that they support; and • very limited funding goes to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Furthermore, an earlier study carried out by TrustAfrica and UBS focusing on the giving habits of approximately 40 HNWIs spread across the continent found amongst other things that they were actively giving within their extended families (19 per cent), communities (12 per cent), and beyond (26 per cent) in the same period (Mahomed et al., 2014). They do not only give through their foundations but also use informal channels. Their giving is also embedded in beliefs and cultural practices. The majority give to health, education, and poverty reduction related causes. The majority have made investments in the education area either through building schools or refurbishing those that currently exist. Other interventions in the domain of education include the purchase of textbooks, providing meals to learners and more recently we have seen innovations such as integrated technology-based learning platforms such as the one developed by Higherlife Foundation, and after-class learning innovations. Some of the more visible actors carrying out service delivery within the education space include the TY Danjuma Foundation, Mohammed Dewji Foundation, Higherlife Foundation, and the Motsepe Foundation. Table 10A.1 in the Annexe to this chapter shows the spread of foundations established by African HNWIs across the selected countries and the causes they are championing. However, there are still challenges to do with African HNWI philanthropy. The majority of the foundations established by HNWIs do not have consistent and transparent grant-making programmes compared to their Global North counterparts except for a few such as the Tony Elumelu and TY Danjuma Foundations. The majority either support government processes or prefer to implement on their own. Very few NGOs receive more than 50 per cent of their budgets from Africa’s HNWIs and thereby curtailing prospects for transforming current NGO–donor relations. As of 2018 only two African HNWIs

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had endowed their foundations – the others remain dependent on either the parent company allocating a percentage from their profits or literally a decision by the founder on how much the foundation should receive. In some instances, the largest HNWI gifts are made outside of their foundations. Furthermore, one would assume that charity begins at home in terms of giving. There have been a number of large gifts donated by Africa’s HNWIs to organisations outside of the continent. In 2019 Aliko Dangote donated US$20 million to the Africa Centre in New York City focused on accelerating change in global narratives about Africa in policy, business, and culture. Earlier on, in 2016, the Nigerian billionaire Mohammed Indimi also made a donation to Lynn University in the United States.

MULTILATERALS IN AFRICA On the other hand, multilateral institutions have a long history of deploying development solutions across the continent. They mostly mobilise resources from donor countries and other big private philanthropy foundations. However, the terrain occupied by MLIs is highly contested. Over the years, these MLIs have become large bureaucracies at times with access to more resources than those of a national government. They have indeed and continue to play a large role in terms of promoting certain development outcomes. They crowd out local responses and where possible subcontract some of their work to local NGOs. They are rarely influenced by national processes but rather they bring the international into the local. Furthermore, despite the numerous vast amounts of resources that these MLIs have deployed, the continent remains highly underdeveloped with some regions experiencing fragile peace. It is important, as a starting point, to note that multilaterals have mostly been vehicles for the distribution of official development aid (ODA). The purpose of ODA is multifaceted. It ranges from governance reforms, infrastructure development, and enhancing production capacities in many economic subsectors, to poverty reduction and improved access to healthcare. In many instance the design of ODA funded initiatives is influenced by the donor country’s foreign policy interests. Multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations family institutions such as the UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UN Women and many others have designed their interventions within the confines of those interests. Instead of a sectoral analysis of the contributions of ODA to Africa, I focus on the theoretical/ideological underpinnings of this assistance and also argue that there is a disconnect between what ODA-led multilaterals are offering/focusing on and the real challenges that African countries have to address. Challenges in Africa are mostly systemic and structural in nature, requiring, on the one hand a radical restructuring of the international governance framework especially around global trade, governance of international investments (curbing illicit

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financial flows), and providing policy space for African governments to innovate in social policy and also their economic policies. On the other hand, challenges in Africa are also domestic – there is a need for internal reforms of political and economic systems (at national and regional levels). ODA-led multilateral interventions have, to their credit, attempted to contribute to some change but the results have been uneven and at times disappointing. At the centre of ODA is an unimaginative linear process-like form of development or a ‘catch-up’ approach to a defined picture of the developed. In this line of thinking Africa is underdeveloped and it needs an accelerated process of growth through a process of modernisation. ODA has mostly been influenced by modernisation theorists who sought to devise ways to transform Africa (or the Third World in general) into capitalist societies. They advanced a set of neoclassical economic prescriptions which reflected their unbridled faith in technology and capitalism to promote the agenda of ‘progressive Africans’ and ‘rational economic men’. Such a position fails to recognise or acknowledge that there are many paths to attaining development rather than the straitjacket approach based on markets and growth. We must acknowledge that within the modernisation framework some success has been achieved. However, if economic growth alone was the missing element Africa would have by now probably overtaken other developed regions. Indicators of growth, such as GDP, across most of Africa have been positive and in some countries in the double digit zone for close to a decade but even a recent issue of The Economist, a traditionally pro-market magazine, acknowledged that GDP alone is not a sufficient indicator of growth. Unfortunately, Africa is nowhere close to poverty reduction despite the positive economic growth. What has transpired is the widening of the gap between the very few rich and the many poor. Interestingly, there is a huge focus on the growing middle class instead of the equally if not faster growth of groups living on less than a dollar a day at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP). The widening income gap is not unique to African development, but rather global inequality has been increasing significantly (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020). Today, it is abundantly clear that, left on their own, markets are not guaranteed to allocate resources in a way that works for everyone. Instead, we have seen a tendency to concentrate benefits in fewer hands resulting in deeper inequality. It has been suggested that inequality is not a sign of a problem in a capitalist economy, but rather a result of a healthy capitalist system. Could it be that we need the state now more than ever especially in Africa to anchor the national consensus and safeguard public interest around an inclusive agenda for economic and social justice? ODA, unfortunately, given its links and role it plays in promoting the foreign policies of rich countries may be constrained from playing a significant role in

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Africa’s quest for structural transformation. Perhaps the big question (beyond the discussion in this chapter) is whether the emerging HNWIs’ philanthropy could contribute towards shaping a new order. Is it desirable for Africa’s HNWIs to seek relationships of collaboration with a compromised multilateral institutions-led development system? Could it be that these HNWIs and the foundations they establish can promote a new public discourse that promotes an alternative approach to development? Whilst it is seemingly desirable for HNWIs to partner with these MLIs, critical questions such as ‘who will set the agenda’ arise when considering these collaborations. The discussion will focus on the work of multilateral institutions such as the African Development Bank, Africa’s Centres for Disease Control, the World Bank, and the United Development Programme (UNDP). The chapter will focus on the relationships forged between HNWIs and MLIs. These relationships take on many forms beyond just the flows of money from HNWIs to recipient multilaterals. We have noted at least five ways in which HNWIs engage with multinationals. These are discussed in detail below. HNWIs as Co-Funders in the Response to Covid-19 One of the most obvious roles expected of HNWIs is their signing of cheques towards important causes. There is no Pan-African fund for the mitigation of disasters across the continent. However, despite the lack of a continent-wide response to Covid-19, HNWI giving has been at its best. In just one year, in response to a pandemic that threatened livelihoods across the continent, African philanthropists gave seven times the annual average number of large gifts for the previous decade.8 No other disaster in the past 10 years attracted this magnitude of funding (Bridgespan Group, 2021). However, the philanthropy by HNWIs has mostly gone native. Giving was local, even while the virus was everywhere at once and despite the outpouring of philanthropy, the continent’s local NGOs received less than one out of every ten large gift dollars granted (Bridgespan Group, 2021). In many instances HNWI philanthropy has focused on in-country initiatives. The three countries with higher densities of HNWI giving – Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa – were able to establish collaborative relief funds in response to Covid-19. In South Africa, HNWIs such as Patrice Motsepe, Nicky Oppenheimer, Johann Rupert, and Mary Oppenheimer each pledged US$67 million to help establish the Solidarity Fund.9 The Solidarity Fund is a collaborative platform designed as a rapid response vehicle to mobilise South Africa in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. The fund mobilised approximately ZAR3.2 billion and a significant portion of these funds came from HNWIs. In Kenya President Uhuru launched the Kenya Covid-19 Fund which managed to mobilise US$3 million. Tony Elumelu of Nigeria donated US$14 million through United Bank for Africa

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to Covid-19 response across 20 African countries including the US$500,000 earmarked for research at the Nigeria Centres for Disease Control. Aliko Dangote, working alongside the Access Bank Group, launched the Coalition Against Coronavirus (COCAVID). Dangote helped initiate the campaign to raise N30 billion ($78.8m) from local donors to finance more than 2,100 intensive care beds, 600,000 test kits for distribution around the country, and a food relief programme.10 The other donors that came alongside to support COCAVID include the founder of Globacom and third-richest African, Mike Adenuga, who donated N1.5 billion, alongside the industrialist Abdul Samad Rabiu, the managing director of Access Bank, Herbert Wigwe, the oil baron Femi Otedola and the vice chairman of Famfa Oil, Folorunsho Alakija, each of whom contributed around N1 billion. In Egypt Naguib Sawiris donated over E£100 million ($6.4m) through his foundation. The donation provided support to the Egyptian health ministry and poor families in response to Covid-19. In Zimbabwe, Strive Masiyiwa helped end a four-month-long strike by doctors over poor pay by offering them a $300 monthly subsistence allowance. He took the lead in helping the country prepare for a wider outbreak of the coronavirus. Most doctors in the country only returned to work after the establishment of a fund to cover their subsistence and transport costs. Through his Higherlife Foundation, a charitable organisation, Mr Masiyiwa secured 45 ventilators to equip Zimbabwe’s public hospitals. At the time, he hoped the intervention would inspire other businesspeople and companies to come to the rescue of the country’s struggling public hospitals. Strive also donated 100,000 test kits. Prior to the Covid-19 outbreak Strive and Tsitsi Masiyiwa had donated US$60 million towards the cholera response in Zimbabwe. Their company, Econet Wireless, had initially donated $10 million in September 2018 as part of an effort to help government’s efforts in responding to the cholera outbreak. Almost half of this had been spent by February 2019, and the Masiyiwas committed to expand these funds by $60 million of their own funds, to be spent over the next five years. Since the 2018 outbreak, the government of Zimbabwe led a massive effort to contain the spread of cholera.11 The swift action in releasing funds was critical for success. The US$60 million commitment supports a wider cholera initiative, also referred to as the ‘End Cholera Now: The 10-Year Promise’ campaign. It has grown into a collaboration with the CDC office in Zimbabwe, the ministry of health and a national taskforce on cholera elimination, with support from Higherlife Foundation. The work of the taskforce is guided by the World Health Organization’s Global Cholera Roadmap for Ending Cholera by 2030, and Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030 Framework.

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HNWIs as Advocates Focused on Multilateral Agencies’ Responses At the beginning of the spread of Covid-19 across the world, the African Union appointed Strive Masiyiwa of Zimbabwe, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Dr Donald Kaberuka, Mr Trevor Manuel and Mr Tidjane Thiam to be the African Union Special Envoys. Strive Masiyiwa was tasked to coordinate the continent’s Private Sector Initiative to Procure Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and other essential supplies. The other envoys were responsible for mobilising resources. Besides being a major funder of the response to Covid-19 in Zimbabwe, Strive had to become a coordinator of a Pan-African initiative working alongside the AU Chair and the Commission. Strive approached the World Bank’s International Finance Cooperation to consider a Marshall Plan approach response to resuscitating a Covid-19 ravaged private sector. As AU envoys, they highlighted the need for a job stimulus programme of $100 billion for Africa through special drawing rights at the IMF. Their advocacy reached to the Global Fund and GAVI and the Vaccine Alliance to make special concessions for African countries. Strive also campaigned for a special facility for Sudan and Zimbabwe. These two countries are under a variety of sanctions and there was a concern that they could be left out of the support facilities developed by Western countries. HNWIs as Collaborators with Multilateral Agencies There is an increased recognition amongst philanthropy organisations and even within NGOs that their effectiveness is limited by many factors especially when attempting to address structural issues that have hindered the transformation of Africa. There has emerged a body of literature that is based on evidence and makes a strong case for collaboration to create synergies (Murisa, 2018; Schwier et al., 2020, p. 11). Collaboration has also been a tool to broaden prospects of mutual learning, spreading risk and tapping into skillsets and expertise that are not ordinarily resident within one organisation. We set out to find out if African foundations are engaged in any forms of collaboration with each other or with any formations such as global philanthropy foundations, NGOs, government agencies, public institutions, and bilateral and multilateral agencies. The levels of collaboration are low across the board (see Figure 10.1). We found that the most common form of collaboration is with local NGOs and multilateral agencies followed by collaborations with global philanthropy foundations. There is very limited collaboration amongst African philanthropy organisations. Murisa (2018) found that there is limited collaboration amongst the philanthropy organisations suggesting possibilities of ‘silo’ based interventions. It is significant to note, however, that there are

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some organisations that are collaborating with government departments and public institutions.

Source:

Murisa (2018).

Figure 10.1

Collaborating partners

There are many HNWI established foundations that are engaged in various forms of collaboration. Strive Masiyiwa as the special envoy for AU worked with representatives from the Africa Centres for Disease Control (CDC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the Afreximbank, towards putting together an agreement that was signed for Johnson and Johnson to manufacture 400 million doses of vaccine for Africa.12 The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, in partnership with three multilateral organisations, the AfDB, UNECA, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), established the Ibrahim Leadership Fellowships Programme. The Fellowships Programme is aimed at preparing the next generation of outstanding African leaders by providing them with unique mentoring opportunities. The Ibrahim Fellows are selected by the institutions in conjunction with the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and they take part in a 12-month fellowship with one of the participating organisations. They are mostly young professionals, mid-career and new executives under the age of forty, or forty-five for women with children. The Fellows are mostly nationals of an African country with 7–10 years of relevant work experience and a master’s degree. During their fellowship they support the work of the institution to further promote the economic development of the continent.

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Speaking on behalf of the AfDB, President Donald Kaberuka said: The Ibrahim Fellowships Programme will ensure there is a growing pipeline of future African leaders who have the experience and ability to build strong African economies. The African Development Bank is delighted to host one of the first Ibrahim Fellows.13 (AfDB, 2011)

Expressing his support for the new programme, Abdoulie Janneh, Executive Secretary of UNECA said: We are proud to be an inaugural partner of the new Ibrahim Fellowships Programme. We share Mo Ibrahim’s determination to inspire outstanding leaders in Africa and expose them to the challenges of African integration. This programme is another step towards a better future for our people.14 (AfDB, 2011)

The Tony Elumelu Foundation collaborates with the AfDB, the European Union, Agence Française de Développement, the German Agency for International Cooperation, the UNDP, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.15 The foundation received a grant of US$5 million from the AfDB to scale up its outreach and impact to 1,000 select youth entrepreneurs. The Bank’s participation was meant to enable an additional 1,000 entrepreneurs to benefit from the Tony Elumelu Entrepreneurship Programme. HNWI as Producers / Implementers In many instances, discussions of Africa’s HNWIs ignore the work of Mo Ibrahim because he is not based in Africa. Besides his geographical base, Mo Ibrahim is one of the few philanthropists who constantly engages with the African governance landscape and has worked closely with the African Union in terms of helping improve conditions of democracy, in particular ensuring that elected leaders adhere to term limits. Perhaps his lasting investment is the Ibrahim Prize which was introduced in 2007. It is awarded to a former Executive Head of State or Government by an independent Prize Committee composed of eminent figures, including two Nobel Laureates. The winner of the award is given US$5 million. To date the following former leaders have received the prize: Nelson Mandela (2007), Joaquim Chissano (2007), Festus Mogae (2008), Pedro Rodriguez (2011), Hifikipunye Pohamba (2014), Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2017), and Mahamadou Issoufou (2020). Besides the Ibrahim Prize, Mo Ibrahim also funds the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The index is a tool that measures and monitors governance performance in African countries. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their

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state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.16 In the IIAG, country performance in delivering governance is measured across four key components that effectively provide indicators of a country’s Overall Governance performance. The key components that form the four categories of the IIAG are Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and Human Development. Each of these categories contain subcategories under which are organised various indicators that provide quantifiable measures of the overarching dimensions of governance. In total, the IIAG contains over 100 indicators. Published since 2007, the IIAG was created to provide a quantifiable tool to measure and monitor governance performance in African countries, to assess their progress over time, and to support the development of effective and responsive policy solutions. The IIAG focuses on measuring outputs and outcomes of policy, rather than declarations of intent, de jure statutes, and levels of expenditure. The IIAG provides data measuring the governance performance across all the dimensions described above for 54 African countries for the years from 2008–2017. In order to provide a broad, documented, and impartial picture of governance performance in every African country, the indicators are collected from 35 independent sources. The entire index time series is updated every year to ensure that each new IIAG provides the most accurate data available. Mo Ibrahim and his foundation have probably become one of the leading advocates for improved governance conditions on the continent based on the production of the IIAG and the follow up meetings to discuss the report. For instance, on 31 March 2020 the foundation launched its report examining the continent’s readiness to tackle Covid-19.17 According to the foundation the report ‘analyses Africa’s readiness and capacity to manage the Covid-19 pandemic’. The report predicted that: COVID-19’s global reach will have a huge economic and wider impact on the entire African continent. Occurring later, it will isolate Africa from other recovering regions. On the continent, the pandemic will widen inequalities within and between countries, worsen already existing fragilities, restrict employment and investment prospects, and potentially fuel additional domestic unrest and conflicts.

Some of the findings of the report were that only 10 African countries provide free and universal healthcare to their citizens, while healthcare in 22 countries is neither free nor universal. It recommended that governments make swift improvements in handling and improving access to basic health services. The foundation called for a ‘coordinated governance, improved health structures and better data to mitigate this crisis’. The foundation emphasised that ‘sound and coordinated governance is needed across the continent’. It also reminded

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African countries to draw from the lessons learned during the Ebola outbreak in 2015 and address the specific weaknesses of Africa’s health structures, improve health systems and citizens’ access to them, and more generally strengthen data and statistical capacity. On the foundation’s website they have a number of Covid-19 related studies focusing on the youth, governance, and the relationship between Covid-19 and poverty. Other Forms of HNWI Giving The discussion has so far provided insights on giving by the billionaire sub-cluster of HNWIs. These have mostly set up foundations within their own countries and engage in high level visible giving. At times they give through their foundations and also at times use their corporations. Within the HNWI clusters there are also those who earn at least US$1 million a year and above. The 2015 TrustAfrica and UBS study also focused on this category of HNWIs and found that they actively give within their communities and are most likely to collaborate with others in giving. Maybe there is a need to focus beyond just the ultra-rich and invest more in understanding Africa’s middle class. The growth of HNWIs across the continent has also been associated with the growth of a new middle class which is approximately 5 per cent of the African population. Observers – including the AfDB and Standard Bank – remain convinced that Africa’s consumer market is burgeoning and bringing with it increased opportunities for businesses on the continent. Many of the studies that have been conducted on the size of the middle class have mostly focused on their consumption habits, but we know very little about their propensity to give and can only extrapolate based on data from other regions. International NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children (StC), Amnesty, and Action Aid raise a significant amount of their resources through individual giving across the developed world and the bulk of the givers are middle income earners. The tax regimes in those regions have created incentives for this kind of giving whilst in Africa (except for South Africa) the same does not exist. In South Africa these HNWIs (upper echelons of the middle class) are the second largest source of giving. The majority of the HNWIs prefer to keep their giving anonymous for a number of reasons including the historical legacy of apartheid which fuelled inequality on racial lines. On the other hand, the black HNWIs prefer anonymity often due to religious reasons. The country remains the most unequal in the world.18 Even the trends in giving demonstrate the inequality. According to the Giving Report published by Nedbank in 2019, the majority (80 per cent) of HNWIs19 are white South Africans. It is estimated that the total population of HNWIs in South Africa is around 135,700. Approximately 83 per cent of HNWIs gave money, time, or goods and services in 2018. The Giving Report estimates that these HNWIs donated roughly

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ZAR6.1 billion (US$320 million) in cash, ZAR3.1 billion (US$163 million) in goods and services and 4.3 million hours of their time (Nedbank Wealth Report, 2019). The biggest cohort (49 per cent) of the HNWIs derive their wealth from earnings from a profession or career. Their motivations for giving vary; they include a desire to make a difference and a personal connection with a cause. In a survey carried out recently amongst HNWIs, approximately 50 per cent were motivated by their desire to give back to their community while 33 per cent were motivated by religious beliefs and 20 per cent were motivated by a family tradition of giving. The majority (approximately 72 per cent) of HNWIs engaged in giving do not have a defined strategy for giving (Nedbank, 2019). In many instances these HNWIs give to social causes through religious organisations (churches and mosques), personal or family involvement or networks of friends and peers. Only a tiny minority (28 per cent) of individual givers execute their giving through a trust or a foundation. Perhaps one of the positive outcomes from the Covid-19 pandemic has been the sense of collective responsibility towards each other. The President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, in an unprecedented move announced that he would be donating a third of his salary for three months to a national fund aptly called the Solidarity Fund.20 Since then a number of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of major corporations have similarly announced that they will be taking pay cuts. As of 29 March 2021, the fund had received ZAR3.22 billion out of a pledged total of ZAR3.22 billion.21 A number of HNWIs and foundations have made contributions to the fund. Outside of the big gifts towards supporting the Solidarity Fund, there are many others who have contributed. The Chairperson’s report for the first six months of the Fund states that the Fund received R3.11 billion in financial contributions from over 304,431 donors, including 14,487 individuals and 2,523 corporates (as at the end of September 2020). A significant proportion of the 14,487 individual donors who gave so generously are members of South Africa’s middle class. In Uganda, local wealthy Ugandans such as Sudhir Ruparelia, Patrick Bitature, the late Amirali Karmali and many other millionaires have either established foundations or are actively engaged in giving towards various charities using their own resources. Sudhir Ruparelia, Uganda’s richest man (according to Forbes Magazine, 201522), established the Ruparelia Foundation23 with a vision to create a positive and transformative change in the community. The Foundation does not have an endowment and receives annual donations. According to audited financial statements,24 the founder has donated 305 million Ugandan Shillings (US$80,000) over a period of five years. Patrick Bitature, a Ugandan first-generation businessman, has established together with his wife the Patrick and Carol Bitature Foundation. The flagship initiative of their foundation is the ‘Project 500K’, which is working

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to set up the next generation of business leaders to succeed and grow Uganda’s economy. The Covid-19 pandemic has also provided a further impetus for the growth of widespread philanthropic solidarity across Ugandan society. According to CivSource Africa (2020), an organisation that promotes the growth of philanthropy in Uganda, more than US$4.5 million in cash and various in-kind donations have been raised to date. Most of the foundations discussed above leverage both local and foreign funding. According to Pascal (2015), sources range from multilateral funding, international NGOs, and global foundations, to corporate institutions, individuals, and religious institutions (members of the East Africa Philanthropy Network25). In Zimbabwe a combination of the upper echelons of the middle class and business professionals established Solidarity Trust Zimbabwe (www​.sotzim​ .org) as part of efforts to respond to Covid-19. One of SOTZIM’s most immediate tasks was to mobilise resources for the establishment of a dedicated Covid-19 treatment facility. The trust entered into a joint venture agreement with St Anne’s Hospital to establish the St Anne’s Hospital Covid-19 Response Centre (SACREC). At that time St Anne’s was closed and in a state of disrepair. SOTZIM together with the team at St Anne’s raised resources to reopen the facility. The hospital was retrofitted with the required equipment to provide at least 100 general ward beds, 40 high dependency unit (HDU) beds and 20 intensive care unit (ICU) beds. SOTZIM raised approximately US$500,000 and more than ZWL$15 million from corporates and individuals (both locally and in the diaspora) to ensure that the hospital could reopen. The hospital was officially opened to the public in August 2020. In addition to mustering resources for the refurbishment of the hospital, SOTZIM also mobilised PPE for use by the health personnel employed at the hospital as well as money to pay for their salaries. SOTZIM also raised resources from the UNDP to cover salaries for health workers for at least three months. SOTZIM was also incorporated into the multi-donor platform responding to Covid-19 in Zimbabwe where it was responsible for mobilising resources from the private sector. Furthermore, the SOTZIM website (www​.sotzim​.org) served as a source of information and a platform for the collection of donations from citizens and businesses to support the fight against Covid-19. For a period of three months SOTZIM took over the running of a government toll-free line. During that time, the line was manned by trained health professionals who would provide an initial and comprehensive first line of diagnosis to citizens as part of efforts to avoid overwhelming public health centres.

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS NEW PARTNERSHIPS African governments have to take advantage of the existing goodwill demonstrated by HNWIs during the Covid-19 pandemic and also in other prior initiatives. To date only Rwanda has a strategy on philanthropy. The HNWIs and the foundations they establish should be formally invited and engaged in contributing to issues of national development. There is a need for a comprehensive framework that creates incentives for giving and also a platform to align priorities between governments and philanthropy. There is a risk that HNWI led philanthropy will focus on its own projects that are not necessarily aligned to national development needs or they could duplicate what is already happening as we have seen with some of the multilateral institutions’ interventions. Current government approaches mostly focus on requesting donations either from corporates or foundations established by HNWIs in response to a disaster or pandemic. However, this approach has limitations. HNWIs, as already discussed above, have co-production capabilities, can mobilise goodwill on behalf of a cause, and can raise more resources based on their vast networks. Financing the SDGs will, by and large, depend on the capacity of African policy makers and the international community to harness the emerging diverse funding options inclusive of improved taxation on natural resource earning, improved efficiencies in taxation, remittances and HNWIs giving to important causes, and foreign investment (Murisa, 2018). Pressure will therefore have to bear on African governments to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation capacity especially by curbing corruption and illicit financial flows to stem the projected slump in ODA in the near-term. African governments will have to increase efforts to strengthen tax systems, expand domestic tax bases, and promote local philanthropy. Covid-19 provided a litmus test for local philanthropy and in almost every country the amount of goodwill and solidarity surpassed expectations. It is high time that African governments seriously consider local HNWIs driven philanthropy as a critical pillar of national and indeed continental development. The HNWI giving space is uneven across the continent. There is an urgent need to align laws for the growth of the new generation of philanthropy that specialises in measurable impact. The foundations being established by HNWIs are yet to meaningfully share their experiences and practices. There are limited platforms for creating a community of practice among foundations established by HNWIs. Conversations on how to give, where to give, and who to work with either do not take place or are very limited. The existing infrastructure platforms such as the African Philanthropy Forum (https://​www​

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.africanpf​.org/​) can play a more meaningful role of ensuring collaboration, learning and also improving the conditions for giving. Giving by Africa’s HNWIs remains largely untracked and at times deliberately so because of the lack of incentives from the governments. Key informant interviews revealed that, unlike their US based counterparts, the African foundations do not have an incentive to publicise their giving especially when it may attract attention from revenue authorities and lead to increased demands for taxes. For instance, only South Africa and Mauritius have tax based incentives for giving. There is no significant advocacy energy towards such policy reforms. The non-existence of tax-based incentives is only one amongst many other barriers to giving. The movement of money across the 54 African countries is still based on a largely US dominated international system. The innovations around mobile money remain limited within individual countries. Hopefully a common currency regime can address some of these needs. However, there are some concerns about African HNWI’s philanthropy, such as their penchant for establishing new things instead of building upon what exists and also at times they prefer to give outside of the continent. Available evidence indicates that their contributions in terms of grants to NGOs remain very low compared to international philanthropy. In the process, some of the HNWIs have established implementing foundations which potentially marginalise local NGOs. In a survey carried out in 2018 none of the HNWI established foundations were providing institutional support funding, the majority were only providing project support (Murisa, 2018). The new HNWI-led foundations are not yet actively involved in some of the systemic issues such as confronting the excesses of power, corruption and broader governance challenges. In some instances, these HNWIs have accumulated their vast wealth based on patronage relationships with government or they still have active lucrative contracts with their governments. These complexities have largely limited HNWI led philanthropy in confronting systemic issues. There are some HNWI led initiatives that have broken with that pattern. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is a good example. They produce reports that examine in detail governance trends across the African countries. However, beyond a lack of a strong governance emphasis, the HNWI led philanthropy interventions have made significant investments in social service delivery. As already stated, the majority of philanthropists give towards improved access to education and health and improved social welfare. Many African governments have over the years reduced their budgetary allocations towards social service delivery as part of ongoing reforms to balance their budgets. The return of nineteenth-century diseases like cholera and typhoid in metropoles like Harare and Kinshasa attest to the collapse of health delivery services. It is also significant that it took a philanthropy led response to tackle this challenge.

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The rise of HNWIs perhaps potentially encapsulates and serves to announce the beginning of Africa’s renaissance as envisaged by the then presidents of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki), Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade), Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), and Libya (Muammar Gaddafi). In President Thabo’s often cited speech on the same subject, he spoke of the restoration of African dignity ‘to assert the principality of her humanity … the fact that she, in the first instance, is not a beast of burden, but a human and African being’ (Mbeki, 1998). This representation of Africa was in direct contrast with the representation made by Western leaders and their media. Tony Blair was quoted saying ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world’ (Blair, 2001) and back in 2000 The Economist described Africa as the ‘hopeless continent’, adding that the ‘new millennium has brought more disaster than hope to Africa’. Fast forward to 2013, and The Economist together with others such as Time Magazine referred to the same ‘hopeless continent’ as ‘Africa Rising’. Many factors explain the radical change in opinion. At that time many African economies had grown at an average of 7.5 per cent in terms of GDP. That growth coupled with favourable global trading conditions led to a phenomenal increase in the growth of HNWIs. Indeed, it was also at that time when financial institutions began to produce wealth reports focused on Africa. The number of billionaires and millionaires spread across the continent has continued to grow. Their philanthropic contributions have gone beyond the US$1 billion mark. As already demonstrated, their contribution in many instances is not just about money – they bring their entrepreneurial capabilities, they leverage their global influence in raising more resources and also act as advocates on important causes. Evidence has shown that they are already connected and interacting with multilateral development agencies. However, it is unclear as yet if their collaboration with existing development actors will radically alter the development landscape to prioritise African ideas and where possible create sufficient policy room for African governments to reimagine solutions to intractable public problems such as social service delivery. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether their collaboration with multilaterals will in any way serve to correct the ongoing marginalisation of local NGOs.

NOTES 1. See https://​www​.devex​.com/​organizations/​dangote​-foundation​-8101. 2. See https://​wellcome​.org/​press​-release/​wellcome​-trust​-announces​-multi​-million​ -pound​-initiative​-emergency​-ebola​-research​-and​-. 3. See https://​au​.int/​sites/​default/​files/​speeches/​27060​-sp​-aseowa​_africaagainstebola​ _lagos3dec2014​_0​.pdf. 4. See https://​newzwire​.live/​strive​-and​-tsitsi​-masiyiwas​-new​-us60m​-cholera​-response​ -plan​-for​-zimbabwe/​. 5. See https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-africa​-47379458.

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6. See https://​www​.forbes​.com/​sites/​kerryadolan/​2021/​01/​22/​the​-forbes​-billionaires​ -list​-africas​-richest​-people​-2021/​?sh​=​1aa1c34448f5. 7. See https://​www​.trustafrica​.org/​en/​publications​-trust/​research​-reports. 8. See https://​www​.bridgespan​.org/​insights/​library/​philanthropy/​landscape​-large​ -scale​-giving​-africa​-2020. 9. See https://​www​.news24​.com/​fin24/​economy/​south​-africa/​donations​-loans​ -pledges-what-you-need-to-know-about​- those​- billions​- aimed​- at​- fighting​ -covid​-19​-20200402​-2. 10. See https://​www​.theafricareport​.com/​57377/​leadership​-africas​-billionaires​-from​ -motsepe​-to​-dangote​-fight​-to​-stamp​-out​-covid​-19/​. 11. See https://​www​.thestandard​.co​.zw/​2019/​02/​10/​masiyiwas​-donate​-60m​-fight​ -cholera/​. https://​www​.​higherlife​foundation​.com/​strive​-and​-tsitsi​-masiyiwa​-avail​ -60​-million​-towards​-cholera​-response​-in​-zimbabwe/​. 12. See https://​www​.263chat​.com/​masiyiwa​-speaks​-on​-his​-role​-in​-getting​-africas​ -400​-million​-vaccine​-doses​-2/​. 13. See https://​www​.afdb​.org/​en/​news​-and​-events/​mo​-ibrahim​-leadership​-fellowships​ -to​-support​-africas​-next​-generation​-7890. 14. Ibid. 15. See https://​www​.afdb​.org/​fr/​news​-and​-events/​press​-releases/​african​-development​ -bank​-approves​-5​-million​-grant​-scale​-tony​-elumelu​-entrepreneurship​-programme​ -33285. 16. See https://​mo​.ibrahim​.foundation/​iiag. 17. See https://​mo​.ibrahim​.foundation/​covid​-19. 18. See http://​www​.statssa​.gov​.za/​?p​=​12930​#:​~:​text​=​South​%20Africa​%20is​%20known​ %20as​,report​%20released​%20by​%20Stats​%20SA. 19. See https://​w ww​. ​n edbankpri​v atewealth​.co​. za/​c ontent/​dam/​npw/​NPWRSA/​ Philanthropy/​G ivingReportIV/​G ivingReport​-IV​.pdf. 20. See https://​solidarityfund​.co​.za/​. 21. See https://​solidarityfund​.co​.za/​integrated​-annual​-report/​. 22. See https://​www​.forbes​.com/​profile/​sudhir​-ruparelia/​#215b9e582507. 23. See https://​rupareliafoundation​.org/​. 24. See https://​rupareliafoundation​.org/​about​-us/​annual​-audit​-report/​. 25. See https://​www​.e​aphilanthr​opynetwork​.org/​Our​-Members​.html.

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ANNEXE: FOUNDATIONS ESTABLISHED BY AFRICAN HNWIs Table 10A.1

Snapshot of HNWI-owned foundations in selected countries

Name of Foundation

Founders

Geographic

Thematic area of focus /

(HNWIs)

area of focus

public cause

Manu Chandaria

Kenya and

Education, Environment,

10 other

Ecology, Youth,

African

Healthcare, Children with

countries

special needs, Youth sport

Mike Adenuga Foundation https://​www​ Mike Adenuga

Nigeria

Health, Rural

.facebook​.com/​AdenugaFoundation/​

and some

development, Education,

African

Entrepreneurship, Special

countries

opportunity grants

Chandaria Foundation http://​www​ .chandariafoundation​.com/​

Rose of Sharon Foundation https://​thero​ Folorunsho seofsharon​foundation​.org/​

Alakija

Sawiris Foundation https://​www​

Onsi Sawiris

Nigeria

Women empowerment, Education

Egypt

.sawirisfoundation​.org/​

Economic Empowerment, Social Empowerment, Education & Scholarships

Motsepe Foundation http://​

Patrice &

motsepefoundation​.org/​

Precious Motsepe

Tony Elumelu Foundation https://​www​

Tony Elumelu

South Africa

Education, empowerment and development initiatives

Africa

.t​onyelumelu​foundation​.org/​

Empowerment of African entrepreneurs

Higherlife Foundation & Delta

Strive and Tsitsi

Philanthropies https://​www​.​higherlife​

Masiyiwa

Africa

Education, Health, Agriculture, Rural Development

foundation​.com/​ and https://​ deltaphilanthropies​.org/​ Dangote Foundation https://​www​

Aliko Dangote

Africa

.dangote​.com/​foundation/​

Health, Education, Empowerment, Humanitarian relief

Mo Dewji Foundation https://​www​

Mohamed Dewji

Tanzania

Education, Health,

Dr Peter Munga

Kenya

Education and Leadership

.modewjifoundation​.org/​ Equity Group Foundation https://​e​ quitygroup​foundation​.com/​

Community Development Development, Enterprise Development and Financial Inclusion, Health, Food and Agriculture, Energy and Environment, Social Protection

Coordination between institutions and philanthropists: a view from HNWIs

Name of Foundation

163

Founders

Geographic

Thematic area of focus /

(HNWIs)

area of focus

public cause

Allan Gray Orbis Foundation https://​

Allan & Gillian

Southern

Education and development

www​.allangrayorbis​.org/​

Gray

Africa

of individuals with entrepreneurial potential and employment

The Brenthurst Foundation, The

Oppenheimer

Oppenheimer Memorial Trust,

Family

Africa

Peace, Security, Governance and Economic Growth, Education

Oppenheimer Philanthropies https://​ www​.the​brenthurst​foundation​.org/​ and https://​www​.omt​.org​.za/​ The Shuttleworth Foundation https://​sh​

Mark

uttleworth​foundation​.org/​

Shuttleworth

South Africa

Social Innovation

11. Challenges and opportunities for improving coordination between multilateral institutions and philanthropies: a view from charitable foundations Geci Karuri-Sebina, Fred Carden and Frederick Beckley INTRODUCTION This chapter explores the hypothesis that regional action is crucial from the perspective of philanthropies and how they engage with development on the continent. The chapter explores the evolution of philanthropy in recent decades, its critiques and praises, how Covid-19 is affecting funding, and perspectives on the potential for their collaboration with multilateral institutions (MLIs). The chapter begins with a description of the approach taken, followed by a brief overview of the philanthropy landscape in Africa, and then explores the role of philanthropies and their work with MLIs through a series of questions.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY We use an institutional approach to explore what has been informing and affecting major philanthropic funding and its ability and/or willingness to function more multilaterally. Institutional analysis asks how the behaviour of political actors, and their collective choices are influenced by their perceived incentives and constraints (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2001). We use journalistic methods to understand these institutional features and relationships, which involves seeking out relevant facts and background information (literature search and document analysis), but also using personal networks to find informants that are willing to speak candidly about their ‘insider’ view of things. The primary data is thus from interviews with a total of 31 key informants with intimate 164

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experience in philanthropic activity in Africa. They represented charitable foundations (19), MLIs (6), and other relevant experts (6). Of the respondents, 20 were female and 11 were male. The interviews are triangulated against the secondary sources, being in primarily academic literature and media articles.

THE LANDSCAPE OF PHILANTHROPY Philanthropy in Africa is both vertical – formal and focused on technical issue of interest to philanthropies (Wilkinson-Maposa and Fowler, 2009), and horizontal – often informal and built around community support. This can be done through a local group, High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), or through remittances (Moyo, 2009). This chapter refers to the limited data and understanding of the contribution of horizontal philanthropy, which is important since giving is an integral part of African cultures and is part of building community. The following sections go further into describing new trends and factors in both horizontal and vertical philanthropy, including new financing strategies, the impact of Covid-19, and the case for indigenising the funding agenda on the continent. While many international and African philanthropies work on the continent, the field is dominated by the Gates Foundation (USD 33 billion 2010–2019) with the MasterCard Foundation (USD 850 million in the same period) coming in as a distant but growing second (OECD, 2021). Funding choices are made by philanthropies themselves. The Gates Foundation has a strong priority on health, and MasterCard on youth employment issues. Funding to the social sector (including education, and increasingly women, children, and youth) generally dominates philanthropic priorities. The trends in this chapter go on to profile more about philanthropy in Africa, and to suggest an urgent need to focus on how to grow the understanding and capabilities of philanthropic funding as an important contribution to enhancing both local engagement and the role of African MLIs.

IMPROVING COORDINATION BETWEEN MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS This chapter was introduced with the hypothesis: ‘Philanthropists directing their funding through multilateral institutions (rather than at individual country level) would improve regional coordination, particularly in times of crisis.’ We begin by testing this hypothesis by asking direct questions about four key assumptions that seem to underpin it: 1. Is regional coordination an ideal mode for African development and/or crisis response?

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2. Are MLIs the vehicle for African development and/or crisis response? 3. Can philanthropies drive African development? 4. How can collaboration between MLIs and philanthropic foundations be improved? Is Regional Coordination the Ideal Mode for African Development / Crisis Response? Regional coordination is probably not on the [philanthropy] agenda – we struggle with that. Not that we don’t want to collaborate; it just takes too long. (#13) MLIs are important for getting to scale. (#23)

A regional approach to crisis response and development in Africa, more generally, seems sensible for numerous reasons. First, there are issues that are regional in scope. Certain issues such as health pandemics, migration (human and wildlife), climate events, managing natural resource systems and water catchment areas tend to manifest in a transnational manner. As such, it makes sense to take a regional, harmonised approach to strategies, interventions, and information sharing. Second, tactics of ‘economies of scale’ and ‘scaling for impact’ invite supra-national approaches which should hypothetically be more efficient. The possibilities of pooling capacity, negotiating financing, favourable procurement deals based on bulk-buying, and sharing risk, become options when acting collectively and cooperatively (Madyo, 2008). Third, besides efficacy and economy, there are also administrative reasons for considering regional approaches. Large-scale global philanthropy has been a growing phenomenon, concerned with larger-scale, big impact issues rather than with specific communities. This typically requires investments at scale – meaning that interventions must be big enough to attract major investment, development partners, and the philanthropists who want to work at pan-African or large-fund level. Such funders would be less inclined to smaller, local or country-level programmes (Schwier et al., 2020). This also relates to efficiency in terms of ease of grant administration; philanthropies looking to work at a supra- or multi-national scale would find it easier to administrate programmes through a few large or regional institutions (such as regional economic communities (RECs) and other MLIs), rather than contracting with up to 54 individual countries and the numerous communities thereof. There have been some notable successes in African regional actions particularly around critical or crisis issues such as health response and surveillance systems across West and Central Africa for Ebola response between 2014 and 2018; Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s multi-million-dollar international multi-donor Covid-19 fund with its speed

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and economies of scale; regional peacekeeping by ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) mainly championed by Nigeria’s capabilities; large-scale infrastructure in health such as the pan-African African Society for Laboratory Medicine (ASLM); and so forth. However, the consistent answer we received to the question of whether regional coordination is the best answer for Africa (for crisis or in general) was that, while regional action is a sensible and a good goal for specific issues, it cannot be taken as a blanket approach. A regional scale is not always the only scale needed for response; there are many instances in which the locus for action is more effective and efficient at a community level such as in local economic development, public health, and lifestyle or cultural preference issues. This is important for ensuring that there are effective local solutions, enabling community building by contributing to empowerment, and strengthening agency and resilience (Layode, 2020). Building local capacity to respond, especially to crises, will continue to matter. There are different modalities for acting ‘regionally’, such as multi-country arrangements, bottom-up aggregations, parallel institutions, or project-based strategies. Alternative forms of regional action should be considered, rather than assuming that you have to develop regional programmes or institutions in order to coordinate regionally. Are MLIs the Vehicle for African Development / Crisis Response? They [MLIs] are lumbering and bureaucratic but in the end, they are foundational institutions. (#12) Philanthropies themselves tend to be afraid to experiment. (#1) They [RECs] are not centres of coordination; they lack political will. (#9)

The answer here seems again to be: partially. MLIs may be useful on some issues and may even be the only viable vehicle in some cases or contexts. Firstly, it is about the varying scale of issues. If issues are deemed appropriate for regional response, then it may make some sense for the approach to those to be directed through institutions that have regional mandates, systems and structures. These, ostensibly, should be more efficient and effective in deploying resources and programmes (Madyo, 2008). Secondly, research by Bryant (2015) has also suggested that multilateral aid can sometimes be more effective than bilateral approaches because the multilateral agencies tend to be motivated by their role in determining allocation which is argued to result in more effective aid distribution. They can also specialise and thereby be more efficient in targeting, reducing transaction costs, and ensuring more knowledgeable and effective policies. Also, their autonomy

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African philanthropy

allows them to resist politically driven pressures in aid distribution compared with country-level agencies. Thirdly, the Pan-African development agenda is a major factor in favour of MLI agency. Agenda 2063 which reflects the AU’s development master plan has a key goal of regional political and socio-economic integration. This regional agenda centres the roles of key African MLIs including the African Union itself, its eight recognised RECs, and agencies. Some major philanthropies, the BMGF in particular, have seen the value in beginning to work through these on particular issues (e.g., ECOWAS and AfDB – the African Development Bank). So, in principle, working through MLIs makes sense. There is a prevailing narrative championing regional thinking and action. However, there are also concurrent concerns expressed about the viability of these agencies. It is clear that there is widespread apprehension about the role of MLIs, including (or perhaps particularly) those in Africa. These include general perceptions about a lack of transparency, access, consistency, competence, breadth, and appropriate structuring (Head, 2003). African stakeholders that we spoke to expressed a view that the MLIs are considered to be slow, inefficient, corrupt, self-perpetuating, bureaucratic, lacking in the right skills, and therefore largely ineffective. Respondents referred to African MLIs as having ‘a bad reputation’, being ‘too political’, ‘money pits’, ‘slow to do things’, ‘unable to articulate coherent position’, ‘lacking technical capacity to supervise grants’, and ‘not seen as a viable conduit for funds’. Real or not, these attitudes and perceptions about MLIs have led to limited funding actually being directed through the legacy MLIs. An example is made of the Covid-19 CDC regional response where it was deemed preferable or necessary to create a new institution – a new, parallel vehicle and mechanisms – rather than to utilise existing MLI institutions and systems due to fear of corruption and inefficiency. RECs were also considered to be ineffective regional coordination mechanisms, this being attributed to a lack of political will and alignment among their member states or agencies, leading to impotence. However, there were also promising mentions of nuance with some agencies demonstrating strategic capabilities (AU and UNECA – the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), functionality (AfDB) or new promise (the African Continental Free Trade Area, AfCFTA). So, it is the direction and speed of change that may determine whether MLIs can be effective vehicles for African development. Can Philanthropies Drive African Development? For development, foundations are not the answer. They can do some catalytic work, but development is not the work of philanthropies. (#21)

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MLIs are important for getting to scale. (#23)

Answering this question requires first appreciating the nature of philanthropic organisations. Most philanthropic organisations are private sources of funds from HNWIs, usually through a foundation or other organisational form. Philanthropies choose their beneficiaries based on their own interests. Many larger philanthropies, notably legacy philanthropic organisations, tend to change strategic direction when a new President is put in place. It is the foundation, through its executive and board, that determines areas of focus, both technically and geographically. Other than financial targets and meeting basic fiduciary rules, foundations whether international or African, are not accountable for the choices they make to anyone outside the foundation, and some see this as self-seeking, while others believe it sincere, ‘from the human desire to make a difference, to give to others and to help them’ (Vallely, 2020, p. 504). Where philanthropies and governments converge to some extent is where philanthropies recognise the value of working with government departments and MLIs. Some, particularly the larger philanthropic organisations, see value in working with and through government agencies and regional or continental initiatives. However it would still seem that philanthropies may lack five key characteristics to drive development: 1. Democratic Mandate: Philanthropies operate as external agents with no authority granted by the government or a community to operate. As one interviewee observed, philanthropies cannot be voted out. (#10; Vallely, 2020) 2. Governance Design. Philanthropic organisations are not designed as institutions of governance or national development. Some in our interviews described them as vanity projects to promote a person or brand, though others dispute this characterisation. (#7, 10; Vallely, 2020) 3. Capacity. Philanthropies tend to have the capacities necessary for their own areas of technical focus. Their priority will tend towards expanding work in those areas, not broadening to other needs and priorities of a society. (#10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18) 4. Resources. Compared to governments and the private sector, philanthropies, even the large ones, are relatively small players in national development, and a lot of their funding goes to international NGOs based in the Global North (Levine, 2020; IRIN News, 2014). 5. Accountability. Philanthropic organisations are accountable primarily to themselves for what they do, and to their home countries for how and how much they spend - not to the countries in which they operate. (Vallely, 2020; #10)

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Taken together, these factors suggest that philanthropies cannot drive development, nor should they. The extent to which philanthropic organisations seek guidance from the countries and organisations with which they operate is dependent on the will of the philanthropy and the position of the government or other organisation to accept or reject the offer. They may also need stronger regulation from the countries in which they operate, and from the organisations with which they collaborate. And the interviews suggest that philanthropies do try to influence governments and governance organisations such as MLIs. Some see their role as one of influence; others see working with governments as ensuring that the work they do has the policy support it needs to sustain over time and even beyond the engagement of the foundation. Smaller philanthropic organisations reported that they tend to work at the local level with NGOs, or more often through international non-governmental organisation (INGOs). In sum, large or small, philanthropies are not qualified to drive development. That is the purview of African people, governments and governance institutions. Can MLI–Philanthropy Collaboration be Improved? It is difficult to imagine [MLIs] being an effective vehicle for collaboration with donors. (#17)

There is enough support among philanthropies for working through MLIs that the question is pertinent. At the same time, it is important to recognise that it is primarily the larger international foundations that are willing and interested to engage with MLIs; the smaller ones do not do so. While there is a strong culture of giving in Africa, much of it has been small scale and local – so African philanthropists largely do not engage with MLIs either. Among international philanthropies our interviews suggested that there are strong and opposing views about the merits of investing through MLIs. Only a few foundations seem to work committedly with the continental and regional MLIs; ‘if they can deliver, we will work with them’ seems to be the sentiment. More appear to work with the special focus MLIs, such as the African CDC (evident during Covid). Many interviewees qualified though that the form of engagement is not necessarily one of co-creation or collaboration, but an instrumental engagement around delivery of the philanthropy’s agenda. Those working with MLIs do so for their convening power, access and intelligence. It was suggested that MLIs are not so good at programme delivery, but are strong as networking, knowledge and idea brokers on the continent, making them important partners.

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Both MLIs and philanthropies commented on the bureaucracy and rule-bound nature of the other; neither is seen by the other as agile. In that sense, both have work to do on their relationships and governance. A challenge noted by interviewees was the mismatch in timelines between the deadlines of a funded project from a foundation and the reality of change on the ground not following the pace set by the grant. While agility and flexibility have been high during Covid-19, it remains to be seen if the typical model itself has evolved. The situation is compounded by the legal pressure on foundations to spend a certain portion of their endowment each year or face penalties. As foundations attempt to spend close to the minimum each year to extend their life, they are under enormous pressure around the timing of disbursements and can thus fail to take realities on the ground into account. The conclusion here is that while the MLI–philanthropy relationship could be improved by both respective (internal) and relational (with each other) work, it is also important to interrogate and clarify the nature, roles and scale of the partnering in relation to purpose.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES Having reflected on what the study had hypothesised, this section widens our gaze to the challenges and opportunities that emerged. Evolutions in Philanthropy Philanthropy is a big business. In a wide-ranging study of philanthropy from the time of Aristotle to the present, Vallely reports that the world’s rich now control more than $1.5 trillion in philanthropic funds and spend more than $150 billion per year. The largest, BMGF, has a bigger budget than 70 per cent of the world’s nations (Vallely, 2020), eclipsing the work of other foundations in Africa. Some argue that this creates enormous potential for philanthropy to influence development. Others dispute this due to the limited spending by any philanthropy in any one country. The emergence of the so-called ‘CEO society’ is argued, in which we are witnessing the transfer of responsibility for public goods and services from democratic institutions to the wealthy, to be administered by an executive class (Rhodes and Bloom, 2018). In the CEO society, the exercise of social responsibilities is no longer debated in terms of whether corporations should or shouldn’t be responsible for more than their own business interests. Instead, it is about how philanthropy can be used to reinforce a politico-economic system that enables such a small number of people to accumulate seriously high amounts of wealth. The inequalities built into giving are also emphasised (Matthews, 2018). Questions of the appropriateness of individuals playing

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this role as well as the relatively small scale of philanthropic funding in places and relative to other funding (public and private sectors, and remittances) all suggest that without a more collaborative and co-creative approach to their work, it is unlikely that most foundations will actually deliver as agents of transformation. Financially, two related trends have emerged in recent years. Firstly, organisations such as the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI) have been set up as Limited Liability Corporations rather than as non-profit foundations. This gives them the option to invest in for profit enterprises, consistent with the promotion of economic development as a key priority (it also leaves them tax liable for the funds as they are not invested in and through a non-profit organisation). Secondly, other foundations have set up arms that allow them to support the development of for-profit businesses and to seek additional funding to increase their giving – essentially borrowing against their endowment. This has allowed bigger and more rapid responses to the needs brought about by the pandemic crisis. Several large foundations have followed this path to enhance their Covid spending (among them Ford and Rockefeller). Although some foundations have argued that shocks such as Covid are unprecedented and require bold action on their part (D. Walker quoted by McCambridge, 2020), other foundations are not convinced that this is the best path and contend that, long term, this action will reduce foundations’ giving potential. As argued by the President of the Hewlett Foundation (Kramer, 2021), by issuing bonds the foundation has not escaped the present versus future trade-off and adding debt will actually reduce the foundation’s future grant making capacity because: (1) the foundation must pay interest (calculated at $750 million over the life of the $1 billion in bonds); (2) it loses the compounding benefit of the interest paid, which accumulates and grows larger over time; and (3) it must still pay back the $1 billion when the bonds mature. Going forward from the repayment, the endowment will be smaller, reducing the giving potential of the foundation long-term (Kramer, 2021). Dynamics of Philanthropy in the African Context Both international and African philanthropy tend to technically focus on the themes and areas of their own interest. African philanthropists tend to provide support in their home countries with a focus on public sector support and impact investing, while international philanthropists tend to have their favourite countries and their traditional grant making approaches. African horizontal, or community, philanthropy is an important but under-studied dimension of philanthropy on the continent. Community philanthropy has been practised for a very long time in Africa and, given the relatively small number of HNWIs who can launch philanthropic organisa-

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tions, will likely remain a significant proportion of giving on the continent. It reflects communities looking out for each other, whether in times of crisis or indeed on an ongoing basis locally. More work needs to be done to identify the actual scale of community philanthropy and identify the different forms that it takes to enable analysis of the trends and potential impact of community philanthropy. Remittances are a particular type of horizontal philanthropy where those who have emigrated into the diaspora give back to connections in their home country (Adhikari, 2020). While much international giving of this kind is through individual remittances to family and villages, some is collective remittances whereby a group of people from a country pool their resources and determine how it will support their country or community of origin (Newland et al., 2010). As reflected previously, remittances are much more significant in dollar terms than vertical philanthropy. It too has its pros and cons. There are warnings of the potential distorting effect of diaspora philanthropy, such as supporting particular religious and political views that are divisive in home-countries (Sidel, 2018). Other than through the formation of ‘Hometown Associations’ in the US (association of migrants from the same communities) and some professional diasporic associations (such as the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin, or the Association of IT Professionals of Nigeria), little data exists about the scale of diaspora philanthropy. The data on what and how much they give is lacking. Like their other counterparts in philanthropy, their fields of giving reflect the interests of their members. In the Covid-19 context, remittances are deemed to have declined because of the straitened circumstances of many who make remittances (World Bank, 2020b). Covid Impacts and Lessons Things are not going back to business as usual. (#14) [On Covid] The question is whether this energy can be sustained. (#9)

Covid-19 is already anticipated to affect the funding landscape in Africa, but also the development landscape itself. The pandemic immediately shifted funding attention to health-related and emergency relief activities and spending. Told anecdotally, there have already been major funding cutbacks to organisations and programmes that are not health related, including in sectors such as research, education, food security, informal settlements, and other community development issues. This may be explained by the early fears about Africa exploding with Covid-19 in ways that could decimate the continent’s vulnerable, but also put the rest of the world at even graver risk.

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Although those fears turned out to be largely exaggerated and more nuanced (so far), the pandemic did expose the vulnerabilities of Africa’s health systems, supply chains, nutrition and food systems, and informal economies. This demanded collective responses by MLIs and development partners. Time will tell how long the diversion of resources may have to be sustained. Two distinct financing trends have emerged during the Covid-19 pandemic. The first is the redirection of foundation funds to Covid programmes by both international and African philanthropists. How this will play out post-Covid is uncertain, although recovery is likely to absorb significant philanthropic resources for some years. The second, discussed in some detail earlier, is the issuance of bonds to the tune of USD 3 billion (Philanthropy News Digest, 2020; Stewart and Kulish, 2020). These are seen by some as essential to address the urgent demands created by Covid-19 (D. Walker quoted by McCambridge, 2020) and by others as a long-term negative opportunity (Kramer, 2021). Within the Covid-19 context, the African philanthropies stepped up. Although a significant amount of African giving already went to emergency issues such as natural disasters and disease outbreaks even prior to the current pandemic, as of May 2020 Bridgespan (2021) indicated that Covid-19 giving commitments around Africa included significant injections of resources by wealthy individuals and domestic foundations in countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Congo, and Kenya that went into the millions of dollars (Schwier et al., 2020). Fifty-one per cent of African philanthropists intensified their quantum of giving, directed to areas of urgent need, filling the gap left by international donors due to the global health and travel restrictions: health (notably in PPE and testing), economic support, and short-term food relief, demonstrating willingness and capacity to respond. There have also been opportunities and innovations identified in the Covid-19 response, such as the prospects for using digital platforms, supply chain innovations such as data analytics for forecasting, and new tools and mobile phone applications to enable government tracking – e.g., of supply chains and vaccinated populations. There have also been lessons learned about working across countries. An important question that has been raised is whether and how the Covid-19 lessons can be embedded, and energy and innovatively sustained. Several philanthropies are already looking to embed some of these lessons. Politics of Development and Philanthropy The international philanthropic space, as well as its relationship to Africa, has been a complicated one with numerous demands and efforts for reform over time (Davies, 2019). Globally analysts comment on the trends of deglobalisation and a growing crisis of multilateralism (Öhm and Maihack, 2020). In

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the aid sector, humanitarian organisations still demonstrate weak capacity for funding, organisational capacity, leadership, and the kind of policy planning needed to mitigate risks and be ready to respond (Parker and Alexander, 2021). Parker and Alexander summarise key trends in philanthropy as including trends towards direct aid (delivering aid as cash through humanitarian schemes rather than state-run systems); a tension between solidarity and selfishness expressed through a continued decline in multilateralism and global solidarity (e.g., ‘vaccinationalism’); and increased focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion in the sector (a power critique of ‘Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic’ (WEIRD; Joseph, 2020) dominance of the sector); and a focus on risk reduction and institutional preparedness for complex mega-crises (Parker and Alexander, 2021). How these trends and issues play out will be of significant consequence to Africa on several levels including the quantum of philanthropic funding, the terms of engagement, and forms and focus of funding. Most importantly, it may mean that there could be less funding but with greater African influence and agency – at regional, national, and/or local levels – in determining how it is allocated and administered with new opportunities for funding impact. A View to Endogenisation Is Necessary Given these dynamics and that international philanthropic funding to Africa is envisaged to reduce in future, with the effects of Covid-19 likely exacerbating things, it is essential to take a view on how Africa’s capacity and resilience to finance its own social development can be bolstered. ‘Endogenisation’ is used here to refer to building or strengthening internal philanthropic (and non-philanthropic) capacity to contribute more significantly to Africa’s own development, even while international development support will continue to be necessary and relevant. To begin with, the future supply of international funding is uncertain. As solidarity is possibly strained, particularly post-Covid, with other parts of the world increasingly having their own crises and problems, this is envisaged to affect aid to Africa. Besides the pandemic-related pressures, development aid also seems to be increasingly influenced by geopolitical dynamics which control and shift development agendas (e.g., Brexit led to much aid from the UK shifting into more trade-related activity as its own interests came to the fore). We have alluded to challenges within the existing vertical philanthropy model, including inefficiency and interrupted understandings and accountabilities. There is evidence that local CSOs directly receive only a tiny portion of the funding that had been allocated for development and humanitarian support in their countries while the bulk (97.9 per cent) is given through INGOs (Okumu,

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2019). For example, the largest recipients of agriculture-related funding from the Gates Foundation are organisations in the US, followed by the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands (GRAIN, 2014). Democratic mandates and local or beneficiary accountability are also important, both of which foundations generally lack in principle. Add to this the drive towards decolonisation which challenges external influence and dependence, and it becomes clear that empowerment towards self-determination is important for Africa. And funding is influential; the piper calls the tune. There are also capability-based arguments for enhancing Africa’s role in its financing agenda. Financing capacity in Africa has been growing, and there has been increased economic growth, and a corresponding increase in the number of HNWIs, on the continent. This intersects with the case often made that giving or sharing is part of African culture – that horizontal contributions in the form of family, community or national development support are part of what binds communities together (Layode, 2020). This can be an important means to promoting endogenous development. But there have been constraints in expanding the role of endogenous philanthropy, including localised and focused giving and limited systems and experience. Importantly, the basic quantum of measured African philanthropic funding is still much, much lower than what it would be seeking to match up against. Still, a diversified understanding of what constitutes African philanthropy and a strategic appreciation of its importance and potential are going to be increasingly important going into the future (Layode, 2020). This capacity would be an important complement to international contributors.

CONCLUSION The role of horizontal philanthropy and other sources – particularly corporate and state finance – cannot be ignored. The combination dwarfs the quantum and responsibility of any vertical philanthropy that Africa can ever hope to receive externally. Philanthropy cannot drive Africa’s development, and MLIs can only be part of the vehicle. Improving coordination between MLIs and philanthropy will therefore be a helpful but insufficient solution. There is a disconnect between funding approaches and the emphasis by most interviewees on local engagement and ownership as being critical to success. Most international philanthropic funding in low- and middle-income countries is through INGOs and other large international organisations in the Global North, not through MLIs or other African organisations. Foundations and their staff, both international and African, appear aware of this, yet they continue to work through their known and trusted international partners rather than developing new partnerships with local actors and local players. This may be the result of the pressure to spend each year, or of

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accountability requirements that are more easily met by international agencies that are large and have financial systems in place that can manage large sums of money; but it may also be the result of inertia – working with the partners they already know. MLIs may be in a position to leverage some of the scale and systems requirements of large vertical philanthropy. They may be able to help frame strategic missions to deal with regional challenges in the medium term, including emergency modalities while creating space for local actions at national and subnational levels. To do so, however, will require building up the capacity, legitimacy and track record to gain and hold the charge. International philanthropy will continue to be important but will also have to consider its role both in supporting the capacitation of the MLIs as well as in addressing some of its own challenges and relations. Both need to see the potential relationship as mutually reinforcing. African philanthropies, whether HNWIs or communities supporting each other, tend to be very local in nature and provide crucial support to those in need. Numerous examples were cited in interviews and in the literature of the importance of local community philanthropy, not only from the wealthy but from all communities in whatever measure they could afford. The consequence otherwise is that communities are not engaged in the decisions about what to fund or indeed how to fund it.

12. Orienting philanthropy towards regional solutions Bhekinkosi Moyo and Katiana Sandra Ramsamy INTRODUCTION There has never been a greater time for philanthropy than today. The interest in philanthropy has grown. For a long time, African philanthropy was accorded no role in promoting and advancing development and policymaking. One reason was because post-colonial Africa was dependent on overseas development assistance. Another reason is that African governments viewed philanthropy (particularly international foundations) as part of a Western agenda to influence regime changes. This sentiment has not changed but African governments have been forced to consider alternative sources of funding due to new economic and political configurations. There is a decline in aid due to political changes, domestic pressures and the slow economic growth in most Western countries. Secondly, the growth in local resources and the ever-increasing population of the middle class and High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) in Africa have also attracted the attention of governments. African governments are now focusing on philanthropy and building partnerships with like-minded institutions in the private and non-profit sector in order to drive development and policy changes. Rwanda and Liberia have actively established specific directorates to deal with philanthropy. They have also developed philanthropy strategies. At a regional level, the East Africa Philanthropy Network is an association of approximately 40 organisations working closely with governments and the private sector in solving the region’s challenges. The network advocates for improved policies in different sectors and enabling environment for philanthropy. In order to solve societal challenges and promote productivity, regional integration, economic transformation and governance accountability, the government of Rwanda has sought to engage and collaborate with the philanthropic sector. The government has prioritised remittances, impact investing, venture capital, public private partnerships, and home-grown initiatives such 178

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as ubudehe, Gira Inka Munyarwanda, Ingando, Imihigo, and umuganda. These have positively impacted Rwanda’s citizens.1 The government of Liberia on the other hand created a Philanthropy Secretariat in the President’s office in 2009. It later moved the Secretariat to the Ministry of National Planning. The Secretariat’s role is to align philanthropic investments with Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Secretariat was the first of its kind for philanthropy in a post-conflict society and was widely thought to be a cutting-edge model worth replicating in other countries similarly transitioning from war. The government of South Sudan later attempted to replicate this model as it sought to build its institutions after its separation from Sudan.2 The Secretariat has lost some momentum due to political transitions and change of leadership but remains a good model around the orientation of philanthropy to solving Africa’s developmental challenges. In South Africa, the National Treasury and the Department of Science and Technology have both conducted studies mapping current collaborations between philanthropy and government, mainly in areas of education and health. They have also worked with various philanthropies. Similarly, in 2015, the AU launched the AU Foundation to mobilise voluntary contributions in supporting the AU’s Agenda 2063. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, the AU Chairperson at the time, said that the establishment of the AU Foundation ‘is a major step towards developing African capacity to mobilise local and international resources for Africa’s development’. She further saw the foundation playing a ‘facilitating role, especially, with respect to mobilising resources from the private sector, philanthropists, individual donors, member states within the diaspora and globally, to fund African development’ (AU, 2017b). The creation of the Foundation was a response to the funding needs of the AU, regional economic communities, and member states. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, also developed a resource mobilisation framework in late 2017/8 that included a special focus on philanthropic activities in supporting its regional integration agenda.3 Similar approaches to philanthropy are being made by other regions such as the East Africa Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). So far, partnerships that African governments have formed with international philanthropies have mainly focused on providing funds and conducting research towards programmes related to health, environment, agriculture, education, sanitation, hunger, family planning, disaster relief, social justice, poverty and inequality eradication. Pandemics and natural disasters have also prompted African governments to form partnerships with local and international philanthropies as well as with the private sector. The 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was

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the largest and most complex outbreak since the virus was first discovered in 1976. In response to the pandemic and in line with its Pan-African ideals, the AU Foundation set up a fund to fight Ebola in the affected African countries. This was an example of how philanthropy, in collaboration with governments and the private sector, can be used to devise solutions at a regional level through collaboration between the private sector and governments. It is also an example of how Pan-Africanism, expressed through philanthropy, is a conduit for regional integration, development and a sense of unity. In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic, solidarity and support from local philanthropies and the private sector also featured strongly. However, unlike with Ebola, the response to Covid-19 from African governments, HNWIs, private sector and business has been more ‘inward-looking’. Most narrowly focused on championing individual countries’ responses to the pandemic while only a few provided support for regional interventions. This could weaken regional integration projects that have the potential to unite Africa and create sustainability in the long run. African philanthropy needs to take a continental approach and undertake regional issues without only narrowly focusing on domestic affairs. Moreover, since philanthropy arises out of a need that cannot be fully met by governments and the private sector alone, all three sectors need to work together to inform policy and promote regional integration and development. This chapter seeks to explore the role that is played by philanthropy in advancing regional integration and development. This chapter is qualitative and theoretical in nature. Qualitative research involves the usage and collection of empirical materials, from case studies, to personal experience and visual texts, to describe routine and key moments and meanings in individual lives and phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 3, Shank, 2002, p. 5). The qualitative approaches that were used to collect and analyse date include desktop research, interviews and case studies. The chapter used secondary data obtained through literature reviews, relevant books, articles, reports, and archival documents. Three case studies of philanthropy platforms are utilised. These are in Kenya, Zambia, and Ghana. By using the case study methodology, we were able to closely examine the data within a specific context (Zainal, 2007). Case studies present a unique way of observing any natural phenomenon that exists in a set of data and only a very small geographical area or number of subjects of interest are examined in detail (Zainal, 2007; Yin, 1984; Richards and Richards, 1994).

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REGIONAL INTEGRATION, PAN-AFRICANISM, AND AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY Regional integration refers to the process by which two or more nation-states agree to cooperate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth (Centre for European Studies, 2021). It is a multidimensional process which may take the form of coordination, cooperation, convergence and deep integration initiatives. Regional integration extends beyond economic and trade issues. It also includes political, social, cultural and environmental issues (CEPAL, 2014). Thus, it helps countries overcome divisions that impede the flow of goods, services, capital, people and ideas (World Bank, 2021). When successfully achieved, regional integration can lead to substantial economic gains (World Bank, 2021). It also allows for improved market efficiency, policy cooperation and reformation, and for the costs of public goods or large infrastructure projects to be shared. Four main challenges that hinder regional integration are: (a) port and customs quality; (b) barriers to trade and investment; (c) development gaps; and (d) nascent regional economic governance (Wignaraja et al., 2019). Other challenges to regional integration in Africa include weak and fragmented African economies, small underperforming markets, overlapping membership of various Regional Economic Commissions, divergent and unstable macroeconomic policies, a lack of credible infrastructure, poor governance, corruption, the lack of regular, free and fair elections, and the lack of the observance of the rule of law (Qobo, 2007). Unemployment and underemployment, low levels of production and productivity, differences in resource distributions, and high levels of debt burden also hinder regional integration in Africa. With the introduction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), some of these challenges will be addressed. Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide and maintains that the people of African descent should be unified (Kuryla, 2020). It is based on the belief that the fates of all African peoples and countries are intertwined and that unity is vital to economic, social, and political progress (Kuryla, 2020). Pan-Africanism has a rich but complex history that dates back to the eighteenth century (Ghelawdewos, 2006; Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014). From the 1920s through to the 1940s, Pan-Africanism and Pan-African ideas continued to rise in the West and expand to the East. During this time, intellectuals such as George Padmore from Trinidad and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya became important figures in Pan-Africanist thought (Kuryla, 2020). In the 1940s, the most important figure of this period was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah believed that European colonial rule of Africa could be extinguished if Africans could unite politically and

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economically (Kuryla, 2020). Nkrumah went on to lead the movement for independence in Ghana, which came to realisation in 1957. This signified that Pan-Africanism was a vital force in the decolonisation and liberation struggles of the African continent. Today, Pan-Africanism expresses itself and re-emerges in new ways. Regional integration initiatives driven are part of the legacy of Pan-Africanism. African philanthropy is also directly related to Pan-Africanism on the continent (Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014). African philanthropy, by its definition and practice, is the foundation for development and is an expression of Pan-African thought conceptualised through notions of solidarity, unity and self-reliance. The very identity of an African is premised on philanthropic notions of solidarity, interconnectedness, interdependencies, reciprocity, mutuality, and a continuum of relationships (Moyo and Ramsamy, 2014). The practice of philanthropy in Africa is not homogeneous across the continent nor is there one accepted definition or expression of it. There are different meanings and manifestations of philanthropy in Africa (Mati, 2016). In certain instances, philanthropy in Africa is referred to as ‘helping’, ‘giving’, and even ‘gifting’. Unfortunately, none of these words capture the richness of the phenomenon (Moyo, 2010). Likewise, there are some who feel philanthropy is the same as ‘charity’ or that philanthropy is equated to the distribution of grants and funds (Moyo, 2019). Once again, these terms and practices are too narrow and fail to capture the richness and depth of the practice in Africa. Philanthropy in Africa goes beyond the temporary relief of suffering. Hence, it is not only ‘charitable’. It also goes beyond the transfer of funds and involves various actors (individuals, foundations, trusts, companies and the non-profit sector) that offer resources such as in-kind goods and services that may be exchanged to promote development and sustainability (Moyo, 2019). Thus, if we had to present a definition of philanthropy in Africa, it would be described as the uplifting and positive actions taken by the non-profit sector and other actors operating outside the state and the marketplace for the public good, development and sustainability (Moyo, 2019). By focusing on the kind of stakeholders and their purpose, Moyo (2019) maintains that this definition of philanthropy encompasses the full spectrum of private actions that may be taken to improve and transform the human condition. As an expression of Pan-Africanism and driven by notions such as Ubuntu and Harambee, research indicates that the philanthropic landscape in Africa revolves around two dimensions – horizontal and vertical – in that the resources and assistance flows from rich to poor (vertically) and from poor to poor (horizontally) (Moyo, 2010). In traditional societies, horizontal philanthropy is an important tool for addressing poverty and social exclusion as it is considered as self-help (Aidoo, 2012). While giving is mostly in-kind and includes aspects such as emotional support and the provision of food, clothes

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and advice, these acts are important social protection mechanisms and are informed by the belief that the well-being and welfare of members is a communal responsibility (Aidoo, 2012; Kumi, 2019; Moyo, 2010). Therefore, the aim of giving is to promote redistribution, informed largely by the understanding of the economy of affection (Kumi, 2019). Vertical philanthropy is largely believed to be an act of personal choice and not necessarily as a social duty or obligation (Gemelli, 2013). Vertical philanthropy is widely understood to be informed by charity, patronage, altruism and generosity (Gemelli, 2013). Essentially, it is the transfer of both material and nonmaterial resources (for example time and talent) of a non-state nature that takes place amongst a given population (Mottiar and Ngcoya, 2016). In the formal or institutionalised realm, African philanthropy expresses itself through private foundations, trusts, corporate foundations, family trusts, community chests and community foundations.

AFRICAN PHILANTHROPY, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY CHANGE African governments have come to terms with the fact that philanthropy in Africa has a big role to play in assisting governments in advancing global and national targets and priorities (Moyo, 2016). First, while philanthropy provides capital, it is a risk-taker and an important driver of innovation and creativity (Callias et al., 2017). These are distinct characteristics that African governments lack and need in order to achieve national and global development priorities. Thus, governments are keen to engage, collaborate and partner with philanthropies in this regard (Moyo, 2016). Secondly, philanthropy enjoys certain privileges and is flexible in its funding modalities, making it available to supplement government service (Moyo, 2016). Thirdly, local philanthropies are a source of significant local influence and are in an ideal position to harness the huge potential of the data revolution (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). Philanthropy is also important for domestic resource mobilisation as well as leadership (Callias et al., 2017). Fourthly, local philanthropy is a source of technical knowledge and expertise that governments can draw from. Thus, philanthropy offers complementary approaches and new pools of funding, accompanied by innovative technical expertise (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). Finally, philanthropy through ‘impact investing’ provides a bridge between commercial financing and traditional grants (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). Other than the service, resources and support those philanthropies can provide to governments, engagement with philanthropy is also due to the steady decline in official development assistance (ODA) and governments’

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wish to decrease their overreliance on foreign aid (Brechenmacher and Carothers, 2018; Magongo, 2017). African governments are increasingly looking to domestic resource mobilisation in order to advance development and sustainability – a feat that is not unrealistic. Firstly, research reveals that, compared to ODA, philanthropic funding tends to support long-term projects that are able to bring about structural change (Kumi, 2019). Secondly, philanthropic inflows tend to be more resilient to shocks compared to ODA because people continue to give in the midst of difficult economic conditions (Kumi, 2019). Thirdly, measures of generosity are increasing on a global scale, particularly in Africa. With the expansion of the global middle class, the possibility for domestic philanthropy to play a larger role in development has become more prominent (Bellegy et al., 2019). These private resources are addressing social issues that other private international flows, like private investment, cannot (Bellegy et al., 2019). In addition, when looking at the steady growth of the rich on the African continent and their giving trends to key issues such as education, health and development, there is indication that Pan-African driven local philanthropy has a huge role to play in the developmental progress of the continent. In Africa, the size of the rich increased by 6.1 per cent in 2019, while wealth increased by 6.5 per cent to US$1.7 trillion (Julien, 2018; Capgemini, 2020). This points to potential elite-giving. The continent has also seen an increase in Pan-African, home-grown African-led foundations, trusts and charitable organisations that governments can reach out to and aim to develop Africa and promote regional integration (Julien, 2018). These foundations and trusts include the Aliko Dangote Foundation, the Motsepe Foundation, the Chandaria Foundation, TrustAfrica, the African Women’s Development Fund and the Southern Africa Trust (Julien, 2018). Today many African governments and institutions are collaborating with philanthropy. In 2009, the government of Liberia established the Liberia Philanthropy Secretariat – a platform for linking national priorities with philanthropic resources (Moyo, 2016). It was clear to the Liberian government that, as a result of global economic changes, it was imperative to seek new partnerships and new mechanisms in order to meet the needs of Liberia’s citizens. The government reached out to philanthropy to meet those needs. In 2015, the AU launched the AU Foundation to mobilise voluntary contributions in support of the Union’s Agenda 2063. Even though international philanthropies contributed to the fund, it was mostly African philanthropists and political and business leaders who raised approximately US$34 million at the time as part of the first wave of pledges to combat disease. The business community came together to create the Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust – a financing mechanism which changed the narrative about health financing in Africa (AU, 2017b). The funds raised were used to support over 850 African

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health workers – including doctors, nurses, and lab technicians – to care for those infected with Ebola, to strengthen the capacity of local health services, to staff Ebola treatment centres in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, and to assist with post-pandemic reconstruction and development. SADC has also developed a framework on resource mobilisation that includes philanthropy supporting regional integration (Moyo, 2016). The framework is expected to allow Southern Africa to take ownership of the regional agenda by exploiting its vast natural resources (Sikuka, 2016). SADC’s decision to develop and find alternative financing modalities to support self-sufficiency, financial independence and regional integration came out of the 35th SADC Summit held in Botswana in 2015. At the Summit, there was a realisation that Southern Africa has the potential to mobilise more than US$1.2 billion from alternative and innovative sources as part of efforts to reduce the reliance on donor support. The Summit also emphasised that most of SADC’s activities, programmes and projects are supported by international development partners – a condition that is neither ideal nor sustainable (Sikuka, 2016). According to SADC, about 9.2 per cent of its work is presently funded by SADC member states while the remaining 90.8 per cent comes from International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) (Sikuka, 2016). This situation has compromised the ownership and sustainability of regional programmes. SADC’s framework includes harnessing resources from philanthropy as well as curbing illicit financial flows (IFFs); the creation of a regional lottery system;4 harnessing the database of private sector companies; development of a sharing formula for import and export levies; and the introduction of regional transport and tourism levies (Sikuka, 2016). As mentioned earlier, the government of Rwanda developed a strategy to engage philanthropy to assist in the implementation of its Vision 2050 (Moyo et al., 2016). Rwanda, like many other countries, faces the challenge of eradicating poverty and inequality. In its previous Vision 2020, the government made a determined effort to achieve a middle income status by 2020 whereby Rwandans live healthy lives, have access to quality education, and enjoy prosperity (Moyo et al., 2016). Between 2006 and 2011, one million Rwandan citizens moved out of poverty; however, high levels of poverty, underemployment and unemployment, high living and transportation costs, and low levels of human development persist in Rwanda (Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000). The government of Rwanda, through its Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (EDPRS-II) prioritised key areas of focus; namely (i) economic transformation; (ii) rural development; (iii) productivity and youth development; (iv) accountable governance; and (v) regional and international integration (EDPRS-II, 2013). To achieve these priorities, the Rwandan government was aware that this would require a lot of resources and investments. It also meant a concerted effort to reduce its

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dependency on external aid and become self-reliant. As a result, local philanthropy was proposed as an alternative source of financing (Moyo et al., 2016). Other alternative sources of financing Vision 2020 and 2050 and the EDPRS-II included remittances, impact investing, venture capital, public private partnerships, and home grown philanthropic initiatives such as ubudehe, Gira Inka Munyarwanda, Ingando, Imihigo and umuganda (Moyo et al., 2016). For the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), its partnership with Education Cannot Wait (ECW) also involves the collaboration with UN agencies, philanthropy, government and civil society to enhance regional cooperation and accelerate more effective education investments for refugees and displaced children and youth across the eight countries of the IGAD region. This agreement provides a regional work approach across the eight member states of IGAD (Education Cannot Wait, 2019). The partnership promotes access to education for refugees, returnees and internally displaced children and youth, as agreed in the Djibouti Declaration and the Addis Ababa Call for Action (Education Cannot Wait, 2019).

THE SDGS PHILANTHROPY PLATFORMS (SDGs PP) IN AFRICA In September 2015, 193 countries adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 SDGs (Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). In order to achieve the SDGs, countries need to mobilise unprecedented levels of financing, investments, technical know-how, data and institutional capacities (Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Research indicates that more than USD 1.4 trillion must be transferred to low and lower middle-income countries to meet the SDG targets. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has estimated that the total investment needed in developing countries amounts to USD 3.3–4.5 trillion annually, with current investment at USD 1.4 trillion implying an investment gap of USD 1.9–3.1 trillion per year (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Data from the Better Business Better World report further shows that achieving the SDGs could open up an estimated USD 12 trillion in market opportunities in four economic systems: food and agriculture, cities, energy and materials, and health and well-being (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). But, to achieve the SDGs, the report maintains that there is a need for innovative new methods and channels of generating financing and investment as well as revitalised and enhanced partnerships between the public and private sectors (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Philanthropy serves as the innovative approach. This is because philanthropies offer financing. Second, they offer innovative and complementary approaches to development (Callias et al., 2017).

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The relationship between philanthropic organisations and development institutions is beneficial for both parties. While philanthropy can provide much needed funds and technical advice to particular sectors, the SDGs give philanthropy the opportunity to contribute to sustainable development (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Moreover, multi-stakeholder partnerships, such as those between government, philanthropy and the private sector can also help link market-driven investment projects and private sector innovation and know-how with sustainable, inclusive, and equitable outcomes for all (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). The SDGs Philanthropy Platform was launched in 2014 to support UN– government–philanthropy collaboration to implement the SDGs. Recent analysis by Candid shows that, from 2010 to 2013, philanthropies invested a total of USD 97.3 billion in the areas of work currently covered by the SDGs. Projecting forward, the philanthropic sector is expected to build on the complementarity of other funding mechanisms by leveraging their innovative capacity in raising additional financial resources (African Development Bank et al., 2015). The sector funding is expected to catapult to more than USD 364 billion from 2016 to 2030 (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). The SDG Philanthropy Platform reinforces the notion that the philanthropic sector can contribute to sustainable development and can significantly increase the chances for countries around the world to reach SDG targets and goals (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). In early 2017, the Platform underwent a process of articulating a theory of change, emphasising philanthropy’s role and value, with specific outcomes for collective work. These outcomes are: (i) collaboration around SDGs to reduce duplication, create synergies, and leverage resources among partners; (ii) increase the voice of philanthropy and grantees in the national plans for the SDGs implementation; (iii) apply and exchange innovation and scaling methods among philanthropic and government partners; and (iv) promote Platform communications that have the ability to educate, empower, connect and activate philanthropy sector actors and SDG drivers in other sectors. At country-level, the notion of multi-sectoral collaboration and expanding the field with new players and new solutions in implementing the collaborative pathways has been emphasised. In Africa, the innovation challenge was opened to social innovators on water in Ghana, early childhood education in Kenya, and the well-being of children in Zambia (Reisman et al., 2017). Kenya After two years of building momentum, designing a process and mobilising partners, the government of Kenya announced at the UN General Assembly the establishment of the SDG PP in 2017. The SDG PP Kenya brings together

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government leaders and officials, development partners, the private sector, philanthropy, civil society organisations, think tanks and academia to create diverse SDG accelerator windows that would catalyse and unlock specific private sector and philanthropic investments, partnerships and innovations that would drive impacts aligned with government development priorities (SDG Partnership Platform Annual Report, 2018). The SDG PP Kenya focuses on four key strategies: (i) joint advocacy and policy dialogue to create an ecosystem that helps partnerships thrive; (ii) scale SDG partnerships and innovations that align with the SDG themes reflected in the Kenya UNDAF Strategic Result Areas and drive shared value creation; (iii) advance SDG financing through optimising blended financing instruments and redirection of capital flows towards SDG implementation; and (iv) facilitate research and learning to inform SDG partnership best policy and practices (SDG Partnership Platform Annual Report, 2018). Primary healthcare (PHC) – contributing to SDG 3 – has been the first Platform window aiming to contribute to the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) pillar under Kenya’s ‘Big Four agenda’5 (SDG Partnership Platform Annual Report, 2018). Recently, the Platform opened a new SDG accelerator window in 2019 for Kenya’s ‘Big Four agenda’ for food and nutrition security (SDG Partnership Platform Annual Report, 2018). In 2020, the Affordable Housing and Manufacturing and Skills Training windows were included. According to Neky, ‘the broadening of the Platform was necessary because philanthropy is often very comfortable engaging by itself but not always so used to collaborate with the private sector, Government, civil society, and other stakeholders. The SDG Partnership Platform is about creating a much broader, multi-stakeholder platform to productively engage all key partners … We want to bring philanthropy as an important stakeholder into the mainstream of development decision making and implementation in the country’ (WINGS interview with Arif Neky, 2019). To support the work of the Platform, the SDG Partnership Platform Multi-Partner Trust Fund (SDG PP MPTF) was established as the main funding instrument for mobilising donor resources. Since its establishment, the Fund has garnered contributions from traditional and non-traditional donors, private sector, foundations, and other sources to support the Platform, complementing other potential funding sources, including UN agency-based funding mechanisms. Since its establishment, the SDG PP has mobilised $5,800,000 financial and in-kind catalytic support from a range of multilateral, bilateral, philanthropic and private sector partners. Forty-five per cent of this support is financing and 55 per cent in-kind. Some $1,500,000, or 58 per cent of this financing is pooled and disbursed through its Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) (Kenya SDG Partnership Platform, 2019). Key private sector partners such as Philips and

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AstraZeneca, bilateral agencies such as the Netherlands and the US, and multilaterals such as the World Bank have joined philanthropic partners such as the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation and Ford Foundation in this effort (WINGS interview with Arif Neky, 2019). As a result of all the contributions, the Platform has received global recognition from United Nations Development Coordination Office (UNDCO) and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation as a best practice to accelerate SDG financing (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2018). The Platform has also become a flagship programme under Kenya’s new official UN Development Assistance Framework 2018–2022 (UNDAF) with the government of Kenya (WINGS interview with Arif Neky, 2019; Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2018). Ghana Ghana formally joined the SDG PP on 9 July 2015 with the aim of facilitating engagement and fostering dialogue between stakeholders and philanthropic institutions in advancing the SDGs. In the same year, the SDG PP established the Ghana Advisory Council to promote collaborative efforts towards the creation of an enabling environment for philanthropic engagement in national development plans (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). The SDG PP and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) during its 2016 election campaign promised to ‘create the enabling legislative and economic environment for philanthropy to blossom and promote a new era of giving, knowing that a prosperous Ghana makes it easier for individuals and organisations to support civil society and the SDGs’ (Kumi, 2019; SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Policy makers in Ghana have emphasised the achievement of SDG 6 – access to safe water and sanitation, as well as ensuring sound management of freshwater ecosystems (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). SDG 6 is particularly relevant in Ghana given that research shows that progress made on the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector was due to over-reliance (about 90 per cent) on support from external traditional development partners and philanthropy (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). With Ghana becoming a lower-middle income country and registering a decline in ODA, the Ghanaian government has realised that exploring alternative forms of raising resources (including philanthropy) to support the WASH sector is imperative (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). Philanthropy has become a critical social investment partner in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana, ensuring that all development partners achieve the SDGs.

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Zambia The launch of SDG PP took place on 20 October 2016 in Lusaka, with a particular emphasis on the well-being of children. It brought together a wide range of philanthropic actors, the government, and the UN in Zambia, where priorities were highlighted and concrete ways for foundations and their partners to leverage resources and ideas for common objectives, in particular the SDGs were identified (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2017). It was clear to the Zambian government that focusing on the overall well-being of children is a multi-sectoral issue that requires inter-sectoral collaboration, especially with philanthropy. In Africa, the SDG PPs have shown that philanthropy is key in promoting and advancing sustainable development and that different sectors and governments need to collaborate with philanthropy. There have been areas also where the SDG PP has been limited. This lack of progress has been largely attributed to challenges such as structural issues and trust among critical partnerships, changes in the environment, management, design, or governance of the Platform (Reisman et al., 2017). In Ghana for instance, informal giving or horizontal philanthropy has been part of Ghanaian historical, traditional and religious contexts (Kumi, 2019). The Ghanaian philanthropic landscape is more inclusive and larger in scope and reach including institutionalised foundations and trusts, HNWIs, faith-based giving, ordinary individual giving, diaspora, and corporate and community philanthropy (Kumi, 2019). Despite the landscape of philanthropy in Ghana being inclusive, large in scope and heterogeneous, research indicates that an enabling environment for the effective functioning of philanthropy is lacking (Ghana Philanthropy Forum Report, 2018). For example, the legal and regulatory environment hinders the effective operations of philanthropy because there is no single policy legislation or legal framework that is specifically targeted at the philanthropic sector (Kumi, 2019; Ghana Philanthropy Forum Report, 2018). Operating under the premise that widening the space for local philanthropy will not only lead to additional funding for Ghana’s development efforts, but also be a source of innovation and locally developed and appropriate solutions, to date, the SDG PP has recorded successes in Ghana worth mentioning. These are: • The Platform has placed philanthropy firmly at the table with government, an important strategic success. The SDG PP in Ghana is currently serving as a conduit between philanthropy and government as well as other sectors such as health and education (Reisman et al., 2017). Related to this is the fact that government has acknowledged the value and role of the philan-

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thropic foundations and trusts in promoting development (Reisman et al., 2017; Debrah, 2018). • The Platform has fostered engagement of philanthropy in the process of localising the SDGs within the country. Thus, the Platform has encouraged inclusivity and multi-sectoral collaboration with various sectors. • The Platform has proposed to develop a network to overcome historical mistrust of philanthropy and ensure foundations consult with people and act in line with national interests. The establishment of the Ghana Philanthropy Network and Impact Investing Network are examples of this. • The Platform has succeeded in connecting philanthropy with new partners beyond government (Reisman et al., 2017). Before, work was previously done with government and traditional development partners to achieve national priorities and development. In Kenya, the Platform has undertaken several key activities that have proven that collaboration between philanthropy and government is key for development, regional integration and policy processes. The platform provided many ‘firsts’ in Kenya. According to Neky (WINGS interview, 2019), these include the fact that the Platform (i) facilitated the first meeting between philanthropy as a sector working in education and government and (ii) that philanthropy as a sector was invited to contribute to the National Education Sector Plan for the first time. Other key milestones and activities of the Platform in Kenya include: • The launching of the Kenya Philanthropy Forum (KPF) in collaboration with the East African Association of Grantmakers (EAAG), and the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF). The KPF is the first common ‘voice’ for the philanthropy sector in Kenya to advocate common interests around the need for an enabling environment, greater, better and more accessible data for development, thematic policies, and greater subnational government engagement, as well as multi-stakeholder collaborations. Its main aim is to increase recognition of philanthropy in Kenya, as well as demonstrate the contribution of philanthropy to national development (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). To date, the forum has been engaging with a number of stakeholders and is recognised as a key partner in ensuring successful SDG implementation in the country (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). • An enhanced trust and understanding between public and private sectors to partner for the financing and delivery of universal health coverage (UHC) through the facilitation of over 20 public private dialogues engaging national government, over 25 countries and key stakeholders from private sector, philanthropy, civil society and academia.

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• Enhanced government capacities to advance public–private collaborations for the financing and delivery of private health coverage (PHC) through, for example, the development of Kenya’s Health public–private partnerships (PPP) strategy and toolkit. • The PHC investment pipeline catalysed approximately $120 million through innovative partnerships and financing mechanisms. • The launching of the SDG Accelerator Lab in 2019 as an innovative solution to strengthen PHC delivery and to bridge the talent, drive, resources and capabilities from Silicon Valley with those in the Silicon Savanna in Kenya. The SDC Platform in Kenya has become a government of Kenya UNDAF (2018–2022) Flagship initiative and has received global recognition from UNDCO and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation as a best practice to accelerate SDG financing (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2018). In Zambia, the progress of the Platform has been modest. The main success of the Platform is that, since its launch, it has worked towards strengthening key linkages between actors nationally and emphasising and monitoring how philanthropic interventions can support Zambia’s achievement of the SDGs. To address the challenge of building capacities at the subnational level, the Platform undertook a mapping of SDG processes in the country as well as mapping what different organisations and institutions are doing for the well-being of children, including policies, initiatives, actors involved and successful interventions (Reisman et al., 2017).

CONCLUSION Given the role that philanthropy plays, governments should create an enabling environment for partners to participate and collaborate, especially the philanthropic sector (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). Building better enabling environments for philanthropy goes beyond legal frameworks for registration and functioning. It includes other aspects such as good tracking systems and a consistent monitoring and evaluation (SDG Philanthropy Platform Report, 2016). When this is achieved, ensuring sustainable and deep collaborative partnerships between governments, philanthropy and other sectors and institutions will be possible.

NOTES 1.

The lead writer of this chapter researched and wrote the government of Rwanda’s Philanthropy Strategy (https://​www​.minecofin​.gov​.rw/​fileadmin/​user​_upload/​ Minecofin/​P ublications/​R EPORTS/​E xternal​_ Finance​_ Department/​F INAL​ _STRATEGY​_REPORT​-PHILANTHROPY​.PDF).

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2.

3. 4. 5.

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The lead writer took part in a planning meeting by the government of South Sudan and philanthropists who had supported the Liberia Secretariat. The meeting took place at the Bellagio Rockefeller Centre in Italy sometime around 2011/12. The lead writer of this chapter led the development of the SADC Resource Mobilization Framework and presented it to SADC Council Retreat in Swaziland in 2015. According to a Global Gambling and Consultants Report of 2002, SADC has the potential to raise over US$30 million per annum from lottery games. The ‘Big Four agenda’ comprises food security, affordable housing, manufacturing (with a strong focus on job creating), and affordable healthcare.

13. Conclusion Bhekinkosi Moyo, Mzukisi Qobo and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya Philanthropy in general and African philanthropy in particular has once again been thrust into the theatre of crises. A lot is expected of philanthropy just as it was in the gilded age when elites like Andrew Carnegie and others made so much money that they felt compelled to give it back to society. The same is happening today. In 2020, private foundations gave away $88.5 billion, a 17 per cent increase from the previous year. High-Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) in Africa gave away $265 million towards addressing the Covid-19 pandemic between March 2020 and December 2020, a trend never witnessed before. The total wealth held by HNWIs is expected to rise by 30 per cent reaching US$2.6 trillion by 2030, according to the Africa Wealth Report 2021 (Capgemini, 2021a). At the same time, many challenges abound today and on the horizon. One of the major crises of our generation is climate change along with disruption in food systems and water scarcity, events that could trigger conflicts and social ruptures in poor nations. This represents an opportunity for philanthropy to solve more of society’s complex challenges. The various chapters in this book covered several dimensions of philanthropy and how it responds during times of crises but also under normal conditions. Some have explored the different manifestations of philanthropy prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is clear that African philanthropy is still understudied yet it is widely practised. Some of the examples of different typologies of philanthropy can be seen in responses such as Kenyans for Kenya – an initiative that was designed in response to a terrorist attack in Kenya in the early 2000s. Philanthropy is also depicted as a complex interplay of contradictory practices that are hinged on voluntary agency. However, as shown by the various authors, in times of crisis, boundaries between ‘pure’ voluntariness and state obligations are blurred given that government and/or intergovernmental agencies take the responsibility to coordinate and mobilise resources. The establishment of several funds in different countries illustrates this point.

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The book underscores the important role that scholars have in interrogating – and contributing towards – constitutive elements of African philanthropy, especially under stress conditions. This book is a contribution to this end. Furthermore, it is a resource for those studying multi-stakeholder partnership processes for resourcing development such as those envisaged by SDG 17. Several chapters in the book deal with the question of partnerships between philanthropy and private sector; philanthropy and multilateral institutions in Africa; HNWIs and multilaterals in Africa; and coordination of efforts during crisis and non-crisis times. Another area that is addressed in the book is the fact that as African philanthropy has transformed, so has scholarly interest increased. A key focus of interrogation has been on its manifestations and how to build on traditions of gifting to scale up impactful efforts. Africa’s growth alone will not lead to inclusive development if social, economic, and political inequalities and disparities in development processes and outcomes are not addressed. The challenge for African philanthropies is that they should be transformative; they also need to embrace social justice-oriented investment approaches. This book contributes to closing this knowledge gap but more still needs to be researched. The book also demonstrates how lessons from past experiences, such as mobile money transfers, have been useful in informing Covid-19 pandemic interventions, especially by accelerating fundamental changes in the way Africans give. During the pandemic there was an increase in individual giving as well as giving by corporates. The different ways through which Africans responded to the pandemic demonstrate Afro-centric philanthropy’s contribution to Africa’s development challenges. A key lesson emerging from various chapters is that given the important role of corporations, philanthropists, and individuals, in catalysing interventions through emergent collaborative partnership models, there is a need to work towards strengthening values of transparency, inclusion and co-creation of best suitable solutions. As the continent gears itself for another climate-induced pandemic, these lessons will help philanthropy respond effectively this time. The African Union and African Development Bank represent the largest continental multilateral platforms for forging an African development consensus. A lot is expected from these bodies during times of crises. At times they can be slow and hobbled by red tape. The continent needs to shift from ad hoc approaches and be more strategic and systematic in cultivating collaborative relationships between multilateral institutions and African philanthropists. In contrast, it has been easier for these institutions to partner with international foundations and philanthropists. To secure greater contributions from African philanthropies towards this consensus, the book argues that these institutions must clearly define a cause that will rally Africans together. As one of the chapters pointed out, although there is a great deal of effort to harness

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philanthropy to needs during times of emergency, what is lacking is a similar consensus in non-crisis periods. While philanthropy responded to the crisis in several ways, civil society broadly was significantly impacted by the pandemic. One of the models articulated in this book focuses on isolating specific variables that can be used to predict the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the civil society organisation (CSO) sector. This model can be used whenever a crisis occurs. Policy makers are also invited to use the model developed in this study to predict the changes to CSOs and enable effective decision-making. Other chapters have shown that despite the critical role played by civil society during the pandemic it received little relief from donors. CSOs had to adapt to working remotely and this curtailed their advocacy, protest and mobilisation facilities. There was also significant pressure that resulted in switching programmatic activities to include a humanitarian response as many CSO staffers / volunteers were directly impacted by a loss of income and suffered socio-economic deprivation during the crisis. The book also draws out empirical findings that show how philanthropic organisations played significant roles that included, among others, coordination and mobilisation of resources to meet the essential needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups in society, information sharing, awareness raising and public education about Covid-19. They have also influenced public policy through advocacy. Through these discussions we see how government’s policies could serve as catalyst for promoting philanthropic acts through collective solidarity and mutual aid. One of the lessons of philanthropy during the Covid-19 pandemic is that philanthropy is a potent tool to foster strong engagement between government and philanthropic actors. We see how, especially in Ghana, this has reinforced the need for better collaboration by philanthropic stakeholders in addressing national development challenges. The research findings have also demonstrated how African philanthropy has become an indispensable element in addressing the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. This is a great expression of shared value. It is not just governments in the domestic domain that can be key partners for philanthropists. Corporate philanthropy and regional multilaterals can reap considerable benefits for society and for the companies, in both crisis and non-crisis times. Recent history shows that this cooperation is strongest during times of crisis, such as the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014–2016, when driven and steered by a coordinating body; this is where regional multilaterals can play a catalytic role. Although regional multilaterals are theoretically well-placed to take on this role, this book points to lack of resources and capacity to do so on an ongoing and sustained basis. Regional multilaterals have the opportunity to adopt a more strategic approach to working with corporates and to build strategic and impactful partnerships for development on the continent.

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This book demonstrates that HNWIs are already connected and interacting with multilateral development agencies in ways that generate shared value. However, it is unclear as yet if their collaboration with existing development actors will radically alter the development landscape to prioritise African ideas and create sufficient policy room for African governments to re-imagine solutions to intractable public problems such as social service delivery. It is worth noting that philanthropy cannot drive Africa’s development alone and multilateral institutions can only be part of the vehicle. Improving coordination between MLIs and philanthropy will therefore be a helpful but insufficient solution. MLIs, however, may be in a position to leverage some of the scale and systems requirements of large vertical philanthropy. They may be able to help frame strategic missions to deal with regional challenges in the medium term, including emergency modalities, while creating space for local actions at national and subnational levels. To do so, however, will require building up the capacity, legitimacy, and track record to gain and hold the charge. International philanthropy will thus continue to be important but will have to consider its role both in supporting the capacitation of the MLIs as well as in addressing some of its own challenges and relations. Lessons from Europe and Asia show that the value creating role of philanthropy is well resourced and extremely dynamic in both regions. Its potential, however, is significantly underused. The mandate of institutional actors in Europe and Asia, especially, has shaped how philanthropists view their impact and thus brought to the fore the value of engaging through regional institutions in Europe and Asia. While several models of engagement are used, venture philanthropy and impact investing are on the rise and appear to be the most common forms of engagement chosen by philanthropic organisations. Most large-scale contributions are in fact conducted through one of these approaches. Engagement through these models (venture philanthropy and impact investing) is dominated by large international philanthropic organisations. This can be explained by the complex procedures often adopted by institutions when engaging with philanthropies, which may discourage smaller philanthropies. This is an important area for future research, more so to understand the relationship between these modes and climate-related risks. Finally, the book argues for philanthropy to build a compact with the private sector, government, and multilateral institutions to respond to complex developmental challenges facing the continent. No single actor can fully address the variety of Africa’s problems. Creating shared value is the future.

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Index 1963 Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, The 30

borders of statutory government 10 bounded regularities 9

access and proximity to those in need 130 Africa Against Ebola Solidarity Trust (AAEST) 25 Africa Centre for Disease Control (CDC) 27, 28 Africa Liberation Fund 12 Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP) 95 African countries 154 African development 166–7 African development Bank (AfDB) 23, 30–34 African economies 13 African governments 183 African multilaterals and philanthropies 22 African philanthropy 7–21 African philanthropy, regional integration, development and policy-change 183–6 African Union (AU) 23, 24–30 African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), The 24 African Union Foundation (AUF) 27 African Union Support to Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA) 25 Africa’s post-colonial 10 Africa’s private sector 28–9 Afro-centric philanthropy 21, 195 Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) 89 Asia Development Bank (ADB) 105 AU Foundation, The 28

CAF Giving 14 civil society organisations (CSOs) 39 community giving 25–6 Community Mobility Reports 91 community organisations 34 community outreach 74 concessional loans and grants 30 cooperation during the Ebola crisis in West Africa 24–5 cooperation with AU on broader development agenda 137 Corporate Governance and the B-BEE legislation 13 COVID impacts and lessons 173–4 COVID pass 98–9 COVID-19 Response Fund’s contributions 27 COVID-19 virus 1 crisis and non-crisis periods 22–37

beneficiaries 10

foundations 13, 143

disaster response 131–4 diversity, equity, and inclusion 175 donor agreements 48 dynamics of philanthropy in the African context 172–3 Ebola 11 effective governance 22 employment 154 endogenous and exogenous practices 23 engagement in policy processes 128 engagement with the African Development Bank 137–8 European Union 24 evaluating projects 34 evolution of philanthropy 164

222

223

Index

Ghana Philanthropy Forum Report 2018 190 Global Disaster Preparedness Centre , The 18 Global Education Coalition 99–100 governance 35 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 114 historical developments 12 HIV and TB programmes 81 HNWI population growth 104 humanitarian and developmental needs 7 humanitarian emergencies 8 Hurricane Katrina 40 identification process 95 impact of budget 52 implement programs 109 indigenous prosocial collectivist 12 individual philanthropy 25 inequity 10 informal channels 146 infrastructure development 147 institutional actors 120, 197 institutional analysis 164 institutionalisation 13 intellectual property (IP) 115 international contributors 176 international financial and human resources 25 investments 19, 109 legal context as an area of engagement, the 110–113 local associations and formal organisations 9 logistic regressions 49 low government social spending 43 MacArthur Foundation’s Nigeria office 39 manuscript philanthropic responses to COVID-19 in Africa, the 2 mobilisations for democracy 12 multilateral institutions 147 multilateral organisations 124 Nelson Mandela Foundation 75 Non-Profit Companies (NPC) 77

overwhelmed by large numbers of hospitalisations 1 Pan-Africanism 181–3 philanthropic activity 104 philanthropic organisations 169 philanthropic sector 192 philanthropy and policy advocacy during COVID-19 66–7 platforms/digital solutions and philanthropy 90–91 political positioning 18 politics of development and philanthropy 174–5 potential role of philanthropy in addressing the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in Ghana 58 private enterprise in Africa 144 refugees 79 regional economic communities (RECs) 166 regional multilaterals 123–40 religious giving, individual donations, volunteering and diaspora philanthropy 59 replace Western philanthropy with ‘African gifting’ 59 research, science and innovation 115 Rockefeller Foundation, The 89 Rockefeller Foundation Advisors 95 romantic humanitarian 12 SDG Philanthropy Platform Report 2017 189 SDGs Philanthropy Platforms (SDG PP) in Africa, The 186–92 shifts in funding 39 SK Happiness Foundation 117 small European foundations 108 social exchanges 9 ‘social justice’/‘social change’ 76 social origins theory 42–3 social phenomenon in Africa 9 societal institutions 76 socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in Ghana 59 socioeconomic status 40 socio-historical 10

224

African philanthropy

sources of income 89 South African civil society and philanthropic responses 75–6 South African Solidarity Fund 81 substantially finance implementations 106 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 107 tax regimes in Europe 110 technical assistance 37 three corporate interviews 124 tithes in Christianity 13 Trialogue 126 TrustAfrica 155

Ubuntu 143 vaccinated populations 174 vaccine alliance 151 volunteering schemes 73 waste during disasters 40 West African nations 19 western philanthropy 23 WhatsApp group 79 World Health Organization 1 Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030 Framework 150