Africa: Diversity and Development [2 ed.] 0367137399, 9780367137397

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Africa

Africa: Diversity and Development introduces and de-mystifies Africa’s diversity and dynamism, and considers how its peoples and environments have interacted through time and space. The book examines the background and diversity of Africa’s social, cultural, economic, political and environmental systems, as well as key development issues which have affected Africa in the past and are likely to be significant in shaping the future of the continent. These include: the impact of HIV/AIDS; sources of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction; the state and governance; the nature of African economies in a global context and future development trajectories. The second edition features new chapters on history and governance, and updated content on all aspects of the continent, particularly aspects of culture and ethnicity. It is richly illustrated throughout with diagrams and plates and contains a wealth of detailed up-to-date case studies and current data. This textbook is a refreshing interdisciplinary text which enhances understanding of the background to Africa’s current position and clarifies possible future scenarios. It will be a valuable resource for students taking modules on Africa, African Development and Geography of Africa, and will also prove useful to students in the wider fields of Geography, Development Studies, Global Studies, Environment and Society and African Politics. Tony Binns was Ron Lister Professor of Geography (2004–2021) at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. Etienne Nel is Professor and Head of the School of Geography at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. Alan Dixon is Professor of Sustainable Development at the University of Worcester, UK. Kenneth Lynch is Professor of Development and Community and Convener of the ‘Place, Environment and Community Research Priority Area’ at the University of Gloucestershire, UK.

Africa Diversity and Development Second edition

Tony Binns, Etienne Nel, Alan Dixon and Kenneth Lynch

Cover image: Aerial City View of Nairobi, Kenya in July. Getty/Vicki Jauron, Babylon and Beyond Photography Second edition published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Tony Binns, Etienne Nel, Alan Dixon and Kenny Lynch The right of Tony Binns, Etienne Nel, Alan Dixon and Kenny Lynch to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. First edition published by Routledge 2011 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Binns, Tony, author. | Nel, E. L., author. | Dixon, Alan, 1972– author. | Lynch, Kenneth, author. Title: Africa : diversity and development / Tony Binns, Etienne Nel, Alan Dixon, and Kenneth Lynch. Description: Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022043467 (print) | LCCN 2022043468 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367137397 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367137410 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429028403 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Social change—Africa. | Social conflict—Africa. | Cultural pluralism—Africa. | Economic development—Africa. | Africa—Geography. | Africa—Social conditions. | Africa—Economic conditions. | Africa—Environmental conditions. Classification: LCC DT6.7 .B56 2023 (print) | LCC DT6.7 (ebook) | DDC 960—dc23/eng/20220907 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022043467 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022043468 ISBN: 978-0-367-13739-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-13741-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-02840-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of Plates

vii

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xi

List of Boxes

xiii

Author Biographies

xv xvii

Preface Chapter 1

Introduction: understanding Africa

1

Chapter 2

Developing Africa

14

Chapter 3

History and Governance

59

Chapter 4

Conflict and Post-Conflict

110

Chapter 5

Africa’s People

151

Chapter 6

Health and Development

181

Chapter 7

African Environments

229

Chapter 8

Rural Africa

277

Chapter 9

Urban Africa

322

Chapter 10

African Economies

379

Chapter 11

Conclusion: what future for Africa?

417

References

427

Index

473

Plates

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6

Barrage Lalla Takerkoust, near Marrakech, Morocco Water hand-pump in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa Durban CBD, South Africa Warwick Junction market, Durban, South Africa An NGO extension agent in Ethiopia delivers spades and energyefficient stoves to a rural community Statue of Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town, South Africa Colonial house, Banjul, The Gambia Colonial Post Office building in Bamako, Mali Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, celebrates Independence Day Diamond miners shovelling gravel in eastern Sierra Leone Arch 22, Banjul, The Gambia to commemorate the military coup of 22 July 1994 Display of armaments in Johannesburg Conflict memorial in Koidu, eastern Sierra Leone Ex-combatant training to be a blacksmith in Panguma, Sierra Leone Traditional roles for women (washing, cleaning, preparing food) Sierra Leone Poster campaign against Violence Against Women (VAW), Sierra Leone Women’s empowerment programme Women disproportionately share the burden of fuelwood collection in Ethiopia Refuse accumulating near a market in Mzuzu, Malawi HIV/AIDS education poster in Sierra Leone A man chewing khat in western Ethiopia Traditional medicine advertising in Lilongwe, Malawi Flash flooding on a rural road in central Mali Arid landscape, Mali Erosion gully in northern Nigeria A boy and donkey with urban refuse for peri-urban fields, Kano, Nigeria Intensive wheat production outside Lusaka, Zambia Agriculture in Ethiopia using traditional technology Traditional irrigation in West Pokot, Kenya A boy gathering wild fonio in Mali during the ‘hungry season’ Participatory field sketch of a wetland farming calendar from western Ethiopia Fulani pastoralists watering cattle from a well in northern Nigeria

26 33 39 40 42 83 88 91 100 124 127 130 140 144 165 168 169 203 206 212 222 226 249 251 258 264 284 284 289 293 294 295

viii • Plates

8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.10 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9

Fishing is a major source of income on the Zambezi floodplain Luo fishing boat in the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria Construction using eucalyptus poles from the surrounding hillsides in Metu, Ethiopia Rural livelihood diversification in Uganda: women make mats from sedges collected from wetlands Women harvesting rice in The Gambia Traditional granaries, Mali A farmer highlights the difference in harvested maize quality between traditional farming (left) and Tiyeni deep-bed conservation agriculture (right) Urban farmer in Kano, Nigeria Urban agriculture, central Freetown, Sierra Leone Ruins at Carthage, northern Tunisia Ancient mosque in Mopti, Mali Informal housing in Mathare Valley, Nairobi, Kenya Central business district, Nairobi, Kenya Johannesburg CBD, South Africa Cape Town waterfront and Table Mountain Duncan Village squatter camp, East London, South Africa Scavenging on a municipal rubbish tip in Freetown, Sierra Leone Coal mine in Utrecht, KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa Illegal artisanal coal mining, South Africa Petro-chemical complex, Sasolburg, Free State Province, South Africa Tannery in old city of Fes, Morocco Village blacksmith, northern Nigeria Gateway regional shopping complex, Durban, South Africa Montecasino hotel complex, Johannesburg, South Africa Amboseli National Park and Mount Kilimanjaro, Kenya/Tanzania Tourist market at Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia

301 302 306 308 309 313 317 341 341 345 346 353 355 357 364 367 373 394 394 399 400 400 403 405 407 411

Figures

1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10

The true size of Africa Africa today: countries and capitals Rostow’s ‘Stages of Economic Growth’ Lake Volta in Ghana Dependency theory in practice Slave ship – Brookes diagram Historical maps – 1880, 1914, 1957 Map of The Gambia Independence dates of African countries Trends in the number of state-based conflicts, non-state conflicts and one-side violence, 1989–2020 State-based conflict, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence events in 2019 Key drivers of conflict and violence in Africa Estimates of battle deaths from 1989 to 2020 throughout Africa Military spending as a percentage of GDP in selected African countries, 1990–2020 Average military spending as a percentage of GDP in selected African countries across three decades Population of African regions from 1950 to 2020 Africa’s Regional Population growth rates 1950–2020 Population growth rate and total fertility rate estimates for African countries 2022 Life expectancy in Africa in 1990 and 2019 The causes of maternal mortality in Africa Progress in access to drinking water and sanitation facilities in sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–2020 Distribution of access within rural and urban populations to drinking water facilities Distribution of access within rural and urban populations to sanitation facilities Projected total municipal solid waste (MSW) generation (103 tonnes/year) of African countries in 2025 Projected MSW collection rate (%) for 2025 Share of the population (aged 15 to 49 years) infected with HIV, 2019 Estimated number of people living with HIV in Africa (compared to HIV prevalence), 1990–2019 HIV prevalence among 15–24-year-olds, by sex, selected countries, 2020

3 4 23 25 27 74 81 87 99 114 115 119 129 131 132 155 155 163 193 196 198 199 199 204 205 209 210 211

x • Figures

6.11 6.12 6.13 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4

Share of those living with HIV who receive antiretroviral therapy, 2010 and 2019 Deaths through intentional and unintentional injuries in Africa, 2019 Number of medical doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 population (2017–2018) Colonizability of Africa Biomes of Africa Lesotho Location of Illubabor Zone, Ethiopia Hadejia-Nguru wetlands, Nigeria Africa, precipitation in January and July Desertification in Africa (UNCOD) Kofyar homeland, Nigeria Teras cultivation in Sudan Africa’s urban and rural populations compared The sustainable livelihoods framework The farming year in Sierra Leone Fulani calendar Cross-section of the Tiyeni deep-bed farming system Capital cities: Coastal, inland and new Nigeria: States Abuja, Nigeria: The new federal capital Kano, Nigeria

215 221 225 230 231 233 237 239 250 253 261 265 278 281 287 297 316 326 331 332 348

Tables

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6

Africa: Key statistics Key development indicators Development theory and practice over time The Millennium Development Goals Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Armed conflict in Africa (1950–2020) where at least one party is the government of a state Summary of conflict impacts on different sectors. Refugees and internally displaced people in selected African countries, 2021 Key demographic details about Africa: Population and development Key demographic details about Africa: life and economic prospects Regional maternal mortality rates in Africa (per 100,000 live births 2000–2017) isiXhosa ritualized greetings illustrating the importance of community The leading causes of death in Africa in 2019 Life expectancy and infant mortality rates in Africa Comparison of maternal mortality rates, 1990–2017 The different service levels for access to drinking water and sanitation Forest statistics for African countries with total forest areas over 10 million hectares, 2015. Agriculture’s changing percentage share of GDP by region in Africa, 1980–2020 Farming systems of Africa Positive and negative effects of rural livelihood diversification Urban growth in Africa’s regions Africa’s ten largest cities in 2018 Ghana: employment and unemployment by gender, 1998–1999 Africa’s key economic indicators (in US$) in 2019 and 2020 Top five African countries: Gross national income per capita (GNI pc) in US$ 2019 Lowest five African countries: Gross national income per capita (GNI pc) in US$ 2019 GDP growth rates in per cent of Africa’s five fastest growing economies in 2019 GDP growth rates in per cent of Africa’s six worst performing economies in 2019 Sectoral composition and change of Africa’s economies

6 17 19 49 106 112 133 135 157 161 164 176 183 191 195 198 267 283 290 310 325 325 339 381 382 382 383 383 384

xii • Tables

10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 10.12 10.13

African countries dependent on a single primary commodity for export earnings (annual average of exports, in US$, 1992–1997) Africa’s oil reserves – five largest reserves, 2021 Africa’s five largest oil producers, 2021 The leading mineral producing economies by value, 2019 South Africa: gold production and employment, 1975–2020 Africa’s leading manufacturing countries 2018 China’s main African trading partners

388 392 392 393 396 399 413

Boxes

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6

South Africa: Reducing inequality in the ‘Rainbow Nation’ The East African Groundnut Scheme The Volta River Project Ujamaa, villagization and rural development in Tanzania Local economic development in Durban in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa Community beekeeping in Bondolfi, Zimbabwe The 17 Sustainable Development Goals Legacies of the slave trade Africa’s boundaries The Gambia: Colonial legacy Portuguese decolonization Ceuta and Melilla: Spanish enclaves in Africa Conflict in the Great Lakes region The conflict in Darfur: Ethnic tensions or climate change? The Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria Regional peacekeeping: The role of ECOMOG in Liberia The NEPAD strategy for post-conflict reconstruction Indigenous justice and reconciliation: Gacaca courts in Rwanda Factors affecting projected population dynamics in Africa Successfully engaging men in maternal and child health in Malawi COVID-19 in Africa Global development goals and health Community-led total sanitation (CLTS) in Sierra Leone HIV and AIDS in Uganda: A success story? Khat-chewing in the Horn of Africa: A mental and social health issue Exporting water from Lesotho to South Africa South Africa’s Working for Water Programme Wetlands in Ethiopia and Nigeria The Nile Basin Initiative Coping with a marginal environment in Burkina Faso People and environment on the Jos Plateau, Nigeria Conserving central Africa’s rainforests The sustainable livelihoods framework Cash crops or food crops? Indigenous agricultural systems in Sierra Leone Pastoralists and pressures in northern Nigeria Fair trade for Africa’s poor farmers Non-timber forest products for livelihood development in Ethiopia

11 21 24 28 38 43 50 72 83 86 92 94 115 120 122 138 141 146 156 169 182 185 201 213 221 232 235 236 240 255 260 268 280 285 286 296 303 306

xiv • Boxes

8.7 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 11.1 11.2

The role of GM technologies in Africa’s rural development Conservation agriculture: Balancing food security with environmental sustainability? Key features of Africa’s urbanism and associated risks Cairo: Growth and development in Africa’s first mega-city Urban growth in Nigeria Structural adjustment and urban employment in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s Urban agriculture: Ensuring food and household security Housing and infrastructure in Lagos and Nairobi Eko-Atlantic and the Lekki Free Zone, Lagos, Nigeria Growth without development in Equatorial Guinea Supporting the agricultural sector: A vital strategy for economic growth and poverty alleviation Changing fortunes for South Africa’s gold-mining industry Cape Verde: Development in an island economy Tourism in Kenya ‘Africa must unite!’: The African Union The African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

314 315 323 328 330 337 340 349 362 385 389 396 405 406 419 422

Author Biographies

Tony Binns was Ron Lister Professor of Geography (2004–2021) at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. He has worked in the field of Geography and Development Studies for over 45 years, and has a longstanding interest in post-conflict reconstruction, food production systems, food security and community-based development. Much of his field-based research has been undertaken in Africa and he taught the only course on Africa in New Zealand – Transformations in Developing Countries (Africa). He has published 22 books and over 160 journal articles and book chapters. Tony is also Editor of the successful Routledge Perspectives on Development book series. He was President of the Commonwealth Geographical Bureau, 2008–2016. In January 2014, he was made a chief in the small town of Kayima in the far north-east of Sierra Leone, West Africa. His title is Chief Manjawah of Sandor. Etienne Nel is Professor and Head of the School of Geography at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. He has spent most of his research career working in, and undertaking research on, Africa and more recently Australasia. His interests are primarily in urban and economic development, with specific foci on small urban centres and local development processes. He has published 12 books and over 190 journal articles and book chapters. He chaired the International Geographical Union’s Commission of Globalization and Marginalization for eight years. Alan Dixon is Professor of Sustainable Development at the University of Worcester, UK. His research examines environment-development relationships in the Global South, with a particular focus on the sustainability of social-ecological systems. Much of his work has explored the importance of wetland environments at the community level, and the ways in which local knowledge, social capital and common property resource institutions contribute to adaptive and sustainable wetland management strategies. Alan has worked on a range of research and development projects throughout Africa over the last 25 years and has published several books about his work. Kenneth Lynch is Professor of Development and Community and Convener of the ‘Place, Environment and Community Research Priority Area’ at the University of Gloucestershire, UK. His research interests have broadly focused on the relationships between the city and the countryside in the Global South, working most recently in Sierra Leone, on linking post-conflict justice to food cultivation and development, and in India on transforming access to sanitation across the rural to urban transition. Kenneth has also conducted research on teaching and learning, most notably on team-based learning, technology enhanced learning and engaging students with communities through work-related learning. In 2004 he was awarded the UK’s ‘Advanced Higher Education National Teaching Fellowship’.

Preface

We are pleased to offer the Second Edition of Africa: Diversity and Development, following on from the First Edition which was published in 2012. This book, like the First Edition, aims to further knowledge and understanding about the world’s second largest continent, Africa, at a time of great change and many challenges and when longstanding perceptions and misunderstandings sadly still persist. The First Edition was generally well received and is used by tutors and students in many countries in programmes on African Studies, Development Studies, Geography and in various Social Science disciplines. For many, Africa is seen as a country, rather than as a continent with 54 countries covering 20 per cent of the world’s land area and with well over 1.4 billion people. It is a continent that includes the world’s largest hot desert (the Sahara), one of the world’s longest rivers (the Nile) and one of the world’s largest wetland areas (the Okavango Delta). In a sense we are all Africans, as our ancestors, Homo sapiens, originated in Africa and the continent has the longest record of human habitation. It is a continent of rich and diverse human cultures, with complex human civilizations such as Ancient Egypt and Carthage in the north, Benin in what is now southern Nigeria, and Great Zimbabwe in the south. In the 21st century, Africa has some of the world’s largest cities (Lagos, Cairo, Kinshasa), with rapidly growing populations, where over 50 per cent are under the age of 25. Too often Africa is perceived as a place of instability, conflict, corruption and poverty. Whilst Africa is currently the world’s least wealthy continent, there are some exciting and positive trends in many of the 54 countries, and it is unwise to generalize without reference to specific examples. To a greater or lesser extent African countries are engaging more with each other and the rest of the world in relation to economic and political collaboration, and the sense that Africa is somewhat marginal in terms of global affairs is gradually being transformed. In this Second Edition of Africa: Diversity and Development, Tony Binns, Etienne Nel and Alan Dixon, have been joined by Kenneth Lynch. The authors have updated qualitative and quantitative material from the First Edition and, in response to readers’ feedback, have significantly expanded sections on history and culture. Additionally, with the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggesting that Africa is the continent with the greatest vulnerability to climate change, more attention has been given to possible effects and future mitigation strategies. The various text ‘Boxes’ have been particularly popular, with both teachers and students, in providing themes for discussion and exemplification of more general issues. Each chapter concludes with a summary, a number of discussion questions and further reading, including useful websites, which can be used to delve into more detail on particular issues. Whereas the First Edition was printed in black and white, we are grateful to Routledge for including full colour illustrations in the Second Edition which we feel greatly enhances the presentation of the book. The authors are particularly grateful to Andrew

xviii • Preface

Mould, Claire Maloney, Egle Zigaite and Natalie Meylan at Routledge for their support throughout the production process. Chris Garden at Otago University has provided invaluable help with producing the figures, both in updating ones from the First Edition and designing completely new figures for this Second Edition. More than anything, this book is a tribute to our friends and colleagues at various universities and research institutions across Africa with whom we have been collaborating in some cases for almost 50 years. In the past, British Council exchange programmes with Rhodes University (Grahamstown, South Africa), Fourah Bay College (Freetown, Sierra Leone) and Bayero University (Kano, Nigeria) led to a large-scale two-way flow of staff and doctoral students, which undoubtedly had a very significant impact on capacity building. We lament the passing of such valuable exchange programmes. But through these and other links it is fair to say that much of the content of this book has been stimulated by our collaborative teaching and research projects, and in particular by primary field-based research in roughly half of Africa’s 54 countries. We hope our readers are engaged by what they read here, and we welcome feedback that might help to shape a possible future Third Edition!

1

Introduction: understanding Africa

1.1 Images of Africa A key aim of this book is to improve readers’ knowledge and understanding of Africa. Between us, the authors have over a 100 years of experience of living and working in almost half of Africa’s 54 countries. Africa is an incredibly diverse and dynamic continent, which is why it is so fascinating to watch and study. We have endeavoured to capture that dynamism in this book. Since we published the First Edition of Africa: Diversity and Development in 2012 there have been many changes. To mention just a few, as we were going to press with the First Edition in 2011, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ was destabilizing some North African countries and the new country of South Sudan was being created. Since then, in 2017 a dictatorship was replaced by democratic rule in The Gambia, a new President was elected in South Africa, terrorism escalated in the West African Sahel, whilst Swaziland was in 2018 renamed the Kingdom of Eswatini. Serious health issues have had a considerable effect on economic growth and development, most notably the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, followed from 2019 by the global COVID-19 pandemic. On a more positive note, recent progress with the institution of the African Continental Free Trade Area and the drafting of the Agenda 2063 strategy for the continent by the African Union bode well for the continent’s future development prospects and for greater regional integration. In the early 21st century, Africa is widely perceived as being the world’s poorest continent, with a seemingly endless agenda of development priorities. Yet in many African countries solid progress is being made (Sustainable Development Goals for Africa, 2020), and Africa undoubtedly deserves to have a stronger voice, such that both its problems and potential are placed ‘centre stage’ in world economic and social development forums. But the continent and its constituent states are unfortunately surrounded by misrepresentation and stereotypes. As Paice (2022: 5) comments, ‘Africa remains fundamentally marginalised, including in stereotypical depictions in most western media and the imaginations of most western citizens’. For some people (including university students!), Africa is seen as a ‘country’ rather than as a ‘continent’, a seemingly vast homogeneous space with little diversity among its people and environment (Vokes, 2018). In reality, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Mountains, deserts, rainforest, wetlands and plains are home to communities with upwards of 3,000 languages across the continent – over 500 in Nigeria alone. All groups have impressive histories and material cultures, and there now seems little doubt that Africa is indeed the ‘cradle of humankind’ from which we all originated. So through our ancestors we all actually have a link to Africa! A once popular image of Africa was that of a ‘dark continent’, as it was first portrayed by nineteenth century explorers such as Stanley and Livingstone. Africa was often DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403-1

2 • Introduction

regarded as being ‘off the map’, a mysterious ‘terra incognita’, populated by wild animals and savage tribes (Watt, 1912) and characterized by harsh environments such as vast deserts and impenetrable forests. Although times have changed, Africa continues to be synonymous with problems such as famine, drought, poverty, and diseases such as Ebola, malaria and HIV/AIDS. It is a continent where poor governance and political instability are often regarded as being the norm rather than the exception. Many of Africa’s challenges can be directly linked to the exploitation and misrule associated with colonialization and Africa’s unequal integration into the world economy post-independence. Falling terms of trade, the Cold War and global economic and debt crises in Africa have not helped the situation. Despite this, many African countries have recorded some of the world’s fastest economic growth rates in the last 20 years and the continent is now receiving significant attention in terms of its economic and political role from China, India, Europe and the USA. Africa is also still seen as a predominantly rural continent, where it is sometimes suggested that an inability to feed its growing population is due to inefficient and outdated farming systems. In reality, however, Africa in recent years has seen significant increases in the amount of land farmed and in agricultural output (Voiland, 2022). Africa is currently the world’s most rapidly growing and urbanizing continent in population terms, such that by 2030 more than 50 per cent of the population will be living in towns and cities. The associated ‘demographic dividend’ of a boom in the numbers of young people creates opportunities in terms of an expanding workforce and market, but also presents challenges in terms of the provision of urban services, housing, education and employment. Generalized images and stereotypes ignore the great physical and human diversity of the African continent and also fail to appreciate the complex historical processes which underlie this diversity. Africa is a vast continent, second only in size to Asia, stretching 8,320km from Tangier (Morocco) in the north to Cape Agulhas on South Africa’s southern coast, and 7,360km from Cap Vert near Dakar (Senegal) in the west to Cape Guardafui, the easternmost point of the African ‘horn’ in Somalia. Africa’s land mass is larger than the combined areas of Europe, the USA, China and India. The continent and surrounding islands now comprise 54 countries. Figure 1.1 provides an intriguing view of the continent in relation to a number of other countries, whilst Figure 1.2 shows the 54 African countries and their capitals. Africa’s pre-colonial history is not widely known, outside of the continent, except perhaps for ancient Egypt which features in many school history curricula. But it is a continent with an incredibly rich heritage of traditions and sophisticated levels of organization in states, settlements, trading and commodity production. Colonialism was a relatively brief, yet very significant, chapter in Africa’s history, when economies and societies were transformed, initially through slavery and missionaries, and were increasingly drawn into the world economic system through the establishment of formal colonial rule and an associated expansion of trade in crops, minerals and other resources (see Chapter 3). An inadequate understanding of African environments, societies, cultures and economies by people from outside of the continent has sometimes, directly or indirectly, compounded Africa’s problems. There are many examples of this, such as in the shape of countries, alignment of boundaries and ethnic composition of African states. The European powers, meeting in Berlin in 1884–1885 to divide up the African ‘cake’, showed little concern for the future viability, governance and development of African countries and peoples. The Europeans merely staked their claims during the ‘scramble’ for Africa, with little consideration for the consequences (Griffiths, 1995).

Introduction • 3 BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

SWITZERLAND FRANCE GERMANY

SPAIN

ITALY

PORTUGAL

EASTERN EUROPE

UNITED STATES

( with Alaska & Hawaii )

INDIA

INDIA PART 2

CHINA

CHINA PART 2 Ireland

UK

JAPAN

Figure 1.1 The true size of Africa Source: http://kai.sub.blue/en/africa.html

1.2 Africa: Achievements and challenges Africa’s rapid population growth rates, the world’s highest and averaging 2.45 per cent annually, will lead to an estimated total population of 1,688 billion in 2030, a fifth of the world’s population, and larger than either China or India. By 2050 the continent will have 25 per cent of the world’s population compared with less than 10 per cent in 1950 (Paice, 2022). Africa will also have the world’s most youthful population under the age of 14, such that by the 2040s 40 per cent of all children born across the world will be Africans. While population growth can be an asset in terms of the growth of the workforce and the consumer market, a growing youthful population can present numerous challenges. For example, African governments will need to increase the provision of schools, tertiary education and vocational training, as well as provide employment opportunities in both

4 • Introduction

Figure 1.2 Africa today: countries and capitals

rural and urban areas. Youth employment is a key priority, as evidence from countries such as Sierra Leone has shown that large numbers of unemployed and disaffected youths can threaten political stability leading to uprisings and even civil war. These demographic challenges need to be balanced against the rapid economic growth rates achieved by the economies of many African countries in recent years, the expanding middle class, growing agricultural and industrial output, the impact of increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and increasing interest being shown in the continent by external powers (see Chapter 10). Africa’s resources and labour are of particular value to the global community and will help guide future investment and development. In terms of the quality of life in Africa as reflected in levels of happiness, 16 of the world’s lowest ranking countries between 2018 and 2020 were in Africa, with Lesotho, Botswana, Rwanda and Zimbabwe among the bottom 5, together with Afghanistan (WHR, 2021). Reviewing the record of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa between 2000 and 2015, whilst many targets were not achieved, there were, however, some notable successes: for example, in improving the participation of girls in

Introduction • 5

primary and secondary education, in combatting HIV/AIDS and other diseases such as malaria, and in increasing life expectancy (see Chapter 6). However, these improvements were often from a low baseline, whilst other MDG targets such as reducing maternal and child mortality, improving sanitation and levels of employment were not achieved (Briggs, 2018). Trying to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly after setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, is a current challenge in the 2020s. Coping with rapid urban growth is another challenge facing African governments. While cities do provide lifestyle and economic opportunities, and also serve as ‘gateways’ to the wider world, the benefits of urbanization are not felt by all. The growth rates of Africa’s cities are generally much higher than those of other countries. Although only 41 per cent of the population south of the Sahara (SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa) was urban in 2020, the World Bank has estimated an annual urban growth rate of 4 per cent, the highest rate among the world’s major regions, and considerably above the world average annual urban growth rate of 1.8 per cent (World Bank, 2021; UNFPA, 2007). Some 52 per cent of Nigeria’s 211 million people are currently urban based, and already the continent’s largest city, Lagos, has an estimated 21 million people, and is projected to become the world’s largest city by 2100 with a population possibly reaching 80 million. The implications of such rapid urban growth in Lagos and other African towns and cities will be examined in more detail later, but include the provision of food, housing, transport, water and sanitation, as well as providing social services such as health and education (Chapter 9). The differential between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is often clearly seen in African cities, where wooden or even cardboard shacks can be closely juxtaposed with sumptuous residences guarded with high gates, electrified fences and barbed wire. In terms of economic progress over the last decade, Africa’s economy as a whole has grown annually by an average of 5 per cent, yet some of Africa’s 54 states remain among the poorest in the world (Future Agenda, 2021). Mozambique experienced a 5.3 per cent annual growth rate between 2000 and 2005, whilst oil-rich Equatorial Guinea achieved a staggering 21.3 per cent growth rate during the same period. But such economic growth is often not maintained, nor translated into better living standards for the general population, and a country such as Equatorial Guinea might be regarded as a prime case of ‘growth without development’, where, despite high rates of economic growth, human development indicators have shown little improvement and evidence in Chapter 10 will detail how some countries are now experiencing economic decline (see Box 10.1). Mali, in the Sahel region of West Africa, is one of Africa’s poorest countries, ranked 184 out of 189 countries according to the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2020). The country is more than five times the size of the United Kingdom, but much of the northern half of the country is desert or semi-desert. Low levels of healthcare and provision of water and sanitation are reflected in a life expectancy at birth of only 60 years in Mali compared with 81 years in UK. Mali is further disadvantaged in being one of Africa’s 14 landlocked states and is located in a region where rainfall unreliability and drought are recurrent problems. But there is much diversity across the continent, and within mainland Africa, oil-rich Gabon had the highest per capita GDP in Africa in 2021 of US$18,647 (see Table 1.1). But such national statistics conceal major variations within individual countries in terms of both spatial and social inequality. Table 1.1 provides key demographic and economic data about Africa’s countries. In reflecting on the statistics contained in the table, several observations can be made: 1

The North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt generally have better human development indicators than those countries south of the Sahara – collectively known as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

6 • Introduction

2 3 4 5

Some of the island states, notably Mauritius and Seychelles, have high levels of human development. Some of the land-locked countries in the Sahel zone to the south of the Sahara Desert have particularly low levels of human development, notably Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger. In countries where there has been prolonged instability or conflict, levels of human development have suffered, for example, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia. Whilst Equatorial Guinea has a high level of economic wealth, as reflected in GDP per capita, human development indicators are generally poor, suggesting a case of ‘growth without development’.

Table 1.1 Africa: Key statistics Country

Total Population GDP per Population Annual capita 2021 Growth % Purchasing 2015– power 2020 parity 2021

Life expectancy at birth (years) 2021

Under 5 mortality (per 1000 births) % 2019

HIV/AIDS prevalence (% adults age 15–49) 2021

Population living off less than $1.90 a day % 2008–2018

Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Congo Rep. Congo Dem Rep. Djibouti Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Eswatini (Swaziland) Ethiopia Gabon Gambia, The Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya

44.6 33.9 12.5 2.4 21.5 12.3 27.2 0.6 4.9 16.9 0.9 5.7 92.4 1.0 104.3 1.4 3.6 1.2 117.9 2.3 2.5 31.7 2.0 13.5 27.1 55.0 2.2 5.2 7.0

78 62 63 70 62 62 60 73 54 54 65 65 62 68 73 60 67 61 67 67 63 64 60 62 59 68 56 65 73

23.3 74.7 90.3 41.6 87.5 56.5 74.8 14.9 110 113 63 48 85 58 20 82 41 49 51 43 52 46 79 99 79 43 86 85 12

0.1 1.8 1.0 22.2 0.8 1.2 3.2 0.1 3.6 1.2 0.1 3.1 0.7 1.3 0.1 7.0 0.6 27.1 1.1 3.6 2.0 1.7 3.4 1.4 2.7 4.8 23.1 1.5 0.1

0.5 47.6 49.5 16.1 43.7 71.8 23.8 – 66.3 38.4 17.6 37.0 76.6 – 3.2 – – 28.4 30.8 3.4 10.1 13.3 67.1 35.3 28.2 36.8 26.9 40.9 –

2.0 3.3 2.7 2.1 2.9 3.1 2.6 1.2 1.4 3.0 2.2 2.6 3.2 1.6 2.0 3.7 1.2 1.0 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 0.8 2.5 1.4

11,829 6,878 2,552 18,113 2,207 727 3,745 7,728 823 2,428 2,799 1,972 843 3,788 14,023 21,442 320 9,186 2,772 18,647 2,278 8,343 1,951 2,390 5,360 5,274 3,868 1,413 4,746

Introduction • 7

Table 1.1 Continued Country

Total Population GDP per Population Annual capita 2021 Growth % Purchasing 2015– power 2020 parity 2021

Madagascar 28.4 Malawi 19.6 Mali 20.9 Mauritania 4.8 Mauritius 1.3 Morocco 37.3 Mozambique 32.2 Namibia 2.6 Niger 25.1 Nigeria 211.4 Rwanda 13.3 Sao Tome & Principe 0.2 Senegal 17.2 Seychelles 0.1 Sierra Leone 8.1 Somalia 16.4 South Africa 60 South Sudan 11.4 Sudan 44.9 Tanzania 61.5 Togo 8.5 Tunisia 11.9 Uganda 47.1 Zambia 18.9 Zimbabwe 15.1

2.7 2.7 3.0 2.8 0.2 1.3 2.9 1.9 3.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.8 0.7 2.1 2.8 1.4 0.9 2.4 3.0 2.5 1.1 3.6 2.9 1.5

1,697 1,234 2,271 4,563 25,029 9,339 1,331 9,542 1,213 5,280 2,641 3,220 3,675 30,486 1,608 888 14,239 1,420 4,232 3,574 1,821 13,417 2,566 4,148 2,621

Life expectancy at birth (years) 2021

Under 5 mortality (per 1000 births) % 2019

HIV/AIDS prevalence (% adults age 15–49) 2021

Population living off less than $1.90 a day % 2008–2018

68 65 60 66 75 77 62 64 63 55 69 70 68 74 56 58 65 58 66 66 62 77 64 65 62

51 42 94 73 16 21 74 42 80 117 34 30 45 14 109 117 35 96 58 50 67 17 46 62 55

0.2 9.5 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 12.1 12.7 0.4 1.3 2.9 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.4 17.3 2.4 0.2 5.1 2.3 0.1 6.1 12.1 13.4

77.6 70.3 49.7 6.0 – 1.0 62.9 13.4 44.5 53.5 55.5 34.5 38.0 1.1 40.1 – 18.9 42.7 12.7 49.1 49.8 0.2 41.7 57.5 33.9

Sources: UNFPA, 2021; UNDP, 2020; World Bank, 2022a.

In the post-independence period, African countries suffered greatly in the 1970s with the knock-on effects of the oil price rise in 1974–1975 and the subsequent world recession and associated debt crisis. From 2007, African countries felt the effects of soaring oil prices, high food prices and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. More recently, the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had a significant economic impact, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where recovery from their earlier civil wars was stalled. From early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the majority of African countries, particularly when only a small proportion of their populations have had access to vaccinations. Mounting debt, illicit financial flows and frequent shortages of basic commodities due to a lack of foreign exchange are commonplace in many African countries. Nonoil producers experience regular oil and petrol shortages, preventing the movement of goods and people and further compounding already serious economic problems. In some cities, power outages are a regular occurrence, caused by fuel shortages or inadequate

8 • Introduction

maintenance of ageing generating plants and power infrastructure. The effects of prolonged power outages on industry can be devastating. In Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, and one of the world’s largest exporters of crude petroleum, the supply of refined petroleum from the five ailing refineries has been a longstanding problem such that even in Africa’s major oil producer there have been frequent petrol shortages. It is in the rural areas, however, where most of Africa’s population still live and work (see Chapter 8). Some would argue that the towns and cities have already received too much of the available wealth and investment, and that there is now a need for a genuine and concerted effort to raise rural living standards and make agriculture more attractive and profitable. In most African countries, over 50 per cent of the labour force still works in agriculture, mainly producing traditional food crops and using methods which have frequently been handed down from generation to generation with little change. Some countries have a very high proportion of their labour force engaged in farming, such as Burundi, Niger, Chad and the Central African Republic, where in all cases over 70 per cent of the labour force is employed in farming and pastoralism. Although the proportion of the population working in agriculture is declining slowly, it is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future and contrasts sharply with a figure of around 1 per cent of the UK labour force employed in agriculture in 2021. For those rural young people with some education, agriculture is often perceived as being much less attractive than the prospects of urban employment. African governments need to somehow restore faith in agriculture by helping farmers to raise production and ensuring they receive good prices for their crops. Greater food production in Africa should help the national and local food security situation, as well as reducing the need for food imports which, together with possible food exports, would significantly improve the foreign exchange position. But such policies are inextricably linked with world trade in food commodities, such that local producer food subsidies in North America and the European Union mitigate against food that might be imported from African countries. As farming systems become more efficient, they may gradually shed surplus labour to the growing industrial and service sectors, which are usually located within, or close to, the towns and cities. Improving Africa’s agriculture will take time and must be done sensitively. Above all, there is a need to take account of the many past failures, and for governments and agricultural advisers to work closely with farmers and acknowledge the value of their indigenous knowledge, rather than merely instructing them which crops they must grow and which techniques they should use. Africa’s political leaders are fond of talking about the importance of agriculture, but very often little is actually done, a key concern being to keep food prices low in the towns so that the better organized, and politically more threatening, urban population stays contented. A further priority for the future will be to improve the transport systems of African countries, which in many cases were laid down in the colonial period. Roads with crumbling surfaces and potholes in the rainy season, and railways with worn out track and rolling stock, are all too common. If agriculture is to become more productive and the benefits of this more widely distributed, then an efficient marketing and transport system is absolutely vital. Much investment is needed, yet many African governments cannot afford the financial outlay. In the last decade China has played a key role in building new railways and roads in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Africa’s future is both exciting and uncertain. There is great potential, but the means, predominantly financial, of achieving this potential are often lacking. Many African countries are now, in relative terms, probably worse off than they were at independence more than 60 years ago. World recession, indebtedness and shortage of foreign exchange,

Introduction • 9

coupled with limited achievements in agricultural development, poor health and welfare, rapid population growth and crumbling infrastructures, have all contributed to the poverty in many African countries. Furthermore, economic instability has often bred political instability and vice versa. One-party states, military regimes and coups d’ états have been common features in Africa since independence, making potential foreign investors cautious about investing in unpredictable locations (see Chapter 3). One of the early post-independence capitalist ‘success stories’ was Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) in West Africa, which benefited from a relatively long period of political stability during the 1960s and 1970s under President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, but then the economic situation steadily deteriorated from the 1980s. Following Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, the country experienced continuous political instability leading to coups d’états in 1999 and 2001, and in April 2011 the eventual ousting of incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and installation of the democratically elected president, Alassane Ouattara. Other African countries, such as Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, have suffered long periods of political instability and even internal wars. In early 2011, the North African countries of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya experienced pro-democracy uprisings leading to the overthrow of longstanding authoritarian leaders Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia, 1987–2011) and Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). Meanwhile, neighbouring Libya was involved in civil war from April 2011 as Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libyan leader for 42 years, attempted to hold on to power, but he was killed in October 2011 by rebel fighters of the National Transitional Council. Economic stability and progress are more likely to be fostered if African countries could work towards settling their internal differences peacefully and generate an atmosphere of greater political stability. Hopefully, this will happen in the future so that significant advances in economic and social development might be possible. Looking ahead to the next 50 years in Africa, one must ask how can wealth redistribution and reduction of inequalities be achieved, and how can any progress be monitored effectively? Reducing inequalities was the main theme of the 2019 Human Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme, titled Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century (UNDP, 2019a). The Report opens with the words: In every country many people have little prospect for a better future. Lacking hope, purpose or dignity, they watch from society’s sidelines as they see others pull ahead to ever greater prosperity. Worldwide many have escaped extreme poverty, but even more have neither the opportunities nor the resources to control their lives. Far too often gender, ethnicity or parents’ wealth still determines a person’s place in society. (UNDP, 2019a: 1) Posing the question, ‘So, are African countries characterized by low or high inequality?’, the Human Development Report suggests that, ‘The question, as simple as it may be, is difficult to answer due to the dissimilarity of data sources’ (UNDP, 2019a: 116). But the Report concludes that there are very significant regional differences across the continent and southern Africa is probably the most unequal region, with, for example, 65 per cent of South Africa’s, and 64 per cent of Namibia’s income being received by the top 10 per cent of the population. North Africa is the region with the lowest income inequality, with the top 10 per cent of earners in Algeria, the least unequal country, receiving 37 per cent of national income (UNDP, 2019a: 116). Philip Nel has done some interesting research on perceptions of inequality among Africans and emphasizes the role of religious belief

10 • Introduction

and devotedness in shaping great tolerance to income and wealth inequality in some countries. Interestingly, he concludes that, ‘This tolerance reduces pressure on African decision makers to implement the type of redistributive measures required to mitigate unequal income levels and access to resources (such as land)’ (Nel, 2021: 358). In most African countries it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on poverty, inequality and unemployment. Furthermore, it would be necessary to define each of these terms carefully in relation to the situation being examined and the differing relative costs incurred in each country. For example, poverty in the UK and other West European countries is often very different in character and magnitude from poverty in places such as Burkina Faso or Zambia. Whilst in Western Europe reference would probably be made to minimum wage levels and receipt of state benefits, in many African countries similar social security measures do not exist. In an African context, some reference to nutritional and health status and access to education, as well as income, would perhaps be more meaningful (UNDP, 2019a). Measuring inequality and unemployment in most African countries is difficult without reliable census and other socio-economic data. Registers of unemployed people are usually only kept, if at all, in African cities, but even there they are unlikely to reflect the situation accurately. Employment is also more seasonal in rural areas, being related to cycles of cultivation, with the heaviest work often coming during the rainy season. The dry season may be a period of relative unemployment, or rather underemployment, when other jobs such as house building or craft work are undertaken in rural villages. Alternatively, for those persons living close to large towns, there may be an opportunity to take up seasonal paid work in the town, perhaps as a carpenter, mechanic, or in some other trade. Such off-farm dry season work can make a significant contribution to household income, as in the region around the city of Kano in northern Nigeria. Dudley Seers (1979) suggests that once the magnitude of poverty, unemployment and inequality is recognized, governments and development agencies should then introduce programmes to fulfil basic human needs and reduce these three key indicators of development. The poorest groups should be the main focus of development planning, with particular attention directed towards provision of adequate food, water, sanitation, shelter, healthcare, education and employment – the basic needs of all human beings. While achieving such progress is admirable, realistically it is likely that such strategies might be ‘more easily said than done’. However, in the last 20 years, there has been a progressive move towards smaller-scale, community-based projects which are more focused on satisfying the basic needs of the poorest households (Chapter 2). Whereas earlier projects and programmes for promoting economic growth have often targeted wealth generation, there is a notable trend that suggests that development interventions in Africa (particularly among NGOs) are becoming increasingly ‘pro-poor’. This was illustrated by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) introduced by Nelson Mandela in South Africa after the country’s first democratic elections in 1994 (see Box 1.1). South Africa is one of the world’s most unequal societies, largely due to the legacies of racially discriminatory apartheid era policies. Mandela’s election was undoubtedly a landmark in Africa’s political history and emphasized the importance of democracy across the continent. He was highly respected internationally and his charismatic presence did much to raise Africa’s profile on the global stage. In fulfilling basic needs, it is argued that people will be able to perform more efficiently and live longer, more fruitful lives, which in turn will raise their economic output in the long-term. Thus, fulfilling basic needs will eventually lead to economic growth as well as development. In later chapters of this book, more detailed reference will be made to specific examples of development schemes and programmes and their impact on reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment.

Introduction • 11

Box 1.1 South Africa: Reducing inequality in the ‘Rainbow Nation’ The ‘New South Africa’, or the ‘Rainbow Nation’, as it was proudly proclaimed in the early 1990s prior to the first democratic elections in April 1994, faces an enormous, some would say, insurmountable, task of ‘reconstruction and development’, in an effort to raise living standards among so-called ‘historically disadvantaged’ households and communities who constitute a large proportion of the national population. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), launched as an African National Congress (ANC) policy document before the elections, and then formalized in September 1994 as the government’s ‘White Paper on Reconstruction and Development’, aimed to address the extreme social and spatial inequalities engendered by many years of apartheid policies. As the policy document states, ‘Every aspect of South African life is deeply marked by minority domination and privilege’ (ANC, 1994: 119). South Africa is characterized by levels of social and spatial inequality which place it among the ten most unequal countries in the world according to income distribution (UNDP, 2007). In fact, in 2021, almost 30 years after the end of apartheid, South Africa was ranked as having the highest wealth inequality of any country in the world (WPR, 2021). Before the end of apartheid, South Africa’s White population in 1993 had a Human Development Index of 0.901, not unlike many Western European countries. However, the HDI for the Indian (Asian) population was 0.836, for Coloureds (i.e., people of mixed race) 0.663 and for the majority Black population only 0.5, the latter being comparable at the time with countries such as Papua New Guinea and Cameroon (Lester et al., 2000). Stark spatial inequalities are also apparent within South Africa, such that, sophisticated urban centres with their established business corporations in high rise buildings, which are indistinguishable from those in the Western world, can be viewed from the same spot as the crime-ridden squatter camps, typical of those in South American cities. (Lester, Nel and Binns, 2000: 235) On a broader regional basis, those provinces which have incorporated the former ‘Black homelands’ (i.e., the largely rural, Black racial reserves), are generally much poorer than others. Eastern Cape province, for example, which in 1994 incorporated the homelands of Transkei and Ciskei, had the highest ‘official’ unemployment rate, the highest infant mortality rate and the second lowest life expectancy in South Africa in 1996 (Binns, 1998; DBSA, 2000; Statistics South Africa, 1999). The Reconstruction and Development Programme, which was designed to tackle such inequality and poverty, identified the need for ‘an integrated and sustainable programme’, which was motivated by the recognition that, The legacy of apartheid cannot be overcome with piecemeal and uncoordinated policies. The RDP brings together strategies to harness all our resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be sustained into the future. These strategies will be implemented at national, provincial and local

12 • Introduction

levels by government, parastatals and organisations within civil society working in the framework of the RDP. (ANC, 1994: 4–5) The RDP was promoted essentially as a ‘people-driven process’, focusing ‘on our people’s most immediate needs, and (relying), in turn, on their energies to drive the process of meeting these needs’ (ANC, 1994: 5). The RDP also placed much emphasis on grassroots empowerment, suggesting that, ‘development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing empowerment’ (ANC, 1994: 5). The ANC government believed these objectives could be achieved by giving much more responsibility for development to local government, which is viewed as the primary level of democratic representation, through what is referred to as ‘developmental local government’, a term which seems to be peculiar to South Africa (Nel and Binns, 2003a). As the RDP stressed, ‘The democratic government will reduce the burden of implementation which falls upon its shoulders through the appropriate allocation of powers and responsibilities to lower levels of government, and through the active involvement of organisations of civil society’ (ANC, 1994: 140). Whilst these are understandable and admirable objectives, they have placed a considerable burden of responsibility on the local tier of government, a situation aggravated by the very real human and financial capacity constraints experienced by many of the smaller local authorities (Nel, 2001). For example, many non-White councillors, often elected for the first time, under apartheid were frequently deprived of a proper education, and many small towns were unable to raise an adequate income through limited rates and local taxation to support local development initiatives. In order to achieve ‘developmental local government’, local authorities were expected to maximize both social development and economic growth and to help ensure that local economic and social conditions are conducive for the creation of employment opportunities (Nel and Binns, 2001). In addition, local government was required to take a leadership role, involving citizens and stakeholder groups in the development process, to build social capital and to generate a sense of common purpose in finding local solutions for sustainability. The wide-ranging National Constitution of South Africa further reinforces the place of local government in society, requiring it to, ‘encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in matters of local government’ (RSA, 1996: 81). Local municipalities thus have a crucial role to play as policy-makers, and as institutions of local democracy, and they are urged to become more strategic, visionary and ultimately influential in the way they operate. However, some three decades after the end of apartheid, it is only really in the largest cities, with their greater financial and human capacity, that significant progress, in terms of infrastructure provision and economic support, has been achieved. With a national unemployment rate in 2019 of 27.32 per cent and local unemployment rates approaching 80 per cent in some areas, together with an adult HIV/ AIDS infection rate of 20.4 per cent (one of the highest in the world), South Africa still has a long way to go in improving the quality of life of its people and eradicating the legacies of apartheid (Statista, 2020).

Introduction • 13

1.3 Structure of the book While it is impossible to reflect the entirety of the diverse experience of all of Africa’s 54 countries in a single book, through a series of thematic chapters, we try and capture the essence of the broad trends and processes which have shaped, and which are shaping, the continent. While most chapters discuss trends and processes in general terms, we refer to numerous examples in the text to illustrate the arguments which we make. In addition, in every chapter there are text ‘Boxes’ which provide detailed, country-based insight into particular topics and which also provide rich empirical detail, while also allowing the reader the chance to gain a sense of the complex issues which play out on the ground. The text is also liberally illustrated with photographs, graphs, tables and maps. At the end of each chapter is a summary, details of possible class questions, a list of useful additional reading and websites. The second chapter of the book is anchored on the theme of development, and explores the internal and external interventions and policies which have been pursued in the postindependence period to promote improved well-being and economic prosperity in Africa. The varying degrees of success achieved, and the role played by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) features prominently in this chapter. Chapter 3 provides a broad-brush overview of Africa’s history and governance, paying particularly attention to pre-colonial empires and cultures, the impact of colonialism and the post-colonial experience. Sadly, Africa has, both in the distant and recent past, experienced high levels of conflict which have had a profound influence on the continent and its peoples. Building on the historical chapter, Chapter 4 examines both past and on-going conflict and the challenges which post-conflict reconstruction and development poses for Africa’s leaders and their citizens. Chapter 5 focuses on social issues and covers a wide range of themes relevant to the continent’s peoples ranging from culture and religion to demographic and educational challenges and opportunities. A critical factor in Africa’s development is that of healthcare, given the high incidence of disease and ill health which the continent experiences. Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the health challenges which Africa faces, including a range of environmental health issues, communicable diseases, and the societal and medical responses to these. Africa’s environment is the focus of the seventh chapter, which explores Africa’s rich and diverse natural environment, the processes occurring within it and key challenges such as drought and desertification. Attention is also paid to the risks and realities posed by climate change. The majority of Africa’s people live in rural areas which are subject to significant challenges climatically, demographically, in terms of economic opportunities and land management and access. These issues are examined in the eighth chapter. In Chapter 9 the focus shifts to examine urban areas where some of the most significant development challenges in Africa are playing themselves out. These include the rapidity of urban growth and associated shortfalls in the provision of adequate shelter, services and employment. The chapter examines both the challenges and the interventions which are being undertaken. Chapter 10 considers the economy of Africa, which is explored through both continental and national economic data. Key foci are on growth, inequality, the make-up of different Africa’s economies and the factors likely to shape future economic growth. Chapter 11, the conclusion, summarizes the key findings and discussion presented in the book, and attempts to identify the factors which are likely to shape Africa’s development in the future, and reflects on how Africa is perceived by and engages with the rest of the world.

2

Developing Africa

We can say without fear of equivocation that in the Third World, over the last fifty years, no single ideal has been as obsessive, in the thinking of African governments, as the goal of development.… [N]o government dares leave the issue of development out of its political language and rhetoric. (Ukaga and Afoaku, 2005: 8)

2.1 Introduction A determining feature of the post-Second World War world has been the quest to attain ‘development’, however it is defined, globally, continentally, regionally, nationally and locally. This quest has particular resonance with the policies and practises pursued by international agencies, national governments, NGOs and CBOs in the Global South and in Africa in particular. Such interventions have variously sought to promote economic growth, provide basic needs, address food security and service provision challenges, improve the human condition and, in recent years, to promote sustainable development. The attainment of these objectives has been only partially successful, accounting for the continued experimentation with a wide range of approaches over the last 70 years and the questioning of Eurocentric notions of what constitutes development. In this regard, decolonial thinking now challenges us to recognize the failings of external, often Eurocentric approaches, and to give precedence to indigenous knowledge, practice and epistemologies, while also challenging understandings of the state, power, knowledge and politics (Ukwandu, 2017; Estrada-Villalta and Adams, 2018; Radcliffe and Radhuber, 2020). In recent years the pursuit of sustainable development and the Sustainable Development Goals (see below) has meant that ‘development’ has become more global in its orientation and focus, leading to the use of the term ‘global development’ which needs to be pursued by all nations and societies (Horner, 2020). As Horner and Hulme (2017) argue, while development needs and disparities within all countries need to be addressed, the Global South needs to remain a key focus in development efforts. Within this context promoting development in Africa is one of the most pressing challenges, as Akanle and Adesina argue: Africa’s development is one of the most critical and important issues on the global agenda … over half a century after most African nations became independent, large parts of the continent remain underdeveloped despite the fact that Africa was originally promised to grow faster than Asia. (2018: 1) In light of Africa’s all too apparent socio-economic backlogs and persistent poverty, relative to other continents, strategies and policies designed to promote ‘development’ have DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403-2

Developing Africa • 15

been hallmarks of the last few decades (Seck and Busari, 2009). It is apparent that while Africa has been performing relatively better economically in the first years of the 21st century than it did in the 20th, such growth is occurring from a very low base and only limited success has been achieved in raising overall welfare levels. In addition, there are very real concerns that the Sustainable Development Goals, like the Millennium Development Goals before them, are unlikely to be achieved within the time frames which have been set in the continent. At the time of writing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was playing out globally, with very real impacts on Africa and its development prospects, leading to clear welfare and employment challenges and the weakening of supply chains and development prospects. As will be outlined below, ‘development’ is a value-laden term that has proven difficult to define categorically (Power, 2003; Moss, 2007). Despite this, efforts by international agencies, governments, non-governmental organizations and community groups, and to some degree the private sector, have variously sought to advance national, regional and local economic growth, support industrialization, address poverty, ensure self-sufficiency and raise overall living conditions. The nature of such interventions cannot be divorced from both prevailing international conceptions of what constitutes development, external global-political agendas and internal political and social realities. Some of the most striking features of what has come to be referred to as the ‘development experiment’ are, first, the degree to which development theory and practice have evolved from a narrow focus on Western concepts of modernization through to more situationally specific endeavours at self-reliance (Potter et al., 2018). Allied with this are internally initiated endeavours at local, community and regional development levels, in the quest to attain African solutions and self-reliant development. Third, and associated with the experimentation with different approaches, have been the rather limited results that have been achieved at the aggregate level through applied interventions. This is both a cause for concern but also serves as a motivation to identify more appropriate interventions. After providing a brief overview of what development is understood to be, and why it has been regarded as important to pursue, this chapter presents a historical overview of evolving development theory and practice, with specific reference to Africa. The last section of the chapter examines a range of core issues that are impacting on Africa’s current development prospects, including poverty relief interventions, local and regional development initiatives, the Millennium and the more recent Sustainable Development Goals, the interrelated issues of trade, aid and debt, and the current nature of Africa’s economic performance. It should be noted from the outset that no single approach to development has or does exist in isolation, but rather an evolving blend of understanding and approaches has co-evolved and are co-practised simultaneously. It should also be pointed out that, while some of the material examined below is of a theoretical nature and aims to explain development realities, other approaches are more of an applied nature. Finally, development is an on-going process and this chapter does not seek to provide a definitive overview of what has been achieved or what worked or failed, but rather it overviews how development has evolved in terms of its understanding and application in Africa.

2.2 Defning ‘development’ The concept of ‘development’ is an elusive one to define, especially as its meaning has evolved over time (Moss, 2007). Aside from the obvious use of the term in education and psychology, from an economic and human well-being perspective it has been in common currency for some 150 years. Development was traditionally associated with

16 • Developing Africa

belief in the value of industrialization, the achievement of higher economic returns, and frequently with faith in the assumed benefits of ‘modernization’, whereby colonies and later independent states were encouraged to emulate the economic trajectories followed by Western states (Pieterse, 2001). However, limited success in attaining widespread improvements in the human condition through such purely Eurocentric and economic-based conceptions of development led to a questioning of what was meant by the term and how to achieve it. In the 1970s, Dudley Seers pointed out that in order to achieve development, issues of unemployment, inequality and poverty needed to be addressed, over and above previous efforts to raise economic growth, which had clearly not led to fairer wealth distribution (in Potter et al., 2018). In practice, this led to a greater focus on addressing the ‘basic needs’ of people from the 1970s, in contrast to simple efforts to achieve economic growth. By the 1980s, themes of social progress and human welfare started to filter into discussions about development, leading to the later construction of the internationally applicable Human Development Index, which provides an aggregate measure for comparing the development status of all countries in the world based on life expectancy (a surrogate for health and well-being), education and income (Willis, 2020). In the late 1990s, Amartya Sen extended the understanding of development through his ‘development as freedom’ thesis, which views dimensions of political and social freedom as being critical to the effective attainment of true improvements in well-being (Sen, 1999). Over and above these conventional understandings of what development is, more critical authors have questioned the Eurocentric bias of definitions of the term. From the 1970s, neo-Marxist scholars argued that development often leads to a situation of ‘dependency’ on Western powers. In recent years, there have been appeals to try to identify ‘alternative’ forms of development that are not locked into Western conceptualizations, but are rather grounded in human-centred and locally relevant strategies (Hettne, 1995). Valuable work by Robert Chambers and Walter Stöhr, arguing for development to be seen as rooted in local action, has led to greater emphasis on the ‘development from below’ thesis (Willis, 2020). More recently, anti- and post-development theorists, such as Escobar, have questioned the whole basis of development and sought locally based alternatives, grounded in local practices, as opposed to what they regard as Western impositions (Schuurman, 1993; Power, 2003). We should also bear in mind that Africa has not accepted Western interventions unquestioningly. Indeed, the continent has a rich history of defining and seeking development on African terms and based on traditional values of social support. Efforts to promote African socialism and pan-Africanism, and regional self-reliance through the Lagos Plan of Action are cases in point (Ukaga and Afoaku, 2005; Moss, 2007). Post-colonial writing has challenged the fundamental bases of Eurocentric thinking and global political and economic control, and within this context there have been calls for development to be aligned with indigenous epistemologies (Ukwandu, 2017). At a broader level, definitions of development have been overlaid in recent years with the need to promote not just development in the Global South, but to address global development challenges – particularly in terms of global socio-economic development and sustainability. These moves are associated with rearticulations of the concept of development around terms such as ‘global development’, ‘sustainable development’, and the ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (Potter et al., 2018; Horner and Hulme, 2019). Hence, the term ‘development’ is an ideologically and politically laden concept, as indeed are the different strategies identified to ‘achieve’ development in practice. Clearly, development involves change and ‘improvement’ in economic and social conditions, which cannot be divorced from local political conditions, the need for changes in human welfare and associated freedoms to fulfil human aspirations. Within this conceptualization,

Developing Africa • 17

however, care needs to be taken not to ‘impose’ external preconceptions on other societies; rather, local values and objectives must be respected. As Moss argues, there is no agreement on what exactly ‘development’ means. … At its broadest, the development question asked here is, ‘how can the standards of living be improved in Africa?’ At the same time, it must be recognised that these questions are not merely technical. Development is ultimately not about bricks and budget systems, but about social change. (2007: 2–3)

2.3 Africa’s need for development As was discussed in Chapter 1, Africa lags behind most other parts of the world in a range of key social and economic indicators, which both calls for and justifies either locally initiated and/or external support to try to reduce poverty, raise incomes and improve overall levels of well-being. Table 2.1 indicates how Africa performs in socio-economic terms, relative to global averages. From the outset, it should be pointed out that averaged figures for the whole continent of Africa mask the relative successes achieved in such countries as Botswana, Mauritius and Tunisia, and the far poorer performances of such countries as Niger and Malawi. As Table 2.1 indicates, Africa is lagging behind the rest of the world in a range of key indicators that include not only economic scores, but also measures of human welfare such as nutrition and healthcare. This has prompted national and international concern and involvement since the 1950s by bodies such as the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and the aid programmes of Western nations. It is estimated that a total of US$568 billion (in today’s terms) was spent in the ‘development’ of Africa between the 1950s and the early years of the current century, yet sadly the continent still lags significantly behind other world regions, and minimal economic growth has occurred in many parts of Africa in recent decades (Easterly, 2007). As Moss (2007: 87) argues, if one examines the last 50 years of development progress, it is apparent that ‘economic growth was barely able to keep up with population growth, and in nearly half of the continent, the average person was actually poorer in 2000 than they were in 1970’. Various reasons can be put forward to explain the poor development success of Africa and what Barrett et al. (2008: 1) refer to as ‘persistent poverty’. While some of this is

Table 2.1 Key development indicators Key indicator

Global average

Africa’s average

Infant mortality rate (per 1000) Life expectancy (years) Percentage population living on under $1.90 per day in 2017 Gross National Income per person parity in US$ in 2018 Human Development Index in 2018 Calories per person per day in 2017 Gender Inequality Index in 2018

31 73 – 15,745 0.731 2859 0.439

49 64 44.7 3,443 0.541 2506 0.573

Sources: FAO, 2020; PRB (Population Reference Bureau), 2020; UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2019a.

18 • Developing Africa

certainly due to local mismanagement and an often weak local economic and environmental base, one cannot ignore the negative implications of colonialism and neo-colonialism and the reality that Africa has struggled to compete on an unequal playing field in a hostile global trading environment. The static prices of commodities and the persistence of agricultural subsidies in the North discriminate against producers in the South. This takes place despite the rhetoric of free trade, emphasizing the reality that the global economic system is dominated by the North. On top of this, much of the foreign aid from, and development policy espoused by, foreign powers has often been politically motivated. The aim has been either to advance national interests or, especially during the Cold War, to try to buy the support of often dictatorial regimes. Rather more critically in this regard, Patrick Bond (2007), in his evocatively titled book Looting Africa, argues that Africa’s key problems are exploitative debt, financial dominance by the North, misdirected aid, unfair trade, distorted investment, capital flight, a ‘brain drain’ to the North and the negative role played by ruling elites. Concerns over the validity of the historic interventions and guidance offered by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and often the negative role played by multinational corporations in terms of payment of low wages, asset stripping and the repatriation of profits, also need to be factored into these debates (Boaduo, 2008). According to Paul Collier (2007: 180), several ‘development traps’ hinder the current and future development of the poorest countries in the world, especially those in Africa: ● ● ● ●

The Conflict Trap, including civil wars and coups, which collectively conspire to ensure the persistence of economic stagnation and the dependence on the production of primary products. The Natural Resource Trap – associated with the ‘resource curse’ – is when there is an over-reliance on a narrow range of export commodities to the detriment of the development of the rest of the economy. Being landlocked with poor neighbours. Bad governance and associated ills of poor state guidance and planning which characterize many ‘failing states’.

A range of additional considerations can be added to this list, including: polarization within societies, political tensions, the reality that many countries are resource poor and often lack adequate land to ensure food security, face climate extremes and shocks (both economic and environmental), the prevalence of disease (especially malaria and HIV/ AIDS and COVID-19 since 2020), high levels of population growth and low levels of human and social capital development, weak government and financial institutions, corruption, political instability, low savings rates and low levels of productivity growth (Mistry, 2005; Ndulu et al., 2007). To this list must be added weak levels of democracy, and the ‘weak state’, hyper-inflation, the debt crisis and externally imposed structural adjustment that saw the weakening of currencies, and the loss of economic independence, with associated implications for development in almost all African countries (Moss, 2007). More recently, concerns have also been raised about the increasing ‘digital divide’ related to impeded progress in information and communication technology development, which is increasing the gap between Africa and the rest of the world in terms of knowledge and information sharing (Mutula, 2008). Finally, the issue of climate change impacts cannot be ignored, since Africa, and southern Africa in particular, seems to be facing the most severe risk of declining food production (Addison and Tarp, 2010). In concluding this section, it is perhaps appropriate to reflect on the reality that the challenge of achieving development is not purely located within the African context. At a

Developing Africa • 19

broader level, as Easterly (2007: 329) notes, the keys to ‘growth’ seem harder than ever to identify and, ‘in the new millennium, a remarkably broad group of academics and policymakers seem to agree that, after all, maybe we don’t know how to achieve development, although they are reluctant to say so, exactly’.

2.4 Development theory and practice over time: refections from post-1945 Africa Rather soberingly, Colin Leys (2005: 109) refers to ‘the rise and fall of development theory’ in his reflection of the history of development theory and practice. However, it would be incorrect to argue that all endeavours in the ‘development experiment’ have failed. Rather, we need to identify which elements in each of the successive development theories and practices have enjoyed some degree of success in order to maximize future development prospects. A wide range of development theories and associated strategies have been tried, as is evident in Table 2.2. It should be noted that the various development theories and practices detailed in the table are not mutually exclusive, nor do they necessarily replace each other in direct sequence. Rather, Table 2.2 indicates when they emerged and the era in which they were particularly in vogue. Further, these theories and practices can exist in

Table 2.2 Development theory and practice over time Time frame

Development theory

Applied practice

Examples

Late colonial

Classical economics

Western-style projectbased development

From the 1950s

Modernization/ diffusionist thinking

From the 1960s

Dependency theory

Stages of growth/ national development strategies Pursuit of self-reliance/ Afro-socialism

Tanganyika groundnut scheme, Gezira, irrigation scheme in Sudan Lake Volta in Ghana, Lake Kariba in central Africa

From the 1970s

Basic needs approach

From the 1980s (following the debt crisis) From the 1980s

Neo-liberalism/ monetarism

From the 1990s

From 2000

Human development/ alternative development Anti- and postdevelopment

Sustainable development

Pursuit of infrastructural and capacity-building interventions Pursuit of structural adjustment programmes/ lending Eco-development/ bottom-up development Search for alternatives, new conceptualization of development anchored in social movements, localism and decolonialization thinking MDGs / SDGs

Sources: Adapted from Barratt Brown, 1995; Pieterse, 2001; Potter et al., 2018.

Ujamaa in Tanzania, state socialism in Zambia and Ethiopia Continent-wide

Ghana and Kenya

Self-reliance strategies in Tanzania

Continent-wide

20 • Developing Africa

parallel in single countries (i.e. national growth strategies and basic needs support), while in other cases strategies have not been adopted by all countries (e.g. self-reliance).

2.4.1 Development in the late colonial era In the late colonial era, the European powers tended to treat their African colonies as adjuncts of their national states (see Chapter 3). The colonies served as sources of raw materials for European industry, suppliers of food, markets for European produce and, in times of war, sources of troops (Barratt Brown, 1995). The economies of the colonies were often transformed from pre-colonial self-sufficiency to mono-economies supplying a single product for European markets: for example, copper in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and groundnuts and cotton from Senegal and Mali. While it is difficult to generalize, according to Vance’s Mercantile Model (1970, cited in Potter et al., 2018), colonialism imposed urban and transport systems that were developed essentially as conduits to supply raw materials from the colony to the imperial power and to redistribute products from the West. The dominance of port cities in Africa (which often became the colonial capitals) and the development of transport routes, not necessarily to where the bulk of the population lived, but rather to the resource nodes – mines, areas of European farming and European towns – created skewed economies and, according to theorists such as Andre Frank and Paul Baran (cited in Willis, 2020), this led to ‘dependency’. According to this line of thinking, colonial economies lost their historical self-sufficiency, and their economies were rearticulated to ensure their absolute dependence on external control, markets and capital. ‘Development’ was more to the benefit of foreign powers than to the host countries, with investment tending to be focused on areas of exploitable resources and European settlement. In the late colonial era, development was conceptualized as focusing on the creation of the infrastructure to promote growth – ports, railways, etc. – and the associated investment in large mining and agricultural undertakings. The building of key ports, such as Mombasa, Beira and Accra, and the expansion of the east African and southern African rail networks, linked to core mining areas such as the Witwatersrand in South Africa and the Copperbelt in central Africa, are examples of these processes. In terms of agriculture, Africa was often viewed as a ‘giant farm’ that could supply industrial crops, such as cotton, and food products, such as groundnuts, to the European markets. Development then involved the expropriation of land to provide farmland for European farmers, such as tobacco farms in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and coffee and tea estates in Kenya and Mozambique. Alternatively, development initiatives involved the design of mega-schemes that were run essentially as corporate undertakings to supply single products, such as the cotton scheme at Gezira on the Nile in Sudan, the Office du Niger in the inland Niger Delta of Mali that was designed to produce cotton and rice, and the East African Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) (see Box 2.1; Best and de Blij, 1977; Willis, 2020; Potter et al., 2018). In most cases, these externally imposed schemes paid little regard to environmental and social issues, including poor soil quality, the risk of water-borne diseases, the aridity of many areas, social constraints on the employment of women in Muslim areas and traditional farming practices. While some of these mega-schemes failed (notably the one in Tanganyika), others (such as Gezira and the Office du Niger) continue to this day. However, even these projects are only shadows of what was originally anticipated (Deiemar, 2004). Since the start of the post-independence era (generally the 1950s and 1960s), this dependence on Europe has tended to persist through economic linkages established in the colonial era with the European powers (Willis, 2020).

Developing Africa • 21

Box 2.1 The East African Groundnut Scheme One of the most dramatic development interventions undertaken in the late colonial era in Africa is variously known as the ‘Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme’ or the ‘East African Groundnut Scheme’ (Wood, 1950, in SJSU, n.d.; Rizzo, 2006). This particular intervention had all the trappings of a fervent belief in modernization – the notion that vast schemes would transform developing regions and that, in this case, Britain could source some of its domestic food requirements from vast agricultural undertakings in its colonies. Unfortunately, for the designers of the scheme, the project suffered from a significant lack of adequate scientific research, and the rather naive belief that foreign ideas and technology could simply be imposed in a different physical and socio-economic context. Sadly, the scheme now stands not as a development success story, but rather as an ‘anti-model’ of what can go wrong when development interventions are inappropriate and inadequately planned. The genesis of the scheme lay in the fact that post-war Britain was suffering chronic food shortages and needed to find alternative sources of supply. In this instance, shortage of cooking oil prompted a plan to transform hundreds of thousands of acres of land in East Africa into a giant groundnut (peanut) plantation. Running in parallel with the necessity of meeting Britain’s needs was a genuine desire to bring about meaningful development in Africa and encourage the modernization of the region (Best and de Blij, 1977). Buoyed by recent successes in the war, British leaders believed in the power of scientific inventions and interventions, and in the ability of strong leadership to drive change. However, the scheme showed all the hallmarks of ill-conceived planning that was largely driven from London in a ‘top-down’ manner with little contact with on-the-ground realities and constraints. The planners had insufficient knowledge of the local climate and soils, misjudged the negative socio-economic impacts of the scheme, and underestimated the logistical challenges of trying to develop a vast scheme thousands of miles from Britain (Rizzo, 2006). The scheme had its origins in the thinking of Frank Samuel, who in 1946 headed the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of Unilever. Samuel came up with the plan of producing vegetable oil from a vast plantation in the British Protectorate of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and neighbouring protectorates (Wood, 1950, in SJSU, n.d.; Birchall, n.d.). The British Labour government welcomed the idea and sent a research team to Africa to investigate the potential of such a scheme. Led by John Wakefield, the Director of Agriculture in Tanganyika, the team reported favourably, arguing that the apparent barrenness and low productivity of the chosen area was due only to traditional local farming practices and that Western technology could rectify the problems. But the team’s soil and rainfall studies were inadequate and contributed to the eventual failure of the scheme, exacerbated by the failure to seek the knowledge of the local Wagogo people (Binns, 1994). As a result of the favourable report, the Minister of Food in Britain, John Strachey, authorized £25 million to be spent on the cultivation of the first 150,000 acres (607km2) of scrubland over six years. The full scheme envisaged the clearance of 2.4 million acres in Tanganyika, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) (Wood, 1950, in SJSU, n.d.). The goal was bold and ambitious – that ‘the south would be transformed into a

22 • Developing Africa

thriving agricultural–industrial region within a matter of years, and thousands of Africans would be brought into the modern sector of the economy’ (Best and de Blij, 1977: 425). The Overseas Food Corporation, headquartered in London, was established to oversee the project, while an ex-military man, Major General Desmond Harrison, was placed in charge of operations in Tanganyika (Birchall, n.d.). The site of the first phase of the scheme was Kongwa. This proved to be a major challenge in itself. There was a nearby railway to the closest port of Dar es Salaam, but the line had been irreparably damaged in floods, requiring all of the equipment for the scheme to be brought up a dirt track once it had been freed from some major congestion at the port (Birchall, n.d.). The first objective of the scheme was to clear thousands of acres of bush to provide land for the first plantings. However, the labourers had to contend with wild animals and frequent bee attacks, while the soil (a mixture of clay and sand) became hard and abrasive when dry (Rizzo, 2006), such that it ruined most of the first 16 tractors within months of their arrival; even bulldozer blades were blunted. In desperation, hybridized tractors based on old Sherman tanks were drafted in, and the bush was cleared by dragging anchor chains across the land. That still left the problem of what to do with tree roots. Moreover, there were issues in terms of food supply and accommodation for the vast staff of 1,000 Europeans and 60,000 Africans (Wood, 1950, in SJSU, n.d.). Other challenges included a flash flood in the first year, a shortage of equipment, delayed decision-making because everything had to be agreed by London, and the workers’ antipathy to Harrison’s military-style discipline (Birchall, n.d.). Unsurprisingly, labour unrest, machinery failure and mismanagement soon became serious problems (Best and de Blij, 1977). The first crop was disappointing, and the baking sun and lack of rain in the second year dashed hopes of a significantly improved harvest. Out of the original target of 150,000 acres, only some 40,000 were cleared in the first year. In the second year, only 2,000 tonnes of groundnuts were harvested from 1,000 tonnes of seeds planted (Wood, 1950, in SJSU, n.d.). An attempt was made to grow sunflowers in 1949, but drought destroyed the crop. In January 1951, the British government finally cancelled the project, which had cost some £49 million, had generated virtually nothing for Britain, and had left Kongwa as an unusable dust-bowl (Birchall, n.d.). In summary, the project suffered from: inadequate research, particularly the failure to undertake proper soil and rainfall surveys or to field-test equipment; its top-down and over-centralized nature; the unrealistic faith placed in Western technology; and the failure to consult with local people (Binns, 1994; Rizzo, 2006). Negative impacts on the area included the long-term discouragement of future investment and foodprice inflation as a result of the wages earned by some, which left many others hungry. Meanwhile, labour competition with sisal estates led to local labour shortages in that industry. In short, ‘the ill-fated East African Groundnut scheme illustrates the problems of attempting large-scale commercial agriculture in a tropical environment without adequate pilot testing and proper understanding of the region’s human and environmental potentials and limitations’ (Best and de Blij, 1977: 425).

2.4.2 The start of the development age: independence and development through modernization, from the 1950s The era of development is generally associated with the post-Second World War era of independence. United States President Truman’s famous inaugural speech in 1949, in which he declared that the ‘underdeveloped’ nations of the world needed to benefit from

Developing Africa • 23

the technological and scientific progress of the West, is often taken as the starting point of the ‘development era’ (Willis, 2020). Within this context, the American model of selfreliant development along market lines was held up as a blueprint, and development was conceived as simply being a process of ‘catching up’ with the West. In this era, development was seen as a process of ‘modernization’: that is, adopting the technology and values of the West and transforming society such that sustained growth could be achieved following ‘take-off’ to a phase of high growth. Growth was regarded as ‘diffusing’ from the West to the core areas within the former colonies, from where, in turn, it would diffuse to peripheral areas, and thereby raise overall levels of development. Economic definitions of development prevailed, and development was seen as being synonymous with the attainment of high levels of economic growth (Barratt Brown, 1995; Potter et al., 2018). Such approaches privileged Western knowledge and ignored indigenous potential and knowledge. Authors such as W.W. Rostow (1960) developed idealized models of how traditional societies could evolve through a phase of rapid growth, referred to as the ‘take-off’, before eventually reaching a level of high mass consumption (see Figure 2.1). In the same era, John Friedmann identified the ‘core–periphery’ framework, in which he argued that growth could ‘diffuse’ from a series of growth-points (i.e. the ‘core’ areas of developing countries) to their peripheries and thus raise overall levels of development (Barratt Brown, 1995; Potter et al., 2018). This thinking encouraged newly independent governments to plan large, multifaceted development schemes, such as Lake Volta in Ghana, which sought to link dam construction with the generation of electricity, the development of heavy industry, irrigated farming and fish farming (see Box 2.2; Best and de Blij, 1977).

5 Age of high mass consumption

Level of Development

4

3

Drive to maturity

Take-off

2 1

Preconditions for take-off

Traditional society

Time

Figure 2.1 Rostow’s ‘Stages of Economic Growth’ Source: redrawn from Binns, 1994.

24 • Developing Africa

Box 2.2 The Volta River Project The early independence era in Africa was characterized by the pursuit of large, show-piece mega-projects. Spurred on by belief in the potential offered by pursuit of ‘modernization’ planning, and encouraged by President Truman’s speech and commitment to address underdevelopment, many newly independent countries in Africa actively sought and implemented what were essentially large, ‘top-down’ development schemes designed to accelerate modernization. The outcomes of these endeavours were mixed, partly because of their failure to engage actively with those people most affected by the imposed changes or to fully appreciate the technological, environmental and applied challenges which they faced. One of the most impressive modernization schemes of the early independence era was the Volta River Project on the Volta River in Ghana (formerly the British colony of Gold Coast), which in 1957 was the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence (Best and de Blij, 1977). This scheme was promoted in the 1960s as a symbolic representation of the country’s new-found independence and economic potential (Ghana Web, n.d.). It undoubtedly brought many benefits to the country; however, as with so many other projects of this nature and size, it also had unintended, undesirable consequences. One of the key physical features of Ghana is the Volta River, which dominates the physical environment of the eastern half of the country (see Figure 2.2). Albert Kitson, a geologist, first proposed damming the river in 1915, but the sheer cost of the endeavour meant the idea was shelved for over 30 years. Then, in 1949, the Gold Coast’s colonial government commissioned a report on damming the Volta for power-generation purposes and independently started planning the new port of Tema at the mouth of the river, just to the east of Accra, the capital city (Ghana Web, n.d.; Fobil and Attuquayefio, 2003). However, with an estimated cost of some £230 million, the project was again delayed. Finally, after independence, it was decided that the dam could be economically justified on account of the need to generate power for the smelting of bauxite at Tema, sourced from mines at nearby Kpong. Following lengthy negotiations with the British and American governments and various aluminium-producing corporations, the newly independent government of Kwame Nkrumah secured loans from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the United States Agency for International Development and private British and American banks (Best and de Blij, 1977; Fobil and Attuquayefio, 2003). Construction of Akosombo Dam on the Volta River began in 1962, creating Lake Volta, one of the largest artificial lakes in the world, which covers some 8,500km2 and has a 5,500km shoreline (Gyau-Boakye, 2001; Fobil and Attuquayefio, 2003). In 1961, the Volta River Authority was set up to oversee the development of the project and to manage the operation. The scheme was initially designed around four key components. First, the dam and the associated hydro-electric power station, which was designed to generate 912 megawatts (some 98 per cent of total national supply); second, the 145,000-ton capacity aluminium smelter at Tema; third, an electricity supply network to most of Ghana and even to neighbouring Togo and Benin; and, fourth, the modern deep-water port at Tema and associated road and rail links. Secondary foci included water supply to Accra and Tema, inland

Developing Africa • 25

Figure 2.2 Lake Volta in Ghana

water-borne transport, inland fishing and irrigation of the Accra plains (Best and de Blij, 1977). Completion of the project in the late-1960s has provided significant long-term benefits for the country. These include: major industrial development in Tema; the associated generation of foreign-exchange earnings and employment; a reliable supply of electricity; lake transport; lake tourism; farming along the lake’s shoreline; and fishing (Gyau-Boakye, 2001). Unfortunately, as has so often been the case with large, ‘top-down’ mega-projects, there have also been significant, unanticipated negative outcomes. The incidence of schistosomiasis (bilharzia) in the population near the lake increased from 2 per cent to 32 per cent, while cases of malaria, and initially river blindness (onchocerciasis), also rose steeply (GyauBoakye, 2001). The enforced migration of 80,000 people led to poverty for many and the associated spread of HIV/AIDS exacerbated the situation (Sauve et al., 2002). At the social level, many of these people found it difficult to cope with their resettlement and the loss of their lands and ancestral sites, and they resented having to change their livelihood strategies to either fishing or farming. Resettlement also often increased population numbers to unsustainable levels in the recipient areas,

26 • Developing Africa

leading to land degradation and out-migration. By the early 1970s, some 20,000 people had already left the resettlement areas (Fobil and Attuquayefio, 2003). In response to many of these social challenges, the Volta River Authority actively promoted educational programmes in the area and it introduced new economic activities (Fobil and Attuquayefio, 2003; Gyau-Boakye, 2001). In addition to the social and health considerations, the sheer size of the lake has caused a range of physical problems. These include seismic activity, siltation in the dam and estuary, flooding and scouring downstream, negative effects on estuarine life in the delta, micro-climatic changes, and an increase of aquatic weed on the lake itself, which has negatively impacted transport and fishing (Gyau-Boakye, 2001). Over the long term, the scheme has also experienced significant operational challenges. In 2007, the aluminium smelter at Tema had to be shut down due to power shortages caused by low water levels in the lake. However, major expansion is now planned, to develop a second refinery, new power-generating facilities and the opening of new bauxite mines were announced in 2008 (Kpodo, 2008). While the Volta River Project undoubtedly helped Ghana to proclaim its independence and attain a degree of ‘modernization’, this clearly came at considerable cost, which has impacted most on those directly affected by the construction of the dam. ‘Top-down’ planning, often in pursuit of Western-style projects, has often not led to the anticipated ‘trickle down’ of benefits to everyone. This fact surely justifies the parallel or alternative pursuit of ‘bottom-up’ projects grounded in communities to try to maximize local benefits and ensure greater empowerment.

Plate 2.1 Barrage Lalla Takerkoust, near Marrakech, Morocco Source: Tony Binns.

Such schemes were conceptualized as the key ingredients required to achieve the desired ‘take-off’. In parallel, many national governments formulated national development strategies in which the ideas of Rostow and Friedmann clearly underlay conceptions of how to promote development with, for example, the construction of major dams such as Barrage Lalla Takerkoust (Morocco) being viewed as anchor points for catalysing regional and national development (Ukaga and Afoaku, 2005; see Plate 2.1).

Developing Africa • 27

Despite the initial optimism that characterized the pursuit of development from the 1950s, expectations were seldom fulfilled, and schemes such as Lake Volta were hindered by limited spin-offs and the unanticipated impacts of water-borne diseases. The limited results generally led to a questioning of the nature of the strategies applied and the viability of the American and Eurocentric model that had been adopted without question. The United Nations’ reflections on the outcomes of the ‘first development decade’ suggested that the results were modest, at best. It is therefore not surprising that development theorists and national states started to question the efficacy of development and began to search for alternatives (Barratt Brown, 1995; Potter et al., 2018).

2.4.3 Alternative conceptions of development: dependency theory and African self-reliance, from the 1960s From the 1960s, dependency theorists, such as Frank and Baran (see above), began to question the relevance of the Western model of development, which they saw as creating and enforcing a dependent form of development based on the West (see Figure 2.3, which shows how transport links and resource flows were structured in the colonial era to the benefit of the colonial powers). Instead, they argued that the states in the developing world needed to ‘de-link’ from their historical dependence on the West and identify situationally appropriate development strategies, which these theorists referred to as the pursuit of ‘self-reliant’ development (Barratt Brown, 1995; Potter et al., 2018; Willis, 2020). In practice in Africa, there was a clear overlap between the questioning of the Western model and an increasing interest shown in socialist models that were in vogue at the time

Figure 2.3 Dependency theory in practice Source: adapted from Potter et al., 2018.

28 • Developing Africa

in eastern Europe and China. While few African countries, with the possible exception of Ethiopia, directly pursued eastern-style socialism, many attempted to throw off what were perceived to be the ‘shackles’ of colonial oppression through efforts to promote unique forms of African development, such as ‘Afro-socialism’ and the active courting of links with the USSR, China and the Eastern Bloc. These strategies had their roots in panAfricanism, as espoused by key African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, and the belief in African self-reliance as advocated by such leaders as Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania (Davidson, 1994; Ayeni, 1997). In countries such as Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia and Tanzania, this era was characterized by bold attempts to implement nationally appropriate strategies that often had a strong rural focus and an appeal to ‘self-reliance’ principles. The most extreme case was Tanzania, which actively sought to sever links with the external world and pursued an ambitious policy of rural development through a villagization development scheme known as ‘Ujamaa’ – a Swahili word meaning ‘extended family’ or ‘brotherhood’ (Davidson, 1994; Ayeni, 1997; see Box 2.3). Although motivated by efforts to raise rural living standards, interventions proved costly and often disrupted traditional life when people were required to live in central villages some distance from their farmlands. Parallel efforts to ensure industrial self-sufficiency were hindered by a lack of local skills, resources and funds. As a result, and despite the enthusiasm with which these programmes were pursued, true economic independence from historical and economic ties with the West proved difficult to attain (Ayeni, 1997).

Box 2.3 Ujamaa, villagization and rural development in Tanzania Challenges posed by trying to achieve development through modernization approaches in Africa encouraged the popularity of ‘dependency theory’, which argued for the shedding of colonial bonds and the pursuit of self-reliance. The parallel emergence of a new group of leaders in Africa, such as Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, who advocated policies of humanism and ‘African socialism’, led to the implementation of rural development schemes and the creation of new rural service villages anchored in basic socialist principles. Probably the most wellknown of these, albeit perhaps the least successful, was the villagization policy pursued in newly independent Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s (Kjekshus, 1977; Barratt Brown, 1995). This scheme was implemented just after Tanzania gained independence from Britain in 1961, when well over 90 per cent of the country’s population lived in scattered rural settlements. Agriculture’s contribution to the nation’s GDP was falling and most farmers were engaged in growing food for family subsistence, using traditional low-level technology. Inequalities were increasing in terms of the distribution of income and the provision of basic services, such as healthcare and education, and the country was becoming increasingly dependent on foreign loans and grants. It was hoped that an aggressive rural development policy would help to address these issues (Binns, 1994). Less than six months after the end of colonial rule, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s president and leader of the ruling party, TANU (Tanganyika African National

Developing Africa • 29

Union), published a pamphlet entitled Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism, in which he urged a return to ‘traditional values’, according to which everyone had a right to be respected, an obligation to work and a duty to ensure the welfare of the whole community and the common ownership of basic goods (Binns, 1994). Ujamaa is a Swahili word that translates as ‘familyhood’ and relates to the concepts outlined by Nyerere in his pamphlet (Best and de Blij, 1977: 426). Later, in 1962, in his inaugural address as President, Nyerere introduced the idea of villagization, emphasizing the importance of developing the agricultural sector, which, he argued, could be achieved only if farmers lived in villages. He said, unless we do [this,] … we shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the towns for all our requirements; and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we should never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead. (Nyerere, quoted in Binns, 1994: 110) Critical to this vision was the perceived need for farming to be done communally, and for people to live close together in villages where services and marketing support could be concentrated (Best and de Blij, 1977). Five years later, the Arusha Declaration of February 1967 was a landmark in Tanzanian, and indeed African, political history. Nyerere announced the nationalization of banks, trading organizations and the largest multinational corporations operating in the country. He also called for a halt to the accumulation of private wealth by party and government leaders (Hyden, 1980) and committed the country to the pursuit of self-reliance (Coulson, 1982). In essence, the Arusha Declaration outlined the key elements of socialist development, stressing the use of local ideas and resources. This was reinforced in September 1968 with Nyerere’s paper on ‘Socialism and Rural Development’, whose Swahili title was ‘Ujamaa Vijijini’, which literally translates as ‘Socialism in the Villages’. In this paper, Nyerere again rejected rural capitalism and turned the ujamaa of his 1962 paper into a national policy, such that rural workers had the responsibility to establish and/or encourage ujamaa villages, building on traditional mutual aid in the extended family of Tanzanian society (Binns, 1994). The main aims of the new rural development strategy were: 1 2 3 4

The establishment of self-governing village communities to improve living standards by providing social infrastructure, such as healthcare and education, while also providing facilities for the marketing of crops and livestock. Better use of rural labour, taking advantage of economies of scale to increase communal production (although the emphasis on communal production was later reduced). The dissemination of new values and the avoidance of exploitation. Village councils would oversee land reform, allocating land among private cultivators. The mobilization of people for national defence by using the villages as paramilitary organizations (Hyden, 1980; Coulsen, 1982; Kahama et al., 1986; Binns, 1994).

30 • Developing Africa

Government and other organizations would supposedly help to explain the underlying principles of ujamaa villages, promote good leadership among farmers, and plan village sites, food cultivation and service provision. Village development was encouraged through a series of ‘operations’, but these campaigns by regional party and government administrations were often carried out hurriedly, with insufficient planning, little consultation with the people and limited understanding of existing farming and pastoral systems. Nyerere took a personal interest in the formation of the ujamaa villages, for example by initiating ‘Operation Dodoma’, a governmentplanned programme to move all the people in that region into villages. Consequently, the number of new villages in Dodoma increased from 75 in 1970 to 246 in 1971 (Binns, 1994). On 6 November 1973, Nyerere announced that all Tanzanians would have to live in new villages by the end of 1976, and at the same time some fundamental policy changes were made. Emphasis on communal production, for example, was dropped in favour of block farming, designed to promote economies of scale and village production planning, but not requiring a wholehearted commitment to the principles of ujamaa. From this time, the new villages were called ‘development villages’, and the idea was that they would serve as multi-purpose cooperatives, taking on all crop marketing and credit functions. This major thrust of compulsory villagization between 1973 and 1976 was probably the largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa (Hyden, 1980). Although most people did not have to move long distances, they often had to agree to abandon their former residence and land. People were instructed to move to the nearest new village or trading centre, and political efforts were made to create ujamaa villages with 250 or more families out of the enlarged units. Initially, people were persuaded to move into the new villages through the promise of such services as water, schools and dispensaries. However, sometimes these, and food supply, proved to be inadequate. Villages were at first concentrated in the poorer regions of Tanzania, and by September 1974 there were 5,000 with 2.5 million residents, representing 20 per cent of the country’s total population. In that year, the government decided to abandon its strategy of persuasion in favour of forced relocation. Between May and December 1974, Operation Sogeza (moving) implemented this new policy, and by 1975 a large majority of the rural population was resident in the new villages. In 1976, 3 million people were living in 7,000 ujamaa villages (Best and de Blij, 1977). Thereafter, a series of bad harvests and food shortages encouraged the government to increase agricultural production targets, and peasant farmers were each required to plant a minimum of three acres of food crops and one acre of cash cops. By the late 1970s, however, many village-based initiatives had collapsed and the future looked unpromising (Binns, 1994). The main problems encountered by the villagization programme were: •

For the majority of people in most villages, their private farms still remained their primary focus of interest, and there was some conflict as to how much labour and attention should be given to communal activities. The first five years of ujamaa did not have any significant impact on peasant agricultural production, and the productivity of the land did not improve. Yields per hectare in communal farming areas were well below those of private farming and

Developing Africa • 31

•

•

•

• •

•

•

there was often confusion over the distribution of income from the communal farms. Communal work actually ceased in some villages by the early 1970s. The bigger the village, the more difficult it was for members to achieve a common sense of purpose. Petty-capitalist farmers often did best, as they were more willing to take risks and modernize their farming methods. Poorer peasants often chose these more successful farmers as their village leaders. In many ujamaa villages, the absence of a reliable system of financial control caused problems, perhaps due to the low level of education of leaders and villagers. Reports of the embezzlement of funds was common and administrative and technical staff often failed to serve the villages adequately and loyally. Impressive progress was achieved in the provision of schools, dispensaries, water supplies and other rural infrastructure, and marked improvements in healthcare and adult literacy were recorded. However, schools and dispensaries often lacked even basic supplies and electrical power and water supply were frequently inadequate. Also, in spite of better rural service provision, young people were still attracted to education and work in the towns, a move that was often supported by parents because it could yield additional family income. The principles of ujamaa and communalization frequently conflicted with well-established networks of social institutions, such as women’s groups and cattle-owner associations. Furthermore, the social effects of villagization must have been traumatic at times, particularly where force was used to resettle people. There is still much debate about whether villagization reduced or increased inequality within and between villages and households. Where tractors and other machinery were introduced, there were problems of maintenance and lack of fuel, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis. The environmental knowledge that peasants had prior to villagization was often invalid in the new settlements, where soil conditions and other factors of production were different. There was concern in some areas that nucleation (concentrated settlements) could lead to erosion as the carrying capacity was exceeded. In many cases, resettled people continued to farm their now-distant ancestral lands at great cost in terms of time and physical energy. Simultaneously, significant declines in export crop production were noted, namely in cotton, coffee, sisal, tea and tobacco. The scheme has been criticized for focusing on the siting of villages, normally on a road to enhance external access, while paying little regard to local mobility patterns, access to the best farmland and local traditions (Kjekshus, 1977; Hyden, 1980; Kahama et al., 1986; Binns 1994; Mapolu, n.d.).

Following food shortages and near famine in 1974, which led to the need to import 880,000 tonnes of maize, wheat and rice, and was attributed to the upheaval in rural areas, cooperatives were completely abolished in 1976 (Best and de Blij, 1977; Kahama et al., 1986), after which the buying of crops and the provision of farm inputs became very unreliable. In the decade after the Arusha Declaration, the majority of peasants were subjected to numerous government directives and orders without witnessing much economic development. In 1974, Nyerere admitted that the country had exhausted

32 • Developing Africa

its financial resources (Time, 27 January 1975). The villagization programme generated massive resentment among peasant farmers. Most writers agree that it was a failure, and the Tanzanian government has since reversed many of its earlier policies. It is noteworthy that underplaying the potential role of industrial development in favour of rural development negatively affected internal industrial supply levels (Kahama et al., 1986). As a result, Tanzania’s bold efforts to ensure rural service delivery and national self-sufficiency fell well short of expectations. While access to certain social services clearly improved, the failings of the intervention are indicative of the inherent problems of ‘top-down’ schemes that do not involve local people in the decision-making process and where politics rather than rationality drives policy. The scheme also reveals the challenges of pursuing the concept of ‘self-reliance’ to its logical conclusion, as proposed by the dependency theorists.

At a broader level, the pursuit of African self-reliance and associated adherence to the principle of pan-Africanism culminated in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 – a bold attempt to lay the basis for a continent in which internal linkages and trade were to be encouraged. However, mistrust, the production of like products (which restricted inter-African trade opportunities) and continuing dependence on Western trade and technology, hampered such bold thinking until the 21st century (Ukaga and Afoaku, 2005; Janneh, 2006).

2.4.4 The basic needs approach – 1970s From the 1970s, it became apparent that ‘take-off’ had not occurred in much of Africa, so there was a need to rethink what development involved and how to achieve it. In parallel, the International Labour Organization and research undertaken by Keith Hart into the informal sector in Ghana (Hart, 1973), revealed the key role played by non-formal economic activities in the livelihoods of a significant percentage of the African population (Barratt Brown, 1995). In turn, this led the donor agencies to adopt a new approach to funding and support of development that prioritized the ‘basic needs’ of Africa’s people. Concrete action shifted from the development of mega-projects and national development strategies to direct support of the poorest communities through the extension of primary healthcare, the sinking of wells and education support (see for example, Plate 2.2). However, the scale of the development backlog in Africa rather limited the effectiveness of these well-intentioned interventions (Barratt Brown, 1995; Potter et al., 2018).

2.4.5 Structural adjustment and neo-liberalism – 1980s Efforts at national development in Africa hit an almost insurmountable barrier in the early 1980s, when most African countries found themselves unable to repay the debts they had accumulated in the 1970s, following the oil-price hike of that decade and global recession. In order to avoid a collapse of the Western banking system, starting in Mexico in 1982, the IMF and the World Bank introduced a system that allowed for the rescheduling of debt repayments from countries in the South in return for acceptance of a package of ‘structural adjustment’ measures, which obligated recipient countries to formally accept neo-liberal economic prescriptions, including the withdrawal of the state from much of

Developing Africa • 33

Plate 2.2 Water hand-pump in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa Source: Etienne Nel.

the economy, rationalization of the civil service, support for the private sector, market liberalization, encouragement of investment and currency revaluation (Barratt Brown, 1995; Bond, 2007). In turn, new conditional loans could be secured. During the 1980s, most African countries were obligated to accept these structural adjustment packages (SAPs). While the World Bank claimed some success, extreme hardship was experienced in Africa, incomes and economic growth rates fell, unemployment increased and social service expenditure declined. Consequently, the 1980s became known as the ‘lost decade’

34 • Developing Africa

for much of Africa. With few exceptions, significant market-led growth did not occur (Barratt Brown, 1995; Bond, 2007). While SAPs and neo-liberalism were not development strategies as such, they led to the rationalization of previous forms of state intervention and by implication of earlier development interventions. The required pursuit of neo-liberal orthodoxy was linked to the belief that development would be achieved by freeing up the markets that would draw in trade and investment. The neoliberal model has witnessed the emergence of what Harrison (2019) refers to as ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, as African states try and control their own destiny, leading to undesirable political outcomes and the search for alternatives. These include a threat to the attainment of sustainable development in Africa due to privatization, deregulation and cuts in government expenditure (Kumi et al., 2014). After 2015, a core focus and continuation of neo-liberal thinking, for global bodies, according to Gabor (2021), has been that of ‘development as de-risking’, which involves the UN and the World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for Development programme which seeks to invest $12 trillion in infrastructure and related development projects in the Global South in collaboration with the private sector. Creating a safety-net for investors, will enhance financial globalization, but also narrow development options in the South through the imposition of restrictions on development options determined by the global financial institutions (Gabor, 2021).

2.4.6 Alternative development, from the 1980s Persistent poverty, the limited success of the SAPs and the questioning of both Western and socialist models led to the search for alternative, situationally appropriate theories and strategies of development from the 1980s onwards. Encouraged by the work of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and thinking about ‘alternative development’ (Hettne, 1995), theorists questioned the beliefs in linear, Western-based development models, which essentially imposed development from the top down on societies in the South. Apparent failures of the Western models to bring about fundamental changes led to the recognition of what was termed a ‘development impasse’ and the need to identify and pursue more situational and contextually important forms of development (Potter et al., 2018). Alternative development thinking both spawned, and was related to, a wide diversity of approaches that emerged in this era, including recognition of the territorial bases for development, and the need to encourage ‘eco-development’, to work with communities at their level and to draw upon their indigenous technical knowledge. Perhaps most significant of all was the recognition of the role and place of ‘bottom-up’ development anchored in the strengths of the host community (Hettne, 1995; Potter et al., 2018). The latter seeks to encourage community-based development and self-reliance through encouraging local people to take the lead and tap into situationally specific resources to improve overall levels of well-being. Numerous case studies from Africa were detailed by such authors as Gooneratne and Mbilinyi (1992) and illustrated the value of community self-reliance, particularly in the face of the harsh realities imposed by SAPs.

2.4.7 Post- and anti-development, decolonization and the pursuit of local development, from the 1990s By the 1990s, development policy and theory had come full circle in Africa. Belief in the ability of modernization to enable African countries to emulate the West had been shattered, and a ‘development impasse’ had arisen (Andreasson, 2005). The debt crisis of

Developing Africa • 35

the 1980s and SAPs had reinforced perceptions of the subservient role that most African countries play in the global economy, while indigenous efforts, such as Afro-socialism, had proved incapable of meeting the needs of growing populations. At a theoretical level, more critical authors, such as Escobar, Pieterse and Schuurman (see Potter et al., 2018) essentially rejected the Western conceptualization of development (i.e. anti-development thinking) and urged planners to seek more situationally relevant forms and approaches to promote improved well-being. Some authors have also argued for the need to move beyond current understandings of development (i.e. post-development) and to look for approaches that are community based and empowering. While not yet offering detailed applied alternative strategies, these theorists have encouraged the broader academic and development community to seek creative alternatives beyond modernization, many of which relate to exploring ‘local’ development potential and capacity. This approach has come to the forefront in an era when the decentralization of state activities is facilitating greater forms of self-reliance among both communities and local governments (Andreasson, 2005; Willis, 2020). Equally important in this regard in Africa have been recent appeals to draw on indigenous or ‘Afrocentric knowledges’ and ‘African solutions to African problems as illustrated through examples of indigenous provision of food security and land management’ (Oloruntoba et al., 2020). Recent years have witnessed significant attention directed to calls to decolonize development and to draw on indigenous approaches and epistemologies (Ukwandu, 2017). The failings of colonialism and its legacy, and the on-going development challenges in the post-colonial world order, have prompted calls to end the continued pursuit of dominant models of economic development. In this regard, a decolonial response reconceptualises development as sustainable security with an emphasis on adjustment to ecological context and care-full navigation of responsibilities and obligations.... These ways of being resonate with the relational conceptions of the person and society attuned to cultural ecologies of interdependence and embeddedness associated with the settings in the Global South. (Estrada-Villalta and Adams, 2018: 198) In this regard the importance of community knowledge in addressing health related challenges in Africa has been investigated by Leach (2015) who argues that bottom-up action needs to be complemented with transformational alliances with other actors – public, private and community – if a way forward is to be found. In recent years writing in the broad area of post-development has evolved as reflected in calls for a ‘people’s pluriverse’ and exploration of the ideas of deep ecology, liberation theology, worker-led production, solidarity economics, energy sovereignty, radical feminism and indigenous movements (Demaria and Kothari, 2017; Dasgupta, 2020). Related to these approaches are emerging arguments about ‘degrowth’ and the pursuit of paradigms which are not anchored on GDP growth, but which rather seek progressive environmental policies to reduce material and energy use, while still addressing inequality and addressing human needs (Hickel and Hallegatte, 2021).

2.5 Development practice in the 21st century In the 21st century, development practice has become more eclectic than in previous decades. While many countries still strive to promote national development strategies, such interventions are now tempered by the legacy of SAPs, the requirement of accession to the World Trade Organization to reduce state intervention, principles of decentralization

36 • Developing Africa

and the acknowledged role of community groups, non-governmental organizations and the private sector in development, as well as the global focus on, first, the Millennium, and now the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, within Africa there are new drives to pursue African-based development options, anchored on historic principles of pan-Africanism and self-reliance, while at the global level, poverty reduction strategy plans (PRSPs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have set the parameters through which global support is applied and assessed. This section of the chapter explores the practical outcomes of these changes, which include changes in global understandings of development, the enhanced role of local and community development, the new role played by regional integration in African development, the roles of trade, aid and debt, and the significance of the MDGs and the SDGs.

2.5.1 To sustainable development and global development From the start of the 21st century the development agenda has evolved significantly in its focus. Key drivers in this regard, stemming from the limited development advances in many countries, the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign and international efforts to address development backlogs, have been the first significant international efforts to develop a global development agenda, aimed at improving socio-economic conditions and well-being globally. In direct response, the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) (see below) were launched by the United Nations (UN) as a global action strategy for the period 2000–2015. In 2015, in recognition of and in response to the key environmental challenges which the world faces, the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) were launched by the UN for the period 2015–2030. The SDGs reflect both global concerns about the serious sustainability challenges which the planet faces, and are also a recognition that development is a ‘global’ requirement and not merely the exclusive priority for the Global South. These changes also reflect the acknowledgement that socio-economic inequalities within all countries have grown significantly in recent decades and require concerted action to reduce them, leading to the use of the term ‘global development’ (Horner and Hulme, 2017; Horner, 2020). Parallel changes in the 20th century have included the economic growth experienced in several key countries in the Global South – such as China, India and Brazil. These countries have not only repositioned themselves in terms of their economic status globally, but several have transformed from being recipients of development aid to becoming aid donors. Equally significant has been the emergence of the so-called BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a global body existing as a counter-point to traditional Western models and leadership, and offering possible alternative development paths and models to those of the West (Mawdsley, 2017).

2.5.2 Local and community-based development Two broad themes characterize local development in Africa. The first is the formal empowerment of local governments through processes of decentralization to engage more directly with local development challenges. The second relates to processes that have always been in existence, namely the actions of local community groups who wish to improve living and economic conditions in their locality. In the view of Gooneratne and Obudho (1997), given the scale of the African economic crisis, communities must pursue local development options. They also recognize the key role that NGOs can play

Developing Africa • 37

in supporting local initiatives, often in the absence of state support. A particular concern for a range of authors is the need for governments to allow for, and facilitate, ‘local selfreliance’ among communities (Gooneratne and Mbilinyi, 1992; Taylor and Mackenzie, 1992). In terms of local government decentralization, driven partially by SAPs and partially by the desire for greater democratic engagement, there has been a dramatic shift in most countries from direct central government control over local governments to acknowledgement and facilitation of local control and decision-making. The introduction of decentralization policies in countries as diverse as Ghana and Zambia has characterized this new era, and the World Bank has noted how widespread this process has become (Binns et al., 2005; Gooneratne and Obudho, 1997; Hope, 2008). However, on-the-ground evidence in countries with well-established track records of decentralization indicates that deeprooted operational challenges impede progress (Binns and Nel, 2002; Nel and Binns, 2003b; Egziabher and Helmsing, 2005). These include a lack of skilled staff in localities, limited funds and, what Stockmayer (1999) has termed the consequential ‘decentralization of poverty’, which has shifted responsibility from the central state to the local level. A variation of local development is the more focused approach of local economic development (LED), which has attracted considerable attention across Africa. While many countries, such as Eswatini and Zambia, have expressed interest in the LED approach and have introduced some policy support, applied practice across Africa remains limited (Gooneratne and Obudho, 1997; Egziabher and Helmsing, 2005; Hampwaye, 2008). The one exception is South Africa, which is regarded as a leader in the policy and practice of LED (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2005). LED is now a legal requirement of local governments in that country and, interestingly, local governments have been challenged to implement policies of ‘developmental local government’, which implies being conscious of encouraging development-related outcomes from all of their actions (Nel, 1999; Nel and Binns, 2003a; Nel and Rogerson, 2005). In recent years the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) has become an important proponent of the role which local governments and LED can play in bringing about fundamental development change within localities across the South. According to the CLGF (2020): Local economic development is a central part of developmental local government. It is a process which brings together different partners in the local area to work together to harness resources for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. Experiences of LED vary widely in Africa – from that of small, impoverished rural municipalities, which are able to support only limited community projects in such activities as community tourism and farming, to the large metropoles, which are pursuing globally competitive marketing and investment strategies (Rogerson, 1997). Johannesburg and Cape Town, for example, have positioned themselves on the world stage as ‘global cities’, replete with modern airports, sports stadia, convention centres, business and tourism support programmes and various forms of informal sector support (Nel and Rogerson, 2005; see also Chapter 9 and Box 2.4). However, evidence suggests that outcomes, though often impressive, seldom devolve down to those communities that are most in need in the big cities. In smaller urban centres, the lack of progress is often more evident where municipalities are unable to effect change, commonly through a lack of resources and staff. A net result of the limitations experienced by developmental local government in both large and small centres has been widespread civil sector protests against local government’s restricted delivery in recent years (Nel et al., 2009). At a broader level

38 • Developing Africa

Box 2.4 Local economic development in Durban in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, South Africa The late twentieth and early twenty-first century has been characterized by the increasing devolution of planning and developmental responsibilities to local governments and local agencies in many parts of the world, including in numerous African countries. One of the key aspects of such devolution involves enhanced local economic planning and development interventions generically referred to as ‘local economic development’ (LED), which is gaining widespread recognition around the world (Pike et al., 2006). This term is generally associated with local government actions, referred to as ‘urban entrepreneurialism’, and/or the actions of local community groups, with or without the support of non-governmental organizations and local business organizations. The focus of such actions tends to be on responding to local economic crises, and/or responding to new growth opportunities, encouraging employment creation and business development and responding to social development needs (Blakely, 1989; Pike et al., 2006). Though common practice for decades in Europe and North America, it is only relatively recently that LED has been practised to any significant degree in Africa. The reasons for this are twofold: first, the traditionally centralized nature of state control in Africa which allowed little scope for local action; and, secondly, the severity of economic crises that have overlapped with the devolution of powers to local levels in recent years. Nevertheless, as Egziabher and Helmsing (2005) note, LED is starting to feature in countries as diverse as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Swaziland and South Africa (Nel and Rogerson, 2005; Hampwaye, 2008). Within this recent movement into LED, South Africa has come to be regarded as a front-runner, not only within Africa, but in the Global South more generally (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2005). South Africa’s prominence in this regard is partly due to its tradition of having large and, by African standards, well-resourced cities, with relatively independent and strong local governments that have the ability and means to influence local development processes. Furthermore, after the fall of apartheid in 1994, the new democratically elected government instituted a series of measures designed to empower communities and ensure that local development was actively pursued by all local authorities. For instance, the 1996 National Constitution mandated local governments to engage in socio-economic development in the areas under their jurisdiction, and the 1998 Local Government White Paper introduced the concept of ‘developmental local government’ (Binns and Nel, 2002; Nel and Binns, 2003a). This prompted local governments to consider the developmental implications of all their activities. Subsequent LED policy papers, and the requirement that LED must form part of regular integrated development planning and promote pro-poor development, have made LED a hallmark of South African local government activities (Nel and Rogerson, 2005). The city of Durban, lies in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality and has a population of 3.4 million people, located on the east coast of South Africa (SACN, 2017). It hosts the busiest port in Africa, is the premier domestic tourism destination, with a string of five-star hotels on its ‘Golden Mile’, has one of the world’s biggest convention centres and the biggest single-phase shopping centre in the

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Plate 2.3 Durban CBD, South Africa Source: Etienne Nel.

southern hemisphere, has two oil refineries and one of the largest Toyota car manufacturing plants in the world, and is the country’s second-largest concentration of industrial activity (see Plate 2.3). However, it is also a city of extreme poverty, with an unemployment rate exceeding 30 per cent and hundreds of thousands of people living close to the poverty line (Nel et al., 2005; Robinson, 2008). The LED imperative therefore requires the city authorities both to address chronic poverty and simultaneously to promote Durban as a key, secondary node in the global economy. Local Economic Development in Durban is anchored in the metropole’s Integrated Development Plan which aims to develop the area’s economic wealth and well-being to create jobs and address poverty. To help achieve this, in 2017, the metropole developed its ‘Radical Economic Transformation Framework’ which seeks to address unemployment, create jobs, provide infrastructure, support business development and communities. Tangible support includes offering business incentives, and supporting the development and application of a job creation and economic development strategy. Key economic sectors and the informal sector receive particular attention according to the plan and there are also plans to promote CBD regeneration and develop key economic nodes across the metropole (SACN, 2017). To help achieve these goals, the city established an Economic Development Unit to actively promote partnerships with business through a series of planning forums. The realities of Durban’s development needs and opportunities are such that both pro-poor and pro-market strategies need to be pursued simultaneously. Regrettably, it would appear that the only significant success has been achieved with the latter, despite the urgent need to address chronic problems of unemployment and poverty. In line with other major cities in the world, partnership formation has proved critical in the initiation of mega-projects. These include the joint city–private sector development of the ‘edge city’ at Umhlanga Ridge, to the north of Durban, and the

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associated shopping centre development, redevelopment of the beach front, two new casino complexes and the opening of a water-world complex. Key city projects include upgrading the transport infrastructure, building the convention centre and waterfront development (Nel et al., 2005). These have undoubtedly enhanced the city’s standing as a key tourism, business, retail and industrial node, but there is little evidence that the poor have shared in these benefits. In terms of pro-poor interventions, in the 1990s the city attempted to promote township economic development with almost no success (‘townships’ in South Africa are low-income areas). This was due to a lack of resources, a failure to involve the beneficiaries in decision-making, and the persistence of poverty. More recently, development teams have targeted the poorest areas, such as Cato Manor and Inanda, where they have attempted to encourage entrepreneurial training, small business support and market development. In terms of project development, support for a Business Development Unit and the noteworthy Warwick Triangle represent concerted efforts to provide skills training and facilities to the poorest entrepreneurs. Warwick Triangle, a key transport node through which hundreds of thousands of commuters pass daily, is also home to thousands of informal sector traders. The council has provided trading facilities, toilets, medical- and child-care in this area, and has won the recognition of the World Bank as a leading example of small business support (Nel et al., 2005; Economic Development Unit, n.d.; see Plate 2.4). Over and above such direct

Plate 2.4 Warwick Junction market, Durban, South Africa Source: Etienne Nel.

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interventions, the city’s Economic Development Unit promotes investment in the city, coordinates economic data collection, supports tourism development and provides general business advisory support. The city is also known for the nature of its procurement policies, which, wherever possible, give preferential consideration to tenders from low-income and disadvantaged communities (Economic Development Unit, n.d.). These activities and policy commitments show how one of Africa’s leading cities has committed itself to the active pursuit of LED. The range of projects adopted is impressive, as are the engagement with the private sector and efforts to promote pro-poor development. There is no doubt that Durban’s role as a key industrial, tourism, business and retail node has been significantly enhanced. Unfortunately, for the underprivileged majority in the city, there is minimal evidence that a significant reduction in poverty has been achieved. It seems likely that this will remain a key failing of LED in Durban and other African cities, where integrating the poor into the formal economy has proved to be particularly challenging.

in Africa, there is growing recognition of the role that local governments can play in development processes, as indicated by the recent establishment of the Municipal Development Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa. Based in Harare, Zimbabwe, this organization is promoting research and collaborative exchanges between local governments. It also works with the Africa Local Government Action Forum, which has a primary focus on the promotion of LED (MDP, 2006). At the community level, recognition in the 1970s that development along the lines proposed by the diffusionist and modernization approaches was not succeeding in addressing mass poverty in Africa galvanized a reinterpretation of development interventions and approaches. This included acknowledgement that ‘basic needs’ intervention was probably a more appropriate line to follow. There was also, finally, recognition that the informal or ‘second’ economy is often the largest part of the economy in many countries (Pacione, 2001; Hope, 2008). In the 1980s, the scale of the debt crisis and negative economic growth in the poorest communities forced many rural communities back into subsistence and a frequent reliance on barter and parallel economic systems. Despite numerous constraints, NGOs have been most active in this area, and governments have attempted various low-level support measures, such as providing market facilities and extension support to farmers and entrepreneurs (see Plate 2.5). In parallel, a significant volume of literature on this dimension of local development has emerged. Prominent in this regard were the research and policy proposals of Gooneratne and Mbilinyi (1992), based at the United Nations Centre for Regional Development’s regional office in Nairobi, Kenya. In addition, Baker (1990) and Baker and Pederson (1992), as well as other researchers based at the Africa Studies Centre in Uppsala, Sweden, discussed the realities of rural and urban livelihoods, and local economic adaptation in order to survive. While the overall economic situation has improved in many parts of Africa since the 1980s, self-reliance initiatives at the local/community and family levels remain absolutely critical for survival among the majority of the poor. As outlined by Taylor and Mackenzie (1992) and Egziabher and Helmsing (2005), initiatives such as the production of charcoal, basic metalwork

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Plate 2.5 An NGO extension agent in Ethiopia delivers spades and energy-effcient stoves to a rural community Source: Alan Dixon.

and handicrafts are often critical in ensuring economic survival (see Box 2.5 which describes community-based self-reliance in Zimbabwe using natural resources and drawing on NGO support). Recent writings on rural and urban livelihood strategies indicate just how important it is for communities to have multiple livelihood strategies and sources of income. Diversification is often the key to survival. While often poorly understood and difficult to support directly, this form of local development is an essential survival mechanism for a significant number of Africa’s people. Future research and policy support in these areas will be critical for the long-term well-being of these people (Egziabher and Helmsing, 2005).

2.5.3 Regional development: the search for collective selfreliance, Agenda 2063 and ‘Homegrown Development’ A distinctive feature of regional development practice and policy in Africa is widespread adherence to the principles of cross-border linkages within the continent for purposes of collective self-reliant development, facilitating trade, social, cultural and economic exchange, peacekeeping and the overall promotion of pan-Africanism. International connectivity has had a relatively long history in the continent. The world’s oldest customs union is the Southern African Customs Union, formed in 1910,

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Box 2.5 Community beekeeping in Bondolf, Zimbabwe Persistent poverty in Africa, the loss of developmental momentum and the economic collapse and stagnation associated with the debt crisis and structural adjustment of the 1980s obliged thousands of community groups to turn inwards – to traditional or new forms of community self-reliance – in order to make ends meet. In many cases, the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s forced many communities out of the money economy and into greater reliance on barter systems and various forms of subsistence (Taylor and Mackenzie, 1992). Extensive research undertaken by the United Nations Centre for Regional Development in Africa has indicated just how widespread community or local self-reliance has become in supporting the livelihoods of millions (Gooneratne and Mbilinyi, 1992). Community self-reliance is seen as having a key role to play, because it is an effective local response to marginalization, it tends to rely on indigenous skills, it is often ecologically appropriate and it is cost effective. Within this context, there is clearly a role for non-governmental organizations and faith-based groups in supplying information, encouragement and support (Burkey, 1993; Scoones and Chibudu, 1996). A key asset of self-reliance strategies is the fact that it draws on indigenous skills and often centuries-old practices of farming, resource management, traditional manufacturing and trade. Zimbabwe has, sadly, experienced significant political and economic turmoil for several decades. Within this context, hundreds of thousands of people have been forced out of the formal economy, have lost access to social services and have become increasingly self-reliant. It is often easier to promote collective community action within traditional rural village settings rather than in the densely settled cities. The community of Bondolfi lies 40km south of the central Zimbabwean town of Masvingo. In the broader area there are some 10,000 people, and the key assets in the community are a few stores, a church, a mission and a school (Illgner et al., 1998). While most people rely on the cultivation of traditional crops, such as maize, the severity of the economic crisis experienced in the mid-1990s prompted local community members, in collaboration with mission staff, to assess the community’s alternative assets and skills. Traditionally, honey has been collected from natural hives for use in domestic beer brewing and rituals. It was recognized that, given the high price that honey can command, there was scope to expand the volume collected. Fortuitously, around this time, the mission was visited by a volunteer worker who had gained experience in Kenya in making simple, cost-effective hives out of natural materials. These hives generated higher yields than traditional honey-collection methods from wild hives (Nel et al., 2000). As a consequence of this, in 1995 members of the community formed the Bondolfi Beekeepers Association. The 70 members of the association work collectively in the manufacture of hives and basic safety equipment and the collection and processing of the honey, while the mission has provided basic training and, critically, a market outlet, as it transports the honey to local retailers in Masvingo (Illgner et al., 1998). Under optimum conditions, and with access to an average of ten hives per member,

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income from honey sales can be nearly 150 per cent higher than from traditional crop farming. It is important to note that as beekeeping is a part-time occupation, members can still produce their usual field crops, so the beekeeping has become an integral element in a multi-livelihood strategy (Nel et al., 2000). The success of this scheme clearly indicates that community-based development, which draws upon local skills and available resources, has the ability to enhance community incomes. Simultaneously, one should not underestimate the key role played by an NGO, in this case the local mission, in helping to address serious skill and logistical shortfalls. Community-based development anchored on beekeeping has much to commend it, as it can be a source of income which does not compete with other activities, and it ‘provides livelihoods for many farming communities with low-cost investment, not so sophisticated equipment and can be done on marginal lands. It enhances protection of the environment and natural resources as communities realise greater benefits from managing forests’ (Nyatsande et al., 2014: 2).

which now includes South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini (Kyambalesa and Hougnikpo, 2006). Hanson (2015) identifies a ‘new’ and ‘mega’ regionalism emerging in Africa which is anchored on openness and, notably, the fostering of South–South cooperation which has significant potential to promote development and overcome the fragility experienced in many areas. According to Oloruntoba (2020), regional integration and pan-Africanism are crucial to ensuring Africa’s place in the modern world order, improving economic development and encouraging inclusive development. Makinda and Okumu (2008) argue that the proliferation of regional groupings in Africa came about because of the perceived need for both collective security and development in the post-Cold War era, and in response to regional conflicts within the continent. According to Adejombi and Olukoshi (2008), slow economic progress and increasing marginalization of the continent at the global level have also given impetus to new regional development strategies. The small size of national economies and the logic of establishing a collective voice through supranational arrangements (Griffiths, 1995) has created what Bell (1987: 108) argues is a ‘powerful case’ for regional cooperation. The post-independence era in Africa was characterized by clear commitment in many African countries to the principle of pan-Africanism and the determination of a unique and collaborative vision for the continent (Makinda and Okumu, 2008). This was initially advocated by first-generation independence leaders, such as Lumumba, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda and Nkrumah. Nkrumah argued for the concept in his book Africa Must Unite (Griffiths, 1995; see Chapters 3 and 11). These concepts crystallized in 1980 with the Lagos Plan of Action, which laid the basis for seeking greater degrees of self-reliance through supranational arrangements. Earlier, in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity had been formed as a loose political union among most of Africa’s states. This has since evolved into the African Union, established in 2001, which has now established a pan-African parliament and supported the formation of the African Economic Community (see below) (Janneh, 2006). In addition to continent-wide initiatives, Africa boasts a significant range of customs and nascent economic unions that have variously assisted with such issues as the provision

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of unified telecommunications networks in southern Africa and the formation of regional peacekeeping forces in West Africa. As Ayeni (1997: 53) notes, these activities ‘have serious repercussions for processes of regional development all over the continent’. The key unions are: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the East African Community (EAC), first established in 1967 and revived in 2000, leading to the establishment of a customs union in 2005 (Kyambalesa and Hougnikpo, 2006); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which was established in 1985 to promote regional economic cooperation, free trade, a customs union and eventually a common market in central Africa; and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, which is seeking collective ‘self-sufficiency’ through the development of an economic and monetary union and a trading bloc (Konadu-Agyemang and Panford, 2006). In southern Africa, there is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was formed in 1992 to replace an earlier political union in the region. This organization strives to promote socio-economic, political and security cooperation. The 12 member countries have formed a free trade area and progress has been made in a range of joint infrastructure, trade and healthcare projects (Kyambalesa and Hougnikpo, 2006). Another union is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), formed in 1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area, which has established a free trade area between its nine member countries. At an even grander level, the African Economic Community (AEC) has utilized the above-mentioned regional groupings as ‘pillars’ for its proposed activities. The AEC was founded in 1991 through the Abuja Treaty and has sought to promote the development of a continental trading bloc (Niang, 2006; Kyambalesa and Hougnikpo, 2006). Effective from 2021, 54 of the 55 member nations of the Africa Union agreed to institute the African Continental Free Trade Area which will see intra-African tariffs reducing by 80 per cent and will have the potential to boost trade within the continent by over 50 per cent (World Bank, 2020a; African Union, 2021a). This is a very significant achievement, which will not only boost pan-Africanism, but also has the potential to catalyze significant intra-country development. At a political level, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (1963) and its successor the African Union (AU) in 2001 have been the primary continental forms of regional political collaboration and cooperation. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, the AU seeks to promote socio-economic and political integration, to achieve consensus and common positions on important issues, and to establish peace and security (Konadu-Agyemang and Panford, 2006; Makinda and Okumu, 2008). A pan-African parliament includes representatives from every country on the continent. Mechanisms to promote peacekeeping, democracy and development have also been put in place (Mohamoud, 2007). In 2007, a Union Government for Africa was mooted. A parallel international initiative that has been formally adopted by the AU is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), established in 2001 through the merger of South Africa, Algeria and Nigeria’s Millennium Partnership Plan and Senegal’s OMEGA Plan (Konadu-Agyemang and Panford, 2006; see Chapter 11). NEPAD seeks to put in place continent-wide mechanisms to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and development, integrate Africa into the world economy and accelerate the empowerment of women (Niang, 2006; Mohamoud 2007). Partnerships have since been developed with many of the world’s key financial bodies, and programmes focusing on agriculture, science, e-schools, infrastructure and building continental institutions have been established. In practice, though, slow progress, the lack of civil

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society participation, perceptions that NEPAD is working too closely with ‘Washington Consensus’ organizations, and the dominance of South Africa in the organization, are concerns for several member states (Makinda and Okumu, 2008). UNCTAD (2009) argues that while substantial progress has been made to establish regional institutions, intra-African trade, investment and people’s mobility have not increased significantly in recent years, meaning Africa still has some of the most fragmented markets in the world. A key continental development initiative, anchored in pan-Africanism, was the release in 2015 of ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa we want’ by the African Union and which argues ‘we are determined to transform the continent and ensure irreversible and universal change of the African continent’ (African Union, 2015: 14). The Agenda calls on steps to support the whole continent to achieve prosperity for all, inclusive growth and sustainable development. Key objectives are: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

The eradication of poverty An education and skills revolution Industrialization Modernization of agriculture Addressing climate change Infrastructure development A Continental Free Trade area Achieving gender parity, silencing the guns, consolidating democracy. (African Union, 2015)

Key actions identified to achieve these outcomes include: accountable leadership, people’s ownership and mobilization, using African resources to finance development, democratic development states, a pan-African perspective, ownership of the African narrative and an African approach to development and transformation (African Union, 2015). Agenda 2063 is a bold and ambitious statement and, while the COVID-19 pandemic has been an unfortunate setback, this will be a very important space to watch in coming decades. Progress made in terms of promoting continental trade, as noted above, is a significant achievement. The arguments presented by Agenda 2063 resonate with the call for ‘Homegrown Development’ made by Okereke and Agupusi (2015), anchored on ‘self-reliant sustainable homegrown development’. In their book, the authors make a strong case for locally based solutions to avoid foreign dependence and satisfy local imperatives through building local capacity and through participatory approaches (Kamalu, 2015). At a broader level such thinking resonates with calls for decolonization and sustainable self-determination (Corntassel, 2012) and the need for development narratives which are aligned with African epistemologies (Ukwandu, 2017).

2.6 Recent theoretical and applied responses to persistent poverty 2.6.1 Asset- and livelihood-based approaches Persistent poverty in the South, and particularly in Africa, has prompted a reassessment of development interventions and ways in which to respond to poverty and encourage

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livelihood diversification. One recent approach to understanding and responding to poverty is the ‘asset-based approach’, which examines the stock of productive, financial, physical, natural, social and human assets controlled by households and individuals, and determines their position in society and their ability to respond to shocks. Strengthening assets can build resilience to shocks and provide the poor with security, be it derived from the land, their families or their skills, should they lose access to income or perhaps experience unanticipated external disruption to their well-being (Barrett et al., 2008). Related to this has been the identification and development of the ‘Sustainable Livelihoods Framework’(SLF), which identifies the capabilities, assets and activities that contribute to the livelihoods of the poor (see Chapter 8). This approach provides a mechanism to identify appropriate entry points for interventions and allows better sequencing of interventions to support the poor. At the core of the SLF is the identification of the ‘asset pentagon’, comprising the various ‘capitals’ to which people might have access: natural, human, financial, social and physical (Potter et al., 2018). The approach recognizes that survival in the South often requires reliance on multi-livelihood strategies, and it has influenced recent interventions and approaches to development pursued by development and donor organizations, such as UNDP and CARE (Potter et al., 2018).

2.6.2 Pro-poor growth and poverty reduction strategy papers In the early years of the 21st century, international development efforts and associated global support have tended to revolve around two core themes – poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium and then the Sustainable Development Goals, which collectively seek to achieve the recently identified goal of ‘pro-poor growth’ (Potter et al., 2018). This has a conceptual link with Pieterse’s idea of ‘reflexive development’, which refers to the way in which mainstream development agencies have softened their economic interpretations and policies to allow for more people-centred development in response to both the shortcomings of traditional development interventions and the criticism of those who have argued for alternative forms of development (Pieterse, 1998). Pro-poor growth ultimately seeks to promote policies that simultaneously achieve growth and also ensure the participation of poor people themselves (Ravallion, 2004). It advocates the need to promote empowerment and investment in poor people and to encourage their participation in the economy, while generating a sound investment climate to promote aggregate growth (Bigsten and Shimeles, 2004). While pro-poor development ultimately underlies much of the work of NGOs, social movements and civil societies, its objectives are increasingly filtering into mainstream practice. One of the most significant influences can be seen in the structure and focus of the development plans or PRSPs that developing countries were required to formulate in the first few years of the current century. PRSPs can, in some ways, be regarded as successors to SAPs. They are strategic documents drafted by developing countries, around which the World Bank, the IMF and other donors coordinate their development efforts (Potter et al., 2018). For the poorest countries, producing PRSPs was obligatory to achieving debt relief and conditional lending. These documents focus on both macro-economic and structural considerations for the management of economies and associated social sector reform, with specific emphasis on development outcomes that benefit the poor. While host countries assume ownership of the process, critics argue that most strategies continue to rely on external prescriptions of reducing state involvement, engaging with globalization and issues of trade that are not always favourable to the host countries and which require such countries to take responsibility for their own poverty reduction (Potter et al., 2018).

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A World Bank/IMF review undertaken in 30 African countries in 2002 suggested that levels of popular participation in the planning process and increased access due to the decentralization of state administration were valuable attributes of the PRSP process. However, the study also recognized that inadequate support was being given to agriculture, and that many countries lacked the requisite skills and planning capacities to implement change adequately (Potter et al., 2018).

2.6.3 Poverty responses At a broader level, anti-poverty campaigns became a rallying call among social groups, governments and academics in the North during the early 21st century. The ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign (Make Poverty History, 2010), the efforts of popculture figures, such as Bono, and theories about the ‘end of poverty’ (Sachs, 2005) have all featured prominently in the media, as have appeals to reduce debt and address the scourge of poverty. The degree to which this translates into securing significant improvements in global, and particularly African well-being remains to be seen. A noticeable trend in Africa in the 21st century has been the development of government social protection programmes, most of which provide cash transfers to address poverty. By 2020 some 46 African countries had some system in place, up from 25 in 2005. Although the experience varies, initial evidence from Malawi suggests that support from the Social Cash Transfer Programme has actually helped to improve food security and livelihoods among the poor (Handa et al., 2021).

2.7 The Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals Development thinking transformed into an international undertaking from 2000, following the United Nations’ Millennium Declaration when the UN General Assembly formally adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a concerted global initiative to coordinate donor efforts and national interventions to improve the welfare and living conditions of the world’s poor (UN, 2001). The MDGs had a set time for their attainment (2000–2015), after which they were replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs: 2015–2030) which are the current global development foci blending objectives of social and economic transformation with sustainability and environmental objectives (see below). The MDGs were particularly significant as they were the first global initiative designed to achieve overarching development goals at a global scale (Polonenko et al., 2017). The MDGs and then the SDGs were not ‘development interventions’ in the classic economic sense, but are aligned rather more with conceptions of ‘human development’ and ‘basic needs’ and more recently with sustainability objectives. There were eight MDGs, with associated targets and indicators designed to give focus to efforts to reduce extreme poverty and hunger, promote equality, combat disease and ensure environmental sustainability through a global partnership for development (see Table 2.3). The authors of the MDGs anticipated that they could be attained by 2015. While the MDGs were clearly well intentioned, and aid agencies and national governments aligned their development interventions with them, they were not primarily a development strategy. Instead, they should be seen as a long-overdue effort to raise global living standards, and in so doing identify targets to form a base on which more sustainable endeavours could be built.

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Table 2.3 The Millennium Development Goals Goal

Targets

1 To eradicate extreme hunger and poverty

•   To halve the proportion of people living on less than $1/day •   To halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger •   To ensure all boys and girls complete primary schooling

2 To achieve universal primary education 3 To promote gender equality and empower women 4 To reduce child mortality 5 To improve maternal health 6 To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 7 To ensure environmental sustainability

8 To develop a global partnership for development

•   To eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education •   To reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate of under-fives •   To reduce the maternal mortality ratio by 75 per cent •   To halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS •   To halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and the spread of other diseases •   To integrate principles of sustainable development into country policies and to reduce the loss of environmental resources •   To halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water •   To improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers •   To promote open trade and finance •   To address the trade and debt relief needs of the poorest countries •   To address the special needs of landlocked and smallisland developing states •   To make debt sustainable •   To develop youth employment •   To provide affordable drug access •   To make available new technologies, especially information and communications

Source: UN, 2001.

In terms of attainment of the MDGs, while many countries in South America and Asia achieved many of the goals prior to 2015 (Clemens et al., 2007), Potter et al. (2018) argue that results were ‘patchy’ and, of all the continents, Africa was the least likely to meet the goals. Clarke and Feeny (2011) argued that Africa would have had to experience economic growth rates in excess of 7 per cent for 15 years if the poverty rate was to be halved. While progress was made in Africa by 2015 in advancing women’s education, unfortunately, in terms of the key goal of reducing poverty, Ayittey (2015) noted that the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa did not decline by 2015, but actually rose from 290 million in 1990 to 413 million and that the continent’s progress with six of the eight goals was ‘inadequate’ (Andrews et al., 2015: 313). That said, it is also important to note that there were clear ‘front-runners’ in achieving the MDGs, such as Benin, Mali and Ethiopia, while, by contrast, conditions in some 12 African countries appear to have worsened (ODI, 2010). In September 2010, the United Nations appealed for an ‘extra push’ in relation to aid, trade and debt relief to help meet the MDGs (UN, 2010a). This appeal noted that aid flows were at an all-time high of $120 billion in 2009, but that this was still $20 billion less than had been pledged by the G8 countries in 2005,

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while the funding gap for Africa was $16 billion. Aside from the scale of the development backlog that needs to be addressed, various authors have questioned the institutional capacity in Africa to address the MDGs, as well as the realism of the goals in terms of the scale of financial commitment required from donor countries, which has not been forthcoming at the desired rate (Clemens et al., 2007; Easterly, 2009). It is important to note that Africa’s seemingly poor performance and ‘failure’ to meet all of the MDGs does not adequately acknowledge that the continent actually started from a much weaker base than all other continents and that questions over the reliability of the scores can be raised (Easterly, 2009). In response, Mistry (2005) argued that poverty reduction needs to go hand in hand with greater efforts at development if ‘true’ progress is to be attained. In 2015, following the expiry of the MDGs, the SDGs were adopted as a new global development agenda. The SDGs (Box 2.6) are far more encompassing and aspirational than the MDGs, not only in terms of the specification of 17 very broad goals and 169 specific targets linked to the goals, many of which have quantifiable indicators, but also in terms of their ‘global’ scope, as opposed to a focus on the South. The SDGs also introduced a key sustainability dimension into the development agenda (UN, 2015). According to Sachs et al. (2021), the SDGs apply to both rich and poor countries and deal with the key global challenges, notably the need for economic development, environmental sustainability and social inclusion. Despite their noble ideals, there are concerns over the potential to attain the goals in Africa, particularly in light of the impact of COVID-19 and the challenge of trying to fund what will often need to be state-led investment in an era of neo-liberalism and budget cuts (Caiado et al., 2018). Additional challenges, identified by Gore (2015), are how to blend global goals with national priorities, and how to achieve the goals in the context of planetary boundaries.

Box 2.6 The 17 Sustainable Development Goals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

No poverty Zero hunger Good health and well-being Quality education Gender equality Clean water and sanitation Affordable and clean energy Decent work and economic growth Industry, innovation and infrastructure Reduce inequality Sustainable cities and communities Responsible consumption and production Climate action Life under water Life on land Peace, justice and strong institutions Partnerships for development

Source: UN (2015).

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In terms of the African context specifically, D’Alessandro and Zulu (2017) argue that while Africa has the advantage of natural resources and a growing population, there are significant leadership, capacity, institutional and financial barriers to achieving the SDGs. In the context of applying the SDGs, it is apparent that significant work needs to be undertaken to embed the SDGs within national and local policy and practice in Africa (Jönsson and Bexell, 2021). By 2020 progress with achieving the SDGs in Africa was sadly lagging due, to a significant degree, to the fiscal effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the Lower Income Developing Countries (Sachs et al., 2021). According to the 2021 SDG Report, ‘All sub-Saharan African countries continue to face major challenges in meeting most of the 17 SDGs. With continued high levels of extreme poverty in some countries in SSA, progress towards socio-economic goals and access to basic services and infrastructure (SDGs 1 to 9) is poor compared to other world regions’ (Sachs et al., 2021: 30). The 2020 Africa SDG Index and Dashboard Report (SDG Centre for Africa, 2020) noted that across the continent there had been either moderate achievement or stagnation in terms of achieving the goals. COVID-19 has seen an increase of 22 million in the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa rather than the anticipated eradication of extreme poverty envisaged by SDG # 1. While North Africa is the best performing region in the continent, in general terms most African countries are not ‘on track’ to achieve the SDGs. The most progress has been made in terms of Goal 13 (Climate action), and Goal 12 (Responsible consumption and production), while the least progress has been made with Goal 3 (Health and well-being), Goal 9 (Infrastructure) and Goal 16 (Peace). As the SDG Report notes, COVID-19 has been a serious setback, and going forward redoubled efforts will be needed to achieve the SDGs, which will require not only local action, but ‘international solidarity and partnerships are needed to respond to the health emergency globally, including through vaccine rollout and strengthened access to financing’ (Sachs et al., 2021: 30).

2.8 Aid, trade and debt The three interlinked topics of aid, trade and debt are undoubtedly some of the most controversial issues impacting on current development prospects for Africa. All three ultimately exist because of the key role which globalization now plays in our contemporary world, be it in terms of economic interdependence between countries, the desire to access necessary raw materials and goods, and/or the ability to respond to perceived development or humanitarian shortfalls in developing countries. From a development perspective, the supply of aid has been one of the key approaches to fostering strategic development interventions, while encouraging trade is regarded as a mechanism through which to promote the development of the broader economy. By contrast, debt has often inhibited investment and has negatively impacted upon growth prospects. Therefore, these three issues, and the ways in which they are playing themselves out in the 21st century, provide a critical context that can either encourage or stifle broader development interventions.

2.8.1 Aid Aid refers to the transfer of resources, usually from the North to the South. Historically, the supply of aid had links with modernization theory, when international support

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was seen as a way to help developing countries address lags in development and achieve ‘take-off’. Over the decades, aid has assumed various guises. These include government-to-government and government-to-NGO/community transfers, and private or NGO support to groups in the South (Willis, 2020). Such support can take various forms, including financial grants or loans, direct assistance with government operations, food aid, military support, technical advice, skills enhancement and the supply of emergency relief. Aid can also be classified as bilateral (transfers directly from one country to another), or multilateral (when an international institution, such as the World Bank, which represents numerous donors, initiates the support) (Moss, 2007). Official state aid to the South, called ODA (Official Development Assistance), currently averages 0.41 per cent of Gross National Income from the OECD states, despite calls from international agencies since the 1970s that a figure of 0.7 per cent is more appropriate (Potter et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the value of aid received in Africa increased from $13 billion in 2001 to $24 billion in 2004 and $55 billion in 2019 (Moss, 2007; World Bank, 2019). This is equivalent to over 5 per cent of the GDP of Africa itself, and if South Africa and Nigeria are excluded from the equation, the figure rises to over 10 per cent. While aid is undoubtedly of critical importance, for example in times of famine, there are times when it has been criticized for generating dependence and for being siphoned off by elite groups (Omotoye et al., 2007). In addition, politically tied aid is highly controversial, with some of the key recipients, both now and historically, being countries aligned with the political interests of the donor countries (Wade, 2004; Omotola and Saliu, 2009). Equally contentious is military assistance. Critics of aid have argued that it can become a ‘bottomless pit’, but Sachs (2005) has argued that an aid-financed ‘big push’ is now needed if countries are to break out of the ‘poverty trap’. In the case of World Bank assistance, the focus of aid support has evolved according to the Bank’s changing agenda – from support for infrastructure projects in the 1960s, to targeting management in the 1970s, to structural reform in the 1980s, and more recently to focusing on issues of governance (Moss, 2007). While aid can be critical, it can also lead to external interests eclipsing local ones, in terms of what can be funded and supported (Omotoye et al., 2007). For example, despite the reality that nearly two-thirds of Africa’s population depend on near-subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods, support for this sector has fallen by two-thirds, while more money is going into supporting social services (Wade, 2004; Alonso, 2014). Further, Mistry (2005) argued that while linking aid to achieving the MDGs is laudable, long-term challenges are being created by reducing support to other sectors, particularly productive activities. China has recently emerged as one of the bigger aid donors in Africa, but the role it plays and the requirements to repay debts incurred are a growing cause of concern (Busse et al., 2016). Alonso (2014: 288) argues that ‘despite the challenges promoted within the aid system, there is a feeling that development policy is not up to the challenges of today’s reality’. He argues that heterogeneity in the developing world and institutional changes have altered the landscape of aid provision, with aid being increasingly diverted from middle-to low-income countries in Africa with a focus on social service provision and less so on economic activities. That said, there is evidence that aid seldom reaches the poorest of the poor (Briggs, 2018).

2.8.2 Trade Trade is an equally contested concept. Many of the trading links dominating Africa over the last few hundred years have been put in place to meet the needs of other

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countries, initially for the supply of slaves, then for Africa’s resources, primarily minerals, and more recently for markets for their products (Potter et al., 2018). While trade has long been regarded as a key mechanism to promote economic development, particularly in light of the export-led success of South-east Asian countries, the ability to penetrate global markets has been more difficult to attain in the case of Africa (Moss, 2007). This situation has been caused by deteriorating prices received for Africa’s produce, which is dominated by the export of raw materials, poor competitiveness, trade barriers and poor domestic performance in the manufacturing sector (Moss, 2007). At the same time, World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements that African countries should lower trade barriers have extended market opportunities for foreign firms in Africa, and no doubt have extended the product range at a lower cost to consumers (Willis, 2020). However, Africa’s fledgling industries have often foundered in the face of cheap foreign products, especially from China, restricting local development opportunities and with many countries having little to export apart from their raw materials (Wade, 2004). Furthermore, EU and North American local-producer food subsidies discriminate against African producers. In 1999, it was estimated that if the West truly opened its markets to developing countries, the latter’s economies would benefit by $700 billion, while in 2001 a UN report estimated that poor countries lose a total of $2 billion each day because of unjust trade rules (Omotoye et al., 2007). Africa’s poor trading performance is exemplified by the fact that its share of global trade was only 6 per cent in 1980, but had fallen to a mere 3 per cent by 2019 (IISD, 2021). Slow global economic growth, particularly since the outbreak on COVID-19, has dampened the export capacity of Africa’s commodities and, by implication, internal growth and development potential (Edo et al., 2020). While African countries have traditionally struggled to make effective objections to the nature of the current global trading regime, in recent years opposition from key developing countries (particularly Brazil and India) at global trade discussions (such as those held in Geneva in 2006) has clearly impacted on the ability of the WTO to achieve global consensus (Wade, 2004; Potter et al., 2018). The Africa Progress Panel (2008) has argued that Africa needs a workable international trade policy and support to create jobs and take advantage of global opportunities. In addition, fair and ethical trade might benefit communities in the South by allowing them to sell such products as coffee and tea directly to Western consumers who wish to make ethical choices about what they purchase (Potter et al., 2018, see Chapter 8). Unquestionably, the role of China has increased dramatically in Africa since the 1990s, and it has become the biggest trade and investment partner for many countries in Africa, whether through new trade relationships, or the establishment of Chinese owned and run industrial and mining estates and the rehabilitation of communication networks to facilitate trade – such as railway projects in Kenya and Ethiopia (Busse et al., 2016). Benefits are, however, selective and the role played by China is regarded by many as controversial.

2.8.3 Debt African debt is equally controversial. While some may argue that African countries only have themselves to blame for getting into debt, this is not the whole picture, and one should not ignore the context in which the debt crisis arose. In the 1970s, there were economic crises in the West associated with the devaluation of the US dollar and

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oil-price hikes. This, coupled with injudicious commercial loans to the South, low or negative economic growth globally, limited trade and investment, and currency devaluation in Africa, made debt repayment impossible for many countries in the 1980s (Willis, 2020). In 1970, Africa’s debt stood at $7 billion. However, between 1980 and 1999, Africa’s debt tripled from 28 per cent to 72 per cent of GDP, equivalent to $216 billion (Moss, 2007; Potter et al., 2018). Between 2010 and 2020 overall African debt rose from $305 billion to $702 billion, a level which the World Bank regards as a threat to economic recovery (Pandey, 2021). Structural adjustment policies and rescheduled debt repayment from the 1980s obliged many African countries to cut their social service expenditure, and several of them became net exporters of currency. In the case of Nigeria, debt service payments were equivalent to between 20 and 30 per cent of total exports between 1998 and 2000 (Omotola and Saliu, 2009). It is estimated that between 1970 and 2002, Africa received $540 billion in loans and paid back $550 billion, yet in 2002 the debt still stood at $293 billion (Omotola and Saliu, 2009). More recent debt writeoffs for the poorest countries are to be welcomed, as are global campaigns on this issue, such as Jubilee 2000 (Potter et al., 2018), but the debt burden remains high for many countries. A total of 38 countries in the world, of which 32 are in Africa, have been identified as HIPCs (highly indebted poor countries). In 2005, in return for meeting externally imposed criteria for good governance and making commitments to address poverty, 18 of them were granted debt relief. Critics argue that while this is clearly beneficial, locking countries into Western-imposed criteria parallels earlier SAPs and, in some senses maintains the status quo by not addressing the fact that Africa remains on the lowest rung of the global economic ladder (Omotola and Saliu, 2009). More positively, those HIPCs that have benefited from debt relief have started to increase investment in education and healthcare. By 2019, 30 HIPCs in Africa had received $75 million in debt relief, but a study by Atangana (2019) found that while debt relief reduced inflation and trade deficits, it has unfortunately not led to economic growth to any noticeable degree. Edo et al. (2020) note with concern that slow recent growth in commodity exports is exacerbating the debt burden in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. In the future, Omotola and Saliu (2009) argue that debt relief and effective aid are inextricably linked, requiring the coordinated development of applied solutions to Africa’s development challenges.

2.9 Current economic growth trends in Africa Despite the general failure of development interventions to raise overall levels of human welfare in Africa, until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, there were signs that real economic growth was starting to occur. For much of the period from 1995 to 2005, economic growth rates in Africa averaged 5 per cent per annum or more. It is also noteworthy that five of the ten fastest-growing economies in the world in the early 2000s were in Africa, and in general terms the continent has been one of the best-performing areas in the world (Allen, 2010). Significantly, the global recession of 2008–2009 appeared to have had less severe effects in Africa than in other parts of the world, and the rate of recovery was more rapid there than elsewhere. Even though growth rates fell to 2.5 per cent in 2009 (OECD Observer, 2010), Devarajan in 2010 suggested that the continent could return to a growth rate

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of 5 per cent per annum after the global recession (Devarajan, 2010). Economists believe this rapid growth and quick recovery were attributable to the pursuit of sound economic policies, managing inflation, avoiding protection, reducing fiscal deficits, and macro-economic stabilization. The rapid recovery was also attributed to the resumption of demand by emerging countries, notably China (Kasekende et al., 2010; OECD Observer, 2010). A key driver for the pre-pandemic growth was China. Between 2014 and 2018 China was the biggest single provider of foreign direct investment to the continent, amounting to $72 billion, which created 172,000 jobs (AFRI-IX, 2021). However, COVID-19 and its effects have been an unfortunate game-changer for Africa and its short and long-term development prospects. Over and above the tragic human effects (see Chapter 6), the economic effects of the pandemic in Africa have been disastrous and will see the contraction of the overall economy by more than 5 per cent. In a worst case scenario incomes could contract by 20 per cent and Africa faces the reality of growing numbers of people living in, or being forced back into, extreme poverty – accounting for up to 50 per cent of the global total (Diop and Asongu, 2021). According to the IMF, the strong economic growth in Africa has been reversed, with 43 million people forced into extreme poverty and with the continent needing $1.2 trillion if it is to cope with these challenges (BBC, 2020a). The potential effects of these changes on Africa’s development prospects and the achievements made to date are extremely negative. Most hard-hit are likely to be the youth, women and those in the informal sector (Kinyondo and Pelizzo, 2021; Naude, 2021). The ability of governments and agencies to respond will be impacted by the prioritization of health responses, the contraction of economic activity and trade and the fact that foreign direct investment in Africa fell 16 per cent, or $7 billion, in 2019–2020 (AFRI-IX, 2021). Another consideration is that, while there were positive trends pre-pandemic, such growth needs to be seen in context, as these figures generally represent percentage increases from an exceptionally low base. Resource- or oil-rich countries have generally fared better, skewing continental statistics (OECD Observer, 2008), and it would be fair to argue that the prime beneficiaries of pre-2020 growth were corporations and the emerging middle class. Whether such benefits are passed on to the lower classes in any meaningful way remains to be seen. Also of concern is the fact that investment levels are still only half of those in Asia, and there is a likelihood that future development prospects will be hindered by continuing massive infrastructural and human-resource deficits (Devarajan, 2010). Furthermore, rising food prices and associated food shortages led to riots in 2010 in such countries as Mozambique, while significant buy-outs of Africa’s productive land by Asian and Middle Eastern countries have been taking place in anticipation of further global shortages. Recently, South Korea was blocked from proceeding with a deal that would have seen the sale of 40 per cent of Madagascar’s arable land (OECD Observer, 2008; Draper, 2010). So, while recent growth is gratifying, the question remains: who benefits? Africa today, therefore, presents a mixed balance sheet. On one level, it has boasted some of the world’s fastest-growing economies this century, yet, on another level, it is unlikely to achieve all the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, whilst the long-term effects of COVID-19 on development prospects have yet to be fully understood. Consequently, ensuring that growth is translated into improved livelihoods for deprived majorities is clearly a major challenge for the future.

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2.10 Conclusion and future prospects As the preceding discussion has illustrated, the experience of ‘development’ in Africa has achieved mixed results. A series of interventions have occurred, inspired by varying theoretical persuasions, but it is difficult to argue that significant improvements in human welfare and well-being for the majority of Africans have taken place since the 1950s. It is apparent that the dreams of emulating the West, which characterized the immediate post-independence era, were scarcely realized, while experiments with self-reliance and local development have had only limited success. Current efforts to achieve poverty relief, attain the SDGs and promote development through regional integration will hopefully, over time, lead to some redistribution of wealth and possibly improved welfare. Principles of ‘bottom-up’ and local development will be increasingly important but, as Samli (2008) argues, such approaches must be grounded in effective entrepreneurship if tangible progress is to be made. The potential benefits of the continental free trade agreement and Agenda 2063, and efforts at homegrown development, need to be balanced against the uncertain impact of COVID-19 on the continent’s development and the nature of backlogs that it might induce. It is inevitable that future development in Africa will be shaped by new global players, notably China and, to a lesser degree, India, Brazil and South Africa. China’s and India’s relentless quests for minerals and raw materials to feed their high-growth economies, and South Africa’s search for new markets for its industrial products, food produce and communications technologies, has led to significant new investment in the continent (Cropley, 2010). While the establishment of new mines and factories may well perpetuate the problems of isolated nodal development, the extension of mobile-phone networks in countries lacking landline connections is proving to be a valuable stimulus for isolated communities by allowing them to establish market links. China has become the continent’s biggest investor (AFRI-IX, 2021). In parallel, Chinese trade with the continent increased tenfold since 2000, meaning it has surpassed the USA’s trade with Africa. Major investment in the oil industry, mining, industry and infrastructure is the hallmark of the new Chinese presence, which is signalling a potential realignment of historic economic links between Africa and the North (Cropley, 2009). However, ever-increasing demands for oil and mineral resources from the likes of China and Brazil will inevitably shape future development and could perpetuate the dependent relationships of the 1970s. Three key questions for the near future are, first, whether all (or indeed any) of the SDGs will be met, secondly, whether mass poverty will be significantly reduced in Africa and, thirdly, what will be the impact of COVID-19 on development prospects? The challenges are very real and, while impressive economic growth is taking place in some African countries, indicators suggest that the needs of the poor majority are being met only very slowly (ODI, 2010). If this continues, it will simply perpetuate Africa’s relatively poor performance in global terms. It is interesting to reflect that the countries of the North have recently experienced periods of economic recession and restructuring (for example, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the 2020–2021 response to COVID-19), marked by enhanced levels of state intervention that are contrary to traditional monetarist prescriptions that have been preached to Africa for decades. Within the context of the now-questionable Western model, it is perhaps appropriate for Africa to start looking inwards for its own solutions. In The Challenge for Africa, Nobel Peace Prize-winner Wangari Maathai (2009: 6) comments:

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As I write, the world is in a financial crisis, caused in part by lack of oversight and deregulation in the industrialized world.… For decades, Africa has been urged to emulate this financial system.… While this structure has enriched the West, practising it without caution has only impoverished Africa. The current crisis offers Africa a useful lesson … rather than following blindly the prescriptions of others, Africans need to think and act for themselves.

Summary 1 2 3 4 5 6

Understanding of what ‘development’ is and how to apply it has evolved over time. Development and political considerations are closely linked. There has been a recent shift to local and self-reliant development and the pursuit of the SDGs and sustainable development. Decolonial and pan-African perspectives are increasingly shaping and focusing debates. Aid, trade and debt all exercise significant influences over the capacity and potential of countries to develop. The impact of COVID-19 on development prospects is likely to be significant.

Discussion questions 1 2 3 4 5 6

What is ‘development’ and how has understanding of the concept evolved over time? How effective have been the different development interventions? What roles do trade, aid and debt play in assisting or hindering development? What are the prospects for success of the SDGs? What do decolonial and pan-African perspectives teach us about the nature and focus of development? What might be the focus of future development strategies in Africa?

Further reading Akanle, O., and Adesina, J.O. (eds) (2018) The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses. Cham: Springer. Bond, P. (2007) Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation. London: Zed Books. Horner, R., and Hulme, D. (2017) From international to global development: New geographies of 21st century development. Development and Change, 50(2), 347–378. Mawdsley, E. (2017) Development geography 1: Cooperation, competition and convergence between ‘North’ and ‘South’. Progress in Human Geography, 41(1), 108–117. Niang, A. (2006) Towards a Viable and Credible Development in Africa. Raleigh, NC: Ivy House. Potter, R.B., Binns, T., Elliot, J.A., and Smith, D. (2018) Geographies of Development (4th edn.). London: Routledge. Power, M. (2003) Rethinking Development Geographies. London: Routledge.

Useful websites African Union: Agenda 2063: https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview Details current continental development plans and priorities. Commonwealth Local Government Foundation: www.clgf.org.uk/ Provides details on decentralization and local economic development in Africa and further afield. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals: https://sdgs.un.org/goals ; www.sdgactioncampaign.org/ ; www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/

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The 2030 Agenda: https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda 2021 SDG Annual Report: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/ The SDG Report: https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/ Details the goals and progress towards their achievement. United Nations University – Worldwide Institute of Development Economics Research (UNWIDER): www.wider.unu.edu/ Contains research reports and findings on a range of developmental activities. World Bank: www.worldbank.org Contains a wide range of statistical and published data pertaining to development activities.

3

History and Governance

3.1 Introduction At the first International Congress of Africanists held in Accra, Ghana in 1962, President Kwame Nkrumah observed that ‘the central myth in the mythology surrounding Africa is that of the denial that we are a historical people’ (Bown and Crowder, 1964: 8). In this chapter we will examine some of the important landmarks in African history. For many people who live outside Africa, the continent’s history is seen to start with European colonization, though ancient Egypt remains a popular element in many school history curricula. However, it is not just in Egypt that the richness of Africa’s history can be seen. Many parts of the continent have significant relics and inheritances from the past that testify to rich and diverse civilizations, and in a single book chapter it would be impossible to encompass all aspects of these. This chapter begins by examining the beginnings of humankind, early livelihood strategies and pre-colonial state formation. Some early outside contacts with Africa are considered and European exploration and exploitation are examined, most notably in the context of slavery and the slave trade. The nature and legacies of colonialism are discussed, and the processes of decolonization and independence are reviewed. The chapter concludes with a consideration of issues relating to political stability and governance since independence.

3.2 Origins of humankind – we are all Africans! In the last few decades there has been much debate about the origins of humankind, but evidence from various archaeological excavations during the last century seems to confirm that humans originated in Africa. It is indeed a sobering thought to know that the origins of all of us on planet Earth today actually began in Africa. As Ann Gibbons confidently asserts, ‘Africa is the birthplace of our species and the source of ancient migrations that spanned the globe’ (Gibbons, 2015: 149). However, the hot and humid climates often mean that ancient DNA is not well preserved. In studying Africa’s human development from the earliest times, it is particularly apparent how climate change at various times and in various locations has played a significant role in shaping patterns and processes affecting the nature of lifestyles and livelihoods. In 1924, one of the earliest paleo-anthropological discoveries was in a limestone quarry at Taung in the present-day North West Province of South Africa, when Professor Raymond Dart of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg found the skull of a child, named as Australopithecus africanus. More commonly known as the ‘Taung Child’, this was the first fossil of a pre-human ancestor found in Africa and probably dates from 2.5 million years ago. About 400km north-east of Taung, and 40km north-west of DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403-3

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Johannesburg, in a series of limestone caves at Sterkfontein, is the so-called ‘Cradle of Humankind’, which in 1999 was designated as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. The Cradle of Humankind is renowned for its Australopithecus africanus specimens, which lived between 3 million and 2 million years ago. The first adult fossil of this hominid (TM 1511) was found at Sterkfontein by Dr Robert Broom in 1936. According to UNESCO, ‘The fossil evidence contained within these sites proves conclusively that the African continent is the undisputed Cradle of Humankind’ (UNESCO, 2020: 1). Elsewhere in Africa, from the 1930s onwards there have been an important series of hominid discoveries in the Olduvai Gorge located in the Great Rift Valley of northern Tanzania. Most notably, Louis and Mary Leakey found stone tools, and in 1959 Mary Leakey found the remains of a skull and upper teeth of a type of hominin that had not been previously identified. The Leakeys classified their hominim as Zinjanthropus boisei. The Leakeys, and their sons Richard and Jonathan, found many other remains, including Homo habilis in 1972 which was dated as 2 million years old and was thought to be able to use tools. The Leakeys concluded that humans did not all evolve from Australopithecus, as identified in the South African discoveries, but that it was more likely that several lines of hominins developed simultaneously across the continent. Further excavations by the Leakeys and others unearthed important remains, such as in 1986 when a group of American and Tanzanian archaeologists found 302 bones and teeth belonging to a female that was likely to be about 1.8 million years old. As Zimmermann comments, ‘The combination of the works of the Leakeys, Dart and Broom made a convincing case that humans originally evolved in Africa’ (Zimmermann, 2013: 2). There is also evidence of the domestication of fire 1.8 to 1 million years ago. More recently, in the 21st century, significant discoveries include a hominid skull found in the Djurab Desert of northern Chad in 2002. This was dated as being probably between 6 and 7 million years old, which is considerably older than hominid remains found in earlier excavations in southern and eastern Africa. Known as Sahelanthropus tchadensis (or better known by its nickname ‘Toumaï’), the badly damaged skull was found to date from the Late Miocene period when, according to genetic data, the evolutionary paths of the ancestors of humans and the ancestors of chimpanzees diverged. The anatomical features of Toumaï clearly indicated that it belonged to the hominid group and is the oldest and most primitive known member. Although it was found over 2,500km west of the East African Rift Valley, it is suggested that such hominid groups had dispersed across the Sahel and East Africa some 6 million years ago (BBC, 2005). It seems likely that various species of pre-human hominids lived across southern and eastern Africa and the relationships between the different groups are still uncertain. The most important discoveries are summarized below: • •

• •

Australopithecus anamensis, Kenya, which lived between 4.2 million and 3.9 million years ago and was found in Kenya in 1994. It probably walked upright and lived in open woodland habitats in what is now Kenya and Ethiopia. Australopithecus afarensis, Ethiopia and Kenya, which lived between 3.6 million and 3 million years ago. Small brained, walked upright, and was mostly herbivorous. It climbed trees well and lived at a time when Africa was forested. The best example of this species is the skeleton of ‘Lucy’, found at Hadar in the Awash Valley of Ethiopia in 1974. Australopithecus bahrelghazali, Chad, which lived circa 3 million years ago. The type specimen of this species is a mandible (lower jaw) fragment, found in a dry riverbed in 1993 in Chad, the furthest west that any Australopithecus has been found. Kenyanthropus platyops, Kenya, which lived between 3.5 million and 3.2 million years ago. Kenyanthropus platyops had primitive features including small ear holes,

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•

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but a lower part of the face that was similar to the Homo habilis skull KNMER 1470. This cranium is referred to by some as Australopithecus platyops. Australopithecus africanus, South Africa, which lived between 3 million and 2 million years ago. Australopithecus africanus was similar to Australopithecus afarensis. The best-known examples of this hominid are the Taung Child discovery of 1924 and ‘Mrs Ples’, a middle-aged female found near Sterkfontein in 1947. Australopithecus (species unnamed), South Africa, which lived 3.2 million years ago. An Australopithecus skeleton nicknamed ‘Little Foot’ was found in 1997 in the Sterkfontein Caves, the Cradle of Humankind. Australopithecus garhi, Ethiopia, which lived circa 2.5 million years ago. Australopithecus garhi, from the Afar region of Ethiopia, first described in 1999 by paleo-anthropologists, may prove to be the link between the Australopithecus and Homo genera and may have made the first stone tools – though researchers debate both these points. (Cradle of Humankind, 2020)

It is likely that anatomically modern humans (Homo sapiens), with large brains and walking on two legs (bipedal), emerged in Africa around 300,000 years ago. In 2017, archaeologists digging in an old mine at Jebel Irhoud, west of Marrakech in southern Morocco, unearthed human remains and stone tools that were thought to be about 300,000 years old as determined by thermoluminescence dating. This, according to Hublin et al. (2017) indicated that the evolutionary processes behind the emergence of H. sapiens almost certainly involved the whole African continent. As the archaeological evidence seems to confirm that Africa was indeed the ‘Cradle of Humankind’, much attention has been given to the timing and processes associated with the diffusion of humankind from Africa to the rest of the world. Eswaran provides an interesting view on this, suggesting that, the worldwide transition to an anatomically modern human form was caused by the diffusive spread from Africa of a genotype – a coadapted combination of novel genes – carrying a complex genetic advantage… (It is suggested that) the movement out of Africa was not a migration, but rather a ‘diffusion wave’, a continuous expansion of modern populations by small random movements, hybridization, and natural selection favouring the modern genotype. (Eswaran, 2002: 749) By about 150,000 years ago it seems likely that populations in Africa were beginning to move to other regions, but Mellars asks why it took up to 100,000 years for these populations to disperse to other regions of the world? He suggests that studies of DNA and archaeological discoveries have indicated that demographic expansion, particularly between 80,000 and 60,000 years ago, was probably associated with ‘a major increase in the complexity of the technological, economic, social and cognitive behaviour of certain Africa groups’ (Mellars, 2006: 9381). Important innovations included improvements in hunting weapons, an increase in the use of root crops in southern Africa, and the development of trading and exchange networks which may have led to increased carrying capacity and to a significant expansion in population numbers and densities. Mellars concludes that, increased levels of technological efficiency and economic productivity in one small region of Africa could have allowed a rapid expansion of these populations to other regions and an associated competitive replacement (or absorption) of the earlier, technologically less ‘advanced’, populations in these regions. (Mellars, 2006: 9383)

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The spread of populations out of Africa is likely to have occurred by way of North Africa and the Nile valley, and/or from Ethiopia across the Red Sea and then northward through the Arabian Peninsula, or along an eastward route via south Asia and eventually to Australasia. However, DNA records seem to suggest that the route from Ethiopia is more likely, with arrival and diversification in southern Asia between 60000 and 50000BP (Mellars, 2006: 9386). From Asia, and much more recently, around 15,000 years ago, humans either crossed the Bering land bridge or travelled by boat from Asia to North America and from there on to South America.

3.3 Early livelihood strategies In the absence of written records for much of Africa’s pre-colonial history, evidence of early habitation can be seen in rock paintings in various locations. The earliest rock art found thus far, in the form of patterned engraving or incising, was at Blombos Cave, on the southern coast of South Africa’s Western Cape Province near the small town of Still Bay. From the early 1990s a series of excavations at Blombos revealed over 8,500 fragments, with 15 showing clear evidence of engraving, and two of which, with a crosshatch pattern, have been dated as early as 77000BP (Henshilwood, 2008). More recent rock art depicting animals was found between 1969 and 1972 in a cave in the Goachanas area of south-western Namibia by German archaeologist W.E. Wendt. The paintings date from 26000–28000BP and Wendt named the cave ‘Apollo 11’ after NASA’s successful moon landing mission. Seven stone slabs of brown-grey quartzite depict a variety of animals painted in charcoal, ochre and white, one of which could be a zebra, giraffe or ostrich. Rock art has also been found in other parts of Africa. Elsewhere in southern Africa, San rock paintings date from 10000BP, with depictions of animals such as eland, kudu and elephants. In some cases, precise dating has been problematic, for example in northern Africa where the earliest images seem to date back 12,000 years. In central and eastern Africa there has been less research undertaken, but evidence of rock paintings by hunter-gatherer groups have been dated at 3000BP, whilst in central Tanzania ancestral Sandawe art dates from 9000BP and includes images of animals in both hunting and domestic scenes with figures holding bows and arrows (British Museum, 2020). Evidence from both archaeological excavations and rock art suggest that huntergathering was probably the earliest form of livelihood strategy in Africa. Such huntergathering groups include the Bushmen (or San) of southern Africa, the Pygmies (or forest peoples) of central Africa and the click-speaking Hadza and Sandawe of eastern Africa (British Museum, 2020). The ‘San’ people were well established over what is now South Africa for at least 20,000 years before pastoralism was introduced. They organized themselves into bands of 20–50 people to hunt game and gather wild fruit and vegetables. Various rock paintings indicate that there was considerable interaction between San groups across southern Africa. By the beginning of the first millennium, it is likely that some groups acquired sheep and goats and later cattle, and some of the hunter-gatherer groups in what is now South Africa had become ‘Khoikhoi’ pastoralists by about AD400. As Elphick and Malherbe (1988) suggest, there was no rigid genetic boundary between the Khoikhoi pastoralists, who numbered some 50,000 by the mid-seventeenth century, and the San hunter-gatherers whose numbers were difficult to determine. As Lester et al. (2000: 47) further comment, Both (Khoikhoi and San) were mobile and the former could resort to San lifestyles when they lacked sheep and cattle, while the latter could effectively

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become Khoikhoi if they acquired livestock. It was therefore possible for the same individuals to be both San and Khoikhoi during different stages of their lives. It is for this reason that the collective term ‘Khoisan’ is often used to describe all of the indigenous inhabitants of the Western Cape at the time that Europeans arrived there. It is likely that hunter-gathering groups had considerable interaction with farming populations, and in Botswana archaeological evidence suggests that hunter-gathering remained well into the 19th century (Smith, 2018). Oral traditions in countries such as Zambia and Malawi also include references to huntergatherers known as ‘Batwa’. Excavations in the Shire Highlands of Malawi have revealed hunter-gatherers living alongside farmers and, as wild resources became depleted, they became more dependent on the farmers (Smith, 2018). Meanwhile, in central Malawi, stone tools from hunter-gatherers have been found in several excavations. In East Africa, because of the dominance of pastoralists and farmers, it is likely that hunter-gatherer groups were generally smaller. In Tanzania, the Hadza and Sandawe people are thought to be descended from hunter-gathering groups. Research has shown that, like the Pygmies, the Hadza have distinctive folklore and rituals, and, interestingly, they use a click language like some southern African groups (Skaanes, 2015). The Sandawe were once hunter-gatherers who have taken up farming, horticulture and herding, possibly due to over-exploitation of wild resources. As Smith comments, ‘They provide, what seems to be an exception, rather than the rule, of a hunter-gatherer group who chose or were coerced into adopting farming, but who succeeded in retaining most aspects of their own cultural traditions through this process’ (Smith, 2018: 126). For many hunter-gatherer groups, although wild foods and animals remained an important resource, over time there was an increasing inclination towards engaging in herding and the cultivation of crops.

3.4 Early domestication of livestock and crops There has been relatively little attention given to the beginnings of food production in Africa compared with other parts of the world, in part due to the scarcity of archaeological evidence of domesticated plants (Bower, 1995). The development of livestock herding and crop growing in Africa is likely to have been affected by fluctuations in climate regimes. The earliest food producers were probably mobile herders. It is likely that cattle herding of wild Bos primigenius began with hunter-gatherers in north-east Africa from about 10000BP and spread across the Sahara and then further south. Rainfall levels in north Africa fluctuated, but they were probably much higher in the Sahara between 9500 and 8600BP, when there was grassland and a Mediterranean vegetation. Levels of mobility varied according to changing rainfall patterns, and there is evidence of human habitation from rock paintings and remains of distinctive pottery. As Marshall and Hildebrand point out, ‘Sites are concentrated in relatively well-watered massifs and lake basins. Some hunter-gatherers were fairly sedentary and harvested wild plants intensively, especially cereals’ (Marshall and Hildebrand, 2002: 107). The earliest domestic sheep and goats are thought to have originated in the eastern Sahara and Red Sea Hills between 7000–6700BP. With increasing aridity, it is likely that much of the eastern Sahara had been abandoned by 5500BP and herders had moved to other sites such as the Nile valley in Sudan and the West African Sahel. Cultivation occurred in the wetter areas, and archaeological evidence from Sudan, in the shape of grindstones, suggests that by 5000BP some pastoral groups were already cultivating sorghum (Marshall and Hildebrand, 2002). Rock paintings are often good

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indicators of the significance of livestock in such communities. There was some migration of herders into Kenya and northern Tanzania from c.4000BP, with herding and hunter-gathering often existing simultaneously. In southern Africa disease was often a barrier to successful herding. Mixed agriculture became common in the extreme east and herding in the west of South Africa – ‘South of the Orange River, hunting and gathering continued across the interior of the subcontinent’ (Marshall and Hildebrand, 2002: 119). Migrating Khoisan groups may have taken pottery and sheep from Zambia and Zimbabwe to Namibia and on to the Cape by 2000BP, and sites in Namibia and the Cape have indicated the presence of sheep (Smith, 2000). Maggs (1984) suggests that around 2000BP Iron Age groups in southern Africa had permanent settlements, keeping sheep and goats and eating grains and pulses. Cattle became more common after 1500BP, and fish and seafood (notably molluscs – mussels, scallops, oysters, etc.) were common foods in coastal areas. Unlike other parts of the world, it seems that plants were domesticated in Africa after the beginning of herding, and domestication occurred in various localities according to different climatic conditions. The northern savanna region and the Sahel were significant areas of cereal crop domestication. In 1992, Wendorf et al. (1992) reported that excavations in southern Egypt had found ancient seeds of sorghum and millet with consistent radiocarbon dates of 8000BP. This is thought to be the earliest evidence for the use of these plants. Wendorf et al. commented that, ‘Whatever their domestic status, the use of these plants 8,000 years ago suggests that the African plant-food complex developed independently of the Levantine wheat and barley complex’ (Wendorf et al., 1992: 721). This is a much earlier date than was previously thought, and in an area which today is largely desert. Further archaeobotanical research suggests that Sorghum bicolor probably originated in the region between Lake Chad, Sudan and western Ethiopia, whilst west of Lake Chad, pearl millet (Pennisetum glaucum) was probably domesticated. It seems that, with wetter conditions in the savanna-Sahel zone, ‘by the early second millennium BC widely dispersed populations in West Africa were cultivating morphologically domesticated pearl millet’ (Fuller, 2007: 918). Domesticated pearl millet, probably developed by semisettled herders, and dating from c.3500BP, has been found in Mauritania, Burkina Faso and northern Ghana. Sorghum, pearl millet and African rice dating from c.2500BP have been found near the Niger river in Mali. Archaeobotanical evidence suggests that emmer wheat (Triticum turgidum ssp. dicoccon), a progenitor of bread wheat (Triticum aestivum), was domesticated over a long period in the region often known as the Levant (what is now commonly called the Middle East, stretching eastwards from the Mediterranean across to what is now Iraq). Wheat varieties were cultivated in Egypt from the period of the earliest settlements (5500–4500 BC). Rice production and consumption are often associated with Asian countries, but rice is an important staple in many parts of Africa, notably in the coastal region of West Africa, where up to 15 million people from Senegal eastwards to the Bandama River in the Ivory Coast regard it as a major food crop. One variety of rice is in fact indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa. Oryza glaberrima, or African rice, is one of two species of cultivated rice, the other being Oryza sativa, or Asian rice. O. glaberimma was cultivated long before Europeans made contact with African peoples. It was probably domesticated some 2,000–3,000 years ago from its wild ancestor Oryza barthii (formerly known as Oryza brevilugata) by peoples living in the floodplains of the Inland Niger Delta, in what is present-day Mali. From this region rice cultivation diffused into the coastal regions of The Gambia and southern Senegal, and also further south in the Guinea forest region from Sierra Leone to Ivory Coast. Early reports from Portuguese visitors in the 15th and 16th centuries mentioned, ‘the vast fields planted in rice by the local inhabitants and emphasized the important role this cereal played in the native diet’ (Linares, 2002: 16360).

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But, as Linares points out, O. glaberimma is now steadily being replaced in West Africa ‘by the Asian species, introduced into the continent by the Portuguese as early as the middle of the 16th century. The native species is thus rapidly diminishing in importance’ (Linares, 2002: 16360). However, O. glaberimma is still used in rituals and ceremonies by groups such as the Mende in Sierra Leone and the Jola in Casamance (southern Senegal). New varieties are becoming common which combine the hardiness of the African species with the productivity of the Asian species.

3.5 The Bantu migrations Research into the origins and distribution of different language groups in tropical Africa has suggested that from possibly as early as 5000BP, various Bantu groups migrated southwards and eastwards across the continent. Some 400 million people are speakers of between 440 and 680 distinct Bantu languages from the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo southwards and eastwards to the south-eastern region of South Africa. In the 21st century these languages are spoken by groups such as the Kikuyu (Kenya), Shona (Zimbabwe) and the Zulu (South Africa). It seems likely that most Bantu communities originated in savanna regions, their core homeland possibly being in the Mambilla Plateau region straddling the border between present-day south-eastern Nigeria and southwestern Cameroon (Brett, 2013). Grollemund et al. (2015) have examined the distribution of various Bantu languages in order to trace possible migration routes. They comment that, Bantu migrations swept out of West Central Africa beginning about 5,000 years ago (B.P.) and eventually moved all the way down to the southern tip of the continent. It was one of the most influential cultural events of its kind, spreading over a vast geographical area a new, more sedentary way of life that was fundamentally different from that of indigenous forest foragers – ancestral Bantu speakers had mixed-subsistence economies, in which farming gradually gained in importance. (Grollemund et al., 2015: 13296) It is likely that environmental change played a role in this as the Bantu migrations may have been affected by a reduction c. 4000BP in the size of the Congo Basin rainforest and also forest reduction along the coasts from Cameroon to Congo. More recently, there is evidence that around 2500BP certain parts of the Congo forest became rather drier, more open and savanna-like, with a c. 400km corridor forming in the western part of the Congo Basin known as the ‘Sangha River Interval’, which may have facilitated the speedier movement eastwards and southwards of plant species, animals and humans, possibly along river valleys and across the Equator (Grollemund et al., 2015). Other migration routes went eastwards towards the Great Lakes region of East Africa and also southwards closer to the coasts of what are now Gabon, the DRC and Angola, probably reaching South Africa around 2300BP.

3.6 Early civilizations and state formation A number of significant civilizations developed in Africa during the pre-colonial period, and there is a wealth of published material on these, most notably the Egyptian civilization that developed in the north-east of the continent. In the space available only some of the most significant civilizations will be briefly mentioned here, together with key sources that can be followed up by the reader.

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The Nile valley, with its fertile soils and good supplies of water, was an important area of early cultivation and settlement with cultivation dating from about 7000 BC, and by 4000 BC it is likely that permanent settlements and extensive agriculture had developed. Various cultures, such as the Tasian, Badari and Amratian, developed at different times and locations, and are associated with distinctive types of pottery and other artefacts that have been found in archaeological excavations. Trade gradually developed across the Mediterranean and with parts of western and southern Asia. There is evidence of copper smelting from the first half of the fourth millennium. Iliffe (1995: 18) comments that During the fourth millennium BC, both Lower Egypt (the Delta) and Upper Egypt (the narrow valley southwards to Aswan) practised a culture characterised by exploitation of the floodwaters, use of copper as well as flint, weaving of linen cloth, trade with south-western Asia, temples dedicated to deities like Horus and Seth, a social stratification displayed by the plain graves of commoners and the elaborate painted tombs of the elite, and several small kingdoms with walled capitals of sun-dried brick. It is likely that Egypt became a unified state about 3150 BC when Upper and Lower Egypt were brought together under the first monarch or Pharaoh, Menes, although archaeological evidence suggests that Narmer may have been the key figure in the unification process. The earliest Pharaohs were buried in large tombs often accompanied by other people, possibly servants, together with items such as pottery. During the Fourth Dynasty the pyramid of Gizeh (Giza) was built some 500 years after the reign of Narmer and is 147 metres high, consisting of ‘some 2,300,000 stone blocks of an average weight of 2.5 tons, and cost, according to the credible tale of Herodotus, the labour of a hundred thousand people for twenty years’ (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 22). As Sasson (1995: 6) comments, ‘The pyramids have regularly been seen as the fruits of their builders’ megalomania. More to the point, however, they were colossal statements of divine kingship’. To the south, Egypt extended its influence over the riverine and largely rural territory of Kush which was located along the Nile valley in Nubia, in what is today southern Egypt and northern Sudan. Kush controlled trade routes to the south along the river and the mines of Nubia produced large quantities of gold (Oliver and Fage, 1988). During the so-called ‘New Kingdom’ (c.1539–1075 BC) Egypt went into decline due to over-expansion, internal division and instability, and the loss of the Asiatic empire under Rameses III (1184–1153 BC). By the first millennium BC Egypt was in full decline and Egypt was now a prize for the great powers. Persian conquerors held it for two centuries after 525 BC.… Alexander the Great took it from them in 332 BC and one of his generals created a Greek dynasty, the Ptolemies, who ruled until 30 BC, when Rome at last added Egypt to its empire. (Iliffe, 1995: 25) Elsewhere in northern Africa, the Phoenicians, from their base in coastal Syria and Lebanon, established widespread trading networks and settlements, most notably Carthage in present-day Tunisia, which was founded around 814 BC as a colony of Tyre and grew to possibly half a million people. The Carthaginian Empire became a major maritime and commercial power in the Mediterranean region, expanding its influence over the Iberian Peninsula, north-west Africa and the Mediterranean islands, and from the 5th century BC there was some trade with West Africa across the Sahara Desert (Hopkins, 1973). Carthage was eventually conquered by the Romans in 146 BC. The Romans converted many of the Berbers in north-west Africa to a settled agricultural lifestyle, but Oliver and

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Fage suggest that the Roman Empire’s greatest contribution to Africa ‘was a largely incidental one: by bringing northern Africa so positively within the sphere of Mediterranean civilization, it greatly facilitated the spread of Christianity’ (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 43). South of the Sahara Desert, at various times there was an ‘ebbing and flowing’ of state creation and demise in the West African region. Located in the eastern part of presentday Mauritania, the ancient kingdom of Ghana was probably at its strongest by 750 AD. Ghana flourished through trade across the Sahara to what are now Morocco and Tunisia, and access to the Bambuk goldfield to the south in eastern Senegal. From about 800 AD other key settlements flourished as the trans-Saharan trade routes developed, most notably Gao (Mali), Djenné (Mali) and Kano (Nigeria) (Hopkins, 1973). Arab power and Islam expanded in the 400 years following the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 AD and progressively became the dominant religion in North Africa and then expanding southwards into West Africa. Timbuktu, now in Mali, was founded in the early 12th century as a trading centre for salt, gold, ivory and slaves and became part of the Mali empire early in the 14th century. By 1300 the town had a population of 10,000 and possibly reached 50,000 in the 16th century. This period of growth was associated with the rise of Timbuktu as a world centre of Islamic learning associated with a university founded in the 12th century and linked with three mosques (Hopkins, 1973). In 1433–1434 Tuareg groups from the Sahara Desert took over Timbuktu. The Mali Empire declined thereafter, and in 1545–1546 was sacked by the state of Songhai, which from the 12th century had established its capital at Gao on the river Niger, controlling some 2,000km along the Niger Valley. As Iliffe comments, ‘Its settlements of slave cultivators probably then made the Niger Valley more productive than at any later period’ (Iliffe, 1995: 72). It seems that ‘domestic slavery’ was a key feature in many of the early states, long before European contact. As Hopkins observes, with shortages of supplies of unskilled labour, ‘Slaves were employed as domestic servants, they acted as carriers, they maintained oases and cut rock salt from the desert, they laboured to build towns, construct roads and clear paths, they were drafted as front-line troops, and they were common in all types of agricultural work’ (Hopkins, 1973: 24). In some cases, long-serving slaves were assimilated into communities and given certain privileges. In a search for more resources for the Moroccan kingdom, a substantial army led by Judar Pasha embarked on a 4-month trek across the Sahara and invaded Songhai. A major battle was fought at Tondibi on 13 March 1591. The Songhai army, however, lacked Morocco’s gunpowder weapons, and the Moroccans subsequently moved on to attack Gao and then retreated to Djenné and Timbuktu (Kaba, 1981). But Moroccan control over the vast Songhai Empire was difficult to maintain with poor communications and problems with acquiring its supplies from across the desert. The region gradually split into several smaller kingdoms and the Songhai established the Dendi Kingdom in its easternmost province in what is present-day Niger, with its last leader being deposed by the French in 1901. Further east in West Africa, in what is now Chad and north-eastern Nigeria, the Kanem Empire was founded by the Saf dynasty in the 8th century AD and lasted as the independent kingdom of Bornu until British occupation in 1902. Kanem-Bornu’s significance was based on its control of profitable north–south and east–west trade routes. Islam reached the area as early as the late 11th century and Sayfawa king Hume declared it as the official state religion. In the late 14th century internal struggles and external threats led to the new centre of the Empire being located in Bornu close to the western edge of Lake Chad. The Bornu Empire grew in its influence, reaching its peak in the second half of the sixteenth century and gaining control over Hausaland and the city of Kano to the west. In light of the significance of trade between West African groups and across the Sahara to North Africa there is evidence of various currencies being introduced, in addition to

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barter-based exchanges. The most important currencies in West Africa were gold, cowrie shells, strips of cloth and copper and iron rods. Cowrie shells, originally exported from the Maldive Islands, were carried overland from the Middle East and North Africa and, according to Hopkins, ‘were in use in the chief markets of the middle Niger from at least the eleventh century’ (Hopkins, 1973: 68), subsequently spreading throughout West Africa and becoming the most widespread currency in the region. At the other end of the African continent there were also very significant developments in state creation and organization in the pre-colonial period. What Iliffe calls ‘The most majestic remains of the African Iron Age’ (Iliffe, 1995: 101) at Great Zimbabwe are located in the south-east of present-day Zimbabwe and date from the 11th century. The area was probably settled from the 4th century AD, but the impressive stone structures of up to 11 metres high are likely to date from the 14th and 15th centuries and the city, spanning 7.22km2, could have housed up to 18,000 people, though others have suggested a maximum population of 10,000 (Fage, 1995). Great Zimbabwe flourished between 1300 and 1450 and was the capital of the Kingdom of Zimbabwe formed by the Shona, a Bantu-speaking people that had moved into southern Africa from the 2nd century AD. Like the West African states, the power and wealth of Great Zimbabwe owed much to its trading activities towards the Indian Ocean coast and possibly as far afield as China. The site has yielded a large range of iron, gold and copper objects, together with glass beads and porcelain from China and Persia. Apart from trade and metalworking, agriculture and pastoralism were also important. There have been various suggestions given for the decline of Great Zimbabwe including the exhaustion of gold mines, a decline in trade, political instability and possibly food and water shortages due to climate change (Fage, 1995). The many pre-colonial states and trade routes are indicative of the strength and richness of the continent’s civilizations and cultures before any significant contact occurred with peoples from outside the continent.

3.7 Early foreign contact with Africa The Phoenicians originated from 3000 BC in the eastern Mediterranean in what is today Lebanon, living in city states such as Tyre, Sidon and Byblos. Their international trade network stretched throughout the Mediterranean region where they established colonies and trading posts. It was the Phoenicians who founded around 814 BC the port city of Carthage, which is located in present-day Tunisia. Following Phoenicia’s conquest by the Neo-Assyrian Empire, Carthage became independent and a significant metropolis in the western Mediterranean. The Carthaginians (814 BC–146 BC) had an extensive maritime trading network across the Mediterranean and probably sent overland caravans southward into the interior of Africa. Manufactured and agricultural goods were traded with African peoples for commodities such as salt, timber, ivory, and gold. Hanno the Navigator, a prominent Carthaginian explorer of the 5th century BC, led a large expedition fleet along Africa’s north-west coast (now Morocco) to explore and colonize, and to investigate a trade route for gold from West Africa. Some writers suggest that he may have travelled as far south as Gabon, whilst others believe that southern Morocco was the furthest extent of the expedition (Warmington, 1960). It was the Romans who used the Latin term ‘Afri’ to refer to the inhabitants of Africa, meaning the lands south of the Mediterranean, although the term may have earlier origins from the Carthaginians or Berbers. Along the eastern coast of Africa there was early contact from around 700 AD onwards with traders from the Arabian Peninsula carrying commodities such as ivory, cloves, agricultural products and slaves. The Swahili city states of Malindi, Gedi and Mombasa

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(in present-day Kenya) had regular contact with Arab traders. Chinese explorers also visited Africa’s east coast. Between 1405 and 1433 China’s Ming government sponsored seven naval expeditions commanded by Zheng He, who made contact with many places along Africa’s east coast, from the Arabian Peninsula to the southern tip of the continent. Zheng He led a fleet of ships into Malindi in 1414 and is reputed to have been given a giraffe by Malindi’s ruler (Duyvendak, 1938). From the early 15th century, the Portuguese were strengthening their links with North and West Africa. Ceuta, on the Moroccan side of the Straits of Gibraltar, was considered as an important strategic target, controlling sea-borne traffic and giving Portugal links to trans-Saharan trade routes southwards into Africa’s interior. Under King John I of Portugal some 200 ships carrying a 45,000 strong army crossed the Mediterranean and took control of Ceuta from the Kingdom of Fes in August 1415 – the so-called ‘conquest of Ceuta’ (Newitt, 2004). Later in the 15th century Portugal acquired other territories in Morocco, namely Ksar-es-Seghir (1458), Arzila and Tangier (both in 1471). At the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668 Portugal formally ceded Ceuta to Spain. Portuguese exploration extended down Morocco’s Atlantic coast and reached the Cape Verde islands in 1444. Subsequently in 1462, Portuguese seaman, Pedro da Cintra, sailing off the West African coast, used the term Serra Lyoa (‘lion range’, or ‘lion mountain’) to describe the Peninsular Mountains behind what is now Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone. In 1458 Portugal dispatched its first missionaries to West Africa, and from 1482 the Portuguese established fortified trading posts on the West African coast from Senegal to Gold Coast (Ghana). Two particularly impressive maritime achievements by Portuguese seafarers soon followed. First, in 1488, Bartolemeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed in what is now Mossel Bay, South Africa. Second, and ten years later in 1498, Vasco da Gama reached India by way of the Cape of Good Hope and the Kenyan port of Malindi. From 1498 the Portuguese established a number of trading settlements along the coast of what is now Mozambique and there was some penetration into the Zambezi basin (Fage, 2002). Sofala (in present-day Mozambique) grew from as early as the 10th century and became an important gold-trading port with Portuguese ships first entering the harbour in 1502. The Portuguese established a trading post in Malindi in 1499 which remained the centre of Portuguese activity until 1593 when they moved their base to Mombasa (Davidson, 1994). The activities of Christopher Columbus and other voyagers led to intense rivalry between Portugal and Spain in exploring and colonizing lands on both sides of the Atlantic, which led Pope Alexander VI in May 1493 to issue the papal bull ‘Inter caetera’ which granted to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain all lands to the ‘west and south of a pole-to-pole line 100 leagues (c.320 miles) west and south of the Azores and Cape Verde islands’ (Van der Linden, 1916: 9). Relationships between Spain and Portugal were difficult at this time and it was known that the Pope favoured Spain. At the signing of the Treaty of Tordesillas by Spain and Portugal in 1494, the line was moved some 1,185 miles west of the Cape Verde islands, such that lands to the west of the line would belong to Spain. Moving the line westwards enabled Portugal to claim the coast of Brazil and lands to the east. Spain did not oppose Portuguese expansion of Brazil across the meridian line, and the borders of modern Brazil were expanded with the 1506 modifications to the Treaty. However, the other European powers, some of which were Protestant rather than Catholic, generally ignored the treaty, as did the indigenous peoples of the lands that were colonized. The Portuguese continued with their efforts to contact and develop links with West African peoples, for example by forging links with the long-established Kingdom of Benin in what is today south-west Nigeria, which is well-known for its skilful metalworking culture. The Portuguese saw Benin as a good source of cloth, beads and peppers

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and in 1514 the king of Benin sent an ambassador to Portugal, whilst Portuguese missionaries were sent to Benin. Settlement also occurred on some islands in the Gulf of Guinea, and sugar cane growing was introduced by the Portuguese to Sāo Tomé where slaves were used to clear and maintain the plantations (Fage, 2002). Iliffe reports how the Akan people of the southern Gold Coast (now Ghana) between 1500 and 1535 bought 10,000 to 12,000 slaves from the Portuguese who were selling cloth and metal goods and used the slaves to both carry the imported goods inland and also to clear forest areas (Iliffe, 1995).

3.8 The slave trade It has already been noted that various forms of domestic slavery existed for centuries in Africa during the pre-colonial period. Often overshadowed by the better-known Atlantic Slave Trade, it should also be noted that from as early as the 7th century there was significant slave trading from the East African coast, with slaves captured from regions such as the present-day countries of Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania and sold throughout the Middle East, Madagascar and South Asia (Allen, 2014). Several Islamic communities developed on the East African coast and Zanzibar became a key hub in the Indian Ocean slave trade. N’Diaye has estimated that up to 17 million East Africans were sold into slavery, though this figure has been disputed (N’Diaye, 2008). On the western side of the continent, the Atlantic Slave Trade was developing from the early 16th century, with considerable European interest in establishing plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean islands. Much research has been undertaken into this grim period in world history, so there is a wide range of available source material. Two particularly important works are those of Eric Williams and Philip Curtin. Williams published his book, Capitalism and Slavery in 1944, which considers the decline of Caribbean sugar plantations in the period from 1823 until emancipation of slaves in the 1830s and argues that British abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade in 1807 was essentially a response to economic factors rather than humanitarian considerations. Williams subsequently served as the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago from 1962 until his death in 1981. Philip Curtin’s important contribution, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A census (1969) examines shipping contracts and port data, concluding that some 9.5 million African slaves were transported to the Americas on slave ships, mainly from West Africa, but also from the regions of present-day Angola and the Congo basin. More recently, Lovejoy has suggested that the number of slaves shipped across the Atlantic was probably about 11.8 million, though with a 10–20 per cent reduction due to deaths during the so-called ‘Middle Passage’, the figure is more likely to be between 9.6 and 10.8 million slaves imported into the Americas (Lovejoy, 1989). The Spanish and Portuguese were the first to engage in the large-scale movement of slaves and the establishment of plantations. The Spanish introduced the concept of the sugar plantation system from the Canary Islands to the Caribbean, and in 1501 transported African slaves across the Atlantic to the Caribbean island of Hispaniola (now Haiti and the Dominican Republic). From about 1525 the Portuguese took the plantation system and slaves from Cape Verde and Sāo Tomé to the Caribbean and Brazil. Other European powers soon engaged in this trade, including the Dutch and the British. Before 1600 it is likely that some 900,000 slaves were transported from West Africa to the Americas. But it was in the mid-17th century that the traffic in African slaves rapidly accelerated, with the development of sugar plantations on the Caribbean islands transforming their local economies. In the 17th century, an estimated 2.75 million slaves were transported, around 7 million in the 18th century and around 4 million in the 19th century. Trading companies were established in the various European countries, for example the Dutch West India Company (1621), the British-based Company

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of Royal Adventurers (1663) – succeeded in 1672 by the Royal African Company – and the French West India Company (1664), which was transferred in 1673 to the Senegal Company. Patrick Manning has shown that there was no organized opposition to the institution of slavery until after 1750, and indeed there were many who extolled the virtues of the practice. For example, King Louis XIV of France, in a decree issued in 1670, stated, ‘There is nothing which contributes more to the development of the colonies and the cultivation of their soil than the laborious toil of the Negroes’ (Harmer, 2014: 18). Over a century later in 1775, Lord Dartmouth, British Secretary of State for the Colonies commented, ‘We cannot allow the Colonies to check or to discourage in any degree a traffic so beneficial to the nation’ (Davidson, 1967: 18). A British trader, Malachi Postlethwayt, commented that the British Empire was a ‘magnificent superstructure of American commerce and naval power on an African foundation’ (Williams, 1964: 52). In 1685, King Louis XIV of France passed a decree known as the ‘Code Noir’ (Black Code) which concerned the conditions of slavery in the French colonial empire. The Code included references to religion, notably that Jews could not live in the French colonies, and that all slaves should be baptized into the Roman Catholic church. The Code also endorsed aspects of severe brutality; for example, that masters could chain and beat their slaves, but could not torture or mutilate them, and those slaves who were absent for a month or longer would be branded and have their ears cut off (Palmer, 1996). The so-called ‘triangular trade’ is often mentioned in connection with the Atlantic slave trade, in which ships left Europe to sell manufactured goods and purchase slaves in West Africa, who were then taken across the Atlantic (the ‘Middle Passage’) to the Caribbean sugar plantations, from where the sugar was taken to Europe. But historians have debated this at some length, suggesting that trading patterns were generally much more complex and often involved more direct trading routes, for example between Europe and the West Indies (Hopkins, 1973). Herbert Klein provides some useful detail on the Middle Passage, commenting that, the water crossing on average took a month from Africa to Brazil and two months from the West African coast to the Caribbean and North America. But most slaves spent at least six months to a year from capture until they boarded the European ships, with time waiting on the coast to board the ship alone being on average three months. (Klein, 1999: 130) By the 18th century the average march to the coast was over 300km and in some cases up to 600km for Bambara captives from the Niger Valley. Conditions on board the slave ships were often appalling, with high mortality rates among the slaves and indeed also among crew members. One British ship, the Brookes, weighing 300 tons and carrying 609 slaves on four decks, had an average space of just under seven square feet per slave. In the early years of the slave trade mortality rates of up to 20 per cent were common, but these rates apparently declined by the late 18th and early 19th centuries to around 10 per cent. Some ports, such as in The Gambia and on the Biafran coast, had higher mortality rates due to the local incidence of malaria and yellow fever, whilst mortality rates generally increased when longer voyages were undertaken (Klein, 1999). The export of slaves significantly reduced populations in parts of Africa where the trade was more active, relative to other parts of the world, for example China in the 18th century, where population was growing rapidly. Manning has estimated that between 1600 and 1900 Africa’s proportion of the combined population of Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the New World declined from about 30 per cent to just over 10 per cent (Manning, 1990: 179). Modern-day countries such as Senegal, The Gambia and western

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Mali were badly affected. Further east, in the Bight of Benin region (present-day Togo, Benin and western Nigeria) internal wars in the 18th century resulted in large numbers of slaves. Slave-raiding by rival African groups was another method of acquiring slaves, ‘but European-led raids counted for little in the aggregate’ (Manning, 1990: 89). Miller’s study of Angola shows that from the region of west-central Africa total population displacement was probably somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000 per year at the height of the slave trade (Miller, 1988). In economic terms, Africa’s share of world trade between the late 17th century and the mid-19th century was relatively small and actually declined during the period of the slave trade (Lovejoy, 1989). However, slave prices increased rapidly in the 18th century and a prosperous class of slave merchants developed, both among the African ruling classes and also among the overseas traders and investors. Fage suggests that some coastal communities between Benin and Cameroon, including the Niger Delta, were well organized and ‘in the later 18th and early 19th centuries, they provided an apparently inexhaustible reservoir of slave labour’ (Fage, 2002: 271). Whilst the increasing sale of slaves led to a greater supply of money, there was a significant loss of the male population in many areas where slaves were sourced. A major political consequence of the slave trade for West African countries was that trade played a key role in shaping political power, while the importation and increasing use of firearms led to minority groups gaining control over larger populations (Iliffe, 1995). The plantation system using slave labour to produce commodities such as cotton, coffee and sugar was certainly profitable for the plantation owners and the prices of slave-produced goods declined towards the end of the 18th century making them more affordable in European countries where they were consumed. Box 3.1 examines some of the legacies of the slave trade.

Box 3.1 Legacies of the slave trade There has been much written about the legacies of the slave trade. The Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slave-ownership at University College, London (UCL) has provided a wealth of information on this (www.ucl.ac.uk/ lbs/). The Centre’s research builds on two earlier UCL projects tracing the impact of slave-ownership on the formation of modern Britain: the Legacies of British Slave-ownership project (2009–2012), and the Structure and significance of British Caribbean slave-ownership 1763–1833 project (2013–2015). Continuing concern about the legacies of the slave trade has been a recurring theme in the rich body of African American literature (see, for example, Gates and McKay, 2004). This was given added momentum in 2020 with the death of the African American George Floyd. Floyd died on 25 May in Minneapolis, USA, following a brutal arrest which was caught on video and showed a police officer kneeling on his neck as Floyd cried out, ‘I can’t breathe’. A large number of demonstrations followed across the world under the banner Black Lives Matter, at a time when many national and local authorities had imposed a lockdown on movement in an attempt to reduce the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) (BBC, 2020a).

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Following earlier events in the USA, on Sunday 7 June 2020 in the port city of Bristol, UK, the statue of Edward Colston was removed and thrown into the harbour. Colston was a Bristol-based merchant, philanthropist and member of parliament, who became Deputy Governor of the Royal African Company (RAC) in 1689–1690. The RAC had a monopoly over the English slave trade and England’s trade with Africa in commodity goods, and shipped more African slaves across the Atlantic to the Caribbean and North America than any other UK organization. UK-based Black Lives Matter supporters subsequently questioned the relevance of other statues such as that of Robert Milligan in Docklands, East London (prominent merchant and slave-owner), Robert Baden-Powell, (founder of the Scout Movement) in Poole Harbour, Winston Churchill (politician) in Parliament Square, London, and Cecil Rhodes (entrepreneur and politician in southern Africa) at Oriel College, Oxford. In the case of the latter, there was a link to the earlier 2015 Rhodes Must Fall campaign among South African students (The Guardian, 2016). The slave trade had a major impact on the growth and development of a number of European towns and cities. In the UK, for example, Bristol and Liverpool were heavily involved with trading commodities associated with overseas plantations, including slaves. The city of Liverpool actually derived much of its early wealth from the slave trade, importing plantation commodities such as sugar, cotton, coffee and tobacco. The first slave ship to leave Liverpool, the Liverpool Merchant, was recorded on 3 October 1688. By the 1780s Liverpool was considered the European capital of the transatlantic slave trade and controlled 80 per cent of the British and over 40 per cent of the entire European slave trade. At least 25 of Liverpool’s Lord Mayors between 1700 and 1820 were closely involved with the slave trade. The slave ship Brookes (named after its owner Joseph Brookes) was launched in Liverpool in 1781, and in 1788 the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade commissioned a shocking illustration of the ship showing how the slaves were stowed (Figure 3.1). The image, which was widely circulated as anti-slavery propaganda, shows 487 slaves, whereas on a journey in 1785 it is likely that up to 740 slaves had been carried by the ship (ISM – International Slavery Museum, 2021). In 1999, Liverpool City Council passed a formal motion apologizing for the city’s role in the slave trade, and in 2007 the International Slavery Museum opened in the dockland area of the city (International Slavery Museum, 2021). The French Atlantic ports of Nantes, Bordeaux, Le Havre and La Rochelle were also heavily engaged in the transportation of slaves to the French Caribbean colonies. Of these, Nantes was dominant, transporting over 550,000 slaves in just over a century. From the first registered ship in 1707, Nantes organized some 1,744 slave-trading expeditions representing over 41 per cent of the French total (Valognes, 2013). Following the abolition of slavery in 1794 after the French Revolution, Napoleon then revived slave trade activity from 1802, until the trade was prohibited in 1831 and finally abolished in 1848. Nantes’ merchant and ship-owning families prospered during the 18th century. Factories were developed, the shipyards thrived, and the fashionable Ile Feydeau residential area on the north bank of the River Loire includes many impressive buildings from that period. Between 1992 and 1994 a major slave trade exhibition was held in Nantes, and in 2012 a memorial to the abolition of the trade was unveiled.

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Figure 3.1 Slave ship – Brookes diagram Source: The Brookes Slave Ship, 1789, in ‘1807 Commemorated’. Available at: arch-1807@york. ac.uk (accessed 5 January 2021).

Many individuals, families, companies and institutions in European slave-trading nations benefitted in different ways from the plantation-based economy which depended on slavery. As mentioned above, in the UK the Slave Compensation Act of 1837, followed the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, and led to £20 million in compensation being given in over 40,000 awards to slave owners for the loss of their slaves. But as Hall et al. (2014: 6) point out, the slave owners received other benefits: In addition to the sum of £20 million that they (slave-owners) received in compensation for the loss of their ‘property’ in enslaved men and women, they also benefited substantially from the system of ‘apprenticeship’, which

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meant that, although formally free, those previously enslaved were compelled to work on the estates of their masters for a further period of four to six years. Former slave owners gained considerable respectability in a wide range of roles and professions. For example, William Gladstone and Henry Goulburn in the House of Commons, Charles Trevelyan in the expanding colonial and civil service, Cardinal Manning in the resurgent Catholic Church, and Captain Frederick Marryat and Charles Kingsley, authors who were among the first generation to be able to make a substantial income from writing, were just some of the many former slave-owners or their descendants who established themselves as influential men in the reconfigured public world. (Hall et al, 2014: 8) The legacies of slavery were detectable in many forms of British life. As Draper comments, ‘Slave-ownership permeated every tier of the elites, not only the aristocracy and gentry, but also the more economically active sections’ (Hall et al., 2014: 37). For example, family members of the company Greene King, a major brewery based in Suffolk and linked to the writer Graham Greene, had plantation estates in St Kitts and Montserrat, whilst Lloyd’s insurance company thrived on the trans-Atlantic slave trade. During the Black Lives Matter campaign in 2020, both Lloyd’s and Greene King agreed to contribute to UK charities supporting black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) groups (BBC, 2020b). The Lascelles family, who own Harewood House, a stately home outside the city of Leeds (UK), had 300-year-old interests in the Caribbean from 1648 until 1975 when the family sold its last plantation. The Lascelles Slavery Archive held at the University of York has a wealth of material about the family and its plantation activities, which by 1787 amounted to 24 Caribbean properties comprising 27,000 acres and nearly 3,000 slaves (Lascelles Slavery Archive, 2020; Smith, 2006). In June 2020, as part of the media coverage relating to Black Lives Matter, the UK newspaper The Sunday Times revealed that a third of the properties owned by the National Trust, a UK charity concerned with heritage conservation, were tainted by slave trade money (Sunday Times, 2020). In September 2020 the National Trust published a report on this with the Introduction stating, The National Trust has made a commitment to research, interpret and share the histories of slavery and the legacies of colonialism at the places we care for. Those histories are deeply interwoven into the material fabric of the British Isles; a significant number of the collections, houses, gardens and parklands in our care were created or remodelled as expressions of the taste and wealth, as well as power and privilege, that derived from colonial connections and in some cases from the trade in enslaved people. (Huxtable et al., 2020: 5)

Manning suggests that three factors led to the eventual demise of the slave trade – slave uprisings in response to harsh conditions, religious opposition and democratic political thought (Manning, 1990). A slave rebellion in Jamaica in 1760 proved a shock to the system and religious individuals such as the Quaker John Woolman from Pennsylvania

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preached strongly against the practice. Increasing attention given to human rights also had an impact on popular opinion as expressed in the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) (Manning, 1990). In Britain the anti-slavery movement grew, and in 1787 the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed in London with leading figures such as the writer Thomas Clarkson, philanthropist Granville Sharp and industrial entrepreneur Josiah Wedgwood. However, there was considerable opposition to the anti-slavery movement from groups such as merchants in Liverpool and well-established slave traders such as William Norris and Archibald Dalzel – the latter suggesting that European slave purchases actually saved Africans from miserable lives and even death in Africa. In France, following the Revolution of 1789, the National Convention in 1794 abolished slavery. Meanwhile, in the French Caribbean colony of St Domingue (now Haiti), the so-called ‘Haitian Revolution’ took place between 1791 and 1804 when slaves rebelled against French colonial rule, leading to the black leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines declaring independence, abolishing slavery and engaging in the massacre of the remaining 3,000–5,000 white population. Rebellions from the late 18th century increasingly focused on the destruction of the entire institution of slavery. Established during a period of much debate about the emancipation of slaves in British territories, Freetown (now the capital of Sierra Leone) was a planned settlement established by the Sierra Leone Company in 1787 to settle by 1792 some 1,600 freed slaves from the West Indies and Nova Scotia (Canada). Granville Sharp referred to the Freetown settlement as ‘The province of freedom’. The settlers, or Creoles as they became known in Sierra Leone, had very different cultural traits from the local indigenous Temne ethnic group. In an attempt to separate the settler community from indigenous ethnic groups, in 1807 the British declared that the local Temne tribe should be excluded from an 11-mile radius around the settlement. The Crown Colony was established in 1808, both in and around Freetown, whilst the Protectorate, established much later in 1896, included the remainder of the country (Lynch et al., 2020). Freetown grew in size and had an influence in encouraging other such freed slave settlements, for example, further east along the West African coast in what is now Liberia where freed slaves from the USA, supported by the American Colonization Society, settled from 1822, with the settlers declaring the Republic of Liberia with an American-style constitution in 1847. Libreville, now capital of Gabon, was established by the French with a small number of freed slaves in the period 1839–1848. British politician William Wilberforce played an important role in getting parliament to agree to the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in the British Empire through the ‘Abolition of the Slave Trade Act’ in 1807. Subsequently, the ‘Slavery Abolition Act’ was passed in 1833 (just a week before Wilberforce died), expanding the terms of the 1807 Act such that the purchase and ownership of slaves in the British Empire were declared illegal and laying the foundations for the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire by 1838, with various exceptions (notably St Helena, Ceylon and possessions of the East India Company) eventually being eliminated in 1843. In 1819, a British naval squadron was established and stationed off the African coast to control illegal trading, but it took some time for Spain, Portugal and Brazil to fall into line. Iliffe comments that, ‘In all, the navy captured 1635 ships and freed just over 160,000 slaves, landing many at the colony created in Freetown (Sierra Leone) in 1787’ (Iliffe, 1995: 148). The Slave Compensation Act of 1837 led to the sum of £20 million being allocated for payments to slave-owning families in the Caribbean, and to absentee owners living in Britain. This sum represented 40 per cent of the UK Treasury’s annual income, necessitating a £15 million loan from bankers Nathan Rothschild and his brother-in-law Moses Montefiore, which actually took until 2015 to pay off! The compensation process was a

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massive undertaking and commissioners were appointed to deal with the many claims and counter claims. Over 4,700 of the claims (c.10 per cent) were contested (Hall et al., 2014). The compensation period coincided with the early phase of the railway boom in the UK, with the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830. In fact, a prominent Liverpool banker and slave-owner, John Moss, in 1824 became chairman of the committee of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. The developing railway network provided a timely opportunity for investing compensation payments. As an example of this, Hall et al. report that, ‘the will of the London merchant and former slave-owner Nathaniel Snell Chauncy, made in 1848, specified that his property in the Caribbean should be disposed of and all the money raised should be invested in railway or other companies ‘[i]n England, Wales, Scotland or Ireland or any of the British colonies’ (Hall et al., 2014: 91).

3.9 Missionaries and explorers The increased European interest in discovering more about Africa in the 19th century was in part a reaction to the growing humanitarian interests engendered by the slave trade abolition movement. Ali Mazrui has classified explorations into three categories; first, what he called evangelical exploration – pursued by either secular or religious missionaries, and inspired by such goals as the spread of civilization, the suppression of the slave trade, or the propagation of a new creed; scientific exploration – often sponsored by learned societies and inspired by the scientific ideal of pushing the curtain of darkness further and further back; exploitative exploration – undertaken often for reasons of commerce, of exploring new markets or possible sources of raw materials. (Mazrui, 1969: 663) But, as Mazrui points out, quite often there were mixed motivations that inspired exploration. An example of ‘exploitative exploration’ is provided by the motivation for Dutch interest in the far south of the continent. Following its establishment in 1602, the Dutch East India Company developed a complex trading network with south and south-east Asia, and it was felt that a supply station should be established in 1652 by Jan van Riebeeck at the southern tip of Africa where Cape Town is now located. Van Riebeeck served as Commander of the Cape from 1652 to 1662, overseeing the early development of the Cape Colony. Dutch settlers were later joined from 1687 by French protestants escaping persecution at home. The so-called ‘Huguenots’ settled at the Cape and were allocated farms in the area now known as Franschhoek (‘French corner’) where they played a key role in the development of the wine industry. There was widespread intermarriage with the Dutch settlers and gradual assimilation within the wider population of the Colony (Lester et al., 2000). A century later, but before the British abolition of the slave trade, in June 1788, the ‘Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa’ was founded in London ‘to promote the cause of science and humanity, to explore the mysterious geography, to ascertain the resources, and to improve the condition of that ill-fated continent’ (Sinclair, 1901: 146). It later became known as the ‘African Association’ and was initially concerned with the exploration of West Africa to chart the course of the River Niger and to locate Timbuktu, the so-called ‘the lost city of gold’. As Kryza suggests, this represents the ‘beginning of the age of African exploration’ (Kryza, 2006: 11). But Mazrui is critical of the idea of Europeans ‘discovering’ people and places in Africa when they had always been there! Referring to Speke’s ‘discovery’ of Lake Nyanza, Mazrui comments,

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‘to describe Speke as having ‘discovered’ the lake ignores those Africans who had seen it before’ (Mazrui, 1969: 662). Some of the earliest explorers had little success: for example, John Ledyard, an American who took part in Captain Cook’s third and final voyage in 1776, was planning to travel west from Cairo in search of the Niger, but unfortunately died of accidental poisoning in 1789. Daniel Houghton in 1790 planned to travel eastwards from the River Gambia via Timbuktu to what is now northern Nigeria, but he was robbed and eventually died of a lack of food and water in the region of eastern Senegal. Rather more successful was the Scottish doctor, Mungo Park, who travelled up the Gambia River and then eastwards, eventually becoming the first European to reach the River Niger and to note that it was flowing eastwards. But he never reached Timbuktu and, with the onset of the rainy season and dwindling supplies, he returned to The Gambia and then eventually reached the UK in December 1797. Exploration of the interior of eastern and southern Africa came later, beginning, ‘only when the geographical problems of West Africa were approaching solution, and that initiative here again was a British one’ (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 122–123). Possibly the best-known explorer of the Victorian era was David Livingstone, who in some ways typified all three of Mazrui’s categories of exploration – evangelical, scientific and exploitative. Livingstone was a Scottish physician and a missionary with the London Missionary Society, who developed strong links with the Royal Geographical Society and was keen to find routes for the development of commercial trade. In his biography of Livingstone, Jeal refers to him as ‘one of imperialism’s earliest prophets and advocates’ (Jeal, 1985: 188). Livingstone’s travels involved an 11-year period in South Africa from 1841, including crossing the Kalahari Desert, and an exploration of the Zambezi from 1852. On 16 November 1855 Livingstone visited the waterfall ‘Mosi-oaTunya’ (‘the smoke that thunders’) which he renamed the ‘Victoria Falls’ before returning to Britain in 1856. In 1857 he published his highly popular Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, which was then followed by his Zambezi expedition (1858–1864). Livingstone had a vision of the Zambezi as ‘God’s Highway’ and he stated that, The main object of the Zambezi Expedition, as our instructions from Her Majesty’s Government explicitly stated, was to extend the knowledge already attained of the geography and mineral and agricultural resources of Eastern and Central Africa – to improve our acquaintance with the inhabitants, and to endeavour to engage them to apply themselves to industrial pursuits and to the cultivation of their lands, with a view to the production of raw material to be exported to England in return for British manufactures; and it was hoped that, by encouraging the natives to occupy themselves in the development of the resources of the country, a considerable advance might be made towards the extinction of the slave trade, as they would not be long in discovering that the former would eventually be a more certain source of profit than the latter. (Quoted in Pachai, 1973: 31) Livingstone experienced many problems on the Zambezi expedition, not least the death of his wife Mary who had joined him in 1862. His final journeys (1866–1868), often accompanied by Arab-Swahili traders, involved extensive travel through central and eastern Africa which led him to develop a theory of the central African river system in relation to the River Nile. In 1869, he left Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika and reached Nyangwe where he witnessed a massacre at the market. In deep shock and with few supplies, he returned to Ujiji where the Welsh American journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley greeted him in November 1871 with the now famous words ‘Dr Livingstone, I presume?’. Livingstone decided to continue his journey to locate the source of the Nile, but unfortunately succumbed to a fever and died on 1 May 1873 at Chief Chitambo’s village at Ilala on the southern shores of Lake Bangweulu, in what is today northern Zambia.

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In relation to Mazrui’s categories of both ‘scientific’ and ‘exploitative’ exploration, it is interesting to note how Livingstone developed a close relationship with the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), founded in London in 1830 (Binns, 1995). Livingstone corresponded regularly on his travels with Sir Roderick Murchison, President of the RGS. In one letter to Murchison, Livingstone, in emphasizing the commercial potential of developing trade with Africa wrote: As I concieve [sic] that the future of the African Continent will be of great importance to England in the way of producing the raw materials of her manufactures as well as an extensive market for the articles of her industry, I feel anxious to give a few hints which your influential position may enable you to turn to good account in occasional intercourse with merchants and travellers. (Quoted in Pachai, 1973: 30) On 15 December 1856, just three days after returning from one of his major expeditions in southern Africa, Livingstone was awarded the Patron’s Gold Medal by the RGS. A few months later he dedicated his book, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, to Murchison, who flattered Livingstone by saying ‘My dear Livingstone, your disclosures respecting the interior of Africa have created profound excitement in the geographical world’ (quoted in Pachai, 1973: 31). Interestingly, though belatedly, a year or so before his death, the RGS had taken steps to see that for the rest of his explorations Livingstone would be short of nothing (Pachai, 1973: 172). Mackenzie concludes that Livingstone was not a ‘prophet and advocate of imperialism’, but others were undoubtedly inspired by him to promote colonial endeavours, for example Cecil Rhodes in developing his vision for Central Africa. Livingstone’s travels and reports also helped to raise the status and improve the perception of missionaries during the 19th century (Mackenzie, 2013). As with the interest in exploration, so the growth of 19th century missionary activity in Africa can be seen as a response to the abolition of slavery: ‘The expansion of the missionary movement into Africa was part of the growing conception of Christian responsibility for the regeneration of an African continent devastated by the slavery and the slave trade’ (Pawlikova-Vilhanova, 2018: 381). French Catholic Archbishop, Cardinal Lavigerie, who in 1868 founded the Society of Missionaries of Africa (or the ‘White Fathers’), strongly favoured the idea of ‘transforming Africa by the Africans’, and the training of African catechists was a key feature of many mission outposts (Pawlikova-Vilhanova, 2018). Education and healthcare were important contributions of missions and missionaries and indeed this provision often continues today. Many Europeans saw the 4Cs – Commerce, Christianity, Civilization and Colonization – as the key factors in transforming Africa and there were certainly strong links between the 4Cs. As Oliver and Fage comment, Missionaries would teach the Africans both to cover their nakedness and to obey the moral law. Traders would supply the means to satisfy the first requirement in the shape of bales from the mills of Lancashire, which would be exchanged for the primary produce grown by industrious, thrifty, Christian, African peasants. Tribes would combine into federations for the better advancement of commerce, and so the nations of the future Africa would be born. (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 123–124) Missions and missionaries therefore played a transformational role in bringing and then promoting ‘Western’ norms and ideals to African communities, and in so doing laid the foundations for the colonization and colonialism that followed.

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3.10 Africa's colonial legacy Collins Dictionary defines ‘colonialism’ as ‘the practice by which a powerful country directly controls less powerful countries and uses their resources to increase its own power and wealth’ (Collins English Dictionary, 2021: 318). The European colonial period was a relatively brief interlude in African history, yet its impact was profound, and debate continues over the merits and problems of colonialism. The colonial powers demarcated boundaries and introduced administrative, legal, health, education and transport systems modelled on their own. Economically, colonialism programmed African countries to consume what they do not produce and to produce what they do not consume. Africa was brought into the world economic system with the large-scale exploitation and export of agricultural and mineral resources. The marketing of commodities by trading companies and multi-national organizations on a global scale developed under colonialism (Fage, 2002). The production of cash crops for export took priority over domestic food crops, whilst in the mining and industrial sectors, emphasis was placed on the extraction of minerals and their export, generally in an unprocessed state. Manufacturing industries were discouraged in the colonies, since their products could compete with European manufactured goods. Within African countries traditional power structures were subordinated to colonial structures, with expatriate governors and district officers making key decisions that affected people’s everyday lives. In many territories, the colonial governor ruled by decree or proclamation, was deferred to by all and lived in comfortable surroundings. The perceptions and aspirations of individual Africans were transformed as a result of their contact with foreign people, foreign systems, foreign structures and foreign ways of life. Treaties were signed with various African leaders, sometimes the latter not really understanding the full implications of what they had signed. Traders and missionaries often penetrated the countries first, whilst the tentacles of formal administration were gradually extended into the remotest areas. In other cases, where African peoples were less willing to cooperate, and often where key resources or territory were at stake, expensive and often bloody military campaigns were conducted against them, such as the four Anglo-Ashanti wars between 1823 and 1894 in what is now southern Ghana. Ashanti had long been known for its significant reserves of gold. Occupation and pacification were followed by control and administration (Iliffe, 1995; Fage, 2002). From the 1870s onwards there was increasing interest in Africa from the European powers, leading to what has often been referred to as ‘the Scramble for Africa’. King Leopold II of the Belgians initially showed much interest in Africa and his diplomatic skills led to his control over the Congo basin. Leopold was keen to further increase his territorial control and, as Oliver and Fage comment, ‘Probably it was Leopold, more than any other single statesman, who created the “atmosphere” of scramble’ (Oliver and Fage, 1988: 161). Leopold inspired other European countries, notably Germany, France, Britain and Portugal, to investigate the possible acquisition of territory in Africa. In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt, whilst between 1883 and 1885 Germany made annexations in Cameroon, East Africa, Togoland and South-West Africa. Meanwhile, the French were concerned to extend their empire in West Africa. With some collective international concern about the Congo situation, and escalating competition elsewhere in Africa, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck called for the European powers to meet in Berlin in November 1884. Whilst the Berlin Conference considered issues such as free trade, the slave trade and the significance of proving occupation before annexation of territories, it was followed by even greater concern among the European powers to stake out their claims in various parts of the continent. The political map of Africa was completely transformed as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 (see Figures, historical maps – 3.2 a, b and c). In East Africa, a treaty between Germany and Britain in 1886 gave Kenya to Britain and what is now Tanzania to Germany, whilst Britain also acquired Uganda. Meanwhile, in West

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Africa, the French moved eastwards from Dakar and Bamako and took Djenné and Timbuktu (both now in Mali) in 1893–1894. Britain already had The Gambia and Sierra Leone on the Atlantic coast, but then occupied Asante (now Ghana) in 1896 and declared a protectorate over the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria in 1900. A key figure in the acquisition of territories for Britain in southern Africa was the entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes, who envisaged the construction of a railway from Cape Town to Cairo, entirely on British soil (see Plate 3.1). Box 3.2 examines some of Africa’s boundaries as established by the colonial powers, whilst Box 3.3 specifically focuses on the former British territory of The Gambia, which is surrounded on three sides by the former French country of Senegal.

Box 3.2 Africa’s boundaries One of the most apparent legacies of colonialism is that the present-day political map of Africa reveals some unusual boundaries. For example, there are many

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Plate 3.1 Statue of Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town, South Africa Source: Tony Binns.

straight-line boundaries, in north Africa between Algeria and its neighbours, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, and between Egypt, Libya and Sudan, and in southern Africa between Namibia and Botswana. The small West African country of The Gambia is surrounded on three sides by the much larger country, Senegal, and the borders at the eastern end of The Gambia are delimited as arcs of circles. It has been suggested (though with little historical substance) that the arcs were drawn

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from the points where shells landed when fired from a British gunboat on the river (see Box 3.3). The small southern African country of Lesotho is entirely surrounded by South Africa, whilst the present-day country of Equatorial Guinea (formerly the colony of Spanish Guinea) is rather fragmented and includes territory on the continent (Rio Muni), the island of Bioko (formerly Fernando Po) with the capital Malabo, and other islands such as Annobon and Corisco (Griffiths, 1994; 1995). The African territorial ‘cake’ was largely divided at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, and within the next 30 years most of the international boundaries had been fixed. The boundaries show little regard for the topography and cultural homelands of African peoples, and in some cases have led to protracted disputes and even military conflict. The process of delimiting a boundary and then demarcating it with boundary pillars was fraught with difficulty. Griffiths raises some interesting questions in relation to boundary delimitation: Awatershed seems a precise enough concept until an attempt is made to delimit one, such as that between the Congo and the Zambezi, on a wide, almost level, plateau surface. A river is a river, but is the boundary line a thalweg (the longitudinal outline of a riverbed from source to mouth), or the median line or bank? The status of islands is unambiguous with thalweg or bank, but what if the main channel of the river changes? Does a river (or lake) bank boundary preclude a country from riparian, fishing or navigational rights? (Griffiths, 1994: 68) Some significant international boundary changes were made after the First World War, when German territories were allocated to other European powers under League of Nations’ mandates. France was given most of German Togo and Kamerun, whilst the western parts of these countries were allocated to Britain and were subsequently administered under Gold Coast (later Ghana) and Nigeria, respectively. German East Africa (Tanganyika) became British, but the state of Ruanda-Urundi was taken from Tanganyika and given to Belgium under a League of Nations mandate. German South West Africa (now Namibia) was given to South Africa. Other boundary changes were made after the First World War when, for example, Portugal took the 345km2 Kionga triangle from Tanganyika. Jubaland in the south-western part of Somalia, bordering on Kenya, was ceded to Italy by the British in 1925, apparently as a reward for joining the Allies in the First World War, and Kenya was extended westwards at the expense of Uganda. In 1935, France gave part of Chad to Libya. The position of international boundaries has caused many problems across the continent. The straight-line boundaries in North Africa are in most cases in inhospitable desert areas and in some cases were never properly delineated when large parts of the region were under French colonial rule. This has led to boundary disputes in various places and at various points in time. In 1964, at a time when many African states were gaining independence, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) made an important statement that, ‘Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension … all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence’ (OAU, quoted in Griffiths, 1994: 68). Africa has almost 80,000km of international land boundaries and many of these boundaries cut through cultural homelands. For example, some 1.6 million Ewe people are split by the international border between south-eastern Ghana and Togo.

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The Nigeria–Cameroon border splits 14 cultural groups, whilst the boundaries of Burkina Faso cross 21 culture areas (Griffiths, 1994). After many years of diplomatic wrangling, and at times violent disputes, in June 2006 Nigeria finally recognized the ruling made in 2002 by the International Court of Justice, which granted the oil rich Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, citing a 1913 agreement between Britain and Germany over the border. The UN-sponsored Cameroon–Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC), chaired by the UN Special Representative for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, worked for several years to try to resolve disputes relating to the Nigeria–Cameroon border which have their origin in the demarcation of territory between Britain and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Where rivers mark international boundaries there can be problems when the river changes its course. The Semliki river between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has changed course several times in the last 50 years causing disputes in an area that has now been proved to be rich in oil. Melting ice caps in the Ruwenzori mountains since about 1987 have led to increasing water flow in the river, widening of about 10 metres, erosion of the riverbanks and changes in the direction of its course (Independent, 2009). In southern Africa, the so-called ‘Caprivi Strip’ is another strange boundary anomaly associated with the demarcation of territories by the European powers in the late 19th century. The Strip consists of a narrow protrusion of Namibia eastwards for about 450km to the Zambezi River, between Botswana to the south and Angola and Zambia to the north. The Strip, which varies in width from 105km to only 32km, takes its name from German Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, who negotiated acquisition of the land with the UK in 1890 as an annex to what was then German South-West Africa. The Strip gave the Germans access to the Zambezi River, and a potential route to the east coast of Africa where the German colony of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) was located. More recently, the Strip has been of military importance during the Rhodesian Bush War (1970–1979), during apartheid South Africa’s involvement in the Angolan Civil War, and was also associated with ANC (African National Congress) and SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) operations against the apartheid regime (1965–1994). A longstanding boundary dispute between Namibia and Botswana, associated with the course of the Chobe River, was eventually resolved by the International Court of Justice in 1999, which ruled that the main river channel, and therefore the international boundary, were further north, and so the contested Seddudu Island was deemed to be part of Botswana. Further instability in the Caprivi Strip has been associated with the activities of the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), a secessionist movement formed in 1994, with the goal of uniting the Lozi people who are currently separated by the border and live in three neighbouring countries, Botswana, Zambia and Angola. In August 1999, a group of armed insurgents attacked the police station, local radio station and nearby airport of the largest town in Caprivi, Katima Mulilo (Melber, 2009). A curfew and state of emergency were imposed in the area and President Sam Nujoma declared, ‘The Republic of Namibia is awakened and ready to combat and destroy the secessionists. We have the capacity to do so and we will do so without mercy’ (in Melber, 2015: 84). The attempt at secession was crushed in a few days and some 130 people were arrested and imprisoned, charged with high treason and various other counts. As Zeller comments, the Caprivi Strip is ‘one of the most bizarre legacies of the Scramble for Africa’ (Zeller, 2001: 9).

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Box 3.3 The Gambia: Colonial legacy With an area of only 10,380km2 (smaller than Northern Ireland and the US state of Connecticut) and a population in 2021 of 2.5 million, the West African state of The Gambia is Africa’s smallest mainland country and one of the poorest (see Figure 3.3). With a per capita Gross Domestic Product of US$787 (UK £570), and 10 per cent of the population living below the international poverty line, The Gambia was ranked 172 out of 189 countries in 2019 according to the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2019). The Gambia is a long, thin country, 350km from west to east and no more than 48km wide, at the heart of which is the River Gambia, a key focus of life and economic activity. Until independence in 1965, The Gambia was a British colony and the official language is English. The administrative framework, together with the health, education and judicial systems, were put in place by the British during more than a century of colonial rule. Banjul (formerly Bathurst), the capital city, and once the hub of the colonial state, had a population of only 31,301 at the 2013 census, but the population of the Greater Banjul conurbation was 413,397. Many of the features of a colonial town are still evident in the layout and style of buildings in Banjul, and government ministries, foreign consulates and development agencies are located there (see Plate 3.2). It is something of a miracle that The Gambia has managed to survive as a state in its own right for well over a century. The Gambia is surrounded on three sides by the French-speaking state of Senegal, more than 17 times larger. The Gambia has been described as, ‘a hot dog in a Senegalese roll’, or as Leopold Senghor, former President of Senegal, said in 1961, The Gambia is, ‘pointed like a revolver in the very stomach of Senegal’. With an international border over 1000km, it has, understandably, always been difficult to control the movement of people and goods between the two countries and smuggling has been a constant drain on the two economies (Swindell, 1981). Senegal’s administrative structure is based on that introduced by the French colonial rulers before independence in 1960. Although the bureaucracies of The Gambia and Senegal are very different, the social and cultural features of their peoples share strong similarities and a common disregard for the artificial international border which cuts through their homelands. Most of The Gambia’s people are Muslim, with the Mandinka and Wolof comprising the main cultural groups. In Senegal, the same cultural groups are also important, and there is constant movement of people and goods across the border dividing the two countries. Many families in The Gambia have relatives in Senegal and visit them regularly. Farm workers from Senegal have for many years migrated into The Gambia to assist with the harvest. Some 120km up the navigable River Gambia, near Farafenni, the important Trans-Gambia Highway crosses the country, linking northern Senegal and Dakar, its capital, with the southern region of Senegal, known as Casamance. Until recently, the river was crossed by ferry, but in January 2019 a 1.9km toll bridge was opened with funding assistance from the African Development Bank. For a short period in the 1980s it did seem that The Gambia and Senegal might be coming closer together in the ‘Confederation of Senegambia’. The confederation was a direct result of a Libyan-backed coup in The Gambia on 30 July 1981, whilst the country’s president, Sir Dawda Jawara, was attending the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana Spencer in London. During the brief uprising, 500 people were killed and

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Plate 3.2 Colonial house, Banjul, The Gambia Source: Tony Binns.

over £10 million worth of damage was done, mainly in and around Banjul. In 1981, The Gambia had no national army and, to everyone’s surprise, Sir Dawda invited Senegalese troops to enter his country and put down the rebellion. Sir Dawda returned to his liberated country on 2 August 1981, and within 6 months he and the Senegalese president, Abdou Diouf, proclaimed the Confederation of Senegambia. Some progress was made on trade agreements and the establishment of a monetary and customs union. However, in August 1989 the confederation collapsed when Senegal pulled out after Jawara suggested that the confederation presidency should rotate between Diouf and himself. After the failure of this brief and somewhat unexpected experiment, there is today a widespread feeling that both countries actually need each other, and it remains to be seen whether a further period of close cooperation develops. The Gambia had the distinction under Dawda Jawara of being one of the oldest multi-party democracies in Africa. But in July 1994, The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), under the leadership of Lieutenant Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh, deposed the Jawara government and banned opposition political activity. Since then Jammeh continued to hold power. In September 1996, retired Col. Jammeh, as a civilian presidential candidate, won 56 per cent of the vote, and 5 years later in October 2001 he beat four opposition parties to win almost 53 per cent of the votes. A third election in 2006 returned Jammeh to power, in what was generally regarded as a free and fair campaign, though in the lead-up to the poll Jammeh controversially asserted that he would develop the areas that voted for him, whilst those who didn’t vote for him should not expect anything! In elections held in December 2016 Adama Barrow defeated Jammeh, bringing his brutal 22-year regime to an end to the relief of many both inside The Gambia and internationally. One of the legacies of the colonial period is that The Gambia is a one-product economy dominated by groundnuts (peanuts). Groundnut cultivation was encouraged by the British, the crop being first exported in the 1830s. Agriculture, which

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employs about 75 per cent of the Gambian labour force, accounts for about 23 per cent of GDP, whilst in 2020 groundnut production represented only about 5 per cent of GDP. A striking feature of many Gambian villages is that women comprise over 70 per cent of the agricultural labour force and produce more than 80 per cent of domestic food requirements. When groundnuts were introduced, it was the men who mainly adopted the new cash crop, leaving the women to grow rice, millet, maize, sorghum and a large variety of vegetables. Cash obtained from groundnut sales is still a key element in most families’ income and any change in the price paid for groundnuts can have widespread repercussions in rural communities. In the late 1980s, groundnut production was relatively more significant in the country’s economy, accounting for 80 per cent of domestic exports, about 60 per cent of total crop land and contributing around 35 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). These figures have gradually declined in recent years due to the increasing importance of manufacturing, commerce, services and particularly tourism. The Gambia’s tourism website, ‘Visit The Gambia’ (http://visitthegambia.gm/) welcomes readers to ‘The Smiling Coast of Africa’ and ‘a leading destination in responsible tourism’ (Gambia, 2021). The Gambia has provided an ideal location for the development of tourism, catering for Europeans who want to exchange the cold and gloom of winter for guaranteed sunshine and temperatures around 30 degrees centigrade. Since the first group of international tourists arrived from Sweden in December 1965, tourist arrivals in The Gambia have grown steadily, with the exceptions of 1981 and 1995, due to political instability and negative international travel advisories. Some 619,000 international tourists visited the country in 2019, a relatively small number when compared with other African countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. But tourism receipts in 2019 represented about 20 per cent of The Gambia’s GDP and tourism provided 18 per cent of national employment, the third largest employer after agriculture and services with some 41,000 directly employed workers. A study undertaken in 2006 revealed average monthly wages for hotel workers of £46. Other tourism-generated jobs include taxi drivers, craft retailers, fruit sellers and ground handlers associated with the various tourism companies. Monthly wages in all these sectors were higher in 2006 than for hotel workers, with taxi drivers earning an average £103 per month and fruit sellers £89 (Mitchell and Faal, 2006). In recent years, some 55 per cent of all tourists have come from Britain and the remainder from Scandinavia (notably Sweden), Netherlands and Germany. The present and potential contribution of tourism to Gambian development must be considered carefully. The extent to which tourism might help to reduce poverty is a key consideration, for example by sourcing more food supplies from within the country rather than relying on imported food. There has been some progress here, in that in 1986 it was estimated that 65 per cent of hotel foodstuffs were imported, whereas by 2006 this figure had fallen to 45 per cent, although there was considerable variability between hotels in terms of their food sourcing policies (Mitchell and Faal, 2006). Despite the significant growth of tourism in The Gambia, it still only affects a relatively small proportion of the country’s land and people along the 80km Atlantic coastline, and for most of the population traditional forms of agriculture and pastoralism provide their main livelihood. In much of rural Gambia methods of food and livestock production have probably changed very little over hundreds of years. Relative to the tourists, many of the local people are very poor indeed. Life expectancy in The Gambia is only 62 years, compared with 81 years in UK, and some 50 per cent of the population is illiterate, with a significantly higher illiteracy rate

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among women. The statistic which perhaps most effectively highlights the level of poverty is the under-five mortality rate, which in The Gambia in 2019 was 52 per 1,000, compared with four per 1,000 in UK (UNDP, 2019a). With a population growth rate of around 2.9 per cent per annum, and a density of over 239 people per square kilometre, The Gambia is already one of the most densely settled countries in West Africa, and more than twice as densely settled as neighbouring Senegal. Clearly, The Gambia does have major problems to contend with in its future development. Its size, shape and the dominance of groundnuts in the economy are a legacy of the colonial period. Whilst tourism has helped to diversify the economy and provide much needed income and jobs, for the bulk of the country’s people there has been little improvement in rural living standards since independence in 1965. More recently, as in many other countries where tourism is a significant element in the economy, Gambian tourist arrivals and revenue were badly affected during 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 global pandemic.

3.11 Styles of colonialism By 1914, the political map of colonial Africa was complete, and the colonial powers were unfolding their various policies and programmes. One significant and very unpopular element in the establishment of administrative frameworks in the African colonies was the introduction of monetary taxes, to be paid at all levels and at particular times. Administration of the various colonial systems was undoubtedly expensive, and the European powers were looking for some way of alleviating their costs. For many Africans, taxation of any kind was a complete innovation, whilst others had only paid indirect taxes to elders and chiefs. There are many instances of African people demonstrating their displeasure at colonial taxation, for example the so-called ‘Hut Tax War’ in Sierra Leone, initiated in 1898 by Temne chief Bai Bureh in response to the British imposition of taxes on all homes (Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). Any tax evasion was brutally discouraged and frequently led to harsh punishment and forced labour. In order to obtain money to pay these taxes, cash crops had to be grown. Additionally, many people, usually men, had no alternative but to leave their villages and go to the rapidly growing towns and plantations where wage labour was needed. Local people were, in effect, forced into a colonial capitalist production system. Approaches to colonial rule differed among the European powers, but any form of resistance to the colonial state was often dealt with severely. Putting a positive gloss on the colonial process, British Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, stated that ‘the great purpose of the British Empire is the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty’s subjects in whatever part of the world they live’ (Hargreaves, 1976: 7). The British adopted a pragmatic and decentralized approach, the essence of which was ‘indirect rule’, whereby Britain maintained indigenous cultures and societies by working wherever possible through local social and political systems, such as the emirs in northern Nigeria. The British generally respected local institutions and feared the problems which might follow their decay. Under indirect rule, large areas could be administered by relatively few officials, though the effectiveness of the system depended on the strength of indigenous institutions. European settlement in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) was another feature of British colonial policy, much of the best land being taken over by the settlers, whilst African farmers were crowded into less fertile reserves, often with disastrous ecological results. In the case of Zimbabwe, the persistence of white settlement and white minority rule led

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to a considerable delay in the granting of independence until 1980. In British West Africa there was no significant white settlement and the ultimate granting of independence to the four territories, Nigeria (1960), Ghana (1957) (then Gold Coast), Sierra Leone (1961) and The Gambia (1965), was less fraught. France’s approach to its colonial territories was very different from the British approach. Whereas British colonialism was designed to create ‘Africans with British characteristics’, French policy was designed to create ‘Black Frenchmen’. French colonialism was more direct and centralized, the colonies being regarded as part of France and referred to as ‘Overseas France’ (Fage, 2002). French policies were essentially geared towards assimilating the colonies into France and the French way of life. Large numbers of French administrators went into the African colonies and, unlike the British, there was little attempt to work through traditional institutions or leaders. Colonial style administrative buildings were erected in the main centres, such as the Central Post Office in Bamako, Mali (Plate 3.3). Local cultures and languages were given little encouragement. The French believed in a bureaucratic and hierarchical state and created small indigenous elites in their territories whose members were often educated in France. White settlement was particularly common in the African countries bordering the Mediterranean (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), but there were also sizeable white minorities in tropical Africa, such as in Dakar (capital of Senegal) and in the plantation areas of Cameroon, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Madagascar. Belgium controlled one vast territory, the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC), initially as the personal possession of King Leopold. Leopold’s rule was associated with much violence and terror. As Freund comments, ‘Nowhere in Africa was the regime of force so raw and dramatic as in the Congo Free State of Leopold II. King though he was, Leopold ran the Free State like a capitalist of the robber baron era’ (Freund, 1984: 115). Joseph Conrad’s highly influential book, Heart of Darkness, serialized in 1899 and published as a book in 1902, revealed the horror of a highly oppressive regime

Plate 3.3 Colonial Post Offce building in Bamako, Mali Source: Tony Binns.

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with forced labour and atrocities associated with the exploitation of rubber from the Congo forests (Conrad, 2007). With a fear of possible foreign intervention, the Belgian state took over the Congo in 1908 and adopted a policy of assimilation similar to the French but, like the British, it was aimed ultimately at independence. Emphasis was placed on economic and social development with a focus on elementary education, so there was no significant growth of an indigenous educated elite. Basil Davidson suggests that the keynote of Belgian rule was paternalism, ‘yet it was a kind of paternalism that seemed more than a little unwilling to see its ‘children’ on the road to maturity’ (Davidson, 1967: 44). The Belgians argued that Africans needed guidance and tuition before they could take over, and political expression was suppressed until just before independence in 1960 (Iliffe, 1995). Portugal was the other major colonial power, a country which played a key role in making initial contact with the African coast during the voyages of discovery in the 15th century. In the scramble for Africa, however, Portugal was less successful in gaining territory than either Britain or France. By the early 20th century Portugal controlled Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) in West Africa, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and its two much larger colonies of Angola and Mozambique (Box 3.4). Portuguese policy, like the French, was aimed at assimilation, with all territories being regarded as part of the Portuguese Union. There were also substantial numbers of white settlers in the Portuguese colonies (Fage, 2002; Griffiths, 1995). The process of decolonization in Portugal’s African territories is considered in Box 3.4.

Box 3.4 Portuguese decolonization Portugal’s links with Africa began long before the other European powers became interested in the continent. Portuguese exploration of the African coastline started in the early 15th century (c.1419). In 1462, a Portuguese seaman, Pedro da Cintra, sailing off the West African coast used the term Serra Lyoa (‘lion range’, or ‘lion mountain’) to describe the Peninsular Mountains behind the present-day city of Freetown, and the country later became known as Sierra Leone. In 1488, Bartolemeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed in what is now Mossel Bay in South Africa. This voyage was followed by many other Portuguese navigators, most notably Vasco da Gama, who reached India in 1498 by way of the Cape of Good Hope and the Kenyan port of Malindi. Despite their early navigation of the African coastline, Portugal gained only five territories in Africa: Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau), Cape Verde off the coast of West Africa, the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, and the two larger colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Portugal adopted a policy of assimilation with its African colonies, and in 1951 the Portuguese constitution actually removed the word ‘colony’, referring to the African countries as overseas provinces of ‘Greater Portugal’. The Portuguese government under dictator, Antonio Salazar, proclaimed that ‘Portugal is not a small power’, stressing that the colonies were 22 times the size of Portugal and that both were now a single political entity. In the late 1950s, at a time when Britain and France were reducing their colonial commitments, Portugal actually strengthened its presence in its African colonies with further large numbers of white settlers continuing to arrive, such that by the end of the 1950s there were

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335,000 in Angola and 200,000 in Mozambique. In light of the fact that there were only 7 million Portuguese at the time, these numbers were quite significant. In Angola, a revolt started in the north of the country in 1961, inspired by earlier independence in the Belgian Congo and also the alienation of land by white settlers for coffee plantations. Although this initial revolt was put down by over 17,000 Portuguese troops, African liberation movements strengthened during the 1960s, including an insurrection by the PAIGC (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) in Portuguese Guinea in 1962 led by Amilcar Cabral, an influential political strategist who was committed to revolutionary democracy and agrarian socialism. In 1972, Cabral actually held elections, apparently the only case of ‘a revolutionary nationalist movement holding elections before independence and setting up structures to maintain accountability’ (Wilson, 1994: 183). Cabral saw decolonization as a process rather than an event, but he was assassinated in January 1973, leading to greater pressure from the people of Portuguese Guinea for independence. By 1973 the PAIGC controlled most of Portuguese Guinea. In September 1974, just five months after the revolution in Portugal, Guinea was the first Portuguese African colony to be granted formal independence as Guinea-Bissau. Meanwhile in Mozambique, three exiled organizations united in 1962 to become FRELIMO (Frente de Libertaçáo de Mozambique), which started a war in 1964, using Tanzania as a base. FRELIMO’s military effectiveness strengthened after 1970 with the use of bases in Zambia to attack guerrilla targets such as the TransZambesi and Beira railways and the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric project (known as Cahora Bassa since independence) – the latter intended to attract a million Portuguese immigrants. In Angola, the nationalists remained split between the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaçáo de Angola) and UNITA (Uniāo Nacional de Independencia Total de Angola). Despite internal rivalries, the MPLA provided the strongest military challenge to the colonial power. MPLA leader Agostinho Neto spoke of ‘freeing and modernizing our people by a dual revolution – against their traditional structures which can no longer serve them, and against colonial rule’ (quoted in Hargreaves, 1996: 232). In countering the liberation movements and guerrilla activities in Africa, Portugal adopted a policy of Africanizing its forces, such that by the end of the various independence struggles about 60 per cent of the troops fighting the nationalists were Africans. Salazar was determined to hang on to the colonies when in the early 1960s many African countries were gaining their independence. He argued that losing its overseas territories would mark the end of Portugal’s independence, and he asserted that he did not wish to hand over the colonies to what he believed were Marxist movements endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). He was a strong supporter of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and, after Rhodesia declared independence from the UK in 1965, Portugal supported Rhodesia economically and militarily until 1975 from its neighbouring colony of Mozambique, including giving Rhodesia important access to Mozambique’s seaports. By 1970, the USA was showing concern about communist influences in some leading African liberation movements, including links between the MPLA and Cuba. Under President Richard Nixon (1969–1974), the US increased its economic and military cooperation with Portugal through the NATO framework. Portugal’s earlier founding membership of the European Free Trade Area from 1960 signalled

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a commitment to greater European cooperation. Military expenditure in the colonies was placing a strain on the Portuguese economy, such that between 1960 and 1971 military expenditure increased from 4.55 to 8.3 per cent of GNP, and to 45.9 per cent of government expenditure (Hargreaves, 1996). The military campaigns in Africa dragged on with little prospect of a resolution. Portuguese colonial policy in Africa ended later and more abruptly than the other European countries and was precipitated by the overthrow by a left-leaning military coup in April 1974 of Salazar’s successor as dictator Dr Marcello Caetano, in the so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’. In fact, the coup in Portugal had been inspired by the pro-independence guerrillas that they had been fighting in its African territories. General Spinola, who was leader of the post-coup military junta, had recently returned from commanding the troops in Portuguese Guinea, and complained that the army there was ‘frustrated by the lack of any progressive political design for the empire’ (Hargreaves, 1996: 233). Independence for the African states came quickly after the downfall of Caetano. Guinea was the first to gain independence in September 1974, followed by Mozambique in June 1975, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe in July 1975, and Angola in November 1975. Whilst the island states had a relatively smooth transition to multi-party democratic systems, Guinea-Bissau endured a brief civil war and transition to civilian rule in the late 1990s, whilst both Angola and Mozambique had protracted civil wars. The speed of the Portuguese decolonization process inevitably meant that African political leaders and civil servants were often ill-prepared for taking control, whereas in the French and British territories the transition from colonial to independent government was generally rather more measured and better planned.

The other colonial powers in Africa included Spain, which had long held the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco (see Box 3.5) and gained Western Sahara and Spanish Guinea (now Equatorial Guinea). Meanwhile, Germany controlled Togoland (now Togo) and Kamerun (Cameroon) in West Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), and Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) in East Africa. However, Germany’s hold on African territory was short-lived, since after the First World War her colonies were mandated to other European powers – Britain, France and Belgium – and in the case of German South West Africa (now Namibia) to South Africa.

Box 3.5 Ceuta and Melilla: Spanish enclaves in Africa Whilst there has been an ongoing international debate between Britain and Spain about whether Britain should continue to hold claim to Gibraltar at the southern tip of Spain, the two Spanish-owned city states of Ceuta, on the northern tip of Africa opposite Gibraltar, and Melilla, some 300km further east along the north African coast, are situated within the boundaries of present-day Morocco (Griffiths, 1994; 1995). Both Ceuta and Melilla have been important ports for centuries, the former

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founded by the Carthaginians and the latter by the Phoenicians. Spain captured the town of Melilla in 1497 from the Kingdom of Fes, whilst Spain acquired Ceuta from Portugal in 1580, after it had been earlier captured by Portugal from the Kingdom of Fes in 1415. In both cases, Morocco claims the two autonomous city states, along with various offshore Spanish islands. When Spain recognized the independence of Spanish Morocco in 1956, Ceuta and Melilla remained under Spanish rule. Ceuta is the larger of the two enclaves, with an area of 28km2 and a population of 84,829 in 2019, whilst Melilla is 20km2, with a population of 84,689. Ceuta is culturally regarded as part of the Spanish region of Andalusia and was formerly attached to the province of Cadiz, whilst Melilla was until 1995 part of Malaga province. Both states were granted autonomous status on 14 March 1995 and are now regarded as part of the European Union – the only EU territories in mainland Africa. Both states use the Euro as their currency. Ceuta and Melilla have important port functions with sizeable fishing fleets and a considerable amount of cross-Mediterranean traffic from Spain, Ceuta being only 90 minutes by ferry from Spain. There are ferry services northwards from both cities to Malaga, Algeciras and Almeria. Whilst Melilla has an airport, Ceuta now has a heliport with connections to Malaga in about 30 minutes. Significant industrial and retail centres have developed in both cities in connection with these activities. An estimated 36,000 Moroccans cross the border daily into Melilla for work, shopping and to trade goods. But in 2020, the two states had among the highest rates of unemployment in the EU, with Ceuta recording 29 per cent unemployment and Melilla, 21 per cent (Statista, 2021a). Both enclaves are surrounded by fences to deter illegal immigrants from Morocco and beyond, notably from the sub-Saharan West African countries. The two port cities are seen as important stepping-stones to Spain and from there to the rest of Europe. Spain has deployed troops to the two enclaves, but large numbers of migrants continue to gain entry. There were strong protests from King Mohammed VI and the Moroccan government when King Juan Carlos of Spain visited the territories in November 2007. Despite strong historical claims on the two territories from the Moroccan government, it seems likely that Ceuta and Melilla will remain part of Spain for the foreseeable future.

The economic policies pursued by the colonial powers had a profound effect on the African people. The widespread cultivation of cash crops for export was one such policy. In French West Africa, northern Nigeria and The Gambia the groundnut (arachis hypogaea) became the principal cash crop, grown primarily to provide oil for growing industries in France and Britain. The cultivation of cash crops often meant that food crops were neglected and the nutrition of rural people suffered, with the situation becoming particularly severe during drought periods when many people died of starvation. In some parts of Africa cash crops were encouraged, not so much to meet demands in Europe, but rather to find some practical form of revenue. In Kenya, for example, sisal, coffee and maize production made the colony financially self-supporting (Iliffe, 1995). As each colony was viewed not as a separate economic unit, but as a cog in a vast imperial machine, there was a tendency towards specialization in some countries and regions. This was the origin of the ‘one-product economies’, which are still a feature of many African countries today; for example, copper from Zambia, groundnuts from The Gambia and Senegal, cocoa from Ghana and diamonds from Sierra Leone. As a result of

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such specialization, these and other countries were, and still remain, vulnerable to world price fluctuations and dependent on the former colonial powers and industrial countries for markets, capital and technology (Hopkins, 1973). There was little trade between colonies and any profits went to the colonial power rather than being invested in the colony. It is important to recognize here that African troops played a significant role during the First World War both as combatants and as civilian war workers in both Africa and Europe. Whilst British African troops did not fight on the European battlefields, they were active in the Middle East and Africa. The French, however, used African troops in Europe, with some 134,000 coming from the French West African territories. The French parliament passed laws to allow conscription and ‘during the (French) 1915/16 recruiting campaign in West Africa, only 7,000 out of 53,000 recruits were volunteers’ (Koller, 2008: 115). In the winter of 1916–1917, there were riots in Algeria against conscription. Many of the German troops fighting in German East Africa were of African origin. The involvement of African troops in the First World War encouraged debate about the move to selfgovernance. Some 3,000 men from the Gold Coast Regiment (now Ghana) served during the war and this led the Gold Coast Independent newspaper in 1921 to comment, ‘If they were good enough to fight and die in the Empire’s cause, they were good enough … to have a share in the government of their countries’ (Kimble, 1963: 545). African involvement in the Second World War (1939–1945) was even greater. As Killingray comments, ‘Britain extensively exploited her colonial African resources of men and raw materials for war purposes in the First World War. The process was repeated in a more systematic and efficient way in the Second World War’ (Killingray, 1986: 68). Various wartime projects across British African territories recruited large numbers of civilian labourers in initiatives such as building new rail and road links, for example to bring valuable bauxite to the coast in the Gold Coast and to construct vital roads in Sudan to assist allied troop movements during the North African campaign. There was large-scale conscription of noncombatant labourers in every British African territory, whilst in Italian, French, Belgian and Portuguese territories forced labour was widely used. Such forced recruitment was unpopular in many places and there were many reported cases of Africans attempting to avoid this. Britain recruited over 500,000 troops from its African colonies during the Second World War, most of whom were non-combatant labourers in uniform, but many were trained for combatant roles. Apart from involvement in the North African campaign, West African ‘carriers’ played an important role in the Burma campaign, whilst East and West African troops undertook labouring duties in India and Ceylon (Killingray, 1986). There were differential pay rates among the various cohorts of British African troops and frequent complaints about the lack of home leave. There was some concern in Eastern and Southern Africa about the impact of the loss of manpower on agricultural production, and elsewhere there was concern about the effects on mining production. Killingray comments that, ‘By late 1943 Bechuanaland (now Botswana) had up to 40 per cent of its male labour force absent from the country, either serving in the AAPC (African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps) or working in South Africa’ (Killingray, 1986: 79). During 1942 and 1943 a combination of drought and lack of manpower led to lower crop yields and in some cases to acute food shortages. For example, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) had to import 40 per cent of its food requirements by the middle of the war. As Crowder comments, ‘the Second World War was a turning point, if not a watershed, in Africa’s colonial history’ (Crowder, 1984: 47). After the end of the war there was a demonstration in Accra, Gold Coast, in February 1948 of ex-servicemen demanding pensions and other compensation for their time fighting alongside British troops in Burma. The British colonial police fired on the unarmed demonstrators, killing three former soldiers and leading to widespread riots in the country and the arrest of political leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah who was later to become the country’s first President.

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3.12 Decolonization and the move to independence African involvement in the two World Wars, the increasing numbers of university-educated Africans, and a steady rise in African nationalism in the post-war period are just some of the factors that led to a growing call for independence among African colonies. The four colonies of South Africa (Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal and Orange River Colony) had become the ‘Union of South Africa’ as early as May 1910, a self-governing dominion of the British Empire. Following the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which established the independence of the British Empire’s self-governing dominions, South Africa in 1934 passed the Status of the Union Act confirming the country to be a ‘sovereign independent state’. After the Second World War, and following the granting of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947, the momentum towards gaining independence in Africa further accelerated. In the post-war period many African towns and cities grew rapidly, infrastructure was developed with road construction and there was a growing demand for African raw materials, leading to some large development schemes such as the ill-fated Tanganyikan Groundnut Scheme, where a vast area of groundnut production was intended to assuage Britain’s demand for edible oils (see Chapter 2). The period leading up to independence was often characterized by a lack of preparation for the event and its responsibilities. In French and British territories, the preparation for Africans taking over legislative, executive and administrative roles and structures began only after the Second World War. Few chiefs in British Africa were allowed any initiative in the administration before 1945. But both Britain and France were keen to develop a cadre of efficient and reliable local leaders in their African territories, and to avoid associations with the communist influences that were a feature of the ‘Cold War’ period. As Hargreaves comments, ‘under the economic and political constraints of the Cold War period the risks seemed necessary – and justifiable by the hope of finding African successors who would ‘talk the same language’ and recognize the same goals’ (Hargreaves, 1976: 30). The nature and ease of transition from colony to independent state varied considerably, although Dudley (1984) suggests that ‘Because the British administered territories in western Africa were governed as separate entities, the process of the transfer of power involved minimum disruption’ (Dudley, 1984: 57). France, however, had envisaged that its territories in West Africa and Central Africa would form two ‘federations’ in which the territories had autonomy, but not full sovereignty, within a greater Franco-African community. But leaders of relatively wealthy states such as Gabon and Ivory Coast wanted a more direct association with France, whilst poorer countries wanted independence. When General Charles de Gaulle became President of France in 1958, he gave the French territories either the choice of autonomy within a Franco-African community, or complete independence and the loss of financial support from France. Only Guinea, led by trade unionist and Marxist, Sekou Touré, voted ‘non’ and thus opted for independence. It was suggested that the French actually tried to destroy the fabric of the state before they departed, even removing the books from the law library of the Ministry of Justice (Iliffe, 1995). Guinea gained independence in October 1958 and the rest of Francophone Africa achieved independence two years later in 1960. Sekou Touré’s main allies were Presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Modibo Keita of Mali, but for three decades after independence Guinea effectively became an isolated socialist state. The Portuguese territories and the Belgian Congo probably provide the most notorious examples of the lack of preparation for the transfer of the institutions of state. (Portuguese decolonization is discussed in more detail in Box 3.4.). In the case of the Belgian Congo, a growing nationalist movement and serious riots in Leopoldville in January 1959 were

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associated with considerable violence and attacks on property. Soon afterwards, King Baudouin proclaimed that Congo would become independent in June 1960 with the name ‘Republic of the Congo’ under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba. However, less than a month later, secessionist regimes developed in Katanga Province under Moise Tshombe and in Kasai under Albert Kalondji. Chaos and political intrigue followed, leading to the murder of Lumumba in early 1961 on the orders of Tshombe. The process of African decolonization was by no means a smooth one, with such events as the protracted war in French-ruled Algeria from 1954–1962 and the Mau Mau uprising in British-ruled Kenya (1952–1960), the latter dominated by Kikuyu people who objected to the alienation of land by European colonist-settlers in the so-called ‘White Highlands’. There were also workers’ strikes in many countries, such as in the docks of Lourenҫo Marques (now Maputo) in Mozambique, Matadi (Congo), Lagos (Nigeria) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and in 1947 among railway workers in French West Africa. In March 1957 the British colony of Gold Coast led the way to self-rule by becoming the independent state of Ghana, thus marking the start of the gradual disintegration of the colonial system in Africa. Ghana’s new leader, the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah, had long been a champion of the pan-African movement, aiming to end colonial rule and racial discrimination and to unify native Africans and members of the African diaspora into a global African community. Following the first Pan-African Conference held in London in 1900, the first pan-African Congress was then held in Paris after the First World War in 1919. Soon after the end of the Second World War, Nkrumah was a speaker at the important post-Second World War 5th Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, UK in October 1945. Nkrumah’s vision of pan-Africanism was inspired by the writings and personal contact with such black intellectuals as Marcus Garvey (Jamaica), W.E.B. Du Bois (US) and George Padmore (Trinidad). The Manchester conference was notable for the attendance of many from the African and Caribbean diaspora, including Africans who were working or studying in Britain. The future Presidents of Nyasaland, (now Malawi) and Kenya, Hastings Banda and Jomo Kenyatta, respectively, were among the Manchester delegates. The origins of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) can be traced to the pan-Africanist movement (see Box 3.6). 1960 was a significant year in the political history of many African countries and has often been described as ‘The Year of Africa’, with some 16 states gaining their independence. This considerable transition of power was envisaged by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan who, after a month-long Africa tour, on 3 February 1960 delivered his much publicized ‘Wind of Change’ speech to the South African parliament in Cape Town. Macmillan said, The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it. (Macmillan, 1960) In the same speech Macmillan also made reference to the sensitive issue of South Africa’s apartheid policies: As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won’t mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect. I think we ought, as friends, to face together, without seeking to apportion credit or blame, the fact that in the world of today this difference of outlook lies between us. (Macmillan, 1960)

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Just over a month later, on 21 March 1960, resistance to apartheid policies escalated when in the township of Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, a group of 7,000 people were protesting against the apartheid ‘Pass Laws’, and police opened fire, killing 69 people and injuring 180 (Lester et al., 2000). The following month, on 9 April 1960, there was an assassination attempt on the so-called ‘architect of Apartheid’, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. Dubow has considered the context and influence of Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ speech and suggests that, whilst it might be regarded as the high-point of Macmillan’s career, ‘The unintended effect of the speech was to help empower Verwoerd by reinforcing his dominance over domestic politics’ (Dubow, 2011: 1089). A referendum among white South Africans to become a republic was held in October 1960 and the Republic of South Africa was constituted on 31 May 1961. South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961 and was only re-admitted after the multi-racial elections that brought Nelson Mandela to power in 1994. Also during 1960, the ‘Year of Africa’, when the French colonies gained their independence, Britain’s most populous colony, Nigeria, gained its independence, followed by other British colonies in the early 1960s (see Independence Map). Subsequently, Portugal relinquished its colonies rather hastily in 1975 (see Box 3.4), but other countries such as Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (now Namibia) had to wait until April 1980 and March 1990 respectively to gain independence (Plate 3.4). Figure 3.4 shows the dates of independence for Africa’s 54 states and the names of the former colonial power/s. Spanish Sahara in north-west Africa was relinquished by Spain in 1975, which was soon followed by neighbouring Morocco initiating the so-called ‘Green March’ when thousands

* Figure 3.4 Independence dates of African countries

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Plate 3.4 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, celebrates Independence Day Source: Tony Binns.

of Moroccans crossed the border and effectively claimed the territory. This was resisted by the pro-independence Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, and in 1976 the Polisario Front proclaimed the territory as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The people of Western Sahara were promised a referendum by the United Nations with independence as a clear option, but after over 40 years of Moroccan occupation, to date the referendum has still not been held and Western Sahara remains a disputed territory. Much of the country is barren desert, but there are valuable phosphate deposits, offshore fishing reserves and possibly offshore oil reserves. Morocco has been repeatedly criticized for human rights violations, whilst the Polisario Front has been criticized for its treatment of Moroccan prisoners of war.

3.13 Refecting on colonialism There is an ongoing debate and a massive literature on the nature of colonialism and its legacies. The debate focuses on questions such as whether there were benefits of colonialism for colonizers and colonized? It is often asked whether colonialism can be blamed for Africa’s current problems 60 or more years after independence? Indeed, the colonial experience and its aftermath remain controversial issues of debate among historians and others, with many conflicting viewpoints. Suffice it to say here that colonialism initiated a type and pace of change that was unprecedented in Africa. Whilst health, education, transport and legal systems were introduced (some would say ‘imposed’), there seems little doubt that colonial policy was generally exploitative and often coercive and confrontational. Two contrasting perspectives on colonialism are provided by Guyanese Marxist historian, Walter Rodney, and American political scientist Bruce Gilley. Rodney’s highly influential book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 1972), examines the exploitation of the continent through slavery, colonial rule and capitalism. Influenced by a group of Marxist writers in the late 1960s and 1970s, such as Andre Gunder Frank

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(1969), Rodney passionately argues that Africa developed Europe at the same rate as Europe underdeveloped Africa. Although having a number of different interpretations, ‘underdevelopment’ might be seen as a process whereby colonial countries became progressively worse off compared with the metropolitan countries which were benefitting from the unequal and exploitative relationship. Rodney comments that, There can be little dispute over the credibility of the data which are available to amply demonstrate that colonialism for the most part aimed at developing the metropoles, and only allowed certain crumbs to the colonies as incidental byproducts of exploitation. (Rodney, 1972: 213) Focusing on the power imbalance between the colonizers and the colonized, he argues that The decisiveness of the short period of colonialism and its negative consequences for Africa spring mainly from the fact that Africa lost power.…When one society finds itself forced to relinquish power entirely to another society, that in itself is a form of underdevelopment. (Rodney, 1972: 224) Underdevelopment, Rodney argues, has been a result of two processes: Firstly, the answer is that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with those who manipulated the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system. (Rodney, 1972: 27) In sharp contrast to Rodney, Gilley has more recently suggested that ‘The notion that colonialism is always and everywhere a bad thing needs to be rethought in light of the grave human toll of a century of anti-colonial regimes and policies’ (Gilley, 2018: 168). Gilley’s controversial paper, ‘The case for colonialism’, led to the resignation of almost half of the editorial board members of the respected journal Third World Quarterly and threats of violence against the editor led to the withdrawal of the article by publisher Taylor & Francis. Gilley presents evidence from a range of sources in developing his argument in favour of colonialism, suggesting that economy and society were often better off during the colonial period. For example, he quotes a 1996 World Bank report which states that ‘Almost every African country has witnessed a systematic regression of capacity in the last thirty years; the majority had better capacity at independence than they now possess’ (in Gilley, 2018: 5). He even quotes one of Africa’s most famous writers, Nigerian Chinua Achebe, who commented, ‘It is important to face the fact that British colonies were, more or less, expertly run’ (Achebe, 2012: 43). Having identified what he believes are some of the weaknesses of the post-independence period, some would argue that Gilley seriously ‘oversteps the mark’ by then examining the case for recolonization, arguing that ‘To reclaim “colonial governance” means increasing foreign involvement in key sectors in business, civil society, and the public sector in order to bolster this capacity’ (Gilley, 2018: 178). In the final section of his paper, and by way of illustration, Gilley makes the rather bizarre suggestion that the government of former Portuguese colony Guinea-Bissau, which he earlier criticizes for its poor post-independence development record and dysfunctionality, might lease back an offshore island to the Portuguese who then, by encouraging

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foreign investment, could create a West African version of Hong Kong – (suggesting that) ‘a small European state would grow up on the African coast’ (Gilley, 2018: 185). Colonialism has undoubtedly left an indelible imprint on many African countries and debates about the merits and problems of colonialism will no doubt continue well into the future. But it is also important to evaluate other factors which may have contributed to the present condition of African countries, such as political instability, corruption and economic mismanagement.

3.14 Post-independence governance The question has often been asked as to how prepared for independence the colonies were, and the extent to which colonial legacies led to stable and effective governance and/ or instability and conflict. Grier has investigated how former colonies performed after independence and has shown that, in analyzing data from 63 ex-colonial states between 1961 and 1990, former British colonies performed significantly better on average than former French and Spanish colonies. He suggests that territories that were colonies for longer generally did better economically in the post-colonial era and, in terms of levels of education at independence, the peoples of former British colonies were significantly better educated than former French colonies. He suggests this difference may be due to the greater centralization of power and policies of assimilation in the French colonies, whereas British colonies were more decentralized and colonial education policies ‘made a conscious effort to avoid alienating the native culture, by teaching in the vernacular languages and training teachers from the indigenous tribes’ (Grier, 1999: 319). Christensen and Laitin (2019), however, are generally critical of the systems inherited by newly independent African states, commenting that, the colonial state did not establish effective or durable governing institutions. To minimize expenditure in the colonies, European powers skimped; as a result, Africa’s charismatic founders inherited states incapable of sustaining order or providing public services. (Christensen and Laitin, 2019: 189) They suggest that British and French colonies were rather better prepared for independence than the Belgian or Portuguese colonies, stating that, Two of Belgium’s three colonies fell into civil war within three years of independence; two of Portugal’s five colonies had a similar fate. In contrast, only one of France’s twenty colonies and none of Britain’s twenty colonies faced civil wars in their first years of independence. (Christensen and Laitin, 2019: 196) However, the civil war in Nigeria, Britain’s most populous African colony, started just 7 years after independence in July 1967, when the largely Ibo population in Nigeria’s south-east supported the breakaway state of Biafra in its effort to secede from the federal government. The Nigerian civil war provides an example of ethnic-based conflict and reinforces comments by Blanton et al. (2001: 488) who have suggested that the nature of colonial rule often led to subsequent ethnic conflict, ‘By fragmenting the traditional ethnic groupings within Africa in their quest to divide up the continent among themselves, the European powers created the potential for ethnic conflict’. The capacity of the leaders and administrators and the quality of the administrative and governance systems inherited at independence were often inadequate for the effective

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functioning of independent states. As Christensen and Laitin (2019: 203) conclude, ‘the colonial powers created low-capacity bureaucracies, instituted weak republican institutions, and relied heavily on legitimate (if enfeebled) traditional leaders’. The colonial powers hoped that their colonies would develop into fully-fledged democracies, but ‘Charismatic leaders turned into autocrats, purging opponents. Economic failure and fears of minority ethnic groups created social tensions in which intervention by the military initially appeared as a respite from chaos’ (Christensen and Laitin, 2019: 66).

3.15 One-party states and African socialism Finding the most appropriate form of governance for newly independent African states was debated at length during the 1960s and 1970s. The failure of some post-independence African states to adopt Western style multi-party parliamentary systems was often regarded as being undemocratic, and there was concern about the left-wing doctrines of some African leaders who, during the Cold War period, were seen by Western leaders as being dangerously sympathetic to communism. However, Neuberger suggested that multi-party politics ‘seems inappropriate for Africa at its present stage of development’ (Neuberger, 1971: 287). He argued that ‘Many African leaders defend the one-party system on the Marxist ground that political parties are part of the political-social superstructure which articulates basic economic class interests’ (Neuberger, 1971: 287). Although it was often argued that one-party states were the best way of creating a more egalitarian society, Davidson pointed out that ‘Not all one-party states are heading, or intending to head, in a socialist direction’ (Davidson, 1967: 108), identifying the more right-wing tendencies of Liberia in the 1960s under the dominance of the True Whig Party and Ivory Coast under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. At independence, Africa certainly had some charismatic leaders, most notably Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Leopold Senghor of Senegal. There was certainly much discussion in the early independence phase about whether to follow a capitalist or more socialist route in attempting to satisfy the immense socio-economic needs of African people. As Akyeampong (2018: 70) comments, ‘Capitalism, when explored by these new governments, often smacked of “neo-capitalism” because, by putting them back in the arms of Western expatriate capital, it would seem to subvert the achievement and purpose of political independence’. One of the strongest proponents of both the one-party state and ‘African socialism’ was Julius Nyerere, first President of Tanzania. He argued that the concept of multiple parties with a governing party and an official opposition was alien to his newly independent country. Nyerere commented that, (our) parties were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people; they were formed to challenge the foreigners who ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political ‘parties’– i.e. factions – but nationalist movements. And from the outset they represented the interests and aspirations of the whole nation. (Nyerere, 1963: 15) He elaborated that, In Western democracies, it is an accepted practice that in times of emergency opposition parties sink their differences and join together in forming a national government. This is our time of emergency, and until our war against poverty, ignorance and disease has been won, we should not let our unity be destroyed by a desire to follow somebody else’s book of rules. (Nyerere, 1997: 160)

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In his thought-provoking collection, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, Nyerere argues that The foundation and the objective of African socialism is the extended family … ‘Ujamaa’, or ‘Familyhood’, which describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. (Nyerere, 1968: 12) Leopold Senghor, the first post-independence leader of Senegal, was also an eloquent advocate of African socialism who defended the one-party state as a way to curb what he saw as growing class differentiation and the widening gap between urban and rural populations. Like Nyerere, Senghor, regarded African society as communal, because ‘it is rather a communion of souls than an aggregate of individuals’ (Senghor, 1964: 71). In reviewing Senghor’s influential collection of essays on African socialism, Stacey suggests that his essays, ‘bear the stamp of the man who has not only guided his country to independence, but who has also been in the vanguard of the movement towards the development of essentially African philosophies and policies’ (Stacey, 1965: 260). Senghor was a leading figure of the Nègritude (or ‘Blackness’) movement which originated among writers in the Caribbean and later Harlem, New York. Aiming to raise Black consciousness within Africa and beyond, in his poetry, books and speeches, Senghor also used the term Africanité – best described as traditional cultural values common to all Africans. As Rabaka comments, In introducing his concept of Africanité, Senghor quickly discovered that Whites did not like the term Nègritude, and, in his incessant efforts to appeal to Whites, in the early 1960s he began using Nègritude and Africanité, in most instances synonymously, depending on his intended audience. (Rabaka, 2015: 207) These various debates helped to shape the nature of governance in the newly independent African states. As Basil Davidson sums up the situation, ‘Towards 1963, accordingly, a new model of what an independent African state should be like had begun to emerge among thoughtful people. It was to be a state governed by a single party representing all or most sections of the population, politically united over and beyond the traditional boundaries of tribal or regional loyalty, equipped with rapidly expanding social services, and moving out of the colonial economic system into a national economic system based on a wide measure of cooperative effort and public ownership’ (Davidson, 1967: 128). However, this somewhat idealistic picture of the typical independent African state proved to be difficult to put into practice, and Davidson identified increasing difficulties and the beginning of a new phase from 1966, which was marked by the breakdown of several important civilian regimes, their displacement by soldiers and technicians, the removal of Nkrumah from the scene of all-African politics, and in the wake of these and other events, a growing frustration of large organs of potential unification such as the Organization of African Unity. (Davidson, 1967: 129)

3.16 Coups d’états Unstable political regimes and frequent changes of leadership through coups d’état were a common feature in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Powell and Thyne define a

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coup as ‘an illegal and overt attempt by the military or other civilian officials inside the state to unseat sitting leaders’ (Powell and Thyne, 2011: 250). They attempt to quantify the number of coups and conclude that between 1950 and 2010, Africa experienced 169 coup attempts, 51.5 per cent of which were successful, more than any other region of the world. The periods with the most coups were the mid-1960s, mid-1970s and early 1990s, and since then there has been a notable decline (Powell and Thyne, 2011: 255). However, in 2021, Africa experienced four coups, and at the end of the year Al Jazeera News reported ‘2021, the year military coups returned to the stage in Africa’ (Al Jazeera News, 2021). The first of these coups was in Chad on 19 April when, after long-serving President Idriss Déby was killed by rebels in the north of the country, his son Mahamat Déby seized power. The 24 May coup in Mali followed an earlier coup in August 2020 when President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was removed from power by a military alliance. In May 2021 Vice-President Assimi Goita was named as Mali’s Interim President. On 5 September, Guinean President Alpha Condé, who had been democratically elected twice in 2010 and 2015 was overthrown by the armed forces led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya who was later sworn in as interim president. The Economic Union of the West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union immediately suspended Guinea’s membership. The fourth coup in 2021 took place in Sudan, where on 25 October the leader of the Sudanese army General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan took control of the government arguing that military actions were taken to avoid a civil war in the country. There were widespread protests and strikes against the coup and ousted civilian Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok was placed under house arrest. A month later Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister after an agreement with al-Burhan that the transition to civilian rule should be restored. However, Hamdok resigned in January 2022 after widespread protests in favour of a return to full civilian rule. In spite of the four coups in 2021, there has been a general decline in the number of coups since the end of the Cold War period (1950–1989) and, since its formation in 2002, the African Union has had some positive effect in combatting coup attempts. As Powell et al. (2016: 500) comment, ‘Though the African Union still faces challenges in combatting unconstitutional maintenance of power, efforts to combat coups d’état have significantly changed the continent’s political fortunes’. Following a detailed survey of African coups and attempted coups, McGowan concluded that only the multi-party democracies of Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius have been entirely coup free since independence (McGowan, 2003). Box 11.1 examines the role of the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union. In June 1989, towards the end of the Cold War period, US President George W. Bush encouraged American diplomats to promote democracy throughout the world. Pressure was put on African leaders to move towards multi-party democracy. In the case of Kenya, foreign assistance was stopped in 1991, and in the following year President Daniel Arap Moi decided to hold multi-party elections in December 1992 (Cohen, 2011). Cohen (2011: 232) concludes that ‘The vast majority of African societies are now much more open to discussion and dissent than before 1990’. But there is still concern about voterigging, freedom of the press and the rule of law in many African countries.

3.17 Good governance In the last decade greater emphasis has been given to achieving ‘good governance’, which Cohen suggests, is ‘essentially the use of state resources to enhance the wellbeing of the general population, as opposed to enhancing the wealth and power of the ruling elites’ (Cohen, 2011: 232). Transparency and accountability are key aspects of good governance. Rotberg (2004) suggested that ranking countries according to various

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governance indicators would be useful. In 2019 the African Union’s Africa Governance Report stated that Governance in Africa has, in general, improved considerably. The strongest performance has been in the area of socio-economic development, and the weakest in democracy and political governance. African Union member states have also performed satisfactorily in economic governance and management and corporate governance. (African Union, 2019: 12) In 2006, Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese billionaire businessman and philanthropist, established the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to ‘bring meaningful change on the continent, by providing tools to support progress in leadership and governance’ (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021). Initiated in 2007, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) assesses annually the quality of governance in African countries according to four variables – safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. Safety and the rule of law are concerned with such issues as personal safety, violent crime, political persecution, internally displaced people, judicial processes, transparency and corruption. Participation and human rights are concerned with free and fair elections, human rights, workers’ rights, freedom of expression, gender equality, women’s rights and women in parliament. Sustainable economic opportunity focuses on public administration, revenue collection, investment climate, bureaucracy and red tape and infrastructure issues such as road, rail and air transport and telephone and IT infrastructure. Human development in the IIAG evaluates issues relating to welfare (welfare services, social exclusion, access to water and sanitation), education (educational provision and quality, primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment and completion rates, the ratio of pupils to teachers), health (maternal and child mortality, immunization, undernutrition, HIV/AIDS treatment, disease prevention e.g. tuberculosis and malaria). The 2019 IIAG governance statistics showed that Somalia was the lowest ranked African country, whilst Mauritius was at the top of the governance table (see Table 3.1). Although Equatorial Guinea has one of the highest rates of GDP per capita in Africa, it ranks fourth from the bottom of the IIAG table. Table 3.1 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Country HIGHEST RANKINGS Mauritius Cape Verde Seychelles Tunisia Botswana LOWEST RANKINGS Somalia South Sudan Eritrea Equatorial Guinea Central African Republic Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021.

Rank, 2019

Change, 2010–2019

1/54 2/54 3/54 4/54 5/54

0 0 +2 +3 –1

54/54 53/54 52/54 51/54 50/54

–1 n/a 0 0 –2

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Rotberg and Gisselquist (2009) argue that the Ibrahim Index is a tool to hold governments to account and frame the debate about how we are governed. Farrington suggests that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation ‘aims to fill the gaps left by existing governance indices by providing a comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality’ (Farrington, 2009: 251). Cilliers (2021) suggests that some 58 per cent of Africans live in countries that could be considered as democratic, but the quality of democracy is often weak and at times undermined by leaders who are eager to retain their power. Some five out of the world’s ten longest serving rulers were in Africa in 2021. Paul Biya of Cameroon, with a 46-year tenure, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, with a 42-year tenure, were the world’s two longest serving leaders (Rulers, 2021). In some African countries, elections failed to be organized, as in Angola from 1992 to 2012, and in Eritrea national elections have not been held since independence in 1993 (Reyntjens, 2020). There are also cases where presidential term limits are a feature of the national constitution but are not respected. In Burkina Faso, for example, Blaise Compaoré was reelected for a third term as president in 2005, although in 2000 a two-term limit was introduced. He stood again in 2010 for a fourth term and attempted to change the constitution to extend his 27-year term, but was overthrown in October 2014 and fled to Ivory Coast. Reyntjens has shown how several national constitutions were actually changed to amend the presidential term before the end of the last legal term – for example, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Rwanda, Togo and Uganda (Reyntjens, 2020: 280). Another issue relating to transparency in governance concerns the representation of women in national parliaments, an aspect of Gender Equality included in UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5). Rwanda holds the distinction of having the highest female parliamentary representation, with 61 per cent of seats across both houses being occupied by women, followed by South Africa (46 per cent) and Namibia (44 per cent). For Africa as a whole, only 24 per cent of parliamentary seats are occupied by women, with West Africa being the weakest region with an average 16 per cent female representation, and Burkina Faso (6 per cent) and Nigeria (4 per cent) having the poorest record for women in parliament (Africa Barometer, 2021). There have been relatively few women African leaders, a number of them in an ‘acting’ role during political transition periods. Africa’s first elected President was Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who served for two political terms in Liberia over a 12-year period from January 2006. Sirleaf studied in the US and gained a Master of Public Administration from Harvard University before returning to Liberia and serving in the Tolbert government from 1972–1973 and 1979–1980. She fled the country in 1980 when Samuel Doe led a bloody military coup, working at the World Bank in Washington and then as Vice President of the African Regional Office of Citibank based in Nairobi. She later held positions at the United Nations Development Programme and was invited by the Organisation of African Unity in 1999 to join a panel of experts to investigate the Rwandan genocide. She contested the 1997 Liberian election which was won by Charles Taylor, but in the 2005 election she won 59 per cent of the vote and in the 2011 election she won 90.7 per cent of the second vote. On becoming President in 2006, Sirleaf inherited a war-torn and desperately poor country, and worked towards improving health and education, introducing free and compulsory elementary education in 2007. She also succeeded in substantially reducing the national debt through negotiations with the G8, International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association. In 2007, George W. Bush awarded Sirleaf the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian award given by the USA. Subsequently in 2011, she was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with Leymah Gbowee of

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Liberia and Tawakkol Karman of Yemen ‘for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women’s rights to full participation in peace-building work’. Looking ahead in relation to future governance issues in African countries, SDG 16 is concerned with developing and sustaining ‘peace, justice and strong institutions’. The stated objective is to ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. The ten targets of SDG 16 include reducing violence and promoting the rule of law, substantially reducing corruption and bribery and developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions, ensuring public access to information and protecting fundamental freedoms and enforcing non-discriminatory laws and policies. Achieving these targets will undoubtedly be a challenge for many African countries, but whilst some countries will be starting from a low base, others have made significant progress in recent years. In this chapter we have examined the rich cultural heritage of Africa and its growing contacts with the outside world which have led to intervention, exploitation and, some would say, marginalization. Hopefully in the decades ahead African countries can play a greater role in global political and economic decision-making than they have in the past, and Africa’s people might achieve some tangible benefits from this enhanced engagement.

3.18 Conclusion This chapter has covered millions of years in African history, starting from the birth of humankind and then examining aspects of state formation in the pre-colonial period. As far as we know, external contacts with Africa were relatively few until the coming of Arab traders and Chinese and European explorers. Reviewing this long period of time, two major events have probably had more impact than others, namely the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the period of colonialism. These events and their associated processes have had both a transformational and an indelible impact on Africa’s people. Independence also brought about fundamental shifts in the continent’s development trajectory and experimentation with a variety of governance models.

Summary 1 2 3 4 5

Africa is the birthplace of humankind. Many diverse civilizations flourished in Africa at different points in time and space. The trade in slaves from Africa had a massive impact on individuals and communities. Although colonial rule was relatively short-lived in Africa it transformed economies and societies. New and varied forms of governance were developed in African states in the early independence period.

Discussion questions 1 2 3 4

Examine the significance of one of Africa’s pre-colonial civilizations, for example in terms of culture, production and trade. Why were the trans-Saharan trade routes important in the pre-colonial period? In what ways did the trans-Atlantic slave trade impact upon communities in West Africa? Compare and contrast the key characteristics of British and French colonial policy in Africa.

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5 6

How did African leaders in some newly independent countries justify the avoidance of multi-party governance? With reference to specific examples, what do you believe have been the main causes of instability in post-colonial African states?

Further reading Achebe, C. (1958) Things Fall Apart. Oxford: Heinemann. Akyeampong, E., Bates, R.H. Nunn, N., and Robinson, J.A. (eds) (2014) Africa’s Development in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fage, J.D. (2002) A History of Africa (4th edition). London: Routledge. Iliffe, J. (1995) Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (3rd edition published 2017). Nyerere, J. (1968) Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.

Useful websites African Union (AU). A wide-ranging website giving up to date information on the AU and its member states: https://au.int/ Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slavery (London): www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/ Cradle of Humankind World Heritage Site (South Africa): www.maropeng.co.za/content/page/ introduction-to-your-visit-to-the-cradle-of-humankind-world-heritage-site/ International Slavery Museum (Liverpool): www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/internationalslavery-museum

4

Confict and Post-Confict

4.1 Introduction On 25 May 2013 governments of the African Union adopted the ‘50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration’ that conveyed Our determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people and to rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide. (AU, 2013) The declaration went on to ‘pledge not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africa and undertake to end all wars in Africa by 2020’, and within the subsequently agreed framework of Agenda 2063 that laid out a pathway to Africa’s future prosperity, the aim of ‘silencing the guns’ by 2020 was further reaffirmed as a critical stepping-stone to this prosperity and the achievement of the SDGs (African Union, 2015). Yet, as 2020 came and went, there was relatively little to celebrate despite the early optimism and the many actions instigated by these declarations. Indeed, 2019 alone was a record year for conflict in Africa, with 14 internationalized civil wars, 13 territorial conflicts, as well as nine countries mired in conflict with Islamic State (Palik et al., 2020). The impacts of war and conflict throughout Africa have been staggering. Between 2000 and 2020 alone, 39 African countries have been engaged in armed conflict in one form or another resulting in almost 370,000 fatalities (UCDP, 2021a; 2021b). Looking beyond the tragedy of battle-related deaths, however, the implications of conflict for development are far reaching, and as Asha-Rose Migiro, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated in 2010, ‘the costs of war in Africa have cancelled out the potential impact of 15 years of development aid’ (UN, 2010b: 1). Conflict has resulted in the collapse of economic systems, state infrastructure and effective governance, and more people die from disease and starvation due to the loss of essential services than from the direct impacts of military action. Those who manage to survive through conflict situations may face numerous development challenges, ranging from displacement and livelihood insecurity to being orphaned, infected with HIV, or co-opted as a child soldier. The persistence of poverty and underdevelopment is inextricably linked with the persistence of armed conflict, and it has been argued that the disappointing progress of the MDGs in Africa between 2000 and 2015 is evidence of this relationship (Ayoyo et al., 2017). Post-2015, African governments have shown a renewed commitment to addressing the conflict-poverty nexus through championing SDG 16 ‘Peace, justice and strong institutions’ (UNDP, 2019b; Mickler and Wachira, 2020). DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403-4

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This relationship between poverty and conflict, however, is extremely complex. Among the diverse (and often contested) causes of conflict in Africa, which include colonial legacies, ethnic and religious divisions, economic inequality, natural resource distribution, and increasingly the implications of climate change, is poverty and underdevelopment itself. Indeed, as is discussed in this chapter, poverty has been regarded as a key driver of conflict as well as a ubiquitous consequence and, as recognized in the aforementioned Agenda 2063, breaking this mutually reinforcing relationship remains both a challenge and priority in periods of peace and conflict. The first half of this chapter examines the nature of conflict in Africa, its geographical scope and complex interrelated causes, and, critically, how it has affected the population and hindered development efforts. The second half discusses the ways in which development has approached conflict in terms of instituting mechanisms for resolution and prevention, and planning for post-conflict reconstruction.

4.2 The scope of confict in Africa 4.2.1 What do we mean by ‘confict’? It is perhaps useful to start by considering what precisely is meant by ‘conflict’, although it is difficult to provide a universal definition. As Unwin (2002) points out, ‘conflict’ is a term that is used synonymously with ‘war’, which usually implies armed conflict, driven by a struggle for power, resulting in a specific number of deaths per year. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines state-based armed conflict as: a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a single calendar year. (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001: 643) Similarly, ‘major armed conflict’, which is also classed as ‘war’, constitutes at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The UCDP also uses a typology of conflicts, which includes: • • •

• •

Inter-state conflict, which occurs between two or more governments. Intra-state conflict, which occurs between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries. Intra-state conflict with foreign involvement, occurring between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict. Non-state conflict, which is the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state. One-sided violence, which is the deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians.

Clearly, these definitions consider conflict occurring at different geographic scales, for primarily political reasons, but conflict can exist in a much broader sense: it can involve exclusively civilians or military personnel, and it can be characterized by lingering violence that does not necessarily produce battle deaths. Brzoska (2007) suggested that

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economically motivated conflict between non-state actors and violence against unarmed civilians has become increasingly common, and arguably more significant than armed conflict involving military personnel. Recent data seem to evidence this trend; between 2011 and 2020 there were 381 recorded non-state conflicts and 200 one-sided violent conflicts in Africa, representing a 68 per cent and 32 per cent increase respectively from the previous decade (UCDP, 2021c; 2021d).

4.2.2 The geography of armed confict As shown in Table 4.1, since 1950, 42 out of Africa’s 54 countries have experienced armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state, and in many cases this conflict can be attributed to a history of long and protracted civil wars. Of particular note here are the cases of Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia, where conflict between 1950 and 2020 occurred for 60, 55 and 49 years, respectively – the highest incidences of conflict within the continent over this 70-year period. Further analysis of the most recent data from UCDP (see Palik et al., 2020) also suggests the following trends over the last decade: •

•

• •

An increase in both the number of countries experiencing conflict and the number of conflicts occurring, suggesting a trend towards countries hosting more than one conflict simultaneously (such as the case of the Somali government engaging in conflict with both Islamic State and Al-Shabaab). An increase in the proportion of armed conflicts with an international dimension (i.e., with at least one state actor receiving support from an external state) from four internationalized conflicts in 2010 to 17 by 2020. This is illustrated again by the case of Somalia, in which ten external states have supported its engagement with IS, Al-Shabaab and other non-state groups. The continued rarity of inter-state war (only seven in total since 1990) with the most recent being the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2016. As such, the majority of conflicts continue to occur for political reasons and governmental change, rather than over territory (as was more frequent up until 1980).

Table 4.1 Armed confict in Africa (1950–2020) where at least one party is the government of a state Country

Dates (1950–2020)

Total number of years in which conflict occurred

Algeria Angola Burkina Faso Burundi

1954–1962, 1991–2020 1961–1974, 1975–2020 1985, 1987, 2018–2020 1965, 1991–1992, 1994–2006, 2008, 2014–2015, 2019–2020 1957–1961, 1984, 1996, 2015–2020 2001–2002, 2006, 2009–2013, 2018–2020 1966–1972, 1976–1984, 1986– 1987, 1989–1994, 1997–2003, 2005–2010, 2015, 2017–2020 1989, 1987

39 60 5 21

Cameroon Central African Republic Chad

Comoros

years years years years

13 years 11 years 42 years

2 years

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Table 4.1 Continued Country

Dates (1950–2020)

Congo, Republic

1993–1994, 1997–1999, 2002, 2016 2002–2004, 2011 1960–1962, 1964–1967, 1977– 1978, 1996–2001, 2005–2008, 2011–2014, 2016–2020 1991–1994, 1999, 2008 1951–1952, 1956, 1967, 1969–1970, 1973, 1993–1998, 2014–2020 1979 1997–2000, 2003, 2016 1960, 1964–2016, 2019–2020 1964 1981 1966, 1981, 1983 2000–2001 1963–1973, 1998–1999 1952–1956, 1982, 2015–2020 1998 1980, 1989–2003 2011–2020 1971 1990–1991, 1994, 2007–2009, 2012–2020 1957–1958, 1975–1978, 2010 1953–1958, 1971, 1975–1989 1964–1974, 1977–1992, 2013– 2016, 2018–2020 1991–1992, 1994–1997, 2007– 2008, 2015–2020 1966–1970, 2004, 2009, 2011– 2020 1990–2002, 2009–2012, 2016, 2018–2020 1990–1993, 1995, 1997–1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2011 1991–2001 1978, 1982–1996, 2001–2002, 2006–2020 1966–1988 2011–2020 1955–1972, 1976, 1983–2020 1978 1986 1953–1956, 1961, 1980 1971–1972, 1974, 1978–1992, 1994–2011, 2013–2019 1967–1968, 1973–1979

Côte d’Ivoire Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) Djibouti Egypt

Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Mali Mauritania Morocco Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa South Sudan Sudan Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zimbabwe Source: UCDP, 2021a.

Total number of years in which conflict occurred 7 years 4 years 27 years

6 years 19 years

1 year 5 years 55 years 1 year 1 year 3 years 2 years 13 years 12 years 1 year 15 years 10 years 1 year 15 years 7 years 22 years 34 years 14 years 17 years 21 years 11 years 11 years 32 years 23 years 10 years 57 years 1 year 1 year 6 years 43 years 9 years

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Concurrently, there has also been a marked increase in non-state conflict, from 14 reported conflicts in 2010 to a record 48 in 2020 (Figure 4.1), the vast majority of which have been classed as ‘communal’ and which include the mobilization of informally organized groups that are often based on ethnic, religious or tribal identities. In 2020 alone, for example, Nigeria reported eight on-going political and territory motivated conflicts between different ethnic groups including the Fulani, Irigwe, Hausa, Chabo and Kadara peoples, and which resulted in over 400 fatalities (UCDP, 2021b). As highlighted in Figure 4.1, the proportion of one-sided violent conflict against civilians is similarly on an upward trend, having gone from eight incidents in 2010 to 30 in 2020. The majority of this has been carried out by non-state actors often identified as terrorist groups, as exemplified by Boko Haram’s actions in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad which claimed the lives of over 10,000 civilians between 2010 and 2020. Whilst such statistics paint a somewhat bleak picture of conflict trends in Africa overall, it is important to consider how the aggregated data often mask more nuanced geographies of conflict in which events tend to be concentrated in specific regions within countries (Figure 4.2). This has been particularly evident in Sudan, where the long-running civil war was confined to the southern half of the country that gained independence as South Sudan in 2011, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the internationalized internal conflict continues to be highly concentrated around the eastern border with the Great Lakes region (Box 4.1). More recently, the IS-backed Ansar al-Sunnah insurgency in Mozambique has been located almost exclusively in the far north-eastern province of Cabo Delgado. In contrast, the conflict in Mozambique and Somalia during the 1980s and 1990s enveloped the whole of these countries. Obviously, the geographical extent of the conflict influences the magnitude of direct and indirect causalities, although, as Luckham et al. (2001) point out, larger impacts are felt when conflict occurs in core regions that are centres of governance and economic productivity, rather than in peripheral areas.

Figure 4.1 Trends in the number of state-based conficts, non-state conficts and one-side violence, 1989–2020 Sources: UCDP, 2021a; 2021c; 2021d.

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Figure 4.2 State-based confict, non-state conficts and one-sided violence events in 2019 Source: adapted from Palik et al., 2020.

Box 4.1 Confict in the Great Lakes region The conflict that spread throughout the Great Lakes region during the 1990s and 2000s was also known as ‘Africa’s World War’ because it eventually involved the armed forces of eight different countries and cost the lives of over 5 million people. The conflict provides a good illustration of how conflict can be driven and reproduced by a range of complex interrelated factors, such as poverty, inequality, ethnicity, resource endowment, colonial history and geography. The Rwandan Civil War and genocide of 1994 is usually cited as the origin of the modern-day conflict in the Great Lakes region, although this itself was a product of colonial and post-colonial policies that resulted in ethnic inequalities. The overthrow of the Hutu Rwandan government by the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic

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Front (RPF) in April 1994 resulted in the dispersal of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu refugees in neighbouring Tanzania, Burundi and eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC – then Zaire). Subsequently, within the DRC, the fleeing Hutu perpetrators of the genocide (the interahamwe militia groups) were able to capitalize on the poor security situation in the country and reorganize themselves to lead incursions into Rwanda, taking revenge on the post-genocide RPF government and the Tutsi population. The spill-over of the conflict into the DRC was soon consolidated when Hutu militia also began targeting the country’s ethnic Tutsi population, the Banyamulenge, with support from Zairian (DRC) government forces and President Mobutu Sese Seko. Increasing violence and persecution of the Banyamulenge throughout 1996 ultimately led to an exchange of fire between Rwandan and Zairian troops, and the emergence of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire (AFDL), which formed from several opposition groups and was headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The AFDL received substantial support from both Rwandan and Ugandan forces, and between October and November 1996 they engaged in the systematic destruction of the large Hutu refugee camps along the Zaire–Rwanda border, forcing many Hutus to flee back into Rwanda. Six months later, Kabila was installed as President of the renamed DRC, having achieved a victory over government forces across the country. This first period of conflict would become known as the First Congo War. The Second Congo War began just a few months later, and this would ultimately cost the lives of over 5 million people. Once in power, Kabila sought to centralize control over the country and suppress minority groups seeking democratic reform and decentralization. Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear that the Rwandan and Ugandan troops remaining in the eastern part of the country, purportedly for security reasons, were actually there to exploit the region’s natural resources and mineral deposits. Kabila’s reaction to their reluctance to leave was to expel all Rwandan and Ugandan officials from the DRC. In response, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments backed Banyamulenge rebels, creating the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which consolidated territorial gains in the eastern provinces. At the same time, the Ugandan government helped establish the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), consolidating its exclusive influence in the north-eastern region. In 1998, however, Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops entered the conflict in support of Kabila’s forces (although Angola used the opportunity to attack UNITA rebels in its own province of Cabinda). Despite all the parties signing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, sporadic conflict continued across the country, and notably around the city of Kisangani, where Rwandan and Ugandan troops engaged in open combat for the first time. In 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila died following an assassination attempt and was replaced as President by his 29-year-old son, Joseph Kabila. After several high-profile meetings with the Uganda and Rwandan governments, both agreed to pull back their forces, and in 2002 peace deals were signed, leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC. A transitional government was established in 2003 and elections held in 2006, which saw Joseph Kabila returned to power in a fragile peace. Although the DRC has not erupted into full-scale civil war, many of the underlying causes of tension remain, and conflict has persisted in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu provinces. Hutu militia groups retain a presence in these areas and, according to Rwanda, continue to threaten ethnic

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Tutsis along the border. In 2008, Rwanda was accused of covertly supporting Laurent Nkunda, the leader of a rebel Tutsi group that has been fighting both DRC government forces and Hutu militia groups. Nkunda received international condemnation for his human rights abuses, including the recruitment of child soldiers, indiscriminate use of violence against civilians, and rape, all of which led to a growing humanitarian crisis. He was arrested in 2009 as part of a deal between the DRC and the Rwandan government, which allowed Rwandan forces into Kivu to pursue interahamwe militia in return for Rwanda’s cooperation in Nkunda’s capture. Conflict in the region has continued throughout the 2010s and has been driven by further social, political and ethnic unrest. In 2012, for example, the breakaway ‘M23’ Tutsi-dominated militia group commenced fighting in North Kivu, creating a refugee crisis for neighbouring Uganda. Joseph Kabila’s cling to power until 2019 resulted in widespread political violence, while peace has so far evaded his successor, Felix Tshisekedi, who in 2021 imposed military rule in North Kivu and Itiri provinces. Together with Ugandan troops DRC forces have been fighting an Islamist armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in a conflict that cost the lives of over 1,600 people in 2021 alone. The impact of conflict on development in the Great Lakes has been catastrophic. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their land and livelihoods, children have been denied education and have been forced to fight, women have been victims of sex crimes, and HIV/AIDS infection rates have increased. Despite various ceasefires and the best efforts of peacekeeping initiatives, the situation in the DRC remains fragile as various groups continue to seek control of mineral resources and exploit ethnic tensions along the eastern border. Sources: Ewald et al., 2004; Lun, 2006; Turner, 2007; HRW, 2021.

It is interesting to note that writing in the First Edition of this book a decade ago we suggested that conflict may actually have peaked in the late 1990s, since the 2000s were characterized by a marked decline in conflict alongside a range of seemingly successful peacebuilding and reconciliation measures. The challenge then, we wrote, was to ensure that those countries in a post-conflict state do not fall back into conflict, since, as is discussed in the following section, past conflict is a good predictor of future conflict. Unfortunately, as illustrated above, the optimism of a decade ago has not been realized and in many instances the causes of conflict in previous decades have been able to reproduce and evolve.

4.3 The causes of confict and violence It is extremely difficult to establish the exact causes of Africa’s many complex and interrelated conflicts. Much research has sought to identify risk factors – the specific underlying social, cultural, economic, political and environmental conditions which predispose a country or a region to conflict. The presence of certain conditions, however, does not

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necessarily guarantee that conflict will occur. In fact, conflict is often triggered by sudden change or a specific event. One example is the Rwandan genocide in which a reported 800,000 people were killed between April and July 1994. The cause of the conflict has been attributed to the underlying inequalities between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups which had existed and been reproduced in Rwandan society for generations. Indeed, the roots of the conflict can be traced back to the ethnic segregation and political manipulation of the Belgian colonial government during the 1920s. However, it was the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994 that triggered the mass killings and, some would argue, the subsequent years of conflict throughout the Great Lakes region (see Box 4.1). Compounding the causal relationship between conflict and specific risks and triggers is the fact that these can change over time; the factors that sustain a conflict are not necessarily those that caused it. Conflict itself can lead to political, economic and social transformations, which in turn create the conditions for further conflict. In this way, conflict can be seen as reproducing itself, and, in some cases, it becomes embedded in society and effectively is a ‘way of life’. Luckham et al. (2001) and Gilpin (2016) suggest that 20th-century conflict in Africa can be viewed as occurring in several historical stages, during which some causes and drivers of conflicts have become more significant than others. First, conflict occurring as part of a process of liberation against colonial powers was largely endemic throughout Africa during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (e.g. the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya during the 1950s, and the Mozambique War of Independence, 1964–1974). Second, the first post-colonial conflicts were motivated by the need to redefine national identities and colonial boundaries – as, for example, occurred in the Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970. Third, conflict was fuelled by rivalries during the Cold War, when states and rebel groups aligned themselves politically and economically with either the US or the USSR. An example here is the Angolan civil war, fought between 1975 and 1991, which was characterized by US and South African support for UNITA and FNLA forces, while the opposing MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Many African conflicts within the 1970s and 1980s can also be considered ‘reform’ wars, characterized by insurgencies against post-colonial governments that had failed to deliver on their promises of development and prosperity (e.g. the activities of the National Resistance Army in Uganda between 1979 and 1986). Following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, there followed a period of ‘Post-Cold War Transition’ (Gilpin, 2016) during which illegitimate governments collapsed, and a range of competing and well-armed non-state actors began to fill the institutional vacuum left behind. Conflict over the control of natural resources also became particularly prominent during the 1990s. Finally, as outlined above, it can be argued that conflict and the causes of conflict throughout Africa since 2005 have been characterized by the rise of non-state violence and one-sided conflict, fuelled by the rise of extremist and disaffected non-state actors, and civil society groups who increasingly have a political voice. Moreover, this is increasingly taking place in urban settings (Cilliers, 2018). Once again, the persistence of poverty, inequality, fragile governance systems and increasing transnational influence within a more connected world, have created the perfect storm (Figure 4.3).

4.3.1 Poverty, inequality and underdevelopment The persistence of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment is probably the most cited explanation for conflict in Africa, and whilst few would dispute the correlation between

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Figure 4.3 Key drivers of confict and violence in Africa Source: adapted from Cilliers and Sisk, 2013.

the two, the direction of causality continues to stimulate much debate (Braithwaite et al., 2014; Okunlola and Okafor, 2020). The ‘greed and grievance’ theory holds that those who live in poverty caused by the lack of economic development and opportunity have little to lose by joining a rebellion or engaging in a conflict that promises an improvement in quality of life (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Indeed, this has often been offered as one explanation for the child soldier phenomenon, common in the recent conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a; Achvarina et al., 2009). However, the relationship between poverty, inequality and conflict is extremely complex; high levels of poverty and inequality are both a cause and a consequence of underlying structural issues such as weak governance and poor political performance, that themselves predispose a state or region to conflict and violence (Cillers and Sisk, 2013). While economic inequality within society – that is, wealth existing alongside poverty – is also regarded as an underlying risk factor, it is important to view this in the wider context of the social and political processes that have created it (Cramer, 2003). Moreover, as Ostby (2008) points out, it is the inequality that manifests between specific groups (rather than individuals) that tends to cause resentment and grievances that are likely to evolve into conflict and violence. This is evident in the conflict that occurred during South Africa’s apartheid era which emanated from economic inequality between groups rooted in complex historical, social and political processes and transformations. Meanwhile, although the uprisings and conflict in North Africa during the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 were influenced by growing unemployment, economic inequality and poverty, it was arguably underdevelopment in its widest sense, in terms of the lack of human rights and political freedoms, that sparked the protests and conflict (Sadiki, 2015).

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4.3.2 Ethnicity The Rwandan genocide of 1994 placed ethnic politics firmly at the forefront of attempts to understand and predict conflict in Africa. Although there is some debate as to how influential a country’s ethnic composition and differences are as causes of conflict, several studies have proposed a heightened risk where one ethnic group is dominant within society or holds more political power (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For example, the 2020 armed conflict in northern Ethiopia between ethnic Tigrayans and central government forces has its roots in the country’s system of ethnic federalism instituted after the overthrow of the communist government in 1991. While this saw Ethiopia divided into nine regional states that reflected traditional ethnic territories, the central federal government was dominated by the interests of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) for over 17 years, raising ethnic tensions around the country. The election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 and the subsequent restructuring of political power raised accusations of exclusion by the TPLF, who in defiance of federal government held their own elections that led to hostility and an armed conflict characterized by thousands of casualties and accusations of rape and civilian killings from both sides. While ethnicity is often cited as cause of conflict, ethnic tensions may simply reflect underlying social and economic inequalities. In the case of Rwanda, ethnic tensions date back to the German and Belgian colonial governments that arbitrarily segregated Hutu from Tutsi and installed the latter in positions of power. Seeking to quash growing demands for independence from the Tutsi elite during the 1950s, the colonial government then transferred power and land from Tutsi to Hutu. Subsequent conflict, while fundamentally driven by unequal power relations, increasingly became associated with ethnicity, to the point where the systematic eradication of Tutsis became the goal of various Hutu militia groups in 1994. Similarly, in neighbouring Burundi, it has been argued that ethnic tensions were manipulated by both Hutu and Tutsi political elites to further their own interests during the civil war of 1993 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2005). Elsewhere, ethnic tensions across Sudan have been cited (particularly by the world’s media) as the driver of ongoing conflict and violence in the Darfur region since 2003 (Box 4.2).

Box 4.2 The confict in Darfur: Ethnic tensions or climate change? The Darfur region of Sudan came to the attention of the world’s media in 2003, when a violent armed conflict suddenly erupted between indigenous nomadic pastoralist Arabs and farmers of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Despite a relatively peaceful coexistence of these groups in the past, during which farmers allowed pastoralists access to land and water, sporadic outbreaks of violence attributed to ethnic tensions over land and resources first began to occur during the 1980s. In 2003, however, tensions rapidly escalated into a regional conflict that has claimed the lives of over 2.4 million people and has led to an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region.

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Shortly after the outbreak of violence in 2003, and particularly as the conflict began to escalate, it became clear that a process of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (some would suggest genocide) was being perpetrated throughout Darfur by government forces and state-sponsored local Arab militia, known as Janjaweed. Indeed, since the late 1990s, the Arab government of Sudan had been replacing local administrators in Darfur with its own political figures, with the aim of supporting Arab pastoralist groups over farmers (de Waal, 2005). The need to retaliate against this oppression triggered an escalation of conflict and the establishment of armed militant ‘rebel’ groups in opposition to the government in Khartoum, and despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, attempts at several ceasefire agreements (most recently in 2016), and the ousting of long-time president Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the conflict has continued. As recently as 2021 the region experienced violent conflict between Masalit groups and Arab nomads escalating into a declared state of emergency in the West Darfur region. In 2007, the UN published its Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment report, which challenged the view that Darfur’s conflict was rooted in ethnic divisions. Instead, the report blamed the conflict firmly on land degradation, desertification and an ‘unprecedented’ scale of climate change (UNEP, 2007: 60). It suggested that rainfall throughout the region has declined significantly and this has caused drought, water shortages and the degradation of agricultural land. This, combined with a growing population and poor environmental governance, has purportedly led to the breakdown of established social systems in Darfur and the outbreak of conflict due to competition for scarce resources. The Darfur conflict was subsequently characterized in the media as the first of many climateinduced conflicts that would inevitably affect Africa in the years to come. While few would deny that sustaining a livelihood in Darfur has been a challenge, many denounced the environmental degradation argument as being too simplistic, citing evidence that people in the region have adapted to environmental change for centuries without resorting to conflict. Indeed, in a detailed analysis of rainfall trends in the region, Kevane and Gray (2008) report that while there has been some variability in rainfall from one year to the next, there is little evidence of a gradual, long-term decline in rainfall during the 30 years preceding the conflict. Moreover, they note that the significant droughts of 1984 and 1990 did not lead to ethnic conflict. The roots of the conflict, they suggest, are overwhelmingly political, and ultimately rest with an elite ruling the country from the capital that has preferred to exclude peripheral populations from genuine participation in political processes and has repeatedly revealed a willingness and ability to use large-scale violence, often against civilian populations, in response to perceived threats from the peripheral regions. (Kevane and Gray, 2008: 10) Almost two decades on from its start, it is clear that conflict in Darfur shows no signs of abating and continues to be driven by a nexus of concerns about access to natural resources combined with ethnic politics and tensions that reflect the national situation. Even if the ethnic origins of the conflict are debatable, there is little doubt that the conflict and violence of the last 20 years has fuelled institutionalized grievances and antagonism along ethnic lines (DRC, 2021).

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4.3.3 Religion Armed conflicts and violence linked to religion have increased significantly in recent decades, with religion-fuelled extremism and terrorism killing civilians in many countries including Burkina Faso, Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria and Mali. In Nigeria in particular, religious conflict that exists to this day can be traced back to the country’s formation from two different territories during the British colonial era: the largely Muslim north, with historical cultural ties to North Africa and the Middle East, and the ethnically diverse and largely Christian south. Like ethnicity, religion is often a convenient label for conflict that has more deep-rooted and complex underlying causes, and for Nigeria it has largely been the case that underlying inequalities in natural resource access have driven religious tensions and violence. Since the declaration of Sharia law by some northern Nigerian states in the early 2000s, however, tensions have grown between Muslim and Christian communities from which extremist religious groups such as Boko Haram have emerged (Box 4.3). The increasing trend towards the radicalization and subsequent violent action of religious groups throughout Africa has in part been attributed to the spread of conservative and fundamentalist versions of Islam that have originated in North Africa, the Middle East, and in some cases terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida and Islamic State (Kim and Sandler, 2020). These have fuelled ‘theological conflicts’ often characterized by violence between different parties over ideas, for example the role of religion in state functioning has become a recurring issue in Somalia and Nigeria. Meanwhile, the number of ‘inter-religious armed conflicts’ in which conflict occurs between parties identifying with a particular religion (e.g. Christians and Muslims), has remained relatively stable (Basedau, 2017). Basedau and Schaefer-Kehnert (2019) further point to a growing trend of religious discrimination throughout Africa. Yet, despite the growing trend in theological conflicts and religious extremism across the continent, it is important to recognize that religious ideas per se do not cause extremism and religion-motivated conflict; rather it tends, once again, to be the prevalence of weak states and poor governance that create the conditions for religious discrimination and radicalization among vulnerable and disaffected populations (Basedau, 2017). With its long history of peaceful and tolerant religious practice, the challenge for Africa is one of mitigating and adapting to the transnational influences that empower religious conflict and violence.

Box 4.3 The Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria Boko Haram, which translates from Hausa as ‘Western education is a sin’, is the common name of the Islamic terrorist group known officially in Arabic as ‘Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad’ (translated as ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’). The group was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, north-eastern Nigeria, by Islamic preacher Mohammed Yusuf, but did not come to international attention until 2009 when it launched its first insurgence against security

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forces across several Nigerian states that left more than 1,000 dead. Following the capture and execution of Yusuf by state forces after this uprising, Abubakar Shekau emerged as the new leader and Boko Haram entered a new phase of attacks which grew in intensity and duration throughout the 2010s. Most notably these included the murder of 65 students at an agriculture college in Yobe state in 2013, the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from the town of Chibhok in 2014, bombings in Jos and Maiduguri throughout 2014, a massacre in the town of Baga in 2015 which claimed the lives of 2,000 people, and the bombing of a market in Gamboru in 2020 which killed 38. Between 2009 and 2022 it has been estimated that Boko Haram actions have led directly to the deaths of over 35,000 people, indirectly to over 100,000 deaths, as well as the displacement of over 3 million people. The wider impacts on development have also been extensive (see Nnorom, 2021). Farming, fishing and various other livelihood activities have experienced severe disruption, leading to greater poverty and a decline in their contribution to GDP. In terms of education, almost 2,300 teachers have been killed and 14,000 schools destroyed, resulting in children being forced from school and in some cases being recruited to fight for Boko Haram. The conflict has also led to more polarized religious divisions within the secular and traditionally tolerant Nigerian Society, and hence a shift towards an era of national political unrest. Like many other insurgency groups, Boko Haram has experienced frequent infighting and challenges to doctrine and authority, and in 2016 a new faction – Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) – broke away from Boko Haram and pledged loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While ISWAP and Boko Haram both continued their terrorist insurgencies, each gained control over different areas; Boko Haram had a stronghold in southern Borno and the border with Cameroon, while ISWAP continue to control areas around northern Borno, southern Niger and around Lake Chad. In May 2021, Abubakar Shekau was assassinated on the orders of the new head of Islamic State in Syria during a clash between Boko Haram and ISWAP forces, and in the following months thousands of Boko Haram rebels were reported to have either surrendered to Nigerian forces or defected to ISWAP. While the influence of Boko Haram has declined in recent years, in no small part to the actions of Nigerian state security forces, ISWAP in contrast has emerged as the most powerful faction in the region and there are growing fears that it will further consolidate its power and influence in the Lake Chad basin. One reason for this lies in the defeat of other Islamic terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, that have subsequently sought to reposition their transnational militant Islamic forces, interests and resources to West and East Africa. However, the situation has also been enabled by a mix of political, social, economic and environmental factors (Avis, 2020). The ISWAP stronghold in the Lake Chad basin is geographically remote and diverse in terrain, which has always been a challenge for state governance and security. Similarly, there are few barriers to illegal and unregulated cross-border trade – in both goods and weapons. The region has also suffered from the impacts of climate change, that has rendered people’s livelihoods vulnerable and increased levels of unemployment, migration and poverty. Finally, support among the different border communities has been achieved through ISWAP’s use of the common regional language, Kanuri (Barkindo, 2020). Both Boko Haram and ISWAP have, therefore, been able to appear more in touch with the needs of these poor and marginalized communities, and able to fill the gaps in governance, service delivery, security and economic support that the state governments of these remote areas have neglected for years.

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4.3.4 Natural resources Much attention has focused on the role of high-value natural resource endowments in fuelling conflict in Africa, and it has been suggested that a strong statistical correlation exists between a county’s reliance on natural resources and its susceptibility to conflict and violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Adhvaryu et al., 2021; Sini et al., 2021). Certainly, since the 1990s attempts to control access to natural resources such as diamonds, gold, timber and coltan have been blamed for long-enduring violence and conflict in DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola (Maconachie and Binns, 2007a; Conrad et al., 2018). The relationship between natural resources and conflict is also complex. In the welldocumented case of Sierra Leone, it remains unclear whether the desire to gain access to diamond mines constituted the original cause of the conflict between the state forces and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Richards, 2003). Nonetheless, once the conflict began, there is little doubt that control of these areas became a major objective (Maconachie and Binns, 2007b; see Plate 4.1). According to UNEP (2009), natural resource endowments are linked to conflict in three ways. First, the economic inequality that results from unequal access to the benefits of natural resources can lead to grievances and trigger the outbreak of conflict, as was arguably the case in Sierra Leone. Second, where conflict exists for other reasons, high-value natural resources may become strategic targets for military forces who see their control as a means of increasing revenue and fuelling further conflict. This has been the situation in eastern DRC, where the forces of several countries sought to gain control over diamond mines and coltan-rich areas, despite fighting what was initially an ethnic-based war. Third, because of the wealth generated by naturalresource exploitation, there is often little incentive to halt the conflict and concede territory and access rights. Natural resources, therefore, can become a barrier to peacebuilding. In examining these relationships further, several preconditions for natural-resourcefuelled conflict emerge. It has been argued that the failure of states to manage and distribute the benefits of natural resources in a fair manner can precipitate violent conflict. Corruption,

Plate 4.1 Diamond miners shovelling gravel in eastern Sierra Leone Source: Tony Binns.

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land appropriation, tolerance of illegal exploitation, or simply the lack of enforceable laws, can create the conditions for grievance among the population, especially those who are living in acute poverty. Removing control of natural resources from the state can therefore be seen as a way of addressing inequality. Many authors, however, have suggested that greed rather than a desire for redistributive justice is a major driver of seeking natural-resource control (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Maconachie and Binns, 2007a). Greed combined with available opportunities for resource exploitation arguably go hand-in-hand. Klosek (2018) points to the critical role of a resource’s ‘value-to-weight’ ratio in determining the likelihood of exploitation and conflict – natural resources that are smaller, more easily traded, and ultimately more readily ‘lootable’ by state and non-state actors, tend to be associated with some of the more violent and long-standing conflicts in Africa. Rather than poor governance and fragile states being a causal factor behind resource conflicts, some have argued the opposite: that the presence of these high-value, easily exploitable natural resources (and a dependency on them) actually erodes state functioning because resource-centred governance tends to neglect other infrastructural considerations (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier, 2007). This has arguably been the case in Nigeria, where most of the country’s economic activity centres on oil production, and where concerns persist about the fragile nature of the state and the challenge of governing a diverse, multi-ethnic population (Maier, 2001; Obi, 2014). Indeed, it is hardly surprising that many have written of Africa’s ‘resource curse’.

4.3.5 Geographical factors In addition to the presence and distribution of specific natural resources, a range of other geographical factors has been proposed as contributing to the risk of conflict in Africa (ADB, 2009). The presence of distinct geographic boundaries, including rivers, mountains and forests, can provide geographical isolation for insurgency groups, as was the case for the anti-government Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces operating from the northern Ethiopian Highlands during the civil war during the 1970s and 1980s. The size of a country and the distribution of population within it can also be influential. It has been argued that large populations located in peripheral areas, away from the capital, may be ignored by government, thereby fuelling resentment and conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This may well have been a contributing factor towards civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa’s two largest countries, DRC and Sudan, where central government has struggled to be effective in distant regions that offer safe havens for rebel forces. On the other hand, many of Africa’s smaller countries, such as Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, have been engaged in civil conflict, too. In the case of Rwanda, population pressure and tension over land availability have been cited as two of many factors driving the ethnic conflict in 1994 (Magnarella, 2005). Many have argued that the roots of modern conflict in Africa lie in the arbitrary geographical boundaries that were imposed by colonial governments during the late nineteenth century. One simply has to look at the present-day borders between Ethiopia and Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania, and Senegal and The Gambia to realize that these were drawn with little consideration of culturally and ethnically contiguous areas. In the case of Ethiopia and Somalia, conflict in the late 1970s was driven by Somali claims over the disputed, ethnically Somali, Ogaden territory, which had been allocated to Ethiopia by colonial powers in the 1950s. Conversely, while Sudan and South Sudan were managed as two distinct regions during the colonial era, these were merged after independence in 1956 leading to over 50 years of conflict between the less developed, ethnically diverse south and the more developed, mainly Arab north. Despite South Sudan gaining independence in 2011, conflict has continued unabated and driven by longstanding territory disputes that reflect natural resource access grievances and ethnic rivalries (Martell, 2018).

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4.3.6 Globalization, interconnectedness and the spill-over effect It has been argued that an increasing interconnectedness of the world system, which has included transport, telecommunications and markets, in combination with the collapse of Cold War rivalries during the 1990s, has provided an environment in which conflict can easily flourish. Luckham et al. (2001) suggest that the immediate reduction in funding and arms supplies after the Cold War led to the instability of many states, and subsequently both state and rebel forces looked to the growing number of private suppliers of arms to provide the resources to assert control over territory. Meanwhile, as access to global markets improved, new sources of revenue such as natural resources have been exploited. This has been exacerbated by the proliferation in mobile telecommunications, internet access and the use of social media networks over the last two decades; a period in which mobile phone subscriptions in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 11.5 million in 2000 to almost 800 million in 2019 (World Bank, 2020b). Social media in particular has been accused of creating virtual echo chambers of views that provide a breeding ground for disinformation, conspiracy theories and political and religious radicalization that go on to fuel violence and conflict. On the other hand, social media has also been used as a tool to draw attention to on-going conflict, political repression and human rights abuses, and in so doing has provided a trigger for protest and further conflict. This was evident in the build up to Robert Mugabe’s removal from office in Zimbabwe in 2017 when the #ThisFlag campaign and others galvanized opposition movements (Hove and Chenzi, 2020). A further consequence of the seemingly arbitrary nature of Africa’s borders is the way in which conflict has spilled over from one country to the next, and as Gleditsch (2007) maintains, conflict is twice as likely in a country where one of its neighbours is at war. The porosity of borders means that militia, weapons and resources can circulate freely, as typified by conflict in the DRC, where no fewer than nine state forces were fighting at any one time during the ‘Second Congo War’ between 1998 and 2003; a conflict that became defined more by the interconnections between natural resource markets, arms suppliers and the mobility of different ethnic groups, rather than the state versus rebel groups. More recently, North Africa’s Arab Spring uprising that originated in Tunisia spread rapidly into neighbouring countries, and in Libya in particular its legacy has been one of ongoing conflict between a range of state and non-state actors and frequent disputes with neighbouring Chad and Algeria, who themselves are embroiled in range of ethnic and theologically-driven conflicts between different groups that span the different borders of the Sahel (OECD, 2020a).

4.3.7 Climate change and confict Of increasing concern is the relationship between climate change and conflict, so much so that in 2021 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union issued a Communique on the theme ‘Sustainable Peace in Africa: Climate Change and its Effects on Peace and Security in the Continent’ (African Union, 2021b). According to the IPCC (Trisos et al., 2022), temperature increases and water shortages in Africa will have a dramatic effect on agricultural land and food security, with between 75 million and 250 million people affected in coming decades. Environmental degradation, food insecurity and water scarcity inevitably put pressure on people’s livelihoods, create competition for land and resources, and ultimately enhance the risk of violent conflict (Brown et al., 2007; Niang et al., 2014). Some researchers have also gone as far as suggesting a causal ‘heat–violence’ relationship in which increasing temperatures have evidenced a proportional increase in violent conflict (Chersich et al., 2019). Indeed, in 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon claimed that the impact of climate change was a significant cause of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur

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region (see Box 4.2). Meanwhile in neighbouring Chad the conflict and violence around its borders with Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon have long been attributed to climate-induced water scarcity characterized by a 90 per cent reduction in surface water in Lake Chad since the 1960s (Nagabhatla et al., 2021). Although not yet erupting into armed conflict, tensions continue to grow between Egypt and Ethiopia over access to the Blue Nile’s water, which have been exacerbated by climate-induced changes to seasonal rainfall and also Ethiopia’s response to this which has been to construct a series of large dams that Egypt claims will have a catastrophic impact on downstream flows and its economy in the coming years. In 2020 the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warned, ‘No force can stop Ethiopia from building a dam. If there is need to go to war, we could get millions readied’ (BBC, 2019). However, the links between climate change and conflict are not clear cut, and it has been argued that analyses tend to ignore complex socio-economic and political determinants that constitute ‘climate fragility risks’ (Nagarajan et al., 2018) as well as the impressive adaptive capacity of people, institutions and policies (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Abraham, 2007). Certainly, it is the calls for adaptation for climate resilience through political co-operation and a commitment to climate mainstreaming that lie at the heart of the aforementioned AU call for action.

4.3.8 Confict triggers While each of the factors discussed above heightens the risk of conflict and violence, it is usually specific political, social, economic or environmental events that trigger it. Military coups, for example, have triggered conflict in Burundi, DRC and Angola, although ‘bloodless’ coups – such as those in Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia and Ghana – have also frequently occurred (Meredith, 2005; see Plate 4.2). There have also been numerous examples of government elections that have precipitated civil conflict and unrest.

Plate 4.2 Arch 22, Banjul, The Gambia to commemorate the military coup of 22 July 1994 Source: Tony Binns.

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In Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2007, 2017), Zimbabwe (2008, 2018), Nigeria (2011, 2019), Côte d’Ivoire (2011, 2020), and Guinea (2020) violence erupted in response to voter intimidation and alleged electoral manipulation (Kovacs and Bjarnesen, 2018; Laakso, 2019). Perhaps the most striking example of a conflict trigger in Africa in recent years was the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia in 2010 in protest to the confiscation of his goods by municipal officials, which sparked the Tunisian revolution and subsequent civil unrest throughout North Africa.

4.4 The impacts of confict In 2005 the UN’s Human Development Report suggested a ‘strong association between low human development and violent conflict’, with nine out of the ten lowest-ranked countries (which were all African) having experienced violent conflict between 1990 and 2005 (UNDP, 2005: 154). Re-examination of the data as recently as 2020 reveals an almost identical situation; one in which each of the ten least developed countries, with the exception of Sierra Leone, has experienced conflict during the previous decade (UNDP, 2020). The implication here is that conflict has a serious impact on those variables used to calculate the Human Development Index – GDP, life expectancy and education – although, as is explored in this section, the impacts of conflict are significantly more diverse and wide-ranging. The impact of conflict on people and their livelihoods can also be long-lasting, extending well beyond the period of conflict itself. Since few African countries have escaped conflict, understanding the interrelated impacts and legacies of conflict has become a fundamental component of most development strategies, particularly those involved in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. A critical consideration in understanding the impacts of conflict, however, is that the consequences of conflict are not always negative. While this is undoubtedly subjective – depending upon which ‘side’ one is on and the underlying causes of the conflict – periods of conflict are fundamentally characterized by a dynamic restructuring of power relationships from the macro-economic to the household levels. Conflict can create new forms of inequality and poverty, but it can also lead to the development of new opportunities for people, which can be consolidated in the post-conflict period (see Section 4.6). Before discussing the specific impacts of conflict in detail, it is worth considering the issues surrounding the reporting of these impacts. Here, the reliability of data becomes a key problem. As Luckham et al. (2001) point out, government records may be physically destroyed during the conflict, making it difficult to establish a benchmark from which demographic, economic and social change can be measured. Data may also exist only at an aggregated, nationwide level, which can mask the effects of localized conflict. Perhaps more importantly, it is often difficult to establish the impacts of conflict relative to what would have occurred in its absence, particularly given the already impoverished status of many African countries that face a range of other development challenges. Statistical information, therefore, is at best unreliable; and most would argue that, for these reasons, the effects of conflict tend to be greatly underestimated.

4.4.1 Casualties It is important to distinguish between direct ‘battle deaths’ – military personnel and civilians killed during conflict – and ‘total war deaths’, which include the former as well as indirect deaths from disease, starvation and crime (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005), although these are notoriously difficult to estimate. The African Development Bank (ADB, 2008)

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suggests that 1.6 million battle deaths occurred in Africa between 1960 and 2005, some 24 per cent of the global total, yet these may constitute only a fraction of total war deaths. For instance, in Angola, there were an estimated 1.5 million total war deaths between 1975 and 2002, of which 165,475 were recorded battle deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). Similarly, it is estimated that war in the DRC between 1998 and 2007 cost the lives of over 5.4 million people (2.1 million after the formal end of the war in 2002), yet fewer than 10 per cent of these were battle deaths (Coghlan et al., 2008). The gross disparities between battle deaths and total war deaths are even more stark in the case of Ethiopia, where the 1976–1991 conflict resulted in just 16,000 battle-related deaths, but most likely 2 million total war deaths, mainly due to the ensuing famine (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). As discussed above in 4.2.2, the inter-state conflicts of the 1990s in which battle deaths peaked (Figure 4.4), have given way to multiple intra-state and non-state low-intensity conflicts involving various state and non-state actors (Palik et al., 2020). Hence, despite battle deaths showing signs of decline during the 2000s, this recent proliferation in the number and frequency of low-intensity conflicts has contributed to an increasing number of casualties since 2013. Indeed, during the 2000s there were on average just over 12,000 battle deaths per year, while for the 2010s this increased to over 17,000 (UCDP, 2021b). Estimating the total war deaths on top of this remains more challenging than ever given the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of conflict. As Wagner et al. (2018) reveal, infant deaths as an indirect consequence of conflict are estimated to be up to 3.6 times the number of infants killed directly from armed conflict.

4.4.2 Macro-economy and government Despite the correlation between conflict and a country’s low ranking on the Human Development Index, it is difficult to determine whether underdevelopment is a cause

Figure 4.4 Estimates of battle deaths from 1989 to 2020 throughout Africa Source: UCDP, 2021b.

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or consequence. The reality is both: underdevelopment increases the risk of conflict, while conflict exacerbates economic decline and underdevelopment. Oxfam’s Africa’s Missing Billions report in 2007 suggested that conflict in 23 African countries between 1990 and 2007 cost around $300 billion in total, with conflict shrinking a country’s economy (GDP) by an average of 15 per cent per annum (Oxfam, 2007). More recently, an IMF analysis of 45 African countries between 1989–2019 estimated that in conflict-stricken countries annual growth was on average 2.5 percentage points lower than non-conflict countries, and GDP per capita was up to 20 per cent lower five years after the start of a conflict (IMF, 2020). Again, the economic costs incurred as a result of conflict are difficult to quantify, but they can be divided into direct and indirect costs. The former are those costs that involve expenditure to support or manage the effects of conflict. Military spending, for example, will increase significantly during periods of conflict, and effectively divert money away from other essential services or infrastructure. In 1999, a year into its conflict with Ethiopia, Eritrea poured a staggering 34.4 per cent of its GDP into the military (in 2003, several years after the ceasefire, military expenditure remained at 20.9 per cent) (SIPRI, 2022). This is illustrated in Figure 4.5, which also shows the level of military spending as a proportion of GDP in several other countries. The increase in military spending in Burundi between 1993 and 2005 can be linked to the country’s civil war in that period. Similarly, in Sudan, spending fell after the end of the north–south conflict in 2001, while the subsequent sustained rise from 2004 can be linked to the conflict in Darfur. Meanwhile, military expenditure in both South Sudan and Libya corresponds with the escalation of conflict during the mid-2010s. Figure 4.6, however, points to a trend of declining military spending over the last three decades among the vast majority of African countries, even though, as highlighted earlier, this does not appear to correspond to a decline in conflict itself. Once again, this is perhaps indicative of the displacement of conflict among private and non-state actors.

Plate 4.3 Display of armaments in Johannesburg Source: Etienne Nel.

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Figure 4.5 Military spending as a percentage of GDP in selected African countries, 1990–2020 Source: SIPRI, 2022.

The direct costs of conflict also include medical and repatriation expenses for the injured, the costs of civilian displacement (see Section 4.4.6), and the cost of rebuilding essential infrastructure, although this usually occurs during the post-conflict period (see Section 4.6). The diversion of funds to meet the direct costs of conflict inevitably results in a range of indirect economic costs, which can be seen in terms of opportunities lost through the lack of investment in essential peacetime infrastructure, services and economic development activities. The deterioration of infrastructure, through either physical destruction or lack of investment, together with ineffective governance, creates the conditions of economic decline. Under these circumstances, tax revenues decrease as economic activity shifts towards an informal economy characterized by short-term opportunistic behaviour and segmented markets, as occurred throughout Somalia following the collapse of the state in 1991 (Luckham et al., 2001) (although Mackie et al. (2017) suggest that growth of the informal economy has actually benefitted longer-term peace and stability in some parts of the country). There may also be a significant ‘brain drain’, as those with skills in such sectors as health and education flee the country (Mlambo et al., 2019). Bilateral and multilateral aid and funding for development projects and NGOs are also likely to be suspended as donors become concerned about operational issues, or money being diverted into military spending. Similarly, foreign direct investment by private firms may be scaled down or halted, while the occurrence of conflict will significantly reduce the likelihood of future foreign investment due to the perceived risks of insecurity. The overall effects of this reduced investment and economic decline are multisectoral in nature: health, education, development, energy, roads, water, environment and social services are all likely to be affected, albeit it in different ways (Table 4.2).

4.4.3 Tourism Tourism is an essential source of foreign exchange and in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it contributed overall to around 6.9 per cent of Africa’s GDP (WTTC, 2021).

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Figure 4.6 Average military spending as a percentage of GDP in selected African countries across three decades Source: SIPRI, 2022.

However, even brief periods of conflict or civil unrest can affect tourist receipts as visitors are sensitive to the security situation. The violence that followed the Kenyan presidential elections in 2007 resulted in a halving of tourist revenue during 2008, with serious implications for employment in the sector (see Box 8.6; BBC, 2008). Similarly, in the aftermath of revolution in Tunisia in 2011, tourist revenues declined by almost $1 billion in the

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Table 4.2 Summary of confict impacts on different sectors

Agriculture

Industry

Education Health

Tourism

Direct impacts

Indirect impacts

Destruction and contamination of land Destruction or theft of livestock and equipment Destruction and looting of factories and equipment Disruption of supply and marketing channels Destruction of schools Shortage of teachers Destruction of hospitals and health infrastructure Looting of equipment Destruction of infrastructure (buildings, roads) and natural capital (wildlife)

Displacement of people Difficult rural livelihoods

Reduced economic activity Unemployment Perceived investment opportunities too risky Brain drain Legacy of poor education Disease and ill health Increased morbidity and mortality Public health neglected Declining tourist receipts, collapse of sector, and unemployment

following year and, despite a strong recovery thereafter, terrorist attacks at a beach resort near Sousse in 2015 led to a further decline (WTTC, 2021). In cases of more prolonged conflict, the physical destruction of tourism infrastructure, such as buildings and wildlife, means that tourism takes a long time to recover and requires significant investment during the post-conflict period (Ferreira et al., 2015). The last 20 years have also seen increasing tourism revenues generated by what is often termed ‘dark tourism’, in which conflict, violence and its legacy become an attraction and marketable commodity. Rwanda, for example, offers ‘peace and reconciliation’ tours in which tourists can visit some of the 400 genocide memorials, inspect human remains and meet both victims and perpetrators of the 1994 genocide (Friedrich and Johnston, 2013). Albeit less recently, the battlefield sites of the Anglo-Zulu and Anglo-Boer Wars in South Africa have become ingrained in the country’s cultural and historical heritage and have become popular tourist attractions.

4.4.4 Agriculture and rural livelihoods While agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed just under 18 per cent of Africa’s GDP in 2020, this figure masks the significant spatial variation between countries and the fact that smallholder farmers make up 70 per cent of the population and similarly produce around 70 per cent of Africa’s food supply (AGRA, 2017). Conflict-induced destruction of land, homes and agricultural resources such as livestock and farming equipment, can consequently have a catastrophic impact on rural livelihoods and food security. In Somalia, for example, decades of conflict led to a national shortage of economically significant livestock resources (Ahmed and Green, 1999), whilst more recently one impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria has been a significant reduction in agricultural productivity specifically among staple crops such as sorghum, cassava, soya and yam (Adelaja and George, 2019). Even if land is still accessible and agricultural activities can continue, normal agricultural production may be disrupted by the destruction and collapse of infrastructure, such as water supply, road networks and extension services, as well as the lack of finance and marketing opportunities. The presence of armed groups

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may also place increasing pressure on farming; Luckham et al. (2001) cite the case of RENAMO insurgents in Mozambique, where soldiers forced local people to give up their food and water supplies. A shortage of agricultural labour may also result from the forced conscription of men and children, as occurred in Sierra Leone during the 1990s. Despite the severe disruption to the functioning of many rural livelihoods, however, evidence suggests that people adapt to the new scenarios created by conflict. Faced with a decline in the able-bodied male workforce, women are likely to take on new roles (albeit with a significant burden). Forms of agriculture that require less maintenance, and are less vulnerable to destruction, may also be developed, or adaptation may be characterized by livelihood diversification (e.g. brick-making, labouring or manure-selling) which itself can create new markets and stimulate economic growth (Young and Ismail, 2019).

4.4.5 Environmental impacts The impacts of conflict on the environment can also be considered in terms of their direct and indirect impacts, and in the wider context of the institutional and governance vacuum created by conflict. Direct impacts include the physical destruction or contamination of land, natural resources and wildlife, usually caused by explosives or their debris. However, the indirect impacts are arguably even more significant (Solomon et al., 2017). Indirect impacts on the environment occur largely through the actions and coping strategies of civilians; in the absence of infrastructure, governance and livelihood opportunities, people are often forced to exploit natural resources. Deforestation, for example, can increase in response to local fuel shortages and the need for construction materials, but illegal timber production and marketing can also form a lucrative economic activity for both civilians and the military. The profit from ‘conflict timber’ consequently acts as an incentive for further conflict (see Section 4.3.3). In the absence of markets and ‘normal’ agricultural resources, wildlife poaching tends to proliferate and ‘bush meat’ becomes an important source of food. This was particularly evident in central Africa and especially the DRC during the 1990s and 2000s, causing alarm amongst conservationists as endangered species such as mountain gorillas were hunted. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this dependency on bushmeat was relatively short-lived and that the number and diversity of species have shown significant recovery (Van Vliet et al., 2017). These pressures tend to be highest where there are displaced people, particularly where refugees are concentrated. For example, it has been estimated that around 3,750 hectares of forest were lost within three weeks of the arrival of refugees from Rwanda in the South Kivu region of the DRC in 1994 (UNEP, 2005). Similarly, in Karago, western Tanzania, where refugees from Burundi have been hosted since 1999, there is widespread evidence of serious soil erosion and land degradation caused by the destruction of vegetation. The demands placed on water resources by refugees can also lead to water shortages, and a deterioration of water quality through human-waste contamination. Again, these effects may be limited to the short term, however, and as Black (1998) suggests, there is evidence that refugees adapt to their new environment in ways that do not necessarily lead to long-term environmental degradation.

4.4.6 Displacement and refugees Faced with the destruction of land, resources and livelihoods, many people in conflict zones are forced to migrate in search of security (Freeman, 2017). Those leaving their country of origin assume the status of a refugee, while those who remain are classified

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as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In both cases, displacement has a range of social, economic and cultural consequences for those on the move and for those already residing in host areas. Not only have displaced people lost their livelihood assets, such as land and resources, but they may have lost their kinship and social connections. Displaced people subsequently become ‘outsiders’ in the areas where they settle, to the extent that this may create tensions within host communities, sometimes leading to further conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). In a recent study of DRC refugees in Rwanda, however, Fajth et al. (2019: 17) suggest that ‘over time, refugees and host communities may build close social relations and sustain a peaceful and inclusive social environment’. Recent data from the UNHCR suggest that in 2021 there were over 24 million IDPs and over 7.9 million refugees throughout Africa; this represents a huge increase since 2010 when numbers were estimated at 6.4 million IDPs and 2.3 million refugees. From the data highlighted in Table 4.3, it is clear that conflict in DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan has had a dramatic effect on the displacement of people: over 5 million people have been displaced within the DRC alone. Many of those displaced will inevitably be drawn towards relief camps, where there is a chance that their basic needs will be met, until the security situation improves and repatriation can occur. Yet, the high concentration of people in relief camps creates other challenges. Food and water tend to be limited, and hence malnutrition and disease become endemic. For example, in the relief camps established around Goma in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, an estimated 50,000 people died as a result of cholera and dysentery linked to poor sanitation (Goma Epidemiology Group, 1995). However, recent evidence suggests that organizations such as UNHCR have made significant progress in managing outbreaks of infectious diseases such as measles, cholera and meningitis in refugee camps, not least due to better vaccination programmes (Altare et al., 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic meanwhile, continues to raise a new series of challenges (as discussed in Chapter 6).

Table 4.3 Refugees and internally displaced people in selected African countries, 2021 Internally displaced persons Democratic Republic of Congo Ethiopia Somalia Nigeria Sudan South Sudan Burkina Faso Cameroon Mozambique Central African Rep. Chad Mali Niger Libya Congo Burundi Eritrea Rwanda

Refugees under UNHCR’s mandate

Total

5,094,035

864,510

5,958,545

3,954,760 2,967,500 2,762,562 2,552,174 1,710,966 1,312,071 1,032,942 788,091 716,678 401,511 386,454 319,895 223,949 134,430 19,399 0 0

145,125 790,022 369,880 805,874 2,277,919 15,813 83,027 74 713,262 10,361 174,319 20,321 18,346 12,595 323,149 492,465 247,974

4,099,885 3,757,522 3,132,442 3,358,048 3,988,885 1,327,884 1,115,969 788,165 1,429,940 411,872 560,773 340,216 242,295 147,025 342,548 492,465 247,974

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Table 4.3 Continued Internally displaced persons Western Sahara Zimbabwe Kenya Malawi Lesotho

0 0 0 0 0

Refugees under UNHCR’s mandate 116,960 8,458 7,533 516 6

Total 116,960 8,458 7,533 516 6

Source: UNHCR, 2021.

4.4.7 Women The consequences of conflict differ greatly between men and women, in a manner which usually reflects wider gender divisions in society. Since men are more likely to be directly involved in fighting, and account for the majority of deaths, it is women and children who can be most affected by the indirect impacts of conflict. Indeed, Wagner et al. (2019) estimated that women living within 50km of a high intensity armed conflict have a 21 per cent greater increase in mortality than those who live further away, and that this is mostly attributed to the deterioration of health services and a subsequent increase in maternal mortality. One effect of the disproportionate loss of men during conflict is an increase in the work burden of women, who are forced to extend their role in economic production, in addition to continuing their household and childcare activities. The death of between 10–15 per cent of Rwanda’s male population during the genocide created a large number of female-headed households, which in turn had a significant impact on rural livelihood dynamics across the country (Brück and Schindler, 2009). Although it has been suggested that such circumstances can be transformational in terms of women’s empowerment, this can be temporary and long-term change hinges on women’s representation in peace agreements and planning during the post-conflict period (Bakken and Buhaug, 2020). Although research suggests that gender-based violence during conflict is influenced by its prevalence in pre-conflict periods, there is little doubt that sexual and domestic violence towards women increases significantly during conflict periods. This can be explained in terms of the ‘breakdown’ of societal norms, but also by the fact that sexual violence has been used as a strategic weapon to spread fear and destabilize communities (El Jack, 2003; Mpinga et al., 2017). For example, in conflicts in Sudan, Uganda and particularly Rwanda (during the 1994 genocide), rape was used extensively as an ‘ethnic cleansing’ tool in an attempt to exercise power over specific ethnic groups. More recently, systematic sexual violence occurring alongside ‘shocking levels of brutality’ has been evidenced among government and rebel forces in Ethiopia’s civil conflict (Amnesty International, 2021). While the effects of sexual violence are profound and long-term in terms of the direct impacts on physical and mental health, and the trauma within families affected, there is also an economic impact; those affected may be unable to return to their livelihood opportunities or may become ostracized within communities.

4.4.8 Children In terms of vulnerability, children are arguably in a similar situation to women. Indeed, many children born into Africa’s long-running conflict hotspots in West Africa, the Great

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Lakes region and the Horn of Africa have known little else. In addition to experiencing poor health and nutrition, displacement and a lack of education opportunities (and perhaps because of this), children are also being recruited into military forces. By the end of the 2010s there were over 100,000 active child soldiers in Africa (Vautravers, 2009), although with the relative decline of conflict in western and central Africa these numbers have fallen, and in 2017 UNICEF declared that almost 65,000 children had been released in the preceding decade (including 20,000 from Democratic Republic of Congo alone) (UNICEF, 2017). While children have always been involved in fighting during periods of conflict throughout history, several explanations have been proposed for their increasing participation in African conflicts in recent years. The long duration of many of these conflicts has led to a decline in the availability of adult male combatants, and hence forces have turned their attention to children as potential recruits. Children are often psychologically manipulated by armed groups who emphasize the moral justifications of their cause; and, as occurred during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, drugs such as marijuana and cocaine may be administered to instil fearlessness and a willingness to fight. In many cases, however, children have been forcibly abducted. Alternatively, there is evidence that some children join armed forces simply because they perceive this to be the only route out of a life of poverty (which itself has been created partly by long-term conflict). Others, meanwhile, are motivated by a desire to avenge the deaths of friends and relatives. Finally, it has been argued that the widespread availability of cheap and light firearms, which can be operated easily by children, has been a major driver (Vautravers, 2009). Soldiering has a long-term effect on the lives of those children involved. In addition to sustaining physical injury, many are engaged in violent conflict during their formative learning years, and hence violent behaviour can become an embedded, ‘normal’ way of life. Indeed, this has been offered as one explanation for the way in which conflict tends to re-emerge within society. A key challenge for the post-conflict situation, therefore, is how to reintegrate physically and psychologically scarred child soldiers into society (Albertyn et al., 2003; War Child, 2019).

4.5 Confict resolution As pointed out above, many of Africa’s conflicts have become protracted because there has been little incentive for armed groups who are profiting from it to stop fighting. This is particularly the case where access has been gained to lucrative natural resources, or where a return to pre-war inequalities is economically or ideologically unattractive for participants. Nonetheless, as is highlighted in Table 4.1, conflicts do end, usually due to a combination of several factors. First, decisive military action by one group may comprehensively defeat the opposition, as occurred in the Angolan government’s victory over UNITA forces in 2002. Second, the intervention of external forces in a peacekeeping role may swing the balance of military action or lead to the demobilization of armed groups. Throughout the 1990s, ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) was active as a peacekeeping force in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (see Box 4.4), although the effectiveness of external peacekeeping interventions has been mixed. While the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2000 is widely attributed to the intervention of British troops who restored relative security to the country, UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda (1994) and Somalia (1992–1995) failed to prevent an escalation of conflict.

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Finally, with or without military victory, conflicts may be resolved through diplomacy and brokered negotiations culminating in a peace deal, the crux of which is usually some sort of power-sharing arrangement. Peace agreements and powersharing initiatives, however, can be fragile, and at worst can lead to the renewal of hostilities. At their most cynical, power-sharing agreements can involve what Omeje (2008) regards as ‘elite co-optation’ – that is, the incorporation of influential individuals from opposition groups into positions of power – to bring conflicts to a close and effectively weaken the legitimacy of opponents. In Zimbabwe, for example, the merger between Robert Mugabe’s ZANU party and Joshua Nkomo’s opposition ZAPU party in 1987 following civil war between the two groups secured Mugabe’s one-party control of the state and effectively silenced all opposition movements; this was repeated in 2009 when opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was appointed to Prime Minister. Power-sharing arrangements can also be problematic in that they effectively reward those involved in violent conflict, while at the same time marginalizing the more moderate voices in society (ADB, 2009). Such polarization in representation may lead to the emergence of new inequalities, and new opposition movements, hence providing a breeding ground for future conflict. Power sharing may also be unsustainable where parties control specific resources or territories and are reluctant to give up their claims and dominance in those areas (this is a major issue hindering conflict resolution in the DRC). Disarmament is another key issue: parties are likely to retain their arms and military wings in anticipation of the failure of the conflict-resolution process.

Box 4.4 Regional peacekeeping: The role of ECOMOG in Liberia The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 with the aim of forging closer economic links and monetary union between participating countries, of which there were 15 in 2010. Since its formation, ECOWAS has been dominated by Nigeria, which has the largest population and economy of the constituent countries. Among its founding principles was the need to maintain peace and security throughout the region, and in 1981 it enshrined in its constitution a protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence, legitimizing a collective response to any conflict that threatened the security of member states. Subsequently, in 1990, a regional peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) was deployed in the ongoing Liberian Civil War, with the aim of imposing a ceasefire between Samuel Doe’s government forces and Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and establishing the conditions for an interim government. Around 3,500 troops were initially deployed, with this figure rising to around 10,000 just before the force was withdrawn in 1998. However, despite ECOMOG’s mission being considered a success in terms of restoring peace and security to Liberia, controversy has surrounded the nature of its intervention. Very soon after arriving in Liberia and consolidating their position in Monrovia, ECOMOG forces were drawn into the conflict in a way that was perceived by many

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to go beyond their peacekeeping mandate. The rebel leader Charles Taylor regarded the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces as invaders, and attacks on the peacekeepers themselves precipitated a shift from humanitarian peacekeeping to offensive military action. Consequently, ECOMOG was perceived to have aligned itself with the Doe government in Monrovia, and then, following Doe’s death, as one of various factions vying for state control. The situation was compounded by political divisions between ECOWAS’s francophone and anglophone states: Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire opposed troop deployment and were critical of anglophone Nigeria’s political ties with Doe’s government (Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire themselves were sympathetic towards Taylor). In order to placate these concerns, leadership of the ECOMOG forces was handed to a Ghanaian general, Arnold Quinoo, but this merely led to further problems of command, given that over 70 per cent of the troops were Nigerian. At various stages in the conflict, ECOMOG forces were accused of assisting all of the increasing number of rebel groups in one way or another, and being inconsistent in their approach to military action. The legitimacy of ECOMOG peacekeepers was eroded further by reports of widespread corruption and looting, earning them the alternative acronym of ‘Every Car or Movable Object Gone’ among the local population (Tuck, 2000). In theory, a regional peacekeeping intervention such as ECOMOG should have been considerably more effective than a typical UN-led peacekeeping operation, not least because the West African force possessed a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the culture, environment and politics of the region. Indeed, a lack of ‘local knowledge’ is often cited as a major problem for multinational UN peacekeeping operations. However, it was arguably the political closeness of all the states involved that led to confusion and disagreements over the precise role of ECOMOG troops. Furthermore, fear of the escalation and spill-over of the conflict into other parts of the region had a significant influence on the extent to which each state supported the intervention, particularly when the impartiality of ECOMOG was questioned. This lack of support – in terms of finance, resources or troops – effectively diminished the opportunities for clear and decisive action, and undoubtedly resulted in a more prolonged and bloody conflict. Sources: Brown, 1999; Tuck, 2000; Olonisakin, 2008.

4.6 The post-confict period Perhaps in response to the peak in the number of Africa’s armed conflicts during the 1990s, much attention among development academics, practitioners and international organizations has focused on the so-called ‘post-conflict period’ – a transitional period between a state of conflict and peace, during which significant challenges emerge for peace, reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. Although individual circumstances dictate the nature and duration, and indeed the formal designation, of post-conflict periods, the period tends to be characterized by intense social, political and economic change. While ceasefire agreements and power sharing may bring conflict to an end, they do not signal an instant return to normality or a state of peace and security. Indeed, to the majority of people caught up in violent conflicts, there is little difference between the conflict and the immediate postconflict periods, since little may change in terms of state functioning, access to resources and livelihood opportunities. Post-conflict periods may also see a continuation of violence as small pockets of armed conflict in isolated areas, or they may be relatively short lived

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and simply provide an intermission between conflicts, as occurred in the Great Lakes region during the 1990s. Either way, the post-conflict period gives rise to a range of complex, interrelated development challenges, which to some extent are influenced by the original causes of conflict as well as the way in which the conflict ends (Green, 2001). Clearly, postconflict rehabilitation and development are likely to be faster and easier where conflict has been short in duration, and where the impacts have been kept to a minimum. But it has also been argued that where the conflict itself is perceived to have been a liberation struggle, or initiated by external actors, then the rehabilitation will be easier than if the causes are more deeply entrenched in groups within society (Green, 2001; see Plate 4.4). An important consideration during the post-conflict period, particularly for those involved in planning and development, is that a return to the ‘normality’ of pre-conflict is not necessarily desirable. For example, the inequalities that led to conflict may have been entrenched in pre-conflict government structures and societal institutions, and hence rebuilding these during the post-conflict period may simply reproduce the conflict at some point in the future. The post-conflict period therefore presents valuable opportunities for change which often go beyond socio-political reforms. The damaged economic sector can be restructured, enabling inefficient or subsidized industries or agriculture to be replaced with more profitable alternatives. There is also the opportunity for pre-conflict gender inequalities to be redressed, particularly given the redefining of women’s roles in economic production and social support during the conflict period itself. This occurred in post-conflict Liberia, where President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first woman to be elected head of an African country, spearheaded a programme of gender mainstreaming that aimed to increase sensitivity to women’s issues in all government departments. Similarly, the inclusion and empowerment of women in post-conflict Rwanda has played a significant role in peacebuilding and stability (Svobodova, 2019). Until the mid-2000s, post-conflict reconstruction and development within many African countries was largely undertaken in an ad hoc manner, involving numerous

Plate 4.4 Confict memorial in Koidu, eastern Sierra Leone Source: Tony Binns.

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international and regional actors. In 2005, however, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme of the African Union launched its vision for postconflict reconstruction in the continent, providing a comprehensive framework identifying common issues, phases, dimensions and processes that should be addressed in pursuit of sustainable peace, security and development (NEPAD, 2005). While highlighting the common needs of post-conflict reconstruction, the strategy also emphasized the importance of recognizing the individual circumstances of each country’s conflict – that is, the often unique and complex causes and consequences of conflict that should explicitly inform the reconstruction process. Box 4.5 summarizes the NEPAD approach, which characterizes post-conflict reconstruction in terms of three phases (emergency, transition and development), in which five dimensions of reconstruction should be addressed.

Box 4.5 The NEPAD strategy for post-confict reconstruction Dimensions

Emergency phase

Security

Establish a safe and secure environment

Transition phase

Develop legitimate and stable security institutions Promote legitimate Political transition, Determine the governance structures, political institutions governance and participatory and foundations for participation processes participation, and processes for political transition Socio-economic Provide for emergency Establish foundations structures, and development foundations, processes for humanitarian needs development Develop mechanisms Build the legal system Human rights, and processes for for addressing past justice and reconciliation and and ongoing reconciliation monitoring human grievances rights Develop technical Coordination and Develop consultative bodies to facilitate management and coordination programme mechanism programme development for internal and external actors

Development phase Consolidate local capacity Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes

Institutionalize long-term developmental programme Established and functional legal system based on accepted international norms Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination

Source: NEPAD, 2005.

Security Security is of paramount importance. It facilitates emergency operations and reduces the likelihood of further outbreaks of violence. Security activities may involve the protection of returning refugees and IDPs, institutions and infrastructure. They may also focus on demobilization activities, the control of small arms and repatriation, while security sector reform is a key component of reconstruction activities.

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Political transition, governance and participation This dimension centres on the development of political and administrative institutions, through a process that maximizes the participation of a range of stakeholders. Activities include strengthening democratic civil society and government administrative organizations, facilitating the participation of ex-combatants in the political process, and developing mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution.

Socio-economic development This dimension reflects the need to rehabilitate or reconstruct basic social and economic services, and essentially rebuild livelihood opportunities for the population. Activities include the provision of humanitarian assistance (during the emergency phase), facilitating repatriation, building infrastructure such as roads, airports and telecommunications, rehabilitating markets and the financial sector, and restoring industry and agriculture.

Human rights, justice and reconciliation In the post-conflict environment, there is a need to rebuild trust, ensure human rights are upheld, and promote reconciliation in the interests of building a sustainable peace. Activities may include judicial reform, establishing human rights monitoring systems, and instituting a truth and reconciliation process.

Coordination, management and resource mobilization Building the capacity for coordination, management and resource mobilization is fundamental to facilitating the activities in each of the other dimensions. Reconstruction and rehabilitation require planning, cooperation and the coordination of other development strategies. Common to all conflict is an emergency period that immediately follows the cessation of hostilities. During this phase, a major goal will be establishing security, possibly through the deployment of African Union or UN peacekeeping forces. These should then provide an operational environment suitable for an emergency response in the form of humanitarian assistance from international NGOs, such as UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). Following the emergency phase, the transition phase is characterized by the appointment of an interim government which oversees reconstruction until elections are held and a legitimate government is formed. There should also be a transition away from emergency relief to a wider process of reconstruction and recovery, characterized by the rebuilding of infrastructure, economy, security and social services, such as education and health. Finally, in the development phase, security operations are scaled down, and the responsibilities of external agencies are likely to be handed over to internal actors and government. However, external aid may continue for some time in support of sectoral development programmes, political reform and economic development. Although this phase may last up to ten years, it is likely that the repercussions of conflict will have to be dealt with for many years thereafter.

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However, the NEPAD strategy has been criticized. Murithi (2006) highlights the absence of any reference to gender mainstreaming in the original framework and lack of attention paid to the role that civil society groups can play in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and how they can work with other stakeholders. It has also been criticized for not explicitly addressing the role of culture in post-conflict reconstruction, again in terms of how indigenous systems of conflict prevention and resolution can be developed and integrated within civil society to avoid the outbreak of violent conflict. As Murithi points out, however, the key challenge lies in popularizing and institutionalizing such a comprehensive strategy among African governments and the various external actors involved in order to prevent ad hoc uncoordinated responses in the future. Only in late 2021 did the African Union officially launch its dedicated ‘Centre for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development’ as a means of operationalizing the NEPAD strategy.

4.6.1 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration As can be seen in Box 4.4, there are many challenges for post-conflict reconstruction throughout all of these three periods in terms of security, governance and participation, socio-economic development, human rights, reconciliation and coordination. Within NEPAD’s ‘security’ dimension, one of the key challenges for African countries in a postconflict situation has been how to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) rebel forces back into society and thereby reduce the risk of future conflict. Since 1989, DDR initiatives managed by the UN have been an integral part of post-conflict resolution in such countries as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. The DDR process usually begins with disarmament, characterized by the collection and destruction of weapons, a process which is often publicized widely to symbolize the end of the conflict. For example, in July 2007, various African heads of state attended a ‘flame of peace’ ceremony in Côte d’Ivoire, during which President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro each set fire to a pile of weapons to signify the launch of the post-conflict disarmament process. Meanwhile, at the 29th Summit of the African Union in 2017 the month of September between 2017 and 2020 was designated ‘Africa Amnesty Month for the surrender and collection of illicit small arms and light weapons’. This was instigated as part of the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ campaign (African Union, 2013) and in response to an estimated 40 million firearms being in civilian possession. However, such disarmament programmes have achieved mixed results. In Liberia, the first attempts at disarmament in 2003 led to sporadic outbreaks of violence when large numbers of ex-combatants were turned away from under-resourced demobilization camps that were unable to cope with the demand (Daboah et al., 2010). Meanwhile, despite initial poor performance of the Nigerian government’s efforts to disarm ethnic groups in the Niger Delta via its Niger Delta Amnesty Program, it has been able to deliver a fragile peace to the area (Okonofua, 2016). Once disarmament has taken place, demobilization attempts to discharge combatants from their armed forces. This usually involves the processing of ex-combatants within demobilization camps, where they receive a discharge package. This has varied between countries, but common elements of these packages include finance, land allocation, job training and healthcare (with an emphasis on HIV/AIDS awareness). In Uganda during the 1990s, the school fees of veterans’ children were paid for one year as part of the discharge package (Kingma, 1997). Clearly, the emphasis here is on providing a social and economic incentive for ex-combatants to return to civilian life. It is perhaps the reintegration of ex-combatants within society that poses the greatest challenge for the whole DDR process (see Plate 4.5). As Solomon (2008) points out,

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Plate 4.5 Ex-combatant training to be a blacksmith in Panguma, Sierra Leone Source: Tony Binns.

there is the overarching question of ‘reintegration into what?’, since most ex-combatants will have been socialized into a vastly different way of life and hence cannot simply be deposited within a community and expected to revert to their pre-conflict livelihood system. First, as occurred in Liberia, there may be problems gaining access to land as a result of land expropriation by displaced peoples during the conflict. Second, ex-combatants may be stigmatized and struggle to gain acceptance and forgiveness from their communities due to the erosion of trust during conflict, and this can lead to further violence (Schmitt et al., 2021). Resentment may be compounded if ex-combatants receive financial assistance through reintegration packages while local communities do not. Finally, many ex-combatants will suffer from mental health problems which render them unable to reintegrate fully into community life. In recognition of this, reintegration programmes in both Liberia and Sierra Leone have pioneered psycho-trauma counselling and human rights training, alongside the provision of education and employment opportunities. While the DDR programmes in these two countries have been largely successful, it is widely acknowledged that a sustainable peace depends upon a long-term political and financial commitment to providing employment and sustainable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants (Daboah et al., 2010; Solomon, 2008; Hill et al., 2008). The challenges of DDR are much more acute when children have been directly involved in conflict. Children experience conflict in different ways to adult combatants: they are more likely to suffer from psycho-social trauma and aggression disorders, and they will not have gained a complete education (Albertyn et al., 2003). Yet, because demobilization activities have largely adopted a policy of ‘one man, one weapon’ – an ex-combatant must give up a weapon in order to qualify for a discharge package – children have been excluded from many DDR programmes (Gislesen, 2006). This is changing, however, and in recent years there has been greater recognition of the unique circumstances and

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challenges facing child ex-combatants (Haer, 2017). For example, UNICEF and Save the Children have established separate DDR programmes for children in Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan, the DRC and Rwanda. As well as providing counselling, healthcare and education, children’s DDR has focused on facilitating family reunification, since many children have been forcibly displaced as a result of conflict or, for various psycho-social reasons, are initially reluctant to return home.

4.6.2 Justice and reconciliation A central element of building peace in the post-conflict period is bringing to justice those who have perpetrated war crimes, while simultaneously engaging in a wider process of reconciliation among all those involved in conflict. As Ginty and Williams (2016) suggest, the underlying rationale here is that it is important to ascertain the ‘facts’ of a conflict, in particular who is responsible for the killing and/or human rights abuses. In doing so, victims and perpetrators can reflect on their experiences and begin the process of rebuilding trust and functional relationships – important elements of most peace agreements and the path towards democratization. Non-judicial Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) have increasingly formed part of the post-conflict reconstruction process throughout Africa in recent years, most famously in South Africa, where the TRC sought to investigate and highlight the injustices and abuses that occurred during the apartheid era. South Africa’s TRC pioneered the idea of conditional amnesty, which allowed participants to gain amnesty from prosecution in exchange for the truth about their experiences and crimes (although amnesty was refused in some cases where the testimony of witnesses did not fulfil specific criteria). More recently, TRCs have been established in Sierra Leone (2002), Liberia (2005), DRC (2004), The Gambia (2017), Zimbabwe (2018) and Libya (2021). While TRCs constitute a form of ‘restorative justice’, in that they focus on rebuilding the relationship between victims and perpetrators of crime within society, most postconflict African countries have also engaged in a process of ‘retributive justice’ by prosecuting perpetrators in courts of law. For many, criminal investigations and war crimes tribunals represent the most effective way of reinforcing the rule of law, removing the perpetrators of crime from power, and deterring war crimes and human rights abuses in the future. While many war crimes tribunals throughout Africa have been held at the domestic level, there has been a shift in recent years towards embedding prosecutions within a framework of international law. In 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN to bring to justice the planners and leaders of genocide, crimes against humanity and other war crimes. Among those individuals standing trial was the former prime minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, who pleaded guilty to genocide and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. However, despite significant progress in bringing the perpetrators of genocide to justice (93 individuals were indicted to the ICTR before its abolition in 2016) the process was criticized for its long duration and its reluctance to indict Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Meanwhile, thousands of lower-ranking individuals accused of complicity in the genocide have been brought to trial more conventionally through the Rwandan national court system, although the sheer number of cases and detainees have placed immense pressure on the domestic judicial and prison systems, which had all but collapsed during the 1994 conflict. In response to these pressures, the Rwandan government announced in 1999 that it would speed up the tribunal process by referring the accused to gacaca courts, a traditional community-based system for achieving conflict resolution (see Box 4.6).

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Box 4.6 Indigenous justice and reconciliation: Gacaca courts in Rwanda Despite trials of individuals commencing in 1996, Rwanda’s judicial and prison systems were ill-prepared to cope with the sheer number of prosecutions against suspected perpetrators of crimes during the genocide, and by the end of the 1990s an estimated 120,000 suspects remained in prison awaiting trial. At the time, it was estimated that completing these cases through the conventional courts would take more than 100 years. To manage the backlog of cases, in 2001 the Rwandan government reinstituted a traditional community approach to justice known as gacaca courts (in Kinyarwanda, the national language, gacaca means ‘grass’; in the past, these hearings were conducted in the open air). Although initially devised to speed up the number of prosecutions, many saw the potential of gacaca courts to act as mechanisms for establishing truth and reconciliation, which could help rebuild trust within communities, and in Rwandan society more generally. While the more serious genocide crimes were dealt with by the ICTR and the Rwandan national courts, those suspected of murder, assault and damage to property were diverted to the gacaca courts. Suspected perpetrators of violence could be given the opportunity to explain their actions, often in front of their victims, and seek forgiveness as a means of ‘moving on’. The courts retained the power to impose sentences, including community work or imprisonment, although those who openly confessed to their crimes were given a reduced sentence. The judges, known as inyangamugayo, which translates as ‘those who detest dishonesty’, were elected from within the community and included women and young people. Following periods of training for inyangamugayo and the piloting of gacaca courts in specific areas, the system was introduced nationwide in 2005 with the expectation of having completed all the trials by June 2009. However, it was not until 2012 that the process formally ended, leaving a legacy of over 160,000 judges participating in 12,000 gacaca courts that engaged in over a million cases, resulting in the conviction of over 800,000 people. Although the gacaca courts were generally considered to have had a positive impact on Rwandan society and the rebuilding of trust within communities, they have been criticized on several grounds. First, many have perceived the whole process as a form of ‘victors’ justice’, in which Paul Kagame’s Tutsi-led government sought retribution for the crimes committed by Hutu during the genocide. Crimes committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front during the genocide, and subsequently during the spill-over conflict in the DRC 1996, are not considered within the remit of the gacaca courts. There has also been concern that the large number of convictions (approximately 14 per cent of Rwanda’s total population in 1994) reflects political manipulation in the process, because judges are under pressure to convict as many people as possible. Furthermore, Longman (2009) suggests that in some cases the government encouraged gacaca courts to bring charges against those who were openly critical of the regime. Other critics have highlighted the lack of legal representation for the accused, some of who died in prison, which also led to convictions based on unreliable witness testimonies. Finally, it has been suggested

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that the lengthy duration of the gacaca system meant participation in it gradually declined as communities became weary and cynical of the process. Despite these issues, the legacy that gacaca leaves behind is one of a pioneering innovation in community-based retributive and restorative justice for post-conflict periods. The central lesson to be drawn, however, is the need to avoid political interference in the process, and to ensure fairness and equity on all sides in terms of accountability for crimes committed. Sources: Kanuma, 2003; Malan, 2008; Longman, 2009.

The approach of Sierra Leone has been slightly different to that of Rwanda in that it commenced both restorative and retributive approaches to justice and reconciliation following the end of the 1991–2001 civil war (Bender, 2011). A TRC was established to document the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations and war crimes, and particularly the role of national and international organizations in the conflict. The TRC also broke new ground in that it collaborated with UNICEF in establishing suitable mechanisms through which children could be involved in the process of reconciliation and reintegration (May, 2006). Simultaneously, a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in 2002 to prosecute the key perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Most notably, the ex-president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was indicted in 2003, and later transferred for trial to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague following concerns over regional security if his trial was held in Sierra Leone. The ICC itself, established in 2002, has also been extensively involved in investigations of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes in the DRC, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Kenya and Sudan. In 2009, much media attention focused on its issuing of an arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir relating to his responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. Despite a subsequent arrest warrant in 2010, al-Bashir continued to receive support from the African Union throughout the 2010s. Only in 2021, following his eventual ousting from power following a military coup in 2019, did the Sudanese government agree to hand him over to the ICC.

4.6.3 Preventing future confict There is general consensus that the key to preventing future conflict in Africa lies in addressing and reducing the underlying causes, as outlined earlier in this chapter. From an economic perspective, the African Development Bank and the World Bank have emphasized the importance of facilitating economic growth throughout the continent, which in the long term will increase people’s income, raise educational levels and promote livelihood diversification to the extent that conflict will become a less attractive option (ADB, 2009; African Union, 2013). Furthermore, the ADB regards the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources as central to both economic growth and conflict prevention; ensuring that revenues from natural-resource exploitation benefit the country as a whole rather than the minority and can reduce regional inequalities and risk of further conflict. However, there is a wider consensus that the elimination of poverty – in its economic, social or cultural sense – constitutes the way forward in building human security and preventing conflict in Africa (Salih, 2008). This lies at the core of the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ campaign within its Agenda 2063 transformational strategy (African Union, 2015).

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Strengthening democratic institutions and instituting good governance at both the local and the national level is also widely regarded as a means of reducing the risk of conflict. Multi-party democracies, characterized by open and fair elections, independent judiciaries and central banks, transparency in economic activities, and a commitment to decentralization and public participation, have been regarded as a prerequisite to peace, security and economic growth (Michailof et al., 2002; ADB, 2009). However, many have questioned the extent to which ‘Western-style’ democracy has been, and indeed might be, successful in Africa, given the diversity of ethnic groups and the continuing significance of tribal leadership and traditional institutions (Gebrewold, 2008). It has been suggested that the incorporation and promotion of traditional African values and philosophies into systems of democratic governance might embed a better framework for conflict prevention and resolution in society (Gade, 2020). One example is the Swahili concept of ubuntu, which embodies group cooperation, respect, forgiveness, tolerance and generosity; values that were central to South Africa’s widely respected TRC. While recognizing what needs to be done is relatively easy, the implementation of economic, social and political reform to prevent conflict is much more challenging, particularly for those countries mired in a post-conflict period. It is therefore unsurprising that since the late 1990s, when conflict in Africa peaked, a significant amount of external aid and assistance has been linked to conflict-prevention initiatives and postconflict development strategies. Within the discourse of development, poverty reduction strategies have sought to emphasize the links between human development, on the one hand, and security and conflict prevention, on the other. Similarly, the concepts of ‘nation-building’, ‘good-governance’, ‘democratization’ and indeed ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ itself began to enter the mainstream development discourse, and subsequently bilateral and multilateral aid interventions. For example, in 2001, the UK’s Department for International Development established its ‘Africa Conflict Prevention Pool’, an initiative which aimed to support conflict-prevention capacity within Africa, post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform. Specific interventions included the provision of civil society peace initiatives in Kenya following the post-election violence in 2007, funding for peace talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Ugandan government, and training assistance for security forces in Sierra Leone (DfID, 2008a). The World Bank, meanwhile, launched its State and Peace-Building Fund in 2008 and spent $359 million during the following decade on projects including land sector reform in Liberia, support for gender-based NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire, improving information communication technologies in Somalia and strengthening resilience and collaborative dialogue throughout the Lake Chad Region (World Bank, 2020c).

4.7 Conclusion This chapter has drawn attention to the complex relationship between armed conflict in Africa and poverty, inequality and development. While one should be cautious about generalizing, given the diversity of experiences throughout Africa, it is clear that those countries affected by conflict are more likely to have inadequate health, education and economic infrastructure; they are more likely to experience environmental degradation and resource exploitation; and they are significantly more at risk of future conflict than those countries that have remained largely peaceful. Although it has been suggested that poverty and underdevelopment themselves fuel armed conflict (the so-called poverty– conflict nexus), this has not always been the case. Many countries, for example Malawi and Zambia, have remained poor but have not descended into armed conflict. Clearly, although our current understanding of the nature of African conflicts helps us to predict,

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plan for and institute measures to prevent conflict, history has shown that conflict is often a result of a volatile, unpredictable mix of specific events and circumstances. What is evident from the experiences of the last decade, however, is that political, social and environmental change that emanates beyond Africa’s borders, is increasingly driving new conflict scenarios characterized by an increasing number of non-state actors. The unpredictability, in a sense, has become even more unpredictable. Possibly more than at any time in Africa’s history, the continent and the rest of the world now appear better equipped to minimize the likelihood of prolonged large-scale armed conflicts. The peak in armed conflicts during the 1990s and early 2000s appears to have placed conflict firmly on the development agenda, while the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the US intervention in Somalia in 1995, the Darfur conflict and the Arab Spring in north Africa have also provided sobering lessons for the international community in terms of what action can, and should, be taken. Over the last decade, however, there has been significant progress from within Africa’s own institutions in addressing conflict and its complex inter-related causes.

Summary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Most African countries have been involved in some form of armed conflict during the last 70 years. Despite conflict declining throughout the 2000s after significant peaks during the late 1990s, the 2010s have seen a proliferation of conflict driven by the involvement of multiple nonstate actors. The causes of conflict in Africa are complex, diverse and interrelated. They have included competition for natural resources, ethnic tensions, religion, colonial boundary legacies, persistent poverty and inequality, and climate change. Although conflict can have a direct impact on populations in terms of war casualties, the effects of poverty, underdevelopment and insecurity caused by conflict usually have longerterm impacts on mortality. Conflict can have a major impact on the agricultural sector and lead to chronic food insecurity. Many of Africa’s refugee crises have been caused by conflict. There is a marked gender dimension to conflict: women and children suffer greater long-term consequences than men. UN peacekeepers have had mixed results in preventing and resolving conflict throughout the continent. The post-conflict period poses new challenges for development in terms of establishing security, demobilizing armed groups, rebuilding institutions and infrastructure, and removing the original causes of conflict.

Discussion questions 1 2 3 4 5

Why might the impacts of conflict be difficult to assess? In what ways have Africa’s conflicts affected rural and urban livelihoods differently? How has globalization influenced armed conflict in Africa? What challenges face the establishment of security during the post-conflict period? In what ways is the boundary between the conflict and post-conflict periods often blurred?

Further reading Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4): 563–595. Francis, D. (2008) Peace and Conflict in Africa. London: Zed Books.

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Ginty, R.M. and Williams, A. (2016) Conflict and Development. Abingdon: Routledge. Turner, T. (2007) The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality. London: Zed Books. Williams, P.D. (2016) War and Conflict in Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Useful websites The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) seeks to ‘promote the constructive resolution of disputes, by the peoples of Africa, and so assist in achieving political stability and socio-economic recovery, within just and democratic societies, towards peaceful co-existence’. It commissions and disseminates research on conflict trends and peacebuilding: www.accord.org.za/ SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. The website contains research reports, publications and databases with statistics on conflict and security trends and military expenditure: www.sipri.org/ The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) is the world’s main provider of data on organized violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war, with a history of almost 40 years: https://ucdp.uu.se/ NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) is a programme of the African Union which aims to promote sustainable growth and development throughout Africa. The need for peace and security is implicit in many of NEPAD’s strategies and development initiatives: www.nepad. org/ UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) is a UN agency that leads and coordinates international action to protect refugees worldwide. The website has numerous reports, publications and updates outlining the state of Africa’s conflicts and their implications for IDPs and refugees throughout Africa: www.unhcr.org. PRIO (the Peace Research Institute Oslo) conducts research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups and people: www.prio.org/

5

Africa’s People

Akan proverb: ‘Se wo were fi na wosankofa a yenkyiri’. Translation: Let us learn from the past to build for the future.

5.1 Introduction Africa is populated by a rich and culturally diverse population which is experiencing significant processes of demographic and social change. Not only are key social and demographic changes evident, but so too are the ways in which scholars seek to understand social change in Africa and the new and diverse ways in which African peoples are expressing their identities. In 2009 the number of people on the whole African continent exceeded 1 billion, while in 2016, the population of sub-Saharan Africa exceeded 1 billion people for the first time, with the countries of North Africa exceeding 200 million in 2020 (World Bank, 2022a). At the time of writing (2022), the continent’s population stands at an estimated 1.4 billion and is expected to reach 1.5 billion by 2025 (UN DESA, 2019). Research focusing on Africa’s people has, in the past discussed the colonization and exploitation of the continent and its people, and some attention has been focused on the African diaspora, particularly in North America, but also on the eastern shores of Latin America, where slaves were taken to plantation estates producing sugar, tobacco and cotton. Research has also focused on the post-independence period, seeking to learn about the impact on societies of achieving economic as well as political independence in states whose boundaries and space economies were mainly formed during the colonial period and dependent on exploiting cheap labour to provide primary export products for colonial powers. Towards the end of the 20th century, attention shifted initially to an African renaissance, born from an optimism of rising economic growth and social prospects and opportunities following the eradication of apartheid governance in South Africa and the end of several drawn-out post-independence civil wars, notably in Mozambique and Angola. After the crisis in international security that was focused on the post 9/11 period, Africa and its people were once more at risk of marginalization at a time when African scholars had much to contribute to the urgent need to better understand the changes in the world order. Not least is a perspective that forces scholars to expand their perspective beyond the dominant Western perspectives. In the first decades of the 21st century, the world is once more faced with challenges, this time associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and its knock-on impacts, particularly in relation to world food and energy supplies. Global attention, once again, seems to have narrowed down the focus of the West’s attention, ignoring the place and the plight of Africa’s peoples. Understanding and writing about Africa has been complicated and compromised by the reality that the Western academy has, traditionally, been the origin of the vast majority of DOI: 10.4324/9780429028403-5

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written scholarship on Africa, resulting in an argument that although the period of formal colonization has come to an end, there remains a form of colonization of culture, scholarship, humanitarianism and peacekeeping that has to be countered if the continent is to truly develop. Building on this evolving scholarship, and in order to provide a better understanding of Africa’s people and current social issues and trends, this chapter pays attention to the continent’s demography, and provides insights into how the population is growing and changing; the role of gender in African society; and finally, the importance of culture.

5.2 Demography 5.2.1 Key census and demographic challenges Obtaining accurate population data for a national population, where that country’s people are constantly moving, being born, dying, and come from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, is a substantial, but important, task. Accurate data on the make-up of the people of a country provide the basis for planning, the provision of public services, and monitoring change in a number of dimensions. All modern nation-states need to undertake regular censuses, which is a national population count, supplemented by large intercensal surveys to provide updates and checks on the quality of the national population database. However, most commentators would argue, that official national population figures for Africa represent a significant under-representation because of the unreliability of the population data itself. Censuses are necessarily a state endeavour because they are expensive and demanding of time and labour. They are also mandatory and may be difficult to enforce and administer due to the inaccessibility of people in remote rural areas, political resistance where the national government is held in low trust, and high illiteracy levels among the population. Early modern censuses were focused on the capture of basic demographic information, particularly numbers of people, labour, growth, occupation and household structure. In Africa, such data collection began during the colonial period, initially focusing on establishing the tax base for the colony, and then expanded as the state became more involved in social welfare and planning, in order to provide a basis for the development of public policy. Contemporary census activities in Africa are generally linked to the establishment of an evidence base for development planning and nationbuilding, but suspicions have also focused on links to taxation and competition between ethnic groups. This is particularly redolent in the poem quoted by Serra in his analysis of census propaganda published in relation to Ghana’s first national census in 1960: ‘Census Night’, anonymous poem in Evening News, 20 March 1960 Under Powerful Fluorescent Lights Young Ghanaians write in a book of gold […] With smiles on their lips they ask: Where did you sleep the night before? How old are you What is your name? Answer! […] And save Ghana from Economic Want And kill poverty and illiteracy Hail the Census Night. (Quoted in Serra, 2018: 659)

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As Serra argues, ‘the census does not simply describe an already existing reality but plays an active role in its construction and consolidation’ (Serra, 2018: 662). In Africa, census-taking has links to legacy attitudes associated with colonialism and ethnic politics, such that the apparently simple act of counting people becomes problematic, when categorizing those people into spatial, ethnic and religious groupings – even if for ostensibly positive or simply technical reasons. Census data can be manipulated for political advantage, particularly when they are used as leverage for development assistance, or where they seek to under- or over-represent different ethnic groups within a population (Potter et al., 2018). The result is that the act of census-taking is ultimately a matter of public trust. For example, the results of the December 1974 census in Sierra Leone were withheld for many years for fear of disturbances that might be caused if one ethnic group were seen to have more members than another (see Ferme, 1998 for more on the Sierra Leonean census). The fractious political process in Zimbabwe over the last 15 years, where election-related tensions have led to allegations of vote rigging to favour a particular tribal/political grouping, is another case in point. Gez et al. (2022) reported that the last Chadian census of 2009 has still not reported the religious affiliation data because of the sensitivities around the balance between Muslims and Christians, while for similar reasons Nigerian Muslim leaders threatened to boycott the 2006 national census if religious identity was on the list of questions (Gez et al., 2022). Thirty-nine out of the 54 African countries undertook their last national census prior to 2015. Eritrea conducted its last census in May 1984, while, on a positive note, censuses are scheduled in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sao Tome, Nigeria, Niger, Namibia, Mali, Burundi and Botswana for late 2022 (UN Statistics Division, undated). Based on the preceding evidence, it is perhaps not surprising that there are uncertainties around African population counts and the true size of the population of Africa is believed to be much larger than current estimates suggest, and probably exceeded one billion earlier than has been asserted (US Census Bureau, 2009). One of the causes of uncertainty with respect to the true size of Africa’s population, comes from the fact that internationally estimates of population integrate population data with population dynamics in order to model population change. A key measure in this regard relates to the role that fertility plays in influencing populations. A factor that adds to the uncertainty about population in Africa is that there are higher levels of uncertainty around what are thought to be the high levels of fertility in Africa, so population projections in Europe with lower levels of fertility have much higher levels of confidence than those in countries with higher levels of fertility (UN Statistics Division, undated). The reliability of census counts is another cause for concern. One detailed analysis of countries in southern Africa found that there was evidence of both under- and over-counting. For example, post-enumeration surveys conducted after several of South Africa’s censuses found undercounting of between 10 and 17 per cent. Recognizing this to be the case, published total population estimates are often adjusted by national statistical offices and by the UN Statistics Division, but despite their publication of methodological papers, it is not always clear how this is achieved. This raises the question of why should this be an issue for development? In short, regular and reliable data on the demographic characteristics of the population, trends in migration, and the spatial distribution of population are essential prerequisites for developing appropriate and sustainable infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, roads, water supplies and sanitation. Census data can draw attention to existing or potential development issues, such as the lack of access to healthcare or education – statistics which, as highlighted later in this chapter, are central to attempts to quantify development using the Human Development Index and are also an important basis for the preparation of elections.

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The population of Europe is expected to fall by 5 per cent between 2020 and 2050, while the population of Africa is expected to double in the same period, and in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone the population is expected to grow to between 2 and 2.2 billion people, meaning that it will grow in absolute numbers over this time period, from around one seventh of the global population to approximately one quarter of the global total (UN Data, 2022). Ezeh et al. (2020) argue that the latest models of global population dynamics group the anticipated population changes into two distinct groups of countries. One group of countries and regions have populations that are forecast to decline – primarily those countries that are amongst the world’s wealthiest – and a group that will continue to grow. Africa is in the latter group and, according to Ezeh et al. (2020), the populations of the countries of North Africa are expected to grow by up to 63 per cent from 2017 to 2100, while the populations of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are expected to triple in size over the same time period, though it is also expected that the rate of population growth will slow over this period. This prompts several considerations: first, that such population growth will require these countries to find more health, education, housing and energy provision for the rising number of people who will need these services. In parallel, associated growth in life expectancy will shift the balance between the dependent (babies, children, ill and retired) and the working population (those of working age). Secondly, the youthful nature of Africa’s population prompts concerns about what this means socially and economically. Will large numbers of young people enter the workforce and boost economic prospects, or, in weak economies will employment prospects be limited and lead to youth unemployment? UNESCO (2017) estimated that 23 million African youth joined the continental job market in 2015, up from an estimated 10–12 million in 2000, and this level of growth is likely to be maintained each year until 2030, although rates will vary across Africa (AFDB, 2016; Dekker and Hollander, 2017; Izzi, 2020). However, it is difficult to rely on this prediction, as Fox and Gandhi (2021) point out, because a more detailed examination of the longerterm trends shows that in many African economies the youth labour pool has peaked and will decline. However, there is considerable variation across the continent and pressure will be greatest where limited economic growth combines with highly youthful populations. Therefore, African economies need to grow at a faster rate in order to offer employment to all young people. At present, as Fields (2021) reports, a third of African youth are unemployed and a third are ‘vulnerably’ employed. For many the problem is not unemployment but ‘underemployment’ and bad jobs – those that are casual, precarious, poorly paid, unsafe or exploitative (see Chapters 9 and 10). These conditions are likely to remain as long as there is an over-supply of young labour. In response, the African Union are promoting what they call a ‘pan-African productive transformation’, that includes initiatives such as boosting intra-continental travel, transport and trade, investing in economic coordination and cooperation, and cultural and technological infrastructure, in order to promote increases in education and training and therefore improved prospects for employment and human well-being. This works in parallel with efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 8, which has a target (8.6) of substantially reducing the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training. Failing to achieve these changes risks the spectre of radicalization, extremism and ongoing patronage with its complex and dynamic links to the threat of violence (Izzi, 2021).

5.2.2 Demographic trends and development Recent historical population trends provide the basis for modelling and predicting future population change and associated development needs. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, trends in population growth vary significantly across the continent which has key implications for

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the ability of countries to respond to the social and economic needs of rapidly or slowly growing populations. Figure 5.2 looks at rates of growth and not actual numbers. Combined, the two Figures show significant demographic variations across the continent, with southern Africa clearly experiencing lower rates of growth than more northerly regions. Understanding these trends plays a critical role in helping to plan for future investment and to anticipate the growth in the demand for services and infrastructure that will be required. However, the dynamics of such changes are complex, and the prediction of future trends is challenging. Changes in growth rates are a factor in identifying and monitoring a number of societal changes, however, only some of these can be captured in quantitative models. To increase the reliability of these predictive models, Stein et al. (2020) argue that a feature of Africa’s population change this century will be a decline in total fertility rate (TFR) which will have an impact on population growth rates. This is important because demographers widely believe that when this indicator drops below 2.2 (Roser et al., 2019)

Figure 5.1 Population of African regions from 1950 to 2020 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019.

4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0

Africa

Eastern Africa

Middle Africa

Southern Africa

Western Africa

Northern Africa

Figure 5.2 Africa’s Regional Population growth rates 1950–2020 Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019.

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what is called ‘generational replacement of the population’ is curtailed. This means that the population will begin to contract. As a result, to increase the reliability of their model, Stein et al. (2020) include in their modelling of population change factors such as mortality, fertility, ‘contraceptive met need’, migration and economic conditions (see Box 5.1). Understanding the dynamics of development is not just about a direct link between numbers of people and the size of the economies. There are a number of other factors that provide an indication of the significance of population growth and the extent to which the people of Africa are able to take advantages of livelihood opportunities and benefits from development. However, evaluating population-linked development prospects and whether well-being conditions are improving, is a significant challenge that requires a nuanced engagement

Box 5.1 Factors affecting projected population dynamics in Africa The methods of developing projections of population have evolved over several decades, with refinements, adjustments and corrections. The tables of total populations for each country mask a complex set of calculations that attempt to make these figures comparable for a country across time and also comparable between countries of varying sizes and contexts. The most widely used global population dataset is the UN Population Division; however, this Division relies on the country members providing the data. The UN Population Division then uses the countrysupplied data to build estimates based on a historical record that starts with a base population in 1950 and then calculates annual estimates based on a range of components. This can result in differences between official country statistics and the UN estimates. However, in the latest estimates and projections, the UN reported that this method integrates information from 1,690 censuses for 235 countries, including 236 censuses conducted since 2010, combined with registration of births and deaths, 2,700 surveys and other sources (UN Population Division, 2020). These are designed to build into the estimates such factors as: • • • •

•

Mortality, which can vary according to changes in risk factors, economic development and investment in public health and healthcare provision. Fertility varies according to a number of factors, including age of first pregnancy, spacing of pregnancies, gender rights and women’s access to education and employment. Contraceptive met needs, which is defined as the proportion of women who are using – or whose partners are using – a method of modern contraception. Migration, which may fluctuate according to conflict and natural disasters, resulting in uncertainty in the impact of refugees leaving or arriving in countries, which has particularly affected Africa. In 2020 Africa hosted 6.6 million of the global total number of international refugees and approximately 26 million out of the global total of 48 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2020). GDP forecasts – the impact of improved economic circumstances can have an impact on TFR (Total Fertility Rate) as more active economies offer the population in general, and women in particular, increased opportunities in the workforce which is known to have an impact on girls remaining in education for longer, delaying their first pregnancy and in the spacing of their pregnancies over their life course.

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with a complex and contested concept. Earlier economic based models failed to provide insight into key social considerations; however, in recent years, use of the Human Development Index (HDI) is often taken to be a more reliable indicator of development (see Chapter 2). As Kabanda (2019) points out, GDP ‘counts’ the effects of wars, hurricanes and accidents, because these all have impacts on economic activities, but not housework, volunteering and creative work that are non-paid or non-monetized and therefore not counted. This raised questions about indicators of development that account for not just economic factors but also for changes in the human experience. The HDI was established by the United National Development Program in its first Human Development Report in 1992 to emphasize human aspects of ‘development’. The HDI is a composite figure made up of life-expectancy data (a surrogate for healthcare), educational attainment and income. The HDI for any country will lie on a continuum from very low (–0) to a possible maximum of 1 (Potter et al., 2018). In the case of Africa, the average HDI in 2019 was a modest 0.459, compared with a global average of 0.737 (see Table 5.1). Europe and Central Asia average a score of 0.797. Within the African continent in 2019, Mauritius recorded the highest HDI at 0.804, but there are six countries with HDI scores of less than 0.450. Table 5.1 Key demographic details about Africa: Population and development Country

Human Development Index 2019

Population (millions) 2022

WORLD AFRICA TOTAL

0.737 0.459*

7,874 1,373

NORTH AFRICA Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Sudan South Sudan Tunisia Western Sahara

0.748 0.707 0.724 0.686 0.510 0.433 0.740 –

WEST AFRICA Benin Burkina Faso Cabo Verde Côte d’Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

0.545 0.452 0.665 0.538 0.496 0.611 0.477 0.480 0.480 0.434 0.546 0.394 0.539 0.512 0.452 0.515

HDI position out of 189 countries

Per cent urban 2018

Population per km2

Per cent of undernourished 2018–2020

– –

55.3 44.1

59.3 33

8.9 19.0

44.82 104.26 6.96 37.34 44.91 11.38 11.94 0.61

91 116 55 121 170 185 95 –

72.6 42.7 80.1 62.5 34.6 19.6 68.9 86.7

18.1 100.8 3.9 81.7 24.3 18.1 75.3 2.2