A New Perspective on Antisthenes: Logos, Predicate and Ethics in his Philosophy 9789048532957

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A New Perspective on Antisthenes

A New Perspective on Antisthenes Logos, Predicate and Ethics in his Philosophy

P.A. Meijer

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: Sokrates, Antisthenes, Chrysippos and Epikouros (from left to right) Source: Wikimedia Commons / Matt Neale Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press. isbn 978 94 6298 298 7 e-isbn 978 90 4853 295 7 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789089646026 nur 683 / 732 © P.A. Meijer / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2017 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

To Els, for her support, tenderness and love

Contents Preface 11 Abbreviations 13 Primary sources – editions used

15

Introduction 21 1 Antisthenes’ status 21 2 The importance of Antisthenes’ philosophical views 24

Part I  Logos and predicate Chapter I Contradiction 29 1 Did Antisthenes claim that there is no such thing as contradiction? 29 2 Was Antisthenes the first theoretician of the predicate? 30 3 Aristotle contra Antisthenes 31 4 A ‘mad’ contradictor 33 5 Antisthenes and ouden legein 35 6 Aristotle’s unconvincing rejoinder 36 7 The silver‒tin analogy 37 8 The Antistheneans 39 9 Was makros logos an unusual notion? 41 10 The enumerative definition 43 1 Was the enumerative definition a trouvaille of the Antistheneans? 44 2 Does ‘one cannot say what a thing is’ conflict with Antisthenes’ own view? 46 11 Antisthenes’ followers and teaching 48 12 Aristotle’s to ti ēn einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) and the ‘was’ (ἦν) of Antisthenes’ explanation of logos 49 13 The imperfect tense in the logos formula, why not also a future tense? 50

Chapter II Investigation of names 53 1 Name (onoma) 53 2 An example of the investigation of a name (polytropos) 54 3 The logos formula reconsidered 56 4 Brancacci’s solution to the imperfect ἦν 59 5 An interim assessment: Antisthenes contra Plato? 62 6 Reconsideration of the issue of contradiction (Plato’s Euthydemus) 64 7 ‘To speak falsely’ (ψεύδεσθαι) 65 8 ‘Nearly’ (σχεδόν) 67 9 Antisthenes’ teaching practice 69 10 Appendix I: Guthrie’s systematic survey 71

Part II Antisthenes’ views on theology: His theoretical approach to the study of Homer Chapter I Theology 75 1 Antisthenes and monotheism: was Antisthenes the f irst monotheist? 75 2 Aphrodite’s case 78 3 Pleasure as background to theological issues 80 4 Antisthenes and the popular gods 82 Chapter II Antisthenes’ scientific approach to the study of Homer 85 1 Polytropos 85 1 Section 1 85 86 2 Section 2 (lysis) 3 Section 3 87 2 Commentary on the sections 88 1 Strange section 3 88 89 2 Antisthenes’ logical style 3 Argumentation in Section 2 91 4 Section 3 revisited 93 3 Aristotle corrected 95 Chapter III Antisthenes’ interpretation of other Homeric figures 97 1 A critical observation: Antisthenes in favour of Homer and the Cyclopes 97

2 Calypso 3 Other places in Homer: On Wine

99 99

Part III Antisthenean ethics Chapter I Ethics and myth 107 1 Introduction: moral strength 107 2 Heracles: ethics and paideia 108 3 Heracles and heavenly matters 109 4 Heracles and money 110 5 Heracles and virtue 111 6 Properties of virtue and wisdom (phronēsis) 112 Chapter II Sex, marriage, family 1 Antisthenes’ teaching regarding sex and marriage 2 Adultery 3 Family

114 114 115 117

Chapter III Aspasia 1 Introduction 2 Aspasia and Pericles 3 Aspasia and Menexenus

119 119 120 122

Chapter IV Alcibiades 1 Alcibiades and beauty 2 Alcibiades’ bad behaviour

125 125 126

Chapter V Antisthenes and politics 128 1 Introduction 128 2 Archelaus, the bad king? 129 3 Whence Antisthenes’ preference for Cyrus as the good king? 132 4 Antisthenes’ Cyrus works and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 134 5 Good and bad in the state 137 6 Social theory 139 Chapter VI The wise 1 The wise person 2 The wise as models

140 140 141

Chapter VII Antisthenes and Xenophon 1 Introduction 2 Jealousy and envy 3 Friendship 4 Friendship and ‘orthosemantics’

143 143 143 145 147

Chapter VIII A portrait of Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium 149 1 Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium 149 2 The teachability of virtue 151 3 Antisthenes as a cross-examiner 154 4 Antisthenes and Niceratus on Homer 156 5 Antisthenes’ speech 158 6 Pandering 164 7 Two incidental appearances 167 8 The final scene between Socrates and Antisthenes 168 9 Antisthenean themes in Xenophon’s Symposium 172 Epilogue: Antisthenes, an assessment

174

Appendix II: The Speeches of Ajax and Odysseus 176 Introduction 176 Antisthenes’ sources 176 The aim of the speeches 178 Ajax’s speech: ‘Not words but deeds’ 179 Odysseus’ speech: ‘I alone am the saviour of the Greeks by secret acts’ 184 Antisthenes’ book On Courage 190 Bibliography 192 Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

195

Index 205 Index of fragments cited 205 Index of passages cited 211 Index of names 216 Index of modern scholars 219 Index of Greek words 220

Preface For most of his professional life, the author of the present book, P.A. (Piet) Meijer, was university lecturer in Ancient Philosophy in the Classics department of Leiden University where he taught with contagious enthusiasm. His classes were characterized by an attractive sort of irreverence towards academic authority. Any scholar, no matter how great his or her reputation, could be wrong and Meijer would take great pleasure in demonstrating that, in his view, they often were, on the basis of thoughtful and often innovative readings of the primary texts. In much the same spirit he meanwhile produced a steady stream of studies on a variety of subjects, such as Plotinus’ metaphysics (Plotinus on the Good or the One (Enneads VI,9): An Analytical Commentary, Amsterdam 1992), Parmenidean ontology (Parmenides Beyond the Gates: The Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa, Amsterdam 1997) and Stoic theology (Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods, Delft 2007), to mention but the most important ones. Upon his retirement, Meijer continued to do research with an almost youthful zeal. He had discovered Antisthenes, whose wit, intellectual acuity and subversive character had clearly struck a cord with him. As Meijer himself sets out in the introduction to this book, Antisthenes was one of the most important and colourful followers of Socrates. He made a major contribution to the history of ancient philosophy by offering the first definition of logos. Unfortunately, his reputation would soon be eclipsed by that other pupil of Socrates, Plato. As a result, Antisthenes’ many books dropped out of circulation and hence did not survive. For the reconstruction of Antisthenes’ views, then, we depend on reports of others, and those of Aristotle in particular. In the first part of this book, Meijer argues that Aristotle did not do justice to Antisthenes and sets out to offer a new, provocative interpretation of the famous logos doctrine of the latter. He argues that Antisthenes’ famous oikeios logos is not a definition, as Aristotle had claimed, but an argument that teaches or clarifies what something was or is. One attractive aspect of Meijer’s new understanding of Antisthenes’ logos concept is that it allows him to connect this important aspect of Antisthenes’ thought to another, that of the study of Homer. Thus, Meijer interprets Antisthenes’ well-known discussion of the question why Homer calls Odysseus polytropos as an example of an Antisthenean oikeios logos: it clarifies the name of a figure from the (mythological) past. This is the topic of the second part of this book. The third part, finally, deals with the

12 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

meagre remains of Antisthenes’ ethics, including his views on sex, marriage, and adultery. Meijer had virtually completed this comprehensive study of Antisthenes when, on 29 January 2010, he suffered a heavy stroke. Ηe made a partial recovery, yet it gradually became clear that he would never again be in a position to see the manuscript through the press. It is at this point that his friends stepped in and made the present publication possible by generous donations of their time and energy. The initiative was taken by the unflagging Inge Aksoycan-de Bever, who made sure that everything that needed to be done was in fact done and found the book a home at Amsterdam University Press. Tony Foster, not for the first time, and Judith Deitch took it upon themselves to correct Meijer’s English, once described by Meijer himself as ‘an almost impossible task’. Peter Stork compiled the indexes, bibliographies, and concordances and made new translations of passages from Xenophon to replace outdated ones. If it had not been for them, this book would never have seen the light of day. Meijer is hugely thankful for their efforts and would here have expressed his gratitude to them himself, had he been able to do so. R.M. van den Berg Leiden, June 2016

Abbreviations BT CAG Caizzi CB CSEL D.C. DK DPhA Giannantoni GCS Guthrie III Guthrie IV Guthrie VI LCL LG LSJ OCT PCG

Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner) Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca, 23 vols (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882-1907) see D.C. Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l’Association Guillaume Budé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres) Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1866-) Antisthenis fragmenta, ed. F.D. Caizzi (Milan/Varese: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1966) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz, 3 vols (6th edn, Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-1952) Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, i: Abam(m)on à Axiothéa (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989) see SSR Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1897-) Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, iii: The FifthCentury Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, iv: Plato, the Man and His Dialogues: Earlier Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, vi: Aristotle: an encounter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard Univer­sity Press) Lexicographi graeci (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner) A Greek-English Lexicon, ed. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones, R. McKenzie, 9th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press) Poetae comici graeci, ed. R. Kassel and C. Austin (Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter, 1983-)

14 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

PG

Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857-1866; reprint Turnhout: Brepols, 1959-1980) Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris 1844-1890; reprint Turnhout: Brepols, 1956-1975) Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (Frankfurt am Main: Sauerländer, 1842-) Sources chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1941-) Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, ed. G. Giannantoni, 4 vols (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990) Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1905-1924) Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association (Boston: American Philological Association, 1869-) Antisthenes Atheniensis, in SSR Diogenes Sinopeus, in SSR

PL RhM SC SSR SVF TAPhA VA VB



Primary sources – editions used

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Aeschylus, ‘Persae’ in Aeschyli septem quae supersunt tragoediae, ed. D.L. Page, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) Aesopus Aesopi fabulae, ed. E. Chambry, 2 vols, CB (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1925-1926) Alex. Aphr., In Metaph. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG, 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891) Alex. Aphr., In Top. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, CAG, 2.2 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891) Ammon., In Porph. Ammonius. In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V Voces, ed. A. Busse, CAG 4.3 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891) Anon. Lat. II ‘Anonymus II Arati epitomam isagogis et scholiis auctam continens’, in Commentariorum in Aratum reliquiae, ed. E. Maass (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898) 99-306 Aristid. Aelii Aristidis Smyrnaei quae supersunt omnia, ed. B. Keil, ii: Orationes XVII-LIII (Berlin: Weidmann, 1897) (49 Ἱερῶν λόγων Γ) Arist., Metaph. Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. W. Jaeger, OCT (Oxford: Clarnedon Press, 1957) Arist., Pol. Aristotelis Politica, ed. W.D. Ross, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957) Arist., Rhet. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica, ed. W.D. Ross, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) Arist., Top. Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) Ars., Viol. ‘Appendix II. Γνῶμαι κατ᾿ ἐκλογὴν ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου, Ἐπι­κ τήτου καὶ ἑτέρων φιλοσόφων, ποιητῶν καὶ ῥητόρων’, in ΑΡΣΕΝΙΟΥ ΙΩΝΙΑ, Arsenii Violetum, ed. Chr. Walz (Stuttgart, 1832) 494-512 Artium scriptores Artium scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik), ed. L. Rademacher, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophischhistorische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 227.3 (Wien: 1951)

16 

Ath. Chrysipp. Cic., N.D. Cic., Ad Q. Fr. Cic., Ad Att. Clem. Alex., Protr. Clem. Alex., Strom. Clem. Rom., Hom. D. Chr.

D.L.

Epict., Diss. [Eratosth.], Cat. Eudocia, Viol. Eus., PE

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Athenaei Naucratitae Dipnosophistarum Libri XV, ed. G. Kaibel, 3 vols, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887-1890) Chrysippus Soleus: SVF 2.1-348; 3.1-205 M. Tullii Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia, fasc. 45: De natura deorum, ed. O. Plasberg and W. Ax, BT (2nd edn, Stuttgart: Teubner, 1933) M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem; Epistulae ad M. Brutum, ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, BT (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1988) M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulae ad Atticum, ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, 2 vols, BT (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1987) Clemens Alexandrinus, i: Protrepticus und Paedagogus, ed. O. Stählin and U. Treu, 3rd edn, GCS 52 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,1972) Clemens Alexandrinus, ii: Stromata Buch I-VI, ed. O. Stählin, L. Früchtel, and U. Treu, 4th edn, GCS 52 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985) Die Pseudoklementinen, i: Homilien, ed. B. Rehm, 3rd edn, ed. G. Strecker, GCS (Berlin:Akadamie Verlag, 1992; first edn, 1953) Dionis Prusaensis quem vocant Chrysostomum quae exstant omnia, ed. J. von Arnim, 2 vols (Berlin: Weidmann,1893-1896 (Oratio 8: De virtute = i, 95-102; Oratio13: De exilio = i, 179-189; Oratio 53: De Homero = ii, 109-113) Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. T. Dorandi, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) Epicteti dissertationes ab Arriano digestae, ed. H. Schenkl, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1916) Pseudo-Eratosthenis Catasterismi, in Mythographi Graeci 3.1, ed. A. Olivieri, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897) Eudociae Augustae Violarium, ed. J. Flach, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880) Eusebius Werke, viii: Die Praeparatio evangelica, ed. K. Mras, 2 vols, GCS 43.1-43.2 (Berlin, 1954-1956)

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Eust., Il. Eust., Od. Gell. Gnom. Vat. 743 Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. Hom., Il. Hom., Od. Isocr. Lact., De ira Dei

Lact., Inst. M. Aur., Med. Ps.-Max. Ps.-Max. Min. Fel., Oct.

17

Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem, ed. M. van der Valk, 4 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1971-1987) Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam, ed. G. Stallbaum, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1825-1826) Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, ed. P.K. Marshall, 2 vols , OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) Gnomologium Vaticanum e codice Vaticano Graeco 743, ed. L. Sternbach, Texte und Kommentare, 2 (Berlin, 1963) Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Stridonensis Presbyteri opera omnia, ii: Adversus Jovinianum libri duo, PL 23 (1883) 221-354 Homeri opera, Ilias, ed. D.B. Monro, Th.W. Allen. 2 vols, 3rd edn, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920) Homeri opera, Odyssea, ed. Th.W. Allen. 2 vols, 2nd edn, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917-1920) Isocrate. Discours, ed G. Mathieu and É. Brémond, i, CB (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1929) [ Discours x: Helena = i, 163-179] L. Caeli Firmiani Lactanti opera omnia, ii.1: Libri de opificio dei et de ira dei, carmina, fragmenta, vetera de Lactantio testimonia, ed. S. Brandt, CSEL 27 (Prague; Vienna; Leipzig: 1893) Lactantius. Divinarum Institutionum Libri septem, Fasc. i: Libri I et II, ed. E. Heck, A. Wlosok, BT (München/Leipzig: Teubner, 2005) Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν: The meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, ed. A.S.L. Farquharson, i (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944) Maximi Abbatis Capita Theologica scite Dicta atque Electa, ed. F. Combefis, PG 91: 721-1018 (Paris, 1865) S. Ihm, Ps.-Maximus Confessor. Erste kritische Edition einer Redaktion des sacro-profanen Florilegiums Loci Communes. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001) Minucius Felix. Octavius, ed. B. Kytzler, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1982)

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Olymp., In Alc. Papyr. Flor. Phld. Phld. Phot., Lex. Pind., Nem. Plato Apol. Euthd. Gorg. Hipp. Min. Ion Lg. Lysis Mx. Phd. Prt. Rp. Sph. Symp. Tht.

Olympiodorus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, critical text and indices ed. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1956) Papyr. Flor. 113 post D. Comparetti, in Frammenti biografici da papiri, ed. I. Gallo, ii (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1980) [Philodemus, De pietate] Philodem. Über Frömmigkeit, ed. Th. Gomperz, i: Abt.: Der Text, Herkulanische Studien, 2 (Leipzig, 1866) [Philodemus, De pietate] Philodemus On Piety, i: Critical Text with Commentary, ed. D. Obbink (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) Photii Patriarchae Lexicon, ed. Chr. Theodoridis, 3 vols (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1982-2013) Pindarus, Nemea in Pindari carmina cum fragmentis, ed. B. Snell and H. Maehler, i, BT (5th edn, Leipzig: Teubner, 1971) Platonis Opera, 5 vols, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press): Apologia, ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, and J.C.G. Strachan, in vol. 1 (1995) Euthydemus, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) Gorgias, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) Hippias Minor, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) Ion, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) Leges, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 5 (1907) Lysis, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) Menexenus, ed. J. Burnet,in vol. 3 (1903) Phaedo, ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, and J.C.G. Strachan, in vol. 1 (1995) Protagoras, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 3 (1903) [Respublica] Platonis Rempublicam, ed. S.R. Slings (2003) Sophista, ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, and J.C.G. Strachan, in vol. 1 (1995) Symposium, ed. J. Burnet, in vol. 2 (1901) Theaetetus, ed. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, and J.C.G. Strachan, in vol. 1 (1995)

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Simp., In Cat. Soph., Ajax Stob., Anth. Suda Teleclides Them., Περὶ ἀρετῆς

Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur.

Vita Pythagorae

19

Plutarchus, Vita Periclis, in Plutarchi Vitae Parallelae, ed. C.L. Lindskog and K. Ziegler, i.2, BT (2nd edn, Leipzig: Teubner, 1959) Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquias, ed. H. Schrader, 2 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1880-1882) Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquias, ed. H. Schrader (Leipzig: Teubner, 1890) Proclus Diadochus. Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato, ed. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1954) Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria, ed. G. Pasquali, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908) Scholia in Homeri Iliadem, ed. I. Bekker, 2 vols (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1825-1827) Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem, ed. H. Erbse, 7 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969-1988) Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, CAG 8 (Berlin: Riemer, 1907) Sophoclis Fabulae, ed. H. Lloyd-Jones and N.G. Wilson, OCT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium, ed. C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, 5 vols (Berlin, 1884-1912) Suidae Lexicon, ed. A. Adler, 5 vols, LG 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928-1938) in Poetae Comici Graecae, ed. R. Kassel and C. Austin, vii (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1989) Themistii Orationes quae supersunt, ed. H. Schenkl†, G. Downey, and A.F. Norman, iii, BT (Leipzig: Teubner, 1974) J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, RhM 27 (1872) 438-462 [Theodoretus, Graecarum Affectionum Curatio] Théodoret de Cyr. Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques, ed. P. Canivet, 2 vols, SC 57 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1958) in Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, ed. A. Nauck, (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886; 2nd edn reprint, New York: Olms, 1977) 17-52

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Xenoph. Xen. Cyr. Mem. Symp.

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Xenophanes 21, 1.113-139 in DK Xenophontis opera omnia, ed. E.C. Marchant, 5 vols, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press): Cyropaedia, in vol. 4 (1910) Memorablia, in vol. 2 (2nd edn, 1901) Symposium, in vol. 2 (2nd edn, 1901)

* Introduction

1

Antisthenes’ status

Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates and a rival of Plato, did not like democracy very much. On one occasion, he ridiculed the practice of voting, advising the Athenians to elevate donkeys to horses by voting. The Athenians considered this advice, to say the least, foolish. However, Antisthenes explained it by adding further insult: ‘But among you there are generals who have not learned anything but have been elevated to the rank of general only by voting’.1 This anecdote shows that Antisthenes was a witty philosopher, an out­ spoken character, and a rude fellow who enjoyed surprising his interlocutors. When someone once remarked that many people praised him, he retorted: ‘Why, what did I do wrong?’2 It is important to note his rudeness as well as his surprising reversals of established opinion because many fragments are marked as authentic precisely on account of these characteristics. These fragments often contain short, pithy statements that were very apt for quotation and in this way found their way into the tradition; but we shall see that he was also very capable of argument in a strictly philosophical manner. This study will also demonstrate that the pithy one-liners were * The fragments of Antisthenes’ work have been collected by F. Decleva Caizzi, Antisthenis Fragmenta, Milan 1966, Frammenti nos. 1-195, p. 17-74; Note ai Frammenti, p. 77-128 (D.C.) and by G. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, Naples 1990, VA Antisthenes Atheniensis, nos. 1-208, II, 137-225 and Note 21-40, IV, 195-411 (SSR VA). Giannantoni provides an enormous amount of discussion of the scholarly literature and is required reading for every investigator, not only of Antisthenes’ work but also of the other Socratics and Socrates himself. It is a pity that Giannantoni provides no collation with Caizzi’s fragments because the older literature uses Caizzi’s numbering, therefore for convenience’s sake I have added a concordance (p. 195-204). Giannantoni’s collection is more extensive than Caizzi’s, and it is unfortunate that there is no discussion of the embedding of the extra fragments in his Note. There are occasions where ‘new’ fragments lacking the name of Antisthenes are added with­out convincing reasons, making these so-called fragments dubious; explanations based on this type of fragment are often not convincing either. Nevertheless, Giannantoni’s great work is impressive, inescapable and indispensable. See also Goulet-Cazé 1989, 249-250, who adds some new parallels and passages. A recent collection of the fragments of Antisthenes is S.H. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens. Texts, translations and commentary 2015. 1 D.L. 6.8 (SSR VA 72; D.C. 169). Antisthenes wrote a series of political works (D.L. 6.16; see pp. 128-139). Here we may also observe Antisthenes’ interest in learning, which will play a role in my discussion below. 2 D.L. 6.8 (SSR VA 89; D.C. 178C).

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

often mitigated in his theoretical discussions or in further statements of his personal views. Such slogans, then, were meant to be provocative and to draw attention to his views, and this explains the imbalance in relation to Antisthenes’ other utterances. With regard to his historical reception, Antisthenes has suffered quite a run of bad luck. According to Popper, Antisthenes was the only worthy successor to Socrates, the last of the ‘Great Generation’.3 Although his intellectual status in his own day was high, his social class was low: his father was a dealer in salt fish and his mother of non-Athenian descent, a Thracian by birth. 4 The prominent rhetor Isocrates wrote twice against his rivals (Against the Sophists [13] and the Helena [10]), presumably at the opening of his school in 393 B.C. or just after that,5 and the first rival hinted at in the Helena is Antisthenes,6 ranked before Plato and others. It would seem that at that time Plato was less known or less important, perhaps still at the beginning of his philosophical career and not yet having developed his doctrine of the Ideas.7 Antisthenes was also eager to respond to Isocrates, which can be seen in three book titles, as listed by Diogenes Laertius, launched against Isocrates and Lysias.8 Thus, Antisthenes seems to have 3 Popper, The Open Society, 194; for other, less flattering judgements, see Guthrie III, 305; for my own judgement see pp. 174-175 below. 4 See p. 132-133 below about Antisthenes’ parents. 5 Mikkola, Isokrates, 293, and Mathieu and Brémond, Isocrate, 160. 6 Isocrates, Helena [10], 1 (SSR VA 156; not in D.C.). 7 Plato’ s Academy started in 387 B.C. Some believe that Plato was included in the attack on Antisthenes in the Helena; see Giannantoni, Nota 27, IV, 274. Even so Antisthenes was more important than Plato because the description given does not fit the teaching of the young Plato, but is typical for Antisthenes (see for the contents of the attack below p. 34 and n. 16). 8 D.L. 6.15 (SSR VA 41.7-8; D.C. 1.7-8). Among these polemic writings we find a work entitled Against Isocrates’ ‘Without Witnesses’ (‘Amartyros’). It is rather difficult to imagine what objections Antisthenes launched against this work of Isocrates. The text discussed the fact that Euthynus, a nephew of Nicias, refused to pay back the full sum of three talents which Nicias had given him in deposito ‘without witnesses’, restoring afterwards only two talents and saying he had received only two talents. It seems that a trivial thing such as the repayment of money was an object for polemics; but this appears to underestimate the issue. It became a cause célèbre, which involved not only Isocrates but also Lysias. Isocrates wrote an assisting work (a deuterologos) to function as a defence of his friend Nicias, who pressed charges against his cousin Euthynus (in 402 or 403 B.C.). Lysias’ speech contained an attack on Nicias in favour of Euthynus. Isocrates’ work was the target of Antisthenes’ detailed criticism. Twenty years later, in 380 B.C., Isocrates complained that he and his work had been victims of many trivial criticisms, intending in his turn to criticize Antisthenes. Thus, we may conclude that Antisthenes’ criticism touched Isocrates deeply since he returned to the issue after two decades had passed. See Patzer’s thorough discussion of the entire issue in Antisthenes, 234-238. We may conclude that even in 380 B.C. Antisthenes still had a prominent place in the intellectual debates of the time.

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been – at least in the period after Socrates’ death – an important intellectual figure. He would perhaps have become Socrates’ most important and most famous disciple if he had not been overshadowed by the genius of Plato, a younger companion of Socrates. Antisthenes regarded Plato as his major rival and quarrelled with him because he felt that Plato had victimized him. Therefore he wrote a work with the rude title Sathōn, which means ‘penis of a little boy’, a parody of Platon, or perhaps suggested by the fact that Plato was also a nickname, meaning ‘the broad one’ because of his build or his forehead (cp. Greek πλατύς, ‘broad’).9 Incidentally, Plato in his turn did not make any attempt to refute Antisthenes publicly under his name. Furthermore, Plato was not the only adversary Antisthenes introduced by a rude nickname; the above mentioned rhetors were also victims of Antisthenes’ verbal jokes: Isographēs (‘Plagiarizer’) for Isocrates and Desias (‘Arrester’) for Lysias.10 The use of these nicknames is evidence that some titles as we know them from Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue were given by Antisthenes himself and thus must be authentic. 9 Plato’s real name was Aristocles (after his grandfather); see D.L. 3.4; Guthrie IV, 12, n. 1. 10 Plato is the only philosopher Antisthenes attacked by name according to the list of titles in Diogenes Laertius, albeit only by hinting at Plato through the nickname Sathōn (6.16; see also pp. 34-35 n. 16); whereas two rhetors (Λυσίας καὶ Ἰσοκράτης) appear in Diogenes’ list by name (D.L. 6.15). On the word Σάθων see Caizzi, p. 99 on frs. 36-37, and Giannantoni, Nota 34, IV, 328, on VA 147-148. The meaning of the word is not quite clear. Caizzi refers to Phot., Lex. σ 21 s.v. σάθων (III, 335), who quotes Teleclides (F 71 PCG VII, 692) as saying that ὑποκόρισμα παιδίων ἀρρένων means ‘the diminutive of the member of little children’. Giannantoni renders Σάθων by minchione (‘asshole’), an Italian word that can also have sexual implications. According to Patzer (Antisthenes, 232) it indicates Plato’s sexual attitude (‘spielt auf Platons Sexualverhalten an’). In any event, it is not meant to be a friendly word, hence the alienation of both Socratics. It appeared to be a rather rude habit of Antisthenes to sometimes introduce his adversaries under a nickname. The rhetors Lysias and Isocrates also appear under nicknames: Desias and Isographēs. Isographēs means Plagiarizer, as Patzer points out (Antisthenes, 228, 229): ‘He who writes the like, the same as another’. Patzer compares Ἰσογράφης, a self-coined word, with Timon’s qualification of Plato τέττιξιν ἰσογράφος (‘writing like cicadas’) in the sense of ‘sweet voiced’. Perhaps Ἰσογράφης, which is undoubtedly negative, signifies something like ‘he who writes the same’ (as himself), in the sense that he repeats himself, hence being far from being original, whereas Isocrates was proud precisely of his originality. Just like someone who is poly-graphos ‘writes much’, an iso-graphos ‘writes the same’. In fact Isocrates actually repeats the reproaches against teaching rivals in the Helena that he had already launched in the Against the Sophists. Desias seems to mean ‘Binder,’ ‘Arrester’, a reversal of Lysias ‘the Liberator’: δέω ‘enchain’ (in prison) is the opposite of to liberate (λύειν) which Antisthenes heard in the name Lysias. Lysias was a writer of pleas. Thus, to be named ‘Arrester’ is not a professional compliment for a barrister. We owe to Pohlenz the reconstruction of the title as read in the manuscripts (see SSR VA 41.34; D.C. 1.32) , who was the first to recognize the names Desias and Isographēs in the MSS (see Patzer, Antisthenes, 221). Patzer has the best discussion of the whole issue, but see also Giannantoni, Nota 27, IV, 268-270.

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The work Sathōn dealt with the subject of contradiction, a highly interesting subject which will be discussed further. Antisthenes’ book, with its degrading title bears silent witness to this animosity, and to the fact that he has been silenced by Plato’s overwhelming influence. For from the numerous works of Antisthenes (more than 60 titles, some of which consisted of several scrolls!11) virtually nothing remains, apart from two rather short speeches and a small cluster of fragments. Nevertheless, although reduced by history to the status of a minor philosopher, his thinking and views certainly merit further exploration.

2

The importance of Antisthenes’ philosophical views

Antisthenes was the first in the history of philosophy to develop a definition for the word logos; in addition he was renowned for his theory about contradiction. Although the relation between monotheism and polytheism was not considered a problem in antiquity, he may also be considered the first Greek monotheist (however much he may have vacillated and despite not having any followers). That he was a philosopher in his own right, and not someone who simply depended on Socrates’ thought or attempted to only memorialize Socrates’ ideas, can be deduced from the fact that he wrote substantial books on a wide range of subjects, so also on subjects which were not the focus of Socrates’ attention. Cicero regarded him as acutus, a ‘shrewd’ thinker, rather than eruditus, ‘learned’ (hominis acuti magis quam eruditi) and complimented him by stating that he enjoyed reading his work.12 Cicero must have had more of his texts than one, and therefore it is surprising that the wide range of Antisthenes’ works and curiosity escaped his attention; otherwise he could not have referred to him as more shrewd than learned. As demonstrated above, his status in his own day was high. Antisthenes seems to have had a powerful style and he was not averse to employing rhetorical means. He is reported to have used a pure Attic.13 It is debated whether his thoughts were presented in a direct manner or whether he used the dialogue form, which was highly popular and used 11 Timon the satirist called him a ‘prolific babbler’: D.L. 6.18 (SSR VA 41.75-76; D.C. 2). 12 Cic., Ad Att. 12.38.5 (SSR VA 84; D.C. 13). He complimented him by saying, ‘I liked the Kyros (or Kyrsas) of Antisthenes just as I liked his other works’ (mihi sic placuit, ut cetera Antisthenis). It could be that Cicero had only Antisthenes’ political works in mind. Although in some MSS the name Kyrsas figures, I prefer ‘Kyros’ because of Cicero’s interest in the person of Cyrus (see p. 134 below, and Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 295, esp. 298). 13 Patzer, Antisthenes, 98-101; about his style see also Rankin, Antisthenes, 151.

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almost exclusively by competitors such as Plato and Aeschines. In this connection we must stress that he was not averse to ad hominem polemics, as we saw with Isocrates and Lysias, and that the works involved can hardly have been dialogues.14 On the other hand, other works can be shown to have been dialogues. It is difficult for us to establish whether Antisthenes was consistent in his thinking during this long life. It may well have gone through changes during his long writing career (approximately 445-365 B.C.).15 Although I view his ideas as being quite consistent and without noticeable changes, the limitations of what the tradition has left us makes it extremely difficult to trace changes – a problem that has not attracted attention in the scholarly literature. While Antisthenes’ contributions to ancient philosophy have been hotly debated in the past and have received ample attention recently, they are worthy of another review, for it is clear that both Plato and Aristotle have corrupted our perspective on Antisthenes’ ideas on logos.16 In addition, his views on theology, especially in relation to Homer, are of interest in conjunction with his theoretical ideas and methods. Moreover, his views on ethics merit consideration. Therefore, this book is divided into three parts: I Logos and predicate; II Antisthenes’ views on theology; his theoretical approach to the study of Homer; III Antisthenean ethics.

14 Cp. D.L. 6.15, and Lysias, see p. 22 and n. 8 above. 15 Giannantoni, Nota 21, IV, 200. 16 See Giannantoni’s notes in SSR IV, 195-411; also important is Brancacci, Oikeios logos (1990; French translation with the title Antisthène: Le discours propre, 2005).

Part I Logos and predicate

Chapter I 1

Contradiction

Did Antisthenes claim that there is no such thing as contradiction?

Antisthenes is credited with a remarkable theory: contradiction is impossible. Diogenes Laertius ascribes the tenet of the excluded contradiction expressly to Antisthenes,1 and it is a theory well suited to Antisthenes’ provocative attitude. It amounts to saying ‘you cannot be contradicted, you are always right’ – what a charming theory for the future politicians who were Antisthenes’ pupils! A witness for this thesis is a quotation from Proclus: ‘That it is not necessary to contradict, because every logos speaks the truth, he [sc. Antisthenes] says, for he who speaks says something, and he who says something, speaks being, and he who speaks being, speaks the truth’.2 ‘Being’ (τὸ ὄν) is what really is, what is true, what is valid. Thus, it turns out that Antisthenes’ ontology and gnoseology coincided: if one says ‘being’, one speaks the truth; being apparently has an actual existence experienced without metaphysics.3 If Antisthenes truly considered logos a kind of definition, then, for example, referring to an animal by the name of ‘horse’ labels an actual existing horse, a being; in that case something that is true is spoken, and such knowledge can spring only from reality. Furthermore, contradiction is not necessary, he claims: it is possible that both debaters are saying something that is true and there is no need to assume that a contradiction is present. However, it is not easy to fathom precisely what Antisthenes had in mind when he launched this view. In the scholarly literature Proclus’ statement is explained as the amazing notion that one is not able to contradict or that contradiction does not exist. However, if this interpretation is right a problem arises, for it neglects the fact that Proclus said that according to Antisthenes it is ‘not necessary’ (μὴ δεῖν) 1 D.L. 9.53 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (SSR VA 154; D.C. 48). 2 Procl., In Cra. 37 (SSR VA 155; D.C. 49): ὅτι Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γάρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τι λέγει· ὁ δέ τι λέγων τὸ ὂν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγων ἀληθεύει. In the Greek it is not clear whether the ‘he’ (ὁ γὰρ λέγων) is the logos or the speaker, but in fact it is not important because it amounts to the same thing. In any case Antisthenes clearly sees the etymological correspondence between λόγος and λέγει. See later on pp. 35-36. This quotation may have originated in Antisthenes’ work Sathōn or On Contradiction; see pp. 34-35 below. 3 See pp. 46-48 below on Antisthenes’ aversion to metaphysics. It is all about seeing reality; he can see a horse, but he cannot perceive horseness (hippotēs) assumed to be in Plato’s transcendent world.

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that one contradicts the other. The phrase ‘not necessary’ implies that there remain cases in which contradiction does actually exist. The number of cases, then, in which there is contradiction has only been reduced, but there positively remains the possibility that contradiction exists. Yet the current interpretation of the excluded contradiction according to Antisthenes has no provisos, an interpretation that could be supported if a slight change to the Greek is allowed and we read μηδ᾿ εἶναι instead of μὴ δεῖν. In that case, the phrase ὅτι Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν μηδ᾿ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν (‘Antisthenes argued that to contradict does not exist at all’) would mean that there is no contradiction at all. If this were to be accepted, then all my later discussion that rests on the basis of this fragment, allowing the possibility of some contradiction after all in Antisthenes’ thought, can be done away with. However, there is no textual evidence to support this conjectural reading. Nonetheless, there is yet another text that could be troublesome for my interpretation, and this will be attended to below. 4

2

Was Antisthenes the first theoretician of the predicate?

What does logos actually mean in the phrase: ‘that it is not necessary to contradict, because every logos speaks the truth’? Antisthenes was the first in the history of philosophy5 to define the term logos: ‘a logos is what clarifies what something was or is’.6 This is usually explained in the sense that there is only one logos of each thing, viz. a definition, in the shape of a proposition, a subject with a predicate. On the basis of this view it is believed that, according to Antisthenes, one can only say of man that ‘man is man’, and of good that ‘good is good’. These examples spring from Plato’s Sophist, from a most critical description of the views of young and old people (perhaps the latter including Antisthenes himself, since he was older than Plato), ‘who in mental poverty not only adhere to this theory but also even admire it as a lucky gain’.7 Unfortunately, there are no extant texts of 4 See pp. 33-35 below. 5 It is believed that this primeur comes from an ancient list of primeurs that seems to be quite reliable (Burnyeat, ‘The Material and Sources’, 116). 6 D.L. 6.3 (SSR VA 151.1-2; D.C. 45) πρῶτός τε ὡρίσατο λόγον εἰπών, “λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν”. On the difficulties of this phrase, see pp. 56-59 below. 7 Plato, Sph. 251C4-6. The passage is understandably not included by Caizzi or Giannantoni. The whole passage (251A8-C6) runs: ΞΕ. Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλ᾿ ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ κατὰ

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Antisthenes himself that contain examples of this kind. The presentation just offered resembles, in one way or another, the example of Aristotle, who also dealt with this subject having considered Antisthenes’ mode of defining rather odd.

3 Aristotle contra Antisthenes To handle this type of problem Aristotle launched a theory on logos starting from the notion ‘substance’ (ousia; οὐσία).8 A substance has essential and accidental properties. For example, white is considered accidental of humans, because there are also black people, but being human is essential, a property belonging to all men, black and white. This doctrine of Aristotle has a grandiose future but a simple past: presumably it is a reaction to Antisthenes’ perhaps somewhat naïve – or provocative – point of view. Aristotle writes:9 ‘Hence it was foolish of Antisthenes to insist that nothing can be described except by its proper definition: one-to-one, from which followed that to contradict does not exist and also to make a false statement does not really exist either’.10 Aristotle regards Antisthenes’ view of a one-to-one definition, leading to the excluded contradiction and the near impossibility of speaking falsely, as mere foolishness. τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἓν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΞΕ. Ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι. See Guthrie III, 209, who presents this example in the belief that it is genuine Antisthenean stuff, although he denies this himself (see ibid. 214), in my view on unacceptable grounds (see p. 40 below). 8 The word ousia which Aristotle uses is usually rendered as ‘substance’. This is a bit misleading because substance really means an independent thing, while ousia actually means being or essence. Something which is referred to as ousia is addressed as the individual thing which has being, i.e. the being of a form which stamps matter in a unity of those two, form and matter. The form ‘man’ stamps a quantity of matter to be a man, whereby the individuality comes from the matter, viz. his specific matter. The form ‘man’ remains general, but it is Socrates’ flesh and blood, which makes him the individual person Socrates. See further Gill, Aristotle on Substance, 13, n. 2. 9 Arist., Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b32-34: διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἓν ἐφ᾿ ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. 10 Aristotle has ‘followed’ (συνέβαινε; synebaine), past tense. The use of the past tense refers to the moment in the past when Antisthenes came to his conclusion and indicates that it is not Aristotle’s own conclusion, but that he is quoting; in any case Aristotle himself thinks so.

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Because Antisthenes’ alleged view is unacceptable in the eyes of Aristotle he attempts to wriggle out of it. According to Aristotle, Antisthenes did not recognize that there is more than one logos in respect to some thing or some person. But one can say that ‘Socrates’ and the ‘cultured Socrates’ speak of one and the same entity; one can speak of something’s essence by saying ‘man’, as its strict definition, but of the individual by saying something else, e.g. ‘cultured’ (mousikos).11 Such qualifications Aristotle also calls logos and he assumes that Antisthenes denied the existence of this kind, calling this ‘foolish’ – perhaps annoyed that Antisthenes radically contracted the meaning of logos, whereas Aristotle extended it. In the case of the extended logos we no longer have a definition, but an ascription of a property, e.g. mousikos. In any case, Aristotle himself does not accept the idea of the excluded contradiction, nor the idea of the near impossibility of speaking falsely.12 It is worthwhile realizing why, according to Aristotle, Antisthenes believed that contradiction is impossible if there is only an oikeios logos, that is a one-to-one correspondence. Aristotle seems to believe that according to Antisthenes, one can only say of a subject one thing, e.g. ‘Socrates is a man’, whereas all other qualifications are impossible, e.g. one cannot say that ‘Socrates is mousikos’. Accordingly, it would seem that if one says something about a subject beyond the proper definition one cannot touch the subject at all, but would fail a priori because only the one-to-one definition is possible; therefore there will be no contradiction if one says something that differs from the one-to-one logos (because one will be speaking about something else instead). The great commentator on Aristotle’s works in antiquity, Alexander of Aphrodisias, further explains why, according to Antisthenes, there is no contradiction.13 There is only one appropriate logos of something; therefore, whoever says a thing different from that logos does not contradict, but presents an appropriate logos of some other thing, which does not contradict the original thing. If I may add an example: one cannot say of man ‘table’, because man has only one proper logos, ‘man’, and table also possesses only one proper logos, ‘table’. However, if one says the logos of table, one 11 Arist., Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b26-32: λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ᾗ ψευδής, διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέρου ἢ οὗ ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. ἑκάστου δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἷς, ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταὐτό πως αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός (ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἁπλῶς λόγος). 12 This is clear from the Topica; see, for instance, Topica 1.11, where Aristotle explains contradictions and presents rules to solve them. 13 Alex. Aphr., In Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b26, 434.25-435.19 (SSR VA 152.8-30; D.C. 47B).

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says being and consequently something true. Therefore, no contradiction is possible, for every logos that says being is true. Ultimately, then, according to Alexander, it is not necessary that contradictions exist. It may be that the explanation of the commentator is correct, but there remains one bothersome fact: that Antisthenes perhaps leaves some room for contradiction; this problem will concern us now.

4

A ‘mad’ contradictor

If one accepts the correction of the Greek that I proposed earlier, μηδ᾿ εἶναι, there is no room for contradiction at all, but even then there remains one troublesome text. In fragment SSR VA 174 = D.C. 65 Antisthenes states that one must not try to stop a person who contradicts by contradicting him. Rather, one should teach him, for one does not cure a mad person by ‘contramadness’.14 Here, you will note, Antisthenes starts from the supposition that someone is actually contradicting. Can we reconcile this utterance with the principle of the excluded contradiction? In the previous case, the utterance of A and the one of B do not touch each other, both being true and referring to different forms of being. In the case of the mad contradictor, Antisthenes starts from the assumption that a thesis or an explanation has been posited, which is contradicted by the misguided speaker. The contradiction exists but is cleared up by teaching, which brings about better understanding so that the contradiction has lost its force. This is obviously the normal way of solving such problems in a debate procedure or didactic process. Nonetheless, it is a case other than the one of the excluded contradiction, because there B is not ‘mad’ at all, as Antisthenes points out: he participates in the truth just as A does. In the case of the mad contradictor, on the other hand, this person has to be taught and led to a better insight so that the contradiction, if it existed at all, vanishes into thin air. These cases need to be well differentiated and may be assumed to have differing functions for Antisthenes. The case of the excluded contradiction can best be considered a novum in the realm of public debate and an attempt to provoke attention, whereas the other case clearly springs from a didactic situation. The quotation that equates contradicting with being mad suits Antisthenes well because he was fond of employing rude expressions (μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενος ‘(cure) a mad person by contra-madness’). 14 Stob., Anth. 2.2.15 (SSR VA 174; D.C. 65) οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Thus, there is no need to distrust the authenticity of fragment SSR VA 174 = D.C. 65; on the contrary, its rude character warrants authenticity. The idea of contradiction is important for Antisthenes because he calls the contradictor mad, and someone who is mad has lost his reason. Hence, there is nothing better to do than to give him his reason back by teaching (διδάσκειν). In the end there are two cases: on the one hand there is the possibility that two speakers both speak the truth; on the other hand, there is the one-sided contradiction on account of stupidity. It is clear that this subject was dear to Antisthenes because he devoted several works to it: a work entitled Discussion on Debating, as well as one with the aggressive title Sathōn or On Contradiction (in three books).15 We may infer from the existence of this extended work and its title Sathōn, referring to Plato(n), that Antisthenes had quarrelled over this subject with Plato. A story told by Diogenes Laertius testifies to this quarrel.16 It is highly 15 D.L. 6.16 (SSR VA 41.33-34; D.C. 1.31-32). 16 D.L. 3.35 (SSR VA 148; D.C. 36). Antisthenes told Plato that he would give a lecture on the subject that ‘contradiction does not exist’ (μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν). Plato reacted to Antisthenes’ invitation to attend by saying: ‘How, then, can you speak about that subject?’ In this way Plato made clear that the argument returns as a boomerang and redirects itself to the speaker and so is self-refuting, as Diogenes tells us. In other words, if to contradict does not exist, no talk about it is possible. This reaction of Plato caused Socrates’ two disciples to drift apart. Antisthenes’ did feel rebuffed by Plato’s remark, which inspired him to write three volumes on contradiction with the title Sathōn or On Contradiction, directing an insult at Plato(n). Antisthenes must have considered it truly possible to say something about the phenomenon ‘contradiction’. In fact, he had done so in the case of the ‘mad’ contradictor. If contradiction is a subject of discussion, one must be able to name it, thereafter one is able to demonstrate that actually on closer analysis contradiction is not possible. Μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν is often translated by ‘that it is not possible to contradict’. So Tredennick in the LCL translation of Arist., Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b34: ‘that contradiction is impossible’, or Hicks in the LCL translation of D.L. 3.35: ‘about the impossibility of contradiction’, εἶναι here is taken in the sense of ἐξεῖναι. The existential translation is stronger: ‘to contradict does not exist’. Plato presumably had this signification in mind because he wanted to tease Antisthenes. Isocrates in his Helena [10] 1, explicitly talks about the possibility of ‘to speak falsely’ and ‘to contradict’ (οὐ φάσκοντες οἷόν τε εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐδ᾿ ἀντιλέγειν, see pp. 67-68 below). According to Giannantoni followed by Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 174, n. 2 = Antisthène, 152, n. 5), the Sathōn (SSR VA 147, 148 = D.C. 37AB, 36) also had a part (SSR VA 149.1-5; D.C. 50A = Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.28-32; SSR VA 149.6; D.C. 50B = Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.15-21; SSR VA 149.6-11; D.C. 50C = Ammon., In Porph. 40.6-8) dedicated to the issue of the existence of ideas such as hippotēs or anthropotēs. Antisthenes said that he did not see these ideas, whereas a horse or a human being he did actually see, implying that observation is the only criterion for existence. However, I myself cannot understand why the Sathōn would contain such a section about the Ideas: the only subject that is transmitted is the issue of contradiction which as such has nothing to do with the Ideas. Furthermore, neither Giannantoni nor Brancacci provide solid evidence for their assumption that this issue figured in the Sathōn. Brancacci adduces the fragments in SSR VA 149, but they do not contain a reference to the discussion on the Ideas as

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probable that the discussion took place after Socrates’ death because Plato’s theory of Ideas is at stake and this theory cannot be assumed to have been established before that time. We can learn here, however, that although we are told that Antisthenes and his pupils had joined Socrates, he later resumed his own independent teaching;17 this is perhaps supported by the notion that one has to ‘teach’ the foolish contradictor. We know he was a devoted teacher because he dedicated a work to teaching methods, Problems about Learning.18 Presumably this work discussed his approach to teaching and learning. Similar problems must have fascinated him because he also wrote a book on Questioning and Answering.19 An important observation not always recognized is that, according to Aristotle, Antisthenes claimed that it is nearly impossible to speak falsely; this means that it is not entirely impossible to speak falsely. One must be aware of this reservation which corrects Guthrie’s description: ‘that he [sc. Antisthenes] was credited with the thesis that it is impossible to contradict or to speak falsely’. However, to speak falsely remains possible when one reads Aristotle in a certain way (‘nearly’!). 20 This qualif ication closely resembles the possibility of contradiction that a silly contradictor has.

5

Antisthenes and ouden legein

There is another approach to the problem of the excluded contradiction suggested by Guthrie: when A posits a thesis, which is true and valid, and B also posits his contradiction in the shape of a counter-remark, it is possible that B posits something true and valid about a different thing. Hence A and B do not contradict each other; B actually says nothing: he utters ouden legein part of the Sathōn. Caizzi does not treat these fragments (D.C. 50ABC) as a part of the Sathōn, but places them under ‘Frammenti da opere non precisabili’. 17 He was present at Socrates’ death (Plato, Phd. 59B5-8 [SSR VA 20; D.C. 132A]), therefore he apparently believed, after Socrates had passed away, that there was no longer any teacher better than he. 18 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.47; D.C. 1.47). 19 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.39; D.C. 1.39). It is important to realize that Antisthenes, who is believed to be the founding father of Cynicism (although it is a matter of some dispute), declares that the pursuit of virtue becomes manifest in deeds, and does not need many logoi or logismoi (D.L. 6.11 [SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70]). This is a rather drastic way of putting it and thus goes well with Antisthenes’ mode of expression, but it seems not to be quite in harmony with the fact that he wrote so often on virtues, e.g. on the beautiful and on justice (twice), or courage; see D.L. 6.16 (SSR VA 41.13, 20, 18; D.C. 1.13, 19, 17). 20 However, see on ‘nearly’ (σχεδόν) below pp. 67-69.

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(οὐδὲν λέγειν), which means to speak nonsense or to say what is not, i.e. to say nothing. He who says nothing cannot contradict or be contradicted. Guthrie (III, 211) suggests, with some reserve, the following example: ‘“one cannot say” “man is a winged and feathered animal”, for that is to say what is not, i.e. to say nothing (οὐδὲν λέγειν)’. He who speaks about ‘a winged and feathered animal’ is really talking about a bird and does not contradict another who gives a different logos of man.21 This speculative approach, starting from ‘to say nothing’ (οὐδὲν λέγειν), does not seem to be concordant with the Antisthenean thesis about the excluded contradiction, for Antisthenes affirmed emphatically that ‘each’ (ἕκαστος) logos is true and says something about the ‘being’ of a subject. If B is really saying something that ‘is being’, he says something, not nothing. Therefore, Antisthenes’ reasoning about the excluded contradiction attributes to both speakers something substantial. Consequently, we can consider the manoeuvre with ‘saying nothing’ invalid, which, it is important to realize, is nowhere ascribed to Antisthenes. Nor has Protagoras, who thought that truth is subjective and that therefore contradiction is not possible, been saddled with the ouden legein.

6

Aristotle’s unconvincing rejoinder

Aristotle’s reply to Antisthenes’ alleged thesis lacks force. He states: ‘But it is possible to predicate every thing, not only by its own definition but also by that of something else, completely falsely [case A], and yet also in a true sense [case B]. For instance, eight may be said to be double by the definition of two’.22 When I apply the definition of a triangle to that of a circle (Aristotle’s own example) then I come up with a false (not applicable) logos. This is evident and rather stupid (case A). In my opinion Antisthenes would say: there is no contradiction at all, only the application of a definition that has nothing or little23 to do with the definition of a circle; the verdict is, therefore, no contradiction. To be sure, both logoi are true, but it is not necessary to assume a contradiction; or to put it more strongly, there is no contradiction at all. Case B is still more in harmony with Antisthenes’ ideas, 21 Guthrie III, 209. 22 Arist., Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b34-1025a1 σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι δ᾿ ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυάδος λόγῳ. 23 In both cases it is geometry that is involved, but that is all.

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for if the definition of ‘eight’ is eight’s own logos, and there is also a definition of ‘twofoldness’ that can be applied to eight, then there is no contradiction at all: both are true and valid. There are two logoi, one of which is eight’s own logos, and the other the logos of twofoldness; eight’s own logos is still its own logos – this is precisely what Antisthenes wished to be the case. No, Antisthenes would not be impressed by Aristotle’s discussion. It seems that with the two types of logoi Aristotle wanted to make clear that there is more than one, or more than a one-to-one definition that can be presented with regard to a thing or a person, and that consequently Antisthenes was wrong in his conviction that there is only one logos applicable, the subject’s own. But now Aristotle has to stretch the word ‘own’ of a logos and apply the definition of another thing (twofoldness) to the case. Antisthenes would say: ‘Listen, that logos is not its own logos, but the definition of the duas and not the fundamental definition of the thing in question, the eight. In fact, the definition of the duas is only applicable as a property of eight, not of its essence’. Taking stock of the discussion thus far, it strikes me that compared to what Plato had to offer, Aristotle does not really have a closer definition. Plato is supposed to have asserted that Antisthenes could only say ‘man is man’. It seems to me that Plato is too rigid. Antisthenes himself confirms that a logos says what something was or is; that ‘something’ must be a subject and not just a category. Aristotle replaces the first ‘man’ by a real individual, i.e. Socrates, and believes it to be within Antisthenes’ thinking to say ‘Socrates is a man’. Aristotle himself speaks of ‘something’, stating that of everything there is a logos, in the sense of its essence or its qualities. Therefore, while according to Plato’s alleged presentation of the doctrine one can only say ‘good is good’, not ‘Socrates is good’, Aristotle comes up with the examples we already know, i.e. Socrates and the ‘cultured’ (mousikos) Socrates. But is it really Antisthenes’ authentic view that at best one can only say of Socrates ‘man’ as Aristotle believes?

7

The silver‒tin analogy

Some ideas in the circle of Antisthenes’ followers, Aristotle believes, are not entirely to be rejected, as appears in the question of the so-called makros (‘extended’ or ‘long’) logos. Antisthenes’ followers24 are even complimented 24 In fact, Aristotle speaks about the followers of Antisthenes, Antistheneioi, and similar uneducated people; we shall return to these people below pp. 39-41.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

by Aristotle on their idea that the essence of a thing cannot be known, albeit that his praise is mixed with some gall. He says: ‘Hence the problem which troubled the followers of Antisthenes and others similarly uneducated [!] has something to it, namely that it is impossible to define what a thing is, for the definition is a logos, which is long (makros [...] logos); but it is possible to teach what it is like, for example, with regard to silver, it is not possible to say what it is, but it is possible to say that it is like tin’.25 Apparently, then, the followers assert that one cannot say in a direct manner what the essence of a thing is, but one can say something about that same essence in an analogical manner, and even teach that. Aristotle cannot but agree, because he believes that one cannot go beyond the ousia, the form of a thing. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish just what exactly Aristotle here is ascribing to the Antistheneans; his thought is rather difficult owing to the nature of the text of the Metaphysics. The notion of the extended logos (makros logos) might be of Antisthenean provenance, because Pseudo-Alexander uses it to explain Aristotle’s text.26 He interprets it as follows: ‘man’ is a name,27 and we are able to say that a man is a rational, mortal being, susceptible to ratio and knowledge. Here we are confronted with a makros logos, because there is more than one name, namely a compositum of names. But according to Pseudo-Alexander, this is ultimately not more than a concatenation of names, an enumeration of elements which, as such, are indefinable. On this view Antisthenes could not go beyond an enumeration of names of the composing elements.28 If this were true, how would he be able to 25 Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b23-28 ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τι ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται [καὶ] διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾿ οἷον καττίτερος. 26 [Alex. Aphr.], In Metaph. Η 3, 1043b23-25, 553.31-554.33 (SSR VA 150.11-39; D.C. 44B). I do not know whether such a commentator has more knowledge of Antisthenes’ works than what he offers. It is possible that what he presents as examples are of his own making or borrowed from others. In the case of the definition, Pseudo-Alexander does not know more than Diogenes Laertius. On the contrary, his view neglects the ‘is’ of the definition, starts from the ‘was’ and attempts to criticize the ‘was’ as being too limited so that he feels ‘to be’ must be added in order to get Aristotle’s own formula: ‘that what was to be’ (see pp. 49-50 below). Consequently Pseudo-Alexander’s comment is useless or even misleading, because it pays no attention to the ‘is’; in fact, it does not even mention it. According to Guthrie (III, 212, n. 3), Pseudo-Alexander makes clear that logos makros as a term is present in Antisthenes, but in explaining Aristotle’s passage does not show more knowledge of logos makros than Aristotle himself. 27 I must emphasize that with Antisthenes onoma means something like ‘word’, referring to a substantive or an adjective. See p. 53 below. 28 One could quote here Plato, Tht. 201D8-202C6 (see Guthrie III, 213) and compare what is described there as a dream with what Antisthenes says about names (onomata): ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ

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reason? He is also assumed not to be able to contradict. We would be able to make some progress in understanding his thought if what comes after the makros logos in the statement could be ascribed to the Antistheneans and not to Aristotle himself, which is generally not done.29 In my view it is possible, even plausible, that the segment that runs ‘but that it is possible even to teach what it is like, for example with regard to silver, it is not possible to say what it is, but it is possible to say that it is like tin’ is an opinion of the Antistheneans. Why suddenly should this statement indicate a personal view of Aristotle and not rather be a part of what the followers believe?30 The statement seems to present a coherent thought: not this (what something is), but that (what something is like).

8

The Antistheneans

It is striking that Aristotle does not speak of Antisthenes but of Antistheneans, the followers of Antisthenes, who are mentioned in one breath with ‘people who are similarly uneducated’ (οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι).31 It is the one time that Aristotle mentions these followers or that they emerge at all. Does their mention mean that Antisthenes is not involved in their view? It could indicate that the followers themselves conceived the silver-tin analogy, finding in this way a solution for what was not clear in the doctrine of their master while attempting to save the teaching style of Antisthenes

ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ᾿ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ᾿ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ “αὐτὸ” οὐδὲ τὸ “ἐκεῖνο” οὐδὲ τὸ “ἕκαστον” οὐδὲ τὸ “μόνον” οὐδὲ τὸ “τοῦτο” προσοιστέον οὐδ᾿ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον – ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν – τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ᾿ οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; 29 Guthrie does use this datum; see Guthrie III, 215. 30 Grube (‘Antisthenes’, 22) does not agree; according to him the analogy is of Aristotelian provenance. 31 See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus 65b59-60 s.v. Antisthenes.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

or teaching in general (see διδάξαι32). It cannot be ruled out that Aristotle first came into contact with this doctrine through the followers and for that reason refers to them and not to Antisthenes himself. Aristotle considers Antisthenes’ followers the kind of people ‘who are in this manner uneducated’ (οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι33). Apparently, then, the application of the analogical method was rather widespread, because not only the followers of Antisthenes, but also other people seem to have had the same manner of thinking.34 ‘Uneducated’ cannot refer to the good point they make, yet they must be considered ‘uneducated’, as Aristotle clearly states. This is a rather severe accusation, because in Aristotle this can mean that one has no knowledge of logic. However, Antisthenes himself can hardly be regarded as uneducated in this field. Therefore, it looks as if ‘uneducated’ here means that Aristotle had a low opinion of Antisthenes’ followers as well as of anyone who shared their analogical method. In this regard it may be decisive that in his works Aristotle refers a few times to Antisthenes himself35; in his own mind, therefore, Aristotle made a clear distinction between Antisthenes on the one hand, and his followers on the other hand. Thus, if he refers to the Antistheneans it must be that he associates the analogical method or the makros logos with them in particular. However this may be, there remains the possibility that Antisthenes himself adhered to the analogical method. Guthrie without further ado says that this method can be ascribed to Antisthenes, but prudence should caution us because of Aristotle’s specific reference to the Antistheneans.36 Incidentally, it 32 Cp. below pp. 48-49. 33 This word occurs already in Antisthenes himself: Gnom. Vat. no. 3 (SSR VA 164; D.C. 68): ‘Antisthenes said that the uneducated walk among the living like corpses’. Was that in Aristotle’s mind? Did he give them a taste of their own medicine? 34 There must have been much resistance to Plato’s transcendent world with its Ideas. This analogical method may have been a welcome refuge from these Ideas, offering a different way to explain relations – welcome because applauded by many, as Aristotle says. 35 See Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b32 (n. 9); Pol. 3.13, 128a15-16 (p. 128 n. 8); Rhet. 3.4, 1407a10; Top. 1.11, 104b21 (n. 12). 36 Guthrie III, 212. Caizzi (102) is aware of the problem, but believes that it is about a description of Antisthenes himself, just as Aristotle more frequently refers to followers when he means the master. I do not consider this acceptable because Aristotle involves other uneducated people as well. He wants to refer to a twofold group divided into two parts: the followers of Antisthenes and the other adherents of the theory. In Aristotle’s writings ‘uneducated’ can refer to someone untrained in logic (Metaph. Γ 3, 1005b3-4 and Γ 4, 1006a6-8 [SSR VA 157.4-6 and 157.6-9; not in D.C.]); see further Burnyeat, ‘The Material and the Sources’, 115 n. 47. Therefore ‘uneducated’ seems to be a better translation than ‘crude’ (Guthrie), because then the reference to not being trained in logic and not being acquainted with the problems of definition would disappear. Antisthenes himself said that the uneducated (apaideutoi) are people who live in a dream world,

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would be odd for the followers to present a doctrine that was not in harmony with or actually deviant from the master’s own thinking. Thus, I do not exclude the possibility that Antisthenes himself used the silver-tin analogy, or something similar; in any case, it did not conflict with Antisthenes’ thought. However, there is the ultimate possibility that the enumerative definition in the shape of the makros logos was a novelty introduced by Antisthenes’ pupils. In that case, they are the ones who stated that one could juxtapose names that form a unitary description of something, the components’ selves still remaining unfathomable. This would entail an extension of the use of the onoma by Antisthenes, who then can be understood to have limited the onoma to one subject. However, in this case, the silver-tin analogy could also be of Antisthenean provenance. In such a case, Antisthenes allowed more to be said of a subject than only a name, that is, the analogy. We shall return to this problem. However, we must first investigate the notion of the makros logos on a broader scale.

9 Was makros logos an unusual notion? I have already presented the notion of the makros logos, which Aristotle introduced in his description of Antisthenes’ pupils37 in line with PseudoAlexander’s interpretation: that it is a matter of the accumulation of names (man as a rational, mortal being, susceptible to ratio and knowledge.38 Although this combination is called a makros logos by Pseudo-Alexander, it is a circumscription, which, because of its Aristotelizing character, has a suspect ring to it. The point is how much here belongs to Aristotle and how much to Antisthenes or the Antistheneans. It makes a difference. Aristotle’s assessment makes it about a material compositum, not about a definition such as man and his qualities as it is to Pseudo-Alexander. There is a further complication, in that Aristotle elsewhere attributes the words makros logos to Simonides from an unknown context, where makros logos is nothing but the ‘long rigmarole’ of slaves, who say nothing sensible.39 In that case makros logos is a pejorative term. like sleepwalkers (see n. 33 above). Rankin (Antisthenes, 69) also believes that Antisthenes adhered to the silver-tin construction. 37 Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b25-26 τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν. Cp. n. 25. 38 [Alex. Aphr.], In Metaph. Η 3, 1043b23-25, 553.31-554.33 (SSR VA 150.11-39; D.C. 44B). 39 Arist., Metaph. Ν 3, 1091a7-9, with the comment of Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. Ν 3, 1090b13-14, 818.13-18: εἰπὼν δὲ τὸ ἔοικε τὰ ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν λεγόμενα τῷ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου μακρῷ λόγῳ, ἑρμηνεύσων τίς ἐστιν ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ἐπάγει “γίνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

In relation to the Antistheneans, we must realize that Aristotle uses the expression in a parenthetic clause. He says that according to the followers of Antisthenes it is not possible to define what something is (‘because the definition is a logos […] long’),40 but that it is possible to teach how something is; then follows the silver-tin analogy. It is very important to know who is responsible for the parenthetic clause ‘because the definition is a logos […] long’. Aristotle does not speak of a logos makros tout court – his wording carefully separates logos from makros by ‘to be’, einai (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν41). This weighs against the idea that makros logos or logos makros is a unified standard expression employed by the Antistheneans themselves. Perhaps it only implies that this kind of logos contains more than one basic element; in that case the word logos is from Aristotle’s hand. This is likely, since he uses logos and horos immediately after the silver-tin analogy: ‘hence there can be a horos and logos of one kind of substance, e.g. the compositum, […] but not of its primary constituents’. 42 It is plausible that the parenthetic clause anticipates what we just quoted, so that the horos of this clause concerns a long logos, namely the logos of a compositum. If so, the parenthetic clause in the above statement is a comment added by Aristotle in order to justify his quotation of the Antistheneans’ point of view. In any case, the Antistheneans’ thought is intended to be described by the sentence ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾿ οἷον καττίτερος (‘for example, with regard to silver, not what it is, but that it is like tin’). It remains difficult whether the Antistheneans actually had any ideas about an enumerative description of a composite. Certainly, in the framework of Aristotle’s discussion of the composite the Antistheneans can have been regarded by Aristotle as speaking about such a composite. The silvertin analogy, then, is Aristotle’s evidence, borrowed from the doctrines of the Antistheneans to confirm the view he had of them. However this may be, we are now in a position to reject any involvement of Simonides’ use of the words makros logos, ‘long rigmarole’. I cannot accept that Aristotle’s use δούλων” καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. καὶ δῆλον ὡς ψευδῆ τὰ ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν λεγόμενα ἐκ τοῦ πάνυ μὲν πολλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπινοεῖσθαι, μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ αὐτὰ συστῆσαι. εἰ δ᾿ ἦν ἀληθῆ, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ταῦτα δεδείχασι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τραγῳδὸν “ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ”. In Aristotle a makros logos in the manner of Simonides is not the makros logos of the Metaphysics, although Grube and also De Rijk (Plato’s Sophist, 117) render the expression as ‘long rigmarole’. 40 See n. 25 above. 41 Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b25-26 (SSR VA 150.1-11; D.C. 44A). Tredennick (LCL) uses a different word order: τὸν γὰρ ὅρον εἶναι λόγον μακρόν. The sentence is given in the accusative-infinitive construction, which could mean that it is Aristotle who is saying this and not the Antistheneans. 42 Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b28-30: ὥστ᾿ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾖ· ἐξ ὧν δ᾿ αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι.

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of logos … makros in his description of the view of the Antistheneans has any pejorative ring to it because he uses these words in an approving and serious context, 43 namely as an anticipation of his own view on the horos and logos of a compositum. Whatever Aristotle had in mind, he has done us sterling service by demonstrating that the Antistheneans were able to say more about something than only a name, that is, the analogy. According to Guthrie the enumerative approach is also applicable to Antisthenes’ definition of logos, namely that ‘a logos is that which makes clear what a thing was or is’. 44 However, I cannot accept this reading either, because Antisthenes’ formula talks about something in the singular, which makes it about a basic principle. Moreover, a thing has its own logos, one-to-one, as Aristotle says, and in this case the enumerative logos plays no part. It could be that the enumerative logos is a trouvaille of the Antistheneans, but this assumption is not at all certain because the only thing that Aristotle directly ascribes to them is not being able to say ‘what’ something is, but indeed ‘how’ it is and how to teach it.

10

The enumerative definition

There is the difficulty in that the silver-tin analogy (ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾿ οἷον καττίτερος ‘for example, with regard to silver, not what it is, but that it is like tin’) can hardly be called a ‘long’ logos, whereas with the parenthetic clause Aristotle seems to suggest that the Antistheneans also speak about a makros logos and the issue of defining a compositum. The problem is that the silver-tin analogy has nothing to do with a compositum, only with a method of defining some separate thing (silver). Thus, the enumerative definition as such seems to fade away. Two serious problems invite further investigation now. First, is the enumerative definition of the Antistheneans really present in Aristotle’s 43 It is an interesting point that Antisthenes himself makes Ajax say that many long logoi are given to mask lack of vigour (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ = SSR VA 53.37-38 [8]; D.C. 14 [8]); but I do not think that in Aristotle’s quotation such a pejorative use is present (note that in the quotation the word ‘logos’ is in the singular). 44 According to Guthrie (III, 214), the logos formula (namely that a logos clarifies what a thing was or is) is also applicable to the enumerative definition. I presume, however, that this formula is about the giving of names (see pp. 56-59 below), not about the enumerative definition. On the basis of what Pseudo-Alexander presents (see above n. 26), Guthrie understands that Antisthenes also himself employed the term makros logos, but it is uncertain whether Pseudo-Alexander knew more about the issue than has come down to us.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

passage? The second problem is that the statement that one cannot say ‘what’a thing is seems incompatible with Antisthenes’ own view on logos, which definitely says something about its object, what it was or is. We must then ask to what degree Antistheneans were still followers of the master himself? 1

Was the enumerative definition a trouvaille of the Antistheneans?

If Pseudo-Alexander’s view makes the definition enumerative but has no basis in what the Antistheneans or Antisthenes himself thought, and if we are consequently victims of later interpretation, it is necessary to determine whether we are on solid ground at all when we speak of this form of definition. We must return to Aristotle’s passage45 and attempt to read it without any regard for this definition, in spite of what Guthrie and others have said.46 What Aristotle is trying to find out is whether the ousiai (οὐσίαι) of perishable things are separable. This is not yet clear, he says, but it is clear that this (to be separable) is not possible with houses or furniture. Perhaps these things and other things that are not naturally composed are not ousiai, for one could only regard the nature in perishable things the ousia. Aristotle’s main point has been reached now: ‘Nature’ is the only ousia that is responsible for things like houses which are composites. In this way, the meaning of ousia is limited. Now Aristotle introduces the opportune point of the Antistheneans:47 if nature is to be put beyond ousia, then we are using a term which does not allow us to look deeper or go beyond it – it is a stop. 45 Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b18-32: εἰ δ᾿ εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον· πλὴν ὅτι γ᾿ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ᾿ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτ᾿ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν· τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν. ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾿ οἷον καττίτερος. ὥστ᾿ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾖ· ἐξ ὧν δ᾿ αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. 46 Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 231, n. 9 = Antisthène, 198 n. 9) ascribes the good point to Antisthenes himself and his followers, with the exception of the silver-tin analogy because it is expressly attributed to the followers of Antisthenes. In fact Aristotle’s words imply that the whole good point is only ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, because he does not mention Antisthenes. Therefore I believe that Antisthenes is left out on purpose. 47 Giannantoni (Nota 38, IV, 383) prefers rightly ‘opportunità’ [‘opportune moment’] to ‘ragionevolezza’ [‘appropriateness’] for καιρόν: the point the Antistheneans make comes at the right moment in Aristotle’s discussion.

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So the Antistheneans make a good point when they say that one cannot know what something is (only how it is). Aristotle also cannot go beyond nature with matter. The Antistheneans believe that one can only say how something is and have come up with their analogical method: we can say that silver is like tin. Aristotle is interested in the Antistheneans; however, he disparages them48 because they believe that one cannot fathom what a thing is, but rather that one can say something about a thing’s quality, how it is, albeit only in a limited sense (because one cannot transcend a comparison of one matter with another). Aristotle believes that they support his own view in a special way. It is therefore understandable that Aristotle quotes their point of view regarding the unfathomable essence of a material ‘thing’ (ti e.g. silver), because the composita he has in mind are also formed by material things (cp. the house), which turn out to be the first things later in the context of this discourse (ἐξ ὧν δ᾿ αὕτη πρώτων ‘but not of its primary constituents’) that are not definable. I suggest that we interpret the difficult parenthetic clause in the same light: that the definition is a logos … long (τὸ γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν). Aristotle wishes to explain why he introduces the viewpoint of the Antistheneans on only one constituent (ti). The definition of a house, for example, consists of more than one material element, and is ‘long’, so he quotes the Antistheneans in regard to one (ti) of the constituents of the definition, which, he agrees, is the limit of the fathomable, and of which one cannot say ultimately what it is. What strikes me is that if the parenthetic clause is really from Aristotle’s hand, he is only referring to his own view of the long definition (e.g. of a house), which means that we are not to conclude that the Antistheneans also had such an extended form of definition. Aristotle is only interested in their view on what in his opinion is a singular constituent (ti) of the extended (material) definition. This is not a hopeful result for those who wish to ascribe an extended definition to the Antistheneans, even as a novelty in the Antisthenean School. If I am wrong, then we must establish that there is no such definition as Alexander has it (man with his qualities), but if there is a definition of the Antistheneans at all, it (horos and logos) is only about a compositum of material elements such as a house or furniture. Aristotle talks about definition and logos49 – where the elements are unfathomable – not only of sensible things but also of ‘noetical’ things. With the noetical things Aristotle returns to the previous part of 48 They are ranked among the uneducated. 49 I assume that horos is definition in the strict sense and logos is something like formula and extended definition.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

his discussion, namely to such composites as man who is more than an animal plus two-footed (Metaphysics Η 3, 1043b10-11). This partly justifies Alexander’s idea that for the Antistheneans it concerns an enumeration of names, in the sense of a definition of man with his properties; but this was not what Aristotle ascribes to the Antistheneans. Giannantoni, who appreciates Aristotle’s differentiation of the followers from Antisthenes himself, believes that if something is to be classified as a long definition (makros logos), it falls within the scope of the aporia of the Antistheneans: ‘in somma, dice Aristotele, se si sostiene che una cosa è sola la sommatoria dei suoi elementi, alora si cade nella ἀπορία degli Ἀντισθένειοι’.50 Being indefinable, he considers the makros logos the criterion that is applied by the Antistheneans and approved by Aristotle; defining, then, is impossible. However, there is the oikeios logos of Antisthenes himself, which promises to explain what something was or is. Giannantoni sees Aristotle as trying to avoid this incongruence by attributing the aporia to the Antistheneans and not Antisthenes himself. Whereas the Antistheneans had the ‘paternità antisthenica’, in the sense that they extended logos as one name to a series of names, a makros logos, which as such is indefinable, but as names may be subject to investigation (ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων) – in fact this is Guthrie’s point of view.51 However, presumably this was not in Aristotle’s mind, because he was neither interested in names nor in saving Antisthenes from an incongruence, but only in quoting the point of view of the Antistheneans regarding one material element in support of his own idea that the essence of an element is unfathomable, and that where matter is concerned one cannot come to know what a participant in a composite is in essence, but one can define what the compositum of the (material) elements are (e.g. of a house). Thus, I cannot accept Giannantoni’s view (in fact partly Alexander’s). Aristotle did not ascribe to the Antistheneans the makros logos, as I explained above. Much less did he allow the aporia to amount to an indefinable makros logos. 2

Does ‘one cannot say what a thing is’ conflict with Antisthenes’ own view?

A very serious problem remains, however. Aristotle declares that the Antistheneans have an opportune point in maintaining that one cannot define what (ti) a thing is (οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι), but this conflicts 50 Giannantoni, Nota 38, IV, 383, 384. 51 See pp. 44-45 above.

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with Antisthenes’ own position that a logos makes clear what something was or is. Consequently, the Antistheneans seem to differ considerably in this respect from the master himself. It is possible that they participated in the discussion about logos as a definition, which Plato started and Aristotle continued, whereas Antisthenes himself defined logos in another way that had nothing to do with the limitation of logos as a proposition with a predicate. We must here add the proviso that Aristotle did not saddle the Antistheneans with a theory that was alien to them. This theory could be separate from a makros logos, but in any case would include their rejection of the possibility of knowing what a thing is, and their acceptance of the possibility of comparing a thing with another thing of the same category. What has not been considered at all in the scholarly literature is that the followers may have limited their opinion to ‘elements’ such as silver or tin, which is exactly where Aristotle’s interest lies in the passage, so that it is of the elements that they confirm that one cannot define them and cannot say what they are, whereas defining non-elemental things might be a different issue. If this is the case, there would no longer be a gap between Antisthenes and his followers: they were able to give definitions and could horisasthai. Furthermore, it may not have been sensible in Antisthenes’ view to ask what a metal is or do empirical research on metals. The fact that the Antistheneans adhered to the silver-tin analogy is very interesting from a historical and philosophical point of view because it is a method of thinking about a generality in terms of class or kind; Aristotle’s deprecating remark about being ‘uneducated’ was therefore not deserved. Such an analogical form of thinking was perhaps felt to be necessary after Plato’s introduction of the Ideas, which had the same function. Aristotle mentions the popularity of the theory of the Antistheneans by stating that they were not alone but in the company of those who were in the same way ‘uneducated’. The silver-tin analogy may then be considered to be a down-to-earth solution to the problem of class or kind. Antisthenes’ own view on the problem is well known: he did not like Plato’s notion of kind or class at all and criticized the doctrine in the following way: ‘I see a horse, but I do not see horseness’. Plato’s reply, ‘This eye with which a horse is seen, you have, but the eye with which the horseness is contemplated, you have not yet acquired’,52 is rather disappointing because he carries the burden of proof that such a mental eye (and its objects) actually exists.

52 Guthrie III, 214. Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.28-32 (SSR VA 149.1-5; D.C. 50A): τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνῄρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε Πλάτωνι

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It also cannot be completely ruled out that the Antistheneans offer something of what their master taught and that we have an authentic piece of Antisthenes’ thinking about his theory of the predicate. If so, we can assume that he could have given them more than a simple predicate in the form of a name (onoma), but that he also gave them a generic comparison, silver with tin. Acceptance of this would be welcome in view of the shortage of data about Antisthenes, and would make him seem less naïve because with the generic comparison he would be acknowledging a kind of class. However, we must realize that the silver-tin analogy is expressly ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes and other people. The fact that he talks about other adherents nearly excludes the idea that Antisthenes himself came up with the analogy. If Aristotle’s information is reliable, and our interpretation of his information correct, we must conclude that Aristotle himself did not ascribe this analogy to Antisthenes and it must have been a novelty of the followers and the other ‘uneducated’. Therefore, we cannot go beyond the maximal point that the followers’ theory did not conflict with Antisthenes’ own thought, or was at least considered by the Antistheneans not to be deviant from the essence of the master’s view. In the end they were his followers and they apparently deserved this name,53 and if they were deviant in one respect, there must have been numerous other shared themes which made the name of ‘follower’ acceptable.

11

Antisthenes’ followers and teaching

Thus far I have not exploited an interesting datum in Aristotle’s account of the thinking of Antisthenes’ followers. Aristotle expressly states that it is not possible to say ‘what’ something is, but that one can say ‘how’ something is and that one can ‘teach’ (διδάξαι) this. The Greek word didaxai is a significant term; it denotes more than simply saying or explaining (as Guthrie has it54). The entire didactic business is very involved. Apparently, an Antisthenean διαμφισβητῶν, “ὦ Πλάτων, ἔφη, ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ”. καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· “ὅτι ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁρᾶται τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δὲ ἱππότης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι”. 53 They were obviously not the Cynics, who are often said to have continued the line of Antisthenes’ thought, because the Cynics had no interest in linguistic theory or the study of elements: D.L. 6.103-104 (SSR VA 135.3-5; 7-8; not in D.C.) ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν, … (104) περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, whereas the followers of Antisthenes launched a physical theory using the silver-tin analogy along with the denial of the possibility of understanding elements. 54 Guthrie III, 212.

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is not necessarily satisfied with the limitation of giving a label (onoma) to something, but he is also able to teach. The silver-tin analogy demonstrates that one can say ‘how’ something is and precisely that is teaching; therefore, the core activity of Antisthenes and his followers is founded on saying how something is. This teaching practice is guaranteed by Aristotle’s account. Unfortunately Guthrie deprives the word didaxai of its essence: ‘You can explain (διδάξαι) what it is like, you cannot say of silver what it is but only that it is like tin’.55 This translation is to be criticized in two fundamental ways. First, the notion of teaching is suppressed, which deprives the Antistheneans of their teaching practice; second, the word ‘only’ is not in the Greek, nor is it implied, and therefore a false emphasis has been given. The followers believe precisely that there is more to say than a thing’s own logos, which would hardly explain anything, but does indicate an operative analogy and saves their practice of teaching. Antisthenes himself was also active as a teacher, as we may conclude from his advice not to contradict mad contradictors but to cure them by teaching, and from several works he wrote about the subject. The problematic issue remains, whether or not what is told of the followers (the analogical method) may be applied to Antisthenes’ own philosophical practice.

12 Aristotle’s to ti ēn einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) and the ‘was’ (ἦν) of Antisthenes’ explanation of logos There is another bit of common ground between Aristotle’s doctrine and Antisthenes’ thought. It is interesting to note that Antisthenes’ definition of logos56 clearly functioned as a basis for Aristotle’s definition of what the essence of a thing is. Aristotle has to ti ēn einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι),57 ‘what something was to be’, while Antisthenes’ definition is to ti ēn ē esti (τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι) ‘what something was or is.’58 The common ground is evident, especially the use of the imperfect so that this correspondence did not escape the attention of scholars.59 To be sure, Aristotle, as we saw earlier, grumbles 55 Guthrie III, 212. Caizzi (102) has a better view. 56 D.L. 6.3 (SSR VA 151.1-2; D.C. 45) λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν. 57 Arist., Top. 1.5, 101b38 ἔστι δ᾿ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων. 58 It is striking that in both definitions the past tense is used. Antisthenes says in his definition of logos: a logos is what clarifies what something was or is; Aristotle says, to be what something was (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Unfortunately Guthrie has the-what-it-is-to-be-that-that-thing, however, one must not neglect the past tense, as he does (VI, 147, in particular n. 1). 59 Already so Ritter and Preller, Historia philosophiae graecae, 315 n. c. Also Alexander of Aphrodisias recognizes the connection, see In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.20-21 (SSR VA 151.10-12; D.C. 46):

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about Antisthenes, but was apparently unable to shake off Antisthenes’ influence. He has changed Antisthenes’ formula and adapted it to his own purpose, and although he does not mention Antisthenes’ name in this context, the common factor is too obvious to be missed. It cannot be without purpose that Antisthenes uses the imperfect ἦν in his formula (‘what something was or is’), but the issue remains what the use of this imperfect means. If one applies ‘something’ to a thing, you make clear what it was or is. What is that ‘something’? It could be a name. If we follow Plato’s Theaetetus,60 the only thing Antisthenes was able to say of something was a name. This opens the following perspective: if I use the name ‘horse’, I speak about something, i.e. an animal that existed already in the past, but also now. This animal is a horse and by receiving this name it is connected with all the horses in the past. So naming is not only giving a label in a present situation, but also activity with an informative past. I would also say that in this way one accounts for something general, i.e. a class or kind. However, can we trust Plato? What can we know for certain? I shall discuss how onoma informs the issue, in particular the investigation of onoma, which Antisthenes recommends, at a later point. Perhaps we must abandon the idea that it is all about naming and we may even go so far as to assume that logos is not to be regarded as a definition, as Plato suggests and Aristotle has it. Moreover, if a logos only labelled something with a name, the effect of this manoeuvre would be rather poor. If I can only say of a horse ‘horse’ then this is a trifling act. In this connection we need to realize that Antisthenes wrote a lot about the subject and that he devoted a special work to it, On the Use of Names, a Contest.61 However, before we tackle this matter (onoma), we have to discuss a related problem.

13

The imperfect tense in the logos formula, why not also a future tense?

The interesting issue of tense remains: why did Antisthenes not say what something was or is or will be? Thus, Radermacher, having posited the problem of why there is no future tense in the formula, was induced to add

οὐκ ἄρα αὔταρκες τὸ ἦν, ὥς τινες ἡγοῦνται, ὧν δοκεῖ πρῶτος μὲν Ἀντισθένης εἶναι, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τινες. 60 See n. 28 above. 61 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.38; D.C. 1.38).

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estai (ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται).62 Yet such interference is not justified, because naming has nothing to do with the future and everything to do with experiences in the past with regard to beings or things. What will be is unknown and has no bearing on the definition. For example, if one were to ask what something is, to be given the answer that it will be a horse makes little sense, because the future has nothing to do with the experience that enables one to recognize a horse. If logos is more than a name, for instance, a kind of research into a name, then the future tense is not pertinent – but by the same token the past tense is highly important. Therefore, such an intervention as proposed by Radermacher is not justified. Burnyeat deduces from the limitation of the formula to present and past that Antisthenes wished to offer a definition, not a statement.63 If it were a statement, a future tense would be appropriate, because apparently a statement, according to Burnyeat, would embrace the future: ‘and if it [sc. Antisthenes’ logos] meant “statement” the absence of the future would be puzzling’; therefore, he concludes, logos is a definition. Yet, in view of what was said earlier about naming on the basis of the past, logos is not a definition. To answer the question ‘what is that?’ with the answer ‘it is a horse’, is not to give a definition. A definition, according to Antisthenes, could at best be the resemblance to some other thing (as silver resembles tin and if he used an analogy at all). Everything has its own logos. ‘What is that?’ ‘That is a horse’. But in this case one has abandoned the field of definition and passed over to clarifying and naming. Naming is not defining. The imperfect would indeed be a strange way of dealing with a definition, that is, to begin an answer to a question of the kind ‘What is a man?’ with the phrase ‘man was ...’. Although Alexander of Aphrodisias found the ‘was’ troublesome, he still adhered to the opinion that Antisthenes had a horos, ‘a definition’ in mind;64 Alexander therefore justified the use of the imperfect by degrading ‘was’ to a means of expressing a definition. Nor was this enough. Aristotle’s view on definition contains more than ‘was’, being (einai) must be added: ‘what something was to be’(τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Alexander thought that he could demonstrate this point by a difficult form of reasoning,65 62 Radermacher, Artium scriptores XIX no. 7, p. 121. 63 Burnyeat, ‘The Material and Sources’, 116. 64 Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.16-17 (SSR VA 151.7-8; D.C. 46), immediately identifies logos with horos, definition. 65 Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.13-22 (SSR VA 151.4-13; D.C. 46): εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἦν τὸ “ἔστι” σημαίνει, εἴη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν σημαίνων ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ “λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων”, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προκείμενον πρᾶγμα οὗ ἀποδίδοται. ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τοῦτο, πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορουμένων τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχων τι λόγος ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ ἔσται· ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι δὲ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ γένη, συνωνύμως γάρ· ὁ ἐν

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and that he could put Antisthenes in with the group of people who do not understand that in a definition ‘being’ (einai) has to be introduced, and that using only ‘was’ is too simple. Antisthenes’ alleged – anachronistic – lack of understanding of the essence of definition is thus to blame for his use of the solitary ‘was’ (τὸ ἦν), although his intention would have been by his logos formula to fathom the essence of definition. However, if it is not a definition, but an appropriate logos, a vexing question remains: why did Antisthenes actually use the imperfect and not simply the present tense? Was this naïve? Although the tense problem did not occur to the Aristotelizing Alexander, the answer is clear to me: naming has to do with the past. It is interesting to note that Alexander does not say that Antisthenes belongs to the group of philosophers who do not understand the essence of the definition and believe that ‘was’ is sufficient in the definition. He claims that Antisthenes ‘seems’ (δοκεῖ) to be the first of this group (ὧν δοκεῖ πρῶτος μὲν Ἀντισθένης εἶναι). This implies that he did not come up with this placement of Antisthenes by his own reading of Antisthenes’ work. Thus, we have an indication of the fact that Alexander did not have his knowledge at first hand, which confirms earlier doubts about the value of his testimonies and explications. When Brancacci says that Alexander’s ‘autorità e particolarmente importante, disponendo di informazioni personali e circostanziate su Antistene’, it is only a random guess.66 We have to free ourselves from Alexander’s dominant presence in Antisthenes research and employ his contributions with the utmost caution and prudence in order to avoid interpreting them anachronistically. We must now try to gain more insight into what ‘name’ meant to Antisthenes.

τῷ γένει ἄρα τὸ εἶδος τιθεὶς λόγος εἴη ἂν ὁρισμὸς τοῦ εἴδους, δηλῶν τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀληθές. οὐκ ἄρα αὔταρκες τὸ ἦν, ὥς τινες ἡγοῦνται, ὧν δοκεῖ πρῶτος μὲν Ἀντισθένης εἶναι, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τινες, ἀλλ᾿ εὐλόγως τὸ εἶναι πρόσκειται. 66 Oikeios logos 243 = Antisthène 207.

Chapter II

Investigation of names

1 Name (onoma) The core business of Antisthenes’ teaching programme must have been his investigation of names: ‘the origin of education is the investigation of names’ (ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις).1 He had a lot to say about the use of names. Obviously labelling something with a name (onoma) is not the end of the matter because otherwise there is no sense in using the word ‘investigation’.2 These enquiries must be informative. What is the signification of ‘name’? Onoma may refer to both persons and things.3 In Plato it is a noun that functions in contrast with rhēma, predicate. To go back to the example of the horse: if one says this is a horse, one has given an onoma to the animal. Presumably Antisthenes attempted to deduce more knowledge from the connection of names. Thus, he could have linked the name silver to tin, getting insight in what is general, in this case matter. Since in our experience with names we receive practical knowledge, Antisthenes can claim that the investigation of names is the origin of education. He wrote a work on the use of names in five books: On Education or Names; moreover, he wrote On the Use of Names, a Contest. 4 The fact that he wrote extended works on this subject and that he debated about it shows how dear to his heart the investigation of names was. If only we knew more about naming! This could be so, if we were able to understand a certain passage in Plato as referring to Antisthenes, but it is unclear how much of Antisthenes’ thought, if any, there is in what Plato said.5 We can only make a fresh start from another point of view. 1 Epict., Diss. 1.17.10 (SSR VA 160; D.C. 38). He considered the garland of education (paideia) to be the most beautiful: Stob., Anth. 2.31.33 (SSR VA 162; D.C. 172). 2 Plato does suggest that the dream passage (Tht. 201D8-202C6; cp. p. 38 n. 28) refers to Antisthenes (and perhaps to others), in that one cannot say more than a name about something. 3 See LSJ. De Rijk, Plato’s Sophist, is very good on this topic. After a careful study he writes: ‘onoma is [...] a “one-word name” intended to pick up some “thing” out of the outside world’ (222). 4 Περὶ παιδείας ἢ ὀνομάτων α´β´γ´δ´ε´ (D.L. 6.17 [SSR VA 41.37; D.C. 1.35]) and Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως, ἐριστικός (D.L. 6.17 [SSR VA 41.38; D.C. 1.38]). It is not likely that these books dealt only with substantives. If onomata are of so much importance, adjectives will play a role, too; cp. n. 10 below. 5 See above p. 38 n. 28. The dream mentioned there speaks of the oikeios logos (Tht. 202A6-7) of every thing. This cannot but refer to Antisthenes because as Aristotle tells us, this oikeios logos is the only instrument to say something of a thing. In this dream it is assumed that the only thing that can be used to address a thing is a name; all predicates (a long list is given), even the

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An example of the investigation of a name (polytropos)

We have some utterances of Antisthenes that are related to the investigation of a word. There is an item on the Homeric polytropos, in particular whether or not the word polytropos gives a negative image to Odysseus, whose name is regularly adorned with this epithet.6 Antisthenes tries to investigate what polytropos means in Homer and goes back to its root: tropos, ‘turn’, or ‘approach’.7 Antisthenes wants to establish that with different people (e.g. men, as opposed to women, as opposed to children) different approaches or methods of association must be applied.8 It appears that someone who is capable of applying multifarious forms of approach to others must be called polytropos, whereas, in contradistinction, we have the monotropos, who applies only a one-sided method of approach, thus displaying a form of social disability. Antisthenes assumes that Odysseus was able to approach different people in different ways.9 In this sense of multifarious approach polytropos is equivalent with sophos or a part of sophos Antisthenes thinks. Immediately I am reminded of the silver-tin analogy. In this way both Odysseus and Homer are redeemed. It seems to me that we have here an example of Antisthenes’ general method of tackling an investigation of an onoma and its use. There is the ousia of a thing cannot be said of thing. This leads to connecting names for composite things, but the result is only a succession of unknown things. I do not believe that giving a name is the ultimate limit for Antisthenes because this activity opens the gates to gaining knowledge by investigating these names. 6 One could construe this as an appealing dilemma: is polytropos positive or negative? Both cannot both be true at the same time. Such a contradiction cannot be regarded as belonging to the domain of the excluded contradiction. In order to contradict the thesis ‘polytropos is positive’ one has to be taught, as described in the text. 7 Porph, Ad Od. α 1 (SSR VA 187.1-35; D.C. 51). For the Greek text see pp. 85-87 nn. 7, 9, 11. 8 Pythagoras’ habit of accommodating his discussions to the character of the audience, women, children, etc. is quoted as an example (Porph., Ad Od. α 1, lines 23-25; see p. 86 n. 9). There is a debate whether Porphyry or Antisthenes himself introduced the example (Caizzi, p. 107). One could accept that Antisthenes himself inserted it, but if not the whole idea of monotropia could be Porphyrian and the whole discussion after syneinai (ibidem line 22) about the audience related speeches as well. Nevertheless, it seems possible that after the example we have a phrase which could still be from Antisthenes (ibidem lines 25-27): ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν· ἀμαθίας δὲ εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνομοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι μονοτρόπῳ, because it is the grounds for the conclusion that Antisthenes arrived at. The rest of the fragment discusses a comparison with medicine and could be Porphyrian or Antisthenean as well; see p. 95 for my final judgement. 9 Porph., Ad Od. α 1, lines 20-22 (see p. 86 n. 9): διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. Whatever one thinks about what may stem from Porphyry, this phrase is the satisfactory conclusion that Antisthenes arrived at; it is implied that polytropos is part of being sophos.

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problem of whether we may consider an adjective like polytropos to be an onoma; presumably we may do so.10 In Plato it is beyond doubt that we are allowed to do so,11 but there are no parallels in Antisthenes. If indeed such parallels are absent, we can still accept that here Antisthenes is investigating the word tropos (poly-tropos), a noun, and so legitimately onoma is involved in his enquiry. Proceeding, we can say that we have here a specimen of the potency of a logos, namely clarifying what something is, in this case polytropos. If this is allowed, we learn that logos is not about definition, as people round Antisthenes (Plato?) or after him (Aristotle) thought, but denotes investigation of a word or a name. The imperfect is clarified: it is an examination of what something was in the past, for instance, what it was in Homer who lived long before Antisthenes and who interested Antisthenes very much, as we may deduce from the fragments of his thought which are extant.12 Antisthenes’ speeches in the name of Ajax and Odysseus testify to this interest.13 Moreover, there are books covering a whole series of Homeric figures: Calchas, Odysseus, Penelope (the famous dog passage), Telemachus, the Cyclopes and many others. There was also a work, although we only have its title, which deals solely with Homer: On Homer.14 Thus, there was interest enough in the past to clarify why ‘was’ precedes ‘is’. As a rhetor and an ancient Greek, Antisthenes applies a popular technique: broad research of Homeric texts. In fact, we may call Antisthenes a philologist. In this manner we find a very satisfactory explanation for the presence of ‘was’ even before ‘is’, although the present (‘is’) will make a contribution too (ἢ ἔστι).15 It turns out that logos is more than a definition or a statement and that we have to avoid these terms; explanation, then, is the keyword. Logos also 10 According to LSJ onoma is a name of a person or of a thing. In Homer it refers to persons. In my text we shall see that it is a reference to an adjective. See further n. 4 above. 11 See De Rijk (Plato’s Sophist, 221) who presents an example of onoma meaning ‘even’: Plato, Laws 10, 895D4-896A4. Kretzmann, too, concludes that an onoma can be an adjective (‘Plato’, 126). 12 However, he did not like the rhapsodists at all (so Xenophon tells us, Symp. 3.5-6 [SSR VA 185; D.C. 61]), who only memorized the works of Homer and were too stupid to fathom the deeper underlying thoughts, the hyponoiai (see pp. 156-158 below). Memorizing and declaiming do not make a person good. There is a scholarly debate on whether or not Antisthenes was an allegorist (see Caizzi, 109). 13 ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ (SSR VA 53; D.C. 14) and ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ (SSR VA 54; D.C. 15). 14 D.L. 6.17 Περὶ Ὁμήρου (SSR 41.51; D.C. 1.51). 15 Rankin, who in interpreting the logos formula does not start from the investigation of names as research, as for example in Homer (i.e. the function of the word in the past), has the habit of speaking of ‘is’ and ‘was’ in the wrong order, not following the Greek. There is a good reason that ‘was’ is the first in the sequence, as I explained in the text; see Rankin, Antisthenes, 64, 65.

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means the content of a contradiction, as we can deduce from the fragment dealing with contradiction, because if someone presents a contradiction, it is more than a definition. A person who contradicts must be convinced by teaching, and this teaching cannot be limited to launching a definition; on the contrary, it must be an argument, perhaps an investigation of a name. The fact that logos cannot be a simple definition can also be seen in the fragment dealing with virtue: ‘The same [sc. Antisthenes] said that virtue needs little logos, badness on the other hand an immeasurable amount of logos’.16 Badness requires a great deal of substantiation, which cannot simply mean giving another (wrong) definition. A different fragment teaches that people who want to be good have to exercise their bodies by gymnastics and their souls by logoi.17 Again, such exercises are more than definitions. In a similar context another fragment uses the interesting word logismos: one has to build walls in one’s own impregnable reasonings (logismoi).18 Logismos means ‘reasoning’, not ‘definition’. Also in the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus about Achilles’ armour, logos constantly emerges as reasoning or argument.19

3 The logos formula reconsidered There is another problem that invites further reflection. In his logos formula Antisthenes uses the definite article to (τό): a logos is that which clarifies ‘the what it (it?) was or is’ (λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν). If this definite 16 Gnom. Vat. no. 12 (SSR VA 104.1-2; D.C. 86): ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπέραντον; Giannantoni reads with the MSS. ἀπέραντον; Caizzi reads ἀπεραντο〈λόγον〉. The phrase ἀπεραντολόγος occurs in D.L. 6.26 and Wachsmuth’s addition ἀπεραντο〈λόγον〉 is very convincing. If, however, we have to maintain the reading of the MSS, we still possess βραχύλογον as witness for logos as more than a definition, because this word in connection with ἀρετή cannot mean a short definition. 17 Stob., Anth. 2.31.68 (SSR VA 163.1-3; D.C. 64): δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίοις ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν 〈λόγοις〉 (MSS. παιδεύειν: παιδεύσει Meineke: λόγοις Caizzi). The word logoi (λόγοις), conjectured and defended by Caizzi, 110, is a felicitous addition; Giannantoni reads Meineke’s παιδεύσει. 18 D.L. 6.13 (SSR VA 134.17-18; D.C.63) τείχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὑτῶν ἀναλώταις λογισμοῖς. For λογισμός see LSJ. This is the context: ‘Wisdom is a most safe wall, which does not crumble away nor is betrayed’; then follows the quotation. 19 In Ajax’s speech we have examples enough where logos cannot be a definition, but always an argument (SSR VA 53.32-33; D.C. 14): (7) μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνοντας, ἀλλ᾿ εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ᾿ ἔργῳ, … γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον ἰσχύν, whereas in Odysseus’ speech we only have once (SSR VA 54.66-67; D.C. 15): (11) κἀμοὶ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος.

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article stems from Antisthenes himself, and is not a later Aristotelizing addition, then it could indicate that (τὸ) τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι is a kind of standard term, a well-circumscribed doctrinal notion.20 However this may be, in this doctrine the word δηλόω (ὁ … δηλῶν) obviously is a legitimate part, signifying ‘to elucidate’. Antisthenes does not utilize the Greek word sēmainein (σημαίνω), ‘to signify’, although he does use it elsewhere.21 The exegetist Alexander of Aphrodisias uses the word σημαίνω when discussing Antisthenes’ use of the word δηλῶν (dēlōn). The verb δηλόω means ‘to clarify a situation’, not simply ‘to indicate’ or ‘to label’ (see LSJ). This ‘indicating’ is σημαίνω and it is quite understandable that someone like Alexander, who is eager to find something like a definition in Antisthenes’ logos, (tacitly) replaces δηλόω by σημαίνω.22 Thus, δηλόω is more than giving a name as an indication; it can be understood as explaining. When one presents an oikeios logos of something, it will be more than naming (as we showed in the case of polytropos). The one-to-one oikeios logos is not necessarily a definition, as Aristotle believes, but it can be assumed to mean that every thing has its own story.23 In that case we have to remove 20 If there is impact of Aristotle’s manner of thinking, we are confronted with influence of the Aristotelian formula: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. The Greek of the sentence is rather strange, if not impossible, because of this τό. In any case ὁ must be connected with δηλῶν. Both Hicks (LCL) and Guthrie translate it as if the subject of τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι is ‘something’, neglecting the τό, whereas τί must mean ‘what’ (interrogative pronoun) not ‘something’ (indefinite pronoun), because if we must read τι in the sense of ‘something’ we have no interrogative pronoun ‘what’ (τί). They translate: ‘a logos is that which sets forth what a thing was or is’ (Hicks quoted in Guthrie III, 210). I translate the subject of is as ‘it’; if this is not satisfactory there are two more possible readings that give a satisfactory indefinite pronoun τι: 1) λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ ὅ τι ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν. Only one thing is added, ὅ, and it is not strange that it was lost: ‘logos is the clarifying, the what something was or is’. However, the τὸ remains odd. 2) λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ ὅ τι ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν. In this case we replace the strange τὸ by ὅ: ‘logos is the clarifying what something was or is’. Thus, we have a well-structured sentence. 21 So in his explanation of Homer in Porph., Ad Od. α 1, lines 12-13; see p. 86 n. 7 (SSR VA 187.12-13; D.C. 51), where it means ‘indicate’: ‘is it not so that tropos on the one hand indicates the character, and on the other hand the employment of words?’ (μήποτε οὖν τρόπος τὸ μέν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν;). We may compare also Porph., Ad Il. Λ 636 (SSR VA 191; D.C. 55), where he explains the elevation of the famous cup by Nestor. Antisthenes’ interpretation was as follows: Homer does not speak about the load for the arm, he wanted to indicate that Nestor did not get drunk, but tolerated the wine easily (see pp. 100-102 below). To indicate (σημαίνω) does not mean ‘to explain’ or ‘to make clear’, but ‘to hint’; and in this case, too, it is not used as an equivalent of δηλόω. 22 Especially in Plato and Aristotle this verb means ‘to signify’ (see LSJ). In Alexander it is found as a substitute for δηλόω: Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.13-22 (SSR VA 151.3-13; D.C. 46). 23 Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 248 = Antisthène, 212), who believes that the oikeios logos is in essence definitory (‘discorso definitorio’) and that we have very limited examples, knows of

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it from the sphere of the theory of the predicate or definition. The oikeios logos cannot be anything less than a form of research into the linguistic history of the meaning of a name. There is another meaning of oikeios logos in Antisthenes’ thought. The word oikeios occurs also in the polytropos discussion which scholars sometimes introduce in the debate on oikeios logos.24 If one does so, the use of oikeios in the polytropos passage supports a specific point of view. There it is employed in the sense of ‘suiting’, ‘appropriate’, ‘in harmony with’, and Antisthenes is so kind as to explain oikeios himself by τὸ ἁρμόδιον ἑκάστῳ, ‘fitting for each thing’. In the passage involved, oikeios is linked with a logos, an address which is specifically made up for a special audience, it is its oikeios (own) logos. Thus, Antisthenes himself in fact explains the meaning of oikeios by τὸ ἁρμόδιον ἑκάστῳ and logos by speech: it is a specific form of address suited to a specific audience. This sense gives an indication of how we can interpret the concept oikeios logos differently from the one-sided view of Aristotle. Even Aristotle’s ‘one-to-one’ is present in the form of ‘one is what is suited to each’ (ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον), but in an entirely different setting.25 It is a problem whether logos as address and logos as investigation of a name (polytropos) have anything in common. A speech attempts to convince an audience with arguments, whereas an investigation tries to understand a word and adduce convincing evidence so that one has an explanation that is exclusively connected with the word or concept at issue. The notion of exclusive connection is the core signification of oikeios; that is the common denominator, although differences remain. In any case, the oikeios logos of the polytropos passage is more than a definition. Ultimately, it now seems that the logos formula has illegitimately been called a primeur in the history of the predicate as a definition.26 However, we cannot rule out that it is the origin of the debate on the predicate, or that it provoked such a thing, or that it was a contribution to a debate on logos. The silver-tin analogy has more of a definition to it, which could be a primeur, or in any case a contribution of Antisthenes with the proviso that

only three logoi oikeioi: 1) λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν; 2) ἀνδρεῖος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι; 3) ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται. 24 Patzer, Antisthenes, 185. 25 Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 64 = Antisthène, 59) sees the necesssity of fixing the significance of each particular term in conformity with the principle ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον (‘fissare l’unità di significato di ogni singolo termine, conforme al principio per cui ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον’). However, this expression only concerns the exclusive connection of speech and audience. 26 See pp. 30-31 above.

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Antistheneans presented the authentic thinking of their master or at least something that had a strong parallel in their master’s thought. If indeed in Antisthenes logos never means ‘definition’ but always ‘reasoning’ in a wider sense (see polytropos), often with a historical perspective, then Antisthenes cannot be assumed to have participated in the debate on the ‘definition’, as Plato and certainly Aristotle have it. In this case we must concede he was a non-contributor in this area, but we may also conclude that the Antistheneans can be supposed to have entered this debate with a view that had to do with the issue of definition: they denied that we can say more than a comparison (silver-tin), and asserted that we are limited by at best assuming an enumerative definition (which does not take into account what Aristotle calls the nature, the form of its elements). Presumably all this was limited to the field of material things, such as houses or furniture. If this is the real situation, we can be sure that Aristotle quoted the Antistheneans and not Antisthenes himself because he has nothing so well circumscribed.

4

Brancacci’s solution to the imperfect ἦν

The solution I propose is to make the imperfect of λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν (‘a logos is that which clarifies the what it was or is’) refer to linguistic-historical research (e.g. in Homer polytropos) seems to me less artificial and more natural than Brancacci’s, however ingenious it may be. ‘He believes that Antisthenes’ method contains a development in a discourse from some question (ἐρωτηθέν, later in retrospection, ‘what was asked’ τὸ τί ἦν) to a definition (λόγος, τὸ τί ἐστι ‘what it is’)’ as a defining answer to the question posed.27 He finds a description of such a discourse in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 4.6, where we are told that Socrates did not stop trying to find out what a thing is and that he presented examples of this form of argumentation.28 To interpret this passage Brancacci starts from a passage in Epictetus, where it is said that Antisthenes wrote that the starting-point of paideia is the investigation of names, and also that Socrates 27 Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 217, n. 38 = Antisthène, 187, n. 39) referring to Sophist 258B7-C5. Plato refers to an earlier conclusion which seems far from Brancacci’s construction with the ἐρωτηθέν. 28 Xen., Mem. 4.6.1: ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτούς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ᾿ ἔληγε. πάντα μὲν οὖν ᾗ διωρίζετο πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἴη διεξελθεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

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continually stated that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and thus of measuring and weighing them. The text runs: ‘Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the investigation of names is the beginning of education? [Antisthenes]. And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write that he began with the examination of names, [with] what each name signified?’ [Socrates].29 The last remark about Xenophon refers to Memorabilia 4.6.1, which is the connection Brancacci wants to exploit. On the authority of Epictetus, Brancacci traces this passage back to Antisthenes and adduces several arguments to support this idea. Admittedly, as sketched in the Memorabilia 4.6, Socrates’ method and Antisthenes’ investigation of names are connected by Epictetus. However, in the Memorabilia passage the word ‘name’ does not figure. It is generalized to such a degree that the connection suggested by Epictetus has no decisive force in favour of Antisthenes as originator. Epictetus needed the connection only to be able to introduce Socrates as the culmination of his enumeration of the names of promoters of logic. It is all intended to demonstrate the usefulness of logic because it has the capacity to investigate things (ἐπισκεπτικά). Indeed, Epictetus links the investigation of names with logic, but his main interest is to introduce his champion of logic, Socrates. Therefore he connects Xenophon’s description of Socrates’ method to the investigation of names, which he had linked with Antisthenes, but without any direct quotation of Xenophon. Such a literal quotation would have shown that the word ‘name’ does not emerge in Xenophon’s rather general description of Socrates’ method of determining what a thing (ti) is. Epictetus could have justified his reference by pointing to the word episkepsis (τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως), which occurs in Xenophon’s passage and also in Antisthenes’ slogan (ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις ‘the origin of education is the investigation of names’). In the subsequent section of Xenophon’s Memorabilia (4.6.2-7), the words or rather the concepts of eusebeia, dikaia, and sophia are examined in order to arrive at the definition of these concepts. Brancacci believes that these examinations are in essence Antisthenean and uses them as examples of 29 Epict., Diss. 1.17.10-12 (SSR VA 160; D.C. 38): (10) “καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι”. καὶ περὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὀψόμεθα. εἰ δ᾿ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνο ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μετρητικά καὶ στατικά. (11) τίς λέγει ταῦτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; (12) Ἀντισθένης δ᾿ οὐ λέγει; καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ γεγραφὼς ὅτι “ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις”; Σωκράτης δ᾿ οὐ λέγει; καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν, ὅτι ἤρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον; The phrases on Antisthenes (καὶ τίς ἐστιν) and Socrates (καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει) are parallel; thus, what Xenophon wrote is related to Socrates.

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Antisthenes’ method. Each question asked (e.g. what is piety?) is developed to the point of a definition. These short dialogues are rather simple and do not show much ingenuity. However, they can be supposed to demonstrate that names are the starting-point of paideia, by investigating what these names in fact indicate because in each case a name (i.e. a word, such as ‘piety’) is the beginning of the investigation.30 Indeed, Epictetus possibly believed that what Antisthenes thought about the investigation of names coincided with what Xenophon writes about Socrates’ method. However, how cogent is that? Are we really obliged to believe that Antisthenes’ investigation of names runs along Xenophon’s line? I do not think so. Epictetus has only six references to Antisthenes’ works in sum, which does not suppose much knowledge of these works. However, some knowledge of Xenophon’s Memorabilia must have reached him. But even if the investigation of names did actually follow Xenophon’s line of reasoning, the case is clear, for in this case also the imperfect of the logos phrase remains strange if it has to refer to the start of an argument, as Brancacci thinks: λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν (‘a logos is that which clarifies the what it was or is’). In Xenophon’s Memorabilia 4.6.1 there is no trace of an imperfect. Brancacci reduces the relevant dialogues of Xenophon to a model in order to be able to make the investigated name the question that was asked at the beginning of the dialogue and see it from the position of the definition which was the result of the argumentation of investigation. Brancacci attempts to support his interpretation by explaining – in a special way.31 The word ἤ has the value of the Latin sive or vel, not of aut because then it would be disjunctive. According to Brancacci it has to connect the two moments of the ‘discorso definitorio’, the question (ἦν) and the acquired conclusion (ἔστι). I would rather have expected καί in his interpretation than ἤ. In the end, I am not convinced by Brancacci’s somewhat artificial reconstruction. It is strange to refer to ‘what something was asked’ (ἐρωτηθέν) by ‘what was’, τί ἦν. Reading Antisthenes’ definition of logos (λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν) nobody can be assumed to be able to understand that ‘what was’ is meant to refer to the starting-point of an argument. I believe that what we have in Antisthenes’ discussion of polytropos is a more natural standard example of his method of clarifying (δηλῶν) a name by means of a thorough historical investigation.

30 As Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 129 = Antisthène, 113) believes. 31 Brancacci, Oikeios logos, 216, n. 37 = Antisthène, 187, n. 38.

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An interim assessment: Antisthenes contra Plato?

To summarize: it may be stated that logos is an argument that elucidates or teaches something. This is a quite different interpretation from Aristotle’s, who considers logos exclusively to be a ‘definition’, or Plato’s, who thinks that it concerns a definition in the form of an onoma. The oikeios logos as a term seems warranted by its presence in Aristotle,32 and tentatively in Plato,33 but its contents must be disconnected from their considerations. In the previous discussion I hope to have sufficiently established that every thing has its own linguistic and historic story, which is more than a definition or a statement.34 There is a serious possibility that Antisthenes refused to go along with Plato’s presentation that there is nothing else to say about a thing than a name (Aristotle, too, transmits this view in his own manner by stating that the Antistheneans could not say anything about ‘das Ding an sich’, especially about what according to Aristotle is its form). Then it is likely that Antisthenes resisted Plato’s malicious narrowing-down of Antisthenes’ alleged point of view in the Theaetetus,35 because Plato argued there that according to the theory involved one cannot do something with a subject, neither being nor not-being, nor this nor that etc., except give it a name. In that case one is silenced, because nothing can be predicated except a name – no other predicate can be given. How then would it be possible to form an argument? There is nothing to tell, only a name. If Antisthenes believed himself to be a victim, perhaps the main victim, of Plato’s presentation of the issue, and in danger of being silenced, then no doubt he felt aggrieved. This would be suggested by the fact that Antisthenes adorned a reply, his work on names, by supplementing the title On the Use of Names, with a contest (eristikos).36 If this is a fair presentation of the historical context, then 32 For Aristotle, see p. 31 n. 9 above. 33 If indeed the expression oikeios logos in Plato is a reference to Antisthenes. See the text of Theaetetus 201D8-202C6 (oikeion […] logon 202A6-7) quoted above (see p. 38 n. 28). 34 We shall come back to his method below, pp. 85-95. 35 See pp. 38-39 above. 36 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.38; D.C. 1.38). It is certain that Antisthenes supplied his works with titles, in any case some of his works such as Sathōn, Desias and Isographēs (see pp. 23-24 above). Possibly some works received subtitles during later times. It cannot be ruled out that a librarian of the library of Alexandria added the word eristikos; yet such a characterization has its value, because the original compiler of the list in Diogenes Laertius (6.15-18), who could have been a Hellenistic scholar who put together an edition of Antisthenes’ works (see Patzer, Antisthenes, 126, 145), must have had some ground for employing this label, perhaps after reading the book, or parts of it, or adopting it from a source. There is a scholarly discussion concerning this word

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Antisthenes is attempting to show how an onoma is a basic starting-point for research, and that starting from a name one can construct extensive arguments. The fact that Antisthenes in a documented situation debated with Plato about contradiction (Sathōn!) supports the suggestion of debate with Plato in this case. It is possible that the logos formula originated in the same atmosphere of debate and perhaps we may ascribe it to the work Sathōn, because in that book there must have been a role for logos in the contradiction on ‘speaking being’. eristikos (see Giannantoni, Nota 25, IV, 249; Caizzi, 81). Some believe that it is intentionally degrading (‘intenzioni denigratorie’) or that it is using loci communes as a standard heading for debates. Such a degrading intention would be strange in a neutral bibliographical list as presented by Diogenes Laertius. Other titles also have subheadings, for example, erōtikos for On Procreation of Children or On Marriage, a Discourse on Love (erōtikos) (D.L. 6.15 [SSR VA 41.11; D.C. 1.11]). Because of its contents, marriage and the procreation of children, the subheading must be simply a neutral description. The characterizing subheading physiognōmikos similarly only describes the contents of On the Sophists, a Physiognomic Work (D.L. 6.15 [SSR VA 41.12; D.C. 1.12]), and oikonomikos the contents of On Victory, an Economic Work (D.L. 6.16 [SSR VA 41.24; D.C. 1.22]). If we were to follow the line of reasoning suggested hereby, the work would discuss eris, controversy or dispute, whatever that might be. But it is difficult to see what ‘the use of names’, a rather general title, has to do specifically with debate (eris). I presume that eristikos, in accordance with LSJ, means ‘eager for strife’, ‘involving a contest’ (cp. Plato, Lysis 211B8, where Menexenus is called eristikos, ‘eager for dispute’). In the title of the Euthydemus we also f ind (D.L. 3.59) the word eristikos, which presumably has an active meaning, ‘Euthydemus, the disputer.’ On this interpretation, the title of Antisthenes’ work could denote the refuting character of the work involved, in this case its connection with Plato’s degrading presentation of Antisthenes’ use of names. However, even if it is taken to mean ‘on dispute’, it could still also refer to Antisthenes’ bitterness aroused by Plato’s presentation of his point of view. Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 45 = Antisthène, 43) and Giannantoni (Nota 25, IV, 249) believe that the subtitle does not come from Antisthenes’ himself. In view of the issues just discussed this is plausible, but not certain because if the word has its active meaning Antisthenes could have written it himself wishing to emphasize his conflict with Plato. When a writer gives a title to his work, an exegetic supplement by a librarian seems out of order. Antisthenes wrote On the Sophists. The fact that it treats physiognomics is rather surprising. Small wonder then that an editor of a catalogue is eager to add this characteristic explaining the content of the work involved. The same goes for On Victory. At first glance, no one could expect this word to indicate economic issues, thus a supplementary characteristic is appropriate. Guthrie, incidentally, believes that Physiognomicus is the title of the work On the Sophists, Physiognomicus and On the Sophists the subtitle, but it is the other way round: physiognomicus is meant as an explanation like erōtikos (Guthrie III, 311, n. 3). There is another problem. Being a rather late work, could Antisthenes have read Plato’s Theaetetus? Its date is generally taken to be round 369/367 B.C. Antisthenes was born c. 455 B.C. and probably died c. 360 B.C. If he is reacting to Plato in his work On the Use of Names, a Contest, he would have been very old. There is a group of scholars who believe that an earlier version of the Theaetetus can be traced (Guthrie III, 311, n. 3). If they are right, Antisthenes’ reaction could be placed earlier as well. It is also possible that Antisthenes became acquainted with Plato’s criticism at an earlier stage through oral transmission, since contact must have been frequent.

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By taking a name as his starting-point, Antisthenes’ use of logos differs entirely from Plato’s. Plato started, in any case in his earlier works, with a definition, which is then methodically investigated via a series of corrected and adapted definitions, ending frequently in a fog of ignorance, the aporia. Such aporetic thinking is far from Antisthenes’ methods or his mental attitude. Logos is not a definition, but an argument. Antisthenes pursued certainty and decision: he was not the man to be in philosophical doubt. In this way, he can be seen as Plato’s counterpart.

6

Reconsideration of the issue of contradiction (Plato’s Euthydemus)

The kernel of Antisthenes’ argument on contradiction can be summarized as follows. Contradiction is a phenomenon whereby, if A says x, having launched a certain opinion or a thesis, B says non-x, where B believes he has brought up something convincing that refutes the opinion or thesis at issue. This is precisely the point that Antisthenes attacks. He presents two possible situations. In the first case, the contesting or contradicting speaker is mad or stupid and one simply has to teach him that it is better not to contradict. If one is able to make clear to him that he is mistaken, this person is aided or cured and there is no longer any contradiction. In the second situation, both debaters say ‘being’ and so the truth, in which case there is no longer any contradiction either. Plato’s formulation, or misformulation, of this remarkable thesis of Antisthenes, is (as the anecdote has it) that ‘to contradict (antilegein) is impossible’ or ‘contradiction does not exist’, and if so, it is also impossible to speak about it. Antisthenes answered him in three books: Sathōn or On Contradiction.37 Burnyeat suggests that Antisthenes’ Sathōn was written as a reply to Plato’s Euthydemus, and while this idea is as such not impossible,38 there is in the Euthydemus, as far as I can see, nothing to provoke the rudeness of Antisthenes’ reaction (Sathōn), whereas the anecdote presents a humiliation that more directly explains the obscenity of the title of Antisthenes’ reply.

37 D.L. 3.35 (SSR 148; D.C. 36); cp. pp. 34-35 n. 16. 38 Burnyeat, ‘The Material and Sources’, 110.

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Plato tackles the problem of contradiction in a more serious way39 in the Euthydemus by positing three options:40 1 Both say the appropriate logos (then there is no contradiction). 2 Neither says an appropriate logos (then there is no contradiction). 3 A says the appropriate logos, but B does not (then there is no contradiction). This argument is ascribed to Protagoras and more ancient thinkers (Euthydemus 286C2-3). We can observe the following if we compare Plato’s presentation of the problem with what we have discovered about Antisthenes. Point 1 states that there is but one appropriate logos, while Antisthenes held that in the case of the so-called contradiction there are two logoi: if both speak the truth in terms of being, then there is no need for a contradiction. The notion oikeios logos posits a problem now, because if there is only one oikeios logos, one-to-one (as Aristotle has it), there cannot be two logoi. Nonetheless, this is Antisthenes’ view. In his eyes, it is important that there is no need to call it a contradiction when we are dealing with two logoi that can be both true, since they both say something regarding ‘being’ without excluding each another. In this case there is no stupidity or untruth. Presumably both situations (stupidity and the lack of necessity for calling something a contradiction) were subjects in Antisthenes’ work Sathōn or On Contradiction (three books!). Points 2 and 3 are not interesting for Antisthenes.

7

‘To speak falsely’ (ψεύδεσθαι)

In the same vein as contradiction we meet the problem ‘to speak falsely’ (ψεύδεσθαι), which should, just like the exclusion of contradiction, be impossible or nearly impossible. 41 According to Plato’s Euthydemus (284B3-C6), the untrue or false logos is connected with not-being; speaking about 39 Plato’s somewhat teasing thesis: ‘then you cannot speak about it [sc. contradiction]’ (see n. 37 above), bears resemblance to a sophism or a sophistic conclusion (see p. 47 above). 40 Plato, Euthd. 286A4-B6. 41 According to Guthrie (III, 209) Antisthenes adheres to the thesis that it is impossible to contradict or to speak falsely. But Aristotle does not say ‘or’, but ‘and’. The word ‘almost’ (omitted by Guthrie) is placed with to speak falsely, not with to contradict, which allows us to assume that to speak falsely has its own status. The two are discussed together and if we may rightly follow Aristotle (of which we can never be sure) then it should have a position in its own right; but see my discussion.

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not-being is impossible; consequently, nobody speaks what is not true. Guthrie believes that Antisthenes also had something like this argument in mind. 42 However, it is unlikely that Antisthenes was accustomed to employing this type of reasoning, because when it comes to contradiction, his point of departure is not ‘not-being’, but ‘being’. While it cannot be denied that there is indeed some correspondence with the passage from the Euthydemus, which also speaks about ‘being’ in connection with this ‘speaking the truth’ (saying being is speaking the truth),43 this is in harmony with Antisthenes’ dictum that a logos speaks being and thus the truth. But the Euthydemus says: ‘nobody speaks the non-being things, consequently Dionysodorus speaks the truth’. However, Antisthenes supposes that there is in fact no untruth, because both logoi speak being, i.e. the truth. The suggestion that non-being plays a part, which as such could be possible, is nowhere to be found in Antisthenes. 44 Moreover, there is also the difference that the Euthydemus has only one logos in mind, viz. the one of Dionysodorus, whereas Antisthenes holds that two logoi are true. It is remarkable that in Aristotle the issue of speaking falsely occurs only once; if he had not mentioned it or connected it with the issue of contradiction in Antisthenes, we would know nothing at all of his notion ‘to speak falsely’. Provided that Aristotle’s connection here is justified, we can develop the following consideration: the connection between both the exclusion of contradiction and to speak falsely must refer to the same method of arguing. This explains why Aristotle presented them together. First, we can suggest a solution based on the concept that ‘speaking being’ is speaking the truth. Then we must assume that in the end the person whom other people believe to be speaking falsely, in fact talks about being, as does the one who ‘contradicts’. When I say a logos about something then I say something that is being and therefore true. If I say something true, I cannot be lying at the same time. Unfortunately this suggestion based on the connection between contradiction and speaking falsely is only likely, but we have no other evidence. I started from the Antisthenean fragment, which declares that every logos is true. Aristotle, however, took a different perspective – he started from the notion of oikeios logos, one-to-one. I shall try to imagine what 42 Guthrie III, 218. 43 Plato, Euthd. 284A5-8: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε τὸ ὂν λέγων καὶ τὰ ὄντα τἀληθῆ λέγει ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τἀληθῆ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ ψεύδεται. 44 Antisthenes could have thought that there is no non-being, so the logoi cannot speak but of being, i.e. the truth.

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he had in mind. If there is only one oikeios logos of a thing, all other logoi refer to other things and have nothing to do with the first thing; thus, one cannot contradict because there is only one own logos, and other logoi are impossible in reference to the subject, they do not contradict. In this case, it is impossible to speak untruth because then you would be speaking about some other thing when you say something different from a thing’s own logos which is at issue. Thus you cannot ‘speak falsely’. We have here an entirely different approach from the fragment about ‘speaking being’: in this fragment, in Antisthenes’ own words, he says that one cannot contradict because every logos is true since every logos speaks being. This implies that you cannot ‘speak falsely’ as we have already pointed out.

8

‘Nearly’ (σχεδόν)

We must emphasize again that according to Aristotle’s interpretation it is ‘nearly’ (σχεδόν) impossible to speak falsely. 45 It would then seem permissible to say that in some cases one does indeed speak falsely. This is in line with the possibility that some contradictions do exist. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that Antisthenes had no concept of speaking falsely. Aristotle would then be responsible for the extension, as Caizzi believes. 46 In fact the word ‘nearly’ raises suspicions. Antisthenes is not the man to express himself with such fussiness or in lofty qualifications. It is of no use to state that speaking falsely is nearly non-existent when one wishes to attract attention because it detracts from the power of the utterance. Moreover, ‘to contradict’ (antilegein) is accompanied by no such mitigation.47 Such considerations make σχεδόν (‘nearly’) suspect or in any case difficult to interpret. Caizzi believes that σχεδόν reflects Aristotle’s introduction of his own consequence or his deduction. Brancacci48 rejects the idea that we have here the introduction of a consequence by Aristotle himself, and points to Isocrates’ Helena 1, where we have a reference to those (a group or Antisthenes specifically?) who deny that it is possible ‘to speak falsely’ and to contradict, 49 which Brancacci rightly believes refers to Antisthenes, 45 See above p. 36 n. 22. 46 Caizzi, Antisthenes, 56, n. 12. She stresses the fact that the commentators in antiquity do not say anything about ‘to speak falsely’ in connection with the passus in Aristotle. 47 But see p. 35. 48 Brancacci, Oikeios logos, 255, n. 54 = Antisthène, 218, n. 54. 49 Cp. Brancacci, Oikeios logos, 240, n. 29 = Antisthène, 205, n. 29. Cp. pp. 34-35 n. 16.

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because ‘to speak falsely’ is mentioned in one breath with to contradict,50 and it is therefore ulikely that a change of person is intended. However, this is only circumstantial evidence. It is remarkable that in the collection of the titles of Antisthenes’ works notions such as dialegein and antilegein figure, but never ψεύδεσθαι, ‘to speak falsely’. There is a strong possibility that Caizzi is right in suggesting that σχεδόν is a suggestion made by Aristotle. Then we would have to connect it with ‘from which followed’ in the phrase ‘hence it was foolish of Antisthenes to insist that nothing can be described except by its proper definition: one-to-one, from which followed that to contradict does not exist and roughly [σχεδόν more or less] speaking that also to speak falsely does not exist (or is not possible)’.51 On this reading σχεδόν does not govern ‘to speak falsely’, but rather it connects ‘to speak falsely’ with ‘from which followed’. Thus, σχεδόν does not contain a mitigation of ‘to speak falsely’, which as we have already pointed out is a qualification not to be expected from the outspoken figure that Antisthenes is. Moreover, we have contextual evidence. It is understandable that Aristotle wished to add something about ψεύδεσθαι, because his entire argument concerned ‘to speak falsely’ (ψεύδεσθαι) or the notion ‘false’ (ψευδής / ψεῦδος). Nevertheless, it is still possible that Aristotle presented his own idea about what Antisthenes actually thought, but that Antisthenes himself formulated his thought otherwise, so that a marker of attention like σχεδόν was needed: ‘roughly speaking’. If Antisthenes did indeed give attention to speaking falsely, it was apparently not the focus of his interest because we find scarcely any trace of it. Isocrates mentions it in the first place in the Helena, prior to the exclusion of contradiction. But in the eyes of Isocrates, the rhetor and advocate, criticizing the concept of ‘to speak falsely’ must have been more important than criticizing the exclusion of the contradiction. Therefore, Isocrates’ priority of ‘to speak falsely’ has no decisive weight for its status in Antisthenes’ thought. In Helena 1, Isocrates connects ‘to speak falsely’ and ‘to contradict’ to ‘to say two opposed logoi about the same issues’, all three being impossible according to the adherents. Isocrates obviously starts from the idea of one logos belonging to a specific object, likely the oikeios logos, because 50 There is no ‘or’ in the Helena 1 (SSR VA 156; not in D.C.). Isocrates connected ‘to speak falsely’ and ‘to contradict’ because it is impossible ‘to say two opposed logoi about the same issue’. This last point is apparently a circumscription of Antisthenes’ view on contradiction and not in conflict with what Aristotle says about the oikeios logos. 51 Arist., Metaph. Δ 29, 1024b32-34; see p. 31 n. 9. Interestingly Isocrates in his Helena 1 (SSR VA 156; not in D.C.) explicitly says that ‘to speak falsely’ (connected with the other items) is not possible (οὐ φάσκοντες οἷόν τε εἶναι), not that it does not exist.

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another logos is impossible with regard to the same object. Thus, Isocrates seems to have thought along the lines of Aristotle, as we sketched it in the preceding paragraph.

9

Antisthenes’ teaching practice

There is still one subject that needs some discussion: Antisthenes’ teaching practice. Antisthenes is reputed to have been a somewhat rude Socrates. Indeed, the title of his book Sathōn is hardly the acme of refinement.52 He is reported to have had few pupils and to have treated them rather brusquely.53 When asked why he treated them so, he answered: ‘Physicians are just the same with their patients’ (there was much cauterization and cutting in ancient medicine).54 Nevertheless, there was demand for his teaching: Diogenes the Cynic, who was at first rejected as a pupil, did his utmost to be accepted and to follow his teaching.55 We also have an impression of the manner of learning. A lad from Pontus asked Antisthenes what he required to be able to attend his lectures. Antisthenes answered: ‘a new book, a new pen, and a new writing-tablet’, punning on ‘mind’ with the last phrase because the word kainou (new) can be taken as kai nou (and mind) (καινοῦ or καὶ νοῦ).56 So Antisthenes hints at the need for understanding on the part of the student. The fact that the youth had to get a new book, a new writing-tablet, and a new pen also suggests that Antisthenes considered his teaching to be fresh and unique, a new start for the pupil. A friend who complained that he had lost his notes received the answer ‘you should have them inscribed in your mind instead of on paper’.57 It is interesting to observe here something of the 52 D.L. 3.35 (SSR VA 148; D.C. 36); Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 147.1-3; D.C. 37A); Ath, 11.115, 507A (SSR VA 147.3-7; D.C. 37B); cp. Patzer, Antisthenes, 150. The problem remains of whether the title was given by Antisthenes himself. Both Herodicus and Diogenes Laertius refer to the work as Sathōn (see Patzer). Sathōn figured in this work in some way, either as title or as interlocutor or both. 53 D.L. 6.4 (SSR VA 169.1-2; D.C. 184). Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us about the Antistheneans. However, perhaps these were not pupils but later posthumous followers. 54 D.L. 6.4 (SSR VA 169.3-4; D.C. 185). 55 D.L. 6.21 (SSR VA 34 = VB 19.1-5; D.C. 138A). 56 D.L. 6.3 (SSR VA 171; D.C. 187): “βιβλαρίου καινοῦ καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ (or καὶ νοῦ)”. 57 D.L. 6.5 (SSR VA 168; D.C. 188). He uses the word hypomnēma (ὑπόμνημα), which means here ‘note’ or ‘entry’ or ‘memorandum’, as in the notes bankers make of the money they have lent out, not philosophical treatise as is so often used (see LSJ).

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ancient practice of following lectures that apparently did not differ much from the modern. With Antisthenes in any case the ancient pupil took notes of the lectures using some sort of pen and material for inscription, just as students do nowadays. Despite his rudeness and the limited numbers of pupils (if this is true), Antisthenes was dedicated to his work as a teacher. It is recorded that he was so impressed by Socrates that he advised his own pupils to become fellow-pupils of the great oral teacher with him.58 The word ‘fellow-pupil’ (συμμαθητής) depicts a sincere and unselfish concern for his pupils; for instance, the master did not feel himself too grand to go along with his own pupils to another master whom he esteemed superior to himself. But after Socrates’ death, he resumed the thread of his teaching, apparently because he thought that there was no teacher better than he himself. This can be corroborated by the fact that there was a later group of pupils who are called the Antistheneans by Aristotle and who put forward a problem that is not ascribed to Antisthenes himself.59 Thus, they must be from a period after Antisthenes’ death. Finally, we must not forget that Antisthenes wrote several works on the process of teaching and learning, as we have seen, which testifies to his intense interest in this field.60 Moreover, his list of works as preserved in the library of Alexandria covers a wide range of subjects, of which, in having referred to the most remarkable, I have thus far omitted mention here of works with a more rhetorical slant. But we have titles of books on diverse subjects: several works on nature, including one on the nature of animals; a book on marriage and procreation;61 on physiognomy; a hortative work on justice and one on courage; also listed are books on the good; on law and state; on law and beauty; on being a free man or a slave; on belief; on the guardian or on obedience; and on victory (an economic work). Further works should be noted on politics and political figures; and we already 58 D.L. 6.2 (SSR VA 12.1-6; D.C. 128A). Diogenes Laertius tells us (6.1 = SSR VA 11.2-5; D.C. 7]) that at first Antisthenes followed the lectures of the rhetor Gorgias. This, he says, explains the elements of rhetorical style in some of his works. Once asked by a man whose teaching his son should follow, he answered: ‘If he wants to be able to live together with the gods, the teaching of a philosopher; but if with people, the teaching of a rhetor’ (Stob., Anth. 2.31.76 [SSR VA 173; D.C. 173], see p. 76 below). In the field of contradiction he seems to be more a follower of Protagoras, who was the first to launch the doctrine of the excluded contradiction; or see Guthrie (III, 182, n. 2). The story is doubted by Patzer (Antisthenes, 246-255), but I believe it can be saved for Antisthenes (see p. 166 below). 59 See pp. 39-41 above. 60 For instance, Problems about Learning. See p. 35 with n. 18 above. 61 See p. 116 below.

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introduced his books on contradiction; on debate; and on names. There are other works on life and death; on the inhabitants of the Hades; on music; on pleasure; on injustice and impiety. From this we see that his pupils would have been confronted with a wide range of subjects – small wonder that they wished to follow his lectures, despite the fact that Antisthenes was rather reluctant to admit them, as the case of Diogenes the Cynic shows.62 These works all testify to the tremendous extent of Antisthenes’ interests. We observe clearly that his contributions to philosophy must have been much richer than the bon mots which tradition has cherished and preserved. It is a pity that we have no more than fragments of these works because they would give us much insight into the intellectual level and interests of the time.

10

Appendix I: Guthrie’s systematic survey

Guthrie presents a systematic, comparative survey of the rhethoricians and philosophers in the days of Antisthenes regarding the subject of language and object (III, 218). But these conclusions cannot be accepted as far as Antisthenes is concerned. I shall here briefly summarize and question Guthrie’s points using what has been established in the previous discussion. 1

‘It is impossible to speak falsely, for that is to say what is not and what is not cannot be uttered.’ Protagoras and Antisthenes are introduced as exponents of this point of view. I cannot agree because this thesis is too strict. First, we do not know much about what role ‘to speak falsely’ played, if any, in Antisthenes. Second, we do not find any evidence that Antisthenes took non-being into account.

2 ‘As a corollary, no one has the right to contradict another.’ Guthrie mentions the same exponents of this rule; however, nowhere have I met the idea that one has no right to contradict, unless μὴ δεῖν is to be interpreted in this manner.63 Yet in Guthrie this interpretation is absent. In my view the issue is not the right, but rather the possibility to contradict, and in a way, even this possibility is present (viz. the ‘mad’ contradictor). 62 See p. 69 above and below p. 163. 63 See pp. 29-30 above.

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3 ‘Definition of the essence of a thing is impossible, for one can only list its elements and they themselves, not being subject to further analysis, are indefinable, and can only be ascribed analogically.’ Antisthenes and Lycophron are introduced as champions of this thesis. Several points of view are implied here. The impossibility of defining implies that the elements cannot be defined. However, we saw that it was not Antisthenes’ aim to give a definition, but to establish a name as the basis of research and at best something like an analogy, with the proviso that this analogy is understood to have figured in Antisthenes’ work and not exclusively with his followers, the Antistheneans. 4 ‘To every object belongs one and only one proper logos, which tells in its naming the elements of which it is composed. If any of them do not apply to the object, there is no logos (Antisthenes).’ Indeed, there exists only one proper logos of an object; it belongs to this object, but not to its elements. This latter feature has to do with the extended or enumerative object. It is far from certain that Antisthenes himself had this kind of object in mind. 5 ‘Names have a natural affinity with their objects, which are known by direct contact of mind with object as in sense perception. A name which has no such affinity is not wrong, but no name at all.’ Antisthenes is ranged among the adherents of this theory. Nowhere, however, have I found anything like the natural affinity of the object with a name in what remains of Antisthenes’ works. A name emerges from the past or the present, which is the main feature of an onoma. Guthrie speculates starting from some views on nominalism, but in the end rejects this, rightly so, I believe (III, 214, 215). Nevertheless, he talks of affinity of name and object. Unfortunately, there is no trace of this idea in the data that are transmitted by the tradition.

Part II Antisthenes’ views on theology: His theoretical approach to the study of Homer

Chapter I 1

Theology

Antisthenes and monotheism: was Antisthenes the first monotheist?

It will appear that what we have found out about Antisthenes’ provocative attitude and methods returns, not only in his views on theology, but also in the field of Homeric research. Theology and Homeric research are strongly connected. Antisthenes’ views on theology contain a form of monotheism, but as it turns out this is not sharply distinguished from polytheism. Antisthenes’ understanding of the opposition between daily practice or custom (nomos) and nature (physis), which he borrowed from the Sophists, led him to a monistic concept of the godhead. This is expressed in the work On Nature (Περὶ φύσεως, α´ β´):1 ‘According to daily practice (nomos),2 there are many gods; according to nature (physis), only one’; or as Cicero puts it: ‘there are many popular gods, but one natural god’.3 Antisthenes is 1 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.44; D.C. 1.44). 2 The word nomos is difficult for it can mean ‘law’ but also ‘custom’ or ‘traditional practice’. There is a work in Diogenes Laertius’ list that has the title On Nomos or Constitution (D.L. 6.16 [SSR VA 41.19; D.C. 1.18]); nomos in this case has to do with the administration of the state. If nomos in κατὰ νόμον has this meaning, it could refer to the gods venerated by the city. 3 Cic., N.D. 1.13.32 (SSR VA 180.1-3; D.C. 39B). In Cicero the work is called physicus, which can be identified with one of the two books On Nature (see Caizzi, 100); there is another quotation in Greek by Philodemus (see below in this note). Rackham in the LCL translation of De natura deorum renders physicus in a personal way as The Natural Philosopher, which as such is possible, but does not take into account the likely connection with the title in Diogenes Laertius, Περὶ φύσεως, α´ β´ (see n. 1 above). Cicero’s Latin text reads: ‘Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens’. Rankin (Antisthenes, 91) makes much of this ‘natural philosopher’, suggesting that he might have been an interlocutor and that the two books on nature took the form of a dialogue. In this case the physicus launched the opinion of the one god and Antisthenes endorsed this idea. In the background is Rankin’s attempt to connect Antisthenes’ monotheistic point of view with ‘Socratism’. Blank-Sangmeister renders naturalem by ‘wirklichen’ (Cicero, De natura deorum, 35), which neglects the notion ‘nature’ and so the opposition between nomos and physis. Moreover, this translation makes the other gods not real (not wirklich), as if there is only one really real god. But this exclusion of the gods is not in harmony with what Antisthenes says in other contexts. Philodemus, De pietate 7a.3-8 (SSR VA 179; D.C. 39A), who had the Greek version of the work, presents the text as follows: π]αρ᾿ Ἀντισθένει δ᾿ ἐν μὲν [τ]ῷ Φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεούς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕν[α. Here we clearly see that naturalis must be rendered by ‘according to nature’ (κατὰ δὲ φύσιν). In Aristid. 49.30-33 (SSR VA 197; D.C. 41), where an unknown god emerges, one god is mentioned who turns out to be Dionysus. In Clem. Alex., Strom. 2.20.107.2-3 (SSR VA 123.1-8; D.C. 109A) and Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53 (SSR VA 123.8-15; D.C. 109B) we have Aphrodite; the

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also reported to have said: ‘god does not resemble anyone, hence nobody can get knowledge of him from a statue’. 4 Already in Xenophanes one encounters verses that attempt to free the gods from anthropomorphic features; however, they refer to polytheistic gods and for Antisthenes it is about the one god.5 With his utterances Antisthenes became the first so-called monotheist without being aware of it and without being followed in this respect either. Monotheism was still an unknown phenomenon and certainly not understood in opposition to polytheism.6 Furthermore, it had no future in classical antiquity because the philosophers themselves gave the gods a place in their systems, or were able to rationalize their existence within these systems, even if they assumed that one god was the greatest.7 As Xenophanes says: ‘One god, the greatest among gods and among men as well, both in form and power of mind not equal to the mortals’.8 There was no need to abolish the gods or to replace them by one god in classical antiquity.9 Antisthenes had no need to do so either; in his conversations the gods emerge as usual. For example, we know that when asked by a man what education his son should get, he said: ‘If he wants to live together with the gods, he needs to become a philosopher; if he wishes to be with people, a rhetor’.10 There are only two fragments which have ‘god’ in the singular. But in one of these fragments it is not the henotheistic god of nature that is referred to;11 rather, a god is mentioned who recommends drinking water instead of wine if one wishes to be successful in achieving a goal. Astonishingly, this issue of what ‘Aphrodite’ means in this fragment is important, because possibly Antisthenes simply considered her to be the erotic drive (see my discussion below pp. 78-80). 4 Clem. Alex., Protr. 6.71.2 (SSR VA 181.1-3; D.C. 40B): θεὸν οὐδενὶ ἐοικέναι, φησίν. διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐκ εἰκόνος δύναται; cp. Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.14.108.4 (SSR VA 181.4-7; D.C. 40A); Eus., PE 13.13.35 (SSR VA 181.7; D.C. 40C); Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 1.75 (SSR VA 181.8-11; D.C. 40D). 5 Xenoph. 21B23-24, 1.135.1-7 DK: εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσι ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα. οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ᾿ ἀκούει; cp. 21B14-16. 6 Rankin (Antisthenes, 92) attempts to trace Antisthenes’ ‘monotheism’ back to previous Greek thought, especially the Eleatic philosophers. 7 It was the Sophists or Sophist-related intellectuals who had atheistic and agnostic thoughts (see Meijer, ‘Philosophers’, 228-232). 8 Xenoph. 21B23, 1.135.4-5 DK; see n. 5 above. 9 See Meijer, ‘Philosophers’, 224-227. 10 Stob., Anth. 2.31.76 (SSR VA 173; D.C.173): ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, “εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα”. 11 Aristid. 49.30-33 (SSR VA 197; D.C. 41): βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων ἔδοξα ἀναγιγνώσκειν, οὗ τὰ μὲν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον […] οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν […] (31) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου τοιάδε μάλιστα ἐνῆν. – ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινος τῶν ἀγονιστῶν λεγόμενα – “ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ῥεῦμα ἄρδην φερόμενον προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἴνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴ τι δεῖται νικῆσαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ σοί, ἔφη,

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god is presumed to be Dionysus because of certain symbols mentioned. Moreover, he is the most appropriate god for a book entitled On the Use of Wine. And there is not a single indication that one should not take this god seriously. In the other fragment with ‘god’ in the singular we meet Aphrodite.12 The meaning of Aphrodite in this fragment is important because, as we shall see, Antisthenes identified her with the erotic drive. If this is the hyponoia of the goddess Aphrodite, Antisthenes proves himself to be rather free in his concept of gods. One could take this as grounds for concluding that Antisthenes did not believe in the gods: if one god can be explained as simply a human drive, why not the other gods? Nevertheless, in other fragments (those already discussed and to be discussed) we have no trace of any allegorical interpretation of Aphrodite. There has been a heated debate between Tate and Höistadt as to whether any degree of allegorical interpretation is admissible in the works of Antisthenes; Höistadt is the champion of the allegorical approach to Antisthenes, whereas Tate denies any such approach (I shall return to this point).13 Ultimately, we must question whether the term monotheism will do for Antisthenes at all, or whether the other gods are assumed to be real in his philosophy as well and therefore both ‘monotheism’ and ‘polytheism’ are present in his thinking (later on we shall see that he took most of the popular gods seriously.)14 Perhaps we must ascribe his ‘monotheistic’ utterance to the form of his strong slogans, whereas more mitigated points of view also have a place in his thinking. There is another point to be made: we have to say that ‘henotheism’ is a better term than ‘monotheism’, because monos includes the notion of ‘being alone’ to the exclusion of others, whereas Antisthenes himself speaks about one god according to nature (κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἕν[α), which ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι”. ἐνταῦθα ἔλεγεν […] (33) καὶ τὸ βιβλίον αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀντισθένους περὶ χρήσεως· ἔφερεν δὲ εἰς οἶνον, καὶ Διονύσου προσῆν τινα σύμβολα. 12 Clem. Alex., Strom. 2.20.107.2-3 (SSR VA 123.1-8; D.C. 109A); Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53 (SSR VA 123.8-15; D.C. 109B). 13 See Tate, ‘Antisthenes Was Not an Allegorist’, 14-15, for a definition and explanation. ‘[D]id Antisthenes reduce the gods and heroes of Greek epic, and the objects associated with them, to personifications, types and symbols of moral or psychological factors?’ According to Tate, there is a current consensus that Antisthenes did not identify any of them with physical or moral elements, nor that by ‘Athena’ he meant not a goddess but reason. Yet Tate has forgotten that Antisthenes expressly said that erōs (often considered divine) is an illness of evil desire and that it is called a goddess (Aphrodite) by bad men. This is a veiled and indirect form of allegory that has no further consequences. Tate refers to and attempts to refute Höistadt, ‘Was Antisthenes an Allegorist?’ 14 See pp. 82-84 below.

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in his eyes obviously does not exclude the existence of the others. It is even possible that for Antisthenes there was no contradiction in his slogan regarding the existence of both the one god and the many gods; in this case his meaning was to put emphasis on the natural god and his position.15

2

Aphrodite’s case

What does Antisthenes actually say in fragment VA 123 = D.C. 109A?16 In fact, Antisthenes declares that if he could catch Aphrodite he would certainly shoot her down because she has corrupted many noble and beautiful women, and he calls erōs the badness of nature (κακίαν φύσεως). Subjected to this badness, bad men17 call the illness a goddess. What happens here is that Antisthenes identifies a goddess with an illness; thus, it would not be an offence if he killed her. The bold image of a hunter killing a goddess is typical of Antisthenes’ provocative manner and exactly fits what we already know about his rudeness. Does his interpretation of Aphrodite mean that he has suddenly turned out to be a full-blown allegorist? I do not think so. What he in fact does is to argue that some bad men call the illness of bad desire, erōs, a goddess, obviously to save themselves from blame if they seduce a noble woman or to make the seduction easier. Some less intellectual types or more stupid people may have no knowledge of a pleasure to which they should not incline, considering especially in this case that it is said to be a goddess and a desire given by the divine for procreation. Antisthenes reduces Aphrodite to a human desire under a false, divine name, which is a form of indirect or veiled allegory because the bad men first did the work of elevating the sexual urge to goddess stature, whereas Antisthenes does

15 See Phld., De pietate 7a.3-8 (SSR VA 179; D.C. 39A) in n. 3. If nomos in κατὰ νόμον refers to the gods venerated by the city, it does not necessarily have a negative meaning, which would affect the existence of these gods, rather the opposite. However, it is still possible that nomos must be intrepreted as ‘in conformity with daily practice’. Even so, it could be that the existence of the traditional gods is still not at stake. 16 Clem. Alex., Strom. 2.20.107.2-3 (SSR VA 123.1-8; D.C. 109A): ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀντισθένη, “τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, λέγοντα, κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς καὶ ἀγαθὰς γυναῖκας διέφθειρεν”. τόν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως· ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν. δείκνυται γὰρ διὰ τούτων ἡττᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν ἡδονῆς, ἣν οὐ χρὴ προσίεσθαι, κἂν θεὸς λέγηται, τουτέστι κἂν θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρείαν δεδομένη τυγχάνῃ. 17 He uses the word kakodaimones (κακοδαίμων), which is very appropiately used in a context of gods (daimones means also evil gods): ‘possessed by an evil genius’ (LSJ).

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nothing more than detect and see through their scheme.18 This is the only place, as we can see, where a specific form of allegory plays a (modest) part in Antisthenes’ work. Antisthenes recognizes that desire for procreation is given by god (θεόθεν), but he refuses to call this lust itself a god. I do not think that we have here more than a criticism of some (or perhaps of most) people’s ideas about sexual desire. Thus, we are not confronted with an attack on religion itself, but at best with an attack on certain opinions adopted because of ignorance. Is Aphrodite’s existence at stake? It is not impossible in spite of his rude utterance that he still has a good type of Aphrodite in mind. Even if this is not so, he does not reject the entire Greek pantheon, as we have already seen. Nevertheless, we must take note of some remarkable utterances. Erōs is a ‘badness of nature’ (τόν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως). This is a daring statement because in the important ‘henotheistic’ fragment19 god is linked with nature, which following this statement could make god responsible for badness. However, Antisthenes speaks of the badness belonging to nature and discourses on the pleasure of sex. In his eyes this pleasure is bad and should not be pursued, even if it is called a god and even if it is given by god to preserve mankind. It is doubtful that the word ‘nature’ here is to be identified with the henotheistic god because the badness is rooted in the nature of sexual desire, and it is this nature that is at stake (although the identification is still possible). Desire for sex turns out to be a ‘natural’ form of badness. In any event, god is responsible for the naturally occurring desire for procreation, as Antisthenes points out.20 Thus, god uses a bad instrument to achieve a good result. Is this god Aphrodite? I do not think so. Although ‘given by god’ (θεόθεν) is a rather vague term, one should think of a divine power which could be a general, undefined divine power, but perhaps also the henotheistic god. If this is the case this datum is important because it indicates what Antisthenes ascribes to the one god, or to a god, the structure of a human drive. It is interesting to note that when Antisthenes says he will hunt Aphrodite, he is making a reference to a scene in Homer’s Iliad. Antisthenes is playing on Diomedes’ attack on Aphrodite in Iliad 5, 330-351; however, he goes beyond Homer because he will not only wound the hand of the goddess, 18 There is some hyponoia at stake, a deeper meaning: Aphrodite veils a mental illness. The signification of the name ‘Aphrodite’ does not play any role (see p. 77 above on allegory; for hyponoia see pp. 156-158 below). 19 See n. 3 above. 20 On marriage and procreation, see p. 115 below.

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like Diomedes did, but he will even shoot her down. In addition, Diomedes accuses Aphrodite of the seduction of feeble women (γυναῖκας ἀνάλκιδας Il. 5, 349), but Antisthenes transposes this by saying that she corrupted our noble and beautiful women. All Antisthenes’ attitude implies is a correction of the existing religion because Aphrodite would be ‘shot down’, and perhaps even ‘eliminated’. This correction could have had an important impact because it shows a way of replacing a mythological god with the influence of the ‘henotheistic’ god or a divine power in general. It can be seen as a kind of inverted euhemerism, which, instead of promoting heroes to be gods, demotes or dethrones gods. Antisthenes also recognizes that this goddess is an invention of stupid, evil-minded people who have elevated a bad desire to divine status. The whole argument is provocative and entirely in line with Antisthenes’ defiant manner of thinking. Yet it is also entirely in line with Antisthenes’ method to show the other side too, that there is a less negative concept of erōs, which seems to deviate from what we have just described, in the description of the wise man’s marriage. The wise man will marry only for the sake of the procreation of children and will choose the best wife for this purpose. He will grow to love them. He only knows whom he must love.21 In the case of the wise man, erōs seems acceptable and the term ‘love’ emerges in a positive manner; Antisthenes seems to have forgotten the badness of nature in this specific case. Thus, he adheres to his style of double thinking. The provocative accent here is on the idea that love is not much more than a necessity for procreation. Moreover, his view of Aphrodite is rooted in his theory of pleasure, as we shall now see.

3

Pleasure as background to theological issues

In connection with his attack on Aphrodite, Antisthenes is reported to have uttered the characteristic statement ‘that it is better to be mad than to have pleasure’.22 He also advised others never to stretch out a finger for pleasure.23 The latter statement is given as background for his opinion 21 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 58; D.C. 115). 22 Eus., PE 15.13.7 (SSR VA 122.12-16; D.C. 108E) ὃς ἔφη τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἶναι and its complement (Gell. 9.5.3 [SSR VA 122.1-3; D.C. 108C]) μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην and Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53 [SSR VA 123.8-15; D.C.109B]). 23 Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 12.47 (SSR VA 122.16-17; D.C. 108F): μηδὲ δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναί ποτε ἕνεκα ἡδονῆς.

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on the negative role of Aphrodite; 24 thus, his theory on pleasure is the dominant one and encompasses his theory on love. This is a strong opinion. There is still another remarkable fragment that also delivers a strong message: ‘Pleasures which do not enter through the door, do not go out through the door, but must be made to collapse or be lessened by hellebore, or in any case weakened by a frugal diet’.25 In view of the verbs employed (σχασθῆναι, ἐλλεβορισθῆναι, λιμαγχονοθῆναι), it is clear that bodily pleasures caused by eating, drinking, and sex are meant.26 In other Greek texts27 we find that the ‘doors’ involved are the ears and the eyes, the entry points for pleasures, whereas Antisthenes is speaking about pleasures that do not go through these entrances, but arise inside the body. The fragment adds: ‘Because for already existing insatiate desire they offer a poor return in favour of little and short-lived pleasure’. The little, short-lived pleasures are the feelings of satisfaction that accompany bodily functions.28 Does this utterance and the fragment that it is better to be mad than to have pleasure contain the unambiguous rejection of pleasure? Or is it only Antisthenes’ usual rude manner of speaking and is there more to be said on the issue of pleasure? There can be no doubt about the authenticity of the adage ‘that it is better to be mad than to have pleasure’, because its rudeness is quite in character and warrants its authenticity; the same can be said for the fragment on bodily pleasures. However, we know that Antisthenes devoted an entire work to pleasure (Περὶ ἡδονῆς, On Pleasure).29 It is not likely that his theory of pleasure was limited to the rude statements, for then he would have had little to say on 24 Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53 (SSR VA 123.8-15; D.C. 109B). 25 Stob., Anth. 3.18.26 (SSR VA 124.3-6; D.C. 112B). Rankin (Antisthenes, 131) omits the word ‘not’ and speaks of pleasures that come in at the door, whereas they certainly do not come through the door, that is from outside. Because they do not leave through the door either, but remain within, they must be treated and lessened in order to get free of them. 26 There is also a shorter version in Stob., Anth. 3.6.43 (SSR VA 124.1-3; D.C. 112A). Both derive from Stobaeus. I believe that D.C. 112B (SSR VA 124.3-6) is the best version, because it uses stronger and unusual terms, which fits with Antisthenes’ mode of speech. For example, hellebore (ἐλλεβορισθῆναι) is used by the Greeks against madness or for epileptic attacks (see LSJ). It may be implied that sexual orgasm is a form of madness, just as τμηθῆναι in D.C. 112A (SSR VA 124.1-3) could also be connected with sexuality if it refers to emasculation. Λιμαγχονοθῆναι can be linked with lessening (ἄγχω often squeezing of the throat) or hunger (λιμός) on account of a frugal diet (see LSJ). 27 See Joël, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates II, 345. 28 Because of the terminology of the fragments I do not approve of Rankin’s ‘spontaneous, impulsive pleasures’, which are too vague (Rankin, Antisthenes, 131) and, more importantly, not related to bodily functions. 29 D.L. 6.17 (SSR 41.55; D.C. 1.55).

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this interesting subject and his book would have been ridiculously short. As it happens, there are also statements which are less hostile to pleasure,30 for example, ‘one must pursue pleasures after efforts, not pleasure before efforts’.31 This statement seems to accept pleasure, albeit conditionally – first effort, then pleasure. This maxim is likely to be part of Antisthenes’ views because it can be reconciled with the admonition not to stretch out a finger for pleasure, particularly if we suggest the following solution. Pleasure for its own sake is still to be rejected, perhaps it is even an evil,32 but as a concomitant phenomenon in certain conditions it is acceptable. According to Athenaeus, with the addition of the idea that it is not to be regretted, Antisthenes would even have said that pleasure is good.33 This may indicate the trace of a theory of personal reflection: one must not regret pleasure; that is to say that after the feeling of pleasure there must not be any damage or disadvantage whatsoever. In connection with this partial approval of pleasure we must bear in mind that Antisthenes did not reject the pleasures of wine unless one was attempting to achieve a goal.34 We are now able to make a rather coherent whole of the scattered statements which are not irreconcilable if the intention and the typical approach of Antisthenes is taken into account. We observe again that Antisthenes has mitigated or ‘forgotten’ his strong statements in favour of more realistic utterances – as the statement about ‘no contradiction’ was balanced by that statement that one has to teach the stupid contradictor.35

4

Antisthenes and the popular gods

Returning now to the issue of how far Antisthenes’ theological criticism extends, we must note that in fragment SSR VA 197 = D.C. 4136 he seems quite traditional: the relevant god, Dionysus, is introduced as arguing 30 Caizzi believes that Antisthenes’ thoughts on pleasure are not easy to reconstruct (116). But, I believe, one has to try because the mitigated utterances are undeniably Antisthenean and in line with his philosophical two-sided method: strong utterances next to mitigated ones. 31 Stob., Anth. 3.29.65 (SSR VA 126; D.C. 113): ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων. 32 D.L. 9.101 (SSR VA 117.3-5; D.C. 111C): ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾿ οὗ μὲν δοξάζεται ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ ἡδονὴ ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου· ὑϕ’ οὗ δὲ κακόν, ὑπ᾿ Ἀντισθένους. 33 Ath. 12.6, 513A (SSR VA 127; D.C. 110): Ἀντισθένης δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκεν τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον. 34 See pp. 99-102. 35 See p. 33. 36 Aristid. 49.30-33 (SSR VA 197; D.C. 41); see n. 11 above.

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and observing (συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν). Caizzi believes that Antisthenes rejected the cult of the popular gods, which she thinks is implicit in the henotheistic fragment: ‘E’implicito, nel fr. 39,37 il rifiuto dei culti populari’.38 She also adduces a fragment, in which Antisthenes is reported to have said, when beggars of Cybele asked something from him: ‘I do not keep or feed the mother of the gods whom the gods keep’.39 But it is the followers of a goddess that he is castigating; this does not indicate any form of unbelief. Rather, it is simply another bon mot that is rather brusque and therefore most satisfactory to Antisthenes. We also possess evidence that underlines a serious attitude to cults. There is a fragment in which Antisthenes recommends people who wish to be immortal to live ‘piously and with justice’. The word ‘piously’ (εὐσεβῶς) implies the fulfilment of one’s cultic duties with respect to the gods. 40 This speaks against Caizzi’s suggestion that Antisthenes rejected the cult of the popular gods. In any event, it is clear that Antisthenes did not reject the popular gods themselves. 41 The wine fragment takes Dionysus seriously, 42 as does Antisthenes’ interpretation of the gods Zeus, Poseidon, and Apollo in his discussion of the Cyclopes. 43 In another fragment, Antisthenes reveals his belief that Odysseus could not have recognized the false promises of Calypso without the intervention of Zeus (οὐκ […] δίχα Διός). 44 I believe that with Antisthenes we are confronted with a form of religious belief similar to that of Xenophanes: in one god the greatest among the others, polytheism or monotheism being outside the power of their imagination. In fact, Antisthenes’ slogan repeats mutatis mutandis what Xenophanes had already said and does not open a new way. Presumably, therefore it could not have had the force of surprise for the ancient reader that it has for the, unprepared, modern reader. At best, Antisthenes 37 D.C. 39A = SSR VA 179; see n. 3 above. 38 Caizzi, 100. Also Rankin (Antisthenes, 99) ‘Antisthenes does seem to imply that there are no grounds for believing in the existence of the other gods’. 39 Clem. Alex., Protr. 7.75.3 (SSR VA 182; D.C. 161); see Caizzi, 125, where Caizzi compares the story in D.L. 6.45 about Diogenes who says of the officials of a temple who were leading away a person who had stolen a bowl: ‘The great thieves are leading away the little thief’. 40 D.L. 6.5 (SSR 176; D.C. 75). He wrote a work On Injustice and Impiety (D.L. 6.17 [SSR VA 41.52; D.C. 1.52]), which implies that he must have promoted piety, as well as justice, which supports the idea that he took this virtue seriously. 41 See also Giannantoni, Nota 25, IV, 253. 42 Aristid. 49.30-33 (SSR VA 197; D.C. 41); see n. 11 above. 43 Porph., Ad Od. ι 106 (SSR VA 189.7-10; D.C. 53). See pp. 97-99 below. 44 Porph., Ad Od. η 257 (SSR VA 188.39-42; D.C. 52B).

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was a ‘henotheist’, which explains the rather small impact this had on ancient philosophy. It is interesting to note that many Christian thinkers especially, who were looking for support for their notion of one God, the Creator, 45 quoted and discussed Antisthenes’ views, whereas we have only two rather superficial quotations of non-Christian authors, Philodemus and Cicero. 46

45 The notion of the divine as a creator hardly functions in Greek philosophy. 46 Phld., De pietate 7a.3-8 (SSR VA 179; D.C. 39A); Cic., N.D. 1.13.32 (SSR VA 180.1-3; D.C. 39B); Min. Fel., Oct. 19.7 (SSR VA 180.3-6; D.C. 39C); Lact., Inst. 1.5.18 (SSR VA 180.6-8; D.C. 39D); Lact., De ira Dei 11.14 (SSR 180.8-10; D.C. 39E); Clem. Alex., Protr. 6.71.2 (SSR VA 181.1-3; D.C. 40B); Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.14.108.4 (SSR VA 181.4-7; D.C. 40A); Eus., PE 13.13.35 (SSR VA 181.7; D.C. 40C): Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 1.75 (SSR VA 181.8-11; D.C. 40D). In Philodemus we have only the slogan. In Cicero, Antisthenes receives only one, critical, observation, ‘his view abolishing meaning and nature of the gods’ (tollit vim et naturam deorum). But Minucius speaks of popular gods (populares deos), the gods of the people, whereas Antisthenes speaks of many gods according to custom or law, which is not the same. The expression ‘according to custom or law’ is not necessarily negative, although perhaps the expression ‘popular gods’ has such an overtone. If so, it could be that Minucius saddles Antisthenes with an interpretation that he would have rejected.

Chapter II Antisthenes’ scientific approach to the study of Homer 1

Polytropos

Antisthenes’ view on the Homeric epithet polytropos, a word that played an important part in our discussion of the study of names, requires special attention.1 Antisthenes made Homer the subject of profound study, as we may deduce from many titles of his works.2 Homer was a favourite of tragedians and rhetors, many of whom did not approve of Odysseus’ behaviour.3 Antisthenes belonged to the group of Odysseus’ defenders. 4 The explication of Homer’s poems, he believed, could not be entrusted to rhapsodists, who do not really understand what they recite in performance.5 Odysseus’ behaviour is often condemned and Antisthenes implies as much, while seeking to protect him explicitly with reference to his Homeric epithet polytropos, ‘turning many ways’, ‘versatile’, ‘wily’, or ‘sly’. As Antisthenes says, this word ‘does no more praise than criticize Odysseus’. This statement is frequently explained by stating that, according to Antisthenes, Homer does not pass moral judgement in deploying polytropos.6 For the sake of clarity I shall divide the original rendering of the text on polytropos into three sections. 1

Section 17

Following Antisthenes’ thesis on the balanced meaning of polytropos (‘polytropos does no more praise than criticize Odysseus’), he states that 1 See pp. 54-56 above. 2 See pp. 97-104 below. 3 Buffière, Les mythes, 365-369. 4 According to Buffière, Antisthenes did much to defend Odysseus and influenced the Cynics who regarded Odysseus as an ideal of virtue (Les mythes, 372). 5 Xen., Symp. 3.5-6 (SSR VA 185; D.C. 61); Symp. 4.6 (SSR VA 186; D.C. 62). Apparently this is a favourite criticism ascribed to Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium (SSR VA 185; D.C. 61). It occurs also in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (4.2.10), but taking into account that it is ascribed to Antisthenes in the Symposium we may assume that it is a borrowing from Antisthenes. See Giannantoni, Nota 23, IV, 220. 6 Caizzi, 105. 7 Porph., Ad Od. α 1 (SSR VA 187.1-16; D.C. 51): 1) οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν φησιν Ἀντισθένης Ὅμηρον τὸν Ὀδυσσέα μᾶλλον ἢ ψέγειν λέγοντα αὐτὸν πολύτροπον. οὐκ οὖν τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα πολυτρόπους πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλ᾿ ἁπλοῦς καὶ γεννάδας, οὐδὲ τὸν Νέστορα, τὸν σοφόν, οὐ μὰ Δία δόλιον καὶ

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Homer does not grant this epithet polytropos to noble heroes such as Agamemnon and Ajax. This might suggest that polytropos ought to be interpreted negatively. Antisthenes calls these heroes ‘uncomplicated, noble persons’ (ἁπλοῦς καὶ γεννάδας); then he presents a sketch of Nestor’s character starting with this characteristic, the uncomplicated nature of his manners. Nestor,8 he says, was a wise person who mainly had to deal with Agamemnon (note the verb ‘to deal [with]’ (συνόντα) which will play an important role in Antisthenes’ argument). Nestor’s character was averse to using a ruse or cheating, and he had uncomplicated relations with Agamemnon and the other heroes. When he had good advice for the army, he gave it and did not hide it. Achilles’ character also avoided the use of a ruse or cheating; in fact, he disliked dissembling to such a degree that he considered ‘a person who says other things than he has in mind’ to be an enemy equal to death. The problem arises because polytropos is not applied to noble persons such as Agamemnon, Achilles, or Nestor, but is said of Odysseus. What does polytropos mean then? What does it say about a person? Furthermore, there is a scholarly question regarding this section: possibly some other author is responsible for the long introduction which culminates in the ascription of the fidelity to Achilles. The first sentence about the balance of the negative and positive side of polytropos is doubtless Antisthenes’ own point of view. As I see it, the introduction, too, is carefully constructed by Antisthenes. If it is another person’s point of view, his words have been reformulated in Antisthenes’ terms because these terms play a part in the solution (lysis, section 2), which is presented in his name. 2

Section 2 (lysis)9

In trying to resolve the polytropos problem, Antisthenes says the following: Was Odysseus called polytropos because he was bad? Or did not Homer |5 παλίμβολον τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ᾿ ἁπλῶς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι συνόντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι καὶ εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἶχε, συμβουλεύοντα καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόμενον. καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἀποδέχεσθαι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ὡς ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ὁμοίως τῷ θανάτῳ ἐκεῖνον, “ὅς χ᾿ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ” (Il. Ι 313). |10 λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης φησί· τί οὖν; ἆρά γε πονηρὸς ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, ὅτι πολύτροπος ἐρρέθη, καὶ μή, διότι σοφός, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσείρηκε; μήποτε οὖν τρόπος τὸ μέν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν; εὔτροπος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραμμένον, τρόποι δὲ λόγου αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις· καὶ χρῆται τῷ τρόπῳ |15 καὶ ἐπὶ φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ μελῶν ἐξαλλαγῆς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀηδόνος· “ἥ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν” (Od. τ 521). 8 Nestor belongs to the top three with Agamemnon and Ajax. 9 Porph., Ad Od. α 1 (SSR VA 187.17-29; D.C. 51): 2) εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοί εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν· ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ 〈ἀνθρώποις |20 συνεῖναι〉 ἀγαθοί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι

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rather call him so because he was wise? On the one hand, tropos (‘turn’) indicates character; for example, ‘well turning’ (eutropos) is he who has a character that is ‘turned to the good’. On the other hand, tropos indicates the use of language. There are many ways of using language; Homer 10 uses a varied approach – both a varied voice and a variety of melodies, ‘like a nightingale, who often varies his many-toned voice’ (Od. 19, 521). If the wise are good at debating and at expressing the same thought and the same subject in many ways, then they are entitled to be called polytropos (‘well turning’). Further, if the wise are good at ‘dealing with’ people, then Homer, in saying that Odysseus is polytropos, says that he is wise since he was able to ‘deal with’ people in many ways. So too it is told of Pythagoras that when asked to speak to children he did so in words suiting children; to women with appropriate words; to governors in a way suitable to governors; and to teenagers in the right words. It is the task of wisdom to find the correct manner (tropos) to approach everybody, and it is stupid to use a uniform (monotropos) linguistic approach with people who are on different levels. Such a thing as a varied approach also occurs in practising medicine, since therapy must fit the many different types of patients. 3

Section 311

Here Antisthenes states that the turn (tropos) is the instablity of the character, both versatile and changing in many ways. However, the variety of approach (polytropia) and its varied use in relation to various audiences becomes a sign of uniformity (monotropia) with each group. Only one approach is suitable for each group, which is why what suits only one group reduces the variety to one thing that is useful for one group. In this case, the τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς παῖδας ἀξιωθεὶς ποιήσασθαι λόγους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικούς, καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναιξὶν ἁρμοδίους, καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικούς, καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς· |25 τὸν γὰρ ἑκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν· ἀμαθίας δὲ εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνομοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι μονοτρόπῳ. ἔχειν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐν τῇ τῆς τέχνης κατορθώσει, ἠσκηκυίας τῆς θεραπείας τὸ πολύτροπον διὰ τὴν τῶν θεραπευομένων ποικίλην σύστασιν. 10 Brancacci (Oikeios logos, 56 = Antisthène, 52) takes Homer to be the subject of χρῆται τῷ τρόπῳ. 11 Porph., Ad Od. α 1 (SSR VA 187.29-35; D.C. 51): 3) τρόπος μὲν οὖν τὸ παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους, |30 τὸ πολυμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον. λόγου δὲ πολυτροπία καὶ χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου εἰς ποικίλας ἀκοὰς μονοτροπία γίνεται. ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἁρμόδιον ἑκάστῳ τὴν ποικιλίαν τοῦ λόγου εἰς ἓν συναγείρει τὸ ἑκάστῳ πρόσφορον. τὸ δ᾿ αὖ μονοειδὲς ἀνάρμοστον ὂν πρὸς ἀκοὰς διαφόρους πολύτροπον ποιεῖ τὸν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον ὡς |35 αὐτοῖς ἀπόβλητον λόγον.

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uniform, however, which is unsuitable with different groups of listeners, makes the (uniform) approach varied (polytropos) because this uniform approach is viewed by many as one that should be rejected.

2

Commentary on the sections

1

Strange section 3

At first glance section 3 opens strangely with the rather surprising 12 affirmation that tropos in a moral sense is something unstable that signifies much changeability and restlessness of character (τρόπος μὲν οὖν τὸ παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους, τὸ πολυμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον). But in the case of the poly-tropia of logos and varied use of logos, the versatility rather becomes the uniformity of a single-track (mono-tropia). The meaning of the introduction of tropos in section three is to illuminate a great difference, i.e. that in the case of a character’s morals tropos is varied, whereas tropos in poly-tropia, on the other hand, results in uniformity.13 The polytropia of logos suddenly turns out to be monotropia. The writer turns things around but still starts from his principle in section two,14 where the monotropic approach has been criticized as unsuitable and even a sign of stupidity because it does not take into account the variety of audiences. The only correct approach of an audience is a specific one, which, of course, has only one form and is therefore monotropic. The uniform approach, which neglects the variety of audiences, turns out actually to be polytropic, because this approach is applied to many audiences without variation. These audiences will not accept this approach as applicable to their case. To construe an example: if one addresses an audience of women as if they were men, these women will not feel that the subject concerns them at all and will reject this approach, which applies equally to men,

12 In fact this section elaborates the sentence in section two ‘it is stupid to use a uniform (monotropos) linguistic approach with people who are on different levels’. 13 τὸ πολυμετάβολον prepares πολυτροπία: great changeability of the character has its counterpart in multiformity of logos, but this form of logos actually turns out to be uniformity, whereas great changeability remains what it was. 14 Brancacci (Antisthène, 55, n. 34; cp. Oikeios logos, 59, n. 29) believes that section three is part of the lysis announced in section two. I do not agree, the solution to the problem of whether polytropos is meant in a negative sense with regard to Odysseus is reached at the end of section two where a positive meaning of polytropos is applied to the physician.

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children, and so on. We may therefore conclude that what originally was polytropia now actually turns out to be monotropia, and vice versa. This argument seems rather odd within the original framework of Antisthenes’ problem. The author clearly planned that Odysseus could be called polytropos in a positive sense, which was rather successfully presented in section two because of Odysseus’ social ability in dealing with various types of people. Monotropia was there linked to stupidity. Thus, it is strange that according to the argument of section three Odysseus’ approach turns out to be monotropic, because to address a specific audience is monotropic. Odysseus’ so-called ability, as implied by section three, consists rather of a series of specific monotropic approaches, although this conclusion is not drawn. The argumentation in favour of polytropos as a positive epithet of Odysseus meets its Waterloo in section two. Is section three perhaps from another hand? The whole fragment is transmitted by Porphyry who is sometimes suspected to have added the story about Pythagoras having a specific manner of address for different groups.15 This reference in Porphyry’s report corresponds with his own interest in Pythagoras, whose biography he produced and in which he mentions the specific approach to various audiences. Porphyry could have embedded the parenthesis about Pythagoras and taken thus could be the author of section three. There is another possibility: that Antisthenes wished to show off by presenting an example of his skill in the art of argumentation. This could have provoked him to undermine his own argument in section two by reversing what he says in section three. Such a demonstration of logical virtuosity is not rare, because as we know already Antisthenes was fond of logical controversies, as evidenced, for example, in the excluded contradiction. It suits Antisthenes to invert an interpretation: monotropia for polytropia, and vice versa. However, these suggestions, too, will turn out to miss the mark. As we shall see, there is another more plausible solution. 2

Antisthenes’ logical style

Even if section three was not written by Antisthenes but by someone who summarized his views, nevertheless the whole argument makes an interesting specimen of Antisthenes’ manner of reasoning. What Xenophon has Antisthenes say in his grand speech in the Symposium is a well-constructed

15 Caizzi, 107; Buff ière, Les mythes, 368, n. 9; and see especially Patzer, Antisthenes, 180. Pythagoras’ attitude to different audiences is mentioned in Vita Pythagorae 18.

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argument.16 However, perhaps it has more to do with Xenophon than Antisthenes. In analysing Antisthenes’ argument on polytropos, we are closer to how he himself tackled a problem, since what Porphyry presents is the only authentic surviving extended example of Antisthenes in his own words. This makes it a precious find among the other extant fragments, which are quotations of one-liners or outlines of his ideas. Following the line of the argument we can observe that the reasoning is aptly constructed. Ajax and Agamemnon, belonging to the category of heroes, do not deserve the epithet polytropos because their behaviour is simple and noble. Nestor represents a different category: the man who has to deal with Agamemnon and the other heroes (i.e. one homogeneous group). Nestor is provided with an ample character sketch in order to demonstrate the simplicity of his approach. When we judge his approach by a standard of monotropia (although disapproved of later on), then there is no problem: he has only one category of listeners, the heroic; so in his case polytropia has nothing to contribute and monotropia will do. Nestor’s character is emphatically called ‘not deceitful and versatile’ (μὰ Δία ‘by Zeus’),17 for Nestor had no need to deal with different categories of people, unlike Odysseus on his travels; remember Odysseus’ meetings with diverse groups such as the Phaeacians, nymphs, and the Cyclopes as well as his deceitful behaviour with Polyphemus (outis, ‘nobody’).18 Nestor’s simple approach is in tune with his uniform audience and could be called monotropic. Achilles’ straightforwardness is pictured with a quotation from Homer to stress his averseness to ambiguity: that he considered ‘a person who says other things than he has in mind’ as an enemy equally bad as death. This statement of sincerity is to be regarded as the climax of the reasoning because of the quotation of Homer and the testimony of the greatest hero, Achilles. Caizzi19 believes that section one can be traced back to the point of view of an interrogator in a dialogue, and Rostagni20 adduces good arguments to support this interpretation (e.g. the exclamation ma Dia). Unfortunately we can no longer point to this dialogue. In this connection it is important to note that Diogenes Laertius nowhere mentions a dialogue in his catalogue of works, nor is there evidence in the fragments on Homeric questions. These 16 Xen., Symp. 4.34-44 (SSR VA 82; D.C. 117.6-65). 17 A sign that it was originally a dialogue? See Brancacci, Oikeios logos, 46, especially n. 8 = Antisthène, 43-44 with n. 8. 18 We shall return to these meetings below pp. 97-99. 19 Caizzi, 105. 20 Brancacci, Oikeios logos, 46 = Anthisthène, 43-44. See Patzer, Antisthenes, 94, 95.

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are always about a specific subject presumably in a direct discussion.21 As far as we know there is no dialogue which discusses Homeric problems. And even if we have here a partner in a dialogue replying to a question or a statement, the style and structure of the discussion have a value of their own that provides important information about Antisthenes’ manner of arguing. Taking the tight construction into account, we are able to see here a specimen of Antisthenes’ own manner of arguing. Ultimately, I find the idea that we have a summary of a dialogue not convincing enough to exclude the possibility that this piece of prose was part of some form of non-dialogical argument. Furthermore, it could be the rhetorical slant of Antisthenes’ prose that is responsible for the resemblance to spoken language, since a rhetorical slant was part of his inheritance from Gorgias22 and is said to be characteristic of the latter’s dialogues, but it is possible that he elsewhere used a similar style to be convincing. 3

Argumentation in Section 2

After what he has presented in section one, Porphyry continues by presenting Antisthenes’ solution. We are now familiar with the problem: is the Homeric term polytropos praise or cricitism? Caizzi believes that, according to Antisthenes, Homer does not attribute a negative or positive value to this word, or rather that this dilemma does not contain a moral judgement, although Odysseus’ polytropia as a part of his sophia is a positive element.23 How are we to judge this verdict? We cannot deny that moral notions are introduced: tropos, ēthos, logos, and sophos24 make up the core of the argument and in different interrelations play leading roles. Tropos has a double function: it not only indicates character but also the use of words. Antisthenes even presents a definition of the word eutropos: he whose ēthos is turned to the good, embracing also the right employment of words. This is the pivotal point of the argument because it opens the possibility that the use of words is diverse and in the end is suitable for polytropos. Thus, logos, use of words, need not be uniform but can be multiform.

21 Cp. On the Use of Wine or On Intoxication or On the Cyclops p. 101 n. 16 below. 22 D.L. 6.1 (SSR VA 11.2-5; D.C. 7). 23 Caizzi, 105. 24 Sophos has been said of Nestor as a person with much prudence and understanding in situations. It is also used of persons who are good at debating (dialegesthai), being sophoi, who are capable of discussing the same thought in many ways. There is still another signification. Wise men are good at dealing with people (syneinai), and a sophos exercises all virtues.

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Again, at another turning point in the argument we have a quotation of Homer, namely the comparison with the nightingale with its multiform song and use of voice. Antisthenes obviously likes to use Homeric verses when it comes to the crunch (cp. the Achilles’ quotation), which is not strange in a discussion of a Homeric subject.25 Patzer26 regards this sentence on the tropos in Homer as peculiar and interfering with the development of the argument (‘dass die vorliegende Passage den Gedankengang formal und inhaltlich unterbricht’). I disagree. A few words on Homer’s use of tropos are called for, since this word is the core of the entire argument. I cannot deny that as such the contents have no role to play in the following argumentation, but as an end to the pericope its contents are most appropriate, especially because the verse emphasizes the word ‘tropos’ by its cognate trōpōsa (τρωπῶσα, turning), thus legitimating the quotation of Homer’s verse. Because of its stress on the multiplicity of the voices and melodies, the quotation is immediately linked to the notion that logoi have ‘many’ forms (plaseis), and it acts as the culmination of the section. The man with good character is represented by the wise who also have multiform methods and words to express the same thought. Here a preliminary part of the goal is reached. The wise are polytropos because of their multiform use of words, and in this sense polytropos has gained a positive valence. Now what is needed is to heighten the argument by organizing polytropos as a part of sophia, ‘wisdom’. The instrument is the verb syneinai, ‘to be together with people’.27 If the wise are good at dealing with people, then the job is finished: in the same way as the wise are good at dealing with people, so Homer affirms that Odysseus is good at dealing with people, because he is able to deal with people in many ways (pollois tropois). The comparison with Pythagoras’ manner of addressing different types of people follows as a parenthesis. This parenthesis is a useful complement, because it introduces different groups of people who each need to be addressed in the way most suited to them. The varied manner of addressing different groups is not directly given in syneinai, ‘to be together’. It has to 25 It should be noted that the same verse (Iliad 9, 313) is used by Plato in the Hippias Minor. Also, in the Hippias Minor 370A4-5, the previous verse is quoted (ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν), which Antisthenes gives in an interpretation: ‘death’ for the ‘gates of Hades’. The quotation, therefore, seems to belong to discussions of the subject since it figured earlier in the Hippias Minor and in a wider Homeric context (Hippias Minor 364E7-365D4). 26 Patzer, Antisthenes, 178. He considers the absence of the subject ‘Homer’ in the sentence (it has to be taken from προσείρηκε at l. 11) to be an argument for it being a fremdkörper. 27 Often used of pupils who frequent the lessons of a teacher. However, here it is used not of pupils but of people Odysseus meets in his travels.

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be made to contain manners of speech, because then the linguistic side of syneinai can be made use of. Now the possibility arrives of defining polytropos in a linguistic way just as monotropos will be. An important moment has been reached, the core thesis: it is the task of wisdom to find the correct manner (tropos) to approach everybody; it is ignorance to use a uniform (monotropos) linguistic approach with people who think on different levels. Now for the first time the term monotropos appears, the counterpart of polytropos. This term is associated with amathia, lack of knowledge or ignorance. For the last time polytropia is praised by means of a comparison with medical practice, which uses the individual therapies in accordance with the needs of individual patients. In the mean time, although the name Odysseus has disappeared from the stage, never to be mentioned again in either section two or in section three, he seems to be saved as a wise man, since polytropia is a part of sophia. Elsewhere Odysseus is crowned with the epithet ‘wise’, and as another fragment (SSR VA 192 = D.C. 56) states, wisdom as the pursuit of every virtue implies virtue itself.28 In the end we can establish that Odysseus is called polytropos in a favourable sense. This brings us back to the original position in section one, that the use of this word contains neither praise nor criticism. 4

Section 3 revisited

Perhaps we should translate more carefully and emphasize the words ‘no more’: polytropos ‘does no more praise than criticize Odysseus’.29 Obviously the word polytropos is supposed to contain both aspects and it is possible to interpret it either positively or negatively. This double sense Antisthenes ascribes to Homer’s use of language. However, we have learned to see that Antisthenes does his utmost to demonstrate that in Odysseus’ case, Homer uses this word in a positive sense. According to Anthisthenes’ lysis, Homer’s 28 Anonym. schol. lips. in Iliadem Ο 123 (ad 4, 35.24-26 Erbse). Buff ière (Les mythes, 368) believes that the word ‘wise’ indicates ‘Sophists’ which is acceptable because they were supposed to be dialecticians. 29 According to Patzer (Antisthenes, 171) the expression οὐ μᾶλλον […] ἤ ‘wird niemals im ausschliessenden Sinne von “weder [...] noch” gebraucht, sondern bedeutet, entsprechend dem lateinischem Ausdruck “non magis [...] quam”, soviel wie: nicht sowohl [...] als vielmehr’. This interpretation includes the notion that we have here not the thesis of Antisthenes, but the original starting-point that Homer is condemning Odysseus when applying the epithet polytropos. Indeed, what follows is a broad treatment of the problem that polytropos is not used of noble figures as Agamemnon, Nestor, or Achilles.

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praise of Odysseus is unmistakeable. The negative association with the word nonetheless remains, the possibility that the word criticizes the person who is labelled with this epithet. I presume that section three is meant to bring out the negative aspect of polytropos since the connotation of the word and its explanation are often negative.30 If this is the case, then section three is less odd than would at first be presumed, and the section strikingly ends with polytropos in the negative sense, returning to the beginning.31 In section three, polytropos is castigated when it means that the speaker addresses different audiences with the same linguistic approach. In that case, the speaker is no longer monotropic in the good sense, but his inept, uniform, monotropic address becomes polytropic, because it is used with different groups (just as a polytropic address can become monotropic when it is intended to address a specific audience). In this manner, monotropia, which was rejected in section two is rehabilitated, whereas polytropia, honoured in section two, is rejected when one and the same method of approach is ineptly used with different audiences, which in fact makes this approach polytropic and leads to rejection by these different audiences. By means of this reasoning the negative side of polytropos is brought forward and the original dilemma, polytropos as ‘no more criticism than praise,’ sufficiently elaborated. Both horns of the dilemma merit discussion, and in this case there is no inconsistency between section three and section two. Because he was able to attune his manner of dealing with people to particular audiences, Odysseus is called polytropos in section two without objection. Polytropos has been used favourably here (its negative side gets its due later in section three). If my interpretation is correct, then section three is not odd at all, but fully justified as an elaboration of the second horn of the original dilemma (criticism),32 and there is no need to postulate an intervention in the text. The most that could be claimed is that the reference to Pythagoras (which may be superfluous) be attributed to Porphyry as a parenthesis.33 However, it would be odd if someone added section three, where polytropia and monotropia curiously change places. Who would have 30 See Buffière, Les mythes, 365, 366. 31 If one follows Patzer’s rendering of οὐ μᾶλλον […] ἤ (see n. 29 above) section three cannot be explained as the second horn of the original dilemma. 32 In this way the negative explanation of polytropos in general in the literature is also sufficiently accounted for. 33 Earlier we demonstrated that this parenthesis is needed as an integral part of the reasoning (see p. 92 above). Patzer (Antisthenes, 180) considers it a learned aperçu of peripatetic origin put into the text by Porphyry. It is not an aperçu but rather a harmonious elaboration of the groups that are to be addressed.

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been interested in the addition of such an argument? It seems to undermine the argument of section two, yet it is connected with and even based on an important principle in that same section (i.e. the monotropic approach), which has been criticized in section two as unsuitable and even a sign of stupidity because it does not take into account the variety of audiences. Only Antisthenes himself could be interested in section three as the completion of the discussion of the original dilemma; only as a counter argument could such an addition as the explanation of the negative side of polytropos make sense. It is important to conclude that tropos, the basis of polytropos, also has two sides. In section two, it indicates ‘character’ or ‘use of speech’ and is made the basis of eutropos, ‘turned to the good’, whereas in section three tropos is connected with instability of character, its frequent changes and versatility. This remarkable double use is understandable in the light of the total reversal of section three with regard to the previous sections. Antisthenes must have been quite satisfied by this volte-face because he enjoyed turning interpretations around. Further on, we shall see further examples of this habit.34 The upshot of all these considerations is that we now have access to an entire elaborated argument from Antisthenes’ own hand, one in which the formulation of a problem dominates the discussion from beginning to end and in which the argument is skillfully arranged. Thus, we have a precious example of the tight and structured style of reasoning that Antisthenes presumably also used in his numerous other books. It is the only fully elaborated line of reasoning which remains from Antisthenes’ entire oeuvre, of which we otherwise have only one-liners and summaries or compendia of his arguments. It differs considerably from the somewhat cheap successes or failures that Xenophon ascribes to Antisthenes in his Symposium.35 In the end Cicero’s comment about Antisthenes being acutus (‘shrewd’) seems to have come true.

3

Aristotle corrected

The investigation of names, which is said to be the core of Antisthenes’ philosophical activity, is industriously applied in Porphyry’s contribution to Antisthenes. Tropos is analysed in its semantic meanings: it indicates

34 See pp. 97-99 below. 35 See pp. 149-151 below.

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both character and the use of language.36 Eutropos is also explained and the flexible use of language backed up with a quotation from Homer. Sophos, rather technically interpreted at the beginning, is seen as the ability to participate in a dialogue and later on it means ‘being good at dealing with people’.37 It should be observed that Antisthenes is here given utterances of the kind he was denied by Aristotle. According to Aristotle, Antisthenes could not say ‘Socrates mousikos’, but only ‘Socrates is a man’. There could be but one definition (the oikeios logos, in the sense of a proposition) of a person or thing. We now see that this picture is too narrow, for Antisthenes was able to say, and indeed he did say, that tropos is varied and unstable, thus using two predicates in the style of mousikos. While this appears in section three, which some would claim to be a later addition (I do not) so that Antisthenes may not be responsible, in section one, which is undoubtedly Antisthenean, Nestor is called ‘not sly’ and ‘not unstable’. This contradicts Aristotle’s view of Antisthenes’ ideas (‘Socrates non mousikos’), that he could only say ‘Nestor is a man’ as the oikeios logos. One could object that perhaps according to Aristotle’s view a negation is still acceptable, but Agamemnon and Ajax were approvingly called ‘simple and noble’ which is comparable to the allegedly rejected ‘Socrates mousikos’. It is hard to understand that Aristotle’s presentation was not contested earlier because of his inaccurate rendering of Antisthenes’ alleged point of view. If we go along with Aristotle’s line of interpretation, we would have to say that Antisthenes could not reason or argue at all because only one type of predicate would be allowed, for instance ‘man’. This naïvety is the foolish consequence of Aristotle’s report of Antisthenes’ doctrine. It should have functioned as an eye-opener to ancient readers, but never did.

36 In Plato’s Hippias Minor (365B2-5), Hippias uses tropos as character in connection with polytropos and pseudēs (Odysseus), and on the other hand with haplous and alēthēs (Achilles): ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν τὸν τρόπον ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής. 37 See also below p. 99, on dealing with people as the essence of sophos and Odysseus seeing through Calypso’s empty promises.

Chapter III Antisthenes’ interpretation of other Homeric figures 1

A critical observation: Antisthenes in favour of Homer and the Cyclopes

One could criticize Antisthenes for connecting the favourable connotation of polytropos with a person and the negative with a form of address, whereas polytropos is often seen as negative precisely in connection with a person, namely Odysseus. Especially in tragedy, he was regarded as a dubious windbag and a sly cheater. But Antisthenes’ preference for a positive explanation of polytropos as an epithet for Odysseus is in line with other favourable interpretations of passages in the Homeric poems. Antisthenes’ idea seems to be that Homer is always right: even if at first inconsistencies emerge, they can ultimately be reconciled if one adheres to the correct line of interpretation – the one that Antisthenes offers, of course. The technical term for this is lysis (solution), as we learn from the polytropos passage in the case of the Cyclopes. Antisthenes says that only Polyphemus is an unjust and bad creature, whereas the other Cyclopes are decent ‘people’. It is understandable that they have no agriculture because the fruits of the land grow spontaneously and without any labour, thanks to the favour of the immortal gods, especially the rain from Zeus.1 Antisthenes calls this particular fact righteous. Whereas Polyphemus despises the immortal gods, the others believe in them. In the story, the Cyclopes declare that Polyphemus’ illness2 is sent by Zeus and there is no remedy against this intervention.3 Polyphemus violated the laws of hospitality and despised Zeus. 4 Although it is not in 1 Antisthenes ignores the fact that the Cyclopes are collectively described as arrogant, hyperphialos (ὑπερφίαλος Od. 9, 106), but he could have recourse to the circumstance that sometimes this word is used in the positive sense of ‘mighty’ in Homer (see Od. 21, 289). The fact that they have no legislation (themis, θέμις), but live without laws (athemistōn, ἀθεμίστων) need not be explained negatively, although elsewhere the Greek word ἀθεμίστων (‘lawless’) is never used in a favourable sense. The Cyclopes do not need laws because every Cyclops lives separately and isolated with his family (Od. 9, 115-122; see Buffière, Les mythes, 360, 361). 2 Because Polyphemus says that ‘nobody’ (outis) kills him by ruse, not by violence, the other Cyclopes who were disturbed in their sleep believe that Zeus has sent an illness which cannot be resisted, they assume, and so go home. 3 Buffière, Les mythes, 360, 361. 4 Od. 9, 275. Polyphemus declares that the Cyclopes do not care about Zeus and the gods, and disavows his genealogy as a son of Poseidon. The other Cyclopes do care about the power of

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the Antisthenean fragment we have, the aim of Antisthenes’ considerations is obviously to exculpate Odysseus for his rude behaviour. One of his main points is to stress that the other Cyclopes are ‘just’ (δίκαιοι), because Antisthenes wishes to neutralize the Homeric predicate ἀθεμίστων (‘without laws’), which rightly understood (and Antisthenes does so understand it) does not condemn the other Cyclopes. Although on a first reading one might think that ἀθεμίστων is a negative epithet, upon further consideration (Antisthenes’ claim) the true meaning emerges. Homer himself confirms that the Cyclopes in their isolation do not need laws, explaining ἀθεμίστων; but being not in the need of them is not to say that they are unjust. They do not detest Zeus and the immortal gods; on the contrary, they honour them. The strange phrase ‘because it is a just work that they do not work on the land’, since the crops grow automatically, is intended to give the reason why the other Cyclopes are just. One could ask what Antisthenes’ problem was with the Cyclops passage and what he wanted to sort out. Obviously the ancient issue was that ἀθεμίστων seems to condemn the other Cyclopes, whereas in the text they do not turn out too bad at all, in spite of the fact that they are without laws. We have here an example of the special method Antisthenes uses to fathom the true meaning of a passage which at first glance seems to contain an inconsistency; deeper understanding teaches him to see through the passage and find the truth. Brancacci believes that, apart from that, we have here an example of the discovery of the oikeios logos of a term, namely ἀθεμίστων, especially of the polysēmia of a name.5 I do not see that we have here a study of the polysēmia of a word, but only of the meaning of a word as an investigation of a name. So ἀθεμίστων has its own story to tell in this context. When leaving the isle of the Cyclopes, Odysseus shouts that even the Earthshaker (Poseidon) will not be able to cure Polyphemus now that his eye is burnt (VA 190 = D.C. 54). It was apparently a problem in ancient Homeric scholarship on what grounds Odysseus was entitled to say this. Antisthenes offers a rather simple, literal solution. Odysseus knew that Poseidon is not a physician, while Apollo is. Antisthenes implies that no one but Apollo could cure such an eye. Following Buffière, there is no blasphemy but only a marking of the limits of Poseidon’s power.6 In this way, three problems have been tackled: (1) not all Cyclopes are unjust; (2) Odysseus is exculpated by emphasizing Polyphemus’ great Zeus and even try to incite Polyphemus to pray to his father Poseidon, whom he so openly insulted and who also belongs to the laughter-loving gods (Od. 9, 410-412). 5 Oikeios logos, 66-69 = Antisthène, 60-63. 6 Buffière, Les mythes, 370, 371.

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impious behaviour; and (3) Odysseus’ remark about Poseidon is shown not to be a question of hybris. The solutions to the problems make Odysseus appear in a favourable light, just as polytropos was supposed to do.

2 Calypso Homer calls Odysseus ‘wise’ (σοφός). Another case in which Odysseus shows his wisdom occurs when dealing with people concerns the nymph Calypso. She promises that Odysseus will never age and even become immortal, if only he will stay with her (Od. 7, 256-257). Antisthenes states that in his wisdom Odysseus knew that lovers make false promises and promise the impossible.7 Where Calypso makes the same empty promises elsewhere, we are told that Odysseus had that same understanding and knowledge, with the important addition ‘not without Zeus’.8 Thus, his wisdom was inspired by Zeus. The issue in Homeric scholarship was clearly how Odysseus was able to see through the emptiness of Calypso’s pledges. One scholion attributes this knowledge to his wisdom while another says that he was influenced by Zeus so that he was able to recognize the emptiness of Calypso’s offers, even though she was semi-divine. Odysseus proffers his nostalgia as an excuse for his refusal; he says that he realizes that as a woman his wise Penelope cannot compete with an immortal nymph,9 but he is not able to resist his nostalgia. This is what Homer makes him say; but according to Antisthenes one has to do better at interpreting his excuse.10 He knows that Calypso’s promises are worthless, but he cannot say such a thing openly. The real cause then is Odysseus’ wisdom, which is inspired by Zeus.

3

Other places in Homer: On Wine

Antisthenes had a special theory to justify his personal study of Homer. In this respect he was a forerunner of the Stoic philosopher Zeno, who believed that Homer wrote some things in conformity with ‘opinion’ (doxa) and other 7 Porph., Ad Od. ε 211 (SSR VA 188.22-23; D.C. 52A). Buffière, Les mythes, 371. 8 Porph., Ad Od. η 257 (SSR VA 188.39-42; D.C. 52B). 9 This is an attempt to be polite to both his wife Penelope, whom he calls ‘wise’, and the nymph, who is superior. 10 Caizzi (107) does not see here ‘esegesi allegorica’. However, we have to see through what is said; see also n. 30 below.

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things in conformity with ‘truth’ (alētheia).11 As a methodical approach to Homer, this statement must suggest that an interpreter has to penetrate through the level of opinion in order to get a glimpse of Homer’s actual intentions. In this manner, apparent inconsistencies can be eliminated. Antisthenes’ theory was not yet as developed as Zeno’s theory, which tried to clarify many more issues in detail. It is interesting to note that in addition to commenting on a name (see polytropos), Antisthenes practised another method: the discovery of Homer’s intention or meaning. A striking example is the wine bowl of dignified old Nestor, who owned a splendid, very heavy cup, which other persons were hardly able to lift, whereas the old man did so without effort. Obviously the ancients felt confronted with a problem.12 How did he manage this? Antisthenes knew how: It was not the weight of the full cup that mattered, but the fact that Nestor had an imposing tolerance for wine so that he got the better of his befuddled guests.13 Possibly Socrates’ great tolerance of wine was a source of inspiration here; in that case, Nestor foreshadows Socrates, in that his tolerance of wine resembles Socrates’ tolerance and both are renowned for being sophos.14 This example (Iliad 11, 636) shows Antisthenes’ interest in the Iliad. The use of wine and intoxication also fascinated Antisthenes, not only in Nestor’s case (tolerance of alcohol), but also in connection with Polyphemus, who having drunk undiluted wine, lost his head and trespassed all laws of hospitality and religion set by the immortal gods.

11 D. Chr. 53.4-5 (SSR VA 194; D.C. 58). See Giannantoni, Nota 35, IV, 342, and Buffière, Les mythes, 205, also especially 147. Buffière regards ‘opinion’ (doxa) as the habits or insights of the time, the historical context; its opposite are things that are told in conformity with ‘truth’ (alētheia). In the examples we find (see my discussion), there is nothing historical, but there are always attempts to solve Homeric difficulties. In the Hippias Minor (365C8-D4), Plato’s Socrates says that we do not know what Homer had in mind when speaking about polytropos: τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη· σὺ δ᾿ ἐπειδὴ φαίνῃ ἀναδεχόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ ταῦτα ἅπερ φῂς Ὅμηρον λέγειν, ἀπόκριναι κοινῇ ὑπὲρ Ὁμήρου τε καὶ σαυτοῦ. It could be that Antisthenes is reacting to this provocation. 12 Il. 11, 636-637: ἄλλος μὲν μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης πλεῖον ἐόν, Νέστωρ δ᾿ ὁ γέρων ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν. Höistad (‘Was Antisthenes an Allegorist?’, 27) finds allegory here, but he does not say what the allegory is. 13 Porph., Ad Il. Λ 636 (SSR VA 191; D.C. 55). 14 In Plato’s Symposium (223D6-12), we read that in the morning Socrates was still drinking and discussing with the last two party-goers, and that after they too had fallen asleep Socrates left and passed the day as usual in the Lyceum, returning home in the evening to get some rest. Even if the whole Symposium is only fiction, the idea of Socrates’ tolerance of wine must have been well known and thus be in character.

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Antisthenes offers another solution to the intriguing problem of Nestor’s cup.15 Stesimbrotus claimed that Nestor’s having retained his strength would plausibly be taken to indicate that he had lived a great number of years, that being the point to be made. There is nothing allegorical about this explanation. Rather, it shows the standard of Homeric problems in antiquity: they were food for thought for intelligent, and not so intelligent interpreters. Antisthenes wrote a book on the subject of wine: On the Use of Wine, or On Intoxication or On the Cyclops.16 Unfortunately we have only one fragment of this work: ‘After the god had thought about this, and seeing that water is entirely to be tolerated, he recommended drinking water and avoiding wine when one wants to win a victory’.17 Exactly what the god had in mind is difficult to fathom. In any event, the intoxication of Polyphemus did him much harm: thanks to Odysseus he is bereft of his eye. In view of the third title of the book, Polyphemus as an example of intoxication must have been a point in the discussion. In the fragment, symbols of Dionysus also played a role. It is not too daring to suppose that the god mentioned is Dionysus: it suits Antisthenes to react in a contrary way, which would explain why he might have made Dionysus, the god of the wine, recommend drinking water – albeit conditionally. Such advice has to do with the first title of the book, announcing a discussion of the use of wine and hardly a rejection. Also, intoxication is its subject and Polyphemus presents a striking example, while both intoxication and the Cyclops figure in the title of the book. We may presume that what we have previously learned about the Cyclopes and Antisthenes’ theory about Polyphemus as the only unjust Cyclops18 does not occur in this book because it has nothing at all to do with intoxication or the use of wine; it is more likely to have come from the book Cyclops or On Odysseus. Nevertheless, in this work, too, the intoxication of Polyphemus must have been a subject that required broad treatment. Thus, we can conclude that the theme of wine was important for Antisthenes in more than one book. Nestor’s cup may also have been discussed in On the Use of Wine. In Nestor’s case it is tolerance of wine that is the key to the problem. If one 15 See Buffière, Les mythes, 135. Stesimbrotus’ solution is mentioned by Porphyry in the text cited in n. 13 above, immediately before that of Antisthenes. 16 D.L. 6.18 (SSR 41.63; D.C. 1.63). 17 Aristid. 49.30-33 (SSR 197; D.C. 41): ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ῥεῦμα ἄρδην φερόμενον προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἴνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴ τι δεῖται νικῆσαι. This was a dialogue as the fragment tells us, referring to one of the antagonists. There is doubt about the authenticity of the fragment. 18 Porph., Ad Od. ι 106 (SSR VA 189.7-10; D.C. 53).

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wishes to achieve a goal, do not drink wine, although a reasonable amount can be tolerated. This is in line with the statement on hēdonē (‘desire’ or ‘pleasure’). Although Antisthenes claimed that it is better to be mad than to feel sexual desire, he also had a milder view: desire is permissible if one has nothing to regret. Thus, intoxication is condemnable, and use of wine is also harmful if one wishes to reach a goal (then ‘drink water’, Dionysus says), but a reasonable amount of wine he seems to have accepted.19 Although no separate work on the Iliad is mentioned in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue (whereas a work is especially devoted to the Odyssey20), there are many examples of Antisthenes’ interest in the Iliad transmitted by the tradition. We have already seen that it inspired his view on Aphrodite in the Diomedes’ scene in Iliad.21 Moreover, in addition to Nestor there is a case of Athena’s interference when Ares wants to participate in the Trojan War to revenge the death of his son Ascalaphus. Athena fears a conflict among the gods and especially punishment from Zeus. This story teaches, according to Antisthenes, that if one wishes to achieve something, the attempt must be supported by all one’s virtues together because Athena gives Ares a triple warning. Antisthenes’ interpretation of what this triple warning meant is not immediately clear in what Athena says. She declares that Ares does not listen, his mind is gone, and also his sense of decency.22 Antisthenes’ conclusion is that this triple warning is similar to doing things with all virtues combined, that is what he says. If the wise undertake something, they must energetically deploy every virtue, which means, if we interpret the comparison with Athena’s warning rightly, that the wise must use their capacity for listening, their understanding, and their decency. Hence we may conclude that Antisthenes’ views on Homer contributed to his ethical ideas. Antisthenes also has an interpretation of Patroclus’ ‘soul’ (psychē), which appears to Achilles in a dream; he states that the psychē must be similar to the bodies which surround the psychē of the persons when alive, or the psychē could not have been recognized.23 In this dream, the famous scene 19 This is in line with what Xenophon makes Antisthenes say about wine in the Symposium (4.41, quoted on p. 159 below). 20 D.L. 6.17 (SSR VA 41.57; D.C. 1.57). The focus on one hero, Odysseus with all his adventures, makes more of a continuing thread in the Odyssey than the wrath of Achilles does in the Iliad; moreover, Odysseus was Antisthenes’ favourite. 21 Seepp. 79-80 above. 22 Il. 15, 128-129 ἦ νύ τοι αὔτως οὔατ᾿ ἀκουέμεν ἐστί, νόος δ᾿ ἀπόλωλε καὶ αἰδώς. 23 Anonym. schol. venet. in Iliadem Ψ 65 (Schol. Hom. 5, 377.41-42 Erbse) (SSR VA 193; D.C. 57): ἐντεῦθεν Ἀντισθένης ὁμοσχήμονας φησὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασιν εἶναι.

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of Patroclus asking Achilles to bury him because unburied he cannot go into Hades, Homer describes the appearance of Patroclus in detail as if he were still alive.24 Here we see that Antisthenes uses Homer to ground a view on a specific subject,25 the form of the soul. He is working here in line with his principle concerning the research of names: he went to the past (Homer) to grasp what a word or concept meant or encompassed. If he really adhered to this opinion on the soul then he believed Homeric studies to be the source of all knowledge. As we shall see below in our discussion of his ethics, the concept of the soul was very important for Antisthenes and forms the core of his ethical views. In summary, one has to recognize that Antisthenes vigorously participated in the contemporary debate on Homeric questions. Obviously, there was an important current that asked difficult questions about problems, anomalies or obscurities in the Homeric poems which may have undermined Homer’s authority. On the other hand, there is a form of orthodoxy according to which everything in Homer is a standard for action. Niceratus in Xenophon’s Symposium is such a believer, but Antisthenes contests Homer’s usefulness as a handbook when it comes to, for example, being a king.26 Consequently, Antisthenes, however conservative, shows a desire to adapt and defend orthodoxy. Antisthenes’ reactions reflect the attacks of Homer’s critics; his instrument is to gain insight into the true intentions of the difficult passages. This optimistic starting-point, based on his orthodox conviction, is that all problems can be given a problem-solving answer. Hypercriticism is not Antisthenes’ way of doing things, nor is it Plato’s solution, who says in the Hippias that one cannot know what Homer intended to say.27 Antisthenes does not believe in this method of just letting problems go; rather, he believes in always having a good answer. His interpretative methods are varied and different. First, there is investigation of a word in a wider context like polytropos, or the word ἀθεμίστων (‘without laws’): the answer is to be found in a correct interpretation that Homer himself offers. Second, there is the assumption of a superior insight (perhaps inspired by Zeus) with Odysseus, as used in connection with Calypso’s promises. Finally, a Socratic power of mind is the solution to the problem of Nestor’s cup. One cannot expect someone with such an attitude to deviate from his approach. 24 Il. 23, 65-92. 25 Now it does not concern a Homeric person (viz. polytropos of Odysseus, Nestor) but a subject of investigation, the soul. 26 See pp. 156-158 below on Niceratus. 27 See n. 11 above.

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Antisthenes’ other books on Homeric subjects must have been full of similar explanations, but unfortunately these have disappeared in the past. Scholars have given much attention to the issue of allegory,28 which to my mind is far less interesting than looking for what contemporary scientific means Antisthenes uses to solve the problems posed in the Homeric tradition. We have already established that allegory had hardly any role in his thought. There is no indication in the extant data that he did not take the Homeric persons and scenes seriously, or that he allegorized them (but see Aphrodite’s case).29 Allegorical explanation does not fit with historical or factual interpretation. Antisthenes’ main objective seems to have been to explain difficult passages, but he also derived knowledge from Homer, for instance, about the soul, and there are moral lessons to learn (see Athena’s triple warning about acting with all virtues). His discussions of mythology are more directed, and they are full of moral lessons sometimes called moral allegory, as we shall now see.30

28 Giannantoni, Nota 35, IV, 338-349. 29 See pp. 78-80 above. 30 See Giannantoni, Nota 35, IV, 341. However, the term ‘allegory’ is not appropriate in that the stories are not doubted. They were not created to be teaching aids, which is the case with allegory, but are moral models that are salutary to follow.

Part III Antisthenean ethics

Chapter I 1

Ethics and myth

Introduction: moral strength

As far as we can see in the debris of his works, Antisthenes’ ethical doctrines have no systematic character. There are a limited number of titles on Diogenes Laertius’ list that promise ethical discussions. But one cannot always trust one’s eyes – even in works with a mythological title moral issues can come extensively to the fore. Nor are these titles united by a leading theme; instead there are multiple themes. We have already offered some remarks on his theory of pleasure (if it deserves to be called a theory), and some discussion of his tendency to mitigate strong pronouncements once they have done their work by drawing attention. The evidence concerning moral strength is found in a number of fragments. We have two core concepts in a fragment which states that ponos (‘effort’, ‘exertion’) is a good (ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθόν1). One could suppose that exertion, even strain, might be a bad phenomenon, but Antisthenes, eager to establish that ponos is a good thing, illustrates this by pointing to Heracles’ efforts in accomplishing his works (as a Greek example), and to his idol Cyrus and his efforts (as a foreign example). We have already noted that pleasure after effort is good, or in any case acceptable, whereas there is also the strong utterance that Antisthenes would rather be mad than move a finger for pleasure. There is furthermore a fragment which compares efforts to dogs because they also bite the unfamiliar; the intention here seems to be that if one is not accustomed to efforts they cause pain, so one had better get used to ponos.2 This is in line with the remark that to exercise virtue all one needs is the strength of a man like Socrates, one of the few references to the name ‘Socrates’ in what remains of Antisthenes’ works.3 It is an important reference because Socrates was an ethical model, an ideal for many including Antisthenes. Socrates was reportedly immune to influences from outside; his long vigil at Delium was proverbial. In Xenophon’s Symposium there is a portrait of Antisthenes’ conducting a conversation in which ethical issues play an important role. Therefore, we

1 D.L. 6.2 (SSR VA 85; D.C. 19). 2 Gnom. Vat. no. 1 (SSR VA 113; D.C. 96). 3 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70): αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος.

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will present a thorough investigation into this work.4 Finally, he also devoted works to the interesting figures Aspasia and Alcibiades, both belonging to Socrates’ inner circle, and discussion of them also contributes information about Antisthenes’ ideas concerning moral judgement. In addition to the fragments with direct quotations or summaries, Antisthenes also used mythology, as previously stated. In this connection we will discuss his use of the mythological figure Heracles, the only figure whom he dedicated entire books to.

2

Heracles: ethics and paideia

Antisthenes’ attitude to mythology is a large field to explore and exploit. According to Antisthenes, one must interpret the mythological data properly in order to gain material to construct one’s own moral convictions. However, Antisthenes’ perspective is quite different from the modern one: for him there was no difference between mythical times and history – for him, what had happened in mythological times had the same historic reality and thus also the same value. His views on Heracles, his favourite, are typical of his moral interpretation of what we call myth. There are three titles in Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue with the name Heracles, but since there may be a repeated title two will do: The Greater Heracles, or On Wisdom and Strength and Heracles and Midas, the latter presumably with the additional title The Lesser Heracles.5 Wisdom and strength are two of the themes discussed, and perhaps they were linked together. But we know of more mythological subjects and their themes. Prometheus is a partner in the dialogue with Heracles where they discuss the theme of human knowledge and knowledge of the sublime. In addition, when Heracles is in the company of the Centaur Cheiron, paideia (education) and love are themes. Although part animal, Cheiron was a wise and just friend to men. Moreover, he was a kind of paidagōgos, as well as being skilled in healing arts. He nurtured and educated Achilles and others. When Heracles saw a boy who was nurtured by Cheiron, he said: ‘He is great and beautiful and ripe; if one fell in love with him he would not be a 4 See pp. 149-173 below. 5 D.L. 6.16 (SSR VA 41.27; D.C. 1.25) and 6.18 (SSR VA 41.68; D.C. 1.69); for the third title, see D.L. 6.18 (SSR VA 41.69; D.C. 1.70). The epithet Lesser is present in D.L. 2.61 (SSR VA 43; D.C. 6), although not connected with Heracles and Midas, but it is likely that it is to be identified with this work; see Giannantoni, Nota 32, IV, 310, 311. See the fragments collected in SSR VA 92-99 and D.C. 22-28.

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bad lover’.6 And another time, when Antisthenes saw a picture of a scene where Achilles was serving Cheiron, he said: ‘Well done, boy, that you bear to serve an animal’.7 Furthermore, Antisthenes praises Achilles for his dedication to the paideia that Cheiron could give him.8 In the eyes of Antisthenes, Cheiron was a model teacher even though he was part animal. Once Heracles went with Cheiron into his den in honour of Pan, presumably in his capacity as an erotic animal god. Another text, however, declares that they spoke about the good.9 Unfortunately, Heracles’ arrow fell on Cheiron’s foot and caused his death, but because of his superhuman qualities the centaur was placed in heaven among the stars. Antisthenes is reported to have mentioned this accident in his Heracles. Although a good pupil must have no prejudices, it is really the quality of the teacher that counts, even if that teacher is an animal, he maintains. One is reminded of Socrates, who in Plato’s Symposium, is compared to the ugly, snub-nosed Silenus. Presumably Antisthenes believed himself to be a member of this genealogy of masters, implying that paideia is all that matters.

3

Heracles and heavenly matters

There is a conversation between Heracles and Prometheus on heavenly matters. Prometheus rebukes Heracles for his shallow concern for humanity, since he has neglected that which is of the greatest concern for humans. He says to Heracles that he will not be a perfect man ‘as long as you have not learned what is sublime (sublimiora) for men. When you will have learned these things, then you will also have learned the human things, but if you only study the human things, you will be erring like a rough animal’. Such a one is not sapiens, a wise person, but like ‘an animal that gets pleasure from a dung-pit’. The rudeness of this remark indicates its authenticity as Antisthenean. The sublime is explained as everything that concerns the heavenly, and it is said that humans should have an opinion on it.10 6 Procl., In Alc. 98, pp. 44.15-18 (SSR VA 93; D.C. 25): μέγας γάρ, φησι, καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὡραῖος, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠράσθη δειλὸς ἐραστής. 7 Gnom. Vat. no. 11 (SSR VA 95; D.C. 28): εὖ γε, ὦ παιδίον, εἶπεν, ὅτι παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ θηρίῳ διακονεῖν ὑπέμεινας. 8 Gnom. Vat. no. 11 (SSR VA 95; D.C. 28). 9 [Eratosth.], Cat. 1.40 (SSR VA 92.1-6; D.C. 24A); Eudocia, Viol. 998, pp. 733.1-3 (SSR VA 92.6-7; D.C. 24B); Anon. Lat. II, pp. 264.20-265.10 (SSR VA 92.7-13: D.C. 24C). 10 Them., Περὶ ἀρετῆς (3, 43.5-20) (SSR VA 96; D.C. 27). Some believe that it is Heracles who rebukes Prometheus (see Giannantoni, Nota 32, IV, 312). But this does not touch the very content

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This fragment presents a teaching on the highest level of human knowledge and the strong connection between the sublime, heavenly things and human things. This subject does not recur in the fragments of other works, but rather what we have are remarks on the one god who exists according to nature, the multitude of traditional gods, and about being just and godfearing as an obligation for humans who want to pursue immortality.

4

Heracles and money

There are no specific data from the work Heracles and Midas, and it is therefore open to conjecture what the connection between the two might have been. Midas is well known for his greed for gold. After he had rescued the drunken Silenus, a follower of Dionysus, the god rewarded Midas by providing him with the capacity to turn everything that he touched into gold. In the end this capacity turned out to be disastrous, resulting in the likelihood of Midas starving to death. Midas must have been a model of greed and the unfortunate fate of money-grubbing people. Heracles, then, must have had a counterfunction: a model of someone averse to the accumulation of wealth or gold. Indeed, Dio Chrysostom narrates that Heracles refused to take the golden apples of the Hesperides, saying that these golden apples are of no use for a human being, nor for the Hesperides themselves.11 Thus, it could be that Heracles is taken to be the perfect counterexample to Midas. Antisthenes must have brought them together to demonstrate his conviction that one must not pursue the acquisition of money; in fact we have a fragment that testifies to this conviction: ‘No silver-loving (money-loving) person, neither king nor free man, is good’.12 Furthermore, Xenophon’s Antisthenes character is eager to defend poverty or rather the possession of a minimal amount of money to satisfy one’s needs (including sexual needs). The possession of money provokes many wrongdoings and of the passage. Prometheus was very unhappy, seeing as how he was being tortured. He despised the heavenly by bringing fire from heaven to men. Small wonder that in his conversation with Heracles he pointed to the importance of the heavenly. ‘Your work (for humanity) is worthless’ is an expression that only makes sense in regard to the works of Heracles. Thus, Prometheus must be the speaker of the sentence and consequently the person who rebukes. 11 D. Chr., Oratio 8 (7), 34 (SSR VB 584.178-181). In this oratio Dio repeatedly mentions Antisthenes, which could indicate that what is said about Heracles and the apples is also of Antisthenean provenance. 12 Stob., Anth. 3.10.41 (SSR VA 80; D.C. 94). It could be that this one-liner stems from the Heracles and Midas.

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entices tyrants to commit every kind of criminal act in order to carry off the goods of their subjects.13 His answer to someone who extolled luxury occurs in a similar atmosphere of financial modesty: ‘May the sons of your enemies live in luxury’, meaning that becoming corrupted by these luxuries it will be easy for their enemies to attain victory over them.14 A complication arises in that Antisthenes is reported to have said to people who asked him why he had such a limited number of pupils that he ‘drove them away with a silver rod’.15 The suggestion is that he asked a very high fee for his lessons so that few could afford to become his pupil. But would he really have considered acquiring wealth to be a worthy goal in life? We have just seen that he rebuked persons who are silver-loving. However, this high fee (‘silver rod’) need not imply that Antisthenes’ actual pupils paid so much. Possibly he used this silver rod to get rid of pupils he did not want to have among his disciples.16 There is also an interpretation that suggests that it is the relation of master and pupil that is characterized by the silver rod. The silver indicates the value Antisthenes attached to his teaching.17 But why should he have said that he ‘drove them away’? What sense could be ascribed then to ‘drove away’? One must bear in mind that the rod is not only the characteristic instrument of the schoolmaster, but that Antisthenes also wrote a book entitled On the Rod. This work is to be found in the Homeric department of Diogenes Laertius’ catalogue. In Homer, both Circe and Hermes have magic rods. It is possible that Antisthenes was thinking about such a rod when he said ‘that he drove them away’. To call it silver, then, is a form of modesty because in Homer Hermes has a golden one.

5

Heracles and virtue

In The Greater Heracles, Antisthenes says that virtue is teachable.18 The Centaur Cheiron is a mythological example of a master who teaches virtue, 13 Xen., Symp. 4.34-44 (SSR VA 82; D.C. 117.6-65). It is difficult to know how far Xenophon’s Antisthenes matches the real one. The tendency to be satisfied with the minimal corresponds with what we may suppose to have been expressed in the Heracles and Midas. Xenophon’s argumentation might be real Antisthenean stuff, but one cannot be certain (see pp. 158-164 below). 14 D.L. 6.8 (SSR VA 114; D.C. 179). 15 D.L. 6.4 (SSR VA 169.1-2; D.C. 184). See Guthrie III, 306 n. 3, but see also Giannantoni, Nota 24, IV, 225. 16 Diogenes the Cynic had to do much to persuade him to be taken as a pupil (see p. 69). 17 Caizzi, 127 on D.C. 184 = VA 169.1-2 (D.L. 6.4). 18 D.L. 6.105 (SSR VA 99; D.C. 23).

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as we have seen.19 The issue of the teachability of virtue was hotly debated in antiquity. In the Protagoras, Plato gives ample discussion to the problem with Socrates arriving at the conclusion that virtue does not seem to be teachable, but as a problem it deserves more investigation.20 This is Plato’s tour de force and so ultimately the problem turns out to be unsolved. However, it is easy to understand that Antisthenes chose the side of those who claim that virtue is teachable because the whole didactic business was at stake. In Plato’s eyes the problem is more interesting than the solution and so his own didactic business is not involved. If one entirely denies the teachability of virtue, one stands to lose one’s didactic job and the possibility of having pupils. In Diogenes Laertius it is said that Antisthenes proved that virtue is teachable.21 Unfortunately, we do not know what evidence was launched by Antisthenes, if any at all; we only know the fact that he accepted this thesis and promoted it in the Heracles, although promotion as such is neither evidence nor proof. We only have fragments addressing the accidental properties of virtue and its exercise.

6

Properties of virtue and wisdom (phronēsis)

According to Antisthenes, virtue is the permanent property of the possessor of virtue. After the all-important ‘education’ (paideia), if one ultimately manages to come into possession of virtue, then its possession ‘can never be lost’ (ἀναπόβλητος).22 But we still do not know precisely what virtue is. Virtue is lauded as the goal of human life and sufficient to attain ‘happiness’ (eudaimonia), but again we do not hear what eudaimonia in essence contains. Furthermore, he states that virtue is practical and does not need much learning or reasoning (logoi), whereas its counterpart, viciousness, actually needs many logoi.23 When one wishes to gain virtue, the task is to unlearn bad things. Therefore, the greatest necessity of education is getting rid of anything one needs to unlearn.24 This is a charming slogan, but in the end what ‘unlearning’ actually means remains obscure.

19 See pp. 108-109 above. 20 Plato, Prt. 360E6-361D6. 21 D.L. 6.10 (SSR VA 134.1-3; D.C. 69). 22 D.L. 6.105 (SSR VA 99; D.C. 23). 23 Gnom. Vat. no. 12 (SSR VA 104.1-2; D.C. 86); see also p. 56 above. 24 Ars., Viol. p. 502.13-14 (SSR VA 87.1-2; D.C. 21A) and Stob., Anth. 2.31.34 (SSR VA 87.2-4; D.C. 21B): ἀπομαθεῖν τὰ κακά. See Giannantoni, Nota 39, IV, 392.

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We are steadily circling around what the essence of virtue is without coming to its core. Antisthenes also speaks about ‘wisdom’ (phronēsis), which seems to be the ability to be in conversation with oneself and is central to being virtuous. This is the main thing to be gained from philosophy.25 The question remains what this conversation consists of. Antisthenes confirms that, in conversation with oneself, true reasoning is more unattainable than the walls of a besieged town. Yet again we do not find out what such reasoning is, only that it is solid and cannot be breached. Instead of explanations, we receive solely descriptions of moral principles, moral admonitions, and warnings. As previously discussed, strength of application of any gained principle seems to be one of the most important things in morality: the Heracles has the subtitle On Strength, and Heracles is indeed well known for his perseverance in the performance of enormous, superhuman tasks. Whether the subtitle was given by Antisthenes himself, or by the later compilers of the list in Diogenes Laertius, the word strength (ἰσχύς) is in line with the strength in which Socrates excels. When asked why he treated his pupils so brutally, Antisthenes answered ‘physicians are just the same with their patients’.26 It may be fruitful to connect this attitude with the core notion that one needs strength to perform what one’s wisdom commands. Emotions ought not to be allowed to get the better of one’s wisdom – a problem in all ethical systems. What stern means Antisthenes used with his pupils remains obscure. He must have had a sharp tongue, neither fearing insult nor courting popularity, and he must have constantly taken them by surprise. What we have seen from his teaching practice is not at odds with this observation. He was given to making rather unnerving remarks; a pupil who complained that he had lost his notes received the answer ‘you should have them inscribed in your mind instead of on paper’.27 The function of education is to make pupils strong by practising the principles, which often were very practical, and explains both the attraction of Antisthenes as a teacher and his influence on his pupils. A good example of the practical side of Antisthenes’ teaching is his advice on marriage and procreation.

25 See pp. 140-141 below. 26 D.L.6.4 (SSR VA 169.3-4; D.C. 185). 27 D.L.6.5 (SSR VA 168; D.C. 188).

Chapter II 1

Sex, marriage, family

Antisthenes’ teaching regarding sex and marriage

We have already encountered some of Antisthenes’ opinions on sex, which in one instance he regarded as an unnatural form of badness, but nonetheless allowed for the necessity of procreation.1 He dedicated an entire work to his theory of marriage, On Procreation of Children or On Marriage, a Discourse on Love,2 of which we do not possess direct fragments. However, we know that Antisthenes had a purely practical eugenetic point of view: he will only marry a woman who has the best natural disposition (ταῖς εὐφυεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί), to get the best children.3 Hicks, in the LCL edition of Diogenes Laertius, translates εὐφυεστάταις as ‘handsomest’ (woman), but Antisthenes recommends that a man should not look for a beautiful woman, because he will have them ‘in common’ with other men. 4 Moreover, one has to look for a woman who will be grateful because she will treat you better5 – a rather unromantic point of view. The wise man will only marry for the sake of procreation, and he himself knows whom he should marry, implying that the women who were match-makers did not know.6 Antisthenes was a rather extraordinary character, as we may conclude from another of his odd actions.7 If he saw a woman anywhere decked out with ornaments he would hasten to her house and ask her husband to bring out his horse and his arms. If the man possessed them, he would leave the woman and her ornaments alone because the man could defend himself; but if not, he would ask him to strip off his wife’s finery. This was obviously a lesson: first things first. Luxury is acceptable if the basics are provided 1 See pp. 78-80 above. 2 D.L. 6.15 (SSR VA 41.11; D.C. 1.11). 3 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 58; D.C. 115): (τὸν σοφὸν) γαμήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφυεστάταις συνιόντα γυναιξί. καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν. 4 D.L. 6.3 (SSR VA 57; D.C. 180). This statement is ascribed to many other persons (Giannantoni, Nota 28, IV, 278). It is given in the form of a rhymed verse, presumably for mnemotechnic reasons, which occurs rarely in antiquity. 5 D.L. 6.3 (SSR VA 56; D.C. 114): καὶ χρὴ τοιαύταις πλησιάζειν γυναιξὶν αἳ χάριν εἴσονται. See also Xenophon’s Symposium below p. 161. Rankin (Antisthenes, 139, 140), who wanted to confront Plato’s eugenic points with Antisthenes’ views, had to admit that this preference for grateful women had little to do with eugenics but purely with physical relief. I do not believe that such a confrontation with Plato has much in it. 6 Licht, Sexual Life in Ancient Greece, 48, the so-called promnēstrides. 7 D.L. 6.10 (SSR VA 61; D.C. 181).

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for. Elsewhere we shall see that luxury is condemnable.8 This makes him like the Cynics, who disapproved of luxury entirely.

2 Adultery While Antisthenes dedicated a book to marriage and procreation, he was also interested in extramarital sexual relations. So he had his own view of adultery, as transmitted by the following fragment. One day when seeing an adulterer running for his life he exclaimed: ‘Unfortunate fellow, what peril you might have escaped at the cost of an obol!’9 Here he implies that the aim of the adulterer was sexual satisfaction, which could have been acquired cheaply by visiting a prostitute. Because of his purely pragmatic and down-to-earth mentality Antisthenes did not even consider the possibility that love could have been an incentive for the adulterer. We ought not to conclude, as many have done on the basis of this fragment, that Antisthenes rejected adultery. We also have evidence that he seems to accept adultery in a fragment given by Pseudo-Clemens Romanus: ‘Antisthenes, the Socratic, writes about the need not to throw off so-called adultery’. This is a remarkable sentence in remarkable Greek.10 In order to smooth away the problem that the Clemens fragment does not reject adultery whereas the remark about the running adulterer does reject it, and furthermore that the latter should represent Antisthenes’ true opinion, an ingenious solution has been proposed. This states that ‘adultery’ is used in the sense promoted by Plato and the Stoics, namely the idea of holding wives in common, which only seemed like adultery to the pious Pope Clemens Romanus. My suggestion is that Clemens’ remark about Antisthenes in fact cannot be taken seriously; the intention of his quotation would be that adultery (read ‘matrimony’) is not to be rejected (do not cast off adultery, that is, matrimony). Dümmler,11 the creator of this solution, which Giannantoni takes over without any form of criticism, says that nobody can believe that Antisthenes would praise12 adulterers. The running adulterer fragment testifies to this point of view. Therefore, 8 See p. 161 below. 9 D.L. 6.4 (SSR VA 60; D.C. 182). We shall see that this was his own practice too (p. 159). 10 Clem. Rom., Hom. 5.18.2 (SSR VA 59; D.C. 116): καὶ ὁ Σωκρατικὸς δὲ Ἀντισθένης περὶ τοῦ δεῖν τὴν λεγομένην μοιχείαν μὴ ἀποσείεσθαι γράφει. For the Greek see p. 116 below. 11 Dümmler, Antisthenica, 5, 6; see Giannantoni, Nota 28, IV, 279. 12 Actually Clemens does not praise adulterers, he only says that according to Antisthenes it is necessary not to throw away so-called adultery.

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the acceptance of adultery by Pseudo-Clemens, if taken as matrimony, can be harmonized. However, the alleged interpretation of the Pseudo-Pope Clemens will not do (adultery for matrimony or vice versa). Unfortunately, the homilies ascribed to Clemens Romanus are nowadays no longer regarded as authentic. What’s more, one has to read the whole sermon to understand his meaning because the fragment is embedded in a grand argument full of serious mythological and philosophical knowledge. The entire argument is a laudatio of adultery, based on theological and historical evidence. To quote only the passage that comes immediately before: ‘The god Apollo called Socrates the wisest of all men. Is it not so that Socrates establishes that in the best-administrated city (Sparta) the wives were in common use? And did he not hide the beautiful Alcibiades under his cloak?’13 This important person, Socrates, the wisest of all men, obviously had nothing against adultery. The fragment with Antisthenes’ view of adultery emerges after this statement. There can be no doubt that the anonymous writer of Homily 5, who had a vast knowledge of his subject, considered his remark about Antisthenes to be serious knowledge and a pure reference to Antisthenes’ theory of adultery. We are able to confirm the fragment as authentic Antisthenean material by pointing to three striking usages. First, the fragment uses the verb ‘to cast away’ (ἀποσείεσθαι) which is fairly unusual in connection with ‘adultery’ in the sense of rejecting, because ἀποσείεσθαι is quite a literal term. This is indicative of Antisthenes’ wilful linguistic twists and often vivid use of language. Second, there is this strange use of ‘so-called’ (τὴν λεγομένην μοιχείαν, ‘the so-called adultery’). The entire argument of Pseudo-Clemens’ homily about adultery stretches over dozens of sentences, even sections. But suddenly the text has ‘so-called’ in relation to adultery, which after such an extended discussion is rather out of place and even odd. Third, Pseudo-Clemens says ‘he writes’ (present tense γράφει). This presupposes the fact that Pseudo-Clemens had read it himself; he does not have ‘says’. It seems to me a quite acceptable proposition that Pseudo-Clemens quoted literally, including Antisthenes’ own words. The quotation is thus an isolated remark from Antisthenes in the stream of data of Pseudo-Clemens’ discussion. Consequently, the issue of adultery is seen from the perspective of Antisthenes. If so, the suddenly emerging word ‘so-called’ suggests that 13 Clem. Rom., Hom. 5.81.1: περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ Φοῖβος ἔφη· “Ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος”, οὐκ ἐν τῇ εὐνομωτάτῃ πόλει [τῇ Λακεδαίμονι] κοινὰς προτίθησι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ τρίβωνι τὸν καλὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καλύπτει;

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Antisthenes wished to give his own twist in a longer discussion to that which is generally (‘so-called’) included in the notion of adultery. Thus, we cannot easily discard the fragment as unreliable. But what about the fragment with the running adulterer? In my opinion, this fragment need not necessarily be taken as a rejection of adultery either; rather, Antisthenes is simply rebuking the adulterer for his stupidity because he could have got what he wanted without peril for a small amount of money. Thus, there is nothing that prevents us from believing that PseudoClemens presented an actual thought of Antisthenes as it was meant to be: no rejection of adultery. What exactly Antisthenes had in mind about the ‘so-called adultery’ and the reasons why he did not reject it remain obscure in the absence of data.14 Here again, we have a typical situation with Antisthenes. The remark about the running adulterer is meant to provoke attention, but the theory is somewhat different in colour, in this case, for us, a shade of grey. We also know that Antisthenes presumably did not object to homosexual relations, because the hero in the Heracles says about a boy nurtured by Cheiron: ‘he is great and beautiful and ripe; if one fell in love with him he would not be a bad lover’.15 Although there is no sign of any form of criticism, he himself did not foster homosexual inclinations, as can be deduced from Xenophon’s Symposium.16

3 Family Although Antisthenes had specific thoughts about the permissibility of adultery, he did not reject the family as such. His ideas were simply very practical and devoid of anything romantic. Marriage in antiquity, in any case in Antisthenes’ times, was a business-like enterprise. Men often had mistresses (or boys) for pleasure and leisure, or other extramarital relations. I do not think that in his time Antisthenes’ thoughts on the subject marriage and family would be considered extremist.17 But there 14 Perhaps he considered adultery as the common use of wives to be equal to matrimony. This is the suggestion of Pseudo-Clemens, as we may deduce from the reference to what Socrates says about the Spartan women before the fragment quoted. It is also possible that the satisfaction of the natural needs of sex (see p. 114) was a sufficient excuse to permit adultery. 15 Procl., In Alc. 98, pp. 44.15-18 (SSR VA 93; D.C. 25). For the text, see p. 109 n. 6. 16 See p. 161 below. However, there is a story which notably ascribes homoerotic feelings to Antisthenes. 17 See Licht, Sexual Life in Ancient Greece, 64, 65.

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are problems. We have discussed above the wise man who has specific knowledge to choose the right wife in order to have the best children. This view is surprising.18 The problem is how does the wise man obtain his knowledge about all this? Here again we have no information. The process of education perhaps opens the way – that his pupils confronted him with the question of whom to marry, we have already mentioned.19 Thus, the issue is presumably addressed in his teaching. In any case, he wrote a book entitled On Procreation of Children or On Marriage, a Discourse on Love. It is striking that the word ‘procreation’ comes first in the title. Antisthenes clearly regarded this as his starting-point. The addition a discourse on love is presumably an explanation by the compiler of Diogenes Laertius’ list or his source. Incidentally, there is no information about Antisthenes having a wife or a family; in Xenophon’s Symposium he is very open about his sexual needs and the solution, and also about his going to ugly women who were ready to accept anyone, even Antisthenes.20 All this indicates that he was himself unmarried and thus an unexperienced adviser in marital affairs. We do know that he was struck by the relationship of brothers. This familial bond seems to have interested him. He said that ‘when brothers agree their community is stronger than every wall’.21

18 See pp. 80 and 114. 19 See p. 114. 20 See Xen. Symp. 4.38 quoted on p. 159 below. 21 D.L. 6.6 (SSR VA 108; D.C. 92). The theme of the value of brothers is broadly discussed in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 2.3. According to Joël (Der echte und der xenophontische Socrates, II, 1004) this chapter has an Antisthenean character which he tries to confirm. In Antisthenes’ speech in Xenophon’s Symposium 4.34-44, brothers appear again, but then because of their different lifestyles (see Xen. Symp. 4.35 quoted on p. 158 below).

Chapter III Aspasia 1 Introduction There is more to say about Antisthenes’ attitude to extramarital relations when we read what he wrote about the well-known hetaira Aspasia, in whom he seemed to have been very much interested. A work with this title occurs in Diogenes Laertius’ list, but the question arises whether he was personally interested in her. Or was this work a dialogue in which one of the interlocutors was Aspasia? Or both? It is sometimes suggested that Pericles also participated in this dialogue.1 In any case, we have a testimonial which states that Pericles frequented her home and that he greeted her daily (as he was going to and coming from the market), which explains her name Aspasia, that is ‘Miss Embrace’.2 It is mentioned that her original name was Myrto (from Miletus).3 This explanation could be taken as an indication of Antisthenes’ authorship because, as we know, he was interested in etymology. Antisthenes himself, in the only fragment in which he figures with his name, tells us that she was very dear to Pericles’ heart, and that Pericles estimated her more than his own life and his property4: ‘Antisthenes the Socratic says that he (Pericles) fell in love with Aspasia and that he twice, coming and going, embraced5 the woman6, and when she once had to defend herself, being accused of impiety, he defended her and speaking for her he wept more, we are told, than when he risked his own life or fortune’. Another story about Pericles is also attributed to Antisthenes. Cimon lived illegally with his sister Elpinice, but later she was given in matrimony to Callias. When Callias was driven into exile, Pericles got to have sex with Elpinice in exchange for Callias’ return.7 Interestingly, the only thing we 1 See Giannantoni, Nota 33, IV, 325. 2 Plut., Per. 24.7-9 (SSR 143.8-16; not in D.C.). Some have said that she got the name because of her frequent visitors; Giannantoni, Nota 33, IV, 324. 3 Ath. 13.37, 576D. 4 Ath. 13.56, 589E-F (SSR VA 143.1-5; D.C. 35). 5 This could be connected with the etymology of her name in the testimonial, which some adduce as evidence of its Antisthenean provenance (see Dittmar, Aeschines, 13, n. 42). 6 τὴν ἄνθρωπον: this is a rare combination of the female definite article (ἡ) with the male form of the noun (ἄνθρωπος), see LSJ. The rudeness, typical of Antisthenes, of this combination is reason to assume its authenticity. 7 Ath. 13.56, 589E-F (SSR VA 143.3-8; D.C. 35): ‘When she (Aspasia) once had to defend herself, being accused of impiety, he defended her and speaking for her he wept more, we are told, than

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can say is that the victim of Antisthenes’ negative remarks is Pericles, not Aspasia; Aspasia is only the cause of Pericles’ exaggerated love. It is highly debated by scholars whether Antisthenes’ judgement of her was favourable or not. It is well known that her reputation was ambivalent: the comic dramatists gave her unpleasant names. However, Antisthenes really says nothing unfavourable here about Aspasia. Moreover, I should find it strange if Antisthenes were to call a work Aspasia and then castigate the subject or give her an objectionable disposition. Also, she was honoured in the same circles Antisthenes moved in: the Socratic Aeschines talks about her in very high terms, as does Plato’s Socrates.8 Furthermore, she is said to have taught politics and rhetoric in her ‘salon’.9 Antisthenes must have known her either personally or by hearsay because she is reported to have been close to the Socratic circle.

2

Aspasia and Pericles

Another striking fragment about Aspasia says that she verbally attacked the sons of Pericles from an earlier marriage, Xanthippus and Paralus. One of them, she is reported to have said, was a companion of Archestratus, who was the keeper of something like a brothel, and the other an acquaintance of Euphemus, who addressed vulgar and demeaning jokes to those whom he met.10 The data in this fragment are ascribed by scholars to Antisthenes,11 but he is not mentioned personally. Some scholars deduce from what Aspasia says about the bad character of the two brothers that Aspasia must have when he risked his own life or fortune. When Cimon lived illegally with his sister Elpinice and she later had been given in matrimony to Callias and Callias was driven into banishment, as a reward for Callias’ return Pericles was allowed intercourse with Elpinice.’ Gercke and Susemihl assert it is not by Antisthenes (see Giannantoni, Nota 33, IV, 324). Gercke takes as his starting-point that the fragment has the indicative, whereas the previous depends on ‘he says’ (accusative inf initive construction). Reading the whole context in Athenaeus one is struck by the fact that nearly everything he tells us is well documented by quotations from a host of authors. Consequently it is not acceptable to leave the quoted phrases unattributed, which is the case if Antisthenes is not credited as the source. Cp. also the female article (ἡ) with the male form (ἄνθρωπος), and the circumstance that Antisthenes reports similar sexual matters about Alcibiades (p. 121 below). 8 See p. 123 below. 9 Plut. Per. 24.5-7. 10 The name Euphemus, ‘he who speaks words of good omen’, is accompanied by a person who speaks vulgar things; remarkable – one might say a classic example or the embodiment of a ‘euphemism’. 11 Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 142; D.C. 34); see Giannantoni, Nota 33, IV, 323.

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said better things about her own son born from a liaison with Pericles. She must have had a good influence on this son, they say, and this praise implies that she must have been a good mother. Perhaps Pericles is being portrayed as a wise man who changed wives because he preferred a better wife for his offspring. Thus, he could have figured as an example of Antisthenes’ moral advice to choose women for their reproductive capacities. All this is interesting, but mere speculation. Moreover, what is said by Antisthenes about Pericles, the alleged promoter of eugenics, is quite unfavourable. This does not make him much of a eugenic model himself. To return to the fragment with Cimon, it is interesting that Antisthenes took sexual relations with a sister as being against the law and presumably therefore condemnable. This will be confirmed by his remarks on Alcibiades, who, according to Antisthenes, had intercourse with his mother and his daughter and his sister. This statement forms part of his censure of Alcibiades, the fragment states.12 It could be that eugenic reasons are in the background of Antisthenes’ rejection of incestuous relations. If we accept the argument in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 4.4.20-23 as Antisthenean, then Antisthenes can be supposed to think that in order to get the best children the bodies of the father and the mother must be in full vigour. If a man has intercourse with his daughter the latter cannot be in full vigour. Thus, the eventual offspring will not turn out so well. In Xenophon the prohibition of incest is ‘a divine law’ and an ‘unwritten law’, because cultures unknown to each other still have the same law. But some scholars believe that Antisthenes accepted incestuous relations, rejecting the family as such, and they conjecture that what is said against these relations is not Antisthenes’ own view, but derives from the view of participants in a dialogue.13 I do not accept this explanation, because in Pericles’ case, Antisthenes said that sexual relations with a sister was against the law.14 What Antisthenes says here casts some light on his own ideas about Pericles. In the one and only authentic fragment in this set we do not find factual criticism of Pericles as an adulterer, but rather criticism of Pericles as an essentially weak man because he falls extremely and irrationally in love with Aspasia, and even sheds tears defending her. Furthermore, he is a womanizer at the cost of the state, as is shown by his sexual connection 12 Ath. 5.63, 220C (SSR VA 141.1-4; D.C. 29A) and Eust., Od. κ 7 (SSR VA 141.4-8; D.C. 29B). 13 Dümmler believes that this chapter in Xenophon was intended to refute Antisthenes’ view, who would not have accepted the family. See Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 303, also 305. On Antisthenes’ view on family see pp. 117-118 above. 14 Ath. 13.56, 589E-F (SSR VA 143.1-8; D.C. 35).

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with Elpinice as reward of his intervention in favour of Callias. There is even a report that Pericles lost his fortune by spending it on Aspasia.15 Dittmar concludes from this negative documentation on Pericles that in the Aspasia he was an example of someone who was dedicated to passion (sexual desire, lust, erōs). Erōs is a badness of nature, as we have seen.16 Since only the wise man knows whom he must love, Pericles is not a wise man, and not even a real politician, Dümmler states. I would say that in the fragment Antisthenes establishes that due to the influence of love a man like Pericles is made weak and unstable, even in love. But whether Antisthenes meant to prove that he was not wise nor even a good politician is uncertain, because we do not know what his purpose was in portraying Pericles as a victim of love other than to point to this weakness. It is all guesswork. In any event, the weak, weeping Pericles conflicts with the usual image of the great statesman and therefore suits Antisthenes, who liked to turn established opinions upside down. Antisthenes did not enjoy full citizen rights in Athens, having a non-Athenian mother (mētroxenos), although he took part in military campaigns. This lower status had been introduced by Pericles in 541 B.C.17; perhaps this is the background of Antisthenes’ negative judgement of Pericles. If the negative data come from the Aspasia, Pericles cannot have been a partner in the dialogue because in that case he would have been saying unpleasant things about himself. Nor can Aspasia easily be assumed to have said these unpleasant things about her lover Pericles. If this is true, the Aspasia cannot be a dialogue with Aspasia and Pericles as participants; at best it could be a dialogue with participants who talked about Aspasia and/or Pericles. There is also the possibility that the Aspasia should not be considered a dialogue but an essay or other genre. The only thing we know for certain is that Antisthenes portrays Pericles as a weak man. He did not say negative things about Aspasia, and in the following discussion we shall see that it is likely that he actually had much respect for her.

3

Aspasia and Menexenus

In Plato’s Menexenus (236D4-249C8) we find a complete funeral oration ascribed to Aspasia. Socrates prides himself upon the fact that he had had 15 Ath. 12.45, 533C-D (SSR VA 144; not in D.C.). 16 See p. 78 above. 17 Rankin, Antisthenes, 2.

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the best teacher in rhetoric, frequented by many, namely Aspasia (Menexenus 235E3-7). We are told that she composed the famous funeral oration of Pericles. Socrates states that for her own funeral speech she improvised parts and used parts from Pericles’ oration, and used both to form a unity. But are we to take this speech seriously? Some believe it is parody.18 In any case, Menexenus himself suggests at the end of the dialogue that perhaps the beautiful speech was not made to Socrates by Aspasia but by a mysterious male person, whoever that might be (Menexenus 249E1). Possibly Plato is here delivering a speech written by himself as an example of his own rhetorical skill. It is interesting that a Menexenus is also ascribed to Antisthenes in Diogenes Laertius’ list. Fortunately, we know something about its contents: the subtitle is On Ruling.19 Although more works survive with the title Menexenus by other writers, 20 it cannot be ruled out that Antisthenes and Plato’s dialogues had something to do with each other. In that case, it is difficult to establish who was the first to write such a work. Actually Plato’s can hardly be called a dialogue because in the main it is a report of the funeral oration. We can conjecture that the Menexenus of Antisthenes had a similar character and for a large part presented a great argument on ruling ascribed to Aspasia. Since the historical Menexenus was very young when he was in contact with Socrates, he can hardly have been pictured as a participant in a dialogue on political rule. Thus, Antisthenes’ Menexenus may have displayed some similarity with Plato’s Menexenus, but instead of a teacher of rhetoric, Aspasia came to the fore as a teacher of politics (On Ruling). Assuming her to be the mouthpiece of Antisthenes (Menexenus being too young for this role), Antisthenes cannot have given her a negative role. It would not make sense for the subject of the Aspasia to discuss the matter of ruling in a negative atmosphere and be considered negatively herself. It would make her teaching worthless and even ridiculous. This consideration provides strong support for our idea that Antisthenes’ judgement of Aspasia was not negative, as Caizzi and Giannantoni believe.21 In the end we must confess that we know next to nothing of the work Aspasia as such. We do not even know for sure whether what we have about Aspasia and Pericles in the fragments originates in Antisthenes’ Aspasia 18 A good summary of scholarly opinions on Plato’s Menexenus is presented by Wichmann, Platon, 237, n. 177. 19 D.L. 6.18 (SSR VA 41.72; D.C. 1.73). 20 Giannantoni, Nota 25, IV, 254. 21 Caizzi, 98 on fr. 34; Giannantoni, Nota 25, IV, 255: ‘In ogni casa è da rammentare il giudizio negativo che Antisthene ha dato di Aspasia’.

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(I think not). If it does, we only have an Aspasia who is not very favourable in connection with Pericles. The main thing is that Antisthenes actually wrote such a work, which testifies to his interest in the Athenian elite. However, what we learn from the fragments is all tabloid-like stuff, and we must leave it at that. In Giannantoni’s collection we find four fragments under the heading Aspasia.22 Only one has Antisthenes’ name as the source of the fragment (from Athenaeus), and the other three are quotations from Plutarch’s Life of Pericles, chapter 24. In Plutarch’s passage Antisthenes is not mentioned at all. Since others wrote about Aspasia in antiquity, there is no specific reason to assume why Antisthenes should be Plutarch’s source. We have seen that Antisthenes’ ethics present judgements about famous figures and we may conclude that they were intended to demonstrate, by means of models, the moral ideas that Antisthenes fostered. We can recognize this method also in what Antisthenes has to tell us about Alcibiades.

22 Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 142; D.C. 34); Ath. 13.56, 589E-F (SSR VA 143.1-8; D.C. 35). Plut., Per. 24.7-9 (SSR 143.8-16; not in D.C.); Ath. 12.45, 533C-D (SSR VA 144; not in D.C.).

Chapter IV Alcibiades 1

Alcibiades and beauty

Alcibiades was an imposing but controversial figure who has provoked a lot of literature. There are many works entitled Alcibiades: two dialogues ascribed to Plato, one of Phaedo, and one of Aeschines. Antisthenes is also among these writers. We have some fragments of his Alcibiades that speak about the title character’s beauty. According to one of the fragments, Antisthenes met Alcibiades in person and was impressed by his beauty,1 describing him as strong, manly, well educated,2 daring and in the bloom of youth (or beautiful), beloved by all Greece. Antisthenes – fond of Homer as he was – compared him to Achilles: ‘If Achilles was not such, he was not ripe (or beautiful) at all’.3 Thus, if Achilles was not as beautiful as Alcibiades he was not beautiful at all (the distance in beauty would be great), for Achilles was the most beautiful in his day. As a kind of proof Antisthenes alludes to Homer’s comment about Nireus: ‘Nireus, the most beautiful man who came to Ilion, of all Danaoi after the excellent son of Pelias [i.e. Achilles]’. Conclusion: Achilles was the most beautiful man of his day, hence Alcibiades was, in his day, the Achilles of ancient times in terms of beauty. Socrates also enters this work because, as Antisthenes tells us, he pleaded to give the prize for valour to Alcibiades at Delium (or Potidaea): the armour and the crown of victory. Thus, Alcibiades’ epithet ‘daring’ was deserved. It is interesting that there is a quotation in the form of a dialogue in which Socrates answers a stranger who said that he (Socrates) had received the prize of valour in Boeotia: ‘We heard that in the war against the Boiōtoi you

1 Ath. 12.47, 534C (SSR 198.1-4; D.C. 30). It is plausible that Antisthenes himself figures in the dialogue because we are told that he himself had seen Alcibiades and reports his impressions. It is likely that Antisthenes met him in person because Alcibiades was in Socrates’ company for some time. 2 There is the reading ἀπαίδευτον in the MSS, but among all the positive epithets in the eulogy this word is rather odd. Therefore, Gulick proposed εὐπαίδευτον, which, however, is rejected by Caizzi (p. 98) and Giannantoni (Nota 36, IV, 348). It is possible that ἀπαίδευτον comes from an anti-Socratic tradition. If he was not educated, then Socrates could not be taken to have been responsible for Alcibiades’ condemnable actions. For Alcibiades’ education with Socrates and its problems see p. 126. 3 Procl., In Alc. 114, p. 51.35-38 (SSR VA 199.1-4; D.C. 32A); Olymp., In Alc. 28, pp. 20.18-21.25 (SSR VA 199.4-12; D.C. 32B).

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received the prize of valour. – Silence stranger! It was the gift of honour given to Alcibiades, not me. – But you gave it, as we have heard’. 4 This little piece of dialogue confirms the history of the prize of valour, but what is perhaps more interesting, we have here a rare authentic piece of an Antisthenean dialogue where two persons are involved: Socrates himself, so that we know explicitly that Socrates figures in a dialogue of Antisthenes, and a stranger, who is unknown to us. This form reminds us of the Eleatic Stranger in the Parmenides of Plato. The introduction of a stranger in a dialogue is a convenient literary trick, because such a person needs much information to be au courant and this makes it possible to relate all sorts of stories or discussions to him. In any case, it is likely that this dialogue belongs to the Alcibiades of Antisthenes.

2

Alcibiades’ bad behaviour

If this Alcibiades with this kind of content was a dialogue – and we may be sure now that it was – Alcibiades’ merits, his outstanding physical attributes, could not have been proffered in conversation by Alcibiades himself, because this is not done and is therefore implausible. Thus, there must have been another figure to recount them, and this had to be Socrates because he also praises his courage. However, Alcibiades was in Socrates’ company for some time. Therefore, the problem arises how to understand Alcibiades’ later bad behaviour – surely he would have learned virtue from such a master.5 Xenophon defends Socrates’ position and influence by stating that during Alcibiades’ time with Socrates he was not bad at all and profited from Socrates’ influence by being prudent.6 Therefore, Socrates cannot be held responsible for Alcibiades’ later deeds. Here we are confronted with Antisthenes’ theory that it is impossible to lose virtue once it has been acquired.7 Xenophon declares that he himself did not adhere to this theory, but if one sticks to it, there seems only one escape route: Alcibiades’ bad features had been present from the beginning but were restrained or contained by his association with Socrates. Perhaps this was Antisthenes’ way out if he used the case of Alcibiades at all in connection with the problem of the loss of virtue. 4 Ath. 5.55, 216B-C (SSR VA 200; D.C. 33). 5 Xen., Mem. 1.2.12. 6 Xen., Mem. 1.2.12, spec. 24-26. 7 See p. 112 above.

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But how are we to explain the contradiction between praise of Alcibiades in this work (his beauty, courage, etc.) and the fact that there is also a very unfavourable description launched by Antisthenes (his sexual misconduct and incestuous behaviour, which have been mentioned above). Antisthenes explicitly called Alcibiades’ sexual behaviour ‘against the law’. 8 While the unfavourable description is presented in another work, Cyrus or On Kingship, it is of less importance in which work the negative description occurs than what Antisthenes actually thought about him. The negative side must have also come to the fore in Antisthenes’ political views on Alcibiades. Embedded in the work Cyrus or On Kingship, the negative side of Alcibiades must have had to do with politics, because the subject was ruling, as the subtitle indicates. Perhaps Alcibiades was the counter-figure to Cyrus, who was Antisthenes’ favourite. There is more to say about the political issue. As we know from the very opening sentence of this study, Antisthenes condemned the democratic leaders in the political arena of Athens.9

8 9

Ath. 5.63, 220C (SSR VA 141.1-4; D.C. 29A); Eust., Od. κ 7, p. 1645.11-13 (SSR VA 141.4-8; D.C. 29B). See p. 21 above.

Chapter V

Antisthenes and politics

1 Introduction The only fragment of an Antisthenean work entitled Politikos1 tells us ‘that his [sc. Antisthenes] dialogue Politikos contained an attack on all the demagogues at Athens’. Note that this is not a condemnation of democracy, only of the demagogues. It is plausible that Alcibiades was also attacked in this work, or in any case included in it, because the verdict on him must have been rather severe due to the moral disapproval of him (as stated already). Antisthenes’ own attitude can be characterized as taking the middle course. In the personal domain he advised against coming too close to politics, but he did not advise abstaining from it either. Just as one must not come too close to fire with the risk of being burned, so too one must not be too far from the fire with the risk of getting cold.2 He seems to have had no preference for any particular form of constitution, be it oligarchic or democratic, only for the right kind of monarchy.3 He was a citizen of Athens, a democracy, 4 and we do not know of any extended stay in another country.5 As a citizen he participated in the battle of Tanagra (426 B.C.6) and distinguished himself, thus creating for Socrates the opportunity to make a humorous remark, something in the vein of ‘if both Antisthenes’ parents had been Athenians he would not have turned out to be so brave’.7 In the theoretical field he had something positive to say about those who are individually outstanding to such a degree that they are entitled to lay claim to absolute power. We have a suggestion by Antisthenes referring to lions and hares at a human congress (!) requiring all of them to be equal. Obviously we are in the realm of fable. The congress of the lions and the hares appears in Aristotle’s Politics, where Antisthenes is introduced8 in a discussion on the superior man, who is like a god, and for whom there can 1 Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 204; D.C. 43). 2 Stob., Anth. 4.4.28 (SSR VA 70; D.C. 168). 3 Stob., Anth. 4.9.10 (SSR VA 74; D.C. 170). 4 Having a non-Athenian mother (mētroxenos), he did not have full rights, although he took part in military campaigns (Rankin, Antisthenes, 2), see p. 21 above, and also Giannantoni, Nota 21, IV, 198, 199. 5 He is reported to have visited Sparta. 6 Or at Delium (Giannantoni, Nota 21, IV, 199). 7 D.L. 6.1 (SSR VA 3.3-6; D.C. 123.1-3); for his parents see pp. 132-133 below. 8 Arist., Pol. 3.13, 1284a11-17 (SSR VA 68; D.C. 100) and see the comment of Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, III, 243.

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be no legislation. Aesop’s fable 241 provides the only clue for interpretation, but there the lions say to the hares: ‘Where are your claws and teeth?’ In other words, ‘We did the job, so we have claim to a greater share’. It could be a share of the spoils when hunting together and thus metaphorically a major share in power in politics. This was presumably what Antisthenes intended with his reference to the fable. Therefore, Antisthenes was obviously not against a superior ruler like Cyrus, but against a misfit like Alcibiades.9 Incidentally, this interpretation of the fable is uncertain and some scholars have a different explanation. The fable is not about the claims of the powerful, they say, but the comparison suggests that when virtue is at stake men behave like beasts.10 I do not consider this explanation preferable because the context of Aristotle’s discussion is the claim of the superior man to power. If we can trust Aristotle, which is not always the case, the fable is quoted in relation to the claim of the outstanding man. King Cyrus was such a superb figure, King Archelaus possibly his counterpart. Antisthenes’ political ideal was the good monarchy; other forms of state were subject to critical advice, although he did not abandon the democracy. However, there was no chance that the urbanized Greek city-states were going to be transformed into monarchies. Hence, Antisthenes shows little interest in their betterment although he gave the advice that they should select good men as rulers.11 He devoted his attention to the politician himself, culminating in what he had to say about the good king. In addition to his Politikos, this is revealed in his works on model-kings such as Archelaus and Cyrus. According to Diogenes Laertius’ list he wrote no less than four works about Cyrus.

2

Archelaus, the bad king?

There are two works that discuss monarchical rule: Cyrus or On Kingship – the good king 12 and Archelaus or On Kingship – the bad king.13 In the 9 Rankin, Antisthenes, 140 believes that the fable seems to be part of a continuing antidemocratic argument. In my view, it backs the idea of the superior ruler. Rankin provides material about animals in Antisthenes’ thinking. 10 Giannantoni, Nota 40, IV, 404; see also Caizzi, 115. 11 He said that ‘cities are doomed when they are not able to distinguish good men from bad men’ (D.L. 6.5 [SSR VA 71; D.C. 103]). 12 SSR VA 141; D.C. 29; see p. 127 n. 8. We have discussed above his Menexenus and his Aspasia, which were also full of political interest. 13 Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 203; D.C. 42).

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Gorgias, Plato portrays Archelaus as a successful but utterly ruthless king.14 Unfortunately, we have no fragments of Antisthenes’ Archelaus; we only know that in the Archelaus there was an attack on Gorgias.15 Mullach believes that Antisthenes’ opinion about Archelaus did not differ very much from Plato’s negative judgement in his Gorgias, although generally Antisthenes was very eager to contradict Plato or demonstrate alternative judgements to his competitor.16 Many culturally important persons (e.g. poets such as Euripides and Agathon) were invited by this king to come to prosperous Macedonia, and even Socrates is reported to have received an invitation to come in order to be made rich, which he rejected, saying that ‘in Athens corn was not expensive and that water still came from the fountains’.17 It is also plausible that Gorgias was a supporter of Archelaus,18 which could explain the attack on him by both Plato and Antisthenes. A small difficulty arises, in that Antisthenes was said to have been a pupil of Gorgias before he became a follower of Socrates.19 Thus, in Antisthenes’ case this attack could have been a little bit painful. But the attack in the Archelaus is explicitly mentioned and so remains an unavoidable fact. There is much bother in the scholarly literature about the Archelaus but the main point is that it is about proper rule, as its title indicates.20 Antisthenes had a dislike for tyrants. Was Antisthenes’ aversion to bad rulers apparent in what he says about tyrants? This could be in line with an aversion to Archelaus as a bad king. Tyrants do condemnable things; the public hangmen kill off the unjust ones, Antisthenes says, whereas the tyrants kill those who did not do anything wrong. Therefore, the hangmen

14 Plato, Gorgias 470D5-8, 471A4-D2. 15 Ath. 5.63, 220D (SSR VA 203; D.C. 42). 16 Cp. Giannantoni, Nota 36, IV, 350, 352. 17 Epict., fr. 11 (Schenkl). Some believe that this datum originates in Antisthenes’ Archelaus; see Giannantoni, Nota 36, IV, 351. 18 See Dodds, Plato’s Gorgias, 242. 19 See, however, p. 70 n. 58 above for a discussion of this issue. 20 In Giannantoni (Nota 36, IV, 350-354), one finds a synopsis of the vast and controversial literature about the authenticity of the Archelaus and its connections with other Socratic works. This literature focuses on the relation of the Archelaus with the 13th Oratio of Dio Chrysostom, who openly confesses that he is copying a Socratic work which is believed to be the Archelaus. This broad quotation by Dio, however, does not have much to do with the Archelaus, but would be more appropriately connected with the (Pseudo) Platonic Clitophon and Antisthenes’ Protreptikos (see below nn. 25; 27). My point – which in this whole debate remains neglected – is that what we actually know is that the Archelaus is about political rule, as the title indicates, and especially about bad rule, but see below pp. 131-132.

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are more pious.21 Tyrants want to acquire the possessions of their subjects, so they do more horrible things than the destitute22 (who have legitimate reasons for wanting to acquire more). He once said to Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, who was sad because he was mortal, that with the passing of time he would be sad that he was still not dead23 because he would regret his actions. In the same setting there is the attack on demagogues and Alcibiades that we already have confronted. All this concerns bad rule. There is a text that could cause my whole theory about king Archelaus as an example of bad rule to crumble. In Oratio 13, Dio Chrysostom appeals to a logos Sokratikos; if he is referring to a work of Antisthenes, this Antisthenean work would contain a positive judgement on Archelaus, because Dio says: But if they do [sc. laugh at me], I shall be able to say that those words were spoken by a man [sc. Socrates] whom the Greeks admired one and all for his wisdom; and what is more, one whom Apollo actually considered the wisest man in the world, while Archelaus, the king of Macedonia, who knew a great deal and had consorted with many wise men, tried to get him to come to Macedonia, offering him gifts and fees that he might have the privilege of hearing him say such things.24

Since this work contains such a positive judgement of King Archelaus, if it is by Antisthenes, the Archelaus too must have been also positive in regard to the ruling of the king. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that in chapter 30 (and in chapters 14-16) Dio actually refers to a work of Antisthenes; it could be a reference to the Clitophon, which has undeniable correspondences with Dio’s Oratio 13.25 In that case, however, the positive judgement would be equally peculiar if the Clitophon is a Platonic work, 21 Stob., Anth. 4.8.31 (SSR VA 75; D.C. 166): Ἀντισθένης ὁ φιλόσοφος τοὺς δημίους εὐσεβεστέρους ἔλεγεν εἶναι τῶν τυράννων. 22 Xen., Symp. 4.36 (SSR VA 82.9-10; D.C. 117.16-18). 23 Gnom. Vat. no. 5 (SSR VA 32; D.C. 156). 24 D. Chr., Oratio 13(12).30 (not included in SSR VA 208 (D. Chr. 13(12).14-28; not in D.C.): εἰ δὲ μή, ἕξω λέγειν ὅτι εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι ἀνδρὸς ὃν οἵ τε Ἕλληνες ἐθαύμασαν ἅπαντες ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἀπόλλων σοφὸν αὐτὸν ἡγήσατο. καὶ Ἀρχέλαος Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς, πολλὰ εἰδὼς καὶ πολλοῖς συγγεγονὼς τῶν σοφῶν, ἐκάλει αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δώροις καὶ μισθοῖς, ὅπως ἀκούοι αὐτοῦ διαλεγομένου τοὺς λόγους τούτους. We already know Socrates’ answer, see p. 130. 25 In the previous chapters 14-16 the same logos Sokratikos is quoted (SSR VA 208.1-24). The quotation contains important references to the Clitophon (see Giannantoni, Nota 36, IV, 352, 353), a work that cannot be from Antisthenes’ hand because Socrates is pictured as a figure who is the best in exhortation to virtue, but one who fails to explain what virtue is. Such a thing would never have come from Antisthenes’ pen. The Clitophon is rather an attack on Antisthenes against whom one might make the same reproach.

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because Plato’s (authentic) Gorgias is not in favour of the king, not in harmony with Dio’s chapter 30, and thus not with the logos Sokratikos in question. If the Clitophon is not a Platonic work, the positive judgement of the king is also a problem, because in the Clitophon King Archelaus does not appear.26 As such this is odd because Dio’s positive judgement of the king seems to stem directly from the logos Sokratikos that Dio refers to. Thus, the Clitophon cannot have been in Dio’s mind. Many commentators believe that chapters 14-28 originated in Antisthenes’ Protreptikos.27 But if this is the case, then the problem of the positive words in chapter 30 about Archelaus also remain, because Antisthenes’ Archelaus can hardly have been full of his reprehensible acts, let alone have demonstrated that he was an example of the bad king sine qua non. In any case, Antisthenes’ dislike of tyrants and bad rule stands unquestioned. However, if Archelaus was not a bad king, then he might be a good candidate for showing the other side of what rulers can be: the good king.

3

Whence Antisthenes’ preference for Cyrus as the good king?

Cyrus was a model king in Socratic circles, at least in the eyes of Antisthenes and Xenophon, who wrote a Cyropaedia, although the Persian Cyrus belonged to the archenemies of Greece. Sometime during his volatile career, Alcibiades went to the Persians to ask for political and military support. In classical times the Greeks had practically no kings.28 Perhaps this fact makes it less odd that such a distant king as Cyrus was a model of kingship for some Socratics and not for them alone. It is possible that because Antisthenes’ mother was a Thracian, or at least not of Attic blood, he was less invested in Athenian democracy. The Thracians had kings.29 The fact that his mother was not an Athenian provoked him to say to the Athenians who gave themselves airs as being sprung from the soil that this ‘Blut und Boden’ (‘blood and earth’) theory did not make them any better than snails or locusts.30 This remark is typical of 26 Important for the Clitophon and its problems is the thorough study by Slings, A Commentary on the Platonic ‘Clitophon’ (revised as Plato Clitophon). Slings hesitantly chooses the option that the author of the Clitophon is not Plato (ibidem, 257). 27 See Giannantoni, Nota 36, IV, 352, 353. 28 The kings of the Spartans were an exception, but they were more like generals. In Athens there was an archōn basileus, but that was a public function. Macedonia had kings. 29 See p. 133 below. 30 D.L. 6.1 (SSR VA 8; D.C. 123.3-6).

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Antisthenes’ sharp-wittedness. Socrates protected him and retorted when someone remarked that Antisthenes had a Thracian mother: ‘Do you think that he would have become so noble if he had had two Athenian parents?’ suggesting that the answer must be, ‘no’.31 His mother clearly played an important part in all this. In her defence Antisthenes said that the mother of the gods was also a Phrygian (and thus a foreigner).32 His father’s name was also Antisthenes.33 According to some scholars, Antisthenes’ family was rather wealthy because he could afford to be a disciple of Gorgias, who demanded a fair sum of money for his lectures.34 His father was a dealer in salt fish and Antisthenes said that ‘his father wiped his nose on his sleeve’, which was characteristic of a dealer in salt fish. Antisthenes ironically quoted Homer: ‘From this provenance and blood I pretend to be’ (Il. 6, 211), which by its irony does not suppose a high rank in society. Typically it is said in a style all his own.35 In this connection there is more evidence that Antisthenes was of rather low birth because he said that ‘the well-born are the same as virtuous’.36 One does not say such a thing if one belongs to the well-born. For his devastating opinion on the Athenians choice of generals the reader is referred to the first page of this study. We are told that he said this in disapproval of their method of holding elections; he says ‘to you’ [sc. the Athenians], using the second person plural in order to get some distance from the Athenians and their constitution.37 Perhaps all this made him more open-minded in political affairs and prone to accept a deviant ideal, the more so, because Cyrus was generally regarded as a noble, virtuous man who liberated the Persians from the Medes. Aeschylus’ judgement of him was already very positive38, as was Xenophon’s.

31 D.L. 2.31 (SSR VA 3.1-3; D.C. 124.) About the origin of his mother, see Giannantoni, Nota 21, IV, 198. 32 D.L. 6.1 (SSR VA 1.1-3; D.C. 122A). 33 D.L. 6.1 (SSR VA 1.1-3; D.C. 122A). This seems odd because a son was usually named after a grandfather. In Xenophon there is another man with this name, a businessman and general (Mem. 3.4.1-4). 34 Giannantoni, Nota 21, IV,199, but see my discussion p. 161. 35 Eust., Il. Ζ 211 (SSR VA 6; not in D.C.) Cp. D.L. 4.47 about Bion of Borysthenes. 36 D.L. 6.10 (SSR VA 134.1-3; D.C. 69). As such this thesis is interesting, because the Stoics later had their paradoxes which are similar to this example and may have been inspired by it. The Stoics said e.g. that the wise man is the truly rich man. See pp. 147-148 below on orthosemantics. 37 D.L. 6.8 (SSR VA 72; D.C. 169). 38 Aesch., Pers. 767-772.

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Antisthenes’ Cyrus works and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia

Because of the scant information it is difficult to establish the precise contents of Antisthenes’ works on Cyrus.39 Cicero read one of the Cyrus works with pleasure, as we have seen. 40 It is worth noting that Cicero was also very much interested in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, of which he said: ‘The well-known Cyrus (Cyropaedia) was written about not in conformity with the truth of history, but as a representation of a just government’ (‘Cyrus ille’ a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus est, sed ad effigiem iusti imperii). 41 Cicero followed the last part of the Cyropaedia in De Senectute. Therefore, it is not odd that Cicero also read the Cyrus of Antisthenes with attention and pleasure. 42 Cicero was most interested in the character of the sketch of the ideal monarch Cyrus, and as the subtitle says (On Kingship) it must have been about proper rule and probably the education necessary for forming a good ruler. The key thought may be contained in the following remark Antisthenes launched at Cyrus, as we learn from a testimonial according to which he says: ‘Have you not heard? It is the task of a king to do good, Cyrus, and to be ill-spoken of’. 43 This utterance was repeated by Marcus Aurelius, who very often felt people spoke ill of him, whereas his intentions actually were to do good. 44 Maintaining independence – keeping a distance from what people say or think – and sticking to what you believe to be for the good of all the people are the best principles for a monarch. These are in line with Antisthenes’ own practice of maintaining his autonomy from public opinion. Once, applauded by bad people,45 he remarked ‘I am horribly afraid that I have done something wrong’. 46 There is also a more neutral and more 39 There is trouble about the four Cyrus works (see Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 295) which as such is not so important when it comes to the contents of the scarce fragments we have. The data we have about Cyrus in the fragments are not transmitted as parts of the Cyrus’ works; see further below n. 47. 40 See p. 24 above. 41 Cic., Ad Q. Fr. 1.8.23. I take ille in the sense of ‘well known’. 42 There is some trouble with the title of one of the Cyrus works (Cic., Ad Att. 12.38.5 [SSR VA 84; D.C. 13]) because there is also a reading ‘Kyrsa’ (Kyrsa was an admirer of Socrates). Because of Cicero’s interest in the Cyropaedia I am inclined to believe that ‘Cyrus’ was the title and not ‘Kyrsa’. This suits the context in Cicero more; see Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 296. 43 Epict., Diss. 4.6.20 (SSR VA 86.1-2; D.C. 20A). 44 M. Aur., Med. 7.36 (SSR VA 86.3-4; D.C. 20B). 45 He was not averse to the company of evil men. When he was censured for this he said: ‘Well, physicians attend their patients without getting the fever themselves’ (D.L. 6.6 [SSR VA 167.3-4; D.C. 186]). 46 D.L. 6.5 (SSR VA 88.1-2; D.C. 178A); Gnom. Vat. no. 9 (SSR VA 88.2-4; D.C. 178B).

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striking version (where it is no longer bad people praising him). Someone said to him ‘many men praise you’, to which he reposted, ‘What wrong have I done?’47 In the quotation above about the high status of kingship the morally beautiful idea is brought to Cyrus, who is the person addressed. Apparently it is good advice within the framework of the education of a prince, i.e. the principle of teaching named paideia. One is immediately reminded of Xenophon’s work the Cyropaedia, which also deals with Cyrus’ education. 48 We may assume that in any case the education of a prince (Cyrus) and the mental attitude appropriate for a king were important parts of what Antisthenes had to say about Cyrus. A passage that discusses something similar is sometimes ascribed to the Cyrus. 49 When King Cyrus observed a woman with a beautiful form a bystander said ‘as a king you are allowed to use this woman if you want to’; to which Cyrus replied ‘but it is not permissible for a king not to be prudent’. Even if what Cyrus says here does not occur in the paideia part of the dialogue, he in any case is shown to have learned about ruling and the task of a good king: to do good. He takes this seriously even though the man in the street (and perhaps most of his subjects) would not have spoken ill of him if he had done what he had wanted to. When asked what was the most important thing to learn, Cyrus said ‘to unlearn bad things’.50 Again, he is depicted as a man of good will. 47 D.L. 6.8 (SSR VA 89; D.C. 178C). Cp. D.L. 6.7 (SSR VA 90; D.C. 85). These fragments tell the same story and are embedded under the heading Cyrus (dialogue) in Giannantoni. It seems to me that these fragments on the rather surprising rejection of public recognition by Antisthenes himself cannot have been part of the dialogue which was devoted to Cyrus, his education, and perhaps other aspects. It is people around Antisthenes that spoke to him about his so-called good name, not Cyrus or other partners in the dialogue. But it is true, that the fragments stem from the same mental attitude and are in line with the emphasis on the independence of a king in regard to public opinion (‘to be ill spoken of’). 48 In the Cyropaedia, the education and the rise of Cyrus as a king are sketched. This latter point (the rise) is not necessarily a part of Antisthenes’ Cyrus, because it is about ruling and not military subjects; see Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 305, who quotes Dahmen, Quaestiones Xenophonteae, 35. He believes that Xenophon’s Cyropaedia is a completion of the Cyrus of Antisthenes, which we should not expect to have military subjects. One must bear in mind that Xenophon had a military career and connections with Cyrus the Younger. Sometimes this Cyrus the Younger is assumed to be subject of the work Cyrus, which as for Cyrus or On Kingship is implausible because the Younger Cyrus never became king. It is possible that one of the works in Diogenes Laertius’ list with the title Cyrus was dedicated to this Cyrus the Younger with whom Xenophon was acquainted (see Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 299). 49 Giannantoni, Nota 31, IV, 301. 50 Ars., Viol. p. 502.13-14 (SSR VA 87.1-2; D.C. 21A). This remark is also ascribed to Antisthenes himself (Stob., Anth. 2.31.34 [SSR VA 87.2-4; D.C. 21B]); see also p. 112 above. The ascription to Antisthenes himself is found in four sources. The fact, however, that the remark is ascribed

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As a good king, Cyrus compared himself to a shepherd who takes good care of his flocks: a king must take care of his subjects, their properties, and their cities in the same way.51 Xenophon’s Cyropaedia contains a related utterance: ‘Indeed, a saying of his [sc. Cyrus] is handed down comparing a good king to a good ‘shepherd’ (νομεύς) – the shepherd must manage his flock by giving them all they need, and the king must satisfy the needs of his cities and his subjects if he is to manage them. We need not wonder, then, that with such opinions his ambition was to excel mankind in courtesy and care’. This idea of Cyrus as the good shepherd could be Antisthenean, launched in Antisthenes’ Cyrus.52 A central point of Antisthenes’ Cyrus, stressed also in the Heracles, is that ‘effort’ (ponos) is an indispensible good. Cyrus’s rise to kingship was a path he paved with much effort. There is a tradition accepted by Antisthenes which states that Cyrus started out as a slave at court.53 His efforts as a slave were strenuous and character-building; there is a correspondence with the efforts of Heracles, who had to perform heavy work in his twelve labours in service to a king and for this received his reward in heaven. This correspondence was exploited by Antisthenes. The fragment quoted places them next to each other although appearing in different works, rightly as it seems. Ponos is the link, considered to be foundational in the upbringing of a king. In the Cyrus we find also strong criticism of Alcibiades, who was apparently the opposite of Cyrus the good king – both in having a privileged early life, and in the way his life ended.54 This pairing of Cyrus and Alcibiades was perhaps a contribution of Antisthenes, and is in any case an important item in his philosophy.55 It is important to note that for a teacher like Antisthenes it was almost necessary to design a political ideal because politics would have been the centre of attention of his pupils who would have asked him how to take a specifically to King Cyrus indicates the authenticity of this ascription, because the mention of the king presupposes special knowledge, whereas the mention of the name ‘Antisthenes’ is more general. It remains possible that Antisthenes used the expression (‘to unlearn the bad things’) two or more times. The ascription to King Cyrus legitimates the embedding of the fragment under the heading Cyrus. 51 Xen., Cyr. 8.2.14. According to Höistad (Cynic Hero, 80) a Socratic thesis. 52 See Joël, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, II, 410. 53 There is another tradition that has him grow up at court; see Höistad, Cynic Hero, 83, 92. It is not surprising in view of Antisthenes’ own youth in socially lower class environment that he chose the other tradition. 54 Ath. 5.63, 220C (SSR VA 141.1-4; D.C. 29A). 55 See Höistad, Cynic Hero and Cynic King, 88.

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stand on political issues.56 Antisthenes’ and Xenophon’s interest in and preference for the Persian kings was an answer to one issue of the day because the subject of how to construct a good state was popular, as Aristotle tells us.57 Plato’s Republic was inspired by the same atmosphere. The art of being a king (βασιλικὴ τέχνη) is a subject in Plato’s Euthydemus,58 where the fact that the discussion comes to a dead end could be taken as an attack on ideas as launched by Xenophon and Antisthenes.

5

Good and bad in the state

Generally, Antisthenes rejected the inclusion of vicious men in the state. ‘It is odd’, he said ‘that we weed out the darnel from the corn and the unfit in war, but do not exclude the evil man from the state’.59 He saw the disadvantages of war – small wonder, having himself participated in the Battle at Tanagra.60 Another fragment runs: ‘When someone said that the war will destroy the poor, Antisthenes said, “And it will make many men poor”’, turning the statement around. He also confirmed that ‘[c]ities are doomed when they are unable to distinguish good men from bad’.61 These bad men should be excluded from power: ‘It is risky to give a knife to a mad man62 and power to a bad man’.63 Being bad is condemnable, but the problem is that in what is left of Antisthenes’ work we cannot find what criteria he applied to establish whether a man is bad – the same goes for the wise or the good man: what makes him good or wise? At best we have some characteristics. The wise man, Antisthenes said, will be a member of the political community but he does not follow the established laws; rather, he follows the laws of virtue.64 Again we are kept ignorant as to what these laws of virtue exactly are. It could be supposed that Antisthenes adhered to a double concept of ‘the just’: the just according to law and the just according to nature. Such 56 See pp. 128-129 above. 57 Arist., Pol. 2.7, 1266a31-34. 58 Plato, Euthd. 292A4-C5. 59 D.L. 6.6 (SSR VA 73; D.C. 104). 60 See p. 128 above. 61 D.L. 6.5 (SSR VA 71; D.C. 103). 62 ‘The mad man’ is a favourite theme of Antisthenes; see pp. 33-34 above. 63 Ps.-Max. 9.45 (9.77/80, p. 239 Ihm) (SSR VA 76; D.C. 105). Rankin (Antisthenes, 139) hardly considers this statement a testimonial in favour of demokratia. But it could be of a more general tendency. 64 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 134.7-8; D.C. 101).

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an opposition between custom and nature is not absent from Antisthenes’ philosophy,65 but I think that the utterance that the wise man follows the laws of virtue does not contain a rejection of the established laws. Rather, it refers to another specific intention of the man who is wise. Antisthenes’ master Socrates carefully followed the laws of the state, which, ironically, eventually led to his death. This cannot have passed Antisthenes unnoticed, who was present when Socrates took the poison.66 Because Antisthenes cannot be taken to have deviated from his former master’s attitude on this topic, I do not believe that he intended to posit a real opposition between the laws of virtue and the laws of the state. ‘Being just is good for those who want to be immortal; and the just are even preferable to relatives’; thus, according to this fragment, to be just and to have the right attitude as a citizen remain extremely important. Therefore, I cannot accept the thesis that according to Antisthenes the state must be administered according to the laws of virtue.67 The administration of the state is not the issue; he seems to have respected the law of the state, as manifested in his condemnation of the sexual behaviour of Alcibiades and Cimon, who acted ‘against the law’ (παρανόμως). Furthermore, there is a work entitled On the Law or On the Constitution in Diogenes Laertius’ list. The issue is rather with the individual wise citizen’s proper intention and characteristics. Several scholars want to wrench a political theory on the state from Antisthenes, but this is difficult, if not impossible.68 It must be admitted that with what remains we cannot reach beyond the role of the individual. At best we find a concept of homonoia of groups in the state corresponding to homonoia with oneself, but Giannantoni affirms plausibly that this concept has no political meaning.69 The basis on which an Antisthenean theory on homonoia in whatever form could be accepted is fragile; there is only one relevant fragment which runs: ‘When brothers are united, no wall is so strong as their common life’.70 Furthermore, I do not think that he had any systematic political theory like Plato’s. He was not a utopian. On the contrary, 65 See p. 75 above and Giannantoni, Nota 40 , IV, 404. Giannantoni (Nota 40, IV, 409) seems to accept this opposition in Antisthenes’ thought regarding ‘the just’. 66 See p. 35 n. 17 above. 67 See Giannantoni, Nota 40, IV, 409, referring to Durič, ‘Die politischen Anschauungen’. According to Rankin (Antisthenes, 144), the philosopher does not pursue his political career (πολιτεύεσθαι) in accordance with the legislated nomoi, but in agreement with the law of aretē (‘virtue’). The verb πολιτεύεσθαι can mean both ‘live as a free citizen’ and ‘take part in the government’ (LSJ). 68 Giannantoni, Nota 40, IV, 411, and especially Höistadt, Cynic Hero, 107. 69 Giannantoni, Nota 40, IV, 409. 70 D.L. 6.6 (SSR VA 108; D.C. 92).

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he sought political salvation in the past (as with Cyrus). Antisthenes had only his broad expectations of the good and just man, especially the education of this man, who was moderately involved in the political life in the state. Ultimately, this is in line with his preference for monarchy and his interest in the good king: Antisthenes’ ‘political theory’ had more to do with the monarchy than with democracy or other forms of state.

6

Social theory

Antisthenes also wrote a work on Freedom and Slavery, only one statement of which is extant: ‘He who fears other people does not notice that he has become a slave’.71 Most scholars believe that this remark belonged to Freedom and Slavery. Because of its contents this ascription is plausible. There is a free man, but on account of fear of other people he no longer has power over himself, but has as it were another as master, thus becoming a slave who has no power over himself. This is a very interesting psychological observation, but it has nothing to do with social relations as such nor with social theory. If Antisthenes had launched some revolutionary insights into society we would have more information about Freedom and Slavery. His view on the virtues of men and women was indeed revolutionary: they have the same virtue. This seems to be an answer to an actual issue and the tradition has preserved this rather revolutionary point of view. But we know no more than that, not even where this point of view was put forward.72

71 Stob., Anth. 3.8.14 (SSR VA 79; D.C. 119). 72 See p. 151 below.

Chapter VI The wise 1

The wise person

The centre of Antisthenes’ ethics is the wise person. Those who act with wisdom act in accordance with complete virtue, as seen when Antisthenes exploits the warning of Athena in Homer.1 The interpretation of Homer makes its contribution to ethics, since virtue and wisdom are two interconnected concepts. The wise want to live in conformity with virtue, and it is the wise who possess virtue. Moreover, virtue is teachable. Not only does his whole didactic practice depend on the teachability of virtue, but so too does the central concept of the wise person. If there was no teachability, there would be no wise man. Wisdom and virtue form a symbiotic unity. Furthermore, as previously noted, virtue once acquired cannot be lost: ‘Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away’.2 This highly debated point is, in Antisthenes’ eyes, very important and he is explicitly reported to have adhered to this theory, as we have seen.3 I believe there is some absurdity in the idea that a wise person could lose his or her virtue, because then the person would stop being wise. In order to acquire the right insight the wise person does not need to use many different forms of reasoning, Antisthenes said, nor does it require a great deal of learning. 4 It is all a question of practice – actions or deeds rather than words. On the other hand, the vicious require a lot of reasons. There is a slight contradiction here because Antisthenes elsewhere stresses the importance of reasoning.5 We are not told what kind of reasoning leads to virtue, although such thinking will have the force of walls. Walls [sc. of the centre] must be constructed in our own impregnable methods of reasoning.6 The centre where such methods of reasoning function is ‘wisdom’ 1 See p. 102 above. 2 D.L. 6.12 (SSR VA 134.11-13; D.C. 71). This remark does not necessarily imply that virtue cannot be lost, it only says that from a person who has virtue, this virtue cannot be taken away by another person, presumably because it is his spiritual property. It remains possible that with time the virtue would fade away. However, it is explicitly stated in another fragment that virtue is not capable of being lost (ἀναπόβλητος D.L. 6.105 [SSR VA 99; D.C. 23]). See also my discussion of the possibility of virtue remaining always (p. 112). 3 See pp. 111-112 above. 4 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70). 5 See pp. 112-113 above. 6 D.L. 6.13 (SSR VA 134.17-18; D.C. 63).

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(phronēsis), but we are not told according to what standards they are to be formed in this centre of the self, nor precisely how they are constructed. The wise are self-sufficient and everything belongs to the wise, that is, they possess all the things they need. While they do not need others, they do recognize their fellows.7 Nothing good is foreign or impracticable for those who are wise; but all bad actions are repugnant, they are ugly and shameful. The above utterances are given in terms of formulas or sayings that are meant to be short summaries of Antisthenes’ opinions. In addition to these, we possess the moral points made in the interpretation of myths. Together they form our only material. Unfortunately, there are no authentic elaborated moral arguments, only the reasoning presented in Xenophon’s works which are suspect in the sense that we cannot know how far they match Antisthenes’ own works or actually render his own opinions. The main issue is how much Xenophon took over from Antisthenes, if anything at all. Brancacci believes that he did, but I doubt it very much.8 It is a bit infra dignitatem to do so. The best strategy for the modern reader is to confront Xenophon’s ascriptions with what can be gathered from other sources. We shall return to Xenophon in the next chapter.

2

The wise as models

On the one hand we are confronted with the notion that virtue cannot be lost, but on the other hand, in order to practise virtue one needs the strength of a Socrates, which is not easy to emulate. Therefore we must ask: is it even possible? Are these two points reconcilable? The concept of those who are wise with their sharp insight seems to be more of an inspirational model than a commonly found reality. The one who practises wisdom seems to be modelled on Socrates, who demonstrated his understanding in conversations that impressed his followers (and not only them) extremely. His death confirmed his convictions which, on many occasions, were surprising, and his death as a martyr to these convictions must have been extraordinarily memorable, as we learn in the Phaedo death scene, where Antisthenes is in attendance. Small wonder that Antisthenes said that virtue needed the 7 All these and the following characteristics in D.L. 6.10-13 (6.10: SSR VA 134.1-3 = D.C. 69; 6.11: SSR VA 134.3-5 = D.C. 70; 134.5-6 = D.C. 80; 134.6-7 = D.C. 95; 134.7-8 = D.C. 101; 6.12: SSR VA 134.9 = D.C. 81; 134.10-11 = D.C. 79; 134.11-13 = D.C. 71; 134.13-14 = D.C. 76; 134.14-15 = D.C. 74; 134.15 = D.C. 72; 134.15-16 = D.C. 73; 6.13: SSR VA 134.16-17 = D.C. 88). 8 Oikeios logos, 114 = Antisthène, 101.

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strength of a Socrates. In his turn Antisthenes offered a model that had its own influence. There is a foreshadowing of the Stoic model of the wise who have attributes that are beyond human capacities just like the ones Antisthenes describes. The Stoic model, however, is even more unrealistic.

Chapter VII

Antisthenes and Xenophon

1 Introduction Antisthenes appears occasionally in Xenophon’s Memorabilia and in his Symposium. His performance is often in character: he is presented as not the most subtle debater or participant in the talks that Xenophon describes, or rather in the talks that Xenophon constructs. Xenophon is not reliable, as is well known. His claims to have been present at conversations he describes are notorious because at times it is obvious that he could not have been present (e.g. being only seven in 422 B.C., the date of his Symposium).1 Nevertheless, this does not imply that everything he tells us is false. We have to reckon with the fact that he could have used authentic material that he couched in the form of the conversations or descriptions. There are indeed many subjects presented in Xenophon’s works which were also discussed by Antisthenes. We have already seen the interest of both writers in Cyrus, and both have something to say about the teachability of virtue, although they differ on this point. But there is much more correspondence. In Giannantoni2 there is a long list of the possible influences Antisthenes had on Xenophon – bait for scholarly discussion because many of the socalled influences are not much more than vague suggestions. There is an interesting fragment that states that Antisthenes was one of Socrates’ closest friends and followers and that he never abandoned him (Mem. 2.11.17). When Xenophon makes Antisthenes appear in a conversation about friendship, he explicitly says that he, Xenophon, heard this conversation (Mem. 2.5.1-5). Xenophon must have been keen on what Antisthenes had to say about Socrates and his views.

2

Jealousy and envy

Antisthenes said that jealousy consumes people the way rust affects iron: ‘As iron is eaten away by rust, so he said, the envious are consumed by their own habit’.3 In Xenophon and also elsewhere (e.g. Plato Apology 1 Giannantoni, Nota 23, IV, 209. In the Oeconomicus Xenophon saddles Socrates with a series of economical views which no one can believe Socrates ever held. 2 Giannantoni, Nota 23, IV, 214. 3 D.L. 6.5 (SSR VA 129; D.C. 82), see Giannantoni, Nota 23, IV, 218.

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33A6-8), Socrates says that he does not ‘begrudge’ (φθονέω, φθόνος) or refuse to grant other people the benefits of his companionship. In fact, we find the same notion in Xenophon’s Symposium spoken by the character Antisthenes, who says that he distributes the riches of his soul to his friends without jealousy or grudge. 4 Apparently, it is Socratic common stock not to begrudge friends the benefits of one’s insights but to bestow them freely. Thus, other people can also acquire these riches, for example, in conversation with Antisthenes. We have already encountered scenes in which someone asked, for instance, whom he should marry or other such questions. This is in line with what the Symposium describes, that Antisthenes did not refuse to grant his mental or intellectual riches to others. Xenophon explicitly confirms that Socrates also did not demand any money for his companionship, he was even attacked on this point: was what he had to say so worthless that he did not ask a fee?5 But here a difference arises between the two philosophers. We have already seen that Antisthenes did charge high fees for his lessons. What about this contradiction? The simplest solution is the assumption that his pupils had to pay for lessons, whereas conversations among friends and also direct questions from passers-by were money-free. But there is more to say regarding Antisthenes’ ideas about jealousy or envy. In a speech by Odysseus, jealousy is presented as the wish for the beautiful, but such jealousy comes at a price.6 Antisthenes’ statement about rust is different from the notion of ‘grudge’ inasmuch as it presents a fine psychological observation which touches another side of jealousy: envy (φθόνος). Whereas what we quoted from Plato and Xenophon only speaks about the notion of grudge in the sense of not refusing to give to other people one’s mental treasures, Antisthenes’ remark strikingly depicts the destructive effect of jealousy on one’s own personality. To be jealous with regard to other people is to envy what they have and wish to have it oneself. Antisthenes does not stop at the signification ‘grudge’, but he testifies to a deeper understanding of this matter: one embitters one’s own life. This theme does not emerge elsewhere and could be considered Antisthenes’ personal contribution to this matter.

4 Xen., Symp. 4.43 (SSR VA 82.41-42; D.C. 117.57-59). 5 Xen., Mem., 1.6.11-14. 6 See p. 189 (13) below.

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3 Friendship We have no specific work on friendship written by Antisthenes, nor do we have one on jealousy. Scattered remarks are the only testimonies we possess. Xenophon has a chapter dedicated to friendship with Antisthenes as a participant in the conversation and with Xenophon’s personal signature: he tells us that he was present in person.7 (incidentally, the latter is doubtful because as we know 8 Xenophon is not reliable when his presence is at stake). Nor do the contents satisfy scholars, inasmuch as the beginning of the text is not in harmony with the end. In the chapter in question, Socrates, having noticed that one of his companions has neglected to care for a poverty-stricken friend, poses the question of whether friends differ in value, just as one pays more money for a better slave. He directs the question to Antisthenes in the presence of some others including the uncaring friend. Antisthenes says that he values some friends above others, and those friends he values ‘any sum’ to have him among his friends.9 The idea must also be applied to oneself: a friend must ask ‘what am I worth to my friends?’. In this way, friends try to make themselves as precious as possible to their friends so that friends are not tempted to betray them. Just as a bad slave is sold for the highest price he can get, it can be tempting ‘to sell a bad friend when there is a chance of getting more than he is worth’. Good servants, Socrates finds, are not offered for sale nor are good friends betrayed. Some scholars find it odd that in the end the uncaring friend seems exculpated (although it is not explicitly stated) because there is a suggestion that the poverty-stricken friend has not done his utmost to be a precious friend to the negligent one.10 This supposed exculpation does not ring true. Patzer says: ‘Am Anfang sieht es so aus, als sollte der treulose Freund für 7 Xen., Mem., 2.5.1-3 (SSR VA 110.1-9; only mentioned by Caizzi in a note on D.C. 79, p. 113). Giannantoni rightly incorporated Xenophon’s chapter, because in it Antisthenes is mentioned and it contains a view on friendship that perhaps Antisthenes held or at least accepted. It is not likely that the other Antisthenes, the general and money-man (although money does play a role in the discussion) is meant, because this man is only referred to and not a participant in the conversation (cp. Mem. 3.4.3) like our Antisthenes. 8 See p. 143 above. 9 Gigon (1956, 124) states that one could be sligthly surprised that a man who confesses in the Symposium (3.8) to possess not even an obol, would pay such large sums for a friend. Giannantoni (Nota, IV, 59) does not share this surprise, because it is only a matter of extending Socrates’ words. I agree. It is Socrates’ comparison between friends and slaves and their value that provokes the talk about money. 10 Patzer, Antisthenes, 49, 56-59.

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sein Verhalten getadelt werden … . Am Ende kommt gerade das Gegenteil heraus: Der Treulose ist gerechtfertigt, und alle Schuld fällt auf den Armen, der nicht Sorge getragen hat, seinem Freund so wertvoll zu sein, dass er nicht verlassen wurde’. [‘In the beginning it looks as if the uncaring (friend) would be rebuked for his attitude … At the end the opposite turns out to be the case. The uncaring (friend) is justified, and all blame is laid on the povertystricken (friend), who has not taken care to be of so much worth to his friend that he would not be let down.’] Patzer sees ‘ein Kompositionsbruch’ and quotes Gigon, who observed ‘ein Widerspruch oder zum mindesten ein schwerer Hiatus des Gedankens’.11 Patzer believes that Xenophon found some material and incorporated it into his book in a rather superficial way: originally the paradox about the money value of friends was presumably eliminated, but as it stands in Xenophon now it makes little sense. This is a rather strong accusation and in my view incorrect. Xenophon explicitly says at the opening of the piece that Socrates wanted to exhort listeners to self-examination by asking how much a friend is worth to another friend. This is the central theme of the whole conversation – the value of friendship and the realization of what one means to one’s friend. The neglect of the poverty-stricken friend is not the point; what is at stake is whether he is worth the money one could give to him, hence the taxation of the value of friends expressed in minas analogous to the value of slaves. Scholars have not grasped Socrates’ intention because they start from a simple and sound morally standard idea: one does not abandon a friend. This is the reason why they have misinterpreted Xenophon’s rendering of the conversation. But Socrates intended, surprisingly, to observe friendship from another, opposite angle: the effort it takes to make oneself precious to a friend. The poor friend vanishes from the scene, and perhaps in the end Socrates would not deny that some aid would be good. But that is not said nor is it what is at stake. It is interesting both that the poverty-stricken friend is absent and that the seemingly unfaithful friend is present at the conversation. It would be rather crude, even painful to develop the theory in the presence of the poor friend, because then there would be the personal suggestion that he did not do his best to be of value for his rich friend. The presence of this uncaring friend is not odd at all, because he is the one who stands to learn the lesson of being worth as much as possible to his friends, and the other companions must learn the same.12 In the end, the rich friend 11 Patzer, Antisthenes, 49. 12 Patzer believes the presence of the uncaring friend is needed so that he can be reprimanded in the following section (Antisthenes, 49).

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might even conclude that the poor friend has done much to be his friend and that he owed it to him to come to his aid, but none of this is said. One wonders why Antisthenes is involved. According to Patzer, Antisthenes does nothing other than confirm what Socrates says. Nothing characteristic is revealed of Antisthenes himself, neither in the development of the argument nor in formal peculiarities, except perhaps for the introduction of the notion of ponos (‘effort’), which could have an Antisthenean ring to it. To Patzer Antisthenes is portrayed simply as a parrot. To be sure his role lacks originality, but do we have to leave it at that? Xenophon esteemed Antisthenes as one of the most eager followers of Socrates, as we saw already.13 If Antisthenes confirmed and extended whatever Socrates said about the value of a friend, what Antisthenes confirmed can perhaps be taken as his own opinion. In fact, what Socrates does is in line with Antisthenes’ own conduct, turning around an established opinion in order to surprise the audience in this manner. Therefore, it does not seem farfetched to suppose that Xenophon assimilated some authentic matter that he had found in Antisthenes’ work, although it is impossible to trace because there is no specific work dedicated to the subject of friendship. However all this may be, we have likely detected here a piece of calculated Antisthenean thinking about friendship.

4

Friendship and ‘orthosemantics’

There is more to the notion of ‘friend’, namely a surprising semantic manoeuvre by Antisthenes with this statement: ‘The good are friends’.14 . However many reasons there may be in a normal life to become friends, here a new and definite norm is introduced: the good. Someone that is morally impeccable will be a true friend to others who are good and vice versa. This new surprising semantic approach is typically Antisthenean, and as far as I can see was introduced by him. There is a two-layered form of semantics at work, the ordinary and the philosophical. For convenience’s sake I shall call this philosophical form ‘orthosemantics’: only the philosopher fathoms the true sense of such a word. The meaning of ‘the good are friends’ is not that the good by being good are mutual friends, which as such is not impossible, but I prefer to develop the orthosemantic interpretation because we find such an interpretation also elsewhere in Antisthenes. There is more. In the 13 See p. 143 above. 14 D.L. 6.12 (SSR VA 134.10-11; D.C. 79).

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statement ‘the good man is worthy of love’, love gets a new status. The good attracts love. Before Antisthenes being good was not considered worthy of love in a specific sense,15 but he believes it must be so. If there could be doubt concerning an orthosemantic interpretation in the two cases just discussed, no doubt is possible in the third case I adduce. This is the most convincing orthosemantic example because it allows only such an interpretation and no other one. The remark that ‘the wellborn are the same as those who stick to virtue’16 casts fresh light on the issue of what ‘wellborn’ means. The true meaning here is that one’s moral behaviour not one’s descent is the mark of being wellborn. This opinion clearly has its background in the lower social status of Antisthenes’ father, as previously discussed.17 It seems likely that the Stoa took over and extended this form of (ortho-) semantics in the so-called Stoic paradoxes (e.g. in their description of the one who is wise as the true friend or the truly rich), whatever the usual sense may be in daily conversation.18 Having discussed important notions in Antisthenes’ ethics, I also see a possibility of viewing Antisthenes at work, as if in an anachronistic film. Xenophon has taken up Antisthenes in his Symposium, so we can experience Antisthenes’ conversational conduct first hand, albeit in fictional form.

15 In fact, Antisthenes has the same view as Plato, who in his Symposium also has erōs given a specific philosophical content, the striving for Beauty. 16 D.L. 6.10 (SSR VA 134.1-3; D.C. 69). 17 See p. 133 above. 18 See Chrysipp. F 617, SVF III, 158.34-39; F 594, SVF III, 155.19-23; F 595, SVF III, 155.25-34. Cp. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, I, 432. Chrysippus supplied a theoretical basis in his work On Zeno’s Proper Use of Terminology, whereas Antisthenes only introduced the method.

Chapter VIII A portrait of Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium

1

Antisthenes in Xenophon’s Symposium

I offer here a discussion of some passages from Xenophon’s Symposium in which a portrait of Antisthenes is presented in conversational action. This significant work can be seen as a counterpart to Plato’s Symposium, which is far more well known because of its philosophical depth and style. However, it is hard to accept that Xenophon’s text was written after Plato’s, although it does not have the grandeur of Plato’s unforgettably rich work. Yet, most commentators believe that Plato’s was prior.1 Guthrie, who does not admire Xenophon’s Symposium very much, speaks about its ‘naivety’, and says that ‘structurally the composition creaks at every joint’.2 I am inclined to side with Patzer who says: ‘Es bleibt im Folgenden zu untersuchen, welche Rolle Antisthenes im Rahmen dieser wohldurchdachten und recht kunstvollen dreiteiligen Gesamtkonzeption spielt’.3 [‘It remains to be investigated in the following what part Antisthenes plays within this well-considered and quite ingenious tripartite composition’]. Antisthenes comes to the scene as a central figure in Xenophon’s Symposium; one of the speeches is even given to him. He is the only future philosopher in the company of Socrates and he appears in this capacity as the most dedicated follower. There is reason to believe that Xenophon presented Antisthenes as he thought that he actually was: somewhat rough and very direct. In the Symposium, Socrates himself ascribes such a character to Antisthenes. 4 Patzer assumes the pursuit of realism to be behind this 1 Patzer, Antisthenes, 60. The majority believe that Xenophon possessed too little originality to be able to invent the idea of writing a Symposium, although incidentally, he was original enough to design the Oeconomicus, with subjects no one could expect Socrates to be interested in. 2 Guthrie III, 342. 3 Patzer, Antisthenes, 61. 4 Xen., Symp. 8.4-7 (SSR VA 14.1-10; not in D.C.): Socrates uses strong words to Antisthenes: (4) ‘Now, please, do not be difficult at present’ (Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄχλον πάρεχε. ὄχλος means annoyance, trouble); and further: (6) ‘By the gods, Antisthenes, if only you don’t wear me out’ (Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς με; συγκόψῃς signif ies ‘wear out’); ‘All other difficult behaviour on your part I will bear now and in the future as a friend’ (τὴν δ᾿ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα ἐγώ σου καὶ φέρω καὶ οἴσω φιλικῶς; χαλεπότητα means ‘being difficult’). Thus,

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portrait of Antisthenes; he presents a thorough and often convincing commentary on this passage in his chapter ‘Der Xenophontische Antisthenes’.5 Xenophon could not have been present at the scene, although he claims that he was there.6 If he was not present, from where did he derive his material? It is likely that he took some material from memories of his contact with Socrates and from his own reading of works by Antisthenes, who did not write a Symposium himself, although he did write many works that were counterparts of books by Plato.7 If Antisthenes had written a Symposium (none is mentioned on Diogenes Laertius’ list), he would not have made an acceptable participant in Xenophon’s work.8 The fact that he gave Antisthenes a prominent role would indicate that Xenophon took sides in the competitive and even combative relations between Plato and Antisthenes. Plato’s name is absent from the Oeconomicus, and only in passing does his name occur in the Memorabilia.9 It is an interesting moment in the Memorabilia because Xenophon appeals to Plato’s being well known as Socrates’ companion; for Plato’s sake Socrates is talked into speaking with Glauco, Plato’s elder brother. Thus, Plato is supposed Socrates uses rather rough terms to indicate that in his conversations Antisthenes has a habit of rudely manifesting himself. The complete text runs: (4) σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, οὐδενὸς ἐρᾷς; Ναὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος, καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώψας ὡς δὴ θρυπτόμενος εἶπε· Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄχλον πάρεχε· ὡς γὰρ ὁρᾷς, ἄλλα πράττω. (5) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεξεν· Ὡς σαφῶς μέντοι σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς· τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι, τοτὲ δ’ ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος. (6) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς με· τὴν δ’ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα ἐγώ σου καὶ φέρω καὶ οἴσω φιλικῶς. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν μὲν σὸν ἔρωτα κρύπτωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς. (7) ὅτι γε μὴν σύ, ὦ Καλλία, ἐρᾷς Αὐτολύκου πᾶσα μὲν ἡ πόλις οἶδε, πολλοὺς δ’ οἶμαι καὶ τῶν ξένων. τούτου δ᾿ αἴτιον τὸ πατέρων τε ὀνομαστῶν ἀμφοτέρους ὑμᾶς εἶναι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς. 5 Patzer, Antisthenes, 60-87. 6 See p. 143 above. 7 As we saw already pp. 64-65 above. 8 Joël, however, supposes that indeed Antisthenes had written a Symposium; Giannantoni, Nota 30, IV, 292-294 has an extensive description of Joël’s massive attempt; and on 294 the negative scholarly reaction to Joël’s construction. 9 Xen., Mem. 3.6.1. Plato had an elder brother, Glauco. It is perhaps because of the humiliating conversation of Socrates with this Glauco in the Memorabilia that Plato gave Glauco (and his elder brother Adimantus) an important part in the Politeia (the beginning of the second book and elsewhere). The opposite may also be true, because Plato gave many members of his family important parts in his dialogues (see Guthrie IV, 11), even if their reputation was not irreproachable – so Critias was one of the tyrants – and in reaction to this display of family pride Xenophon presented the humiliating conversation of Glauco with Socrates. Ultimately, Xenophon does not seem to be a friend of Plato. We shall see that Xenophon was not a good friend of Antisthenes either (see p. 155 below). It is significant that even Plato pictures Glauco, through their brother Adimantus, as a quarrelsome, impulsive man (Rp. 8, 548D8-9).

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to have had this kind of influence on Socrates, giving him a prominent position among his followers. As Xenophon creates or relates this conversation, Glauco has to pipe down, and his conceit fades away. Plato himself is regarded here as arrogant, and perhaps this conversation was intended to be unpleasant for Plato. However this may be, Plato is not mentioned again either in Xenophon’s Memorabilia or in the Symposium. His absence tells us much. Xenophon wrote a Defence of Socrates just as Plato did in his Apologia (two counterposed works again, it is difficult to establish which work is prior), and he clearly wanted to shine his own light on Socrates. Xenophon had more sympathy for Antisthenes: both had a common interest in King Cyrus as the ideal king; both felt sympathy – or something more – for Sparta. After Socrates himself, Antisthenes is the one who is most prominent in Xenophon’s Symposium. He is constantly drawn into the conversation, both by Socrates and by Callias, who is giving the feast. His name appears twenty-one times, more than anyone else in the Symposium except the symposiarch Socrates. It is the only occasion in Greek literature where we meet Antisthenes in the act of conversation. Although fictionalized, this representation is nevertheless instructive because we have a picture made by someone, Xenophon, who had met Antisthenes in person in the companionship of Socrates and his followers. I believe that in Xenophon’s Symposium we have a good fictional example of his conversational conduct, since it fits the rather rude and surprising utterances we meet in Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere. His speech is therefore in character, well composed and typical for the man Antisthenes was; also a rough style can be a good style, and we must not forget that in antiquity Antisthenes was admired for his literary qualities. I want to examine a series of scenes of confrontation between Socrates and Antisthenes to develop further how this representation corroborates analytic findings thus far.

2

The teachability of virtue

In the Symposium, the problem of the teachability of virtue is explicitly posed. After the beautiful performance of the dancing girl at the beginning of the symposium Socrates chooses his position on the issue by saying that the dance proved that ‘woman’s nature is in nowise inferior to man’s. All she needs is judgement and strength; and that should be an encouragement to those of you who have wives, to teach them whatever you would have them know as your associates’. At this point Antisthenes reacts rather abruptly, rejoining: ‘If that is your conclusion, Socrates, why don’t you tutor your own

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wife, Xanthippe, instead of allowing her to remain, of all the wives that are, indeed that ever will be, I imagine, the most shrewish?’10 Socrates answers with a comparison of the rider who wants to ride a horse with spirit in order to to be able to deal with all other horses: ‘And that is just my case. I wish to deal with human beings, to associate with people in general; hence my choice of wife. I know full well, if I can tolerate her, I can easily attach myself to every other human being’.11 Antisthenes’ reaction sets the tone that he will employ during the whole symposium. His conduct is unpredictable, brusquely intruding in the conversation, presenting Xanthippe as a difficult wife, and characteristically aggravating his remark by saying that she is the most difficult of all women, not only of the past, but also of the future too. The reader of the Symposium recognizes immediately the attitude of Antisthenes as similar to what we find in the fragments: he loves to create surprise by subverting opinions, turning them upside down. Socrates revisits the problem of the teachability of virtue after the next performance of a girl with a wheel with swords. This time, Socrates turns to Antisthenes: ‘None of the present company, I take it, who have watched 10 Xen., Symp. 2.9-10 (cp. SSR VA 18.1-4; Caizzi p. 112 on D.C. 72): (9) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης εἶπεν· Ἐν πολλοῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον καὶ ἐν οἷς δ’ ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ ὅτι ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὖσα τυγχάνει, γνώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται. ὥστε εἴ τις ὑμῶν γυναῖκα ἔχει, θαρρῶν διδασκέτω ὅ τι βούλοιτ’ ἂν αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένῃ χρῆσθαι. (10) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω γιγνώσκων οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην, ἀλλὰ χρῇ γυναικὶ τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτῃ. The Greek has γνώμης and ἰσχυός as needed by a woman. Xenophon’s Socrates advocates the equality of man and woman by nature, saying that the feminine nature is in no way inferior to the masculine. But now he says that she is lacking in understanding (judgement) and power (strength), which seems to contradict equality. This supposed contradiction inspired Mosche in 1799, with many followers (see Huss, Xenophons Symposion, p. 137), to replace γνώμης by ῥώμης (also meaning power or strength; see Patzer, Antisthenes, 62, n. 12). The assumption of two synonyms next to each other does not seem very convincing to me. The message is not that a woman has no understanding (judgement) and power (strength): her nature is the same as the nature of man, but she needs to form these in virtue, and she apparently has a good basis herself, thanks to her nature, to be taught whatever her husband wants her to know (ἐπισταμένῃ). The Greek word δεῖται is the real issue, because it can mean both ‘to need’ and ‘to be lacking’. A woman is not lacking in understanding or judgement, but she needs to form it, for she has the right basis and, if she is married, this understanding or judgement can be stimulated by her husband. Thus, she can learn whatever the husband finds useful (for himself), a rather selfish goal from the male point of view made with Socratean irony. The phrase ‘whatever’ (ὅ τι) is also the way to change the subject from dance to teaching Xanthippe to be less difficult. The dancing girl has successfully been taught the virtue of courage; thus, other virtues can be taught to other women. Antisthenes himself has said that virtue is the same in man and woman (D.L. 6.12 [SSR VA 134.15; D.C. 72]; see pp. 140-141 with n. 7). 11 The name ‘Xanthippe’ with the element ‘hipp-os’ (horse) provokes the comparison.

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this spectacle will ever again contradict the notion that courage can be taught, when the girl there, woman rather, rushes so boldly into the midst of swords’.12 Socrates’ remark is a reaction to Antisthenes’ critical question about Xanthippe. Some scholars believe that this reference to ‘contradict’ refers to Antisthenes’ important thesis that ‘to contradict is not possible’.13 If so, Socrates cannot expect any thing other than Antisthenes’ agreement. Nobody therefore, not even Antisthenes, can contradict what Socrates now says about the teachability of courage. Indeed, Antisthenes seems to accept Socrates’ suggestion, but he gives an answer that ironically ridicules Socrates’ thesis; thus challenged he answers jokingly: ‘No; and what our friend, the Syracusan here [sc. the dancing-master], should do is to exhibit his dancing girl to the state. Let him tell the authorities he is prepared, for a consideration, to give the whole Athenian people courage to face the hostile lances at close quarters’.14 This is, of course, a proposition intended to shock. It may seem as if Antisthenes is rejecting Socrates’ argument because he does not want such evidence in support of his basic idea that virtue (i.e. bravery) is teachable, because he detects the irony in Socrates’ argument, or because he did not adhere to this theory at all or not yet. However, Socrates turns specifically to Antisthenes, from which it could be supposed the latter was interested in the issue. Antisthenes’ answer contains the suggestion that the Athenians lack bravery and emphasizes the fact that he maintains some distance from fullblooded Athenian citizens, having only an Athenian father. The example of a dancing girl as a means to teach the Athenians courage also coincides with his advice about electing generals.15 Some see Socrates’ words as a rather soft reaction to Antisthenes’ brusque remarks about Xanthippe.16 Of course, it is all still in the atmosphere of joking and irony, no personal offence is here intended, but later on Socrates is less lenient, as we shall see.17

12 Xen., Symp. 2.12 (SSR VA 103.2-4; Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69): Οὔτοι τούς γε θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἴομαι, ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν, ὁπότε αὕτη καίπερ γυνὴ οὖσα οὕτω τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ ξίφη ἵεται. 13 See pp. 29-30 above. 14 Xen., Symp. 2.13 (SSR VA 103.4-7; Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69): καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν· Ἆρ᾿ οὖν καὶ τῷδε τῷ Συρακοσίῳ κράτιστον ἐπιδείξαντι τῇ πόλει τὴν ὀρχηστρίδα εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν διδῶσιν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναῖοι χρήματα, ποιήσειν πάντας Ἀθηναίους τολμᾶν ὁμόσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἰέναι; 15 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 66 and p. 21 above. 16 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 66. It cannot be ruled out that Antisthenes’ rude comments about Xanthippe are the source of her bad reputation; see Patzer, Antisthenes, 64. 17 Although Socrates later in his great speech on Eros complains that Antisthenes wears him out and that he at the moment cannot stand his ‘savagery’ (see above n. 4). This shows

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Antisthenes as a cross-examiner

Each of the participants in the symposium have promised to make their own precious contribution to the conversation of whatever he can offer. The host, Callias, commences his speech by saying that he will not discuss what justice actually is, but that he makes people more just by means of his money. Callias’ speech (4.1-5) is going to be all about money and that subject is dear to Antisthenes’ heart, as we know already (4.1).18 At that moment, Antisthenes gets to his feet, which is a rather significant gesture because the partygoers were reclining at the table; he is the only person who makes such a gesture and it characterizes Antisthenes and his urge to intrude and draw attention. We have here again Xenophon’s rather unpredictable and aggressive Antisthenes. As if he has taken on the role of the sharpest cross-examiner (μάλα ἐλεγκτικῶς ‘in a very critical manner’), he asks (4.2): ‘Do human beings seem to you to harbour justice in their souls, or in their purses, Callias?’ Callias answers: ‘In their souls’. Antisthenes then says: ‘And do you pretend to make their souls more righteous by putting money in their pockets?’ Callias now replies: ‘With money in their pockets people are less inclined to do evil things’. However, Callias has to acknowledge that unfortunately they do not repay his generosity, neither with money nor with gratitude. Some of them are even worse disposed towards him after having received his money than before. This prompts Antisthenes, looking at Callias as if he has succeeded in refuting him, to exclaim: ‘How strange! You can render people just to all the world, but towards yourself you cannot?’ (4.3) This is a smart attempt to demolish Callias’ argument, but Callias is not impressed by this sophistical trick and gives him a taste of his own medicine: ‘And where’s the wonder? Do you not see what scores of carpenters and house-builders there are who spend their time in building houses for half the world; but for themselves they simply cannot do it, and are forced to live in lodgings. And so admit that home-thrust, Sophist, and confess yourself confuted’ (4.4). How disappointing for Antisthenes that the rich man Callias, who was of course acquainted with the world of architects whereas Antisthenes was not, had got the better of him in debate. This would be more embarrassing and shameful because Antisthenes had opened the conversation in a very sharp tone and believed he had won at the end of it. Indeed, Socrates’ irritation, which has perhaps its origin in the scene in which Antisthenes characterizes Xanthippe so harshly. 18 See pp. 110-111 above.

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he is refuted as a failed Sophist.19 Even Socrates agrees with Callias by pointing to prophets who proverbially foretell the future for mankind but cannot foresee what is coming upon themselves. Yet it is small wonder that Socrates agrees with Callias because we may assume that Socrates felt some satisfaction that Antisthenes had been put in his place after his earlier attack on Xanthippe. Here we see an Antisthenes who seems to be no favourite of our friend Xenophon. Although Antisthenes’ role is second in importance only to Socrates in the Symposium, his defeat here seems to be welcomed by Xenophon. Antisthenes had been put in a vulnerable position by his intervention earlier in the Symposium when Callias announced his main point about making people better and more just. Antisthenes asked: ‘How, by teaching them some base mechanic art? Or teaching them nobility of soul?’ Callias replied: ‘If it is true that justice is synonymous with that high type of virtue (i.e. social uprightness)’. Antisthenes rejoined: ‘Of course it is, the most indisputable example. Look, courage and wisdom may at times be found detrimental to friends or country, but justice has no single point in common with injustice, right and wrong cannot commingle’ (3.4). Yet, in attempting to refute Callias, Antisthenes had in fact already implied that justice has a negative side when he said ‘you can render people just to all the world, but towards yourself you cannot?’ and so conflicted with his earlier thesis, but this point is ignored in the discussion. Here a scholarly problem arises.20 It is interesting to note that nowhere in the traditional fragments do we find Antisthenes taking a special position on justice as he just pointed out, having no bad side nor allowing the commingling of right and wrong. I believe that a solution to this problem can be found in the freedom that the author Xenophon took; he made Antisthenes more vulnerable in his debate with Callias on justice. On the basis of this passage we cannot ascribe to Antisthenes a special place for justice among the virtues, nor a prohibition on the mingling of right and wrong. However, the radical charge of this view fits Antisthenes’ radical attitude, so that this position could belong to his ideas. In Diogenes Laertius’ list we have two relevant works: On Justice and Courage, a hortative work (3 books) and On Law, or On Beauty and Justice.21 Justice certainly attracted his attention, but more we cannot say for certain. 19 Interesting is the fact that ‘Sophist’ here already has the negative overtones it has later. Antisthenes himself had another meaning in mind (see pp. 62-63 n. 36). 20 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 67, 68. 21 D.L. 6.16 (SSR VA 41.13-14 and 41.20: D.C. 1.13-14 and 1.19).

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In the passage quoted there is a small trace of Antisthenes’ style as known from the fragments. He compares the soul with a purse, introducing a concrete thing to go with an abstract thing, purse and soul.22 But while I believe that he thought of the soul in material terms, nevertheless the comparison is surely characteristic for there is also a linguistic trace: the negated form of the double adjective which is the most indisputable evidence, νὴ Δί᾿, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, ἥ γε ἀναμφιλογωτάτη (‘Yes, by Zeus’, Antisthenes said, ‘[righteousness is] the least debatable kind’). More such adjectives recur in the fragments, but they do not suffice to make the thesis Antisthenean. Xenophon’s main purpose could have been to make Antisthenes painfully vulnerable when arguing the complete opposite of his earlier position in his later cross-examination. The superlative is intended to underline the usual extremist position Antisthenes has taken, just as the description of Antisthenes’ attitude ‘strongly refuting’ (μάλα ἐλεγκτικῶς 4.2). We have here the already established familiar pattern: a strong opinion, later mitigated,23 in this case even changed into its opposite – perhaps Xenophon actually intended this. In the end, what we are left with is Antisthenes as a miserable failure in cross-examination.

4

Antisthenes and Niceratus on Homer

In the dialogue, just after Antisthenes has contended that justice has no negative side, we find a short discussion with young Niceratus, who is the ‘Homer expert’ because his father made him learn the complete Homeric poems by heart (3.5). Antisthenes, who must have considered himself, or could claim to be, the real expert because of the many books he had written on Homer, and was perhaps even acknowledged as such, claims that the rhapsodists can also recite Homer by heart and asks Niceratus (3.6): ‘And did you ever come across a more ridiculous group of people than these same rhapsodists?’ Niceratus agrees: ‘No, indeed I haven’t. Don’t ask me to defend their intelligence’. Antisthenes, however, is not able to continue the interrogation that would have forced Niceratus into a difficult position, because Xenophon makes Socrates come to his rescue by postulating that the rhapsodists, while being able to recite the words, do not know the underlying meaning (its hyponoia: Δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται ‘For clearly’, Socrates said, ‘they do not know the underlying 22 So Patzer, Antisthenes, 72. 23 See Xen., Symp. 3.4

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meanings’); but he, Niceratus, has learned to detect the hyponoia with Stesimbrotus and Anaximander.24 In this way, Socrates takes over the conversation and frustrates a triumphant, if rather cheap cross-examination by Antisthenes. Scholars have been interested in what Socrates’ intervention using the concept of hyponoia might mean with regard to the thinking of Antisthenes himself.25 To detect the underlying thought – does that include the notion of allegory, for instance, seeing natural powers promoted to gods as subjects for interpretation? Antisthenes does not seem involved in this issue in the Symposium because he is silenced by Socrates’ intervention. Although allegory and hyponoia are often connected or regarded as the same issue, it is still possible that detecting the hyponoia, the deeper sense of a passage, is a technique in its own right and does not involve allegorical interpretation at all. It could be that to explain some crux, for instance, the issue of Nestor’s cup, is to detect the hyponoia in the passage involved. One has to understand that the word allegory as such only appears in later Greek. The problem remains whether Socrates’ intervention has anything to do with Antisthenes’ thought at all. Does this indicate that for Antisthenes, too, the notion of hyponoia and its connection with allegory are two sides of the same coin? This slight passus is too fragile a basis for any declaration regarding Antisthenes as an adherent of the hyponoia or allegorical type of reading. He was keen to solve Homeric problems by attempting to find the doxa, essentially the first thought.26 Solving difficult passages is quite different from explaining passages as bespeaking ‘another’ reality (allegoria), in regard to mythical or divine figures and scenes. This was the method of Stesimbrotus and of many others.27 In any event, the rhapsodists, according to Socrates, are not familiar with the hyponoiai in Homer. Thus, we see here that hyponoia was used in connection with Homer-exegesis in general. It should be noted that these progressive ideas that Socrates in a friendly manner ascribes to Niceratus seem to have no meaning at all for Niceratus because he does not reveal any influence of them in his orthodox use of the Homeric poems; he simply uses Homer as a handbook. We see this later on, when he makes a speech about the usefulness of the knowledge in Homer with regard to any given profession, and Antisthenes intrudes again in order 24 See Buffière, Les mythes, 133, 134. We have met already Stesimbrotus as a Homer expert because of his theory on Nestor’s cup (see p. 103 above). 25 See Giannantoni, Nota 35, IV, 338-341. 26 See pp. 99-100 above. 27 He is mentioned among the Homer experts in Plato’s Ion, 530D1.

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to cast doubt on Homer’s usefulness as a handbook for kingship.28 ‘Hold on,’ Antisthenes interrupted, ‘do you also know how to be a king, since (you are well aware) Homer praises Agamemnon for being a good king as well as a bold spearman?’ Niceratus says that he knows and since he feels the risks of his answer he changes the subject subito: ‘And full well I know the duty of a skilful charioteer; how he who holds the reigns must turn his chariot when he comes to the pillar’s edge’, quoting instructive verses from Homer. And in this way Antisthenes is eliminated from the conversation. His Homeric intervention is not very impressive, although he must have been renowned for his knowledge of and interest in the subject. Apparently Xenophon for some significant reason did not want him to have a convincing success in the matter. Thus, we can say, up to now Antisthenes’ performance in the Symposium has been far from successful.

5

Antisthenes’ speech

Antisthenes’ great chance to impose himself is the speech which Xenophon lets him make, quoted in its entirety below. Socrates utters the prompt, saying, ‘Come, now, Antisthenes, take your turn and tell us how it is that with such slender means you base your pride on wealth’. Earlier Antisthenes had acknowledged that he did not possess even an obol,29 and now he will explain that he is rich nonetheless. He defends his ‘wealth’, which does not consist of money or property, but surprisingly only of spiritual abundance, and Xenophon has him do so with vigour, enthusiasm, and well-invented arguments. Here is his speech (4.34-44): (34) ‘Because I believe, gentlemen, that the wealth and poverty people have are not to be found in their home but in their souls. (35) For I see that many private persons, who though they possess quite a lot of money think they are so poor that they undertake every possible labour and every possible risk in order to acquire more, and I know even of brothers having inherited an equal share, of whom one has sufficient means, even exceeding his expenses, whereas the other is in need of everything. (36) I also hear of certain tyrants, who are so hungry for money that they do much more terrible things than people who are absolutely without means. For it is obviously because of their need that some of them steal, others 28 Xen., Symp. 4.6. 29 Xen., Symp. 3.8.

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commit burglary, others sell people as slaves. There are certain tyrants who destroy whole households, kill men wholesale, and many times even enslave whole cities for the sake of money. (37) Now these people I for one actually pity very much because of their quite irksome disease. For they seem to me to be in the same position as if someone would have much and, though eating much, would never eat his fill. As for me, I possess so many things that I can hardly find them myself. And yet, there is enough for me so that I can eat enough so as not to be hungry, and drink enough so as not to have thirst, and clothe myself so as not to shiver outside any more than Callias here, who is very wealthy. (38) And whenever I get into my house, the walls appear to me to be quite warm tunics and the ceilings very thick coats, and what’s more, I have such adequate bedding that it is quite a job even to wake me up. And if at any moment my body feels the need to have sex, whatever comes up is sufficient for me, with the result that the women I approach welcome me with open arms because there is no one else who is willing to approach them. (39) And, believe me, all these things appear to me to be so pleasurable that I could not pray for greater pleasure in doing any of them, but less: so much more pleasurable some of them appear to me to be than is good for one. (40) But what I reckon is the most valuable possession in my wealth is that, if someone would take away from me even the things I now possess, I do not see a job that is so mean as not to provide me with sufficient livelihood. (41) And that is because, whenever I want to indulge my appetite, I do not buy the valuable things on the market (for they come too expensive), but I dispense them to myself out of the storehouse of my soul. And it is much more conducive to pleasure, when I fall to after having waited for the need to come than when I partake of one of the fancy things, as right at this moment I drink this Thasian wine without being thirsty having fallen in with it through sheer luck. (42) And yes, it is probably so that those who have an eye to economy are much more righteous than those who have an eye to great expense. For those who are most satisfied with what they have are least inclined to covet what belongs to other people. (43) It is worth realizing that wealth of this kind makes people more liberal too. For Socrates here, from whom I acquired this wealth of mine, gave me his assistance without counting or weighing it, but handed over to me as much as I could carry away. And as for me, I now do not begrudge anyone, but to all my friends I both display my abundance and let anyone who wants to, share in the wealth of my soul. (44) And, indeed, what is in fact the most splendid possession, you see all the time the leisure that I have, which enables me to behold what is most worthy to be seen and hear what

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is most worhty to be heard and, a thing I value most, spend the day with Socrates in leisure. He too does not admire those who count most gold (money), but invariably spends his time with those who please him.’30

There are several important themes in Antisthenes’ speech. First, the soul is imagined to be something concrete rather than abstract: it is a storehouse. We have already met Antisthenes’ view of the soul as a copy of the person with a concrete aspect;31 we have seen a fragment that warns a disciple to write his lecture notes not on paper but in his soul;32 and earlier in the Symposium he stated that it is the soul that harbours justice, contrasting it to a purse where no justice can be found. But this theme of the soul as the spiritual storehouse is launched only in the Symposium, therefore we do 30 Xen., Symp. 4.34-44 (SSR VA 82; D.C. 117.6-65): (34) Ὅτι νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς. (35) ὁρῶ γὰρ πολλοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας, οἳ πάνυ πολλὰ ἔχοντες χρήματα οὕτω πένεσθαι ἡγοῦνται ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται, ἐφ’ ᾧ πλείω κτήσονται, οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἀδελφούς, οἳ τὰ ἴσα λαχόντες ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν τἀρκοῦντα ἔχει καὶ περιττεύοντα τῆς δαπάνης, ὁ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ἐνδεῖται· (36) αἰσθάνομαι δὲ καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἳ οὕτω πεινῶσι χρημάτων ὥστε ποιοῦσι πολὺ δεινότερα τῶν ἀπορωτάτων· δι’ ἔνδειαν μὲν γὰρ δήπου οἱ μὲν κλέπτουσιν, οἱ δὲ τοιχωρυχοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζονται· τύραννοι δ’ εἰσί τινες οἳ ὅλους μὲν οἴκους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἁθρόους δ’ ἀποκτείνουσι, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὅλας πόλεις χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐξανδραποδίζονται. (37) τούτους μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε καὶ πάνυ οἰκτίρω τῆς ἄγαν χαλεπῆς νόσου. ὅμοια γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἔχοι καὶ πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίμπλαιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω μὲν πολλὰ ἔχω ὡς μόλις αὐτὰ καὶ [ἐγὼ ἂν] αὐτὸς εὑρίσκω· ὅμως δὲ περίεστί μοι καὶ ἐσθίοντι ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ πεινῆν ἀφικέσθαι καὶ πίνοντι μέχρι τοῦ μὴ διψῆν καὶ ἀμφιέννυσθαι ὥστε ἔξω μὲν μηδὲν μᾶλλον Καλλίου τούτου τοῦ πλουσιωτάτου ῥιγοῦν· (38) ἐπειδάν γε μὴν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ γένωμαι, πάνυ μὲν ἀλεεινοὶ χιτῶνες οἱ τοῖχοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάνυ δὲ παχεῖαι ἐφεστρίδες οἱ ὄροφοι, στρωμνήν γε μὴν οὕτως ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχω ὥστ’ ἔργον μέγ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεγεῖραι. ἂν δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι τὸ σῶμά μου δεηθῇ, οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ ὥστε αἷς ἂν προσέλθω ὑπερασπάζονταί με διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄλλον αὐταῖς ἐθέλειν προσιέναι. (39) καὶ πάντα τοίνυν ταῦτα οὕτως ἡδέα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὡς μᾶλλον μὲν ἥδεσθαι ποιῶν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν εὐξαίμην, ἧττον δέ· οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ἔνια αὐτῶν ἡδίω εἶναι τοῦ συμφέροντος. (40) πλείστου δ’ ἄξιον κτῆμα ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ πλούτῳ λογίζομαι εἶναι ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι εἴ μού τις καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα παρέλοιτο, οὐδὲν οὕτως ὁρῶ φαῦλον ἔργον ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀρκοῦσαν ἂν τροφὴν ἐμοῖ παρέχοι. (41) καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἡδυπαθῆσαι βουληθῶ, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι (πολυτελῆ γὰρ γίνεται), ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι. καὶ πολὺ πλέον διαφέρει πρὸς ἡδονήν, ὅταν ἀναμείνας τὸ δεηθῆναι προσφέρωμαι ἢ ὅταν τινὶ τῶν τιμίων χρῶμαι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ Θασίῳ οἴνῳ ἐντυχὼν οὐ διψῶν πίνω αὐτόν. (42) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πολὺ δικαιοτέρους γε εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦς εὐτέλειαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυχρηματίαν σκοποῦντας. οἷς γὰρ μάλιστα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ ἥκιστα τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται. (43) ἄξιον δ’ ἐννοῆσαι ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται. Σωκράτης τε γὰρ οὗτος παρ’ οὗ ἐγὼ τοῦτον ἐκτησάμην οὔτε ἀριθμῷ οὔτε σταθμῷ ἐπήρκει μοι, ἀλλ’ ὁπόσον ἐδυνάμην φέρεσθαι, τοσοῦτόν μοι παρεδίδου· ἐγώ τε νῦν οὐδενὶ φθονῶ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ἐπιδεικνύω τὴν ἀφθονίαν καὶ μεταδίδωμι τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ πλούτου. (44) καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἁβρότατόν γε κτῆμα, τὴν σχολὴν ἀεὶ ὁρᾶτέ μοι παροῦσαν, ὥστε καὶ θεᾶσθαι τὰ ἀξιοθέατα καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ ἀξιάκουστα καὶ ὃ πλείστου ἐγὼ τιμῶμαι, Σωκράτει σχολάζων συνδιημερεύειν. καὶ οὗτος δὲ οὐ τοὺς πλεῖστον ἀριθμοῦντας χρυσίον θαυμάζει, ἀλλ’ οἳ ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι τούτους συνὼν διατελεῖ. 31 See p. 102 above. 32 See pp. 69 and 113 above.

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not know whether it is Xenophon’s invention or whether it occurred in Antisthenes’ other writings. It is the dominant theme of the entire speech and its basis. Here again a concrete approach is strikingly deployed: the wealth in his soul is immeasurable and can be distributed to all his friends. He owes this wealth to Socrates, who gave him all the spiritual riches he could carry. The underlying thought is that the riches of his soul can be shared and do not become diminished, even though he bestows them abundantly on others. This is the form of wealth that really makes one generous. Money does not play any role except for its rejection; this is the basic principle. If one has no money, one leads an entirely different lifestyle. Money is good when less is more. He enthusiastically portrays the advantages of having little money. In connection with this he praises the soberness of his clothes, home, and food. The keynote is material independence. The rejection of greed we have already met before.33 All the sins connected with moneymaking and desires for increased wealth vanish. The simplest job will procure sufficient means to stay alive. Moreover, relative poverty furthers one’s capacities for justice, because the property of other people is no longer desirable. He calls the desire for money or what belongs to other people a terrible disease; money is the root of evil. Sexual desire is described as unavoidable, because the body asks for it, but to satisfy it the least desirable women are good enough and they are grateful too. This theme of grateful women we also came across in the fragments.34 Antisthenes seems to enjoy sexual intercourse but has some reservations.35 We know already that Antisthenes considers sexual relations necessary and useful for the procreation and excessive appetite a natural evil, but it is here that we learn that the body asks for sex.36 He does not mention any homosexual needs here; they do not seem to interest him.37 Another theme in the speech is pleasure. Pleasure is most when the fulfilment of it is postponed. We have already discussed Antisthenes’ theory of pleasure,38 and what he says here does not deviate from that, at least with 33 See pp. 110-111 above. 34 See p. 114 above. 35 Guthrie (III, 307) ascribes to Antisthenes the notion that he prefers to satisfy sex without pleasure, because the intense pleasure derived from it is harmful. This is not in Xenophon’s text. 36 See p. 114 above. 37 Although in one fragment we hear that he was in love with a boy (Papyr. Flor. II 113, col. II 26-36 [SSR VA 175; D.C. 192]). According to Xenophon’s Symposium, at the time he was in love with neither a man nor woman (see Xen. Symp. 8.4 quoted on p. 168). Here his needs seem to have been limited to intercourse with (grateful) women. 38 See pp. 80-82 above.

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regard to more mitigated utterances. He is not averse to discounting the value of the excellent wine that is on offer at the banquet by stating that it is inferior to his own simple pleasures. The wealthy host Callias is mentioned only once as being equally protected by his clothing against cold as poor Antisthenes himself. Callias is also the one who makes an ironic remark following the speech, saying that he envies Antisthenes’ wealth, because the spiritual riches do not have the disadvantages of the material ones (e.g. the burdens from the state who treats you as a slave; angry people when you refuse to lend them money). Thanks to being freed from duties, leisure (σχολάζων) comes in: it is the greatest good of all. Leisure procures the possibility of seeing what is worth seeing and hearing what is worth hearing, and, most precious of the goods of the soul, to spend the whole day with Socrates. The eulogy of Socrates is the high point of the whole speech. Socrates is mentioned twice in it: all spiritual riches come from him, and in connection with this at the end it is said that to pass the whole day with him is the most precious thing. This is a supreme compliment. Furthermore, Socrates is adduced to confirm the unimportance of gold (money); it is the inner aspect of the person that Socrates appreciates. There is with Antisthenes an inclination to sharpen or elaborate tendencies which are characteristic in Socrates’ behaviour.39 Socrates is both Antisthenes’ model and his ideal, something shared by Xenophon himself: the eulogy by Antisthenes is at the same time a eulogy by Xenophon. It is interesting to note how meticulously this portrait of Antisthenes is constructed. Patzer40 summarizes a series of figures of style, and the main themes are worked out eloquently. It is all strikingly worded and organized. We learn practically nothing that we do not already know from elsewhere, except for the notion of the soul as spiritual storehouse and some minor points (Antisthenes does not seem to have been an early riser). We hear again about brothers, 41 but now with a different lifestyle. Patzer42 believes that we have a parodic imitation of Antisthenes’ style, but I do not see any parody here. It is a serious argument, thoroughly presented, that fulfils the task of rendering exactly what Xenophon believes constitutes the thinking of Antisthenes or what this can be assumed to be. 39 Socrates was not influenced by drinking much wine, so we are instructed in Plato. Antisthenes was highly interested in this subject, as we have seen already, and constructed an entire theory on the use of wine (see pp. 101-102 above). 40 See p. 149 above. 41 See p. 118 above. 42 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 77.

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Lastly, there is in the speech an important urging for limitation of needs, which is often indicated by philosophers with the name autarkeia (the name, however, does not occur in the speech). It is believed that the Cynics adopted and strengthened this line of thought derived from Antisthenes; hence he is often regarded as the father of this philosophical school. Diogenes the Cynic and his tub could be considered to be the continuation of the frugal house of Antisthenes, and there are more suchlike points. As far as I can see, however, what is missing here is a tendency such as the Cynic’s ‘back to nature’; instead, what we find in this speech is the rejection of riches and unnecessary goods as impediments to a virtuous way of life43 (and such a thing spoken in the house of the richest man in Athens!). The scholarly discussion of autarkeia nonetheless deserves further examination. Autarkeia Patzer characterizes the idea of Antisthenes’ speech with the term autarkeia, although he admits that this word does not figure in the speech itself.44 In the speech the verbal form of the word (ἀρκέω) does not occur in connection with a person, but it does occur with objects. Consider the following three examples: 1 ‘And what’s more, I have such adequate bedding that it is quite a job even to wake me up’ (στρωμνήν γε μὴν οὕτως ἀρκοῦσαν 4.38); 2 ‘And if at any moment my body feels the need to have sex, whatever comes up is sufficient for me, with the result that the women I approach welcome me with open arms because there is no one else who is willing to approach them’ (ἂν δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι τὸ σῶμά μου δεηθῇ, οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ ὥστε αἷς ἂν προσέλθω ὑπερασπάζονταί με διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄλλον αὐταῖς ἐθέλειν προσιέναι 4.38); 3 ‘I do not see a job that is so mean as not to provide me with sufficient livelihood’ (ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀρκοῦσαν ἂν τροφὴν ἐμοὶ παρέχοι ἐπήρκει 4.40). These examples show that his focus is on independence from money in order to be able to dedicate himself to the riches of his soul; the proper way to gain this is to converse with someone who can enrich one’s mental store. The notion of ‘autark’ (self sufficient) also occurs elsewhere in connection with virtue as that which is sufficient for eudaimonia (happiness). 45 In 43 There are also remarks of Antisthenes about simple clothing, but in the speech this point is not mentioned. Diogenes the Cynic claimed that ‘to fortune he could oppose courage, to convention nature, to passion reason’ (D.L. 6.38, emphasis added). 44 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 76. 45 D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70).

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this case, Antisthenes presumably wished ‘autark’ to be understood as independence from material goods. The wise call themselves by this term, too, because it is said that all the material goods that others enjoy are also possessed by the wise. There is nothing that others have, such as food, shelter, and clothing that the wise must go without. It is not impossible that we have here one root of the ascetic attitude of someone like Diogenes the Cynic, but for Antisthenes autarkeia is not a goal in itself.

6 Pandering A surprising exchange between Socrates and Antisthenes takes place in the midst of the speech Socrates contributes to the series of speeches in the Symposium; the issue is who makes the best procurer or go-between. Prior to analysis, the entire exchange is quoted here from Xenophon. Socrates is speaking (4.60-64):46 (60) ‘And if someone would be able to make people pleasing even to the whole city, would in that case this man not be altogether a good procurer?’ All said, ‘Yes by Zeus, clearly so.’ Socrates, ‘If then someone would be able to bring about that his clients would be of that nature, would he not have every right to be very proud of his profession and would he not have every right to receive a large remuneration?’ (61) When all agreed also on that 46 Xen., Symp. 4.60-64 (SSR VA 13.1-23; D.C. 107.22-55): (60) Eἰ δέ τις καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ἀρέσκοντας δύναιτο ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐχ οὗτος παντελῶς ἂν ἤδη ἀγαθὸς μαστροπὸς εἴη; Σαφῶς γε νὴ Δία, πάντες εἶπον. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις τοιούτους δύναιτο ἐξεργάζεσθαι ὧν προστατοίη, δικαίως ἂν μέγα φρονοίη ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ δικαίως ἂν πολὺν μισθὸν λαμβάνοι; (61) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πάντες συνωμολόγουν, Τοιοῦτος μέντοι, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖ Ἀντισθένης εἶναι οὗτος. καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, Ἐμοί, ἔφη, παραδίδως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὴν τέχνην; Ναὶ μὰ Δί’, ἔφη. ὁρῶ γάρ σε καὶ τὴν ἀκόλουθον ταύτης πάνυ ἐξειργασμένον. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὴν προαγωγείαν, ἔφη. καὶ ὃς μάλα ἀχθεσθεὶς ἐπήρετο· (62) Καὶ τί μοι σύνοισθα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον εἰργασμένῳ; Οἶδα μέν, ἔφη, σε Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγεύσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ, ὅτε ἑώρας τοῦτον μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἐρῶντα, ἐκεῖνον δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενον· οἶδα δέ σε Ἱππίᾳ τῷ Ἠλείῳ, παρ’ οὗ οὗτος καὶ τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔμαθεν· ἀφ’ οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτικώτερος γεγένηται διὰ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν καλὸν ἴδῃ μηδέποτε ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. (63) ἔναγχος δὲ δήπου καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον ἐπεί με ἐποίησας ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτοῦ, συνέστησάς μοι αὐτόν. καὶ χάριν μέντοι σοι ἔχω· πάνυ γὰρ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. Αἰσχύλον δὲ τὸν Φλειάσιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν καὶ ἐμὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὐχ οὕτω διέθηκας ὥστε διὰ τοὺς σοὺς λόγους ἐρῶντες ἐκυνοδρομοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ζητοῦντες; (64) ταῦτα οὖν ὁρῶν δυνάμενόν σε ποιεῖν ἀγαθὸν νομίζω προαγωγὸν εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ οἷός τε ὢν γιγνώσκειν τε τοὺς ὠφελίμους αὑτοῖς καὶ τούτους δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀλλήλων, οὗτος ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι φίλας ποιεῖν καὶ γάμους ἐπιτηδείους συνάγειν, καὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ †πόλεσι καὶ φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις† κεκτῆσθαι. σὺ δὲ ὡς κακῶς ἀκούσας ὅτι ἀγαθόν σε ἔφην προαγωγὸν εἶναι, ὠργίσθης. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’, ἔφη, οὐ νῦν. ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δύνωμαι, σεσαγμένος δὴ παντάπασι πλούτου τὴν ψυχὴν ἔσομαι.

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point, 47 Socrates said, ‘Believe me, Antisthenes here appears to me to be such a man .’ And Antisthenes said, ‘Are you handing over to me, Socrates, your profession?’ Socrates said, ‘Yes, by Zeus, for I see that you have quite perfected also the profession that is attendant on that one.’ Antisthenes ‘What may that be?’ ‘The profession of go-between,’ Socrates said. And Antisthenes, quite vexed at this, asked, (62) ‘And what did you witness, Socrates, that you say that I did such a thing?’ Socrates said, ‘I know that you have acted as go-between for Callias here and the wise Prodicus, when you saw that the former (Callias) was enamoured of philosophy, but the latter (Prodicus) wanted money. And I know that you (introduced him) to Hippias of Elis, from whom he in fact learned his memory-system, as a result of which he has become even more amorous because he never forgets whatever beautiful thing he has set eyes on. (63) And, indeed, quite recently you brought the stranger from Heraclea (Zeuxippus) in contact with me after you had made me want to meet him by praising him to me. And I am quite grateful to you for that, indeed. For he appears to me to be quite the gentleman. And did you not, by praising Aeschylus of Phlia to me and me to him, affected us in such a way that through your words we fell in love and coursed like hunting-dogs in search of one another? (64) Because, therefore, I see that you are able to bring that about, I believe that you are a good go-between. For the person who is able to recognize those who are useful to one another and can make them want to meet one another, that man, it seems to me, could also make cities friends and arrange suitable marriages, and would be worth much for cities and friends and allies to possess. But you, you became irritated as if you were badly spoken of because I said that you were a good go-between.’ Antisthenes said, ‘No, no by Zeus, not this time. For if I am capable of all that, I shall actually be stuffed absolutely full with wealth in my soul.’

It is interesting that Xenophon ascribes this talent for connecting people as a go-between to Antisthenes. 48 He introduced Hippias and Prodicus to Callias using several motives to make them mutually connect. This is a very unexpected datum, which cannot easily be doubted in view of the meticulous manner used by Xenophon to present a portrayal of Antisthenes’ 47 The previous section (4.56-59) contains an interesting argument in which Socrates proceeds in a series from proposition to conclusion with the agreement of all the persons present. Apparently this is a model of the Socratic approach as Xenophon understood it. 48 The erotic aspect is repeatedly stressed, but it is a non-erotic erōs. Hippias taught the mnemotechnic to Callias, so that he would not forget all the erotic moments in his life, and so on.

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life and behaviour. This information is important in connection with the following. As previously mentioned, there is this story that Antisthenes invited his pupils to follow Socrates together with him, their teacher, to become fellowpupils (συμμαθηταί). 49 The story is heavily doubted, especially by Patzer, who devotes several pages to this incident.50 He considers it an ancient biographical concoction. A major objection to this small but characteristic story is the required assumption that Antisthenes had pupils who wished to learn rhetoric from him. This would make Antisthenes the first teacher in rhetoric around 422 B.C., the time when the incident must have taken place, whereas historically it is Antiphon (c. 480-411 B.C.) who is introduced as the first teacher of rhetoric.51 This objection regarding the teaching of rhetoric is based on two fragments, whereas Diogenes Laertius simply refers to the story without mentioning rhetoric at all. The issue at hand is this: what did Antisthenes teach his pupils before he became a fervent disciple of Socrates? The fragments involved say that he taught them Gorgian rhetoric before his conversion to Socrates. As such this is not that problematic. We have two magnificent examples of Antisthenes’ rhetorical capabilities in the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, which, according to Patzer, are of the same style as the speech Antisthenes gives in Xenophon’s Symposium and full of Gorgianisms.52 Patzer believes that Antisthenes was not able to afford the large fees Gorgias asked for his lessons, and that he could not have taught himself any kind of Gorgian rhetoric. However, there are several objections that can be brought against this scholarly dismissal. First, it remains possible that his father as a merchant had money enough to pay Gorgias’ fees. Second, we must consider that originally Gorgias’ lessons were not really so expensive. Third, it is possible that, being an original man himself, Antisthenes taught his own version of rhetoric, perhaps based around Homer.53 Fourth, perhaps he conversed with Gorgias just as he was well acquainted with Hippias and Prodicus, which may be deduced from this section in the Symposium.

49 D.L. 6.2 (SSR VA 12.1-6; D.C. 128A); Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. 2.14 (SSR VA 12.10-17; D.C. 128B); Gnom. Vat. no. 4 (SSR VA 12.6-10: D.C. 128C). 50 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 250-252. 51 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 251. 52 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 208. 53 We saw in the Symposium 3.5-6 (SSR VA 185; D.C. 61) that Niceratus’ Homer activities were attacked by Antisthenes alone, which suggests that Antisthenes was already a specialist before his first meeting with Socrates.

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It strikes me that nowhere in the scholarly literature is this last point about his function as go-between brought into the discussion on Antisthenes as a ‘disciple’ of Gorgias. Moreover, if indeed Antisthenes was a didactical ‘go-between’ as the Symposium has it, it is not odd at all that he brought his pupils into contact with Socrates and invited them to be his fellow-pupils. In addition, he must have had a lively interest in rhetoric because he believed it to be necessary in his writings to attack rhetors like Isocrates and Lysias, even with his unusual nicknames.54 Thus, I do not consider it at all strange that before his decisive meeting with Socrates he had his own form of teaching rhetoric. This would explain his saying ‘if he [i.e., a son who is to be educated properly] wants to live together with the gods, [he should follow] the teaching of a philosopher; but if with people, the teaching of a rhetor’.55 It is significant that Xenophon believed Antisthenes to have contacts in the highest intellectual circles of Athens, which as such can hardly be something he made up and therefore is an important piece of information for understanding Antisthenes’ intellectual position in Athens. This is in harmony with what we saw early on about Isocrates, who attacked Antisthenes as the first among his competitors.56 In the passage quoted above, Antisthenes at first seems angry when Socrates says that he is an excellent example of a procurer. This is because, as it is observed, it was a deadly sin to prostitute young people. Small wonder then that Antisthenes was anything but pleased. However, after Socrates’ explanation Antisthenes becomes convinced that no harm was intended and he confirms that he is calm and he ultimately accepts the explanation as a compliment. What we notice here again is that yet again the impetuous Antisthenes has had to eat humble pie and swallow his words.

7

Two incidental appearances

There are still two incidental appearances of Antisthenes in Xenophon’s work that need to be discussed. First, while Antisthenes is in the process of refuting someone during the symposium,57 Callias asks the company which melody (of the flute) would make a good accompaniment. This question is rather ironic and a little bit sour because Callias had earlier refuted 54 See p. 23 n. 10 above. 55 See p. 70 n. 58 and p. 76 above. 56 See pp. 22-23 above. 57 Xen., Symp. 6.5.

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Antisthenes, who, although he believed himself to have won the dispute, was defeated in the end while Callias, the host, triumphed over him.58 Now at this juncture, Antisthenes himself spontaneously answers this general question, which while unaddressed is directed at him. Xenophon grants Antisthenes a smart reply: the suitable melody is the syrigmos; this is a shrill piping sound, a hissing of serpents, which is very appropriate for the shrill tone of Antisthenes’ method of interrogation. It is also used of the hissing in the theatre and therefore appropriate as a catcall (for the victim of his interrogation)59 from Antisthenes’ point of view, and conveys the idea of his elenctic superiority. However smart his reply may be, the assumption remains that Antisthenes was beaten by Callias, so that this hissing could also be directed at him. This is an incident told in very few words, only two phrases. There is another minor occasion where Antisthenes only incidentally participates.60 He attempts to defend Socrates when he is attacked by the Syracusan dancing-master. The latter mockingly asks Socrates what the distance between them is measured by the feet of a flea (referring to the famous opening scene of Aristophanes’ Clouds). But Socrates ignores Antisthenes’ intervention and handles his own defence masterfully.

8

The final scene between Socrates and Antisthenes

Antisthenes plays one more unexpected, short, but rather important role, completing his part in the Symposium. There is a final scene in which Socrates makes a grand speech about erōs. During the speech Socrates suddenly stops and asks (8.4-7): (4) ‘And are you, Antisthenes, the only one not to be in love with anyone?’ Antisthenes said, ‘No, no by the gods, in fact I am madly in love with you’. And Socrates said, jokingly as if he were being coy, ‘Now, please, do not be difficult at present, because as you see I have another occupation now’. (5) And Antisthenes said, ‘That is what you always do, you self-panderer! At one time you refuse to converse with me, using your daimonion as an excuse, and at another because you are bent upon something else’. (6) And Socrates said: ‘By the gods, Antisthenes, if only you don’t wear me 58 See p. 154 above. 59 See LSJ sub voce. 60 Xen., Symp. 6.8.

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out! All other difficult behaviour on your part I will bear now and in the future as a friend. But enough,’ he said, ‘let us not speak of your love, since that love is not for my soul, but for my physical wellformedness. (7) In any case, that you, Callias, are in love with Autolycus, all the city knows and many of the strangers too, I would say. And the reason for that is that both of you are sons of famous fathers and conspicuous men yourself.’61

It is interesting to note that at first it is assumed that Antisthenes is not in love with anybody, which confirms his unmarried status, alone with his heterosexual needs. Therefore, Socrates can challenge Antisthenes by suggesting that he does not love anyone at all. Antisthenes goes along with this challenge by overturning the situation saying that he loves Socrates. In that way he cannot be ‘accused’ of being the only one present who does not love somebody. Socrates in fun at being the erotic object replies: ‘Do not be difficult at present, because as you see I have another occupation now [namely making a speech on Eros]’. Antisthenes says: ‘That is what you always do, you self-panderer’. What Antisthenes really means is that Socrates is always busy as a go-between of himself, i.e. a person who only considers himself and is not interested in the other (i.c. Antisthenes). This appears in his reproaches: Socrates uses his inner voice (daimonion), which prevents him from doing things (i.e. conversing with Antisthenes, or he has another pretext).62 Socrates’ answer is less friendly: ‘By the gods, Antisthenes, if only you don’t wear me out’. This is a rather strong word (συγκόψῃς) showing Socrates is irritated. All other difficult conduct Socrates will bear now and in the future as a friend, he says. Socrates finalizes his remarks by saying that Antisthenes’ so-called love is best ignored, because 61 Xen., Symp. 8.4-7 (SSR VA 14; not in D.C.): (4) σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, οὐδενὸς ἐρᾷς; Ναὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος, καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώψας ὡς δὴ θρυπτόμενος εἶπε· Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄχλον πάρεχε· ὡς γὰρ ὁρᾷς, ἄλλα πράττω. (5) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεξεν· Ὡς σαφῶς μέντοι σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς· τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι, τοτὲ δ’ ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος. (6) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς με· τὴν δ’ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα ἐγώ σου καὶ φέρω καὶ οἴσω φιλικῶς. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἔφη, τὸν μὲν σὸν ἔρωτα κρύπτωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς. (7) ὅτι γε μὴν σύ, ὦ Καλλία, ἐρᾷς Αὐτολύκου πᾶσα μὲν ἡ πόλις οἶδε, πολλοὺς δ’ οἶμαι καὶ τῶν ξένων. τούτου δ᾿ αἴτιον τὸ πατέρων τε ὀνομαστῶν ἀμφοτέρους ὑμᾶς εἶναι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς. 62 Xenophon is ambiguous in regard to the daimonion. On the one hand he confirms that it dissuades (Symp. 8,5 τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι); on the other hand he says that it also advises (advising included Mem. 1.1.4; 4.8.1). Here, it is opposition that is the point, but opposition to speak with him need not include dissuasion. Plato denies that it urges Socrates to do anything (Apol. 31C7-D6), but when he went to the trial Socrates concluded that because the daimonion did not oppose him, going to trial was good (Apol. 40A2-C3); in fact this amounted to advice to go. (For more on Socrates and the daimonion see Guthrie III, 402-405).

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it is love for his beautiful body and not for his soul. This mock accusation is meant to be comical because earlier Socrates had pointed out his own ugliness, whereas Antisthenes had said that his soul was filled by Socrates with mental riches.63 Although the atmosphere is full of jokes and irony, something quite remarkable happens that reveals Xenophon’s clever compositional strategies. Socrates is unusually sharp, and he is the one who provokes Antisthenes in the same intrusive way that Antisthenes usually applies himself. Antisthenes replies rather good naturedly by involving Socrates himself.64 Nevertheless, Xenophon’s Socrates twice attacks Antisthenes in a rather unfriendly way, which seems a little unreasonable. First he says: ‘Do not be difficult at present, because as you see I have another occupation now’. ‘Difficult’ is the same word Antisthenes used in connection with Xanthippe. Socrates is presumably trying to give Antisthenes a taste of his own medicine. Second, Socrates’ aggravated exclamation also uses rather strong words: ‘By the gods, Antisthenes, if only you don’t wear me out (μὴ συγκόψῃς). Συγκόψῃς (‘thrash’) here means something like ‘to wear out’. Socrates continues: ‘All other difficult behaviour (χαλεπότητα) on your part I shall bear now and in the future as a friend’. Again we see the word ‘difficult’ and again we have the future involved: one might thus add the unuttered implication, ‘as I bear the conduct of Xanthippe’. Previously Antisthenes had said that Xanthippe was the most difficult wife, ‘even among wives yet to be’. These correspondences are clearly intended as references to the wording and contents of Antisthenes’ attack on Xanthippe. Thus, we may conclude that there is a stylistic-thematic basis for the rather unreasonable behaviour of Xenophon’s Socrates: a reference to the earlier passage. In light of that parallel we might say Antisthenes is, as it were, the Xanthippe of his comradeship. Now the entire conversation with Antisthenes has come to an end and we have here the closure of Antisthenes’ appearance in the Symposium, which as such is not very successful. Ultimately, Socrates silences him by joking about the object of Antisthenes’ ‘love’, Socrates’ soul, and he is as it were rejecting this love. Referring to his ugliness by making his ‘beautiful forms’ Antisthenes’ supposed goal of his love is a not very friendly move. 63 In the background is perhaps the preference of Antisthenes for ugly women (see p. 118 above). 64 Scholars compare the Alcibiades scene in Plato’s Symposium (213C6-D6), where we are told that Alcibiades is very much in love with Socrates. Even if this passage had been written before Xenophon’s, which some scholars believe, then the fact still stands that Xenophon had his own purposes in including it (see Patzer, Antisthenes, 86).

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Antisthenes’ appearance in Xenophon is not much applauded. The one and only thing that is convincing is his well-balanced and well-written speech. That is all. Almost all other appearances end rather negatively and especially his elenctic activities are either failures or quashed. He remains the rather rude fellow, not without merit, but scarcely acceptable in social circles. However, he must have been a welcome figure in the composition of the Symposium, adding to its vivacity. All these negative portrayals of his conduct seem to be adequate. What he personally has to contribute has its merits, but in Xenophon’s eyes he is not a likeable character. In fact, Socrates often stops Antisthenes in the conversation or is an impediment to Antisthenes’ success. Patzer sees Antisthenes as playing an outsider role, often challenged by Socrates, who attempts to lead the conversation in more decent directions. As I see it, Xenophon’s Socrates hinders Antisthenes on purpose in order to diminish his success. However, according to Patzer,65 Antisthenes is the only one who attempts to discuss an issue to the end. I cannot detect such a tendency and therefore disagree with Patzer. Even the reaction to Antisthenes’ speech is rather meek, with only Callias having something to say (4.45):66 Those were Antisthenes’ words. Callias said, ‘By Hera, I envy you your wealth, amongst other things in particular the fact that the city does not impose financial obligations on you and treat you as a slave nor do people get angry if you do not make them a loan.’ ‘No, by Zeus,’ Niceratus said, ‘do not envy him. For I will be back after having made him make me a loan of the capacity to need nothing more at all (τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι), schooled as I am by Homer in counting’.

Thus, some lofty references to the speech return in the Symposium only incidentally. The fact that Callias reacts is not strange, because he complained about the burdens of the state on the rich and the ingratitude of his borrowers. In 4.64 Antisthenes himself refers in passing to the riches of his soul, and later on in 5 Critobulus ironically refers to Antisthenes’ riches. The impression of Antisthenes’ appearance left on the partygoers is not strong.

65 Patzer, Antisthenes, 89. 66 Xen., Symp. 4.45: οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὕτως εἶπεν. (45) ὁ δὲ Καλλίας, Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, τά τε ἄλλα ζηλῶ σε τοῦ πλούτου καὶ ὅτι οὔτε ἡ πόλις σοι ἐπιτάττουσα ὡς δούλῳ χρῆται οὔτε οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἂν μὴ δανείσῃς, ὀργίζονται. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί’, ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, μὴ ζήλου· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥξω παρ’ αὐτοῦ δανεισάμενος τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου ἀριθμεῖν.

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Antisthenean themes in Xenophon’s Symposium

It is interesting to review the themes that Xenophon connects with Antisthenes throughout the work. They must have been the focus of Antisthenes’ attention since they can all be linked with the tradition preserved in the fragments, although there is always the difficult question whether some data in the fragments have their origins in the Symposium. In that case their value would be diminished. Here follows a list of the Antisthenean themes discussed above. Soul The theme of the soul as the spiritual storehouse inspires a new sober lifestyle. Teachabilty of virtue Antisthenes touches on the subject teachability in answering a question from Socrates. Homer As an expert who wrote many works on Homer, he is nonetheless hindered by Socrates from bringing his remarks to a favourable conclusion. His negative attitude to the rhapsodists is mentioned not only in the Symposium but perhaps also alluded to in the Memorabilia.67 Apparently this is a theme that was well known as Antisthenean. Money Money is the root of much evil in Antisthenes’ major speech. In the fragments, greed for gold is also rejected. All sorts of people, especially tyrants, are guilty of cruel actions because of their drive to acquire wealth. Justice Justice has no negative side. The further details of this position are unknown, but they could be Antisthenean. Frugality makes one more just than greed, for in that case one does not attempt to get what belongs to other people.

67 See p. 85 above with n. 5. It is a problem whether the condemnation of the rhapsodists as ridiculous can be ascribed to the historical Antisthenes. In any case, Xenophon referred to it in Memorabilia 4.10, but as part of Socrates’ view.

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Sex Antisthenes considered sex a natural need, although the fragments also state that it is a natural evil. Here, he states how unattractive women are ready to accept him, which corresponds with the grateful women in the fragments. Xenophon’s description of Antisthenes as unmarried and heterosexual must be reliable, because these characteristics are immediately refutable if not true. Pleasure Postponed pleasures are better and the fragments suggest the same. In reconsidering these points it is clear that Xenophon did not deviate much from what we already know from the fragments and he does not provide much new information. The treatment of the themes does not reveal much detailed knowledge of them or much interest in them, and the question remains how much Xenophon knew apart from the actual superf icial knowledge in the Symposium and how much of his own creativity he put into to the speech. Therefore, it is somewhat risky to embed pieces of the Symposium in a collection of fragments like the one of Giannantoni or Caizzi, because a reader might think that independent knowledge is being made available, which is possible but far from certain.



Epilogue: Antisthenes, an assessment

Analysis of the extant material shows that it is the veracity of the emerging picture of Antisthenes that matters. He is represented as a true and diligent follower of Socrates, despite all the negative points that Xenophon embeds in this portrait, such as his being a rather unpredictable and intruding person, a character that seems to be in line with his conduct in life. But Antisthenes must have grown into a master of his own character and spirit, becoming a philosopher capable of writing an impressive oeuvre itself much appreciated in antiquity given the witness of Cicero, and the recognition by Isocrates that this was his greatest rival for the duration of twenty years. There is the risk of underestimating Antisthenes as a simpleton because of his at times extravagant or seemingly childish behaviour. Aristotle’s description of the excluded contradiction as a silly thing, and his description of the viewpoint of the Antistheneans as ‘uneducated’, must not corrupt our perspective nor dominate our understanding. It must be underlined that Antisthenes was an interesting philosopher with interesting and logically coherent arguments, and perhaps an even better philologist in his time, although his interpretations of Homer are often more far-fetched than convincing. He was not averse to engaging in debate, for instance, with the rhetoricians Isocrates and Lysias, whom he attacked vehemently. However, from a historical perspective his influence should not be overestimated either. This study has attempted to exhaustively retrieve what could be saved from the slippery ground of tradition, but a constant reminder is necessary that much of his influence in antiquity is no longer traceable since so many of his numerous works are lost. He does not seem to have been a constructive thinker in the sense of one who designs philosophical and cultural panoramas. Here, I have attempted to find the core of his philosophy, but what I have found is an amalgam of concepts that do not constitute a perspicuous whole, although they circle around wisdom and insight. The details of what this core actually entails remain obscure. For instance, at the centre of his educational activities, paideia, we find a form of ethics by example, not a thorough system. There are nearly always different impulses and rather fragmentary utterances. Admittedly, the limitation of what the tradition delivers to us may be partly responsible for this view, but in the end I am inclined to assume that if we had more knowledge of his works the final judgement would, I fear, be the same. The most important schools of philosophy after Socrates were those continued by Plato and the Academy and Aristotle. In these traditions

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there was no place for Antisthenes, who is only once mentioned in Plato in a non-philosophical context1 and only rarely by Aristotle. Nevertheless, there were other important schools, Cynicism and Stoicism, and sometimes we detect Antisthenes’ influence there; for example, as quoted above, his ideas on the life and habits of the philosopher were influential on Cynicism and foreshadow the rigid Stoic figure. His influence on Cynicism – in antiquity he is often called its founding father – remains a difficult point. Rankin speaks of Antisthenes as a Protocynic,2 but it is hardly possible to establish the contours of this influence. This hotly debated issue will not be discussed here because it has been the goal only to present a sketch of Antisthenes as the most important follower of Socrates, next to, or rather after, Plato. It must be noted furthermore that his interpretation of myth also had its impact on later philosophy, as did his philological work on Homer (as we saw with polytropos) and the concept of orthosemantics.

1 The scene of Socrates’ last moments in the Phaedo, from which Plato himself was absent. 2 Rankin, Antisthenes, 179. Guthrie has a survey of the problem in how far Antisthenes may be called the father of the Cynics (Guthrie III, 307, 341).



Appendix II: The Speeches of Ajax and Odysseus

Introduction Antisthenes’ sources We have two coherent speeches from an ancient Greek handbook of speeches that are attributed to Antisthenes, one spoken by Ajax and one by Odysseus.1 Myth relates that after the death of Achilles these two men both claimed the armour of the greatest Greek hero. The Atreides, the kings Agamemnon and Menelaus, not without manipulation, left the judgement about the armour to a jury consisting of Greek warriors who had fought at Troy. The mythological scene was well known before Antisthenes’ day because of its treatment by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar. Every reader of Antisthenes’ speeches knew from the start that Ajax was not awarded the armour, which was given to Odysseus instead, and moreover that Ajax could not handle his defeat and killed himself. In his tragedy, Sophocles gives his Ajax a long speech deploring the method of jury selection and lamenting his loss. Pindar also dedicates a passage to this subject; he states that Ajax was ‘without gift of speech, but bold at heart’ (because in Homer Ajax was presented as a fighting machine).2 The secret votes of the Greeks favoured Odysseus, unfairly according to Pindar; the result, he says, ‘Ajax’s sword once used in favour of the Greeks and above the corpse of the newly slain Achilles made also a suicidal end to Ajax’s life’.3 Regarding Ajax’s loss as unfair, Pindar takes sides against Odysseus, whose reputation was rather controversial as was previously discussed, accusing him of ‘cunning falsehood’. 4 There must have been something attractive in the matter of the contest between Ajax and Odysseus. Antisthenes also apparently felt that possibilities for exhibiting his eloquence were ready at hand, perhaps especially because Ajax was known to be ‘without the gift of speech’, as Pindar said. Hence it might be an incentive to write a striking speech in favour of a 1 They occur in the first tomos of Diogenes Laertius’ list: 6.15 (SSR VA 41.4; 5; D.C. 1.4; 5). 2 Pind., Nem. 8.24. 3 Pind., Nem. 8.23-34; cp. Nem. 7.20-27. 4 See pp. 54-56.

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person who was known to be but a moderate speaker, or no speaker at all: in the underworld scene in Homer where Odysseus meets Ajax, he refuses to say anything to Odysseus. As already discussed, Antisthenes had written much to save the reputation of Odysseus, and it must have been attractive to do this again, or to use the material for the first time in a speech, but instead Antisthenes tries to be rather neutral here (at first glance in any case), because of the demands of the forensic context.5 There was, as far as we can see, no one before Antisthenes who had approached the situation as he did: as an opportunity to come down in favour of both parties. In the period after Antisthenes we have the debate for the jury in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Those who previously had had something to say, like Sophocles in his Ajax and Pindar in his Nemean Ode, were pro Ajax. Sophocles made Ajax the protagonist of his tragedy; small wonder that Sophocles presented the case for Ajax. Pindar had an open choice and he also chose for Ajax against Odysseus. Antisthenes also had to choose sides and he knew well what was written about the contest, as can be seen from his choice of the members of the jury. His jury consists of Greeks who fought against Troy, just as in Sophocles’ Ajax (445-449). In the tragedy, the intrigues of the Atreides influence the proceedings such that the Greeks decide to give the armour to Odysseus; this theme also occurs in Antisthenes. Deep down in Homer’s underworld Odysseus himself says that the jury consisted of Trojans (Od. 11.543-547); in other sources, even Trojan women are mentioned as members of the jury. Antisthenes must have known that Odysseus spoke about Trojan captives6 as members of the jury since the Odyssey has it so, but for his speeches this datum is unworkable because then he could not use any kind of appeal to comrades or the whole entourage of warriors.7 Moreover, Sophocles’ treatment, which apparently exerted an important influence on Antisthenes’ composition, would not be intertextually relevant. In any case, Antisthenes had surely read Sophocles (see the discussion below).8 5 We do not know from which stage in Antisthenes’ career these speeches originate, possibly from an early stage (see Patzer, Antisthenes, 215). Antisthenes already had considerable knowledge of Homer since rather early on we find him quarrelling with Plato about the meaning of Odysseus’ Homeric epithet polytropos (see pp. 54-56 above). If there was still much to come on Homer in his career, this speech could also be an early defence of Odysseus. 6 Patzer, Antisthenes, 199 n. 85. 7 Patzer (Antisthenes, 202) has a good discussion of the mythological data Antisthenes used or omitted, and his ‘autoschediasms’. That Ajax saved the body and Odysseus the armour of Achilles is not mentioned elsewhere and is an important innovation of Antisthenes, which serves as the pivot of the whole creation of the speeches. 8 See n. 38 below.

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Patzer believes that the style of the speeches is rather simple, presenting mainly paratactic phrases, although there are many stylistic influences of Gorgias: ‘Im auffälligen Gegensatz zu diesem gorgianischen Kolorit steht die überaus einfache Satzbildung, die logische Unterordnung meidet und stattdessen die Parataxe bevorzügt’ [‘In marked contrast to this Gorgianic stylistic colouring stands the extremely simple syntax, which avoids logical subordination and rather uses a paratactic sentence structure instead’].9 It is true that hypotactic phrasing is unexpected when such a fighter and simple rhetor as Ajax speaks; however, note that the phrases of the more rhetorically skilled Odysseus are paratactic too. There is the issue of authenticity to be considered. In Giannantoni, the immense debate on this issue is given a lively treatment;10 Patzer also has a good historical review.11 In the end, both Giannantoni and Patzer rank themselves with those who accept authenticity; I too have reasons to view the texts as authentic and it will appear in my commentary on the speeches why. For now it should be stated that the only indisputable point is that because of cross-referencing between the two speeches they must have been written by one and the same person.

The aim of the speeches Leaving aside the issue of authenticity for the moment, we still have the problem of what precisely the aim of the speeches was. Were they models to be used in teaching rhetoric? Or were they only examples of Antisthenes’ ability in writing forensic speeches? Or both? Since they deviate considerably from other forensic speeches, they cannot be purely examples of rhetoric.12 Patzer believes that Antisthenes’ intention was to represent the polytropic character of Odysseus’ speech and the monotropic character of Ajax’s speech.13 The polytropic character, he says, is manifest in the sentence: ‘For me no armour is drawn up in which I challenge the enemies to fight but in which manner (tropos) someone wants to fight, I am always prepared both against one or against many’. This is not a very felicitous supporting 9 See Patzer, Antisthenes, 208. Patzer considers the rather simple phrasing characteristic and thus as an indication of the authenticity of the speeches. 10 Giannantoni, Nota 26, IV, 257-264. 11 Patzer, Antisthenes, 199-215. 12 Patzer, Antisthenes, 211. 13 Patzer, Antisthenes, 213.

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quotation, because it is the manner of fighting that is the point not the manner of addressing an audience. We can more easily accept Patzer’s statement that the connection of rhetoric and ethics is the main characteristic and aim of the speeches. However, I believe that the main point of Antisthenes’ efforts is to find and represent what real courage entails. Ajax has a lot to say about virtue but virtue in his eyes is synonymous with courage, as when he states: ‘I say to you, judges-who-know-nothing and jurymen, do not look at the speeches when judging in a case of virtue, but rather look at the deeds’. For Odysseus virtue appears to be connected with wisdom and thus polymorphous; he says, ‘When a good poet will emerge who will praise virtue, he will portray me as enduring much, a good adviser, inventive, a capturer of cities’. His point is that bravery without wisdom (which Ajax embodies) is worthless: it is wisdom (such as Odysseus has) that matters. By this can be seen that the virtue of courage contains endurance, being a good adviser, being inventive, and, even being a capturer of cities. Thus, courage must be linked to wisdom in order to be considered real virtue and real courage. This is the essence of Antisthenes’ forensic endeavour. Here is the full text of the two speeches.

Ajax’s speech: ‘Not words but deeds’14 (1) Ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἵπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρῆσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ’ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἄπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν μὴ εἰδότων γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγίγνετο ἔργῳ. (2) τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκόμισα ἐγὼ φέρων, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ὅδε, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι οὐ τῶν ὅπλων μᾶλλον ἐπεθύμουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ κρατῆσαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ᾐκίσαντό τε ἂν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἕκτορος ἐκομίσαντο· τὰ δὲ ὅπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ’ (3) ἀπέκρυψαν, δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ὃς καὶ πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ νύκτωρ ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο 14 Rankin (Antisthenes, 151-173) has a good, somewhat literary translation of both speeches with useful commentary. We also have a thorough German translation in Patzer, Antisthenes, 194-198. My translation attempts to follow the text more closely and sometimes I have a different interpretation and translation of the Greek. The Greek text is taken from Radermacher, Artium scriptores XIX.11 ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ, pp. 122-124 (SSR VA 53; D.C. 14).

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τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. κἀγὼ μὲν ἀξιῶ λαβεῖν ἵν’ ἀποδῶ τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἵν’ ἀποδῶται, ἐπεὶ χρῆσθαί γε αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε· δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήμοις ὅπλοις χρήσαιτο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὅπλα. (4) σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἅπαντα ὅμοια. οἵ τε γὰρ διαθέντες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις, οἵ τε οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάσειν ὑπισχνεῖσθε περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴστε. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπίσταμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἱκανὸς ὢν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἤπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰατρὸς διαγνῶναι νοσήματα ἄλλῳ παρείη. (5) καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοιότροπον, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡττᾶσθαί μοι διέφερε· νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει πλέον ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε. ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν δράσειε φανερῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρᾳ τολμήσαιμι πρᾶξαι. κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων, οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς πάσχων, ὃ δὲ κἂν κρεμάμενος, εἰ κερδαίνειν τι μέλλοι· (6) ὅστις γε μαστιγοῦν παρεῖχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγμαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον, κἄπειτα περιβαλόμενος ῥάκη, τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδὺς τῶν πολεμίων, ἱεροσυλήσας ἀπῆλθε. καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογήσει ποιεῖν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πείσει, λέγων ὡς καλῶς πέπρακται. ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων ὅδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερόσυλος ἀξιοῖ κρατῆσαι; (7) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς καὶ δικασταῖς, μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνοντας, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ· οὐδ’ ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλ’ ἢ μαχομένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ. πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθρεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὡς, εἰ μὴ δικάσετε καλῶς, γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον ἰσχύν, (8) οὐδ’ ἔστιν ὑμᾶς ὅ τι λέγων ἀνὴρ ὠφελήσει, εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δι’ ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι λέγονται. ἀλλ’ ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς. καὶ ταῦτα μὴ κρύβδην {φέρετε}, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς, ἵνα γνῶτε ὅτι καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάζουσι δοτέα δίκη ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ δικάσωσιν ὀρθῶς. κἄπειτ’ ἴσως γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ κάθησθε. (9) ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν μὲν ὑμῖν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτρέπω, διαδοξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρός, ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ’ ἄκων ἀφῖκται εἰς Τροίαν, καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὃς πρῶτος ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγμαι. (1) ‘I should wish that the same people who were present in the situation concerned would judge us.15 For I know that then I would remain silent and that there would be nothing more to say for my opponent. But in the present situation, those who were present at the events themselves 15 Ajax and Odysseus.

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are absent and you who know nothing are the judges.16 Now I ask, what fair process can there be when the judges know nothing and the event will be presented by means of speeches, whereas the event itself took place in actuality? (2) It was I who carried away Achilles’ body, hence preserving it – this man [Odysseus] only carried the armour – and I was well aware that the Trojans wanted rather to seize the dead body than the armour.17 For if they had seized the corpse they should have mutilated it as payback for Hector. And this armour they would not have dedicated to the gods,18 (3) but they would have hidden it for fear of this “eminent” man,19 who earlier, after having deprived them of the statue of the god [Pallas] during the night, showed it off to the Achaeans as if he had done something splendid. And I wish to receive the armour so that I can give it to Achilles’ friends,20 whereas he wants to sell it because he would not dare to use it. No coward would use such well-known armour realizing that the armour would reveal his cowardice. (4) All other things are practically the same.21 For those who organized this contest, although confirming that they are kings,22 trusted it to others 16 Those who defend the notion that Trojan captives make up the jury exploit the absence mentioned here as evidence for the idea that another version of the myth is referred to (see Patzer, Antisthenes, 201). 17 There is a problem. Rankin, as his translation shows, connects ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι οὐ τῶν ὅπλων μᾶλλον ἐπεθύμουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ κρατῆσαι with ὅδε, thus with Odysseus, because the part of the sentence τάδε ὅπλα ὅδε is close to ὅδε (the same in Patzer, Antisthenes, 194 ‘weil er [sc. Odysseus] wusste’ etc.). However, the sentence contains an idea that is more suitable to Ajax, who is the dominant subject of the main part of the sentence (ἐγώ) and perhaps of the whole sentence, τάδε ὅπλα ὅδε included. The fact that the Trojans would have seized the corpse rather than the armour means that taking the armour would be less dangerous, which suits the ‘coward’ Odysseus. As a consideration of Ajax it grounds the following, namely that he attempted immediately to seize the body, which is a more dangerous and therefore more desirable thing for the brave Ajax to do. For Odysseus’ reaction, see n. 51 below. 18 Ironically, he ascribed to Odysseus the habit of depriving temples of their goods. If the armour were dedicated to the gods in a temple the Trojans must fear another secret theft, in this case of Achilles’ armour. 19 Odysseus. 20 Ajax did not need such armour having famous armour of his own (see p. 187 (7) below), whereas according to Ajax’s intuition based on his characterization of Odysseus, the latter would want to sell it because he was too much of a coward to use it. For if he would have used it, he would have been known to be a loser, because he would have lost the armour during a fight and anyone would notice the loss of such well-known armour. 21 Ajax seems to mean that all other circumstances are against him. 22 Again an insult to the judges, and moreover to the kings who left it to them to judge, because they wished themselves to be free of blame. In Sophocles’ Ajax it is the Atreides who organize

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to judge this matter of virtue, and you who know nothing promised to judge about things you do not know.23 But I am sure about one thing: that no capable king would entrust the judgement of virtue to others any more than a good physician would entrust the diagnosis24 of illness to others.25 (5) And if the issue was between me and a man of a similar character, being beaten would make no difference. But in the present situation there could not be a greater contrast than between me and this man. There is nothing that he would do openly, whereas I would not dare do anything secretly. And I would not put up with being ill spoken of, even if I would suffer for it,26 but this man would bear even being hanged27 if he thought he would have profit from it. (6) A man who let himself be whipped by slaves, and beaten on his back with sticks, and punched in the face with fists, and then in rags, 28 sneaking around in the night behind the walls of the enemy to rob the temple, and after that coming back. And he will admit that he did it and perhaps he will convince you by his words that he did something splendid. Is it possible that such a man, who ought to be whipped for robbing the temple, wishes to carry off the armour of Achilles?

the procedure and direct it against Ajax (Sophocles, Ajax 445-449). 23 Already Sophocles’ Ajax complains that the kings tried to undermine his position. Here Antisthenes goes further and suggests they lack capability as kings. 24 Later on he requires the judges to come to the right ‘diagnosis’ in his case. In his discussion of polytropos, medicine and the good doctor are also adduced (see p. 87 above). It seems Antisthenes was rather fond of the analogy to medicine (see p. 69 above), but we cannot maintain that he was the only one to use these examples. 25 We have to connect περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν not with ἱκανὸς ὤν (so Rankin, Antisthenes, 157) but with ἐπιτρέψειεν, parallel with ἀγαθός connected with ἰατρός and διαγνῶναι νοσήματα with παρείη. There is in Xenophon’s Memorabilia a discussion of the capable leader, which is quoted in connection with our text (2.1.1). 26 Antisthenes is outspoken on the theme of reputation; he himself did not care at all about it as long as he thought he was on the right moral track (see D.L. 6.3 [SSR VA 28; D.C. 150] and p. 134 above). This theme was also embedded in the description of Cyrus’ education (see pp. 134-137 above). Here Ajax says the opposite: he could not bear it to be ill spoken off. It could be that a forger used this trait to make the speech more authentically Antisthenean. However, one could equally maintain that Antisthenes himself put the opposite thought in the speech to make it more convincing within the limitations of Ajax’s alleged limited eloquence. Cp. nn. 27 and 29 below. 27 We find the notion of hanging treated elsewhere, namely in the fragments (see p. 130 above). This could be taken as an indication of Antisthenes’ authorship. 28 Odysseus dressed himself as a beggar because of what his own people inflicted on him in order to carry out his sly deed.

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(7) I say to you, judges-who-know-nothing and jurymen, do not look at the speeches when judging in a case of virtue, but look rather at the deeds. For war is not judged by words but by deeds. You cannot contradict29 where enemies are concerned, only by fighting can you either win or become a slave in silence. Pay attention to that and look at this point, in order that you, when your judgement fails,30 will realize that speech has no strength at all when it comes to action. (8) There isn’t a chance that someone who only talks will bring you advantage, and you will clearly realize that if there are no deeds many and long arguments will be presented.31 The only thing to do is recognize that you do not understand what is said and stand up and go away32 or come to the right judgement. Give that judgement not secretly, but each one openly so that you will learn that those who judge also have to suffer punishment themselves when they do not give the right judgement. And then you will realize that you are not sitting as judges of what is said, but as persons who make conjectures about it. (9) What concerns myself I entrust to you to determine33 – this suit about me and what belongs to me34 – and I forbid all of you to conjecture about it.35 And your verdict must decide between a man who not willingly but reticently came to Troy, and myself, who as first and on his own without a wall36 took a stand in battle.’

29 Contradiction is a hot topic in Antisthenes’ work. Here the idea that Odysseus is a superior rhetor is in the background. Ajax tries to neutralize the idea that convincing eloquence should win the armour. In this framework the idea of contradiction emerges as a rhetorical weapon. Ajax tries to say that such modes of speech have no effect in wartime. Although contradiction was a favoured subject of Antisthenes, as we know, as such the appearance of the contradiction is not evidence enough for ascribing the speech to Antisthenes or considering it parodic or satirical (Rankin, Antisthenes, 172). To contradict is a general rhetorical habit or even a must. (See what I said about the reputation n. 26 above.) Nevertheless, in this context the idea of contradiction comes out of the blue. 30 Note that he already starts from the idea that the judges will be wrong. 31 See pp. 41-43 above on this theme. 32 This is impertinent or contemptuous advice. It is not proper behaviour either to threaten the judges. 33 Achilles uses the word διαγιγνώσκειν, of which diagnosis is the substantive (see n. 24 above). 34 Ajax anticipates the judgement; he believes that the armour is already his. 35 Conjecture is not a good form of deliberation; do not use conjecture, just let deeds speak and give me the armour. 36 Rankin (Antisthenes, 100) translates ‘without protection’ for ‘without a wall’ (teichos), but then one loses the echo of Odysseus’ reference to this ‘wall’ (see p. 188 paragraph 7 below).

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Odysseus’ speech: ‘I alone am the saviour of the Greeks by secret acts’ (1) οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος, δι’ ὃν ἀνέστην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας· πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζῶντος ἂν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ νῦν τεθνεῶτος λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην μεμάχησθε, ἣν οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ μεθ’ ὑμῶν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ξύνοιδε. (2) καίτοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς μάχαις, οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις, οὓς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνευον, εἰ μὲν κατορθώσαιμι, ἅπαντα ὑμῖν ἐπετελεῖτο, ὧν ἕνεκα δεῦρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ’ ἐσφάλην, ἐμοῦ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα μαχοίμεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ’ ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἵνα τήν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιμεν καὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἕλοιμεν. (3) ταῦτα δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις ἐνῆν ἅπαντα. ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεχρημένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιμεν τὸ κλαπὲν παρ’ ἡμῶν, τίς ἐστιν ὁ κομίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλμα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγώ; ὃν σύ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶσθα, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν ὑφελόμενον παρ’ ἡμῶν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον. (4) καὶ τὴν Τροίαν μὲν ἁλῶναι ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως ἔσται τοῦτο, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἴπερ καλόν γε ἦν ἑλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὑρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ἐμοί. ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀμαθίας ὧν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα. (5) κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ὀνειδίζω σοι τὴν ἀμαθίαν – ἄκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ σὺ καὶ 〈οἱ〉 ἄλλοι πεπόνθασιν ἅπαντες – ἀλλ’ ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὀνείδη τὰ ἐμὰ σῳζόμενος οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τούσδε, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ τὰ ὅπλα ψηφίσωνται. καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ πολλά, πρὶν καὶ σμικρόν τι ἐργάσασθαι· ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἴομαί σε κακόν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι. (6) καὶ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεμίους κακῶς ἐποίησα, δειλίαν ὀνειδίζεις· σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερῶς ἐμόχθεις καὶ μάτην, ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. 〈ἢ〉 ὅτι μετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἴει βελτίων εἶναι; ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις; ὃς πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ’ ὅπως ἔδει μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ὗς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόμενος τάχ’ ἄν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν κακῷ περιπεσών τῳ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὔθ’ ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ χρὴ οὔθ’ ὑφ’ ἑταίρου οὔθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων κακὸν οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν; (7) σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαίρεις, ὅτι σέ φασιν οἵδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν γε ἁπάντων τε καὶ δεδιότα τὸν θάνατον μάλιστα· ὅστις γε πρῶτον ὅπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα καὶ ἄτρωτα, δι’ ἅπερ σέ φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι. καίτοι τί ἂν δράσεις, εἴ τις σοὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἦ που καλόν

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τι καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μηδέτερος ὑμῶν μηδὲν δρᾶσαι δύναιτο. ἔπειτα οἴει τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι; καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ δὴ τεῖχος οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς σὺ φῄς· μόνος μὲν οὖν σύ γε ἑπταβόειον περιέρχῃ τεῖχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ· (8) ἐγὼ δὲ ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ’ εἰς αὐτὰ εἰσέρχομαι τὰ τείχη, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς προφύλακας ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὅπλοισιν αἱρῶ, καὶ εἰμὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τά τ’ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐχὶ πέμπων κατασκεψόμενον ἄλλον· ἀλλ’ αὐτός, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σῴζω. (9) οὐδ’ ἔστιν ὅντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγησάμενος, ἐν ᾧ μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν· οὐδ’ εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαί μέ τινες ἔμελλον, γλιχόμενος ἂν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐτόλμων· ἀλλ’ εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μαστιγίας ὢν μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν, ἐπεχείρουν ἄν, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς ὁρῴη. οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεμος ἀλλὰ δρᾶν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ ὅπλα ἐστί μοι τεταγμένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλοῦμαι τοὺς πολεμίους μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἕτοιμός εἰμ’ ἀεί. (10) οὐδ’ ἡνίκα κάμνω μαχόμενος, ὥσπερ σύ, τὰ ὅπλα ἑτέροις παραδίδωμι, ἀλλ’ ὁπόταν ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέμιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεμαι, ἔχων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἃ ἐκείνους βλάψει μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νὺξ πώποτέ με ἀφείλετο, ὥσπερ σὲ πολλάκις μαχόμενον ἄσμενον πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ’ ἡνίκα ἂν ῥέγχῃς σύ, τηνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σῴζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀεὶ κακόν τι ποιῶ, ἔχων τὰ δουλοπρεπῆ ταῦτα ὅπλα καὶ τὰ ῥάκη καὶ τὰς μάστιγας, δι’ ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις. (11) σὺ δ’ ὅτι φέρων ἐκόμισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρεῖος οἴει εἶναι; ὃν εἰ μὴ ἠδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην, κἄπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν ἠμφισβήτουν. κἀμοὶ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν ἔλεγες ἀμφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν φροντίσαις, ἑνὸς δ’ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁμολογῶν δειλότερος εἶναι; (12) οὐκ οἶσθ’ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἔμελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν ἔμελλον, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουμένοις αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσι θάπτειν. σὺ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἕτοιμα ἐκόμισας· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὀνειδιζόμενα ἀφειλόμην ἐκείνους. (13) φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς, κακῶν ἐναντιώτατα αὑτοῖς· καὶ ὃ μέν σε ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν, ἣ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπινον μὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας· διότι γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἴει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφίᾳ περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἰσχῦσαι; ἀμαθία δὲ κακὸν μέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσιν.

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(14) οἶμαι δ’, ἐάν ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητὴς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται, ἐμὲ μὲν ποιήσει πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ μόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἑλόντα, σὲ δέ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις καὶ βουσὶ τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσμεύειν καὶ ζευγνύναι αὑτούς. (1) ‘My speech is addressed not only to you in person [Ajax], on whose account I rose from my seat, but also to all the others.37 The army benefited more from me than from you all. I would say that even if Achilles were still alive, but now he is dead it is up to me to say it to you.38 For you have not seen combat in battles other than those I fought with you. But not one of you has any knowledge of the dangers I encountered. (2) Even if you fought eminently in the common battles, we should not have made any progress. But in those dangerous situations which I alone underwent, if I were to be successful, all would be achieved on account of which we came; but if I were to fail, you would have been deprived of only one man: myself. For we did not come here to fight with the Trojans but to get Helen back and to take Troy. (3) All this was dependent on the dangers I had to endure. It was predicted that Troy could not be taken if first we did not take back the statue of the goddess [Pallas] which had been stolen; who was it who brought this statue here other than myself? A person whom you [Ajax] judge to be guilty of temple robbery! You have no idea, you who accuse the man who saved the statue of the goddess of being a temple robber instead of Alexander [Paris],39 the man who stole it from us. (4) You all prayed that Troy would be taken, and you [Ajax] call me a temple robber, the one who invented the way to achieve that? Yet if it was splendid 37 Instead of addressing the jurymen as ignoramuses, as Ajax has, Odysseus makes them participant comrades in the events as can be observed later in the speech. The Greek text is taken from Radermacher, Artium scriptores XIX.12 ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ, pp. 124-126 (SSR VA 54; D.C. 15). 38 The fact that Odysseus refers hypothetically to Achilles being still alive implies that nobody had more right to the armour than Odysseus himself. Interestingly, this is a type of argument that Ajax himself launches in Sophocles’ tragedy: ‘If Achilles, being still alive, had to decide, no other man than Ajax himself would have got the armour’ (Sophocles, Ajax 442-444). Here, we have evidence that Antisthenes consulted Sophocles’ Ajax. It seems to me typical of Antisthenes that he gives the argument not to Ajax, as Sophocles does, but, turning the situation around, he gives it to Odysseus. This is a sign of authenticity. If Antisthenes had given it to Ajax, he would have come close to plagiarism, or at least to simply adopting his predecessor’s text. We learn also that Antisthenes started from the traditional situation as given in the Ajax: a Greek jury decided against Ajax on the instigation of the Atreides. See n. 22 above where Ajax hints at the intrigues of the Atreides. 39 Paris.

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to take Troy, then it is also splendid to find out its cause. The others are grateful to me, but you make reproaches to me. Your stupidity is the cause that you do not realize the good things you have received from me. (5) And I do not reproach you this stupidity – not willingly do you and all the others40 endure this – but I do reproach you that, in spite of the fact that you have been saved by what you reproach me with now, you are not willing to follow the verdict, but also even threaten to do harm to these members of the jury when they decide to give the armour to me. And time and again you threaten them with many threats before you will do some small thing. And if I may conclude from what is likely, I believe that because of your bad temper you will harm yourself. 41 (6) And you reproach me with being a coward because I harmed the enemies, but you are the ridiculous one because you toiled publicly but to no effect. 42 Do you believe that because you did this together with all Greeks that you are better than me? Do you speak about virtue43 to me then, who first of all does not know in what manner one has to fight, but like a wild boar in a rage rushing in you will kill yourself as a victim of some terrible accident?44 Do you not know that a good man is harmed neither by himself nor by a comrade nor by the enemies in any respect? (7) But you, are you happy like a child that the men here say that you are brave? I say that you are the most faint hearted and most fearful of death of all. You are someone who has resilient and invulnerable armour, because of which they say that you are invulnerable. And yet, what would you do if one of the enemies with similar armour approached you? Would it be something beautiful and admirable if neither of you was capable of achieving something?45 Do you think then that it would 40 Here Odysseus transgresses the borderline of his previous prudence: who are the other stupid people? There could be a suggestion of the other Greeks involved. 41 This predicts Ajax’s death, which everyone knows already (see below n. 44). 42 The Homeric duel of Ajax and Hector in presence of both armies (‘publicly’) had no winner (‘to no effect’); see (7) below. 43 The virtue is courage, the pre-eminent virtue of fighters. 44 Homer compares Ajax to a wild boar running into the enemy (Il. 7.257). Odysseus foretells here what is known already, namely that Ajax will kill himself. It is remarkable that Homeric scenes inspired Antisthenes to suggest similar scenes about what is to come, vaticinia ex eventu. 45 It is noteworthy that Ajax had already had such a fight – with Hector – which ended as a draw because of approaching night (Il. 7.279-302). Neither Ajax nor Hector achieved anything, although Ajax came out as slightly superior. The readers or the listeners who knew their Homer must have understood Antisthenes’ reference. Antisthenes pretends that Odysseus is ignorant of this fact, while exploiting it as source of inspiration for presenting scenes that are unpleasant for Ajax.

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make any difference to have such armour or to sit behind a wall?46 And you alone have no wall, as you say? Yet, you alone have a shield of seven layers of ox-hide to protect yourself. (8) Whereas without weapons I not only went to the walls of the enemies, I also went behind them. And I took their weapons, including those from the guards of the enemies who were awake. I am the general and the one who guards you and all the others, and I know the situation here and the situation of the enemy without sending any other man as a spy, but just as the helmsmen keep watch night and day to keep the sailors safe, so I myself keep you and all the others safe. 47 (9) And there is no situation in which I could have done harm to the enemy that I avoided or fled from, because I should have judged it to be disgraceful (to flee). 48 And even if some saw me, I would not continue a daring action for the sake of appearances only. If I could do any harm to the enemy as a slave, or as beggar and a rogue, I would undertake it, even if no one saw it. For war is not a matter of appearances, but always a matter of action, night and day. For me no armour is fabricated in which I challenge the enemies to fight, but in whatever manner someone wants to fight, I am always prepared either against one or against many. (10) And when I get tired of fighting I do not hand over my weapon to others, like you do, but when the enemies take rest, then I attack them during the night with the weapons that will damage them most. The night did not stop me ever, as it often stopped you – to your relief. While you were snoring, at that same time I saved you and inflicted a damaging loss on the enemies – carrying the weaponry of a slave, in rags and under the marks of lashes, 49 the cause of your sleeping safely. (11) Do you believe you are brave because you carried back the corpse [of Achilles]? This corpse two men could carry if you could not have carried it back. 46 Odysseus exploits Ajax’s remark that he stood in battle without a ‘wall’ (teichos). Homer (Il. 7.219) compares Ajax’s armour with a tower. This is the background to the remark of Odysseus, who concludes that having this towering armour Ajax had nothing to fear and therefore can scarcely be called ‘courageous’. 47 Rankin (Antisthenes, 139) makes a connection between this nautical image and Plato’s comparison of a democratic assembly with the mutinous crew of a ship who give ill-informed orders to the navigator. This comparison seems meaningless to me because of the contextual difference. 48 Here we have a reaction to Ajax’s admission that he could not bear to be spoken ill of. Odysseus says that he would not be influenced to give up by the possibility of making a bad impression, he just confronts the judges with situations in which he gave an advantage to the Greeks. Of course he cannot say that a king should be ill spoken of, but his intention is the same. 49 Here are the rags, etc., again. Odysseus wishes to emphasize the usefulness of his humiliating disguise.

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And if that were the situation then the two would perhaps compete with me in virtue. And I would give the same speech to them. What would you say to competing with them? Or would you not care about two persons, but would you be ashamed to admit to be more cowardly than one person?50 (12) Do you not realize that the Trojans were not interested in the body, but in the armour?51 They intended to give back the corpse, but they would dedicate the armour to the gods in the temple. It is not shameful for those who do not take corpses with them, but it is for those who do not give them back for burial. You brought back what posed no problem already, but what I took from them is reproached! (13) You suffer from jealousy and stupidity, the most contrary things in themselves. The one makes you desire the beautiful; the other turns you away from it. Your situation is typically human. For, because you are strong, you believe you are also brave. Do you not realize that where war is concerned wisdom and bravery do not have the same power? But stupidity is the greatest of evils for its possessor. (14) When a good poet emerges who praises virtue, he will portray me as enduring much, a good adviser, inventive, a capturer of cities, and one who on his own captured Troy,52 whereas as I believe he will compare your nature to slothful donkeys and grazing bullocks, who give themselves to others to chain them or to yoke them.’53 50 This argument is rather complicated, even strange – especially the two questions at the end. Odysseus imagines a situation where two persons would carry the body instead of Ajax, if he had not been in the position to do so; in other words it was not any tremendous feat, but required only manpower. Odysseus then hypothesizes, perhaps ironically, that the competition in virtue would then be between himself and the two in relation to the armour. Odysseus claims that he would present the same argument as he does now, but suggests that Ajax could not say the same thing if he were to compete with the two. Odysseus suggests that Ajax would not be ashamed to lose from two persons, an opinion forced on Ajax, but that he is ashamed to admit that he was more of a coward than one person – does he mean himself or another single man who would have carried back Achilles’ corpse? The idea is to suggest that Ajax is a coward because he would not dare to bring back the body alone or because he did not dare bring back the armour as Odysseus did. This is a rather artificial construction purely intended to discredit Ajax, not only not to the point, but even malicious. 51 This is the answer to the thesis of Ajax that the Trojans wanted to get the corpse more than the armour, and it is evidence that this thesis must not be ascribed to Odysseus, as Rankin and Patzer do (see above n. 17) but to Ajax himself. Odysseus reacts to the idea of Ajax that the Trojans were eager to capture the body, because according to Odysseus’ argument, the body was of no interest to them, since as people with a moral code and open to shame they would give back the body as is appropriate. Thus, the armour, which Odysseus brought back, was what the Trojans wanted. 52 Rankin, Antisthenes, 171. 53 Odysseus’ animal comparisons, first a swine, now a donkey and an ox, are far from flattering and are meant to emphasize Ajax’s lack of brains and his stubbornness.

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The end of Odysseus’ speech is spectacular. Odysseus announces Homer as a good (of course!) poet and refers to Homer’s poems, in which he will be given the epithets he now claims and which he amply uses in praise of himself: πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον (‘enduring much, a good adviser, inventive’). Rankin calls this ‘dramatic irony’. These three adjectives begin with poly and one might wonder why polytropos, which is the first epithet Homer gives to Odysseus in the Odyssey, is absent. But if indeed the speech is Antisthenean, it is understandable that polytropos is missing because however strong Antisthenes’ defence of polytropos may have been,54 this word is not free from general criticism and therefore it is better left out; also because Antisthenes himself said that the word was ambivalent, that it could indicate both praise and criticism. I take the absence of polytropos as an indication that the speech is authentically Antisthenean. Odysseus does his utmost to refute all of what Ajax has said and uses this as his lead. He attacks argument after argument, not forgetting to emphasize that his own secret endeavours were essential for the victory of the Greeks. His speech had to be so good – and it is much better than Ajax’ speech – in order that the armour be assigned to him in accordance with the myth. In the end, both speeches subvert the concept of courage, but Odysseus’ idea of courage is much more nuanced whereas Ajax’s notion of courage is limited to tough fighting (‘only by fighting can you either win or be slave in silence’). Thus, this virtue is the pivotal point of each speech. However, the idea of virtue is different in both cases. It would be useful if we knew more about Antisthenses’ ideas about the virtue named courage, to which he dedicated an entire book. However, as I will now demonstrate, what we know is rather disappointing.

Antisthenes’ book On Courage Antisthenes wrote a work On Courage (Περὶ ἀνδρείας).55 It remains a strange idea that the noble Athenians, as we believe them to have been, such as Socrates, Antisthenes, and others who are in many ways an ideal for mankind, fought bravely in battles and were not averse to bloodshed nor to killing their fellow Greeks among their enemies. Antisthenes was reputed for his bravery, as appears in the quotation of Socrates’ remark about his 54 See pp. 54-56 above. 55 D.L. 6.16 (SSR VA 41.18; D.C. 1.17). See Giannantoni, Nota 25, IV, 243.

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parents: ‘Do you think that he had become so noble [sc. courageous] if he had had two Athenian parents?’56 However, brave participation in battles may have had little to do with what Antisthenes thought about bravery itself. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the content of On Courage. Some believe that the anecdote about the prize of courage, which Socrates received and handed over to Alcibiades, stemmed from On Courage; but this simply testifies to his veneration of Socrates’ courage. The only method of detecting something of his view is to interpret the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus as two models of bravery. Ajax is the unintelligent fighting-machine who rushes into dangerous situations without much deliberation, like an animal (a wild boar), as in Odysseus’ speech. Odysseus’ criticism of this attitude, which ultimately ends in Ajax’s death, can be taken as a judgement of Antisthenes himself: criticism of such forms of spontaneous acts of bravery are likely to have been part of the considerations of On Courage. If it is courage at all, it is courage in the open battlefield. Ajax has the courage to fight in this manner against Hector, as Homer tells us, but his seven-layered shield protects him. Odysseus does not show much appreciation for this method of fighting, although this seems to be an ad hoc judgement of Odysseus’ character in the speech, because public fighting was what Antisthenes and Socrates had done themselves, as we stated already. Being ‘strong’ (ἰσχυρός57) is not the same as being brave, as Odysseus says, because stupidity will annihilate what desire for the beautiful, inspired by jealousy, wants. It is ‘wisdom’ (sophia) that matters and that shows how being brave is realized in certain situations. Wisdom inspires, while courage brings the matter to a good end. So the good poet [sc. Homer] will appreciate inspired courage and recognize that endurance is laudable and true courageous action leads to capturing a city [Troy]).58 There is no reason why this summary of Odysseus’ speech could not be identified with Antisthenes’ own opinion in the matter. We have already seen that other virtues are determined by wisdom,59 albeit we are not told what that wisdom precisely is. Here we see that while some actions originate in wisdom, what makes wisdom wisdom remains rather vague. 56 His mother was Thracian, and Thracians were regarded as wild impetuous people; for the anecdote, see p. 133 above. 57 In D.L. 6.11 (SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70) it is said that we need the power (ἰσχύς) of Socrates; this form of ἰσχύς is mental and physical power (see pp. 107 and 113 above). 58 Good advice is embedded in the enumeration but it has little to do with courage, rather with wisdom. 59 See pp. 112-113 above.

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Goulet-Cazé, M.-O., and Goulet, R. (eds.), Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements, Actes du Colloque International du CNRS, Paris, 22-25 juillet 1991 (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1993) Grube, G.M.A., ‘Antisthenes Was No Logician’, TAPhA 81 (1950) 16-27 Gulick, C.B., Athenaeus:The Deipnosophists, with an English translation, 7 vols., LCL (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1927-1941) [cited as Gulick, LCL] Hicks, R.D., Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, with an English translation, LCL (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1925) [cited as Hicks, LCL] Höistad, R., ‘Cynic Hero and Cynic King. Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man’, Diss. Uppsala, Bloms Boktryckeri, 1948 Höistad, R., ‘Was Antisthenes an Allegorist?’, Eranos 49 (1951) 16-30 Huss, B., Xenophons Symposion. Ein Kommentar, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 125 (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1999) Joël, K., Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates (Berlin: R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1893-1901) Kretzmann, N., ‘Plato on the Correctness of Names’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (April 1971) 126-138 Lévystone, D., ‘La figure d’Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate polutropos’, Phronesis 50 (2005) 181-221 Licht, H., Sexual Life in Ancient Greece (London: Routledge, 1932; reprint New York: AMS Press, 1974) [Translation of Sittengeschichte Griechenlands, ii: Das Liebesleben der Griechen (Dresden: Aretz, 1926)] Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (eds.), The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Mathieu, G. and Brémond, E., Isocrate. Discours, texte établi et traduit par G. Mathieu et E. Brémond. 4 vols. CB (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1928-1962) Meijer, P.A., ‘Philosophers, Intellectuals and Religion in Hellas’, in H.S. Versnel (ed.), Faith, Hope and Worship, Studies in Greek and Roman Religion, 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 216-263 Mikkola, E., Isokrates: seine Anschuungen im Lichte seiner Schriften, Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian toimituksia, Sarja B, nide 89 (Helsinki: Finnische Literatur-Gesellschsaft, 1954) Navia, L.A., Antisthenes of Athens: Setting the World Aright, Contributions in Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001) Newman, W.L., The Politics of Aristotle, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887-1902) [i: Introduction to the Politics, 1887; ii: Prefatory Essays, Books I and II. Texts and Notes, 1887; iii: Two Essays, Books III, IV, and V. Text and Notes, 1902] Patzer, A., ‘Antisthenes der Sokratiker: Das literarische Werk und die Philosophie, dargestellt am Katalog der Schriften’, Diss., Heidelberg, 1970 Pépin, J., ‘Aspects de la lecture antisthénienne d’Homère’, in Goulet-Cazé and Goulet, Le Cynisme ancien, 1-13 Popper, K., The Open Society and Its Enemies. i: The Spell of Plato, 5th edn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966; originally published1943) Prince, S.H., Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015) Rackham, H., Cicero De natura deorum; Academica, with an English translation, LCL (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979; originally published 1933) Rankin, H.D., Antisthenes Sokratikos (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1986)

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Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

Caizzi usually includes one text in one number (with parallel texts indicated by ‘cf.’). Sometimes Caizzi mentions a text in the Note ai Frammenti, pp. 77128, which is included as a fragment by Giannantoni. Giannantoni often combines more than one text in one number. Whenever that is the case, the line numbers of the fragment have been added: VA 1.1-3 = lines 1-3 of fragment VA 1. SSR IE = Libanii Declamationes et Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes, I, 227-300; IH = De philosophis qui Socratici appellati sunt, I, 343-374; IIIA = Phaedon Elidensis, I, 487-494; IVA = Aristippus Cyrenaeus, II, 3-104; VA. = Antisthenes Atheniensis, nos. 1-208, II, 137-225; VB = Diogenes Sinopeus, II, 227-510; VH = Crates Thebanus, II, 523-576. D.C. 128* = fragment 128 cf. (parallel text); D.C. 128n. = note on fragment 128. SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

IE 2.151-153 IH 4.6-9 IH 6.30 + 34 IH 8.7-10 IH 9.31 IH 9.36-69 IVA 46 IVA 166; VB 368 IVA 222

D.C. 132B D.C. 134B D.C. 134A D.C. 136D D.C. 136C D.C. 136n. p. 121 D.C. 194 D.C. 176 D.C. 155n. p. 125

VA 1.1-3 VA 1.4-6 VA 1.6-7 VA 1.8-9 VA 1.10 = IH 3.1-7 VA 1.10-11 = IH 2 VA 2.1-2 VA 2.2-4 VA 2.5-8 VA 3.1-3 VA 3.3-6

D.C. 122A D.C. 122B D.C. 122A* D.C. 122D1-2 D.C. 140 not in D.C. D.C. 122C D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 124 D.C. 123.1-3

VA 3.6-8 VA 4 VA 5 VA 6 VA 7 VA 8 VA 9 VA 10 VA 11.1-2 VA 11.2-3 VA 11.2-5 VA 11.5-6 VA 11.5-6 VA 12.1-6 VA 12.6 VA 12.6-10 VA 12.10-17 VA 13.1-23 VA 13.24-28 VA 14.1-10 VA 14.10-12

D.C. 145 D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 146 not in D.C. D.C. 195 D.C. 123.3-6 D.C. 127 D.C. 171 D.C. 126 D.C. 125 D.C. 7 D.C. 7* D.C. 125* D.C. 128A D.C. 128A* D.C. 128C D.C. 128B D.C. 107.28-55 D.C. 107n. p. 115 not in D.C. D.C. 117n. p. 117

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A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

VA 15.1-3 VA 15.3-5 VA 15.5-8 VA 16 VA 17 VA 18 VA 19 VA 20 VA 21 VA 22.1-9 VA 22.9-12 VA 22.13-14 VA 22.22-25 VA 22.25 VA 22.25 VA 22.25 VA 22.26 VA 23.3 VA 23.3-4 VA 23.5 VA 23.5-6 VA 23.7 VA 24 VA 25 VA 26 VA 27.1-4 VA 27.4-6 VA 28 VA 29 VA 30.1-3 VA 30.3-7 VA 30.7-10 VA 31 cf. VA 147-159 VA 32 VA 33 = IVA 19 VA 34 = VB 22 = VB 290 VA 34 = VB 19.1-6 VA 34 = VB 19.7-15 VA 34 = VB 19.16-21 VA 34 = VB 23 VA 34 = VB 17 = VB 584.5-15 VA 35

D.C. 148B* D.C. 148B D.C. 148 D.C. 167 not in D.C. D.C. 72n. p. 112 D.C. 131 D.C. 132A D.C. 133 D.C. 136A D.C. 3 D.C. 135A D.C. 135B D.C. 3* D.C. 135B* D.C. 136A* D.C. 136A* D.C. 130B D.C. 136B D.C. 138E D.C. 136B* D.C. 5n. p. 88 D.C. 130A D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 137 D.C. 151 D.C. 152 D.C. 150 D.C. 154 D.C. 153 not in D.C. D.C. 153*

VA 36 VA 37.1-6 VA 37.7-9 VA 37.11 VA 37.12-14 VA 38.1-6 VA 39 VA 40 VA 41.1-75 VA 41.75-76 VA 41.76 VA 41.78-81 VA 41.82-83 VA 42 VA 43 VA 44.1-3 VA 44.4-7 VA 44.7-15 VA 45 VA 46 VA 47 VA 48 VA 49 VA 50 VA 51.1-3 VA 52.1-2 VA 52.2 VA 53 VA 54 VA 55 VA 56 VA 57.1-3 VA 57.3 VA 58 VA 59 VA 60 VA 61 VA 62 VA 63 VA 64.1-3 VA 64.4-6 VA 64.6-8 VA 64.8-10 VA 65

D.C. 144 D.C. 142 D.C. 143* D.C. 143 not in D.C. D.C. 142n. p. 123 D.C. 137n. p. 123 not in D.C. D.C. 1 D.C. 2 D.C. 2* not in D.C. D.C. 5 D.C. 4 D.C. 6 D.C. 8A D.C. 8B D.C. 8C D.C. 12 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 11 D.C. 9 D.C. 10 D.C. 157 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 14 D.C. 15 not in D.C. D.C. 114 D.C. 180 D.C. 180* D.C. 115 D.C. 116 D.C. 182 D.C. 181 D.C. 16 D.C. 17 D.C. 18D D.C. 18C D.C. 18B D.C. 18A D.C. 121

D.C. 156 D.C. 155 D.C. 118 D.C. 138A D.C. 138B D.C. 138C D.C. 149 D.C. 139 D.C. 141

197

Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

VA 66 VA 67 VA 68 VA 69 VA 70.1-3 VA 70.3 VA 70.4 = IH 13 VA 71 VA 72 VA 73 VA 74 VA 75 VA 76 VA 77.1-4 VA 77.4 VA 78 VA 79 VA 80 VA 81.1-4 VA 81.5-11 VA 82 VA 83.1-17 VA 83.17-21 VA 84 VA 85.1-3 VA 85.3-4 VA 86.1-2 VA 86.3-4 VA 86.4-6 VA 87.1-2 VA 87.2-4 VA 87.5-7 VA 87.7-9 VA 87.9-10 VA 88.1-2 VA 88.2-4 VA 88.4-5 VA 88.5-7 VA 89 VA 90 VA 91.1-4 VA 91.4-8 VA 92.1-6 VA 92.6-7

not in D.C. D.C. 125n. p. 119 D.C. 100 D.C. 106 D.C. 168 D.C. 168* D.C. 102 D.C. 103 D.C. 169 D.C. 104 D.C. 170 D.C. 166 D.C. 105 D.C. 99 D.C. 99* not in D.C. D.C. 119 D.C. 94 D.C. 117.1-6 D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 117.6-65 D.C. 120.7-27 not in D.C. D.C. 13 D.C. 19 D.C. 19* D.C. 20A D.C. 20B not in D.C. D.C. 21A D.C. 21B not in D.C. D.C. 174 not in D.C. D.C. 178A D.C. 178B D.C. 178B* not in D.C. D.C. 178C D.C. 85 D.C. 147 D.C. 147* D.C. 24A D.C. 24B

VA 92.7-13 VA 92.15-20 VA 92.21-24 VA 93 VA 94 VA 95 VA 96 VA 97 VA 98 VA 99 VA 100.1-2 VA 100.2-5 VA 101.1-3 VA 101.4-5 VA 102 VA 103.1-7 VA 103.7-13 VA 104.1-2 VA 104.3-4 VA 105.1-5 VA 105.5-8 VA 106 VA 107 VA 108 VA 109 VA 110.1-9 VA 110.10-11 VA 111.1-2 VA 111.2-4 VA 112.1-4 VA 112.4-8 VA 113.1-2 VA 113.3-9 VA 114 VA 115 VA 116.1-2 VA 116.2 VA 117.3-5 VA 121.4 VA 121.4 VA 121.4 = IH 13 VA 122.1-3 VA 122.4-5 VA 122.5-7

D.C. 24C D.C. 24C* not in D.C. D.C. 25 D.C. 26 D.C. 28 D.C. 27 D.C. 19 D.C. 22 D.C. 23 D.C. 177 D.C. 193 D.C. 51n. p. 107 D.C. 159 D.C. 158 D.C. 69n. p. 111 not in D.C. D.C. 86 D.C. 87 D.C. 67 D.C. 67* D.C. 91 D.C. 90 D.C. 92 D.C. 77 D.C. 79n. p. 113 not in D.C. D.C. 97A D.C. 97B not in D.C. D.C. 191 D.C. 96 not in D.C. D.C. 179 not in D.C. D.C. 163 D.C. 163* D.C. 111C D.C. 111A D.C. 111B D.C. 102 D.C. 108C D.C. 108A D.C. 108B

198 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

VA 122.8-11 VA 122.11-12 VA 122.12-16 VA 122.16-17 VA 123.1-8 VA 123.8-15 VA 124.1-3 VA 124.3-6 VA 125 VA 126 VA 127 VA 128 VA 129 VA 130 VA 131.1-3 VA 131.4-6 VA 132 VA 133 VA 134.1-3 VA 134.3-5 VA 134.5-6 VA 134.6-7 VA 134.7-8 VA 134.9 VA 134.10-11 VA 134.11-13 VA 134.13-14 VA 134.14-15 VA 134.15 VA 134.15-16 VA 134.16-17 VA 134.17-18 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19

not in D.C. D.C. 108D D.C. 108E D.C. 108F D.C. 109A D.C. 109B D.C. 112A D.C. 112B D.C. 93 D.C. 113 D.C. 110 D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 82 not in D.C. D.C. 84B D.C. 84A D.C. 89 D.C. 165 D.C. 69 D.C. 70 D.C. 80 D.C. 95 D.C. 101 D.C. 81 D.C. 79 D.C. 71 D.C. 76 D.C. 74 D.C. 72 D.C. 73 D.C. 88 D.C. 63 D.C. 63* D.C. 69* D.C. 70* D.C. 71* D.C. 72* D.C. 74* D.C. 73* D.C. 76* D.C. 79* D.C. 80* D.C. 81* D.C. 88*

VA 134.18-19 VA 134.18-19 VA 135 VA 136 VA 137.1-6 VA 137.6-9 VA 138 VA 139.1-3 VA 139.4 VA 139.5-9 VA 140 VA 141.1-4 VA 141.4-8 VA 142 VA 143.1-8 VA 143.8-16 VA 147.1-3 VA 147.3-7 VA 148 VA 149.1-5 VA 149.6 VA 149.6-11 VA 149.11 VA 149.13 VA 149.14-18 VA 150.1-11 VA 150.11-39 VA 151.1-2 VA 151.3-13 VA 152.1-8 VA 152.8-30 VA 152.30-31 VA 152.31 VA 153.1-3 VA 153.4 VA 153.4 VA 153.4-20 VA 153.21-29 VA 153.29-30 VA 154 VA 155 VA 156 VA 157 VA 158

D.C. 95* D.C. 101* not in D.C. not in D.C. D.C. 1n. p. 87 D.C. 69n. p. 111 D.C. 135Bn. p. 120 not in D.C. D.C. 138D not in D.C. not in D.C. D.C. 29A D.C. 29B D.C. 34 D.C. 35 not in D.C. D.C. 37A D.C. 37B D.C. 36 D.C. 50A D.C. 50B D.C. 50C D.C. 50C* D.C. 50C* D.C. 50C* D.C. 44A D.C. 44B D.C. 45 D.C. 46 D.C. 47A D.C. 47B D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 48 D.C. 49 not in D.C. not in D.C. not in D.C.

199

Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

VA 159.1-6 VA 159.7-13 VA 160 VA 161.2-4 VA 162 VA 163 VA 164 VA 165 VA 166.1-5 VA 166.7 VA 167.1-2 VA 167.3-4 VA 168 VA 169.1-2 VA 169.3-4 VA 170 VA 171 VA 172.1-4 VA 172.4-7 VA 172.7-11 VA 173.1-3 VA 173.4 VA 174 VA 175 VA 176 VA 177 VA 178 VA 179 VA 180.1-3 VA 180.3-6 VA 180.6-8 VA 180.8-10 VA 181.1-3 VA 181.4-7 VA 181.7 VA 181.8-11 VA 182 VA 183 VA 184 VA 185 VA 186 VA 187 VA 188.1-21 VA 188.22-23

D.C. 160 not in D.C. D.C. 38 D.C. 66 D.C. 172 D.C. 64 D.C. 68 not in D.C. D.C. 183 D.C. 183* D.C. 98 D.C. 186 D.C. 188 D.C. 184 D.C. 185 not in D.C. D.C. 187 D.C. 175 D.C. 189 D.C. 190 D.C. 173 D.C. 173* D.C. 65 D.C. 192 D.C. 75 D.C. 164 D.C. 162 D.C. 39A D.C. 39B D.C. 39C D.C. 39D D.C. 39E D.C. 40B D.C. 40A D.C. 40C D.C. 40D D.C. 161 not in D.C. not in D.C. D.C. 61 D.C. 62 D.C. 51 not in D.C. D.C. 52A

VA 188.23-38 VA 188.39-42 VA 189.1-7 VA 189.7-10 VA 189.10-71 VA 190 VA 191 VA 192 VA 193 VA 194 VA 195 VA 196 VA 197 VA 198 VA 199.1-4 VA 199.4-12 VA 200 VA 200.3-4 VA 201 VA 203 VA 204 VA 206 VA 207.1 = IVA 223 VA 207.1 = IIIA 15 VA 207.2 VA 207.2 = IVA 224

not in D.C. D.C. 52B not in D.C. D.C. 53 not in D.C. D.C. 54 D.C. 55 D.C. 56 D.C. 57 D.C. 58 D.C. 60 D.C. 59 D.C. 41 D.C. 30 D.C. 32A D.C. 32B D.C. 33 D.C. 129 D.C. 31 D.C. 42 D.C. 43 D.C. 155n. p.124 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 132An. p. 119 D.C. 155n. p. 125

VB 16.1-5 VB 80 VB 263 cp. VB 383 VB 529.1-4 VB 532.1-9 VB 558.59-63 VB 564 VB 567 VB 588.22-34 VB 592 VH 93.1-5

D.C. 138F D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 78 D.C. 147* D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 139n. p. 123 D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 139n. p. 123 D.C. 136n. p. 122 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 139n. p. 123

not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR

D.C. 83 D.C. 98n. p. 114 D.C. 98n. p. 114 D.C. 107.1-27 D.C. 107n. p. 115

200 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

SSR

D.C.

D.C.

SSR

not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR not in SSR

D.C. 107n. p. 115 D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 120.1-7 D.C. 136A* D.C. 136n. p. 122 D.C. 147* D.C. 155*

D.C.

SSR

D.C. 1 D.C. 1n. p. 87 D.C. 2 D.C. 2* D.C. 3 D.C. 3* D.C. 4 D.C. 5 D.C. 5n. p. 88 D.C. 6 D.C. 7 D.C. 7* D.C. 8A D.C. 8B D.C. 8C D.C. 9 D.C. 10 D.C. 11 D.C. 12 D.C. 13 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p.89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 13n. p. 89 D.C. 14 D.C. 15 D.C. 16 D.C. 17 D.C. 18A D.C. 18B

VA 41.1-75 VA 137.1-6 VA 41.75-76 VA 41.76 VA 22.9-12 VA 22.25 VA 42 VA 41.82-83 VA 23.7 VA 43 VA 11.2-5 VA 11.5-6 VA 44.1-3 VA 44.4-7 VA 44.7-15 VA 49 VA 50 VA 48 VA 45 VA 84 VA 46 VA 47 IC 435? VA 25 VA 52.2 VA 52.1-2 VB 592 VA 53 VA 54 VA 62 VA 63 VA 64.8-10 VA 64.6-8

D.C. 18C D.C. 18D D.C. 19 D.C. 19 D.C. 19* D.C. 20A D.C. 20B D.C. 21A D.C. 21B D.C. 22 D.C. 23 D.C. 24A D.C. 24B D.C. 24C D.C. 24C* D.C. 25 D.C. 26 D.C. 27 D.C. 28 D.C. 29A D.C. 29B D.C. 30 D.C. 31 D.C. 32A D.C. 32B D.C. 33 D.C. 34 D.C. 35 D.C. 36 D.C. 37A D.C. 37B D.C. 38 D.C. 39A D.C. 39B D.C. 39C D.C. 39D D.C. 39E D.C. 40A D.C. 40B D.C. 40C D.C. 40D D.C. 41 D.C. 42 D.C. 43

VA 64.4-6 VA 64.1-3 VA 97 VA 85.1-3 VA 85.3-4 VA 86.1-2 VA 86.3-4 VA 87.1-2 VA 87.2-4 VA 98 VA 99 VA 92.1-6 VA 92.6-7 VA 92.7-13 VA 92.15-20 VA 93 VA 94 VA 96 VA 95 VA 141.1-4 VA 141.4-8 VA 198 VA 201 VA 199.1-4 VA 199.4-12 VA 200 VA 142 VA 143.1-8 VA 148 VA 147.1-3 VA 147.3-7 VA 160 VA 179 VA 180.1-3 VA 180.3-6 VA 180.6-8 VA 180.8-10 VA 181.4-7 VA 181.1-3 VA 181.7 VA 181.8-11 VA 197 VA 203 VA 204

201

Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C. 44A D.C. 44B D.C. 45 D.C. 46 D.C. 47A D.C. 47B D.C. 47C D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 47C* D.C. 48 D.C. 49 D.C. 50A D.C. 50B D.C. 50C D.C. 50C* D.C. 50C* D.C. 50C* D.C. 51 D.C. 51n. p. 107 D.C. 52A D.C. 52B D.C. 53 D.C. 54 D.C. 55 D.C. 56 D.C. 57 D.C. 58 D.C. 59 D.C. 60 D.C. 61 D.C. 62 D.C. 63 D.C. 63* D.C. 64 D.C. 65 D.C. 66 D.C. 67 D.C. 67* D.C. 68

VA 150.1-11 VA 150.11-39 VA 151.1-2 VA 151.3-13 VA 152.1-8 VA 152.8-30 VA 153.1-3 VA 153.21-29 VA 152.30-31 VA 153.4-20 VA 152.31 VA 153.29-30 VA 153.4 VA 153.4 VA 154 VA 155 VA 149.1-5 VA 149.6 VA 149.6-11 VA 149.11 VA 149.13 VA 149.14-18 VA 187 VA 101.1-3 VA 188.22-23 VA 188.39-42 VA 189.7-10 VA 190 VA 191 VA 192 VA 193 VA 194 VA 196 VA 195 VA 185 VA 186 VA 134.17-18 VA 134.18-19 VA 163 VA 174 VA 161.2-4 VA 105.1-5 VA 105.5-8 VA 164

D.C. 69 D.C. 69* D.C. 69n. p. 111 D.C. 69n. p. 111 D.C. 70 D.C. 70* D.C. 71 D.C. 71* D.C. 72 D.C. 72* D.C. 72n. p. 112 D.C. 73 D.C. 73* D.C. 74 D.C. 74* D.C. 75 D.C. 76 D.C. 76* D.C. 77 D.C. 78 D.C. 79 D.C. 79* D.C. 79n. p. 113 D.C. 80 D.C. 80* D.C. 81 D.C. 81* D.C. 82 D.C. 83 D.C. 84A D.C. 84B D.C. 85 D.C. 86 D.C. 87 D.C. 88 D.C. 88* D.C. 89 D.C. 90 D.C. 91 D.C. 92 D.C. 93 D.C. 94 D.C. 95 D.C. 95*

VA 134.1-3 VA 134.18-19 VA 137.6-9 VA 103.1-7 VA 134.3-5 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.11-13 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.15 VA 134.18-19 VA 18 VA 134.15-16 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.14-15 VA 134.18-19 VA 176 VA 134.13-14 VA 134.18-19 VA 109 cp. VB 383 VA 134.10-11 VA 134.18-19 VA 110.1-9 VA 134.5-6 VA 134.18-19 VA 134.9 VA 134.18-19 VA 129 not in SSR VA 131.4-6 VA 131.1-3 VA 90 VA 104.1-2 VA 104.3-4 VA 134.16-17 VA 134.18-19 VA 132 VA 107 VA 106 VA 108 VA 125 VA 80 VA 134.6-7 VA 134.18-19

202 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C. 96 D.C. 97A D.C. 97B D.C. 98 D.C. 98n. p. 114 D.C. 98n. p. 114 D.C. 99 D.C. 99* D.C. 100 D.C. 101 D.C. 101* D.C. 102 D.C. 103 D.C. 104 D.C. 105 D.C. 106 D.C. 107.1-27 D.C. 107.28-55 D.C. 107n. p. 115 D.C. 107n. p. 115 D.C. 107n. p. 115 D.C. 108A D.C. 108B D.C. 108C D.C. 108D D.C. 108E D.C. 108F D.C. 109A D.C. 109B D.C. 110 D.C. 111A D.C. 111B D.C. 111C D.C. 112A D.C. 112B D.C. 113 D.C. 114 D.C. 115 D.C. 116 D.C. 117.1-6 D.C. 117.6-65 D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 117n. p. 117

VA 113.1-2 VA 111.1-2 VA 111.2-4 VA 167.1-2 not in SSR not in SSR VA 77.1-4 VA 77.4 VA 68 VA 134.7-8 VA 134.18-19 VA 70.4 = IH 13 VA 71 VA 73 VA 76 VA 69 not in SSR VA 13.1-23 not in SSR VA 13.24-28 not in SSR VA 122.4-5 VA 122.5-7 VA 122.1-3 VA 122.11-12 VA 122.12-16 VA 122.16-17 VA 123.1-8 VA 123.8-15 VA 127 VA 121.4 VA 121.4 VA 117.3-5 VA 124.1-3 VA 124.3-6 VA 126 VA 56 VA 58 VA 59 VA 81.1-4 VA 82 VA 128 VA 81.5-11 VA 14.10-12

D.C. 117n. p. 117 D.C. 118

not in SSR VA 34 = VB 22 = VB 290 VB 263 VB 564 VB 80 VA 79 not in SSR VA 83.1-17 VA 65 VA 1.1-3 VA 1.6-7 VA 1.4-6 VA 2.1-2 VA 1.8-9 VA 2.5-8 VA 2.2-4 VA 4 VA 3.3-6 VA 8 VA 3.1-3 VA 11.2-3 VA 11.5-6 VA 67 VA 11.1-2 VA 9 VA 12.1-6 VA 12.6 VA 12.10-17 VA 12.6-10 VA 200.3-4 VA 24 VA 23.3 VA 19 VA 20 VA 207.2 IE 2.151-153 VA 21 IH 6.30 + 34 IH 4.6-9 VA 22.13-14 VA 22.22-25 VA 22.25 VA 138

D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 118n. p. 118 D.C. 119 D.C. 120.1-7 D.C. 120.7-27 D.C. 121 D.C. 122A D.C. 122A* D.C. 122B D.C. 122C D.C. 122D1-2 D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 122n. p. 118 D.C. 123.1-3 D.C. 123.3-6 D.C. 124 D.C. 125 D.C. 125* D.C. 125n. p. 119 D.C. 126 D.C. 127 D.C. 128A D.C. 128A* D.C. 128B D.C. 128C D.C. 129 D.C. 130A D.C. 130B D.C. 131 D.C. 132A D.C. 132An. p. 119 D.C. 132B D.C. 133 D.C. 134A D.C. 134B D.C. 135A D.C. 135B D.C. 135B* D.C. 135Bn. p. 120

203

Concordance Giannantoni (SSR) – Caizzi (D.C.)

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C. 136A D.C. 136A* D.C. 136A* D.C. 136A* D.C. 136B D.C. 136B* D.C. 136C D.C. 136D D.C. 136n. p. 122 D.C. 136n. p. 121 D.C. 136n. p. 122 D.C. 137 D.C. 137n. p. 123 D.C. 138A D.C. 138B D.C. 138C D.C. 138D D.C. 138E D.C. 138F D.C. 139

VA 22.1-9 not in SSR VA 22.25 VA 22.26 VA 23.3-4 VA 23.5-6 IH 9.31 IH 8.7-10 VB 588.22-34 IH 9.36-69 not in SSR VA 26 VA 39 VA 34 = VB 19.1-6 VA 34 = VB 19.7-15 VA 34 = VB 19.16-21 VA 139.4 VA 23.5 VB 16.1-5 VA 34 = VB 17 = VB 584.5-15 VH 93.1-5 VB 558.59-63 VB 567 VA 1.10 = IH 3.1-7 VA 35 VA 37.1-6 VA 38.1-6 VA 37.11 VA 37.7-9 VA 36 VA 3.6-8 VA 5 VA 91.1-4 VB 529.1-4 VA 91.4-8 not in SSR VA 15.5-8 VA 15.3-5 VA 15.1-3 VA 34 = VB 23 VA 28 VA 27.1-4 VA 27.4-6

D.C. 153 D.C. 153* D.C. 154 D.C. 155 D.C. 155* D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 155n. p.124 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 155n. p. 125 D.C. 156 D.C. 157 D.C. 158 D.C. 159 D.C. 160 D.C. 161 D.C. 162 D.C. 163 D.C. 163* D.C. 164 D.C. 165 D.C. 166 D.C. 167 D.C. 168 D.C. 168* D.C. 169 D.C. 170 D.C. 171 D.C. 172 D.C. 173 D.C. 173* D.C. 174 D.C. 175 D.C. 176 D.C. 177 D.C. 178A D.C. 178B D.C. 178B* D.C. 178C D.C. 179 D.C. 180 D.C. 180* D.C. 181

VA 30.1-3 VA 30.7-10 VA 29 VA 33 = IVA 19 not in SSR VB 532.1-9 VA 206 IVA 222 VA 207.1 = IVA 223 VA 207.1 = IIIA 15 VA 207.2 = IVA 224 VA 32 VA 51.1-3 VA 102 VA 101.4-5 VA 159.1-6 VA 182 VA 178 VA 116.1-2 VA 116.2 VA 177 VA 133 VA 75 VA 16 VA 70.1-3 VA 70.3 VA 72 VA 74 VA 10 VA 162 VA 173.1-3 VA 173.4 VA 87.7-9 VA 172.1-4 IVA 166; VB 368 VA 100.1-2 VA 88.1-2 VA 88.2-4 VA 88.4-5 VA 89 VA 114 VA 57.1-3 VA 57.3 VA 61

D.C. 139n. p. 123 D.C. 139n. p. 123 D.C. 139n. p. 123 D.C. 140 D.C. 141 D.C. 142 D.C. 142n. p. 123 D.C. 143 D.C. 143* D.C. 144 D.C. 145 D.C. 146 D.C. 147 D.C. 147* D.C. 147* D.C. 147* D.C. 148 D.C. 148B D.C. 148B* D.C. 149 D.C. 150 D.C. 151 D.C. 152

204 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

D.C.

SSR

D.C.

SSR

D.C. 182 D.C. 183 D.C. 183* D.C. 184 D.C. 185 D.C. 186 D.C. 187 D.C. 188

VA 60 VA 166.1-5 VA 166.7 VA 169.1-2 VA 169.3-4 VA 167.3-4 VA 171 VA 168

D.C. 189 D.C. 190 D.C. 191 D.C. 192 D.C. 193 D.C. 194 D.C. 195

VA 172.4-7 VA 172.7-11 VA 112.4-8 VA 175 VA 100.2-5 IVA 46 VA 7

Index Index of fragments cited This index lists the fragments of Giannantoni (SSR) and Decleva Caizzi (D.C.) cited in the present volume. The source texts are added in parentheses. In the case of Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Antisthenes (6.1-19) the line numbers of Dorandi’s edition have been added; in that of Athenaeus those of Kaibel’s edition. The references are to pages and notes. As a rule the fragments are cited in the notes (e.g., 133 n. 32); whenever a direct quotation of (part of) a fragment is given in the main text, the page number is put in bold type (e.g., 133 n. 31). Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae (SSR) VA 1.1-3 = D.C. 122A (D.L. 6.1 [1-3]) 133 n. 32; n. 33 VA 3.1-3 = D.C. 124 (D.L. 2.31) 133 n. 31 VA 3.3-6 = D.C. 123.1-3 (D.L. 6.1 [4-6]) 128 n. 7 VA 6; not in D.C. (Eust., Il. Ζ 211) 133 n. 35 VA 8 = D.C. 123.3-6 (D.L. 6.1 [6-8]) 132 n. 30 VA 11.2-5 = D.C. 7 (D.L. 6.1 [9-11]) 70 n. 58; 91 n. 22 VA 12.1-6 = D.C. 128A (D.L. 6.2 [16-21]) 70 n. 58; 166 n. 49 VA 12.6-10 = D.C. 128C (Gnom. Vat. no. 4) 166 n. 49 VA 12.10-17 = D.C. 128B (Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. 2.14) 166 n. 49 VA 13.1-23 = D.C. 107.22-25 (Xen., Symp. 4.6064) 164-165; 164 n. 46 VA 14.1-10 = not in D.C. (Xen., Symp. 8.4-7) 149 n. 4; 168-169; 169 n. 61 VA 18.1-4 = Caizzi p. 112 on D.C. 72 (Xen., Symp. 2.9-10) 151-152; 152 n. 10 VA 20 = D.C. 132A (Plato, Phd. 59B5-8) 35 n. 17 VA 28 = D.C. 150 (D.L. 6.3 [33-34]) 182 n. 26 VA 32 = D.C. 156 (Gnom. Vat. no. 5) 131 n. 23 VA 34 = VB 19.1-5 = D.C. 138A (D.L. 6.21) 69 n. 55 VA 41.4 = D.C. 1.4 (D.L. 6.15 [161]) 176 n. 1 VA 41.5 = D.C. 1.5 (D.L. 6.15 [162]) 176 n. 1 VA 41.7-8 = D.C. 1.7-8 (D.L. 6.15 [164-166]) 22 n. 8 VA 41.11 = D.C. 1.11 (D.L. 6.15 [169]) 63 n. 36; 114 n. 2 VA 41.12 = D.C. 1.12 (D.L. 6.15 [170]) 63 n. 36 VA 41.13 = D.C. 1.13 (D.L. 6.16 [171]) 35 n. 19 VA 41.13-14 = D.C. 1.13-14 (D.L. 6.16 [171-172]) 155 n. 21 VA 41.18 = D.C. 1.17 (D.L. 6.16 [176]) 35 n. 19; 190 n. 55 VA 41.19 = D.C. 1.18 (D.L. 6.16 [177]) 75 n. 2

VA 41.20 = D.C. 1.19 (D.L. 6.16 [178]) 35 n. 19; 155 n. 21 VA 41.24 = D.C. 1.22 (D.L. 6.16 [182]) 63 n. 36 VA 41.27 = D.C. 1.25 (D.L. 6.16 [185]) 108 n. 5 VA 41.33-34 = D.C. 1.31-32 (D.L. 6.16 [191-192]) 34 n. 15 VA 41.34 = D.C. 1.32 (D.L. 6.16 [192-193]) 23 n. 10 VA 41.37 = D.C. 1.35 (D.L. 6.17 [196]) 53 n. 4 VA 41.38 = D.C. 1.38 (D.L. 6.17 [199]) 50 n. 61; 53 n. 4; 62 n. 36 VA 41.39 = D.C. 1.39 (D.L. 6.17 [200]) 35 n. 19 VA 41.44 = D.C. 1.44 (D.L. 6.17 [205]) 75 n. 1 VA 41.47 = D.C. 1.47 (D.L. 6.17 [208]) 35 n. 18 VA 41.51 = D.C. 1.51 (D.L. 6.17 [212]) 55 n. 14 VA 41.52 = D.C. 1.52 (D.L. 6.17 [213]) 83 n. 40 VA 41.55 = D.C. 1.55 (D.L. 6.17 [216]) 81 n. 29 VA 41.57 = D.C. 1.57 (D.L. 6.17 [218]) 102 n. 20 VA 41.63 = D.C. 1.63 (D.L. 6.18 [224]) 101 n. 16 VA 41.68 = D.C. 1.69 (D.L. 6.18 [230]) 108 n. 5 VA 41.69 = D.C. 1.70 (D.L. 6.18 [231]) 108 n. 5 VA 41.72 = D.C. 1.73 (D.L. 6.18 [234]) 123 n. 19 VA 41.75-76 = D.C. 2 (D.L. 6.18 [238-239]) 24 n. 11 VA 43 = D.C. 6 (D.L. 2.61) 108 n. 5 VA 53 = D.C. 14 (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 55 n. 13; 179-183; 179 n. 14 VA 53.32-33 = D.C. 14 (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 7) 56 n. 19 VA 53.37-38 [8] = D.C. 14 [8] (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 43 n. 43 VA 54 = D.C. 15 (ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 55 n. 13; 184-189; 186 n. 37 VA 54.66-67 = D.C. 15 (ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 11) 56 n. 19 VA 56 = D.C. 114 (D.L. 6.3 [27-28]) 114 n. 5 VA 57 = D.C. 180 (D.L. 6.3 [31-32]) 114 n. 4

206  VA 58 = D.C. 115 (D.L. 6.11 [117-119]) 80 n. 21; 114 n. 3 VA 59 = D.C. 116 (Clem. Rom., Hom. 5.18.2) 115 n. 10 VA 60 = D.C. 182 (D.L. 6.4 [42-44]) 115 n. 9 VA 61 = D.C. 181 (D.L. 6.10 [105-108]) 114 n. 7 VA 68 = D.C. 100 (Arist., Pol. 3.13, 1284a11-17) 128 n. 8 VA 70 = D.C. 168 (Stob., Anth. 4.4.28) 128 n. 2 VA 71 = D.C. 103 (D.L. 6.5 [54-55]) 129 n. 11; 137 n. 61 VA 72 = D.C. 169 (D.L. 6.8 [79-82]) 21 n. 1; 133 n. 37 VA 73 = D.C. 104 (D.L. 6.6 [62-64]) 137 n. 59 VA 74 = D.C. 170 (Stob., Anth. 4.9.10) 128 n. 3; 137 VA 75 = D.C. 166 (Stob., Anth. 4.8.31) 131 n. 21 VA 76 = D.C. 105 (Ps.-Max. 9.45) 137 n. 63 VA 79 = D.C. 119 (Stob., Anth. 3.8.14) 139 n. 71 VA 80 = D.C. 94 (Stob., Anth. 3.10.41) 110 n. 12 VA 82 = D.C. 117.6-65 (Xen., Symp. 4.34-44) 90 n. 16; 111 n. 13; 118 n. 21; 158-160; 160 n. 30 VA 82.9-10 = D.C. 117.16-18 (Xen., Symp. 4.36) 131 n. 22 VA 82.41-42 = D.C. 117.57-59 (Xen., Symp. 4.43) 144 n. 4 VA 84 = D.C. 13 (Cic., Ad Att. 12.38.5) 24 n. 12; 134 n. 42 VA 85 = D.C. 19 (D.L. 6.2 [21-24]) 107 n. 1 VA 86.1-2 = D.C. 20A (Epict., Diss. 4.6.20) 134 n. 43 VA 86.3-4 = D.C. 20B (M. Ant., Med. 7.36 ) 134 n. 44 VA 87.1-2 = D.C. 21A (Ars., Viol. p. 502.13-14) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 VA 87.2-4 = D.C. 21B (Stob., Anth. 2.31.34) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 VA 88.1-2 = D.C. 178A (D.L. 6.5 [56-57]) 134 n. 46 VA 88.2-4 = D.C. 178B (Gnom. Vat. no. 9) 134 n. 46 VA 89 = D.C. 178C (D.L. 6.8 [82-83]) 21 n. 2; 135 n. 47 VA 90 = D.C. 85 (D.L. 6.7 [70-71]) 135 n. 47 VA 92-99 = D.C. 22-28 108 n. 5 VA 92.1-6 = D.C. 24A ([Eratosth.], Cat. 1.40) 109 n. 9 VA 92.6-7 = D.C. 24B (Eudocia, Viol. 998, p. 733.1-3) 109 n. 9 VA 92.7-13 = D.C. 24C (Anon. Lat. II, p. 264.20265.10) 109 n. 9 VA 93 = D.C. 25 (Procl., In Alc. 98, p. 44.1518) 108-109; 109 n. 6; 117 n. 15 VA 95 = D.C. 28 (Gnom. Vat. no. 11) 109 n. 7; n. 8 VA 96 = D.C. 27 (Them., Πɛρὶ ἀρɛτῆς [3, 43.5-20]) 109 n. 10 VA 99 = D.C. 23 (D.L. 6.105) 111 n. 18; 112 n. 22; 140 n. 2 VA 103.2-4 = Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69 (Xen., Symp. 2.12) 152-153; 153 n. 12

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

VA 103.4-7 = Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69 (Xen., Symp. 2.13) 153 n. 14 VA 104.1-2 = D.C. 86 (Gnom. Vat. no. 12) 56 n. 16; 112 n. 23 VA 108 = D.C. 92 (D.L. 6.6 [58-59]) 118 n. 21; 138 n. 70 VA 110.1-9 = Caizzi p. 113 on D.C. 79 (Xen. Mem. 2.5.1-3) 145 n. 7 VA 113 = D.C. 96 (Gnom. Vat. no. 1) 107 n. 2 VA 114 = D.C. 179 (D.L. 6.8 [89-90]) 111 n. 14 VA 117.3-5 = D.C. 111C (D.L. 9.101) 82 n. 32 VA 122.1-3 = D.C. 108C (Gell. 9.5.3) 80 n. 22 VA 122.12-16 = D.C. 108E (Eus., PE 15.13.7) 80 n. 22 VA 122.16-17 = D.C. 108F (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 12.47) 80 n. 23 VA 123.1-8 = D.C. 109A (Clem. Alex., Strom. 2.20.107.2-3) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 78 n. 16; 79 VA 123.8-15 = D.C. 109B (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 80 n. 22; 81 n. 24 VA 124.1-3 = D.C. 112A (Stob., Anth. 3.6.43) 81 n. 26 VA 124.3-6 = D.C. 112B (Stob., Anth. 3.18.26) 81 n. 25; n. 26 VA 126 = D.C. 113 (Stob., Anth. 3.29.65) 82 n. 31 VA 127 = D.C. 110 (Ath. 12.6, 513A [3, 132.1517]) 82 n. 33 VA 129 = D.C. 82 (D.L. 6.5 [51-52]) 143 n. 3 VA 134.1-3 = D.C. 69 (D.L. 6.10 [109-110]) 112 n. 21; 133 n. 36; 141 n. 7; 148 n. 16 VA 134.3-5 = D.C. 70 (D.L. 6.11 [110-113]) 35 n. 19; 107 n. 3; 140 n. 4; 141 n. 7; 163 n. 45; 191 n. 57 VA 134.5-6 = D.C. 80 (D.L. 6.11 [113-114]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.6-7 = D.C. 95 (D.L. 6.11 [114-115]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.7-8 = D.C. 101 (D.L. 6.11 [115-117]) 137 n. 64; 141 n. 7 VA 134.9 = D.C. 81 (D.L. 6.12 [120-121]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.10-11 = D.C. 79 (D.L. 6.12 [121-123]) 141 n. 7; 147 n. 14; 148 VA 134.11-13 = D.C. 71 (D.L. 6.12 [123-126]) 140 n. 2; 141 n. 7 VA 134.13-14 = D.C. 76 (D.L. 6.12 [126-127]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.14-15 = D.C. 74 (D.L. 6.12 [127-128]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.15 = D.C. 72 (D.L. 6.12 [128-129]) 141 n. 7; 152 n. 10 VA 134.15-16 = D.C. 73 (D.L. 6.12 [129-130]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.16-17 = D.C. 88 (D.L. 6.13 [130-131]) 141 n. 7 VA 134.17-18 = D.C. 63 (D.L. 6.13 [131-132]) 56 n. 18; 140 n. 6 VA 135.3-5 = not in D.C. (D.L. 6.103) 48 n. 53 VA 135.7-8 = not in D.C. (D.L. 6.104) 48 n. 53 VA 141 = D.C. 29 129 n. 12 VA 141.1-4 = D.C. 29A (Ath. 5.63, 220C [1, 487.17-21]) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8; 136 n. 54

Index

VA 141.4-8 = D.C. 29B (Eust., Od. κ 7, p. 1645.1113) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8 VA 142 = D.C. 34 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23488.4]) 120 n. 11; 124 n. 22 VA 143.1-5 = D.C. 35 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.2]) 119 n. 4 VA 143.1-8 = D.C. 35 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.5]) 121 n. 14; 124 n. 22 VA 143.3-8 = D.C. 35 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.24-300.5]) 119 n. 7 VA 143.8-16 = not in D.C. (Plut., Per. 24.7-9) 119 n. 2; 124 n. 22 VA 144 = not in D.C. (Ath. 12.45, 533C-D) 122 n. 15; 124 n. 22 VA 147 = D.C. 37AB 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16 VA 147.1-3 = D.C. 37A (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 488.4-6]) 69 n. 52 VA 147.3-7 = D.C. 37B (Ath. 11.115, 507A [3, 120.22-25]) 69 n. 52 VA 148 = D.C. 36 (D.L. 3.35) 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16; 64 n. 37; 69 n. 52 VA 149 = D.C. 50ABC 34 n. 16 VA 149.1-5 = D.C. 50A (Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.28-32) 34 n. 16; 47-48 n. 52 VA 149.6 = D.C. 50B (Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.15-21) 34 n. 16 VA 149.6-11 = D.C. 50C (Ammon., In Porph. 40.6-8) 34 n. 16 VA 150.1-11 = D.C. 44A (Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b25-26) 41 n. 37; 42 n. 41; 45; 46 VA 150.11-39 = D.C. 44B ([Alex. Aphr.], In Metaph. Η 3, 1043b23-25, 553.31-554.33) 38 n. 26; 41 n. 38 VA 151.1-2 = D.C. 45 (D.L. 6.3 [25-26]) 30 n. 6; 49 n. 56; 55; 56-57; 57 n. 20; 59-61 VA 151.4-13 = D.C. 46 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.13-22) 51-52 n. 65; 52; 57 n. 22 VA 151.7-8 = D.C. 46 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.16-17) 51 n. 64 VA 151.10-12 = D.C. 46 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.20-21) 49-50 n. 59 VA 152.8-30 = D.C. 47B (Alex. Aphr., In Metaph. ∆ 29, 1024b26, 434.25-435.19) 32 n. 13 VA 154 = D.C. 48 (D.L. 9.53) 29 n. 1 VA 155 = D.C. 49 (Procl., In Cra. 37) 29 n. 2 VA 156 = not in D.C. (Isocrates, Helena [10], 1) 22 n. 6; 34 n. 16; 68 n. 50; n. 51 VA 157.4-6 = not in D.C. (Arist., Metaph. Γ 3, 1005b3-4) 40 n. 36 VA 157.6-9 = not in D.C. (Arist., Metaph. Γ 4, 1006a6-8) 40 n. 36 VA 160 = D.C. 38 (Epict., Diss. 1.17.10) 53 n. 1 VA 160 = D.C. 38 (Epict., Diss. 1.17.10-12) 60 n. 29 VA 162 = D.C. 172 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.33) 53 n. 1 VA 163.1-3 = D.C. 64 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.68) 56 n. 17 VA 164 = D.C. 68 (Gnom. Vat. no. 3) 40 n. 33 VA 167.3-4 = D.C. 186 (D.L. 6.6 [60-62]) 134 n. 45

207 VA 168 = D.C. 188 (D.L. 6.5 [48-51]) 69 n. 57; 113 n. 27 VA 169.1-2 = D.C. 184 (D.L. 6.4 [39-40]) 69 n. 53; 111 n. 15; n. 17 VA 169.3-4 = D.C. 185 (D.L. 6.4 [41-42]) 69 n. 54; 113 n. 26 VA 171 = D.C. 187 (D.L. 6.3 [28-31]) 69 n. 56 VA 173 = D.C. 173 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.76) 70 n. 58; 76 n. 10; 167 VA 174 = D.C. 65 (Stob., Anth. 2.2.15) 33 n. 14; 34 VA 175 = D.C. 192 (Papyr. Flor. II 113, col. II 26-36) 161 n. 37 VA 176 = D.C. 75 (D.L. 6.5 [53-54]) 83 n. 40 VA 179 = D.C. 39A (Phld., De pietate 7a.3-8) 75 n. 3; 77; 78 n. 15; 83 n. 37; 84 n. 46 VA 180.1-3 = D.C. 39B (Cic., N.D. 1.13.32) 75 n. 3; 84 n. 46 VA 180.3-6 = D.C. 39C (Min. Fel., Oct. 19.7) 84 n. 46 VA 180.6-8 = D.C. 39D (Lact., Inst. 1.5.18) 84 n. 46 VA 180.8-10 = D.C. 39E (Lact., De ira Dei 11.14) 84 n. 46 VA 181.1-3 = D.C. 40B (Clem. Alex., Protr. 6.71.2) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 VA 181.4-7 = D.C. 40A (Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.14.108.4) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 VA 181.7 = D.C. 40C (Eus., PE 13.13.35) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 VA 181.8-11 = D.C. 40D (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 1.75) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 VA 182 = D.C. 161 (Clem. Alex., Protr. 7.75.3) 83 n. 39 VA 185 = D.C. 61 (Xen., Symp. 3.5-6) 55 n. 12; 85 n. 5; 166 n. 53 VA 186 = D.C. 62 (Xen., Symp. 4.6) 60; 85 n. 5; 158 n. 28 VA 187.1-35 = D.C. 51 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 54 n. 7 VA 187.1-16 = D.C. 51 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 85-86 n. 7 VA 187.12-13 = D.C. 51 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1, 12-13) 57 n. 21 VA 187.17-29 = D.C. 51 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 86-87; 86-87 n. 9 VA 187.29-35 = D.C. 51 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 58; 87-88; 87 n. 11; 88 VA 188.22-23 = D.C. 52A (Porph., Ad Od. ε 211) 99 n. 7 VA 188.39-42 = D.C. 52B (Porph., Ad Od. η 257) 83 n. 44; 99 n. 8 VA 189.7-10 = D.C. 53 (Porph., Ad Od. ι 106) 83 n. 43; 101 n. 18 VA 190 = D.C. 54 (Porph., Ad Od. ι 525) 98 VA 191 = D.C. 55 (Porph., Ad Il. Λ 636) 57 n. 21; 100 n. 13 VA 192 = D.C. 56 (Anonym. schol. lips. in Iliadem Ο 123) 93; 93 n. 28 VA 193 = D.C. 57 (Anonym. schol. venet. in Iliadem Ψ 65) 102 n. 23

208  VA 194 = D.C. 58 (D. Chr. 53.4-5) 100 n. 11 VA 197 = D.C. 41 (Aristid. 49.30-33) 75 n. 3; 76 n. 11; 82-83; 82 n. 36; 83 n. 42; 101 n. 17 VA 198.1-4 = D.C. 30 (Ath. 12.47, 534C [3, 178.10-13]) 125 n. 1 VA 199.1-4 = D.C. 32A (Procl., In Alc. 114, p. 51.35-38) 125 n. 3 VA 199.4-12 = D.C. 32B (Olymp., In Alc. 28, p. 20.18-21.25) 125 n. 3 VA 200 = D.C. 33 (Ath. 5.55, 216B-C [1, 478.23479.7]) 125-126; 126 n. 4

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

VA 203 = D.C. 42 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23]) 129 n. 13; 130 n. 15 VA 204 = D.C. 43 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.2122]) 128 n. 1 VA 208 = not in D.C. (D. Chr., Oratio 13(12).1428) 131 n. 24; 132 VA 208.1-24 = not in D.C. (D. Chr., Oratio 13(12), 14-16) 131; 131 n. 25 VB 19.1-5 = VA 34 = D.C. 138A (D.L. 6.21) 69 n. 55 VB 584.178-181 (D. Chr., Oratio 8 [7], 34) 110 n. 11

Decleva Caizzi (D.C.) 1.4 = SSR VA 41.4 (D.L. 6.15 [161]) 176 n. 1 1.5 = SSR VA 41.5 (D.L. 6.15 [162]) 176 n. 1 1.7-8 = SSR VA 41.7-8 (D.L. 6.15 [164-166]) 22 n. 8 1.11 = SSR VA 41.11 (D.L. 6.15 [169]) 63 n. 36; 114 n. 2 1.12 = SSR VA 41.12 (D.L. 6.15 [170]) 63 n. 36 1.13 = SSR VA 41.13 (D.L. 6.16 [171]) 35 n. 19 1.13-14 = SSR VA 41.13-14 (D.L. 6.16 [171-172]) 155 n. 21 1.17 = SSR VA 41.18 (D.L. 6.16 [176]) 35 n. 19; 190 n. 55 1.18 = SSR VA 41.19 (D.L. 6.16 [177]) 75 n. 2 1.19 = SSR VA 41.20 (D.L. 6.16 [178]) 35 n. 19; 155 n. 21 1.22 = SSR VA 41.24 (D.L. 6.16 [182]) 63 n. 36 1.25 = SSR VA 41.27 (D.L. 6.16 [185]) 108 n. 5 1.31-32 = SSR VA 41.33-34 (D.L. 6.16 [191-192]) 34 n. 15 1.32 = SSR VA 41.34 (D.L. 6.16 [192-193]) 23 n. 10 1.35 = SSR VA 41.37 (D.L. 6.17 [196]) 53 n. 4 1.38 = SSR VA 41.38 (D.L. 6.17 [199]) 50 n. 61; 53 n. 4; 62 n. 36 1.39 = SSR VA 41.39 (D.L. 6.17 [200]) 35 n. 19 1.44 = SSR VA 41.44 (D.L. 6.17 [205]) 75 n. 1 1.47 = SSR VA 41.47 (D.L. 6.17 [208]) 35 n. 18 1.51 = SSR VA 41.51 (D.L. 6.17 [212]) 55 n. 14 1.52 = SSR VA 41.52 (D.L. 6.17 [213]) 83 n. 40 1.55 = SSR VA 41.55 (D.L. 6.17 [216]) 81 n. 29 1.57 = SSR VA 41.57 (D.L. 6.17 [218]) 102 n. 20 1.63 = SSR VA 41.63 (D.L. 6.18 [224]) 101 n. 16 1.69 = SSR VA 41.68 (D.L. 6.18 [230]) 108 n. 5 1.70 = SSR VA 41.69 (D.L. 6.18 [231]) 108 n. 5 1.73 = SSR VA 41.72 (D.L. 6.18 [234]) 123 n. 19 2 = SSR VA 41.75-76 (D.L. 6.18 [238-239]) 24 n. 11 6 = SSR VA 43 (D.L. 2.61) 108 n. 5 7 = SSR VA 11.2-5 (D.L. 6.1 [9-11]) 70 n. 58; 91 n. 22 13 = SSR VA 84 (Cic., Ad Att. 12.38.5) 24 n. 12; 134 n. 42 14 = SSR VA 53 (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 55 n. 13; 179-183; 179 n. 14 14 = SSR VA 53.32-33 (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 7) 56 n. 19

14 [8] = SSR VA 53.37-38 [8] (ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 43 n. 43 15 = SSR VA 54 (ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ) 55 n. 13; 184-189; 186 n. 37 15 = SSR VA 54.66-67 (ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 11) 56 n. 19 19 = SSR VA 85 (D.L. 6.2 [21-24]) 107 n. 1 20A = SSR VA 86.1-2 (Epict., Diss. 4.6.20) 134 n. 43 20B = SSR VA 86.3-4 (M. Ant., Med. 7.36) 134 n. 44 21A = SSR VA 87.1-2 (Ars., Viol. p. 502.13-14) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 21B = SSR VA 87.2-4 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.34) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 22-28 = SSR VA 92-99 108 n. 5 23 = SSR VA 99 (D.L. 6.105) 111 n. 18; 112 n. 22; 140 n. 2 24A = SSR VA 92.1-6 ([Eratosth.], Cat. 1.40) 109 n. 9 24B = SSR VA 92.6-7 (Eudocia, Viol. 998, p. 733.1-3) 109 n. 9 24C = SSR VA 92.7-13 (Anon. Lat. II, p. 264.20265.10) 109 n. 9 25 = SSR VA 93 (Procl., In Alc. 98, p. 44.1518) 108-109; 109 n. 6; 117 n. 15 27 = SSR VA 96 (Them., Περὶ ἀρετῆς [3, 43.5-20]) 109 n. 10 28 = SSR VA 95 (Gnom. Vat. no. 11) 109 n. 7; n. 8 29 = SSR VA 141 129 n. 12 29A = SSR VA 141.1-4 (Ath. 5.63, 220C [1, 487.1721]) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8; 136 n. 54 29B = SSR VA 141.4-8 (Eust., Od. κ 7, p. 1645.1113) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8 30 = SSR VA 198.1-4 (Ath. 12.47, 534C [3, 178.10-13]) 125 n. 1 32A = SSR VA 199.1-4 (Procl., In Alc. 114, p. 51.35-38) 125 n. 3 32B = SSR VA 199.4-12 (Olymp., In Alc. 28, p. 20.18-21.25) 125 n. 3 33 = SSR VA 200 (Ath. 5.55, 216B-C [1, 478.23479.7]) 125-126; 126 n. 4 34 = SSR VA 142 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23488.4]) 120 n. 11; 124 n. 22

Index

35 = SSR VA 143.1-5 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.2]) 119 n. 4 35 = SSR VA 143.1-8 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.5]) 121 n. 14; 124 n. 22 35 = SSR VA 143.3-8 (Ath. 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.24-300.5]) 119 n. 7 36 = SSR VA 148 (D.L. 3.35) 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16; 64 n. 37; 69 n. 52 37AB = SSR VA 147 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16 37A = SSR VA 147.1-3 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 488.4-6]) 69 n. 52 37B = SSR VA 147.3-7 (Ath. 11.115, 507A [3, 120.22-25]) 69 n. 52 38 = SSR VA 160 (Epict., Diss. 1.17.10) 53 n. 1 38 = SSR VA 160 (Epict., Diss. 1.17.10-12) 60 n. 29 39A = SSR VA 179 (Phld., De pietate 7a.3-8) 75 n. 3; 77; 78 n. 15; 83 n. 37; 84 n. 46 39B = SSR VA 180.1-3 (Cic., N.D. 1.13.32) 75 n. 3; 84 n. 46 39C = SSR VA 180.3-6 (Min. Fel., Oct. 19.7) 84 n. 46 39D = SSR VA 180.6-8 (Lact., Inst. 1.5.18) 84 n. 46 39E = SSR VA 180.8-10 (Lact., De ira Dei 11.14) 84 n. 46 40A = SSR VA 181.4-7 (Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.14.108.4) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 40B = SSR VA 181.1-3 (Clem. Alex., Protr. 6.71.2) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 40C = SSR VA 181.7 (Eus., PE 13.13.35) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 40D = SSR VA 181.8-11 (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 1.75) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 41 = SSR VA 197 (Aristid. 49.30-33) 75 n. 3; 76 n. 11; 82-83; 82 n. 36; 83 n. 42; 101 n. 17 42 = SSR VA 203 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23]) 129 n. 13; 130 n. 15 43 = SSR VA 204 (Ath. 5.63, 220D [1, 487.2122]) 128 n. 1 44A = SSR VA 150.1-11 (Arist., Metaph. Η 3, 1043b25-26) 41 n. 37; 42 n. 41; 45; 46 44B = SSR VA 150.11-39 ([Alex. Aphr.], In Metaph. Η 3, 1043b23-25, 553.31-554.33) 38 n. 26; 41 n. 38 45 = SSR VA 151.1-2 (D.L. 6.3 [25-26]) 30 n. 6; 49 n. 56; 55; 56-57; 57 n. 20; 59-61 46 = SSR VA 151.4-13 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.13-22) 51-52 n. 65; 52; 57 n. 22 46 = SSR VA 151.7-8 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.16-17) 51 n. 64 46 = SSR VA 151.10-12 (Alex. Aphr., In Top. 1.5, 101b39, 42.20-21) 49-50 n. 59 47B = SSR VA 152.8-30 (Alex. Aphr., In Metaph. ∆ 29, 1024b26, 434.25-435.19) 32 n. 13 48 = SSR VA 154 (D.L. 9.53) 29 n. 1 49 = SSR VA 155 (Procl., In Cra. 37) 29 n. 2 50ABC = SSR VA 149 35 n. 16 50A = SSR VA 149.1-5 (Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.28-32 ) 34 n. 16; 47-48 n. 52

209 50B = SSR VA 149.6 (Simp., In Cat. 8, 8b25, 208.15-21) 34 n. 16 50C = SSR VA 149.6-11 (Ammon., In Porph. 40.6-8) 34 n. 16 51 = SSR VA 187.1-35 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 54 n. 7 51 = SSR VA 187.1-16 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 85-86 n. 7 51 = SSR VA 187.12-13 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1, 12-13) 57 n. 21 51 = SSR VA 187.17-29 (Porph., Ad Od α 1) 86-87; 86-87 n. 9 51 = SSR VA 187.29-35 (Porph., Ad Od. α 1) 58; 87-88; 87 n. 11; 88 52A = SSR VA 188.22-23 (Porph., Ad Od. ε 211) 99 n. 7 52B = SSR VA 188.39-42 (Porph., Ad Od. η 257) 83 n. 44; 99 n. 8 53 = SSR VA 189.7-10 (Porph., Ad Od. ι 106) 83 n. 43; 101 n. 18 54 = SSR VA 190 (Porph., Ad Od. ι 525) 98 55 = SSR VA 191 (Porph., Ad Il. Λ 636) 57 n. 21; 100 n. 13 56 = SSR VA 192 (Anonym. schol. lips. in Iliadem Ο 123) 93; 93 n. 28 57 = SSR VA 193 (Anonym. schol. venet. in Iliadem Ψ 65) 102 n. 23 58 = SSR VA 194 (D. Chr. 53.4-5) 100 n. 11 61 = SSR VA 185 (Xen., Symp. 3.5-6) 55 n. 12; 85 n. 5; 166 n. 53 62 = SSR VA 186 (Xen., Symp. 4.6) 60; 85 n. 5; 158 n. 28 63 = SSR VA 134.17-18 (D.L. 6.13 [131-132]) 56 n. 18; 140 n. 6 64 = SSR VA 163.1-3 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.68) 56 n. 17 65 = SSR VA 174 (Stob., Anth. 2.2.15) 33 n. 14; 34 68 = SSR VA 164 (Gnom. Vat. no. 3) 40 n. 33 69 = SSR VA 134.1-3 (D.L. 6.10 [109-110]) 112 n. 21; 133 n. 36; 141 n. 7; 148 n. 16 p. 111 on D.C. 69 = SSR VA 103.2-4 (Xen., Symp. 2.12) 152-153; 153 n. 12 p. 111 on D.C. 69 = SSR VA 103.4-7 (Xen., Symp. 2.13) 153 n. 14 70 = SSR VA 134.3-5 (D.L. 6.11 [110-113]) 35 n. 19; 107 n. 3; 140 n. 4; 141 n. 7; 163 n. 45; 191 n. 57 71 = SSR VA 134.11-13 (D.L. 6.12 [123-126]) 140 n. 2; 141 n. 7 72 = SSR VA 134.15 (D.L. 6.12 [128-129]) 141 n. 7; 152 n. 10 p. 112 on D.C. 72; cp. SSR VA 18.1-4 (Xen., Symp. 2.9-10) 151-152; 152 n. 10 73 = SSR VA 134.15-16 (D.L. 6.12 [129-130]) 141 n. 7 74 = SSR VA 134.14-15 (D.L. 6.12 [127-128]) 141 n. 7 75 = SSR VA 176 (D.L. 6.5 [53-54]) 83 n. 40 76 = SSR VA 134.13-14 (D.L. 6.12 [126-127]) 141 n. 7 79 = SSR VA 134.10-11 (D.L. 6.12 [121-123]) 141 n. 7; 147 n. 14; 148

210  p. 113 on D.C. 79 = SSR VA 110.1-9 (Xen. Mem. 2.5.1-3) 145 n. 7 80 = SSR VA 134.5-6 (D.L. 6.11 [113-114]) 141 n. 7 81 = SSR VA 134.9 (D.L. 6.12 [120-121]) 141 n. 7 82 = SSR VA 129 (D.L. 6.5 [51-52]) 143 n. 3 85 = SSR VA 90 (D.L. 6.7 [70-71]) 135 n. 47 86 = SSR VA 104.1-2 (Gnom. Vat. no. 12) 56 n. 16; 112 n. 23 88 = SSR VA 134.16-17 (D.L. 6.13 [130-131]) 141 n. 7 92 = SSR VA 108 (D.L. 6.6 [58-59]) 118 n. 21; 138 n. 70 94 = SSR VA 80 (Stob., Anth. 3.10.41) 110 n. 12 95 = SSR VA 134.6-7 (D.L. 6.11 [114-115]) 141 n. 7 96 = SSR VA 113 (Gnom. Vat. no. 1) 107 n. 2 100 = SSR VA 68 (Arist., Pol. 3.13, 1284a11-17) 128 n. 8 101 = SSR VA 134.7-8 (D.L. 6.11 [115-117]) 137 n. 64; 141 n. 7 103 = SSR VA 71 (D.L. 6.5 [54-55]) 129 n. 11; 137 n. 61 104 = SSR VA 73 (D.L. 6.6 [62-64]) 137 n. 59 105 = SSR VA 76 (Ps.-Max. 9.45) 137 n. 63 107.22-25 = SSR VA 13.1-23 (Xen., Symp. 4.6064) 164-165; 164 n. 46 108C = SSR VA 122.1-3 (Gell. 9.5.3) 80 n. 22 108E = SSR VA 122.12-16 (Eus., PE 15.13.7) 80 n. 22 108F = SSR VA 122.16-17 (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 12.47) 80 n. 23 109A = SSR VA 123.1-8 (Clem. Alex., Strom. 2.20.107.2-3) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 78 n. 16; 79 109B = SSR VA 123.8-15 (Thdrt., Graec. aff. cur. 3.53) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 80 n. 22; 81 n. 24 110 = SSR VA 127 (Ath. 12.6, 513A [3, 132.1517]) 82 n. 33 111C = SSR VA 117.3-5 (D.L. 9.101) 82 n. 32 112A = SSR VA 124.1-3 (Stob., Anth. 3.6.43) 81 n. 26 112B = SSR VA 124.3-6 (Stob., Anth. 3.18.26) 81 n. 25; n. 26 113 = SSR VA 126 (Stob., Anth. 3.29.65) 82 n. 31 114 = SSR VA 56 (D.L. 6.3 [27-28]) 114 n. 5 115 = SSR VA 58 (D.L. 6.11 [117-119]) 80 n. 21; 114 n. 3 116 = SSR VA 59 (Clem. Rom., Hom. 5.18.2 ) 115 n. 10 117.6-65 = SSR VA 82 (Xen., Symp. 4.34-44) 90 n. 16; 111 n. 13; 118 n. 21; 158-160; 160 n. 30 117.16-18 = SSR VA 82.9-10 (Xen., Symp. 4.36) 131 n. 22

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

117.57-59 = SSR VA 82.41-42 (Xen., Symp. 4.43) 144 n. 4 119 = SSR VA 79 (Stob., Anth. 3.8.14) 139 n. 71 122A = SSR VA 1.1-3 (D.L. 6.1 [1-3]) 133 n. 32; n. 33 123.1-3 = SSR VA 3.3-6 (D.L. 6.1 [4-6]) 128 n. 7 123.3-6 = SSR VA 8 (D.L. 6.1 [6-8]) 132 n. 30 124 = SSR VA 3.1-3 (D.L. 2.31) 133 n. 31 128A = SSR VA 12.1-6 (D.L. 6.2 [16-21]) 70 n. 58; 166 n. 49 128B = SSR VA 12.10-17 (Hieronym., Adv. Jovin. 2.14) 166 n. 49 128C = SSR VA 12.6-10 (Gnom. Vat. no. 4) 166 n. 49 132A = SSR VA 20 (Plato, Phd. 59B5-8) 35 n. 17 138A = SSR VA 34 = VB 19.1-5 (D.L. 6.21) 69 n. 55 150 = SSR VA 28 (D.L. 6.3 [33-34]) 182 n. 26 156 = SSR VA 32 (Gnom. Vat. no. 5) 131 n. 23 161 = SSR VA 182 (Clem. Alex., Protr. 7.75.3) 83 n. 39 166 = SSR VA 75 (Stob., Anth. 4.8.31) 131 n. 21 168 = SSR VA 70 (Stob., Anth. 4.4.28) 128 n. 2 169 = SSR VA 72 (D.L. 6.8 [79-82]) 21 n. 1; 133 n. 37 170 = SSR VA 74 (Stob., Anth. 4.9.10) 128 n. 3; 137 172 = SSR VA 162 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.33) 53 n. 1 173 = SSR VA 173 (Stob., Anth. 2.31.76) 70 n. 58; 76 n. 10; 167 178A = SSR VA 88.1-2 (D.L. 6.5 [56-57]) 134 n. 46 178B = SSR VA 88.2-4 (Gnom. Vat. no. 9) 134 n. 46 178C = SSR VA 89 (D.L. 6.8 [82-83]) 21 n. 2; 135 n. 47 179 = SSR VA 114 (D.L. 6.8 [89-90])  111 n. 14 180 = SSR VA 57 (D.L. 6.3 [31-32])  114 n. 4 181 = SSR VA 61 (D.L. 6.10 [105-108])  114 n. 7 182 = SSR VA 60 (D.L. 6.4 [42-44])  115 n. 9 184 = SSR VA 169.1-2 (D.L. 6.4 [39-40])  69 n. 53; 111 n. 15; n. 17 185 = SSR VA 169.3-4 (D.L. 6.4 [41-42])  69 n. 54; 113 n. 26 186 = SSR VA 167.3-4 (D.L. 6.6 [60-62])  134 n. 45 187 = SSR VA 171 (D.L. 6.3 [28-31])  69 n. 56 188 = SSR VA 168 (D.L. 6.5 [48-51])  69 n. 57; 113 n. 27 192 = SSR VA 175 (Papyr. Flor. II 113, col. II 26-36) 161 n. 37

Index

211

Index of passages cited This index lists the primary sources cited in the present volume. The numbers of the collections of Giannantoni (SSR) and Decleva Caizzi (D.C.) are added in parentheses, whenever relevant. The references are to pages and notes. For the page numbers in bold type, see the Index of Fragments Cited. Aeschylus (525/4-456/5 bc) Persae 767-772 133 n. 38 Aesop (6th cent. bc) Fabula 241 129 ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ (SSR VA 53; D.C. 14) 55 n. 13; 179-183; 179 n. 14 (SSR VA 53.32-33; D.C. 14) 56 n. 19 (SSR VA 53.37-38 [8]; D.C. 14 [8]) 43 n. 43 (7) 190 Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd-3rd cent. ad) In Aristotelis Metaphysica ∆ 29, 1024b26, 434.25-435.19 (SSR VA 152.8-30; D.C. 47B) 32 n. 13 In Aristotelis Topica 1.5, 101b39, 42.13-22 (SSR VA 151.4-13; D.C. 46) 51-52 n. 65; 52; 57 n. 22 1.5, 101b39, 42.16-17 (SSR VA 151.7-8; D.C. 46) 51 n. 64 1.5, 101b39, 42.20-21 (SSR VA 151.10-12; D.C. 46) 49-50 n. 59 Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias (between 4th and 12th cent. ad) In Aristotelis Metaphysica Η 3, 1043b23-25, 553.31-554.33 (SSR VA 150.11-39; D.C. 44B) 38 n. 26; 41 n. 38 Ν 3, 1090b13-14, 818.13-18 41 n. 39 Ammonius (ad 435/445-517/526) In Porphyrii isagogen 40.6-8 (SSR VA 149.6-11; D.C. 50C) 34 n. 16 Anonymus Latinus II (8th cent. ad) p. 264.20-265.10 (SSR VA 92.7-13; D.C. 24C) 109 n. 9 Aelius Aristides (2nd century bc) Orationes 49.30-33 (SSR VA 197; D.C. 41) 75 n. 3; 76 n. 11; 82-83; 82 n. 36; 83 n. 42; 101 n. 17 Aristotle (384-322 bc) Metaphysica Γ 3, 1005b3-4 (SSR VA 157.4-6; not in D.C.) 40 n. 36 Γ 4, 1006a6-8 (SSR VA 157.6-9; not in D.C.) 40 n. 36 ∆ 29, 1024b26-32 32 n. 11 ∆ 29, 1024b32-34 31 n. 9; 68 n. 51 ∆ 29, 1024b32 40 n. 35 ∆ 29, 1024b34 34 n. 16 ∆ 29, 1024b34-1025a1 36 n. 22 Η 3, 1043b10-11 46

Η 3, 1043b18-32 44 n. 45 Η 3, 1043b23-28 38 n. 25; 39; 40; 42; 43; 45; 46 Η 3, 1043b25-26 (SSR VA 150.1-11; D.C. 44A) 41 n. 37; 42 n. 41; 45; 46 Η 3, 1043b28-30 42 n. 42; 43; 45 Ν 3, 1091a7-9 41 n. 39 Politica 2.7, 1266a31-34 137 n. 57 3.13, 1284a11-17 (SSR VA 68; D.C. 100) 128 n. 8 3.13, 1284a15-16 40 n. 35 Rhetorica 3.4, 1407a10 40 n. 35 Topica 1.5, 101b38 49 n. 57 1.11, 104b21 32 n. 12; 40 n. 35 Arsenius (15th-16th cent.ad) Violetum p. 502.13-14 (SSR VA 87.1-2; D.C. 21A) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 p. 507.12-15 135 Athenaeus (2nd-3rd cent. ad) Deipnosophistae (Kaibel) 5.55, 216B-C [1, 478.23-479.7] (SSR VA 200; D.C. 33) 125-126; 126 n. 4 5.63, 220D [1, 487.21-22] (SSR VA 204; D.C. 43) 128 n. 1 5.63, 220C [1, 487.17-21] (SSR VA 141.1-4; D.C. 29A) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8; 136 n. 54 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23] (SSR VA 203; D.C. 42) `129 n. 13; 130 n. 15 5.63, 220D [1, 487.23-488.4] (SSR VA 142; D.C. 34) 120 n. 11; 124 n. 22 5.63, 220D [1, 488.4-6] (SSR VA 147.1-3; D.C. 37A) 69 n. 52 11.115, 507A [3, 120.22-25] (SSR VA 147.3-7; D.C. 37B) 69 n. 52 12.6, 513A [3, 132.15-17] (SSR VA 127; D.C. 110) 82 n. 33 12.45, 533C-D (SSR VA 144; not in D.C.) 122 n. 15; 124 n. 22 12.47, 534C [3, 178.10-13] (SSR VA 198.1-4; D.C. 30) 125 n. 1 13.37, 576D 119 n. 3 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.2] (SSR VA 143.1-5; D.C. 35) 119 n. 4 13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.21-300.5] (SSR VA 143.1-8; D.C. 35) 121 n. 14; 124 n. 22

212 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

13.56, 589E-F [3, 299.24-300.5] (SSR VA 143.3-8; D.C. 35) 119 n. 7 Chrysippus (c. 280-207 bc) Fragmenta F 617, SVF III, 158.34-39 148 n. 18 F 594, SVF III, 155.19-23 148 n. 18 F 595, SVF III, 155.25-34 148 n. 18 Cicero (106-43 bc) Ad Atticum 12.38.5 (SSR VA 84; D.C. 13) 24 n. 12; 134 n. 42 Ad Quintum fratrem 1.8.23 134 n. 41 De natura deorum 1.13.32 (SSR VA 180.1-3; D.C. 39B) 75 n. 3; 84 n. 46 Clement of Alexandria (2nd cent. ad) Protrepticus 6.71.2 (SSR VA 181.1-3; D.C. 40B) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 7.75.3 (SSR VA 182; D.C. 161) 83 n. 39 Stromata 2.20.107.2-3 (SSR VA 123.1-8; D.C. 109A) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 78 n. 16; 79 5.14.108.4 (SSR VA 181.4-7; D.C. 40A) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 Pseudo-Clement of Rome (4th cent. ad) Homiliae 5.81.1 116 n. 13 5.18.2 (SSR VA 59; D.C. 116) 115 n. 10 Dio Chrysostom (c. ad 40/50-110) Orationes 8 (7), 34 (SSR VB 584.178-181) 110 n. 11 13(12), 14-16 (SSR VA 208.1-24; not in D.C.) 131; 131 n. 25 13(12), 14-28 (SSR VA 208; not in D.C.) 131 n. 24; 132 13(12), 30 131 n. 24; 132 53.4-5 (SSR VA 194; D.C. 58) 100 n. 11 Diogenes Laertius (3rd cent. ad) Vitae philosophorum (Dorandi) 2.31 (SSR VA 3.1-3; D.C. 124) 133 n. 31 2.61 (SSR VA 43; D.C. 6) 108 n. 5 3.4 23 n. 9 3.35 (SSR VA 148; D.C. 36) 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16; 64 n. 37; 69 n. 52 3.59 63 n. 36 4.47 133 n. 35 6.1 (1-3) (SSR VA 1.1-3; D.C. 122A) 133 n. 32; n. 33 6.1 (4-6) (SSR VA 3.3-6; D.C. 123.1-3) 128 n. 7 6.1 (6-8) (SSR VA 8; D.C. 123.3-6) 132 n. 30 6.1 (9-11) (SSR VA 11.2-5; D.C. 7) 70 n. 58; 91 n. 22 6.2 (16-21) (SSR VA 12.1-6; D.C. 128A) 70 n. 58; 166 n. 49 6.2 (21-24) (SSR VA 85; D.C. 19) 107 n. 1 6.3 (25-26) (SSR VA 151.1-2; D.C. 45) 30 n. 6; 49 n. 56; 55; 56-57; 57 n. 20; 59-61 6.3 (27-28) (SSR VA 56; D.C. 114) 114 n. 5

6.3 (28-31) (SSR VA 171; D.C. 187) 69 n. 56 6.3 (31-32) (SSR VA 57; D.C. 180) 114 n. 4 6.3 (33-34) (SSR VA 28; D.C. 150) 182 n. 26 6.4 (39-40) (SSR VA 169.1-2; D.C. 184) 69 n. 53; 111 n. 15; n. 17 6.4 (41-42) (SSR VA 169.3-4; D.C. 185) 69 n. 54; 113 n. 26 6.4 (42-44) (SSR VA 60; D.C. 182) 115 n. 9 6.5 (48-51) (SSR VA 168; D.C. 188) 69 n. 57; 113 n. 27 6.5 (51-52) (SSR VA 129; D.C. 82) 143 n. 3 6.5 (53-54) (SSR VA 176; D.C. 75) 83 n. 40 6.5 (54-55) (SSR VA 71; D.C. 103) 129 n. 11; 137 n. 61 6.5 (56-57) (SSR VA 88.1-2; D.C. 178A) 134 n. 46 6.6 (58-59) (SSR VA 108; D.C. 92) 118 n. 21; 138 n. 70 6.6 (60-62) (SSR VA 167.3-4; D.C. 186) 134 n. 45 6.6 (62-64) (SSR VA 73; D.C. 104) 137 n. 59 6.7 (70-71) (SSR VA 90; D.C. 85) 135 n. 47 6.8 (79-82) (SSR VA 72; D.C. 169) 21 n. 1; 133 n. 37 6.8 (82-83) (SSR VA 89; D.C. 178C) 21 n. 2; 135 n. 47 6.8 (89-90) (SSR VA 114; D.C. 179) 111 n. 14 6.10 (105-108) (SSR VA 61; D.C. 181) 114 n. 7 6.10 (109-110) (SSR VA 134.1-3; D.C. 69) 112 n. 21; 133 n. 36; 141 n. 7; 148 n. 16 6.10-13 141 n. 7 6.11 (110-113) (SSR VA 134.3-5; D.C. 70) 35 n. 19; 107 n. 3; 140 n.4; 141 n. 7; 163 n. 45; 191 n. 57 6.11 (113-114) (SSR VA 134.5-6; D.C. 80) 141 n. 7 6.11 (114-115) (SSR VA 134.6-7; D.C. 95) 141 n. 7 6.11 (115-117) (SSR VA 134.7-8; D.C. 101) 137 n. 64; 141 n. 7 6.11 (117-119) (SSR VA 58; D.C. 115) 80 n. 21; 114 n. 3 6.12 (120-121) (SSR VA 134.9; D.C. 81) 141 n. 7 6.12 (121-123) (SSR VA 134.10-11; D.C. 79) 141 n. 7; 147 n. 14; 148 6.12 (123-126) (SSR VA 134.11-13; D.C. 71) 140 n. 2; 141 n. 7 6.12 (126-127) (SSR VA 134.13-14; D.C. 76) 141 n. 7 6.12 (127-128) (SSR VA 134.14-15; D.C. 74) 141 n. 7 6.12 (128-129) (SSR VA 134.15; D.C. 72) 141 n. 7; 152 n. 10 6.12 (129-130) (SSR VA 134.15-16; D.C. 73) 141 n. 7 6.13 (130-131) (SSR VA 134.16-17; D.C. 88) 141 n. 7 6.13 (131-132) (SSR VA 134.17-18; D.C. 63) 56 n. 18; 140 n. 6 6.15-18 62 n. 36

Index

6.15 23 n. 10; 25 n. 14 6.15 (161) (SSR VA 41.4; D.C. 1.4) 176 n. 1 6.15 (162) (SSR VA 41.5; D.C. 1.5) 176 n. 1 6.15 (164-166) (SSR VA 41.7-8; D.C. 1.78) 22 n. 8 6.15 (169) (SSR VA 41.11; D.C. 1.11) 63 n. 36; 114 n. 2 6.15 (170) (SSR VA 41.12; D.C. 1.12) 63 n. 36 6.16 21 n. 1; 23 n. 10 6.16 (171) (SSR VA 41.13; D.C. 1.13) 35 n. 19 6.16 (171-172) (SSR VA 41.13-14; D.C. 1.1314) 155 n. 21 6.16 (176) (SSR VA 41.18; D.C. 1.17) 35 n. 19; 190 n. 55 6.16 (177) (SSR VA 41.19; D.C. 1.18) 75 n. 2 6.16 (178) (SSR VA 41.20; D.C. 1.19) 35 n. 19; 155 n. 21 6.16 (182) (SSR VA 41.24; D.C. 1.22) 63 n. 36 6.16 (185) (SSR VA 41.27; D.C. 1.25) 108 n. 5 6.16 (191-192) (SSR VA 41.33-34; D.C. 1.3132) 34 n. 15 6.16 (192-193) (SSR VA 41.34; D.C. 1.32) 23 n. 10 6.17 (196) (SSR VA 41.37; D.C. 1.35) 53 n. 4 6.17 (199) (SSR VA 41.38; D.C. 1.38) 50 n. 61; 53 n. 4; 62 n. 36 6.17 (200) (SSR VA 41.39; D.C. 1.39) 35 n. 19 6.17 (205) (SSR VA 41.44; D.C. 1.44) 75 n. 1 6.17 (208) (SSR VA 41.47; D.C. 1.47) 35 n. 18 6.17 (212) (SSR VA 41.51; D.C. 1.51) 55 n. 14 6.17 (213) (SSR VA 41.52; D.C. 1.52) 83 n. 40 6.17 (216) (SSR VA 41.55; D.C. 1.55) 81 n. 29 6.17 (218) (SSR VA 41.57; D.C. 1.57)  102 n. 20 6.18 (224) (SSR VA 41.63; D.C. 1.63) 101 n. 16 6.18 (230) (SSR VA 41.68; D.C. 1.69) 108 n. 5 6.18 (231) (SSR VA 41.69; D.C. 1.70) 108 n. 5 6.18 (234) (SSR VA 41.72; D.C. 1.73) 123 n. 19 6.18 (238-239) (SSR VA 41.75-76; D.C. 2) 24 n. 11 6.21 (SSR VA 34 = VB 19.1-5; D.C. 138A) 69 n. 55 6.26 56 n. 16 6.38 163 n. 43 6.45 83 n. 39 6.103 (SSR VA 135.3-5; not in D.C.) 48 n. 53 6.104 (SSR VA 135.7-8; not in D.C.) 48 n. 53 6.105 (SSR VA 99; D.C. 23) 111 n. 18; 112 n. 22; 140 n. 2 9.53 (SSR VA 154; D.C. 48) 29 n. 1 9.101 (SSR VA 117.3-5; D.C. 111C) 82 n. 32 Epictetus (1st-2nd cent. ad) Dissertationes 1.17.10 (SSR VA 160; D.C. 38) 53 n. 1 1.17.10-12 (SSR VA 160; D.C. 38) 60 n. 29 4.6.20 (SSR VA 86.1-2; D.C. 20A) 134 n. 43 Fragmenta fr. 11 Schenkl 130 n. 17 [Eratosthenes] (c. 276-c. 195 bc) Catasterismi 1.40 (SSR VA 92.1-6; D.C. 24A) 109 n. 9

213 Pseudo-Eudocia (16th cent. ad) Violarium 998, p. 733.1-3 (SSR VA 92.6-7; D.C. 24B) 109 n. 9 Eusebius (c. ad 260-339) Praeparatio evangelica 13.13.35 (SSR VA 181.7; D.C. 40C) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 15.13.7 (SSR VA 122.12-16; D.C. 108E) 80 n. 22 Eustathius (c. ad 1110-1192) In Iliadem Ζ 211 (SSR VA 6; not in D.C.) 133 n. 35 In Odysseam κ 7, p. 1645.11-13 (SSR VA 141.4-8; D.C. 29B) 121 n. 12; 127 n. 8 Aulus Gellius (c. ad 130-180) Noctes Atticae 9.5.3 (SSR VA 122.1-3; D.C. 108C) 80 n. 22 Gnomologium Vaticanum 173 (14th cent. ad) no. 1 (SSR VA 113; D.C. 96) 107 n. 2 no. 3 (SSR VA 164; D.C. 68) 40 n. 33 no. 4 (SSR VA 12.6-10; D.C. 128C) 166 n. 49 no. 5 (SSR VA 32; D.C. 156) 131 n. 23 no. 9 (SSR VA 88.2-4; D.C. 178B) 134 n. 46 no. 11 (SSR VA 95; D.C. 28) 109 n. 7; n. 8 no. 12 (SSR VA 104.1-2; D.C. 86) 56 n. 16; 112 n. 23 Hieronymus see Jerome Homer (8th cent. bc) Ilias 2, 673-674 125 5, 330-351 79 5, 349 80 6, 211 133 7, 219 188 n. 46 7, 257 187 n. 44 7, 279-302 188 n. 45 9, 313 86 n. 7; 92 n. 25 11, 636-637 100 n. 12 11, 636 100 15, 128-129 102 n. 22 23, 65-92 103 n. 24 Odyssea 7, 256-257 99 9, 106 97 n. 1 9, 115-122 97 n. 1 9, 275 97 n. 4 9, 410-412 98 n. 4 11, 543-547 177 19, 521 86 n. 7; 87 21, 289 97 n. 1 Isocrates (436-338 bc) Helena [10], 1 (SSR VA 156; not in D.C.) 22 n. 6; 34 n. 16; 68 n. 50; n. 51 Jerome (c. ad 350-420) Adversus Joviniamum 2.14 (SSR VA 12.10-17; D.C. 128B) 166 n. 49

214  Lactantius (4th cent. ad) Divinae Institutiones 1.5.18 (SSR VA 180.6-8; D.C. 39D) 84 n. 46 De ira Dei 11.14 (SSR VA 180.8-10; D.C. 39E) 84 n. 46 Marcus Aurelius (ad 121-180) Meditations 7.36 (SSR VA 86.3-4; D.C. 20B) 134 n. 44 Pseudo-Maximus Confessor (c. ad 580-662) Loci communes 9.45 (9.77/80, p. 239 Ihm) (SSR VA 76; D.C. 105) 137 n 63 Minucius Felix (2nd or 3rd cent. ad) Octavius 19.7 (SSR VA 180.3-6; D.C. 39C) 84 n. 46 ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ (SSR VA 54; D.C. 15) 55 n. 13; 184-189; 186 n. 37 (11) (SSR VA 54.66-67; D.C. 15) 56 n. 19 (14) 179; 190 Olympiodorus (c. ad 495/505-565) In Platonis Alcibiadem 28, p. 20.18-21.25 (SSR VA 199.4-12; D.C. 32B) 125 n. 3 Papyri Florentini (2nd cent. ad?) II 113, col. II 26-36 (SSR VA 175; D.C. 192) 161 n. 37 Philodemus (c. 110-40/35 bc) De pietate 7a.3-8 (SSR VA 179; D.C. 39A) 75 n. 3; 77; 78 n. 15; 83 n. 37; 84 n. 46 Photius (c. ad 810-895) Lexicon s 21 s.v. σάθων (III, 335) 23 n. 10 Pindar (6th-5th cent. bc) Nemea 7, 20-27 176 n. 3 8, 23-34 176 n. 3 8, 24 176 n. 2 Plato (c. 429-347 BC) Apologia 31C7-D6 169 n. 62 33A6-8 143-144 40A2-C3 169 n. 62 Euthydemus 284A5-8 66 n. 43 284B3-C6 65 286A4-B6 65 n. 40 286C2-3 65 292A4-C5 137 n. 58 Gorgias 470D5-8 130 n. 14 471A4-D2 130 n. 14 Hippias Minor 364E7-365D4 92 n. 25 365B2-5 96 n. 36 365C8-D4 100 n. 11 370A4-5 92 n. 25 Ion 530D1 157 n. 27

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Leges 10, 895D4-896A4 55 n. 11 Lysis 211B8 63 n. 36 Menexenus 235E3-7 123 236D4-249C8 122 249E1 123 Phaedo 59B5-8 (SSR VA 20; D.C. 132A) 35 n. 17 Protagoras 360E6-361D6 112 n. 20 Respublica 8, 548D8-9 150 n. 9 Sophista 251A8-C6 30-31 n. 7 251C4-6 30 n. 7 258B7-C5 59 n. 27 Symposium 213C6-D6 170 n. 64 233D6-12 100 n. 14 Theaetetus 201D8-202C6 38-39 n. 28; 53 n. 2; 62 n. 33 202A6-7 53 n. 5; 62 n. 33 Plutarch (c. ad 46-120) Vita Periclis 24 124 24.5-7 120 n. 9 24.7-9 (SSR VA 143.8-16; not in D.C.) 119 n. 2; 124 n. 22 Porphyry (c. ad 232/3-305) Ad Iliadem Λ 636 (SSR VA 191; D.C. 55) 57 n. 21; 100 n. 13 Ad Odysseam α 1 (SSR VA 187.1-35; D.C. 51) 54 n. 7 α 1 (SSR VA 187.1-16; D.C. 51) 85-86 n. 7 α 1 (SSR VA 187.17-29; D.C. 51) 86-87; 86-87 n. 9 α 1 (SSR VA 187.29-35; D.C. 51) 58; 87-88; 87 n. 11; 88 α 1, 12-13 (SSR VA 187.12-13; D.C. 51) 57 n. 21 α 1, 20-22 54 n. 9 α 1, 22 54 n. 8 α 1, 23-25 54 n. 8 α 1, 25-27 54 n. 8 ε 211 (SSR VA 188.22-23; D.C. 52A) 99 n. 7 η 257 (SSR VA 188.39-42; D.C. 52B) 83 n. 44; 99 n. 8 ι 106 (SSR VA 189.7-10; D.C. 53) 83 n. 43; 101 n. 18 ι 525 (SSR VA 190; D.C. 54) 98 Proclus (c. ad 410/412-485) In Platonis Cratylum 37 (SSR VA 155; D.C. 49) 29 n. 2 In Platonis Alcibiadem 98, p. 44.15-18 (SSR VA 93; D.C. 25) 108109; 109 n. 6; 117 n. 15 114, p. 51.35-38 (SSR VA 199.1-4; D.C. 32A) 125 n. 3

Index

Scholia In Iliadem Anonym. schol. lips. in Iliadem Ο 123 (ad Schol. Hom. 4, 35.24-26 Erbse) (SSR VA 192; D.C. 56) 93; 93 n. 28 Anonym. schol. venet. in Iliadem Ψ 65 (Schol. Hom. 5, 377.41-42 Erbse) (SSR VA 193; D.C. 57) 102 n. 23 Simplicius (6th cent. ad) In Aristotelis Categorias 8, 8b25, 208.15-21 (SSR VA 149.6; D.C. 50B) 34 n. 16 8, 8b25, 208.28-32 (SSR VA 149.1-5; D.C. 50A) 34 n. 16; 47-48 n. 52 Sophocles (c. 495-406 bc) Ajax 445-449 177; 182 n. 22 442-444 186 n. 38 Stobaeus (5th cent. ad) Anthologium 2.2.15 (SSR VA 174; D.C. 65) 33 n. 14; 34 2.31.33 (SSR VA 162; D.C. 172) 53 n. 1 2.31.34 (SSR VA 87.2-4; D.C. 21B) 112 n. 24; 135 n. 50 2.31.68 (SSR VA 163.1-3; D.C. 64) 56 n. 17 2.31.76 (SSR VA 173; D.C. 173) 70 n. 58; 76 n. 10; 167 3.6.43 (SSR VA 124.1-3; D.C. 112A) 81 n. 26 3.8.14 (SSR VA 79; D.C. 119) 139 n. 71 3.10.41 (SSR VA 80; D.C. 94) 110 n. 12 3.18.26 (SSR VA 124.3-6; D.C. 112B) 81 n. 25; n. 26 3.29.65 (SSR VA 126; D.C. 113) 82 n. 31 4.4.28 (SSR VA 70; D.C. 168) 128 n. 2 4.8.31 (SSR VA 75; D.C. 166) 131 n. 21 4.9.10 (SSR VA 74; D.C. 170) 128 n. 3; 137 Teleclides (5th cent. bc) Fragmenta F 71 PCG VII, 692 23 n. 10 Themistius (c. ad 317-c. 388) Πɛρὶ ἀρɛτῆς 3, 43.5-20 (SSR VA 96; D.C. 27) 109 n. 10 Theodoretus (c. ad 393-466) Graecarum affectionum curatio 1.75 (SSR VA 181.8-11; D.C. 40D) 76 n. 4; 84 n. 46 3.53 (SSR VA 123.8-15; D.C. 109B) 75 n. 3; 77 n. 12; 80 n. 22; 81 n. 24 12.47 (SSR VA 122.16-17; D.C. 108F) 80 n. 23 Vita Pythagorae (Iamblichus) (3rd-4th cent. ad) 18 89 n. 15 Xenophanes (6th-5th cent. bc) 21B14-16 76 n. 5 21B23, 1.135.4-5 DK 76 n. 8 21B23-24, 1.135.1-7 DK 76 n. 5 Xenophon (c. 430-c. 354 bc) Cyropaedia 8.2.14 136 n. 51 Memorabilia 1.1.4 169 n. 62

215 1.2.12 126 n. 5; n. 6 1.2.24-26 126 n. 6 1.6.11-14 144 n. 5 2.1.1 182 n. 25 2.3 118 n. 21 2.5.1-5 143 2.5.1-3 (SSR VA 110.1-9; Caizzi p. 113 on D.C. 79) 145 n. 7 2.11.17 143 3.4.1-4 133 n. 33 3.4.3 145 n. 7 3.6.1 150 n. 9 4.2.10 85 n. 5 4.4.20-23 121 4.6 59 4.6.1 59 n. 28; 60; 61 4.6.2-7 60 4.8.1 169 n. 62 4.10 172 n. 67 Symposium 2.9-10 (cp. SSR VA 18.1-4; Caizzi p. 112 on D.C. 72) 151-152; 152 n. 10 2.12 (SSR VA 103.2-4; Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69) 152-153; 153 n. 12 2.13 (SSR VA 103.4-7; Caizzi p. 111 on D.C. 69) 153 n. 14 3.4 155; 156 n. 23 3.5-6 (SSR VA 185; D.C. 61) 55 n. 12; 85 n. 5; 166 n. 53 3.5 156 3.6 156 3.8 145 n. 9; 158 n. 29 4.1-5 154 4.1 154 4.2 154; 156 4.3 154; 155 4.4 154 4.6 (SSR VA 186; D.C. 62) 60; 85 n. 5; 158 n. 28 4.34-44 (SSR VA 82; D.C. 117.6-65) 90 n. 16; 111 n. 13; 118 n. 21; 158-160; 160 n. 30 4.35 118 n. 21 4.36 (SSR VA 82.9-10; D.C. 117.16-18) 131 n. 22 4.38 118 n. 20; 163 4.40 163 4.43 (SSR VA 82.41-42; D.C. 117.5759) 144 n. 4 4.45 171; 171 n. 66 4.56-59 165 n. 47 4.60-64 (SSR VA 13.1-23; D.C. 107.2225) 164-165; 164 n. 46 4.64 171 5 171 6.5 167 n. 57 6.8 168 n. 60 8.4 161 n. 37 8.4-7 (SSR VA 14.1-10; not in D.C.) 149 n. 4; 168-169; 169 n. 61 8.5 169 n. 62

216 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Index of names The references are to pages and notes. In the case of the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus the paragraph numbers are added. Academy of Plato, the 22 n. 7; 174 Achaeans, the 181 (3) Achilles 86; 90; 92; 93 n. 29; 96 n. 36; 102; 102 n. 20; 103; 108; 125 contest about his armour 176-191 Adimantus, brother of Glauco 150 n. 9 Aeschines of Sphettus 25 Alcibiades 125 Aeschylus of Athens 133; 176 Aeschylus of Phlia 165 Aesop, Fables 129 Agamemnon 86; 86 n. 8; 90; 93 n. 29; 96; 158; 176 Agathon, tragic poet 130 Ajax 43 n. 43; 86; 86 n. 8; 90; 96; 176-190; 191 speech of Ajax 55; 56; 56 n. 19; 166; 179-183 Alcibiades 108; 116; 120 n. 7; 121; 124; 125-127; 128-129; 131; 132; 136; 138; 170 n. 64; 191 Alexander (Paris) 186 (3) Alexander of Aphrodisias 32-33; 46; 49 n. 59; 51-52; 57; 57 n. 22 Pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias 38; 38 n. 26; 41; 41 n. 39; 43 n. 44; 44 Alexandria, library of 62 n. 36; 70 Anaximander of Miletus 157 Antiphon, the orator 166 Antisthenean School 45 Antistheneans 39-49; 59; 62; 69 n. 53; 70; 174 Antistheneioi 37 n. 24; 40; 46 Antisthenes Against Isocrates’ ‘Without Witnesses’ 22 n. 8 Alcibiades 125-127 Archelaus or On Kingship 129-132 Aspasia 119-124; 129 n. 12 Cyclops or On Odysseus 101 Cyrus 135 n. 47; n. 48 Cyrus or On Kingship 127; 129; 134-137 Desias 23; 23 n. 10; 62 n. 36 Discussion on Debating 34 Freedom and Slavery 139 The Greater Heracles or On Wisdom and Strength 108-109; 111-112; 113; 117; 136 The Lesser Heracles 108; 108 n. 5 Heracles and Midas 108; 108 n. 5; 110; 110 n. 12; 111 n. 13 Isographēs 23; 23 n. 10; 62 n. 36 Kyros 24 n. 12 Kyrsas 24 n. 12 Menexenus, or On Ruling 123; 129 n. 12 On Courage 190-191 On Education or Names 53

On Homer 55 On Injustice and Impiety 83 n. 40 On Justice and Courage, a hortative work 155 On Law or On Beauty and Justice 155 On the Law or On the Constitution 75 n. 2; 138 On Nature 75; 75 n. 3 On Pleasure 81-82 On Procreation of Children or On Marriage, a Discourse on Love 63 n. 36; 114; 118 On the Rod 111 On the Sophists, a Physiognomic Work 63 n. 36 On the Use of Names, a Contest 50; 53; 62; 63 n. 36 On the Use of Wine or On Intoxication or On the Cyclops 77; 91 n. 21; 99-102 On Victory, an Economic Work 63 n. 36 Physiognomicus 63 n. 36 Politikos 128-129 Problems about Learning 35; 70 n. 60 Protreptikos 130 n. 20; 132 Questioning and Answering 35 Sathōn or On Contradiction 23; 23 n. 10; 24; 29 n. 2; 34; 34-35 n. 16 ; 62 n. 36; 63; 64-65; 69; 69 n. 52 speech of Ajax 55; 56; 56 n. 19; 166; 179-183 speech of Odysseus 55; 56; 56 n. 19; 166; 184-189 Antisthenes, father of Antisthenes 133 Aphrodite 75-76 n. 3; 77; 77 n. 13; 78-81; 102; 104 Apollo 83; 98; 116; 131 Archelaus, king of Macedonia 129-132 Archestratus, keeper of a brothel 120 Ares 102 Aristocles, real name of Plato 23 n. 9 Aristophanes, Clouds 168 Aristotle 25; 31; 31-33; 35; 36-50; 51; 53 n. 5; 55; 57; 57 n. 20; n. 22; 59; 62; 62 n. 32; 65-69; 69 n. 53; 95-96; 128-129; 137; 174-175 Politics 128 Ascalaphus, son of Ares 102 Aspasia 108; 119-124 Athena 77 n. 13; 102; 104; 140 Athenaeus 82; 120 n. 7; 124 Athen(ian)s 21; 122; 127; 128; 130; 132; 132 n. 28; 133; 153; 163; 167; 190; 191 Atreides, the 176; 177; 181 n. 22; 186 n. 38 Autolycus, lover of Callias 169 Bion of Borysthenes 133 n. 35 Boeotia, war against 126

217

Index

Calchas 55 Callias (1), son of Hipponicus 119; 120 n. 7; 122 Callias (2), grandson of Callias (1) 151; 154-155; 159; 162; 165; 165 n. 48; 167-168; 169; 171 Calypso 83; 96 n. 37; 99; 103 Cheiron, the centaur 108-109; 111; 117 Christian thinkers 84 Chrysippus, the Stoic 60 On Zeno’s Proper Use of Terminology 148 n. 18 Cicero 24; 24 n. 12; 75; 75 n. 3; 84; 84 n. 46; 95; 134; 134 n. 42; 174 De Senectute 134 Cimon, son of Miltiades 119; 120 n. 7; 121; 138 Circe 111 Cleanthes, the Stoic 60 Pseudo-Clement of Rome 115-117 Critias, one of the Thirty 150 n. 9 Critobulus, son of Crito 171 Cybele, beggars of 83 Cyclop(e)s 55; 83; 90; 97-99; 101 Cynicism 35 n. 19; 175 Cynics 48 n. 53; 85 n. 4; 115; 163; 175 n. 2 Cyrus, the Great 24 n. 12; 107; 127; 129; 132-137; 139; 143; 151 Cyrus, the Younger 135 n. 48

Helen of Troy 186 (2) Heraclea 165 Heracles 107-108; 108-113; 136 Hermes 111 Herodicus of Babylon 69 n. 52 Hesperides, the 110 Hippias of Elis 96 n. 36; 165; 165 n. 48; 166 Homer 25; 54; 55; 55 n. 10; n. 12; n. 15; 57 n. 21; 85-87; 90; 91-94; 96; 97-104; 111; 125; 140; 156-158; 166; 171; 172; 174; 175; 176; 177; 177 n. 5; 187 n. 44; n. 45; 188 n. 46; 190; 191 Iliad 79; 100; 102; 102 n. 20; 133 Odyssey 102; 102 n. 20; 177; 190 Homeric problems 91; 100 n. 11; 101; 103; 156-158 Homeric research 75; 99; 103 Homeric scenes 187 n. 44 Ilion 125 Isocrates, the orator 22; 22 n. 8; 23; 23 n. 10; 25; 67; 68 n. 50; 167; 174 Against the Sophists 22; 23 n. 10 Helena 22; 22 n. 6; n. 7; 23 n. 10; 34 n. 16; 67; 68; 68 n. 50; n. 51 Kyrsa, admirer of Socrates 134 n. 42

Danaoi, the 125 Delium, battle at 107; 125; 128 n. 6 110; 110 n. 11; 130 n. 20; Dio Chrysostom 131-132 Diogenes Laertius 22; 23; 23 n. 10; 29; 34; 34 n. 16; 38 n. 26; 62 n. 36; 69 n. 52; 70 n. 58; 75 n. 2; n. 3; 90; 102; 107; 108; 111; 112; 113; 114; 118; 119; 123; 129; 135 n. 48; 138; 150; 151; 155; 166 Diogenes the Cynic 69; 71; 83 n. 39; 111 n. 16; 163; 163 n. 43; 164 Diomedes 79-80; 102 Dionysius of Syracuse 131 Dionysodorus, brother of Euthydemus 66 Dionysus 75 n. 3; 77; 82-83; 101; 102; 110

Lyceum, the 100 n. 14 Lycophron, the sophist 72 Lysias, the orator 22; 22 n. 8; 23; 23 n. 10; 25; 167; 174

Eleatics, the 76 n. 6 Eleatic Stranger in Plato’s Parmenides, the 126 Elpinice, half sister of Cimon 119; 120 n. 7; 122 Epictetus 59-60; 61 Eros 153 n. 17; 169 Euphemus, maker of vulgar jokes 120; 120 n. 10 Euripides, invited by Dionysius of Syracuse 130 Euthynus, cousin of Nicias 22 n. 8

Nestor 57 n. 21; 86; 86 n. 8; 90; 91 n. 24; 93 n. 29; 96; 100; 101; 103 n. 25 Nestor’s cup 57 n. 21; 100-102; 103; 157; 157 n. 24 Niceratus, son of Nicias 103; 103 n. 26; 156-158; 166 n. 53; 171 Nicias, plaintiff vs. Euthynus 22 n. 8 Nireus, the best-looking man after Achilles 125 Nymphs, the 90

Glauco, elder brother of Plato 150; 150 n. 9 Gorgias of Leontini 70 n. 58; 91; 130; 133; 166; 167; 178 Gorgianisms 166; 178 Greeks, the 132; 176-177; 187 (6); 188 n. 48 Hades 71; 92 n. 25; 103 Hector 181 (2); 187 n. 42; n. 45; 191

Macedonia 130-131; 132 n. 28 Marcus Aurelius 134 Medes, the 133 Menelaus, brother of Agamemnon 176 Menexenus, pupil of Socrates 63 n. 36; 122-124 Midas 110 Miletus 119 Minucius Felix 84 n. 46 Myrto, real name of Aspasia 119

Odysseus 54; 55; 83; 101; 102 n. 20; 103; 103 n. 25; 176-190; 191 polytropos 85-96; 97-99 speech of 55; 56; 56 n. 19; 144; 166; 176-179; 184-190 Ovid, Metamorphoses 177

218  Pallas (Athena) 181 (3); 186 (3) Paralus, son of Pericles 120 Paris 186 (3) Patroclus 102-103 Pelias, father of Achilles 125 Penelope 55; 99; 99 n. 9 Pericles 119; 120; 120 n. 7; 120-122; 124 funeral oration 123 Persian kings 137 Persians, the 132; 133 Phaeacians, the 90 Phaedo, Alcibiades 125 Philodemus of Gadara 75 n. 3; 84; 84 n. 46 Phrygian, mother of the gods 133 Pindar, Nemean Odes 176-177 Plato 21; 22; 22 n. 7; 23; 23 n. 9; n. 10; 24; 25; 30; 34; 34 n. 16; 37; 47; 50; 53; 53 n. 2; 55; 57 n. 22; 59; 59 n. 27; 62-64; 65; 65 n. 39; 114 n. 5; 115; 120; 138; 150; 150 n. 9; 151; 162 n. 39; 174; 175; 175 n. 1; 177 n. 5; 188 n. 47 Alcibiades 125 Apology 143-144; 151; 169 n. 62 Clitophon 130 n. 20; 131-132 Euthydemus 63 n. 36; 64-66; 137 Gorgias 130 Hippias Minor 92 n. 25; 100 n. 11; 103 Lysis 63 n. 36 Menexenus 122-124 Parmenides 126 Phaedo 141; 175 n. 1 Protagoras 112 Republic [Politeia] 137; 150 n. 9 Sophist 30 Symposium 100 n. 14; 109; 148 n. 15; 149 Theaetetus 50; 62; 63 n. 36 theory of Ideas 29 n. 3; 35; 40 n. 34 Plutarch, Life of Pericles 124 Polyphemus, the Cyclops 90; 97; 97 n. 2; n. 4; 101 Pontus, a lad from 69 Porphyry 54 n. 8; n. 9; 89; 90; 91; 94; 94 n. 33; 95 Poseidon 83; 97 n. 4; 98-99 Potidaea, battle of 125 Proclus 29-30 Prodicus of Ceos 165-166 Prometheus 108; 109; 109 n. 10 Protagoras of Abdera 36; 70 n. 58; 71 Protocynic, Antisthenes as 175 Pythagoras of Samos 54 n. 8; 87; 89; 89 n. 15; 92; 94 Rhapsodists 55 n. 12; 85; 156; 172 n. 67 Silenus, father of the Satyrs 109; 110 Simonides of Ceos 41; 42; 42 n. 39

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Socrates 21; 23; 24; 31 n. 8; 34 n. 16; 35; 35 n. 17; 59-60; 69; 70; 100; 100 n. 11; n. 14; 103; 107; 109; 112; 113; 116; 117 n. 14; 120; 122-123; 125; 125 n. 1; n. 2; 126; 128; 130; 131; 131 n. 25; 133; 134 n. 42; 138; 141-142; 143; 144; 174; 175; 175 n. 1; 191; 192 n. 57 Socrates mousikos 32; 37; 96 in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 145-147 in Xenophon’s Symposium 149-153; 155-156; 156-158; 159-160; 162; 162 n. 39; 164-168; 168-171; 172; 172 n. 67 Socratic(s) 23 n. 10; 115; 120; 132 Sophist(s) 75; 76 n. 7; 93 n. 28; 154-155; 155 n. 19 Sophocles, Ajax 176-177; 181-182 n. 22; 182 n. 23; 186 n. 38 Sparta(ns) 116; 117 n. 14; 128 n. 5; 132 n. 28; 151 Stesimbrotus 101; 157; 157 n. 24 Stoa, the 148 Stoicism 175 Stoic(s) 99; 115; 133 n. 36; 142; 148 Syracuse/an 131; 153; 168 Tanagra, battle of 128; 137 Teleclides, comic poet 23 n. 10 Telemachus, son of Odysseus 55 Thasian wine 159 Thracian(s) 22; 132-133; 191 n. 56 Timon of Phlius 23 n. 10; 24 n. 11 Trojan captives 177; 181 n. 16 Trojan War 102 Trojan women 177 Trojans 177; 181 (2); n. 17; n. 18; 189 (12) Troy 177; 183 (9); 186 (2); (3); 186-187 (4); 189 (14); 191 Xanthippe, wife of Socrates 152; 152 n. 10; n. 11; 153; 153 n. 16; 154 n. 17; 155; 170 Xanthippus, son of Pericles 120 Xenophanes of Colophon 76; 83 Xenophon 55 n. 12; 126; 133; 137; 141; 143-148; 155; 158; 162; 167; 174 Cyropaedia 132; 134-137 Defence of Socrates 151 Memorabilia 59; 60-61; 85 n. 5; 118 n. 21; 121; 143; 150-151; 172; 182 n. 25 Oeconomicus 143 n. 1; 149 n. 1; 150 Symposium 85 n. 5; 89; 95; 102 n. 19; 103; 107; 110-111; 114 n. 5; 117; 118; 118 n. 21; 143; 144; 145 n. 9; 148; 149-173 Zeno the Stoic 60; 99-100 Zeus 83; 97; n. 2; n. 4; 98; 99; 102; 103 Zeuxippus of Heraclea 165

Index

219

Index of modern scholars The references are to pages and notes. Blank-Sangmeister, U. 75 n. 3 Bonitz, H. 39 n. 31 Brancacci, A. 25 n. 16; 34 n. 16; 44 n. 46; 52; 57 n. 23; 58 n. 25; 59 n. 27; 59–61; 61 n. 30; n. 31; 63 n. 36; 67; 67 n. 48; n. 49; 87 n. 10; 88 n. 14; 90 n. 17; n. 20; 98; 141; 141 n. 8 Brémond, E. 22 n. 5 Buffière, F. 85 n. 3; n. 4; 89 n. 15; 93 n. 28; 94 n. 30; 97 n. 1; n. 3; 98; 98 n. 6; 99 n. 7; 100 n. 11; 101 n. 15; 157 n. 24 Burnyeat, M.F. 30 n. 5; 40 n. 36; 51; 51 n. 63; 64; 64 n. 38 Caizzi, F.D. 21 n.*; 23 n. 10; 30 n. 7; 35 n. 16; 49 n. 55; 54 n. 8; 55 n. 12; 56 n. 16; n. 17; 63 n. 36; 67; 67 n. 46; 75 n. 3; 82 n. 30; 83; 83 n. 38; 83 n. 39; 85 n. 6; 89 n. 15; 90; 90 n. 19; 91; 91 n. 23; 99 n. 10; 111 n. 17; 123; 123 n. 21; 125 n. 2; 129 n. 10; 145 n. 7; 173 Dahmen, J. 135 n. 48 Dittmar, H. 119 n. 5; 122 Dodds, E.R. 130 n. 18 Dümmler, F. 115; 115 n. 11; 121 n. 13; 122 Durič, M. 138 n. 67 Gercke, A. 120 n. 7 Giannantoni , G. 21 n.*; 22 n. 7; 23 n. 10; 24 n. 12; 25. n. 15; n. 16; 30 n. 7; 34 n. 16; 44 n. 47; 46; 46 n. 50; 56 n. 16; n. 17; 63 n. 36; 83 n. 41; 85 n. 5; 100 n. 11; 104 n. 28; n. 30; 108 n. 5; 109 n. 10; 111 n. 15; 112 n. 24; 114 n. 4; 115; 115 n. 11; 119 n. 1; n. 2; 120 n. 7; n. 11; 121 n. 13; 123; 123 n. 20; n. 21; 125 n. 2; 128 n. 4; n. 6; 129 n. 10; 130 n. 16; n. 17; n. 20; 131 n. 25; 132 n. 27; 133 n. 31; n. 34; 134 n. 39; n. 42; 135 n. 47; n. 48; n. 49; 138; 138 n. 65; n. 67; n. 68; n. 69; 143; 143 n. 1; n. 2; n. 3; 145 n. 7; 150 n. 8; 157 n. 25; 173; 178; 178 n. 10; 190 n. 55 Gigon, O. 145 n. 9 Gill, M.L. 31 n. 8 Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 21 n. * Grube, G.M.A. 39 n. 30; 42 n. 39 Gulick, C.B. 125 n. 2 Guthrie, W.K.C. 22 n. 3; 23 n. 9; 31 n. 7; 35; 35–36; 36 n. 21; 38 n. 26; n. 28; 39 n. 29; 40; 40 n. 36; 43; 43 n. 44; 44; 46; 47 n. 52; 48; 48 n. 54; 49; 49 n. 55; n. 58; 57 n. 20; 63 n. 36; 65 n. 41; 66; 66 n. 42; 70 n. 58; 71–72; 111 n. 15; 149; 149 n. 2; 150 n. 9; 161 n. 35; 169 n. 62; 175 n. 2 Hicks, R.D. 34 n. 16; 57 n. 20; 114

Höistadt, R. 77; 77 n. 13; 100 n. 12; 136 n. 51; n. 53; n. 55; 138 n. 68 Huss, B. 152 n. 10 Joël, K. 81 n. 27; 118 n. 21; 136 n. 52; 150 n. 8 Kretzmann, N. 55 n. 11 Licht, H. 114 n. 6; 117 n. 17 Long, A.A. 148 n. 18 Mathieu, G. 22 n. 5 Meijer, P.A. 76 n. 7; n. 9 Meineke, A. 56 n. 17 Mikkola, E. 22 n. 5 Mosche, C.J.W. 152 n. 10 Mullach, F.W.A.  130 Newman, W.L.  128 n. 8 Patzer, A.  22 n. 8; 23 n. 10; 24 n. 13; 58 n. 24; 62 n. 36; 69 n. 52; 70 n. 58; 89 n. 15; 90 n. 20; 92; 92 n. 26; 93 n. 29; 94 n. 31; n. 33; 145–146; 145 n. 10; 146 n. 11; n. 12; 147; 149; 149 n. 1; n. 3; 150 n. 5; 152 n. 10; 153 n. 15; n. 16; 155 n. 20; 156 n. 22; 162; 162 n. 42; 163 n. 44; 166; 166 n. 50; n. 51; n. 52; 170 n. 64; 171; 171 n. 65; 177 n. 5; n. 6; n. 7; 178; 178 n. 9; n. 11; n. 12; n. 13; 179 n. 14; 181 n. 16; n. 17; 189 n. 51 Pohlenz, M.  23 n. 10 Popper, K.  22; 22 n. 3 Preller, L.  49 n. 59 Prince, S.H.  21 n. * Rackham, H.  75 n. 3 Radermacher, L.  50–51; 51 n. 62; 179 n. 14; 186 n. 37 Rankin, H.D.  24 n. 13; 41 n. 36; 55 n. 15; 75 n. 3; 76 n. 6; 81 n. 25; n. 28; 83 n. 38; 114 n. 5; 122 n. 17; 128 n. 4; 129 n. 9; 137 n. 63; 138 n. 67; 175; 175 n. 2; 179 n. 14; 181 n. 17; 182 n. 25; 183 n. 29; n. 36; 188 n. 47; 189 n. 51; n. 52; 190 De Rijk, L.M.  42 n. 39; 53 n. 3; 55 n. 11 Ritter, H.  49 n. 59 Rostagni , A.  90 Sedley, D.N.  148 n. 18 Slings, S.R.  132 n. 26 Susemihl, F.  120 n. 7 Tate, J.  77; 77 n. 13 Tredennick, H.  34 n. 16; 42 n. 41 Wachsmuth, C.  56 n. 16 Wichmann, O. 123 n. 18

220 

A New Perspec tive on Antisthenes

Index of Greek words The references are to pages and notes. alētheia [ἀλήθεια] 100; 100 n. 11 alēthēs [ἀληθής] 96 n. 36 amathia [ἀµαθία] 93 anamphilogōtatos [ἀναµφιλογώτατος] 156 anapoblētos [ἀναπόβλητος] 112; 140 n. 2 andreia [ἀνδρεία] 190-191 anthrōpos, hē [ἄνθρωπος, ἡ] 119 n. 6 anthrōpotēs [ἀνθρωπότης] 34 n. 16 antilegein [ἀντιλέγειν] 34 n. 16; 64; 67-68 antimainomenos [ἀντιµαινόµενος] 33-34 apaideutoi [ἀπαίδευτοι] 39-40; 40 n. 33; n. 36; 48; 125 n. 2 aporia [ἀπορία] 46 aposeiesthai [ἀποσείεσθαι] 116 archōn basileus [ἄρχων βασιλεύς] 132 n. 28 argurea rhabdos [ἀγυρέα ῥάβδος] 111 astatos [ἄστατος] 88 athemistos [ἀθέµιστος] 97 n. 1; 98; 103 autarkeia [αὐτάρκεια] 163-164 basilikē technē [βασιλικὴ τέχνη] 137 daimones [δαίµονες] 78 n. 17 daimonion [δαιµόνιον] 168; 169; 169 n. 62 dein [δεῖν] 29-30 deitai [δεῖται] 152 n. 10 dēloun [δηλοῦν] 57; 57 n. 21; 61 diagignōskein [διαγιγνώσκειν] 183 n. 33 dialegesthai [διαλέγεσθαι] 91 n. 24 didaskein/didaxai [διδάσκειν/διδάξαι] 34; 40; 48-49 dikaios [δίκαιος] 60; 98 doxa [δόξα] 99; 100 n. 11; 157 duas [δυάς] 37 einai [εἶναι] 30; 33; 49-50; 51; 52; 57 n. 20 elegktikōs [ἐλεγτικῶς] 156 elleboristhēnai [ἐλλεβορισθῆναι] 81; 81 n. 26 ēn [ἦν] 49-50; 50-52; 55; 56-57; 59-61 episkepsis tōn onomatōn [ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνοµάτων] 46; 53; 60 eristikos [ἐριστικός] 46; 62; 62-63 n. 36 erōs [ἔρως] 77 n. 18; 78-80; 122; 148 n. 15; 168 erōtēthen [ἐρωτηθέν] 59; 59 n. 27; 61 erōtikos [ἐρωτικός] 63 n. 36 ēthos [ἦθος] 88; 91 eudaimonia [εὐδαιµονία] 112; 163 euphuestatos [εὐφυέστατος] 114 eusebeia [εὐσέβεια] 60 eusebōs [εὐσεβῶς] 83 eutropos [εὔτροπος] 87; 91; 95; 96 gennadas [γεννάδας] 86 haplous [ἁπλοῦς] 86; 96 n. 36 harmodios [ἁρµόδιος] 58 hēdonē [ἡδονή] 102 hippotēs [ἱππότης] 29 n. 3; 34 n. 16

homonoia [ὁµόνοια] 138 horisasthai [ὁρίσασθαι] 46-47 horos [ὅρος] 42-43; 45; 45 n. 49; 51; 51 n. 64 hybris [ὕβρις] 99 hyperphialos [ὑπερφίαλος] 97 n. 1 hypomnēma [ὑπόµηνµα] 69 n. 57 hyponoia [ὑπόνοια] 55 n. 12; 77; 79 n. 18; 156-158 ischys/ischyros [ἰσχύς/ἰσχυρός] 107-108; 113; 152 n. 10; 191 kainos [καινός] 69 kairos [καιρός] 44 n. 47 kakia physeōs [κακία φύσεως] 78-79 kakodaimones [κακοδαίµονες] 78 n. 17 limanchonothēnai [λιµαγχονοθῆναι] 81; 81 n. 26 logismos [λογισµός] 56 logos [λόγος] 24-25; 29; 29 n. 2; 30-31; 31-33; 36-37; 42-44; 45; 45 n. 49; 47; 49; 49-50; 51-52; 55-56; 56-59; 59; 62-64; 65-67; 68; 69; 72; 88; 88 n. 13; 91-92; 112 lyein [λύειν] 23 n. 10 lysis [λύσις] 86-87; 93; 97 ma Dia [µὰ Δία] 90 mainomenos [µαινόµενος] 33-34 makros logos [µακρὸς λόγος] 37-39; 40; 41; 41-43; 43; 45-46; 47 mēd’ [µηδ(έ)] 30; 33 mētroxenos [µητρόξενος] 122; 128 n. 4 moicheia [µοιχεία] 116 monos [µόνος] 77 monotropia [µονοτροπία] 54 n. 8; 87; 88-89; 90; 94; 178 monotropos [µονότροπος] 54; 87; 88 n. 12; 93 mousikos [µουσικός] 32; 37; 96 nomeus [νοµεύς] 136 nomos [νόµος] 75; 75 n. 2; 78 n. 15; 138 n. 67 nous [νοῦς] 69 oikeios [οἰκεῖος] 58 oikeios logos [οἰκεῖος λόγος] 32; 46; 53 n. 5; 57-58; 62; 62 n. 33; 65; 66-67; 68; 68 n. 50; 96; 98 oikonomikos [οἰκονοµικός] 63 n. 36 on, to [ὄν, τό] 29 onoma [ὄνοµα] 38 n. 27; n. 28; 41; 48; 49; 50; 53; 53 n. 3; n. 4; 54-55; 55 n. 10; n. 11; 60; 62-63; 72 ouden legein [οὐδὲν λέγειν] 35-36 ou mallon … ē [οὐ µᾶλλον … ἤ] 93 n. 29; 94 n. 31 ousia  [οὐσία] 31; 31 n. 8; 38; 44; 54 n. 5 outis [οὔτις] 90 paidagōgos [παιδαγωγός] 108 paideia [παιδεία] 53 n. 1; 59; 61; 108-109; 112; 135; 174 paideusis [παίδευσις] 53; 60 palimbolos [παλίµβολος] 88

Index

paranomos [παράνοµος] 127; 138 phthonos/phthonein [φθόνος/φθονεῖν] 144 phronēsis [φρόνησις] 112-113; 140-141 physiognōmikos [φυσιογνωµονικός] 63 n. 36 physis [φύσις] 75; 77; 78-79 politeuesthai [πολιτεύεσθαι] 138 n. 67 polymēchanos [πολυµήχανος] 190 polymetabolos [πολυµετάβολος] 88 polymētis [πολύµητις] 190 polytlas [πολύτλας] 190 polytropia [πολυτροπία] 87; 88 n. 13; 88-89; 90; 91-93; 94; 178 polytropos [πολύτροπος] 54-56; 57-59; 85-95; 97-99; 100 n. 11; 103; 103 n. 25; 175; 177 n. 5; 182 n. 24; 190 ponos [πόνος] 107; 136; 147 pseudesthai [ψεύδεσθαι] 65-67; 68 pseudēs/pseudos [ψευδής/ψεῦδος] 68; 96 n. 36 psychē [ψυχή] 102 rhabdos [ῥάβδος] 111 rhēma [ῥῆµα] 53 rhōmē [ῥώµη] 152 n. 10

221 schasthēnai [σχασθῆναι] 81 schedon [σχεδόν] 35 n. 20; 67-69 scholazein [σχολάζειν] 162 sēmainein [σηµαίνειν] 57; 57 n. 21 sophia [σοφία] 60; 91-93; 191 sophos [σοφός] 54; 54 n. 9; 91; 91 n. 24; 96; 96 n. 37; 99; 100 symmathētēs [συµµαθητής] 70; 166 syneinai [συνεῖναι] 86; 91 n. 24; 92-93 synkoptein [συγκόπτειν] 149 n. 4; 169-170 syrigmos [συριγµός] 168 teichos [τεῖχος] 183 n. 36; 188 n. 46 themis [θέµις] 97 n. 1 theothen [θέοθεν] 79 ti [τι] 45; 46; 60 tmēthēnai [τµηθῆναι] 81 n. 26 to [τό] 56-57; 57 n. 20 to ti ēn ē esti [τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι] 49-50; 51; 55; 56-57; 57 n. 20; 59-61 to ti ēn einai [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] 49-50; 51; 57 n. 20 tropos [τρόπος] 54-55; 87; 91-92; 95; 96 n. 36; 178 trōpōsa [τρωπῶσα] 92