Philosophy and Community Practices (Dia-Logos) [New ed.] 9783631733851, 9783631733868, 9783631733875, 9783631733882, 3631733852

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Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

This book deals with the relevance of community-based philosophical practices to individual and social empowerment. The authors analyze if it is possible for the inclusive dialogue between people of diverse backgrounds in informal adult education to benefit from the community practice of philosophy. They discuss if the latter can offer a contribution to individual, community and social empowerment. They make use of the dialogical methodology linked to M. Lipman and A.M. Sharp’s “Philosophy for Children”. The book aims at achieving a critical lens for the analysis and assessment of community practices and for envisioning further possibilities of philosophical inquiry.

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo is F.R.S.-FNRS Chargé de recherche (Postdoctoral researcher) at the Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). Graziano Lingua is Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Turin. www.peterlang.com

DIA 23 273385_5167_Tibaldeo_RW_HCA5 new globaL.indd 1

R. Franzini Tibaldeo / G. Lingua (eds.) · Philosophy and Community Practices

23

Bd./vol. 23

Dia-Logos Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

Philosophy and Community Practices Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo  Graziano Lingua (eds.)

ISBN 978-3-631-73385-1

16.05.18 00:23

Dia-Logos

Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences

This book deals with the relevance of community-based philosophical practices to individual and social empowerment. The authors analyze if it is possible for the inclusive dialogue between people of diverse backgrounds in informal adult education to benefit from the community practice of philosophy. They discuss if the latter can offer a contribution to individual, community and social empowerment. They make use of the dialogical methodology linked to M. Lipman and A.M. Sharp’s “Philosophy for Children”. The book aims at achieving a critical lens for the analysis and assessment of community practices and for envisioning further possibilities of philosophical inquiry.

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo is F.R.S.-FNRS Chargé de recherche (Postdoctoral researcher) at the Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). Graziano Lingua is Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Turin.

R. Franzini Tibaldeo / G. Lingua (eds.) · Philosophy and Community Practices

23

Bd./vol. 23

Dia-Logos Herausgegeben von/Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński und Piotr W. Juchacz

Philosophy and Community Practices Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo  Graziano Lingua (eds.)

www.peterlang.com

DIA 23 273385_5167_Tibaldeo_RW_HCA5 new globaL.indd 1

16.05.18 00:23

Philosophy and Community Practices

Dia-Logos Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von / Edited by Tadeusz Buksin´ ski / Piotr W. Juchacz Advisory Board Karl-Otto Apel (Frankfurt am Main) Manuel Jiménez-Redondo (Valencia) Peter Kampits (Wien) Theodore Kisiel (Illinois) Hennadii Korzhov (Donetsk) Marek Kwiek (Poznan´) George McLean (Washington) Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Athènes) Sergey Nizhnikov (Moscow) Ewa Nowak (Poznan´)

Bd. /vol. 23

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo / Graziano Lingua (eds.)

Philosophy and Community Practices

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. This publication stems from the project “Filosofia e pratiche di comunità. Progetto di ricerca, formazione ed empowerment sociale”, which involved a research group of the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences at the University of Turin. The project was funded by Fondazione CRT (Turin, Italy) and by the same Department (Ricerca locale 2015, Prof. G. Lingua), and co-funded by the association Centro Studi sul Pensiero Contemporaneo (CeSPeC, Cuneo, Italy). Sarah De Sanctis translated the introduction, and chapters 3, 4, 5, 14, and 15. Languages Point (Turin) translated chapter 16. Alessandro De Cesaris translated chapters 6 and 7. Polianne Delmondez translated chapter 9. Lewis Coyne and Jack Griffiths carried out the linguistic revision of chapters 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13. Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck ISSN 1619-005X ISBN 978-3-631-73385-1 (Print) ISBN 978-3-631-73386-8 (E-Book) ISBN 978-3-631-73387-5 (EPUB) ISBN 978-3-631-73388-2 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b11736 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2018 All rights reserved. Peter Lang –· Berlin · Bern · Bruxelles · New York · Oxford · Warszawa · Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Table of Contents Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Graziano Lingua Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Section 1  The Theoretical and Practical Framework: State of the Art and Critical Lens Alessandro De Cesaris, Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Cristina Rebuffo Chapter 1 – Philosophy���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19 Graziano Lingua, Paolo Monti Chapter 2 – Community�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������37 Sara Nosari, Federico Zamengo Chapter 3 – Education�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49 Section 2  Accounts of Community Experiences Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Nicolò Valenzano Chapter 4 – Promoting and Assessing Community Development Through Philosophy���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������65 Sergio Racca, Nicolò Valenzano Chapter 5 – Building Bridges Between Diversities: The Case Study of “MondoQui”, Mondovì����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������77 Pierpaolo Casarin Chapter 6 – Philosophy in San Siro. An Experience in Philosophy for Communities: Rethinking Inhabiting and Inhabiting Thought in the Neighbourhood Workshops��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������87 Silvia Bevilacqua Chapter 7 – We Have Encountered Not only Words: The Practice of Philosophy for Communities in the Community of San Benedetto al Porto, Genoa�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������97 Félix García Moriyón Chapter 8 – Philosophy for Children: A Longitudinal Research���������������������� 107

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Edna Olimpia da Cunha, Vanise Dutra Gomes, Walter Omar Kohan Chapter 9 – Paths of the Labyrinth: A Philosophy Project in a Public School in Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro��������������������������������������������������������� 115 Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Sergio Racca, Nicolò Valenzano, Federico Zamengo Chapter 10 – An Outline Appraisal of Community Practices��������������������������� 127 Section 3  Prospects for the Future: Further Reflections and Practical Possibilities Giacomo Pezzano Chapter 11 – “I open the Problem, and I don’t know…”: What is “Philosophical” in P4C and in Philosophy?��������������������������������������������������������� 135 Alessandro De Cesaris Chapter 12 – New Literacy and Multidimensional Thinking: P4C and the Challenges of the Digital Age������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 145 Ewa Nowak, Małgorzata Steć Chapter 13 – Linking Moral Competence, Hospitality, and Education. An MCT-based Pilot Survey���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 157 Federico Zamengo Chapter 14 – Who is the Adult Educator?����������������������������������������������������������� 167 Gabriele Vissio Chapter 15 – Praxis of the Common and Community-based Philosophical Practices������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 175 Anna Granata Chapter 16 – Different Minds Thinking Together: The Potential of Philosophy for Communities from an Intercultural Perspective���������������������� 187 About the Contributors������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 197

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Graziano Lingua

Introduction Abstract: In this introduction the authors present the interdisciplinary project “Philosophy and Community Practices”, which was carried out between 2016 and 2017 at the University of Turin. The project aimed at evaluating the relevance of community-based philosophical practices like Philosophy for Communities (p4c) to empowering individuals and communities. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); pluralism; diversity; community; empowerment.

The present publication is one of the outcomes of the interdisciplinary research project called “Philosophy and Community Practices”1, which was carried out between 2016 and 2017 at the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences of the University of Turin. This project involved about 20 people (researchers, scholars and educators) and benefited from the collaboration with two organisations: CeSPeC (Cuneo, Italy), to disseminate the research and raise public awareness, and MondoQui (Mondovì, Italy) for the pilot empirical evaluation project. The project aimed to analyse the contribution of the philosophical practice known as Philosophy for Communities – an application of Matthew Lipman and Ann M. Sharp’s well-established Philosophy for Children (p4c) to non-formal and informal education contexts with adults2 – in relation to a number of problems which have arisen in the social and political spheres. It was expressed in a twofold structure encompassing a critical study of theoretical models and practical

1 The project was directed by Professor Graziano Lingua (University of Turin) and was funded by Fondazione CRT (Turin, Italy) and the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences of the University of Turin (Ricerca locale 2015). It received additional co-funding by Centro Studi sul Pensiero Contemporaneo (CeSPeC), Cuneo, Italy. 2 In this volume we use the acronym “p4c” as regards both Lipman-Sharp’s Philosophy for Children curriculum and those experiences of Philosophy for Communities, which extend Lipman and Sharp’s proposal to non-formal and informal educational contexts with adults. With the expression “Philosophy for Communities” we wish to underline both the sense of philosophy to be practised by particular communities, whatever its purpose may be, and the fact that in such contexts philosophy might also help building “community” and empowering individuals. Indeed, the plural “communities” is also more in line with the original “children”.

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intervention in terms of education and empowerment. Specifically, the aim of the project was to evaluate the social relevance of community philosophical practices such as Philosophy for Communities, which contribute to spreading a formative proposal that not only helps people socialise, but also guides them in acquiring useful skills for the realisation of inclusive communities and shared projects. In this introductory chapter, we would like to briefly present the following aspects of the project: a) the social, political and cultural issues it had to address (sections 1 and 2); b) the research questions and the underlying premises (sect. 3); c) the methodology, the results achieved so far and the structure of the present publication (sect. 4).

1.  Literary prologue Proceeding eighty miles into the northwest wind, you reach the city of Euphemia, where the merchants of seven nations gather at every solstice and equinox. The boat that lands there with a cargo of ginger and cotton will set sail again, its hold filled with pistachio nuts and poppy seeds, and the caravan that has just unloaded sacks of nutmegs and raisins is already cramming its saddlebags with bolts of golden muslin for the return journey. But what drives men to travel up rivers and cross deserts to come here is not only the exchange of wares, which you could find, everywhere the same, in all the bazaars inside and outside the Great Khan’s empire, scattered at your feet on the same yellow mats, in the shade of the same awnings protecting them from the flies, offered with the same lying reduction in prices. You do not come to Euphemia only to buy and sell, but also because at night, by the fires all around the market, seated on sacks or barrels or stretched out on piles of carpets, at each word that one man says – such as “wolf,” “sister,” “hidden treasure,” “battle,” “scabies,” “lovers” – the others tell, each one, his tale of wolves, sisters, treasures, scabies, lovers, battles. And you know that in the long journey ahead of you, when to keep awake against the camel’s swaying or the junk’s rocking, you start summoning up your memories one by one, your wolf will have become another wolf, your sister a different sister, your battle other battles, on your return from Euphemia, the city where memory is traded at every solstice and at every equinox (Calvino 1974: 36–37).

We have chosen to start with this literary prologue because it aptly expresses the meaning of the “Philosophy and Community Practices” project. Euphemia (from the Greek eu, “good”, e phemi, “speaking”) literally means “speaking well”, and is not only the name of a person, but also that of one of Italo Calvino’s famous “invisible cities”. The story of Euphemia, from which the quotation is taken, can be read as a metaphor for the practice of inclusive dialogue that transforms the interlocutors. The scene is that of the encounter with the other, with the foreigner, who is not just a stranger but turns for a day into a companion with whom to build a common memory. This is the starting point of the idea of working on community-based philosophical practices.

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As is known, in the face of the (broadly understood) cultural issues of diversity and pluralism, the projects of “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism” express two different points of view: the first descriptively acknowledges a plurality (of views, values, cultural and religious instances, but also ways of living and concrete practices) and investigates the rules of the coexistence of different identities; the second, instead, has the goal – which is certainly more ambitious, but also more difficult and controversial – to work in view of the qualitative transformation of plurality in pluralism. This means favouring and practicing interrelations of diversity that go beyond the simple act of pluralisation, seeking a real interaction made up of an in-depth comparison, translation practices, research and the construction of common horizons. Without an active encounter between those who hold culturally different views and ways of life, the other remains a stranger arousing fear or, at best, indifference. Concrete interaction, instead, pushes people to decentralise their point of view and to relativize their practices, thereby offering the context for the creation of innovative existential, cultural and value-based relationships. The pluralistic and dialogic option therefore reflects the desire to see, in the contemporary and globalised socio-cultural complexity, a plural reality in the making that contains a normative instance: it does not just ask for political management but rather requires an in-depth ethical and pedagogical reflection. As Calvino points out, the very dynamics of human desire and the concrete fabric of the relationships of existence are what exposes us to “otherness” and “diversity”, pushing us – as long as we freely consent – towards the overcoming of the existing plurality and towards a pluralism to come. However, this pluralism cannot be reached without accepting the partiality of one’s point of view in the context of a wider horizon: one of coexistence and a shared common horizon to be cooperatively constructed. Such “inclusive” pluralism, capable of integrating cultural differences without homologating them, is not at all irreconcilable with renewed and non-totalitarian (or fundamentalist) forms of community ties that do not aim at idiosyncratic closure but open up to a cosmopolitan universalism (think of U. Beck’s reflections, of G. Marramao’s “universalism of difference” or of M. Pagano’s “universal without one” – Beck 2004; Marramao 2003; Pagano 2007). This is a multi-faceted challenge whose results are largely unknown and unpredictable, although it is clear that the transition to a pluralist society can offer more than one chance of success, as opposed to the risk of slipping into one of the “pathologies of the global age” (Pulcini 2013; Honneth 1992; Honneth 1994). We believe that the abovementioned challenges require institutionalised and professionalising education (school, university, etc.) to work alongside practices

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and occasions of informal education (Calvino’s “fires all around the market”) addressed to people and citizens of all ages. The encounter with the other – as again suggested by Calvino – does not only happen through the negotium (= the space of action necessary for survival, labour, etc.), through which we surely come into contact and get to know the otherness of the other. Indeed, the negotium has to be complemented with the otium, that is, the ability to take the time to reflect on the meaning of one’s and the others’ existence, and experience relative analogies and differences.

2. Global age and the practice of dialogic inclusion: from formal to informal education Even at first glance, the past decades have been of extraordinary importance to understanding the difficulties related to the accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity, both in Europe and globally. In many countries, the public opinion, politicians and scholars have underlined the government’s incapacity to provide satisfactory policies on social cohesion and on the governance of ethnically and religiously diverse groups. To some extent, the alleged ineffectiveness of these policies highlights a deeper problem: since the 1990s (the decade of the war in former Yugoslavia), and especially since the beginning of the new millennium (9/11 in the USA and several terror attacks in Europe), a growing fear of the so-called “clash of civilisations” has spread all over the globe. According to this trend, ethnic and religious diversities and traditions are perceived as menaces to the status quo and therefore trigger problematic reactions: first, the social groups’ enclosure within the defensive barriers of static identities, which are often manipulated for political purposes; and, second, the tendency of the members of a dominant group not to recognise the “other” as equal in his or her rights. In addition, the recent global economic crisis has given people and politicians of several developed European and Western countries an excuse to engage in further defensive processes: all those who are perceived as somewhat “different” or “outsiders” are likely to suffer various forms of discrimination and exclusion. Therefore, we are witnessing an additional threat to society: the “us vs. them” conflict discriminates against the weakest members of society and the so-called “minorities within minorities”, that is – generally speaking – women, young people and immigrants (Ambrosini 2005; eds. Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev 2005). As a result, our epoch seems to be afflicted with a series of problems, such as the spread of stereotypes, social prejudice and discrimination; an increasing lack of faith in future opportunities; a generalised breakdown of critical and reflective

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thinking; and a pervasive distrust of democracy (Bobbio 1987; Appadurai 1996; Pulcini 2013). Of course, one of the aspects that are directly affected in this landscape is education, whose role is indeed of paramount importance, especially in the presentday culturally diverse society. However – as often happens – the relevance of education is largely underestimated or even ignored in too many Western and European countries (Nussbaum 2010). As a consequence, educational methods, strategies and practices appear not to be as effective as expected in facing the abovementioned challenges – that is, in enhancing critical thinking and social inclusion, offering job opportunities and educating reflective democratic citizens (see, among others, Torres 2009; Nussbaum 2010; eds. Grant & Portera 2011; Nowak 2013; eds. Nowak, Schrader & Zizek 2013). To be sure, traditional education has always been criticised for its incapacity to be abreast of the contemporary situation and to understand the signs of changing times (see, for instance, Dewey 1980). However, the present context is quite different, due to factors such as globalisation, social and cultural fragmentation, the consequences of digitalisation and the current trends in international migration (Gobbo 2000; Bauman & Mazzeo 2012; eds. Portera & Grant 2017). These circumstances also affect education, which is forced to review its overall aims and develop new pedagogical methods and practices in order to reconnect itself with what is happening in the world and restore its formative, leading and propulsive role in society. It is also in order to achieve these results and regain effectiveness that, in the last few decades, pedagogy and educational practices have extended their area of intervention beyond the school domain and have been paying increasing attention to non-formal and informal adult education (Eaton 2010). Among the new educational challenges to be addressed in this regard, the issue of pluralism and diversity of values, cultures, religions, etc., is certainly of the greatest importance. And yet, these social and political challenges are far from being successfully dealt with by social and educational institutions. In this respect, our aim was to undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry into the relevance of philosophical practices in fostering community-based reflection, inclusion and democracy among adults. But why philosophy? And why in its interpersonal specificity? Our societies are currently experiencing the tension between two diverging forces: on the one hand, the individual is subject to a process of individualisation and social atomisation that results in marginalising the intersubjective meaning of individual existence; on the other hand, we witness a global spread of communitarian trends aiming at the creation of idiosyncratic identities and at the restoration of an intersubjective meaning by renouncing individual freedom. We believe that re-establishing sociality

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and interpersonal capabilities, fostering inclusive democracies and appreciating diversities entails steering clear of these extremes and being capable of enhancing both individual freedom and commitment to otherness. In Matthew Lipman and Ann M. Sharp’s p4c, we have found an educational proposal pivoted on the practice of philosophy, which aims at achieving precisely these goals. In this regard, p4c emphasises two interesting aspects: on the one hand, the multidimensionality of creative, critical and caring thinking; and, on the other hand, the importance of both thinking-for-oneself and thinking-withothers through dialogue, thereby highlighting both individual autonomy and a non-communitarian community of inquiry (Lipman 1995; Lipman 2003). These are the main reasons why our project leaned towards p4c rather than other philosophical practices. There are also some additional reasons: a) the p4c proposal is structured according to an educational curriculum and a replicable, though flexible, methodology, and was originally conceived for education both inside and outside of school, involving both young people and adults; b) in the 1970s (viz. its early years), the p4c scholastic curriculum underwent empirical corroboration and in the following decades it received continuous scholarly attention, but not enough theoretico-practical research has yet been carried out as regards its impact outside of school. Our project contributes precisely to filling this gap: by focusing on adults, the research project aims at clarifying the social impact of the philosophical dialogue fostered by p4c and at assessing its relevance to presentday issues related to the inclusion and appreciation of diversity.

3.  The “Philosophy and Community Practices” project The “Philosophy and Community Practices” research project intended to address the issue of social inclusion and dialogue between diverse cultures, with particular reference to the democratic and (arguably) pluralistic public sphere that presently characterises the European states and their societies. The underlying problem was how to form an effective pluralism without sacrificing the search for common horizons that is indispensable for social coexistence and for the political government of society. How could we contribute to this transformation? The first major issue we wanted to address in our work was whether the creation of spaces to exchange views and ideas and the concrete practice of dialogue in the contexts of strong social differentiation could help achieve this objective. We therefore thought that the dialogical practice was the central element to address in our research, from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. The second general question we have tried to investigate was whether and to what extent the social/community practice of philosophy had something to offer in this regard.

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The aim was to verify the potential educational role it may play in the attempt to make social relationships more reflective and self-aware. Within this framework, the project revolved around the following research questions: 1. What are the outlines, the specifics and the theoretical significance of the “community” instituted by the p4c with respect to today’s debate between the advocates of communitarianism and supporters of liberal individualism? How can the “community” theoretical-practical paradigm avoid both the closures of the former and the social atomisation advocated by the latter? Can the “Community of philosophical inquiry” of p4c make an innovative contribution to this theoretical debate and the related social inclusion practices? 2. Is it possible for the inclusive dialogue between people of diverse backgrounds in informal adult education to benefit from the community practice of philosophy, in line with Lipman and Sharp’s theory? If so, to what extent? How to evaluate its effects and effectiveness? To what extent can this benefit translate into virtues, such as mutual respect, tolerance, mutual understanding, sense of belonging or empathy, which are the basis of every attempt to build inclusive communities in which diversity is valued (Gutmann 1994; Bitting 1995; Rovatti 2007; Franzini Tibaldeo 2014; Lingua 2016)? What is the role played in this regard by the “caring” (i.e. “valuational” or “appreciative”, “affective”, “active”, “normative”, “empathic”) dimension of thought, described by Lipman (Lipman 1995: 8–12; Lipman 2003: 264–271)? 3. Compared to the educational challenges coming from the encounter between diversity and pluralism of values, perceptions and points of view, what can be the contribution of the community practice of philosophy between adults? Can the latter offer a contribution to individual, community and social empowerment? To what extent does the contribution of philosophy differ from that of other disciplines (psychology and pedagogy, in the first instance) that are equally involved in the development of community practices? 4. In the face of the challenges arising from today’s dialogue between people of different backgrounds, is it necessary to reformulate Lipman and Sharp’s philosophical and educational proposal of Philosophy for Communities? What further development scenarios of p4c can be hypothesised about? These are the questions in the light of which the project team has carried out its activities, making use of the dialogical methodology linked to p4c – such methodology was both proposed as a practical activity for the project’s participants and theoretically studied by the research team. Here is how the planning activities have been articulated:

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• P  hase 1: Preliminary action research in order to identify and analyse the needs of partner regional and professional organisations with respect to social inclusion and dialogue among people of different backgrounds. • Phase 2: Theoretical research articulated in meetings and seminars involving the research team. The aim was to critically examine the theoretical-practical paradigm of the p4c’s “Community of philosophical inquiry” and evaluate its placement within today’s debate between communitarianism and liberal individualism. One of the objectives of these activities was also to develop a set of qualitative indicators to evaluate processes of social inclusion and dialogue between people of different backgrounds. • Phase 3: Individual and community empowerment activities carried out through p4c sessions addressed to local partner organisations (in particular, MondoQui in Mondovì, Italy). These sessions were evaluated against a set of qualitative indicators (see Phase 2) in order to study the effectiveness of p4c in the informal education context. • Phase 4: Reflection on the practice that took place in Phase 3 in order to clarify the educational challenges related to the implementation of social inclusion and intercultural dialogue, formalising the contribution of the community-based practice of philosophy, and hypothesising scenarios of future development.

4.  Research findings and structure of this publication This collective volume is one of the outcomes of the theoretical-practical research described. The project was carried out in the spirit of Lipman and Sharp’s p4c, which was studied from a theoretical point of view and practised according to its canonical structure (reading the text aloud, questioning, discussion, metacognitive reflection – detailed in Chapter 1). The tripartite structure of the volume is significant in showing how the research unfolded. Section 1 provides the general framework of the publication and the research project, focusing on Lipman and Sharp’s Philosophy for Communities and its relevance to the fulfilment of democracy, the achievement of political and social inclusion and the essential role played by community practices and adult education. This framework is presented in both theoretical and practical terms. We identified three core notions: philosophy, community and education. Each chapter illustrates the state-of-the-art of a notion and then focuses on the key aspects of it, in order to achieve an overall critical lens for the analysis and assessment of community practices and experiences. In particular, each chapter provides converging guidelines for choosing the proper indicators for accomplishing this critical inquiry.

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The first chapter of section 2 (Chapter 4) follows from the reflections of section 1 and tries to operationalise the envisaged guidelines and indicators in terms of general questions and issues (see Appendix to Chapter 4) to be addressed in the following contributions (Chapters 5–9). Thus, the specific accounts of community experiences are conceived of as a plurality of perspectives originating from the proposed stimuli. The appraisal of these perspectives through the abovementioned critical lens provided interesting feedback to our research, as evidenced in Chapter 10. Finally, the chapters composing section 3 are inspired by aspects and statements expressed in the previous community experience accounts (section 2). The aim of these final chapters is to envision further possibilities of communitybased philosophical inquiry and practice as regards the understanding of what is “philosophical” in a p4c session (Chapter 11), the idea of rationality fostered by p4c (Chapter 12), the meaning of moral education (Chapter 13), the relevance of p4c to the educator’s self-awareness (Chapter 14), the political debate pivoted on the “common” (Chapter 15) and intercultural education (Chapter 16).

References Ambrosini, M., 2005, Sociologia delle migrazioni, il Mulino, Bologna. Appadurai, A., 1996, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Bauman, Z. & Mazzeo, R., 2012, Conversazioni sull’educazione, Erickson, Trento. Beck, U., 2004, Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Bitting, P., 1995, ‘Philosophy in the Democratic Multicultural Community of Inquiry’, in J. Portelli & R. Reed (eds.), Children, Philosophy and Democracy, pp. 179–190, Detselig Enterprises, Calgary. Bobbio, N., 1987, The Future of Democracy (1984), transl. R. Griffin, Polity Press, Cambridge. Calvino, I., 1974, Invisible Cities, transl. W. Weaver, Harcourt Brace, Orlando. Dewey, J., 1980, Democracy and Education (1916), in The Middle Works 1899– 1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 9, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Eaton, S.E., 2010, Formal, Non-formal and Informal Learning: What Are the Differences?, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://drsaraheaton.wordpress. com/2010/12/31/formal-non-formal-and-informal-learning-what-are-thedifferences/.

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Eisenberg, A. & Spinner-Halev, J. (eds.), 2005, Minorities within Minorities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Franzini Tibaldeo, R., 2014, ‘Reframing and Practicing Community Inclusion. The Relevance of Lipman’s P4C’, Childhood & Philosophy 10(20), 401–420. Gobbo, F., 2000, Pedagogia interculturale, Carocci, Roma. Grant, C.A. & Portera, A. (eds.), 2011, Intercultural and Multicultural Education. Enhancing Global Interconnectedness, Routledge, New York. Gutmann, A. (ed.), 1994, Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Honneth, A., 1992, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Honneth, A., 1994, Pathologien der Vernunft. Geschichte und Gegenwart der Kritischen Theorie, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main. Lingua, G., 2016, ‘Legati, ma non incatenati. Rischi e potenzialità del comune nella comunità’, Lessico di Etica Pubblica 1, 1–12. Lipman, M., 1995, ‘Caring as Thinking’, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines 15(1), 1–13. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Marramao, G., 2003, Passaggio a Occidente. Filosofia e globalizzazione, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, new enlarged edition 2009. Nowak, E., 2013, Experimental Ethics. A Multidisciplinary Approach, Lit Verlag, Zürich-Berlin. Nowak, E., Schrader, D. & Zizek, B. (eds.), 2013, Educating Competencies for Democracy, Lang, Frankfurt am Main. Nussbaum, M., 2010, Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford. Pagano, M., 2007, ‘Differenze nell’universalità. Questioni filosofiche nell’orizzonte della globalizzazione’, Annuario Filosofico 22, 61–79. Portera, A. & Grant, C.A. (eds.), 2017, Intercultural Education and Competences. Challenges and Answers for the Global World, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne. Pulcini, E., 2013, Care of the World. Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age, Springer, Dordrecht. Rovatti, P.A., 2007, Abitare la distanza. Per una pratica della filosofia, Cortina, Milano. Torres, C.A., 2009, Education and Neoliberal Globalization, Routledge, New York.

Section 1 The Theoretical and Practical Framework: State of the Art and Critical Lens

Alessandro De Cesaris, Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Cristina Rebuffo1

Chapter 1 – Philosophy Abstract: In recent decades, philosophy has been characterised by the development of so-called “philosophical practices”. This trend in philosophy intertwines with education’s coeval “reflective turn” and extension beyond the school domain. In this regard, the framework provided by Lipman and Sharp’s Philosophy for Children is particularly effective and flexible. Keywords: Philosophy for Children (p4c); reasonableness; community of philosophical inquiry; questioning; facilitator.

1.  Philosophy’s practical turn In recent decades, philosophy has been characterised by a relatively new trend, namely the development of so-called “philosophical practices”. This expression refers to a range of experiences and methodologies centred around philosophy, such as philosophy with/for children (Lipman, Sharp, Matthews, Sasseville, Tozzi, Galichet) or Kinderphilosophie (Martens, Marsal), cafés-philo (Sautet, Onfray), philosophical counselling (Achenbach, Schuster, Marinoff, Lahav) and ateliers focusing on Socratic maieutic (Brenifier) or meditation (Lenoir). Although the Western philosophical tradition never completely relinquished the concern for and engagement in practical matters – see the preeminent cases of Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, Montaigne, Marx, Dewey and the German Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie among others – it is nevertheless true that philosophy has almost exclusively been understood as a theoretical discipline often characterised by a specialist attitude to knowledge. The novelty of philosophical practices thus relies on a twofold reframing of philosophy: firstly, its meaning is no longer primarily understood in terms of pure theory and, secondly, its practical relevance entails its being accessible to all, as pointed out by forerunners of philosophical practices such as Nelson, Foucault and Hadot, among others. This trend has culminated in the attention recently devoted by Unesco (2007) to philosophy and in

1 This chapter is the result of joint research. In particular, Alessandro De Cesaris wrote sects. 4.1 and 4.3.2, Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo sects. 1, 2, 3, and 4.2, and Cristina Rebuffo sects. 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, and 5.

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the clarification of the latter’s turn to practice in terms of its social, civil, political and educational relevance.

2. The social, civil, political relevance of philosophy and the philosophical turn in education The reflection on the “practical” meaning of philosophy is related to crucial contemporary issues, not least the future of democracy in an era of globalisation, multiculturalism and religious diversity (see for instance Bobbio, Habermas, Beck, Bauman, Taylor, Nussbaum and Kymlicka). The increasing difficulty of coping with diversity and the need to foster social and political inclusion have led to a practical reassessment of democracy. This trend finds an ally in philosophy’s aforementioned turn to practice: indeed, the idea is that the practice of philosophy can play a part in fostering citizenship and democratic competencies both in individuals and social groups or communities – an idea which has become widespread. Thus, the practice of philosophy intertwines with education’s coeval “reflective turn” and extension beyond the school domain (see for instance Freire and Schön, whose contributions shall be alluded to in Chapter 3). As a result, the convergence between philosophy and education gives rise to issues worthy of further consideration, such as the following: A) Which goals and methodologies should present-day education pursue? B) How does philosophy help in the redefinition of education’s identity and specificity? C) To what extent is the epistemological status of philosophy affected by the latter’s commitment to education? D) In what sense should this reflection involve both schools and extra-scholastic domains, and thus apply to citizens of any age, gender, religion, social condition and so on? As we shall see in the next section, Lipman and Sharp offered a remarkable and pioneering contribution to these topics.

3. Lipman and Sharp’s “Philosophy for Children” (p4c): cultural context, theoretical background, aims, curriculum, scholastic and extra-scholastic relevance According to Matthew Lipman, the “Philosophy for Children” (henceforth “p4c”) curriculum was conceived in response to the pessimism following the political, civil and social tensions which permeated US society in the 1960s. With respect to education, many stressed the inadequacy of schooling in addressing these challenges. Educational reform which would tackle the vagueness and ambiguity of “democracy” was required, while aiming to reconstruct the latter and make “children more reasonable and more capable of exercising good judgement”

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(Lipman 2008a: 107). How could these goals be accomplished? How could the individual’s capacity to be reflective and responsible be fostered? How could children better acquire the thinking skills and moral qualities necessary for communal life? From the early 1970s, these questions shaped Lipman’s intellectual efforts, as well as those of other researchers such as Ann M. Sharp, based at the Montclair State College (now Montclair State University). The cornerstone of this educational proposal is philosophy, understood as a practical activity and a discursive process accomplishable by schoolchildren. Lipman and Sharp developed their ideas with close, although not exclusive reference to the pragmatist tradition – Pierce, Dewey, Mead, and Buchler – whose reflections they critically reappraised2. The outcome of their research was a school curriculum consisting of novels for students and manuals for teachers, designed to engage both students from 6 to 18 years old and adults in exploring “the philosophical dimensions of their experience, with particular attention to logical, ethical and aesthetic dimensions” (Iapc n.d.). The p4c curriculum demonstrably enhanced the effectiveness of teaching various subjects3, and eventually spread across the world. We believe that among the reasons for p4c’s worldwide success are the following: A) p4c has succeeded in highlighting the potential relevance of philosophy to educational, social and public issues; B) p4c is a community-based philosophical practice providing the individual with a practical understanding of the fruitful relationship between the self and the other, freedom and commitment, autonomy and dependence, thinking and emotions, rationality and reasonableness, etc.; C) p4c is characterised by a relatively simple, reproducible and corroborated methodology, which has subsequently received substantial scholarly attention; D) in spite of its methodological distinctiveness, p4c’s educational proposal remains flexible and applicable in a range of contexts, including informal adult education (see for instance Lipman 2008a: 141–144; Lipman 1987; Gregory 2011; Nussbaum 2010: 76), and this is why we believe that the “c” in the acronym could refer not only to “children”, but in fact be broadened to “communities”.

2 See, for instance, Lipman 2008b. Social learning theory and educational psychologists such as Vygotsky and Davydov also influenced p4c (see Lipman 1996). 3 The first experiment was conducted by Lipman in 1970 to investigate the effects of the nascent p4c programme on a group of fifth-grade students (Lipman 2008a: 121). As will be noted in Chapter 4, further experiments were conducted in subsequent decades.

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4.  Key features and dimensions of p4c It is for these reasons that we prefer p4c to individual philosophical practices such as philosophical counselling or other methodologies which aim to foster moral or democratic competencies (see Kohlberg and Lind, among others – see Chapter 13). We shall now detail some core aspects of p4c in order to comprehend their relevance to the present publication, which stems from the project “Philosophy and Community Practices”.

4.1. Education for reasonableness, reflectivity and the multidimensionality of thinking The traditional understanding of philosophy is based on an idea of rationality central to which are strict deductive and argumentative competencies. Despite this widespread conception, the educational aims of philosophical practices in a community setting are much more complex. This is the reason why, rather than rationality, their main task is to train the members of the community of inquiry in reasonableness. It would be a mistake to understand the latter as a “weak” form of rationality, as some sort of imperfect and flexible rationality that is necessary in order to act in a comparably imperfect and unstable world. On the contrary, reasonableness is much harder to develop than rationality, and this is because it is not only more complex than the former, but also broader (Rawls 2001: 6–7; Sen 2009: 195–196; Brandom 2009: 2). Lipman defines reasonableness as “rationality tempered by judgement” (Lipman 2003: 11). With the noun “judgement” Lipman seems to appeal to a faculty that brings the theoretical and practical aspects of reasoning together, conjoining critical skills with Aristotelian wisdom (Lipman 2003: 191). Since Kant, judgement has been understood as the faculty which unites the particular and the universal in both the determinative and reflective sense, not just to reduce a particular case to a given rule, but also to create a rule for a singular given case (Koehn 2000). In contrast to the conception of philosophy revolving on purely rational activity, philosophical practices like p4c emphasise the need to develop thinking together with the other dimensions of human experience. Reasonableness is therefore the ability to consider theory and praxis, and thinking, sensitivity and perception, in their unity. This aspect is closely connected with the reflective dimension of philosophical practice. Many philosophers in the Western tradition – including Aristotle, Hegel, and Wittgenstein – have described philosophy as first and foremost a reflective operation on ordinary language. As Robert Brandom has recently argued, we do not need logic in order to be rational, but we need it in order to be philosophers

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(Brandom 2009: 11). Logic is in fact nothing else than this awareness of language’s hidden structures. And yet, reflectivity is not just logic. Too often, when dealing with logic, the only aspect considered is analysis in terms of formulas and arguments. What really matters, though, is the judgemental activity required in order to refer every expression of ordinary language and experience to its underlying logical form, as specifically pointed out by Lipman4. This is why the task of fostering reflectivity requires us to first of all shift the focus from mere contents – rules, values, well-established truths – to the process and activity that have produced those particular contents. To judge reflectively means, therefore, that no content can be simply acquired as something given and/or endowed with eternal value. Since all content is the result of a process of inquiry, it is subject to the change in conditions and activities involved in the inquiry itself, and must always be understood in terms of its dynamic relationship with effectual reality, the interests of the inquirers and the status of the inquiry. While rationality is result-oriented, reasonableness, on the contrary, tends to keep the argumentative process open, and can be seen as a practical version of the neo-pragmatist critique of the “myth of the given”. Being aware of the premises supporting a given proposition or belief is exactly what allows someone to assume an active and not just passive attitude towards that particular belief. Reflectivity is then the necessary prerequisite for active thought. As a result, p4c requires a truly extended notion of “thinking”. When Lipman endorses a multidimensional account of thinking, he refers to an activity involving each person in their entirety and overcoming the abstract distinction between theory and practice. This is the reason why the three dimensions of thinking (critical, creative and caring) have to be understood in their dynamic unity and reciprocity (Lipman 2003: 197–271). The critical dimension of thought is the one most directly linked to reflectivity. It is no coincidence that the word itself actually refers to judgement (whose Greek equivalent was the verb κρίνω). This must not be mistaken for the simple urge to negate and criticise. Critique is rather the choice not to take anything for granted, and is consequently the search for – à la Kant – the conditions of possibility and the limits of any given rule, content or belief. 4 See Lipman 2003: 40–42. As Lipman correctly mentions, in his Prior Analytics (I, 32, 47a1) Aristotle already underlined the importance of informal logic, one that “concentrates on practical argument analysis” in the context in which the arguments actually occur. See also Varzi, Nolt & Rohatyn 2011: 17.

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Furthermore, critical reasoning is related to creative reasoning. In a world made of given data, thinking would have no alternative but to passively accept what already exists. By contrast, in a critical context every standpoint and rule has an inherently processual nature. In this case, thinking proves to be active in a twofold sense: first of all, there is always the chance to question the data and to create new questions and problems; secondly, one also has to generate new answers and solutions that are suitable for the new circumstances and for the shape that the problem has assumed in the community of inquiry. An additional precondition of the community of inquiry is that each member is personally and fully engaged in the process, and does not simply act on the basis of a command or an external interest. The caring aspect of thought is central to any model that does not understand emotions and keen involvement as separable from rationality, but rather as a key aspect of philosophical inquiry. In order to think profitably about something, each member must care about “what” they discuss and “how” they think about this subject (Lipman 2003: 262–263; Creel 2001: 69–70). Furthermore, being part of a community entails sharing a personal and emotional engagement with other fellow inquirers.

4.2. The “normative” relationship between the individual and the community of inquiry These final remarks on the multidimensionality of thinking and philosophical inquiry have to be understood in interpersonal terms, since p4c entails a community-based involvement of each participant. Indeed, the relationship between the individual and the community here is one of great interest, both in theoretical and practical terms. Regarding the first, the community of philosophical inquiry aims at overcoming the current dualism between individualism on the one hand and communitarianism on the other (see Chapter 2). From the perspective of p4c, the individual can neither flourish nor be understood without reference to his or her relationship with others, nor should the community take over the individual’s freedom and capacity for self-determination or aim at getting rid of differences between individuals. As for the second aspect, the practice of p4c displays the dynamic relationship between freedom and commitment, willingness and obligation, truthfulness and respect, inclusion (of diverse individuals, groups, modes of expression, ideas, beliefs, etc.) and dissent. Lipman stresses that a community-based inquiry has to be characterised by “a deep commitment to the social solidarity” that should prevail among the inquirers, and by “a sense of respect […] in the manner in which the participants” address “their remarks to one another, even when the waters of disagreement” run deep (Lipman 2008a:

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118–119). These relational circumstances are indeed relevant, since any individual engaging in philosophical inquiry with an eager and open mind is vulnerable to the criticism of others (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1980: 132). It is therefore important to encourage the development of “mutual trust” as a precondition for both the individual’s and the community’s “commitment to reasonableness” (Lipman 2003: 111). However, the opposite is also true, since it is precisely due to the individual’s participation in a philosophical inquiry aiming at “violence reduction” (Lipman 2003: 105–124) through the strengthening of judgement that the community develops group solidarity, and the individual develops his or her own thinking skills and flourishes (Lipman 2003: 102, 116–119; Gregory 2004; Bleazby 2006; eds. Gregory & Laverty 2017). In what sense is this mutual process related to “normativity”? P4c has received criticism in the academic literature because its constructivist approach (ultimately relying on American pragmatism) renounces an orientation of the discussion towards the achievement of a normative, viz. non-relativistic, ideal (see for instance Leleux 2017; Brenifier 2007: 225–254). According to others, the problem is precisely the opposite, since p4c relies on “a normative model of human subjectivity among many, without any objective or foundational reasons to privilege it over others” (Gregory 2011: 208). Worth emphasising, however, is that Lipman’s insistence on the logical structure of discourse indicates the particular importance he gives to the regulative ideal of truth (as correctly pointed out, for instance, by Gardner 1996: 102–111). But Lipman (2003: 268–269) is also aware that this normative goal is to be achieved in the complexity, diversity, contingency and improvisation of everyday life where – as shown in the previous section – informal logic applies. This entails a significant adjustment of the very idea of “normativity” employed to assess the process of philosophical inquiry and its truthfulness, effectiveness, creativity, inclusiveness, etc.: We are committed to procedures of inquiry, and practices of political and ethical interdependence that we take to be normative; and, as I said, to the aim of practical wisdom, or better ways to live. But these commitments aren’t dogmas. If someone wants to challenge them, we should give that challenge a fair hearing. But there’s a presumption, let’s say, in favour of these aims and these procedural norms, based on how well they have served us in the past. We don’t pretend to be neutral about them, and we don’t pretend they are compatible with every idea we might discuss. But of course, they are neutral with regard to all kinds of other questions. So I guess I’d say our practice is relatively value-neutral5.

5 Ann M. Sharp’s statements quoted in Gregory 2011: 206. See as well Gregory 2014 and 2006. Last but not least, David Kennedy (2004: 763) underlines that p4c’s Community of philosophical inquiry “as a normative educational form has enormous implications

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4.3.  The p4c session: distinctive features and flexibility We shall now try to show how the characteristics described in the previous sections are put into practice in each session of p4c, which is generally composed of four phases: reading, questioning, discussing and metacognitive reflection (Lipman 2003: 95–100; Oyler 2016). Finally, we shall add some remarks on the role played by the facilitator.

4.3.1.  Reading the text A p4c session follows an organised, although flexible structure based on particular aspects. Firstly, it always moves from a text reading, whose aim is the following: “each session should begin with a procedure or incident that can be counted on to provoke the quest for meaning” (Lipman 2003: 97). From this perspective, the reading aloud of a text implies an effort of listening, appreciation, deduction, and in depth-analysis of its contents by participants. Lipman and Sharp designed a specific curriculum composed of philosophical novels and corresponding teaching manuals to help teachers and students discuss and practice philosophy6. The novels are addressed to children of different ages and they have the purpose of getting the readers used to questioning and discussing, thanks to the suggestions and inspiration provided by the fictional characters. This means that “the privilege that the LS-P4C [Lipman-Sharp Philosophy for Children] approach grants to the philosophical novel is grounded in its ability to serve as both a stimulus for, and a model of, philosophical sensitivity and multidimensional thinking” (Oyler 2016: 3–4). Lipman and Sharp did not oppose the use of alternative texts, but they considered their own philosophical novels as the best instruments to achieve that dual aim and encourage the development of a “community of inquiry”. This is particularly true when the community is composed of children and set in the school environment. By contrast, when sessions take place in alternative cultural contexts and are composed of adults, other texts may be used as a stimulus to the discussion, even if they do not directly invoke an ideal community of inquiry. For instance, the sessions of the pilot study related to the “Philosophy and Community Practices” project and involving adults (see Chapter 5) rarely began with texts authored by Lipman and Sharp, for two reasons: firstly, we needed more for the evolution of a form of social life that seeks to overcome relations of domination – beginning with the adult-child relation – as a necessary form of power for the maintenance of individual and group order and stability”. 6 Full details may be found at the following link: http://www.montclair.edu/media/ montclairedu/cehs/documents/iapc-catalogue.pdf (viewed 15 September 2017).

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‘ice-breaking’ and entertaining texts in an attempt to remove inhibitions among persons who were unfamiliar with one another; secondly, we were curious to see which texts helped generate philosophical debate and why.

4.3.2. Questioning After reading the text, questioning is a pivotal moment of p4c. By asking a question stimulated by the text, each member of the community of inquiry has the chance to contribute to the ensuing discussion by introducing a topic or underlining a problematic aspect of what has been read (Lipman 2003: 98). Questioning has been central to philosophy since its inception: philosophy exists because there is a problem. The etymology of the word refers to something that is in front of us and prevents us from going ahead. We question because there is an aporia – that is, because “I don’t know my way about” (Wittgenstein 1958: 49). It is often said that in philosophy the question matters more than the answer. Common sense often interprets this statement as a form of disengagement from the issue at hand. On the contrary, the emphasis on questioning – and not just on the question – is a form of deeper engagement, and is directly related to some aspects of p4c that have already been discussed. First of all, questioning is a necessary requirement for autonomous thinking. Immanuel Kant’s claim to autonomy has been incorrectly understood as the assumption of thinking without any form of interpersonal exchange or collaboration, in a sort of solipsistic individual inquiry. Far from it: questioning is a practice that involves a responder and can be fruitfully developed in a community-based setting (Guin 1992: 81–84). The collaboration also has to be authentic, and not just a rhetorical performance aiming at an already given result: as John Dewey emphasised, “suggestive questioning” controlled by the teacher/facilitator alone cannot be considered a good way of developing a community of inquiry (Dewey 2014: 61; Reed 1992: 35–36). Secondly, questioning also means to question oneself in an act of self-reflection. A core aspect of philosophical practices is the ability to think “objectively”7. This is often misunderstood as the endorsement of thinking which is completely detached from any kind of emotion. On the contrary, objectivity is what requires every interlocutor to put him- or herself to the test, to accept the possibility of 7 Husserl’s motto “zu den Sachen selbst”, a reinterpretation of Hegel’s “die Sache selbst” and Aristotle’s αὐτό τό πρᾶγμα, can be seen as a good example of this attitude (see Bodei 2015: 11). For a critical analysis of objectivity as a philosophical aim, see Gregory 2000: 47–49.

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developing a radical change in his or her own standpoint. There is no objective thought without caring. Since by asking a question every member of the community exposes him/herself personally, in this phase of the inquiry it is essential to discuss and to select the questions democratically, without any authoritarian intervention (Lipman 2003: 98–99). Finally, philosophy has always searched for a particular kind of knowledge. This knowledge, originally called ἐπιστήμη, has been misunderstood as some sort of definitive result that would close the inquiry once and for all. In truth, philosophy’s “epistemic” or inquiring attitude stems from the peculiar shape of philosophical questions, to which it is impossible to give an immediate and univocal answer. The search for “epistemic” knowledge emphasises that what matters in philosophy is not just the content, but the process leading to it (Lipman 2003: 21). This means that it is precisely in the epistemic dimension that the processual and not mechanical character of philosophy is evident. All this taken into account, it is quite clear why questioning leads to discussion as the methodological model of philosophical practice (Creel 2001: 47–51). Philosophical discussion has in fact an inherently processual structure, but is at the same time a kind of practice in which every participant has to be entirely and personally involved. In contrast to other models of philosophical or scientific inquiry, dialogue keeps many different elements united: rationality, rhetoric, sensitivity, style and biography. To emphasise philosophy’s practical dimension also means to recognise the importance of a dialogic relationship rather than a purely dialectical one. Raimon Panikkar (1999: 23–31) distinguished the two kinds of relationship by saying that in the latter it is the topic that matters – according to the motto that philosophy’s true interest is “the thing in itself ” – whereas the former is mostly about an exchange between subjects and the topic discussed is a means for the process of sharing and exchanging. This model of dialogue (a Socratic-Platonic legacy) offers a method that does not ignore the need for a result, but that emphasises both the process leading to that result and the subjects involved in the inquiry.

4.3.3. Discussion As specified by Lipman, “the community of inquiry is not aimless. It is a process that aims at producing a product […]. Second, the process has a sense of direction; it moves where the argument takes it. Third, the process is not merely conversation or discussion; it is dialogical. This means it has a structure” (Lipman 2003: 83–84). It is necessary to understand what this product is. Lipman warns us against considering it as a conclusion, a closure or an affirmation rather than,

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more generally, an instrument suitable to reinforce the community of inquiry through the employment of cooperative thinking, and characterised by integrations of each other’s ideas, offers of counter-examples or alternative hypotheses. For exactly this reason, Justus Buchler (Lipman’s mentor when he started teaching at Columbia University in the 1950s) emphasises that “if the discussion method is superior to the lecture method, this is not because of its degree of activity but because the establishment of a product of inquiry by students is more fundamental to the deepening of their powers than their acceptance of such a product, and because the assimilation of ideas is more important than the compilation of ideas” (Buchler 1954: 9). According to Lipman, the aim of the community-based philosophical discussion is the reinforcement of the community itself in a pluralistic and democratic sense (Lipman 2003: 102): the participation of each member takes place within a dialogical context where his or her perspective mutually interacts with the interventions of other members. Lipman and Sharp’s fictional characters themselves are constantly engaged in questioning, formulating hypotheses and integrating one another’s solutions. Worth underlining is that questioning, formulating hypotheses, inventing and integrating are different expressions of thinking, understood as – to quote Dewey – a developing experience, an inquiry, a reflective, creative and – adding Lipman and Sharp – caring procedure. In Dewey’s perspective, language itself always plays a heuristic and epistemic role since “it compels one individual to take the standpoint of other individuals and to see and inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly personal but is common to them as participants or ‘parties’ in a conjoint undertaking” (Dewey 2008: 52). Being part of a community of inquiry actually means focussing on a cooperative thinking process and increasing one’s awareness of this. Research may be undertaken and knowledge acquired only as a result of a shared enterprise, only thanks to the genuineness of each member’s contribution and to the respect of rules and principles, which are those of a democratic community: “Her question and my answer – how beautifully they go together!” (Lipman 1988: 76–77), says Elfie, the protagonist of Lipman’s eponymous novel.

4.3.4.  Metacognitive reflection (self-evaluation) A p4c session usually ends with a phase of metacognitive reflection or self-evaluation, during which the facilitator suggests that the community of inquiry’s members reflect on the practice itself, with the aim of assessing the process through the lens of the aforementioned multidimensional thinking (critical, creative and caring). The facilitator provides help in this exercise, which might be inspired by some guiding questions, such as the following: “Are we looking at the issue from

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different perspectives? Are we making sure that no one is dominating the discussion? Are we challenging each other’s thinking? Are we building toward a reasonable conclusion? Are we digging deep into concepts and ideas? Are we getting better at [one of these] than we used to be? How can we improve our practice and/or our thinking next time?” (Oyler 2016: 6). Nevertheless, other methods may be used with, say, the purpose of asking participants to draw something or define their experience through an image able to catch the meaning of the cooperative thinking exercise just accomplished. In any case, the importance of metacognitive reflection is that it offers the opportunity to clarify the principles supporting a good inquiry, and to compare the practice to certain standards (Gardner 1996). Finally, it shows participants that the inquiry itself can be an object of a shared reflection. A real critical, creative and caring thinking entails the chance of increasing the participants’ awareness of their own and others’ behaviours, recollecting what they have internalised and sharing these thoughts with the rest of the group. To understand why Lipman thought of this conclusive phase of a p4c session, it is important to remember that central to this approach is the commitment to helping students strengthen their capacities for inquiry, with the aim of fostering their ability to formulate reasonable judgments autonomously and to become good, critical and reflective citizens.

4.3.5. Facilitation Facilitation is necessary in order to guarantee the difference between dialogue and mere conversation (Gardner 1996; Kennedy 2004; Bleazby 2006). If it is true, as Lipman claims, that “in contrasting conversation and dialogue we cannot help seeing in conversation a process in which the personal note is strong but the logical thread is weak, whereas in dialogue just the reverse in the case” (Lipman 2003: 87), then facilitating a p4c session will aim at ensuring that the community of inquiry follows a logical thread, at limiting thorough personalisation, and at preventing one or more members from dominating the dialogue by transforming it into a contest among protagonists. The discussion within a community of inquiry should be logically structured, and the facilitator’s role is to underline and when necessary restore the logical thread which is gradually appearing courtesy of the participants’ contributions. In this respect, Lipman and Sharp’s novels were conceived to serve as a model: teachers, always present in the plots, correspond perfectly to the facilitator of a community of inquiry. They are usually depicted as cultured but not pedantic, authoritative but not oppressive, able to indicate the way towards knowledge without unnecessary explications or evaluative judgements regarding what is said by schoolchildren or community members. Thanks

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to these traits the facilitator can be distinguished from similar roles played by, say, judges, moderators, mediators, conductors and so on. The specificity of the facilitator’s task commences with the second phase of the p4c session. Each contribution has to be written on a chalkboard; next to each question the facilitator should also write the contributor’s name in order to match each question with its author, and to show to everyone the active participation of community members. Sometimes it might be useful, especially when the number of questions is particularly high, to reread what is on the chalkboard with the aim of identifying leitmotifs flowing through the questions and to let different perspectives expressed in different contributions emerge. An effective facilitator can show that some points have been broached from different perspectives and by more than one person, or can highlight that the group is particularly interested in discussing one specific aspect of a theme. In this way, the group usually enters the discussion phase. In this phase, it is important as well that the facilitator helps participants clarify their interventions and better express them. The aim is to help participants deepen, in a non-oppressive way, the different philosophical concepts encountered. In order to successfully achieve this goal, it may be useful for the facilitator to address the group with new questions or draw conceptual maps on the chalkboard, helping to show the path taken by cooperative thinking. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, of decisive importance is the stimulus offered by the facilitator in the conclusive metacognitive phase.

5.  Conclusions: What is “philosophical” in the p4c experience? So, what is specifically philosophical about p4c? As discussed in the previous sections, and returning to Lipman’s definition, p4c is characterised by reflective, deliberative and dialogic behaviour, which ends in both reinforcing individual judgement and solidifying the community. The term “philosophical” is here to be considered in light of its relationship with the process of community building, whose members are freely committed to (philosophical) research into a certain question. Being “philosophical” is also p4c’s original purpose: activating the individual’s capability to cooperate with each other in carrying out a meaningful inquiry. Based on these premises, it is clear that p4c provides a flexible framework which can apply to both school and extra-scholastic contexts – namely, in any context where there is the desire to form a community of individuals willing to reappraise their personal emotional prejudices and give life to a cooperative thinking process around questions considered particularly important for the participants and the community itself.

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References Achenbach, G., 1984, Philosophische Praxis, Dinter, Köln. Bahler, B. & Kennedy, D. (eds.), 2016, Philosophy of Childhood Today. Exploring the Boundaries, Lexington Books, Lanham. Beck, U., 2004, Der kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Bleazby, J., 2006, ‘Autonomy, Democratic Community, and Citizenship in Philosophy for Children: Dewey and Philosophy for Children’s Rejection of the Individual/Community Dualism’, Analytic Teaching 26(1), 30–52. Bobbio, N., 1987, The Future of Democracy (1984), transl. R. Griffin, Polity Press, Cambridge. Bodei, R., 2015, The Life of Things, transl. M. Baca, Fordham University Press, New York. Brandom, R., 2009, Reason in Philosophy. Animating Ideas, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Brenifier, O., 2007, La pratique de la philosophie à l’école primaire, Alcofribas Nasier, Paris. Buchler, J., 1954, ‘What is a Discussion?’, The Journal of General Education 8(1), 7–17. Cosentino, A., 2008, Filosofia come pratica sociale. Comunità di ricerca, formazione e cura di sé, Apogeo, Milano. Creel, R.E., 2001, Thinking Philosophically, Blackwell, Malden. Dewey, J., 2008, Logic. The Theory of Inquiry (1938), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale. Dewey, J., 2014, Democracy and Education (1916), Aakar Books, Delhi. Foucault, M., 1986, The Care of the Self, transl. R. Hurley, Vintage, New York. Galichet, F., 1998, L’éducation à la citoyenneté, Anthropos, Paris. Galichet, F., 2007, La philosophie à l’école, Hachette, Paris. Garcìa Moriyon, F., 2016, ‘Philosophical Inquiry in Education’, in M.A. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, pp. 1–6, Springer, Dordrecht, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://link.springer.com/ referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_162-1. Gardner, S., 1996, ‘Inquiry is no Mere Conversation (or Discussion or Dialogue). Facilitation of Inquiry is Hard Work!’, Analytic Teaching 16(2), 102–111. Goubet, J.-F. & Marsal, E. (eds.), 2015, Philosopher avec des enfants, une discipline nouvelle?, Lit, Wien.

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Gregory, M.R., 2000, ‘The Status of Rational Norms: A Pragmatist Perspective’, Analytic Teaching 21(1), 43–51. Gregory, M.R., 2004, ‘Being Out, Speaking Out: Vulnerability and Classroom Inquiry’, Journal of Gay & Lesbian Issues in Education 2(2), 53–64 and 85–90. Gregory, M.R., 2006, ‘Normative Dialogue Types in Philosophy for Children’, Gifted Education International 22, 160–171. Gregory, M.R., 2011, ‘Philosophy for Children and its Critics: A Mendham Dialogue’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 45(2), 199–219. Gregory, M.R., 2014, ‘Éducation morale et pratiques de la sagesse’, in M.-P. Grosjean (ed.), La philosophie au cœur de l’éducation. Autour de Matthew Lipman, pp. 37–66, Vrin, Paris. Gregory, M.R., Haynes, J. & Murris, K., eds., 2017, The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children, Routledge, London-New York. Gregory, M.R. & Laverty, M.J. (eds.), 2017, In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp. Childhood, Philosophy and Education, Routledge, New York. Grosjean, M.-P., ed., 2014, La philosophie au cœur de l’éducation. Autour de Matthew Lipman, Vrin, Paris. Guin, P.C., 1992, ‘Thinking for Oneself ’, in A.M. Sharp & R.F. Reed (eds.), Studies in Philosophy for Children, pp. 79–86, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Hadot, P., 1995, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. A. Davidson, Blackwell, Malden, MA. Hagaman, S., 1990, ‘The Community of Inquiry: An Approach to Collaborative Learning’, Studies in Art Education 31(3), 149–157. Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (Iapc), n.d., What is the IAPC Curriculum, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://www.montclair. edu/cehs/academics/centers-and-institutes/iapc/what-is/iapc-curriculum/. Kennedy, D., 2004, ‘The Philosopher as Teacher. The Role of a Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Metaphilosophy 35(5), 744–765. Koehn, D., 2000, ‘What is a Practical Judgement?’, Professional Ethics 8(3–4), 3–18. Kohan, W.O., 2015, Childhood, Education, and Philosophy. New Ideas for an Old Relationship, Routledge, New York. Kymlicka, W., 2007, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lahav, R., 2004, Comprendere la vita. La consulenza filosofica come ricerca della saggezza, transl. F. Cirri, Apogeo, Milano. Leleux, C. (ed.), 2008, La philosophie pour enfants. Le modèle de Matthew Lipman en discussion, second edition, De Boeck, Bruxelles.

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Leleux, C., 2017, ‘Quel lien entre philosophie et citoyenneté dans le nouveau cours d’EPC?’, lecture held on 13 March at the Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium) within the seminar organised by the Société philosophique de Louvain on “L’enseignement de la philosophie peut-il servir la citoyenneté?”. Lenoir, F., 2016, Philosopher et méditer avec les enfants, Albin Michel, Paris. Lind, G., 2016, How to Teach Morality, Logos, Berlin. Lipman, M., 1987, Harry Prime, Iapc, Montclair. Lipman, M., 1988, Elfie, Iapc, Montclair. Lipman, M., 1996, Natasha: Vygotskian Dialogues, Teachers College Press, New York. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lipman, M., 2008a, A Life Teaching Thinking, Iapc, Montclair. Lipman, M., 2008b, ‘Philosophy for Children’s Debt to Dewey’, in M. Taylor, H. Schreier & P. Ghiraldelli Jr. (eds.), Pragmatism, Education, and Children: International Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 143–151, Rodopi, AmsterdamNew York. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. & Oscanyan, F.S., 1980, Philosophy in the Classroom, second edition, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Marinoff, L., 2002, Philosophical Practice, Academic Press, San Diego. Marsal, E., Dobashi, T. & Weber, B. (eds.), 2009, Children Philosophize Worldwide. Theoretical and Practical Concepts, Lang, New York-Frankfurt am Main. Martens, E., 1999, Philosophieren mit Kindern. Eine Einführung in die Philosophie, Reclam, Stuttgart. Matthews, G.B., 1980, Philosophy and the Young Child, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Matthews, G.B., 1994, The Philosophy of Childhood, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Naji, S. & Hashim, R. (eds.), 2017, History, Theory and Practice of Philosophy for Children: International Perspectives, Routledge, Abingdon-New York. Nelson, L., 1970, ‘Die sokratische Methode’ (1922), in Id., Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 271–316, Meiner, Hamburg. Nowak, E., Schrader, D. & Zizek, B. (eds.), 2013, Educating Competencies for Democracy, Lang, Frankfurt am Main. Nussbaum, M., 2010, Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford.

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Oyler, J., 2016, ‘Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children’, in M.A. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, pp.  1–7, Springer, Dordrecht, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-287532-7_226-2. Panikkar, R., 1999, The Intrareligious Dialogue, Paulist Press, Mahwah. Rawls, J., 2001, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Reed, R.F., 1992, ‘Discussion and the Varieties of Authority’, in A.M. Sharp & R.F. Reed (eds.), Studies in Philosophy for Children, pp. 32–41, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Santi, M. & Oliverio, S. (eds.), 2012, Educating for Complex Thinking through Philosophical Inquiry. Models, Advances, and Proposals for the New Millennium, Liguori, Napoli. Santi, M. & Zorzi, E. (eds.), 2016, Education as Jazz. Interdisciplinary Sketches on a New Metaphor, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne. Sasseville, M. (ed.), 2007, La pratique de la philosophie avec les enfants, Presses de l’Université Laval, Québec. Sautet, M., 1995, Un café pour Socrate, Laffont, Paris. Schuster, S.C., 1991, ‘Philosophical Counselling’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 8(2), 219–223. Sen, A., 2009, The Idea of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Tozzi, M., 2012, Nouvelles pratiques philosophiques: répondre à la demande sociale et scolaire de philosophie, Chronique sociale, Lyon. Tozzi, M., 2014, La Morale, ça se discute…, Albin Michel, Paris. Unesco, 2007, Philosophy – A School of Freedom, viewed 15 September 2017, from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001541/154173e.pdf. Varzi, A., Nolt, J. & Rohatyn, D., 2011, Schaum’s Outline of Logic, McGraw Hill, New York. Weiss, M.N. (ed.), 2015, The Socratic Handbook, Lit, Wien. Wittgenstein, L., 1958, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford. Zizek, B., Garz, D. & Nowak, E. (eds.), 2015, Kohlberg Revisited, Sense, Rotterdam.

Graziano Lingua, Paolo Monti1

Chapter 2 – Community Abstract: The idea of community has been central in the recent philosophical debate. In several lines of inquiry, communities appear as either sources of meaningful discourses, contexts of practices and structures of authority. As a strategy of understanding, practice and transformation, Philosophy for Communities stimulates interactions between all these dimensions. Keywords: community; meaning; practice; authority; power.

What is the link between philosophical community practices and the creation and development of community relations? Formulated in this way, the question is perhaps too straightforward, but it helps to identify the connection we are going to investigate. Philosophy for Communities points, by definition, to this link between the philosophical enterprise and the creation of strong social relations that exceed the mere sharing of the same space or the same belief. Philosophy for Communities is an extension of the Philosophy for Children programme beyond the school context, and is similarly centred on the notion of a community of philosophical inquiry: a specific form of social relationship based on a cooperative research practice. “Community” has here both a descriptive and a normative meaning. It does not just identify an intersubjective way of philosophising whose roots go back to the Socratic-Platonic dialogue, but also points to the purpose of that research, an objective that is to be understood within the research context. On this, Matthew Lipman is explicit: the community of inquiry is not simply a conversational space or a chance to exchange opinions. Rather, within the community, a specific rationality is at work, which brings about the cooperative flourishing of those who join in the philosophical dialogue. While ordinary conversation is premised on the stability of the beliefs that are expressed, the critical and reflexive dialogue Lipman has in mind generates a condition of instability and constant movement. However, this movement has an internal direction: it has a specific pragmatic purpose, a meaningfulness [Prägnanz] that orients both the discursive practice and the relational form [Gestalt] connecting the participants, ultimately modifying their original perspectives (Lipman 2003: 86). 1 This chapter is the result of joint research. In particular, Graziano Lingua wrote sects. 1, and Paolo Monti sect. 2. Sect. 3 was written conjointly by both authors.

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In this essay, we focus on the significance of this specific relational form, not merely as a particular social experience, but also as an opportunity to develop social bonds within the contexts of its application, such as associations, groups, companies and institutions. We do not delve into the specifics of the Philosophy for Communities programme, but instead analyse it with reference to the central questions of the philosophical debate around community. Our purpose is to understand how the most influential answers that emerged from that debate can help address the challenges of this specific philosophical practice. First, we will question the relevance of community in contemporary discussions and examine the concerns surrounding its philosophical applications. We will then investigate three notions central to the recent theoretical accounts of community: meaning, practice and power relations. By briefly demonstrating how these have been articulated in contemporary political philosophy, we aim to both highlight the relevant aspects and see how they relate to philosophical community practices. This should inform the overall attempt to discover whether, by shifting these practices from the context of schools to communities in general, new lines of inquiry emerge regarding theory and application.

1.  Desiring bonds, defending autonomy The idea of community is a controversial one. For some, the fragmentation of social relationships instils a desire for community, the need to rediscover less instrumental forms of socialisation. For others, the appeal to the centrality of communities is viewed with suspicion, as a potential threat to the liberty of individuals who, when embedded in a communitarian context, might lose their autonomy and chances to develop a unique identity. Lipman himself is aware of this ambivalence. Although he took the concept of a “community of inquiry” from Peirce (1955), he extended it beyond scientific research. While the general concept of community refers to an ‘organic’ and totalising relationship, the purpose of philosophical practices is to recognise the unique insight each person contributes to the cooperative effort (Lipman 2003). This ambivalence is deeply embedded in the modern history of the concept of community. A central aim of modernity is the project of emancipation from dependence and tradition, and community is unfavourably perceived as preserving those traditional bonds and fetters. Throughout the modern era, the primacy of individual self-determination has gradually penetrated social imaginaries, thus contributing to the decline of old communitarian relationships. Liberalism has probably been the greatest influence on this process, as it has substantially shaped the political canon of modernity. By emphasising negative freedom, the liberal

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understanding of the individual supports an anthropology that is idiosyncratically opposed to all forms of social interference and affiliation, which are construed as illegitimate intrusions into the sphere of private choice. To this extent, the liberal perspective codified a strict opposition between individual and community. Ironically, the development of modern individualism is a major source of insights that lead to a questioning of this polarisation, by rediscovering the constitutive value of intersubjective bonds. Zygmunt Bauman correctly points out that “missing community” (Bauman 2000) is a trait specific to contemporary society, as the longing for communitarian relationships has been generated, in part, by the failed promise of emancipation that lies at the core of all modernisation processes. On many counts, these processes have actually led to a growth of new forms of alienation: once the most fundamental social bonds have disappeared, the self-sufficient individual is left with only short-term relations dominated by the maximisation of interests. The ideal of autonomy as a capacity to formulate and pursue one’s own course of action has equally produced mixed results. Centred on a sharp distinction between the public and the private, liberal autonomy posits that the individual needs no social bonds to realise his or her own authenticity, and that the only legitimate social bonds are contractual in nature. From this perspective, societies are constituted by calculated exchanges rather than meaningful intersubjective relationships. Charles Taylor’s analysis of the “social atomism” (Taylor 1985b) implicit in a significant strand of the liberal tradition reminds us that the misfortunes of contemporary individualism are not merely a contingent side-effect of modernity, but rather an essential implication of its general project. It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of the strict opposition of individual and community is at the heart of the two most relevant debates that the recent history of philosophy has devoted to the concept of community: that of the distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society)2 at the end of the nineteenth century, and the clash between liberals and communitarians in the last quarter of the twentieth century3. The “missing community” – understood as a form of nostalgia for a diminishing experience of social bonds that are at once intimate and liberating – is one of the recurrent imaginaries of modernity, despite its distinctly mythical traits. This kind of community never existed, even in traditional societies, but the myth of

2 See the seminal essay by Tönnies (1887). Also, see the fundamental work articulated on the subject by Durkheim (2014). 3 On this controversy, see Forst (1994).

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the lost community is not a mere “retrospective projection”, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests4. Rather, we argue that it actually is the symptom of a real need, one that motivates the justified call for meaningful alternatives to the profound failures of modern individualism and autonomy-centric liberalism. The significance of the debate between liberals and communitarians is clear from this perspective. The communitarian camp has successfully showed the importance that experiences of affiliation, dependence, and cooperation have for human beings. In the debate with communitarians, the liberal tradition has been represented by one of its most brilliant contemporary articulations: John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971). For Rawls, the principles of justice are established from a hypothetical original position where individuals act under a veil of ignorance, as though they were separated from their context and values. Michael Sandel (1982) strongly criticised the abstraction of this “unencumbered Self ”, and Charles Taylor (1985a: 15–44, 97–114) similarly argues against the “disengaged” and “buffered” self that overlooks its structural dependence on social bonds. Despite their convincing line of criticism, the communitarians’ counterproposals were problematic. Sandel and MacIntyre, in their effort to recover the public significance of the enduring social bonds characteristic of traditional communities, end up conflating cultural and political identities and supporting the notion that democratic politics should be grounded on common substantive values and a shared understanding of history. In irrevocably pluralistic societies, arguing for the justification of political arrangements on the basis of a shared pool of substantive values is unrealistic, and fuels the forces of conflict and self-segregation. On these premises, there is a concrete risk that the contested atomisation of the individual may present itself again under communitarian wrappings, within a divided society made of closed and mutually hostile cultural groups. The failures of strong multiculturalist views supporting group rights and cultural policies without a sufficient focus on the importance of interaction, participation and shared principles of justice shows how threatening the closure of communities can be. It is telling that, in the French context, the term communautarisme has gradually become a label for anti-social phenomena that include religious radicalisation and political extremism.

4 Nancy argues that we should be suspicious of the retrospective imaginary of community, as it is historically unrealistic. Has there really ever been such a harmonious and infrangible social bond “wherein each member identifies himself only through the supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body of the community”? (Nancy 1991: 9).

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2.  Interpretations of community: meaning, practice and power Within the historical account of this contentious debate over the concept of community, it is difficult to identify univocal interpretations and shared categorisations. For some authors, community is the main subject of inquiry, but, in most cases, it is merely a relevant concept for scholars addressing other philosophical problems, such as the public justification of coercion, the defence of minority rights or the foundation of civic duties. Nevertheless, we identify three key interpretations: (i) community as a source of meaning, (ii) community as the context of practices, (iii) community as a structure of authority and power-relations. (i) Communities are sources of meaningful discourses. Scientific and professional communities establish shared codes, articulate technical languages, formulate standards and check hypotheses. Religious communities elaborate articles of faith, interpret Holy Scriptures, portray symbols and articulate a view of the meaning and content of a good life. Local communities rely on narratives of identity and cooperation, share dialects and vernacular and formulate interpretations of the present based on their history. In all these cases, the communities can be construed as repositories of cognitive and symbolic resources that are developed and questioned over time. This kind of understanding has nourished much of the debate on political liberalism and deliberative democracy, two dominating trends in contemporary political theory. John Rawls’ paradigmatic separation of the political principles of justice from comprehensive accounts of the good is reflected in the assumption that the notion of a political community is radically different from the idea of a community based on a specific worldview. In Rawls’ own words, “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power. If we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is necessary for political community” (Rawls 1993: 37). In this sense, a well-ordered society is not a community, if by community we mean a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine. The exercise of reason in public justification cannot rely on any of these, but rather needs to appeal to political values that all can endorse from their different worldviews. Other liberal theorists share with Rawls this notion of a community as a cultural entity that, at its core, revolves around a repertoire of symbolic and conceptual resources; nonetheless, some of them are open to the notion that those resources might have political significance. This is the case in Will Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, which highlights how access

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to communitarian cultural resources is crucial to the development of individual autonomy. From this perspective, the freedom that liberals demand for individuals “is not primarily the freedom to go beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are most worth developing, and which are without value” (Kymlicka 1995: 90–91). Jürgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy involves a similar consideration of the political use of the semantic resources of linguistic communities. His Kantian quest for universalist justifications that all citizens, as co-legislators, can endorse, is tempered by the awareness that “members of a local linguistic community experience everything that they encounter in the world in the light of a habitual ‘grammatical’ pre-understanding […]. The linguistic mediation of our relations to the world explains why the objectivity of the world that we presuppose in acting and speaking refers back to a communicative intersubjectivity among interlocutors” (Habermas 2008: 35–36). This plurality of local communities of speech is, however, politically problematic. After the Enlightenment severed the connection between public justifications and religious-metaphysical traditions, we were left with a plurality of moral communities that face ethical dilemmas and political decisions by appealing to moral reasons that have since lost their traditionally shared cultural and religious background. The central political problem of modern society is thus to integrate this plurality of different religious and ethical communities of speech into a universalistic, discursive process of democratic deliberation. For this purpose, Habermas argues that the validity claims of legal arrangements are sufficiently justified through the enactment of discursive democratic procedures, and do not require grounding in the pre-political ethical convictions of religious or national communities. Nonetheless, he is concerned about the desertification of the resources of civic engagement caused by an extreme proceduralisation of democracy and the global rise of neoliberal mechanisms of domination. This concern drives his gradual reconsideration of the role of religious communities in the life of democratic societies. Habermas’ deliberative theory is therefore more open than Rawls’ political liberalism is to acknowledging that communities with a comprehensive identity can play a role in the life of contemporary democracies. Still, their different normative stances are based on a very similar understanding of what community is. For both, the defining trait of communities is the moral and theological discourse they adopt when formulating claims and offering justifications. (ii) Communities are the contexts of practices. Social practices are enacted by communities of practitioners that, by adhering to shared rules, values and institutions, contribute to the experience of social cooperation. From this perspective, the

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backbone of society is the complex web of professional associations, scientific communities, cultural institutions, sporting clubs, religious groups and political parties to which individuals hold their allegiances. This view reverses the liberal image of the community as a repository of beliefs and worldviews that an individual may choose to adopt; the individual here is rather structurally embedded into a community to which he or she belongs as an active participant. Moreover, individual agency is understandable only within a predefined space of means, ends and evaluations that is communitarian in nature. As discussed, the development of this kind of communitarian view has historically been motivated by the opposition to liberal theories but, in time, it has generated a number of independent philosophical projects that reaffirm the philosophical centrality of the community in a neo-Aristotelian and neo-Hegelian fashion. Charles Taylor’s monumental work on the genesis of the modern self relies on a specific version of this interpretive move that frames the individual within an intersubjective moral ontology. Along these lines, he notes that “our language of good and right makes sense only against a background understanding of the forms of social interchange in a given society and its perceptions of the good” (Taylor 1989: 56). Humans are self-understanding animals whose interpretations of the self, of its moral possibilities and boundaries, always happen within practices that test their potential and channel their efforts to make sense of their own lives in cooperation (or rivalry) with others. Being embedded in a community is, in this sense, not a destiny but a condition of self-development and inquiry. Alasdair MacIntyre articulates a parallel communitarian hermeneutics of modernity by means of a neo-Aristotelian project that focuses on the moral significance of traditions. In his account, traditions are research enterprises that, by pursuing the goods internal to certain social practices, develop the moral identity of a community over the course of history. The relationship between individuals and communities revolves around the sharing and pursuit of the characteristic goods that result from the realisation of these social practices: artistic beauty, scientific discovery, bodily health and, above all, moral excellence. Within each cultural tradition, some individuals interpret this quest for excellence in paradigmatic forms that advance the effort of the whole community. In this sense, the goods realised through the participation in social practices “are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice. So when Turner transformed the seascape in painting or W.G. Grace advanced the art of batting in cricket in a quite new way their achievement enriched the whole relevant community” (MacIntyre 2007: 190–191). This understanding of communities centred

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on their collective pursuit of the good is at odds with the modern disembedding of the individual from the traditional contexts that gave him or her direction and purpose in the classical and medieval era. The disembedding strategy is, MacIntyre argues, alienating, since “the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. Notice that rebellion against my identity is always one possible mode of expressing it” (MacIntyre 2007: 221). By separating the individual from its context, modernity tends to exclude from view any conception of society as a community based on the cooperative pursuit of human excellence and a shared practice of the moral virtues. As these practical forms of identification with a community fade away, the possibility of cultivating a shared vision of the good as prior to, and independent of, individual interests is also lost (see MacIntyre 2007: 236). (iii) Communities are structures of authority and power-relations. The development and transmission of cultural identities and comprehensive religious-moral doctrines relies heavily on the establishment of authorities of interpretation, education and correction. Similarly, each community as a context of practice persists over time by institutionalising the conditions of enactment of the practice: this leads to the creation of internal hierarchies and bureaucracies that assign different roles and powers to the practitioners. Political and judiciary authorities, ecclesiastical hierarchies, healthcare institutions and educational systems embody this process of internal distribution of power within the community. The thought of Michel Foucault has been pivotal in nurturing a renewed attention to the mechanisms of power and the subtle forms of domination that are implicit in social relationships. On his account, beyond the direct control exerted by political institutions, the subject is directed through social practices that gradually constitute the self as a docile member of the collective. In this sense, the phenomenon of “governmentality” is not only about being directed from the outside, but also refers to the ways in which people are taught to govern themselves. Liberal theorists, he argues, are mostly blind to the risks connected with this second form of power. Their fixation on the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of the community is particularly misleading, as it highlights the importance of the visible processes of decision and argumentation but overlooks the mechanisms of power implicit in communitarian relationships. In Habermas’ work, argues Foucault, “there is always something which causes me a problem. It is when he assigns a very important place to relations of communication and

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also to functions that I would call ‘utopian’. The thought that there could be a state of communication which would be such that the games of truth could circulate freely, without obstacles, without constraint, and without coercive effects, seems to me to be Utopia” (Foucault 1991: 18). In reality, there is no society without implicit relations of power. The ideal community, then, is not a community of transparent communication, free from the influence of power; it is rather a community that achieves an adequate awareness of how the exercise of power is articulated and deals with it by minimising the instances of unchecked domination. The ambivalent relation between community and domination has been further explored from different perspectives in political theory. Feminist authors have highlighted the political relevance of the instances of oppression and discrimination that happen outside of the sphere of political procedures and institutions. Families, religious groups and local communities are, in this sense, repositories of enduring practices of domination that mainstream theories of justice overlook, by confining them to the private sphere. Within this line of thought, Susan Moller Okin has argued that the communitarian appeal to “traditions” and the liberal appeal to public deliberation on “shared meanings” are “both incapable of dealing with the problem of the effects of social domination on beliefs and understandings. They therefore prove to be useless or distorting ways of thinking when we include women as fully human subjects in our theorising about justice or try to assess gender by the standards of justice” (Okin 1987: 42–43). Both the “traditions” and the “shared meanings” preserved by cultural and religious communities, in fact, mirror the biased point of view of some community members at the expenses of others: typically the free, the educated, the wealthy and men, at the expense of the marginalised view of the unfree, the uneducated, the poor and women (see Okin 1987: 69). Moved by a similar concern for the problem of domination, republican theorists have advanced a different line of argumentation, highlighting the essential role of communities in furthering the cause of non-domination. The active participation of the citizenry in the political life of the republic is, on this perspective, the only guarantee of the people’s freedom not only against the risk of domination at the hands of powerful economic and religious actors, but also against the abuse of power perpetrated by the state. The most important form of community is thus the political community: more precisely, the political community of citizens driven by a joint commitment to the ideal of non-domination. Philip Pettit, among the leading thinkers of neo-republicanism, argues that as non-domination is promoted “factors like caste and class, colour and culture, should decline in political significance: in significance as markers of vulnerability to interference. The community as a whole should approach the point of being a single vulnerability class.

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[…] The closer we approximate to the enjoyment of perfect non-domination, then, the more common that ideal will become: the more it will appear that our fortunes in the non-domination stakes are intimately interconnected. It is a very important observation that non-domination is a communitarian good. It means that the cause of freedom as non-domination will always have the dimension of a social and common cause for the people involved in pursuing it” (Pettit 1997: 125). In republican terms, individuals alone cannot advance the cause of freedom as non-domination effectively: communal solidarity among the citizens is a necessary condition for the realisation of republican liberty, since only a community of free and equal citizens can shield its members from the risk of being dominated.

3. Conclusion: “Philosophy for Communities” as a strategy of understanding, practice and transformation These different approaches highlight the multidimensionality of the concept of community as a source of meaning, context of practice and infrastructure of authority. These perspectives are also in a mutual dialectical relationship: liberal and deliberative models contest the authoritarian implications of communitarian identity politics, neo-Aristotelian stances contest the liberal fixation on public justifications based on abstract public reasons, and feminist and republican theorists criticise both liberal and communitarian views for their obliviousness of the problem of power imbalances and internal domination. This divided intellectual landscape suggests that a philosophical inquiry into the idea of community needs to accept its irreducible multidimensionality. From this perspective, the Philosophy for Communities approach embraces all three dimensions and sets them in motion through the development of specific philosophical practices: i. The discursive nature of philosophical engagement within the Philosophy for Communities paradigm focuses on ideas, arguments and values. At its core, the community of philosophical inquiry works cooperatively on meanings that are at once already part of the community’s background, but in a substantial sense are also the product of an ongoing exercise of clarification, interrogation and debate among the participants. This discursive process, which starts from the reading and discussion of a selected stimulus text, is key to overcoming the separation between the commitment to private substantive values and the opening up of a public dimension of deliberation. Philosophy for Communities allows for the expression of opposed identities and values, but also seeks their discursive integration, thus contesting idiosyncratic closures.

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The communicative pragmatics of this philosophical practice does not focus exclusively on the elucidation of specific arguments but, in line with the multifunctional dimension of thought that Lipman highlights, seeks also to inspire a caring attitude towards both the “short” relations of the community of inquiry and the wider political relations of citizenship. ii. The close connection between “thinking” and “caring” supported by the Philosophy for Communities contributes to the distinct practical character of the community of philosophical inquiry. The philosophical dialogue aims at a collective formulation of questions, with no predefined directions. In this sense, this approach creates a space of relationships that is not governed by a production of absolutes, but rather by the power of the communicative relationship. Therefore, the internal goods of this community-within-the-widercommunity are the cooperative pursuit of self-knowledge, the articulation of new forms of mutual understanding and the access to forms of communication that are rigorously based on fair rules and equal respect for all voices. iii. Finally, the application of the Philosophy for Communities paradigm challenges the existing structures of authority and power imbalances in two ways: firstly, in terms of content, since the cooperative inquiry addresses all sorts of cultural, ethical or political problems, thereby offering a chance for the contestation and revision of established norms and institutions; secondly, in terms of rules, since the discursive setting puts all participants on an equal footing and thus inherently questions the relationships of authority and domination that exist outside of the philosophical practice. By interacting with all three dimensions of meaning, practice and power, Philosophy for Communities places itself at the crossroads of the recent philosophical inquiry into the ambivalent role of communities. Its main contribution lies precisely in the practical interaction it initiates across and between these dimensions. In this sense, the reflexive reconsideration of the impact of this kind of practices on the relationships among the participants, and between the participants and their wider social contexts, is a promising point of departure for making progress towards a deeper understanding of this contemporary issue.

References Bauman, Z., 2000, Missing Community, Cambridge, Polity Press. Durkheim, E., 2014, The Division of Labor in Society (1893), transl. W.D. Halls, Free Press, New York.

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Forst, R., 1994, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. Politische philosophie jenseits von Liberalismus und Kommunitarismus, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Foucault, M., 1991, ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview’, in J. Bernauer & D. Rasmussen (eds.), The Final Foucault, transl. J.D. Gauthier, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Habermas, J., 2008, Between Naturalism and Religion, Polity Press, Cambridge. Kymlicka, W., 1995, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. MacIntyre, A., 2007, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981), third edition, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, IN. Nancy, J.-L., 1991, The inoperative community, transl. P. Connor, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-Oxford. Okin, S.M., 1987, Justice, Gender and the Family, Basic Books, New York. Peirce, C.S., 1955, ‘The Fixation of Belief ’, in J. Buchler (ed.), Philosophical Writings of Peirce, pp. 5–22, Dover, New York. Pettit, P., 1997, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rawls, J., 1971, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Rawls, J., 1993, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York. Sandel, M., 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Taylor, Ch., 1985a, Philosophical Papers. Human Agency and Language, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Taylor, Ch., 1985b, ‘Atomism’, in Id., Philosophical Papers. Philosophy and the Human Sciences, vol. II, pp. 187–210, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Taylor, Ch., 1989, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Tönnies, F., 1991, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (1887), Reislad, Leipzig.

Sara Nosari, Federico Zamengo1

Chapter 3 – Education Abstract: This chapter explores the potentialities of Philosophy for Communities as an informal educational practice to adults: the pedagogical proposition is to promote the human ability to change as the attitude of dealing with reality. By this educational approach, the ethical and social dimension of existence is involved in problematic and relational terms. Keywords: human abilities; educability; adult education; informal education; community of inquiry.

The contributions in this chapter are intended to highlight some of the main aspects of Philosophy for Communities within the pedagogical discourse. The first contribution is aimed at placing this proposal in the broader framework of Adult Education. The second identifies this proposal as an effective opportunity to promote the specificity of the human condition.

1.  “Philosophy for Communities” and adult education It is well known that the pedagogical proposal made by Lipman-Sharp, known and practised as Philosophy for Children, has resulted in the construction of a curriculum that is aimed at children within the field of formal education. The research project underlying this publication, while placed within the educational framework backed by Lipman-Sharp, extends its scope in some ways. What we strive for is not so much, therefore, a Philosophy for Children, but rather a Philosophy for Adults. And again, not a philosophy “in the classroom” or that “goes to school” (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1980; Lipman 1988), but rather a philosophy out of school that explores the horizon and potentialities of Philosophy for Communities.

1.1. From the Philosophy for Children to the “Philosophy for Communities”: pedagogic implications It is clear that there are at least two explicit differences between Philosophy for Children and Philosophy for Communities: the first in relation to the composition of the participants; the second in reference to the place where this practice is promoted. 1 This chapter is the result of joint research. In particular, Sara Nosari wrote sect. 2 and Federico Zamengo sect. 1.

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In the first case, this discontinuity is also implicitly revealed by Lipman himself: pointing out that, in his experience, he rarely found children dissatisfied with philosophical discussion, he argues: “Children, unlike adults, do not look insistently for answers or conclusion” (Lipman 2003: 86). On the other hand, although Lipman was not directly interested in adults, in Thinking in Education it is not uncommon to find some observations involving adults and expressly addressing the purposes of Philosophy for Children: in particular, for Lipman, education to complex thinking, developed since childhood, would have a decisive role in view of the formation of “reasonable adults”: Children brought up in reasonable institutions are more likely to be reasonable than children raised under irrational circumstances. The latter, as we know, are more likely to be those who grow up irrational and raise their own children irrationally. More reasonable schools mean more reasonable future parents, more reasonable citizens, and more reasonable values all around (Lipman 2003: 11).

The difference between adults and children, also noted by Lipman, is obviously not found at the level of human dignity, but originates, at least in a preliminary and intuitive way, from the mere fact that adults have lived for a wider portion of time compared to minors. This “experience” translates into a different relationship and a particular stance towards existence: unlike children, adults would be more oriented towards finding answers or immediate solutions to problems. However, as regards the different places to promote the experience of a community of philosophical inquiry, outside a classroom, it seems that the emancipatory effects identified by Lipman within education to complex thought do not change in relation to the place where it is practised2. However, building a research community (community of inquiry) outside of an institutional path may seem more difficult: the continuous participation of the subjects involved in the proposal can indeed be a critical element. These discontinuities are interesting ideas in terms of pedagogical interpretation: the Lipman-Sharp proposal does not in principle exclude the possibility of being extended to other ages of life, or of being carried out in places other than the original ones. This research hypothesis also seems to welcome the explicit Deweyan invitation to rethink philosophy as a social practice capable of investigating people’s problems: “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosopher, for dealing with the problems of men” (Dewey 1980a: 46). 2 I am referring to the characteristics of Lipman’s complex thinking: critical, creative and caring, as well as a sensible and context-sensitive thought.

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Precisely for these reasons, the first aspect I would like to dwell on is the identification of a possible relationship between childhood, adulthood and philosophy. The definition of this relationship would, in fact, allow me to take the next step: to extend the legitimacy of Philosophy for Communities as a pedagogical practice to adults. Precisely in this sense, Kohan suggests that childhood is not only a stage of life, described in either subtractive or nostalgic terms as opposed to adulthood, but rather a dynamic condition typical of anyone facing a new beginning (of some activity, path or action). At this level, then, childhood and adulthood may have a lot in common: each of them is not a state, but a condition capable of asking questions. Childhood is a disposition able to accommodate one’s not knowing and asking questions, accepting the precariousness of the uncertainty and the partiality of one’s positions. In short, it is a “starting” condition that brings together human existence, at every stage of life, and the very origin of philosophising. It translates into the experience of openness and possibility, by doing without – or problematising – whatever is taken for granted. In these terms, then, in Philosophy for Communities, the adult who is “already grown up” is called to depotentiate himself: not in the unlikely attempt to be a child again, but rather with the aim to recover the simplicity and uncertainty of discovering or inventing. This reversal, which has the character of being able to linger and dwell, has nothing to do with the diffusion of the infatilist ethos among adults that has been highlighted by Barber as a typical trait of contemporaneity (Barber 2007). Rather, for me the recuperation of the peculiarity of infancy in adulthood leads exactly in the opposite direction: to the courage to ask questions and potentially change one’s framework of meaning3.

1.2.  Between learnification and the reflective turn Based on these observations, it is possible to look for contact points between Philosophy for Communities and the broader landscape of adult education, without thereby misunderstanding the specificity of the former. In the face of this aim, it seems interesting to note first and foremost the fruitful outdatedness of this proposal. From my point of view, Philosophy for Children-Communities is not just a particular educational method, but above all a pedagogical proposition that promotes an attitude – a complex way of dealing with reality. As a proposal, it has to deal with the current efficiency-drivenness of adult education: this paradigm 3 I am referring to the meaning described by Jack Mezirow (1991).

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metaphorically leads to the silent explosion of learning in the educational field4. The affirmation of the principles of long-life and long-wide learning has highlighted in recent decades an increase in training opportunities for adults involving both the formal and the informal field as well as different levels of experience: from the professional dimension to the wider and ever-flourishing “supermarket offers” of spare time. This explosion, however, has a distinctive feature: these are learning opportunities especially focused on individualistic learning, in which the learner is increasingly regarded as a potential buyer and the training provider focuses mainly on responses capable of meeting the needs of the learner-customer, both in individual terms and in relation to the economic and productive demands. In short, there seems to be a redescription of the process of education in terms of an economic transaction in which (1) the learner in the (potential) consumer, the one who has certain “needs”, in which (2) the teacher, the educator, or the educational institution is seen as the provider, that is, the one who is there to meet the needs of the learner, and where (3) education itself becomes a commodity – a “thing” – to be provided or delivered by the teacher or educational institutions and to be consumed by the learner (Biesta 2006: 20).

In this scenario, an idea of education understood as a process strictly related to the human ability to change, capable of involving the ethical and social dimension of existence, in problematic and relational terms, is slowly absorbed by seemingly more neutral approaches referred to as a generalised process of learning. The “new language of education”, however, does not exhaust its complexity: rather, it risks supporting an exclusively technical-instrumental interpretation of it. In this very perspective, Biesta defines this erosion process as the learnification of education, underlining how this new language risks remaining “empty”, as it is much more interested in the procedural dimension and much less able to question the contents of what it proposes (Biesta 2010: 15–19). In relation to these paradigmatic aspects of contemporaneity, the perspective of Philosophy for Communities may seem outdated: first of all, because – as already noted – it addresses people that, unlike children, might be less familiar with (and have less time for) the very act of asking questions. Secondly, because within an educational culture focused on individual performance and subjective needs, the practice taking place in the community of philosophical inquiry focuses on problem posing rather than problem solving, starting from the recognition of the cognitive and social value of common reflection and research. 4 Field 2006. In this regard, with particular reference to formal education, Martha Nussbaum (2010: 1–10) also speaks of silent crisis.

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What Philosophy for Communities offers is not a solution but a problematisation of the question itself. From my point of view, this does not mean excluding a priori the possibility that the community of inquiry might find some answers, because this might mean nipping an opportunity in the bud and not “following the argument where it leads” (Lipman 2003: 84), remaining stuck in the rhetoric of the question – which is no less paralysing than the search for immediate answers. Rather, what Philosophy for Communities can strive for is the implementation of a strategy of constant and shared in-depth analysis: posing new questions, also in the light of the potential intermediate solutions that have emerged. Dewey makes a similar point when, dealing with the issue of the sources of educational science, he identifies philosophy – especially the philosophy of education – as a contribution aimed at “range, freedom and constructive or creative invention”. He concludes: The philosophy of education not only draws its original materials as to ends and value from actual experience in education, but it goes back to these experiences for testing, confirmation, modification, and the provision of further materials. This is what is meant when it is said its work is intermediate and instrumental, not original or final (Dewey 1980b: 30).

If this statement inevitably calls for a more general reflection on the potential formative role of philosophy, as well as the role it can play within a community, from the pedagogical standpoint the educational potential of Philosophy for Communities is mainly expressed as the experience of a specific setting aiming to be inclusive and community-driven. The construction of a community of inquiry, in fact, cannot of course be traced back to the field of formal education; however, it remains an intentionally promoted activity: the setting, for example – to refer to one of the simplest and most obvious elements – the circular disposition that allows all participants to look at each other, or the construction of an informal atmosphere, are very important elements within the organisation of a session. Indeed, they implicitly express the connotations of that specific experience: in Deweyan terms, the latter becomes the “means and goals of education”5 among adults. And it is precisely based on the enhancement of experience, then, that it seems interesting to place the proposal of Philosophy for Communities within the broadest reflective turn that has affected the field of adult education. Since the late 1980s, as is well known, many researches, united by a revitalisation of Deweyan thinking, have analysed the relationship between experience and learning in adulthood, enhancing the moment of reflection in action. These 5 On this, see the final paragraph of John Dewey’s Experience and Education (1958: 61–62).

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contributions arise from the scope of professional epistemologies and focus, for example, on learning in organisations6. However, being an interpretative and analytical construct, the paradigm of reflexivity can be transformed into a specific mode of cultivation of reflective skills within a community, not just in professional terms. The reflexive and self-corrective way of retrieving a topic dear to the Lipmanian proposal does not allow for “shortcuts”: it requires patience, time, participation and implies decentralisation. So, Philosophy for Communities can be understood as an opportunity for Transformative Learning, as it does not merely rectify a “mistake” that emerges from practice but urges to question the very premises of one’s reflection (Mezirov 2000). As has been noted, the Transformative Learning construct presents itself in a way that is not homogeneous (Newman 2012). Therefore, the contribution that Philosophy for Communities can certainly provide in this field is alternative to the possible individualistic outcomes of adult education (Brookfield & Holst 2011). Rather, the presupposition of a community and the attention to the exercise of a social practice call for a critical retrieval of Paulo Freire’s contribution (2001: 54), in the perspective of a problematising adult education.

2.  Philosophy for the education of human capacities 2.1.  The invention of existence According to Paulo Freire, humans have turned the “life support” – the dimension of animality, where other species remain – into “world”, thereby inventing existence: Within the life support, human life takes on a specific qualitative difference in relation to animal life. Animals, for example, operate in given dimensions of space, confined in some case, unrestricted in others, in which they develop “affective” boundaries necessary for their survival, growth, and development. […] The invention of “existence” necessarily involves the emergence of language, culture, and communication at levels of complexity much greater than that which obtains at the level of survival, self-defence, and self-conservation. The human capacity to intervene, to compare, to judge, to decide, to choose, to desist makes men and women capable of acts of greatness, of dignity, and at the same time, of the unthinkable in terms of indignity. This capacity makes men and women capable to make the world either beautiful or ugly (Freire 2001: 52–53).

6 In this perspective, a decisive contribution came from Donald A. Schön (1983, 1987) and Chris Argyris (Argyris & Schön 1996).

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Man invented existence essentially because he is endowed with extraordinary skills that make him an incomplete being to be completed  7. Far from being a sign or proof of weakness, this unfinishedness is the condition that allows humans to be recognised not only for what they are or could be, but especially for what they could initiate8. Unfinishedness, in fact, does not commit humans to a simple act of completion – which would make them mere executors – but faces them with the possibility (which is also “task” and “potency”, “solicitation” and “promise”)9 to create a world – a world made of relations and roles, values and goals – that could not exist otherwise10. This unfinishedness is marked by the abilities that – according to Paul Ricœur’s (2005) “phenomenology of human capacity” – enable humans to recognise themselves as beings able to speak, to act, to narrate and to self-narrate, and ultimately to establish themselves as able to be responsible. These are particular capacities that reveal the ethical and social character of the human being, because they necessarily imply a relationship with others. This is mainly because, in exercising these skills, humans inevitably encounter others: “The ‘I could’ can go beyond the self as the power of a singular subject to include the possibility of others […]. One does not simply act for oneself; one acts for or against others” (Kearney 2010: 53). The implication does not only concern the “realm of action”: these skills involve relationships with others because, to “operate”, they need others. The ability to speak, for example, places humans in a structure that includes a speaker and an interlocutor. The same applies to the ability to act, which “makes something happen” in a physical and social space in front of which the human being declares: “it was me”. The abilities with which the human being invents existence, however, do not imply relationships with others solely understood as inescapable or functional

7 “The unfinishedness is essential to human condition. […] My destiny is not a given but something that needs to be constructed and for which I must assume responsibility” (Freire 2001: 52–54). 8 It is “the transformation of the question ‘What’ is the human? Into the question ‘Who’ is the capable self?” (Greisch 2010: 101). 9 “L’homme capable is both descriptive and normative: it is what we are and what we should try to become” (Kaplan 2010: 113). 10 The extraordinary nature of this condition of unfinishedness has been underlined by Hannah Arendt (1958: 177–178): “It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before. […] The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable”.

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presence. “In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world […]. But – claims Hannah Arendt in her presentation of the human condition – this revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness” (Arendt 1958: 179–180). The relationship with others is implicit in these “creative” capacities because it is implicated in their originally educable character11. In fact, these capacities, outside the boundaries of the relationship, could not be discovered or recognised or accomplished as such.

2.2.  The educability of “human” capacities These capacities – which allow the human being to affirm and distinguish himself as a being capable of inventing existence, being able to initiate change – are waiting to be initiated. For them, the educational process does not coincide either with exercise or with transmission. While belonging to the human being as such, they are not already owned, and simply have to be exercised: their action does not coincide with an implementation that develops the anticipated content or makes it explicit (as is the case, for example, for the ability to walk). Nor are they acquired or acquirable through a more or less structured and complex learning process. There is no educational method or strategy that can transmit them (as happens, for example, with the ability to sew)12. These capacities await to be put to the test. This test cannot be verification, preparation or demonstration based on a result taken at the same time as a model and as a goal; instead, it must be an opportunity to question, appeal and, as such, await an answer. As a consequence, education has the task of intervening on these abilities as a first beginning: it must then commit itself to setting up a test that would “create a beginning”13, so humans can recognise these capacities and start practising them.

11 Educability is the most important essential feature of the human being. On the principle of educability and on pedagogical causality, see eds. Siljander, Kivelä & Sutinen 2012. 12 For this reason, the “ownership” of these abilities is neither verifiable nor measurable. If it were measurable in terms of a verification or measurement, the invention of existence would lose its creative character and would become the product or the result of an acquisition, of a previous programming, and of a subsequent application. 13 On the issue of the “first beginning” see Walter Kohan (2015).

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The human being, in fact, needs a trial space where to begin to speak, act, narrate and self-narrate, and finally become responsible. Engaged in a test that starts with an action that does not cause, but appeals14, education can only be an encounter. Only in a test experienced as an encounter with others can the capabilities that specify the human being prove themselves and take shape. However, to paraphrase Romano Guardini, there is no encounter when, turning around the corner, one bumps into another: there is no “encounter” in the case of two or more billiard balls that clash together. There is an encounter only when it is possible to experience oneself in comparison and in communion with others15, that is, when there is mutual recognition as beings that discover, affirm and complete themselves only in the space of the “between” and the “with” of relationship: If you consider the individual by himself, then you see of man just as much as you see of the moon; only man with man provides as full image. If you consider the aggregate by itself, then you see of man just as much as we see of the Milky Way; only man with man is a completely outlined form. Consider man with man, and you see human life, dynamic, twofold, the given and the receiver, he who does and he who endures, the attacking force and defending force, the nature which investigates and the nature which supplies information, the request begged and granted – and always both together, completing one another in mutual contribution, together showing forth man (Buber 2002: 243–244).

Attending spaces of encounter thus becomes indispensable for testifying the abilities that distinguish humans as such16. It is then the responsibility of education to make people engage in authentic and meaningful encounter spaces, but above all – following Martin Buber – spaces that are “binding”17.

14 “What, then, does it mean to educate? Certainly – writes Romano Guardini (1987: 221–222) – not that a piece of inanimate matter gets shape, like the stone by the sculptor’s hand. Rather, to educate means that I give this man’s courage toward himself ”. 15 The encounter is the experience of a continuous and inexhaustible dialectic between identity and difference through which those who meet become part of the world (Dewey 1958). 16 “Attending a place is not simply the act of physically passing through that place: it is a matter of absorbing the spirit of the place in our soul, letting it affect us and at the same time projecting our state of mind on it, as a reflection” (Mathieu 1998: 1). 17 “From time immemorial man has known that he is the subject most deserving of his own study, but he has also fought shy of treating this subject as a whole, that is, in accordance with its total character. Sometimes he takes a run at it, but the difficulty of this concern with his own being soon overpowers and exhausts him, and in silent resignation he withdraws – either to consider all things in heaven and earth save man,

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It is an endless responsibility because it does not cease with reaching a particular age or giving up a particular role. The unfinishedness characterising human capacities requires constant attendance that reminds them of a task that cannot be carried out definitively; consequently, the education that brings about the ability to speak, to act, to narrate and to self-narrate so as to be responsible is not accomplished by the initiation of these capacities because it cannot intervene once and for all: in fact, it accompanies the human being throughout his or her existence. At the same time, however, the same education cannot be reduced to a retention exercise, nor can it repeat itself in the same way.

2.3.  Philosophy as a testing ground Practising human capacities is indispensable for them to be able to “reveal the meaning of what otherwise would remain an unbearable sequence of sheer happenings” (Arendt 1983: 104). Philosophical practices – declined in the ways, times and places of Philosophy for Communities – respond to this need by bringing others (and ourselves) together into possible experienced real life situations (borderline cases, common stories, made up stories), which initiate and exercise human capacities by raising – or pedagogically, generating – questions of meaning18. These testing grounds opened up by philosophical practices test these capabilities without asking questions of knowledge. This is what Matthew Lipman states when outlining their field of action: We are not like trees, whose cross-sections reveal the mere addition each year of a new circumference, we are cumulative beings, and each increment forces its way into our summed-up self and causes all the other parts to readjust their relationship with one another, even while the increment is itself altered as we seek to compel it to adapt to its new environment (Lipman 2003: 292–293).

Consequently, attending these testing grounds means practising human capacities (to speak, to act etc.) first of all as judgment skills19: the abilities that invent or to divide man into departments which can be treated singly, in a less problematic, less powerful and less binding way” (Buber 2002: 140–141). 18 The question is, certainly, the most important and effective way to start: it opens a space of possibilities that is offered as a common experience. “The question of meaning – in fact – is not satisfied with an individualistic answer” (Mollo 1996: 27). 19 Following Paul Ricœur (2000: 127–128), it is possible to distinguish four different meanings of judgment: “First, in a weak sense, to judge is to opine. However, an opinion is expressed about something. In a slightly stronger sense, to judge is to value, to assess. In this way, a hierarchical element is introduced, expressing a preference, an evaluation, an approbation. A third degree of force expresses the encounter between

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existence, giving it a “human” destination, are – and could not be otherwise – abilities of choice and action that answer the questions emerging from the situations encountered, by taking a stance20. These practices educate – initiate and exercise – the abilities that distinguish the human being through a questioning that does not intend to teach someone something. These practices - read in the light of Karl Jaspers’ thought – consist, on the contrary, in “shaking, inciting, a continuous appeal to one’s strength and that of others”. These practices do not seek to achieve a result, but want people to experience a common research aimed at the “clarification” of existence (Jaspers 1995: 230), without making the mistake of defining it  21. The capacities that have to be tested, in fact, look to the future22: only thanks to them can the human being achieve change in a new and unexpected (“just”, “honest”, “democratic”, “inclusive”, “free”, “responsible”… human) way.

References Arendt, H., 1958, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Arendt, H., 1983, ‘Isak Dinesen (1885–1963)’, in Men in Dark Times, pp. 95–109, Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego-New York-London. Argyris, C. & Schön, D.A., 1996, Organizational Learning II. Theory, Methods and Practice, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc., Boston.

the subjective and the objective sides of judgment. Objective side: someone takes a proposition as true, good, just, legal; subjective side: he subscribes to it. Finally, at a deeper level […], judgment proceeds from the conjunction between understanding and will. The understanding that considers the true and the false – the will that decides. In this way we have reached the strong sense of the word ‘judge’: not just to opine, value, take as true, but in the final analysis, to take a stand”. 20 “Those who wish to devote themselves to a thoroughgoing reworking of the design of education – goes on Lipman – should take very seriously this understanding of judgement as expressive of one’s person”. 21 Hannah Arendt’s warning to storytelling can also be applied to philosophical practices, as they both should “reveal meaning without committing the error of defining it, that it brings about consent and reconciliation with things as they really are” (Arendt 1983: 105). 22 Educational professions, according to Lipman, look to the future. For example, “the teacher, whose professional life is given over to making judgement of how best to prepare students to make judgement (unlike the judge, whose professional life involves passing judgement upon someone else’s past judgement) exemplifies judgement in its forward-looking aspect” (Lipman 2003: 293).

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Barber, B.R., 2007, Con$umed. How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole, Norton & Company, New York. Biesta, G.J.J., 2006, Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for a Human Future, Paradigm, Boulder. Biesta, G.J.J., 2010, Good Education in an Age of Measurement, Paradigm, Boulder. Brookfield, S.D. & Holst, J.D., 2011, Radicalizing Learning: Adult Education for a Just World, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Buber, M., 2002, What is Man? (1938), in Between Man and Man, transl. R. Gregor-Smith, Routledge, London-New York. Dewey, J., 1958, Experience and Nature, Dover Publications, New York. Dewey, J., 1980a, The Need of a Recovery of Philosophy, in The Middle Works 1899–1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 10, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Dewey, J., 1980b, The Sources of a Science of Education, in The Later Works 1925–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 5, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Dewey, J., 1988, Experience and Education, in The Later Works 1925–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 13, pp. 3–62, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Field, J., 2006, Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order, second edition, Trentham Books, Stoke-on-Trent. Freire, P., 2001, Pedagogy of Freedom. Ethics, Democracy, and Courage, transl. P. Clarke, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. Greisch, J., 2010, ‘Toward Which Recognition?’, in B. Treanor & H.I. Venema (eds.), A Passion for Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricœur, pp. 90–111, Fordham University Press, New York. Guardini, R., 1987, ‘La credibilità dell’educatore’, in Persona e libertà. Saggi di fondazione della teoria pedagogica, Editrice La Scuola, Brescia. Jaspers, K., 1995, The Philosophy of Existence, transl. R.F. Grabay, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Kaplan, D.M., 2010, ‘Paul Ricœur and Development Ethics’, in B. Treanor & H.I. Venema (eds.), A Passion for Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricœur, pp. 112–128, Fordham University Press, New York. Kearney, R., 2010, ‘Capable Man, Capable God’, in B. Treanor & H.I. Venema (eds.), A Passion for Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricœur, pp. 49–61, Fordham University Press, New York. Kohan, W.O., 2015, Childhood, Education and Philosophy. New for an old relationship, Routledge, London-New York.

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Lipman, M., 1988, Philosophy goes to School, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. & Oscanyan, F.S., 1980, Philosophy in the Classroom, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Mathieu, V., 1998, Per una cultura dell’essere, Armando, Roma. Mezirow, J., 1991, Transformative Dimension of Adult Learning, John Wiley & Sons, New York. Mezirow, J., 2000, Learning as Transformation: Critical Perspectives on a Theory in Progress, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Mollo, G., 1996, La via del senso. Alla ricerca dei significati dell’esistenza per un’autentica formazione culturale, Editrice La Scuola, Brescia. Newman, M., 2012, ‘Calling Transformative Learning into Question: Some Mutinous Thoughts’, Adult Education Quarterly 62, 36–55. Nussbaum, M.C., 2010, Not for Profit. Why Democracy needs the Humanities, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford. Ricœur, P., 2000, The Just, transl. D. Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London. Ricœur, P., 2005, The Course of Recognition, transl. D. Pellauer, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Schön, D.A., 1983, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action, Basic Books, New York. Schön, D.A., 1987, Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Siljander, P., Kivelä, A. & Sutinen, A. (eds.), 2012, Theories of Bildung and Growth. Connections and Controversies Between Continental Education Thinking and American Pragmatism, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam.

Section 2 Accounts of Community Experiences

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Nicolò Valenzano1

Chapter 4 – Promoting and Assessing Community Development Through Philosophy Abstract: In this chapter, we will show how the Lipman-Sharp approach to philosophy can be employed to promote community development in informal contexts and with adult participants. After clarifying the affinities between the practice of philosophy and community development, we look into how to evaluate the philosophically enhanced community development. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); community development; assessing community development; evaluation of Philosophy for Communities; critical lens.

1. Introduction In this chapter, which links the first and second parts of the book, we will try to show how the practice of philosophy according to the model presented in Chapter 1 (the Philosophy for Children conceived of by Lipman and Sharp) can be concretely used to promote community development in informal contexts and with adult participants (in these cases, we use the term Philosophy for Communities)2. In order to achieve this goal, we could not but start from a preliminary inquiry into the current historical-cultural context and the debate about the meaning of the term “community” (Chapter 2) as well as the “educational” relevance of the relational dynamics implicated (Chapter 3). What we propose in this chapter is to highlight how the research team of “Philosophy and Community Practices” has developed a critical lens to observe, evaluate and promote community development through dense dialogue and research-action with the case study described in the next chapter (Chapter 5). To do this, we have first tried to reinterpret the meaning of the phrase “community development” in the light of the contribution of the practice of philosophy (§ 2). Then we looked into how to evaluate a community development that makes use 1 This chapter presents the results of a joint research. In particular, Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo wrote sects. 1, 4, 5 and 6, and Nicolò Valenzano sects. 2 and 3. 2 As already mentioned in footnote 2 to the Introduction, in the chapters of this volume the acronym “p4c” stands for both Philosophy for Children and Philosophy for Communities, with the exception of the instances where we want to highlight possible differences between those two practices.

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of the practice of philosophy (§ 3). To this end, we have tried to develop a critical lens through which to interpret and evaluate both the p4c interventions conducted in the project (discussed in detail in Chapter 5), as well as some other interventions conducted with similar methodology in various contexts (see Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9). Comparing the latter to the project has made it possible to obtain a more accurate critical feedback about the possibilities offered by the philosophical practice for community development (Chapter 10).

2.  The practice of philosophy and community development From the point of view of social policies, community development is defined as “a process whereby community members come together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems”3. From the point of view of specialised professionals, it is defined as “a practice-based profession and an academic discipline that promotes participative democracy, sustainable development, rights, economic opportunity, equality and social justice, through the organisation, education and empowerment of people within their communities, whether these be of locality, identity or interest, in urban and rural settings”4. Our reference to both definitions is explained by the intention to keep together the political, social and research aspects. We certainly do not intend to reduce p4c to a community development tool or technique. Rather, we would like to clarify the affinities between the practice of philosophy and community development, from the point of view of both their theoretical approach and their educational proposal. Therefore, we will only focus on some aspects that we deem important for the encounter between philosophy and community development: a) the focus on the plurality of points of view, b) the centrality of problems and problematisation, c) the construction of social bonds, d) inclusion and participation and, finally, e) the dimension of empowerment. P4c encourages pluralistic interpretations of problems because it brings different (individual and subjective) perspectives into an interpersonal and social context, the outside world and so on. Sharing and problematising views is stimulated by the reflection and dialogue that take place in the community of philosophical 3 Frank & Smith 1999: 3. This definition is taken up almost literally by the United Nations: https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA/bead44b0ac66-48f8-86b1-ff78c6c334da (viewed 15 September 2017). 4 http://www.iacdglobal.org (viewed 15 September 2017). See eds. Craig et al. 2008. See as well Bhattacharyya (2004), who analyses many definitions of community development elaborated over the last forty years and proposes “a parsimonious definition”.

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inquiry. As seen in the previous chapters, one of the characteristics of p4c and its specific philosophical aspect is reflective thinking, with significant educational consequences: “reflective thinking is prepared to recognise the factors that make for bias, prejudice, and self-deception. It involves thinking about its procedures at the same time as it involves thinking about its subject matter” (Lipman 2003: 26). Another specifically “philosophical” element in p4c sessions is the role of dialogue, able to connect the transformative dimension of the self to that of the community: if “conversation is an exchange”, then “dialogue is a mutual exploration, an investigation, an inquiry” (Lipman 2003: 87–88). Dialogue thus constitutes a space of encounter, comparison, exchange and negotiation where participants are invited to first inquire about the existence of a common research interest (a problem, a topic, etc.), or the willingness to find one, and then analyse it with a self-correcting procedure aimed not so much at finding solutions but rather at exploring the very possibility of a plurality of views. The caring dimension of thought, underlined by Lipman, emphasises the empathic element of opening up to the other and the appreciative one of valuing the other, which is then recognised as an intrinsic value (Lipman 2003, 269–271 and 264–266). Second, reflection and dialogue shape p4c as a problematising education practice in the Freirean sense of the term: the problem is first and foremost problematised in its complexity5. By analogy with what generally happens in community development projects (Christens 2012; Lavanco & Novara 2012), in p4c “the community of inquiry takes the problematic seriously”, thus recognising the importance of reflection on what constitutes a problem and how it is framed (Lipman 2003: 123). As already pointed out in the previous contributions (see Chapters 1 and 3), the act of asking questions, which opens the sessions after reading the stimulus text, acquires value as a function of the “potential of putting a portion of the world in question” (Lipman 2003: 99). Also, the act of asking has a generative function: it allows you to question your beliefs and open up to the dimension of possibility. In community development contexts, p4c allows you to deal with actual central issues, including “problem-posing” or “problem reframing”. Reflection on experience and dialogue also invite participants to indirectly consider solving problems (“problem-solving”) or, if the problem is complex, to express their creative imagination to propose alternative solutions. The emphasis on the philosophical and educational role of dialogue in p4c brings a third element of interest into community development dynamics. P4c

5 Freire 1970. As regards the relationship between Freire and Lipman, see Lipman 2008: 148.

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focuses on the construction of social bonds, contrasting with the progressive erosion of the relational dimension that characterises many contemporary social contexts (see Chapter 2)6. The community that is established through philosophical research is a pluralistic and flexible relational community, capable of creating trusting relationships among its members and fostering coping skills (Berg, Meegan & Deviney 1998; eds. Marchetti, Di Terlizzi & Petrocchi 2008). P4c thus highlights a close interdependence between the individual and social levels of social relations, according to a dual movement by which the individual feeds and is fed by the community itself (see Chapter 1, Section 4.2). In this context, one of the decisive questions concerns the possibility that p4c may contribute to developing the sense of community, assuming that the individual is an inviolable core that the community must not phagocytise7. Regarding the aspect of problematising education, sessions generally tend to suspend and question the established social conventions, prejudices and mental patterns. The reflectiveness, dialogue and mutual respect activated in p4c sessions favour both this individual distancing and the exposure of one’s individuality to the other. These elements enhance another factor relative to the community dimension: the inclusive character embedded in the Lipmanian model. This dimension manifests itself in two ways: on the one hand, as an initial welcoming reception that helps one open up and appear vulnerable to the other; on the other hand, the consequent inclusion of differences that can be attributed both to the individual and to his ideas. In the perspective of community development, participation is the premise, tool and goal of educational projects aimed at social change. P4c is consistently characterised by the ability to include each participant by inviting everyone to speak freely (both in the agenda stage and in the discussion phase) and by accepting a plurality of expressive registers (from argumentation to imagination to narrative). P4c also invites those who are usually at the margins of social participation to intervene and share their ideas because it stimulates the emergence of all points of view. In this way, p4c makes room for minority narratives because it offers the opportunity to break the tacit consent by which the actors of a context accept the social conventions in which they find themselves. Lipman’s emphasis on judgment – namely the sensitivity to one’s context and circumstances – is another non-secondary aspect of convergence between p4c and community development. For Lipman, “critical thinking in this sense is a descendant

6 See for example Bauman 1999; Etzioni 1993. 7 Lipman (2003: 102) himself refers to “solidifying the community” as one of the goals of the Community of philosophical inquiry.

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of Aristotle’s consciousness that individual situations need to be examined on their own terms” – and this applies to contexts both inside and outside philosophical sessions (Lipman 2003: 219). In this framework, one should emphasise the caring dimension of thought activated and developed in p4c encounters: attention to the other is to be interpreted not towards the generic other, but also in the more specific sense of the other that is actually present. The ability to assess the circumstances in which a conflict of ideas or points of view is to be embraced or avoided, in which disagreement should or should not be manifested, is a distinctive feature of the “empowered” person. In this dynamic, an important role is played by reflection, which is decisive in p4c sessions (see Chapter 1). Reflection on oneself, on others and on the world allows the person to pay attention to the context and to evaluate one’s possibilities of action in those particular circumstances. The term “empowerment” (used earlier) typically signifies the very process by which individuals gain the access to and control of resources that are important to them, the aim being “to enhance the possibilities for people to control their own lives” (Rappaport 1981: 15). The concept of empowerment today is widely used in social and educational sciences and refers both to subjective self-determination and to participation in community life, connecting the individual dimension to the social dimension, similarly to what has been pointed out in relation to p4c in Chapters 1 and 2. In p4c sessions – as we have just seen – we encourage mutual respect among participants and the ability to take care of their relationship. Such actions are understood as propaedeutic for the philosophical inquiry, participation and the shared construction of a sense of belonging: these characteristics are indeed consistent with a community development approach aimed at individual and collective empowerment. The community of philosophical inquiry, moreover, contributes to empowerment to the extent that, acting on community narrative dynamics, it allows each participant to observe reality with different eyes and ends up feeding a sense of “learned hopefulness”8. Increasing the individuals’ self-determination skills and capabilities also increases the group’s relational and negotiating skills, self-awareness and ability to handle conflicts in a profitable way. In a virtuous spiral, an empowered community further strengthens its members: in p4c sessions, social bonds are created that develop the empowerment of the individual and work on the complex bundle of individual abilities that can in turn contribute to “making the community” and to producing community empowerment.

8 Rappaport 2000. The concept of “learned hopefulness” is also analysed by Marc A. Zimmerman and Julian Rappaport (1988) as opposed to that of “learned helplessness” proposed by Steven F. Maier and Martin E. Seligman (1976).

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3. The evaluation of the impact of philosophy on community development According to Lipman and Sharp’s original intentions, Philosophy for Children should not be solely assessed as a product and a purely quantitative analysis of improved reasoning skills in school contexts. Indeed, in addition to the dimensions of complex reasoning and thinking, p4c implies (as seen in Chapter 1) also a socially inclusive dimension and a personality formation that are difficult to measure through standardised tests9. Yet, as meta-analyses show, much of the research carried out in this regard available today has evaluated p4c in terms of product, even when focusing on its long-term impact10. Our attempt to assess the impact of the practice of philosophy on community development was therefore facing a twofold difficulty: first of all, we did not want to reduce the complexity of the educational proposal of p4c, which implies a plurality of levels, variables, etc. that were irreducible to measurable indicators; secondly, as already pointed out at the time (see Chapters 1 and 3), we were dealing with adult extracurricular communities, to which we proposed Philosophy for Communities activities. Therefore, the evaluation of the effectiveness of philosophy could not be measured solely in the educational terms of “reasoning abilities” or as the contribution offered by philosophy to the acquisition of school-related learning goals linked to curricular teaching. In addition, the evaluation of the effectiveness of philosophy in extracurricular contexts with adults should reconcile the specific requirements of philosophy with the evaluation system characteristic of community development processes. As is evident from the scientific literature (see for instance Weiss 1998; Patton 2002), no process in the educational sense can give up the evaluation instance, even if the latter is transferred – as in the case of p4c – to the very members of the community of inquiry in the form of self-evaluation. The question we faced was therefore how to assess the impact of philosophy on community development processes. The picture was further complicated by the adult and extracurricular context in which we proposed p4c. Hence the need to use qualitative tools to grasp the complexity of community-oriented non-cognitive processes activated in p4c sessions. The reflection of the research team of the “Philosophy and Community Practices” project, compared with the practical results obtained (MondoQui case 9 See for example the New Jersey Test of Reasoning, proposed as part of the early Philosophy for Children in the late 1970s (Shipman 1983; Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1980: 217–224, Appendix B). See as well Mortier 2008. 10 See for example Trickey & Topping 2004; García Moriyón, Rebollo & Colom 2005; Colom, García Moriyón, Magro & Morilla 2014.

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study, in particular the reconnaissance of needs, as described in Chapter 5), has brought about the proposal to focus on some evaluation methods considered coherent both with the complexity of p4c (see Chapter 1) and with that of the association where we have developed the project. The first element calls for the focus on interpersonal dynamics: to what extent, why and how did they contribute to generating change (on individuals, on the community as a whole, on a cognitive, emotional or attitudinal level, etc.)? The goal is not only to allow for some generalisation of the results obtained but also to make the practice comparable and hopefully applicable to other contexts. The specific object of this operation is not to get data and measurements, but interpretations and theories to understand the reasons behind the changes. As highlighted, for example, by Theory Based Evaluation, often the expectations of change are related to the underlying theoretical assumptions used to evaluate it (Weiss 1997). In the accounts that are included in the next chapters, the authors try to do more than simply determine the effects of a particular social education program, focusing on the mechanisms, the circumstances and the theories explaining the reasons as to why one should expect those effects. To describe the reasons as to why change happens and why an educational proposal does (or does not) work, one has to go into the complexity of the processes that take place in p4c sessions. The second evaluation method used in the next chapters, indeed, refers to process evaluation. Its main tools are observation and listening, in relation to which we have tried to clarify some indicators along with their qualitative levels. We have therefore chosen to investigate two aspects at the observational stage: complex thinking, indicated by Lipman as a set of critical, creative and caring thinking, and the social and inclusive dimension that is realised in the dialogical activity of the community of inquiry. We would like to mention only two tools by which these aspects of p4c can be subject to a process evaluation: the participatory assessment and the “empowerment evaluation”, which we have tried to re-qualify in a qualitative sense in order to address the complexity of factors present in p4c activities, which are characteristic of relational dynamics between adult subjects in extracurricular contexts. Consistently with the so-called fourth generation evaluation (the most relevant for the present case, as it revolves around the centrality of the demands, interests and problems brought forward by a group of stakeholders)11, evaluation 11 Guba & Lincoln 1989; Whitmore 1998. The so-called “fourth generation” evaluation seems to us to be more relevant than the first, second and third generation ones, which instead emphasise (respectively) measurement, description of objectives and understanding of the evolution of the educational project and the results achieved.

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is conceived of as a social and political process that is continually and recursively implemented, where learning and teaching are hybridised. The participatory assessment of social educational interventions is based on the assumption that if evaluating means giving value to facts, then it is important that the protagonists involved should do so. This implies a continuous negotiation process among the members of the community of inquiry, which in p4c sessions takes shape in the conclusive stage of self-evaluation. As outlined in the next chapters, this metareflective phase involves the participants in the evaluation of the process itself and provides them with tools to acquire an informed attitude with regard to the issues to be addressed, the goals to be defined and the solutions to be found. The importance of this self-assessment is consistent with Lipman’s emphasis on the education of the reflective component of thought: “reflective thinking includes recursive thinking, metacognitive thinking, self-corrective thinking, and all those other forms of thinking that involve reflection on their own methodology at the same time as they examine their subject matter” (Lipman 2003: 27). The concluding phase of each p4c session also allows for a reflection on the unforeseen and unpredictable outcomes of the community discussion and, in line with the theoretical framework of the participatory assessment, induces both researchers/ observers and participants to make a collaborative effort to identify the meaning of the dialogue itself, as well as its “philosophical” value. In the perspective of the empowerment evaluation, the guiding criterion of the assessment path is the development of a community’s ability to carry out some operations, including using concepts, tools and evaluation data to reinforce the subjects’ skills and power, as well as their capability of self-determination (eds. Fetterman & Wandersman 2005). In p4c, thanks to the self-evaluation phase, participants reflect on the practice itself, evaluating it in the light of their expectations and their research path: this enhances one’s sense of mastery over what one is doing. Perceived as such, the process of evaluation is not only directed to the production of useful and informational results, but also to “enhancing the self-development and political influence of participants” (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman 1999: 58). From this point of view, and as outlined in the next chapters, p4c requires particular attention to the participants’ involvement and empowerment, both in the planning phase of the evaluation practices and during the self-evaluation and metareflection concluding every session.

4.  A critical lens to look at experience In line with what has been discussed so far and with the aim of assessing the impact of the social practice of philosophy on community development, we have

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chosen to translate assessment instances into a number of questions that we have submitted to the authors of the reports contained in the following Chapters (5–9). The objective is to verify whether the evaluative hypotheses deduced from the case study directly connected to the project (MondoQui, described in Chapter 5) can be relied on and, if so, to what extent it also applies to similar situations (that is to say, p4c with adults and in informal contexts – see Daniel 2014) carried out elsewhere. This set of questions aims to act as a critical lens with a dual value: first of all, it is an instrument by which to observe and evaluate – in the field of scientific research – specific community experiences, in order to highlight their similarities and differences, as well as to explore the possibility of comparing, transferring and generalising the results achieved; secondly, it is a tool for the members of the community of inquiry itself to use in self-evaluation so as to increase their self-reflection skills. The questions therefore put the emphasis on why the experience of community dialogue can be termed “philosophical”, thus trying to focus on the philosophical specificity of p4c. Two questions (questions no. 1 and 2, see the questionnaire in the Appendix) concern internal aspects of the educational proposal of p4c: these elements may appear technical, but affect the very identity of this practice and involve more general notions of philosophy, education and community. On the one hand, it is interesting to study the role played in p4c sessions by the stimulus text (question no. 1), investigating not only the characteristics it must have in order to “work” and succeed in triggering dialogue between participants, but also how and why it works. On the other hand, experience reports allow one to reflect on the facilitator’s role in p4c sessions (question no. 2), analysing in particular his or her tasks and influence on the dialogue within the community of inquiry. Other questions explore the possibility (theoretically hypothesised in Chapter 3) that the Lipman-Sharp model should be specifically adapted to adult contexts. This calls for more urgent questions about the role played in p4c sessions by past and present experiences (question no. 3), as well as the relevance to the community dialogue of the social role played by each participant in ordinary life (question no. 4). A further question relates to the connection between social skills and p4c, both to investigate the importance of social skills in p4c sessions and to speculatively understand how the community of philosophical inquiry contributes to developing those skills (question no. 5). The last question relates to the meaning and evaluation of p4c sessions according to process indicators addressing the following aspects: inclusion and participation, reasoning skills and dialogic practice (question no. 6). The multiplicity of proposed indicators, analysed from a qualitative point of view, makes it possible

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to understand the complexity of the dimensions involved in p4c, especially when practised in extracurricular contexts and aimed at community development.

5. Conclusions Let’s now move on to the reports of the various experiences of p4c, which are included in Chapters 5–9. In a later chapter (see Chapter 10), we will draw the conclusions and analyse the degree of similarity or dissimilarity of the narrated experiences. In particular, we will try to assess whether and to what extent p4c has had the impact hypothesised in the theoretical-designing phase and whether and to what extent the proposed critical lens (see the questionnaire in Appendix) has made this visible to both the researchers and the participants themselves. As for the case studies, we chose them according to the criteria that would allow for the subsequent critical-comparative examination: A) one case study was conducted directly by the team of the “Philosophy and Community Practices” project (see Chapter 5), while others are independent and precede it (see Chapters 6–9); B) three case studies were conducted in Italy (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7), one in Spain (see Chapter 8) and one in Brazil (see Chapter 9); C) three case studies involved adult participation in extracurricular contexts according to the Philosophy for Communities proposal (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7), while two were conducted in schools under the educational proposal of Philosophy for Children (see Chapters 8 and 9).

6. Appendix Here are the questions we have asked the authors of the reports presented in Chapters 5–9 of this publication: 1. What was the role of the stimulus text in p4c sessions? 2. What was the facilitator’s role? 3. In the community discussion, how important were the single participants’ experiences (their lives, problems, beliefs, convictions, etc.)? 4. In the sessions of community dialogue, was people’s role in ordinary life (social status, profession, etc.) relevant? 5. How relevant were social skills in p4c sessions? Have the latter helped develop such skills? If so, how? 6. If you had to assess ex post the community dialogue in terms of inclusion, participation and the development of reasoning skills and dialogical practice, what would you say?

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References Bauman, Z., 1999, In Search of Politics, Polity Press, Cambridge. Berg, C.A., Meegan, S.P. & Deviney, F.P., 1998, ‘A Social-contextual Model of Coping with Everyday Problems across the Lifespan’, International Journal of Behavioral Development 22(2), 239–261. Bhattacharyya, J.R., 2004, ‘Theorizing Community Development’, Journal of the Community Development Society 34(2), 5–34. Christens, B.D., 2012, ‘Targeting Empowerment in Community Development: A Community Psychology Approach to Enhancing Local Power and Well-being’, Community Development Journal 47(4), 538–554. Colom, R., García Moriyón, F., Magro, C. & Morilla, E., 2014, ‘The Long-term Impact of Philosophy for Children: A Longitudinal Study (Preliminary Results)’, Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis 35(1), 50–56. Craig, G., Popple, K. & Shaw, M. (eds.), 2008, Community Development in Theory and Practice: An International Reader, Spokesman, Nottingham. Daniel, M.-F., 2014, ‘Dialogue philosophique, pensée critique dialogique et conscience humaine. Comment la philosophie pour enfants donne une voix aux adultes analphabètes’, in M.-P. Grosjean (ed.), La philosophie au cœur de l’éducation. Autour de Matthew Lipman, pp. 189–209, Vrin, Paris. Etzioni, A., 1993, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda, Crown Publishers, New York. Fetterman, D.M. & Wandersman, A.H. (eds.), 2005, Empowerment Evaluation Principles in Practice, Guilford Publications, New York. Frank, F. & Smith, A., 1999, The Community Development Handbook: A Tool to Build Community Capacity, Human Resources Development Canada, Ottawa. Freire, P., 1970, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, transl. M. Bergman Ramos, Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, London. García Moriyón, F., Rebollo, I., & Colom, R., 2005, ‘Evaluating Philosophy with Children: A Meta-Analysis’, Thinking. The Journal of Philosophy for Children 17(4), 14–22. Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S., 1989, Fourth Generation Evaluation, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. Lavanco, G. & Novara, C., 2012, Elementi di psicologia di comunità. Progettare, attuare e partecipare il cambiamento sociale, McGraw-Hill, Milano. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. & Oscanyan, F.S., 1980, Philosophy in the Classroom, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Maier S.F. & Seligman, M.E., 1976, ‘Learned Helplessness: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 105(1), 3–46. Marchetti, A., Di Terlizzi, E. & Petrocchi, S. (eds.), 2008, Fiducia e coping nelle relazioni interpersonali, Carocci, Roma. Mortier, F., 2008, ‘Études d’évaluation: la méthode de Matthew Lipman comme moyen de développement’, in C. Leleux (ed.), La philosophie pour enfants. Le modèle de Matthew Lipman en discussion, pp. 47–69, De Boeck, Bruxelles. Patton, M.Q., 2002, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Rappaport, J., 1981, ‘In Praise of Paradox: A Social Policy of Empowerment over Prevention’, American Journal of Community Psychology 9(1), 1–25. Rappaport, J., 2000, ‘Community Narratives: Tales of Terror and Joy’, American Journal of Community Psychology 28(1), 1–24. Rossi, P.H., Lipsey, M.W. & Freeman, H.E., 1999, Evaluation: A Systematic Approach, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Shipman, V., 1983, New Jersey Test of Reasoning, Form A, Totowa Board of Education, Totowa. Trickey, S. & Topping, K.J., 2004, ‘Philosophy for Children: A Systematic Review’, Research Papers in Education 19(3), 365–380. Weiss, C.H., 1997, ‘Theory-based Evaluation: Past, Present, and Future’, New Directions for Evaluation 76, 41–55. Weiss, C.H., 1998, ‘Have We Learned Anything New About the Use of Evaluation?’, American Journal of Evaluation 19(1), 21–33. Whitmore, E., 1998, Understanding and Practicing Participatory Evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Zimmerman, M.A. & Rappaport, J., 1988, ‘Citizen Participation, Perceived Control, and Psychological Empowerment’, American Journal of Community Psychology 16(5), 725–750.

Sergio Racca, Nicolò Valenzano1

Chapter 5 – Building Bridges Between Diversities: The Case Study of “MondoQui”, Mondovì Abstract: “Philosophy and Community Practices” is a project of the University of Turin (Italy) developed in collaboration with the MondoQui association. Its aim was to test the validity of Philosophy for Communities – inspired by M. Lipman and A.M. Sharp – in terms of community empowerment. In this chapter, we will analyse the design phase, describe the p4c sessions and present the results achieved. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); community empowerment; Matthew Lipman; Ann M. Sharp; social bonds.

1.  Theoretical premise and context “Filosofia e pratiche di comunità” (“Philosophy and Community Practices”) is the title of a project by a research group of the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences of the University of Turin (Italy), which took place between 2016 and 20172. Its aim was to test the validity of a specific philosophical practice – the Philosophy for Communities (p4c) inspired by Matthew Lipman and Ann M. Sharp – in terms of community empowerment, as the construction and strengthening of social bonds between adults. Inserted in the Italian social context but in a comparative relation with other international projects3, our research was based on a collaboration with the MondoQui Onlus association, located in Mondovì, a city in the north-western part of Italy, on the border with France. MondoQui hosted a cycle of p4c sessions that were analysed and studied by the research team. In this paper, we will present this cycle of sessions: after describing the work of 1 Both authors have equally contributed to this paper; parts 1 and 2 were written by Sergio Racca; parts 3 and 4 by Nicolò Valenzano. 2 “Filosofia e pratiche di comunità. Progetto di ricerca, formazione ed empowerment sociale” was funded by Fondazione CRT (Turin, Italy) and the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences of the University of Turin (Ricerca Locale 2015), and co-funded by the association Centro Studi sul Pensiero Contemporaneo (CeSPeC, Cuneo, Italy). 3 See the chapters (1, 2, and 3) of section 1 and the other reports in this section (Chapters 6–9).

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MondoQui, we will analyse the project’s design phase and the sessions. Finally, we will briefly present the results achieved. The decision to partner up with MondoQui was dictated by the characteristics of the association, which make it a cross-section of Italian society and an ideal place to implement the project. MondoQui in fact has operated since 2008 in the context of social animation including non-formal and informal education: its objectives are the promotion of dialogue between cultures, community development and the construction of inclusive socio-cultural contexts. In its headquarters, the Mondovì railway station, the association guarantees the presence of educational figures in a symbolic place of passage and partial social risk, transforming it into an educational stronghold. There are two reasons why we became interested in MondoQui: on the one hand, it is a meeting point between Italian and foreign nationals who have immigrated from North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe; secondly, it belongs to the fabric of the Italian civil society, being a place of expression of local associative ferments. Mondovì’s intercultural context encourages the participation of first and second generation immigrants in the activities of MondoQui4. However, MondoQui is not an association of Italians working for foreign nationals and providing assistance to them, but a composite group in terms of cultural origin, gender, class and age working towards inclusion, civic participation, intercultural dialogue and community development. This has allowed us to focus on a social and civil issue, linked to migration and undetectable from the statistical analysis: the acquisition of a substantial – and not only formal – citizenship, understood as a condition that is obtained with a long process of construction of belonging made of participation and civic engagement (Saggar, Sommerville & Sobolewksa 2012; Mantovan 2007; Samers 2010). The informal and non-formal education activities carried out by MondoQui, though, also fit into the fabric of the Italian civil society, that is, the network of citizens and associations that are independent from the political and institutional sphere (Taylor 1995). In fact, requests for participation and belonging, by both Italians and foreigners, intersect the issue of social empowerment, the process by which individuals get the access to, and learn the management of, important resources in order to be better in control of their lives (Rappaport 1981). Working with MondoQui has therefore allowed us to witness the proactive and generative

4 The percentage of non-EU residents in Mondovì is about 13% of the total population, which is higher than the Italian national average, which is 9%. (Cf. Istat Data, 01/01/2016, viewed 15 September 2017, from http://stra-dati.istat.it/Index.aspx).

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power of civil societies in terms of the achievement of democratic competence, through community development, participation and creation of social empowerment (Pateman 1970; Hirst 2002). The planning process that we will now describe, developed between November 2015 and February 2017, has thus started from these general assumptions.

2.  The planning phase From the very start, the planning phase has been part of the research of “Philosophy and Community Practices”, and it was developed both in theory and in practice. In this context, the reflections we have made during the meetings of our academic research group were not merely accompanied by the organisation of an “applicative” intervention in a specific social reality: the main idea underlying our research has been to articulate an experience based on a theory that would only be constructed and concretised in the light of the reality it would be dealing with (Dewey 1986). So, starting from an analysis of the status and consequences of philosophical practice – especially the community-driven one conceived by Lipman and Sharp in the 1970s (see Chapter 1 in this book) – we were mainly guided by the specific issues of p4c and its potential contribution to adult communities. On the one hand, we wondered what would distinguish p4c from the group practices that, despite their objective to intervene in community contexts with dialogue techniques, are not prima facie philosophical5. In other words, what does it mean for a practice to be philosophical? We also believe that philosophy – contrary to the Aristotelian perspective – should be concretised and realised in action [praxis], as opposed to mere theoretical reflection [theoria] (Aristotle 2000)6. As for the second aspect, our leading question has been: how can philosophical practice intervene in social bonds? Can there be a Philosophy for Communities aimed to institute social bonds ex novo? Or should one stick to a Philosophy in Communities, which would only act on existing groups to change or guide their internal dynamics? These two questions, though, have not been taken as theoretical models to be verified by practical application: on the contrary, they have been formulated as working hypotheses by means of a constant reference to MondoQui. So, in the 5 Think of Étienne Wenger’s “community of practice”, discussion groups among people who, sharing common interests, relate by exchanging information and building a shared repertoire of knowledge (Wenger 1998). 6 See the first part of Chapter 1 of this volume.

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light of the two initial presuppositions (§ 1) – the construction of substantial citizenship and the proactive role of civil society – we have tried to specify the initial goal of the project: what specific philosophical action [praxis] would be consistent with the ideas of social empowerment and community development? What social contribution, in an adult and intercultural context, can generate the acquisition of a philosophical habitus related to phronesis? As for the first question, we have focused on the multidimensional and composite character of the acquisition of thought skills in the members of a Community of Inquiry as proposed by Lipman and Sharp: in fact, underlying our project there was the goal to develop community dialogue by empowering individual attitude and the ability to think in a critical, creative and caring way (Lipman 2003: 195–293). However, if Lipman’s original working hypothesis was mainly targeted at the youth and children of US schools, the goal that has guided our project – in the context of MondoQui and the part of the Italian civil society it represents – was not the simple reproposition of the multidimensionality of thought. Rather, it was a remodulation of the latter in relation to a broader idea of adult action [praxis], understood as the critical yet caring ability to formulate good judgments in the presence of others. The second issue was also guided by Lipman, specifically by his notion of Community of Inquiry (Lipman 2003: 81–124): with respect to this point, the social plurality of MondoQui has suggested that a philosophical practice intended for the adult world should not only intervene within already established community contexts (Philosophy in Communities) but on the contrary can also be an instrument to start a process of the formation of social bonds – Philosophy for Communities7.

3.  Description of the initiative There were sixteen sessions of p4c, in line with Lipman’s setting. They were attended by twelve to twenty adults, of various cultural backgrounds, social class and age: the group, which has remained largely stable over the course of the experience, was made up half of Italians and half of first or second-generation immigrants (Moroccans, Congolese, Ivorians and Albanians). No one had ever studied philosophy or previously attended p4c sessions. The meetings all took place at MondoQui, managed and moderated by members of the research group: taking turns, a member 7 In Italy, a reflection on the possibility of educational intervention at a social and community level can be found in Tramma 2009. For accounts of the Philosophy for Communities experience in Italy, see at least Volpone 2014.

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would moderate the session as a facilitator, another would observe (recording and then transcribing the session), while the others participated as part of the group. In the framework of active planning that characterises many community development experiences, the first four sessions were dedicated to acknowledging the participants’ needs (Twelvetrees 2002). This was followed by attempts to answer the question asked by Claudio, the president of MondoQui: “How can we use this method in our association?”, which was translated into “How can MondoQui use p4c?” In this first phase, through stimulus texts and as a result of dialogue, we saw in the first instance issues related to interculturalism (e.g.: diversity, lack of communication, the possibility of misunderstanding, dialogue and friendship), issues concerning coexistence (e.g.: selfishness and selflessness, possibility of disinterested relationships, link between one’s own happiness and that of others) and meta-associative issues (e.g.: difference between association and society, dialectic between benefits and interest in associated living, the risk of individualism and the issue of responsibility). Superimposed on these core topics, there was the participants’ common interest in the role of trust in human relations and educational issues. In the light of the participants’ needs and the reflections of the research group, over the next twelve sessions – with the same group of people – we overall changed the selection of stimulus texts. So, the first meetings analysed the role of trust in the development of social bonds (e.g.: its role in human relationships, the relationship between clarification, mutual understanding and reduction of quarrels, love as a social bond based on trust, how to build a relationship of trust). An important part of this discussion focused on the theme of marriage: in an intercultural perspective and across different generations, there was an interesting debate between a second-generation Moroccan girl and a young man who had recently migrated to Italy from Morocco. Thanks to the moderator and the other participants, the dialogue on arranged marriage and the choice of a spouse proved complex and animated. No attempt was made to find a synthesis between the different positions, in an attempted conciliation: to the contrary, the objective was to allow for the emergence of disagreement in a controlled manner, through the formulation of arguments and good judgments in the presence of others. Then the sessions proceeded to deal with more strictly educational issues, with reference to intercultural, inter- and intra-generational variables (e.g.: the dilemma between interventism and laissez-faire, the difference between educating and teaching, the dimension of power inherent in educational relationships, the connection between habit and education). The intergenerational issue was an important theme of dialogue that was tackled over several sessions: for example,

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the participants reflected on the importance of having a common vocabulary between generations but also on the possibility of dialogue, regardless of such shared vocabulary. The construction of the latter vocabulary was one of the goals of this series of meetings: within the intercultural context of MondoQui, the intergenerational variable made the relationships between different parties more dynamic and complex. Compared to the expectations and to the previous phase, this second phase brought to the fore the importance of the stimulus texts: the rich experiential baggage that characterises the adult world was in fact the reason for us to start from these resources, also in our own intervention, so as to submit them to a coinvestigation process and thus stimulate the epistemological curiosity mentioned, among others, by Paulo Freire (Freire & Macedo 1995; Freire 2001; Borg & Mayo 2004). We therefore chose to write and use texts that could be considered significant by the participants, taking inspiration from everyday situations, transforming them in a dialogic form and emphasising the plurality of stances and arguments of the people involved, so as to favour the “gradual internalisation of the thinking behaviours of the fictional characters” (Lipman 2003: 101). Drafting texts specifically dedicated to MondoQui turned out to be a winning move also according to the self-evaluation of the participants themselves: for example, on one occasion, Cristina, a recently immigrated Brazilian woman, stressed the role of experience as the starting point for the proposed stimulus texts. Given the degree of dialogic awareness reached by the participants in the last session, we also gave ample room for self-evaluation with the aim of enhancing meta-reflection and of applying it to the whole experience. This made it possible to focus our attention on a change of attitude towards p4c itself: initially, one of the recurring questions at the time of self-evaluation concerned the usefulness of such practices in general and for the association in particular; during the last meeting, the community of inquiry instead highlighted the benefits of the project and expanded the issue beyond the community itself. Claudio, the president of MondoQui, also asked if similar activities could be formative if they were organised among the parents of various communities of foreigners present in the city. In this way, the pilot project has achieved a further objective, namely to lay the groundwork for future developments in a participatory context.

4.  Results achieved and conclusive remarks The experience allowed us to analyse the initial hypotheses and verify their validity by identifying specific indicators. What the project has shown is a link between the two starting issues: in fact, the specific philosophical aspect understood as

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the formulation of good judgments in the presence of others and the creation of social bonds within a community of inquiry, analysed in the context of the peculiar characteristics of MondoQui, have developed in parallel over the sessions. In general, the presence of the indicators was detected with a comparative analysis between the phase of recognition of needs and the subsequent sessions: sources for the analysis and interpretation of the data were given by the drafting of minutes, the transcription of the recordings and their comparative study in the light of the initial hypotheses. The first thematic core observed was an increase in the ability to formulate judgments, argumentation and discussion within the group during the sessions. Using as indicators the construction of the agenda (e.g.: typology of proposed questions) and the articulation of the discussion (typology of interventions: propositional, collaborative, reinforcing of one’s or another’s opinion, correction and/or self-correction, expression of dissent, etc.), two elements emerged. First, a gradual detachment from the text and a growing ability of the group to argue in an autonomous way (as evidenced, for instance, by Kennedy 2004): a good example of this was the formulation of questions that were no longer related to situations reported in the text (e.g.: deeper psychological study of characters, plot developments, motivations of actions) but linked to general categories (e.g.: request for definitions, insights into specific concepts). In addition to this, we have noticed the resulting articulation of discussions that were no longer related to the content read, as in the first sessions, but organised around specific issues raised by the other members’ questions and discussion proposals. Secondly, we have also noted a shift in this second empowered phase – in terms of both questions and discussion – from the early interest in classic philosophical general themes (e.g.: definition of concepts, dichotomies between interpretative categories) and a latter application of these universals to concrete situations related to MondoQui (e.g.: education, intergenerational bonds, intercultural problems): this has shown the adaptability and sensitivity to the context typical of Lipman’s critical thought (Lipman 2003: 219–223). However, this critical and argumentative skill was developed in the direction of caring, in the empathic sense of opening up to the other’s point of view and in the appreciative sense of acknowledging otherness in view of the relations it has with us (Lipman 2003: 264–266, 269–271). The group members in fact moved from making isolated remarks to the facilitator or to a generic interlocutor to a situation of dialogue, engagement and construction of their point of view in response to other real interlocutors. This allowed them to go from substantial agreement to discussions expressing strong dissent and dialectic between different positions.

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The interpretation of these elements allowed the analysis to be extended to the second issue of the design phase: the capacity for social empowerment has in fact been shown as a consequence of the concept of making judgments in the presence of others. The initial heterogeneous composition of the group had indeed given way to a clear process of building a true Community of Inquiry. The indicator by which we highlighted this process has been the development of a common practice [praxis], which came to be seen in the increase of the argumentative capacity and care in the relationship and was structured in Lipman’s dialogic-argument form, also devoted to instability and tension between different positions (Lipman 2003: 87–103)8. The initial discussions, led by the facilitator in the passages between the different phases (e.g.: the link between the agenda and the discussion) have left room for progressively more autonomous exchanges: here the idea of a Philosophy for Communities, understood as the creation of significant ties between the participants, was formally displayed in the creation of automatisms in which the passages between different phases were handled by the participants (e.g.: formulation of questions already aimed at the discussion to follow) and, from a thematic point of view, the ability to bring together the issues discussed, beyond the impressions aroused by the starting text, within a range of interests shared with the association (e.g.: education, intergenerational bonds, intercultural issues). “Philosophy and Community Practices” has, therefore, demonstrated that a close connection exists between the fabric of the Italian civil society and p4c. Working with MondoQui, we have both tested the validity of p4c’s theoretical premises and shown civil society to be a public space where citizens can generate inclusive community dynamics and social empowerment. In conclusion, the research outcomes suggest that this model should be applied to new scientific projects: only in this way will we more deeply show how people can “formulate good judgments in the presence of others” and strengthen social bonds in the whole framework of civil society.

References Aristotle, 2000, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. R. Crisp, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 8 On the other hand, Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy also identified in the concept of praxis the focus of the adult training path. Freire’s praxis, however, adds to the (more neutral) idea we propose here the character of an informed action consequent to a conscientisation [conscientização], capable of transforming reality by eliminating the state of oppression (Freire 1970).

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Borg, C. & Mayo, P., 2004, ‘Diluted Wine in New Bottles: The Key Messages of the EU Memorandum (on Lifelong Learning)’, Lifelong Learning in Europe 9(1), 19–25. Dewey, J., 1986, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in The Later Works 1925–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 12, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Freire, P. & Macedo, D., 1995, ‘A Dialogue: Culture, Language, and Race’, Harvard Educational Review 65(3), 377–402. Freire, P., 1970, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, transl. M. Bergman Ramos, Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, London. Freire, P., 2001, Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage, transl. Patrick Clarke, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham. Hirst, P., 2002, ‘Renewing Democracy through Associations’, The Political Quarterly 73(4), 409–421. Kennedy, D., 2004, ‘The Philosopher as Teacher. The Role of a Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Metaphilosophy 35(5), 744–765. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Mantovan, C., 2007, Immigrazione e cittadinanza. Auto-organizzazione e partecipazione dei migranti in Italia, Franco Angeli, Milano. Pateman, C., 1970, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Rappaport, J., 1981, ‘In Praise of Paradox: A Social Policy of Empowerment Over Prevention’, American Journal of Community Psychology 9(1), 1–25. Sagger, S., Somerville, W., Ford, R. & Sobolewska, M., 2012, The Impact of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration, UK Border Agency, Home Office, London. Samers, M., 2010, Migration, Routledge, London. Taylor, Ch., 1995, ‘Invoking Civil Society’, in Id., Philosophical Arguments, pp. 204– 224, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London. Tramma, S., 2009, Pedagogia della comunità. Criticità e prospettive educative, Franco Angeli, Milano. Twelvetrees, A., 2002, Community Work, Palgrave, Basingstoke. Volpone, A. (ed.), 2014, Pratica filosofica di comunità, Liguori, Napoli. Wenger, É., 1998, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pierpaolo Casarin

Chapter 6 – Philosophy in San Siro. An Experience in Philosophy for Communities: Rethinking Inhabiting and Inhabiting Thought in the Neighbourhood Workshops Abstract: In recent years, the district of Milan has activated many programmes of urban regeneration. The areas involved in this service are some of the most problematic and complex in the city. The chapter describes the results achieved in the area of San Siro thanks to actions focused on philosophical discussion and aiming at the enhancement of civic participation. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); urban regeneration; neighbourhood workshops; inhabiting; participation.

As described in the introduction to the volume Ogni volto è una storia [Every face is a story]1, the district of Milan has activated a social companionship service in the areas of Gratosoglio, Mazzini, Molise-Calvairate, Ponte Lambro and San Siro. This is intended as a supplement to the programmes of urban regeneration, Contratti di Quartiere II [Neighbourhood Contracts II]2. The areas involved in this service are some of the most problematic and complex in the city of Milan. There are different levels of criticality, but also many pleasant surprises, as well as much energy and engagement among the inhabitants of the territory. The Social Companionship Plan is a service aimed at supporting material and immaterial actions planned as part of the regeneration process, and has a variety of aims: to bring the inhabitants closer to each other; to accompany and support them in the 1 The reference is to the introduction of the book Ogni volto è una storia. Immagini e racconti della città che cambia. Cinque quartieri di Milano. The book was produced by the administration of the District of Milan (Service for Neighbourhood Contracts and Urban Regeneration). It is composed almost entirely of pictures and short sentences collected from the inhabitants of the areas mentioned, and constitutes a valuable document for advancing the understanding of the territory and the importance of the work done by the Service. 2 These complex programmes of urban regeneration aim at social and urbanistic recovery through particular interventions, e.g. through the refurbishment of neglected buildings and infrastructure and through the promotion of social bonds.

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process of transforming their living areas; to mediate conflicts and promote local resources; and to strengthen and consolidate a widespread relationship between all the subjects involved in the Neighbourhood Contract. At the beginning of the programme, in order to enable fruitful relationships within the territory, five spaces named Neighbourhood Workshops were set up. These were customised for each particular context, and are recognised as places where many different processes can be facilitated: communication, information, listening and mediation between the many subjects involved in the transformation process. Within a short space of time, the Neighbourhood Workshops have become well-known landmarks in which people can develop relationships, build bridges between associations, citizens and institutions, suggest activities and share ideas. They have become thriving aggregation points. Each workshop is composed of people with diverse occupational backgrounds. This ensures that each group reflects the complexity of communities, which must be addressed when dealing with the theme of ‘inhabiting’. There are architects, psychologists, educators, sociologists and, lately, also philosophers. In the Neighbourhood Workshop in San Siro, located in Piazza Selinunte, right in the heart of a quadrangle formed entirely of housing projects built since the second half of the 1930s, a small but very popular library has been created. The library has been able to engage and thrill many locals. The management of the library itself was made possible by volunteers among the inhabitants, who – autonomously from the rest of the workshop’s group – have managed the book loan service and all the work that such a space requires. The neighbourhood of San Siro, also named Quadrilatero [Quadrangle] because of its very peculiar development in space, represents an extremely peculiar housing situation. Many of the inhabitants are from foreign countries (especially from North Africa), and there are many problems linked to the use of housing space, such as occupations, vacant houses, generalised negligence and the substantial presence of subjects with serious psychiatric conditions (not always treated by the existing services). It is a very complex situation, but – as Nietzsche (2006: 9) suggests – in order to give birth to a dancing star (or, much more simply, to a few philosophy meetings) one must have chaos in oneself. There is no lack of chaos in the neighbourhood of San Siro, neither inside of us, who have dared to propose some meetings of Philosophy for Communities3, nor outside of us, in the streets, in the bars and in the yards of the housing projects in the territory.

3 We are of course absolutely certain that such a proposal is deeply meaningful, with possible consequences for the web of relations existing between the subjects inhabiting

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In an age featuring crises of many different sorts, it seemed to us vitally important to promote creative forms of cooperation in order to enable every citizen to deal with difficult economic, ecological and social challenges. According to the Transition Towns movement founded by Rob Hopkins, and as Patrizia Ottone reminded us4, cities are social-ecological systems based on the close relation between environmental resources and subjects. From this standpoint, the development of local communities’ relational and creative capabilities contributes just as much as technological innovation to producing change and to the development of new solutions. In order to enable the development of new ideas and practices it is important to create a fitting space, one in which participants can enjoy reading and sharing time together. Therefore, we decided to engage our readers in a Philosophy for Communities itinerary, in order to combine passion for reflection with the pleasure of sharing an initiative in the heart of one’s own neighbourhood. The neighbourhood library was perfect for enabling the realisation of such desires and promoting moments of reflection on themes that we thought particularly meaningful for the territory. That is how the experience of Philosophy for Communities in San Siro started, a movement whose main aim was to get philosophy closer to people’s lives, and to get life itself closer to thought, by promoting everyone’s reflective skills, the elaboration and expression of autonomous thought. The exercise of philosophical thought, as Roberto Frega (2005: 14) stresses, facilitates

the territory. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a certain kind of philosophy, or, better said, a certain approach by some specialists of the field, regards with suspicion any attempts to engage in philosophy made by individuals outside of the philosophical establishment. Their perplexity and lack of trust in the effectiveness of these opportunities for shared reflection – which are available to all regardless of their level of philosophical knowledge or educational history – does not constitute an obstacle to our aims. 4 Patrizia Ottone is a careful observer of urban realities and author of many projects in the territory of Mirafiori Sud in Turin. The reference is to some of her inputs to the meeting Prendersi cura della città. Fare spazio al terzo paesaggio? [Taking care of the city. Making space for a third kind of landscape?], realised together with Gaia Giovine at the Cavallerizza Reale in Turin on 14th March 2017 and included in the programme Philosophy for children in gioco. Laboratori di pratiche di filosofia [Philosophy for children in play. Workshops of philosophical practices], which was promoted by the research net Insieme di Pratiche filosoficamente autonome [Set of philosophically autonomous practices]. For those who would like to explore further the research horizon and activities set out by this net, we suggest visiting the website www.insiemedipratichefilosoficamenteautonome.it (viewed 15 September 2017) and referring to the books published in the series Passaggi by Mimesis Publishing.

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“the creation of a space-time where habits, routines, implicit presuppositions and prejudices are suspended in order to be critically examined and eventually modified”. What is meant by the term “philosophical practices” is a variety of now well-established experiences.5 In this perspective, philosophy is not presented as a production of knowledge, nor simply as a review of what has already been thought, but is intended as a way to approach critically the complexity of events concerning every individual. The workshop, led by a facilitator with specific competencies in the field of philosophical practices, was organised around some communication ground rules, in order to support listening and direct engagement. The texts to be used in the activities were shared with the volunteers in the library. Of course, no particular literary or philosophical competency was required in order to take part; it was open to all the inhabitants of the territory, to the volunteers in the library and to any who consider dialogue an important, fascinating and at the same time entertaining instrument. The workshop was a chance to articulate one’s own inhabiting, in its many senses. The proposal entailed a transition from knowledge (sapere) to taste (sapore), insofar as every meeting featured a space and a time dedicated to food and wine tasting. This was made possible by the culinary skills of the participants, who put their efforts into the preparation of the food and the choice of the drinks; that is how a proper supportive, convivial atmosphere was created – an often undervalued but necessary prerequisite for beginning an authentic and fruitful reflexive journey. The first series of meetings, on which I wish to focus in this short paper, had as their core topic the notion of inhabiting. This is a broad but crucial theme, and it is possible to discuss it from a plurality of perspectives. We organised four meetings of two hours each, always on Thursday, from 18.00 to 20.00. The frequency of the meetings was fortnightly and enabled us to focus on four different aspects of the topic: inhabiting as a reflection about living together; inhabiting as a reflection about “strangerhood”; inhabiting as a reflection about playing and passions; inhabiting as a reflection about space (the neighbourhood, the city). At the end of every session, an essential bibliography was given out in order to enable a more detailed study through further reading or specific research. A good number of the texts taken under consideration have since become available in the neighbourhood library, in order to increase their availability to the local inhabitants. A comprehensive analysis of the programme would need to account for all four meetings, and to reflect on the in-depth analyses and plurality of thought styles that came into play.

5 With reference to this plurality of experiences, the reader may wish to see also the book edited by Silvia Bevilacqua and myself (2013).

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But in this paper, our focus shall be limited to the analysis of the first meeting, and the reflective exchanges that took place between its participants.

Inhabiting as a reflection about living together The first meeting, attended by a substantial number of participants (around twenty), started with the reading of some passages from three texts that we imagined could set a good common ground and starting point for the dialogue. The theme of inhabiting, as reported in the title of this part, was developed with regard to the concept of “living together”. I shall now list the texts which were taken under consideration for the first meeting, along with a brief description of each, probably unnecessary given the popularity of the references. a) Ermanno Bencivenga (2014: 99–101), The Library [La biblioteca]. A brief, paradoxical fable in which we read of an ethereal library where books are archived, the main feature of which is its being able to foresee everything that will happen to men. This awareness and predictive skill soon shows itself as a limit rather than a resource. The text is an invitation to reflect on the human condition and on the possibility of living together in a time when everything is foreseen and known a priori. b) Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities [Le città invisibili]. The text we read is the wellknown conclusive passage of Calvino’s masterpiece (Calvino 1978: 164–165). Polo thinks about inferno, about its existence and about the ability of men and women to really deal with it. How much room for manoeuvre do we have, how much effort can we wish for? At stake are our discernment skills and the categories of space and time. Another text used was The City and Desire. The city is Fedora (Calvino 1978: 32–33). It is an ideal city in every possible time, and yet once it has been hypothesised, it eludes its own realisation. This is a prompt to invite one to think about the relationship between the real and the imaginary, the possible and the necessary. c) James Graham Ballard (1975), High Rise (esp. section 5 on “The Vertical City”). A description of the social stratification of the inhabitants of an apartment building. To every social class corresponds a precise section of the building. The height of the residence becomes the ultimate reference point. A tale about power and its consequences in the context of residential dynamics. After the shared reading of the texts – in a deeply focused atmosphere – we continued by collecting together the thoughts and insights of the participants. We gave priority to questioning, to doubt and to inquiry, above any assertive

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attitude, in order to allow more openness in communication and a more indepth analysis of the particular topics. Following this came speeches made by the participants, and some remarks made by myself. These were not aimed at making everything that had been said and analysed more explicit (we did not use recorders precisely to avoid possible influences or distress), but simply at offering some further indications, partial and not necessarily objective, in addition to what had been transcribed in the poster, as usually happens in the context of Philosophy for Communities. One of the most important aspects of the practice, from a meta-reflexive and self-evaluative perspective, is the re-elaboration of the facilitator’s comment after the speeches of the participants. What is the position articulated by the facilitator with respect to what is actually said? What is their aim? What task do they have to fulfil? What is the gap between the words of those who speak and the perhaps necessary but also always debatable reinterpretation by the facilitator? On these matters, which are pivotal from our point of view, we believe it is best to leave the questions open. In the transcript of the contributions by the participants we shall use the present tense in order to allow an easier and more direct reading. 1) Fedora, where are you really? I believe you exist, I will get to you! (Andrea) Andrea interrogates Fedora, in the sense that he asks himself where it could be. The intonation of the questioning suggests that it is a barely identifiable place. In the second part of the speech, Andrea actually makes his position explicit, i.e. that Fedora could really exist and be reachable. In his words the complex relationship is expressed between imagination and reality, but also the possibility that such an idea has a real chance of fruition. 2) Is inferno made by real or possible others? (Pasquale) Pasquale is clearly inspired by the conclusion of Invisible Cities, and his question addresses otherness and our perception of it. It is a question concerning also the “constitution” of inferno and the possible link between inferno and the reality of the other. It is clear that this question also addresses possible modalities of living together, be they real or imaginary, with those who inhabit our everyday reality. 3) Why do we not recognise the inferno that is already here? (Magda) With her question, Magda starts from the presupposition that what Calvino is inviting us to do, i.e. to unmask inferno as a result of our living together, is no simple thing. According to Magda, what is missing is the awareness that would

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allow us to see inferno in front of us. Her question aims to learn the reasons for this lack of recognition. 4) Today’s apartment building is conflictual, before it was open (Luigi) Luigi starts from a statement, the remark that the “context” has changed. It is a change that, from Luigi’s standpoint, has to do with the attitude of the inhabitants, of the population. Previously, people had lived in a supportive spirit, and spaces were understood as meeting points. In previous years, maybe in the last two or three decades, this attitude has changed. Now mistrust makes a certain kind of meeting impossible, and conflicts proliferate. 5) Social stratification. Verticality, a possible reading (Moris) Moris’s speech starts from Ballard’s text and underlines how his vision of living together, with some possible references to the biblical text, is one way to understand the matter; one possibility, but not the only one. Other possibilities for reading living together could be given, for instance by using the metaphor of life and death in connection to inhabiting. Another aspect singled out by Moris from the text is the topic of city as transit, as movement: the movement of cars, but also of bodies and subjects. Also Luigi weighs in on this topic of movement, and underlines that all this whirling movement requires movement from past to future. At the core of this exchange, there is surely the temporal dimension of inhabiting, and the question concerning how much the temporal factor changes the relational codes of the subjects with respect to the theme of inhabiting. 6) Unpredictability and possible prediction (Magda) Magda’s reflection starts again from the texts, in particular that by the philosopher Bencivenga, and explores the polarity of predictable-unpredictable. There is a prediction margin that requires effort and attention, but that is necessarily also a limit to this faculty. The excess of prediction would cause the problems present in the philosophical tale. 7) Respect for the fundamental elements. How to do it? (Magda) Magda continues her reflection started in the previous speech. She interrogates herself with respect to the fundamental aspects that concern people when they live together. According to Magda, the scarcity of attention has extremely negative effects, and these are very evident. What to do? That is, how can people live together and control this decline? How can everyone take on themselves the burden of this important aspect of collective responsibility? The question opens up a discussion about how one could stay in a neighbourhood like ours, like San Siro.

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What task can each of us try to accomplish? Different possibilities appear, many ideas intertwine with each other, from territory cleaning to relationship care to the respect of legality. The question “how to do it?” becomes a permanent invitation to feel responsible and to engage actors in cohabitation processes. 8) Residential area as micro-world (Moris) Starting from Ballard’s text, Moris – but not only him – understands a residential area as a particular world with a variety of internal dynamics and power relationships. In each building, but also, and much more, in each neighbourhood, there are clear power relationships that have to be first of all understood. To understand these microphysical elements means to become aware of the place in which one lives. Sometimes, the disparities in power and strength between the subjects inside a neighbourhood are a problem, and are not always easy to solve. 9) Inhabiting also means reflecting on the materials making up the buildings that host us (Linda) Linda invites us to rethink the materials we use when we build the structures that host us. She underlines the greatness of simplicity, a simplicity that becomes beauty. Linda’s thoughts lead us to think about the importance of beauty also with reference to inhabiting. Living in a beautiful neighbourhood has important consequences on the citizen’s life quality. On the other hand, staying in an ugly and neglected place entails negative effects of many sorts. 10) Inhabiting and childhood (Luigi) Luigi invites us to reflect on the availability of spaces for children. No one thinks about children anymore, who often end up having no spaces left to themselves. In other historical times, for instance, courtyards were a permanent playing area. But now, prohibitions have spread and it is not easy to find places in which to grow up together. Starting from this reflection, the group focuses on today’s different way of “inhabiting” the territory. Now, it looks as though it is only non-Italians who live in space openly, while Italians more and more seek “protected” space. A glaring example is the affluence of Italian children at the local school. The presence of foreign children becomes a deterrent when it comes to enrolment in the institution. In this way, we witness a progressive depopulation of the sharing spaces for children of Italian origin. The discussion goes on with some remarks about the relocation from certain neighbourhoods to others that is now underway in the territory of Milan. People often move out of the city into external locations, or from central areas once inhabited by the working class, which have become more expensive to live in (e.g. Ticinese, Isola), to other areas of the city.

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11) San Siro: a debatable density (Laura and Natalia) Laura’s conclusive speech, shared with Natalia, summarises and expands on the remarks made during the meeting. It becomes almost a title, a slogan to think about and to investigate further. Magda’s previous question emerges again: what to do? How can we focus on and care about inhabiting and living together? Questions about topics such as loneliness or indifference seem to be notions to consider and investigate more deeply. In conclusion, Moris invites us to read a text taken from Masal Pas Bagdadi’s book (2010), a very interesting conclusion that works as a bridge to the next meeting, in which inhabiting will be investigated with regard to “strangerhood”. In conclusion, these are the most substantial passages, or at least those that were considered most relevant during the discussion. In the Philosophy for Communities experiences in the workshop of the neighbourhood of San Siro, in the activities led by Silvia Bevilacqua in Don Andrea Gallo’s Community of San Benedetto al Porto in Genova or in the juvenile detention camp “Cesare Beccaria” in Milan, the main focus was on critically engaging a plurality of subjects, on giving voice and offering occasions for exchange and on promoting openness to the idea that knowledge should be understood as a shared thought experience, not as a certain doctrine that has to be disseminated. What is at stake is an idea of philosophy as a movement through which we free ourselves from what is presented as true at any cost. From this standpoint, it becomes possible, as Foucault writes (1990: 9), to do a philosophical exercise, that is “to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently”. It is a movement that is necessary in order to live one’s own condition differently and revisit it, to put one’s effort into finding new, different, unprecedented kinds of interpretation regarding what we tend to see and read more or less in the same way. It is a movement that does not tend toward acritical repetition, but rather leaves space for difference, for transformation, for the possibility of putting all the subjects involved in the experience into play. “We are not just referring to the participants of the community of inquiry, but also and mostly to the facilitators of the practice, who we hope will become more and more free interpreters, creative translators, artisans of philosophising” (eds. Bevilacqua & Casarin 2016: 31). It is something that allows us to think in a different light, to recall the well-chosen title Rosella Prezzo (2006) gave to her essay on philosopher Maria Zambrano. New light in San Siro.

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References Bencivenga, E., 2014, La filosofia in sessantadue favole, Mondadori, Milano. Bevilacqua, S. & Casarin, P. (eds.), 2013, Disattendere i poteri. Pratiche filosofiche in movimento, Mimesis, Milano-Udine. Bevilacqua, S. & Casarin, P. (eds.), 2016, Philosophy for children in gioco, Mimesis, Milano-Udine. Calvino, I., 1978, Invisible Cities, transl. W. Weaver, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York. Frega, R., 2005, Considerazioni preliminari, in Id., La svolta pratica in filosofia, Vol. II, Quodlibet, Macerata. Graham Ballard, J., 1975, High Rise, Jonathan Cape Publishing, London. Nietzsche, F., 2006, Thus spoke Zarathustra, transl. A. Del Caro, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Pas Bagdadi, M., 2010, A piedi scalzi nel kibbutz, Bompiani, Milano. Prezzo, R., 2006, Pensare in un’altra luce, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano.

Silvia Bevilacqua

Chapter 7 – We Have Encountered Not only Words: The Practice of Philosophy for Communities in the Community of San Benedetto al Porto, Genoa Abstract: The reflections of this chapter are the outcome of a series of Philosophy for Communities meetings conducted over the last ten years in the farmsteads of the Community of San Benedetto al Porto, Genoa, and coordinated by Don Andrea Gallo. The practice of philosophy proved to be a stimulus to reshape and restart life. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); community; human condition; natality; questioning.

These reflections are the outcome of a series of Philosophy for Communities meetings conducted over the last ten years in the farmsteads (cascine) of the Community of San Benedetto al Porto, Genoa, and coordinated by Don Andrea Gallo.

Places and spaces of the possible: community What I think, I haven’t thought alone. G. Bataille

Let us start from the physical place where this political and philosophical space has established itself. The Community of San Benedetto al Porto in Genoa is a host community, set up in the 1970s, and has since its inception been a social frontier where those who are marginalised and in a condition of distress are welcomed, particularly those suffering from drug addiction. At the core of the community’s philosophy is a deep political engagement, in the form of actions based on social, critical and human responsibility developed through a web of participatory, emancipatory and engaging relationships. The project was the idea of its coordinator, Don Andrea Gallo, emerging from his long experience with those who live on the street. Don Gallo has always remarked, with extreme humility and courage, that he has not created anything alone, but rather that the streets and the squares offered him the chance to develop his research. The concept of street is in Don Gallo’s philosophy at the same time a metaphor, a concrete experience, a place and a time to inhabit.

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Walter Benjamin offers a similar perspective in Passages, Berlin Childhood, and City Images (Städtebilder). As Claudio Magris remarks, “the cities he grasps in a snap-shot, that holds the ephemeral in the eternity of the image, are alive, melancholy or lovable; their aura is the seductiveness of the sensible and of the present” (2007: 4). From the street thus rises the community, and to the street the community always returns, in perpetual dialogue. The city and the streets are an image of the world, collectively imagined, a boundless common condition, communities to come, vital places of knowledge and thought. The invocation of the street does not entail communitarianism or territorialism, as there we encounter widespread rhizomatic roots that are segmented, underground and constantly shifting. As Deleuze says, quoting Henry Miller, they are like a weed that “exists only to fill the waste spaces left by cultivated areas. It grows between, among other things. The lily is beautiful, the cabbage is provender, the poppy is maddening – but the weed is rank growth…: it points a moral” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 19). It is not only cultivated, but also spontaneous, vital and intertwining. In keeping with the botanical metaphor, courtesy of Deleuze, the notion of a rhizome accurately represents the philosophy of Don Gallo and the community practices he coordinated. An ensemble of communities between Liguria and Piedmont – communities that developed in accordance with the ideas of autonomy and self-administration – engaged in a project of permanent experimentation, based on equality and a disregard for hierarchical powers: a steady attempt to multiply the signs, messages, actions, desires and humanities at play1. Here, we find the beginnings of a lifestyle, and not just a host community, whose focus is on “being human”, where research and debate about political and social topics are oriented towards in-depth analysis and research. The idea is that of a collective and shared journey, where people deal with essential notions and words that are complex but comprehensible by all:

1 Today the Community of San Benedetto is articulated in four cascine: Cascina Giovanni Rangone (1980, Frascaro, Alessandria, Piedmont), a host community for addicts; Cascina Antonio Canepa (1983, Mignanego, Genoa, Liguria), today a host community for refugees; Cascina Nelson Mandela (1994, Visone, Acqui Terme, Piedmont), today a host community for refugees; Casa Anna Agostinis (2004, Genoa, Liguria), a host community for addicts. Today (in 2017), in addition to the ongoing work of hosting addicts and refugees, the community has developed a series of projects on the urban territory of Alessandria and Genoa through new social spaces: for instance, the Neighbourhood houses, intended to be places of participation, networking and community activities for citizens. The community has also started projects of hospitality for refugees and migrants inside some of the cascine.

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[T]he Community was not a place for seminars between young pseudo-intellectual university students, nor for lazy theorists of revolutions still to come. In the Community revolution happened every day, it required renunciations and forced us to get our hands dirty, to put ourselves at stake in our entirety. The first information one would get, even before crossing the threshold and asking to do civil service in the Community, was the following: “… look, here we ask full time and there is common fund”. In regards to time, in those 1980s now very far away, it was very full-on, from seven in the morning up to midnight, if not beyond. Full of work, of relationships, of cultural activities, of animation, of political activity (Folli 2015: 4).

Practical engagement in the community lent itself to a strong repudiation of consumerism, individualism and today’s dominant lifestyle, which, as Don Gallo observed even in the early 1980s, threatens social, political and cultural devastation. Starting from these existential and political premises, Philosophy for Communities developed with the aim of opening new spaces for critical thought, freedom and autonomy.

We are born also in order to begin2 To wake up is to be re-born each day. And the light is already waiting for us, whatever history or story that we must continue is already underway […]. Waking up is like entering a cocoon spun by countless industrious worms; we pick up our threads again and return to work on the cocoon, where the worm-man labours tirelessly, producing the dreams that become objectified, making history (Zambrano 1999: 39).

It is not easy to understand how a dream can be born safe from the night’s obscurity, nor is it easy to think at the same time that a dream can come into the path of history, beginning right when one wakes up. In order to dream it is perhaps “necessary to wake up, to slowly awaken one’s own dreams’ being, to wake up together with it” (Zambrano 2002: 61). A short step separates us from ourselves and the world and allows us to turn desires into possibilities, the subject into the human condition, life into vitality. It is a space between things, among others, that opens collective, free and creative abilities to act. It is a territory we still do not 2 The title of this section is inspired by Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition, in particular the passage in which the author invites us to reconsider the classical philosophical notion of a humanity born in order to die, by emphasising an extraordinary aspect of humanity: our natality, that which interrupts the course of human life through the faculty of beginnings, i.e. of initiating actions and/or devia(c)tions from the norm (see Arendt 1958: 246).

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understand and are not always willing to understand, one that we often perceive as dangerous and from which we hide ourselves by silencing our mood, our questions, our answers and the thoughts that emerge from the encounter with it. A borderland that often discomfits us who are secure in clarity. How we might engage with the other, outside or inside of us, is not a question that can be answered easily, and our everyday life tells us that it would in fact be easier not to truly engage with anyone. In fact, it quite often happens that when we encounter ‘others’, a number of outcomes are possible: closure, unease, fear, clinging to one’s identity or safety strategies. All restrict us, in that point that could have let us be ‘born’ but instead makes us withdraw, and pushes every one of us back into their cocoon, where we no longer wish to know what there is to live, without wanting to find the need to believe. That ‘need to believe’ was defined by Julia Kristeva, in a secular fashion, as the condition of the desire to know. A knowledge at the same time nourished and ripped apart by the need to believe, a desire to know where no one is the guardian of truth: [I]n order to face the two monsters now threatening our globalised planet, that is politics dominated by economy and finance, and ecological self-destruction, a central role is played by cultural experience and in particular by the answer it will be able to give to the contradictions regarding identity. If it will be able to take seriously the complexity of the human condition in its entirety, the teachings of its memory and the risks of its freedom, then it will act as a springboard for a true European political confederation, it will be its avant-garde (Kristeva 2014: xii).

This is not just about dealing with the other because together people live better and help each other out, but also because in this way one can put dogmas, beliefs and certainties in question. This paradoxical nature of the need to believe on the one hand allows us to know, but on the other weakens the truth paradigm in favour of a steady search for poetic and political spaces3. Maybe it is possible to talk about a poetry of politics, or of a politics of poetry. This political and poetic intention motivated my style as a thinker/facilitator in the context of the Philosophy for 3 Don Andrea Gallo emphasised in many public speeches and interviews that one can be a “dream trafficker”, thereby linguistically and politically altering the meaning of “trafficking” and our understanding of “dreaming”. Trafficking traditionally refers to commerce and to distribution (often of drugs), while in Gallo’s usage it suggests a movement, a circulation. In the association with dreams, the verb loses its specific economical meaning but still possesses a sense of something “outside of given and prescribed rules”. Dreaming here does not merely refer to a nocturnal subjective experience, as something unconscious, but rather becomes an action that precisely through “trafficking” comes into the world in manifold forms.

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Communities activities. A community that is philosophical in inquiry (and not just a community of philosophical inquiry) finds in the act of questioning a space for both the singularity of the subjects in play and their coming together. It discovers that the core of questioning is not rules or moral conduct, but rather the incentive to recognise oneself in the question: Who are you? – a question that, as Hannah Arendt noted, is asked of every newcomer. This permanent disposition to be together with the other as if he/she were a newcomer is unique and irreplaceable4. Questioning, so fundamental to Philosophy for Communities, is thus not only a heuristic or theoretical element, but is revealed in its essential simplicity: asking something of someone. The question is an ethical plea, a relationship that contemplates the presence of someone we cannot already know everything about. In this reciprocal and multiple summoning of people and thoughts we have the chance to deconstruct a morality made of precepts, and to open us to the unending space of ethical experimentation, to the exposition to the other, from whom we will never have a full and definitive answer. This exercise of questioning through thinking represents an ethical challenge that puts in play the perception of steady change, the idea of complexity and the will to critique a violent view about ethics, that which presupposes the durability through time of an alleged and infinitely repeated identity. In this sense, we have encountered not only words, but we have got to know the world anew by addressing the other without silencing its voice, without asking ourselves about the utility of philosophy and its practice. It is an invitation to those who care about philosophy and the human world to undertake a common and philosophically autonomous search, the aim of which is not to transmit a content or a method that is believed valid, but rather a transient, desiring knowledge – a trace of a political and philosophical experience5 that still suggests, with Bakunin, that “revolution is always three quarters fantasy and one quarter reality”.

“Philosophy for Communities” in common I misbehaved in the cosmos yesterday. I lived around the clock without questions, without surprise. W. Szymborska, Distraction

Why practice Philosophy for Communities in a drug rehabilitation community? The aim is not therapeutic. We should stop and think about assuming an oblique gaze when we talk about therapy and healing, a gaze that neutralises these concepts in order to rethink their borders. Notions of healing, diagnosis and treatment refer to 4 On this topic, see also Cavarero 1997 and Butler 2005. 5 On this topic, see the important essays collected in eds. Vattimo & Rovatti 2012.

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an essentially passive subject/body, one with no voice in a process where the power of others can dominate. This is often associated with the notion of social deviance, from which emerge almost inescapable dispositifs that legitimate the restriction of freedom, social exclusion, segregation and re-education. Michel Foucault warned us against this web of power-knowledges and practices by revealing their possible manifestations. Therefore, I believe that the question of whether philosophy can heal or educate requires permanent reflection, not an uncritical or ready-made answer. In doing so, it is part of an ongoing attempt to “unblock the paralyses of thought, sometimes walled up in only one dimension or scenario or – so to say – paradigm, and to try and offer more space and freedom to alternative forms of representing one’s own life experience, that is, to a plurality of dimensions and paradigms of thought” (Rovatti 2006: 13–15). In this sense, the philosophical practice tries first of all to generate a political space where philosophy is not consumed, is not taken as a drug, does not enact strategies of self-confession; a space where the aim is to act freely and to engage in the activity Arendt called thinking without banisters. This condition encourages us to push the boundaries of philosophers and of philosophy itself as a profession. Therefore, we search for philosophy as a common need, a need that transforms philosophy itself without making it something “specialist” and thus not recognising it only as “scientific material” (see in particular Heller 1984). Philosophy is thus understood as the creation of concepts, the activity of thought in common, beginning a journey and the possibility of equality: anyone, in any moment or place in his/her own life, can decide to stop and think alone or together with others, finding the courage to speak without having necessarily understood or studied everything, but nevertheless letting themselves be guided by argumentative tensions, research about some topics, areas of ignorance, inappropriate questions, stutters or lack of words. This is a philosophy that has no definite places, but looks for places where it can happen. Its being is a possibility that embodies a certain idea of childhood. It is not by chance that the practice of Philosophy for Communities takes its inspiration from Philosophy for Children, a practice that for the first time in the history of the discipline legitimates its own existence in contexts where philosophy is not only non-contemplated, but even considered to be inappropriate: [A] fundamental movement that has to be acknowledged in the efforts of Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret is the attempt to build a bridge between childhood and philosophy. Official philosophy, the one that demands or at least prefers the first letter to be capitalised, almost never welcomed the voice of childhood inside its “fortress”; it has at most addressed childhood as a research topic, but it has rarely embraced childhood as a possibility, as a sensible world-view. […] When we imagine a bridge between childhood and philosophy we are not thinking about a deeper analysis of skill development or of the

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level of argumentative skills obtained during school years, but rather about something even more inclusive. We would like this bridge to be a request for time, a time to meet what children think. Childhood can also be a metaphor, as something that allows us to form a new relation with thinking; it is not just a philosophy that deals with children or kids, but much more a philosophy seeking its own childhood, a new relationship to thinking. Such an opening brings along results that are relevant and not always foreseen or foreseeable. At stake is our idea of knowledge and even more a certain style or way to articulate this knowledge, be it actual or alleged. This dynamic involves us completely and “forces” us toward self-criticism and self-transformation (eds. Bevilacqua & Casarin 2016: 42–49).

In the experience of Philosophy for Communities we have thus looked for this freedom of thought, realised through a steady questioning of concepts. This exercise has engaged with life experience not as material to be analysed, but as a starting point for thinking which could go in many directions. The ordinary life of those who spent time in the community is not, in fact, ordinary, since no repressive and punitive system of extra-social conditions determined their place in the world. To take back a space for speech and thought is then simultaneously a political, social and subjective act in which one also tries to take back a lost participative dimension (a dimension that we have, perhaps, all but lost today). On the one hand, the existential time generated by addiction6 is exhausted in every moment by the addict’s relation to the substance and presents an obstacle to any other possible modality. On the other hand, the social role that derives from this is a “dangerous monster” from which we can defend ourselves and that we can re-educate. This social status determines an exit from the borders of the world or of the social community. The political action inherent to Philosophy for Communities practices is first of all to contravene this vision. Even today, when the streets have been long since infested by the madness of consumerism, and the drug addict has become

6 By “addiction” I mean a form of relationship that goes towards the total (self)destruction of the life of one or more people, something that very often is not just about the use of illegal substances. Today, an important debate regarding the various forms addiction can take has opened up. As I said earlier, it is hard to realise how much, as, since the 1980s, the phenomenon of addiction in its most extreme form has manifested as excessive consumerism. If we try and think about it with more care, it becomes apparent that addiction and consumption affects many people and not just a few. It is necessary to return to these topics, and not just the problem of the criminalisation of drugs, but also the question of what we consider to be the objects of addiction. Consumerism and addiction represent the general lifestyle, the most widespread modality of being in the world, characterised by a strong focus on the self, the satisfaction of one’s needs and the exploitation of the other to that end. Turning this modality around and deconstructing it is an everyday political practice involving everyone’s life.

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the ghostly manifestation of excess, we find ourselves having to deal with a form of “exaggerated consumerism”. In this unsatisfied society how can we still feel engaged by anything? If engagement and participation can only begin in the self, from something experienced or said, then Philosophy for Communities is like going back into the world, meeting people, sharing and stopping to think. It is not a project which aims to help people make themselves better or change their views, even though these are possible – but not predictable or determinable – consequences. On the contrary, if we conceive of this practice as a mere technique, we risk the loss of its philosophical, poetic and political dimensions. Rather, one does not learn how to think – just like one does not learn how to tie one’s own shoes – without being personally involved. I get dressed, that is I tie my shoes, I put on my clothes, I have done it a thousand times already. While I perform this act I do not think about it, I think of other things: things into which I am involved (my assignments, a date, etc.). The degree of my involvement is independent of the type of action. For the little boy who is learning to tie his shoes this means unusual concentration of attention: for him the tying of the shoelaces is an end in itself, and as later on during the solution of mathematical problem (Heller 2009: 13).

This example helps us understand that in the doing of Philosophy for Communities an invitation is already included to imagine a coming community, and a philosophy that comes into the world. Both are a steady shifting of expectations, of efforts in exposing subjects to the other in a still unknown space. Therefore, there is no instrumental character in this activity, but rather a form of care and focus toward those conditions we often let pass by: the time to think, to question, to listen, to give reason, to meet, to focus and to disagree. It is an experience that brings along with it the shared condition of being-born in a common world in which we have, perhaps, abandoned ourselves to solitude and denied ourselves the chance to be together, but also to reflect and judge autonomously (Aut Aut 1990: 68).

References Arendt, H., 1958, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Aut Aut, 1990, Issue on “Il pensiero plurale di Hannah Arendt” [Hannah Arendt’s Plural Thought] nn. 239–240. Bevilacqua, S. & Casarin, P. (eds.), 2016, Philosophy for children in gioco, Mimesis, Milano-Udine. Butler, J., 2005, Giving an Account of Oneself: A Critique of Ethical Violence, Fordham University Press, New York. Cavarero, A., 1997, Tu che mi guardi tu che mi racconti, Feltrinelli, Milano.

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Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1987, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, transl. B. Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Folli, A., 2015, La pedagogia di Don Gallo, Sensibili alle foglie, Roma. Heller, Á., 1984, A Radical Philosophy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Heller, Á., 2009, A Theory of Feelings, Lexington Books, Plymouth. Kristeva, J., 2014, Stranieri a noi stessi, Donzelli, Roma. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Magris, C., 2007, ‘Introduzione’, in W. Benjamin, Immagini di città, Einaudi, Torino. Rovatti, P. A., 2006, La filosofia può curare?, Cortina, Milano. Vattimo, G. & Rovatti, P.A. (eds.), 2012, Weak Thought, transl. P. Carravetta, Suny Press, Albany. Zambrano, M., 1999, Delirium and Destiny. A Spaniard in Her Twenties, transl. C. Maier, Suny Press, Albany. Zambrano, M., 2002, Il sogno creatore, transl. V. Martinetto, Bruno Mondadori, Milano.

Félix García Moriyón

Chapter 8 – Philosophy for Children: A Longitudinal Research Abstract: From the outset, the authors of the p4c curriculum wanted to provide empirical evidence of the positive effects of its application. At the same time, they thought that, in order to achieve this positive effect, students should practise philosophy for a long period. This longitudinal study aims to verify these two assumptions by evaluating the positive impact of the community of philosophical inquiry implemented over a long period. Keywords: Philosophy for Children (p4c); longitudinal research; cognitive abilities; empirical evidence.

Introduction When Matthew Lipman started developing the Philosophy for Children curriculum back at the beginning of the 1970’s, the hypothesis supporting the validity of the proposal was that transforming the classroom into a community of inquiry would foster critical thinking. The publication of the first book in the curriculum – Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery – took place just when the critical thinking movement was taking off in the world of education. In an unusual move for a philosopher, but not for an educator, Lipman realised the vital importance of offering empirical evidence for his hypothesis, such that this proposition could be shown to be an empirical fact – that children exposed to the practice of philosophical inquiry in a community of open and critical dialogue improved their thinking skills. When he published his first theoretical book about their educational proposal (by that time, Ann Sharp was an essential collaborator of the development and dissemination of the programme), he could add in the appendix some empirical research that verified the hypothesis: children’s thinking skills improved after doing philosophy in the classroom using p4c didactic resources (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1988). In the following decades, the programme grew a lot and it became a curriculum of eight books for students and eight manuals for teachers. A full curriculum to be implemented at school from kindergarten until grade 10: children and adolescents age 4 to 18 were invited to discuss philosophical topics in the classroom. The programme spread very fast all over the world and it was translated into many languages. Many people who implemented the programme accepted the

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challenge of validating the educational results, as Lipman himself had done at the beginning of its implementation in New Jersey, and carried out educational research about the impact of the programme in terms of the growth of critical thinking. Even more, they widened the scope of their research goals and focused on affective and social skills as well. By the beginning of the 21st century, there had been a substantial body of research (García & Cebas 2001). During that time, two meta-analyses were published, and both confirmed the positive impact of the philosophical discussion in the improvement of children’s thinking skills (Colom, García & Rebollo 2005; Trickey & Topping 2004). Therefore, the general trend indicates a positive impact, although the evidence is largely heterogeneous (García et al. 2002). It is noteworthy that, generally speaking, cognitive training programmes do have a positive impact in the short-term, but the effect vanishes in the medium and long-term (Baumeister & Bacharach 2000). On the other hand, according to what we know, there is only one longterm study (Malmhester 1996) and the remaining research was carried out in the short-term (one year or less). For the program, it is not enough to have a positive impact in the academic results of students, even less if those results coincide in time with the implementation of the program. We can take it for granted that if you teach critical thinking to students for one academic year, they will at the end of this period master cognitive skills better than students that were not exposed to the program. It is the same in any discipline or subject matter: those who are taught mathematics, for example, do better than those who are not taught that subject matter. This improvement affects as much the contents of the subject matter as it does the specific skills and competences that are involved in the discipline. For the founders of the program, and for the whole community of people committed to its implementation and evaluation, the main aim of philosophising with children is to empower children so that they can grow as critical, creative and caring people who can sustain and improve democratic societies. Thus, we need to find out if after school life, when they enter the life of adult people, they still have the skills that, as civic virtues, allow them to participate as active citizens in the processes of deliberation and decision that are fundamental for democracy. On the other hand, although cognitive skills play a fundamental role in the programme, the purpose of the programme is also to foster those affective skills that are necessary to accept an open dialogue about controversial topics, stimulating the capacity of judging based upon the quality of the arguments as the criteria of the assessment of statements and judgements. In our analysis of the competences fostered by the programme, we selected 21 affective skills that make it possible to build a true community of inquiry committed to the search for truth (García et al. 2002).

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Of course, this ambitious goal needs more time than just twice a week over one academic year to get a well-rooted change in the behaviour of children, supported by the growth of those skills or habits. Philosophy should be present in the actual educational curriculum of a school every year, starting on the kindergarten level until the last year of high school, when students go to university, undertake vocational training or start a professional career. Thus, we designed a research project that focused on cognitive and affective skills and that followed the students all the way through their academic life in primary and secondary education.

The project Back in September 2001, a private school in Las Rozas – a town on the outskirts of Madrid – invited me to conduct a Philosophy for Children workshop. This was a school with a strong interest in fostering thinking skills and intelligence, looking for a good pedagogical programme to be implemented in primary and secondary education. After the introductory workshop of 25 hours involving a group of 25 teachers, the staff made the decision to implement the programme. The staff of the school appointed Elena Morilla, the philosophy teacher at the school, as coordinator of the program, and selected two other professors to implement the programme in their classes. Over the next two years, I visited the centre once every two or three weeks to follow up on the formation of those teachers. I conducted some sessions with children and their teachers as an observer, and observed sessions conducted by the teachers. At the end of the school day, we held a specific two-hour session to analyse the practice and to improve the understanding of the programme. As a consequence of this formation, p4c was integrated into the regular curriculum of the school and students attended one class per week, starting in primary school (6 years of age) and extending until the end of high-school (18 years of age). These classes were conducted by a teacher previously involved in the implementation of the programme, while Elena Morilla took care of the ongoing formation of new teachers who were appointed by the staff of the school to implement the p4c programme in their classes. This provides a very good example of a classic approach to educational research: an action-research plan. The school administration had identified a valuable educational aim, that of improving cognitive skills. They had also designed a plan of action – implementing the Philosophy for Children Programme – and it was time to collect information about the results of their action plan. Our team quickly decided to carry out research with the active collaboration of the programme coordinator and the staff of the school: a longitudinal study for investigating the presumed lasting positive impact of p4c on cognitive and non-cognitive

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factors and on academic achievement. This research project was coherent with the problems encountered in the previous research that I have mentioned above. Longitudinal studies are usually descriptive studies carried out over a long period of time. However, they are also carried out in order to understand life outcomes and even to predict those outcomes. In our study, we also wanted to explain the causes of those outcomes, trying to establish the causal relationship between an independent variable – the p4c programme – and the dependent variable – the outcomes: high order thinking skills (g, Gf and Gc), affective dimensions (N, E, P, S) and academic achievement, as evidenced below. As in any other research project, we selected another school as a control group. Both schools shared some significant contextual variables: both were private schools located in mainly residential towns, 18 km and 32 km away from Madrid, located along the same A-6 highway, etc. Students came from middle-to-upper class families, and middle-to-upper social and cultural status. There was one important difference, however: I had conducted an introductory workshop in p4c in one of the schools a few years earlier, in 1997, but the administration decided not to implement the programme. Given that both schools did not have many students, we recruited six cohorts from the experimental school and five cohorts from the control school across the years. Data was collected at three time points: 2nd grade (8 years of age), 6th grade (11–12 years) and 4th grade of secondary school (16 years). As we had done in previous research, we applied a quantitative methodology for gathering information and we used standard tests that were well-known in the field of educational research. Cognitive abilities were measured by two closely related standardised batteries: EFAI and IGF. These batteries comprise a set of subtests (verbal ability, numerical ability, spatial relations, and abstract reasoning) that first produce a verbal (Gc) and non-verbal (Gf) index, and then a general ability score (g). Non-cognitive traits were measured by the EPQ-A and the EPQ-J, which gather information about four basic personality traits: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Psychoticism (P), and Honesty (S). Finally, academic achievement was measured according to school grades and performance in standardised tests of academic achievement. We focused on language and mathematics. After secondary school, it is our intention to gather more information from the students five to six years later. We will use individual data sets from deep interviews and we will gather some information about the students’ academic or professional life. The entire research project has the aim of validating the hypothesis of the school and of the p4c project. The experimental school believes that if an ongoing practice of a significant set of cognitive and affective skills is implemented,

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children will improve those skills as they become behavioural habits. Furthermore, their academic achievement will improve. For the p4c programme, the hypothesis is as follows: the practice of philosophical inquiry, according to the p4c programme approach, improves basic cognitive and non-cognitive psychological traits and has a positive impact on academic achievement; therefore, the treatment group will show higher scores in the standardised measures of both psychological factors, while their academic performance will be more successful.

Provisional findings The research project is still in progress, and we will have to wait a few years before it is finished and all the data has been gathered. Nevertheless, in 2014, we offered a preliminary study that covered the changes of both groups in the first 4 years of the research period – from 2nd until 6th grade of primary school. 281 students from the treatment group (p4c) and 146 students from the control group were considered in that analysis (Colom et al. 2014). The results were positive, in the sense that they validated the hypothesis: the treatment group outperformed (positive d value) the control group in g (general cognitive ability), Gf (fluid or abstract ability) and Gc (crystallised or verbal ability). These values were relatively high, because values greater than 0.2 are considered significant from an applied perspective (Cohen 1980). After converting these d values to the IQ scale (mean = 100, SD = 15) for comparative purposes, the results indicate that there is an advantage favouring the treatment group equivalent to 7 IQ points in general cognitive ability (g), 4 IQ points in fluid-abstract intelligence (Gf) and 7 IQ points in crystallised intelligence (Gc). It is a highly significant result, not very common in other cognitive enrichment programmes. If we analyse the measured personality traits – those that are valid indicators of affective skills according to our model – the d values obtained were substantially lower. The treatment group displayed higher levels of extraversion, neuroticism and honesty along with lower levels of psychoticism. On the other hand, there was a small trend suggesting that students who attended philosophy classes and were exposed to philosophical inquiry were more extraverted, more honest and more emotionally oriented, but also less emotionally stable. These results are not as significant as the others, but in any case point to the positive impact of programme implementation. Although there is not a clear model of affective growth, and it is not an easy task to sort affective traits according to their positive value for personal flourishing, we might accept, for example, that being emotionally oriented is better than exhibiting emotional disorientation, and being more honest is also better than a diminishing honesty.

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At that stage of the research, we lacked academic results that might be reliable for the research. At the end of the compulsory secondary level, when students are 16 years old, we gathered data from their grades at school and from an external test that assesses their command of a language and mathematics – the two subjects we have chosen on the basis of their role in the educational system. In addition to these global analyses, we focused our attention on the lower level of the ability distribution (80–90 and 90–100). There is some evidence showing the negative impact of schooling on children in the lower IQ percentile (Hunt 2011). In standard compulsory education, children having a lower level of general intelligence suffer a significant worsening of their cognitive abilities over time. Cognitive challenges increase as students move on to higher grades, and they must cope with intellectual challenges that grow beyond their zone of proximal development. Taking this into account, our research has produced some very important results. It is important to note, moreover, that the accumulation of difficulties that manifests itself as an increase in academic failure is substantially less visible in the treatment group (p4c). At the end of primary school, those students from the treatment group who have participated in philosophical dialogues and who are in the lowest end of the cognitive ability distribution remain almost in the same range as at the beginning of the study, when they were in 2nd grade – at both junctures they were less than 5%. That is not the case for the control group – at the beginning, they were under 5%, but after these four years they increased to 14%. These are interesting results, because they imply that p4c is especially positive for the more disadvantaged students.

Some provisional conclusions Although our research is still a long way from being finished, we can be optimistic. Our first analysis is positive and, to a certain point, provides further evidence for what we already know – that p4c is a good programme. Any time we present the programme at conferences, or to any specific school or official educational administrators, we can support our offer with sound data – the evidence that has accumulated from abundant research confirms that thinking skills are improved. This is a very important finding, given that the programme was born with cognitive enrichment as one of its most important, if not the most important, characteristics. Despite frequent arguments against the role of intelligence in human accomplishment, and against the possibility of a valid and reliable way to measure intelligence (particularly general intelligence), we have strong evidence indicating that intelligence is an integrative trait that “can be considered the sun of our psychological cosmos” (Colom 2014). Moreover, intelligence is the individual

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personal trait most likely to be predictive of personal flourishing. Improving intelligence is thus very important, and much more so for those people who exhibit lower CI levels. The social consequences of ignoring this can be very damaging, even devastating (Gottfredson 2004). The Philosophy for Children programme has passed the test; as the accumulated evidence demonstrates, p4c is a very effective programme. More research is needed in order to specify the particular contributions of the programme, and how other dependent variables interact with the programme to achieve this improvement. In our research, for example, the different educational styles of both schools might be crucial; in the treatment group, the practice of philosophical inquiry happens in an educational environment where cognitive development plays a paramount role. Important as it is, however, intelligence is not enough. Affective traits are also very important, and some evidence has emerged from the research, although the conclusions are not as clear as in the area of cognitive enhancement. Throughout more than forty years that the programme has been implemented, many research projects have explored its impact on social and affective characteristics (García & Cebas 2004). Yet, as far as we know, no general overview, let alone any metaanalysis, has emerged from that research. Finally, the issue of increased emotional instability would be well worth more profound exploration. At a time when there is strong interest in happiness, it is important to take a deeper look into this concept – one which is too frequently identified with an internal emotional state, with buoyancy and cheerfulness, a reductionist concept that is far from the eudemonistic ideal of Aristotle or from the rich concept of joy in Spinoza. Fostering critical thinking can help people to move closer to eudemonia or joy, to flourish as human beings. Yet, this process might lead to a strong sense of melancholy as a reasonable consequence of facing the complexity and uncertainty of living. As the good Brahmin of Voltaire said: “I have said to myself a thousand times that I should be happy if I were but as ignorant as my old neighbour; and yet it is a happiness which I do not desire”. We agree with Voltaire’s conclusion: “although we may set great value upon happiness, we set still greater value upon reason”.

References Baumeister, A.A. & Bacharach, V.R., 2002, ‘Early Generic Educational Intervention Has no Enduring Effect on Intelligence and Does Not Prevent Mental Retardation: The Infant Health and Development Program’, Intelligence 28(3), 161–192.

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Bouchard, T.J. Jr., 1995, ‘Longitudinal Studies of Personality and Intelligence A Behavior Genetic and Evolutionary Psychology Perspective, in D.H. Saklofske & M. Zeidner (eds.), International Handbook of Personality and Intelligence, pp. 81–106, Springer, Dordrecht. Cohen, J., 1988, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, second edition, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. Colom, R., 2014, ‘From the Earth to the Brain’, Personality and Individual Differences 61–62, 3–6. Colom, R., García Moriyón, F., Magro, C. & Morilla, E., 2014, ‘The Long-term Impact of Philosophy for Children: A Longitudinal Study (Preliminary Results)’, Analytic teaching and philosophical praxis 35(1), 50–56. García Moriyón, F. & Cebas Tudela, E., 2004, What we know about Research in Philosophy with Children, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://philoenfant. org/2015/10/30/resume-de-103-recherches-en-philosophie-pour-les-enfants/. García Moriyón, F., Colom Marañón, R., Lora Cerdá, S., Rivas Vidal, M. & Traver Centaño, V., 2002, La estimulación de la inteligencia cognitiva y la inteligencia afectiva, De la Torre, Madrid. García-Moriyón, F., Rebollo, I. & Colom, R., 2005, ‘Evaluating Philosophy for Children: A Meta-Analysis’, Thinking. The Journal of Philosophy for Children 17(4), 14–22. Gottfredson, L.S., 2004, ‘Intelligence: Is it the Epidemiologists’ Elusive “Fundamental Cause” of Social Class Inequalities in Health?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86(1), 174–199. Hunt, E.B., 2011, Human Intelligence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. & Oscanyan, F., 1988, Philosophy in the Classroom, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Malmhester, Bo, 1996, The 6 Years Long Swedish Project: “Best in the World in Thinking”, paper presented at the ICPIC congress 1999, viewed 15 September 2017, from http://hem.bredband.net/b131630/English_files/Swedish%20 projekt.html. Trickey, S. & Topping, K.J., 2004, ‘Philosophy for Children: A Systematic Review’, Research Papers in Education 19(3), 365–380.

Edna Olimpia da Cunha, Vanise Dutra Gomes, Walter Omar Kohan

Chapter 9 – Paths of the Labyrinth: A Philosophy Project in a Public School in Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro Abstract: Inspired by the idea of labyrinth this chapter analyses what we are doing when we philosophise with children, young people and adults in a project co-developed by a Public University of Rio de Janeiro and a public school of a public school of the city of Duque de Caxias, State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. What the experiences tell is that childhood is not only or principally an age, but it is a dimension of human life. Keywords: childhood; experience; public education; thinking; labyrinth.

Thinking of the idea of the labyrinth and the possibility of bringing it closer to what we do in a project of philosophy with children in school, we can ask another question: What conditions are necessary for our movements in this place full of twists and turns? Perhaps this question helps us to think about what we are doing when we propose to philosophise with children in public school. Philosophy has invited us to live out an exercise of attention that makes possible another view, another relation with school education processes, in the sense of re-signifying our pedagogical know-how, as well as reinventing school and life itself, both inside the school and outside of it. In this text, we propose thinking about a philosophy project in a school in the district of Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, based on accounts of experience that, like footprints, make us think of attempted paths of thinking with others about the meaning of our presence in schools.

A call to/from the labyrinth Perhaps our trajectory in the project “Em Caxias, a filosofia en-caixa? [In Caxias, does philosophy fit?]”1 has been forming as an experience of walking in a 1 “Em Caxias a filosofia en-caixa?” is an outreach project of the Universidade do Estado Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), whose principal aim is to educate teachers and affirm philosophical practices with children and adults in municipal schools in Duque de Caxias and at our own university. For a broader description of the project, see eds. Kohan & Olarieta 2012.

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labyrinth, of experiencing a kind of vertigo, a sensation of losing balance and of instability that makes us think about all our formative routes and our practices as public school teachers. We lose ourselves inside and out, in the intertwining of the institutional networks that constitute us and that we have internalised in the form in which we perform the role of teachers in a public school on the periphery of the city of Duque de Caxias, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Let us pay attention to the following account of one of these experiences, which happened at the Joaquim da Silva Peçanha School in Duque de Caxias, in 2014 (Experience of Thinking in Youth and Adult Education, Joaquim da Silva Peçanha School, Class 504 Stage II. UERJ/PROPED/NEFI Archive): Vanise presents the participants of the experience of thinking with an image of a person in a labyrinth taken from her Facebook page. Under the image is written: “Sometimes to find yourself you have to lose yourself ”. Silence… Looks… Cora: - Where do we lose ourselves? Where do we find ourselves? Because I’m here with me, I’m here… I don’t know… to lose myself, how? What is this “losing myself ”? Mara: - Inside us, in the same person. After that shock you have to stop and analyse to choose and keep walking […]. Vanise: - I also think this losing is an internal losing. Losing yourself… Mara: Inside yourself! Fabiana: Do we just lose ourselves with a shock? Or are there other ways to lose ourselves? Mara: No, there are other ways! Comments and dialogue… Some of the students gave examples of things we lose inside and outside of people. Vanise: - So finally, is this losing outside or inside of us? Some responded outside, others responded inside. Heber: - I think it’s from the inside to the outside… Fabiana: When we lose something that we already had, we can go look and find it, but it seems that the sentence suggests that we lose ourselves and also find something new: something that has never been seen!

This dialogue evokes the image and myth of the labyrinth, labýrinthos, a construction full of twists and turns (Brandão 2013: 57). What can we lose and find when we venture into a labyrinth? Is the labyrinth inside or outside of us? What can the image of the labyrinth contribute to thinking about our relationship with philosophy in school? The experiences of thinking that have occurred since the beginning of the project challenge us to face the turns in a path of a group of students and teachers from a public school and a public university that wager on the power of thinking. But in what sense does thinking have to do with the labyrinth? Is thinking entering a labyrinth? In the dialogue above, Mara gives us a clue when she mentions

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the occurrence of a “shock” that causes a certain interruption. She says “you have to stop and analyse to choose and keep walking”. Is it the interruption, the shock, that provokes thinking, that throws us into a labyrinth experience? In another text, we noted an important issue, observed at the beginning of the experiences of thinking in 2007, when the children participating in the project “baptised” the philosophy room as a thinking room (eds. Kohan & Olarieta 2012: 16). The very children who gave this name to the space of the experiences of philosophy noted an astounding difference that they took on themselves to put into question: “Why was the philosophy room called the thinking room? Don’t we think in the classroom?” (Gomes 2011: 85–86). In other words, must we suspend the normality of school life in order to be able to think? Is it necessary to establish a specific space – even a specific room – for the school and those in it to open themselves up to thinking? Is this one of the paths of the labyrinth? These are some of the intriguing questions that we are constantly exploring in an effort to understand the movements induced during the time of carrying out the project in our school. The practices of schooling, with its play of questions and answers, the accumulation of diverse content and classificatory assessments, produce an image of thought that could approximate what Deleuze called a “moral or dogmatic” image of thought (Deleuze 1994), and this image itself has been radically put into question what was until now experienced under the name of philosophy. The philosophical experiences with the project claim another place, another way of walking that moves us away from the straight line of hegemonic discourses nourished by a dogmatic image of thought. It would seem as if something is freed in thought, something that binds thought is suspended, and thought, shocked, opens itself to a labyrinth. Inspired by Borges and Kant, preoccupied with the relations between time and movement, Deleuze tells us in the letter “K as in Kant” of his Abécédaire that “[t]he labyrinth more terrible than a circular labyrinth is a straight labyrinth” (Deleuze 1997). But could a true labyrinth be straight? Could it have a straight line? Perhaps Deleuze is alerting us to the illusion of the existence of a labyrinth without curves, without turns, without interruptions… Our project and schools have been visited by many students and teachers from all over the world. On many of these occasions, they ask us if what we have experienced in the project is really philosophy. We are also often challenged, by the institutions we pass through, to point to the “concrete” results of this work that has already existed for a decade. We are also frequently asked if what we do has a method or not. These are not simple questions, nor are they easy to answer. There

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are diverse ways to experience philosophy. In many cases, there is a specific way to conduct philosophy, a methodology inspired by the legacy of Matthew Lipman, that is, a Philosophy for Children, with precise, previously delineated paths (Lipman 1988). In this case, philosophy and its pedagogy overlap in a didactic logic, with a step-by-step explanation, across a constituted material, for example the novels and manuals of Lipman, or any other previously established material. In this understanding, philosophy must answer set questions about what it is and how to practice it with children. However, before attempting to answer these questions, we have learnt through the experiences with the participants of the project – children, young people and adults – to think about what they lead us to ask about how we have dwelled in the times and spaces of school, how we have lived in our own world of philosophy and, more importantly, what we, as philosophers-educators, have affirmed in our own lives with the experiences of the project. This movement may distance us from a specific method and bring us closer to a composition (Kohan & Olarieta 2012: 19), a collective invention, with many voices, with a variety of sounds… Rather than a method, we have some principles, presented in various spaces (Kohan & Olarieta 2012). Inspired by Rancière, we start from the presupposition of the equality of intelligence, that we are all equally capable of thinking, of narrating our experiences, of thinking about what has affected us and given meaning to what we do and what is our being. In the experiences of thinking, there is a certain suspension of the codes present in the language of schooling, such as the serial classification of students, the separation of the didactic material according to age group or the place demarcated for a teacher and a student according to how they are usually expected to speak. Therefore, the philosophy we experience is difficult to define, difficult to be translated into a straight answer. How to name what we are still inventing, day after day, with the movements drawn in our experiences? In what manual is a dizzying and destabilising philosophy that walks in a labyrinth, that invites us to leave the place, to change, to move, written?

The labyrinth of questioning and self-questioning In another experience, in the same school, also in 2014, we proposed to the class three exercises: a) the game of telephone; b) the presentation of a book on the game of telephone, and c) three cards on the floor, each with an option: a) listen; b) hear; c)? (symbolising doubt) and leaving a blank space for them to complete. In the final part, the participants had to think and vote on what in the first two exercises had been the most important: a) listen; b) hear; c) doubt. During the voting, the majority sided with the word “hear” and others with “listen”. However,

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one student, João, explained that he was in doubt, because he was worried by thinking and wondering if the two words would be almost the same thing or not, and invited everyone to pay better attention, to better confront the two words circulating in that conversation. After João’s words, the following dialogue took place: Stela: - I want to change, because João said it’s all the same. Vanise: And do you think it’s all the same? So, you can change your vote. But did you vote to listen? The next one. What’s your name? Does Nicole want to talk too? Student: - I want to change my vote too, auntie. Student: Because some people who spoke left me in doubt. (Transcription of the Experience of Thinking “Ouvir ou Escutar?” Class 401 Stage II. UERJ/PROPED/NEFI Archive, 2014).

To welcome questions, to ask questions, to ask the other’s questions to our questions, to problematise them, to make them resonate is one of the dimensions of the labyrinth exercise of the experiences with the project in our schools. “I thought that way, now I think differently”, “I’ve changed what I thought”, “Professor, this question is not from here, it’s from the thinking room”, “Now I’m in doubt, confused”. “I want to change, because João said it’s all the same”… How to measure the movements caused by these exercises? How to circumscribe in a method a movement that throws us outside of ourselves, on the line of flight of the witch’s flight? (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 41). Would this line of flight be a kind of entrance to the labyrinth? Is entering the labyrinth a way to dwell philosophically in education? To lose yourself, find yourself, lose yourself once more…? Is to philosophise to allow the interruptions along the path to force us to pay special attention to what we are thinking, being, to what we are?

The Minotaur and childhood Children seem to venture without fear in the labyrinth of thinking, perhaps the childhood of children is a large labyrinth mocking our illusion that there is only one possible way to walk, in a straight line… Yes, it is possible that the intensity of childhood is able to put us face to face with each other, in the entrance to the unknown, to transform the labyrinth into a different game to play: “professor, what we are doing here seems to be a riddle…”2. It is the hand of childhood, the childhood of children, which touches the hand of the Minotaur3, a terrible mythical 2 A sentence said by one of the children of class 501, in an experience in the Joaquim da Silva Peçanha School in 2012, in which Professor Gert Biesta participated. 3 “In order to avenge himself even more on the king for perjury, Poseidon made the wife of Minos, ruler of Crete, conceive a fatal and irresistible passion for the bull. Without

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creature that dwells in the labyrinth, and invites the monster to play around in the curves, to face the labyrinth within himself, the dead ends, crossroads, questions without answers… And, when many push their curiosity to know what the Minotaur made of the child, they are surprised to learn what the child made of the Minotaur. He enters into the student’s labyrinth and begins to question himself, just like any teacher in any public school, perplexed at being a stranger to herself, as he or she enters the other’s labyrinth: “What to do with what these children have done to me? What to do when I follow their movements, their unusual gestures and I see myself so hardened? What to do with what I heard and with what I began to hear from myself? What do I do when I find out that I do not control the labyrinth as I believed I could control it?” These questions are reminiscent of some of the accounts shared by teachers participating in the project when they describe the impact that the experiences of thinking have had on their daily practices in school. Affected by the untimeliness of childhood, perplexed like the Minotaur, we ask ourselves how we relate to our practice as teachers, for it seems to us that in the hegemonic pedagogical discourse there is always an effort to “technify” or “resultify” what to do with children, with how they are educated in the school context. There is a tendency to valorise results above the school process itself and to demand sufficiently “safe” techniques or paths in order to arrive at such results. Out of our experience with the philosophy project in our school, we asked ourselves if there would be a space for thinking about what the childhood of the children, young people and adults can compose with us, public school teachers and university professors, with the questions it offers us and with its unique modes of participation in the experiences of thinking. Can childhood lead us to a place outside ourselves, reverse roles, displace certain truths, create labyrinths? Would this be an educational, philosophical dimension in the experiences? Instead of just worrying about a certain didactisation of our school activities, why not exercise thinking in the sense of questioning not what we will reach and how to get there, but what we are doing to ourselves, with each other? What is happening with us in school?

knowing how to give herself to the animal, Pasiphaë resorted to the arts of Daedalus, who made a bronze heifer so perfect that he managed to deceive the animal. The queen placed herself within the simulacrum and conceived with the bull a monstrous being, half man, half bull, the Minotaur” (Brandão 2013: 63–64).

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The labyrinth of compositions In the experiences with the project, it is not the questions of the didactic manuals that stand out, but the events, the questionings of life itself, of our relation to life, to words, of the relation to ourselves as singular subjects. That is, we bring to our encounters a good deal of the dramatic charge of the present, of what has affected us in our way of living. In this respect, our experiences may be closer to the power of the theatre, in the terms that Foucault tells us, because “theatre seizes the event and stages it” (Foucault 1994: 574)4. The dramaturgies of living that are summoned, enter the stage, are problematised in our wheels of thought, we sit in circles, so that all may be visible to one another. It is also a concern of the participants in the meetings that everyone can speak, voice and expose what they think, agreeing, disagreeing, thinking, rethinking what was said or heard, what resonated more strongly, what we carry with us in our thoughts when we leave from there… We think of the dramatic dimension of our experiences and could think them with other kinds of language, such as painting, dancing, music, cooking, poetry, among others, because the philosophy we have experienced, being averse to methods, at times makes unusual drawings, paints, creates different tones, shows itself in an enigmatic image: “Can the enigma be disguised as obvious?”, “When I ask myself a question, are one or two people asking?”, students5 asked in an experience in 2016. In some situations, our experiences come close to being a dance, the dance of thinking, with comings and goings, surprising gestures that put our attention on our bodies, the movements we have made and what they can give us to think… Hearing the sound of our voices with other voices brings the musical power of our encounters: “Someone projects the sound outside; it is inside the body when you hear it from the inside” (Gomes 2017: 126)… The sound that resonates, that is heard in the uncomfortable silence when we can hear only ourselves… 4 “To answer the question: who are we? And what is happening? These two questions are very different from traditional questions: what is the soul? What is eternity? Philosophy of the present, philosophy of the event, philosophy of what happens, is indeed, in a certain way, to recapture through philosophy what theatre is concerned with, because theatre is always concerned with an event, the paradox of theatre being precisely that this event repeats, repeats every evening, since one plays it, and repeats for eternity or in any case for an indefinite time, since it is always the reference of a certain anterior and repeatable event. Theatre seizes the event and stages it” (Foucault 1994: 573–574). 5 In 2016, students in a seventh-grade class at the Zilla Junger Municipal School also participated in the experiences of the project “In Caxias, does philosophy fit? The public school wagers on thinking.”

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The flavours that we experience together and each in their own way remind us of the common etymological origin of the words “knowledge” [saber] and “flavour” [sabor]. Philosophy as a tireless exercise of trying to know what we do not know, experiencing in different ways the sweet and sour taste of our labyrinth search, of our ignorance… The cuisine of the spices of thinking… Philosophy shows our daily struggle with words, with the hits and misses we commit with them, the abyss between what we want, but still cannot name. The tightrope between the poorly-spoken and well-spoken words, the words and their enigmas: “Words do not speak, words explain words themselves” (Gomes 2017: 160), “some words keep secrets”, “poetry is the key to opening the world”, “it is a passion that composers and writers can make every day…” (Gomes 2017: 139). What we have is nothing more than a scrawled drawing, a painting blurred by the mixtures of vibrant colours… We are dancers fighting against the rust of our own bodies… we dance alone, because sometimes we must, however, we are very happy to dance with another, creating other movements… Together we experience a flavour that we prepare ourselves and for a long time remains in the affective memory of our palate… we taste, we taste… to the sound of a beating heart… life, there is life… Often at other times we try to enclose the words to help us in that moment that we want, we need to say, but still cannot narrate, tell, describe accurately from a strange language, in a strange place… what we can offer is just a few fragile, staggering, passionate words… Thinking, saying, philosophising as if entering a labyrinth…

Moving in the labyrinth: to fly or to walk? The idea of the labyrinth evokes in us another question: what conditions are necessary for our movement in this place full of twists and turns? Perhaps this question helps us to think about what we are doing when we propose to philosophise with children, young people and adults in the public school. At school, we teachers receive guidance all the time from the official institutions (secretariats, ministries), guidance based on theories and methods that aim to overcome school failure and promote an improvement in the quality of learning in school (Biesta 2006). When Mara tells us, “After that shock, you have to stop and analyse to choose and keep walking”, she suggests that, in a supposed territory that appears to be a labyrinth, we need to make choices in order to move. In a path that appears vertiginous and destabilising, there may emerge some choices more interesting than others for our movement.

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In E-ducating the Gaze: The Idea of a Poor Pedagogy, Jan Masschelein (2010), inspired by Walter Benjamin, proposes two different ways of relating to a path. The first is given by those who fly over the path. The path is seen as an object, we pass over it, but it cannot pass over us, it cannot affect us or affect our route and, somehow we travel across the path like a person travels across a timeline without dwelling in the present. We may even more or less know the path, acquire a certain knowledge of it, but we cannot be affected by it on our route, nor dwell in it in a present time (Masschelein 2010). Is flying over a path like trying to walk through a labyrinth in a straight line? In the experience of philosophy in school, can there be a path (method) without curves, without turns, without interruptions? With this way of travelling the path the Belgian author contrasts another way, inspired by Benjamin. It is a question of walking the path, that is, of displacing one’s gaze so that one can see differently, can see what is visible (since the ‘distances, belvederes, clearings, prospects’ are not hidden, not beyond) with the result that the individual (the ‘I’ and ‘we’) can be transformed. That is exactly what walking is about: a displacement of the gaze that enables experience, not just as a passive undergoing (being commanded), but also as blazing a trail or path, a kind of cutting a road through (Masschelein 2010: 45).

If the subject who flies is the subject of knowledge, who posits the path as the object of his or her knowledge, the subject of the walk is the subject of experience who posits him or herself in the position of the one who will be transformed by the experience of walking. As we move inside the project of philosophy with children in public school, we feel a force to walk the path of school in another way, to tread a labyrinth. This movement helps us to open our eyes to our own path, to listen to the authority – the authorship – of the path shared with our students. New possibilities arise, labyrinth possibilities, for relating to school and its educational processes. The walk in the philosophy project is an invitation to move in a perspective close to the ground, lowering the height of learned knowledge and methods to the possibility of looking closely at what the path shows us, which we cannot anticipate. It is an approach from the school floor, at the height at which our students move, in a more present time possible, attentive to what the experience itself could tell us. Thus we come to strengthen our desire, our will to reinvent our practice and improve relationships in the school/classroom. Perhaps, in this way, the participants-others-inhabitants of the school also open up other possibilities of dwelling there.

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Two epigraphs in Masschelein’s text draw our attention. One, by Subcomandante Marcos, states: “We walk, not in order to arrive at a promised land, but because walking itself is the revolution” (cited in Masschelein 2010: 43). This means that the path of school in itself opens meanings, by the way we walk and not by the destination it allows us to reach. We do not walk to reach another land, not even another school, nor even another classroom. We walk by the revolutionary value of walking when we set ourselves as subjects of experience and not as distant knowers who affect others with their knowledge without being affected by the path. The second epigraph is by Simone Weil: “Attention should be the sole goal of education”. Therefore, we set out to travel the path with attention to the vigilance of its commands. In the path of philosophy, the work of a teacher is a work of attention, in attention and on attention, our own and of others. When we fly over a pedagogical path with questions such as “How to teach?”, “How to learn?”, “How to assess what my students are learning (or not learning)?”, “How…?”, “How…?”, “How…?”, and many other “How?”s, involved in the search for pedagogical methods and recipes, distressed by the assessment of the administration of the official system of teaching, full of good educational intentions, we can forget to look closely at the differences and singularities of those who circulate in school under the labels of “failed” or “successful”. What have these “failed” and “successful” students learnt, not only in terms of the content of knowledge but in relation to themselves and to their peers? What images of self and others do they learn as subjects of knowing, of thinking, of living? Let us consider interventions such as those of Mara who, exposing herself, calls us to think with attention and care, inviting her colleagues to open their eyes to look at what seemed obvious to them, out of a research practice centred on the present. It is an invitation “to open oneself to the world”, “to be present in the present” (Masschelein 2010: 48), to be able to stay exposed before the present, transforming us and liberating our gaze. Finally, we understand that the episodes of the experiences of thinking, narrated here, occur out of the choice to take a chance in the direction of an opening to the power that is born of the desire of an attentive and careful thought in the sense of looking for new/other ways of cohabiting the school/classroom from the composition of a thought-provoking, disturbing, enigmatic encounter between education, philosophy and childhood. What the experiences in the project also tell us is that childhood is not only or principally an age, but it is a dimension of human life. We have to take care of it and let it educate us before we seek to educate it. In a dialogical context where

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everyone participates equally from their differences, philosophy is not for us a set of thinking skills, but a sensitivity that makes us walk in order to find, in the school in which we dwell, the school of childhood.

References Biesta, G., 2006, Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future, Routledge, New York. Brandão, J. de Souza, 2013, Mitologia Grega, vol. 1, Vozes, Petrópolis. Deleuze, G., 1994, Difference and Repetition, transl. P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York. Deleuze, G., 1997, ‘L´Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze’, Editions Montparnasse, Paris. Video. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1994, What is Philosophy?, transl. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, Columbia University Press, New York. Foucault, M., 1994, ‘La Scène de la Philosophie’, in Id., Dits et Écrits, vol. 3, pp. 571– 595, Gallimard, Paris. Gomes, V. de Cássia Dutra, 2011, ‘Filosofía con niños: ¿Camino para un pensar transformador en la escuela?’, Única. Revista de Artes y Humanidades 12(2), 160–189. Gomes, V. de Cássia Dutra, 2017, Dialogar, conversar e experienciar o filosofar na escola pública: encontros e desencontros, PhD thesis, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Kohan, W. & Olarieta, B.F. (eds.), 2012, A Escola Pública aposta no pensamento, Autêntica, Belo Horizonte. Lipman, M., 1988, Philosophy Goes to School, Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Masschelein, J., 2010, ‘E-ducating the Gaze: the Idea of a Poor Pedagogy’, Ethics and Education 5(1), 43–53.

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Sergio Racca, Nicolò Valenzano, Federico Zamengo

Chapter 10 – An Outline Appraisal of Community Practices Abstract: In this chapter, we endeavour to focus on some suggestions put forward by the community practices described in the previous chapters (5–9) of this book. Our aim is to shed additional light on the relevance of philosophical practices in fostering individual and community empowerment, which, we hope, will provide a basis for further research. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); informal and non-formal education; personal flourishing; inclusion; stimulus text.

In this chapter, we endeavour to focus on some suggestions put forward by the community practices described in the previous chapters. Our aim is to shed additional light on the relevance of philosophical practices in fostering individual and community empowerment, which, we hope, will provide a basis for further research. As shown, common to all case studies is the employment of the same educational programme, namely Lipman and Sharp’s Philosophy for Children. However, only one study was conducted directly by the team behind “Philosophy and Community Practices” (Chapter 5), with the others conducted independently and prior to it (see Chapters 6–9). Moreover, three case studies (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) were conducted in Italy, while one took place in Spain (Chapter 8) and one in Brazil (Chapter 9). Finally, it is important to note that three case studies involved adult participants in extracurricular contexts (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), while two were conducted in schools (Chapters 8 and 9). This last distinction is of particular relevance for the research project, the aim of which is to analyse what the adaptation of Philosophy for Children to adults entails. Does it help to foster critical thinking and social capabilities in individuals, and by extension the process of building inclusive communities? Does practising philosophy with adults in some way require changing or adjusting the p4c proposal? Does the practice of philosophy become, perhaps, an ideal setting for educational goals aiming at the generation of democracy and reasonableness? And so on. We are of course aware of the heterogeneity of the experiences described in the previous chapters; we are also aware of the different contexts where the philosophical practice took place, and of the different ages of participants (children and

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adults). Far from being an impediment to our research, however, we firmly believe that the plurality of perspectives, contexts and participants’ ages and experiences may shed further light on p4c’s theoretical and practical programme, and perhaps suggest some reformulations, adjustments or reappraisals. As García Moriyón correctly points out (Chapter 8), dealing with these issues would require a long-term and thoroughly structured investigation. To be sure, this is an aim which in its start-up phase “Philosophy and Community Practices” was clearly unable to fulfil (at least for the time being). From a pedagogical point of view, the long-term impact of an educational practice is related to its “transferability” to extracurricular contexts (Bruner 1966: 50; see as well Bruner 1971). As regards p4c, its long-term effectiveness has been characterised by Marina Santi (2007: 112) in terms of “internalisation of interpersonal dynamics, of forms of interaction and of communicative rules”. On the contrary, the focus of García Moriyón’s innovative approach seems to be the question – rarely raised in p4c – of the externalisation of what has previously been internalised, or, as Barbara Rogoff (1990) had it, the effectiveness in ordinary life of the “participatory appropriation” of a significant experience. Nevertheless, we maintain that a critical, comparative analysis of the previous chapters allows for reflective insights, which we wish to set out for the sake of future research. To this end, after gathering the experiential accounts of Chapters 5–9, we carried out a comparative re-reading in the light of the aforementioned guideline questionnaire (see Appendix to Chapter 4). This helped us to single out relevant connections between the accounts as a precondition for tackling the general research questions of the project. In this regard, questions no. 5 and 6 of the questionnaire (the ones focusing on inclusion, participation and dialogical practice as related to the development of social and reasoning skills) proved to be particularly fruitful. Hence, we came to a unanimous agreement on the following: Racca and Valenzano (Chapter 5) emphasise that significant changes occurred in the participants of philosophical inquiry (for example: an increased ability to formulate autonomous argumentations; better use of universal categories and their application to concrete situations; the creation of a community of inquiry organised around a caring and often “instable” praxis). Casarin (Chapter 6) highlights the benefits of thinking “in a different light” for sociality and democratic participation, while Bevilacqua (Chapter 7) discusses the relevance of “thinking without banisters” and “changing a point of view”. Da Cunha et al. (Chapter 9) emphasise the core experiences – provided by philosophical inquiry – of losing oneself in the labyrinth, freeing oneself from ordinary viewpoints and taking part in a “dance

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of thinking”, which enables convergence with other persons. As such, according to da Cunha et al., philosophy is not “a set of thinking skills, but a sensitivity that makes us walk in order to find”. Thinking skills are shown to be closely related to social skills, regarding both their genesis (Vygotsky 1986) and their expression: the inter-personal shapes the personal, allowing the latter to manifest itself. Racca and Valenzano point to this connection in their account of “formulat[ing] good judgments in the presence of others”, where the first half of the sentence predominately, albeit not exclusively, emphasises the cognitive dimension, and the second half the social one. As for da Cunha et al., their emphasis on “hearing” and “listening” reveals the importance of interactions and mutual understanding. Bevilacqua also refers to this political and communal dimension of p4c (for instance, her discussion of the question “Who are you?”). Philosophy helps to bring about change, thanks to the fact that the practice of p4c is related to “cognitive enrichment” and the development of intelligence. García Moriyón claims in Chapter 8 that intelligence “is an integrative trait that ‘can be considered the sun of our psychological cosmos’”, an “individual personal trait most likely to be predictive of personal flourishing”. All authors point to a further change, which often allows and anticipates the cognitive one: namely, the change of the participants’ socio-emotional characteristics. It is true that evaluating changes in this domain is not as easy and clear as in the area of cognitive enhancement (García Moriyón). Nevertheless, what we find striking is that all accounts which focussed on philosophical practice with adults unanimously identify changes in both respects. This is an important correlation, the understanding and evaluation of which, both in terms of individual and community empowerment, surely merits further study. Doing so could address the following questions: How do these changes occur? How can they be evaluated? How is the related increase in “emotional instability” (García Moriyón) thematised, tackled and overcome? Do extracurricular contexts involving adults possess some specific quality lacking in the school context? And so on. The empirical accounts given in previous chapters do, however, offer some interesting hints in this regard that can be further developed. For instance, Bevilacqua and da Cunha et al. stress the emancipatory role played by questioning in defeating the violence of dogmas, fostering inclusion, developing mutual respect and creating bonds among participants. Racca and Valenzano emphasise the fruitfulness of some indicators (such as the autonomous deviations from the stimulus text and the given context, the capacity to deepen the analysis without the mediation of the facilitator and the endeavour to find creative solutions to the problematic issues debated) in recognising and evaluating changes, achievements

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and developments in the community-based dialogic praxis. Finally, García Moriyón highlights that in school contexts the practice of p4c helps disadvantaged students to reduce the cognitive gap between themselves and others, thereby directly and indirectly fostering social inclusion and greater opportunities for everyone to flourish as human beings. Additional issues are raised by other items in the questionnaire, namely those addressing the role played by the stimulus text in community-based dialogue (no. 1), the facilitator (no. 2) and the participants’ experiences and backgrounds (no. 3). As for the stimulus text itself, Racca and Valenzano apparently took inspiration from Nussbaum’s (2010: 76) suggestion to rewrite Lipman and Sharp’s texts “as culture changes”, designing tailor-made dialogic texts and employing them in the sessions with adult participants. These texts chiefly serve the following purposes: a) they function as ice-breaking devices; b) they provide imaginative means to stimulate the philosophical inquiry; c) they provide a model of philosophical sensitivity and multidimensional thinking; d) they welcome participants to the discussion through an inclusive ritual (Lipman 2003: 97–98)1. In designing their texts, Racca and Valenzano aimed at connecting with the participants’ everyday experience, but also at opening it to further reflections. The same is true of Casarin, who aimed to find a connection with the participants’ experience and arouse their interest in a dialogue. What is particularly interesting is that in all three accounts regarding adults (the third being da Cunha’s et al.), the participants’ experiences and backgrounds – their lives, problems, beliefs, convictions, etc. (question no. 3) – played a vital role. In what sense? Many participants had suffered peculiar, often traumatic experiences. However, when these experiences were shared and communicated in a p4c session, instead of anchoring the agent to the past, they seem to provide him or her with the capacity to see things clearly and start again. This is achieved through an appreciation of the variety of human specificities, which is achieved thanks to philosophical dialogue. And it is precisely the recognition of these experiences – not setting them aside – that inspires the adult participants’ willingness to contribute truthfully to the inquiry. In this respect, especially at the beginning of the community-building process, the role played by the facilitator (question no. 2) is of paramount importance; then, he or she may leave room for progressively more autonomous exchanges as the community grows in confidence (Racca & Valenzano). The facilitator keeps the dialogue open and assures its participative nature and democratic procedure, providing comments and attempting to deepen the participants’ proposals (Casarin 1 See as well supra, chapter 1, section 4.3.1.

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and Bevilacqua). They embody the self-reflective and self-corrective nature of the philosophical practice (Casarin); the facilitator does not limit his or her own understanding of p4c to a “specific method”, but rather “a composition, a collective invention, with many voices, with a variety of sounds” (da Cunha et al.). Finally, since the facilitator is able to “think with care and attention”, he or she is also able to recognise these very traits in other individuals and to help finding “new/other ways” of communal cohabitation (da Cunha et al.).

References Bruner, J.S., 1966, Toward a Theory of Instruction, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London. Bruner, J.S., 1971, The Relevance of Education, Norton, New York. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Rogoff, B., 1990, Apprenticeship in Thinking. Cognitive Development in Social Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Santi, M., 2007, ‘Democracy and Inquiry. The Internalization of Collaborative Rules in a Community of Philosophical Discourse’, in D. Camhy (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Innovative Learning, pp. 110–123, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin. Nussbaum, M., 2010, Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton University Press, Princeton-Oxford. Vygotsky, L., 1986, Thought and Language, transl. E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar, MIT Press, Cambridge-London.

Section 3 Prospects for the Future: Further Reflections and Practical Possibilities

Giacomo Pezzano

Chapter 11 – “I open the Problem, and I don’t know…”: What is “Philosophical” in P4C and in Philosophy? Abstract: Philosophy for Communities shows that the improvement of thinking involves reflection. How should reflection be conceived? In what sense does reflection reveal the “philosophical attitude” of p4c? The chapter revolves around statements taken from participant contributions to p4c sessions and aims at posing such questions, rather than simply answering to them. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); problematisation; transformation; relationality; questioning. When a problem cannot be solved, then it’s not a problem. When a problem can be solved, then it’s not a problem. (Munari 1996: 35) An I do not know that has become positive and creative, the condition of creation itself, and that consists in determining by what one does not know. (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 128)

In p4c, “the improvement of thinking involves reflection” (Lipman 2003: 26). I claim that “reflection” here means problematisation, and that the philosophical attitude of p4c consists in this. Often, in writing on philosophical practice, one goes from a philosophical theory to its concrete application (a top-down approach). Here, I will try also to explore the ways in which practice can inform thinking, such as how practice makes possible the renewal of theoretical frameworks (a bottom-up approach). Practice forces us to explore deeply the way in which we understand a problem, the way in which we perceive how a problem works, and – last but not least – shows us that insisting on problems is what constitutes the “philosophical” in philosophy. This chapter revolves around some phrases taken from participant contributions to the 8th session of the “pilot project” of MondoQui (see Chapter 5). These phrases have been appropriated for the title of this chapter and its section headings. In this way, this piece attempts to take hold of and put to work the specificity of philosophical problematisation, which – as I shall indicate – highlights and

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functions via the reciprocal juncture of the singular and the universal, and speculates and reflects not just in the abstract sense of theorising, but also and firstly in the sense of mirroring – of folding.

1. “They come out with ideas that would never come from a person alone. […] I see that it works; I mean that here it’s working. And nobody said ‘now we teach you how to think’: it’s done in community and it’s learned by doing” In p4c, reflection involves a specific pregnancy, intended as the being-in-theprocess of the community of inquiry (Lipman 2003: 81–104). This implies at least three intertwined aspects: i) Reflection is, so to say, co-reflection: one cannot think all by oneself. Thinking develops itself through an opening, a multiplication of options, possibilities, perspectives, reasons, distinctions, etc. P4c shows that this is not only an abstract, logical or theoretical process (the talking of the soul with itself), but also a concrete exposure to others, an actual “contamination” by others’ insights, perceptions, emotions, convictions, opinions and thoughts – it is a reciprocal co-opening. ii) Thus, thinking is a relational action of discernment-in-context: there is no such thing as The Community, there is only, on each occasion of thinking, a community, this community. P4c testifies that reflection is a question of “flexing” a real situation, a specific set of circumstances, of apprehending and extending a singular event into something that at the same time “overlaps” and “deals with” itself (a true experience, not a universal rule). iii) Reflection’s “situatedness” implies that it is not given in advance: no general instructions on how to practise it are set. It is not a given repeatable state, but an open and differential process. When you reflect, you must begin anew each time, you must dive into the peculiarity of the process you find yourself in the middle of. P4c, I think, reveals that these aspects are linked by the fact that thinking is introducing a difference, an inner fold or internal relationship, into a context or situation. Reflection calls for relations on several levels (from the abstract/rational to the concrete/emotional). This is because it concerns and stimulates that strange, paradoxical and uncanny internal distance that works within a field – from a shared situation to a personal worldview. Furthermore, through p4c we can see how a singularity is not subsumed into a universal, “in all times and places”,

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containing every possible case, but is prolonged in all the problematic richness of its potential linkages. All this is to say – as I will clarify – that to reflect is to problematise.

2. “A question is something useful. I don’t know exactly how. […] But it’s useful” P4c has a peculiarly childish and thus purely philosophical attitude, in which reflection does not look insistently for answers; it involves rather for the kind of transformation that philosophy provides: not giving a new answer to an old question, but transforming all the questions (Lipman 2003: 86–87). Philosophy exhibits rather than affirms; it engages in problem-posing more than problemsolving (see Chapter 4): questions are highlighted and thus made visible as questions, whilst former answers are seen as a problem, and thus are perceived in their problematicity. To problematise is to pose questions. In our daily lives, questions are often discarded for their inutility: they are seen as a waste of time, a fruitless exercise that produces nothing but immobilisation and hesitation. At best, questions are nothing but the first step in a process which culminates in the answer, that is, culminates in the definitive re-solution of a problem or the ultimate overcoming of an obstacle. On this view, we ask questions only in order to get the answer, the right and true answer; questions posed for the sake of posing questions soon become disorientating and annoying, if not frustrating (like the endless and why? and then? of a child). For sure, a question is a problematic demand, a problem, something which produces a suspension of a given state, situation, action and so on, but it is here that we find its specific utility and capacity. To accept this, we should stop looking for the dis-solution of questions. We should renounce the idea that the re-solution of a problem means making it disappear, and that if you are not able to solve it, then you are not facing a real problem, as if the meaning of a problem arises merely from its (dis)solution. The disclosure of an internal difference within a givenness reveals that no going back from this moment is possible, but only a problematic going on. This suspension marks the entrance to a zone of collapsing and indiscernibility which makes possible further distinctions and discernment. In this regard, p4c consists in the practical apprehension of the intrinsic significance of questions and problems, which does not mean that we have no use for answers and solutions, but just that through p4c the specific and irreducible value of problematisation is experienced – if not discovered.

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3. “Moving from the experience is the most touching, genuine and realistic thing. When I go out of the door, maybe I’ve some more doubts, but these doubts make me work” Through p4c, one faces a situation in which “nothing thereafter can be the same” (Lipman 2003: 87): a true transformation is produced. To ask a question is to compel to think differently. This cannot be a simple intellectual effort: as explained, thinking is involved in a concrete situation and a specific set of circumstances. If you are provoked by a genuine question, you cannot remain indifferent to it. A problem is not the mere abstract formulation of an issue or of a disinterested intellectual game, but an invitation to think differently, to conceive the world, relations and yourself differently, so that a “repositioning” in the world is involved, and this replacement is an effective transformation. To conceive has first of all to be understood as to give birth; it is literally a conception, not just something represented in your mind or merely recognised. Rather, in conceiving you are forced to produce and develop a “point of view”, which has ramifications, implications, linkages, etc. Once you have been “inseminated”, life starts to grow: conception follows inception. Such a “perspective” does not summarise or encompass the experience in an abstract or detached way, but comes alongside the experience, redoubling it and making it resonate. So, something is produced that would not otherwise resound or become visible, perceivable and conceivable, and this does have “realistic” effects. Problematisation works as the echoing of the experience, hence it has consequences: it changes your world, it modifies the world1. The triggering of such a transformation, for sure, provokes a peculiar estrangement effect, a shock in which one is – so to say – both excited and frightened. That “philosophy begins in wonder” indicates exactly both that philosophy makes one feel such a double-faced mood (thauma), and that such a mood is appropriate to an act of questioning. In p4c, a problem is not taught, nor is it simply built, but rather it is apprehended. In the first case, the instructor assumes a normative attitude and transmits an answer, so that the core relation is one between the teacher and the given knowledge. In the second case, the instructor incites the learner to investigate a given problem, so that the core relation is one between the teacher and the student.

1 For several examples, see Watzlawick, Fisch & Weakland 1974.

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In the third case, instead, the instructor acts as a mere facilitator and offers a prop in structuring new problems in relation to specific situations, so that the core relation is an appropriative one between the “learner” and the “knowledge”. Here, the facilitator works as a sort of fair-minded stimulator of wonder.

4. “I have a lot of ideas, even if I don’t know how to transform them into a question; but I think that this is one of the secrets of such a technique” My main claim here is that p4c demonstrates the need for philosophy to be considered as an art or practice of problematisation, and, I claim, that the specifically philosophical nature of philosophy is to be found in this. It could seem trivial to stress that philosophy has a sort of privileged relationship with problems, but still too often, according as much to common sense as to philosophical tradition, philosophy is considered – as Hegel once put it, polemically – as an idle tale or an erudite investigation. That is, it is too often seen as a conglomeration or alignment of disordered opinions, a mere succession of various positions and claims, namely, a discipline in which answers and solutions follow one another. But all concern for questions and the position of problems disappears when it is seen in this way, as if philosophy coincides simply with a catalogue of given ideas, from which one need merely choose one’s favourite, or that which strikes one as the most resolute, or best argued. Consequently, in philosophy, there is lacking a rigorous reflection on the nature of the question, a systematic theory of the problem and a discussion of the possibility of defining philosophy itself as the technique of problem-posing2. That is, except in the case of some relevant contemporary works3.

2 A trivial “experiment” can be done: you can easily find a student in philosophy, a person who got a bachelor’s degree or a PhD in philosophy, or a philosophy professor able to explain to you what Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, etc., or even themselves, said, wrote or argued. However, sadly, it is less likely that they will be able to answer the seemingly simple question “but what did they (or you) think?”, namely, “what was their (or your) problem? What kind of problem did they (or you) pose?”, nor the more general question “what is a problem? How does a philosophical question work? What does a question mean?”. 3 I take these as a general reference for my considerations: Dewey 1938; Spirito 1948; Deleuze 1994; Deleuze & Guattari 1994; Meyer 1995; Fabre 2009; Meyer 2010; Salavastru 2010; Casati 2012; Charbonnier 2012; Floridi 2013; Turnbull 2014; Jaeggi 2015; Fabre 2016; Pezzano 2016: 31–73.

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Thus, it is important to underline that the philosophical attitude cannot be reduced to the problem-solving approach, according to which to engage in philosophy would be to go from the indeterminacy of a problem to the determination of a solution, and would be to look at the questions only in order to dissolve them ultimately into the answers. Our lives are interwoven with questions (posed explicitly or unintentionally) and animated by problems (actively or by our stumbling across them). If any innovation, discovery or transformation introduces new problems and questions, then philosophy can be considered as the “shepherd” of their nature and modes. Philosophers are the professionals or the artisans of the problem-question: a philosopher is a “problematologist”. So, philosophers do not reduce a problem ad alio; they do not erase the “differentiating” and “pausing” nature of a problem, by which something (a condition, a thought, a relationship, a belief, etc.) is posed in a condition of both relative immobility and possible remobilisation. Philosophy is in this sense a sort of “handicraft”, insofar as it requires and builds technical languages, logics, instruments, methods and so on. In this regard, the history of philosophy tells of the construction of a “tool box”. Since antiquity, philosophers have stood accused of living in a strange atopos, a sort of suspended place, which corresponds to the problematological attitude proper of philosophy. Philosophers do nothing but thematise; they pose, create and “lift” problems; they raise questions out of answers already given. In philosophy, you see something new when you see the already known in a different light: you see what is supposed to be already known as unknown, as supposed knowledge. Acknowledging that the known is unknown; coming to see that the seen is unseen; disclosing the understood as misunderstood; realising that the felt is unfelt, and so forth: this is to re-flect, to problematise. In philosophy, answering a question is equivalent to unfolding the question in the answer itself, so that the latter can be perceived and conceived as such, as something that regards the question to which it is the answer or is supposed to be the answer. Thus, it is clear why philosophers can easily be labelled as gadflies, and their attitude as sterile. However, across life, there come moments in which such a sterility becomes – surprisingly – extremely useful, moments in which asking yourself a question (as you would others), the right question, becomes particularly crucial. In such a moment, one needs – or at least can call into action – philosophy.

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5. “The construction of the questions themselves, of the questions of our several meetings… there’s an evolution: now they are questions posed by someone who understands that afterwards there’ll be a discussion of them” In philosophy, in fact, you answer when you make explicit the question which was already at work in minds, worldviews, habits, behaviours, practices, etc., so that the implicit role of questioning in all such processes is highlighted, and so that the constitutive role of questions in any kind of experience can emerge (as in the fact that we “revolve around” a question, that we “insist on” problems). For philosophy, when things become highly complex, the solution is to make efforts to thematise problematicity itself, so that the doors to a transformation are opened. Reflecting, as with problematising, means distancing something from itself, or – even better – putting something in relation with itself (a person, a society, a culture, a theory, etc.). It means finding its internal difference, its inner dynamical fold, that which represents at the same time an outside more exterior than any exteriority and an inside more interior than any interiority. Folding is not self-referred in any way, because it engenders doubt intended as that paradoxical inner doubling which marks a split, an opening, an intimate overture. Relating to oneself requires, and is achieved in virtue of, discovering something different from a simple “yourselfness”. Such a problematisation becomes an abstract or intellectual affair in technical philosophical systems. However, we often experience the difficulty of finding the right question in our actual lives, that is, the difficulty of focusing on the actual core of the problem over which we feel we are puzzling, of grasping the real question about which we are racking our brains. And it is this difficulty that blocks us and stops any transformation, or, rather, that slows down a transformation already in progress. If we have the answer to the question, then we have all the information we need: we do not need to reflect (we do not have any real question). If we have neither the answer nor the question, then we are in a condition of complete ignorance: we are unable to reflect (we cannot pose any real question). If we have the question, but not the answer, then we are in a condition of uncertainty: we are reflecting, we are posing a real question and raising a true problem. In this regard, philosophy could be seen as the zone of transition between both ignorance-uncertainty and certainty-uncertainty, the movement towards the problematicity of the I know that I do not know, which does not mean a solution such as “I know that I know nothing”. Philosophy is the cultivation of the ability to pose the right question, to formulate the appropriate problem. It is to recognise

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a sign of saliency that indicates something you have to deal with, that indicates the task of flowing into a problematic universality but with no possibility of reducing it to a given generality. This uncertain condition is in all respects a state of perplexity, but it is precisely this state which makes possible any “redoubling”, “unfolding” or “explication”: it is the pausing of reflection over entanglement in a problem that allows one to straighten it out; it is the indeterminacy of the hesitation that permits the happening of events and things. Here, nobody and nothing tells you what and how to think or act, but that is precisely how a new thought or action (your thought or action) becomes possible. As long ago as the fourth century BC, Archytas stated that “to discover without seeking is difficult and rare, but if one seeks, it is frequent and easy; if, however, one does not know how to seek, discovery is impossible” (fragment DKB3). Definitely, philo-sophy should be intended not as the “tension” to knowledge or wisdom (a simple attempting), but as the pretension to know or comprehend (an insistent reclaiming). Philosophy, let me say, is more erotetic than erotic: it evokes demands, provokes questions, puts in question and so forth. Such a pretension is not equivalent to a presumption, neither to a pretence (to know, think, understand, etc.), nor, and even less so, to a mere “love of ” as an aspiration. It is rather a revendication that firstly revendicates the reasons of the revendication itself, and that rather than demanding the restoring of something, engenders the creation of what is revendicated (as it happens when you lay claim to a right). Philosophy is primarily the defender of the reasons and the practice of posing problems, therefore it is able to pose problems of specific sorts, such as those of art, science, ethics, politics, economics, experience, choices, thoughts, etc. We can have problems of all sorts: political, ethical, technical, economic, existential, mathematical, religious, etc. But they all are problems. Philosophy works on the nature of problematicity as such: it poses to itself the question of the structuring and functioning of problems. This is done through several specific kinds of conceptual problems and questions, but these should be considered as a sort of “gymnastic”, as a way to engage in a reflection on the problem-question itself (and perhaps only today have we become able to do this explicitly)4.

4 To put a twist on a famous thesis of Marx, we could even say that “the philosophers have only interpreted and changed the world, in various ways; the point is to problematise it”.

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In this way, “flexing” can be understood as the inner folding within a “selfness”, by which this “selfness” folds in on itself and is put into question. Furthermore, “whatever” must be distinguished from “all”, or “anything” from “everything”. To problematise means to move on from what is happening, and to recognise that “anything” can happen from that moment onwards. But this does not imply that “everything” will actually happen, or that you will be able to predict what will actually happen by referring that particular moment to some given generality. You have rather to test what is happening now and to make it happen: you do not simply “contemplate” problems, you practise them. So, in conclusion, the “philosophicity” of philosophy, and of p4c in particular, lies in the sensibility for problems. Their “aim without finality” is to develop, renew or enforce such a sensibility, through which, in facing a particular case, no removing (Aufhebung) can be achieved, but only an inventive folding (problématiser). It is to put together, strangely and concretely, the finding or discovering with the creating or constructing.

References Casati, R., 2012, Prima lezione di filosofia, Laterza, Roma-Bari. Charbonnier, S., 2012, Deleuze pédagogue. La fonction transcendantale de l’apprentissage et du problème, L’Harmattan, Paris. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1994, What is Philosophy?, transl. H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, Columbia University Press, New York. Deleuze, G., 1994, Difference and Repetition, transl. P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York. Dewey, J., 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Holt & C., New York. Fabre, M., 2009, Philosophie et pédagogie du problème, Vrin, Paris. Fabre, M., 2016, Qu’est-ce que problématiser?, Vrin, Paris. Floridi, L., 2013, ‘What is a Philosophical Question?’, Metaphilosophy 44(3), 195–221. Jaeggi, R., 2015, ‘Towards an Immanent Critique of Forms of Life’, Raisons politiques 57(1), 13–29. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Meyer, M., 1995, Of Problematology: Philosophy, Science and Language, transl. D. Jamison & A. Hart, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Meyer, M., 2010, La problématologie, PUF, Paris.

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Munari, B., 1996, Da cosa nasce cosa. Appunti per una metodologia progettuale, Laterza, Roma-Bari. Pezzano, G., 2016, Ideare. Gilles Deleuze e la ricostruzione del platonismo, QuiEdit, Verona. Salavastru, C., 2010, Essai sur la problématologie philosophique. Approche critique et applicative, L’Harmattan, Paris. Spirito, U., 1948, Il problematicismo, Sansoni, Firenze. Turnbull, N., 2014, Michel Meyer’s Problematology: Questioning and Society, Bloomsbury, London. Watzlawick, P., Fisch, R. & Weakland, J.H., 1974, Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Solution, Norton & Company, New York.

Alessandro De Cesaris

Chapter 12 – New Literacy and Multidimensional Thinking: P4C and the Challenges of the Digital Age Abstract: New media are at the same time a problem and an opportunity for the practice of philosophy. On the one hand, the increasing use of digital devices creates new problems; on the other hand, new media offer the possibility for a broader application and understanding of Philosophy for Communities (p4c) as an educational practice. Keywords: Philosophy for Communities (p4c); new media; questioning; technology; multidimensional thinking.

1. Introduction It has been remarked that new technologies constitute a problem for p4c (Kizel 2014). In this chapter I shall argue that, even if this is true, new media also offer a huge opportunity for gaining a deeper understanding of p4c, and for broader employment as an educational practice. By this I do not mean simply that community philosophical practices could or should use advanced technological instruments, such as tablets, multimedia contents, virtual reality or long-distance communication software. This aspect is without doubt very interesting, but it does not really address the essence of the praxis in itself. In this chapter, I shall instead discuss the relationship between p4c and media in a different and more fundamental sense. In particular, I would like to suggest that a mediological1 approach to the structure of p4c as an educational proposal could allow a deeper understanding of its potentialities, its limits and the difficulties it has to face. Any practice, p4c included, requires the use of a certain number of communication media: written or oral language, reading, projection of pictures and so on. In particular, every p4c session starts with the reading of a text that is intended 1 The word “mediology” has been used to translate the work and theories of Régis Debray. In this context, I will use the term “mediological” in a much broader sense, in order to refer to any kind of inquiry concerning media. This means that for the sake of this chapter I will not differentiate between media theory, media studies, media philosophy and so on.

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to act as an incentive for further discussion. This aspect must be deeply analysed: reading a text requires a certain range of competencies, skills and habits that are historically determined by their place in an alphabetical society in which the press is still a hegemonic medium. And yet it is precisely this setting that is changing: the shift from the culture of the press to a digital culture, from text to hypertext, produces changes that are not only superficial but quite substantial in the dominant skills and forms of thought among new generations. To those who ask themselves whether Google is making us cleverer or more stupid, it has been rightly replied that the nature of intelligence itself is changing. To new technologies correspond new forms of rationality (Carr 2008; De Kerckhove 2016). One of the aims of p4c as a practice of education is to cultivate reasonableness, to enhance the rational skills and communication competencies of the members of the community of inquiry. But the natures of rationality, reasonableness and communication are not eternally fixed; they are not ahistorical phenomena. To face the changes of the digital age, philosophical practices need to be developed with full awareness of the challenges and problems entailed by changes in the way texts are consumed, and in the forms of reasoning that are needed. P4c is an educational proposal with a strong interdisciplinary inspiration: pedagogy, philosophy, sociology and psychology are all elements crucial to the development of an effective philosophical practice. In this essay, I intend to argue that, together with these disciplines, media theory can offer an essential contribution to the enhancement of p4c’s methodology. This is made possible, secondly, by the fact that media theory and p4c – disciplines which developed at around the same time2 – bear some similarities in their theoretical principles and in their starting points. First of all, I shall explain what these similarities are, and after that I shall propose some possible contributions that can be made by media theory to the study and enhancement of p4c.

2. The medium is the message: p4c and media theory on the problem of form The first element of similarity between p4c and media theory is that both try to drive the focus away from content and towards form. Lipman states more than once, inspired by Dewey’s philosophy of education, that the aim of p4c is not to 2 It is worth mentioning that pragmatist philosophers of education, such as George Mead and John Dewey, explicitly addressed the problem of media with reference to the relationship between communication and democracy. See for instance Mead 1972: 327–328.

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“hand out” a certain set of principles, knowledges, values or data, but simply to educate according to some determinate models of thought and of community practice. It has already been remarked (see Chapter 1) that the multidimensional model of thinking implies precisely that no facts or data can be simply taken for granted once and for all, or considered as given. P4c, on the contrary, invites the members of the community of inquiry into critical elaboration; it invites them to ask questions and to develop a form of critical thinking that enables them to individuate the presuppositions of every standpoint, or to trace the path that has led to a particular result. The studies of media theory, starting with its founders and pioneers (Marshall McLuhan, Eric A. Havelock and his scholar Walter J. Ong)3, have always emphasised the need to consider the forms of communication over and above the messages conveyed through those forms. The main difference, of course, is that in the case of media theory the forms are first of all technological instruments, although in a very broad sense (oral language is a technology just like alphabetical writing, and the alphabet is a technology just like a smartphone). Nevertheless, McLuhan’s famous quote “The Medium is the Message” can easily be used to describe p4c’s interests as well. In this sense, p4c can be presented not only as an educational proposal, but also, and above all, as a communicative proposal in which it is the means and the methods used during the sessions that modify the contents of the discussion, as well as the habits and competencies of the members of the community. To move the focus from the content of discourse to its form – be it the process that led to the discourse or the instruments and the media that have been used – is particularly important today, since access to content does not seem to be a problem anymore. With the internet and portable devices a situation has been created where information is very easily accessible. Digital natives are accustomed to asking questions the answers to which are available almost immediately: the process of solving a problem, and the means to ending an inquiry, have become reduced to entering a query on Wikipedia. The problems of today’s socio-mediological context are the inverse of those of the past: we have at our disposal a huge – almost

3 The question about the birth and origin of media theory is quite controversial. It would be unfair to identify Marshall McLuhan as the “first” media theorist, and yet in this context it seems right to mention him as the author of the first proper general theory of media. For a wider panoramic on the history of media studies, see Scannell 2007. Havelock and Ong deserve to be mentioned since their studies on alphabetic culture in ancient Greece marked a parallel and different path, but just as profitable.

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endless – amount of information, but we lack the instruments and the skills necessary in order to elaborate, differentiate and filter this information. This means that one of our society’s most urgent needs is precisely the enhancement of our skill of judgement, i.e. of Lipman’s reasonableness. The need is not for more data, but rather for discursive and decisional practices that allow us to relate to those data in a reasonable way. In this sense, every p4c session can also be interpreted as a session of education aimed at the improvement of communication, independent of whether it is new or old media that are used. During a p4c session, we are asked questions to which it is impossible to give an immediate answer (for instance by “looking it up” on the Web). During a p4c session, most of all, every piece of information and every standpoint are checked and tested through discursive models that it is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate via the communicative context of new media. This is also relevant in relation to the meaning of community itself. It is becoming ever more urgent to understand community not just as a collection of values, myths and opinions, but rather as a system of shared practices (see Chapter 2). What makes up the essence of every community is not a certain set of facts, but the way in which those facts are elaborated and passed on. That is why the birth of the internet produced new forms of communitarian discourse, ones in which it is simply a shared access to certain media that plays the role of a binding factor, just as in the past, when there was a “Republic of Letters” independent of any national, religious or geographical identity. Media, just like shared practices, do not just modify community, but also modify its values and in particular the kinds of competencies and forms of intelligence that operate within it. New digital media have produced a new kind of intelligence, be it collective (Levy 1994) or connective (De Kerckhove 1997), and this has to be kept in mind during a p4c session, if the aim is to act on the forms of rationality operating within a particular context or group. This means that p4c cannot afford to make the mistake of considering the multidimensionality of thinking as something ahistorical. It cannot afford to forget that every technological setting offers its own potentialities and challenges, and that in each mediological context critique, creativity and care mean something very specific that must be individuated, just like the difficulties that have to be overcome.

3.  Critique, creativity and care in the age of new media Media theory can be useful to p4c primarily for two reasons. First of all, it allows us to recognise our age’s specific difficulties. Secondly, a mediological analysis of a p4c session allows us to individuate its potentialities and its limits and to acquire

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full awareness of the practices that are enacted. A p4c session is in fact – from a mediological standpoint – quite a complex event: it is suspended between orality and writing, between individual reflection and collective elaboration. A session will commonly use instruments that are typical of alphabetical society in a context that is mostly oral, i.e. a context that features a direct exchange, to which new generations may be less accustomed than previous ones. The kind of intelligence developed through digital media is characterised by an increase in the speed and ability with which people are able to link together very different topics and conduct diverse tasks at once. These advantages, of course, are counterbalanced by some problematic aspects that have to be considered with respect to the formative process of every citizen and member of a discursive community. Two questions must therefore be asked in the context of a mediological interpretation of p4c. First of all, what kinds of difficulty are generated by our society’s present technological configuration for pursuing the tasks of a philosophical community practice? Secondly, on the basis of the changes to rationality models and discursive practices introduced by new media, what does it mean today to enhance skill in judgement and to educate in a way that enhances reasonableness? In other terms, what is critical, creative and caring thinking today? Let us start with the critical dimension of thinking. P4c’s educational proposal focuses on educating community members so as to discourage the acritical acceptance of any given element of an issue without firstly discussing and questioning it. This means, first of all, to ask questions the answers to which have to be found in the context of the inquiry group, and not outside of it. Secondly, this means to educate the members of the community so as to encourage critical reception of news and data, and critical awareness in the use of sources and information channels. The debate about the notion of “post-truth” rightly belongs to an age in which there is no form of mediation between the producer and the receiver of information, and in which there is a complete lack of competencies when it comes to the filtering and administration of one’s own sources. In such a context, p4c is a vital instrument for educating members of the community to question what they watch, listen to or read. A second common problem is the question concerning intersubjective dialogue. It has been shown that the World Wide Web offers a strongly polarised discussion model, in which the endeavour for truth and the common good is put aside, in favour of defending one’s own opinion or that of one’s companions (Bessi et. al. 2015). A p4c session, on the contrary, is organised with the explicit aim of neutralising this kind of tendency. The role of the facilitator is in fact precisely to lead the discussion so that a conflict does not develop into an unproductive

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contrast between opposed and inflexible standpoints. In this sense, p4c is a possible answer to the problem of “echo chambers” and can be interpreted as an instrument apt to solve certain difficulties generated by social media in the context of public debate. Another centrally important point is that critical thinking is today a core aspect of the literacy needed in order to use digital media well. The problem of functional illiteracy is an epiphenomenon of a broader context, i.e. the fact that today we have new forms of literacy (Kress 2003: 27–43). Being able to read and write is no longer sufficient for understanding a piece of text or a news item on the Web. Moreover, today it is essential to be able to grasp a large quantity of further information (metadata, source, kind of website, settings and functions of the social medium one is using), and in order to develop this kind of competency a certain critical sense must be developed. This means that it is necessary to maintain a critical distance from the medium, in order to be able to develop an objective analysis of the context in which the discussion or the information process occurs. In a technological setting marked by the passage from text to hypertext, it is fundamental that the user develops competencies that grant him relative autonomy, in order that he does not become merely a passive consumer of information from the Web. Behind the appearance of a text in which the user is finally able to “operate” (by clicking, commenting, sharing, finding new contents) there is at the same time the reality of a modality of information that discourages introspection and personal elaboration of data, and that progressively reduces the research waiting times by extending the time for flames and clashes between hardened opinions. P4c’s role in this context is to enable individual standpoints to become more flexible and to make every member of the community of inquiry accustomed to reasoning with their own minds, instead of merely turning to the Web as an external source of answers. Let us move on to the problem of creativity. The question concerning creativity in the age of digital media has already been asked. The algorithms of search engines, the automation of production processes and the emergence of individual advertising encourage a narrowing of habits and a tendency to conform to past activities and preferences (Cardon 2015)4. Gamification processes in all the main 4 It should be noted that this analysis is not intended only as the criticism of a negative situation. Any technological development brings about new problems and difficulties, but that does not imply that it cannot also create substantial benefits and new potentialities. In this case, of course, the focus is on the problems, since the aim of this chapter is to show how p4c can be of help in this matter. For a review of the benefits of new technologies in education, see Meyer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013: 201–254.

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activities of the public sphere, from work to politics through personal health and shopping, make it so that every activity in the life of every individual conforms to previously established patterns, and the recreational aspect of online activities hides the lack of space for individual autonomy. At the same time, the ever increasing scope for choice between different products hides the underlying passivity of the life of every consumer. Although the notion of prosumer (producer and consumer at the same time), born with the advent of Web 2.0, seems to evoke the idea of active participation on the part of the user, the truth is that the productive patterns of Web 2.0 – from the creation of memes to the sharing processes of social media – display an almost automated character, where in effect very little space is given to individual autonomy. In this context, p4c’s work is essential, since it produces the competencies necessary to disrupt consolidated patterns of agency in the world of media and other social relationships and enhances the ability to create autonomous ways of behaving (Lipman 2003: 255). In a world filled with narratives and gamified practices, p4c creates a platform where exchange is possible and where it is possible not only to choose, but also to create, and to create not only contents, but even the rules according to which these contents are produced, elaborated and shared. Lipman writes that creativity, the artist’s work, is to show the world not just as it is, but also as it could be (Lipman 2003: 248). To imagine possibilities for the future is one of the core aspects of creative thinking. And yet this is stifled by a society in which the future is already largely inscribed in the present, where technological, artistic and social evolution is largely predicted in advance. The slogan “the future is now” aims to express the extent to which our present is already projected into the future, but it also reveals the other side of this reality, that our society’s future is already contained within our present. This means, once again, that the individual is encouraged to accept progress and change passively, without any personal contribution to these processes. In this setting, the role of p4c is to show that a shared discursive practice can produce unexpected results, results free from patterns set by media and other well-established social forces. From this standpoint, creative thinking is important first of all in the form of defiant thinking (Lipman 2003: 251). The relationship between critical and creative thinking here is evident: creativity is a pivotal faculty when it comes to really questioning what is offered to us as the only possible set of alternatives. Autonomous thinking is not possible without critical sense, but neither is it possible without the essential contribution of creativity, that is of the capacity to imagine something other than what is already there. In our era, this does not necessarily require dreaming up something new or original. Rather, and much

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more importantly, being creative today means elaborating by oneself, by following personal rules and pathways, data that are already available for the eyes of everyone else. At last, we need to discuss the caring dimension of thought. The need for an enhancement of caring in thinking is self-evident if one considers some of the most discussed problems of our time. Firstly, one problem is the progressive shortening of attention span, with young users accustomed to ever faster and ever more superficial content that requires less and less attention in order to be enjoyed. Secondly, it has already been remarked that the massive use of social media – due to the distance it creates between people, and the possibility of using avatars, of filtering one’s own contacts and selecting visualised contents – produces a growing disaffection, or at least the kinds of relationship in which the emotional factor is progressively marginalised, leaving greater space for cynical attitudes (Masahiro & Kushin 2013; Thurlow 2013)5. The growth of such distance, the hypermediation in action in today’s society, also produces a much wider and bigger problem: technological progress gives us great power and huge possibilities to act and operate on the world and on others, but at the same time the mediation process makes it difficult to develop empathy and to grasp the consequences of one’s own actions.6 This matters on a broader level but also in the intersubjective sphere, where the problem of violence has exploded because of this curious paradox. One of p4c’s fundamental themes is the relationship between conflict and violence. It is thus urgent to grasp the ways in which the forms of conflict are changing (for instance in online discussions) and the ways in which the forms of violence are changing (such as cyberbullying), in order to be fully aware of the strategies that need to be enacted to enable the members of the community of inquiry to face such situations. Also, in this area, p4c can play a very important role. To develop a caring thinking means first of all to enable the members of the community of inquiry to improve their attention span, to focus on others and on their words or on the topic being discussed. P4c’s educational proposal is a way to educate the members of the community of inquiry so as to improve their concentration and encourage 5 Other studies have underlined, on the other hand, the potentialities of social media for the development of social skills and for greater engagement in social and political issues. Again, the aim of this chapter is not to present a negative account of social media, but rather to show how p4c can help with facing the issues produced by the massive use of new digital media. 6 One of the first philosophers to point out this dynamic was Günther Anders (1961: 264–270).

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dedicating the necessary time to a topic. At the same time, to promote direct exchange between members means to focus on the emotional dimension of conflict, to educate everyone so as to enhance their empathy and to improve their possible reactions to others. P4c can be a valuable instrument for fighting the spreading cynicism in communication today. It can play this role, by the way, without any form of sentimentalism: the members of the community of inquiry are joined by the passion and interest for the same topic, and the caring dimension of thought aims to respect others inasmuch as every member of the community is willing to put himself on the line in order to reach a shared goal. As media theorists have argued since McLuhan, new technologies rewire our mind and at the same time shape our very idea of time and space. In today’s hyperconnected society, we experience a total absence of boundaries or distances and we have a multilayered perception of time (see for instance Bauman 2017: 3–10). Space and time have imploded. In this setting, p4c offers the opportunity to experience a separate, common space where it is possible to build connections with others, but where it is at the same time important to recognise boundaries and distances. If respect has something to do with distance (Han 2017), then p4c can offer a space where distance can be experienced again as a binding factor. P4c, on the other hand, does not just offer a space, but also a time: during a p4c session, time is not multilayered and there is no space for multitasking, since the session is conceived of as a moment of focus during which time itself is shared and felt as an explicit element of the session experience itself. Every session contributes to leading the members of the community of inquiry along a path within which every development is clearly traceable: the fact that there are many sessions linked to each other allows the members of the community to experience time as a collective, shared dimension in which progress can be made in the project at hand. Finally, the caring dimension of thought has to be deeply linked to the critical one, since the estimation of the possible consequences of an action, or of a communicative strategy, is only possible by joining critical distance and care together. P4c can be interpreted, from this standpoint, as an important exercise in imagination, but at the same time as a community practice where the experience of debate and of exchange of ideas can be lived with greater awareness and attention.

4. Conclusion In conclusion, it is clear that media theory can offer a contribution to p4c, but also that p4c can be a valid educational instrument for facing some of the difficulties that emerge from today’s technological setting.

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The analysis of the relationship between p4c and new media does not require in any way an “update” of the methods or the devices used during the sessions. It is not about replacing texts with e-books or having Skype sessions rather than live ones. On the contrary, the session in its present form can represent a space in which the members of the community of inquiry experience a new kind of situation, something different from what happens every day on social media, or on the Web in general (it can provide a “counter-narrative”, as stated by Kizel 2014). An educational proposal able to promote the critical, creative and caring dimensions of thinking is extremely useful in a society where disaffection, disintermediation and polarisation of public discourse seem to be spreading more and more. This means that p4c can be understood as a philosophical practice the aim of which is to empower the individual and to develop their awareness in today’s setting. In order to do so, though, the practice itself must be led and structured by having in mind the kinds of emotional and rational deficit that are caused by prevalent forms of social and private life, entertainment and communication.

References Anders, G., 1961, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution, Beck, München. Baron, N.S., 2013, ‘Reading in Print or Onscreen. Better, Worse of About the Same?’, in D. Tannen & A.M. Trester (eds.), Discourse 2.0. Language and New Media, pp. 201–224, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC. Bauman Z., 2017, ‘Liquid Modern Challenges to Education’, in A. Portera & C. Grant (eds.), Intercultural Education and Competences: Challenges and Answers from the Global World, pp. 3–22, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne. Bessi, A., Petroni, F., Del Vicario, E., Zollo, F., Anagstopoulos, A., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G. & Quattrociocchi, W., 2015, Viral Misinformation: The Role of Homophily and Polarization, Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World-Wide-Web, pp. 355–356, ACM, New York. Cardon, G., 2015, A quoi rêvent les algorithmes: Nos vies à l’heure des big data, Seuil, Paris. Carr, N., ‘Is Google Making Us Stupid?’, The Atlantic, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-googlemaking-us-stupid/306868/. Cukier, K. & Meyer-Schönberger, V., 2013, Big Data, John Murray, London. De Kerckhove, D., 1997, Connected Intelligence: The Arrival of the Web Society, Somerville House Publishing, Toronto. De Kerckhove, D., 2016, La rete ci renderà stupidi?, Castelvecchi, Roma.

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Han B.-C., 2017, In the swarm, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Kizel, A., 2014, ‘Communication Discourse and Cyberspace’, Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 20(3–4), 40–44. Kress, G., 2003, Literacy in the New Media Age, Routledge, London-New York. Lévy, P., 1994, L’intelligence collective. Pour une anthropologie du cyberespace, La Dècouverte, Paris. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Masahiro, Y. & Kushin, M.J., 2013, ‘More Harm Than Good? Online Media Use and Political Disaffection Among College Students in the 2008 Election’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 19(3), 430–445. Mead, G., 1972, Mind, Self and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Scannell, P., 2007, Media and Communication, SAGE, London. Thurlow, C., 2013, ‘Fakebook: Synthetic Media, Pseudo-sociality, and the Rhetorics of Web 2.0’, in D. Tannen & A.M. Trester (eds.), 2013, Discourse 2.0. Language and New Media, pp. 225–250, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.

Ewa Nowak, Małgorzata Steć

Chapter 13 – Linking Moral Competence, Hospitality, and Education. An MCT-based Pilot Survey Abstract: This chapter presents the results of a pilot survey based on Moral Competence Test. The study was conducted to verify the link between moral competence and hospitable behaviour. Even though the study shows a weak correlation between these variables, it still shows the importance of moral competence as a good mediator of hospitable behaviour. Keywords: moral competence; hospitality; hospitable behaviour; Moral Competence Test; Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion.

1.  Moral competence Lawrence Kohlberg defined moral competence as the cognitive ability to make judgements and decisions that are based on internal moral principles, and to act in accordance with such judgements (Kohlberg 1964; Lind 2016). According to Georg Lind, “moral competence is the ability to resolve problems and conflicts on the basis of inner moral principles through deliberation and discussion instead of violence and deceit” (Lind 2016:13). Of course, people also make decisions individually even when in social contexts, for example, when meeting strangers, or those we feel responsible for. The pilot study reported here1 was conducted to find out whether there is a link between moral competence and hospitable behaviour and to examine whether visual perception and narration have different effects on people’s hospitable decisions. The “Moral Competence Test” (Lind 2016) was used to conduct the study. According to Lind, “the differences in behaviour stem, rather, from difference in moral competence” (Lind 2016: 57). These differences are usually caused by the quality of socio-moral education. Approaching hospitality in terms of socio-moral competence goes beyond its standard definitions, be the religious, anthropological, cosmopolitan (Kant 2006: 82) or deconstructionist 1 The research reported in this paper was supported by The Kosciuszko Foundation (NY, 2016). It would not have been possible without the hospitality of Cornell University, Ithaca (NY) and without intellectual exchanges with Dawn E. Schrader (Dept. of Communication at Cornell), Georg Lind (University of Konstanz) and Bruce Janz (Univ. of Central Florida).

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(Derrida 2001). We only found a few supporters: Lévinas, Westoby and Dowling (2013: 12) and Cousineau (1998: xxvii). They all said that hospitable conduct originates “from below”, rather than “from above”, as in for example from institutions, norms (lex hospitia, asylum) or pragmatism (Gil-Bazo 2015). Meeting others seeking hospitality in Europe we have had an impression that planet Earth has become literally too overcrowded a place to live. This is becoming especially apparent when genocide, terrorism and other kinds of violence squeeze out the humanitarian relationships between human beings and challenge one’s personal capacity for hospitality. Furthermore, about 200 million climate refugees are expected by 2050. If there is any link between hospitality and moral competence, it needs to be promoted by education (Lind 2016; Malti & Latzko 2010; Shelton & Richeson 2005). In his monograph Dream? Democracy! A Philosophy of Horror, Hope and Hospitality in Art and Action (in particular the chapters “The Power of Culture and Activism against the Far Right” and “A Political Philosophy of Hope versus Horror”), Tomasz Kitliński (2014) shows the potential of “hospitalterity” in Polish society, which incorporates a peculiar mix of multicultural and monocultural dialectics. In its new democratic history, since 1989, Poland has experienced the problem of deficient mutual recognition as it is typically found in the transition and “consumer” (Weber 2011) societies. Furthermore, the representations of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in monocultural societies are often outdated. Learning mutual recognition requires more than just meeting the other. This is why the context of an initial meeting is always burdened with additional factors which should be taken into account. This is why the cultivation of hospitality remains “a risky business”, despite the original messianic meaning of the term intended by Derrida and Caputo (2014: 86).

2.  Research aims and methodology In 2016, a pilot survey was conducted in several high schools in Poland. Following the “Moral Competence Test” (MCT) methodology, each participant (N = 56, F = 30, M = 16, Age: 16- to 18-year-old adolescents) was asked to resolve two dilemmas (the Worker’s and the Doctor’s Dilemma) included in the standard MCT (Polish validation 2008). We divided the group into subgroups A and B. Subgroup A received the MCT with a brief narrative about a foreign family (mother, father and child) who sought free accommodation for a two-week stay. Subgroup B received the MCT with the narrative and a photograph of an anonymous MiddleEastern family pictured in a relaxed domestic situation. No biased vocabulary (Arab, Muslim, refugee, immigrant, etc.) was applied. Only subgroup B was presented with the typical Middle-Eastern appearance of the potential guests. The

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interviewees in both subgroups were asked to decide whether they would offer that family accommodation for two weeks or not. Only a few students disclosed that they had foreign-born schoolmates.

3.  Findings and hypotheses Hypothesis 1 There is a correlation between moral competence (C) and the willingness to be hospitable.

Findings Only a slight correlation between C and hospitable behaviour was observed. Participants who scored 22.4 C on average showed hospitable behaviour more frequently, whereas participants who scored 20.2 C on average showed hospitable behaviour less frequently. Figure 1.  Hospitality and moral competence: a slightly positive correlation.

The average C-score in the entire group was low. It is recommended that the correlation between a higher moral competence and hospitable behaviour should be re-assessed in additional MCT studies. The low correlation does not necessarily speak against the link between moral competence and hospitality. A larger spectrum of C-scores, including higher ones, could demonstrate a stronger correlation. One reason strongly speaks in favour of our hypothesis – that making hospitable decisions is not regulated by conventional rules or interests, but depends on people’s voluntary (ex gratia) judgment.

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Figure 2. A slight difference between narrative and pictorial impact on participants’ hospitable behaviour.

Understanding how people make decisions is a complex and nuanced issue: “One person may know [and perceive] something that another person doesn’t” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008: 214).

Hypothesis 2 Narrative and visual information have different effects on the frequency of hospitable conduct. People faced with a narrative only show hospitable behaviour more willingly than do people faced with a narrative story and a photograph.

Findings Of the survey participants in group A, who were presented with the narrative only, 37.3% showed hospitable behaviour and answered “yes” to the question of whether they would be inviting a foreign family, whereas 62.069% answered “no”. Of the survey participants in the group B, who were presented with both the narrative and the photograph, 37.04% answered “yes”, whereas 62.96% answered “no”.

Discussion The findings showed that the addition of the photograph had no effect on the hospitable conduct of the participants in subgroup B. Because they ascribed no imaginative or false beliefs to the strangers, the participants were not prone to visual stereotypes (Arab, Muslim, refugee, etc.). However, the findings clearly

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showed that a minority of the participants would receive strangers in their home regardless of their cultural, ethnic and religious background. The reason that the photograph made no difference in the hospitable behaviour of the participants in subgroup B might be the following: in seeing the photograph of the strange family, the participants did not identify themselves with their faces. In other words, reciprocal facial relations did not occur and no interpersonal recognition took place. Gallagher and Di Paolo explained that reciprocity is a precondition in which relations with strangers are shaped. According to Gallagher (2014: 5), “[j]ust as it takes two to tango, one cannot accomplish interaction by oneself. Just as when two people dance the tango, something dynamic is created that neither one could create on one’s own”. The findings indicated that the meaningful narrative provoked more identification in the participants than the photograph did. In further surveys, we will combine additional narratives of situational dilemmas (Schillinger & Devendra 2009) with the MCT to provoke stronger affective reactions, such as fear, risk and responsibility for other human beings. The higher their moral competence, the better the participants will deal with their own difficult emotions.

Hypothesis 3 Females show hospitable conduct more willingly and frequently than males do.

Findings A significant correlation between gender and hospitable conduct was observed. Females with 22 C-scores on average showed hospitable conduct more frequently than males with 17 C-scores. Figure 3.  Correlation between gender and moral competence.

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In the MCT study, the inclusion of the decision to “invite or not invite a foreign family” was expected to generate a gender-related difference in the participants’ decision-making behaviour. The findings showed that the C-scores of the female participants were higher than the C-scores of the male participants. A stronger positive correlation was found between the moral competence scores and the hospitable conduct of the female participants. However, the correlation primarily related to C-scores and not to gender. It could be expected that a wider spread of C-scores would provide a stronger correlation between moral competence and hospitality; thus, further MCT studies are required.

4. Education for hospitality, social visibility, and moral competence In their education, Polish students do not have the opportunity to discuss alterity, hospitality, cosmopolitanism and so forth. The contemporary refugee crisis remains taboo for political-conservative reasons. Thus, the interviewers expected that in responding to the survey, the participants would follow the influence of the “first impact” evoked by the photograph and their personal experiences with strangers and stereotypes. The most recent research findings (Gallagher 2014; Bloom 2016) demonstrate that the significance of perception and empathy is ambiguous (Hamlin et al. 2013). Empathy does not always support decision-making. Jean Piaget defended sympathy and respect (Piaget 1969: 224) as generators of basic social rules. According to Paul Bloom, too much empathy leads to bad moral decisions. Thus, educating fair and just decision makers instead requires fostering reflective judgement, reasoning and cognitive moral competence. The latter “has two faces, an individual and a social-communicative face”, as Lind (2016: 29, 2011) puts it. The “communicative face” of human cognition is engaged within interactions such as social perception and dialogue (discourse)2. Both constitute starting points for hospitality and must be trained before, for example, a helping behaviour is to be expected. This shows some ambiguity, too: for Georg Lind, “helping has many meanings. These meanings depend on the particular situation […]. The meaning of helping depends also on the social perspective one takes” 2 Perceiving others is connected with being perceived by them. “Watchful eyes have great power over us, it’s probably because watchful eyes are nearly always connected to running mouths […]. [W]e all know people behave better when they think they’re being watched, when they are feeling self-conscious […]. In a world full of watchful eyes and loose mouths, people are bound to get caught doing uncooperative things” (Greene 2014: 45–46).

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(Lind 1997: 4–5). The meaning of hospitality as a behaviour depends on voluntarism (not on a rule, for hospitality is “impossible as a rule” [Derrida 2001]), on varying social context, on risk and on – unconditional or conditional – readiness to ingratiate and welcome invited and uninvited visitors, as Derrida shows it. However, “there is no culture without hospitality”, he claims. In our opinion, today’s intercultural dynamics shows that hospitality needs to be cultivated to provide more evidence for Derrida’s general claim (Nowak 2015).

5. Conclusion Although the findings showed a slight correlation between moral competence and hospitality, they should not be considered as synonymous notions. Moral competence involves judgemental conduct, but is also related to situational knowledge, the subject’s relations with others, responsiveness, etc. Hospitality is a socio-moral and cultural behaviour rather than a manifest ability to make moral judgments. In the face of growing hostility, exclusion and social and political divisions, hospitality should be promoted. According to the UNO, European citizens will permanently face the presence of immigrants (including climate immigrants) in their everyday life. The most efficient methods of strengthening moral competence and – let us call it this way – “hospitability” would be the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (Lind 2016; Nowak 2013) combined with Lipman and Sharp’s “Community of philosophical inquiry” (Lipman 2003). Both methods create favourable didactic opportunities for experiencing otherness and constructing peaceful and trustful relations between others and oneself. Both combine free speech and listening to others as complementary aspects of interpersonal hospitality in conversation. Instead of questions such as “What are you coming for? Will you work with us? Do you have a passport?” (Derrida on conditional hospitality), such discursive communities enable participants to explore and discuss fundamentally human topics beyond inter-individual phenomenal differences, as well as to include others in their thoughts. Open-minded participants learn how to make reasonable judgments (Lipman 2003, 2008) instead of re-storing harmful verdicts and stereotypes as is observed increasingly often by teachers in classrooms. Generation after generation, this kind of education is the sine qua non for building inclusive and cooperative contemporary societies.

References Bloom, P., 2016, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Random House, New York.

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Caputo, J., 2014, ‘Hospitality and the Trouble of God’, in R. Kearney & K. Semonovitch (eds.), Phenomenologies of the Stranger. Between Hostility and Hospitality, pp. 83–97, Fordham University Press, New York. Cavelzani, A. & Esposito, M., 2010, Emotional Intelligence & Hospitality, Tate Publishing (e-Book). Derrida, J., 2001, ‘A Discussion with Jacques Derrida’, Theory and Event 5(1), 1–24. Gallagher, S. & Hutto, D., 2016, ‘What’s the Story With Body Narratives? Philosophical Therapy for Therapeutic Practice’, in press, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://www.academia.edu/31105770/Whats_the_story_with_body_ narratives_Philosophical_therapy_for_therapeutic_practice. Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D., 2008, The Phenomenological Mind, Routledge, New York-London. Gallagher, S., 2008, ‘Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context’, Consciousness and Cognition 17, 535–543. Gallagher, S., 2014, ‘In Your Face: Transcendence in Embodied Interaction’, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8, 1–5. Gil-Bazo, M.-T., 2015, ‘Asylum as a General Principle of International Law’, International Journal of Refugee Law 27(1), 3–28. Greene, J., 2014, Moral Tribes. Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them, Penguin Books, New York. Hamlin, J.K., Mahajan, N., Liberman, Z. & Wynn, K., 2013, ‘Not Like Me = Bad: Infants Prefer Those Who Harm Dissimilar Others’, Psychological Science 24(4), 589–594. Hamlin, J.K., Winn, K. & Bloom, P., 2007, ‘Social Evaluation by Preverbal Infants’, Nature 45, 558–560. Kitliński, T., 2014, Dream? Democracy! A Philosophy of Horror, Hope and Hospitality in Art and Action, WUMSC, Lublin. Kohlberg, L., 1964, ‘Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology’, Review of Child Development Research I, 381–433. Krebs, D., 1982, ‘Altruism – A Rational Approach’, in N. Eisenberg (ed.), The Development of Prosocial Behavior, pp. 53–76, Academic Press, New York. Lind, G., 1985, Inhalt und Struktur des moralischen Urteilens, PhD Dissertation. University of Konstanz Press, Konstanz. Lind, G., 1997, ‘How Moral Is Helping Behavior?’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL, March. Lind, G., 2011, ‘Editorial: Moral Competence and the Democratic Way of Living’, Europe’s Journal of Psychology 7(5), 569–596.

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Lind, G., 2016, How to Teach Morality. Promoting Deliberation and Discussion, Reducing Violence and Deceit, Logos, Berlin. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lipman, M., 2008, A Life Teaching Thinking, IAPC, Montclair. Malti, T. & Latzko, B., 2010, ‘Children’s Moral Emotions and Moral Cognition: Towards an Integrative Perspective’, in B. Latzko & T. Malti (eds.), Children’s Moral Emotions and Moral Cognition: Developmental and Educational Perspectives. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, pp. 1–10, JosseyBass, San Francisco. Montadon, A., 2004, Hospitalités: hier, aujourd’hui, ailleurs, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand. Nowak, E. & Lind, G., 2015,‘Kohlberg’s Unnoticed Dilemma – The External Assessment of Internal Moral Competence?’, in D. Garz, E. Nowak & B. Zizek (eds.), Kohlberg Revisited, pp. 139–154, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam. Nowak, E., 2013, ‘Democracy Begins in the Mind. Developing Democratic Personality’, in E. Nowak, B. Zizek, & D.E. Schrader (eds.), Educating Competencies for Democracy, pp. 399–416, Peter Lang Publishing, Frankfurt am Main. Nowak, E., 2015, ‘Mediterranean Drama: Pragmatic, Legal and Moral Aspects of Hospitality’, Public Philosophy and Democratic Education 2(2015), in press. Piaget, J., 1969, Psychologie et pédagogie, Denoël, Paris. Piaget, J., 1981, Intelligence and Affectivity, Annual Reviews Monograph, Palo Alto. Schillinger, M. & Devendra, K, 2009, ‘Accountants and Moral Judgement Competence’, paper presented at the International Conference “Can Morality Be Taught?”, 27–31 July 2009, Konstanz, Germany. Shelton, N.J. & Richeson, J.A., 2005, ‘Intergroup Contact and Pluralistic Ignorance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88(1), 91–107. Stern, D., 1985, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, Basic Books, New York. Weber, B., 2011, ‘Lévinas and the Problem of Mutual Recognition or the Consumer Society and Its Fears’, in B. Weber, K. Herb, E. Marsal, T. Dobashi & P. Schweitzer (eds.), Cultural Politics and Identity. The Public Sphere of Recognition, pp. 17–29, LIT, Berlin. Westoby, P. & Dowling, G., 2009, Dialogical Community Development: With Depth, Solidarity, and Hospitality, Tafina Press, West End Queensland. Westoby, P. & Dowling, G., 2013, Theory and Practice of Dialogical Community Development. International Perspectives, Routledge, New York-London. Zahavi, D., 2014, ‘Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality’, Topoi 33, 129–142.

Federico Zamengo

Chapter 14 – Who is the Adult Educator? Abstract: The community of philosophical inquiry provides a valuable contribution to the construction or consolidation of an effective “educational community”, which is characterised by openness, reflectivity and participation. In this regard, the Philosophy for Communities (p4c) proposal represents a means of “education among educators”. Keywords: community of inquiry; adult education; educational community; lifelong education; thinking together.

Philosophy for Communities appears to have many implications from the point of view of adult education. If, in general terms, this philosophical practice can be located within the so-called Reflective Turn, this article attempts to identify a promising and specific place for the construction of a community of philosophical inquiry among adults. I am referring in particular to the “grey zone” that originates from the presence of a number of adult figures involved in the educational processes of younger generations, such as teachers, parents, sports coaches, volunteers and non-formal educators. All these figures, more generally, make up a so-called Educating Community, according to the definition that has been given since the 1970s also in International Reports (Faure et al. 1972; Delors et al. 1996). The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the establishment of a community of philosophical inquiry among those involved in education can be a valuable contribution to the construction or consolidation of an effective “educational community”, meaning the latter as an open, reflective and participatory place. From this point of view, the pedagogical potential of Philosophy for Communities is not constituted by its methodological and instrumental contribution; more radically, it represents the proposal of a true “education among educators”. Its foundations are traceable to the promotion of a philosophical-problematic attitude towards education that revolves around some keywords identified by Lipman’s analysis, such as “dialogue” and “community reflectiveness”.

1. The community of philosophical inquiry as an educating community Despite their specific differences, both the Faure Report and the Delors Report (Elfert 2015; Lee & Friedrich 2011) internationally marked a major breakthrough compared to a traditional and only “educational” concept of education: one that

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was innovative with regard to the continuity of this process (lifelong education or learning) and the plurality of places where it can be realised (lifewide education or learning). In a nutshell, in line with the claims of some 20th century pedagogues – including John Dewey, Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich – the experiences we have in different environments of our lives are potentially an educational sign within our existential trajectories and choices (Field 2001). In everyday practice, from the point of view of those involved in the educational processes of younger generations – such as parents, teachers, educators and many figures who animate the landscape of non-formal education – the recognition of the principle of lifelong and lifewide education-learning also translates into the presence of several adults involved in educational processes. The plurality of figures and experiences is undoubtedly an important aspect for the subject’s harmonious and complete growth. However, in this composite scenario, there is often latent or explicit conflict, which sometimes turns the desired shared participation into hostility and people’s different views into tools for mutual delegitimisation among the different adult-educators. In the Italian educational landscape, it is not uncommon for both pedagogical literature and media attention to emphasise the conflict between different educational figures and agencies: between teachers and parents or between formal and non-formal education environments. In short, the plurality of spaces, times and educators, as well as representing a precious educational resource, can prove to be a place of tension and clashes (Martino, Perlino & Zamengo 2015; Simeone 2017). In today’s changing cultural and historical contexts, intra-generational conflict also highlights the increasing difficulties faced by adults in promoting educational relationships and alliances within daily educational practices. These resistances can be linked both to the prevalence of instances of education understood as learnification and to the idea of a “self-made man” kind of formation (see Chapter 3 in this book). There is nothing wrong with the latter in terms of the value of selfeducation, which remains the end of every educational process. However, I am still convinced that a dialogue with responsible adult figures can contribute, even in the present time, to support one’s growth and path towards autonomy (Zamengo 2012). The possibility of having different points of reference can only be positive for younger generations: it is an existential wealth to be protected and promoted also in the educational sphere. In this perspective, building a community of philosophical inquiry that knows how to involve the various components of the educative community seems to be a valuable asset. In fact, it supports the creation of a “space” that is not intended to homologise the different views of the adults involved, but, on the contrary, aims to bring out the reasons and arguments of the

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different positions. Building a community of philosophical inquiry that includes those involved in education also seems important for at least two specific reasons: one in reference to the present time, the other in relation to the future. Firstly, it is an opportunity to support a wider and more vital perspective, aimed at making the idea of education comprehensive. In fact, in the contemporary age, whether you educate or are educated, you often perceive education as an individual and solitary undertaking. To support, on the other hand, the construction of a community of philosophical inquiry seems to give space to intersubjectivity – something that qualifies the human condition. This means recognising education as a characteristic of a shared process that is carried out in a larger relational scenario, which involves – in concentric circles, so to speak – an entire community, starting from the local one: in short, this is an opportunity to re-territorialise educational processes (Benasayag 2015a, 2015b). Secondly, with reference to one of the pillars of future education identified by the Delors report, this approach seems to encourage learning to live together: addressing not only young people but also those who work with them daily. This aspect is far from irrelevant: in the face of the challenges posed by pluralism in the current socio-cultural landscape, in fact, learning to live together is certainly one of the most important pedagogical issues for the contemporary era (Biesta 2006). From this point of view, the community of inquiry’s approach, as Lipman points out, can have a decisive influence both in encouraging the encounter between the participants’ views in a dialogic and open-minded perspective and in reducing violence and conflict: “If people were ever to learn to use improved methods of conflict resolution in their daily live, it will have to be by first having learned to question together, to reason together, and to make judgments together. […] [S]tudents can benefit far more from acquiring foundational skills in thinking critically, creatively, and caringly, in engaging in exploratory dialogue, and in learning to take into account the other sides to each issue” (Lipman 2003: 106; italics added). In this sense, the approach of the community of philosophical inquiry is neither a technique to resolve conflicts, nor a hypothetical court in which to condemn or absolve daily educational practices. Rather, it promotes the construction of an intermediate space in which to contemplate conflict itself without trying to eliminate or anesthetise it1. In addition, it urges educators to show an attitude capable of decentralisation, through argumentation and dialogue, exercising complex thinking without ever “closing off ” the concepts (Morin 1999).

1 Lipman himself (2003: 105–124) explicitly talks about a “violence reduction” rather than the solution of conflict.

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Precisely for these reasons, an educative community inspired by the principles of the community of philosophical inquiry represents, in effect, an educational proposal: indeed, it promotes a specific attitude to address the issue of education, based on reflexivity, intersubjectivity and the recognition of plurality as a resource.

2.  Education among educators: beyond experience The Philosophy for Communities approach as a proposed “education among educators” has to primarily focus on the meaning and role of experience in training practices. On the one hand, adult educators are first invited to experiment with an ad hoc setting, that of the community of philosophical inquiry. On the other hand, more generally, the role of experience is widely recognised by educators themselves as an important reference point in their daily practice. For both educational professionals and others, in fact, experiences are a constant reference point for educational intervention: the resource to draw on, from which to draw ideas and orientations to educate others in the present. In addition, the “educational experience” is common to every human being: on the one hand, because everyone has received education, on the other hand, because, more or less consciously even without being a professional, anyone can become the educator of people met along one’s existential path: the dichotomy between the educator and the educated disappears when one recognises the reciprocity of the educational experience as something shared by two beings that are both exposed to the world (Freire 1970). The relationship between experience and education is, therefore, a fundamental issue. In this regard, Dewey’s observations are particularly explicit. There is an indissoluble link between the two concepts, but – Dewey points out – experience and education are not the same, because education adds meaning to experience. If, then, there is no education without experience, it is equally true that not every experience can be considered educational2. The relationship between education and experience is not automatic and has to do with the search for meaning and reflection: it is not a mere “experience”, but rather the act of “having an experience” in the sense of owning it critically. It is not surprising, then, that Lipman, thinking of the role of Philosophy for Children in teacher training, highlighted the following: Philosophy for children must also be philosophy for teachers. If the teachers do not take an interest and they fall by the wayside, then they will also lose the children, and no one

2 I am referring in particular to Dewey 1988: 11–30 and 1980a: 146–170.

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will be involved. […] “Philosophy in the classroom” means in class, between adults and children. I would go as far to say that teacher discover philosophy for the first time when they start to philosophise with children. They are forced to rethink their positions and about what they previously took for granted. They discover that children reproduce their own lives and they are excited about it. This is one of the strongest points of Philosophy for Children, i.e. it being also a profound form of education for adults (Santi 2012: 508; italics added).

The logic of inquiry inspiring Philosophy for Children-Communities connects experience and education, triggering a “movement of thought”: what adds meaning to the experience of the community of inquiry is therefore a reflective action among the participants by which they are able to rethink their position, mainly encouraging the questioning of whatever they have taken for granted. When this action occurs within an educational community, this means giving life to a process in which whatever is considered habitual and obvious, characteristic of one’s everyday experience as an educator, becomes the object of investigation (Dewey 1980b: 3–4): it is problematised, reconsidered and analysed in-depth in the community. But there is more: the movement of thought that takes place in the community of philosophical inquiry can only start from the educator’s experience and, at the same time, by addressing issues, it is able to overcome it, opening up to the unprecedented and placing itself beyond concrete and individual experience. The act of asking questions after reading the pretext-text, in my understanding, has this precise function: it is neither a comment, nor the request to provide one’s interpretation of what has been read, nor a way to show off one’s knowledge. The facilitator’s call to ask questions urges the participants to establish a relationship with the issues that have come out from the reading. This means questioning one’s point of view, something that activates and establishes a relationship with one’s beliefs within a community. Certainly, the questions arise from the personal experience triggered by the pretext-text, but they go further as soon as they are shared within the group of participants. The discussion that is generated by the encounter of questions originates in the issues raised by each subject, but turns into the community’s argumentation – then returning, after being further analysed and changed, to each participant.

3.  “Cui prodest?” Thought in motion As Hannah Arendt observed, provided the human need to think, thought is one of those activities that end in themselves and leave no final product in terms of external manifestation in the world. There is a clear paradox in this affirmation: such a daily and somewhat habitual action as thinking, if proposed as a practice

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of adult education, risks appearing particularly outdated – indeed, it is not immediately usable and it is elusive, because it does not offer definitive conclusions. This is not a matter of little concern, especially if adult educators are involved, as they are often in search of solutions and responses to the daily needs raised by educational practices. So, who benefits from thought? What is its aim? I will answer these questions by means of the observations made by two participants of the research sessions: I thought of one element: water. I mean that the feeling I get, which I think is beautiful, is that it’s as if there were many drops which together create a watercourse, a puddle, a lake – something that I like very much as a feeling. When I get out of here I feel less and less like a water drop, and more like I’m part of something else. For me it is like a camera that focuses things, because it seems to me that these sessions do exactly that. At first we have words of which we only know a superficial meaning, as if they were a somewhat blurred image; and then talking about them, these words that we might write on the blackboard are filled with more meaning – they are focused. In short we could say that everything has a word that corresponds to it, but if we are somewhat generic in the definition of a certain thing or a certain situation, we are also less aware of it. When we increase the definition, the detail, then our understanding of that thing becomes clearer – sharper. In short, we take a word, we twist it, we break it down, and we find new meanings that maybe we hadn’t thought of before3.

The Philosophy for Communities proposal may not be particularly innovative: however, its wealth lies in its “complex simplicity”. It is, in fact, an invitation to investigate the obvious, what is apparent, also in current discourses on education, starting from the educators themselves, encouraging a perpetual movement of thought between the immersion into reality and the emergence of a search for meanings. Certainly, this practice is substantiated by taking up Socrates’ known observation in favour of an examined life, but there is more: it also implies the recovery of the human need to think invoked by Hannah Arendt and often suppressed in the frenetic rhythm of everyday life. In the first sessions, this practice may appear as a kind of “suspension” in time, but through exercise it can engender the construction of a true posture within time. The invitation that this proposal can express, not only towards educators, is in some respects similar to Antonio Gramsci’s words of encouragement to his brother Carlo: “One must always stand above the environment in which one lives,

3 Both excerpts refer to the final self-assessment of the Philosophy for Communities experience which took place at the Association MondoQui (see Chapter 5 in this book).

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without therefore despising it or believing that one is superior to it” (Gramsci 1994: 140). From this point of view, Philosophy for Communities calls for a movement of thought: however, contrary to what the Sardinian thinker argues, this movement might not be “upwards” because the view from above is not necessarily the best, as shown by Caspar D. Friedrich’s famous painting, Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (1818).

References Benasayag, M., 2015a, El cerebro aumentado, el hombre disminuido, Paidós, Buenos Aires. Benasayag, M., 2015b, Clique du mal-être. La “Psy” face aux nouvelles souffrances psychiques, La Découverte, Paris. Biesta, G.J., 2006, Beyond Learning. Democratic Education for Human Future, Paradigm, Boulder. Delors, J. et al., 1996, Learning: the Treasure within. Report to Unesco of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, Unesco, Paris. Dewey, J., 1980a, Democracy and Education, in The Middle Works 1899–1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 9, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Dewey, J., 1980b, The Sources of a Science of Education, in The Later Works 1925– 1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 5, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Dewey, J., 1988, Experience and Education, in The Later Works 1925–1953, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 13, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Elfert, M., 2015, ‘Unesco, the Faure Report, the Delors Report and the Political Utopia of Lifelong Learning’, European Journal of Education 50(1), 88–100. Faure, E. et al., 1972, Learning to Be. The Word of Education Today and Tomorrow, Unesco-Harrap, Paris-London. Field, J., 2001, ‘Lifelong Education’, International Journal of Lifelong Education 20, 3–15. Freire, P., 1970, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, transl. M. Bergman Ramos, Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, London. Gramsci, A., 1994, Letters from Prison, transl. R. Rosenthal, Columbia University Press, New York.

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Lee, M. & Friedrich, T., 2011, ‘Continuously Reaffirmed, Subtly Accommodated, Obviously Missing and Fallaciously Critiqued: Ideologies in Unesco’s Lifelong Learning Policy’, International Journal of Lifelong Education 30, 151–169. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge. Martino, S., Perlino, A. & Zamengo, F., 2015, I ragazzi del Millennio, il Mulino, Bologna. Morin, E., 1999, Le tête bien faite, Seuil, Paris. Santi, M., 2012, ‘A Conversation with Matthew Lipman’, in M. Santi & S. Oliverio, Educating for Complex Thinking through Philosophical Inquiry, pp. 501–517, Liguori, Napoli. Originally published in 1991. Simeone, D., 2017, ‘Rel-azioni. Educare e comunicare a scuola’, in A.M. Mariani (ed.), L’agire scolastico, pp. 241–263, La Scuola, Brescia. Zamengo, F., 2012, L’adulto presente, SEI, Torino.

Gabriele Vissio

Chapter 15 – Praxis of the Common and Community-based Philosophical Practices Abstract: The first part of the chapter reconstructs the main features of a recent debate centred on the notion of “common”, bringing the notion of “common-instituting praxis” into focus. The second part tries to make some remarks about how this idea can be helpful to account for community-based philosophical practices inspired by M. Lipman and A. M. Sharp. Keywords: common; common-instituting practice; philosophy of praxis; community; social imaginaries.

In the first part of the following essay, I intend to reconstruct the main features of a recent debate centred on the notion of “common”, analysing its genesis starting from the discussion of “commons” and “common goods”. This reconstruction will identify the notion of “common-instituting practice”, which, in the second part of the paper, I will try to relate to some reflections about community-based philosophical practices inspired by M. Lipman’s and A.M. Sharp’s work. I shall ask, in particular, how and why this philosophical practice should be considered a common-instituting practice, and what can be the advantages of considering the reflection on community-based philosophical practice along with the debate around the concept of “common”.

1.  From commons to common: a contemporary debate For the political discourse of the last thirty years, the notion of commons has been a particularly interesting element for its ability to combine theoretical reflection and concrete political struggles as well as the criticism of capitalism in every corner of the planet. As is well known, academic reflection on commons was officially born in 1968, with Garrett Hardin’s famous article The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968). Hardin’s article expresses a dilemma: except for specific situations characterised by markedly small populations, commons impose on their users the difficult choice between private personal interest and the profit of the community. Assuming the anthropological perspective of the rational agent and the homo œconomicus, Hardin expects private individuals to inevitably tend to over-exploit commons, with the sole interest to maximise their profit. According to Hardin, therefore, the fate of commons is to inevitably lead, sooner

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or later, to a Malthusian catastrophe (Malthus 1826). The systematic pursuit of private interests would cause the population to grow at an exponential growth rate, where common resources would be subject to substantial stability or, at best, to a linear growth rate. According to a controversial historical reconstruction, Hardin suggests that the very prospect of a Malthusian catastrophe would be the cause of the abandonment, at least in the West, of practices related to common goods (Hardin 1968: 1244). Hardin’s starting hypothesis1 is affected by an anthropological model for which the only motivation to act is private interest and, as a consequence, the only possible limitation is mutual coercion (Hardin 1968: 1244). This model essentially applies the dynamics involved in managing public and private assets to the issue of “common property”. Only Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009, and her pupils systematised a new approach to the commons, aimed at overcoming both the model of the statalist coercive government and the privatisation of resources (Ostrom 1990). In her work, Ostrom shows that, as a matter of fact, it is not true that shared management practices have disappeared. She addresses several contemporary case studies, from which it emerges that different communities have in fact resolved the social dilemma of commons through different strategies. From Switzerland to Japan, from Spain to the Philippines, Ostrom analyses communities that have implemented management strategies alternative to both “Leviathan as the ‘only’ way”, and “privatisation as the ‘only’ way” (Ostrom 1990: 58–102). For this reason, even though Ostrom’s prospect is today being criticised and reconsidered2, Governing the Commons can still be 1 Think, for example, of Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop’s criticism of the notion of “common property resources”, considered vague. Specifically, the two authors noted that “common property is not ‘everybody’s property’” (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975: 715) and, partly anticipating the following evolutions of the debate, noted that “[t]he concept ‘property’ has no meaning without this feature of exclusion of all who are not either owners themselves or have some arrangement with owners to use the resource in question” (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975: 715). 2 A particularly significant case is that of Harvey (2011), who effectively demonstrated the limits of the global application of the teachings that Ostrom draws from her cases, most of which relate to relatively small communities. According to Harvey, specifically, “in the grander scheme of things, and particularly at the global level, some sort of enclosure is often the best way to preserve valued commons. It will take a draconian act of enclosure in Amazonia, for example, to protect both biodiversity and the cultures of indigenous populations as part of our global natural and cultural commons” (Harvey 2011: 102). In addition, at least as regards the model proposed in Governing the Commons, Ostrom seems to refer in particular to common natural goods and “expresses no

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considered the fundamental text of a political economy alternative both to the perspective of the neoliberal market and to that of the statalist management, whose main merit is to show, in the context of an institutional approach to selforganisation phenomena and community self-government, the specific rationality and effectiveness of commons. These characteristics of rationality and effectiveness are the basis of the various concrete attempts to link the proposal of a commons-based economy to civil and political struggle movements whose purpose is to propose new possible social models. French economist Benjamin Coriat, in the preface to the book Propriété et communs edited by the Mouvement Utopia3, writes: “If the twentieth century ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, at the same time the twenty-first century has started with the flourishing and great return of the commons [communs] all over the world” (Coriat 2017). On the one hand, the last decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of struggles against new enclosures4; on the other, commons management experiences subsequently expanded thanks to the ‘discovery’ of commons of knowledge. With the powerful transformation of the media, technical reproducibility, information products, research, knowledge, intellectual and cultural activities, we have witnessed two different changes. On the one hand, the application of unprecedented enclosure processes – made possible by an extraordinary extension of the concept and practice of the patent (Boyle 2003), along with the advent of “cognitive capitalism” (Moulier Boutang 2011) – has completely changed our idea of what goods can be owned, which today include music, images, software, but also some animals, seeds or molecules. On the other hand, we have witnessed a number of interesting practices of sharing and collective management of some “intellectual resources”: think of peer to peer practices, GNU/Linux and software like Firefox, or things such as Wikipedia, the Wikimedia Foundation and

interest in other forms of common property, such as genetic materials, knowledge, and cultural assets, which are very much under assault these days through commodification and enclosure” (Harvey 2011: 103). 3 Mouvement Utopia is an association active in France and in other parts of the world, with an altermondist and ecological inspiration. The political programme of the Mouvement has been expressed in a manifesto, the first version of which (Mouvement Utopia 2008) was the result of the activists’ elaboration, and subsequently appeared in a new version (Mouvement Utopia 2012), which shows the constant revision and collective rewriting of the content. 4 I am thinking, for example, of the movements of water and land defence in the Amazon, or the Narmada Bachao Andolan movement in India, which fights against large dams.

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the creative commons movement. According to some, we are even facing a new way of thinking and practising the economy, capable of overcoming the capitalist organisation (Bauwens & Lievens 2015), based on new models, such as that of wikinomics (Tapscott & Williams 2006), where the consumer is a prosumer, namely a co-producer and co-creator of the product he or she is using. All these phenomena have led people to speak of a real “rebirth of the commons” (Bollier 2013)5. Not only are commons today the subject of widespread and pervasive practices, but these practices are linked – sometimes consciously, sometimes in a more eclectic and naïf fashion – to the most important social movements of recent years: from Occupy Wall Street in the USA, to the Indignados in Spain, to the Gezi Park chapulling in Turkey, up to the French protests in 2016. Different movements, though not originally geared towards precise enclosure phenomena, have soon taken commons as a central element of their proposal6, helping to redirect the discussion from individual common goods to the specific ability to overcome the models of both private and public property. In this regard, scientific debate itself has undergone an important evolution, turning into a discourse on the concept of “common”. The introduction of this term in the singular, no longer referring to a single “common good” but as a principle of action and political organisation, dates back to the famous book Commonwealth, by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009), completing the decennial trilogy started with Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004). Going beyond the notion of commons as common goods and shifting the attention to common as a philosophical and political principle allows Hardt and Negri to overcome the descriptive limits of the enclosure model7. In fact, according to 5 An example of the renewed importance of the commons issue in the second decade of the 21st century is that, in 2009, Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences, “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. The award came almost twenty years after the publication of Governing the Commons, confirming that, for economic science, the issue of the commons is no fleeting fashion or contingent matter, limited in space and time. 6 The theoretical reflection that has been produced within the world of social movements has also sometimes expressed in a very original way the connection between commons and revolution, re-elaborating in the light of contemporaneity even very old political experiences, such as those of the “communes” (Comité Invisible 2014: 199–221). 7 A great synthesis of the deadlocks of the enclosure paradigm is provided by Dardot and Laval (2014: 119–122). In particular, according to Dardot and Laval, thinking that the “fencing movement” is the main form of capital accumulation fails to take into account the relationship between the privatisation phenomena and the new phenomena related to the transformation of the financial market or to work sociology. In addition, such

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the two authors, “capitalist accumulation today is increasingly external to the production process, such that exploitation takes the form of expro-priation of the common” (Hardt & Negri 2009: 137). This way to understand the neoliberal attack on the common, though, is unsatisfactory, because “although it articulates fully the state policies and fortunes of dead labour, it says little about the other element necessary for an investigation of the organic composition of capital: the productivity of living labour” (Hardt & Negri 2009: 138). The current situation requires integrating and correcting this model, still present in Ostrom and other scholars, with a bio-political analysis of value appropriation through the exploitation of positive externalities and financial returns (Hardt & Negri 2009: 141). This conceptual shift has the merit of undertaking a contemporary analysis that does not merely consider the current transformation processes of the production system and the economic structure as a repetition of phenomena, such as enclosures, typical of the nascent phase of capitalist modernity but somewhat adapted to account for today’s situation. Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri’s proposal is the subject of criticism that could be the starting point for a complete rethinking of the debate. In particular, Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have recently noted a number of problems with the analytical model proposed by Hardt and Negri: according to the two French scholars, in fact, this analysis proposed in Empire, Multitude and Commonwealth is spoiled by a rentier conception of capitalism, by an inadequate representation of the dynamics of “immaterial work” and by a somewhat naïve trust in the spontaneous emergence of an “informational and reticular” communism (Dardot & Laval 2014: 54). Hardt and Negri’s theoretical model seems therefore traceable to the “collective force” or, better, the “spontaneous social force” of the common (Dardot & Laval 2014: 177), which historically originated in Proudhon (1994). For the latter, the common is the product of a spontaneous force born out of society (Dardot & Laval 2014: 189–195), while for his ‘opponent’ Karl Marx the common is the product of a historical dynamics within the capital (Dardot & Laval 2014: 196–198). Hardt and Negri’s mistake consists in not recognising the production of the common as internal to the history of capitalism, but seeing it as the result of contingent biopolitical production dynamics (Dardot & Laval 2014: 204–205). Hardt and Negri’s approach avoids the common’s “reification” typical of the theory of common goods, but still does not go beyond the common-property link, understanding the common as a good that can be owned. Dardot and Laval propose instead a

a view risks being merely a “defensive” and conservative proposal with regards to the commons (Dardot & Laval 2014: 119).

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new theory of the common as an institution, where the term “institution” indicates neither an already available resource (Ostrom) nor something historically constituted as an ownable asset (Hardt and Negri) but as something constituted by praxis, by definition non-ownable (Dardot & Laval 2014: 215). It seems to me that this proposal shifts the focus of the discourse on the common from how to protect the common from the logics of the “captivation” of the public and the private to how to establish an instituting praxis of the common. In particular, the latter is the object of the final chapter of the second part of Commun, where the authors start by criticising the sociological confusion between the institution and the instituted. Taking up Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion (1987) of “social imaginary”, contra Durkheim, Dardot and Laval express the idea that the imaginary harbours two dimensions: the instituted and the instituting (Dardot & Laval 2014: 382). Castoriadis’ social imaginary also overcomes the causalist perspective of ‘classical’ Marxism, correcting the excessive causal importance attributed to the economic structure (Dardot & Laval 2014: 383). The imaginary also allows one to avoid the impasse of Marxism that a recent tradition of Althusserian inspiration has sought to solve, incorporating structural analysis with a philosophical anthropology mostly inspired by Spinoza (Lordon 2014; Macherey 2011; Balibar 1998). In particular, Dardot and Laval underline the creative and non-reproductive function of the imaginary in Castoriadis’ sociology, making it the basis on which to rethink the very notion of praxis. If the process of institution is somewhat anonymous and impersonal, praxis always requires consciousness and autonomy; the former is politically neutral (any model of society produces imaginary meanings), while the latter is always emancipatory, precisely because it implies autonomy (Dardot & Laval 2014: 390). The challenge therefore lies in thinking and implementing a dynamic institution of the common that is also authentic political praxis.

2.  Community practices and the praxis of the common Dardot and Laval thus have the merit of shifting the discussion from the principle of the common to the question of how its emancipating praxis can be thought of (and implemented) as “instituting praxis or conscious instituting activity” (Dardot & Laval 2014: 395). The creation of communities through the construction of national imaginaries (Anderson 1991) or the invention of traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1992), for example, do not represent emancipating practices because they lack the reflective and conscious element. At the same time, a practice incapable of producing an institution could not have as a result either the production of the common or that of the community. The latter case seems to apply to some alleged forms of

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“individual counterconduct” which, despite the claim to make room for lifestyles other than the dominant ones, may result in simple ‘aesthetic’ gestures, incapable of real political significance. According to Dardot and Laval, the revolution is the only time when the instituting praxis becomes a truly authentic institution of society (Dardot & Laval 2014: 527). Only in the revolution, in fact, does the imaginary trait reveal its productive and non-reproductive capacity, re-establishing society on the basis of a counterfactual action. Other authors, such as Mark Hunyadi, who explicitly takes up Dardot and Laval’s work (Hunyadi 2015: 78), think that it is possible to conceive of an “institution of the common” [institution du commun] within a framework that is not necessarily revolutionary (Hunyadi 2015: 111). While sharing the idea that the common – understood as “common action” – does not originate spontaneously, Hunyadi proposes, as an example of its institution, a supranational parliamentary form, which does not presuppose a true revolutionary fracture, even though he admits the possibility of some type of legal enforcement (Hunyadi 2015: 83). However, the two proposals – the revolutionary and the so-called reformist – both seem to recognise the need to think of the common as an instituting praxis, in reference to what we might call ‘institutional imagination’. Hunyadi comes to speak explicitly of a Homo institutionalis, who must be freed from the dominion exercised on him by the model of Homo faber (Hunyadi 2015: 86–87) and in any case acknowledges the need to think and implement the common through an instituting processuality. In other words, the common can only be thought of as a praxis. If the debate on the common is a novelty within the philosophical debate, the problem of community is a theoretical core that has been at the centre of the discussion for some time now.8 Within this broad and complex debate, the proposal of the community-based philosophical practices has taken on a notable role, also because of the versatility of some of these protocols, capable of acting effectively in many areas: from education to social services, from informal to professional contexts. Many of these proposals, in particular the Philosophy for Communities (p4c), originate from more or less profound extra-scholastic re-elaborations of the Philosophy for Children protocol proposed by Matthew Lipman and Ann M. Sharp9. The question I would like to try to answer now is 8 For a consideration of the most recent debate and for a theoretical framing of the matter, I refer the reader to the chapter written by Lingua and Monti in the present book (Cf. supra, Chapter 2). 9 For a brief reconstruction of the theoretical and cultural background behind Lipman and Sharp’s proposal, and for a more accurate discussion of p4c’s relevance in and out of the educational context, see the first chapter in this book.

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how the community-based philosophical practices inspired by Lipman’s reflection, particularly those that integrate the concept of “community of inquiry”, can be an example of building the common. First of all, according to Lipman, “the glue that holds a community together is practice, but it does not have to be self-critical practice” (Lipman 2003: 83). Not all the practices capable of establishing communities are, in other words, what we called, with Castoriadis, authentic “praxis”. The community of inquiry, instead, is “a process that aims at producing a product”, according to a precise direction given by the development of the argument (Lipman 2003: 83). Lipman immediately takes pains to point out that this oriented production process, however, does not consist of “merely conversation or discussion; it is dialogical” (Lipman 2003: 84). What seems interesting to note is that these features make it possible to think of the community not as a ‘thing’ but as a dialogically organised dynamic process. In the philosophical practices inspired by Lipman’s protocol, community is neither the precondition nor the crystallised product of practice, but is constantly generated in the act of practising thought in common. The community is always instituting and never definitively instituted, leaving room for its ongoing redefinition. Precisely with reference to Castoriadis’ notion of the social imaginary, it has also been noted that in Lipman’s proposal the centrality of the idea of “inquiry”, the dialogic structure of practice and its being oriented to a product often result in an authentic transformation, through processes of self-criticism and selfcorrection (Racca 2015: 109). Secondly, the practice of “thinking in community” does not only involve cognitive aspects but is centred on a multidimensional model of thinking, which integrates “critical thinking”, “creative thinking” and “caring thinking” (Lipman 2003: 200). The community of inquiry at the centre of philosophical practice is therefore a very complex process, whose dialogical product is not measurable only in terms of logical-syntactic coherence but also as (1) appreciative, (2) active, (3) normative, (4) affective, (5) empathic (Lipman 2003: 264–271), (6) ethical (Cosentino 2011) and (7) democratic thinking (Sharp 1991). For these reasons, it seems to me that, in the case of community-based philosophical practices, and in particular of the p4c, it is possible to speak of real instituting praxis, where the instituted common is a dialogical thought, understood in a complex and stratified manner and, precisely for this reason, able to become the centre of the activity and attention of a community.

3. Conclusions The reflection on the common, developed over the last few years since the commons debate, along with the concept of “instituting praxis”, has allowed me to

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clarify some aspects of the community-based philosophical practices inspired by Lipman’s Philosophy for Children and to outline a possible political meaning for these practices. Not only do these philosophical practices avoid the risk of reifying the common into a specific object (material or abstract), but also – focusing on the “community of inquiry” and combining the elements typical of practice (conscience, reflection) and of instituting activity (reference to ‘non-logical’, but imaginary, relational, affective aspects, etc.) – they can be an interesting example of common-instituting praxis, thus taking on an important role in the political transformation of society. From a methodological point of view, they can also be an ideal access point for research on the common, as they can reproduce, on a ‘micro scale’, processes and structures that might prove useful in building general theoretical and practical frameworks. On the other hand, the interesting notion of common and common-instituting praxis that I have tried to reconstruct could be an element of innovation within the studies and research on philosophical practices and the concept of “community” that they integrate and implement. Although most researches on p4c and community-based philosophical practices underestimate their political significance, a wider discussion of their meaning as a practice of the common could lead to significant advances both in the understanding of community-based philosophical practice and in the elaboration of authentic political praxis of the common.

References Anderson, B., 1991, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London. Balibar, È., 1998, Spinoza and Politics, transl. P. Snowdon, Verso, London-New York. Bauwens, M. & Lievens, J., 2015, Sauver le monde – Vers une économie postcapitaliste avec le peer-to-peer, Les Liens qui Libèrent, Paris. Bollier, D., 2013, La renaissance des communs, Éditions Charles Léopold Mayer, Paris. Boyle, J., 2003, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain’, Law and Contemporary Problems 66, 33–74, viewed 15 September 2017, from http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol66/iss1/2. Castoriadis, C., 1987, The Imaginary Institution of Society, transl. K. Blamey, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. & Bishop, R.C., 1975, ‘“Common property” as a concept in natural resource policy’, Natural Resources Journal 15, 713–727.

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Comité Invisible, 2014, A nos amis, La Fabrique Éditions, Paris. Coriat, B., 2017, Les communs, c’est déjà l’alternative en acte, Préface à Mouvement Utopia, Propriété et communs, pp. 9–12, Les Éditions Utopia, Paris. Cosentino, A., 2011, ‘La comunità di ricerca filosofica come istanza etica’, in A. Cosentino & S. Oliverio (eds.), Comunità di ricerca filosofica e formazione. Pratiche di coltivazione del pensiero, pp. 1–119, Liguori, Napoli. Dardot, P. & Laval, C., 2014, Le Commun. Essai sur la révolution au XXIe siècle, La Découverte, Paris. Hardin, G., 1968, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 162(3859), 1243–1248, viewed 15 September 2017, from https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243. Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2000, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2004, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2009, Commonwealth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Harvey, D., 2011, ‘The Future of the Commons’, Radical History Review 109 (Winter 2011), 101–107. Hunyadi, M., 2015, La tyrannie des modes de vie, Le Bord de l’Eau, Lormont. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lordon, F., 2014, Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire, Verso, London-New York. Macherey, P., 2011, Hegel or Spinoza, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Malthus, Th.R., 1826, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Library of Economics and Liberty, viewed 15 September 2017, from http://www.econlib.org/library/ Malthus/malPlong.html. Moulier Boutang, Y., 2011, Cognitive Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge. Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Mouvement Utopia, 2008, Manifeste Utopia, Paragon, Lyon. Mouvement Utopia, 2012, Manifeste Utopia, Les Éditions Utopia, Paris. Mouvement Utopia, 2017, Propriété et communs, Les Éditions Utopia, Paris. Proudhon, P.-J., 1994, What is Property?, ed. D.R. Kelley and B.G. Smith, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Racca, S., 2015, ‘Dagli immaginari sociali alla società civile: le pratiche filosofiche e la comunità di ricerca tra Castoriadis, Taylor e Lipman’, Lessico di Etica pubblica 2, 104–114.

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Sharp, A.M., 1991, ‘The Community of Inquiry: Education for Democracy’, The Journal of Philosophy for Children 9(2), 31–37. Tapscott, D. & Williams, A.D., 2006, Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything, Portfolio, New York.

Anna Granata

Chapter 16 – Different Minds Thinking Together: The Potential of Philosophy for Communities from an Intercultural Perspective Abstract: Intercultural education considers the dialogue between people from different cultures as an opportunity to build community. In this chapter, the author investigates the potential of Philosophy for Communities (p4c) from an intercultural perspective by focusing on the topics of discussion, the features used and the contexts in which it could be used. Keywords: intercultural education; Philosophy for Communities (p4c); multicultural society; dialogue; intercultural relations.

A mono-cultural education is not a positive one. In his essay The Concept of Multi-Cultural Education (1986), Bhikhu Parekh was among the first to propose this theory in 1989. What, in fact, are the traditional goals of a scholastic (and not only) educational training? To learn reason, practise discussing a viewpoint, stimulate the imagination and conceive alternatives, develop a curiosity in other ways of thinking and living and increase sensitivity towards others’ experiences. Intercultural education may be considered an education in relationships with others which, by striving towards these goals, attributes particular value to cultural factors. Nowadays, in fact, interpersonal relationships increasingly involve people of different origins and cultures: the pedagogic model of relationships cannot ignore the various cultural backgrounds within which each individual operates. The very idea of a culture that is driven by this paradigm is crucial1. Culture is never intended as a destiny but as an open field of action in which someone 1 Particularly effective is Doris Edelmann and Tania Ogay’s (2016) recent proposal based on three metaphors, as well as a deterministic and essentialistic vision of culture: 1) culture is like language: culture is generated by individuals as they interconnect with each other, through repertoires of shared meanings, in an ever-open and dynamic process; 2) culture is like the air we breathe: culture is difficult to define and we become aware of it only as we are leaving it, for example while travelling abroad; 3) culture is like a non-Newtonian fluid, or rather a substance that may find itself in the solid, liquid or gas form, depending on its contact with different external agents. Also in intercultural relationships, the relationship with people from different cultures may generate the dynamics of identification or differentiation that lead to the decreasing or exalting of certain aspects of culture.

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“presents himself ”, to quote a still current phrase by Erving Goffman (1990). When people from different cultures clash within the most varied contexts (school classes, youth centres, professional teams, religious communities, etc.), all those involved come out somehow transformed, renewing and reinterpreting their own culture. The practice of Philosophy for Communities seems to be in line with this type of reflection. Firstly, because it considers the relationship and dialogue between different people as an opportunity to strengthen social relations; secondly, as it uses educational features such as asking questions, debating a point of view, conceiving alternative thoughts and developing the imagination, all of which are also adopted in promoting intercultural relationships. In this essay, I will, therefore, be investigating which role Philosophy for Communities may play within an intercultural educational procedure and reflection. Following a brief excursus of the paradigm of intercultural pedagogy, with its history, principles and objectives, and its most recent trends of research, I will try to outline some possible intercultural applications of the Philosophy for Communities, regarding the themes of discussion, the features used and the contexts in which it could be used.

1. Interculture: promoting relations between people from different cultures Intercultural dialogue, intercultural education, intercultural integration: if, today, one word has become fashionable in social and media contexts it is “intercultural”, used interchangeably with other terms such as “multicultural” and “transcultural” that in fact drive different anthropologies that in part are not merely synonyms for the intercultural approach (Abdallah-Pretceille 2000; Gobbo 2000). The term “intercultural” appeared for the first time in France, in 1975, in schools and referred to the process of welcoming students from other countries, initially conferring to this discipline a very operative and “hands-on” style. The first truly scientific studies date back to the eighties2 and focus on the possibility of favouring deep and positive relations between people from different cultures. After the initial welcoming of foreign students, other themes immediately emerged such as the valorisation of multilingualism, the management of discrimination

2 In 1986, the first ARIC (Association pour la Recherche InterCulturelle) convention was held, and this year celebrated its fourteenth edition; this association brings together the main exponents of intercultural research in the Francophone area.

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and racism, global citizenship education and the training of teachers and educators operating in heterogeneous contexts3. The prefix inter, as Franca Pinto Minerva (2007) suggests, puts the focus on the aspect of relationship and reciprocity, and describes intercultural meetings as fertile soil for negotiation and exchange which in turn may bring forth new ideas and projects. With a simple prefix, we highlight the need to recognise and practise, in an educational field, reciprocal debate and enrichment between people of different cultures. A more recent and particularly promising field of investigation is that of intercultural competences (Deardorff 2009; eds. Portera & Grant 2017), developed primarily in North America and regarding the collaboration between professionals in international teams. According to this branch of study, when people of different cultures meet, nothing should be taken for granted. There is, in fact, always the risk of misinterpretation and incomprehension, no matter how latent. Intercultural competence represents a multidimensional luggage of knowledge compared to the history and culture of the other person, the ability to communicate both verbally and non-verbally as well as participate in shared activities, and attitudes such as listening, empathy and decentralisation that favour the deep understanding between people who have different cultures but share common goals4. This branch of study and research drives intercultural reflection towards a higher level of coherence and scientificity of their own hypotheses, elaborating an outline of reference that appears particularly fertile both for epistemological reflection as well as for the operative spin-offs within the ambit of teacher training.

2. A “Philosophy for Communities” in an intercultural perspective Meeting, talking or understanding each other as different people should never be taken for granted. As suggested by the intercultural competence branch of study,

3 Main references include Claude Clanet, Martine Abdallah-Pretceille, Carmel Camilleri. 4 According to Piergiorgio Reggio and Milena Santerini (2015), in particular in educational contexts, these competences fall into at least three types: interpretation of cultures (knowing how to be aware of the authentic meanings behind the other person’s gestures and words within an outline of sense); reduction of prejudices (trying to escape from the cognitive “cage” of stereotypes and prejudices that characterise out functional style of thought, reducing as much as possible the damage caused in the relationship with others); search for shared horizons (taking on common goals and perspectives despite the difference of approaches and contexts of origin).

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in order to ensure that meetings with others are effective and deep, those participating must in some way be taught to be aware of their own culture, their own stereotypes and prejudices and the need to look beyond their own ethnocentrism. The feature of Philosophy for Communities thereby also appears to be a valid and pertinent tool in exchanges that may be deemed intercultural. In this essay, we intend in particular to highlight three possible applications of the Philosophy for Communities in an intercultural perspective: we are not dealing with three alternative demands but rather three levels that may also be taken into consideration concurrently.

2.1.  The choice of the text to be discussed: dilemmas Choosing a text that will stimulate debate from the perspective of comparison between different values and cultures: this may be the first application of the Philosophy for Communities in the intercultural interpretation. People discuss interculturally-sensitive matters on a daily basis thanks to the instrumentalisation of certain themes by the media in the current social context: being able to discuss these themes with clear and effective methodology, and also with the help of an expert, may bring to light some dynamics of thought that move even further away from more stereotypical and prejudiced visions. Below is an example of a text that poses a key question of intercultural reflection: plural identity. A young man born in Italy to Syrian parents, co-founder of the Giovani musulmani d’Italia association5, is asked the same question every day: whether he feels more “Western” or more Muslim. Whoever asks him this inevitably considers the two categories to be mutually exclusive. His reply is certainly as motivating as it is unexpected. The theme of identity often leads to discussion, insofar that we all feel affected by it on a personal level. In this case, the debate may also focus on the possibility of reconciling European identity with the Muslim religion, which is an extremely current political and social theme. Whose son am I? The question in itself is rather worrying! From which culture does my identity come, Islam or the West? I speak, I reason, I behave in a public office, I walk the streets and dream in Italian, like an Italian: so I am a child of the West! But when I pray, celebrate a holiday in my community, I have a conception of the uniqueness of God that is different to that of many of my friends; not to mention

5 Giovani musulmani d’Italia is an Italian association founded in 2001 by some young Muslim people born in Italy.

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the fact that my name is quite clearly Muslim: Abdallah, which means ‘God’s servant’. So then I must be a son of Islam! I have given an answer that may seem like an easy way out but it is in fact the absolute truth: I am a son both of Islam and the West, as I am the son of a father and a mother, with all the inferences that this metaphor may constitute. Therefore, I have taken something from Islam and something from the West, it was an automatic and natural process, just like inheriting some traits from your mother and some from your father. My father and my mother, Western culture and Islam, fight my cause, fight for my future: we should go to this school or another, we should go to your family for the holidays or to mine, the same old scenes that are played out in all families! So please, don’t ask me if I feel more Western or more Muslim, because it makes no sense: it would be like asking who you love most, your mother or your father! These are questions that you cannot ask! Because to be honest there are no answers, and people ask them when they have nothing else to say6.

2.2.  Relational features: from reason to empathy It is said that we should understand people from other countries in order to have peace on Earth. However, I ask myself up to what point we understand our neighbours. Love and comprehension can be freed only by the bonds of a union made of proximity. Peace and happiness can only be found in living, solid, deep relationships that are found in an immediate community, says John Dewey (1980). The immediate community is that place where people of varying ages, backgrounds and origins, and even different viewpoints, have the chance to meet and talk with each other. This is the fundamental challenge of the Philosophy for Communities, which takes on an even more radical and deep meaning within an intercultural interpretation. A second type of intercultural application of the Philosophy for Communities therefore looks at the relational features used within this practice, of which Matthew Lipman considers there to be at least fifteen7. Some of these appear particularly important within their intercultural application: inclusion, for which the diversities of opinion do not implicate exclusion from the community; faceto-face relationships, which involve people’s non-verbal language as a fundamental 6 Abdallah Kabakebbji, co-founder of the Giovani musulmani d’Italia association, statement included in Granata 2011: 19. 7 Inclusion, participation, shared knowledge, face-to-face relationships, research of meaning, feelings of social solidarity, deliberation, impartiality, models, independent thought, procedure of provocation, reasonableness, interpretation, formulation of questions and discussion (Lipman 2003: 95–100).

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relationship tool also between people who do not share a mother tongue; research for meaning, such as a fundamental option of intercultural meeting, both regarding the decoding of words and gestures that are not immediately understood, as well as the active construction of a common repertoire of meanings, even between different cultures. It seems that the intercultural paradigm may, however, help further outline the features, accentuating the role of emotions within this type of group dynamic. In particular, over the years, intercultural education has set great store by the construct of empathy8, which, according to Edith Stein (1964), is an actual type of knowledge: becoming aware of the state of mind of others, experiencing within oneself a brand new feeling such as great love, trust, courage, terror, bereavement, radical change. An experience such as this inevitably leads to new questions and concerns, in turn leading to new kinds of research. In this sense, promoting and valorising empathy within the practices of the Philosophy for Communities means, in a society that is often numb to emotions, turning this experience into an extraordinary occasion for collective growth. During a recent session of the Philosophy for Communities, parents from different origins were brought together to discuss a text on the theme of adolescence. These discussions were an important chance to share experiences on the hardships involved in bringing children up in a context that is not your own. If we read between the lines, we can find the “emotive thermometer” of this exchange between peers: Mario: I don’t think it’s a good idea to compare our children to us… the context is different, when I was young mobile phones didn’t even exist, there was no Internet, but there were, our lives were slightly different but some things haven’t changed like the role of parents, between parents and children, having to study, how to treat other people… the context has changed, but then you maybe grew up in Brazil and they grew up here so maybe that is also a bit different […]. Cecil: I see that here in Italy as well as in Brazil teenagers are fragile: in any problem, for anything already we die a little inside and it becomes an illness, a depression… but what is going on? […] I think that bringing up children together is not like a medicine that you say try and do this, or this. […] It’s very difficult, isn’t it? Because you are always faced with the same question: but am I doing the right thing, am I making mistakes?

8 Empathy is a very important construct in general pedagogy (Bellingreri 2013). This construct is also present in the totality of models for education in intercultural competence elaborated since the beginning of the 21st century. For a complete discussion of the theme, refer to Deardorff 2009. In fact, Matthew Lipman (1995) spoke about a “caring thinking” close to the construct of empathy.

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Sumaya: In fact, no one is born with knowledge. Many older women have told me this. Giulia: My goodness, it’s so hard…9

2.3.  New contexts for thinking together In the third instance, we can apply a Philosophy for Communities in an intercultural key referring to the contexts in which this practice can be experimented. As well as a culturalist paradigm, Davide Zoletto (2015) believes we should pay attention to all those “heterogeneous contexts” in which people with different identities relate to each other. In this sense, the Philosophy for Communities may also be applied in heterogeneous contexts where building communities becomes an urgent aim. In the way of conclusion, we would like in any case to mention three possible contexts in which this feature may be implemented with undoubtedly promising results. Minority religious communities. The concern of preserving and reinforcing rituals and traditions so that children maintain a link with their country of origin and uphold their beliefs and religious practices is extremely strong, especially in some minority religious communities. In Turkish Muslim communities, for example in France, we speak of “first perpetual generations” that should maintain, through the generations, a strong connection with Turkey and its Islamic traditions (Akgönül 2009). This aspiration is easily disregarded, even within those communities that are most attentive to keeping their practices and traditions intact. In fact, young people often choose to follow their own paths, looking for compromises and new fusions, asking questions on the traditions taught and living faith in a personal and authentic way (Granata 2010). Adopting the method of Philosophy for Communities in religious communities frequented by first generation adults and second generation young people could be an excellent way to favour healthy debate and mutual understanding within families and religious groups. University halls. Martha Nussbaum (1998) maintains that universities should not only represent an introduction to disciplinary education but also be a place where we learn to become citizens. She proposes teaching citizenship in American colleges based on three simple but revolutionary educational objectives: 1) developing the typically Socratic ability of critically judging ourselves and our own traditions (not necessarily shared by students, who increasingly represent different cultural contexts, both for migratory dynamics as well as international 9 The extract refers to a session of the Philosophy for Communities course held at the Associazione MondoQui (see Chapter 5 in this volume).

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studies undertaken); 2) developing the capacity to perceive ourselves not only as members of a nation but as part of humanity, connected to others no matter origin, ethnicity and personal beliefs (within the perspective of global citizenship education); 3) implementing the ability of narrative imagination, or knowing how to walk in someone else’s shoes, sense their feelings, needs and desires (a fundamental antidote to cultural conflict that is both latent and manifest in our societies). A Philosophy for Communities in our universities would certainly put the focus back on these fundamental instances: in my specific case, the training of future teachers and educators cannot ignore the education of active global citizens. Social Networks. An immediate community is made up of people in a close physical contact with others. To be able to think together we need to establish face-toface relationships. This was Matthew Lipman’s strong conviction (Lipman 2003). Nevertheless, today, children and young adults in particular spend a considerable part of their days on social networks, sharing news, participating in virtual debates, expressing their own opinions and debating with perfect strangers in the plural and dynamic space of the web. Research carried out in our country reveals that social networks are involved with a high risk of violent outbursts and verbal racism that may have very serious consequences for the development of the identity of young people (Pasta 2015). A virtual Philosophy for Communities could lead to platforms for debate based on dialogue and mutual respect, valorising processes of personal and collective growth. All that is left to do is work out how.

References Abdallah-Pretceille, M., 2000, L’éducation interculturelle, Presses universitaires françaises, Paris, 2011 (or. ed. 1999). Akgönül, S., 2009, ‘Appartenances et altérités chez les originaires de Turquie en France. Le rôle de la religion’, Hommes et migrations 1280, 34–49. Bellingreri, A., 2013, L’empatia come virtù. Senso e metodo del dialogo educativo, Il pozzo di Giacobbe, Trapani. Deardorff, D.K. (ed.), 2009, The Sage Handbook of Intercultural Competence, Sage publications, Thousand Oaks. Dewey, J., 1980, Democracy and Education (1916), in The Middle Works 1899– 1924, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 9, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale-Edwardsville. Edelmann, D. & Ogay, T., 2016, ‘Taking Culture Seriously. Implications for Intercultural Education and Training’, European Journal of Teacher Education 39(3), 388–400.

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Gobbo, F., 2000, Pedagogia interculturale. Il progetto educativo nelle società complesse, Carocci, Roma. Goffman, E., 1990, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Random House, New York (or. ed. 1956). Granata, A., 2010, ‘Di padre in figlio, di figlio in padre. Il ruolo innovativo delle seconde generazioni nelle comunità religiosa di minoranza’, Mondi migranti 3, 87–100. Granata, A., 2011, Sono qui da una vita. Dialogo aperto con le seconde generazioni, Carocci, Roma. Lipman, M., 1995, ‘Caring as Thinking’, Inquiry: Critical thinking across the disciplines 15(1), 1–13. Lipman, M., 2003, Thinking in Education, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Nussbaum, M., 1998, Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Parekh, B., 1986, ‘The Concept of Multi-Cultural Education’, in A. Modgil et al. (eds.), Multicultural Education. The Interminable Debate, pp. 19–31, The Falmer Press, London. Pasta, S., 2015, Pregiudizio 2.0. Forme di intolleranza nella cultura giovanile contemporanea. Metodi teorici e pratiche educative, Post-grad. thesis in Pedagogy, Cycle XXVIII, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano. Pinto Minerva, F., 2007, L’intercultura, Laterza, Roma-Bari. Portera, A. & Grant, G.A. (eds.), 2017, Intercultural Education and Competences, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne. Reggio, P. & Santerini, M. (eds.), 2015, Le competenze interculturali nel lavoro educativo, Carocci, Roma. Stein, E., 1964, On the Problem of Empathy, transl. W. Stein, Nijhoff, Den Haag. Zoletto, D., 2015, Dall’intercultura ai contesti eterogenei. Presupposti teorici e ambiti di ricerca, Franco Angeli, Milano.

About the Contributors Silvia Bevilacqua Silvia Bevilacqua is a PhD candidate at the University of Genoa. She is a school teacher and Philosophy for Children educator. She develops projects concerning philosophical practices and has cooperated with the Community founded by don Gallo in Genoa. She gave her contribution to the birth of the projects “Insieme di pratiche filosoficamente autonome” (http://www.insiemedipratichefilosofica menteautonome.it/) and “Propositi di filosofia”. Together with Pierpaolo Casarin, she has edited the volumes Disattendere i poteri. Pratiche filosofiche in movimento (Mimesis, Milan-Udine, 2013) and Philosophy for children in gioco (Mimesis, Milan-Udine, 2016). Email: [email protected].

Pierpaolo Casarin Pierpaolo Casarin holds a Master’s degree in Philosophy (University of Milan) and one in Philosophical consulting (University of Venice). He is a social worker and trainer in Philosophy for Children. He is devoted to the implementation of philosophical practice projects in different contexts. He gave his contribution to the birth of the projects “Insieme di pratiche filosoficamente autonome” (http:// www.insiemedipratichefilosoficamenteautonome.it/) and “Propositi di filosofia”. Together with Silvia Bevilacqua, he has edited the volumes Disattendere i poteri. Pratiche filosofiche in movimento (Mimesis, Milan-Udine, 2013) and Philosophy for children in gioco (Mimesis, Milan-Udine, 2016). Email: [email protected].

Edna Olimpia da Cunha Edna Olimpia da Cunha received her Master’s degree in Education at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). She teaches at the Escola Municipal Joaquim da Silva Peçanha in Duque de Caxias (RJ) and is a researcher of the Núcleo de Estudos de Filosofias e Infâncias (NEFI) at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Email: [email protected].

Alessandro De Cesaris Alessandro De Cesaris is a PhD candidate at the University of Eastern Piedmont (Vercelli, Italy). His main fields of interest are ancient metaphysics, classic German philosophy and philosophy of media. Email: [email protected].

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Vanise Dutra Gomes Vanise Dutra Gomes received her PhD in Education at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). She teaches at the Escola Municipal Joaquim da Silva Peçanha in Duque de Caxias (RJ) and is a researcher of the Núcleo de Estudos de Filosofias e Infâncias (NEFI) at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Email: [email protected].

Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo (PhD in Science of Culture, Modena 2005 and in Philosophy, Torino 2011) is F.R.S.-FNRS Chargé de recherche (Postdoctoral researcher) at the Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). Research interests: continental philosophy (esp. Hans Jonas), ethics and politics of responsibility, p4c, interculturality, landscape studies. He is also a practitioner of Philosophy for Children-Communities. Email: [email protected].

Félix García Moriyón Felix García Moriyón, Ph.D. in Philosophy, is Honorary Professor at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain). He has authored 19 books, co-authored or edited 22 books, and written 184 articles about philosophical and educational topics, with a specific focus on practical philosophy. In 1986, he received a Fulbright grant to stay as a visiting scholar at the IAPC (Montclair State University, USA). He started disseminating p4c programmes in 1985; then he was founding member of the Spanish Centre of Philosophy for Children; president in 1991–1994 and 2003–2004. Founding member of Sophia, the European foundation for the dissemination of Philosophy for Children. Member of the ICPIC since 1987; vicepresident from 2005 to 2007, and president between 2009 and 2012. He has conducted many workshops in Spain and other countries on different topics related to education and the teaching of philosophy. Email: [email protected].

Anna Granata Anna Granata is Assistant Professor of Intercultural Education at the University of Turin (Italy). Research interests: intercultural education, second generation of immigrants, heterogeneous classrooms at school, intercultural competences for teachers and educators. Email: [email protected].

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Walter O. Kohan Walter Kohan is Full Professor of Educational Philosophy at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). He is a researcher at the National Council for Scientific Research (CNPq) and the Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ). His main areas of interest are the relationships between childhood and philosophy, teacher education and philosophy of education. Email: [email protected].

Graziano Lingua Graziano Lingua is Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Turin and Associate Member of GSRL (EPHE-CNRS) in Paris. His research focuses on social philosophy and the relationship between religions, identities and politics. He is the author or editor of numerous volumes including Esiti della secolarizzazione (2013), Il principio ricostruttivo (2012), L’idolo, l’icona e la guerra delle immagini (2006). Email: [email protected].

Paolo Monti Paolo Monti is Lecturer at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milan, Italy). His research focuses on the ethics of citizenship, the role of religion in the public sphere and the philosophy of social practices. He has been a visiting researcher at Notre Dame University (2004 and 2006) and at the Department of Bioethics of the NIH (2009). Together with Camil Ungureanu, he is the author of Contemporary Political Theory and Religion (Routledge, New York-London, 2017). Email: paolo. [email protected].

Sara Nosari Sara Nosari is Associate Professor in Pedagogy of Creativity at the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences (University of Turin). Her main areas of interest are the principles of educational process, creative action and its conditions, the ethical character of sport. Email: [email protected].

Ewa Nowak PhD in Philosophy and Associate Professor (Chair of Ethics) at the University of Poznań (Poland). Former visiting researcher at the Universities of Siegen, Berlin (Humboldt), Bern, Konstanz, and Cornell (USA). Her research interests

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include ethics, moral-cognitive development, medical humanities, identity and responsiveness. Her recent books are Kohlberg Revisited (co-edited with B. Zizek & D. Garz, 2015), Experimental Ethics. A Multidisciplinary Approach (2013), and Educating Competencies for Democracy (co-edited with D.E. Schrader & B. Zizek, 2013). Email: [email protected].

Giacomo Pezzano Giacomo Pezzano is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Turin (Italy). His research fields are metaphysics and the philosophy of nature of Gilles Deleuze, the contemporary development of philosophical anthropology and the philosophical investigation of social imaginaries. Email: [email protected].

Sergio Racca Sergio Racca is a PhD candidate in Philosophy (University of Turin, Italy). His research interests include philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history, with particular regard to Hegel’s and Charles Taylor’s thought, sociology of religion and Philosophy for Children/Philosophy for Communities. Email: sergio. [email protected].

Cristina Rebuffo Cristina Rebuffo graduated in 2011 in Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Turin (Italy) with a Master’s thesis on the experience of death in the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. She is a high school teacher and carries out research activity at the CeSPeC research centre (www.cespec.it). She is also a practitioner of Philosophy for Communities. Email: [email protected].

Małgorzata Steć Małgorzata Steć is currently a doctoral candidate (Psychology) at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and Assistant Professor/Lecturer at the University Ignatianum in Cracow (Poland). Her research field is developmental psychology and moral development. She is interested in fostering moral and democratic competence. She has received her first PhD in Philosophy in 2013 at the Marie CurieSkłodowska University (UMCS) in Lublin (Poland) on the topic of moral identity and moral personality. Email: [email protected].

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Nicolò Valenzano Nicolò Valenzano graduated in Philosophy and History of Ideas and is currently a PhD student at the University of Turin (Italy). Recently, he has dealt with issues related to death education. He is currently interested in Philosophy for Communities as an adult education proposal in informal and non-formal contexts. Email: [email protected].

Gabriele Vissio Gabriele Vissio is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Turin and at the Université Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne. He is interested in French contemporary philosophy, especially the “historical epistemology” tradition and its legacy. Email: [email protected].

Federico Zamengo Federico Zamengo is Assistant Professor of Theory of Education (University of Turin, Italy). His main research interests involve the relations between formal, non-formal and informal education both in youth and in adulthood. Email: [email protected].

DIA-LOGOS Schriften zu Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences Herausgegeben von Edited by Tadeusz Buksiński & Piotr W. Juchacz "Dia-Logos. Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences is a peer-reviewed book series publishing valuable monographs and edited volumes on various aspects of philosophy and social sciences. The series is intended to be an interdisciplinary forum of deliberation according to our firm belief that challenges of the contemporary world require common and multilevel research. The Dia-Logos series does not represent a single ideology or school of thought, but it is open to different trends and various styles of reflection, trying to understand better the contemporary world. We invite the submission of manuscripts of monographs and edited volumes from academic philosophers and social scientists." Bd. / Vol. 1 Piotr W. Juchacz / Roman Kozłowski (Hrsg.): Freiheit und Verantwortung. Moral, Recht und Politik. 2002. Bd. / Vol. 2 Norbert Leśniewski / Ewa Nowak-Juchacz (Hrsg.): Die Zeit Heideggers. 2002. Bd. / Vol. 3 Marek Kwiek (ed.): The University, Globalization, Central Europe. 2003. Bd. / Vol. 4 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (Hrsg.): Philosophie an der Schwelle des 21. Jahrhunderts. Geschichte der Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Ethik, Wissenschaftstheorie, Politische Philosophie. 2003. Bd. / Vol. 5 Danuta Sobczyńska / Pawel Zeidler / Ewa Zielonacka-Lis (eds.): Chemistry in the Philosophical Melting Pot. 2004. Bd. / Vol. 6 Marek Kwiek: Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge. Studies in the Philosophy of Culture and Education. 2004. Bd. / Vol. 7 Marek Kwiek: The University and the State. A Study into Global Transformations. 2006. Bd. / Vol. 8 Andrzej Przylebski (Hrsg.): Das Erbe Gadamers. 2006. Bd. / Vol. 9 Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp (ed.): Values and Norms in the Age of Globalization. 2007. Bd. / Vol. 10 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Democracy in Western and Post-Communist Countries. Twenty Years after the Fall of Communism. 2009. Bd. / Vol. 11 Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Mariusz Golecki / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.): Multicentrism as an Emerging Paradigm in Legal Theory. 2009. Bd. / Vol. 12 Bartosz Wojciechowski: Philosophical Approach to the Interculturality of Criminal Law. 2010. Bd. / Vol. 13 Marek Nowak / Michał Nowosielski (eds.): (Post)transformational Migration. Inequalities, Welfare State, and Horizontal Mobility. 2011. Bd. / Vol. 14 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Religions in the Public Spheres. 2011. Bd. / Vol. 15 Bartosz Wojciechowski / Piotr W. Juchacz / Karolina M. Cern (eds.): Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Democratic Principles. 2013. Bd. / Vol. 16 Ewa Nowak / Dawn E. Schrader / Boris Zizek (eds.): Educating Competencies for Democracy. 2013. Bd. / Vol. 17 Tadeusz Buksiński (ed.): Identities and Modernizations. 2013. Bd. / Vol. 18 Karolina M. Cern: The Counterfactual Yardstick. Normativity, Self-Constitutionalisation and the Public Sphere. 2014.

Bd. / Vol. 19 Vito Breda / Lidia Rodak (eds.). Diverse Narratives of Legal Objectivity. An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 2016. Bd. / Vol. 20 Marek Woszczek: Platonic Wholes and Quantum Ontology. Translated by Katarzyna Kretkowska. 2015. Bd./Vol. 21 Roman Hauser / Marek Zirk-Sadowski / Bartosz Wojciechowski (eds.): The Common European Constitutional Culture. Its Sources, Limits and Identity. 2016. Bd./Vol. 22 Aigerim Raimzhanova: Hard, Soft, and Smart Power – Education as a Power Resource. 2017. Bd./Vol. 23 Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo / Graziano Lingua (eds.): Philosophy and Community Practices. 2018. www.peterlang.com