A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea: Researching Recent Social and Political Trends [1st ed. 2023] 9819958288, 9789819958283

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Jibum Kim   Editor

A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea Researching Recent Social and Political Trends

A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea

Jibum Kim Editor

A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea Researching Recent Social and Political Trends

Editor Jibum Kim Department of Sociology Sungkyunkwan University Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

ISBN 978-981-99-5828-3 ISBN 978-981-99-5829-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5829-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

Social science research, empirical or theoretical, is impossible without data. Data provides information, and information enables knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of theory and ultimately wisdom for social policy. Theory remains as speculation or ideology without thorough empirical verification. Social policies can secure validity and exert impact if they are supported by theories. From a comparative perspective, the importance of general social survey cannot be overemphasized. General social survey data provides a window for tracing social change, as well as a reference for international comparison. Although big data became a buzzword as digital economy enlarges, and platform society is ripened, the merits of traditional social survey data, such as representativeness secured by elaborate sampling, depth and accuracy of information, are not disappearing. Big and shallow data cannot easily replace the advantage of small but deep survey data. Looking back at the modern history of Korea, we find there were clear spirits of the times: Korea went through a period of rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s and a period of democratization after the 1980s. But Korea is now suffering from the paradox of affluence and the paradox of democratization. A red light has been lit on sustainability in Korea. Declining fertility rate, disintegration of families and communities, the paradox of affluence, severe trust deficits, and declining national competitiveness are negative signals for sustainability. Despite the continuous rise in the level of income as measured by GDP, the suicide rate of Korean is among the highest in the world, and people’s sense of well-being continues to decline. Although Koreans aspired for democracy and successfully entered the path of democratization, people’s cynicism toward politics reached a dangerous level. What is the problem? Sociological wisdom implies that development is not automatically achieved by economic growth alone. The most important challenges Korean society is now facing are not well captured by objective and hard statistics such as GDP. Although social aspects of the society, such as social capital, inclusion, trust, fairness, transparency, and responsibility, are getting more importance, official government-generated statistics do not include these soft but important indicators.

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It is very clear that neither further economic growth nor deepening of democracy is possible without the accumulation of ‘social capital’. The widening gap between economic performance of Korea and happiness of Koreans reveals that there is a serious problem in national well-being account. Political leaders all promised to enhance the ‘people’s happiness’, but there are no systematic efforts to measure the reality by collecting soft data. The Korea General Social Survey (KGSS), which started in 2003, has filled the gap and established itself as Korea’s representative general social survey that is internationally renowned. KGSS is a model of cooperative survey research harboring the nation-wide participation of professors and students from every corner of the country. Without the dedication and initiatives of Survey Research Center (SRC), Sungkyunkwan University, and the leadership of Prof. Jibum Kim, the accumulation of data over the past 18 years would not have been possible. KGSS is now a treasure of social science research in Korea. Thousands of articles and research papers have been published by utilizing KGSS data. Personally, one of the important facts I realized when participating in an international comparative joint study on social quality is that available general social survey data and a platform for sharing are one of the most important factors for understanding social quality. When I first started the study on the quality of society, I expected that it would be possible to compare various regions of the world. But I realized that without proper data showing the social aspects of a society, it is impossible to measure the social quality. Diverse issues related to social cohesion cannot be measured without proper data on transparency, institutional trust, solidarity among people, and belongingness. Diverse issues related with empowerment cannot be measured without data on political participation and efficacy, grievance, self-development, and flourishing. In this book, most productive leading scholars have contributed chapters on diverse and important issues, such as familism, gender role, religion, stratification and inequality, fairness, mobility and relative deprivation, welfare attitudes, personal and institutional trust, multiculturalism, nationalism, attitudes toward North Korea. All these topics are closely interconnected with the sustainability issue of Korea. As the KGSS covers recent decades, these chapters can be read as an archeology of modern Korean society. I hope this volume can contribute to the understanding of modern Korea, adding pivotal explanations on paradoxes of affluence and democracy. Jaeyeol Yee Department of Sociology Seoul National University Seoul, Korea (Republic of) [email protected]

Preface

Korea underwent a turbulent twentieth century, and the rapidity epitomized economic, political, social, and cultural transformations. After five hundred years (1392–1910) of the Chosun dynasty, known as the hermit kingdom to Westerners, Japanese colonization (1910–1945) ended the dynasty. The enjoyment of liberation from Japan was cut short by the Korean War (1950–1953), resulting in the division of Korea into the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). North Korea continues to be a communist country under the three-generation rule of the Kim family, with its relationship with South Korea oscillating between conflict and cooperation. In contrast, South Korea (hereafter Korea) held its first general election in 1948, establishing a democratic system. However, the democratization process was disrupted by the Korean War and two coup d’etat in 1961 and 1979 before procedural democracy was fully established in the 1987 general election. Two dominant forces that shaped modern Korea were economic development and democracy. President Park Chung-hee governed Korea under an authoritarian regime from 1961, by a coup d’etat, until his assassination in 1979. During his rule, he prioritized Korea’s export-oriented economy and spearheaded industrialization, leading to an economic miracle for the country. This resulted in remarkable growth in Korea’s GDP, from 158 US dollars in 1960 to 31,721 US dollars in 2020 (Worldbank 2023). The success of economic development during the latter half of the twentieth century came at the expense of a delayed transition to democracy. However, starting in 1988, Korea witnessed alternating political leadership between conservative and liberal presidents. Roh, Tae-Woo (1988–1993) and Kim, Young-Sam (1993–1998) served as conservative presidents for ten years, followed by two liberal presidents, Kim, DaeJung (1998–2003) and Roh, Moo-Hyun (2003–2008). This pattern continued with the election of two conservative presidents, Lee, Myung-Bak (2008–2013) and Park, Geun-Hye (2013–2016). Unfortunately, Park, Geun-hye, the first female president and daughter of Park, Chung-Hee, faced impeachment in 2017. Subsequently, liberal president Moon, Jae-in (2017–2022) assumed office, followed by conservative president Yoon, Suk-Yeol (2022- ). While Korea’s journey toward economic development

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and democracy has been largely successful, the country is currently grappling with mounting concerns regarding economic inequality and political polarization. Driven by rapid economic growth, Korea has profoundly transformed its cultural values, norms, and behaviors. Despite a longstanding tradition of Confucianism, traditional norms like patriarchal familism have gradually eroded, and efforts to promote gender equality have improved over time, although persistent debates and challenges remain in achieving full gender equality. Within this context, Korea faces a pressing challenge in the form of a sharp decline in the fertility rate, which currently stands as the lowest in the world. The total fertility rate stood at 4.53 in 1970, declined to 1.63 in 2000, and dropped to 0.84 in 2020 (OECD Family Database 2023). Another noteworthy example of cultural norm change in Korea was the increasing permissiveness of sexual attitudes toward premarital sex or homosexual relationships. According to the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), the percentage of Koreans who considered premarital sex to be always or almost always wrong decreased from 50% in 2008 to 25% in 2018. Similarly, those who believed homosexual relations were always or almost wrong dropped from 86% in 2008 to 63% in 2018. In the twenty-first century, marked by technological advancement, Koreans have experienced two fundamental aspects of societal change. Firstly, rather than merely consuming foreign influences, Korea actively contributes to global interconnectedness through the Korean Wave, such as artists like BTS, movies like Parasite, and TV shows like Squid Game. Secondly, Korean society has become multicultural, mainly due to the influx of marriage migrants. Despite this diversity, Koreans have been relatively slow in fully accommodating this new phenomenon due to the long-held belief in Korea’s homogeneous ethnic identity. Taking this context in mind, our goal is to bridge the knowledge gap surrounding contemporary Korean society. To achieve this, we present ‘A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea’, a comprehensive book that provides invaluable insights into Koreans’ values, attitudes, and behaviors over the past two decades. Esteemed Korean scholars have contributed to this edited book, utilizing the rich data from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS). This edited book covers many topics to explore Korea’s recent changes and continuities: national identity, immigration, religion, gender roles, familism, family values, stratification, work, trust, social fairness, social welfare, and attitudes toward North Korea. These issues have continuously influenced the lives of Koreans and warrant deeper examination to gain a comprehensive understanding of Korean society. Each chapter in this book provides readers with background information on the subject matter, followed by, for some chapters, a comparison of Korean attitudes to those of other countries, using cross-national data from reputable sources, such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or East Asian Social Survey (EASS). Then, the chapter explores trends in stability or change regarding these attitudes. While the book does not cover every exciting topic, we aim to create an indispensable reference for undergraduates, graduates, and scholars seeking to

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understand the fundamental facts about the changes and continuities in contemporary Korean society. Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

Jibum Kim

References Worldbank, 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR. OECD Family Database, 2023. https://www.oecd.org/social/family/SF_2_1_Fertility_rates.pdf.

Acknowledgments

The KGSS is a remarkable collaborative endeavor to create academic social science data. Its founder, Honorary Professor Seok, Hyunho, successfully established a consortium to collect the KGSS. Over the course of 2003 to 2018, a total of 116 professors and 2,797 student interviewers from 66 universities across Korea dedicated their efforts to gathering the KGSS data. It is impossible to fully acknowledge their unwavering commitment and invaluable contributions to the KGSS project. The groundbreaking impact of the KGSS on social science research would not have been possible without the generous financial support from the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A3A2A03096777), Sungkyunkwan University, and numerous researchers. Their support has played a crucial role in developing and continuing the KGSS. In addition, I would like to dedicate this edited book to Tom W. Smith, the former General Social Survey (GSS) director. I worked with him at NORC at the University of Chicago since 2000, before transitioning to working on the KGSS at Sungkyunkwan University in 2013. Throughout our collaboration, Tom W. Smith instilled in me a deep passion for producing high-quality data collection and conducting rigorous research on survey methods. His mentorship has been invaluable, and I am grateful for the knowledge and inspiration he has imparted to me. This dedication is a testament to his influential role in shaping my professional journey. I am deeply indebted to the chapter authors for their steadfast support and cooperation. They have made this edited book a reality. With their valuable contributions, completing this project was a manageable task. Lastly, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Alexandra Campbell and Arumugam Deivasigamani for their vital guidance and relentless patience while completing this edited book.

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Contents

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Democracy and National Identity in South Korea After 1987 . . . . . . Jaesok Son

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Living Together with Unease—Koreans’ Perception of and Attitudes Toward Immigrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Seokho Kim and So Hyun Park

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Religious Landscape in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jibum Kim and Sori Kim

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Trends in Gender Role Attitudes in South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soo-Yeon Yoon

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Familism in South Korea, 2006–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phil-Suk Kim and Yun-Suk Lee

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Family-Related Values in South Korea: Temporal Changes and Cross-National Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Bongoh Kye

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Stratification and Economic Inequality in South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . 139 ChangHwan Kim

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Embedded Economy and Work: Expectations and Fulfillments Before and After 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Jae-Mahn Shim and Heijin Oh

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Interpersonal Trust and Its Associations with Respondents’ Community Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Jeong-han Kang and Eehyun Kim

10 Changing Perceptions of Societal Trust Among Koreans: Relative Deprivation, Downward Mobility, and Sociotropic Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Harris Hyun-Soo Kim

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11 Social Welfare Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Dong-Kyun Im 12 South Koreans’ Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification, 2003–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Shang E. Ha The Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Chapter 1

Democracy and National Identity in South Korea After 1987 Jaesok Son

Abstract Jaesok Son traces how South Koreans’ sense of national identity has changed over decades. South Koreans’ national identity used to mean mainly ethnicity vis-à-vis Japanese, Chinese, Russians, and Americans. In recent decades, there are signs indicating that non-ethnic elements, such as citizens’ rights and duties, are becoming increasingly more important as bases of national identity over time. He argues democratization in South Korea is one of the key social processes behind this shift, and he supports and illustrates his argument by reviewing various social trends and by discussing a public controversy that changed the citizenship law in 2005. This change in national identity has potentially significant implications. When South Koreans think of themselves in terms of civic values and institutions more than ancestry and history, and when they see North Korea as an undemocratic and underdeveloped country, their motivations and reasons for unification are likely to weaken. It can also result in an exclusionary immigration policy even toward those co-ethnic migrants from China and North Korea. Keywords National identity · Nationalism · Democracy · Citizenship · Civic duties and rights

1 Introduction We live in a globalized world. Globalization, however, has not weakened nationalism, and national identities still affect people’s interactions and relationships. They can also shape important government policies—such as those related to foreign relations, immigration, and responses to the pandemic—by including some people while excluding others. National identity has taken on special importance on the Korean Peninsula because Korea has been divided since 1945. Any changes in national identity may affect whether the two Koreas will unify in the future and how reunification may proceed. Even when we consider South Korea alone, the low fertility rate and J. Son (B) NORC at the University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Kim (ed.), A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5829-0_1

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increasingly aging population raise questions about whether immigration should be expanded. At a quick glance, public surveys do not seem to indicate drastic changes in national identity over the past few decades in South Korea. Yet, when we look into the trends more closely, there are signs that suggest national identity may have changed in some respects. For example, while most South Koreans agree that they need to unify with the North, their enthusiasm has declined (Kim et al., 2019). Unfavorable sentiments toward co-ethnic migrants from China and North Korea are growing steadily (Kang, 2015). At the same time, the growing number of South Koreans think of “being truly Korean” based on criteria other than ancestry or ethnicity, such as citizenship and civic values (Kim et al., 2019). This change becomes more interesting when we consider the fact that South Korea is one of the most racially and ethnically homogenous countries in the world. The population of foreign nationalities is often used as an estimate of non-ethnic Koreans1 and it passed the 3% mark only in 2017 (Korea Immigration Service, 2017). South Koreans take this ethnic homogeneity as a unique national characteristic and a basis of national unity. Ethnic pride is high in South Korea, and it is easy to see or hear references to it in everyday life, schools, the media, and online discussions. Why are the civic criteria of “Korean-ness” becoming more important in an ethnically nationalistic country like South Korea? What implication does this have for Korea? This chapter examines changing national identity in South Korea by focusing on the impact of the democratic transition after 1987. While investigating the South Korean case, I discuss the broader issue of whether democracy promotes nationalism and national identity. I argue that the democratization of sociopolitical institutions played a key role in people becoming more aware of their citizenship by raising the importance of civic values such as citizens’ rights and duties. Civic qualities can increase solidarity among members through participation and by creating a sense of entitlement and belonging to the nation. Yet, this same logic can work to change the definition of “us” and exclude “others.” Through this process, democratization can redefine national identity based more on civic qualifications than ethnicity. In the following sections, I first discuss the existing literature on national identity and citizenship, and argue that democracy strengthens the civic aspect of national identity. This theoretical discussion is followed by a brief historical background on nationalism under the authoritarian state in South Korea before 1987. The focus of this chapter, however, is the period after 1987 when democracy began to progress in South Korea. Using the survey data available, I show the growing importance of civic qualities in national identity (Shin, 2006) while the ethnic aspect is not changing much. In an analysis of attitudes toward North Korea, co-ethnic migrants from China and North Korea, and social policies, I find evidence that the importance of ethnicity may actually be waning while civic values are gaining ground. To illustrate the changing notion of national identity, I present a public debate in the early 2000s over 1

This measure includes residents of foreign nationalities who are registered at the Immigration Office with the intention of staying in South Korea long term. Because this includes those ethnic Koreans of foreign nationalities, the percentage of non-ethnic Koreans is likely even smaller.

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military draft evasion among sons from affluent families, which resulted in revising laws related to conscription, nationality, and privileges of co-ethnics living abroad. I discuss how this episode shows the changing notion of ethnicity and the growing importance of citizens’ duties in national identity.

2 Democracy and Nationalism What impact does democratization have on nationalism and national identity? Studies of nationalism and democracy have been interested in the question of how nationalism affects democracy as political elites try to mobilize people (Breuilly, 1982; Calhoun, 2007; Giddens, 1987; Mann, 1993; Tilly, 1998), and concerned with threats nationalism poses to democracy, such as the mass violence it can trigger (Hutcheson, 2017; Mann, 2005) and the exclusion of minority groups (Mudde, 2004; Rydgren, 2008). Does this conversely mean democracy can weaken exclusive nationalism and promote peaceful and inclusive nationalism? It is not easy to find studies that explicitly address how democratization affects nationalism because studies often treat democracy as part of modernization, nation-state formation, and nationalism, without disentangling their relations or considering alternative cases (Chernilo, 2011; Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). Some studies (e.g., Ipperciel, 2007) suggest democracy generally promotes inclusive, civilized nationalism. Yet, history also shows democracy is not a guarantor of inclusion and civility. The recent rise of right-wing, populist nationalism in the West (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007) incites hatred and violence against minorities and immigrants. Studies of democracy and civil society in Western Europe and North America still provide some clues to the question of how democracy may affect nationalism in some cases such as South Korea. Because the national state is the most important aspect of democracy, we focus on the type of the state and the relation between the state and society. An authoritarian state makes the social environment easier for state-led, totalitarian nationalism to grow. It typically suppresses the public sphere and civil society, which results in weak development of intermediary institutions between the state and the people. Society is not fragmented by segmental or sectional interest groups as in a democratic country, creating a “mass society” where the majority of the population shares similar interests and identities (Kornhauser, 1959), and social ties between various groups are absent (Putnam, 2000; Warren, 2001). In this situation, political elites have an easier time mobilizing the masses under their leadership using a sweeping, broad totalitarian ideology that groups the majority of the people into a single, homogeneous category and forces individuals to sacrifice for the state while suppressing different opinions. The state can resolve the legitimacy issue by portraying itself as the only route to achieving national missions such as national prosperity (Tudor & Slater, 2020). Nationalism can create national identity by setting a membership boundary between “us” and “others.” As many studies of collective action have pointed out (e.g., Johnston, 1994; Polletta & Jasper, 2001), collective identity is one of the most

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crucial components of mass mobilization. National identity can be promoted by emphasizing commonness and solidarity among members. The state may lead nationalism by selectively highlighting certain symbols, heroes, and events in history of ethnic majority according to its political purpose, and imposes its version of nationalism on the whole country (Tilly, 1998). An authoritarian state often focuses on the membership boundary and excluding “others.” History shows blaming ethnic minorities and immigrants for the problems an ethnic majority is experiencing, such as in the case of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany (Mann, 2005), can be a powerful way for political elites to mobilize people. Membership boundaries may be also drawn based more on values and institutions than ethnicity. National hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was deeply related to anticommunism and anti-capitalism on each side, although it had some roots in history and ethnic relations as well (Vujacic, 2007). What happens to nationalism if the state becomes more liberal and democratic? Democratic state-society relationships are more balanced and reciprocal, which helps increase a sense of belonging and entitlement. This further contributes to strengthening national identity. Civic participation promotes a sense of community and solidarity among people (Bellah, 1985; Warren, 2001) and helps them form “the imagined community of the nation” (Anderson, 2006) with people living far away from their locality (Skocpol, 2003). The increased government responsiveness to citizens’ demands in democracy also helps raise a sense of ownership and entitlement among people, not just at the formal level but also at the substantive level. People expect the state to provide basic assistance when they are in need, as a member of the national community (Marshall & Bottomore, 1950; Turner, 2001). They feel they are entitled to enjoy rights as citizens, not necessarily based on heritage or ethnicity. This sense of entitlement comes from the notion of deservingness, that they have fulfilled their duties as citizens such as paying taxes and serving in the military (Bloemraad et al., 2019). In democracy, nationalism is no longer an ideology dominated only by political elites—it can also be a bottom-up mobilization, thanks to the expansion of civil society and the public sphere. Democracy means more power sharing between elites and the people (Welzel, 2019). A liberal state institutionalizes a free and fair election system where citizens can choose their leaders. The state guarantees basic political and civil rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly, which expands the public sphere and civil society. In the public sphere, people exchange views on issues, and political leaders compete with one another to gain more public support (Habermas, 1989). On the one hand, vibrant civil society usually creates cross-cutting identities and interests, which makes large-scale collective action more difficult (Kornhauser, 1959). Yet, the development of civil society enables civic groups to participate in civic and national issues, demanding that the state resolve grievances or take on certain policies (Hall, 1995; Skocpol, 2003). Thus, democracy is likely to promote national identity based on democratic institutions and civic values through civic participation. Does this mean democracy will promote “good nationalism” that is more inclusive to “others” and tolerant to diversity? Democratization can potentially shake up the meaning of national identity and

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shift its boundary on the civic dimension. By expanding citizens’ rights and sensitizing duties, democratization raises questions about who “the people” are, pushing people to rethink the concept. Should people be eligible to receive welfare benefits even if they have been evading taxes? Should citizens be prioritized over immigrants in vaccination during a pandemic? The redefinition of national identity and the redrawing of its boundary inevitably involves including some people while excluding others—whether the bases of this are ethnic or civic qualities. An authoritarian state often uses nationalism to exclude minorities or justify aggressiveness toward foreign countries as a form of political legitimation (Brown, 1999). In democracy, it may also be the people, not just the state, who mobilizes an exclusionary version of nationalism, and it does not have to be on the basis of ethnic qualities. A failure to practice civic values and follow rules becomes a legitimate basis of exclusion from the national membership when a sense of entitlement has heightened. They expect the state not just to serve them, but it also prioritizes serving them over “others” such as immigrants and foreigners (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). Just as an authoritarian state excludes certain groups for political reasons, the citizens of a democratic country may try to make clear distinctions from other groups (Bourdieu, 1984) to limit access to resources by others. The existing studies then suggest national identity may not weaken in democracy, and it may thrive on the contrary. However, they also suggest that democracy can highlight the civic basis of national identity which can be also used as a basis of excluding some groups. I will demonstrate these points using the case of South Korea’s democratization history.

3 South Korea Before 1987: A Brief Overview South Korea shows how democratization may change national identity. This case has an advantage in studying national identity and democratization because it has a relatively clear point in history that divides the periods before democratization and after democratization started in 1987. In Western Europe, the emergence of the modern nation-state and democratization often occurred together, making it difficult to separate the impact of democratization on national identity. This chapter focuses on the period after 1987 when democratization began. To understand the current trends in national identity in South Korea, however, we briefly go over its modern history after 1945 to get a sense of how the authoritarian state used nationalism for its rule before democratization began in 1987. Korea went through a tumultuous history in the twentieth century, manipulated by foreign powers and international conflicts, which resulted in the establishment of an ethnically nationalistic country after World War II. The widely accepted historical narrative traces the roots of Korea back to a dynasty that existed 5,000 years ago and emphasizes that Koreans have remained mostly a single people in history, sharing the same language and culture. In modern history, the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula between 1909 and 1945 played a decisive role in making Koreans

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very conscious of their ethnicity-based national identity. Although Korea restored its independence at the end of World War II, it became immediately divided into South and North Korea by foreign powers and it remains divided today. This unwanted division served as a source of continuous ethnic nationalism that made reunification a sacred national mission. The first modern republic was founded in South Korea in August 1948 and a socialist state was formed in the North within a month. Rhee Syngman, the first South Korean president, ruled for 11 years by arbitrarily revising the Constitution, but he was eventually ousted by the April Uprising of 1959. In this political chaos, General Park Chung-Hee seized power by coup d’état in 1960 and ruled until he was assassinated in 1979. Another power transition period brought another military coup led by Chun Doo-Hwan. He stayed in presidency through 1987 when the June Uprising forced the regime to agree to revise the Constitution, which finally started the democratization process in the country (Son, 2022). All three authoritarian regimes used nationalism to legitimize their rule as the only way to save the nation from poverty. They suppressed political and civil rights while ignoring social rights. Nationalism was used as a political ideology that justified limited rights while obligating citizens to endure hardships to achieve a better future for the Korean nation. The two military regimes oppressed democratic discussions about government policies because they were “wasteful” and “inefficient” in the process of “modernizing” the country by creating unnecessary chaos and disunity (Kim, 2013; Kwag, 2018). Workers were “the industrial army” at the international economic warfront, and they had to accept long work hours and low wages for the growth of national economy (Koo, 2001). Individuals were urged to integrate themselves with the nation and put the national interest above their own interests and views (Kim, 2010). The authoritarian state in the South set unification with North Korea as a sacred national goal. The communists in the North were the enemy of the entire Korean people because they relied on foreign powers like the Soviet Union and China and even started the Korean War against the same Koreans in the South. The South had a responsibility to rescue the people in the North from this communist dictatorship to form one country again. In order to beat communism in the North, economic prosperity was the best strategy (Jeon, 1999). Individual sacrifice for economic development, then, could benefit the whole nation by bringing prosperity and national reunification. Anti-communism was used not only in confrontations against the North, but also in restricting citizens’ rights in the South. South Korea was supposedly a free, democratic country unlike the North, but, in reality, citizens had political and civil rights not far better than those living in the communist North. The notorious AntiCommunism Law and National Security Law in the South could frame just about any political activity or expression as conduct benefiting “the enemy” (i.e., North Korea), providing legal grounds for brutally punishing political dissidents without proper legal process (Cho, 1997). While political and civil rights were severely restricted, social rights were almost entirely neglected (Jo, 2008). There was no universal health insurance, and old age

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pensions were available only for government employees, military personnel, and teachers (Kang, 2006). Insurances for industrial accidents and unemployment were unavailable to the vast majority of workers, and poverty relief was offered only to extreme cases that could not expect any family support (Yoon, 2018). The social safety net, including healthcare insurance, was finally revamped and instituted in the early 2000s during an economic recession in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1998 (Lee, 2016). Until then, the state from the 1960s through 1980s focused on economic development rather than redistribution. In summary, the authoritarian state in South Korea used nationalism to suppress opposition and legitimate its rule. It emphasized national unity and individual sacrifice. How were these nationalist discourses of the authoritarian state accepted among the people? Unfortunately, it is difficult to analyze systematically how state-led nationalism shaped national identity among ordinary people, because public surveys were still rare and freedom of the press was limited during this period. Nevertheless, the historical context suggests that the state was something to be feared for most people during this period, not something they could participate or rely on. For this reason, political and civic institutions probably carried importance mostly in a negative way (i.e., fearing state repression), while ancestry and history were still a strong basis of national identity during this period (Campbell, 2015; Shin, 2006). Although South Koreans might have taken pride in their history and culture, before democratization in 1987, they thought of their present country as still underdeveloped in many respects compared to advanced Western countries (Oh, 2019).

4 Sources and Analytic Strategies National identity (and nationalism) is often divided into two types based on membership criteria: ethnic national identity and civic national identity (Kohn, 1944; Smith, 1998). Ethnic national identity emphasizes commonly “ascribed” characteristics among members such as ethnicity, ancestry, and history. Based on ethnic criteria, membership is determined at birth and there is not much room to accommodate new members. Civic national identity, on the other hand, focuses on membership qualifications people can achieve with “voluntary” efforts, such as accepting traditions, abiding laws, and respecting civic and political institutions. Membership based on civic criteria is often considered open and inclusive. As many scholars have pointed out (e.g., Brubaker, 2004; Yack, 1996), these two categories are not mutually exclusive and the line between ethnic and civic qualities is unclear in reality. Traditions may be described as both ethnic and civic while ethnic minorities may be excluded based on civic qualities rather than ethnicity per se. Despite such limitations in this binary typology, I use the ethnic-civic dimension here because it is widely used and its (over-)simplification still provides some insight in the analysis of national identity. I mainly use the Korean General Survey (KGSS), 2003–2018, to trace trends in national identity (Kim et al., 2019) which participated in the International Social

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Survey Programme (ISSP) survey about national identity as well as citizenship and the role of the government. I use two additional survey data to complement KGSS/ ISSP: the World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart et al., 2016), another internationally collaborative survey, and the National Identity Survey (NIS) (Kang, 2005, 2010, 2015), a Korea-only survey. National identity is a difficult concept to measure, and there are practically no survey questions related to national identity before the 1990s. National pride, on the other hand, has been asked about in various surveys at least since 1982 when Korea started to participate in the WVS. This is the closest alternative measure to national identity, but pride in one’s national identity is not the same as national identity. Because measures of national identity and national pride generally show positive correlations,2 national pride will be used as a proxy for national identity in this study for some years. In this chapter, I present four analyses to support the argument. Using the survey data, I will first show that the trends indicate the importance of civic, rather than ethnic, elements is growing in South Korean national identity. National identity can tell us more when we examine its intergroup relations. Among “other” groups important to South Koreans, I choose co-ethnic migrants from China and North Korea. Although these groups share the same ethnicity with South Koreans, their living situations and lifestyles are substantially different. Thus, South Koreans’ attitudes toward them can reveal which type of national identity is more important. To support the argument that democratization was one of the main factors drove this change, I check correlations between the measures of citizens’ rights and obligations and national identity. Finally, I present a historical case in which a public debate over conscription and nationality led to amending the related laws. This case illustrates how democratization can promote civic national identity by strengthening a sense of citizens’ rights and duties.

5 Trends in National Identity: Rising Civic Basis History suggests South Koreans probably had a strong sense of ethnic national identity by the end of the 1980s, after the experience of the Japanese occupation and the nationalist mobilization for economic growth by the military regimes (Shin, 2006). While this does not necessarily mean the civic type of national identity was unimportant, the ethnic aspect was a prominent characteristic of Korean national identity. Was there any change in national identity after 1987 when the democratization process began? Recent studies (e.g., Campbell, 2015) argue that ethnic nationalism is declining in South Korea while the civic type is rising. This section examines how national identity changed in South Korea after 1987 using survey data. These trends suggest that people treat civic qualifications of The correlation between pride and the mean of the seven identity measures in the KGSS is r = 0.367 (p < 0.01).

2

1 Democracy and National Identity in South Korea After 1987

9

national identity more importantly than before, while the importance of ethnic criteria is not changing much. I first go over general trends in national pride using public survey data to show the rising importance of civic qualities in national identity. Because national identity can often be revealed by exploring the boundaries of identity, we also discuss how people feel toward other national groups or immigrants. Finally, I present the results of correlation analysis between national pride and the indicators of rights and obligations as citizens.

5.1 Trends in Ethnic and Civic National Identity One of the earliest attempts to measure national pride in South Korea was the WVS. In 1982, almost half of the respondents were “very proud” of their nationality and 31.2% were “quite proud”—equating to roughly 80% feeling some degree of pride. The percentage of proud people remained at around 80% until 2001, and then it increased to 88.7% in 2005 and to 90.9% in 2010. The KGSS started to ask a similar question in 2003 with the same scale. It also shows the percentage of people having some pride increased from 75.6% in 2003 to 87.3% in 2010. The KGSS goes beyond 2010 and national pride mostly stayed at around 85%, although it decreased to a level below 80% in 2014 and 2016. Based on national pride, we can infer that people have become more conscious of their national identity, and more likely to see it in a positive light, since 1987. A more direct measure of national identity can be found in the NIS, which asked how close they felt to Korean citizens. In 2005, around 77% said they felt either “Very close” or “Somewhat close.” This percentage rose to 83.8% in 2010 and 85.3% in 2015. The survey also asked a similar question with a slightly different wording— about feeling close to Korean people. A close feeling was expressed among 63.9% in 2005, which increased mildly to 67.6% in 2010 and 70.1% in 2015. These results indicate that the feeling toward ethnic Koreans is generally weaker than toward Korean citizens, suggesting that participants care more about the civic aspect of national identity than the ethnic side. To explore more trends, we turn to other measures in the NIS. The NIS started asking questions about the important criteria for one to be considered as a member of the country in 2005. The eight criteria include ancestry, birthplace, residency, citizenship status, language, religion, respecting laws, and subjective feeling. Sharing ancestry and respecting laws are considered prototypical elements of ethnic and civic national identity, respectively (Kunovich, 2009), but other elements are less straightforward. Here, language and religion are treated as “ethnic” aspects, while citizenship as “civic” elements. Birthplace and residency are usually treated as “ethnic” criteria, but they require some caution in interpretation. We go over the ethnic criteria of national identity first (Fig. 1). In 2005, 36.7% of the respondents thought having Korean ancestry was “Very important”, which dropped slightly to 33.3% in 2010, but it rose back to 37.8%. in 2015. The percentage of “Very important” responses to the question about Korean language were stable at

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60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 2005 Korean ancestry

2010 Korean history & traditions

2015 Korean language

Fig. 1 The percentage of people responding “Very important” to ethnic elements of national identity. Source National Identity Survey. Notes The question asked how important each of these items is for being truly Korean. Four response options were offered: “Very important,” “Fairly important,” “Not very important,” and “Not important at all”

around 43% for a decade. On the question about the importance of understanding Korean history and following Korean traditions, the “Very important” response decreased from 34.4% in 2005 to 30.7% in 2010, rose back to 32.6% in 2015. These trends suggest the importance of ethnocultural qualities is not changing much—some measures fluctuated or increased slightly while others remained stable. The civic criteria of national identity, on the other hand, show more noticeable changes (Fig. 2). Respecting political institutions and laws in the country is an important indicator of the civic aspect of national identity. The NIS shows the importance of such respect steadily rose from 27.3% in 2005 to 30.9% in 2010 and further up to 40.6% in 2015. Those who treat citizenship as “Very important” were stable at around 47% in 2005 and 2010, and then increased to 54.2% in 2015. Birthplace and residency are often considered as indicators of ethnic national identity (Fig. 3). Trends in the importance of both qualifications are on the rise. 39.4% thought having been born in South Korea was “Very important” in 2005 and 2010, and then increased to 43.1% in 2015. The importance of living most of life in South Korea shows a steady increase: 25.4% in 2005, 31.5% in 2010, and 36.1% in 2015. Because South Korea is an ethnically homogenous country, these measures may also imply open membership based on territoriality, i.e., anybody born or who lived long enough in Korea are “true Koreans” regardless of their ethnicity. Although it is unclear that they had such an inclusive attitude, the rising importance of the civic criteria shown in other measures while the importance of ancestry staying at the similar level, suggests birthplace and residency may reflect the rising trends of a non-ethnic notion of national identity.

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60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 2005

2010

2015

Respect for political institutions and laws

Citizenship

Fig. 2 The percentage of people responding “Very important” to civic elements of national identity. Notes Please refer to notes for Fig. 1 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 2005

2010 Birthplace

2015 Length of residence

Fig. 3 The percentage of people responding “Very important” to birthplace and the length of residence in Korea (%). Notes Please refer to notes for Fig. 1

The NIS adopted these questions about national identity from the KGSS/ISSP. The ISSP started asking them about in 1995, but South Korea’s data are available only from 2003 onward. The KGSS trends of these measures fluctuate over time somewhat widely which makes it hard to see the clear directions of trends. Overall, we see trends similar to the NIS: more increases in the importance of civic criteria than ethnic ones. For example, the proportion of people who treated ancestry as a very important qualification slid from 36.8% in 2003 to 31.9% in 2010 but rose back to 39.3% in 2013. The importance of language started at 51.0% in 2003 but dipped to 45.1%,

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and then jumped back to 53.9% in 2013. On the other hand, those who considered respect for political institutions and laws as a very important criterion increased from 28.9% in 2003 to 40.0% in 2010 and then decreased to 32.4% in 2013KGSS/ISSP also asked about the importance of subjective feeling Korean, which is a voluntary element of national identity and often grouped together with civic criteria. It grew slightly from 57.1% in 2003 to 60.0% in 2010, and to 61.1% in 2013.

5.2 Immigration and National Identity Overall, ethnic and cultural aspects of national identity have been fairly stable in importance while civic qualifications are gaining importance in national identity. Does the growing importance of civic criteria mean South Koreans are becoming more open and inclusive about their national identity? The trends that we have seen so far are about the constitutive elements of national identity. The picture gets little more complicated, however, when we examine measures that focus on the boundaries of national identity, the relationship to “other” peoples. As South Korea began to attract international migrants in the 1990s, the issue of multiculturalism and immigration grew bigger. The KGSS/ISSP asked a series of questions about attitudes toward immigrants in selected areas, and some questions presented statements about immigrants. Overall, trends show that people have increasingly negative opinions toward immigrants, while the positive image of immigrants is not expanding. For example, approximately half of South Koreans thought immigrants were beneficial to economy in 2010 and 2013. Only 5.0% agreed strongly with the statement that immigrants are taking away jobs from native-born citizens in 2003, and this did not change much (4.3%) in 2013. In terms of the statement that immigrants raise crime rates, only 6.8% agreed strongly in 2003, but this increased to 11.4% in 2013. The percentage of those who agreed moderately to this statement soared from 26.2% in 2003 to 42.1% within a decade. One interesting thing to note about the immigration situation in South Korea is that the single largest immigrant group is actually ethnically Korean migrants from China, constituting approximately a third of the whole international migrant population in the country (Korea Immigration Service, 2017). Thus, this negative sentiment toward immigrants is related, in large part, to those Korean-Chinese migrants. In fact, there have been concerns about growing negative sentiments toward these coethnic migrants (Kim, 2018), which provide further evidence that ethnicity is losing importance compared to civic and cultural bases in South Koreans’ national identity.

5.3 North Korea Any discussion of South Korean national identity will be incomplete without factoring in North Korea. South Koreans’ attitude toward the North is ambivalent.

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13

North and South Korea existed as one country for a long time, and the North remains a viable partner for reunification with the South. On the other hand, North Korea has an undemocratic political system, a poor economy, and culture isolated from global trends, which are all characteristically different from those of contemporary South Korea. North Korea’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles have created a military tension on the Peninsula since the 2000s. Despite these differences and circumstance, if South Koreans still show favorable attitudes toward North Korea, it can be interpreted as a sign of strong ethnic national identity. The trends generally indicate South Korean’s identification with North is weakening, especially among younger generations (Chap. 12 of this volume). We first check trends at the broad, macro level to see if there are any indications that ethnic nationalism is growing. The unification of South and North Korea has long been treated as a sacred national mission. The KGSS asks people whether they thought unification was necessary, and almost 80% of the respondents thought it was necessary to some degree in 2003 (Fig. 3 in Chap. 12). The trend hit the lowest point at near 70% in 2011 in the midst of a crisis over the North’s nuclear program, and rebounded to almost 75% by 2018 when the inter-Korea summit eased the tension. Despite these fluctuations, the majority of South Koreans have always agreed unification is necessary which suggests their ethnic identification with the North is holding up. Nevertheless, such necessity may arise out of a political reality on the Peninsula or a hope to avoid war rather than ethnic national identity. Studies show that South Koreans tend to support unification in recent years because of “practical” reasons rather than identification with North Koreans (Jeon, 2012; Jung et al., 2019). Increasingly, people choose reducing military tension as the reason why they think unification is necessary, while the choice of common ethnicity as the reason is declining. “Practical” reasons are arguably closer to the civic type than the ethnic type of national identity. Baek (2016) finds that unification is supported mostly among those who are strong on civic national identity, whereas ethnic national identity does not matter much. Unification is a macro-level issue that involves complicated political and military considerations, which may not reflect South Koreans’ feelings toward North Korean people at the individual level. It becomes more apparent that South Koreans have mixed feelings toward their fellow co-ethnics at the micro level. On the KGSS question that asked whether they felt close to, or distant from, migrants (“defectors”) from North Korea, South Koreans were almost evenly split. While almost half expressed some degree of closeness consistently from 2011 through 2014, the other half felt some distance from North Korean migrants. The NIS found similar results when they asked how people felt toward co-ethnics. 70.6% in 2010 and 67.1% in 2015 regarded North Korean migrants as South Korean citizens rather than some “other” people. In comparison, 60.0% felt that Korean-Chinese migrants were South Koreans in 2010, and the percentage plunged to 45.6% in 2015. These trends suggest the positive feeling toward co-ethnic migrants is waning somewhat. The trends also indicate South Koreans’ attitudes toward co-ethnic migrants are not any more positive than those toward non-ethnic Koreans. For instance, marrying a

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North Korean was an idea positively received among 36.3% of the respondents in the 2010 KGSS. Similarly, 32.3% were open to the idea of having an ethnic Korean from China as a spouse. These attitudes toward co-ethnics are comparable to those toward Americans: 35.5% responded favorably to a possibility of having an American as their spouse. When the KGSS asked people which country they felt closest among the five neighboring countries (Fig. 2 in Chap. 12), the United States has always been selected as the closest country by far in KGSS since 2003 while North Korea is a distance second or third. The decreasing positive attitudes toward co-ethnic migrants from North Korea and China indicate the relatively weakening importance of the ethnic sense of national identity. These trends support the previous analysis that the civic elements of national identity are gaining more importance while the importance of ethnic criteria remains stable. Why is national identity changing in South Korea? Why are civic qualities becoming important criteria of South Korean national identity? While there are many social processes, such as globalization, involved in this change, I highlight the role of democratization here. I argue democratization played an important role in raising the importance of civic qualities in South Korean national identity. Democratization itself is a convoluted process unfolding at multiple levels. In the following section, I examine whether citizens’ rights and duties that were expanded after 1987 show correlations with national identity.

6 National Pride and Citizens’ Rights and Duties Democratization brings many changes at various levels and in a wide range of institutions. One of the most profound and observable changes includes the expansion of citizens’ rights. If democratization promotes national identity, measures of rights will show significant correlations with proxies of national identity. Citizens’ rights are usually divided into three rights: political, civil, and social rights (Turner, 2001). The core of political rights is the right to vote for political leaders. Civil rights include freedom of expression and assembly. Social rights are the right to have a decent standard of living, which is closely related to welfare policies. Here, I focus only on social rights (and obligations). These indicators are all from the KGSS/ISSP, which asked questions related to various citizens’ rights in 2006 and 2016. There are four measures of social rights: the government’s responsibility in providing healthcare, old-age security, assisting the unemployed, and reducing income inequality. Unfortunately, because these questions were not asked together with the questions related to national identity in the same survey years, I use national pride as a proxy of national identity and examine the correlations between national pride and social rights at these two time points. For obligation measures, I use three items from the ISSP Citizenship module in 2004 and 2014: the importance of voting, the importance of never trying to evade taxes, and the importance of obeying laws. These three items are some of the civic duties frequently mentioned in public discourse.

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Table 1 presents the correelations between measures. In 2006, national pride was significantly correlated with the government’s responsibility to provide healthcare and old-age security, but not with assisting the unemployed, and reducing income inequality. People who think it was the government’s responsibility to provide support in these two areas were more likely to feel stronger national pride. In 2016, public healthcare remained significantly correlated but not old-age security and assisting the unemployed. This time, however, national pride was also correlated with reducing income inequality. Interestingly, the direction of correlations reversed in 2016. Those who thought healthcare was a responsibility of individuals rather than the government tended to have greater national pride. National pride was also stronger among those who thought reducing the income gap was an individual responsibility. While correlations between the measures of social rights and national pride are inconsistent, measures of citizens’ obligations (the importance of voting, paying taxes, and obeying laws) became more strongly correlated with national pride. In Table 1 Correlations between national pride and rights and duties A. Citizens’ Rights 2006

Pride

Healthcare

0.072**

Healthcare

Senior

Unemployed

Senior

0.099***

0.465***

Unemployed

0.048

0.261***

0.301***

Inequality

−0.031

0.182***

0.269***

0.371***

Healthcare

Senior

Unemployed

2016

Pride

Healthcare

−0.066*

Senior

0.013

0.499***

Unemployed

−0.037

0.302***

0.436***

Inequality

−0.100**

0.239***

0.297***

Voting

Paying taxes

0.429***

B. Citizens’ Duties 2004

Pride

Voting

−0.097**

Paying taxes

−0.031

0.432***

Obeying laws

−0.005

0.333***

0.503***

2014

Pride

Voting

Paying taxes

Voting

−0.154***

Paying taxes

−0.079**

0.521***

Obeying laws

−0.137***

0.429***

0.684***

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Source KGSS/ISSP. Indicator of national pride: how proud the respondent was of being Korean (4-point scale from “Very proud” to “Not proud at all”). Indicators of rights: whether it should be the government’s responsibility to provide healthcare and a decent standard of living for the old and for the unemployed (4-point scale from “Definitely should be” to “Definitely should not be”). Indicators of duties: how important it is to vote, never try to evade taxes, and obey laws (7-point scale from “Not at all important” to “Very important”)

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2004, the importance of voting was the only obligation measure that significantly correlated with national pride. Those who thought voting was important were more likely to feel proud of South Korea than those who cared less about voting. Ten years later, however, things changed. While national pride remained significantly correlated with the importance of voting in 2014, it also became significantly correlated with never trying to evade taxes and obeying laws. Those who thought not evading taxes was important were more likely to feel stronger national pride. Similarly, national pride was higher among people who treated obeying laws as important. Citizen duties became more strongly correlated with national pride over time. For example, the importance of voting was 1.6 times more strongly correlated in 2014 (r = − 0.154) than 2004 (r = −0.097). Overall, national pride is correlated with citizens’ sense of rights and duties, but it is more clearly correlated with citizens’ obligations and its correlation is getting stronger. We need further research to understand these patterns, but here I point out that rights and obligations are two sides of the same coin. Citizens became more aware of their duties, thanks in part to the expansion of rights. More freedom of speech and political participation allowed public criticism against tax evasion among the upper-class families, which, in turn, helped create a social environment that takes citizens’ duties seriously. What can the correlations of national pride with citizens’ rights and duties tell us about democratization and national identity? How is this relevant to the trends in national identity we discussed earlier? I argue that the strengthening correlation between indicators of citizen obligations and national pride is a result of the growing importance of civic qualities in South Korean national identity.3 Democratized institutions in South Korea became an important basis of national pride after 1987, and pride should also have heightened a positive sense of national identity. To better understand what happened to national identity in South Korea after democracy took off in 1987, I present one example of how democratization promoted a civic sense of national identity in the following section. The case I discuss is a public debate over the military conscription law in the early 2000s, which resulted in changing laws related to nationality and citizenship. All young men holding South Korean nationality are subject to the mandatory conscription system, and it caused a controversy when the public found that some upper-class families used loopholes in nationality laws for their sons to avoid the draft. This eventually led legislators to amend the laws related to conscription and nationality, which raised questions about who should be drafted and what should be the consequences of draft evasion. As we will see, this case illustrates how people may redefine the meaning of “South Koreans” and redraw the boundary of national identity through the public discussion of citizens’ rights and duties. 3

The KGSS asked questions about national pride (“How proud are you of South Korea in each of the following?”) in specific domains. The percentage of combined “Very proud” and “Somewhat proud” stayed almost the same between 2003 and 2013 (73.9 and 77.2%). On the other hand, in a domain such as social security, the proportion of people expressing some degree of pride more than doubled from 17.9% in 2003 to 42.9% in 2013.

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7 National Identity and Citizens’ Duties: Conscription and Citizenship Since 1951, in the middle of the Korean War, all South Korean men have been subject to mandatory military conscription when they turn age 18. For many young men, military service4 is something that they want to avoid for apparent reasons if possible: a tightly scheduled life, strict discipline, limited meals, physically demanding activities, sometimes abusive superiors, and gap years in their education or career trajectory. Under certain special circumstances, they can be exempted from military duty or serve non-active duties. The most common reason for exemption is being physically unfit for duty which can be demonstrated by failing to pass a physical exam or submitting medical records. Because military duty is not something most men look forward to, draft exemption can be a sensitive issue, especially if it is granted illegally or unfairly. An exposure of illegal exemption can easily spark public rage and outcry for fairness when thousands of young men spend their precious years fulfilling their duty. Thus, attempts to avoid military service often involve corruption of government bureaucrats, money, and secrecy. Those families attempting to dodge the draft may submit false medical records,5 or bribe an examiner and ask him to fail their son in the physical. After democratization in 1987, however, draft evasion became increasingly riskier as the conscription system became more transparent to the public. For instance, free elections meant political parties competed to gain more voter support. The election campaign became a period in which candidates were scrutinized for their qualifications, and it often exposed past corruption and unethical activities of candidates who were usually elites in society. During the presidential election campaign of 1997, one of the major issues was how two sons of the governing party candidate could both have been underweight and exempted from military duty (Kristof, 1997). The candidate had lived his entire life as an elite—born to an upper-class family, became a judge at a young age, and served as the prime minister of the country. His background led many people to the suspicion that he used elite connections to fabricate the physical results. He lost the election by a narrow margin, and this controversy probably was one of the factors contributed to his loss. After this presidential election, public scrutiny became formally institutionalized. Since 1999, high-ranking officials, elected or appointed, have been required to disclose their military service records and those of their sons. Nominees for top government offices must go through parliamentary hearings before appointments become effective. During the process, nominees must submit certain personal information to the National Assembly, which includes their own tax and their conscription records as well as those of their family members. The hearings have revealed that 4

The mandatory service period changed over time, from 36 months in 1953 to 24 months in 2003 and to the current 18 months in 2018 (Ministry of National Defense, 2018). 5 For example, in 2004, police arrested brokers who provided false medical records to draftees seeking for ways to avoid serving (Kang, 2004).

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sons from upper-class families are more likely to receive exemptions from conscription than average citizens (Lee, 2000). A nominee for the prime minister in 2003, for example, avoided military duty when he was young, and his explanation that he did not receive a draft notice letter raised the eyebrows of many people (Park, 2005). Two of his three sons served in the military but for a period shorter than usual, and the second son was exempted because he failed to pass the physical, although he was healthy enough to pursue his career without any issue (ibid.). In 2004, there were a series of reports about draft exemption among upperclass families which stirred public opinion. While the “traditional” methods of draft evasion using medical records remained available, new methods emerged as South Korea turned increasingly into a global country in the 2000s. Taking advantage of the citizenship laws in some countries where people become citizens if born in their territories, such as the United States, some pregnant women deliberately traveled to those countries and gave birth (Demick, 2002), also known as “birth tourism.” Sons born in those countries could avoid draft in South Korea using their foreign citizenship. Because South Korean nationality is based on ancestry, these boys became dual citizens in practice and enjoyed all rights as Korean citizens while still retaining foreign nationality. Birth tourism was expensive because these women had to pay for their prenatal and postnatal care as well as lodging and other living expenses while staying in the country abroad. Thus, these women were often from affluent families who could afford all these expenses out of their own pocket. Birth tourism grew into a new trend and became known among the general public in the early 2000s, which ignited a new controversy about upper-class morality and loopholes in laws regulating conscription and citizenship. Especially in 2004, birth tourism became a buzz word after the media reported that the wife of a prominent business executive of a major corporation gave birth to their son in New York, raising public suspicion of birth tourism to obtain US citizenship (Seon & Lee, 2004). There were even birth-tourist businesses connecting pregnant women with lodging, care services, and hospitals in a country they selected (Park, 2004). Stories about birth tourism among the affluent class circulated online and offline, and the public debate led the attention of the media and politicians to upper-class families who used their privileges to avoid duties. It should be noted that this kind of open discussion about elites and government policies all became possible thanks to the public sphere liberalized and expanded after 1987, which contributed to making conscription fair and transparent. The culmination of these developments led legislators to amend the Nationality Act on May 4, 2005, which aimed to plug loopholes in conscription (Lee, 2008). The amended law forces a male with dual nationality to choose one before he reaches age 18. Once he turns 18, he can renounce South Korean nationality only after fulfilling his military duty. If he nevertheless gave it up without serving in the military, he will be treated as a foreigner and lose all rights as a South Korean citizen. As a foreigner, his stay in South Korea will be limited to a short period and he cannot get a job or open a business unless he obtains a special visa. Under the amended law, it became difficult to avoid draft using foreign nationalities while receiving benefits as Korean citizens. The amendment of the Nationality Law

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caused a surge in renunciation of Korean nationality and the fact they were overwhelmingly under 20 suggested avoiding draft might be the reason (Kim, 2005). Most of these men had elite parents including former government officials, executives at major business corporations, and professors at prestigious universities (Lee, 2008). For these affluent-class members, nationality and citizenship were something they could select based on practical considerations when they were not a matter of choice for the vast majority of the people. The Nationality Law still had a potential loophole. South Korea treated ethnic Koreans holding foreign nationalities differently from “pure foreigners,” and it granted limited citizenship rights to those ethnic Koreans from abroad (Jeon, 2008). Once they obtained a special visa for ethnic Koreans, they could stay in South Korea for a long term while engaging in economic activities and receiving healthcare benefits. Thus, those men who deliberately gave up the South Korean nationality could become “semi-citizens” as ethnic Koreans and still enjoy rights, although on a limited basis. This possibility sparked another controversy immediately after amending the Nationality Law. Some legislators jumped on this issue and attempted to patch this loophole by amending the Overseas Koreans Law, stripping the privileges granted to ethnic Koreans holding foreign nationalities from those who renounced their Korean nationality before completing military service. In late June, less than two months after passing the nationality bill, the National Assembly put another bill on vote to make draft evasion harder. However, this bill failed to pass. Some legislators were concerned that the bill would unfairly limit benefits to most of the conscientious overseas Koreans. Others pointed out the existing laws and policies were already sufficient to deal with such draft evasion. Nevertheless, online forums were immediately filled with outcry over those legislators who voted against the bill, and sent their disappointment and anger directly to the legislators (Mun, 2005; Yoo, 2005). Many online posts contended these legislators were hypocrites who pretended to be reformers, and attacked them for protecting draft evaders (Segye Ilbo, 2005). One newspaper portrayed them as the defenders of the privileged (Mun, 2005). The National Assembly voted on a similar bill again in December of the same year and passed it this time. Legislation and public debate on conscription and nationality raised an important issue of who South Korean citizens were and who should be the citizens. Can those people who seek to avoid civic duties still be Korean citizens who are entitled to rights as citizens? Is ethnicity a sufficient qualification to gain some citizenship rights? It should be also apparent that there was a class element in this debate over citizenship. While nobody called for excluding upper-class members altogether from the Korean nation, public outrage called for tighter citizenship regulations and imposing obligations strictly and fairly regardless of class backgrounds. By doing so, they unintentionally shook up the boundary and the meaning of national identity. South Korean citizens are not just people with Korean heritage anymore. Having a birthplace in South Korea and living there for entire life are not sufficient conditions to be a citizen either. Legitimate South Korean citizens must pay taxes and serve in the military, and those who fail to fulfill their civic duties are not qualified to

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be South Koreans. The civic qualifications of national identity have become very important—in some contexts, more important than ethnic criteria.

8 Conclusion I examined the growing importance of the civic basis of South Korean national identity in recent decades and argued that democratization was an important social process that drove this change. The available survey data showed the indicators of civic national identity have grown in importance while ethnic criteria remain at similar levels. There are some signs that South Koreans’ attitudes toward North Korea and co-ethnic migrants from North Korea and China are becoming less favorable. On the other hand, measures of citizens’ obligations are becoming more correlated with national pride, further suggesting the increasing importance of civic qualities. To illustrate how democratization allowed open discussion that pressured politicians to listen to citizens’ demands, I also discussed the public debate over conscription and nationality in 2005. This case showed how the meaning and the boundaries of national identity changed and how civic qualifications became more important in redefined South Korean national identity. What are the implications of these trends? Changing national identity can potentially have significant impacts on unification and immigration. First, the South Korean case shows how civic qualifications of national identity can be used as a basis of exclusion, just like ethnic one. As seen in the debate over conscription and citizenship, the fulfillment of civic obligations has become an important criterion in deciding “Koreans.” The same logic of exclusion is already being applied to co-ethnic migrants from North Korea and China. Those who oppose immigration criticize these immigrants for not paying taxes while receiving a lot of government benefits that are unavailable to native-born South Korean citizens (Kang, 2014; Yoon et al., 2018). They also point out the differences in civic manners and cultures between co-ethnic migrants and the native-born Koreans (Park & Choo, 2017). Here, common lineage and language are not enough to overcome differences in the civic dimension. The growing significance of civic aspects of South Korean national identity may work unfavorably in efforts to reunify with the North. South Koreans seem to be becoming less enthusiastic about unification with North Korea, especially among younger generations (Jung et al., 2019). Although most people still think unification is a necessity, they do not view their North Korean brothers more favorably than they view Americans, as we discussed earlier. While we need to bear in mind that shortterm events such as the military tension over the North’s nuclear programs have had an important impact, life in South Korea after 1987 changed significantly from the North not only in economics but also in political and cultural domains. The South Korean people have experience of fighting against anti-democratic governments and critically discussing public policies. They successfully pressured the military regime to adopt democratic measures in 1987. Although democratic consolidation has been a bumpy process since 1987, the citizens maintained vibrant democracy both on the

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street and online by critically monitoring the government and political elites. In 2016, they made another history when citizens’ protest successfully pressured the National Assembly to impeach President Park Geun-hye for corruption and incompetence, and the Constitutional Court eventually upheld the impeachment. From the protest to the court’s decision, democracy worked through the rights and the process outlined in the Constitution written 30 years ago in the aftermath of the 1987 pro-democracy uprising. From the viewpoint of the South Korean citizens with such democratic experiences, North Korea’s autocratic government and limited individual freedom are very alien despite shared common ethnicity and history between the South and the North. Does democracy weaken national identity? The South Korean case shows democracy tends to promote a certain type of national identity, the one based on civic values and institutions rather than ethnicity and ancestry. Yet, civic national identity promoted by democracy is not necessarily inclusive and universal as some expected. On the contrary, South Korea shows civic qualifications can be used to discriminate and exclude certain groups, just as in the ways ethnic criteria are used. By no means, democracy guarantees democratic outcomes.

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Chapter 2

Living Together with Unease—Koreans’ Perception of and Attitudes Toward Immigrants Seokho Kim and So Hyun Park

Abstract Seokho Kim and So Hyun Park highlights that while Koreans acknowledge loosening immigration controls contributes to the economy by alleviating labor shortages, they still exhibit considerable concern that increased immigration may aggravate social conflicts. Many hold neutral attitudes regarding immigrants’ contribution to social development, which suggests a lingering doubt and apprehension about their overall impact on Korean society. Such a result provides insights into the need to shift away from the current paradigm considering immigrants—a sense of separation between individual migrants and migrant communities and Korean society. To address this gap, they suggest we should cogitate beyond how close migrants can come to being Koreans and part of Korean society and delve deeper into the lives and thoughts of migrants through a more intrinsic approach. In other words, the prospect of immigrant social integration is only promising when and if we change. Keywords Immigration · Multiculturalism · Attitude toward immigrants · Social distance

1 “Immigration Nation” on the Horizon Since its liberation from the Japanese 76 years ago, Korean society has undergone a major transformation—a country who was forced to rely on financial aid in the past is now the world’s 10th largest economy. In an astonishingly short period, South Korea’s GNI per capita rose from $67 in 1953 to $33,790 in 2019. During this period, conflict and growing pains were unavoidable, but democracy inevitably helped Korea overcome these difficulties. All this was possible because we, the people, were confidently united for a better tomorrow than today. It was also a result of the government’s plan to develop the economy by firmly implementing S. Kim (B) · S. H. Park Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Kim (ed.), A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5829-0_2

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necessary measures, ensure stable human resource development through intensive investment in education, and an appropriate level of population growth. Above all, the greatest resource that made these achievements possible was stable population growth, which served as the driver for developing excellent human resources. Quality human resources were cultivated on the sheer will for success and education, thereby creating something out of nothing. However, since the 2000s, Korea’s population, which was the basis of the country’s success, has ceased to grow, thus weakening Korea’s traditional development model. The population peaked in the mid-1990s, but declining birthrates and an aging population are creating various dark shadows in each sector of society. According to the National Statistical Office, South Korea’s population is expected to peak at 52.16 million in 2030 and then begin to decline. By 2060, the population is expected to be 43.96 million, a decrease of 7.27 million from the 2019 population. The demographic structure is also changing rapidly. According to the 2019 Population and Housing Census, the proportion of young people (0–14 years old) in the total population dropped sharply from 40.7% in 1960 to 12.6% in 2019, while the proportion of people aged 65 and over increased from 3.4% in 1960 to 15.5% in 2019. Simply put, the proportion of the productive population capable of economic activity continues to decline, and the proportion of the elderly population requiring the umbrella of social safety net continues to rise. Many express concern about demographic changes and carefully present loosening migration control as an alternative. We are to re-establish the growth engine of Korea by relocating the malformed population structure, which is the result of poorly addressed policy failures, through migration. The precedent that led rural bachelors who were already hit by demographic changes and manufacturing-oriented growth strategies to find brides from developing Asian countries is already well known. As the number of foreigners in Korean society is increasing, transition to an immigrant or multicultural society is no longer an option. Then, is the acceptance of migrants the most ideal alternative? Is bringing foreign workforce the only possible solution? Koreans have begun to recognize the existence of marriage migrants as an inevitable and natural reality; thus, the current antipathy towards the large-scale importation of foreign workers may be dissolved in near future if we actually start living together. However, consideration should be given to the lessons learned from the greater scale and kinds of difficulties experienced by other nations that loosened immigration controls in the past. Logically speaking, it is unreasonable to compare admitting millions of foreign workers needed to fill labor shortages in the productive population with the limited challenges Korea has thus far faced by accepting only approximately 200,000 marriage migrants. As the phrase “we imported labor force but people came” ruminates, the increasing problem of incorporating foreigners into Korean society will face diverse and serious socio-cultural side effects when approached only from the economical or logical perspectives. In fact, Korean society has already experienced the precursors of these problems. Violation of human rights of marriage migrants, maladaptation of children from multicultural families, workplace discrimination toward short-stay foreign workers, increase of illegal immigrants, and conflicts between Korean-Chinese and Koreans in everyday life can be the examples.

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Debate on multiculturalism has been long-standing as the foreign population gradually increased due to the changes in domestic population structure and the effects of global migration. However, previous studies are limited in that they mostly focus on marriage migrants and their families. This is because, excluding Chinese-Koreans, most of the foreigners who settle in Korean society are marriage migrants, and the remaining are migrant workers who work for a short period of time and return to their home countries (Kim et al., 2011). However, the number of long-term settlers such as permanent residents, naturalized people, Korean-Chinese, and long-term foreign workers has increased recently, and their adaptation and social integration has become an emerging issue. In particular, the question of whether we can truly accept immigrants as our neighbors, friends and colleagues, and what are the barriers within us that make it difficult is the important issue in the discussion of immigrant integration. At the heart of the debate is the question of how we will behave when Korean society reaches a state of greater racial and ethnic diversity (Kim, 2015; Kim et al., 2015b). Can we really get along with them? Are we properly prepared for a post-migrant society? Previous studies of migrant groups examining multicultural families, migrants, and other foreigners focus solely on these migrant groups. Except for a few studies, most of them focus on the migrants’ relationship with Koreans or Korean society experienced while rooting in Korean society. However, this approach reveals only one side of the phenomenon and often exaggerates prejudice against others (Wilson, 1987). Immigrant integration is not only an issue for migrants but also for Koreans. Nevertheless, the academic debate dealing with the public attitudes towards immigrants is at a rudimentary level (Kim et al., 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2015b). Accordingly, more systematic empirical research is needed to highlight Koreans’ multicultural awareness and specifically verify how Koreans view immigrants, as well as their perspectives on social integration issues. Considering the above circumstances, this chapter examines how Koreans perceive the growing immigrant population and immigrant society and tries to derive implications concerning social integration. To this end, we analyze the data of the “70th Anniversary of Korean Independence Survey” collected by the Asian Research Institute of Seoul National University in 2015 and the “Korean General Social Survey” collected Sungkyunkwan University Survey Research Center in 2003.

2 Increasing and Diversifying Foreign Residents Before analyzing the data, let us take a look at the current levels of immigration in Korean society. The number of foreigners has been steadily increasing in Korean society. Figure 1 shows the trend of the increase of foreign residents since the 2000s. In the early 2000s, the number was only about 600,000 but in 2020 the number has reached approximately 2.5 million. The number of illegal immigrants exceeded 300,000 in 2002, just before the start of the Employment Permit System, but now it has decreased to the level of 390,000. Figure 2 shows the distribution of foreigners

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Fig. 1 Number of foreign residents in Korea. Source Ministry of Justice (2019)

staying in Korean society by the status of residence as of 2019. The number of short-term workers such as foreign workers (E-9) and foreign nationals (H-2) who entered Korea under the Employment Permit System, and overseas Koreans with permanent residence visas (F-4) are the largest. It is not an exaggeration to say that these two groups actually represent almost every migrant in Korean society. On the other hand, although not shown in the figure, the nationalities of foreign residents in Korean society are highest in the order of China, Vietnam, Thailand, the United States, Japan, and Uzbekistan in 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 2019). Currently, the migrant groups in Korean society have a clear tendency to permanently settle down (Jung, 2013), and marriage migrants and their families (multicultural families), foreign workers, and overseas Koreans account for the majority. In addition, there is a high possibility that these groups and their second generation will emerge as the core subject of issues related to future immigrant social integration. Therefore, this article considers marriage migrants and their families, migrant workers, and overseas Koreans as the core migrant groups in Korean society, and briefly examines their social, cultural, and economic characteristics and difficulties. Then, we will to ascertain the general attitudes Korean people have toward migrant groups, which can be another axis of future immigrant social integration, through an analysis of existing data. This is to emphasize that the obstacles to social integration of immigrants exist within us by examining our level of perceived susceptibility to immigrant society.

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Fig. 2 Number of foreign residents by Visa status. Source Ministry of Justice (2019)

2.1 Marriage Migrants and Their Families: Concerned About Generational Poverty, But We Are Still Cold and Callous The proportion of marriage migrants and their families (hereinafter referred to as multicultural families) has steadily increased in Korean society. The number of multicultural family members increased to 1,060,000 in 2019, more than tripled in eight years. Their share of the total population of South Korea was only 1.1% in 2006, but increased to 2.1% in 2019 (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2018). And this tendency will not be easily undermined. International marriage is no longer an exceptional phenomenon but has become one of the common marriage types, and the rapid increase of international marriage is influenced by a number of social factors such as the imbalance of sex ration at birth, rural–urban migration, the spread of gender equality norm and globalization. The number of international marriages held every year is nearly 40,000, accounting for more than 10% of the total number of marriages. Of course, some oppose conflicting arguments. There is a prospect that marriage migration is only a temporary phenomenon that occurs due to an unexpected increase of rural bachelors who could not find a spouse in the marriage market from the 1990s to around 2010, and considering the decrease in gender ratio, the increase in single-person households, and the decrease in the rural population represented by local extinction, the key group of migrants in the future will not be the marriage migrants but the labor migrants and their families (Kim et al., 2015a, 2015b). Even

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Fig. 3 Number of marriage migrants: 2008–2019. Source Ministry of Justice

if the current immigration trend is continued, the relative importance of marriage migrants and their families in the discussion of immigrant society will diminish as the size of foreign workforce that is required to fill the labor shortage will reach millions. As shown in Fig. 3, the increase in marriage migrants has been stagnant since 2011. It took only three years for the size of marriage migrants to increase from 120,000 in 2008 to 150,000 in 2010, but the number has remained at about the same level since it reached approximately 150,000 in 2013. Rather, the rise of children from multicultural families is expected to be more prominent. Looking closely at the growth trend of children from multicultural families, the number increased from 25,246 in 2006 to 103,484 in 2009, an increase of 75.6% over the period of three years. In particular, the number of children with parents from Southeast Asia such as Vietnam has increased sharply. If such trends continue, the proportion of foreigners will soon exceed 5% of the total population and the number of children in multicultural families will reach 160,000 (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2014a, 2014b). Figure 4 shows the share of students from multicultural backgrounds over the past decade. Figure 4 reveals that the share of students from multicultural backgrounds has increased across elementary, middle, and high school, with the steepest increase in elementary school. Therefore, the social, political, and academic interests in multicultural families, which so far have been mainly focused on the problems experienced in the early stages of settlement such as language communication and marital conflict, need to be expanded and the issue of children of multicultural families must be addressed under the big picture of social integration (Kim et al., 2015). Ensuring whether children with multicultural background are growing up just like children in ordinary households without major difficulties is necessary. This is the time to reset the focus of the traditional multicultural policy to a more long-term perspective.

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Fig. 4 Proportion of multicultural students in Korean schools (%). Source Ministry of Education

The biggest concern associated with children in multicultural families is that since parents are low-educated and earn low incomes, children may inherit poverty due to social maladaptation and poor educational achievement. This is well represented in previous studies, where 6.3% of children from multicultural families aged between 15 and 17 do not attend school, and the number is much higher when compared to children from ordinary families (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012). 25.3% of children from multicultural families have difficulty studying at school, and are exposed to problems associated with language, emotional development, selfidentity, and friendships. When social problems such as multicultural parents’ low socioeconomic status, children’s maladaptation in the educational field, and failures in the labor market are repeated, they will be placed in the lowest position in our society and face the danger of falling into racial, ethnic, and hierarchical minorities. This minority grouping sometimes affects Koreans residing in the same space to perceive migrants as a threat and to stigmatize them as criminals or losers, thus forming among the original inhabitants the illusion of having to protect their space from outside influences. Notably, this attitude concerning a false threat can result in justifying prejudice and violence against minority groups (Heitgerd & Bursik, 1987). In this context, efforts should be made to observe and correct how Koreans perceive immigrants to determine whether or not there are any prejudices stemming from such misunderstandings in addition to supporting immigrants’ stable settlement in these communities.

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2.2 Migrant Workers: They Want to Put Down Roots, But We Don’t Know Them Well It has already been 30 years since migrant workers first appeared in Korean society. The first group of migrant workers was the industrial trainees who worked as lowskilled workers but whose status were trainees, and thus paid less than half of Korean workers doing similar jobs at the time. While implementing the Industrial Technical Trainee System (ITTS), problems such as workplace discrimination, low wages, residency restrictions, and an increase in the number of undocumented workers continued to emerge (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2012), the Employment Permit System came into effect in August 2004 and is still active today. Currently, migrant workers in Korean society are divided into those who entered Korea under the Employment Permit System (E-9) and foreign nationals who entered Korea under the Special Employment Permit System or the Working Visit System (H-2). Most of them work as low-skilled labors and can stay in Korea for up to 4 years and 10 months—first they are allowed to stay for 3 years and can extend their staying for additional 1 year and 10 months. The principle of short-term cycle labor is thoroughly applied. As of 2019, migrant workers who entered Korea under the Employment Permit System and the Working Visit System reach about 500,000 and account for the absolute majority of foreign resident. As shown in Fig. 5, the number of E-9 workers from Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, and visiting workers (H-2), mostly Korean-Chinese, are the largest—approximately 270,000 and 220,000 respectively. The recent trend observed in these two groups is that more and more migrants do not leave Korea after 4 years and 10 months and become unregistered workers, or form families illegally and give birth to children. Even among Korean-Chinese who entered Korea as visiting workers, there is a growing tendency to acquire permanent residency in various ways. As a result, immigrant enclaves called China in South Korea are established in Daerim-dong and Garibong-dong in Seoul, where a growing number of Korean-Chinese entrepreneurs succeeded in business, accumulated capital and put down roots. In summary, permanent settlement of migrant workers is progressing rapidly, and the dynamic between them and Korean society is transforming from primarily employer-employee relationships to neighbors occupying the same space. In response to the population cliff phenomenon, the South Korean government is making increased efforts to assist migrant workers, especially Korean-Chinese, settle down and adapt to Korean life. There is a system, such as the “qualified migrant worker scheme” which guarantees long-term stays or settlement. Although the number is not very large yet, the number of migrant workers residing in Korea is increasing as the “qualified migrant worker scheme,” which allows the workers to stay in Korea twice for four years and 10 months, is implemented. In fact, more than 50% of migrant workers entering under the Employment Permit System hope to continue living in Korea for economic reasons (Lee and Kim, 2011).

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Fig. 5 Number of foreign workers in Korea. Source Ministry of Justice (2019)

Most of the migrant workers who entered Korea under the Employment Permit System or the Working Visit System work at small-scale manufacturers, and are generally paid less than 2 million won per month. As shown in Fig. 6, the number of migrant workers who receive wages of less than one million won is about 42,400 (5.1%), and about 2,247,000 (27.2%) receive wages between one and two million won, about 423,800 people (51.3%) receive wages between two and three million won, and about 134,400 people (16.3%) are paid more than three million won (Ministry of Justice, 2019). The wage is relatively low considering the average monthly wage of Korean workers at workplaces with 10 or more employees in 2019 was about 4.27 million won. Migrant workers are not only exposed to the problem of low wages. As migrant workers work mainly in small-scale businesses, there is no institutional device providing protection such as workplace safety, job stability, and working environment. Out of the total 87,944 workplaces employing foreigners, only 1.0% of the workplaces have labor unions (Kim et al., 2015a, 2015b). Importantly, it should be noted that in parallel to this rapid increase in immigrants is an increase in the number of illegal immigrants. Looking at the historical experiences of countries welcoming large numbers of immigrants, it can be identified that illegal immigrants incur enormous social costs, which contributes to the negative perception of the native population towards immigrants. The number of illegal immigrants surpassed 300,000 in the early 2000s then decreased to a total of 154,342 in 2003. However, it has steadily increased since then, reaching a total of 390,281 as of December 2019 (Ministry of Justice, 2019). Meanwhile, unskilled foreign workers are not allowed to accompany or form a family and give birth to a child. However, it is estimated that more than 20,000 “unregistered” immigrant children currently live in South Korea, which the Korean government has consistently ignored (Kim

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Fig. 6 Wages for foreign work: 2019 (%). Source Statistics Korea

et al., 2015a, 2015b). Illegal immigrants are more likely to be exposed to human rights abuses in the industrial setting, but their illegal status makes it impossible to take appropriate measures, and immigration offices and the Ministry of Employment and Labor also discriminate against them. Children of illegal immigrants cannot go to educational institutions before they reach school age (Jung, 2013). Illegal immigrants play a role in creating prejudice against migrants, but if the inaction regarding the discrimination against migrants in the labor market and their second generations continues, immigrants, conversely, may develop strong anger toward Korean society. Therefore, although the situation has no easy answer, the considerable number of illegal immigrants and their children has become a social problem that must be addressed as a priority, considering Korea’s pursuit of a multicultural and diverse society.

2.3 Foreign Nationals: Can We Ever Live Together as the Same Koreans? In migration studies, return migration refers to a situation where a person who has migrated to another society returns to his or her home country. This is the case when people who have temporarily left the country due to political and social unrest or economic problems return to their home countries as the conditions for returning are settled. Korean activists who had fled to China and the Soviet Union for the independence movement and returned after liberation and Korean descendants who had lived in China and other countries since the 1990s and returned to Korea for various reasons are the returning migrants. The final group of migrants we want

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to look at here is the foreign nationals, especially Korean-Chinese, who settled in Korea through return migration. According to the Immigration and Foreigners Policy Headquarters, as of 2019, about 719,269 Korean-Chinese live in Korea. Among them, about 195,000 hold the Working Visit visa (H-2), about 346,000 are holding the Overseas Koreans visa (F-4), and about 89,000 are permanent residents (F-5). Of these, the number of naturalized people is about 77,000. The number of Korean Chinese residents has rapidly increased from about 270,000 in 2006 to 700,000 today (Table 1). Korean-Chinese account for almost half of the 1.5 million long-term visitors staying for more than 91 days. As can be seen in the figure below, they have lived together around Daerim-dong and Garibong-dong in Seoul, which are relatively inexpensive to live in, forming a small Chinese community in Seoul. After 20 years since their return migration first began, Korean-Chinese are now building self-sufficient and dense social networks in the region. Korean-Chinese have secured their own physical, social, and economic spaces unlike the marriage migrants, who have adapted to the unfamiliar Korean culture in rural areas, and the migrant workers, who have stayed mainly in the accommodations provided by their employers near the work places. As the precedents of other immigrant countries show, migrants tend to live in specific areas, interact with mainstream society to a limited extent, and maintain closed social networks. This tendency is clearly an obstacle to immigrant social integration (Edin et al. 2003). According to Castles and Miller (2009), the concentration of certain migrant groups in residential areas is often initiated through personal networks among those searching for affordable housing prices. As the concentration of immigrants reaches a certain size and they elect to extend their period of stay, kinship networks are formed and immigrant-centric shops, groups, organizations and related professions begin to emerge. As a result, economically and socially successful migrant groups develop permanent settlements after qualitative transformation in the relationship with the native society takes place. Although many Korean-Chinese live in Daerimdong and Garibong-dong, their exchanges with Korean society have not yet reached an active stage. However, they have established self-sufficient economic foundations such as organizations, stores, and industries, and are in the early stage of forming direct relationships with Korean neighbors and colleagues residing in or adjacent to the district (Park, 2010). As the amount of contacts, transactions, and relationships between KoreanChinese and Koreans has increased, perceptions of each group regarding the other Table 1 Status of sojourn of Korean-Chinese residing in Korea Total

Working visit (H-2)

Overseas Korean (F-4)

Permanent resident (F-5)

Visiting or joining family (F-1)

Other

712,637

207,226

348,289

85,718

20,157

51,247

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have begun to change. Although Koreans have both vague expectations and anxieties about the growing immigrant population, this is not a judgment made based on any direct interactions, but rather based on their national or social identity and anti-immigrant prejudice. However, it seems that Koreans now have more specific opinions, wishes or dissatisfaction regarding immigrant issue as they encounter more migrants in their daily life compared to the past, when they were mostly concerned with only the number of immigrants. For example, Kim et al. (2015a, 2015b) argues that as people have more direct experiences with immigrants, they ae more likely to break away from thinking that immigrants can become Koreans only if they share the same lineage, ethnicity, and history. Koreans began to consider whether or not migrants have the virtues and qualities to live together within the boundaries of established laws and rules as their neighbors and colleagues more importantly. Increasing number of migrants, the rising level of diversity and the advent of an immigrant society are not far off. Migrants already have come into our daily lives in various ways, and we have become so dependent that they are indispensable. In the future, this trend is expected to accelerate further, and problems and challenges of immigrant society will emerge in an unexpected manner. Therefore, tracking changes in the way Koreans perceive foreigners is an essential task that must be steadily carried out in order to strengthen future social integration and reduce social conflicts.

3 Changes in Koreans’ Perceptions of and Attitudes Toward Immigrants The time has come to expand our discussions on social integration in order to take into account the entire migrant group including migrant workers. The hate toward immigrants, such as multicultural families, migrant workers, and Korean-Chinese, which are recently expressed mainly in online communities, is definitely a social concern. Considering that those migrants are not just temporal visitors but future neighbors who have to live face-to-face with us, hate speeches against migrants appeared online show us what tasks we have been given to prepare for the advent of an immigrant society. Negative attitudes the younger generation displays online are not representative of the general public sentiment toward immigrants. However, even though the younger generation is a small part of the population, we still need to intervene and take actions since they will soon become the middle-aged generation and will lead our society. That’s even more so because what is inherently bad and irritating spreads out so easily. In this context, it is significant to examine how Koreans view immigrants. Here, the perceptions and attitudes that Koreans have toward immigrants are analyzed through their perceptions on immigrants’ socioeconomic and sociocultural impact, attitudes toward increasing and decreasing foreigners, and positions toward multiculturalism .

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(1) Socio-economic and socio-cultural impact of immigrants We examined the impact of increasing immigration on our society in 2003 and 2013, respectively (Fig. 7). First of all, looking at the overall result of the evaluation of immigration impact, the results in 2013 is more negative than in 2003. Looking at the results of the 2013 survey, in response to the question “immigrants generally help the Korean economy” (53.9% in 2003, 50.2% in 2013), the number of respondents who answered ‘very agreeable’ and ‘somewhat agreeable’ decreased compared to 2003. On the other hand, in response to the statements “immigrants increase crime (33.1% in 2003, 52.7% in 2013)” and “immigrants take away jobs from Koreans” (23.6% in 2003, 26.9% in 2013), the number of respondents who answered ‘very agreeable’ and ‘somewhat agreeable’ increased compare to 2003. This result shows that the public perceive the impact of immigrants on Korean society more negatively than the past. In addition, neutral attitudes toward the impact of immigrants who answered ‘neither agree nor disagree’ increased significantly. Let us examine the perceptions Koreans have about immigrants by category. In Fig. 8, the results of the 2013 survey show that the proportion of respondents who agree that immigrants contribute to the Korean economy has decreased compared to 2003, with fewer ‘agree’ and more ‘somewhat disagree’ and ‘no consent or disagreement.’ The most notable change is the fact that the number of Koreans who are unable

Fig. 7 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants (%)

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Fig. 8 Korean’s attitude toward immigrants: immigrants contribute to the Korean economy (%)

to determine whether immigrants benefit the Korean economy or not has increased the most. In the early 2000s, when marriage migrants, migrant workers, and foreign nationals first flooded Korea, expectations for economic benefits were high. However, as the period of the migrants’ stay is prolonged, the negative aspects of migrant society such as the increase in social, political, and economic costs continue to be raised; particularly, as the Korean economy has failed to overcome the recession, Koreans have started to think differently about the economic role of migrants in society. What is still hopeful is that, regarding the migrants’ evaluation of the Korean economy, the positives are far higher than the negatives. There is also a gap between generations in evaluating whether immigrants contribute to the Korean economy. Figure 9 well represents this. In 2003, positive evaluations exceeded the majority of the respondents in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s, but in 2013 they have not reached the majority. Negative perceptions increased significantly, especially among the 20s, and in the 30s, the number of people who chose neutral evaluations over positive evaluation increased. The interesting point is the change of the elders in their 60s and older who displayed the most negative attitudes in the past. In 2003, they were the only generations with less than half of the positive ratings, but in 2015 they became the generation with high positive ratings rate compared to the past. Figure 10 shows the responses to the statement “immigrants increase crime rates” in 2003 and 2013. Perspectives that immigrants do increase crime rates were much higher in 2013 than in 2003. Specifically, the percentage of respondents who agreed

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Fig. 9 Generation gap: immigrants contribute to the Korean economy (%)

immigrants increase crime rates, or the percentage of negative perceptions toward immigrants, increased significantly from 32.5% to 52.3%. There was no significant change in the evaluation regarding immigrants’ contribution to the economy, but the increase of negative evaluation is remarkable regarding the view that an influx of immigrants leads to higher crime rates. Perhaps this is due to the fact that cases of shocking and graphic crimes committed by a few immigrants are frequently exposed in the mass media, forming a kind of prejudice that links immigrants and crimes. If so, what is the actual level of crime rate of foreigners compared to that of Koreans? It is known that the crime rates in Guro-gu and Yeongdeungpo-gu, the districts where foreigners are highly concentrated in, have the highest crime rates in Seoul. Some argue that there is a need for a policy-based approach to disperse the Korean-Chinese population in order to reduce crime rates and prevent regional slums in the future. However, the reality that statistics show is different. Unlike the sensitive reaction to foreign crimes in Korean society, the number of foreign crimes in 2011 was 27,436, which counted for about 1.5% of the total crimes of 1,815,233, and the number of foreigners staying in Korea was 1,395,077, which was 2.9% of the total population of 47,990,761. In other words, the ratio of foreign crimes accounted for in all crimes was lower than the ratio of foreigners to the total population. There are also differences between generations concerning the perception that immigrants increase crime rates. Notably, there has been no change in tendency to believe that immigrants increase crime rates as the respondents get older, with 2013 survey data indicating the same tendency as 2003. However, the intergenerational gap in 2013 was relatively smaller than in 2003. Overall, the gap between generations has diminished because negative assessments of foreigners increasing crime rates in all generations have increased. While it is true that the number of people linking

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Fig. 10 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants: immigrants increase crime rates(%)

foreigners to crime has increased across all generations, the negative perceptions of people in their 50s and older are of particular concern. As shown in Fig. 11, the percentage of people who believe foreigners increase crime rates in 2013 (strongly agree + slightly agree) is as high as 57.3% and 54.9% among those in their 50s and 60s respectively. The fact that most people, regardless of age, hold the idea that migrants increase crime rates is of concern. Moreover, the prejudice against migrants is particularly severe among the older age groups who will occupy the majority of the total population for the time being. This leads us to predict that future immigrant integration in Korean society will not be a smooth process. This increase in negative perception of foreigners is also evident in responses regarding competition between Koreans and foreigners over jobs (Fig. 12). The percentage of people who agree that “immigrants are taking jobs away from Koreans” has increased from 23.5% in 2003 to 26.9% in 2013, while the percentage of people who oppose has sharply decreased from 47.7% to 39.7%. In fact, two opposing arguments exist. One is that the influx of migrant workers intensifies employment competition over similar types of jobs, thereby lowering employment stability and wages of native workers. The other is that native workers, especially skilled ones, can be the beneficiaries of the rising relative wages (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). It remains difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on this issue in Korean society for two reasons. First, migrant workers who entered Korea under the Employment Permit System and the Working Visit system are returning to their home country

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Fig. 11 Generation gap: immigrants increase crime rates (%)

Fig. 12 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants: immigrants are taking jobs away from Koreans (%)

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after a short period of time by the principle of short-term cycle. Second, the labor market separation between Koreans and foreigners is still distinct as most migrant workers are concentrated in the 3D industries and low-wage service industries that most Koreans avoid. However, it will take time to assess the potential consequences of the increase in migrants in the labor market since there is an increasing number of migrants, such as illegally employed or undocumented workers, working for the purpose of settling in Korea, while at the same time the government and industry are increasingly voicing that they should actively introduce and encourage human resources with a certain skill level to settle in Korean society. There are also intergenerational differences in the concerns that immigrants are taking Koreans’ jobs, but the differences are not that large compared to the other issues above. Finally, we will examine the respondents’ views on the statement that immigrants bring new ideas and cultures to make Korean society better (Fig. 13). Compared to the past, fewer people agree with the statement which looks at the positive social effects of increasing migrants while the number of respondents who slightly disagree’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree’ increased. The shift from the positive to the neutral attitude can be explained by the theories of ‘symbolic politics’ or ‘social identity theory’. An important symbolic tendency which determines the attitudes toward immigration issues is the notion of national identity, which researchers argue that people have negative or hostile attitudes toward beings that pose a threat to maintaining homogeneity in social and cultural characteristics (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Similarly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Koreans tended to feel a vague or abstract appreciation of migrants for being the spouses of rural bachelors or filling labor shortages. However, as their sojourns are extended, immigrant enclaves are developing across the country and interactions between Koreans and foreigners in daily life are becoming more frequent. Thus, it can be presumed that Koreans have begun to consider migrants’ socio-cultural impact more deeply. (2) Attitudes toward increasing number of immigrants and multiculturalism Figure 14 shows the difference in perceptions between 2003 and 2013 about the increase in the number of foreigners entering Korea. The number of respondents arguing the number of foreigners “should increase” and “should decrease” both decreased, while “must be at the current level” increased 14.3%. In other words, the demand to maintain the status quo has been proved. Although Koreans admit that migrants, who came due to the need of Korean society, are making contributions, they are preferred to find the best solution in the current state considering various social problems migrants may cause. Figure 15 shows how Koreans perceive the increasing number of marriage migrants and migrant workers using the 2018 KGSS survey data. It can be assumed that Koreans are in general more hospitable towards marriage migrants while more concerned about the increasing number of migrant workers. It is also notable that the number of respondents who prefer the number of immigrants to stay at the current level noticeably decreased from 52.7% in 2013 to approximately 39.8% in 2018. Figure 16 reveals the respondents’ attitudes on multiculturalism, that is, whether or not they agree migrants should embrace Korean culture while maintaining their own

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Fig. 13 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants: immigrants bring new ideas and cultures to make Korean society better (%)

Fig. 14 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants: the number of immigrants should be increased or decreased (%)

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Fig. 15 Koreans’ attitude toward immigrants: the number of marriage migrants and migrant workers should be increased or decreased (2018)

culture. Multiculturalism is regarded as a value that immigrant society should aim for, along with inter-culturalism, in that migrants seek social integration in the process of naturally accepting the culture of the migrant country while maintaining their own culture. Koreans also have a very high level acceptance of multiculturalism at 86%. However, it seems necessary to discuss whether that acceptance of multiculturalism actually came out of the mindset to actively prepare for the future of a migrant society. This is especially true when we recall that the responses to the above questions about the increasing number of migrants are generally becoming more negative. In Korean society, the issue concerning accepting immigrants gained more attention after the arrival of approximately 500 Yemeni refugees to Jeju Island in 2018. Despite Koreans claiming to be open to multiculturalism with respect to preserving immigrants’ own cultures, as can be seen in Fig. 17, many were easily perplexed by the sudden influx of unfamiliar Yemeni refugees.1 Without a clear understanding of who the Yemini were, negative, even fearful, perceptions of the refugees became the norm in Korean society. Following the worsening public opinion opposing large numbers of refugees, the Korean government removed Yemen from its list of visa-free entry countries to Jeju Island. Figure 17 illustrates that the opposition to accepting refugees was still prevalent in 2021, as an atmosphere of hatred for refugees had spread nationwide. This anti-refugee backlash revealed the dynamic implications 1

The issue of refugees in South Korean society did not receive much attention before 2018. While the number of asylum seekers had been steadily increasing for decades, very few had been granted the right to asylum. Surveys on South Koreans’ attitudes toward refugees only began to be conducted after the controversial arrival of Yemeni refugees on Jeju Island in 2018. That is why this article analyzes the change in Koreans’ attitudes toward refugees using data collected in 2018 and 2021.

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100 90

86

80 70 60 50 40 30 20

10.3

10

3.7

0 Immigrants should accept Korean culture and preserve their own culture

Immigrants should abandon their own culture and accept Korean culture

Immigrants should preserve their own culture and not accept Korean culture

Fig. 16 Koreans’ attitude toward multiculturalism (%)

within the perception of immigrants, as tolerance beyond respecting foreign cultures is necessary as the characteristics of immigrants become more diverse. (3) Perceptions of Koreans living in foreigner-concentrated neighborhoods The result of examining the changes in Koreans’ attitudes toward the increase of foreigners can be summarized in two ways. First, Koreans’ attitudes toward migrants

Fig. 17 Koreans’ attitude toward refugees: sour government should accept more international refugees by easing the criteria for recognizing refugees (%). Source A Study on Multicultural Acceptability, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family

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and migration policies have become considerably more negatively than they were in the past. Second, the number of Koreans taking a neutral stance on the growing number of migrants has increased. In other words, at present, it seems that many people prefer to withhold judgment on this issue. This tendency is particularly noticeable when assessing the sociocultural impact of foreigners. Previously, this propensity was interpreted as a result of increasing doubt as the evaluation based on vague and abstract impressions of foreigners changed to one based on more concrete daily experiences. In fact, I have empirically verified these claims through two recently published journals.2 The results indicate that the more Koreans become neighbors in everyday life with migrants, the greater their specific anxieties and worries toward migrants. The figure shows how support for migrant policies varies depending on whether respondents live in foreigner-concentrated areas, adjacent areas, and other areas. Regarding multiple policies related to migration support, the approval rating of residents living in general areas is 2.348 out of 4 points, while it is 1.713 points in foreigner-concentrated areas and 1.714 points in adjacent areas, which are extremely low. These results confirm the speculation that people who have more contact with migrants will more likely to have stronger negative perceptions of migrants and migrant policies. One of the biggest changes in current Korean society compared to 15 years ago is that foreigners can be easily met almost everywhere, and no one stare at foreigners awkwardly. Interactions with foreigners are now becoming a part of our lives. However, in real life, momentary contacts with people from different cultural backgrounds remain as uncomfortable and awkward memories unless the contact persists and opportunities to understand each other in the long run are arranged. Such awkward memories may have been converted into doubts and uncomfortable feelings, when combined with mono-ethnic myths and racial prejudices collectively shared in Korean culture. Figure 18 shows how the perception toward foreigners varies according to the demographics in respondents’ residential areas. When looking separately at the attitudes toward North Korean defectors, Korean-Chinese, Chinese, Japanese, Southeast Asians, and Americans, the level of social distance was the lowest at 1.35 points toward Americans, and North Korean defectors was the second lowest with 1.38 points, followed by Korean-Chinese (1.447), Southeast Asians (1.478), Japanese (1.451) and the social distancing to Chinese(1.503) was the highest (the most negative).3 The level of social distancing toward migrants increases when respondents

2

Refer to Kim. Seokho et al.. (2015). “What Made the Civic Type of National Identity More Important among Koreans? A Comparison between 2003 and 2010” Development and Society and Park. Hyomin, Kim Seokho, Lee Sangrim (2016). “Native Koreans’ Attitudes toward Immigrants in Ethnic Enclaves” Korean Party Studies. 3 For each question, the social distance score was measured 1 for positive answers and 2 for negative answers, and the higher the score, the higher the sense of social distance to the target group. For a specific ethnic group, if all questions are answered negatively, the score is 1 point, and if all questions are answered positively, the overall score is 2 points. That is, the social distance score represents the average score of respondents for each group.

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Fig. 18 Social distance to foreigners according to the demographics in residential areas

live in foreigner-concentrated areas. Notably, respondents living nearby foreignconcentrated areas also have a higher sense of social distancing to foreigners when compared to those living in general areas.

4 Uneasy Expectations. But it’s Not Their Problems The impact of immigration and the attitudes of Koreans towards the influx of immigrants can be summarized as follows. Koreans acknowledge loosening immigration control contributes to the economy by alleviating labor shortages, but there is also considerable concern that the increased immigration may aggravate social conflicts. Many hold neutral attitudes, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the contention that the migrants will bring new ideas to Korean society and thus contribute positively to social development. Until now, when we think of foreigners who stay permanently in Korea, we have usually thought of only the marriage migrants or the foreign nationals seeking to settle in their ancestral country. Particularly, there was a strong tendency to view marriage migrants as prospective Koreans who live with Korean spouses and give birth to half-Korean children, thereby forming a connection through blood even though the marriage migrants are not from the same lineage. For this reason, it is true that our interest in marriage migrants and multicultural families has been greater compared to other migrant groups. However, as discussed above, the race, purpose of residence, political history, and economic backgrounds of migrants seeking to settle in Korean society are diversifying and disparate, and this trend is expected to continue for the time being. Furthermore, the migrant groups that have already started to take root in Korea are building their own self-sufficient communities spatially, politically,

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and culturally. Immigrants are no longer strangers who provide labor and return to their home countries, but are very likely to stay permanently in Korea as our neighbors, colleagues and friends. Immigrants from the same ethnic group are living together in specific areas, and their ways of life are gradually embedded in Korean society. As a result, migration at the individual level is now extending to problems to be solved at the community level in the process of adaptation. The fact that communities built on the basis of foreign settlements are on the rise demands the introspection that the way we view them should be different from the past. We should stop considering migrants only as a temporary labor force and instead acknowledge them as members of our society, thus cultivating a system and culture that properly suits them. And now is the time to consider social integration not just at the individual level of adaptation, but at the community level (Park et al., 2016). It is necessary to seriously reflect how to live well together, with the realization that ethnic enclaves and self-sufficient communities are already formed and there will be more diversification in the future. The approach to immigration research should also be changed. So far, we have had a strong tendency to set the unit of observation as individuals who are struggling to live in Korean society when dealing with immigration issues for various reasons. Our attention has been focused only on questions that target people, such as how close migrants can come to being Koreans and part of Korean society, and thus projecting our perspectives into research and policy. However, if a state of harmonious co-existence with both migrants and Koreans is the end goal, that is, if we agree that immigrant social integration of a multitude of cultures is the ultimate aim that Korean society should pursue, the current paradigm—individual migrants and migrant communities separated from Korean society—must be shifted. Since an independent society full of realities we do not well understand has already formed in the migrant community, and if we cannot read the lives and thoughts of migrants through an intrinsic approach, the results of the study will remain at a superficial level and the immigrant social integration policy created based on such studies will only be fruitless. What are the actions needed for migrants and Koreans to live well together? The two most important steps would be to close the socioeconomic gap between migrants and Koreans and to recognize the cultural differences. Considering the experiences of countries that welcomed immigrants beforehand, the socioeconomic gaps as well as immigrants’ generational poverty problems are always present, but gradually decrease over time (Waldinger, 2001). However, cultural differences do not diminish as easily by rather reinforcing misunderstandings and prejudices by building cultural barriers as time moves on. The development of a migrant community and an increase in their level of economic independence does not mean that they will be able to live in harmony with Koreans. According to Hollinger (2006), the formation of community does not necessarily lead to solidarity. While the concept of a community contains only the meaning of a collective classification of people who share racial or cultural characteristics, solidarity requires members to practice and commit to the community regardless of one’s background. Given this context, are we mature

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enough to overcome the existing predominately fixed identity and pursue solidarity with migrants? As citizens of the so-called global era, are we ready to move beyond the framework of the traditional politics of recognition and the politics of distribution to the politics of solidarity? Do governments and social institutions have the capacity to support such action? Can we confidently say ‘yes’ to any of those questions? As the number of migrants settling in Korean society increases, nationalism and racial identity are strengthened and we become more used to distinguishing them from us (Kim et al., 2013a, 2013b). In addition, as the frequency of contact grows and the content of contact deepens, conflicts in everyday life increase and misunderstandings and prejudices about differences are intensifying. Exacerbating matters, Koreans’ low level of tolerance turn doubts and concerns about migrants into convictions. What actions should we take? There are no policies or programs that can transform society in a short period of time. In order to successfully implement the right social integration policy related to the acceptance of migrants, there is an urgent need for civic education to resolve the prejudices against migrants that are prevalent in our society. Long-term planning for improving citizenship and enhancing multicultural susceptibility must commence immediately. Such a plan is particularly significant for the younger generation, who are the protagonists of our future. In sum, the prospect of immigrant social integration is promising, but only when and if we change.

References Castles, S., de, H. H. G., & Miller, M. J. (2009). The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. Red Globe Press. Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y. M. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: An analysis of data from the General Social Survey. The Social Science Journal, 38(2), 177–188. https:// doi.org/10.1016/s0362-3319(01)00106-9 Edin, P.-A., Fredriksson, P., & Aslund, O. (2003). Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants–evidence from a natural experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 329–357. https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535225 Fetzer, J. S. (2000). Public attitudes toward immigration in the United States, France, and Germany (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. Heitgerd, J. L., & Bursik, R. J., Jr. (1987). Extra community dynamics and the ecology of delinquency. American Journal of Sociology, 92, 775–787. Hollinger, D. A. (2006). From identity to solidarity. Daedalus, 135(4), 23–31. https://doi.org/10. 1162/daed.2006.135.4.23 Jung K. (2013). Survey on the living conditions of foreign workers. Ministry of Justice. Kim, E., Lee, A., & Lee, E. (2013a). The social integration of married immigrant women and differentiation in its policy demand. Korea Womens Policy Institute. Kim, S., Shin, I., Ha, S., & Jeong, K. (2013b). Measuring social distance using knowledge space theory: The case of South Korea. Korea Journal of Population Studies, 36(1), 1–20. Kim, S. (2015). Social Distance toward immigrant among Koreans. Journal of Contemporary Korean Studies, 2(2), 45–67. Kim, S., Jeong, K., Lee, J., & Ha, H. (2011). Labor migration and challenges of social integration policy. Korea Womens Policy Institute.

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Kim, S., Kim, K., Bae, Y., & Han, S. (2015a). Types of internet use and turnover among KoreanChinese workers in Korea. Korea Journal of Population Studies, 38(1), 105–124. Kim, S., Yang, J., & Noh, M. (2015b). What made the civic type of national identity more important among Koreans? A comparison between 2003 and 2010. Development and Society. Lee, J., & Kim, S. (2011). Resettlement process of returning foreign workers. Human Resources Development Service of Korea. Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. (2012). National survey of multicultural families 2012. Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. (2014a). National survey of multicultural families 2014. Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. (2014b). National survey of international marriage 2014. Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. (2018). National survey of multicultural families 2018. Ministry of Justice. (2019). Korea immigration service statistics. Korea Immigration Service. Park S.-H. (2010). Ethnic places in South Korea: Historical development and socio-spatial transformation. Journal of the Korean Urban Management Association, 23(1), 69–100. Park, H., Kim, S., & Lee, S. (2016). Native Koreans’ attitudes toward immigrants in ethnic enclaves. Korean Party Studies Review, 15(2), 105–138. Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1), 133–145. https://doi.org/ 10.1162/003465301750160108 Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). European opinion about immigration: The role of identities, interests and information. British Journal of Political Science, 37(3), 477–504. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0007123407000257 Waldinger, R. D. (2001). Strangers at the gates: New immigrants in urban America. University of California Press. Wilson, W. J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 3

Religious Landscape in Korea Jibum Kim and Sori Kim

Abstract Jibum Kim and Sori Kim provided key facts about the Korean religious landscape in the first 20 years of the twenty-first century, taking place after the remarkable growth of religions in the second half of the twentieth century. Joining the secularization debate mainly discussed in Western countries, they suggest that almost all religious items appear to indicate the weakening of religions, and not a single item points to strengthening. In other words, the period of growth of religion seems to have ended. In addition, they found that the change of official religion does not lead to an increase or decrease in nonofficial religion. Keywords Secularization · Religious affiliation · Religious participation · Religious beliefs · Confidence in religious leaders

1 Introduction The current religious landscape in Korea is different from that in the past. In 2018, according to the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), there are 19% Buddhists, 20% Protestants, 12% Catholics, 1% other religious groups, and 48% religiously unaffiliated people. Korea is the only country in the world with similarly large percentages of people who identify with Buddhism or Protestantism and is the most Protestant country in Asia in terms of population percentage (Baker, 2020). This current religious context is unique; historically, folk religion (Shamanism), Buddhism, and Confucianism were the three main religious traditions in pre-modern Korea. Although Korean people do not consider either folk religion or Confucianism a religion (Baker, 2017), they have had a major impact on Korean religions. Each religion dominates during a specific period of time, such as Buddhism in Silla (668– 935) and Koryo (918–1392) dynasties and Confucianism in the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910) (Grayson, 2002). With the introduction of Catholicism in 1784 and Protestantism in 1884, Koreans were introduced to a monotheistic god for the first J. Kim (B) · S. Kim Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Kim (ed.), A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5829-0_3

51

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time. Still, in 1960, fewer than 6% of Korean were Buddhists, and less than 6% were Christians. Along with modernization, industrialization, and urbanization in the mid-1960s to the 1970s, Buddhists and Protestants started to increase rapidly, and Catholics started to increase in the early 1980s (Lee & Suh, 2017). Koreans became more religious from 1985 to 1995, but, from 1995 to 2005, the growth of Buddhists and Protestants slightly declined and the number of Catholics continuously increased (Kim et al., 2009).1 The future growth of Eastern and Western religions in Korea is uncertain. Secularization has been a major topic of religion in modern society, positing religion is decreasing in influence on life due to modernization. Secularization is defined as the decline of religious belief and practice, belief in God and the afterlife, or of religious authority (Chaves, 1994). According to Inglehart (2020), from 1981 to 2007, people in many countries became more religious, while from 2007 and 2009, people in these countries became less religious. This shift in religion lends support to secularization. In a similar vein, Voas and Chaves (2016) showed that there is no indication of the upward trend of religious beliefs and practices in the United States, which once was known as a counterexample of secularization in the West due to high religiosity, and the driving force behind secularization is cohort replacement. In Korea, two distinctive points regarding secularization should be noted. First, as Barker (2013) highlighted, Koreans did not conceive of a Christian-like god in pre-modern times, and they participated in religious rituals without identifying themselves as members of a particular group. This helps explain the different paths toward secularization: “The West moved from a faith-based society in which faith was unquestioned to one in which faith can be questioned, while Korea moved from a ritual-based society to a society in which faith is playing an increasingly important role” (Barker, 2013: 191). In other words, the growth of the religious population is a recent phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century and occurred concurrently with rapid industrialization and modernization. If we consider that most Koreans started to identify themselves with a specific religion in this time of high existential insecurity, it might be too early to fully test a secularization thesis. Second, folk religion in Korea not only strongly influences Buddhism and Christianity, but also has been a fundamental part of Korean culture, through practices such as divination and fortune-telling (Kim, 2005a; Yoo, 2017). Due to the prevalence of this nonofficial religion, also known as “common,” “folk,” or “popular” religion (McGuire, 2002: 113), Kim (2005a) suggested that it must be included in the secularization debate. The relationship between official and nonofficial religions is complex. On the one hand, people who identified with an official religion might not believe in 1

Starting in 1985, the Korean census performed every 10 years has asked one religious question about affiliation. The 2015 census results showed 15.5% Buddhists, 19.7% Protestants, 7.9% Catholics, and 56.1% no religion among the Korean population. These statistics puzzled many religious scholars and leaders because they are not consistent with previous census figures. For example, the percentage of Buddhists dropped from 22.9% in 2005 to 15.5%. This controversy was attributed to several factors including change of survey features, such as adoption of internet mode, in 2015, but this controversy was not fully resolved. Ultimately, the Korean Statistical office decided not to release the religious identification question in the census microdata.

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

53

nonofficial religion. On the other hand, people who believe in official religion might be more likely to believe in nonofficial religion due to spiritual commonality (Rice, 2003). In other words, the secularization of official religion can either increase or decrease nonofficial religion. This chapter presented a summary of recent changes and continuities in religious beliefs and practices in twenty-first century Korea, with special emphasis on different religious groups. The Korean case can add knowledge to the secularization debate, which is lacking in non-Western countries (Norris & Inglehart, 2011: 4S; Gorski & Altinordu, 2008). Korea provides a unique religious context to examine the secularization thesis because it has a long tradition of religious syncretism among folk religions, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity, without a single dominant religion. This study intentionally analyzes various religious topics that are discussed widely in Western religious literature (Voas & Bruce, 2019; Chaves, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Although this study is descriptive, not explanatory, and uses data from a relatively short time period, it is timely and appropriate because previous descriptive studies on the religious landscape of Korea (Kim, 2002, 2005a; Kim et al., 2009) are outdated and do not cover wide ranges of religious topics. This chapter has three parts. In Part 1, we briefly outline the characteristics of folk religion, Buddhism, Confucianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism in Korea. We selectively discuss a few studies relevant to our subject2 as a foundation for understanding the results of the analysis. Against this background, in Part 2, using data from the 2003–2018 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), we analyze diverse religious topics, such as affiliation, service participation, confidence in leaders and organizations, number of organizations, attitudes toward groups, and religious and non-religious beliefs. Since only the four items religious affiliation, church (temple) attendance, strength of religious affiliation, and confidence in religious leaders were included in every survey, we could not examine every item every survey year. Additionally, we used some items of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) modules from 2008 and 2018. Both of these cross-national data sets are part of the KGSS. Lastly, we include statistics provided by the Korean National Statistical Office. Moreover, when possible, our analysis examined the differences of religious groups on religious beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. We believe that focusing on the differences between religious groups and official and unofficial religious items provides a more nuanced understanding of the Korean religious context.

2

For more detailed history of Korean religion, see Huntley Grayson’s “Korea-A Religious History” (2002).

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2 Religions in Korea: Folk Religion, Buddhism, Confucianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism Folk religion is an essential foundation on which to understand the religiosity and spirituality of Koreans because it has influenced Buddhism, Confucianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism (Grayson, 2002: 230). Folk religion is an indigenous religion that does not have institutionalized doctrines but is centered on rituals. Shamans (spiritpossessed or hereditarily passed on), almost all of whom are women, perform rituals to invite the gods to solve people’s worldly needs. A Shaman mediates between people and gods appropriate to the domain of need rather than to the supreme god. Yim et al. (1989) summarized the characteristics of the gods of Shamanism. First, there are more than 300 gods, each reigning over a specific realm, such as the Seven Star god who regulates the lifespan. Second, “the gods are perceived not primarily as objects of admiration and respect but as tools with which to satisfy one’s desires” (Yim et al., 1989: 338). Since one’s fate is determined by gods, individuals believe that if they treat gods well, the gods will fulfill their wishes, cure disease, and resolve misfortunes. Despite the oppression of Shamanism in the Chosun period where Confucianism ruled, during Japanese colonization and in the modern period, Korean shamanism has survived as an integral part of Korean culture. Another role of Shamans is fortune-telling or divination. Divination is conducted by either a spirit-possessed shaman or a scriptural diviner. Unlike shamans, the scriptural diviner uses the Four pillars of destiny, which are based on the year, month, day, and time of individual birth in the lunar year to predict one’s future life. The core concept of gods and rituals affected the Eastern and Western religions imported into Korea, and they have coexisted with other religions. Even today, for example, a couple planning marriage receives a divination regarding their married life. The findings of divination continue to be as influential on the marriage as it was in the past. Between 1984 and 2014, about 37% of Koreans thought that it was better not to get married if the divination was bad (Gallup Korea, 2015). Buddhism was introduced first in the late fourth century when the Three Kingdoms fought to gain control of Korea, and remained a major religion for a thousand years. Korean’s adoption of Buddhism is related to worldly concerns, such as political power and healing. Especially, in the period of the Three Kingdoms and Shilla, Buddhism played a major role in people’s concern about health and healing, attracting many Korean people to Buddhism (Baker, 1994). Koryo maintained Buddhism as a state religion that underwent demise at the end of the Koryo dynasty due to corruption and power struggles. With the coming of a new Chosun dynasty that saw Confucianism as a state religion, Buddhism and folk religion were oppressed as not productive for society, although they remained as important religions among the lower class and women. For instance, temples were not allowed to be built in the city, and monks were not allowed to enter the capital city (Nathan, 2017: 102). Buddhism teaches inclusivism that incorporates the aspects of shamanism tradition. Buddhis temples include shrines of mountain god or the Big Dipper. Furthermore, traditionally, monks have played an important role as geomancy expert and

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

55

fortune tellers (Leverrier, 1972) as well as healers (Baker, 1994). In the modern period, however, monks rarely performed these roles and emphasize the core doctrines of Buddha and the experience of enlightenment. Fewer and fewer people are entering into the Buddhist order, with the number of candidates for monks or nuns continuously decreasing from 510 (282 males, 228 females) in 1993 to 151 (94 males and 57 females) in 2017 (Kim et al., 2019). Confucianism was a state ideology for 500 years before modernization. However, from the late nineteenth century to the modern period, Confucianism has been criticized (Robinson, 1991) as a useless tradition against foreign intrusion, especially Japanese colonization, and a barrier to modernization. Although values and principles of Confucianism have changed and weakened, Koreans continue to value Confucian traditions, such as harmonious social relations and ancestral rites, as a manifestation of filial piety. Despite the substantial effect on their lives, few Koreans identify themselves as Confucians. In the Korean census in 1985, about 480,000 people identified with Confucianism, while only about 76,000 did so in 2015. It is the only religion comprised of more males than females (45,390 vs. 30,313). Despite the small number of respondents who identified as Confucian in the census, in the 2016 KGSS, when respondents were asked “(Regardless of your religious affiliation) do you consider yourself a Confucian?”, about 51% said they did. Among religious groups, 66% of Buddhists, 39% of Protestants, 61% of Catholics, and 47% of nonreligious considered themselves Confucian. There is a link between Confucianism and Shamanism. Many Confucian scholars are experts in geomancy and use it to identify auspicious locations, such as a new capital of Chosun, or a King’s or ancestor’s grave site (Yoon, 2007). The Bureau of Astronomy has chosen dates, times, and places for numerous rituals. For example, when a prince needed to be moved to a new burial site, the auspicious date was chosen for the relocation as well as for “lowering the coffin into the grave and sealing” (Park, 2018). Catholicism and Protestantism were differently integrated into Korean culture. Catholicism was the first Christian religion in Korea, founded in 1784 in the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910), when Korean people were non-theists or polytheists. “Catholics were the first group in Korea to place a religious label on ordinary laypeople” (Baker, 2017:5). Acceptance and survival of Catholicism was difficult partly because of Koreans’ unfamiliarity with monotheism and partly because of prohibition of core ancestral rites of Confucianism, which were considered idolatrous rituals (Baker, 2006: 286–289). In addition, the series of Catholic persecutions in 1791, 1801, 1839, and 1866, especially the persecution of 8,000 people in 1866, was devasting effect on the growth of Catholicism. In the 1960s, Catholicism was fully Koreanized in terms of the number, characteristics, and leadership of priests or nuns (Koreans instead of foreigners) and in language (Korean instead of Latin) in major ritual (Baker, 2013). Furthermore, Catholicism took an active role in social issues, such as democratization or environmental movements. These factors provided underpinnings for Catholic growth. A reporter wrote that it might be a bizarre to foreigners to “spot the countless neon red crosses sprinkled across the Seoul skyline,” contrary to their expectation of Koreans being Buddhists or

56

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Confucianists.3 Protestantism, mainly that of evangelicals, which entered into Korea 100 years after the introduction of Catholicism, had unprecedented success. In addition to the rapid increase of the Protestant population from about 600,000 in 1960 to 9,670,000 in 2015, Korea sent out one of the largest international missionaries (Johnson et al., 2013), comprising 14,896 people in 2006 and 28,039 in 2019 (Korean World Mission Association, https://www.missionews.co.kr/news/581786). Furthermore, of the top 30 global Protestant churches with weekly attendance 30,000 and above, Korea is home to seven, including the first megachurch, which has a 480,000 weekly attendance.4 The unusual growth of Protestantism has gained attention from many religious scholars (Grayson, 2001; Kim, 2005b), and there are many attempts to explain why Christianity is practiced more widely in Korea than in other East Asian countries. First, the Chosun Dynasty faced with foreign forces and domestic problem from mid1850s could not function properly to handle the turmoil. Under this circumstance, Christianity is considered as “an agent of modernization” (Park, 2000: 507) for the transformation of society, contrasted with Confucianism, a backward-looking religion. Second, unlike China and Japan, where Christianity is a vanguard of Western threat against nationalist rituals, in Korea, Christianity is considered as representing Western power to help fight against the Japanese colonizer (Kane & Park, 2009; Park, 2000). Thirdly, Lee and Suh (2017) emphasized the state-building process in that the military dictator promoted Christianity and Buddhism to establish rapid modernization and economic development while suppressing the folk religion as superstition. Fourth, Protestantism incorporated many aspects of Korean traditional religious and cultural tradition, such as Shamanism and Confucianism. According to Grayson (2009), from the early stage of the introduction of Protestants has continuously adapted and modified a Christian liturgy to maintain ancestral worship rituals, creating chudoyebe, an anniversary of parental death. For example, Protestant leaders linked ancestral rites with the Fifth commandment, “honor your father and your mother.” This creative amalgam of seemingly uncompromisable values was considered a backbone of the early success and later growth of Christianity in Korea. Lastly, Korean clergy selectively chose and underscored the contents of the Bible to fit the worldly success, faith-healing, and miracles of Shamanism and the family values of Confucianism (Kim, 2000; Suh, 2019). Despite the success of Protestantism and its contribution to modernization, of the three major religious groups, Protestants hold exclusive beliefs, and the religious authority seems to be in trouble. There have been many incidents in which Protestants have attempted to destroy Buddhist temples (Yoon & Jones, 2017). Also, Protestant pastors were involved in many more scandals than monks or priests (Kim et al., 2010; Lee, 2006) and opposed paying income taxes that were exempted for pastors, monks, and priests in 1948. In addition, currently, some Protestant churches have been clusters of COVID-19 because they were uncooperative with government guidelines (Lee & Oh, 2021; Kim, 2020), which appeared to damage their religious authority. 3 4

https://www.koreaexpose.com/facts-south-korea-foreigners-not-believe/. https://leadnet.org/world/.

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

57

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018 Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No Religion

Fig. 1 Religious affiliation, 2003–2018, three-year moving average

3 Religious Belief, Practice, and Attitude 3.1 Religious Affiliation Religious affiliation has been one of the most widely used indicators for the debate about secularization. Figure 1 illustrates the three-year moving average of religious affiliation from 2003 to 2018. People who are not affiliated with religion is the largest group, followed by Protestants, Buddhists, Catholics, and other religious groups (not shown in Fig. 1). Over the same period, there is a decrease in Buddhists, stability of Protestants and other religious groups, and a slight increase of Catholics and the unaffiliated. The percentage difference between Buddhists and Protestants is small. By looking at the increasing number of the unaffiliated, Korea seems to be moving toward secularization. It is important to note that, however, this secularization involves a decreasing proportion of Buddhists rather than of Christians.5 In 2008 and 2018, family religious backgrounds were a question of the survey. Based on pooling of two years of the ISSP, Table 1 presents the relationship between childhood religious upbringing and current religious identification. Not surprisingly,

5

There is difference in the order of differences in religious affiliation and church/temple attendance between 2003–2004 and 2005–2018. In 2003–2004, religious affiliation is based on church attendance and then strength. But from 2005, church attendance was asked first, followed by affiliation and strength of affiliation.

58

J. Kim and S. Kim

Table 1 Current religious identification by religion of origin (%) Current religious affiliation

Religion of origin Buddhism

Protestantism

Catholicism

None

Buddhism

48.2

3.4

3.5

11.5

Protestantism

12.6

70.2

3.5

16.6

Catholicism

5.4

3.9

69.2

7.2

None

33.7

22.4

23.8

64.7

N

848

410

172

972

for all religious groups, religious origin is associated with current religious identification. The stability of religious affiliation is stronger for Protestants, Catholics, and None than it is for Buddhists. Almost 70% of Protestants and Catholics maintain their religion of origin, while slightly less than 50% of people who grew up in Buddhist family religious background maintain that religion. Religious switching is more likely from Buddhist to Christianity than from Christianity to Buddhism. For example, of those who grew up in Buddhist family background, about 13% became Protestants and 5% Catholics, whereas less than 5% of people whose childhood upbringing was Protestant or Catholic became Buddhist. Also, while about one of five people originating in a Protestant or Catholic religion became non-religious, one of three people with a Buddhist upbringing became unaffiliated. In sum, although people with religion or the unaffiliated are more likely to retain their family religious affiliation, intergenerational transmission of religion is stronger among Protestants or Catholics than among Buddhists. Another important indicator of secularization is the strength of religious affiliation among those who identified with religion because religious organizations need the commitment of followers. We examined the changes of Korean’s strength of religious affiliation by religious group. Of those who are affiliated with religion, intensity was rated as strong, somewhat strong, and not strong. Figure 2 displays the trend of Koreans who report a strong (strong and somewhat strong) affiliation with their religion. Over the period, Protestants more than Buddhists and Catholics reports a strong religious affiliation. The gap between Protestants and the two other religious groups identifying strong affiliation has narrowed in recent years. For Protestants, strong affiliation with their religion has decreased. Meanwhile, for Buddhists and Catholics, there is little change among those who report a strong affiliation with their religion.

3.2 Religious Participation: Church/Temple Attendance Religious service attendance is the most widely used indicator of religiosity other than religious affiliation in cross-national surveys (Brenner, 2016). Such attendance measures commitment to religious organizations and sense of belonging and identity.

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

59

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018 Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

Fig. 2 Strength of religious affiliation, 2003–2018, three-year moving average

Table 2 reveals at least weekly attendance of Buddhists, Protestants, and Catholics based on the 2008 and 2018 ISSP data. We select countries with religious groups reporting attendance of 100 or more. As we expected, four Asian countries of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have the largest number of Buddhists. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, there is little change of weekly attendance from 2008 to 2018, and, in 2018, the attendance of a religious service at least once a week was 1% in Japan, 6% in Korea, and 11% in Taiwan. Attendance might not appropriately measure the strength of religiosity among Buddhists. For example, in Korea, most temples are located in mountain areas. For Protestants, Korea shows the highest weekly attendance in 2018, 72% followed by 54% in Taiwan, 42% in the US, 38% in Chile, 16% in England, and 8% in Switzerland. It is not known whether Korean weekly attendance is exaggerated as in the Western countries or if the Korean figure is more exaggerated than the Western figure. Regardless of the level of exaggeration, as Chaves (2011) put it, “the exaggeration arises mainly because people want to tell interviewers truthfully that they consider themselves to be religiously involved.” Over the study decade, there is little change of weekly attendance in these countries. For Catholics, Korea’s weekly attendance was 48% in 2008, less than the 55% of Poland but greater than the 41% of Dominican Republic, 47% of Ireland, 46% of Philippines, and 40% in Slovakia. Korea is only historically non-predominant Catholic country that has a greater than 40% weekly attendance. The overall trend over the study period does not reveal any increase across the countries.

–

2

–

Chile

–

–

2.3

–

Japan

Latvia

–

394

0

–

–

0.0

Israel

Italy

1

0.0

Ireland

–

–

–

–

Hungary

Iceland

–

–

Germany

–

–

–

–

Finland

7

2

France

0.0

England

50.0

–

Dominican Republic

Denmark

–

–

Czech Republic

–

0.0

–

Croatia

Cyprus

–

–

–

Belgium

Bulgaria

34

–

5.9

–

Australia

9.9

–

87.5

0.0

31.3

–

2.8

4.5

20.7

2.7

18.9

51.5

2.1

6.9

100.0

50.0

39.6

–

30.0

2.5

15.2

weekly %

223

–

8

3

64

–

213

559

29

856

1,135

357

1,597

58

1

2

250

–

10

40

480

N

2008 Protestant

weekly %

N

2008 Buddhist

Austria

Country

18.5

–

32.3

13.3

46.5

–

10.5

15.3

12.8

-

36.5

41.1

0.0

12.6

33.3

23.2

14.6

–

9.5

19.3

16.8

weekly %

195

–

933

15

1,759

–

612

577

1,102

–

562

1,614

13

443

6

1,034

1,034

–

924

771

327

N

2008 Catholic

Table 2 Church or temple attendance, 2008 and 2018, ISSP (% at least once a week)

–

1.4

–

–

–

12.5

–

–

0.0

0.0

12.5

–

0.0

0.0

–

–

–

–

–

0.0

–

weekly %

–

440

–

–

–

8

–

–

1

1

8

–

2

1

–

–

–

–

–

1

–

N

2018 Buddhist

–

–

–

0.0

–

2.3

8.4

5.1

13.0

2.4

15.6

–

1.3

32.6

–

–

38.4

20.0

–

0.0

–

weekly %

–

–

–

2

–

782

190

565

23

744

256

–

1,220

43

–

–

224

25

–

60

–

N

2018 Protestant

–

–

–

40.0

–

20.6

7.2

10.0

9.9

0.0

26.2

–

22.2

16.8

–

17.5

12.5

0.0

–

10.4

–

–

–

–

15

–

34

543

491

365

7

107

–

9

374

–

796

763

1

–

703

–

N

(continued)

weekly %

2018 Catholic

60 J. Kim and S. Kim

10.0

New Zealand

4

2

–

6.5

25.0

0.0

South Africa

South Korea

0.0

United States

6

–

–

–

–

Thailand

390

13.3

Taiwan

Ukraine

8

37.5

–

–

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain

356

–

Slovenia

–

–

–

–

Slovak Republic

3

Slovakia

33.3

Russia

–

–

–

–

Poland

Portugal

–

–

Philippines

–

–

Norway

10

–

8

Mexico

–

N

12.5

weekly %

2008 Buddhist

Netherlands

Country

Table 2 (continued)

39.6

59.1

–

53.9

10.5

3.1

69.6

73.0

31.5

7.7

14.4

–

100.0

76.0

63.6

35.3

1.1

17.2

37.1

60.8

weekly %

652

22

–

76

428

798

23

389

1,716

13

125

–

1

25

11

17

833

297

415

97

N

2008 Protestant

27.9

30.4

–

22.2

13.4

8.3

18.6

48.1

25.5

20.4

40.1

–

0.0

22.2

54.5

46.1

0.0

30.5

8.2

25.1

weekly %

355

148

–

27

365

12

1,686

133

286

773

768

–

3

851

1,073

965

7

131

497

1,125

N

2008 Catholic

25.0

–

12.2

10.9

0.0

0.0

12.5

5.8

–

0.0

–

–

0.0

–

–

0.0

0.0

0.0

–

–

weekly %

8

–

1,321

247

22

6

8

191

–

2

–

–

3

–

–

1

10

27

–

–

N

2018 Buddhist

41.8

–

71.4

53.5

7.7

3.5

60.0

72.3

–

7.7

–

14.7

45.5

–

–

66.3

5.0

–

–

–

weekly %

522

–

7

101

610

1,159

35

202

–

13

–

116

11

–

–

83

820

–

–

–

N

2018 Protestant

27.6

–

100.0

34.8

9.6

20.0

18.4

45.2

–

16.5

–

27.0

16.7

–

–

36.5

19.4

31.9

–

–

301

–

1

23

710

20

1,090

124

–

635

–

729

6

–

–

928

31

138

–

–

N

(continued)

weekly %

2018 Catholic

3 Religious Landscape in Korea 61

7.7

Total

1,227

0

–

0.0

–

N

Uruguay

weekly %

2008 Buddhist

Venezuela

Country

Table 2 (continued)

20.1

80.5

45.0

weekly %

12,082

128

131

N

2008 Protestant

26.7

25.0

8.8

weekly %

22,482

832

524

N

2008 Catholic

9.1

–

–

weekly %

2,308

–

–

N

2018 Buddhist

11.5

–

–

weekly %

7,813

–

–

N

2018 Protestant

18.4

–

–

weekly %

8,944

–

–

N

2018 Catholic

62 J. Kim and S. Kim

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

63

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018 Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No Religion

Fig. 3 Weekly church or temple attendance, 2003–2018, three-year moving average

In sum, Korean Protestants show the highest weekly attendance and Korean Catholics one of the highest across nations. Having known the attendance level of one Korean religious group compared with that of other countries, Fig. 3 displays a more detailed trend of at least once-a-week church (temple) attendance by religious group. The church attendance of Protestants has not dwindled, and Buddhists’ church attendance is relatively stable. However, a clear downward trend of church attendance is noted among Catholics. Although not shown here, about 13% of Buddhists, 8% of Protestants, and 19% of Catholics have never attended church (temple). Despite Korean Catholics exhibiting the highest church attendance compared with those in other countries, as shown in Table 2, the downward trend of at least once-a-week church (temple) attendance as well as “never” attendance has implications for the future growth of Catholicism.

3.3 Religious Affiliation, Church Attendance, Strength of Affiliation by Cohorts Given that cohort replacement is important for secularization, using the pooled 2003 to 2018 data, we examined the cohort differences in religious affiliation, strength of association, and church attendance in Table 3. If we first look at religious affiliation, older cohorts are more religious than younger cohorts. Especially, compared with other cohorts, the clear majority of the youngest cohort (1991–2000) is unaffiliated.

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J. Kim and S. Kim

Of religious groups, there has been a substantial decrease of the youngest cohort who identified as Buddhists, from three of 10 people born in 1961–1970 to one of 10 people born in 1991–2000. But, Protestants slightly decrease, and there is almost no change among Catholics. If we look at the youngest cohort (1991–2000), the percentage of Buddhists (11%) is half that of Protestants (20%) and similar to the level of Catholics (10%). Having noted that cohort differences on religious affiliation vary by religious group, we examined the subjective strength of religious affiliation across cohorts. Regardless of religious group, in general, younger cohorts are less likely to have strong strength of religious affiliation than older cohorts. But in terms of strength of religious affiliation, the Protestants are higher than Catholics, who are higher than Buddhists. Unlike the overall stability of religious affiliation among Protestants and Catholics as shown in Fig. 1, those born after 1970 are much less likely to attend church. Across cohorts, Protestants are more likely to attend church than are Catholics, but the attendance gap between Protestants and Catholics is getting bigger for younger cohorts. For example, there is about 42%p striking difference of church attendance between the youngest cohort of Protestants and Catholics. Furthermore, among Catholics, there is a remarkable 56%p difference between the cohort born before 1951 and the youngest cohort.

3.4 Religious Leaders/Religious Organizations Religious organizations have been known as a vehicle for religious growth in Korea. Baker (2006: 297–298). Figure 4 displays the trend of religious organization from 1993 to 2018 reported by the Korean National Statistical Office. The total number of religious organizations has remarkably increased from 38,782 in 1993, 63,328 in 2003, 74,491 in 2013, and 73,994 in 2018. However, between 1993 and 2003 compared to the years between 2003 to 2013, the growth has slowed for all of these religious organizations. All religious organizations peaked in 2012, and the growth stalled after that. In 2012, the religious organizations were comprised of 18% Buddhist, 76% Protestant, 3% Catholic, and 3% other religious organizations; this slightly changed from 22% Buddhist, 72% Protestant, 4% Catholic, and 2% other religious organizations in 1993. Confidence in religious leaders has been used as an indicator of religious authority, which has been associated with religious growth (Kim et al., 2010). The KGSS asked a question about confidence in the leaders of 16 societal institutions: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” Overall, the three-year moving average of those who reported a great deal of confidence or only some confidence decreased from 69% for 2003–2005 to 55% for 2014–2018. During this period, of the 16 institutions, religious institutions were among the bottom three, above only

20.4 8.9 33.8 1,860

Catholic

No religion

N

43.7 36.2 1,216

Protestant

Catholic

N

82.4 76.9 0.2

86.0 75.6 0.0 1,723

Protestant

Catholic

No religion

N 1,927

6.7

6.4

1,369

23.6

32.1

17.2

2,047

32.2

9.8

23.6

34.4

Buddhist

Church or temple attendance (at least once a week)

26.0

Buddhist

Strength of religious affiliation (strong + somewhat)

36.9

Protestant

3,143

0.3

53.6

76.5

8.9

2,191

18.4

24.3

18.1

3,334

33.5

10.8

22.4

33.4

4,063

0.2

51.9

75.3

5.7

2,530

9.6

25.5

11.1

4,349

41.1

9.6

23.3

25.9

3,600

0.5

30.7

66.7

3.8

1,917

9.2

18.4

8.7

3,919

50.6

7.8

23.4

18.2

2,861

0.0

31.2

65.7

3.6

1,534

11.7

20.9

7.2

3,001

48.4

10.5

24.3

16.9

865

0.0

21.2

63.2

5.3

347

12.3

18.6

6.4

877

59.5

9.8

19.8

10.8

18,182

0.2

48.6

73.4

6.2

11,104

15.6

25.1

14.8

19,387

25.5

22.9

9.5

42.0

1910–1940 1941–1950 1951–1960 1961–1970 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 Total

Buddhist

Religious affiliation

Table 3 Religious affiliation, strength of religious affiliation, church or temple attendance by cohort, 2003–2018

3 Religious Landscape in Korea 65

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J. Kim and S. Kim

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

Protestant Org.

Catholic Org.

2017

2018

2015

2016

2013

2014

2012

2010

2011

2008

2009

2007

2006

2004

2005

2002

2003

2001

2000

1998

Buddhist Org.

1999

1997

1996

1995

1993

1994

0

Other Org.

Fig. 4 Number of religious organizations, 1993–2018

central government (57.1%) and congress (28.2%). Figure 5 shows the confidence (a great deal and only some) in the leaders of religious institutions by the religious group. Compared to the three-year average of 2003–2005, the three-year average of 2014–2018 of confidence in leaders in religious institutions decreased about 10%p for Protestants (88% to 78%) and Buddhists (72% to 61%), 8%p for Catholics (86% to 78%), and 18%p for None (52% to 36%). Protestants and Catholics similarly are more confident in religious leaders than are Buddhists or None. Although the majority of Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists has confidence in leaders of religious institutions, the declining trend of confidence in leaders of religious institutions among religious group and the sharp dip of religious none may not suggest the vitality of religious institutions. While Fig. 5 shows the trend of confidence in leaders of religious organizations, a slightly different question was asked in 2008 and 2018 ISSP. Table 4 shows the confidence in religious institutions with a 5-point response scale (1: complete confidence to 5: no confidence at all). In this period, confidence (complete/a great deal/some confidence) in religious institutions such as churches, temples, or cathedrals considerably declined: 15%p (73.2–58.1%) for Buddhists, 11%p (88.7–77.7%) for Protestants, 13%p (91.5–78.6%) for Catholics, and 18%p (46.0–27.6%) for the unaffiliated. The trend of confidence in religious institutions corroborates the findings about the trend of confidence in leaders of religious institutions. Despite different questions, the two indicators similarly support declining confidence in religious institutions.

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

67

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 2018 Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No Religion

Fig. 5 Confidence in religious leaders, 2003–2018

Table 4 Confidence in religious institutions in 2008 and 2018, ISSP Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No religion

2008

2018

2008

2018

2008

2018

2008

2018

Complete confidence

7.8

5.8

9.7

8.4

10.8

5.6

1.2

0.2

A great deal of confidence

13.1

12.6

25.1

20.3

28.5

10.3

5.5

2.5

Some confidence

52.2

39.8

53.8

49.0

52.3

62.7

39.2

24.9

Very little confidence

20.7

35.1

10.0

19.8

6.9

18.3

36.0

46.8

No confidence at all

6.1

6.8

1.3

2.5

1.5

3.2

18.1

25.6

N

358

191

390

202

130

126

581

489

3.5 Attitudes Toward Religious Groups Table 5 comes from the question “What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?” … Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Won Buddhists, Chondogyo, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Atheists or non-believers. Won Buddhis and Chondogyo are an indigenous Korean religion. The response categories range from very positive (1) to very negative (5), and we combined two positive categories of very positive and somewhat positive. If we look at the Total column, generally speaking, from 2008 to 2018, there is declining positivity toward all religious groups, while the positivity toward atheists or non-believers has slightly increased. As expected, Buddhists, Protestants, and Catholics are more likely to

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J. Kim and S. Kim

have positive attitudes toward their own religious group. Surprisingly, the positive attitude of each group toward its own religious group also has decreased, by about 9%p for Protestants, 5%p for Catholics, and 2%p for Buddhists. Catholics showed the highest positive attitudes toward their own group (87% in 2018) compared to Protestants (76% in 2018) or Buddhists (82% in 2018). One notable finding is that positive attitudes toward religious groups among the unaffiliated decreased for the three major religious groups, 7%p for Buddhists, 11%p for Catholics, and 8%p for Protestants. If we compare the positive attitudes of the four major groups toward each other in 2018, Buddhists are more likely to have positive views toward Catholics than toward Protestants, and the difference is about 28%p (15.2% vs. 43%). While Protestants have an about 23%p more positive attitude toward Catholics than Buddhists (56.2% vs. 33.3%), Catholics have a 39%p greater positive attitude toward Buddhists than Protestants (64% vs. 24.8%). Both Buddhists and Catholics have more positive attitudes toward atheists or non-believers than do Protestants. Regarding attitudes toward Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists, the unaffiliated are much less likely to have positive attitudes toward Protestants (9%) than toward Catholics (32%) and Buddhists (36%). Furthermore, of those with No religion, 19% of the unaffiliated Table 5 Positive attitudes toward religious groups by current religious affiliation (% of very and somewhat positive) Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No religion

Total %

N

2008

83.6

27.4

61.5

43.5

50.8

1,469

2018

82.0

33.3

64.0

36.4

48.0

1,006

2008

17.2

84.5

36.4

17.1

37.0

1,464

2018

15.2

75.9

24.8

8.7

25.5

1,004

Roman Catholicism

2008

44.8

59.4

92.3

43.3

52.3

1,466

2018

43.0

56.2

87.2

32.1

45.9

1,005

Atheists or non-believers

2008

23.5

17.5

23.2

28.9

24.0

1,446

2018

27.4

16.2

27.4

36.3

29.5

992

Won-Buddhism

2008

32.7

14.8

30.6

14.0

20.3

1,434

2018

30.4

18.9

28.5

12.9

19.3

979

The Cheondo religion

2008

19.3

9.9

21.8

10.0

13.3

1,417

2018

14.0

14.4

21.0

5.3

10.7

961

Muslims

2008

14.2

11.3

22.0

8.2

11.7

1,412

2018

6.1

8.1

12.3

3.2

5.9

973

2008

13.2

9.9

21.3

7.0

10.6

1,411

2018

7.3

6.2

12.4

3.0

5.6

964

2008

13.0

13.0

26.2

7.0

11.7

1,413

2018

6.7

13.5

14.3

4.7

8.0

962

Buddhist Protestant

Hindus Jews

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

69

have positive attitudes toward Won Buddhists, 11% for Chondogyo, 6% for Muslims, 6% for Hindus, and 8% for Jews. In conclusion, Protestants are the least positively evaluated religious group, and this could not be a sign of strength of Protestantism.

3.6 Religious Beliefs Table 6 shows the distribution of diverse religious beliefs, such as believe in god, life after death, heaven, hell, religious miracles, and supernatural powers of deceased ancestors by the religious group. Overall, about 30–40% of Koreans definitely and probably believe in these beliefs in 2018, which is a 5 to 9%p decrease from 2008. Koreans are less likely to believe in the supernatural power of ancestors than in other religious beliefs. By religious group, there are large differences in these beliefs. Regarding beliefs in heaven and hell, life after death, and religious miracles, the change is modest for Buddhists, Protestants, and the unaffiliated. The most striking change is the 12%p drop for belief in heaven and the 14%p drop in belief of hell among Catholics. There is a hierarchy of belief in these items across religious groups. For example, 81% of Protestants, 63% of Catholics, 41% of Buddhists, and only 17% of the No religious believe in heaven. The belief in the supernatural power of ancestors, which is distinctively different from belief in life after death, heaven, hell, and religious miracles, showed that, compared with 2008, Buddhists, Catholics, and Religious none accept this belief less in 2018 but, surprisingly, not Protestants. This belief is the most accepted among Buddhists and the least accepted among Protestants and Catholics. Also, unlike other religious beliefs, supernatural powers of deceased ancestors are accepted in the order of Buddhists, Catholics, No religion, and Protestants. Similar Table 6 Religious/nonreligious beliefs in 2008 and 2018 (% definitely and probably believe in) Buddhist

Protestant

Catholic

No religion

Total

2008

2018

2008

2018

2008

2018

2008

2018

2008

2018

Believe in god

54.7

51.1

87.2

87.3

77.2

74.8

14.8

8.9

49.7

41.2

Life after death

47.4

43.2

78.1

75.0

69.2

63.2

27.4

25.9

49.6

43.5

Heaven

42.2

40.8

84.7

80.5

75.2

63.2

23.2

16.5

48.9

39.6

Hell

38.4

42.9

81.9

79.6

72.9

58.9

21.3

16.1

46.3

39.1

Religious miracles

34.4

32.8

76.3

77.5

62.8

57.1

12.0

9.8

39.2

33.5

Supernatural power of ancestors

53.6

45.6

17.3

22.1

45.4

31.5

30.0

23.8

33.8

28.6

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J. Kim and S. Kim

percentages of No religion believe in life after death and the supernatural power of ancestors. Along with the lack of growth of religious organizations in recent years (Fig. 4), the number of divination service businesses, employees, and revenues has declined. For example, according to the Korean Statistical Information Service, the fortunetelling industry is worth 164 million US dollars in 9,421 businesses employing 10,629 people in 2018, which is a decline from 252 million US dollars in 14,715 businesses employing 15,777 employees in 2008.6 Does the trend of organizational aspects of nonofficial religion align well with the trend of nonofficial religious beliefs? Table 7 presents the results of three questions related to unofficial religion, which are asked twice in the KGSS. Unfortunately, the questions about fortune teller and four pillars of destiny used different scales, prohibiting tracking of change. However, the relative positions of religious group toward these items can be estimated. In 2018, 11% of Koreans agree (strongly and somewhat agree) that “some fortune tellers really can foresee the future,” and about 21% of Koreans agree that “the Four pillars of Destiny determines a person’s life.” In terms of attitude toward the capability of fortune tellers, Buddhism is distinctively different from other religious groups, and there are very slight differences among Protestants, Catholics, and the unaffiliated. Also, in 2018, all religious groups except Protestants are twice as likely to believe in the Four Pillars of Destiny as a driving force of one’s life than in the ability of fortune tellers. One-third of Buddhists and almost one of five Catholics and the unaffiliated accept the power of the Four Pillars of Destiny, but only less than 10% of Protestants believe. Again, we see a relationship between religious groups and the Four Pillars of Destiny similar to that shown for fortune tellers. Lastly, if we assess the distribution of “care about auspicious or ominous day for special occasions such as wedding, moving, or funeral ceremony,” more than 30% of Koreans very and fairly much care about it. Over the study period, there is a slight but not significant decrease across religious groups toward caring about auspicious or ominous day for a special event. The relationship between religious group and two nonofficial religious beliefs, “four pillars of destiny” and “auspicious day,” Buddhists are five times more likely to believe than are Protestants, and Catholics and the unaffiliated are twice as likely to believe than are Protestants. In sum, believing in nonofficial religion varies by religious group.

6

An article, “In South Korea fortune-telling will soon be a $3.7bn business,” in Economist (2018) reported that there are an estimated $3.7 billion worth of fortune-telling business including 300,000 fortune-tellers and 150,000 shamans. However, these figures are not based on reliable sources and might be overestimated.

3 Religious Landscape in Korea

71

Table 7 Nonofficial religious beliefs by religious affiliation, 2008 & 2018 (%)

Buddhist

Fortune teller

Four pillars of destiny

Auspicious/ominous day

2008 4-point scale

2018 5-point scale

2008 4-point scale

2018 5-point scale

2008 4-point scale

2018 4-point scale

34.4

17.0

58.4

36.1

71.0

68.8

Protestant

13.4

10.3

19.9

7.9

15.4

13.8

Catholic

14.6

7.9

40.6

18.4

31.3

27.4

No religion

18.2

9.8

36.1

20.6

34.3

29.4

Total

20.6

11.1

37.7

20.8

38.1

33.5

N

1,466

1,012

1,463

1,012

1,475

1,009

Note For fortune teller and four pillars of destiny, 2008 used a 4-point scale and 2018 used a 5-point scale; For both scales, % agree combines strongly and somewhat agree. For Auspicious question, % combines very and fairly much

4 Conclusion We provided key facts about the Korean religious contours in the first 20 years of the twenty-first century, taking place after the remarkable growth of religions in the second half of the twentieth century. Joining the secularization debate mainly discussed in Western countries, our results suggest that Korea is experiencing a similar trend. While acknowledging the limitations of the data, such as the crossnational nature and the relatively short time period, almost all religious items appear to indicate the weakening of religions, and not a single item points to strengthening. The number of unaffiliated people has increased, and younger cohorts are noticeably more likely to be unaffiliated, less likely to have a strong association with a religious group, and less likely to participate in religious service. There is no increasing trend in the number of religious associations, and the confidence in religious leaders or religious organizations has substantially declined. In addition, the positive attitudes toward religious groups among the unaffiliated also have declined. Lastly, the change of official religion does not lead to an increase or decrease of nonofficial religion. At the risk of being proved incorrect, the findings of beliefs, practices, and attitudes as well as the declining number of organizations over the last twenty years suggest that the period of growth of religion seems to have ended. We examined nonofficial religion to analyze the ramifications of changes in official religion and its relationship with religious groups. About one in three Koreans believe in the supernatural power of ancestors and attend to auspicious and ominous days for special events, although there is no increase in the prevalence of these beliefs. Despite the sizable number of Korean people subscribed to nonofficial religion, the official religious decline does not indicate an increase in nonofficial religion. Compared to Catholics and No religion, Buddhists are more likely to accept unofficial beliefs, and Protestants are less likely to believe them.

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Predicting the future religious profile of Korea is a risk. But, as much as Korea has undergone compressed religious growth along with compressed modernization in the second half of the twentieth century, many religious indicators in the first twenty years of the twenty-first century reveal the end of religious growth and appear to prompt the path toward secularization.

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Chapter 4

Trends in Gender Role Attitudes in South Korea Soo-Yeon Yoon

Abstract Soo-Yeon Yoon investigated changes in gender-role attitudes in South Korea and how they vary by gender, cohort and educational attainment. The study utilized data from three waves of the KGSS and employed logit regression analyses to examine the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and gender-role attitudes. The results suggest progress towards gender egalitarianism in Korea, yet also highlight the persistence of traditional beliefs regarding women’s domestic roles. In conclusion, Yoon emphasized the importance of understanding and addressing these nuanced attitudes as a crucial step towards promoting gender egalitarianism in Korean society. Keywords Gender-role attitudes · Gender ideology · Gender equality · Gender egalitarianism · Gender revolution

1 Introduction Existing research suggests progress toward gender egalitarianism and gender equality in many parts of the world during the last few decades. Scholars often refer to this progress as a “gender revolution.” Some used the terms “stalled” (England, 2010) or an “incomplete” gender revolution (Esping-Andersen, 2009) to indicate its slow pace and uneven progress in specific aspects of gender relations, both in private and public spheres. In line with global trends toward gender egalitarianism, South Korea (hereafter Korea) has also made some advancements. For example, women’s educational attainment has surpassed that of men, indicating a reversal in the gender gap in education, as observed in several industrialized countries (Van Bavel et al., 2018). In 1995, only 24% of Korean women aged 25–34 had tertiary education while 34% of men in the same age group had tertiary education (OECD, 2022). Twenty years later, the gender gap in education was reversed, with more women in the same age group attaining tertiary education. In 2015, 61% of women and 58% of men aged S.-Y. Yoon (B) Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 J. Kim (ed.), A Contemporary Portrait of Life in Korea, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5829-0_4

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between 25 and 34 had tertiary education. The most recent data suggests that 64% of men and 76% of women aged 25–34 have tertiary education (OECD, 2022). Despite some progress, however, certain indicators still point to relatively high levels of gender inequality, particularly in relation to labor force participation. Female labor force participation rates have shown a marginal increase, rising from 49% in 2000 to 52% in 2015 and further to 55% in 2022 (KOSIS, 2023). Additionally, as several previous studies have highlighted, the challenge of balancing employment and family responsibilities for working women is evident in the M-Shaped female labor force participation rate in Korea (Brinton & Oh, 2019; Yoon, 2016). Theoretical discussions on the incompatibility between work and family, especially for women, have been a focal point in the literature on gender inequality (Blair-Loy, 2005; Budig & Hodges, 2010; Philipov, 2008). Using data from the 2003–2018 Korean General Social Surveys (KGSS), this chapter aims to assess progress toward gender egalitarianism by examining various aspects of gender-role attitudes. The chapter begins by offering a concise overview of the literature on gender-role attitudes in surveys. Subsequently, it delves into three key areas: (1) the trends in gender-role attitudes, (2) the differences in gender-role attitudes based on gender and cohort, and (3) the correspondence between sociodemographic characteristics and gender-role attitudes through multivariate analyses. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on the implications derived from the findings.

2 Measurement of Gender-Role Attitudes in Surveys Gender-role attitudes are frequently measured in several surveys, such as the World Value Survey and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). These surveys use gender-role attitude items to assess individuals’ levels of support for the division of paid work and family responsibilities, based on the concept of separate spheres (Davis & Greenstein, 2009, p. 88). Scholars have used several terms, oftentimes interchangeably, to refer to these attitudes, including gender ideology, gender role attitudes, gender-related attitudes, and gender egalitarianism. Davis and Greenstein (2009, p. 89) classified gender-role attitudes items into six categories: the primacy of the breadwinner role, belief in gendered separate (gendered) spheres, working women and relationship quality, motherhood and the feminine self, household utility, and acceptance of male privilege. Other scholars have classified gender-role attitudes differently. For instance, Philipov (2008), in a comparative study of gender attitudes of ten European countries, divided gender-role attitudes into three dimensions: gender-role ideology, family consequences, and economic consequences of women’s participation in work. Below I organized the survey items asked in the KGSS at least twice from 2003 to 2018, based on the classifications by Davis and Greenstein (2009) and Philipov (2008) (Table 1). The ‘gender-role ideology’ dimension includes items that inquire about the perception of women’s nature and whether their primary role is to care

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for children and the family, with paid work considered secondary (Philipov, 2008, p. 157). Therefore, agreement with these statements (i.e., items b, f, and g) suggest a preference for traditional domestic roles for women. The ‘consequences for the family’ dimension, or Davis and Greenstein’s (2009) ‘working women and relationship quality’ category, emphasizes women’s work and its perceived detrimental effect on the family and children. Agreement with these items (i.e., items c, d, and e) suggest a preference for women’s part-time work or women staying home (Philipov, 2008). The remaining item (i.e., item a) falls within the ‘economic consequences’ dimension, or what Davis and Greenstein refer to as ‘the primacy of breadwinner role.’ This item measures two aspects: equality in work and the economic necessity of dual income in the family. In this chapter, I adopt the representations of each item measuring gender-role attitudes suggested in Philipov (2008) and Davis and Greenstein (2009). However, it is important to note that previous studies indicate considerable differences in the interpretation of gender ideology measures across countries, as the specific gender ideology items are framed differently (Braun & Scott, 2009). For instance, Yoon (2020), in her descriptive comparative analysis of selected measures from the 2012 ISSP survey, found considerable variations in gender-role attitudes across countries, with each item exhibiting varying degrees of support. Regarding the perception of a working mother and relationship quality (i.e., item c) and the nature of women (i.e., item g) Koreans differed considerably from respondents in other countries, including China and Japan. Koreans reported more traditional attitudes regarding these two items, favoring women’s traditional domestic role or part-time work, in contrast to their Chinese and Japanese counterparts. Additionally, Braun and Scott’s (2009) comparative analysis of gender-role attitudes from the ISSP revealed diverse trends in gender egalitarianism across Western countries depending on chosen indicator as the dependent variable. Specifically, the use of the term “fulfil” in an item might indicate support for women’s preference for egalitarian individuals in Anglo-Saxon countries, but it could signify a justification for discrimination against women in the labor market in former socialist countries.

3 Data, Variables and Methods The analysis is based on data from three waves of the KGSS: 2003, 2012, and 2016. The 2003 wave includes 1,309 respondents, the 2012 wave includes 1,396 respondents, and the 2016 wave includes 1,051 respondents. These specific waves were chosen due to the availability of gender-role attitude items in KGSS. Not all measures of gender-role attitudes were collected in all three waves. The dependent variable in this study is gender-role attitudes. In the previous section I introduced the list of variables related to gender roles following the classifications from previous studies (see Table 1). All measures of gender-role attitudes were asked using the same phrase: “To what extent do you agree or disagree (with the following statement?)” Responses were collected as a 5-point Likert scale, ranging

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from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ For the regression analysis predicting egalitarian attitudes, the dependent variable was operationalized as a dummy variable. A value of 1 represented ‘egalitarian gender attitudes,’ while a value of 0 represented ‘all others.’ I use several socio-demographic characteristics following previous studies (Knight & Brinton, 2017; Philipov, 2008). The variables included gender, birth cohorts (1910–1940, 1941–1950, 1951–1960, 1961–1970, 1971–1980, 1981–1990, and 1991–2000), marital status (reference group = not married), educational level (less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, and bachelor’s degree or above), employment status (reference group = not employed), monthly household income (less than 2,500,000, between 2,500,000 and 3,490,000, between 3,500,000 and 5,490,000, and 5,500,000 or higher) and rural or urban residence (reference group = rural). Since the dependent variable was operationalized as a dummy variable, I conducted logit regression analyses to estimate the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and the likelihood of holding egalitarian gender-role attitudes. Table 1 Classification of gender-role attitude items used in KGSS Items

Davis and Greenstein (2009)

Philipov (2008)

a. Both the man and woman should Primacy of breadwinner Economic consequences contribute to the household role income b. A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family

Primacy of breadwinner Gender-role ideology role

c. A working mother can establish Working women and just as warm and secure a relationship quality relationship with her children as a mother who does not work

Consequences for the family

d. A preschool child is likely to Working women and suffer if his or her mother works relationship quality

Consequences for the family

Working women and e. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time relationship quality job

Consequences for the family

f. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children

Wife/motherhood and the feminine self

Gender-role ideology

g. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay

Wife/motherhood and the feminine self

Gender-role ideology

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3.1 Trends in Gender-Role Attitudes Table 2 presents the changes in gender role attitudes from 2003 to 2012 and to 2016, using data from the KGSS. While some items were asked in all three years, others were only asked in two of the years. Regarding the statement about a working mother’s relationship with her children, a larger proportion of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the idea of compatibility between work and motherhood. In 2003, approximately 62% of survey respondents agreed, and this percentage increased to 67% in 2012 and to 71% in 2016. For the statement asking whether a mother’s work negatively impacts her preschool child, the percentage of respondents who agreed decreased from 73% in 2003 to 68% 2012. However, a majority of respondents still believed that a preschool child is likely to suffer if their mother works. The third item focused on women’s work and its influence on the overall family life. The proportion of people who either strongly or agreed with the statement decreased by 18% from 2003 to 2016. In 2016, about 46% of respondents agreed with the statement regarding the negative influence of women’s full-time work on family life. The fourth item pertained to women’s traditional roles and domestic responsibilities. The percentage of people who agreed with the statement decreased from 28% in 2003 to 23% 2012. At the same time, people who strongly disagreed noticeably increased from 8% to 13%. Overall, opinions on this statement were divided, with 40% of respondents agreeing and another 40% disagreeing. The fifth item inquired whether respondents agreed that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. Throughout the years 2003 to 2006, the majority of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. Over 80% of respondents expressed this view, while the percentage of people who disagreed with the statement slightly declined from 5% in 2003 to 3% in 2016. The last two items concern primacy of breadwinner role. Most respondents, nearly 70%, agreed that both man and woman should contribute to the household income in both 2003 and 2012. About 20% of the respondents reported neutral attitudes. There was no significant change over time in attitudes toward dual earner couples. This is the only item that did not change over time. The last item asks agreement with the male breadwinner and female homemaker family model. Proportions of people who strongly disagreed with the male breadwinner family model considerably increased from 11 to 17%. Only about 34% of the respondents agreed with the notion of male breadwinner family model.

3.2 Trends in Gender-Role Attitudes by Gender An interesting finding from Table 2 that the majority of people (71%) believe that a working mother can establish a warm and secure relationship with her child. However, paradoxically, a large proportion of the respondents (68%) also hold the view that a mother’s work has a negative impact on her preschool child. Additionally, 45%

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Table 2 Changes in gender role attitudes across 2003, 2012, to 2016 2003

2012

2016

Test

A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work Strongly agree

21.31

29.77

27.18

Agree

40.18

37.04

44.28

Neither agree nor disagree

13.23

12.19

16.12

Disagree

21.82

18.16

10.59

Strongly disagree

3.45

2.85

1.83

***

A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works Strongly agree

22.07

22.86

–

Agree

51.38

45.28

–

Neither agree nor disagree

14.04

15.69

–

Disagree

10.76

11.84

–

Strongly disagree

1.75

4.32

–

**

All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job Strongly agree

16.61

18.62

9.17

Agree

47.73

42.16

36.89

Neither agree nor disagree

19.11

17.89

21.94

Disagree

13.11

15.95

23.98

Strongly disagree

3.43

5.38

8.02

***

A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children Strongly agree

15.18

17.10

–

Agree

28.41

23.26

–

Neither agree nor disagree

21.02

19.74

–

Disagree

26.94

26.69

–

Strongly disagree

8.45

13.21

–

***

Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay Strongly agree

37.75

45.87

39.90

Agree

44.34

32.64

42.31

Neither agree nor disagree

11.93

14.63

13.60

Disagree

5.35

5.22

3.11

Strongly disagree

1.02

1.63

1.07

***

Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income Strongly agree

22.34

25.34

–

Agree

46.47

42.52

–

Neither agree nor disagree

21.83

21.63

–

Disagree

8.06

8.65

–

Strongly disagree

1.30

1.85

– (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) 2003

2012

2016

Test

A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family Strongly agree

11.00

11.22

–

Agree

24.95

23.12

–

Neither agree nor disagree

23.08

19.86

–

Disagree

30.45

28.79

–

Strongly disagree

10.51

17.02

–

Sample size

1315

1396

1051

***

**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

of the respondents reported that a woman’s full-time job adversely affects family life. To delve deeper into this topic, I further explored potential gender and cohort differences. In terms of gender-role attitudes, Fig. 1 highlights two pertinent items from Table 1 and examines gender differences. The results indicate that opinions on women’s work, particularly that of mothers, vary considerably depending on how the question is framed. While a majority of both men and women agreed that a working mother can establish a warm relationship with her children, women displayed higher levels of support compared to men across all three years. Although there was a significant gender difference in attitudes towards a working mother’s relationship with her child in 2003 (p < 0.05), the observed gender differences in 2012 and 2016 were not statistically significant. However, it is noteworthy that more men than women expressed disagreement with the idea that women’s full-time work disrupts family life, and the gender difference has grown over time. In 2003, only slightly over 15% of respondents disagreed with the statement, indicating that approximately 85% agreed with it. However, in 2016, around 35% of men disagreed with the notion, whereas only about 29% of women shared the same view. It is surprising that nearly 70% of women and 65% of men still believe that women’s full-time work interrupts family life. Interestingly, the gender difference was not significant in 2003 regarding this particular item, but it became statistically significant in both 2012 (p < 0.05) and 2016 (p < 0.001). Overall, the gender-role attitudes concerning a mother’s work, as reflected in these two items, suggest that while a working mother can establish a warm relationship with her children, it is considered ideal for her to have a part-time job to prioritize her family responsibilities. This implication is derived from the high percentages of respondents who disagreed with the notion that women’s full-time work interrupts family life. These attitudes are reflected in women’s work patterns, such as the “M-shaped” female labor force participation rate. It is well-known that a considerable portion of women choose to exit the labor force upon marriage or when they have children, typically occurring in their early to mid-30s (e.g., Brinton & Oh, 2019). Next, I examined items related to the traditional male breadwinner family model, which outlines the expected gender roles for men and women. Figure 2 presents the

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S.-Y. Yoon 80 70

Percent

60

65.2

69.08

64.45

72.35

70.54

57.68

50 40

35.21 28.83

30 20

22.56 16.83

20.16

16.25

10 0

men

women 2003

men

women

men

2012

women 2016

working mother can establish warm relationship (percent agree) women's full-time work interrupts family life (percent disagree) Fig. 1 Gender-role attitudes by gender and year (2003, 2012, and 2016)

gender differences in two items related to this notion. The key distinction between the items analyzed in Fig. 1 and the two items presented in Fig. 2 lies in whether the statements specifically address women’s roles, particularly those of mothers, or include both men and women. The first item explores the agreement or disagreement with the statement, “a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” Among male respondents, the percentage of those who disagreed with the statement increased from 34% in 2003 to 42% in 2012. However, the percentage of female respondents who disagreed with the statement saw only a marginal increase of 2% during the same period. The second item, which concerns the male breadwinner family model, asserts that both men and women should contribute to the household income. In comparison to the first item, a much higher proportion of respondents agreed with this statement. In 2003, 61% of men and 76% of women agreed with the idea of dual-earner couples. Surprisingly, attitudes toward dual-earner couples remained relatively stable from 2003 to 2012. For men, the percentage of those who agreed with the statement increased by less than 2%, while for women, there was an unexpected decrease of nearly 4%. Moving on to the gender differences in each item, women exhibited more egalitarian gender role attitudes than men for both years. However, the difference between men and women narrowed in 2012 compared to 2003. In 2003, approximately 76% of women agreed that both men and women should contribute to the household income, whereas only around 61% of men shared the same view, resulting in a 15-percent difference. However, in 2012, the gender difference in the same item decreased as the percentage of female respondents who agreed with the statement declined from 76% to 73%, with little change observed among men. Similarly, the gender difference in

Percent

4 Trends in Gender Role Attitudes in South Korea

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

83

76.4

72.6 62.94

60.98 47.51

49.46 41.98

34.14

men

women

men

2003

women 2012

men work, women take care of family (percent disagree) both men and women should contribute to household income (percent agree) Fig. 2 Gender-role attitudes by gender and year (2003 and 2012)

the first item also became diminished. Overall, both men and women exhibited more egalitarian attitudes when it comes to expectations about dual-earner couples than attitudes regarding the traditional male breadwinner and female homemaker family model.

3.3 Trends in Gender-Role Attitudes by Birth Cohort Table 3 provides an analysis of cohort differences in gender-role attitudes regarding women’s gender roles. To facilitate interpretation, I combined the responses of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ into one group, as well as ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ into another group. The results show that the percentages of respondents who agreed with the statement about a working mother’s relationship with her children are higher among younger birth cohorts. Only 52% of the 1910–1940 cohort agreed with the statement, while 80% of the youngest birth cohort (1991– 2000) expressed agreement. Neutral attitudes, where individuals neither agree nor disagreed, are lower among younger birth cohorts. The second item also pertains to the role of a working mother and whether her employment has a negative influence on her preschool child. Among older birth cohorts spanning from 1910 to 1970, over 75% of them agreed with this statement, with the 1961–1970 cohort showing the highest agreement at 77%. Notably, younger birth cohorts, specifically the 1981–1990 and 1991–2000 cohorts, displayed considerably higher proportions of individuals holding neutral opinions compared to the older cohorts. Likewise, gender-role attitudes regarding women’s full-time work exhibit variation across different birth cohorts. The third item states that “All in all, family life

1941–1950

1951–1960

1961–1970

1971–1980

1981–1990

32.56

D

61.02

26.58

12.39

63.64 23.96

12.39

11.14

13.30

Neither A nor D

D

15.77

9.96

74.27 11.23

11.91

76.86

14.62

D

64.54

18.33

17.13

64.93 18.27

16.80

68.76

23.22

13.81

62.95

12.88

9.84

77.27

18.88

12.34

18.09

Neither A nor D

D

62.56

23.03

14.41

10.74

5.84

12.17

7.92

Neither A nor D

Note A: agree, D: disagree **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

D

83.41

79.91

A 6.25

11.29

82.46

5.02

12.47

82.49

36.07

29.43

41.59 22.31

50.17 20.39

(5) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay

62.46

19.45

A

(4) A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children

70.03

15.35

A

Neither A nor D

(3) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job

75.56

A

(2) A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works

51.54

15.91

A

Neither A nor D

5.51

11.98

82.51

48.26

20.57

31.17

21.57

22.19

56.24

12.43

18.43

69.15

15.92

15.03

69.05

7.19

19.74

73.07

55.55

22.72

21.73

29.93

29.08

40.99

20.42

24.22

55.35

14.75

16.36

68.89

(1) A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work

1910–1940

Table 3 Gender-role attitudes by cohort, 2003, 2012, 2016

4.20

18.76

77.05

61.68

18.88

19.44

38.45

26.13

35.42

27.87

29.94

42.19

9.77

9.70

80.53

1991–2000

**

***

***

***

***

Test

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suffers when the woman has a full-time job.” Among the older birth cohorts ranging from 1910–1940 to 1961–1970, a majority agreed with the statement, with agreement percentages ranging from 63% to 70%. Around 56% of the 1971–1980 birth cohort agreed with the statement. However, the two youngest birth cohorts, 1981–1990 and 1991–2000, showed lower percentages of agreement. Similar to the previous item, higher proportions of younger cohorts held neutral positions on this statement. As for the fourth item, which states, “A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children,” the findings reveal contrasting patterns between older and younger birth cohorts, as anticipated. While the majority of older cohorts agreed with the statement, the majority of younger cohorts disagreed. Approximately 20% of respondents, except for the 1941–1950 birth cohort, held neutral opinions on this item. Lastly, the final item focuses on women’s domestic roles as housewives. The majority of respondents agreed with the statement saying that “being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay,” with significant variations across birth cohorts (p