Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation, 1953-1957 (Cold War History) [1 ed.] 041538074X, 9780415380744

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Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War

This book provides a comprehensive insight into one of the key episodes of the Cold War – the process of reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. At the time, this process shocked the world as much as the violent break up of their relations did in 1948. This book provides an explanation for the collapse of the process of normalization of Yugoslav­­­–Soviet relations that occurred at the end of 1956 and the renewal of their ideological confrontation. It also explains the motives that guided the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and the Soviet leader Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Based on Yugoslav and Soviet archival documents, this book establishes several innovative theories about this period. First, that the significance of the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation went beyond their bilateral relationship. It had ramifications for relations in the Eastern Bloc, the global Communist movement, and on the dynamics of the Cold War world at a crucial juncture. Second, that the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation brought forward the process of de-­ Stalinization in the USSR and in the People’s Democracies. Third, it enabled Khrushchev to win the post-­Stalin leadership contest. Lastly, the book argues that the process of Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation permitted Tito to embark, together with Nehru of India and Nasser of Egypt, upon creating a new entity in the bipolar Cold War world – the Non-­Aligned Movement. This book will be of interest to students of Cold War History, diplomatic history, European history and International Relations in general. Svetozar Rajak is a lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the Academic Director of LSE IDEAS, Centre for the Study of International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy at LSE, and is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Cold War History.

Cold War History Series Series Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox ISSN: 1471–3829

In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available sources.   1 Reviewing the Cold War Approaches, interpretations, and theory Edited by Odd Arne Westad   2 Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War Richard Saull   3 British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War Marrku Ruotsila   4 Europe, Cold War and Co-­existence, 1953–1965 Edited by Wilfred Loth   5 The Last Decade of the Cold War From conflict escalation to conflict transformation Edited by Olav NjØlstad   6 Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War Issues, interpretations, periodizations Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero   7 Across the Blocs Cold War cultural and social history Edited by Rana Mitter and Patrick Major   8 US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam Insurgency, subversion and public order William Rosenau

  9 The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s Negotiating the Gaullist challenge N. Piers Ludlow 10 Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64 Changing alliances Mari Olsen 11 The Third Indochina War Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79 Edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-­Judge 12 Greece and the Cold War Front Line State, 1952–1967 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou 13 Economic Statecraft during the Cold War European responses to the US trade embargo Frank Cain 14 Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1960 Kitty Newman 15 The Emergence of Détente in Europe Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik Arne Hofmann 16 European Integration and the Cold War Ostpolitik-­Westpolitik, 1965–1973 N. Piers Ludlow 17 Britain, Germany and the Cold War The search for a European Détente 1949–1967 R. Gerald Hughes 18 The Military Balance in the Cold War US perceptions and policy, 1976–85 David M. Walsh 19 The Cold War in the Middle East Regional conflict and the superpowers 1967–73 Nigel J. Ashton 20 The Making of Détente Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–65 Edited by Wilfred Loth and Georges-­Henri Soutou

21 Europe and the End of the Cold War A reappraisal Edited by Frédéric Bozo, Marie-­Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti 22 The Baltic Question During the Cold War Edited by John Hiden, Vahur Made, and David J. Smith 23 The Crisis of Détente in Europe From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–85 Edited by Leopoldo Nuti 24 Cold War in Southern Africa White power, black liberation Edited by Sue Onslow 25 The Globalisation of the Cold War From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 Edited by Max Guderzo and Bruna Bagnato 26 Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation, 1953–1957 Svetozar Rajak

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation, 1953–1957 Svetozar Rajak

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2011 Svetozar Rajak All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN 0-203-84241-3 Master e-book ISBN ISBN13: 978-0-415-38074-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-84241-6 (ebk)

To my mother Jelena and father Nikola

Contents



Acknowledgements Terms and abbreviations



Introduction

x xii 1

  1 Overtures

16

  2 Normalization

66

  3 Comradeship

109

  4 Contention

151

  5 Confrontation

178



Conclusions

201



Notes Select bibliography Index

219 257 264

Acknowledgements

I dedicate this book to my parents, my mother Jelena and my late father Nikola, who passed away while this book was in the making. The limitations of space will make it impossible for me to express adequately the debt of gratitude I owe to so many. Every name that I will fail to mention will sadden and shame me. My only consolation is that they will see this book for what it is – as much their achievement, as it is mine. The book that is before you owes most to two people, mentors and colleagues whom I am proud to call friends. It would simply not have been written without them. Arne Westad, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Co-director of the LSE IDEAS, has read and reread the manuscript, providing crucial guidance and commentary that helped create everything that is good in this book. Mistakes and failings that escaped his scrutiny are strictly mine. Moreover, he has helped me become a better historian. Anita Prażmowska, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science, my PhD Supervisor, is, first and foremost a true friend. The single most precious gift she had given me, as a historian, is the belief and devotion to integrity. Unselfishly there whenever I was in need, she was also my fiercest critic when I deserved it. I owe so much to her and her partner, Jan Toporowski, Reader of Economics at the SOAS, UCL, two uniquely gracious people. Special appreciation goes to Michael Cox, Professor of International Relations at the LSE and Co-Director of LSE IDEAS, a friend and supporter, someone I have indeed, learned so much from. I am indebted to Professor Dominic Lieven, Head of the International History Department at LSE for his unyielding support. His kindness and willingness to read and comment on the manuscript, despite his heavy work load in the Department, have been invaluable. I am grateful to Dr Sue Onslow for reading early versions of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Mrs Tiha Franulović and Dr Emilia Knight for the understanding, patience and support, and to the wonderful people in the LSE IDEAS. I wish also to thank my colleagues in the Department of International History at the LSE for their assistance and support. A debt of gratitude is owed to a number of Serbian historians and social scientists, people I am proud to count among friends. I have benefited so much

Acknowledgements   xi from the insight and long conversations with Dr Miroslav Perišić, a true historian and Director of Archives of Serbia. This book would have suffered without the input from Ljubodrag Dimić, Professor of History at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. I am also grateful to wonderful colleagues at the University of Belgrade, namely Professor Radmila Nakarada, Professor Ljubinka Trgovčević, and Professor Milan Podunavac. It goes without saying that research for this book and unique insight into primary sources would have been impossible without the expertise and help of Mr Miladin Milošević, Director of the Archives of Yugoslavia, Mrs Nada Pantelić of the Archives of Josip Broz Tito and staff in the Archives of Yugoslavia and in the Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Serbia. I am also indebted to the staff of the RGANI Archives in Moscow, and of the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. A big thank you is owed to Ms Jelena Jovanović, research assistant in Moscow. My family was there for me, as always – my sister Mirjana, Bogdan, Bojana, Dejan, Tanja, Bane, Ljiljana, Milan… I am blessed with true friends and am forever grateful to them for being unselfish – Pavle and Branka, Danica, Marija, Ilija and Miloš, Gordana, Mira and Rasko, Majda and Zvone, Breda and Igor, Manča, Nebojša and Olivera, Dana, Oza and Tina, Jovan, Ljiljana, Olga, Sonja, Arne and Karin… And, to Jasminka… so viel und noch viel mehr.

Terms and abbreviations

Agitptop

Agitacija propaganda. Yugoslav Party apparatus in charge of propaganda and ideology ВКП(б) / AUCP (b)   All Union Communist Party (bolsheviks). The official name of the Soviet Party before it changed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952. Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Soviet Bloc economic organization akin to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation Cominform Communist Information Bureau or Informbiro, as it was popularly known in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc. An association of the Communist parties of Peoples Democracies and other Communist parties, created in September 1947 under Soviet auspices, a successor to the Comintern. Dissolved in 1956 Comintern Communist International. An international association of Communist Parties, set up by Lenin in March 1919, as a successor to Marx’s International and as the counterbalance to the Second International, controlled by the European Social-Democratic Parties. Disbanded by Stalin in 1943 CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia (changed its name to the League of Communist of Yugoslavia at its Sixth Congress, November 1952) CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CC (of CPSU or CPY/LCY)   Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/League of Communists of Yugoslavia; by statute, the highest Party organ between ­Congresses DSIP Državni Sekretarijat za Inostrane Poslove. State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Yugoslav Foreign Affairs Ministry EDC European Defence Community Executive Committee of the LCY CC   Yugoslav equivalent of the Communist Party Politburo FNRJ Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija. Federative Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia. Official name for Yugoslavia from 1946

Terms and abbreviations   xiii LCY

League of Communists of Yugoslavia (new name for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, adopted at its Sixth Congress in November 1952 MID МИНИСТЕРСТВО ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ. Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs Partisans Popular name for the fighters of the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement during the Second World War, organised by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and led by Tito Plenums Meetings of the Communist Party Central Committee Postanovlenie Resolution or decree (Rus.) TANJUG Official Yugoslav News Agency TASS Official Soviet News Agency USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Vozhd Вождь. Russian for “leader”, often referred to Joseph Stalin Yugoslav War of Liberation   Official Yugoslav term for the armed resistance organised by the CPY and led by Tito, against the German occupation and Quis lings during the Second World War

Introduction

When researching Yugoslav documents from the early 1950s, which for the most part have received very little attention from historians of the Cold War, I was immediately drawn to the subject of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1953 and 1957. The wealth of documental evidence revealed the significance of this process for wider regional and global developments of the early Cold War. The Yugoslav–Soviet normalization had a profound impact on the process of de-­Stalinization in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, on the relations within the international Communist movement, and on the creation of the Non-­Aligned Movement. As much as the 1948 Tito–Stalin break up did receive considerable attention, the subsequent period of Yugoslav–Soviet relations remained largely outside historiographical focus. The precious little that has been written on the subject is found either in the studies on the general history of post-­1945 Yugoslavia or in several articles addressing Yugoslavia’s role in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 written by ex-­Yugoslav historians, such as Branko Petranović, Ljubodrag Dimić, Miroslav Perišić, Dragan Bogetić, Darko Bekić and Djoko Tripković.1 Among non-­ Yugoslav historians, Leonid Gibianskii and Johana Granville wrote on aspects of Yugoslavia’s involvement in the Hungarian events of 1956.2 More recently, two books by a Czech, Jan Pelikán,3 and a Russian historian, A. Edemskii,4 addressed the issue of Yugoslav–Soviet relations after 1953. Although a welcome and valuable contribution to the understanding of the subject, both studies, however, are focused on the early phase of the process of normalization, up to Tito’s June 1956 trip to the USSR. Pelikán’s attention is centred on relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries in the early 1950s. Furthermore, both authors obviously lacked access to a number of important Yugoslav documents, in particular those found in the Archives of President Tito, which are crucial for the understanding of Yugoslav–Soviet relations during this period. Edemskii’s presentation ends before Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956. In my opinion, it is impossible to understand the multifaceted aspects of the process of the normalization between Moscow and Belgrade without understanding the reasons behind its breakdown, in particular the impact and consequences of Tito’s visit and the dramatic deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations after November 1956.

2   Introduction Among the biographies and memoirs of the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders, this work has benefited most from the Russian language edition of Khrushchev’s autobiographical Reminiscences, and the Serbo-­Croat edition of Dedijer’s seminal The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito, Volume 3. A special mention should be made of the Serbo-­Croat edition of Veljko Mićunović’s Moscow Years, 1956–1958. It remains the best first-­hand account of this phase in Yugoslav–Soviet relationship. Having had access to original Yugoslav documents from this period, I became convinced that when writing his memoirs, Mićunović fully consulted Yugoslav archival documents, retracing the events he had witnessed. This reaffirms his integrity as a witness and as a historian. The particular contribution of the book before you to the scholarship of the early Cold War lies in the fact that it is almost exclusively based on the Yugoslav and Soviet archival documents. Among the Yugoslav sources, of particular importance were the collections in the Archive of Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav Archives, and the Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Serbia. Among the Russian sources, this work has benefited most from the collections in the Russian State Archive of Recent History (Российски Государственй Архив Новейшей Истории – РГАНИ), and in the Archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Архив Внешней Политики Российскей Федерации – АВПРФ).5 Despite limited access to the Soviet archives, my unprecedented access to the Yugoslav archives allowed for the comprehensive analysis of Yugoslav–Soviet relations during the period in focus. The most revealing among Yugoslav documents were Yugoslav Ambassador Mićunović’s reports on his meetings with Khrushchev; the transcripts of talks held between Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, and Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership; and transcripts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee Plenums and the meetings of its Executive Committee.6 Much of the archival material referenced in this book has been researched for the first time and has never before been presented in the English language historiography. Thus, this volume fulfils another of its goals – to contribute to the integration of the wealth of Yugoslav and, to a much lesser extent, Russian archival sources into the global scholarship of the Cold War. Very useful among primary sources were public speeches by Yugoslav and Soviet leaders and officials, in particular those of Tito, published in the Yugoslav and the Soviet party organs, Borba and Pravda. Editorials in these publications were another important source, in particular during the polemics between Moscow and Belgrade. With regard to witness accounts the time distance proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. I was, unfortunately, able to interview only one of the protagonists, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, a member of the highest Yugoslav leadership at the time. Sadly, the interview was conducted only months before his death. A number of published documental collections have proven invaluable, namely Documents on 1948 by Vladimir Dedijer, the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS, Volumes VIII, 1952–1954, and XXVI, 1955–1957), Documents on the Foreign Policy of FNRJ (1945–1950), and the Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents by Csaba Békés et al.7

Introduction   3 Although no effort has been spared to ensure a balanced presentation of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, I am painfully aware that the focus, at times, is dependant on the Yugoslav perceptions and interpretations. If and when this most unfortunate and always unintentional imbalance did occur, it should be attributed to the accessibility of the Yugoslav compared to the Russian archival sources. For this reason, the term Yugoslav–Soviet rather than Soviet–Yugoslav has been used throughout to depict the relations between the two countries. This book emphasizes the extraordinary contribution of two leaders, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and Josip Broz Tito. The Yugoslav leader was the sole arbiter of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategies. He maintained absolute control and held the firmest grip over Belgrade’s relations with Moscow. For his part, Khrushchev was behind the initiative for the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. He was also seen by Tito and the Yugoslav leadership as the main force behind the process of de-­Stalinization in the Soviet Union. They perceived the dismantling of Stalin’s legacy as the sine qua non of true normalization of relations with Moscow and of the elimination of threat to Yugoslav national security. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, only very brief references to their personal traits are made in this book. It has been impossible to offer a proper insight into these truly formidable personalities who had important and, in the case of Khrushchev, decisive impacts on the early Cold War. However, it is my hope that the book adequately presents their critical role in Yugoslav– Soviet relations. Another consolation is the abundance of excellent recent literature on Khrushchev, namely William Taubman’s seminal biography and Alexandar Fursenko and Timothy Naftali’s book on Khrushchev’s Cold War.8 As for the definitive biography of Tito, it remains to be written. I hope that this book will be a worthy contribution. Washington’s influence on Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union played an important part prior to Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955 and is awarded due attention. In the later phases of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization and, in particular during their renewed confrontation, as this volume shows, the US did not exercise much influence on the course of events. An excellent book by Lorraine Lees provides detailed insight into US–Yugoslav relations during the 1950s.9 Limitations of space have also determined the format of the presentation of Yugoslavia’s and, in particular, Tito’s role in the conceptualization and institutionalization of the Non-­Aligned Movement. Nonetheless, the book provides insight into Belgrade’s increasing focus on non-­alignment after 1955. By the end of the decade, the emerging Non-­Aligned Movement took absolute priority in Tito’s foreign policy activities. In conceptualizing and writing this book, I have benefited enormously from the knowledge and profound insight of many impressive historians who have written on the early Cold War. Sadly, it is impossible here to award credit to all of those to whom I feel deeply indebted. The impact they have had on my understanding of the phenomena of this period of the Cold War humbles my effort. Unfortunately, the fact remains that very little has been written on the history of

4   Introduction Yugoslav–Soviet relations in the early 1950s and on their wider relevance. In my opinion, this is disproportional to the significance of these relations to the history of the early Cold War. What little has been written suffers, to a large extent, from inaccuracies of interpretations caused by inadequate research of Yugoslav and Soviet/Russian archival material. Being fortunate to have acquired unique access to Yugoslav archives, as well as, for a limited period, to the Russian sources, I have decided to place emphasis on primary sources. The wealth of Yugoslav archival material represented continuous inspiration and has provided unique new insight into the developments of the early Cold War. Hopefully, more substantive access to the Russian archival material will award us with a more comprehensive understanding of this period. Although focused on the process of normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1953 and 1957, the book offers insight into a decade of their relations, between 1948 and 1958. During this period, the character and many fluctuations of the relations between Moscow and Belgrade had a significant impact on the dynamics of the early Cold War. In particular, the process of normalization of their relations, the central theme of this volume, influenced the process of de-­Stalinization in the Soviet Union, the reformist upheaval and revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1956, the dynamics within the international Communist movement, and the creation of the Third World alternative to the bipolarity of the Cold War international system – the Non-­Aligned Movement. To date, this correlation has not received the attention it deserves. The book before you aims to correct this and, in doing so, to contribute to the understanding of the history of the early Cold War. The normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations after 1953 dramatically influenced the beginning and the pace of the process of de-­Stalinization in the Soviet Union. Contrary to prevailing historical interpretations, which attribute the start of this process to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956, this book proposes that the deconstruction of Stalin’s legacy began eight months earlier and was triggered by the ‘Yugoslav question’. As it will be demonstrated, the first open criticism of Stalin outside the confines of the CPSU CC Presidium’s walls occurred at the July 1955 Plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC). It was provoked by the discussion on the roots of the 1948 break up with Yugoslavia and Khrushchev’s report on his visit to Yugoslavia a month earlier. This debate brought into the open Stalin’s responsibility for the 1948 conflict with Tito. The revelation of machinations and fabrications laid bare the character and the destructiveness of his rule. The acrimonious polemic that erupted at the Plenum also served as platform for the first open confrontation between the leader of the hard-­liners in the Presidium, Molotov, and the person who spearheaded reformist initiatives, Khrushchev. Without successfully sidelining Molotov on this occasion, it would probably have been impossible for Khrushchev to secure the Presidium’s support for the re-­assessment of Stalin’s personality and policies and, eventually, to deliver the ‘secret speech’ at the Twentieth Congress in February 1956.

Introduction   5 Second, the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Moscow allowed the public in Eastern Europe to learn of Yugoslavia’s ‘road to socialism’. The attractiveness of ‘Tito’s socialism’, founded on primacy of national identity and interest, would prove corrosive for the Stalinist-­type unity of the ‘socialist camp’.10 Moreover, Yugoslavia’s independence from Soviet tutelage, while still retaining its socialist orientation, would encourage the 1956 upheavals in Eastern Europe, in particular in Poland and Hungary. Of particular importance for the liberalization wave that shook the Soviet Bloc, as the book argues, were the two documents produced by the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, namely the Belgrade Declaration, signed at the end of Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade on 2 June 1955, and the Moscow Declaration, singed at the end of Tito’s visit to the USSR, a year later. Furthermore, the questions raised by the Yugoslav–Soviet break up in 1948 and the normalization of their relations after 1953, for the first time since Lenin’s death, forced the Soviet leadership to address and even question Moscow’s hegemony in relations with People’s Democracies and other Communist parties. This was officially and publicly recognised in the Resolution promulgated at the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU CC. The impact of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization on relations in the Soviet Bloc prior to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, and the fact that it inspired Moscow to re-­examine its hegemonic position in the Bloc has not been adequately highlighted in the historiography. Third, the book will suggest that the tumultuous course of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations had an important impact on the power dynamics within the international Communist movement. The Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation that followed the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in November 1956, and was reinvigorated after the Yugoslav refusal to sign the joint Declaration at the end of the Moscow Conference of the Communist parties a year later, encouraged dissent within the wider Communist community. In particular, it offered the Chinese Communist Party a golden opportunity to assume the role of the ideological arbiter. The Soviet leadership perceived ideological polemics with the Yugoslavs as means to reaffirm its leadership of the international Communist movement. Seriously weakened by events in Poland and Hungary, Moscow solicited Chinese support, allowing Mao and the CCP to reaffirm themselves in the new role of ideological authority. Within several years, the Chinese would be in a position to challenge the Soviet leadership. The existing Cold War scholarship fails to acknowledge the role that the Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation in late 1956 and in 1958 played in the development of the Sino-­Soviet split. Fourth, the process of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, as the book will argue, enabled Tito to pursue non-­alignment. Following the 1948 break up with the Soviet Bloc, he and the Yugoslav leadership have found themselves in complete international isolation. Although US and Western aid and assistance secured the regime’s survival in the face of the Soviet threat, Belgrade harboured no illusions regarding the West’s long-­term affection. Thus, as the book suggests, from the very early stage of their conflict with the Soviets, Tito and his aides searched for an alternative – an equidistant position from either Bloc. The

6   Introduction real and very present danger of Soviet aggression, however, kept these aspirations on the backburner. Only once the normalization of relations with Moscow had eliminated the physical threat to its existence was the Yugoslav regime free to pursue strategic reorientation. Several-­month long trips to Asia and Africa between 1954 and 1959 enabled Tito to identify allies and, together with a number of Third World leaders, in particular Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and Abdul Gamaal Nasser, the young and energetic Egyptian leader, to conceptualise non-­alignment and create a movement. This book provides unique, albeit brief insight into the political and philosophical origins of Yugoslavia’s non-­aligned orientation and into its role in the creation of the Movement. Much of what will be presented here is new to the existing Cold War scholarship. The narrative of the book is presented chronologically, through five chapters. The focus is clearly on the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization between 1953 and 1957. Events and developments preceding the normalization or following its collapse in February 1957, as well as the Yugoslav role in the genesis of the Non-­Aligned Movement are presented in the briefest possible form, to the extent to which they help with the understanding of the central theme. This volume represents the first comprehensive attempt at providing insight into the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation in its entirety. The years 1953 and 1957 encapsulate the full circle of this process – from the state of hostile confrontation, through first tentative overtures towards improvement of relations in 1953, to subsequent normalization of state relations and full reconciliation after the re-­ establishment of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in June 1956, to renewed confrontation and the collapse of normalization in early 1957, which threatened a repeat of the 1948 rupture. The chronological approach offers the best understanding of the dynamics of the relations between the two countries during this period. The reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade was an evolutionary process and the causality of the motives that guided the two leaderships is best demonstrated through progression in time. This approach also enables better understanding of how Moscow and Belgrade’s changing positions in the international system and in the international Communist movement influenced their bilateral relations. Lastly, the ideological tenets and perceptions held by Tito and Khrushchev, the architects of their countries’ foreign policies, evolved in time. Chapter 1, entitled Overtures, presents the first tentative steps taken by the Soviet leadership in the year after Stalin’s death to overcome the state of open hostility that existed in relations with the Yugoslav regime since 1948. On the one hand, the chapter attempts to explain the true motives that prompted the Soviet leadership to contemplate such a major departure from one of the cornerstones of Stalin’s foreign policy, so soon after his death, as well as account for the deep disagreements within the Kremlin as to how to proceed with the policy shift towards Yugoslavia. On the other hand, an attempt has been made to explain the Yugoslav leadership’s reluctance to respond to Soviet overtures. To

Introduction   7 achieve its goals, Chapter 1 provides an understanding of the deep political, cultural and social transformation of the Yugoslav regime and society in the years after the break up in 1948. This transformation would be responsible for the subsequent Yugoslav–Soviet ideological divisions that would determine the character, pace and eventual collapse of the normalization of their relations. The chapter also provides an account of the national security crisis into which the Yugoslav regime was plunged only months before Stalin’s death and how it set out to urgently solidify the Western security umbrella that had provided a crucial deterrent against aggressive Soviet appetites since 1948. Lastly, this chapter provides insight into another major foreign policy crisis that the Yugoslav leadership faced in the autumn of 1953, the Trieste crisis, and the  beginning of re-­consideration of its strategy towards the Soviet overtures in October 1953. The true normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations was set in motion through secret correspondence between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships, initiated by Khrushchev in June 1954. For the next two years and with increasing momentum, the relations between the two countries followed an upward trend. By early 1956, normalization evolved into comradeship. This ascendant road of hope and genuine reconciliation is the subject of Chapters 2 and 3, named Normalization and Comradeship, respectively. Chapter 2 focuses on the secret correspondence between the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaderships from late June 1954. It also dwells on dilemmas that emerged within the Kremlin during the autumn of that year with regard to the future course of this process. The impasse that followed was resolved with Khrushchev’s victory in the leadership contest against Malenkov at the end of January 1954. The last part of this chapter provides insight into Tito’s first forays into non-­alignment, a result of sufficiently improved relations with Moscow and the conceptualization of Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy orientation. It presents in more detail Tito’s first trip to India and Burma, during which he had fateful encounters with Nehru and Nasser. Khrushchev’s historic visit to Belgrade in May 1955 and the Plenum of the CPSU CC a month later are the focus of Chapter 3. The two events had a decisive impact not only on further improvement of relations between Belgrade and Moscow but on the start of the process of de-­Stalinization in the USSR. The talks between Tito and the Yugoslav leadership and the Soviet delegation, headed by Khrushchev, in Belgrade and Brioni, at the end of May and in the first days of June 1955, signalled the end of the seven-­year conflict between the two states and facilitated accelerated improvement of their relations. The document signed at the end of Khrushchev’s visit, the so-­called Belgrade Declaration, promulgated principles that would reverberate throughout Eastern Europe. The Plenum of the CPSU CC held in early July, in particular the confrontation between Khrushchev and Molotov over normalization with Yugoslavia, represented the first step in the process of the deconstruction of Stalin’s legacy. The end of the chapter focuses on the elation with which Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ at the Twentieth Congress was received in Belgrade and the enthusiasm with which the Yugoslav leadership anticipated Tito’s visit to USSR in June 1956, as the apex of true Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation.

8   Introduction Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956 represented a threshold. The pomp and glitz that surrounded it were intended to promote the new era of comradeship between Moscow and Belgrade. Instead, the talks held in the Kremlin during Tito’s visit represented a true war of attrition. Under the shadow of gathering clouds over Poland and Hungary the Soviet leadership subjected Tito to the fiercest pressure to rejoin the ‘camp’. The proceedings of the four rounds of talks in the Kremlin constitute the core of Chapter 4, suitably named Contention. The chapter also provides insight into the strain under which Yugoslav–Soviet relationship came following Tito’s USSR visit and developments in Poland and Hungary. It further addresses the delicate manoeuvring between the two sides during the months leading to the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. While the Kremlin was frantically trying to lure Tito back into the ‘socialist camp’, the Yugoslavs were doing much to ensure that reformists were installed in Hungary. This chapter finishes with a detailed account of the dramatic meeting between Tito and Khrushchev, in Brioni, on the eve of the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary, during which the Yugoslav leader performed a true volte face and gave support for the Soviet action. Chapter 5 begins with the unintended result of the Tito–Khrushchev encounter in Brioni, the asylum of the deposed Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his entourage in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest after the Soviet troops stormed Budapest on 4 November 1956. The chapter further addresses the impact of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution on the Yugoslav– Soviet normalization. The public dispute that ensued, in particular after Tito’s Pula speech a week after the Soviet intervention, evolved into the ideological confrontation that soon sucked in other Communist parties, in particular the Chinese. The renewed confrontation would, within months, cause the collapse of the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. By February 1957, less than three years after the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow had started in earnest, the process entered a downward spiral. The Conclusion follows the impact of the renewed confrontation on Yugoslav–Soviet relations in the years until Khrushchev’s demise. It also provides insight into the cardinal role Tito and Yugoslavia, in particular his long trip to Africa and Asia in 1958, during the nadir in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, played in the process of the institutionalization of the Non-­Aligned Movement. Most importantly, the Conclusion will re-­emphasize the relevance of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1953 and 1957 and its collapse for regional and global developments in the early Cold War. It is difficult to understand the course of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization in the 1950s, much less the reasons behind its collapse, without reminding ourselves of the character and causes of the dramatic rupture of their relations in 1948. If the factual history of the so-­called Tito–Stalin split has, to some extent, been covered in the English language historiography, it is surprising that the interpretations of its origins owe more to Stalin’s fabrications than to serious historical research. Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party emerged from the Second World War as victors of the national-­liberation struggle, with overwhelming popular support

Introduction   9 behind them. Not least, they commanded the fourth-­largest European army of 400,000 loyal fighters. Tito was admired and hailed throughout Europe as the great hero and leader of the most successful anti-­Nazi resistance movement. The European left worshipped him as the leader of a Communist Party that carried out the only successful indigenous revolution after October. Between 1945 and 1948, the Yugoslav regime was regarded as the most radical and most loyal among Moscow’s satellite parties and states in Eastern Europe. At the formative meeting of Cominform in September 1947, Yugoslav representatives were awarded the special honour of spearheading the ‘critique’ of the French and Italian Communist Parties. Belgrade was further honoured by being appointed the seat of the new Communist organization. At home, true to its radical credentials, Tito’s regime blindly replicated the Soviet system. The only exception was the absence of collectivization, a concession to the peasant population, which comprised the backbone of the partisan liberation movement during the war. Thus, when the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade erupted in public, it came as a bolt from the blue for everyone, politicians and public on both sides of the Iron Curtain alike. Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform was not a result of Tito’s ‘national Communism’ or of his independent foreign policy. True, at times, his revolutionary enthusiasm contravened Stalin’s geopolitical considerations. Such was Tito’s standoff with the Anglo-­American Allies over Trieste in May 1945. Contrary to conventional perceptions, however, this incongruence occurred rarely and more as a result of Tito’s revolutionary zeal than as a mark of opposition to the interests of the ‘revolutionary forces’. Whenever reproached by Stalin, the Yugoslav leader would subordinate his actions to Soviet foreign policy demands. Tito embarked upon his ‘own road to socialism’ and independent foreign policy only after the break up with Stalin. For a year after June 1948, he was careful not to antagonise Stalin and hopeful of proving the falsity of the accusations against Belgrade. Eager to reaffirm his Marxist credentials and endear himself to Stalin, Tito imposed collectivization in Yugoslavia after the break with Moscow, in 1949. The implementation of this measure against strong opposition in the countryside, at a time when his regime was fighting for survival against the most intense Soviet pressure and subversion, was a manifestation of Tito’s deep-­rooted Communist internationalist loyalty and obedience to the ‘Centre’. The first worrying signals from Moscow were registered in Belgrade in January 1948. A top-­ranking Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito’s closest aide, Milovan Djilas, was in Moscow to negotiate the new round of Soviet military and economic assistance. Unlike on previous occasions, however, weeks of idling produced no conclusion. Around the same time, at a press conference during his visit to Romania, Georgi Dimitrov, enthused by the fact that Eastern Europe was under Communist regimes, proposed a vision of a Balkan and a wider East European federation. On 29 January, however, in an unprecedented move, Moscow Pravda publicly denounced Dimitrov and dismissed the idea of a federation as ‘problematic’ and a ‘concoction’.11 Ominously, Stalin urgently summoned both Tito and Dimitrov to Moscow. Instinctively cautious, Tito

10   Introduction dispatched his second-­in-command, Edvard Kardelj. During the meeting in the Kremlin that took place on 10 February, Stalin viciously attacked the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs for neglecting to consult Moscow on foreign policy issues. He singled out the question of the Balkan federation, the alleged deployment of two Yugoslav Army divisions in Albania, and Sofia and Belgrade’s continuing assistance to Greek Communists. The following night, Kardelj was unceremoniously awakened at two o’clock in the morning and driven to Molotov’s office to sign a formal agreement compelling Yugoslavs to consult Moscow on all foreign-­policy issues. Needless to say, he had never before seen the document.12 The Soviet conduct infused Tito and his associates with deepest foreboding. Indeed, on 22 February, barely days after Kardelj’s return from the meeting with Stalin, Moscow informed Belgrade of an indefinite postponement of trade negotiations. On 18 and 19 March, Tito received two demarches announcing withdrawal of all Soviet military and civil advisers from Yugoslavia.13 He immediately dispatched a letter to Molotov pleading for the reversal of the decision. Tito argued that the cited reason for the withdrawal, lack of Yugoslav cooperation, was nothing but a malicious fabrication.14 Moscow’s response came in a letter dated 27 March, signed by Stalin and Molotov. The speed of the response suggested that it was prepared well in advance. The letter accused the Yugoslav leadership, among other things, of initiating slanderous remarks against the USSR and of repudiating Marxism–Leninism by abandoning the principles of the class struggle and of the commanding role of the Party.15 Soon afterwards, Belgrade received a resolution of the Hungarian Communist Party of 8 April fully backing Moscow’s accusations. Tito understood that Stalin had orchestrated and unleashed a campaign against him and his aides.16 On 12 April, Tito convoked a closed session of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee. He acquainted members of the Yugoslav leadership with the Soviet letter and proposed a response, which he had drafted himself. All members of the Central Committee, apart from Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Žujović, prominent Croatian and Serbian party leaders, approved Tito’s draft. The Yugoslav response began with the statement that ‘no matter how much one loved the first country of socialism, the USSR, one must not love less his own country’. It further qualified Soviet accusations as ‘monstrous and false’, revealing ‘complete absence of understanding of the real situation’ in the Yugoslav Party and the state. The letter also accused the Soviet intelligence agencies of recruiting Yugoslav officials, a practice Yugoslav leadership found incongruent with ‘socialist fraternal relations’. In the end, it proposed that a Soviet party delegation visit Yugoslavia and confirm the absurdity of the accusations.17 The Yugoslav Central Committee, however, voted to strike off as too provocative a sentence Tito included in his initial draft, which stated that ‘false accusations represented a veiled hegemonic assault of one state against the sovereignty of the other, hidden behind the ideological veneer’.18 He would adhere to this formulation in all his later explanations of the causes of the Yugoslav–Soviet break up. During the next two months, and in absolute secrecy, Moscow and Belgrade continued to exchange accusations, counter accusations and denials. As

Introduction   11 expected, during April, all Eastern European Communist parties sent letters to Belgrade fully supporting and endlessly repeating Stalin’s accusations. Stalin and Molotov’s reply to the Yugoslav letter of 13 April came dated 4 May. Compared to the first letter of 27 March, it was an even lengthier litany of Yugoslav sins and outright dismissal of every Yugoslav argument, adding even more preposterous and insulting accusations. The letter dismissed the Yugoslav proposal for a Soviet delegation to be sent to Belgrade and instead requested that the whole ‘case’ be handed over to the next Cominform meeting. In his very curt response on 17 May, Tito rejected the invitation declaring it pointless for such a gathering to decide on the veracity of accusations against him and the Yugoslav Party leadership since all Parties that were to be present there had already fully supported Moscow’s claims.19 The Cominform meeting was held in Bucharest and the Resolution published upon its conclusion, on 28 June 1948, decreed the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the organization. This was the first public acknowledgement of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict and a first-­rate world sensation. The Resolution was never officially presented to Belgrade and the Yugoslav leadership learned of its contents from agency reports. The document was drafted on accusations listed in Stalin’s letters, namely that Tito and the Yugoslav leadership were conducting policies aimed against the Soviet Union and the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and had abandoned Marxism–Leninism. The Resolution openly exhorted ‘healthy elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)’ to replace Tito and his closest associates with a ‘new, internationalist leadership’.20 In response, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership mobilized the Yugoslav Communist Party membership and the Yugoslav public in support of their resistance to Stalin’s pressure. The Fifth Congress of the CPY, the first since 1940, which was convened in Belgrade between 21 and 28 July, ‘approved the position of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPY’ and declared Soviet and Cominform accusations ‘untrue, incorrect, and unjust’.21 The fault lines of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict were thus set. The break between Moscow-­led Cominform and Belgrade was complete. Following ideological disqualification, Yugoslavia was immediately subjected to concrete pressure from the Soviet Union and People’s Democracies. Within days after the Cominform meeting, the USSR and its satellites began, one by one, to cancel existing agreements with Yugoslavia on economic, military or cultural cooperation.22 By the end of 1948, the Soviet Union and People’s Democracies had imposed on Yugoslavia a total economic blockade, causing the de facto collapse of its economy. Famine appeared in the poorest regions of the country and remained a threat for several years after 1948. The gravity of the situation can be fully appreciated if one remembers that only three years earlier Yugoslavia had emerged from the Second World War in economic ruin and with a proportional loss of human life second only to that of Poland. Due to German occupation, heavy fighting, and frequent German and Allied carpet bombing, economic output was reduced to a fraction of that in 1939, with infrastructure almost completely destroyed.23 The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that

12   Introduction between 1945 and 1948, blindly following doctrinarian Stalinist concepts, the Yugoslav leadership had subordinated their country’s economy to the ‘division of labour’ within the ‘socialist camp’, making it fully dependant on Soviet assistance.24 Moscow and its satellites also unleashed a vicious propaganda war against the regime in Belgrade.25 On a daily basis, over the radio waves and through the press and thousands of printed books and brochures, they disseminated harangue and disinformation about Yugoslavia, openly exhorting Yugoslavs to liquidate Tito and his ‘clique’. Within a year after the Cominform Resolution, diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its allies had effectively collapsed. Yugoslavia’s diplomatic missions in these countries were reduced to two to three people only, subjected to absurd restriction of movement and under constant and intimidating surveillance and harassment. In this respect, they were treated much worse than the Western diplomats. Between 1948 and 1953, 145 Yugoslav diplomats were expelled from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.26 Blindly obedient to the Kremlin’s demands to exert maximum pressure on Yugoslavia and in order to fulfil the task of Sovietizing Eastern Europe, the satellite regimes staged show trials against ‘Titoists’. In 1949 alone, prominent political figures, such as Albania’s Defence and Interior Minister Koci Xoxe, Hungary’s Foreign Minister László Rajk, and Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Traicho Kostov were tried, sentenced to death and executed. Between 1948 and 1955, forty high-­profile anti-­Yugoslav trials were organized in People’s Democracies. At the same time, thousands of ordinary Communists and citizens were tried on fabricated charges and interned or executed. Many, however, were liquidated outside the judicial process. In Albania alone, 142 people were executed without a trial.27 The prospect of Soviet and satellite military aggression, however, posed by far the biggest threat to the survival of Tito’s regime. Very soon after the Cominform Resolution became public, Yugoslavia was subjected to daily border skirmishes and infiltration of armed groups from the neighbouring satellite countries. Between 1948 and 1953, 7,877 such border ‘incidents’ were recorded, of which 142 were characterized as ‘substantive’ armed clashes. Military provocations continued unabated until 1955, well after Stalin’s death and the beginning of the Soviet–Yugoslav normalization of relations.28 In August 1949, the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that Stalin was contemplating an attack on Yugoslavia. During the previous months, the Yugoslav authorities had arrested a number of White Russian émigrés, settled in Yugoslavia after the October Revolution who, following the June 1948 break up, were recruited by Soviet military intelligence for subversive activities in Yugoslavia. At 3 am on 18 August 1949, a Soviet Embassy representative left a Soviet Government Note with the night porter of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Relations (DSIP) in Belgrade. Using the arrest of White Russian émigrés as pretext, the Note stipulated that the Soviet Government would be ‘forced to adhere to other, more effective measures that it finds necessary in order to

Introduction   13 protect the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia and to bring to account [Yugoslav] Fascist despots’.29 The Yugoslav leadership immediately set into motion contingency military preparations for guerrilla warfare, namely the formation of partisan units and creation of secret caches of food and munitions throughout the country. Among other things, the Government began evacuating state archives to safe locations.30 During the following weeks and months, Stalin raised the prospect of an imminent attack on Yugoslavia. On 11 September, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Rajk, was indicted as the ‘chief American and Yugoslav spy’. Thirteen days later, it was officially announced that he had been sentenced to death. On 28 September, the Soviet Government unilaterally cancelled the accreditation of Karlo Mrazović, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow.31 On 29 November 1949, at its session in Matra, Hungary, the Cominform issued the second Resolution on Yugoslavia, entitled The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies. The document declared that the ‘struggle against Tito’s clique – paid spies and murderers, represents the internationalist duty of all Communist and Workers parties’.32 Belgrade remained in constant fear of a Soviet attack until well after Stalin’s death in March 1953. The second and perhaps even bigger scare than that of autumn 1949 occurred in October 1950, after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River and engaged with US troops in Korea. Tito and his aides were convinced that this was just a diversion concealing Stalin’s real intention to invade Yugoslavia and destroy the thorn that had been troubling him for two years. This prompted Yugoslav leadership to seek Western military assistance for the first time since 1948. Secret Yugoslav–US contacts and talks on procurement of US military aid started in December 1950.33 The first formal and public Yugoslav– US military assistance agreement, signed on 14 November 1951, confirmed that Yugoslavia and its leadership, once the most loyal of Stalin’s disciples, had not only become one of the West’s most important propaganda assets in the ideological war against the Soviets but a vital strategic component of the Western alliance as well.34 Between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia received approximately US$1.5 billion of Western aid, mainly American economic and military, more than many NATO member states.35 The Yugoslav–Soviet conflict impressed upon the Yugoslav leaders the belief that they were waging a life-­and-death struggle against Stalin. Fearing a split among the members of the CPY and the creation of a Soviet ‘fifth column’, the Yugoslav regime often succumbed to brutal repressive methods. Between 1948 and 1953, approximately 200,000 people were arrested in Yugoslavia on charges of siding with the Cominform Resolution, of which about a third were indicted. The first and only concentration camp in Tito’s Yugoslavia was created in 1949 on the island of Goli Otok in the Adriatic. More than 32,000 political prisoners, most of them ex-­partisans, and often co-­combatants and war companions of the jailers, were imprisoned in the camp. Around 3,200 of the detainees died there.36 Historians have mistakenly attributed the Soviet–Yugoslav break up either to Tito’s ‘national Communism’ or to his foreign policy adventurism. As proof,

14   Introduction they cite his decision to deploy Yugoslav troops in Albania or the plan to create a Balkan federation with Dimitrov. Evidence that has become available since the end of the Cold War, both from Yugoslav and Russian archives, offers a different interpretation. Prior to 1948, Tito had always bowed to Stalin’s authority, even with regard to border settlement with Italy over Trieste and with Austria over Carinthia, issues over which he demonstrated an insatiable territorial appetite. At the July 1955 Plenum of the Soviet Party Central Committee, President of the Soviet Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin, echoed by Nikita Khrushchev, confirmed that ‘sins’ purportedly perpetrated by Tito had been Stalin’s fabrications.37 Tito’s alleged unauthorised deployment of two Yugoslav divisions in Albania was nothing more than Belgrade’s agreement in principle to consider the Albanian request for military assistance against possible attack from Greek government troops. After the expulsion from the Cominform, the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that Hoxha’s request was contrived in Moscow to substantiate later accusations against Tito.38 Likewise, the Balkan federation was an equally speculative proposition that was never close to implementation. At the end of their meetings in Yugoslavia, in August 1947, and few months later in Bulgaria, Tito and Dimitrov officially dismissed the idea as premature. Stalin’s harassment of Dimitrov and Kardelj during the February 1948 meeting can only be understood as part of a build-­up against Tito. It is telling that at the end of the meeting, Stalin suddenly and completely reversed his position and insisted that the federation be created immediately.39 The Yugoslav–Soviet break up, in my opinion, was a result of a flawed execution of Stalin’s plan to create a monolithic Communist ‘camp’. Not by accident, the attacks on Tito coincided with the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. Stalin embarked upon creating a Soviet Bloc after autumn 1947 and the Sovietization of Eastern Europe became the most expeditious way to accomplish it.40 The removal of Tito, as the ‘enemy within’ was, most probably, part of a plan to trigger the process of witch-­hunt throughout Eastern Europe and mobilize popular support behind satellite regimes.41 Moscow immediately portrayed the conflict with Yugoslavia as an ideological confrontation with Tito, in order to stigmatize him as a ‘traitor’. Unfortunately for Stalin, the plot to remove the Yugoslav leader did not go according to plan and led to a complete rupture of Yugoslav–Soviet relations with a long-­term eroding impact on the Soviet Bloc. Tito, on the other hand, embarked upon his ‘own road to socialism’ and began to pursue independent foreign policy only after the break up with Stalin. The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture in 1948 had wider, geo-­strategic implications. The Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, in the heart of divided Europe, which remained a possibility throughout the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict, would have almost certainly escalated into a global confrontation between the two Blocs. Furthermore, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform and Belgrade’s subsequent request for Western military assistance enabled readjustment of NATO defence strategy. Tito rightly calculated that Stalin would not contemplate an invasion of Yugoslavia if convinced that it could trigger a war with the Western Bloc. As a result, between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia became effectively incor-

Introduction   15 porated into NATO’s South-­East European flank through defence coordination, massive American arms deliveries and other military assistance. Thousands of US military advisors were attached to the Yugoslav Army’s units.42 Tito, however, consistently repudiated Western pressure to formally join NATO. On the one hand, he was afraid that membership would forever destroy the chances of reconciliation with the international Communist movement; on the other hand, he feared, probably correctly, that it would help the United States to topple his regime. The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture in 1948 and the ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’ that was created as a result destroyed the ideological uniformity of Stalinism. Moreover, it blurred the fault lines of the Cold War. Yugoslavia’s challenge to Stalin’s authority in 1948 would result in the first schism in the post-­October 1917 history of the international Communist movement and destroy its monolithic cohesion. The excommunication of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform created a rupture in what looked to be an impermeable, monolithic Communist Bloc. The break up also inspired Tito to seek a ‘third way’ between the two Blocs and play a crucial role in the creation of the Non-­Aligned Movement. The Soviet–Yugoslav confrontation, however, facilitated the process of Sovietization of Eastern Europe and plunged the Balkans into a period of grave instability. The daily rattling of sabres on Yugoslavia’s borders threatened the fragile stability of the nascent Cold War in Europe.

1 Overtures

Yugoslavia’s specific brand of socialism, often called in the literature ‘Tito’s national Communism’ or ‘Yugoslavia’s road to socialism’, was conceived after the 1948 Tito–Stalin split. Clearly not the cause of the confrontation, it crucially pushed Moscow and Belgrade to drift apart ideologically in the subsequent years. The schism that was thus created preconditioned the course and the limitations of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization between 1953 and 1957. In particular and as will be shown, it determined the strength of opposition within the Kremlin to the change of policy towards Belgrade, as well as the Yugoslav caution in embracing Soviet overtures in 1953 and 1954. Neither was ‘Tito’s independent foreign policy’, another attribute used in the historiography to explain the split, responsible for Stalin’s excommunication of the Yugoslav leadership in 1948. Tito’s cooperation with the West and his later pursuit of non-­ alignment, the cornerstones of his independent foreign policy, came in response to the strategic isolation into which the conflict with the USSR and Cominform had plunged Yugoslavia. Belgrade’s strategic alignment with the West, prior to Stalin’s death, was in response to a very real Soviet threat and was equally responsible for Yugoslavia’s reluctance to accept Soviet initiatives towards the normalization of their relations prior to autumn 1954. Thus, the beginning and the course of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization in 1953 and 1954 were a function of the transformation of Yugoslavia’s political system and its ideological underpinning, and of its strategic realignment, both created in the period between the 1948 break up and Stalin’s death in March 1953. Between 1948 and 1953, the Yugoslav regime waged a life and death battle against the very authority that formatted its identity and legitimacy – Stalin. During this period, Yugoslavia’s domestic political system and its foreign policy underwent changes of revolutionary magnitude. Remarkably, and seemingly paradoxically, the regime had initiated a profound transformation of itself and society at the time of the gravest threat to its existence. The character of the transformation fostered an irrevocable break with Stalinism. Its wider, global effect was to create a heresy against the ruling Stalinist interpretation of Marxism, introducing new approaches to socialism. The sudden drama in Yugoslavia’s relations with the West that occurred at the end of 1952 triggered panic in Belgrade and would have a critical impact on

Overtures   17 the dynamics of Yugoslav–Soviet relations in 1953. Tito and his aides2 interpreted the inconclusive adjournment of the strategic planning discussions between Yugoslavia, the US, Britain and France, held in Belgrade in November 1952,3 as a grave threat to Yugoslavia’s national security. The concurrent resurgence of the Trieste problem with Italy only exacerbated the Yugoslav leadership’s consternation. These two challenges shaped Yugoslav foreign policy priorities during the following year and a half. With utmost urgency, Yugoslavia set out to create a military alliance with its pro-­Western Balkan neighbours, Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO. Belgrade’s predicaments during this period were augmented by a catastrophic economic situation. The second consecutive drought in 1952, coupled with the disastrous consequences of forced collectivisation resulted in widespread food shortages, even famine in some regions of the country, while the spiralling balance of payment deficit was depriving Yugoslav industry of badly needed raw materials. Life-­saving dependence on Western economic aid and assistance underlined the importance of maintaining a strategic partnership with the West, particularly the US.4 Very soon after Vozhd’s death on 6 March 1953, the new post-­Stalin leadership in the Kremlin initiated unprecedented, albeit very subtle, conciliatory overtures towards Yugoslavia. Tito’s pursuit of a closer association with the West and the creation of the Balkan Alliance forced the new Soviet leadership to seek ways to normalize Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities, however, together with accumulated mistrust towards the Soviets, attributed to Belgrade’s lack of responsiveness to the Kremlin’s overtures. Only after the escalation of the Trieste crisis in October 1953 did the Yugoslav leadership decide to slightly moderate its attitude to the Soviet approaches. 1

The genesis of the heresy: the ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’ Excommunication of the Yugoslav Party and its ‘Fascist’ leadership from the Cominform had stripped Tito’s regime of its socialist credentials within the international Communist movement. Stalin, the ultimate ideological authority, immediately presented the confrontation with the Yugoslavs as the struggle against their revisionism and betrayal of Marxism–Leninism. The Yugoslav leadership’s Communist legitimacy, in the eyes of the global proletarian movement, was further undermined when, fighting for survival, it committed the gravest ‘sin’ and solicited support from the ‘class enemy’, the USA and the capitalist Bloc. In spite of this, Tito and his aides never abandoned their Marxist convictions and would remain determined to regain their previous standing within the international Communist movement, an aspect that would play an important role during the period of normalization. Restoration of ideological credibility became one of the key strategic and tactical goals for the Yugoslav leadership. On the one hand, they saw in this a way to weaken support within the Communist movement for Stalin’s campaign against Yugoslavia, in particular for possible military aggression. On the domestic front, the loss of Stalin’s seal of approval threatened Tito’s leadership of the Party. The regime in Belgrade was

18   Overtures forced to seek re-­establishment of ideological legitimacy in order to fend off external and internal threat. This explains what many saw as paradoxical and too adventurous – Tito’s decision to embark upon a political, socio-­economic and cultural metamorphosis of the country almost immediately after the 1948 break up. Unquestionably laden with enormous risks, the gamble would, nevertheless, prove crucial for his survival. The revolution of the Yugoslav domestic political system in the early 1950s was unprecedented within the existing communist paradigm and established the Yugoslav concept of socialism as an alternative to Stalin’s model. The Yugoslav ‘domestic metamorphosis’ was a case of a top-­down revolution – the changes were initiated by the Yugoslav Party leadership. Available documents suggest that debates regarding new strategic options intensified within Tito’s innermost circle during 1949. A very rare occurrence in the preceding years, seventeen Politburo meetings were held in 1949 and 1950, including two Central Committee plenums in 1949 alone.5 Of particular significance for the charting of the new course was the Third Plenum, held on 29 and 30 December 1949.6 The raising of the stakes and added pressure from Stalin after August 1949, as described in detail in the introduction, provided perhaps the crucial impetus for the Yugoslavs to embark on their own journey. It finally convinced the Yugoslav leadership to abandon, once and for ever, the notion of possible reconciliation with Stalin. Disillusioned with Moscow and Stalinism and faced with an imposed imperative to find new ideological identity and legitimacy, Tito and his closest associates began contemplating in earnest a departure from Stalinist dogmas, as the ‘correct and only road to socialism’. Additional encouragement came from a realization, perhaps more of a hope at the time, that existence outside the Soviet Bloc was feasible. Rather than posing a threat, the West was increasingly demonstrating willingness to buttress Yugoslavia’s regime. To reclaim its own legitimacy and Communist credentials, however, Yugoslavia had to redefine its own ideological identity in a manner that would position it as an alternative to that of Stalinism. This implied creating a new identity founded on ‘true’ understanding of Marx and Lenin, as the only way to disqualify Stalin’s interpretations. In circumstances when every aspect of Yugoslavia’s social, political, economic and cultural life and organization was rigidly ideological, implementation of a new ideological foundation inevitably led to a comprehensive overhaul of the political system, leaving few aspects of the country’s socio-­economic structure unchanged. Crucially, Tito and his comrades understood that the new legitimacy was possible only if founded on wider mass participation and inclusion. Popular support was critical if the regime was to fend off the overwhelming foreign threat and overcome its fundamental crisis of identity. The Yugoslav leadership also realized that in addition to the political, the economic and cultural strata of social organization needed to be transformed. The most dramatic break with Stalinism occurred when the Yugoslav regime, hitherto considered the most radical within Cominform, accepted that wider  inclusion and participation necessitated liberalization, democratization,

Overtures   19 decentralization and intellectual freedoms. The aim however, was to ‘democratize’ socialism, not to replace it with a multi-­party system. This is something Milovan Djilas, an unyielding radical always on the lookout for a new cause, clearly misunderstood. The new Yugoslav ideological identity was thus being constructed as an antithesis to Stalin’s ideological precepts and a negation of the Soviet model. Preserving the true spirit of socialism against the Soviet betrayal and Stalin’s falsifications became the justification for the introduction of Yugoslavia’s road to socialism. In his report to the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in November 1952, Tito stressed that what gave him and his comrades strength to confront Stalin in 1948 was ‘our revolutionary consciousness telling us that we are conducting ourselves as true Communist-­revolutionaries and as such obliged to defend both – the socialist principles and our own people’.7 Time and again, the Yugoslavs would stress that their approach reflected adherence to scientific axioms of Marxism–Leninism, as opposed to falsifications created to fit Stalin’s deviant system. In his speech before the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Parliament, in June 1950, which promulgated legislation introducing self-­management, Tito stressed that, prior to the infamous Cominform Resolution, [the Yugoslav] Party nurtured too many illusions, uncritically accepting and implementing everything that was being done in the way it was being done in the USSR, even things that were not in accordance with [Yugoslavia’s] specific conditions or in the spirit of Marxism–Leninism. . . . Today, however, we are building socialism in our country ourselves, without clichés and guided only by the science of Marxism . . .8 The Yugoslav leadership was also keen to promote Yugoslavia’s positive experience in the pursuit of independence from Moscow’s tutelage, as an invaluable contribution to the theory and practice of socialism. They hoped that by awarding their experience and their new ideological identity universal character and value, they could successfully challenge Stalin’s authority as the interpreter of the Marxist doctrine. As Tito emphasized, successful implementation of Marxist science in [Yugoslavia] enabled us to successfully fight revisionism in this science . . . [Marxist science] does not need additional [to Marx, Engels, and Lenin] authorities, much less tutors or surrogates of the Marxist science who can only divert it from the correct socialist way into revisionism.9 The legitimacy of the new Yugoslav ideological concept was dependent on a successful challenge against the existing axiom that only one road to socialism, the Soviet one, existed. Tito addressed this at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Parliament in June 1950, when he declared that ‘different economic, cultural and other conditions in different countries demand different

20   Overtures forms [of construction of socialism], without prescriptions or clichés’.10 He then defined points of demarcation between the Yugoslav and the Soviet models, as a) the question of the role of the state in the transitional period, in its withering stage; b) the role of the [Communist] party, in particular its relation to the state; c) the question of the lower phase of Communism or, as it is called these days – socialism; and d) the question of the state vs. socialist ownership.11 Of these, the third point referring to the question of the lower phase of Communism, or the character of transition from the lower phase, socialism, to true Communism was aimed at ridiculing the Soviet leadership’s occasional statements proposing that the Soviet Union had already entered Communism. The points of demarcation with the Soviet system, as stipulated by Tito, defined the transformation of the Yugoslav political system and constituted the building blocks upon which the Yugoslav leadership constructed the new ideological foundation and their own ‘road to socialism’. The success of Yugoslavia’s challenge, as Tito had understood when drafting response to Stalin’s first letter of accusations of 27 March 1948, stood a much better chance if the 1948 break up was shown not to have been a result of Yugoslavia’s betrayal of Marxism, Stalin’s main argument. For this reason, Tito vehemently denied the ideological character of 1948 and insisted that it came as a result of ‘aggressive and hegemonic policy of the USSR towards Yugoslavia, of the [Soviet] effort to subjugate [Yugoslavia], economically and politically, to destroy [Yugoslavia’s] independence and transform the country into its colony’. Moreover, according to him, this ‘happened at the moment when [the USSR] had unambiguously abandoned socialist principles in its domestic policy, as well as in its foreign policy, and had openly embarked upon pursuit of imperialist expansionism’.12 Addressing both domestic and international audiences from the pulpit of the Sixth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in November 1952, Tito insisted that it was the Kremlin leadership who betrayed the cause of socialism. He accused ‘Soviet imperialists and thieves’ of years of raiding and exploiting not only peoples of Eastern Europe but, also ‘those in Austria and Germany under the Soviet occupation’.13 Tito recalled that ‘after Teheran, the Soviet Union began showing its true imperialist character’ and, as such ‘has contributed most to the current tense international situation’. Tito ascribed this to the fact that ‘[the Soviet Union] had betrayed socialist principles and embarked upon the ways of the old Czarist Russia, pursuing Russian imperial goals through imperialist methods, while concealing them behind the revolutionary interest of the international proletariat’. ‘By subjugating Communist parties throughout the world,’ Tito explained, ‘the Soviet Union had transformed them into mere instruments of its foreign policy.’ Reminding comrades that 1948 represented Stalin’s unsuccessful effort at subjugating Yugoslavia, he insisted that the ‘[Soviet Union] aims to impose its will and incessant appetite for exploitation of other

Overtures   21 nations . . ., creating colonies in the centre of Europe out of hitherto independent states, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.’.14 Indeed, the anti-­Stalin and anti-­Soviet rhetoric of the Sixth Congress sounded more like something one might hear at Senator McCarthy’s rallies, rather than from the pulpit of a congress of a European Communist party. The new Yugoslav heresy, however, in one of its crucial departures from Stalinism, offered, at least declaratively, a re-­defined role of the Communist Party in society. A mere suggestion of a change in the commanding role of a Bolshevik Party was, at the time, regarded by Communists worldwide as the gravest sin – a revision of one of Lenin’s crucial postulates and, as such, the betrayal of Marxism–Leninism. The orthodoxy stipulated that the Party fulfils its historic task of expropriating the bourgeois class only by assuming the political monopoly within a society and imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat, on behalf and in the name of the working class. Strict adherence to the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ in the Party, as the orthodoxy went, safeguards its organizational unity and operational capability. To justify re-­defining the Party role, Yugoslavs accused Stalin of transforming the Bolshevik Party into an instrument of rule over the people and over the proletariat. There was perhaps another good reason for Tito and his comrades to contemplate a less dictatorial role for the Party. On the eve of the Second World War, the Yugoslav industrial working class was small in number. In addition, Tito’s guerrilla warfare and resistance against the Germans and domestic quislings was conducted in the countryside. As a result, his partisans were overwhelmingly recruited among the peasantry. The Yugoslav Communists thus owed victory in the war of liberation and success of their social revolution more to peasants and young intellectuals, namely students, than to the traditional proletariat. Desperately needing the widest possible popular support at a time of dire threat in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Yugoslav regime could ill afford to alienate any part of society, in particular those who in the past had lent it decisive support – the peasants. This demanded abandonment of ideological sectarianism and, if only declaratively, abandonment of the ‘proletarian dictatorship’. Tito and others may also have heeded lessons of recent history, remembering how, when faced with Hitler’s troops on the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin appealed to the tradition and glory of the Russian Czarist army and Generals Kutuzov and Suvorov and successfully mobilized popular support behind the fight for the ‘motherland’ and not for socialism. Between 2 and 7 November 1952, in Zagreb, the Yugoslav Communist Party held its Sixth Congress. One of the pivotal precepts of Yugoslavia’s new ideological identity, the new role of the Party was validated at the Congress, together with its new name. Tito proposed that ‘the current phase [of socialist construction], as well as its future development demand that the Party be renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’. By pointing out that the term was, in fact coined by Marx, he underlined the organic link between the Yugoslav concept and ‘scientific’ Marxism–Leninism. As Tito insisted, the change in name asserted the new role that the Communists would in future play in Yugoslav

22   Overtures society, one of greater accountability and responsibility. According to him, this would enable ‘[the Yugoslav Party] to rid itself of harmful methods that derive from the Soviet experience and which brought the Communist Party in the Soviet Union into the role of an auxiliary gendarme of a bureaucratized regime’.15 The new name was intended to re-­define the Party as an association of conscientious communists, in the mould proposed by young Marx, in contrast with the caste of apparatchiks and bureaucrats that the Bolshevik Party grew into during the Russian Civil War, the form Stalin later embalmed. While the Soviet Party grew used to commanding, the League would ‘lead by example’. Only in this new role, Tito argued, would Communists be able to contribute towards ‘decentralization and democratization of management and administration of the economy’, a precondition of new relations in the ‘sphere of production’. This, in turn would finally and for the first time in history, enable appropriation of ‘surplus value’ by workers themselves – the crux of the new ‘road to socialism’ that Yugoslavs were proposing.16 Tito also proposed and the Congress promulgated a change of name and structure of the Popular Front. In its new role, the Party was to relinquish tutelage of mass political organizations; Communists were no longer to act as supervisors or policemen but, as ‘conscientious members’ of the Popular Front who initiate action rather than issue guidelines. Between 1945 and 1948, in Yugoslavia, as indeed throughout the Soviet Bloc, former parliamentary parties were amalgamated into a single political organization – the Popular Front. It was a framework for dissolving remnants of bourgeois political organizations. Controlled by Communists, Popular Fronts provided quasi-­democratic legitimacy to the Communist political monopoly. The new organization that was to replace the Front, as envisioned by the new Yugoslav model, was to provide a formal framework for wider popular participation and for the decentralization of the economy and state administration. The new name and a looser association with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were intended to transform the Front into a representative association for political engagement of all members of Yugoslav society, above all the non-­communists. Four months after the Party Congress, in February 1953, at its Fourth Congress, the Popular Front changed its name to the Socialist Working Peoples’ Alliance of Yugoslavia. Of particular significance however, and something that has hitherto escaped historiographical scrutiny was that Tito, even at this early stage, associated transformation of the Front with the new foreign policy strategy of non-­engagement that he and his colleagues were obviously conceptualizing by this time. At this stage, of course, he was very careful not to openly advocate such aspirations. At the Sixth Congress, however, Tito hinted that beside domestic considerations, external reasons, in particular further cooperation with socialist and other progressive movements encourage us [to change the name and role of the Popular Front]. In order for this cooperation to happen, it is essential to make changes in the organization and role of the Front, as a factor of huge political importance not only domestically but also internationally.17

Overtures   23 Preparing for the big foreign policy leap that would be allowed to happen only after normalization with the Soviets, Tito was creating a non-­Communist mass political organization to facilitate contacts with the non-­engaged, non-­socialist countries and movements around the world. This corroborates the argument that Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy orientation was conceptualised well before it was formally launched in the winter of 1954–1955. Tito and his comrades did not stumble into non-­alignment; rather, they thoughtfully and patiently constructed it over a period of time, always mindful of outside circumstances and the ‘favourable correlation of forces’ in the international arena. This also confirms that domestic reforms and new foreign policy strategy went hand in hand and were simultaneously constructed and utilised by the Yugoslav regime towards fulfilment of a single strategy – survival. The changed role of the Yugoslav Communist Party was intended to result in the separation of the Party from the state apparatus and eventually in the ‘withering of the state’. From these first steps and indeed, throughout the existence of Tito’s regime, this concept would remain among the fundamental building blocks of the new Yugoslav ideological model. It was also meant to support the Yugoslav claim that their model was based on the ‘scientific’, i.e. ‘true’ Marxism–Leninism. The ‘withering away of the state’, to adopt Lenin’s term, in the transitional phase of socialism was identified by the ‘classics of Marxism’, as one of the pivotal preconditions for the transformation of capitalism into Communism.18 Tito had announced this shift two years before the Congress, at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Parliament, declaring it the crucial distinction between the Yugoslav and the Soviet ideological models. The merging of the Party and state apparatus was blamed for the bureaucratization of the socialist state and the creation of a deviant quasi-­socialist system, such as that of the Soviet Union. According to Tito, not only was such a system alien to Marxist doctrine but, ‘bureaucratism is one of the biggest enemies of socialism’.19 Lenin’s caveat against the ‘growing together of the party and the state apparatuses’ was widely quoted by Yugoslavs in support of their new model. The strong link with Lenin was also meant to prove that Yugoslav leaders were the true interpreters of Marxism–Leninism and that Stalin was a mere usurper. Because, as the Yugoslavs argued, this disqualified Stalin as the interpreter of the Marxist doctrine, it disqualified him as the leader of the international Communist movement. The process of separation of the Party from the state and the democratization of state organization, which began in Yugoslavia in 1952, would continue in the next decades. It was given a particular boost by the new party statute promulgated at the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists in April 1958. By far the most important innovation of the new Yugoslav model was the introduction of ‘self-­management’ in economy and of its key element – workers’ councils. The councils enabled direct worker and employee participation in the administration and management of factories and enterprises. The concept of self­management, in turn, was the framework for the implementation of two axioms that Tito identified in 1950 as crucial for distinguishing the Yugoslav ideological

24   Overtures model from the Soviet one. On the one hand, it was the decentralization and withering of the state and, on the other hand, the transformation of state ownership into socialist ownership of the means of production. Introduction of workers’ councils and self-­management would have a unique impact on the theory and practice of socialism. They would become the focus of popular demands for economic and political reforms throughout the existence of the Soviet Bloc.20 It is wrong, however, to attribute impeccable planning to the manner in which elements of the new Yugoslav ideological identity were being introduced and implemented. The Yugoslav leadership was treading completely unknown territory, constantly debating various concepts. Nevertheless, they aspired to consistency, as much as their own understanding of the theoretical innovations they were introducing allowed them to. Tito and his aides understood, however, that in order for their new ideological model to stand against the Stalinist one, it had to be firmly embedded in the ‘process of production’. This explains why priority was awarded to the introduction of the revolutionary new concept of the ‘workers’ councils’. True to Marxist doctrine, the Yugoslav regime recognised workers as its main support base. The legitimacy of the Party’s arrogation of power was based on the premise that it was ruling ‘in the name of the proletariat and the working people’. Consequently, any attempt at introducing mass participation had to include first and foremost the workers themselves. Securing workers’ inclusion and support became a priority for yet another reason. Just as it was starting to pick up for the first time since the War, the general standard of living, and in particular that of industrial workers, had begun to deteriorate dramatically as a result of the Soviet economic blockade imposed in the summer of 1948. The introduction of workers’ councils as forms of ‘proletarian democracy’, as the first element of Yugoslavia’s new ideological system reflected how critical Tito’s regime deemed workers’ support for its survival. The ‘Guidelines on establishment and functioning of workers’ councils in state enterprises’, had been promulgated in the form of a decree already by the end of 1949. The document heralded forthcoming transformation of the domestic political system and was the precursor to the self-­management legislation that would be formally introduced in June 1950. The decree established experimental workers’ councils in 215 enterprises throughout Yugoslavia,21 the first being the thirteen-­member workers’ council set up in the cement plant ‘Prvoborac’ in Solin, near Split, on 31 December 1949.22 On 27 June 1950, ‘The basic law on handing over of the administration and management of state enterprises and higher economic associations to the workers’ was promulgated in Belgrade. It was the first legislation of self-­ management, ushering in a new model in the twentieth century practice of socialism. The historical significance of the legislation was accentuated by the fact that it was promulgated at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Parliament and that Tito himself presented the proposal. He immediately hinted at the true aims of the new law – to define Yugoslav ideological credentials as an alternative to Stalinism and, ultimately, to restore the regime’s legitimacy. In his

Overtures   25 exposé, Tito stressed that the new legislation defined the ideological differentiation between Yugoslav and the Soviet roads to socialism and declared that, the crux of [Yugoslav] road to socialism is that [Yugoslavs] . . . apply Marxism in practice in accordance with the specific conditions that exist in [Yugoslavia]. For [Yugoslavs, Marxism] is not a dogma . . . and its principles . . . are fully applicable even at this stage . . . and any departure from these principles, under any excuse, means revisionism and betrayal, not only of the interests of the working class but of progressive humanity, in general.23 The fact that workers’ councils were defined in Marx’s early works among his rare deliberations on the organization of the socialist economy, confirmed, in Yugoslav eyes, the ‘scientific’ nature of the Yugoslav proposition. Tito triumphantly proclaimed that ‘this new legislation finally creates conditions for the realization of one of the basic axioms of Marxism and Leninism – ‘factories to the workers’ ’.24 The introduction of direct workers’ control over production fulfilled one of Marx, Engels and Lenin’s key postulates of the ‘withering of the state’ and as such disqualified Stalin’s axiom of administrative organization of the system of production, based on the strengthening of the state ‘in the name of the workers’. Tito quoted Lenin’s maxim that ‘only a withering state corresponds to the true needs of the proletariat’. The theoretical differentiation of the Yugoslav concept of a socialist state against the Soviet one, as the key point of demarcation between the Soviet and Yugoslav ideological models, was perhaps most explicitly presented by the Yugoslav leader at the Sixth Party Congress, as a response to his own rhetorical question: What does the Soviet experience show? It shows that the USSR has not liquidated exploitation of workers; [workers] do not command the process of production and are nothing but poorly paid hired labour. They do not participate in the distribution of the surplus value, which is appropriated, in its entirety, by bureaucracy. The experience also shows that there are very few socialist forms [in the Soviet] economy; state-­capitalist forms are developing and are transforming the system into monstrous bureaucratic state-­ capitalism . . . it is evident that Stalin’s revisionist theory of the necessity of the strengthening of state is a result of internal contradictions that have pushed [Soviet] society towards state capitalism, away from socialism. Stalin’s aim is to strengthen the state inwards, in order to uphold the subjugation of hired labour and to preserve the system of exploitation and, outwards, in order to pursue his imperialist policy.25 Tito concluded his scathing denunciation of Stalinism with an allegation that the Soviet working class was ‘in a much worse position than in most backward capitalist countries’, and that when he talks of the working class, Stalin, in fact ‘means the NKVD, the state bureaucracy, and the enormous bureaucratised state machinery’.26

26   Overtures Self-­management led to introduction of market economy in Yugoslavia and to a dramatic and definitive break with the rigid, administrative economic system of the Soviet type. In the following decades, the role of the market would steadily increase until, by the late 1960s, it constituted the theoretical and constitutional foundation of the new Yugoslav ‘socialist market economy’. Market was indispensible for the new Yugoslav model as a framework, which enabled workers’ participation in the distribution of the surplus value. In the Soviet model, Yugoslavs argued, the surplus value was appropriated by the bureaucratic caste by means of state ownership, administrative planning, and central allocation of resources and products. By contrast, in a genuine socialist economy, as the Yugoslav model proposed, the surplus value was appropriated by workers by means of, on the one hand, their control of the means of production through workers’ councils and, on the other hand, through the exchange of products and allocation of resources on the market. In as much as this represented a genuine Yugoslav innovation, it was at the same time an admission that a system based on independent economic subjects, in the form of enterprises run by workers’ councils, cannot function within a Soviet-­type administrative system; it was dependent on the existence of market-­validated allocation of resources and exchange of products. When introducing it in Parliament, Tito declared the new ‘Workers’ Law’, as the ‘Basic law’ was immediately branded by Yugoslav propaganda, to be ‘the most important historical decision of this Parliament after the “Law on nationalisation of the means of production” ’.27 Tito’s grandiloquence on the side, the introduction of self-­management placed the Yugoslav system on a course of irreversible transformation. Within several years after June 1950, all enterprises in Yugoslavia were headed by workers’ councils.28 At first, their impact was largely declarative. Tight state control over the economy continued for some time after the ‘Basic Law’ was enacted, as a result of the inertia caused by the existing Stalinist administrative methods and, perhaps even more so, as a result of the continuing Soviet threat. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership continued to create conditions, legal and political, that would facilitate the implementation of ‘self-­ management’. New laws enacted as a follow up to the ‘Basic Law’ enabled, on the one hand, functional adjustment of new forms in the economic system with existing legal and constitutional framework. On the other hand, they helped set up a new, more decentralized system of political and economic organization at all levels of administration, from communes to republics and the Federation. New laws on state administration, promulgated in the first few years of the 1950s provided a crucial life-­line to ‘self-­management’ and fostered decentralization of the Yugoslav state. As stated earlier, the cornerstone of the new Yugoslav ideological approach was the precept of the withering state in socialism.29 The ‘classics of Marxism’ proposed that successful seizure of power by the party of the proletariat, the Communist party, would initiate the process of the withering of the state. According to them, every state, even the one organised by the proletariat, is an instrument of oppression and subjugation and as such must be destroyed.30 At the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Parliament, in

Overtures   27 June 1950, Tito cited Lenin’s statement that ‘to the proletariat, only one type of state is necessary – one that is withering’. He then insisted that the fulfilment of this prophecy is the Yugoslav contribution to the implementation of ‘scientific Marxism’ against Stalin’s falsifications.31 According to him, this was to be achieved, on the one hand, through ‘decentralization of the state administration, in particular in economy’ and, on the other hand, by ‘handing over the administration and management of factories and state enterprises to workers’.32 Disempowerment of the state apparatus and decentralization thus became key aspects of the transformation of the Yugoslav political system. Two laws in particular, promulgated within three years after changes in the Yugoslav political system were first announced, inaugurated the transformation of the state administration and Yugoslavia’s constitutional structure. The first of the two, ‘The Law on People’s Councils’ of 1 April 1952 established people’s councils as the basis of local self governance. The concept was rooted in the experience of the National-­Liberation councils, unique self-­governing political bodies created during the War of Liberation, 1941–1945. They were set up in the liberated territories by Tito’s National-­Liberation movement as instruments of the new state administration. They were the instruments of the social revolution that Tito and the Party were carrying out under the guise of the National-­Liberation war. Presenting it before the Yugoslav Parliament, Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s closest associate and official ideologue, claimed that the new law would prevent bureaucratization of the Yugoslav socialist state, a threat much greater, in his words, than the threat of the bourgeois counter revolution. In addition, as he underlined, the law was to contribute towards ‘the [concept of the] withering of the state . . . [which] in contrast to the Stalinist theory of the strengthening of the State represents today a touchstone of true socialism’.33 The new legislation was also intended to devolve functions of the state executive organs to the organs of self-­management and self-­ governance.34 The ‘Constitutional Law on Basic Social and Political Structure and Federal Administrative Bodies’, promulgated less than a year later, on 13 January 1953, constitutionally restructured the Federal administration. Furthermore, it constitutionally defined self-­management and self-­governance as the foundation of the Yugoslav socio-­political system and reaffirmed the role of workers’ and people’s councils. On the top executive level, it replaced Federal and Republican Councils of Ministers with Executive Councils. As they were parliamentary executive bodies, this seemingly strengthened the role of the Federal and Republics’ Assemblies, or parliaments. Creation of new Houses of Producers in new bi-­ cameral Federal and Republics’ parliaments further reaffirmed the system of self-­management in the economy. The changes in the Yugoslav constitution, although ground-­breaking from the point of view of the existing Stalinist paradigm, did not transform the Yugoslav system into a multi-­party parliamentarian democracy. Neither did they diminish Tito and the Party’s grip on power. They did, however, start the process that would lead to the liberalization and democratization of Yugoslav society two decades later.

28   Overtures

Cultural and intellectual transformation of Yugoslav society Rejection of the Soviet model, which began with the introduction of self-­ management in 1949, imposed upon Tito and his aides the necessity or, as they claimed, ‘liberated them’, to re-­conceptualize Yugoslav society’s perception of itself and the world around it. The transformation of the existing ‘intellectual superstructure’ or ‘the sphere of consciousness’, as the Marxists called it, which until then was moulded in the rigid, Stalinist mode, became an imperative. Tito and his comrades understood the futility of trying to implant anti-­Stalinist concepts into a Stalinist mindset. Perceptions of the contemporary world, until then formatted within Stalinist, quasi-­Marxist–Leninist ideological imagery, had to make room for a more realistic understanding of global phenomena, of human co-­existence and civilizational advancements. The expulsion from the ‘socialist camp’ had forced Yugoslavia to fight for survival. The success of this struggle was conditional on the support and sympathy of a non-­Communist world. This imposed upon the Yugoslav regime the need to project its identity in a radically different manner and language, one that the world existing outside Stalinist symbolism could understand and communicate with. As a result, some of the most dramatic changes within the Yugoslav domestic ‘revolution’ in the early 1950s occurred within the cultural and educational spheres, within the domain of perceptions and of the Yugoslav Wettanschauung. It was the transformation of the intellectual sphere that turned the drifting away from the Soviet reality into an irreversible process. In turn, the changing system of perceptions encouraged further transformation of the Yugoslav system, namely the conceptualization of new liberal forms of the federal structure, new concepts of the socialist market economy and of non-­aligned foreign policy. The Third Plenum of the Yugoslav Communist Party, held at the end of December 1949, represented an ideological earthquake. It made public the radical departure from the inherited Stalinist ideological and intellectual paradigm and sanctioned a completely different approach to socialist education and culture. The Plenum endorsed and encouraged free exchange of ideas with the outside world. Moreover, it acknowledged that Yugoslavia, as an intellectually and culturally underdeveloped country, must reach out for the knowledge and intellectual achievements the outside world had to offer. The Plenum proposed that, as a prerequisite for its cultural advancement, Yugoslavia must expose its intellectual potential to the scrutiny and influence of the outside world and compete with it. In the most dramatic break with the Stalinist past, the Plenum pronounced the Party’s commitment to creative freedom and the diversity of artistic expression and abandonment of its censorial role in culture.35 The fact that the message was delivered from the pulpit of the Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee and, more importantly, by Milovan Djilas, a member of Tito’s four-­strong innermost circle and the official Party ideologue and Head of Agitprop, the all-­powerful Party propaganda apparatus, confirmed that a decisive ideological turn had been made. Breaking out of the international isolation imposed after the expulsion from Cominform and by the subsequent Moscow-­

Overtures   29 directed propaganda was an imperative for the Yugoslav leadership. They understood that creative freedom and the energy it liberates could decisively help towards this goal and could secure support across the globe. Furthermore, only the intellectual scrutiny deriving from such freedom would enable Yugoslavia to overcome dogmatism, which never ceased to threaten to pull it back into Soviet hands. It was also recognized that such scrutiny would help the development of new Marxist concepts, essential for the construction of a new ideological identity and crucial for the regime’s survival. Bolstering intellectual and artistic freedoms, nevertheless, can fatally undermine an autocratic regime, regardless of how ‘enlightened’ it wished to appear. All evidence, however, points to the unparalleled confidence that the Yugoslav regime possessed at the time. Within a year after being exposed to the most dangerous threat it had ever faced, the break with the Soviet Union, it felt that it exercised absolute control over the country and could rely on the unconditional obedience of its security apparatus. Most importantly, it never doubted the highest possible degree of public support based on Tito’s charismatic, almost mythological, personal popularity. The conclusions of the Third Plenum were acted upon within a month. On 30 January 1950, Party officials together with academics, artists, intellectuals and scientists from all over Yugoslavia, non-­party and party members alike, were convened in a conference on Yugoslavia’s cultural and artistic propaganda abroad. The main report, delivered by Ivo Sarajčić, placed the proposed changes within the new Yugoslav ideological concept, stressing that, Yugoslavia wishes to establish its relations with abroad, with the world of culture, in a completely different manner compared to that of the USSR. We do not approach [abroad] in order to fight for an artificial supremacy. We approach it with the intention to appreciate the development of culture, art and science, and to strive for collaboration and everything positive [the world] can offer us.36 The most striking feature of the new Yugoslav approach was that scientific and cultural relations with the West were taken away from Party scrutiny and censorship. In accordance with the guidelines adopted at this conference, they were to be supervised and guided by qualified experts in the field. Sarajčić underlined that, decisions and recommendations regarding [Yugoslavia’s relations with the West] must be provided by experts and professional departments who will know what and from which country should be brought in . . . Opinion on what is of worth and of quality must be given by our scientists, our professional associations, and by cultural and artistic organizations. They alone, and not the bureaucratic organ of some ministry [are qualified] to provide final judgment.37 The Conference further disqualified the existing state cultural policy and announced its de-­bureaucratization; it granted artistic and other professional

30   Overtures associations, such as the Painters’ Association and the Writers’ Union, freedom of action and the right to establish collaboration with foreign associations. It also demanded from the Federal administration that stimuli be introduced to support and encourage collaboration of individual scientists and artists with foreign colleagues and associations. Moreover, the Conference set out as a priority that as many experts, researchers and professionals as was possible, within all fields of science and arts, be allowed to visit leading foreign centres of scientific research and culture. These policy recommendations represented a hitherto unprecedented liberalization of culture and sciences in a socialist country and the manner in which it conducted cultural and scientific exchange with the outside world. It would have been too much to expect that the new course would prevail overnight. It was met with resistance from Party conservatives and bureaucrats alike. The fiercest opposition came from existing ‘arbitrators of ideological purity’ in arts and sciences who rightly saw the new creative freedoms as a grave danger to their profitable and powerful positions as indisputable authorities. The Yugoslav leadership, however, convinced that cultural and scientific exchange with the world was essential in overcoming international isolation, relentlessly confronted all opposition to the new course. As early as 1950, collaboration was established with a number of international cultural organizations and associations. Yugoslavia also revived relations with a number of international institutions of which it was formally a member but with which it had not cooperated prior to 1948, when it blindly followed Soviet obstruction of international and UN organizations. One such example was Yugoslavia’s position in UNESCO. As a founding member of the UN, it had formally been part of UNESCO but had practically no relations with it. Once re-­established in 1950, the relations brought immediate effect. Yugoslavia began receiving research grants and financial assistance for the purchase of books and material for scientific research. In the same year, Yugoslav authorities started seriously researching and familiarizing themselves with American and German university programmes and curricula. In October 1951, an agreement was signed with Columbia University for the secondment of two Yugoslav lecturers and a professor in the 1952–1953 academic year. The Yugoslav Scientific and Cultural Council also established an extensive translation program from foreign art and science periodicals and publications. Very soon and for the first time since 1945, public reading rooms with foreign periodicals, newspapers and journals were opened in major Yugoslav cities.38 By 1953, around 300 Yugoslav institutions were collaborating with 650 Western institutions. Between 1950 and 1952, more than 50,000 books, periodicals, journals and other publications were imported from the West, including the US. In the decade between 1953 and 1963, around 17,000 Yugoslav experts and scientists spent time abroad, as part of various research and study programmes. In 1957 alone, 951 Yugoslav University professors and lecturers, or 27% of the total number of 3,456, spent time abroad, as part of one of the above programmes. On 12 March 1953, the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council formed a Commission for cultural relations with foreign countries, whose task was to foster and assist the development of Yugoslav cultural and scientific relations

Overtures   31 with other countries. The Commission was empowered with many of the prerogatives of a regular government ministry and comprised prominent scientists, academics and artists, many of whom were not Party members.39 The boldness of the Yugoslav cultural leap was perhaps best illustrated by Sarajčić’s statement that, there is much in all fields of science and arts in the West that [Yugoslavia] can learn from . . . even decadence, as it appears in the West, should be accessible to us if we wish to fully appreciate their culture and art; we should not be afraid that it will have a negative impact on us.40 Transformation of everyday imagery and symbolism became evident very quickly. Denunciation of ‘Westernism’ or ‘decadent art’ emanating from ‘decaying capitalist society’ became far less frequent. The enormity and significance of the ‘cultural revolution’ that occurred in Yugoslavia in 1950 was most evident in the dramatic break with ideological axioms in the arts and with ‘politically correct’ projections of socialist society, which until then were deemed unchangeable building blocks of Stalin’s ‘new socialist culture’. Socialist realism was disqualified as a model. It was denied creativeness and branded a product of ‘ideological blindness’ and a deviant creation of Stalinism. Standards defined by socialist realism, against which for decades in the Soviet Union everything in arts had been measured, were now interpreted by Yugoslavs as a system of over-­ simplified and vulgar perceptions and interpretations. The striking departure from ideological clichés and stereotypes was reflected in the new Yugoslav approach to representation abroad. Yugoslav leaders understood that the image Yugoslavia projected abroad was an essential element of its communication with the world, one that would determine the range and volume of cultural and scientific exchange and import. The improved image of Yugoslavia, it was hoped, would attract public sympathy and political support internationally, which was crucial for overcoming isolation. It was thus important, as Sarajčić put it, that ‘[Yugoslavs] present [their] country in true light, as a country with a rich cultural legacy, with rich culture and not as a wild Balkan country, a perception that existed in the eyes of the West.’41 The country’s entire cultural and historical heritage, rather than glorification of ‘socialist achievements’, were now projected as Yugoslavia’s bona fide face and its true contribution to global culture. One of Yugoslavia’s first major exhibitions in the West, organised in Paris in 1951, was that of medieval frescoes. It was soon followed by exhibitions of painters, such as Stojan Aralica, Petar Lubarda, Milo Milunović and Pedja Milosavljević, who studied and lived in Paris before the Second World War and, as representatives of current European artistic styles and trends, were as distant from socialist realism as one could be. Commenting before the Federal commission for cultural relations with foreign countries on the participation of Yugoslav films at the Edinburgh festival between 1949 and 1951, the Yugoslav Ambassador in London Jože Brilej warned that ‘if we wish to promote Yugoslav film abroad, the contents and artistic production must be adjusted to the demands and

32   Overtures tastes of foreign markets and public.’42 The new openness, boldness and willingness to embrace the challenge of exposure to Western cultural achievements and experience made possible an exhibition of modern French paintings in 1952, which toured all the major Yugoslav cities. This opened a floodgate of exhibitions of modern art and architecture that were not limited to Belgrade but were also presented throughout Yugoslavia. In 1955, Henry Moore, as a guest of the Yugoslav government, opened a major exhibition of his sculptures in Belgrade. From 1954, prominent European theatres with contemporary repertoire regularly toured major Yugoslav cities.43 The changes introduced to the intellectual sphere of perceptions, in arts, sciences and education in Yugoslavia in the first few years of the 1950s represented a true revolutionary leap. It would have a transforming effect on Yugoslavian society and the country’s relations with the world. Without intellectual freedoms and openness, the search for new strategic alternatives and the introduction of an innovative foreign policy strategy could not have been possible. Despite the introduction of self-­management and self-­governance and the transformation of culture and education, Tito and the leadership of the Party never relinquished their monopoly on power. Multi-­party parliamentarianism remained prohibited. Nonetheless, the significance of the changes in the Yugoslav political system in the early 1950s should not be underestimated, in particular their impact on Yugoslavia’s relations with the USSR. The transformation represented a dramatic departure from the Stalinist model and created a new socialist proposition. As such, it irrevocably distanced the two regimes. The transformation of the Yugoslav ideological model and political system created a permanent chasm between Yugoslavia and the USSR, much more than the threat of Soviet military aggression and economic blockade. The character of the changes transformed the break between the two countries into an unbridgeable abyss. This would consistently hamper efforts at better mutual understanding throughout the process of reconciliation after 1953 and eventually lead to its collapse at the end of 1956.

Yugoslav national security crisis in November 1952 At the end of 1952, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that the country’s national security was endangered.44 Several months earlier, in July 1952, the three Western powers, the US, Britain and France, reached an understanding that military cooperation with Yugoslavia had achieved a level which demanded improved strategic coordination with Belgrade. On the one hand, the south-­eastern NATO flank would be considerably strengthened by the Yugoslav link between Italy and Greece. On the other hand, improved coordination would further integrate Yugoslavia into the Western Bloc. This was the Western rationale behind talks that were held in Belgrade between 16 and 20 November. The tripartite (US, Britain, France) military delegation was led by the US General Thomas T. Handy while the Yugoslav delegation was headed by the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, General Peko Dapčević. The Yugoslavs attrib-

Overtures   33 uted the utmost importance to these talks; and behind the scenes, Tito was personally involved. Reporting on the talks, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Sir Ivo Mallet, speculated that the conference room was bugged and that Tito followed the discussions from a nearby room. According to him, General Dapčević relied heavily on written messages regularly brought to him by an orderly from an adjacent room.45 From the first day, it became apparent that the two sides had divergent goals. On the one hand, Belgrade was looking for concrete Western commitment towards Yugoslavia in case of Soviet aggression. Once it received such guarantees, Yugoslavia was willing to disclose fully its defence plans and coordinate troop disposition with the West.46 General Handy, on the other hand, came with a limited mandate. His task was to acquire a better insight into Yugoslavia’s defence planning and capabilities to help Western military planners to structure future military aid in accordance with the Yugoslav Army’s true requirements. He was not authorized to offer the Yugoslavs formal security guarantees.47 General Handy’s refusal to make such commitments after repeated demands was interpreted by Tito and his associates as tacit acceptance that a Soviet or satellite48 attack on Yugoslavia could be confined to a local war. Faced with daily military incidents on its borders with the satellites, Belgrade found such a position frightening. More than anything else, the Yugoslavs feared becoming a European Korea.49 Such apprehensions were only further augmented by the vociferous anti-­Communism of the newly elected Eisenhower/Dulles administration. Alarmed by the outcome of talks with General Handy, Tito convened the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) within a week of the General’s departure from Belgrade. Speaking of the talks, Tito voiced his apprehension that, [the West] considers that a [Soviet–Yugoslav] war could be confined to Yugoslavia. . . . It is obvious that [General] Handy is a member of the reactionary wing. . . . The developments in the World are turning towards the Right (the Eisenhower victory). . . . The American reactionary forces are going against Communism in general and not just against Soviet hegemony and aggression.50 Given the coincidental timing of the Belgrade talks and the US Presidential elections, the Yugoslav leadership attributed General Handy’s stance to the pronounced anti-­Communism of the new Eisenhower Administration. Tito feared that the new Republican President would be indifferent to Yugoslavia’s fate, regarding the country as a Communist state indistinguishable from the Soviet Union or its satellites. The compelling reason behind the Yugoslav leadership’s panicked reaction to Handy’s mission was, of course, the ubiquitous threat of a Soviet invasion. The country had been living in its shadow since 1948 and continued to be subjected

34   Overtures to daily armed provocations on its borders, the Soviet economic blockade, vicious anti-­Yugoslav propaganda, and total isolation from the international Communist movement. Generous Western economic and military aid, flowing in since 1950, had helped Yugoslavia to overcome the debilitating consequences of the Soviet economic blockade and maintain its defence capabilities at a very high level, equal to or higher than the combined capabilities of its Soviet Bloc neighbours. However, Tito knew only too well that the true deterrent against a Soviet invasion lay in Western security guarantees. As he would admit later, ‘My associates and I believed that for as long as he lived, Stalin would not initiate a war that could lead to a global conflict. He was shrewd enough not to walk into something like that.’51 The removal of the tacit Western security shield, as Tito and his aides understood General Handy’s mission to imply, undermined the very deterrent that kept the Soviets at bay. The Yugoslav leadership became convinced that this would present Stalin with an open invitation. Looking at the Korean example, they feared that Yugoslavia could end up bogged down in a protracted local war against the Soviet and satellite forces. On 7 January 1953, Tito stressed to the US Ambassador George Allen that General Handy’s visit had made ‘a most unhappy impression on the Yugoslavs’, mainly because they understood that the West had reconciled itself with the idea that Yugoslavia ‘would become another Korea in case of [a Soviet] attack’.52 In the twelve months following General Handy’s visit, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy focused on averting renewed strategic isolation that could result in Yugoslavia fighting a ‘localized’ war. At the 27 November meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC LCY, Tito repeatedly emphasized the danger of isolation and pointed to the exit strategy. He insisted that ‘[Yugoslavia] must not allow [itself] to be isolated in Europe. . . . However, we need not enter NATO. We should negotiate with the Greeks and the Turks’.53 Edvard Kardelj,54 at the time the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, added that ‘With the Greeks and the Turks [Yugoslavia] must enter political clarifications. This way, we would not undertake obligations towards NATO . . . certain political arrangements with them are possible and could form the basis for later military discussions.’55 Explaining Yugoslavia’s dilemmas in the aftermath of General Handy’s visit, in a conversation with the British Ambassador two years later, Kardelj emphasized that ‘in the situation when there was real danger of the Soviet attack, we put emphasis on strengthening our defences. . . . For this reason we went for the Balkan Pact, Tripartite strategic talks, etc.’56 Yugoslavs simultaneously pursued several strategies aimed at averting isolation and preventing Soviet aggression. On the one hand, every effort was made, in particular during Tito’s visit to Britain in March 1953, to change the American and British perception that the Soviet attack on Yugoslavia could remain localized. In the absence of formal security guarantees, Belgrade hoped to procure, at a minimum, the reinstatement of tacit Western security commitment. On the other hand, Yugoslavia immediately initiated contacts with Greece and Turkey to create a defensive alliance. The first goal was to combine Yugoslavia’s

Overtures   35 defensive capabilities with the two Balkan neighbours willing to stand against Soviet expansionism. Although inferior to the combined Soviet and satellite forces, such an alliance would, nevertheless, represent a formidable deterrent against the Soviets and the satellites. There was, however, a second and much more sophisticated rationale behind Yugoslavia’s Balkan alliance initiative. Greece and Turkey had recently become members of NATO. If formally allied with Belgrade, they would be obliged to come to its assistance in case of a Soviet or satellite attack. Such involvement would inevitably provoke Soviet retaliation. As the Atlantic Treaty Charter stipulated, an attack on any member of NATO would be met with immediate response from all other members, including the US. In this way, Yugoslavia would secure an indirect US security commitment. Moreover, by forming a defensive Pact with Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia hoped to evade Western pressure to formally join NATO. It would be incorporated in the Western defence system while remaining outside NATO. Why was Yugoslavia so adamantly against formally joining NATO while, at the same time, desperately seeking integration into the Western defence system? First, by staying outside NATO, it hoped to remain neutral in the event of an East–West war initiated elsewhere in the world. The Yugoslav leadership took very seriously the rhetoric of the incoming US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the 1952 election campaign and they were afraid of being dragged into a ‘preventive war’ against Communism.57 Unless directly attacked by the Soviets, the Yugoslav regime, being Communist itself, had no stomach to fight other Communists. Second, by joining NATO, Yugoslavia would give credence to Stalin’s propaganda claims that it had betrayed Communism and had become an ‘imperialists’ pawn’.58 Even during the most threatening periods of his confrontation with Stalin, Tito never renounced his Communist identity. He was opposed to Stalin’s aggressive and hegemonic policies but remained a dedicated Marxist. This explains the last but perhaps the most important of the reasons behind Tito’s refusal to join NATO, one that he never mentioned in contacts with Westerners. Tito feared that if Yugoslavia ever became a member of NATO, the ideological character of the Western Alliance would eventually destabilize his Communist regime.59 Tito and other Yugoslav officials used every opportunity in talks with Western leaders and diplomats to dissuade them from a perception that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia could remain localized. During his meeting with the US, British and French Ambassadors on 20 December 1952, Kardelj stressed that Yugoslavia did not want to ‘become another Korea’ and expressed hope that the Western powers ‘would not permit Cominform to extend its control any further’.60 Meeting Churchill and Eden in London, between 17 and 22 March 1954, Tito insisted that the clarifications of positions on the ‘local war’ issue should receive absolute priority in the talks. The British assured Tito that they shared his conviction that a military conflict anywhere in Europe would not remain localized and explicitly disavowed General Handy’s ambiguity on the issue. Furthermore, they promised to help persuade the Americans. The joint Communiqué, issued at the end of Tito’s visit to Britain, stated explicitly that,

36   Overtures [the British and Yugoslav Governments] undertook to work closely together and with other freedom-­loving nations to defend peace. They were in full agreement that, in the event of aggression in Europe, the resulting conflict could hardly remain local in character.61 Tito’s second foreign policy strategy, the creation of an alliance with Greece and Turkey, was pursued with equal vigour and at a breathtaking pace. Ever since Tito had closed his country’s borders with Greece in July 1949, terminating the infiltration of Greek communist guerrillas from Yugoslavia into Northern Greece, relations between Belgrade and Athens gradually but steadily improved. Prospects of military cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia became real once Yugoslavia started receiving US military aid in 1950, effectively becoming part of the Western defence system in Europe. By the beginning of 1952, both Greece and Turkey came to a joint conclusion that ‘close collaboration with Yugoslavia was indispensable for [their] defence efforts’.62 As a result of the improved atmosphere, political contacts between the three countries intensified in the summer of 1952. A Greek parliamentary delegation, led by its Speaker, M. Gondikas, visited Yugoslavia in July 1952. A Turkish political delegation, led by the Mayor of Istanbul, F. Gokay, visited Belgrade in August. At the end of August, the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, headed by the Speaker of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Moša Pijade, visited Greece. Moreover, a high-­level Yugoslav military delegation, led by General Pavle Jakšić, visited Greece and Turkey in September 1952.63 Despite intensified contacts, Yugoslavia remained deaf to Greek and Turkish overtures for a formalized cooperation, including military assistance. Things changed dramatically in the aftermath of General Handy’s visit to Belgrade. On 23 November, a day before the Greek General Ioannou was to arrive to Belgrade, reciprocating General Jakšić’s September visit to Greece and three days after adjournment of talks with General Handy, Yugoslav Defence Ministry officials informed the stunned Greek Military Attaché in Belgrade that the ‘stage [was] set for substantial developments’.64 This signalled the Yugoslav leadership’s readiness to start talks on military cooperation with its Balkan neighbours. From this moment on, rapprochement between the three countries accelerated with astounding speed. A Turkish military delegation, which arrived in Belgrade on 20 December, found the Yugoslavs willing to discuss a tripartite military alliance. Between 26 and 30 December, as an immediate follow-­up to these talks, a high-­ranking Yugoslav military delegation led by General Miloš Šumonja visited Greece.65 General Šumonja’s enthusiasm for an alliance with the Greeks and the Turks shocked his hosts. The Yugoslav sudden and complete change of heart was stunning.66 The US Ambassador in Athens, J. Peurifoy, reported that, the Yugoslavs desire formal tripartite agreement with Greece and Turkey [stipulating that co-­signatory countries] will assist in case of attack upon any one of parties . . . Greeks are puzzled by urgency with which Yugoslavs are

Overtures   37 pressing for this agreement, particularly since the Yugoslav delegation which visited Athens in September did not raise the question and appeared to consider threat of war not imminent.67 Within two months, the new Balkan alliance was put in place. Between 20 and 25 January 1953, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, visited Yugoslavia and held intensive talks with Tito. In an astonishing volte face, Tito informed Köprülü that ‘different possibilities now exist for our joint collaboration. It is for this reason that I believe that our two countries and Greece could proceed to negotiate and create an alliance.’68 At the same time, Tito did his best to dispel Greek and Turkish concerns regarding Yugoslavia’s refusal to join NATO. He explained that, in principle we are against being formally tied to NATO. I underline, formally. . . . We are waging a fight with the Russians for the public opinion of the [Communist] world, which currently supports them. This most potent of weapons is in our hands and this is one NATO does not possess. We are the only ones who have it, and why discard it for the sake of some formal alliance?69 On the one hand, Tito’s argument was an excuse for what, in truth, was his ideological opposition to joining NATO. On the other hand, it revealed a genuine belief held by Tito and the Yugoslav leadership that Yugoslavia represented a beacon that would attract satellite countries away from Soviet control. During talks with Köprülü, however, Tito succeeded in creating a definitive push towards the Balkan alliance. The Turkish Foreign Minister went straight from Belgrade to Athens to brief his Greek counterpart, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and the new Greek President, General Alexander Papagos, on the astonishing outcome of his talks with Tito. On 3 February 1953, only three days after Köprülü’s departure from Athens, Stephanopoulos flew to Yugoslavia. After four days of talks with Tito and his associates, the two sides agreed to accelerate the Balkan alliance negotiations.70 As a result, a tripartite Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav defence officials meeting convened in Ankara between 17 and 20 February. From the outset, Yugoslavia not only did everything to speed up the creation of the Balkan alliance but insisted on its distinct military character.71 On 20 February, the very same day the defence experts meeting was concluded in Ankara, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, began in Athens. At its conclusion, on 26 February, the three Foreign Ministers initialled the draft of the Treaty of Friendship and Assistance. The three ministers then flew together to Ankara where, on 28 February, they formally signed the Treaty.72 Following General Handy’s disastrous mission to Belgrade in November 1952, Belgrade speedily secured the creation of an anti-­Soviet Balkan alliance with Greece and Turkey to avert the danger of strategic isolation, or worse of Soviet attack. Although still not a fully fledged military alliance, the Ankara Agreement represented a decisive step towards Yugoslavia’s integration into the Western defence system.

38   Overtures

Stalin’s death Tito’s confidant and biographer Vladimir Dedijer claimed that he was the first to inform Tito and the Yugoslav leadership of Stalin’s fatal illness.73 According to Dedijer’s version of events, early on the morning of 4 March 1953 he was awakened and asked for an official statement by the Belgrade Daily Express correspondent claiming that Stalin was ill, probably dead. Dedijer immediately called Milovan Djilas, who then informed Tito, Kardelj and Aleksandar Ranković over a special telephone line.74 Given that the Yugoslavs regularly monitored Soviet and Eastern European radio broadcasts, it is hard to accept the veracity of Dedijer’s version. On the evening of 3 March, Radio Moscow had already broadcast a joint statement by the Soviet Government and the Party Central Committee about Stalin’s illness. Regardless of how the news had reached them, the manner in which the Yugoslav leadership was informed of Stalin’s illness is indicative of Yugoslavia’s complete isolation from events in Moscow. The rupture that occurred in 1948 resulted in complete severance of contacts between the two countries. Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and People’s Democracies were at a bare minimum. The Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow had been reduced to two diplomats only, headed by Chargé Dragoje Djurić. Their movements were restricted more than those of Western diplomats and the embassy had very limited and only indirect communication with Belgrade. A short telegram that Djurić managed to send to Belgrade on the evening of 4 March was the first report from the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow regarding Stalin’s illness. It revealed barely suppressed elation over the demise of a hated enemy, ‘[Stalin] has no chance. Death is to be expected at any moment. Unhidden jubilation among diplomats.’75 There was, however, no official reaction in Belgrade either to the news of Stalin’s illness or to his death. The Yugoslav press printed without commentaries Western agency reports from Moscow and official Soviet communiqués. Available evidence reveals Tito’s studied public indifference at this time of great uncertainty. On the evening of 5 March, Tito left Belgrade by train for the port of Zelenika where he was to board his yacht ‘Galeb’ and head for the official visit to Great Britain. Stalin’s death was awaited by the hour; Dedijer, who was among those seeing Tito off at the Belgrade railway station, described the Yugoslav leader as being in a jovial mood, cracking jokes.76 The trip to Zelenika took several days, and was filled with public engagements. On the evening of 6 March, when Radio Moscow broadcast the official statement announcing Stalin’s death, Tito attended an opera performance in Sarajevo.77 He spent the next day visiting a nearby metallurgical plant in Zenica. On the day of Stalin’s funeral, 9 March, Tito was on board ‘Galeb’. The Yugoslav leader was at pains to demonstrate complete indifference to events in Moscow. Not once during his many public appearances and speeches in these few days did he make a single reference to Stalin’s illness or death. Behind the scenes, however, he followed events with greatest attentiveness. Tito was at all times in the company of Ranković, in charge of the security apparatus, Koča Popović,78 the Foreign Minister, and Aleš Bebler, the Deputy Foreign Minister. Coupled with the fact

Overtures   39 that Kardelj was left in charge in Belgrade, this reveals Tito’s resolve to maintain absolute control of the situation. According to Dedijer, Tito and his entourage spent every moment between public engagements in discussions and analyses of the latest news from Moscow, of the reactions around the world, and in issuing instructions to various government agencies.79 The official silence and public manifestations of indifference continued even after Tito’s departure for Britain. In an interview given to TANJUG, the official Yugoslav news agency, on board ‘Galeb’ on 15 March, Tito never once mentioned Stalin.80 The only Yugoslav reaction to Stalin’s death during this period appeared in the daily Politika on 9 March, on the day of Stalin’s funeral. The unofficial short commentary asserted that ‘regardless of who succeeds [Stalin], no one will have his power and authority. The infighting at the top should give food for thought to conscientious revolutionary forces that surely still exist in the Soviet Union.’81 The statement predicted the certainty of imminent infighting for the leadership position in the Kremlin and called for the removal of Stalin’s legacy. Following Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia pursued a dual foreign policy strategy that would remain in place until November 1953. On the one hand, Belgrade continued to pursue military integration with the West with undiminished determination. With equal resolution however, it kept fending off requests to join NATO. On the other hand, Tito and his associates adopted a cautious wait-­andsee attitude towards the new post-­Stalin leadership. Belgrade’s pursuit of closer military cooperation with the West was focused on the continuation of the strategic cooperation talks with the three Western powers, suspended after General Handy’s visit, and on the creation of an Alliance with Greece and Turkey. This coincided with the efforts of the new Eisenhower Administration’s to consolidate NATO’s European south-­eastern flank by connecting Greece and Turkey with Italy. Crucial to this strategy was Yugoslavia’s integration. Following Tito’s successful visit to Britain in March 1953, military experts of the tripartite powers began work on a joint platform for the continuation of strategic discussions with Yugoslavia and for overcoming the negative fallout from General Handy’s mission.82 A series of meetings between Yugoslav, US, British and French military representatives paved the way for the second round of strategic talks, held in Washington between 24 and 28 August 1953. In sharp contrast to General Handy’s visit, this round of talks proved to be very successful. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Popović, reported that these talks opened way for the ‘development of a mutual concept for the defence of South-­Eastern Europe, thereby strengthening the common defensive system against Soviet aggression’. As a result, the Yugoslavs for the first time divulged their detailed defensive plans to Western experts.83 Yugoslav efforts to strengthen military cooperation with the West through an alliance with Greece and Turkey progressed equally well. Immediately after the signing of the Ankara Agreement in February 1953, Belgrade initiated discussions with Greece and Turkey aimed at transforming the Agreement into a proper military alliance. A meeting of representatives of the three General Staffs was held in Athens, between 3 and 12 June 1953.

40   Overtures Yugoslavia remained vitally interested in maintaining the Western security umbrella. Despite Stalin’s death, Tito and his aides continued to see the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to the country’s national security. On 19 March, speaking before the British Parliament during Tito’s official visit, Koča Popović, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, stated that ‘the peace is under threat, directly and concretely, by the policies of a big superpower – the Soviet Union’.84 Commenting on Yugoslav Chief of Staff General Peko Dapčević’s visit to the US between 11 and 25 March 1953, a confidential Yugoslav Foreign Ministry memo underlined that it was part of the consultations on required measures in peace and war, ‘to fight off the aggression of the Russians and their satellites against our country and Europe’.85 During the Yugoslav leader’s visit to Great Britain, the third round of official Churchill–Tito talks was entirely devoted to defence issues related to countering a possible Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. Appropriately, the talks were held in the Cabinet Map Room. At the end of the talks, Tito gladly accepted Churchill’s proposal for the press release to specifically mention the venue where the talks were held.86 The intention was to make it obvious to the Soviets that the talks focused on closer military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West. Several factors contributed to the Yugoslav leadership’s continued perception of the Soviet Union as its main threat. In the months following Stalin’s death, there was no decrease in the hostility and pressure from the Soviet Union and satellite countries against Yugoslavia. At the end of May, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, Bebler, informed Yugoslav Ambassadors that, there is no sign of improvement of [Yugoslav–Soviet] relations. . . . During March there were 296 border incidents and during April, 342. Between 1 April and 15 May alone, the central press [of the Soviet Union and the satellites] printed 107 articles against Yugoslavia. Their radio stations broadcast 20 commentaries against Yugoslavia daily. The attitude towards our representatives [in these countries] remained the same.87 Furthermore, the composition of the post-­Stalin leadership suggested that there would be no change in the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia. Every member of the ‘new’ leadership in the Kremlin belonged to Stalin’s innermost circle. Several of them, namely Lavrenty Beria, Vyecheslav Molotov and Mikhail Suslov, were among the chief organisers of campaigns against Yugoslavia and continued to head the apparatus entrusted with executing the policies of intimidation and hostility against Yugoslavia. In a telegram to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Sweden, Koča Popović underlined that ‘regardless of whether the present [Soviet] leadership, or part of it, condemns the previous course, it is almost inconceivable that they would condemn Stalinism because all of them were Stalin’s closest associates’.88 Moreover, Tito was predicting a fierce leadership contest among Stalin’s successors that would inevitably destabilise the USSR and add to global tensions.89 He was convinced that,

Overtures   41 [members of the Soviet leadership] will try to get themselves sorted out, to create authority . . . [however,] there will only be a temporary respite. . . . The Western world needs to understand that the Cold War will never cease between them and the [Soviets], nor will it cease between [Yugoslavs] and [the Soviets].90 Tito, who worked in Comintern headquarters in Moscow in the 1930s, recognized only too well the enormity of the vacuum in the Soviet power structure created by Stalin’s death. In such circumstances, the Yugoslav leadership was concerned that one or more pretenders to the Kremlin throne could see an attack on Yugoslavia and the elimination of the ideological heresy as a winning formula for a top spot. Infighting in the Kremlin, they feared, could thus pose an even bigger threat to Yugoslavia than the period before Stalin’s death. The second tier of the foreign policy strategy pursued by the Yugoslav leadership in the wake of Stalin’s death was the cautious wait-­and-see strategy towards Moscow. ‘We will just keep on watching’, declared Tito at a Party Plenum in June.91 On the one hand, this was the result of Belgrade’s lack of understanding of the intentions of people in the Kremlin. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs were careful not to discourage positive signals that may come from Moscow and could contribute towards the reduction of tensions on Yugoslavia’s borders with the satellite countries. For this reason, Belgrade was careful to acknowledge and reciprocate negligible but unprecedented goodwill signals coming from the new Soviet leadership even before Stalin was officially buried. During preparations for Stalin’s funeral, Djurić reported an absence of the usual discrimination of Yugoslav diplomats in comparison to other members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow. The short telegram of condolences that he, along with all other heads of missions in Moscow, had sent to the new Soviet leadership was printed in the Soviet press along with the others. Together with other foreign diplomats, Djurić had been invited to the commemorative reception given by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Furthermore, the Soviet press recorded his presence at Stalin’s funeral.92 This kind of civilized Soviet behaviour towards Yugoslav diplomats had been unheard of since 1948. Belgrade’s restrained reaction to Stalin’s death, outwardly devoid of any sign of jubilation, was thus in response to the barely noticeable but positive signals from Stalin’s successors. Within this context, the Yugoslav leadership decided to follow the usual diplomatic protocol and express official condolences to the Soviet Chargé in Belgrade. The official chosen to fulfil this extraordinary task, given the deceased’s pre-­eminent role in the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, was Veljko Mićunović, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister. In his memoirs, Mićunović admitted that, once in the Soviet Embassy, in front of Stalin’s portrait, he, delivered, almost recited, according to the protocol rules, the words of condolences on behalf of the Yugoslav Government. Even I was aware however, that it did not sound like an expression of condolences, but rather like congratulations on a happy occasion.93

42   Overtures Belgrade had carefully chosen the messenger. Mićunović did not belong to the top echelon of the Yugoslav leadership. This ensured that the gesture would not be accorded unwarranted importance, either in Moscow or in the West. At the same time, however, he was a sufficiently high-­ranking official for his visit to be noticed in the Kremlin. The gesture was meant to send a signal to the new Soviet leaders that the Yugoslavs would respond positively to a reduction of tensions in relations between Yugoslavia and the ‘socialist camp’. Belgrade’s first official reaction to Stalin’s death came on 23 March. In a speech before the Federal National Assembly, on the occasion of the ratification of the Ankara Agreement, Kardelj stated that, Yugoslavia [had] no demands from the countries of the Eastern Bloc, other than for them to leave her be and to respect her borders. Moreover, [Yugoslavia] has done its best and will continue to do so, to normalize its relations with these countries, as much as it is possible.94 The choice of the ratification of the Ankara Agreement as the occasion for sending a message to the Soviets was not accidental. Neither was its brevity – it consisted of only two sentences. On the one hand, it was intended to show Moscow that Yugoslavia would not initiate improvement of relations with the USSR and that it remained firm in its determination to maintain strategic cooperation with the West. On the other hand, the statement expressed Yugoslavia’s willingness to respond in kind if the initiative came from Moscow. In accordance with the strategy of restraint and caution, Tito’s public speeches were as carefully balanced. On 31 March, upon his return from Britain, Tito addressed a rally in Belgrade and spoke publicly for the first time about Stalin’s death. He accentuated that, a question arises, however, what will happen after [Stalin’s] death, now that new people are in the leadership – Malenkov and others? Being younger and more temperamental, wouldn’t they be tempted to take irresponsible actions, even go to war? . . . I do not believe that they would do such a thing. I believe that, seeing that the peace-­loving forces of the world are stronger by the day, they will try to look for a way out of the dead-­end which they were brought to by [Stalin’s] foreign policy.95 Tito’s conciliatory tone was deliberately noncommittal. At a time when Yugoslavia was doing its utmost to improve military cooperation with NATO powers, he was eager to avoid suspicion in the West that there might be a change in the Yugoslav attitude towards the USSR. The Yugoslav leadership was equally keen to demonstrate to the Soviet and other Communist parties that it would not be the one to initiate normalization with Moscow. Within the international Communist movement, this would have been perceived as Yugoslavia’s admission of responsibility for the 1948 rupture. Belgrade monitored the post-­Stalin leadership’s first steps and changes in the Soviet policies with the utmost attention, interpreting them, of course, through

Overtures   43 the prism of Yugoslav ideological perceptions developed during the conflict with Stalin. Tito and his associates believed that Stalin’s system was estranged from the ‘true’ nature of socialism and maintained its hold of power through crude oppression. Once the creator of the system died, it was inevitable that the system would collapse. According to Yugoslavs, there were several motives behind changes introduced by the Kremlin after Stalin’s death. The amnesty was introduced to placate huge domestic dissatisfaction accumulated during Stalin’s reign. The new leaders were simply not able to control popular discontent, as none of them possessed Stalin’s charisma or authority.96 Furthermore, a fierce leadership struggle in the Kremlin was forcing the post-­Stalin leadership to ‘buy time’ by introducing populist measures in domestic policy and a conciliatory foreign policy of small concessions, the ‘peace offensive’.97 The new decency in the Soviet diplomatic communications with Yugoslavia was seen as a mere by-­ product of the ‘peace offensive’ and not as a sign of a major Soviet policy shift. Given the undiminishing number of border incidents and the intensity of the anti-­ Yugoslav propaganda, Belgrade continued to believe that the long-­term Soviet goals of expansionism and aggression remained unchanged.98 The Yugoslav documents from this period still address the Eastern Bloc countries as the ‘Cominform countries’, the same disparaging term that had been in use since 1948. Yugoslav leaders were, however, perplexed by the pace of changes in the USSR. At the session of the Federal Executive Council in April, Koča Popović admitted that, ‘we have expected something similar to what is now going on in the USSR to happen sometime after Stalin’s death . . . I must say however, that the suddenness and the speed of these changes have surprised me.’99 In a telegram to Djurić in Moscow, the head of the First (East European) Department of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (DSIP), Arso Milatović stated that, due to their often contradictory character, the sudden and unexpected changes carried out hitherto and specific decisions taken by the present [Soviet] leadership are making it difficult for us to analyse them and to anticipate the future actions of the Soviet foreign policy.100 The Yugoslav leadership had identified several contradictions in the actions of the post-­Stalin leadership that made it hard for them to fully assess the course of changes in the USSR.101 There was an apparent effort by new Soviet leaders to reduce the number of economic ministries while strengthening the role of the Army and of the security apparatus. At the same time, the new Kremlin leaders had inaugurated a much more conciliatory attitude on a number of foreign policy issues. They announced formal separation of the Party from the state apparatus while, at the same time, propagating a much stronger presence of Party cadres in the state apparatus. On the one hand, the new Soviet leadership was emphasizing the dangers from the ‘internal enemy’ and the need for vigilance. On the other hand, the Soviet Presidium approved an amnesty and continued to underline their confidence in the strength of the internal order in the USSR.102 During a meeting with the US Counsellor in Belgrade, Woodruff Wallner, on 3 April,

44   Overtures when asked whether he considered the most recent changes in the USSR to be a manoeuvre or a change of the policy, Koča Popović replied that, according to my opinion, we can still not talk about the change of the policy. However, if it is a manoeuvre it is then interesting that this manoeuvre is carried out on such big issues. Only a year ago it would have been unthinkable.104 A few days later, Koča Popović emphasized to Yugoslav Ambassadors that ‘one should not underestimate the importance of changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, regardless of what they really mean and what purpose they are intended to serve’.104 The speed and the character of some of the measures undertaken by the new Soviet leadership immediately after Stalin’s death suggested to Yugoslavs that changes introduced were not merely a tactical exercise but much more profound than first anticipated.

Soviet overtures In the second half of March 1953, members of the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow were making courtesy calls to Molotov, the newly appointed Soviet Foreign Minister. Djurić, the Yugoslav Chargé in Moscow, suggested to the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP) that this might be a good opportunity for him to request a meeting with Molotov and test whether there were changes in the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia. Belgrade agreed and on 4 April instructed Djurić to be courteous but restrained during his meeting with Molotov. He was also told not to address the contested issues between the two countries and the history of their bilateral relations. Djurić was to restrict himself to saying that Yugoslavia was not responsible for the appalling state of these relations. As regards the timing of the visit, Djurić was told to request a meeting with Molotov only once all the other heads of missions had visited the Soviet Minister.105 The Yugoslavs did not wish to demonstrate willingness to initiate the normalization of relations. The initiative for a meeting eventually came from the Soviets through a third party, the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow. The Yugoslavs knew him to be close to the officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID). In the beginning of April, during a reception in his Embassy, the Finnish Ambassador told Djurić that ‘he was confident’ that the Soviet MID would look favourably at the Yugoslav Chargé’s request for a courtesy visit to Molotov.106 After three days of deliberation, the Yugoslav leadership instructed Djurić to proceed with the request, but with the repeated warning not to ‘demonstrate even a hint of curiosity, nor to mention anything more’.107 Both the Yugoslavs and the Soviets were treading very cautiously; neither was ready to be seen as the side taking the initiative. On Saturday, 25 April, in accordance with received instructions, Djurić telephoned MID and requested a courtesy meeting with Molotov.108 To his surprise, the MID replied already on Monday, confirming that Molotov would see him as

Overtures   45 soon as possible. Only two days later, on Wednesday 29 April, to his further astonishment, the MID informed the Yugoslav Chargé that Molotov would see him that afternoon.109 According to Djurić’s report, Molotov was courteous throughout the meeting. Breaking with the usual custom, Molotov met Djurić alone and invited him to take a seat. During the initial cordial exchanges, Djurić made the first digression from instructions received from Belgrade. He stated that his government was interested in normalizing relations with the USSR. Molotov did not even acknowledge the statement. Instead, and in a sarcastic tone, as reported by Djurić, Molotov asked for an explanation of ‘what is happening in Yugoslavia’, clarifying that he was referring to the signing of what he called the Balkan Pact. Djurić went on to explain at length the Ankara Agreement, noticing that the Soviet side had not yet officially commented on it. When leaving the meeting, Djurić repeated his Government’s desire to improve relations with Moscow and again Molotov did not acknowledge it. Molotov’s willingness to meet the Yugoslav Chargé and the events of the meeting suggest several conclusions. It confirmed that merely weeks after Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership had decided to make approaches towards the Yugoslav leadership. Given the high degree of the ideological sensitivities of the Yugoslav question which after all carried Stalin’s personal imprint, the motives behind such a decision were of cardinal importance. The only political topic Molotov introduced during the meeting was the question of the Ankara Agreement, suggesting that the creation of the Balkan Alliance was a question of grave concern to the Soviet leadership. The new Alliance was obviously being perceived in the Kremlin as a threat to Soviet national security, prompting its first conciliatory move towards Yugoslavia since 1948. Although lasting a mere fifteen minutes, the Molotov–Djurić meeting on 29 April created a sensation among diplomatic observers in Moscow.110 It was the first time since 1948 that a Soviet official, let alone the Foreign Minister himself, had met a Yugoslav diplomat. Moscow’s conciliatory signals towards Yugoslavia continued after the Molotov–Djurić April meeting. On 31 May, Yugoslavia was able to sign an agreement with Romania regulating traffic on the river Danube, which forms a border between the two countries. Given that this question had been ‘unsolvable’ since 1948, Belgrade understood sudden Romanian willingness to cooperate to be a result of a nod from the Kremlin.111 In May, the Yugoslav national basketball team participated in the European Basketball Championship in Moscow. Unlike on similar occasions earlier, the Yugoslavs were not harassed and were awarded equal treatment to that of other participating teams. Seemingly unimportant, however, this represented another precedent in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. On 6 June 1953, Moscow initiated a dramatic and sensational new development in its relations with Belgrade. At an hour’s notice, Djurić was called to the Soviet MID to meet Molotov. According to Djurić’s report, the meeting lasted only several minutes. After asking several questions about the Yugoslav basketball team, Molotov simply stated that the Soviet Government was of the opinion that it was time for the two sides to appoint Ambassadors in

46   Overtures Belgrade and Moscow respectively. He then asked for the Yugoslav Government to grant an agreement for Vassiliy Alekseyevich Volkov and expressed hope that both governments would soon exchange Ambassadors. Deep in shock, Djurić replied that he would inform the government in Belgrade and come back as soon as he received a reply. Molotov added with a grin that he hoped there would be a response.112 Djurić’s complete surprise was also due to the fact that only two days earlier, in accordance with MID’s request, he had issued a visa for the newly appointed Soviet Chargé to Belgrade, Oleg Kirsanov. During the meeting on 6 June, Molotov did not mention Kirsanov, or whether he would go to Belgrade, at all. The haste and obvious lack of coordination suggested that there existed disagreements within the Soviet Presidium with regard to the re-­ establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and that the decision was made only at the last moment. Indeed, the Soviet leadership was deeply divided over future relations with Yugoslavia.113 While diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were being officially normalized and positive signals sent to Belgrade, the head of the Fourth European Sector of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, M. Zimianin, submitted a report to Molotov accusing ‘Tito’s clique’ of intending to ‘liquidate the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav people’.114 The qualifications and the language used in the report were obviously intended to please Molotov’s ears. Available evidence suggests that for months after Stalin’s death, the Soviet leadership agonized over the course of future relations with Yugoslavia, unable to resolve serious differences of opinion that existed among them. The Presidium finally accepted Khrushchev’s compromise proposal and appointed a special Central Committee Commission to determine whether Yugoslavia was still a socialist country or whether it had already ‘slipped into capitalism’, as those opposed to normalization were arguing. The findings of this Commission were to provide guidelines for the future approach to Yugoslavia.115 The setting up of the Commission illustrated the degree to which the Soviet leadership had itself fallen victim to Stalin’s mendacious propaganda against Yugoslavia. It also confirmed the strength of the opposition in the Presidium to any change of course towards Yugoslavia. As Khrushchev later admitted, ‘it was shameful that we had to appoint a commission of economists to provide us with the answer whether Yugoslavia was a fascist country or not. Simply put, we were trying to re-­ discover America’.116 The Yugoslav leadership suspected that Molotov’s initiative was timed to inflict maximum damage on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. In a telegram to Djurić, Aleš Bebler, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that, [the Molotov–Djurić meeting of 6 June] and the [Soviet] haste to send a person of quality117 to Belgrade came at a time when the military negotiations of the [Ankara] Agreement countries are taking place [3–12 June], when the Bermuda Ministerial Conference of the Big Three is being prepared [10–14 July], when the West is exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to enter NATO, and at the time of the prolonged Soviet ‘peace offensive’

Overtures   47 towards the West. . . . One of the reasons behind [Molotov’s proposal] is most certainly the desire to isolate Yugoslavia from the West, in particular at the moment when the Balkan Agreement is being strengthened.118 The initiative also came on the eve of the Conference of the Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, scheduled to take place between 7 and 11 July. Mistrust of the Soviet intentions remained high in Belgrade. In an instructive telegram to Yugoslav Ambassadors, on 11 June, Bebler emphasized that ‘[Yugoslavia] will make every effort to counter [Soviet] intentions in the Balkans through the strengthening and extending of our cooperation with Greece and Turkey and through the strengthening of our cooperation with the Western powers’.119 Highly suspicious of Moscow’s motives and determined not to allow Molotov’s latest initiative to harm Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, Tito felt compelled to publicly restate Belgrade’s independence. On 14 June, in a speech at a rally in Pazin, Croatia, he reminded the Soviets in an unequivocal tone that the ‘exchange of Ambassadors did not mean an improvement of relations between the two countries’. To assuage Western anxieties over the sudden normalisation of diplomatic relations with Moscow, as well as to serve notice to the Soviet leadership that he was distrustful of their intentions, Tito reaffirmed that Molotov’s initiative, would not cause a change in Yugoslavia’s attitude to Western powers, nor would anyone abroad be able to break the new friendship pact between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey . . . [The Soviets] are mistaken if they think that they can isolate us from our allies.120 Tito further disclosed that the number of border incidents since Stalin’s death had actually increased by 50 per cent, to 860, compared with the same period in the previous year. According to him, this confirmed that the Yugoslavs were right to be distrustful of the Soviets and underlined that, ‘because of the wrong [the Soviets] have done [to Yugoslavia since 1948] we will never fully trust them. Whatever [the Soviets] do, we will take it with a pinch of salt’.121 On 28 June, marking the fifth anniversary of the Cominform resolution against Yugoslavia, Borba, the Yugoslav party organ, published an editorial by Kardelj. The article represented a scathing attack on the hegemonic nature of the Soviet, Stalinist state and its ‘imperialistic ambition that held peoples of Eastern Europe under its yoke’.122 Kardelj was alluding to the recent Soviet military clampdown on demonstrations in East Berlin. Decisive and public demonstrations of reservations towards Moscow’s overtures helped the Yugoslav leadership to dispel Western suspicions that the Yugoslav–Soviet diplomatic normalization heralded a secret accommodation.123 Reasserting its close relationship with the West was important as the Yugoslav leadership had decided to respond positively to Molotov’s proposal for the exchange of ambassadors. In an effort to diminish the Soviet threat and reduce

48   Overtures tensions on its borders, Yugoslavia could ill afford to forgo a chance of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the relations between the two countries remained far from friendly. The new Soviet Ambassador, Vassiliy Volkov, arrived in Belgrade on 21 July to a cool welcome. His presentation of credentials to Tito at the beginning of August lasted just several minutes, with few courteous statements exchanged.124 During Volkov’s courtesy call to the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Bebler, the Soviet Ambassador was brusquely reminded that, ‘things [that] have happened in the last few years between our two countries are difficult if not impossible to forget’.125 In a demonstration of studied indifference to Soviet initiatives, Belgrade asked for Moscow’s agreement to the appointment of its new Ambassador to the Soviet Union on 15 July, a full five weeks after the Molotov–Djurić meeting. The Yugoslav Ambassador-­designate, Dobrivoje Vidić, arrived in Moscow at the end of September, more than two months after Volkov had taken up his post in Belgrade. In another rebuff to Moscow, unlike Volkov, Vidić was a young diplomat reassigned to Moscow from the more junior post of the Yugoslav envoy in Burma. Tito used the opportunity of the Second Plenum of the LCY CC, held on 16 and 17 June 1953, to inform the wider Party leadership of the most recent developments in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, in particular of Molotov’s initiative of 6 June. At the Plenum, he triumphantly declared that, ‘[the Soviet initiative for the exchange of Ambassadors was proof] that even such a great opponent can be defeated. . . . We were right in every respect’. At the same time, he warned that, ‘[Yugoslavia will] have to go towards normalization [with the USSR]. This does not mean that we will trust them blindly every time they smile at us and believe blindly in everything they are saying or will say to us. We will just keep on watching’.126 Tito reaffirmed the wait-­and-see strategy that Yugoslavia had followed since Stalin’s death. His other intention, was to prepare the party leadership and its membership for a possible further improvement. Tito emphasized that although changes inaugurated by the post-­Stalin leadership were extorted by domestic and external pressure and the debacle of Stalin’s foreign policy, evidence seems to suggest that the introduction of new policies was genuine. Most of the LCY ‘cadres’ were in their twenties, and promoted to leading positions in the Party and state apparatus during the conflict with Stalin. They became indoctrinated with fierce anti-­Stalinism, even Russophobia. At the same time, Tito wished to send a strong message to those in the Party who still harboured affection towards ‘the first country of socialism’. He made it clear that there could be no detour from the independent course that Yugoslavia was pursuing in its foreign policy and that normalization with the Soviets would not mean a return to the pre-­1948 relations. To justify this, Tito juxtaposed Yugoslavia’s achieved independent position with that of East Germany, which, as he put it, was unable to rid itself of the Soviet yoke even after the bloody uprising that was, at the time, unfolding in East Berlin.127 Following Molotov’s initiative of 6 June, Soviet conciliatory gestures towards Yugoslavia multiplied. To a limited extent, Moscow even engaged the satellites.

Overtures   49 On 23 June, discriminatory restrictions on Yugoslav diplomats’ movements in Moscow were lifted and they were awarded the same status as other Western diplomats.128 Applying strict reciprocity but with a three-­week delay the Yugoslavs responded in kind on 18 July.129 A day earlier and for the first time since 1948, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry invited the Yugoslav envoy in Budapest to attend the session of the Hungarian Parliament and a reception given by the Hungarian Foreign Minister. On the same day, Czechoslovakian authorities invited the Yugoslav Ambassador in Prague to attend an international football match between Czechoslovakia and Romania. At the end of June, the Romanian government informed Belgrade that it had accepted a long-­standing Yugoslav proposal for the establishment of a joint commission to investigate border incidents. On 3 July, Bulgaria also agreed to form a joint commission with the same task and on 13 July Hungary followed suit. The Yugoslavs paid special attention to this particular development, as armed incidents continued to occur on daily basis on its borders with the satellites. In the period between 1 January and 1 June 1953 there were 172 incidents on the Yugoslav–Romanian border; between 1 August 1950 and 1 July 1953, 714 border incidents were registered on the Yugoslav–Bulgarian border.130 However, despite the Bulgarian and Romanian apparently conciliatory proposals, border incidents continued unabated and the setting up of the commissions dragged on indefinitely. It soon became clear to the Yugoslavs that the increased number of initiatives coming from Moscow or its satellites were more of a public relations exercise, aimed to create the impression in the West that relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc were improving at such a pace as to suggest Belgrade’s return to the socialist camp. 131 At the beginning of July, the Yugoslav leadership received news of Lavrenty Beria’s arrest. The Yugoslavs were of the opinion that Beria’s removal signalled a true and symbolic distancing of the post-­Stalin leadership from Stalin’s legacy.132 Tito and his aides also deduced that the Soviet Party was instrumental in Beria’s removal which, to them, suggested that the Party apparatus was asserting a more prominent, even a leading role in the USSR.133 The Yugoslav leadership concluded that, for the time being at least, Beria’s arrest had removed the danger of a coup against the new people in the Kremlin and as such represented a positive development.134 Beria’s removal even inspired Tito with optimism regarding the future of socialism in the Soviet Union. Throughout the conflict with Stalin, Tito and his aides never abandoned their Communist beliefs nor did they cease hoping that the Soviet party would, one day, return to ‘true’ socialism and discard Stalin’s deviant model. Several statements made by Tito and Kardelj in the immediate aftermath of Beria’s arrest reveal this re-­born enthusiasm. On 14 July, in conversation with his associates, Tito underlined that Beria’s arrest was of huge importance because it confirmed that the Soviet Party had managed to re-­impose control over the NKVD.135 On 19 July, during his meeting with Aneurin Bevan in Brioni, Tito warned that, we must never forget that the USSR is, despite Stalin’s despotism, home to the October Revolution, a country whose base is progressive. A collapse of

50   Overtures the USSR, in the anti-­socialist sense, would represent a huge blow to all socialist and progressive forces in the world.136 In a similar fashion Kardelj observed to Dedijer on 22 July that, the base [the proletariat] in the USSR is progressive. [For this reason] we will have to revise our outlook on the social character of the USSR. [Our] existing views were created in the heat of the conflict. At the time, we had deliberately disregarded positive elements of [the Soviet] system, such as its base.137 Thus, to Yugoslavs Beria’s removal represented a very significant development in the process of the post-­Stalin succession and confirmed the continuity of changes inaugurated by the new Soviet leadership. Despite the hope generated by Beria’s arrest, Belgrade regarded Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia as fundamentally unchanged and they continued to look at Soviet conciliatory gestures and initiatives with mistrust and suspicion. On 8 August 1953, in a speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet, Georgiy Malenkov, the most prominent member of the post-­Stalin collective leadership and the President of the Council of Ministers, made the first official Soviet acknowledgement of the ongoing diplomatic normalization between the USSR and Yugoslavia.138 Again, the timing of Malenkov’s statement made Yugoslavs extremely wary. It came ahead of the strategic coordination talks between Yugoslavia and the three Western powers, scheduled for 24–28 August 1953 in Washington. On 22 August 1953, Kardelj stressed to the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade, Agah Axel, that the Yugoslavs ‘did not trust the Soviet peace offensive to be sincere’. He reaffirmed Yugoslavia’s determination to develop the military aspect of the Ankara Agreement.139 Several days later, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry memo concluded that, [the Soviet] offer for the exchange of Ambassadors and for the normalization of relations is, on the one hand, an admission of their defeat in the conflict with Yugoslavia, and on the other hand, . . . an effort to create mistrust in the West towards Yugoslavia.140 Thus, by the end of the summer of 1953 the Yugoslav leadership was still unimpressed by the Soviet overtures. They judged Moscow’s new attitude to be nothing but a ploy to create mistrust in the West towards Yugoslavia. Consequently, there was no dent in the Yugoslav resolve to pursue closer cooperation with the West, including military collaboration.

Modification of the Yugoslav response to Soviet overtures In October 1953, the Trieste question, which had its origins in the 1918 creation of Yugoslavia and had been on the back burner ever since the end of the Second

Overtures   51 World War, suddenly exploded into a crisis that very nearly plunged Yugoslavia into a war with Italy and, possibly with the US and Britain. The crisis and its resolution, a year later, had considerable implications on the adjustment in the Yugoslav attitude to Soviet overtures. In the aftermath of both World Wars, the port of Trieste, at the northernmost tip of the Adriatic Sea, emerged as a contentious issue. After the First World War, both Italy and the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes141 demanded that Trieste, hitherto part of the Austro-­Hungarian Empire, be included within their respective boundaries. Trieste re-­emerged, once again, as a contested issue at the end of the Second World War. On 30 April 1945, Tito’s National Liberation Army reached Trieste ahead of the British and the American troops. As a result, the peninsula of Istria and the territory between the city of Trieste and the pre-­war Yugoslav–Italian border came under Yugoslav occupation. Tito’s new Yugoslavia, however, was Communist and the Western powers were not ready to accept incorporation of the strategically important port into the future Soviet Bloc. In a statement of 19 May 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, British Field Marshal Harold Alexander, used unprecedented language in communication between wartime allies to compare Yugoslavia’s occupation of Trieste to ‘those of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan’.142 A dangerous standoff followed between the still formally allied Yugoslav and British and American troops. The daily incidents that ensued threatened to escalate into a full-­blown military confrontation and created the first Cold War fault line in Europe. On 20 June 1945, after Stalin’s decisive pressure on Tito, a provisional agreement was signed between the Yugoslav High Command and the Supreme Allied Command of the Mediterranean. It established a demarcation line that placed the eastern part of the disputed territory, including the peninsula of Istria, under the Yugoslav Army occupation. Under the provisions of the agreement, the western part of the territory, including the port of Trieste came under the British and Amer­ ican military occupation. The provisional agreement left the final settlement to be defined in the Peace Treaty negotiations with Italy.143 However, the Peace Treaty, signed at the Paris Peace Conference on 10 February 1947, failed to resolve the problem. The Treaty formalized yet another provisional agreement, based on the demarcation arrangement of 20 June 1945. The co-­signatories of this latest agreement were the victorious Allied powers, the US, the UK, France, the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Italian Peace Treaty also gave a new name to the disputed territory of the city of Trieste and the adjacent territory – the Free Territory of Trieste. The new entity was divided into two zones. Zone A, the western part, including the city of Trieste, came under the joint Anglo-­American military and civil administration. Zone B, the eastern part, including eastern environs of the city of Trieste and the Istria peninsula, was placed under Yugoslav administration. The agreement was provisional and left it to Italy and Yugoslavia to negotiate a final settlement. Importantly for the origin of the 1953 crisis, the agreement stipulated that the status of Trieste could not be changed without the endorsement of all co-­signatories.144 In the years that followed, Yugoslavia established itself as a prominent member of the Soviet Bloc and Italy became firmly embedded within the

52   Overtures Western sphere of influence. On 20 March 1948, with the advent of the Cold War, the increased Italian importance for the Western Alliance and in a calculated bid to favourably influence the outcome of the forthcoming Italian general elections, the US and the British governments declared their unilateral decision to hand over the administration of Zone A and the city of Trieste to the Italians. In June 1948, however, the Tito–Stalin conflict broke out and Yugoslavia soon became the West’s invaluable propaganda asset against the Soviets. Overnight, it became important for the British and the Americans not to antagonise the new and important ally. As a result, the March 1948 declaration on Trieste was put on hold indefinitely. The Italian dissatisfaction was silenced for the sake of ‘higher’ interests. Unfortunately for the Western allies, the Trieste question continued to fester in Yugoslav and Italian consciousness. In the summer of 1953, following the indecisive parliamentary elections of 7 June, Italy was thrown into a period of political instability. Vying for public support, Italian political parties pulled out the Trieste card. At the end of August, the Italian Government accused Yugoslavia of intending to annexe Zone B and declared that Italy would respond by annexing Zone A and the city of Trieste. At the same time, the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Pella, threatened the West with the Italian exit from NATO should the Allies refuse to support Italian demands regarding Trieste. In the following weeks, the accusations and counter accusations between Italy and Yugoslavia burgeoned. Tensions were further exacerbated by the highly public nature of the dispute. It inflamed popular opinion and inflated patriotic and nationalist sentiments in both countries. This, however, limited either government’s manoeuvrability. On 11 September, Washington, least interested in the rebirth of a dispute over Trieste, came up with a plan to impose a solution to the Trieste problem on Italy and Yugoslavia. President Eisenhower was of the opinion that the Balkans ‘represented our weakest flank’ and that, it was this European situation and the defence problem that caused us to make a desperate effort to get these two countries on the same side of the fence. Our only hope of getting them together rested on a resolution of this Trieste problem.145 As it turned out, however, the American plan merely aggravated the situation. The plan was created upon the presumption that Yugoslavia would accept the division of the Free Territory of Trieste along the existing zones. This assumption was based on remarks Tito made during talks he held with the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on 19 March 1953, during his official visit to Britain. However, one important omission in the calculation was made. Tito had underlined that he was ready to accept such a division under the condition that Britain and the US provided official and public guarantees that it would constitute a final solution and would not serve as a springboard for future Italian demands for Zone B.146 The new US State Department initiative, however, did not include such provision. The US plan of 11 September envisioned the British

Overtures   53 and the American handing over of the administration of Zone A to the Italians, which would provoke, as the Americans expected, Yugoslav annexation of Zone B. According to the plan, the Americans would then exert pressure on both Italy and Yugoslavia to accept this fait accompli as a final solution to the Trieste problem.147 While London and Washington were coordinating the final aspects of the plan, the Yugoslav–Italian public row escalated to such an extent that it irreversibly inflamed public opinion in both countries and made acceptance of any fait accompli all but impossible for either government. On 8 October 1953, the British and the American governments issued a joint statement announcing their decision to hand over Zone A and Trieste to Italy. This immediately escalated the crisis and, in the dramatic week that followed, brought Italy and Yugoslavia to the brink of war. Because of the presence of their troops in the area, the conflict would have inevitably dragged in the US and Britain. On the morning of 8 October, the British Ambassador, Sir Ivo Mallet, and the US Chargé, William Wallner, called upon Tito and handed him the Anglo-­American Declaration transferring administration of Zone A and the city of Trieste to the Italians. Tito promised a response on the following day, once he had had a chance to consult his government. He stressed however, as his personal opinion, that he found the Anglo-­American decision unacceptable to Yugoslavia. He further asked the two governments to delay their official announcement until he had prepared a communiqué of his own.148 The British and Americans, however, allowed Radio Paris to broadcast the full text of the Declaration barely an hour after the two envoys had left Tito’s residence in Belgrade. Furthermore, the Radio Paris broadcast publicly confirmed that the Anglo­American decision had been made without prior consultations with Belgrade. This was a further insult to the already wounded Yugoslav pride.149 Within hours, demonstrators started gathering in front of the US and the British Embassies in Belgrade. By that same evening, huge and violent anti-­British and anti-­ American demonstrations, increasingly out of control, broke out throughout Yugoslavia. The US and British Embassies in Belgrade and consulates in Zagreb were stoned. Their libraries and Cultural Centres in several cities in Yugoslavia were demolished and ransacked.150 The State Department assessed that the popular reaction and the anger of demonstrators seemed to have been spontaneous and genuine, simply because they started before Yugoslav officials had time to organise anything.151 As Yugoslav sources confirm, the very public spat between the Italian and Yugoslav governments, waged through media for weeks, had electrified the masses to an extent that they spontaneously went onto the streets. During an emergency meeting he held the next morning with Kardelj, Ranković and Djilas, Tito berated them for allowing the previous night’s demonstrations to get out of hand and even descend into vandalism. The three were at pains to persuade him that they neither ordered nor organised the demonstrations.152 The demonstrations continued for several days throughout Yugoslavia, although less violent and by now under the authorities’ control. Tito’s official response to the British and the US Governments’ statement came on 9 October. The Deputy Foreign Secretary, Aleš Bebler, handed the

54   Overtures official Yugoslav Note to the British Ambassador and the US Chargé rejecting the Anglo-­American decision of 8 October.153 On 10 October, Tito held a speech at a rally in Leskovac, southern Serbia, demanding that the decision of 8 October be revoked. He added that ‘[Yugoslavs] can trust no one any more’ and warned that any ‘attempt by Italian troops to occupy Zone A would be considered by Yugoslavia as an act of aggression’. Tito further confirmed that Yugoslav Army reinforcements were being sent to the Yugoslav-­administered Zone B. Alluding to the possibility that the British and Americans might exert pressure on him to compromise, he declared that Yugoslavia ‘was a proud nation’ and would never trade ‘any part of its territory for aid’.154 The next day, at a rally in Skopje, Macedonia, Tito raised the stakes and threatened that ‘the very moment [the Italian soldiers] enter Zone A, [Yugoslav troops] shall enter that zone’.155 By issuing blatant threats day after day, Tito was in fact desperately trying to avert the Italian entry into Zone A, which, as he saw it, would have left him with no alternative but to go to war. On the other hand available documents suggest that the British and the Americans were completely in the dark as to how far Tito and Yugoslavia were prepared to go. Washington attributed Tito’s belligerent rhetoric on 10 and 11 October in Leskovac and Skopje to his brinkmanship. 156 However, in his diary entries for 12 and 13 October 1953, Dedijer provides a chilling account of the fateful two days. The Yugoslav leadership was expecting Italian troops to enter Zone A on 12 October. On that very same day, Tito despatched his Chief of Staff, General Peko Dapčević, to the border region with orders to initiate immediate military operations upon Italian entry into Zone A, without need for further official approval. At the same time, a Foreign Ministry team, headed by Bebler, was instructed to immediately draft official Notes to major powers and the UN announcing the beginning of hostilities with Italy. A blank space was left in the Notes for the date to be filled in. According to Dedijer, the Yugoslav leadership spent a sleepless night between 12 and 13 October, expecting the beginning of military operations. Fortunately, Italian troops did not enter Zone A. The immediate danger of war further subsided after two days of talks, held on 12 and 13 October, in Washington, between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović and the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The Yugoslavs, however, did not destroy the official Notes prepared on 12 October; they were stored in the special safe of the Foreign Ministry, in case of future deterioration of the crisis.157 A combination of belligerent rhetoric and intense diplomatic activity focused on the US Administration enabled the Yugoslavs to regain the initiative and effectively cancel the Anglo-­American decision of 8 October. On 21 October, in a telegram to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Popović, Kardelj concluded that the first phase of the Yugoslav effort to reverse the decision of 8 October could be considered a success because ‘[Yugoslavia] had succeeded in moving the whole issue to diplomatic channels and making it the subject of negotiations’.158 Indeed, during the next two months, consultations, proposals and counter-­proposals between Belgrade, Washington and London followed one another. Meanwhile, the implementation of the 8 October decision

Overtures   55 was put on hold. As a result of this intense diplomatic activity, in the end of December the US and the British Governments invited representatives of the Yugoslavian Government to meet in Washington or London, ‘as the three occupying powers in Trieste to secretly discuss a possible solution to the Trieste question’. It was agreed that the Italian representative would be present in the same city and would be kept informed by the British and the Americans of the progress of negotiations. Once a successful agreement was reached, all parties were to join in a Five-­Power conference that would also include France.159 The secret negotiations between Yugoslavia, Britain and the US started on 1 February 1954, in London. The conference would, eventually pave the way for the final resolution of the Trieste question on 5 October 1954. At the peak of the Trieste crisis, the Soviets tried to become party to the dispute from which they had been completely excluded. On 12 October, the Soviet Government handed official notes to the US and British Embassies in Moscow and to the UN Security Council protesting against the Anglo-­American decision of 8 October as a violation of the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947.160 However, the Yugoslavs were very careful to disassociate themselves from any such Soviet ‘support’.161 Tito never forgot that it was due to the lack of Stalin’s backing during the negotiations over the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy that the problem was created in the first place. Furthermore, during the years of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict after 1948, the USSR backed the Italian Communist Party in its support of the Italian Government’s demands for the annexation of Trieste and both zones. Most importantly, however, the Yugoslavs were fully aware that the solution of the Trieste problem could be reached only with the support of the British and the Americans who occupied the city of Trieste and Zone A, and who held a decisive sway over the Italian Government. The Trieste crisis of October 1953, however, prompted Tito and his associates to re-­evaluate the opportunities that normalization with the Soviets might offer. At the peak of the Trieste crisis, the Yugoslav leadership decided to reconsider their attitude towards the conciliatory overtures from Moscow. On 20 October, on Tito’s orders, Kardelj summoned a number of members of the Yugoslav leadership, together with several top Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry officials to his home in Belgrade. He first conveyed Tito’s request that a strategy be plotted, which would encourage the Soviets to proceed with normalization with Yugoslavia. According to Kardelj, Tito demanded that ‘in this respect there has to be a definite break’ with the hitherto lack of Yugoslav responsiveness to Soviet initiatives.162 Kardelj opened the meeting by suggesting that ‘[Yugoslavia’s] relations with the USSR and other Eastern European states have reached a stage where it is possible to define [Yugoslavia’s] policy on a more long-­term basis’.163 In his view, there was no longer any doubt that changes in the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia, as well as towards the world in general, were genuine. Kardelj explained that the Soviets, after finally realizing that they could not ‘crush’ Yugoslavia, had adopted new tactics aimed at achieving two goals – to prevent further rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the West, and to prevent the transformation of the Ankara Agreement into a true

56   Overtures military alliance and a threat to the USSR and its satellites. The Soviets, according to Kardelj, had also come to the conclusion that the normalization with Yugoslavia could provide the much-­needed credibility to their ‘global peace offensive’. He emphasized that Yugoslavia had so far deliberately shown no responsiveness to the Soviet initiatives for improvement of relations. According to him, although this had been the correct approach immediately after Stalin’s death, it was now proving to be a limiting factor. Kardelj insisted that the time had come to reassess Yugoslavia’s current attitude in order to enable it ‘to make better use of the existing global contradictions and relations’. He underlined that changes that had taken place in the USSR ‘should be exploited in a better way in order to strengthen Yugoslavia’s international position’.164 Following Kardelj’s exposé, Veljko Mićunović, Deputy Foreign Minister, summarized Soviet initiatives since Stalin’s death.165 Given that he had appeared in the same role at the 19 July meeting of the Executive Council, this confirms that Mićunović was at the time entrusted by Tito to supervise the daily operational aspects of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. According to Mićunović, apart from the liquidation of Beria, nothing exceptional had happened in the USSR since the initial changes inaugurated by the new leadership in the first few weeks after Stalin’s death. By July, according to him, the limited achievements of the new Soviet foreign policy in general, together with Yugoslavia’s lack of responsiveness to conciliatory gestures, had contributed to an impasse in the process of improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Throughout this period, according to him, Yugoslavia’s representatives limited themselves in contacts with the Soviets to reminding the other side of the 1948 conflict. At the same time, Mićunović admitted, a positive change could be detected in the Soviet behaviour. There had not been a single public anti-­Yugoslav statement by any member of the new Soviet leadership. Equally, the Soviet propaganda against Yugoslavia was no longer as vulgar as before. With regard to possible changes in the satellite leaderships, Mićunović observed that ‘for the time being, the Soviets had decided to stick to the existing teams’.166 He emphasized that ‘throughout this period [April – October 1953], Yugoslavia did show particular interest in improving diplomatic relations with the satellites’.167 However, as Mićunović concluded, ‘the satellites firmly follow Soviet instructions and are careful not to show any superfluous enthusiasm [towards Yugoslavia] beyond what the Soviets allow’.168 Mićunović’s deliberations suggest that Belgrade saw the potential for further improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations but, at the same time, remained pessimistic about prospects of immediate improvement of relations with the satellites. Concluding the meeting, Kardelj defined what was to be the new Yugoslav approach towards the Soviet initiatives. He predicted that although the imminent danger of Soviet aggression had ceased, the process of normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations would be slow and without sudden leaps and dramatic changes. Kardelj stressed that ‘normalization of [Yugoslavia’s] relations with the USSR and the satellites will not mean a change in [Yugoslavia’s] foreign policy’.169 He insisted, however, that the significance of changes in the USSR

Overtures   57 should not be underestimated. With this in mind, Kardelj suggested modification of Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviets and mapped the course of future dealings with Moscow. According to him, Yugoslavia should carry out normal communication with Moscow, in accordance with a ‘constructive’ policy shaped in its own interest. At the same time there was to be no triumphalism in contacts with the Soviets. Contrary to existing practice, difficult issues should be avoided in future communications with the Soviet representatives and attention should be focused on uncontroversial issues. Finally, he insisted that, questions raised by the Soviets were to be dealt with in a more expeditious manner . . . In doing so, however, [the Yugoslavs] should always be governed by reciprocity; not to obstruct the process of normalization but, at the same time, to establish it firmly on the basis of equality. For this reason as Kardelj specified, Yugoslavia would not exchange Ambassadors with those countries of the Eastern Bloc that had not initiated it themselves.170 Those attending the meeting were clear that Kardelj was conveying Tito’s instructions. The timing of the meeting suggests that the Allied unilateral decision of 8 October and the ensuing Trieste crisis had prompted Tito and his associates to reconsider Soviet overtures. They were infuriated with the manner in which the Western powers had handled the Trieste question and saw it as proof of their complete disregard for Yugoslavia’s interests. At the same time, the most recent overtures from Moscow had certainly deflated danger of the Soviet aggression and the Yugoslavs saw further normalization as an opportunity to play one Bloc off against the other. This prospect was particularly appealing as it offered Yugoslavia a chance to decrease its dependency on Western support, while remaining independent from the Eastern Bloc. Of course, neither Tito nor any one else in the Yugoslav leadership even contemplated a return to the ‘socialist camp’. Kardelj was clear about it at the meeting and underlined that relations with the USSR must be on par with relations with the West. Furthermore, his remark that Yugoslavia should make ‘better use of existing global contradictions’ revealed that Tito and his aides were conceptualizing a new foreign policy orientation of equidistance to either Bloc. The new Yugoslav approach to the Soviet overtures was implemented immediately after the meeting at Kardelj’s residence. On 3 November 1953, Koča Popović informed Yugoslav Ambassadors in the US, UK, France, Italy, West Germany and the UN of the modification of Yugoslav policy towards the Soviets. He instructed them to gradually normalize diplomatic contacts with the Russians. . . . It is inappropriate to further precondition such contacts by insisting that [Soviets] admit [responsibility for the 1948 conflict with Yugoslavia]. Furthermore, feel less obliged to inform Western representatives of what was talked about with the Russians.171

58   Overtures The change in attitude became evident also in prompt alterations to the official Yugoslav political vocabulary. From November 1953 onwards, all documents and official correspondence referred to the Eastern Bloc countries as the ‘East European countries’ instead of as the ‘Cominform countries’, the derogatory term that had been in use since 1948. A DSIP policy memo of 17 November advised Yugoslav Ambassadors of specific measures and activities towards fulfilment of the new Yugoslav approach towards the Soviets. It underlined that ‘from now on, we will do our best through planned activities and use every opportunity to speed up the normalization [with the Soviets], bearing in mind the necessity to make better use of existing global contradictions’. At the same time however, the memo underlined that Yugoslav responsiveness to the Soviet initiatives would be limited. It warned of the insincerity of Soviet motives and cautioned Yugoslav diplomats that, today, as will be the case in the future, in its policy towards Yugoslavia, the USSR will do its best to prevent further development of our co-­operation with the Western countries, to prevent transformation of the Balkan Pact into a more effective defensive alliance, as well as to cash in elsewhere in the world on its formal normalization with us. . . . The Soviet government will continue, albeit within new and innovative forms to exert pressure on us because the USSR, as a big power, remains an enemy of our political system and independence. . . . We should understand the normalization with the USSR as normalization with any other capitalist country or any other big power. Thus, the normalization in question is exclusively a normalization of inter-­state relations. With regard to political issues and ideology, there is nothing that can be normalized between us, as we are countries with incongruent political systems.172 As the above document confirms, the change in the Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviets, inaugurated in the wake of the Trieste crisis, was neither a policy U-­turn nor strategic reorientation. The modification of the Yugoslav attitude to the Soviet initiatives was far from a Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement; it was to be pursued only to the extent it helped maximize Yugoslavia’s existing foreign policy goals. The USSR continued to be regarded as the biggest threat to Yugoslav national security, albeit a diminishing one, and Belgrade remained highly sceptical of Soviet motives behind initiatives for normalization. Most importantly, the insistence that higher responsiveness to Soviet initiatives was to be limited strictly to state relations revealed Tito and his aides’ firm belief that the chasm between Yugoslav and Soviet Communists was so deep that no ideological reconciliation was possible. In the beginning of 1954, the Yugoslav regime was shaken by a very public manifestation of disunity within its highest leadership. On 10 January, a statement from the Central Committee of the LCY announced an imminent session of the Plenum of the Central Committee with a single point of agenda – the conduct of comrade Milovan Djilas. At the time, Djilas was a member of the Executive

Overtures   59 Committee of the LCY Central Committee, head of the all-­powerful Party propaganda apparatus, the Agitprop,173 and the official Yugoslav party ideologue. Together with Kardelj and Ranković, he had been Tito’s closest associate since 1940. Djilas’ falling out and his demise owed most to articles he published in the months preceding the January Plenum. Between the summer of 1953 and the beginning of January 1954, Djilas published a series of articles in the party organ Borba and in the new literary journal Nova Misao (The New Thinking), which were highly critical of the Yugoslav leadership and the Yugoslav political system. The articles irrevocably placed Djilas in opposition to the regime and to his comrades.174 On 16 and 17 January 1954, the Third Extraordinary Plenum of the LCY CC, held in Belgrade, addressed the ‘case of Milovan Djilas’. The Plenum condemned Djilas and appointed a special Party commission to recommend appropriate ‘measures’ against him.175 Although he was de facto expelled from the leadership at the Third Plenum, it was only at the Fourth Plenum on 30 March – after the Commission had formally concluded its work – that Djilas was officially stripped of all his functions. At the time, however, there was no legal persecution of Djilas, nor was he threatened with imprisonment.176 This would come several years later, and most probably as a result of Tito’s anger for Djilas’ disregard of a ‘gentleman’s’ agreement not to publicly promote his opposing views. One could not explain otherwise the fact that Djilas remained alone among other members of the leadership who, at one point or another, had parted ways with Tito to suffer prolonged imprisonment. After his arrest in December 1956, in the aftermath of the events in Hungary, Djilas acquired the aura of the first Yugoslav dissident. The removal of Djilas, however, did not provoke a major political upheaval in Yugoslavia nor did it have any impact on its foreign policy. Neither did it represent a threat to Tito’s regime. Djilas had never managed to create a following among the Party faithful or among the public. On the one hand, Party members did not find his ideas of a multi-­party state particularly appealing. On the other hand, those who were democratically oriented and opposed to the regime could never forgive him for being for years by far the most radical and brutal among the Yugoslav Communist leaders. Djilas’ hands were bloodied by executions of ‘class enemies’ and ‘wavering revolutionaries’ alike during and immediately after the war. The level of Tito’s confidence that Djilas had not made a political imprint was best illustrated by the fact that Belgrade Radio broadcast live the whole session of the Third Plenum. The West was equally indifferent to Djilas’ removal. Washington commented that ‘its primary significance is internal . . . and we do not anticipate that this will alter basic orientation of the regime’.177 The Soviets, on the other hand, took exceptional interest in the Djilas affair and tried to exploit it. In his first letter to Tito six months later, Khrushchev presented the removal of Djilas as the Yugoslav leadership’s response to Beria’s removal.178 Available evidence overwhelmingly confirms, however, that there never existed a connection between the Djilas case and future normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations nor with any other foreign policy decision of the regime at the time. Transcripts of both the Third and the

60   Overtures Fourth Plenums, and other available Yugoslav documents, firmly place the Djilas removal within internal debates on the future course of Yugoslav socialism and the role of the League of Communists. The decision of the Yugoslav leadership to modify its attitude towards the Soviets after the 20 October meeting at Kardelj’s residence was soon tested during a meeting between the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Vidić, and Molotov in the beginning of 1954. The exchanges that took place during the meeting and, even more so Belgrade’s reaction to its own Ambassador’s conduct reveal deep Yugoslav mistrust towards the Soviets and extreme sensitivity to any issue that may even remotely be ideologically coloured. On 21 January, Dobrivoje Vidić called on Molotov to inquire about the Soviet position on Austria in advance of the Conference of the Four Allied Foreign Ministers in Berlin.179 The meeting lasted only twenty minutes. After informing Vidić about the Soviet position on Austria, Molotov stated that, he wished to stress that the question of Djilas and subsequent discussions on this question [in Belgrade] have aroused huge interest in Moscow. It is well known that Djilas emulated the West and harboured negative feelings towards the Soviet Union. It is possible that measures taken against Djilas could have a positive impact on the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.180 It is interesting to note that in the Soviet transcript of this meeting, Molotov’s statement on Djilas was declared ‘unofficial’, whereas in Vidić’s report it was presented as ‘official’. The dialogue that followed between Molotov and Vidić, as reported by the Yugoslav Ambassador, is illustrative of the suspicions that burdened Yugoslav–Soviet relations: Vidić: 

[the Yugoslavs] have always been Marxists and [they] never behaved differently. molotov:  It is good to be a Marxist, but is Djilas a Marxist? Vidić:  No, definitely not. molotov:  And yet he was considered a party ideologue. Vidić:  But you also had people at the highest positions who were considered to be Marxists only to be proven differently. Life is a struggle. molotov:  True, we have also had such cases. I agree.181 The Molotov–Vidić exchange caused an irate reaction in Belgrade. In a strongly worded telegram, K. Popović personally reproached Vidić for allowing Molotov to make an official statement on Djilas, an internal Yugoslav affair.182 Belgrade was particularly infuriated by the discussion between Vidić and Molotov on who was and who was not a Marxist. According to Popović, this had allowed Molotov to take the role of a Marxist, Communist authority and arbiter. . . . It comes out that [Yugoslavia’s] resistance to [the Soviet] crude aggressive policies was [the result of

Overtures   61 Yugoslavia’s] betrayal of Marxism and of the opportunism of our leadership whom, until only recently they have called the ‘Tito-­Fascist clique’.183 Popović then reminded Vidić that, although you were informed earlier that it is no longer necessary to insist on clarification of responsibility [for the 1948 break up] when talking to the Soviets, if and when [the Soviets] try to pin the blame on us . . . we must repel it resolutely. . . . Do not allow them to present their de facto capitulation as their victory or gracious conciliatoriness.184 In conclusion, Popović warned Vidić that ‘[The Soviets] are above all interested in spoiling [Yugoslavia’s] relations with the West through gradual normalization, especially if that would also help them rehabilitate their earlier policies and actions towards us.’185 Popović’s angry reprimand to Vidić demonstrated Yugoslavia’s firm resolve to resist Soviet ideological lecturing and attempt to re-­establish themselves as ideological authority over the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav leadership’s deep scepticism towards the motives behind Soviet conciliatory gestures and extreme caution they exercised when responding to such initiatives was a result of the continuing dichotomy of the Soviet and Yugoslav interpretations of the causes behind the 1948 break up. In this context, Molotov’s meeting with Vidić on 21 January confirmed once again to Belgrade that the Soviet position remained the same as it had been in 1948. Hence the vitriolic tone of Popović’s response to his Ambassador. This aspect would also determine Tito’s approach to the improvement of relations with the Soviets throughout 1954 and 1955. He would continue to insist that the normalization be limited to state relations because, as he adamantly underlined, the 1948 rupture was a result of resistance to Soviet state hegemony and not a result of inadvertent ‘ideological misunderstanding’, as the Soviets were trying to present it. Popović insisted in the telegram to Vidić that the Soviets must not be allowed to misrepresent ‘[Yugoslavia’s] resistance to [Soviet] crude aggressive policies as [Yugoslavia’s] betrayal of Marxism and not for what it was, a result of those very same policies.’186 Tito repeatedly underlined that the Soviets had tried to conceal their hegemonic onslaught on Yugoslavia behind accusations that Yugoslavia abandoned true Marxism–Leninism and had created an ideological heresy. As he emphasized at the Fourth Plenum of the LCY CC in March 1954, [In the Eastern Bloc] they remain on the positions from 1948; that we then made a mistake; that the conflict was purely of ideological nature; that it wasn’t [related] to inter-­state relations; that it wasn’t with regard to economy; that we have deviated from Marxism–Leninism, etc.187 Lack of substantive progress in Soviet attitudes towards Yugoslavia, evident from Molotov’s exchange with Vidić, frustrated the Yugoslav leadership even more so in light of their recent decision to be more positive towards the Soviet

62   Overtures initiatives. This disappointment, even aggravation, prompted Tito to react surprisingly quickly. On 29 January 1954, in a speech to the National Assembly, Tito called the Soviet normalization a ‘partial normalization’ and made it clear that there ‘exist a number of issues that need to be addressed if true normalization is to be achieved, not merely an exchange of diplomatic representatives’.188 At the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, in March 1954, Tito revealed his frustrations and pessimism that true reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the USSR would ever be possible. He emphasized that, [the Soviets] now expect us to come to them in penitence. We must tell them that they are wrong, that we will never do that . . . [I do not believe] that we will ever come into a position that [the Soviets] will treat us as equals, as a partner on foreign policy and other issues . . . I only hope that global developments force them to have at least the same kind of relations with us as they have with any other capitalist country. We do not ask them for more, because we . . . do not want to copy their methods any more, we have our own road, we follow our own road to socialism.189 There were, however, other reasons behind the Yugoslav reticence towards the Soviets. In the first months of 1954, major foreign policy considerations required Belgrade to act warily towards the Soviet overtures, first and foremost because of the negotiations with the US and Britain over Trieste, which started on 1 February in London. Yugoslavia was well aware that the Western powers held the key to the settlement of the Trieste question. Furthermore, because of its catastrophic domestic economic situation, Yugoslavia still relied heavily on American economic aid. A crucial American emergency food relief aid package was being negotiated between Washington and Belgrade in the first months of 1954.190 This made it paramount for Tito’s regime not to endanger close relations with the West, in particular with the US. Yugoslav leaders were very careful to discourage speculations that the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization might lead to Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘socialist camp’. Ironically, at the time of the Molotov–Vidić meeting, developments in the Kremlin were moving in the direction opposite to the one understood by the Yugoslavs. Several days before he was to meet Vidić, the Presidium had instructed Molotov to communicate to the Yugoslav Ambassador Soviet readiness for further improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. According to Malenkov, Molotov completely disregarded the Presidium’s instructions and conducted a ‘dry’ meeting of twenty minutes, the ‘transcript of which took me only half a minute to read’.191 This indirectly confirms that by January 1954 the Special Commission on Yugoslavia, appointed in July 1953 by the Presidium, had completed its work. Given the sensitivity of the Yugoslav issue and level of disagreement it raised among its members, it is unlikely that the Presidium would have made any recommendations independent of the findings of the Commission. According to Khrushchev, the Commission had concluded that Yugoslavia was still a socialist country.192 It is inconceivable at this stage of the

Overtures   63 succession battle in the Kremlin, while his position was still weak, that he would have been so reckless to persist on such a contentious issue without the Presidium’s endorsement and some kind of support form a number its members. Together with Bulganin, Malenkov and Mikoyan, Khrushchev had by this time become the main force behind the drive for the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia.193 Molotov’s audacity in disregarding the Presidium’s recommendation however, confirmed the depth of the divisions within the Soviet Presidium regarding normalization with Yugoslavia. Molotov could contemplate sabotaging the Presidium directive only if assured of open or tacit support from other members. Apart from Molotov, Mikhail Suslov and Kliment Voroshilov were the strongest opponents of the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia.194 Suslov, who headed a special Commission of the CPSU Central Committee that coordinated the propaganda campaign against Belgrade throughout the Eastern Bloc and supervised activities of Yugoslav anti-­Titoist émigrés, was particularly opposed to the reconciliation with Tito.195 Molotov’s defiance also confirms Khrushchev’s vulnerability at this stage. Consequently, another compromise within the Presidium had to be sought before the Yugoslav issue could move ahead. In February 1954, yet another Commission was appointed by the Presidium to prepare specific recommendations for further improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. The Commission was headed by the CC Secretary Mikhail Suslov and consisted of Molotov’s deputies Valerian Zorin and Vladimir Kuznetsov. The composition of the commission reflected the effort by Molotov and opponents of normalization to sabotage the process. Not surprisingly, as Suslov later admitted, the first draft of the Commission’s recommendations prepared by Zorin, ‘concluded that Yugoslavia was still a Fascist country . . . [The draft] was done [in such a way as] not to improve relations but to make them even worse’.196 However, while Molotov was attending the Geneva Conference on Indochina between April and July 1954 Khrushchev took advantage of his protracted absence from Moscow. During a meeting in May, Khrushchev skilfully orchestrated the Presidium to overrule Zorin’s draft of the Commission’s conclusions.197 While obviously still unable to openly challenge Molotov, Khrushchev nevertheless managed to circumvent him. This opened the way for Khrushchev’s first letter to Tito in June 1954. The above sequence of events in the Kremlin leads to the conclusion that by May 1954 the majority of the Presidium had accepted Khrushchev’s position that the process of normalization with Yugoslavia was inevitable. Thus, while from October 1953 the Yugoslav leadership modified its attitude and became more responsive to subtle Soviet signals, the infighting among different factions in the Soviet Presidium backing opposed approaches to the normalization with Yugoslavia reached an impasse. For the time being this paralysis halted further initiatives from Moscow.

Conclusion Contrary to prevailing interpretations, Tito’s independent concepts were the result and not the cause of the conflict with Stalin. The excommunication from

64   Overtures the Communist movement after the 1948 break up created a crisis of identity of the Tito regime. Determined to stay Marxists, Tito and his aides went on to create their own alternative to the Soviet model. Within several years only, Yugoslavia had undergone a complete transformation of its political and economic system and society. A system of self-­management was introduced in the economy, based on social ownership and on management of enterprises and industrial plants by workers’ councils. Legal and ideological conditions that were implemented to support this new system of economy allowed greater representation and participation to penetrate into a Stalinist state administration. Simultaneously, liberalization in the sphere of culture and education opened doors for far greater freedom of intellectual thought and artistic expression than had previously existed in the history of socialist states. Nonetheless, the LCY political monopoly and Tito’s firm grip on power remained unchallenged. Out of resistance to Stalin’s intended coup in 1948 and out of years of struggle against the Soviet military, economic and propaganda threat, a new Yugoslav ideological identity, a concept of a different ‘road to socialism’, and a new alternative to the bipolar structuring of the Cold War world were born. It was this profound domestic transformation and not the years of threat of the Soviet aggression, of economic blockade and vulgar propaganda that irrevocably distanced Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union. An ambiguous conclusion of a meeting between Yugoslav, US, British and French military officials, held in Belgrade in the end of November 1952, and refusal of the Head of the Tripartite delegation, US General Handy, to offer Belgrade explicit assurances that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would be met with a decisive US and NATO response, triggered panic within the Yugoslav leadership. To Tito and his aides, this meant removal of the principal deterrent that had kept Stalin from attacking Yugoslavia after 1948. Within just three months, Yugoslavia created an alliance with Greece and Turkey, new NATO members, indirectly re-­establishing the Western security umbrella. Almost immediately following Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership started emitting positive, albeit modest signals to Belgrade. Suspicious, the Yugoslavs treaded with extreme caution and reluctance, correctly understanding these feelers to be part of Moscow’s effort to prevent increasing incorporation of Yugoslavia in the Western defence system. The crisis over the unresolved status of the Free Territory of Trieste, which exploded in October 1953, brought Yugoslavia within hours of armed confrontation with Italy and possibly the British and the Americans. Although eventually diffused via diplomacy and negotiations, the crisis had persuaded the Yugoslav leadership to re-­examine their attitude towards the Soviets. In the aftermath of the Trieste crisis, realizing that Moscow’s initiatives offered certain strategic openings, the Yugoslavs decided to adjust their stance towards the Kremlin. This alteration, however, did not mean departure from achieved level of relations with the West, including military cooperation, much less a return to the Soviet ‘camp’. At the same time, the divisions in the Kremlin over the future course of the reconciliation with Tito imposed an impasse on the approaches it had hitherto

Overtures   65 pursued. Driven by the realization that a ‘normalization’ with Yugoslavia was important for the success of the ‘peaceful co-­existence’ initiative it had recently launched, a group led by Khrushchev pushed for a break up of this deadlock. With some delicate manoeuvring over several months, this group managed to overcome the opposition, in particular that of Molotov, and secure the backing of the whole Presidium for an initiative towards true improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. The critical step would be made in the form of a secret letter from the Soviet Party Central Committee, signed by Khrushchev, and sent to the Yugoslav leadership on 22 June 1954.

2 Normalization

For a full year following the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet diplomatic relations on 6 June 1953, there were no further Soviet initiatives for the improvement of relations between the two countries. Desperate to maintain its strategic partnership with the West and distrustful of the Soviets, Belgrade was careful not to show undue enthusiasm about reconciliation with Moscow. The relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc remained as hostile as ever. Daily incidents and provocations on Yugoslavia’s borders with the Soviet satellites and fierce anti-­Yugoslav propaganda continued unabated. Then, as a bolt from the blue, at the end of June 1954 the Yugoslav leadership received a letter from the Soviet Party Central Committee, signed by Khrushchev. Not only was this the first direct communication between the two leaderships since 1948 but, astonishingly, Moscow was proposing full normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The Yugoslav response was delayed for more than a month. On the one hand, Tito remained deeply distrustful of Soviet intentions. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was, at the time, fully engaged in final and delicate negotiations concerning the creation of the Balkan Pact and over the Trieste question and was afraid to jeopardize them. By September, however, once the Balkan Pact Agreement had been signed and following a number of measures Moscow undertook to demonstrate its sincerity, the correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships resumed with vigour. By the end of November, both sides were in agreement that the level of communication and understanding had reached a point at which they could contemplate a meeting of their highest representatives. Yet, an impasse occurred over the next few months, partly due to Tito’s two-­and-a-­half month long trip to Asia. The main reason, however, was the intensification of the leadership battle between Khrushchev and Malenkov, which would culminate at the Soviet Party Plenum on 31 January 1955. As was shown in the previous chapter, by November 1953 the Yugoslav leadership had realized the strategic potential of the normalization of relations with the USSR. At the same time, however, they were careful not to allow Moscow to manipulate with the overtures in a way that could compromise either Yugoslavia’s strategic partnership with the West or, ironically their continuing hope of being accepted once again into the international Communist community with their independence and new ideological identity intact. The benefits of the

Normalization   67 improvement of relations with Moscow became more evident after the successful conclusion of negotiations over foreign policy issues that had preoccupied Belgrade for the previous two years, the Balkan Pact and the Trieste settlement, and after the success of Tito’s first venture into the Third World. If hesitant and resentful in their approach to the Soviets only a year earlier, by the beginning of 1955 the Yugoslavs had become vitally interested in the acceleration of the process of normalization of relations with Moscow.

Establishment of direct communication In May 1954, the Soviet leadership was confronted with the increasingly pressing question of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Further vacillation over Yugoslavia threatened a repeat of Stalin’s strategic miscalculation in 1948. Six months after the dramatic Trieste crisis in October 1953, which brought Yugoslavia and the West to the brink of war, the Trieste question was safely confined to discreet diplomatic negotiations between Yugoslavia, Britain and the US in London. On 31 May, the three had successfully reached an interim accord on Trieste. This heralded the restoration of full strategic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West.1 As a result of the progress over Trieste, the final negotiations between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey on the creation of the Balkan Pact resumed with added momentum. Between 24 March and 1 April, a tripartite2 military conference was held in Ankara.3 Tito visited Turkey between 12 and 18 April 1954, and a visit to Greece was announced for June.4 The joint communiqué, issued at the end of Tito’s talks in Turkey, declared the readiness of both sides to proceed with the transformation of the Ankara Agreement into a full military alliance, the Balkan Pact.5 Tito’s forthcoming visit to Greece was expected to remove the last obstacles to the successful conclusion of the Pact.6 All this suggested further integration of Yugoslavia into the Western alliance. The Soviet leaders looked upon these developments with increasing apprehension.7 The removal of Djilas in January 1954 provided Khrushchev and those in the Presidium who supported improvement of relations with Belgrade with an additional opportunity. They could now argue against their opponents in the Presidium that by discarding a pro-­Western supporter from its leadership, Yugoslavia merited normalization of relations with the USSR. Throughout the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict, Djilas was the head of Yugoslavia’s anti-­Cominform propaganda apparatus.8 On 31 May the Soviet Presidium approved a Resolution, which, in the form of a letter, was then sent to all ‘comradely parties’, including the Chinese, the Italian and the French. The Resolution related to the findings of the Commission, appointed by the Presidium in February, which sanctioned further improvement of relations with Yugoslavia.9 The letter informed ‘comradely parties’ of the Soviet leadership’s decision to establish direct contact with Belgrade and initiate normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.10 Given the enthusiasm and zeal they demonstrated in spearheading anti-­Titoist campaigns after 1948, the leaders of ‘fraternal parties’ must have received the letter with

68   Normalization shock and utter dismay. Nevertheless, they all duly wrote back expressing ‘full support’ for the new course of the Soviet leadership.11 The Presidium Resolution of 31 May revealed the true motives behind the Soviet decision to take decisive steps towards improving relations with Yugoslavia. The necessity for the Presidium to pass yet another Resolution before it could embark on the new course towards Yugoslavia revealed the importance of the Yugoslav question but, more importantly, its divisive impact on the Soviet leadership and on the ‘socialist camp’. Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Presidium sought support from major Communist parties confirmed that the new leadership in the Kremlin lacked Stalin’s authority. In its first paragraph, the Resolution contained an admission that the continuing conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was harming not only Yugoslavia but the whole socialist ‘camp’, as well. It pointed to the ‘self-­evident’ fact that should ‘the imperialists’ succeed in their intentions towards Yugoslavia, it would bring misery and suffering to the peoples of Yugoslavia, ‘seriously complicate the situation in the Balkans and strengthen the position of the aggressive Bloc in its struggle against the camp of peace, democracy and socialism’. Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia, according to the Resolution, should aspire to ‘destroy this anti-­Soviet plan of Anglo-­American imperialists and make use of all available possibilities to increase [Soviet] influence on Yugoslav people’.12 The Resolution was uncharacteristically short – one page only – and devoid of excessive ideological jargon. Emphasis on geopolitical and strategic considerations confirmed that the Kremlin perceived Yugoslavia’s further integration into the Western alliance through the Balkan Pact as a threat to the existing strategic balance in Europe. However, it also revealed Moscow’s effort to conceal the ideological retreat on the Yugoslav question behind geopolitical concerns. Acknowledgement that the conflict with Yugoslavia had cost the Eastern Bloc dearly represented an unprecedented admission of the complete failure of Stalin’s policies towards Belgrade. There is no evidence to suggest that at this point Khrushchev’s push for normalization with Yugoslavia was based on expectation of Tito’s return to Cominform. At this early stage, Khrushchev could not have anticipated Tito’s response to the Soviet approach. A gamble on Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘camp’ when, as we know, Tito was a complete unknown to Stalin’s successors would have been unreasonably risky. If the Yugoslav leader chose to rebuff the initiative it would have cost Khrushchev dearly, possibly fatally undermining his position vis-­à-vis other leadership contenders. Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership could begin to entertain the notion of Tito’s return to the ‘camp’ only later, once Tito had agreed to normalization. The initiative for the normalization was driven by strategic considerations and was calculated at preventing Yugoslavia’s irreversible integration in NATO. On 22 June 1954, in utmost secrecy, the Soviet Party Central Committee sent a letter to the Yugoslav Party Central Committee proposing the full normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The letter was signed by Khrushchev and was the first direct communication between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships since 1948.13 The Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Volkov, handed the letter to

Normalization   69 Tito on 30 June in Brioni. The letter came as a complete surprise to the Yugoslav leader. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo,14 at the time a member of Tito’s innermost circle, described it as a ‘bolt from the blue’.15 The Yugoslavs had noted that Khrushchev, on behalf of the Soviet Central Committee, was the sole signatory of the letter. Given that the letter represented a major shift in Soviet foreign policy, Tito and his aides deduced that Khrushchev had become primus inter pares in the Presidium.16 At the time of Stalin’s death, the Yugoslavs had identified Malenkov, Molotov and Beria as the main leadership contenders. Until the arrival of the letter, Khrushchev was out of the Yugoslav field of vision.17 The date on the first Khrushchev letter,18 22 June 1954 was not accidental. On this occasion, as would often be the case in the future, symbolism played an important part in Tito–Khrushchev exchanges. The date marked the anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. It is highly likely that Khrushchev wished to remind Tito of the brotherhood of arms that existed between the two peoples during the Second World War and of their shared destinies and sacrifices, which ran deeper than any ‘misunderstandings’ that might have occurred. Furthermore, there was irony in the fact that it was also a letter, on that occasion signed by Stalin and Molotov, on 27 March 1948, which triggered the Yugoslav–Soviet break up in 1948. This time a letter was sent with the intention to put an end to that conflict. Khrushchev’s letter began with a statement that ‘the CPSU CC had concluded that there exist some conditions for the improvement of relations between our countries and for the establishment of contacts between the CPSU CC and the leadership of the LCY.’19 From the very opening, the Soviet leadership intended to impose its ideological seniority upon the Yugoslavs by implying that the CPSU CC had the authority to determine whether the moment for normalization had arrived or not. The letter further asserted that, the President of Yugoslavia, Tito, and other leaders of the LCY and the government of [Yugoslavia] have in their speeches on numerous occasions expressed their desire for improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This fully coincides with the wishes of the Soviet leaders.20 The above statement implied that the Soviets were merely responding to Yugoslav overtures and served to conceal the fact that the initiative for the normalization came from Moscow. This was of huge importance. Within the Comintern’s paradigm, an initiative towards reconciliation meant admission of responsibility for the rupture. Furthermore, the letter acknowledged that the conflict between the two countries had caused damage to the interests of Yugoslavia and those of the Soviet Union . . . [that] there were no valid foundations for the dispute and accusations against Yugoslavia [in 1948] . . . [that] there exist no serious contradictions that [should be] the source of hostility and constant acrimony between our countries and peoples.21

70   Normalization This statement represented the first, albeit circumvented, admission from the Soviet leadership that the conflict was destructive, unnecessary, and that Yugoslavia had been wrongly accused in 1948. Khrushchev’s letter then addressed the most contentious issue between the two sides, the responsibility for the 1948 rupture. It suggested that facts relating to the causes of the 1948 conflict ‘now look different’, a result of the ‘uncovering’ of Lavrentii Beria’s scheming. It accused Beria and his associates of fabricating accusations against the Yugoslavs in 1948 ‘without the knowledge of the CPSU CC and the government of the USSR’. In the same breath, however, the letter added that, the leadership of the CPY [the Communist Party of Yugoslavia]22 did not take advantage of all opportunities to avoid conflict with the CPSU CC, either. For example, non-­Marxist statements and anti-­Soviet outbursts by [Milovan] Djilas did not, at the time, meet with resistance from the leadership of the CPY CC. Djilas, this pseudo-­Marxist, a man estranged from the cause of Communism . . . has abundantly contributed to the deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.23 Moscow thus proposed that the responsibility for the 1948 rupture be shared evenly between the two sides; the culpability was placed on two villains, one from each side – Lavrentii Beria and Milovan Djilas. It resorted to Stalin’s formula of directing blame on an ousted, preferably executed, member of the leadership. The formulation offered to exonerate current Soviet leaders of responsibility for 1948, thus preserving their infallibility. In continuation, the letter addressed the common ideological identity of the two Parties and pressed for the re-­establishment of their relations. It proposed that since the LCY leaders assert that Yugoslav Communists ‘are also guided by teachings of Marxism–Leninism’ and are building socialism, ‘there truly exist objective conditions, not only for the improvement of political, economic and cultural relations between our governments, but also for the establishment of contacts between the CPSU CC and the LCY CC’.24 By stressing Belgrade’s professed adherence to Marxism–Leninism, the Soviets were justifying their initiative; Communist internationalism obliged them to do their utmost to renew relations with the prodigal member of the movement. At the same time, by reminding the Yugoslav leadership that Marxism–Leninism was the guiding principle of both Parties, the Soviets hoped to impose a sense of obligation on the Yugoslavs. If Communist, the Yugoslavs were obliged to seek ways to reconcile themselves with the rest of the Communist movement and in particular with its leader, the party of Lenin: the Soviet Party. The shared ideological identity implied that Yugoslav–Soviet normalization had to include the renewal of party relations. Within this context and in accordance with the ‘Communist comradeship’, Khrushchev concluded the letter by proposing the ‘meeting of leading representatives of the CPSU CC and the LCY CC . . . in the near future, either in Moscow or in Yugoslavia, at [Yugoslav] convenience’.25 A proposal for a meeting of top leaders of the two countries was a risky, as well as a sly proposal. It was risky

Normalization   71 because if Tito chose to rebuff the initiative and decided to make the letter public, the proposal for a meeting would have been embarrassing for the Soviets. At the same time, the proposal represented an intelligent manoeuvre and a hidden trap for the Yugoslavs. If years of confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR could be put behind with one meeting of their top Party leaders, it would imply to everyone, including the West that the conflict was nothing but a ‘family quarrel’. To members of the international Communist movement in particular such a meeting would suggest that the rupture of 1948 was a result of an ideological misunderstanding, fabricated by devious traitors, Beria and Djilas. For three weeks after its arrival, Tito shared the contents of the letter only with his innermost circle, namely Kardelj and Ranković. He drafted himself the first version of the response.26 The unexpectedness of Khrushchev’s initiative prompted Tito, as he later admitted, ‘to approach the letter with extreme caution because we were not sure what was truly behind it’.27 Several factors warranted such prudence. On the one hand, in the months preceding Khrushchev’s letter, there had been no approaches from the Soviets.28 After the diplomatic normalization in June 1953, the Yugoslavs saw no further improvement in Yugoslav– Soviet relations. In May and June 1954, the anti-­Yugoslav propaganda in Eastern Europe remained undiminished. There was also no reduction in the number of border incidents.29 The discriminatory surveillance of Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow, suspended for some months after Molotov’s June 1953 proposal for the exchange of Ambassadors, had been resumed.30 Only weeks before the arrival of Khrushchev’s letter, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry had concluded, that ‘regardless of [their positive gestures], it is clear that the essence of Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia had not changed. Their [positive] statements and actions are of tactical nature . . . [and] are aimed at weakening Yugoslavia and contributing to its international isolation’.31 Nothing in the Soviet behaviour in the months preceding Khrushchev’s letter suggested its sincerity. Conspicuously, the letter also arrived at a very inopportune moment for the Yugoslavs. It coincided with the final negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia on the creation of the Balkan Pact. Tito’s successful June visit to Athens removed the  last obstacles and suggested the imminent signing of the Balkan Pact. The meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav military experts and representatives of their General Staffs was scheduled for 28 June in Athens, to be followed by the formal signing of the Balkan Pact at the end of July, in Bled, Yugoslavia. This explains why Tito was initially inclined to suspect that Khrushchev’s letter was part of a ploy to sabotage the signing of the Pact and undermine Yugoslavia’s relations with the West.32 If the Yugoslavs responded to Khrushchev’s initiative with undue enthusiasm and the Soviets chose to publicize the correspondence, it would have convinced the West that Yugoslavia was secretly negotiating its return to the Soviet Bloc. Tito’s anxiety about the Western reaction was well founded. A day before Volkov met Tito, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, unaware of the letter, had instructed his Ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger, to convey to Koča Popović American reservations regarding the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization.33

72   Normalization The rest of the Yugoslav leadership learned of Khrushchev’s letter on 19 July 1954, at the meeting of the ‘enlarged’ LCY CC Executive Committee.34 Tito opened the meeting by warning those present to keep the contents of the meeting secret. After reading Khrushchev’s letter and the response he had drafted, Tito asked members of the Executive Committee to decide on two questions. First, whether to accept the Soviet initiative and respond to the letter and, second, what impact could this have on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, in particular with the US? With regard to the first question, he set the tone by reminding colleagues that, when Stalin died, we expected changes [in the USSR] . . . we wanted normalization with the USSR and relations have started to improve. . . . This letter is a huge event and requires long and serious consideration . . . I believe that doubts that this letter might be a manoeuvre are unfounded. Tito emphasized that Khrushchev’s letter surpassed bilateral Yugoslav–Soviet relations and was of wider implications for the international Communist movement. According to him, the letter showed that ‘[although the Soviets] will probably not relinquish their foreign policy aspirations, [they] will have to change their approach towards [other] Communist parties. This will give strength to other parties to think independently and work freely’.35 Kardelj added that Khrushchev’s letter represented the strongest [Soviet] confrontation with Stalinism so far. . . . Within the Cominform parties, new liveliness will arise and free discussions will begin. The silenced elements within them that have secretly sympathized with us will become more active. We have to react positively to [the letter] and provide [those silenced elements] with support. Veljko Mićunović stressed that ‘the [Yugoslav response] is important for the cause of Marxism and socialism and would be welcomed by all progressive forces in the world’.36 Members of the Yugoslav party Executive Committee agreed that Khrushchev’s initiative heralded a profound change in the Soviet political philosophy. They also saw the letter as an acknowledgement of Yugoslavia’s victory in the ideological conflict with Stalin. Many participants euphorically emphasized that the letter was a defeat of the Soviet Union. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo proclaimed that it represented ‘a capitulation of the CPSU before Yugoslavia’.37 Yugoslav leaders now felt justified in regarding themselves as the ideological authority within the Communist movement and regarded in the letter recognition of their version of Marxism–Leninism. They also felt confident that Khrushchev’s initiative would have a profound positive impact on relations between the Communist parties and on relations between the USSR and its satellites because it tacitly recognized the principle of equality between the Communist parties. This, however, as the participants of the Plenum professed, placed a burden of

Normalization   73 responsibility on their shoulders and an obligation to respond positively to Khrushchev’s letter. By doing so, they would support anti-­Stalinist forces, not only among other Communist parties but within the Soviet Party itself. Tito admitted as much when he said that ‘latent socialist forces do exist in the USSR. This process is starting and [Yugoslavia] should have a role in that process’. A jubilant atmosphere and a feeling of self-­importance, ideological righteousness and of an obligation to act as a role model for the rest of the Communist world dominated the 19 July meeting of the Yugoslav Executive Committee. Tito also set the tone of the discussion regarding the second question he had asked the meeting of the Executive Committee to address – the impact that a positive response to Khrushchev’s initiative might have on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, in particular the US. He unleashed a scathing attack on the West for its current attitude towards Yugoslavia declaring that, In the West, they think that we have irrevocably broken-­up with the USSR and that as a result we have nowhere to go. For this reason they believe that they can hold us to ransom . . . [The West] wishes to make us their satellite and thinks that we cannot be independent any more. They exert pressure on us . . . and constantly nurture the idea that we are threatened by the Soviet Union. . . . They keep postponing the signing of the Balkan Pact because, through the Pact, they wish to tie us to NATO. They create obstacles over Trieste as well. In one word, the policy of the Western powers, first and foremost that of the United States, towards Yugoslavia is neither sincere nor honest.38 Tito’s anger was, on the one hand, provoked by an impasse that befell negotiations over Trieste and by the delay in the signing of the Balkan Pact, which will be addressed in more detail later. On the other hand, the rant was calculated, to help overcome anxieties that some of his aides may have had towards normalization with the Soviets in light of Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western economic and military assistance. Indeed, some of those present at the meeting voiced their apprehension that normalization with the Soviets might seriously damage relations with the West. Concerns were raised with regard to disastrous consequences Yugoslavia could face should the US aid and assistance be cancelled, or even delayed or disrupted. General Ivan Gošnjak, the Defence Minister, stressed Yugoslavia’s dependence on American military aid. Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, in charge of the economy, reminded those present of Yugoslavia’s dire economic situation. He particularly stressed Yugoslavia’s chronic wheat deficit, which only the US was able to supplement on a regular basis. He asked ‘for serious consideration of these circumstances’. Tito, however, acted decisively to dispel concerns, insisting that ‘[Yugoslavia] would not be receiving aid from the West for much longer anyway. [The West] is becoming more aggressive, they ask for concessions. But I do not believe that they will cancel the aid’. Koča Popović supported Tito’s assessment and stated that,

74   Normalization it is a question whether and for how long would we continue to receive aid [from the US] and, at the same time, be able to maintain our independence. It is becoming increasingly difficult to manoeuvre . . . [I believe, however, that] the Americans would not risk making an enemy out of us. Kardelj also expressed conviction that the US would not cancel aid to Yugoslavia. To allay remaining misgivings, Tito used the incontrovertible argument – Yugoslavia’s independence. He emphasized that, it may happen that the West cancels aid under the pressure of reactionary propaganda. A problem then arises how and where to replace it? Are we still ready even under those circumstances to pursue the normalization of relations? I believe that we are, because the other option spells capitulation to the US. . . . Should we wish to pursue policies of principle, we must be prepared to sacrifice something. As expected and speaking for all present, Vukmanović-Tempo demanded that Yugoslavia maintain its independent foreign policy regardless of the cost.39 Discussions at the 19 July meeting of the Executive Committee confirm that the Yugoslavia’s leadership was fully aware of the possible adverse consequences that normalization with the USSR might have on its relations with the West. Nevertheless, these considerations did not impede its decision to respond favourably to Khrushchev’s initiative. The discussions also confirm that Tito and his aides saw in the normalization with the USSR an opportunity to reduce dependence on the US and to manoeuvre themselves into a position of equidistance from either Bloc. At the end of the meeting, the Yugoslav Party Executive Committee unanimously voted to respond positively to Khrushchev’s letter of 22 June. In his closing statement, Tito insisted that the Yugoslav letter to Khrushchev should not be sent before the Balkan Pact had been signed and the Trieste negotiations successfully concluded. According to him, this would ensure that in the event that Moscow’s initiative was, after all, a ploy and the Kremlin chose to publish the Yugoslav response, it would not jeopardize the positive outcome of negotiations that were of vital importance to Yugoslavia. At the same time, Tito was of the opinion that the Soviets should not be left for too long without some sort of acknowledgement. He recommended that the Soviet leadership be informed orally through diplomatic channels that the Yugoslav leadership intended to send a full reply in due course. Tito also asked for all anti-­Soviet propaganda to be immediately cleansed of abusive and insulting content. He nevertheless voiced a suspicion that the Soviets might still, at some point, choose to publish the correspondence and added that, ‘the wording of [the Yugoslav response] should be such that all progressive forces in the world would support it’. The Committee also voted for Tito, Kardelj and Ranković to formulate the Yugoslav response to the Soviets based on his initial draft.40 Despite the rhetoric and bravado, rational and sober assessment of Yugoslav foreign policy considerations prevailed at the 19 July meeting. Tito and the

Normalization   75 Yugoslav leadership were well aware that a sudden and substantial improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations could raise suspicions in the West, in particular in the US. The Americans were crucial for the resolution of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities, which Tito and his aides were desperately trying to resolve during the previous year and half, following General Handy’s visit to Belgrade in November 1952. In July of 1954, Yugoslavia was engaged in the final and most sensitive stage of negotiations, on one side with the US and Western powers over the Trieste settlement, and on the other side, with Greece, Turkey and the US behind the scenes, on the creation of the Balkan Pact. In addition, the third drought since 1950 made Yugoslavia vitally dependent on the urgent and substantial food aid from the US. On either of these issues Tito and his associates could ill afford to antagonize the US. However, as his irritation voiced during the 19 July meeting revealed, the resolution of each of these priorities, at the time, had stalled, forcing him to delay the response to Khrushchev. The first of these priorities, the settlement of the Trieste question had by mid-­ July suddenly fallen into an impasse, despite the earlier successful conclusion of the tripartite negotiations. On 31 May 1954, after four months of secret negotiations in London, Yugoslavia, the US and Britain initialled the ‘Agreed Record of Positions Reached’. The Agreement was based on the territorial settlement. Yugoslavia accepted the division of the Free Territory of Trieste along the existing zonal lines. Italy was to get Zone A with the city of Trieste, currently under joint British and American administration, and Yugoslavia would get Zone B, which it already occupied. According to John Foster Dulles, the only changes to the situation that existed on the ground amounted to ‘minor rectifications of the boundary’. In compensation for relinquishing the claim to the city of Trieste itself, Yugoslavia was promised additional aid for the financial year 1954 of US$20 million from the US and US$5.6 million from the British to build and expand the port on its side of the border, Koper. The US was also to grant the Italians a similar amount of aid to assist them in reaching a financial settlement with Yugoslavia regarding war reparations, another contested issue.41 Yugoslavia made last minute territorial concessions in response to a commitment stipulated in the ‘Agreed Record of Positions Reached’ that, once Italy and Yugoslavia had signed the final agreement, the US and Britain would issue a public statement ‘of their non-­support to further territorial claims by either side’.42 As was shown earlier, during his talks with Churchill and Eden in March 1953 Tito was ready to accept the existing zonal division, provided Western powers’ guarantees that Italy would renounce further territorial demands. After the agreement was reached on 31 May, in accordance with the previous understanding, Italian representatives joined tripartite negotiators on 1 June for the final phase of negotiations. Contrary to what the Yugoslavs were earlier assured of by the US and the British, the Italians did not recognize the ‘Agreed Record’ as a fait accompli. Their delegation arrived in London in early July with a number of amendments to the 31 May agreement and with additional territorial demands. The Italian government practically blackmailed the US to support these demands. It conditioned its ratification of the EDC agreement and the

76   Normalization signing of the Military Facilities Agreement on NATO and US bases in Italy with a ‘favourable’ settlement of the Trieste question.43 Although resentful of Italian shenanigans, the US, nevertheless, agreed to lean on the Yugoslavs to accept Rome’s territorial demands.44 The Yugoslavs, understandably, were infuriated and regarded the US volte face as a betrayal of the 31 May agreement.45 The second Yugoslav foreign policy priority, which had provoked Tito’s irate outburst against the West at the 19 July meeting and prompted delay in replying to Khrushchev was sudden postponement of the signing of the Balkan Pact. After Tito’s trip to Greece, in early June, the signing of the Balkan Pact seemed a foregone conclusion. In a joint communiqué at the end of the visit, he and the Greek President, General Papagos, reaffirmed their commitment to the earliest signing of the Balkan Pact.46 The meeting of experts of the three Balkan countries, held in Athens between 28 June and 5 July, was expected to draft the final Balkan Pact agreement. This was to be followed by a Conference of Foreign Ministers and the formal signing of the Pact in Yugoslavia in mid-­July.47 During the meeting in Athens, however, Turkey and Greece unexpectedly raised serious objections to the draft prepared by Yugoslavia and the whole process suddenly stalled.48 The Yugoslavs became aware that Turkish and Greek obstruction was a result of strong US pressure. Washington had objected to an early accord on the Balkan Pact Agreement for several reasons. First, it insisted that the signing of the Pact should coincide with real progress in the Trieste negotiations.49 Second, the US strongly opposed the lack of ‘symmetry’ between Articles II and VII of the draft Pact Agreement submitted by the Yugoslavs in Athens. Article II stipulated automatic response of the signatories in case of an attack on any member of the Pact. At the same time, Article VII did not require Yugoslavia’s automatic response in case of Greek and Turkish involvement in a conflict under their NATO obligations.50 The Yugoslav draft clearly envisioned an extension of NATO commitments to Yugoslavia without its reciprocal obligations towards NATO. This, of course, had been the Yugoslav goal and the rationale behind its push for the creation of the military alliance with Greece and Turkey from the very beginning. Lastly, Washington rejected the notion that any agreement could be reached without prior US approval.51 To secure the desired outcome, the US became openly involved in the proceedings of the Athens meeting through its Ambassadors in Belgrade, Athens and Ankara.52 As a result, the Athens meeting adjourned on 5 July without consent on the final draft of the Balkan Pact Agreement.53 The three governments were forced to issue a humiliating joint statement on 15 July which admitted that the meeting of Foreign Ministers, scheduled for 17 July, was postponed indefinitely pending the ‘completion of necessary preparations’.54 The disaster of the Athens meeting and open interference from Washington prompted Tito to irately declare at the meeting of the Executive Committee that ‘the postponement of the signing of the Pact is the work of the US, maybe in collusion with the UK. . . . The Italians believe that if the Balkan Pact was to be signed before the settlement of the Trieste question, Yugoslavia would be in a better position and would not compromise’.55 Tito and his associates were convinced that the US was using its consent to the signing of the Balkan Pact as leverage to extract Belgrade’s concessions over Trieste.

Normalization   77 Yugoslavia’s dire economic situation in the summer of 1954 was an additional factor that prompted Tito and his associates to delay their reply to Khrushchev. Yugoslavia was suffering its third consecutive catastrophic drought. In July, Yugoslavia’s wheat reserves were insufficient to cover a month of the country’s needs. Of the approximately 2.7 million tons of wheat that Yugoslavia consumed yearly, the 1954 yield was estimated at only 1.6 million tons.56 Alternative supplies of wheat from Turkey or Canada were inaccessible to Yugoslavia either due to their own reduced crop yield or to Yugoslavia’s inability to finance purchases. To avert food shortages, even famine, Yugoslavia was thus completely dependent on US assistance.57 The urgency of the situation prompted Tito, on the eve of the Executive Committee meeting, to authorize Tempo to seek US emergency aid.58 On 5 July, Tempo met the US Ambassador and informed him of Yugoslavia’s urgent requirement for 700,000 tons of wheat.59 The second predicament that exacerbated Yugoslavia’s economic situation was its debt burden, which, by the summer of 1954, amounted to US$400 million. The structure of the debt further aggravated the problem. Short and mid-­ term loans with high interest rates constituted more than 60% of Yugoslavia’s overall debt. Servicing interest payments alone constituted 20% of the total Yugoslav debt.60 At the Executive Committee meeting of 19 July, VukmanovićTempo disclosed that 50% of the country’s export earnings were being used for debt repayment.61 A considerable number of the short-­term loans with the highest interest rates were the result of emergency purchases of wheat from Turkey and Canada after the previous drought of 1952. Most of the high interest loans, however, were taken from countries like Belgium and Sweden in the first months after the USSR and the satellites had imposed the economic blockade on Yugoslavia in 1948. In the beginning of July 1954, Yugoslavia was forced to default a repayment of a £5 million UK loan.62 During the 5 July meeting with the US Ambassador, Tempo officially asked Washington to support Yugoslavia’s request for the reprogramming of its debts at the forthcoming conference of creditors. Tempo also appealed to the US to exert influence on the International Monetary Fund to convert Yugoslavia’s existing debt from mid-­term to long-­ term loans.63 The Soviet secret initiative for the true normalization of relations was not only a complete surprise for Belgrade but came at the most inopportune moment for Tito’s regime, raising suspicions within Tito’s innermost circle. Not only was Belgrade embroiled in the most sensitive phase of negotiations for the resolution of its long-­standing foreign policy priorities, the creation of the Balkan Pact and the Trieste settlement, but was in a disastrous economic situation. The resolution of all these issues was possible only with US assistance. Aware of the advantages the Soviet initiative was offering, Tito was equally determined not to forego a perhaps unique opportunity, if genuine, to improve relations with Moscow and reduce the threat on Yugoslavia’s borders. Tito and his aides thus turned to some delicate manoeuvring in order to reconcile existing foreign policy priorities and economic predicaments with a strategic possibility that had suddenly and unexpectedly presented itself.

78   Normalization

Continuation of Tito–Khrushchev correspondence On 21 July, during a diplomatic reception in Belgrade, on the occasion of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selasie’s visit, Kardelj passed to the Soviet Ambassador Volkov an oral message for the Soviet leadership. He advised Volkov that the Yugoslav leadership received Khrushchev’s letter with interest but was forced to delay the response for the time being due to matters outside its control. Kardelj explained that they were concerned that an accidental indiscretion revealing the Yugoslav–Soviet correspondence could jeopardize ongoing sensitive negotiations with the Western powers on the Trieste settlement, a question of the utmost importance to Yugoslavia.64 On 24 July, Moscow promptly responded with a short telegram expressing satisfaction with the positive reaction from Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership also acknowledged the importance of the Trieste settlement for Yugoslavia and underlined their readiness to wait for the Yugoslav response.65 The speed of the Soviet response revealed the Kremlin’s relief that the signal from Belgrade was positive. Furthermore, the expressed Soviet understanding for Yugoslav foreign policy considerations and readiness to wait for a full response was evidence of Soviet eagerness to appease Yugoslavia and encourage Belgrade to enter into a dialogue with Moscow. Tito’s reply to Khrushchev’s first letter was sent on 11 August 1954.66 It was a measured response that left the door open for the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization but under conditions acceptable to the Yugoslavs. It was worded very carefully in order to allay lingering Yugoslav suspicion that the Soviets might make the correspondence public. In the opening sentence, Tito concurred with Khrushchev’s statement that the existing state of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR was harmful to both countries. This represented a declaration of Belgrade’s readiness to work with Moscow to improve their relations. Tito emphasized, however, that the slow pace of normalization so far ‘demonstrates the need for serious efforts . . . to remove negative elements that have accumulated since 1948, which continue to aggravate our relations’.67 This was a clear signal to the Soviet leadership that brushing aside everything that had happened since 1948 was not an acceptable basis for normalization. Tito further insisted that improvement of bilateral relations must also lead to the termination of Yugoslavia’s isolation in the international Communist movement. He chose to address issues raised in Khrushchev’s letter point by point. In doing so, Tito was highlighting the fact that it was the Soviets and not the Yugoslavs who had initiated the contact in the first place. Having established at the very beginning that Yugoslavia was the one being courted, Tito went on to spell out his conditions for the normalization of relations. He stressed that, ‘it would be unrealistic to think that a quick and short process is possible for the creation of the necessary trust between [the Soviet and Yugoslav] governments’.68 Tito stated openly that the Yugoslavs had become mistrustful of Soviet intentions. In order to commit to full normalization, they would need to be convinced of Moscow’s sincerity. Next, he insisted that ‘normalization and improvement of [Yugoslav–Soviet] relations must be . . . in

Normalization   79 accordance with our policy of international cooperation and must not jeopardize [Yugoslavia’s] position in the world’.69 The Yugoslav leader wanted to make it absolutely clear to the Soviets that they should not entertain hopes of changing Yugoslavia’s international position, in particular its relationship with the West. In continuation, Tito re-­emphasized the pledge stated in Khrushchev’s letter that Yugoslav–Soviet relations must be based on the ‘principle of non-interference into affairs of other countries’. This was important, according to Tito, because improved relations between the two countries must never again ‘create new internal strife, whether political or economic’.70 He was alluding to the economic blockade and subversive actions Moscow embarked upon after the 1948 break up, as well as the Cominform resolutions of June 1948 and November 1949, which almost ripped apart the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito then reasserted Yugoslavia’s independence and declared that ‘[Yugoslavs] are resolute in preserving [their own] principles of a socialist country, in [their] internal development as well as in [their] foreign policy, in particular in . . . the defence of [Yugoslavia’s] independence’.71 He further underlined this point by insisting that the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization must not be conditioned by ‘an unrealistic expectation of uniformity of views’.72 This was a crucial statement. Tito re-­ affirmed Yugoslavia’s determination to resist Soviet hegemony and defined the ideological sine qua non of future Yugoslav–Soviet relations – Moscow’s recognition of independent roads to socialism. In the closing paragraphs of his response, the Yugoslav leader addressed two questions that figured prominently in Khrushchev’s letter – the question of responsibility for the 1948 break up and the question of the re-­establishment of relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet Parties. With regard to the onus of responsibility for 1948, Tito stated that he would prefer not to discuss this in the first exchange of letters. He clearly wished to avoid the debate and possible confrontation this early in their correspondence; it could endanger the process of normalization before it had even got off the ground. Tito, however, remarked that ‘an individual, for example Djilas, was not the cause of this conflict. . . . We consider other reasons to be behind the conflict and the break up of 1948. The Fifth [1948] and later the Sixth [1952] Congresses of our Party have stipulated them. As with regard to the extent of Beria’s guilt, you know best his role in the whole affair and we have no reason to doubt your assertions’.73 Tito wanted the Soviets to understand that his current reluctance to debate the question of responsibility did not mean that the Yugoslavs would accept shared responsibility for 1948 or that the whole issue could be swept under the carpet. Without being explicit, he referred in his letter to the Fifth and the Sixth Congresses of the Yugoslav Party. Resolutions of these Congresses named Stalin as the main culprit of the 1948 conflict. Tito was also reminding present Soviet leaders that they were all members of Stalin’s innermost circle – as Beria had been – and have played a role in the events of 1948. With regard to the re-­establishment of party relations, Tito stated that ‘in principle we are not against. . . . However, before some progress in normalization of government relations is achieved, the meeting you are suggesting [between representatives of the two Parties] would not prove effective’.74 This statement confirmed

80   Normalization Yugoslav position that the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations was to be restricted to improvement of state relations only. Party contacts could be re-­ established only after a substantial progress in relations between the two Governments and once the trust between the two leaderships had been fully restored. Tito was alert to the fact that a meeting of the Yugoslav and the Soviet Party leaders, before government relations had acquired a level of normality, would suggest to the world that the Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation was just an ideological quarrel, a family affair. Belgrade wanted the 1948 break up to be understood for what it was – Yugoslavia’s resistance to Soviet hegemony. Tito’s reply to Khrushchev was sent on 11 August, two days after the Balkan Pact was signed. A few weeks earlier, the Yugoslav compromise proposal, which reduced the automaticity of NATO engagement in case of an attack on a signatory of the Balkan Pact, paved the way for Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to agree on the final draft of the Balkan Pact Charter. The Agreement then received the final seal of approval at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on 29 July.75 The Balkan Pact was formally signed on 9 August 1954 in Bled, Yugoslavia.76 It is likely that the prospect of normalization with Moscow, and the reduction of the Soviet threat, had created enough of a momentum to allow Tito to settle for diminished NATO guarantees. Aware that contacts with the Soviets could not go unnoticed for too long, the Yugoslav President did his utmost to preclude Western suspicions of a Yugoslav–Soviet settlement behind their backs. On 12 August, only a day after the Yugoslav response was sent to the Kremlin, Koča Popović summoned the British, US, Greek and Turkish Ambassadors to inform them that the Soviets had proposed normalization of relations and that Belgrade had decided to accept it. Popović underlined to the Ambassadors that Tito had made it clear to the Soviets that normalization must not interfere with the existing excellent relations between Yugoslavia and the West.77 It is interesting, however, that contrary to the conclusions of the Executive Committee meeting Tito had rushed his response to Khrushchev before the resolution of the Trieste question. There may be several explanations. On the one hand, Tito and his associates could have been eager to exploit the momentum created by the successful conclusion of the Balkan Pact; it provided them with leverage vis-­àvis the Soviets. On the other hand, Tito might have calculated that news of Soviet approaches could prompt the US to lean on the Italians to abandon further demands for territorial concessions from the Yugoslavs. Positive conclusion of the Trieste issue, at that point, still looked a distant prospect. Of the greatest relevance, however, could have been that Tito and the Yugoslav leadership had become worried that further delay in their reply to Khrushchev’s letter could weaken the position of those in the Soviet leadership who supported normalization with Yugoslavia and thus jeopardize the initiative.78 The Soviet leadership replied to Tito on 23 September 1954, again in a letter signed by Khrushchev.79 The third Soviet letter accepted Tito’s assertion that there was a ‘necessity for . . . practical elimination of negative occurrences that obstruct rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR’.80 To assuage

Normalization   81 Yugoslav misgivings about the Soviet initiative, Khrushchev addressed the issue he assumed Tito was sensitive about and declared that, in the interest of the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, [the Soviet leadership] had explicitly confronted the Association of Yugoslav Patriots with the question of the appropriateness of the continuation of their activity . . . [The Soviet leadership] is taking measures to ensure the needed clarification of questions related to Yugoslavia in the Soviet press, journals, and books . . . [The Soviet leadership] wishes to know what further practical measures, you consider, need to be undertaken in the immediate future, on both sides, for the purpose of contributing toward the establishment of mutual understanding and genuine cooperation between our countries.81 The above remarkable statement revealed that the Soviets were determined to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs and were ready to back it with concrete gestures. The Soviet leadership had shut down the Association of Yugoslav Patriots, a Moscow-­created organization of anti-­Titoist Yugoslav émigrés who supported the Cominform Resolution against Tito in 1948. It was run by the KGB and supervized, on behalf of the CPSU CC, by Mikhail Suslov. These ‘true Yugoslav patriots and Communists’, as official Moscow used to call them, were instrumental to the Soviet propaganda campaign and had participated in covert operations against Yugoslavia. In the letter, Khrushchev also promised to ‘clean up [Soviet] publications’ and to bring to an end anti-­Yugoslav propaganda. Moreover, the Soviet leadership invited the Yugoslavs to name further measures they would perceive as tokens of the genuine Soviet commitment to improvement of relations between the two countries. Concessions of this kind and without request for reciprocity were unmistakably aimed at providing ultimate assurances to Tito and to encourage him to accept accelerated improvement of relations. Apart from one mention, Khrushchev’s third letter was devoid of insistence on Marxist–Leninist proletarian unity, customary in communications between the socialist states at the time. Instead, the Soviet leadership specifically declared its tolerance towards ‘issues of internal development’ and its commitment to ‘equality and non-­interference in affairs of others . . . and to the cooperation between countries with different political systems’.82 Moscow had thus accepted the postulate of equality in relations with Yugoslavia, set out as a precondition in Tito’s letter of 11 August. Perhaps for the first time in the post-­ Lenin history of relations between Communist parties and socialist states, the leadership of the Soviet Party acknowledged, albeit still tacitly, the existence of different roads to socialism. At the same time, in the letter of 23 September, the Soviet leadership continued to insist that normalization must include renewal of relations between the two Communist parties. Its relevance for the Soviets was manifested in the fact that the secret correspondence was carried out as an exchange of letters between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committees. Despite his

82   Normalization insistence that the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization should be limited to state relations, this detail had escaped Tito. By continuing to communicate with the Soviet Central Committee on behalf of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Tito had, in a way, renewed party links. Inadvertently, he had also admitted the primacy of the ideological aspect of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. In this third letter, Khrushchev further stressed that the cooperation of [the Yugoslav and the Soviet] parties, based on the principles of Marxism–Leninism, is vital not only in the interest of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia but in the interest of the consolidation of the international workers’ movement and for the unification of all forces fighting for the victory of socialism.83 This statement revealed motives behind the Soviet insistence on re-­establishment of relations between the LCY and the CPSU. Further to the initial goal to deny Yugoslavia to the West, the Soviets were now looking at the normalization with Yugoslavia as a tool to reinforce the cohesion of their Bloc. An immediate re-­ establishment of party relations during the first stages of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization would indicate to other Communist parties that the Yugoslavs had recognized their erroneous ways in 1948 and have again reconciled themselves with the Soviet leadership. The heresy of 1948 would thus be declared annulled and the global Communist movement would again be governed by a single dogma, the one defined in the Kremlin. The post-­Stalin leadership in the Kremlin must have hoped that re-­ established uniformity of thought within the international proletarian movement would inevitably cement the cohesion of the Bloc behind the Soviet Union and, more importantly, reaffirm their own authority and legitimacy. On 27 September, only three days after their latest communication, Moscow sent a new letter to Tito.84 It was short, and informed Tito and the Yugoslav leadership that, an inappropriate formulation . . . aimed against the leadership of Yugoslavia . . . which is contrary to directives from the CPSU CC . . . [appeared] in the book ‘Historical Materialism’ . . . in June 1954. . . . The CPSU CC has discussed the question of this gross error . . . and has made an appropriate decision to punish harshly those responsible for the violation of directives of the CPSU CC on the character of material on Yugoslavia that is published in the USSR.85 The transcript of the corresponding decision of the Presidium of the CPSU CC was attached with the letter.86 The publication date of the book in question, months before Khrushchev’s first secret letter was sent to Tito, reveals that the editors had, in fact, followed what was, at the time, the official Party line. It was obvious that the unfortunate editors of ‘Historical Materialism’ have been sacrificed so that a point could be made. This latest letter reflected Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership’s desire to dispel Tito’s suspicions and was meant to offer

Normalization   83 proof of the sincerity of their initiative, something the Yugoslav leadership had insisted on. In his first letter of August 11 but perhaps more in his public speech at a rally in Ostrožno, Slovenia, on 16 September, Tito underlined that only concrete ‘deeds’ would confirm veracity of Soviet intentions.87 Khrushchev’s fourth letter of September 27 was also intended to demonstrate the Soviet leadership’s determination to follow up on the pledge given earlier of ensuring ‘clarification of questions related to Yugoslavia in the Soviet press, journals and books’.88 Kremlin leaders hoped that their offering of a truce in the propaganda war and their harsh and rapid dealing with the ‘transgressions’ would convince Tito, once and for all, of the sincerity of their initiative. It is impossible to understand the nuances of the Tito–Khrushchev secret correspondence in 1954 without understanding the language used. Linguistic complexities, so common in the Tito–Khrushchev correspondence, reveal the atmosphere, motivations and true meanings behind the written words. The correspondence is remarkable for the extreme care shown by both sides in the use of ideologically ‘correct’ formulations. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that ideology, which enshrouded the conflict between the two sides from the outset, was now dictating the form of their communication. Both leaders had politically matured within Stalin’s paradigm, which meant that any departure from ‘politically correct’ communist terminology used to promulgate the ‘universal’ truths could be used to support of the betrayal of the ‘cause’. On the other hand, the care in the choice of words and terms used revealed the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaderships’ distrust of each other and fear that the other side might publish the correspondence. The prospect of the whole international Communist movement scrutinizing the correspondence made them extremely careful in their use of ideologically correct language. The letters were thus written with the intention of appealing to the global Communist audience. Tito confirmed later that ‘when writing these letters we did not write them only for the Soviet Union but for the whole world. . . . We wrote these letters for the progressive public of the world and wrote them in such manner as to be able to publish them if necessary’.89 The Tito–Khrushchev correspondence was also striking for the complexity of the language used. Sometimes, indirect speech and complex syntax served to conceal true meaning or motives. At other times, the multi-­faceted syntax helped to gloss over existing disagreements. Both Tito and Khrushchev were well aware of the huge differences and mistrust that still prevailed between them. To their credit, it was evident that they were both determined to reach the basic common understanding necessary for the re-­establishment of proper communication. For this reason, they did their best, as far as possible, to avoid confrontational language. The complex language also served to evade the admission of initiating the normalization. To Communists around the world, such an initiative would equal to the admission of responsibility for the 1948 break up, something the post-­Stalin leadership, desperate to re-­assert its authority in the global Communist movement could ill afford. An admission of responsibility for 1948 was equally unacceptable for Tito, who wanted to be readmitted to the international communist movement, on his own terms, and not to the Soviet Bloc.

84   Normalization While the Tito–Khrushchev secret correspondence was taking place, Yugoslavia’s relations with the West improved significantly after the mid-­July crisis. By the end of September, the biggest stumbling block in these relations, the Trieste question, was on the way to being resolved. Ironically, it was not the signing of the Balkan Pact on 9 August but the debacle of the European Defence Community (EDC) that brought about the resolution of the Trieste problem. On 30 August, the French Parliament had rejected the EDC, effectively killing off the whole idea. As a result, the newly signed Balkan Pact acquired increased significance for the Western European defence and Yugoslavia’s strategic role received renewed and immediate recognition. The consolidation of the Southeast European flank became an urgent imperative for the Western Alliance and the linkage between Turkey and Greece with Italy was the crucial part of it. The main obs­ tacle, of course, remained the Yugoslav-­Italian confrontation over Trieste. At the end of August, the Trieste negotiations in London were bogged down in minor territorial disputes over which neither Italy nor Yugoslavia wished to compromise. In the beginning of September, President Eisenhower demanded from the State Department that something be done ‘soon [with regard to Trieste], if for no other reason than to provide some counterbalance for the EDC flop’.90 Robert D. Murphy, the Deputy Under-­Secretary of State, was dispatched, as President Eisenhower’s personal envoy to Belgrade and Rome. Murphy was chosen because of his acquaintance with Tito, which dated back to the war years. He first met Tito in Naples in July 1944 and then on several occasions on the Yugoslav island of Vis where Tito resided between May and October 1944. The State Department had hoped that Murphy would appeal to Tito’s well-­known ability to communicate easily with fellow war veterans. The Americans also calculated that Eisenhower’s personal involvement, in recognition of Tito’s status as a world statesman, would appeal to the Yugoslav leader’s vanity. To this end, Murphy brought with him Eisenhower’s personal letter. In his message, the US President stressed the importance of the Trieste settlement for the US and wider global considerations, and appealed to Tito’s statesmanship to help with the resolution of the problem. In one sentence at the very end of the letter, phrased in a manner that would not suggest a ‘trade-­off ’, Eisenhower underlined that he was well aware of the economic hardships facing Yugoslavia and that he had instructed Murphy to discuss these problems with Tito ‘in a spirit of sympathy’.91 With the above considerations addressed, the US Administration hoped that Murphy’s visit would facilitate Tito’s willingness to compromise over Trieste.92 Indeed, Murphy’s shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Rome, between 15 and 28 September 1954, broke the deadlock. The breakthrough that would eventually lead to the agreement came after Murphy’s four-­hour long meeting with Tito on 17 September. In the leisurely atmosphere of his summer residence on the island of Brioni, after reading Eisenhower’s letter and reminiscing with Murphy about the war years, Tito agreed to a crucial territorial concession.93 During the next ten days, Murphy successfully pressed the Italians to accept Tito’s compromise. The last minute adjustments were then finalized during Dulles’ stay in London between 28 September and 3 October. On 5 October 1954, a Memoran-

Normalization   85 dum of Understanding on Trieste was initialled by the representatives of the US, UK, Italy and Yugoslavia, signalling the end to the decades-­long Trieste dispute.94 The Western powers’ agreement to guarantee the permanence of the final settlement along zonal lines was crucial for Tito to accept the deal. Announcing the Memorandum of Understanding on Trieste on 5 October 1954, the US Government issued a formal statement in which it undertook an obligation to ‘give no support to claims of either Yugoslavia or Italy to territory under the sovereignty or administration of the other’.95 For the West, the Trieste settlement meant the long-­awaited consolidation of the important south-­eastern flank of European defence. Furthermore, it was a welcome consolation for the EDC debacle. For Yugoslavia, the resolution of the Trieste issue had finally relieved its leadership of a burden that had often and for too long impaired its foreign policy manoeuvrability. Coupled with the increasing prospect of improved relations with the Soviets, the enhanced manoeuvrability offered Yugoslav leaders an opportunity to pursue equidistance from either Bloc. From the beginning of September, perhaps not as unrelated to Washington’s decision to settle the Trieste question, Moscow intensified its ‘normalization offensive’ towards Yugoslavia. The Soviets were certainly eager to counter the Yugoslav-­West rapprochement that followed the signing of the Balkan Pact. In an attempt to woo Tito, Soviet leadership had decided to respond to his demands for ‘concrete deeds’ that would demonstrate Moscow’s commitment to the improvement of relations. It was not by chance that the first of Soviet ‘concrete’ proposals addressed the re-­establishment of Yugoslav–Soviet trade relations. The Soviets were certainly well informed of the severity of Yugoslavia’s economic problems and have probably calculated that Tito would not hesitate to accept a gesture of this kind. The Yugoslav–Soviet trade negotiations, conducted in Belgrade during September were successfully concluded on 1 October. The result was the first commercial agreement between the two countries since 1948, worth US$4 million. Both sides also agreed to start a new round of negotiations in December, in Moscow, with the aim of increasing the volume of trade in 1955 to at least US$25 million.96 On 22 September, in an unprecedented gesture, Pravda published excerpts of Tito’s Ostrožno speech of 16 September in an article entitled ‘A Speech by the Yugoslav President Tito’. It was the first time since 1948 that the Soviet press had addressed Tito as President and had published excerpts of his speech.97 On 7 October, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, D. Vidić reported that ‘Free Yugoslavia’, a Moscow based, anti-­Titoist émigré radio station had been taken off air. He further confirmed that the Soviet authorities have stopped jamming Radio-­Belgrade’s Russian language broadcasts.98 Moreover, by the end of September, anti-­Yugoslav propaganda in the USSR and in the satellites, except in Albania, was effectively terminated.99 Following the 22 September article in Pravda, the Soviet and the satellite press, apart from Albania, started publishing news of economic achievements in Yugoslavia. The official Soviet news agency, TASS, began circulating Yugoslav press commentaries on various international issues, choosing, of course, excerpts that coincided with Soviet views.

86   Normalization These actions also amounted to unprecedented improvements in Yugoslav– Soviet relations.100 In an article of 20 October, the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade from the Germans, a joint Yugoslav–Soviet military operation, Pravda wrote of the ‘comradeship in blood’ forged between the Soviet and Yugoslav peoples during the Second World War. It was the first time since 1948 that Moscow acknowledged the true contribution of the Yugoslav partisan armies in the war against the Nazis.101 The Kremlin’s further ‘concrete proof ’ of genuine intent to improve relations with Yugoslavia followed the signing of the Trieste Agreement. According to the Peace Treaty with Italy of 10 February 1947, the USSR, as a co-­signatory, should have been party to any negotiations on the amendments to the Treaty, including any change in the status of the Free Territory of Trieste. However, Moscow was neither invited to London talks nor otherwise consulted at any stage of the negotiations that took place over the period of nine months. Nevertheless, on 12 October, in response to the signing of the Trieste agreement in London, Moscow handed an official Note to the UN Security Council stating that since the Trieste agreement would contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Europe, the Soviet Government took ‘cognisance of the agreement’.102 Moscow obviously hoped that its supportive behaviour over an issue of great importance to Yugoslavia would be understood in Belgrade as yet another confirmation of the sincerity of Soviet intentions to improve relations. After a year of very limited real change, the re-­establishment of trade relations, termination of anti-­Yugoslav propaganda, the ban on the activities of Yugoslav émigrés, and positive recognition of Yugoslavia in the Soviet media were signs that Moscow was indeed eager to normalize relations with Belgrade. The gradual progress in Yugoslav–Soviet relations was followed by improvement of Yugoslavia’s relations with the People’s Democracies, albeit at a much slower pace and limited in scope.103 Between August and October 1954, a full year after Moscow’s Ambassador Volkov arrived in Belgrade, Yugoslavia exchanged Ambassadors and re-­established normal diplomatic relations with Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Albania. Following the successful conclusion of the Yugoslav–Soviet trade talks on 1 October, similar arrangements were signed with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Trade negotiations with Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria were scheduled to start before the end of that year.104 The anti-­Yugoslav propaganda in the East European media was significantly reduced and publications containing ‘unacceptable anti-­Yugoslav formulations’ were being removed from bookshops and libraries.105 Belgrade keenly observed behaviour of the ‘People’s Democracies’, knowing that Moscow exercized absolute control over their relations with Yugoslavia. On the one hand, nuances in satellites’ behaviour served the Yugoslavs as barometer of Soviet true intentions. A positive change in their attitude would confirm that Soviet declarations of intent represented a genuine strategic shift, not a tactical manoeuvre. On the other hand, Belgrade was vitally interested in eliminating the constant threat to its security. In the autumn of 1954, armed incidents were still a  daily occurrence on Yugoslavia’s borders with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. For this reason, Tito had insisted in his letter to Khrushchev on

Normalization   87 11  August that Yugoslav–Soviet normalization must include normalization of Yugoslav relations with the satellites.106 There is no evidence to suggest that during this period Tito and aides have managed or were overly enthusiastic to establish a closer contact with any of the leaderships in People’s Democracies. Neither was there enthusiasm among satellite leaders to improve relations with Tito. Almost all of them had either come to power or have consolidated their leadership by spearheading fabricated, Moscow-­orchestrated anti-­Titoist purges and organizing show trials between 1948 and 1953. Many popular national leaders, such as Władisław Gomułka in Poland or Janosz Kádár in Hungary were imprisoned and suffered humiliation, even torture. Others, such as Laszlo Rajk in Hungary, or Robert Slansky in Czechoslovakia were disgraced in show-­trials and executed. Tito regarded some of the satellite leaders, in particular the Hungarian, Matyas Rakosi, and the Albanian, Enver Hoxha, deplorable and could not bring himself to communicate with them after 1948.107 Tito’s next communication to Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership was dispatched on 16 November 1954, a full month and a half after Khrushchev’s last letter. It was partly a response to Khrushchev’s messages from 23 and 27 September and partly a reaction to two incidents that had occurred only days before the letter was sent to Moscow. The first of these was a speech by Maxim Saburov, a member of the Soviet Party Presidium, delivered on 6 November at the session of the Moscow City Soviet marking the 37th anniversary of the October Revolution. Saburov’s speech was sensational for the unprecedented attention it devoted to the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.108 The second incident was a conversation between the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Vidić, and Khrushchev the following day, during a formal reception in the Kremlin.109 At one point during the reception, Khrushchev invited the Yugoslav Ambassador to join the group of highest-­ranking Soviet officials, including himself, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Saburov. This was Vidić’s first encounter with Khrushchev. To the Yugoslav Ambassador’s huge surprise, Khrushchev immediately started berating the Yugoslav leadership for being indecisive with regard to normalization.110 As proof, he singled out Yugoslavia’s reluctance to agree to the re-­establishment of party relations. Khrushchev further accused the Yugoslavs for failing to respond to Soviet initiatives over recent months. The Soviet leader then contemptuously compared Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the normalization between the two countries to ‘horse trading’.111 Referring to the Balkan Pact, Khrushchev stressed that it was incongruous for a country which claimed to be building socialism to maintain close relations with the US. He than added in a derogatory manner that the Yugoslavs ‘would like to sit on two stools at the same time’, but would eventually have to choose sides.112 In his letter of 16 November, Tito singled out this particular accusation by responding that he wished to ‘assure [Khrushchev] that [the Yugoslavs] are determined to sit on one stool only – their own’.113 Tito’s letter of 16 November, however, was conciliatory in tone. It differed from his first letter in that it contained fewer pamphlet-­like declarations. This confirms that by this time Tito had become convinced that the Soviet initiative was genuine.

88   Normalization In order to keep the dialogue alive, he obviously found it important to communicate with the Soviets in a more receptive manner. Attributing Khrushchev’s outburst in front of Vidić to the Soviet leadership’s frustration with the delay in the Yugoslav response, Tito assured Khrushchev that the delay was not intentional but a result of ‘objective domestic considerations’.114 He also praised the latest Soviet steps towards normalization, in particular the termination of anti-­Yugoslav propaganda. The Yugoslav leader then addressed the issues to which Khrushchev kept returning – the normalization of party relations and the meeting between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders. Tito agreed that the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations had confirmed the success of their correspondence. He also agreed that the time had come ‘for the most significant questions that still stand as an obstacle between us to be clarified and cleared’. In this context, Tito allowed a possibility of a meeting between representatives of the Yugoslav and the Soviet Governments but not between the officials of the two Parties, as the Soviets insisted asserting that the renewal of Party contacts was still premature.115 To placate the Soviet frustration regarding Yugoslavia’s refusal to agree to the renewal of party relations, Tito explained that Belgrade was compelled to put off the renewal of party relations with the Soviet Union because of the negative impact it would have on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. He reminded that after the Soviets had imposed the economic blockade in 1948, Yugoslavia had survived largely thanks to Western economic aid and was still dependant on it. Tito skilfully took the opportunity, once again, to remind the Soviet leadership that the 1948 blockade inflicted huge damage to the Yugoslav economy. In conclusion, Tito proposed that a meeting of highest Government representatives of the two countries be arranged after his return from the forthcoming trips to India and Burma.116 The letter of 16 November revealed clearly that he was manoeuvring to avoid the renewal of Party contacts with the Soviets while, at the same time, doing his best to keep Moscow’s initiative for the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations alive. The Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC, held in Belgrade on 26 November 1954, addressed the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.117 The Central Committee of the Party was informed for the first time of the existence of the five-­ month long Tito–Khrushchev correspondence. As was the custom, Tito opened the proceedings at the Plenum. In his exposé, he singled out Khrushchev’s letter of 22 June 1954 as a cornerstone. Tito then pointed out that after his reply of 11 August Moscow had demonstrated that their initiative was genuine. The Yugoslav leader admitted that initially he and his closest aides had suspected that Khrushchev’s initiative was a ploy. This was also the reason, as he explained, for extended delays in his responses. Tito stressed that ‘we did not rush, we did not embrace them with both arms, we looked with caution at what they would do’.118 Only once the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that the correspondence indeed represented a genuine change of Soviet policy did they decide to acquaint members of the Central Committee with the exchange. Tito concluded his opening address at the plenum by declaring that both the Soviet initiative and the content of their letters represented an ideological victory for Yugoslavia ‘because it confirmed that what [the Soviets] were saying and have

Normalization   89 slandered us with [in 1948 and ever since] was untrue . . . they have admitted that we are building socialism in our own way’.119 After his introductory exposé on the chronology of the Soviet initiative, the exchanged letters were read out and members of the Central Committee were invited to comment. Tito’s closest associates, Kardelj, Ranković, Vukmanović-Tempo and Koča Popović dominated the discussion. In the end, Tito summarized the debate and proposed conclusions, which, as was always the case, were accepted unanimously. The Fifth Plenum supported the Yugoslav leadership’s reading of the Soviet initiative and defined the tactics for further normalization. Members of the Central Committee were also read Vidić’s report on his meeting with Khrushchev on 7 November. Tito stressed that the Khrushchev–Vidić conversation revealed that ‘[the Soviet leaders] do not think in precisely the same manner as they write in their letters. They believe that we should join their family, their “lager”, although we have made it clear that we would not go into a “lager”’.120 Veljko Mićunović added that it was obvious that the remnants of Stalinist thinking remained strong in the Kremlin. Their presence was not evident in the letters but had surfaced in Khrushchev’s conversation with Vidić.121 Mićunović also informed members of the Central Committee that the Yugoslav leadership had learned that the Soviet Presidium had sent a letter to the satellites informing them of the secret correspondence with the Yugoslavs.122 Kardelj suggested that it was obvious that the Soviet goal was to drive a wedge between Yugoslavia and the West. Nevertheless, as he pointed out, the exchange of letters was also a sign that a positive trend was emerging in the USSR. In this context, Kardelj warned against passing excessively harsh judgment against the members of the present Soviet leadership. He stressed that these people had lived under Stalin’s shadow and had been faced with the choice either to ‘serve that system or go to the gallows. They chose to serve that system. This does not mean that they accepted everything that happened in that system’.123 However, he cautioned that parallel to the positive tendencies appearing in the USSR, Stalinist forces opposing them were still strong. The best way Yugoslavia could contribute to the containment of these forces was by asserting its ‘good will and readiness to cooperate [with the USSR], while making it also clear to [the Soviet leadership] that we will refuse to accept uncritically the manifestations of the old thinking’.124 In conclusion, Kardelj, aided by Tito, defined the essence of Yugoslavia’s future tactics vis-­à-vis normalization with the Soviets: Kardelj: 

We must not bring ourselves into a position which would destroy what we have built in our relations with the West, because we would not be able to influence positively the course of the development of our relations with the Soviets tito:  . . . but would weaken our position... Kardelj:  . . . and give support to those hegemonic elements in the USSR who would say, ‘Yugoslavia is now separated from the West and we should now impose our conditions upon relations with it.’ On the contrary, we should force them . . .

90   Normalization tito:  . . . to be the other way around . . . Kardelj:  . . . force them to cooperate with

policies that we carry out today.125

us on equal terms, on the basis of the

Kardelj reiterated the decision taken at the Executive Committee on 19 July to respond positively to the Soviet initiative. At the same time, he reminded members of the Central Committee that Yugoslavia’s receptivity to the Soviets must never jeopardize its independent position. Concluding the discussions at the Plenum, Tito proposed guidelines for the next stages in the normalization with the USSR. He reminded members of the Central Committee that the 1948 rupture did not occur because of ideological disagreements between the Yugoslav and the Soviet Party but, because ‘[the Soviets] wanted to make us one of their satellites. They used the ideological aspect to exert pressure on us by appealing to our socialist consciousness in order to enslave us as a state’.126 For this reason, according to him, it was important for the Yugoslavs not to allow the Soviets to present the 1948 break up as a mere ideological discord. A hurried re-­establishment of party relations immediately after the first contacts between the two Governments would signal just that. Tito thus insisted that the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations should, for the time being, be limited to Government relations. Although, as he admitted, the talks between the two parties were unavoidable at some point in the future because the Communist parties were the leading political forces in both Yugoslavia and the USSR, he insisted that the subject of any such contacts must not be the return of Yugoslavia back into the ‘Cominform family. This is out of the question . . . that would only serve their purpose to enmesh us again through Party discipline . . . to lose our independence’.127 Tito was of the opinion that the Soviets ‘believed that we should join their family, their “lager” ’ and that this was their ultimate goal. He warned that this should not be forgotten in dealings with Moscow and that the Yugoslavs must ensure that ‘[Yugoslavia] maintained the status of an independent country with an independent foreign policy . . . a country that is nobody’s satellite . . . It is only on this basis that we will carry on with the normalization with the USSR’.128 Tito considered the proposal for re-­ establishment of party relations to be a Soviet trap to draw Yugoslavia back into the ‘socialist camp’. The Fifth Plenum unanimously approved Tito’s secret correspondence with the Soviet leadership and endorsed the strategy for further conduct of normalization with the Soviets that he and Kardelj had proposed. Discussions at the LCY November Plenum confirm that Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, while apprehensive of the Soviet motives, were at the same time keen to maximize the opportunities and prospects that the normalization with Moscow offered. Improved relations with the USSR would further diminish the threat of Soviet and satellite aggression. In addition, the re-­establishment of economic cooperation with the Eastern Bloc could reduce Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western economic aid. Moreover, Moscow’s initiative offered to put an end to Yugoslavia’s ideological excommunication and isolation. It opened the door for Yugoslavia to be accepted back into the Communist movement, while

Normalization   91 remaining outside the ‘socialist camp’. Of particular importance to Tito and his aides was that the normalization with Moscow would prove the falsehood of accusations Stalin levelled against them in 1948. The correspondence with Khrushchev, as well as Moscow’s goodwill gestures, suggested to Tito and his associates that the Soviets were ready to accept relations with Yugoslavia on the basis of equality and mutual respect. If so, normalization with the USSR would represent a moral and ideological victory for the Yugoslav leadership. Most importantly, perhaps, they saw normalization as a strategic opening that would enable Yugoslavia to maximize its opportunities by playing one Bloc against the other. In this respect, as the discussion at the Plenum confirmed, Tito and his aides were also conscious that the strength of their position vis-­à-vis Moscow lay in their special relations with the West. The Plenum fully endorsed new foreign policy positioning between the two Blocs. The Yugoslav Central Committee supported Tito’s assertion that ‘the position that [Yugoslavia] now has, [namely] good relations with both the Soviet Union and the West, is the most beneficial for us and enables us to pursue the goals we have put before ourselves – the building of our country and socialism’.129 Equidistance from either Bloc, still a distant possibility only a year earlier, when first mentioned at the meeting at Kardelj’s residence, on 20 October 1953, was reaffirmed at the Plenum as Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy strategy. This was not a coincidence. Within days, Tito was scheduled to leave on his first trip to India and Burma. It must be stressed, however, that at this stage the new foreign policy aspiration was still far from being fully conceptualized into a non-­aligned policy. The Fifth Plenum and the Yugoslav leader’s subsequent trip to India and Burma came at a time when Yugoslavia achieved a very favourable strategic position. His two-­month absence from home confirmed the confidence with which Tito viewed his country’s position in the international system. Relations with the West were at their zenith. Yugoslavia had just attained three of its long-­ term strategic goals. On 9 August, the Balkan Pact was signed and on 5 October, the final settlement of the Trieste was announced. On 22 November, after ten days of gruelling negotiations in Washington, the Yugoslav delegation led by Vukmanović – Tempo successfully negotiated huge US economic assistance. The US agreed to grant Yugoslavia 450,000 tons of wheat, in addition to the 400,000 tons promised earlier. This was enough to eliminate the wheat deficit Yugoslavia had accrued after two consecutive droughts. The US also promised to help Belgrade secure a loan from the Exim Bank to reduce its short-­term debt. Furthermore, Washington promised support at the forthcoming Creditors Conference on Yugoslavia for the reprogramming of Yugoslavia’s medium-­term debt. Washington’s aid and financial assistance, as well as the restructuring of debt, helped Tito’s regime stave off economic collapse.130 Meanwhile, relations with Moscow were clearly in the ascendency. Belgrade’s initial suspicion surrounding Khrushchev’s offer was replaced by hope. The favourable position Yugoslavia had found itself in by the end of 1954, which only a year earlier had seemed unattainable, liberated Tito to embark upon his most ambitious endeavour – the search for a position between the two Blocs.

92   Normalization The major pre-­condition for this strategic shift, the elimination of the Soviet threat, seemed achievable for the first time since 1948. By October, not only was one gesture of good will from Moscow following another, as proof of the sincerity of Soviet intentions, but the Kremlin seemed impatient to further improve relations with Belgrade. However, as would often be the case in the course of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, the next step was never a foregone conclusion.

A tactical impasse in the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization During the four months following Tito’s letter of 16 November, no further correspondence took place between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships. The process of normalization between the two countries had stalled. Two factors can explain this stalemate. Tito’s two-­month-long trip to India and Burma made secret correspondence with Moscow all but impossible. More importantly, however, the leadership contest between Khrushchev and Malenkov paralysed the Kremlin during December 1954 and January 1955. Neither contender wished to unnecessarily expose himself to risk by making initiatives on such a contentious and divisive issue, as were relations with Yugoslavia. It was a supreme irony that among the members of the Soviet Presidium, Khrushchev and Malenkov were probably the strongest supporters of the normalization with Yugoslavia. In all encounters with the Yugoslavs, Malenkov came across as the most willing among the Soviet leaders to support the improvement of relations between the two countries.131 Despite the lack of new initiatives during this period, Moscow was, however, careful not to suspend nor jeopardize the already achieved level of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. On 5 January 1955, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement for 1955, worth US$20 million. Although incomparable with Yugoslavia’s exchange with the West, the agreed trade volume was, nevertheless, five times that of the previous year. However, the trade negotiations took well over a month and were suspended on several occasions due to Soviet obstruction. This suggested Moscow’s reduced willingness to cooperate.132 In the course of the negotiations, Khrushchev and members of the Soviet leadership had two meetings with Mijalko TodorovićPlavi, the Head of the Yugoslav delegation and a member of the Yugoslav Central Committee. He was the first member of the top Yugoslav leadership to have met Soviet leaders since the start of the process of normalization. The two meetings, however, were highly confrontational, only confirming Kremlin’s apparent and sudden change of heart towards Yugoslavia. In their contacts with the Yugoslavs during the months of the impasse, the Soviet leaders demonstrated inflexibility and eagerness to provoke ideological confrontation. The course of the two meetings between Todorović and Vidić, and the Soviet leadership in December 1954 suggest that the Yugoslav issue played a role in the leadership contest in the Kremlin. Khrushchev’s conduct during the meetings illustrates his skill at using political mimicry against Malenkov. Discussions during both meetings were highly charged and heated. The first meeting was organized over private dinner at Ambassador Vidić’s

Normalization   93 residence on 26 December 1954. From the Soviet side, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Saburov were present. According to Todorović and Vidić’s report, as soon as the dinner had begun, Khrushchev posed the question of the establishment of Yugoslav–Soviet party relations in a confrontational manner.133 Todorović replied that, for the time being, the normalization should be limited to state relations because of the mistrust between the two leaderships, accrued since 1948. When Todorović mentioned the need for a dialogue with the social democratic parties, Khrushchev interrupted by calling those parties ‘bourgeois lackeys’. He was particularly hostile towards the British Labour Party, deriding Bevin and Atlee as ‘royal socialists waiting for knighthoods’.134 When Todorović attacked the destructive role of the Cominform, Malenkov reminded him that Yugoslavia had played a prominent role in establishing the organization. Khrushchev himself strongly opposed any notion of winding down the ‘only organization of the socialist forces’. Todorović then opined that many people in the West were equally opposed to capitalism and to Stalin’s socialism. At this point, according to the report, Khrushchev reacted in an extremely hostile manner. He shouted that Stalinism did not exist, that Stalin had been lazy, but that he had lived and died as a true Communist. The exchange at this point became very heated and Malenkov assisted Todorović in calming it down. After a short digression into European issues, Khrushchev once again returned to Yugoslav– Soviet relations. He declared that, as he saw it, there were only two paths for the two countries to follow. They would either live as good neighbours or as brothers, ready to sacrifice themselves for each other and for the common cause. Todorović responded that it was better to live like a good neighbour than a bad brother. He then added that the Yugoslavs did not accept a monopoly by any party to define the common goal for the socialist countries or how it should be achieved. According to the report, a very unpleasant discussion followed during which Khrushchev repeated ‘old, Cominform-­style argumentation’.135 At this point in the discussion, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Saburov lit cigarettes, remarking wryly that they had not smoked since the war. The dinner ended in a less than cordial atmosphere. The Soviet leaders met Todorović and Vidić again on 30 December, at Molotov’s dacha ‘Spyridonovka’. On this occasion the Soviet side included Khrushchev, Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan and Saburov – nearly half of the Soviet Party Presidium. According to Todorović and Vidić’s report, the Soviets started the conversation by commenting sarcastically on Kardelj’s views about ‘democratic socialism’, outlined during his recent speech in Sarajevo.136 Khrushchev insisted that Kardelj was simply inventing different socialisms and that the term ‘democratic socialism’ was a favourite of Western socialists. In his view, Kardelj was using such terminology only to please the Americans. Khrushchev then reasserted that the core issue of Yugoslav–Soviet relations was the re-­ establishment of party ties. He revealed to Todorović and Vidić that the Soviet Party Presidium met after their previous meeting to assess the discussion and had concluded that Todorović’s explanations were ‘so, so’.137 In fact, as Khrushchev had put it, the Presidium was not sure anymore ‘who the Yugoslavs wish to

94   Normalization be with’. He then stated openly that the main Soviet goal was to draw Yugoslavia back into the socialist camp, even to the Cominform – ‘if not right away then at a later date’.138 Khrushchev went further and asserted that the Cominform had played a positive role during the conflict with Yugoslavia because it preserved the unity of the Communist movement at the time when the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict threatened to destroy it. He declared that the Soviet interest in Yugoslavia was motivated [by] the need for a monolithic and strong camp; [by] the extraordinarily favourable implication that the return of Yugoslavia back into the fold would have on the international proletarian movement; [by Yugoslavia’s] thirty divisions of good soldiers; and [by] benefits [to the socialist camp] arising from exploiting Yugoslavia’s influence in South-­Eastern Europe and Europe in general.139 The offensiveness of Khrushchev’s assertions shocked the Yugoslavs. Todorović replicated that future relations between the two countries cannot be based on the ‘old type of relations’. This triggered loud Soviet opposition, in particular from Khrushchev who expressed Soviet readiness to address questions related to the 1948 conflict. Khrushchev placed all blame on Beria who, he argued, had skilfully deceived an already aged Stalin. Khrushchev admitted that within this context, as member of the Soviet leadership at that time, he and his colleagues felt guilty for the 1948 schism and could thus understand why the Yugoslavs still did not trust them. He assured Todorović that when the time came for the settling of accounts with Beria ‘[the Soviet leadership’s] hand did not quiver’.140 Khrushchev continued that the main problem in Yugoslav–Soviet relations were not different paths to socialism. He insisted that different paths already existed in China and Poland and this did not present a problem in their relations with the USSR. According to Khrushchev, the main question before the Soviet leadership was whether they could reach an agreement with the Yugoslavs for their return to the ‘socialist camp’. He underlined that the Soviet leadership had concluded from the conversations with Todorović that the answer to this question of crucial importance to the ‘unity of the socialist camp’ was, for the moment, inconclusive. The Soviet leadership, Khrushchev added, would continue its efforts to achieve the goal of bringing Yugoslavia back into the ‘camp’ and would wait patiently until there would be a meeting of minds between the two leaderships.141 According to Todorović and Vidić’s report, much like the first dinner, the second dinner ended in an equally subdued tone. The conduct and contents of the two meetings the Soviet leadership held with Todorović and Vidić suggest several conclusions. Khrushchev, as the primus inter pares, had conducted the meetings in a highly confrontational manner. He obviously used the occasion to strike alliances with Presidium members, ahead of the forthcoming showdown with the main leadership contender, Malenkov. At this point, the normalization with Yugoslavia, very much a divisive issue in the Kremlin and one he was increasingly being identified

Normalization   95 with, had become a liability for Khrushchev. He thus had to disengage himself temporarily from this policy if he was to secure the support of the hard-­line members of the Presidium against Malenkov, namely Molotov, Kaganovich, Suslov and Voroshilov. All four of them were known opponents of improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. It is highly possible that Khrushchev had staged meetings with Todorović to reassure the conservatives in the Presidium that he would not give in to the Yugoslavs. The dinners thus provided Khrushchev with the chance to demonstrate his ideological firmness against Tito. This may explain why both meetings were attended by so many members of the Presidium. They were his audience and his witnesses. The Yugoslav–Soviet meetings in December also suggest that by this time, the Soviet leadership had raised the bar of expectations of what it wished to achieve from the normalization with Yugoslavia. As elaborated earlier, the Soviet letter of 31 May 1954 informing ‘fraternal parties’ of the forthcoming Soviet initiative insisted that the sole aim of normalization with the  Yugoslavs was to prevent Yugoslavia from sliding into a firmer alliance with the West. It was at a time when the Soviets had no idea how Tito would respond to their initiative. Five months later, however, an internal Soviet Foreign Ministry report, dated 21 October 1954, concluded that Yugoslav behaviour in the period between July and October confirmed that ‘the Soviet Union’s policy towards Yugoslavia has produced serious positive results’. According to the report, this opened the door for ‘measures conducive to further development of Soviet–Yugoslav relations that would force the Yugoslav government to come closer to the USSR’.142 In this context, Khrushchev’s admission during the dinner on 30 December that the main Soviet goal was to lure Yugoslavia back in the ‘camp’ confirmed that within several months after the first letter had been sent to Belgrade, and after Tito had positively responded to the Soviet initiative, the Kremlin leadership began to entertain hope that normalization could land them the ultimate prize – Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘socialist camp’. Belgrade’s reaction to the Soviet behaviour during the two meetings with Todorović would, after a short period of inaction, become noticeably pro-­active, even challenging. The initial restraint was partly due the fact that Tito, who firmly held reins of Yugoslav policy towards the Soviets, was away in India and Burma. Yugoslav documents confirm that Tito was informed promptly about both dinners, as indeed he would be about any new developments in Yugoslav– Soviet relations.143 On the other hand, the Yugoslav leadership was aware that normalization would not be a smooth process. They understood that there was lack of consensus in the Soviet Presidium on Yugoslavia, coupled with the ongoing power struggle in the Kremlin. Tito and his associates were convinced that internal tensions within the Soviet leadership would always reflect on relations with Yugoslavia.144 By the end of January 1955, however, Belgrade was becoming increasingly apprehensive about the power struggle in the Kremlin. On 1 February, DSIP requested from Vidić an urgent appraisal of developments in Moscow. Belgrade’s anxiety was aroused by signs of discontinuity in the Soviet foreign and domestic policies compared to the positive trends during

96   Normalization the several months before November 1954. To the Yugoslav leadership, this suggested that ‘old’, Stalinist forces might be prevailing in the Soviet leadership battle.145 Belgrade’s main concern was that the victory of the hard-­liners in Kremlin would mean an end to the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The Yugoslavs had correctly anticipated an imminent showdown within the Soviet leadership. Indeed, on the last day of the CPSU CC Plenum on 31 January 1955, Khrushchev executed the coup against Malenkov.146 The Plenum relieved Malenkov of the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The resolution of the Malenkov–Khrushchev confrontation became public on 8 February 1955 when Malenkov formally resigned at the session of the Supreme Soviet.147 Ironically, the Yugoslav leadership saw Malenkov’s political demise as a victory for the hard-­liners.148 This confirms that Khrushchev was still very much an enigma for the Yugoslav leadership. Tito and Kardelj’s statements at the Fifth Plenum reveal that the Yugoslav leadership regarded Khrushchev as a member of a conservative group within the Soviet leadership.149 Khrushchev’s behaviour during meetings with Todorović and Vidić only confirmed this assessment.150 Belgrade saw Malenkov as more sympathetic to the form of relations that the Yugoslavs sought to achieve with the Soviets.151 This may very well have been an additional reason behind Tito’s insistence in his letter of 16 November that the first meeting between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders should be between the two heads of governments; at the time, Malenkov was the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. At the session of the Supreme Soviet on 8 February, which relieved Malenkov of his posts, Molotov gave a speech on Soviet foreign policy. The tone of the speech only confirmed Yugoslav fears that Malenkov’s resignation signalled a victory for the conservatives in the Presidium. Speaking of relations with Yugoslavia, Molotov underlined that the Soviet Union had done everything possible to improve them and that it was now up to the Yugoslavs to respond in kind. The Soviet Foreign Minister added that it was obvious that in recent years Yugoslavia had strayed from the course it pursued in the first few years after the Second World War.152 This particular statement indicated to Belgrade that Moscow had returned to the habit of passing judgment on the degree of Yugoslavia’s ‘loyalty’ to Marxism–Leninism. Molotov’s statement was also interpreted by the Yugoslavs as a proposal for equal sharing of responsibility for the 1948 rupture and an invitation to the Yugoslav leadership to recant its mistakes in 1948.153 Indeed, during the same session of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov told Vittorio Vidali, the Trieste Communist Party Secretary, that a condition for improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations would be that both the USSR and Yugoslavia underwent ‘self-­criticism’.154 In their first response to Khrushchev’s letter, in August 1954, the Yugoslav leadership had firmly rejected the notion of self-­criticism, which to them would be tantamount to accepting shared responsibility for the 1948 conflict. Belgrade was truly agitated by Molotov’s statement on Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The signals emanating from Moscow seemed to confirm that Khrushchev’s victory represented a discouraging turn of events.155

Normalization   97 The official Yugoslav response to changes in Moscow had to await Tito’s return from Asia. The Yugoslav leader approached this precarious turn in Yugoslav–Soviet relations with utmost delicacy. In one of his first public speeches upon returning from Asia, at a rally in Belgrade on 12 February, Tito stressed that the changes in Moscow need not be for the worse. He then reproached the West for being partly responsible for Malenkov’s defeat. According to Tito, the  West’s uncompromising policies towards Moscow played into the hands of  the conservatives in the Soviet leadership.156 Tito’s statements acknowledged that the change in Moscow could mark a shift in Soviet foreign policy towards a more inflexible, hard-­line position. At the same time, however, by accusing the West for lack of responsiveness to the post-­Stalin leadership, Tito offered a hand to the victorious Khrushchev. Belgrade’s conciliatory approach to Khrushchev’s victory against Malenkov was dictated by Yugoslavia’s desire to preserve the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization By early March, however, Tito had decided to respond more forcibly to Molotov’s speech of 8 February and openly challenge the Soviet leadership. This was a reflection of Belgrade’s frustration with the absence of new initiatives from Moscow and an attempt to provoke Soviets to return to the normalization. On 7 March, in a foreign policy exposé before the Federal Assembly, Tito sharply criticized tendencies ‘by some’ in the USSR and in the satellite countries to convince their party and citizens that Yugoslavia, having now realized its delusions of 1948, will repent. Tito emphasized that this ‘nonsense’ raised doubts among the Yugoslavs ‘about the sincerity of statements made in direct contacts by the most responsible persons in those countries concerning the unjust accusations made against our country in 1948’. He then directly accused Molotov as one of those responsible for such ‘efforts, which threatened to stop the normalization halfway’. He also openly declared the Soviet Foreign Minister’s speech of 8 February as ‘not corresponding to the truth’.157 Tito’s reference to ‘statements made in direct contact’ was a reminder to Khrushchev of their secret correspondence in 1954. Tito thus threatened to suspend normalization should Soviet leaders renege on the conciliatory positions presented in their letters. The uncharacteristic hostility and openness of Tito’s rebuttal of Molotov was surprising. However, the absence of further polemical debate from Belgrade confirms that Tito’s attack was a calculated move designed to put normalization back on track, not to endanger it. By naming Molotov, Tito avoided intimidating the new leader – Khrushchev. On the other hand, by attacking Molotov Tito hoped to reach out to those in the Kremlin who still believed in normalization with Yugoslavia. In particular, he was appealing to Khrushchev, the signatory of the letters in 1954, to continue with the initiative. The Yugoslav leader was soon rewarded for playing on Khrushchev despite initial doubts. On 10 March, in an article ‘Speech by President Tito at a session of the Yugoslav Parliament’, Pravda published excerpts from Tito’s speech. In an unprecedented manner, not only did the official Soviet Party organ publish without commentary Tito’s speech but it directly quoted his criticism of a member of the highest Soviet leadership.158 Only two days later, Pravda again

98   Normalization returned to Tito’s speech in a surprisingly conciliatory tone.159 Moscow’s reaction to Tito’s criticism confirmed that Molotov’s views were not representative of the majority opinion in the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, Pravda’s articles suggested that the apparent winner in the Kremlin leadership contest, Khrushchev, was not necessarily at one with Molotov. As it happened, Tito’s criticism and accusations provided Khrushchev with an opportunity to fire the first salvo against Molotov, his next leadership challenger. The contentious issue of relations with Yugoslavia proved, once again, to be the tool for the settling of accounts in the Kremlin. Moscow’s reaction to Tito’s speech also revealed that the new round of the Kremlin leadership contest, this time between Khrushchev and Molotov, had started barely a month after the resolution of the previous round between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Moreover, it was evidence of the extraordinary speed with which Khrushchev was solidifying his position in the Presidium. The several-­month long impasse in the process of Yugoslav–Soviet nascent normalization was a result of lack of initiatives from the Soviet side. Despite appearances and Yugoslav frustration and anxiety, however, this sudden inactivity was not a result of yet another shift for the worse in the Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia, rather a function of Khrushchev’s tactical retreat. During this period, he was embroiled in a resolution of a leadership contest with his main rival, Malenkov and to a lesser extent with Molotov. As soon as he felt sufficiently strengthened against both, however, he was quick to respond positively to Tito’s nervous appeals for the continuation of the normalization of relations. To a certain extent, however, the impasse was, at least partially due to Tito’s two-­month long absence form Belgrade, and his first exploratory trip to Asia and to the non-­engaged world.

In search of the Third World – a revolution in Yugoslav foreign policy On 30 November 1954, aboard his yacht ‘Galeb’, Tito departed on a two-­month trip to India and Burma. On his return leg, the Yugoslav President made a stop­ over in Suez, for a first encounter with Colonel Gamaal Abdel Nasser, the young Egyptian leader. This trip and, in particular the meetings and exchange of views with Nehru and Nasser, would assist Tito and his associates in conceptualizing Yugoslavia’s strategic foreign policy shift towards non-­alignment. Yugoslavia’s search for a position outside the two Blocs began at the time of its break up with Moscow in 1948, much earlier than prevailing interpretations suggest. Until now, it has eluded the attention of historians that Stalin’s first salvo against Tito coincided with a Western ultimatum to Yugoslavia over Trieste. Coincidences were rare with Stalin, in particular given the exceptional intelligence assets he possessed in Italy and in Britain. Thus, months before the Yugoslav–Soviet rift became public, the Yugoslav leadership had found itself in an unprecedented ‘no-­win’ situation – under threat from both the East and the West. On 18 and 19 March 1948 Tito received two consecutive demarches from

Normalization   99 Moscow announcing the withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian advisers from Yugoslavia. He immediately recognized this as part of the Soviet ploy to remove him and incorporate Yugoslavia more firmly into the emerging Soviet ‘camp’. He and his comrades knew that any opposition to Stalin inevitably led to confrontation with the ‘Leader of Communism’ and a risk to the country’s very survival. The very next day the Yugoslav leadership learned of a threat from the other side. On 20 March 1948, Washington and London jointly announced their unilateral decision to hand over to Italy administration of the city of Trieste and Zone A of the free territory of Trieste. The intended reinstitution of Italian sovereignty over Zone A, if contested, would inevitably pull Yugoslavia into armed confrontation not only with Italy but with the US and Britain. Thus, when making the decision in March 1948 to resist Stalin, Tito and his associates did not have an exit strategy. Yugoslavia paid a heavy price for the overdependence on one Bloc and barely survived the 1948 break up with Stalin. Tito was determined not to allow a repeat of this mistake. The search for greater strategic manoeuvrability, understandably restricted to his innermost circle, began from the moment Yugoslavia was forced to seek Western protection and aid by the end of 1949, and military assistance from 1950. Existence of such debates and dilemmas were first revealed by Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s closest associate and, at the time, Yugoslav Foreign Minister at the Third Party Plenum, which was held behind closed doors in December 1949. Reporting on foreign policy, he proposed that Yugoslavia should in future ‘take advantage of the existing rivalry in the world in order to secure its survival and further consolidation’.160 The first public disclosure however, came as the result of the outbreak of the Korean War. The war had laid bare the dangers that small countries face in the global confrontation between the two Blocs. It also added urgency to the conceptualization of a foreign policy alternative. At the Fifth Annual session of the UN General Assembly, in September 1950, Kardelj pronounced that, The people of Yugoslavia cannot accept the postulate that humanity today has only one choice – a choice between a domination of one or the other Bloc. We believe that there exists another road. True, it may be a difficult one but, at the same time, it is an unavoidable one. It is the road of democratic struggle for a world in which people are free and equal, for democratic relations between nations that would eliminate outside interference in internal affairs of nations, and for a full peaceful cooperation between nations based on equality.161 From the very beginning however, non-­engagement and equidistance to either Bloc was not merely a moral choice for Tito and his aides. For them, it was the means of self-­preservation; the ability to resist superpower hegemony was seen as proportional to a country’s independence and hence, survival. However, as long as there existed a very real threat of Soviet military aggression, the Yugoslav leadership was careful not to undermine its strategic reliance on Western

100   Normalization economic and military aid and assistance, their only lifeline. In January 1953, two months before Stalin’s death, US Ambassador in Belgrade, Allen, met with Tito and reported that ‘[Tito] had stated solemnly that [isolationism and neutralism] were abhorrent both to him and to his people. He very earnestly repeated that he wished to take this occasion to state solemnly not only that he would not, even if he could, return to the Cominform fold, but that also any form of neutralism or isolationism was a practical and moral impossibility for his people’.162 Tito understood that equidistance to either Bloc would not endanger country’s national security, only if there was a favourable shift in external circumstances and if allies were to be found outside the two global alignments. By 1951, Tito and his aides were working to identify countries of similar foreign policy outlook and aspirations with which they could establish cooperation. In the autumn of that year, at a meeting of the Heads of Departments in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Josip Djerdja, who had just returned from his posting as the Yugoslav Ambassador in India, suggested that a way out of isolation for Yugoslavia could be to associate itself more with the newly liberated colonies, in particular India. Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, immediately adjourned the meeting to phone Tito and report that Djerdja had come up with interesting ideas, ‘similar to what we have been talking about’. Tito promptly ordered both men to his residence.163 From 1950, after a positive experience in the UN when they jointly drafted a Resolution on Korea, Yugoslavia became increasingly eager to develop ties with India. Belgrade appointed top calibre diplomats as Ambassadors to New Delhi. Josip Djerdja, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, was accredited to New Delhi between April 1950 and autumn of 1951 to be succeeded by Dr. Jože Vilfan from February 1952 until March 1953.164 Upon his return from India, Vilfan became a very influential Chief of Tito’s Cabinet. Belgrade also sent a number of fact-­finding missions to India. In November and December 1952, a high-­profile Yugoslav ‘mission of good will’ visited New Delhi. In January 1953, on their return journey from the First Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, Milovan Djilas, one of Tito’s closest aides, together with Dr Aleš Bebler, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, visited New Delhi. Yugoslav Foreign Ministry policy planning staff had by then identified several important aspects that singled out India as particularly attractive. They concluded that for a number of reasons, namely its huge population, its geo-­strategic position, and its rich cultural and historical heritage, India was destined to play a major role in the world, in particular in Asia. The analysts also pointed to something of particular interest to the Yugoslavs – India’s current foreign policy engagement far exceeded its current ‘economic and military strength’. This played well into Tito’s conviction that a country could play a role in global politics beyond the limitations imposed by its economic and military resources. Policy planning experts also underlined a number of aspects of India’s foreign policy which appealed to Yugoslavia, namely the policy of ‘mutual cooperation’ between Asian countries, non-­interference in the affairs of others, opposition to the existence of Blocs, and its anti-­colonial policy.165 Thus it was not by chance that for

Normalization   101 his first visit to Asia Tito chose India, and that the first leader he wished to meet was Nehru. Stalin’s death and the subsequent normalization of relations with Moscow from the summer of 1954 created the necessary shift in external circumstances that Tito and his aides were hoping for. The greatly diminished threat of Soviet aggression allowed them to make a leap from confidential brainstorming to the realization of the new strategic positioning. Only two years after he professed ‘abhorrence of neutralism’ to the US Ambassador Allen, Tito would publicly declare Yugoslavia’s opposition to either Bloc and commitment to non-­ engagement during his visits to India and Burma. His first trip to Asia, in the winter of 1954–1955 was still exploratory in character, as was the shorter, second trip in winter 1955 to Ethiopia and Egypt. However, Tito’s third and longest trip in the winter of 1958–1959, just four years after the first one, confirmed the maturity of the new foreign policy concept and its global recognition. Moreover, it demonstrated the extent to which non-­alignment was gathering support among the newly liberated colonies and Third World countries. The talks Tito held during these trips with the leaders of the countries he visited, joint communiqués, his policy statements, public speeches and interviews affirmed Yugoslavia’s new global role and provided crucial incentive for the creation of the Non-­aligned Movement. Tito’s first trip to Asia in the winter of 1954–1955 was, in many ways a watershed. It made profound imprint on his perceptions and the understanding of the Third World and helped him to identify allies in his pursuit of non-­alignment. The trip happened at the height of the preparations for the Bandung Conference, allowing Tito first-­hand insight into the ideas behind the initiative from one of its main protagonists, Nehru. For the first time in his life the visits to India and Burma brought Tito in contact with a non-­European world and enabled him to familiarize himself with Asian, in particular Indian culture, customs, and philosophy. During more than two weeks, he visited fourteen Indian cities. The Yugoslav leader travelled tirelessly by train or by car, visiting numerous factories, hospitals, military barracks, universities, as well as some of the poorest villages along the road he travelled on. His days were filled with countless meetings and conversations with officials, India’s intelligentsia, ordinary citizens, and poor peasants. It was in India that Tito, for the first time, openly declared his opposition to ‘any and all’ ideological and political Blocs.166 Importantly, the trip made it possible for Tito and Nehru to meet. The two established immediate rapport, based on mutual respect. During their first meeting, Tito confided in Nehru about the secret correspondence he was at the time conducting with the Soviet leadership. The Indian Prime Minister was the first foreign leader to be informed of this explosive new development in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.167 Tito and Nehru held four rounds of official talks but, more importantly spent long hours between meetings, over private dinners, and before and after official engagements in informal conversations. From the very first meeting with Nehru, Tito continually emphasized his commitment to non-­engagement. Informing Nehru of the Balkan Pact, which he had signed

102   Normalization only few months earlier, Tito did his best to dispel suspicions that Yugoslavia had aligned itself with NATO, insisting that the Pact was the only way to avert Soviet aggression. He particularly emphasized that during his visit to Turkey in April, he made a point of seeking assurance from the Balkan Pact ally, Turkey that the new Turkish–Pakistani pact was not aimed against India.168 Nehru was also eager to stress that India was not a member of any alliance, insisting that the Commonwealth could not be regarded as one since there existed no legal or military commitments.169 The changing position and role of China consumed much of Tito and Nehru’s first meetings. Both were eager to discuss China’s increasing activism in Asian affairs, in particular in preparation for the Bandung Conference, as well as its emerging superpower posture. Nehru informed Tito of Zhou Enlai’s recent visit to New Delhi and that two countries had pledged to cooperate despite differences in their political systems.170 Tito inquired whether the Chinese could be trusted in their relations with others and whether Zhou’s visit to India was not initiated by Moscow. Nehru did not believe that the Soviets were behind Zhou’s visit and expressed belief that the Chinese had ‘their own feeling for Asia’. He even asserted that the Russians did not seem ‘too happy’ with the Chinese foreign policy initiatives and revealed that the Soviets had approached him with a proposal to sign a document similar to the ‘five principles’ document signed at the end of Zhou Enlai’s visit to Delhi.171 Nehru further emphasized that India and China shared more than 2,000 miles of common border and underlined that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet had never been in question. He insisted that it was the British who had created ‘certain privileged positions in Tibet, [a situation] India inherited but was from the very beginning aware that it was not capable to maintain such positions’. Nevertheless, Nehru admitted that during his recent talks with Zhou he had tried ‘to encourage the Chinese to recognise Tibetan individuality in the form of a certain kind of autonomy for Tibet’.172 In turn, Tito suggested that ‘it looks as if the Soviets are against the Chinese entry into the UN. There is certainly some kind of change in the Soviet policy [towards China].’ Further to the deliberations with Nehru, Tito accepted that China and the USSR did not represent a united front in Asia and that the Chinese regional policies were much more independent from Moscow than was generally believed. He was, convinced of the existence of a friction between the Chinese and the Soviets. Tito drew analogies with Yugoslavia’s own experience with Moscow, which seemed to confirm the inevitability of a confrontation between an indigenous revolutionary movement, such as that of China or Yugoslavia, determined to maintain its independence, and Moscow’s aspirations to maintain its hegemony over the international Communist movement.173 During their fourth meeting, on 21 December, Tito confided with Nehru that in the preceding days the Chinese had initiated establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia through their Ambassador in Moscow. He expressed strong suspicion that the form and timing of the Chinese initiative was aimed, on the one hand, to give the impression that the initiative came from the Yugoslavs and, on the other hand, to overshadow the achievements of his India visit. Although inclined to  rebuke the Chinese

Normalization   103 approaches, Tito, nonetheless, accepted Nehru’s advice to continue secret contacts with the Chinese. Soon this led to establishment of full diplomatic relations between Beijing and Belgrade.174 On 21 December, Tito delivered a landmark speech before the Indian Parliament. In this programme speech, considered by many to be one of his most important and most eloquent on the topic of non-­alignment, Tito formulated in depth and for the first time in public the postulates of Yugoslavia’s non-­aligned foreign policy. He identified four main threats to peace as being the inequality among states and nations, the interference of big powers into affairs of other states and peoples, the division of the world into spheres of interest and Blocs, and colonialism. Tito further stressed the need for a global and not just regional gathering of the non-­engaged countries. He underlined that non-­engagement meant equidistance to either Bloc arguing against the tendency of the newly liberated colonies to regard USSR as a lesser of the two evils. Tito also proposed that increased trade and economic cooperation between newly liberated and non-­ engaged countries was the only way for them to free themselves from economic dependence on old colonial masters and to pursue rapid industrial development. The Yugoslav President used the speech to inject an element of dynamism into the concept of non-­engagement based on traditional Asian neutralism. He promoted ‘active coexistence’ based on dynamic cooperation, engagement in peaceful settlement of international issues, and efforts towards removal of obstacles that impeded cooperation between states.175 Both Nehru and Tito recognized that joint statements and communiqués were suitable platforms for propagation of principles of non-­engagement; they immediately agreed that the Joint Statement, issued at the end of the visit, should address global issues as well as their bilateral relations. The document underlined Yugoslavia and India’s shared opposition to aggression, interference in affairs of other states and support and respect of the independence and sovereignty of individual states. It stressed the principle of peaceful coexistence and specifically emphasized the two leaders’ opposition to the creation of any sort of a ‘Third Bloc’.176 After a private dinner at Nehru’s residence, the two personally went over the draft of the Joint Statement and Tito added that the word ‘active’ should be added to the sentence in the Statement describing India and Yugoslavia’s ‘positive and constructive policy of non-­alignment’.177 The next morning, Nehru accepted Tito’s suggestion.178 This insertion would have a far-­reaching impact, as it distinguished non-­alignment from neutralism. As opposed to the political passivity towards global developments and crises, which characterizes neutralism, ‘active non-­ engagement or non-­alignment’ takes positions and acts on all global issues in pursuit of the reduction of global tensions and threat to the sovereignty and wellbeing of smaller, underdeveloped and independent nations. This explains the emphasis on the exchange of views on global issues and, in particular, crises which characterized Tito’s every conversation with Third World leaders. It was not, as some would suggest later, a reflection of self-­importance and pomposity. Such exchanges helped define common positions among the non-­aligned countries and contributed towards a consensus over the action required.

104   Normalization Tito and Nehru’s Joint Statement articulated aspirations of the emerging non-­ aligned alternative in the international system.179 In the document, the two leaders announced their intention to ‘devote their energies . . . towards the advancement of peace through negotiations and reconciliation as the means for the resolution of international conflicts’. Tito and Nehru then clarified that ‘the policy of non-­alignment with Blocs, which they pursue, does not represent “neutrality” or “neutralism”; neither does it represent passivity as is sometimes alleged. It represents the positive, active and constructive policy that, as its goal, has collective peace as the foundation of collective security.’180 India and Yugoslavia further committed themselves to fulfilment of a number of principles regarding relations between the states, namely recognition of individual sovereignty, independence and integrity, non-­aggression, equality, respect, non-­ interference into affairs of other states, and peaceful co-­existence. The Joint Statement specifically dismissed Western media allegations that the two leaders sought to create a ‘Third Bloc’.181 Importantly, Tito and Nehru expressed hope that ‘principles of relations between countries that they have proclaimed could acquire a wider, universal implementation’.182 This confirmed their determination to seek following among the non-­engaged countries and actively pursue implementation of the principles they proclaimed their commitment to. Tito’s and Nehru’s Joint Statement, issued at the end of Tito’s first visit to India, in the end of 1954, represented the first program document of the emerging Non-­ alignment movement. The second leg of the journey, a visit to Burma, between 6 and 17 January 1955, provided Tito with an immediate opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to the principles he and Nehru had only just vowed to uphold. In his talks with the Burmese, Tito ardently advocated that non-­engagement meant true distancing from either Bloc. In this respect, the Yugoslav President also warned against China, which he recognized as a future world power. Ironically, before and during his visits to India and Burma, Western press speculated that Tito would seek to facilitate Soviet penetration in the Third World. Nothing was further from the truth. On 14 January, during the fourth round of talks in Rangoon, Tito did not mix words in stressing that, There are two global powers today – the Soviet Union and the United States. Between themselves they have undertaken to divide the world. From the American side, this is done under the pretext and slogans of the fight against the spread of Communism; from the other side, it is done in the name of the struggle for the Revolution, for social change in which, of course, the Soviet Union has to play the leading role. Both are equally dangerous. I do not know which is in fact more dangerous for the small nations.183 Tito also advocated mutual reliance and cooperation among the Third World countries as the only way to defend sovereignty and independence against superpower subjugation. The best part of Tito’s meetings with U Nu and the Burmese leadership was devoted to economic and military cooperation. In what would

Normalization   105 prove to be of exceptional importance for the future non-­aligned grouping, Tito inaugurated with the Burmese barter exchange as the mechanism for overcoming the perennial obstacle to economic cooperation between Third World countries – their inability to finance mutual trade. The superpowers and ex-­colonial masters determined patterns of global commodity exchange through control of international financial institutions and availability of loans to finance trade. Promoting self-­reliance and mutual cooperation, Tito also offered U Nu military cooperation. He argued that ‘Burma, like any other small country, has better chances of securing its independence if it had resources to defend it’. The Yugoslav leader reminded his hosts that Yugoslavia had managed to resist the Soviet threat only because it possessed a strong army. He was blunt and admitted that ‘no improvement of international relations or various initiatives for disarmament could lull me; I believe that it is still better to be armed and have a strong army than wait for others to disarm.’184 The Special Statement, issued with the Joint Statement at the end of Tito’s visit to Burma, stipulated that the Yugoslav President had offered, ‘as a gift’, to arm one brigade of the Burmese Army and that the Burmese government, in ‘accepting this generous offer with gratitude’, had decided ‘to offer in return, as a gift, rice for the people of Yugoslavia’.185 One of Tito’s priorities during his 1954 trip to Asia was to identify allies among the Third World countries who would help him create an independent position from either Bloc. In this respect, he was eager to secure the support of India, the second most populous country in the world, with a very proactive foreign policy. Speaking off-­record to Yugoslav journalists on a train from Calcutta, Tito made this very clear: What would small Yugoslavia be able to do alone in this [struggle to secure an independent position outside the Blocs] unless some big country would join in? That is why we are looking for allies. That was the goal of this trip. Why else would we go on such a long trip? Certainly not to [hunt] tigers.186 From the moment they met, Tito and Nehru recognized in each other an exceptional congruence of views on global developments and struck an immediate personal rapport. Their discussions regarding the Joint Statement revealed their intention to produce a document of universal significance, one that surpassed bilateral relations. The two leaders formulated principles they wished to see implemented in international relations and openly invited other countries to follow their lead. The Statement represented one of the first conceptualizations of non-­alignment. Significantly, it was signed and made public on the eve of Nehru’s trip to Djakarta for the Bandung Conference preparatory meeting. On his return journey to Yugoslavia, Tito made a stop-­over in Suez where he met for the first time the young Egyptian leader Gamaal Abdul Nasser. Tito was eager to meet Nasser because he recognized Egypt’s potential to play a central role in the Middle East and in the Arab world. He was also quite impressed with the fact that, although comprised of young officers who only recently came to power, the new Egyptian regime had manifested a commitment to reform its

106   Normalization society, to extract itself from British and Western domination and tutelage, and to play an active and central role in the Arab world. Although their meeting only lasted a few hours, the time it took Tito’s yacht ‘Galeb’ to transit the Suez Canal, Nasser left a very favourable impression on the Yugoslav President. The Egyptian Colonel was frank and keen to listen to Tito’s outlook on the world situation, repeatedly stressing his determination to tackle regional issues in a way that would maximize Egyptian and Arab interests. Stressing the need for Arab unity, Nasser revealed to Tito his willingness to assume the leadership of the Arab world. The Egyptian Colonel enthusiastically embraced Tito’s arguments promoting equidistance from both Blocs and closer collaboration between the non-­engaged countries. In confirmation of the new-­found rapport, Nasser immediately accepted Tito’s invitation for a high-­profile Egyptian delegation to visit Yugoslavia and discuss economic collaboration. Tito also promised to supply small arms to Egypt.187 Having found like-­minded leaders and potential allies, and with the constantly improving relations with Moscow, for the next two years Tito would pursue his new foreign policy strategy with vigour, determination and inventiveness. He rapidly asserted himself as the fulcrum of the new global initiative. Although many Third World leaders began visiting Yugoslavia, the meeting between Tito, Nehru and Nasser proved decisive for the articulation of Yugoslavia’s new strategic orientation and the formation of the Non-­Aligned Movement. In July of 1955, only seven months after their first meeting, Nehru made a return visit to Yugoslavia. In December of the same year, Tito went on a month-­long journey to Ethiopia and Egypt. Six months later, in July 1956, Nasser came for a two-­week visit to Yugoslavia. Tito seized the opportunity created by Nehru’s tour of Europe, which coincided with Nasser’s visit to Yugoslavia, to stage a meeting of the three in his summer house, on the island of Brioni on 18 and 19 July. Contrary to prevailing historical interpretations, this was not a pre-­arranged summit and Nehru only reluctantly agreed to a joint declaration, the so-­called Brioni Declaration, at the end of the meeting.188 Once again, Tito’s instinct had proven him right. The tripartite meeting and the joint declaration provided real impetus to the non-­ alignment initiative and boosted support among the non-­engaged and newly liberated countries. The Brioni Declaration was done in haste and only after the Yugoslavs had agreed for it to be based on an Indian draft.189 Tito was nonetheless determined for the meeting to end with a document of a programme character, beyond a mere communiqué. In the opening sentences of the Declaration, Nehru, Tito and Nasser reasserted their intention to act together and actively engage in the resolution of conflicts and global issues such as de-­colonization and economic cooperation. The document stipulated their common position on all major issues. Most importantly, Nehru, Tito and Nasser, unequivocally underlined their resolve to pursue non-­alignment to either Bloc and, moreover, to encourage others to adhere to it as the only alternative to conflicts and injustice that existed in a divided world.190 The Declaration reverberated throughout the Third World, forcing major powers to take notice. The document articulated the political philosophy of non-­alignment. Not least, the three leaders strengthened

Normalization   107 the bonds between them that would exist until their deaths. In Brioni, the triumvirate asserted resolve to raise hope among the deprived, underdeveloped, or those still under the colonial yoke that their destiny is in their own hands.

Conclusion It took a year for the Soviet–Yugoslav reconciliation to move forward after the re-­establishment of normal diplomatic relations in June 1953. The initiative came from the Soviet leadership in form of a secret letter, dated 22 June 1954. The letter was addressed to Tito, as the Yugoslav Party leader, and the signatory was Khrushchev, on behalf of the Soviet Party Central Committee. Tito’s response to what was ‘a bolt from the blue’ was extremely cautious and delayed for a month and a half. On the one hand, he was weary of yet another Soviet ploy to discredit the Yugoslav leadership. On the other hand, Tito and his aides were in the most delicate stage of achieving three strategic goals of vital importance to Yugoslavia and feared that the Soviets were up to their old tricks and were trying to sabotage them. All three goals, the signing of he Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, the agreement with Italy on Trieste, and an agreement on the US food aid and financial assistance package, have, at the time Khrushchev’s letter arrived, encountered a stalemate in the final stages of their resolution. Once the Balkan Pact was signed and the financial and food aid packages were agreed with Washington, Tito continued the correspondence with the Soviets. In December, amidst growing signs of Soviet genuine intent to normalize relations with Yugoslavia, including the toning down of the anti-­Yugoslav propaganda, the process ran into a sudden impasse. Conciliatory gestures were replaced by Khrushchev’s rants. In March, however, after Tito’s public challenge to the Soviet leadership to continue with the normalization, the Soviets seemed inclined to respond positively. This suggested that the stalemate was a factor in the Khrushchev – Malenkov leadership contest, which culminated in a showdown in the end of January, and not part of yet another shift in Moscow’s policy towards Belgrade. The Yugoslav leadership’s search for an alternative foreign policy strategy began almost immediately after the break up with Moscow in 1948. Yugoslavs were under an imperative to find a way out of the international isolation imposed upon the country after the expulsion from the Cominform and to secure a place equidistant from either Bloc. While the Soviet threat was real, priorities of survival dictated close proximity to the Western alliance. Once, however, this danger subsided, by fall of 1954, Tito felt free to venture to India and Burma in search of allies for a new policy of non-­engagement. His first trip to Asia in the winter of 1954–1955 enabled him to define his approach and identify like-­minded leaders in Nehru and Nasser. Within a year and a half after this first venture, by the time they met together in Brioni in July 1956, Tito had managed, together with Nehru and Nasser, to conceptualize basic precepts of a Third World alternative to the Cold War division of the world – the non-­alignment.

108   Normalization The new confidence imbued in Tito and the Yugoslav leadership by his first venture into the non-­engaged world would have a great impact on the way the Yugoslavs approached the further normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations after the winter of 1955. Tito had found allies in the Third World which made him less fearful of the isolation he found himself in in 1948. This realization gave Tito the additional manoeuvrability to deal with the Soviet prevarications and possible Western pressure caused by the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations.

3 Comradeship

In March 1955, after months of impasse, the process of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization was suddenly reactivated. In a dramatic exchange of letters over the next six weeks, Tito and Khrushchev agreed to meet in Belgrade at the end of May. Khrushchev’s historic trip to Yugoslavia on 26 May 1955 shocked the world. The visit, which ended on 2 June with the signing of the so-­called ‘Belgrade Declaration’, would have momentous political impact beyond bilateral Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Khrushchev’s report on the talks with Tito, delivered before the Plenum of the CPSU CC in July, provoked an open confrontation with Molotov. The debate, which for the first time called into question Stalin’s role with regard to the break up with Yugoslavia, forced the hard-­liners into a retreat. This tactical victory would allow Khrushchev and his supporters to begin with the reassessment of Stalin’s personality and character of his rule. This process would lead to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ at the end of the Soviet Party’s Twentieth Congress, eight months later, and the official launch of the process of de-­Stalinization. The Belgrade Declaration affirmed normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations and promulgated principles upon which relations between socialist countries and the Soviet Union should be based on. Khrushchev’s visit marked the end of the seven-­ year confrontation between the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia. During the talks, the Yugoslavs resolutely refused to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’. The discussions in Belgrade revealed an unbridgeable ideological chasm between Belgrade and Moscow. As a result, official relations between the CPSU and the LCY on which the Soviets kept insisting were not renewed. Nevertheless, after July, other aspects of relations between the two countries – economic, political, and cultural – experienced a transformation that was unthinkable only six months earlier. In the beginning of 1956, the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations went even further. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ and admission of Stalin’s responsibility for the 1948 rupture removed the last obstacle to full normalization. A period of apparent comradeship between the two leaderships ensued, paving way for the renewal of relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

110   Comradeship

Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia Khrushchev’s flirting with the hard-­liners at the end of 1954, which helped him eliminate Malenkov as a leadership contender, caused a fleeting impasse in the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization process. However, this tactical alliance was of a truly temporary nature. Within weeks of Malenkov’s removal, the Soviet leadership initiated a continuation of the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. On 23 February 1955, the Presidium of the CPSU sent a Resolution, in the form of a letter to ‘fraternal parties’ informing them of its decision to continue the dialogue with Belgrade.1 The letter, however, underlined that ‘the proclivity of the Yugoslav leaders to sit between two stools, their proclaimed adherence to the so-­called independent position between two “lagers” can only be explained . . . by the distancing of the LCY leaders from Marxism–Leninism.’ The Resolution concluded that ‘in our relations with the Yugoslav leaders we must exercise necessary caution and vigilance’.2 This was an ideological caveat to the satellites and Communists worldwide to engage with the Yugoslavs only at a pace and in the form approved by Moscow. To justify the resumption of contacts with Tito, the document stressed that ‘in the future, we need to continue to work patiently and steadily on breaking Yugoslavia away from the imperialist camp or at least to weaken Yugoslavia’s ties with that camp’.3 The letter, however, did not specify forms of future contacts with the Yugoslavs. This suggested continued disagreements within the Soviet Presidium on the course of future action. The Resolution reiterated that the goal of normalization was to weaken Belgrade’s ties with the West. It did not, however, put forward the more ambitious goal of returning Yugoslavia to the ‘socialist camp’. As available evidence suggests, this Resolution was drafted under Molotov’s supervision, which can explain its ambiguity and absence of any notion that a meeting between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders was being considered.4 On 17 March 1955, however, the Soviet leadership sent a letter to Tito, the first since September 1954.5 Writing as if no time had elapsed since their last exchange, Khrushchev followed up on Tito’s comments of 16 November regarding the prospects of a meeting between the highest representatives of the two governments. He declared Soviet readiness for such a meeting to take place and invited Tito to propose the date and the venue.6 The uncharacteristic brevity of the letter and the fact that it addressed only one issue, the meeting at the highest level, suggested Moscow’s eagerness for it to happen, as soon as possible. It represented a stark departure from the non-­committal character of the Presidium’s letter to ‘fraternal parties’ of 23 February, less than a month earlier. Furthermore, it was manifest to Khrushchev’s resolve and cunning and showed the manner in which he repeatedly outmanoeuvred Molotov. Determined to continue normalization with Yugoslavia and yet still in need of Molotov’s consent in the first weeks after Malenkov’s removal, Khrushchev agreed to the resolution of 23 February, regardless of its ambiguity. Weeks later, as his position vis-­à-vis Molotov strengthened, Khrushchev felt sufficiently secure to push for the resumption of the dialogue with Tito. His letter to Tito of 17 March proposing a

Comradeship   111 meeting suggests that Khrushchev had solidified his position within the Presidium with breathtaking speed. The exchange of letters that ensued between Belgrade and Moscow after 17 March led, within just two months, to Khrushchev’s historic trip to Belgrade. On 16 April, Tito replied to Khrushchev’s March proposal.7 In a very short letter, Tito suggested that the Yugoslav–Soviet meeting took place between 10 and 17 May, ‘on the Danube, on the ship, or, if you are in accordance, in Belgrade’. Tito underlined that the meeting should be public and to have the character of a meeting of heads of governments. He also proposed that a declaration or ‘something similar’ be issued at the end of these talks. Tito also informed the Soviets that, as the President of the Republic, he would head the Yugoslav delegation and expected the same level of representation from the Soviet side.8 The Yugoslav letter of 16 April revealed that Tito’s agreement to meet Soviet leaders in the immediate future was conditional. First, he had ruled out Moscow as the venue. Tito did not want the meeting to look as if he was begging Moscow for forgiveness or to suggest that he was returning to the fold. He was not about to forego the ideological victory he had in his grasp. Second, Tito’s insistence on the state character of the meeting confirmed his determination not to engage in party normalization. Third, the ‘open and public’ character of the talks that he also set as a condition was to ensure that the meeting did not arouse suspicions on the other side and jeopardize Yugoslavia’s excellent relations with the West. Within three weeks, in a letter dated 6 May, Khrushchev confirmed to Tito that the Soviet delegation would be ‘authorized to discuss any question’, meaning that it would be of the highest level.9 Khrushchev also confirmed that he would personally lead the Soviets. Responding to Tito’s condition regarding the state character of the visit, Nikolai Bulganin, the new President of the Council of Ministers, was to act as the nominal head of the Soviet delegation. Khrushchev, however, used the opportunity to remind Tito that the interests of the ‘international proletarian movement’ demanded that the ‘two parties urgently achieve mutual understanding’.10 He accepted, however, Belgrade as the venue for the meeting and suggested 23 May as the beginning of the visit, without specifying its end date. Khrushchev further accepted Tito’s proposal that the meeting be ‘open and public’ and that a declaration be issued at the end of talks.11 Khrushchev’s reply, in particular his agreement to come to Belgrade, which was only one of Tito’s proposals, confirms that by this time Molotov was already unable to obstruct Khrushchev’s actions regarding Yugoslavia.12 Khrushchev’s letter of 6 May also demonstrated the Soviet leadership’s unrelenting desire to continue exerting pressure on the Yugoslavs to accept the renewal of party relations. Khrushchev’s historic trip to Yugoslavia was arranged with bewildering haste. The official press release, issued simultaneously in Moscow and Belgrade on 14 May, named members of both delegations but only stated that the meeting would take place in Belgrade at the end of May.13 The duration of the visit and the agenda of the meeting were finalized by Mićunović and the Soviet Ambassador Volkov on 20 May – less than a week before Khrushchev’s scheduled

112   Comradeship arrival.14 The organizational aspects of the visit were specified and agreed on at the very last moment. This was not due to disagreements between the two sides. On the contrary, both sides were extremely flexible and eager. It was simply because the time span between the agreement to hold the meeting and the scheduled date was extremely short. The Soviet haste was, among other things, a result of the consolidation of Khrushchev’s leadership position. After months of tactical delays imposed by his confrontation with Malenkov, Khrushchev felt free to pursue the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. He genuinely and deeply believed it to be one of the priorities of the Soviet foreign policy.15 Moscow was also eager for the meeting in Belgrade to precede talks on strategic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the three Western powers, scheduled for the end of June in Belgrade. An additional incentive for the Soviet urgency could have been the Geneva ‘Big Four’ summit, scheduled for 18 July. Khrushchev believed that the Yugoslav–Soviet break up and the confrontation that followed had inflicted irreparable damage to the Soviet prestige in the world.16 With the conflict with Belgrade resolved and the Austrian Treaty scheduled to be signed on 15 May, the Soviet delegation believed it would arrive in Geneva with a vastly improved image. Reconciliation with Yugoslavia was also to enhance personal prestige of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, for whom the Geneva meeting represented a debut on the world stage. From their side, the Yugoslavs were happy to have Khrushchev’s visit sooner rather than later. Weary of a repeat of the impasse, such as the one at the end of 1954, the Yugoslav leadership was eager not to miss an opportunity for a real improvement of relations with the Soviets. The Yugoslavs hoped that a meeting with top  Soviet leaders would ensure the continuity of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization.17 At the same time, however, the Yugoslav leadership was determined not to allow the Soviets to use the visit to arouse Western suspicions of Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘socialist camp’. On 13 May, one day before the official announcement, K. Popović conveyed Ambassadors of the US, Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey to inform them of Khrushchev’s forthcoming visit. At the same time he appealed to them to discourage comments in their media that the Yugoslav– Soviet summit signalled Yugoslavia’s return into Moscow’s orbit.18 Belgrade’s concerns regarding the interpretation of Khrushchev’s visit increased dramatically when on 14 May, on the same day when the visit was officially announced, representatives of the Soviet Union and its East European allies formally signed in Warsaw the ‘Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid’, creating a new military alliance in Europe. Tito acted swiftly to reassert Yugoslavia’s opposition to Blocs and to reaffirm its independent position on the eve of Khrushchev’s arrival. A day after the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, at a rally in Pula, Tito publicly criticized the creation of another military alliance in Europe, declaring that, [Yugoslavia] would not join a Bloc of any kind . . . different policies should be pursued, not the policies of Blocs or the policies of ideological division

Comradeship   113 of the world. . . . In preparing for this meeting [with Khrushchev] we have made it clear [to the Soviets] . . . that we want to talk on the basis of equality, that we want to talk as an independent country, that we wish to remain independent in future, as we are today, that we do not wish anyone to interfere in our own affairs. . . . We will confer [during Khrushchev’s visit] in front of the whole world . . . we have no intention of secretly manoeuvring or plotting against anyone.19 Most of the members of Yugoslavia’s highest leadership were informed for the first time about Khrushchev’s visit on 13 May, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC held in Belgrade.20 The fact that Yugoslavia’s top leadership learned of Khrushchev’s visit only hours before the Western Ambassadors was evidence of Tito’s absolute monopoly on decision-­making regarding relations with the Soviet Union. Tito was at the same time on an official visit to France and Kardelj chaired the meeting in his absence. Kardelj stressed to the members of the Executive Committee that, by coming to Belgrade with such [a senior] line-­up, the Russian goal is to exert the strongest possible political and ideological influence on us. . . . It is important that we do not give them any concessions with regard to the Cominform nor with regard to the policy of confrontation between the Blocs.21 Kardelj’s commentary confirms that the Yugoslavs were under no illusions about Soviet intentions and were determined to defend their independent position. Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation landed at Zemun airport in Belgrade on 26 May 1955 at 5 pm. Beside Nikolai A. Bulganin, the President of the Council of Ministers and nominal head of the Soviet delegation and Khrushchev, the delegation also included Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Vice President of the Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Presidium, Dimitri T. Shepilov, member of the CPSU CC and the Chief Editor of Pravda, and Andrey A. Gromyko, the First Deputy Foreign Minister. The Soviets were greeted by Tito, the highest Yugoslav leadership, and the diplomatic corps. The sensational Soviet arrival of the in Belgrade was witnessed by hundreds of foreign correspondents. It was indeed, a world sensation and a rare occurrence of the humbling of the superpower by a small country. Again, symbolism played a very important part in the communication between Tito and Khrushchev. To emphasize the importance of the party relations, Khrushchev, who was a Party Secretary, stood together with Bulganin, the head of the Soviet Government, during the ceremonial greeting reserved for visiting heads of states. Tito, however, greeted the Soviets wearing a Marshal’s uniform to underline the fact that this was a state visit.22 Khrushchev was the one who, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, approached the microphones at the airport and read a speech. He began by reminding those present of the strong ties that exist between peoples of Yugoslavia and the USSR, and in particular of bonds forged between them during the common

114   Comradeship struggle against the Fascist aggressors.23 This opening statement suggested that such bonds were stronger than any ‘misunderstandings’. He then continued that  after a period of comradeship immediately after the Second World War, relations between the two countries were ‘spoiled. We sincerely regret for what happened and resolutely reject everything that was accumulated during that period.’ Without naming the year or calling it ‘the rupture’, he attributed responsibility for the 1948 break up to Beria, Abakumov and other ‘unmasked enemies of the people’. Khrushchev expressed his belief that this period was behind the two countries and promised that ‘from our side, we are ready to do whatever is necessary to remove all obstacles to full normalization of relations between our states and to further strengthening of friendly relations between our peoples’. Although pinning the blame on Beria, these statements represented the closest the Soviets could come to an apology for the 1948 conflict. Khrushchev then pledged that Yugoslav–Soviet relations in future would be based ‘on prin­ ciples of peaceful co-­existence, equality between the states, non-­interference and respect of sovereignty and national self-­determination’.24 By reiterating these principles Khrushchev hoped to reassure Tito. He also acknowledged Yugoslavia’s independent role and expressed Soviet understanding for Yugoslavia’s desire to develop relations with both the East and the West. At the end of his speech, however, Khrushchev insisted on the need for the re-­establishment of party relations between the CPSU and the LCY. He reminded the Yugoslavs that Lenin, to whom Yugoslav Communists continued to swear allegiance, was the founder of the CPSU.25 According to witness accounts, Tito could hardly conceal his anger at the end of the speech. He was particularly unhappy with Khrushchev’s explanation of who was responsible for 1948 and his insistence on the renewal of party relations, suggesting that it would be on the meeting’s agenda. This was contrary to explicit conditions Tito set out in recent correspondence and to the official agenda of the meeting, agreed by Mićunović and Volkov on 20 May. When Khrushchev finished, Tito defied the protocol and declined to speak. Moreover, he did not allow Khrushchev’s speech to be translated, explaining to the Soviet leader that those present understood Russian. Tito simply waved the stunned and humiliated Khrushchev to the waiting limousine.26 The first round of Yugoslav–Soviet talks took place on 27 May. Before the official start, Khrushchev felt compelled to explain to Tito and the Yugoslavs that his speech at the airport was approved by the Presidium and was intended for the Soviet public and the ‘fraternal parties’. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership was worried that people might be asking themselves whether ‘[the new Soviet leadership] is selling out . . . because we have claimed that you have sold yourselves [to the Capitalists]’.27 The Soviet leader’s frank admission reveals the level of the anxiety with which the Soviets arrived in Belgrade. Khrushchev would later admit that he found it necessary to apologize for his speech to Tito; he realized that attributing blame to Beria sounded hollow.28 As agreed, the first day was dedicated to the first point on the agenda: the international situation. The second point on the agenda, bilateral relations, was to be

Comradeship   115 addressed during the second day of official talks. This was done intentionally, to allow the two delegations to get to know each other before they began addressing what was expected to be highly contentious – the 1948 break up and subsequent confrontation.29 The venue chosen for the official talks was ‘Dom Garde [The House of the Guards]’, a hall inside the Presidential Guard compound, close to Tito’s Belgrade residence. The choice of this Hall was highly symbolic. Talks that were to end the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict were being held in the very same hall where, in July 1948, the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia took place. The Congress was convened only weeks after the Cominform resolution which expelled Yugoslavia, to demonstrate overwhelming Party support to Tito’s rebuttal of Stalin. In accordance with agreed protocol, Tito was to give a short introduction and then to hand over to Khrushchev. In his opening address, Tito mentioned the ‘misunderstandings of the past’ only in passing, expressing hope that it would be overcome only if addressed openly and in direct talks.30 Tito’s conciliatory tone suggested that he had decided to brush aside Khrushchev’s airport speech and focus on the success of the talks, which would consolidate Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. In the first sentence of his exposé, Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet delegation was authorized by the Government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU to discuss any and every question with the Yugoslavs. The necessity to assert their credentials revealed Khrushchev and his colleagues’ awareness that they still lacked Stalin’s authority. The Belgrade meeting was Khrushchev’s first true international appearance outside the umbrella of the ‘collective leadership’. Khrushchev continued his expose by admitting how difficult it was for them to come to Belgrade. They had to endure not only the hostility from those in the leadership who opposed normalization, but the bewilderment of the majority of the Soviet public whose perception of Yugoslavia had been shaped by years of anti-­Yugoslav propaganda. In continuation Khrushchev went on to elaborate the Soviet position on major international issues. He singled out Germany as the most important question of the day. In Khrushchev’s view, after West Germany’s accession to NATO, the agreement on the future of Germany had become impossible. He insisted that this cancelled any notion of the unification of Germany because it would simply ‘add ten million East Germans’ to NATO forces. However, Khrushchev revealed that the Soviets were eager to establish normal relations with West Germany and would like to see the same happen between the two Germanys. On disarmament, he confirmed that the Soviets were genuinely in favour of the reduction of armaments and armies, and were ready to sign a realistic agreement immediately. At the same time, however, Khrushchev was very pessimistic about the outcome of the forthcoming Geneva summit of the Big Four. He was convinced that the Americans did not want the summit to succeed. Knowing that it would appeal to Tito, Khrushchev then declared Soviet readiness to disband the newly created Warsaw Treaty Organisation, if the West would dismember NATO. Tito interrupted Khrushchev at this point with a question whether this meant that the Soviets would agree to the liquidation of the Blocs. Khrushchev confirmed this.

116   Comradeship To Tito’s question about the Bandung Conference, which had just ended, Khrushchev replied that the Soviets would gladly undersign many of the Conference’s conclusions. With regard to the Far East, the Soviet leader condemned American policy towards the People’s Republic of China. He then informed the Yugoslavs that during his recent trip to China he had established excellent relations with the Chinese leadership, in particular with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Khrushchev also confirmed that the USSR was providing all necessary economic and ‘other’ support to Ho Chi Minh to consolidate his power in North Vietnam. Turning to Yugoslavia’s relations with the ‘socialist camp’, Khrushchev pointed out that the Soviet initiative for normalization with Yugoslavia was not a result of a joint policy formulated with ‘People’s Democracies’ but that they had been informed of Soviet actions in advance. He underlined that the Soviet leadership received endorsement for the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia from all ‘fraternal parties’, as well as from Mao.31 This statement once again confirmed the Soviet leadership’s awareness that it lacked authority in the international Communist movement. Khrushchev then asserted that the situation in the People’s Democracies was ‘solid’. He concluded his overview of the global state of affairs with an opinion that, despite tensions between the USSR and the US, the current situation ‘[did] not smell of war’ to him. In the end, Khrushchev could not resist firing a passing shot at the Yugoslavs. He warned them not to forget that the American aid to Yugoslavia was designed to serve US strategic interests.32 Following Khrushchev’s deliberations, Tito presented Yugoslavia’s outlook on the international issues. He began his exposé by stressing that in its relations with the West and the US, Yugoslavia had never compromised its independence or its resolve to build socialism based on Marxism–Leninism. Tito then addressed the issue that he assumed was of primary interest to the Soviets, in particular since Khrushchev did not even mention it in his presentation – the Balkan Pact. After reminding the Soviets of the circumstances, which compelled Yugoslavia to seek an alliance with Greece and Turkey, Tito went on to minimize the military aspect of the Alliance. He declared that ‘[the Balkan Pact] will now be given, before all else, the cultural, economic, and political dimension’.33 Tito’s interpretation was an obvious tactical move to diffuse a contentious issue that threatened to be a stumbling block in the further course of the talks. He diverted Soviet attention further by focusing on an uncontroversial topic – he spent considerable time recounting enthusiastically of his recent trips to India and Burma. Tito stressed how impressed he was with the strides India was making towards industrialisation and with Nehru as a visionary politician. At one point, Khrushchev cut in with an admission that the Soviet leadership knew very little of India, even less of Burma. He described how, during his recent trip to China, he had asked Mao about India and Burma and that Mao admitted knowing little about the two countries. Khrushchev then stressed that, after Tito’s comments, the Soviet leadership would approach Nehru’s forthcoming visit to Moscow, scheduled for June, with increased interest. Concluding his account of the trip to Asia, Tito referred to his one-­day meeting with Nasser in

Comradeship   117 Suez. He had a very positive impression of Nasser and conviction that the Egyptian leader would play an important role in the Near and the Middle East. Tito then voiced anxiety about the Egyptian leader’s precarious position vis-­à-vis the traditional colonial powers and advised Soviets to help out Nasser. He further suggested that this assistance should not be conducted in an open fashion, as it could trigger a violent reaction from these powers.34 Khrushchev confided in Tito that the Soviet Union was already supplying Nasser with weapons to which Tito replied that Yugoslavia was doing the same. It is extraordinary that such a confidential exchange occurred during the very first day of the first meeting between Tito and Khrushchev. It is evidence to how ideological proximity led to propinquity of outlook on international issues despite the conflict that raged between the two countries until only recently. Moreover, it heralded the ease with which Tito and Khrushchev would, in future, transcend existing differences and animosity whenever it was necessary to find common ground on issues of strategic importance. The confidential exchange on Egypt also revealed the beginning of the Soviet and Yugoslav engagement in one of the most strategically important regions in the world. At one point during the remainder of the first day of talks, a discussion on aspects of international issues inescapably sparked off an ideological confrontation. While presenting a case for cooperation between the Communist, socialist and social democratic parties in Western Europe, Kardelj argued against a single form of socialism being imposed on others. Moreover, he suggested that the parliamentarian evolution could be the form of transition to socialism in Western Europe and that Communists should support nationalist and anti-­colonial movements, even if they were not openly pro-­Communist. Kardelj’s statements immediately drew a heated response from the Soviets. Khrushchev argued that the social democrats’ amity towards the Yugoslavs was only part of the Western strategy to distance Yugoslavia from true Marxism–Leninism and from the Soviet Union. To this, Tito immediately replied that the distancing that occurred between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was not the responsibility of the social democrats but the result of the 1948 rupture. At this point, the exchanges became heated and confrontational. Khrushchev proposed that a commission be formed from members of the two delegations that would address all disputed ideological questions and suggest ways to resolve them. Khrushchev insisted that ‘on cardinal questions there cannot be two approaches’.35 Members of the Soviet delegation declared Kardelj’s views on the evolutionary rather than revolutionary socialist transformation contrary to the teachings of Marxism–Leninism. Tito, however, did not even acknowledge Khrushchev’s proposal for the appointment of a commission that would rule on ideological discord.36 He was careful not to fall into the trap; the creation of such a commission would give legitimacy to the notion of one truth and one road to socialism. It would also confirm that the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was in essence ideological in character. In contrast to discussions on international issues, as soon as the conversation turned towards ideological questions, the two sides ceased to look for common ground and reverted to their entrenched positions. The existing ideological chasm proved to be unbridgeable.

118   Comradeship The second day of the official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, on 28 May, was devoted to the Yugoslav–Soviet bilateral relationship.37 Tito spoke first and immediately addressed the causes of the 1948 schism. He insisted that the disagreements between the two sides had started before 1948 and could be traced back to the War years. Tito reminded all present how offended the Yugoslavs had felt when they heard of the Stalin-­Churchill October 1944 percentage agreement on Yugoslavia. According to him, the main cause of the 1948 rupture was the ‘erroneous Soviet approach to the relations between socialist countries’. The Yugoslav leader pointed out that, at the time, ‘certain’ Soviet leaders simply denied the existence of individual particularities in the development of Yugoslavia and other countries. Tito underlined that the Soviet hegemonic aspirations and Yugoslavia’s desire to preserve its sovereignty and independence were the cause of the 1948 split. Within this context, he added that ‘there is no need for special ties, for artificial discipline that would hold together states, peoples, and, in particular the Communist parties . . . what is important is the unity of the goal. . . . There is no single method [for achieving the goal of building socialism that is] applicable for all countries’.38 With this, Tito confirmed his opposition to all forms of supranational organizations empowered to secure cohesion within the Communist movement. Addressing the question of Western aid to Yugoslavia, the subject of frequent Soviet jibes, Tito reminded them of the hardships that Yugoslavia had to endure as a consequence of the catastrophic economic blockade imposed by the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies in 1948. He underlined that the aid received from the West, particularly the US, had helped Yugoslavia to survive. Furthermore, according to Tito, when the USSR and the People’s Democracies threatened to attack, Yugoslavia had been obliged to seek military aid from the West to defend itself. He accentuated that throughout this period of dependency on the West, Yugoslavia had preserved its national and ideological independence. Tito however, added that of late Yugoslavia and the West were increasingly ‘following divergent paths’ due to ‘Yugoslavia’s new concepts of foreign policy, [namely its] position against both Blocs’. As a result, as he pointed out, Yugoslavia was seeking to free itself from the dependence on Western aid and expressed hope that it would be able to do so in a year or so.39 To underline the sincerity of these remarks, Tito disclosed the true size of Western, mainly US, aid to Yugoslavia. He stated that between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia received approximately US$1.5 billion, of which approximately US$600 million was economic aid and the remainder was military assistance.40 Tito’s statements were obviously designed to impress the Soviet delegation; he was deliberately optimistic in forecasting the termination of Western aid. On the one hand, it was intended to help Khrushchev counter accusations by the opponents of the normalization that Western aid was proof that Yugoslavia was selling out to the West. On the other hand, this statement reflected Tito’s genuine desire to reduce Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western aid. Khrushchev’s first letter in June 1954 encouraged the Yugoslav leadership to begin entertaining the notion that improvement of relations with the Soviets would offer Yugoslavia an alternative

Comradeship   119 source of economic assistance. Tito hoped that the Belgrade meeting would inaugurate the renewal of substantial Yugoslav–Soviet economic cooperation. For the remainder of the second day, however, Stalin’s spectre came to dominate, directly or indirectly, the discussions. Tito and his associates informed the Soviet delegation in detail of their grievances regarding Soviet behaviour towards Yugoslavia preceding the 1948 break up. They singled out the workings of ‘joint-­stock companies’, the role of Soviet military and civil advisers, and the conduct of Soviet intelligence in Yugoslavia. Khrushchev and his colleagues gave the impression of being genuinely interested in learning the truth. Khrushchev insisted that it was essential for him and his comrades ‘to become acquainted with the past [in order] to prevent such occurrences in the future’.42 In this context, Khrushchev mentioned Stalin for the first time. He admitted that there were different opinions on Stalin and that some of his actions were ‘uncomfortable’. Khrushchev insisted, however, that Stalin always remained faithful to the interests of the proletariat. He spoke of Stalin’s genius and of the clarity of his thought. However, after uttering these praises, Khrushchev added that since Stalin’s death the Soviet leadership had done much to ‘amend’ some of the things he had done. Nevertheless, he insisted that this ‘amending’ did not mean that the Soviet leadership was ‘correcting Stalin . . . because it would [weaken] our Marxist–Leninist camp’.43 Although at the time of his visit to Yugoslavia he was becoming increasingly aware of crimes committed during Stalin’s leadership, Khrushchev could not discard Stalin’s postulate that strong control of society by the state apparatus and the Soviet hegemony in the ‘socialist camp’ were the essential foundations of socialism. Khrushchev’s observations revealed the limited extent to which he could, or was, at the time allowed to question Stalin’s personality. Indeed, despite his crucial personal role in making the ‘secret speech’ possible and for the process of de-­Stalinization, a measure of personal inability to confront the full extent of Stalin’s crimes would haunt Khrushchev throughout his tenure as the Soviet leader and would prevent him from decisively transcending Stalin’s legacy. This personal dilemma and dichotomy, in my opinion, could explain his transformation following the Hungarian events in 1956. Further discussions during the second day focused on how and why it was possible for fabricated accusations against Yugoslavia to escalate in 1948 into the full-­blown confrontation between the two countries. Khrushchev explained that once the conflict had started, the fact that Yugoslavia was receiving Western aid seemed to confirm that it ‘sold out to the Capitalists’. In a rare emotional outburst, Tito interrupted Khrushchev exclaiming that there must have been something very wrong with the Soviet leaders if they could believe this nonsense, in particular because he and his associates never ceased to claim publicly that they were Communists. Apparently very excited, Tito exclaimed, ‘not even the Devil himself could force me to go towards another system . . . how could I betray myself . . . I consider myself part of the idea of Marxism–Leninism’. Khrushchev replied that it was easy for Tito to speak as he did, but that he should try to put himself in the position of Khrushchev and his comrades in 41

120   Comradeship 1948. He added that what had happened could not be rectified but, that the Soviet leadership was now showing courage. He insisted that ‘[he and the Soviet delegation] did not come [to Yugoslavia] because of [their] weakness. . . . We cursed you, called you Fascists and Devil knows what else, and then we came to you . . . We understood that it would not be possible for you to take the initiative’.44 The catharsis of emotional exchanges allowed the second day to end in a friendly atmosphere. The two sides had engaged in soul searching with surprising candour. This unexpected openness made it possible for the Yugoslavs and the Soviets to look back at 1948 and the ensuing conflict in a manner that would not threaten the meeting itself. It removed layers of mutual distrust and in doing so enabled both leaders and their aides to successfully conclude their first encounter since 1948. After two days of official talks in Belgrade, the two delegations flew to Tito’s summer retreat, the Adriatic island of Brioni. The relaxed atmosphere and informal exchanges during the one-­day stay on the island further contributed towards the building of, if not trust, then certainly respect between Tito and Khrushchev. The only available account of the informal conversations held in Brioni was provided by Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CPSU CC, a month after he returned from Yugoslavia.45 According to him, in Brioni the Soviets finally managed to have an exchange with Tito on normalization of party relations. In Belgrade, whenever they initiated the question of re-­establishment of party relations, Tito would respond that the issue was not on the official agenda, adding that they would have an opportunity to talk about it in Brioni. According to Khrushchev, in Brioni Tito took him, Bulganin and Mikoyan for a ride around the island. Driving the car himself, Tito finally addressed the renewal of party relations. Recounting the incident, Khrushchev emphasized the fact that there were no other Yugoslavs present, which, in his opinion, allowed Tito to speak frankly, ‘without witnesses’.46 He reassured the Soviets that eventually the two sides would reach an understanding on re-­establishment of Party links. Khrushchev and others then reminded Tito of one of his speeches in May during which he appealed to Yugoslav Communists to remain faithful to the ideas of Marxism–Leninism. This had led them to conclude that he was debating with someone in the LCY leadership. According to Khrushchev, Tito confirmed this to be the case, admitting that hardly a week passed that he did not fight those in the Yugoslav leadership who, on ideological grounds, opposed the renewal of Party links.47 He reiterated that relations between the two parties should be improved gradually, step by step. Promising that he and his colleagues ‘would spare no effort’ to bring forward normalization of party relations, he also pointed to circumstances which prevented this from happening too soon. Tito underlined that after years of vicious confrontation with the USSR, the Yugoslav people and the LCY needed to be prepared for a change of such magnitude. Furthermore, hasty renewal of relations with the Soviet Party would jeopardize Yugoslavia’s economic recovery, which was wholly dependent on US and Western economic aid. Tito proposed to Khrushchev that the best way to reconcile existing ideological differences and to bring forward the re-­establishment of party

Comradeship   121 relations would be through further exchange of letters between the two Central Committees. He promised to send such a letter to the CPSU CC, in the nearest future.48 Khrushchev’s reading of Tito’s explanations was, in my opinion, either naïve or a manipulation aimed to win over the Plenum audience. He may have chosen to present the Brioni incident as proof of Tito’s plight. It conveniently demonstrated to members of the Central Committee the timeliness of the meeting that took place with the Yugoslav leader and the need to support him against those in Belgrade who were trying to steer Yugoslavia further into the Western embrace. Khrushchev was reporting to the Plenum, aware that many in the Soviet Central Committee remained sceptical towards normalization with Tito; many more were deeply unhappy with his visit and what they saw as the humiliating kowtow in front of the Yugoslav leaders. As indirect Yugoslav archival evidence suggests, the Brioni conversation ‘without witnesses’ was Tito’s calculated manoeuvre. It aimed to preserve established good atmosphere in talks and Soviet cooperativeness by preventing the question of party relations to take the centre stage. As previously shown, Tito’s deliberations at the July LCY Executive Committee meeting confirm his conviction that normalization with USSR would hugely benefit Yugoslavia’s foreign policy position. He also understood that, if successful, the visit would stabilize the process of normalization and put it on an irreversible track. Tito was thus resolute not to allow heated discussions on party relations between overzealous members of the two delegations, to trigger an ideological spat that could paralyze the talks and endanger the final outcome of the visit.49 Indeed, his anxiety was proven justified. The transcripts show that flare ups erupted during two days of talks in Belgrade. Whenever discussions touched on the contentious issue of ideology or responsibility for the 1948 break up.50 At the same time, Tito was equally determined not to rush with the renewal of party links. He had emphasized, time and again, that he was adamant not to allow establishment of party relations so early in the process of normalization, as it would endanger the existing level of Yugoslavia’s cooperation with the West. As we know from the already-­cited transcript of the LCY Executive Committee meeting in July and other Yugoslav documents, what Tito had said to the Soviets in Brioni, according to Khrushchev’s account, did not differ from the positions and evaluations he shared with his aides. Moreover, he was unopposed within the Yugoslav leadership and commanded absolute control over its policies towards the Soviets. All this suggests that there was no need for Tito to communicate with Khrushchev ‘without witnesses’. He used the theatrics to persuade the Soviets to accept postponement of party normalization while continuing with the normalization of government relations. On 2 June, after the signing of a Declaration and the Joint Communiqué, the Soviet delegation left Belgrade. The Declaration, officially referred to as the Belgrade Declaration, was drafted by the Yugoslavs. The Soviets had accepted it with only minor amendments, obviously as eager as Tito was to bring their first meeting to a successful conclusion. The Belgrade Declaration remains a unique document of the Cold War. It formulated principles that should govern relations

122   Comradeship between a small country and a superpower and between a socialist country and the Communist Bloc hegemon.51 The document consisted of three parts. The smallest part, which addressed international issues, was characteristic in its brevity and omission of many important international issues of the day, such as the German question or disarmament. Given the expressed closeness of views on these issues during talks, as confirmed in transcripts, Tito obviously wished to avoid accusations from the West that he supported Soviet views. The section of the Declaration stipulating the principles upon which relations between states should be based on was the largest. It was of particular significance since it transcended bilateral relations. As the most important among these principles it promulgated respect for the sovereignty, independence and integrity, as well as peaceful co-­existence, between states with different political systems. The Declaration underlined that the nature of the political and social system and the choice of different forms of socialism were prerogatives of the peoples of individual countries. In this context, it rejected every form of imposition of political or economic hegemony on other countries. In the third part, related to the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, the Declaration stipulated that after a period of confrontation, the two countries were determined to improve their relations on the basis of the principles to which they had committed. Among areas of future cooperation, it awarded most prominence to economic collaboration.52 The wording and the contents of the Belgrade Declaration revealed why the Yugoslavs had insisted on it. They believed that a document stipulating prin­ ciples upon which the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR should be based on, once signed by the Soviets would prevent ‘misunderstandings’ and confrontation between the two countries in future. The Yugoslavs hoped that a document of this kind would ensure the continuity of the improvement of relations and lead to full Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. The content and conduct of Yugoslav–Soviet talks confirm firm resolve on both sides to ensure the success of the meeting. First and foremost, the visit signalled an end to the seven-­year conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc. It also reasserted the process of normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and provided impetus for their further improvement. Although talks confirmed congruence of Yugoslav and Soviet positions on many international issues, the meeting failed to bridge the ideological divide that existed between the two leaderships. Relations between the LCY and the CPSU were not re-­established. Tito successfully manoeuvred the Soviets, in particular during the Brioni exchanges, from extracting imminent renewal of party relations, as the price for normalization. The visit, nevertheless, signalled an end to Belgrade’s isolation from the international Communist movement, in spite of Yugoslav resolute refusal to return to the Soviet ‘camp’. Eager to use normalization with the USSR to facilitate his quest for equidistance to either Bloc, Tito was vitally interested in the success of Khrushchev’s visit. This can explain absence of confrontational responses from the Yugoslav side to Khrushchev’s occasional rigid positions, even provocations. Tito’s absolute command over the Yugoslav leadership enabled him to manage and control the atmosphere as well

Comradeship   123 as the conduct of the talks. He was confident that, if successful, Khrushchev’s visit would bring irreversibility into the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was as determined as Tito to make the talks in Belgrade a success. Too much of his political capital had been staked on normalization with Yugoslavia and in particular on his decision to travel to Belgrade for him to allow the visit to fail. This, in my opinion, rather than political naiveté, can explain his readiness to go along with Tito’s manoeuvring, including that in Brioni, as well as to accept the Belgrade Declaration more or less as drafted by the Yugoslavs. It is worth noting that it was Bulganin and not Khrushchev who signed the document. At the same time, the meeting and talks with Tito prompted Khrushchev to re-­examine Stalin’s role and legacy.53 Although he was still reluctant to openly challenge Stalin, the true impact of the visit on Khrushchev would become evident during the course of the forthcoming Plenum of the CPSU CC, held in Moscow between 4 and 12 July. Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and the reconciliation with Tito reverberated throughout Eastern Europe and the international Communist movement. Poisoned by years of fierce anti-­Yugoslav propaganda, most people in the Soviet Bloc greeted events in Belgrade with shock and disbelief. Many even saw Khrushchev’s trip as a sign of Soviet surrender to Yugoslavia on ideological matters.54 After the conclusion of their visit to Yugoslavia and the signing of the Belgrade Declaration, Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation did not return immediately to Moscow. Instead, on 2 June 1955 they flew to Sofia and then on to Bucharest where the leaders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary joined them. Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan conferred with the satellite leaders before they briefed their own Presidium. Khrushchev admitted later that ‘it was deemed necessary to visit several countries of the People’s Democracies’ in order for the ‘fraternal parties and peoples to understand us correctly’.55 Moreover, on 25 June, the CPSU CC also sent a letter to all ‘fraternal’ parties with an account of the talks in Yugoslavia.56 The need to explain and justify the visit to its allies immediately after it took place suggests that Moscow feared opposition and confusion in Eastern Europe regarding the reconciliation with Tito. It also confirmed, once again, that the new Soviet leadership was principally aware that it lacked the undisputed authority Stalin commanded over the international Communist movement. Belgrade’s immediate reaction to the results of Khrushchev’s visit avoided euphoria, emphasizing instead that the visit represented only a beginning, albeit a hugely important one, of true improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. In his circular to Yugoslav Ambassadors on 4 June, Koča Popović stressed that the visit represented ‘an admission by the USSR, although not a full one, of mistakes done towards Yugoslavia’. He also underlined that it signified Soviet recognition of Yugoslavia’s independent road to socialism.57 With regard to party relations, according to Popović, the Soviets had hoped to establish co-­operation based on common ideology, in fact on ideological compromises from our side. . . . It seems that the Russians still lack realism in their approach . . . to

124   Comradeship our bilateral relations and are not yet capable of profound understanding of the implications of the policies pursued by Stalin.58 Popovi´c concluded that the visit had made it clear that Yugoslav–Soviet relations would depend on future developments in the USSR and would ‘progress at a slow pace’.59 Yugoslavia’s foreign policy activities following Khrushchev’s visit reflected its desire to play one Bloc against the other in pursuit of the position of equidistance. Between 24 and 27 June 1955, only three weeks after Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia, a meeting of representatives of the Yugoslav Government and the Ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom and France took place in Belgrade. The Ambassadorial Conference represented the follow up to strategic coordination talks between Yugoslavia and the three Western powers, first held in November 1952 when General Handy visited Belgrade, and then in August 1953 in Washington. On the one hand, the convening of the Ambassadorial Conference manifested Belgrade’s determination to uphold the existing level of relations with the West. To this end, the official Communiqué of the Conference emphasized ‘cordiality and mutual trust’ between Yugoslavia and its Western partners.60 By holding the Conference only weeks after Khrushchev’s departure, the Yugoslavs also wished to send a message to Moscow that they would not allow the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations to jeopardize Yugoslavia’s independent foreign policy and its relations with the West. At the Conference, however, Yugoslavia refused to commit itself to further strategic coordination talks with the West. Still, Belgrade insisted, that current levels of Western military aid be maintained.61 In a way, this was a tactical manoeuvre. The Yugoslav leadership wished to keep all options open until the attitude of the Soviets towards the future course of Yugoslav–Soviet relations became clearer. The Yugoslav behaviour after the Ambassadorial Conference reflected the new reality created by the Khrushchev visit. Belgrade was now careful to play the balancing game; every move that could be read as pro-­West or pro-­East had to be counterbalanced with a gesture in the opposite direction. The day after the Conference adjourned, on 28 June, Belgrade issued the official press release announcing that Tito had accepted Khrushchev’s invitation, extended to him during the meeting in Belgrade to visit the USSR at some future date.62 It was also not coincidental that this announcement came on 28 June, which marked the seventh anniversary of the expulsion of Yugoslavia. By itself, it was a sign of a Yugoslav victory. Excommunicated in 1948, Tito was now being officially invited to visit the USSR! The next day, the Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Srdja Prica, called in the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, and acquainted him, albeit in very general terms, with the contents of the Ambassadorial Conference. Prica pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that during the Conference, Yugoslavia had not undertaken further military commitments vis-­àvis the Western alliance.63 It was the first time since 1948 that the Yugoslavs had informed the Soviets of their dealings with the West. On the same day, 29 June, Tito himself met the Soviet Ambassador.64 Following up on Prica’s earlier brief,

Comradeship   125 he pointed out to the Ambassador that the positive tone of the joint Communiqué released after the Conference did not reflect accurately the fact that the Americans were very unhappy with its outcome. Yugoslavia, according to Tito, had decided to hold the Conference ‘in order to disperse Western illusions regarding their relations with Yugoslavia’.65 He also talked at length to Volkov about dis­ agreements that had arisen of late between Yugoslavia and Turkey, its Balkan Pact ally. The two countries were growing increasingly at odds with each other because of Yugoslavia’s intention to underplay the military aspect of the Pact. Tito’s ‘indiscretion’ was obviously intended to reconfirm assurances given to Khrushchev during talks in Belgrade that the Balkan Pact would not serve as a threat to the USSR. Tito concluded his conversation with Volkov by underlining Yugoslavia’s desire to substantially increase economic cooperation with the USSR. The transcript of Khrushchev’s closing address at the July Plenum of the CPSU CC confirms that Tito had achieved his goal. Khrushchev was so impressed with the Tito-­Volkov meeting that he read the Ambassador’s report in its entirety to the Plenum.66 During their meeting on 29 June, Tito also handed Volkov a letter for the CPSU CC in which he addressed the issue of the renewal of relations between the two parties.67 It was the fulfilment of another promise given to Khrushchev in Brioni and part of Tito’s effort to maintain the momentum created by Khrushchev’s visit.68 In the letter, Tito acknowledged that the achieved level of normalization between Yugoslavia and the USSR had made possible establishment of ‘contacts’ between their two parties. Terminology was important – instead of re-­ establishment of relations between the two Parties, the letter spoke of contacts. Tito suggested that these contacts should be conducted in the form of letters, exchanges between institutions and, ambiguously, through ‘personal contacts’. The Yugoslav leader, however, used the opportunity to reiterate his ideological positions. He stressed that different levels of economic, social and cultural development in various countries have given birth to different forms of socialism. Tito also accentuated that the cooperation between Communist parties should be voluntary, based on the principles of equality and non-­interference into the affairs of others. According to him, individual Communist parties must never again be subordinated to a supranational organization acting as an ideological arbiter and empowered to impose solutions on individual parties. The rebuttal of Cominform was blatantly obvious. Finally, Tito endorsed the need for cooperation between the Communist, socialist and social democratic parties.69 Tito’s letter of 29 June confirmed that, although eager to keep the momentum of Khrushchev’s visit alive, Tito was as determined not to make concessions to Moscow on pivotal ideological positions that could compromise Yugoslavia’s independence from the Soviet Bloc. To avoid ideological confrontation that could endanger the process of normalization Tito insisted that these polemics be confined within the exchange of letters. It is within this context that one should read Tito’s true intentions behind the 29 June meeting with the Soviet Ambassador. His ‘indiscretions’ about the Ambassadorial Conference and reassurances about the benign character of the Balkan Pact were meant to counterbalance

126   Comradeship what was in essence a further delay in the renewal of party links, the re-­assertion of Yugoslav ideological positions manifestly opposed to the Soviet ones, and the Yugoslav refusal to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’. The forthcoming Plenum of the CPSU CC was equally responsible for the timing and the content of Tito’s meeting with Volkov and in particular for the timing of the letter to the Soviet Central Committee. Tito might have somehow been alerted by Khrushchev in Belgrade or Brioni to the Soviet Party Plenum in July that was to address Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia. At the LCY July 1954 Executive Committee meeting and on many occasions since, Tito made it clear that he believed that the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations served to strengthen the position of the anti-­Stalinist ‘forces’ within the Soviet leadership.70 In this context, the Yugoslav leader was keen to provide Khrushchev with concrete proofs of the success of his Yugoslav policy to be presented to the Plenum. Khrushchev responded to Tito’s letter surprisingly promptly, on 7 July 1955, while the Plenum was still in session.71 Addressing the question of individual forms of socialism, Khrushchev acknowledged that ‘it is possible that different countries can apply different forms and methods of building socialism’. He named examples of such ‘different’ forms as those practiced in China, Poland and Czechoslovakia.72 Although not in a confrontational manner Khrushchev nonetheless identified the point of true incompatibility with the Yugoslavs. Referring to the cooperation between the Communists and the social democrats, Khrushchev insisted that relations between the Communist parties ‘must be tighter’ because the interests of the working class required from them ‘closer co-­ordination of action’.73 The swiftness of the Soviet Presidium’s response and its apparent non-­confrontational tone regarding different forms of socialism revealed that the Soviets had by then judged the process of normalization to have yielded positive results. Furthermore, the Kremlin also demonstrated eagerness not to allow ideological incompatibility to endanger this process. The tone of Khrushchev’s arguments also suggested that the issue of different forms of socialism arose as a source of friction in Yugoslav– Soviet exchanges whenever the Yugoslavs insisted that it implied freedom from membership of the ‘socialist camp’. The divergence of socialist forms, per se, was not unacceptable to Khrushchev, as long as the Communist parties conformed to the ‘unity in action’, in accordance with Moscow’s foreign policy goals. For the time being, however, both sides found it convenient to tone down the line of ideological demarcation between them – Yugoslavia’s refusal to rejoin the ‘camp’.

The July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Between 4 and 12 July, while the latest round of correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev was taking place, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union was in session in Moscow. The Plenum represented a threshold in the Soviet post-­Stalin transition. The Yugoslav–Soviet normalization and Khrushchev’s trip to Yugoslavia dominated its proceedings

Comradeship   127 and determined the conclusions set in its Resolution. On 9 July, after hearing Khrushchev’s official report, the Plenum began its deliberations on the result of the visit of the official Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia. The debates that followed would take up the remaining three days of the Plenum, until its adjournment on 12 July. Molotov, who had been attacked in the report for opposing the Presidium’s policy towards Yugoslavia, spoke after Khrushchev. Not only did he reject Khrushchev’s accusations but, went into a counteroffensive condemning the policy of normalization with Yugoslavia as the ‘betrayal of principles of Marxism–Leninism’. Molotov’s reaction inaugurated a showdown between two strategic policy orientations within the Presidium. Bulganin immediately replicated and, point by point, rebuffed Molotov’s arguments. On 11 July, the next working day of the Plenum, the remaining members of the Presidium, including Suslov and Malenkov, spoke in support of Khrushchev, adding to accusations against Molotov. On the last day, Khrushchev delivered a closing address, which confirmed his tactical victory against Molotov.74 The first priority for Khrushchev and his supporters at the Plenum was to justify the visit to Yugoslavia. In the opening sentences of his report, Khrushchev acknowledged that ‘many have said that by going to Belgrade we would make concessions to Yugoslavs and hurt the prestige of the USSR’. He explained that the Soviet leadership had concluded that the trip to Belgrade offered the best opportunity for ‘open and direct discussion with Yugoslavia’s leaders’.75 Khrushchev then explained the motives behind the Soviet leadership’s decision to initiate full normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. He stressed that the continuation of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict increased the possibility that the ‘West would succeed in overturning [Yugoslavia’s] socialist regime’.76 After distancing Yugoslavia from the socialist ‘camp’, the West would then, according to Khrushchev, create a ‘breach’ in the Communist front and ‘attract to this road other countries of People’s Democracies’.77 He singled out detaching Yugoslavia’s military potential from the Western alliance as the most important motive behind the Soviet initiative for the normalization with Yugoslavia. Khrushchev pointed out that if successful in acquiring Yugoslavia, the West would succeed in cutting off the Soviet Bloc from the Mediterranean Sea. He stressed triumphantly that the Presidium was of the opinion that, first results have been achieved and conditions have been created for further improvement of contacts and togetherness between the LCY and the CPSU . . . and for a more forceful influence of fraternal parties on the Yugoslav people and the LCY.78 Obviously emboldened by the letter he had just received from Tito, Khrushchev then went on to declare that the normalization may create a possibility of Yugoslavia’s return into the ‘socialist camp’. He accentuated that ‘[the Soviet leadership] has to create such relations with Yugoslavia so that it would, in time, join our “lager”, or in case it doesn’t, to be our ally or a fellow traveller’.79 In the closing part of his report, Khrushchev informed the Plenum that the Presidium

128   Comradeship had just received a letter from Tito and considered it to be a serious step towards the creation of links between the LCY and the CPSU. Admitting that ideological differences remained between the Yugoslav Communists and the ‘international proletarian movement’, Khrushchev argued that the Soviet party must continue to work on establishing party contacts with the Yugoslavs in order to bring them back into the ‘socialist camp’.80 The latter part of Khrushchev’s report was not included in the official Plenum material and was to be found only in the transcript of the Plenum discussions. This suggests that Khrushchev had added this part to his speech after having received Tito’s letter of 29 June and after the original text of the report had already been submitted to the Secretariat. Khrushchev’s optimism regarding the future of relations with the Yugoslav Party was inspired by Tito’s letter, despite the fact that the Yugoslav leader had reiterated his ideological postulates, which were certainly not to Moscow’s liking. However, of much greater importance to Khrushchev was probably the fact that by sending the letter Tito had confirmed that the party links would be re-­ established. This allowed him to lay claim at the Plenum that his policies towards Yugoslavia were successful beyond expectations, warranting an even more ambitious goal than the one initially set up by the Presidium. When Molotov, speaking after Khrushchev insisted that Yugoslav–Soviet relations should be limited to cooperation on foreign policy issues only, Khrushchev interrupted him exclaiming ‘we want more!’81 Part of Khrushchev’s report and the subsequent debate, which partly focused on ideological differences between the Yugoslav and the Soviet parties provided him and his supporters with the opportunity to reassert their ideological credentials. The new Soviet leadership was still struggling to come out of Stalin’s shadow and reclaim the authority he commanded at home and in the international Communist movement. In his report, Khrushchev identified points on which the Yugoslavs had departed from Marxism–Leninism.82 He stressed that the Yugoslavs regarded the Soviet economic model as state capitalism and have ‘publicly and slanderously’ asserted that the Soviet foreign policy was imperialistic. Moreover, Khrushchev accused the Yugoslav leaders of revising the ‘fundamental principle of the Marxism–Leninism – the leading role of the Party’.83 He added that the LCY leaders were also propagating a revisionist theory of a peaceful evolution to socialism in developed Western countries. Khrushchev also emphasized that the Yugoslav leaders had ‘openly expressed disagreement with the position, adopted by the whole international workers’ movement, of the existence of two “camps” – the socialist one and the Capitalist one’. Summarizing Yugoslav revisionism and Belgrade’s key ideological digression, he singled out that, [the Yugoslavs] were preoccupied with searching for a theoretical basis of their ‘own road to socialism’. . . . It is an absolute theoretical nonsense that there is a Russian, or Chinese, or a Yugoslav [road to socialism]. . . . Forms can be different but the essence is one. Socialism cannot be based on different principles. . . . It is not impossible that some Yugoslav cadres have altogether

Comradeship   129 departed from Marxism–Leninism. . . . By disregarding Marxist–Leninist principles, [the Yugoslavs] propagate false views that Yugoslavia can develop as a socialist country independently from other countries of the socialist ‘lager’; that it needn’t coordinate its struggle with the countries that are building socialism.84 To reclaim ideological authority, Khrushchev and his supporters had to reassert the Soviet ideological leadership within the Socialist Bloc. Hence Khrushchev’s fierce criticism of the Yugoslavs at the Plenum. He opposed the Yugoslav concept of ‘different roads to socialism’ not because it threatened to create different forms of economic and political organization. After all, some differences existed between Communist-­run countries. In contrast to the Soviet Union, limited private land ownership existed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as it did in Yugoslavia. In crucial aspects Yugoslav socialism, at the time, was still not that different from the Soviet system. The new form of ‘workers’ ownership of the means of production’ in Yugoslavia, a product of the newly introduced ‘self-­ management’ system, was in its infancy and was only just beginning to differentiate itself from the Soviet system. In the political sphere, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia firmly held the monopoly on power, much like the CPSU in the Soviet Union or Communist or Workers’ parties in the People’s Democracies. After several Commissions appointed by the Presidium in the previous two years had confirmed that Yugoslavia qualified as a socialist country and following Khrushchev’s visit in May, the Soviet leadership did not really doubt that Tito’s Communists were firmly in control in Yugoslavia. The Kremlin’s fierce opposition to Yugoslavia’s concept of ‘separate roads to socialism’ arose, first and foremost, from the fear that it could represent a theoretical foundation for disassociation of socialist states from the Soviet tutelage. The concept, as propagated by the Yugoslavs, threatened the cohesion of the socialist ‘camp’ by demonstrating to member states that they could remain socialist even if outside the Soviet Bloc. Yugoslavia’s independence challenged the credo for the existence of a ‘socialist camp’. By defining the ideological demarcation with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership aimed to prevent the Yugoslav example from exerting undue influence on the Soviet Party and the satellites. In the wake of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, this was increasingly perceived as a threat. This explains Moscow’s decision to immediately despatch both Tito’s letter of 29 June and the Presidium’s reply of 7 July, together with an accompanying Resolution to all ‘fraternal’ parties. In the Resolution, the Presidium ‘drew [fraternal parties’] attention to serious deficiencies and shortcomings in [Tito’s] letter’.85 At first glance, it may seem paradoxical that while doing their best to convince the Soviet Party of the success of their policy towards Yugoslavia, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership resorted to harsh ideological criticism of Yugoslavia. In fact, by carrying out ‘ideological differentiation’86 with Yugoslavia at the Plenum, Khrushchev and supporters hoped to reassert their own authority and with it, the Soviet hegemony in the international Communist movement, in particular among the satellites. By singling out Yugoslav

130   Comradeship ideological ‘deviations’, the Soviet leadership wished to define ideological postulates and forms of permissible behaviour that other Communist parties and countries of People’s Democracies had to heed. Heated exchanges at the Plenum between Molotov and Khrushchev, with most members of the Presidium supporting the latter, and the revelations about Stalin’s role in initiating the conflict with Yugoslavia suggest that re-­assessment of Stalin’s legacy, the beginning of the process of de-­Stalinization in the USSR, had started a full eight months before Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956. The new post-­Stalin leadership in the Kremlin had to confront and resolve the conflict with Tito, if their new foreign policy of peaceful coexistence was to gain credibility. Once, however, they started to unravel the ‘Yugoslav knot’, it was inevitable that they would stumble across its cause – Stalin. Thus, when the issue of the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia came to be addressed, the Plenum was ineluctably drawn into the debate on who was responsible for the 1948 conflict. This forced members of the Central Committee, for the first time, to question Stalin’s role. In his opening report, Khrushchev acknowledged ‘that there were no reasons for such a complete rift [with the Yugoslavs]’. He then introduced the ‘official’ interpretation that ‘Beria and Abakumov secretly supplied Stalin with false information’ naming them as the main culprits for the 1948 rupture.87 In a rejoinder to Khrushchev’s opening exposé, Molotov, however, unwillingly unmasked this ‘official’ explanation of the responsibility for the Yugoslav–Soviet split. The following exchange between Molotov and Khrushchev best illustrates the manner in which the debate over Yugoslavia digressed into revelations about Stalin’s role: Molotov: 

Once one is acquainted with the materials, one can, however, establish that [Khrushchev’s] statement, which tries to explain the reason for the rupture in relations with the CPY in large part by the hostile intrigues of Beria and Abakumov, does not fit with the factual situation. Beria and Abakumov’s intrigues without doubt played a certain role here, but this was not of decisive importance. . . . In a discussion on this issue in the Presidium, some doubt was expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given explanation. However, the following arguments were given in defence of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the main reason was Beria’s and Abakumov’s intrigues, then the responsibility for the rupture would fall on Stalin, which we cannot allow. These arguments should not be accepted. khrushchev:  [The responsibility should fall] on Stalin’s and Molotov’s [shoulders]. Molotov:  That’s new. khrushchev:  Why is it new? Molotov:  We all signed the letter on behalf of the Party Central Committee. khrushchev:  Without asking the Central Committee. Molotov:  That is not true. khrushchev:  That is exactly true. Molotov:  Now you can say whatever comes to your mind.

Comradeship   131 khrushchev: 

Without even asking the members of the Politburo. I am a member of the Politburo, but no one asked for my opinion. Molotov:  Comrade Khrushchev is not speaking the truth. khrushchev:  I want once again to repeat: I was not asked, although I was a member of the Politburo.88 Undoubtedly, Molotov’s intention was to warn that since the conflict against Yugoslavia had Stalin’s personal imprint it was incontestable. Ironically however, Molotov had inadvertently implicated Stalin. Khrushchev, on the other hand, skilfully manipulated Molotov into revealing Stalin’s wrongdoing. By stressing ‘real acquaintance with materials’ Molotov admitted that Beria and Abakumov were not the instigators of the 1948 conflict with Yugoslavia. He also revealed that the Presidium, at some point preceding the July Plenum had overridden available evidence and knowingly created a lie that implicated Beria and Abakumov. This exposed the ‘official’ interpretation as a fabrication. More importantly, however, Molotov acknowledged that the reason for this fabrication was to cover up Stalin’s role. This laid before members of the Central Committee the first accusation against Stalin. With his rebuke that the responsibility for the split was to fall ‘on Stalin and Molotov’s [shoulders]’ Khrushchev slyly underlined Molotov’s complicity in Stalin’s crime. By adding that even the members of the Politburo, let alone the members of the Central Committee, were not consulted on such a crucial issue, Khrushchev exposed Stalin’s despotism and sole responsibility for the rupture. Speaking after Molotov, Bulganin further implicated Stalin as the main culprit for the conflict with Yugoslavia. He addressed, one by one, Molotov’s accusations against Yugoslavia. Although Bulganin never openly accused Stalin, it was more than evident from his interpretation of events that no one but Stalin stood behind critical decisions that precipitated the confrontation with Yugoslavia. Among other things Molotov had repeated accusations that prior to the 1948 split, the Yugoslavs had slid towards ‘nationalism’. Bulganin responded thus: bulganin: 

There were no facts to the effect that the Yugoslavs were creeping away from a Marxist–Leninist position, from internationalism, and were taking a nationalist path. . . . Comrade Molotov wrote [letters that started the conflict in March and April 1948] at Stalin’s dictation. khrushchev:  And the main material for this came from the blue, it was fabricated. bulganin:  Yes, it was a fabrication. It was then that they made fabrications about Marxism–Leninism and nationalism. . . . That is how the confrontation with Yugoslavia began.89 Bulganin also addressed another crime that Molotov attributed to the Yugoslavs – the intention to create the Balkan Federation together with Bulgaria: bulganin: 

Comrade Molotov is now ascribing the Balkan Federation to Tito. But the issue was first raised by Stalin in a conversation with Dimitrov:

132   Comradeship ‘What if ’, he said, ‘you united the Balkans and created a federation? You would be supported’, Stalin said to Dimitrov, ‘try talking with Tito.’ Dimitrov went home, visited Tito, spoke with him, and then [the federation] got underway.90 The ‘crimes’ named by Molotov and then rebuked by Bulganin were among the very same ‘crimes’ Tito was accused of in the letters from Stalin and Molotov in March and April 1948. These accusations led to the Cominform Declaration on 28 June 1948 and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Communist movement. Bulganin’s intervention revealed Stalin’s responsibility in the fabrication of each and every one of these accusations. When exposing the falsity of allegations against Tito, Bulganin never once mentioned Beria. Once the lid of this Pandora’s Box was removed, the Plenum debates went beyond the responsibility for the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict and led to the first condemnation of Stalin’s autocratic rule. Khrushchev and his supporters used the question of responsibility for the Yugoslav–Soviet break up as a tool to expose Stalin’s overall legacy. Speaking a day before Khrushchev’s closing address, Shepilov boldly observed that, after years of not meeting, the Plenum of the Central Committee meets regularly once again. . . . For thirteen years the Congress of the CPSU did not meet. . . . The party work is alive once again. . . . The most dangerous enemy of the construction of Communism – the personality cult – is defeated. Collective leadership really functions.91 This was the first mention of the ‘personality cult’. Shepilov, Khrushchev’s protégé, was attacking Stalin’s legacy by contrasting the present functioning of party institutions against its nonexistence during Stalin. Given Shepilov’s proximity to Khrushchev and the boldness of his address, it is very likely that Khrushchev was using him as a trial balloon to test the reaction of the Central Committee. Indeed, in his closing address, Khrushchev, for the first time openly questioned Stalin’s record. He reproached Molotov for boasting that he had sat in the Politburo for 34 years and added that ‘it is about time that the Plenum of the CC takes the position it deserves, the role of the xозяин [the head] of the party, that of the leader of the party and the country and assumes its responsibilities . . . the Party is led by the CC and not by Molotov or Khrushchev, or anybody else. . . . We need to rejuvenate the Presidium’.92 Khrushchev then went even further and added that ‘we all respect and will continue to respect comrade Stalin. . . . However, in his last years, when Stalin was greatly incapacitated, many wrongs have happened. True, we have now rectified things, but how many honest people have we lost’?93 Although with caution, Stalin’s infallibility had been openly questioned for the first time. Khrushchev and his supporters used the Plenum to enhance his standing and leadership role in the Party. In his opening address, Khrushchev declared that the meeting with Tito, as well as the policy of normalization of relations with

Comradeship   133 Yugoslavia, were successful. He emphasized that ‘the CPSU and the Soviet government have performed a huge task – the first step has been achieved towards disengagement of Yugoslavia from the Imperialist “lager” ’.94 Khrushchev told the Plenum that Tito had assured them during talks in Yugoslavia that the military component of the Balkan Pact would be phased out. As proof, he then read Volkov’s report of his meeting with Tito on 29 June, during which the Yugoslav leader confirmed Yugoslavia’s diminishing commitment to the Pact.95 Khrushchev also triumphantly declared that the Soviet initiative for the normalization with Yugoslavia had liquidated the conflict between the two countries, which inflicted huge damage to the prestige and strategic interests of the USSR. He assured members of the Central Committee that ‘the Soviet–Yugoslav talks [in Belgrade] created a fundamental turnaround in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The abnormal situation created in 1948 was liquidated’.96 By default, all these successes were easily attributed to Khrushchev. Supporters in the Presidium, namely Bulganin, Saburov and Shepilov praised him as the driving force behind the initiative for the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. Even those usually in opposition, Malenkov, Suslov, Kaganovich and Molotov, credited Khrushchev for his crucial role in the creation and implementation of the new policy towards Yugoslavia.97 Khrushchev thus emerged as the main beneficiary of the apparent success of the policy shift on Yugoslavia. This promoted an image of him as a visionary. Khrushchev further strengthened his leadership position at the July Plenum by successfully isolating Molotov. The latter’s opposition to the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia offered Khrushchev and his supporters the pretext to launch an attack on him.98 The proclaimed success of the policy of normalization with Belgrade greatly facilitated this task. At the end of his opening report, Khrushchev ‘reluctantly’ felt ‘obliged’ to report to the Plenum of Molotov’s opposition ‘throughout the [process] of resolving questions related to normalization with Yugoslavia’. Khrushchev underlined that ‘as it is clear to everyone, the progress of talks with the Yugoslavs had demonstrated the incorrectness of comrade Molotov’s position on the Yugoslav question’.99 Ominously, Khrushchev asserted that Molotov’s stance ‘[did] not coincide with the interests of the Soviet State and the socialist “lager” and with the principles of the Leninist policy’. During Stalin’s reign, such qualification would have meant condemnation leading to imprisonment, even death. Unlike in the past, however, Molotov was now being given an opportunity to respond to accusations, as the first speaker after Khrushchev. Molotov defended his opposition to the trip to Belgrade on the grounds that it debased the authority and the prestige of the Soviet leadership. He repeated his firm belief that the Yugoslav leadership was equally responsible for the split, if not more. In 1948, according to him, Belgrade had departed from Marxism–Leninism and had succumbed to ‘nationalism’. Molotov then reminded that in the years since the 1948 break up, the Yugoslav leadership had further slipped away from its initial Communist orientation. As proof, he pointed to the huge military aid Yugoslavia was receiving from the West and to its revisionist amiability towards social democrats.100 However, Molotov was fighting a losing battle. Obviously following an agreed

134   Comradeship script, other members of the Presidium addressed the Plenum after Molotov and one by one supported Khrushchev’s accusations. Even Suslov, who was hardly sympathetic to the normalization with Yugoslavia, attacked Molotov for undermining ‘the only correct policy of the CPSU’.101 Malenkov, for his part, pointed to the fact that Molotov openly sabotaged Presidium’s instructions when he refused to initiate talks on further normalization during his meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Vidić, on 21 January 1954.102 The rally against Molotov thus, turned into the declaration of allegiance to the new leader – Khrushchev. However, the disagreement over policy towards Yugoslavia was only one, and probably the lesser of the motives behind Khrushchev’s attack on Molotov. Rather, the showdown was a result of an ongoing leadership contest between the two and their divergent concepts on the future role of the Party and the disagreement on the need for the dismantling of Stalin’s personality cult. Tactically, Khrushchev allowed first his supporters to formulate the line of demarcation with Molotov. Bulganin asserted that Molotov disagreed with the rest of the Presidium not only on the issue of Yugoslavia, but also ‘on all important issues of [Soviet] foreign policy’.103 To underline the depth of the rift between Molotov and the rest of the leadership, Bulganin added that ‘even with regard to domestic policies [there were] similar disagreements’.104 Saburov accused Molotov of promoting an ‘incorrect position’ that the head of the Ministerial Council should be the leader of the country and not the First Secretary of the Party. He also added that Molotov had opposed the initiative for normalization with Yugoslavia only because it was Khrushchev’s brainchild. According to Saburov, Molotov had offered the same resistance to Khrushchev’s other initiatives, such as the Austrian compromise in the beginning of 1955.105 Shepilov, who had declared the ‘personality cult’ defeated, accused Molotov of opposing the new course introduced by the Party after ­Stalin’s death.106 In his closing speech, the day after Shepilov and Saburov’s addresses, Khrushchev accused Molotov of refusing to accept that the Party was led by the Central Committee and not by powerful individuals.107 This bold new statement from Khrushchev not only rebuked Molotov but, more importantly, it impugned the usurpation of power during Stalin’s reign. The successful sidelining of Molotov at the July Plenum represented a step towards the consolidation of Khrushchev’s leadership. Moreover, the debates at the Plenum legitimized further questioning of Stalin’s legacy. It is very doubtful whether without this victory Khrushchev would have been able first to obtain the Presidium’s approval for the inquest into the Vozhd’s reign and to subsequently launch a full assault against Stalin at the end of the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956. The July Plenum, encouraged by the debate on Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, challenged, also for the first time, the existing form of relations within the Soviet Bloc and within the international Communist movement. In its opening statement, the Resolution, issued at the end of the Plenum, explicitly acknowledged lessons from of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict in 1948. In an unprecedented manner, it ­stipulated that,

Comradeship   135 the Plenum of the CPSU CC had concluded that, based on the lessons of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1948 and 1953, it is necessary to draw conclusions for the improvement of all aspects of relations between the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist ‘lager’, as well as for the further improvement and strengthening of bonds with fraternal Communist parties. . . . In all our relations with the countries of the People’s Democracies, as well as with fraternal Communist and proletarian parties, the Soviet Government and Party organs, as well as our representatives abroad, are obliged to be strictly governed by Leninist principles of socialist internationalism, by full equality, recognition of national sovereignty, and by taking into consideration the national individuality of corresponding countries. . . . [With regard to the question of the construction of socialism] the historical experience of the Soviet Union and countries of People’s Democracies demonstrated that in different countries, together with the unanimity regarding the most important task of securing the victory of socialism, it is possible that different forms and methods of solving specific problems of the building of socialism can be introduced, according to historical and national particularities.108 The document addressed the relations in the Soviet Bloc and within the international Communist movement in a ground breaking manner. Up to that point, Stalin’s imposition of absolute Soviet hegemony had been accepted by Communists throughout the world as the immutable postulate of Marxism–Leninism. The Resolution of the July Plenum, however, became the first official Soviet Party document to promulgate equality in relations between socialist countries and to call for an end to Soviet hegemony. In a further historic first, the document allowed for the existence of individual roads to socialism. Speaking at the Plenum against bourgeois nationalism, as the enemy of proletarian internationalism, Khrushchev warned against the ‘state chauvinism’. This was an implicit condemnation of Soviet hegemony and Stalin’s chauvinism. Using ‘the Yugoslav case’ as pretext, Khrushchev underlined that, at the time of 1948, the Soviet Government . . . seized upon methods and activities that negated the national feelings of the Yugoslavs. Thus, the USSR, a huge power, which now with China represents a vast part of the world that is building socialism, has a responsibility to be very alert and careful towards the national feelings of peoples, in particular smaller peoples. . . . This is important for the strengthening of the socialist ‘lager’ .109 At the Plenum, he argued that Soviet flexibility and sensitivity to the experiences of other socialist countries would only enhance the cohesion of the ‘socialist camp’.110 These formulations sounded almost identical to those put forward by Tito during the talks in Belgrade. The concepts of equality and respect for national particularities of individual nations and Communist parties were re-­ introduced at the July Plenum for the first time since Lenin’s era. Being included

136   Comradeship in the Plenum Resolution, these concepts became the new official ideological line from Moscow. Representing a true departure form Stalin’s legacy, they became part of the new ideological identity of Khrushchev and his supporters. The significance and impact of the July Plenum of the CPSU CC far exceeded Yugoslav–Soviet bilateral relations. Eight months before the ‘secret speech’, Khrushchev and his supporters raised first questions regarding Stalin’s legacy. Probing the causes of the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948, they provided evidence of Stalin’s machinations. For the first time since the despot’s death, the members of the Central Committee had faced the truth that ‘many good comrades were lost’ during his reign. Only once this first hurdle had been successfully surmounted could Khrushchev and his supporters embark on a crucial battle in the Presidium for the open denunciation of Stalin in February 1956. The ‘secret speech’ would never have happened if Khrushchev had lost at the  July Plenum. The ‘secret speech’ thus signalled the end of the battle in the Kremlin and Khrushchev’s final victory – not the beginning of this process. Moreover, the lessons learned from the break up with Yugoslavia in 1948 were used at the Plenum to question Stalin’s postulates on relations within the Soviet Bloc and to promote equality and respect for national particularities. One could thus be justified in regarding the July Plenum as the true beginning of the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe, much earlier than has hitherto been acknowledged. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ represented the final act that officially empowered reform-oriented members of satellite leaderships to remove ‘little Stalins’ in their midst. This explains how it was possible for the situation in Poland and Hungary to reach boiling point only months after the ‘secret speech’. Khrushchev’s conduct at the July Plenum and the courage to pose questions regarding Stalin’s infallibility were inspired by the imprint that the visit to Yugoslavia, and in particular conversations with Tito, made on him and his comrades. By the time the Plenum took place, Khrushchev had by his own admission become convinced of the necessity for dismantling Stalin’s legacy. How else can we explain the enormous gamble he took by challenging Stalin at the Plenum; by that time he had already outmanoeuvred Malenkov and to a large extent Molotov, his main leadership contenders? In his memoirs, many years later, Khrushchev would admit that the conversations he held with Tito had a decisive impact on him and his comrades. As he remembered, ‘I realized the falsehood of [our] position [regarding Stalin] for the first time and in earnest when I arrived in Yugoslavia and spoke with Tito and other comrades there’.111 During meetings with Tito and the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders entered, for the first time in their lives, into open ideological debates with other Communists, on an equal basis. These exchanges enabled them, also for the first time, to hear theoretical views opposed to Stalin’s from someone they recognized as a Communist and who could not be discarded as a ‘class enemy’. Deliberations with Tito and other Yugoslav officials forced Khrushchev to face the truth about Stalin. As he would admit later, it was from the Yugoslavs that I have heard an open criticism of Stalin for the first time. It knocked me off my feet and made me feel dejected. . . .

Comradeship   137 Subconsciously, I agreed [with the Yugoslav accusations] but was still under the spell of Stalin’s authority to be able to call things their true names. . . . We were still not ready, we had not yet liberated our spirit from the slave-­like dependence that we lived in under Stalin.112 The July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed the results of Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia, confirmed irreversibility of the Yugoslav– Soviet normalization, as part of the Moscow’s long-­term strategic interest. Encouraged by the success of its initiative, the Soviet leadership reaffirmed an added goal of their Yugoslav policy – to draw Belgrade back into the ‘socialist camp’. Importantly, the Plenum helped the post-­Stalin leadership define itself ideologically, an important step towards consolidation of its authority at home and in the international Communist movement. It also provided the stage for a first showdown between the staunch hard-­liners, headed by Molotov, and those eager to search for ways out of the dead end of Stalin’s policies, led by Khrushchev. The latter’s success in isolating Molotov at the Plenum, allowed for the earliest questioning of Stalin’s legacy and authority outside the confines of the Soviet party Presidium. The debate over Yugoslavia produced first evidence of Stalin’s fabrications. The importance of Khrushchev’s victory against Molotov on the question of Yugoslavia, at the July Plenum, cannot be overestimated. It is my belief that without this outcome, it would have been impossible for Khrushchev to push on with the reassessment of Stalin’s legacy and his personality cult and, eventually deliver the ‘secret speech’ in February 1956. Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia forced the debate at the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU CC. The debate and its outcome, in turn, opened the way for the process of de-­ Stalinization in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Rapprochement Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade and the endorsement his policy received at the July 1955 Plenum had a profound impact on Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The hitherto sporadic pace of normalization gave way to an accelerated improvement and true rapprochement. In the months that followed the Plenum, every aspect of relations between the two countries – political, economic and cultural – developed beyond recognition. The initiatives mainly came from Moscow. It followed up on Khrushchev’s pledge at the Plenum that no effort would be spared by the Communist parties to act as an ‘irresistible pulling force for the healthy elements in the LCY and for the peoples of Yugoslavia’.113 Economic cooperation registered the most dramatic upsurge. Moscow identified assistance with Yugoslavia’s economic problems as potentially the strongest ‘pulling force’ towards closer links between Yugoslavia and the socialist Bloc. Yugoslavia, for its part, was more than eager to develop economic cooperation with the USSR and to improve its economic situation, as well as to decrease its inordinate dependence on the US aid. At the very earliest stage of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, Tito had stressed that ‘[Yugoslavia] needs to trade with the

138   Comradeship Russians’.114 By May 1955, the US economic assistance and aid delivered to Yugoslavia since 1950 had reached US$503.2 million. Almost all of this was in the form of grants, well over half of which consisted of shipments of food and other agricultural commodities. Economic assistance from the UK and France in the same period amounted to a further US$77 million. On top of this economic assistance, in the same period, the equivalent of US$787.7 million of military aid was allocated to Yugoslavia, of which about US$432.9 million had been delivered by May 1955.115 US assistance to Yugoslavia surpassed assistance provided through the European Recovery Programme to many European states. Despite evident political willingness, there still remained an obstacle to the full development of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR. This was the question of outstanding financial claims and compensations created by the 1948 break up. The Soviet claims referred to the military assistance the USSR had delivered to Tito’s partisans in the closing stages of the Second World War and then to the Yugoslav Army in the period between 1945 and 1948. Yugoslavia, from its side, demanded compensation for the unilateral Soviet cancellation in 1948 and 1949 of existing commercial contracts and state agreements between Yugoslavia and the USSR. During Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, the two parties had only agreed to postpone discussion on the problem because of its complexity.116 However, on 29 June during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, Tito proposed a way for the Gordian knot to be untied. He suggested that both sides simultaneously renounce their claims.117 To demonstrate his willingness for a truly substantial improvement of economic cooperation with the USSR, Tito also specified that Yugoslavia would, among other things, seek Soviet economic assistance in the construction of metallurgical, aluminium, and electricity plants.118 On 8 July, a day after he had responded to Tito on the re-­establishment of party relations, Khrushchev sent another letter to the Yugoslav leader informing him of the decision of the CPSU CC to cancel the outstanding Yugoslav debt to the Soviet Union of 528 million Roubles (approximately US$90 million). In the letter, Khrushchev emphasized that the decision to cancel Yugoslavia’s debt reflected Soviet desire to clear the way for the development of full economic cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia. He underlined that the decision was in response to Tito’s suggestions made during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade on 29 June.119 Khrushchev’s letter of 8 July provided an immediate boost to economic cooperation between the two countries. On 30 July, both sides agreed to double the volume of the existing trade exchange protocol for 1955, worth US$20 million.120 On 1 September, in Moscow, Vukmanović-Tempo and his Soviet counterpart and host, Mikoyan, signed an Agreement of Intent announcing considerable boost to their existing economic cooperation. The two agreed to bring the Soviet–Yugoslav trade exchange in the forthcoming year to a minimum of US$70 million. This was an almost twofold increase on the already revised protocol signed only a month earlier, on 30 July, and a fourfold increase on the original trade protocol signed in the beginning of the year.121 The Tempo–Mikoyan agreement was indeed, implemented in the beginning of 1956 with the signing

Comradeship   139 of a number of contracts. On 6 January, a Protocol on Trade for 1956, worth US$70 million was signed. The ‘commodity lists’ stipulated by the Protocol, which specified the type and quantities of goods to be exchanged between the two countries, reflected Yugoslavia’s wish list. On 12 January the Soviets agreed to provide a loan for the financing and construction of several industrial plants in Yugoslavia, worth US$110 million. Again, further loan agreements were signed on 2 February. The Soviets agreed to finance US$54 million worth of Yugoslavia’s purchases of raw materials in the USSR in the next three years. Moscow also approved a US$30 million loan in gold or in convertible currencies. Both were ten-­year loans with a 2 per cent annual interest rate, well below current market rates. In addition, the Soviets also agreed in February to finance the construction of one copper-processing and two aluminium plants in Yugoslavia, and expressed interest in ordering commercial vessels from Yugoslav shipbuilding yards worth US$400 million.122 On 28 January, the two countries signed an Agreement of cooperation in the field of commercial use of atomic energy, which stipulated that the Soviets would help Yugoslavia build its first commercial nuclear reactor.123 Given the strategic importance of nuclear technology, this agreement exceeded ordinary economic cooperation. It hinted at ‘special relations’, an impression that the Soviets certainly were only too happy to promote. Moscow’s willingness to substantially increase its economic cooperation with Yugoslavia and readiness to sign financial agreements granting the Yugoslavs unusually favourable terms was duly recorded in Belgrade. Tito and his aides, were fully aware that this unprecedented Soviet generosity was only a reflection of their calculated political interest, aimed at attracting Yugoslavia into their orbit.124 For the time being, however, Belgrade only saw the advantages of such Soviet generosity. On the one hand, as no political conditions were being attached, the Yugoslavs were only too happy to exploit the opportunity, particularly since their continuing disastrous economic situation left little room for choosiness regarding the source of desperately needed assistance. On the other hand, the momentous increase in economic cooperation with the USSR was raising prospects of the realization of a goal which Tito identified as the most desirable goal from the very beginning of the contacts with the Soviets, at the meeting of the Executive Committee in July 1954. At the time, Tito expressed hope that the normalization with the USSR could open the door to economic cooperation that would, in time, diminish Yugoslavia’s dependency on US economic aid. The reduction in dependency from either superpower was a precondition for Tito to pursue equidistance from either Bloc. Lastly, the magnitude of the Soviet economic assistance seemed to have fully vindicated Tito’s gamble against sombre voices of warning expressed at the July 1954 Executive Committee meeting that the normalization of relations with the USSR may result in the US retaliation – cancellation of Western economic and military assistance with dire consequences for Yugoslavia. Parallel to this unprecedented surge in economic cooperation, an equally remarkable expansion of political, military, cultural, and other contacts between the two countries occurred in the months that followed Khrushchev’s visit to

140   Comradeship Yugoslavia and the July Plenum of the CPSU CC. As with the economic relations, the initiatives largely came from Moscow. From 1 to 10 July, at the invitation of the Soviet Air Force, a very senior Yugoslav Air Force delegation, headed by General Zdenko Ulepić visited the USSR. The visit represented the first Yugoslav–Soviet military contact since 1948. At the end of July, a delegation of editors of the most prominent Yugoslav newspapers visited the USSR. Soviet editors returned the visit almost instantaneously, in the second half of September. Between 1 and 21 August, at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet, a high level delegation of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly visited the USSR. As earlier with newspaper editors, this visit was returned very quickly, in October.125 The haste with which the return visits were carried out was the result, on the one hand, of the Soviet desire to accelerate the political normalization between the two countries. On the other hand, Moscow was only too happy to fuel Western anxiety that an unusually rapid improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations could suggest Yugoslavia’s return to the fold. Between 17 September and 5 October, Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev’s closest collaborators and a member of the Soviet Party Presidium, spent an extended holiday in Yugoslavia. Apart from few days in Brioni, where he met Tito, Mikoyan travelled extensively throughout Yugoslavia. His busy itinerary and schedule, set up at his own request, took him to all parts of Yugoslavia. During the trip he held innumerable meetings with regional and local party and state officials, as well as with ordinary citizens.126 Given Mikoyan’s closeness to Khrushchev the busy schedule of the visit suggested Khrushchev’s keen interest in acquiring first-­hand information on all aspects of social and political life and organization in Yugoslavia. In the same spirit, in the beginning of September, Nikolai Firyubin replaced Volkov as the new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade.127 The appointment of Firyubin served several purposes. It demonstrated the Soviet leadership’s desire to elevate its relations with Belgrade by appointing a higher calibre envoy. Firyubin belonged to the top echelons of the Soviet MID and was the husband of Ekaterina Furtseva, the Moscow Party Chief and the Candidate member of the Party Presidium. Firyubin’s appointment also reflected Moscow’s desire to receive higher quality reports from Belgrade. Lastly, the change of Ambassadors was Khrushchev’s concession to Tito who on several occasions had expressed disappointment with Volkov’s ideological rigidity.128 By the end of 1955, Yugoslav–Soviet government relations were almost fully ‘normalized’ and could easily have been characterized as cordial. The links between the CPSU and the LCY, however, were not re-­established nor was there improvement in Yugoslavia relations with the satellites. Tito and Khrushchev did not broach the subject of party links, following the exchange of letters in early July. On 25 December, in a cable sent from his yacht ‘Galeb’, en route from Ethiopia to Egypt, Tito instructed Kardelj in Belgrade to decline, ‘for obvious reasons’, the Soviet invitation for a LCY delegation to attend the forthcoming Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.129 Four days later, following Tito’s instructions, Kardelj called in the new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firyubin, and requested that the invitation not be sent to Belgrade because it was

Comradeship   141 ‘premature’. Equally, improvements of relations between Moscow and ­Belgrade were not followed by the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries. Throughout 1955, these relations were limited to fulfilment of trade protocols, agreed a year earlier.131 By the end of 1955, however, with the exception of Poland, trade between Yugoslavia and the satellite countries failed to reach even the agreed levels.132 Contacts between Yugoslavia and these countries remained limited to the signing of protocols regulating transport, communications, and visa regimes and to sporadic exchanges of visits by artists and sports teams. Tito expressed his frustration with the progress of normalization with Eastern Europe in a cable to Kardelj on 25 December 1955. He instructed Kardelj to make it clear to the Soviet Ambassador that during his forthcoming visit to the USSR, in June of 1956, he would wish to discuss with the Soviets the attitude of the People’s Democracies towards Yugoslavia.133 The lack of meaningful progress in Yugoslavia’s relations with Eastern European states could be attributed to several factors. On the one hand, the leading elites in these countries were uncomfortable with improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. They were afraid that it would force them to confront questions related to their role in the 1948 break up with Yugoslavia. More importantly, they feared that this would, in turn, open debates regarding the Stalinist legacy in their own countries and purges that followed the 1948 break up with Belgrade. On any of these issues, the existing leaderships throughout Eastern Europe knew they could not expect much sympathy neither from the Yugoslavs nor from their own countrymen. Most of the incumbent satellite leaders had come to power by fabricating trials against their own Party comrades, accusing them of being ‘Titoists’. On the other hand, the Soviets were reluctant to allow People’s Democracies to establish closer links with Yugoslavia fearing Belgrade’s corrosive influence on their allegiance to Moscow.134 From their side, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership harboured strong personal animosity towards many satellite leaders who spearheaded hostilities and propaganda campaigns against Yugoslavia after 1948. Of some, such as Matyas Rakosi of Hungary and Enver Hoxha of Albania, Tito spoke with unveiled contempt. En route by train to Moscow, in June 1956 Tito travelled via Romania, a much longer route than the one through Hungary. He purposefully chose this route to avoid meeting Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian leader. Speaking in November 1956, Tito admitted that he could not bring himself ‘to go through Hungary, even if it meant a three times shorter journey. . . . To me, [Rakosi and his henchmen] are the most dishonest people in the world.’135 For several months after Khrushchev’s visit, Yugoslavia’s relations with the West followed an inversely proportional track to the one characterising relations with the Soviet Union. The US was particularly annoyed with the alacrity of Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement, as well as with the enthusiasm with which Yugoslavia had begun to ‘preach “peaceful co-­existence” ’.136 The unproductive conclusion of the Ambassadorial Conference, held in Belgrade three weeks after Khrushchev’s visit, only exacerbated the West’s anxiety. In frustration, 130

142   Comradeship Washington even temporarily suspended US military aid to Yugoslavia at the beginning of August.137 Increasingly aware of possible long-­term damage to relations with the West, Tito intensified communication with Washington from the second half of July through regular exchanges between his Deputy Foreign Minister, Srdja Prica, and the US Ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger.138 Washington, at the same time, came to the conclusion that further de­terioration of relations with Belgrade did not serve its interests either. CIA analysts never really doubted Tito’s resolve to remain outside the Soviet orbit.139 By early August, Washington had firmly concluded that Tito’s usefulness still outweighed the irritation caused by his propensity to flirt with the other side. Reporting to the President on 11 August, Dulles expressed his firm conviction that Tito would never again ‘go under the yoke of Moscow’. Moreover, he identified in Tito an ambition to establish himself as a new authority in the Communist world. In doing so, Dulles concluded, Tito would ‘attract [satellites] away from Moscow’, an ambition the US ‘could afford quietly to countenance’.140 It was concluded that such a goal would be ill served by the severance of US military and economic aid, as it would ‘cause considerable Yugoslav resentment and would somewhat impair Tito’s bargaining position against Moscow’.141 With both sides realising that their long-­term interests may be at stake, Belgrade and Washington undertook decisive steps in early September to mend their relations. Once again, the Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy was dispatched to Belgrade as President Eisenhower’s personal envoy. After, several days of intense talks Murphy and Tito signed an Agreement of Understanding on continuance of US military assistance and additional economic aid to Yugoslavia.142 The renewed cordiality in Yugoslav–US relations and the need for a further sounding of Tito’s intentions inspired US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to spend a day with Tito in Brioni, on 6 November 1955, during a break in the Four Power Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva. Unexpectedly, given Dulles’ professed anti-­Communism, he and Tito immediately struck a chord. A surprisingly open and substantive exchange of views took place between the two during the three hours of their official talks. According to Dulles, this was followed by even more remarkable several-­hour long frank conversations during a ride around the island in a speedboat driven by Tito himself, or in his private villa. Dulles left Brioni deeply impressed with Tito.143 The Yugoslav leader managed to convince the American Secretary of State of the benefits of Yugoslavia being positioned between the two Blocs. From what we know, there can be little doubt that Tito genuinely believed in what he was saying to Dulles. If anything, only honesty and logic could have sounded convincing to a seasoned lawyer and negotiator of Dulles’ calibre. Tito’s point of departure that the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization would inevitably accelerate the weakening of the Soviet grip on the ‘socialist camp’ clearly struck a chord with Dulles’ own evaluation, as conveyed in his conversation with the President early in August.144 To underline Belgrade’s importance to the West vis-­à-vis the Soviets, Tito deliberately sounded more optimistic about the prospect of liberalization in Eastern Europe and overemphasized Yugoslavia’s role in the process. Dulles’, an advocate of

Comradeship   143 the ‘roll back’ policy, recognized Tito’s usefulness in carving a wedge between the USSR and the People’s Democracies. Recognition of mutual interest and of a common goal made the meeting a resounding success. This was publicly acknowledged at the press conference, held at the end of Dulles’ visit. Summarizing the meeting, the Secretary of State underlined that both sides had ‘reached accord on recognizing the importance of independence of [the satellites], non-­ interference from the outside in their internal affairs and their right to develop their own social and economic order in ways of their own choice’. Asked by journalists whether he agreed with Dulles’ conclusion, Tito publicly endorsed it.145 This in itself, was a remarkable statement from a Communist who had only just embarked upon normalizing relations with the Soviet Union after years of vicious confrontation. It was, however, no slip of the tongue. Evidence confirms that Tito had thought this through and had agreed to this formulation with Dulles in advance, before the press conference.146 When reporting on his visit to Brioni, at the meeting of the National Security Council on 21 November, Dulles described his talks with Tito as ‘illuminating’. He added that the joint statement regarding the satellites, issued at the press conference at the end of the visit ‘was in itself worth the whole trip’.147 The meeting with Tito in Brioni left a lasting impact on Dulles. In a message to President Eisenhower upon his return from Brioni, Dulles wrote that ‘the day with Tito was one of the most interesting I have ever spent’.148 The Secretary of State seemed to have developed true respect for Tito during this short and, as it turned out, their only meeting. Dulles became convinced that Tito would remain independent from Moscow and, as such, continue to undermine the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc and subvert Moscow’s control of the global Communist movement. This would explain Dulles’ unwavering backing for continued US military and economic aid to Yugoslavia, even during Tito’s visit to USSR, in June 1956 or, in the first days after the Soviet intervention in Hungary, in November 1956, when many started doubting the Yugoslav President’s independence.149 As the events of 1955 unravelled, Yugoslavia was increasingly losing interest in the Balkan Pact, a military alliance it had done its utmost to create only a year earlier. Several factors were responsible for this volte face. The threat of Soviet aggression, the rationale for Yugoslavia’s interest in the Pact, had all but disappeared. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Tito and his aides to reconcile the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation of non-­ engagement with a membership in a military alliance that was leaning heavily on NATO. Only a year after it was signed, the Pact began to fragment. Not just Yugoslavia’s growing disinterest but the mounting animosity between the Greeks and the Turks were making the Pact more and more unworkable. Frictions between Yugoslavia and other two members of the Pact first appeared during the Conference of the Council of Ministers of the Balkan Pact, held in Ankara between 28 February and 3 March 1955. Yugoslavia’s position that the new Soviet foreign policy initiatives were diffusing global tensions caused consternation among its Balkan Pact allies. Furthermore, Greek and Turkish insistence on closer coordination of defence plans between the Balkan Pact and

144   Comradeship NATO was resolutely rejected by Belgrade.150 Relations between Yugoslavia and its other two partners, in particular with Turkey, further deteriorated as a result of Khrushchev’s visit. In its aftermath, Belgrade started publicly accentuating ‘cultural and economic’ aspects of the cooperation against the military one. The Pact was rendered a mortal blow in September 1955 after the bloody anti-­ Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir. In the months that followed, a complete para­ lysis developed in relations between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.151 By the end of 1955, the Balkan Pact had lost its purpose and would soon peter out into complete irrelevance.

Reconciliation On the eve of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, a report from the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow suggested that Khrushchev had still not fully secured his leadership position. It asserted that Khrushchev and Bulganin depended heavily on the support of Marshall Georgii Zhukov and the Red Army who were instrumental in liquidating Beria and later decisively helped Khrushchev against Malenkov. The report underlined that the Army had imposed itself as a new power broker in the Kremlin.152 The Yugoslav leadership concluded that Khrushchev was in need of support and felt obliged to offer some. Kardelj articulated this when he explained to the British Ambassador, Sir Frank Roberts, that ‘Mr. Khrushchev and his group deserve encouragement. . . . Mr. Khrushchev must show success in his policies, and it was particularly important that the Yugoslavs, as the main beneficiaries so far, should not be hesitant in welcoming any progressive steps.’153 During the talks in Belgrade, Tito and his associates became convinced that Khrushchev was the main force behind the Yugoslav– Soviet normalization and the new Soviet foreign policy in general. It was then logical to expect that Khrushchev would be the most determined among the Soviet leaders to pursue such policies in future. With this in mind, Tito decided to send a letter of greetings to the Soviet Congress, the first such gesture from the Yugoslav leadership since the break up in 1948.154 Khrushchev read Tito’s telegram at the plenary session of the Congress on 18 February, a custom otherwise reserved only for the ‘fraternal’ parties. With the same goal in mind, Tito also made sure that the Soviet leadership received during the Congress his personal summary of visits to Egypt and Ethiopia two months earlier.155 The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was held between 14 and 25 February 1956. Khrushchev delivered his famous speech ‘On the Personality Cult And Its Negative Implications’ on 25 February. It became known as the ‘secret speech’ because it was delivered before a closed session of the Plenum of the Congress, a few hours after the Congress was formally adjourned. On 8 March, Khrushchev sent two copies of the speech to Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Barely concealing triumphalism, Khrushchev wrote in the covering letter that he was ‘presuming that [Yugoslav leaders] are interested in familiarizing [themselves] with this speech’.156 There is no evidence to suggest that the Yugoslav leadership had any foreknowledge of Khrushchev’s historic feat. In the speech, Khrushchev

Comradeship   145 openly condemned Stalin’s despotism and named him as the one responsible for mass liquidations during purges before and after the Second World War, as well as for the catastrophic loss of Soviet lives during the War. In the section devoted to the causes of the Soviet–Yugoslav rupture in 1948, Khrushchev asserted that, Stalin’s role was shameful. ‘The Yugoslav Affair’ did not contain a single problem that could not have been dealt with in a comradely discussion . . . this does not mean that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes, or that they were without fault. However, these mistakes were blown up by Stalin to monstrous proportions, which brought about the rupture of relations with a friendly country.157 Khrushchev then provided an account of a meeting he had had with Stalin at the beginning of the ‘Yugoslav affair’. Stalin boasted at the occasion that it would be enough for him to move his little finger and Tito would disappear. According to Khrushchev, this illustrated that ‘[Stalin] had completely lost his sense of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and arrogance not only towards his countrymen but towards all other parties and nations.’ Khrushchev concluded that, [the Soviet leadership] had examined the case of Yugoslavia and had made the only proper decision . . . the liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole socialist camp, for the strengthening of peace in the world.158 Khrushchev had thus unequivocally admitted Soviet responsibility for the conflict with Yugoslavia and Stalin’s crucial role in the rupture, and acknowledged that the full normalization of relations with Yugoslavia was a necessity. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ prompted an immediate and euphoric reaction from the Yugoslav leadership. Belgrade’s attitude towards Moscow and Khrushchev in particular was soon stripped of the last vestiges of hesitation or reservations. The truth about Stalin’s key role in 1948 and about overall Soviet responsibility for the rupture was the one last remaining hurdle the Soviets had not been ready to cross during Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia. The Soviet initiative for normalization, without full admission of responsibility for 1948, was deemed by the Yugoslavs to be sufficient only for the normalization of government relations between the two countries. Tito and his associates continued to rebuff Soviet insistence on the re-­establishment of relations between the CPSU and the LCY, as long as Moscow remained reluctant to acknowledge its sole responsibility for 1948. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ finally fulfilled this condition. The Yugoslav leadership was further impressed that the admission was made before the Party Congress, which in their eyes would ensure the continuity of improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. At the Plenum of the LCY Central Committee, Tito was elated and stressed that ‘events in the Soviet Union have evolved much faster than we could have expected. . . . From now on, I believe, it will be easier to talk with them.’159

146   Comradeship The new course in the Kremlin offered hope that any future changes in the power balance in the Kremlin need not bring a change in the Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia. The strength of opposition and dangers that Khrushchev had to confront in order to deliver the ‘secret speech’ inspired Tito and his associates with awe and respect for the Soviet leader. As an old Comintern disciple himself and a survivor of Stalin’s purges in 1938, Tito was aware of the risks Khrushchev undertook. The strength and courage shown by Khrushchev in initiating the process of de-­Stalinization fully convinced the Yugoslav leadership that he was the only one in the Kremlin willing and able to fulfil this gargantuan task. At the LCY CC Plenum in March, Tito exclaimed in exaltation that ‘[the Soviet leaders] have a very difficult situation. But, what that group has done to date – this includes Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan, and the others as well – are very important and brave deeds; what they have done at the Twentieth Congress was more courageous than their trip to Belgrade’.160 This explains why the Yugoslavs, ‘beneficiaries’ of Khrushchev’s bold policies as they admitted to Sir Frank Roberts, felt obliged to support him.161 The Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, held on March 13 and 14 1956, confirmed that Yugoslav–Soviet relations had indeed entered a phase of true comradeship.162 Several important considerations prompted Tito to convene the Plenum so quickly after the Soviet Twentieth Congress. Khrushchev’s speech had introduced a new quality into the relations between the two countries. The Plenum served Tito to inform members of the Central Committee of the latest developments in Moscow and to secure their support for the new leap in relations with the USSR. Furthermore, after years of exposure to Western influence, Tito might have felt the need to remind his Party members of their Marxist ideological affiliation. According to the figure he had disclosed to Khrushchev during talks in Belgrade, 83 per cent of Party members in 1954 joined the Party after 1948.163 This was also a result of anti-­Stalinist purges that took place in Yugoslavia and the LCY between 1948 and 1953. Moreover, many of the Yugoslav top Party officials had come to prominence after 1948 on the wave of anti-­Stalinism. In 1956, the vast majority of the members of the Yugoslav top leadership, the Party Executive Committee and the LCY Central Committee were only in their thirties. These people had spent half of their young lives either fighting a guerrilla war against the Germans or struggling under a very real Soviet military threat and economic blockade. Anti-­Stalinist indoctrination in Yugoslavia during the conflict had very often and inevitably digressed into Russophobia, in particular at times of heightened danger of Soviet attack. Tito, who was in his early sixties, was the oldest among Yugoslavia’s leaders; Kardelj was in his late forties. More importantly, Tito and Kardelj were among the very few who had spent some time in the USSR and had acquired the classic Bolshevik indoctrination. At the March Plenum, Tito acknowledged that some party members were still suspicious of the Soviets, afraid of being cheated once again. Tito underlined that it would be disastrous should party members have divergent views on developments in the USSR. He asked for unity among members and a single and very

Comradeship   147 clear policy of the LCY toward the Soviet Party. In other words, Tito demanded full compliance with the new course he was about to launch in relations with Moscow. On 2 April, the meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee further endorsed Yugoslavia’s new attitude towards the Soviets. Tito set the agenda by stressing that if hesitation and reservations towards the Soviet leadership were understandable during and after the Belgrade talks in 1955, the situation had changed after the Twentieth Congress. 164

For us it is clear that [the developments after the Twentieth Congress] are not a result of new tactics or a manoeuvre but represent true intentions. We should give support to the Khrushchev group. . . . Excessive reservations from our side will only feed bureaucratic, Stalinist elements in the USSR.165 Accordingly, Tito demanded that the Executive Committee redefine Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities. He was of the opinion that Yugoslavia should cancel further US military aid. In his view, the US had already reduced deliveries of military equipment and was regularly imposing new conditions. In the context of new developments in the USSR, Tito posed a rhetorical question before the Committee, ‘who are we now arming ourselves against?’166 On the other hand, according to Tito, Yugoslavia should continue to receive US economic aid, unless the Americans chose to cancel it. Once again, as was the case during the meeting of the same body on 19 July 1954, after Khrushchev’s first letter, Tito’s statements confirmed that relations with the West had no bearing on Yugoslavia’s determination to pursue a course of normalization or reconciliation with the Soviets. At the same time, however, Tito insisted that there was no basis for the existence of an organization such as the Cominform, assigned to ‘coordinate’ relations between the Communist countries.167 The record of discussions at the Executive Committee meeting reveal that the process of de-­Stalinization announced in Moscow aroused euphoric sentiments among the Yugoslav leaders. They now looked with almost naïve optimism at future relations within the Communist movement. Kardelj was convinced that the collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe was in full progress and that Yugoslavia should be aiding this process. He even suggests that Yugoslavia should revisit certain decisions, which, at the time of real Soviet threat, it had to take for tactical reasons. Among others, he proposed that Yugoslavia should leave the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, as it was definitely a Western ideological organization. He underlined that, ‘[Yugoslavia is] not joining the Russian fold, but [is] in the socialist “lager” of the whole world. . . . We are, and have always been in the socialist “lager” but not in the context of the policies of the Blocs’.168 Kardelj’s deliberations confirm that the Yugoslav leadership came to believe that in the new circumstances, the Soviets would finally abandon the role of a hegemon in the Communist movement. This belief gave the Yugoslav leadership the confidence to move closer to the Soviets. They finally felt safe to join the socialist world to which, as they firmly believed, they always belonged.

148   Comradeship The discussions at the EC meeting, however, did not imply that Yugoslavia was willing to relinquish its independence and align itself with the Soviet Bloc. There isn’t a single Yugoslav document from this period to suggest anything of the sort. Yugoslavia’s independent orientation never came into question. The new opportunities created by the de-­Stalinization in the USSR were seen by the Yugoslav leadership as an environment that would enable Yugoslavia to engage fully in its policy of non-­engagement. Time and again during the meeting, speakers underlined Yugoslavia’s independence from the two Blocs. Tito repeatedly stated that the Cominform was baseless; Kardelj made it very clear that being part of the socialist ‘world’ did not mean membership of the ‘socialist camp’. He also stressed that Yugoslavia should maintain relations with both Blocs while maintaining a safe distance from either. With regard to economic cooperation, he insisted that Yugoslavia should be careful not to be excessively dependent on either side.169 Koča Popović, the Foreign Minister, emphasized that the global prestige of Yugoslavia was stronger than ever before and if the country was to maintain it, it must remain outside the Blocs. He also condemned Soviet intentions to pull non-­engaged countries, such as India and Burma into the ‘socialist camp’.170 The debates at the April meeting of the LCY Executive Committee also confirm that developments in Moscow re-­ignited the feeling of self-­righteousness among the Yugoslav leadership. The ‘secret speech’, they thought, acknowledged the correctness of their positions in the conflict with Stalin. The Yugoslav leaders believed that this earned them the right to share the position of ideological authority, a place hitherto occupied by Moscow alone. Addressing the meeting of the Executive Committee, Vukmanović-Tempo stressed that the Russians, as well as the satellites, did not know how to achieve the desired goals of ‘socialist construction’. In his view, Yugoslav assistance in this respect would be essential and should be given.171 In the interview given to the author, Vukmanović-Tempo confirmed that, at the time, the Yugoslav leadership shared an overwhelming enthusiasm with regard to the future of relations with the Soviets and with other Communist parties. Being proven right, and as true Communists, the Yugoslavs also genuinely felt obliged to help their comrades in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. The Yugoslavs believed that they were ideologically and theoretically ahead of the rest in the Communist movement. As Tempo would later remember, ‘we felt as if we had won. We had been proven right. We believed that they should come to us, not the other way around’.172 The meeting of the LCY Executive Committee, in April 1956 offers additional conclusions. Yugoslav leaders were unanimous in that the Soviet leadership, and Khrushchev in particular, deserved unreserved Yugoslav support. Considering themselves the most experienced in the post-­Stalinist restructuring, they believed that they should award all necessary help to the Soviets and the satellites. It was also concluded at the meeting that the threat from the Soviet Union had definitely been removed. Consequently, further US military aid was unnecessary and Yugoslavia’s relations with the West could be more evenly balanced. Moreover, the threat of the reduction or cancellation of Western economic aid to Yugoslavia, as the consequence of much improved Yugoslav–Soviet

Comradeship   149 relations, did not have any bearing on the decisions taken by the Yugoslav leadership regarding the future course or pace of the Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Yugoslav leaders concluded at the EC meeting that the de-­Stalinization process in the satellites was lagging behind the process in the USSR and were adamant not to initiate reconciliation with the Eastern European countries. The Yugoslavs believed that any approaches to the satellites were futile as long the Stalin-­era leadership was still in place. This implied Yugoslavia’s interest in having these leaderships removed. Indeed, this would be manifested in Yugoslavia’s active support of Gomułka in Poland and Nagy in Hungary later in the year. In the months after Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, the Yugoslav leadership enjoyed a period of true revolutionary enthusiasm and awakened hope in the unity of the Communist movement based on equality. Belgrade looked forward to Tito’s forthcoming June visit to the USSR to provide further impetus to the improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. It was expected that the visit would crown the newly found comradeship between the two countries. Within less than a year, Yugoslav–Soviet normalization seemed to be following a steep upward curve. From one dramatic event and unprecedented leap to another, the relations between the two countries reached a stage where, to the Yugoslavs, the impossible became possible. Expectations turned to euphoria, feeding again the somewhat pacified revolutionary zeal of Tito and the leading Yugoslav Communists.

Conclusion One of the by-­products of the leadership contest between Khrushchev and Malenkov, which peaked during the winter of 1955, was the hiatus in the process of tentative Yugoslav–Soviet normalization that was being carried out through the secret correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev. In addition, Tito’s two­month long trip to India and Burma and focus on the new Yugoslav foreign policy strategy of non-­engagement had temporarily removed dealings with Moscow as the central point of his attention. In March, however, as soon as he had safely removed Malenkov and to an extent, sidelined Molotov, his main leadership contenders, Khrushchev resumed correspondence with Tito with added vigour. With unprecedented speed, as if to compensate for the lost time, the renewed correspondence led to Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade at the end of May and meeting with Tito. The historic visit by the Soviet delegation, led by Khrushchev, and several days of official and informal talks with the Yugoslav leadership led to resumption of normal government relations and the signing of the Belgrade Declaration. The document promulgated equality and respect as the guiding principle of relations between the two countries and, more importantly, between the USSR and other socialist countries. Normalization of government relations, however, could not bridge the ideological chasm and there was no renewal of links between the CPSU and LCY. The report on the results of the visit to Yugoslavia, which he delivered at the Soviet Party Central Committee Plenum, held in early July, became the platform

150   Comradeship for Khrushchev’s showdown with Molotov and the hard-­liners in the Presidium. Importantly, the confrontation at the Plenum produced the first criticism of Stalin, signalling the beginning of the process of de-­Stalinization. As a result of the victory against the conservatives at the Plenum, Khrushchev was able to secure the backing of the Presidium for the re-­examination of Stalin’s legacy and that would lead to his ‘secret speech’ at the end of the Twentieth Congress, in February 1956. In the months after Khrushchev’s visit, Yugoslav–Soviet normalization gained breathtaking pace, resulting in an unprecedented surge of economic cooperation. The speed of the improvement of relations between Moscow and Belgrade raised understandable suspicions in the West. However, both Tito and the Eisenhower Administration quickly realized that both stood to loose from a deterioration of the existing level of relations. This sobering realization led to Dulles’ one-­day meeting with Tito in Brioni in early November 1955. During their official and informal exchanges, the sworn anti-­Communist, Dulles, and the devoted Bolshevik, Tito, struck an unexpected accord, which dispelled the former’s suspicions regarding Yugoslavia’s future relations with the Soviet Bloc. As a result, Washington resumed military and economic aid to Yugoslavia. Despite the unprecedented increase in economic cooperation and the breathtaking pace of normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, Belgrade continued to resist Soviet demands for the renewal of party relations. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, however, changed everything. It came at the end of a process of reassessment of Stalin’s legacy that started eight months earlier, at the Soviet Party Plenum with discussions over the policy shift towards Yugoslavia. In his ‘secret speech’, Khrushchev admitted Soviet responsibility for the 1948 break up and Stalin’s personal culpability. Overwhelmed by euphoria in the aftermath of the speech, Tito and his comrades decided to renew party relations with the Soviets, a mark of true reconciliation. This, however, did not mean rejoining the ‘socialist camp’ or abandonment of Yugoslavia’s new non-­ aligned orientation. Nonetheless, Tito’s forthcoming visit to the USSR, scheduled for June, was now being perceived by Belgrade as an opportunity for the beginning of a new phase of relations with Moscow, of true comradeship.

4 Contention

Tito visited the USSR between 2 and 23 June 1956. The trip became his personal triumph, with jubilant masses greeting him wherever he went. At the end of the visit, the so-­called Moscow Declaration was signed. The document formalized the renewal of relations between the CPSU and the LCY. Many Western obser­vers were led to believe that the trip heralded Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘socialist lager’.1 They, however, overlooked the fact that the Document stipulated principles of relations within the global Communist community that negated Soviet hegemony within the movement. Although some of the feting of the Yugoslav leader was staged for the Soviets propaganda purposes, the popular adulation of Tito, the acclaimed war hero and a man who stood up to Stalin, was by-­and-large genuine. At the Mamaiev Kurban in Stalingrad, the place where unknown thousands of the defenders of the city lay buried, crowds broke through Soviet security cordons and joined in a spontaneous, warm encounter with Tito and Khrushchev.2 These scenes, however, hid arduous exchanges between the two delegations, a result of insurmountable difference in their approach to developments in Eastern Europe and Tito’s refusal to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’. In the months following Tito’s visit, under the pressure of mounting crises in Eastern Europe, signs of growing dissension in Soviet–Yugoslav relations multiplied. At the end of September, Khrushchev and Tito spent two weeks ‘holidaying’ together, first in Yugoslavia and then at Yalta. While in Yugoslavia, Khrushchev spent time truly relaxing and engaged in a serious conversation with his host only on the evening before his departure. On the other hand, during the week in Yalta Tito and Khrushchev conferred extensively and mostly in private. Contrary to outside appearances, this prolonged association, however, spelled the culmination of unsuccessful Soviet efforts to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘socialist camp’ and to engage it in harnessing the increasingly precarious developments in Poland and Hungary.

Tito’s visit to the USSR – euphoria and betrayed expectations It may seem paradoxical that the chapter addressing the beginning of the deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations begins with Tito’s triumphant visit to the

152   Contention USSR in June 1956. The event was, at the time, perceived as the culmination of the rapprochement between the two countries. Many observers, such as the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Hayter, saw Tito’s visit as the confirmation of Yugoslavia’s return to the Soviet ‘camp’.3 The truth however, could not have been more different. Underneath the pomp, mass jubilations and manifested comradeship, the talks between two delegations resembled more of a battle between irreconcilable adversaries. Tito’s visit was in fact the beginning of the next Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation.4 Tito’s visit took place between 2 and 23 June 1956, and was his first trip to the Soviet Union since 1946. During the three weeks, the Yugoslav leader travelled to Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad and the Kuban region. On the eve of the visit, the Soviets made gestures intended to impress Tito. On 22 May, Khrushchev sent Tito a detailed account of the April visit to Moscow by a French Socialist Party delegation, led by the Prime Minister Guy Mollet. Mollet’s visit represented Moscow’s first official dialogue with a major Western socialist party. During Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, a year earlier, the Yugoslavs had urged the Soviets to establish contacts with the socialist and social democratic parties of Western Europe. By sending a report on talks with Guy Mollet, Moscow wished to prove to Tito that his suggestions were being taken seriously.5 Furthermore, Molotov’s resignation from the post of Foreign Minister was officially announced a day before Tito’s arrival. Although the resignation most certainly reflected the consolidation of Khrushchev’s leadership position, the announcement was conveniently timed to ‘soften’ Tito ahead of his talks with the Soviet leaders. The Soviets were aware of Yugoslav animosity towards Molotov. In March and April 1948, together with Stalin, Molotov co-­signed the letters that triggered the conflict with Yugoslavia. The same calculated motive may have been behind the timing of the announcement of the dissolution of the Cominform, which came on 18 April, six weeks ahead of Tito’s visit. The stage was thus set, as the Kremlin certainly hoped, for Tito to be more responsive to Soviet demands during the forthcoming talks. Four rounds of official Yugoslav–Soviet talks were held in the Kremlin during Tito’s visit.6 The Yugoslav delegation consisted of Tito, Kardelj, Koča Popović and Mićunović, the newly appointed Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow. The Soviet side was headed by Khrushchev and included Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov and Shepilov, the new Soviet Foreign Minister. The first official round of talks was held on 5 June and was devoted to foreign policy issues and economic cooperation. In his opening statement, Tito emphasized Yugoslavia’s interest in increasing economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. He focused on Yugoslavia’s desire to build aluminium plants with Soviet assistance. Tito, however, insisted on the bilateral character of the economic cooperation. His obvious aim was to pre-­empt possible Soviet effort to channel the cooperation through the Comecon. Addressing international issues, Tito underlined the convergence of the Soviet and the Yugoslav positions on many international issues. Speaking about the Middle East, Tito urged the Soviets to provide more aid to the Arab countries of the region, in

Contention   153 particular to Nasser’s Egypt. He confided that his intelligence reports suggested the creation of a Western plot to overthrow Nasser.7 In his opening exposé, Khrushchev reiterated that he fully shared Tito’s views on many international issues. He addressed the issue of Western economic aid to Yugoslavia in a conciliatory manner, commenting that ‘one should be reasonable and take advantage of possibilities offered to Yugoslavia by its current international position’.8 At the end of this round of talks, Tito returned to the issue of the US economic and military aid announcing that Yugoslavia had asked the Americans for the future economic assistance to be in the form of commercial loans, rather than the aid. Tito stressed that this would eliminate Yugoslavia’s moral indebtedness to the US. He also downplayed US military aid, characterizing it as obsolete and largely symbolic. However, according to Tito, Yugoslavia was not presently in a position to cancel it for political reasons. He also underlined that Yugoslavia had never made political concessions to the Americans in return for their aid. Accentuating that he trusted the honesty and friendship of his Yugoslav comrades, Khrushchev, nevertheless, remarked sarcastically that ‘capitalists never give to anyone unless it is to their benefit. If they gave help to the Yugoslavs without political preconditions, it meant that Yugoslavia, as it was, was of use to them’.9 By playing down the importance of the US economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, Tito obviously intended to pre-­empt anticipated confrontation with the Soviets over this question. Much of the first round of talks was devoted to Germany and Yugoslavia’s relations with People’s Democracies. On Germany, Khrushchev repeatedly insisted that it was the most important international problem. According to him, it was an issue through which the West would try to exert a blow against socialism. He made it clear that ‘for this reason, the USSR doesn’t even contemplate giving in and that a special effort will be made, together with the countries of Eastern Europe, for a speedy development of East Germany’.10 Khrushchev added that East Germany (GDR) should become the showcase that would demonstrate the advantages of the socialist system. For this reason, according to him, all necessary economic resources would be made available for GDR’s rapid development. Addressing Yugoslavia’s relations with the People’s Democracies, Tito confirmed improvements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, but not with Bulgaria and Hungary. With regard to Albania, however, Tito was bitter and insisted that reconciliation with Enver Hoxha was impossible. Khrushchev mentioned the brewing crisis in Hungary only in passing. He admitted that things were very difficult there and asserted that ‘undesirable forces are mushrooming [in Hungary]’. Khrushchev insisted that it was Stalin and not Rakosi who was responsible for the present difficulties. He then informed Tito that the Soviet leadership, worried about developments in Hungary, had decided to dispatch Suslov to Budapest in the coming days.11 In continuation of the first day deliberations, Tito also informed the Soviets about his visit to France, several weeks earlier. Khrushchev responded with a detailed account of his visit to the UK, also in May. He described how the Soviets were insulted by Eden’s frosty reception and condescension. According

154   Contention to Khrushchev, at one point, he and Bulganin had decided to interrupt the visit and return to Moscow but were persuaded against at the very last moment after a sudden positive change in Eden’s attitude. On disarmament, Khrushchev and Tito agreed that efforts should be made for a substantial reduction, especially of nuclear weapons. Kardelj revealed later that when talking off-­the-record about disarmament ‘[the Soviets] always added: “Nevertheless, the conflict [with the capitalists] will unavoidably happen one day and we have to arm ourselves. Throughout history, disarmament has always been a fiction” ’.12 Kardelj’s account illustrates the extent to which the post-­Stalin Soviet leaderships’ foreign policy outlook was moulded by ideological postulates. At the end of the first day of talks, having agreed that there was high degree of symmetry in their views on international issues, the two delegations concluded that there was no need for further discussions on the subject. The second round of official Yugoslav–Soviet talks was held on 9 June. The agenda for this day consisted of one issue only – relations between the CPSU and the LCY. The beginning of the session was burdened with considerable unease and hesitation. A commentary in the Yugoslav transcript of the talks reveals that, it seemed as if no one was ready for the discussion on Party matters. For this reason, almost forty minutes of the meeting was spent in conversations about Leningrad from where Comrade Tito returned this morning, on Stalingrad and Kuban where he is going tomorrow, or on the reactions to this visit in the world.13 Both delegations were reluctant to broach the topic they knew would be contentious. At one point, however, when Khrushchev mentioned the word ‘lager’, Tito seized the opportunity to say that he disliked that expression because it implied Soviet hegemony. He added that it was impossible and wrong to confine socialism within the boundaries of the ‘lager’ and that ‘Yugoslavia will not formally join the “lager” although [it] is part of the socialist world’.14 His comments immediately triggered a debate about the role of the ‘socialist camp’. Khrushchev responded to Tito that actions of the socialist countries required coordination because the ‘capitalists’’ intention was to break their alliance and then deal with them one by one. He singled out Western activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as proof. Insisting that ‘discipline is needed’, Khrushchev went on to elaborate in front of the stunned Yugoslavs that the Cominform had played a progressive role after the 1948 Soviet–Yugoslav rupture. He even asserted that the organization had preserved the unity of the socialist ‘camp’ by securing and maintaining the cohesion of the international Communist movement under the leadership of the USSR. At this point, although Khrushchev had immediately added that the conflict with Yugoslavia was fabricated and would not happen again, ‘a number of members of the Yugoslav delegation loudly protested’.15 Mikoyan and Shepilov intervened to calm down the atmosphere. Once order had been restored, Tito asked that certain issues be addressed during the talks, for the sake of socialism’s global appeal. He particularly singled

Contention   155 out the question of the modality of Communists’ engagement in global affairs and the issue of relations between socialist countries. Khrushchev impatiently cut in asserting that autonomy of action of individual socialist countries was unacceptable because a middle position between capitalism and socialism is impossible. [Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union] have achieved much regarding [their] government relations and cooperation, but need to agree on Party [cooperation] as well. Because of Yugoslavia’s special position between the socialist and the capitalist worlds, we could agree on a tactical role for Yugoslavia – for the benefit of our common goal. It does not mean however, that we could do the same with other countries.16 Kardelj responded to Khrushchev by saying that Communists should take advantage of all forms of social development, whether evolutionary or revolutionary. He also made clear that although ‘[the Yugoslav leadership] never believed that Comecon or the Warsaw Pact should be mechanically disbanded . . . we are convinced that it would not be in [Yugoslavia’s] interest to join these organizations’. Molotov interrupted that there could be no doubts that ‘there exist two “camps” ’.17 Once again, this brought the atmosphere close to boiling point and Tito intervened, stressing that it was not Yugoslavia’s intention to weaken the existing organizations and institutions of the socialist countries. He then characterized as ‘stupid’ and provocative the stories circulating in the West that Yugoslavia aimed to disassociate the People’s Democracies from the Soviet Union; Tito underlined that Yugoslavia’s good relations with the West and with the social democratic parties were not aimed at harming the Soviet Union. Likewise, the Yugoslav leader insisted that ‘[Yugoslavia’s] relations with Poland, Romania, Hungary and other East European countries should be regarded in this way. We do not intend to interfere in their internal affairs’. He added that existing agreements and arrangements between the Soviet Union and East European countries need not be dismantled. Reactionary elements, according to him, still existed in these countries and the Communists there faced serious difficulties. This, Tito elaborated, was due to the fact that unlike in Yugoslavia, where socialism was inaugurated through an indigenous revolution, circumstances in Eastern European countries ‘were different’. He insisted, however, that the question of ‘how [socialism] should be built and in what form, should be debated’. In conclusion, Tito strongly rebuked Molotov’s earlier statement on the existence of two camps, the socialist and the capitalist, as a harmful oversimplification. At this point Khrushchev adjourned the meeting.18 The third round of the Yugoslav–Soviet talks took place on 18 June. It was planned as a discussion on the drafts of the documents the two delegations had agreed to sign at the end of the visit. Prior to this session, the Yugoslav delegation had submitted draft proposals of the official Communiqué and of the Declaration on relations between the CPSU and the LCY. The Soviets accepted the Communiqué with only minor corrections. The proposed Yugoslav draft of

156   Contention the  Declaration, however, provoked a continuation of a fierce ideological confrontation that marked the previous round of talks. The Soviets voiced ‘grave disappointment’ with the Yugoslav draft. Khrushchev went furthest, insisting that ‘to accept [the Yugoslav draft] would mean a surrender to social democrats and to all those who promote the revision of Marxism–Leninism’. Addressing Tito personally, he asked whether he was correct in presuming that ‘the opposition of Yugoslav comrades to the Soviet views results from [the Yugoslav] desire to remain outside the “lager”?’ Tito replied unequivocally that, ‘[Yugoslavia is] not outside the socialist front, but [is] outside the Eastern Bloc’.19 Aware that the continuation of the discussion would not bridge the existing gap, the two sides appointed two teams, one from each side, headed by Kardelj and Mikoyan respectively to continue work on a compromise draft of the Declaration. The Yugoslav–Soviet talks concluded on the morning of 20 June. The closing session started with Mikoyan and Kardelj presenting the draft of the Declaration on which they had worked around the clock since the previous meeting of 18 June. Mikoyan expressed Soviet dissatisfaction with the existing document and singled out three contentious issues on which the two teams could not agree. First, and contrary to Soviet suggestions, the Yugoslavs continued to insist that the Declaration should specifically address only bilateral relations between the CPSU and the LCY. Second, the Yugoslavs rejected the Soviet paragraph on the importance of ‘scientific socialism’, agreeing only for the term to be mentioned in one sentence in the draft. The final point of contention, according to Mikoyan, was that the Yugoslavs had rejected a paragraph proposed by the Soviets, expressing support of the Communist parties to the anti-­colonial movements and accentuating the need for their closer cooperation. Following Mikoyan’s elaboration, a very tense atmosphere engulfed the meeting room. Several heated exchanges that ensued confirmed the futility of further attempts at reaching a compromise on the Declaration draft. According to the Yugoslav transcript, ‘Khrushchev, after consulting through eye contact other members of the Soviet delegation, declared that he would reluctantly accept the stand of the Yugoslav comrades citing an old Russian proverb that one cannot embrace what is impossible to embrace’.20 Khrushchev’s reaction confirmed that the Soviets had accepted the draft-­ proposal only because time was running out. The official signing of both the Communiqué and the Declaration was scheduled immediately after the conclusion of this last round of talks, at midday. At a press conference following the signing ceremony, Koča Popović was expected to brief numerous foreign journalists on the results of the visit. Finally, Tito’s official departure from Moscow was scheduled for 3:00 pm on the same day. The Soviet leadership had obviously concluded that it was impossible to achieve a higher degree of understanding with the Yugoslavs. An unplanned continuation of talks that would result in the postponement of the signing ceremony and of Tito’s departure would have made public the existence of deep disagreements between the two sides. Such an embarrassment would have compromised the Soviet aim to present the visit as confirmation of the convergence of views between Moscow and Belgrade. Most importantly, the conclusion of talks and Tito’s visit without the renewal of party

Contention   157 relations would have meant the humiliating public collapse of the Soviet policy of normalization with Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership was most certainly aware that, on the one hand, this would have seriously undermined the still fragile authority of Khrushchev and the post-­Stalin leadership within the ‘socialist camp’ and in the global Communist movement. On the other hand, such an outcome could further enhance the corrosive impact Yugoslavia’s independence was having on the ‘socialist camp’, in particular at a time of growing crises in Poland and Hungary. The irreconcilable positions that prevented a compromise on the Declaration brought to the fore the extent of the Yugoslav–Soviet ideological incompatibility. The Yugoslav leaders insisted that the re-­establishment of relations between the CPSU and the LCY be limited to the bilateral level. They were adamant not to allow being associated with the ‘socialist camp’ hence, insistence against any mention in the Declaration of multilateral cooperation, coordination, or need for closer relations between the Communist parties. Yugoslav rejection of the inclusion of a paragraph on ‘scientific socialism’, a euphemism for the Moscow-­ approved interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, reflected their refusal to acknowledge the Soviet system as the official form of socialism or Moscow’s ideological authority. Finally, by declining to sign the appeal for closer cooperation between the Communist parties and the anti-­colonial movements, Tito and his aides had forestalled the Soviet attempt to hijack Yugoslavia’s growing stature among the non-­engaged countries and to associate the non-­aligned group of nations with the ‘socialist camp’. Tito was only weeks away from hosting a tripartite meeting with Nehru and Nasser, which he hoped to be an important step in his effort to formalize and strengthen Yugoslavia’s position of equidistance from either Bloc. The manifested firmness in refusing to compromise on certain issues, even if it meant bringing into question the signing of the Declaration, confirmed Tito’s determination to return from Moscow with his image untarnished. Thus, at midday of 20 June 1956, as originally planned, Tito and Khrushchev signed the ‘Declaration on Relations Between the LCY and the CPSU’, better known as the ‘Moscow Declaration’.21 While the Belgrade Declaration stipulated principles of relations between states and promulgated normalization of government relations between the two countries, the Moscow Declaration re-­established links between the CPSU and the LCY and formulated principles that were to govern them. The structure and the language of both Declarations revealed the Yugoslav leadership’s intention to award those documents the character that would transcend Yugoslav–Soviet bilateral relations.22 More importantly, the Yugoslavs were eager to force Moscow to publicly commit to the principles they wished to have embedded in their bilateral relationship. Belgrade hoped that this would safeguard the relations between the two countries against Moscow’s attempts to impose its hegemony. Tito and his associates knew that the Soviets had never abandoned hope of getting Yugoslavia back into the ‘socialist camp’. At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership needed normalization of relations with the USSR in order to diminish Yugoslavia’s dependence on the West and establish a truly equidistant position to either Bloc.

158   Contention The Moscow Declaration was much shorter than the one signed in Belgrade. It reflected lack of agreement between the two sides on issues regarding the character of relations between Communist parties. Nonetheless, the document promulgated principles that were of unprecedented importance for future relations between the Communist parties and states. The Moscow Declaration acknowledged that relations between the CPSU and the LCY would be founded on the principle of equality, which would guarantee ‘free and comradely’ exchange of views on contentious issues that existed between the two parties. The Declaration also underlined that both sides had accepted that forms of socialism implemented around the world could differ and condemned the practice of imposition of a single model of socialism on any party and country. Importantly, the document recognized the right of every party to pursue contacts with ‘other Communist and workers’ parties’, the latter being an euphemism for labour and social democratic parties. The Declaration also stipulated that cooperation between Communist parties should be democratic, open, public, based on equality, and that ‘each participant [of such cooperation] would retain the freedom of action’. This was a rebuff to the Soviet demands for closer ‘coordination’ between the Communist parties and the socialist countries.23 The Moscow Declaration represented a victory for the Yugoslavs. It affirmed principles promoted by the Yugoslavs and publicly confirmed that Belgrade did not yield to Moscow’s pressure to join the ‘lager’. Moreover, the document undermined the concept of ‘lagerism’ at a time of increasing demands throughout Eastern Europe for de-­Stalinization and liberalization of relations in the ‘socialist camp’ and at a time when the crises in Poland and Hungary were already threatening the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc. The Moscow Declaration articulated an ideological rationale behind demands for democratization in Eastern Europe in 1956. It is not surprising then, as will be shown later, that the Soviet leadership wished to bury the Declaration even before the ink had dried. Why did the Soviet leadership, after two years of patiently wooing Tito, subject him to the strongest pressure in Moscow, and drive the talks to the brink of collapse? Bringing Tito back into the ‘socialist camp’ had always loomed large among the Soviet motives for the normalization with Yugoslavia. However, the crisis that was enveloping Eastern Europe at the time Tito arrived in Moscow created a sense of urgency, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership were losing patience, convinced that Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘camp’ would diffuse the nationalist revival in Poland and Hungary. The force and crudeness of the Soviet pressure on the Yugoslavs marked Khrushchev’s clear departure from the strategy he had hitherto pursued with Tito. As shown earlier, the dichotomy of the public and private side of Yugoslav–Soviet exchanges, in particular with regard to the ideological issues, was also marked during Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955.24 In Belgrade, however, Khrushchev did not allow Soviet pressure on the Yugoslavs to lead to a confrontation. Kardelj, who negotiated both with Stalin and Khrushchev, observed that the latter differed from Stalin in that he did not rush stubbornly to achieve a pre-­conceived goal. According to him, ‘[Khrushchev] tried but, when he failed, he withdrew and for the time being

Contention   159 accepted whatever policy went furthest towards securing normal relations’.25 The overt pressure exercised during the Moscow talks, however, confirmed the Soviet leaders’ growing frustration with the Yugoslavs, exasperated by the deteriorating situation in Poland and Hungary. The urgency to get the Yugoslavs on board and diffuse the crises left no room for subtleties. Prior to Tito’s departure for Moscow, Western observers in Belgrade speculated whether he would be able to influence Moscow to allow further liberalization of Eastern Europe.26 As has been shown, Tito was not in a position to do so. During talks in Moscow, he was at pains to defend his own independent position and rebuff the Kremlin’s pressure without causing the collapse of the normalization process. As the transcript of the talks confirms, Tito was careful not to antagonize the Soviets more than necessary and tried to placate them by stressing that Yugoslavia was not working towards dismantling the Soviet Bloc. Anyway, Tito regarded socialism in the satellite countries to be less than firmly established. Together with the imposed reality of the post-­war settlement in Europe, the fragility of Communist credibility throughout Eastern Europe justified in his view, the existence of ‘supervisory’ relations between the USSR and People’s Democracies. Whilst supporting wholeheartedly the need for Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe to be replaced, Tito, as a true Communist, was not ready to see the socialism in these countries replaced with capitalism. A factor that also contributed to the confrontational course of the Yugoslav– Soviet talks in June 1956 was the apparent weakening of Khrushchev’s position within the Soviet leadership. Observing the behaviour of the Soviet leaders during talks, Tito and his associates became convinced that Khrushchev was under pressure. On 10 July, speaking before the Federal Executive Council, Tito pointed out that, a second faction is now present [in the Kremlin], a very strong faction, which pushes a little more to the right. [During talks in Moscow], whenever a [ideological] question was discussed, Khrushchev would immediately look at the others. On the other hand, on government matters he would decide alone.27 The Yugoslavs understood that Khrushchev and his policies, which culminated with the dismantling of Stalin’s cult at the Twentieth Congress, were being blamed by the hard-­liners in the Presidium for the crises in Eastern Europe. Before Tito’s arrival in Moscow, Mićunović, who had just taken over as the new Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, anticipated that, instead of being ‘softer’ in the forthcoming talks, ‘Khrushchev would be “harder” because he is not strong and would, for this reason, demand Yugoslav support in a way that corresponds to what the Russians are looking for’.28 What the Soviets were looking for, of course, was Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘camp’. Khrushchev, the main force behind the process of de-­Stalinization and normalization with Yugoslavia stood to benefit most should Tito agree to it, hence his pressure on the Yugoslavs.

160   Contention Tito’s belief that Khrushchev’s leadership was threatened explains his manifestations of public support for the Soviet leader throughout the visit, even in the face of obvious Soviet manipulation. On a number of occasions the Soviets carefully orchestrated Tito’s presence to project an impression of his compliance with the Soviet policies. On 19 June, a rally was organized at the Dynamo stadium in Moscow during which both Khrushchev and Tito spoke. The Soviet leader used the occasion to launch an exceptionally vitriolic attack on the West. Tito, who spoke after Khrushchev, did not publicly rebuke the Soviet leader. His refusal to confront Khrushchev publicly could partly be attributed to his manoeuvring to secure a favourable compromise on the Declaration, which at that very moment was being negotiated behind the scenes by Kardelj and Mikoyan. At the same time, however, Tito’s lack of response resulted from his awareness that a public rebuttal would humiliate Khrushchev and was likely to further weaken his leadership position. Tito’s reluctance to shun Khrushchev was confirmed by another incident during the visit. The Yugoslav leader did not publicly denounce intentional Soviet misinterpretation of a statement which he made during his visit to Stalingrad. The statement attributed to Tito was published in the Soviet press and immediately picked up by foreign journalists, causing uproar in the West. According to the Soviet interpretation, Tito stated in Stalingrad that in a future war the Yugoslavs and the Soviets would ‘walk hand in hand’. Immediately upon returning from Stalingrad, at the beginning of the second round of talks, Tito strongly protested to Khrushchev about ‘the misinterpretation of his speech in Stalingrad in which he had said that it “was possible for us to cooperate in peace, because the Yugoslav and the Soviet peoples have together shed blood in the [Second World] War” ’. Khrushchev did not offer an explanation nor did he apologize for the fabrication.29 Tito’s protest showed that the Yugoslavs were fully aware of Soviet effort to spin the visit as confirmation of Belgrade’s extraordinary proximity to Moscow. The British Ambassador in Belgrade, Sir Frank Roberts, reported during the visit that several very senior Yugoslav officials had complained to him of Soviet machinations. Sir Frank observed that ‘it would be unrealistic to expect Tito to reflect any such doubt in public, especially in Moscow since his policy, as explained to me [during a meeting with Tito on 4 May] is public encouragement of “Soviet better tendencies” ’.30 Despite the fanfares and apparent celebratory mood, Tito’s trip to the USSR in June 1956 had mixed results. On the one hand, Tito had every reason to declare the visit to the USSR a success.31 Ideologically, the Moscow Declaration acknowledged Yugoslavia as a socialist country, a recognition it had been denied since 1948. At the same time, the document recognized Yugoslavia’s unique independent position in the Communist movement, outside the ‘socialist camp’. For the first time in post-­Lenin history, relations between the Bolshevik party and another Communist party, as well as between the Soviet Union and another socialist state, were established on the basis of equality. Tito’s dream, ever since the rupture of 1948, for Yugoslavia to be accepted back into the Communist community on its own terms was finally fulfilled. Not least Khrushchev had

Contention   161 promised further increase in the economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR. On the other hand, the Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Moscow in June 1956 signalled the beginning of the end of the rapprochement between the two countries. The Soviet leadership regarded the outcome of talks with Tito to be unsuccessful. According to Tito, it was immediately obvious that ‘[the Soviets] were not very happy with how [the talks] ended and with the Declaration’.32 The Soviets did not achieve the goal they deemed critical for harnessing worrying developments in Poland and Hungary – to pull Yugoslavia into the ‘camp’.

‘Containment’ of Yugoslavia Following the debacle of talks with Tito, the Kremlin turned to ‘containment’ of Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership adopted a two-­tier strategy. On the one hand, convinced that Yugoslavia’s example encouraged demands for liberalization in Eastern Europe, the Soviets embarked upon isolating Yugoslavia from the satellites. On the other hand, through manipulation and misrepresentation, Moscow sought to use Yugoslavia’s prestige among the public and the rehabilitated ‘cadres’ in Eastern Europe to harness demands for democratization and greater independence from the Soviet yoke. Pursuing the first strategy of isolating Yugoslavia, the Soviet leadership took immediate steps to limit the impact of the Moscow Declaration on the ‘socialist camp’. The Kremlin stripped the radiance off the Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement even before Tito had left the territory of the USSR. On 21 June, while Tito’s train, on its return journey to Yugoslavia, was being greeted with adulation throughout Ukraine, the leaders of the satellite countries were being summoned to a closed conference in Moscow. Officially, the meeting addressed cooperation within the ‘camp’ in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Cominform. Mićunović reported that Khrushchev used the opportunity to inform the satellite leaders that relations between the LCY and the CPSU had been normalized and that Tito had promised to be more in tune with the ‘socialist camp’.33 However, according to Mićunović, the attending satellite leaders were also told in unequivocal terms that the signed Declaration was Moscow’s tactical concession to Tito and that relations within the ‘camp’ had to be based on different principles.34 The speed with which this meeting had been convened suggested that Moscow was indeed concerned that principles stipulated in the Moscow Declaration could have a damaging impact on the cohesion of the Bloc. The Declaration was a public document and it promoted the very same mode of relations which the anti-­Stalinist opposition throughout People’s Democracies was demanding. During the second round of talks in Moscow, on 9 June, Khrushchev openly told Tito that ‘what was allowed to the Yugoslavs would not be allowed to the others’.35 Indeed, the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation enhanced Yugoslavia’s already impressive prestige and influence among the Eastern European public. One of the by-­products of the normalization was that objective information on Yugoslavia became increasingly available in People’s Democracies. Yugoslavia’s new presence was not due to its miraculous propaganda efforts or to intelligence

162   Contention penetration. In this respect, Belgrade’s accomplishments remained limited. What made the difference, however, was the suspension of anti-­Yugoslav propaganda. Following Khrushchev’s visit the obsessive rant against the ‘Titoist fascist clique’ was replaced by objective reporting on Yugoslavia’s achievements. This, in turn, allowed the truth to penetrate that Yugoslavia’s improved standard of living was founded on Western aid and facilitated by its ideological and foreign affairs independence from Moscow. The public in the satellite countries became aware of the extent to which good relations with the West had brought economic benefits to Yugoslavia. What particularly appealed to East Europeans was that with the signing of the Belgrade and, in particular the Moscow Declaration, Yugoslavia was recognized as a socialist country while remaining outside the Soviet Bloc. Finally, as a result of de-­Stalinization and, above all, public pressure, during the summer of 1956 rehabilitated ‘cadres’ were being reinstated throughout Eastern Europe. Between 1948 and 1953, many of these people had been imprisoned as Titoists. ‘Cadres’, such as Władisław Gomułka in Poland and Imre Nagy in Hungary were now at the centre of demands for liberalization in Eastern Europe. Within a week after Tito’s departure from Moscow, the Soviet leadership distanced itself further from the policy of de-­Stalinization. Reports of tragic events in Poznań on 28 June were received with shock in Moscow. According to Mićunović, the Soviet leadership, as well as many ordinary citizens were convinced that the Poznań riots were a result of ‘Western subversion’.36 Although Belgrade refrained from publicly criticising the Polish regime, the Yugoslav interpretation of events was opposite to the Soviet version. The official LCY organ, Borba, asserted that the reason behind Poznań lay in the workers’ discontent with their living conditions and in public demands for greater democratization.37 On 30 June, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a Postanovlenie38 entitled ‘On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences’.39 The document was in fact drafted earlier, in response to US State Department’s worldwide release on 4 June of the English translation of Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’.40 However, the publication of the Postanovlenie and its hard-­line tone only two days after the Poznan riots represented a signal from Moscow to its satellites. The document attacked the ‘slanderous anti-­Soviet campaign’ based ‘on certain facts related to the condemnation of the cult of J. V. Stalin by the CPSU’ and offered an ‘objective’ appraisal of Stalin’s contributions to the cause of socialism.41 The aim of the Postanovlenie was to water down crucial accusations brought against Stalin in the ‘secret speech’ and to pass a definitive judgment on Stalinism. It declared that the process of de-­Stalinization has been completed.42 The document signalled the resurrection of the hard-­line faction in the Soviet Presidium. Mićunović reported to Belgrade that Suslov, the silent opponent of normalization with Yugoslavia, was the chief architect of the Postanovlenie.43 The document also confirmed that the Soviet leadership had concluded that the circumstances developing in Eastern Europe demanded urgent consolidation of the international Communist movement around uniform ideological postulates.

Contention   163 The hardening of the Soviet ideological stance became apparent in the weeks after the publication of the Postanovlenie. On 6 July, at a reception in the Kremlin, Mićunović approached Khrushchev in greeting. To his amazement, Khrushchev started berating the Yugoslav leadership for ‘duplicity’. He complained that the official Yugoslav papers had not published the full text of his speech at the Dynamo stadium rally on 19 June, during Tito’s visit. While delivering the tirade, Khrushchev was in the company of Molotov and Voroshilov. Once the two had left, however, Khrushchev confided in Mićunović that every member of the Presidium had received report on this ‘error’, adding that ‘the whole Presidium is watching me. For the moment, they are still not saying anything, just watching me.’ This ‘indiscretion’, according to Mićunović was intended to justify the rant against the Yugoslav leadership as something being forced upon Khrushchev by the hard-­liners in the Presidium. The Yugoslav Ambassador also suggested that such a disproportional reaction by the Soviet leadership to a minor incident revealed their desire to pick an ideological fight with Belgrade at that particular moment.44 Belgrade took Mićunović’s evaluation seriously. Two days later, Koča Popović met Firyubin and explained that the decision to publish excerpts from Khrushchev’s speech was taken by the editors and did not reflect the official Yugoslav position.45 The above incident, however, suggested to Belgrade that the attitude shift in Moscow was the result of the strengthening of the hard-­liners in the Presidium, namely Molotov, Voroshilov and Suslov. Tito and his aides also understood that, in an effort to undermine Khrushchev’s authority, this group blamed the crises in Eastern Europe on his policy of de-­Stalinization and on his failure to bring Tito back to the fold.46 In the days following the publication of the Postanovlenie, Belgrade registered with increasing anxiety the growing evidence of a backlash against Yugoslavia, as well as against anti-­Stalinists throughout Eastern Europe and in the West European Parties.47 The concerted hard-­line campaign unleashed in the Soviet and the satellites’ press seemed to suggest that the Kremlin was imposing a tougher course in response to the growing crises in Eastern Europe.48 Although it never openly or directly mentioned Yugoslavia, the Postanovlenie warned others in the international Communist movement against associating with Belgrade. In an unprecedented manner, it attacked Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist Party leader, for his public statement in which he blamed Stalin’s policies for deviations in the Soviet system. Togliatti made this comment in May, several days after returning from a visit to Belgrade. He was the first leader of a major Western European Communist Party to visit Tito since 1948.49 Khrushchev later admitted that accusations against Togliatti were not accidental and blamed Yugoslav influence for the Italian’s comments.50 In the weeks following the publication of the Postanovlenie, the leaders of all major West European Communist Parties, one after the other, were summoned to Moscow for bilateral ‘consultations’.51 Belgrade understood these summons as part of the Kremlin’s effort to impose ideological conformity or ‘unity of action’ on ‘fraternal parties’.52 The Yugoslavs remembered similar ‘mobilizations’, that followed disruptions in the power balance in the Kremlin, such as in early 1955 before

164   Contention Malenkov’s fall. The first consequence of such shifts had always been the hardening of Moscow’s attitude towards Yugoslavia. In mid-­July, speaking in the Kremlin on the occasion of the visit by the East German Government delegation, Khrushchev reproached ‘some’ for using the concept of ‘different roads to socialism’ as a tool to break up the ‘camp’. According to him, this would only help the ‘imperialists’ to subjugate People’s Democracies one by one. On 21 July, at a rally in Warsaw, Bulganin underlined that no one should ‘disregard efforts being made to weaken bonds within the socialist camp under the banner of ‘national particularities’ ’.53 Being the main proponents of ‘different roads to socialism’ and of ‘national particularities’, the Yugoslavs recognized themselves in these accusations.54 It was becoming increasingly apparent to Tito and the Yugoslavs that Moscow was, once again, treating Belgrade as a pariah and was doing everything to isolate Yugoslavia from the People’s Democracies and the international Communist movement. Indeed, on 13 July, the CPSU CC issued a secret Resolution entitled ‘The Information on the Results of the Soviet–Yugoslav Talks, Held in June 1956’. The document was read at closed Soviet Party meetings and was sent to the leaderships of ‘fraternal parties’. The Resolution gave an account of the Yugoslav– Soviet talks in Moscow in June 1956 in a manner that branded Yugoslavia’s positions as anti-­Marxist and destructive to the cohesion of the ‘camp’. The Resolution disclosed that the first draft of the Moscow Declaration, submitted by the Yugoslavs, was resolutely rejected by the Soviet delegation because it contained a number of ‘incorrect postulates’ that would have led to ‘disorientation’ among Communist parties. It then listed these ‘incorrect’ ideological positions in detail. First, according to the document, the Yugoslavs had asserted that in the past decade the Marxist dogma was increasingly failing to interpret new global realities. Second, the Yugoslav leadership rejected the Soviet principled position that cooperation between the LCY and the CPSU should be aimed at strengthening the ‘unity of the action of the international proletarian movement’. Third, according to the resolution, the Yugoslavs did not differentiate between the form of relations that existed between true Marxist–Leninist parties and that which was applicable to their relations with the socialist and social democratic parties. Belgrade had rejected the binding association of Communist parties. Within this context, according to the Resolution, the Soviet delegation had reproached the Yugoslavs for initiating close relations with the socialist, social democratic and labour parties in France, Great Britain, Belgium and Norway whilst, at the same time, disregarding relations with the Communist parties in these countries. Here, the document quoted Kardelj as promising that the Yugoslav leadership would meet representatives of other Communist parties and do everything possible to improve their relations. The quote was intended to suggest a Yugoslav admission of guilt and recantation on their previously held erroneous positions.55 The Resolution of 13 July represented by far the strongest condemnation of various Yugoslav deviations since the start of the process of normalization. It asserted that the Soviet side had reluctantly accepted a compromise on the Moscow Declaration in order not to inhibit further improvement of relations

Contention   165 with the LCY. The document underlined that the talks in Moscow had confirmed that although the Yugoslav leaders were coming nearer to the ‘correct’ positions, they still remained estranged from true Marxism–Leninism. The Resolution ­concluded that, the CPSU CC asserts that the characterization of comrade Tito as being a Leninist, given by comrade Bulganin [in the toast] during lunch in Moscow, on 5 June, was premature because such qualification could hamper the process of further improvement of understanding with Yugoslav comrades on ideological questions and could mislead the fraternal Communist parties and members of the CPSU.56 By spelling out ‘incorrect ideological postulates’, the CPSU CC Resolution defined the Yugoslav heresy and stigmatized it as a threat to the existence of the ‘socialist camp’. The accusations signalled the beginning of an end of the rapprochement with Tito. By disseminating the Resolution to ‘fraternal parties’ the Soviet leadership took a step, from passively ignoring the Moscow Declaration to actively pursuing a policy of ‘containment’ of Yugoslavia. The unprecedented humiliation of Bulganin, the member of the highest Soviet leadership and one of Khrushchev’s closest allies, had a dual purpose. On the one hand, the intention was to inform ‘fraternal parties’ that Yugoslavia remained an outcast from the international Communist movement. On the other hand, it served as a warning to Khrushchev himself. The hard-­liners in the Presidium demonstrated that they had become strong enough to issue reprimands to Khrushchev or his supporters. Belgrade first learned of the Resolution from Mićunović on 18 August.57 The Yugoslav leadership would receive the full text of the document months later, on 4 December, when Khrushchev, provoked by Mićunović during one of their heated exchanges in the aftermath of the Hungarian events, ordered the Resolution to be dispatched to Tito.58 As the crisis in Hungary deepened during July, Moscow continued with the tactics of simultaneously isolating the Yugoslav leadership from Eastern Europe, while wooing it to assist with the harnessing of the increasingly uncontainable developments in Poland and Hungary. On 13 July, during a reception in the Kremlin, Khrushchev took Mićunović aside for a ‘confidential conversation’.59 The Soviet leader asked the Ambassador to inform Tito that the situation in Hungary ‘was very complex’. According to him, the Soviet leadership, acting on Suslov’s recommendation, had decided to fully support Rakosi. Khrushchev underlined that, knowing Tito’s animosity towards Rakosi, he wished to avoid possible disagreements between Moscow and Belgrade over this decision. He also wanted the Yugoslav leader to understand correctly that, in the circumstances, the Soviets had no other policy alternatives. Khrushchev then informed the Yugoslav Ambassador that Mikoyan was leaving for Budapest the next day to inform the Hungarian leadership of Moscow’s decision. Ominously, Khrushchev added that should the situation in Hungary deteriorate any further, Moscow would not hesitate to use ‘all available means’ to suppress the crisis.60 Mićunović

166   Contention was in no doubt that Khrushchev had issued a veiled warning to Tito and the Yugoslavs not to meddle in Hungarian affairs.61 Three days later, at a reception in the French Embassy, Khrushchev arranged another tête-à-tête meeting with Mićunović.62 He again asked the Yugoslav Ambassador to inform Tito that, as a result of Mikoyan’s ‘work’ in Budapest, ‘we have fared better than expected. . . . The Hungarian comrades have decided that Rakosi should resign.’63 This encounter happened on the eve of the session of the Plenum in Budapest, during which Rakosi was indeed forced to resign. Informing Tito ahead of the events, in particular with regard to Rakosi, was a calculated move by Khrushchev to cajole the Yugoslav leader. At the end of his conversation with Mićunović, the Soviet leader proposed that Mikoyan fly from Budapest to Brioni in the next few days and personally brief Tito on the events in Hungary.64 Khrushchev’s repeated tête-à-tête conversations with Mićunović, in ‘strictest confidence’, and professed ‘cooperativeness’ were, however, taking place at the very same time the CPSU CC was circulating to the ‘fraternal’ parties the damning 13 July Resolution on the Yugoslav–Soviet talks. Further to Khrushchev’s proposal, Mikoyan visited Brioni on 21 and 22 July. Tito agreed to the visit in the belief that a rejection of Khrushchev’s personal request could further weaken the latter’s standing in the Soviet leadership. The Yugoslav President was initially reluctant to agree to the visit because of its timing.65 The Soviet ploy was all too evident. Mikoyan’s arrival to Brioni immediately after he had engineered Rakosi’s removal would suggest to satellite leaders and the public that the change in Budapest was a result of a joint Yugoslav–Soviet action. This fitted well with the Soviet tactics of convincing anti-­ Stalinist forces in Eastern Europe of Belgrade’s collusion with Moscow. It would also imply that by participating in a ‘united action of the socialist forces’, Yugoslavia had, de facto, joined the ‘camp’. There is no evidence of any coordination of strategy between Belgrade and Moscow over Rakosi’s removal. Based on Khrushchev’s information of 13 July, the Yugoslav leadership could only assume that the Soviets were firmly behind the Hungarian leader. By 16 July, however, the Soviet strategy had changed. Moreover, during the conversation with Mićunović on 13 July, Khrushchev explicitly warned Tito against involvement in Hungarian affairs. The Yugoslavs were further annoyed with the timing of Mikoyan’s visit because it coincided with the first tripartite conference between Tito, Nehru and Nasser in Brioni. The Conference, held on the 18 and 19 July, was a pinnacle of Yugoslavia’s efforts to lay the foundations of the non-­ alignment partnership. Belgrade was understandably anxious that Mikoyan’s visit during the meeting, as Khrushchev first suggested, could raise suspicions among Tito’s new allies regarding Yugoslavia’s true independence from Moscow. The Yugoslav leader thus, manoeuvred and succeeded in postponing Mikoyan’s visit to 21 July, two days after Nehru’s departure. Mikoyan’s two-­day stay in Brioni and talks he held there were uneventful. In a cable to Mićunović, Koča Popović characterized exchanges with the Soviet official as ‘hollow’. On the subject of Rakosi’s removal, Mikoyan told the Yugoslavs nothing more than what they have read in the Soviet and Hungarian press.66

Contention   167 One of the aims of the visit seemed to be silencing of the Yugoslav press, prominent in supporting the reformist opposition in Hungary.67 Even more so, the Soviets were irritated by the active role Yugoslav diplomats were playing in Hungarian events. Ever since the CPSU Twentieth Congress, Nagy’s associates regularly visited the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest to exchange information. They also used Yugoslav diplomats as intermediaries and message couriers between Nagy and reform-­minded officials.68 The new Hungarian leader who had just replaced Rakosi, Ernö Gerö, considered Tito’s support crucial for securing domestic legitimacy. He repeatedly demanded from Moscow to exert pressure on Tito to deliver a public endorsement of the post-­Rakosi leadership.69 On 21 July, during Mikoyan’s visit, the Hungarian Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sándor Kurimszky, handed Tito a letter from Ernö Gerö. In the letter, the new Hungarian leader officially recanted ‘mistakes’ made by the earlier Hungarian leadership against Yugoslavia since 1948, pleaded for the re-­establishment of party relations and for a meeting between representatives of the two parties.70 Mikoyan’s mission, however, failed on all fronts. Tito refused to meet Gerö, whom he considered Rakosi’s clone, and responded to his letter almost two months later on 11 September.71 Although he had made a concession to Khrushchev by agreeing to see Mikoyan, Tito refused to rescind his backing for the democratization and de-­Stalinization in Hungary. The Yugoslav press continued to openly support the democratic opposition in Hungary and demanded Nagy’s return.72 According to a report from Yurii Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest continued to actively ‘propagate the Yugoslav way’ at meetings organized by liberal intelligentsia and at factory rallies, as well as to maintain contacts with opposition leaders. Andropov found it even more alarming that an increasing number of members of the Hungarian Central Committee were now looking upon Yugoslavia as the model to be emulated.73 During the second half of September and in early October, a dramatic sequence of moves in the on-­going Yugoslav–Soviet chess game took place. On 19 September, Khrushchev arrived in Yugoslavia for a ‘holiday’, as the visit was officially declared. On 27 September, Tito accompanied the Soviet leader back to Crimea for another week of joint ‘vacationing’. Khrushchev’s ‘holiday’ followed a ‘suggestion’ to Mićunović earlier in July, after which Tito was left with very little choice but to issue a formal invitation in the beginning of August.74 With growing signs of Moscow’s hard-­line shift, Tito hoped that a tête-à-tête exchange with Khrushchev would reduce the looming threat to the achieved level of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. After receiving the official invitation, however, Khrushchev conditioned the visit by insisting that Tito accompany him back to Crimea.75 The Yugoslavs, who now found themselves in a quandary, delayed their response for more than a week.76 An extended ‘holiday’ with Khrushchev carried with it the danger of damaging Belgrade’s relations with the West. The Suez situation was deteriorating at an alarming pace. At the same time, the release of the US economic and military aid package to Yugoslavia was dependent on President Eisenhower’s positive evaluation of the US– Yugoslav relations, due before the US Congress in mid-­October. The President

168   Contention was expected to confirm to Congress that Yugoslavia was outside the Soviet Bloc and that it remained an ally of the United States. With so much at stake and after noticeable hesitation Tito, nevertheless, accepted Khrushchev’s condition and decided to follow him to Yalta.77 He hoped to exert positive influence on the Soviet leadership’s attitude towards developments in Poland and Hungary.78 Tito firmly believed that the crises in Eastern Europe could determine the future of socialism as a global system. The Yugoslav President’s decision to follow Khrushchev to Yalta, in the face of possible adverse consequences for Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, only confirms that relations with the USSR and the unravelling crises in Eastern Europe represented an absolute priority to him and took precedence over relations with the West. In fact, the Yugoslav leadership had consciously neglected relations with the West through much of 1956, despite Yugoslavia’s continuing dependence on American economic assistance. The ostensible indifference suggests that Tito and his aides felt comfortable that the achieved level of normalization with the USSR has already provided them with relative safety of equidistance from either Bloc. This, in turn, also explains why Tito found it imperative to keep the process of normalization alive. Khrushchev arrived in Brioni on 19 September. The Yugoslav leadership was keen to confront him over the 13 July Resolution and to demand an explanation ‘why Moscow had buried the Moscow Declaration even before the ink on it had dried’. Throughout his stay in Brioni, however, Khrushchev avoided discussions on any of the contentious issues.79 Although the ‘[debate] was hanging in the air’, Tito, for tactical reasons, did not initiate it himself.80 It was only on the evening before his departure, on 26 September, that Khrushchev finally confronted the Yugoslavs.81 In a toast during dinner at Tito’s residence in Belgrade, Khrushchev addressed the controversial issues, which then provoked a passionate debate between him and members of the Yugoslav leadership who attended the dinner.82 Khrushchev pointed out that the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies were in the process of mending Stalin’s mistakes but wished to do so in a way ‘that would result in the strengthening and not in the weakening of the camp’. The Soviet leader then reproached the Yugoslavs for using terms such as ‘de-­Stalinization’ and ‘democratization’ when addressing current developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. During his speech, Khrushchev identified three reasons, which, in his view, showed that Yugoslavia and the USSR should bury their disagreements. First, in Eastern Europe, the West was skilfully fuelling dissent in the ‘socialist camp’ by championing the example of Yugoslavia. Second, various ‘counter-­revolutionary’ elements in Eastern Europe adopted Yugoslavia as their role model. Finally, for the sake of the ‘unity of action of the socialist forces’ Khrushchev insisted that there should be no competition between Yugoslavia and the USSR over their influence on countries such as Bulgaria, Romania or Hungary.83 The Soviet leader also pointed out that the world consisted of ‘clean’ (socialist) and ‘unclean’ (capitalist) countries. According to him, countries such as India and Burma were ‘half clean’.84 Khrushchev’s metaphor provoked laughter and ridicule among the Yugoslavs, prompting the Soviet leader to cut short his speech. In the conclusion, Khrush-

Contention   169 chev reminded the Yugoslavs of his contribution to the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization and of the personal risks he faced when coming to Yugoslavia in May 1955. In a melodramatic fashion, he ended by asking for full ideological unity between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union for the good of socialism.85 Khrushchev had for the first time pointed a finger at an aspect of Yugoslav– Soviet confrontation that neither side would acknowledge at any time before or after: the rivalry for the soul of Eastern Europe and the leadership of the International Communist movement. Obviously, this was an issue of genuine consternation in the Kremlin. Khrushchev later admitted that both he and the rest of the Soviet leadership were at this point convinced that ‘Tito wished to obtain a special role for Yugoslavia. He nurtured the hope of weakening the influence of the CPSU on fraternal Communist parties and increasing the influence of the LCY. To a certain extent he succeeded in this’.86 The rivalry for the leadership of the Communist movement was an underlying constant of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. However, both sides were careful never to publicly acknowledge it. In his speech on 26 September, Khrushchev declared that under the dictum of history and because other Communist parties demanded it, the USSR and the CPSU occupied the position of leadership of the ‘camp’. He insisted that Moscow and Belgrade agreeing on this.87 For the Yugoslavs, however, then as in 1948, this meant an unacceptable subordination of LCY to the Soviet party. Responding to Khrushchev, Tito confirmed existence of differences between the two sides. Among other things, according to him, they held opposing views on whether there were ‘permissible’ forms of socialism, as well as on the question of cooperation between the Communist and the socialist and social democratic parties.88 Tito notably left out the issue constantly brought out by the Soviets, Yugoslavia’s ‘coordination’ with the ‘socialist camp’. As other encounters between himself and Khrushchev confirmed, he never initiated a discussion on this question. Instead, he would only respond to Khrushchev’s pressure, hoping that the Soviets would understand that it is a ‘non-­issue’. At the same time, he would always strongly dismiss Soviet accusations of harbouring intent to break up the ‘socialist camp’. In a riposte to Khrushchev, Tito observed that in comparison to the period immediately after the Twentieth Congress, a stagnation of the process of de-­Stalinization was evident in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. He insisted that de-­Stalinization and democratization must continue because this would strengthen the cause of socialism. The Soviets, in his opinion, should not look at the events in Poznań as the ‘end of the world’. Tito pointed out that a mistake had been made when Nagy was expelled from the Hungarian leadership and that he must be reinstated.89 At this point Khrushchev interrupted by repeating that the West was using its good relations with Yugoslavia to undermine the unity of the ‘camp’, triggering a heated exchange. The Soviet leader accused the Yugoslav leadership of sympathising with the anti-­regime elements in the People’s Democracies. Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, and Koča Popović, in turn, accused Khrushchev and the Soviets of hypocrisy mentioning for the first time the Resolution of 13 July. Taken by surprise, Khrushchev admitted the existence of the Resolution and tried to justify it. Alluding to the

170   Contention Resolution, Tito concluded the debate by pointing to Khrushchev that no one had the right to judge whether he and his comrades, after a lifetime of revolutionary struggle and after leading a successful Revolution, were true Marxist– Leninists or not.90 Following this exchange, the evening ended on a highly confrontational note. It became more than evident that there would be no coming together of views on any of the contested ideological issues. It also became clear that, as never before, Khrushchev was now explicit in his demand for Yugoslavia to conform to the ideological unity of the ‘socialist camp’. Khrushchev’s visit and Tito’s subsequent trip to Crimea were qualified as ‘holidays’. As such, no official talks were held, providing the two leaders with an opportunity to confer in private and at length.91 This may explain why only incidental accounts from Tito and Mićunović are available. According to Mićunović’s brief report, in Yalta Tito and Khrushchev, accompanied occasionally by Ranković and Bulganin, would walk through the park of the villa Tito was staying in and confer.92 Tito later confirmed that the discussions in the Crimea took place over dinner or during walks.93 Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia at the end of September and Tito’s stay in Yalta represented the culmination of Soviet efforts to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘socialist camp’. According to Tito, during his stay in the Crimea, Khrushchev made a concerted push to persuade him to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the ‘camp’. His refusal resulted in deep consternation and frustration among the Soviet leaders.94 With only a minor tactical concession obtained from Tito, the failure of Khrushchev’s offensive was evident. On 29 September, after Khrushchev and Tito had left for Yalta, the official spokesman of the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Branko Drašković, confirmed at a press conference that ‘open questions and differences of view’ existed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.95 In an editorial published on 12 October, after Tito’s return from the Crimea, Borba confirmed that there remained ‘outstanding questions and differences of views [between the CPSU and the LCY]’.96 Furthermore, Yugoslavia continued to support Nagy and the opposition in Hungary. On 27 October, the official Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman hailed the appointment of Nagy as the new Hungarian Prime Minister and the replacement of Gerö by Kádár, as the new First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party. He also characterized the Soviet military intervention of 23–24 October as ‘tragic and unnecessary’.97 Nonetheless, in an effort to diffuse somewhat the Soviet pressure and to keep the normalization alive, Tito made some tactical concessions in Yalta. He agreed to re-­establish relations with the satellite parties. Links with the Polish United Workers Party, established earlier on 2 September, were a demonstration of Yugoslavia’s support for the reforms in Poland and not the result of the Soviet pressure. As a direct result of the Tito–Khrushchev talks in the Crimea, successive delegations of the Bulgarian, Romanian, and the Hungarian parties rushed to Belgrade. On 7 October the re-­establishment of Yugoslav–Bulgarian party relations was announced at the conclusion of the visit to Belgrade of the delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, led by its First Secretary, Todor

Contention   171 Zhivkov. During the visit by the delegation of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, led by its First Secretary, Ernö Gerö, between 15 and 23 October, relations were renewed between the Hungarian and the Yugoslav parties. On 28 October, at the end of an eight-­day visit by the Romanian Workers Party (RWP) delegation, headed by its First Secretary, Gheorgiu Dej, a joint declaration was signed, which formally established relations between the LCY and the RWP.98 Why did Tito, despite the pressure he endured during talks in Moscow in June, continue to maintain the semblance of good Yugoslav–Soviet relations even in the face of Soviet deception? In the months after his visit to USSR, despite the Soviet duplicity, numerous Yugoslav delegations visited the USSR, from high-­level military ones to representatives of the Young Pioneers’ Organization. In the first week of August, an irritated Mićunović registered sixteen Yugoslav delegations in Moscow. On occasions, two or three groups would arrive on the same train from Belgrade. For many of them Mićunović could see no logical purpose.99 In August, two members of the LCY Executive Committee, Blažo Jovanović and Lazar Koliševski, spent their ‘holidays’ in the Crimea. This was part of the exchange agreed during Tito’s June visit and devised to promote party contacts.100 If not before, however, then certainly after 18 August when Mićunović had sent an extensive report on the CPSU CC Resolution of 13 July, Tito and his aides were fully aware of the Soviet clandestine campaign to discredit Yugoslavia.101 Several factors offer an explanation for Tito’s behaviour. He did everything in his power to preserve the rapprochement with the Soviets precisely because he understood it to be threatened by the hard-­line shift in the Kremlin. Good relations with the Soviets were also crucial if the threat of Soviet invasion, a real possibility for five years after 1948, was to be eliminated for good. Furthermore, normalization was essential for the elimination of Yugoslavia’s overdependency on Western support. This, in turn, was a sine qua non of Yugoslavia’s non-­aligned aspirations. Furthermore, the signing of the ‘Aluminium’ contract between Yugoslavia, the USSR and East Germany on 1 August 1956 enabled construction of a huge aluminium plant in Yugoslavia with supporting hydroelectric power plants. The plant laid the foundation for Tito’s dream – Yugoslavia’s own armaments industry. He regarded it crucial for the achievement of true independence from either Bloc.102 Tito’s readiness to accommodate Khrushchev and give him the benefit of the doubt in the months after his June visit to the USSR was also the result of his assessment that Khrushchev’s leadership was under threat. The hard-­line shift in Moscow manifested by the Presidium’s Postanovlenie of 30 June seemed to confirm to Tito that Khrushchev was indeed in danger. To the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev personified the normalization between the two countries. Tito also regarded him to be the main force behind de-­Stalinization in the Kremlin. Furthermore, Moscow’s vacillation over Hungary, manifested in the U-­turn in mid-­ July from supporting Rakosi to his removal, most probably convinced Belgrade of the existence of a dangerous deadlock in the Kremlin between the hard-­liners

172   Contention and Khrushchev. If sustained over a longer period, such a deadlock could result in delayed Soviet reactions to unforeseen events, followed by erratic actions. This, in turn, would inevitably increase international tensions and endanger not only the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization but also peace in Europe and in the world. In this respect, the strengthening of Khrushchev’s position seemed the best way out of what the Yugoslavs may have perceived as a dangerous paralysis of the Soviet leadership. Additional factors prompted Tito to avoid confrontation with Moscow during the summer and autumn of 1956. On the one hand, the Yugoslav President was vigorously working to strengthen his alliance with Nasser and Nehru, as the axis of the new non-­aligned initiative. Tito was working to set up their first joint meeting in the second half of July. A number of Third World leaders were also scheduled to visit Belgrade in the following months. Focus on non-­alignment demanded peace on the ‘Soviet front’. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs were keen to maintain and, if possible, enhance their presence and influence in Eastern Europe. A sustained rapprochement with Moscow was the key precondition. Tito and the Yugoslav leadership understood that encouragement of the process of de-­Stalinization in the satellites and change of leadership there would serve Yugoslavia’s long-­term interest. Only this, in Belgrade’s opinion, offered true guarantees against the renewal of tensions on Yugoslavia’s borders. Moreover, the Yugoslav leadership regarded it as part of their Communist internationalist duty to help comrades in People’s Democracies to liberate themselves from the Stalinist yoke.103 Having been granted access to the satellite countries, as a consequence of the normalization with the USSR, Tito was reluctant to let this opportunity slip. As he explained to the Director of the US Foreign Operations Administration, Harold Stassen, in October 1954, Yugoslavia’s influence on the satellites was proportional to its presence in these countries and normalization provided the opportunity to establish such presence.104 Lastly, the burgeoning crisis in Eastern Mediterranean, following Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July, demanded from Tito to avoid the deterioration of Yugoslav– Soviet relations. Best part of the meeting between Tito and the Soviet Ambassador on 9 August was devoted to the Suez crisis.105 Mićunović also confirmed in his memoirs that Suez dominated his correspondence with Belgrade during August.106 A renewal of confrontation with Moscow was the last thing Tito needed at the time a war was looming in the Middle East, practically on his doorstep.

Clouds gathering – Hungary Following the first Soviet military intervention on 23 and 24 October, Yugoslavia offered emphatic support to changes that took place in Hungary. Imre Nagy took over as Prime Minister and János Kádár replaced Ernö Gerö as the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party. Much to Moscow’s consternation, Yugoslavia officially pronounced 23 October demonstrations in Budapest as a ‘justified popular revolt’ and the subsequent Soviet military intervention as

Contention   173 ‘tragic’. Belgrade blamed the ‘bloodbath’ that followed the first Soviet intervention on the absence of true de-­Stalinization and democratization in Hungary and on its leadership’s lack of responsiveness to popular demands.108 This differed sharply from the Soviet qualification of events in Budapest as the ‘counterrevolutionary riot’ incited by the ‘subversive activity by the imperialist states’.109 Moreover, on 30 October Belgrade papers published Tito’s open letter of support to the new government and the party leadership in Budapest.110 The letter was in response to the plea for support from Nagy and Kádár.111 Notably, the Hungarian appeal and Tito’s endorsement received the Soviet leadership’s full approval. At its meting on 28 October, the CPSU CC Presidium had decided to back the new Nagy Government and authorized a telegram to Belgrade appealing for Tito’s public endorsement of the new Hungarian leadership.112 By 2 November, however, Tito became convinced that Nagy was not in control of the situation in Hungary. Two developments contributed to his change of heart – the increasingly anti-­Communist character of the Hungarian uprising and the decision of the Nagy Government to leave the Warsaw Pact. On 28 October, a day before he had dispatched his letter of support to Nagy, Tito expressed his first doubts about the course of developments in Hungary. During a reception for the visiting delegation of the Soviet Komsomol, Tito observed that a terrible bloodbath was taking place in Hungary, citing that in one town over twenty Communist officials had been lynched. His comments revealed deep dismay and repugnance.113 On 31 October, Koča Popović instructed the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatić, to voice Belgrade’s ‘concern’ with the Nagy Government that the situation in Hungary was sliding towards the ‘right’ and to ask that ‘no further concessions be made [to the right]’.114 Tito increasingly feared for the fate of socialism in Hungary. The second event that contributed to his change of heart towards Nagy was the Declaration of Hungarian Neutrality, broadcast by the Nagy Government on 1 November. Tito qualified it as a ‘stupid manifesto’ and further proof that the Nagy Government had by then lost touch with reality and was following the most unrealistic demands of the mob. He believed that Hungary’s unilateral departure from the Warsaw Pact would destabilize the balance of power between the two Blocs in Europe, provoking a war that would most certainly engulf Yugoslavia.115 Thus, even before he secretly met Khrushchev in Brioni on 2 November, Tito had become convinced that Nagy was unable to control events in Hungary in the way Gomułka had managed to steer developments in Poland away from the precipice.116 On the evening of 2 November, following a decision of the CPSU CC Presidium of 31 October, the same meeting that authorized military intervention in Hungary, Khrushchev and Malenkov arrived in Brioni in strictest secrecy. They sought Tito’s support for the Soviet military intervention in Hungary.117 As if to emulate the gravity of the situation, the Soviet leaders’ small two-­engine IL-­14 turboprop plane landed at Pula airport amidst a hurricane. Khrushchev later described it as the ‘most harrowing flight of my life’.118 From Pula, through the roughest seas and in pitch darkness, the Soviets were ferried by a Yugoslav 107

174   Contention Navy launch to the island of Brioni where the meeting took place. Only Khrushchev, Tito, Malenkov, Kardelj, Ranković and Mićunović attended the meeting. No translators were present and both sides agreed not to take notes. The next morning, once Khrushchev and Malenkov left Brioni, Tito asked Mićunović to create from memory a record of the meeting. The meeting lasted through the night and was concluded at 5 am on 3 November, after ten hours of discussions.119 The Soviets expected a long and difficult meeting, similar to the one they had the previous day with Gomułka in Brest. According to Khrushchev’s account, after a very cordial welcome at the pier in Brioni and after having been told by the Soviet leader of the reasons for their arrival, Tito immediately expressed agreement with the Soviet military intervention against the ‘counterrevolution’ in Hungary. Mićunović’s account of the meeting, however, does not mention that Khrushchev and Tito had an exchange on the pier. According to Mićunović, instead of a coherent analysis of developments in Hungary, Khrushchev gave an emotional account of events as soon as they entered Tito’s residence. He exclaimed that ‘[the counter-­revolutionaries] are killing, slaughtering, and hanging Communists’. Khrushchev informed the Yugoslavs that the Soviet leadership had already held consultations with the Czechs, Romanians, Bulgarians and Chinese and that all had backed Soviet military action. He admitted that only talks with Gomułka had ended without a clear endorsement. Once he calmed down, the Soviet leader continued to elaborate his reading of the latest developments in Hungary and how the Kremlin intended to cope with them. According to him, the ‘restoration of capitalism’ that was taking place in Hungary had left them with no other option but to use the troops to quash it. Khrushchev underlined that if the Soviets failed to act decisively, it would be understood in the West as a sign of either weakness or stupidity. To him, this was ‘one and the same’. According to Mićunović’s record, Tito at this point interrupted Khrushchev and expressed reservations about the use of Soviet troops. Although agreeing that Hungary was sliding towards ‘reactionary restoration’ and that something had to be done, Tito suggested that workers’ councils should be encouraged to take a leading role in the armed action. Khrushchev, however, insisted that there was no time for other measures and that urgent action needed to be taken. He asserted that it would take the Red Army only two days to ‘stop this development in Hungary’. Khrushchev then admitted that the Soviet leadership was forced to take military action for domestic reasons as well. He explained that unless it acted decisively, the Soviet leadership would come under threat from ‘some’ in the USSR who could join forces together under the slogan that while during Stalin ‘everything there’ was in order and under control, under the new post-­Stalin leadership the ‘socialist camp’ was disintegrating. According to Mićunović’s record, Khrushchev singled out the Red Army as being susceptible to such reasoning.120 This admission seemed to suggest that Khrushchev was under pressure from Zhukov and the Soviet military and that he feared an army coup in case of further indecisiveness. Of course, Khrushchev’s allusions might easily have been designed to soften Tito and make him more inclined to support the Soviet plan to intervene militarily. If genuine, however,

Contention   175 the admission could explain Khrushchev’s volte face between the meeting of the CPSU CC Presidium of 30 October, which promulgated a conciliatory Declaration on relations in the ‘socialist camp’, and the Presidium meeting the next day, at the beginning of which Khrushchev immediately asked for the previous day’s decision to be rescinded and demanded a military intervention.121 Khrushchev then disclosed to Tito that the military preparations were at an advanced stage, which convinced the Yugoslavs that the intervention was imminent. From that point onwards, according to Mićunović’s account, Tito and aides resigned themselves to the inevitability of the Red Army action as the ‘lesser evil’ and concentrated instead on the political measures that should follow the intervention to minimize its negative implications.122 Tito reminded the Soviets that the uprising in Hungary came as the result of Rakosi’s policies and argued that if military intervention was ‘unavoidable’ it should be conducted in conjunction with political actions. He advised that simultaneously with the military operations, a new Revolutionary Government should be set up in Budapest that would issue a Declaration addressing the grievances that had brought people out onto the streets in the first place. After these words, which signalled Tito’s acceptance of the intervention, Khrushchev, reacted ‘as if a huge burden was lifted from his shoulders’.123 A discussion then focused on the choice of the new Hungarian leader. Khrushchev favoured Ferenc Münnich while the Yugoslavs insisted on Kádár.124 In continuation, Mićunović, certainly at Tito’s nod, initiated the question of Nagy’s fate. He suggested that if Nagy would resign and issue a statement condemning the slide of the popular uprising into counterrevolution, it could reduce armed resistance to Soviet troops and minimize the ‘bloodshed’. Khrushchev and Malenkov immediately accepted this idea. Tito then revealed to the Soviets that Zoltán Szántó and Géza Losonczy, members of Nagy’s innermost circle, had already approached Yugoslav diplomats in Budapest and inquired if Yugoslavia would grant Nagy and his associates an asylum in case of ‘reprisals carried out by the reactionaries’. Mićunović’s record implied ‘reactionaries’ to mean anti-­Communists. Tito emphasized to Khrushchev that, by not seeking refuge in the West, Nagy and his group were behaving like good Communists. According to Mićunović’s account, ‘it was then agreed that the Yugoslavs should explore the suggested course of action since the Russians do not have such possibilities’. In the ensuing conversation, it was mentioned several times that ‘Nagy should be isolated’. The Yugoslavs promised to do as much as possible along these lines but insisted that it was not clear yet as to what exactly could be done. According to Mićunović’s record, Yugoslav reservations were a result of the fact that Khrushchev and Malenkov refused to disclose when the military operations would start. At one point, Tito asked Khrushchev about the position of other members of the Presidium with regard to the military intervention in Hungary. After a short pause, both Khrushchev and Malenkov replied that the Soviet leadership was united on this question.125 Despite agreeing on the inevitability of the military intervention, the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaders remained divided when it came to the causes of the

176   Contention Hungarian uprising. The Yugoslavs regarded initial protests as the justified popular rebellion against Rakosi’s Stalinist regime. Tito repeated several times during the Brioni meeting that stubborn Soviet support of Rakosi until mid-­July contributed to the postponement of necessary reforms beyond the point at which a bloody outcome could have been prevented. Khrushchev and Malenkov insisted, though, that the main instigators of the Hungarian uprising were the ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and ‘reactionaries’.126 In the record of the meeting, Mićunović commented that the disagreement on the causes of the Hungarian uprising made it blatantly clear that Khrushchev and Malenkov’s conciliatory manner was designed to secure Tito’s endorsement of the intervention at all costs. Mićunović’s recollection also suggests that the Soviets had accepted the Yugoslav proposal to isolate Nagy from the ‘reactionaries’, meaning the anti-­ Communist leadership of the uprising. The Yugoslavs believed it to be a way to blunt the anticipated armed resistance of the Hungarian nationalists and to minimize casualties. Later, however, once the success of the Soviet operation was secured and Nagy had found himself in the Yugoslav Embassy, Khrushchev denied existence of any such agreement. The outcome of the Brioni meeting came as a huge relief to the Soviet leadership.127 Tito’s endorsement was important because of the unique prestige Yugoslavia enjoyed among the public and reform-­minded Communists in the People’s Democracies and, increasingly, in the Third World. Only hours after the beginning of military operations in Hungary, the Yugoslav News Agency, TANJUG, broadcast an official statement by the Yugoslav Government. It emphasized that in light of the latest deterioration of the situation in Hungary, which threatened a bloodbath, the removal of socialism and serious destabilization of the balance of power in Europe, Yugoslavia had decided to support the newly installed Kádár Government in its efforts to stabilize the situation in the country.128 On the same morning, on 4 November, the Indian Ambassador in Belgrade, Dayal, acting on instructions from Nehru, urgently requested from the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade the Yugoslav interpretation of developments in Hungary. He was immediately seen by the Deputy Foreign Secretary, Vidić, who justified the Soviet intervention as the lesser of two evils.129 The very next day, Tito sent a personal letter to Nehru with a detailed chronology of the Hungarian crisis and his rationalization of the latest developments.130 His intervention directly influenced the change in Nehru’s position towards the Soviet military action, from initial doubts to tacit support expressed in his address to the Indian Parliament on 19 November.131 Yugoslavia’s interpretation also influenced the Polish leadership’s position towards the Soviet intervention in Hungary. At the meeting with Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov in Brest, on 1 November, Gomułka and the Polish leadership neither endorsed nor condemned the forthcoming Soviet intervention.132 Throughout the day on 4 November, Korolczyk, a member of the Polish Central Committee, called the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw repeatedly, asking for Belgrade’s position. He informed the Ambassador’s secretary that he had to obtain the information before 6 pm when Gomułka was expected to address local party secretaries on developments in Hungary.133 Indeed, Gomułka’s position at the con-

Contention   177 ference coincided in every detail with TANJUG’s statement. On 5 November, all Polish papers published TANJUG’s statement in full.134 On the same day, following his Government’s instructions, Pietrusińsky, the Polish Chargé in Belgrade, called on Vidić seeking the latest Yugoslav interpretation of developments in Hungary ‘[for the purpose] of preparing the [Polish] position in the UN’.135 The Yugoslav endorsement during the first hours and days following the Soviet military intervention was crucial for the position of many in Eastern Europe and in the Third World who otherwise would have opposed it.

Conclusion Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956, the first after the 1948 break up, came in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ delivered at the end of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet admission of Stalin’s guilt for the Yugoslav– Soviet rupture opened way for the renewal of links between the LCY and the CPSU, formalized in the so-­called Moscow Declaration and signed at the end of Tito’s visit. Although in all appearances a triumph of comradeship and confirmation of full reconciliation, the visit in fact sowed the seeds of the renewal of the Soviet–Yugoslav confrontation following the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Far from being comradely, the four rounds of official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in the Kremlin resembled a dogged fight between entrenched adversaries. Hoping to employ Tito and Yugoslavia’s immense prestige among the Eastern European public to harness developments in Poland and Hungary that were escaping their control, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership exerted immense pressure on Tito during the Moscow talks to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’. However, not only did Tito rebuke the pressure, the Moscow Declaration publicly promoted democratization of relations between CPSU and other Communist parties, fuelling further demands for liberalization in Eastern Europe. In the months leading up to the tragic resolution of the Hungarian crisis, both Khrushchev and Tito tiptoed delicately around each other in an effort to maximize their divergent interests. The Soviet leadership continued to put pressure on Tito to rejoin the fold, at times subtle and at times overt. Simultaneously, the Kremlin did everything in its power to isolate and contain Yugoslavia’s corrosive influence on the satellites, in particular its backing of Imre Nagy’s reformists in Hungary. On both accounts the Soviet strategy had failed. Tito rejected Soviet courtship and stubbornly continued interfering in the Hungarian events. Yugoslavia condemned the first Soviet intervention in Hungary in October in the strongest possible terms and gave unwavering support to Nagy upon his return. Once, however, the uprising in Hungary acquired an openly anti-­Communist character, and Nagy announced departure from the Warsaw Pact, Tito revoked his support. Concerned for the fate of socialism in Hungary and about the destabilization of the existing European balance of power, Tito endorsed the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary at a secret meeting with Khrushchev and Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November at his residence in Brioni.

5 Confrontation

During their meeting in Brioni, Tito gave Khrushchev support for the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. However, only hours after the Red Army’s onslaught began, on the morning of 4 November, the Yugoslav and Soviet relationship became entangled in events that spiralled out of their control. Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, escaped arrest by fleeing to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, where he was granted asylum. Only a week after the Soviets suppressed the Hungarian uprising, in a speech to Party officials in the Yugoslav town of Pula, Tito unequivocally criticized not only the way Moscow handled the Hungarian crisis but some of the precepts of the Soviet system. The speech, published in Yugoslav newspapers together with the fallout from the Nagy ‘affair’ marked the beginning of a very public Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation. By February 1957, after several months of public polemics and recriminations, the Yugoslav–Soviet altercation threatened a repeat of the 1948 rupture. Although neither leadership would allow the conflict to go that far, Yugoslav–Soviet relations never recovered the high levels of optimism that existed for several short months in 1956, between Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February and Tito’s trip to the USSR in June.

The Nagy ‘affair’ In the early hours of 4 November, immediately after the commencement of Soviet military operations, Imre Nagy and fifty-­two of his associates and members of their families fled to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest where they were granted asylum. During the following three weeks, the Yugoslav Government, first through its Ambassador Soldatić and then its Deputy Foreign Minister, Dobrivoje Vidić, who was dispatched from Belgrade on 18 November, worked hard to negotiate an exit out of this situation with the Kádár Government. Finally, on 22 November, after Vidić had received a written undertaking from Kádár the previous evening guaranteeing their safe passage home, Nagy and his entourage left the Yugoslav Embassy. Several hundred yards outside the Yugoslav compound, however, they were abducted by Soviet intelligence officers. Nagy’s asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy was a result of a failed and bungled attempt by the Yugoslavs and the Soviets to neutralize Nagy in order to facilitate the instalment of the Kádár Government and secure the success of the Soviet

Confrontation   179 intervention. During the afternoon of 3 November, after Khrushchev had left Brioni, Belgrade instructed its Ambassador in Budapest, Soldatić, to respond positively to the request for asylum submitted a day earlier by Zoltán Szántó on behalf of Nagy and his associates.1 The Yugoslav leaders believed they were acting in accordance with the agreement reached only hours earlier with the Soviets in Brioni, the aim of which was to ‘isolate’ Nagy from the ‘reactionaries’.2 As Ranković’s instructive cable to Soldatić of 4 November suggested, the Yugoslav plan was to evacuate the whole Nagy group to Yugoslavia before the start of the Soviet military operations. As had been agreed during the previous day with Szántó, the Yugoslavs were expecting Nagy’s final response during the morning of 4 November. However, the beginning of the Soviet operation in the early hours of 4 November foiled the evacuation plans.3 This confirms that the Yugoslav leadership had no prior knowledge of the precise timing of the intervention. The Soviet reluctance to inform the Yugoslavs in advance of the timing and the lack of coordination between the two sides once the intervention had started triggered a chain of events that left both parties with the least expected and desired outcome – Nagy being granted asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. On the morning of 4 November, Kardelj called in Firyubin, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, and informed him that Nagy, twelve other Hungarian officials, and their families had been granted asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, ‘as has been agreed with comrade Khrushchev’. Kardelj also asked for instructions from the Soviet leadership on whether a statement from Nagy, as discussed in Brioni, was still necessary.4 Moscow replied on the same day that ‘there was no further need for any statement [from Nagy]’. It also requested that the Yugoslavs hand Nagy over to Soviet troops.5 On 5 November, Khrushchev sent a euphoric cable to Tito informing him that the ‘counterrevolution was crushed on 4 November, at noon’. He underlined that Tito’s endorsement of the intervention had been well received in the Soviet Presidium.6 In light of developments involving Nagy, this served as a reminder to Tito that Moscow expected his continued cooperation. On 5 November, Tito sent a telegram to Moscow asking that Nagy and his group be given free passage to Yugoslavia.7 Khrushchev’s response, two days later, caused consternation and anger among Tito and his aides for its complete disregard of Yugoslavia’s predicament and its ‘vulgar and crude’ language.8 Openly threatening and in a tone devoid of diplomatic niceties, Khrushchev implied that by providing shelter to Nagy and his group, Belgrade admitted that Nagy had been its agent all along. He stated that while the Brioni agreement had for the time being dispelled suspicions about Yugoslavia’s role in the Hungarian events, now that Nagy and his cohorts have found refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, our assessment of the causes of the developments in Hungary would require a revision. This fact would certainly introduce suspicion into our relations and would inflict an irreparable damage upon them. Khrushchev concluded his missive with an ominous and open threat that ‘the sooner Nagy and his group were handed over to Hungarian authorities, the better

180   Confrontation it would be for all of us’.9 Tito later confirmed that this ‘vulgar’ letter, as he called it, was the first sign of an impending Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation.10 In the subsequent exchange of letters, on 8 and 10 November, Tito and Khrushchev managed to diffuse somewhat the explosiveness of the Nagy ‘affair’.11 As a result, after 8 November the problem was relegated to negotiations between the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest and the Kádár Government. In the ensuing two weeks, a number of proposals and counterproposals were discussed, ranging from the evacuation of Nagy and his group to Yugoslavia or Romania to their safe return home with a granted pardon from the Kádár Government.12 Three rounds of decisive negotiations held between Kádár and Vidić, which on 21 November finally produced a resolution to the impasse. The new Hungarian Government gave a written undertaking guaranteeing their safe return home for Nagy and his entourage.13 The next evening, on 22 November, in accordance with the Vidić–Kádár agreement, Nagy and his group, together with two Yugoslav diplomats acting as their escorts, boarded a special bus in front of the Yugoslav Embassy. At the last moment, a Soviet officer jumped into the bus. Several cars belonging to the Soviet military intelligence followed behind. Minutes after the motorcade left the Embassy, the Soviet officer in the bus, pointing a gun at them, ordered the two Yugoslav diplomats to get out. The bus was then driven to the building of the Soviet Military Command. The same evening, Nagy and several members of his group were flown to Romania.14 Yugoslavia’s rigorous protests and two official notes to the Hungarian Government on 24 November and 6 December, as well as to the Soviet Government, demanding that the agreement between the Hungarian Government and the Yugoslav Government of 21 November be honoured and Nagy and his group returned home, produced no result.15 Available Soviet documents suggest that the plan for the abduction and arrest of Nagy’s group was conceived as early as 17 November. Thus, Kádár had given his Government’s guarantees on 21 November in full knowledge of the planned arrest.16 The available evidence, however, does not support suspicions of Yugoslav complicity. Among other things, Tito continued to plead for Nagy’s return to Hungary in subsequent secret correspondence with Khrushchev.17 The Yugoslav President also repeatedly addressed this topic during his meetings with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade at the end of November and at the beginning of December.18 Thus, Kádár’s ‘admission’ before the Hungarian Party leadership in December that the Yugoslavs were informed in advance that the written guarantee would not be honoured, as quoted in Békés’ book, cannot be taken at face value.19 The above-­mentioned meeting took place a month after the Soviet intervention and Kádár was aware that many of those present still harboured sympathies towards Yugoslavia and opposed the Soviet action. Moreover, Kádár’s words have to be taken within the context of the fierce anti-­Yugoslav campaign that had just been unleashed throughout the ‘socialist camp’ aimed at discrediting Yugoslavia’s prestige among the public in People’s Democracies.

Confrontation   181

Yugoslav–Soviet polemics The fallout from the Soviet military intervention in Hungary and the scandalous abduction of Nagy initiated developments that shattered the shaky foundations of the Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement and unmasked the pretence of good relations maintained in the months following Tito’s visit to the USSR. The deep mistrust and unbridgeable ideological divide between Moscow and Belgrade, concealed under the good intentions of the normalization, would contribute decisively towards the collapse of the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation. The Yugoslav leadership interpreted Khrushchev’s ‘vulgar’ and threatening letter of 7 November as an ominous sign.20 Indeed, on 8 November an article signed by the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha entitled ‘Fifteen Years of the Albanian Workers’ Party’, appeared prominently in Pravda.21 Although it never mentioned them by name, the article was a thinly veiled attack on Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Among other things, Hoxha lambasted ‘those who claim to have invented “new forms” and “organizations” of the socialist system, who aspire to impose it on others and preach departure from the example and experience of the Soviet Union’. He indirectly accused Tito of ‘cultivating [his] own personality cult’ under the pretext of fighting against that of Stalin.22 As the article was published in Pravda, the Yugoslavs were in no doubt that it had been sanctioned by the Soviet leadership. Given the well-­known animosity between Tito and Hoxha, it came as no surprise that the Yugoslav leadership responded harshly. Moscow’s decision to allow Hoxha to fire the first salvo was interpreted in Belgrade as a Soviet wish to add insult to injury. On 11 November Tito gave a speech in Pula, Istria, at a closed meeting of the regional LCY officials and the Yugoslav Army officers.23 On 16 November, the speech was published in the official party organ Borba. This unprecedented gesture confirmed that the Yugoslav leadership had decided that there was nothing further to be gained from concealing differences with the Soviets. Tito’s Pula speech represented a watershed in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. It marked the departure from the pretence of good relations between the two countries and inaugurated public confrontation. The speech announced the Yugoslav resolve to openly challenge the Soviet leadership. In the opening statement of his speech in Pula, Tito declared that he wished to respond to the ‘slander’ against Yugoslavia from ‘quasi-­Marxists’ such as Hoxha and to provide Yugoslav Communists with insight into the most recent events in Hungary, Poland and the Middle East.24 Tito then devoted considerable attention to the state of Yugoslav–Soviet relations during the preceding months, revealing that the disagreements between the CPSU and the LCY had existed for some time. He emphasized that at the Twentieth Congress the Soviets had condemned Stalin’s conduct but had ‘wrongly addressed it as the question of a personality cult and not as a question of the system. In truth however, the personality cult was a product of the system’.25 The roots of the personality cult, according to Tito, lay in the bureaucratized Soviet system. He then stressed that for a time normalization with the Soviets had progressed well, resulting in the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations. Tito confirmed that the Yugoslav intent

182   Confrontation from the very beginning was for these documents to transcend the bilateral Yugoslav–Soviet relationship and reaffirm principles upon which relations between socialist countries should be based. He then confessed that it soon became evident that the Soviets wanted these Declarations to apply exclusively to Soviet–Yugoslav relations. After Poznań, according to Tito, ‘[the Soviet leaders] became much colder [towards Yugoslavia]’. He then revealed that talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders in Crimea at the beginning of October demonstrated that the Soviet leadership ‘harboured a wrong understanding of the causes of the developing crises in Poland and Hungary’. It was evident, Tito emphasized, that a distorted interpretation of these events, imposed by those in the Presidium who ‘still stand . . . on the Stalinist positions’ has prevailed against others in the leadership who ‘wanted to promote further democratization and elimination of Stalinist methods’.26 Tito then gave his interpretation of events in Hungary. According to him, as the situation in Hungary became more complex during the summer, the Yugoslav leadership had not done enough to exert pressure on the Soviet leadership to remove Rakosi and Gerö earlier. Tito admitted that he and his associates had feared that their insistence could provoke a confrontation with the Soviets. He then characterized the 23 October demonstrations in Budapest as a justified popular revolt against Rakosi and Gerö. Tragically and wrongly, however, the Soviet troops intervened on 24 October opening the way for the ‘reactionary forces’ to usurp what until then was a justified ‘people’s revolt’. Within days, according to him, this revolt turned into a ‘general people’s insurrection against socialism and against the Soviet Union’. Tito insisted that the first intervention, ‘which was requested by Gerö was absolutely wrong’.27 As a result things rapidly spiralled out of control and according to him ‘that stupid manifesto’, Nagy’s Declaration of Neutrality of 1 November, provoked the second Soviet intervention. Tito also reminded his audience in Pula that on the eve of the second intervention, the prospect of a bloodbath and of a horrific civil war became very real. As a result, socialism would have been buried and a Third World War could have followed. . . . The mob went into houses and killed Communists. . . . In Soprony, they hanged twenty Communists. . . . The Government of Nagy did nothing to stop this . . . instead, they issued that manifesto, the declaration that it would leave the Warsaw Pact.28 In these circumstances, as he underlined, the second Soviet intervention was the ‘lesser of two evils’. Furthermore, ‘if, as a result, socialism will be saved in Hungary, then comrades we could say . . . that the Soviet intervention was necessary’.29 Concluding his speech, however, Tito again reminded the Soviet and East European leaders that had they corrected their mistakes in time, intervention would not have been necessary. He also warned them against believing that military force could resolve everything.30 After months of compromizing and doing everything to keep the process of normalization with the Soviets alive, what prompted Tito to publicly challenge

Confrontation   183 Moscow and provoke the confrontation? The Pula speech was intended to reassert the line of demarcation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc. The Belgrade leadership had obviously concluded that further concealment of deep Yugoslav– Soviet disagreements on a number of fundamental issues, in the circumstances created by the Soviet military intervention in Hungary and the Moscow-­orchestrated anti-­Yugoslav campaign, threatened to undermine Yugoslavia’s prestige and endanger its non-­aligned orientation. Of equal importance were pressing domestic considerations. As much as to the international audience, Tito felt compelled to justify and explain his endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Hungary to the Yugoslav public, which had lived under the threat of the Soviet aggression for the previous eight years. Moreover, shaken by the rage of Hungarian workers, the Yugoslav leadership feared a spillover to the Yugoslav workers, who lived under similar economic hardships. Time and again, Tito repeated that the danger of the overthrow of socialism in Hungary was the principal reason for supporting the Soviet intervention. He insisted that he supported liberalization and de-­Stalinization as the only way to safeguard socialism in People’s Democracies and preserve its appeal globally. However, once the process was ‘hijacked’ by ‘reactionary forces’ and threatened to undermine the socialist system itself, as he believed had happened in Hungary by the beginning of November, Tito did not hesitate to back every measure designed to ‘rescue it’. Sir Frank Roberts, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, called it Yugoslavia’s ‘remarkable ambivalence’.31 Tito must also have feared that the defeat of socialism in Hungary would create a precedent that could revamp Yugoslavia’s domestic and external anti-­Communist opposition. Perhaps the single most important aim of the Pula speech was, however, to distance Yugoslavia from the Soviet Bloc. Moscow had promulgated the ‘official’ truth that the Hungarian uprising was an organized attempt by the ‘reactionary forces’ inspired and backed by the West to replace socialism with capitalism in Hungary. This, according to Moscow, necessitated decisive Soviet military intervention as a means of salvaging socialism. As it had supported the Soviet intervention, Yugoslavia had made itself vulnerable to accusations of aligning with the ‘socialist camp’. For this reason, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership felt compelled to declare urgently and publicly that their endorsement of the Soviet intervention was only conditional and not part of a coordinated action with the ‘socialist camp’, and that fundamental ideological differences between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union remained. After months of evasive manoeuvring designed to resist Soviet pressure to rejoin the ‘camp’, while keeping alive the process of rapprochement, the Yugoslav leadership had obviously concluded that continuation of such a course could seriously damage Yugoslavia’s position. In this context, the Pula speech was meant to be a definitive and public rebuttal of Soviet efforts to create the pretence that Yugoslavia was sliding back into the ‘socialist camp’. Reporting on his meeting with Khrushchev on 3 December when they discussed the Pula speech at length, Mićunović concluded that ‘[with the Pula speech, Yugoslavia] had now definitely and publicly dispelled speculations that [it] would rejoin the “lager”. It seems that this was something the Russians did not stop hoping for until Pula’.32

184   Confrontation Tito’s condemnation of the Soviets in his Pula speech was also in response to the ongoing anti-­Yugoslav campaign in the ‘camp’, launched by Moscow immediately after Tito’s June visit and intensified after the Hungarian events. Tito’s intention was to fend off the Soviet tactics of isolating Yugoslavia from the rest of the Communist movement by blaming it for the crises in Poland and Hungary. In February 1957, at the Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC, Tito explained that the anti-­Yugoslav campaign, reinvigorated after the frustrated Soviet attempts in Crimea in October to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘camp’, confirmed that, [the Soviets] have been preparing for a long time and very meticulously for an ideological fight against Yugoslavia. [At the time of the Nagy ‘affair’, the Soviets] went even further. Through their cronies they started insinuating that Yugoslavia was responsible for Poznan, as well as for Hungary; that we have been doing the same thing as the reactionary forces from the West, only in a more perfidious manner. All in all, the aim was to discredit Yugoslavia.33 The Yugoslav leadership understood that, having learned the lesson of 1948, the Soviets had resorted to more subtle methods in their latest anti-­Yugoslav campaign. On the one hand, they publicly promoted good relations with Yugoslavia, whilst on the other hand, in private, they made every effort to discredit Belgrade and rally People’s Democracies and Communist parties against it.34 To achieve the much-­desired cohesion of the Bloc in the face of the unravelling crises in Poland and in Hungary, the Soviets needed to rally the ‘camp’. As in 1948, the Kremlin cast Yugoslavia as a traitor to the cause; hence accusations against Yugoslavia as the instigator of the Hungarian developments. The Yugoslav leadership had obviously concluded that to remain quiet would have meant an admission of culpability and further corrosion of Yugoslavia’s prestige and influence in the Communist movement. Deprived of channels of communication with the Communist parties and the public in Eastern Europe, which Moscow firmly controlled, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership were left with the only available avenue to counter Soviet intrigues – to bring everything into the open. Tito later admitted that he was ‘not sorry that [the Pula speech] was published because [it enabled] the whole thing to come out of the confines of narrow-­minded scribbling and to become public’.35 Ironically, Tito also hoped that the Pula speech would assist Khrushchev and his supporters in the Presidium. As shown earlier, he was convinced that the crises in Poland and in Hungary had made Khrushchev vulnerable to the attacks from the hard-­liners. This explains references in the Pula speech to the existence of ‘Stalinists’ and ‘non-­Stalinists’ in the Soviet leadership.36 Tito later explained to the Soviet Ambassador, Firyubin, that by pointing to the divisions in the Soviet leadership, he wanted to help those ‘who are thinking in a “new way” ’.37 The Yugoslav leader was particularly concerned about possible pressure from the Red Army that could force Khrushchev to adopt even more conservative policies. On several occasions Tito had been alerted to the new role of

Confrontation   185 the Soviet Army as a power broker. Reporting on the eve of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, on 9 February 1956, Vidić asserted that in the struggle against the hard-­liners, Khrushchev had become dependent on the support of the Army. This, according to the Yugoslav Ambassador, was increasingly placing the Army in the centre of the power battle in the Kremlin and its influence seemed to be growing by the day.38 During the meeting in Brioni on 2–3 November 1956, Khrushchev alluded to Tito that unless the Soviet leadership acted decisively in Hungary, the Army might stage a coup.39 Mićunović’s report on his conversation with Khrushchev on 11 November again suggested that Khrushchev could be under pressure from the Army. Khrushchev admitted to Mićunović that, there are people even within [the Soviet] party who think that the Twentieth Congress was to blame for developments [in Poland and Hungary]. . . . Such accusations are evident in particular in the Army . . . the Army is an important political factor in the USSR, above all with regard to the question of Stalin and preservation of the socialist ‘lager’. . . . Such forces . . . are against the legacy of the Twentieth Congress and [the Soviet leadership] is forced, because of them, to make compromises that are in opposition to the spirit of the Congress.40 According to Mićunović, when talking about these things, ‘Khrushchev looked insecure and vulnerable’.41 The growing insecurity of his leadership position arising from continuous reliance on the Army’s support may explain Khrushchev’s decision to remove Zhukov from the position of Defence Minister in October 1957. Khrushchev had struck as soon as he eliminated the last remaining opposition in the Presidium, that of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. Ironically, Zhukov was instrumental in their removal. At the same time, the alleged threat from the Army may have been Khrushchev’s construct and a sly attempt to justify actions he knew would meet Tito’s disapproval. However, available evidence suggests that Tito had miscalculated. By the time he spoke in Pula, developments in Hungary had transformed Khrushchev. His exchanges with Mićunović suggest that the Soviet leader had come to believe that demands for democratization and liberalization in Eastern Europe, radicalized by Western propaganda would lead to an inevitable break up of the ‘socialist camp’ and the collapse of the idea of socialism.42 Ironically, Khrushchev, who led the process of de-­Stalinization, seemed to have by this time accepted Stalin’s postulate that socialism was dependant on the ideological uniformity of the Soviet Bloc. Scarred by the Hungarian experience, he re-­embraced the necessity of tight cohesion of the ‘camp’ under the Soviet hegemony. During their meeting on 11 November, Khrushchev admitted to Mićunović that ‘as the initiator of the policies of the Twentieth Congress [he] now accepted the thinking [of those in the Soviet leadership who were sensitive] to the question of  Stalin and the preservation of his legacy’.43 After meeting Khrushchev on 3 December, Mićunović concluded that,

186   Confrontation during many conversations that I have had with him these days, it is becoming clear that Khrushchev and Bulganin are most critical of Tito’s speech in Pula. . . . It is clear what tendencies are strengthening here, now under the leadership of Khrushchev and Bulganin, no matter how strange it may look.44 Khrushchev’s increasingly conservative stance from autumn of 1956 could be attributed to defensive manoeuvring against accusations that his policies were responsible for the chaos in Hungary. However, there seems to be enough evidence that suggests otherwise. Khrushchev exerted strong and continued pressure on Tito to return to the ‘socialist camp’ during September and October 1956, even when the two conferred alone.45 Mićunović’s reports of his tête-à-tête conversation with Khrushchev in the months following the Soviet intervention in Hungary show the Soviet leader growing increasingly less tolerant and professing hard-­line views on the necessity of ideological uniformity.46 During the Conference of the Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, a year after Hungary, Khrushchev pressed for a Stalinist-­type unity of the international Communist movement.47 At the time his leadership position was unassailable; he had successfully fought off the challenge from the hard-­line troika, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich and had rid himself of Zhukov. Tito’s Pula speech was also intended to help mend Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. Throughout 1956, preoccupied with the rapprochement with the Soviets and later with developments in Hungary and Poland, Tito had neglected this aspect of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. As has already been argued, at no time during this period did considerations arising from relations with the West influence the Yugoslav pursuit of normalization with the Soviets. However, faced with the prospect of a Kremlin-­orchestrated anti-­Yugoslav campaign and the negative fallout from the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Tito and his associates began to fear that the renewed confrontation with Moscow could lead to a repeat of 1948 and their international isolation.48 The post-­intervention concentration of Soviet troops on Yugoslavia’s doorstep, in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, was in these circumstances perceived in new light. In a telegram to Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad, Koča Popović warned that, the Soviet military operations [in Hungary] . . . because of their breadth have themselves become an element of increasing tension (huge number of troops and armour in Hungary, strengthening of [Soviet] contingent in Romania, news of the arrival of Soviet troops in Bulgaria, renewal of the Potsdam regime in East Germany, etc.). [The Soviet military measures] are aimed at establishing Soviet control over the East European theatre and as a warning to the West. However, because of their closeness to our borders, they also act as an element of pressure on [Yugoslavia].49 The warning by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister was circulated only a day before Tito addressed his audience in Pula. The threat of isolation and increased

Confrontation   187 security concerns most certainly prompted the Yugoslav leadership to unequivocally demonstrate to the West that they had not returned to the ‘fold’ and, more importantly, were still capable and willing to oppose Moscow. Domestic considerations were to a very large extent responsible for the content of Tito’s speech in Pula and for the decision to make it public. Tito felt compelled to justify to the Yugoslav public his support for the Soviet intervention. Without doubt, his popularity at home was still unparalleled and his regime was in full control of the country. However, the Yugoslav public, proud of having withstood the threat of Soviet aggression for five years, was confused to see its leadership support the Soviet assault on another socialist country. On many occasions during the following months, Tito stressed that in the first days after the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary there was a need for a ‘thorough explanation of the Hungarian events’ to the ‘perplexed’ Yugoslav public.50 Telegrams from Yugoslavia’s most prominent diplomats, such as Aleš Bebler, the Ambassador in Paris, who until recently had held the position of the Deputy Foreign Secretary, or Jože Brilej, the Yugoslav representative in the UN, revealed equal unease among Yugoslav diplomats and officials caused by Yugoslavia’s endorsement of the Soviet intervention.51 Although muted, discomfort of this kind among state officials was previously unknown in Yugoslavia. Equally pressing among domestic considerations was the question of the deteriorating living standard. Tito felt compelled to address in Pula the grievances of the working class. Dissatisfaction with their living standards incited workers to play prominent roles in the Poznań riots and during the Hungarian uprising. The standard of living enjoyed by the Yugoslav workers was only marginally better than that of the Hungarians and the Yugoslav leadership obviously feared a spillover. Tito used the Pula speech to announce measures aimed at improving workers’ standard of living.52 Indeed, at the meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee on 6 November, the second and only point of agenda in addition to the situation in Hungary was the ‘urgent reallocation of economic resources to the consumer sector’.53 In Pula, Tito declared that the Executive Committee had decided that the living standard of the working class must become the priority of the current Five-­Year Plan. He announced with immediate effect an increase in workers’ salaries of 5–10 per cent, a reduction of production norms and quotas, and allocation of additional resources for the development of the consumer sector.54 The speed with which they heeded the lessons of Hungary and acted to address the problems of the workers’ standard of living reveals the degree of anxiety among the Yugoslav leaders. Understandably, Tito’s Pula speech provoked Moscow’s immediate and furious reaction. On 18 November, two days after the speech had been published in Borba, Mićunović had to endure the full force of Soviet wrath during a reception in the Kremlin on the occasion of the visit by the Polish Party and Government delegation.55 Throughout the two-­hour reception, not a single Soviet official approached or shook hands with the Yugoslav Ambassador. As Mićunović was leaving, Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov stopped him at the

188   Confrontation door and asked to talk to him. During an hour of tempestuous exchanges in the hallway, the Soviets berated the Yugoslav leadership. After this initial verbal assault, the whole group then moved to one of the side rooms where the conversation continued in a calmer tone for a further hour. In the end, Khrushchev offered to drop Mićunović home. The two spent an hour and a half alone in Khrushchev’s car in front of the Yugoslav Embassy. According to Mićunović’s report, Khrushchev was furious.56 He could not understand why Tito had chosen to attack and condemn the Soviets publicly. Khrushchev insisted that he and his comrades were ready to discuss disagreements with the Yugoslavs in a ‘comradely fashion’ through letters but, after Pula, ‘we will have to fight . . . there is no other way’. Khrushchev promised a response to Tito’s attack, which according to him ‘will inevitably start a confrontation’. He also insisted that the Soviet leadership would never accept the Yugoslav assessment of Stalin.57 In response to Khrushchev’s direct question about Tito’s motives, Mićunović replied that the speech, on the one hand, represented an effort to explain the Hungarian events to the Yugoslav public. On the other hand, the speech was a response to Hoxha’s article in Pravda for which Mićunović blamed Moscow. Khrushchev reminded Mićunović that he was Yugoslavia’s friend and had submitted a very positive report to the Presidium on his talks with Tito in Crimea. He then admitted in a dejected manner that after the Pula speech a confrontation would ensue and ‘who knows where it would lead?’ During the four hours of this conversation, Nagy, who was at the time confined in the Yugoslav Embassy, was mentioned only once – when Khrushchev agreed with Mićunović that it would have been best if he was allowed to go home in the first few days.58 As Khrushchev had forewarned Mićunović, the Soviet official and public response to Tito’s Pula speech appeared in the form of a very long Pravda editorial on 23 November.59 Entitled ‘For Further Rallying of Forces of Socialism on the Basis of Marxist–Leninist Principles’ it immediately pointed to the core of the Yugoslav–Soviet dispute. The article first contested at length Tito’s view that the  Hungarian working class had risen justifiably against the mistakes of the Rakosi regime. It insisted that the events in Hungary were the result of an attack by the ‘counterrevolutionary forces’ inspired by the West. The Pravda editorial also strongly rejected Tito’s assertion that the personality cult was a result of the deficiencies of the Soviet system. It then accused the Yugoslav leader that ‘his criticism of the [Soviet] system was aimed at casting a shadow over the system of life of the Soviet people’. Arguing that while no one should deny Yugoslav people the right to build a system to their liking, the editorial insisted that it was equally inappropriate for the Yugoslav leadership ‘to attack the socialist system of other countries, to glorify its own experience as being better than others’ and of universal value’.60 Pravda reproached Tito for demanding independence of socialist countries, Communist parties from the Soviet Union. It quoted the Resolution of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the Presidium’s 30 October Resolution as proofs that the CPSU and the Soviet Government were not trying to impose hegemony on others. In this context the editorial also quoted at length the Resolution on the relations between the USSR and other socialist parties

Confrontation   189 adopted at the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU CC. Pravda also accused Tito of trying to create a rift within the international proletarian movement by dividing leaders of the Soviet Union and other Communist parties into ‘Stalinists’ and ‘anti-­Stalinists’. In conclusion, the Pravda editorial defined the essence of the Soviet confrontation with Tito, declaring that ‘the higher interests of socialism demand . . . the removal of everything that hampers the rallying of the socialist forces on the basis of Marxism–Leninism’.62 On 1 December, in what he would later describe as a ‘conciliatory’ letter to Khrushchev, Tito made a final effort to steer the Yugoslav–Soviet debate away from its confrontational course.63 Tito started the letter by pointing out that unlike the Yugoslavs who had published Pravda’s article of 23 November in its entirety, the Soviets had still not published Tito’s Pula speech. He then emphasized that ‘a campaign [was] being unleashed against Yugoslavia, similar to the one during Stalin’s period in 1948, with a goal to isolate Yugoslavia from the socialist world’.64 Explaining the motives behind his Pula speech Tito singled out the anti-­Yugoslav campaign spearheaded by the Albanian, Czech, Bulgarian and the French parties, unleashed immediately after his visit to the USSR. The campaign alleged that the process of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization was only a ploy to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘camp’. Tito also pointed to the 13 July Resolution of the CPSU CC, after which the campaign was intensified. He admitted that he had to make the Pula speech in order to explain to the ‘confused’ public in Yugoslavia the causes and the truth behind the events in Hungary. Tito asserted that what had happened ‘represented a huge blow to the socialist world’ and appealed to the Soviet leadership to send Nagy home and stop the forced deportations that were going on all over Hungary. In the conclusion of his letter, he warned that ‘no one has the right, in the name of some quasi higher interests, to slander [Yugoslavia] and to spread false propaganda’. Although conciliatory in tone, the letter did not offer the Soviets a single concession.65 However, only three days after Tito had dispatched the ‘conciliatory’ letter to Khrushchev, the Yugoslav leadership decidedly raised the stakes in the ongoing dispute. On 7 December, speaking in the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Edvard Kardelj delivered the most devastating attack on the Soviet system.66 He went much further than Tito had done in Pula. What would irritate the Soviets most was his attempt to provide a ‘theoretical’, Marxist interpretation of the superiority of the Yugoslav over the Soviet system. Kardelj blamed the fallacy of uncritical copying and implementation of the Soviet system in other countries as one of the main factors behind the Hungarian revolt. He then subjected the fundamental precepts of the Soviet system to the harshest criticism, using terminology not heard since the 1948 conflict. Kardelj insisted that there can be no socialism, much less Communism, ‘as long as the State, as an instrument of force, is the main factor in economic relations’. His critique of the Soviet political system bordered on the revision of Lenin’s postulates. Kardelj insisted that ‘democracy must be an unconditional factor and element of socialism’ and that ‘a political monopoly, be it of one or of many parties, is incompatible with the decisive role 61

190   Confrontation of the working masses through workers’ councils in factories and boroughs’.67 The Yugoslav system, according to him, based on self-­management of workers’ councils, represented a higher form of socialist organization. Kardelj also emphasized that ‘to regard the process of socialist development exclusively . . . through the clash between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is ideologically absurd and politically reactionary’.68 In conclusion, he subjected to fierce criticism the Soviet postulate of the inevitability of the division of the world into two antagonistic Blocs – the socialist and the capitalist. As much as openly challenging the Soviet authority, Kardelj questioned a number of Lenin’s postulates. If the letter to Khrushchev of 1 December was an attempt to defuse the dispute, Tito and his aides could have anticipated that Kardelj’s speech, delivered only days later, would be seen in the Kremlin as an intentional provocation. The Soviets knew well that a public speech by a member of the Yugoslav leadership on relations with Moscow could not have been delivered without Tito’s consent. Furthermore, it was delivered at a particularly sensitive juncture in the Yugoslav–Soviet relationship. Why then did the Yugoslav leadership conscientiously escalate the row with the Soviets? At the LCY Plenum in February 1957, Tito explained that he and his aides had decided that his Pula speech was not enough and that there was a need for ‘theoretical depth’ that would strengthen Yugoslavia’s arguments in the polemics with the Soviets.69 This confirms that, by this time, Tito and his associates were not interested in quietening down the ideological debate with Moscow. The evidence seems to suggest that they wanted to draw a definitive ideological demarcation line between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Obviously, a decision was made around this time that further and explicit criticism of the Soviet system, in addition to the Pula speech, was necessary in order to reject, once and for all, the Soviet attempts at drawing Yugoslavia back into the ‘socialist camp’. Kardelj’s speech confirmed that the ideological chasm created after 1948 remained as wide as ever and that the Yugoslavs had accepted the futility of further efforts to bridge it. Furthermore, the Yugoslav leadership was keen to disassociate itself from the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. At the end of November, instead of subsiding, the repressive actions of the Soviet military authorities in Hungary intensified. Courts-­martial were mushrooming all over Hungary, deportations of prisoners to the Soviet Union and Romania continued unabated, and the crackdown on the workers’ councils led to their eventual outright ban on 9 December. The Yugoslav leadership looked at this as Soviet violation of the understanding reached in Brioni that the military phase of the intervention would be as short as possible and would be followed by political reconciliation. The abduction of Nagy was the last straw that truly offended and angered the Yugoslavs.70 The Soviet response to Kardelj’s speech was predictably virulent. On 12 December, Khrushchev summoned Mićunović and for three hours vented his rage over Kardelj’s speech. The Yugoslav Ambassador reported to Tito that he had never seen Khrushchev so angry.71 The Soviet leader characterized Tito’s letter of 1 December as an effort to defuse the polemics but insisted that after  Kardelj’s speech ‘there would be a rupture of party relations and a

Confrontation   191 confrontation’. In an attempt to justify Kardelj’s speech, Mićunović complained that the military phase of the Soviet intervention in Hungary was still taking priority over political measures. Khrushchev replied that ‘Kádár was soft’ and that the Soviets were now on course to crush the ‘counterrevolution’ in Hungary, once and for all.72 He then angrily insinuated that it was highly conspicuous that in the days prior to 23 October, while the ‘counterrevolution’ was being prepared in Hungary, Gerö visited Yugoslavia. According to Mićunović, Khrushchev was so angry that ‘the conversation was unpleasant, at times very difficult and almost nonsensical’. The Yugoslav Ambassador understood from the conversation that the Soviet leadership had concluded that the confrontation with Yugoslavia offered a chance for them to strengthen the cohesion of their Bloc. Mićunović predicted that the Soviets would now do their best to mobilize the socialist ‘camp’ against Yugoslavia and that ‘it should be expected that [the Soviets] would also force the Romanians and the Chinese to wake up from their ‘neutralist’ stance towards [the ongoing Yugoslav–Soviet dispute], which they occupy at the moment’.73 True to Khrushchev’s threat, the Soviet response to Kardelj’s speech came on 18 December, in the form of a venomous anti-­Yugoslav article in Pravda.74 It accused Kardelj of revisionism, anti-­Leninism and anti-­Marxism. The article also asserted that the Yugoslavs had deliberately escalated the confrontation at a time when the ‘reactionaries [were] attacking Communist parties and doing everything to create divisions within the international Communist movement’. Pravda accused Yugoslavia of acting as the West’s Trojan horse. As proof, it quoted the West German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, allegedly proposing during the recent meeting of the NATO Council that ‘the North Atlantic Alliance should promote “Titoism” among People’s Democracies because it brings better results than [Western] subversive activities’.75 In comparison with the relative sophistication of the article of 23 November, this article was intimidating, full of uncorroborated insinuations, and, at times, insulting towards Kardelj and the Yugoslav leadership. Clearly, Moscow’s irritation with the Yugoslavs was turning into outright hostility.

From polemical debate to anti-­Yugoslav campaign: the collapse of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization As Mićunović predicted in his report on the 12 December meeting with Khrushchev, it soon became evident that the ‘camp’ was being mobilized behind an anti-­Yugoslav campaign. On 29 December, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the organ of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee (CPC CC), published a long editorial under the title ‘More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’.76 The editorial represented a scathing attack on Belgrade. It singled out Yugoslavia as being responsible for the devastating theory of ‘many roads to socialism’. The article asserted that the experience of the October Revolution should be the only road for the proletariat of all countries to follow. Renmin Ribao openly attacked Yugoslavia’s criticism of Stalin. It

192   Confrontation claimed that ‘socialism had achieved huge progress during Stalin’, and that ‘Stalin’s mistakes [were] not the product of the socialist system. Consequently, there [existed] no need for the “reform” of the socialist system’. The article directly accused the Yugoslavs of aligning with the bourgeoisie by creating the term ‘de-­ Stalinization’ and by claiming that there was a clash between ‘Stalinists’ and ‘anti-­Stalinists’ in the Soviet leadership. To eliminate ambiguity, it openly declared that ‘Stalinism is Communism’.77 In conclusion, Renmin Ribao provided the most forceful endorsement of Moscow’s leading role in the international Communist movement. A eulogy of this kind coming from the Chinese had become rare after Stalin’s death. Among other things, the editorial asserted that, the strengthening of the international solidarity of the proletariat, in the centre of which is the Soviet Union, is not only in the interest of the global proletariat but also in the interest of the independence movements of all oppressed nations and of world peace.78 The Renmin Ribao editorial provided the Soviet leadership with desperately needed legitimization of their authority in the renewed confrontation with Yugoslavia. At the same time, however, it transformed the bilateral Yugoslav–Soviet polemics into a Soviet Bloc assault against Yugoslavia. The Chinese intervention escalated the ideological debate between Moscow and Belgrade into an anti-­Yugoslav campaign. As developments in the coming years would confirm, the apparent Chinese ‘assistance’ also heralded a change in the power configuration of the international Communist community. Oblivious to these dangers and badly in need of support, the Soviet leadership welcomed with relief the Chinese condemnation of Yugoslavia. Khrushchev later revealed that the Soviet leadership had asked the Chinese to act in their support and had waited anxiously for a month and a half for the Beijing’s reaction to Tito’s Pula speech.79 The Chinese interference awarded a seal of ideological authority to the shaken post-­Stalin Soviet leadership. Besides being published in Pravda the day after it appeared in Beijing, the Renmin Ribao editorial was reprinted in five Soviet central papers and in fifteen regional papers in the Soviet Republics. Furthermore, the editorial was disseminated as an offprint in tens of millions of copies.80 The Yugoslav leadership on the other hand was immediately alerted to the changed role and position of the Chinese. In a telegram to Belgrade in early January 1957, Mićunović concluded that the Renmin Ribao article had a more profound effect on Khrushchev than either the successful resolution of the crisis in Hungary or the normalization of relations with Gomułka’s Polish United Workers’ Party in mid-­December.81 For the moment, according to Mićunović, the Soviet leadership seemed not to mind the huge increase in the prestige of the Chinese CP. He asserted that, although it claimed to support Moscow as the ‘centre’ of the Communist world, the Chinese article actually undermined Moscow’s leadership. Mićunović concluded that the Soviet leaders seemed not to have recognized this. Instead, they naïvely felt strengthened in their ideological

Confrontation   193 confrontation with Yugoslavia. The Renmin Ribao article of 29 December, coupled with Beijing’s crucial endorsement of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, confirmed Mao and the Chinese CP in their new role as arbiters on important questions regarding relations in the ‘socialist camp’, at Moscow’s expense. Tito and his aides seemed to have fully understood the implications of the Chinese involvement in the Yugoslav–Soviet dispute. It was awarded particular prominence at the LCY CC Plenum in February 1957.83 The Chinese, alone among the major ‘fraternal parties’, had earlier published Tito’s Pula speech in full and Belgrade was initially under the impression that Beijing might decide to remain neutral in the Yugoslav–Soviet debate.84 The appearance of the Renmin Ribao editorial thus represented a blow. Tito admitted at the February Plenum that, 82

the [Renmin Ribao] article did a huge service to the Soviet Union and, on the other hand made our situation more difficult. . . . [It] has now become the main document for the mobilization of support [among the Communist parties] behind the Soviet foreign policy and [the Soviet] ideological line.85 The Yugoslav leadership conceded that the Chinese support had enabled the Soviets to shift the character of Yugoslavia’s confrontation with the Soviet leadership into a confrontation between the LCY and the rest of the Communist movement. Belgrade also understood that the Chinese support had emboldened the Soviet leaders. Mićunović asserted that the ‘Russians believe [that the Chinese article had not only] improved the Soviet positions but had also changed the situation towards further isolation of Yugoslavia’.86 Tito agreed with Mićunović and added a warning that ‘thanks to the support obtained from the Chinese, the Soviet comrades are today fairly self-­assured and believe they have turned the fight against us to their favour’.87 The Yugoslav leadership acknowledged that the Chinese interference had tilted the balance of the Yugoslav– Soviet debate in the Soviets’ favour and had helped Moscow to isolate Yugoslavia from other Communist parties. At the same time, however, Tito and his aides became convinced that the Chinese intervention announced a shift in the power dynamics within the international Communist movement, marking the ascension of the Communist Party of China to the leadership pedestal, alongside the CPSU.88 The Yugoslavs recognized it as further erosion of the Soviet prestige. The Hungarian crisis and the consequent Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation provided the Chinese with an opportunity they duly seized. The Chinese support for the military action on the eve of the second intervention in Hungary helped the Soviet leadership to stop agonizing over the course it needed to take.89 In the aftermath of the intervention, with an ebbing authority and embroiled in ideological polemics with the Yugoslavs, the Soviet leaders were, once again, anxious to receive Chinese support.90 Moscow’s dependence on Chinese backing at critical junctures allowed Mao and his Party to grasp the role

194   Confrontation of ideological arbiter in the ‘socialist camp’. Only after having acquired such credentials would they later be in a position to mount a challenge for the leadership of the international Communist movement. Desperate to crush Yugoslavia’s defiance at a time when its hold of Eastern Europe was in danger, the Soviet leadership undermined its own ideological pre-­eminence. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s tour of Eastern Europe, between 7 and 19 January 1957, during which he met with the leaders of the USSR, Poland and Hungary, affirmed the new Chinese role.91 On 10 January, Kádár flew to Moscow for a day in order to meet Zhou. The Chinese Prime Minister then made a stopover in Budapest, on 16 January, on his flight from Warsaw to Moscow and met with the whole Hungarian leadership. The tone and manner of Zhou’s talks with Kádár and the Hungarian leaders during their meeting in Budapest confirmed the new position of authority that the Chinese came to occupy in the international Communist movement.92 A little known Sino-­Soviet initiative in January 1957 for the resolution of the Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation further illustrates the new role the Chinese Communist Party had acquired. During talks with Zhou Enlai in Moscow, in January 1957, the Soviets ‘suggested’ that a meeting with Tito could help stop the ongoing polemics.93 They asked Zhou to initiate contact with the Yugoslavs and proposed that representatives of the Chinese, Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and ‘a few other’ parties also be present at the meeting. Zhou telephoned Mao who gave his consent but suggested that the meeting be a Conference of all Communist parties. The Soviets accepted Mao’s proposal and Zhou immediately instructed Peng Zhen, who was at the time visiting Yugoslavia as the head of the Chinese Parliamentary delegation, to approach the Yugoslav leader. Tito responded in a non-­committal manner, demanding first to know where and when the meeting would take place. Most importantly, however, he refused to agree to the meeting before the agenda of such a gathering was known and accepted by all. Although he would have welcomed a chance for the Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation to be diffused, Tito was adamant not to allow ‘another Cominform’ and a repeat of the 28 June 1948 Bucharest meeting, which excommunicated Yugoslavia from the international Communist movement.94 He informed the Yugoslav leadership of the Chinese initiative at the session of the Executive Committee on 24 January and at the LCY CC Plenum on 1 February. Tito underlined that he would not consider the proposal until further clarifications were provided, suspecting the Soviets to be behind the whole idea.95 Belgrade’s lack of enthusiasm eventually killed off the Sino-­Soviet proposal.96 Nonetheless, this initiative most probably provided the grounds for the convoking of the Conference of the Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, on the occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution. Following Kardelj’s speech of 7 December and emboldened by the Chinese support, the Soviets stepped up the campaign against the Yugoslavs. On 29 December, Khrushchev sent a letter to Tito postponing indefinitely agreements signed on 12 January 1956 for the construction of the fertilizer and electricity plants in Yugoslavia, as well as the agreement signed on 1 August for the

Confrontation   195 construction of the aluminium plant. Tito and the Yugoslav leadership understood this not a result of economic considerations, as formulated in Khrushchev’s letter, but as part of the Soviet pressure in the ongoing ideological confrontation.98 Indeed, at the Plenum of the CPSU CC on 14 February, Khrushchev confirmed that the de facto cancellation of the economic assistance agreements with Yugoslavia was politically motivated and was intended to exert additional pressure on Belgrade.99 On 10 January 1957, Khrushchev sent a letter to the Yugoslav Central Committee, a response to Tito and Kardelj’s speeches.100 The Soviet leader first condemned the Yugoslavs for bringing into the open a debate that had hitherto been carried out in a more ‘appropriate form’, through the exchange of letters. He renewed suspicions regarding Belgrade’s ‘true’ role in the Hungarian events. According to Khrushchev, the Yugoslavs had provided support to those in Hungary who ‘later became the transmission of the reaction’. He called Tito’s assertion in Pula that the personality cult was a product of the Soviet system absurd and underlined that ‘the question of the socialist nature of the Soviet system is the fundamental question of Leninism. In a true Marxist party there can be no two opinions on this question’.101 Addressing Tito’s allegations that there were ‘Stalinists’ and ‘non-­Stalinists’ in the CPSU and in other ‘fraternal’ parties’ leaderships, Khrushchev accused the Yugoslav leader of interfering in the affairs of others. According to him, ‘by propagating such allegations Tito had dealt a blow to the cause of socialism, to the international workers’ movement and to Yugoslav–Soviet relations’. Concluding his letter, Khrushchev accused Belgrade of hypocrisy by falsely claiming to be outside the military alliances whilst, in reality, it was part of NATO through the Balkan Pact. He issued a veiled threat, underlining that the Soviet Union looked with dismay at the presence of ‘a large US military mission’ in Yugoslavia, which ‘under the cover of supervising US military aid to Yugoslavia was, in fact, conducting intelligence surveillance against socialist countries’.102 The vocabulary and the tone of Khrushchev’s January letter, more a long list of accusations against the Yugoslav leadership, corresponded in tone to Stalin and Molotov’s letters in 1948. It underlined the depth and hostility of the chasm that had reopened between Yugoslavia and the USSR. The escalation of the anti-­Yugoslav campaign after the Renmin Ribao editorial and the tone of Khrushchev’s letter of 10 January convinced the Yugoslav leadership that the prospect of a repeat of 1948 had become real. On 24 January, Tito summoned a meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee and informed his closest collaborators that the deterioration of relations between the two countries had come to a point which demanded the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee. He insisted that the roots of this deterioration were not related to recent developments but could be traced back to the talks held in the Kremlin during his June 1956 visit to the USSR.103 Within a week, on 1 February, the Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC met in Belgrade. At the beginning of the Plenum, members of the Central Committee were read the correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev since the second Soviet intervention in Hungary, as well as the draft of Tito’s response to Khrushchev’s 10 January letter. In his 97

196   Confrontation exposé, Tito offered an extensive analysis of Yugoslav–Soviet relations and of the roots of their deterioration.104 He informed the Plenum that he and his closest aides had decided to present [the issue of the deterioration of relations with the USSR] before the Plenum because we believe it to be a grave matter; because we have the duty not to be isolated from the masses in [People’s Democracies] but, even more so, because we believe that all of us together should carry the responsibility for what might come in the future. [We have also decided to bring this issue to the Plenum in order] for all of us to define our future course and for you to tell us whether we have acted correctly in defending our positions and in not allowing to be drawn into that socialist ‘lager’ .105 The solemn tone of Tito’s words, the emphasis on the shared ‘responsibility’ for the future, as well as his insistence that the Yugoslav leadership was ‘defending positions’, meaning independence, had not been heard since the conflict with Stalin. Tito further underlined the gravity of the situation by comparing it directly to 1948. According to him, a campaign is being waged against our LCY, against Yugoslavia, and against leaders of this country, a campaign that is similar to the one in 1948, although the form is somewhat different and is not as vulgar. . . . On the one hand, this campaign is aimed at isolating Yugoslavia and the LCY from People’s Democracies and, on the other hand, at destroying the credibility of Yugoslavia as a state.106 Tito then invited Veljko Mićunović to address the Plenum, as someone who has had extensive conversation with Khrushchev on several occasions in the recent months. Mićunović stressed that, the Soviets, having learned from their 1948 experience, have employed different tactics [in the current] conflict with Yugoslavia. They are now more skilful and plan better . . . than during the conflict of 1948. [The essence of their tactics now is to assert] that, this time, it is they who, out of the blue, have been attacked [by Yugoslavia] and are only defending themselves.107 Mićunović’s statement was in a way an admission that the Yugoslav leadership might have made a tactical mistake when it allowed the secret Soviet anti-­ Yugoslav campaign to go unanswered for months after Tito’s visit to Moscow. Tito also acquainted members of the Central Committee with the draft of his response to Khrushchev’s letter of 10 January. The response, in the form of a letter, was to be handed to the Soviet Ambassador Firyubin on 8 February.108 The tone and contents of Tito’s letter confirmed that the Yugoslav leadership had reconciled itself to the inevitability of a new conflict with the Soviets. Before

Confrontation   197 reading the draft, Tito emphasized that, unlike his letter of 1 December, which was intended to calm down the atmosphere, this time he had purposefully written a letter that he ‘knew would not only make them feel worse but would surely infuriate them. . . . Although there would certainly be a strong reaction from their side, I believe that it is important for us to say what we think’.109 Indeed, the letter represented a lengthy rebuttal of Khrushchev’s accusations of 10 January. Unlike in 1954 or even in December 1956, there was no offer from the Yugoslav side of a conciliatory path that could help in sidelining the existing differences between the two leaderships. Tito’s letter of 1 February was more of a propaganda pamphlet aimed at defending Yugoslavia’s case before other Communist parties and the public in People’s Democracies.110 Several factors contributed to the severity of the Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation from the end of 1956. First and foremost the conflict arose as a result of Moscow’s efforts to re-­establish the cohesion of its Bloc. As documented earlier, the Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, had by June 1956 arrived at the conclusion that the deconstruction of Stalin’s legacy had opened Pandora’s Box and was threatening the very existence of the ‘socialist camp’.111 Seriously shaken by the developments in Poland and Hungary, which were galloping out of control, and with its authority tarnished, the Soviet leadership attempted to impose ideological uniformity on its satellites. Blinded at this time of great insecurity by the false radiance of Stalin, Khrushchev and his comrades reverted to the remedies of the past. In the belief that the uniformity could best be achieved through the mobilization of the ‘camp’ against a common enemy, as was the case in 1948, they cast Yugoslavia in the role of the pariah. After all, Belgrade had distinguished itself in promoting ‘anti-­Stalinism’ and democratization in Eastern Europe throughout 1956.112 While continuing efforts to draw Tito into the ‘socialist camp’ Moscow did everything to ‘contain’ Yugoslavia’s influence and isolate it from the People’s Democracies and the rest of the international Communist movement. As the situation in Poland and Hungary grew worse, the Kremlin’s attitude towards Yugoslavia was becoming more uncompromising and less refined until, eventually it turned hostile. The intensity of the Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation was also due to the ideological rivalry between them. As the crises in Eastern Europe peaked in 1956, the Soviet leaders became convinced that the Yugoslavs were challenging their leadership of the Communist movement. In his memoirs, Khrushchev admitted to having been convinced that ‘Tito and his comrades aimed to acquire a leading role in the Communist movement. In any case, that is what I thought then’.113 The Pravda editorial of 23 November alleged that Tito was aiming to impose the ‘Yugoslav way’ of building socialism as a way to be copied by others.114 On 3 December, talking to Mićunović, Khrushchev accused Tito of harbouring ambitions not only to impose the Yugoslav model upon others but to assume for himself the leading role in the Communist movement.115 Tito, of course, denied these accusations vehemently and at every opportunity.116 Nonetheless, there seemed to have been at least some merit in Soviet accusations. Kardelj’s speech of 7 December often sounded like a lecture to the Soviets. He repeatedly insisted

198   Confrontation that the way forward in building socialism was by transforming the economy from state ownership to ‘social ownership’ of workers’ councils and in the democratization of political life through ‘self-­management’ – all aspects of the Yugoslav model. Kardelj did not allow the Soviet form of economic and political organization even the right to co-­exist.117 In doing so, he was replicating what he was accusing the Soviets of – intolerance and imposition of a single model. Seeing themselves as victors against Stalin and Stalinism, the Yugoslav leaders succumbed to the righteous delusion that they had been awarded the role of responsibility for the fate of socialism and were bound by their internationalist duty to help other Communists find their way out of Stalinist deviations. At the 1 February 1957 Plenum, Tito justified confrontation with Moscow by asserting that it was Yugoslavia’s ‘duty not to be isolated from the masses in [People’s Democracies]’.118 The Yugoslav leadership viewed victory against Stalin as proof of the superiority of their model. In their eyes, this gave them the moral right to support Gomułka in Poland or to demand and actively work on Nagy’s return to Hungary. It is understandable that the Soviets found the Yugoslav behaviour so intimidating and a challenge to their leadership role in the Communist movement and, thereby, to the unity of the ‘socialist camp’. By February 1957, Yugoslav–Soviet relations were in a downward spiral. In many respects, the course seemed set for a repeat of the 1948 rupture. The two leaderships had allowed their ideological polemic to turn into a hostile and very public spat. When Moscow cancelled the economic assistance agreements on 29 December 1956, the ideological confrontation threatened to sever state relations. At this point the two countries had come full circle, from the conflict of 1948, through normalization in 1954 and 1955, through rapprochement in 1956, to the renewed break up of relations by the beginning of 1957. At the Seventh LCY CC Plenum, on 1 February, Tito unequivocally compared the current state of Yugoslav–Soviet relations to the situation in 1948.119 At the Plenum of the CPSU CC, also in February, Khrushchev, for his part, blamed Tito for reneging on the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations and thus causing the latest confrontation. He went as far as to accuse Tito of ‘barking at the socialist “lager” [like an abandoned dog]. As a payback, the imperialists are feeding him. . . . It is the role of a strike-­breaker’.120 At the last moment, however, both leaderships drew back from the precipice and managed to confine the rupture to party relations. Since the Communist party leaderships controlled both governments, the grave deterioration of party relations at the beginning of 1957 inevitably affected state relations. However, unlike in 1948, there was no complete break up of diplomatic relations and Yugoslav–Soviet government relations and economic cooperation survived, albeit at a much reduced level. The Soviets had learned a very important lesson from the 1948 rupture and did not wish to repeat the same mistakes. At the CPSU CC Plenum on 14 February, despite earlier spiteful remarks about Tito, Khrushchev insisted that, [the Soviet Union] should not completely rupture relations [with Yugoslavia], either along party lines or along government lines. That would be of

Confrontation   199 benefit only to our enemies. . . . We should be smart and [responsible] politicians in this question. We should take into account our foreign policy interests. For this reason we must behave sensibly and not allow someone else to make use of the conflict between us and the Yugoslavs.121 While determined not to surrender in the ideological debate, the Yugoslavs were equally eager to have the confrontation confined to party relations. On 8 February, during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Firyubin, Tito asked him to convey his message to the Soviet leadership that economic and government relations should not be ruptured as a result of the ideological polemics.122 Carefully monitoring nuances in the Soviet behaviour, the Yugoslavs seemed fairly confident that, at this point, the Kremlin would not go all the way and provoke a full break up. Reporting on his meeting with Khrushchev on 3 December, Mićunović accurately predicted that, the Russians would not go for the rupture of government relations. . . . In the current difficult circumstances, this is not the result of principles or their wish for normal relations, rather it is a result of tactics. . . . [The Soviet leadership] draws on its negative experience from the past and on Stalin’s mistakes in the [1948] conflict with [Yugoslavia] and are planning their current positions with greater caution, with more realism and more skill although, in essence, they still hold on to the methods that remind of those used during Stalin’s times.123

Conclusion The first hours of the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary produced an episode which would contribute towards the deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations – the so-­called ‘Nagy affair’. In the belief that they were fulfilling what had been agreed at the meeting in Brioni on the eve of the second Soviet intervention in Hungary, to isolate Nagy and minimize resistance to Soviet troops, the Yugoslavs granted him and his entourage asylum in their Embassy in Budapest. Within a day, however, the Soviet and the Yugoslav leadership found themselves embroiled in an angry debate over Nagy’s fate. After three weeks of acrimonious accusations, counteraccusations and negotiations, the Soviet military intelligence abducted Nagy as he was leaving the Yugoslav Embassy under guarantees of safe passage given by the new Kádár Government. Although the ‘Nagy affair’ contributed to the deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, it was by no means the reason behind the collapse of the process of normalization. The true cause, as this book argues, was the chasm created between Belgrade and Moscow after 1948; it smouldered underneath the surface of good intentions throughout the process of normalization. Within days after the Soviet troops had crushed the Hungarian resistance, Tito felt compelled to distance himself form the Soviet handling of the aftermath of the intervention. The Yugoslav leadership had come to realize that continued

200   Confrontation identification with the Soviet intervention could be understood as Yugoslavia’s slide into the Soviet ‘camp’. In a speech in Pula, barely a week after the Soviet military intervention, Tito not only distanced Yugoslavia from the Soviet actions but subjected the Soviet system and its leadership to the harshest possible criticism. With the publishing of the speech in Yugoslav papers several days later, a fierce ideological debate between Moscow and Belgrade exploded into the open. The very public ideological polemic, coupled with the hardening of the Soviet ideological position following the Hungarian intervention and the weakening of Khrushchev’s standing in the Presidium, set both sides on an irreversible course of confrontation. At the end of December, at an invitation from the Kremlin, the Chinese entered the debate with an aura of ideological authority. The Chinese involvement turned the Yugoslav–Soviet polemics into an anti-­Yugoslav campaign. Apparently propping up Moscow’s position against Belgrade, the Chinese provided the crucial ideological rationale for the mobilization of the ‘socialist camp’ against the Yugoslav heresy and for the abandonment of the deconstruction of Stalin’s legacy. The Chinese intervention confirmed that Tito and the Yugoslavs were, once again, being isolated from the rest of the Communist community and cast as pariahs. More importantly, however, it crucially undermined the unassailability of Moscow’s ideological authority and became the basis for Beijing’s leadership challenge several years later. A few days before the end of the year the Soviets announced the severing of commercial, trade and cultural ties with Yugoslavia. By February 1957, the deterioration of Yugoslav–Soviet relations had reached a nadir reminiscent of 1948. The gravity of the situation prompted Tito to convoke a Plenum of the LCY CC on 1 February to prepare the Party for a possible complete break up with Moscow. At the last moment, however, both leaderships made a decision to refrain from the repeat of 1948. Nonetheless, barely six months after Tito’s apparently triumphant visit to the USSR in June 1956 and full reconciliation of relations between the two countries, confirmed by the renewal of party relations, the process of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization had collapsed.

Conclusions

Yugoslav–Soviet relations: the follow-­up For the remainder of the decade, Yugoslav–Soviet relations lingered on as a distant echo of the comradeship of the first few months of 1956. On 17 and 19 April 1957 Mićunović had two short encounters with Khrushchev. Although mundane in content, they represented the first ‘civil’ communication between Moscow and Belgrade after months of ferocious anti-­Yugoslav campaigning.1 In the following months, the campaign was toned down.2 The Yugoslavs attributed this change, at least in part, to renewed shipments of US arms to Yugoslavia.3 As at the time of the signing of the Ankara Agreement in February 1953, the Soviets seemed to have woken up to the fact that the danger of Yugoslavia’s alignment with NATO far outweighed the ideological disagreements between them. On 2 July, only hours after he landed in Belgrade, after attending the Central Committee Plenum in Moscow, the Soviet Ambassador Firyubin requested an urgent meting with Tito. The Ambassador was promptly flown to the Adriatic coast and to Brioni where the Yugoslav President was staying at the time. Firyubin, as instructed by Khrushchev, delivered a detailed report on the proceedings of the Soviet Party Plenum and the debacle of the Molotov–Kaganovich– Malenkov coup. Tito and Kardelj, who was urgently summoned and arrived only a couple of hours after Firyubin, received news of the latest developments in Moscow and of Khrushchev’s lucky escape with relief and overt satisfaction.4 There was no love lost between the Yugoslavs and Molotov for the part he played in the 1948 break up and whom they considered the leading hard-­liner in the Presidium. The Yugoslavs saw in the outcome of the Soviet Party Plenum a victory for the reformers. Seeing Khrushchev as the main architect of de-­ Stalinization and normalization with Yugoslavia they were again willing to offer him support, despite the acrimonious polemics that had raged between Moscow and Belgrade since November of the previous year. Responding to Khrushchev’s invitation, Tito dispatched Kardelj and Ranković to Moscow. The talks they held there opened way for the Tito–Khrushchev meeting on 1 and 2 August.5 Unlike in 1955, this time Khrushchev did not want to fly to Belgrade and the meeting took place on ‘neutral’ territory, in Bucharest. The Yugoslavs saw it as a show of support for Khrushchev who, weakened after the

202   Conclusions most recent challenge to his leadership, was in need of a quick success on a major issue, such as was Yugoslavia.6 In a surprisingly open atmosphere, Tito and Khrushchev spent hours in private walks in the park of the villa they stayed in, accompanied occasionally by Mikoyan. Simultaneously, two working groups, headed by Kardelj and Ranković on the Yugoslav side, and Otto Kuusinen, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU, together with Panteleimon Ponomarenko and Yurii Andropov, on the Soviet side, addressed the contested issues that figured prominently during previous months of the very public ideological dispute.7 Once again, the Yugoslavs rebuked the Soviet demand to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’. However, in an effort to prop up Khrushchev, whom he perceived as being in a ‘difficult and vulnerable position’, Tito made two important concessions.8 He agreed to come to Moscow for the Fortieth Anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution and take part in the gathering of the leaders of Communist parties, as well as to establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic.9 Indeed, Yugoslavia recognized GDR on 15 October, causing the immediate break of diplomatic relations with West Germany, its second most important trade partner and economic assistance provider after the US.10 By mid-­October, however, the anti-­Yugoslav campaign was renewed. Belgrade was particularly offended by the fact that Moscow allowed the Albanian, Ever Hoxha, an ideological minion in Yugoslav eyes and someone Tito deeply detested, to spearhead the newest wave of attacks against Yugoslavia.11 By end of October, the Yugoslav leadership also received from the Soviets a draft of the Declaration that was to be signed at the end of the Communist parties’ gathering in Moscow. Tito was bitterly disappointed. The tone and the language of the document were such that to sign it would have meant agreeing to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’.12 To the Yugoslavs, the renewed anti-­Yugoslav campaign and the Declaration draft amounted to the ‘betrayal’, not only of what Tito and Khrushchev discussed and agreed to in Bucharest, but of the spirit of understanding and tolerance they hoped was reinstated there.13 The meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, held on 29 October, only days before he was scheduled to travel to Moscow supported Tito’s decision to cancel the trip. Officially, the last minute cancellation was to be attributed to illness. It was also decided that a delegation headed by Kardelj would participate at the Anniversary ceremony and attend the meeting of the Communist parties, scheduled for 16 to 18 November. Kardelj, however, was given clear instructions to acquaint the Soviet leadership with the true reasons for Tito’s absence and not to sign the Declaration.14 Why did Moscow snub Tito when he finally agreed to come to Moscow and attend a meeting he opposed for so long? His presence would have been a coup for Khrushchev. What was the reason for Khrushchev’s change of heart after the success of Bucharest and, in particular, for his unveiled attempt to manipulate Tito to the point of affronting him? In my opinion, it should be attributed to Khrushchev’s assessment that it was more important, not least for the strengthening of his position abroad and at home, to appease Mao. The Chinese were clearly unhappy with the June purge of the Stalinist troika from the Presidium and insisted on the continuing excommunication of the Yugoslavs from the ‘socialist camp’.

Conclusions   203 The tone of the festivities in Moscow, the content and course of the conference of the Communist parties, and Khrushchev’s open hostility towards the Yugoslav delegation confirmed Belgrade’s worst fears.15 The Yugoslav refusal to sign the Declaration after the Moscow meeting and their renewed rebuttal of, at times vulgar, pressure to rejoin the ‘camp’ pointed towards an intensified and even more acrimonious Yugoslav–Soviet ideological confrontation. This time, however, it would be with strong participation from the Chinese, Albanians, Bulgarians and Czechs.16 The Chinese, now in the role of ideological arbiter, spearheaded the campaign against Yugoslav ‘revisionism’ after the Moscow meeting and in particular following the Seventh Congress of the LCY in April 1958. This was further affirmation of the position of prominence within the Communist movement which they acquired after the Hungarian crisis. The new harangue orchestrated by Moscow turned Tito’s sense of betrayal and bitter disappointment into definitive disillusionment with Khrushchev’s true commitment to de-­Stalinization and with the prospect of ideological coexistence with the Soviets.17 This probably played a decisive role in convincing Tito and his aides to abandon remaining restraints regarding the introduction of more liberal ideological interpretations in the new Party Programme that was to be promulgated at the Seventh Congress in April, something they had been ruminating over for some time. Belgrade approached the beginning of the new confrontation much more self-­assured and confident in its dealings with Moscow. In contrast to 1948, Yugoslavia was this time in a completely different international position. Most importantly, it was not isolated. The conceptualization of the non-­aligned option was well under way and an increasing number of Third World countries were declaring their interest in joining the gathering. Importantly, unlike in 1948, the Yugoslavs were now confident that the renewed ideological confrontation with the Communist world could not result in Soviet military aggression. Even at the height of this renewed anti-­Yugoslav campaign, when berating the Yugoslavs from the pulpit of the Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in June 1958, Khrushchev did not forget to add that the ideological confrontation would not result in the complete break up of state relations, as was the case ten years earlier.18 During the months following the Moscow meeting of the Communist parties the anti-­Yugoslav campaign intensified. The Yugoslavs, however, seemed unperturbed and to a large extent refused to be drawn into it. The Yugoslav leadership was preoccupied with preparations for the Seventh Congress of the LCY, scheduled for 22–27 April, in Ljubljana. About a month before the Congress, in a move probably designed to forestall an explosive overreaction, the Yugoslavs circulated the draft of the new Party Programme to Moscow and to other major Communist parties. The response was almost instantaneous. In a letter of 5 April, Khrushchev condemned the draft in the strongest terms. Among its biggest ‘failings’, Khrushchev underlined that the Programme denied the existence of the two camps, the socialist and the capitalist, and treated both military Blocs in equally negative terms. The Soviets were further angered by the Programme’s stipulation that the Soviet foreign policy had supported US

204   Conclusions imperialism in the creation of interest spheres ever since Teheran and that hegemony and exploitation of smaller countries was as present in the Eastern as it was in the Western Bloc. In no uncertain terms, the letter accused the new Programme of undermining the cohesion of ‘the socialist world and the ranks of the international Communist movement’. Khrushchev informed the Yugoslavs that, in the circumstances, the CPSU Presidium had decided against sending its delegation to the Yugoslav Congress, despite having already agreed to do so. In the end, he openly threatened the intensification of the ideological campaign against the Yugoslavs if the new Programme was accepted at the Congress.19 During a meeting with Mićunović, on 16 April, Suslov went a step further and openly accused the Yugoslavs of aspiring to claim the leadership of the international Communist movement with the new Programme.20 Unsurprisingly, a number of other parties, including those from Eastern Europe and China, one by one cancelled sending their delegations to the LCY Congress. The Yugoslav leadership understood Moscow’s hostile reaction as a justification for the course they intended to pursue all along – the intensification of the confrontation.21 Disillusioned, Tito was convinced that the Soviets were determined ‘this time to do what they failed to achieve in Moscow [in November 1957] – to continue confrontation with us, to subordinate, and isolate us. . . . We should be prepared for a prolonged battle.’22 The adoption of the new Party programme at the Seventh Congress of the LCY added fuel to the concerted anti-­Yugoslav campaign orchestrated from Moscow and Beijing. There is no doubt that the Yugoslavs were fully aware that the new Programme would further aggravate the already deteriorating relations with Moscow and the rest of the Communist world. Available evidence suggests that should the positive spirit of Bucharest have prevailed, Tito would have been ready to cleanse the new Programme of distinctive anti-­Soviet qualifications. Proposing at the LCY Plenum in early September that the Congress be delayed from October 1957 to April of next year, Tito underlined that, [at the meeting in Moscow in November] there will be some very hard talk. . . . A number of consistently contested issues would have to be cleared there. As we are attending the celebrations anyway, we are, of course, interested for these issues to be clarified there. For this reason, according to him, ‘being now in a position to have a good discussion with comrades [attending the gathering in Moscow]’ by postponing the Congress, ‘we would be able, without sacrificing any of our principled positions, to make conclusions [at the Congress] that would not lead us into a new cold war with other Communist parties’.23 After what the Yugoslavs saw as the Soviet ‘betrayal’ of Bucharest, Belgrade awarded the new Programme the role of a statement of ideological demarcation with Moscow; it was not an accidental side result of the renewed anti-­Yugoslav campaign. The attacks against ‘Yugoslav revisionism’ that followed the Seventh Congress were vicious, coming not just from Moscow but from Beijing and other

Conclusions   205 Communist parties and socialist countries. Two events in June 1958 marked the true nadir of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. On 3 June, Khrushchev’s speech at the VII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia turned into a rant against the Yugoslavs and their revisionism. Using the vocabulary of 1948, Khrushchev accused the Yugoslavs of acting as the imperialists’ ‘Trojan horse’ and receiving US economic aid in repayment for undermining the cohesion of the socialist forces. To add insult to injury, Khrushchev rehabilitated Cominform policies and its decision to excommunicate Yugoslavia in June 1948.25 The second event, possibly provoked by the collapse of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, was the trial and execution of Imre Nagy on 16 June. In every public utterance designed to justify Nagy’s execution as punishment for treason, Moscow propaganda never missed an opportunity to mention the role Yugoslavia played in aiding him. This led the Yugoslavs to conclude that Nagy’s fate might have been connected to the escalation of the anti-­Yugoslav campaign.26 Thus, the last act of the Hungarian tragedy, Nagy’s execution, served as a tool in the acrimonious confrontation that was going on between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist movement. The last reverberations of the Nagy ‘affair’ played itself out in futile exchanges of notes between the Yugoslav, Hungarian and Soviet Foreign Ministries that went on for months.27 Almost to the day, ten years on, the spirit of 1948 returned to haunt Belgrade and Moscow. For the next few years, the anti-­Yugoslav campaign continued unabated. However, after Zhou Enlai walked out of the Twenty-­second Congress of the CPSU in October 1961 and the Sino-­Soviet split became public, the Kremlin immediately turned to normalize relations with Belgrade. At the end of September 1962, Leonid Brezhnev, the President of the Supreme Soviet, visited Yugoslavia. Tito returned the visit between 3 and 21 December of the same year. Tito and Khrushchev would meet once again, on 8 and 9 June 1964 when the Yugoslav President made a stop-­over in Leningrad on his return trip from a state visit to Finland. This would turn out to be their last meeting, as Khrushchev was demoted barely three months later. Stabilized at a level of tolerance, Yugoslav– Soviet relations would never regain the spirit of hope they radiated in the first few months of 1956 and the expectation that coexistence between Moscow and Belgrade’s ideological approaches was possible. 24

Yugoslavia and the birth of the Non-­Aligned Movement Due to his inherent dynamism and propensity to seize the moment, once an opportunity had presented itself and due to the fact that both Nehru and Nasser had exceptional rapport with him and not necessarily with each other,28 Tito took it upon himself to take the lead in mobilizing the non-­engaged countries into a movement. The success of the tripartite meeting in Brioni in July 1956 asserted Tito’s new role. An increasing number of Third World leaders were visiting Belgrade and Tito planned more winter journeys. However, adverse developments in Eastern Europe and tensions in Yugoslav–Soviet relations following Soviet

206   Conclusions intervention in Hungary in November 1956 forced Belgrade to temporarily concentrate on relations with Moscow. Tito was reluctant to venture too far from home. Only once relations with Moscow were sufficiently stabilized, in the winter of 1958–9, was the Yugoslav President able to turn his focus, once again, to non-­alignment and to resume his long winter expeditions. Of particular significance was Tito’s third winter voyage. In early December of 1958, the Yugoslav leader embarked on a three-­month long tour of Asia and Africa, during which he visited India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Syria. The longest of Tito’s Third World journeys, this trip would decisively contribute towards the transformation of a shared kinship among the non-­engaged countries into a Non-­Aligned Movement. Furthermore, it would affirm Tito’s leadership role among the non-engaged. The trip also enabled him to assert himself as a mediator in local disputes, interpreter of global political developments, articulator of Third World aspirations, and a champion of independence and anti-­colonialism. The Yugoslav President used the trip to reach out to a number of prominent Third World leaders and foster the awareness of a common identity and common destiny. Within less than two years after this trip, he would be able to gather twenty-­one leaders of the non-­engaged states at a summit in Belgrade that would establish the Non-­Aligned Movement. In a new role as a mediator, Tito initiated resolution of local disputes, often a legacy of colonial rule. He assisted the leaders he met to overcome the surprising levels of mistrust that had accumulated between them. During his talks with Sukarno and his aides, Tito did his best to dispel their perception of Nehru as being arrogant.29 In his report before the closed session of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, upon his return to Belgrade, Tito observed that although Nehru remained unquestionably committed to Bandung principles, when it came to ‘concrete actions and to acting upon these principles, he becomes very cautious [and] if such action could in any way be disadvantageous to India, he would remain passive and would not sacrifice anything’.30 Likewise, Tito took it upon himself to improve relations between India and Ceylon, strained over the Tamil issue. During their talks in Colombo, Ceylon’s Prime Minister, Solomon Bandaranaike, admitted having anxieties about India. The Yugoslav successfully dissuaded him, expressing confidence in Nehru’s commitment to true and honest relations with Ceylon.31 Tito also involved himself in the resolution of the Egyptian–Sudanese dispute over the building of the new Aswan dam. When he met the new Sudanese strongman, General Ibrahim Abboud, Tito communicated Nasser’s assurances that Sudan would be protected against the rising levels of the Nile, caused by the construction of the new dam. In return, Abboud pledged to work towards improvement of relations with Egypt and even promised to meet Nasser.32 Tito also mediated between Nasser and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I. Selassie had earlier accused Egypt of harbouring, training and infiltrating Ethiopian Eritrean Islamic separatists. Egypt, on the other hand, was accusing Ethiopia of intending to annexe parts of Somalia, a fellow Muslim country. The two countries were also in dispute over Nile waters. In the end, Tito managed to convince Selassie to accept Nasser’s invitation to visit Egypt.

Conclusions   207 Both Nasser and Selassie acquiesced to Tito’s argument that their unity and improved relations were crucial for African de-­colonisation.33 During the official talks, and often prompted by his hosts, Tito would freely comment and advise on domestic issues and disputes. In Indonesia, Prime Minister Raden Djuanda Kartawidjaja appealed to him to persuade Sukarno to tone down his public endorsement of the concept of ‘guided democracy’. During their next meeting, Tito advised Sukarno against overemphasizing it publicly as it could be misrepresented and used by those inside and outside Indonesia who wished to undermine his regime and its non-­engagement. Sukarno and Djuanda freely confided in Tito on other internal issues, such as relations with the Indonesian Communist Party and on domestic regional tensions, namely between Sumatra and Java.34 In Burma, leaders of confronted factions, the ex-­Prime Minister U Nu, leaders of the Burmese Socialist Party, Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, and General Ne Win, the caretaker Prime Minister and Tito’s host, invited the Yugoslav leader to comment and advise them on the way out of the political turmoil the country was in.35 During this trip, Tito was keen to promote his non-­ideological credentials. Ironically, the Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda openly boasted to Tito of his anti-­Communism, while Sukarno exercised his personal influence to dissuade local Communists, encouraged by the Chinese, from sabotaging Tito’s visit.36 In private, Tito supported Nasser against the Syrian and Egyptian Communists who allied themselves with feudalists in opposition to the agrarian reform the Egyptian leader was keen to implement. The Yugoslav leader recognized Moscow’s ploy to exert pressure and to blackmail Nasser.37 Tito continuously warned his hosts in Asia of Soviet and, in particular, of the Chinese hegemonic aspirations equating them with those of the Western powers. Unlike during his first trip, four years earlier, these warnings, in particular with regard to China, were now being listened to much more attentively. The Yugoslav President noticed an increasing unease about China among the Asian statesmen he met, in particular Nehru. In private, the Indian Prime Minister voiced his apprehension regarding the impact of accelerated economic development in China, fearing that ‘the “great leap forward” would enable China to overtake India. [Nehru] was concerned that it could have an impact on the very fragile Indian domestic situation.’ Tito was also under the impression that the ‘split in the [India’s] Congress party that followed proclamation of [India’s] road to socialism at its last congress’ had weakened Nehru’s position at home.38 Tito’s trip in the winter of 1958–1959 demonstrated that within four years after he first ventured into the Third World, the Yugoslav leader had acquired a unique position of authority, even veneration, not only among the Third World leaders but equally with the ordinary people. Illustrative of this was the extent to which Nasser heeded Tito’s advice. Literally hours before he was to speak at a 100,000 strong rally, Nasser changed most of his speech after Tito advised him against publicly attacking Israel and condemning Moscow for supporting Egyptian Communists.39 Selassie admitted that the Yugoslav President was the only person he trusted in international politics.40 Tito’s popularity among the masses

208   Conclusions was equally impressive. The 1958–1959 trip created an image of him that would outlive him, even to this day. He came to epitomize the leader who raised pride in millions of Third World paupers, the exploited and oppressed, the hero of the struggle for liberation and independence and a champion of peace. Scenes of spontaneous mass adulation greeted Tito wherever he went during this trip, whether in cities or in remote villages of Java, Ethiopia or Sudan, Egypt or India. En route from Damascus to Latakia, where the Yugoslav President was to board his yacht and leave Syria, a rare snowstorm forced Tito and Nasser’s motorcade to reroute to Aleppo. Within minutes, a chanting crowd of tens of thousands quickly surrounded them, amidst scenes of unprecedented reverence.41 The 1958–1959 trip also brought mutual economic and military cooperation into the focus of Third World countries. Aware of the benefits it could bring to Yugoslavia, Tito also genuinely believed that such cooperation was the only way for the non-­engaged to secure their independence and that Belgrade should take the lead. Yugoslavia’s new stature among the non-­engaged, as well as its industrial edge in comparison to many underdeveloped Third World countries, offered Belgrade numerous opportunities. The focus on economic and military aspects was evidence of new-­found confidence and resolve among the developing countries to rid themselves of dependency on big powers and their ex-­colonial masters through mutual, South–South cooperation. In his report to the Yugoslav leadership upon his return, Tito underlined economic cooperation and the benefits it could bring to Yugoslavia, as one of the most important results of his trip. He demanded from the Yugoslav leadership that a strategy of economic and military cooperation with the Third World countries be drafted and implemented without delay. Tito underlined that this was also in response to requests put forward by the leaders he met during the trip, namely for Yugoslav expert and technical assistance, education, purchase of capital equipment, construction of industrial plants and ports, etc.42 Indonesia for example, asked for loans and to purchase Yugoslav arms. In return, it offered to channel Indonesian trade with Europe through the Yugoslav port of Rijeka, instead of Dutch ports. Indonesian leaders also asked for their political and technical elites to be educated in Yugoslavia.43 Ceylon expressed interest in ordering a fleet of commercial vessels and patrol boats to be built in Yugoslav shipyards. Bandaranaike also offered the Yugoslavs to participate in the construction of a new Colombo sea port.44 Among other things, the Ethiopian Emperor wanted the Yugoslavs to build cement plants, a dam in Southern Ethiopia, railroads between Addis Ababa and Asmara and Assab, and meat processing plants. Selassie also asked for the Yugoslav experts to draft and then oversee implementation of Ethiopia’s mid and long-­ term development strategy.45 Although the Yugoslav–Indian economic cooperation was already at an impressive level, Tito and Nehru agreed to give it a further boost.46 Sudan asked for technical advisors and merchant vessels.47 Nasser wanted an already respectable Yugoslav–Egyptian cooperation to increase manifold, including intensification of military cooperation through joint investment in Yugoslavia’s weapons industry.48 Education of new Third World political, technical and military elites in Yugoslavia received Tito’s particular attention. This

Conclusions   209 type of assistance was requested by Tito’s hosts and repeatedly emphasized by them as one of their top priorities. A solution to the lack of resources to finance it was found in specific forms of barter. In return for the education provided in Yugoslav Institutes and Universities, Belgrade was awarded concessions in commodity trade, investment and capital construction. Tito was keen to offer assistance in education, recognising its strategic potential and long-­term benefits. As he pointed out to the Yugoslav leadership upon his return in March 1959, other countries are vying to offer education to [students and future elites from Third World countries]: the English want to have them; the Americans are enticing them by offering free education; the Russians are also luring them and are offering free education. They all know that they would be able to do something with [these students] and, as a result, at least to a certain extent, create attachment.49 Titos voyage in the winter of 1958–1959 was a much more ambitious endeavour than his previous trips, not only because of the number of countries he visited, itself impressive, but, more importantly, because of what the Yugoslav President managed to accomplish. It confirmed Tito’s unique position of authority among the leaders of the Third World and decisively contributed towards the building of common positions on global issues among the non-­engaged countries. If, at the time of his first trip in 1954, it was still very much a regional Asian concept, the 1958–1959 trip affirmed non-­engagement as an emerging global alternative to the Cold War bipolarity. Tito’s exchanges with the Third World leaders he met strengthened awareness of common identity and the confidence to act. The trip further inaugurated political, economic and military cooperation between the Third World countries as a way to reduce their dependence on big powers and ex-­ colonial masters. The Yugoslav President had concluded an impressive number of bilateral agreements on trade and economic, technical and military assistance, providing leadership for a bolder South–South collaboration. Finally, Tito’s 1958–1959 trip was the cardinal step towards creation of the Non-­Aligned Movement. Within less than two years, at Tito’s invitation, heads of twenty-­one non-­ engaged countries would assemble in Belgrade to officially launch it. Several factors contributed to Yugoslavia’s strategic foreign policy shift towards non-­alignment. First and foremost, Tito and his aides never forgot the lesson they learned in 1948. The gravest consequence of Yugoslavia’s excommunication from the socialist community in June 1948 was the complete international isolation it found itself in. This was the point of greatest danger for the small country and its regime, a point at which it could easily have become prey to greater powers’ appetites. Tito and his aides were determined never to find themselves in a similar situation, hence their panic in November 1952. Expelled from the fold but resolved to remain Communist, the Yugoslavs harboured no illusions that the West could ever become their natural habitat. This was the reason why, very soon after being expelled from the Cominform, the Yugoslav leadership started searching for a way to position themselves between the two

210   Conclusions Blocs. Of course, as long as their survival in the face of a very real Soviet threat depended on Western economic and military aid and assistance, this quest was discreet and confined to brainstorming within Tito’s innermost circle. By late 1950, as obscure evidence seems to suggest, the Yugoslav leadership had recognized the non-­engagement of the newly de-­colonized Asian countries as an attractive prospect for the achievement of equidistance to either Bloc. The elimination of the Soviet threat, conducted through the process of normalization that started in earnest in mid-­1954, provided the Yugoslav regime with the opportunity to openly look for allies and lay the foundation for its new strategic orientation. Tito’s commitment and resolve to construct the cohesion of the non-­engaged countries after the 1956 meeting with Nehru and Nasser in Brioni, as manifested during his 1958–1959 trip, was aimed at transforming the abstract concept of non-­engagement into a non-­aligned movement. Tito seemed to have understood that non-­engagement had a chance to become an alternative to the bipolarity of the Cold War only if institutionalized into a movement with clearly defined goals and positions on major global issues, and with economic and political cooperation between member states. As such, it stood a chance to be tolerated by the two superpowers and thus provide Yugoslavia with a long-­term prospect of existence between the two Blocs. For a small country, as was Yugoslavia, this was a gargantuan task with very slim chances of success. In the course of achieving this goal, Yugoslavia had to engage in a disproportionate contest with one of the superpowers, the USSR. Conducted through the process of normalization of their relations after 1953, this contest produced implications of wider significance for the history of the early Cold War. **** The picture most associated with the beginning of de-­Stalinization is that of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev at the pulpit of the just-­adjourned Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, on 25 February 1956. For four hours, well into the cold Moscow night, he read the damning condemnation of Stalin and of the monstrous system he had created. Before stunned delegates, Khrushchev deconstructed the legacy of a demigod who, with utmost cruelty and by simply ‘shaking his little finger’, commanded the destinies of millions in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and across half of the world.50 The monumental importance of this accomplishment cannot be overstated, as it shaped the course of the history of the Soviet Union, of Eastern Europe, and of the international Communist movement. Eventually it would contribute to the demise of Stalin’s Communism as a global system. This book, however, places the beginning of this complex process some eight months earlier, to the time of Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, in May 1955 and the Plenum of the CPSU CC, a month later. Both events came as the result of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, initiated a year earlier. Khrushchev’s report on the results of his visit to Yugoslavia in May 1955, delivered at the Plenum of the CPSU in July, triggered heated exchanges between himself and his supporters and Molotov, revealing Stalin’s respons-

Conclusions   211 ibility for the 1948 conflict. Once, however, the lid of Pandora’s Box was removed, the Plenum debates went beyond the history of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict and, for the first time outside the confines of the Presidium, raised questions about Stalin’s rule. The Yugoslav question became the tool that created the first cracks in Stalin’s overall legacy. For the first time, members of the Central Committee faced the truth that, as Khrushchev put it, ‘many good comrades were lost’ during Vozhd’s reign. Only once this first hurdle had been successfully surmounted were Khrushchev and his supporters able to proceed with open condemnation of Stalin in February 1956. The ‘secret speech’ thus signalled the end of the crucial battle in the Kremlin that laid the ground for the process of de-­ Stalinization. It would never have happened if Khrushchev had been defeated at the Plenum, almost eight months earlier. The conversations he held with Tito during the visit to Yugoslavia, a month earlier, left an imprint on Khrushchev, which inspired him to challenge Stalin’s infallibility at the July Plenum. As Khrushchev would later admit, ‘I realized the falsehood of [the Soviet leadership’s] position [regarding Stalin] for the first time and in earnest when I arrived in Yugoslavia and spoke with Tito and other comrades there’.51 At the July Plenum, Khrushchev and his supporters used the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia as pretext to launch an attack against Molotov and to draw a line between reformists and the hard-­liners in the Presidium.52 The successful conclusion of the debate aided Khrushchev and his supporters to consolidate their authority in the Presidium. The outcome of the Plenum debate on the origins of the conflict with Yugoslavia and on the normalization of relations between the two countries inaugurated the process of de-­ Stalinization in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. This book identifies lesser known reasons behind the post-­Stalin leadership’s urgency to normalize relations with Yugoslavia so soon after Stalin’s death. The signing of the Ankara Agreement in February 1953 and the level of Yugoslavia’s integration in the Western defence system and its cooperation with NATO was perceived in Moscow as a genuine threat to its security. This assessment enabled Khrushchev and proponents of normalization to secure the Presidium’s crucial go-­ahead for an initial approach to Tito in June 1954 and authorization eventually, of his trip to Belgrade in May 1955. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership understood that the resolution of the six-­year-long conflict with Yugoslavia was essential for the credibility of their new foreign policy initiative, the ‘peaceful coexistence’. There was, however, no ideological thaw; in these early days, many in the Presidium remained convinced by Stalin’s propaganda that Yugoslavia had abandoned socialism.53 It is indeed rare in history that bilateral relations between the global power and an ideological hegemon, and a small country committed to the same ideological identity, produce an impact of much wider, even global significance, as was the case with the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. Inspired by the lessons of the Yugoslav–Soviet break up in 1948 and drawing upon the experience of the process of normalization of relations with Belgrade, the July Plenum of the CPSU CC questioned the existing form of relations in the Soviet Bloc and

212   Conclusions in the international Communist movement. The Plenum promulgated a Resolution, the first official Soviet Party document since Lenin’s era, that promoted equality as the basis for relations between the socialist countries and the Communist parties, recognized national particularities, and questioned the Soviet hegemony within the ‘socialist camp’. In yet another historic first, the document allowed the existence of individual roads to socialism. In no uncertain terms, the Resolution promulgated that, based on the lessons of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1948 and 1953, it is necessary to draw conclusions for the improvement of all aspects of relations between the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist lager. . . . In all our relations with the countries of the People’s Democracies, as well as with fraternal Communist and proletarian parties . . . the Soviet Government and Party organs . . . are obliged to be strictly governed by Leninist principles of socialist internationalism, by full equality, recognition of national sovereignty, and by taking into consideration the national individuality of corresponding countries . . . the historical experience of the Soviet Union and countries of People’s Democracies demonstrated that . . . it is possible that different forms and methods of solving specific problems of the building of socialism can be introduced, according to historical and national particularities.54 Two further documents that emerged from the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization far surpassed the bilateral relations between the two countries and were of wider European relevance. Both were exceptional to the early Cold War in that they formalized a unique concession made by one of the superpowers. By signing these documents, the USSR, the Communist Bloc hegemon, formally and publicly committed itself to equality and mutual respect as the basis of its relations with countries and Communist parties that belonged to its Bloc. Furthermore, both documents were drafted by a junior partner – Yugoslavia. The so-­called Belgrade Declaration, signed at the end of Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade on 2 June 1955, promulgated peaceful co-­existence between states with different political systems, mutual respect, and non-­interference into affairs of other states. Of particular relevance for Eastern Europe was that it underlined that the nature of the political and social system and, eventually, the choice between different forms of socialism were prerogatives of the peoples of individual countries. In this context, it rejected every form of imposition of political or economic hegemony on other countries. The Moscow Declaration signed at the end of Tito’s visit to the USSR a year later promulgated principles that were of unprecedented importance for future relations between the Communist parties and states. The document acknowledged that forms of socialism implemented around the world could differ, and condemned the practice of imposition of a single model of socialism by any party and country. It also recognized the right of Communist parties to pursue contacts with labour and social democratic parties, the first such Soviet endorse-

Conclusions   213 ment in the post-­Stalin era. The Declaration stipulated that cooperation between Communist parties should be democratic, open, public, based on equality, and that ‘each participant [of such cooperation] would retain the freedom of action’. This was a rebuff to closer ‘coordination’ between Communist parties and socialist countries and an unequivocal challenge to the concept of the ‘socialist camp’. The significance was all the more important given that this public document appeared at a time of increasing demands throughout Eastern Europe for de-­Stalinization and liberalization of relations within the ‘socialist camp’, and at the time when the crises in Poland and Hungary were already threatening the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc. The Moscow Declaration articulated the ideological rationale behind demands for democratization in Eastern Europe in 1956. The book argues that the Yugoslav–Soviet rupture in 1948 was a result of the so-­called Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the imposition of Stalin’s hegemony over the Soviet sphere of influence and the creation of his own ideological and military Bloc. It should not, as many historians have done, be attributed to ‘Tito’s national Communism’, implementation of the ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’ or to his foreign policy adventurism. Yugoslavia was Moscow’s loyal disciple prior to its excommunication from the Cominform in 1948. Tito’s regime, much like those of the People’s Democracies, blindly imposed the Soviet political, economic and administrative structure and organization on Yugoslav society. In many ways, Belgrade’s revolutionary radicalism and zeal made it ‘more Catholic than the Pope’. There was no deployment of Yugoslav troops in Albania in 1947 nor was Tito about to create the Balkan federation with Dimitrov without Moscow’s consent. Ironically, many historians have accepted Stalin’s fabrications as truth. The 1948 break up, the development of the Yugoslav socialist model as the result, and the subsequent process of normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1953 and 1957, relate in an interesting and illuminating way with a phenomenon of civilizational proportions. The Yugoslav heresy, a consequence of 1948, was conceptualized between 1949 and 1958. The correlation it created between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement parallels the origins and development of schisms in monotheistic, would-­be universal empires. The decade of Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation between 1948 and 1958 provides interesting insight as to how dissent against autocracy and coercion in the periphery of an empire that bases its cohesion, as was the case with the Soviet Bloc, on ideological uniformity inevitably evolves into an ideological heresy. In the end, the heresy challenges and eventually contributes to the hegemon’s demise and the fragmentation of the empire itself. Tito’s conflict with Stalin started, in essence, as a dissent against the latter’s autocracy. The Imperial centre, Moscow, reacted by creating a rupture. It condemned dissent as a heresy against the doctrine itself, accusing Tito and the Yugoslavs of betraying Marxism–Leninism. In the next phase, it excommunicated the heretic from the empire, from the Cominform. To survive banishment, Tito and the Yugoslavs were compelled to define their resistance against the catechism by reinventing a new interpretation of Marxism–Leninism – the

214   Conclusions ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’. The attraction of the heresy eventually undermined Moscow’s ideological authority and hold over its empire. Mao’s challenge, which happened a decade after the Yugoslav and, as the book suggests, was amply aided by the fallout from the Soviet–Yugoslav confrontation, only confirms the interesting implications of the analogy. The metamorphosis of the Yugoslav political system and the society that emanated from the 1948 break represented the first departure from the Stalinist paradigm within the Communist movement. Yugoslavia’s domestic revolution, coupled with non-­aligned reorientation, constituted the Yugoslav ‘road to socialism’. Within a very short period and seeking to re-­establish the legitimacy that had been taken away by Stalin, Tito’s regime reinvented its ideological identity. It introduced a system of self-­management in economy, based on social ownership and on management of enterprises and industrial plants by workers’ councils. Legal and ideological framework implemented to support this new system of economy allowed greater representation and participation that eventually undermined the Stalinist political system. Simultaneously, the liberalization of arts, culture and education opened the door for far greater freedom of intellectual thought and artistic expression than ever before in the history of socialism after Lenin. Nonetheless, the LCY political monopoly and Tito’s grip on power remained as firm as ever and unchallenged. In the long-­term, the introduction and attractiveness of a Yugoslav counter proposition to Stalin’s model challenged Moscow’s control over Eastern Europe and contributed to the disintegration of Soviet Communism. The character of the dramatic changes in the Yugoslav system and society of the early 1950s and their impact on the processes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe in the early Cold War has hitherto attracted very little, if any, historiographical attention. The attractiveness of the Yugoslav model and its potential to distance the satellites away from Moscow was behind Yugoslavia’s unique influence on developments in Eastern Europe in 1956. Yugoslavia played an important role in encouraging the liberalization process in Hungary. At the same time, Belgrade’s influence in Eastern Europe was among the most important factors which burdened the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization and contributed to its collapse. The fear of its corrosive influence was the reason why the Soviets kept exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to rejoin the ‘socialist camp’, even when the futility of such efforts was obvious. It was present as an undertone throughout the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. The ideological identity of Tito’s regime and the rationale behind the ‘Yugoslav road to socialism’ were based on the negation of the Stalinist model. As long as Khrushchev and the post-­Stalin leadership seemed to be distancing themselves away from the Vozhd’s shadow, the prospect of Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation seemed to be on track. However, once the Soviet leadership abandoned the deconstruction of Stalinism and re-­ embraced old forms, in particular by re-­imposing ideological uniformity over the ‘socialist camp’ after Hungary, the clash with the Yugoslav proposition became inevitable. At that point, the Yugoslav–Soviet reconciliation was doomed. The

Conclusions   215 dividing line for the Soviets was the corrosive influence of Yugoslavia’s model and its independence from the Soviet tutelage on the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc. Khrushchev’s fascinatingly frank admission to Tito at the end of their meeting in Bucharest, in August 1957, perhaps sums this up best, ‘The main thing in our relationship is for you not to boast with your system.’55 The ideological polemics and public confrontation between Moscow and Belgrade that marked the end of the process of normalization would decisively encourage and deepen disunity in the international Communist movement. The convocation of the Conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957 was intended to demonstrate the consolidation of the Communist movement. The rallying of parties behind the Soviet Party was meant to reaffirm Moscow as the undisputed leader and ideological authority. In this respect, the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution was highly symbolic. Furthermore, the picture of new-­found unity of the Communist movement was to be Khrushchev’s ultimate triumph and further consolidation of his leadership after the serious challenge at the June Plenum. However, Tito did not go to Moscow and the Yugoslav delegation that attended the Conference refused to sign the joint Declaration. Behind the façade of ‘unity of action’, the truth was that several other delegations had signed the document only under enormous Soviet pressure. Debates over the final draft of the document revealed open disagreements between the Soviets, the Chinese and other parties, namely the Polish and the Italian. The event that in all appearances demonstrated the new, post-­ Hungarian unity of the Communist movement marked in fact the beginning of disintegrating debates within it.56 Although triggered by the 1948 rapture, the depth and scope of the changes in Yugoslav society, however, were the result of the autochthonous character of the Yugoslav revolution carried out through a national-­liberation struggle against Nazi occupation, and the personality of its leader. The same factors, however, made Yugoslav resistance to Soviet hegemony and the break up inevitable. The hostility of the acrimonious split, in turn, prompted the creation of an ideological alternative to the Soviet concept of socialism and a challenge to Moscow’s Communist leadership. These same factors that preconditioned Yugoslav–Soviet acrimony presaged and defined later confrontations within the international Communist movement, in particular the Sino-­Soviet split. In this respect, the significance of the Yugoslav–Soviet ideological polemics that erupted soon after the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in November 1956 cannot be overstated. Far from being tactical, the debate affirmed Belgrade and Moscow’s ideological incompatibility and announced deepening dissension in the international Communist movement. At the same time, it enabled China to establish itself as a new ideological arbiter and authority. Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, weakened by the crises in Poland and in Hungary, were only too eager to solicit Chinese support in the ideological confrontation with the Yugoslavs. In the process, the Soviets invited the Chinese to join them on the leadership pedestal of the Communist movement. The stature that Mao and the CCP acquired in 1956 was affirmed a year later at the Moscow conference and, in particular, after

216   Conclusions the Seventh Congress of the LCY in April 1958. As in December 1956, the Chinese spearheaded the ideological crusade against the Yugoslavs, this time against their ‘revisionism’. The two campaigns which awarded Mao and the CCP the aureole and authority of the ideological arbiter laid the foundations for the challenge they would mount soon afterwards for the leadership of the international Communist movement. The rivalry for the leadership of the global Communist movement was an underlying constant of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization and would play a role in its collapse. At the time, both Tito and Khrushchev vehemently denied its existence. Seeing themselves as the winners of the ideological battle with Stalin, Tito and his aides believed that this victory confirmed the superiority of their over the Soviet model. As true internationalists, they became convinced that this had placed on their shoulders special responsibility for the fate of socialism. The Yugoslav leadership felt obliged to assist other Communists to discard Stalinism. From their side, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership understood this as clear indication of Belgrade and Tito’s ambition to assume the ideological leadership of the global Communist movement.57 The normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations between 1953 and 1956 allowed Yugoslavia to make a critical contribution to the emergence and the institutionalisation of the Non-­Alignment Movement and in particular to its ability to become the Third World challenge to the bipolarity of the Cold War international system. Yugoslav leadership began excogitating a position of equidistance to either Bloc immediately after the 1948 break up with Stalin. However, only strategic manoeuvrability created by the removal of the Soviet threat after Stalin’s death and with the normalization of relations with Moscow allowed Tito to play a critical role in the conceptualization and institutionalization of the new gathering and to rally Third World leaders behind it. Yugoslavia’s new strategic reorientation was conceptualized during a number of Tito’s trips between 1954 and 1959. Usually conducted over a period of several months during winter, these trips allowed Tito to visit an impressive number of non-­engaged countries in Asia and Africa. His first trip to India and Burma in late 1954, an exploratory journey, enabled Tito to identify allies in newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa eager to follow independent policies and remain non-­ engaged. The Yugoslav President’s third trip, in the winter of 1958, confirmed Tito’s pre-­eminence among the Third World leaders. He worked tirelessly to rally non-­engaged countries behind the principles he, Nehru and Nasser promulgated at their tripartite meeting in July 1956 in Brioni and to promote the idea of the institutionalization of the Non-­Aligned Movement. In September 1961, just six years after the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization had started, Tito managed to assemble leaders of twenty-­one Third World countries to a summit in Belgrade, which established the Non-­Aligned Movement. The book recognizes the unique role of two leaders who were the driving force behind the process of Yugoslav–Soviet normalization. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, General Secretary of the CPSU, and Josip Broz Tito, General Secretary of the LCY and President of Yugoslavia. They also determined its course

Conclusions   217 and dynamics, and were responsible for its eventual collapse. There could hardly be two more different personalities, both in character and demeanour. Khrushchev was of peasant origin, whose experience of the world and cultural construct were limited to Russian and then Soviet reality and horizons. With a very modest command of Marxist doctrine, he was indoctrinated in Stalin’s Soviet Union and was its typical product. He did not travel outside the Soviet Union before he was sixty, a fact that certainly determined the scope of his understanding of the wider world and global processes. On the other hand, Tito was brought up in Austria-­ Hungary. Although of modest peasant and proletarian origins, he acquired an eclectic education and even managed to learn to play the piano. His Communist indoctrination occurred during Lenin’s times, in circumstances of a relatively free debate among the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, he acquired an extensive Marxist education during the time he spent in prison in Yugoslavia, somewhat distanced from narrow Stalinist interpretations. As the Comintern cadre, he travelled extensively and lived for prolonged periods of time in Western Europe in the 1930s. His cultural background, despite his Marxist indoctrination, belonged to the Western European tradition. That these two personalities built a specific rapport and managed to communicate with unexpected ease, as this book amply demonstrates, was in itself a miracle. What made this miracle work, most of the time, was the single thing they shared passionately – a sincere and unwavering belief in Communism. To the Yugoslavs, however, Khrushchev became a personality with two faces, one of which they discovered only in 1957. During the years of the normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, the Yugoslavs saw in Khrushchev the leader who was most responsible for the process of de-­Stalinization in the USSR and reconciliation with Yugoslavia. As such, whenever he was challenged in the Kremlin, they felt obliged to support him in the interest of the stability of the Yugoslav–Soviet normalization, something they were vitally preoccupied with. This explains Tito’s repeated concessions to Khrushchev even when such support threatened very adverse implications for Yugoslavia itself, as was the case with Tito’s endorsement of the second Soviet intervention in Hungary or with the recognition of GDR in October 1957. From the end of October 1957, however, the Yugoslav leaders were able to see the flip side of Khrushchev. They understood that the Soviet leader could be a manipulative and an unscrupulous hypocrite and opportunist, in particular when threatened. During their meeting in Bucharest, in August 1957, Tito asked Khrushchev why he repeatedly attacked the Yugoslavs for receiving US economic aid in return for betraying socialism, although he knew the truth very well. Khrushchev admitted that he saw very good reason for the Yugoslavs to continue to receive the aid and knew they made no political concessions in return but, nonetheless, still used these arguments to publicly attack the Yugoslavs simply because he needed to.58 Tito and his aides were angered by the way Khrushchev tried to manipulate them to come to Moscow in November 1957 and sign the document that differed from what had been agreed only two months earlier. Particularly disappointing for the  Yugoslavs was the devious manner in which Khrushchev orchestrated the

218   Conclusions removal of G. Zhukov while the latter was on official visits to Albania and Yugoslavia. In particular since Zhukov provided Khrushchev with decisive support in the removal of Beria and in the thwarting of the Molotov– Kaganovich–Malenkov coup. 59 This reminded them of Stalin’s methods.60 The belief and devotion to the Marxist idea was, perhaps, the most important factor that determined Tito and Khrushchev’s actions and permeated their behaviour. This was in constant competition with the efforts of both Tito and Khrushchev and the leaderships of the two countries to pursue and respect demands posed by Realpolitik considerations. Ironically, the belief in the same idea kept them apart instead of drawing them closer. What turned out to be Tito and Khrushchev’s curse was that they could not agree to disagree. This may help explain the nemesis of the twentieth century Communist movement. Instead of compatibility and common purpose, it bred competitiveness. Instead of the stability of a common faith, based on the idea promulgated in several volumes of Marx, Engels and Lenin’s writings, it gave birth to dissent, heresy and excommunications. A true aberration, Stalinism perpetuated a delusion that uncritical ideological uniformity guaranteed the cohesion and was the sine qua non of the survival of the Communist system and Marxism. Eventually, as the law of dialectics suggests, it bred ‘the seeds of its own destruction’.

Notes

Introduction   1 Detailed listing of their work is available in the Bibliography section of this book.   2 Ibid.   3 Pelikán, Jan, Jugoslávie a východní blok, 1953–1958 [Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, 1953–1958], (Univerzita Krlova v Praze: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2001).   4 Едемский, А.Б., От конфликта к нормализации: Советско – югславские отношения в 1953–1956 годах [From Conflict to Normalization: Soviet – Yugoslav Relations in 1953–1956], (Mосква: Наук, 2008).   5 For a full listing of Yugoslav and Russian archival sources and collections, please refer to the Bibliography section of this book.   6 LCY Central Committee Executive Committee – highest leadership of the LCY and Yugoslavia (equivalent to the Politburo).   7 Full bibliographical listing is available in the Bibliography section of this book.   8 Taubman, William, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (London: Free Press, 2004); Fursenko, A. and Naftali, T., Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).   9 Lees, Lorraine M., Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 10 ‘Socialist camp’, ‘lager’, ‘camp’, ‘fold’, terms used, in particular by the Soviet and Yugoslav officials, to depict the community of the Soviet Bloc, often including ‘fraternal parties’, i.e. those Communist Parties in Western Europe, China and around the world that recognized the Soviet leadership. Hereafter, either of the terms will be used freely in accordance with the particular use by the personality or in a document quoted or referred to. 11 Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, pp. 167–8. 12 Reports by Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, pp. 168–187. 13 Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, pp. 196–7. 14 Letter from the President of the Council of Ministers of FNR Yugoslavia (J.B.Tito) to the Foreign Minister of USSR (V.M. Molotov), in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, pp. 198–9. 15 Letter from the All-­Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, signed by J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Central Committee, 27 March 1948, in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . . pp. 201–6. 16 Report on the letter from A.A. Zhdanov with the Resolution of the Hungarian CP, 16 April 1948, in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . . p. 252. 17 Report on the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav CP, 12 April

220   Notes 1948, Belgrade/Letter of the CPY CC, signed by Tito and Kardelj, to AUCP (b) CC and J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, 13 April 1948, in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . . pp. 225–249. 18 Note on the original draft of the CPY CC letter to AUCP (b) CC and Stalin and Molotov, 13 April 1948, in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . ., pp. 249–251. 19 Letter from the CPY CC to the AUCP (b) CC, 17 May 1948, in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . ., pp. 285–6. 20 The Resolution of the Information Bureau on the situation in the CPY, Bucharest, 28 June 1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945–1950 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 1945–1950] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu/Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), pp. 621–7. 21 Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the CPY on relations with the Information Bureau, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj . . . (1948), pp. 266–7. 22 Note of the Government of FNRJ [Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia] to the Government of People’s Republic of Albania regarding unilateral cancellation of economic contracts, agreements and conventions, 2 July 1948, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj . . . (1948), pp. 189–93. 23 Jugoslavija, 1945–1964: Statistički pregled [Yugoslavia, 1945–1964: Statistical Review], (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 1965), pp. 174–78. 24 Speech by President J.B. Tito at the Fourth (extraordinary) session of the Federal Assembly of FNRJ on the economic development of Yugoslavia in 1948, Belgrade, 27 December 1948, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj . . . (1948), pp. 488–90. 25 Statement by the Federal Assembly of the FNRJ on the propaganda campaign by the Information Bureau, Belgrade, 30 September 1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj . . . (1948), pp. 373–6. 26 Ibid. 27 AJB Tita (Archives of J.B. Tito), KPR, I-­3-a, SSSR. 28 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita,[The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito] Volume 3, (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija ‘Rad’, 1984), pp. 461–2. 29 The Note by the Government of the USSR to the Government of the FNRJ, Belgrade, 18 August 1949, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945–1950 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 1945–1950] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu/Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), pp. 462–7. 30 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., Vol. 3, pp. 430–6; Also, Svetozar VukmanovićTempo, Revolucija koja teče: Memoari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs], (Beograd: Komunist, 1971), 106–8; Author’s interview with S. VukmanovićTempo, 12 February 2000, Reževići, Montenegro. 31 Djoko Tripković, ‘Vruće leto’ 1949. godine [‘The Hot Summer of 1949’], in JUGOSLOVENSKI ISTORIJSKI ČASOPIS, No. 1–2, 2000, pp. 189–208. 32 Second Resolution of the Information Bureau, ‘The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of murderers and spies’, Hungary, 29 November 1949, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj . . . (1949), pp. 493–6. 33 Mira Šuvar, Vladimir Velebit: Svjedok historije [Vladimir Velebit: Witness to History], (Zagreb: Razlog d.o.o., 2001), pp 176–7; Also, Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi…, Vol. 3, p 436. 34 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., Vol. 3, p. 439. 35 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.

Notes   221 36 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., Vol. 3, p. 478. 37 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; Bulganin’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, pp. 90–100. 38 Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948 . . ., p. 177. 39 Ibid., pp. 179–82. 40 For a more detailed argument on the causes of the Yugoslav–Soviet split in 1948 and the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, please see the author’s chapter, ‘The Cold War in the Balkans: From the Greek Civil War to the Soviet–Yugoslav Normalization’ in Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). On the consolidation of the Soviet Bloc and Stalin’s motives, please see Vladimir Pechatnov’s contribution in the same volume of the Cambridge History of the Cold War, ‘The Soviet Union and the Outside World, 1944–1953’. 41 Ibid. 42 For more details on US and Western military assistance to Yugoslavia during this period, see Heuser, Beatrice, Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53 (London, New York: Routledge, 1989) and, Lees, Lorraine M., Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 1  Overtures     1 At the time, J.B. Tito (henceforth Tito) held the positions of the General Secretary of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, and from 14 January 1953 of President of Yugoslavia.    2 Also ‘Tito and his collaborators’, ‘Tito and his comrades’, ‘Tito and associates’ – henceforth to mean Tito and a small number of top Yugoslav leaders with whom he consulted and discussed major foreign policy issues. This circle usually comprised of Edvard Kardelj (Foreign Minister until 1953, with Ranković Tito’s closest collaborator), Aleksandar Ranković (Head of Security and Tito’s second in command), Milovan Djilas (until January 1954 when he was expelled from the leadership), Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo (from 1954), and Koča Popović (Head of Yugoslav Peoples’ Army General Staff until 1953 and Foreign Minister from 1953). Depending on the issue under consideration, high officials from the Foreign Ministry, in particular Deputy Ministers, namely V. Mićunović, A. Bebler, D. Vidić, or S. Prica would often be invited to offer opinion and provide data during discussions, usually in one of Tito’s residences.     3 Tripartite discussions – the term used by the governments of the United States, Britain and France at the time to denote their coordinated effort to negotiate military and economic cooperation or aid to Yugoslavia. In this context, also ‘tripartite governments’,    4 On 6 October 1952, in a plea to the tripartite governments’ ambassadors, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleš Bebler indicated that Yugoslavia desperately needed food aid. He also indicated that due to the lack of raw materials, factories would soon have to be shut down; industry only had coke for twenty-two more days and cotton for thirty days. The US Ambassador in Yugoslavia (George Allen) to the Department of State, 7 October 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp.  1314–15. In the period July–December 1952, Yugoslavia received US$50 million worth of US economic aid. In addition, on 22 December 1952, a supplemental US$20 million of urgent, ‘drought aid’ had been extended through the Mutual Security Agency, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Perkins), 26 December 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, pp. 1324–5; Allen to the Department of State, 10 January 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, pp.  1336–9. On 20 March 1953, the US

222   Notes ­allotted a further US$7 million to Yugoslavia for the procurement of wheat to assist in addressing the effects of the 1952 drought, Note to the Memorandum of Conversation, William Barbour, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Vladimir Popović), 2 March 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, pp. 1342–4.    5 Transcripts of meetings of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1949–1950; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/38–54.    6 Transcript of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 29–30 December 1949; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7.     7 Tito’s report to the Sixth Congress, Zagreb, 3 November 1952; Borba, 4 November, 1952.     8 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June 1950.    9 Ibid.   10 Ibid.   11 Ibid.   12 Tito’s report before the Sixth Congress of the CPY, Zagreb, 3 November 1952; Borba, 4 November 1952.   13 Ibid.   14 Ibid.   15 Ibid.   16 Ibid.   17 Ibid.   18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels did not write much on the subject, in particular on the role of the state in the post-­Capitalist society. Marx’s few deliberations can be found in ‘The Class Struggle in France, 1848–1850’, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte’ and in the ‘The Civil War in France’. Engels dwelled on the topic in his ‘Anti-­Dühring’. In truth, the ‘Marxist’ outlook on the role of the state, in particular on the ‘withering away of the state’ was founded on Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s deliberations, in particular in his famous ‘The State and Revolution’. Among the latter day Marxists, surprisingly few wrote on the subject, perhaps another legacy of Stalinist dogmatism. Most notable among them were Max Adler, Otto Bauer and Antonio Gramsci.   19 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June, 1950.   20 Formation of the workers councils consistently reappeared as one of the first demands put forward during revolutionary convulsions that periodically erupted in Eastern Europe, from the revolt in Poland and uprising in Hungary in 1956, through Czechoslovakia in 1968, to the Solidarity strikes in Poland in 1980.   21 Blagoje Bošković, Dr David Dašić, Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji, 1950–1976: Dokumenti razvoja [Self-­management in Yugoslavia, 1950–1976: Documents on evolution], (Beograd: Privredni pregled, 1977), p. 47.   22 Branko Petranović, Čedomir Štrbac, Istorija Socijalističke Jugoslavije [The History of the Socialist Yugoslavia], (Beograd: Radnička knjiga, 1977), p. 134.   23 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June 1950.   24 Ibid.   25 Tito’s report to the Sixth Congress of the CPY, Zagreb, 3 November 1952; Borba, 4 November 1952.   26 Ibid.   27 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June 1950.   28 Jugoslavija, 1945–1964: Statistički pregled [Yugoslavia, 1945–1964: Statistical Review] . . ., p. 29.

Notes   223   29 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June 1950.   30 Karl Marx, ‘The Class Struggle in France, 1848–1850’, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte’, ‘The Civil War in France’ and Frederick Engels, ‘Anti-­Dühring’ in Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, Selected Works, Volumes I and II, (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1951). Also, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ‘The State and Revolution’ in Lenin, V.I., Selected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969).   31 Tito’s speech at the First Extraordinary Session of the Yugoslav Peoples Assembly, 26 June, 1950; Borba, 27 June 1950.   32 Ibid.   33 Edvard Kardelj’s exposé at the Fifth Session of the People’s Assembly, 1 April 1952; Borba, 2 April 1952.   34 Ibid.   35 Transcript of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Belgrade, 29–30 December 1949; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7. See also, Miroslav Perisic, Od Staljina ka Sartru; Formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima, 1945–1958 [From Stalin to Sartre: Forming of the Yugoslav Intellectual Elite on European Universities, 1945–1958], (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008).   36 Report by Ivo Sarajčić at the Conference on [Yugoslavia’s] cultural and artistic propaganda abroad, Belgrade, 30 January 1950; AJ, Sciences and Culture Council, F-­29. Also, Miroslav Perisic, Od Staljina ka Sartru . . . p. 343.   37 Ibid, p. 343.   38 Ibid, p. 351.   39 Ibid, pp. 350–4.   40 Miroslav Perisic, Od Staljina ka Sartru . . ., p. 342.   41 Ibid, p. 345.   42 Ibid, p. 364.   43 Ibid, pp. 362–96.   44 Meeting of the Executive Committee (Yugoslav equivalent of the Politburo) of the Central Committee (CC), League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) – Memorandum of Discussions, 27 November 1952; AJ (Yugoslav Archives), ACK SKJ (LCY CC Collection), 507/III/61.   45 Report on Yugoslav Defence talks – UK Military Attaché in Belgrade (Colonel G.R.G. Bird) to the War Office, 22 November 1952. The National Archives, formerly Public Records Office (PRO), FO 371, File No. 102168, Doc. No, WY1022/94.   46 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61.   47 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, 18 and 20 November 1952; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1316–17 and 1320–1, respectively. In his report, the British Military Attaché stressed that General Handy had ‘absolutely nothing concrete to offer to the Yugoslavs’ – UK Military Attaché in Belgrade (Colonel G.R.G. Bird) to the War Office, 22 November 1952. The National Archives, (PRO), FO 371, File No. 102168, Doc. No, WY1022/94.   48 Term used also by the Yugoslavs to depict countries of People’s Democracies, i.e. the countries of Eastern Europe, members of the Soviet Bloc.   49 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61.   50 Ibid.   51 Tito’s speech at a rally in Belgrade, 31 March 1953, upon returning from a visit to United Kingdom, Borba, 1 April 1953, pp. 1–2.   52 The US Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State (Telegrams 934 and 935, 8 January 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1333–6.

224   Notes   53 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61.   54 Together with Aleksandar Ranković, Edvard Kardelj was Tito’s closest collaborator. He was elected to the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1938. As the member of the Supreme Staff of the Partisan Army, he was at Tito’s side throughout the War. After liberation and until January 1953, he was the first Yugoslav Foreign Minister. From January 1953 he became the Vice-­President of the Federal Executive Council (Yugoslav Federal Government), of which Tito was the President. After the expulsion of Milovan Djilas in January 1954, Kardelj became the sole Yugoslav ideologue. Even after Koča Popović took over as Foreign Minister in January 1953, Kardelj remained the interpreter of Tito’s foreign policy directives. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry often sent memorandums of his conversations or speeches to Ambassadors as interpretations of official Yugoslav positions on various issues. Until his death in 1979 he remained Tito’s closest associate.   55 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952. AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61.   56 Memorandum of conversation between Kardelj and the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts), 8 April 1955; SMIP (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs), SPA (Top Secret Archive Collection), 1955, F II/Engl. I – 199.   57 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952. AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61. Also, Tito’s report of his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council – Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (no specific date of the session); AJBT (The Josip Broz Tito Archive), KPR (The Cabinet of the President of the Republic), I-­2/1, pp. 1300–12.   58 Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü – Transcript, 23 January 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/Turska I-­48.   59 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   60 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to Department of State, 22 December 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1322–3.   61 Tito’s visit to Britain, 17–22 March 1952; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1270–99; Memorandum of conversations between Tito, Churchill, and Eden, 17–21 March 1953; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1259–1269.The U.S. Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 21 March 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1346–7.   62 The US Ambassador in Athens (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 6 May 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 592–3.   63 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952–31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), pp. 12781–2.   64 The US Ambassador in Belgrade (Allen) to the Department of State, 24 November 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 597.   65 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952–31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), pp. 12781–2.   66 The US Ambassador in Athens (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 31 December 1952, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 600–2.   67 Ibid.   68 Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü – Transcript, 23 January 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/Turska I-­48.   69 Ibid.   70 Official talks between President Tito and the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, 6 February 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, FII/Turska I-­48.   71 Telegram, the US Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 26 February 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 625–6.

Notes   225   72 In documents and in historiography, this Treaty is also referred to as the Treaty of Ankara, the Ankara Pact, the Ankara Agreement, or, wrongly, the Balkan Pact. The Treaty became a full military alliance, the Balkan Pact, on 9 August 1954, in Bled, Yugoslavia. Henceforth the term Ankara Agreement will be used.   73 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], Volume 3, (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija ‘Rad’, 1984), p. 614.   74 Milovan Djilas – Until January 1954, together with Kardelj and Ranković, he was a member of Tito’s innermost circle. Elected to the CPY Politburo in 1940. Leader of the uprising in Montenegro, during the Second World War, Djilas was known for rigid, ultra-­leftist views and was responsible for several massacres and executions of Communists’ opponents, as well as of fellow Communists. After the war, he headed the Agitprop, the propaganda machinery of Tito’s regime and became the ideologue of the Yugoslav Communist party. In January 1954, he was expelled from the LCY leadership. Aleksandar Ranković – He was appointed by Tito to the CPY Politburo in 1937 and remained Tito’s closest and most loyal collaborator during and after the War. Ranković shaped the organization of the Partisan Army and was entrusted with the security of the movement. After the War, he headed Yugoslavia’s security apparatus, officially until 1953 and unofficially until his removal. He was elected Vice-­Prime Minister to Tito in 1953 and later Vice-­President. Rankovic was expelled from the leadership in 1966 for ‘usurpation of power’.   75 D. Djurić to DSIP (Državni Sekretarijat za Inostrane Poslove – Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs – the official name at the time for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry; henceforth DSIP), 4 March 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR (USSR), 1953, F84/13–42877.   76 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., p. 615.   77 Borba, 7 March 1953. Also, Borba, 8 March 1954.   78 Koča Popović – From a wealthy Serbian family. Attended graduate studies at the Sorbonne and was a prominent surrealist poet in the 1930s. As a member of the CPY since 1933, joined the International Brigades and fought in the Spanish Civil War. In the Second World War became the first General and Commander of the first Partisan brigade and then its first corps. From 1945 until 1953 he was the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army. From January 1953 until 1965 occupied the post of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. Retired at his own request in 1968 as the Vice-­President of Yugoslavia.   79 Dedijer, Vladimir, Izgubljena bitka J.V. Staljina [The Battle Stalin Lost], Sarajevo, Svjetlost-­Prosveta-Oslobodjenje, 1969, p. 423.   80 Borba, 16 March 1953.   81 Politika, 9 March 1953.   82 Agreement Between Military Representatives of the British, French, and the United States Government, 22 May 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1354–5.   83 Memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State and the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (V. Popović), 3 September 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 244–7.   84 Speech by Koča Popović before the British Parliament, 19 March 1953, AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1276–7.   85 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 30 April 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b /I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 8/53, pp. 6–8.   86 Transcript of the third round of Tito–Churchill talks, 19 March 1953, AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1259–69.

226   Notes   87 Bebler to Ambassadors, 22 May 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, Jugoslavija, F45/5–46745.   88 Koča Popović to Yugoslav Ambassador in Sweden (Černej), 4 May 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1953, F85/14–45648.   89 Churchill to Eisenhower, 19 March 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part Two, pp. 2026–7.   90 Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council – Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (the document carries only April as the date of the session); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1300–1312.   91 The Second Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 16–17 June 1953, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/II/10.   92 Djurić’s report to DSIP, 9 May 1953; SMIP, PA (Confidential Archive), 1953, SSSR, F84/9–46642.   93 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine, 1956–1958, [The Moscow Years, 1956–1958], (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1977), p. 22.   94 Borba, 24 March 1953.   95 Borba, 1 April 1953. Tito’s public speeches played an important part in his politics. He enjoyed speaking at public rallies and spoke frequently. The speeches represented the quickest way for him to relay a message to all concerned, at home or abroad. Tito was aware of the extraordinary attention the Western media and diplomats awarded to his public speeches. Furthermore, by announcing foreign policy initiatives or positions on foreign policy issues in public speeches, Tito was able to sound out reactions abroad. If necessary, he would later modify or fully retract these public statements through quieter diplomatic channels. Tito also used public speeches to rally domestic support behind his policies and actions and stave off possible opposition within the party. In the absence of democratic institutions and debating forums, public speeches legitimized his policies. Many Yugoslav documents confirm the importance of Tito’s public speeches in the formulation of the country’s foreign policy. Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad would very often be advised by the Foreign Ministry to read Tito’s most recent speech as Yugoslavia’s official position on a certain issue [For example: DSIP to Yugoslav Mission in UN, 24 September 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/f3/2, Razno-­645/DSIP to Yugoslav Embassies, 3 August 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F III/Jug. I – 297]. Tito himself would sometimes issue instructions that his recent speech be used as a guideline for new foreign policy direction [Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13].   96 Koča Popović to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm, A. Černej, 4 May 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, F85/14–45648, Sovjetski Savez.   97 Tito identified Malenkov, Beria and Molotov as the main leadership contenders. Khrushchev was completely out of the Yugoslav focus, at the time – The Tito– Churchill conversation in the Yugoslav Embassy, 21 March 1953 – Transcript; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1270–99.   98 Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council – Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (No specific date on document); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1300–12.   99 Koča Popović’s exposé at the meeting of the Federal Executive Council – Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (carries only April as the date of the meeting); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1300–12. 100 Arso Milatović to Djurić (Moscow), 6 April 1953, SMIP, PA (Confidential archives), 1953, SSSR (USSR), F84/9–45309. 101 Policy paper prepared by the First Department, DSIP, 27 April 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F84/8–417777. 102 Ibid. Also, Arso Milatović to Djurić (Moscow), 6 April 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F84/9–45309.

Notes   227 103 Memorandum of conversation between K. Popović and the US Chargé in Belgrade (Wallner), 3 April 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/SAD II-­154. 104 Koča Popović to Yugoslav ambassadors, 9 April 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/ SSSR I – 165. 105 Bebler to Djurić, 4 April 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR I – 146. 106 Djurić to DSIP, 8 April 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F85/14–44624. 107 Bebler to Djurić, 11 April 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1953, F85/14–44624. 108 Report by Djurić on the meeting with Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister of 29 April 1953, 30 April 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR I – 228. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 June 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b /II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 11/53, pp. 1–2. 112 Memorandum of conversation between Djurić and Molotov, 6 June 1953; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1953, F II/Strogo Pov. – 15. 113 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU CC) – Transcripts, 4–12 July 1955; РГАНИ (Russian State Archives of Contemporary History), Фонд (Collection) 2, Опись (Series) 1, Ролики (Microfilm rolls) 6225,7,8. 114 Internal report by the Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry (M. Zimianin) for V.M. Molotov, 27 May 1953; Edemskii, A, The Turn in the Soviet– Yugoslav Relations, 1953–1955, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, p. 138. 115 Talbot, S. (Trans. and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, (London: André Deutsch, 1971), pp. 377–8. 116 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1,Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 81. 117 The new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Vassiliy Volkov headed the Balkan Department in MID – Note attached to Djurić’s report on the meting with Molotov, 6 June 1953; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1953, F II/Strogo Pov. – 15. 118 Bebler to Djurić, 10 June 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR II – 315. 119 Bebler to Yugoslav Ambassadors, 11 June 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR II – 315. 120 Borba, 15 June 1953. 121 Ibid. 122 Borba, 28 June 1953. 123 Lees, Lorraine M, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 130. 124 Arso Milatović, Pet diplomatskih misija [Five Diplomatic Assignments], (Ljubljana, Zagreb: Cankarjeva zalozba, 1985) p. 137. 125 Memorandum of conversation between A. Bebler and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 1 September 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/SSSR I – 390. 126 The Second Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 16–17 June 1953, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/II/10. 127 Ibid. 128 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 13/53, pp. 31–34. 129 Memorandum of conversation between A. Milatović and the Soviet Chargé in Belgrade (Snyukov), 18 July 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/SSSR I – 350. 130 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 13/53, pp. 31–34. 131 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 31 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 14/53, pp. 1–3.

228   Notes 132 A. Milatović to Djurić, 30 July 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR II – 365. 133 Ibid. Also, DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b /II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 13/53, pp. 11–13. 134 Ibid. 135 Dedijer, Vladimir, Novi Prilozi . . ., 617. 136 Ibid. p. 621. 137 Ibid. p. 616. 138 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952–31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), pp. 13096–7. 139 Memorandum of conversation between Edvard Kardelj and the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade (Axel), 22 August 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II/Turska I-­380. 140 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 31 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b /II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 14/53, pp. 1–6. 141 From 6 January 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 142 Statement by Field Marshal Harold Alexander, Caserta, 19 May 1954; Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945. . . , p. 380. 143 Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army, Devin, 20 June 1945 in Dokumenti o spoljnoj . . ., 1945, pp. 98–9. 144 Peace Treaty with Italy, signed in Paris, 10 February 1947 in Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici . . ., 1947, Vol. I, pp. 125–185. 145 Memorandum of Conversation, President Eisenhower, Secretary of State, Defence Secretary, et al. on Trieste, Washington, 22 October 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 325. 146 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Austria (Thompson), 28 January 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp.  368–71. Also, Memoranda of conversations between Tito, Churchill and Eden, 17–21 March 1953; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1259–69. 147 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 11 September 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 273–7. 148 The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Wallner) to the Department of State, 8 October 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 298. 149 Memorandum of conversation, the Yugoslav deputy Foreign Secretary (Bebler) with the UK Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Mallet) and the US Chargé in Yugoslavia (Wallner), 9 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV/V – 454. 150 Ibid. 151 Memorandum of conversation, Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, 9 October 1953: FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 303. 152 V. Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., Vol. 3, p. 626. 153 Memorandum of conversation between the Yugoslav deputy Foreign Secretary (Bebler) and the UK Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Mallet) and the US Chargé in Yugoslavia (Wallner), 9 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV/V – 454. 154 Borba, 11 October 1953. 155 Borba, 12 October 1953. 156 Memorandum of Discussions at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 13 October 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 312–13. 157 V. Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., 629. Also, Memorandum of conversations between the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Popović) and the US Secretary of State (Dulles), 12 and 13 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV/VII – 528. Also in, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 305–12. 158 Edvard Kardelj to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (V. Popović), 21 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV/VI – 487.

Notes   229 159 The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State, 24 December 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 356–7. 160 FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 310, footnote 2. 161 Memorandum of conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov) with the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council (Kardelj), 13 October 1953; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1953, I – 5 – v/188. Also, Memorandum of conversations between the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Popović) and the US Secretary of State (Dulles), 12 and 13 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV/VII – 528. The same also in: FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 305–12. 162 ‘Discussion on our relations with the USSR and the Cominform countries, 20. X. 1953, at Comrade Kardelj’s’, 20 October 1953; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1953, I – 5 – v/297. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Telegram, K. Popović – Yugoslav Ambassadors in the US, UK, France, Italy, W. Germany, and the UN, 3 November 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III/SSSR II – 512. 172 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 17 November 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V/Fasc. 10b / II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 19/53, pp. 5–6. 173 Agitprop was the abbreviation for ‘AGITation-­PROPaganda’, the name given officially to the Party propaganda and ideology apparatus. It was the arbiter on all matters related to culture, education, publishing, media and propaganda. As the guardian of ideological purity, the Agitprop was second in authority only to the Security apparatus. 174 Third, Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY – Transcripts, 16–17 January 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/II/11. 175 Ibid. 176 Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY, 30 March 1954, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/12. 177 Walter Bedell Smith, the Acting US Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 16 February 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 641. 178 First letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I–48. 179 Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four, Berlin, 25 January–18 February 1954. 180 The report by Vidić on his meeting with Molotov, 21 January 1954, SMIP, Kabinet Drzavnog Sekretara Koče Popovića, FI, 1954. Also, Memorandum of conversation, V. Molotov – Yugoslav Ambassador, D. Vidić, 21 January 1954; АВП, РФ [Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation], Фонд 0144, Опись 39, Папка 157, Дело 5, pp. 1–4. 181 Ibid. 182 Dispatch from the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, K. Popović to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, D. Vidić, 22 January 1954, SMIP, Kabinet Drzavnog Sekretara Koce Popovića, FI, 1954. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid.

230   Notes 186 Ibid. 187 The Fourth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 30 March 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/12. 188 Borba, 30 January 1954. 189 The Fourth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 30 March 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/12. 190 Memorandum of Conversation, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Popović) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy), 22 January 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, 1367–9. Also, Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Popović), 11 March 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 380–1. 191 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Malenkov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 160, 79. 192 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: Время,Люди,Власт [N.S. Khrushchev, Reminiscences: Times, People, Power], Кн.3 [Vol. 3], (Москва: Московские Новости, 1999), p. 126. 193 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Kaganovich’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 160, 7/Also, Saburov’s address, Ibid, p. 112. 194 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.3, p. 146. 195 Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Mićunović) to DSIP, 23 April 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 90/9, SSSR – 46256. 196 Plenum of the CC CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Suslov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 159, 151. 197 Ibid. 2  Normalization     1 Memorandum of conversation K. Popović – Sir Ivo Mallet, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, 26 May 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F I/Engleska I–288.    2 Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.     3 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 April 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 7/54, p. 1.    4 Ibid. Tito visited Greece between 2 and 7 June 1954.     5 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 4 May 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 8/54, pp. 1–2.     6 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 May 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 9/54, p. 1.     7 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s opening address, Transcript of the 9 July, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143.     8 Talbot, S. (Trans. and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, (London: André Deutsch: 1971), p. 377.     9 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 65. Also, Ibid, Suslov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, morning session, РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Delo 159, 151.   10 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 107. Also, Ibid, Pervuhin’s address, Transcript of 11 July, evening session, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 160, 91.   11 Talbot, S. (Trans. and ed.), Khrushchev . . ., p. 378.   12 Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU sent as a letter to ‘Comradely

Notes   231 parties’, 31 May 1954, Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 66.   13 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (First Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­48.   14 After Djilas’ removal in January 1954, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo joined the most exclusive circle of Tito’s closest associates, which included only Kardelj and Ranković. Between 1953 and 1958, Tempo was in charge of Yugoslavia’s economy. Officially, he held the position of the Economy and Finance Minister and of the Vice-­President of the Federal Executive Council, Yugoslavia’s equivalent of the Council of Ministers, presided by Tito. In 1958, he was appointed President of the Trade Unions of Yugoslavia.   15 Author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, 12 February 2000, Reževići, Montenegro. Also, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Revolucija koja teče: Memoari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs], (Beograd: Komunist, 1971), p. 210.   16 Ibid.   17 Tito–Churchill conversation in the Yugoslav Embassy, 21 March 1953 – Transcripts of Tito’s conversations during his visit to Britain; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, 1270–99. Also, Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council – Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (the document carries only April as the date of the session); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/1, pp. 1300–12.   18 The Soviet–Yugoslav exchange of letters in 1954 is presented as the First, Second, etc. of Khrushchev or Tito’s letters. This is according to the depiction given by Tito himself when presenting them before the meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee, on 3 November 1954. Each document is annotated at the top of the first page accordingly, in Tito’s handwriting.   19 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (the First Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­48.   20 Ibid.   21 Ibid.   22 At its Sixth Congress, in June 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).   23 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (the First Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­48.   24 Ibid.   25 Ibid.   26 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a. A meeting would officially be called ‘Enlarged’ whenever a number of important officials, not members of the Executive Committee but whose presence was deemed necessary for qualified deliberations on issues on the agenda, were in attendance.   27 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/13.   28 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   29 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 12/54, p. 5.   30 Telegram from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, D. Vidić, to DSIP, 31 May 1954; SMIP, PA, 1954, SSSR, F 87/2 – 47124.   31 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 12/54, p. 6.   32 A. Bebler to K. Popović, 29 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/III, Razno-­391.   33 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgrade, 29 June 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 658.

232   Notes   34 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   35 Ibid.   36 Ibid.   37 Ibid.   38 Ibid.   39 Ibid.   40 Ibid.   41 Memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President, 3 June 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 438–9.   42 Ibid.   43 Telegram 3952, Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to Secretary of State, 4 June 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 443, Note 3. Also, Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador in Italy (Luce) and Assistant Secretary of State (Merchant), 14 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 472–3.   44 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy, 8 June 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp.  448–9 and, Telegram 5832, US Chief Negotiator (Thompson) to Department of State, 18 June 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 462, Note 2.   45 Memorandum of Conversation, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Mates) – the US Assistant Secretary of State (Merchant), 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 466–7.   46 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 14/54, pp. 1–4.   47 Ibid.   48 K. Popović to A. Bebler in Athens, 28 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/III, Razno-­388. Also, A. Bebler to K. Popović, 29 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/ f4/III, Razno-­391/See also, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 8 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 661–2.   49 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 659–60.   50 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 8 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 661–2.   51 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 659–60.   52 K. Popović to A. Bebler (Athens), 28 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/III, Razno-­385. Also, A. Bebler (Athens) to K. Popović, 2 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/III, Razno-­399 (I/174).   53 Cable A. Bebler to all Embassies, 9 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/IV, Razno-­418.   54 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 14/54, 1–4.   55 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   56 S. Vukmanović-Tempo, Revolucija . . ., 211. Also, author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, 12 February 2000. See also The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 15 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 539–41.   57 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   58 Vukmanović-Tempo, S, Revolucija . . ., 210. Also, author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, 12 February 2000.   59 Memorandum of Conversation, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo and the US Ambassador in Belgrade, (Riddleberger), 5 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/ f3/1,Razno-­470.

Notes   233   60 Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Revolucija . . ., p. 203.   61 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Enlarged) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   62 Memorandum of Conversation, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo and the US Ambassador in Belgrade, J. Riddleberger, 5 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/f3/1,Razno­470. In his report of the meeting, Riddleberger mentioned the sum of £1 million. The discrepancy was probably due to the fact that the Yugoslavs referred to the total loan and Riddleberger to the amount of repayment due. The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 7 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1395–6.   63 Ibid.   64 Memorandum of conversation of the USSR Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov) at the reception in honour of the Ethiopian Emperor, 21 July 1954; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 39, Папка 157, Дело 9, pp. 87–8. Also, Tito’s account at the Fifth Plenum of LCY CC, 26 November 1954 – Transcripts; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13.   65 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 24 July 1954 (Khrushchev’s second letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­49.   66 LCY CC EC letter, signed by Josip Broz Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev (Tito’s first letter), 11 August 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­50.   67 Ibid.   68 Ibid.   69 Ibid.   70 Ibid.   71 Ibid.   72 Ibid.   73 Ibid.   74 Ibid.   75 The United States Permanent Representative in the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State, 29 July 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, 671–3.   76 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 16 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FIV/ I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 15/54, pp. 1–3.   77 Memorandum of conversations between K. Popović and the Ambassadors of the US, UK, Greece, and Turkey, 12 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F III/Jugoslavija, Zab. – 553. See also, the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 12 August 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1398–9.   78 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13.   79 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito (Khrushchev’s third letter), 23 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/ I-­51.   80 Ibid.   81 Ibid.   82 Ibid.   83 Ibid.   84 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito (Khrushchev’s fourth letter), 27 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/ I-­52.   85 Ibid.   86 Ibid.   87 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952–31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), p. 13806.   88 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to

234   Notes Tito (Khrushchev’s third letter), 23 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/ I-­51.   89 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/13.   90 The President to the Acting Secretary of State (Smith), 3 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. V, pp. 1145–6.   91 President Eisenhower’s letter to J.B. Tito, 10 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 531–2.   92 The Acting Secretary of State to the President, at Denver, 3 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, p. 517. Also, the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 5 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 519–20.   93 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 17 September 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 543–5.   94 FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 570–3.   95 Ibid.   96 Memorandum of conversation, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Bebler) – the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 28 September 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F III/SSSR Zab. – 663. Also, DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 19/54, p. 22.   97 Pravda, 22 September 1954.   98 The Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić) to DSIP, 7 October 1954; SMIP, PA, 1954, F 88/16, SSSR, 413193.   99 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 October 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 18/54, Prilog. 100 Ibid. 101 Pravda, 20 October 1954. 102 Memorandum by John C. Campbell of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of Staff (Bowie), 29 October 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 586–8. 103 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 October 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 18/54, Prilog/DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 19/54, 22./DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 20/54, pp. 1–4. 104 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 19/54, p. 22. 105 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 October 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FI V/II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 18/54, Prilog. 106 LCY CC EC letter, signed by Josip Broz Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev (Tito’s first letter), 11 August 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­50. 107 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3. 108 The Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić) to DSIP, 12 November 1954; SMIP, PA, 1954, F 86/21, SSSR, 414956. 109 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/13. 110 Ibid. Also telegram from K. Popović to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić), 16 November 1954; SMIP, Kabinet Državnog Sekretara Koče Popovića, F I, 1954/1956. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 The LCY CC letter, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev (Tito’s second letter), 16 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­53. 114 Ibid.

Notes   235 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, 12 February 2000. Also, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Revolucija . . ., 211–22. Also, The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, 23 November 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1426–7. 131 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. Also, Memorandum of conversations, between M. Todorović – Plavi and N.S. Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, 29 and 30 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954, I – 5 – v. 132 The Deputy Foreign Secretary (Mićunović) to the Foreign Secretary (Popović), aboard ‘Galeb’, 2 January 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v. 133 Memorandum of conversation, Mijalko Todorović-Plavi and Dobrivoje Vidić with the Soviet leaders in Moscow (the first dinner, 26 December), 27 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954, I – 5 – v. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Memorandum of conversation, Mijalko Todorović and Dobrivoje Vidić with the Soviet leaders in Moscow (the second dinner, 30 December), 31 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954, I – 5 – v. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Edemskii, A, The Turn in the Soviet–Yugoslav Relations, 1953–1955, in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, p. 138. 143 V. Mićunović to Tito on board ‘Galeb’, 31December 1954 (report on the first dinner of 26 December) and 2 January 1955 (report on the second dinner of 30 December and conclusion of Yugoslav–Soviet trade talks); AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954, I – 5 – v. 144 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. 145 DSIP to the Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić), 1 February 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, Sovjetski Savez F62/2 – 41282. 146 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 25–31 January 1955 – Transcript of the 31 January (ninth) session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6221, Дело 127 (microfilm). Also, Plenum Transcripts, 1955–1957: Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU, Ninth Session, Morning, 31 January 1955, in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 10, March 1998, pp. 34–7.

236   Notes 147 Pravda, 9 February 1955. 148 Memorandum of conversation, V. Mićunović – the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts), the US Ambassador (James Riddleberger), and the French Chargé (Burin des Roziers), 10 February 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/ Jug., Zabeleške I – 48. 149 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. 150 Memorandum of conversations, Mijalko Todorović and Dobrivoje Vidić with the Soviet leaders in Moscow (26 and 30 December 1954), 27 and 31 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954, I – 5 – v. 151 Ibid. 152 Pravda, 9 February 1955. Also, the report from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić), 9 February 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II-­39. 153 Borba, 10 February 1955. 154 Giuseppe Boffa Povijest Sovjetskog saveza [The History of the Soviet Union], Vol. II, Od domovinskog rata do položaja druge velesile: Staljin i Hruščov, 1941–1964 [From the Great Patriotic War to the Position of the Second Superpower: Stalin and Khrushchev, 1941–1964] (Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1985), p. 370. 155 Memorandum of conversation, V. Mićunović – the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts), the US Ambassador (James Riddleberger), and the French Chargé (Burin des Roziers), 10 February 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/ Jug., Zabeleške I – 48. Also, Despatch From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, 21 February 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 615–22. 156 Borba, 13 February 1955. 157 Borba, 8 March 1955. Also, Stephen Clissold (Ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939–1973: A Documentary Survey (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 249. 158 Pravda, 10 March 1955. 159 Stephen Clissold (Ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union . . ., p. 250. 160 Third Plenum of the CPY CC – Transcript, 29–30 December 1949; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, II-­7. 161 E. Kardelj’s speech at the Fifth Annual Session of the UN General Assembly, 20–28 September 1950; Leo Mates, Nesvrstanost: Teorija i savremena praksa [Non-­Alignment: The Theory and Current Practice], (Belgrade: Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1970), p. 216. 162 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, 8 January 1953; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1333–5. 163 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . . Volume 3, p. 554. 164 Monograph ‘India’, prepared for Tito for his trip to India, November 1954; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–1. 165 Ibid. 166 Collection of memoranda and transcripts of talks, related to Tito’s trip to India and Burma, 30 November 1954–5 February 1955; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 167 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 18 December 1954, at 12:00 pm, in the residence of the Indian Prime Minister; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 168 Ibid. 169 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 18 December 1954, at 18:00; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 170 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 18 December 1954, at 18:00; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi between 25 and 28 June 1954, on his return trip from the Geneva Conference on Indochina.

Notes   237 171 In a joint statement issued at the end of Zhou Enlai’s June visit to New Delhi, the Indian and the Chinese Prime Ministers reaffirmed the ‘Five Principles’, which should guide relations between their two countries, as well as their relations with other countries. They were first laid out in the Agreement on Tibet, signed by two countries on 29 April 1954. The ‘Five Principles’ were: 1) Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) Non-­aggression; 3) Non-­ interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) Equality and mutual benefit; 5) Peaceful coexistence [Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1952–1954, Ninth Volume, July 3–10, 1954, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), p. 13661. 172 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 18 December 1954, at 18:00; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 173 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 20 December 1954, at 17:30; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 174 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 21 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 175 The speech by President J.B. Tito in the Indian Parliament, 21 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–1, pp. 876–80. 176 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 21 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 177 Memorandum of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India, J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 21 December 1954 (after dinner in Nehru’s residence); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 178 Memorandum of the meeting at the Indian Foreign Ministry, 22 December 1954, at 10:30; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 179 The Joint Statement by the President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, 22 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 183 Transcript of talks held between the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. B. Tito and the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, aboard vessel ‘Mindon’, 14 January 1955, at 15:30; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 184 Ibid. 185 Special Statement (Annexe to the Joint Statement by the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal, J. B. Tito and the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, 17 January 1955; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 186 Memorandum of conversation during the meeting President had had with the Yugoslav journalist accompanying him in a train from Calcutta to [unclear, hand written name of town]; 2 January 1955; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 187 Transcript of talks held between the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. B. Tito and the Prime Minister of Egypt, Gamaal Abdul Nasser and their aides, aboard ‘Galeb’, 5 February 1955, AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4 – 3. 188 Ciphered telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koča Popović to several Yugoslav Ambassadors, 26 July 1956, SMIP, SPA, 1956, FII/Jugoslavija I-­176. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid. Also Borba, 20 July 1956. 3  Comradeship     1 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU CC), 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of the Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of the 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143. Also, Ibid, Molotov’s

238   Notes address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158.     2 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4–12 July 1955, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 49.    3 Ibid.    4 Ibid.     5 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 17 March 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v.    6 Ibid.     7 Letter from the EC of the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 16 April 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v.    8 Ibid.     9 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 6 May 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­54.   10 Ibid.   11 Ibid.   12 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 4–12 July 1955, Molotov’s address, Transcript of the 9 July (evening) session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, pp. 20–56.   13 Official press release on the forthcoming visit of the delegation from the USSR to Yugoslavia, 14 May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v.   14 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mićunović and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 20 May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v/490.   15 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.3, pp. 146–52.   16 Ibid.   17 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/13.   18 Memorandum of conversation between K. Popović and the Ambassadors of US, Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey, 13 May 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD, Zab. – 229.   19 Borba, 16 May 1955.   20 Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council, LCY CC, 13 May 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/64.   21 Ibid.   22 V. Dedijer, Novi Prilozi . . ., 564–7; Also, Darko Bekić Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu: Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955 [Yugoslavia In the Cold War: Relations With the Big Powers 1949–1955], (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), p. 707.   23 Transcript of the speech by N.S. Khrushchev at the Belgrade airport, 26 May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v.   24 Ibid.   25 Ibid.   26 Dedijer Novi Prilozi . . ., Vol. 3, p. 567.   27 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.   28 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.3, pp. 148–50.   29 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mićunović and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 20 May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v/490.   30 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.   31 Ibid.   32 Ibid.   33 Ibid.   34 Ibid.

Notes   239   35 Ibid.   36 Ibid.   37 Ibid.   38 Ibid.   39 Ibid.   40 Ibid.   41 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a.   42 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.   43 Ibid.   44 Ibid.   45 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of Soviet–Yugoslav talks; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 37–47.   46 Ibid.   47 Ibid.   48 Ibid.   49 Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar, Revolucija koja teče: Memoari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs] (Beograd: Komunist, 1971), pp. 232–4.   50 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.   51 Belgrade Declaration, 2 June 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v.   52 Ibid.   53 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.4, p. 189.   54 Review of Reports from East European Countries on Reactions to [Khrushchev] Visit and the Belgrade Declaration; No date [probably around 15 June 1955]; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/IV-­98/Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.   55 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, 49.   56 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Mikhail Pervuhin’s address, Transcript of 11 July, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 160, 91.   57 Koča Popović to Yugoslav Ambassadors, 4 June 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/ SSSR I – 253.   58 Ibid.   59 Ibid.   60 Transcript of the Ambassadorial Conference in Belgrade and related documents, 24–27 June 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F III/Jug II – 340. Also, Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, 28 June 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 659–60.   61 Ibid.   62 Memorandum of Conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov); АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 40, Папка 163, Дело 4, pp. 131–5.   63 Memorandum of conversation between Srdja Prica and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 29 June 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F64/6–48704.   64 Memorandum of conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, V. Volkov; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 40, Папка 163, Дело 4, pp. 131–5.   65 Ibid.

240   Notes   66 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 161, pp. 187–192.   67 The letter from the EC LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 29 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­55.   68 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 37–47.   69 The letter from the EC LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 29 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­55.   70 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a. Also, Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13.   71 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 7 July 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­57.   72 Ibid.   73 Ibid.   74 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Transcripts and Accompanying Documents and Resolutions; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролики(Rolls) 6225, 6227, and 6228 (microfilms).   75 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, p. 23.   76 Ibid, p. 1.   77 Ibid, p. 2   78 Ibid, p. 48.   79 Ibid, p. 43.   80 Ibid, p. 90.   81 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, p. 51.   82 Ibid, pp. 37–8.   83 Ibid, p. 37.   84 Ibid, pp. 39–40.   85 Ibid, p. 90.   86 Term used by Communist officials, part of Marxist terminology, to depict the process of defining ideological differences with the enemies of socialism.   87 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 5–20.   88 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, pp. 23–4.   89 Ibid, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, pp. 90–100.   90 Ibid.   91 Ibid, Shepilov’s address, Transcript of 11 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 159, p. 123.   92 Ibid, Khrushchev’s closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 161, pp. 198–201.   93 Ibid, pp. 196–7.   94 Ibid, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, p. 49.   95 Ibid, p. 33.

Notes   241   96 Ibid, p. 36.   97 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; Ibid, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 56; Kaganovich’s address (evening, 11 July), Ibid, Дело 160, 7; Saburov’s address (evening, 11 July), Ibid, Дело 160, p. 112.   98 Ibid, Transcripts, Accompanying Documents, and Resolutions; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролики (Rolls) 6225, 6227, and 6228 (microfilms).   99 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, p. 49. 100 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; Ibid, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, pp. 1–65. 101 Ibid, Suslov’s address, p. 132. 102 Ibid, Malenkov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening, session, Ibid, Ролик 6228, Дело 160, p. 79. 103 Ibid, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; Ibid, Дело 158, p. 113. 104 Ibid, p. 116. 105 Ibid, Saburov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening, session, Ibid, Дело 160, pp. 112–14. 106 Ibid, Shepilov’s address, Transcript of 11 July 1955, morning session; Ibid, Дело 159, p. 123. 107 Khrushchev’s closing address, pp. 198–201. 108 Ibid; The Resolution of the Plenum: The Results of the Soviet–Yugoslav Talks; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 205–6. 109 Ibid, Report by the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of the Soviet– Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 60–2. 110 Ibid, 63. 111 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.4 [Vol. 4], p. 189. 112 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], pp. 148–50. 113 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, p. 48. 114 The Meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) – Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/62a. Also, Fifth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. 115 Progress Report on NSC 5406/1 United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, 13 April 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 632–5. Also, Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, 16 September 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 666–7. In the Memorandum from Murphy, the total amount of programmed military aid quoted was slightly smaller, US$772.2 million. 116 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56. 117 Memorandum of conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, V. Volkov; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 40, Папка 163, Дело 4, pp. 131–5. 118 Ibid. 119 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 8 July 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­58. 120 Report by the First Department of DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5–18764. 121 DSIP Memo on Relations with the USSR after Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia;

242   Notes Part of the materials prepared for Tito for his trip to USSR in June 1956; No date, probably second half of May 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F87/2–423244. 122 Ibid. Also, Report by the First Department of DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5–18764. 123 The Chronology of Yugoslav–Soviet Relations (1953–1956) – Report prepared by DSIP for Tito’s visit to the USSR, June 1956; No date, probably second half of May 1956 (the last entry in the document was for 18 May and Tito departed for Moscow on 1 June 1956); AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, 683–717. 124 DSIP Memo on Relations With the USSR-­Part of the materials prepared for Tito for his trip to USSR in June 1956; Second half of May 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F87/2–423244. 125 Report by the First Department of the DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5–18764. 126 Detailed report on Mikoyan’s visit, 26 October 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/ SSSR I – 334. 127 Memorandum of conversation, V. Mićunović – new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firyubin, 15 September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SSSR Zab. – 313. 128 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 161. 129 Cable from Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, to Kardelj, 25 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I-­5–v. 130 Memorandum of conversation between Kardelj and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), cabled to Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, 29 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I – 5 – v. 131 For more on these trade agreements please refer to the previous Chapter. 132 Report by the First Department of the DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5–18764. 133 Cable from Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, to Kardelj, 25 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, I-­5–v. 134 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of Soviet–Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, p. 90. 135 Tito’s speech before the political leadership of Pula and the discussions that followed – Transcript, 10 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3. 136 US National Intelligence Council, Yugoslavia National Intelligence Estimates (NIE): NIE 31/2–55, 7 September 1955 (www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_ support/yugoslavia/Pub15_NIE_31_2–55.pdf ). 137 Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, August 11, 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 660–1. 138 Memorandums of Conversations between Srdja Prica and the US Ambassador (Riddleberger), 20 July 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. – 291; on 8 August 1955, SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. – 298; and on 16 August 1955, SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. – 300. 139 US National Intelligence Council, Yugoslavia National Intelligence Estimates (NIE): NIE 31/1–55, 19 May 1955, (www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/ yugoslavia/Pub14_NIE_31_1–55.pdf ). 140 Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, August 11, 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 660–1. Also, US National Intelligence Council . . . NIE 31/1–55, 19 May 1955 (www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_

Notes   243 support/yugoslavia/Pub14_NIE_31_1–55.pdf ); 31/2–55, 7 September 1955 (www.dni. gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/yugoslavia/Pub15_NIE_31_2–55.pdf ). 141 US National Intelligence Council . . . NIE 31/2–55, 7 September 1955 (www.dni. gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/yugoslavia/Pub15_NIE_31_2–55.pdf ). 142 Memorandum of Two Conversations Between President Tito and the US Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy, 27 and 29 September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. II – 345; Confidential Memorandum of Understanding, 1 October 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F III/SAD I – 332 /, 306–12. 143 Record of the Meeting Between President Tito and the US Secretary of State (Dulles) on Brioni, 6 November 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. II – 362. Also, Record of the Meeting Between Secretary of State Dulles and President Tito on the Island of Vanga [Brioni Archipelago], November 6, 1955, 3–5:40 pm; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 680–97. 144 Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, August 11, 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 660–1. 145 Note 5; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, p. 699. 146 Record of the Meeting Between President Tito and the US Secretary of State (Dulles) on Brioni, 6 November 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II/SAD Zab. II – 362. 147 Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 November 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 703–4. 148 Message From the Secretary of State to the President, at Denver, 7 November 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 698–9. 149 Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 November 1955; FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVI, pp. 703–4. 150 Relations In the Balkan Alliance After the Ankara Conference, 1 September 1955; Top Secret DSIP Bulletin, 1 September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F IV/Fasc. I /I – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 16/55, pp. 7–9. 151 Top Secret DSIP Bulletin, 1 December 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F IV/Fasc. I /II – DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 22/55, pp. 3–6. 152 Report From the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, 9 February 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/II-­40. 153 Report by the HM Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) of a Conversation With E. Kardelj, 9 March 1955; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY 10338/16, Telegram No. 35. 154 The Letter From the CC LCY, signed by Tito, to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, 11 February 1956; AJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­62. 155 Letter from Tito to Khrushchev and the CC CPSU, Belgrade, 20 February 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­63. 156 Copy of the ‘Secret speech’ by N.S. Khrushchev and the accompanying cover letter, 8 March 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­65. Also, Josip Vrhovec, Zlatko Čepo (eds.), Tajni referat N.S. Hruščeva [The Secret Report by N.S. Khrushchev], (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1970), pp. 15–93. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13–14 March 1956 – Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/II/14. 160 Ibid. 161 Report by the HM Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank) of a Conversation With E. Kardelj, 9 March 1955; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY 10338/16, Telegram No. 35. 162 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13–14 March 1956 – Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/II/14. 163 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Mikoyan’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, morning session; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 159, p. 61.

244   Notes 164 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13–14 March 1956 – Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/II/14. 165 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC – Transcript, April 2, 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/66. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 172 Author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, 12 February 2000.

4  Contention     1 The British Ambassador in Moscow (Sir William Hayter) to the Foreign Office, Telegram No. 849, June 20, 1956; The National Archives (PRO), FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. RY 10338/63.     2 V. Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., pp. 87–9.     3 The British Ambassador in Moscow (Sir William Hayter) to the Foreign Office, Telegram No. 849, June 20, 1956; FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. RY 10338/63.     4 Dobrivoje Vidić, Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Yugoslav Ambassadors – ‘On the Origins Of the Recent Worsening Of Relations With the USSR’, 8 January 1957; SMIP, SPA, 1957, F II/SSSR I – 8.     5 Letter by Khrushchev and the CC CPSU to Tito and the CC LCY, May 22, 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­68.     6 Official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in the Kremlin – Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 732–801.    7 Ibid.    8 Ibid.    9 Ibid.   10 Ibid.   11 Ibid.   12 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Romania, and USSR – Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 130–70.   13 Official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Kremlin – Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 732–801.   14 Ibid.   15 Ibid.   16 Ibid.   17 Ibid.   18 Ibid.   19 Ibid.   20 Ibid.   21 Official text of the Moscow Declaration, 20 June 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69.   22 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, I–3.   23 Ibid.   24 Transcript of Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­56.

Notes   245   25 Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences: The Struggle For Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 1944–1957, (London: Blond and Briggs, 1982), pp. 132–3.   26 Telegram No. 51 from the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) to the Foreign Office, 26 May 1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY10338/43.   27 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Romania, and USSR – Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 130–70.   28 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 78.   29 Official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Kremlin – Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 732–801.   30 Telegram No. 407 from the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) to the Foreign Office, 23 June 1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. RY 10338/70.   31 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Romania, and USSR – Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 130–70.   32 Ibid.   33 V. Mićunović’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-­August 1956, in preparation for Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 – 423481.   34 Ibid.   35 Official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in Kremlin – Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp. 732–801.   36 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 94.   37 Borba, 1 July 1956.   38 Resolution or Decree.   39 Pravda, 2 July 1956.   40 Paul E. Zinner (ed.), Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1956, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 201 (Note 1) and p. 207.   41 Pravda, 2 July 1956.   42 V. Mićunović’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-­August 1956, in preparation for Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 – 423481.   43 Telegram from V. Mićunović to DSIP, 5 July 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F87/2–411016.   44 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., 103.   45 Telegram from K. Popović to V. Mićunović on his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 9 July 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/SSSR I – 164.   46 V. Mićunović’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-­August 1956, in preparation for Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 – 423481.   47 DSIP Strogo Pov Bilten [Top Secret Bulletin], Nr. 12/1956, 8–19, 6 July 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F III/Fasc. I.   48 Ibid. Also, DSIP Memorandum on the Soviet Press Coverage on Yugoslavia in July and August 1956, 9 September 1956; SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1956, F87/2–414829.   49 Pravda, 2 July 1956. On Togliatti’s visit, see also DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 19 June 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F III/Fasc. I, Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 11/1956, 25–33.   50 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн. 4 [Vol. 4], p. 154.   51 V. Mićunović’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-­August 1956, in preparation for Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 – 423481.

246   Notes   52 V. Mićunović report to A. Ranković (for Tito) on conversation with Khrushchev, 13 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v.   53 Report on Khrushchev and Bulganin’s speeches, 25 July 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III-­8.   54 V. Mićunović’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-­August 1956, in preparation for Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 – 423481.   55 Ibid.   56 Ibid.   57 V. Mićunović’s report from Moscow, 18 August 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69.   58 Pouch from CPSU CC and N. S. Khrushchev, 4 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69. See also Document No. 14: Nikita Khrushchev’s Letter to Matyas Rakosi and Other Socialist Leaders, 13 July 1956 in Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2002), pp. 136–42.   59 V. Mićunović report to A. Ranković (for Tito) on conversation with Khrushchev, 13 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. Also, Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., pp. 106–9.   60 Ibid.   61 V. Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 107.   62 Ibid, p. 109.   63 Ibid. For Mikoyan’s report, see Document No, 15: Report from Anastas Mikoyan on the Situation in the Hungarian Workers’ Party, 14 July, 1956 in Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 143–7.   64 V. Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 109   65 Ibid, p. 110.   66 Cable K. Popović to V. Mićunović, 26 July 1956; SMIP, Kabinet Državnog Sekretara Koče Popovića, FI, 1956–2/41.   67 Report of the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest (Andropov), 9 July 1956, as quoted in Leonid Gibianskii, Soviet–Yugoslav Relations and Hungarian Revolution, 1956, in Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis [Yugoslav Historical Journal], 1996, Issue 1–2, 156. Also Document No. 19: Report from Ambassador Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Condition in Hungary, 29 August 1956, in Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 159–67.   68 Note 309, in Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002), p. 351.   69 Reports from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Hungary (Dalibor Soldatić), 19 and 23 July 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 51/121–3–411988.   70 Document No. 18: Letter from Ernö Gerö to Josip Broz Tito, July 19, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 157–8.   71 Ibid. (Introductory Note).   72 Borba, 20 July 1956, 3; 23 July 1956, 1; 23 August 1956, 3. Also, Document No. 19: Report from Ambassador Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Conditions in Hungary, August 29, 1956, in Csaba Békés et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 159–67.   73 Document No. 19: Report from Ambassador Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Conditions in Hungary, August 29, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 159–67.

Notes   247   74 V. Mićunović report to A. Ranković (for Tito) on conversation with Khrushchev, 13 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. Also, Report on the meeting [of Ambassador Firyubin] with the Yugoslav President, Comrade J.B. Tito, 9 August 1956; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 41, Папка 169, Дело 5, pp. 65–8.   75 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 123.   76 Ibid, pp. 125–6.   77 Ibid.   78 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   79 Telegram from S. Prica to Yugoslav Ambassadors on Khrushchev’s visit, 28 September 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/SSSR II – 242.   80 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   81 Cable from S. Prica to Yugoslav Ambassadors on Khrushchev’s visit, 28 September 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/SSSR II – 242.   82 Memorandum of discussion during the dinner at comrade Tito’s, given in Khrushchev’s honour, 26 September 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­73.   83 Ibid.   84 Ibid.   85 Ibid.   86 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн. 4 [Vol. 4], p. 154.   87 Memorandum of discussion during the dinner at comrade Tito’s, given in Khrushchev’s honour; 26 September 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­73.   88 Ibid.   89 Ibid.   90 Ibid.   91 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 141.   92 Report by V. Mićunović on conversations with Bulganin,Firyubin, Voroshilov, and Kirichenko during the visit to Crimea, 6 October 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­74.   93 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   94 Ibid.   95 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955–31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), p. 15188.   96 Borba, 12 October 1956   97 Borba, 28 October 1956.   98 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955–31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), p. 15188   99 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., p. 115. 100 Ibid, p. 116. 101 V. Mićunović’s report from Moscow, 18 August 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69. 102 Transcript of talks held between the President Tito and the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, on board the ship ‘Mindon’, 14 January 1955, at 15:30; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/4–2. 103 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/13. 104 Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Secretary of State, 1 November 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1414–16. 105 Report on the meeting with the Yugoslav President, Comrade J.B. Tito, 9 August 1956; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 41, Папка 169, Дело 5, pp. 65–8. 106 Veljko Mićunović, Moskovske godine . . ., pp. 118–26.

248   Notes 107 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955–31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), p. 15188. 108 Instructive cable from K. Popović to Yugoslav Ambassadors on the official position regarding events in Hungary, 26 October 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/Madj. I – 260. 109 Document No. 41: Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC Presidium Instructions to Yurii Andropov [Soviet Ambassador in Budapest] and Arkadii Sobolev [Soviet Ambassador in the UN], October 28, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 270–1. 110 Borba, 30 October 1956. 111 Telegram from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatić) to DSIP, 27 October 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska II – 417907. 112 Document No. 40: Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session, October 28, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp.  262–9. In the footnote No. 166 to the above quoted document, Békés et al. assert that, in the end, Moscow had never sent the telegram to Belgrade. 113 Memorandum of conversation between President Tito and the KOMSOMOL Delegation, 28 October 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. 114 Document No. 55: Instructions from Koča Popović, Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Dalibor Soldatić, October 31, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., p. 312. 115 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3. Also, S. Prica to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris (Bebler), 9 November 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/Madj. I – 275. 116 Ibid. 117 Document No. 53: Working Notes and Attached Extracts from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., p. 312. 118 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj, and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November 1956, (compiled the next morning, from memory 3 November, by Mićunović, on Tito’s orders); AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. Also, Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], pp.  257–8. Also, Veljko Mićunović, Mos­kovske godine . . ., pp. 156–64. 119 Ibid. 120 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj, and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. 121 Document No. 53: Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting, October 31, 1956, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 307–10. 122 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj, and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], p. 258. 128 Telegram from S. Prica to the Yugoslav Embassy in New Delhi – paraphrase of the TANJUG statement, 9 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska X – 419045.

Notes   249 129 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidić and the Indian Ambassador in Belgrade (Dayal), 4 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska V – 418445. 130 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidić and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 6 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska VII – 418778. 131 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­83. 132 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], p. 257. 133 Telegram No. 614 from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw (Milatović) to DSIP, 5 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska VI – 418571. 134 Telegram No. 615 from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw (Milatović) to DSIP, 5 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska VI – 418570. 135 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidić and the Polish Chargé in Belgrade (Pietrusińsky), 5 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska VI – 418551. 5  Confrontation     1 Instructive telegram from A. Ranković to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatić), 4 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37, p. 7.     2 Report from the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Firyubin) to the Presidium of the CPSU CC, 4 November 1956; РГАНИ, Φонд 89, Опись 45, Дело 25, pp. 1–4.     3 Instructive telegram from A. Ranković to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatić), 4 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37, p.  7. Also, Letter from the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council to the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, signed by E. Kardelj, 18 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX-­75/I-­37, pp. 15–18.     4 Report from the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Firyubin) to the Presidium of the CPSU CC, 4 November 1956; РГАНИ, Φонд 89, Опись 45, Дело 25, pp. 1–4.     5 Instructions from the CPSU CC Presidium to the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 4 November 1956; РГАНИ, Φонд 89, Опис 45, Дело 25, pp. 1–4.     6 Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 5 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­76.     7 As paraphrased in Khrushchev’s letter to Tito, 7 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­77.     8 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC–Tito’s address, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.     9 Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 7 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­77.   10 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC–Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/15.   11 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 8 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III-­15, Prilog 3/Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 10 November 1956; РГАНИ, Φонд 89, Опись 45, Дело 38, pp. 2–4.   12 Collection of documents on the Nagy affair, 3–22 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37. Also, Politika Jugoslavije prema Madjarskoj i slučaj Imre Nadja (Bela knjiga) [The Policy of Yugoslavia Towards Hungary and the Case of Imre Nagy (The White Book)], (Belgrade: Sekretarijat za informacije, SIV – The Secretariat for Information, Federal Executive Council, 1959) [Henceforth: The White Book . . .].   13 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidić and Imre Nagy, Géza Loszonczy, Donáth, and Haraszti in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, 19 November 1956;

250   Notes AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37, pp. 19–20/Memorandum of conversations between D. Vidić and János Kádár on: 19, 21, and again on 21 (20:30 – 00:30) November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37, pp.  21–32/Letter from János Kádár to the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, 21 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX – 75/I – 37, pp. 33–6.   14 Report from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatić), 22 November 1956; The White Book . . ., p. 148.   15 Yugoslav Note to the Hungarian Government, 24 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska XVI – 420207/Yugoslav Note to the Hungarian Government, 6 December 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska XVIII – 420849/Soviet Note to the Government of Yugoslavia, 6 December 1956; РГАНИ, Фонд 89, Oпись 45, Дело 56, pp. 4–5.   16 Document No. 98: Report by Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov, and Averki Aristov on Hungarian-­Yugoslav Negotiations, November 17, 1956 in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 435–6.   17 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­83.   18 Memorandum of conversation between Tito and A. Ranković and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v. The same meeting also from the report by Firyubin, 29 November 1956; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опис 41, Папка 169, Дело 5, pp.  115–20. Also, Report by the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Firyubin on the conversation with the Yugoslav president Tito and A. Ranković, 5 December 1956; АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опис 41, Папка 169, Дело 5, pp. 123–6.   19 Introductory note to Document No. 101, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., p. 445.   20 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   21 Pravda, 8 November 1956.   22 Ibid.   23 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3.   24 Ibid.   25 Ibid.   26 Ibid.   27 Ibid.   28 Ibid.   29 Ibid.   30 Ibid.   31 Dispatch from Sir Frank Roberts in Belgrade to the Foreign Office, 17 August 1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124275, Doc. RY 1022/83.   32 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mićunović and N. S. Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162.   33 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   34 Ibid.   35 Ibid.   36 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3.   37 Memorandum of conversation between president Tito, A. Ranković and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v.

Notes   251   38 Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidić) to DSIP, 9 February 1956; AJ, 507/IX, 119/II-­40.   39 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj, and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v.   40 Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­80.   41 Ibid.   42 Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­80. Also, Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162.   43 Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­80.   44 Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162.   45 Tito’s report at the Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   46 Report by Mićunović on his conversation with Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Molotov, 18 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­81. Also, Report by V. Mićunović on the meeting with Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162.   47 Kardelj’s report on the Moscow Conference, IX Plenum of the LCY CC, 7 December 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/17.   48 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   49 Koča Popović to Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad, 10 November 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/Jug. II – 278.   50 Memorandum of conversation between Tito and A. Ranković and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v/Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   51 Cable J. Brilej to DSIP, 28 October 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska II – 417965. Also, A. Bebler to DSIP, 3 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50/Madjarska VI – 418490.   52 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3.   53 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, 6 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III-­67.   54 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his responses to questions – Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I – 3.   55 Report by Mićunović on his conversation with Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Molotov, 18 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­81.   56 Ibid.   57 Ibid.   58 Ibid.   59 Pravda, 23 November 1956.   60 Ibid.   61 More on this Resolution in Chapter III.   62 Pravda, 23 November 1956.   63 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­83.   64 Ibid.

252   Notes   65 Ibid.   66 Borba, 8 December 1956. Also, in Robert Bass, Elizabeth Marbury (eds.) The Soviet–Yugoslav Controversy, 1948–58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect Books for The East European Institute, 1959), pp. 86–105.   67 Ibid.   68 Ibid.   69 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, Tito’s address, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   70 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­83/Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   71 Report by V. Mićunović on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 12 December, 13 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 166.   72 Ibid.   73 Ibid.   74 ‘For Whose Benefit’ by J. Pavlov, Pravda, 18 December 1956.   75 Ibid.   76 ‘More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ in Renmin Ribao, 29 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III – 12.   77 Ibid.   78 Ibid.   79 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24.   80 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   81 Telegram from V. Mićunović to DSIP, 3 January 1957; SMIP, PA, 1957, F 98/320–1 – 4168.   82 Ibid.   83 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   84 D. Vidić to Yugoslav Ambassadors, 26 November 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/ SSSR II – 288/Memorandum of conversation D. Vidić and the Chinese Ambassador in Belgrade (Wu), 17 December 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, FII/Kina I, pp.  176–7/K. Popović to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Peking (V. Popović), 18 December 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II/Kina. I – 314.   85 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   86 Ibid.   87 Ibid.   88 Ibid.   89 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj, and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2–3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I – 5 – v.   90 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24.   91 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1957–31 December 1958, Vol. XI, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), pp. 15463–4.   92 Document No. 109: Minutes of a Meeting between the Hungarian and the Chinese Delegations in Budapest, 16 January 1957, in Csaba Békés, et al. (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution . . ., pp. 496–503.   93 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 24 January 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III-­68. Also, Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14

Notes   253 February 1957, Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24.   94 Meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee – Transcript, 24 January 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III-­68. Also, Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.   95 Ibid.   96 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24.   97 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 29 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­85.   98 Report by Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 11 January 1957; АВП, РФ, Φонд 0144, Опись 42, Папка 175, Дело 4, pp. 6–11.   99 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24. 100 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 10 January 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­92. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC – Memorandum of discussions, 24 January 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III-­68. 104 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­95. 109 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15. 110 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­95. 111 Official Yugoslav–Soviet talks in the Kremlin – Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-­2/7–1, pp.  732–801; Postanovlenie of the CPSU CC ‘On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences’, of 30 June 1956 in Pravda, 2 July 1956, 1–2; Resolution of the CPSU CC: The Information On the Results of Soviet–Yugoslav Talks, held in June 1956, 13 July 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69. 112 V. Mićunović’s report from Moscow, 18 August 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69. Also, Pouch from CPSU CC and N. S. Khrushchev, 4 December 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­69. 113 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], 272. 114 Pravda, 23 November 1956. 115 Report by V. Mićunović on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162. 116 Report from the Soviet Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 29 November 1956; АВП, РФ, Φонд 0144, Опись 41, Папка 169, Дело 5, pp. 115–20. 117 Borba, 8 December 1956. Also, in Robert Bass at al (eds.) The Soviet–Yugoslav Controversy . . ., pp. 86–105. 118 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC – Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/15.

254   Notes 119 Ibid. 120 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13–14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address – Transcript of the fourth, evening session, 14 February 1957; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6239, Дело 215, pp. 105–24. 121 Ibid. 122 Report by Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 27 January 1957; АВП, РФ, Φонд 0144, Опись 42, Папка 175, Дело 4, pp. 40–2. 123 Report by V. Mićunović on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI/Strogo pov. – 162. Conclusions   1 Mićunović report on meetings with N.S. Khrushchev, 21 April 1957, SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1957, FIII/Strogo pov. – 29.   2 Cable from Mićunović to DSIP, 12 May 1957, SMIP, PA, 1957, F 98/320–5 – 410430.   3 Cable from Mićunović to DSIP, 20 May 1957, SMIP, PA, 1957, F 98/320–5 – 411170.   4 Report from the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, N.P. Firyubin on meetings with Tito, Kardelj, and General I. Gošnjak on 2 and 3 July 1957, АВП, РФ, Фонд 0144, Опись 42, Папка 175, Дело 4, pp. 105–10.   5 Cable from Vidić, Deputy Foreign Secretary to Ambassadors, 21 July 1957, SMIP, SPA, 1957, F II/SSSR II – 154.   6 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 September 1957, SMIP, SPA, 1957, F III/Fasc. I/DSIP Bulletin No. 14/57, pp. 5–8.   7 Eighth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 9 September 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/16.   8 Ibid.   9 Ibid. 10 Cable M. Iveković – All Ambassadors, 9 October 1957, SMIP, SPA, 1957, F II/Ist. Nem. II – 243. 11 Record of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, 29 October 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III-­73. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC – Transcript, 23 November 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III/74. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Khrushchev’s speech at the VII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 3 June 1958, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­127. 19 The letter of the CPSU CC of 5 April 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III/78. 20 Report by Mićunović on the meeting with Suslov, 16 April 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III/78. 21 Report from the meeting of the EC of the LCY CC, 17 April 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/III/78. 22 Ibid. 23 Eighth Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 9 September 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/16. 24 Cable Mićunović – DSIP, 31 May 1958, SMIP, PA, 1958, F 117/320–2 – 413084. 25 Khrushchev’s speech at the VII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 3 June 1958, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-­127.

Notes   255 26 Mićunović report on meeting with Khrushchev, 20 June 1958, SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1958, FI/Strogo pov. – 35 27 Yugoslav Note to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 October 1958, SMIP, SPA, 1958, F II/Madjarska I – 296. 28 During a meeting with Tito in 1958, Nehru expressed disappointment with Nasser’s actions, at the time and the Yugoslav leader had to persuade him that, post-­Suez and developments in Iraq, the Egyptian leader was a victim of a concerted Western, in particular British smear campaign. Talks between President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 and 15 January 1959 – Transcript; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–4; Report on the trip of the President of the Republic and the Yugoslav delegation to friendly African and Asian states before the extended (and closed) session of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, Belgrade, 17 March 1959 – Transcript; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 29 Memorandums of conversations, Yugoslav – Indonesian talks held during Comrade President’s visit to Indonesia, 23 December 1959–1 January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–2. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 30 Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 31 Talks between President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 and 15 January 1959 – Transcript; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–4; Report on the trip of the President . . . AJBT, KPR I-­2/11; Memorandum of conversation, Yugoslav – Ceylonese talks, Colombo, 21January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–5. 32 Memorandum of conversations between President [Tito] and President Nasser, Port Said, 5 December 1958; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–1, and in Cairo, 21 February 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–8; Memorandum of conversations, Yugoslav-­Sudanese talks, Khartoum, 12–18 February, 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–7. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 33 Memorandum of conversations between President [Tito] and President Nasser, Port Said, 5 December 1958; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–1, and in Cairo, 21 February 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–8; Memorandum of conversation between Comrade President and Emperor Haile Selassie I, Addis Ababa, 11 February 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–6. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 34 Memorandums of conversations, Yugoslav – Indonesian talks held during Comrade President’s visit to Indonesia, 23 December 1959–1 January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–2. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 35 Memorandums of conversations between President Tito and the Burmese Prime Minister, Ne Win, Rangoon, 8 and 9 January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–3; Memorandum of conversation between President Tito and ten members of the Executive Committee of the Burmese Socialist party, led by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, Rangoon, 9 January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–3; Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 36 Memorandums of conversations, Yugoslav – Indonesian talks . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–2. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 37 Memorandum of conversations between President [Tito] and President Nasser . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–8. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 38 Talks between President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 and 15 January 1959 – Transcripts; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–4. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 39 Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 40 Ibid.

256   Notes 41 Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 42 Ibid. 43 Memorandums of conversations, Yugoslav – Indonesian talks held during Comrade President’s visit to Indonesia, 23 December 1959–1 January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–2. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 44 Memorandum of conversation, Yugoslav – Ceylonese talks, Colombo, 21January 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–5. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 45 Memorandum of conversation between Comrade President and Emperor Haile Selassie I, Addis Ababa, 11 February 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–6. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 46 Talks between President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 and 15 January 1959 – Transcripts; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–4. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 47 Memorandum of conversations, Yugoslav-­Sudanese talks, Khartoum, 12–18 February, 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–7. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11. 48 Memorandum of conversations between President [Tito] and President Nasser, Port Said, 5 December 1958; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–1, and in Cairo, 21 February 1959; AJBT, KPR I-­2/11–8. Also, Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/1. 49 Report on the trip of the President of the Republic . . .; AJBT, KPR I-­2/1. 50 ‘It would be enough for me to shake my little finger – and there will be no more Tito. He will fall’. According to Khrushchev, this is how Stalin commented Tito’s defiance, in the early phase of the Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation, in the spring of 1948. Tajni referat N.S. Hruščova [Secret Report by N.S. Khrushchev], (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1970), p. 70. 51 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания . . ., Кн.4 [Vol. 4], p. 189. 52 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955, Transcripts, Accompanying Documents, and Resolutions; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролики(Rolls) 6225, 6227, and 6228 (microfilms). 53 T William Taubman, Khrushchev: The man and His Era (London: Free Press, 2004), p. 268. 54 Ibid. The Resolution of the Plenum: The Results of the Soviet–Yugoslav Talks; РГАНИ, Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6225, Дело 143, pp. 205–6. 55 Seventh Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 9 September 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/16. 56 Report by Edward Kardelj on the Conference in Moscow at the Ninth Plenum of the LCY Central Committee – Transcript, 7 December 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/17. 57 Н. С. Хрущев, Воспоминания: . . ., Кн.3 [Vol. 3], p. 272. 58 Seventh Plenum of LCY CC – Transcript, 9 September 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/ IX, 119/II/16. 59 Record of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, 29 October 1957, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III-­73. 60 Ibid.

Selected bibliography

Primary sources Unpublished documents Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ) [Yugoslav Archives] ACK SKJ, 507: The LCY Central Committee Collection.

Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (AJBT) [The Archive of Josip Broz Tito] KPR: The Cabinet of the President Collection.

Arhiv Ministarstva za inostrane poslove Republike Srbije (AMIP) [The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Serbia] PA: Poverljiva Arhiva – confidential archives. SPA: Strogo Poverljiva Arhiva – top secret archives.

Российски Государственй Архив Новейшей Истории (РГАНИ) [The Russian State Archives of Contemporary History] No. 89: Various CPSU Confidential Papers No. 2: CPSU Central Committee Plenums (1941–1966) No. 5: CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Papers

Translation of Russian archival terms: Φонд Опис Дело Папка Ролик

collection series/record series folder file microfilm roll

Архив Внешней Политики Российскей Федерации (АВП РФ) [The Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation] 06, 0536: Cabinet of the Foreign Minister (V. Molotov and D. Shepilov) 144: Yugoslav Department (confidential) 0144: Yugoslav Department (top secret)

258   Selected bibliography National Archives of Great Britain – Public Record Office (PRO), Kew FO/371: Foreign Office Series CAB: Cabinet papers

Published documents Bass, Robert and Elizabeth Marbury (eds), The Soviet–Yugoslav Controversy, 1948–58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect Books for the East European Institute, 1959). Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer (eds), The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002). Bošković, Blagoje and Dr Dašić, David, Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji, 1950–1976: Dokumenti razvoja [Self-management in Yugoslavia, 1950–1976: Documents] (Beograd: Privredni pregled, 1977). Clissold, Stephen (ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939–1973: A Documentary Survey (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975). Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu/Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984). Dedijer, Vladimir, Dokumenti 1948, Knjige 1–3 [Documents 1948, Volumes 1–3] (Beograd: Izdavacka radna organizacija ‘Rad’, 1979). Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS), 1952–1954, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Vol. VIII, and 1955–1957: Central and Southeastern Europe, Vol. XXVI (United States Government Printing Office, 1988). Luburić, Radoica (ed.), Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR-­a 1953–1955: Tematska zbirka dokumenata [Reconciliation of Yugoslavia and USSR, 1953–1955: Thematic Collection of Documents] (Podgorica: Historical Institute of Montenegro, 1999). Petranović, Branko and Zečević Momčilo, Jugoslovenski federalizam: Ideje I stvarnost – tematska zbirka dokumenata, I i II tom, [The Yugoslav Federalism: Ideas and Reality – Thematic document collection, Vols I and II] (Beograd: Prosveta, 1987). Politika Jugoslavije prema Madjarskoj i slučaj Imre Nadja (Bela knjiga) [The Policy of Yugoslavia Towards Hungary and the Case of Imre Nagy (The White Book)] (Belgrade: Sekretarijat za informacije SIV, 1959). Stokes, Gale (ed.), From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Vrhovec, Josip and Zlatko Čepo (eds), Tajni referat N.S. Hruščeva [The Secret Report by N.S. Khrushchev] (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1970). US National Intelligence Council, Yugoslavia National Intelligence Estimates (NIE); www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/yugoslavia Zinner, Paul E. (ed.), Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

Interviews Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, conducted on 12 February 2000, in Reževići, Montenegro.

Selected bibliography   259 Newspapers and journals BORBA: the LCY official organ. POLITIKA: Yugoslav daily newspaper. PRAVDA: the CPSU official organ.

Secondary sources Books and abstracts Banac, Ivo, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits In Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Békés, Csaba, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics, Cold War International History Project Working paper, No. 16 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1956). Bekić, Darko, Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu: Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955 [Yugoslavia in the Cold War: Relations with the Big Powers 1949–1955] (Zagreb: Globus, 1988). Beloff, Nora, Tito’s Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939–84 (London: Gollancz, 1985). Bilandzić, Dušan, Historija Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978). Boffa, Giuseppe, Povijest Sovjetskog saveza [The History of the Soviet Union], Vol. II, Od domovinskog rata do položaja druge velesile: Staljin i Hruščov, 1941–1964 [From the Great Patriotic War to the Position of the Second Superpower: Stalin and Khrushchev, 1941–1964] (Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1985). Bokovoy, Melissa K., Irvine, Jill A. and Lilly, Carol S., State–Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945–1992 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). Bošković, Blagoje and Dr Dašić David, Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji, 1950–1976: Dokumenti razvoja [Self-­management in Yugoslavia, 1950–1976: Documents on Evolution] (Beograd: Privredni pregled, 1977). Brands, H.W., The Spectre of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Burlatsky, Fedor, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991). Campbell, John C., Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1967). Campbell, John C. (ed.), Successful Negotiations: Trieste 1954: An Appraisal by the Five Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Carter, April, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1982). Conquest, R., Power and Policy in the USSR: The Struggle for Stalin’s Succession, 1945–1960 (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1967). Crampton, Richard J., The Balkans since the Second World War (New York: Longman, 2002). Dedijer Vladimir, Izgubljena bitka J.V. Staljina (Sarajevo: Svjetlost-­ProsvetaOslobodjenje, 1969). ——, The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948–1953 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978).

260   Selected bibliography ——, Novi Prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito] Vols 1 and 2 (Zagreb-­Rijeka: Mladost – Liburnija, 1980). ——, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito] Vol. 3 (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija ‘Rad’, 1984). Dimić Ljubodrag, Istorija srpske državnosti [A History of Serbian Statehood] Vol. III, Srbija u Jugoslaviji [Serbia in Yugoslavia] (Novi Sad: Srpska Akademija Nauka, 2001). Dimitrov, Vesselin, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria, 1941–48 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Djilas Milovan, Tito: The Story From Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981). ——, Rise and Fall (San Diego: Harcourt and Brace Jovanovich, 1985). ——, Conversations With Stalin (London: Hart-Davis, 1962). Doder, Duško, The Yugoslavs (Random House: New York, 1978). Едемский, А.Б., От конфликта к нормализации: Советско – югславские отношения в 1953–1956 годах [From Conflict to Normalization: Soviet–Yugoslav Relations in 1953–1956] (Mосква: Наук, 2008). Fejtö, François, A History of the Peoples’ Democracies: Eastern Europe since Stalin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974). Fowkes, Ben, Eastern Europe, 1945–1969: From Stalinism to Stagnation (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000). ——, The Rise and Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). Fursenko, A. and Naftali, T., Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006). Glenny, Misha, The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: Granta Books, 1999). Halperin, Ernst, The Triumphant Heretic: Tito’s Struggle Against Stalin (Toronto: Heinemann, 1958). Heuser, Beatrice, Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Johnson, Ross A., The Sino-­Soviet Relationship and Yugoslavia, 1949–1971 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1971). Kardelj, Edvard, Sećanja: Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije, 1944–1957, [Reminescences: Struggle for the Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia, 1949–1957] (Ljubljana-­Beograd: Državna založba Slovenije – Radnička štampa, 1980). ——–, Izbor iz dela [Selected Works] (Beograd: Izdavacki centar Komunist, 1979). Kosanović, Sava, Jugoslavija je bila osudjena na smrt (Zagreb: Globus, Beograd-­Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1984). Lafeber, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1975 (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1976). Lampe, John, Yugoslavia As History: Twice there was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Lees, Lorraine M., Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). Lenin, V.I., Selected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969). Lynch, Michael, Stalin and Khrushchev and the USSR, 1924–1964 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990).

Selected bibliography   261 Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, Selected Works, Volumes I and II (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1951). Mates, Leo, Medjunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije (Beograd: Nolit, 1976). Mazower, Mark, The Balkans: A Short History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000). McCauley, Martin, The Khrushchev Era: 1953–1964 (London and New York: Longman, 1995). Miller, R.F., External Factors in Yugoslav Political Development (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977). Neal, F. and Hoffman, G., Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962). Pavlowitch, Stevan, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and Her Problems, 1918–1988 (London: C. Hurst, 1988). Pelikán, Jan, Jugoslávie a Východní Blok, 1953–1958 (Univerzita Krlova v Praze: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2001). Petranović, Branko, Istorija Jugoslavije, 1918–1988 [History of Yugoslavia, 1918–1988], Vols. I–III (Beograd: Nolit, 1988). Petranović Branko, Štrbac Čedomir, Istorija Socijalističke Jugoslavije [The History of the Socialist Yugoslavia] (Beograd: Radnička knjiga, 1977). Perišić Miroslav, Od Staljina ka Sartru: Formiranje Jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima, 1945–1958 [From Stalin to Sartre: The Forming of Yugoslav Intelligentsia on European Universities, 1945–1958] (Beograd: Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije, 2008). Ramet, Sabrina, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005 (Washington, DC and Bloomington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Indiana University Press, 2006). Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Rusinow, Dennison, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (London: C. Hurst, 1977). Singleton, Fred, Twentieth Century Yugoslavia (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1976). Wilson, Duncan, Tito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Memoirs and biographies Auty, Phyllis, Tito: A Biography (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1970). Banac, Ivo (introduced and edited), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). Bebler, Aleš, Kako sam hitao: Sećanja [How I Dwelled: Reminescences] (Beograd: Cetvrti jul, 1982). Bohlen, Charles, Witness to History 1929–1969 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973). Chuev, Feliks, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations With Felix Chuev (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993). Crampton, Richard J., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). Crankshaw, E., Khrushchev, A Career (New York: The Viking Press, 1966). Dallin, David J., Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1960). Eden, Anthony, The Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960). Хрущев, Н.С., Воспоминания:Время,Люди,Власт [N.S. Khrushchev, Reminiscences: Times, People, Power], Кн.3 и 4 [Vols 3 and 4] (Москва: Московские Новости, 1999).

262   Selected bibliography Kardelj, Edvard, Reminescences: The Struggle For Recognition and Independence – The New Yugoslavia, 1944–1957 (London: Blond and Briggs in association with Summerfield Press, 1982). Kennan, George, Memoirs, 1950–1963 (London: Hutchinson, 1973). Khrushchev, Sergei, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2000). Macmillan, H., Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969). Medvedev, Roy, Khrushchev (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1983). Medvedev, Roy A. and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years In Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1977). Mićunović, Veljko, Moskovske godine, 1956–1958 (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1977). Milatović, Arso, Pet Diplomatskih Misija [Five Diplomatic Assignments] (Ljubljana and Zagreb: Cankarjeva zalozba, 1985). Nenadović, Aleksandar, Razgovori sa Kočom [Conversations with Koča] (Zagreb: Globus, 1989). Pavlowitch, Stevan, Tito: Yugoslavia’s Great Dictator – A Reassessment (London: C. Hurst, 1992). Ridley, Jasper, Tito (London: Constable, 1994). Šuvar, Mira, Vladimir Velebit: Svjedok historije [Vladimir Velebit: Witness to History] (Zagreb: Razlog d.o.o., 2001). Talbot, S. (trans. and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (London: André Deutsch, 1971). Taubman, William, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (London: Free Press, 2004). Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar, Revolucija koja teče: Memoari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs] (Beograd: Komunist, 1971). West, Richard, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (London: Sinclair-­Stevenson, 1994).

Articles and chapters in edited volumes Borozan, Djordje, ‘Posrednik mira izmedju ‘Gvozdenih zavesa’ (razgovori Tito-­Hruščov u Moskvi 1956’ [‘Peace Mediator Between the ‘Iron Curtains’ (Tito-­Khrushchev Talks in Moscow, 1956)’], Vojnoistorijski Glasnik [Journal Of Military History], Vol. 2, 1996, 133–53. Dimić, Ljubodrag, ‘Josip Broz i Nikita Sergejević Hruščov: Razgovori u Beogradu, 27. maj-­2. juni 1955’ [‘Josip Broz and Nikita Sergevich Khrushchev: Belgrade talks, 27 May – 2 June 1955’], Istorijski Glasnik [Historical Review], Vols 1–2, 1997, 35–67. ——, ‘Jugoslovensko-­Sovjetski odnosi 1953–1956’ [‘The Yugoslav–Soviet Relations, 1953–1956’], in Jugoslovensko-­sovjetski sukob 1948. godine: Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa [The Yugoslav–Soviet Conflict in 1948: Collection of Works From the Scientific Conference] (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu istoriju, 1999), 279–93. Edemskii, A., ‘The Turn in the Soviet–Yugoslav Relations, 1953–1955’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Vol. 10, 1998, 138. Gibianskii, ‘Leonid, Sovjetsko–Jugoslovenski odnosi i Madjarska revolucija 1956. godine’ [‘Soviet–Yugoslav Relations and Hungarian Revolution in 1956’], Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis [Yugoslav Historical Journal], Vols 1–2, 1996, 151–70. Gluchowski, L.W., ‘Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the “Polish October” ’, Cold War International History Project, Spring 1995, 38–49.

Selected bibliography   263 Granville, Johanna, ‘Josip Broz Tito’s Role in the 1956 “Nagy Affair” ’, Slavonic and East European Review, 1998, Vol. 76, No. 4, 672–702. Granville, Johanna, ‘Hungary, 1956: The Yugoslav Connection’, Europe–East Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1998, 493–517. Granville, Johanna, ‘Satellites of Prime Movers? Polish and Hungarian Reactions to the 1956 Events: New Archival Evidence’, East European Quarterly, Vol. 35, 2001, 435–71. Kiraly, K. Bela, ‘The Aborted Soviet Military Plans Against Tito’s Yugoslavia’ in Vuchinich, S (ed.), At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito–Stalin Split in a Historical Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Kramer, Mark, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crisis in Hungary and Poland’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1998, 163–214. Perovic, Jeronim, ‘The Tito–Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2007, 32–63. Rajak, Svetozar, ‘The Tito–Khrushchev Correspondence, 1954’, Cold War International History Project, Vol. 12/13, 2001, 315–24. Rajak, Svetozar, The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956 in the Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). ——, “Auf der Suche nach einem Leben außerhalb der beiden Blöcke: Jugoslawiens Weg in die Blockfreiheit” in Dominik Geppert and Udo Wengst (Hrsg.), ed., Neutralität – Chance oder Chimäre?: Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt, 1945–1990 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005). Ripp, Zoltán, ‘Hungary’s Part in the Soviet–Yugoslav Conflict, 1956–58’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1998, 197–225. Tripković, Djoko, ‘Jugoslavija i pitanje azila Imre Nadja’ [‘Yugoslavia and the Asylum of Imre Nagy’], Istorija 20. Veka [The Twentieth Century History], Vol. 1, 1997, 61–73. ——, ‘Normalizacija Yugoslovensko-­Sovjetskih Diplomatskih odnosa 1953. godine’ [‘The Normalization of Yugoslav-­Soviet Diplomatic Ralations in 1953’], Istorija 20. Veka, Vol. 1, 1994, 112–22.

Reference literature Hronologija revolucionarne delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita [The Chronology of the Revolutionary Work of Josip Broz Tito] (Beograd: Eksportpres, 1988). Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1950–30 June 1952, Vol. VIII (Bristol: Keesings Publications). Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952–31 December 1954, Vol. IX (Bristol: Keesings Publications). Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955–31 December 1956, Vol. X (Bristol: Keesings Publications). Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1957–31 December 1958, Vol. IX (Bristol: Keesings Publications). Jugoslavija, 1945–1964: Statistički pregled [Yugoslavia, 1945–1964: Statistical Review] (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 1965).

Index

Abakumov, Viktor 114, 130, 131 Abboud, General Ibrahim 206 Africa, Tito’s visit to 206–10, 216 Agitprop 59, 67 Albania, Yugoslav relations with 153 Alexander, Field Marshal Harold 51 Allen, Ambassador George 34 Ambassadorial Conference (1955) 124, 125–6, 141 Andropov, Yurii 167, 202 Anglo-American Declaration on Trieste (1953) 53–5, 57 Ankara Agreement (1953): military aspect 50; negotiations 37; as threat to Soviet national security 42, 45, 47, 50, 55–6, 211 anti-colonial movements 156, 157 anti-colonialism 100, 206 anti-Stalinism 48, 146, 163, 197 anti-Western demonstrations in Yugoslavia (1953) 53 anti-Yugoslav propaganda: abusive content of 74; collapse of normalization and resumption of (1956) 183, 184, 189, 191–9, 202–5; satellite states 71, 86–7, 181; and Soviet perceptions of Yugoslavia 115; Soviet promises to end 81, 82–3; termination of 85, 88; unleashing of (1948) 12 archival documents 1, 2–3, 4 art exhibitions 31–2 artistic associations 29–30 Asia, Tito’s visits to 101–7, 206–10, 216 Association of Yugoslav Patriots 81 atomic energy agreement 139 Austrian Treaty 112 Axel, Agah 50 Balkan federation, plan to create 14

Balkan Pact: irrelevance 143–4; irrelevance of post-normalization, 125–6, 143–4; military aspect of 116, 133; negotiations 34–5, 36–7, 39, 67, 71, 73–6, 80, 84; Soviet view on 45, 68, 87 Bandaranaike, Solomon 206, 208 Bandung Conference 116, 206 Basic Law (on handing over of the administration and management of state enterprises and higher economic associations to the workers) 24–7 Bebler, Aleš 38, 40, 46–7, 48, 53–4, 100, 187 Békés, Csaba 180 Belgrade Declaration (1955) 5, 7, 121–2, 123, 157, 162, 181–2, 212 Belgrade Radio 59 Beria, Lavrenty: attacks on Yugoslavia 40; as leadership contender 69; removal of 49–50, 59; responsibility for 1948 split 71, 79, 94, 114, 130, 131 Bevan, Aneurin 49 biographies 2 book chapters 6–8 Borba 2, 47, 59, 162, 170, 181, 187 border incidents 12, 40, 41, 47–8, 71, 86–7; joint commission to investigate 49 Brezhnev, Leonid 205 Brilej, Jože 31–2, 187 Brioni Declaration (1956) 106 Britain: Khrushchev’s visit to (1955) 153–4; Tito’s visit to (1953) 35–6, 40, 52 British Labour Party 93 Bulganin, Nikolai: condemnation of Stalin 14, 131–2; humiliation of 165; support for Khrushchev 127, 133, 134; visit to Yugoslavia 111, 113, 123

Index   265 Bulgaria: conciliatory initiatives towards Yugoslavia 49; Yugoslav relations with 153, 171 Burma: relations with 207; Tito’s visit to 104–5 censorship, easing of 28–30 Ceylon: economic cooperation with 208; relations with 206 China: activism in Asia 102–3; attack on Yugoslavia 202–3; hegemonic aspirations 207; Soviet policy on 116; split with Soviet Union 205, 215–16 Chinese Communist Party 5, 8; attack on Yugoslavia 191–4 Churchill, Winston 35, 40, 75 collective security, Tito–Nehru promotion of 104 collectivization in Yugoslavia 9 Columbia University 30 Comecon 152, 155 Cominform: cohesion of 82; dissolution of 152; prospect of Yugoslav return to 68, 90; Resolution of 28 June 1948 11, 79, 81; Resolution of 27 November 1949 13, 79; role of 93, 94, 154; Tito’s views on 148–9; Yugoslavia’s expulsion from 9–11, 17 Commonwealth 102 Communist Parties: CPSU Presidium letter to 67–8; gathering in Moscow (1957) 202–3; re-establishment of Yugoslav relations with 68–9, 70–1, 79–80, 81–2, 87, 88, 90, 93–4, 114, 120–1, 122, 125–6, 128, 154–5, 156–7, 158 Conference of Communist Parties, Moscow (1957) 194, 202–3, 215 Conference on Yugoslavia’s cultural and artistic propaganda abroad (30 January 1950) 29, 30; consumer sector in Yugoslavia 187 Congresses of the CPY/LCY: Fifth Congress (21–28 July 1948) 11; Seventh Congress (22–27 April 1958) 203; Sixth Congress (2–7 November 1952) 20–3, 25 Congress of the CPSU, Twentieth (1425 February 1956) 144–6 conservative revival in the Kremlin (1956) 158–9 Constitutional Law on Basic Social and Political Structure and Federal Administrative Bodies 27

containment of Yugoslavia161–72 Council of Europe 147 creative freedom 28–30 cultural cooperation, Yugoslav-Soviet 139–40 cultural transformation in Yugoslavia post1948 28–32 Czechoslovakia: conciliatory initiatives towards Yugoslavia 49; Yugoslav relations with 153; Western activities in 154 Dapčević, General Peko 32–3, 40, 54 de-Stalinization: in Hungary 167, 173; influence of Yugoslav-Soviet split or normalization on 4, 130; in USSR 1, 4, 7, 146, 147–8; in Eastern Europe 1,7, 149, 162, 163; stagnation in process of 169; Tito’s support for 146–8, 183, 192 debt cancellation 138 debt crisis 77 debt restructuring 91 decentralization in Yugoslavia 23–7 Declaration of Neutrality, Hungary 173, 182 Dedijer, Vladimir 38, 39, 50, 54 Dej, Gheorgiu 161 democratic centralism 21 democratic socialism 93 democratization 5, 142–3, 158, 159, 173; demands for 161–72 Dictatorship of the proletariat 21 Dimitrov, Georgi 9–10, 14 diplomatic relations: surveillance of Yugoslav diplomats 71; YugoslavSoviet, collapse of 12, 38; YugoslavSoviet, improvements in 41; Yugoslav-Soviet, normalization of 46, 47–8, 49; Yugoslavia with China 102–3; Yugoslavia with satellite states 57, 86; direct Yugoslav-Soviet communication, establishment of 67–77 disarmament 115, 154 Djerdja, Josip 100 Djilas, Milovan: Soviet aid negotiations 9; attacks on Soviet Union 70; as cause of 1948 split 71, 79; dismissal of 58–61, 67; visit to India 100 Djurić, Dragoje 38, 41, 44–6 domestic policy, Soviet Union 43–4 Drašković, Branko 170 Dulles, John Foster 35, 54, 71, 75, 84; meeting with Tito 142–3

266   Index East Berlin, military clampdown (1953) 47, 48 East Germany: Soviet policy on 153; Yugoslav recognition of 202 economic aid to Yugoslavia: cancellation of 142, 143, 147, 148–9; conditions for 167–8; dependency on 62, 73–4, 75, 77, 90, 139; negotiation of 91; post-Tito– Stalin split 5, 13, 17, 91, 118–19, 138, 153 economic assistance agreements 195, 198 economic blockade 11, 79, 88, 118 economic cooperation: with Soviet Union 103, 104–5 137–9, 148, 152, 171; with Third World countries 208–9 Edemskii, A. 1 Eden, Anthony 35, 52, 75, 153–4 Egypt: dispute with Sudan 206–7; economic cooperation with Yugoslavia 208; Suez crisis 167, 192; Tito’s visit to 105–6, 116–17; Yugoslav-Soviet discussions on 152–3 Eisenhower, Dwight 33, 39, 52, 84, 167–8 European Basketball Championship, Moscow 45 European Defence Community (EDC) 84, 85 European Recovery Programme 138 Executive Committee of the LCY CC meetings: 27 November 1952 32; 19 July 1954 (enlarged) 72–4; 13 May 1955 113; 2 April 1956,147–8; 6 November 1956 187; 24 January 1957 194–5; 29 October 1957,202; 23 November 1957 203 financial compensation, Yugoslav-Soviet agreement on 138 Firyubin, Nikolai 140–1, 163, 179, 184, 201 food shortages in Yugoslavia 73, 77, 91 foreign policy: Soviet Union 43–4; Yugoslavia 22–3, 32–7, 39–44, 98–107 Free Territory of Trieste, zonal division 51–2 ‘Free Yugoslavia’ radio 85 Fursenko, Alexandar 3 Geneva ‘Big Four’ Summit (1955) 112 geo-political implications of YugoslavSoviet rupture in 1948 14–15 Gerö, Ernö 167, 170, 171, 172, 182 Gokay, F. 36 Gomulka, Wladislaw 87, 162, 174, 176–7

Gondikas, M. 36 Gošnjak, General Ivan 73 Greece, defensive alliance with 34–5, 36–7, 39, 67, 76, 143–4 Gromyko, Andrey A. 113 Haile Selassie I, Emperor 206–8 Handy, General Thomas T. 32–4, 35, 36, 37, 39, 75, 124 Hayter, Sir William 152 Hoxha, Enver 14, 87, 141, 153, 181, 188, 202 Hungarian Workers Party 170, 172 Hungary: aftermath of military intervention 188–91, 195; causes of uprising 176; conciliatory initiatives 49; deepening crisis in 165–7, 172–7; execution of Nagy 205; forced deportations 189, 190; military intervention 172–7, 178–80, 188; nationalist revival 158–9; Tito’s interpretation of events in 182–4; Western activities in 154; Yugoslav relations with 153 ideological authority 148, 192–3 ideological credentials, Soviet leadership 128–30 ideological credibility 17–18 ideological demarcation 190 ideological incompatibility 157 ideological polemics, post-Hungarian revolution 181–91 ideological rivalry 169, 197–8, 216 ideological rupture: causes of 118–20, 144–6, 213–14; character and causes of 8–15; lessons from 134–5, 136–7; prospect of repeat of 195–9; responsibility for 69–71, 79, 83, 96, 145, 211 ideological sectarianism, abandonment of 21 ideological uniformity 185–6 ideologically correct language 83 imperialist expansionism, accusation of 20–1 independence 79, 90, 113, 116, 129, 148, 159 India: economic cooperation with 208; relations with 206; Tito’s visit to 101–4, 116 Indonesia: Tito’s visit to 206, economic cooperation with 208; relations with 206, 207

Index   267 intellectual transformation 28–32 international communist movement 1, 6, 17 international community, change in power configuration 192–3 international institutions, Yugoslavia’s relations with 30 international isolation of Yugoslavia 71, 186–7, 193, 209–10 international issues, Soviet–Yugoslav talks on 114–17, 122, 152–4 International Monetary Fund 77 isolationism 100, 101, 103, 104 Italian Communist Party 55, 163 Italian Peace Treaty (1947) 51, 55 Italy, and Trieste question 51–5, 75–6 Jakšić, General Pavle 36 Jovanović Blažo 171 Kádár, Janosz 87, 170, 172–3, 175, 178–9, 180, 191, 194 Kaganovich, Lazar 87, 95, 133, 185, 186, 201, 218 Kardelj, Edvard: attack on Soviet system 47, 50, 189–91, 197–8; and Balkan Pact 34; and Bucharest talks 201–2; and democratic socialism 93; at Fifth Plenum 89–90, 96; and Khrushchev’s visits to Yugoslavia 113, 117, 169–70, 174; meeting with Stalin 10; meetings with Western leaders 35, 42; on relations with West 74; response to Soviet overtures 55–7; and Tito’s visit to Soviet Union 152, 154, 155, 156, 158–9; and Yugoslav reforms 27 Kartawidjaja, Raden Djuanda 207 Khrushchev, Nikita: conservative stance 185–6; cultural background 216–17; dependency on army support 184–5; justification of Yugoslav visit 127–8; in leadership contest 7, 66,,92–7, 98; and Nagy ‘affair’ 179–80; personal traits 3; reaction to Kardelj’s speech 190–1; reaction to Tito’s Pula speech 187–8; secret correspondence with Tito 67–75, 78–92; ‘secret speech’ 4, 136, 137, 144–50, 162, 210; threats to leadership of 159–60, 163, 165, 171–2, 201–2; Tito’s support for 160–1; and Tito’s visit to Soviet Union 161–72; visits to Yugoslavia 110–37, 167–70, 173–7; Yugoslav view of 217–18 Kirsanov, Oleg 46

Koliševski, Lazar 171 Köprülü, Fuad 37 Korean War 99, 100 Kurimszky, Sándor 167 Kuusinen, Otto 202 Kuznetsov, Vladimir 63 Law on People’s Councils (1952) 27 laws, state administration 26–7 leadership contest, Soviet Union 69, 92–8, 134, 144 League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) 21–2; Central Committee (CC) 33, 34, 48, 58–9; Executive Committee 72–4; new party programme 203–4; Second Plenum (1953) 48; Third Plenum (1954) 58–60; Fourth Plenum (1954) 59–60, 61–2; Fifth Plenum (1954) 88–91, 96; role of 60; Seventh Congress (1958) 23, 203–4; Seventh Plenum (1957) 184, 190, 193, 194, 195–7, 198, 200; Sixth Plenum (1956) 146–7 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 27, 189–90, 195 liberalization 5, 142–3, 158, 159, 173; demands for 161–72 living standards 162, 187 loan agreements 139 local self-governance 27 Losonczy, Géza 175 Malenkov, Georgiy: attack on Molotov 134; as leadership contender 7, 66, 69, 92–3, 94–5; removal of 96, 97, 98, 110. 185, 201; visit to Yugoslavia 174, 175, 176; and Yugoslav-Soviet normalization 50 Mallet, Sir Ivo 33, 53 market economy, introduction of 26 Marxism–Leninism 19, 49–50; betrayal of 17–27, 60–2, 70, 127; distancing from 110, 117; loyalty to 96; repudiation of 10; revision of 128–9, 156; scientific Marxism–Leninism 21, 23, 27, 157; Soviet insistence on 81; Tito/Khrushchev belief in 218 Mićunović, Veljko: and Chinese attack on Yugoslavia 192–3; and death of Stalin 41–2; and Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia 174–6; meetings with Khrushchev 163, 165–6, 183, 185–6, 187–8, 190–1, 196, 204; on Soviet overtures 56, 89; and Tito’s visit to Soviet Union 152, 159, 161

268   Index Mikoyan, Anastas: economic cooperation negotiations 138–9; meeting with Tito 140; visit to Yugoslavia 152, 156, 166–7 Milatović, Arso 43, 111 military aid, cancellation of 139; conditions for 147, 167–8; and defence capabilities 34; dependence on 73–4, 100, 118–19, 153; levels of 124; and military cooperation 36; necessity of 148; suspension of 142, 143; talks on 13; Western 15–17 military aid, Soviet 138 military contact 139–40 military cooperation: Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 139–40; Yugoslavia and the Third World countries 104–5, 208–9, Yugoslavia and the West 32–7, 39–44,; military intervention, Hungary 172–7, 178–80, 188; Tito’s limited endorsement of 182–4 Mollet, Guy 152 Molotov, Vyecheslav: attacks on Yugoslavia 40, 96, 97–8; Khrushchev’s attack on 133–4; Khrushchev’s victory against 127, 136, 137, 185; as leadership contender 69; meetings with Vidić 60–1, 62–3; and Stalin 130–1, 132;Yugoslav animosity towards 152 Moore, Henry 32 Moscow Declaration (1956) 5, 151, 157–8, 160–1 162, 168, 181–2, 212–13; Draft of 155–7, 164–5 Moscow Years (Mićunović) 2 Münnich, Ferenc 175 Murphy, Robert D. 84, 142 Nagy, Imre: asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy 178–81; contacts with Yugoslavia 167; demands for liberalization 162; dismissal of 169; as prime minister 172–3, 175; and Soviet intervention 178–80, 188, 189, 190; trial and execution of 205; Yugoslav support for 170 Nasser, Colonel Gamaal Abdel: plot to overthrow 153; strengthening alliance with 172; Tito’s influence on 206–8; Tito’s meeting with 98, 105–7, 116–17 National Liberation Army 51 national security crisis (1952) 32–7 National-Liberation councils 27 Nehru, Jawalharlal: and Bandung

principles 206; and Chinese threat 207; and Hungarian crisis 176; strengthening alliance with 106–7, 172; Tito’s meeting with 101–4, 105 New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito (Dedijer) 2 Non-Aligned Movement 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 216; birth of 205–18 non-alignment policy 5–6, 22–3, 91–2, 98–107, 143, 148, 172, 203 normalization: collapse of 191–9; effects of 4–6; tactical impasse in 92–8 North Atlantic Alliance 191 North Atlantic Council 80 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): and Balkan Pact 143–4; Charter of 35; commitments to Yugoslavia 76, 80; dismemberment of 115; readjustment of defence strategy 14–15; Yugoslav refusal to join 34, 35, 39; Yugoslav cooperation with 211 Nova Misao 59 Naftali, Timothy 3 October Revolution, Fortieth Anniversary celebrations 202–3, 215 Papagos, General Alexander 37 peace offensive (Soviet) 43–50: modification of Yugoslav response to 50–63; Yugoslavia’s distrust of 46–7 peasantry, support for Yugoslav Communist Party 21 Pelikán, Jan 1 Pella, Giuseppe 52 Peng, Zhen 194 Peoples’ councils 27 Peoples’ Democracies, conflict with Yugoslavia 9–15; relations with Yugoslavia post-Khrushchev’s May 1955 visit to Belgrade 140–1, 153; relations with Yugoslavia post-Tito’s June 1956 visit to USSR 170, 172 Peurifoy, J. 36–7 Pijade, Moša 36 Poland: nationalist revival 158–9; Poznán riots 162, 169, 187; reaction to intervention in Hungary 176–7; Western activities in 154; Yugoslav relations with 153, 170 political prisoners in Yugoslavia 13 political system, internal criticism of 59 political transformation 17–27, 214 Politika 39

Index   269 Ponomarenko, Panteleimon 202 Popović, Koča: attack on Khrushchev 169–70; criticism of Vidić 60–1; on diplomatic contacts 57; and Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia 123–4; on non-alignment 148; on relations with West 73–4, 80; on Soviet overtures 43, 44; and Stalinism 40; and threat from Soviet Union 186 Popović, Vladimir 39, 54 Popular Front, change of name and structure 22 post-Stalin leadership 40–4 Poznán riots 162, 169, 187 Pravda 2, 9, 85, 86, 97–8, 181, 188–9, 191, 192, 197 Prica, Srdja 124, 142 public speeches 2 Radio Moscow 38 Radio-Belgrade 85 Rajk, Laszlo 13, 87 Rakosi, Matyas 87, 141, 175, 176, 182, 188; resignation of 165–6 Ranković, Aleksandar 74, 89, 169–70, 174, 201–2 rapprochement 137–44 reconciliation 144–9 Red Army 144, 174–5, 184–5 Reminiscences (Khrushchev) 2 Renmin Ribao 191–4 Riddleberger, James 71, 142 Roberts, Sir Frank 144, 146, 160, 183 Romania: conciliatory initiatives 45, 49; Yugoslav relations with 153, 171 Russophobia 146 Saburov, Maxim 87, 93, 133, 134 Sarajčić, Ivo 29, 31 satellite states: briefing on Soviet– Yugoslav talks 123; conciliatory initiatives 45, 49; de-Stalinization in 149; diplomatic relations with 86–7; isolation of Yugoslavia from 161–72; relations with 56, 57, 58, 140–1, 153, 170–1; sensitivity to experiences of 135–6; as threat to socialist system 183; weakening of Soviet grip on 142–3; Yugoslavia’s influence on 172, 214–15; Zhou Enlai’s visit to 194 ‘scientific’ socialism 23, 27, 156, 157, 257 secret correspondence, Tito–Khrushchev (1954–5): Khrushchev’s fifth letter (17 March 1955) 110; Khrushchev’s first

letter (22 June 1954) 66, 68–70; Khrushchev’s fourth letter (27 September 1954) 82; Khrushchev’s second letter – telegram (24 July 1954) 78; Khrushchev’s sixth letter (6 May 1955) 111; Khrushchev’s third letter (23 September 1954) 80–2; Tito’s first letter (11 August 1954) 78–80; Tito’s second letter (16 November 1954) 87–8; Tito’s third letter (16 April 1955) 111 ‘secret speech’ 4, 136, 137, 144–50, 162, 210 security guarantees 32–7 self-management system 23–7, 63, 129, 190 Shepilov, Dimitri T. 113, 132, 133, 134, 152 show trials 12, 87, 141 Slansky, Robert 87 social democrats, cooperation with 125, 126, 133, 152, 158 socialism; different forms of 125, 126, 158, 163; many roads to 5, 9, 14, 15, 79, 81, 128–9, 191–2, 214 socialist camp: drawing Yugoslavia into 151, 152, 156, 158, 159, 170; impact of Moscow Declaration 161; role of 154 socialist ownership of means of production 24, 63 socialist system, Tito’s attack on 181–91 Socialist Working People’s Alliance of Yugoslavia 22 Soldatić, Dalibor 173, 178, 179 Soviet Communist Party: Plenum (Feb 1957) 195, 198–9, 201; Plenum (Jan 1955) 66, 96; Plenum (July 1955) 4, 5, 7, 14, 109, 120–1, 125–37, 140, 149–50, 210–12; Twentieth Congress 144–6, 188–9 Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) 44–6, 95 Soviet model, rejection of 17–27 Soviet Presidium: Central Committee Commission on Yugoslavia 46, 62–3; lack of consensus 95; Postanovlenie 30 June 1956 162–3, 171; Resolution of 31 May 1954 67–8; Resolution of February 1955 110; Resolution of 13 July 1956 134–5, 164–6, 168, 170, 171, 189, 211–12 Soviet Union: accusation of imperialist expansionism 20–1; behaviour prior to 1948 break up 119; Chinese split with 205, 215–16; Chinese support for

270   Index Soviet Union continued 191–4; containment strategy 161–72; death of Stalin 38–44; establishment of direct communication 67–77; fear of aggression from 12–13, 33–7, 40–1, 47–8, 57, 186–7; military intervention in Hungary 172–7, 178–80, 182–4; peace offensive 43–63; policy towards China 102; reaction to Djilas affair 59–61; reaction to Tito’s Pula speech 187–8; response to Kardelj’s speech 191; tactical impasse in normalization 92–8; threats to security of 211–12; Tito’s visit to 151–61; and Trieste question 55, 57 Stalin: as cause of conflict 4, 79, 211; condemnation of 132, 144–6; death of 38–44; ideological confrontation with 17–27, 35; legacy of 134–5, 136–7, 141, 162, 185; Khrushchev’s observations on 119; policy failures 68; role in conflict 130–2 Stalinism 93; Chinese defence of 191–2; remnants of 89; see also anti-Stalinism Stassen, Harold 172 ‘state chauvinism’ 135–6 state, withering away of 23–7 Stephanopoulos, Stephanos 37 strategic isolation 34 Suez crisis 167, 192 Sukarno, Ahmet 206, 207 Šumonja, General Miloš 36 surplus value 26 Suslov, Mikhail 63, 81, 95, 133, 134, 163, 165, 204 Szántó, Zoltán 175, 179 TANJUG 176–7 TASS 85 Taubman, William 3 Tibet, Chinese sovereignty of 102 Tito, Josip Broz: communication with Khrushchev 67–75, 78–92; Communist identity 35; cultural background 216–17; criticism of Molotov 97–8; Dulles’ assessment of 142–3; first visits to Asia (winter 1954–5) 6, 98, 101–7; internal criticism of 59; as mediator 206–7; meeting with Dulles (6 November 1955) 142–3; meeting with Khrushchev, Bucharest (1–2 August 1957) 201–2; optimism in future of Soviet socialism 49–50; personal traits 3; Pula speech 181–8; reaction to Stalin’s death 38–9, 42; resistance against Germans 21;

response to Anglo-American Declaration on Trieste 53–4; response to Khrushchev peace initiative 71–5; response to ‘secret speech’ 145–60; second visit to Asia and Africa (winter 1958–9) 6, 8, 206–10, 216; support for Khrushchev 160; support for military intervention in Hungary 173–7; threats to leadership of 17–18; visit to Africa (winter 1955–6) 101, 106; visit to Britain 35–6, 40; visit to Soviet Union 151–61; ‘Tito’s national Communism’ 16; ‘Tito’s/Yugoslav road to socialism’ 9, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 62, 63 Todorović-Plavi, Mijalko 92–3, 94–5 Togliatti, Palmiro 163 trade exchange protocol 138–9 trade relations 85, 86, 92, 103, 105; satellite countries 141 Treaty of Friendship and Assistance (1953) 37 Trieste Agreement 86 Trieste question 50–3; crisis (1953) 50–5, 57, 62, 98; diplomatic negotiations 67, 73, 74, 75–6, 78, 80; Memorandum of Understanding 84–5 tripartite meeting: Tito, Nehru, Nasser, Brioni (1956) 106–7 tripartite talks: Balkan states 67, 75–6; Western alliance 17, 32–3, 39, 50, 124 Turkey: defensive alliance with 34–5, 36–7, 39, 67, 76, 143–4; disagreements with 125 Ulepić, General Zdenko 140 United Nations (UN): General Assembly 99, 100; Security Council 86; UNESCO 30 university collaborations 30 U Nu: meeting with Tito 104–5 US: anti-Communist stance 33; influence on Yugoslav–Soviet relations 3, 186; intervention in Trieste negotiations 84–5; objections to Balkan Agreement 76; reservations on normalization 71, 80, 141–2; see also economic aid; military aid Vidali, Vittorio 96 Vidić, Dobrivoje: and anti-Yugoslav propaganda 85; arrival in Moscow 48; and Hungarian crisis 176–7, 178, 180; meeting with Khrushchev 87, 89, 92–3, 94–5; meeting with Molotov 60–1

Index   271 Vilfan, Dr Jože 100 Volkov, Vassiliy Alekseyevich: appointment of 46; arrival in Belgrade 48; meeting with Prica 124–5; replacement of 140; Tito’s meetings with 126, 133, 138 von Brentano, Heinrich 191 Voroshilov, Kliment 63, 95, 152, 163 Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar 69, 73–4, 77, 89, 138–9, 148 Wallner, William Woodruff 43–4, 53 War of Liberation (1941–1945) 21, 27 war reparations 75 Warsaw Pact 155, 173, 182 Warsaw Treaty Organisation 112–13, 115 West Germany: Soviet policy on 115, 153; Yugoslav relations with 202 West: activities in Eastern Europe 154; isolation of Yugoslavia from 46–7; Khrushchev’s attack on 160; reassertion of relationship with 47–8, 186–7; scientific and cultural relations with 29–32; weakening Yugoslavia’s ties with 110, 167–8 Western powers: impact of normalization on relations with 73–4, 127, 141–3; and Trieste question 51–5, 57, 62, 67, 75–6; military cooperation with 32–7, 39–44, 57, 79, 87, 88; reaction to Djilas affair 59; strategic coordination talks 124 workers’ councils 23–7, 63, 174, 190 World War II 11, 21, 51, 75, 86, 138 Yugoslav Communist Party: change of name and structure 21–2;

excommunication from Cominform 17; separation from state 23; Sixth Congress (1952) 19, 20–2; Third Plenum (1949) 28–30 Yugoslav Embassy: Budapest 178–80; Moscow 38, 41, 43, 44–6, 47–8, 49, 57–8, 60–1, 62–3, 71 Yugoslav Federal Executive Council 30–2, 43 Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (DSIP) 43, 44, 58, 95–6 Yugoslav Parliament; First Extraordinary Session (1950) 19–20, 23, 24–5, 26–7 Yugoslav Scientific and Cultural Council 30 Yugoslavia: birth of Non-Aligned Movement 205–18; Chinese attack on 202–3; containment of 161–72; cultural and intellectual transformation 28–32; and death of Stalin 38–44; endorsement of Hungarian intervention 187; establishment of direct communication 67–77; Khrushchev’s visits to 110–37, 167–70, 173–7; national security crisis 32–7; modification of response to Soviet peace initiative 50–63; political transformation 17–27; and Soviet peace initiative 44–50; tactical impasse in normalization 92–8; view of Khrushchev 217–18 Zhivkov, Todor 171 Zhou Enlai 194, 205 Zhukov, Marshall Georgii 144, 174, 185 Zimianin, M. 46 Zorin, Valerian 64