World Soul – Anima Mundi: On the Origins and Fortunes of a Fundamental Idea 9783110628609, 9783110628463

Citation preview

World Soul – Anima Mundi

Topics in Ancient Philosophy/ Themen der antiken Philosophie

Herausgegeben von / Edited by Ludger Jansen, Christoph Jedan, Christof Rapp

Volume 8

World Soul – Anima Mundi On the Origins and Fortunes of a Fundamental Idea Edited by Christoph Helmig With the assistance of Laura Marongiu

ISBN 978-3-11-062846-3

e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-062860-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062896-8 ISSN 2198-3100 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019944706 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Acknowledgment The starting point of this volume goes as far back as September 2011, when Christoph Markschies and I organised a conference at the Humboldt-Universität Berlin under the title The World Soul and Cosmic Space, which was generously financed by the Excellence Cluster TOPOI. Several of the contributors to the conference agreed to publish their papers. Others, not present at the conference, joined in later. I would like to thank all contributors for their papers, their broad collaborative effort and patience over the years. Most of the work on the present volume was done at the Philosophisches Seminar of the University of Cologne, and I heartily thank my collaborators Emil Gaub, Fedora Hartmann, Ina Schall, Kevin Licht and also Lee Klein for their precious help. In the last month, Dr. Laura Marongiu (Cagliari / Cologne) meticulously prepared the book for publishing and compiled the indices. Without her, the volume would probably have never been published in its present form. Finally, let me also thank the great team of De Gruyter and especially Dr. Serena Pirrotta for their advice, help and encouragement.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-202

Contents Acknowledgment 

 V

Christoph Helmig The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond 

 1

Part I: Prehistory of the concept Christian Vassallo Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? On the relationship between cosmology and psychology in Heraclitus 

 27

Part II: Plato’s Timaeus and Pseudo-Aristotle’s De Mundo Filip Karfík Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 63

Franco Ferrari Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c   77 Federico M. Petrucci Ascoltare l’anima cosmica: riargomentazione ed esegesi tecnica κατὰ ζητήματα della divisio animae platonica   91 Johan C. Thom The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach   135

Part III: Old Academy, Stoicism, and Middle Platonism John Dillon The World Soul takes command: The doctrine of the World Soul in the Epinomis of Philip of Opus and in the academy of Polemon   155 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 167

VIII 

 Contents

Angela Ulacco Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica: kosmologische und erkenntnistheoretische Aspekte   189 Carl O’Brien Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 211

Part IV: Neoplatonism Damian Caluori Plotinus on the World Soul 

 245

James Wilberding The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus  Dirk Baltzly The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 289

Marc-Antoine Gavray From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus   309

Part V: Nachleben Johannes Zachhuber World Soul and celestial heat. Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in the history of natural philosophy   335 Index of Names 

 355

Index of Ancient Citations  Index of Subjects 

 363

 357

 269

Christoph Helmig

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond There have only been very few ideas in the history of Western philosophy as influential as that of the ensoulment of the world or the cosmos.1 The first explicit mention of a World Soul or soul of the all (gr. tou pantos psuchê, lat. anima mundi) can be found in Plato’s Timaeus (41d), but even modern environmental activists have invoked this conception in order to argue that we must not treat the world around us as a mere object.2 It rather has the same dignity and the same rights as other living beings or even humans. This idea might be compared to several mythical traditions that speak of Mother Earth (‘Mutter Erde’) or Mother Nature (‘Mutter Natur’). This seems to be, I am glad to say, the first collected volume on the World Soul in ancient thought.3 It has, however, not been the aim to cover all aspects of the topic, but I hope that the present volume provides a good overview of relevant debates and stimulates further research. The following pages are meant as a short introduction into theories of the World Soul in ancient, late ancient and early Christian philosophy.4

1 From Plato to German idealism As said, Plato was the first to explicitly talk about a soul of the world in his dialogue Timaeus (41d). He derives this surprising claim from the well-known analogy of the micro- and macrocosm. If a human being is a small-scale cosmos, the cosmos itself, in turn, ought to possess a (rational) soul; it is, in Plato’s words, an ‘ensouled and rational animal’ (gr. zôon empsuchon ennoun, Tim. 30b8-c1). As

1 Moreau, J.: L’âme du monde; Madey, J.: Lehre von der Weltseele; Ott, L.: ‘Die platonische Weltseele’; Fick, M.: Sinnenwelt und Weltseele; Schlette, H.R.: Weltseele; Ziebritzki, H.: Heiliger Geist und Weltseele; Zachhuber, J.: Art. ‘Weltseele’; Vassányi, M.: Anima mundi (with a useful overview over the most important literature on pp. 397–398). 2 See Schlette, H.R.: Weltseele, 226–235. See also Scruton, R.: The Soul of the World, where the ‘soul of the world’ becomes a metaphor for the presence of the sacred in the world and an engaging plea for the importance of a transcendent dimension in a life dominated by natural science. 3 See also Wilberding, J. (ed.): The World Soul (forthcoming). This book will contain a section on ‘The World Soul in Ancient Platonism’, written by George Boys-Stones and James Wilberding, but mainly pursues the concept in the subsequent history of thought. 4 The following overview is a slightly shortened and modified English version of Helmig, C.: ‘Weltseele im Welt-Raum?’. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-001

2 

 Christoph Helmig

far as I can see, all Middle and Neoplatonists believed in the existence of a World Soul. Even in the Latin Middle Ages we find traces of it,5 first and foremost in the commentaries on Vergil, Martianus Capella, Calcidius, Macrobius, Boethius and John Scotus Eriugena. As one may expect, philosophers of the Renaissance such as Nicolaus of Cusa and Giordano Bruno were familiar with the conception as well. It gained wider currency in German romanticism (e.g. in Novalis’ ‘Weltpsychologie’ and Goethe’s poem ‘Weltseele’ [initially called ‘Weltschöpfung’]) and German idealism. Regarding the latter, we may above all mention Franz Xaver von Baader’s ‘Vom Wärmestoff, seiner Vertheilung, Bindung und Entbindung, vorzüglich beim Brennen der Körper’ (Vienna and Leipzig, 1786) and Schelling’s ‘Von der Weltseele – eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus’ (Hamburg 1789). Hegel dedicates some attention to the World Soul, but the expression ‘spirit of the world’ (‘Weltgeist’) is much more prominent in his works. Leibniz and Kant, on the other hand, rejected the idea, while Salomon Maimon attributed an important role to the World Soul in his philosophy.6

2 Plato’s Timaeus as a ‘likely story’ In his Timaeus, Plato describes the creation or, rather, the ordering of the all so as to become a cosmos by means of the highest god or demiurge (i.e. ‘craftsman’). From Tim. 34a onwards, the production of the World Soul, the best of all created things (Tim. 37a), and her relation to the body of the world is depicted. The whole passage and, more specifically, the composition of the World Soul (Tim. 35a-36d) has been much disputed, also because of difficulties regarding the Greek syntax.7 Many interpreters nowadays favour a reading of the passage that was first suggested by the Neoplatonist Proclus of Athens (412–485 AD) and, after him, for instance, by the English scholar F.M. Cornford in his translation with commentary of the Timaeus (London / New York 1937).8 Since this is not the place to discuss the psychogony of the Timaeus in great detail, I shall only note the following. In simple terms, three ingredients enter into the World Soul’s mixture: Being, the Undivided, the Divided. The latter two

5 As far as the Medieval Arabic tradition is concerned, see Dieterici, F.: Die Lehre von der Weltseele and, most recently, Adamson, P.: ‘World-Soul in Medieval Philosophy’ (forthcoming). 6 See Vassányi, M.: World Soul, 343–353; 363–396 and Schlette, H.R.: Weltseele, 178–181. 7 See the contribution by Filip Karfík and Dirk Baltzly in this volume. 8 For details see Dirk Baltzly in this volume and Brisson, L.: Le même e l’autre, ad loc.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 3

can be linked to the intelligible and sensible realm respectively. In a later passage (Tim. 37a), it becomes clear that these ingredients enable the soul to recognise both realms, that of Being (i.e., true being or the Forms) and that of Becoming. The underlying principle, namely that ‘like is known by like’, can already be found in the Presocratics (Empedocles). Plato also tells us that the World Soul consists of two circles (the circle of the Same and the circle of the Different). The two circles are identified with the ecliptic and the equator respectively. It is interesting to note that Plato does not only consider the World Soul the moving cause of the universe and the principle of life (i.e., the whole cosmos as a living being / a living organism), but also attributes cognition to it.9 Depending on whether the object is changeable or not, true opinion or knowledge result. In contrast to human cognition, the World Soul never errs, Plato emphasises. However, it is not immediately obvious, for instance, how cognition would in any way influence or change the World Soul, or how the World Soul is able to intentionally relate to its objects. At Tim. 33c, for example, it is said that the body of the world does not possess nor requires sensory organs. Yet, it may be that with his account of the World Soul and its composition Plato first and foremost intended to pave the way for the creation of the human soul. The latter is composed of the same elements as the World Soul, but in a less pure mixture and without being the cause of cosmic movements. However, cognition is obviously fundamental to the human soul. Since the soul of the world and the individual souls are akin according to Plato, Plotinus referred to them as soul sisters (IV 3 [27] 6, 13 und II 9 [33] 18, 16), pointing to their common origin from the ‘mother’ all soul (gr. pan psuchê). The Neoplatonist explicitly dismisses an interpretation that makes the World Soul the principle and cause of individual souls. In this short summary on the nature of the World Soul in Plato’s Timaeus, I have on purpose left out one rather crucial feature of the dialogue, namely its manner of presentation. It is well known that Plato personally never enters the stage in his dialogues and never talks in the first person. Instead, he lets other characters speak – though it is less clear whether or not he lets them speak on his behalf. However, in the Timaeus Plato even goes a step further. He puts the whole cosmogony in the mouth of a certain Timaeus of Locri and makes him emphasise repeatedly that his narrative is merely a ‘likely story’ (gr. eikôs muthos). This suggests discussing the dialogue together with other Platonic myths, and the relation of philosophical contents and mythological outfit needs to be considered.

9 See, for instance, Corcilius, K.: ‘Intellectual Cognition in Timaeus’.

4 

 Christoph Helmig

Hence, the literary form as a (merely) ‘likely story’, which Plato has chosen for the Timaeus, is of utmost importance to correctly decode the account of the World Soul. What is more, for the history of physics, Plato’ remarks on the relation of the World Soul and cosmic space are of great interest, even if they are rather cryptic. Consider especially the following passage where the association of the World Soul and the body of the all is described in a remarkable way. When the whole fabric of the soul had been finished to its maker’s mind, he next began to fashion within the soul all that is bodily, and brought the two together, fitting them centre to centre. And the soul, being everywhere inwoven from the centre to the outermost heaven and enveloping the heaven all round on the outside, revolving within its own limit, made a divine beginning of ceaseless and intelligent life for all time. Now the body of the heaven has been created visible; but she is invisible, and, as a soul having part in reason and harmony, is the best of things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible and eternal.10

What Plato is alluding to here is how the soul relates to cosmic space or pervades the all. The paradoxical nature of this conjunction is evident: How can an incorporeal (lit. ‘invisible’, Tim. 36e6) World Soul fuse with the body of the all? The Timaeus asserts that the soul permeates the world from within, but also encompasses it from the outside. Hence, the soul is no longer in the body but, as Plotinus puts it, the body in the soul (III 9 [13] 3.2–4; IV 3 [27] 22.7–12). In this context, it ought to be emphasised that cosmic space is not a mere interval, but, as it were, ensouled space. The way space is imagined here is not static, but dynamic to a high degree. This dynamic conception of space has, first of all, inspired Neoplatonic theories of space according to which, in contrast to modern physicalist theories, space has an ordering and structuring power, pervading the things in space. This is made possible because space, as in Plato’s Timaeus, is considered ensouled. However, what we learn in this dialogue is rather sketchy in nature and leaves many questions unanswered. It was to due Plato’s successors, starting with his direct pupil Aristotle, that the ‘likely story’ of the Timaeus began to be unravelled. In what follows, we shall encounter several instructive examples of how this can be done. To sum up, Plato attributes three main functions to the World Soul. She animates the cosmos, which in turn is considered a living organism. She is the principle of movement and has two different cognitive faculties. It is important to emphasise, once again, that the Timaeus is standardly referred to as a likely story (eikôs muthos). This raises certain questions concerning the philosophical nucleus of the doctrine of the World Soul. 10 Plato, Timaeus 36d–37a, translated by F.M. Cornford.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 5

Finally, it ought to be emphasised that the similarity of the World Soul and the human soul justifies the central Platonic analogy of macrocosm and microcosm, of the organism world and the human being (Tim. 90c-d). The visual imagery of the Timaeus also hints at the relation of the World Soul and cosmic space. It is surprising that already Plato himself did not consider the all the place of the World Soul, but rather the World Soul as the all-pervading place of the cosmos.

3 Aristotle on the Platonic World Soul Aristotle’s remarkable criticism of Plato’s conception of a World Soul, to be found in his On the soul (De anima I 3, 406b26–407b11), is the first critical or polemical reaction to the Platonic suggestion of the ensouled cosmos.11 How, he asks, can Plato attribute extension (gr. megethos) to the soul if the latter is incorporeal? Moreover, how can the soul move the body of the world and why does it move in a circle? At times, scholars have pointed out that Aristotle’s criticism did not take into account the merely ‘likely story’ of the Timaeus (29d, 30b and passim); in other words, his reading of the dialogue was considered too literal. On the other hand, Aristotle’s criticism hints at two dilemmas of ancient and late ancient Platonism: What is the philosophical nucleus of the Timaeus? How can an incorporeal principle be in a body? Can it be localised altogether? According to Timaeus 52a-b, everything that comes into being is in a place. However, from this it does not follow that everything that exists is in a place. Platonic Forms are nowhere (Symp. 211a). But what about the soul? She too can, strictly speaking, not be in a place, but the way the World Soul is described in the Timaeus seems to suggest exactly this. To Aristotle, we can likewise trace back the tendency to speak of a spirit of the world (‘Weltgeist’) rather than a soul. In his criticism of Plato, he intends to demonstrate that the Platonic World Soul should rather be an intellect / spirit (gr. nous, De anima I 3, 407a19–20). In this case, however, it is unclear how the spirit of the world, being an extended magnitude (gr. megethos) can think its objects. The spirit and soul of the world point to two aspects of one intelligible principle that makes the cosmos a rational entity, providing life and movement as well. Already in Plato, the World Soul is essentially rational (an intellect in a soul, Tim. 30b). Therefore, the cosmos can be referred to as an ensouled and rational living being (gr. zôon empsuchon ennoun, Tim. 30b8–c1).

11 On Aristotle’s criticism, see von Perger, M.: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios. On interesting parallels between Plato’s conception of a World Soul and Aristotle’s doctrine of ether (fifth or first elemental body), see Johansen, T.K.: ‘From Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s De Caelo’.

6 

 Christoph Helmig

4 Middle Platonism For the Middle Platonists, the Timaeus was the central dialogue, while in Neoplatonism Plato’s Parmenides obtained this role. Because of its crucial role, Middle Platonists have composed several commentaries on the Timaeus, starting with a certain Crantor of Soloi, a pupil of Xenocrates (Old Academy). Unfortunately, only a small fraction of these commentaries are extant or can be recovered, partially from Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus. Explicating the Timaeus, Platonists tried to offer an interpretation of the ‘likely story’ and determine Plato’s philosophical views on a whole series of topics such as the theory of principles, cosmogony, psychology, physics or biology. Pressing issues for every exegete were, for instance: (1) Was the world generated in time? (2) How shall we interpret the  chaotic, precosmic movement? (3) What is the significance of the mixture of the soul? (4) How are individual souls and the World Soul related? (5) What is the nature and role of the demiurge? The first question has either been answered affirmatively or negatively, depending on how literally an author took the ‘likely story’. Those who claimed that the ‘likely story’ is told didaskalias charin (‘for the sake of instruction’) could interpret it as an illustration of causal relations and interactions outside of space and time. The role of the precosmic movement was crucial for determining the nature of the World Soul. Some Platonists raised the question of how such movement could have originated.12 Since, for Plato, the soul is the principle of movement, it was reasonable to explain precosmic movement by means of a precosmic soul. Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 46–120 AD) even suggested to identify this precosmic soul with the evil principle of the world, taking his start from an admittedly obscure passage in Plato’s Laws X, 896d5–898c8. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that some Middle Platonists interpreted the generation of the soul, of which in the Timaeus only the demiurge was in charge, as a kind of transformation of the precosmic soul (‘Urseele’). With the latter move, they departed significantly from the wording of the Platonic text. In what follows, I shall provide two Middle Platonic examples of such a transformation of the precosmic soul into the World Soul. The first text, from the Middle Platonic “Handbook of Platonism” (gr. Didaskalikos, written most probably in the second half of the 2nd century AD), describes the psychogony of the Timaeus as an awakening / an arousal of the precosmic soul from a state of precosmic unconsciousness.

12 See the contribution by Filip Karfík in this volume.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 7

[...] God does not create the soul of the world, since it exists eternally, but he brings it to order, and to this extent he might be said to create it, by awakening and turning towards himself both its intellect and itself, as out of some deep coma or sleep [...].13

The second text, taken from a well-known treatise by Plutarch of Chaeronea, bears witness to the fact that the precosmic soul (here referred to as nature of the all / universal nature, gr. hê pantôn phusis), after an initial trigger by the demiurge / god, plays an active role during the genesis of the cosmos. In other words, the cosmos comes into being because precosmic soul likens herself to god (gr. homoiôsis theôi). Consider first that God, as Plato says, offers himself to all as a pattern of every excellence, thus rendering human virtue, which is in some sort an assimilation to himself, accessible to all who can ‘follow God’. Indeed this was the origin of the change whereby universal nature, disordered before, became a ‘cosmos’: it came to resemble after a fashion and participate in the form and excellence of God.14

Surveying the way Middle Platonists read the Timaeus, one can recognise a certain tendency to analyse the dialogue as a work on the principles of (physical) reality. How many principles, it was asked, essentially shape the cosmogony? Platonists provided varying answers spanning from two, three, four, five to a doctrine of even six principles. This plurality of (highest) principles is different from the severe monism of principles characteristic of the Neoplatonic system that derives all things from the One beyond being (gr. to hen). In contrast, according to Middle Platonists, the principles precede the ordering of the cosmos. To put it simply, their reading of the Timaeus presupposes a contrast of reason and disorder. To conclude this section, I would like to mention en passant that the effects of Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic World Soul continued to reverberate in Middle Platonism. In his De anima, the pupil of Plato argued that the Platonic World Soul failed to sufficiently explain the circular movement of the all (De anima I 3, 407b5–11). Probably as an answer to Aristotle’s criticism, the Pseudo-Timaeus Locrus introduces a curious innovation.15 Although the Timaeus only talks of one mixture of the soul, according to Pseudo-Timaeus the soul of the cosmos (gr. kosmô psucha, De nat. mund. 208, 13) originates by means of two mixtures or, rather, a mixture and an admixture. The latter, which cannot be accounted for on the basis of the Platonic

13 Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism (Didaskalikos) XIV, 169.35–39 (Whittaker-Louis), translated by J.M. Dillon. 14 Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 550 D, translated by Ph.H. de Lacy and B. Einarson. The entire passage is discussed in much detail by Helmig, C.: ‘Die Weltentstehung des Timaios’. 15 See the contribution by Angela Ulacco in this volume.

8 

 Christoph Helmig

text, adds to the World Soul two principles of movement. It is likely that the Middle Platonic interpreters, and before them the Old Academy, tried to not only account for the soul’s cognition, which is discussed at length in the Timaeus itself, but also for its self-movement. In this way, the circular movement of the cosmos could be explained, contrary to what Aristotle maintained in his criticism of Plato. In Middle Platonism, the Platonic doctrine of the World Soul is systematised, but also elaborated further. Most important, in this respect, is certainly the struggle for an appropriate understanding of the Timaeus and its cosmological story. Middle Platonists took the dialogue literally, as they assumed that the demiurge orders something already at hand, something already existing. In other words, they conceived of him as ordering a pre-existing constellation of the precosmic soul and original matter. In Neoplatonism, interpreters of Plato distanced themselves from reading the dialogue more literally, and the cosmogony was not conceived an episode of initial ordering, but rather the derivation of all things from the One.

5 Early Neoplatonism: Plotinus and the shift of paradigm The unique metaphysical paradigm of the Neoplatonists raises several interesting questions concerning the role and nature of the World Soul. Although scholars at times debate whence exactly Neoplatonism originated (in Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines, in the Old Academy, with the Neopythagorean Moderatus of Gades or with Ammonius Sakkas, the teacher of Plotinus), it is clear that an elaborated Neoplatonic system of philosophy can initially be found in Plotinus. He is the first philosopher whose philosophy can be characterised as Neoplatonic, a term that originated in the histories of philosophy in the end of the 18th, beginning of the 19th century.16 Eduard Zeller, for instance, in his Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (volume III.2, p. 847, Leipzig 51923) formulates the Neoplatonic ‘law’ (‘Gesetz’), according to which all is intertwined as a great whole: ‘It is the procession of the manifold from the One and its reversion towards it that determines the connexion of all things and the place which each and everyone of them occupies.’ 17

16 Hager, F.P.: ‘Bedeutung des Begriffes Neuplatonismus’; id.: ‘Neuplatonismus’; Lemanski, J.: ‘Von Brucker zu Augustinus’. 17 ‘[E]s ist der Hervorgang des Vielen aus dem Einen und seine Hinwendung zum Einen, wodurch der Zusammenhang aller Dinge und die Stelle bestimmt wird, welches jedes in diesem Zusammenhang einnimmt.’

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 9

While in Middle Platonism divine intellect (gr. nous) figured as the highest principle, Neoplatonists considered the One beyond being (gr. to hen) the principle and origin of all things. The Platonic model for such a view on reality is, on the one hand, the admittedly rather obscure second part of the Parmenides and, on the other, a passage in Plato’s Republic where it is said that the Form of the Good is beyond being (Pol. VI, 509b9, gr. epekeina tês ousias). Neoplatonists endorsed a strong monism according to which all things (even matter) proceed from the highest principle, the One beyond being. According to Plotinus, reality as a whole is governed, as it were, by means of three so-called hypostases (divine and immaterial levels of reality): the One, the intellect, and the soul. From the soul proceeds the visible, material world. While Middle Platonists merely distinguished two types of soul, namely World Soul and individual souls, in Plotinus we get a third category, namely the hypostasis soul (frequently referred to as all-soul, gr. hê holê psuchê), which is neither identical with the World Soul nor with the individual souls.18 The hypostasis soul rather is the principle and origin of all other souls, i.e., of the World Soul and the individual souls. Introducing a hypostasis soul raises the question of how the World Soul and the individual souls have originated and are related. For instance, scholars have frequently noted that because of the much more complex structure of reality, in Plotinus it is much more difficult to mark off the hypostasis soul (all-soul) from the World Soul. Because everything is derived from a first principle, it is an intriguing question how time and space came into being. In Neoplatonism, this is related to the activity of the World Soul.

6 Proclus on the Platonic World Soul The most comprehensive late ancient interpretation of the constitution of the World Soul in the Timaeus can be found in the third book of Proclus’ commentary on the dialogue.19 The commentary, which has only partially survived (until Tim. 44d, altogether about 1100 pages in the Teubner edition of Diehl), is the only extant Neoplatonic commentary on the Timaeus.20 The voluminous work is of

18 See Damian Caluori’s contribution in this volume. 19 See Baltzly, D.: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. 4, Book 3, Part II: Proclus on the World Soul. 20 Plutarch’s De anima generatione in Timaeum is not a commentary in the classic sense. It is rather a kind of paraphrase focusing exclusively on the constitution of the World Soul. Calcidius’ Latin commentary was rather influential in the Latin West, but is attributed to the period of

10 

 Christoph Helmig

greatest interest to scholars of the history of Platonism because, other than in his Commentary on the Parmenides, Proclus mentions most of his sources explicitly. Therefore, it is the most important document of the Middle and Neoplatonic exegesis of the Timaeus and an indispensable source for research on the history of Platonism. Because Proclus’ comments on the nature and role of the World Soul are so comprehensive and contain much material from his predecessors and contemporaries, a thorough analysis of the third book of the Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus is an important desideratum for anyone interested in the history of its conception.21 We owe to Proclus what can probably be considered the only satisfactory philological-philosophical reconstruction of the difficult mixture of the World Soul (Tim. 35a). Also, he made explicit that the World Soul, as mediator between the intelligible and the sensible, is at the same time paradigm and image. The latter because it bears a copy of the intelligible (i.e., the so-called essential reason-principles [gr. logoi]) and, as a cause, brings forth the cosmos. Finally, Proclus provides a highly interesting discussion of how the body and the incorporeal soul may interact. As with other Platonists before him, he adopts a theory of the vehicle of the soul (also referred to as pneuma), ultimately inspired by Plato’s Timaeus and worked out in great detail in the Commentary on the Timaeus. As with Plotinus, Proclus derives the visible cosmos, place and time from the World Soul. As with Plotinus, we encounter, in Proclus, problems of demarcation concerning the relation of the hypostasis soul and the World Soul or the relation between demiurge, World Soul and nature. Significant differences compared to his predecessor result, inter alia, from the ontological status of matter.

7 The World Soul and early Christianity The divine nature of the World Soul in the Timaeus, and hence in Platonism in general, results from the divinity of the cosmos, which she governs, and from the fact that she was created directly by the demiurge. However, Christian trinitarian theology hardly leaves room for a divine World Soul. Nontheless, the doctrine of

Middle Platonism, although it undoubtedly reveals influence of Neoplatonic authors such as Plotinus or Porphyhry. 21 See Dirk Baltzly’s contribution in this volume.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 11

the World Soul enjoyed a certain diffusion in early Christianity and after.22 Scholars have always searched for an explanation for this. On the whole, we can distinguish four options of how to deal with the concept in patristic theology. First, one could simply oppose it. Second, the World Soul could have merely been considered a vital principle in nature, without attributing much significance to it. Third, the World Soul could have been identified with the Holy Spirit. Finally, the World Soul could have been identified with Christ (the logos). Interestingly, in the last two options, the World Soul figures as one of the three persons of the trinity. The influence of the concept of a soul of the world among early Christians has frequently been discussed in the context of whether there existed something like a Christian Platonism. Sometimes, scholars have argued that the fact that a World Soul seems prima facie irreconcilable with trinitarian theology clearly speaks against the existence of a Christian Platonism. However, such a simplifying point of view ought to be modified considerably.

8 Outline of the present volume As said at the outset, the present volume does not aim at presenting a history without gaps, as it were, of the World Soul in Antiquity and late Antiquity. Our aim is to shed some light on several interesting aspects of the ongoing debates concerning the World Soul within the Platonic (and Aristotelian) tradition. Against the background of the short overview provided above, the volume falls into five sections (cf. the table of contents): (I) Prehistory of the Concept; (II) Plato’s Timaeus and Pseudo-Aristotle’s De Mundo; (III) Old Academy, Stoicism, and Middle Platonism; (IV) Neoplatonism; (V) Nachleben. Christian Vassallo, professor at the University of Calabria (Cosenza, Italy), who mainly works on Presocratic philosophy and papyrology,23 deals with the prehistory of the concept by establishing an interesting connection between Heraclitus’ notorious doctrine of logos and the soul of the world.24 In other words, his paper tackles the problem of Heraclitus’ concept of the soul and its relationship with cosmology. Vassallo argues that the logos of Heraclitus

22 On the World Soul in early Christian philosophy, see Ziebritzki,  H.: Heiliger Geist und Weltseele; Markschies, C.: ‘Die Seele als Bild der Welt’; Zachhuber, J.: ‘The World Soul’. 23 Vassallo, Ch. (ed.): Presocratic Philosophy and Its Reception; id. (ed.): Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition. 24 Another important contribution on the World Soul in Presocratic philosophy is Karfík, F.: ‘L’âme du monde’.

12 

 Christoph Helmig

ought not to be identified with the World Soul as described by the subsequent Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions. Nevertheless, Heraclitus’ ‘World Soul’ is not only different from the individual souls of human beings, but it also acts chiefly as an intermediary force between the cosmos and the logos, precisely between physical phenomena and the law of the coincidence of opposites. An appendix provides an edition with a commentary of an important Herculanean testimonium concerning the reception of the Heraclitean ‘World Soul’ in the Stoic tradition. The section on Plato’s Timaeus and (Pseudo-)Aristotle’s De mundo is openend by Filip Karfík, chair of ancient and medieval philosophy at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) and specialist of Plato and the Platonic tradition (especially Plotinus).25 In his contribution, entitled ‘Disorderly Motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus’, Karfík restates the vexed question whether or not, in Plato’s Timaeus, the World Soul is the source of all motion, including ‘disorderly motion’. The analysis proceeds in four steps. The author first recalls the rather complex articulation of Timaeus’ speech in order to distinguish the main stages in his account of the creation of the world. He then elucidates the meaning of the notion of ‘disorderly motion’ by distinguishing between its pre-cosmic and its mathematically structured form and by highlighting the definition of motion and rest at 57d-58a. In the third part, the author analyses the account of the production of the World Soul by the demiurge and raises the question as to how the latter relates to both kinds of disorderly motion. Within this section, three interpretative hypotheses are proposed concerning the production of the World Soul: (i) the ‘divisible’ kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference, referred to at 35a, are to be interpreted in terms of Becoming, Similarity and Dissimilarity; (ii) the intermediate terms resulting from mixing Being with Becoming, Sameness with Similarity, and Difference with Dissimilarity are to be interpreted as a kind of mathematical Being, Equality and Inequality; (iii) the self-motion of the World Soul is a result of its involving Inequality, which is the source of motion according to the definition of motion and rest given at 57d-58a. In the final part, Karfík argues that, while the production of the World Soul presupposes pre-cosmic Becoming just as the production of mathematically structured bodies presupposes that of the World Soul, pre-cosmic Becoming itself is independent of the production of the World Soul, except for its perpetuity. In his conclusion, the author dismisses Harold Cherniss’ interpretation according to which the World Soul is the only source of every kind of motion in Plato’s Timaeus.

25 See esp. Karfík, F.: Die Beseelung des Kosmos.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 13

An interesting connection between the Timaeus and the Sophist is explored by Franco Ferrari, chair of ancient philosophy at the Dipartimento di Scienze del Patrimonio Culturale / DISPAC (University of Salerno, Italy) and specialist in Plato, Middle Platonism and Plotinus.26 In his contribution, entitled ‘Die “Seele” des Seienden bei Platon’, he seeks to establish a connection between the ‘perfect being’ of the Sophist (to pantelôs on, Soph. 248e–249a) and the ‘perfect animal’ of the Timaeus (to panteles zôon, Tim. 30a–31c). When Sophist 248e mentions a soul that belongs to ‘perfect being’, this comes rather close to the ‘perfect animal’ of the Timaeus which, qua animal, ought to be somehow endowed with soul. The author begins by determining the meaning of the phrase ‘pantelôs on’ and the nature of the soul in question. He identifies the former with the intelligible Forms and the latter with a self-moving principle. This, in turn, raises the question of what the soul of the ‘perfect being’ is and what it can possibly mean that this being lives and moves itself. Ferrari, unlike for instance F.M. Cornford, assumes that the ‘perfect animal’ of the Timaeus is ensouled (because also its image, the world, possesses a soul) and endowed with reason. It represents, for him, the sum of the intelligible Forms and not only part of it. But what special kind of soul can be said to ensoul the intelligible realm? The author, following K. Gaiser, argues that it is pricisely the Platonic demiurge that metaphorically represents an active, operative or self-moving aspect of the intelligible. Federico M. Petrucci, professor of philosophy at the University of Turin (Italy), mainly working on the history of Middle Platonism,27 takes a closer look at several Middle Platonic interpretations (by Theon of Smyrna, Plutarch, Nicomachus, Aelianus and the testimony of the Neoplatonist Proclus in his Commentary on the Timaeus) of the way Plato has structured and divided the World Soul in the Timaeus.28 The aim of his paper is to detect and analyse standard problems (zetêmata) related to Plato’s divisio animae, which Middle Platonists dealt with in their technical, i.e., musical, exegeses. He points out that Middle Platonists examined a codified set of technical issues and demonstrates which strategies were invented and employed by these thinkers and how they managed to reconcile Plato and the musicological tradition; the latter often appeared to be inconsistent with Platonic musical passages. In this context, a pattern of exegetical strategies emerges, which the Middle Platonists applied to establish Plato’s authority also in the field of musical theory. According to his overall conclusion,

26 Ferrari, F.: Dio, idee e materia, and id.: Plutarco. La generazione dell’anima nel ‘Timeo’. 27 Petrucci, F.M.: Teone di Smirne, and id.: Taurus of Beirut. 28 See also Petrucci, F.M.: ‘Making Sense of the Soul’s Numbers’.

14 

 Christoph Helmig

Middle Platonists aimed to show that Plato ought to be credited with founding a complete and authoritative musical theory. Johan Thom, professor of Classics at the Department of Ancient Studies at Stellenbosch University (South Africa), who mainly works on Greek popularphilosophical texts and connections between the New Testament and the ancient world,29 analyses the Pseudo-Aristotlian treatise De mundo, focusing on the power of god and the relation between god and world. The short treatise Περὶ κόσμου (De mundo), ascribed to Aristotle, is probably to be dated between the 1st century BCE and the 2nd century CE. Supposedly an exhortation to Alexander the Great to study philosophy, the text starts by providing a description of the cosmos, including the geography and climatology of the inhabited world and all the conflicting forces at work within it. In the second half of the treatise, the author tries to provide an explanation for the continued harmony and stability of the world, despite all the opposing principles threatening to destroy it. The treatise does not engage directly with the notion of a World Soul, but attempts to provide a Peripatetic solution to the problem of divine involvement in the sublunary world (usually called providence). The question it tries to address is how it is possible for god to be responsible for the order and preservation of the world without giving up his self-sufficiency and independence, i.e., the problem commonly described as transcendence versus immanence. The solution to the problem envisaged in De mundo is to devolve such immanent involvement to god’s dunamis. In doing so, the author of the De mundo appears to respond to Stoic notions of causation and immanence, while also taking the first steps towards a division of the demiurgic principle that we later find in Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean texts. The main thrust of the work, however, is the distinction between god, who in his essence remains separate from the world, and his power, which pervades the cosmos and intervenes in the world. The treatise thus suggests an alternative approach to the World Soul as the organising principle. John Dillon, former Regius Professor of Greek at Trinity College Dublin (Ireland) and founder of the Dublin Centre for the Study of the Platonic Tradition, specialising in Plato and the Platonic tradition,30 investigates the role of the World Soul in the Old Academy, starting from the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis. The purpose of the paper is to examine Philip of Opus’ position on the nature of the first principle (assuming that he is the true author of the Epinomis), namely that it

29 Thom, J.C.: The Pythagorean Golden Verses; id.: Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus; id. (ed.): Cosmic order and divine power. 30 Dillon, J.M.: The Middle Platonists; id.: The Great Tradition; id.: The Heirs of Plato.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 15

is a rational World Soul, essentially performing the function of a de-mythologised version of the demiurge of the Timaeus, and to explore the possibility that this was also the view of Plato at the end of his life, as expounded in his last work, The Laws. In this context, a number of key texts from both works are examined. Dillon then proceeds to suggest that Polemon, the last head of the Old Academy, might have shared this position, on the basis of his reported view that ‘the cosmos is God’, and he adduces a passage of Cicero’s Academica (1. 24–9) to support this thesis. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, full professor of philosophy and director of the Centre Léon Robin (Paris, France), specialising in the Stoics (and Plotinus), analyses the notion of apospasma (‘detached portion’) in Stoic psychology.31 According to the Stoics, the world is an ensouled living being, and the individual souls are ‘detached portions’ (apospasmata). Apospasma describes a detached portion of something, and the Stoics seem to be willing to endorse both a part / whole relationship and the idea that the individual souls are detached from and, as such, autonomous portions of the whole. Both models seem to conflict with each other. It order to solve this difficulty, it is argued that the Stoics endorse a biological model based on the reproduction of living beings. The World Soul – as opposed to individual souls – is immortal but, as with individual rational souls, it has sense-perception, impulses and rationality. Like the individual souls, it has a ruling part and subordinate parts, including the semen, which is considered part of the soul. In individual living beings, the semen of the parents detaches from the father, is mixed with the semen of the mother and gives birth to a child. This child develops the fragment of pneuma it has received from its parents into the soul of a living being. Similarly, the World Soul is originally contained in the semen of the universe, but eventually develops further. In the world, also individual living beings emerge, as the result of the combination of elements. As such, they ultimately derive from the semen of the universe, of which they are detached parts (apospasmata). Since the universe is a continuum, this separation cannot be complete, and individual souls have a part / whole relationship to the World Soul. On the other hand, since these individual souls are rational souls, as in the case of living beings, the individual rational animals gain a certain autonomy, comparable to the autonomy of children to their parents. As a result, the relation of the individual souls to the World Soul becomes that of children to their parents or of citizens to their ruler, i.e., individual, autonomous souls submitted to the authority of a ruling soul.

31 Gourinat, J.B.: Les stoïciens et l’âme; id.: La dialectique des stoïciens.

16 

 Christoph Helmig

Angela Ulacco, junior professor of philosophy at the Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (Germany), mainly working on the tradition of Pseudo-Pythagorean texts,32 focuses on the World Soul in Ps.-Timaeus Locrus and other Pseudopythagorica. Starting from the main questions raised by ancient interpreters about the composition of the World Soul in Plato’s Timaeus, the paper focuses on some passages of Timaeus Locrus’ On the Nature of the World and the Soul. The treatise as such is the product of a close reading of Plato’s Timaeus and constitutes one of its early interpretations. Ulacco analyses the sources and the theoretical consequences of Timaeus Locrus’ reading of the composition of the World Soul. According to him, the World Soul has a hylomorphic structure, since it is a mixture of form and matter, which derives from two supreme principles. This interpretation strongly relies on Academic doctrines and shows the necessity to answer to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of the World Soul. This strategy results in important consequences not only for cosmology, but also epistemology. Ulacco also compares Timaeus Locrus’ text with other Ps.-Pythagorean treatises in which the soul is directly or indirectly discussed. Despite certain differences, all of these texts share an analogous cosmological theory. Carl O’Brien, currently Fritz Thyssen fellow at the University of Heidelberg (Germany), who mainly works on the figure of the demigure in the history of Platonism,33 takes a closer look at the intricate relation of fate and the World Soul in Calcidius’ influential Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. This work certainly represents the major conduit for Platonic thought in the Latin West until the Renaissance. O’Brien analyses Calcidius’ conception of the World Soul, starting with the terminology he employs and the metaphysical significance that this has. Special attention is paid to both the manner in which Calcidius’ translation diverges from the text of the Timaeus and the passages of the dialogue which prove to be most central for his interpretation, such as Plato’s treatment of the composition of the World Soul. Although the possibility of Neoplatonic influence upon Calcidius is explored, Stoic and Middle Platonic elements are demonstrated to play a greater role in his intellectual heritage. Calcidius stresses the parallelism between the World Soul and its human counterpart, although he faces difficulties in explaining the extension of the human soul throughout the body. Particularly significant in this regard is his presentation of the World Soul as tripartite, based on its composition from three substances.

32 Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica. 33 O’Brien, C.: The Demiurge in Ancient Thought.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 17

The critique of earlier Platonic commentators is examined with particular attention paid to Numenius’ influence. Calcidius’ understanding of fate is examined against the background of both the Stoic doctrine of the logos and the Middle Platonic concept of the demiurge. As this is typically a point of contention between Stoics and Platonists, other relevant sources treating fate, free will and providence are taken into account as well: Alcinous’ Didaskalikos, pseudo-Plutarch’s De Fato and Nemesius. The deterministic Stoic position can be seen as the result of inadequate metaphysics, positing only a single causal principle, whereas the more sophisticated Platonic scheme, relying on the two causal principles – namely reason and necessity – of the Timaeus, offers greater flexibility in accounting for human freedom. Calcidius attempts to locate fate within the divine hierarchy by identifying it with the highest intellective aspect of the World Soul and presenting it as the mechanism by which the decisions of providence are transmitted to the sensible realm. This helps explain the World Soul’s regulatory activity. Despite his lack of originality, Calcidius’ doctrine of the World Soul is demonstrated to be more than a mere translation of the Timaeus into Latin. It rather is the result of a selective appropriation of the Middle Platonist formulations which he found to be the most suitable. The section on Neoplatonism is introduced by Damian Caluori, associate professor of philosophy at Trinity University (San Antonio, Texas), specialising in Plotinus, especially his psychology.34 He provides a concise analysis of the World Soul in the Enneads, explaining that Plotinus rejects the Gnostic view that this world, the world of our experience, is a terrible place, created by an incompetent craftsman. This rejection is usually interpreted as a Plotinian rejection of a divine craftsman tout court. Against this, Caluori argues that Plotinus, while holding on to the idea of a Timaean craftsman, rejects only the view that the craftsman is incompetent. Plotinus argues that the World Soul functions as creator and is the soul of this world. As a consequence of his anti-Gnostic arguments, however, the World Soul cannot be immanent in this world (in its body) but must be transcendent; it must, while creating, remain in the intelligible world of Platonic Forms. ‘Remaining in the intelligible world of Forms’ here means being in a permanent state of actively understanding the Platonic world of Forms. Caluori argues that not permanently being in this state would lead to the Gnostic view of an incompetent craftsman. He further argues that a consequence of the claim that the World Soul crucially functions as a craftsman is the claim that the World Soul also thinks practically or productively: it thinks about how to create this world in such a way

34 See Caluori, D.: Plotinus on the Soul.

18 

 Christoph Helmig

as to make it a perfect image of the paradigmatic world of Forms. Next to thinking about the world of Forms (theoretical thinking) and about how to providentially arrange this world (practical / productive thinking), the World Soul must also take care of the non-cognitive activity of creation. Caluori discusses how it does so by having its power exercised by other souls which act as its agents and do the toilsome work for it. The World Soul acts just like a king who wins a battle by means of an army that exercises his power while he does not even enter the battlefield. In this context, the World Soul is compared to other individual souls and to the hypostasis soul. James Wilberding, full professor of ‘Philosophie der Antike und Gegenwart’ at the Humboldt-Universität Berlin (Germany) and specialist of Neoplatonic philosophy (especially Plotinus and ancient biology)35 investigates the World Soul in Plotinus and Porphyry from an innovative perspective, namely embryological theories. As he points out, Galen informs us that some Platonists held that the World Soul is responsible for the creation and formation of human embryos in the womb. This report raises important questions concerning the demarcation between the World Soul and individual souls, and about the extent to which the World Soul is directly responsible for the processes going on in individual human bodies. In his contribution, Wilberding examines Plotinus’ Enneads and Porphyry’s To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled for answers to some of these questions, since Plotinus and Porphyry have both been thought to hold views comparable to that described by Galen. He explores the evidence for these attributions and sets out to disambiguate the role of the World Soul in embryology from that of the parents’ and offspring’s souls. He manages to show that, although there are some important differences between Porphyry’s and Plotinus’ views on this matter, we may conclude that both are in agreement as far as the World Soul’s contribution to embryology is concerned. For both, it is the parents who are the major causal agents in the formation of the embryo’s body, though Plotinus might also envision a role for the descending individual soul of the offspring. It is argued that the World Soul itself may be said to be involved in the embryogenesis only to whatever extent the geological environment and the stars also have some influence on the formation. Moreover, the World Soul appears to be responsible, in some sense, for coordinating the automatic descent of the offspring’s individual soul to the individual body that is a suitable receptacle for it. Dirk Baltzly, full professor of philosophy and head of the discipline of philosophy and gender studies at the University of Tasmania (Australia),

35 Wilberding, J.: Plotinus’ Cosmology, and id.: Forms, Souls and Embryos.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 19

specialises in Plato and late ancient philosophy, especially Proclus.36 For this volume, he interprets what can be considered the most comprehensive treatment of Plato’s conception of the World Soul in late Antiquity, namely a long section in Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus. Proclus’ own conception, Baltzly argues, is refined and articulated in response to interpretations of his Platonist predecessors. A general overview of the nature of the World Soul in Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus, according to Baltzly, is one that needs to be carefully extracted from his specific contributions to existing debates about the interpretation and significance of Plato’s text. In general, Proclus is at pains to avoid fragmenting what he regards as the plural functions of a unified and unique World Soul into a plurality of souls. The World Soul is one soul and Proclus’ approach labours to overcome what he sees as threats to this central idea. In pursuit of this goal, he distinguishes the World Soul from nature, which is distinct from and subordinate to it. On the other hand, he also distinguishes it from hypercosmic souls, though he denies that various passages of Plato’s Timaeus that were taken by his predecessors to be about hypercosmic souls are, in fact, to be read that way. Baltzly first asks why Proclus thinks we may be confident that there is a World Soul. He then investigates why the Neoplatonist thinks we may be sure that there is one World Soul. It emerges from these investigations that the World Soul is best understood by reference to what it does. The third section considers how the nature of the World Soul is dictated by its function. The fourth section distinguishes it and its function from nature, on the one hand, and hypercosmic souls on the other. The paper concludes with an unorthodox suggestion about the kinds of questions we may profitably ask about Proclus’ written works. Marc-Antoine Gavray, researcher at the University of Liège (Belgium) and specialist of Plato and late ancient Neoplatonism (especially Simplicius and Damascius),37 in a way approaches terra incognita by looking at traces of the doctrine of the World Soul after Proclus. While Damascius or Simplicius remain almost silent on the topic, in John Philoponus we find discussions of the relation between the World Soul and particular souls, but also arguments that center

36 D. Baltzly has translated and annotated, for Cambridge University Press, a huge part of Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus (Books 3–4, in three volumes, including the long digression on the World Soul), Essays 1–6 of his Commentary on the Republic (with J. Finamore and G. Miles), and, for the series Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, part of Hermias’ Commentary on the Phaedrus (227a-245e, with M. Share). 37 Gavray, M.-A.: Platon héritier de Protagoras, and id.: Simplicius lecteur du “Sophiste”.

20 

 Christoph Helmig

around the existence and nature of the World Soul. First, in his Commentary on the De anima, we observe that he (as his contemporaries) feels no urge to defend the notion of a World Soul. He comments on it, it seems, only because the issue is found in Aristotle’s text. In his Contra Proclum, on the other hand, particularly in the seventh essay, he tackles Proclus’ argument for the existence of a World Soul, especially the idea that from the existence of a World Soul results the eternity of the world (i.e., the world’s body). Whether the World Soul exists does not seem to be Philoponus’ main concern. Rather, he sets out to demonstrate that if something such as a World Soul exists, it cannot be as Proclus considers it to be. For Proclus’ reading of Plato’s Timaeus, according to Philoponus, is mistaken and his alleged proofs for the existence of a World Soul are in disagreement with sensible experience. Johannes Zachhuber, full professor of historical and systematic theology at Trinity College Oxford (United Kingdom) and specialist of Gregory of Nyssa and the history of Christian theology,38 concludes our volume by taking a wideranging glance at the influence (‘Nachleben’) of the notion of the World Soul in Renaissance and Early Modern philosophy, investigating how it became intermingled with the Aristotelian notion of celestial heat. Zachhuber argues that, while the longevity of the notion of a World Soul is recognised by scholars of the history of philosophy, the various transformations it underwent in the course of this history are still often neglected. The idea of a World Soul has its historical origin or, at least, its classical point of reference in Plato (Tim. 34a-37c, 41d). In subsequent development, however, this idea was variously adapted. It was aligned to similar, or seemingly similar, concepts; it was influenced or even contaminated by theories from more or less incompatible rival philosophies. In order to understand its continuing use and attractiveness over the centuries, it is thus not enough to merely consider its Platonic origin, but its historical transmissions and transformations have to be taken into account as well. His attempt to reconstruct one chapter in the complex history of this idea starts from this premise. Zachhuber intends to show how specifically the interference of the Platonic notion of a World Soul with an element of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature became influential for philosophical and proto-scientific conceptions about the nature, the origin and the evolution of life from the 16th to the 18th century.

38 Zachhuber, J.: Human Nature, and id.: Theology as Science.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 21

References Adamson, Peter: ‘“The Universe is an Animal”: World-Soul in Medieval Philosophy’, in: J. Wilberding (ed.), The World-Soul: A Philosophical History of the Concept, Oxford 2020, (forthcoming). Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. III, Book 3, Part I: Proclus on the World’s Body, Cambridge 2007. Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. IV, Book 3, Part II: Proclus on the World Soul, Cambridge 2009. Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. V, Book 4: Proclus on Time and the Stars, Cambridge 2013. Baltzly, Dirk, Finamore, John, and Miles, Graeme: Proclus, Commentary On Plato’s Republic, Vol. 1, Cambridge 2018. Brisson, Luc: Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. Un commentaire systématique du Timée de Platon (International Plato Studies, 2) Sankt Augustin 42015. [first published 1974] Caluori, Damian: Plotinus on the Soul, Cambridge 2015. Corcilius, Klaus: ‘Ideal Intellectual Cognition in Timaeus 37 A 2–C 5’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54 (2018), 51–105. Dieterici, Friedrich H.: Die Lehre von der Weltseele bei den Arabern im X. Jahrhundert, Leipzig 1872. Dillon, John M.: The Middle Platonists, Ithaca 1977 [new edition with a preface by Lloyd Gerson, Philadelphia 2004]. Dillon, John. M.: The Great Tradition. Further Studies in the Development of Platonism and Christianity, Aldershot 1997. Dillon, John M.: The Heirs of Plato. A Study of the Old Academy, 347–247 B.C., Oxford 2003. Ferrari, Franco: Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea, Napoli 1995. Ferrari, Franco: Plutarco. La generazione dell’anima nel ‘Timeo’, testo critico a cura di F. Ferrari e L. Baldi, introduzione, traduzione e commento di F.F., apparati critici di L. B., Napoli 2002. Fick, Monicka: Sinnenwelt und Weltseele. Der psychophysische Monismus in der Literatur der Jahrhundertwende, Tübingen 1993. Gavray, Marc-Antoine: Platon héritier de Protagoras. Un dialogue sur les fondements de la démocratie, Paris 2017. Gavray, Marc-Antoine: Simplicius lecteur du “Sophiste”. Contribution à l’étude de l’exégèse néoplatonicienne tardive, Paris 2007. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste: La dialectique des stoïciens, Paris 2000. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste: Les stoïciens et l’âme, Paris 22017 [first published 1996]. Hager, Fritz-Peter: ‘Zur Geschichte, Problematik, und Bedeutung des Begriffes Neuplatonismus’, Diotima 11 (1983) 98–110. Hager, Fritz-Peter: ‘Neuplatonismus’, in: Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Band 24, Berlin / New York 1994, 341–363. Helmig, Christoph: ‘Die Weltentstehung des Timaios und die platonische homoiōsis theōi. Zum kosmologischen Hintergrund von Plutarchs De sera numinis vindicta 550 D–E’, in: T. Leinkauf / C. Steel (eds.), Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance, Leuven 2005, 13–40.

22 

 Christoph Helmig

Helmig, Christoph: ‘Weltseele im Welt-Raum oder Welt-Raum in der Weltseele? – Die Weltseele (anima mundi) und ihr Verhältnis zum Raum im antiken Platonismus und frühen Christentum’, Jahrbuch der historischen Forschung (2008), 31–44. Johansen, Thomas: ‘From Plato’s Timaeus to Aristotle’s De Caelo. The Case of the Missing World Soul’, in: A.C. Bowen / C. Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Caelo. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009, 9–28. Karfík, Filip: Die Beseelung des Kosmos. Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie, Seelenlehre und Theologie in Platons Phaidon und Timaios, München / Leipzig 2004. Karfík, Filip: ‘L’âme du monde: Platon, Anaxagore, Empédocle’, Études platoniciennes 11, 2014 [online] http://etudesplatoniciennes.revues.org/572. Lemanski, Jens: ‘Von Brucker zu Augustinus. Probleme mit der Geschichte des Begriffs Neuplatonismus’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 53 (2011), 33–52. Madey, Johannes: Wladimir Sergejewitsch Selewjew und seine Lehre von der Weltseele, Dissertation München, 1961. Markschies, Christoph: ‘Die Seele als Bild der Welt – gestern, heute, morgen’, in: Berichte und Abhandlungen der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 14, Berlin 2009, 9–24. Moreau, Joseph: L’âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens, Paris 1939. O’Brien, Carl: The Demiurge in Ancient Thought. Secondary Gods and Divine Mediators, Cambridge 2015. Ott, Ludwig: ‘Die platonische Weltseele in der Theologie der Frühscholastik’, in:  K. Flasch (ed.), Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, Frankfurt am Main 1965, 307–331. von Perger, Micha: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios, Stuttgart / Leipzig 1997. Petrucci, Federico M.: ‘Making Sense of the Soul’s Numbers. Middle Platonist Readings of Plato’s Divisio Animae’, Apeiron 52 (2019), 65–92. Petrucci, Federico M.: Taurus of Beirut. The Other Side of Middle Platonism (Issues in Ancient Philosophy), London / New York, 2018. Petrucci, Federico M.: Teone di Smirne. Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium, introduzione, traduzione, commento (Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 11), Sankt Augustin 2012. Schlette, Heinz Robert: Weltseele. Geschichte und Hermeneutik, Frankfurt am Main 1993. Scruton, Roger: The Soul of the World, Princeton 2016. Share, Michael and Baltzly, Dirk: Hermias: On Plato Phaedrus 227A–245E, London 2018. Thom, Johan C.: Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum, 33), Tübingen 2005. Thom, Johan C. (ed.): Cosmic order and divine power. Pseudo-Aristotle, On the cosmos (SAPERE, 23), Tübingen 2014. Thom, Johan C.: The Pythagorean Golden Verses, with Introduction and Commentary (Religions in the Graeco-Roman World, 123), Leiden, 1995. Ulacco, Angela: Pseudopythagorica Dorica. I trattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed epistemologico attribuiti ad Archita e a Brotino, introduzione, traduzione, commento (Philosophie der Antike, 41), Berlin 2017. Vassallo, Christian (ed.): Physiologia. Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and Its Reception in Antiquity (= AKAN-Einzelschriften, 12), Trier 2017. Vassallo, Christian (ed.): Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition. A Philosophical Reappraisal of the Sources (Studia Praesocratica, 10), Berlin / Boston 2019.

The World Soul in Antiquity and beyond  

 23

Vassányi, Miklós: Anima mundi (International Archives of the History of Ideas, 202), Dordrecht 2011. Wilberding, James: Forms, Souls and Embryos. Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction (Routledge Issues in Ancient Philosophy Series), London 2016. Wilberding, James (ed.): The World-Soul: A Philosophical History of the Concept, Oxford 2020 (forthcoming). Wilberding, James: Plotinus Cosmology. A Study of Ennead II.1 (40). Text, Translation and Commentary, Oxford 2006. Zachhuber, Johannes: Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa. Philosophical Background and Theological Significance, Leiden 1999. Zachhuber, Johannes: Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany. From F.C. Baur to Ernst Troeltsch, Oxford 2013. Zachhuber, Johannes: ‘The World Soul in Early Christian Thought’, in: A. Schiavoni-Palanciuc (ed.), The Philosophical and Theological Sources of the Byzantine Cosmologies (forthcoming). Zachhuber, Johannes: Art. ‘Weltseele’, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 12, 2004, 516–521. Ziebritzki, Henning: Heiliger Geist und Weltseele. Das Problem der dritten Hypostase bei Origenes, Plotin und ihren Vorläufern, Tübingen 1994.

Part I: Prehistory of the concept

Christian Vassallo

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? On the relationship between cosmology and psychology in Heraclitus The word λόγος no doubt represents one of the most prominent topics of ancient thought. Indeed, the term involves the entirety of Greek literature, from Homer to the Neoplatonists.1 Obviously, even if one takes a dispassionate view of early Greek philosophers and their sources, the question is more complicated because of the philological difficulties entailed by this task. As far as the relationship of the λόγος to the concept of World Soul is concerned, there are three further complications. First of all, although the World Soul appears as a widespread idea in the history of ancient philosophy,2 directly referring to it in the context of the fragments of a pre-Socratic author can expose even the most careful scholar to the risk of anachronisms. It would be easy, for example, to ascribe to the Heraclitean Logos the same properties as the Deus sive natura of Baruch Spinoza or the features of the world as a ‘living Being’ discussed in Friedrich W.J. von Schelling’s Romantic philosophy. Secondly, the expression World Soul does not appear in the testimonia belonging to Heraclitus’ corpus. This pre-Socratic thinker uses both words of this expression (ψυχή and κόσμος), but separately and within contexts that raise several interpretive difficulties. As a final point, one should take into account the real meaning of the noun λόγος, which remains thus far an unsolved problem among scholars.3

1 This paper was first presented on the occasion of the International Conference “The World Soul and Cosmic Space” at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (September 17/18, 2010). It was further developed during the summer semester of 2011, which I spent as a visiting scholar at the Seminar für Klassische Philologie at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, thanks to the funding of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR-ILIESI) of Rome. It has been given its final shape during my stay at the Universität Trier, while working on my research project “Die Vorsokratiker in den Herkulanensischen Papyri”, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), which I sincerely thank for supporting my research over the past years. For a complete survey on the concept of logos in ancient philosophy, see Fattal, M.: Logos. Pensée et vérité. 2 By way of example, one need only consider Plato’s Timaeus or the Stoic and Plotinian thought. 3 See especially Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’ and Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, both dealing extensively with this difficult subject precisely in relation to the World Soul-question. Christian Vassallo, University of Calabria, Cosenza https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-002

28 

 Christian Vassallo

In this paper, I will tackle the subject of the Heraclitean Logos, arguing for the possibility of considering it as a kind of Anima mundi. But in answering this touchy question, I intend not to start directly with the meaning of the word λόγος. I will instead begin by considering the features of ψυχή, paying particular attention to fragment B 45, which seemingly gives the soul its own λόγος. After looking at fragment B 1, I will discuss the possibility of comparing the nature of the Universe in Heraclitus with a ‘living soul’, taking the most authoritative interpretations of B 36 as a starting point. Then, in the final section, I will try to demonstrate that a probable solution of the World Soul-question in Heraclitus’ thought lies in the cosmological relationship between One and Whole. In this respect, fragment B 50 can be taken as the intermediate element between B 1 and B 36 and as the textual proof of a World Soul considered as a synthesis of κόσμος and λόγος.

1 The features of Heraclitus’ soul and its relationship to the Logos In the first few pages of On the Soul, Aristotle outlines a kind of ‘archaeology’ of the concept of the soul and critically relates the ideas of the pre-Socratic thinkers to Platonic philosophy with respect to this subject. More specifically, in the middle of the sections devoted to Diogenes of Apollonia and to Alcmaeon respectively, he describes the position of Heraclitus regarding this matter as follows: Heraclitus also calls the first principle soul [τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί ϕησι ψυχήν], as the emanation [ἀναθυμίασιν] from which he constructs all other things; it is most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux [καὶ ἀσωματώτατον δὴ καὶ ῥέον ἀεί]: he, like many others, supposed that a thing moving can only be known by something which moves, and that all that exists is in motion.4

Towards the end of the 19th century, Erwin Rohde, who was obviously influenced by this disputed piece of evidence, equated the concept of ψυχή with that of πῦρ in Heraclitus’ philosophy. In particular, he considered this latter element (Fire) as the physical principle of the Universe: ‘Feuer und Psyche sind Wechselbegriffe. Und so ist auch die Psyche des Menschen Feuer, ein Theil der allgemeinen feurigen

4 Aristot., De an. Α 2.405a25–29 (= DK 22 A 15); transl. by W. S. Hett. Cf. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. I 14.19; Aët. (Ps.-Plut.) IV 3.12 (DG, p. 389). On the Aristotelian passage, cf. English, R. B.: ‘Heraclitus and the Soul’, 167 f.; Mondolfo, R. / Tarán, L.: Eraclito. Testimonianze e imitazioni, 140 f., where the testimonium of On the Soul is considered to be in line with Plato’s account (Crat. 413a1–c7). See also Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, 321 f.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 29

Lebensfülle, die sie umfangen hält.’5 According to Rohde, this fact implies a total dependence of the individual soul on cosmic Fire and further suggests Heraclitus’ complete indifference towards events concerning the Einzelseele.6 Consequently, the life and death of individual souls were nothing but offshoots from Fire, which was considered the living power of the original Being (‘die lebendige Kraft des Urwesens’).7 Rohde founded his thesis on a careful reading of B 50. Moreover, he knew this important fragment through the ancient collection of Ingram Bywater, who notoriously placed it in the beginning of Heraclitus’ On Nature. I shall come back to B 50 at the end of the paper (§ 4). At the moment, I would like to dwell only upon the passages that allow us to describe a theory of the Heraclitean soul most easily and, subsequently, to check the soundness of Rohde’s authoritative thesis. In fact, two preliminary observations seem to clash with this opinion. To begin, as far as I know, the corpus of the fragments does not make any explicit equivalence between ψυχή and πῦρ. Secondly, Heraclitus nearly always seems to focus on the life of the individual soul. I will deal later with the psychological and cosmological themes of B 36 (§ 3). At this point I would like to argue that, in each of the other Heraclitean testimonia where it is quoted, the word ψυχή shows a three-part semantic significance. As a matter of fact, along with a prevailing physiological character, it is possible to detect in the fragments both ethical and proper epistemological shades of meaning in the word ‘soul’. The Heraclitean physiology of the individual soul is repeatedly related to the evaporation process. This conflation of images also occurs when Heraclitus resorts to his famous metaphors, such as that of the river. It is so, for instance, in fragment B 12 (= fr. 40 Marcovich), where Zeno of Citium is said to agree with Heraclitus in considering the soul as αἰσθητικὴ ἀναθυμίασις. According to this testimonium, the evaporation of moisture (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν) makes the souls ever younger; therefore, Heraclitus compared them to the river’s water, perpetually different for men walking there.8 Furthermore, Numenius and Stobaeus confirm that both the ‘moral’ (pleasure/pain or wisdom/foolishness) and the ‘ontological’ (birth/death) states of ψυχή directly depend on the soul’s moisture ratio.9

5 Rohde, E.: Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube, II, 146. 6 Ibid., II, 150. 7 Ibid., II, 145. 8 Cleanth. ap. Ar. Didym. (fr. 39 Diels) ap. Eus. PE XV 20.2, II, p. 384 Mras (= DG, pp. 470–471; SVF I 519). 9 Numen., fr. 35 Thedinga (= A 46 Leemans) ap. Porph., De antr. nymph. 10, p. 63, 10 Nauck2 (= DK 22 B 77 = fr. 66 [d1] Marcovich); Stob., Flor. III 5.7, III, p. 257 Wachsmuth/Hense (= DK 22 B 117 = fr. 69 Marcovich); Stob., Flor. III 5.8, III, p. 257 Wachsmuth/Hense (= DK 22 B 118 = fr. 68 [a2] Marcovich). The fragments B 68, where Iamblichus suggests a Heraclitean etymology of the

30 

 Christian Vassallo

As for the individual souls, a proper ethical description of them appears instead in the well-known fragment B 85 (= fr. 70 Marcovich), where Heraclitus affirms the nature of ψυχή as being an entity wholly involved in human emotion. It is hard to fight with the heart’s desire [θυμῷ]; for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul [ψυχῆς].10

Miroslav Marcovich supposes that in this passage, Heraclitus is using two popular adages. But the question is how he adapted them to his thought and above all what meaning he assigned to the nouns θυμός and ψυχή. Aristotle maintains that here θυμός means ‘anger’, and, of course, his judgment has been very influential in ancient philosophy.11 Among modern scholars, only Willem J. Verdenius follows the Aristotelian interpretation12; the others, beginning with John Burnet, do not hesitate to consider θυμός a term synonymous with ‘desire’.13 In regard to the word ψυχή, the three options chosen by scholars for translating it have been ‘life’, ‘fire’ and ‘intelligence’.14 Moreover, some of them have taken B 85 as a starting point for drawing a parallel between Heraclitus’ psychology and Plato’s theory of the soul.15 As a matter of fact, it seems to me that reading θυμός and ψυχή as the two conflicting sides of the same soul, viz. the irrational and the rational parts of it, does not excessively strain the text. In any case, a parallel like this can only apparently justify the attribution of a λόγος to the individual soul, whatever it means. As I will explain below, what is completely outside Heraclitus’ thought is the concept of a λόγος of the soul: that is, the idea of a λόγος belonging to the soul, instead of including the soul within its infinite extension. The epistemological meaning of the individual soul is a semantic nuance very well expressed by fragment B 107 (= fr. 13 Marcovich). For ‘barbarian’ souls (βαρβάρους ψυχάς) – according to Heraclitus – eyes and ears are evil witnesses. Mysteries, and B 98, where the sense of smell is explicitly attributed to souls of the afterlife, are entirely different. 10 Plut., Coriol. 22.2; transl. by M. Marcovich. 11 Aristot., EE Β 7.1223b22; Pol. Ε 11.1315a29; EN Β 2.1105a7 (= fr. 70 [b1–b3] Marcovich). The same meaning seems to be accepted by Philod., Ir., PHerc. 182, col. 27.28–29 Indelli (= fr. 70 [e] Marcovich) as well. For an alternative reading of this Herculanean piece of evidence, see Vassallo, Ch.: ‘Il fr. 70 Marcovich di Eraclito’. 12 Verdenius, W. J.: ‘A Psychological Statement of Heraclitus’, 117 f.; the scholar also highlights the etymological connection between θυμός and the verb θύω and infers that the fragment ‘is not a part of Heraclitus’ ethics but belongs to his psychology.’ See also Kirk, G. S. / Raven, J. E. / Schofield, M.: The Presocratic Philosophers, 208, n. 2. 13 Burnet, J.: Early Greek Philosophy, 140 and n. 2; 153. 14 Cf. Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 387. 15 Cf. Kahn, Ch. H.: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 242.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 31

In this context, the word ψυχή can mean nothing but intelligence or faculty of understanding and interpretation, as Marcovich points out, adding also that ‘the fragment stresses the need of personal intelligence or insight for the apprehension of the Logos.’16 For this reason, here there is no devaluation of the senses, as many scholars usually suppose. Heraclitus merely considers the soul as an intermediate faculty between senses and ‘science’. Moreover, I believe that this is epistemological proof of the connection between the individual ψυχή and the universal Logos. Such a Logos has to be provided with a soul somehow, and this soul is necessarily similar to the individual souls of men who try to understand the λόγος. Now, if it is plausible that the universal Logos has a soul, I find it impossible that the individual soul has its own logos. Such a hypothesis seems to raise philosophical problems that not even the ‘obscure’ style of Heraclitus could justify. I will support my interpretation by analysing the only two Heraclitean passages where the words λόγος and ψυχή appear together, viz. B 45 (= fr. 67 Marcovich) and B 115 (= fr. 112 Marcovich). In particular, fragment B 45 has been studied some years ago by Gábor Betegh. By means of not only philosophical but also philological and palaeographical arguments, this scholar has restored the text transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius as follows: ψυχῆς πείρατα [ἰών] οὐκ ἄν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.17 He who travels every road will not find out the limits of the soul [as he goes], so deep a logos does it/he have.18

16 Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 47, who consequently translates the fragment as follows: ‘Evil witnesses are eyes and ears for men, if they have souls that do not understand their language.’ 17 Diog. Laërt., IX 7 Dorandi: ψυχῆς πείρατα †*ον† οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει. Dorandi, T.: ‘Considerazioni di un editore laerziano’, 116, explains the reason for choosing the scriptio continua ἐξεύροιο. Mansfeld, J.: ‘Heraclitus Fr. 22 B 45 D.-K.’, 120, thinks that the expression οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο is a paraphrase of οὐκ ἐξευρήσει used by Heraclitus in fragment B 18. But with this conjecture – as Mansfeld himself admits – the problem of the meaning of λόγος remains: ‘One is tempted to translate logos as “definition”, but a punning allusion to the “limits” of the soul would presumably not be in good taste’ (121). For more on this topic, see Bremer, D. / Dilcher, R.: ‘Heraklit’, 620–621; Fronterotta, F.: Eraclito. Frammenti, 235–242. 18 Transl. by G. Betegh.

32 

 Christian Vassallo

The interpretive difficulties of this fragment are shared equally between the two parts into which it is traditionally divided. As regards the first (ψυχῆς […] ὁδόν), the philosophical problem lies in the kind of soul Heraclitus is talking about and above all in the meaning of its πείρατα. In addition, the second part (οὕτω […] ἔχει), raises the philosophical problem of the meaning of λόγος, the philological question of the authenticity of the final line, and the question (both philosophical and grammatical) of the subject of the verb ἔχει.19 As for the nature of ψυχή in B 45, some scholars, beginning with Bruno Snell, have considered it the individual soul;20 others, on the other hand, consider it a term synonymous with Cosmic Soul.21 To my mind, the first hypothesis does not exclude a cosmological interpretation of the fragment altogether. This is clear from the attribution of specific πείρατα to the soul. Such ‘limits’ seem to project it onto a spatial dimension. Now, if here Heraclitus is talking about an individual soul, a physical description of its ‘life’ can be assumed. According to Marcovich, the πείρατα are ‘a counterpart’ of the λόγος, viz. the ‘bonds’ or ‘rope-ends’ of the soul,22 its beginning and its end. They can be discovered in the blood and depend on the measure (λόγος) according to which the reciprocal changes of blood into fire and vice versa occur.23 But I believe that this thesis is not very helpful for understanding the second part of the fragment because it seems to reduce the individual soul to a kind of ‘monad’ totally unrelated to the surrounding cosmos. Betegh, on the contrary, rightly remarks that both in Homer and in Hesiod the πείρατα are mentioned in relation to ‘cosmic masses’ such as the earth and the sea.24 This is not an insignificant detail if we compare it with fragment B 36 (= fr. 66 Marcovich).

19 A detailed report on the less recent (philological and philosophical) interpretations of this testimonium can be found in Zeller, E. / Mondolfo, R.: La filosofia dei Greci, I.4, 272–274. 20 Snell, B.: Die Entdeckung des Geistes, 36–37; so also Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 367–368, although he criticizes Snell’s interpretation. Betegh, G.: ‘The Limits of the Soul’, 405, for his part, mentions the possible renditions of this thesis: ‘Heraclitus may speak about individual human souls in general or about some particular soul.’ 21 Bollack, J. / Wismann, H.: Héraclite ou la séparation, 163–164; Kahn, Ch. H.: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 127–128; Kirk, G. S. / Raven, J. E. / Schofield, M.: The Presocratic Philosophers, 204. 22 So Onians, R. B.: The Origins of European Thought, 324. 23 Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 367: ‘x quanta of the hot blood-exhalation turning into fire are the soul’s beginning; and the equal measure of x quanta of fire turning into blood by liquefaction are the soul’s end.’ 24 Hom., Il. VIII 478–479; XIV 200; XIV 301; Od. IV 563; IX 284; XI 12; Hes., Op. 168. Cf. Betegh, G.: ‘The Limits of the Soul’, 406.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 33

We can generally observe that the individual nature of the soul does not make the ψυχή something alien to the Heraclitean concept of World Soul. This fact is all the more true if one considers the ending of B 45. During the late Hellenistic age (and afterwards) this piece of evidence was known as a saying of Heraclitus, but both textual parallels25 and stylistic remarks26 cannot resolve the problem of its authenticity once and for all.27 The last colon seems to say that the λόγος of the soul is literally βαθύς. Is it plausible that Heraclitus maintained something of the sort? And, above all, what did he mean by that? Assuming that the fragment, as handed down by Diogenes Laërtius, is authentic, one cannot agree with Snell, in whose opinion ‘daβ die Seele in das Unendliche geht, gerade zum Unterschied vom Körperlichen, will Heraklit ausdrücken.’28 It is indeed anachronistic to ascribe to Heraclitus the pseudo-Cartesian idea of a clean dichotomy between mind and matter, res cogitans and res extensa.29 But assuming that Heraclitus did not consider the soul and body radically different in kind, we can also come to a compromise between the two traditional interpretations of the λόγος, viz. the epistemological (λόγος as knowledge of the soul) and the cosmological (λόγος as order of the Universe provided with the function of the World Soul). As a matter of fact, Betegh uses this nuanced understanding of λόγος in considering the traveller (ὁ […] ἐπιπορευόμενος), not the soul, to be the subject of the verb ἔχει: ‘the logos of such a person will not be so different from the cosmic logos, and the logos of his soul will not be so different from the logos of the cosmic soul.’ Thus, the meaning of the fragment would be paradoxical, as always happens in the case of Heraclitus’ maxims. Only the one who travels every road of the soul will not be able to find its limits, in the sense that this apparently useless ‘wandering’ would be the precondition for giving a λόγος as deep as that of the World Soul to the traveller’s individual soul. For this reason, the scholar concludes, ‘only such a person will be aware of the limitlessness of the soul. And at this point the syntactic ambiguity can take effect: you can also become that person.’30

25 Ibid., 403–404, who refers to the reception of the Heraclitean passage by Plotinus’ treatise On the Impassibility of Things without Body (Enn. III 6 [26] 15) and by the Septuagint (particularly, in the apocryphal Book of Judith VIII 14.1 and in Proverbs XVIII 4). 26 Ibid., 404: ‘adding the striking punch line οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον, without any connective, is quite characteristic of Heraclitus’ style.’ 27 Ibid., 404. 28 Snell, B.: Die Entdeckung des Geistes, 37. Contra, as already said, Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 368. 29 Kahn, Ch. H.: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 127: ‘the fragments show no trace of a Cartesian or Platonic contrast between mind and matter, soul and body.’ 30 Betegh, G.: ‘The Limits of the Soul’, 412.

34 

 Christian Vassallo

The reading of Betegh is no doubt attractive, philosophically well-argued, and supported by a sound philological analysis. But, as I argue above, the one thing I find not quite convincing is the idea of a soul having its own λόγος, as if the λόγος were an element of its property and totally dependent on it. In my opinion, this thesis raises two kinds of problems: firstly, it heightens the semantic difficulties of each attempt at interpreting the word λόγος; secondly, it does not thoroughly explain the cosmological relationship between λόγος and the soul. As we know, another Heraclitean fragment mentions a λόγος of the soul. It is B 115 (= fr. 112 Marcovich), according to which: ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων.

The philosophical complications raised by such a sentence clearly emerge from the numerous attempts at translating it.31 But the basic issue of its authenticity is significantly called into question by Marcovich on the grounds of three relevant remarks: the attribution of the saying to Socrates, instead of Heraclitus, by Stobaeus, who is in this case the only source;32 its analogy with several Middle- and Neoplatonic passages;33 and its contradictory nature in relation to the uniform character of the concept of measure/ratio in Heraclitus’ physics.34 Even if one considers the last objection questionable,35 the former two are difficult to rebut. I would therefore like to propose a different reading of the end of B 45. This attempt has no philological claim with regard to the critical text of Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives, but merely aims to provide the future editors of Heraclitus’ fragments

31 Just as an example, one could compare the following translations: ‘Der Seele ist der Sinn eigen, der sich selbst mehrt’ (Diels); ‘Soul has a (numerical) ratio which increases itself’ (Marcovich); ‘À l’âme appartient un logos qui s’accroît lui-même’ (Mouraviev). 32 Stob., Flor. III 1.180a, III, p. 130 Wachsmuth-Hense. This passage has been considered a Socratic testimonium by Diano, C. / Serra, G.: Eraclito; Pradeau, J.-F.: Héraclite. Aliter Mouraviev, S. N.: Heraclitea, B/iii, 136. Cf. Mouraviev, S. N., ‘Stobée, citateur d’Héraclite’; O’Meara, D. J., ‘Tracking the Sources’. 33 Plut., De an. procr. 1.1012d; Plot., Enn. III 6 [26] 1.31; V 1 [10] 5.9 f.; VI 5 [23] 9.13. But see also Aristot., De an. Α 2.404b29; 4.408b32 f.; Aët. (Stob.), IV 2.3–4 (DG, p. 386); Macrob., in Somn. Scip. I 14.19. 34 See, for instance, DK 22 B 31 (= fr. 53b Marcovich). 35 Bollack, J.: ‘Rev. Marcovich’, 9: ‘Abusé par les textes platonisants qu’il rapproche, M. voit dans λόγος le nombre (569). Il est naturel dès lors qu’il refuse à Héraclite la formule.’ According to Marcovich, M.: ‘On Heraclitus’, 29–30, here ‘λόγος comes from Xenocrates’ ἀριθμός’ (cf. e.g. Xenocr., fr. 108 Isnardi Parente2), so that Stobaeus’ Σωκράτους could be a corruption of Ξενοκράτους. Contra West, M. L.: Early Greek Philosophy, 128, n. 3: ‘I think that Hense’s ascription of the fragment to Heraclitus is more likely, in view of fr. 67 = B 45, and the double divergence from Xenocrates’ statement.’

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 35

with a different philosophical ‘conjecture’. In general, the expression οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει seems to be unreliable and quite misleading. As for the palaeographical evidence, it is well known that the adjective βαθύν in the accusative is transmitted only by the codex Laurentianus Plut. 69.13 (F), whereas both the Neapolitanus Burbonicus III B 29 (B) and the Parisinus Gr. 1759 (P) give the nominative βαθύς. In terms of style, the use of the verb ἔχω poses further problems. Heraclitus usually employs the transitive construction of this verb,36 but in the pivotal fragment B 1, he resorts to an intransitive construction introduced by a conjunction. This construction appears in the ‘methodological’ section of that sentence,37 where Heraclitus maintains that, contrary to the behaviour of ignorant people, the only way of thoroughly understanding the things that happen κατὰ τὸν λόγον lies in separating each of them according to their nature (κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον) in order to explain their nature as it is (φράζων ὅκως ἔχει). Upon closer inspection, the final statement of B 45 can also be considered an extension of this ‘scientific method’ for the Logos mentioned by B 1. Both fragments would thus be philosophically consequential. And this understanding of the fragments could give us a reconstructed text of this kind, where the intransitive use of the verb ἔχω is preceded by an adverbial clause that specifies, as it were, the conjunction ὅκως (ὅπως) of B 1: […] οὕτω βαθέως38 λόγος ἔχει. […] so boundless is the logos.

Therefore, one of the primary characteristics of the Logos of B 1 is its extraordinary extent, viz. depth or height (βάθος). This feature makes it the place (in a spatial sense) of all things, even the natural framework of both the cosmic and individual souls. In a certain sense, Sextus Empiricus was not wrong in considering it a kind of περιέχον.39 Each test for measuring it is obviously doomed to failure if directed

36 B 78 (= fr. 90 Marcovich); B 20 (= fr. 99 Marcovich); B 117 (= fr. 69 Marcovich); B 114 + 2 (= fr. 23 Marcovich); B 107 (= fr. 13 Marcovich). 37 Cf. infra, § 2. 38 I am aware of the palaeographical and philological difficulties related to the ratio corruptelae of βαθύς/βαθύν into βαθέως within the text of Diogenes Laërtius. Here I am only proposing a philosophical reading of the sentence as it stands based on its plausible coherence with fragment B 1. Otherwise, one cannot make sense out of this piece of evidence, and it would be better to consider its debated ending as a non-Heraclitean sentence (maybe a gloss?). At any rate, for the loci similes attesting the use of ἔχω along with an adverb, I refer to Kühner, R. / Gerth, B.: Ausführliche Grammatik, 382–383. 39 Sext., Adv. math. VII 132 (= DK 22 A 16). According to Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, 326, also the soul (including individual souls) should be considered as a περιέχον. Such a

36 

 Christian Vassallo

towards seizing it in its entirety, because the Logos as a whole always has a constant measure. On the other hand, these tests are implied to be successful (in method and content) if addressed to single parts of the Logos, among which both individual souls and the Cosmic Soul are to be counted. In this sense, Heraclitus’ soul is not provided with a λόγος because it lies within the Logos. On the other hand, the Logos has a ‘soul’ and contains it inside all its infinite extension. However, we should deal with the meaning of the renowned fragment B 1 in order to prove this thesis.

2 The Logos as a whole, or the way of understanding the universal order: A cosmological re-examination of fragment B 1 According to some scholars, the history of the word λόγος in ancient Greek literature constantly shows a linguistic meaning that, at first glance, seems to exclude any rational or logico-mathematical meaning.40 However, I believe that no philological investigation can establish a definitive semantic ‘truth’ about the λόγος of Heraclitus. As we know, this pre-Socratic philosopher marked a turning point in the history of ancient thought. His concepts and ideas cannot be confused with the same words used by previous or contemporary poets and historians. The linguistic reading of the Heraclitean λόγος, considered the speech of Heraclitus himself, goes back as far as Burnet.41 It was later accepted by some learned scholars of ancient philosophy, who further attempted only to identify λόγος with an entity much greater than the word it represents.42 This correction opened the way for a cosmological and ontological interpretation that identifies the λόγος with the order or the intelligence that governs everything. Geoffrey S. Kirk advanced the most complete version of such a thesis.43 Furthermore, the fascinating hypothesis

concept of World Soul would be already attested in Thales (DK 11 A 22; A 22a; A 23 = Th 31–32; 72; 340; 360 Wöhrle) and Anaximenes (DK 13 B 1 = As 27 Wöhrle). 40 Cf. Gianvittorio, L.: Il discorso di Eraclito, 139 f., who firmly contends that λόγος means ‘speech’. So already West, M. L.: Early Greek Philosophy, 124 f., and now Laks, A. / Most, G. W.: Early Greek Philosophy, III.2, 137, who translate the λόγος of fragment B 1 with the noun ‘account’. 41 Burnet, J.: Early Greek Philosophy, 130 f. 42 In particular, this was the opinion of Diels and Snell. Cf. Zeller, E. / Mondolfo, R.: La filosofia dei Greci, I.4, 24 n. 43 Kirk, G. S.: Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments, 39: ‘“Measure” is not far from the most plausible sense, […] what we are trying to summarize is an idea like “the organized way in which (as Heraclitus had discovered) all things work”; “plan” (in a non-teleological sense), “rule”, even

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 37

had already been accepted by Eduard Zeller, who, however, mixed it with a linguistic approach.44 In addition, one should also take the logical interpretation into account, which considers the Heraclitean λόγος as an eternally valid Denkgesetz,45 as well as the spiritualistic understanding, conceived inside the cultural circles of the so-called ‘Third Humanism’, according to which the λόγος of B 1 would be a ‘Geist als kosmisches Sinnorgan’ that influences the human ‘spirit’ as well.46 As a result, over the past two centuries, the prominent interpretations of Heraclitus’ λόγος quoted above have influenced the various attempts at translating fragment B 1.47 Recently, only Andrei V. Lebedev has proposed an alternative interpretation, trying to read Heraclitus’ λόγος as a kind of ‘divine command’ and ‘cosmic imperative’ through the analogy of the Liber Naturae, viz. the ‘Book’ of our Universe: in this way, it would be ‘not a feature of reality, but reality itself, a holistic concept of the Universe.’48 Now, if one takes into account what has already been said about the concept of the soul, both the logical and spiritualistic interpretations can be easily ruled out. Hence, apart from Lebedev’s new attempt, the alternative between a λόγος as the ‘word’ (of Heraclitus) and a λόγος as ‘order’ (of the Universe) remains. The radical linguistic option clearly runs into two contradictions. First of all, very few fragments seem to confirm it in its entirety: B 87 (= fr. 109 Marcovich), where Heraclitus proclaims the tendency of silly men to give credit to every ‘word’ (ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ);49 and B 108 (= fr. 83 Marcovich), in which he

“law” (as in “the laws of force”) are possible summaries. “Principle” is too vague; I suggest the less ambiguous if more cumbersome phrase “formula of things” as a translation of λόγος.’ On the contradictions raised by this opinion, cf. Verdenius, W. J.: ‘Der Logosbegriff’, 89. 44 Zeller, E.: Die Philosophie der Griechen, I.2, 792 n.: ‘Bei dem λόγος ist, meiner Ansicht nach, zunächst zwar an die Rede, zugleich aber auch an den Inhalt der Rede, die in ihr ausgesprochene Wahrheit zu denken […] (d.h. das, was immer ist, die ewige Wahrheit, enthält).’ An important attempt at reconciling the cosmological and linguistic perspectives on the word λόγος, whereby the difference between B 1 and B 48 could also be better explained, is in Pagliaro, A.: ‘Eraclito e il logos (fr. B 1)’, 144–145. 45 Reinhardt, K.: Parmenides und die Geschichte, 61; 217 f., who extends this reading to Parmenides as well. Actually, this thesis goes back to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. VII 126–127 = DK 22 A 16), who saw in Heraclitus’ λόγος the common and divine ‘reason’ which gives man a ‘criterion of truth’ (κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας). 46 Jaeger, W.: Paideia, I, 245 f. 47 In Gianvittorio, L.: Il discorso di Eraclito, 158–159, one can find a useful table with the modern translations of λόγος, as from the edition of Schleiermacher, F. D. E.: ‘Herakleitos der Dunkle von Ephesos’, to that of Gemelli Marciano, M. L.: Die Vorsokratiker. 48 Lebedev, A. V.: ‘The Metaphor of Liber Naturae’, esp. 235. See also Hülsz Piccone, E.: ‘Heraclitus on Logos’. 49 Plut., De aud. 40f–41a. Against the identification of λόγος with ‘word’ (Burnet, Diels, Kirk), Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 561, suggests that the expression πᾶς λόγος could imply ‘every new teaching (doctrine or message).’

38 

 Christian Vassallo

polemically complains about the lack of ‘human wisdom’ in the teachings of wise men (ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα).50 One should consider fragment B 39 (= fr. 100 Marcovich), where Heraclitus recalls the good reputation (λόγος) of Bias in Priene, separately. As Marcovich observes, ‘the word λόγος here is far from any philosophical implication, since πλέων λόγος was a common Ionic phrase.’51 But the linguistic theory raises in particular philosophical aporias. They concern the overall meaning of B 1 and, therefore, that of Heraclitean writing as a whole, for which B 1 should represent the incipit, according to both Aristotle52 and Sextus Empiricus.53 In fact, the identification of the λόγος with Heraclitus’ speech calls for specific punctuation of the first part of this passage:54 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος, αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.

This grammatical choice sounds obviously contradictory from the viewpoint of the author of the λόγος. Either Heraclitus wrote for himself alone or he spoke for an audience, and in this second case, it does not make sense that he would assume his audience to be incapable of understanding his speech.55 Moreover, if the adverb αἰεί were really referring to ἀξύνετοι, the following adverbs of the fragment (πρόσθεν and τὸ πρῶτον) would be specific temporal determinations of it. But what does it mean that men are ignorant of the λόγος even before they have ‘heard’ of it? The expression πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι should call to mind a reality of the λόγος quite independent from the ‘word’ of Heraclitus56 and, at the same time, a meaning of the verb ἀκούειν much wider than simply ‘listening’.57 Now, a λόγος existing apart from any entity about which it speaks necessarily embodies

50 Stob., Flor. III 1.174 (III, p. 129 Wachsmuth-Hense). Cf. Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 441, who, in this case, also interprets the λόγοι as ‘teachings’ or ‘doctrines’. 51 Ibid., 525, who refers to Herodot., II 89.1; III 146.3; IX 32.1. 52 Aristot., Rhet. Γ 5.1407b11 (= DK 22 A 4). 53 Sext., Adv. math. VII 132 (= DK 22 A 16). 54 On the problem of the punctuation marks in Heraclitus’ fragments, cf. Aristot., Rhet. Γ 5.1407b11; Dem., De eloc. 192 (= DK 22 A 4). See Sider, D.: ‘Word Order and Sense in Heraclitus’. 55 As Pagliaro, A.: ‘Eraclito e il logos (fr. B 1)’, 138, rightly observes, ‘prima che l’abbiano udito, il discorso non c’è; se dopo che l’abbiano udito, non l’intendono, diventa assurda la stessa iniziativa dell’ammaestramento.’ 56 Ibid., 138: ‘È evidente che il λόγος, oltre ad avere una realtà che si esprime nelle parole, quando si costituiscono in frase, ha una realtà che si attua nelle cose stesse, nel moto delle cose, e che può riflettersi nella frase quando venga dichiarata con parole, ma può pure rimanere inespressa.’ 57 Cf. ibid., 139 with n. 5.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 39

an enduring presence inside the realm of natural beings. Therefore, the adverb ‘always’ should be linked to λόγος rather than to ignorant men.58 As far as the verb ἀκούειν is concerned, I think it is possible to provide a deeper epistemological interpretation of the verb. Heraclitus would not refer to listening to a speech but to the human skill of understanding the world order. Besides, the difference between κλύειν (to listen) and ἀκούειν (to understand) is authoritatively attested within archaic Greek literature.59 In the remainder of Heraclitus’ corpus as well, the verb ἀκούειν belongs to the epistemological sphere. Instead of listening, it indicates the human cognitive skill and its development before and after each pedagogical attempt of a third party (sage or philosopher) at transforming it into an act of knowledge, viz. a steady and conscious ‘scientific knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη). This fact seems to emerge clearly from the first words of fragment B 34 (= fr. 2 Marcovich), where the textual connection ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες refers back directly to B 1 and gives a concessive meaning to the participle: ‘even though they (scil. men) have reached the competence to understand, they remain ignorant, etc.’60 The reference to deafness (κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι) is only a metaphorical tool that becomes part of a well-established paroemiological usage.61 Fragment B 50 (= fr. 26 Marcovich) as well leads us to similar conclusions. There the correct use of understanding (ἀκούσαντας) is thought of as a source of wisdom, but only in the case it would be applied to the λόγος as the ‘universal Law operating in all things around us’,62 not to the simple words of human speech. If this is the case, the cosmological interpretation of the λόγος, saved from any misunderstanding, remains the only way of reaching the core of Heraclitus’ message. In particular, such an interpretation has the merit of not isolating the 58 Contra Robinson, T. M.: ‘Esiste una dottrina del Logos in Eraclito?’, 67 f. 59 See, for instance, Aeschl., Pr. 448: κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον; Ch. 5: κλυεῖν, ἀκοῦσαι. 60 On the word ἄνθρωποι as the probable subject of this statement, cf. Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 13, who nevertheless translates it as follows: ‘People who remain uncomprehending (even) when they have heard (scil. the teaching on the Logos) are like the deaf; etc.’ The translation by Diels is similar in its content: ‘Sie verstehen es nicht, auch wenn sie es vernommen; so sind sie wie Taube. usw.’ 61 CPG I, p. 347 (= Ps.-Plut. Prov. 43). Cf. also Parmenides’ fragment B 6.7 (= Simpl., in Phys. 117.2 Diels); Aeschl., Sept. 202; Ch. 882 f. In addition, the saying echoes throughout various biblical passages (Is. 6.9; Mt. 13.13), and not by chance the main source of this Heraclitean fragment (Clem., Strom. V 115.3, II, p. 404 Stählin) quotes Mt. 11.15 and Lc. 14.35. 62 Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 113 (on B 50, cf. infra, § 4). The same conclusion could be applied to fragment B 19 (= fr 1 [g] Marcovich), which Clement (Strom. II 24.5, II, p. 126 Stählin) misunderstood by comparing it to a saying of Salomon (Sir. 6.33). On the contrary, here Heraclitus aims only to reaffirm the dependence of ‘science’ (ἐπιστάμενοι) on understanding (ἀκοῦσαι) and to explain (εἰπεῖν) the knowledge process. An eternal Logos is evidently doomed even if men will not be able or do not desire to know it.

40 

 Christian Vassallo

initial part of the fragment and of connecting it to the other testimonia in which the λόγος is openly considered a ‘cosmic order’.63 Starting with this assumption, it is then possible to read B 1 again in relation to the World Soul-question. The methods suggested by the fragment to prove the existence of a World Soul correspond roughly with the three sections into which it can be schematically divided: a) Cosmological and epistemological section, i.e. the Logos as an eternal entity and causal description of the human ignorance of it. Even if this Logos is eternal [τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος αἰεί], men remain dull-minded both before they have acquired the skill of understanding it [καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι] and as soon as they employ this skill [καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον]; […]

b) Methodological section, i.e. the mechanism of the universe and explanation of the dialectical method for studying it. […] for, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos [κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε], men behave as if ignorant (or unexperienced) each time they undertake (or experience) both the speech (scil. concepts) and deeds (scil. phenomena) I am going to speak about, taking apart each of them according to its real constitution [κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον] and then showing how it is [φράζων ὅκως ἔχει]; […]

c) Polemical section, i.e. Heraclitus’ criticism of human rejection of knowledge (unconsciousness in waking, oblivion in sleeping).64 […] as for the rest of men, they remain unaware of what they do after they wake up [ἐγερθέντες] just as they forget what they do while asleep [εὕδοντες].65

63 For example, one can recall B 2 (= fr. 23 Marcovich). In Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math. VII 133) the λόγος is defined as something common to all living beings (ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν), viz. the ‘ruling force’ of the universe or the ‘Law’ by which everyone has to abide. In B 31 (= fr. 53 Marcovich) as well, the λόγος has the features enumerated by B 1 (cf. Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Heraclitus B 31b DK (53b Mch)’; Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, 346). It is the cosmic order that always remains the same and according to which the various elements, transforming themselves, do not change either in quantity or in proportion. With regard to fragment B 72 (= fr. 4 Marcovich), Marcovich considers the expression λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι to be ‘an explanation by Marcus [Ant. IV 46] himself’ (ad loc.). At any rate, such a λόγος is no doubt very similar to that of B 1. On B 50 (= fr. 26 Marcovich), see infra, § 4. 64 See the ‘physiological’ interpretation of this passage given by Sext., Adv. math. VII 129 (= DK 22 A 16). 65 Transl. by M. Marcovich (with substantial changes).

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 41

In order to prove that the incipit of Heraclitus’ work allows us to speak of a World Soul, we need to analyse the testimonia in which the ψυχή appears strictly connected to the physical process inside the λόγος. Among them, fragment B 36 (= fr. 66 Marcovich) is no doubt the most significant.

3 On the nature of the ‘living’ soul: An in-depth study of fragment B 36 In his essay On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus’ Psychology, Betegh correctly emphasizes the enormous extension of the role of Heraclitean ψυχή in comparison with the original Greek ‘psychology’. Heraclitus was the first author to consider the soul ‘an integrated centre of motor, cognitive and emotive functions.’ Therefore, he anticipated the meaning that the word ψυχή would assume during the Greek classical (and post-classical) period.66 However—the scholar notes—the categories of self-consciousness and mental cognition, and in general of ‘subjectivity’,67 are only one aspect of Heraclitean psychology. To get to the bottom of ψυχή in Heraclitus’ thought, we must consider the close relationship he establishes between the soul and the physical world. In this way, on the one hand, ‘understanding the soul is the key to understanding human nature and the world, and the interrelation of the two’; on the other hand, ‘understanding the cosmic order and the major physical processes is vital to gaining knowledge about the soul.’68 In particular, Betegh considers fragment B 36 (= fr. 66 Marcovich) the most important piece of evidence for proving the significant role that the soul plays in physical processes. Heraclitus’ soul would be the continuum ranging from atmospheric air to heavenly fire, and this phenomenon would include it in the cycle of physical changes (soul → water → earth ← water ← soul). The pre-Socratic thinker preferred to focus on the ‘changes’ rather than on the ‘states’, and this way of thinking would be confirmed by the fact that here the word θάνατος does not refer to the state of death but to the ‘event of dying’, expressed by the aorist γενέσθαι.69 In any case—according to Betegh—what matters is that in this

66 Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’, 4. Cf. Nussbaum, M. C.: ‘Ψυχή in Heraclitus’, 8 f.; Schofield, M.: ‘Heraclitus’ Theory of the Soul’, passim. 67 On this problem, cf. Mondolfo, R.: La comprensione del soggetto umano, passim; Long, A. A.: ‘Finding Oneself in Greek Philosophy’; Gill, Ch.: ‘La “psychologie” présocratique’. 68 Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’, 5. 69 On the contrary, in the second part of the fragment ‘is being born’ is rendered by the indicative γίνεται. Cf. ibid., 7.

42 

 Christian Vassallo

fragment, Heraclitus ‘attaches (some form of) life to stuffs that are not usually conceived as living.’ Life is closely linked to death, and in the processes of physical transformation, Heraclitus talks about the death of elements traditionally considered devoid of life.70 But the soul does not play a ‘cosmo-spiritual’ role in regard to the mass of physical elements: viz. it is not their source of life and consciousness,71 because it is itself a stuff or a physical mass. As soon as you have water or earth, you do not have soul. For this reason—Betegh continues—there must necessarily be an asymmetrical formulation72 of the physical cycle in B 36 and a semantic difference between the plural ψυχῇσιν, with which the fragment begins, and the singular ψυχή at the end of the fragment: ψυχή, in fact, does not indicate the individual souls that are born from the element water, but another element, soul (‘soul stuff’), arising from a part of the element water. This means that the soul, as such, is also itself a physical element.73 All this reasoning is, in my view, essential to finding new solutions for the several problems of Heraclitus’ psychology. But perhaps it is not sufficient to ensure that fragment B 36 gains the place it deserves within a philosophical inquiry into the alleged Heraclitean World Soul concept. Thus, to overcome the difficulties of a sharp distinction between the singular and plural forms of the word ψυχή, I find it necessary to amend the text of Clement of Alexandria as follows: ψυχῇ ᾿στιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι. ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.74 For soul it is death to become water, for water it is death to become earth; but out of earth water comes-to-be, and out of water, (again) soul.75

70 Ibid., 7–8. 71 This is the argument advanced by Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, 336–337, who complains about Betegh’s assent to the common opinion according to which Heraclitus did not use the noun ἀήρ or an equivalent notion (cf. B 76 and B 126 and the pertinent doxography). Fragment B 36 would be the only example of the equivalence ψυχή = air + fire, but this equivalence would also raise several doubts because ‘l’absence (totale?) du mot AIR contrasterait singulièrement dans nos sources avec la fréquence (impressionnante) du mot FEU.’ 72 The way down: souls → water → earth (‘dying’); the way up: earth → water → soul (‘becoming’). 73 Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’, 7–9. 74 Clem., Strom. VI 17.1–2, II, p. 435 Stählin. 75 Transl. by M. Marcovich (with a few changes).

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 43

At the beginning of the fragment, I accept the philological conjecture of Karl Deichgräber, who considered the reading ψυχῇσιν, usually proposed by the editors, as a corrupted form of the original expression ψυχῇ ᾽στιν.76 I thus disagree with the scholars who consider this proposal for the plural form of the word ψυχή used by the majority of the testimonia groundless.77 Against this argument, one can simply observe that, before he quotes Heraclitus, Clement also mentions an Orphic fragment, similar in form and in content to the Heraclitean one. In this fragment, the word ‘soul’ appears in the singular both at the beginning and at the end (ψυχῇ […] ψυχή).78 In Hippolytus79 and Aristides Quintilianus,80 the plural dative ψυχῇσιν is a correction of the singular forms handed down by the manuscripts.81 Moreover, in Nemesius’ testimonium, which seems to echo Stoic tenets, the word ψυχή appears in the singular82 in addition to the already mentioned testimonia of Aristotle83 and Cleanthes.84 Such textual arguments are sufficient to demonstrate the peculiarity of fragment B 36 in comparison with the other passages of Heraclitus’ corpus dealing with the soul. Here it does not seem to be an allusion to the events of individual souls.85 Heraclitus refers directly to the cosmological dynamics of the World Soul within the Logos. So, Betegh is correct in underlining the strong link between psychology and cosmology in B 36, but Serge N. Mouraviev is also correct in saying that the most important question posed by B 36 is the plausibility of the following equivalence in Heraclitus’ thought: ψυχή = World Soul = environment = exhalations = λόγος.86

76 Deichgräber, K.: Rhythmische Elemente, 504. 77 So Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 361. 78 Fr. 437 Bernabé (= fr. 226 Kern). 79 Hippol., Ref. V 16.4, p. 111, 23 Wendland (= fr. 66 [c] Marcovich). 80 Aristid. Quint., De mus. II 17 (p. 89, 5 Winnington-Ingram = fr. 66 [d2] Marcovich), rightly considered by Marcovich as a testimonium derived from Pythagorean sources. 81 Viz. ψυχῆς εἰ P, corr. Bernays (Hyppolitus): ψυχὴν codd., corr. Jahn (Aristides Quintilianus). 82 Nem., De nat. hom. 5, p. 160 Matthäi (= fr. 66 [e6] Marcovich): […] κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν […]. 83 DK 22 A 15 (= fr. 66 [f1] Marcovich). 84 DK 22 B 12b (= fr. 66 [f2] Marcovich). 85 Aliter, Mansfeld, J.: ‘Heraclitus on the Psychology and Physiology’, 18–19, who however observes that B 36 ‘makes a statement about the position of soul within the full circle of (cosmic) change’ and translates the last words of the fragment as follows: ‘[…] from water soul-stuff is born.’ 86 Mouraviev, S. N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II’, 329.

44 

 Christian Vassallo

This equivalence can be so rewritten, according to my previous interpretation of Heraclitean λόγος: λόγος → individual souls = ψυχή / κόσμος = World Soul ← λόγος. And perhaps we could confirm this provisional scheme with the following testimonium of Aëtius (Ps.-Plutarch): Heraclitus (maintains) that World Soul [τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν] is an exhalation deriving from the moisture within it (scil. the κόσμος), and that the soul of the living beings [τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις], which derives from an external and internal exhalation, is of the same kind [ὁμογενῆ].87

These words clarify not only the philosophical consistency but also the lexical legitimacy of a World Soul theory by Heraclitus,88 whereas this World Soul differs from the individual soul in its greater extent. On the other hand, it is joined with the individual souls by the universal nature of the evaporation process. Therefore, it is not so important to distinguish within B 36 souls from the soul, because a cosmological speech on the (World) Soul refers implicitly to individual souls as well. What is certain is that the cosmology of Heraclitus proves to be closely related to his psychology. The life of the soul is given by the transformation process of its components. And this also applies to fire, even though it is not mentioned in B 36 and generally occupies a privileged and ‘archetypal’ role in Heraclitean thought in regard to the other natural elements. This reading, moreover, seems to be the only way not to discredit important evidence such as that of Theodoretus89 and Macrobius90 on the fiery nature of the Heraclitean Cosmic Soul.91 Obviously, this is a thesis that leads us back to the old interpretation of Rohde, which I think

87 Aët. (Ps.-Plut.), IV 3.12, DG, p. 389 (= DK 22 A 15 = fr. 66 [f3] Marcovich); the translation is mine. According to Mondolfo, the Cosmic Soul referred by Aëtius to Heraclitus would be ‘il fuoco universale, principio di nascita e vita del cosmo. L’omogeneità qui asserita fra essa e le anime umane è essenzialmente affermazione dell’identità fra anima, esalazione e fuoco’ (Mondolfo, R. / Tarán L.: Eraclito. Testimonianze e imitazioni, 144). But I am personally convinced that Heraclitus’ World Soul is also, but not only fire. On the sources of Aëtius, cf. Mansfeld, J. / Runia, D. Th.: Aëtiana, I. The Sources, 121 f. 88 Contra Gigon, O.: Untersuchungen zu Heraklit, 59. 89 Theodoret., GAC V 18, DG, p. 388 (= DK 18 A 9 = fr. 66 [f4] Marcovich). 90 Macrob., in Somn. Scip. I 14.19 (= DK 22 A 15 = fr. 66 [f4] Marcovich). 91 Cf. also Tert., De an. 5.2. On the Latin testimonia to Heraclitus, see Lévy, C. / Saudelli, L.: Présocratiques latins. Héraclite, ad loc.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 45

one could reinstate without basing the physical structure of Heraclitus’ soul on a single natural element. For this reason, I agree with Betegh in supporting the coherence of B 36 with the ancient sources (especially Aristotle) that consider the Heraclitean soul as an exhalation.92 But we ought to specify that in Heraclitus this physical process occupies all the layers of matter together (and simultaneously), from the moisture of the atmosphere’s lower layers to the white-hot temperatures generated by the stars’ and heavenly bodies’ fire. This is a fact we should consider in order to confirm that the Heraclitean ψυχή is both air and fire.93 In any case, I think that in fragment B 36, Heraclitus refers only to the World Soul. But this physical process, as previously stated, concerns also individual souls, and in several cases, Heraclitus testifies to both their ‘ethical’ and ‘epistemological’ qualities.94 The relationship between World Soul and individual souls is of primary importance in order not to reduce the Heraclitean concept of ψυχή to something a-rational. In fact, Heraclitus considers the World Soul a living organism, but one provided with ‘ethical’ and ‘intellectual’ properties, thanks to the action of individual souls. If so, we cannot believe that Heraclitus’ World Soul coincides with Logos, because Logos appears instead as an entity including the soul and not involved at all with its ‘laws’ and ‘values’. By virtue of the unity of opposites, the soul is the living face of the death that lies within the Logos, and, what is more, it is the ‘ethical’, peaceful, and divine face of the amoral, polemical, and ‘atheistical’ side of the Logos. The life of the Heraclitean soul certainly has a physical substratum. But in spite of this, from a philosophical point of view, it is above all a strange arrangement of ‘ethical values’ which have instead no meaning within the confused dimension of the Logos: To God all things are fair and just [καλὰ πάντα καὶ δίκαια], but men have supposed some things unjust and some just.95

92 Aristot., Metaph. Α 3.984a7 (= DK 22 A 5). Cf. Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’, 19–20, who refers back to the classifications of the (dry and moist) exhalations by Aristot., Meteor. Α 3. 93 Betegh, G.: ‘On the Physical Aspect’, 10 f., appropriately quotes Anaximenes (DK 13 A 2), Anaxagoras (DK 59 B 12), Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64 B 4), and Xenophon (Mem. I 4.8). 94 Cf. supra, § 1. 95 Porph., Qu. Hom. ad Il. IV 4 (p. 69 Schrader = DK 22 B 102 = fr. 91 Marcovich); transl. by M. Marcovich. Most of the interpreters (Guthrie, Fraenkel, Kirk, Reinhardt, Ramnoux) identify Heraclitus’ God with the λόγος. I agree with this thesis. Contra Gigon, O.: Untersuchungen zu Heraklit, 137; Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 482.

46 

 Christian Vassallo

In this sentence one could capture, as it were, the ‘tragedy’ of Heraclitean thought, by which, among others, Friedrich W. Nietzsche was deeply influenced.96 The traditional wisdom invites us to know the soul, conceived of as a set of ‘ethical values’ that reflect the physical world that we can investigate through reason. But true wisdom is something totally ‘separate’ because it allows us to understand the coincidence of the ‘values’ ascribed to the soul with their opposites, viz. between the physical process that supports those ‘values’ and the logical mechanism that inevitably destroys them.97 I believe that the most important aspect of Heraclitus’ psychology lies in this contrast. But in order to give a conclusive assessment of the World Soul-question, we should take a step forward in thinking over fragment B 50 (= fr. 26 Marcovich).

4 One and many in fragment B 50: World Soul as a ‘synthesis’ of Cosmos and Logos Up until now, I have talked about the soul and its complex relationship with the Logos. But there is still something to say on the Cosmos, which represents the remaining part of the expression World Soul. Aryeh Finkelberg maintains that until the first half of the 5th century BC, the Greek word κόσμος meant not ‘world’ but only ‘order’.98 He quotes several examples in order to confirm this thesis, but, as is often the case with semantic inquiries, it is difficult to account for the exceptions that appear from time to time in literary and philosophical texts. Even if they are not so numerous, the passages where Heraclitus uses the word κόσμος show that in his thought, the meaning of ‘order’ is rather to be ascribed to λόγος, whereas the noun κόσμος indicates (our) ‘world’, viz. a world that has an organic share in the universal order. In my opinion, this ‘sharing’ process is possible precisely because of the intermediate action of the Cosmic Soul. On this subject, fragment B 30 (= fr. 51 Marcovich) no doubt strongly supports such a thesis, despite

96 Cf. Rapp, Ch.: ‘Friedrich Nietzsche’, 348–350. 97 Stob., III 1.174, III, p. 129 Wachsmuth/Hense (= DK 22 B 108 = fr. 83 Marcovich). The problem has an enormous significance for Neoplatonic philosophy, especially in Plotinus. On the relationship between Neoplatonism and Heraclitean psychology, see, among others, Stamatellos, G.: Plotinus and the Presocratics, passim; Vassallo, Ch.: ‘The Legacy of Heraclitean Logos’. 98 Finkelberg, A.: ‘On the History of the Greek κόσμος’, 115, who considers Empedocles’ fragment B 134.5 as the only exception. But it is meaningful that in this piece of evidence, the mind (φρήν) seems to have all the features of a World Soul. Cf. Zeller, E. / Mondolfo, R.: La filosofia dei Greci, I.4, 75.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 47

its remarkable philological and philosophical difficulties. For this important fragment, I propose the following text: κόσμον τόνδε,99 100 τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων,101 οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται102 πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.103 This world order, the same for all , no one of gods or men have made, but it always was and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.104

If one considers this piece of evidence alongside fragments B 89 (= fr. 24 Marcovich) and B 124 (= fr. 107 Marcovich),105 one can conclude that: a) according to Heraclitus, a cosmic structure that is unitary and common to our world and to the other worlds of the universe exists;106 b) this cosmic structure shares two features

99 Clement of Alexandria omits the deictic word. In my opinion, it is not wrong to insert τόνδε in the text (as Kirk, G. S.: Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments, 307, does; contra Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 268). Most likely, not only Clement but also Plutarch (De an. procr. in Tim. 1014a) and Simplicius (in Cael. p. 294, 4 Heiberg), who instead preserve τόνδε, drew inspiration from the same Stoic source. According to Mouraviev, S. N.: Heraclitea, B/ iii, 38, ‘l’omission de τόνδε par Clément pourrait être le fruit d’une négligence ou d’une simple haplographie de sa part (saut de TON- à TON).’ 100 This amendment by A. G. Calvo (ap. Mouraviev, S. N.: Heraclitea, B/i, 85, in app.) sounds interesting. It makes the whole fragment comprehensible and was supported by the pre-Socratic thinkers who believed in infinite worlds, like Anaximander (DK 12 A 10; A 14–15; A 17 = Ar 2; 4; 29; 53–54; 101; 128; 142; 144–145; 178; 192 Wöhrle). 101 I agree with Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 269, who considers the expunction of τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων ‘not at all likely’ (an expression that is interpreted as Clement’s gloss by Reinhardt and Kirk, followed by Snell, Fraenkel, Stokes, Rou, Diano/Serra, and Dilcher). See also Zeller, E. / Mondolfo, R.: La filosofia dei Greci, I.4, 74 f., where these words are considered to be authentic. 102 It would be better to omit the punctuation mark after ἔσται in order to give the verb to be a copulative meaning, rather than an existential one. So Diels/Kranz, Gigon, Walzer, and Mouraviev suggest (contra Gomperz, Guthrie, Reinhardt, Snell, Kirk, Marcovich, and others). 103 Clem., Strom. V 103.6, II, p. 396 Stählin. 104 Transl. by M. Marcovich (with a few changes). 105 Fragment B 75, that Marcovich considered only a reference to fr. 1, testifies to a coincidence of κόσμος and world only from an ethical and political point of view. 106 Plut., De superst. 166c (= DK 22 B 89): τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, κτλ.

48 

 Christian Vassallo

of the Logos, viz. the eternity107 and the ‘logical’ contradiction,108 but it is mediated at the same time by a force (i.e. the World Soul) that provides it with a symmetrical, scientifically intelligible, and therefore rational regularity.109 Obviously, such a cosmology leads us to one of the most important problems of ancient philosophy, viz. the relationship between One and Many.110 In Heraclitus, this problem assumes a particular epistemological meaning. Hippolytus says that Heraclitus identifies the whole (τὸ πᾶν) with the unity of opposites and thinks that the wise understanding of the One/Many identification depends on the direct ‘listening’ of the Logos: οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοϕόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἶναι.111 As we know, in the opinion of Martin Heidegger, fragment B 50 would be a testimonium to Heraclitus’ concept of ontology.112 According to other scholars, it would instead be clear proof of Heraclitean monism, implicitly confirmed by fragment B 10 (= fr. 25 Marcovich).113 This latter hypothesis is certainly more well-grounded than the former. However, such a monism does not seem to be reduced to the derivation process of the multiplicity from a single element (Fire, for example). It rather consists of the unitary existence of different elements that live and work along the cosmic space within the Logos. Among these elements the soul should absolutely be counted. 107 Cf. B 1: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος αἰεί, κτλ. 108 Theophr., Metaph. 14.1 Gutas (= 15, p. 7a10 Usener = DK 22 B 124 = fr. 107 Marcovich): ‘σάρξ, εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος’, ⌈ὥς⌉ φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ‘κόσμος’. Cf. Most, G. W.: ‘Heraclitus, D-K 22 B 124’; Viano, C.: ‘Eraclito nella Metafisica di Teofrasto’; Raalte, M. van: Theophrastus. Metaphysics, 301–306; Henrich, J.: Die Metaphysik Theophrasts, 298–315; Gutas, D.: Theophrastus On First Principles, 328–334. 109 Here I leave out the complex problem of the ἐκπύρωσις. Cf. Finkelberg, A.: ‘On Cosmogony and Ecpyrosis in Heraclitus’, 201–202; Finkelberg, A.: ‘On the History of the Greek κόσμος’, 116–117, who rereads the meaning of κόσμος in B 30 by the light of the conflagration process: ‘the fragment seems to be properly understood as speaking of the ordered eternal sequence of the fire’s measured alterations, which is also the sequence of all things’. 110 Stokes, M. C.: One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, 86 f. 111 Hippol., Ref. IX 9.1 (p. 241, 15 Wendland) (= DK 22 B 50 = fr. 26 Marcovich). See the different intepretation of Lebedev, A. V.: The Logos of Heraclitus, 7, who, like the old Bywater’s edition, considers B 50 as the incipit of Heraclitus’ poem and prefers to insert between τοῦ and λόγου. 112 Heidegger, M.: Heraklit, 264: ‘Das Alles ist das Seiende, das im ἕν den Grundzug seines Seins hat’. 113 Barnes, J.: The Presocratic Philosophers, 60.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 49

But once we have demonstrated the existence of a World Soul in Heraclitus, the next step would be to see whether it enjoys a privileged position among the elements to which it belongs. My impression is that from B 50 alone, one can assume that the Anima mundi takes on a mediating role between Cosmos and Logos. The soul, having—as I have said—no λόγος, takes part in the ordering role played by the λόγος within the universe114 and creates a kind of ‘bridge’ linking cosmic ‘phenomenology’ with its superior ‘logic’, which often becomes incomprehensible to men who pass judgement on everything around them according to deceptive critical standards. The World Soul, not the word of a sage or a prophet (οὐκ ἐμοῦ), is the key to translating the original language of the Logos and to understanding the multiplicity as the visible face of the unity of the whole. Therefore, the identification of psychology and cosmology in Heraclitus has a deep ‘epistemological’ meaning. It turns out to be the only way to reach the truth following the narrow roads of human reason.

Appendix Heraclitus’ World Soul in a testimonium to Chrysippus in Philodemus’ On Piety Most part of PHerc. 1428, the ‘midollo’ of the large roll that hands down Philodemus’ On Piety, is devoted to a critical survey of the theological conceptions of the philosophers, beginning from the Milesians up to Diogenes of Babylon. As is well known, in the Doxographi Graeci, Hermann Diels compared this large section of On Piety with a parallel passage of Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods, Book 1.115 The comparison between the two texts brings out similarities and differences which have led the scholars to formulate several hypotheses about the sources Cicero and Philodemus used.116 A new reconstruction of the ‘pre-Socratic section’ of this part of On Piety has recently provided even more elements useful

114 One can find clear traces of this ordering function of Heraclitus’ soul in Hp., Vict. VI 1 Joly (= DK 22 C 1): τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα, καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ σῶμα ὁκοῖον ἡ ψυχὴ, διακοσμεῖται. κτλ. Cf. Kirk, G. S.: Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments, 21. 115 Cic., ND I [10] 25–[15] 41. Cf. Diels, H.: Doxographi Graeci, 529–550. 116 For a status quaestionis along bibliographical references, I refer to Vassallo, Ch.: ‘Xenophanes in the Herculaneum Papyri’, 54 with n. 35.

50 

 Christian Vassallo

for this doxographical comparison.117 Cicero and Philodemus, probably independently of each other, used a common but not only one source. They drew on various sources, which they reworked and adapted to the different aims of the texts at hand. Further elements that could confirm this hypothesis can be derived from a re-examination of the sequel of Philodemus’ criticism of the philosophers after the Presocratics (Milesians ~ Prodicus). This section polemically describes the theology of the Socratics, Plato and the Academy, Aristotle and the Lyceum, and, above all, the Stoics, from Zeno of Citium to Diogenes of Babylon. The Stoic doxography transmitted by this Herculanean text is extremely interesting. In particular, in the columns of PHerc. 1428 concerning Chrysippus, there are two meaningful references to Heraclitus that are totally absent in the parallel Ciceronian account. For this reason, it could be useful to add this testimonium to the sources and arguments previously employed for dealing with the question of the psychological and cosmological aspects of Heraclitus’ Logos. Philod. Piet., PHerc. 1428, cols. VII 12–VIII 13118 Conspectus siglorum P PHerc. 1428 O apographum Oxoniense PHerc. 1428 (G. Casanova) Oac apographum Oxoniense PHerc. 1428 ante correctionem Opc apographum Oxoniense PHerc. 1428 post correctionem N apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. 1428 (G. Casanova) Nac apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. 1428 ante correctionem Npc apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. 1428 post correctionem NArman apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. 1428 (M. Arman) Bernabé

Capasso

Gomperz

Bernabé, Alberto, Poetae Epici Graeci, Pars II. Orphicorum et orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta, 3 vols., Munich – Leipzig 2004–2007 Capasso, Mario, Epicureismo e Eraclito. Contributo alla ricostruzione della critica epicurea alla filosofia presocratica, in: Livio Rossetti (ed.), Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981, 2 vols., Rome 1983, I, 423–457 [= Mario Capasso, Comunità senza rivolta. Quattro saggi sull’epicureismo, Naples 1987, 59–102] Gomperz, Theodor, Philodem. Über Frömmigkeit, Leipzig 1866

117 Cf. Vassallo, Ch.: ‘La “sezione presocratica” del De pietate’; Vassallo, Ch.: ‘The “pre-Socratic Section” of Philodemus’ On Piety’, where a new numbering of the columns is given as well. 118 Cf. Vassallo, Ch.: ‘A Catalogue of the Evidence for Presocratics’, 90 (= IPPH [Index Praesocraticorum Philosophorum Herculanensis] XIX 103).

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

DG DK Hayter

Henrichs Kern Sauppe

Schober

Spengel

SVF VH2 II *

 51

Diels, Hermann, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879; 19654 (repr.) Diels, Hermann / Kranz, Walter, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., Berlin 1903; 19526 Hayter, John, Observations upon a Review of the Herculanensia in the Quarterly Review of Last February, in a Letter to the Right Hon. Sir William Drummond, London 1810 Henrichs, Albert, ‘Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428’, Cronache Ercolanesi 4 (1974) 5–32 Kern, Otto, Orphicorum fragmenta, Berlin 1922 Sauppe, Hermann, Commentatio de Philodemi libro qui fuit de pietate, Göttingen 1864, 3–17 [= Hermann Sauppe, Ausgewählte Schriften, gesammelt von Conrad Trieber, Berlin 1896, 387–403] Schober, Adolf, Philodemi Περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit A. Schober, Diss. ined. Königsberg, 1923 [= Adolf Schober, ‘Philodemi De pietate Pars prior’, Cronache Ercolanesi 18 (1988), 67–125] Spengel, Leonhard von, ‘Aus den Herculanischen Rollen. Philodemus Περὶ εὐσεβείας’, Abhandlungen des Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philos.-Philol. Kl.), 10 (1864), 127–167 Arnim, Hans von, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig 1903–1905 Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt. Collectio altera, tom. II, Neapoli 1863 ego

Conspectus signorum α̣β̣γ̣ litterae dubiae quae aliter legi possunt [αβγ] litterae ab editore suppletae {αβγ} litterae ab editore deletae ‹αβγ› litterae ab editore additae [PON] lectiones quae in papyro vel apographo desunt ⟦αβγ⟧ litterae a librario deletae ∖αβγ∕ litterae a librario supra lineam additae ⌜αβγ⌝ litterae alterutrius vel utriusque apographi � diple obelismene ̲ ̲ ̲ paragraphos ⊺ spatium vacuum [. . .] litterae deperditae

52 

 Christian Vassallo

Col. VII

15

Β̅·

20

25

30 32 Col. VIII

5

10

13



ε̲ ̲ὐ̲εργεσιῶν. ⸆ τὰ παραπλήσια δὲ κἀν τοῖς Περὶ φύσεως γράφει μεθ’ ὧν εἴπαμεν καὶ τοῖς Ἡρακλ[εί]του συνοικειῶν. κ[αὶ δ]ὴ κἀν τῶι πρώτ{ιστ}ωι τὴν Νύκτα θεάν φησιν [ε]ἶν[αι πρωτίστην· ἐν δὲ τῶι τρίτωι τὸ⟦υ⟧⸌ν⸍ κ[όσμον ἕνα τῶν φρονίμ[ω]ν, συνπολειτευόμενον θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὸν Δία τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον λέγειν· ἐν δὲ τῶι πέμπτωι καὶ λόγους ἐ- ‖ ρωτᾶι περὶ τοῦ [τ]ὸν κόσμον ζῶιον εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ φρονοῦν κα‹ὶ› θεόν. κἀν τοῖς Περὶ προνοίας μέντοι τὰς αὐτὰς ἐκτίθησιν συνοικειώσεις τῆι ψυχῆι τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα ἐφαρμόττει τῆς δρειμύτητος ἀπολαύων ἀκοπιάτως.

(...). He (scil. Chrysippus) writes similar things also in the treatise On Nature, bringing (scil. the Stoic philosophy) into relation with Heraclitus’ thought too, together with the people we spoke about (scil. the poets). As a matter of fact, in the first book he (scil. Chrysippus) maintains that Night is the very

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 53

first goddess; in the third book that the universe of the wise is one, having as fellow-citizens gods and men, and that war and Zeus are the same, as also Heraclitus says; in the fifth book he inquires into the subjects if the universe is a living being, rational, intelligent, and divine. Furthermore, in the books of On Providence he gives the same combinations (or allegorical identifications) with the World Soul and fits to it the names of the gods, having tireless enjoyment of [his] keenness. (continues on) PHerc. 1428, coll. VII 12–VIII 13, crr. 6–7 = O C, c (MS. Gr. class., c. 5, foll. 1232–1233) coll. 4–5 = N coll. 7 (olim 29) et 8 (olim 30) = VH2 II 14–15 [= DG, p. 548 = SVF II 636; cf. Heraclit. fr. 29 (e) Marcovich; test. 262; 307 Mouraviev VII 16–17 Gomperz || 18–21 Mus., DK 2 B 14 (= fr. 20 v Bernabé et app. = fr. 28a Kern) || 18 Sauppe || 20 [ε]ἶν[αι * ([εἶ]να[ι iam Henrichs): [εἶναι Hayter, deinde Sauppe, Gomperz et Schober || 22–24 Sauppe || VIII 1 Spengel || 4 θεόν ex O Sauppe, deinde Gomperz et Schober: θ[ε]όν Henrichs: θ[εῖ]ον Gigante ap. Capasso Palaeographical notes. VII 12 ⌈ρ⌉ O: [PN] || ⌉ε dext. sup. horiz. sicut γ, τ, π || 15 ⌈π⌉ Oac:  sin. sup. horiz. in iunctura sicut π, τ P:  (ν, ρ) Opc: [N] || ⌉ (α, λ) || 16 ⌈ε⌉ O:  sup. arcus P: [N] || ⌉κ sup. apex || 17 ⌈λ⌉ O: [PN]

]ο (τ, π, γ) || 18 ρ dext. inf. et sup. vest. || 19 ⌈ιστω⌉ Oac: [PN]: ι[]ω Opc

|| ⌈ν⌉ O:  dext. sup. vest. P:  vert. NArman (in marg dext.): [N] || ⌈τα⌉ O:  sup. vest., (α, λ, δ) P: [N] || 20 ][ sup. vert., sin. asc. vel arcus || 22 ⌈ι⌉ ON: [P] || 25 ⌈ο⌉ O:  sup. arcus P: [N] || 26 ⌈ν⌉ ON:  desc. P || ⌈ο⌉ O:  sin. sup. arcus P: [N] || 27 ⌈π⌉ ON:  sin. sup. vest. P || οκ dext. sup. vest. || 28 ⌈δι⌉ ON: [ asc. P || ατ dext. sup. ramus vel vest. || 29 ⌈αικα⌉ ONac: [P]: ]α (κ, χ) Npc || πρ dext. med. horiz. || 30 ⌈η⌉ ON: [P] || VIII 1 ⌈⌉ (ρ, γ, ι) N: [P]: ν O perp. || ⌈τα⌉ ON: [ (τ, π) P || εο sup. vest., inf. vert. apicata, sin. sup. vest. || ⌈ον⌉ O: ] sup. vest. P: [N] || 2 ⌈α⌉ ON: [P] || 3 ⌈ν⌉ ON: [P] || 4 ‹⌈ι⌉› Opc: [POacN] || ⌈θεο⌉ O:  (θ, ε, ο, σ), sin. inf. vest., dext. inf. arcus P: θ[ N || 5 ⌈τ⌉ ON :  (τ, π, γ) P: [N] || 6 ια (τ, π) || 8 ⌈ι⌉ ON:  inf. vest. P || 9 ⌈το⌉ O: [ inf. apex P: ο

Arman (in marg sin.)

vert. N Arman (in marg dext.): [N] || 10 ⌈ον⌉ O:  sup. vest., sup. vest. P: ο[ N || 11 ⌈η⌉ O: [ dext. inf. apex P: [N] || 12 ⌈δ⌉ O:  (δ, λ, α) P: [N] || ⌈τ⌉ ONac:  (τ, π) P: [N] || 13 ⌈αυ⌉ O: ] dext. sup. vest. P: [N]

VII 12–13: τὰ πα|ραπλήσια. From col. IV 12 to col. VII 12 of PHerc. 1428, Philodemus summarizes the theological conception exposed by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Gods. In Book 1 of that work, the Stoic philosopher traces everything back to Zeus, who coincides with the Logos steering all things (τὸ] ν ἅπαν|[τα διοικοῦ]ντα λόγον) and with the World Soul (τὴν] τοῦ ὅλου ψυ|[χήν). Consequently, the universe is animated (τ[ό]ν [τε] κό[σ]μ[ον | ἔμψυ]χον) and driven by a necessary fate (εἱμαρμέ|νην καὶ ἀνάγκην). Furthermore, the names of the various gods are fictitious: in particular, Eunomia, Dike, Homonoia, Eirene, and Aphrodite are the same thing. There is no gender distinction among the gods, and it is childish to attribute human shape to them. In fact, their names presuppose precise physical or inanimate entities. Zeus, for instance, would be

54 

 Christian Vassallo

nothing but the aether (τὸν αἰθέ|ρα), viz. the air around the earth ([τὸ]ν περὶ τὴν [γ]ῆν ἀ|έρα). And gods would also be the sun, the moon, the other celestial bodies, and even the law. Moreover, in Book 2 of On the Gods, Chrysippus, in the wake of Cleanthes, would have tried to combine the opinions of the Stoics with those of Orpheus, Musaeus, and the poets. This is why he would have reduced everything to aether (ἅπαντα [τ’] ἐσ|τὶν [αἰθ]ήρ), ruled out each defined family tie among gods (already in Book 1 of this work, Rhea was considered at the same time mother and daughter of Zeus), and, within the treatise On the Charites, applied to the gods the mechanism of the συνοικείωσις, due to which, for example, Zeus is identified with the law (τὸν | Δία νόμον). The parallel passage of Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (I [15] 39–41) contains a quite similar paraphrase of the first two books of Chrysippus’ On the Gods. The style is obviously different: Cicero’s account is more polemical, especially in the preamble (iam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrumus habetur interpres, etc.). But also in this case the divine power (vis divina – Cicero does not explicitly mention Zeus) is identified with universal Reason and with the World Soul (in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente). Furthermore, Chrysippus’ divine συνοικειώσεις are mentioned alongside his attempt to ‘stoicize’ Orpheus, Museus, Homer, and Hesiod (here Euripides does not appear, as in the Herculanean text). On the contrary, we cannot read in Cicero the partial paraphrases of the Chrysippean treatises On Nature and On Providence which appear in PHerc. 1428, cols. VII 12– VIII 13. In this last testimonium alone, Philodemus highlights the philosophical debt of Chrysippus to Heraclitus’ theology and cosmology. VII 16–17: τοῖς Ἡρα|κλ[εί]τ․ου συνοικειῶν. On the relationships between Heraclitus and the Stoics, see Long, A. A.: ‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’. The κ[αὶ δ]ὴ of the line 18 suggests that almost all Chrysippus’ theological opinions, which are outlined in this and in the following column of PHerc. 1428, are in some way a reference to Heraclitus, even when this is not expressly stated (as in lines 29–31). VII 19–21: τὴν Νύκτα | θεάν φησιν [ε]ἶν[ αι] | πρωτίστην. The idea of the Night qua “the very first goddess” is quite original in the Greek theological tradition and seems to find no trace even in the Orphic Rhapsodies (cf. West, M. L.: I poemi orfici, 83–88). In Hesiod (Theog. 116 f.), for example, we read that in the beginning was Chaos (πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ’), from whom Erebus and Night was born. It is significant that previously, specifically as early as PHerc. 1428, col. 324 Vassallo (olim fr. 13 Schober), Philodemus (or his source) refers the concept of πρῶτος θεός to Parmenides. In this last case, such a divine entity is quite surely to be identified with Aphrodite or, more generally, with the Goddess who is the main character of Parmenidean poem. But on this last point, I refer to Vassallo, Ch.: ‘Parmenides and the “First God”’.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 55

VII 22–24: τὸν κ[όσ]|μον ἕνα τῶν φρο|νίμ[ω]ν. On the Chrysippean concept of cosmos qua the community of gods and wise men, and also on the further developments of the Stoic concept of universal law, see Obbink, D.: ‘The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City’, esp. 184–191. I accept here the translation proposed by Schofield, M.: The Stoic Idea of the City, 74 with n. 19, also for the further indirect allusion to Heraclitus’ cosmology and theology which it entails. Cf. e.g. the fragments B 30 and 60 (= frs. 51 and 33 Marcovich); B 32 and 41 (= frs. 84–85 Marcovich), on which see now Vassallo, Ch.: ‘Zeus unique, puissant, savant’. Contra Henrichs, A.: ‘Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428’, 18 (‘der Kosmos sei einer der Weisen’) and Laks, A.: ‘Rev. Schofield’, 459–460 (‘the universe is one of the wise’). In the wake of Schofield, Obbink, D.: ‘The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City’, 185 translates as follows: ‘the cosmos is a single entity of (or for?) the wise.’ VII 27–31: τὸν πόλεμον καὶ | τὸν Δία τὸν αὐτὸν | εἶναι καθάπερ καὶ | τὸν Ἡράκλειτον λέ|γειν. The identification of war and Zeus can be traced back to two renowned Heraclitean fragments: B 53 (= fr. 29 Marcovich), that makes πόλεμος father and king of all things, and B 67 (= fr. 77 Marcovich), that qualifies the θεός through pairs of opposites: day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, satiety/hunger, and so on. Just this last fragment is paraphrased in a passage of Philodemus’ On Piety, which precedes the piece of evidence concerning Chrysippus: PHerc. 1428, col. 330 Vassallo (olim fr. 17 Schober), where the Heraclitean ‘dialectics’ inside the God is explicitly referred to Zeus Thunderbolt (Ζεύς Κεραυνός). For a new critical edition with commentary of this last Herculanean testimonium, see Vassallo, Ch.: ‘Feuer und göttliche Dialektik bei Heraklit’. Here, however, I would like to add that this passage of Philodemus’ On Piety could provide a relevant doxographical element: a) first, to detect the legacy of Xenophanes’ theology in Heraclitus’ fragment B 32 (= fr. 84 Marcovich); b) second, to associate the figure of Zeus qua ἕν and τὸ σοφόν, as it stands out in that fragment, with the only Wisdom which was thought to govern all things, as attested by fragment B 41 (= fr. 85 Marcovich). On the textual problems of this last Heraclitean fragment, I refer to Marcovich, M.: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, 449–450, and Dorandi, T.: Diogenes Laertius, 657. VIII 8–9: τῆι ψυχῆι | τοῦ παντὸς. On the basis of Philodemus’ account, the ‘allegorical’ exercise that Chrysippus applies to the World Soul concept in his On Providence seems to be strictly connected to the philosophical goals of his On Nature, Book 5 (col. VIII 2–4): viz. the definition of the universe as a living being ([τ]ὸν | κόσμον ζῶιον) animated by a divine Logos (καὶ λογικὸν καὶ φρο|νοῦν καὶ θεόν). On this point, Heraclitus’ influence on Chrysippus in certainly mediated

56 

 Christian Vassallo

by Cleanthes and his use of Heraclitean Logos in the famous Hymn to Zeus (fr. 537, SVF I, 121–122). On a τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή in Heraclitus we are kept informed solely by Aëtius ([Ps.-Plut.] IV 7.2, DG 392 = DK 22 A 17), who describes the World Soul as the place to which each individual soul returns (ἐξιοῦσαν γὰρ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές), gaining in this way its immortality. As previously stated, Aëtius ([Ps.-Plut.] IV 3.12, DG 389 = DK 22 A 15III) always refers the idea of a World Soul (τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή) as an exhalation deriving from the moisture which lies in it ([...] ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν) to Heraclitus. See Mansfeld, J.: Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul.

References Barnes, Jonathan: The Presocratic Philosophers, London – New York 1979; 19822. Betegh, Gábor: ‘On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus’ Psychology’, Phronesis 52 (2007), 3–32 [now in: Dirk Obbink / David Sider (eds.), Doctrine and Doxography, 225–261]. Betegh, Gábor: ‘The Limits of the Soul. Heraclitus B 45 DK. Its Text and Interpretation’, in: Enrique Hülsz Piccone (ed.), Nuevos Ensayos sobre Heráclito. Actas del secundo Symposium Heracliteum, Mexico City 2009, 391–414. Bollack, Jean: ‘Rev. Marcovich, Miroslav (Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, Mérida, Venezuela 1967)’, Gnomon 42 (1970), 1–10. Bollack, Jean / Wismann, Heinz: Héraclite ou la séparation, Paris 1972. Bremer, Dieter / Dilcher, Roman: ‘Heraklit’, in: Friedrich Überweg (ed.), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie; Die Philosophie der Antike, Hellmut Flashar / Dieter Bremer / Georg Rechenauer (eds.), Bd. 1.2, Frühgriechische Philosophie, Basel 2013, 601–656. Burnet, John: Early Greek Philosophy, London 1892; 19203. Deichgräber, Karl: Rhythmische Elemente im Logos des Heraklit (= Abhandlungen des Geistesund Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse / Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur 9), Wiesbaden 1963. Diano, Carlo / Serra, Giuseppe: Eraclito. I frammenti e le testimonianze, Milan 1993. Diels, Hermann: Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879; 19654 (repr.). Dorandi, Tiziano: ‘Considerazioni di un editore laerziano in margine al testo di un frammento di Eraclito (B 45 D.-K. = 67 Marcov.)’, Elenchos 31 (2010), 111–116. Dorandi, Tiziano: Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Cambridge 2013. English, Robert B.: ‘Heraclitus and the Soul’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 44 (1913), 163–184. Fantino, Enrica / Muss, Ulrike / Schubert, Charlotte / Sier, Kurt (eds.): Heraklit im Kontext (= Studia Praesocratica 8), Berlin – Boston 2016. Fattal, Michel: Logos. Pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque, Paris 2001. Finkelberg, Aryeh: ‘On the History of the Greek κόσμος’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 98 (1998), 103–136. Finkelberg, Aryeh: ‘On Cosmogony and Ecpyrosis in Heraclitus’, The American Journal of Philology 119 (1998), 195–222. Fronterotta, Francesco: Eraclito. Frammenti, Milan 2013.

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 57

Gemelli Marciano, Maria L.: Die Vorsokratiker. Auswahl der Fragmente und Zeugnisse, I, Düsseldorf 2007. Gianvittorio, Laura: Il discorso di Eraclito. Un modello semantico e cosmologico nel passaggio dall’oralità alla scrittura, Hildesheim – Zürich – New York 2010. Gigon, Olof: Untersuchungen zu Heraklit, Leipzig 1935. Gill, Christopher: ‘La “psychologie” présocratique. Quelques questions interprétatives’, in: Pierre-Marie Morel / Jean-François Pradeau (eds.), Les anciens savants (= Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg 12), Strasbourg 2001, 169–190. Gutas, Dimitri: Theophrastus On First Principles (known as his Metaphysics) (= Philosophia Antiqua 119), Leiden – Boston 2010. Heidegger, Martin: Heraklit, 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens; 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos, Frankfurt a.M. 1979. Henrich, Jörn: Die Metaphysik Theophrasts. Edition, Kommentar, Interpretation (= Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 139), München – Leipzig 2000. Henrichs, Albert: ‘Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im PHerc. 1428’, Cronache Ercolanesi 4 (1974), 5–32. Hülsz Piccone, Enrique: ‘Heraclitus on Logos. Language, Rationality and the Real’, in: Dirk Obbink / David Sider (eds.), Doctrine and Doxography, 281–301. Jaeger, Werner: Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, I–III, Berlin – Leipzig 1934–1955; 19593. Kahn, Charles H.: The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge 1979. Kirk, Geoffrey S.: Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge 1962. Kirk, Geoffrey S. / Raven, John E. / Schofield, Malcolm: The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 1957; 19832. Kühner, Raphael / Gerth, Bernhard: Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Hannover – Leipzig 1898³, II.1; Darmstadt 1963 (repr.). Laks, André: ‘Rev. Schofield, Malcolm (The Stoic Idea of the City, Cambridge 1991)’, Ancient Philosophy 14 (1994), 452–460. Laks, André / Most, Glenn W.: Early Greek Philosophy, III. Early Ionian Thinkers, Part. 2, in collaboration with Gérard Journée and assisted by Leopold Iribarren (= Loeb Classical Library 526), Cambridge (MA) – London 2016. Lebedev, Andrei V.: The Logos of Heraclitus. A Reconstruction of his Thought and Word (with a New Critical Edition of the Fragments), St. Petersburg 2014. Lebedev, Andrei V.: ‘The Metaphor of Liber Naturae and the Alphabet Analogy in Heraclitus’ Logos-Fragments (with some Remarks in Plato’s “Dream Theory” and the Origin of the Concept of Elements)’, in: Enrica Fantino / Ulrike Muss / Charlotte Schubert / Kurt Sier (eds.), Heraklit im Kontext, 233–269. Lévy, Carlos / Saudelli, Lucia: Présocratiques latins. Héraclite (= Fragments 17), Paris 2014. Long, Anthony A.: ‘Finding Oneself in Greek Philosophy’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 54 (1992), 257–279. Long, Anthony A.: ‘Heraclitus and Stoicism’, in: Anthony A. Long (ed.), Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996, 35–57 [already in Philosophia 5/6 (1975–1976) 133–156]. Mansfeld, Jaap: ‘Heraclitus on the Psychology and Physiology of Sleep and on Rivers’, Mnemosyne s. IV, 20 (1967), 1–29. Mansfeld, Jaap: ‘Heraclitus Fr. 22 B 45 D.-K. A Conjecture’, Elenchos 31 (2010), 117–121. Mansfeld, Jaap: ‘Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul with an Afterthought on the Afterlife’, Rhizomata 3 (2015), 62–93.

58 

 Christian Vassallo

Mansfeld, Jaap / Runia, David Th.: Aëtiana. The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, I. The Sources, Leiden – New York – Boston 1997. Marcovich, Miroslav: ‘On Heraclitus’, Phronesis 11 (1966), 19–30. Marcovich, Miroslav: Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary (= International Pre-Platonic Studies 2), Mérida, Venezuela 1967; Sankt Augustin 20012. Mondolfo, Rodolfo: La comprensione del soggetto umano nell’antichità classica, Florence 1958; Milan 2012 (repr.). Mondolfo, Rodolfo / Tarán, Leonardo: Eraclito. Testimonianze e imitazioni, Florence 1972. Most, Glenn W.: ‘Heraclitus, D-K 22 B 124 in Theophrastus’ Metaphysics’, in: André Laks / Glenn W. Most / Enno Rudolph, Four Notes on Theophrastus’ Metaphysics; in: William W. Fortenbaugh / Robert W. Sharples (eds.), Theophrastean Studies. On Natural Science, Physics and Metaphysics, Ethics, Religion, and Rhetoric (= Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 3), New Brunswick – London 1998, 224–256: 243–248. Mouraviev, Serge N.: ‘Heraclitus B 31b DK (53b Mch). An improved Reading?’, Phronesis 22 (1977), 1–9. Mouraviev, Serge N.: Heraclitea, Extraits des sources (II.A et II.B); III.3. Recensio: Fragmenta; B. Libri reliquiae superstites; i. Textus, uersiones, apparatus I–III; ii. Apparatus IV–V: Formae orationis; iii. Ad lectiones adnotamenta, Sankt Augustin 2006. Mouraviev, Serge N.: ‘Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II: Âme du monde et embrasement universel (Notes de lecture)’, Phronesis 53 (2008), 315–358. Mouraviev, Serge N.: ‘Stobée, citateur d’Héraclite’, in: Gretchen Reydams-Schils (ed.), Thinking through Excerpts: Studies on Stobaeus, Turnhout 2011, 247–266. Nussbaum, Martha C.: ‘Ψυχή in Heraclitus (I–II)’, Phronesis 17 (1972), 1–16; 153–170. Obbink, Dirk: ‘The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City’, in: Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1999; 2004 (repr.), 178–195. Obbink, Dirk / Sider, David (eds.): Doctrine and Doxography. Studies on Heraclitus and Pythagoras (= Sozomena 14), Berlin – Boston 2013. O’Meara, Dominic J.: ‘Tracking the Sources of the Fragments of Heraclitus in Stobaeus’ Anthology’, in: Enrica Fantino / Ulrike Muss / Charlotte Schubert / Kurt Sier (eds.), Heraklit im Kontext, 439–450. Onians, Richard B.: The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate, Cambridge 1951. Pagliaro, Antonino: ‘Eraclito e il logos (fr. B 1)’, in: Antonino Pagliaro (ed.), Saggi di critica semantica, Messina – Florence 1953; 19612, 133–159. Pradeau, Jean-François: Héraclite. Fragments, Paris 2002. Raalte, Marlein van: Theophrastus. Metaphysics. With an Introduction, Translation and Commentary (= Mnemosyne Suppl. 125), Leiden – New York – Köln 1993. Rapp, Christof: ‘Friedrich Nietzsche and Pre-Platonic Philosophy’, in: Oliver Primavesi / Katharina Luchner (eds.), The Presocratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels (= Philosophie der Antike 26), Stuttgart 2011, 335–357. Reinhardt, Karl: Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Bonn 1916; Frankfurt a.M. 19592. Robinson, Thomas M.: ‘Esiste una dottrina del Logos in Eraclito?’, in: Livio Rossetti (ed.), Atti del Symposium Heracliteum 1981, I–II, Rome 1983, I, 65–72. Rohde, Erwin: Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen, I–II, Freiburg i.B. – Leipzig – Tübingen 1898²; Darmstadt 1974 (repr.).

Is the Logos a kind of World Soul? 

 59

Schleiermacher, Friedrich D.E.: ‘Herakleitos der Dunkle von Ephesos, dargestellt aus den Trümmern seines Werkes und den Zeugnissen der Alten’, in: Friedrich A. Wolf / Philipp Buttmann (eds.), Museum der Alterthums-Wissenschaft, I, Berlin 1807, 315–533. Schofield, Malcolm: ‘Heraclitus’ Theory of the Soul and its Antecedents’, in: Stephen Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought, 2. Psychology, Cambridge 1991, 13–34. Schofield, Malcolm: The Stoic Idea of the City, Cambridge 1991; Chicago – London 19992. Sider, David: ‘Word Order and Sense in Heraclitus. Fragment One and the River Fragment’, in: Konstantine J. Boudouris (ed.), Ionian Philosophy (= Studies in Greek Philosophy 1), Athens 1989, 363–368. Snell, Bruno: Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen, Hamburg 1946; 19553. Stamatellos, Giannis: Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus’ Enneads, Albany (NY) 2007. Stokes, Michael C.: One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy, Washington, D.C. – Cambridge (MA) 1971. Vassallo, Christian: ‘Il fr. 70 Marcovich di Eraclito (= DK 22 B 85) nel De ira di Filodemo. Praesocratica Herculanensia III’, Cronache Ercolanesi 43 (2013), 73–93. Vassallo, Christian: ‘Xenophanes in the Herculaneum Papyri. Praesocratica Herculanensia IV’, Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete 60 (2014), 45–66. Vassallo, Christian: ‘A Catalogue of the Evidence for Presocratics in the Herculaneum Papyri’, Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete 62 (2016), 78–108. Vassallo, Christian: ‘Parmenides and the “First God”. Doxographical Strategies in Philodemus’ On Piety. Praesocratica Herculanensia VII’, Hyperboreus 22 (2016), 29–57. Vassallo, Christian: ‘La “sezione presocratica” del De pietate di Filodemo: una nuova ricostruzione. Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Parte I)’, Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete 63 (2017), 171–203. Vassallo, Christian: ‘The “pre-Socratic Section” of Philodemus’ On Piety: A New Reconstruction. Praesocratica Herculanensia X (Part II)’, Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete 64 (2018), 98–147. Vassallo, Christian: ‘The Legacy of Heraclitean Logos in Plotinus’ Ontology’, in: Christian Vassallo (ed.), Physiologia. Topics in Presocratic Philosophy and Its Reception in Antiquity (= AKAN-Einzelschriften 12), Trier 2017, 41–60. Vassallo, Christian: ‘Zeus unique, puissant, savant. Une note à Héraclite, fr. 84–85 Marcovich (= DK 22 B 32 et 41)’, Philosophia 47 (2017), 17–20. Vassallo, Christian: ‘Feuer und göttliche Dialektik bei Heraklit. Neue Lesungen in PHerc. 1428, Kol. 330 (olim Fr. 17). Praesocratica Herculanensia IX’, Mnemosyne 71 (2018), 717–732 (preprint). Verdenius, Willem J.: ‘A Psychological Statement of Heraclitus’, Mnemosyne s. III, 11 (1943), 115–121. Verdenius, Willem J.: ‘Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides’, Phronesis 11 (1966), 81–98. Viano, Cristina: ‘Eraclito nella Metafisica di Teofrasto. Il fr. 124 DK e la discussione sui principi dei cap. IV e V’, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 47 (1992), 455–476. West, Martin L.: Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, Oxford 1971. West, Martin L.: I poemi orfici (The Orphic Poems, Oxford 1983), It. transl. by Marisa Tortorelli Ghidini (= Skepsis 8), Naples 1993. Zeller, Eduard: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, I.2, Leipzig 1920. Zeller, Eduard / Mondolfo, Rodolfo: La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico (Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig 1892; 19235), ed. by Rodolfo Mondolfo, I. I Presocratici, 4. Eraclito, Florence 1961; 1968 (repr.).

Part II: Plato’s Timaeus and Pseudo-Aristotle’s De Mundo

Filip Karfík

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus The question of the relationship between the disorderly motion that the Demiurge finds before him at the beginning of his work in the Timaeus (30a3–5) and the World Soul that he creates in the course of this work (34a7–37c5) represents one of the Timaeus’ many riddles.1 In this study, I am only concerned with the particular question of whether or not the (World) Soul is the source of all motion, including the pre-cosmic ‘disorderly motion’. In a penetrating analysis, Harold Cherniss advanced the claim that this must be the case and tied his thesis to a decidedly metaphorical interpretation of the Timaeus myth.2 I would like to show that the ‘disorderly motion’ in the theory of the Timaeus does not presuppose the motion of the World Soul, but that, on the contrary, it is one of the prerequisites for the constitution of the World Soul.

1 Four stages in the generation of the world Before we attempt to define the relationship between the disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus, we must shed some light on the former of these two notions. It is often used with reference to several passages in the Timaeus,3 which, however, do not necessarily always describe the same thing. This ambiguity is tied up with the peculiar structure of Timaeus’ discourse. Let us therefore first recall the articulation of this speech. It begins at 27d5 with the description of the making of the world by the Demiurge, which comprises the making of the world’s body and the World Soul and extends up to the making of immortal souls for the mortal animals. Starting from 42e5, the young gods take centre stage and carry out the task that has been

1 Cf. Karfik, F.: Die Beseelung des Kosmos, esp. 127–138, 149–153; Karfik, F.: ‘Que fait et qui est le démiurge dans le Timée ?’. 2 Cherniss, H.: ‘The sources of evil according to Plato’ [photomechanical reproduction in Id., Selected Papers, edited by L. Tarán, 253–260]. 3 The following passages are relevant for the description of the disorderly motion: Tim. 30a2–6, Tim. 47e3–48b3, Tim. 52d2–53b6, Tim. 68e1–69c3. Note: Translated from German by Chad Jorgenson. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-003

64 

 Filip Karfík

assigned to them, namely the making of the mortal animals. This section coincides with the making of humans, under which the making of animals is subsumed and with which, at 92c3, Timaeus’ whole discourse comes to an end (it is followed only by a brief concluding remark at the end of the Timaeus 92c4–9 and a corresponding prayer by Timaeus at the beginning of the Critias 106a1–b7). For the sake of brevity, throughout this paper I will use the terms cosmogony, anthropogony, zoogony, psychogony, and somatogony for designating the making of the world, humans, animals, soul(s) and bodies respectively. This exposition is, however, interrupted shortly after the beginning of the anthropogenic section, in the middle of the description of sense perception, and a new, quasi-independent treatise is inserted, which is said to constitute a new beginning to the whole discourse, on the grounds that the first beginning at Tim. 27d5 drew on an insufficient number of principles, namely two instead of three.4 Thus, at Tim. 48e2, Timaeus starts all over again, introducing the ‘difficult’ third kind of principle: ‘the receptacle – like a nurse – of all generation’ (πάσης […] γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν οἷον τιθήνην, Tim. 49a5–6). In addition to the definition of the third type of principle, the new account includes a new definition of the other two principles, namely the noetic paradigm and visible Becoming (Tim. 48e4–52d4), as well as the division of the latter into a pre-cosmic Becoming, that corresponds to a state in which god is absent, and an ordering of the world, diakosmêsis, carried out by god (Tim. 52d4–53b5). This diakosmêsis is, in turn, analyzed in terms of a theory of the structure of the elementary bodies and their properties, viz. motion, rest, and mixture. This theory merges into a description of the sensible qualities of physical bodies, which aims to reconnect with the interrupted anthropogony, since it constitutes a necessary complement to the theory of sense perception (on this point, cf. Tim. 61c3–d5). Thus at 68e1 the long insertion takes up the thread of the discussion at exactly the point where it was broken off at Tim. 47e2. Taking into account this articulation of his speech we see that Timaeus distinguishes between the following four stages in the generation of the world: (1) Pre-cosmic Becoming, i.e., the generation of the elementary μορφαί in receptive space; (2) The diakosmêsis, i.e., the shaping of these μορφαί by means of figures and numbers, which is carried out by the Demiurge and whose result is the triangular structure of the elementary bodies; 4 Cf. Tim. 48e2–3: ῾Η δ’ οὖν αὖθις ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μειζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διῃρημένη· τότε μὲν γὰρ δύο εἴδη διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος ἡμῖν δηλωτέον. Plato engages here, as often in the Timaeus, in a play on words with respect to the concept ἀρχή, which is simultaneously a beginning of the discourse and a principle of the cosmos. As a principle of the cosmos, ἀρχή is now to be divided into three rather than two εἴδη, or γένη. Compare also 29b2–3 and 48a7–b3.

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

(3) (4)

 65

The cosmogony, i.e. the production of the immortal living beings, which is likewise carried out by the Demiurge; The anthropogony (including the zoogony), i.e. the production of the mortal animals, which is left to the young gods.

We can ask about the relationship between this division and the psychogony, i.e. the production of the World Soul, of which it is said that the Demiurge produced it such that it was ‘earlier and older’ (προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν, Tim. 34c4–5) than the body. There is no doubt that the cosmogony, as well as the anthropogony, presupposes the psychogony. The question is whether this also holds of the diakosmêsis, out of which the mathematically structured elementary bodies arise, and whether it can hold for the pre-cosmic Becoming, in which, according to Timaeus’ account, the Demiurge has no part. To ‘presuppose’ does not necessarily imply temporal ‘precedence’, along the lines of a literal interpretation of the Timaeus. It can also be understood causally, rather than temporally, in line with a metaphorical interpretation of the myth.

2 Disorderly motion We can now focus on what Timaeus says about the motion that he calls ‘disorderly’. What moves in this way, how does this motion arise, and how is it constituted? Timaeus proposes a comprehensive theory that answers these questions. This theory takes as its point of departure the thesis that there are imitations of the Forms (τῶν ὄντων […] μίμηματα, Tim. 50c5; εἴδη, Tim. 51d5) that somehow arise in space – the third kind of principle, called chôra (χώρα, Tim. 52a8, Tim. 52d3) – like impressions (τυπωθέντα, Tim. 50c5) in a malleable substance (ἐκμαγεῖον, Tim. 50c2). The chôra always remains identical (Tim. 49e7–50a5, Tim. 50b5–8), while the imitations enter into and leave it, come into being and pass away. These imitations are in constant motion (πεφορημένον ἀεί, Tim. 52a6). At the pre-cosmic stage (cf. Tim. 52d2 ff.), the chôra takes up in this way the μορφαί of the Forms of water, fire, earth, and air. The receptive space thus ‘appears to sight’ (ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, Tim. 52e1) to become watery, fiery, earthy, or airy in different places (Tim. 51b4–6, Tim. 52d4–6). Thus what is primarily at issue is the motion of these appearances (φάντασμα, Tim. 52c3; cf. Tim. 49d1, e8). It is repeatedly stated that they come into being and pass away, such that one might think that this is what their movement consists in (cf. Tim. 49b7–c7). However, Timaeus also speaks of these appearances – i.e. the pre-cosmic μορφαί – as exhibiting locomotion. This  locomotion arises in virtue

66 

 Filip Karfík

of the fact that their properties (δυνάμεις) are neither ‘similar’ (ὅμοιαι) nor ‘balanced’ (ἰσορροποί) (Tim. 52e1–2). This lack of uniformity causes a motion that Timaeus characterizes as an uneven swaying and shaking of the chôra (ἀνωμάλως πάντῃ ταλαντουμένην σείεσθαι, Tim. 52e3–4), which in turn shakes the μορφαί that appear in it (κινουμένην δʼ αὖ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν, Tim. 52e4–5). This description gives the impression that it is the chôra itself that moves, since Timaeus does, in fact, attribute this shaking movement primarily to the chôra (cf. Tim. 50c2–3, Tim. 52e3–5, Tim. 53a3–4, Tim. 57c3) and only secondarily to the μορφαί of water, fire, earth, and air that appear in it. Nonetheless, it is the μορφαί that provide this type of motion, not the chôra, and it must be the motion of these μορφαί that is perceived as a swaying and shaking of the chôra, since in itself this principle has no properties whatsoever that would allow us to speak of it as changing, neither in terms of generation and destruction nor in terms of locomotion. It is explicitly stated that the chôra is identical (ταὐτόν, Tim. 50b7), that it ‘never departs at all from its own character’ (ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως, Tim. 50b7–8, Cornford’s translation), that it itself never takes up the μορφαί that enter into it (Tim. 50c1–2, Tim. 50d4–51b2), and that it does not admit destruction (Tim. 52a8–b1). Thus, when Timaeus says that the chôra is shaken by the lack of similarity and balance between the μορφαί that enter into it and that it shakes these in turn, he cannot mean anything other than that the parts of the chôra that appear, in each instance, watery, fiery, earthy, and airy are in motion (cf. Tim. 51b4–6: πῦρ μὲν ἑκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρομένον μέρος φαίνεσθαι κτλ.), which makes the chôra itself appear to move and to be moved. What actually moves are these parts in their reciprocal relationship. This motion (κινούμενα, Tim. 52e5) is then described more precisely as a separating out (διακρινόμενα, Tim. 52e6) of the different μορφαί, in which each is borne (φερέσθαι, Tim. 52e6) in a different direction (ἄλλα ἄλλοσε, Tim. 52e5). The most dissimilar things are most isolated from one another (τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα πλεῖστον αὐτὰ ἀφʼ αὑτῶν ὁρίζειν, Tim. 53a4–5) and occupy a different place (χώραν ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄλλην ἴσχειν, Tim. 53a6–7). According to Timaeus, this process occurs before the generation of the Heaven, i.e. the Whole (Tim. 52d4, 53a7), and precedes the diakosmêsis of the pre-cosmic μορφαί by means of figures and numbers (Tim. 53a7–b5). As a whole, this pre-cosmic motion is compared with the motion imparted to particles of grain in a winnowing-basket, through which the heavy and light components of the threshed grain – i.e. the grains of corn and the chaff – are separated out (Tim. 52e6–53a4). It should be noted that this analogy is inserted as a mere illustration (ὥσπερ […] οὕτω, Tim. 52e6–53a2), not as a conceptual explanans. The cause and the nature of this motion are explained only later, in a passage that draws on the already mathematically structured elementary bodies, but

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 67

nonetheless explicitly refers back to the description of the pre-cosmic shaking motion. This is the important section Tim. 56e7–58c4, which lays out the general principles of a doctrine of motion and rest (κινήσεως […] στάσεώς τε πέρι, Tim. 57d7) with respect to bodies. Timaeus summarizes these principles as follows (Tim. 57e2–58a4): (i) [...] ἐν μὲν ὁμαλότητι μηδέποτε ἐθέλειν κίνησιν ἐνεῖναι. τὸ γὰρ κινησόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ κινήσοντος ἢ τὸ κινῆσον ἄνευ τοῦ κινησομένου χαλεπόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἶναι· κίνησις δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων ἀπόντων, ταῦτα δὲ ὁμαλὰ εἶναί ποτε ἀδύνατον. οὕτω δὴ στάσιν μὲν ἐν ὁμαλότητι, κίνησιν δὲ εἰς ἀνωμαλότητα ἀεὶ τιθῶμεν· (ii) αἰτία δὲ ἀνισότης αὖ τῆς ἀνωμάλου φύσεως. ἀνισότητος δὲ γένεσιν μὲν διεληλύθαμεν· (iii) πῶς δέ ποτε οὐ κατὰ γένη διαχωρισθέντα ἕκαστα πέπαυται τῆς διʼ ἀλλήλων κινήσεως καὶ φορᾶς, οὐκ εἴπομεν. ὧδε οὖν πάλιν ἐροῦμεν […]. (i) [...] motion will never arise in a state of homogeneity. For it is difficult, or rather impossible, for there to be a moved without a mover or a mover without a moved. There is no movement when these [two factors] are absent. But it is impossible for them to ever be homogeneous. Let us affirm in this way that rest is always to be found in homogeneity, while motion is to be found in heterogeneity. (ii) The cause of heterogeneity is, in turn, inequality. We have already gone over the origin of inequality. (iii) But we have not yet explained how it is that the bodies that have been separated out have not stopped moving through one another and changing place, so let us say the following […].

The concept of heterogeneity (ἀνωμαλότης), which plays a central role in this passage, was already mentioned in the description of the pre-cosmic motion (ἀνωμάλως πάντῃ ταλαντουμένην, Tim. 52e3), although there it was the concepts of the ὅμοιον and the ἰσόρροπον that were in the foreground of the explanation of the movement of the pre-cosmic μορφαί. The heterogeneity of the pre-cosmic motions arose out of the lack of similarity and balance between the pre-cosmic μορφαί and their δυνάμεις. In the case of the mathematically structured elementary bodies, the ἀνωμαλότης is traced back to the ἀνισότης, which is presented as the αἰτία of the ἀνωμαλότης (ii). It is possible that the difference lies in the fact that, in the case of the pre-cosmic μορφαί, we cannot speak of ἰσότης, since they lack all mathematical exactness and consequently are not ἴσα and ἄνισα in relation to one another, but merely ὅμοια and ἀνόμοια. By contrast, the mathematically-structured elementary bodies stand in an ἴσα-ἄνισα relationship to one another. Be that as it may, the key point is assertion (i), namely that a lack of homogeneity is a necessary condition for motion, such that it can arise only when there is a relationship between two different factors, of which one is to be understood as the mover and the other as the moved, i.e. one is active or effective and the other is passive or affected. This principle applies just as much to the motion of the pre-cosmic μορφαί as to that of the mathematically structured elementary bodies.

68 

 Filip Karfík

A corollary of this principle is the thesis that ὁμαλότης must be a cause of rest (στάσις, 57d7). This thesis represents an important complement to the description of the motion of the pre-cosmic μορφαί. Since this motion leads to the separating out of dissimilar μορφαί and to the gathering together of similar μορφαί in different places, the end result would have to be a general state of rest (iii). This would come about if it were possible for the different types of similar μορφαί to no longer enter into contact with μορφαί of a different kind. This situation would occur if empty space (κενὴ χώρα, Tim. 58a7) were to emerge between the ‘places proper to them’ (ἴδιοι τόποι, Tim. 57c3). ‘Before the origin of the Heaven’ (Tim. 52d4, cf. Tim. 53a7), nothing stood in the way of this possibility, since per se the chôra has no form (cf. Tim. 50e1–51a3) and consequently no limits. For this reason, i.e. in order to preserve the constant motion of the elementary bodies formed out of the pre-cosmic μορφαί by means of figures and numbers and to prevent everything from coming to a halt, the Demiurge enclosed the four elementary genera in a circular motion (περίοδος), which presses them together (σφίγγει πάντα) and prevents the emergence of empty space (Tim. 58a4–7). This way, the reader of the Timaeus is informed about the cause and nature of the motion of the elementary appearances and the elementary bodies. Its cause is to be found in the ἀνομοιότης and the ἀνισότης of the spatially contiguous μορφαί and elementary bodies and it ceases when at least one of these two conditions is not fulfilled: the ἀνωμαλότης (i.e. ἀνομοιότης/ἀνισότης) or the spatial contact. It is nowhere suggested that this motion has another origin or cause than those that are given here. It is, however, made clear that this motion is not inertial and that it lies in its nature to strive towards a state of rest. Consequently, another, additional cause is required to preserve motion in the cosmos. This additional cause is designated as ἡ τοῦ παντὸς περίοδος, which encompasses the four elementary genera (συμπεριέλαβεν τὰ γένη) and which is circular (κυκλοτερής) and by nature cyclical (πρὸς αὑτὴν πεφυκυῖα βούλεσθαι συνιέναι, Tim. 58a5–6). This additional cause does not bring about the motion of the elementary appearances, or elementary bodies, but it does guarantee that, within the created universe, this motion never ceases.

3 The making of the World Soul and its constituents This finally leads us back to the question of the relationship between the ‘disorderly motion’ and the World Soul.

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 69

According to the Timaeus, the soul is a constituent part of the world and thus a partial product of the cosmogony. If it holds for the world as a whole that it ‘has become’ (γέγονεν, Tim. 28b7) – whatever sense one may give to this ‘becoming’ – then this also holds for the body of the world and the World Soul (γέγονεν, Tim. 36e6). Among the three types of principle with which Timaeus operates in his account of the world – ὄν, χώρα, γένεσις (Tim. 52d3) – the World Soul falls under the rubric of γένεσις, not under that of ὄν or under that of χώρα. In line with this, Timaeus describes the generation of the World Soul (Tim. 34b10–36d7) and, later, of the individual souls as well (Tim. 41d4–7). There are several points in this description that are important for our analysis: (1) The World Soul comes into being as a product of the Demiurge (Tim. 34b10–35a1). (2) The generation of the World Soul has priority over that of the world’s body: the World Soul is produced by the Demiurge as something ‘older’ (πρεσβυτέρα) and ‘earlier’ (προτέρα) with respect to the world’s body, rather than as something ‘younger’ (νεωτέρα) and ‘later’ (ὑστέρα; Tim. 34c10–35a1). (3) Correspondingly, the Demiurge first completed the systasis of the World Soul and only afterwards (μετὰ τοῦτο) constructed ‘everything bodily’ (πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδές) ‘inside of it’ (ἐντὸς αὐτῆς; Tim. 36d8–e1). (4) The production of the World Soul occurs in the first instance through the mixture of pre-existing material (Tim. 35a1–b1). This material is of two kinds. One kind is characterized as ‘indivisible’ (ἀμέριστος, Tim. 35a1; ἀμερές, Tim. 35a5) and ‘always in the same condition’ (κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούση, Tim. 35a2), the other as ‘originating in the domain of bodies and divisible’ (περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μερίστη, Tim. 35a2–3; κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστόν, 35a6). (5) There exist two kinds of Being (οὐσία, Tim. 35a2, a4), of Sameness (ἡ ταὐτοῦ φύσις, Tim. 35a4; ταὐτόν, Tim. 35a8) and of Difference (ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου φύσις, Tim. 35a4–5; ἡ θατέρου φύσις, Tim. 35b3–4). The Demiurge first mixes together both kinds of Being, both kinds of Sameness, and both kinds of Difference. In this way, three intermediate mixtures arise: Being, Sameness, and Difference that each contains a component that is ‘indivisible and always identical’ and a component that is ‘divisible with respect to body’. (6) The Demiurge then makes a single mixture out of these three intermediate mixtures, of which it is said that he must make use of violence (βία) in order to bind Difference with Sameness (Tim. 35b1–3). (7) This final mixture is then divided by the Demiurge, shaped, and set in motion. First, he divides it according to numbers and numerical proportions (Tim. 35b4–36b6), then he shapes it into the form of plane and solid geometrical figures (Tim. 36b6–36c2), and finally he sets this complex compound in a number of regular, commensurate circular motions.

70 

 Filip Karfík

The description of the production of the soul is completed with reference to the following points, which tell us more about its motion: (8) The World Soul moves, ‘revolving in itself’ (αὐτὴ ἐν αὑτῇ στρεφομένη), for the whole duration of its endless and rational life (Tim. 36e3–5). (9) The World Soul moves itself (τὸ κινούμενον ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ, Tim. 37b5, cf. Tim. 89e1–2). (10) Through its movements (κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς, Tim. 37a6–7), the World Soul comes into contact, on the one hand, with what possesses ‘dispersed Being’ (σκεδάστη οὐσία, Tim. 37a5) and, on the other, with what possesses ‘indivisible Being’ (οὐσία ἀμέριστος, Tim. 37a6), by which is understood, in the former case, the perceptible (τὸ αἰσθητόν, Tim. 37b6) and, in the latter case, what can be grasped by reason (τὸ λογιστικόν, Tim. 37c1). In this way, there arises in the World Soul δόξαι and πίστεις (Tim. 37b8), on the one hand, and νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη (Tim. 37c2), on the other. The whole description of the psychogony is of the highest complexity and is informed by astronomical, musical, and epistemological objectives. I will not enter into this complex of problems here and will only pick out those points that are potentially of importance for the question of the relationship between the disorderly motion and the World Soul. To begin with, how does the account of the psychogony relate to that of the somatogony? The problem lies in the fact that Timaeus gives an account of the psychogony before the fresh start in the presentation of the cosmogony that introduces the third kind of principle. He does not examine the psychogony again in light of this new theory. One might think that this is not necessary, because of the priority, mentioned in point (2), of the generation of the soul over the somatogony, i.e. because the psychogony precedes everything related to the generation of bodies. Point (3) seems to confirm this. Nonetheless, this claim is contradicted by Timaeus’ description of the mixture, with which the production of the World Soul by the Demiurge begins, since this theory implies that there is something that enters into the sustasis of the World Soul that stands, in an unspecified way, in relation to bodies (4). The psychogony presupposes a kind of Being, Sameness, and Difference, of which it is expressly stated that they arise περὶ τὰ σώματα and are divisible κατὰ τὰ σώματα. It is not merely a question here of the chronological succession of the cosmogonical stages that Timaeus distinguishes in his myth, but more fundamentally of the causal dependence of the soul on the constituent parts out of which it is mixed. The description of the mixture of the soul, which is summarized in points (4–6), is too specific to be explained away as a mere myth. This raises the question of how we are to understand this theory. Being, Sameness, and Difference are defined in the Sophist as the three greatest genera,

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 71

between which there exists a reciprocal communion (κοινωνία, cf. Soph. 254b7– 256d7). We can assume that the ‘indivisible’ type of Being, Sameness, and Difference, of which Timaeus speaks, refer to these three genera, taken as Forms in the sense of the theory of the Forms advocated by Timaeus (cf. Tim. 51d3–5, Tim. 51e6–52a4). It is more difficult to determine what kind of Being, Sameness, and the Difference it is that arises περὶ τὰ σώματα and that is ‘divisible’ κατὰ τὰ σώματα. In the absence of a better explanation, I would like to suggest the hypothesis that this kind is what corresponds to the genera of Being, Sameness, and Difference in the realm of the divisible. What is divisible, according to Timaeus at any rate, are bodies. In Timaeus’ later analysis of the bodily, everything that appears to be in a place and to occupy a space is understood to be divisible (cf. 52b4). If this is the case, there must be a type of Being, a type of Sameness, and a type of Difference that appear in the domain of the spatially divisible as μίμηματα of noetic Being, noetic Sameness, and noetic Difference. What could these μίμηματα be? We can assume that Becoming (γένεσις) is such a μίμημα of Being. This corresponds to the conception of Becoming that Timaeus lays out at Tim. 50b–52d. If one were to ask what the corresponding μίμηματα of the Forms of Sameness (ταὐτόν) and Difference (ἕτερον) are, the only conceivable candidates are, in my opinion, Similarity (ὅμοιον) as an imitation of Sameness and Dissimilarity (ἀνόμοιον) as an imitation of Difference.5 According to Timaeus, Sameness and Difference in the strict sense (δι’ ἀκριβείας, Tim. 52c6) cannot exist in the realm of what appears spatially, i.e. in the chôra (cf. Tim. 52a8–d1). The kind of identity that corresponds to spatial appearances is their similarity to the noetic model that they imitate (cf. τὸ ἀφομοιούμενον, Tim. 50d1; τὸ ὅμοιον, Tim. 52a5), while the corresponding type of difference is dissimilarity with respect to what is different from the Form they imitate. Thus the pre-cosmic μορφαί that imitate the same Form (e.g. the Form of fire) are also ὁμοιότατα (Tim. 53a5) with respect to each other, while those that imitate different Forms (e.g the Form of fire and the Form of water) are also said to be ἀνομοιότατα (53a4) with respect to each other. According to this interpretation, at step (5) of the psychogony the Demiurge prepares mixtures of, respectively, Being and Becoming, Identity and Similarity, and Difference and Dissimilarity. But what do these three intermediate mixtures signify? And what philosophical meaning are we to attach to the concept of mixture?

5 For the terms ὅμοιον/ἀνόμοιον as against ταὐτόν/ἕτερον cf. Plato’s Parmenides 139e7: τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον, 140a7–b1: τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.

72 

 Filip Karfík

In the absence of a better interpretation, I would like to propose a second hypothesis. Mixture is to be understood as a metaphor for something that shares certain properties with one thing and other properties with another thing, such that these two things are designated as components of the mixture in question. In this sense, as an intermediate between the indivisible (i.e. noetic) Being, on the one hand, and divisible (i.e. spatial) Becoming, on the other, there exists, on this reading, an intermediate entity that has something in common with noetic Being and something in common with spatial Becoming. This intermediate entity, I suggest, should be understood as a mathematical kind of Being, for the following reasons. It has in common with noetic Being that is invisible (ἀόρατος, Tim. 36e6) and graspable only by means of reason (νοητή). It has in common with spatial Becoming that it is divisible (μεριστή) in a way that the Forms are not, that it implies a kind of spatiality (cf. Tim. 33b3–4, Tim. 36b6–c4, Tim. 36e2–3), and that it also admits a kind of movement (Tim. 36c4–d7, Tim. 37a5–c6). In this way, it is neither identical with noetic Being nor with spatial Becoming, because it possesses properties that are incompatible with each of them. In exactly the same way, there must be an intermediate term between noetic Identity and the Similarity of what appears spatially, as well as an intermediate term between noetic Difference and the Dissimilarity of what appears spatially. Are there such intermediates between these terms? It seems so: between Identity and Similarity we find Equality (ἰσότης), while between Difference and Dissimilarity there is Inequality (ἀνισότης).6 Equality and inequality are the fundamental characteristics of the mathematical. With noetic Identity and noetic Difference they have in common conceptual precision, but they distinguish themselves in virtue of the fact that equality is not equivalent to numerical identity and all difference is not inequality. With similarity and dissimilarity, they have in common that the equal, like the similar, can be embodied in a number of different instances and that in certain cases (i.e. when it is a question of incommensurable magnitudes) two unequal things can stand in relation to each other in a way that cannot be measured with precision. If this hypothesis is true, then the intermediate product of the Demiurge’s mixing mentioned in point (5) consists in mathematical Being, Equality, and Inequality. Step (6) of the psychogony would thus refer to an entity that unites all three of these terms: a generated, but noetically apprehensible Being, which can be determined as equal and unequal. The mathematical characteristics summarized under point (7) – whole numbers, proportions, geometrical figures, and their uniform, commensurable motions – would represent such determinations.

6 For the terms ἴσον/ἄνισον cf. Plato’s Parmenides, 140b7–c8.

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 73

Let us leave this interpretation of points (4–7) as a hypothesis and turn to the question of when exactly in the psychogony, as presented by Timaeus, motion enters into the World Soul. As in the case of the somatogony, it is possible to already see motion in the very same generation of the World Soul as well as in the Becoming in which divisible Being, divisible Sameness, and divisible Difference are implicated. If we were to take all of this Becoming as a form of motion, there would already be motion in the World Soul from the very beginning, or rather motion would belong to the soul in virtue of its relationship to what becomes περὶ τὰ σώματα and to what is divisible κατὰ τὰ σώματα. In this context, however, Timaeus never speaks of a κίνησις or of a φορά, but only of γένεσις. He does, however, speak of a κίνησις (Tim. 36c3) and φορά (Tim. 36c4) that the Demiurge imparts to the whole frame of the World Soul, as well as to its constituent parts, after it has been arithmetically determined and geometrically shaped (point 7). The motion at issue here corresponds to the uniform, axial revolutions in opposing directions and at different speeds, which are, however, all commensurable with each other, i.e. mathematically determinate. In addition to the polarization between the Becoming that precedes and the circular motion that emerges from the Demiurge’s activity, Timaeus’ account also contains a tension between the thesis that it is the Demiurge who imparts motion to the World Soul (point 7) and the thesis that the World Soul moves itself (point 9). In the Timaeus, the self-motion of the World Soul is presented as a state in which the World Soul finds itself after the Demiurge has formed it and attached it to the world’s body that he has constructed within it (point 3). Only at this point does its life begin (point 8), in that it moves itself (point 9). The question is: to which of its properties does it owe this capacity? Timaeus does not give an explicit answer to this question. He does, however, present in the course of his exposition the general principles of a theory of the motion and rest of bodies, of which we have already spoken. It is legitimate to ask whether there is a connection between these principles and the self-motion of the soul, especially since, in the framework of the psychogony, Timaeus explicitly operates with the idea that something enters into the constitution of the soul that stands in relation to bodies. In the absence of a better explanation, I would like, for the third time, to suggest a hypothesis, one that presupposes that there is indeed such a connection. The theory of the motion and rest of elementary bodies and their pre-cosmic elementary μορφαί traces the origin of motion back to ἀνωμαλότης, which is defined more precisely as ἀνομοιότης in the case of the pre-cosmic μορφαί and as ἀνισότης in the case of the mathematically-structured elementary bodies. This ἀνωμαλότης is a necessary condition for motion. Another necessary condition is spatial contact between two dissimilar elementary μορφαί or unequal elementary

74 

 Filip Karfík

particles. Taken together, these constitute the two necessary conditions that are sufficient for the emergence of motion. If we then apply these principles to the account of the production of the World Soul, we observe that they are not necessarily irrelevant, since the World Soul is generated out a mixture of components that are different from one another. If my interpretation of the primary materials (point 4) and the intermediate products of the mixing process (point 5) is correct, then the ‘divisible’ primary materials are Becoming, Similarity, and Dissimilarity, while the intermediate products are mathematical Being, Equality, and Inequality. The end result of the mixing process arises from the binding together of the latter three ingredients, in which the Demiurge must make use of violence in order to join the unequal together with the equal (point 6). The observation that the intermediate product of the Different was ‘difficult to mix’ (δύσμεικτον) with the intermediary product of the Same and that they could only be joined together (συναρμόττων) by means of violence (βίᾳ, 35a8) is quite remarkable and requires interpretation. It provides an indication that the mixture of the two aforementioned elements meets with resistance, which in turn implies that there is a tension in the constitution of the soul between these components. If these components are indeed to be identified with Equality and Inequality, which are taken as intermediates between Identity and Similarity on the one hand, and Difference and Dissimilarity on the other, then this moment of the psychogony can be brought into relation with the theory of the motion and rest of bodies. This would provide an indication that the cause of the soul’s motion lies in the connection between Equality and Inequality. Unfortunately, the concept of self-motion is not explained in more detail in the Timaeus. The theory of the motion of bodies can, however, help us to understand how a self-moving entity must be constituted. It must be an entity that is, in relation to itself, both mover and moved, i.e. an entity that acts upon itself and is acted upon by itself. Thus, the soul must act and be acted upon, just as body acts and is acted upon. In the case of a body, however, this can only occur in relation to other bodies, not in relation to itself. The soul, by contrast, is constituted in such a way as to act and be acted upon in relation to itself. However that may be, the mention of demiurgic violence is connected with the composite nature of the soul. In this respect, it is also to be connected with the idea that everything that is bound together can be dissolved (τὸ […] δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν), but that the Demiurge holds together through his will (βούλησις) everything that he has bound together himself (Tim. 41a7–b7). Even the systasis of the World Soul is held together by and dependent on the will of the Demiurge, and consequently its self-motion is too. To this extent, the demiurgic will constitutes one of the conditions for the self-motion of the soul.

Disorderly motion and the World Soul in the Timaeus 

 75

4 The place of the psychogony in the cosmogony Let us return now to the question of the relationship between the different stages of the generation of the world and of the psychogony. The question was whether or not the pre-cosmic Becoming and the somatogony also presuppose the production of the World Soul. On the basis of the analysis of the text undertaken above, as well as the interpretative hypotheses I have proposed, I am inclined to defend the thesis that the psychogony is not presupposed by the pre-cosmic Becoming, but that pre-cosmic Becoming is presupposed by the psychogony, just as the psychogony is presupposed by the somatogony. This thesis has certain implications that I would like to elucidate. In the first place, it implies that the pre-cosmic Becoming of which Timaeus speaks is an occurrence that is not influenced by the Demiurge or the World Soul. It proceeds exclusively from the other two principles named by Timaeus: ὄν and χώρα, and produces the μορφαί, whose motions tend towards a state of rest. This thesis implies furthermore that in the psychogony, the Demiurge acts upon pre-existing μίμηματα of the ἀεὶ ὄντα. In this way, the psychogony presupposes the two principles of the ὄν and the χώρα, which bring about a pre-cosmic γένεσις. A consequence of this last point is that the pre-cosmic γένεσις, along with its distinctive kind of κίνησις or φορά cannot be caused by the World Soul. My thesis implies that, on the contrary, the somatogony, i.e. the structuring of the pre-cosmic μορφαί by means of figures and numbers and the production of συμμετρίαι within and between them takes place ‘in’ the World Soul. On this interpretation, the World Soul would be that mathematical Being by means of which the Demiurge carries out the somatogony. The mathematical figures and numbers are results of the production of the World Soul. Finally, we should draw from this reading the following consequences, which bear on the problem of motion. There is a motion that is independent of the production of the World Soul. This is the pre-cosmic motion of the μορφαί of the ὄντα in the χώρα. The proper motion of the mathematically structured elementary bodies also comes from these pre-cosmic motions, to the extent that they are not directed by a soul. Both kinds of motion, the pre-cosmic and that of the mathematically structured elementary bodies are designated as ‘disorderly’ and subsumed under the concept of ἀνάγκη, i.e. of the necessary cause. By contrast, what comes into being with the production of the World Soul is the uniform circular motion that is proper to the soul. The origin of this motion qua motion is to be found in the constitution of the soul as a mixture of two kinds of Being, Identity, and Difference. But its mathematical characteristics as well as its capacity to move endlessly itself by itself are due to the ordering activity of the Demiurge.

76 

 Filip Karfík

5 Conclusion I have attempted to read and interpret Timaeus’ account as it is given. I did not want to take a decision in advance with respect to the literal or metaphorical meaning of the creation story in the Timaeus that has been the subject of controversy since antiquity. I will allow myself, by way of conclusion, to make only the following remark concerning the interpretation proposed by Harold Cherniss that was mentioned at the beginning of this paper. On the basis of what has been said, it is clear that I do not agree with Cherniss’ interpretation, according to which even in Plato’s Timaeus there cannot be any motion that does not either immediately or mediately have the self-motion of the World Soul as its cause. I am of the opinion that, in the Timaeus (not so in the Phaedrus and in the Laws), Plato lays out a theory according to which there is a source of motion in the world that is independent of soul and according to which this source of motion constitutes the germ of the motion of the soul itself, into whose constitution it enters. The fact that this motion becomes an ordered self-motion is to be traced back to the influence exercised by the Demiurge on pre-cosmic Becoming. I think that this also applies if we take the creation story of the Timaeus as a didactic description of the structure of an everlasting world with no temporal beginning. In this case too, we should acknowledge that there are causes of disorderly motion within the structure of the world that do not depend on the selfmotion of the World Soul, but that, on the contrary, count among the necessary conditions of the soul’s motion. In my opinion, this aspect ought to be preserved even in an interpretation of the Timaeus which – following in the footsteps of the Old Academy (Xenocrates and Speusippus) and the Neoplatonic interpreters (from Plotinus to Proclus) who opposed the literal reading of Aristotle and some Middle Platonists (Plutarch and Atticus) – interprets the creation myth as a didactic metaphor for the causal relationships within an eternally-existing world.

References Cherniss, Harold: ‘The sources of evil according to Plato’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 98 (1954), 23–30. Cherniss, Harold / Tarán, Leonardo: Selected Papers, Leiden 1977. Karfik, Filip: Die Beseelung des Kosmos, München – Leipzig 2004. Karfik, Filip: ‘Que fait et qui est le démiurge dans le Timée?’, Études platoniciennes 4 (2007), 129–150.

Franco Ferrari

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 1 Die Bewegung des vollkommenen Seienden Einer der umstrittensten Aspekte in Platons Spätwerk besteht in der Vorstellung, dass das Seiende, d.h. die Ideenwelt, Leben und Seele besitzt. Diese Lehre scheint im Sophistes und im Timaios anwesend zu sein, insbesondere im Hinblick auf das vollkommene Seiende und auf das vollkommene Lebewesen. Im Folgenden werde ich die Beziehung, die zwischen dem vollkommenen Seienden (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν) des Sophistes 248e–249a und dem vollkommenen Lebewesen (τὸ παντελὲς ζῷον) des Timaios 31a–b besteht, untersuchen. Selbstverständlich kann man nicht ausschließen, dass es keine echten Beziehungen zwischen diesen beiden Wesenheiten gibt. Es ist aber bekannt, dass der antike Platonismus und besonders der Neuplatonismus eine originelle und komplexe Lehre der Identität zwischen Subjekt und Objekt (und zwar die Identität von Denken und Sein in der zweiten Hypostase / dem Intellekt [nous]) behauptet hat, die die implizite Gleichsetzung zwischen dem vollkommenen Seienden und dem vollkommenen Lebewesen voraussetzt.1 Bei Platon existierte die Theorie der Identität von Subjekt (nous) und Objekt (Ideenwelt) wahrscheinlich noch nicht, auch wenn einige Interpreten wie zum Beispiel Lloyd Gerson behaupten, dass diese Lehre schon in einem fortgeschrittenen Entwicklungsstadium vorlag.2 Im Übrigen hatte schon Hans Joachim Krämer in seinem bekannten Buch über die sogennante Nus-Theologie vertreten, dass Spuren von Geistmetaphysik, das heißt einer auf die Identität von Sein und Denken gegründeten Ontologie, bereits bei Platon sichtbar gewesen seien, um danach von Xenokrates und Aristoteles (im Buch XII der Metaphysik mit der Lehre des ersten unbeweglichen Bewegers als Denken des Denkens) auf systematische Art weiterentwickelt zu werden.3

1 Zur diese Lehre, bzw. zum Verhältnis zwischen Seienden, Leben und Denken bei und vor Plotin vgl. Hadot, P.: „Être, vie e pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin“. Zur Nuslehre Plotins als Ergebnis der Interpretation einiger platonischer Stellen s. Szlezák, T. A.: Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins. 2 S. Gerson, L. P.: „The Holy Solemnity of Forms“, nach dem das Seiende und das Denken (Vernunft) bei Platon als untrennbare Wesenheiten zu begreifen sind. 3 Krämer, H. J.: Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-004

78 

 Franco Ferrari

In Bezug auf diese Themen ist das Ziel meines Beitrages in Wirklichkeit viel bescheidener. Ich versuche zu ermitteln, was diejenige Seele ist, von der im Soph. 248e gesagt wird, dass sie zum Vollkommenen Seienden gehört, und in welcher Beziehung sie zur im Timaios formulierten These steht, nach der das Vorbild der sinnlichen Welt ein Lebewesen ist, d. h. ein beseeltes Wesen und daher in gewisser Weise mit einer Seele versehen. Die Stelle des Sophistes, von der diese Untersuchung ihren Ausgang nimmt, steht am Ende eines berühmten Abschnittes, in dem der Gast aus Elea die Position der „Erdgeborenen“, das heißt der Materialisten (die nur die Existenz der körperlichen Dinge anerkennen), und die der „Ideenfreunde“ oder der Idealisten, für die das wahre Sein das der Ideen, das heißt das unkörperliche und unbewegliche Sein, ist, einander gegenüberstellt. Der Fremde präsentiert, wie bekannt ist, die Diskussion als eine „Gigantomachie“ um das Seiende.4 Der Fremde aus Elea scheint eine Gleichstellung zwischen Sein und Vermögen oder Fähigkeit / Kraft (dunamis) zu etablieren. Ich behaupte also: was nur immer über eine Kraft verfügt, sei es, auf irgendetwas anderes eine Wirkung auszuüben, sei es, um selbst etwas an sich zu erleben, mag das auch das allermindeste von dem Geringsten sein und wenn auch nur ein einziges Mal – das alles ist wirklich; ich stelle nämlich als Merkmal zur Bestimmung des Seienden auf, dass es nichts anderes ist als eine Kraft.5

Der Fremde vertritt also eine ontologische Auffassung, die die Einseitigkeit der Erdgeborenen und der Idealisten überwinden möchte, obwohl sich diese Definition insbesondere auf die Ideenfreunde bezieht. Beide werden dazu geführt, einerseits (die Erdgeborenen) die Existenz einiger ideeller Wesenheiten und andererseits (die Ideenfreunde) die Gegenwart einer bestimmten Form der Bewegung auch in der Ideenwelt, da zumindest die Ideen erkannt werden und damit etwas erleiden, anzuerkennen.6 4 Zur Rekonstruktion dieses Gedankenganges vgl. Fronterotta, F.: „La notion de dunamis dans le Sophiste de Platon“, 188–200; Centrone, B.: Platone, Sofista, XXXIII–XL und Leigh, F.: „Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist“, 67–76. 5 Platon, Sophistes 248e–249a: Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [τινα] κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον [ὁρίζειν] τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. Die Bedeutung dieser Passage wird richtig von Mouroutsou, G.: Die Metapher der Mischung, 71 hervorgehoben, nach der Platons Stellungnahme in den Horizont der allgemeinen Ontologie gehört. S. auch die ausführliche Diskussion von Gonzalez, F. J.: „Being as Power“, 65–71. 6 Die Anerkennung der Bewegung des Seienden als „Erkannt-werden“ der Ideen stellt, meines Erachtens, ein Argument ad hominem dar, mit welchem der Fremde versucht, die Ideenfreunden

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 79

An dieser Stelle fragt der Gast aus Elea, indem er gleichsam seinen Gedankengang in rhetorischer Form radikalisiert, seinen Gesprächspartner: Sollen wir uns leichtlich überreden lassen, dass in der Tat Bewegung, Leben und Seele und Vernunft dem vollkommen Seienden gar nicht eigne? Dass es weder lebe noch denke, sondern heilig und ehrwürdig, der Vernunft entbehrend, unbeweglich stehe?7

Er bringt also seinen Gesprächspartner Theaitetos, der als Vertreten der Ideenfreunde betrachtet werden muss, zu der Überzeugung, dass das vollkommene Seiende neben der Vernunft auch Leben, und dazu Seele hat, und dass es, insofern es „beseelt“ (ἔμψυχον) ist, nicht völlig unbeweglich (ἀκίνητον) sein kann. Es handelt sich dabei um einen schwierigen, äußerst konzisen Gedankengang, der den zuvor formulierten Grundvoraussetzungen möglicherweise nicht ganz zu entsprechen scheint. Wie gesagt, ich habe den Eindruck, dass der Gast gewissermaßen den Sinn seines Gedankengangs radikalisiert. Die Interpretationen zu dieser Stelle sind zahlreich und ganz unterschiedlich. Sie vermitteln den Eindruck, als ob die Forscher nicht denselben Text interpretierten. Ein klares Indiz für die Schwierigkeit dieser Sektion des Dialoges besteht darin, dass die Interpreten in unterschiedlichen Weisen den platonischen Gedankengang rekonstruiert haben. Die größten Schwierigkeiten treten, wie man leicht einsehen kann, bei der Identifikation des Gegenstands auf, um den sich die gesamte Argumentation des Fremden dreht, und zwar um das „vollkommene Seiende“ (παντελῶς ὄν). Die Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks ist bekanntlich sehr umstritten. Worum handelt es sich? Zu dieser Frage sind im Wesentlichen zwei Antworten formuliert worden: a) die Ideenwelt, das heißt das Seiende, das auf vollkommene und absolute Weise ist, das selbe Seiende, von dem in Staat 477a gesagt wird, dass es vollkommen erkennbar (παντελῶς γνωστόν) ist8; b) die Gesamtheit von dem, was ist, das heißt die Gesamtheit der Dinge, die sind, die existieren (also die Ideenwelt, die sinnliche Welt, die Seele, usw.).9 Im ersten Fall zu überreden. Richtig bemerkt Mesch, W.: „Die Bewegung des Seienden“, 109–110, dass dieses Argument, welches Erkennen als ein Wirken und Erkannt-Werden als ein Leiden bestimmt, problematisch bleibt, weil der Status der Prämissen unklar ist. 7 Platon, Sophistes 248e–249a: ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι; 8 So interpretiert Gerson, L. P.: „The Holy Solemnity of Forms“, 292 Anm. 3. In diesem Sinn legt die Stelle auch Centrone, B.: Platone, Sofista, XXXV–XL aus. S. schliesslich Mouroutsou, G.: Die Metapher der Mischung, 91, derzufolge das pantelôs on sich auf den ausgezeichneten Bereich der Ideen bezieht. 9 Der wichtigste Vertreter dieser Interpretation ist Cornford, F. M. D.: Plato´s Theory of Knowledge, 244–245. In der jüngster Zeit wurde die extensionale Interpretation auch von Fronterotta, F.: „La

80 

 Franco Ferrari

wird das Adverb παντελῶς („volkommen“) im intensionalen Sinn, im zweiten im extensionalen Sinn verstanden. Ich halte die Interpretation a) für die richtige und verstehe damit das „vollkommene Seiende“ als das durch qualitative Vollkommenheit ausgezeichnete Seiende, d. h. das perfekte und vollkommene Sein der Ideen.10 Natürlich habe ich keine Schwierigkeiten, zu akzeptieren, dass es auch vernünftige Argumente zugunsten der zweiten Interpretation gibt. Ich halte jedoch die intensionale Interpretation für stichhaltiger und besser fundiert, auch wenn sie vielleicht eine gewisse Radikalisierung des platonischen Gedankengangs mit sich bringt. Diese Radikalisierung besteht darin, dass der eleatische Fremde aus der Zugehörigkeit der Seele und der Bewegung zu dem Bereich des wahren Seienden, – insofern das Seiende erkannt und daher bewegt wird, – die (nicht wirklich konsequente) Folge zieht, dass Seele und Bewegung als innewohnende Eigenschaften des Seienden betrachtet werden müssen. Die zweite grundlegende Frage betrifft offensichtlich die Natur der Seele (psuchê), von der gesagt wird, dass sie zum vollkommenen Seienden gehöre. Infolge der Identifikation des „vollkommenen Seienden“ mit der Ideenwelt denke ich, dass hier „Seele“ nicht die rationale Seele des Menschen meint, die das Sein, das heißt die Ideen erkennt, sondern dass sie einen konstitutiven Aspekt des „vollkommenen Seienden“ darstellt. Mit anderen Worten, ich glaube nicht, dass „vollkommenes Seiendes“ und Seele nebeneinanderstehen, – das eine als Objekt und die andere als Subjekt der Erkenntnis, – sondern dass die Seele ein wesentliches Attribut bzw. ein Merkmal des vollkommenen Seienden und damit von diesem untrennbar ist. Deshalb würde ich auch der Behauptung von Filip Karfík skeptisch gegenüberstehen, gemäß welcher „aus der gestellten Frage selbst noch nicht folgt, dass die ontos ousia der Ideenfreunde die phronêsis bzw. den nous samt der psuchê, der zoe und der kinêsis mit einschließen muss.“11 Meiner Meinung nach versucht der Fremde aus Elea, seinen Gesprächspartner davon zu überzeugen, dass die Seele als Bewegungsprinzip dem vollkommenen Seienden zukommt. Zugunsten dieser Interpretation scheint meines Erachtens die Tatsache zu sprechen, dass der Fremde, nachdem er versichert hatte, dass Bewegung, Leben, Seele und Vernunft zum vollkommenen Seienden gehören, mit der Behauptung notion de dunamis dans le Sophiste de Platon“, 208–209 verteidigt. S. auch Leigh, F.: „Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist“, 76–79. 10 Ich bin also völlig mit Mesch, W.: „Die Bewegung des Seienden“, 115 einverstanden, der behauptet: „[D]as vollkommenen Seiende meint hier das wahre Sein der Ideen und nicht ein indifferentes All, das Ideen, Seelen und vielleicht auch Körper gleichermassen enthält.“ 11 Karfik, F.: „Gott als Nous“, 91.

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 81

fortfährt (249a), dass dieses (αὐτό), das heißt das vollkommene Seiende, lebt und denkt (αὐτό ist Subjekt beider Verben). Das Leben und das Denken, die von der Seele untrennbar sind, stellen also die Tätigkeit des Seins, der Ideenwelt dar, und sind keine Wesenheiten, die von dem Sein unabhängig sind. Es ist ferner hervorzuheben, dass die Bewegung des vollkommenen Seienden aktiv zu verstehen ist; nicht passiv als ein Bewegt-Werden. In diese Richtung sind die aktiven Verbformen „leben“ und „denken“ (ζῆν und φρονεῖν) zu interpretieren. Das bedeutet m. E., dass das vollkommene Seiende nicht durch etwas anderes bewegt wird, sondern sich selbst bewegt, das heißt, dass es als selbstbewegendes Prinzip zu verstehen ist.12 Es kann mithin angenommen werden, dass alle Merkmale, die dem Sein zugeschrieben werden, eng miteinander verflochten sind und sich auf gewisse Weise um die Seele drehen. Die Seele ist das Prinzip der Bewegung, das Wesen des Lebens, die Voraussetzung des Denkens (nous), aufgrund des Prinzips, nach dem Vernunft nicht ohne Seele vorkommen kann (Soph. 249a und Tim. 30b). Wenn die hier vorgelegte Interpretation plausibel ist, stellt sich also unvermeidlich die Frage nach dem Wesen der Seele. Was ist die Seele des Seienden? In welchem Sinn ist das vollkommene Seiende eine beseelte Realität, die lebt und sich bewegt?

2 Das allumfassende Lebewesen als beseelte Wesenheit Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, ist es fast unvermeidlich, sich auf diejenige Stelle des Timaios zu beziehen, in der eine Wesenheit vorkommt, die dem vollkommenen Seienden des Sophistes sehr ähnlich, wenn nicht sogar mit diesem identisch ist. Es handelt sich um das „vollkommene Lebewesen“ (παντελὲς ζῷον), das das Vorbild (paradeigma) des sinnlichen Kosmos darstellt (in Tim. 37d ist die Rede von „einem ewigen Lebewesen“, ζῷον αἴδιον).13 Dieses intelligible Lebewesen, das alle einzelnen intelligiblen Lebewesen in sich enthält, ist mit der Gesamtheit der Ideenwelt identisch, insofern es das Vorbild des sinnlichen Kosmos ist. Sowohl im Timaios als auch im Sophistes handelt es sich um eine 12 Dieser Zusammenhang wurde am besten von Finck, F.: Platons Begründung der Seele im absoluten Denken, 88–89 verstanden. 13 Eine enge Verbindung zwischen dem vollkommenen Seienden und dem allumfassenden Lebewesen wird auch von Mesch, W.: „Die Bewegung des Seienden“, 116–117 angedeutet. Vgl. Mesch, W.: „Seele und Körper bei Plato“, 55–56.

82 

 Franco Ferrari

intelligible und beseelte Realität, die in einer nicht genauer bestimmten Weise mit einer Seele versehen ist. Bevor wir über die Merkmale des intelligiblen Lebewesens sprechen, ist es angebracht, näher auf den Kontext einzugehen, in dem dieses eingeführt wird. In Platons Timaios wird der sinnliche Kosmos bekanntlich als ein beseeltes Wesen begriffen, und zwar aufgrund des Prinzips, nach dem „nichts Vernunftloses jemals schöner als das Vernunftbegabte ist“ (Tim. 30b) und die Vernunft niemals ohne die Seele entstehen kann (Tim. 30b, vgl. Phil. 30c ). Der Gott hat also die Vernunft (nous) in die Seele und die Seele in den Körper eingesetzt und den Kosmos zu einem beseelten und vernunftbegabten Wesen gemacht (Tim. 30b–c). Die beseelte Natur des sinnlichen Kosmos wird durch die Gegenwart der Allseele garantiert, in deren Tätigkeit auch ein noetischer Aspekt präsent ist, der in den regelmäßigen und kreisförmigen Bewegungen der Gestirne zum Ausdruck kommt, welche die sinnliche Erscheinung der Bewegungen der Vernunft sind.14 Wenn sich der sinnliche Kosmos, der ein Abbild ist, als ein beseeltes und vernunftbegabtes Wesen erweist, muss auch sein Vorbild, nämlich die Ideenwelt, ein irgendwie beseeltes und vernunftbegabtes Wesen sein.15 Das wird zwar nicht ausdrücklich von Timaios gesagt, kann aber aus seinen Worten entnommen werden. Er begreift das Vorbild des Kosmos als ein Lebewesen, und im Besonderen als das intelligible Lebewesen, das alle einzelnen Lebewesen in sich einschliesst (τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει).16 Timaios’ Gedankengang betont vor allem die umfassende Natur dieses Lebewesens, dessen Überlegenheit gegenüber allen anderen Lebewesen darin zu bestehen scheint, eine allumfassende Gesamtheit zu sein, das heißt eine Gesamtheit, die in sich selbst all ihre Teile umfasst.17 Da das allumfassende Lebewesen das Vorbild des sinnlichen Kosmos ist, ist dieses auch mit der Gesamtheit der Ideenwelt identisch. Es handelt sich um die allumfassende Einheit und Ganzheit des Ideenkosmos, der, nach Timaios’ Rede, der Grund der Vollkommenheit, der 14 Der vernünftige Aspekt der Weltseele wird von der „Ungeteilten Wesenheit“ (ἀμέριστος οὐσία) garantiert (35a), die zugleich mit dem „Immerseienden“ (ὂν ἀεί) zu identifizieren ist (28a). Dazu s. von Perger, M.: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios, 90–94. 15 Dagegen denkt Cornford, F. M. D.: Plato´s Cosmology, 40: „[T]he panteles zôon is a generic form, it is an eternal and unchanging object of thought, not itself a living creature any more than the Form of Man is a man.“ 16 Tim. 30c–d. 17 Zur Rolle des „Prinzips der Ganzheit“ in diesem Zusammenhang s. Раrry, R. D.: „The Intelligible World-Animal in Plato’s Timaeus“, 23–27. Wichtige Bemerkungen finden sich auch bei Enders, M.: „Platons Theologie: Der Gott, die Götter und das Gute“, der behauptet: „Dieses eine und einzige Paradeigma kann daher nichts anderes als der die Gesamtheit der Ideen umfassende Ideenkosmos als ganzer sein.“

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 83

Einzigkeit und der Ganzheit der sinnlichen Welt ist.18 Obwohl die Frage umstritten bleibt, würde ich die Interpretation verteidigen wollen, dass das ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον, von dem in Tim. 39e die Rede ist, mit dem vollkommenen Lebewesen gleichzusetzen ist. Es handelt sich dabei um dasselbe Lebewesen, von dem in Aristoteles‘ De anima A 2 (404b6-27) die Rede ist, nämlich dem αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον.19 Wir haben gesehen, dass, wenn der sinnliche Kosmos ein beseeltes Wesen ist, auch sein Vorbild beseelt sein muss. Letzteres wird von Timaios als Lebewesen (ζῷον) bezeichnet, also als eine mit Seele versehene Wesenheit. Aber in welchem Sinn? Da es sich um einen ideellen und abstrakten Gegenstand handelt, besitzt es keinen Körper, und damit ist auch seine “Seele” nicht etwas, das in einem Körper zu finden ist.20 Es muss also angenommen werden, dass der Besitz der Seele von Seiten des Weltkörpers und der Besitz der Seele von Seiten des intelligiblen Lebewesens verschieden sind, und dass die Bedeutungen von “Besitz” (und damit auch von „Seele“) nicht in demselben Sinn zu verstehen sind. Es scheint auch unvermeidbar, das vollkommene Lebewesen des Timaios mit dem vollkommenen Seienden des Sophistes zu verbinden, zumindest in Form einer Arbeitshypothese; nicht zuletzt, weil dem vollkommenen Seienden eine Seele zugeordnet wird, zumindest aufgrund der hier angenommenen Interpretation.

3 Der Demiurg als Metapher der Aktivität der Ideen Was ist also die Seele des vollkommenen Seienden und des allumfassenden Lebewesens? Bevor ich versuchen werde, diese Frage zu beantworten, muss ich kurz über die Bedeutung des Demiurgen in Platons Timaios sprechen. Aus Platzgründen ist es nicht möglich, diese Frage ausführlich zu diskutieren. Deswegen werde ich einige Thesen in assertorischer Form vorstellen, die sich aus der jüngeren kritischen Literatur ergeben haben:21 Der Demiurg stellt kein selbstständiges und 18 S. dazu Perl, E.: „The Demiurge and the Forms“, 86–87 und Halfwassen, J.: „Der Demiurg“, 51 und 55–56. 19 Zum Verhältnis (wahrscheinlich Identitätsverhältnis) zwischen diesen Wesenheiten vgl. Krämer, H. J.: Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, 201 und insbesondere Halfwassen, J.: „Der Demiurg“, 60–61. 20 Richtige Bemerkungen dazu finden sich bei Strobel, B.: “Dieses” und “So etwas”, 259–260. 21 S. Perl, E.: „The Demiurge and the Forms“; Baltes, M.: „Γέγονεν (Platon, Tim. 28B7)“, 314 und 317–318; Enders, M.: „Platons Theologie“, 158–160; Halfwassen, J.: „Der Demiurg“, 50 ff. und Ferrari, F.: „Der entmythologisierte Demiurg“, 72–76. Die Gleichsetzung von Demiurg und Paradeigma wurde auch von Gaiser, K.: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 193–195 angedeutet.

84 

 Franco Ferrari

unabhängiges metaphysisches Prinzip dar, sondern bringt in metaphorischer Form die aktive Natur des vollkommenen Lebewesens, d. h. der Ideenwelt, zum Ausdruck. Mit anderen Worten, der Demiurg drückt die wirkende Kraft der Ideen aus. Ich zitiere in diesem Zusammenhang die Worte von Konrad Gaiser, der den Kern der Sache m. E. hervorragend getroffen hat. Auf Grund dieser Konzeption ist auch leicht zu erklären, was unter dem Demiurgos der platonischen Kosmologie zu verstehen ist: dieser ‘Werkmeister’ ist offenbar nichts anderes als der anschaulich beschriebene Dynamis-Aspekt der Idee, die man sich eben nicht nur als in sich ruhende Form, sondern auch als wirkende Kraft der Gestaltung und Erkenntnis (Nus) zu denken hat.22

Mit dem Rückgriff auf die mythische Figur des Demiurgen will Platon sich auf die aktive Funktion der Ideenwelt beziehen, die im Timaios auch die Merkmale eines intelligiblen Lebewesens annimmt, dessen Tätigkeit hauptsächlich in der ontologischen Erzeugung des sinnlichen Kosmos besteht. „Wie soll das intelligible Lebewesen wirklich Lebewesen sein, ohne zu wirken?“, fragte sich vor einiger Zeit Matthias Baltes.23 Diese Tätigkeit ist m. E. mit dem ontologischen Erschaffen bzw. Ordnen der Welt gleichzusetzen. Es handelt sich um ein Ereignis, das von Timaios mit einer Reihe von Metaphern beschrieben wird wie der Geburt eines Kindes (Tim. 50d), der Formung einer Goldmasse (Tim. 50a), der Prägung eines grundlegenden Stoffes (Tim. 50c) usw.24 Die systematische Verwendung von Metaphern und Analogien stellt ein Indiz dafür dar, dass Platon sich dem Fehlen einer Sprache und einer technischen Terminologie bewusst war, die imstande sind, das vielleicht wichtigste Thema seiner Philosophie zu beschreiben: die Teilhabe, das heißt die Tatsache, dass der sinnliche Kosmos ist, wie er ist, aufgrund seiner Teilhabe an der intelligiblen Welt. Die Teilhabe bedingt eine Tätigkeit seitens des Seienden, d. h. eine gewisse Form von Bewegung. Die Metapher des Baumeisters will eben diese Bewegung metaphorisch (d. h. der Klarheit wegen / um der Unterweisung willen) zum Ausdruck bringen.

22 Gaiser, K.: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre, 193. 23 Baltes, M.: „Γέγονεν (Platon, Tim. 28B7)“, 317. 24 Zur Funktion dieser Metaphern und zur ontologischen Natur des platonischen Indeterminationsprinzips im Timaios s. Ferrari, F.: „La chora nel Timeo di Platone“, 16–22. Zur platonischen Beschreibung der ontologischen Entstehung des Kosmos und zur Benutzung unterschiedlicher Metaphern vgl. auch Sampson, K.: Ontogony, 123–152.

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 85

4 Die Seele als Bewegungsprinzip des Seienden Ich habe bereits betont, dass die „Seele des Seienden“ nicht die Seele eines körperlichen Lebewesens sein kann und dass eine Seele zu haben, für das vollkommene Lebewesen eine andere Bedeutung hat als für ein körperliches Lebewesen. Die vernünftigste Erklärung scheint mir die zu sein, dass die Seele des vollkommenen Seienden bzw. des vollkommenen Lebewesens als Bewegungsprinzip aufzufassen ist, und zwar aufgrund der Tatsache, dass die Seele Prinzip und Ursache jeder Bewegung ist.25 Im Übrigen scheinen an besagter Stelle des Sophistes Bewegung, Leben und Seele eng miteinander verbunden zu sein, als ob die Seele die Ursache der Gegenwart von Bewegung und Leben im „vollkommenen Seienden“ (pantelôs on) wäre. Aber was bedeutet es, dass das vollkommene Seiende bzw. das vollkommene Lebewesen beseelt ist, insofern es das Prinzip der Selbstbewegung besitzt? Im Kontext der Stelle des Sophistes ist dieser Aspekt mit der Definition des Seienden als Fähigkeit / Kraft / Vermögen, zu wirken und zu leiden (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν), das heißt als dunamis, in Zusammenhang zu bringen. Auf einer ersten Ebene hängt die Bewegung des vollkommenen Seienden von der Tatsache ab, dass die Ideen gedacht und erkannt werden, d. h. Gegenstand der Erkenntnis sind. Dieser Gedankengang scheint jedoch ein Argument ad hominem zu sein, das keinen absoluten Wert besitzt. Ich halte es hier für angebracht, die Funktion der Bewegung auszudehnen, da z. B. die Bewegung der Ideen auch mit den gegenseitigen Teilhabebeziehungen, mit der Verflechtung und der Gemeinsamkeit der Ideen (κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν) verbunden ist. In diesem Sinn wird die Bewegung einer jeden Idee durch die Teilhabebeziehungen gegeben, die diese hervorbringt oder in denen sie sich findet. Die Bewegung (kinêsis) kann in diesem Zusammenhang von zwei Gesichtspunkten aus analysiert werden: einem aktiven, aufgrund dessen sie poiêsis ist, und einem passiven, aufgrund dessen sie pathos ist. Mit anderen Worten kann die δύναμις κοινωνίας (oder κοινωνεῖν) der Ideen als eine dunamis zur Gemeinschaft mit anderen Ideen interpretiert werden. In diesem Sinne sind die Idee insofern (und vielleicht nur insofern) onta, als sie die dunamis zur Gemeinschaft mit anderen Ideen haben.26

25 Zur Seele als Bewegungsprinzip und als selbstbewegendes Wesen vgl.  Finck, F.: Platons Begründung der Seele im absoluten Denken, 276–284 und Mesch, W.: „Seele und Körper bei Platon“, 53 ff. 26 Eine ausführliche Diskussion dieser Konstellation findet sich in Meissner, D.: „Der DynamisVorschlag im Sophistes“, passim. Ein Verhältnis zwischen der Gemeinschaft der grössten Gattungen und der Kraft des Tuns und Leidens wird auch von Mouroutsou, G.: Die Metapher der Mischung, 91 thematisiert.

86 

 Franco Ferrari

Dieser Zusammenhang wurde m. E. am besten von Florian Finck verstanden, der den platonischen Gedankengang folgendermaßen erklärt. Das paschein bezeichnet den passiven Aspekt bestimmt werden, dem mit dem poiein der aktive Aspekt in Sinne von bestimmen gegenüber steht.27

In der Teilhabebeziehung ist die Idee aktiv, insofern sie eine bestimmte Eigenschaft übermittelt, und sie ist passiv, insofern sie diese erhält. Die Gesamtheit dieser Beziehungen artikuliert sich in einer mit Bewegung begabten, und damit „lebendigen“ Sphäre, da sie von einem Relationsprinzip gekennzeichnet ist. Jedes einzige Seiende ist das, was es ist, durch ein gegliedertes Relationssystem. Die Tatsache, dass dieses Relationssystem geordnet und rational (taxis und logos, Staat 500c), d. h. ein Kosmos ist, macht den Bezug auf die Vernunft (nous) unvermeidbar, die laut Platon das einzige Prinzip der Ordnung und Rationalität darstellt.28 Der Gedankengang des Sophistes bringt also die Annahme einer ontologischen Ebene mit sich, die von einem komplexen Relationssystem gekennzeichnet ist, dessen Ordnungsgefüge auf die Präsenz einer Vernunft, – die wohl als ein unpersönliches Prinzip zu verstehen ist, – verweist. Diese ontologische Sphäre ist die Ideenwelt, in der Bewegung, Leben und Seele die miteinander verbundenen Prinzipien dieser geregelten Relationalität sind.29 Im Timaios übernimmt dieselbe ontologische Sphäre im Hinblick auf die ontologische Erzeugung des sinnlichen Kosmos eine aktive Funktion. Diese Rolle wird auch durch die Metapher des Werkmeisters / Schöpfers (demiourgos) bildlich ausgedrückt. In diesem Fall ist die Bewegung nicht nur der intelligiblen Sphäre immanent (als Verflechtung der Ideen), sondern bedingt auch eine nach Außen gerichtete Aktivität, die in der ontologischen Erschaffung der Welt besteht. In diesem Zusammenhang wird das Seiende, bzw. die intelligible Welt mit dem Vater gleichgesetzt (Tim. 28c und 50d), weil seine Aktivität verantwortlich für die Entstehung des sinnlichen Universums ist.

27 Finck, F.: Platons Begründung der Seele im absoluten Denken, 87. Zur Gleichsetzung von dunamis und Teilhabe s. auch Fronterotta, F.: „La notion de dunamis dans le Sophiste de Platon“, 213–217. Zur Identität von metechein und paschein in dem Sinn, dass das metechon immer ein paschon ist, vgl. Lünstroth, M.: „Teilhabe“ und „Erleiden“ in Platons Parmenides, 90–114. 28 Zur Ideenwelt als „network of forms“ s. jetzt Kahn, C. H.: Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 112–115. 29 Ich würde die Hypothese nicht ausschließen, nach der diese intelligible und lebendige Wesenheit der Vorgänger des aristotelischen Systems der unbewegten Beweger, nämlich der protê ousia, gewesen ist. Dazu s. Krämer, H. J.: „La Noesis Noeseos e la sua posizione nella Metafisica di Aristotele“.

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 87

Die Präsenz der intelligiblen Sphäre im Kosmos wird im Timaios bekanntlich von der Allseele garantiert, die das Ordnungs- und Vernunftprinzip der sinnlichen Welt darstellt. Diese Weltseele dürfte allerdings nicht mit der Seele des Seienden (oder des Lebewesens) identisch sein, eben weil sie ein gewordenes Wesen oder vielmehr “das Beste der gewordenen Dinge” (ἀρίστη τῶν γεννηθέντων, Tim. 37a) darstellt, während der Demiurg bzw. das vollkommene Lebewesen “das Beste der denkbaren und ewig seienden Dinge ist” (ὁ ἄριστος τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων, Tim. 37a). Auch wenn die Gleichsetzung von Demiurg und Allseele von einigen Interpreten vertreten wurde, scheint sie doch letztendlich dem platonischen Text zu widersprechen. Wenn also die Seele des pantelôs on / panteles zôon nicht die Weltseele ist, muss angenommen werden, dass es neben der Menschen- und Weltseele eine weitere Seele gibt, eine Art „göttliche Seele“, die in der intelligiblen Welt zu finden ist und deren Gegenwart in dieser die Vernunft hervorruft, nach dem Prinzip, dass Vernunft nicht ohne Seele existiert. Aber vielleicht ist es nicht notwendig, eine solche Hypothese zu formulieren, die, unter anderem, einige Befürworter in der Antike hatte, wie vielleicht Attikos und Plutarch, die, wie Proklos berichtet, die Hypothese einer göttlichen Seele (theia psuchê) entwickelten.30 Vielleicht genügt es, zu denken, dass das vollkommene Seiende bei Platon sowohl einen ordnenden Aspekt (die Vernunft) als auch einen aktiven Dynamismus (Seele) besitzt, und dass sich dieser aktive Dynamismus auf transzendenter Ebene in der Form der Ideenverflechtung und auf kosmischer Ebene als Demiurg ausdrückt, der durch die Weltseele als sein Instrument den sinnlichen Kosmos erschafft und ordnet. Da die Seele das Prinzip jeder Bewegung ist, wirkt sie sozusagen sowohl auf die transzendente Ebene als auch auf die sinnliche Welt ein. Mit anderen Worten, m. E. sollte die Bewegung, die mit der Seele verbunden ist, als Vermögen der Ideen, ihre Eigenschaften zu übertragen und zwar sowohl auf den intelligiblen Bereich als auch auf die wahrnehmbare Welt, interpretiert werden.

5 Schlussbemerkungen Ich bin mir vollkommen darüber im Klaren, dass viele meiner Überlegungen angezweifelt werden können. Einige Punkte meiner Argumentation sind heftig umstritten und sehr fraglich, z. B. die qualitative und intensionale 30 Attikos, bei Proklos, In Tim. 2.153,25–154,1 (Diehl = Attikos, Fr. 35 des Places). Diese „göttliche Seele“ wäre identisch mit der unteilbaren Seele, von der in Timaios 35a die Rede ist.

88 

 Franco Ferrari

Interpretation des pantelôs on, die Tatsache, dass diesem die Seele als Bewegungsprinzip zugeordnet wird, die Interpretation dieses Bewegungsprinzips als Hinweis auf die koinônia und Teilhabe der Ideen untereinander, und, last but not least, die Gleichsetzung des pantelôs on des Sophistes mit dem panteles zôon des Timaios. Keine dieser Vorschläge scheint mir jedoch vollkommen unbegründet zu sein, was die einfache Feststellung beweist, dass einem großen Teil der antiken und spätantiken Exegese Interpretationen dieser Art zugrunde liegen.31 Im Übrigen führt die chronologische Nähe des Sophistes zum Timaios zur Überlegung, dass die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Dialogen sehr eng war. Ersterer bevorzugt die Behandlung von logischen und ontologischen Themen und die Untersuchungen zur Natur des transzendenten Bereiches, während der Timaios sich auf die kosmologischen Aspekte konzentriert, indem er die aktive und generative Funktion des Seienden bzw. der Ideenwelt analysiert.32

References Baltes, Matthias: „Γέγονεν (Platon, Tim. 28B7). Ist die Welt real entstanden oder nicht?“, in: Matthias Baltes, Dianoemata. Kleine Schriften zu Platon und zum Platonismus, Stuttgart – Leipzig 1999, 303–325. [zuerst erschienen 1996] Centrone, Bruno: Platone, Sofista, Testo greco a fronte, Torino 2008. Cornford, Francis Macdonald: Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary, London 1935. Cornford, Francis Macdonald: Plato´s Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato translated with a running commentary, London 1937. Enders, Markus: „Platons Theologie: Der Gott, die Götter und das Gute“, Perspektiven der Philosophie 25 (1999), 131–185. Ferrari, Franco: „La chora nel Timeo di Platone. Riflessioni su materia e spazio nell’ontologia del mondo fenomenico”, Quaestio 7 (2007), 3–23. Ferrari, Franco: „Der entmythologisierte Demiurg“, in: Dietmar Koch, Irmgard Männlein– Robert u. Niels Weidtmann (Hgg.), Platon und das Göttliche, Tübingen 2010, 62–81. Finck, Florian: Platons Begründung der Seele im absoluten Denken, Berlin – New York 2007. Fronterotta, Francesco: „La notion de dunamis dans le Sophiste de Platon: koinonia entre les forms et methexis du sensible à l´intelligible“, in: Michel Crubellier, Annick Jaulin, David

31 S. jetzt Lo Casto, C.: Teleia Zoe. 32 Eine italienische Version dieses Beitrages ist in dem Band λόγον διδόναι. La filosofia come esercizio del rendere ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano, a cura di Lidia Palumbo, Napoli 2012, 601–613 erschienen.

Die „Seele“ des Seienden bei Platon: Sophistes 248e–249a und Timaios 30a–31c 

 89

Levebvre et Pierre-Marie Morel (Hgg.), Dunamis: Autour de la puissance chez Aristote, Louvain-La-Neuve 2008, 187–224. Gaiser, Konrad: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre: Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaften in der Platonischen Schule, Stuttgart 1963. Gerson, Lloyd P.: „The Holy Solemnity of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation of Sophist“, Ancient Philosophy 26.2 (2006), 291–304. Gonzalez, Francisco J.: „Being as Power in Plato’s Sophist and beyond“, in: Ales Havlicek and Filip Karfik (eds.), Plato’s Sophist. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Praha 2011, 63–95. Hadot, Pierre: „Être, vie e pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin“, in: Les sources de Plotin, (Entretiens Fondation Hardt, 5), Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960, 104–142. Halfwassen, Jens: „Der Demiurg: Seine Stellung in der Philosophie Platons und seine Deutung im antiken Platonismus“, in: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (Hg.), Le Timée de Platon: Contributions à l´histoire de sa réception, Louvain – Paris 2000, 39–62. Kahn, Charles H. : Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue. A Return to the Philosophy of Nature, Cambridge 2013. Karfik, Filip: „Gott als Nous. Der Gottesbegriff Platons“, in: Dietmar Koch, Irmgard Männlein Robert u. Niels Weidtmann (Hgg.), Platon und das Göttliche, Tübingen 2010, 82–97. Krämer, Hans Joachim: Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin, Amsterdam 1964. Krämer, Hans Joachim: „La Noesis Noeseos e la sua posizione nella Metafisica di Aristotele“, in: Adriano Bausola u. Giovanni Reale (Hgg.), Aristotele, Perché la metafisica, Milano 1994, 171–185. Leigh, Fiona: „Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist“, Apeiron 43.1 (2010), 63–85. Lo Casto, Claudia: Teleia Zoe. Ricerche sulla nozione di vita in Plotino, Pisa 2017. Lünstroth, Margarete: „Teilhabe“ und „Erleiden“ in Platons Parmenides. Untersuchungen zum Gebrauch von metechein und paschein, Göttingen 2008. Meissner, David: „Der Dynamis-Vorschlag im Sophistes. Überlegungen zum platonischen Seinsbegriff“, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 122 (2015), 3–23. Mesch, Walter: „Die Bewegung des Seienden in Platons Sophistes“, in: Ales Havlicek and Filip Karfik (eds.), Plato’s Sophist. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Prag 2011, 96–119. Mesch, Walter: „Seele und Körper bei Platon. Zur Psychologie im Phaidon und im Timaios“, in: Michele Abbate, Julia Pfefferkorn und Antonino Spinelli (Hgg.), Selbstbewegung und Lebendigkeit. Die Seele in Platons Spätwerk, (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 356), Berlin – New York 2014, 53–85. Mouroutsou, Georgia: Die Metapher der Mischung in den platonischen Dialogen Sophistes und Philebos, (International Plato Studies, 28), Sankt Augustin 2010. Parry, Richard D.: „The Intelligible World-Animal in Plato’s Timaeus“, Journal of History of Philosophy 29.1 (1991), 13–32. Perl, Eric: „The Demiurge and the Forms: A Return to the ancient Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus“, Ancient Philosophy 18.1 (1998), 81–92. Sampson, Kristin: Ontogony, Conceptions of Being and Metaphors of Birth in the Timaeus and the Parmenides, Bergen 2005. Strobel, Benedikt: “Dieses” und “So etwas”: Zur ontologischen Klassifikation platonischer Formen, Göttingen 2007.

90 

 Franco Ferrari

Szlezák, Thomas Alexander: Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins, Basel – Stuttgart 1979. Von Perger, Mischa: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 96), Stuttgart 1997.

Federico M. Petrucci

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica: riargomentazione ed esegesi tecnica κατὰ ζητήματα della divisio animae platonica Premessa L’esposizione della dottrina dell’anima cosmica del Timeo rappresenta uno dei luoghi platonici di maggiore oscurità. Tale condizione dipende da un lato dalla convergenza di fondamentali tematiche filosofiche, dall’altro dall’applicazione, specialmente nella cosiddetta divisio animae (Tim. 35 b4–36 b5), di meccanismi aritmetici e scelte lessicali non certo trasparenti, in quanto allusivi a uno specifico ambito tecnico, quello musicale. Al primo aspetto è legato il fiorire di imprese esegetiche durante tutta la storia del platonismo, con contenuti che sono stati ben analizzati dalla critica.1 Il secondo, invece, è stato relativamente trascurato, specialmente per quanto riguarda le sue componenti tecniche. In effetti, se si guarda alla fase della tradizione platonica in cui l’esegesi del Timeo rappresentò un passaggio centrale (benché non esclusivo) dell’attività filosofica, ovvero il Medioplatonismo,2 è possibile individuare una serie di passi – diffusi in opere, ambienti e contesti relativamente differenti – specificamente mirati a produrre un’esegesi tecnica, e in particolare musicale, della divisio animae. Ciascun 1 Sulla dottrina medioplatonica dell’anima cosmica cfr. ora Boys-Stones, G.: Platonist Philosophy, 212–249. 2 Gran parte delle opere medioplatoniche implicano in qualche misura intenti esegetici, diretti o indiretti, riconducibili al Timeo – benché essi risultino spesso solo punti di partenza per sviluppi propriamente filosofici. Matrici esegetiche sono talvolta nascoste all’interno di trattati (come nel caso del trattato Sul Bene di Numenio – cfr. Baltes, M.: “Numenios von Apamea” –, o del De defectu oraculorum, del De E apud Delphos e del De Iside et Osiride di Plutarco – cfr. Ferrari, F.: Dio, idee e materia, 51–62, 74 sgg., 117 sgg., 154–156, 231–236), oppure rappresentano esplicitamente il fondamento dell’opera (si pensi al De animae procreatione in Timaeo; per i metodi dell’esegesi plutarchea, la più studiata, cfr. anche Donini, P.: “Plutarco e i metodi dell’esegesi filosofica”, 79–96, Donini, P.: “Il trattato filosofico in Plutarco”, partic.136–139, Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”, 147–175). Non meno importante è stato poi lo studio dell’attività diretta sul testo di Platone, con i suoi meccanismi e i suoi fini esegetici; cfr. Hadot, P.: Théologie, exégèse, révélation, partic. 14–23; Dillon, J.: “Tampering with the Timaeus”, 50–72; Whittaker, J.: “The Value of Indirect Tradition”, 63–95; Donini, P.: “Testi e commenti”, 5027–5100; Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”, partic. 165–168; Ferrari, F.: “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale” , 525–574; Ferrari, F.: “Esegesi, commento e sistema”, 51–76. Per una nuova lettura di aspetti centrali dell’attività esegetica medioplatonica cfr. ora Petrucci, F. M.: Taurus of Beirut, cap. 4. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-005

92 

 Federico M. Petrucci

gruppo omogeneo di passi è individuato dal suo tema, cioè dal problema che affronta. In questo senso, l’esegesi tecnica della divisio animae si configura come luogo di convergenza di ζητήματα esegetici, nuclei di ricerca relativamente autonomi considerati topici dai filosofi Medioplatonici.3 In questo contributo saranno dunque considerati gli ζητήματα tecnici, e in particolare musicali, dedicati alla divisio animae del Timeo, al fine di renderne evidenti i contenuti, i riferimenti esegetici (cioè, i passi o i problemi specifici a cui sono dedicati), le fonti, i metodi, le finalità. Emergerà così non solo un panorama composito e vivo, fondato proprio sulla gestione strategica degli ζητήματα e su una studiata interazione tra fonti tecniche ed esegesi, ma anche una peculiare rappresentazione di Platone come auctoritas in ambito tecnico.

1 ζήτημα I. Introduzione alla musica platonica: la natura del suono Eliano fu autore di un Commento al Timeo, pochi estratti del quale sono tràditi da Porfirio nel Commento all’Armonica di Tolemeo.4 Una prima sezione è esplicitamente dedicata alla natura della differenza tra i suoni (τίνες εἰσὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς

3 La presenza di tali nuclei incide su un dibattito ancora acceso, quello relativo alla struttura dei commenti medioplatonici. Importanti e autorevoli contributi (cfr. partic. Sedley, D.: “Plato’s Auctoritas”) hanno sostenuto che i commenti medioplatonici erano continui e anticipavano la forma delle esegesi neoplatoniche, mentre altrove si è argomentato che l’esegesi medioplatonica fu fondata principalmente su ζητήματα, dunque sviluppata in Spezialkommentare, commenti specialistici dedicati a temi filosofici determinati, sezioni circoscritte o dottrine riconducibili a una determinata disciplina (cfr. partic. Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”; Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”; Ferrari, F.: “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale”; Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 12 sgg.; Ferrari, F.: “Esegesi, commento e sistema”, partic. 64 sgg.; mi sono espresso in questo senso rispetto all’esegesi tecnica in Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 45–62). A mio avviso entrambe le tesi contengono elementi di verità, ma probabilmente nessuna delle due coglie pienamente la peculiare natura intermedia dei commenti medioplatonici, benché l’aspetto tematico sia assolutamente centrale nel determinare specifiche irregolarità nel trattamente esegetico di un dialogo: cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Taurus of Beirut, cap. 4, e “Wave-Like Commentaries”, in cui propongo l'idea per cui i commenti medioplatonici avevano una peculiare struttura “a onda”. 4 Il Commento al Timeo di Eliano constava di almeno di due libri; cfr. Goulet, R.: “Ailianos”. Un’utile traduzione inglese annotata dei passi in questione, ricca di preziose osservazioni tecniche, è proposta da Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 230–235; per un’interpretazione dei passi nella prospettiva dell’esegesi specialistica cfr. Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 193–195. Per un commento puntuale a queste sezioni cfr. ora Barker, A.: Porphyry’s Commentary, ad loc.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 93

τῶν φθόγγων ἀρχηγοὶ αἰτίαι).5 Secondo Eliano il suono acuto si associa al movimento veloce mentre il grave al lento, e ciò dipende dal fatto che il suono è ἀὴρ πεπληγμένος, che la πλῆξις è κίνησις e che l’organo uditivo percepisce il movimento come suono.6 Un’ampia serie di esperimenti7 conferma questa posizione poiché, scegliendo strumenti adeguati, le distinzioni considerate si rivelano esatte: sono richiamati esperimenti con due auli, la syrinx, un solo aulo e il triangolo.8 Una seconda parte della citazione contiene invece una breve discussione sulla natura dell’intervallo musicale e delle sue relazioni con la consonanza (non tutti gli intervalli sono consonanze): il διάστημα si pone tra δυεῖν φθόγγων ἀνομοίων ὀξύτητι καὶ βαρύτητι.9 Benché simili sezioni appaiano di natura strettamente tecnica, il fatto che esse siano riconducibili a un Commento al Timeo non lascia dubbi sulla loro matrice esegetica, quale che sia.10 Non a caso, passi simili si rintracciano all’inizio della parte sulla musica dell’Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium di Teone di Smirne, opera che deve essere considerata come esegesi tecnica del Timeo, con particolare attenzione agli aspetti musicali e astronomici della psicogonia.11 Teone riprende da Trasillo (47, 18–49, 5) e dal Commento al Timeo di Adrasto12 (49, 6–56, 5) introduzioni alle nozioni di base della teoria musicale. Secondo Trasillo il suono armonico è un suono intermedio tra grave e acuto assoluti, dunque non estremo, mentre l’intervallo è una φθόγγων τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιὰν σχέσιν; vengono poi offerte anche le definizioni di sistema e harmonia; infine, sono distinti gli intervalli consonanti da quelli dissonanti. La sezione ripresa da Adrasto inizia invece con l’identificazione del suono come parte elementare dell’intervallo (a sua volta costitutivo del sistema); prosegue con la descrizione fisica – di chiara origine peripatetica – della produzione e della propagazione del suono e con l’affermazione per cui

5 In Harm. 33, 19–35, 12. 6 In Harm. 33, 19–28. 7 Sugli esperimenti nella letteratura musicale ed esegetica cfr. Burkert, W.: Weisheit und Wissenschaft, 369–386, Comotti, G.: “Pitagora, Ippaso, Laso”, Meriani, A.: “Teoria musicale e antiempirismo”, Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 359–368. 8 In Harm. 33, 28–35, 12. 9 In Harm. 35, 13–36, 3. 10 Cfr. già Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 192–196. 11 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne; Petrucci, F. M.: “Theon of Smyrna”. Una traduzione inglese con importanti note tecniche di alcune sezioni musicali è proposta da Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 211–229. 12 Una collazione tra l’Expositio e il Commento al Timeo di Calcidio, opere che impiegano il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto come fonte, può consentire di individuare sezioni con ogni probabilità presenti nell’opera del peripatetico: cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”.

94 

 Federico M. Petrucci

necessariamente suoni armonici producono anche rapporti numerici adeguati; si chiude, per quanto in modo non del tutto schematico, tematizzando l’intervallo (50, 22–52, 22), e infine descrivendo il sistema e i suoi possibili generi (53, 1–56, 5). Come nel caso dei frammenti di Eliano, l’argomento sembra qui del tutto tecnico, ed eventuali basi esegetiche rimangono opache. Come conciliare, dunque, la necessità – che si impone a vario titolo – di trovare una matrice esegetica in queste pagine e la loro apparente estraneità rispetto a una riflessione filosofica? Le sezioni in questione potrebbero essere direttamente connesse alle parti del Timeo dedicate al suono, all’interno della seconda parte del dialogo (67 b2–c3 e 80 a3–b8).13 Questa interpretazione implica però alcuni svantaggi: in primo luogo, nozioni di natura musicale verrebbero a sostenere l’esegesi di passi di ispirazione fisiologica; ancora, considerando che almeno il Commento di Adrasto e l’Expositio di Teone si occupano dell’esegesi della sezione psicogonica del Timeo, un interessamento per le pagine sopra indicate sembrerebbe fuori luogo e condurrebbe l’attenzione al di fuori dell’oggetto specifico di esegesi. Un’indicazione dirimente può però derivare da sezioni analoghe presenti in scritti di natura diversa, i manuali musicologici. Queste opere, manuali introduttivi alla teoria e alla pratica musicale,14 si aprono generalmente con le definizioni di 1) suono, 2) intervallo, 3) sistema, 4) genere, 5) tropo, 6) metabolê, 7) melopoiia. Ora, Eliano e Teone sembrano riproporre, seppur in modo embrionale e rielaborato, un analogo schema isagogicum musicologico: le sezioni di Eliano, pur essendo collocate nel II libro del suo Commento,15 potevano avere una simile funzione rispetto a un nucleo di nozioni musicali e propongono la sequenza di definizioni suono-intervallo; Teone apre la parte sulla musica definendo le nozioni richiamate, e probabilmente – così sembra indicare la citazione parallela nel Commento al Timeo di Calcidio (XLIV 92, 10–93, 4) – la sezione 49, 6–56, 5 assolveva la medesima funzione già nel Commento di Adrasto. Non solo: da un lato i contenuti proposti dai commentatori non si distaccano eccessivamente da quelli presenti nei manuali,16 dall’altro anche un’esegesi “esplicita” come quella 13 Cfr. Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 193. 14 Cfr. Zanoncelli, L.: La manualistica musicale greca, 7–27, Bélis, A.: “Harmonique”, 359 sgg., Gibson, S.: Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 144 sgg. 15 Cfr. Porph., In Harm. 33, 16–18. 16 Ad esempio, la definizione di intervallo di Eliano riecheggia chiaramente quelle della tradizione aristossenica, alla base della manualistica tecnica – cfr. Aristox., El. harm. I 20, 20–21, 1: διάστημα δ’ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ δύο φθόγγων ὡρισμένον μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐχόντων; simili le definizioni di Cleonide (Intr. harm. 179, 12–13), Bacchio (Intr. mus. 292, 18–19), Gaudenzio (Intr. harm. 329, 23–24); per una ricognizione sull’evoluzione della definizione a partire da Aristosseno cfr. Gibson, S.: Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 152–156, ma soprattutto Barker, A.: “Early Timaeus Commentaries”, 81–83, per il suo riuso esegetico –, mentre le definizioni di suono proposte da Teone

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 95

del De animae procreatione in Timaeo plutarcheo (1020 e5) ricorre a definizioni tecniche affini. Sembra dunque che gli esegeti abbiano ripreso dai manuali musicologici i contenuti tipici delle “introduzioni”, e rimane in questo senso probabile che tali sequenze mantenessero la stessa funzione anche all’interno delle opere filosofiche. A confermare questa tesi giungono paradossalmente le divergenze tra le opere filosofiche e i manuali. In effetti, i musicologi tendono a coprire tutti i punti dello schêma e a soffermarsi sugli ultimi due, metabolê e melopoiia, cioè su nozioni tipiche della pratica e della produzione musicali,17 mentre i Platonici eliminano simili riferimenti alla dimensione esecutiva della musica, abolendo almeno le menzioni di metabolê e melopoiia e si concentrano – con vari livelli di selezione – soprattutto su nozioni fondamentali per discussioni astratte di teoria armonica, come suono (inteso come grado di altezza) e intervallo. Nelle opere platoniche, dunque, si assiste a una sostanziale focalizzazione in senso teorico e, in prospettiva, matematizzante: le fonti tecniche, presumibilmente altri manuali, vengono “depurate” e rifunzionalizzate. Anche i riferimenti alla dimensione sensibile del suono sono da un lato raccolti, dall’altro modificati, poiché gli autori di manuali si concentrano sulla prassi esecutiva, mentre gli esegeti su quella fisica: sia Eliano sia – poco oltre, a 56, 9–61, 17 – Teone si impegnano infatti nell’illustrazione di esperimenti che verifichino la corrispondenza tra dimensione teorica del suono (relativa alla sua natura fisica) e esperibilità (con riferimenti, soprattutto in Teone, all’esperibilità delle consonanze attraverso aneddoti sulla loro scoperta). Si può dunque delineare un quadro complessivo. Alcuni esegeti del Timeo (Eliano, Teone, Adrasto) si appropriano di strumenti tecnici rivedendoli e mettendoli al servizio dell’introduzione alle questioni musicali del Timeo. Lo schema musicologico è recuperato e rimodulato per gettare le basi di una teoria astratta del suono tale da garantire la riscontrabilità della sua natura fisica e numerica nel

compaiono anche nell’Encheiridion di Nicomaco (Ench. 261, 4–5) – per una ricognizione sull’evoluzione della definizione a partire da Aristosseno cfr. Gibson, S.: Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 148–152, e Rocconi, E.: “Il suono musicale”. Per una rassegna delle definizioni offerte nei vari manuali cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 348–352. 17 Aristosseno non fornisce una definizione di μεταβολή, ma si può seguire Da Rios, R.: Aristoxeni Elementa harmonica, 164, nell’intenderla come modulatio (cfr. anche Cleon. Intr. harm. 180, 6–7, Bacch., Intr. mus. 305, 5–6; cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 424 n. 126). Negli Elementa harmonica (I 29, 14–17) μελοποιία ha il significato generale e non necessariamente tecnico di modalità di esecuzione; il termine è successivamente specializzato in senso tecnico (cfr. ad es. Arist. Quint., De mus. I 12, 1–4). Non è raro che la melopoiia venga tralasciata (così Bacchio – almeno esplicitamente –, Gaudenzio, Nicomaco ed Euclide), mentre è meno frequente che sia del tutto accantonata la metabolê: così fanno infatti solo Nicomaco ed Euclide, che non possono essere considerati a pieno titolo all’interno della tradizione musicologica.

96 

 Federico M. Petrucci

reale. In tal senso è forse inopportuno trovare un passo specifico a cui ricondurre tali sezioni: le definizioni offerte dagli esegeti possono essere immaginate come una sezione isagogica sui generis, premessa musicale mirata alla divisio animae. Si assiste dunque a un fenomeno di traslazione, per cui un nucleo dei manuali musicologici viene traslato nelle esegesi, con il medesimo fine introduttivo ma al servizio di una prospettiva diversa previe modifiche interne.

2 ζητήματα II–X: la divisio animae È a questo punto opportuno introdurre il brano sul quale vertono gli ζητήματα musicali che saranno analizzati, la divisio animae (Tim. 35 b4–36 b5): ἤρχετο δὲ διαιρεῖν ὧδε. μίαν ἀφεῖλεν τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῖραν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀφῄρει διπλασίαν ταύτης, τὴν δ’ αὖ τρίτην ἡμιολίαν μὲν τῆς δευτέρας, τριπλασίαν δὲ τῆς πρώτης, τετάρτην δὲ τῆς δευτέρας διπλῆν, πέμπτην δὲ τριπλῆν τῆς τρίτης, τὴν δ‵ ἕκτην τῆς πρώτης ὀκταπλασίαν, ἑβδόμην δ‵ ἑπτακαιεικοσιπλασίαν τῆς πρώτης· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνεπληροῦτο τά τε διπλάσια καὶ τριπλάσια διαστήματα, μοίρας ἔτι ἐκεῖθεν ἀποτέμνων καὶ τιθεὶς εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων, ὥστε ἐν ἑκάστῳ διαστήματι δύο εἶναι μεσότητας, τὴν μὲν ταὐτῷ μέρει τῶν ἄκρων αὐτῶν ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ ὑπερεχομένην, τὴν δὲ ἴσῳ μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὑπερέχουσαν, ἴσῳ δὲ ὑπερεχομένην. ἡμιολίων δὲ διαστάσεων καὶ ἐπιτρίτων καὶ ἐπογδόων γενομένων ἐκ τούτων τῶν δεσμῶν ἐν ταῖς πρόσθεν διαστάσεσιν, τῷ τοῦ ἐπογδόου διαστήματι τὰ ἐπίτριτα πάντα συνεπληροῦτο, λείπων αὐτῶν ἑκάστου μόριον, τῆς τοῦ μορίου ταύτης διαστάσεως λειφθείσης ἀριθμοῦ πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἐχούσης τοὺς ὅρους ἓξ καὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίων πρὸς τρία καὶ τετταράκοντα καὶ διακόσια. L’operazione suggerita da Platone18 prevede: la produzione, a partire dall’unità, della cosiddetta tetractide platonica – 1, 2, 4, 8 e 3, 9, 27 – ; l’individuazione di intervalli minori tra questi trovando medi armonici e aritmetici tra ogni coppia di termini consecutivi; infine il riempimento degli intervalli con toni e leimmata, in

18 Cfr., per analisi specifiche anche se in diverse prospettive, Taylor, A. E.: A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 136–146; Cornford, F. M.: Plato’s Cosmology, 66–72; Brisson, L.: Le même et l’autre, 314 sgg.; Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 60 n. 18; Barker, A.: “Three Approaches to Canonic Division”, 68–71; Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 318–323.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 97

modo tale da ottenere un sistema diatonico dorico.19 Come già accennato, questa serie di operazioni, oscura sia per le numerose omissioni sia dal punto di vista propriamente tecnico, è alla base, nell’ambito dell’esegesi medioplatonica,20 di una grande proliferazione di questioni, talvolta ipertrofiche nei commenti o al contrario confuse all’interno di osservazioni a prima vista puramente tecniche. Per affrontare il tema si seguirà qui – almeno parzialmente – lo schema topico più chiaro che il Medioplatonismo abbia trasmesso, quello di Plutarco,21 che nel De animae procreatione in Timaeo (1027 c8–10) espone un programma peculiare: si propone di affrontare in primo luogo i problemi relativi alla quantità dei numeri utilizzati da Platone, in secondo luogo quelli legati alla loro disposizione (τάξις), in terzo luogo la descrizione delle loro capacità. Poiché è maggiormente il primo momento ad offrire spunti di natura tecnica, ad esso si riallaccia la maggior parte degli ζητήματα musicali. Inoltre, la gestione delle strategie e dei problemi scelta da Plutarco per questo primo punto trova riscontro anche altrove: da un lato Plutarco divide in due momenti la discussione, dedicando un capitolo (XV) all’introduzione dei medi aritmetici e armonici e uno (XVI) al riempimento con tono e leimma; dall’altro Teone, nel proporre la divisione del canone (87, 4–93, 7), distingue due fasi, quella dell’individuazione delle note fisse (87, 4–90, 21) e quella del “riempimento” dei loro intervalli con tono e leimma (90, 22–93, 7). Una conferma è fornita da Proclo,22 secondo il quale Platone stesso aveva distinto tre momenti nella divisio: un primo dedicato all’individuazione della tetractide platonica, un secondo all’inserimento dei medi, un terzo al riempimento con tono e leimma. All’interno di questa macrostruttura si collocano diverse questioni puntuali, che saranno affrontate miratamente qui di seguito: sulle medietà (ζήτημα III); sul metodo di individuazione dei medi proporzionali (ζήτημα IV); sulla differenza tra intervallo e rapporto (ζήτημα V); sui numeri adeguati per rappresentare l’intera anima cosmica – dopo il riempimento con tono e leimma  – (ζήτημα VI); sull’estensione massima del sistema dell’anima (ζήτημα VII) e il suo genere (ζήτημα VIII); sulla posizione di acuto e grave nel sistema (ζήτημα IX); sull’indivisibilità del tono (ζήτημα X). A tali questioni deve probabilmente esserne 19 Per il quale cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 60 n. 18 e West, M. L.: Ancient Greek music, 160–170. 20 Per una ricognizione sulle intepretazioni antiche della psicognia cfr. Brisson, L.: Le même et l’autre, 318 sgg. 21 La topicità di questo schema è stata sottolineata da Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”, 159 sgg.; Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 204 sgg.; Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 328 n. 231; essa viene confermata da un’analoga esposizione di intenti presente nel Commento al Timeo di Calcidio (XXXIV 83, 20–27) e probabilmente riconducibile ad Adrasto, le cui divergenze rispetto al piano plutarcheo sono state risolte da Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 208–209. 22 In Tim. II 171, 9 sgg.

98 

 Federico M. Petrucci

premessa una meno attestata, relativa alla produzione della tetractide platonica a partire dall’unità (ζήτημα II). Il secondo e il terzo momento plutarchei, invece, sembrano più circoscritti nelle esegesi tecniche – per questo verranno discussi a parte, nella sezione 3 – : il secondo ha prodotto una nota polemica sulla disposizione dei numeri in forma grafica (ζήτημα XI), mentre il terzo diverse speculazioni volte ad attribuire, in modo più o meno immediato, caratteri propri ai numeri della tetrade (ζήτημα XII).

2a) ζήτημα II. La produzione della tetractide platonica Una peculiare dimostrazione aritmetica relativa alla produzione delle proporzioni a partire dall’uguaglianza di unità è attestata in età ellenistica e imperiale, oltre che nell’Introductio arithmetica di Nicomaco,23 in opere di esegesi tecnica del Timeo: nell’esporla, infatti, Teone di Smirne24 richiama l’enunciazione che ne faceva, senza fornirne un’illustrazione, Eratostene25 – verosimilmente nel Platonico – e poi afferma di riprendere la relativa dimostrazione di Adrasto di Afrodisia, altro esegeta del Timeo. Ecco il contenuto del passo dell’Expositio (partic. 107, 24–108, 8): considerati tre termini in una qualsiasi proporzione (a/b = b/c) e ottenuti 3 ulteriori termini A, B, C, tali che (A = a), (B = a + b), (C = a + 2b + c), A, B, C saranno proporzionali. Partendo dai termini minimi 1, 1, 1, la proporzione iniziale sarà (a/b = b/c) = (1/1 = 1/1); se (A = a = 1), (B = a + b = 1 + 1 = 2), (C = a + 2b + c = 1 + 2 + 1 = 4), la proporzione ottenuta (A/B = B/C) sarà (1/2 = 2/4). Applicando la regola alla proporzione ottenuta si ricava di volta in volta quella basata sul rapporto multiplo successivo (ad esempio, dalla proporzione in rapporto doppio si ottiene quella in rapporto triplo). Dunque, dall’uguaglianza (esprimibile nella forma basilare come uguaglianza di unità) è possibile ricavare proporzioni diverse

23 Nicom., Intr. arithm. I 63, 22 sgg. (cfr. anche Papp., Syn., III cap. XVIII); in merito D’Ooge, M. L.: Nicomachus of Gerasa, 225 sgg., e Bertier, J.: Nicomaque de Gérase, 183–189. 24 Exp. 107, 15–111, 9. 25 Sulle medietà in Eratostene cfr. Wolfer, E. P., Eratosthenes von Kyrene, 20–35, il quale ha inoltre suggerito che l’affermazione di Proclo (In Tim. II 19, 30–20, 9) relativa all’origine di tutte le medietà dall’uguaglianza abbia una base eratostenica (sembra diversa l’interpretazione di Festugière, A.-J.: Proclus, III, 43 n. 3, seguito poi da Baltzly, D.: Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 63 n. 75, secondo cui Proclo farebbe riferimento all’eguaglianza tra diversi elementi – differenza aritmetica, rapporto, frazione di fattori – comunque stabilita da ciascuna medietà; una teoria analoga è presente in Olymp., In Gorg. 35, 13, per il quale cfr. Tarrant, H. / Jackson, R. / Lycos, K.: Olympiodorus, 235–236). Fortunatamente Sara Panteri, PhD presso la Humboldt Universität Berlin, sta lavorando a un nuovo studio sulle fonti filosofiche e matematiche per Eratostene (Eratosthenes’ Mathematical and Philosophical Testimonia and Fragmenta).

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 99

nei loro minimi termini (poiché il primo termine, 1, rimane sempre identico), e fornisce così il “prototipo” della serie dei rapporti multipli. Su questa base Teone svolge ulteriori illustrazioni in relazione a differenti rapporti (dalle proporzioni in rapporto multiplo si ricavano quelle in rapporto epimore, poi – 109, 15–110, 18 – da quelle in rapporti epimori quelle in rapporti multiepimori ed epimeri, e da queste altre in rapporti epimeri e in rapporti multiepimeri; viene infine – 110, 19–111, 9 – proposta una regola inversa), ma l’attenzione rimane focalizzata sulla possibilità di sviluppare tutte le proporzioni a partire dall’uguaglianza (di unità). La regola, in questi termini, non sembra avere riferimenti extra-aritmetici, e certamente – considerando la sua presenza nell’Introductio di Nicomaco – doveva essere entrata a far parte di un corpo tradizionale di teorie aritmetiche. E tuttavia, la sua presenza (peraltro preponderante) all’interno di opere di commento – quelle di Eratostene, Adrasto e Teone – ne attesta un valore esegetico, e in un senso specifico: essa doveva riguardare il Timeo, e in particolare una sua pagina “musicale”, considerando che Teone – e presumibilmente Adrasto – la inserivano in un contesto di esegesi musicale. Il problema può essere risolto guardando la prima parte della divisio animae. La base aritmetica della struttura dell’anima cosmica è la tetractide (nella tradizione poi denominata “platonica”), costituita da numeri doppi e tripli a partire dall’unità fino alla terza potenza: 1, 2, 4, 8 e 3, 9, 27.26 Per indicare la serie Platone si limita a trarre da una unità termini in rapporto doppio e triplo: dall’unità una parte doppia (Tim. 35 b5), e poi una doppia della doppia (35 b7); una parte tripla (35 b6) e poi una tripla della tripla (35 b7–8). I numeri 8 e 27, cubici, sono invece presi senza riferimenti ai precedenti, cioè come otto e ventisette volte l’unità. Ora, la regola aritmetica degli esegeti sembra esemplificare una plausibile base tecnica per l’operazione di Platone, che per costituire le serie numeriche non fa altro che trarre da una unità termini in rapporto doppio e triplo: dall’unità una parte doppia (2; Tim. 35 b5), poi una doppia della doppia (4; 35 b7); ancora, dall’unità una parte tripla (3; 35 b6), poi una tripla della tripla (9; 35 b7–8). Ancora, si spiega perché Teone dia particolare importanza alla produzione delle proporzioni in rapporto multiplo, quelle impiegate da Platone nella tetractide. Due possibili incongruenze non sembrano troppo problematiche. Da un lato, la regola “esegetica”, a differenza di quanto fa Platone, distingue la produzione delle serie pari e dispari: questa scelta, tuttavia, può essere finalizzata a fornire una sistematizzazione aritmetica del metodo platonico. Dall’altro lato, il fatto che la regola non

26 Sulla tetractide platonica cfr. Pieri, S.: Tetraktys, 173–178, ma già Taylor, A. E.: A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 137 sgg., Cornford, F. M.: Plato’s Cosmology, 66 sgg., Brisson, L.: Le même et l’autre, 314 sgg.

100 

 Federico M. Petrucci

consentisse di produrre una proporzione in quattro termini ma solo in tre (1, 2, 4; 1, 3, 9; etc.), e che dunque non riproducesse immediatamente la tetractide, poteva essere spiegabile agli occhi degli esegeti attraverso lo stesso testo del Timeo: 8 e 27 sono individuati senza fare riferimento al loro rapporto proporzionale con i valori precedenti. La relazione esegetica può inoltre essere confermata da due elementi. In primo luogo, alla stessa regola potrebbero alludere due autori della tarda antichità: nel Commento al Timeo (II 18, 29–19, 3 e 19, 30–20, 9) Proclo sembra fare riferimento a questa prova, mentre Pappo (Synt. III cap. XVIII) indica esplicitamente che la prova dimostra che Platone aveva ragione nel vedere τὴν τῆς ἀναλογίας φύσιν αἰτίαν τῆς ἁρμονίας πᾶσι καὶ τῆς εὐλόγου καὶ τεταγμένως γενέσεως.27 In secondo luogo, nell’Expositio Teone completa la sezione con un’appendice (111, 10–113, 8) dedicata alla derivazione delle dimensioni dal punto al solido, con un parallelo tra numeri pari e figure rettilinee e dispari e curve. Tale appendice, probabilmente ereditata da Eratostene,28 non risulta comprensibile se non si applica una delle chiavi interpretative della tetractide platonica, quella dell’associazione dei numeri della tetractide alle dimensioni.29 Queste indicazioni forniscono solidi indizi per sciogliere il problema posto all’inizio del paragrafo: probabilmente gli esegeti vi vedevano la descrizione aritmetica alla base della produzione della tetractide platonica. In questo modo, peraltro, i platonici isolano implicitamente il problema tecnico, cioè dimostrano di considerarlo come uno ζήτημα autonomo, e lo affrontano come tale, rintracciando la “soluzione” più opportuna al problema specifico. Ciò non implica che la prova sia nata30 con questo fine, ma in ogni caso la sua presenza nell’Introductio di Nicomaco testimonia che in età Imperiale essa era considerata come parte integrante di un bagaglio tecnico. Dunque, il fenomeno a cui si assiste è quello dell’appropriazione di una regola o di una nozione in grado di spiegare un elemento tecnico oscuro applicato da Platone: il nucleo tecnico viene traslato all’interno del contesto esegetico. Deve però essere notato un aspetto ulteriore che emerge dalle pagine di Teone: l’esposizione della prova non è limitata alle 27 La menzione esplicita di Platone elimina ogni dubbio sulla relazione che Pappo stabilisce tra la regola e la tradizione platonica, ma in generale è stato evidenziato che lo stesso Pappo aveva specifici interessi per la tradizione commentaria del Timeo: cfr. Mansfeld, J.: Prolegomena mathematica, 99–121, partic. 120–121. 28 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, ad loc. 29 Per quanto l’associazione di pari e curvilinei e dispari e rettilinei non sia tradizionale, la differenziazione indica la corrispondenza tra le due serie di numeri e le due di dimensioni. Cfr. anche infra, 122. 30 La prova, in ogni caso, deve essere relativamente antica: secondo Teone, Eratostene si limitava ad enunciarla, quindi occorre considerarla ben nota già alla sua epoca.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 101

parti che interessano l’esegesi (in particolare, la produzione di proporzioni in rapporto doppio e triplo), ma, come detto, propone anche le regole relative alle proporzioni in rapporti ulteriori. Questo atteggiamento troverà riscontro in altri ζητήματα e segnala probabilmente un principio metodologico importante: nella traslazione del nucleo tecnico possono essere mantenuti aspetti ridondanti al fine di fornire un quadro più completo.

2b) ζήτημα III. Le medietà L’elenco di medietà stilato da Nicomaco nell’Introductio arithmetica (II 122, 11 sgg.) e le indicazioni che Pappo fornisce nella Synagoghê (III capp. XVIII sgg.) consentono di ottenere il quadro canonico di undici medietà,31 che era probabilmente già ben noto in età imperiale.32 Questa è dunque l’ampia base tecnica con la quale gli esegeti si dovevano confrontare nel momento in cui affrontavano il commento dei passi del Timeo in cui Platone faceva uso di questo strumento aritmetico: la medietà geometrica (unica che sia proporzione) stabilisce il rapporto tra i corpi elementari (31 c2 sgg.), ma conferisce anche e soprattutto la struttura alla tetractide platonica: 1/2 = 4/8 e 1/3 = 9/27; l’aritmetica e l’armonica sono utilizzate per trovare i medi tra le coppie di termini consecutivi nella tetractide platonica all’interno della divisio animae (35 c2–36 a5). Sulla base di questo quadro non stupisce che nel De animae procreatione in Timaeo (1019 b10–e4)33 Plutarco descriva in termini generali solo le medietà aritmetica e armonica, le uniche coinvolte in modo specifico nella sequenza centrale della divisio animae. In altri termini, Plutarco applica una traslazione

31 Nessun autore presenta insieme le undici medietà: dieci sono riportate da Nicomaco, e ad esse va aggiunta come undicesima la medietà riportata come ottava da Pappo: 1) aritmetica: (a – b) = (b – c); 2) geometrica: (a – b)/(b – c) = a/b = b/c; 3) armonica: (a – b)/(b – c) = a/c; 4) subcontraria: (a – b)/(b – c) = c/a; 5) quinta: (a – b)/(b – c) = c/b; 6) sesta: (a – b)/(b – c) = b/a; 7) settima [assente in Pappo]: (a – c)/(b – c) = a/c; 8) ottava [nona di Pappo]: (a – c)/(a – b) = a/c; 9) nona [decima in Pappo]: (a – c)/(b – c) = b/c; 10) decima: (a – c)/(a – b) = b/c; 11) undicesima [assente in Nicomaco e ottava di Pappo]: (a – c)/(a – b) = a/b. Per osservazioni tecniche cfr. Acerbi, F.: Il silenzio delle sirene, 241–245. 32 All’epoca di Archita le medietà conosciute erano tre, aritmetica geometrica e armonica (sulla controversa questione cfr. Burkert, W.: Weisheit und Wissenschaft, 441 n. 84, e Huffman, C. A.: Archytas of Tarentum, 172–173). Eudemo (fr. 133 = Procl. In Eucl. 67, 5 sgg.) informa che le tre successive, subcontraria quinta e sesta, furono scoperte da Eudosso. Gli sviluppi della teoria delle medietà sono da collocare dopo Eratostene: secondo Giamblico (In Nicom. 116, 1–7) furono infatti due pitagorici, Myonide e Eufranore, a portare il numero delle medietà da sette a dieci. 33 Cfr. Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 343–345 nn. 265–272.

102 

 Federico M. Petrucci

esegetica estremamente mirata, esponendo solo i nuclei che interessano strettamente nel contesto dello ζήτημα sull’individuazione dei medi tra i numeri della tetractide. Questo approccio esegetico trovava probabilmente un’ulteriore applicazione nel Commento di Adrasto, che si impegnava a descrivere l’individuazione dei medi armonici e aritmetici tra i termini doppi e tripli 6–12, 9–18, 12–24, 24–48.34 A fornire una possibilità alternativa è invece Teone, che offre una discussione più estesa. Nell’ampia sezione dedicata alle medietà, l’ultima della parte sulla musica dell’Expositio, Teone fa riferimento a dodici medietà: le prime tre, canoniche (aritmetica, geometrica, armonica); le medietà quarta (subcontraria), quinta, sesta; altre sei, definite subcontrarie alle prime sei35 (106, 13–15). La discussione che viene riservata ai vari gruppi è però disomogenea: le prime sei medietà sono tutte descritte (113, 9–116, 7) ma poi viene individuato il medio solo delle prime tre (116, 8–119, 16), mentre le medietà dalla settima alla dodicesima (le “subcontrarie” alle prime sei) sono del tutto trascurate. Questa impostazione è apparentemente inadeguata sia per un manuale tecnico (come quello di Nicomaco, in cui si affrontano tutte le medietà note) sia per un’opera commentaria che rispetti il “modello” plutarcheo. E tuttavia, essa dipende ancora da un’ispirazione esegetica, benché diversa da quella individuata in precedenza. Proprio nell’Introductio (II 142, 21–143, 8; cfr. anche II 122, 11 sgg.), infatti, Nicomaco afferma che le prime tre medietà sono rintracciabili negli scritti di Platone e Aristotele, ma anche che le medietà dalla quarta alla sesta sono ἐκείναις ὑπεναντίαι e τοῖς μετ‵ ἐκείνους [Platone e Aristotele] ὑπομνηματογράφοις τε καὶ αἱρετισταῖς ἐν χρήσει γινόμεναι. Ancora, secondo Nicomaco le medietà oltre la sesta sono state scoperte “da altri” e non compaiono negli scritti “degli antichi”, quindi le discuterà nella sua opera solo πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀγνοεῖν. Questa testimonianza attesta che le medietà

34 cfr. Calc., In Tim. XL–XLII 89, 3–91, 19: Come si vedrà, la sezione parallela dell’Expositio ha uno svolgimento diverso. A causa di queste divergenze, pace Waszink, J. H.: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius, 7–8, le sezioni sulle medietà di Teone e Calcidio non provengono entrambe da Adrasto, che qui ispirò probabilmente il solo Calcidio (cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, 10–12). Il peripatetico illustrava invece la proporzione geometrica in relazione alla costruzione del corpo del mondo (Calc., In Tim. IX–XIX 62, 1–71, 9). 35 L’allusione ad altre sei medietà “subcontrarie” alle prime è tecnicamente enigmatico e a prima vista inappropriato, poiché le undici medietà presentate da Nicomaco e Pappo (cfr. supra, n. 24) esauriscono le possibilità (cfr. Acerbi, F.: Il silenzio delle sirene, 243–245). Potrebbe trattarsi di un riferimento alle medietà di Nicomaco e Pappo (cinque e non denominate subcontrarie), oppure di un’indicazione, tecnicamente erronea, ad altre medietà (ad esempio Proclo nel suo Commento al Timeo – II 19, 3–5 – attribuisce la scoperta di medietà ulteriori alle prime a Moderato, Nicomaco e “alcuni altri”).

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 103

dalla quarta alla sesta erano ancora riconducibili all’esegesi platonica, probabilmente per la stretta relazione che intercorre tra esse e le prime tre: l’opposizione tra gruppi di medietà, dunque, non è stabilita unicamente tra le prime tre – platoniche – e le altre, ma anche tra le prime sei e le successive.36 Ciò indica che Teone continua a muoversi all’interno di moduli appropriati per l’esegesi tecnica di questo ζήτημα, per trattare il quale era possibile adottare il modello “basilare” di Plutarco o quello, più particolare ma tradizionalmente affermato, di Teone. Alla luce di queste considerazioni appare in primo luogo evidente la presenza di uno ζήτημα tecnico specifico relativo alle medietà, ricorrente nelle opere esegetiche e volto a spiegare quali medietà Platone abbia utilizzato e quali caratteristiche siano loro proprie. Al contempo lo svolgimento della questione può avere diversi livelli di approfondimento ed estensione. Sia il metodo di Plutarco che quello di Teone si fondano evidentemente su una traslazione di contenuti dall’ambito tecnico a quello del commento e sul loro rimodellamento in funzione del nuovo contesto. Tale rimodellamento può tendere alla selettività – così, ad esempio, Plutarco – o essere mirato a fornire un quadro leggermente più ampio ma ancora coerente con il fine esegetico: il nucleo di commento tecnico proposto da Teone, in effetti, eccede lo spettro di nozioni strettamente necessarie per spiegare il Timeo, ma ha il vantaggio di inquadrarle in una dimensioni più sistematica e comprensiva.

2c) ζήτημα IV. Rintracciare i medi Dopo aver introdotto le medietà, sia Plutarco che Teone illustrano come individuare i relativi medi tra due estremi. Anche in questo caso la funzione esegetica dei passi, piuttosto immediata, è quella di fornire uno sfondo teorico all’operazione di individuazione dei medi armonico e aritmetico tra i numeri della tetractide platonica, momento fondamentale a cui Platone accenna nella divisio animae. Grazie a un riferimento esplicito sappiamo che il metodo contenuto nel De animae procreatione in Timaeo plutarcheo (1019 e5–1020 a11) risale in realtà a Eudoro. Esso è limitato – in conformità con lo svolgimento dello ζήτημα precedente – alle medietà aritmetica e armonica, dunque si mantiene più vicino al testo platonico. La regola per rintracciare il medio aritmetico prevede l’addizione della 36 Cfr. anche Papp., Syn. cap. XVIII, anche in questo passo probabilmente in dipendenza da opere di commento al Timeo (cfr. Mansfeld, J.: Prolegomena mathematica, 118–119): le prime tre medietà sono utili per la lettura dei testi degli antichi, ma ve ne sono anche altre tre κατὰ τοὺς παλαιούς, mentre le quattro successive sono state scoperte ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων.

104 

 Federico M. Petrucci

metà degli estremi (M = T/2 + t/2). Alla sua esposizione, però, Plutarco aggiunge che non vi sono metodi differenziati da applicare a numeri in rapporto doppio o triplo, sottolineando inoltre: ὁ συντεθεὶς ἔσται μέσος ἔν τε τοῖς διπλασίοις καὶ τοῖς τριπλασίοις ὁμοίως. In modo coerente, per trovare il medio armonico, per cui una differenziazione è possibile, vengono offerte due diverse regole per termini in rapporto doppio o triplo: per i primi il medio è la somma di una terza parte del termine minore e metà del maggiore (M = T/2 + t/3), mentre per gli altri il medio equivale alla somma di una terza parte del termine maggiore e metà del minore (M = T/3 + t/2).37 L’attenzione specifica per coppie di numeri doppi e tripli non può non ricordare i numeri della tetractide platonica, a cui il maestro applica le medietà. Per esemplificare l’ultimo caso, inoltre, Plutarco considera le coppie (6, 12) e (6, 18), derivanti dalle quelle platoniche secondo un modello diffuso nell’antichità (cfr. la sezione 2e, particolarmente la nota 45). Questa esposizione plutarchea è dunque ben comprensibile all’interno della già mirata focalizzazione esegetica; e tuttavia, essa contiene un’anomalia macroscopica dal punto di vista tecnico, ovvero la ricerca – evidenziata in modo diverso nei due casi – di regole mirate per termini doppi e tripli. L’atteggiamento che Plutarco eredita da Eudoro non è però isolato.38 Come accennato poco sopra, la parte sulla musica dell’Expositio di Teone si chiude con un’esposizione (più vasta e apparentemente eterogenea rispetto alla sezione plutarchea) delle regole per l’individuazione dei medi aritmetico, geometrico, e armonico. Per il medio aritmetico sono proposte tre regole,39 tutte esemplificate con i numeri 6 e 12 (116, 8–116, 22): il termine medio è la somma del termine minore e della metà della differenza tra il maggiore e il minore (M = t + (T – t)/2); il termine medio è uguale alla somma delle metà degli estremi (M = T/2 + t/2); il medio è uguale alla metà della somma degli estremi (M = (T+t)/2). Per il medio geometrico (116, 23–118, 3) Teone indica due regole, l’una aritmetica, l’altra geometrica: secondo la prima, applicabile solo a estremi il cui prodotto è un quadrato, il medio geometrico tra due numeri è uguale alla radice quadrata del loro prodotto; secondo la seconda, il medio è l’altezza del triangolo rettangolo 37 Cfr. Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 345 n. 272. 38 La possibilità di confronto è comunque limitata. Non ci sono passi paralleli fruibili in Calcidio, dunque – probabilmente – in Adrasto. Nell’Introductio arithmetica (I 134, 1 sgg.) la discussione non è introdotta come una semplice illustrazione aritmetica (trovare termini medi equivale a stabilire delle note mobili tra due note fisse, cioè all’operazione suggerita da Platone nel Timeo; il riferimento platonico non sembra però trovare ulteriori basi; cfr. D’Ooge, M. L.: Nicomachus of Gerasa, 278–281). 39 Le regole aritmetiche proposte da Teone sono rintracciabili nel corso dell’illustrazione di ciascuna medietà di Nicomaco, che tuttavia non dedica sezioni definite al tema specifico dell’individuazione dei termini medi. Pappo propone solo dimostrazioni geometriche.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 105

inscritto in una semicirconferenza che ha per base la somma degli estremi.40 Per il medio armonico, infine, Teone propone tre regole (118, 4–119, 16), le prime due delle quali sono istanze particolari della più generale in quanto considerano gli estremi rispettivamente in rapporto doppio e triplo: a) per due estremi in rapporto doppio vale che M = t+ t (T – t) / (T + t); b) per due estremi in rapporto triplovale che M = t + [(T – t)2/2] / (T + t); c) per due estremi in generale vale che M = t + t (T – t) / (T + t). Teone sembra dunque amplificare le anomalie già presenti nel passo plutarcheo: da un lato viene applicata una focalizzazione parziale, poiché sono affrontate solo tre medietà, cioè le due necessarie nella divisio animae più quella geometrica; dall’altro si intrecciano la tendenza a fornire una pletora di regole (come nel caso del medio aritmetico) e quella a differenziarle secondo medi doppi e tripli (come nel caso del medio armonico). Alla base di questo atteggiamento, tuttavia, sembra possibile osservare l’interazione tra i due principi esegetici già applicati negli ζητήματα precedenti (in particolare nel III): da una parte Teone seleziona il materiale tecnico da traslare, focalizzando la scelta in base alle esigenze dell’esegesi; dall’altra tale selezione non è stretta, anzi, tende a traslare una base tecnica più ampia del necessario, come a fornire il retroterra aritmetico dell’operazione di Platone in modo sistematico.41 In altri termini, applicando questo metodo Teone non si limita a completare le nozioni impiegate da Platone, ma si spinge a mostrare come Platone utilizzasse solo parte di un corpo organico di nozioni che però necessariamente padroneggiava. Quanto detto conferma le acquisizioni già raggiunte nell’analisi degli ζητήματα precedenti. In questo caso, però, emerge anche un altro aspetto importante. Nel traslare il nucleo tecnico sia Plutarco che Teone introducono una distinzione tra regole applicabili a estremi doppi e tripli, distinzione che in termini tecnici è impropria, se non erronea: laddove sia indicata o indicabile una regola generale, ogni restrizione è tecnicamente inadeguata. Tale “violazione” dipende però dal fine esegetico, cioè dalla volontà di riprendere i metodi di Platone. Nella traslazione del nucleo tecnico, dunque, gli esegeti sono disposti a deformare le fonti e i principi tecnici in nome del maestro, che nell’economia interna dell’esposizione ha comunque autorità e normatività.

40 Per la dimostrazione in sé cfr. Eucl., El. II prop. 14 e soprattutto VI prop. 13; per il suo impego con lo stesso fine Papp., Syn. III cap. XII (prop. 6). 41 In effetti, la tetractide platonica è composta da due medietà geometriche divise (cioè i quattro termini), e in questi termini l’introduzione da parte di Teone della regola per il medio geometrico non è estranea all’esegesi del passo del Timeo in questione, benché amplii in qualche modo la focalizzazione rispetto alla prospettiva plutarchea.

106 

 Federico M. Petrucci

2d) ζήτημα V. La distinzione tra intervallo e rapporto Nel suo Commento all’Armonica di Tolemeo Porfirio individua e affronta il problema specifico della distinzione tra intervallo e rapporto riportando due diverse tendenze4²: Eratostene, e dopo di lui Eliano e Trasillo,43 differenziarono l’intervallo dal rapporto, mentre altri teorici – tra i quali Archita,44 Panezio45 e Dionigi di Alicarnasso (ma anche Euclide come autore della Sectio canonis) – utilizzarono indifferentemente i termini intervallo – διάστημα – e rapporto – λόγος – (91, 4–95, 23). In realtà secondo la testimonianza di Porfirio solo Eratostene e Trasillo (il secondo in dipendenza dal primo) sembrano aver proposto una menzione esplicita del problema, mentre le opinioni alternative sono rintracciate richiamando testi in cui i due termini venivano impiegati in modo ambiguo. Più importante è però che Porfirio citi anche un breve estratto del Timeo (36 a6–b5), relativo alla divisione dell’anima secondo intervalli di tono e leimma, in cui i rapporti di consonanza sono chiamati intervalli (ad es. τῷ τοῦ ἐπογδόου διαστήματι). Il problema sollevato da Porfirio sembra dunque derivare proprio da questo passo canonico, in cui emerge in modo evidente l’incongruenza nel lessico tecnico tanto dibattuta: nella teoria musicale,46 infatti, il rapporto sesquiottavo corrisponde all’intervallo di tono. In effetti, i primi due autori citati – che sono poi quelli più direttamente impegnati nel tema – sono due commentatori del Timeo, Eratostene con il Platonico ed Eliano con il Commento al Timeo. Fin qui le testimonianze sono ancora indirette e oscure. L’interpretazione generale del passo di Porfirio è però confermata da Teone (81, 6–82, 5), il quale – senza dipendere qui da Adrasto – si sofferma su questa distinzione nell’ampia sezione che prepara la divisione del canone, cioè la riproposizione tecnica della divisio animae platonica. Teone si impegna a stabilire il criterio di differenziazione tra intervallo

42 Cfr. anche Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 388–389. Per un’analisi più mirata del passo in una prospettiva non dissimile da quella qui proposta cfr. ora Raffa, M.: “The Debate on logos and diastêma”; per le implicazioni esegetiche del problema cfr. anche Barker, A.: “Early Timaeus Commentaries”, 81–87. 43 Nel “gruppo di Eratostene” viene citato anche Filolao (A 25 DK; ma evidenti problemi di cronologia sollevano perplessità sull’attribuzione; cfr. Huffman, C. A.: Philolaus of Croton, 377–380). Raffa, M.: “The Debate on logos and diastêma”, partic. 246–247, ha suggerito di includere nel gruppo anche il Diodoro citato poco più avanti (92, 26) e identificabile con il matematico alessandrino del I secolo a.C.. 44 Porph., In Harm. 93, 6–17 = Arch. fr. 2; cfr. Huffman, C. A.: Archytas of Tarentum, partic. 166–167 e 181. 45 Non il più celebre stoico, bensì l’autore del trattato Περὶ τῶν κατὰ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν λόγων καὶ διαστημάτων (cfr. Porph., In Harm. 65, 21). 46 Per osservazioni più specifiche cfr. ancora Raffa, M.: “The Debate on logos and diastêma”.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 107

e rapporto: l’intervallo si dà solo tra termini diversi e non si differenzia in funzione dell’ordine dei termini che lo costituiscono (81, 6–16). In altri termini, se due oggetti sono in rapporto di 1/1 non si dà intervallo, e tra due termini differenti si dà un solo intervallo ma due rapporti (evidentemente inversi tra loro). A sostegno, il platonico riprende esplicitamente Eratostene citandone un esempio importante, che, pur impiegando come oggetti di discussione le facoltà psichiche – dunque solo indirettamente mirato al dibattito tecnico – , conferma l’intento di distinguere l’intervallo e il rapporto.47 In primo luogo il passo conferma la notizia di Porfirio e l’originaria collocazione del problema in una prospettiva esegetica – come quella dell’Expositio e del Platonico di Eratostene –. Ma non solo: la differenziazione proposta da Teone indica il significato che lo ζήτημα poteva avere proprio nel contesto dell’esegesi del Timeo. Secondo i presupposti di Teone, infatti, quando Platone parla di “intervalli” sesquiottavi, doppi, etc., lo fa in modo fondato, perché considera termini disuguali e tra i quali sussiste una determinata “direzione” (quella della scala, tra grave e acuto). D’altro canto, l’uso di Platone si spiega facilmente in funzione della coincidenza tra intervalli musicali e rapporti numerici (cfr. la sezione successiva), coincidenza che giustifica implicitamente la scelta lessicale una volta stabilita la legittimità di quest’ultima. La tradizione a cui si allinea Teone sembra quindi caratterizzata dalla volontà di difendere l’uso platonico di Tim. 36 a6–b5, cioè di spiegare come Platone non presentasse una scelta lessicale errata. In questo caso il fenomeno in gioco non sembra limitato alla traslazione; al contrario, un nucleo tecnico minimale viene completato con la rielaborazione di nozioni musicale e – soprattutto – calato all’interno di un’esegesi κατὰ λέξιν.48

2e) ζήτημα VI. I numeri della divisio animae Gli ζητήματα finora considerati, pur prendendo in esame questioni legate al testo della divisio animae, sono dedicati a problemi preliminari di teoria musicale,

47 Teone afferma (81,17–82,5): Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ ἐν τῷ Πλατωνικῷ φησι, μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι διάστημα καὶ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ λόγος μέν ἐστι δύο μεγεθῶν ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιὰ σχέσις· γίνεται δ’ αὕτη καὶ ἐν διαφόροις . οἷον ἐν ᾧ λόγῳ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς τὸ νοητόν, ἐν τούτῳ δόξα πρὸς ἐπιστήμην, καὶ διαφέρει καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ ᾧ καὶ ἡ δόξα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. διάστημα δὲ ἐν διαφέρουσι μόνον, ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ ποιότητα ἢ κατὰ θέσιν ἢ ἄλλως ὁπωσοῦν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι λόγος διαστήματος ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ ἥμισυ πρὸς τὸ διπλάσιον λόγον μὲν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει, διάστημα δὲ τὸ αὐτό. Per il possibile sfondo teorico della discussione sulle facoltà in Eratostene cfr. Dörrie, H.: “Formula analogiae”, 35–39. 48 Per la natura della quale cfr. ora Petrucci, F. M.: “Wie man eine Platonstelle deutet”.

108 

 Federico M. Petrucci

come a fornire un quadro ampio in cui inserire la discussione di una specifica struttura armonica. La discussione di tale struttura, coincidente con il nucleo centrale del primo ambito di ricerca proposto da Plutarco relativo all’individuazione dei valori che compongono l’anima cosmica, è rappresentato da questo ζήτημα. Dopo la trattazione delle medietà,49 Plutarco riferisce che Crantore – e poi con lui Eudoro – riproduceva la divisione armonica dell’anima cosmica con numeri che portavano a individuare il primo leimma nel rapporto 512/486 e la nota più acuta nel valore massimo di 10368. Ciò vuol dire che l’unità, punto di inizio della struttura armonica dell’anima, era moltiplicata per il coefficiente 384. Un’immagine più ampia della medesima impostazione è fornita da Proclo, il quale attribuisce ad Adrasto50 un metodo grafico che, attraverso tre triangoli, illustrava progressivamente i termini della tetractide platonica, e il cui triangolo “maggiore”, contenente i primi due, indicava tutti i numeri prodotti dal riempimento degli intervalli con tono e leimma grazie al coefficiente 384.51 Questa struttura è dunque ben attestata nella tradizione platonica, dall’Accademia antica al Medioplatonismo, e poi raccolta da Proclo.52 Ma lo stesso metodo aveva anche 49 De an. procr. 1020 a11–e1. Sul noto passo cfr. Brisson, L.: Le même et l’autre, 318 sgg., e Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 355 n. 299 sgg. 50 L’attribuzione è probabilmente corretta, nonostante la divergenza con un brano calcidiano (In Tim. XLIX 98, 1 sgg.). Recentemente Creese, D.: The Monochord, 239–249, ha suggerito che a partire da Exp. 57, 11–58, 12 è possibile ricostruire una diversa divisione scalare di Adrasto. Contro una simile ipotesi si deve però obiettare l’assenza di riscontri esterni (ad esempio, paralleli nel Commento al Timeo di Calcidio, ma anche in altri autori posteriori come Proclo) che garantiscano la paternità adrastea del passo; inoltre, l’interpretazione di Creese sembra forzare il testo – che di fatto illustra solo la composizione numerica delle consonanze – il quale offre solo pochi e deboli appigli per la ricostruzione in questione. 51 Procl., In Tim. II 170, 22 sgg.; ma cfr. anche II 177, 25 sgg. Il triangolo più interno raccoglieva i numeri della tetractide e aveva come apice l’unità; il secondo, che conteneva il primo, recava i termini moltiplicati per 6 (collocato all’apice: su un lato la serie pari 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 32, 36, 48, sull’altro la dispari 9, 12, 18, 27, 36, 54, 81, 108, 162), in modo tale da mostrare anche i numeri ricavati dall’inserimento dei medi aritmetici e armonici. 52 Lo stesso coefficiente è inoltre adottato dallo Pseudo-Timeo (209, 9–212, 24), che si impegna in un’ampia trattazione, per la quale cfr. Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros, 77–85; per osservazioni tecniche cfr. Hagel, S.: Ancient Greek music, 160 sgg.. La ragione del ricorso al coefficiente 384 è spiegata da Proclo (In Tim. II 177, 10 sgg.; Plutarco – De an. procr. 1020 d2 sgg. – sembra offrire solo ragioni aritmologiche): ponendo come vertice del primo tetracordo il numero 256 sarà impossibile proseguire la scala in quanto è possibile trovare numeri interi che rappresentino la prima nota del tetracordo successivo dopo il tono di disgiunzione, 288 (= 9/8 di 256), e la seconda, distante un tono, 324 (= 9/8 di 288), ma non la terza nota, distante un tono da 324, poiché 324 non è divisibile per 8. Ciò testimonia che la ragione per cui Crantore alzava il coefficiente risiede nella volontà di estendere il sistema al di là del primo tetracordo.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 109

una sua diffusione tecnica, come testimoniato da un testo di dubbia attribuzione, gli Excerpta Nicomachi (267, 1–271, 15), in cui è presente un calcolo peculiare degli intervalli di quarta e quinta in cui sono utilizzati numeri compatibili con quelli del metodo di Crantore. Quello che per Crantore, Eudoro e Adrasto era il primo metodo, per Teone53 è solo ulteriore. Nell’Expositio egli dedica un ampio passaggio all’individuazione del valore numerico del leimma (66, 19–72, 20) e propone il calcolo necessario per produrre un leimma dello stesso valore di quello fissato da Platone nel Timeo, 256/243 (coefficiente per l’unità 192).54 Chiosando la dimostrazione, Teone aggiunge (69, 3–11) che alcuni utilizzavano un metodo per cui il valore del leimma era identificato nel rapporto 512/486,55 ma il primo metodo ha la caratteristica di mantenerei i valori impiegati da Platone. La medesima posizione è inoltre espressa da Plutarco,56 che afferma esplicitamente di preferire l’impiego del coefficiente 192 perché esso compare nel testo di Platone, e riportata da Proclo.57 Anche l’impiego di questo coefficiente trova attestazione nei manuali: Gaudenzio58 fornisce una dimostrazione che segue gli stessi principi pur non essendo coincidente con quella di Teone, mentre svolgono un’illustrazione simile Aristide Quintiliano59 e Tolemeo.60 Il panorama va completato con un ultimo metodo, riportato da Proclo e attribuito a Severo:61 per varie – e relativamente sottili – ragioni tecniche, esso considerava numeri ancora più grandi, adottando per l’unità il coefficiente 768.62 Ora, queste operazioni sottintendono una diffusa e più approfondita operazione tecnica, ovvero l’individuazione delle note all’interno dello spazio musicale ed eventualmente l’associazione di numeri (o, in generale, valori quantitativi)

53 Anche in questo caso, pace Waszink, J. H.: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius, 6, le sezioni parallele di Teone e Calcidio (XLVIII–L 97, 20–100, 2) sono eccessivamente divergenti per poter provenire entrambe dalla fonte adrastea; cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, ad loc. 54 Per la dimostrazione e i suoi valori cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 375–376. 55 Cfr. anche Exp. 93, 2–7. Per la dimostrazione e i relativi valori cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 376. 56 De an. procr. 1020 a11–e1. 57 In Tim. II 175, 22 sgg. 58 Intr. harm. 342, 7–342, 26. 59 De mus. 96, 18 sgg. 60 Harm. I cap. 10. 61 Procl., In Tim. II 191, 1 sgg. 62 La ragione tecnica risiede nella volontà di arrestare il sistema platonico al leimma e non al tono (dopo quattro ottave e una quinta), ma probabilmente l’operazione di Severo sottende una più profonda riflessione metodologica: cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Making Sense”.

110 

 Federico M. Petrucci

alle note.63 Nei modelli esegetici il richiamo a tale operazione tecnica è consapevole e i piani sono evidentemente intrecciati: Teone, ad esempio, alla fine della sua divisione del canone (87, 4–93, 7) richiama il valore più alto del modello di Crantore, 10368, ed esplicita che esso viene associato alla nêtê degli iperboli, nota più acuta del grande sistema perfetto64 (93, 2–6). In questo senso i più attestati modelli esegetici possono essere ricondotti alla loro matrice tecnica, dalla quale simili applicazioni (associazioni di vario tipo tra note e numeri) erano probabilmente emerse con una certa diffusione. Le tracce di diverse versioni, in effetti, permangono in alcune sezioni, tecniche ed esegetiche. Un primo esempio è attestato ancora da Teone, che propone una divisione del canone armonico, un monocordo (operazione che per un platonico richiama la divisio animae), ripresa esplicitamente da Trasillo (87, 4–93, 7). Questa sequenza di operazioni si basa sull’individuazione delle note fondamentali di un sistema armonico e passa per l’associazione di queste note a valori numerici specifici (in questo caso da 6 a 24). La sezione è a prima vista simile alla divisione del canone prodotta nella classica Sectio canonis euclidea, ma a un’analisi più attenta emerge che le non trascurabili divergenze tra il testo di Teone e quello euclideo, nonché la struttura stessa dell’operazione riportata nell’Expositio, dipendono da un modello specifico, quello rappresentato dalla divisio animae del Timeo.65 Una prospettiva ancora diversa è offerta da Nicomaco (Ench. 251, 12–13), il quale fa riferimento esplicito a Platone affermando che il

63 L’esempio canonico è fornito dalla Sectio canonis euclidea, in cui le note vengono individuate in fasi progressive e la quantificazione è prodotta attraverso la geometria. Cleonide (Intr. harm. 182, 4–184, 15) elenca in sequenza tutte le note di ciascun genere; Bacchio (Intr. harm. 299, 4–16) elenca dapprima i tetracordi e le note per poi distinguerle in fisse e mobili; Gaudenzio (Intr. harm. 331, 24 sgg. e 352, 5–355, 17) scorre tutte le note del sistema diatonico (accordato secondo tre tropoi: hypolidio, hyperlidio ed eolico) a partire dalla proslambanomenê; ciò che rimane dell’opera di Alipio, infine, è interamente rappresentato da una serie di elenchi di note, di volta in volta relativi ai generi accordati secondo diversi tropi. In Nicomaco (Ench. 255, 22; cfr. anche Exc. 281, 1–17) tutte le note del genere diatonico sono elencate insieme e in sequenza. Una ricognizione ampia, da Archita a Tolemeo, è fornita da Barbera, A.: “The consonant Eleventh”, il quale distingue due nature di divisione, una geometrica e una aritmetica, alle quali sono rispettivamente riconducibili le divisioni aristossenica e pitagorica. Per una descrizione tecnica delle divisioni manualistiche cfr. ora Hagel, S.: Ancient Greek music, 97–102, e Creese, D.: The Monochord, passim. 64 Per una trattazione sui fondamenti del sistema musicale greco cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 1–27, e Barker, A.: “Three Approaches to Canonic Division”, 52–53 e 57–59, West, M. L.: Ancient Greek music, 160–166, Landels, J. G.: Music in Ancient Greece and Rome, 86–92, Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 12–18, Hagel, S.: Ancient Greek music, 1–9. 65 In questa sede è impossibile e probabilmente inopportuno proporre la dimostrazione di tale derivazione, per la quale devo rimandare a Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 402–404.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 111

maestro, dopo aver tratto altri numeri dalla prima serie numerica attraverso le medietà, ha fatto corrispondere al numero 9 della serie finale la paramesê.66 Ma l’elemento esegetico torna anche poco dopo (264, 6 sgg.), quando Nicomaco si impegna in una divisione più ampia in cui tutte le note sono riportate in un unico sistema che rappresenta la sovrapposizione di tutti i generi: chiudendo questo passaggio Nicomaco critica esplicitamente la divisione di Trasillo (260,12–19) in quanto non rispondente a quella platonica, che sarebbe stata fraintesa (260, 16: παρήκουσεν).67 Nello stesso passo, infine, Nicomaco critica anche la divisione di Eratostene,68 che riguardava i tre generi, era estremamente attenta alla scelta di rapporti epimori e manteneva i tradizionali valori di tono e leimma per il genere diatonico. In modo implicito o esplicito, queste due testimonianze indicano due dati importanti. Da un lato, quella di assegnare ai numeri della serie platonica le note corrispondenti era una pratica affermata, con varianti interpretative già in qualche modo determinabili (associazione di note e numeri, estensione del sistema, identificazione di numeri maggiori con note acute o gravi, adattamento del sistema platonico ad altri di ampiezza più convenzionale). Dall’altro, la psicogonia di Platone era considerata come istanza normativa, come modello di divisione del canone a cui adeguare gli esempi tecnici che la tradizione offriva; ciò implica che la costruzione della divisione fosse studiata per essere il più possibile aderente alla lettera del maestro, e che il confronto stabilito con le sezioni tecniche era al contempo consapevole e destinato a vedere Platone come unica vera auctoritas. È ora opportuno riprendere le diverse tracce percorse. In relazione alla quantificazione dei numeri della divisio animae platonica, la tradizione propriamente esegetica evidenzia due principali metodi di lettura e riproposizione, uno già elaborato da Crantore (coefficiente 384) e uno riportato da Teone e sposato da Plutarco (con coefficiente 192); a margine rimane quello di Severo (coefficiente 768). Metodi alternativi sono però proposti dallo stesso Teone e da Nicomaco, i quali associano le note fisse a numeri minori. Ancora, questi casi particolari si inseriscono in un panorama in cui l’individuazione delle note sul canone (e, talvolta,

66 Il passo è comunque controverso; cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 259, n. 60. Hagel, S.: Ancient Greek music, 160 sgg., propone un’analisi accurata del modello di Nicomaco e lo confronta con quello dello Pseudo-Timeo. 67 Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 266 n. 87, propone alcune spiegazioni congetturali; probabilmente Nicomaco allude in generale all’estensione del sistema, che Teone limita alle due ottave e che invece dovrebbe essere maggiormente esteso (Ench. 260, 12 sgg.). 68 Per la quale cfr. Barbera, A.: “Arithmetic and geometric divisions of the canon”, 302–304, e Hagel, S.: Ancient Greek music, 182–187. Per le critiche di Nicomaco cfr. anche Bower, C. M.: “Boethius and Nicomachus”, 22 sgg.

112 

 Federico M. Petrucci

la loro quantificazione numerica o geometrica) è un’operazione tecnica diffusa nei manuali e nei trattati tecnici.69 Ora, alle origini di simili applicazioni vi sono certamente le controverse operazioni attribuibili a Filolao e Archita,70 che tuttavia possono al massimo essere considerate alla base della formulazione di alcuni principi tecnici dell’operazione: né i tecnici né tantomeno gli esegeti si richiamano ai caratteri di tali divisioni se non nei termini generalissimi delle norme ormai affermate della teoria armonica. Il principio – cronologico ed essenziale – della tradizione va quindi rintracciato proprio nel Timeo (35 b4–36 b5), in cui l’anima cosmica è divisa come un canone secondo il genere diatonico con arrangiamento dorico.71 In effetti, le divisioni di ambito esegetico (da Crantore in poi) sviluppano (per vocazione) il passo platonico, mentre i primi modelli tecnici, come la Sectio canonis, si sviluppano in parallelo: le due linee, inoltre, non sono certo prive di sovrapposizioni e contaminazioni. Sembra così emergere che la tradizione esegetica e quella tecnica derivano, almeno per quanto riguarda le linee di forza che ne determinano lo sviluppo, dall’influente passo platonico. Inoltre, le loro differenziazioni dipendono non tanto dallo strumento utilizzato – la divisione del canone o dell’anima – quanto piuttosto dalla modulazione e dalle finalità perseguite da ciascun autore: i Platonici sono evidentemente più fedeli alla divisione diatonica, i musicologi estendono la divisione ad altri generi. Lo ζήτημα tecnico in questione ha dunque una peculiarità eccezionale: esso non

69 Alla natura della divisione del canone è stato dedicato da Creese, D.: The Monochord un importante volume, al quale si rimanda per numerose indicazioni tecniche e ulteriori analisi. Occorre però precisare qui che l’autore, a partire dal presupposto per cui il canone è da intendersi sempre e comunque come strumento al contempo empirico e teorico, modello ed oggetto reale, di fatto esclude Platone dalla storia ideale della pratica della divisione, che inizia propriamente con la Sectio canonis euclidea. Se si accetta invece un’idea più ampia della divisione e si identifica il canone con lo spazio musicale da sezionare linearmente secondo un certo genere, è evidente che proprio Platone finisca per rappresentare il modello di partenza sia per la successiva tradizione tecnica (quella della Sectio) sia – e ancora prima – per i suoi esegeti tecnici, innanzitutto Crantore. 70 Un frammento di Filolao (6 = Stob. Anth. I 21, 7d = Nicom. Ench. 252, 17 sgg) e uno di Archita (16 = Ptol. Harm. 30, 9–31, 18) propongono le prime due divisioni della scala musicale a noi conosciute, che sono per molti versi differenti. Per discussioni complete su queste divisioni, tema al quale la critica si è frequentemente dedicata, si può rimandare a Burkert, W.: Weisheit und Wissenschaft, 383–400, Barbera, A.: “Arithmetic and geometric divisions of the canon”, 295–297, Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 43–52, e Barker, A.: “Three Approaches to Canonic Division”, 71–75, Huffman, C. A.: Philolaus of Croton, 123–165, e Huffman, C. A.: Archytas of Tarentum, 402–428, Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 264–278 e 292–302. 71 Cfr. Taylor, A. E.: A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 136–146, Cornford, F. M.: Plato’s Cosmology, 66–72, Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 60 n. 18, Barker, A.: “Three Approaches to Canonic Division”, 68–71, Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 318–323. Un’ampia analisi complessiva delle evidenze medioplatoniche è ora offerta in Petrucci, F. M.: “Making Sense”.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 113

rappresenta una traslazione o un adattamento, quanto piuttosto una modulazione parallela ma in qualche modo osmotica di un medesimo nucleo teorico. Al contempo, tutto ciò autorizza due inferenze: in primo luogo, è del tutto giustificato vedere nei passi tematici degli esegeti medioplatonici uno ζήτημα, cioè un nucleo tematico autosufficiente e oggetto di indagine e analisi specifica; in secondo luogo, come mostrato soprattutto da Teone e Nicomaco, pur nell’interazione con la tradizione tecnica per i platonici il maestro rimane l’unica auctoritas tecnica vincolante.

2f) ζητήματα VII–VIII. L’estensione massima del sistema (VII) e il suo genere (VIII). Leggendo virtualmente la divisio animae platonica attraverso le esegesi tecniche, con l’acquisizione dello ζήτημα VI ci si trova di fronte a diversi sistemi “costruiti” con numeri di valore talvolta molto elevato, ordinati in ordine crescente e tra loro in rapporti armonici. Le scelte dei diversi coefficienti, tuttavia, sono a loro volta legate ad altri problemi tecnici. Nel discutere i valori dei numeri adottati per riprodurre la divisio animae Plutarco fa menzione, come detto, della posizione di Crantore: essa viene spiegata in termini essenzialmente aritmologici e abbandonata in favore della numerazione che consente di identificare il leimma nel valore platonico 256/243. In questo caso, però, Plutarco non coglie una ragione importante che doveva fondare la posizione dell’accademico. Come spiega Proclo,72 infatti, adottare come primo tetracordo quello “platonico” (con coefficiente 192, sulla base della quantificazione del leimma come 256/243) è possibile solo se a questa operazione non viene dato seguito, cioè se lo si considera come un tetracordo esemplare e non come primo di un sistema a ottave: per completare l’ottava, infatti, occorre trovare tre toni consecutivi (uno di disgiunzione e due per il tetracordo successivo) e un leimma a partire da 256, nota superiore del primo tetracordo; ma questo è impossibile dal punto di vista aritmetico.73 Proprio raddoppiando il coefficiente, invece, si può proseguire fino a comporre un sistema di quattro ottave, una quinta e un tono, cioè di ampiezza uguale a quello proposto (benché in modo oscuro) da Platone.74 Per converso, la volontà di Plutarco di attenersi ai valori del maestro indica quanta importanza dovesse avere per Crantore e poi per Adrasto la possibilità di ripercorrere l’intero sistema platonico nella sua 72 In Tim. II 177, 10 sgg. 73 Cfr. supra, 108 n. 52. 74 Ovvero, una serie consecutiva di numeri in grado di essere identificati con tutte le note del sistema platonico nel rispetto dei relativi intervalli musicali.

114 

 Federico M. Petrucci

estensione totale, esigenza che portò ad alterare i numeri scelti da Platone. In altri termini, si scontrano due esigenze di fedeltà al testo platonico: da un lato la fedeltà al valore assoluto del leimma, dall’altro quella all’estensione totale del sistema. Queste riflessioni, inoltre, introducono e danno un primo corpo a due appositi ζητήματα. Nell’Expositio una tra le prime sezioni della parte sulla musica è dedicata in generale ai sistemi e al leimma, e si apre con alcune osservazioni sulla composizione delle consonanze (62, 1–63, 24): il suo significato complessivo – non estraneo ad opere tecniche75 – è quello di dimostrare che la somma di consonanze è in qualche modo ancora e sempre consonante. Il fine esegetico di una simile sezione, di per sé piuttosto incerto, emerge dal tema trattato immediatamente dopo: Teone, seguendo certamente Adrasto,76 difende Platone dall’accusa di aver composto un sistema troppo ampio per essere suonato e ascoltato perché esteso a quattro ottave, una quinta e un tono.77 Una simile accusa viene ricondotta “virtualmente” ad Aristosseno (nominato esplicitamente), secondo il quale l’estensione massima corrisponde a una doppia ottava e quinta,78 e ad alcuni “moderni”,79 che arrivano a una tripla ottava e un tono. Per affrontare la difesa del maestro, al contrario di quanto ci si potrebbe aspettare, Teone non si limita – come sarebbe prevedibile – a marginalizzare il contesto tecnico: in questo modo, insieme alle obiezioni di Aristosseno, verrebbero meno anche la competenza di Platone, la sua autorevolezza in ambito tecnico. Al contrario, la tesi difensiva è che il sistema platonico, che rimane un sistema propriamente musicale, è così 75 Tolemeo (Harm. I 13, 3–7) propone una dottrina simile sottolineando che, aggiungendo un’ottava a qualsiasi intervallo consonante, esso rimarrà consonante. Nello stesso passo, inoltre, questo tipo di composizione viene ricondotta a una tipologia propria di consonanze, quelle “sinfoniche”, che comprende quarta e quinta ma anche le consonanze prodotte da queste e quelle “omofone”, cioè ottava e doppia ottava. 76 A conferma dell’esplicito richiamo c’è un chiaro parallelo nel Commento al Timeo di Proclo (II 170, 5–21), che indica Adrasto come fonte della propria citazione; cfr. già Waszink, J. H.: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius, 13–15, e ora Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, ad loc. 77 Cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 59 n. 17. 78 Teone riporta l’errata estensione di due ottave e una quarta (errore probabilmente già adrasteo, forse dovuto a una citazione mnemonica del dato; cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 139 n. 75) ma probabilmente fa riferimento all’impossibilità di estendere la voce o il suono di uno strumento al di là di due ottave e una quinta (El. harm. 26, 1–7); nello stesso passo, inoltre, Aristosseno suggerisce che non sembrerebbe esservi alcuna restrizione alla somma di intervalli consonanti a causa della natura armonica di ciascuno di essi (cfr. anche Ptol., Harm. I 13, 1–23). 79 Probabilmente epigoni di Aristosseno; cfr. Aristid. Quint., De mus. I 20, 5 sgg., e Ptol., Harm. II capp. 7–11, per le critiche del quale cfr. Barker, A.: Scientific method in Ptolemy’s Harmonics, 173 sgg.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 115

composto perché guarda alla natura delle cose, e per questo si estende fino a 8 e 27 (numeri cubici della tetractide platonica, che indicano l’estensione in quanto estremi), che consentono all’anima di abbracciare il corpo tridimensionale del mondo.80 La contrapposizione, dunque, non è tra un modello musicale (aristossenico) e uno di natura “ontologica”, ma tra due modelli propriamente musicali, l’uno limitato, l’altro universalmente valido, fondato sull’autentica armonia, cioè sulla sua dimensione cosmica e naturale quindi matematica. La stessa logica, inoltre, rappresenta la base per la quale i Platonici, volendo riprodurre l’intero sistema dell’anima, si sentivano giustificati a estendere la serie numerica fino ad accrescere il coefficiente fino a 384. Un problema correlato (perché alla base della scelta dei rapporti tra le note) e svolto in modo analogo fu affrontato in relazione al genere adottato da Platone, diatonico secondo l’arrangiamento dorico. Nell’Expositio (55, 15–56, 5), ancora in dipendenza da Adrasto (cfr. Procl., In Tim. II 169, 27–130, 1; il peripatetico, tuttavia, sembra aver esteso ulteriormente l’argomento), Teone evidenzia l’opposizione tra la posizione platonica e la teoria aristossenica, secondo la quale il primato della perfezione tecnica dovrebbe essere accordato al genere enarmonico.81 In questo modo Teone (dopo Adrasto) fa emergere un problema certamente rilevante, poiché, benché difficilmente gli esegeti si soffermino a difendere Platone per la sua scelta, tutti la riproducono in modo fedele. L’argomento impiegato da Teone è analogo al precedente: la preferenza accordata da Aristosseno al genere enarmonico è fuori luogo in quanto il diatonico rappresenta la naturalezza e la semplicità, a fronte dell’ipertecnicismo dell’enarmonico. Si osserva ancora, quindi, la consapevolezza della contrapposizione di Platone alla tradizione musicale canonica, una contrapposizione che rimane comunque all’interno dell’ambito tecnico e che si realizza nella “vittoria” di Platone, unico ad aver colto l’essenza dell’armonia perché scegliendo il genere diatonico ha attinto alla dimensione naturale della musica. Gli ζητήματα in questione condividono due caratteri peculiari: da un lato prevedono un confronto diretto ed esplicito con Aristosseno, dall’altro nascono per difendere Platone da accuse strettamente legate alla tecnica esecutiva, un ambito in realtà estraneo alla formulazione platonica. Per riuscire in questa impresa non si sceglie la via meno impegnativa, ovvero una “fuga” dall’ambito tecnico, bensì quella più forte, per la quale la posizione di Platone viene ad essere identificata con una dottrina normativa anche in un ambito strettamente tecnico. In altri termini, gli esegeti 1) individuano un nucleo tecnico nel testo di Platone;

80 Per l’associazione tra numeri e dimensioni cfr. infra, 122. 81 El. harm. 24, 17–25, 4.

116 

 Federico M. Petrucci

2)  aprono uno ζήτημα riscontrando un’incongruenza tra questo nucleo e posizioni alternative autorevoli, cioè all’interno di ricerche appartenenti all’ambito tecnico di riferimento; 3) per confrontare le posizioni e giustificare Platone, assumono come tecnicamente normativa (in quanto ispirata alla natura delle cose) la posizione di Platone. Il consueto meccanismo di traslazione, dunque, è limitato al quadro generale e si associa all’elaborazione ad hoc di una dottrina tecnica alternativa a quella consueta sulla base dell’opinione di Platone. In questo modo il maestro diviene l’autorità tecnica per eccellenza, spinto in una “invasione” di campo nei confronti della tradizione maggioritaria. Rimane evidente che tale linea di ragionamento sia per certi versi circolare, poiché per difendere tecnicamente il Timeo si fa leva proprio sulla sua radice ontologica; ma ciò evidenzia ancora una volta l’elemento essenziale del procedere argomentativo degli esegeti, poiché inizio e fine di ogni argomentazione rimane l’identificazione di Platone come unica vera auctoritas.

2g) ζήτημα IX. L’individuazione del grave e dell’acuto Il sistema armonico ottenuto alla fine della divisio animae consiste in una serie di numeri “musicali”, cioè tra loro in rapporti tali da produrre intervalli e consonanze e da configurare globalmente un sistema diatonico dorico. Dai cenni di Platone (in particolare, la menzione del “riempimento” con tono e leimma) si può dedurre il genere del sistema, diatonico con arrangiamento dorico. Rimane però, tra le altre, un’ambiguità di non poco conto: con quale numero va identificata la nota più grave del sistema?82 Una passo dell’Expositio, piuttosto oscuro e tecnicamente difficoltoso, rappresenta probabilmente un esempio di dibattito in merito. All’interno di una macrosequenza sulla composizione dei sistemi già fortemente orientata in senso esegetico83 (61, 18–72, 20), Teone propone una tesi singolare (65, 10–66, 11): con tre esperimenti il platonico dimostra che ai suoni più gravi devono essere associati valori numerici maggiori. Ora: da un punto di vista tecnico il passo risulta enigmatico e in ogni caso di scarso rilievo;84 dal punto di vista compositivo sembra superfluo (l’obiettivo di rimarcare la corrispondenza tra suono astratto e riscontro empirico85 è già stato perseguito nelle 82 Recentemente Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 322, ha suggerito che Platone identificasse la nota grave con il numero maggiore. 83 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, ad loc. 84 Cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 221 n. 53. 85 Così descrive l’operazione Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 211 e 221 n. 53.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 117

pagine dell’Expositio dedicate alla scoperta delle consonanze, a 56, 9–61, 17); dal punto di vista esegetico appare fuori contesto, perché rappresenterebbe una annotazione puramente tecnica all’interno di una sezione molto orientata verso l’esegesi tecnica della divisio animae86. Un passo successivo (Exp. 89, 9 sgg., all’interno della cosiddetta sectio canonis) dell’opera di Teone, tuttavia, indica la soluzione. In quel caso, infatti, per esemplificare la propria opera di divisione Teone associa alla proslambanomenê (nota più grave) il numero maggiore della serie considerata, 12. Ciò diventa significativo se si considera che alla fine della stessa sectio canonis (93, 2–6) Teone richiama un sistema alternativo (senza appoggiarlo), quello che arriva a 10368, identificando stavolta questo valore con la nota più acuta del grande sistema perfetto, la nêtê degli iperboli. Nella misura in cui la stessa sectio canonis di Teone tenta di riprodurre la divisio animae, incrociando le due letture esegetiche87 emerge esattamente il problema prefigurato dal nostro passo: una volta strutturata l’intera serie numerica in cui consiste il sistema armonico dell’anima, e una volta determinati la sua estensione e il suo genere, occorre comprendere “in che verso” leggerla, cioè dove collocare acuto e grave. I dati forniti da Teone, come il riferimento alla nêtê di valore 10368 (secondo il modello di Crantore) aprono ad altre ben attestate istanze esegetiche; per questo, benché esigui, sembrano sufficienti per individuare uno ζήτημα autonomo: un problema che nella teoria musicale non trova collocazione – né, in questa formulazione, passi paralleli88 – viene invece posto, risolto e applicato a un dibattito esegetico benché sempre nei termini propri della riflessione tecnica sulla musica. Il testo di Platone, dunque, si conferma qualcosa di più di un polo di attrazione per nozioni tecniche già formate, riprese e rielaborate in chiave esegetica: esso stesso spinge a produrre nuclei tecnici autonomi all’interno dell’esegesi, e in questo senso rivela ancora la sua normatività anche all’interno dell’ambito tecnico.

86 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 368–369. 87 Per le quali cfr. supra, 107–109. Sulla relazione tra questo ζήτημα e il problema della ricostruzione della serie numerica della divisio cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Making Sense”. 88 Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings , 221 n. 53, avvicina alcune riflessioni riportate da Porfirio (In Harm. 63, 1 sgg.) e probabilmente attribuibili a Teofrasto sul rapporto tra suoni e forza necessaria per produrli; nella sezione, tuttavia, non è presente una teoria compatibile, ma solo un possibile riscontro per il metodo impiegato. Rimane probabile che alla base degli argomenti empirici utilizzati possano esservi le discussioni sull’acustica di Aristotele (ad esempio De gen. an. 786 b7–788 b2) e della sua scuola.

118 

 Federico M. Petrucci

2h) ζήτημα X. L’indivisibilità in parti uguali del tono Plutarco89 introduce la questione della divisibilità del tono in relazione al valore numerico del leimma90 come se ne rappresentasse un approfondimento specifico ma in qualche modo autonomo (σκοπῶμεν εἰ […]).91 Ciò dipende dall’elementare osservazione per cui, se il tono fosse divisibile in parti uguali, il ruolo del leimma (completamento della quarta con un intervallo minore del tono) potrebbe essere svolto dal semitono perfetto. Tale possibilità trova in realtà un referente autorevolissimo in Aristosseno, che di fatto rese canoniche in ambienti non platonici sia l’identificazione del semitono come metà del tono sia la possibilità di dividere il tono in parti uguali.92 Plutarco discute dapprima la questione in termini “storiografici”:93 gli Armonici94 (sulla linea dei quali evidentemente Plutarco colloca anche Aristosseno e i suoi epigoni) dividevano il tono in due metà, semitoni perfetti, mentre i Pitagorici ritenevano che il tono fosse indivisibile in parti uguali e completavano la quarta con il leimma. Dal platonico ci si aspetterebbe a questo punto una perorazione convinta e completa della seconda posizione, che Platone ripropone e rende canonica nel Timeo. Curiosamente, invece, Plutarco prosegue indicando che la sensazione sembrerebbe dare ragione agli Armonici (1020 f 3 sgg.), cioè alla posizione aristossenica: per quanto Plutarco si schieri poi con i Pitagorici e Platone proponendo la dimostrazione matematica che ne conferma la tesi95 (partic. 1020 d10 sgg.), alla posizione rivale è concesso un margine di liceità su base empirica. Come Plutarco, anche Teone (che non dipende da Adrasto)96 propone quello della divisibilità del tono come tema autoconsistente (69, 12–72, 20) all’interno di una discussione sul leimma, all’inizio della quale (66, 19–69, 11) si trova una

89 De an. procr. 1020 e7 sgg. 90 Lo ζήτημα è già stato individuato da Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 210; cfr. anche Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 348 n. 284. 91 De an. procr. 1021 c10. 92 Aristosseno (El. harm. 57, 2–5), e con lui i musicografi, definisce il semitono come la metà del tono, e ricava inoltre altri due intervalli minori rispetto ad esso. 93 De an. procr. 1020 e8–f2. 94 In generale, si tratta di studiosi di musica con interessi fortemente empirici che, seguendo un orientamento metodologico che precede Platone, si impegnarono particolarmente nel tentativo di trovare – al fine dell’esecuzione musicale – l’intervallo (acustico, non matematicamente definito) minimo percettibile. Cfr. Meriani, A.: “Un ‘esperimento’ di Pitagora”, 565–602, e Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 33–104. 95 La dimostrazione si basa sull’impossibilità di reperire termini che verifichino l’equazione (a/b)(a/b) = 9/8; cfr. in merito Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 352 n. 289. 96 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, 7–9.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 119

premessa specifica simile all’introduzione plutarchea: alcuni, e in particolare Aristosseno, ritengono che il tono sia divisibile in due metà, corrispondenti a semitoni perfetti. La seguente dimostrazione, che vale come indicazione circa il metodo di quantificazione del leimma, assume dunque in questa prospettiva anche il ruolo di argomento contro l’autorevole posizione di Aristosseno. Aprendo la confutazione diretta della posizione aristossenica (70, 7–72, 20) Teone fa di nuovo riferimento a procedimenti aritmetici, peraltro molto discutibili dal punto di vista tecnico e fondati sull’indivisibilità dell’unità come differenza tra due numeri in rapporto sesquiottavo (quello del tono).97 Dunque Teone, come Plutarco – anche se con ampiezza maggiore –, afferma la posizione platonica grazie a dimostrazioni aritmetiche (corrette o meno che siano). Ciò che cambia nettamente, invece, è l’atteggiamento nei confronti della prospettiva aristossenica al di fuori dell’ambito strettamente numerico: l’ultima parte (relativamente ampia: 70, 19–72, 20) della sequenza propone infatti alcune osservazioni sull’assoluta indivisibilità in parti uguali di un qualsiasi oggetto fisico, e apre dunque a una contestazione diretta della tesi della divisibilità del tono anche nell’ambito del sensibile: con una serie di esempi Teone “dimostra” che ogni taglio fisico implica di per sé la perdita di una parte, pur minima, dell’oggetto tagliato,98 che corrisponde all’unità nelle dimostrazioni aritmetiche. Lo svolgimento parallelo dello ζήτημα da parte di Teone e Plutarco rivela dunque sostanziali tratti di omogeneità argomentativa (in particolare, l’uso di una prospettiva aritmetica a favore della posizione platonica, la cui correttezza viene dunque attestata in modo indiscutibile) e tematica, con la considerazione della teoria aristossenica, dunque degli aspetti sensibili della questione. La differenza nel trattamento di quest’ultimo punto, però, apre alla divergenza tra i due platonici e induce a chiedersi quale bisogno ci sia, nella prospettiva esegetica, di esporsi al rischio del “confronto” con il dato percettivo. In questo elemento particolare, in realtà, si rivela un tratto peculiare del fenomeno della traslazione 97 Nel primo Teone oppone al rapporto che egli crede corrispondere al semitono perfetto (17/16) quello tra 243 e 13, cioè quello tra valore numerico del sesquiottavo e valore numerico nella stessa “scala” del leimma; se il semitono perfetto è 17/16 e il leimma, considerato come 13/243, è minore di 1/18, il leimma è minore di un semitono perfetto in quanto 1/18 è minore anche di 1/16. Nel secondo (partic. 70, 14–19) si osserva che i termini numerici in cui si esprime il tono differiscono di una unità (9 e 8), che è indivisibile, e che anche coppie di numeri maggiori in rapporto sesquiottavo differiscono talvolta di un numero dispari (ad esempio 243 – 216 = 27 = 13 + 14), anch’esso indivisibile in parti uguali. 98 Un problema simile e una soluzione analoga sono forse adombrati nei Problemata (XIX 905 b24–28); una riflessione sull’approssimatività della divisione del tono fisico è proposta da Porfirio (In Harm. 65, 21 sgg.), che probabilmente cita Panezio – cfr. Barker, A.: Greek Musical Writings, 237 nn. 120–121.

120 

 Federico M. Petrucci

dello ζήτημα tecnico. Infatti la tradizione tecnica con la quale gli esegeti dovevano confrontarsi, benché presentasse anche una certa varietà di osservazioni aritmetiche o matematiche a favore dell’indivisibilità del tono (come nella Sectio canonis euclidea o nell’Introductio di Gaudenzio)99, manteneva la posizione di Aristosseno100 come tecnicamente prevalente, e questa era fondata sulla sensibilità e in sostanza indifferente alle prove aritmetiche. Ora, nella misura in cui l’esegesi riprende un tema trattato dai musicologi e deve confrontarsi – come indicano le premesse di Teone e Plutarco – con autorevoli avversari tecnici, non può prescindere dal considerare il nucleo della posizione avversaria. Ciò determina la presenza nelle due sezioni parallele di una discussione della posizione “avversaria”, ma lascia aperta la scelta di metodi differenti: Plutarco, probabilmente in modo più cauto e prudente dal punto di vista tecnico, tenta di sminuire e limitare la validità della tesi avversaria, mentre Teone si impegna in un (piuttosto maldestro) tentativo di confutazione. Esiste dunque uno ζήτημα relativo all’indivisibilità del tono in parti uguali: diffuso nei trattati tecnici e opposto a posizioni di musicologi autorevoli, viene traslato all’interno dell’esegesi di Platone,101 in funzione della quale diviene complementare rispetto alla valutazione del leimma e assume determinati caratteri, in particolare l’associazione di dimostrazioni aritmetiche alla considerazione della dimensione sensibile del tono. Anche in questo caso il meccanismo di traslazione determina alcuni aspetti centrali della questione: il fatto che in ambito tecnico la posizione aristossenica sia autorevole, infatti, vincola i Platonici a rafforzare il punto di vista aritmetico, autenticamente platonico, con osservazioni di carattere empirico. Ciò implica tuttavia una specifica strategia difensiva nei confronti della musica “di Platone”: che la posizione aristossenica sia solo limitata o addirittura affrontata a viso aperto, è evidente che Teone e Plutarco sono

99 Cfr. Gaud., Intr. harm. 343, 1–10, con Zanoncelli, L.: La manualistica musicale greca, 366 n. 1. Nella Sectio canonis (prop. 3, 152, 1–153, 3), locus classicus per la dimostrazione in ambito tecnico, si indica che, poiché la differenza tra due segmenti in rapporto epimore corrisponde a un segmento che vale una unità, è impossibile rintracciare un loro medio proporzionale (cfr. la recente analisi di Barker, A.: The Science of Harmonics, 380–382; cfr. già la dimostrazione, analoga ma non coincidente, attribuita ad Archita da Boezio – Mus. III 11 = Arch. A 19 – , con Burkert, W.: Weisheit und Wissenschaft, 444–446, e Huffman, C. A.: Archytas of Tarentum, 457–470). Prove aritmetiche sono presenti anche negli Excerpta Nicomachi (267, 6 sgg.), che tuttavia offrono paralleli meno stringenti, e in Macrobio (Somn. Scip. II 1, 22) il quale afferma che il tono è indivisibile in parti uguali perché lo è il numero 9. 100 ad es. El. harm. 57, 2–5. 101 Lo ζήτημα permane nell’esegesi di Proclo (In Tim. II 178, 18 sgg.), il quale si dilunga in dimostrazioni aritmetiche e geometriche ma cita al loro termine l’oppositiore più autorevole, Aristosseno, e con lui gli Armonici.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 121

consapevoli di dover imporre in qualche misura la prospettiva del maestro su quella tecnicamente dominante. La psicogonia platonica, dunque, si configura nuovamente come unica vera auctoritas, tanto forte e vincolante da consentire un confronto diretto con la tradizione aristossenica e addirittura un’ “invasione di campo” verso la valutazione del problema in termini empirici.

3 ζητήματα XI–XII. La disposizione dei numeri della divisio animae e le loro δυνάμεις Nel percorso tracciato da Plutarco (cfr. supra, p. 97–98) si giunge ai temi secondo e terzo, dedicati rispettivamente alla disposizione dei numeri della divisio animae e alle loro δυνάμεις. Essi non derivano dalla teoria musicale né possono essere discussi in relazione a paralleli tecnici: nati dall’esegesi della sezione psicogonica, ne rappresentano i poli più propriamente filosofici. Per queste ragioni ci si limiterà qui a segnalarne i tratti essenziali e a mostrare come in alcuni casi essi siano stati incorporati all’interno di ζητήματα propriamente tecnici. Nello svolgere il secondo punto del proprio programma (ζήτημα XI)102 Plutarco offre la base sufficiente per delineare i tratti che la questione assume nella tradizione platonica. Il problema riguarda la disposizione dei numeri della tetractide platonica (tra i quali occorre immaginare i medi ed eventualmente i termini ricavati dal riempimento con tono e leimma), e le soluzioni proposte sono riconducibili a due modelli: da un lato già Crantore, e poi con lui Clearco, elaborarono una struttura a Λ sulla quale disporre le serie di pari (su un segmento) e dispari (sull’altro), con il principio collocato al vertice; dall’altro Teodoro pensò piuttosto a una disposizione lineare – in continuità – dei numeri. A completare il quadro giunge un’importante testimonianza di Proclo,103 il quale riconduce al modello di Teodoro (non nominato) le posizioni di Porfirio e Severo e a quello di Crantore l’ulteriore elaborazione di Adrasto,104 il quale propose di raffigurare i numeri con tre triangoli inscatolati l’uno nell’altro.105 Questo tema non rappresenta la traslazione di uno ζήτημα tecnico all’interno dell’esegesi: pur

102 De an. procr. 1022 c6 sgg. 103 In Tim. II 171, 4 sgg. 104 Come è stato suggerito da Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 206 n. 69, Adrasto e Severo sembrano rappresentare il culmine di due tradizioni esegetiche alternative, in realtà molto ricche e diffuse. 105 Cfr. anche supra, 108.

122 

 Federico M. Petrucci

sviluppando l’immagine della divisione del canone,106 esso se ne allontana profondamente fin dalle origini. E tuttavia, all’interno della tradizione la discussione del problema è in alcuni casi tornata a confluire all’interno di discussioni esegetiche più propriamente tecniche, come accade in due sezioni dell’Expositio. Un primo caso parrebbe più chiaro: nell’ampia sezione aritmologica sulle tetractidi che segue la sectio canonis (93, 17–106, 11, partic. 95, 16–96, 5) Teone allude alla disposizione a Λ dei numeri della tetractide platonica, disposizione che Teone potrebbe verosimilmente aver ripreso da Adrasto.107 Qui, tuttavia, è probabile che Teone non dipenda dal peripatetico (vi sono troppe divergenze tra queste pagine e i passaggi aritmologici offerti da Calcidio)108; inoltre l’operazione qui perseguita da Teone, completata poi con l’associazione di numeri e dimensioni, benché di derivazione esegetica è a questo livello della tradizione stabilmente legata all’aritmologia pitagorico-platonica, e sembra aver perso l’originario (e consapevole) legame con il testo di Platone.109 Un passo successivo sembra invece più vicino allo ζήτημα. Qui Teone, probabilmente in dipendenza da Eratostene,110 completa l’esposizione della regola di derivazione della tetractide platonica dall’unità (ζήτημα II) con una derivazione parallela svolta nell’ambito delle dimensioni geometriche (111, 10–113, 8): l’unità si associa al punto e i numeri pari e dispari, secondo due serie differenti, si associano rispettivamente a linea, superficie, solido rettilinei e curvilinei o equilaterali e non. Per argomentare la sua tesi Teone sottolinea inoltre che tra le dimensioni esiste una relazione generativa simile a quella proposta per i numeri: in particolare, le dimensioni minori rappresentano i πέρατα di quelle maggiori.111 La soluzione fornita da Plutarco al terzo problema (ζήτημα XII), legato alle δυνάμεις dei numeri della tetractide platonica, è estremamente vicina a quella offerta per il secondo112 (De an. procr. 1028 a5 sgg.): la capacità dei numeri della tetractide platonica, che rappresentano delle dimensioni e giungono alla tridimensionalità, è quella di abbracciare perfettamente il corpo del mondo conferendo ad esso ordine e razionalità. Il fatto che Plutarco correli esplicitamente problema esegetico e svolgimento garantisce la funzione della teoria proposta e induce a pensare che tale strumento facesse parte del repertorio impiegato dai

106 Cfr. supra, 107–113. 107 Così Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, 357 n. 301. 108 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, ad loc., ma così si esprimeva già Waszink, J. H.: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius, 15–16. 109 Cfr. ad es. Iambl., In Nicom. 14, 3 sgg. 110 Cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 432–434. 111 Cfr. già Eucl. El. I deff. 5 e 6. 112 Cfr. già Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, 207–208.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 123

commentatori Platonici. E tuttavia, la presenza di uno specifico ζήτημα sulle δυνάμεις dei numeri e la sua correlazione con la penetrazione nel reale fisico della tetractide platonica può rendere conto di un altro possibile svolgimento della stessa questione: è possibile ipotizzare, infatti, che lo ζήτημα fosse proposto e risolto anche attraverso uno strumento più tradizionale, quello della trattazione aritmologica. In effetti, digressioni aritmologiche dedicate ai numeri della tetractide sono un patrimonio (pitagorico) platonico e ricorrevano nelle opere di Nicomaco (passi dell’opera sono stati recuperati nei Theologoumena Arithmeticae), Anatolio e nei Theologoumena Arithmeticae. E tuttavia, esse sono utilizzate nel contesto di esegesi – dirette o indirette – a opere platoniche o di ispirazione platonica. Se infatti utilizzi significativi sono riscontrabili in opere tarde e meno connotate filosoficamente (come il De mensibus di Lido – II 22, 5–36, 14 – o Le nozze di Mercurio e Filologia di Marziano Capella – VII 730–742),113 sezioni aritmologiche integrano opere esegetiche di ispirazione medioplatonica: se ne servono Filone di Alessandria (diffusamente, ma in particolare nel De opificio mundi, capp. 47–52), Calcidio nel Commento al Timeo (capp. XXXV–XXXIX), dunque probabilmente anche Adrasto, e Teone (93, 17–106, 11). D’altro canto è estremamente probabile che già in epoca ellenistica commenti al Timeo contenessero osservazioni aritmologiche.114 Benché spesso il fondo esegetico di simili speculazioni sia solo implicito, rimane fondamentale che esse si basano tutte (pur in misure differenti) sull’attribuzione ai numeri di una funzione strutturante sul reale fisico. Inoltre, l’attenzione riservata ai vari numeri trova spesso un riscontro nell’importanza dei numeri stessi all’interno della psicogonia: ad esempio, il numero che riceve maggiore attenzione è il sette, quanti sono i numeri della tetractide platonica. Dunque, è forse ipotizzabile che il breve svolgimento plutarcheo sia solo uno dei diversi possibili per lo ζήτημα XII e che un esempio di svolgimento alternativo sia rappresentato dalla tradizionale discussione aritmologica.

113 Cfr. inoltre passi minori: Varr., apud Aul. Gell., NA III 10; Hierocl., In carm. Aur. XX 15, 6 sgg.; Clem., Strom. VI 16, 137, 2 sgg.; strumenti analoghi sono raccolti anche da Macrobio e Favonio Eulogio nei loro Commento al Sogno di Scipione – rispettivamente I 5, 3–6, 83 e I–XIX. 114 Per quanto controversa sia la collocazione tradizionale del Commento al Timeo di Posidonio – cfr. Kidd, I. G.: Posidonius, vol. I, 337–340 – rispetto alla tradizione aritmologica, con ogni probabilità esso conteneva considerazioni aritmologiche pur nella prospettiva di un’ampia lettura esegetica del testo – cfr. Kidd, I. G.: Posidonius, vol. II, 981–983. Per l’esegesi posidoniana del Timeo cfr. Merlan, P.: “Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus, II”, 197–214, e Merlan, P.: From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 109–114; Reydams-Schils, G.: Demiurge and Providence , 85–115.

124 

 Federico M. Petrucci

4 I metodi dell’esegesi musicale κατὰ ζητήματα e la riargomentazione del Timeo L’analisi condotta consente di fissare un quadro complessivo dei metodi dell’esegesi musicale applicata alla divisio animae. L’aspetto macroscopico che emerge, assunto all’inizio di questo contributo come ipotesi di lavoro (benché già ben affermato negli studi)115, è la possibilità di ricondurre gli elementi esegetici a ζητήματα mirati, legati all’intera sezione psicogonica o a suoi aspetti specifici. Le dodici questioni affrontate, in effetti, sono approfondimenti specializzati e in qualche modo autoconsistenti, problemi dai contorni tecnici definiti che vengono svolti in parallelo degli esegeti con una certa coerenza metodologica e contenutistica. Proprio in questo senso, cioè attraverso la lettura dei problemi esegetici come ζητήματα, la breve sezione della divisio animae è alla base di un numero elevato di questioni parallele ed evidentemente topiche: cioè emerge grazie ai riscontri nelle diverse opere medioplatoniche, che dimostrano di individuare nello stesso passo gli stessi aspetti problematici. A confermare tale vocazione è la corrispondenza rintracciabile tra le varie questioni esegetiche e nuclei di ricerca all’interno dei manuali tecnici: si tratta, cioè, del riuso di volta in volta mirato di elementi ben definiti già dal punto di vista musicologico, che vengono traslati o rimodulati all’interno del nuovo contesto senza perdere le proprie specificità e si disseminano nelle opere commentarie come nuclei indipendenti. In una frase, la ricerca conferma che l’esegesi tecnica medioplatonica sulla divisio animae è eminentemente κατὰ ζητήματα.116 All’interno di questo quadro è inoltre possibile rintracciare una serie di metodi di svolgimento degli ζητήματα, metodi spesso sinergici e usati di volta in volta dai diversi esegeti a seconda di esigenze e interessi specifici. La base metodologica consiste in un meccanismo di traslazione, ovvero la trasposizione di nuclei tecnici, riscontrabili principalmente all’interno di manuali musicologici, nel contesto dell’esegesi di un problema specifico posto dalla divisio animae. L’applicazione di questo metodo implica il riconoscimento delle singole questioni come problemi di ambito tecnico, la loro “delimitazione” come questioni specifiche, il ricorso a presidi già definiti per la loro soluzione. Come si vedrà immediatamente la traslazione viene applicata a vari livelli di complessità e secondo differenti modulazioni; e tuttavia il fatto stesso che essa venga applicata sistematicamente evidenzia un primo fine specifico dell’esegesi tecnica, quello di

115 Cfr. supra, 92. 116 Questa priorità è del resto confermata dall’esegesi medioplatonica delle sezioni astronomiche del Timeo: cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: “L’esegeta e il cielo del Timeo”.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 125

superare l’obscuritas117 del testo del maestro: un nucleo ricavato (con le dovute modulazioni) dai manuali può essere impiegato come presidio esegetico in primo luogo per rispondere all’esigenza di un chiarimento tecnico. A seconda dei contesti, tuttavia, tale chiarimento richiede modifiche mirate per rendere funzionali ed efficaci gli elementi traslati nel nuovo contesto: – Selezione. Evidentemente i nuclei tecnici per come proposti dalla tradizione manualistica o in generale nelle opere musicologiche non sono immediatamente adeguati a chiarire il testo del Timeo: una loro traslazione “meccanica” produrrebbe annotazioni prive di orientamento specifico, poco mirate e non efficaci perché “sbilanciate” a favore della tradizione tecnica. Per questo un primo artificio applicato dagli esegeti consiste in un’accorta selezione del materiale, che viene spesso riadattato eliminando indicazioni superflue o addirittura fuorvianti. Un caso evidente è quello dello ζήτημα I, in cui vengono traslate solo alcune definizioni tra quelle proposte nello schema isagogicum dei manuali musicologici: da un lato sono mantenuti funzione introduttiva e, in termini generali, contenuti dello schema (ovvero le definizioni per come offerte nella tradizione), dall’altro sono eliminati i riferimenti, centrali nella manualistica, alla prassi esecutiva. Il materiale, dunque, viene selezionato al momento della traslazione in modo tale da produrre un’introduzione tecnica ad hoc. Un fenomeno analogo si osserva negli ζητήματα II, III, IV: nel II la regola di produzione delle proporzioni viene riproposta riservando specifica attenzione ai valori impiegati nella psicogonia; nel III e nel IV, prima ancora di ulteriori rielaborazioni (evidenziate nel punto successivo), le medietà considerate sono meno di quelle conosciute nei trattati tecnici poiché non tutte sono pertinenti all’esegesi del passo platonico. – Estensione. Ciò non implica, tuttavia, che gli esegeti producano sempre una selezione “stretta” del materiale tecnico, ovvero che eliminino ogni riferimento a nozioni non immediatamente implicate (ai loro occhi) dal testo platonico; al contrario, una possibile scelta strategica è quella di selezionare le nozioni in modo tale da annettere un nucleo tecnico esteso, cioè contenente uno spettro di informazioni intermedio tra quello dei testi musicologici e/o aritmetici e quello che sembrerebbe strettamente necessario per commentare un problema. Questo atteggiamento emerge nell’articolazione degli ζητήματα III e IV di Teone, il quale non si limita – come fa, invece, Plutarco – a introdurre la trattazione delle medietà impiegate da Platone nella divisio

117 Per questa nozione, affrontata diffusamente – benché in termini diversi – dai Medioplatonici, cfr. Ferrari, F.: “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale”, 533 sgg., e Ferrari, F.: “Esegesi, commento e sistema”, 62–64, e ora Petrucci, F. M.; Taurus of Beirut, cap. 2.

126 

–

 Federico M. Petrucci

animae, ma discute brevemente anche medietà geometrica, quarta, quinta e sesta. Come visto, ciò implica comunque una selezione e non segnala un distacco dalla tradizione esegetica: si tratta semplicemente di una tipologia peculiare di traslazione, mirata a produrre un quadro sistematico del nucleo tecnico pur all’interno del suo riadattamento esegetico. In questi casi emerge in modo particolarmente chiaro un fine importante dell’operazione di commento, quello di attribuire a Platone una conoscenza compiuta della materia benché nel Timeo se ne possa riscontrare solo un impiego limitato. Comincia così ad affacciarsi un tratto fondamentale della prospettiva dell’esegeta, ovvero l’esigenza di identificare Platone non solo e non tanto come “oggetto di attenzione” ma anche come modello, autorità tecnica. Deformazione e/o integrazione. E tuttavia, anche dopo la selezione non sempre le nozioni proposte dalla manualistica sono compatibili o vantaggiose nel nuovo contesto. Una prima causa di disomogeneità può dipendere dal peculiare impiego platonico delle nozioni tecniche, impiego che rende faticosa la loro applicazione ai brani da commentare. Un caso evidente è offerto ancora dallo ζήτημα IV dedicato all’individuazione dei medi: sia Plutarco che Teone, infatti, introducono all’interno del materiale tecnico un orientamento particolare, l’attenzione per coppie di estremi doppi o tripli, come quelli impiegati da Platone nella divisio animae. La coerenza della trattazione tecnica, che vorrebbe una priorità per le dimostrazioni generali, viene qui soppiantata dall’attenzione per un aspetto particolare del testo di Platone, ovvero l’uso di termini specifici. Il nucleo aritmetico viene dunque deformato in funzione del brano del maestro. Esigenze analoghe si pongono nei casi particolari in cui i trattati tecnici non contengano trattazioni specifiche da traslare all’interno dell’esegesi, ma solo elementi teorici non organizzati in temi autonomi. Laddove occorra questa condizione gli esegeti devono necessariamente strutturare uno ζήτημα ex novo e integrarvi le nozioni tecniche necessarie per chiarire il testo platonico. Ciò accade, ad esempio, negli ζητήματα V e IX, in cui gli elementi aritmetici e musicali relativi rispettivamente alle nozioni di rapporto e intervallo e alla collocazione di grave e acuto sono integrati in una struttura argomentativa ad hoc. Ora, entrambi i meccanismi indicati, la deformazione e l’integrazione, prefigurano l’idea per cui è il testo di Platone a dettare non solo la struttura degli argomenti, ma anche e soprattutto i criteri della loro composizione e i loro contenuti.    Un caso particolare, riconducibile solo in parte a questo metodo, è rappresentato dallo ζήτημα VI, che sembra trovare proprio in Platone la sua origine e vivere di una dialettica costante tra le elaborazioni musicologiche – le divisioni scalari dei manuali – e i tentativi esegetici. Anche in questo caso, tuttavia, si osserva come il polo esegetico dello ζήτημα abbia la sua

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

–

–

 127

motivazione e il suo criterio centrali nell’identificazione del maestro come auctoritas in base alla quale confrontarsi con elaborazioni parallele. Rielaborazione con funzione difensiva. Vi è però una circostanza ulteriore, non certa rara, in cui l’esegeta deve far fronte a difficoltà specifiche dettate da una sostanziale incompatibilità tra le nozioni più diffuse e il testo di Platone. In effetti, la scienza armonica ellenistica e post-ellenistica è dominata, almeno nella manualistica, dall’impostazione aristossenica – empiristica e anti-aritmetica –, attraverso la quale non si riescono a fondare le scelte di Platone (ad esempio, la preferenza per il genere diatonico, discusso nello ζήτημα VIII) o che addirittura porterebbe a negare la correttezza tecnica della divisio animae (come accade in relazione all’estensione massima del sistema, affrontata nello ζήτημα VII, o all’indivisibilità in parti uguali del tono, dimostrata nello ζήτημα X). In questi casi lo svolgimento dello ζήτημα non può che farsi più articolato e prestarsi all’applicazione di diverse strategie. Un’opzione consiste nel ricorso alla tradizione musicologica pitagorico-platonica, attraverso la quale si può fare leva su dimostrazioni aritmetiche per “difendere” Platone (così Plutarco nello ζήτημα X); in alternativa ci si può spingere fino a sostenere in modo radicale la posizione del maestro producendo argomenti difensivi ad hoc (come fa Teone nello ζήτημα X) o addirittura stabilendo (in modo finanche circolare) la correttezza della posizione a cui si allude nel Timeo sulla base del presupposto per cui Platone guarderebbe alla natura delle cose, all’essenza dell’armonia, e non alla dimensione esecutiva (come accade negli ζητήματα VII e VIII). In queste circostanze ad essere traslati sono il quadro tematico delle discussioni tecniche e alcuni dei loro contenuti, tra i quali vengono selezionati elementi utili e altri – spesso di ispirazione aristossenica – da combattere. Questi casi offrono uno spaccato fondamentale per quanto riguarda la prospettiva dell’esegeta medioplatonico: laddove si percepisca una contraddizione tra le teorie più canoniche e il testo del maestro, a quest’ultimo si accorda una priorità assoluta e lo si considera normativo, unica vera auctoritas. Rimanendo saldo questo punto, è poi possibile per gli esegeti adottare una “linea morbida”, concedendo una qualche liceità anche alle teoriche empiristiche (come fa Plutarco nello ζήτημα X), oppure una “linea dura”, tentando addirittura di demolire completamente le posizioni avversarie e di indicare il testo platonico come l’unica vera espressione della teoria musicale: l’autorevolezza della tradizione aristossenica e la coerenza argomentativa possono essere sacrificate in nome dell’unico dato che sta a cuore all’esegeta, affermare l’autorità del maestro. Produzione. A questo quadro, già decisamente complesso, si aggiungono casi particolari in cui ζητήματα vengono di fatto prodotti già all’interno della tradizione esegetica, come nel caso di XI e XII: più che derivare, in parte o

128 

 Federico M. Petrucci

del tutto, dalle opere musicologiche, essi evidenziano una vicinanza osmotica con gli scritti tecnici o addirittura si inseriscono all’interno di contesti di esegesi tecnica pur essendo legati ad essa solo dall’oggetto di commento, la divisio animae. I dati di maggior rilievo che emergono da questa sinossi sono di due ordini: da un lato, l’esegesi tecnica presenta elementi di specificità non trascurabili, in particolare per quanto riguarda la gestione specifica dei meccanismi di traslazione; dall’altro lato, anche questo ambito dell’esegesi si lascia ricondurre alle stesse basi che motivano e danno forma al commento medioplatonico.118 Le specificità vanno ricondotte alla necessità di un’interazione dialettica con la teoria musicale, un’interazione che può presentare vari gradi di problematicità e costringere a diverse forme di traslazione, selezione, deformazione, integrazione. Rimane evidente, tuttavia, che i Platonici non tendano a evitare lo “scontro” tra il maestro e le nuove e più diffuse teorie musicali: più che allontanare Platone dall’ambito tecnico per rimarcare gli aspetti filosofici della divisio animae, essi dimostrano di vedere nelle pagine del Timeo un’autorità tecnica, musicale, ben più forte di qualsiasi istanza aristossenica o manualistica. Anche questo aspetto, tuttavia, rimanda a caratteri comuni dell’esegesi medioplatonica, caratteri che si mostrano in modo evidente anche nelle sezioni qui analizzate. In effetti, il presupposto ricorrente degli ζητήματα considerati è quello della normatività della lettera di Platone: il maestro è l’unica vera auctoritas. Ma sono presenti anche altri aspetti comuni: – In primo luogo, come già accennato all’inizio di questa sezione, il basilare meccanismo di traslazione non può che essere finalizzato alla dissoluzione dell’obscuritas del testo del maestro. Il fatto che nella divisio animae Platone abbia alluso ad aspetti musicali e che questi possano essere spiegati attraverso la traslazione di nuclei tecnici implica che i riferimenti oscuri del maestro dovevano essere considerati dagli esegeti come allusioni consapevoli a un quadro teorico complesso, un corpo di conoscenze nascosto ma sempre presente. In questo senso conduce inoltre una delle declinazioni del metodo della traslazione, quello dell’estensione: si può spiegare un riferimento puntuale proponendo uno spettro ampio di nozioni solo perché si attribuisce a Platone la conoscenza dell’intero corpo di competenze.119 118 In effetti, la natura tematica è un aspetto chiave nella determinazione della struttura del commentario medioplatonico: cfr. Petrucci, F. M.: Taurus of Beirut, cap. 4. 119 Ciò non implica che in un autore come Teone, il quale tende a estendere i contenuti degli ζητήματα, sia possibile rintracciare anche una “teoria” della volontarietà dell’obscuritas (sulla cui diffusione cfr. Ferrari, F.: “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale”, 533 sgg.).

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

–

–

 129

In secondo luogo, alcuni degli ζητήματα considerati evidenziano un interesse per la coerentizzazione tecnica del testo del maestro. Con questo fine, ad esempio, i Platonici si impegnarono nel trovare coefficienti per l’unità tali da rendere aritmeticamente plausibile un sistema esteso quanto quello a cui fa riferimento Platone (cfr. gli ζητήματα VI e VII), oppure vollero giustificare il lessico talvolta tecnicamente improprio della divisio animae attraverso spiegazioni articolate (cfr. lo ζήτημα V). Ma scopi analoghi sono propri di ogni tipo di contestualizzazione di allusioni tecniche all’interno di un sistema di conoscenze, grazie al quale ogni ambiguità trova una collocazione “scientifica” consapevole. Simili finalità si lasciano ricondurre a una preoccupazione tipica dell’esegesi medioplatonica, che qui si presenta in una veste peculiare: la difesa dall’accusa di inconstantia. Generalmente tale accusa era legata a contraddizioni tra diversi passi del corpus,120 mentre in questo caso i Platonici sono impegnati nella dimostrazione della coerenza interna della divisio animae da un punto di vista tecnico oppure della compatibilità tra le nozioni proposte da Platone e un sistema scientifico completo, quel sistema che – per il principio di autorità – Platone doveva già padroneggiare. Infine, va segnalata l’interazione degli strumenti dell’esegesi tecnica con altri che la critica ha ormai da tempo riconosciuto nell’esegesi “filosofica” del Timeo. Non si tratta solo della centralità della natura tematica del commentario medioplatonico: all’interno di alcune delle questioni considerate, infatti, emergono impieghi di strategie più mirate, come l’esegesi κατὰ λέξιν, che è alla base dello ζήτημα V.

L’esegesi tecnica, benché ricca di peculiarità e di strategie proprie, è dunque perfettamente organica rispetto alla prospettiva filosofica e metodologica medioplatonica: ricorre a meccanismi propri ma li integra all’interno di quelli più diffusi, si impegna nella dissoluzione dell’obscuritas del testo e nella difesa di Platone dall’accusa di inconstantia, ma soprattutto è fondata sul presupposto dell’assoluta normatività della parola del maestro. L’applicazione di quest’ultimo aspetto all’ambito tecnico pone però due problemi, quello della circolarità degli argomenti usati per affermare l’autorità platonica (in particolare sulla tradizione aristossenica) e quello, più generalmente storiografico, del fine perseguito dagli esegeti con la loro attività di commento. Il problema della circolarità si manifesta in termini differenti in tutti gli ζητήματα: in quelli che necessitano di una traslazione (a vari livelli di complessità) la circolarità consiste nel considerare il testo di Platone al contempo come

120 Sul problema cfr. Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”, 154–155.

130 

 Federico M. Petrucci

oggetto di esegesi e testo normativo, in base al quale selezionare il materiale tecnico; in quelli di natura difensiva, invece, a sembrare circolare è l’argomento che attesta la superiorità di Platone, perché vuole dimostrare la normatività tecnica del testo del maestro a partire dal presupposto per cui la teoria del Timeo è migliore in quanto coglie la teoria armonica nella sua dimensione più pura ed essenziale, quella del cosmo. Probabilmente è impossibile superare del tutto un simile tratto di debolezza dell’argomentazione, cioè scorgere una struttura logica valida al di sotto dell’incongruenza: gli ζητήματα analizzati attribuiscono costantemente al testo di Platone un doppio ruolo, considerandolo come oggetto di esegesi musicale e insieme come unica vera autorità tecnica. E tuttavia, l’approccio dei Medioplatonici sembra ben più coerente se si modifica la nostra strategia di lettura del fenomeno e si segue la logica di questo elemento problematico per coglierne il significato e l’assunzione di base: il punto è che l’autorità platonica rappresenta per gli esegeti un presidio talmente forte da garantire la riuscita dell’argomentazione. In questo senso, tuttavia, il cuore dell’approccio al testo del maestro non consiste semplicemente in una profonda – e sincera121 – allégeance, ma anche nella certezza da parte dei Platonici di riuscire a rintracciare una coerenza tecnica complessiva nelle affermazioni di Platone in ambito musicale, elemento che di per sé può poi assicurare che Platone già presupponesse tutti i nuclei tecnici che gli sono attribuiti. Ciò conduce al secondo aspetto problematico: a partire da simili presupposti in che termini può essere descritta “dal punto di vista dell’esegeta” l’operazione di commento? Le descrizioni ad oggi più autorevoli, quelle di iper-argomentazione e completamento del Timeo,122 sono efficaci come descrizioni “esterne” 121 Cioè, non basata sulla sottaciuta consapevolezza di una qualche carenza tecnica del testo del maestro. La possibilità di una “malafede” o non sincerità degli esegeti potrebbe in effetti essere adombrata dall’inverosimiglianza di alcuni elementi dell’operazione esegetica: è davvero possibile che Aristosseno fosse attaccato senza la consapevolezza della sua fondamentale e realmente normativa riforma della scienza armonica? è davvero possibile che la strenua difesa di Platone, che passava anche per la deformazione o la forzatura di alcune nozioni, non sottenda la consapevolezza della debolezza tecnica del Timeo? Probabilmente la risposta a queste domande è affermativa. In caso contrario, considerando che il fondo reale degli argomenti impiegati è il principio di autorità, sarebbe la stessa percezione della propria opera da parte dei Medioplatonici a dover subire un forte ridimensionamento fino a divenire una sorta di esercizio vuoto. Inoltre nell’ambito dell’esegesi musicale il ruolo di Aristosseno come figura di riferimento è, benché effettiva, comunque possibile da contestare (come farà, in fondo, Tolemeo): in termini generali i margini per la riuscita dell’operazione esegetica, al di là del suo effettivo svolgimento, sono relativamente ampi, specialmente se essa viene pensata come impresa di commento interna alla tradizione platonica. 122 Il completamento (cfr. Ferrari, F.: “I commentari specialistici”, partic. 222–224) prevede che la prospettiva teorica del dialogo venga integrata e completata fornendo le coordinate tecniche

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 131

dell’operazione esegetica, cioè come chiarimento di ciò che il commento realizza. Se invece si vuole cogliere cosa l’operazione di commento significasse per gli stessi esegeti esse sembrano meno calzanti. In effetti, se la lettera di Platone era l’auctoritas assoluta, l’esegeta non poteva vedere nel proprio commento né un completamento (che implicherebbe una qualche mancanza) né un’aggiunta o una deduzione estrinseca (che implicherebbe un’estensione contenutistica). Sembra piuttosto che la forza dell’autorità del maestro sia meglio mantenuta considerando le note esegetiche come riproposizioni chiarificatrici di quanto già affermato da Platone: in altri termini, le note tecniche si limitano a sciogliere lo sfondo teorico che da un lato il maestro già conosceva e applicava secondo l’opportunità del contesto, e che dall’altro un lettore disattento, o impreparato, poteva non comprendere – ed evidentemente, in tal caso, la responsabilità del fraintendimento ricade sul lettore e mai su Platone. Del resto, le deformazioni e le integrazioni, come anche gli ζητήματα difensivi, confermano che la funzione ultima di una simile modalità esegetica doveva essere quella di trasformare i cenni di Platone in elementi di un sistema tecnico coerente e completo attraverso il chiarimento mirato delle sue basi musicali. Si tratta cioè di argomentare nuovamente la lettera del maestro in modo tale che la sua autorità sia riconoscibile a tutti. In questi termini, l’esegesi tecnica κατὰ ζητήματα della divisio animae, perfettamente coerente con i tratti più generali dell’attività commentaria medioplatonica, si propone come istanza rilevante della ri-argomentazione123 del Timeo.

References Acerbi, Fabio: Il silenzio delle sirene. La matematica greca antica, Roma 2010. Baltes, Matthias: Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele, Leiden 1972. Baltes, Matthias: “Numenios von Apamea und der platonische Timaios”, Vigiliae Christianae 29 (1975), 241–70. Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, vol. III, part 1: Proclus on the World’s body, Cambridge 2006.

ampie di ciascuna nozione evocata da Platone. La nozione di iper-argomentazione, invece, è stata indicata come fine dell’esegesi filosofica di Plutarco da Donini, P.: “Plutarco e i metodi dell’esegesi filosofica”, 84 sgg. (ma cfr. anche Ferrari, F.: “La letteratura filosofica”, 172–173; la nozione era stata evocata in passato da Hadot, P.: Théologie, exégèse, révélation, 14–23, in relazione a testi più tardi) e prevede che il testo del maestro sia letto in funzione non solo della sua lettera ma anche delle sue conseguenze e implicazioni filosofiche. 123 Per questa nozione cfr. anche Petrucci, F. M.: Teone di Smirne, 43–62; Petrucci, F. M.: “L’esegeta e il cielo del Timeo”; e Petrucci, F. M.: “Theon of Smyrna”.

132 

 Federico M. Petrucci

Barbera, André: “Arithmetic and geometric divisions of the canon”, Journal of music theory 21 (1977), 292–323. Barbera, André: “The consonant Eleventh and the expansion of musical tetraktys: a study of ancient Pythagoreanism”, Journal of music theory 28 (1984), 191–223. Barker, Andrew: Greek Musical Writings, II: Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, Cambridge 1989. Barker, Andrew: “Three Approaches to Canonic Division”, Apeiron 24 (1991), 49–83. Barker, Andrew: Scientific method in Ptolemy’s Harmonics, Cambridge 2000. Barker, Andrew: “Early Timaeus Commentaries and Hellenistic Musicology”, in: Robert W. Sharples / Anne Sheppard (eds.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, London 2003, 73–87. Barker, Andrew: The Science of Harmonics in classical Greece, Cambridge 2007. Barker, Andrew: “Shifting conceptions of ‘Schools’ of harmonic theory, 400 b.C.–200 a.D.”, in: Chiara Martinelli (ed.), La musa dimenticata: aspetti dell’esperienza musicale greca in età ellenistica, Pisa 2010, 164–190. Barker, Andrew: Porphyry’s Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, Cambridge 2015. Bélis, Annie: Aristoxène de Tarente et Aristote. Le traité d’Harmonique, Paris 1986. Bélis, Annie: “Harmonique”, in: Jacques Brunschwig / Geoffrey Lloyd (eds.), Le savoir grec, Paris 1996, 352–367. Bertier, Janine: Nicomaque de Gérase, Introduction arithmétique, Paris 1978. Bower, Calvin M.: “Boethius and Nicomachus: an essay concerning the sources of De institutione musica”, Vivarium 16 (1978), 1–45. Boys-Stones, George: Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation, Cambridge 2018. Brisson, Luc: Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon, Paris 1974. Burkert, Walter: Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon, Nürnberg1962, trad. ingl. Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Cambridge 1972. Comotti, Giovanni: “Pitagora, Ippaso, Laso e il metodo sperimentale”, in: Robert W. Wallace / Bonnie MacLachlan (eds.), Harmonia mundi: musica e filosofia nell’antichità. Music and Philosophy in the Ancient World, Roma 1991, 20–29. Cornford, Francis M.: Plato’s Cosmology: the Timaeus of Plato, London 1937. Creese, David.: The Monochord in Ancient Greek Harmonic Science, Cambridge 2010. Da Rios, Rosetta: Aristoxeni Elementa harmonica Rosetta da Rios recensuit, Roma 1954. Dillon, John: The Middle Platonists: a study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, London 1977. Dillon, John: “Tampering with the Timaeus: Ideological Emendations in Plato, with Special Reference to Timaeus”, American Journal of Philology 110 (1989), 50–72. Donini, Pierluigi: Le scuole, l’anima, l’impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino, Torino 1982. Donini, Pierluigi: “Plutarco e i metodi dell’esegesi filosofica”, in: Italo Gallo e Renato Laurenti (eds.), I Moralia di Plutarco tra filologia e filosofia, Napoli 1992, 79–96. Donini, Pierluigi: “Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 36 (1994), 5027–5100. Donini, Pierluigi: “Il trattato filosofico in Plutarco”, in: Italo Gallo / Claudio Moreschini (eds.), I generi letterari in Plutarco, Napoli 2000, 133–145. D’Ooge, Martin L.: Nicomachus of Gerasa. Introduction to Arithmetic, Ann Arbor 1938. Dörrie, Heinrich: “Formula analogiae: An Exploration of a Theme in Hellenistic and Imperial Platonism”, in: Henry Jacob Blumenthal (ed.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought, London 1981, 35–39.

Ascoltare l’anima cosmica 

 133

Erler, Michael: “Philologia Medicans. La lettura delle opere di Epicuro nella sua scuola”, in: Gabriele Giannantoni / Marcello Gigante (eds.), Epicureismo greco e romano, Atti del congresso internazionale di Napoli 19–26 maggio 1993, Napoli 1996, 513–526. Ferrari, Franco: Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea, Napoli 1995. Ferrari, Franco: “Galeno interprete del Timeo”, Museum Helveticum 55 (1998), 14–34. Ferrari, Franco: “I commentari specialistici alle sezioni matematiche del Timeo”, in: Aldo Brancacci (ed.), La filosofia in età imperiale, Napoli 2000, 169–224. Ferrari, Franco: “La letteratura filosofica di carattere esegetico in Plutarco”, in: Italo Gallo e Claudio Moreschini, I generi letterari in Plutarco, Napoli 2000, 147–175. Ferrari, Franco: “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del Timeo”, Athenaeum 89 (2001), 525–574. Ferrari, Franco: “Esegesi, commento e sistema nel medioplatonismo”, in: Ada NeschkeHentschke (ed.), Argumenta in Dialogos Platonis, Basel 2010, 51–76. Ferrari, Franco / Baldi, Laura: Plutarco. La generazione dell’anima nel Timeo, Napoli 2002. Festugière, André-Jean: Proclus. Commentaire sur le Timée, 5 Bände, Paris 1966–1968. Gibson, Sophie: Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the birth of musicology, New York 2005. Goulet, Richard: “Ailianos”, in: Richard Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, I, Paris 1994, 78. Hadot, Pierre: “Théologie, exégèse, révélation”, in: Michel Tardieu (ed.), Les régles de l’interprétation, Paris 1987, 13–34. Hagel, Stefan: Ancient Greek music: a new technical history, Cambridge 2010. Hirsch-Luipold, Rainer (ed.): Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch, Berlin – New York 2005. Huffman, Carl A.: Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge 1993. Huffman, Carl A.: Archytas of Tarentum, Cambridge 2005. Kidd, Ian Gray: Posidonius, The Fragments: The Commentary: I Testimonia and Fragments 1–149, Cambridge 1988. Kidd, Ian Gray: Posidonius, The Fragments: The Commentary: II Fragments 150–293, Cambridge 1988. Landels, John G.: Music in Ancient Greece and Rome, London – New York 1999. Mansfeld, Jaap: Prolegomena: questions to be settled before the study of an author, or a text, Leiden – New York – Köln 1994. Mansfeld, Jaap: Prolegomena mathematica: from Apollonius of Perga to late Neoplatonism with an appendix on Pappus and the history of Neoplatonism, Leiden 1998. Meriani, Angelo: “Un ‘esperimento’ di Pitagora (Nicom. Harm. ench. 6, pp. 245–248 Jan)”, in: Bruno Gentili / Franca Perusino (eds.), Mousike, Metrica ritmica e musica greca: in memoria di Giovanni Comotti, Pisa – Roma 1995, 77–92. Meriani, Angelo: “Teoria musicale e antiempirismo nella Repubblica di Platone (Plat. Resp. VII 530 c–531 d)”, in: Mario Vegetti (ed.), Platone, Repubblica, vol. V, Napoli 2003, 565–602. Merlan, Philip: “Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus, II”, Philologus 89 (1934), 197–214. Merlan, Philip: From Platonism to Neoplatonism, Den Haag 1953. Opsomer, Jan: “Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism”, in: Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch, Berlin – New York 2005, 51–99. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Se per Platone 9/8 non è un rapporto epimore. Su una curiosa esegesi tecnica del Timeo (Theon Smyrn., Exp. 74, 15–75, 25)”, Elenchos 31 (2010), 319–330.

134 

 Federico M. Petrucci

Petrucci, Federico Maria: Teone di Smirne, Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium: Introduzione, traduzione, commento, Sankt Augustin 2012. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Il Commento al Timeo di Adrasto di Afrodisia”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 23 (2012), 1–33. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “L’esegeta e il cielo del Timeo: riargomentazione ed esegesi astronomica κατὰ ζητήματα nel Medioplatonismo”, Athenaeum 104 (2016), 159–186. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Wave-Like Commentaries: The Structure and Philosophical Orientation of Middle Platonist Commentaries”, JHS 138 (2018), 209–226. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Wie man eine Platonstelle deutet: Exegetische Strukturen im Mittelplatonismus”, Philologus 162 (2017), 55–91. Petrucci, Federico Maria: Taurus of Beirut. The Other Side of Middle Platonism, London 2018. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Theon of Smyrna: Re-Thinking Platonic Mathematics in MiddlePlatonism”, in: H. Tarrant et al. (eds.), The Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Plato, Boston – Leiden 2018, 143–155. Petrucci, Federico Maria: “Making Sense of the Soul’s Numbers. Middle Platonist Readings of Plato’s Divisio Animae”, Apeiron 2018 (available in AoP: https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron2017-0080). Pieri, Silvia: Tetraktys: numero e filosofia tra il I e il II secolo d.C., Firenze 2005. Raffa, Massimo: “The Debate on logos and diastêma in Porphyry’s Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics”, Greek and Roman Musical Studies 1 (2013), 243–252. Reydams-Schils, Gretchen: Demiurge and Providence, Turnhout 1999. Rocconi, Eleonora: “Il suono musicale tra età ellenistica ed età imperiale”, in: Chiara Martinelli (ed.), La musa dimenticata: aspetti dell’esperienza musicale greca in età ellenistica, Pisa 2010, 191–204. Sedley, David: “Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition”, in: Jonathan Barnes / Miriam Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford 1997, 110–129. Tarrant, Harold / Jackson, Robin / Lycos, Kimon: Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias, Leiden 1998. Taylor, Alfred Edward: A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Oxford 1928. Waszink, Jan Hendrik: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius: die erste Hälfte des Kommentars, Leiden 1964. West, Martin Litchfield: Ancient Greek music, Oxford 1992. Whittaker, John: “The Value of Indirect Tradition in the Establishment of Greek Philosophical Texts or the Art of Misquotation”, in: John N. Grant (ed.), Editing Greek and Latin Texts. Papers given at the Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto 6–7 November 1987, New York 1989, 63–95. Wolfer, Ernst Paul: Eratosthenes von Kyrene als Mathematiker und Philosoph, Gröningen 1954. Zanoncelli, Luisa: La manualistica musicale greca: [Euclide], Cleonide, Nicomaco, Excerpta Nicomachi, Bacchio il vecchio, Gaudenzio, Alipio, Excerpta Neapolitana, Milano 1990.

Johan C. Thom

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach The short treatise Περὶ κόσμου (De mundo) ascribed to Aristotle does not engage directly with the notion of a World Soul, but attempts to provide a Peripatetic solution to the problem of divine involvement in the sublunary world (usually called providence).1 The question it tries to address is how it is possible for god to be responsible for the order and preservation of the world without giving up his self-sufficiency and independence, i.e. the problem normally described as transcendence versus immanence.2 Its own solution to the problem is to devolve such immanent involvement to god’s δύναμις. In doing so the author of the De mundo appears to respond to Stoic notions of causation and immanence, while he also takes the first steps towards a splitting-up of the demiurgic principle that we later find in Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean texts.

1 It is a matter of debate ‘whether the mere presence of order deriving from a divine principle is sufficient to justify application of the term “providence” at all’; see Sharples, R. W.: ‘Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle’, 25, 30, who also refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias’s insistence that it is not possible to talk of providence where an effect is entirely accidental. 2 In the De mundo god is not strictly speaking located ‘outside’ the world, but rather in the highest point of the heavens (397b24–27, 398b7). According to Besnier, B.: ‘De mundo: Tradition grecque’, 479–480, the opposition in the De mundo is not between transcendence and immanence, but between god’s autarchy and his demiurgic activity. For Opsomer, J.: ‘Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism’, 61n47, too, ‘the issue seems to be not so much that of transcendence, but rather one of activity and causation.’ Sharples, R. W.: ‘Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle’, 15 with n69, maintains that the description in the De mundo does not necessarily imply a distinction between god and the heavens, but he also suggests that ‘whether we are then to think of a soul within the heavens moving them, or a transcendent deity causing the movement of an otherwise inanimate heaven, is perhaps relatively unimportant.’ In what follows I will continue to use the convenient term transcendence, but this should not be taken to imply an absolute separation between god and the world. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-006

136 

 Johan C. Thom

1 Questions of introduction 1.1 Author and date The authenticity of the De mundo remains a contentious issue.3 The text is transmitted on its own in the oldest manuscripts of Aristotle and probably did not form part of Andronicus of Rhodes’ edition of Aristotelian texts that was published around the middle of the 1st century BCE.4 The treatise is addressed to Alexander (the Great),5 but this may well be a literary fiction. The first testimonium to the De mundo is by Apuleius of Madaura (b. c. 125 CE), who reworked the De mundo into a Latin text. Apuleius describes his paraphrastic translation as his own composition based on the work of Aristotle and Theophrastus6 – which would be unlikely if the Greek text was known to be Aristotle’s.7 Most of the other ancient testimonia do ascribe the De mundo to Aristotle, however. The most important of these is Stobaeus (5th cent. CE), who excerpted nearly two-thirds of the work.8 Proclus

3 For a brief discussion of the authorship and date, see Thom, J. C.: Cosmic Order and Divine Power, 3–8. 4 See Flashar, H: ‘Aristoteles’, 271; Besnier, B.: ‘De mundo: Tradition grecque’, 475. For the text tradition of the De mundo see Lorimer, W. L.: The Text Tradition of Pseudo-Aristotle ‘De Mundo’. The best critical text of the De mundo is to be found in Lorimer, W. L.: Aristotelis qui fertur libellus de mundo. A text and translation with notes may also be found in Thom, J. C.: Cosmic Order and Divine Power, 20–66. For the date of Andronicus’s edition of Aristotle’s school treatises, see Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1095–1096. 5 See Mund. 391a2: ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε; 391b6: [...] σοί, ὄντι ἡγεμόνων ἀριστῷ. After a careful investigation of the various titles in which the phrase περὶ (τοῦ) κόσμου occurs, Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’,  397, suggests that the original title was probably Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ κόσμου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. Bernays, J.: ‘Über die fälschlich dem Aristoteles beigelegte Schrift περὶ κόσμου’, 278–281, suggested that the Alexander to who the work is addressed was Philo’s nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, but this seems unlikely. Although Pohlenz, M.: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, 382–383, does not think this hypothesis can be proved, he thinks the work originated in the time of Philo. 6 Apul., Mund. pref. lines 45–51: Quare nos Aristotelen prudentissimum et doctissimum philosophorum et Theophrastum auctorem secuti, quantum possumus cogitatione contingere, dicemus de omni hac caelesti ratione, naturasque officia conplexi et cur et quemadmodum moueantur explicabimus. 7 Thus Dihle, A.: ‘Die Geographie der Schrift vom Kosmos’, 12. 8 References to the testimonia are conveniently collected in Lorimer, W. L.: The Text Tradition of Pseudo-Aristotle ‘De Mundo’, 15, 19.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 137

(5th cent. CE) is the only author to express some doubt about the Aristotelian authorship of the treatise.9 The issue was heavily debated during the Renaissance and early modern period, with more or less equal supporters on both sides.10 The consensus in current scholarship is that the treatise was not written by Aristotle, despite recent attempts by the German scholar Paul Gohlke, the Italian scholar Giovanni Reale and the Dutch scholar Abraham Bos to argue for authenticity.11 Arguments against authenticity include the following:12 a. The philosophical position in the De mundo differs from that in other authentic Aristotelian writings. This includes inter alia the doctrine about god’s involvement in the cosmos which conflicts with Aristotle’s view elsewhere of god as the unmoved mover. Scholars have furthermore identified similarities to Platonic, Stoic and Neopythagorean doctrines which may point to post-Aristotelian influences. Parts of the De mundo appear to have been influenced by, or to react against Stoic positions.13 b. Instead of the type of argumentation found in other writings by Aristotle, we find in the De mundo an exposition without substantiation. c. Some of the metereological and geographical details in the De mundo are based on post-Aristotelian developments.14

9 See in Tim. 3, p. 272.20–21 Diehl: οὔτε [εἱμαρμένη] ὁ νοῦς τοῦ παντός, ὥς πού φησι πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴπερ ἐκείνου τὸ Περὶ κόσμου βιβλίον. Proclus’s reference to the nous as destiny is not found anywhere in the De mundo, however; see Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 403n4. The 13th-cent. Jewish scholar Moses Maimonides is more explicit: the treatise belongs to those falsely attributed to Aristotle; see Stern, S. M.: ‘A Third Arabic Translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise De Mundo’, 393; Kraye, J.: ‘Aristotle’s God and the Authenticity of De Mundo’, 341. 10 For an excellent overview of this debate, see Kraye, J.: ‘Aristotle’s God and the Authenticity of De Mundo’; Kraye, J.: ‘Disputes over the Authorship of De mundo between Humanism and Altertumswissenschaft.’ 11 See Gohlke, P.: Aristoteles an König Alexander Über die Welt; Reale, G.: Aristotele: Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro; Bos, A. P.: Aristoteles: Over de kosmos; Bos, A. P.: ‘Considerazioni sul De mundo e analisi critica delle tesi di Paul Moraux’; Reale, G. / Bos, A. P.: Il trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro attribuito ad Aristotele. 12 Cf. Bos, A. P.: Aristoteles: Over de kosmos, 11–12. 13 E.g. the definition of κόσμος in Mund. 2, 391b9–12 and the phrase συνεκτικὴ αἰτία in Mund. 6, 397b9; see Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’; Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 401, 405n24; Opsomer, J: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 6–8. For the anti-Stoic tendency of De mundo’s theology see Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1137. 14 Cf. Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 16–20; Dihle, A.: ‘Die Geographie der Schrift vom Kosmos’. Eratosthenes (3rd cent. BCE) was probably used as (indirect) source.

138 

 Johan C. Thom

d. Some of the words and linguistic expressions used in the De mundo point to a date after the 4th century BCE.15 e. Some of the images (e.g. the description of the King of Persia and of Pheidias’s statue of Athena) would not have been used by someone in Aristotle’s time.16 Such arguments are not all equally cogent, but taken together they have lead most scholars to the conclusion that the De mundo cannot be dated in the time of Aristotle. The translation by Apuleius provides a terminus ante quem of the middle of the 2nd century CE, but the terminus a quo remains uncertain. Proposals vary considerably, from ca. 200 BCE to the first half of the 2nd century CE.17 Since the treatise displays tendencies similar to Middle Platonism (i.e. the combination of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ideas),18 a dating around the turn of the Millenium seems reasonable, although an earlier dating cannot be ruled out.

15 See Barnes, J.: ‘Review of Giovanni Reale, Aristotele: Trattato sul Cosmo per Alessandro’; Boot, P.: ‘An Indication for the Date of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise De Mundo’ (on the use of καίτοι; but see the criticism of Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 82n266); Schenkeveld, D. M.: ‘Language and Style of the Aristotelian De Mundo’ (with the observation of Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 403n3); Dihle, A.: ‘Die Geographie der Schrift vom Kosmos’, 8 (on the use of τε καί); Chandler, C.: ‘Didactic Purpose and Discursive Strategies’, 69–73. 16 For the King of Persia see Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 66; for the description of Pheidias’s statue, Mansfeld, J.: ‘Two Attributions’, 541–543. 17 Cf. e.g. Runia, D. T.: ‘The Beginnings of the End’,  305: 200 BCE (based on linguistic evidence and resemblances to the theology and cosmology of Theophrastus); Riedweg, C.: Jüdischhellenistische Imitation eines orphischen Hieros Logos, 94: first half of 2nd cent. BCE (Aristobulus made use of the De mundo); Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, esp. 391: not before the end of the 1st cent. BCE (Philodemus was unaware of the De mundo or did not believe it was written by Aristotle, since he explicitly states in Rhet. PHerc 1015/832 col. LVI 15–20 that Aristotle did not try to persuade Alexander to philosophize); Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1138: after 60 BCE (publication of Andronicus of Rhodes’s edition of Aristotle’s school treatises); Pohlenz, M.: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, 382–383; Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 6–7, 77, 81–82: a date near the time of Philo of Alexandria; Strohm, H.: Aristoteles: Meteorologie; Über die Welt, 268: a date between the time of Plutarch (c. 45 CE – before 125 CE) and that of Apuleius (close relationship to Plutarch). 18 Cf. also Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 400: ‘In my view, a Peripatetic philosopher of Platonic leanings using a Stoic book-title can hardly be dated earlier than the late first cent. BCE.’

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 139

1.2 Genre and function The De mundo has very little in common with the school treatises of Aristotle.19 It tries to convey insights about the cosmos in a simple manner, using images and comparisons instead of providing syllogistic proofs. It also does not enter into the various contemporary polemics regarding the topics treated in the work (e.g. on aither as fifth element; on the eternity of the world). Its intended audience is clearly not scientifically or philosophically trained, but rather one with a general education.20 Although ‘Alexander’ is directly addressed in the first chapter, the fiction of a letter is dropped from the second chapter onwards,21 but Alexander (as a person reputed to have a good general education) may represent the ideal audience. The De mundo instead shares many of the characteristics of a handbook,22 but it goes beyond the dry and sober style of a mere handbook:23 it tries to make the exposition of rather dry material more attractive with various stylistic and artistic devices such as poetic or rare words, literary quotations, rhetorical questions, ornamental epithets, elaboration, vivid descriptions, digressions, images and comparisons.24 Such literary elaboration, the use of the arguments of beauty, possibility and usefulness, and of encomium, together with the exhortation to Alexander to study philosophy, furthermore point towards protreptic.25 The author describes what he does as ‘theologizing’,

19 This section is based on Thom, J. C.: Cosmic Order and Divine Power, 14–15. 20 See Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 57. 21 See Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr.,  59. Stobaeus refers to this work in each of his excerpts as ‘from the letter of Aristoteles to Alexander’ (Ecl. vol. 1, pp. 43.15–16, 82.24–25, 255.10–11 W.), but Philoponus and David refer to it as ‘treatise’ (λόγος), ‘book’ (βίβλιον), or πραγματεία; see Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 396–397. 22 Festugière, A. J.: La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, 486, contends that is an introduction (εἰσαγωγή); so also Furley, D. J.: ‘Aristotle, On the Cosmos’, 334. 23 See Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 58. He suggests that the author used a Stoic handbook and elaborated it with the addition of Aristotelian material (Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 78, with note 263). The description of the De mundo as a compendium (Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1132) does not do justice to the literary character of the work. 24 See Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 61–62; also Chandler, C.: ‘Didactic Purpose and Discursive Strategies’, 69–87. 25 Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 60–61.

140 

 Johan C. Thom

θεολογεῖν,26 and this may also indicate the function of the De mundo: to move beyond a description of the world to an understanding of the god who maintains the cosmos.27

1.3 Composition and content The De mundo consists of three main parts: (I) an introduction; (II) a description of the cosmos; and (III) an explanation of cosmic harmony and of god’s role in the cosmos.28 (I) Chapter 1 provides an introduction in which philosophy is praised as the contemplation of all that exists. Through the mind, the soul can journey even to the heavens, discover large-scale relationships, and comprehend and interpret ‘the divine things’ (τὰ θεῖα). Such large-scale philosophical investigations, which the author calls ‘theologizing’ (θεολογεῖν), are contrasted with the examination and description of small-scale phenomena. The introduction ends by exhorting the addressee, Alexander, to study philosophy. (II) The second part, Chapters 2–4, entails a description of the cosmos, including geography and meteorology. Although it contains a lot of detail, the emphasis is not on single phenomena, but to provide an all-encompassing view of the world, that which Strohm called a ‘Blick von oben’, a view from above.29 (A) It starts out by giving a definition of ‘cosmos’ and then describes the cosmos in terms of the five elements, aither, fire, air, water, and earth, each occupying a region above the next element in sequence. (B) This is followed by a section focussing on the last two elements, water and earth, which thus contains a geographical description of Okeanos with its various embayments into the inhabited world, the location of major islands, and the division of the three continents, Europe, Libya and Asia. (C) The third section deals with metereological and other phenomena of the air, earth and sea. These are mostly attributed to either the wet or the dry exhalation, 26 Mund. 391b4. 27 Cf. Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 77; Runia, D. T.: ‘The Beginnings of the End’, 305: ‘He [sc. the author] is not attempting to give a scientific account of the universe, but works his way towards an explanation of its features in theological terms.’ 28 For a more detailed discussion, see Thom, J. C.: Cosmic Order and Divine Power, 10–14. 29 Strohm, H.: Aristoteles: Meteorologie; Über die Welt, 265.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 141

i.e. exhalations of the sea or of the earth. From the wet exhalation come phenomena like mist, clouds, rain and snow, from the dry exhalation winds and phenomena associated with thunder and lightning. The author also distinguishes between phenomena in the air that are real and those that have only an apparent existence, i.e. optical phenomena. The latter phenomena include halos around stars, and rainbows; real phenomena are meteors and comets.30 Next, the author describes phenomena on the earth that are formed by water, wind and fire, such as volcanoes, vapours emitted from chasms, and earthquakes. Similar phenomena occur in the sea: chasms, tidal waves and volcanoes. (III) In the third part of the De mundo (chs. 5–7) the author tries to explain why the various tensions and opposing principles in the cosmos have not long ago lead to its destruction. (A) He starts out (ch. 5) by stating that nature creates harmony and concord from opposites. The cosmos as a whole has been created as a composition and mixture of opposing elements and principles. By being held within the confines of a sphere, the various opposing elements are forced into an equilibrium, which constitutes an agreement between them. This concord is the cause of the preservation of the cosmos, because through it, despite the cataclysmic forces at work in the world, the whole is kept indestructible. (B) In the next section (ch. 6) god is explicitly identified as the cause of the cohesion of the cosmos and as the ‘begetter’ (γενέτωρ) of everything that comes into existence. The only term used here and elsewhere for his creative activity is γενέτωρ; κτίστης or δημιούργος is not used. He does not act directly, however, but through his power (δύναμις). God himself is based in the highest point in heaven, but his power is at work by first acting on the immediately adjacent region and then on the next, and so on, until it reaches the earth. The precise mechanism of how this works is not explained, but the author tries to show by means of extensive examples how it is possible to influence events at a distance without any direct physical contact or involvement; how a single movement can result in diverse effects; and how it is possible for an invisible initial impulse to give rise to so many subsequent events.

30 In Mund. 392b2–5, however, these are located in the fire.

142 

 Johan C. Thom

(C) The final section (ch. 7) shows how the various names given to god are based on the effects he causes to come into existence; the variety of effects do not negate the fact that he is one. This also applies to the various names given to Destiny and Fate: god is the one who causes what we ascribe to fate.

II. The power of god: An Aristotelian alternative The title Περὶ κόσμου already suggests that the author composed his work as an Aristotelian alternative to Stoic discussions of the world, since this form of the title is elsewhere only used for Stoic works.31 In the introduction (ch. 1) the author makes it clear that he is not simply going to give a description of the physical world: his interest is in ‘the heavenly place’ and ‘the sacred region’ which ‘the soul [...] by means of philosophy, taking the mind as its guide’32 is able to visit. From this heavenly perspective philosophy is able to discern various relationships and to comprehend and interpret ‘the divine things’ (τὰ θεῖα) with the divine eye of the soul.33 The act of interpretation itself is called προφητεύειν.34 He further on in the passage describes what he does in the De mundo as ‘theologizing’ (θεολογῶμεν) about ‘the greatest things in the cosmos’.35 This ‘journey through the cosmos’ which affords the soul insight into the nature of the world is a topos with strong Platonic roots.36 In the beginning of ch. 2 Pseudo-Aristotle first defines ‘cosmos’ as ‘a system of heaven and earth and the entities contained within them.’37 This is the normal

31 See Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’. For the following discussion, see also Thom, J. C.: ‘The Cosmotheology of De mundo.’ 32 λαβοῦσα ἡγεμόνα τὸν νοῦν; cf. Plato, Phdr. 247C: ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ. See on this passage Strohm, H.: Aristoteles: Meteorologie; Über die Welt, 275. 33 The phrase τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα (‘the eye of the soul’) occurs for the first time in Plato (Resp. 533d2), while the phrase τὸ θεῖον ὄμμα (‘the divine eye’) is first used by the Neoplatonists (cf. Porph., VP 10.29; Iamb., VP 16.70). The combination ‘the divine eye of the soul’ is only found here. 34 Mund. 391a8–16. 35 Mund. 391a25–26, b3–5. 36 See for the topos Jones, R. M.: ‘Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind through the Universe’; Festugière, A. J.: ‘Les thèmes du Songe de Scipion’; Koller, H.: ‘Jenseitsreise des Philosophen’; for the Platonic background of this passage see Strohm, H.: Aristoteles: Meteorologie; Über die Welt, 265, 274–275; Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 410n63. 37 Mund. 391b9–10.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 143

Stoic definition found in Chrysippus and repeated by Posidonius;38 it describes the cosmos as a self-contained system, which in Chrysippus is even identified with god, who thus ensures the cosmos its coherence.39 Pseudo-Aristotles however also gives a second definition: ‘the arrangement and order of the universe, preserved by god and because of god [ὑπὸ θεοῦ τε καὶ διὰ θεόν]’ (391b10–12); here god is separate from and transcendent to the world. In what follows the author first concentrates on the first definition, but in the second half, from ch. 5 onwards, he shifts his focus to the second. The ultimate aim of the De mundo is not simply to provide a description of the cosmos as system, but to explain god’s involvement in the order and preservation of the world. Such involvement by god is of course by no means conventional Aristotelian doctrine. According to Aristotle, god is turned away from the world; he is pure thought contemplating himself; ‘his thinking is a thinking of thinking’ (ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις; Metaph. 12.9, 1074b34–35).40 As the first Unmoved Mover, he is the final cause influencing the heavens to move in a cyclical movement as the object of their desire, but he is not in any way concerned with what happens in the sublunary world. The Aristotelian god is therefore transcendent, unlike the demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus, who is ultimately responsible for the creation of the world and its continued existence. Like Plato, the author of the De mundo wants to show that god is directly responsible for acting on and maintaining this world, but without giving up his transcendence. He attempts to provide explanations for two problems in particular: (a) The first is how it is possible that the world is preserved despite the many opposing and conflicting elements that he described in chs. 2–4. Why do these elements not annihilate one another, thus causing the destruction of the world? (b) The second problem is how it is possible for god to act on the world if he is separate from the world. The author begins to address the first problem in ch. 5 by suggesting that nature itself needs opposites and creates consonance (τὸ σύμφωνον; i.e. harmony) between them just like the concord (ὁμόνοια) established between different interest groups in a city.41 Harmony between conflicting principles thus appears to result from the constitution of nature. A little further on,42 however,

38 Cf. Chrysippus SVF 527.1–3 ap. Arius Didymus fr. 31.1–2 (Diels, Dox. Graec. pp. 465–466), 529.3–4; Posidonius, fr. 334 Theiler ap. Diog. Laert., 7.138. See also Pohlenz, M.: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, 377; Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 194. 39 Λέγεται δ’ ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ’ ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. 40 Cf. Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1134–1135. 41 Mund. 396a33–b8. 42 Mund. 396b23–397a5.

144 

 Johan C. Thom

harmony (ἁρμονία) is depicted not as a product of something else (e.g. the constitution of nature or some action) but as an active force that ‘has arranged the composition of the universe’ from opposite principles. It is described as a power (δύναμις) pervading all things, a power that set everything in order. It has created (δημιουργήσασα)43 the whole cosmos from diverse elements and compelled them into agreement and thus ensured preservation for the whole (see below on σωτηρία as a key concept in the work).44 The agreement (ὁμολογία) or concord (ὁμόνοια) results from the equality or equilibrium enforced by the cosmic power. The author again uses Stoic formulations, especially the idea of ‘a single power pervading all things’ (μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις).45 The coherence is not however caused by a divine immanent pneuma permeating all things, but results from the (mechanical) equilibrium brought about by the cosmic power between opposing principles: the equilibrium itself is a balance of forces within an enclosed space.46 Despite the change and destruction of individual parts, the principle of preservation keeps the whole indestructible.47 At the beginning of ch. 648 the author says that he will now speak about that which is most important (κυριώτατον) in the cosmos. In this introductory statement he uses the expression περὶ κόσμου λέγοντας, ‘when speaking about the cosmos’, which is a clear reference to the title of the work itself, since the phrase περὶ κόσμου is not used anywhere else in the treatise.49 This is therefore a crucial passage indicating the main theme of the work, namely the cause of the preservation of the cosmos. While in ch. 5 the power of harmony and preservation seems like a force of nature, it is in ch. 6 explicitly identified with the power of god. God is ‘the cause holding the universe together’ (ἡ τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴ αἰτία), that is, preserving it from the forces of chaos. The notion that there is a divine force holding the world together and thus preserving it from chaos was already present

43 This is a problematic statement for an Aristotelian author because Aristotle taught that the world is uncreated and eternal (see Cael. 1.10; 3.2, 301b31–302a9), as opposed to the Platonists who supported the notion of a created world. 44 Thus also Pohlenz, M.: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, 377. Cf. the references in n. 57 below. 45 For the notion of a divine power pervading all things in Stoic authors cf. SVF 1.158, 161, 533, 537.12–13; 2.323a, 442, 473, 946, 1040; 3.4, etc. For a discussion see Thom, J. C.: Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, 87–88. 46 See also Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 195–196. 47 Mund. 397b2–8. 48 Mund. 397b9–13. 49 It indeed occurs nowhere else in the Corpus Aristotelicum; see Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 401–402.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 145

in the time of Plato and Aristotle,50 but the phrase συνεκτικὴ αἰτία seems to be a direct reaction to Stoic doctrine, because it is a variant of the formula συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον coined by the Stoics.51 The transcendent Aristotelian god is thus put in place of the immanent Stoic pneuma as cohesive cause of the cosmos. The author refers to ‘an ancient account’52 with which he apparently agrees, according to which everything owes its existence and continued preservation to god; all things have come to be ‘from god and because of god’ (ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεόν).53 Nothing is self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης), i.e. can exist in and of itself, if deprived of god’s preservation. The author immediately corrects the wrong inference by ‘some of the ancients’ that this means that everything is full of god,54 i.e. that god himself is immanently present in the world. The author again takes up a position against Stoic immanentism and pantheism.55 According to the author one should instead distinguish between god’s essence (οὐσία) and his power (δύναμις): ‘God is really the preserver (σωτήρ) of all things and the begetter (γενέτωρ) of everything however it is brought about in this cosmos, without indeed enduring the hardship of a creature hard at work for itself, but by making use of an untiring power, by means of which he prevails even over things that seem to be far away.’ God himself is established in the highest region and does not do any work himself, because it would not be ‘appropriate’ (πρέποντα).56 The concept of σωτηρία clearly plays a crucial role in the De mundo.57 The cosmos needs to be preserved and sustained to keep it from destruction. What is significant is that this role is ultimately assigned to god: he is the ‘saviour’ (σωτήρ) of all things. He is at the same time called the ‘begetter’ (γενέτωρ)58

50 Cf. Arist., Pol. 7.4, 1326a32–33; Xen., Mem. 4.3.13; see also Reale, G. / Bos, A. P.: Il trattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro attribuito ad Aristotele,  313n233; Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 195; Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 7. 51 See Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 197–198; Mansfeld, J.: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ’, 401; Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 7–8. 52 Mund. 397b13–20. 53 Cf. Mund. 391b12: ὑπὸ θεοῦ τε καὶ διὰ θεόν. 54 This view may refer to Thales; cf. Thales 11 A 22 DK = Arist. de An. 411a7. 55 Pohlenz, M.: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, 377–378, even speaks of a ‘Kampfansage’ against Stoicism. See also Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 39. 56 Mund. 397b19–27. 57 See 396b33–34; 397a31, b5, 16; 398a4, b10; 400a4 (σωτηρία); 397b20, 401a24 (σωτήρ); cf. also 391b12, 396a32, 397b7 (φυλάττω). 58 The term γενέτωρ is used twice in the treatise for God (397b21, 399a31), and the term γενετήρ once for the cosmos (397a4). These are not used elsewhere in Aristotle as description of God (γενέτωρ only in fr. 489.9, 11 as epithet of Apollo).

146 

 Johan C. Thom

of all things, which is reminiscent of Plato’s demiurge.59 The statement that all things have come to be ‘from god and because of god’ (ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεόν) furthermore identifies god as efficient cause of the cosmos.60 God effects all of this without having to act directly himself, however; active involvement in the world is relegated to the power of god instead. In other passages, too,61 the distinction between god and his power is based on what is ‘dignified’ and ‘becoming.’62 This distinction between a transcendent god and an immanent divine power is similar to a tendency found in Platonic and Neopythagorean texts of the early Imperial period to split the demiurge god into two (or more) principles: a fully transcendent god and a lower principle (variously identified as the World Soul, the cosmic intellect, a second or third demiurge, etc.) on which the demiurgic functions devolved.63 In these texts, as in the De mundo, the distinction between different divine principles (in the De mundo between god’s essence and his power) serves to maintain god’s transcendence, while at the same explains how it is possible that he can be active in the world. There is however an important difference: the De mundo is more strictly monotheistic than the Platonic and Neopythagorean texts; in the De mundo everything is ultimately derived from one god.64 The way god’s power is transmitted through the cosmos is described in subsequent passages. The author starts by saying that the power is physically transmitted from one body to the next, gradually weakening in proportion to the distance from its origin until it reaches earth. God’s preservative and beneficial influence (ὠφέλεια) nevertheless penetrates down to the lowest level.65 A formulation such as ‘in as far as the divine naturally penetrates to everything’ (καθ’ ὅσον ἐπὶ πᾶν

59 Cf. also the use of δημιουργήσασα in 396b31; see n. 43 above. For the Platonic connection see Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 11. 60 Cf. Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 8. 61 Cf. Mund. 398b6–10. 62 There is some confusion between god and his power in 398a1–6, but it is clear from texts like 398b6–10 that god’s power penetrates through the whole cosmos. Cf. on the confusion between these passages also Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 203–204. 63 See Opsomer, J.: ‘Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism’. Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 10, suggests that the beginning of this process is found in the De mundo. 64 See Festugière, A. J.: La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste, 515–516; Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’,  1136, 1138; Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 16–17. For the polytheism of the Platonists, cf. Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1138: ‘[T]he Platonists, while monotheists with their heads, remained polytheists with their hearts.’ 65 Mund. 397b27–35.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 147

διικνεῖσθαι πέφυκε τὸ θεῖον) again sounds Stoic, but the gradual, physical transmission of power envisaged here is very different from the Stoic pneuma that permeates everything equally. The concept of a physical transmission of power is picked up again in Mund. 398b19–27: an initial first movement leads to a chain-reaction by means of which the power is transferred from one region to the next, and so on until it reaches the whole cosmos. The activity of the δύναμις itself is described as nothing other than movement.66 This passage introduces a new idea, namely that bodies react differently to the initial impulse on the basis of their constitutions. This idea is explored in Mund. 398b27–35 by means of two examples: the different results produced when differently shaped objects (a sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder) are thrown at the same time and the different movements taken by animals from the land, water and air when they are set free by the same motion. The first example in particular is probably inspired by Chrysippus’s famous example of the cylinder to explain the ‘freedom’ of human action: the cylinder is set in motion by an initial push, but its movement is determined by its own constitution, namely its rounded shape. In the same way human behaviour is ‘triggered’ by the series of events constituting fate, but the way they react is based on their own individual volitions and inclinations.67 The examples are used for very different purposes, however: Chrysippus uses it to illustrate human autonomy vis-à-vis fate, while in the De mundo it shows how one single impulse from god can have many different results.68 Several other comparisons are used to explain god’s influence on the world; the use of such comparisons is indeed one of the striking features of the De mundo.69 God is compared to a chorus-leader who gives the keynote, which is then taken up by the chorus of various celestial bodies, whose revolutions again cause seasonal and other changes on earth.70 Other comparisons include the rapid communication between the Persian king and his empire, despite his physical isolation, by means of a system of signal beacons;71 the dramatic effects produced when the trigger of a war machine (a catapult) is released72; the ability of puppeteers to affect different motions in the puppet by pulling a single string;73

66 Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., 39–40. 67 Chrysippus ap. Cic. Fat. 42–43 (in SVF 2.974); ap. Gell. 7.2.11 (in SVF 2.1000). 68 The examples are discussed at length by Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 207–211. 69 See Betegh, G. / Gregoric, P.: ‘Multiple Analogy’. 70 Mund. 398b26–27, 399a12–21. 71 Mund. 398a11–35. 72 Mund. 398b13–16. 73 Mund. 398b16–22.

148 

 Johan C. Thom

the different effects produced by the same trumpet signal during a war;74 a single keystone holding together the vault of a vast building (399b28–32). These comparisons are used to illustrate either the diverse and multitudinous effects arising from a single impulse from god, or his ability to have effect over a distance. The fact that the initial impulse is invisible but still able to stir all things into action, is explained by comparing it to the actions performed by the soul: the soul is also invisible but it has far-reaching effects on households and cities and even beyond the city borders (399b10–15). In the same way, god is invisible, but all that take place in the world are in fact his works (ἔργα); he can therefore be seen from the works themselves (399b19–25). It should be noted that god (or his power) is not compared with soul, such as a Platonic World Soul; only the invisibility of his actions is explained by means of the analogy of the soul. In Mund. 400b11–15 god is explicitly said to lead and move all things with his power where and how he wills, although he himself remains immovable. God is like the immovable law in the souls of citizens, which though fixed and unchangeable has many administrative consequences. God is in fact the law administering the whole cosmos in an unmoved and harmonious manner (400b26–33).75 A god that wills is however also a god that can change, which is very different from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover.76 In the immediately preceding passage (400a33–b6) the author even referred to an example of episodic intervention into the world: god (τὸ δαιμόνιον) saved two young men and their parents from the lava during an eruption of Aetna because of their piety.77 We see here a move away from the god of philosophy towards the god of popular philosophical religion.78 In ch. 7 the plurality of effects brought about by god is emphasized by all the names attributed to him, but these all derive from the one god. God as the law of

74 Mund. 399a35–b10. 75 For a critique of the effectiveness of this comparison see Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 216–219. 76 See Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 15. 77 According to Opsomer, J.: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’, 11, episodic intervention entails an intervention in the world that adapts itself to the ever-changing circumstances and particularities. For a different perspective on this episode cf. Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 215: ‘Dieu a ainsi pu ne pas avoir à enfreindre l’ordre naturel des choses. L’“intervention” divine donc susceptible de n’être qu’une image exprimant une organisation préalable: Dieu, prévoyant le courage des jeunes gens, aurait ordonné les événements, et en particulier leur fuite, de telle manière qu’ils fussent sauvés sans que le fonctionnement normal de la nature fût modifié.’ 78 Cf. Furley, D. J.: ‘Aristotle, On the Cosmos’, 334–336; Gottschalk, H. B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, 1134–1135: ‘The god of the De mundo [...] is an Unmoved Mover with a human face’; also Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 220, 224–225: ‘Le Ps.-Aristote a aussi la piété en commun avec le Portique [...].’

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 149

the world is therefore also identical with Fate.79 Both the use of etymology and the identification of god with fate are very close to Stoic practice.80 The author concludes the treatise with a cento from Plato’s Laws (715e–716a, 730c).81 Interestingly enough the author changed the antecedent of the relative clause in the final sentence from Ἀλήθεια (Truth) to Δίκη (Justice). There is however no other reference to ethics elsewhere in the work. To summarize this survey: The author wants to maintain the transcendence of god, but at the same time allow for his immanence. On the one hand, god is described as the creator and preserver of the world, the cohesive cause of the universe, the leader and commander of the cosmos. Everything that happens in the world is his work. God’s activity is therefore immanently present in this world: the world depends on god, is ordered by him and receives its existence from him. On the other hand, he is in essence absolutely transcendent, established above this world in the highest region. He does not perform any action himself, because it would be inappropriate to his dignity. To reconcile these extremes, the author introduces the notion of god’s power. The exact relationship between god and his power is not made clear,82 but the power in any case transmits or mediates god’s will to the lower regions. At times the active force of god’s power is explained in a mechanistic, physical manner, e.g. it is set in motion by a single trigger or impulse and moves from one body to the next in a wave-like motion or with a domino effect; at other times a more intelligible explanation is given, e.g. it affects its environment like the soul or like the law. The latter two comparisons are reminiscent of the role of the World Soul in Platonism or of fate as nexus of causality in Stoicism, but neither comparison is explored in any detail. It is clear that the De mundo is based on Aristotle and his school in many of its main doctrines. This includes, inter alia, the doctrines about the fifth element, the two exhalations, the eternity of the world, the geocentric world with concentric spheres, the division into a supralunary region and the sublunary world, and of course the transcendent god. There are also many similarities between ch. 4 and the first 3 books of Aristotle’s Metereologica, although the De mundo is dependent

79 Mund. 401a12–b9. 80 Cf. e.g. Duhot, J. J.: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme’, 221–223. 81 Mund. 401b23–29. 82 Cf. Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr, 40: the author is not a deep-thinking metaphysician or theologian.

150 

 Johan C. Thom

on Theophrastus rather than Aristotle.83 The attribution of the text to Aristotle further confirms the author’s primary philosophical allegiance. At the same time there are also strong connections with Platonism: the notion of god as father, creator, and preserver of the world is more Platonic than Aristotelian.84 The distinction between the transcendent god and his power is also similar to the move in Middle Platonic and Neopythagorean texts to split the divine into two or more principles. It is also significant that the De mundo begins in the first chapter with an allusion to a Platonic version of the heavenly journey of the soul and closes with a quotation of two passages from Plato’s Laws (715e–716a and 730c). The main thrust of the work is however the distinction between god who in his essence remains separate from the world and his power which pervades the cosmos and intervenes in the world. The treatise thus suggests an alternative approach to the World Soul as organizing principle.

References Barnes, Jonathan: ‘Review of Giovanni Reale, Aristotele: Trattato sul Cosmo per Alessandro’, Classical Review 27 (1977), 40–43. Bernays, Jacob: ‘Über die fälschlich dem Aristoteles beigelegte Schrift περὶ κόσμου’, in: Hermann Usener (ed.), Gesammelte Abhandlungen, vol. 2, Berlin 1885, 278–281. Besnier, Bernard: ‘De mundo: Tradition grecque’, in: Richard Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Supplément, Paris 2003, 475–480. Betegh, Gábor / Gregoric, Pavel: ‘Multiple Analogy in Ps.-Aristotle, De Mundo 6’, Classical Quarterly 64 (2014), 574–591. Boot, Pieter: ‘An Indication for the Date of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise De Mundo’, Mnemosyne 34 (1981), 139–140. Bos, Abraham P.: Aristoteles, Over de kosmos, Meppel 1989. Bos, Abraham P.: ‘Considerazioni sul De mundo e analisi critica delle tesi di Paul Moraux’, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 82 (1990), 587–606. Chandler, Clive: ‘Didactic Purpose and Discursive Strategies in On the Cosmos’, in: Johan C. Thom (ed.), Cosmic Order and Divine Power: Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, Tübingen 2014, 69–87. Dihle, Albrecht: ‘Die Geographie der Schrift vom Kosmos’, Geographia Antiqua 6 (1997), 5–12. Dillon, John: The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Ithaca 1977. Duhot, Jean-Joël: ‘Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme dans le peri kosmou pseudo-aristotélicien’, Revue de philosophie ancienne 8 (1990), 191–228.

83 See Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr, 20–23; Strohm, H.: ‘Ps.Aristoteles De Mundo und Theilers Poseidonios’. 84 Moraux, P.: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr, 77.

The power of god in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo: An alternative approach 

 151

Festugière, André-Jean: ‘Les thèmes du Songe de Scipion’, Eranos 44 (1946), 370–388. Festugière, André-Jean: La révélation d’Hermès Trismégiste: Le dieu cosmique, vol. 2, Paris 1949. Flashar, Hellmut: ‘Aristoteles’, in: Hellmut Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophie der Antike: Ältere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos, vol. 3, Basel 2004, 167–492. Furley, David J.: ‘Aristotle, On the Cosmos’, in: Edward S. Forster and David J. Furley (trans.), Aristotle: On Sophistical Refutations; On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away; On the Cosmos, Cambridge – Massachusetts, 1955, 333–409. Gohlke, Paul: Aristoteles an König Alexander Über die Welt, Paderborn 1968. Gottschalk, Hans B.: ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987), 1079–1174. Jones, Roger Miller: ‘Posidonius and the Flight of the Mind through the Universe’, Classical Philology 21 (1926), 97–113. Koller, Hermann: ‘Jenseitsreise des Philosophen’, Asiatische Studien 27 (1973), 35–57. Kraye, Jill: ‘Aristotle’s God and the Authenticity of De Mundo: An Early Modern Controversy’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990), 339–358. Kraye, Jill: ‘Disputes over the Authorship of De Mundo between Humanism and Altertumswissenschaft’, in: Johan C. Thom (ed.), Cosmic Order and Divine Power: PseudoAristotle, On the Cosmos, Tübingen 2014, 181–197. Lorimer, William Laughton: The Text Tradition of Pseudo-Aristotle ‘De Mundo’, London 1924. Lorimer, William Laughton: Aristotelis qui fertur libellus de mundo, Paris 1933. Mansfeld, Jaap: ‘Two Attributions’, Classical Quarterly 41 (1991), 541–544. Mansfeld, Jaap: ‘ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ: A Note on the History of a Title’, Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992), 391–411. Moraux, Paul: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr. (Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, vol. 2), Berlin 1984. Opsomer, Jan: ‘Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism’, in: Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und Götter bei Plutarch: Götterbilder – Gottesbilder – Weltbilder, Berlin, vol. 2) 2005, 51–99. Opsomer, Jan: ‘Over de wereld en haar bestuur’ (Unpublished lecture delivered at a symposium Over de kosmos in honour of Prof. dr. A. P. Bos at the Free University, Amsterdam, 28 April 2006). Pohlenz, Max: ‘Philon von Alexandreia’, in: Heinrich Dörrie (ed.), Kleine Schriften, vol. 1, Hildesheim 1965, 305–383. Reale, Giovanni: Aristotele: Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro, Napoli 1974. Reale, Giovanni / Bos, Abraham P.: Il trattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro attribuito ad Aristotele, Milano 1995. Riedweg, Christoph: Jüdisch-hellenistische Imitation eines orphischen Hieros Logos: Beobachtungen zu OF 245 und 247 (sog. Testament des Orpheus), Tübingen 1993. Runia, David T.: ‘The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology’, in: Dorothea Frede and André Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath, Leiden 2002, 281–316. Schenkeveld, Dirk Marie: ‘Language and Style of the Aristotelian De Mundo in Relation to the Question of Its Inauthenticity’, Elenchos 12.2 (1991), 221–255. Sharples, R. W.: ‘Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle’, in: Dorothea Frede and André Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath, Leiden 2002, 1–40.

152 

 Johan C. Thom

Stern, Samuel Miklos: ‘A Third Arabic Translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise De Mundo’, Muséon 78 (1965), 381–393. Strohm, Hans: Aristoteles: Meteorologie; Über die Welt, Darmstadt 1970. Strohm, Hans: ‘Ps.Aristoteles De Mundo und Theilers Poseidonios’, Wiener Studien 100 (1987), 69–84. Thom, Johan C.: Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary, Tübingen 2005. Thom, Johan C.: ‘The Cosmotheology of De mundo’, in: Johan C. Thom (ed.), Cosmic Order and Divine Power: Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, Tübingen 2014, 107–120. Thom, Johan C. (ed.): Cosmic Order and Divine Power: Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, Tübingen 2014.

Part III: Old Academy, Stoicism, and Middle Platonism

John Dillon

The World Soul takes command: The doctrine of the World Soul in the Epinomis of Philip of Opus and in the academy of Polemon My purpose on this occasion is to explore somewhat further a thesis that I have proposed on a number of previous occasions, but primarily in my study of the Old Academy, The Heirs of Plato,1 to the effect that, towards the end of his life, Plato, after having advanced a number of conjectures during his philosophical career as to the nature of a First Principle, was inclined to settle on the concept of a rational World Soul, with demiurgic functions, and that this was a doctrine that his faithful amanuensis in his last years, Philip of Opus, advanced on his own account, in the belief that in this he was developing the latest theories of his Master. Plato, after all, seems to leave a rather confusing legacy to his successors, when it comes to First Principles. We have, on the one hand, the Good of the Republic, a first principle which is presented as being in some way ‘beyond’ (epekeina) the rest of existence, of which it is the generative ground, as well as an object of desire or striving for all things; but then there is the Demiurge of the Timaeus, who is described as an Intellect, but who is represented as contemplating a Model in some way above and beyond himself, in his creation of Soul and of the world (unless the Demiurge and his creation are in fact mythical, and to be deconstructed – as was stoutly maintained, against the criticisms of Aristotle, by both of Plato’s closest associates and immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates); then there is the One of the hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, which may or may not have been intended by Plato as a first principle, but which was certainly taken as such in later times; further, there are the first principles set out in the Philebus (26c ff.), Limit, the Unlimited, and the Cause of the Mixture, which in turn seem to have a fairly close relationship to the One and Indefinite Dyad of the Unwritten Doctrines. All these, whatever else is to be made of them, would constitute first principles superior to anything that could be identified as a World Soul. But then, last but not least, we seem to have the doctrine, firmly enunciated first in the Phaedrus (245c ff.), but particularly dominant in Book X of the Laws,

1 Dillon, J.: The Heirs of Plato, 183–193, and 168–174; but cf. also Dillon, J.: ‘Philip of Opus and the Theology’. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-007

156 

 John Dillon

of a rational World Soul as the first principle of all motion, and therefore of all creation. What are we to do with this apparent change of heart? It might be said, admittedly, of the famous definition of soul in the Phaedrus, that all it, strictly speaking, does is to assert the immortality of soul, and to identify it as the source of all motion, but this does not preclude there being principles higher than soul that are unmoved; and indeed in the Myth we are presented with a whole array of Forms which the souls of both gods and mortals contemplate, which are certainly not presented as being dependent for their existence on any soul. In Book X of the Laws, on the other hand, the situation is significantly different, and it is to that that I will now turn, before addressing the question of the position of Philip himself. Let us first remind ourselves of the context, and then consider a series of key passages. The Visitor from Athens is concerned, at this stage of the conversation, to present his companions Cleinias and Megillus – neither of them, to say the least of it, accomplished philosophers – with a refutation of atheism, which he regards as a great evil, and profoundly subversive of good government. To do that, he has to bring to their minds the true nature of God. We must not forget this: his topic is not here the World Soul as such, or the originator of motion, or any type of intermediate being; we are concerned with God as first principle of all creation. The Visitor starts in as follows (Laws 891e ff.):2 So it looks as if I must produce a rather unfamiliar argument. Well then, the doctrine that produces an impious soul also ‘produces’ in a sense the soul itself, in that it denies the priority of what was in fact the first cause of the birth and destruction of all things (prôton geneseôs kai phthoras aition hapantôn), and regards it as a later creation. Conversely, it asserts that what actually came later, came first. That’s the source of the mistake these people have made about the real nature of the gods. CLEINIAS: So far the point escapes me. VISITOR: It’s the soul, my good friend, that nearly everybody seems to have misunderstood, not realising its nature and power. Quite apart from other points about it, people are particularly ignorant about its origin (genesis). It is one of the first creations, born long before all physical things (sômatôn emprosthen pantôn genomenê), and is more than anything else the cause of all their alterations and transformations. Now if that’s true, anything closely related to soul will necessarily have been created before material things, won’t it, since soul itself is older than matter.

2 I borrow here the excellent, if perhaps rather excessively chatty, Penguin translation of Trevor Saunders, with minor alterations.

The World Soul takes command 

 157

This certainly sounds promising, but by itself it cannot be said to get us very far. Soul is asserted to be superior to body, and to the material world in general, and to be the cause of its existence, but it itself is spoken of as being generated (genesis, genomenê), which, if taken literally, would imply some higher power again, such as would be responsible for its generation. As the Visitor proceeds, however, it becomes much less clear that there is any force in the universe superior to Soul. Let us turn now to the core of the argument, at Laws 896a ff.: So what’s the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: ‘motion capable of moving itself’? CLEINIAS: Do you mean that the entity which we call ‘soul’ is precisely that which is defined by the expression ‘self-generating motion’? VISITOR: I do. And if that is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past present and future things and their contraries, since it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in everything. CLEINIAS: Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved most adequately that soul is the most ancient of all things, since it has been shown to be the source of motion.

We have now advanced to the position where Soul, being endowed with selfmotion (and thus, in effect, ungenerated and eternal), is presented as prior to all other things, and as the cause of all other things. One could still, perhaps, argue for a supreme deity which would be a sort of ‘unmoved Mover’ (like the Good of the Republic), but we must reflect at this point, once again, that this whole argument is directed towards establishing the nature of God, so that, if the soul is not God, we are wasting our time establishing the existence and superiority of soul – unless we are then going to proceed to an investigation of whatever the real supreme principle might be. But in fact we never move beyond this demonstration of the nature and power of soul; on the contrary, the role of soul becomes ever more central and more exalted. If we move on, for instance, to Laws 896e, we learn that ‘Soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea.’ A long list of psychic states and functions then follows, which govern a long list of physical conditions, at the conclusion of which (Laws 897b1–3) we are told that the soul ‘governs all things rightly and happily, when it takes a divine intellect to itself (noun men proslabousa theion).’3 3 The text is sadly disturbed here, the chief mss. (A and O) reading ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, which really makes no sense. I must say that I favour, first, adopting the reading of L and Eusebius,

158 

 John Dillon

Here again, it could be objected, perhaps, that the theios nous here mentioned should logically be an entity superior to soul, but in fact such a supposition would be unjustified, as, with an interesting touch of dualism which we need not go into further in the present context, the Visitor envisages Soul alternatively taking ‘mindlessness’ (anoia) to itself (Laws 897b3–4), in which case all things would be administered in an entirely opposite way, and it would be absurd, I think, to suppose that anoia here is being hypostatised. So all the Visitor really means to say is that Soul will act rationally rather than irrationally. This in turn, in my view, can be seen as assimilating Soul here to what must after all be taken as the supreme principle of the Timaeus, if we are prepared to demythologize the account of the demiurgic creation, as was certainly the position of Speusippus and Xenocrates – though it did not induce them to postulate a rational World Soul as their supreme principle – but must also have been the view of their successor Polemon, as I shall argue presently – who in turn passed it on to Zeno and the Stoic tradition, by which time a rational World Soul had become the accepted first principle. But from these rather bold speculations let us return one last time to the text of Laws X, this time to 898B ff., where it is finally made clear both that the driving force of the universe is a World Soul, and that each of the heavenly bodies, which are in fact the ‘gods’ that we have been in search of, is a (fiery) body guided by a soul of its own (Laws 898d–e). At Laws 899c–d, the whole course of the argument is summed up, in a most significant manner: VISITOR: Now then, Megillus and Cleinias, let’s lay down limiting conditions for anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and so dispose of them. CLEINIAS: What conditions do you mean? VISITOR: Either he must demonstrate that we’re wrong to posit Soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth (genesin hapantôn einai prôtên), and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken, or, if he can’t put up a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us, and live for the rest of his life a believer in gods.

We may note here how much the status of Soul has been enhanced from its first introduction at Laws 892a. There, it was spoken of itself having a genesis, albeit one antecedent to all other things; here, however, it itself is the prôtê genesis of all things, and so, inevitably, the supreme deity. As for the other gods, whose existence and providential care for mankind the Visitor from Athens wants to

θεῖον for θεὸν, and then Winckelmann’s proposal ὀρθῶς θέουσα, ‘running on correctly’, cleverly drawing on Socrates’ etymology of theos in the Cratylus (397d), to which Plato may well be alluding here.

The World Soul takes command 

 159

establish, they are revealed as celestial deities subordinate to Soul, though each ruled by their own soul. Having set out, then, in what I hope is a reasonably convincing fashion, the theological position taken up by Plato in his last work, a work in the editing of which Philip of Opus was intimately involved over many years, we may turn to an examination of the Epinomis itself. The raison d’être of the Epinomis, as set out at the beginning of the work, is to give a more specific account of ‘what it is that mortal man should learn in order to be wise’, on the grounds that that was not dealt with in the previous conversation. In fact, Plato himself seems deliberately to refrain from giving any details about this in the Laws, probably out of a conviction that it was better transmitted orally. This, however, gives Philip the opportunity to provide his own view of what the members of the Nocturnal Council of Laws XII – and indeed any man who desires to be wise – should be studying, and to lead up to that by providing a theological underpinning to justify it. It is this theological underpinning that I wish to dwell on in particular here, as it reveals most clearly Philip’s distinctive philosophical position. Now it is clear, I think, from the Epinomis that the supreme active principle in the universe favoured by the author is in fact a rational World Soul, not transcending the physical world, but presiding in the celestial realm. This position may seem somewhat surprising, in view of what we think we know of the first principles favoured by Philip’s more distinguished contemporaries in the Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, and, if the evidence of Aristotle may be trusted (particularly in Metaphysics A 6), by Plato himself – basically, variations on the Pythagorean pair of Monad and Indefinite Dyad – but the evidence seems to bear this out.4 Let us look at some significant passages. There are four in particular that I should like to examine: Epinomis 976d–977b, 982a–983c, 984b–c, and 988a–e, all from the preamble, as it were, to the exposition of that science which Philip declares to be the supreme and most divine one – not dialectic, as one might

4 We must bear in mind, however, that this apparent unanimity may conceal considerable differences. Xenocrates’ first principle, after all, is explicitly an Intellect, and may be regarded as immanent in the cosmos (cf. Fr. 15 Heinze/216 Isnardi Parente), while Speusippus’ One is pretty clearly neither of the above. As for the Good of the Republic, it was certainly regarded in later times as being ‘above Intellect and Being’, but it has also been claimed not to transcend Being (cf. Baltes, M.: ‘Is the Idea of the Good in Plato’s Republic beyond Being?’), and it is in fact nowhere specified in the text whether it is an intellect or not.

160 

 John Dillon

expect from a Platonist, but rather astronomy, understood in its Platonic sense (that is, as expounded in Republic VII, 529–30).5 First, then, let us consider Epinomis 976d ff. Here the Visitor from Athens begins his search for the single most basic science, without the possession of which, he says, ‘mankind would be the most mindless and senseless of creatures.’ This science he declares to be that of number – a gift to us from God himself. He then proceeds to explain what he means by God – a move interesting in itself, since Plato, in using the indefinite term ho theos, would never bother to provide any gloss for it: And I must explain who it is that I believe to be God, though he be a strange one (atopos) – and somehow not strange either, for why should we not believe the cause of all good things that are ours to have been the cause also of what is far the greatest, understanding (phronêsis)? And who is it that I magnify with the name of God, Megillus and Cleinias? It must be Heaven (ouranos) that has full claim to our honour and especially our prayers, as is the case for all the other daemons and gods also. That it has been the cause of all the other good things we have, we shall all admit; that it really gave us number also we assert, and that it will give us more gifts yet, if we will but follow its lead. For if one enters on the right theory about it, whether one be pleased to call it World-Order (kosmos) or Olympos or Ouranos – let one call it this or that6 – but follow where, in bespangling itself and turning the stars that it contains in all their courses, it produces the seasons and food for all. And thence, accordingly, we have understanding (phronêsis) in general, we may say, together with all number, and all other good things: but the greatest of these is when, after receiving its gift of number, one explores the whole circuit, (Epinomis 976e3–977b8).

This is surely a remarkable passage, even though the style be turgid. The old god Ouranos is pressed into service in a quite new role, as the immanent guiding principle of the universe, and assigned a demiurgic function (though proper also to the Good of the Republic), that of the ultimate provider of all good things to mortals, but in particular – by reason of the alternation of day and night, and the movements of the sun and moon and other planets – of number and reasoning in general. There is not yet here, admittedly, any mention of a World Soul, but for that we do not have to wait very long. Let us turn next to Epinomis 982a ff. Here Philip has just (Epinomis 981b–e) finished setting out his five-element universe (fire, water,

5 Dialectic does indeed appear briefly, in Epinomis 991c – Philip, as a good Platonist, could hardly dispense with it altogether – but simply as a tool for pursuing astronomy. 6 This seems to echo interestingly Plato’s phraseology in Timaeus 28b3–5: ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς – ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ’ ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω – though with the significant difference that here we are naming a supreme deity!

The World Soul takes command 

 161

air, earth – and aether7), each with its proper inhabitants, ending with a distinction between two basic types of creature in the universe, mortal and immortal. He now goes on to expand on this: Let us therefore first observe that, as we state it, such creatures are of two sorts – for let us state it again – both visible, one of fire, as it would appear, entirely,8 and the other of earth; and the earthy one moves in disorder, whereas that of fire has its motion in perfect order. Now that which has motion in disorder we should regard as unintelligent, acting like the animal creatures about us for the most part; but that which has an orderly and heavenly progress must be taken as providing strong evidence of its intelligent life […] The necessity of a soul which has acquired intellect (ἡ ψυχῆς ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης) will prove itself by far the greatest of all necessities; for it makes laws as ruler, not as ruled; and this unalterable state, when the soul has taken the best counsel in accord with the best intellect, comes out as the perfect thing in truth and in accord with intellect, and not even adamant could ever prove stronger than it or more inalterable, but in fact the three Fates (Moirai) have taken hold, and keep watch that what has been decided by each of the gods with the best counsel shall be perfect.

This contains its fair share of obscurantist guff and contorted syntax, as is characteristic of Philip’s prose, at least when he is trying to imitate the worst excesses of his Master’s late style, but nevertheless it can be seen, I would suggest, that Philip is touching on some significant Platonic bases here. Specifically, he seems to be alluding to certain aspects of the myth of Republic X. The mention of the anangkê of soul here would seem to be a reference, above all, to the passage 616c–617c, which presents us with the image of the great cosmic spindle, consisting of the outer circle, or ‘whorl’, of the fixed stars, and seven inner circles, representing the planetary circuits, which rests on the knees of a personified Necessity, who turns it – that would presumably be the point of the otherwise rather vacuous remark that it acts ‘as ruler, not ruled’ (by contrast to the anangkê of Timaeus 48a, for instance, which is controlled by the Demiurge, qua Intellect). The probability that Philip has the Republic in mind here is strengthened by references to ‘adamant’ (cf. 616c8: the staff and the hook of the spindle are made of adamant), and to the Fates (cf. 617b9–c10: the Moirai, daughters of Necessity, who sit around the spindle at equal intervals, and help their mother to turn it).

7 Remarkably, Philip introduces aether, not as the highest of the elements, proper to the heavenly realm, as did Aristotle and Xenocrates, but the second-highest, below fire, in the area just below the Moon. 8 This might seem to suggest that the heavenly bodies (for it is those to which he is referring) are composed not only of fire, but also of immaterial souls, but as Tarán, L.: Academia, 267 points out, what Philip seems rather to have in mind (cf. 981D–E) is that they have slight portions of all the other elements also – a thoroughly materialist scenario, therefore.

162 

 John Dillon

It should be clear that in the above passage Philip is presenting Soul as the supreme active principle in the universe. The various mentions of nous as something which it ‘acquires’, or ‘takes counsel with’ should not, I think, be taken to refer to some shadowy superior entity in which Soul participates, but rather as characterizations of its own proper mode of being, that is to say, rational or intellectual, on the model of the reference to Soul’s taking on a divine nous in Laws. X 897b2, quoted above. The supremacy of Soul is confirmed a little further on, at Epinomis 983c ff., where it is presented as creating all the various classes of being, from the heavenly gods on down, through the aetherial and aerial daemons, to the denizens of water, and finally men. And yet, in the middle of this, we suddenly find a reference to ‘God’, being differentiated from the various levels of daemon, as not being subject to passions (Epinomis 985a5–8): For we know that God, who possesses the final end of divine fate (τὸν τέλος ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας),9 transcends these affections of pleasure and pain, but has share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere (τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν κατὰ πάντα μετειληφέναι).

There is really nothing else for God to denote here, however, than the World Soul. This is confirmed a little later on, at the end of what is Philip’s elaborate preamble to his proposing of astronomy (which he manages to identify with the dialectic of Republic VII, 531d–535a) as the highest science. He is criticizing the primitive conceptions of divinity held by men of former times, in contrast with the best thinking of the present day (Epinomis 988b7–e3): And indeed there is much good reason to suppose that formerly, when men had their first conceptions of how the gods came to exist and with what qualities, and whence, and to what kind of actions they proceeded, they were spoken of in a manner not approved or welcomed by the prudent, nor were even the views of those who came later, among whom the greatest dignity was given to fire and water and other bodies, while the wonderful soul was accounted inferior, and higher and more honoured with them was a motion assigned to the body for moving itself by heat and coolings and everything of that kind, instead of that which the soul had for moving both the body and itself. But now that we account it no marvel that the soul, once it is in the body, should stir and revolve this and itself, neither does soul, on our reckoning, doubt her power of revolving any weight. And therefore, since we now claim that, as the soul is the cause of the whole (ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου), and all good things are causes of like things, while on the other hand evil things are the causes of other things like them, the soul should be the cause of all activity and motion, and that activity and motion towards the good is the work of the

9 What on earth does this really mean, one might ask? It comes across as a typical piece of Philippian guff. One may take it, however, I presume, as according this entity ultimate control over the workings of fate, such as is appropriate to a supreme being.

The World Soul takes command 

 163

best soul, while that tending towards the opposite is of the opposite,10 it must be that the good things have conquered and continue to conquer those that are not such.

Once again, Soul emerges as the cause of all things, here in contrast to earlier theories11 which wished to derive the world, including the gods, from material principles, indicating that, for Philip, questions as to the true identity and composition of the gods or of ‘God’ can be answered by an enquiry into the true source of motion, which is Soul. Despite the various references to Soul ‘taking to itself nous’, or the like, it seems clear enough that for Philip, and, in his mind, for his master Plato as well, certainly in the Laws, but perhaps going back as far as the Republic and the Timaeus, the supreme principle in the universe is a rational World Soul, immanent in the cosmos, and residing most particularly in the sphere of the fixed stars. The study of astronomy is therefore the contemplation of the structure and workings of God’s mind. It is this that teaches us the wonders of number, and it is that, in turn, which endows us with wisdom, phronêsis. I have already suggested that this scenario did not appeal to Speusippus or Xenocrates – though, as I have suggested, the Nous-Monad of the latter may well have been envisaged as residing in the heavens – it is described, at any rate, by the doxographer Aetius12 as en ouranôi basileuousan.13 The question now remains as to whether any echo of Philip’s take on Plato’s First Principle may be discerned in the thought of Polemon, last head of the Old Academy. There is unfortunately not much to go on here, as is the case with almost every other aspect of Polemon’s doctrine, but there is one clue which, properly interpreted, may yield something. This comes in the shape of a bald doxographic report of Polemon’s position, relayed by the same Aetius, as preserved by Stobaeus in his Anthologia, just below the report on Xenocrates mentioned above. The report runs as follows: ‘Polemon declared that the cosmos was God’ (Polemôn ton kosmon theon apephênato). It might be thought – indeed it seems to have been generally assumed – that this sentence need only mean that Polemon regarded the cosmos as a god, and thus was not of any great interest. But the context in which it occurs excludes that 10 This suggestion of dualism is doubtless inserted here by Philip as an echo of similar suggestions in Laws X 896e, and is not, I think, to be taken too seriously. 11 Doubtless those of the Presocratics, from Thales on down to the Atomists. 12 Xenocr. Fr. 15 Heinze. 13 This may well be, as I have suggested in Dillon, J. M.: The Heirs of Plato (102, n. 44), an intentional reminiscence of Phaedrus 246e, where Zeus is presented as ‘the great leader in the heavens’, but this, though employing figurative language, need not preclude Xenocrates’ being serious about the immanent nature of the Nous-Monad.

164 

 John Dillon

interpretation. The whole section in Stobaeus is concerned with the nature and functions of the supreme God, so this must give Polemon’s view on that subject. We are faced, therefore, with the assertion that Polemon’s supreme principle can be described as kosmos – which, we may recall, is one of the alternative appellations which Philip suggested, at Epinomis 977b2 (quoted above, p. 160), for his supreme principle Ouranos, also an immanent divinity, which, as we have seen, turns out to be a rational World Soul. There is, as I say, very little other evidence as to what Polemon thought about anything, but I believe that one can flesh out somewhat our understanding of his views by adducing a piece of evidence that has also been generally disregarded, the summary of Academic doctrine presented by Cicero, through the mouth of Varro, in his Academica I, 24–9, a passage which must derive substantially from Antiochus of Ascalon. However, while the Antiochian provenance of this is generally agreed, its validity as an account of any sort of Old Academic doctrine has been vigorously disputed, it being felt that it is a Stoic-influenced farrago concocted by Antiochus himself. This consensus, however, was forcefully contested, some little time ago now, by David Sedley, in an important article,14 and I think that he is right to do so. When one looks carefully at this passage, one can discern that there is nothing there that could not have been propounded by Polemon, and that the similarity to Stoic doctrine results from the fact that Zeno learned a lot from his period of study with Polemon. Let us look at the relevant section: The topic of Nature, which they treated next (sc. after Ethics), they approached by dividing it into two principles, the one the creative (efficiens = poiêtikê), the other at this one’s disposal, as it were, out of which something might be created. In the creative one they deemed that there inhered power (vis = dunamis), in the one acted upon, a sort of ‘matter’ (materia = hylê), yet they held that each of the two inhered in the other, for neither would matter have been able to cohere if it were not held together by any power, nor yet would power without some matter – for nothing exists without it being necessarily somewhere.15 But that which was the product of both they called ‘body’ (corpus = sôma), and, so to speak, a sort of ‘quality’ (qualitas = poiotês).

What do we have here? It is a system of two principles, very like that of the Stoics, certainly – except that there is no suggestion that either of these principles is corporeal – but also quite compatible with that which would emerge from a nonliteral interpretation of the Timaeus. The active, demiurgic principle, which, 14 Sedley, D.: ‘The Origins of Stoic God’. 15 This is certainly reminiscent of a passage of the Timaeus 52b: ‘everything that exists must necessarily be in some place (en tini topôi)’, which would assimilate matter here, interestingly, to the Receptacle of the Timaeus.

The World Soul takes command 

 165

as I have suggested above, must really be conceived as a rational World Soul, whose contents are the Forms, acts on a passive, infinitely malleable, ‘material’ principle, to create a world of physical bodies. The concept of poiotês, ‘quality’, to describe, presumably, what the active principle impresses upon the passive principle, seems to embody a reference to Theaetetus 182a, from which a scholastic mind could, I think, derive the theory that an active (poiêtikê) principle possesses a dunamis to impose poiotêtes on a passive principle, where it is also plain that Plato is postulating an etymological connection between poiein and poiotês. It seems a reasonable postulation that this summary of Academic doctrine reflects the position of the Academy under Polemon, if not also under Xenocrates. If it were a total concoction of Antiochus’, it is reasonable to argue that Cicero would have made that accusation against him (or allowed one of his spokesmen to do so), since he is not backward in accusing Antiochus elsewhere of excessive enthusiasm for Stoicism. But nowhere does he do that, so I think that we must assume that he felt there was some plausibility to this account of Academic doctrine. If that is so, then where, one might ask, does this leave such entities as the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad of the ‘unwritten doctrines’ (and of Xenocrates), the Limit and Unlimitedness of the Philebus, or for that matter the Good of the Republic? And how can those principles, and indeed the active and passive principles of the present summary, be reconciled with the concept of a rational World Soul? I must say that I do not see that there need be any serious degree of discrepancy here. If we turn back to Xenocrates, for a start, his Monad is also characterized as an Intellect, but this Intellect is presented as interacting with a dyadic principle, and is the ultimate cause of motion in the universe, and that, on Platonic principles, is properly the province of Soul. So if, as we must suspect, Xenocrates’ Monad has the same function in the universe as the demythologized demiurgic principle of the Timaeus, then we are back to a rational World Soul. It is merely a matter of terminology. The active principle of the later Academy (I leave Speusippus out of the reckoning, as his radical concept of the One excludes him from this consensus) possesses the characteristics of rationality and of motivity, as it acts on a passive principle to produce a physical world of the best type possible, and thus, it seems to me, is best described as a rational World Soul. So it may after all be the case that Philip of Opus was right in his interpretation of Plato’s final position on the nature of the first principle, and that at least the majority of his colleagues, from Xenocrates on, came to share his view.

166 

 John Dillon

References Baltes, Matthias: ‘Is the Idea of the Good in Plato’s Republic beyond Being?’, in: Mark Joyal and John Whittaker (eds.), Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition, Aldershot 1997, 3–23. Dillon, John M.: ‘Philip of Opus and the Theology of Plato’s Laws’, in: Samuel Scolnicov and Luc Brisson (eds.), Plato’s Laws: From Theory into Practice. Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Augustin 2001, 304–311. Dillon, John M.: The Heirs of Plato. A study of the Old Academy (347–274 B.C.), Oxford 2003. Saunders, Trevor J.: Plato. The Laws, translated with an introduction, Harmondsworth 1970. Sedley, David: ‘The Origins of Stoic God’, in: Dorothea Frede and André Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, Leiden, 2002, 41–83. Tarán, Leonardo: Academia. Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis, Philadelphia 1975.

Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism According to various Stoic texts and sources, our souls are parts of the World Soul; they are merê or apospasmata of the World Soul. What does this mean exactly? Not only does this have consequences regarding the relationship between the World Soul and the individual souls, but it also has consequences concerning the nature of both souls. A meros seems to designate a part belonging to a whole. This would mean that the World Soul is divided between the individual souls it is composed of, so that, in a way, the World Soul is composed or constituted of the individual souls. Therefore, the perceptions, reasonings, and will of the World Soul would be the sum or the result of the perceptions, reasonings, and wills of the individual souls. There would be no difference or conflict between them. This, however, hardly seems to be a consequence that the Stoics are willing to endorse. On the other hand, an apospasma seems to be a detached portion of the World Soul. In that case, the individual souls are autonomous parts of the World Soul. This is the most likely version of the relationship between the individual souls and the World soul, and this seems to be the version endorsed, at the end of the history of Stoicism, by Marcus Aurelius when he said that each individual human being’s soul is a ‘fragment’ (ἀπόσπασμα) of himself, which ‘Zeus has given to each man to guard and guide him’ (5.27). However, this version of the relationship appears syncretic, since Marcus described this guardian soul as a daimôn, a ‘god-like entity’, and this appears to be a notion borrowed, among others, from Plato’s Republic by the Stoics. Such a conception of the soul as a god-like entity seems to pertain mainly to the ‘divine’ part of the soul, not to the animal soul which, in the Stoic tradition, appears at birth by the transformation of a physical plant-like breath to an ensouled breath: in this version, the soul does not come from God from the outside, it is nothing else than the transformation of the qualities and properties of the breath, and it is not detached from God and does not supervene from the outside. In that case, the World Soul and the individual souls are simply analogous. Again, this is clearly not what the Stoics have in mind: the relationship between the World Soul and the individual souls is not an analogy, it rather seems to be a whole-parts relationship. Moreover, the Stoics seem to maintain both that the individual souls are generated by a transformation of the inner plant-like breath of the embryo and that it results from an exhalation of the Word Soul. They combine a medical theory Note: I wish to express my gratitude to Lee Klein for kindly checking and correcting my English. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-008

168 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

of soul-formation with a cosmological, Heraclitean-like view of the formation of the individual souls from the World Soul, in a rather puzzling manner. To put it in a nutshell: the Stoics seem to endorse the cosmological view that the individual souls are parts and emanations of the World Soul, but this seems to conflict with their more medical description of the process of soul-formation, and, in addition, this creates difficulties concerning the kind of relationship between the parts and the whole. In order to address these issues, the present paper will first describe the Stoic conception of the World Soul and then proceed to the different accounts of the formation of the individual souls and their relation to the whole.

1 The world is an ensouled living being The world is commonly described by the Stoics in a way reminiscent of Plato’s Timaeus, as a living being endowed with soul, a ζῷον ἔμψυχον. Cicero and Sextus Empiricus attribute such a doctrine to the Stoics, starting from Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school.1 Sextus and Cicero credit Zeno with a whole series of arguments in favour of the world’s rationality and animation. A first series of arguments is based on perfection: the world is perfect, but nothing is more perfect than soul and reason; therefore, the world must have a rational soul. This series of arguments is preserved by Sextus in two different forms, the first being also preserved by Cicero in Latin:2 Zeno says: ‘What is rational (logikon) is better than what is not rational; nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is something rational.’ And similarly it partakes of thought (noeron) and animation (empsukhia): ‘What is endowed with thought (noeron) is better than what has no thought and what is endowed with soul (empsukhon) is better than what has no soul; but nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is endowed with thought and soul.’3 What uses of reason (ratione utitur) is better than what is not rational; nothing is better than the world; therefore the world uses reason.4

There are two additional arguments pertaining to semen and sense perception in Sextus and Cicero, which do not refer to perfection but to a relation between 1 Cicero, N. D. 2.22 (SVF 1.113): animans est mundus; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9.104 (SVF 1.111): ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9.107 (SVF 1.110): ζῷον ἔμψυχον. 2 On these arguments, see Schofield, M.: ‘The syllogisms of Zeno of Citium’, 47–48 and Meijer, P.A.: Stoic Theology, 2–11. 3 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists 1.104 = SVF 1.111. 4 Cicero, N. D. 2.21 = SVF 1.111.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 169

semen and its offspring and to a relation between parts and the whole. Zeno, taking his starting-points from Xenophon,5 formulates his argument as follows: ‘That which produces the semen of the rational is itself rational; but the world produces the semen of the rational; therefore the world is itself rational.’6 Its existence is deduced by this argument. Zeno says similarly: ‘Nothing devoid of sense-perception can have sentient parts. The world has sentient parts. Therefore the world is not devoid of sense-perception.’7 According to Sextus, there is a difference between the first argument, mentioning reason, and the second one that mentions thought and animation. Strictly speaking, only in the second argument Zeno argues in favour of the existence of a soul of the world. However, the four arguments provide almost all the properties of the soul according to the Stoics: rationality and thought (logikon and noeron), sensibility (aisthêsis), and reproduction through the semen.8 The argument from the perfection of the world is endorsed by Chrysippus, but he seems to have gathered in the same argument the three epithets of Zeno (rational, endowed with thought, and endowed with soul), and it is in the context of this argument that he seems to have described the individual souls as ‘detached portions’ (ἀπόσπασματα) of the World Soul: The world is an animal, rational, ensouled and endowed with thought: so says Chrysippus in the 1st book of his treatise On Providence, and so does Apollodorus in his Physics, and Posidonius. It is an animal since it is an ensouled substance endowed with sensation; for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the world; therefore the world is an animal. And it is ensouled, as is obvious from our own soul being a detached portion of it. Boethos, however, denies that the world is an animal.9 5 The reference to Xenophon probably refers to the passage of Memorabilia 1.4.2–9, summed up by Sextus, I.92. See Meijer, P.A.: Stoic Theology, 12–16 and 25–26, but there is no strong reason to disbelieve, as Meijer does, that Xenophon was not quoted or referred to by Zeno. However, the argument from the semen does not come from Xenophon: Sextus refers to a more general way of arguing in favour of the existence of providential gods, thus combining Plato’s World Soul in the Timaeus with a providential conception of the World Soul that does not derive from Plato’s Timaeus. 6 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists 1.101 = SVF 1.113. 7 Cicero, N. D. 2.22 = SVF 1.114. 8 Note that, according to the Stoics, the semen (sperma), like the pneuma expanding from the ruling part of the soul to the genitals, is one of the eight parts of the soul. See Ps.-Plutarch, Plac. 4.21 (SVF 2.836). 9 Diogenes Laertius, 7.142–143 = SVF 2.633: Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ζῷον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ φησὶν Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος [φησιν] ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος· (143) ζῷον μὲν οὕτως ὄντα, οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. τὸ γὰρ ζῷον τοῦ μὴ ζῴου κρεῖττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρεῖττον· ζῷον ἄρ᾿ ὁ κόσμος. ἔμψυχον δέ, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὔσης ἀποσπάσματος. Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον.

170 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

According to the Stoics, the soul is an inner breath, a sumphuton pneuma, pervading the whole body and connected with respiration.10 But there are three kinds of breath, the cohesive breath, which is the cause of the cohesion of stones, the natural breath, which ensures nutrition and growth of plants, and the psychic breath, belonging to animals.11 What is distinctive of the psychic breath of animals is that it is endowed with sense-perception (aisthêsis) and impulse.12 Impulse is not mentioned in Diogenes Laertius, 7.142–143, but it is probably not relevant to the argument. As we will see later, the idea that the soul of the world has impulses is found in other contexts. The assumption that the world may have sense-perception suffices for the present argument. Here, Chrysippus is said to have argued that the world is endowed with soul, based on the idea that our own souls are detached portions of it. The existence of the whole is argued for by means of the existence of its parts: if there are souls that are parts of the whole, then the whole exists. An ἀπόσπασμα is something detached from something else, preferably a fluid, for instance, a portion of a stream of lava from a river that is an affluent of the Tartarus (Plato, Phaedo, 113b). In Chrysippus’ argument, as presented by Diogenes Laertius, the idea that our souls are ‘detached fragments’ of the World Soul is not a consequence of the idea that the world is an ensouled animal. Quite the contrary: the idea that our own souls are fragments of the World Soul is an additional argument in favour of the thesis that the world in ensouled. Chrysippus adds the apospasma-argument to the argument from perfection. That our own souls are ‘portions’ of the World Soul is more or less presented as a fact, and it is this fact that makes ‘obvious’ (δῆλον) that the world is an ensouled living being. The argument is obviously very compressed and, as it stands, it seems to beg the question: the world is an ensouled animal because our souls are detached from the World Soul. But if this is the argument, it presupposes that the world is an ensouled animal, and it is difficult to prove that there is a World Soul from the alleged fact that the individual souls are parts of it. There may be many steps missing in the argument (for instance, how the Stoics establish that the individual souls are parts of a whole). Traces of such steps may be reconstructed from parallel arguments attributed to Zeno by Cicero: ‘the world has parts that are sentient’, ‘nothing that is inanimate and rational can give birth to an animate and

10 Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat., 3.1, p. 170.9–10 De Lacy (SVF 2.885): ‘The soul is a breath connate to us, pervading continuously throughout the body, as long as the easy-going breath of life is present in the body’ (Ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διῆκον, ἔστ᾿ ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς εὔπνοια παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι). 11 [Galen], Intr. s. med., 9, XIV 697.7–11 K. 12 See Hierocles, El. moral., 1a.31–33, ed. Bastianini-Long: ἐ[ν]θυμ[ητέο]ν [(ἐστὶν) ὅτι τὸ] ζῷο(ν) [το]ῦ μὴ ζῴου δυο[ῖν] ἔχει δ(ια)φοράν, (αἰ)σθήσει τε κ(αὶ) ὁρμῆ.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 171

rational living being’.13 So the argument seems to run as follows: the world is unified, and it is composed of parts that are sentient and endowed with soul, and the powers of the whole cannot be inferior to the powers of its parts, and the world cannot produce sentient parts, endowed with a soul, if it is itself devoid of sensibility and soul. In fact, this argument probably does not make sense unless one takes into account that there is a cosmogony in the background. The only way to make the argument work is to understand that it is based on a cosmological, developmental conception of the universe.14 Animals appear last in the development of the universe: the world is shaped as an uninhabited universe before it is peopled with plants and animals – therefore, the whole is there before its animal parts, but if these parts are animated and sentient, these living parts descend from the world and they appear as offshoots (ἀπόσπασματα) of the universe; ensouled living beings can only be generated from a sentient, ensouled world. The Stoics do not consider it a logical possibility that life can appear as the result of chemical processes from inanimate matter. And their ensouled, sentient, and rational world is God: Chrysippus, referring the whole to Zeus in the first book of his treatise On the Gods says that Zeus is the reason that rules everything and the soul of the universe, and that everything [lives (zên)?] by participating to him… [even the stones], and this is why he is called Zêna, while he is also called Dia, because he is the cause and the master of everything. The world is endowed with soul and it is god, and it is also the ruling part and the soul of the universe, and similarly Zeus and the common nature of everything and fate and necessity are drawn together in it.15 13 Cicero, N. D. 2.22. 14 Moreau, J.: L’âme du monde, 176–177 argues that what the Stoic argument presupposes as a postulate does not prove that there is an organic unity of the world: ‘La supériorité du Tout aux parties, invoquée […] par Zénon, ne saurait être valablement affirmée en dehors de la perfection absolue du Tout; aussi est-il encore postulé pour la conclusion du raisonnement que le Monde soit vraiment un Tout absolu, un Univers; sans quoi, s’il n’était qu’un ensemble, rien ne garantirait qu’il fût supérieur à ses parties. […] Les raisonnements précédents […] tous présupposent dans leur majeure, sous une expression biologique ou dans une formule dialectique, l’unité organique du Monde.’ This seems to be presupposed in the argument from perfection, but the key may be the cosmological and developmental view of the universe as a history in which biological and psychic processes cannot appear from an inferior form of being: as individual animals generate individual animals and are not generated by stones and plants, so the world, which is first devoid of animals and plants, cannot create them if it does not possess this power. This is what is elucidated by the flute argument of Zeno reported by Cicero, N. D. 2: ‘If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; […] why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring?’ (Rackham’s translation). 15 καὶ Χρύσ[ι]π[πος τὸ π]ᾶν ἐπ[ὶ] Δι᾽ ἀ[νάγων ἐ]ν τῷ πρώ[τῳ περὶ θεῶ]ν Δία φη[σὶν εἶναι τὸ]ν ἅπαντ[α διοικοῦ]ντα λόγον κ[αὶ τὴν] τοῦ ὅλου ψυ[χὴν καὶ] τῇ τούτου [μετοχ]ῇ πάντα [....] ο [......] καὶ το[ὺς λίθους, δ]ιὸ κα[ὶ] Ζ[ῆ]να [καλεῖσθ]αι, Δ[ία] δ᾿ ὅτ[ι ριον]. τόν [τε]

172 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

This quote is from a fragment of Philodemus preserved on papyrus. It must be used cautiously, as it comes from a hostile piece of polemics and is fragmentary and corrupt. The text edited by Henrichs (1974), 15, is different from Arnim’s text in SVF 2.1076, edited from Diels’ edition in the Doxographi Graeci.16 In particular, Henrichs has not included Diels’ hesitative conjecture of ‘lives’ (ζῆν) in the sentence ‘everything [lives (ζῆν)?] by participating to him… even the stones’. But since it is a justification of the name ‘Zeus’ in the accusative form (Zena) echoed in Diogenes Laertius 7.147, who says that God is called Zena ‘because it is the cause of life’ (τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιος), the general idea is obviously correct, while the conjecture according to which ‘even the stones’ share life seems much more problematic: the stones have no life, they have their own kind of pneuma, just as animals have a psychic pneuma and the plants a natural pneuma, as was acknowledged by [Galen], Intr. s. med., 9, XIV 697.6–8 K (SVF 2.716). As a consequence, animals have a certain kind of union with the stones, because there is a pneuma pervading animals, plants, and stones, as Sextus says, Adv. Math. 9.130 (SVF 3.370): ‘look: the pneuma also extends through stones and plants so that are united with them’. But the pneuma inherent to stones is not animated (it neither has movements nor perception like animals nor even nutrition and growth like plants), it is not endowed with life, so that it is doubtful whether a Stoic might have written that ‘even the stones’ participate in Zeus as a purveyor of life. The general sense of the text of Philodemus is nonetheless probably correct and means that everything that has life owes this life to God as the soul of the universe and nothing can come to life without the power of a sentient God that pervades everything.17 The Stoics think that there are mineral and natural processes in animals: the bones are permeated and ruled by a cohesive pneuma, like stones, while nails and hair are ruled respectively by a pneuma phutikon, like plants,18 so that things are perfectly similar in the world and in individual animals. There are portions of the universe (stones and plants) where the divine breath that permeates the universe is not psychic, but natural or mineral, and

κό[σ]μ[ον ἔμψυ]χον ε[ἶναι κ]αὶ [θεόν, κ]αὶ [τ]ὸ ἡ[γεμονικὸν κ]αὶ τὴν ὅ[λου ψ]υχ[ή]ν καὶ ο[ὕ] τω[ς ἀν]ὰ λγον σ[υ]νά[γε]σθαι τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴ[ν] πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἀνάγκην. (Philodemus, De pietate, PHerc. 1428, iv 13–v 2, ed. Henrichs). 16 Note, however, that Henrichs goes back to Diels’ reading τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ψυχήν, which was emended by Arnim into τὴν ὅλην ψυχήν. 17 When Diogenes Laertius says that God is called Zêna ‘because it is the cause of life’ (7.147), he adds that it is called Demeter when it pervades the earth, and this is probably the part of the pneuma that pervades stones, too. 18 Compare Diogenes Laertius 7.86 (SVF 3.178) with Philo, Leg. Alleg., 2.22 (SVF 2.458) and Galen, Adv. Iul., 5.48.18 Wenkebach [266 K.] (SVF 2.718).

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 173

this is also the case for individual animals. This is clearly explained in another passage of Diogenes Laertius: The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise On Providence and Posidonius in the thirteenth book of his treatise On the Gods, since intelligence pervades every part of it, just like the soul in us, but it pervades some parts to a greater extent, others to a lesser degree. For through some parts it passes as tenor (hexis), as is the case through our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as through the ruling part.19

Chrysippus’ book quoted here by Diogenes Laertius is the same as the one quoted by Philodemus, and therefore it confirms the right interpretation of what Chrysippus wrote, i.e., not that even stones have life because of Zeus, but that they are pervaded by the pneuma of God which is a soul wherever there is life.

2 World formation as a biological process Stoic cosmology is based on an account of two principles, one passive, matter, and one active, God or reason (logos). This logos works like a craftsman (δημιουργεῖν), but it does not work on matter as a craftsman, from the outside, but from the inside, as a biological principle: The Stoics think that there are two principles of the universe, that which acts and that which is acted upon. That which is acted upon is the unqualified substance, i.e. matter; that which acts is the reason in it (ἐν αὐτῇ), i.e. God. For this, since it is everlasting, works like a craftsman (δημιουργεῖν) every single thing throughout all matter (διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς).20

This conception results from the fact that the Stoics see the formation of the world as processing from physical and chemical transformations of the elements into one another and then from a mixture of the elements with each other to engender more complex entities. The Stoics neither believe in the existence of atoms randomly aggregating themselves into more complex entities nor in the existence of patterns imposed on matter from the outside, and thus, leaving aside random formation and technical processes, they are left with a chemical and a biological model. God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; He is also called by many other names. In the beginning, He is by himself and transforms the whole of substance through

19 Diogenes Laertius, 7.138–139. 20 Diogenes Laertius, 7.134.

174 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed is contained in the semen, so God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture, working on its own matter to make it more malleable, with a view to the subsequent generation. Thereupon He engenders first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. Zeno speaks about all this in his treatise On the Whole, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Archedemus in one book of his treatise On the Elements. An element is that from which generated things first come to be and into which they are finally resolved.21 The world comes to be when the substance is turned from fire through air into moisture; then the thicker part of moisture condenses and ends up as earth, but the finer part is rarefied, and when it has been thinned still further, it generates fire. Thereafter out of these, by mixture (kata mixin), plants and animals and the other natural kinds come to be. Zeno speaks of generation and corruption in his treatise On the Whole, Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On the World and so does Cleanthes and Antipatros in the tenth book of his treatise On the World.22

In those two passages, the first two references, i.e., Zeno’s On the Whole and the first book of Chrysippus’ Physics, are the same, and the context and source are obviously parallel. They describe a physical and chemical process of elementary transformation of elements, which finally mix with each other to generate more complex entities like plants and animals. It is in this sense that animals and their souls are apospasmata of the world, which originally is just a substance, made of fire. The animals are later-stage developments of the original elements, transformed into each other, and combined by mixture. But apparently the Stoics think that, in order to explain the transformations of the elements, one needs to assume the existence of an active principle (as opposed to passive matter) permeating elements, already present in fire and the efficient cause of the transformation. This principle is said to act as semen and therefore it introduces a biological process at the very heart of a basic chemical transformation and of complex processes of mixture. The Stoics explain basic chemical processes and elementary transformations by the power of life, or some power similar to it  – God is a ‘seminal reason’ of the universe, compared to the seed contained in the semen. This enables them to avoid the hazards of materialistic combinations of 21 Diogenes Laertius, 7.135–136 = SVF 2.580: Ἕν τ᾿ εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλαῖς τ᾿ ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι. [136] κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ᾿ αὑτὸν ὄντα τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι᾿ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, εὐεργὸν αὑτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἑξῆς γένεσιν· εἶτ᾿ ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων τ᾿ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀρχέδημος ἔν τινι Περὶ στοιχείων. ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. 22 Diogenes Laertius, 7.142 = SVF 2.581.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 175

passive atoms, as well as the power of ‘form’, whether separated, as in Platonism, or inherent to matter, as in Aristotelianism.

3 The parts of the World Soul and the location of its ruling part While the pneuma pervades the whole world, and makes it continuous, it has a ruling part, like the souls of individual animals. In animals, the breath pervades the whole body. In bones and sinews, it is just tenor (hexis) and in nails and hair it is just phusis, like in plants,23 but in the rest of body, endowed with nutrition, growth, and sense perception, it is soul, mixed with the body and divided into eight parts: the commanding faculty or hegemonikon, the five senses (sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch), the semen, and the voice. The commanding faculty is located in the heart, while the other parts ‘flow from their seat in the heart, as if from the source of a spring, and spread through the whole body. They continually fill all the limbs with vital breath, and rule and control them with countless different powers – nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, impulse to action’.24 The senses are parts of breath extending from the commanding faculty to the corresponding sense organs, for instance, ‘sight is breath which extends from the commanding-part to the eyes, hearing is breath extending from the commanding-part to the ears, …’, and they are like messengers delivering messages to the central part of the soul, conveying the information or impressions they receive from the outside (or, in some cases, from the inside).25 Similarly, the breath of the world permeates the whole world. This breath is present in a less elaborated form in stones and plants.26 As in individual animals, the breath that constitutes the World Soul is also present in a ruling part, where it exists under the more achieved form of the soul. This ruling part must have a specific location, as is the case with the ruling faculty of individual animals:

23 See below, with reference to Diogenes Laertius 7.86 (SVF 3.178), Philo, Leg. Alleg., 2.22 (SVF 2.458) and Galen, Adv. Iul., 5.48.18 Wenkebach [266 K.] (SVF 2.718). 24 Calcidius, 220 (SVF 2.879, LS 53G). 25 [Plutarch], Plac., 4.21, 903 B (SVF 2.836, LS 53 H, transl. modified). 26 See Diogenes Laertius, 7.138–139, quoted above.

176 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

So, then, the whole world which is a living being, endowed with soul and reason, has aether for its ruling part: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise On the Cosmos. But Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Providence and Posidonius in his book On the Gods say that the heaven is the ruling part of the world, while Cleanthes says that it is the sun. Chrysippus, however, in the course of the same book gives a somewhat different account, saying that it is the purest part of the aether. This, they say, as primary God, passes perceptibly as it was through things in the air and through all animals and plants, and through the earth itself, by way of tenor.27

There was a disagreement between Cleanthes, on the one side, and Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius on the other, concerning the location of this ruling part, but they agree that there is a ruling part. Cicero, Acad. 2. 126 (SVF 1.154) also says that, in contrast to Cleanthes, ‘Zeno and almost all the other Stoics think that the aether is the supreme God, endowed with a mind by which the whole universe is ruled’. As a consequence of this line of argument, it is rather clear that individual souls must be parts, not of the ruling part of the World Soul, but rather parts of the soul dispatched in animated parts of the world, as in individual animals, for instance, sight is a part of the psychic breath in the eyes and stretched between the eyes and the commanding faculty. In animals, there are parts of the soul, and one of these parts is a ruling part, located in the heart. Similarly, in the world, there are parts of the soul, and one of these parts is a ruling part, located in the heavens (or in the sun). But, similarly to what happens to the senses, which have no autonomy in relation to the ruling part of the soul, because the ruling part of the individual animal is the one that commands, the individual souls must be ruled by the ruling part of the universe and should have no autonomy.

4 The World Soul has sense perception and impulses As noted earlier, in the arguments in favour of the existence of the World Soul, impulse is not mentioned as one of the faculties of the World Soul, for instance, in Diogenes Laertius, 7.142–143. Diogenes Laertius says that the world is a rational 27 Diogenes Laertius, 7.139 (SVF 2.634): οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Χρύσιππος δ᾿ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. ὁ μέντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ, ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν· διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ᾿ ἕξιν.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 177

animal, and this implies that the world has a reason. He mentions that the world has sense perceptions, but he does not say that it has impulses, while every soul has sense perceptions and impulses. According to the Stoic doctrine, every soul is endowed with aisthêsis and impulse28, in addition to the properties of the hectic pneuma (coherence) and the natural pneuma (nutrition and growth)29. The reason why Diogenes Laertius does not mention impulses is presumably that it is not relevant to the argument. In any case, it is made clear in other contexts that the World Soul has not only sense perceptions and rationality, but also impulses, as individual souls have: Just as all the other natures are generated, grow and are sustained by their own seeds, so the nature of the world has all the voluntary motions, the impulses and the desires which the Greeks call hormai, and exhibits the actions in agreement with these in the same way as we ourselves do, who are moved by our souls and our sense-perceptions (sic natura mundi omnis motus habet voluntarios conatusque et adpetitiones, quas ὁρμάς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet, ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus). Such is the mind of the world that it may for this reason be correctly named prudence or providence (for this is called pronoia in Greek).30

In the first sentence of this passage, Cicero attributes these impulses and voluntary motions not exactly to the World Soul, but to the ‘nature of the world’ (natura mundi). Since this nature of the world has impulses and will and is compared to ‘ourselves who are moved by our minds’, it is clear that this means that the nature of the world is moved by a soul according to impulses, just like individual souls. And this becomes completely clear at the end of the passage, when Cicero says that ‘such is the mind of the world (mens mundi)’. Mens mundi is clearly a Latin translation for World Soul, probably with the Greek word dianoia in the background. This description of the World Soul as a providence (pronoia), namely the capacity to plan and organise in advance is confirmed by other sources, in particular Diogenes Laertius 7.147, who says that god is ‘provident toward the world and what is contained in the world’. It is, however, in Cicero that it is made clearer that this providence is due to the capacity of the World Soul to have impulses. Impulse in men is described by Chrysippus as ‘the reason of man ordering him what to do’ (Plutarch, Stoic. Repugn. 11, 1037 F). Similarly, the Stoics describe law as a reason that gives commands and ‘orders what to do and what not to do’.31 Hence, it seems clear that the reason of the world has a reason with impulses that

28 Hierocles, El. moral., 1a.31–33, ed. Bastianini-Long. See above, p. 140. 29 [Galen], Intr. s. med., 9, XIV 697.6–8 K (SVF 2.716). 30 Cicero, Nat. deor. 2.58 (SVF 1.172). 31 See Alexander, Fat. 35, 207.8–11 Bruns (SVF 2.1003).

178 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

move the world; and one particular way of doing this is the way the natural ‘law’ gives prescriptions to rational individuals. In this way, individual souls appear as subordinated to the World Soul.

5 The World Soul is immortal An important difference between the World Soul and individual souls is that the World Soul is immortal, while the individual souls are mortal. Given the fact that the world disintegrates in the conflagration, this is not evident, and the Stoics could have said that the World Soul disappears in the conflagration and is therefore mortal. In addition, the world as an animal seems to emerge rather late: it emerges from its initial fiery state and then from a liquid state where God as ‘seminal reason’ is contained ‘in the moisture’; then, it seems that the world first exists as any individual living being first as an embryonic form before becoming a living being. The Stoics could have therefore assumed that, in its last and first stage, the animal is no more a living being than semen and sperm, or even no more a living being than a foetus. However, they precisely maintained the contrary. This is in fact quite understandable: contrary to individual animals, which are engendered by their parents, reproduce themselves and die, the world is not engendered by another animal. This, as we shall see later, does not prevent it from, in a way, engendering other animals, and this is why God is sometimes considered the father of all living beings. But it does not give birth to another world, only to other animals and souls within him, contrary to what individual animals do. Furthermore, though it becomes fiery, it could be described as being reduced into ashes and reborn later from its own ashes, like a Phoenix. However, this is a step the Stoics do not seem to have taken, since they never say that the world is reduced to ashes and then reborn from its own ashes. What they endorse is rather that in its final and initial state, the world is reduced to fire in its purest, lively form.32 Chrysippus argued from the definition of death as the separation from body and soul that death is not what happens to the world when it becomes fiery: In the first book of his treatise On providence, [Chrysippus] says that Zeus continues to grow until he has absorbed everything into himself: ‘For since death is the separation of soul from body, and the World Soul is not separated but grows continuously until it has com-

32 On the nature fire in the stage of ekpurosis, see Cooper, J.: ‘Chrysippus on Physical Elements’, 103–113, and also Gourinat, J.B.: ‘The Stoics on Matter’, 59–62.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 179

pletely absorbed its matter into itself (εἰς αὑτὴν καταναλώση τὴν ὕλην), the world must not be said to die (οὐ ῥητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον)’.33

In fact, what happens is not that the soul of the world separates from the body nor that the soul is destroyed, but quite the contrary, namely that the soul expands through the universe and devours everything that exists. It is not the soul that disintegrates, but the soul of the world that absorbs everything (a description reminding of Saturn devouring his own children). This doctrine is well known in modern times as the doctrine of the ‘everlasting recurrence’. According to this doctrine, there is not only one generation of the world from chaos, as in the Timaeus, but the process repeats itself an infinite number of times, so that at the end of each process, the world turns into fire and disintegrates, while, at the beginning of each process, the world is reformed again from this state of fire.34 This initial state of fire is compared to semen, from which everything else is generated.35 At this point, in fact, there is nothing else than soul: [Chrysippus] says that when conflagration has occurred through and through, alive and an animal, but as it goes out again and condenses, it turns into water, earth and what is corporeal. In the first book of his treatise On Providence, he says: ‘For the world, when it is thoroughly fiery, is immediately its own soul and its own ruling part. But, when having changed into moisture and the residual soul, it has in a way changed into body and soul, so as to be compounded of these two, it possesses some other reason’.36

Here, Long and Sedley, in their translation of this passage in 46 F, understand ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον as ‘it has a different principle’. However, it makes more sense to understand this as referring to ‘some other reason’, namely to the fact that ‘reason’ in this stage has the form of a seminal reason, and not the form of the completely developed rationality of an adult. If one calls to mind Zeno’s arguments as preserved by Cicero and Sextus, it was quite clear that Zeno argues that the world is logikos in two ways, according to the different meanings of the 33 Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 39.1052C (SVF 2.604). 34 See, for instance, Aristocles in Eusebius, E. P. 15.14 (SVF 1.98). 35 Ibid: ‘The primary fire is at it were a sperm which possesses the principles of all things and the causes of past, present and future events’. See ibid., 15.8.3 (SVF 1.107): ‘the whole of substance turns into fire as if it were into sperm’; Stobaeus, Eclog, I, 20, p. 171, 2, W. (SVF 1.107; SVF 2.596). 36 Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 41.1053B = SVF 2.605: Καὶ μὴν ὅταν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, ζῆν καὶ ζῷον εἶναί φησι, σβεννύμενον δ᾿ αὖθις καὶ παχυνόμενον, εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τρέπεσθαι. Λέγει δ᾿ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Προνοίας· Διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης, εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχή ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν· ὅτε δέ, μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχήν, τρόπον τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν, ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ ἔσχε λόγον.

180 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

word. In one sense, the world is logikos insofar as it ‘uses reason’ (ratione utitur), as Cicero translates in N. D. 2.21. In the other sense, the world is logikos insofar as it ‘produces the semen of the rational’, in other words, the spermatikoi logoi, the semen that is able to produce according to a determined plan and that exists in another part of the soul (in the seed, not in the ruling part in grown-up rational beings). The world that ‘possesses some other reason’ is presumably identical to God as ‘the seminal reason of the universe’, compared by Diogenes Laertius, 7.136 to the ‘seed contained in the semen’. God having ‘another reason’, namely having spermatikos logos, is a newly born animal, whose ‘reason’ is a semen, not the developed form of rationality that adult living beings have. In individual adults, the semen and the rationality are contained in two different parts of the soul, the genitals and the ruling part of the soul. In animals when they are still unborn or when they are recently born, only the spermatikos logos is present, and the rationality will develop later (at the age of 7 to 14). Things happen in the opposite way for the world. When the world is in its fiery stage, all logos is contained in the same place, and it is the rationality of the world that absorbs everything: ‘the world, when it is thoroughly fiery, is immediately its own soul and its own ruling part’, and this clearly means that, at that stage, there is nothing else than the ruling part of the soul.

6 Formation of the individual souls and World Soul: biological birth, exhalation and prosphusis One of the most delicate aspects of the relationship between individual souls and the World Soul is the way in which individual souls are generated. At some point, in the account of the birth and development of animals, it seems clear that the soul appears when the animal is born, and that the formation of individual animals is an individual biological process, independent of the World Soul. This biological process conforms to standard physiological descriptions. However, the Stoics claim that the soul in all animals appears only at birth. According to the Stoics, the embryo is a plant-like part of the womb; it is not a living being.37 Its nutrition in the womb is analogous to the nutrition of a plant, since it is fed through the umbilical cord, just as a plant is fed through its roots.38 At birth, the 37 Ps.-Plutarch, Plac. 5.15, 907 C (SVF 2.756). 38 Plutarch, Stoic. Repugn. 41, 1052 F (SVF 2.806).

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 181

foetus becomes a living being and an animal, since its natural breath becomes an animated breath and the soul appears. This transformation is the result of a physical process: cold air enters into the lungs when the foetus is brought to birth, and the warmth of its inner breath is submitted to a chemical reaction that transforms the natural breath into a psychic breath.39 This ‘chilling process’ is compared to the ‘tempering’ of a metal, when the hot iron is plunged into water to temper it and is thus strengthened and condensed.40 There seem to be no room in such a description for the individual souls to be detached portions of the World Soul. In parallel to these biological descriptions, which seem to date from Chrysippus, Eusebius has transmitted three extracts of Arius Didymus that describe individual souls as ‘parts’, ‘detached portions’ (apospasmata), exhalations (anathumiaseis), and offsprings (prosphuseis) of the World Soul, by giving an account of Zeno’s and Cleanthes’ doctrine. He starts by presenting Zeno’s position concerning the seed: The semen (σπέρμα), says Zeno, which man emits, is breath combined with moisture, a part (μέρος) and detached portion (ἀπόσπασμα) of soul, and a blending of the parents’ seed (τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα), and a concrete mixture of the various parts of the soul. For this, having the same reasons as the universe, when emitted into the womb is caught up by another breath, and made a portion of the female’s soul and grows into one with it, and being there stirred and kindled by it grows in secret, continually receiving additions to the moisture and increasing of itself.41

In this text, something is described as a ‘part’ (μέρος) and a ‘detached portion’ (ἀπόσπασμα) of the soul, but it is not the individual soul that is described as a part and a portion of the World Soul. Like in Diogenes Laertius 7.143, it is the semen that is described as a part and a detached portion of a man’s individual soul. This seems to be the proper meaning of apospasma as applied to biological matter, as is confirmed by the doxographical description in Ps.-Plutarch’s Placita, 5.4, 905 B (SVF 1.128): ‘Leucippos and Zeno say that (seed) is a body since it is a portion (ἀπόσπασμα) of soul’. As mentioned before, the Stoics think that there are eight parts of the soul: the ruling part, the five senses, the phonetic organs producing the voice, and the semen. The semen has a particular feature: it may be detached from the soul of the father to blend with the breath of the mother in her womb.

39 Plutarch, Prim. frig., 2, 946 C (SVF 2.806); id., Stoic. Repugn., 41, 1052 F (SVF 2.806); id., Not. Comm., 1084 D-E (SVF 2.806); , Ad Gaurum, 14, 4, p. 54, 15–20 K.; Hierocles, El. moral., 1a, 21–22. 40 Plutarch, Prim. frig., 2, 946 C; id., Stoic. Repugn., 41, 1052 F; id., Stoic. Repugn., 41, 1053 C. 41 Eusebius, Evangelical preparation, 15.20.1 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels, SVF 1.128).

182 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

All the other parts of the soul cannot be detached from the soul to which they belong without losing their faculties and properties. The semen, however, can be detached from the soul to which it originally belonged to mix with another semen. This is a necessary condition due to which it can perform its proper function. In this sense, it is a part (meros) of the soul, like the other parts, but, contrary to the other parts, it is also a detachable portion (apospasma), which can only perform its action when mixed with a similar part of another soul. This mixing, Marcus Aurelius, 6.13 will later describe as the result of ‘the attrition of an entrail and a convulse expulsion (ekkrisis) of mere mucus’. In addition, Zeno mentions that this detached portion of a man’s soul ‘has the same reasons as the universe’ (ἔχον γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὅλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς), and this means that there is something in the semen that includes the reasons of the World Soul, the so-called spermatikoi logoi. Thus, not only individual souls are addressed here, but also the World Soul. Finally, Zeno describes the mixture of the seed of the two parents as ‘growing in secret, continually receiving additions to the moisture and increasing of itself’. This presumably describes the progressive transformation of the mixture of the seed of the two parents into a foetus, but also the growth of the foetus in the womb and its nourishment until birth. Eusebius says that ‘a little further on Arius adds what follows’: About the soul, Cleanthes, in setting forth the doctrines of Zeno for comparison with the other physicists, says that Zeno calls the soul an exhalation endowed with sense perception (αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν), just as Heraclitus does. For wishing to make it clear that intelligent souls are continuously produced by exhalation (ἀναθυμιώμεναι), he compared them to rivers, speaking as follows: ‘Though men step into the same rivers, the waters that from time to time flow over them are different: and souls likewise are exhaled from moisture.’ So then Zeno, like Heraclitus, describes the soul as an exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις). And he says that it is sensitive for the reason that the ruling part is capable of being impressed through the senses from real and existent objects, and of receiving their impressions. For these are special properties of soul.42

The evidence may come from Cleanthes’ Exegesis of Heraclitus, or from his Physiology of Zeno. 43 As Long acknowledges, we may assume that Cleanthes ‘looked for views similar to Zeno’s in other thinkers, and found them in Heraclitus’, ‘for strengthening the foundations of Zeno’s philosophy’.44 Clearly, this is an interpretation of Zeno linked with an interpretation of Heraclitus, and not a genuine quotation of Heraclitus or Zeno. The only genuine quotation of Heraclitus seems 42 Eusebius, Evangelical preparation, 15.20. 2–3 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels, SVF 1.5182). 43 Both titles are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 7.174. Arnim, SVF 1, appendix p. 137, assigns it to the Exegesis of Heraclitus. 44 Long, A.A.: Stoic Studies, 54.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 183

to be the first part of the quotation, according to which ‘men step into the same rivers’, but ‘the waters that from time to time flow over them are different’. Even what appears to be the second part of the quotation, namely ‘and souls likewise are exhaled from moisture’, may be an exegetical addition rather than a genuine quotation of Heraclitus. However, it is clear that what Cleanthes ascribes to both Zeno and Heraclitus is that souls are exhalations that evaporate from liquid, like from the surface of rivers – in other words, the comparison implies both a certain substance of souls, as exhalations, vapours, steam, or breath, and a description of the way the soul is nourished by moisture. This is close to the description Zeno gives in the first text, describing the semen and the foetus as ‘receiving additions to the moisture and increasing of itself’. In the first text, there is addition to the moisture and in the second exhalation from the moisture. But the two descriptions may be combined in the soul produced by the exhalation from moisture and continually increasing in the moisture nourishing the soul by exhalation. By quoting the two texts one after the other, Eusebius – or even already Arius – clearly intends to create the impression that the second passage applies to human souls as well as the first, and this may be what Cleanthes had in mind, too. However, it does not mean that this is what already Heraclitus had in mind. In Diogenes Laertius’ exposition of Heraclitus’ philosophy, there are various mentions of exhalations, but they describe atmospheric and cosmological phenomena: night and day, seasons, winds and rains. 45 According to the doxographical tradition, the stars are produced by exhalation  – this in fact is attributed to both Heraclitus and the Stoics: ‘Heraclitus and the Stoics say that the stars are nourished by exhalation coming from the surface of the earth.’ 46 Hence, exhalations are again attributed to both Heraclitus and the Stoics, and this clearly connects the Stoic doctrine of exhalation with an exegesis of Heraclitus. And if the stars, which may be of divine nature, are described as exhalations by the doxographer of the Placita, it may be the case that the divine souls of the stars are also the subject of Cleanthes’ exegesis of Heraclitus. It seems that, similarly, the Stoics sometimes describe the soul as an ‘exhalation from the blood’.47 Thus, we seem to encounter a similar phenomenon regarding the nourishment of the stars and regarding the nourishment of the substance of the human soul. The reliability with regard to the details of the Heraclitean doctrine transmitted by Arius is not very high, but what seems to be rather clear is that, for Cleanthes, souls are compared to exhalations from the moisture, and this phenomenon

45 See Diogenes Laertius, 9.10–11 (Heraclitus A1). 46 Ps.-Plutarch, Plac. 2.17, 889 D (Heraclitus A11). 47 Scholia in Homer. Iliad II 857 (SVF 2.778); see Marcus Aurelius, 5.33.4.

184 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

is comparable to the exhalation of vapours from water, to the exhalations that nourish atmospheric phenomena, and to the ones that nourish the stars. What distinguishes the soul is that it is endowed with sense perception. Arius then adds some remarks according to Eusebius. These remarks introduce the existence of the World Soul, and they make clear that the previous passage had probably implied it already in the comparison: They say that there is a soul in the universe, which they call aether; and air surrounding the earth and the sea, and exhalations (anathumiaseis) from them; and that the other souls naturally grow on this soul, both the souls of the living beings, and those in the atmosphere – for the souls of the dead remain. (5) Some say that the soul of the universe is eternal, but that the others at death mix with it: and that every soul has in it a certain ruling part, which is life, and sense perception, and impulse.48

As we have seen earlier, the identification of the World Soul with aether is the doctrine of Antipater and Chrysippus, while Cleanthes maintained that the soul of the universe is the sun.49 Hence, this text probably does not reflect Cleanthes’ position, but more presumably the position of Chrysippus. Exhalations are mentioned again, but the role that they play is not clear. Exhalations seem to stem from the earth and water surrounded by air: it may be that these exhalations are supposed to nourish the aether, so that exhalations from earth and water would constantly fuel the World Soul. This would fit the description of the previous text and would not be incompatible with the description of the stars as nourished by exhalations. There may be, at first sight, an incompatibility with the first passage quoted by Eusebius, since it describes the soul as transmitted in its seminal form through the seed of the parents, while the second and the third passage describe the soul as exhalations from the moisture and the earth. However, in fact, it is rather clear that the second and the third passage describe the nourishment of the soul, not the way it is engendered initially. And it must also be clear that the World Soul is everlasting, while the individual souls are engendered in animals by a transformation of their breath at birth, which was initially contained in the mixture of the parents’ seeds. Exhalations nourish the breath throughout the life of the animals, so that there is a similar process through which the World Soul and the individual souls are nourished. However, after describing the way the 48 Eusebius, Evangelical preparation, 15.20.4–5 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels, SVF 2.821): Εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα, καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζῴοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἔτι τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχάς. (5) ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην. ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὑτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή. 49 Diogenes Laertius, 7.139; Cicero, Acad. 2.126. See above, p. 176.

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

 185

World Soul results from exhalations, Arius adds that ‘the other souls naturally grow on this soul’. This sounds as if the individual souls were developed from the World Soul, and this seems again to allude to the fact that the individual souls are parts and ‘detached portions’ of the World Soul, and at the same time it seems to contradict it, because the idea of ‘grow on’ (prosphuein) seems to imply a continuous link, without separation. Obviously, one can try to put together all the various pieces of the puzzle, as they have been collected so far. Chrysippus says that a human soul is a detached portion (ἀπόσπασμα) of the World Soul, but Zeno, before him, said that the semen of a man is ‘a part and a detached portion’ (μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα) of the soul. And Zeno adds that the individual semen has the same ‘reasons’ as the World Soul. This, as Epictetus puts it, means that ‘you are a portion (ἀπόσπασμα) of God; you have inside you a part (μέρος) of him’.50 If we are detached portions of the World Soul, this is because, as living beings, we are the result of the successive transformations of the semen of our father, detached from his soul and body and mixed with the seed of our mother in her womb. This mixture of seeds develops into a foetus, growing inside the mother’s womb, nourishing itself like a plant. Later, it is born and transformed into a new individual living being. Ultimately, this offspring comes from the initial transformation of matter, which was produced in the universe from the semen of the universe; and this semen of the universe is itself a part of the World Soul. In addition, this individual soul is constituted of the same substance as the World Soul, namely breath, and it contains similar ‘reasons’.51 For that reason, the individual souls are detached portions (apospasmata) of the World Soul, and they also ‘grow on this soul’ (προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ), as the foetus grows inside the womb attached to it through the umbilical cord like a plant rooted in the soil. The description of the soul as a detached portion captures the process though which an animal grows into an autonomous individual being from the seed of its parents. The description ‘growing on it’ captures the way a foetus grows inside the womb of their mother as a plant grows on the soil of the earth. In this way, there is a unique continuum of material souls in the universe, and

50 Epictetus, Discourses, 2.8.11. 51 As says Reydams-Schils, G.: The Roman Stoics, 124: ‘a human soul is a “piece broken off” (apospasma) from the divine principle: it is made of the same corporeal stuff (pneuma) as is god and in its rational aspect is structurally analogous to divine reason. When human beings procreate they in turn pass on a piece (apospasma) of their soul pneuma to their offspring. [SVF 1.123–33, 2.738–60] Hence a continuous chain is established from divine pneuma through the substance of parents’ souls down to their offspring.’

186 

 Jean-Baptiste Gourinat

the individual souls cannot be independent from the World Soul. This is perfectly encapsulated by Epictetus: But are the plants and our own bodies so closely bound up with the universe, and do they so intimately share its affections, and is not the same much more true of our own souls? (6) But if our souls are so bound up with God and joined together with him (ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ), as being parts and portions of him (αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα), does not God perceive each of their motion as being proper and connatural to him (οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς)?52

There is an intimate connection between our individual souls and the World Soul and, as a consequence, God cannot ignore any of our feelings and motions. What is the relation of the thoughts and impulses of the individual souls and the thoughts and impulses of the World Soul? They cannot be identical, and the fact that individual souls are detached portions of the World Soul, growing out of it as plants grow out of the earth, does not mean that they are not autonomous parts of the World Soul. The relation of the seed to the soul in human beings and animals consists in the seed being part of the soul, though different from the ruling part of the soul and subordinated to it. When this seed has developed into an adult world, as any other living being, it has a soul, and this soul has parts, which are present in individual animals and human beings. At this stage, the relation of these parts to their ruling part becomes comparable to that of citizens to their ruler in the organisation of a city. The relation of the individual souls to the World Soul is different from the relation of the parts of the soul of an individual living being to its ruling part, since, in individual animals, only the ruling part of the soul is rational, while in the world both the ruling part of the soul and the individual souls are rational. As a consequence, this relationship of the parts to their ruler is similar to that of a city or a family: a child is a detached portion of the souls of its parents, as it was previously contained in their semen, but it is submitted to the authority of its father. Likewise, the individual souls as detached portions of the World Soul: they are submitted to the authority of the World Soul. Not only is the universe a living being endowed with soul and rationality – it is also the common habitation of God and men, where men and gods live as fellow citizens, and where Zeus, the ruling part of the World Soul, is the first ruler. 53 The World Soul is the soul of the whole, reigning over the individual souls, not the whole of the soul as opposed to its parts. The individual souls are detached portions (apospasmata) of the World Soul, just as children are detached portions of the soul of their parents. 52 Epictetus, Dissertations 1.14.5–6. 53 Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation 15.15.4–8 (SVF 2.528).

Apospasma: The World Soul and its individual parts in Stoicism 

References Cooper, John: Chrysippus on Physical Elements, in: Salles 2009, 95–134. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste: The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter, in: Salles 2009, 46–70. Henrichs, Albert: ‘Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie in PHerc. 1428’, Cronache ercolanesi 4 (1974), 5–32. Long, Anthony A.: Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996. Meijer, Pieter A.: Stoic Theology. Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods, including a commentary on Cleanthes’ Hymn on Zeus, Delft 2007. Moreau, Joseph: L’âme du monde de Platon aux stoïciens, Paris 1939. Reydams-Schils, Gretchen: The Roman Stoics. Self, Responsibility, and Affection, Chicago 2005. Salles, Ricardo (ed.): God and Cosmos in Stoicism, Cambridge 2009. Schofield, Malcolm: ‘The syllogisms of Zeno of Citium’, Phronesis 28 (1983), 31–58.

 187

Angela Ulacco

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica: kosmologische und erkenntnistheoretische Aspekte 1 Einleitung Der Abschnitt in Platons Timaios, in dem die Erschaffung und die Komposition der Allseele dargestellt wird (34c10–37c5), ist von zentraler Bedeutung für das Verständnis der platonischen Kosmologie und Epistemologie.1 Schon die ersten Schüler Platons haben sich, zur Zeit der Alten Akademie, mit diesem Abschnitt beschäftigt und versucht, die Bedeutung der von Timaios gehaltenen Rede zu erklären.2 Auch in der Zeit danach, insbesondere seit dem 1. Jh. v. Chr., wo der dogmatische Platonismus ein starkes Wiederaufleben erfährt, ist die Diskussion der kosmischen Seele von großem Stellenwert.3 Eines der Zeugnisse für die 1 Zu den Hauptproblemen des Timaios, vor allem was die kosmische und menschliche Seele betrifft vgl. Taylor, A. E.: A commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Cornford, F. M.: Plato’s Cosmology, Brisson, L.: Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon, von Perger, M.: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios, Johanssen, T. K.: Plato’s Natural Philosophy, Carone, G. R.: Plato’s cosmology and its ethical dimensions, Broadie, S.: Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus. 2 Zur Rezeption des Timaios vgl. Reydams-Schils, G.: Demiurge and providence und idem (Hg.), Plato’s Timaeus as cultural icon, Leinkauf, Th. / Steel, C. (Hgg.): Platons Timaios, Mohr, R. D. / Sattler, B. M. (Hgg.): One book, the whole universe, Celia, F. / Ulacco, A. (Hgg.): Il Timeo. 3 Die Phase des Platonismus, die sich vom 1. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 3. Jh. n. Chr. erstreckt, wird mit Bezug auf Plotins neuen Kurs häufig als „Mittelplatonismus“ bezeichnet. Unter diesem historiographischen Etikett werden üblicherweise unterschiedliche Tendenzen des Platonismus in der Kaiserzeit versammelt. Die Platoniker dieser Zeit, wie Alkinoos, Plutarch, Attikos und Numenios, haben das gemeinsame Bedürfnis, ein kohärentes System aus Platons Dialogen herauszuarbeiten. Sie versuchen die Aporien des platonischen Textes durch Vergleiche mit anderen platonischen Textstellen, die scheinbar in Widerspruch mit der jeweils untersuchten Textstelle stehen, zu lösen. In dieser Zeit besteht die platonische Philosophie im Wesentlichen in der Exegese der Texte Platons. Die Brauchbarkeit der Bezeichnung „Mittelplatonismus“ ist umstritten. Zum Terminus siehe Dörrie, H.: „Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandreia“, 44. Zur Diskussion dieser Kategorie siehe, unter anderem, Donini, P.: „Medioplatonismo e filosofi medioplatonici“ , Männlein-Robert, I.: Longin, Philologe und Philosoph, 15–18. Vgl. nun Ferrari, Franco: „Der Begriff ‘Mittelplatonismus’ und die Forschungsgeschichte“. Was die exegetische Note: Ich möchte Mareike Hauer (München) herzlich für die sprachlichen Korrekturen danken. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-009

190 

 Angela Ulacco

Bedeutung des Abschnittes über die Komposition der Seele ist Plutarch’s Spezialkommentar De animae procreatione in Timaeo, verfasst wahrscheinlich zwischen dem 1. Jh. und 2. Jh. n. Chr., in dem Plutarch die vorangehenden Interpretationen der Timaios Stelle kritisiert und seine eigene Exegese begründet.4 Eine Interpretation der Komposition der Seele, die sehr wahrscheinlich der Exegese von Plutarch vorausgeht, aber welche Plutarch nicht erwähnt, ist in einigen dorischen pseudopythagoreischen Texten zu finden. In diesen Texten, die sich als Schriften der antiken Pythagoreer des 4. Jh. v. Chr. präsentieren,5 vermutlich jedoch zwischen dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. und dem 1. Jh. n. Chr. verfasst wurden, kann man den Versuch einer Synthese von platonischer, aristotelischer, sowie hellenistischer Theorie erkennen, die ihre Autoren wiederum auf den alten Pythagoreismus zurückzuführen versuchen.6 An dieser Stelle sollen die dorischen pseudopythagoreischen Traktate, die in der Textsammlung von H. Thesleff enthalten sind, behandelt werden.7 Diese Traktate konstituieren nämlich einen Teil einer umfangreichen Sammlung, die nicht nur Traktate, sondern auch Briefe, Berichte sowie verschiedene Zeugnisse enthält. All diese Texte haben einen gemeinsamen Charakterzug: sie sind auf artifiziellem Dorisch geschrieben und behandeln verschiedene Bereiche der Philosophie, nämlich Logik, Physik und Ethik, während sie religiöse

Technik der Mittelplatoniker betrifft, vgl. die zahlreichen Studien von Franco Ferrari, z.B. Ferrari, F.: „Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo“, „Verso la costruzione del sistema: il medioplatonismo“ und „Esegesi, commento e sistema nel medioplatonismo“. 4 Siehe die Edition von Ferrari, F. / Baldi, L.: Plutarco, La generazione dell’anima nel Timeo. 5 Z.B. Archytas, Aresas, Aristaios, Damippos, Ocellus, Onatas, Philolaos, Timaios Lokros. 6 Über die Datierung und den Zweck der Pythagoreischen Fälschungen wurden unterschiedliche Hypothesen geäußert. Nach einer alten von Zeller (Zeller, E.: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 235–236) vorgeschlagenen Hypothese wurden alle pseudoepigraphischen Texte im 1. Jh. v. Chr. in Alexandria verfasst, wo das Interesse für den alten Pythagoreismus wieder auflebte, wie man es z. B. bei Eudoros von Alexandria feststellen kann. Thesleff dachte dagegen an eine Verfassung der Texte zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten (vom 4. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 3. Jh. n. Chr.) und an verschieden Orten (Rom, Alexandria, Magna Graecia). Die letzten Studien zu einzelnen Traktaten haben die Hypothese von Zeller bestätigt. Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele mit Hinblick auf De natura mundi et animae von Ps.-Timaios Lokros, Szlezàk, T. A.: Pseudo- Archytas über die Kategorien bezüglich Über die Kategorien von Ps.-Archytas und Centrone, B.: „Pseudopythagorica Ethica“ mit Hinblick auf die ethischen Schriften neigen zu einer Datierung in der Zeit vom 1. Jh. v. Chr. bis zum 1. Jh. n. Chr. Sie finden zahlreiche Ähnlichkeiten mit den Platonismus des 1. Jh. v. Chr., vor allem mit Eudoros und seinem Interesse für den alten Pythagoreismus. Weitere Indizien bilden die Annäherung an den aristotelischen Text und das Interesse für die Kategorien. Vgl. auch Bonazzi, M.: „Pythagoreanising Aristotle“, Centrone, B.: „The pseudo-Pythagorean Writings“ und schließlich Ulacco, A: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 2–16. 7 Cf. Thesleff, H.: The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 191

Aspekte nicht in den Blick nehmen.8 Zu diesem pseudopythagoreischen Corpus gehört die Abhandlung De natura mundi et animae (Περὶ φύσιος κόσμω καὶ ψύχᾶς), die Timaios Lokros, dem gleichnamigen Protagonisten des platonischen Timaios, zugeschrieben wird. Die kleine Abhandlung, die eine Art Zusammenfassung des Timaios bietet, wurde in der Antike als das Vorbild für den platonischen Dialog betrachtet.9 Die Eigentümlichkeit dieser Schrift besteht darin, dass sie den einzigen pseudopythagoreischen Text darstellt, der als eine Art Epitome eines platonischen Dialogs verfasst wurde. Sie kann also als Zeugnis eines frühen Stadiums der Timaios-Exegese betrachtet werden. Matthias Baltes hat diesen Text analysiert und ist zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass er eine Mischung aus einer Epitome des Timaios und einer Lehrschrift ist. Er datiert die Schrift, wegen der Ähnlichkeit von Ps.-Timaios Lokros zu Eudoros von Alexandria, auf die Zeit zwischen dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. und dem 1. Jh. n. Chr.10 Ich möchte in diesem Aufsatz die philosophischen Aspekte der Vorgehensweise aufzeigen, mit der Ps.-Timaios Lokros den Abschnitt über die Komposition der Seele interpretiert. Zum einen ist seine exegetische Strategie sehr bedeutend, da sie – das gilt es zu zeigen – darin besteht, gewisse Probleme in Platons Timaios durch die Aneignung aristotelischer Elemente zu lösen.11 Zum anderen ist das Ergebnis der Strategie von Ps.-Timaios Lokros von Bedeutung, da es eine Interpretation des platonischen Dialogs darstellt, die sehr nah an dem Platonismus der frühen Kaiserzeit ist. Wie verschiedene Studien gezeigt haben, kannte das 1. Jh. v. Chr., in dem die pseudopythagoreischen Texte vermutlich verfasst wurden, verschiedene Arten von Platonismus, die das Ziel hatten, jeweils eine bestimmte Deutung der Philosophie Platons voranzutreiben.12 Die Rückkehr zum

8 Andere Zeugnisse behandeln Aphorismen und Lebensregeln und reihen sich in den akusmatischen Pythagoreismus ein. 9 Proklos, in seinem Kommentar zu Platons Timaios, behandelt die Schrift von Ps.-Timaios Lokros als ein pythagoreisches Modell für Platons Dialog (In Tim. I.1.5–16). Simplikios meint, dass die Schrift Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων von Ps.-Archytas ein Vorbild für die Kategorienschrift von Aristoteles war (In Cat. 2,15–25; 407,15–17). Zur Rezeption der Pseudopythagorica bei den Neuplatonikern vgl. Macris, C.: „Jamblique et la littérature pseudo-pythagoricienne“, Gavray, M. A.: „Archytas lu par Simplicius“, Ulacco, A.: „The creation of authority“ (im Erscheinen). 10 Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele, 4–11; 20–26. 11 Siehe Chiaradonna, R.: „Interpretazione filosofica e ricezione del corpus“ zur platonischen Rezeption des aristotelischen Corpus. Dabei kann man Aristoteles-kritische Tendenzen von unterschiedlichen Versuchen, die Lehren des Aristoteles in den Platonismus zu integrieren, unterscheiden. Zur „appropriation“ von Aristoteles’ Theorien in den Pseudopythagorica vgl. Ulacco, A: „The appropriation of Aristotle in the Ps-Pythagorean treatises“. 12 Vgl. z. B. Bonazzi, M. – Opsomer, J.: The Origins of the Platonic System, 1–2.

192 

 Angela Ulacco

alten Pythagoreismus könnte eine Weise sein, eine dogmatische Interpretation des Platonismus zu fördern. Im ersten Teil meines Aufsatzes werde ich den Text De natura mundi et animae analysieren und insbesondere diejenige Textstelle, in der Ps.-Timaios Lokros sich mit der „Zusammensetzung der Seele“ (compositio animae) auseinandersetzt, einer näheren Betrachtung unterziehen. Anschließend sollen die Auswirkungen dieser Interpretation für die kosmologische und epistemologische Rolle der Seele sowie für die menschliche Seele rekonstruiert werden. Im zweiten Teil werde ich den dem Philolaos zugeschriebenen Text Über die Seele untersuchen, in dem Ps.-Philolaos eine „psychologische“ Theorie entwickelt, die – so hat es zumindest den Anschein – ganz verschieden von derjenigen des Ps.-Timaios Lokros ist.

2 Die Komposition der Seele bei Platon und bei Timaios Lokros Bevor die Textstelle untersucht wird, in der Ps.-Timaios Lokros die Komposition der Seele darstellt und damit eine bestimmte Interpretation nahezulegen versucht, gilt es zunächst, die Hauptpunkte der Darstellung Platons über die Seele kurz zusammenzufassen. Folgt man Timaios’ Rede über die Erschaffung des Kosmos, so muss der Kosmos eine Seele haben, weil er nicht vernunftlos sein darf (Tim. 30a6–b3). Dank der Seele kann der wahrnehmbare Kosmos an der Vernunft teilhaben und stellt somit das schönste Werk des Demiurgen dar, während die Seele zwischen dem immer Seienden und dem immer Werdenden steht. Die Seele wird als aus drei gemischten Grundbestandteilen bestehend beschrieben, und zwar aus dem ungeteilten und dem geteilten Sein dem ungeteilten und dem geteilten Selben und dem ungeteilten und dem geteilten Anderen.13 Diese gemischte Substanz wird zuerst nach Zahlen und Proportionen geteilt und danach noch einmal in zwei Kreisen getrennt. Durch den Umlauf des Selben bewegt sich die Seele und erkennt das, was gleich ist. Auf diese Weise bringt sie Vernunft und Wissenschaft hervor. Durch den Umlauf des Anderen hingegen erkennt sie, was anders ist, und bringt so Meinung und Vermutungen hervor.14 Die Seele hat folglich verschiedene Fähigkeiten, sie ist gewissermaßen sowohl Bewegungs- als auch Erkenntnisprinzip. Was aber die eigentliche Natur ihrer Substanz ist, ist nicht klar, vor allem weil Platon im Timaios die Seele als vom Demiurgen geschaffen und somit

13 Plat., Tim. 35a–b3. 14 Plat., Tim. 37a2–c5.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 193

als entstanden definiert, wohingegen im Phaidros15 oder in den Nomoi16 die Seele als nicht entstanden und als erstes Bewegungsprinzip beschrieben wird. Die Hauptprobleme, mit denen sich die antiken Platoniker auseinandersetzten, können kurz zusammengefasst werden: 1. Ist die Seele real entstanden oder nicht? Wie bekannt ist, wurde das Problem einer realen Erschaffung der Welt, und folglich der Seele, durch den Demiurgen ausgiebig in der Antiken Akademie diskutiert. Akademiker, wie Speusippos und Xenokrates, sprechen sich beispielsweise für einen allegorischen oder didaktischen Charakter von Timaios’ Rede aus.17 2. Wie kann die Annahme einer erschaffenen Seele, die von der Aktivität des Demiurgen abhängig ist, mit der Darstellung einer unsterblichen und ewigen Seele im Phaidros oder vor allem in den Nomoi, wo die Seele ein Prinzip und eine Ursache für Bewegung ist, vereinbart werden? 3. Wie muss die Komposition der Seele verstanden werden und was sind die Elemente der Mischung? Dieses Problem ist von großer Bedeutung im Zusammenhang mit den erkenntnistheoretischen Aspekten des Begriffs der Seele. Denn, beginnend mit Aristoteles, ist die Seele bei Platon, vielen Interpreten zufolge, ein Erkenntnisprinzip und sie erkennt anhand der sie konstituierenden Elemente. Dies folgt aus dem Prinzip, dass das Gleiche Gleiches erkennt.18 4. Eine zusätzliche Schwierigkeit, die eng mit den vorangegangenen Fragen verknüpft ist, ist die Tatsache, dass die Rede des Timaios also ein εἰκὼς μῦθος/ λόγος19 bestimmt wird, wobei nicht klar ist, was mythologisch und was wörtlich zu verstehen ist. Ps.-Timaios Lokros setzt sich vornehmlich mit der dritten Frage auseinander, aber man kann in seinem Text ebenfalls indirekte Antworten auf die anderen Fragen finden. Insgesamt präsentiert er sich nicht als ein Exeget Platons, sondern versteht sein als archaisch-pythagoreisch zu charakterisierendes Werk implizit als Quelle für den zweiten, kosmologischen Teil des Timaios, also nicht für die Atlantiserzählung oder das Vorgespräch. Das bedeutet folglich, dass die Erzählung über die Erschaffung des Kosmos und der Seele nicht dialogisch konzipiert wird. Zudem hat der Autor alle Hinweise auf den Charakter des εἰκὼς μῦθος ausgelassen. Das heißt, dass die Timaios-Rede abgekürzt wird und die Erzählung über 15 Plat., Phaidr. 245c5–246a2. 16 Plat., Leg., X, 895e10–897b5. 17 Vgl. Arist., DC, I 10, 279b32–280a3. 18 Vgl. Arist., DA, I, 404b16–18. 19 Plat., Tim. 29d2.

194 

 Angela Ulacco

den Kosmos sich in einem ernsten und dogmatischen Stil präsentiert. Timaios leitet seine Rede mit einer Prinzipienlehre ein, die er dem letzten Teil des Timaios entnimmt (47e2–48b3). Laut Ps.-Timaios Lokros sind die Ursachen (αἰτίαι) für die Gesamtheit aller Dinge zwei: der Intellekt, der die Ursache der Dinge ist, die durch Vernunft geschehen, und die Notwendigkeit, die die Ursache der Dinge ist, die durch die Kräfte der Elemente geschehen.20 Auf diese Klassifikation folgt eine Unterscheidung von Substanzarten. Die Substanzen sind dreierlei: Idee, Materie (ὕλα) und das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare, das Produkt (ἔγγονον) von Idee und Materie. Wie wir feststellen können, ersetzt Ps.-Timaios Lokros die drei Gattungen des Timaios durch das aristotelische Schema der drei Arten für die Substanz.21 Merkwürdig ist, dass Ps.-Timaios Lokros den aristotelischen Begriff der Materie benutzt, um die platonische χώρα zu erläutern:22 Die Idee sei immer, ungeworden und unbewegt, unteilbar und von der Art der Gleichheit, geistig und Vorbild für all das Geschaffene, welches sich im Wechsel befindet. Ungefähr so etwas nämlich bezeichne man und denke man sich mit Idee. Der Stoff aber sei Knetmasse und Mutter, Amme und Hervorbringer der dritten Wesenheit; denn nachdem sie die Bilder in sich aufgenommen und gleichsam in sich abgedrückt hat, bringe sie hervor was in dieser Welt Geschaffenes ist. Diese Art des Stoffs nannte er ewig, freilich nicht unbewegt, aber an sich ungestaltet und ungeformt, doch jede Gestalt annehmend. Hinsichtlich seines Auftretens bei den Elementen aber sei er teilbar und von der Art der Andersheit. Man nennt den Stoff Ort und Raum.23

Ps.-Timaios Lokros unterteilt anschließend Idee und Materie und sammelt alle Beschreibungen, die in Platons Timaios auf diese zwei Substanzen bezogen 20 Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς τάδε ἔφα· Δύο αἰτίας εἶμεν τῶν συμπάντων, νόον μὲν τῶν κατὰ λόγον γιγνομένων, ἀνάγκαν δὲ τῶν βίᾳ καττὰς δυνάμεις τῶν σωμάτων (Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 205, 4–6 Marg). 21 Vgl.  dazu Centrone, B.: „La cosmologia di Pseudo Timeo di Locri ed il Timeo di Platone“, 320–321. 22 Vgl. dazu Ulacco, A. / Opsomer, J.: „Elements and elemental properties in Timaeus Locrus“, 159–168. 23 καὶ τὰν μὲν εἶμεν ἀεί, ἀγέννατόν τε καὶ ἀκίνατον, ἀμέριστόν τε καὶ τᾶς ταὐτῶ φύσιος, νοατάν τε καὶ παράδειγμα τῶν γεννωμένων, ὁκόσα ἐν μεταβολᾷ ἐντι· τοιοῦτον γάρ τι τὰν ἰδέαν λέγεσθαί τε καὶ νοῆσθαι. τὰν δ’ ὕλαν ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ ματέρα τιθάναν τε καὶ γεννατικὰν εἶμεν τᾶς τρίτας οὐσίας· δεξαμέναν γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιώματα ἐς αὑτὰν καὶ οἷον ἐναπομαξαμέναν ἀποτελῆν τάδε τὰ γεννάματα. ταύταν δὲ τὰν ὕλαν ἀίδιον μὲν ἔφα, οὐ μὰν ἀκίνατον, ἄμορφον δὲ κατ’ αὐταύταν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεχομέναν δὲ πᾶσαν μορφάν· τὰν δὲ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὰν εἶμεν καὶ τᾶς θατέρω φύσιος. ποταγορεύοντι δὲ τὰν ὕλαν τόπον καὶ χώραν (Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 205,10– 206,5 herausgegeben und übersetzt von W. Marg). Vgl. die Übersetzung und die Interpretation des Abschnittes 206,3–4 in Ulacco, A. / Opsomer, J.: „Elements and elemental properties in Timaeus Locrus“, 166–167: „Matter is also that which is divisible in the realm of bodies and is of the nature of the different.“

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 195

werden können, wobei er sich nicht über den Unterschied zwischen Materie, chôra und der Natur der Andersheit bewusst zu sein scheint. Er weiß aber, dass Platon das Wort hylê (Materie) nicht benutzt hat, denn er schreibt, dass „man den Stoff Ort und Raum nennt“ (ποταγορεύοντι). Auf dieses Zweiprinzipienschema, das ein Kernelement pseudopythagoreischer Texte ist, werde ich auf den nächsten Seiten zurückkommen. Relevant für diese Untersuchung sind aber vor allem zwei Aspekte. Zunächst schreibt Ps.-Timaios Lokros, dass Idee, Materie und Gott (der Intellekt) nur „begrifflich“ (λόγῳ) voneinander getrennt vor der Entstehung des Kosmos bestehen. Das heißt, dass in einem „begrifflichen“ vorkosmischen Zustand, und nur dann, Idee, Materie und Gott unterschieden sind. Die Erschaffung ist also nur „auf logischer Ebene“ und zeigt, dass in der Realität Idee und Materie nie getrennt sind und die Tätigkeit Gottes keinen zeitlichen Anfang hatte. Ps.-Timaios Lokros neigt zur sogenannten didaktischen Interpretation der Erschaffung des Kosmos, derzufolge die Weltschöpfung nicht wörtlich zu verstehen wäre. Die Tätigkeit des Gott-Demiurgos, wie Ps.-Timaios Lokros sie in den folgenden Zeilen beschreibt, besteht in der Gestaltung der Art und Weise, auf die die Materie an der Idee und den Formen partizipiert, so dass sie an der Vernunft teilhat. Ps.-Timaios Lokros beschreibt eine beständige Mischung der Idee und der Materie im Kosmos. Dank der Aktivität des Gottes ist dieser geordnet und rational. Was sind die Auswirkungen dieser Konzeption für die Seele? Bevor er die Entstehung der Elemente erörtert, beschreibt Ps.-Timaios Lokros die kosmische Seele und ihre Komposition: Die Seele der Welt brachte er herzu und knüpfte sie in der Mitte an und hüllte sie außen ganz mit ihr ein; er mischte sie als eine Mischung aus der unteilbaren Gestalt und der teilbaren Wesenheit, so daß eine einheitliche Mischung aus diesen beiden entstand. Ihr mischte er zwei Kräfte zu, die Ursprünge der Bewegungen, der Bewegung des Gleichen und der des Anderen; diese, da sie schlecht mischbar ist, mischte sich nicht allzu leicht bei.24

Wie sich unschwer erkennen lässt, gibt es einige Abweichungen von Platons Timaios. Der komplexe Vorgang der Seelenmischung aus den ungeteilten und den geteilten Formen des Seins, des Selben und des Anderen, wird hier verkürzt und durch zwei Mischungen ersetzt: 1. eine Mischung aus der unteilbaren Gestalt und der teilbaren Wesenheit; 2. die Hinzumischung zweier Kräfte bzw. Prinzipien der Bewegung des Gleichen und des Anderen. Über die Gründe, warum Ps.-Timaios Lokros auf diese Weise verfährt, können verschiedene Hypothesen aufgestellt 24 Τὰν δὲ τῶ κόσμω ψυχὰν μεσόθεν ἐξάψας ἐπάγαγεν, ἔξω περικαλύψας αὐτὸν ὅλον αὐτᾷ, κρᾶμα αὐτὰν κερασάμενος ἔκ τε τᾶς ἀμερίστω μορφᾶς καὶ τᾶς μεριστᾶς οὐσίας, ὡς ἓν κρᾶμα ἐκ δύο τουτέων εἶμεν. ᾧ ποτέμιξε δύο δυνάμιας ἀρχὰς κινασίων, τᾶς τε ταὐτῶ καὶ τᾶς τῶ ἑτέρω· ἃ δὴ ἃ δὴ καὶ δύσμικτος ἔασσα οὐκ ἐκ τῶ ῥᾴστω συνεκίρνατο (Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 208,13–17 Marg).

196 

 Angela Ulacco

werden. So kann eine Verkürzung des Prozesses der Mischung der Seele auch bei Plutarch nachgewiesen werden, die mit aller Wahrscheinlichkeit bereits auf die Alte Akademie zurückgeht. Auch Ps.-Timaios Lokros Interpretation der Zusammensetzung der Seele in „begrifflichem“ Sinne weist eine signifikante Nähe zu den Alten Akademikern auf. 25 Er schreibt zwar nicht ausdrücklich, dass die Seele nicht real entstanden sei, aber wir können vermuten, dass seine Ausführungen über den Kosmos auch für die Seele gültig sind. Und das erst recht, wenn wir sehen, welche die Elemente sind, aus denen die Seele zusammengesetzt wird. Denn wenn Ps.-Timaios Lokros eine Kohärenz mit seiner Klassifikation der Substanzen beabsichtigt, dann würde die unteilbare Gestalt unter „Idee“ und die teilbare Wesenheit unter „Materie“ fallen. Damit hätte man hier das Paradox einer Seele, – die von Platon immer als immateriell beschrieben wurde –, also eine Mischung aus Form und Materie. Ps.Timaios Lokros scheint sich dieses Problems bewusst zu sein und es zu berücksichtigen, wenn er nicht direkt Form und Materie in der Seele ansetzt, sondern Elemente, die diesen analog sind. Es ist ihm offenbar sehr wichtig, die Seele im Lichte einer Zweiprinzipienlehre zu deuten und den mittleren Charakter zwischen Sein und Werden, den die Seele bei Platon innehatte, wiederherzustellen. Angesichts der zweiten Mischung, also Beimischung der Natur des Gleichen und der des Anderen, die bei Platon eine wichtige Rolle für die Erkenntnisfähigkeit der Seele spielt, kann man feststellen, dass es sich hier um zwei Prinzipien der Bewegung handelt und dass diese, wie Ps.-Timaios Lokros an anderer Stelle erklärt, die Bewegungen der Gestirne gemäß den Kreisen des Gleichen und des Anderen verursachen. Das Gleiche und das Andere werden also, Ps.-Timaios Lokros zufolge, den beiden Substanzen zugeordnet: das Gleiche der Idee und das Andere der Materie. Die Bewegung, in ihren zwei Arten, ist demzufolge ein zusätzliches Element, das der Demiurg der Seele beigibt. Um zu verstehen, woher Ps.-Timaios Lokros diese Interpretation der Seelenmischung eigentlich nimmt und was sein Ziel ist, müssen wir den Spezialkommentar De animae procreatione in Timaeo hinzuziehen. Wie bereits erwähnt, berichtet Plutarch hier von den Akademischen Interpretationen der Seelenmischung. So habe Xenokrates, der Darstellung Plutarchs zufolge,26 das Unteilbare mit dem Einen und das Teilbare mit der Vielheit, die mit der unbegrenzten Zweiheit aus der platonischen Prinzipienlehre gleichgesetzt wurde, identifiziert. 25 Über die verkürzte Lesart des Abschnittes des Timaios über die Erschaffung des Kosmos bei den Akademikern, Ps.-Timaios Lokros und Plutarch vgl. Ferrari, F.: „Platone, Tim. 35A1–6 in Plutarco, An. Procr. 1012B-C“, Opsomer, J.: „Plutarch’s De animae procreatione in Timaeo“, Bonazzi, M.: „Pythagoreanising Aristotle“, 164–171. 26 Plut., An. procr. 1012 D–E.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 197

Nach Xenokrates ist das Ergebnis der Mischung eine Zahl, nicht einfach eine reine Zahl, sondern eine Zahl, die sich bewegt. Die Prinzipien des Selben und des Anderen wurden bei Xenokrates jeweils mit dem Prinzip der Ruhe und der Bewegung identifiziert. Diese Interpretation ist verbunden mit der Lehre der zwei Prinzipien, dem Einen und der unbegrenzte Zweiheit, die Platon angeblich in seiner Ungeschriebenen Lehre formuliert hatte. Es ist für unsere Zwecke hier nicht wichtig, auf die Debatten zur Ungeschriebenen Lehre einzugehen.27 Festzuhalten ist die Tatsache, dass es in der Alten Akademie eine Seelenlehre gab, die im Einklang mit der Zweiprinzipienlehre stand. Vielleicht hat Xenokrates mit dieser Konzeption den Versuch unternommen, eine auf die Bewegung der Seele zielende aristotelische Kritik an Platons Timaios zu entkräften. Denn nach Aristoteles muss etwas, das sich bewegt, eine Größe haben und körperlich sein, die Seele, bzw. der Intellekt hat keine Größe und ist zudem unkörperlich.28 Krantor hat die komplexe Seelenmischung des Timaios ebenfalls verkürzt dargestellt, da er aber mehr an den epistemologischen Aspekten der Seele interessiert war, fasste er das Unteilbare als intelligible Natur und das Teilbare als passive, in den Körpern befindliche Natur auf. Die beiden Naturen partizipieren am Gleichen und am Anderen.29 Die Beimischung eines materiellen Elements in die Seele könnte ein Versuch darstellen, eine von Aristoteles ausgehende Kritik abzulehnen, nämlich, dass Platon die Verbindung der Seele mit dem Körper nicht ausreichend erläutert hätte.30 Laut Plutarch habe Eudoros beiden Ansätzen, die von Xenokrates und die von Krantor, eine gewisse Plausibilität beigemessen, während Plutarch selbst bekanntermaßen verschiedene Einwände gegen diese Interpretationen anführt.31 Die genannten Platoninterpreten gingen zu Unrecht davon aus, dass Platon die Seele als nicht real entstanden konzipierte. Plutarch zufolge muss die Seele jedoch zeitlich entstanden sein, weil sie sonst immer mit dem Weltkörper verbunden wäre und es ohne ihre Entstehung keinen Grund für die Annahme einer unabhängigen, sie verbindenden Ursache, die nur eine göttliche Vernunft sein könne, gäbe. Die Seele, wie Platon sehr klar im Timaios und in anderen Dialogen sagt, muss älter als der Körper sein. Plutarch legt auf originelle Weise dar, dass die Weltseele aus dem Intellekt und der Seele-an-sich, einer nicht-rationalen Seele, die zugleich auch ein Prinzip der nicht-rationalen Bewegung und des Bösen ist,

27 Vgl. für die Tübinger Platonschule Gaiser, K.: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. 28 Arist., DA I 407a2–22. 29 Plut., An. procr. 1012F–1013A. 30 Arist., DA I 407b14–26. 31 Plut., An. procr. 1013B.

198 

 Angela Ulacco

zusammengesetzt wird.32 So gelingt es ihm auch, den Timaios mit dem Phaidros, wo die Seele ein Bewegungsprinzip ist, und mit den Nomoi, wo die Seele zwei Naturen hat, rational und nicht-rational, zu harmonisieren. Es kann an dieser Stelle nicht auf alle mit dieser Deutung zusammenhängenden Probleme eingegangen werden. Ich möchte mich daher auf die Kritik beschränken, die Plutarch gegen Krantor anführt, weil es auch für unser Verständnis der Position von Ps.Timaios Lokros sehr hilfreich sein dürfte. Plutarch argumentiert, dass es absurd sei, der Seele ein körperliches Element zuzuschreiben, weil nur die Materie sichtbar und fühlbar, die Seele aber nicht wahrnehmbar ist.33 Ps.-Timaios Lokros‘ Theorie eines materiellen Elements in der Seele könnte die gleiche Kritik treffen, wenn die Materie auch Körperlichkeit einschließt. Die von Ps.-Timaios Lokros beschriebene Seelenmischung wurde von Matthias Baltes als eine Zusammenfassung der Konzeptionen des Xenokrates und des Krantor betrachtet.34 Das würde voraussetzen, dass irgendein Autor, – der Baltes zufolge Eudoros sein dürfte –, die beiden Interpretationen miteinander vermischt hat. Folgt man Plutarch, dann teilte Eudoros, in Übereinstimmung mit den alten Interpreten, die Ansicht, dass die Seele nicht real entstanden sei und dass die Positionen von Xenokrates und Krantor beide annehmbar wären. Aber auch wenn eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen Eudoros und Ps.-Timaios Lokros unverkennbar ist, so soll angemerkt werden, dass die Interpretation von Ps.-Timaios Lokros (und vielleicht die Interpretation von Eudoros) sich von der Alten Akademie unterscheidet. Laut Baltes konzipierte Ps.-Timaios Lokros die Seele als eine Mischung von Idee und materieller Substanz, ebenso wie Krantor, der an die noetische und körperliche Substanz dachte. Wie für Krantor, so war auch für Ps.-Timaios Lokros das Ziel dieser Mischung, eine Erklärung für die Erkenntnisfähigkeit der Seele geben zu können. Dem Prinzip „Gleiches erkennt Gleiches“ folgend, kann die Seele die Ideen sowie die Körper erkennen, weil sie aus eben jenen Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt ist. Ps.-Timaios Lokros folgt allerdings Xenokrates, indem er das Selbe und das Andere mit den zwei Prinzipien der Bewegung identifiziert. Nach Baltes ist das Ziel dieser zweiten Mischung, die Selbstbewegung der Seele zu erklären.35 Wenn die Prinzipien Bewegungsursache sind, ist der erste Grund der Bewegung nicht die Seele, sondern die Prinzipien. Man kann also sagen, dass die Seele, kraft der sie konstituierenden Prinzipien, selbstbewegend ist.

32 Plut., An. procr. 1014A–1015A. 33 Plut., An. procr. 1012C, 1022E. 34 Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros, 69–73. 35 Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros, 72–73.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 199

Man muss jedoch betonen, dass Ps.-Timaios Lokros als zweites Element der Seele keine körperliche Substanz, sondern ein materielles Prinzip setzt.36 Damit unterscheidet er sich von Krantor. Die Seele wird in Ps.-Timaios Lokros‘ Darbietung hylemorphisch konstituiert und ist selbst ein Kompositum (σύνολον) im aristotelischen Sinne und kann daher als ein Produkt (ἀποτέλεσμα) zweier Substanz-Prinzipien verstanden werden. Wo liegt also der Unterschied zwischen der Seele und dem Körper, der ebenfalls ein Kompositum von Idee und Materie ist? Und warum ist es für Ps.Timaios Lokros geboten, den Hylemorphismus auch auf die Seele anzuwenden? Zur ersten Frage kann angemerkt werden, dass die Erörterung von Ps.-Timaios Lokros der von Plutarch in seinem Kommentar kritisierten Ansicht zwar ähnlich ist; wobei gleichwohl unklar bleibt, wer diese Meinung vertreten haben könnte. Laut Plutarch kann eine Theorie, die die Seele als Ableitung aus Intelligiblem und Materie betrachtet, den Unterschied zwischen der Seele und den anderen hylemorphischen Gegenständen in der Welt nicht erklären.37 Auf Ps.-Timaios Lokros würde diese Kritik allerdings nicht zutreffen. Er könnte den Einwand entkräften, indem er klar zwischen der selbstbewegten Seele und den anderen Dingen unterscheidete. Die Seele enthält ein Bewegungsprinzip, das den anderen sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Dingen fehlt. Ps.-Timaios Lokros schreibt der Seele zwei Arten von Bewegung, gemäß dem Selben und gemäß dem Anderen, zu. Sie verkörpern nicht, wie in Xenokrates, die Ruhe und die Bewegung, sondern sind beide Bewegungsprinzipien. Was die zweite Frage betrifft, können wir nur feststellen, dass Ps.-Timaios Lokros keinen Widerspruch darin zu sehen scheint, dass ein materielles Prinzip in der Seele anwesend ist. Auf keinerlei Weise scheint dies die Unkörperlichkeit der Seele zu unterminieren. Nach Ps.-Timaios Lokros ist die Seele ein Produkt aus Form und Materie als Prinzipien, genau wie die Körper, z. B. die aus Form und Materie zusammengesetzten ersten Elemente, Erde, Feuer, Wasser und Luft. Körper und Seele haben die gleiche hylemorphische Struktur, die Seele aber ist kein Körper, sondern umkreist den Weltkörper.38 In diesem Sinne, kann auch davon gesprochen werden, dass Ps.-Timaios Lokros der Seelenmischung einen epistemologischen Aspekt beimisst. Die Seele kann die Dinge, die hylemorphisch strukturiert sind, genau deshalb erkennen, weil sie auf die gleiche Weise wie jene hylemorphisch ist. Es kann darüber hinaus vermutet werden, dass Ps.-Timaios Lokros der Ansicht ist, dass die entstandenen Dinge (auch wenn sie nur „begrifflich“ entstanden sind) kraft ihrer elementaren Struktur alle aus den gleichen Prinzipien abgeleitet sind, nämlich aus Idee und Materie. 36 Die Unterscheidung zwischen „körperlich“ und „materiell“ wird im folgenden erläutert. 37 Plut., An. Procr. 1013B-C. 38 Über den Hylemorphismus der elementaren Körper in Ps.-Timaios Lokros vgl.  Ulacco, A. / Opsomer, J.: „Elements and elemental properties in Timaeus Locrus“, 168–178.

200 

 Angela Ulacco

Was das materielle Element der Seele betrifft, ist jedoch zuerst die Frage zu stellen, was genau die Begriffe „materiell“ und „körperlich“ bedeuten? Normalerweise würde man annehmen, dass alles, was hylemorphisch zusammengesetzt ist, ein Körper ist. Das gilt bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros aber nur für die vier ersten Elemente. Wenngleich dieser Unterschied bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros nicht ausdrücklich so bestimmt wird, ist davon auszugehen, dass bei ihm nur das, was mit der prima materia zusammengesetzt ist, körperlich ist. Eine hylemorphische Zusammensetzung ist nicht notwendigerweise eine Zusammensetzung mit der üblichen prima materia, sondern mit einem höheren Materie-Prinzip. Auch wenn die Seele unter anderem aus der Materie zusammengesetzt ist, ist sie kein Körper, sondern nur etwas, das auch von dem Prinzip der Materie abgeleitet ist. Der Begriff einer Derivation aller Dinge aus zwei Prinzipien, die sich auf verschiedenen Ebenen manifestieren, nämlich sowohl auf der Ebene der Seele als auch auf der Ebene der elementaren Körper, ist nicht ganz neu. Es erinnert an die akademische Lehre, über die Aristoteles in De anima 404 b 16–27 berichtet.39 Die Prinzipien Einheit und Zweiheit sind die Elemente (στοιχεῖα), aus denen die Seele im dreidimensionalen Raum und in der Zeit hervorgeht. Auch die Dinge, die von der Seele erkannt werden, stammen aus den gleichen Prinzipien (ἀρχαί). Aristoteles geht davon aus, dass diejenigen Philosophen, die, wie etwa Empedokles und Platon, die Seele als aus den Elementen zusammengesetzt aufgefasst haben, dies angenommen haben, um zu erklären, dass die Seele nur das ihr Ähnliche zu erkennen vermag. Aristoteles tritt dieser Auffassung entschieden entgegen. Auch wenn die Theorie erklären könne, wie die Seele die einzelnen Elemente erkennt, sei es ihr nicht möglich, zu motivieren, wie Erkenntnis über die Vereinigung jener Elemente zu konkreten Dingen, wie Knochen oder dem Menschen, zustande kommt, wenn diese Dinge als solche nicht in der Seele sind.40 Mit anderen Worten, wie kann die Seele die Komposita erkennen, wenn sie in ihrem Inneren nicht über eine Ursache der Vereinigung der Elemente verfügt? Die hylemorphische Seelenauffassung in Ps.-Timaios Lokros könnte sehr wohl eine Antwort auf eine solche Kritik darstellen. Weil die Seele in sich schon

39 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ’ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ’ αἰσθήσει· εἴδη δ’ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων (Arist., DA I 404 b16–27). 40 Arist., DA I 409b30–410a15.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 201

eine Vereinigung der Elemente ist, kann sie die Dinge selbst, und nicht nur ihre Bestandteile, erkennen. Denn als Zusammengesetztes umfasst sie das Prinzip der Zusammensetzung selbst. Es kann zwar nicht bewiesen werden, dass sich Ps.Timaios Lokros der soeben referierten Kritik bewusst war und gezielt eine Antwort auf sie formuliert hat, – zumal wir nicht wissen, ob Ps.-Timaios Lokros Aristoteles’ De anima überhaupt gekannt hat. Es ist aber sehr wahrscheinlich, dass er den aristotelischen Dialog Peri philosophias kannte.41 Auch in diesem Werk hat Aristoteles den Timaios und die akademische Prinzipienlehre dargestellt und kritisiert. Xenokrates und Krantor haben wahrscheinlich auf die von Aristoteles vorgebrachten Kritiken geantwortet, aber haben nicht die aristotelische Theorie für eine bessere Erklärung oder zur Systematisierung der platonischen Theorie verwendet. Die Methode von Ps.-Timaios Lokros unterscheidet sich von der der alten Akademiker. Das Ergebnis der Exegese von Ps.-Timaios Lokros bleibt ganz platonisch, aber mittels einer vorangehenden Identifizierung der beiden Prinzipien mit der Idee und der Materie, die auf Aristoteles zurückzuführen ist, gelingt es ihm, eine aristotelische mit einer platonischen Theorie zu vereinigen. Zugleich ist die Strategie von Ps.-Timaios Lokros, obwohl der Text keine direkte und systematische Exegese vom platonischen Dialog darstellt, mit Plutarchs exegetischer Methode verwandt. Letzterer versucht, die Aporien des platonischen Textes zu lösen, indem er ebenfalls andere Stellen aus Platons Dialogen hinzuzieht. Was die erkenntnistheoretischen Aspekte der Mischung der Seele betrifft, ist jedoch anzumerken, dass diese für Ps.-Timaios Lokros nicht an erster Stelle stehen. Sie werden nur am Rande diskutiert und nicht direkt aus der Zusammensetzung der Seele abgeleitet oder mit den Komponenten des Selben und des Anderen in Verbindung gebracht. Nur am Anfang seiner Abhandlung, wo er die Klassifizierung der Substanzen beschreibt, heißt es: Als dreifache werde es durch dreierlei erkannt, die Idee durch den Verstand auf wissenschaftlichem Wege, der Stoff durch unechten Schluß, weil er noch nicht auf direktem Weg gedacht wird, sondern auf dem der Entsprechung, die Erzeugnisse durch Wahrnehmung und Meinen.42

Der epistemologische Aspekt wird in Beziehung auf die mathematische Aufteilung der Seele, die in dem Abschnitt nach der Erklärung der Komposition der kosmischen Seele folgt, erwähnt. Ps.-Timaios Lokros sagt, dass der Gott die Elemente 41 Über die Rezeption des Peri philosophias zwischen dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. und dem 2. Jh. n. Chr. vgl. Chiaradonna, R.: „Interpretazione filosofica e ricezione del corpus“, 90–91. 42 τρία δὲ ὄντα τρισὶ γνωρίζεσθαι, τὰν μὲν ἰδέαν νόῳ κατ’ ἐπιστάμαν, τὰν δ’ ὕλαν λογισμῷ νόθῳ διὰ τὸ μηδέπω κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν νοῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δ’ ἀπογεννάματα αἰσθήσει καὶ δόξᾳ (Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 206,7–10 Marg).

202 

 Angela Ulacco

der Seele gemäß zahlenmäßiger Verhältnisse vermischt habe, so dass klar sei, aus welchen Elementen sich die Seele konstituiert.43 Das würde bedeuten, dass die Zahlen und die Proportionen nötig sind, um die Komposition und Konstitution der Dinge zu erklären. Durch die Zahlen und die Proportionen sind die Dinge arithmetisch strukturiert,deswegen begrenzt und somit erkennbar. Ps.-Timaios Lokros beschäftig auch mit der Erschaffung der menschlichen Seelen. Ps.-Timaios Lokros konstruiert die menschliche Seele aus den gleichen Wirkkräften und Proportionen wie die kosmische Seele.44 Lediglich die Fähigkeit des Selben befindet sich im rationalen Seelenteil, während der nicht-rationale Seelenteil aus der Wirkkraft des Anderen stammt.45 Trotz dieses Unterschieds gibt es, wie Baltes festgestellt hat, eine starke Verbindung zwischen kosmischer und menschlicher Seele. Gott ist nicht mehr der Ferne, schwer Auffindbare (Tim. 28c), sondern er wird durch den Nus unmittelbar geschaut […]. Der Unterschied zwischen Gott und Mensch verwischt sich; denn des Menschen Seele ist in allen Stücken der Weltseele gleich, d. h. sie ist selbst eine Gottheit.46

In dieser Vorstellung liegt vielleicht der Grund, weshalb Ps.-Timaios Lokros der Erkenntnisfrage offenbar keine große Bedeutung beimisst. Der Mensch hat in sich eine psychologische Struktur, die von Gott kommt und ihn zur Erkenntnis der Dinge befähigt. Der göttliche Mensch besitzt somit grundsätzlich die Möglichkeit zur Einsicht in die Gründe des Seins und des Lebens.

3 Gott und die Seele: Ps.-Timaios und Ps.-Archytas Der Text De natura mundi et animae ist nicht der einzige im Pseudopythagoreischen Corpus, der ein hylemorphisches Modell verwendet. In der dem Ps.-Archytas zugeschriebenen kurzen Abhandlung Über die Prinzipien47 führt der Autor die gesamte Wirklichkeit auf die zwei Prinzipienreihen zurück: die Reihe des  Definierten, Begrenzten und Organisierten, und die des Undefinierten, 43 Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 208,17–209,1 Marg. 44 Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 218,5–11 Marg. 45 Die kosmische Seele besteht aus Identität und Differenz, während die rationale menschliche Seele aus den gleichen Bestandteilen zusammengesetzt wird, während die nicht-rationalen Teile im Nachhinein hinzugefügt werden. Somit wären Identität und Differenz sowohl in der menschlichen als in der kosmischen Seele Teil der rationalen Seele. 46 Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros, 10–11. Für eine detaillierte Interpretation des Texts vgl. Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 22–54. 47 Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 19,5–20,17.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 203

Unbegrenzten und Nicht-Organisierten.48 Diese zwei Prinzipien werden in verschiedenen Formen und auf verschiedenen Ebenen der Wirklichkeit erläutert. Was die konkreten Dinge betrifft, so werden die zwei Prinzipien als Form (μορφώ) und Materie (ὠσία)49 bestimmt.50 Form und Materie werden eben genau im Zusammenhang mit den drei aristotelischen Substanzen bestimmt. Die konkreten Dinge bestehen somit aus zwei Elementen: Die Form und die Materie. Da Form und Materie aber nicht autonom auseinandertreten können, bedarf es einer dritten Ursache – einer Bewegungsursache –, um Form und Materie zu vereinen. Dieses Prinzip ist Gott und seine Handlung ist mit der eines Handwerkers vergleichbar. Die Form deckt sich mit der Technê (τέχνη), die Materie mit dem begewten Substrat.51 Der Gott erzeugt die Formen innerhalb des Substratums und verwendet zu diesem Zweck Zahlen und Proportionen. Der Gott ist also die erste Kraft und er bewegt sich von selbst (ἐξ αὑτῶ κινατικὸν).52 Wie einige Forscher nachgewiesen haben, liegt die Notwendigkeit, eine der Form und der Materie übergeordnete Ursache anzunehmen, vermutlich in dem Versuch begründet, den Einwänden des Aristoteles im Buch Lambda der Metaphysik (1070a und ff.) entgegenzutreten.53 Materie und Form seien demzufolge nicht in der Lage, den Ursprung der Bewegung zu erklären, vielmehr sei eine dritte Ursache nötig, die die Rolle des Bewegungsprinzips übernimmt. Die exegetische Strategie, die eine Kombination einer Zweiprinzipienlehre mit einer Einprinziplehre impliziert, weist einige Affinitäten mit dem bekannten Eudoros-Referat von Simplikios auf.54 Ich möchte an dieser Stelle nicht auf die mit diesem Fragment verbundenen Interpretationsprobleme eingehen, sondern lediglich festhalten, dass Eudoros eine analoge Verbindung jener beiden prinzipientheoretischen Erklärungsmodelle angestrebt haben muss, in der Monas und Dyas als „Elemente“ bezeichnet werden, jedoch einer wahren, mit dem Prinzip des Einen identifizierten Ursache untergeordnet werden. Dieses Prinzip ist bei Ps.-Archytas ein bewegender Intellekt, aber er ist nicht wie bei Aristoteles selbst

48 Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 19,5–7. 49 Zu dem stoischen Ursprung der Bedeutung von Ousia als Materie vgl. Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 39–40. 50 Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 19,17–20. 51 Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 19,21–20,2. 52 Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 20,12. 53 Vgl.  dazu Bonazzi, M.: „Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale“ und Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 50–51. 54 Simpl., In Phys. 181, 7–30. Es muss allerdings bemerkt werden, dass bei Ps.-Archytas die Kombination von einer „Dreiprinzipienlehre“ (Gott-Idee-Materie) und einer „Zweiprinzipienlehre“ noch relevanter ist: vgl. Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, insb. 10–12; 24–27; 43–44.

204 

 Angela Ulacco

unbewegt, sondern selbstbewegt – oder bewegend aus sich selbst – und übernimmt damit ein Merkmal, das Platon in einigen Dialogen der Seele zuschreibt.55 Der Text von Ps.-Archytas stellt keine direkte Exegese oder Epitome des Timaios dar. Ps.-Timaios Lokros folgt im Gegenteil dem Bericht von Platon und erklärt deswegen, was die Seele ist. Ps.-Archytas redet nicht von der Seele, sondern von allen zusammengesetzten Dingen, die aus Materie und Form hervorgehen.56 Was die als eine Komposition zu konzipierende Erschaffung garantiert, ist ein höheres, selbstbewegendes Prinzip. In Ps.-Timaios Lokros ist die Seele nicht nur eine Komposition. Im Gegensatz zu anderen körperlichen Dingen bekommt und hat sie in sich die Wirkkräfte (δυνάμεις) der Bewegung, die vom höchsten Prinzip stammen. Ps.-Archytas und Ps.-Timaios Lokros vertreten allerdings beide die Position, dass die Dinge im Kosmos etwas Zusammengesetztes aus Idee und der Materie sind. Ein höheres Prinzip garantiert darüber hinaus, dass die Produkte von Idee und Materie in ihrer Verbindung verbleiben. Ps.-Timaios Lokros spricht aus einer kosmologischen Perspektive, in der der Gott-Demiurgos den Kosmos als einer gordnete Zustand, in dem die Idee zur Materie hinzukommt, erschafft (nur in logischem Sinne). Alle Dinge, die sich im Kosmos befinden, sind hylemorphisch strukturiert. Das heißt, dass alle Dinge aus zwei Prinzipien-Elementen hervorgehen, die sich auf verschiedenen Ebenen (der Seele, der elementaren Körper) befinden. Ps.-Archytas nimmt ebenfalls eine hylemorphische Struktur aller Dinge, die im Kosmos sind, an. Er konzentriert sich aber auf die ontologische Derivation aus den Prinzipien. Er spricht ferner nicht von der Seele, sondern von einem Gott-Prinzip, das Bewegungsprinzip ist und sich bewegt. Seine Tätigkeit besteht darin, die Form zur Materie zu bewegen und gemäß Zahlen und Proportionen zu ordnen, was unbegrenzt und ungeordnet ist. Bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und Ps.-Archytas ist die Tätigkeit des Gottes ähnlich, aber Ps.-Archytas schreibt die Bewegung dem Gott zu. Bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros gibt es eine Seele, zwischen dem Gott und den Körpern des Kosmos, die Bewegung und numerische Proportionen in sich hat. Ps.-Archytas und Ps.-Timaios Lokros haben vermutlich unterschiedliche Perspektiven, – die nur scheinbar miteinander im Widerspruch stehen, – weil ihre Abhandlungen unterschiedliche Interessenschwerpunkte haben. Ps.-Timaios Lokros schreibt im Kontext einer „Epitome“ des Timaios und nimmt eine kos55 Plat., Phdr. 245a5–246a2; Leg. X 894d3–4; vgl.  den Kommentar zu Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 20,11–12 in Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 50–51. 56 Wobei die zwei Logoi (δύο λόγως), die vermutlich zwischen den Prinzipien und den sinnlichen Dingen stehen (Ps.-Archytas, de princ. 20,16–17), zwei seelischen Prinzipien entsprechen könnten: einem guten und einem bösen. Vgl. dazu noch Ulacco, A: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 32–37.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 205

mologische Perspektive ein, in der alle Ebenen des Kosmos beschrieben werden. Demgegenüber hat Ps.-Archytas eine ontologische Perspektive, in der das Gottesprinzip qua Prinzip vermutlich auch die Vermögen der Seele enthält. Demgemäß könnte die Seele als eine Tätigkeit oder Erscheinung der Tätigkeit, wenn nicht sogar als ein Teil Gottes in der Welt angesehen werden.57

4 Ps.-Philolaos: Die Gott-Seele Ein ungelöstes und vielleicht unlösbares Problem der Forschung zu den Pseudopythagorica ist die Frage, ob diese Texte aufgrund stilistischer und inhaltlicher Kriterien einem einzigen, zeitlich und räumlich fest umrissenen Umfeld zugeordnet werden können. Man müsste untersuchen, ob womöglich eine einheitliche Theorie in ihnen zu finden und ob eine Homogenität zwischen Traktaten, die verschiedene Bereiche des Wissens behandeln, feststellbar ist. Wie ich oben argumentiert habe, ist eine gewisse Kohärenz zwischen Ps.-Timaios Lokros und Ps.-Archytas auszumachen, auch wenn beide Autoren ganz ähnliche Probleme aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven darstellen. Ps.-Timaios Lokros ist in der Tat der einzige unter den Pseudopythagoreern, der sich mit dem Problem der Entstehung der kosmischen Seele beschäftigt.58 Der dem Philolaos zugeschriebene Text Über die Seele behandelt ein kosmologisches Problem. Nach Ps.-Philolaos ist der Kosmos unzerstörbar, d. h es gibt keine externe oder äußere Ursache, die ihn zerstören könnte, somit bleibt er ewig bestehen, d. h. er kann nicht aufgelöst werden. 59 Für dieses Argument kann man, 57 Dass im frühkaiserzeitlichen Platonismus das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Seele auch in diese Richtung konzipiert wurde, zeigt z. B. Plutarchs zweite Quaestio Platonica, wo die Seele nicht nur ein Produkt (ἔργον), sondern auch ein Teil (μέρος) Gottes ist. (Plut., Quaest. Plat. 2, 1001C). Vgl. dazu Ferrari, F.: „Dio: padre e artefice“ und Helmig, Ch.: „Die Weltentstehung des Timaios und die platonische ὁμοίωσις θεῷ“, 25–40. 58 Für eine vollständige Analyse des Problems der Seele in den Pseudopythagorica, die an dieser Stelle nicht möglich ist, sollte man noch den Ps.-Archytas zugeschriebenen Text Über den Intellekt und die Wahrnehmung (Περὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθάσιος 36,13–39,25) in Betracht ziehen. Ich weise auf den Kommentar zum Text hin in Ulacco, A.: Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 101–153, insb. 132–141. 59 Φιλολάου Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς. Φιλόλαος ἄφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον εἶναι. λέγει γοῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς· Παρὸ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα· οὔτε γὰρ ἔντοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτᾶς εὑρεθήσεται οὔτ’ ἔκτοσθεν φθεῖραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα· ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμενεῖ, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῶ συγγενέος καὶ κρατίστω καὶ ἀνυπερθέτω κυβερνώμενος. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν τᾶς κινήσιός τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐὼν καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγεόμενος ἐξαρχιδίως· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλατον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστί· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τᾶς τὸ ὅλον περιεχούσας

206 

 Angela Ulacco

mit einigen Varianten, Parallelen bei anderen Pseudopythagoreern finden.60 Das Problem der Ewigkeit des Kosmos, für die Aristoteles als erster ausführliche Argumente präsentiert, war ein Kernthema in den späthellenistischen Debatten, und die Theorie der Ewigkeit des Kosmos wird von der platonischen und pythagoreischen Tradition in der Folge übernommen.61 Nach Ps.-Philolaos enthält der Kosmos in sich das Prinzip der Bewegung und der Veränderung (τὰν ἀρχὰν τᾶς κινήσιός τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς). Der Kosmos ist in zwei Teile geteilt: einer, der unveränderlich ist, und ein anderer, der veränderlich ist. Eine Aufteilung des Kosmos in einen veränderlichen und einen unveränderlichen Bereich geht wohl auf die peripatetische Tradition zurück. Auffällig und interessant ist die Tatsache, dass Ps.-Philolaos nicht von einem sublunaren Bereich redet, sondern von einem unveränderlichen Teil, der von der den Kosmos umfassenden Seele bis zu den Fixsternen reicht, und einem zweiten, veränderlichen Teil, der vom äußersten Rand der Fixsternsphäre bis zur Erde reicht. Der erste Teil ist der Ort des Intellekts und der Seele, der zweite Teil ist der Ort der Entstehung und Veränderung. Bemerkenswert ist die Tatsache, dass die Seele an dieser Stelle sehr eng mit dem Intellekt verbunden zu sein scheint. Sie ist im supralunaren Kosmos angesiedelt, ist aber ebenfalls in der Lage, das Ganze zu begrenzen. Das heißt wahrscheinlich, dass nach Ps.-Philolaos, die Seele ein „Arm“ Gottes ist und dass sie am Intellekt und an Gott teilhat. Dieser Gott ist aber nicht unbeweglich, sondern immer in Bewegung. Diese Bewegung ist jedoch keine Veränderung, wie im unteren Teil des Kosmos, sondern eine ewige Bewegung. Der zweite Teil des Kosmos ist der Bereich der Veränderung bzw. der Natur (phusis), wo Entstehen und Vergehen sich abwechseln. Es gibt einige Analogien mit dem Text von Ps.-Timaios Lokros, der die Bewegung der präkosmischen Welt als eine Veränderung (ἀλλοίωσις)

ψυχᾶς μέχρι σελήνας περαιοῦται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τᾶς σελήνας μέχρι τᾶς γᾶς. ἐπεὶ δέ γε καὶ τὸ κινέον ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεόμενον, ὡς τὸ κινέον ἄγει, οὕτως διατίθεται, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν· καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκωμα πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρᾶτόν τε δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερέχον, τὸ δ’ ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμενον· τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀεὶ θέοντος θείου τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γενατοῦ, κόσμος. Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀίδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τᾶς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος. καὶ ὁ μὲν εἷς ἀεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ καὶ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορᾷ ὄντα καὶ φύσεις καὶ μορφὰς σῴζοντι καὶ γονῇ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν μορφὰν ἀποκαθιστάντι τῷ γεννάσαντι πατέρι καὶ δημιουργῷ. (150,4–151,6 Thesleff). 60 Vgl. Ps.- Timaeus Locrus, de univ. nat. 207,3–7 Marg; Ps.-Aristaios, de harm. 52,10–53,8 Thesleff; Ps.-Ocellus Lucanus, de univ. nat. 127,25–128,8; 135,5–8 Thesleff. 61 Vgl. die ausführliche Darstellung von Andrea Falcon: Falcon, A.: „The Reception of Aristotle’s Physics in Antiquity“. Zu Ps.-Ocellus Lucanus und die Aneignung der Theorie der Ewigkeit des Kosmos vgl. auch Ulacco, A.: „The Appropriation“, 210–215.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 207

beschreibt.62 Und in seiner Erörterung der Erschaffung der menschlichen Seele weist er diese Aktivität nicht den Göttern, sondern einer τᾷ φύσει τᾷ ἀλλοιωτικᾷ zu;63 ἀλλοίωσις ist der Terminus, mit dem Aristoteles qualitative Veränderungen bezeichnet.64 In den pseudopythagoreischen Texten verweist dieses Wort auf die allgemeine Bewebung, meistens im präkosmischen Zustand. Matthias Baltes meint in dieser zweiten Natur einen niederen Seelenteil ausmachen zu können.65 Falls man diese Hypothese für plausibel hält, und wenn Ps.-Timaios Lokros und Ps.-Philolaos eine ähnliche Theorie teilen, finden wir bei Ps.-Philolaos einen kosmologischen Abschnitt, in dem drei Seelentypen oder drei seelische Aspekte erörtert werden. Der erste wäre die Seele, die mit Gott identisch ist. Nach dieser Auffassung wäre Gott ein in sich selbst bewegtes Bewegungsprinzip, das mittels seiner Kräfte dem Kosmos Bewegung verleiht. Der zweite Aspekt der Seele wäre die kosmische Seele, oder besser eine mittlere Substanz, die beide Teile des Kosmos umfasst. Der dritte Aspekt der Seele wäre die Natur der Veränderung, i.e. die Seele und ihre Bewegung im unteren kosmischen Bereich, wo die Dinge geboren werden und sich wieder auflösen. Auch wenn diese Hypothese schwer zu beweisen ist und nur den Versuch einer Erklärung dieser fragmentarischen Texte darstellt, ist es trotzdem möglich, eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit zwischen Ps.Timaios Lokros, Ps.-Philolaos und Ps.-Archytas zu erkennen. Die Selbstbewegung ist kein wesentlicher Aspekt der Seele mehr, sondern primär ein Kennzeichen des Gottes und seiner Wirkung als kosmologisches Prinzip. Mit Hinblick auf die Seele und ihr Verhältnis zum Kosmos können die Ergebnisse der Analyse folgendermaßen zusammenfasst werden. Ps.-Timaios Lokros sowie Ps.-Philolaos und die anderen Pseudopythagoreer haben eine psychologische Theorie entwickelt, die eng mit einer Prinzipienlehre verbunden ist und aus dieser gespeist wird. Trotz der Hinweise auf eine alte akademische Lehre ist diese Theorie ganz und gar originell. Wir finden hier eine Auffassung der Welt, nach der die Bewegung und die Transzendenz die primären Eigenschaften Gottes sind. Durch die Seele und ihre verschiedenen Aspekte, die auch, zumindest in gewissem Sinne, Materie enthalten, ist der Gott trotzdem weltimmanent. Auch für die menschliche Seele ist dies bedeutsam, weil der Mensch, dessen Seele und Intellekt die gleichen Strukturen wie die kosmische Seele aufweisen und somit gottähnlich sind, die Fähigkeit besitzt, die göttlichen Prinzipien und die Struktur

62 Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 216,14 Marg. 63 Ps.-Timaeus, de univ. nat. 217,26 Marg. 64 Vgl. dazu Ulacco, A. / Opsomer, J.: „Elements and elemental properties in Timaeus Locrus“, 182–183. 65 Baltes, M.: Timaios Lokros, 138.

208 

 Angela Ulacco

der Welt zu erkennen; eine Ansicht, die hervorragend zum kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus passt. Manches an den Pseudopythagorica Dorica bleibt noch zu erforschen. Welche Texte haben diese Autoren rezipiert, was sind ihre Ziele, und vor allem, welche exegetischen Strategien wenden sie an? Es dürfte m. E. aber deutlich geworden sein, dass diese Texte eine wichtige, auch weil sehr frühe, Stufe der Rezeption und Exegese des platonischen Textes darstellen. Sie beinhalten zudem den Versuch, platonische und aristotelische Elemente zu kombinieren und vor allem den Kritiken von Aristoteles eine platonische Antwort entgegenzusetzen. Angesichts der späteren Entwicklung des Platonismus sind diese Versuche also als historisch wichtig einzustufen.

References Baltes, Matthias: Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele, Leiden 1972. Bonazzi, Mauro: „Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale“, in: Mauro Bonazzi u. Vincenza Celluprica (Hgg.), L’eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo, Napoli 2005, 115–160. Bonazzi, Mauro: „Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the Systematisation of Platonism“, in: Malcolm Schofield (Hg.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge 2013, 160–186. Bonazzi, Mauro / Opsomer, Jan (Hgg.): The Origins of the Platonic System. Platonisms of the Early Empire and their Philosophical Contexts, Leuven 2009. Brisson, Luc: Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon, Sankt Augustin 1998. Broadie, Sarah: Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, Cambridge 2012. Carone, Gabriela Roxana: Plato’s cosmology and its ethical dimensions, Cambridge 2005. Celia, Francesco / Ulacco, Angela (Hgg.): Il Timeo. Esegesi greche, arabe, latine, Pisa 2012. Centrone, Bruno: „La cosmologia di Pseudo Timeo di Locri ed il Timeo di Platone“, Elenchos 2 (1982), 293–324. Centrone, Bruno: Pseudopythagorica Ethica. I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo, Napoli 1990. Centrone, Bruno: „The pseudo-Pythagorean Writings“, in: Carl A. Huffman (Hg.), A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge 2014, 315–340. Chiaradonna, Riccardo: „Interpretazione filosofica e ricezione del corpus. Il caso di Aristotele (100 a.C.–250 d.C.)“, in: Lucio Del Corso u. Paolo Pecere (Hgg.), Philosophy and the Books: From Antiquity to the 21th Century / Il libro filosofico dall’Antichità al XXI secolo, Quaestio 11, Turnhout – Bari 2011, 83–114. Cornford, Francis Macdonald: Plato’s Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato, translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford with a running Commentary, London 1956. Donini, Pierluigi: „Medioplatonismo e filosofi medioplatonici. Una raccolta di studi“, Elenchos 11 (1990), 79–93.

Die kosmische Seele bei Ps.-Timaios Lokros und den anderen Pseudopythagorica 

 209

Dörrie, Heinrich: „Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandreia“, in: Heinrich Dörrie, Platonica Minora, München 1976, 297–309. Falcon, Andrea: „The Reception of Aristotle’s Physics in Antiquity: Ps-Ocellus and the Doctrine of the Eternity of the World in the Late Hellenistic and Early Post-Hellenistic World (2nd and 1st Century BC)“, Philosophia 46 (2016), 154–169. Ferrari, Franco: „Dio: padre e artefice. La teologia di Plutarco in Plat. Quaest. 2“, in: Italo Gallo (Hg.), Plutarco e la religione, Atti del VI Convegno plutarcheo (Ravello, 29–31 maggio 1995), Napoli 1996, 395–409. Ferrari, Franco: „Platone, Tim. 35A1-6 in Plutarco, An. Procr. 1012B-C: citazione ed esegesi“, Rheinisches Museum 142 (1999), 326–339. Ferrari, Franco / Baldi, Laura: Plutarco, La generazione dell’anima nel Timeo, testo critico a cura di Franco Ferrari e Laura Baldi; introduzione, traduzione e commento di Franco Ferrari, apparati critici di Laura Baldi, Napoli 2002. Ferrari, Franco: Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del Timeo, Athenaeum 89 (2001), 525–574. Ferrari, Franco: „Verso la costruzione del sistema: il medioplatonismo“, Paradigmi 21 (2003), 343–354. Ferrari, Franco: „Esegesi, commento e sistema nel medioplatonismo“, in: Ada NeschkeHentschke (Hg.), Argumenta in dialogos Platonis, 1: Platoninterpretation und ihre Hermeneutik von der Antike bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, Akten des Internationalen Symposiums im Istituto Svizzero di Roma, Basel 2010, 51–76. Ferrari, Franco: „Der Begriff ‘Mittelplatonismus’ und die Forschungsgeschichte“ § 48 (6. Kapitel: Mittelplatonismus und Neupythagoreismus), 1. Teilband, in C. Horn-C. Riedweg-D. Wyrwa (Hgg.): Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg. Philosophie der Antike, vol. V: Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike, Basel 2018, 545–555. Gaiser, Konrad: Platons ungeschriebene Lehre : Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaften in der Platonischen Schule, Stuttgart 1963. Gavray, Marc-Antoine: „Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation“, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5 (2011), 85–158. Helmig, Christoph: „Die Weltentstehung des Timaios und die platonische ὁμοίωσις θεῷ – Zum kosmologischen Hintergrund von Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 550 D-E“ , in: Theo Leinkauf und Carlos Steel (Hgg.), Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Platoìs Timaeus and the Foundations of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Leuven 2005, 13–40. Huffman, Carl: Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic. A Commentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretive Essays, Cambridge 1993. Johanssen, Thomas Kjeller: Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias, Cambridge 2004. Leinkauf, Theo / Steel, Carlos: Platons Timaios als Grundtext der Kosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance. Platos Timaeus and the Foundations of Cosmology in Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Leuven 2005. Macris, Constantinos: „Jamblique et la littérature pseudo-pythagoricienne“, in: Simon C. Minouni u. Constantino Macris (Hgg.), Apocryphité. Histoire d’un concept transversal aux religions du livre, Turnhout 2002, 77–129.

210 

 Angela Ulacco

Männlein-Robert, Irmgard: Longin, Philologe und Philosoph: eine Interpretation der erhaltenen Zeugnisse, München – Leipzig 2001. Marg, Walter: Timaeus Locrus. De natura mundi et animae, Überlieferung, Testimonia, Text und Übersetzung, Leiden 1972. Mazzarelli, Claudio: „Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di Alessandria“, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 77 (1985), 197–209. Mohr, Richard Daniel / Sattler, Barbara M. (Hgg.): One book, the whole universe: Plato’s Timaeus today, Las Vegas 2010. Opsomer, Jan: „Plutarch’s De animae procreatione in Timaeo: Manipulation or Search for Consistency?“, in: Peter Adamson, Han Baltussen und Martin William Francis Stone (Hgg.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, London 2004, 137–162. Perger, Mischa von: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios, Stuttgart – Leipzig 1997. Reydams-Schils, Gretchen: Demiurge and providence: Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato’s Timaeus, Turnhout 1999. Reydams-Schils, Gretchen (Hg.): Plato’s Timaeus as cultural icon, Notre Dame 2003. Szlezák, Thomas Alexander: Pseudo–Archytas über die Kategorien, Berlin – New York 1972. Taylor, Alfred. E.: A commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Oxford 1928. Thesleff, Holger: An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo 1961. Thesleff, Holger: The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo 1965. Ulacco, Angela / Opsomer, Jan: „Elements and elemental properties in Timaeus Locrus“, Rheinisches Museum 157 (2014), 154–206. Ulacco, Angela: „The appropriation of Aristotle in the Ps-Pythagorean treatises“, in: Andrea Falcon (Hg.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden – Boston 2016, 202–217. Ulacco, Angela: Pseudopythagorica Dorica. I trattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed epistemologico attribuiti ad Archita e a Brotino. Introduzione, traduzione, commento, Boston – Berlin 2017. Ulacco, Angela: „The creation of authority in Pseudo-Pythagorean texts and their reception in late ancient philosophy“, in: Jan Papy u. Erika Gielen (Hgg.), Falsifications and Authority in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Leuven, 6–7 December 2012, LECTIO: Studies on the Transmission of Texts and Ideas, Turnhout. [im Druck] Zeller, Eduard: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Erster Teil, Leipzig 1869.

Carl O’Brien

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 1 Introduction The translation and commentary of the Timaeus produced by the Christian Calcidius is of major importance for the history of ideas as the conduit through which Plato was known in the Latin West during the Middle Ages. Calcidius remains something of a shadowy figure for us; the traditional view is that his patron Ossius, at whose request the work was undertaken, was to be identified with Bishop Ossius of Cordoba and that Calcidius was his archdeacon. Indeed, even Calcidius’ Christianity has not always been accepted. If he is Christian, it is strange that he never quotes the New Testament, whereas his references to the philosophy of the Hebrews raises the possibility that he was Jewish. The name suggests a possible Greek origin, though the traditional view locates him in Spain. Calcidius’ comments concerning the soul are scattered throughout his commentary, beginning at c. 26 (on the generation of the World Soul), with further remarks at cc. 51–58 and a discussion at cc. 214–235. Other observations can be found in the discussion of astronomy at cc. 59–91 and the noteworthy treatment of Fate at c. 141–c. 190. The work exhibits no clear sign of originality: Phillips refers to it as a derivative work and Switalski’s attitude was that one should not expect anything original from Calcidius.1 After briefly considering the terms which he uses to describe the World Soul and the identification of his sources based on the current state of scholarship, I shall turn to the functions which the World Soul fulfills within the metaphysical hierarchy Calcidius posits and its relationship to the Stoic-Platonist debate concerning Fate and Providence, as a mechanism for demonstrating the extent to which Calcidius, even when diverging from the Timaeus, bases the solutions provided by his Commentary on interpretations already current amongst his Middle Platonist predecessors. 1 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 132; Switalski, B. W.: Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus, 13. Note: I am extremely grateful to Prof. John Dillon (Trinity College Dublin) for commenting extensively on an earlier draft of this paper, as well as to Prof. Christoph Helmig for suggesting fruitful lines of research. I am also grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for the award of a fellowship to conduct research with Prof. Jens Halfwassen at the Department of Philosophy, University of Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-010

212 

 Carl O’Brien

2 Terminology Calcidius uses varied terminology to describe the World Soul. His usual term is anima mundi, literally the World Soul. Plato himself does not use the expression World Soul, tending to simply refer to it as soul and makes it apparent from the context that he is not referring to the individual human soul. An exception to this is at 41d, where Plato uses the term Soul of the Universe (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν). More explicitly, Calcidius distinguishes the anima sensiblis mundi, the sensible soul of the world (e.g. at c. 51), where he describes it as the cognitricem tamen rerum omnium, quae sunt tam intellegibiles quam sensibiles, ‘the knower of things, as much the intelligible as the sensible’ and, the rationabilis mundi anima, ‘the rational soul of the world’ (c. 54). Calcidius distinguishes between two souls: a higher one which remains in the intelligible world and a lower one which descends and provides the ability to contemplate the intelligible realm. Calcidius, though, does not always distinguish between the terms animae and substantiae, the substances of which soul is composed, for example at cc. 53–54 and also at cc. 29–31, where he equates substantiae with animae as the components of the World Soul.2 The other relevant term which Calcidius employs is anima stirpea, the lower aspect of the soul, which combined with its relationship to the intellective soul, forms the rational World Soul. Anima stirpea is a translation of ψυχὴ φυτική which as used in the later Platonists refers to the soul as turned towards the material realm and as the ‘creating force and sustainer of the natural order as nature’, so there is nothing unusual in Calcidius’ usage of the term.3 The World Soul is also described as a mens secunda to distinguish it from the mens Dei or Providence, but this distinction is primarily used when Calcidius considers the World Soul as the equivalent of Fate. At c. 178, he gives the World Soul the name Vesta. The closest similarity to this idea which I can cite are the references made by Hermias, a student and relative of Syrianus in his Commentary on the Phaedrus p. 136 to Hestia in a context which suggests a hypercosmic demiurgic role. Clearly both usages stem from Plato’s description of Hestia being the only one of the divinities to remain at home at Phaedrus 247: Thus, all things separately follow their own god and as Plato says ‘the king and emperor of heaven, the head of the procession and the lofty leader, who in his winged chariot regulates and guides all things is followed by legions of heavenly and angelic powers, distributed into eleven parts. For, as he says, ‘only Vesta stays in her abode’, Vesta who evidently as the

2 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 139 n.2. 3 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 141.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 213

World Soul and the mind of that soul, guides the reins of starry heaven according to a law ordained by Providence. This law, which ordains by a kind of chain of consequences and successions, is, as we have often said, Fate.4

Den Boeft has found an echo in Plotinus, which like the usage in Hermias is not really a close parallel: τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καί Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι (Plotinus, Enn. IV 4 [28] 27.15–16) ‘another soul and mind which men call Hestia and Demeter’. Another echo which he cites is St. Augustine’s reference to Vesta being the earth at De Civitate Dei VII, 16: Vestam quoque ipsam propterea dearum maximam putaverunt, quod ipsa sit terra (‘Vesta also they suppose to be the greatest of the goddesses on this account; that she is the earth.’). This range and variety of terminology applied to the World Soul is consistent with Calcidius’ practice elsewhere. It is illustrated by his varied references to Providence: his own term for this is provida mens dei (e.g. c. 268), whereas his Latin translation of the Timaeus uses the term providae mentis intellectus. Calcidius, to my knowledge, does not use the Latinised form demiurgus, but prefers opifex.5 I am not sure that we can read anything specific into this: if Calcidius disliked referring to God as a Demiurge because of its pagan associations, he would hardly have set about translating the Timaeus. (The claim that he mediates the Timaeus in a more Christian way would not resolve the problem either, since Calcidius does not always adopt the philosophical formulations which one would imagine would be most agreeable to a Christian). The likely solution is that it is simply a manifestation of the looseness of Calcidius’ translation, although in the case of the World Soul, such variation in terminology can be explained by the range of functions which he wishes to combine or identify with the World Soul.

3 The Calcidian World Soul and its relationship to the Timaeus Calcidius’ position regarding the World Soul is not simply a paraphrase of the Timaeus. For a start, he has a richer range of terminology to describe it, rather

4 C. 178, trans. den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate, 100. 5 I have run computerised searches of the text without identifying any use of the word, but I am open to correction on this point. This avoidance of the term ‘Demiurge’ is observable in the translation also. For example, at Tim. 29a, the single word δημιουργός is translated as opifexque et fabricator.

214 

 Carl O’Brien

than simply anima mundi. Calcidius in the commentary section of his treatise does not convey the impression that he is looking back over his own translation when he is commenting, but rather working from memory. Secondly, he is heavily influenced by Stoicism, Middle Platonism, particularly Numenius and Plutarch, and possibly Neoplatonism (though this is not universally accepted). Calcidius’ interpretation does not slavishly follow the text of the Timaeus, but in the course of expounding it, he is open to accepting the formulations of subsequent philosophers as a means of developing or clarifying what he feels is Plato’s meaning. This is apparent in the ontological position assigned to the World Soul. In the Timaeus, it would rank in position three or four, if one accepts either of the following schemata: 1) the Forms, 2) the Demiurge, 3) the Young Gods and then 4) the World Soul; or if one prefers to place the Young Gods and the World Soul on the same level, since both are the products of the Demiurge, one arrives at the scheme: 1) Forms, 2) Demiurge, 3) World Soul and Young Gods. Calcidius presents a similar structure: 1) God, 2) mind of God and 3) World Soul. This very closely echoes not just the Timaeus, but also the hierarchy of hypostases posited by Numenius at Fr. 6 (Des Places): 1) First God (idea of the Good), 2) Second God (Demiurge) and 3) Third God (World or World Soul). Where Calcidius advances beyond the Timaeus is in his (not always successful) attempts to identify other entities with the terms which he uses to describe his upper three ontological levels. The treatment of the World Soul in the Timaeus is concerned with its composition (34c–36c) and functions (36e–40d), though the most influential passage for Calcidius and the exegesis of the Neoplatonists is Timaeus 35a. The World Soul is constructed out of divisible and indivisible Being and a third substance which is a type of Being blended out of Sameness and Difference (35a), blended together in accordance with harmonic series and ratios on the principle that like must know like and then woven throughout the heaven (36d). The main function of the World Soul there is to act as the source of motion for the planets and other heavenly bodies (39a–b). While in the Timaeus it does not have any demiurgic function as such, it is possible to see how it might have acquired the regulatory function which it possesses in Calcidius. For Calcidius, the World Soul as Fate transmits the decisions of Providence to the sensible realm. The association between Fate and the World Soul is completely logical, when one considers the belief that the decisions of Fate were believed to be caused by or heralded by astral influence of various sorts and it is the World Soul which is responsible for this motion. Secondly, if one considers Providence as the divine plan for the world, it becomes similar to the realm of the ideas. The World Soul in the Timaeus uses reasoning to transmit at least one idea continuously to the sensible realm; Time as an image of the Idea of Eternity (Timaeus 37d–e).

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 215

In any case, Calcidius’ translation is not particularly accurate.6 One of the examples Switalski uses to demonstrate this phenomenon is the translation of Timaeus 35a, which is of major relevance in understanding Calcidius’ conception of the World Soul: Plato, Timaeus 35 a–b: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως [αὖ πέρι] καὶ τῆϛ τοῦ ἑτέρου καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο […] μειγνὺς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας […] Midway between the path of Being which is divisible and remains always the same and the Being which is transient and divisible in bodies, he blended a third form of Being compounded out of the twain, that is to say, out of the Same and the Other; and in like manner, He compounded it midway between that one of them which is indivisible and that one which is divisible in bodies. And He took the three of them and blent them altogether […] And when with the aid of Being he had mixed them […] (trans. Bury). Calcidius’ translation: Ex indiuidua semperque in suo statu perseuerante substantia itemque alia, quae inseparabilis corporum comes per eadem corpora scindere se putatur, tertium substantiae genus mixtum locauit medium inter utramque substantiam. eodemque modo ex gemina biformique natura, quippe cuius pars idem pars diuersum uocetur, tertium naturae genus commentus est, quod medium locauit inter indiuiduam et item coniugatione corporea diuiduam substantiam. triaque haec omnia in unam speciem permiscuit, diuersa illa natura concretioni atque adunationi generum repugnante. Quibus cum substantia mixtis […]. From indivisible substance which remains always in its own state and the other sort which is an inseparable companion of bodies, and which is thought to divide itself in these same bodies, he marries together a third kind of substance: midway between each substance. And in the same way, out of twin and two-formed nature, since one part of this is called the Same and the other part is called the Different, he contrived a third kind of nature, which he situated midway between the indivisible and the substance divisible in the union of bodies. And he mixed all of these three thoroughly into a single kind although that diverse nature tended to reject the combination and union of kinds. When these had been mixed into a substance […] (my translation).

It is apparent from this that Calcidius has taken certain liberties with the translation. Though the Greek word ousia can also mean substance, the connection with Being is lost through Calcidius’ use of substantia, but this could simply be viewed as a natural consequence of producing a Latin translation. However, Calcidius actually introduces elements which do not correspond to anything in the Greek;

6 As noted with numerous details by Switalski, B. W.: Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus, 10, where he also demonstrates that it is not dependant on Cicero’s version.

216 

 Carl O’Brien

Plato does not actually refer to the third substance being a contrivance of nature. Calcidius seized upon the idea of three substances in the World Soul in his claim that it had a tripartite structure, a claim which allowed for greater kinship to be demonstrated between it and the human soul, which Plato in the Republic claims is tripartite.

4 Calcidius and his sources The sources used by Calcidius are a vexed question. Although he mentions Numenius and Philo of Alexandria by name, he tends to avoid explicitly mentioning his immediate source. Such an attitude is in agreement with his position concerning the Platonic commentators, who he claims are ‘younger philosophers, who, just as heirs who are not of the better sort waste their father’s wealth, broke up a perfect and faithful analysis into vile little opinions.’7 Calcidius mentions his predecessors in a way which glorifies his own achievements. He claims originality in his commentary: other commentaries exist, to be sure, but they only explain certain parts or specific subjects, whereas he claims to be expounding the dialogue in its entirety. Others, who were qualified to produce a commentary, avoided doing so on account of their envy of Plato. Despite the availability of works explaining limited sections, Calcidius had to examine the entire dialogue himself in order to expound it, a task that, he claims, was not without difficulty and even went beyond what his patron, Ossius, had expected in his request for a translation. The general consensus amongst modern scholars is that Calcidius draws upon Numenius: such a position is adopted by Jacobus van Winden and John Phillips.8 While Werner Deuse does not regard Numenius as a source, this may be due to not taking full account of the Middle Platonist elements in Calcidius.9 Jan Hendrik Waszink also regards Calcidius as using Numenius, though considers this influence to be mediated by a lost commentary of Porphyry. Trying to identify Numenian influence in Calcidius is fraught with difficulty: one is faced with the fragmentary nature of the evidence, the problem that some testimony consists of paraphrase rather than quotation, which leads to uncertainty over which fragments can be trusted or not and most importantly,

7 C. 256.14–16. 8 Van Winden, J. C. M.: Calcidius on Matter and Philipps, J.: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’. 9 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 139.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 217

as Phillips notes, the inconsistency of the fragments as regards the psychogonia.10 However, the basic structure of the tripartite godhead with a First Principle, a secondary demiurgic entity and a World Soul is clearly similar to the Numenian Dreigötterlehre. Calcidius treats of the generation of the World Soul at cc. 26–9 (explaining Timaeus 35a) and does not regard this generation as taking place in time (since it is eternal), the standard Platonist interpretation of the Timaeus, beginning with the Old Academy. A similar statement is made by Taurus, cited at Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi 187.11 Plato’s account of a temporal generation was simply an explanation for the unphilosophical (c. 26). This point is picked up again at c. 276, this time focusing on the generation of the entire sensible world. ‘Beginning’ they say, has no temporal meaning, for before the ordering of the world, there was neither time, nor succession of day and night, the very things by which time is measured. Besides ‘beginning’ has more than one meaning. […] Yet there is one beginning of everything about which Solomon in the Book of Proverbs says ‘God created me as the Path along which he wanted to go in order to rely on it in performing his divine works. He made me before the origin of the world and the earth, before he founded the deep and caused the sources to flow and the mountains to rise’. He clearly indicates that God first created divine Wisdom and afterwards heaven and earth and that divine Wisdom is the origin of the universe. Thus, Wisdom appears to be made by God but not in time, for there cannot have been a time when God was without Wisdom. That Man comes to knowledge of God before he comes to Wisdom is necessary on account of the sanctity of His nature. First, we know the owner of a thing (God) and only then the thing itself (Wisdom). It is in this way that we should understand the term ‘beginning’.12

Divine Wisdom must be Providence or the mens Dei. The notion that it is the origin of the universe or assists God in ordering the world is common. It is found, for example, at Philo, Det. 16.54, or exhibited by Origen’s comment at Comm. Jn. I.111: Δημιοργὸς δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς ὡς ἀρχή, καθ’ ὃ σοφία ἐστί, τῷ σοφία εἶναι καλούμενος ἀρχή. ‘It is as a principle that Christ is the Demiurge, in so far as he is Wisdom, as it is because He is Wisdom that he is called a principle.’ Calcidius discusses two theories concerning the generation of the World Soul at c. 26–31 and c. 297 ff. It is not clear from where the first theory is drawn, though there are some possibilities. His summary of both theories runs as follows:

10 Phillips, J.: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’, 236. 11 Jones, R. M.: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, 196. 12 C. 276, trans. van Winden, J. C. M.: Calcidius on Matter.

218 

 Carl O’Brien

Num speciem intellegibilis mundi, ad cuius similitudinem formas mente conceptas ad corpora transferebat, indiuiduam substantiam nuncupauerit, diuiduam uero siluam, quae uelut exordium et fons est corporum, ita ut tertium illud mixtum substantiae genus formam esse intellegendum sit, qua informata sint tam mundi quam cetera quae mundus conplectitur corpora, an potius indiuiduam Plato substantiam censeat eminentiorem animam, quae nulli sit incorporationi obnoxia cuiusque ueneranda puritas nulla corporis contagione uioletur, diuiduam uero substantiam illam animam dicat, quae non solum cunctis animalibus sed etiam stirpibus et arboribus dat uitalem uigorem: ut sit ex his duabus conflatum tertium animae genus rationabile, idcirco ne omnia muta essent et ratione carerent quae uitam sortirentur corpora, uidelicet animalia, sed esset praeterea genus animantium huius modi, quod rationis disciplinaeque et intellectus capax diuini operis admirandam rationem dispositionemque intellegens ueneraretur mundani operis auctorem (c. 29). Is it the case that he calls the individual substance the structure of the intelligible world, in the likeness of which he transferred intelligible forms to bodies, while the divided forms he called matter, which he transferred as the fount and origin of bodies, in such a way that the third mixed type of substance should be understood to be formed by the infusion of which there comes to be the body of the world and those bodies the world embraces, or rather did Plato consider the indivisible substance to be a higher soul, which is never subject to any incorporation and maintains its venerable purity, violated by no contamination of body, while he calls the divided substance that soul which gives violent force not only to all animals, but even to plants and trees, so that there should be conflated from these two a third rational form of soul, so that all bodies which were allotted life should not be mute and lack reason, with the purpose that there should be a special class of animals of this nature and they should be capable of reasoning, learning and comprehension, and understanding that the rational disposition of divine craftsmanship should be admired, they should venerate the author of the work that is the world? (my translation).

This passage underscores the value which Calcidius has as a synthesizer of Middle Platonist doctrines. Of the two schools of thought which Calcidius can identify, the first school considers soul to be generated from a mixture of Intellect and matter, while the second views the indivisible substance as pure, rational soul, divided substance as the immanent soul and the third substance is rational soul which is drawn into the mixture. At c. 300, Calcidius revisits this topic, further developing the second alternative: Superest ipsa nobis ad tractandum Platonis de silua sententia, quam diuerse interpretari uidentur auditores Platonis: quippe alii generatam dici ab eo putauerunt uerba quaedam potius quam rem secuti, alii uero sine generatione, sed anima praeditam, quando ante inlustrationem quoque motu instabili atque inordinato dixerit eam fluctuasse, cum motus intimus genuinusque sit uiuentium proprius: quodque idem saepe alias duas esse mundi animas dixerit, unam malignam ex silua, alteram beneficam ex deo. Existentibus itaque bonis ac malis bona quidem ex anima benefica mundo tributa, incommoda porro ex si1uestri maligna, cum diuina sapientia intellegentiaque opificis dei siluae seuere atque efficaciter persuaderet praebere cultui atque exornationi suae

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 219

patientiam, persuasio uero non nisi animantibus uitaque fruentibus adhibeatur. Quibus Hebraei concinunt, cum dicunt homini quidem a deo datam esse animam ex inspiratione caelesti, quam rationem et animam rationabilem adpellant, mutis uero et agrestibus ex silva rationis expertem iussu dei uiuis et animantibus bestiis terrae gremio profusis: quorum in numero fuerit etiam ille serpens, qui primitias generis humani malis suasionibus inlaqueauerit. It remains for us to treat of the opinion of Plato concerning matter, which the followers of Plato seem to have interpreted in different ways: indeed some suppose him to have said that it is indeed generated, following certain words of his rather than the truth of the matter, whereas others say that it is ungenerated, but that it is provided with soul, since he said, before making it evident, that it teemed with unstable and disorderly motion, whereas internal and proper motion is characteristic of living things. He often says that there two different souls of the world, an evil one from matter and a beneficent one from God. And so he accounts for the existence of good and evil, attributing good in the world to the beneficent soul and errant elements in the material realm to the malignant soul, since the divine wisdom and intelligence of the craftsman-god austerely and effectually persuaded matter to submit itself to cultivation and ornamentation. Persuasion indeed is applicable only to ensouled things and those which enjoy life. The Hebrews agree with such statements when they say that soul was indeed given to Man by God from the heavenly breath, which they call reason and rational soul, while by the order of God, the soul devoid of reason, deriving from matter, was bestowed upon mute beasts in the fields, endowed with life and soul, scattered about the bosom of the earth, of which number there was even that serpent, who entrapped the first of the human race with his evil persuasions (my translation).

According to the first theory, God mixes undivided substance and divided matter. The undivided substance is simply Plato’s ἀμέριστος οὐσία or Intellect. The undivided Nature is Plato’s μεριστὴ οὐσία and this is rather more problematic; either Essence is divided about bodies (meaning that the Soul’s nature includes an element of corporeality) or one adopts the position of the Neoplatonists that this divided Essence is not actually part of the Soul.13 Plato in his use of the terms which Calcidius translates as substantia individua and substantia divida could mean either Forms and matter or pure soul and the souls of animals and plants.14 Proclus agrees with Calcidius (In. Tim. II.139.14 ff.): οὐκοῦν ἀμερίστον μὲν οὐσιάν φῶμεν τὴν νοητὴν πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν νοερὰν τήν τε ὁλικὴν καὶ τὴν μερικὴν τήν τε ἄυλον καὶ χωριστὴν καὶ πρὸ αἰῶνος ἢ ἐν αἰῶνι οὖσαν, μεριστὴν δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα προϊοῦσαν […] (p. 140, 24–30) ὥστε τριπλῆν ζωὴν ἕχει τὸ πᾶν, τὴν σωματοειδῆ, τὴν ψυχικήν, τὴν νοεράν. καὶ ἡ μὲν νοερὰ ἀμέριστός ἐστιν, ὡς αἰώνιος. […] ἡ δὲ 13 Phillips, J.: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’, 231. 14 Van Winden, J. C. M.: Calcidius on Matter, 16.

220 

 Carl O’Brien

σωματοειδὴς μεριστή, ὡς προϊοῦσα περὶ τοὺς ὅγκους καὶ συνανακιρναμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ δύνουσα κατὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· μέση δὲ ἡ ψυχική […]. Therefore we say that the indivisible Essence is all intelligible and intellective, both the general and the particular, non-material and separate and either prior to eternity or in eternity, but the divisible is that substance which goes out around bodies. […] So the universe has a threefold life: the corporeal, the psychic, and the intelligible. And the intelligible is indivisible since it is eternal […] and the corporeal is divisible since it proceeds forth into three-dimensional masses and mixes thoroughly with bodies and descends into their substrate. The psychic, however, is intermediate […] (my translation).

Proclus though, unlike Calcidius at c. 29 does not tell us that the μεριστὴ οὐσία is matter. Proclus claims that the soul is intermediate between indivisible and divisible Essence, but rather than a simple mixture of both elements, he claims that soul is formed from both according to Reason.15 For Jones, Proclus’ argument is more sophisticated than the position advanced by Calcidius at c. 27: igitur ex his duabus ait opificem deum tertium genus essentiae miscuisse, ‘therefore from these two they say that the craftsman god mixed a third kind of essence.’16 The second theory appears Plutarchan, but may be taken from Atticus, and this is the viewpoint which Calcidius adopts:17 The same Numenius applauds Plato because he acknowledges two Souls of the world, one of the highest beneficence and the other evil, that is to say matter which, although its motion is chaotic, nevertheless, since its motion derives from its own interior movement, necessarily is alive and possesses the life of a soul according to the law governing all things that move through a natural motion […]18

Again Calcidius turns to the second group of Platonists in his discussion at c. 301: Nec desunt qui putent inordinatum illum et tumultuarium motum Platonem non in silua, sed in materiis et corporibus iam notasse, quae initia mundi atque elementa censentur. Quippe si est informis et inordinata, nimirum etiam inmobilis natura sua, nec inmobilis modo, uerum etiam incommutabilis: quippe commutationes non siluae accident sed corporibus, in quibus sint qualitates. eodemque pacto etiam exanimis, quando quidem inmobilis. Malitiam porro aiunt uirtutis esse carentiam, ut informitatem, inopiam, intemperantiam, proptereaque uirtutibus addita orationis parte negatiua contra quam uirtutes cognominatas fore inprudentiam, iniustitiam, inperitiam. Haec atque huius modi est dissensio Platonicorum philosophorum.

15 In Tim. II 149, 5: ἐκ τῶν ἀνὰ λόγον εἶναι τούτοις. 16 Jones, R. M.: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, 197. 17 Jones, R. M.: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, 196. 18 Calcidius, In Tim. c. 297, p. 299, 14–18 Waszink ( = fr. 52, p. 97, 64–70 des Places, trans. Phillips, J.: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’, 237).

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 221

Nor is there any lack of those who suppose that Plato discerned disorderly and confused motion not in matter, but rather in material stuff and bodies, which they consider the first principle and elements of the world. Surely if it is unformed and unordered, and actually immobile of its own nature and not only immobile, but even unchangeable: indeed alterations happen not to matter, but to bodies, in which there are qualities. And by the same token, it is without soul, seeing it is motionless. Furthermore, they say that evil is the lack of virtue, as is the case of deformity, poverty, intemperance, and therefore when negatives have been added to the names of the virtues, one will get the opposite appellations, such as imprudence, injustice, ignorance. Of such a nature are the disagreements among the Platonist philosophers (my translation).

So Calcidius divides the Platonists into two main groups: the first group regard matter (silva and Plato’s divided substance) as the production of God and the undivided substance corresponds to the intelligible world. The second group who regard matter as ungenerated is further subdivided. The first subdivision consists of those (like Plutarch most famously, but also Atticus), who regard the disorder of the generated realm as due to the activity of an evil World Soul and regard matter as passive, which is a more Aristotelian notion and also reminiscent of the position of Crantor. The second subdivision consists of Platonists, like Calcidius himself, who regard matter as a principle which is not generated by God, though he draws a distinction between (primary) matter (which he regards as immobile) and bodies (or corporeal matter), to which he attributes disorderly motion. The individua substantia, then, is the higher soul (eminentior anima), while the dividua substantia is the cause of this disorderly motion and is termed the anima stirpea (and seems to be little more than a life-principle), identified with the errant cause of Timaeus 30a.19 Phillips explains Calcidius’ understanding of both substances as follows: the undivided substance is Mind and Intellect which remains immune from embodiment, but is always intelligible (c. 31), whereas the divided substance is the lower soul which is distributed into bodies and has both the capacity to gaze upward to the intelligible realm and the tendency to turn downwards towards material reality.20 The reference to a Jewish belief in the heavenly breath at c. 300 is repeated at c. 55, where the accounts of the creation of the soul at Gen. 1, 26 and 2, 27 are interpreted as the creation of the anima stirpea, into which God breathes the rational soul.21 One of the objections typically raised against Numenian influence in Calcidius is that the anima stirpea in the psychogonia at cc. 29–31 is not portrayed as evil, but rather as an ordering principle. This differs from the description of the lower soul in the more obviously

19 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 134. 20 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 135. 21 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 135.

222 

 Carl O’Brien

Numenian account of cc. 295–300 or the evil (irrational) soul which Numenius posits. Phillips manages to resolve this contradiction by pointing out that since the anima stirpea is the World Soul’s divided essence, it tends to be linked to the irrational soul by later Platonists.22 Neoplatonist influence on Calcidius’ psychogonia has been suggested by Switalski, who favours Plotinus as a source, and by Steinheimer, claiming the influence of Porphyry, whereas Jones rejects the idea. His main reason for this assertion is that Calcidius regards matter as an independent principle. For the Neoplatonists, everything, even matter, is ultimately dependent on the One. Jones argues that for a Christian like Calcidius, such a formulation would be welcome, and one would expect him to draw upon it to demonstrate that there is only a single principle, God. The fact that he does not do this, Jones asserts, indicates that he is not influenced by Neoplatonism and the similarities between his work and that of Plotinus is to be attributed to the use of a common source.23 As far as the structure of the World Soul is concerned, Calcidius follows Adrastus and Crantor in his suggestion at c. 39 that the two series (1, 2, 4, 8 etc.) and (1, 3, 9, 27 etc.) of Timaeus 35b should be arranged in a triangular shape (as Bury does in the schema in his edition p. 66 n. 2), a position rejected by Proclus and Porphyry.24 Calcidius also differs from the Neoplatonists in his interpretation of the Timaeus’ astronomy, crediting Plato with the introduction of epicycles.25 It is not just his belief in the independence of matter or his astronomy which suggest that Calcidius, despite the period in which he lived, is more heavily influenced by Middle Platonist interpretations of Plato, rather than a Neoplatonist one. Also suggestive of this approach is his discussion of three principles: God, matter and the Ideas at cc. 303–305. Since the Ideas (ideae) are described as the opera […] intellectus,26 we have a very Middle Platonic formulation in terms of the Forms being the ideas of God.27 Furthermore, Calcidius shows absolutely no interest in the allegorisation of the introductory section of the dialogue, which we know was undertaken by Porphyry, even if only on an ‘ethical’ level.28 22 Phillips, J.: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, 141. 23 Jones, R. M.: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, 208. 24 Proclus, In Tim. II 171.4ff. Cf. c. 39: Nunc praestanda ratio est formae istius triangularis, in qua sunt limites septem et sex interualla duplicis et triplicis quantitatis, ‘now it is necessary to explain this triangular form in which are the seven terms and the six intervals of double and triple value’. 25 C. 112. 26 C. 304. 27 As further evidence against Neoplatonic influence on Calcidius, Jones, R. M.: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, 207, mentions Calcidius’ interpretation of Tim. 46e. 28 I am grateful to Prof. J. M. Dillon for raising this point.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 223

5 The Stoic theory of logos and the Demiurgic functions of the World Soul The Demiurge generates the World Soul in a Receptacle and inserts it throughout the cosmos, before the residue in the mixing-bowl is used for a second distillation to produce a soul of inferior quality, which becomes the human soul. If we choose not to interpret the myth literally and to demythologise the Demiurge, as was done in the Old Academy and as many modern commentators would wish to do, the myth becomes simply an account of what the world would have been like in the absence of ordering Reason, but it means that there never was a time when the world was ‘created’.29 The ordering activity that Plato attributes to the Demiurge becomes the activity that is carried out continuously by the rational World Soul (which would seem to be the situation in Book X of the Laws). While the World Soul in Calcidius has functions which appear to be demiurgic, some interim developments should be noted. Despite the figurative interpretation of the Timaeus advocated in the Old Academy, from the first to third centuries B.C.E., the Demiurge had begun to be interpreted as a literal figure (largely due to his utility in accommodating a variety of dualistic beliefs). The notion of the Demiurge was influential before this in the extent to which it shaped the Stoic doctrine of the logos.30 There are striking differences between the logos and the Demiurge, even if the work of exegetes like Philo of Alexandria tends to blur such distinctions. The most important is that the logos is immanent and regulates through being embodied in the world, whereas the Demiurge is insulated from his production (via the mixing-bowl or the Young Gods, for example). Secondly, the Demiurge is continuously constrained in his activity, whereas Stoic matter is compared to wax and easily accepts the ordering of the logos, without requiring persuasion (as it does at Timaeus 48 a). In the opening chapters of the work, little evidence can be found of the influence of the Stoic logos. Only a World Soul is mentioned without a mens Dei, the term Calcidius uses to denote the form of nous influenced by the Stoic conception of the logos, in the chapters up to c. 119. The mens Dei mentioned in the later sections of the work is more of a Stoic logos than a Pla-

29 The world for Plato, of course, is not ‘created’ in a Judaeo-Christian sense but ‘ordered’. 30 For more on the relationship between the Stoic logos and the Demiurge, see O’Brien, C. S.: ‘The Middle Platonist Demiurge’, and O’Brien, C. S.: The Demiurge in Ancient Thought. A fuller discussion of this topic is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an area which I hope to revisit at a subsequent date.

224 

 Carl O’Brien

tonic Demiurge in the sense that it penetrates matter in order to give it shape.31 The process of world-generation for Calcidius is not simply one of craftsmanship which only imposes form on a surface, but matter allows itself to be ‘adorned’ by the immanent divine mind.32 At c. 304, the mens Dei has a demiurgic function as it orders the entire world: Nec uero prouidentia sine intellectu est, intellectusque sine mente non est, Mens ergo dei modulauit, ordinauit, excoluit omnem continentiam corporis. Inuenta ergo est demum opificis diuina origo. Operatur porro opifex et exornat omnia iuxta uim rationabilem maiestatemque operum suorum. Nor indeed is Providence without intelligence and there is no intelligence without mind. Therefore, the mind of God regulates, orders, carefully tends the whole extent of the body. Therefore, the origin of divine workmanship has at length been found. Further more, the craftsman labours and adorns everything in accordance with the rational force and majesty of his works.

While Providence is identified with Reason and engages in demiurgic activity, the World Soul is also assigned a demiurgic function, examined in detail at c. 146–7.

31 Cf. c. 269 discussed below. 32 Denique addit: Mixta siquidem mundi sensibilis ex necessitatis intellegentiaeque coeta constitit generatio (Tim. 48a). Quia igitur de mundi generatione tractatur perfecteque id fieri conuenit, oportet de utroque genere disseri: ex quo de natura silvae necessarius esse tractatus ostenditur. Mixtam vero generationem dicit esse ideo quod ex diuersis elementis promisce constet. recteque ex necessitate et prouidentia: non enim ex his mixtus est mundus, sed consultis prouidae mentis et necessitatis rationibus constitit operante quidem prouidentia et agente, silua uero perpetiente exornationique se facilem praebente. penetratam siquidem eam usque quaque diuina mens format plene, non ut artes formam tribuentes in sola superficie, sed perinde ut natura atque anima solida corpora permeantes universa uiuificant (c. 269). And finally he adds: ‘Since the generation of the sensible world comes about as a mixture from the union of necessity and intelligence, because we are discussing the generation of the world and it is agreed that it is made in a perfect fashion, it is fitting for us to discuss both elements in it: from which circumstance it is shown to be necessary to discuss the nature of matter. He says that the generation of the soul is mixed for the reason that it comes into being from a thorough mixture of diverse elements and specifically from Necessity and Providence: for it is not from these (i.e. Necessity and Providence) that the world is mixed, but it comes about through the planning of a providential intellect and according to the principles of Necessity, with Providence being operative and efficient, while matter is passive and makes itself available to ‘adornment’ (i.e. being infused with intelligence). At any rate, the divine mind forms it fully by penetrating through all of it, not like the arts and crafts, attributing form only to the surface of something, but just as nature and the soul permeate solid bodies and give life to them as wholes’ (my translation). The idea of matter making itself available to be ordered is reminiscent of the irrational soul desiring to be ordered at Alcinous, Didasc. 14.2: ‘God does not create the soul of the world, since it exists eternally, but he brings it to order’ (trans. Dillon). Alcinous speaks as if the World Soul is in a coma and God wakes it up.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 225

[146] Quae cuncta manifestius in Timaeo digerit ita dicens: Quibus ita ordinatis cum in proposito rerum creator maneret. (p. 42E.) Quaenam ordinauerat? Scilicet quod uniuersae rei animam corpusque omne modulamine apto iugauerat. Intellegentes, inquit, iussionem patris filii iuxta mandatam informationem inmortali sumpto initio mortalis animantis ex mundi materiis igni terraque et aqua cum spiritu faenus elementarium mutuati, quod redderetur cum opus foret, ea quae acceperant conglutinabant non indissolubilibus illis nexibus, ex quibus ipsi cohaeserant. (p. 42E.) Etenim dei iussum, cui parent dii secundi, ratio est, opinor, continens ordinationem perpetuam, quae fatum uocatur, idque trahit originem ex prouidentia. [147] Quid cum dicit? coagmentataque mox uniuersae rei machina delegit animas stellarum numero pares singulasque singulis. conparauit easdemque uehiculis conpetentibus superinpositas uniuersae rei naturam spectare iussit legesque inmutabilis decreti docuit. (p. 41D.) Mundi quippe machinam absoluere, deligere animas stellarum numero pares, uehiculis aptis superinponere, universae rei monstrare naturam, leges inmutabilis decreti docere: cuncta haec officia prouidentiae sunt. Ipsae uero leges, quae dictae sunt, fatum est idque diuina lex est mundi animae insinuata, salubre omnium rerum regimen. Sic fatum quidem ex prouidentia est, nec tamen ex fato prouidentia. [146] All this he explains more clearly in the Timaeus by the words: ‘When the creator of the universe, having thus arranged these things persisted in his manner of life – what things had he arranged? Evidently, he means his connecting the World Soul and its body in an appropriate harmony. Understanding the order from their Father, the sons according to the ordinance enjoined upon them, having received the immortal principle of a mortal creature, borrowed from the mortals of the world – fire, earth, air and water – the elementary capital to be repaid and cemented together, that they took, though not with the indissoluble bonds whereby they were connected themselves.’ Truly the order from God, obeyed by the second gods as Reason, containing the perpetual ordinance which is called Fate and this derives its origin from Providence. [147] He further says: ‘Having cemented together the engine of the universe he chose the souls in equal number to the stars and arranged them each to a separate star and having mounted them in appropriate chariots, he told them to observe the nature of the universe and taught them the laws of unalterable decree. For completing the engine of the world, choosing souls in equal numbers to the stars mounting them in appropriate chariots, showing them the nature of the universe, teaching the laws of unalterable decree, all these are duties of Providence. The laws themselves, however, which were mentioned are Fate and that is a divine law infused into the World Soul, a salutary guidance of all things. This Fate is in accordance with Providence, but not Providence in accordance with Fate.’33

The bulk of c. 146 is simply a summary of the Timaeus, with the Demiurge entrusting production of the mortal elements of the soul and of the material realm to the Young Gods, since what he generates is so well put together that he would never permit its dissolution and as part of the instantiation of all possibilities, the world requires mortal genera. The manner in which the World Soul is joined to the body is described as harmony, which recalls the cosmic music of Timaeus 35b ff. The

33 Trans. den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate.

226 

 Carl O’Brien

final lines of c. 146 and c. 147 are far more interesting, since this moves beyond the text which Calcidius is expounding. Demiurgic activity is assigned to Providence, which is understandable since it is essentially an activity of intellect, whereas the World Soul is the instrument by which the material realm is able to be ordered, since it, as divine law, contemplates the intelligible realm. The complicated identification of Fate with the World Soul and its relationship with Providence is discussed below.

6 The World Soul and its human counterpart The Timaeus posits the individual human soul as a less refined version of the World Soul, through its representation of the cosmos as a macrocosm of the individual. There are significant differences: the human soul is akin to the World Soul in that it does contain some of the residue of the World Soul which remains in the mixing-bowl (41d) and it is mixed with only a second and third degree of purity. The body of the World Soul, the cosmos, is a god, while the human body incurs a number of scornful remarks from Plato. The World Soul contains only the finest element of the soul, Reason, while the human soul struggles with the lower elements of spirit and appetite. As Reydams-Schils shows, though, Calcidius takes pains to illustrate the parallelism between the microcosm of the human soul and its more exalted counterpart. Although the World Soul may not have appetitive elements, there is a correspondence in terms of the planets, which comprise the lower-tending aspect of its nature.34 Like the human soul, Calcidius manages to identify a tripartite structure in the World Soul: the fixed stars, the planets and the sublunar realm (c. 144; 182.16–183.1 Waszink).35 Calcidius runs into difficulties in attempting to explain how the human soul extends throughout the body. There is a problem in explaining how a corporeal can act upon an incorporeal and Calcidius’ terminology comes close to suggesting an element of corporeality to the soul. It is like the body (similitude corporis c. 92; 144.21; 145.4).36 At c. 197–198, he denies the transmigration of the soul into an animal’s body on the grounds that the soul cannot enter into bodies which are without reason.37 He also denies that this could have been Plato’s meaning.38

34 Reydams-Schils, G.: ‘Calcidius on the Human Soul’, 104. 35 Reydams-Schils, G.: ‘Calcidius on the Human Soul’, 105. 36 Reydams-Schils, G.: ‘Calcidius on the Human Soul’, 98. 37 Non proueniat in iis, quae sine ratione uiuunt, c. 198. 38 Anima quondam hominis nequaquam transit ad bestias iuxta Platonem, c. 198.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 227

What Plato meant, Calcidius claims, is that in a new (human) life, the vices of an evil man are increased, so that a man prone to anger can be said to approach the ferocity of a lion or a rapacious man, a wolf.39 Both of these problems: extension of the soul through the body and transmigration of the soul into the bodies of animals, were vulnerable to Aristotelian criticism. Aristotle asserts at De anima I.3.407b13–26 that there can be no interaction between two chance entities; one entity acts upon another on account of their affinity (κοινωνία) and this cannot exist in a random combination, a point which he alleges that the Platonists (and Pythagoreans) do not sufficiently clarify. Aristotle similarly locates the soul in a body, but the real problem as Bos has noted40, is that the Platonists place souls in bodies at random, hence there can be no κοινωνία between a soul and the body which is meant to be its instrument: But these thinkers only try to describe the specific characteristics of the soul, without specifying in their definition more precisely any details about the body which is to receive it; as though it were possible, as the Pythagorean stories suggest, for any soul to enter into any body. [Which is absurd.] For each seems to have its own specific form and shape (De anima I.3.407b).41

Aristotle, then, takes issue not with soul entering body, but with souls of any type entering random bodies. A soul, according to Aristotle, should only be able to enter a body with which it has an affinity. The soul of a human should not be able to enter the body of a horse, as the Platonists and the Pythagoreans would claim, since if, as is the case for Aristotle, the soul is the blueprint of a specific living form, only a human soul should occupy a human body or have that body as its instrument. If, as Plato asserts, the human soul contains a rational component, what happens to this element if it becomes ensouled in a non-rational animal? The soul of a plant is even further limited, with only nutritive functions.42 Calcidius similarly expresses his opposition to transmigration of souls on the grounds that a rational soul cannot enter the body of a non-rational animal: a philosophical (and Aristotelian), rather than religious objection. Calcidius is faced with a difficulty in explaining the functions (vires) of the tripartite soul: λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν. He himself identifies two principal vires: the rational (deliberativa) and the appetitive (quae ad adpetendum quid inpellit), downplaying the spirited element.43 Calcidius locates the 39 C. 198. 40 Bos, A. P.: ‘Why the Soul Needs an Instrumental Body’, 21 ff. 41 Trans. W. S. Hett, modified by Bos. 42 Bos, A. P.: ‘Why the Soul Needs an Instrumental Body’, 29. 43 C. 230.

228 

 Carl O’Brien

rational part in the brain and the appetitive part in the heart. So Calcidius in his interpretation of the Platonic tripartite soul ends up with two principales vires (or controlling faculties). The notion that the soul has a ἡγεμονικόν is a Stoic one, although division of the soul into rational and irrational parts is Platonist.44 Indeed, Philo of Alexandria distinguished between two dynameis (powers): a power of vitality and a power of rationality at Det. 82–3.45 One of these faculties allows humans to contemplate the intelligible realm, whereas the other allows it to function in the material realm: Therefore let there be a Soul suitable to the sensible world, generated from one indivisible Nature that is Mind and Intellect, and another [Nature] that is divided and dispersed among bodies; let it come forth situated between the undivided and divided Souls, so that [part of it] might remain always in the intelligible world, unaffected by embodiment [inmunis quidem ab incorporatione in mundo esset intellegibili semper], while its physical part might assist those beings that are mute and insentient; thus this intermediate Soul, since it was necessary that there exist in the world a race of animals that employ reason, could provide life and breath to this race; and, situated between two Natures, the Same and the Other, it could on the one hand contemplate the divinity of the Nature of the Same by raising its vision toward the higher regions, and on the other, turning to the lower sphere and realm of the Nature of the Other, it could equally distribute the decrees of the Demiurge and impart Providence to the beings of this world.46

The description of the Soul’s activity here is very similar to Numenius’ comparison of the Second God at Fr. 18 (Des Places = Eus. Pr. Ev. XI, 18, 24) with a helmsman, navigating with the aid of the celestial bodies. There the Demiurge is responsible for harmonising matter with the Forms and is the crucial link between sensible and intelligible worlds, an entity which contemplates the Forms, but is also involved in the material realm. The human soul, then, is simply a microcosm of the World Soul, as it was for Plato, since the Calcidian World Soul serves as a bridge between intelligible and sensible realms, just like its human counterpart. As Fate it is responsible for enacting the decrees of the Demiurge on a cosmic level. Calcidius transfers this activity to the World Soul, possibly because it can be regarded as an activity of Fate and by Calcidius’ time the identification of the World Soul with Fate, as well as its subordination to Providence/the Demiurge, had already been established. Demiurgic activity is typically noetic and as Cal44 For a detailed discussion of problems concerning Platonic psychology, see either ElkaisyFriemuth, M. / Dillon, J.: The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul or Dillon, J.: ‘How does the Soul direct the Body’. 45 This passage and the resultant difficulties are discussed at Dillon, J.: ‘Philo of Alexandria in Platonist Philosophy’, 21. 46 C. 31, p. 81, 7–18 Waszink, trans. Phillips, J.: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’, 240.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 229

cidius regards the World Soul as originating from a fusion that contains Mind and Intellect, this would not be problematic.

7 Fate and Providence The concept of Fate and free will is one which seems to belong to the realm of ethics.47 However, the Middle Platonists clearly locate it in the realm of physics or more strictly speaking, metaphysics. Alcinous in the Didaskalikos, for example, discusses the concept in the physical, rather than the ethical section. On further consideration, this seems to be a perfectly logical decision. The consequences of a doctrine of Fate goes far beyond the issue of human autonomy, since it is related to the manner of God’s working on the world and raises the question of what the limits to God’s power and knowledge are. It is a subject of major disagreement between the Stoics and the Middle Platonists, and this can be viewed as the result of divergent metaphysics, as much as due to a different treatment of ethics. Here the influence of Stoicism upon Calcidius is apparent, though this is probably due to the extent to which the Middle Platonist position on Fate and Providence was influenced by Stoicism, rather than as the result of Calcidius directly appropriating Stoic formulations. In order to appreciate the intellectual climate in which Calcidius is working, it will, I feel, be profitable to review the background to the discussion of Fate. The basic Stoic position, as it is generally understood, is that everything which happens is fated to occur, but some things still depend upon our own actions which are themselves fated; the Stoic notion of co-fated events. For example, if Laius has a son, that son will kill him. It might seem to be up to Laius to have a son or not, but both the initial act and the consequence are predetermined. The advantage of such a position is that it helps to preserve the possibility of divine foreknowledge. Since the Stoics asserted the validity of divination, the gods would be able to tell the future simply by understanding the web of cause and effect. The Stoic position can be easily assailed on two principal grounds: it removes the grounds of personal responsibility – no one can really be praised or criticised for their actions, if what they did was fated. Zeno himself fell foul of this argument when one of his slaves claimed that he was fated to steal from him, though Zeno responded that it was also fated that he should be whipped:48 Fate cannot be used to exempt one from personal responsibility.

47 Boys-Stones, G.: ‘“Middle” Platonists on Fate’, provides a very useful discussion of this topic in relation to Stoicism and Middle Platonism. 48 DL, VII 24.

230 

 Carl O’Brien

The famous example of the dog running along after the wagon to which it is tied suggests a strict determinism where only our volition can be truly described as ‘up to us’: And they (Chrysippus and Zeno) strongly maintained that everything is in accordance with Fate by using the following example: If a dog were fastened to a wagon and if he desires to follow and is dragged along and he follows, he combines his own power and compulsion. However, if he does not desire to follow, he will be forced to do so anyway. It is the same with humanity. Even if they do not desire to follow, they will be compelled to enter into that which is fated.49

One can still claim that the Stoics allow for human autonomy by not reading this passage in terms of free will or determinism, but rather as spiritual advice, urging the recipient to be more realistic in the pursuit of his goals.50 The second ground on which the Stoic position could be attacked is the so-called ‘lazy argument’. It makes no sense to apply effort to anything if the outcome has already been predetermined. The famous refutation of these points is found in Chrysippus’ argument of the cylinder and the cone. Shoving either of these starts it rolling, but does not give it the capacity to roll and each one rolls in a different manner, due to its own inherent nature. Such a response cannot really pacify the Platonists. For if our impulses are given to us by Fate, and it is Fate that prevents or does not prevent them, then everything comes about according to Fate, even those things that seem to be ‘up to us’.51

We still seem to have the same inability to preserve individual freedom, since the cylinder and cone can hardly be said to be responsible for their nature and can hardly respond to the external stimulus other than they do. The Stoics might try to preserve the illusion of things being ‘up to us’ by arguing for a distinction between auxiliary (external) causality and perfect (internal) causality, but the theory does seem to run into difficulties at this point. If the external stimulus is not a sufficient cause for the action, but internal causality is required, actions occur independently of the divine will, which would mean that some actions are independent of the god, as Plutarch points out; not a position which the Stoics

49 SVF II.975 = Hippolytus, Philos. 21, my translation. 50 Long, A.A.: Problems in Stoicism, 192. 51 Nemesius, Nature of Man 105.14–17, Morani trans. with modifications, Boys-Stones, G.: ‘“Middle” Platonists on Fate’, 439.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 231

could countenance.52 Plutarch in De Stoicorum Repugnantiis continues his attack by stating that either individual decisions should remain outside the control of God or He has to take some responsibility for them. Such a view of Fate makes better sense when one turns to examine the Stoic concept of the world. While the Platonists regard the world as produced in the best possible manner, for the Stoics its arrangement is a matter of indifference (and any other arrangement would be equally a matter of indifference): Such is the nature of the cosmos and such it was and is, and will be; and what happens cannot happen otherwise then as it now is […] If you make the attempt to incline your mind to these things, and to persuade yourself to accept the necessary things willingly, then you will live your life most moderately and harmoniously.53

Although the arrangement of the cosmos might be indifferent, the Stoics identify Fate with the principle of the universe. ‘Nothing either rests or is moved otherwise than according to the reason of Zeus.’54 The Stoic description of the cosmos as a household run by a beneficent master further suggests some identification between the desires of the individual and the whole.55 This is brought out by Themistius’ remark that ‘the Stoics held that God pervades every substance and in some part of the world is mind, in another soul or nature or cohesion.’56 Since the individual’s goals become identified with the Whole, one circumvents (to some extent) the issue of freedom and determinism. So, the Stoics are forced to identify Nature, Providence, Fate and Zeus as the result of (from the Platonist perspective) inadequate metaphysics.

8 The Middle Platonists The basic Middle Platonist theory which we have on the issue of Fate is supplied by Alcinous’ Didaskalikos 26, with further elaborations contained in pseudo-Plutarch’s De Fato and Nemesius of Emesa’s On the Nature of Man 38; the texts which influenced Calcidius’ In Timaeum 142–90, which is Middle Platonist, rather than Neoplatonic. Although Alexander of Aphrodisias is an Aristotelian, 52 ‘So, then, should we say that assent is not up to us and neither is virtue nor vice, nor right-actions and wrong-doing; nor should we say that Fate is deficient and destiny ineffectual and that the activities and states of Zeus are all in vain.’ (De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, 1056c–d). 53 Musonius Rufus, fr. 42, Hense, trans. Lutz. 54 SVF II 937c. 55 Alex: SVF II 945; Pl: SVF II 645. 56 SVF I 158, 46 trans. Botros, S.: ‘Freedom, Causality, Fatalism’, 303.

232 

 Carl O’Brien

his De Fato seems to parallel Middle Platonist positions so closely that it has been sometimes suggested that they share a common source, though the overlap may simply be caused by the identical positions which all these texts attack. Maximus of Tyre is not often mentioned in such contexts, probably because his orations are not particularly technical, but he does raise some items of interest for this debate. The Middle Platonists, in their attempt to escape from the strict determinism of the Stoics, develop the doctrine of hypothetical Fate i.e. if X occurs, than Y will follow. This ensures that the initial action depends upon the agent, although the consequences might be fated. It differs from its Stoic equivalent of co-fated events in which both actions are predetermined. A difficulty with this theory is how one can decide where the causal chain begins. At what point could Oedipus, one of the classic examples cited, have avoided his fate? The other problem with hypothetical Fate is that if in order to preserve human autonomy, one accepts that human actions can be spontaneous (in the sense of being uncaused by antecedent causes), God’s Providence is affected since He is not able to care for the whole of the universe, as He could not plan for the infinite possibilities which would result. It also has consequences for divine foreknowledge. God, knowing the character of the participants might be sure that Y is particularly likely, but if I have some degree of autonomy, God cannot actually know my course of action until I actually make a decision. Though the likelihood of predicting a single action might be high, modern probability demonstrates the alarming rate of decrease for accurately predicting the outcome of a series of interdependent actions.57 This leaves God with the type of knowledge which is effectively useless. Maximus of Tyre suggests that God is like a doctor, a helmsman or a general, whose specialised knowledge ensures that he has a heightened understanding of the outcome of the events in his own proper sphere of expertise.58 Chrysippus uses a similar argument in favour of divination. It is a skill (τέχνη) or science (ἐπιστήμη), which interprets signs given by the gods. According to Cicero, ‘their view is that the world was from its beginning set up in such a way that certain things should be preceded by certain signs.’59 Though it is possible to develop

57 Probability can be expressed by a figure between 0 (will not occur) and 1 (will occur). The probability of two events occurring sequentially is found out by multiplying their probability. If God knows that I am 90% likely to order a full Irish breakfast and 90% likely if I order a full Irish breakfast to drink coffee with it, He is only 81% sure that I will order a full Irish breakfast with coffee (0.9 x 0.9 = 0.81). It only takes some 28 interdependent decisions, each with a 90% probability, for God to have a less than 1% certainty of the course of events. Cf. Johnson, D.K. ‘The Foreknowledge of a Painter’, 110–122. 58 Oration 13.4. 59 Div. I.118 trans. Long/Sedley.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 233

‘theorems’ (θεωρήματα, Cic. Fat. II.97) expressing the formulation between signs and the events which they precede, we do not find any comment that a given sign has any causality over its event.60 Although the Stoics simply identify Zeus, Providence and Fate, they do draw distinctions about each of these divine manifestations. Posidonius, in fact, suggested a triad of divinities: Zeus, Nature and Fate.61 The point of this division is presumably to indicate that Zeus or the god is superior to the other two of his manifestations. Maximus too attempts to distinguish between Providence and Fate: Καὶ μὴν τῶν ὅσα οἱ ἄνθρωποι εὔχονται γενέσθαι σφίσι, τὰ μὲν ἡ πρόνοια ἐφορᾷ, τὰ δὲ εἱμαρμένη καταναγκάζει, τὰ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἡ τύχη, τὰ δὲ οἰκονομεῖ ἡ τέχνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν πρόνοια θεοῦ ἔργον, ἡ δὲ εἱμαρμένη ἀνάγκης, ἡ δὲ τέχνη ἀνθρώπου, ἡ δὲ τύχη τοῦ αὐτομάτου· διακεκλήρωνται δὲ τούτων ἑκάστῳ αἱ ὗλαι τοῦ βίου· ἃ τοίνυν εὐχόμεθα, ἢ εἰς πρόνοιαν συντελεῖ θεοῦ, ἢ εἰς εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπου τέχνην ἢ εἰς τύχης φοράν. (5.4.80–87) Of all the things which men pray to obtain, some are under the control of Providence, some are enforced by Fate, some are at the mercy of fickle Fortune and some are regulated by Science. Providence is God’s work, Fate the work of Necessity, Science the work of man, and Fortune the work of blind Chance. It is to the supervision of one or other of these four factors that the raw material of life is allocated. What we pray for must therefore be attributed either to divine Providence, or to destined Necessity, or to human science or to the vagaries of Fortune (trans. Trapp).62

The basic Middle Platonist doctrine of hypothetical Fate as found in Alcinous Didasc. 26.1, pseudo-Plutarch and Nemesius can be reduced, as it has by Dillon, to four main points:63 1) All things are within Fate’s sphere, but not all things are fated. 2) Even though Fate has the status of a law, it does not make specific statements, since that would result in an infinity of possibilities and results. 3) If everything is already predetermined, what is in our power (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) would disappear. This is the argument of personal responsibility which was levelled against the Stoics. 4) Although the soul is autonomous and is not compelled to act in a particular manner, once it makes a specific choice, a particular chain of causality results, which is brought about by Fate.

60 Bobzien, S.: Determinism and Freedom in Stoicism, 88. 61 Diels, Dox. Gr. 324. 62 Similar lists exist elsewhere: [Plut.], Placita 885cd, Sextus, Pyrr. Hyp. 1.237, Stob., Ecl. 1.5. 15–16, i.45, 25–47.16 Meineke, DL, III 96, cf. Trapp, 1997, 45. 63 Dillon, J. M.: The Middle Platonists, 295.

234 

 Carl O’Brien

This view can be traced back to Republic 617d ff., the Myth of Er, where it is granted to each soul to chose a virtuous life or tyranny, but once the lot has been chosen, there appears to be no escape. This permits divine foreknowledge, while ensuring that free will can operate in the realm of the possible. Alcinous distinguishes between the potential and the actualised. While it might be possible for a given individual to be a scholar or a flautist or a carpenter, he or she may only be ‘in the state of’ one of these. So hypothetical Fate may result in inescapable consequences, but still requires an act of human free will to trigger the causal chain. As Nemesius comments: it is in our power whether to undertake a sea voyage; this has the status of a hypothesis (καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν). Once it is established that we make the voyage, however, it then follows from this hypothesis that we are either shipwrecked or not.64

The elaboration on this basic theory found in pseudo-Plutarch’s De Fato links the issue of Fate again with the realm of metaphysics. Pseudo-Plutarch draws a distinction between Fate ‘in activity’ and Fate ‘in substance’, which is identified with ‘the soul of the world in all three of its divisions’.65 This leads to the triadic division of the universe, with one of the three Moirai or the traditional Fates of Greek mythology presiding over each of these divisions (which was inspired by Timaeus 39–41) and so providing us with three Providences: the activity of a Demiurge, that of the World Soul and that of the daemons in the sublunar realm. Perhaps the aim is to show how Providence can enclose a Fate which encloses Free Will, but manages to have some element of coordination, but it is unclear that this threefold division actually achieves anything.66 The aim of this manoeuvre is perhaps rather to portray Stoicism, not in opposition to Platonism, but as a poor reception of Plato, due to its weak metaphysics, with its simple identification of Providence and God, rather than exhibiting a more sophisticated understanding of multiple levels of Providence (and even Calcidius’ simplified account distinguishes between the level of Fate and that of Providence).67 The extent to which the Middle Platonists shaped their own position using Stoic material is apparent. The primary Providence is that applied by the Demiurge and which regulates the universe. In Middle Platonist terms, it seems to involve God thinking the Ideas. This is similar to the Stoic view that Providence can be seen as the organising principle of the universe. Secondary Providence is Fate operating as the instrument of the Demiurge; this view is attacked by Nemesius on the grounds that it confuses Providence and Necessity, which he views 64 Nemesius, Nat. Hom. 38. 65 568e, Dillon, J. M.: The Middle Platonists, 35. 66 Cf. Dillon, J. M.: The Middle Platonists, 324 f. 67 Boys-Stones, G.: ‘“Middle” Platonists on Fate’, 445.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 235

as incompatible (Nem. 38 756C–760A). The third Providence, which seems to be a later elaboration, is an attempt to extend divine Providence as far as possible down the ontological scale, while permitting human autonomy. God simply does not work at the level of the individual for the Middle Platonists. Indeed, on the Middle Platonist reading, God would be prevented from having detailed knowledge of his creatures on an individual level, since his thoughts are universals and so cannot be concerned with particulars.68 This again helps to resolve the problem of divine foreknowledge in emphasising that God simply does not work directly on the lower levels of the cosmos (other than in generating the agents who do work at this level). Maximus’ argument here is part of the general opposition to the industriousness of the Stoic god, which was attacked by a broad spectrum of philosophers. As Alexander of Aphrodisias comments: ‘Surely it demeans our preconception of the divinity to say that god pervades the whole of [the] matter […] ?’69 Yet the kernel of the idea that the divinity is not concerned with minor matters seems to have been found in Stoic thought: the Stoic Balbus in Cicero’s De natura deorum claims magna di curant, parva neglegunt, ‘the gods care about the great matters and neglect the minor ones’. However, in reality, though the gods might not be concerned with every detail of our lives they do concern themselves with great men as individuals. The Stoic gods work at the level of the individual or the level of the particular precisely because the whole, the universal, depends upon the existence of the part. Stoic comments that God does not concern himself with minor matters seems to really be that God is justified in focusing to a greater extent on the interests of the cosmos as a whole rather than those of individuals – consider the famous claim that a single worthy individual suffering is like a few grains that get lost in a well-run household – rather than an argument against the gods working at the level of the particular. The Stoics and Middle Platonists are divided on the issue of Fate and the related questions of divine foreknowledge, Providence and Free Will. Their deterministic view of Fate heavily influences their ethics and has serious implications for the extent to which human autonomy can exist. The Middle Platonist response, the notion of hypothetical Fate, can also appear problematic in certain respects. In reality the divergence between both schools is not based on the question of ethics, but that of metaphysics. The Stoics, by insisting on a single causal principle, are forced to regard the entire operation of the cosmos as being con-

68 The very idea that God micromanages to this degree is ridiculed by Maximus of Tyre at Oration 13.2.43–47. 69 Alexander, De Mixtione, p. 226, 24–9 = SVF II.1048, R. Todd’s translation.

236 

 Carl O’Brien

ducted in accordance with the will of God. Their identification of Fate, Nature and Providence can be seen as a consequence of their rejection of an adequate level of metaphysics. Such an identification is rejected by Platonists such as Plutarch or Maximus because this would ultimately make God responsible for the existence of evil. The Middle Platonists clearly make use of Stoic material in shaping their views of Fate, but their metaphysical system based on two causal principles, the Reason and Necessity of the Timaeus, allows greater flexibility in accounting for divine providence, while also preserving space for human freedom. Ultimately, though, the tension between these two is never satisfactorily resolved. It is into this wider context that we may fit Calcidius’ speculations on Fate, one of the areas of his writings which has been most intensively researched and of major importance for explaining the manner in which the World Soul plays a regulatory function in the continual ordering of the cosmos. Calcidius would have been influenced by Stoic theory concerning Fate via Posidonius’ commentary on the Timaeus, as well as the writings of pseudo-Plutarch and the sources used by the Christian Nemesius.70 In Calcidius, we observe the development of attempts to resolve philosophical problems concerning the doctrine of Fate and Providence, as well as the result of speculations concerning the ontological status of the Demiurge and the postulation of numerous mediating entities. Calcidius reveals the convergence of both approaches, by assigning Fate a specific role within the ontological hierarchy.71 Calcidius’ explanation of the activity of the World Soul and the activity of Fate is not completely clear. Since Fate is an activity of Becoming, Switalski regards it as problematic how it, as necessarily limited, can play a role in the unlimited management of the world.72 At c. 144, Fate is the World Soul, whereas at c. 177 the World Soul obeys Fate. Part of this problem seems to arise from Calcidius’ failure to bear in mind the distinction which he draws between the activity of Fate and the essence of Fate at c. 143–144 elsewhere in the commentary.73 It will be observed also that unlike the accounts of pseudo-Plutarch, Apuleius and Nemesius, Calcidius does not have a subdivision of Providence between that of the highest God, secondary gods and daemons; he simply has a single Providence (although, of course, he draws a distinction between Providence and Fate). Given Calcidius’ assignment of intellective activity to the World Soul in its role as Fate, and since this is the activity only of the highest element of soul (and the World 70 Cf. also c. 164, where Calcidius discusses the things which are up to us which is reminiscent of Epictetus, Switalski, B. W.: Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus, 31. 71 Cf. den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate, 85. 72 Switalski, B. W.: Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus, 29. 73 Den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate, 16–19.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 237

Soul for Calcidius has a tripartite structure, just like the human soul), this inconsistency on Calcidius’ part might be resolved if one envisages Fate being identified only with the highest intellective part of soul. Such a theory agrees with Calcidius’ definition of Fate at c. 146 as a divine law penetrated into the World Soul, rather than as the World Soul in its entirety. Since the World Soul as a secunda mens is the second intellect, one would expect it to occupy the second ontological level (as it does in Numenius or the Chaldaean Oracles), rather than the third position, as in Calcidius. Den Boeft suggests that Calcidius is combining two hierarchies: 1) the Numenian Highest Being, 2) nous and 3) the World Soul and 1) Highest Being, 2) Providence, 3) secunda mens (which is perhaps equivalent to second providence). Den Boeft points out that at c. 188 Calcidius describes the Second God (the Demiurge in Numenius’ system) as latorem legis utriusque uitae tam aeternae quam temporariae, ‘the giver of law and of each kind of life, both the eternal and the temporal’. The term lator legis evokes both Numenius’ application of its Greek equivalent νομοθέτης to the Demiurge at Fr. 22 (Des Places) and by Plotinus to νοῦς at Enn. V 9 [5]. Unfortunately, such usage does not really help us to understand how Calcidius developed his theory. The main difference between pseudo-Plutarch and Calcidius is that while they both place Fate at the third ontological level, pseudo-Plutarch identifies it with the secondary gods (δεύτεροι θεοί), whereas Calcidius identifies it (some of the time, at least) with the World Soul. [176] In the first place all things and the world itself are held together and ruled principally by the highest God, who is the supreme Good, beyond all essences, above appraisal and understanding, after whom all things seek, whereas himself, he possesses full perfection and does not need any fellowship: to say more about him would be to cause a deviation from the course of my subject. In the second place, things are ruled by a supreme providence which has second place after that supreme God and which the Greeks call nous; that is an intelligible essence which emulates the goodness of the highest God because of its unwearied turning to Him from which it has a draught of goodness by which it is as much adorned itself as other things, which are embellished on his personal authority. Therefore, this will of God, because it is a wise guardianship of all things, is called Providence by mankind, which name is not used as most people think – because of its anticipation in seeing and understanding future events – but because it is the characteristic of the divine mind to understand, which is the characteristic act of mind. And God’s mind is eternal, so God’s mind is the external activity of understanding. [177] This Providence is followed by Fate, which is divine law, published by the wise harmony of intelligence for the government of all things. This is obeyed by the so-called second mind i.e. the tripartite World Soul [anima mundi tripertita], as has been observed above, just as one would call law the soul of an expert law-giver (trans. den Boeft).

238 

 Carl O’Brien

Again, this follows Middle Platonist speculations in attempting to work out how Fate can remain subordinate to Providence. Since Providence is involved in carrying out the functions of a transcendent God in the sublunary sphere, it is a secondary God, comparable to the continuing activity of the Demiurge or a logos. In fact, both of these functions occupy the same rank in the divine hierarchy and are identical in some thinkers, when one considers the Logos-Cutter of Philo of Alexandria, penetrating those parts of the cosmos where it is beneath God’s dignity to go. What is more interesting is Calcidius’ claim that Soul is a Mind. Once Providence is regarded as the mens Dei, it becomes the second Intellect. Platonists tend to distinguish between the noetic level or the level of the Intellect and the psychic one, but Plotinus frequently assigns soul an intellective activity, calling it a ‘noetic substance’ (οὐσία νοητή, Enn. III 6 [26] 6.1), ‘noetic being’ (νοητὴ φύσις, IV 2 [4] 1.5), ‘the lowest Logos of the noetic realm’ (λόγος ἔσχατος μὲν τῶν νοητῶν IV 6 [41] 3.5–6), ‘a certain image of the intellect’, (εἰκών τίς ἐστι νοῦ, V 1 [10] 3.7).74 Plotinus, however, does not go so far as to suggest that the Soul is actually a second intellect. There is no need to posit Plotinian influence upon Calcidius; the Platonic soul, after all, contains a reasoning part. Furthermore, this claim that the World Soul is a mind has a justification in the Timaeus: And the Soul, being woven through the Heaven every way from the centre to the extremity and enveloping it in a circle from without, and herself revolving within herself, began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent (ἔμφρονος) life lasting throughout all time. And whereas the body of the Heaven is visible, the Soul is herself invisible, but partakes in reasoning and in harmony (λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας), having come into existence by the agency of the best of things intelligible and ever existing as the best of things generated (Timaeus 36e–37a).75

The other passage of major importance for the operation of Fate on the generated realm is to be found at c. 188, where Calcidius explains where he views Fate as fitting with the divine hierarchy:

74 Den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate, 96. Cf. ‘Soul is of Plotinus’ three hypostases the most-wide ranging and various in its activities. At the top of its range, it lives on the highest level in the world of Intellect, and with Intellect can rise in self-transcendence to union with the One […] Its proper and most characteristic activity is discursive thinking, reasoning from premises to conclusion.’ Armstrong, A. H.: ‘Part III – Plotinus’, 250. In any case, Plato himself claims that ‘the one and only existing thing which has the property of acquiring thought is Soul (Tim. 46d5–6), and at Sophist 249a4–8, nous can only exist in Soul. 75 Trans. Bury (my italics).

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 239

Ut igitur breui multa complectar, istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est. Originem quidem rerum, ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur, esse summum et ineffabilem deum; post quem prouidentiam eius secundum deum, latorem legis utriusque uitae, tam aeternae quam temporariae. tertium porro esse substantiam, quae secunda mens intellectusque dicitur quasi quaedam custos legis aeternae. His subiectus fore rationabiles animus legi obsequentes, ministras uero potestates naturam, fortunam casum et daemones inspectatores speculatoresque meritorum. Ergo summus deus iubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat; animae uero lege agunt. So, to summarise briefly, we have to imagine the following arrangement of this subject: (1) the origin of things, from which existence is provided to all other beings, is the highest and unutterable God, (2) after Him His Providence is the second god, the legislator of both lives, the eternal as well as the temporal, (3) the third being is the so-called second mind and intellect, a kind of preserver of the eternal law; (4) subjected to these are the rational souls obeying the law and, as attendant powers, nature, fortune, chance, and the daemons, who inspect and investigate merits. (5) So, the highest god commands, the second arranges, the third makes known, the souls, however, act according to the law.76

Thus, passage is basically a summary of c. 176. Providence participates in goodness as a result of its ἐπιστροφή to the First Principle; this does not have to be viewed as a Neoplatonist feature, as it is observable in the relationship which Numenius posits between the First and Second Gods. The World Soul ranks at position three on this hierarchy, as the second mind which preserves the eternal law, but in Platonic style, since it ranks first amongst souls in degree of purity, it ranks above rational souls, amongst which fortune and chance are grouped, so combining Platonist speculations on the topic to develop the interrelation between categories of causality traditionally considered in Greek thought to influence human autonomy.

9 Conclusion Calcidius’ work is not particularly coherent when taken in its entirety; comments made in a given context are contradicted elsewhere. For example, he posits a tripartite godhead consisting of God, mens Dei (c. 147) and Fate (or World Soul c. 176f, c. 188), though this structure only really emerges when he is discussing his views on Providence and Fate. He identifies Fate with the World Soul, or 76 Trans. den Boeft, J.: Calcidius on Fate, 118–119.

240 

 Carl O’Brien

more specifically with the highest intellective aspect of the World Soul, assigning it an ordering function, which assists the Demiurge or Providence in its task of continuously regulating the material realm. In doing this, Calcidius’ interpretation goes beyond the letter of the Timaeus, but his comments are made within the framework of previous Middle Platonist discussions of the topic. Even though the Enneads began circulating around 301, apart from some resemblances which could either be attributable to a common source or which closer examination reveal to be superficial, there is not really any observable Neoplatonic influence, corresponding closely with the pattern for Christian authors in the fourth century.77 Calcidius combines his speculations on the ontological hierarchy with the results of the Stoic/Middle Platonist debate concerning Fate and Providence. In introducing Fate into his hierarchy, he is not particularly original, since it is paralleled in the Middle Platonist tradition. Indeed, his account simplifies alternative theories by only having one sort of Fate. This may account for the ambivalence which he exhibits in his account, sometimes equating Fate with the World Soul and elsewhere suggesting that the World Soul is the instrument of Fate, though it could also be caused by the range of activity which he assigned to the tripartite World Soul. Calcidius in expounding his doctrine of the World Soul does not simply translate the Timaeus into Latin, but neither does he display striking originality. His Commentary selects the formulations which he feels most appropriate from amongst those already supplied by Middle Platonist scholarship, without attempting to harmonise them with his religious doctrines, as was the prevalent pattern for Judaeo-Christian thinkers of his time.

References Armstrong, Arthur H.: ‘Part III – Plotinus’, in: Arthur H. Armstrong (ed.), Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967. Bakhouche, Béatrice: Calcidius. Commentaire au Timée de Platon, edited and translated by Béatrice Bakhouche, Paris 2011. Bobzien, Susanne: Determinism and Freedom in Stoicism, Oxford 1998. Boeft, Jan den: Calcidius on Fate. His Doctrine and Sources, Leiden 1970. Bos, Abraham. P.: ‘Why the Soul Needs an Instrumental Body According to Aristotle (Anim. I, 3, 407b13–26)’, Hermes 128.1 (2000), 20–31.

77 St Basil’s use of Neoplatonism is likewise more limited than one might expect. Cf. O’Brien, C. S.: ‘St Basil’s Explanation of Creation’.

Calcidius on Fate and the World Soul 

 241

Botros, Sophie: ‘Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy’, Phronesis 30.3 (1985), 274–304. Boys-Stones, George, ‘“Middle” Platonists on Fate and Human Autonomy’, in: Richard Sorabji and Robert W. Sharples (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100BC-200AD, vol. 2, London 2007, 431–448. Brennan, Tad: The Stoic Life. Emotions, Duty and Fate, Oxford 2005. Bury, Robert Gregg: Plato, Timaeus, edited and translated by Robert Gregg Bury, Cambridge 1929. Des Places, Edouard: Numenius. Fragments, edited and translated by Edouard des Places, Paris 1973. Dillon, John: Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, translation with an introduction and commentary by John Dillon, Oxford 1993. Dillon, John: The Middle Platonists, Cornell 1996. [2nd revised ed.] Dillon, John: ‘Philo of Alexandria in Platonist Philosophy’, in: Maha Elkaisy-Freimuth and John Dillon (eds.), The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul. Reflections of Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, Leiden 2009, 17–24. Dillon, John: ‘How does the Soul direct the Body after all? Traces of a Dispute on Mind-Body Relations in the Old Academy’, in: Dorothea Frede and Burkhart Reis (eds.), Leib und Seele in der antiken Philosophie, Berlin – New York 2009. Elkaisy-Freimuth, Maha and Dillon, John (eds.): The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul. Reflections of Platonic Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, Leiden 2009. Hoenig, Christina: ‘Calcidius’, in: Harold Tarrant, Danielle A. Layne, Dirk Baltzly and François Renaud (eds.) Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity, Leiden 2018, 433–447. Johnson, David K: ‘The Foreknowledge of a Painter, the Fate of a Hero’, in: David K. Johnson (ed.) Heroes and Philosophy, Hoboken 2009, 110–122. Jones, Roger Miller: ‘Chalcidius and Neo-platonism’, Classical Philology 13 (1918), 194–208. Long, Antony Arthur (ed.): Problems in Stoicism, London 1971. Meijering, Eginhard P.: ‘Mosheim on the Difference between Christianity and Platonism. A Contribution to the Discussion about Methodology’, Vigiliae Christianae 31.1 (1977), 68–73. Menn, Stephen: ‘Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good’, The Review of Metaphysics 45 (1991), 543–573. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘The Origin in Origen. Platonic Demiurgy or Christian Creation?’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 54.1–2 (2007), 169–177. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘Platonism and the Tools of God’, Trinity College Dublin Journal of Postgraduate Research 6 (2007), 60–72. [Electronic version available at http://docs. wixstatic.com/ugd/2b8f23eda23f014ad549f89789ef1bf27245b3.pdf] O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘The Descent of the Demiurge from Platonism to Gnosticism’, in: Gunnar af Hällström (ed.), Människan i Universum: Platons Timaios och dess tolkningshistoria, Åbo 2009, 113–132. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘St Basil’s Explanation of Creation’, in: Gunnar af Hällström (ed.) The Actuality of St Basil the Great, Åbo 2011,194–224. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘The Middle Platonist Demiurge and Stoic Cosmobiology’, Horizons. Seoul Journal of Humanities 3.1 (2012), 19–39. O’Brien, Carl Séan: The Demiurge in Ancient Thought. Secondary Gods and Divine Mediators, Cambridge 2015.

242 

 Carl O’Brien

O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘Creation, Cosmogony and Cappadocian Cosmology’, in: Nicu Dumitrascu (ed.) The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians, New York 2015, 7–20. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘Plotinus and the Soul’s logos as the Structuring Principle of the World’, in: Jens Halfwassen, Tobias Dangel u. Carl O’Brien. (eds.) Seele und Materie im Neuplatonismus. Soul and Matter in Neoplatonism, Heidelberg 2016, 105–133. O’Brien, Carl Séan: ‘Alcinous’ Reception of Plato’, in: Harold Tarrant, Danielle A. Layne, Dirk Baltzly u. François Renaud (eds.) Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity, Leiden 2018, 171–182. Phillips, John: ‘Plato’s Psychogonia in Later Platonism’, The Classical Quarterly 52.1 (2002), 231–247. Phillips, John: ‘Numenian Psychology in Calcidius’, Phronesis 48.2 (2003), 132–151. Reydams Schils, Gretchen: ‘Calcidius on the Human Soul’, in: Barbara Feichtinger, Stephen Lake and Helmut Seng (eds.), Körper und Seele: Aspekte Spätantiker Anthropologie, Berlin 2006, 95–114. Reydams Schils, Gretchen: ‘Calcidius on the Human and the World Soul and Middle-Platonist Psychology’, Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 39.2 (2006), 177–200. Reydams Schils, Gretchen: ‘Metadiscourse. Plato’s Timaeus according to Calcidius’, Phronesis 52.3 (2007), 301–327. Sharples, Robert W.: ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias. De Fato: Some Parallels’, The Classical Quarterly 28.2 (1978), 243–266. Sharples, Robert W.: ‘Nemesius of Emesa and Some Theories of Providence’, Vigiliae Christianae 37.2 (1983), 141–156. Sharples, Robert W.: ‘Soft Determinism and Freedom in Early Stoicism’, Phronesis 31.3 (1986), 266–279. Switalski, Bronislaus Wladislaus: Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato’s Timaeus. Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung, Münster 1902. Van Winden, Jacobus Cornelius Maria: Calcidius on Matter. His Doctrine and Sources, A Chapter in the History of Platonism, Leiden 1965. Waszink, Jan Hendrik: Calcidius, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, edited by Jan Hendrik Waszink, Leiden 1962.

Part IV: Neoplatonism

Damian Caluori

Plotinus on the World Soul Plotinus’ lifetime fell within a period that Dodds famously called an age of anxiety. This anxiety was not only due to economic and political instability in large parts of the Roman Empire but also an expression of more fundamental existential concerns.1 People worried about whether their destinies were in their hands, i.e. whether they were the proper agents of their actions. Some movements popular at the time, such as astral fatalism, claimed that this was not the case. According to astral fatalism, we – and our actions – are completely determined through the activities of the stars in such a way that we are not proper agents. The third century Christian theologian Methodius of Olympus, for example, describes such a view in his Convivium Decem Virginum. The greatest of all evils implanted in the many is to ascribe the causes of sins to the movements of the stars, and to say that our life is governed by the necessities of fate, as those boastful people say who study the stars.2

It is easy to see how one might think that a world in which we are no more than puppets is utterly flawed: by losing our agency, we lose a crucial part of what makes us human. While this worry concerns humans as subjects and agents, many of Plotinus’ contemporaries were also plagued by unsettling beliefs about the external world. They thought that the world of our experience may be the product of a bad or incompetent Craftsman. Indeed, according to views of this sort, the world might even be such as, while allowing for rational agency, the way to happiness, tranquillity, or salvation is blocked through external obstacles. Plotinus was thoroughly familiar with such ideas. In particular, he knew a movement whose members Porphyry, his student and the editor of his writings, identified as Gnostics, a movement that defends the view that the world is the work of a bad or incompetent Craftsman.3

1 Dodds, E. R.: Pagans and Christians in an Age of Anxiety, 3. 2 Meth., Symp. 8.13.209 (Musurillo H.: Méthode d’Olympe. Le Banquet, 236 = PG 18:161). 3 For the purposes of this paper, I will remain neutral as to whether or not Plotinus presents Gnostic views correctly, as to whether he thought of his opponents as Gnostics and what movement that might otherwise be called Gnostic he targeted. When I say ‘Gnostics’ I only refer to Plotinus’ unnamed opponents and their views as presented by Plotinus in Ennead II 9 [33]. I call them ‘Gnostics’ because Porphyry entitled the corresponding Plotinian treatise Against the Gnostics. For the scholarly debate about this movement see the classic discussion in Jonas, H.: The Gnostic Religion and Markschies, Ch.: Die Gnosis. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-011

246 

 Damian Caluori

I will discuss some of Plotinus’ anti-Gnostic arguments and attempt to show that they do not imply that Plotinus rejects the existence of a divine Craftsman but only that he rejects the view that the Craftsman is incompetent or bad. I will further argue that, as a consequence of his anti-Gnostic arguments, Plotinus must hold that the World Soul, even though it is the soul of the world of our experience, is not immanent in its body but rather a transcendent entity. By ‘transcendent’ I mean ‘belonging to the intelligible world of Platonic Forms’. A further point revealed by Plotinus’ confrontation with Gnosticism, as I shall argue, is the fact that the World Soul’s thinking is not restricted to theoretical contemplation; rather, the World Soul has to think also practically or productively. This is, roughly, because the World Soul crucially functions as Craftsman.4 I will argue that the World Soul’s cognitive activity exclusively consists of these two activities (theoretical and practical/productive thinking) and in particular that other activities and functions usually associated with souls or minds (such as sense perception, memory, or figuring something out) are absent in the case of the World Soul. How, then, will it complete the toilsome work of creation? I will argue that it does so by exercising its power by means of other rational agents that take care of all the other activities necessary for the creation of an excellent image of the world of Forms. Finally, I will compare the World Soul to other individual souls5 and to the hypostasis Soul.6

1 Plotinus against the Gnostics At Ennead II 9 [33] 4, 1–2 Plotinus attacks the view of his Gnostic opponents thus: ‘If they are going to claim that the soul has created [the sensible world] “after having shed its feathers,” then this does not happen to the World Soul.’ First, note that Plotinus here by the first occurrence of the word ‘soul’ refers to the soul quite generally and not to any soul in particular. When he states that ‘this does not happen to the World Soul’ then this means that we cannot claim of the soul quite generally that it has created this world after having shed its feathers because there is at least one soul, the World Soul, that has not shed its feathers. 4 By saying that the World Soul functions as Craftsman, I do not mean to imply that they are strictly identical. 5 By the expression ‘individual souls’ I exclusively refer to individual rational souls in this paper. I will neither discuss nor refer to non-rational souls. 6 The current paper partly relies on my earlier work on this topic. I have discussed the World Soul in Caluori, D.: Plotinus on the Soul, ch. 5 in detail. The World Soul’s practical thinking is further considered in Caluori, D.: ‘Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus’.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 247

Second, Plotinus does not attack the view that the soul has created the sensible world. Rather, he argues against the claim that the soul created this world while not being in its best possible state. This is indicated by his rejection of the view that the soul has created the world after having shed its feathers. What does it mean for a soul to shed its feathers? This expression can be found in Plato’s Phaedrus 246c2. But if we look at this passage (that the Gnostics appear to refer to), we do not find the claim that each soul has shed its feathers (and thus that the soul quite generally has done so). The whole soul takes care of everything soulless […] Being perfect and furnished with feathers, it travels high up and arranges the whole world. But any soul that has shed its feathers is carried away until it takes hold of something solid, where it settles and takes on an earthly body […].7

Plotinus understands the expression ‘the whole soul’ as referring to the World Soul and thus sees a contrast between the World Soul, being furnished with feathers, and other souls (such as the soul of Socrates), having shed their feathers. Plotinus’ argument thus is this: if something is furnished with feathers, it is travelling high in the sense of still being in contact with the Divine (i.e. with the Platonic world of Forms). Hence, it is wrong to say that the soul, in so far as it creates this world, has lost contact with the Divine. For there is at least one soul, the World Soul, that is both crucially involved in the creation of this world and that, qua creator, is still in touch with the Divine. Plotinus continues: But if they are going to claim that [sc. the soul has created this world] after having fallen, they must give us the reason for this fall. When did it fall? For if it is eternal, it always remains in a fallen condition, according to their account. But if it [i.e. the fall] occurred [at some point in time], why not earlier?8

According to the Gnostics, the soul (quite generally) has fallen and thus has lost contact with the Divine. This explains why the sensible world, being the creation of the fallen soul, is in the bad shape that the Gnostics think it is. Against this, Plotinus argues that the Gnostics misconceive what it means for a soul to have fallen. He states that the soul is either eternally in a fallen condition or it is not. The former is impossible – an eternal state of having fallen is no state of having fallen at all. This is because for the soul to have fallen presupposes a time before its fall. Yet if the latter is the case, Plotinus claims, then there is no reason why the

7 Plato, Phaedrus 246b6–c4. 8 Enn. II 9 [33] 4, 2–6. For a fascinating discussion of Gnostic imagery of the fall, see Jonas, H.: The Gnostic Religion, 62–65.

248 

 Damian Caluori

fall occurred at the particular moment in time it did supposedly occur. Perhaps the point of this latter part of the dilemma is this. Assume that the soul is in the divine realm. Why would it, at some particular moment or other, turn away from the Divine and fall? After all, there was nothing but the eternally unchanging state of being in the divine realm before the fall supposedly took place. Given the unchanging nature of the divine realm, nothing there could have occurred to cause or occasion the soul to fall. But could it not have been attracted by the sensible world and hence turn away from the Divine and incline towards the sensible world? Plotinus, at Ennead II 9 [33] 12, 41–42, rejects this option as well. If they are going to claim that the soul made it [i.e. the sensible world] when it inclined, there was clearly nowhere for it to incline to […].

There was nothing to incline to because the sensible world, including everything non-divine, was, at that point, not yet created. For the Gnostics, the act of creation cannot have occurred before the soul’s fall because the fall is explanatorily prior to the creation. Therefore, there was nothing outside the Divine that could have caused or occasioned the soul to fall. The only remaining option would seem to be that the soul spontaneously and without any cause turned away from the Divine. Against this, Plotinus argues in his treatise On Fate, III 1 [3] 1, 13–16. About things belonging to the realm of becoming and things that always are but do not always exercise the same activity, one must say that everything occurs according to a cause; nothing uncaused is acceptable.

With specific reference to the soul he continues that no impulse of the soul could occur without the soul having been moved.9 We can therefore conclude that there could not have occurred any Gnostic fall of the soul, neither caused nor uncaused. This does not imply, however, that the soul has not created the sensible world; it only shows that, if the soul has created the sensible world, it must have done so while remaining in the Divine. What about the antecedent? The view that the soul crucially is the creator is explicitly expressed a little later in the same treatise. Considering the Gnostic question of why the soul made the universe, Plotinus states: ‘To ask why the soul made the universe is like asking why there is a soul and why the Craftsman made.’10 Here he explicitly identifies the soul and the maker of the universe and claims that creating the universe is a crucial

9 This rules out an explanation based on libertarian free will. 10 Enn. II 9 [33] 8, 1–2.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 249

function of the soul. He thus endorses the antecedent: the soul, while remaining in the Divine, creates the sensible world. According to Plotinus, the Gnostics arrived at their erroneous views through a misinterpretation of Plato: they have mixed Platonic doctrine with vain new ideas, which they have found ‘outside of the truth.’11 One Platonic passage that the Gnostics misunderstood, according to Plotinus, is the famous passage at Timaeus 39e. In the same way as the intellect sees Forms in the living being that truly is (what they are like and how many there are), such and so many, he [the divine Craftsman] thought, also this world should have.

As I have discussed Plotinus’ own interpretation of this passage elsewhere, I will be brief.12 Plotinus identifies the object of intellectual thought, the living being that truly is (i.e. the world of Forms) and the intellect as subject of intellectual thought. Moreover, the maker of this universe, the soul, is not separate from the intellect and thus has not fallen. It is not separate in the sense that, while creating, it knows the paradigm of what it is to create, namely the content of the living being that truly is, i.e. the world of Platonic Forms. Let us call the knowledge that the soul thus possesses of the world of Forms, theoretical knowledge. Now since the making of the world is indeed the making of an image of the living being that truly is and since the soul is the maker of this image, it creates by crucially knowing the content of the intellect’s thinking, i.e. by knowing the living being that truly is. The Gnostics, by contrast, drive a wedge between the Timaean intellect and the soul such that the soul creates without knowing the paradigm of which (according to the Timaeus) it is supposed to create an image. This is how they ‘falsify [Plato’s] account of creation and many other things and degrade the man’s views as if they had understood the intelligible nature but he and the other blessed philosophers had not.’13

2 Providence The relation of the soul to the sensible world is beautifully described at Enn. V 1 [10] 2, 1–7.

11 Enn. II 9 [33] 6, 12. 12 For a detailed exposition of Plotinus’ understanding of this passage see Caluori, D.: Plotinus on the Soul, chs. 1 and 2. 13 Enn. II 9 [33] 6, 24–28.

250 

 Damian Caluori

Now let every soul first consider this, that it made everything into a living being by breathing life into them, those that the earth feeds and those that the sea feeds, and those in the air and the divine stars in heaven, and it itself made the sun a living being and this great heaven, too, and itself has ordered it and causes it to revolve in orderly fashion, being a nature different from the things which it orders and moves and makes into living beings; and it must necessarily be more honourable than they.

The first remarkable thing about this passage is the fact that Plotinus invites every soul to consider that it made everything into a living being. The souls invited to consider this must be human souls; for the World Soul does not need to be reminded that it is the creator and, in this context, it is also clear that Plotinus does not speak to the World Soul (who would not, as we will see below, hear him anyway). But if so, how could the soul of Porphyry, for example, possibly be the creator of everything; how could it possibly move the sun? It would be wrong to assume a shift in the use of the word ‘soul’ from individual human souls to the World Soul in this passage. ‘Soul’ in ‘every soul’ refers in particular to human souls, not least those of Plotinus’ readers, and the subject remains the same throughout the cited text. This problem gets solved if we assume that the individual souls addressed, qua soul, brought about the life, order and beauty of this world but not, of course, qua the individual soul they respectively are.14 The passage indicates in what way we have to understand Plotinus’ notion of the creation of the sensible world. Firstly, creation is not a one-time act that occurred at the beginning of time or at some point in time. Rather, for Plotinus, the world exists sempiternally. This does not imply that the world was not created. Rather, it means at least that, at any given time, the order, beauty, life and existence of this world depends on something else, namely on the creator. As Plotinus identified the creator in this sense in the above passages with the soul, the sensible world, at any given time, completely depends for its order, beauty, life, and existence on the soul. Now this dependence-relation can be further specified. Since the creator is indeed a creator or maker, as Plotinus affirms also in this passage, the world is created or made. This implies that the soul qua creator is in some way involved in an activity of making or creating. Since making or creating is a systematic way of bringing something into existence, in particular if it is such a complex thing as the sensible world, we would expect it to presuppose a sort of knowledge or expertise that we may call (given the excellence of the product)

14 One might object that it is at least odd to say that you, qua human being, are responsible for everything human beings ever did and will do even if we say that you did this qua human being and not qua the human being that you are. The relation of individual soul to soul, however, is different from that of individual to species (as commonly understood on the model of Aristotle).

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 251

practical wisdom (phronêsis) or art or craft (technê).15 The soul will not only have to possess this sort of knowledge but also, in order to be able to make, actively be engaged in a corresponding sort of thinking, i.e. it must exercise its knowledge. Compare this to the systematic way in which health is brought about. The systematic way of bringing about health is the exercise of the art or craft (technê) of medicine but also the sort of thinking that allows physicians to apply the art of medicine so as to bring about health. The sort of thinking involved will be practical or productive.16 This is not to say that the practical or productive knowledge and the practical or productive thinking of the soul in relation to the creation of the sensible world is exactly of the same sort as medical knowledge and thinking in relation to health or to the bringing about of health. It is just supposed to indicate that making or creating something in a systematic way implies a sort of non-theoretical thinking as can be seen from the example of medicine. We will see that there are also crucial differences between the creative or practical thinking of the soul and the medical thinking of the physician and other ordinary arts or crafts (technai). Before discussing this, however, let us first look at the way the world is organized according to Plotinus. Plotinus agrees with the Stoics and many fellow Platonists that the world is excellently arranged. He devoted two treatises in particular to this topic: Ennead III 1 [3], titled On Fate, and Ennead III 2–3 [47–48], divided by Porphyry into two treatises and titled On Providence. The result of his investigations is that this world is providentially arranged and that it is so down to the smallest details. Certainly, everyone intending to make something, must look to the whole, yet he must also set the parts where they ought to be, especially when they are ensouled and have life and are even rational; and providence ought to reach everything and it is its task to leave nothing neglected.17 The maker, thus, has to create a whole but, in doing so, make sure that the parts of the whole, in particular if they are rational, fit into the whole. The creator does so by weaving together all the parts to be created into a causal net. The ruling principle [sc. of the world] weaves all things together, while individual things contribute according to their nature […], as in military commands the general rules and his subordinates work together with him. The world is ordered by general-like providence which sees actions and experiences and what must be ready at hand; food and drink are foreseen and all weapons and devices as well and everything which results from their interweaving,

15 I will come back to Plotinus’ view on the relation between practical wisdom and productive knowledge below. 16 Thus, the dependence-relation of sensible world to creator in Plotinus is quite different from that of Intellect to One and of Soul to Intellect. 17 Enn. III 2 [47] 6, 18–22.

252 

 Damian Caluori

in order that what results from it may have room to be well used; and all things come in a well-planned way from the general – even though what his enemies planned to do is out of his control. But if it was possible for him to command the enemy forces as well, if he was really ‘the great leader’18 to whom all things are subject, what would be unordered, what would not be fitted into his plan?19

Everything, according to this passage, is well-planned by the ruling principle or the great leader. Now what is the ruling principle and great leader? As I have argued elsewhere20, Plotinus uses the same expressions at Ennead IV 4 [28] 9–12 to refer to the World Soul. Considering this passage will help us understand how the World Soul rules the sensible world and how it arranges everything by means of this general-like providence.

3 The practical thinking of the World Soul In Ennead IV 4 [28] 9–12, Plotinus is at pains to show that the World Soul, while providentially arranging the sensible world, is not engaged in any process of reasoning. He compares and clearly distinguishes the thinking of the World Soul from the discursive reasoning that we often use when we try to do or make something. The reason why this is important to him is at least closely related to the reason we considered above. If the soul, qua creator, has to reason, then it does not know what to produce or how to produce it. This would correspond to the fallen condition of the Gnostic soul as discussed above. Now the people Plotinus argues against at Ennead IV 4, 9–12 assume that the World Soul, when creating, must possess memory and devise the future in the light of the past. Plotinus opposes their view on what providential thinking must be like. In particular he denies that it is, as his opponents seem to believe, reasoning as a process in time. For what else is reasoning than the desire to find practical wisdom (phronêsis) […] ? For the person reasoning resembles someone who plays the cithara in order to acquire the art or craft (technê) of cithara-playing and the one training in order to acquire a habit and in general the learner who wants to acquire knowledge. For the person reasoning is looking to learn what the wise person already possesses. Hence, understanding (phronein) is in the one who stands still. The reasoning person himself is witness to this. For as soon as he finds what is necessary, he stops reasoning. And he has stopped because he has arrived at understanding.21

18 This expression stems from Plato’s Phaedrus 246e4. 19 Enn. III 3 [48] 2, 3–15. 20 Caluori, D.: ‘Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus’. 21 Enn. IV 4 [28] 12, 5–13.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 253

Like the excellent cithara player and the excellent craftsman, the World Soul knows what to produce and how to produce. It does not have to figure it out first. In this passage, as in others, Plotinus compares the creative activity of the soul (here: of the World Soul) to the exercise of an art of craft (technê). Let us look at a further passage from his treatise On Providence, III 2 [47]. So the activity of life is productive (technikê), in the way in which a dancer is moved; for the dancer himself is like the life which is productive (technikê) in this way and his art or craft (technê) moves him and moves him in such a way that the actual life is somehow of this [productive] kind.22

A little earlier in the same treatise Plotinus states: For this world-order is truly Adrasteia and truly justice and wonderful wisdom. That this universal order is forever something of this kind, we must conclude from the evidence of what we see in the All, how this order extends to everything, even to the smallest, and the art or craft (technê) is wonderful not only in the divine beings but also in the things which one might have supposed providence would have despised for their smallness, for example, the wonderful and manifold workmanship in any random animal, and the fact that it even extends to plants – to the beautiful shape of their fruits and leaves, the sea of blossoms, their tenderness and variety; and this has not been made once and come to an end but is always being made as the powers above move in different ways according to the same principle over the world.23

This passage is further evidence for the claim that the order of the world, down to its smallest details, is due to an art or craft (technê) that reveals itself in the whole life of the world and even in such things as the tenderness of leaves and fruits. Not only the World Soul but also human beings, even while living their lives in this world, have not lost their character of being rational but still participate ‘even if not to the highest degree, in wisdom and understanding and art or craft (technê) and justice’.24 Plotinus states that even here do we possess art or craft. The qualification ‘even if not to the highest degree’ implies that somewhere else (namely in the intelligible world) souls possess art or craft to the highest degree. This is because art or craft belongs to the very rationality of souls; souls, unlike intellects, are beings whose essence does not only consist of theoretical thinking but also of a sort of thinking that crucially allows them to create or at least to contribute to the creation of a world.

22 Enn. III 2 [47] 16, 23–27. 23 Enn. III 2 [47] 13, 16–27. 24 Enn. III 2 [47] 9, 25–26.

254 

 Damian Caluori

Against this one might point to passages where Plotinus contrasts nature and art or craft, attempting to show that nature is superior to the latter. One such passage is Ennead IV 3 [27] 10, 13–17. For whatever comes into contact with the soul is made in the way the essence of the soul has it in its nature to make it; and it makes, not according to a purpose brought in from outside, nor waiting for deliberation and examination; for in this way it would not make according to nature, but to an art or craft (technê) brought in from outside. For art or craft (technê) is posterior to soul and imitates it […].

Three points are made in this passage. Firstly, by contrast to arts or crafts, the soul makes by its nature and not according to a purpose brought in from outside. Secondly, the principle that brings about the product belongs to the nature of the soul; it is not due to an art or craft that the soul has learned or otherwise acquired (it is not ‘an art or craft brought in from outside’). Thirdly, there is no deliberation and examination involved in the productive activity of the soul. By making the third point, Plotinus has perhaps EN 1140a10–13 in mind where Aristotle states: All art or craft is concerned with things coming to be, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being of the things that can be and not be […].

Whatever Aristotle may precisely have in mind when describing productive activity in this way, Plotinus thinks that the creative activity of the soul, in particular of the World Soul, is not of that sort. At Ennead IV 8 [6] 8, 13–16 he states that the World Soul gives order to the whole [i.e. the sensible world] in effortless transcendence because it does not do so by deliberating but by proper thinking, as art or craft does not deliberate.

With reference to Physics 199b28–9, Plotinus makes it clear that the art or craft of the World Soul is distinct from the sort of art or craft that Aristotle may have in mind in the Nicomachean Ethics – it is not concerned with reasoning.25 Discussing whether human souls, when not incarnated in bodies, are reasoning, Plotinus states that a soul only has to reason when it is

25 Indeed, also Aristotle makes this point explicitly in Phys. II 8, 199b27–29: ‘It is absurd to assume that purpose is not present if we do not observe the agent deliberate. Yet also art or craft does not deliberate.’

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 255

already in difficulties and filled with care, and very weak […] just as in the arts or crafts reasoning occurs when the craftsmen are in difficulties but when there is no difficulty, the art or craft is in command and does its work.26

According to this passage, the perfect craftsman under ideal conditions, therefore, does not need to reason. She will just exercise her art or craft skillfully. Perhaps it is helpful to reflect on Plotinus’ comparison of a craftsman to a dancer. The dancer who knows his movements, does not have to consider what to do next. He knows what to do next and will not have to reason at all. Yet there seem to be at least two sorts of occasion at which the dancer may have to reason. First, if, while he is dancing, something unexpected happens (someone jumps on stage for example). In this case, it may well be that the dancer starts to reason and be in doubt about what to do. But whatever his considerations then may be, they are not part of the exercise of the art of dancing. Second, if the dancer is uncertain about how to continue his dance. Yet if he fails to know how to bring about a certain movement belonging to his dance, this shows a lack of mastery of the art of dancing. It is thus, again, not constitutive of the art of dancing either; the dancer, qua dancer, exercises his art skillfully. It is not at all clear why reasoning or considering should be essential to the exercise of an art or craft even though, of course, as a matter of fact, human beings, due to their weakness, will often reason when exercising an art or craft. About the second point we may say that arts or crafts, as we commonly understand them, are indeed acquired. We cannot learn an art or craft without experience, as Aristotle explains to us, for example in Metaphysics A 1. The productive knowledge of the Plotinian World Soul, by contrast, is not acquired – and a fortiori not acquired by means of experience – it is a priori knowledge. This does not imply, however, that this sort of knowledge is not productive. The World Soul’s perfect productive knowledge simply is the knowledge of how to arrange the sensible world as an excellent image of the world of Forms. The first point concerned the purpose of an art or craft. Again, according to Aristotle, arts or crafts have their respective purpose outside of themselves in the following sense. Practical wisdom, Aristotle explains, cannot be an art or craft, ‘because action and making are different kinds of thing […]. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot. For good action itself is its end’.27 Health, for example, is the purpose of medicine but it is not part of the activity of medicine. While the physician is exercising her art or craft, health is not present in the patient. As soon as the physician has successfully completed the exercise of her 26 Enn. IV 3 [27] 18, 2–7. 27 EN VI 4–5, 1140a2; b6–7. See Politis, V.: ‘Aristotle’s Advocacy of Non-productive Action’.

256 

 Damian Caluori

art or craft in a particular case, however, she has stopped exercising it – precisely because health has been established and is now present. An action, by contrast, is good in itself, according to Aristotle, and has its end in itself. Plotinus rejects Aristotle’s distinction between practical and productive activity even though he does not dispute, of course, that we can meaningfully distinguish activities like building a house from activities like dancing, walking or perhaps acting justly (if we assume, as Aristotle does, that the aim of acting justly is the just action itself and not a just state of affairs brought about by the just action).28 We can meaningfully distinguish between them because there is a product external to the activity in the former but not in the latter sort of case. Plotinus explains this difference at Ennead VI 3 [44] 22, 3–4, in a context where he attempts to clarify what change (kinêsis) in the sensible world is. Let change, in outline, be the way or passage from potentiality to that of which it is said to be the potentiality.

He goes on to distinguish the sorts of change at the end of which there is a product (a product distinct from the change) from the sorts of change where, at the end, there is no such product distinct from the change. For example, the making of a statue is a change at the end of which there is an actual statue while dancing or walking are changes at the end of which there is no product. And in one case of change, that towards the statue, another form comes into being, produced by the change, but in the other case, dancing, because it is a simple form of the potentiality, has nothing after it when the change has stopped.29

Thus, even though Plotinus agrees with Aristotle that we can meaningfully sort activities on the basis of whether there is a product at the end of the activity or not, Plotinus’ account still differs from that of Aristotle. For he does not consider the external product to be the end or goal of the productive activity. What matters in both sorts of activity is the fact that the activity is an exercise or an expression of rationality. In this way, the two sorts of change are essentially the same. Whether or not there is an external product at the end of the activity does not make an essential difference between the two sorts of change. If we apply the results of these considerations to the World Soul, we can now conclude that the World Soul is active in the sensible world, that the sensible world is (at least partly) the result of the World Soul’s activity and that this does not imply that the aim or end of the World Soul’s activity consists in 28 For a more detailed discussion of this see Caluori, D.: ‘Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus’. 29 Enn. VI 3 [27] 22, 9–13.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 257

producing the world. We may also conclude that the World Soul’s activity in the sensible world (its creative activity) is the result of its unchanging and timeless practical or productive thinking. When bearing the necessary qualifications just discussed in mind, we may call the World Soul’s knowledge that allows it to produce the world, an art or craft, but it does not matter much whether we wish to call it such. Indeed, calling the World Soul’s knowledge in this context practical wisdom (phronêsis), as Plotinus also sometimes does, may be more suitable. For the corresponding activity is the exercise of a specific kind of perfect rationality.

4 The World Soul and other individual souls In the scholarly literature the World Soul is sometimes contrasted with individual souls as if the World Soul itself was not also an individual soul.30 However, there is no reason to assume that the World Soul is not an individual soul in the same way as the soul of Socrates is. After all, just like the soul of Socrates, the World Soul cares for an individual body, namely the body of the sensible world. One possible motivation for thinking that the World Soul is not an individual soul could be based on an interpretation according to which Plotinian individual souls are parts of the World Soul. Perhaps one might then, assuming this, consider the World Soul a universal soul (in some sense) whose parts are individual souls. Yet Plotinus rejects this view.31 A discussion of Plotinus’ reasons for rejecting this view will further illuminate the role of practical thinking in his philosophy quite generally and explain the relation of the World Soul to other individual souls. What are reasons for thinking that other individual souls are parts of the World Soul and what would it mean for them to be its parts? I argued earlier that, according to Plotinus, the sensible world is organized excellently down to the smallest detail; it is providentially arranged and everything in it, including the tenderness of fruits and leaves, is part of this providential arrangement. Furthermore, the soul of the sensible world is the World Soul. So the World Soul will be crucially responsible for the excellent order and beauty of the sensible world and thus for its providential arrangement. Since other individual souls take care of parts of the sensible world, it may appear natural to assume that they are parts of the World Soul. 30 E.g. Zeller, E.: Die Philosophie der Griechen, 588–598. 31 See in particular Helleman-Elgersma, W.: Soul-Sisters, 1–8.

258 

 Damian Caluori

In his treatise On Fate (III 1 [3]), Plotinus criticizes such a view. He discusses a number of views that, in his eyes, rob us of our own agency. One of these views is the astral fatalism that I mentioned above.32 Yet another view is more important for present purposes. According to this view there is a principle of the universe that his opponents call fate and to which all changes and movements are ultimately to be attributed. Let us call this view World Soul fatalism. World Soul fatalism defends the claim that not only the other things belonging to the realm of becoming [i.e. to the sensible world] but even our own thoughts derive from the movements of this entity, just as the individual parts of a living being are not moved by themselves but by the ruling part in each living being.33

According to World Soul fatalism, there is one soul permeating the world and accomplishing everything in it, each thing being moved as if it was a part and moved in the way that the whole directs.34

This one soul is the World Soul. Thus, World Soul fatalism states that the World Soul directs and rules everything in the sensible world and that all actions occurring in the world are the actions of the World Soul. What is wrong with World Soul fatalism? According to it, […] we are not ourselves nor is anything our work. We do not reason ourselves but our decisions are the reasoning of someone else. Nor do we act any more than our feet kick [...]. But each individual must be who he or she is, there must be actions and thoughts that are ours; each person’s good and bad actions must come from himself, and we must not attribute the doing of bad actions in any way to the world.35

It is important to Plotinus, as perhaps to every serious moral philosopher, that we are responsible for our actions, in particular for our bad actions. Remember that this was a key element in Methodius’ critique of astral fatalism. If we (rightly) praise or blame an agent for her actions, this implies that the agent is responsible for the action she is (rightly) blamed or praised for. An agent can only be responsible for her actions, if she is a rational agent, capable of practical thought, of evaluating things and of making decisions. If the World Soul were the only proper rational agent in the world, our souls, being parts of the World Soul, would not be responsible for our actions precisely because we would not be rational agents.

32 See Enn. III 1 [3] 2, 25ff. and Enn. III 1 [3] 5. 33 Enn. III 1 [3] 2, 23–25. 34 Enn. III 1 [3] 4, 1–3. 35 Enn. III 1 [3] 4, 20–28.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 259

The decision to do this or that would not be ours but the World Soul’s. It would then be equally absurd to praise or blame us for our actions as it would be absurd if someone blamed their feet for kicking. It is important to emphasize that the sort of thinking in question here is, not theoretical, but practical thinking. It is the sort of thinking that is presupposed in decisions and action. Plotinus thus here once more rejects views according to which we are not practically thinking beings. Now if both the World Soul and other rational souls are rational agents in the sensible world, how is it possible for the World Soul to be ultimately responsible for the providential arrangement of the world? In order to explain this, Plotinus develops an argument that can also be found in Pseudo-Aristotle’s De Mundo. Since I have discussed this elsewhere in more detail, I will be brief.36 The author of De Mundo defends the view that God is transcendent but nevertheless the creator of the sensible world. He is active in the sensible world by means of a divine power.37 To explain God’s activity in the sensible world further, the author compares God to the Great King of Persia who ruled the whole Persian Empire without ever leaving his palace. How is it possible for the Great King to exercise his power everywhere in the Persian Empire without ever leaving his palace? The author of De Mundo insists that the Great King is not self-working (autourgos). Rather, his power is exercised by officials who act on his behalf. Imagine the Persians fighting a war against the Lydian Empire, led by a general who is not the Great King. The general, in commanding his troops, exercises the Great King’s power. If the Persians win the war, it makes good sense to say that the Great King has won the war because the power exercised in the field was his power. The Great King can fight and win a war thanks to the fact that there are agents acting on his behalf and exercising his power. Plotinus’ Ennead IV 8 [6] bears striking similarities to De Mundo, which seem to me to provide sufficient evidence to believe that Plotinus knew De Mundo.38 For example, when Plotinus describes the World Soul’s creative activity, he denies that the World Soul is self-working (autourgos) just like the author of De Mundo denies that God is self-working (autourgos).39 Thus, the World Soul, on the one hand, providentially arranges everything in the sensible world but is, on the other hand, not self-working. Instead, its work is carried out by agents acting on behalf of the World Soul. The only work that the World Soul does itself 36 Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, ch. 5. 37 Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo 297b19–24. Cf. also the contribution by J. Thom in this volume. 38 If he did not know De Mundo, he knew a text dependent on De Mundo or a text on which De Mundo depends. 39 Enn. IV 8 [6] 2, 26–30.

260 

 Damian Caluori

in the sensible world is the movement of the outermost sphere. This, again, finds a parallel in De Mundo. [B]y means of a simple revolution [brought about by God] of the whole heaven in a night and a day, the various motions of all the heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are embraced in one sphere, some move faster and others more slowly, according to their distances and their individual constitution.40

Everything else is done by the World Soul’s agents, most prominently by the souls of the stars, sun, moon and planets. There is a chain of command such that the first heavenly soul (e.g. the soul of the sun) moves its body based on the movement of the outermost sphere and with a view to the arrangement of the whole sensible world. The next soul in command (e.g. the soul of Jupiter) acts, i.e. moves its body, on the basis of the movement of the outermost sphere and of the movement of the first heavenly soul and with a view to the arrangement of the whole sensible world. And so on. Like the Great Kings in Persia, the World Soul acts in the sensible world by means of agents acting on its behalf. These agents are proper rational agents, acting by themselves on behalf of the World Soul. Their actions are not caused by the World Soul (any more than the actions of the general are caused by the Great King). This account may seem problematic for a Platonist, because we read at Timaeus 36d–e, in the discussion of the creation of the World Soul and its body, that the soul [i.e. the World Soul] was woven together with the body from the center out in every direction to the outmost limit of the universe, and covered it all around on the outside.

Thus, the World Soul seems to be immanent in the world. Yet, consistent with what has been established so far, Plotinus understands this passage in the following way. The lowest power of the soul [i.e. of the World Soul]41, beginning at the earth, is interwoven through the whole [i.e. the sensible world].42

Hence, for Plotinus, it is only the lowest power of the World Soul that is interwoven through the sensible world. I have argued, on the basis of Ennead IV 8 [6], that this power is a power exercised by the agents of the World Soul, which are rational souls, acting on the basis of their own thinking and making their own

40 Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo 399a1–6. 41 That Plotinus is referring to the World Soul is clear from the Timaeus-passage he refers to. 42 Enn. II 2 [14] 3, 1–3.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 261

decisions. These decisions are, of course, in keeping with the decisions of the World Soul but each rational agent comes to their decision on the basis of their own thinking. Each divine soul understands that arranging the sensible world in the way the World Soul commands is the most excellent way of arranging it.

5 Sense perception, memory and discursive reasoning Plotinus argues in quite some detail that the World Soul never exercises any capacity of sense perception, that it has no memory and that it never reasons discursively. These claims are a consequence of the fact that the World Soul never descends. Now Platonists use the word ‘descent’ and cognate words in different ways. But when I say here that the World Soul never descends I mean that it never turns its attention to the created sensible world. In this sense the World Soul differs greatly from human souls who, when embodied, cannot help but turn their attention to their bodies and the environment they live in.43 Against the Gnostics, Plotinus argues that the World Soul never descends – neither literally nor even in the sense of ever directing its attention to the created sensible world. We have already briefly discussed how reasoning is only necessary for someone who lacks knowledge. Because the World Soul is always in possession and aware of its eternal theoretical and practical wisdom, it never needs to reason. Nor does it have memory – for the following reason. Assume that someone’s cognitive activity and his awareness thereof is always and exclusively directed towards eternal truths, such as the truths of the world of Forms. If so, there is no change involved in this eternal contemplation nor in one’s awareness thereof. Now Plotinus argues that divine beings, such as the World Soul, are indeed eternally in such a state. He asks whether such divine beings remember God and answers: Well, they always see him. As long as they see him, it is impossible for them to say that they have seen him. For this happens to those who have ceased to see him.44

43 Of course, there is a sense in which also our souls do not descend, according to Plotinus. Our souls, unlike the World Soul, however, attend to the created world (in particular to our respective bodies) and thus are more often than not no longer aware of their own activity in the intelligible world. 44 Enn. IV 4 [28] 7, 1–3.

262 

 Damian Caluori

Divine beings cannot, as such, be in a mental state specifically directed towards the past because their minds are in an eternally unchanging state. The state they were in yesterday is no different from the state that they are in today. Since memory is specifically about the past, as we know also from Aristotle,45 divine beings such as the World Soul possess no memory. What about sense perception? Plotinus characterizes sense perception as the becoming aware of corporeal sensory objects.46 Human beings, while embodied, can only take care of their bodies if they are aware of them and of their environment. The reason why there is sense perception, according to Plotinus, is thus not epistemic but rather practical. Souls possess sense perception only if and because they are in need of it in order to take care of their bodies (see Enn. IV 4 [28] 24–25). Becoming aware of sensory objects is not forced upon souls (the sensory object is not the cause of our seeing it). Rather, sense perception is an act of the soul where the soul turns its attention to sensory objects. At Enn. IV 4 [28] 25, 1–3 Plotinus states: The existence of a medium [for sight] is not a sufficient cause of sight, and in general of perception, but the soul must be so disposed as to incline towards sensory objects.

In other words, in order to perceive an object, the soul must turn its attention to it. Because sense perception is the way in which a soul becomes aware of sensory objects and because the embodied human soul must be aware of its body and its environment in order to be able to take care of its body, an embodied human soul is in need of sense perception. Although the World Soul also has to care for a body, it does not need to incline towards any sensory object as Plotinus explains in the same chapter. Even if it was possible for [the World Soul] to perceive, it will not do so, due to its being directed towards better things.47

The World Soul’s attention is always directed towards objects in the intelligible world and thus it never inclines towards sensory objects. There is no need to. For the World Soul, in its enormous power and wisdom, has arranged the sensible world by means of providence in such a perfect way that there will never be any need for it to incline towards it.

45 Aristotle, De memoria, 449b9–30. 46 Enn. IV 4 [28] 23, 1–3. 47 Enn. IV 4 [28] 25, 4–5.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 263

6 The World Soul and the hypostasis soul I have argued above that, according to Plotinus, the World Soul is not the whole of which other individual souls are parts. Rather, Plotinus calls the World Soul at Ennead IV 3 [27] 6, 13 our soul sister – an individual soul like ours, just much more powerful, a big sister, as it were. Plotinus argues that, in addition to all individual souls, including the World Soul, there exists a further soul, the so-called hypostasis Soul, which is not an individual soul. All individual souls, he claims, derive from this hypostasis Soul and are its parts. Now it may appear far from clear why Plotinus thinks that postulating the existence of all individual souls, including the World Soul, is insufficient and why he thinks that there must be also such a thing as the hypostasis Soul. For present purposes it will have to suffice to explain the reasons for introducing it only in so far as it helps explain the relation of this entity to the World Soul. In order to attempt to get clear about this relationship, let us ask what it is that individuates individual souls. Now if we reflect on how individual souls differ from one another, it will occur to us as a striking fact that each individual soul cares for an individual body in particular and that souls differ from one another by caring in particular for different bodies respectively. Socrates’ soul differs from Plato’s soul in caring in particular for Socrates body, for example.48 One might think that the World Soul is an exception to this as it cares, not for a particular body, but for the sensible world as a whole. Yet this would be a mistake. For the body of the sensible world as a whole is also a particular body and, in so far as it is a particular body, it is no different from the body of Socrates. The fact that it comprises other (even all other) bodies does not imply that it is not a particular body. It implies this as little as the fact that my body consists of various body parts (which are also bodies) implies that my body is not a particular body. Given this, it is tempting to think that souls get individuated by their bodies.49 Though such a view has found prominent defenders in the history of philosophy, it cannot be Plotinus’ position. For Plotinus claims in various contexts that souls in the intelligible world are there as individuals. Our earlier discussion has

48 If an individual soul takes care of several sublunary bodies in a temporal sequence, it gets incarnated in a number of bodies, but at most in one body at a time. Thus, the above claim has to be somewhat modified in this case, but this modification does not affect the main point. For if so, individual souls get individuated by caring for a particular series of bodies in a temporal sequence. 49 See Capone Braga, G.: ‘Il Problema del Rapporto’, 116–117, and Armstrong, A. H.: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe, 90.

264 

 Damian Caluori

already confirmed this point. For, although the World Soul never descends, it is nevertheless distinct from all other individual souls. It is even distinct from other individual souls that never descend, such as the souls of the stars, planets, sun and moon. Thus, their bodies – to which these souls never descend – cannot be the principle of their individuation (at least not in the sense that the descent to bodies individuates souls). Yet Plotinus even denies that souls that actually descend get individuated by bodies. But how will one particular soul still be yours, another one someone else’s and a third one the soul of another person? Are they the soul of someone particular only down here [i.e. in the sensible world] but not of the same person but another one […] above [i.e. in the intelligible world]? But if so, Socrates will only be when also his soul is embodied, yet will cease to be when he reaches the best [i.e. when arriving at the intelligible world]. But no real being ever ceases to be.50

Thus, the individuation of souls does not occur in the sensible world. If the individuation does not occur in the sensible world, it must occur in the intelligible world if there are to be individual souls at all. Perhaps souls are individuated depending on what individual intellect they depend on. A first problem for this view is the fact that the question of whether there are intellects of individuals (such as an intellect of Socrates) prior to and distinct from souls of individuals (such as the soul of Socrates) is disputed.51 However, let us grant, for the sake of argument, that there are, next to other individual intellects, also individual intellects of individuals (such as the intellect of Socrates). Even if we grant this, it will not give us a sufficient reason to believe that intellects of individuals individuate souls. This for two reasons: First, there are individual intellects corresponding to which there are no souls and, second, there are individual souls corresponding to which there are no individual intellects. First, let us assume that individual souls are individuated by intellects of individuals (such as the intellect of Socrates). Now Plotinus does not think that intellects of individuals, if there are such, are the only individual intellects. Rather, each Platonic Form corresponds (indeed, is identical) to an individual intellect. A defender of the view that souls are individuated by corresponding individual intellects will have to explain why, theoretically, only intellects of individuals individuate souls and why other individual intellects do not. There are many Platonic Forms, and thus individual intellects, for which there is no corresponding soul at all. Note that the explanation of the distinction between

50 Enn. IV 3 [27] 5, 1–6. 51 For this discussion see, e.g., Rist, J. M.: ‘Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus’; Kalligas, P.: ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus’, and O’Meara, D. J.: ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus’.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 265

two sorts of individual intellects (between those for which there are corresponding souls and those for which there are not) must be purely theoretical. By this I mean that it cannot make reference to the sensible world because the Intellect is not structured with a view to the creation of a sensible world – it does not think practically. It seems to me hard to see how this would work. Second, Plotinus claims that there is no individual intellect (a fortiori no individual intellect of an individual) corresponding to the World Soul. Rather, the World Soul, while fulfilling its function in the sensible world, is looking at the whole Intellect (Enn. IV 3 [27] 6, 15–17). Thus, there is at least one individual soul for which there is no intellect of an individual even if we grant that there are intellects of individuals. Now since there is at least one individual soul for which there is no individual intellect and since there are individual intellects for which there is no soul, I suggest it is better to look elsewhere for the principle of individuation of souls. Plotinus’ view that souls are essentially also practically thinking beings provides, I suggest, the solution to the problem of individuation. For each individual soul cares for a particular body and each body is part of the providential arrangement of the whole sensible world. Thus, I propose that each rational soul is individuated by focusing its practical thinking on one particular aspect of the soul’s providential thought respectively, namely on the body that it is going to take care of. Socrates’ soul, for instance, is individuated by thinking in particular about the role that the incarnated Socrates is going to play in the providential arrangement of the sensible world and thus by its focus on Socrates’ body in particular. Since, indeed, each individual soul cares for a particular body respectively and since each (rational) living being in the sensible world (and the sensible world as a whole) possesses (i.e. is taken care of by) its own individual soul, this smoothly accounts for this fact. The World Soul is no exception to this. It also focuses its practical thinking on the role of one particular body in the providential arrangement of the sensible world, namely on the body of the sensible world as a whole. Note that this explanation differs in crucial respects from the first one considered above because the focusing on one particular body occurs in the intelligible world. Each soul focuses on the function of the body it is going to take care of within the providential arrangement of the whole sensible world to be created. Note also that it is plausible that individual souls get individuated by taking a particular interest in the one part of the providential arrangement that they, as a consequence, are actually going to take care of. Socrates’ soul, for example, takes care of Socrates in the sensible world because it takes a particular interest in the body of Socrates and the corresponding part of the providential arrangement.

266 

 Damian Caluori

I suggest that this focusing, due to a particular interest in one body, respectively, of the providential arrangement individuates souls and distinguishes individual souls from the hypostasis Soul. For the hypostasis Soul is the only soul that is never the soul of a body as Plotinus states. If this is how it is with the whole Soul [i.e. the hypostasis Soul] and the others, the whole [Soul] of which the others are parts, will not be the soul of anything but remain itself by itself.52

This implies, given the view defended in this paper, that the hypostasis Soul does not care for any body in particular and thus has no particular interest in any aspect or part of the providential arrangement of the sensible world. It does not imply that the hypostasis Soul does not take any interest at all in providential arrangements. Rather, the hypostasis Soul thinks, in its practical thinking, about the providential arrangement of a sensible world without focusing on any individual body or aspect in particular. It rather just is the hypostasis of rational thought (both theoretical and practical) or, in other words, it is rational thought hypostasized. This crucially distinguishes it from every individual soul, and thus also from the World Soul, and confirms my earlier claim that the World Soul is an individual soul just like the soul of Socrates.

References Armstrong, Arthur H.: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Amsterdam 1940. Capone Braga, Gaetano: ‘Il Problema del Rapporto’, Rivista di Filosofia 23 (1932), 106–125. Caluori, Damian: Plotinus on the Soul, Cambridge 2015. Caluori, Damian: ‘Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 26 (2015), 55–77. Dodds, Eric Robertson: Pagans and Christians in an Age of Anxiety, Cambridge 1965. Helleman-Elgersma, Wypkje: Soul-Sisters. A Commentary on Ennead IV 3 [27], 1–8, Amsterdam 1980. Jonas, Hans: The Gnostic Religion. The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity, Boston 1963. Kalligas, Paul: ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination’, Phronesis 42 (1997), 206–227. Markschies, Christoph: Die Gnosis, München 2001. Musurillo, Herbert: Méthode d’Olympe. Le banquet, Paris 1963.

52 Enn. IV 3 [27] 2, 54–56.

Plotinus on the World Soul 

 267

O’Meara, Dominic J: ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Preface to the Question’, in: John J. Cleary and John Dillon (eds.), Traditions of Platonism. Essays in Honor of John Dillon, Aldershot – Brookfield 1999, 263–269. Politis, Vasilis: ‘Aristotle’s Advocacy of Non-productive Action’, Ancient Philosophy 18 (1998), 353–279. Rist, John M.: ‘Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus: A Reply to Dr. Blumenthal’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 14 (1970), 298–303. Zeller, Eduard: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig 1923.

James Wilberding

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus In his treatise On the Formation of the Embryo Galen articulates an aporia concerning the identity of the soul that is responsible for the embryo’s formation. He does so by describing a series of views that had been advanced by his predecessors, beginning with two suggestions that propose causes at an individual level within the seed.1 Some say it is (i) the soul that is provided in the seed that is responsible, either (a) using the seed itself as material or (b) using it as an instrument and the blood provided by the mother as matter. Others say it is (ii) the seed itself, either (a) in its entirety or (b) the pneuma in the seed. He then reports two other views that propose more universal candidates for the formative cause of embryos. One of his Platonic teachers advanced the view that (iii) the World Soul is the demiurge of embryos, and another camp – left unnamed by Galen but conspicuously Middle Platonic2 – might have proposed that it was (iv) the ‘soul of matter’. Galen says he dealt with these questions in two treatises that have not come down to us (one dedicated to Chrysippus’ views on the soul, and one dedicated to the apparent contradictions in Plato’s theory of soul),3 but that the issue cannot be decided scientifically. A soul in the seed provided by the parents would be in a good position to account for family resemblances, but this soul would either be rational or sub-rational, and either way there are serious problems. A sub-rational soul in the seed would not be in a position to account for the ‘wisdom and power’ involved in embryonic formation, but rational souls do not possess any a priori knowledge of anatomy, as we can see from the fact that even adults know nothing of anatomy unless they have studied it empirically. The universal candidates appear to fall victim to similar concerns. The ‘soul of matter’, by which Galen presumably understand some lowest-level universal soul, would seem to lack the necessary wisdom and power, yet the suggestion that the World Soul is responsible, while accounting for the wisdom and power, seems blasphemous to Galen. The concern seems to be that if the World Soul is responsible for generating human embryos, it must be responsible for the generation of all living things, from which it would follow that it would

1 Galen, Foet. Form. 102,29–106,13 Nickel. 2 This same soul is also mentioned by Galen at Foet. form. 100,24–29 as the soul that has been in matter ‘for all of eternity’ and that orders matter itself by looking to the Forms. 3 See Nickel, D.: Galeni. De foetuum formation, ad loc. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-012

270 

 James Wilberding

also be generating ignoble creatures such as worms and scorpions, which would simply be beneath it.4 Thus, Galen characteristically refrains from speculating any further about the identity of the soul that forms the embryo. It is precisely this aporia that I would like to investigate here with a view to late Platonic theories of embryology. As we shall see, Platonists in late antiquity – here I shall focus on Plotinus and Porphyry – do indeed attribute some role in embryology to the World Soul, and in doing so raise the question: What exactly is the role of the World Soul, and how is it related to the other candidate souls, i.e., the parents’ souls, the soul in the seed, and the soul of the offspring? In my pursuit of this question I shall begin with Porphyry, since his letter To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled is the most detailed discussion of these issues that we possess, before turning to Plotinus in subsequent sections.

1 The role of the World Soul in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum Since I have already examined the embryology of the Ad Gaurum in greater detail elsewhere,5 I shall limit myself here to giving a summary of the main lines of his theory. Porphyry’s explicit goal in the Ad Gaurum is to argue that the individual soul, by which he means the soul capable of reason and sense-perception, enters into the offspring at the moment of birth and no sooner. Thus, one of the obstacles that he must overcome is explaining how the generation of the embryo can proceed without the individual soul of the offspring being present to guide the process, and so we find in the AG a rather detailed, if not always as detailed as we might like, picture of his embryological metaphysics. According to this picture, only the father produces a seed, and to this extent Porphyry (and as far as I can tell, all Neoplatonists) follow the Aristotelian oneseed model as opposed to the two-seed model common in medical circles. More specifically, it is the father’s phusis – also called his vegetative faculty or soul – that generates the seed, by producing a replica of itself that includes all of its logoi which correspond to the various parts of the body. This seed, however, is – unlike the Aristotelian seed – not self-sufficient. Taken by itself, it lacks actual motion and needs to be set in motion by something else. This is to say that the logoi in

4 This is a concern that is also found in Alexander, Mixt. 226, 24–30. 5 See Wilberding, J.: ‘Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed’ and Wilberding, J.: Porphyry. To Gaurus, and now Wilberding, J.: Forms, Souls and Embryos.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 271

the seed need to be actualized by something. What sets it in motion and actualizes these logoi, we are told, is the mother’s soul. The phusis in the seed ‘blends’ together with the phusis of the mother, and so both are actualized by the mother’s soul. The mother remains in this position for as long as the embryo-fetus is in the womb, steering the formation of the embryo by this power of actualization. At birth the individual soul of the offspring comes in to take over as the actualizer of its own phusis. Thus, we might distinguish three stages in the Werdegang of the offspring: (1) the seed (& phusis) prior to conception, (2) the seed-embryo-foetus (and phusis) after conception but before birth, and (3) the offspring after birth. Porphyry puts these three stages on view in the following passage, where he takes up the De anima’s tentative metaphor of the sailor being the actuality of the ship: Therefore, nature even joins with different captains at different times: (i) For as long as the seed is in the father, it is administered by the vegetative [power] of the father as well as by the father’s soul from above which conspires with the vegetative power towards its works. (ii) And once it has been released from the father into the mother, it joins the vegetative [power] of the mother and her soul – and by ‘joins’ one must understand, not that both are destroyed together nor that they are resolved into their elements like mixed items,6 but rather that they maintain that divine and paradoxical [kind of joining], blending, that is the special power of living [substances]. And so in this way [they] are both united with the suitable things just like elements that get destroyed [viz. by uniting with other suitable elements] in mixtures, and again preserve in this way their own powers just like things that are unmixed and are separated out by themselves. And this is indicative of their neither being bodies nor even having their substances because of the dispositions of bodies. However, as far as concerns the complete blending which does not entail the destruction of its parts, I am prepared to provide an account of the appropriate length in other sacred books. (iii) And once [this power] is no 7 under the direction of the mother, and indeed when the mother does not resist the [force] that will cut off the blending via separation, that [power] for its part is delivered by the laws of nature from darkness to light, from its abode moist with blood to the airy hollow. And it in turn at this time immediately gets from outside the captain who is present by the providence of the principle that administers the whole, which in the case of animals would in no way let the vegetative soul come to be bereft of a captain.8

6 The emendation follows Deuse, W.: Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, 187n.209. 7 Following Kalbfleisch’s suggestion of reading μὴ for μὴ. 8 Porphyry, AG 10.5–6 (47,16–48,5 Kalbfleisch): διὸ καὶ προσχωρεῖ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις αὐτὴ κυβερνήταις· ἕως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ τὸ σπέρμα, διοικεῖται ὑπό τε τῆς φυτικῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ συμπνεούσης τῆς ἄνωθεν τοῦ πατρὸς ψυχῆς τῇ φυτικῇ πρὸς τὰ ἔργα·ὅταν δ’ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καταβληθῇ εἰς τὴν μητέρα, προσχωρεῖ τῇ φυτικῇ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ταύτης, τοῦ προσχωρεῖν δέοντος ἀκούειν οὐχ ὅτι συμφθείρεται οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ κραθέντα ἀναστοιχειοῦται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὴν θείαν ἐκείνην κρᾶσιν καὶ παράδοξον καὶ τῶν ζωικῶν ἰδίαν δύναμιν διασῴζεται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνοῦνται τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις ὡς τῶν κιρναμένων τὰ συμφθειρόμενα καὶ πάλιν οὕτως τὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις σῴζουσιν ὡς τὰ ἄκρατα καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ διακεκριμένα· ὃ καὶ τοῦ μὴ σώματα

272 

 James Wilberding

In this way Porphyry is able to account for both paternal and maternal resemblance. The paternal resemblance is accounted for via the logoi in the seed, whereas resemblance to the mother is accounted for without a seed, simply by the process of actualization. The idea seems to be something along these lines: if the father has a snub-nose, the logos of snub nose is contained in the seed (as it is a replica of his own phusis). This logos, however, needs to be set in motion by another logos of nose that is actually linked into the ontologically hierarchy, and this is the logos of nose in the mother’s soul. Thus, if the mother herself has an aquiline nose, the nose of the offspring might be either snub or aquiline, depending on how this process of actualization turns out. Porphyry produces two empirical cases designed to support this non-seminal account of maternal resemblance. One is drawn from botany and pertains to grafting (AG 10.1–2), and the other relates to ideoplasty, i.e., the phenomenon – widely acknowledged in antiquity and beyond, though rather curious-sounding today – according to which the formation of the embryo-foetus is influenced by what the mother perceives (especially by sight) at the moment of conception (AG 6.1–4). It follows that the individual (descended) soul of the offspring is not directly involved in the process of forming the embryo at all, as Porphyry insists that it only arrives at birth. But what about the World Soul? If by ‘World Soul’ we mean a soul belonging to the universe that is distinct from the phuseis of the father and mother, then it would seem that the World Soul is not directly involved in the process of forming the embryo at all. Yet this conclusion contradicts the view of Karl Kalbfleisch, the editor of first critical edition of the text,9 who in his introduction describes the formation as follows: Dagegen erklärt der Verfasser der Schrift an Gauros (AG 10.3 ff.) mit voller Bestimmtheit, dass es die bereits dem Samen zukommende vegetative Seele (φύσις, φυτική ψυχή) ist, welche, vermöge der in ihr enthaltenen Keimformen [logoi] in Verbindung mit den Seelen der Eltern, unter Aufsicht und mit Unterstützung der Weltseele (τῆς τὰ ὅλα διοικούσης ἀρχῆς AG 10.6, vergl. 16.5) den Körper baut (13).

εἶναι μηδὲ διαθέσεσι σωμάτων τὰς οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐνίσχεσθαι γίγνεται κατήγορον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀσυμφθάρτου δι’ ὅλων κράσεως ἕτοιμος ἐν ἄλλοις ἱεροῖς λόγοις τὸ προσῆκον μέτρον ἀποδοῦναι· ὅταν δὲ μη κατὰ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς οἰκονομίαν, οὔτε μὴν ἡ μήτηρ στέγει τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάκρισιν ἀποκόψον τὴν κρᾶσιν, φέρεται δὲ κἀκείνη θεσμοῖς φύσεως ἀπὸ σκότους εἰς φῶς, ἀπὸ ἐνύγρου καὶ ἐναίμου διαίτης εἰς ἐναέριον κύτος· κἀνταῦθα δὴ πάλιν εὐθὺς ἔχει ἔξωθεν τὸν κυβερνήτην παρόν(τα πρ)ονοίᾳ τῆς τὰ ὅλα διοικούσης ἀρχῆς, ἣ ἔρημ(ον) κυβερνήτου ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων οὐδαμῶς τὴν φυτικὴν εἴασε γενέσθαι ψυχήν. 9 Since this paper was written, a new critical edition has appeared, namely Brisson, L. et al.: Porphyre. Sur la manière. The differences between these editions have no bearing on the issues being examined here.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 273

So let us take a look at the two passages Kalbfleisch takes to be indicating the World Soul’s involvement in the formation. The first and apparently primary passage is the one we looked at above. Here Porphyry does clearly refer to the World Soul, but Porphyry here is surely not saying that the World Soul is ‘supervising’ (Aufsicht) the process of formation. The World Soul’s responsibility here is rather limited to the role, as it were, of a cosmic matchmaker. The body of the offspring together with the vegetative soul is provided by the parents, and once this is prepared, the World Soul makes sure that a (suitable) individual soul descends into it at the right time, namely at birth. The second passage Kalbfleisch refers to is possibly more ambiguous: However, regarding the corporeal and irrational substance, what is lacking in terms of its being joined to [a captain] at birth is provided and afforded by the universe, as an individual soul is immediately present, the very soul which comes to be present to the [body] that has been brought forth at just the right moment, and comes to be in harmony with the instrumental body that is suited to receive it.10

The universe here might well be intended as a reference to the World Soul, and it is said to provide τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς συναρτήσεως – in and of itself a fairly vague expression. Yet even if this is the only occurrence of συνάρτησις in the Ad Gaurum, there is a relevant use of the verb συναρτᾶν that would appear to shed some light on the intended sense, namely in AG 10.4 where Porphyry is introducing the analogy of the soul’s relation to the embryo as that of a captain that is ‘joined’ (συνηρτημένον) to his ship. This strongly suggests that the role of the World Soul here is the same as in 10.6, namely to supply the suitable individual descended soul, and this takes place μετὰ τὴν κύησιν, i.e., at birth. There is a final passage that Kalbfleisch does not refer to in connection with his claim about the World Soul’s involvement but which seems relevant nonetheless: And for this reason the vegetative [power] in us [males] generated something worse than itself, the seed, since it lacks actual movement. As a supplement, it receives the movement from the nature of the mother and from its environment, since in all things the actual precedes the potential.11

10 Porphyry, AG 16.5: κα(τ)ὰ μέντοι τὴν σω(ματικὴν) ἄλογον οὐσίαν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς συναρτήσε(ως) μ(ετ)ὰ τὴν κ(ύ)ησιν ἐνδίδωσί τε καὶ ἀποπίμπλησι τὸ πᾶν, ἰδίας ψυχῆς εὐθὺς παρούσης, ἥτις ἂν κ(ατὰ καιρὸ)ν ψυχὴ τῷ τεχθέντι γενομένη καὶ σύμφωνος τῷ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντ(ι αὐτ)ὴν δέξασθαι (ὀργανικῷ σώ)ματι. 11 Porphyry, AG 14.3 (= 54,12–15 Kalbfleisch): καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν φυτικὴ χεῖρον ἐγέννα ἑαυτῆς τὸ σπέρμα ὡς ἂν ἐλλεῖπον τῇ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν κινήσει, ἣν προσλαμβάνει ἀπό τε τῆς ἐν τῇ μητρὶ φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος, τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ προηγουμένου ἐν πᾶσι τοῦ δυνάμει.

274 

 James Wilberding

This is perhaps the most promising passage in the AG in terms of the World Soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo, as the ‘environment’ is put on a par with the mother’s lower soul in the context of actualizing the vegetative power in the seed-embryo-foetus. Of course the exact meaning of the passage is difficult to establish with any degree of certainty, especially as the term ‘environment’ is itself ambiguous, referring perhaps to the womb, perhaps to the geographical region and perhaps to something even grander.12 But the most straightforward way of understanding this passage is to take it to be saying exactly what was said in the other two passages: as long as the embryo-foetus is in the womb, the mother serves as its captain, but at birth it receives a new captain from the environment, i.e., from the universe, i.e., from the World Soul.

2 The role of the World Soul in Plotinus This brief look at Porphyry’s views on the World Soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo-foetus provides a helpful starting point for appreciating Plotinus’ remarks on the topic. For it has been observed that Plotinus advances different and not necessarily compatible views regarding the identity of the soul that is responsible for this process of formation.13 And indeed it is possible to distinguish three tendencies and three batches of passages based on these tendencies. In the first Plotinus credits the parents with the generation of the bodies of their offspring; in the second batch the World Soul (or the universe or the stars) is said to be responsible for the generation of the bodies of living things; and in the final batch the individual souls of the offspring themselves are said to be involved in the process. Not all of these passages are equally explicit – indeed, some require significant additional assumptions and inferences (I shall have more to say about some of these assumptions below) – but the following table gives us a reasonable overview of the evidence in favor of each thesis.

12 Cf. Festugière’s (Festugière, A. J.: La Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste, vol. 3, 265–302) remarks in his note ad loc.: ‘On n’ose préciser. S’il s’aggisait du nouveau-né après la sortie, τὸ περιέχον serait évidemment l’air enveloppant.’ Although I do not agree with Festugière’s tentative suggestion, presumably with an eye on the Stoics (cf. SVF 2.804–808], that the surrounding air is meant here, I am inclined to agree that Porphyry is thinking of the new-born at the moment of delivery. 13 Sorabji, R.: The Philosophy of the Commentator, vol. 1, 211–2 and vol. 3, 362–3. See also my remarks in Wilberding, J.: ‘Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed’, 427 and Wilberding, J.: ‘Review of M. Congourdeau’, 15.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 275

Soul of parents/father

World Soul

Descended soul of offspring

IV 7 [2] 5,40–51

IV 9 [8] 3,23–29

IV 7 [2] 13,1–14

III l [3] 1,32–36

V 7 [18] 1,24–25

IV 3 [27] 7,25–31

III l [3] 5,20–34

VI 4 [22] 15,8–17

IV 3 [27] 9,20–26

III l [3] 5,53–55

IV 3 [27] 6,13–18

VI 7 [38] 7,8–16

III l [3] 6,1–17

IV 3 [27] 11,8–12

III 3 [48] 4,37–43

V 9 [5] 4,8–10

IV 3 [27] 27,1–3

I 1 [53] 11,8–15

V 9 [5] 6,9–24

IV 4 [28] 32,9–11

III 4 [1] 6,37–45

IV 4 [28] 34,1–3

V 7 [18] passim

IV 4 [28] 37,11–25

IV 3 [27] 10,11–13

IV 4 [28] 39,5–13

III 8 [30] 7,18–26

IV 4 [28] 43,1–5

II 9 [33] 12,18–23

II 9 [33] 18,14–17

III 3 [48] 7,26–28

VI 6 [34] 7,5–7

II 3 [52] 12,1–11

III 5 [35] 6,28–35

II 3 [52] 14,29–34

II l [40] 5,18–20 II 3 [52] 9,6–14 II 3 [52] 13,40–45 II 3 [52] 16–17

A glance at this table quickly reveals two important facts: (i) there are relatively few passages supporting the view that the individual descended soul of the offspring is the one responsible for the formation of its own body; (ii) the passages in favor of the parents and the World Soul are found throughout Plotinus’ writing career and within the same treatises (especially in II 3 [52]). This already suggests that the first two candidates are in some sense compatible and both correct, while the third option is at least in need of some refinement. In what follows I shall first examine some of the representative passages from the first two batches and argue how these are to be understood as complementary parts of a single thesis, then I shall turn to the third batch and explain why these passages are not necessarily at odds with the others. Plotinus’ most considered discussion of the formation of the embryo is found in V 7 [18] Are there Ideas of Particulars, though in this treatise we do not find anything like the level of detail found in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum. This treatise takes a particularly dialectical approach to its investigation, which of course complicates any detailed exegesis of the treatise, yet there are several central points that do emerge clearly from the discussion. Chapters 2 and 3 have an embryological

276 

 James Wilberding

focus on the issues surrounding parental resemblance, and Plotinus advances the view that each parent supplies a copy of the logoi characteristic of his or her own phenotype’s parts, with the phenotype of the offspring resulting, part by part, depending on which parent’s logos succeeds in forming the matter: But if it is the mixtures of the rational forming principles of the male and female that give the offspring their different characteristics, then there will not be a particular rational forming principle of each child, and it will be one of the parents, for example the male, who produces the child not in accordance with differing rational forming principles but in accordance with one of his own or his father’s. The answer is that nothing prevents parents from producing children with differing characteristics, since they contain all the rational forming principles, of which some are to hand at any one time. What about differences in children from the same parents? Well, they are due to unequal predominance.14

The mechanics of this process are left unclear. Plotinus speaks of ‘mixtures’ and ‘predominance’, but he does not appear to subscribe to a two-seed theory.15 Here we might recall that Porphyry, too, spoke of a ‘blending’ (κρᾶσις)16 of male and female principles, and of ‘predominance’ (πλεονάζειν, τὸ πᾶν συναιρεῖν)17 in this blending, also without adopting a two-seed theory. So perhaps Plotinus, too, is thinking of the blending of logoi themselves rather than of seeds. Be that as it may, Plotinus routinely appeals to family (or more often, to paternal) resemblance to support the view that the logoi in the seed are responsible for shaping the embryo, as opposed to any external influences from the stars or the universe. E.g., as early as III l [3] 1,32–36 he says that the father is the cause of the child, though there are perhaps some external contributing causes (e.g., diet, well-flowing seed, a fertile mother), and in 6.1–7 he underlines again that the lion’s share of responsibility in the formation of individual living things goes to the parents,18 and that ‘the revolution of the universe’ is a mere contributing cause. And as late as II 3 [52] 12,5–8 we find that it is from the logos of a man that a man comes to be, and this

14 V 7 [18] 2,1–8 Fleet-Sorabji translation (in Sorabji, R.: The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 1, 212): Ἀλλ’ εἰ αἱ μίξεις τῶν λόγων ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος διαφόρους ποιοῦσιν, οὐκέτι τοῦ γινομένου ἑκάστου λόγος τις ἔσται, ὅ τε ἑκάτερος γεννῶν, οἷον ὁ ἄρρην, οὐ κατὰ διαφόρους λόγους ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕνα τὸν αὐτοῦ ἢ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. Ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κατὰ διαφόρους τῷ τοὺς πάντας ἔχειν αὐτούς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀεὶ προχείρους.Ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων διάφοροι; Ἢ διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἴσην ἐπικράτησιν. 15 Plotinus never explicitly mentions a female seed, and the two references to menses (V 8 [31] 2,6–7 and II 9 [33] 12,18–21) suggest that it is a passive material principle in embryology. See Wilberding, J.: ‘Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed’, 409–411. 16 Porphyry, AG 10.5 (= 47,27 ff. Kalbfleisch). 17 Porphyry, AG 10.2 (= 46,22–23 Kalbfleisch). 18 I read γειναμένοις with Sleeman for γινομένοις at 6,6.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 277

is why the offspring resembles his father, and again in II 3 [52] 14,29–34 he insists that the generation of children follows upon marriages, with the children being formed according to the logos as long as nothing impedes it (where the mother and the ‘environment’ are listed as possible obstacles).19 All of this fits nicely with Plotinus’ routine assertion that it is the logoi in the seed that shape and form the living thing.20 This suggests that Plotinus is more or less in agreement with Porphyry regarding the identity of the agent responsible for forming the embryo-foetus: it is the bundle of logoi in the seed provided by the father (and perhaps for Plotinus also by the mother) which collectively may be identified as an individual nature or vegetative soul.21 For Porphyry, as we saw, these logoi must further be set in 19 Likewise, brothers are said to be similar because they come from the same parents (III 3 [48] 7,26–28), and cf. V 9 [5] 4,8–10. 20 V 9 [5] 6,9–24; IV 3 [27] 10,11–13; III 8 [30] 7,18–19; V 3 [49] 8,4–5; cf. IV 7 [2] 5,42–43. 21 Some might find this claim about the existence of individual natures in Plotinus troubling. For it is possible to find a number of scholars maintaining there is no real distinction between the vegetative soul of any two given individuals, as both are involved in the same activities of growth, nourishment and reproduction, for example, Tornau, C.: Plotin. Enneaden VI 4–5 [22–23]: ‘Diese erste Gestaltung kommt allen Lebewesen seitens der Weltseele zu; ausreichend ist sie freilich nur für die Pflanzen, zur Gewährleistung der sinnlichen und Denk-Funktionen müssen individuelle Seelen hinzukommen (IV 9 [8] 3,23–26). In diesem Sinne kann Plotin sagen, dass die Weltseele die Körper für ihre individuellen ‘Schwesterseelen’ skizzenhaft ‘vorformt’ (προϋπογράφειν VI 7 [38] 7,9f.; IV 3 [27] 6,13–15). Dies entspricht der Stufe des ἄνθρωπος φυτικός aus VI 7 [38] 5,10f., auf der es demnach noch keine menschliche Individualität gibt. Individualität entsteht durch die Gegenwart von Einzelseelen, die auf transzendenten Individuen des Geistes zurückgehen’ (282–283); Aubry, G.: Plotin. Traité 53 (1,1): ‘C’est la puissance vegetative qui, de la matière inanimée, fait un corps vivant ou ‘qualifié’, capable de croître et de se nourrir, mais pas encore de sentir ni de désirer. Un tel corps n’est donc, cette fois vraiment, qu’une parcelle d’univers, un morceau de matière vivante, séparée mais encore anonyme, privée d’individualité’ (253); Blumenthal, H.: Plotinus’ Psychology: ‘The point seems to be that reunion is not really applicable to this part because it was never really individualized’ (63). Thus, when Plotinus claims that our lower soul comes from the universe, this is taken to be a confirmation that there is no real individuality at this level, but this Plotinian claim is again best understood by turning back to Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum. As we have seen, Porphyry is also interested in distinguishing between the individual soul that descends into the body from the intelligible world – for him this occurs at birth, though as we shall see Plotinus might be envisioning an earlier moment of descent – and a lower soul that is provided by the father via the seed. Thus, Porphyry can also say that the lower soul comes from the universe, or from the soul present in the universe, but by this he does not mean that these lower souls lack individuality but that they derive from the vegetative souls of their fathers which as vegetative souls are inextricably bound up in the matter of the universe. Indeed, it is only by appreciating the individuality of vegetative souls that we can begin to make sense of Porphyry’s appropriation of the Stoic account of complete blending to explain relation of the vegetative soul of the offspring to that of its father, mother and its own descended soul (see AG 10,5–6, cited above). Moreover,

278 

 James Wilberding

motion by the mother, and it remains to be seen whether this is also the case for Plotinus. For now, however, let us focus on the problem of the World Soul’s role in embryology. If the seed comes from the father, and the formation of the embryo-foetus is executed by the logoi in this seed together with the logoi from the mother, then how are we to account for Plotinus’ repeated references to the involvement of the World Soul? A number of Plotinus’ remarks about the World Soul’s involvement in the formation of individual bodies can be understood in a way that is completely compatible with the formation of the offspring’s body being due entirely to the logoi provided by the parents. In passages such as IV 3 [27] 11,8–12 and VI 6 [34] 7,5–7 Plotinus maintains that Nature is responsible for the production of the bodies of individual living things. Likewise in IV 3 [27] 6,13–18 and II 9 [33] 18,14–17 he says that our bodies are built for us by our ‘sister-soul’, which is generally taken to refer to the (lower) World Soul, i.e., Nature. In all of these cases, however, Plotinus’ primary aim is to establish what the individual descended soul is and is not responsible for. Thus, when Plotinus says that Nature is responsible for forming our bodies, he does not mean to single out universal Nature as distinct from the individual natures in seeds as the agent of formation; rather, his point is that the formation of the embryo is achieved by that end of the spectrum of soul that is already at work in the sensible world and does not need to be accomplished again by the descending soul. Thus, in contexts where Plotinus is primarily interested in contrasting the individual descended soul with the external influences that it has to deal with in the sensible world, he includes both the parents and the universe under the rubric of external influences. E.g., in III l [3] 5,20–34 he contrasts ‘what is ours’ to what comes ‘from the universe’ (ἀπὸ τοῦ παντός), and the latter category includes both the similarity to one’s parents and the environmental influences.22 But in other contexts, especially those where Plotinus is concerned to play down the efficacy of the stars and the universe, parents are not counted among, and even contrasted

even if all vegetative souls are executing the same kinds of activities, they have their own individual manners of execution that conform to the logoi that are ‘to hand’ in them (cf. V 7 [18] 2,5–6). E.g., as Socrates is growing up, his vegetative soul is developing and forming his snub nose, a feature that Plotinus sees as following from a logos in his vegetative soul (V 9 [5] 12,4–12) and when he reproduces, his seed will be at work trying to reproduce this snub nose according to the same logos. So we should think of each individual as having its own individual vegetative soul, which has its own distinct agenda according to the logoi that are to hand in it. I have discussed individuals and universals at the level of nature in more detail in Wilberding, J.: ‘Intelligible Kinds and Natural Kinds’. 22 Cf. II 3 [52] 15,13–17.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 279

with, external influences.23 These latter cases make clear that the formation of the offspring is not, after all, entirely determined by the parents. Plotinus indicates that certain factors external to the parents affect the formation of the body without having the power to change the essence of the offspring. These include the mother’s diet24, the region and climate25 and the revolution of the stars.26 It is these non-parental, external influences that ultimately provide a way of saying that the World Soul is involved as a distinct agent in the formation of the embryo. For although these influences might prima facie seem coincidental, Plotinus at times suggests that they are all coordinated by a single universal logos that governs the cosmos, e.g., in IV 4 [28] 39,5–14: What comes to be in the All, then, does not come to be according to seminal formative principles but according to formative principles which include powers which are prior to the principles in the seeds; for in the seminal principles there is nothing of what happens outside the sphere of seminal principles themselves, or of the contributions which come from the matter to the whole, or of the interactions on each other of the things which have come to be. But the rational formative principle of the All is more like the formative thought which establishes the order and law of a state, which knows already what the citizens are going to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this.27

The difficulties surrounding Plotinus’ views on providence and fate are well-known, and this is not the place to explore them any further, but it looks as if he wants to collect all of the factors that are at work on the formation of the embryo-foetus, including both the seminal principles derived from the parents and all the other environmental factors, and put them under the governance of the World Soul. Some of Plotinus’ remarks, however, appear to suggest that the universe’s involvement in the generation of the offspring goes well beyond this. For he repeatedly says that the lower soul of the offspring along with its accompanying passions is given by the universe or, at times more specifically, by the stars, for example:28 We, however, have been formed by the soul dispensed from the gods in heaven and from heaven itself. This is the soul by which we are joined to bodies.29

23 E.g., III l [3] 5,53–55 and 6,1–7; II 3 [53] 12,1–11. 24 III l [3] 1,34. 25 III l [3] 5,24–33; II 3 [52] 14,30–33. 26 III l [3] 5,53–55; III l [3] 6,3–7; II 3 [52] 12,1–11. 27 IV 4 [28] 39,5–14, Armstrong translation. 28 See also IV 9 [8] 3,23–29; VI 4 [22] 15,8–17; IV 3 [27] 27,1–3; IV 4 [28] 32,9–11; IV 4 [28] 34,1–3; IV 4 [28] 43,1–5; II 3 [52] 13,40–45. 29 II 1 [40] 5,18–20.

280 

 James Wilberding

Or again: And in the Timaeus the God who makes the world gives the ‘first principle of soul’, but the gods who are borne through the heavens ‘the terrible and inevitable passions’, ‘angers’, and desires and ‘pleasures and pains’, and the ‘other kinds of soul’, from which come passions of this kind. These statements bind us to the stars, from which we get our souls, and subject us to necessity when we come down here; from them we get our moral characters, our characteristic actions, and our emotions, coming from a disposition which is liable to emotion.30

But these claims need not be understood as going beyond what we have already established. For as we have seen, Plotinus appears to be in agreement with Porphyry about the father providing an initial bundle of logoi in the seed that constitutes the vegetative soul,31 and this allows Plotinus to say that our lower soul derives from the universe as opposed to descending from the intelligible region, as our higher soul is said to do. Strictly speaking, then, it is one’s parents – and most probably only one’s father – who are supplying one’s lower soul for Plotinus, but we have also seen that non-parental, external influences have their own effect on the formation of the embryo. Now, one of Plotinus’ conclusions in On the Difficulties about the Soul32 is that the affections and emotions associated with the lower soul in some important sense follow upon the constitution of the body. To be sure, Plotinus is no advocate of epiphenomenalism, as Galen might have been,33 but he is willing to say that the nature and intensity of one’s passions and imaginations depend at least in part on physiological considerations.34 This means that we can account for the presence of a lower soul of a certain kind, i.e., of a certain temperament and having certain dispositions, solely in terms of a body of a particular constitution being formed. A more bilious body, for example, would come hand in hand with a more irascible temperament. And so, since we can account for the constitution of the body in terms of the parents’ logoi together with certain environmental factors, these same factors can account for the presence of a lower soul of a certain kind. Thus, by having a role to play in the

30 II 3 [52] 9,6–14, Armstrong translation. 31 Again, there remains the question of whether these logoi require some form of actualization in Plotinus as they do in Porphyry, and if so, which soul is providing it. I shall return to this question below. 32 IV 3–4 [27–8]. 33 For an assessment of Galen’s commitment to epiphenomenalism, see Caston, V.: ‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’. 34 See, for example, I 4 [28] 28,35–43; 32,27–29; and 41,9–11 on the influence of bile and VI 8 [39] 3,13–16 on that of semen. This is also confirmed by Porphyry’s report in VP 11,14–20, where Plotinus advises Porphyry to change climates to help with his bouts of depression.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 281

formation of the body, the stars also have a role to play in the determination of the lower soul’s character. As far as the first two columns of passages are concerned, then, the World Soul’s contribution to the formation of the embryo may be summarized as follows. Although the primary agent in the formation of the embryo is the individual nature supplied by the father in the seed, the World Soul is also involved via the influences from the environment, climate and stars, which affect the ultimate constitution of the offspring’s body. These influences and seminal logoi of the parents are all subsumed under a single governing logos that we may identify as belonging to the World Soul. Moreover, the lower soul of the offspring together with a certain set of characteristic dispositions may be said to derive from the World Soul, because the soul which is donated by the parents obtains a certain character from the constitution of the body, which again is at least in part determined by cosmic influences.

3 The role of the individual descended soul in Plotinus If the conclusions reached above are right, then Plotinus would seem to be in agreement with Porphyry about the individual descended soul not being directly involved in the formation of the embryo-foetus. There are, however, some passages that suggest precisely this, to which we should now turn. To begin, it should be acknowledged that Plotinus, like Porphyry, does allow the individual descended soul to play an important role in determining the form of his or her body without being directly involved in the embryological formation itself. This is the upshot of their exegesis of Plato’s myth of Er.35 The stars signify the lots and the kinds of lives available, and the descending souls must choose from this selection,36 thus becoming themselves responsible for the choice they have made. More specifically, Plotinus interprets the lots to refer to the starting points that one receives in life, including those which are responsible for the formation of the embryo-foetus: 35 I believe Plotinus and Porphyry are basically in agreement in their interpretations of this aspect of the myth of Er: the descending soul is choosing the external starting points of one’s life, which include those that determine the formation of the embryo. I have discussed Porphyry’s exegesis of the myth of Er in more detail in Wilberding, J.: Porphyry, To Gaurus and Wilberding, J.: ‘The Myth of Er’. 36 IV 3 [27] 12,19 ff.; 13,1 ff.; IV 3 [27] 16,5–6; etc.

282 

 James Wilberding

But what are the lots? Being born when the All was in the state in which it was when they came into body, and coming into this particular body and being born of these particular parents, and in such and such a place, and in general what we call the external circumstances.37

In other words, both the seminal logoi and all of the other external factors that contribute to the formation of the embryo are determined by the descending soul’s choice of life. The idea appears to be that by choosing a life, the soul becomes uniquely suited to an individual body and is therefore delivered automatically to that body. Further, this automatic delivery is apparently provided for by the universal logos that governs the cosmos: For what [the World Soul] has is the All already complete; this is and will be sufficient to itself: it completes its course periodically according to everlastingly fixed rational principles, and everlastingly returns to the same state, period by period, in a proportionate succession of defined lives, these here being brought into harmony with those there and completed according to them, everything being ordered under one rational principle in the descents of souls and their ascents and with regard to everything else. The harmonious adjustment of the souls to the order of this All of ours witnesses to this.38

This bears a striking similarity to the match-making role that the World Soul was seen to play in the Ad Gaurum.39 There are four passages, however, that appear to go further and attribute a firsthand role in the formation of the embryo to the individual soul. The first of these is, taken by itself, too ambiguous to overturn our previous results. And does the living thing include brute beasts? If as it is said there are sinful human souls in them, the separate part of the soul does not come to belong to the beasts but is there without being there for them; their consciousness includes the image of soul and the body: a beast is then a qualified body made, as it were, by/for an image of soul (σῶμα δὴ τοιόνδε οἷον ποιωθὲν ψυχῆς εἰδώλῳ). But if a human soul has not entered the beast it becomes a living being of such and such a kind by an illumination from the universal soul.40

The context of this passage makes fairly clear that that τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδωλον refers to an illumination of the descended indivdual soul, but the aorist participle ποιωθὲν with the dative εἰδώλῳ strikes me as somewhat ambiguous. It is usually

37 II 3 [52] 15,5–8, Armstrong translation. 38 IV 3 [27] 12,12–20, Armstrong translation. See also IV 3 [27] 13,1–3; IV 3 [27] 15,21–23; VI 4 [22] 15,1 ff. 39 In the Ad Gaurum, too, the World Soul’s delivery of individual souls is accomplished via the suitability of the soul to the body, see AG 11,2–12,3 (with 13,7 and 14,4). On suitability in Porphyry, see Aubry, G.: ‘Capacité et convenance’. 40 I 1 [53] 11,8–15, Armstrong translation slightly revised.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 283

translated as ‘made by an image of the soul’ but it might simply mean ‘made for an image of the soul’.41 A second passage from IV 3 [27] is also obscure: And we stated that, since we are in the all, we have something from the soul of the whole, and we agreed that we were affected by the circuit of the universe; but we opposed another soul to this, and one which shows itself other especially by its opposition. As for the fact that we are begotten inside the universe, in the womb too we say that the soul which comes in is another one, not that of the mother.42

‘The soul which comes in’ is generally, and I think correctly, taken to refer to the descending rational soul,43 though it is not impossible that Plotinus is drawing an analogy here between soul that descends into the universe from the intelligible world and the vegetative soul that enters the womb from outside. Yet, even putting this possibility aside, this passage makes no explicit claims about the soul’s time of entry or its role in the formation of the embryo-foetus.44 Plotinus might, for example, think that the soul enters just prior to birth in order to help with the delivery (see AG 5,3), in which case the embryo-foetus would have already been formed. But as we shall see in the next two passages, Plotinus’ view seems be somewhat stronger than this. And the rational principle (ὁ λόγος) must be said to contain within itself the rational principle of the matter as well, the matter which it will make its own, either by making the matter accord with itself or by finding it already consonant (ἣν αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται ποιώσας καθ’ αὑτὸν τὴν ὕλην ἢ σύμφωνον εὑρών). For the rational principle of an ox does not impose itself on any other matter than that of an ox. Hence Plato says that the soul enters into other living beings, in the sense that the soul becomes different and the rational principle is altered, in order that what was formerly the soul of a man may become the soul of an ox.45

41 Armstrong: ‘made by an image of soul’; Aubry: ‘produit, en quelque sorte, par le reflet de l’âme’; Theiler: ‘wie sie ihm durch den Seelenschatten gegeben wird’; Pradeau: ‘produit par une image de l’âme’. As we shall see below, I shall ultimately conclude that this common translation does indeed seem to fit well with Plotinus’ theory. My point here is simply that this passage is not conclusive. 42 IV 3 [27] 7,25–31, Armstrong translation slightly revised. 43 Helleman-Elgersma, W.: Soul-Sisters, 413; Brisson in Brisson, L. / Pradeau , J. F.: Plotin Traités, ad loc. 44 Brisson in Brisson, L. / Pradeau, J. F.: Plotin Traités, ad loc suggests that the entry occurs at birth, which presumably means the moment just prior to birth, given that Plotinus says that the soul enters the womb. Helleman-Elgersma, W.: Soul-Sisters, 413 implies that the entry is taking place sometime before birth. 45 III 3 [48] 4,37–43, Armstrong translation slightly revised.

284 

 James Wilberding

This passage provides some strong evidence for the individual descended soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo-foetus, not because Plotinus explicitly commits himself to this view, but because he entertains the view and appears to leave the question open. In the larger context of this passage, Plotinus is concerned to explain that, although some are unable to live according to their higher souls because of the influence of their bodies, we must not think of the body as an independent principle that determines the life of the soul. Rather, the soul is itself responsible for the body (and matter) that it inhabits, which we may assume has been allotted to it as a result of the choice of life that the soul makes prior to its descent, as outlined above. But here Plotinus goes beyond that initial act of choice to signal that this logos, which appears to refer to an illumination from the individual descending soul, ‘makes’ the matter to which it is descending ‘its own’ (αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται) in one of two ways: either by ‘making the matter accord with itself’ (ποιώσας καθ’ αὑτὸν τὴν ὕλην) or by ‘finding the matter already consonant’ (ἢ σύμφωνον εὑρών). This alternative raises two important questions to which the final passage below shall offer some answers. The first concerns how the soul can be described as ‘making’ the matter its own if it simply discovers it already consonant. The second question has to do with whether the first alternative described here can be made compatible with Plotinus’ (and Porphyry’s) view that the soul’s descent into a given body is a function of the suitability of that body to the individual soul in question. For it is the latter alternative that appears to give us a recognizable characterization of the suitability thesis: the individual soul descends once the body has already been made suitable. The former alternative, however, suggests that Plotinus was at least open to the possibility that the soul descends earlier and itself helps form the embryo into a suitable receptacle for itself, which would seem to go against the grain of the suitability thesis,46 at least if Plotinus understands ‘suitability’ in the way Porphyry does, namely to refer to the completed formation of an organic body. Since Plotinus is only offering this as one of two possibilities, we need not view this as a definite problem at this point. Perhaps he is simply refusing here to be sidetracked into the debate concerning the soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo-foetus, since either way the soul is responsible for its presence in this or that body. As a result, this passage is certainly not a clear affirmation of the individual descended soul’s involvement in the formation of the body, nor need it even be understood as an indication of any indecision on Plotinus’ part.

46 See IV 3 [27] 12,37–38 and IV 3 [27] 13,10 for statements to the effect that the soul descends into receptacle bodies that are already suited to it. Cf. IV 3 [27] 12,49–55 and VI 4 [22] 15,1 ff.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 285

A final passage does, I think, provide good evidence for the view that for Plotinus the individual soul has some active role to play in the formation of the embryo: But if it is when it is spoilt and has become worse that the soul forms a beast nature, it was not from the beginning the principle which made horse or ox, and the forming principle of horse, and horse, were against nature. No, a lesser thing, certainly not an unnatural one, but that which made them was somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any case: it is like the craftsmen who know how to make many forms and then make just this one, for which they had the order or which their material by its suitability [to a particular form] required. For what is there to prevent the power of the World Soul from drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the universal forming principle, even before the soul-powers come from it, and this preliminary outline being like illuminations running on before into matter, and the soul which completes the work itself (τὴν ἐξεργαζομένην ψυχὴν) following the traces of this kind and making by articulating the traces part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to the dramatic part given to him?47

The larger context of this passage is once again the transmigration of the soul into animals. And as in III 3 [48] 4 Plotinus emphasizes that the soul must itself be responsible for the type of body it inhabits, and here again he indicates that this is possible in one of two ways: Either the matter is amenable to all sorts of different forms and the descending soul decides to impose a particular form on it, or the matter is already predisposed to a particular form of living thing. But here he sides explicitly with the latter option, and in doing so he provides answers to both of the questions that arose in connection with III 3 [48] 4, as well as suggesting how the passages indicating the individual soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo can be reconciled with the passages in the first two columns of our table, according to which the formation was due to the parents and the World Soul. The details of this passage are certainly murky, but I think the following offers a fair reconstruction of its sense. The World Soul, we are told, provides

47 VI 7 [38] 7,8–16, Armstrong translation revised: κακυνθεῖσα καὶ χείρων γενομένη πλάττει θήρειον φύσιν, οὐκ ἦν ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βοῦν ἐποίει ἢ ἵππον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἵππου καὶ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν. Ἢ ἔλαττον, οὐ μὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνό πως καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἵππος ἢ κύων. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕξει, ποιεῖ τὸ κάλλιον, εἰ δὲ μή, ὃ δύναται, ἥ γε ποιεῖν προσταχθεῖσα· οἷα καὶ οἱ πολλὰ εἴδη ποιεῖν εἰδότες δημιουργοί, εἶτα τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὃ προσετάχθησαν, ἢ ὃ ἡ ὕλη ἐθέλει τῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι. Τί γὰρ κωλύει τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς προϋπογράφειν, ἅτε λόγον πάντα οὖσαν, πρὶν καὶ παρ’ αὐτῆς ἥκειν τὰς ψυχικὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὴν προϋπογραφὴν οἷον προδρόμους ἐλλάμψεις εἰς τὴν ὕλην εἶναι, ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἴχνεσιν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τὴν ἐξεργαζομένην ψυχὴν κατὰ μέρη τὰ ἴχνη διαρθροῦσαν ποιῆσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἑκάστην τοῦτο, ᾧ προσῆλθε σχηματίσασα ἑαυτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν ἐν ὀρχήσει πρὸς τὸ δοθὲν αὐτῷ δρᾶμα;

286 

 James Wilberding

a ‘preliminary sketch’. Given what we have already seen, this is best understood as a reference to the logoi provided by the vegetative souls of the parents, which Plotinus described above as not deriving from the descended soul itself, but rather ‘from the universe’. If so, then we should expect these logoi to be provided at the moment of conception, in which case the reference to the sketch (προϋπογράφειν) in the present passage finds a striking echo in II 9 [33] 12,20–21, where a preliminary sketch (περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφή) is said to be imprinted on the menstrual fluid.48 The individual descended soul is said to be present after this sketch is in place, which would mean that the soul could descend at or after conception. Yet this soul is also said to ‘complete the work’ (ἐξεργαζομένην)49 in the manner analogous to a craftsman who, while capable of producing all sorts of different forms in matter, must allow the material she is working on to guide her actions, which strongly suggests that this soul is descending well before birth and perhaps directly at conception. In this case Plotinus’ descended soul would appear to be taking on the role that Porphyry had allotted to the mother’s soul. In the Ad Gaurum we saw that the logoi in the seed-embryo needed to be actualized and thus required a soul that possesses these same logoi, which Porphyry located in the mother’s soul with the result that the mother could be described as the ‘creator’ (δημιουργός, AG 6.1 [= 42,14 Kalbfleisch]) of the offspring. Plotinus’ idea, however, seems to be that this task is performed by the descended soul, and this is possible because, as he routinely says,50 every descending soul contains the entire spectrum of logoi within itself. There is, however, a striking difference in their respective characterizations of the manner of actualization. For Porphyry described the mother’s activity as ‘steering’ the seed-embryo-foetus, and indeed

48 περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφὴ τυποῦσα ἐπὶ τοῖς καταμηνίοις παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου. The notion of a sketch of the entire body being supplied at the start is already to be found in Aristotle’s GA 743b20–24 (and cf. 740a28–9 and 764b30). Galen also adopts this idea, although for him the sketch is not present until the third stage of formation (de Sem. 94,1–2 and 100,23–4 De Lacy). What both accounts share – and what is much more explicit in Michael of Ephesus’ extensive development of the idea ([Philoponus] in GA 76,16–18; 80,26–7; 101,9–102,7; 103,8–11; 106,2–32; 114,17–25; 115,29–33) – is the distinction between a preliminary outline and the actual formation and articulation of body. The same idea appears in Proclus in Parm. 327,25–8. 49 Compare the use of αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται above in III 3 [48] 4,39. The descended individual soul is also described as creating (δημιουργεῖ) in IV 7 [2] 13,8. Armstrong seems to take this passage to refer to the World Soul’s act of creation (note that he adds ‘the world’ as the unexpressed object of δημιουργεῖ in l. 8), but Plotinus makes clear here that the individual descending soul is the focus of the passage. For the soul in question is described as ‘wanting to direct a part’ (μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βουληθεῖσα, l. 11) and initially being transcendent ‘together with the World Soul’ (μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα, ll. 9–10). Cf. also IV 3 [27] 9,20–26. 50 E.g., V 7 [18] 1,8–9; V 7 [18] 2,5–7; V 7 [17] 3,20–23; VI 7 [38] 6,33–36.

The World Soul in the embryological theories of Porphyry and Plotinus 

 287

steering in such a way that the logoi of her own phenotype can end up dominating those of the father, but Plotinus prefers a more passive characterization of this activity: the soul completing the work is a follower rather than a leader. The full reconstruction of Plotinus’ views on the formation of the embryo would be as follows. (i) The individual descending soul chooses a life that consists of certain genetic, environmental and astrological starting points, which amounts to choosing one’s parents along with the time and place of one’s conception. These factors together determine the sketch that is not produced by the descending soul itself but rather by its parents and the universe as a whole. This is one sense in which the World Soul may be said to be involved in the process of formation. (ii) Once this sketch is established, the seed-embryo immediately becomes a suitable receptacle for the descending soul. Suitability for Plotinus, then, should be understood differently than for Porphyry. For whereas the latter understands suitability in the physiological terms of the full completion of the organic body, which occurs only at birth, the former appears to put more emphasis on the ethical aspects of suitability. For Plotinus a vessel is suitable as soon as all of the criteria contained in the choice of life are met, and since these criteria are basically the genetic and cosmic starting points of one’s life, the suitability requirement may be seen as being fulfilled at conception, once the sketch is imprinted on the menstrual fluid. The automatic descent into the suitable receptacle also appears to be provided for in some way by the World Soul. (iii) Once the individual soul descends into the womb – and nothing in my view speaks against the assumption that Plotinus sees this happening at conception – it takes on the role, to use Porphyry’s vocabulary, of ‘captain’ of the seed-embryo, which is to say that it completes the formation of its body in accordance with the logoi that are pre-contained in it. This examination has shown, then, that beneath a couple points of broad agreement, one finds that Plotinus’ metaphysical embryology differs in some significant ways from Porphyry’s. The salient points of agreement are: (i) the parents contribute logoi corresponding to their phenotypes at conception, which for the most part determine the phenotype of the offspring; (ii) the World Soul is also involved at this stage to the extent that the geological environment and the stars also have some influence on the formation; (iii) the logoi in the seed-embryo must be set in motion by a soul with the same kinds of logoi that completes the work; (iv) the individual soul descends once this seed-embryo constitutes a suitable receptacle for it; and (v) this descent to the suitable receptacle is provided for in some sense by the World Soul. The salient points of disagreement are: (i) each understands the suitability of the receptacle differently, with Porphyry focusing on the physiological side of things and Plotinus on the ethical. This disagreement about the nature of suitability allows Plotinus to disagree with Porphyry about

288 

 James Wilberding

(ii) the identity of the soul that completes the formation and (iii) the moment of the individual soul’s descent into the body. Whereas Porphyry has the mother’s soul completing the formation and the offspring’s soul entering at birth, Plotinus appears to envision the individual soul of the offspring descending at conception and completing the formation itself. Finally, (iv) allowing the mother’s soul to take on the role of actualizer as he does, Porphyry provides a rather elegant solution to the problem of maternal resemblance within a one-seed theory, whereas Plotinus leaves this problem unsolved.

References Armstrong, Arthur. H.: Plotinus. Enneads, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1966–88. Aubry, Gwenaëlle: Plotin. Traité 53 (1,1), Paris 2004. Aubry, Gwenaëlle: ‘Capacité et convenance. La notion d’epitêdeiotês dans la théorie porphyrienne de l’embryon’, in: Luc Brisson (ed.), L’Embryon: Formation et Animation, Paris 2008, 139–156. Blumenthal, Henry: Plotinus’ Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul, Nijhoff 1971. Brisson, Luc: Plotin. Traités, Traductions sous la direction de Luc Brisson, Paris 2002–2010. Caston, Victor: ‘Epiphenomenalisms. Ancient and Modern’, The Philosophical Review 106.3 (1997), 309–363. Deuse, Werner: Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, Mainz and Wiesbaden 1983. Helleman-Elgersma, Wendy: Soul-Sisters. A Commentary on ENNEADS IV3 (27), 1–8 of Plotinus, Amsterdam 1980. Nickel, Diethard: Galeni. Defoetuum formatione, Berlin 2001. Festugière, André-Jean: La Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste, 4 volumes, Paris 1944–1954. Kalbfleisch, Karl: Die neuplatonische, fälschlich dem Galen zugeschriebene Schrift ‘Pros Gauron peri tou pōs empsychoutai ta embrya’, Berlin 1895. Sorabji, Richard: The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD. 3 Volumes, Ithaca – New York 2005. Tornau, Christian: Plotin, Enneaden VI 4–5 [22–23]. Ein Kommentar. Stuttgart – Leipzig 1998. Wilberding, James: ‘Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed’, Phronesis 53 (2008), 406–432. Wilberding, James: ‘Review of M. Congourdeau L’embryon et son âme dans les sources grecques (VIe siècle av. J.-C. – Ve siècle apr. J.-C.)’, Gnomon 82.8 (2010), 12–16. Wilberding, James: Porphyry, To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled and On What is in Our Power, London – New York 2011. Wilberding, James: ‘Intelligible Kinds and Natural Kinds in Plotinus’, in Études Platoniciennes VIII: Les formes platoniciennes dans l’Antiqué tardive, Paris 2011, 53–74. Wilberding, James: ‘The Myth of Er and the Problem of Constitutive Luck’, in: Anne Sheppard (ed.) Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Republic, London 2013, 87–105. Wilberding, James: Forms, Souls and Embryos. Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction, London 2016.

Dirk Baltzly

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary The World Soul is one of the most formative ideas for subsequent Platonism. The general notion that there is a soul for the entire visible cosmos that renders it a unified, living creature clearly gripped the subsequent philosophical tradition and influenced even those who did not identify themselves as Platonists.1 Plato lavished great detail upon the ‘creation’ of the World Soul in the Timaeus, but this had the effect of leaving his interpreters frankly puzzled on many points. Hence by the 5th century AD there was already a considerable literature on the proper interpretation of the World Soul in the Timaeus.2 Proclus’ own conception of the World Soul is inseparable from this fact, for his conception is refined and articulated in response to interpretations of his Platonist predecessors. He accepts from them a set of puzzles about the meaning of Plato’s remarks on the World Soul in the Timaeus. Much of his commentary is taken up with addressing these puzzles. So a general overview of the nature of the World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary is one that needs to be carefully extracted from his specific contributions to existing debates about the interpretation and significance of Plato’s text. In general, Proclus is at pains to avoid fragmenting what he regards as the plural functions of a unified and unique World Soul into a plurality of souls. The World Soul is one soul and Proclus’ approach labors to overcome what he sees as threats to this central idea. In pursuit of this goal he distinguishes the World Soul from Nature, which is distinct from and subordinate to it. On the other hand, he also distinguishes it from hypercosmic souls, though he denies that various passages Plato’s Timaeus that were taken by his predecessors to be about hypercosmic souls are, in fact, to be read that way. In what follows I will first consider why Proclus thinks we may be confident that there is a World Soul. I then investigate why he thinks we may be sure that there is one World Soul. It emerges from these investigations that the World Soul is best understood by reference to what it does. The third section considers how the nature of the World Soul is dictated by its function. The fourth section distinguishes it and its function from Nature, on the one hand, and hypercosmic souls on the other.

1 See, for instance, Reydams-Schils, G.: Demiurge and Providence. 2 The classic study is Baltes, M.: Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios, vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-013

290 

 Dirk Baltzly

1 The existence of the World Soul The idea that the entire universe is animated by a single soul – though it is a prominent feature in Platonism – is not one that is obviously recommended by our experience. After all, we encounter animals, and perhaps to a lesser extent plants, whose salience to us as living things emerges from their contrast with the much more extensive backdrop of inanimate nature. On a walk in the bush we encounter an echidna foraging for ants by the side of a small gum tree. The echidna is pretty obviously an individual, self-motive creature with some kind of awareness. It moves – albeit with no great urgency – and it may perceive our presence, though they typically do not care much about human beings unless you do something silly. If you take the same walk many times over several years you will notice slower changes taking place in the gum tree too. Unlike the changing patterns of clouds in the sky, these changes strike us as changes in a single, continuous, organised being. Both these living things seem to stand out against the backdrop of the soil, the cliffs, boulders, and sky that also figure in your experience of that walk. Why would anyone suppose that all these things are, in fact, ensouled? And in particular, why would anyone suppose that there is a single soul that makes them all parts of a unique cosmic organism? I will not speculate on what prompted Plato to embrace this extraordinary idea. I will simply observe that Plato’s authority insures that Platonists such as Proclus would continue to embrace it. However, it is not simply the authority of Plato’s Timaeus or Laws that recommends this idea to Proclus. An argument from his general theory of causation provides a ground for belief in the World Soul. Proclus’ Platonic Theology I 14, 63.9–25 reviews the argument of Laws X for the existence of the divine. The key premise that Proclus derives from this argument is that the changes that take place in the visible cosmos are amenable to rational understanding. This is particularly true of the motions of the heavens, but the fact that there are detectible patterns of inter-related changes even within the sub-lunary region shows that here too the world of changing things is subject to some level of rational understanding. While we would say that this makes them intelligible or understandable, Proclus would hesitate to describe these motions as noêta since noêsis, considered as a kind of thinking, demands a certain kind of object. Nonetheless, the fact that these changes in the visible cosmos admit of a kind of understanding entails that they stand in a certain relation to the proper objects of noêsis. Proclus treats it as evident that what is understandable in this way conforms to intellect or is kata noun. Now, Proclus has views about the kind of thing that

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 291

intellect is and this is not the place to rehearse his reasons for these views. The argument for the existence of a World Soul presupposes his doctrine of a separate intellect. Let us grant for the sake of argument that the intellect to which the visible cosmos conforms in this way is radically different from the kind of thing that the cosmos itself is. Intellect is indivisible and highly unified, eternal and atemporal, unextended, unmoved and so on. The cosmos is, of course, divisible into distinct parts, spatially extended, and undergoes change in time and so on. Let us take these premises for granted, for certainly Proclus does – accepting them on the authority of the divine Plato. The key step in the argument for the World Soul refers to the necessity of an intermediary between intellect as a separate cosmic principle and the cosmos of which it is the principle. At Plat. Theol. V 23, 85.16 Proclus claims to find it impossible to understand how the kind of Being had by intellect could be rendered coordinate with or communicated to the universe in a way that was unmediated. This is why Socrates insists in Tim. 30b3 that it is impossible for intellect to be present in (paragenesthai) anything apart from soul. This should not be understood as the claim that soul is prior to intellect, so that the latter’s existence is predicated upon the former’s. In fact, of course, it is exactly the other way around according to the Neoplatonists: intellect is ontologically prior to soul. It is rather the claim that the conformity of the visible cosmos with intellect that requires soul as an intermediary. Intellective substance is undivided, uniform and eternal, that of bodies divided, pluralized and coexistent with temporal extension. Because of this they are diametrically opposed to one another and have need of a mean which is able to bring them together, one that is at once divided and undivided, complex and simple, eternal and generated. Plato makes the psychic order such [a mean, representing it as] at the same time intelligible and the first of things that come to be, eternal and in time, undivided and divided. So if the universe must come into being with intellect (ennous), there is also need of soul; for it is the receptacle of intellect and it is through it that intellect makes its appearance in the material substances (onkos) of the universe. It is not that intellect has need of soul. In that case it would be of lower status than soul. Rather, it is that bodies have need of soul if they are to participate in intellect.3

When we think about what is required for the sensible realm to conform to the intellectual first principles, we can be sure that there must be such a thing as World Soul.

3 In Tim. I 402.15–28, trans. Runia, D. and Share, M.: Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. II, Book 2.

292 

 Dirk Baltzly

2 One World Soul – not a team effort We will return to the nature of this psychic intermediary shortly. For the moment let us ask why intelligibility of the various changes that we see in the visible cosmos presupposes the existence of a single soul for the entire universe rather than a plurality of souls associated with the various parts of the universe. To appreciate the force of this question, let’s consider an alternative conception of the cosmic role of soul. One reading of the means whereby Aristotle’s prime mover causes the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars (and the spheres nested below it) assigns a soul to the sphere (and perhaps to those individual nested spheres as well).4 It is this soul that, taking the prime mover as an object of desire, imitates its unextended activity by moving its sphere in a circle. The motions of the celestial spheres, in turn, bring about changes in the sub-lunary region principally by the influence of the Sun and the Moon in ways that are basically mechanical. Since the sphere of the fixed stars encompasses all the subsequent celestial sphere and they, in turn, encompass the sub-lunary region, one could assign a coordinating role to the soul of the sphere of the fixed stars. It might be in virtue of this soul’s mediation that the visible cosmos conforms (to an extent at least) to intellect. This coordinating soul of the celestial region could thus make a World Soul that animates the whole redundant. In fact, Proclus at one point takes this to be Aristotle’s position: Aristotle assigns to the soul of the inerrant sphere the role that Plato gives the World Soul (In Tim. III 69.28–70.1). Such a view clearly has its attractions. Suppose we followed Proclus’ argument that the extent of the universe’s conformity with intellect requires the mediation of a psychic order between the indivisible, uniform and eternal intellect on the one hand and the divisible, multi-form and temporal visible cosmos on the other. Confining that psychic order to the celestial region means that we do not have to reject as misleading the impression gained on our bushwalk – that there is a crucial difference between the animate echidna or gum tree and the inanimate cliffs and boulders. It is one thing to accept that the celestial spheres are great ensouled beings who mediate the intellectual order to matter. It is quite another to accede to the idea that the echidna, the gum tree and the boulder are all parts of a single cosmic creature animated by a single World Soul. The first obstacle to such an account – at least from Proclus’ point of view – is the text of Plato. Tim. 36e2–5 tells us that the soul was interwoven from the middle of the world’s body on out in every direction to the outermost edge of heaven and, further, that it covers it from the outside as well. It would appear, then, that there

4 Cf. Alexander (?), Quaest. 1.25, 40.8–23.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 293

is no part of the universe to which the World Soul is not present. Thus, it cannot be the soul merely of a part of the universe – like the celestial region – but most be instead the soul of the entire universe considered as a whole.5 Furthermore, Tim. 33c3–34a1 pretty clearly attributes single organic body, as well as the unity of perception, that is characteristic of a single living creature to the universe as a whole. This life, unlike the life of an individual echidna, is wholly self-sufficient and happy. This self-sufficiency is, in Proclus’ view, the fifth of the Demiurge’s gifts to the visible cosmos.6 But Proclus could also appeal to philosophical considerations distinct from the authority of Plato’s text. The argument is seldom spelled out explicitly, but Proclus generally subscribes to the ontological priority of wholes over their parts. This is not a wildly implausible view to hold and it is defended by some contemporary metaphysicians.7 There is something appealing to the idea that (at least in some cases) the parts of a thing owe their existence as those very parts to their integration into the whole of which they are parts. However, the notion of wholeness that Proclus works with is not confined to the kinds of particular sensible things that we moderns tend to think of as examples of things that are wholes with parts – a motor car or a wombat, for instance. For Proclus, the unparticipated Form or paradigmatic cause, Wombat Itself, is a whole that is prior to the participated form or universal wombat-hood that constitutes the repeatable nature found in common across all individual wombats.8 The latter is a whole-inthe-parts that exists in a manner that is associated with participation.9 Similarly, Proclus treats the ontological priority of the intelligible living being or Autozôon that serves as the paradigm for the visible universe as an example of the whole prior to the parts.

5 Proclus concedes some ground to the ‘Aristotelian’ position subsequently in his Timaeus Commentary. He addresses a puzzle about why Plato’s dialogue generates the sub-lunary gods from Ouranos and Gaia rather than from the World Soul and answers that while Tim. 36d8–e1 shows that the Demiurge framed all that is corporeal within the World Soul – and not merely the celestial region – nonetheless the World Soul illuminates the heavens primarily and only enlivens the sub-lunary region insofar as it is dependent upon the former. He reads the parallel between the human soul and the universe from the micro to the macrocosm. The situation is like our own, where the rational human soul is lodged in the head (In Tim. III 181.16–182.9). 6 In Tim. II 5.23. 7 Schaffer, J.: ‘Monism: The priority of the whole’, 31. 8 For a succinct explanation of the distinction between participated and unparticipated Forms, see Steel, C.: ‘Proclus’, 645–647. 9 Proclus, Elem. Theol. § 67.

294 

 Dirk Baltzly

The intelligible Living Thing is inclusive of all the things [that come] after it, not as being constituted by them – it is a whole-prior-to-the-parts, not a whole-composed-of-parts – nor as being predicated of them – indeed, it is the cause of the many […].10

When we combine Proclus’ view of the ontological priority of the whole over the part with his more expansive notion of what things can be properly described as wholes, we arrive at a doctrine that might better be described as the ontological priority of the whole to the partial or perhaps a priority of the general to the more specific. This generalised holism manifests itself in the priority of the totality or wholeness of body to individual bodies and a corresponding priority of the soul of the entire universe to the souls of various parts of it. To sum up then, we say that there is a single corporeal wholeness for the universe, as well as many other [wholes] dependent upon this single wholeness. And while there is a single soul of the universe, there are also many other souls after this one who, in conjunction with it, arrange the entire region in a manner that is undefiled.11

The plurality of ‘other wholes’ that are dependent upon the world’s single and all-encompassing corporeal wholeness are ‘universal things’ like the spheres of the stars or the totalities of earth, air, fire and water.12 The souls of the stars and planets are not parts of the World Soul in the same way in which, say, the sphere upon which Venus moves is a part of the total mass of the universe. Rather these divine souls are sisters to the single World Soul that the Demiurge creates.13 This is why I said that Proclus’ holism includes an expanded notion of what constitutes a whole and a corresponding range of ways in which the whole (or the general) is prior to the part (or the partial). Once we allow for this broad notion of wholeness, then Proclus’ holism supports an argument to the priority of a single cosmic soul prior to the souls that animate the various parts of the universe.

3 The nature of the World Soul Proclus’ central idea about the nature of the World Soul follows more or less directly from his most basic argument for its existence. As we saw above, the intelligibility of the visible cosmos – its conformity with the hypostasis of 10 In Tim. I 426.14–17, trans. Runia, D. and Share, M.: Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. II, Book 2. 11 Plat. Theol. I 14, 68.17–21, my translation. 12 See Baltzly, D.: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. III, Book 3, Part I, 2–6. 13 In Tim. III 184.24–9.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 295

Intellect – requires the existence of something that mediates the undivided, uniform and eternal Being of intellect to the Being of bodies that is divided, pluralized and temporally extended.14 The World Soul is that intermediary, in touch with both Intellect above and the visible cosmos below. Proclus is quite clear that this is the World Soul’s defining feature: The following is the defining feature of the World Soul – not that it is composed out of numbers (cf. Tim. 35b), nor that it is the result of such and such ratios (36b), nor that it is composed of circles (36c) of such and such a sort (for all these things and others are common characteristics of all souls, whether divine, daemonic or human) – rather [the defining feature of the World Soul] is that its essence (ousia) is an intermediary between the following extremes: the one cosmic Intellect and the entirety of the divisible Being that has come to be in the realm of bodies.15

The double-ringed ‘structure’ of the soul that the Demiurge creates in Plato’s famous description in Tim. 35b4–36d7 is not what is distinctive about the soul of the universe.16 This structure is common to all souls and doesn’t distinguish the World Soul from them. Nor does playing the role of mediator between some body or other and some specific Intellect distinguish the World Soul from the divine souls of specific stars and planets. All divine souls – both the World Soul and the souls of the stars and planets are connected to Intellect.17 Rather, the World Soul plays a specific intermediary role that is distinguished by the generality of the things between which it mediates. For the extreme terms [between which the World Soul stands as an intermediate] are the simple, indivisible Being and the simple divisible Being in the realm of bodies – not the being of some particular bodies, but rather the divisible Being that pertains to all body. For surely the soul of the Sun is an intermediary between some particular indivisible being and some particular divisible being – not between indivisible Being considered indefinitely – nor is it [an intermediary between some particular indivisible being and] divisible Being in the realm of bodies in general. Assuming this first as the defining feature of the Cosmic

14 In Tim. I 402.15. 15 In Tim. II 141.8–14, trans. Baltzly, D.: Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. IV, Book 3, Part I. 16 The word ‘structure’ appears in scare quotes of course since the soul is unextended and thus lacks a shape of the sort that is characteristic of objects extended in space. Literally speaking, it has no shape, but the shape that is symbolically ascribed to it conveys a great many insights according to the Neoplatonists. 17 Cf. Proclus, Elem. Theol., §§ 182–184. Proclus actually distinguishes between souls that are gods existing in the psychic mode because they participate in nous and souls that perpetually accompany the gods and participate in a nous that is merely intellectual. This complication need not concern us here, I think.

296 

 Dirk Baltzly

Soul, the dialogue then takes the remaining features as things that follow given a soul of this sort, i.e. number, harmony and form.18

So the metaphysical role of the World Soul is primary and this role (putatively) explains why the Demiurge composes it from numbers, ratios, and the circles of the Same and the Different. The role of the World Soul as an intermediary between indivisible Being in general and divisible Being in general also helps us to understand what has been the most popular aspect of Proclus’ reading of Plato’s psychogony. The text of Timaeus 35a1–8 has been regarded as problematic. [a1] τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως [αὖ πέρι] καὶ τῆς τοῦ [5] ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ.19 Most editors want to bracket αὖ πέρι in spite of the fact that all our manuscripts contain it since a) it seems hard to understand and b) is a likely candidate for diplography from line 1. This textual change invites an identification of Sameness and Difference with the Divisible and Indivisible kinds of Being introduced in the first clause. Now this would not be an obviously absurd thing for Plato to think, since the Indivisible kind of Being is associated with Forms. Forms are, of course, unchanging and always the same. Hence Indivisible Being could be regarded as more or less equivalent to Sameness. The Divisible Being is associated with bodies and these are always changing and hence to be identified with the Different. Of course this change to the text removes the mystery of one apparent repetition (αὖ πέρι) only by introducing another, for now ‘καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ’ seems redundant. What could it possibly add to what has just been said? Taylor, who accepted the emendation, had this answer to that question:

18 In Tim. II 142.2–9, trans. D. Baltzly. 19 Tim. 35a1–8 in the OCT text. a4 αὖ πέρι (περὶ) A F P Y Pr. Plut. Eus. Stob. : om. (bis) Sext. Emp., non vertit Cic. a5 ταυτὰ F: τὰ αὐτὰ Eus.: ταῦτα A P Y Stob.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 297

This seems a repetition of what had already been said three lines above, but has a point if the object of the clause is to remind us that the Same and the Different of 4–5 are identical with the Indivisible and Divisible of a 5–6.20

This understanding of the Demiurge’s psychogonic activity agrees with the general gist of Proclus’ early Platonist predecessors. In the interpretations given by Crantor, Alcinous, Atticus and Plutarch of Chaeronia, the central role in the mixing of the psychic ‘stuff’ is given to the divisible and indivisible forms of Being, with Sameness and Difference playing either a vague ancillary role related to the soul’s movement or explicitly being equated with the divisible and indivisible Being. In addition to making this equation Plutarch also associated the kind of Being that is divisible in the realm of bodies with a pre-existing irrational soul.21 This, of course, was obviously unacceptable to Proclus. His arguments against it, however, need to be accompanied by a positive account of what Plato was saying. Hence the need for a disambiguation of the difficult passage at Tim. 35a1–8. Proclus’ alternative is the reading that has, since Grube’s influential paper, become the standard one for us too.22 The words αὖ πέρι in line 4 indicate that the Demiurge now engages in the same mixing of divisible and indivisible kinds that he previously undertook in the case of Being but now with divisible and indivisible species of Sameness and Difference. The τρία that are subsequently combined are the Being, Sameness and Difference that result from the compounding of the divisible and indivisible kinds into an intermediate form. So soul is an intermediate between divisible and indivisible Being, as well as between divisible and indivisible Sameness, and finally a compound of divisible and indivisible Difference. No alternative that equates Sameness with the realm of the intelligible, changeless and indivisible or equates Difference with the realm of changing bodies is possible. The proponents of the equation mistake predominance for identity: For if they were to say just the following – that Sameness predominates in things intelligible and indivisible, while Difference predominates in sensible and divisible things – then they would speak correctly. But if they said this – that indivisible things are separate from Difference – then they will be unable to grant Sameness to these things either, for the One differs from the Same. Likewise, [if they were to say] that Sameness was separate from divisible things, they would destroy the Being of these things, for if Being is in all things, then Sameness will be in all things too.23

20 Taylor, A. E.: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, 108–109. 21 In Tim. II 153.25. 22 Grube, G. M. A.: ‘The Composition of the World Soul’, 80–82. 23 In Tim. II 156.1–8.

298 

 Dirk Baltzly

To suppose otherwise would be to ignore the Proclean axiom that all things are in all, but in each in a manner appropriate to that thing. Difference as much as Sameness is present in the intelligible order – albeit in a different way than the way in which Difference is present in other orders of being. It is easy to get lost in the scholastic air of much of this debate. But the important point is that Proclus treats the three genera in the soul as explanatory principles and argues to a reading of Plato’s text on that basis. If we confine Sameness to the realm of indivisible intelligibles and Difference to the realm of divisible bodies, then there are facts about each realm that cannot be explained. So there are really two motivating principles in Proclus’ philosophical methodology. The first is the most obvious and the most alien to our own methodology: the authority of Plato’s text (and that of the Chaldean Oracles, the Orphic texts and the inspired Homer with whom Plato is in agreement). In the present context, this comes out as the presupposition that whatever Plato means in the thorny passage at Tim. 35a1–8, it must be true. The only question is precisely what he means.24 The less obvious methodological principle is one that is perfectly familiar: the pattern of inference to the best explanation. In Proclus’ argument for the existence of the World Soul, we have a phenomenon that needs explaining – the fact that the visible cosmos conforms to the paradigms in intellect (at least to some degree). This conformity requires mediation by something that is akin to both the paradigm and the copy in certain important respects. Similarly here in Proclus’ account of the specific kind of intermediate nature that the soul has, we must disambiguate Plato’s text by reference to the explanatory power of Sameness and Difference. When we reflect on things that cry out for explanation – i.e. the fact that Being differs from Sameness – we can see that these explanatory principles cannot be confined to the realms of Being and Becoming. If they are present in both, then World Soul as mediator between them must contain appropriately intermediate forms of Sameness and Difference, as well as of Being. So the ambiguity of the authoritative text at Tim. 35a1–8 is resolved through the familiar method of inference to the best explanation. Above I quoted In Tim. II 142.2–9 where Proclus asserts that it is not the structure of the World Soul that distinguishes it from other encosmic souls, but rather the terms between which it stands as an intermediary. You might wonder how it is that the World Soul can play its particular mediating role, and other souls cannot, if they do not differ in any intrinsic way. To put the same point another way: if I tell you that what distinguishes relation R from relation R* is the kind of relata that each is capable of holding between, then you might wonder whether

24 Cf. Baltzly, D.: ‘Plato’s Authority’.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 299

the difference in the possible relata does not presuppose some intrinsic difference in the nature of the two relations. Proclus’ answer is that the intermediate is composed differently depending on which relata it binds: Now, if we were to inquire what it is that makes this one single idea, not any old soul, but rather the cosmic soul, and moreover how it is that these ingredients constitute souls other than the World Soul in other instances, then we will answer that it is a matter of the universal (holikos) character of the genera that were assumed (for the Being, Sameness and Difference within the soul are not intermediate species between any old extreme terms, but of the universal Intellect and the universal corporeal nature, through which the cosmos is a living thing – something endowed with mind in virtue of indivisible kind and ensouled in virtue of the intermediate kind). Now, the predominance of Being [makes it the soul of the world, and not any chance soul], for this makes the soul divine, just as the predominance of Sameness alone makes a soul daemonic, and the predominance of Difference alone makes it partial or particular. Therefore a difference with respect to the extreme terms also makes for a difference in the intermediate ones and the mixture of the intermediates that is defined by the predominance of one of the things that have been mixed evidently brings about changes in the whole.25

So while the structure26 – the existence of the portions corresponding to 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27; the ratios inserted between these numbers; the double circle ‘shape’; the opposite movement of the circles – of the various encosmic souls may be roughly the same, the ratios among the genera from which the psychic ousia is composed may differ between divine, daimonic and human souls. Thus Proclus not only provides a neat resolution of a puzzling text from Plato’s Timaeus, he utilises his solution to that puzzle in order to develop an account of psychic composition that can be extended to answer a question that perhaps did not occur to Plato himself.

4 Above and below In order to further understand what the World Soul does it will be helpful to distinguish it from the hypercosmic souls that are ontologically prior to it and the hypostasis Nature that comes after it. Soul is, indeed, the intermediary between cosmic Intellect and the divisible Being that comes to be in bodies, but the latter is not to be equated with bodies or matter – considered either individually or as a whole. Rather, Proclus equates the

25 In Tim. II 158.3–15. 26 The shared structure is also what makes the human being a microcosm of the living cosmic creature; cf. In Tim. I 5.11–17.

300 

 Dirk Baltzly

‘οὐσίας περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς’ of Tim. 35a with Nature or phusis. The Timaeus is, by Proclus’ lights, a work of physiologia. It is also a work in which the World Soul looms large. So right at the start he distinguishes the two. In doing so he illustrates further the crucial role of mediation and descent by degrees in his philosophy. And intelligent soul and nature are two different things, for nature is what belongs to bodies, deeply embedded in them and existing as something inseparable from them, whereas soul is separable and is rooted within itself, and belongs at the same time to itself and to another – being ‘another’s’ by the participation of others in it, and ‘its own’ by its not sliding into what participates, just as the father of the soul is only ‘his own’ by being unparticipated.27

Proclus goes on to spell out a descent from a principle of the cosmos that is ‘just itself’ to that which is ‘merely other’. I summarise this five-term series introduced at in Tim I. 11.1–2 and explained in lines 2–10 in the following table: ‘itself’

the intelligible and paradigmatic cause of all things to which the Demiurge looks in creating the cosmos; this is why Plato calls it the Autozôon or ‘Living-thing itself’

its own

the demiurgic mind that ‘remains within the character of its own according to its manner’ (Tim. 42e5-6)

its own and another’s

soul since it is both within itself and also gives the light of a secondary life to another

what belongs to another (only) nature that is inseparable from bodies the other

the whole sensible world, in which there is separation and division of every kind

Systematic though it is, in Proclus’ characteristic way, this leaves the nature of Nature a bit opaque. What is this thing that comes after Soul? My purpose here is not a lengthy exposition of Proclus’ theory of Nature.28 It will be sufficient for the purposes of this chapter that we see roughly what it is and why its function is not one that could be undertaken by the World Soul. Proclus’ conception of Nature resembles Aristotle’s by virtue of being an internal source of both stability and development. Unlike Soul, Nature is in bodies and not ‘in itself’. It is, moreover, a first principle of changes that are subject to rational understanding. Hence the proximate sources of the rest and stability 27 In Tim. I 10.24–31, trans. H. Tarrant. 28 For a more thorough study, see Martijn, M.: Proclus on Nature and Lernould, A.: Nature in Proclus, 68–102.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 301

that universal Nature coordinates can rightly be called logoi and it has become conventional to translate this Neoplatonic term of art as ‘rational-forming principles’. By virtue of possessing these logoi Nature ‘engenders and vivifies’ sensible things.29 Though it engenders and enlivens bodies, Proclus takes Plato’s account of Nature to be of something incorporeal. In spite of the fact that it is incorporeal, Universal Nature’s logoi are said to be in bodies as a kind of immanent cause. Although incorporeal and thus indivisible, a logos or enmattered form ‘sends forth from itself the enmattered power like an exhalation (pnoê) and this is a particular quality’30. The relation between the Universal Nature that bounds World Soul on its lower end and the plural natures of individual sensibles is described in the Platonic Theology: Universal Nature envelops in unity the reason-principles (logoi) of all things, celestial and sub-lunary, and distributes its own powers to natures which, from Nature, become particularized relative to bodies (περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριζομέναις).31

So it appears that World Soul is adjacent – metaphysically speaking – to Universal Nature, where the latter should be understood as the unitary source of the plural rational-forming principles that, in turn, engender and vivify individual sensible things. These individual natures or logoi themselves seem to have a dual nature. On the one hand, they too are incorporeal things, but they send forth enmattered powers that we can identify with, say, the heat of this particular fire. The interposition of Nature and its logoi between the World Soul and the world that it animates may seem odd to modern readers of Plato. After all, is it not characteristic of soul to be a self-moving origin of motion in other things? Surely this is the lesson of Phaedrus and Laws. Where does Plato sanction the idea of a Nature that is the proximate source of motion in bodies? Surely for a Platonist that should be the job of soul. Stephen Menn has already discussed the problem that Phaedrus 245c5, ff. poses for the Neoplatonists.32 Here Socrates seems to say that (1a) self-motion is characteristic of soul and further to this (1b) it is the source or origin of motion for other things. As a consequence of its self-motive nature, it is said that 2) ‘all soul is immortal’ (245c5). Now, Proclus (and Hermias) do not think that all soul is in fact immortal – only the rational parts of the soul are. Hence they narrow the range of motion under discussion in (1a). What Plato really means, they suppose, is the motion characteristic of rational souls – which is of course reversion or 29 In Tim. I 10.20. 30 In Tim. II 25.8–9. 31 Theol. Plat. III 2, 8.14–17. 32 Menn, S.: ‘Self-motion and reflection’.

302 

 Dirk Baltzly

epistrophê. A narrowing of the sense in which soul is a self-mover in (1a) brings about a corresponding narrowing of the scope of the word ‘all’ in (2): it is only rational souls that are immortal. I think that the role of Nature in mediating the World Soul’s life and motion to the sensible realm should be seen in this context too. The narrowing of the kind of motion that is proper to soul in (1a) opens up space for a subordinate and auxillary cause of the motions discussed in (1b). The World Soul does not directly bestow its characteristic motion upon the visible cosmos taken as a whole. After all, reversion is a single very special kind of non-extended quasi-motion that is imitated by the motion of a sphere on its axis.33 But when we focus upon the visible cosmos, we notice all kinds of motions and changes. So there must be some ‘principle of multiplication’ that falls between the one and the many. This principle of plurality is Nature. In short, Proclus distinguishes Nature from the World Soul because, having narrowed the range of motions for which soul can be an origin, something else must be posited as the source of those motions that are not images of the distinctively psychic motion of epistrophê. This something else must be like soul but distinct, and superior to passive matter. It is Nature. If Universal Nature is immediately ontologically posterior to the World Soul, what is immediately prior? One natural thought would be that prior to the World Soul must be the ‘cosmic intellect’. After all, Proclus himself says that the World Soul is distinguished by having an ousia that is intermediate between the cosmic intellect and the entirety of divisible being.34 Moreover, this accords with some of Proclus’ general remarks on the connection between Soul and Intellect. In his initial comments on Tim. 34b3–4 (where the Demiurge places the soul in the middle of the universe) Proclus writes: [H]e introduced the soul into the universe and filled all things with life (though different things have different kinds of life) and made intellect preside over soul itself. Because of this fact, soul is connected with its own source (for the World Soul is connected with the intelligibles by participating in intellect).35

This supposition, however, leaves another element in Proclus’ ontology out of the picture: hypercosmic souls. These are souls that are not the souls of any body. The World Soul, by virtue of being the soul of the cosmos, is related to a body. So it is not a hypercosmic soul. Moreover, given the priority of the unparticipated to the participated in Proclus’ metaphysics, it would seem inevitable that every

33 In Tim. II 92.10–95.12. 34 In Tim. II 141.11. 35 In Tim. II 103.14–19; cf. 105.13–15.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 303

hypercosmic soul is prior to any encosmic one. After all, every soul that is the soul of some body is participated in by that body. Thus it would seem that hypercosmic souls in general will be prior to the World Soul as well since it is the soul of some body. So it might appear that, just as Nature insulates the World Soul from the totality of corporeal nature below it, so too a hypercosmic soul is intermediate between World Soul and Nous. Proclus’ apparent endorsement of an immediate connection between intellect and the World Soul in passages like the one quoted immediately above might be only loose talk. The argument of the preceding paragraph may well have been what prompted Iamblichus to read parts of Plato’s Timaeus as introducing an additional hypercosmic soul prior to the World Soul (Tim. frs. 50 and 54, ed. Dillon). At least as Proclus presents his predecessors, Iamblichus was opposed in this interpretation by Porphyry who read the Timaeus’ psychogony as concerning only the World Soul. This is not to say that Porphyry rejected the idea of a hypercosmic soul entirely. He instead identified the Demiurge with a hypercosmic soul (In Tim. frs. 42 and 53, ed. Sodano). Proclus’ teacher, Syrianus, seems to have sided with Porphyry’s rejection of Iamblichus’ reading of Tim. 34b3–4 and 36b6–7, though he also rejected Porphyry’s view on the identity of the Demiurge. His reading of the World Soul is aptly described by Klitenic Wear as a ‘portmanteau view’ that attempts to combine what he regarded as important in the views of both his predecessors.36 On the one hand, the Timaeus does not discuss a hypercosmic soul. On this matter, Porphyry was right. On the other hand, Syrianus posited a ‘hypercosmic aspect’ (ti) for the World Soul through which it is connected to Intellect (In Tim. II 105.29–31 = Syrianus In Tim. fr. 13, ed. Klitenic Wear). Proclus endorses his teacher’s position explicitly in his commentary on Tim. 34b3–4 – the passage that serves as the first occasion for Iamblichus’ attribution to Plato of a two-soul theory. When he turns to Tim. 36b7–8, he seems to amplify Syrianus’ solution by introducing the idea that the World Soul is bi-formed (duoeidês). The two strips into which the Demiurge divides the single row of psychic ousia (Tim. 36b6–7) do not signify two distinct souls – one hypercosmic, the other encosmic – as Iamblichus supposed. Rather, in Plato’s text there is but one soul – the World Soul – and it is both a monad and a dyad. That is to say, it somehow unites in a single existence the apparently incompatible natures of the encosmic and the hypercosmic. [I]t is in this respect that the essence of the soul differs from intellectual essence: while the one is uni-form and antecedently comprehends all the forms in a monadic manner, the 36 Klitenic Wear, S.: ‘Syrianus’ Teaching on the Soul’.

304 

 Dirk Baltzly

other is dyadic and has the same logoi in the manner of discursive thought and opinion. They are present in the first mode in the circle of the Same, but in the other mode in the circle of the Different, for the soul is both a monad and a dyad.37

Proclus explains this miraculous combination of apparently incompatible features by reference to the role of the World Soul as intermediary between the intelligible and sensible realms. He recalls the argument of Tim. 31c2–32b4 in which the two intermediate elements of air and water are needed to establish a geometric proportion between the opposed elements of fire and earth. Because the elements are corporeal things, distinct from one another, it takes two distinct kinds of body – air and water – to bind them in a geometric proportion. But to bind the sensible realm to the incorporeal realm of intellect, we don’t need to distinct intermediate terms. One term with a dual nature will suffice. That single intermediary is the World Soul and it is able to unify the sensible and intelligible realms, making the former a visible image of the latter, by virtue of the fact that it is bi-formed.38 The nature of this argument for the unity of the bi-formed World Soul reinforces the argument of section 3: according to Proclus, the defining feature is its role as an intermediary and it is this metaphysical role that determines what we say about its nature. If the World Soul has a hypercosmic aspect, as Syrianus and Proclus suppose, then perhaps there is no need for us to suppose that it is itself the product of a distinct hypercosmic soul. After all, it can be connected to nous through its hypercosmic aspect. What need then is there to posit a hypercosmic soul over and above the World Soul with its hypercosmic aspect? This question takes us into the difficult issue of the demarcation between universal soul or the hypostasis of soul and the World Soul. Klitenic Wear supposes that Proclus’ teacher, Syrianus, conflated the World Soul with the hypostasis or universal soul.39 Proclus’ view on this matter is harder to fathom. He undoubtedly endorses Syrianus reading of Plato’s Timaeus against that of Iamblichus: there is no need to read Plato’s text in terms of a hypercosmic soul. But this does not mean that general metaphysical principles about procession do not demand that there should be such a thing. Elements of Theology proposition 164 speaks unambiguously of an unparticipated soul that is immediately above the cosmos. This unparticipated soul seems to be hypercosmic since Proclus infers that the gods that it participates must be hypercosmic too. It is hard to know whether this soul is the same as the World

37 In Tim. II 241.29–242.2. 38 In Tim. II 241.15–23. 39 Klitenic Wear, S.: ‘Syrianus’ Teaching on the Soul’, 182.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 305

Soul (or at least its hypercosmic aspect). In any case, Proclus uses the singular. Proposition 166 uses the plural, so it might appear that there are many hypercosmic souls – not just a single unparticipated monad of all souls. Such a reading is consistent with the idea that when Socrates begins to speak of the super-celestial place at Phdr. 247c3, he passes from the discussion of encosmic gods to hypercosmic ones.40 While proposition 164 deals with the relation between hypercosmic soul and gods, 166 concerns souls (both hypercosmic and encosmic) and intellects (whether participated or unparticipated). It would seem that hypercosmic souls mediate the participated intellects in which they share to encosmic souls. But there are also intellects – presumably participated ones? – that are encosmic and these would seem to need no mediation from hypercosmic souls. The picture is, to say the least, none too clear. I think it is not easy to bring clarity to the relation between unparticipated or hypercosmic soul and the World Soul in Proclus. Nonetheless, it may be that his Timaeus Commentary sheds some light on why the question of the relation between them is so vexed. At In Tim. II 289.29–290.6 Proclus considers a potential objection to the very idea of a hypercosmic soul that is intermediate between nous and the World Soul.41 The objection turns on the thinking activity of each. Nous thinks all things at once, while the World Soul thinks discursively and, moreover, thinks one thing at a time. A hypercosmic soul will have to somehow split the difference; discursively thinking many things at once. It may well be that this is something that can, in fact, be explained. I have suggested that Proclus might invoke his distinction between hypercosmic and encosmic time to explain the difference between the discursive activities of hypercosmic and encosmic souls.42 Regardless of the merits of this solution – a solution perhaps available to Proclus but not explicit in his text – the puzzles that he does explicitly raise about the discursive thought of hypercosmic souls helps to explain why this is a problematic stage in the procession from intellect to encosmic souls. It is the World Soul’s role, according to Proclus, to be an intermediary between intellect and the sensible. But intellect’s characteristic activity is non-discursive noêsis while soul seems linked to discursive dianoia. One approach is to grasp the nettle and refuse to posit an intermediary for the intermediary. This seems to be the position of Syrianus, if  indeed Klitenic Wear is right to infer that he conflated the hypostasis Soul with the World Soul. Another approach is to accept the World Soul’s mediation of nous to Nature itself requires a mediator between nous and World Soul.

40 Iamblichus, In Phdr. fr. 1 = Hermias, In Phdr. 10.7–8 (Lucarini / Moreschini). 41 See also In Tim. III 251.32–252.9 where the same objection is entertained again. 42 See Baltzly, D.: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. IV, 38–41.

306 

 Dirk Baltzly

This is perhaps the impetus behind Iamblichus’ hypercosmic soul. While Proclus’ position on the interpretation of the Timaeus seems to go with Syrianus,43 his general approach to problems in the metaphysics of procession is closer to the spirit of Iamblichus. Proclus seldom refuses the opportunity to multiply intermediate stages. The correct resolution of these competing loyalties in the case of the World Soul and hypercosmic souls remains unclear to me.

5 Conclusion Proclus’ conception of the World Soul’s nature is largely determined by its metaphysical role as a mediator between matter and nous. This conception, of course, is one that is easily found in Plato’s Timaeus and Proclus is deeply committed to the authoritative character of Plato’s writing.44 But there are also other conceptions of the primary metaphysical role of soul in Plato that might claim equal authority. In particular, the Phaedrus and the Laws – and to some extent the Timaeus too – recommend a conception of it as that which enlivens the material universe. For the reasons we have discussed, Proclus prioritises the mediating role for World Soul over the enlivening one. He allocates to Nature a large part of that metaphysical work. The other determinant of Proclus’ view of the World Soul is the general framework of the unparticipated monad, the participated, and the participant that he inherits from Iamblichus via Syrianus. For the reasons we have discussed, there is a lack of clarity about Proclus’ view on a hypercosmic soul prior to the World Soul. He clearly sides with Syrianus in thinking that Plato’s Timaeus does not discuss another hypercosmic soul, distinct from and prior to the World Soul. Yet Proclus’ ontology clearly includes hypercosmic souls. The exact relationship between these souls and the World Soul remains obscure – perhaps for reasons having to do with the nature of psychic versus noetic activity. In closing, let us step back for a moment and ask ourselves why any of this really matters. Is a detailed examination of Proclus’ view on the World Soul not an illustration of the saying, attributed to Harvard’s Burton Dreben, that ‘Philosophy is garbage, but the history of garbage is scholarship.’ At the start of this chapter I noted that Platonic idea of a World Soul that constitutes the universe as a single, living organism is not one that is obviously

43 In addition to In Tim. II 105.28–9 and 240.2–4, see also 251.31–2 and 255.1–2. 44 On the nature of Plato’s authority for the Neoplatonists, see Baltzly, D.: ‘Plato’s Authority’.

The World Soul in Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary 

 307

recommended by our experience of our surroundings. Return to our hypothetical bushwalk introduced in section 1 where I noted that the echidna and the gum tree strike us immediately as organisms and, moreover, as distinct organisms. Their surrounding environment – the dusty earth, the rocks, the clouds, and the entire universe containing them – does not strike us as alive, nor do we immediately jump to the conclusion that it is a single organism. Could our perceptions of these things be transformed so that the cosmic totality could strike us as unified and alive? Could we experience the presence of a World Soul with the same immediacy that we experience the life of the echidna? Or must the majority of the sensible remain a lifeless corpse for us? The entire corpus of Neoplatonic commentaries is exactly that – a corpse. Or more accurately (and perhaps less offensively) the commentaries we possess are textual-skeletal remains of communities of teaching and learning that aimed at the divinisation of all parties involved. The telos, according to the Platonists, was likeness to God and we are rendered godlike by becoming virtuous. But the various gradations of the virtues were correlated with progress through the Platonic dialogues. It seems that one was meant to acquire the virtues (and thus be rendered more divine) by reading Plato with the master of the school. Elsewhere I have hypothesized that this progress in virtue ought to be understood in terms of the acquistion of new metaphors to live by.45 The teaching and learning environment that we glimpse through its textual remains aimed at self-transformation that consisted in living ‘in and through’ the texts of Plato. Internalising a conceptual framework and semantic association derived from their reading of Plato, the Neoplatonists aspired to be in the world in a very different way from the way in which ordinary people are in the world – indeed, a more divine way, as they supposed. If indeed Proclus achieved the highest levels of the virtues, as his biographer Marinus asserted, perhaps his experience of this hypothetical bushwalk would be very different indeed. This suggestion raises the possibility of a very different kind of investigation of the Proclean texts than the one I have engaged in here. Here I have asked the staple questions of historians of philosophy: ‘What were Proclus’ views on the World Soul and how plausible were the justifications that he offered either explicitly or implicitly for those views?’ A different, and necessarily much more speculative question, would be ‘How would a 6th century person’s experience of life be changed by the practices of teaching and learning, as well as ritual, that we glimpse through his commentaries? How would the features of these texts, like repetition or the construction of patterns, symbolism, Platonic allusions and

45 See the introduction to Share, M. and Baltzly, D.: Hermias: On Plato Phaedrus.

308 

 Dirk Baltzly

so on, change the metaphors and pre-conceptions that shape his experience?’ Answering this question would involve not merely the standard tools of philosophy, but also those of rhetorical and literary studies. If – as I think – the study of philosophy still aims at transforming the philosopher’s way of being in the world, then perhaps posing this question might do more to make the study of the Neoplatonic commentaries relevant to contemporary concerns, even if the question is not one we are accustomed to ask.

References Baltes, Matthias: Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, vol. 1, Brill 1976. Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. III, Book 3, Part I: Proclus on the World’s Body, Cambridge 2007. Baltzly, Dirk: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. IV, Book 3, Part II: Proclus on the World Soul, Cambridge 2009. Baltzly, Dirk: ‘Plato’s Authority and the Formation of Textual Communities in Late Antiquity’, Classical Quarterly 64.2 (2014), 793–807. Grube, George. M. A.: ‘The Composition of the World Soul at Timaeus 35 A-B’, Classical Philology 27.1 (1932), 80–82. Klitenic Wear, Sarah: ‘Syrianus’ Teaching on the Soul’, in: Longo, Angela (ed.), Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive. Actes du colloque international, université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006, Naples, 2009, 177–200. Lernould, Alain: ‘Nature in Proclus: from irrational immanent principle to goddess’, in: Wilberding, James / Horn, Christoph (eds.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford 2012, 68–102. Martijn, Marije: Proclus on Nature: Philosophy of Nature and its Methods in Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Leiden 2008. Menn, Stephen: ‘Self-motion and reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the Harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the Soul’, in: Wilberding, James / Horn, Christoph (eds.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford 2012, 44–67. Reydams-Schils, Gretchen: Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato’s Timaeus, Turnhout 1999. Runia, David and Share, Michael: Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. II, Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation. Cambridge 2008. Schaffer, Jonathan: ‘Monism: The priority of the whole’, The Philosophical Review 119.1 (2010), 31–76. Share, Michael and Baltzly, Dirk: Hermias: On Plato Phaedrus 227A–245E, London 2018. Steel, Carlos: ‘Proclus’, in: Gerson, Lloyd P. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 630–653. Tarrant, Harold: Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Vol. I, Book 1: Proclus on the Socratic State and Atlantis, Cambridge 2007. Taylor, Alfred E.: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, Oxford 1928.

Marc-Antoine Gavray

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus In the wake of Proclus’ unforgiving cosmological demonstration, how could one deny the necessity of a World Soul?1 Had it not become self-evident? Subsequent Platonists evidently had not the slightest doubt, and for this reason, did little more than clarify certain details that the Lycian philosopher had left unresolved, without really challenging the validity of his teachings.2 Yet, with John Philoponus, we have notable exception to this orthodoxy. Rather than shore up the fringes of Proclus’ theory, Philoponus instead puts it to the test in order to grasp its scope, particularly the definition of soul that underlies it. Philoponus questions of the validity of reasoning by analogy: can one move from the World Soul to the particular soul? Should it not be the inverse? Should one not begin with particular experience, on later to determine its universality? But is the World Soul really so similar to our own? Do these two souls indeed have the same functions, the same composition, and the same nature? For instance, does the World Soul know in the same way as we do? What form of motion does it have? These are the questions raised by Philoponus, as he wonders what it means to be a soul, if one must take into account both the World Soul and the particular soul. It is thus these questions that I shall here investigate, drawing largely on two fundamental texts of Philoponus: the Commentary on the De anima and the treatise De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum.

1 E.g. Proclus, In Tim. II, 102.7–316.4. See also Dirk Batlzy’s paper in this volume. 2 In truth, my research on the subject of the World Soul in post-Procline Neoplatonism turned out to be unfruitful, not to say disappointing: references to this issue are rare, even in Simplicius’ Commentaries on the Physics and on De Caelo. The result is hardly different in the case of the Commentary on the De anima attributed to Simplicius, which remains almost silent on this issue or, at least, just paraphrases Aristotle’s argument without any further reference to Neoplatonic theory (In De anima 27.25–31.6, on 404b8–405a7; the Soul of the Universe does not even appear in In De anima 40.1–47.3, commenting on 406b25–407a22, where just such a soul is mentioned). Obviously, the influence of Proclus’ thought on the subject was so profound that any further development became pointless – unless the reason for this silence was simply a lack of interest. Note: I thank Simon Fortier for translating this text into English. All remaining mistakes are mine. I also thank Andrea Falcon and Stephen Menn for their precious suggestions during a seminar held in McGill University. Their contribution to this paper cannot be underestimated. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-014

310 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

1 Evolution or rupture? The thesis of K. Verrycken Before we look to the substance of Philoponus’ doctrine, we must examine the matter of its consistency, in so far as the question of a possible doctrinal evolution has been recently the subject of some debate among scholars. In a landmark article published in 1990, K. Verrycken suggested that the work and thought of John Philoponus could be divided into two distinct periods.3 In the first, which encompasses his exegetical texts, Philoponus appears as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle generally faithful to the thought of his master Ammonius. In the second period, however, he assumes the mantle of a Christian philosopher who, on many an occasion, denies his philosophical past. The suggested turning point is the year 529, which saw the publication not only of the imperial decree of Justinian proclaiming the closure of the School of Athens, but also of Philoponus’ treatise entitled De Aeternitate contra mundi Proclum. In an article published the following year, in 1991, K. Verrycken analyses Philoponus’ change of heart on questions of psychogony, i.e. of the soul and its genesis.4 He speaks of a ‘retraction’ of which one of the consequences was the disappearance of the concept of the World Soul from the later treatises. The thesis of K. Verrycken consists thus in the rejection of the idea of a doctrinal evolution in favour of a sudden rupture on the grounds that the Philoponine corpus bears no trace of a progressive doctrinal shift.5 There exists, however, an alternative to this reading of chronology of Philoponus, one which was developed by É. Évrard in 1953 before being recently brought to the fore by P. Golitsis.6 According to this hypothesis, one must indeed

3 Verrycken, K.: ‘The Development of Philoponus’ Thought’. 4 Verrycken, K.: ‘La Psychogonie platonicienne’. And more recently Verrycken, K.: ‘Philoponus’ Neoplatonic Interpretation’. 5 Verrycken has to admit this evolution, since he distinguishes in the second half of Philoponus’ life between two levels, the one related to the De aeternitate mundi, the other related to the De opificio mundi, because he sees the disappearance, between these two texts, of the World Soul. Why then does he talk about a rupture, instead of an evolution, as it is an on-going process? Verrycken rather talks of a later withdrawal ‘sous la contrainte de la logique meme de son nouveau système’ (Verrycken, K.: ‘La Psychogonie platonicienne’, 233). 6 Évrard, É.: ‘Les Convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon’. This thesis was recently taken anew in Golitsis, P.: Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon, 27–37; Golitsis, P.: ‘John Philoponus’ Commentary’, 402–403; Golitsis, P.: ‘Simplicius and Philoponus’, 433–434; and Golitsis, P.: ‘John Philoponus as an editor’, where he distances himself from Évrard in showing that the Commentary on the Meteorology must predate the Contra Proclum. Following his chronology, the Commentary on De anima (I–II) is to be considered as an early work (before 517), while the Contra Proclum belongs to Philoponus’ late production.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 311

speak of an evolution in Philoponus’ thought, as his corpus of exegetical works was begun before the decree of Justinian and continued to grow in its wake. I will opt here for this second thesis and will insist on the continuity of the Philoponus’ thought over the course of his oeuvre. Without hazarding to explain the absence of the theory of the World Soul from a late treatise such as the De opificio mundi (for justifying the absence of a given doctrine is always delicate, if not dangerous, work), I wish to show the continuity of Philoponus’ project, which culminates, in many ways, in a doctrinal continuity. The guiding theme of my argument will be the opposition that characterizes Philoponus and Proclus’ relationship. Although it is most apparent in the De aeternitate mundi, which, after all, is written contra Proclum, this opposition is already present in the Commentary on the De anima where, by means of an exegesis of Aristotle, Philoponus discusses and questions interpretations that may be traced ultimately back to Proclus. I do not propose, however, to offer a complete interpretation of the seventh question of the De aeternitate mundi, where the problem of the World Soul receives its most continuous treatment. I will instead concentrate on the main lines of the polemic that runs through this question and, in consequence, on the definition of the soul in general, but also on the manner in which it is carried on. The difference in focus of the two texts, the Commentary on the De anima and the De aeternitate mundi, is clear. Their respective reflections revolve, on the one hand, around the Timaeus and the question of the mathematical structure of the soul, and, on the other, around the Phaedrus and the problem of its definition of the soul. And if the coherence of the dialogues, which implies understanding why Plato offers different solutions to similar problems, is one of the fundamental philosophical issues in both contexts, the difference in perspective appears to be a major cause of this variation. To a great extent, the interpretation of the dialogue’s psychology, and more particularly its application to the World Soul, is the result of emphasis being placed either on the cognitive function of the soul (in the Timaeus), or on the kinetic or motive function (in the Phaedrus).7 Relatively speaking, the situation is analogous to that of contemporary interpretations of Plato’s political philosophy: according to the dialogue on which the emphasis is placed, be it the Republic, the Statesman, or the Laws, commentators tend to find in Plato either a totalitarian idealist, a political scientist, or a pragmatic legalist. We must at least concede that Philoponus was conscious of the impact of a difference of perspective.

7 In De anima 81.17–31.

312 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

2 An innovative commentator? Let us begin with the Commentary on the De anima, in which, while remaining faithful to Ammonius and his project of the harmonization of Plato and Aristotle, Philoponus does not limit himself to reproducing the psychology inherited from Proclus.8 This exegetical framework in fact offers him the occasion for original developments, which seem to stem from his sounding of the work of his predecessors. All the references to the World Soul concentrate on the same passage in Aristotle, which begins as follows: In the same way Timaeus gives a physical account of how the soul moves the body. For, by its own motion, it moves the body also through its connection with it.9

This lemma raises two difficulties for Philoponus. The first concerns the level at which the interpretation should be situated, which will determine these sense of the underlying content. The second concerns the scope of the World Soul and its relation to the particular soul.

2.1 The symbolic exposition of the structure of the soul The Timaeus develops its psychogony according to the symbolic method of the Pythagoreans. One must therefore search for the hidden sense, and not interpret the mathematical notions literally, which would be as foolish as comparing a poetic depiction with nature. It would be equally foolish to imagine Aristotle guilty of such an error, who, according to his usual habit, criticizes instead those interpretations based on only the apparent meaning in order to dissuade those interpreters incapable of grasping the sense of such symbols.10 On this point, Philoponus takes similar line to that of the commentary attributed to Simplicius

8 This commentary is regarded as a collection of notes taken during a course of Ammonius, who were rewritten by Philoponus with the addition of personal reflections, or criticisms (μετά τινων ἰδίων ἐπιστάσεων) – as the manuscripts say. 9 De anima I 3, 406b26–28: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα· τῷ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτό. See Timaeus 35a1–37c5. 10 In De anima 116.21–30. Philoponus paraphrases the psychogony in the previous lines (116.1–21).

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 313

and upholds the exegetical principles of the school of Ammonius.11 He thus partakes of a predetermined hermeneutical framework: the cosmological reading of a passage of the Timaeus in the midst of an Aristotelian treatise on psychology, which demands that the commentator determines the meaning of mathematical symbols and pushes beyond the absurdities that emerge from a literal reading. Philoponus cites five such absurdities:12 1. How to divide a straight line in two, if it is a length without extension? 2. How, once it had been divided into numbers, can the straight line be split or rolled into a circle? 3. How can it become into a circle? 4. How is the outer circle larger if the two straight lines are initially equal? 5. How can these circles stretch from the centre as far as the extremities? Philoponus responds to these questions with the following interpretation. The Soul of the Universe is intellective life, that which sets in motion two opposed geometric symbols: the line and the circle.13 Life is symbolised by the line as the procession and flow of that which gives (life) towards that which receives it. Its intellective dimension is itself represented by the circle, as intellective movement contracts in upon itself, departs from itself, and comes to a stop in itself, like a conversion and contemplation of oneself. In other words, the World Soul is at once a line and a circle, because through its productive activity it resembles the linearity of the gift of life, while through its cognitive activity it resembles the circularity of contemplative intellection (for it is by referring to the intelligible that it organises life, which is, for it, a form of self-knowledge). As a rational soul, it is distinguished by its movement, since irrational souls (be they nutritive, appetitive, or sensitive) have a linear motion according to which they move towards their desired object.14 While retaining an interpretation similar to

11 ‘Simplicius’, In De anima 28.12–20. However we find in ‘Simplicius’ nothing of what follows in Philoponus. 12 In De anima 117.14–24. 13 In De anima 117.30–118.6. In this chapter, the phrases ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή (the World Soul) and ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή (the Soul of the Whole or the Soul of the Universe) are considered equivalent. Philoponus makes no distinction and sometimes uses one after the other in a same context (e.g. in the seventh question of the De aeternitat mundi contra Proclum). Damascius and Simplicius use the same synonymy, preferring one instead of the other not because of a difference in nature, but of a difference of perspective. The World Soul is the soul considered in its unity and in relation with a (World) body, while the Soul of the Universe refers to its relations with its own parts (see Damascius, In Parmenidem II, 67.11–17 for the World Soul, and De Principiis III, 67.17–23 for the Soul of the Universe). 14 In De anima 124.29–125.31.

314 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

that of Proclus, Philoponus distinguishes himself by not making the processive structure explicit. The procession to which he refers is not the transmission of the life of the soul from superior entities, but only the linear causal chain that goes from producer to product.15 The explanation better preserves the parallel between the Soul of the Universe and the particular soul. As for the division of the straight line in two, it may be explained by the ambivalent nature of the Soul of the Universe, which exists midway between two extremes: the intelligibles on the one hand, characterised by their identity and their unity, and the natural lives on the other, which are disseminated into bodies and turned towards plurality, according to duality. As a rational soul, principle of knowledge, the World Soul is intellective and immovable, by essence separable from bodies in its activities and, in this way, oriented towards unity. As the providential and conversive principle of animation, it is bound to the body and, for this reason, it is on the side of plurality and duality.16 It is therefore a reality at once indivisible and divided, one and many, whence the recourse to a geometric absurdity. On this point, Philoponus takes up the standard Neoplatonic doctrine.17 Next, the division of the World Soul into numbers capable of diverse relations symbolises the soul’s ever harmonious movement, embodying identity. The same reasoning applies to our own soul, which must be able to harmonise its parts (ἐπιθυμία and θυμός) and, by its fundamentally harmonic nature, know the harmony behind the movement of the heavenly bodies.18 In this way Philoponus explains the structural analogy that allows the latter to arrive at (a knowledge of) the first – the Soul of the Universe having both the cognitive ability and the capacity to produce harmony, while our own can only recognize that harmony. Where the soul of all has productive and paradigmatic capabilities, ours has corresponding cognitive and representative powers (γνωστικάς τε καὶ εἰκονικάς), to the extent that they allow it to know the relationship of the movements of celestial bodies, their similarities, and their differences.19 The structural similarity

15 Cf. Proclus, In Timaeum II, 244.12–22; 245.15–17. 16 In De anima 118.6–20. 17 See Proclus, In Timaeum II, 196.19–197.14. 18 In De anima 118.28–38. In 118.20–28, Philoponus gives an account for the numerical relationships taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (lost) commentary, and he refers his reader to it for more details, Saffrey, H. D.: ‘ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ’, 79. However, unlike this latter, I take only these lines to be inspired by Alexander, since the reverse would be to consider that Alexander would try to save Plato from his geometric absurdities and would adopt the harmonising way of reading texts which characterises the late Neoplatonism. 19 In De anima 120.8–13; 123.7–12. It belongs to our soul to recognise what is harmonious.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 315

becomes evident through the exercise of their powers, even if it is fundamentally by these very powers that the two types of souls differ. Then comes the question of the circles, which extends the analogy. The outer circle symbolizes the anagogic powers (ἀναγωγοί) of the soul to ascend to the intelligible; the inner circle symbolizes its generative powers (γενεσιουργοί) oriented towards the world here below. Unsurprisingly, Philoponus associates these powers with the charioteer of the Phaedrus, associating the good horse with the circle of the Same, and the bad horse with that of the Other.20 In doing so, he further reduces the difference between the particular soul and the World Soul, in so far as the latter appears subject to the same conditions required to reconcile centripetal and centrifugal forces. And although he admits that, in the Timaeus, the circles have an astronomical significance, describing the nesting and movement of the stars,21 he reinforces the structural analogy between the particular soul and the World Soul, allowing to some extent that we should be able to move from the former to the latter. Not only are they composed of the same materials, but they also obey the same opposing constraints. This symbolic analysis not only allows, on the basis of an explanation of Aristotle, to unfold the composition and functions of the Soul of the Universe, but also to determine the correspondences between its nature and that of the particular soul. Ultimately, it is the relation to harmony, and not harmony itself, which distinguishes our soul from that of the Universe: our soul recognizes it, while the Soul of the Universe produces it.22

2.2 The extension of life and the limits of the World Soul In the list of five geometric absurdities, the last – on the extension of circles – symbolically means there is nothing in the heavens that does not participate in life and does not participate in the illumination proceeding from the Soul of the

20 In De anima 119.15–24. Phaedrus 246b. Verrycken, K: ‘La psychogonie platonicienne’, 224, thinks that the analogy only works for the particular soul. However, Philoponus never shows to extend the comparison he has made before between the Soul of the Universe and the particular Soul. He talks here of the ‘powers of the soul’, which are supposed to be the powers of every rational soul – be it particular soul or Soul of the Universe –, if we follow what he told us beforehand about the division. 21 In De anima 119.24–120.5. 22 If the parallel between the charioteer of the Phaedrus and the circles of the Timaeus can also be found in, e.g., Hermias, In Phaedrum 123.4–125.12 (Couvreur), explaining the relationship between the World Soul and the particular souls in terms of harmony seems to appear only in Philoponus’ Commentary (Hermias makes no reference to the World Soul in this context).

316 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

Universe, each according to its measure.23 From this point of view, even inanimate being (τὰ ἄψυχα) participates in some form of life in the sense that it has certain powers (warmth, cold, dryness, wetness, movement as does the stone of Magnesia). According to Philoponus, the Soul of the Universe is responsible, directly or indirectly, for all forms of activity in the world. Moreover, this symbolic explanation justifies why Plato has united the Soul of the Universe with the World Body, in a mixture that is neither a juxtaposition (παράθεσις) nor fusion (κρᾶσις), but an intertwining (διαπλοκή), in the manner of a rope, a form of mixture midway between the other two where each keeps its specificity, all while being intertwined with each other. The Soul of the Universe is therefore deeply intertwined with the whole of the World Body. It affects this body, yet its powers remain separate. In this context, the accent is on the link. In the Contra Proclum, Philoponus will focus instead on maintaining the separation in the mixture in order to underline the independence of the soul from the body. The two readings are, however, not incompatible. With regard to knowledge, the Soul of the Universe is no different from any other (cognitive) soul. It indeed also possesses discursive intellection (μεταβατική), which moves from one intelligible to another in a kind of revolution (περιφορά).24 Unlike our soul, however, its intellection is eternal, which does not mean that it knows the same intelligible permanently, nor that it would infinitely rediscover the same objects of knowledge. The eternity of its cognitive movement is a result of its circularity, in that at the end of its cycle, it returns to its starting point, an intelligible that it already knows. It is the result of its inability to grasp the intelligible in its entirety, as only the first intellect can. Knowledge of the Soul of the Universe does not differ from ours by its modality, but rather by its ability to focus indefinitely upon the intelligible, not in its entirety, but successively on each intelligible. This, at least, is the position that, according to Philoponus, Aristotle attributed to Plato.

2.3 The principles of the soul In another famous passage of the De anima, Aristotle affirms that, ‘in the same way, Plato in the Timaeus constitutes the soul from the elements’.25 Modern interpreters have understood this to be a reference to the constitution of the World

23 In De anima 120.19–33. 24 In De anima 132.26–133.7. 25 De anima I 2, 404b16–27.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 317

Soul (and the Platonic theory of numbers).26 One should recall, however, that Aristotle speaks here only of the soul in general (unless we count the evocation of ‘the animal itself’ immediately after), and that the ancient commentators did not specify anymore than him to what soul the passage is referring. However, as its purpose is to make Plato one amongst the partisans of an epistemology which holds that like is known by like, one would expect, given the context – as Empedocles was just discussed and Democritus will follow –, that the commentators would refer to the four elements according to which the Timaeus explains sensation.27 Instead, they mention the genera which are used by the Demiurge in order to initially create the World Soul, namely, Being, Same and Other.28 Philoponus goes even further than the commentary attributed to Simplicius, as he adds to the three genera of the Timaeus two more in order to arrive at the list of the Sophist: Plato, he says, on the basis of his own principles, from which he said everything exists, said on this very basis that soul exists as well, in order that, since it exists from the same principles, it recognises everything. So he said that the five genera were the principles of every being: the essence, the identity, the difference, the movement, and the rest.29

We must conceive of these genera as ‘diacosmic’, to paraphrase the commentary attributed to Simplicius, i.e. as genera constituent of beings, and not merely as logical genera, in the manner of the Peripatetics. The commentators all agree on this point. As for the extension of the list of genera by Philoponus, it serves two purposes. First, it reinforces the doctrinal coherence, explaining Plato by means of Plato so as to show the complementarity between two lists of genera from two different dialogues: from the Timaeus to the Sophist, Plato develops the same explanation of the genera’s presence in the world, although he sometimes envisions this presence from an epistemological perspective (in the Timaeus), and sometimes from an ontological perspective (in the Sophist). Furthermore, it shows that the soul partakes of the same nature as all beings, which is for it the necessary condition for all knowledge. We can see why, despite their careful harmonization of Plato and Aristotle, the ancient commentators, unlike their modern counterparts, felt no need to explicitly associate this passage with the World Soul. Why look to an intermediary being here in order to justify the twofold process of sensible and intelligible knowing, 26 Robin, L.: La théorie platonicienne, 485–491; Cherniss, H.: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato, 565–566; Brisson, L.: Le Même et l’Autre, 276–290; Bodéüs, R.: ‘Âme du monde’, 81–82; Gourinat, M.: ‘La Doctrine platonicienne’. 27 Plato, Timaeus 61c–68d. 28 See ‘Simplicius’, In De anima 27.25–28.4. 29 In De anima 74.32–75.1.

318 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

any more than the dissemination of the mathematical structure that makes it possible. Moreover, for Philoponus, τὸ αὐτοζῷον does not refer to the total living being whose soul is that of the world. According to him, Aristotle refers by this to only ‘the idea itself and the model of the living being’.30 Again, there is no more trace of the World Soul here than there is of the World Body.

3 The polemic over the definition of the World Soul: The Contra Proclum The opposition to Proclus is obviously more pronounced in the pamphlet De aeternitate mundi, a succession of eighteen essays in which Philoponus refutes the theses of Proclus on the eternity of the world. Regarding the World Soul, the seventh essay is of greatest interest, wherein Philoponus discusses the consequences of the relationship between the soul and the body of the world relative to their respective generation and corruption.

3.1 The argument of Proclus Philoponus presents the argument that he intends to refute as follows: If the soul of the universe is ungenerated and imperishable, the world too is ungenerated and imperishable. For the definition [of the soul of the universe], as of all soul, is ‘that which moves itself’; and everything which moves itself is a fount and source of movement. So if the soul of the universe is everlasting, the universe must always be being moved by it. For, despite always being a source of movement and being unable not to be a source of movement (for it is by its essence self-moved and therefore a source of movement), it would not be a source for movement should the universe either previously or subsequently not exist. But soul is, by virtue of this very self-movement, ungenerated and imperishable. Therefore the universe too is ungenerated and imperishable. [And] from this it is quite clear that all soul is in the first instance mounted upon everlasting body and moves it for ever and that whenever it is present in perishable bodies, it moves them through the agency of those [sc. the everlasting ones] which are for ever moved [directly] by it.31

The argument rests on the definition of the soul as self-moving, from which Proclus deduces that it is the motive principle of other things. The reasoning that

30 In De anima 77.6: αὐτὴ ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ζῴου καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα. 31 De aet. mund. 243.2–19, tr. M. Share.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 319

follows results from this deduction: if, by definition, the World Soul is a principle of motion and if by definition also, since it is self-moving, it is eternal, then what it is the principle of and what it provides the movement of the World Body to, must also be eternal, or it will be nothing principle, at least some portion of the time. The discussion revolves around three major issues: the definition of the soul and its extension, the nature of its activity, and its character as a principle. Throughout this refutation, Philoponus’ approach is characterized by a refusal to admit any argument from authority, whether it comes from Proclus or even from Plato himself, unless it has been proven valid by experience or by logical necessity.

3.2 Self-moving principle or principle of motion Philoponus is clear: since Proclus’ sophisms take their origin in the double affirmation of Plato according to which the soul is self-moving and a principle of motion, the first thing to do is to examine the veracity of this affirmation, in so far as an opinion alone, even if it be that of Plato, is insufficient as an argument – Philoponus thus takes up the precept of Aristotle amicus Plato […].32 The difficulty arises from the application of the definition of the soul drawn from the Phaedrus to the particular case of the World Soul. Philoponus concedes the thesis (συγχωρήσαντες), albeit with the intention of testing it by its own criteria and of focusing on the implications of the second part, i.e. on the idea of the World Soul as a principle of movement.33 His first demonstration examines whether to be a principle of motion exactly corresponds to the being (εἶναι) and the essence (οὐσία) of the soul, or, to put it otherwise, if being a principle of motion belongs to its definition or if it is a non-essential property of the soul. Plato’s affirmation is thus laid out in terms of logical necessity, and the consequences of each term of the alternative are carefully considered. Making the soul by essence a principle of motion, as Proclus has done, amounts to linking, if not subordinating, the soul to the body and thus denying it the possibility of a separate existence. If that is indeed its essence, it can not simply possess this property in potency. It must instead exercise it without interruption, otherwise its essence would not (always) be fully realized. In these 32 De aet. mund. 248.7–21 (13–15: ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ᾗ φησιν ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μαθητής, ὅσιον πανταχοῦ προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν); see Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096a16–17. Proclus’ thesis makes a logical mistake because it goes away from facts (ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων), instead of reasoning from what everyone admits (what is obvious) to what is ignored (non-evident). 33 Philoponus often talks of soul without specifying whether he means the World Soul.

320 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

circumstances, the soul would need the body to exist, and conversely, its own eternity would necessarily imply that of the body. Such a conclusion clearly contradicts the Platonic premise – that Proclus admits by principle, although at this stage of the examination it is not yet possible to determine if Philoponus does also – that the soul (including the World Soul) must be able to exist separately from the body it moves and, above all, that its being can in no way depend on the body. Between these two clearly inconsistent premises – the soul as the motive principle and the soul as a separate entity – one must therefore choose which belongs to the definition of the soul, the latter allowing for the soul to be the source movement only in potency and ensuring that this property is not part of its essence (or of its definition). However, as it retains them both, the thesis of Proclus appears logically inconsistent. Philoponus then attempts to show the inconsistency of the position of Proclus with regard to Platonic doctrine. In so far as it establishes a dependency between the soul and the body being moved, it degrades it to the level of the material life of the body (ἡ ἔνυλον τῶν σωμάτων ζωή) and, in turn, brings the World Soul to the level of the irrational soul, that soul which, although it can move itself – at least as far as Plato is concerned –, cannot exist outside the body it moves and animates.34 It also prohibits the soul having a separate activity, since its essence cannot remain absolutely separate from the body. Philoponus reasons once again in the Neoplatonic fashion so dear to Proclus: if the essence is a cause whose activity is an effect, the activity cannot be greater than the cause and, consequently, cannot exist separately from the latter. The proposal evidently supposes, as the Platonists would have it, the superiority of what is separate. However, Philoponus calls instead upon (philosophical) common sense: it would be wrong to deny that the soul has at least one separate activity (e.g. intellection) while considering at the same time that it may not be separated from the body.35 The reader inevitably thinks of Proclus’ Elements of Theology:36 Philoponus then attempts once more to hoist Proclus by his own petard. In his opinion, Proclus’ thesis appears inconsistent with his own Platonism whereas his own fits it perfectly: it seems ontologically superior to move oneself rather than to move another and, therefore, the second property can only be added in an accessory manner to the first since some realities are causes of motion without being the principles of their proper motion. Similarly, in order to preserve the intellectual essence of the soul, i.e. the

34 De aet. mund. 251.4–16. 35 Philoponus (De aet. mund. 251.16–252.9) invokes Aristotle too (cf. De anima I 3, 403a4–16). He will deal with the separation within intellection in the next paragraph (252.10–15). 36 Proclus, Elem. theol. prop. 7 and 75.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 321

activity it exercises independently of the body, one must deny that the essence of the body qua body can exist outside the soul, although the inverse is true. The third demonstration that Philoponus develops takes an exegetical turn. Throughout his writings, Proclus recognizes the distinction between the essence (what it is, ἡ οὐσία) and activity (what it does, ὅτι) of the soul. In his commentary on the Phaedrus, he admits that what constitutes the essence of the soul is its self-motion (ἡ αὐτοκινησία).37 Contemplation, recollection or animation of the body are, however, only activities which do not belong to its definition. Hence the superiority, according to him, of the demonstration of the Phaedrus over that of the Phaedo, as a demonstration from the soul’s essence proves superior to one from its sole activities. Proclus not only misunderstands Plato’s original doctrine, but he contradicts himself from one text to another, since he confuses here the essence and the activity of the soul by including in its essence one of its activities (i.e. the fact that it is a source of motion). Philoponus shows himself not only to be a better reader of Plato, but also better reader of Proclus himself. If, over the course of his demonstration, Philoponus appears intent only on testing the logical value of the Platonic thesis and its use by Proclus, the coherence of Plato’s texts nevertheless plays out in his favor. We need look only to the definition of the soul that gives the Phaedrus: All soul is immortal. For that which is always moving is immortal; and that which moves something else and is moved by something else, since it has a stopping of motion, has a stopping of life. Only that which moves itself, then, since it does not abandon itself, never ceases from moving, but this is also the source and principle of motion for whatever other things are moved. […] Now, since that which is moved by itself has been revealed as immortal, one will feel no sense of shame in saying that this very thing is the essence and definition of the soul (ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον). […] If this is indeed the case, that that which itself moves itself is nothing other than soul, soul would of necessity have no coming into being and be immortal.38

In defining the nature of the soul, Plato justifies its immortality by the fact that only that which is in itself the cause of its own movement can always be in motion. Plato’s entire demonstration consists in presenting the soul as a self-moving principle without beginning or end. It follows that only the soul can be the true principle of motion because it ensures its own continued existence in the world. Thus the distinction advanced by Philoponus – that between the definition and essence of the soul on the one hand, and its property on the other – seems justified by the

37 De aet. mund. 253.9–254.18. Philoponus quotes a passage from Proclus’ (lost) commentary on the Phaedrus. 38 Phaedrus 245c5–9, 245e2–4 and 245e6–246a2, tr. S. Scully, modified.

322 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

text of the Phaedrus: only immortality and self-motion are essential features of the soul, whereas the fact of moving something else is only the consequence at the origin of the demonstration. In addition, the opposition to Proclus over the definition of the soul becomes a way to reconcile – implicitly – the Phaedrus with Book X of the Laws, or at least to read the former as in agreement with the latter, where Plato defines the soul as ‘the movement capable of moving itself’.39 In this passage, Plato indeed removes from the definition of the soul the notion of principle to insist on movement, which supports the interpretation of Philoponus: before being principle of motion for that which depends on it, the soul is what moves itself, self-moving motion. Put otherwise, if Plato in the Phaedrus uses the term ἀρχή, it is primarily in reference to the soul itself and is meant to show the soul depends on nothing else rather than to highlight any role of as a producer of external effects: before moving anything else, the soul is its own principle. Proclus seems to overemphasize its status as an ἀρχή for others by considering this as part of its definition – of its nature and essence. There remains a point to clarify that Philoponus seems to leave open: does the definition of the soul in the Phaedrus apply to the World Soul as well? To put it another way, how do we arrive at a cosmological application of the particular definition of the Phaedrus, while avoiding the difficulty raised by Philoponus that is inherent to the position of the soul as a principle of motion? At no time does Philoponus deny them having the same definition, but he admits the continuity between the particular soul and the World Soul. Again, the text of Laws X justifies his reading, in so far as it is possible to interpret it in a cosmological manner. The soul is in fact described as the source of the movements of the world.40 However, since its definition is that of a movement that moves itself, the definition of the Phaedrus must a fortiori apply to the World Soul. Philoponus is therefore entitled to accept the Platonic postulate of a continuity of definition between the particular soul and the World Soul. Better still, the properties applied to the particular soul will be a fortiori applicable to the World Soul. Therefore, if there is something like a World Soul, in the same way as every other soul, it must be able to exist separately from the body, to carry on an activity separately from the body, and to exist independently of any body. In these circumstances, it must be conceived of as a soul before being conceived as ‘of the world’. The animating principle does not exist as a principle and depending on what it animates prior to existing in the own, mobile nature of movement: if it exists, the World Soul will be, before any subsequent movement, selfmoving.

39 Plato, Laws X, 896a1–2: τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν. 40 Laws X 897b–c.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 323

3.3 The activities of the World Soul Once it has been demonstrated that the essence and the activity of the soul are two different things, the question arises as to whether the soul can exercise one of its activities in a continuous and eternal way, given that being source of motion is, for it, the exercise of a power – or an activity. Philoponus reasons a fortiori, first concerning the powers themselves and their objects, then concerning the level of the soul to which these powers correspond.41 To prove that the lower activity of the soul, those activities that it exercises in its relationship to the body, can be eternally exercised, it is necessary to prove beforehand that its higher activities can be so as well. Philoponus distinguishes three levels according to an ever greater transcendence of the body, which therefore surpass all bodily activities: cognitive (αἱ γνωστικαὶ) and practical (αἱ πρακτικαί) activities, self-reflexive (or conversive) activities αἱ ἐπιστρεπτικαὶ), and finally the intellective activities that elevate the soul to the divine (αἱ νοερώτεραι καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀναγωγοί). Yet none of them is exercised continuously and eternally: the first two, cognitive and practical, assume the passage from one contrary to another – from ignorance to knowledge, from vice to virtue, and vice-versa – and therefore imply a process with clear ending. In the case of the final two categories, Philoponus once again invokes common sense:42 it is clear to all that the soul cannot remain permanently in a state of conversion and intellection of divine objects. If these superior, divine activities, despite their transcendence of the body, cannot be exercised eternally, then neither can the lower, bodily activities – and this to an analogous degree to the ontological gulf between the lower bodies from the higher realities. The conclusion appears identical with regard to the part of the soul concerned with these activities. If the rational activities of the soul cannot be exercised eternally, neither can its irrational activities. Indeed, for the soul, moving a body is a lower, unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν) activity, which does not contribute to the perfect realization of its essence. The soul, particular as well as that of the world, is characterized above all by its rational power, unlike the power to move bodies, which is an irrational power found in nature. It appears that the soul of the world, like every soul, is simply a soul before being the soul of a given body and that its first activities are those that concern itself alone in its intelligible nature, before the activities that put in relation to the body. It may therefore exist independently of the world. The World Soul is not a soul for the world. Rather, it is capable of fully realising itself in its proper psychic activities.

41 De aet. mund. 254.19–256.3 and 256.4–17. 42 De aet. mund. 255.14: παντὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν.

324 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

In this argument, Philoponus never distinguishes the World Soul from particular souls. Better still, he never invokes the World Soul as such, although it is around its motive activity that he constructs his refutation of Proclus. However, his conclusion should apply to the World Soul, given that it is the possibility of an eternal activity on its part that is the real object of his investigation. But the demonstration was carried out on the basis of human activities, knowledge, virtue and vice, etc. As a result, from the perspective of Philoponus, the World Soul should not be seen as a different kind of soul whose activities would be exercised in different manner, for example, in a more perfect manner than the psychic activities of man. The World Soul is simply a particular soul which has exactly the same capabilities as any particular soul, employing them in the same way and with the same limitations. It would seem that the soul, especially the World Soul, does not exercise any of its activities in a continuous and eternal way. Therefore it moves in an way that still has to be determined. The transition from ignorance to knowledge, from vice to virtue, is more like rectilinear motion. But is it the only possible movement of the soul? On closer examination,43 Philoponus refuses that any movement that the soul imparts to the body – whether generation and corruption, alteration, growth and decline, linear or circular movement – should be exercised eternally for abovementioned reasons.44 Unlike the soul, which does not need to exercise its activities in order to exist, the world body exists in time, for it could in no way be moved continuously and eternally. The World Soul can therefore exist eternally without this being the case for the World Body.

3.4 The World Soul as a principle The third and final question concerns the causal nature of the soul and its effects. Firstly, it is not because the soul has the property of being a principle of motion that the resulting motion is only the spontaneous consequence of its status as a principle. Philoponus thus expresses his opposition to the concept that he attributes to Proclus (and which is, in his opinion, absurd), that the soul’s function as motor is only a consequence of its status as a principle: it moves simply by being a principle of motion, without this action being the object of a decision

43 De aet. mund. 256.18–259.10. This analysis reminds of Aristotle, De an. I 3, 406a13–b5. 44 Regarding circular movement, Philoponus only refers to his (lost) treatise Contra Aristotle On  the Eternity of the World, without giving here any further arguments (see De aet. mund. 258.23–259.6).

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 325

on its part (ἀπροαιρέτως καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι).45 In the same way that the Sun is a source of light by its mere appearance or fire a source of heat by its mere presence, the rational soul would be involuntarily a source of life and motion for that to which it is linked.46 The thesis has the advantage of making the motor function of the soul permanent. Nevertheless, it reduces the soul’s organizing function to no more than an existence where all movement would already be determined without the soul exercising any genuine psychic activity, that is to say, intellectual or rational. Philoponus therefore undertakes a refutation based on empirical observation and that proceeds a fortiori from individual bodies to the Soul of the Universe. If the motor activity of the soul stemmed only from its nature as a principle, it would be constantly exerted on the living body to which the soul is attached. This body should therefore be in constant motion, because of the immortality and continuity of motion that characterizes the motor principle on which it depends. This, however, is contrary to observed reality, where we witness resting phases in the movement of bodies.47 (Philoponus reduced his refutation to the rectilinear motion, which he has just established as finite, with a beginning and an end, without considering the possibility of another continuous movement, such as breathing.)48 Such an alternation in bodily movement must therefore be explained by a decision on the part of the soul. Therefore, as soul itself, and more precisely as rational soul, the motor action of the World Soul is a fortiori the result of an impulse, or a decision (κατ’ ὄρεξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν): the Soul of the Universe decided to move the World (body) in the same way that every soul moves the body that depends on it. And it is by this decision that it differs from nature, whose principles of motion are immanent and irrational. The World Soul is the source of movement resulting from a deliberate act, whereas nature presides over involuntary and spontaneous movements, such as those of bodies towards their proper place or those from the logoi. Secondly, the motor action of the soul does not have to be permanent, but it can remain potential, because of the distinction between essence and property, between being self-moved and being a principle of movement. By virtue of its quality as a motor principle, moving another is for the soul a power that it exercises or not, as building is for the architect or teaching a student for the teacher.49 However, it can exist as a principle regardless of the actualisation of its power, 45 De aet. mund. 260.3–8. 46 De aet. mund. 269.9–18. 47 De aet. mund. 260.8–261.13. 48 De aet. mund. 258.11–22. Philoponus refers to Aristotle, Physics VIII 8, 262a12–263a3. 49 De aet. mund. 262.1–10.

326 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

which results from a decision, just as much as the correlate upon which it may exert its action. The World Soul as well, in and of itself, does not need to exercise its motor activity to exist. As an unbegotten and immortal principle, according to Plato, it does not even need the World Body which, in turn, is generated and perishable – while, conversely, no animated body can exist without a soul.50 Philoponus thus establishes the relationship between the psychic principle and its correlate as one of relative independence, which he expresses in terms of potentiality. Three aspects emerge from his refutation of Proclus. Firstly, as a principle, and because of his movements, the soul provides the body with the vital functions that distinguish it from an inanimate body (sensation, nutrition, reproduction, desire, and voluntary movement). These functions correspond to capacities and are, in this regard, forms of rest. Movement occurs with their activation. Therefore, if the soul is the principle and source of movement for the world, it is not that it directly moves the world, but that it gives it a capacity for movement that remains to be actualised.51 Secondly, the soul (of the world) is not the cause of bodily movements, but the cause of the order that occurs in bodily movements. There are in fact some bodily movements that are unrelated to rationality, such as vital faculties or the senses of which irrational animals also make use, sometimes even better than we do. The motor function of the rational soul is to order them, as in Phaedrus, as Philoponus points out, it is the horses that put the chariot in motion, whereas it is the role of the charioteer to direct and moderate them.52 Therefore, it is through the order that it imprints on the irrational faculties that the soul (of the world) is the cause of the movement of the body (of the world). Philoponus thus explains the organization of the world at the same time as the disturbances that occur, without, however, making them depend on the rational soul. Moreover, he does not contradict what he wrote while commenting on the De anima. Rather, he specifies what is meant by the illumination from the Soul of the Universe that passes through all things, giving them life. Thirdly, it is not the fact of moving but that of being a principle of movement that is involuntary for the soul – although this is not its essence (as the essence of the Sun or fire is one thing, while their illumination or heat is another). Therefore, it falls to him to foster the encounter between the active principle (the soul and its ordering

50 De aet. mund. 267.10–20. 51 De aet. mund. 263.24–264.28. Philoponus concludes that ‘self-movement is always potentially the source of movement, but not always actually’, which allows him, against Proclus but with Plato, to underline that, unlike soul, body is neither always moving, nor ungenerated and imperishable. 52 De aet. mund. 265.1–267.9. See Phaedrus 246a–d. Philoponus takes an obvious care to make sense of Plato’s text. Cf. 271.14–272.18.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 327

movement) and the passive principle (the body and its disorderly movement) so as to activate its motor capacity.53 In this section of the treatise Philoponus employs a hypothetical argument that seeks a proper interpretation of the Phaedrus, that is to say one that not only seeks to provide a coherent reading of the text but one that also accords with experience, unlike the interpretation of Proclus.54 However, beyond his opposition to Proclus over Plato’s doctrine, the core of this argument is the relation to the principle of order. The consequence of Philoponus’ position against Proclus is that the order of the world, that produced by the soul (of the world), does not need to be embodied (by the world) to exist, for, as an order, it is true for all eternity and there may even potentially, while the position of Proclus, which is reminiscent of that of the Megarics, assumes that a principle is only really a principle when it is the active principle of something. The World Soul, at least if there is something like this, remains the soul of the world, the source of this organization which we constantly experience, whether the world exists or not.55

3.5 Nature and movement of the World Soul In several demonstrations, we saw Philoponus reason a fortiori with reference to intellective activities of the soul. On what basis, however, does he found this mode of argumentation? Philoponus does not use the principle of procession common to the Neoplatonists.56 He instead employs a distinction based on the mode of activity:57 the rational soul, the category to which, as we have seen, the World Soul belongs, is at the level of intelligible substance (ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας τυγχάνουσα) and it is distinguished from the intellect only with regard to its relation to the body. It is intellect when it directly grasps objects and operates in a completely separate manner, in itself. It is soul when it animates and vivifies the body. In the first case, it is intellect in act; in the second, it is

53 De aet. mund. 269.4–271.13. 54 We find the phrase κἂν συγχωρηθείη κατὰ Πλάτωνα (261.28–29). See also 264.26–27. 55 The remainder of the seventh question has no direct connection with our purpose here. Philoponus leaves soul aside and refutes Proclus’ hypothesis of an eternal body capable of being eternally moved. 56 De aet. mund. 195.13–196.4. For the place of the Soul of the Universe within procession after Proclus, see Damascius, De Principiis I, 59.15–18. 57 In In Cat. 327.35–328.3, Simplicius gives a list of actions resulting only from being (illumination for the Sun), from thinking (for the Intellect of the world) or from reasoning (for the Soul of the Universe), without saying anything more about the difference between the latter two.

328 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

intellect in potency. Philoponus does not speak about a descent of the soul, nor of an undescended part of the soul. He speaks of the intellect and the soul as a single being which differs depending on the type of relationship it assumes, on the basis of whether it refers to itself or to something else, as an individual can be at the same time a man and a pilot, on the basis of whether he is considered in himself or in relation to the boat. Accordingly, given that the soul is fundamentally intellect, Philoponus is justified in reasoning a fortiori on the basis of the activities that are truly its own. Such an explanation allows him to justify why Plato introduced a psychogony in the Timaeus while, according to the Phaedrus, he claims that the soul is uncreated and indestructible, all while separating the questions on the generation of the Soul and of the World Body.58 Philoponus has recourse to two readings, one hypothetical (ἐν ὑποθέσει), and the other symbolic (τὸν συμβολικὸν τρόπον). First, Philoponus takes up the argument of his opponents (Porphyry, Taurus, and Proclus) in order to refute it. The last of these thinkers indeed concludes from the hypothetical nature of the psychogony that the cosmogony must be equally hypothetical. Yet, for Philoponus, if the Timaeus assumes a birth of the soul, it is in the sense that it is there being considered in its intellectual nature and not according to its relationship with the body. The soul becomes soul, or more accurately the intellect / soul is born as a soul in the moment that it comes into relation with the body, which it orders and moves.59 However, unlike this latter entity, the soul is not born in an absolute sense; it only takes on a form different from its own. Secondly, one must not take literally the idea that the soul transmits a motion to the heavenly bodies, in so far as it is incorporeal and therefore unable to move according to local movements of bodies.60 This symbolic, enigmatic mode, is a way for Plato to explain how what exists in the copies, i.e. bodies, exists first and foremost in causes considered as paradigms: the movement exists in the soul, the movement of the Same, before it occurs in the heavenly body it animates and that move circularly, remaining in the Same. In this sense, the psychogony is pure animation. Once again, the opposition is part of an exegetical framework, motivated by an argument of Proclus, and the result is largely in agreement with the arguments encountered earlier. The differences are from the fact that the interpretation no longer is anchored in the criticism of Aristotle but seeks to refute the reading of Proclus. 58 De aet. mund. 243.9–16. Philoponus’ psychogony has been studied in Verrycken, K.: ‘La Psychogonie platonicienne’ and Verrycken, K.: ‘Philoponus’ Neoplatonic Interpretation’. 59 De aet. mund. 196.4–19. Thus soul is the principle of order for the world, and it is produced, as a soul, by God (179.22–180.10). 60 De aet. mund. 196.19–198.2 and 487.20–489.2.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 329

4 Conclusion Regarding Plato, Philoponus appears to be a more careful reader than Proclus. The double error of the latter is to have neither sufficiently confronted his interpretation with the sensible experience, nor to have sought the real coherence between the dialogues. Philoponus meanwhile manages not only to clarify Plato via Plato by showing the agreement between the dialogues, but also satisfies the demands of logic and of sensible experience. What may be deduced about to the position of Philoponus on the World Soul? In both of the works that we examined, he offers demonstrations that are in perfect agreement with Plato’s doctrine. It seems that two options may be envisaged: either Philoponus behaves from beginning to end as a Platonist, or, on the contrary, he simply adopts the vocabulary and theory of his interlocutors in order to discuss their arguments in their own terms. In so far as Philoponus often remains in the hypothetical or concedes an argument in order to test its validity, the second option seems the more plausible. The question for Philoponus is therefore not so much whether the World Soul exists or not, as whether the arguments of his interlocutors are empirically sound and logical consistent or not. In other words, if Philoponus speaks of the World Soul, it is never of his own initiative, but always to explain or refute the position of the author upon whom he is commenting, whether it be Aristotle or Proclus. And it is no surprise, as a World Soul seems to be of no use in a Christian (even Platonic) system of thought. However, Philoponus’ situation is similar to that of his contemporary Simplicius, who discusses this notion only because it is found in the passage upon which he is commenting.61 Conversely, when the discussion is purely personal initiative, the notion disappears – as is also the case with Simplicius who, for instance, over the course of a cosmological digression which examine all of procession from the first principle downwards, indeed speaks of the self-moved, but without mentioning the World Soul.62 For these reasons, it seems premature to conclude, concerning the gradual disappearance of the concept in the Philoponus later treatises, that there is a radical break in his thought to which his works bear witness. There is certainly an evolution in his thought, but one which seems greater than simply personal development, given that it also found in the texts of his contemporaries. In some ways, the World 61 Simplicius, In De caelo 377.35–378.10 (objecting against Alexander of Aphrodisias); In Cat. 327.35–328.4 (paraphrasing Iamblichus); In Phys. 615.33–35 (paraphrasing Porphyry’s interpretation of a passage taken from the Republic). The only exception is In Ench. 100.26–30. On this last text and the relationship between soul and self-movement in Simplicius, see Hadot, I.: Le Problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin, 167–181. 62 Simplicius, In De caelo 94.1–8.

330 

 Marc-Antoine Gavray

Soul appears as a vestigial doctrine that periodically resurfaces in specific contexts, where the lexicon is borrowed from an earlier interpreter of the doctrine of Plato, and for which it is possible to find a logical coherence. But this doctrine is no longer part of the conceptual framework by which the sixth-century Platonist explain the world. The question of reasoning by analogy also ceases to be a problem, provided that it is consistent with experience, in so far as the World Soul is (at best) a soul at work in only a particular case.

References Bodéüs, Richard: ‘Âme du monde ou corps céleste ? Une interrogation d’Aristote’, in: Gilbert Romeyer-Dherbey (ed.), Corps et Âme. Sur le De Anima d’Aristote, Paris 1996, 81–88. Brisson, Luc: Le Même et l’Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon. Un commentaire systématique du Timée de Platon, Sankt Augustin 1983. Cherniss, Harold: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Ancient Academy, New York 1944. Évrard, É.: ‘Les Convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux Météorologiques’, Bulletin de l’Académie Royale de Belgique 39 (1953), 299–357. Évrard, É.: L’École d’Olympiodore et la composition du Commentaire à la Physique de Jean Philopon, Liège 1953. [unpublished] Golitsis, Pantelis: Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote, Berlin – New York 2008. Golitsis, Pantelis: ‘John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Third Book of Aristotle’s De Anima, Wrongly Attributed to Stephanus’, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Re-Interpreted, New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, London – Oxford 2016, 393–412. Golitsis, Pantelis: ‘Simplicius and Philoponus on the Authority of Aristotle’, in: Andrea Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden – Boston 2016, 419–436. Golitsis, Pantelis: ‘μετά τινων ἰδίων ἐπιστάσεων: John Philoponus as an editor of Ammonius’ lectures’, in: Katerina Ierodiakonou / Pantelis Golitsis (eds.), Aristotle and His Commentators: Studies in Memory of Paraskevi Kotzia, Berlin – Boston 2019, 167–194. Gourinat, Michel: ‘La Doctrine platonicienne de l’âme du monde d’après le De Anima d’Aristote (I, 2, 404b16-27)’, in: Gilbert Romeyer-Dherbey (ed.), Corps et Âme. Sur le De Anima d’Aristote, Paris 1996, 89–105. Haas, Frans A.J. de: John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter, Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition, Leiden – New York – Köln 1997. Hadot, Iseltraut: Le Problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978. Judson, Lindsay: ‘God or Nature? Philoponus on Generability and Perishability’, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London 2010, 221–237. Robin, Léon: La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d’après Aristote: Étude historique et critique. Paris 1908. Saffrey, Henry Dominique: ‘ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ. Une inscription légendaire’, Revue des Études Grecques, 81 (1968), 67–87.

From the particular soul to the World Soul: Some puzzles in Philoponus 

 331

Share, Michal: Philoponus, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 6–8, translated by Michael Share, London – New York 2005. Verrycken, Konrad: ‘The Development of Philoponus’ Thought and its Chronology’, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, Ithaca 1990, 231–274. Verrycken, Konrad: ‘Philoponus’ Neoplatonic Interpretation of Aristotle’s Psychology’, Apeiron, 48.4 (2015), 502–520. Verrycken, Konrad: ‘La Psychogonie platonicienne dans l’oeuvre de Philopon’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 75 (1991), 211–234. Wildberg, Christian: John Philoponus’ Criticism of Aristotle’s Theory of Aether, Berlin – New York 1988. Wildberg, Christian: ‘Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus’ Contra Aristotelem’, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London 2010, 239–250.

Part V: Nachleben

Johannes Zachhuber

World Soul and celestial heat. Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in the history of natural philosophy While the longevity of the notion of a World Soul is recognised by scholars of the history of philosophy, the various transformations it underwent in the course of this history are still often neglected.1 The idea of a World Soul has its historical origin or, at least, its classical point of reference in Plato. The vast majority of later references can be traced back, directly or indirectly, to the famous passage in the Timaeus 34a–37c in which the demiurge as part of his creation of the world forms a soul for it as well.2 In subsequent development, however, this idea was variously adapted. It was aligned to similar, or seemingly similar, concepts; it was influenced or even contaminated by theories from more or less incompatible rival philosophies. In order to understand its continuing use and attractiveness over the centuries, therefore, it is not enough merely to consider its Platonic origin, but its historical transmissions and transformations have to be taken into account as well. The following attempt to reconstruct one chapter in the complex history of this idea starts from this premise. I intend to show how specifically the interference of the Platonic notion of a World Soul with an element of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature became influential for philosophical and proto-scientific conceptions about the nature, the origin, and the evolution of life from the 16th to the 18th century. I shall begin my account of this narrative at its historical end-point – in the late 18th century with its renewed interest in the World Soul (1). In a second step, the intellectual constellation encountered in those debates is traced back to a much earlier conflation of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas (2). The resulting notion of World Soul is then considered in its impact on Renaissance and Early Modern thought (3). I end with a brief conclusion (4).

1 The present article is a revised and translated version of ‘Weltseele und Himmelswärme. Zur Diskussion um den Ursprung des Lebens in der Neuzeit’, in: I. Hübner / K. Laudien / J. Zachhuber (eds.): Lebenstechnologie und Selbstverständnis, 113–130. It has previously appeared in Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 57 (2012), 13–31. 2 An overview of this history is given in Zachhuber, J.: ‘Weltseele’. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-015

336 

 Johannes Zachhuber

1 Salomon Maimon and the renewed interest in the World Soul at the end of the 18th century On 15 May 1790, Salomon Maimon (1753–1800) wrote a letter from Berlin, where he was staying at the time, to Immanuel Kant. Born in Poznan into a Jewish family and brought up with Hebrew, which throughout his life felt more familiar to him than German, Maimon had been schooled in the Kabala and influenced specifically by the medieval theologian and philosopher Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon, 1138–1204). Upon his arrival in Berlin, this background made him a fascinating outsider amongst the enlightened and educated public of that city. His critical response to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had drawn from the celebrated Königsberg philosopher the most enthusiastic praise that ‘not only has none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Herr Maymon does but also very few men possess so much acumen for such deep investigations as he.’3 In his letter, Maimon confirms with gratitude the receipt of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. With apparent understatement, he writes that he has not yet had time to read the book or indeed reflect with care on its contents. One particular idea that has been stimulated by its perusal, however, seems so important to him that he wishes to share it immediately with his famous colleague: The approbation you bestow on Privy Councilor Blumenbach4 induced me to read his excellent little essay and called up an idea in me which, though not new, may seem quite paradoxical, viz., the idea of the World Soul and of how its reality might be determined. I venture to submit my thoughts on this for your examination.5

This Maimon does in the following part of the letter: The World Soul is a power inherent in matter in general (the material of all real objects), a power that affects matter in general in different ways according to the various ways that matter is modified. It is the ground of the particular sort of matter (even in unorganised matter), the ground of the organisation in every organised body, the ground of the life in an animal, of the understanding and reason in human beings, etc.; in short, the World Soul confers forms on all things according to the constitution of their matter, in such a way that it adapts matter, enabling it to change from a single form, to take on other forms, forms of a higher order. And since matter can undergo unlimited modification, so this entelechy too can supply an unlimited variety of forms. It is thus the ground of all possible agency. I fail to see what might have caused the newer philosophers to repudiate this view entirely.6

3 Kant, I.: Briefwechsel, 49,12–15, ET: Correspondence, 311–312. 4 Cf. Kant, I.: Kritik der Urteilskraft § 81, 424,19–22. 5 Kant, I.: Briefwechsel, 174,12–18, ET: Correspondence, 351. 6 Kant, I.: Briefwechsel, 174,22–35, ET: Correspondence, 352 (with changes).

World Soul and celestial heat 

 337

A number of observations can be made at once on the basis of these lines: 1. Let us first consider the project Maimon proposes to Kant. It is not so surprising considering the latter’s appropriation of teleology in his third Critique. The concept developed in this writing of the world as an organic whole does indeed suggest the existence of a principle corresponding to this structure.7 Characteristically, Kant recognised the legitimacy of the question but exercised the kind of restraint towards it that was so typical for his general attitude to more ‘speculative’ ideas. Still, Maimon’s proposal is more than yet another variant of early Idealist attempts to ‘develop further’ Kant’s critical philosophy. For he rightly perceives that Kant’s critical philosophy opens up the opportunity for a new philosophy of nature precisely by excluding the identification of the principle of the world’s teleological unity with God. This is where, for him, the potential of the World Soul rests, and for this reason the charge of pantheism against this theory, according to him, is void too: According to Spinozism, God and the world are one and the same substance. But it follows from the explanation I have given that the World Soul is a substance created by God. God is represented as pure intelligence, outside the world [intelligentia pura extramundana]. This World Soul, by contrast, is indeed represented as an intelligence but as one that is essentially connected to a body (the world), consequently as limited and as subordinate to the laws of nature. 8

2.

The explanatory value of the World Soul, then, consists in its representation of the quasi-organic unity of the cosmos as its teleological principle (‘its entelechy’). In his most extensive treatment of the same topic, Maimon explains that it has to be ‘one and the same power […] uniting in its agency ends (Zwecke) and the [mechanical] laws of nature’.9 This universal character of its function means that one and the same principle, precisely the World Soul, governs inanimate being as well as vegetative and animal life. Even for human cognition, the World Soul is foundational as all individual souls are ‘various emanations of one and the same source, the universal World Soul’.10 Maimon considered the topic of the World Soul unduly neglected. In this, he clearly referred to the widespread rejection of the notion throughout the 18th century.11 In 1754, the Orientalist Herman Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768),

7 Cf. here and in the following: Düsing, K.: Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 172 and 197–205. 8 Kant, I.: Briefwechsel, 175,3–9, ET: Correspondence, 352. 9 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 194 (= Id., Gesammelte Werke, ed. V. Verra, Hildesheim 1970, vol. 3, 203–232). Here and in the following I use the pagination of the original edition. 10 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 191. The epistemological function of the World Soul, which is crucial for Maimon, I shall leave aside. Cf. however n. 49 below. 11 Cf. for this background now the very full account in Vassányi, M.: Anima Mundi.

338 

 Johannes Zachhuber

most famous for his radical contribution to early biblical criticism published posthumously by G.E. Lessing, scathingly dismissed the idea as ‘an empty tone and a mere refuge of our ignorance’: ‘It does not explain anything and is – like other, similar inventions – […] a hidden quality (qualitas occulta).’12 Reimarus’ statement neatly represents the broad consensus of a time strongly influenced by Locke and Leibniz, both of whom, in spite of their many disagreements, had discarded this theory tout court.13 Yet at the time of Maimon’s writing, change was in the air. In his celebrated (and to some, notorious) conversation with Jacobi, whose publication in 1785 caused in Goethe’s phrase ‘an explosion’,14 Lessing had allegedly said he could only think of God as ‘the soul of the all’15. In subsequent years, Herder positioned himself along similar lines;16 Kant’s development in the third Critique, as Maimon rightly saw, moved in a similar direction even though the term ‘World Soul’ was used regularly only in his Opus Postumum.17 Maimon’s own publications, two major articles developing the plan enunciated in his letter to Kant,18 kickstarted the renewed reception of the concept, and with Schelling’s writing On the World Soul (Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus) in 1798 the topic finally was firmly established on the intellectual agenda. Maimon’s interest, then, is representative for a broader development at the time. Yet he does not seem to share the emotional exuberance of early romantic and Idealistic fascination with this topic; for him, much more soberly, the theory of the World Soul is of potentially ‘great value for the enlargement of our understanding of nature.’19

12 Reimarus, H. S.: Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, 124 (= 31766, 138). Qualitas occulta was a popular term of abuse during the age of enlightenment. The more clear-sighted recognised that their complete purge would destroy scientific explanation altogether. Cf. Voltaire, Élémens de la philosophie de Newton, 130–131: ‘Si l’on entend par ce mot un principe réel dont on ne peut rendre raison, tout l’univers est dans ce cas. Nous ne savons ni comment il y a du mouvement, ni comment il se communique, ni comment les corps sont élastiques, ni comment nous pensons, ni comment nous vivons, ni comment ni pouquoi quelque chose existe; tout est qualité occulte.’ 13 Locke, J.: An essay concerning human understanding III, 403. Leibniz, G. W.: Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain III, 343,28–29. 14 Goethe, J. W.: Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, 313,4. 15 Jacobi, F. H.: Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, 75 f. 16 Herder, J. G.: Gott, 526 f. 17 Düsing, K.: Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, 172–205. 18 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’ and id., ‘Ueber die Weltseele’, 47–92. 19 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 208.

World Soul and celestial heat 

3.

 339

Given that this is his explicit concern, Maimon’s brief allusion to his source of inspiration, mediated through Kant’s Critique of Judgment, deserves attention. It is Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), to whose work Maimon claims to have been directed by his supposedly preliminary reading of Kant’s book. Blumenbach was a major naturalist of his time, whose studies in anthropology were widely appreciated; but it is with his work on Bildungstrieb (nisus formativus, ‘formative impulse’) that he contributed to contemporary debates on the nature and the origins of life.20 Closer scrutiny reveals that Maimon’s reference to Blumenbach’s work in his letter to Kant is by no means the mere product of politeness or flattery. In his essays on the World Soul, Maimon draws heavily on Blumenbach; in fact, their sections on natural philosophy are largely extracted from Der Bildungstrieb. What, then, connects Blumenbach’s work with the theory of the World Soul? Why would Maimon’s reading of Der Bildungstrieb induce him to renew this kind of philosophical speculation? In fact, there is, at first sight, no indication that Blumenbach himself had any interest in this notion. He refers, in a note, to the 1782 Latin dissertation of a certain Adam Michael Birkholz (1746–1818) who, in his later life, became a noted alchemist and who had drawn a parallel between Blumenbach’s scientific work and the Platonic tradition of natural philosophy.21 Blumenbach, however, did not take this as a compliment, but remarks with evident sarcasm: Since more recently critical acumen has been able to find animal response to stimuli prefigured in Homer and Harvey’s blood circulation described in the book of Ecclesiastes, it would be altogether bad if not the whole [theory of] nisus formativus [sc. formative impulse] could with some effort be extracted from all the works about generation that have been written over the past 2000 years and which, taken together, have by now grown into a not inconsiderable library.22

His proper concern is the controversy in natural philosophy between the theories of epigenesis and evolution. The latter does not, of course, refer to Darwin’s later theory; Blumenbach describes this view as follows:

20 For a full account of his life cf. Schmidt, O.: ‘Blumenbach, Joh. Friedrich’. For an informed summary of his theory of Bildungstrieb see further: Lenoir, T.: The Strategy of Life, ch. 1; Richards, R. J.: The Romantic Conception of Life, 216–222. More recently, Blumenbach has also been considered in the context of the early history of the concept of race. For this cf. Eigen S. / Larrimore, M. J.: The German Invention of Race. 21 Birkholz, A. M.: Disputatio de respiratione eiusque fine summo atque ultimo, Leipzig 1782, § 5, p. 15. 22 Blumenbach, J. F.: Über den Bildungstrieb, 35 f.

340 

 Johannes Zachhuber

[This theory rejects] all actual generation in the world and [believes] instead that the seeds for all human beings, animals and plants that have ever lived and will ever live were made in the first creation so that now one generation after another can merely evolve. This is why it is called the theory of evolution.23

The theory of epigenesis, on the other hand, assumes that […] the parents’ mature but otherwise raw and unformed generative matter when, at the right time and under the necessary conditions, it has reached its place of destination, is then successively formed into the [new] creature.24

The discovery of sperm cells in 1677 had seemingly yielded the upper hand to the theory of evolution, but it is Blumenbach’s intention to redress the balance by offering a stinging critique of the latter; it is this argument which Kant cited with approval in his Critique of Judgment.25 His own experiments, Blumenbach claims, have lent support to the epigenetic hypothesis: No preformed seeds pre-exist; but in the generative matter of organised bodies, which was previously raw and unformed, there arises, once it has reached maturity and its place of destination, a special impulse (Trieb) that continues throughout their lives and causes them to take on their specific form, to retain it throughout their lives and, in case they are at all mutilated, to restore them to it wherever possible.26

This impulse, a kind of vital force, Blumenbach calls ‘formative impulse’ (Bildungstrieb). Maimon observes that in this scientific theory an internal cause, rather than an external one, is offered to explain the functioning of organisms. He agrees that such an explanation is indeed needed here: an external cause or form would only ‘lead to an aggregate of parts of matter’.27 Yet if one accepts that internal forms are necessary for our understanding of things, then the question arises how these forms come about. As they are evidently indivisible, they themselves cannot originate through successive development according to mechanical laws. Neither can they emerge from other, different forms: They must have the cause of their existence either in themselves, in which case they are substances, or in something external to them.28

23 Blumenbach, J. F.: Über den Bildungstrieb, 14. Cf. id., 17 ff. 24 Blumenbach, J. F.: Über den Bildungstrieb, 13–14. 25 Kant, I.: Kritik der Urteilskraft § 81, 7–34. Kant had previously supported the theory of seeds (Keime) which Blumenbach rejected. Cf. Bernasconi, R. L.: ‘Kant and Blumenbach’s Polyps’. 26 Blumenbach, J. F.: Über den Bildungstrieb, 31–32. 27 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 189. 28 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 190.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 341

The former of these possibilities, according to Maimon, is held by the school of Leibniz and Wolff, the latter by ‘the Aristotelian School’, which […] assumed a universal form existing separate from all matter and imparting onto the specific bodies their specific forms.29

This precisely is the World Soul, and Maimon after careful examination of both positions and their arguments, concludes that this theory does indeed offer the best explanation of natural phenomena.

2 Historical background: A late ancient harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle and its medieval reception If one searches for the background of Maimon’s theory in the history of ideas, the first rather astonishing observation is that this philosopher ascribes the hypothesis of a World Soul to – as he calls it – the Aristotelian School. Intuitively, this seems rather implausible. We have already seen that term and concept go back, rather, to Plato’s late dialogue Timaeus, where the World Soul is formed by the demiurge in order to guarantee the quasi-organic unity of the world and facilitate knowledge and motion. Thus far, at least its characterisation by Maimon as ‘created intelligence’ might seem to have support in this text. Aristotle, on the other hand, omits the World Soul from his cosmology; in fact, not only does he omit it, but quite clearly such an entity could never have a place in his philosophy. Firstly, the Stagirite consciously limits the existence of souls to animate being – plants, animals and human beings. The cosmological and epistemological functions of Plato’s World Soul, secondly, he ascribes to the unmoved mover, which in some ways is its conceptual counterpart (the World Soul moves as eternally self-moving30). Thirdly and finally, the unmoved mover is not different from God, hence while there may be no danger here of ‘pantheism’, one certainly could not speak of ‘created intelligence’ either. Still, it would be facile to conclude that Maimon was quite simply disoriented in the history of philosophical ideas and merely confused Plato with Aristotle. For it is evident from his account that Aristotelian philosophy with its complementary duality of matter and form provides the frame in which he reconstructs

29 Ibid. 30 Plato, Laws X, 896 a.

342 

 Johannes Zachhuber

the originally Platonic conception of the World Soul. Certainly, nothing may be further from Aristotle’s own intention than Maimon’s claim that ‘matter and form’ are ‘completely heterogeneous things’,31 and the ‘formal and final cause of all objects’32 is, if anything, the unmoved mover, not the World Soul. We must not forget, however, that in the course of the century-long reception history of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies the two have variously interacted and been combined in ways that may make statements such as these appear meaningful. It may be rash, then, to dismiss Maimon’s whole argument on account of its lack of explicit references to the Timaeus, as some scholars have done.33 For by insisting on such philological purity one may well lose sight of potentially interesting ideas facilitated precisely by means of such ‘eclecticism’. I therefore propose to ask specifically for the historical origin of the Aristotelian interpretation of Platonic doctrine that seems indicated in Maimon’s account. It will turn out that this specific interpretation has had a rather long and distinguished history and exercised considerable influence. The first relevant testimony is found in Themistius, a rhetorician from Constantinople (c. 317–388) and author of paraphrases of Aristotle’s writings which combined a summary of their argument with an elementary commentary. Of his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics only the twelfth book is extant and only in a Hebrew version translated from the Arabic. In the third chapter of this book, Aristotle had explained to his readers why Forms, as stipulated by Plato and his School, were unnecessary. All that was needed to understand the being of a particular individual, for example a human being, was knowledge of its progenitor or parent. For a human being, as Aristotle famously declared, it was most characteristic to have been begotten by a human being.34 Themistius, however, does not fully agree and tries to criticise Aristotle on the basis of the latter’s own teaching elsewhere. While it was right, he argues, that only a human being (more precisely of course two of them) are needed to explain how a man is begotten, there are other, less straightforward cases: The author [sc. Aristotle] failed to consider the large number of creatures originating from others unlike them. Thus we observe a kind of wasps originating from the bodies of dead horses and bees from the bodies of dead cattle.35 We see frogs originating from rot and

31 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 190. 32 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 194. 33 Vieillard-Baron, J.-L.: ‘D’une Weltseele (1798) à l’autre’, 401–404. 34 Aristotle, Met. Λ 3, 1070a27–30. 35 A well known theory in antiquity; cf. e.g. Virgil, Georgics IV, ll. 300ff.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 343

midges from fermented wine. Thus we note that nature does not generate these beings from a form similar to their own.36

Themistius here refers to the problem of so-called spontaneous generation (generatio aequivoca), which he implies Aristotle himself describes and distinguishes from the normal case where like is brought forth by like.37 In those cases at least even Aristotle must admit that another factor beside ‘parents’ has to be taken into account in order to explain the generation of new life. And, Themistius adds, this is indeed what Aristotle does. Only several lines further down in the same book he names beside the parents (more precisely, the father) also sun and ecliptic (loxòs kýklos) as causes for the individual human being (1071a15 f.). More remarkable and surprising is that Themistius goes further by identifying these Aristotelian ideas with a characteristic element of Platonic doctrine: This proves that these ‘proportions’ [sc. the germinal powers necessary for individual generation; Greek: logoi] are brought about by a cause which is the greatest and most eminent of them all: the soul of the earth which, according to Plato is produced by the secondary gods and, according to Aristotle, by sun and ecliptic.38

One would hardly overstate matters by calling this passage mysterious. If the ‘secondary gods’ are the created gods of the Timaeus 39d–41e, the soul of the earth cannot be the World Soul. Themistius in at least one place draws a clear distinction between the two and only identifies the latter with intellect (nous).39 However, elsewhere he is less careful and in one central passage, which also is rather similar to the one quoted above, he seemingly identifies the two.40 Yet this is nothing in comparison to the riddle of his Aristotelian reference. What do ‘sun and ecliptic’ generate that is, in effect, similar to Plato’s World Soul? No answer to this question is given in Themistius’ text, but it appears not unlikely that he here thinks of celestial heat (calor coelestis), a marginal and rather dark element of Aristotle’s natural philosophy.41 Its obscure character, however, may have made it all the more appealing to those who expected to discover the most important

36 Themistius, In Aristotelis metaphysicorum librum Λ paraphrasis, ed. S. Landauer, ‫ז‬,28–‫ח‬,2. For my translation I have generally preferred Averroes’ version of the passage: Averroes, Tafsīr mā ba‘d at-Tabī‘at (Long Commentary on Metaphysics), ed. M. Bouyges, 1492,3–10. I use the French translation by A. Martin, 128–129. 37 For example at Aristotle, Historia animalium V 1, 539a 15–25; 19, 550b 30–551a 8. 38 Themistius, In met. Λ, ‫ח‬, 18–21 Landauer = Averroes, Tafsīr, 1494,4–7 Bouyges. 39 Themistius, In libros de anima paraphrasis, 20, 19–25. 40 Themistius, In de anim., 26,25–30 Heinze. 41 Its primary significance is in the physics of celestial bodies: How do they produce heat? Cf. Zabarella, G.: De calore coelesti, 555–582.

344 

 Johannes Zachhuber

information hidden in equivocal allusions. The Stagirite philosopher in some places mentions the heat within the seed as necessary for the generation of life.42 The origin of this heat, he argues in a celebrated passage in the second book of his work On the Generation of Animals, is not the fiery element, but it is ‘analogous to the element of the stars’ (736b37). It seems likely then that Themistius’ remark is based on an interpretation that connects the mention of ‘sun and ecliptic’ in Metaphysics XII with the doctrine of celestial heat from the Generation of Animals and on this basis constructs a parallel between Aristotle’s teaching and Plato’s theory of the World Soul. Recalling Maimon’s argument, it is remarkable that the specific problem Themistius has in mind here is the generation of individual life; this, he argues, cannot be explained without reference to a World Soul or to celestial heat respectively. It was the same question that formed the starting point for Maimon’s deliberation. He too, interestingly, mentions spontaneous generation as at least one major argument in favour of the existence of a World Soul. 43 The very nearly casual way in which Themistius introduces and presents his remark makes it not improbable that others before him made the same or a similar move, but we know little about any such prehistory of this piece of Platonic-Aristotelian exegesis or indeed of the more immediate reception of Themistius’ ideas.44 From its textual transmission alone it is evident that Themistius’ paraphrase was known in the Arab world. It is not so surprising then that the next major reference to our passage together with an extensive discussion of its ideas occurs in Averroes’ (Ibn Rušd; 1126–1198) Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.45 Averroes, who strives for a strict Aristotelianism, is unconvinced by Themistius’ critique of the Stagirite and uses his text, which he cites in full, as a starting point for a robust defence of what he considers Aristotle’s actual position. It soon becomes clear that the addressee of this defence is not so much Themistius as orthodox Islamic theology of creation. Core to Averroes’ reading of Aristotle is the assumption, which is indubitably historically correct, that Aristotle’s forms are strictly immanent and hence must not be conflated in any way with Platonic Forms.

42 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione II 9–11; De generatione animalium II 3; De caelo II 7. 43 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 207. 44 Cf. however Nemesius Emesenus, De natura hominis 43, 126, 4–7. 45 Averroes, Tafsīr, 1491,4–1505,6 Bouyges. Cf. also the influential Latin translation in: Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, 303 E–305 I.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 345

The subtle details of Averroes’ argument in this passage, which according to Ernest Renan offers a summary of his whole philosophy,46 are beyond the scope of the present investigation. The following observations, however, are significant:47 1. In his interpretation of Themistius’ passage, Averroes takes it for granted that it refers on the one hand to Plato’s concept of the World Soul48 and, on the other, to Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals II 3 and thus to the theory of celestial heat. In fact, he discusses the latter text at some length in order to refute Themistius’ ‘Platonising’ interpretation and suggest a more appropriate one. Thus, Averroes offers the first explicit testimony for the identification of World Soul and celestial heat – even though he himself rejects it. 2. For Averroes himself, the real issue is the proper understanding of creation including what we call providence. In other words, his interest is to mediate natural causation with the ultimate sovereignty of an external, transcendent cause, namely God. He distinguishes between two fundamentally different views (and three further mediating ones): the theory of ‘latent creation’ assumes that God created everything fully in the beginning so that subsequent history is merely the unfolding of his principal act. According to ‘absolute creation’, on the other hand, God creates everything – and to be precise we ought to say every single act – exactly when and where it occurs.49 While Averroes goes on to characterise the positions of both Aristotle and Themistius as more moderate and hence as lying between these two extremes, the parallel to the dichotomy of evolution and epigenesis in Maimon (who drew on Blumenbach for it) is striking. 3. A further detail may also be significant. Maimon several times writes that the World Soul ‘imparts’ or ‘gives’ forms to the individuals.50 Averroes in the present passage sharply rejects those who postulate a ‘Giver of Forms’. For him, this is more or less tantamount to an affirmation of the World Soul. 51 Apart from Themistius, whom he credits with such an assumption, Averroes explicitly mentions Avicenna (Ibn Sīna, 980–1037)52 for whose thought this phrase (wāhib aṣ-ṣuwar) was indeed seen as typical.53 46 Renan, E.: Averroès et l’Averroïsme, 111. 47 Cf. on this section: Renan, E.: Averroès et l’Averroïsme, 108–115; Allard, M.: ‘Le rationalisme d’Averroès d’après une étude sur la création’, 36–40. 48 Cf. his reference to Themistius’ De anima paraphrase (1497, 2–7 Bouyges). 49 This, according to him is the position of Islamic as well as Christian theologians. Of the latter, he explicitly mentions John Philoponus (Averroes, Tafsīr, 1498, 4–6 Bouyges). 50 Maimon, S.: ‘Weltseele’, 179 and 190. 51 Averroes, Tafsīr, 1496, 2–5 Bouyges. 52 Averroes, Tafsīr, 1498, 15–17 Bouyges. 53 Cf. Hasse, D. N.: Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, 188 f. It seems likely then that there are connections as well to the Arabic tradition of the theory of active intellect (cf. Maimon’s men-

346 

 Johannes Zachhuber

All these observations taken together serve to make plausible, I believe, the assumption that in Themistius and Averroes we encounter a tradition in which the World Soul is described with a combination of Platonic and Aristotelian notions similar to what one later will find in Maimon. I name the following features of this eclectic theory: 1. Aristotle’s remarks about celestial heat and its role in the formation of individual life54 is harmonised with Plato’s theory of a World Soul. In Maimon, admittedly, only the result of this harmonisation is encountered, but no reference to celestial heat. 2. The most prominent example to illustrate the significance of the World Soul is the generation of individual life. This would seem surprising given that is not Plato’s concern where he deals with the World Soul, but becomes intelligible once one recalls that this precisely is Aristotle’s topic in Generation of Animals II 3. 3. Maimon describes the World Soul, in Aristotelian language, as a separate Form that ‘gives’ individuals their respective, immanent forms. This corresponds exactly to the view Averroes ascribes to Themistius and Avicenna, but rejects as un-Aristotelian. 4. The paradigmatic example cited regularly for the necessity to postulate an external cause of individual generation is spontaneous generation as, for example, the (alleged) generation of frogs from rot. This reconstruction of the background to Maimon’s theory gains further plausibility once one recalls his intellectual upbringing in the Jewish tradition. Nowhere else was Averroes as influential as among medieval Jewish writers. His work was popularised by means of Hebrew translations, paraphrases and commentaries. Renan estimated that only biblical books were more frequently encountered in medieval Hebrew manuscripts than the writings of the philosopher from Cordoba.55 Considering this extensive reception, it seems a distinct possibility that Maimon was acquainted with the very passage from Averroes’ Long Commentary discussed above even though, on balance, it is more likely that his knowledge was mediated by the writings, for example, of Rabbi Moses Narboni (1300–1362) whom Maimon seems to have known extremely well.56

tion of ‘created intelligence’). Avicenna occasionally identified World Soul (nafs al-‛ālam) and active intellect. Cf.: Avicenna, Fī itbāt an-nubuwwāt. Proof of Prophecies, ed. M. Marmura, 44. ET: Lerner, R. / Mahdi, M.: Medieval Political Philosophy, 114. 54 Aristotle, De generatione animalium II 3. 55 Renan, E.: Averroès et l’Averroïsme, 85. 56 Cf. Hayoun, M.-R.: Les Lumières de Cardoue à Berlin, 184. On Narboni’s reception of Averroes cf. by the same author: La Philosophie et la Théologie de Moïse de Narbonne.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 347

3 World Soul and celestial heat in Renaissance and Early Modernity Let us, however, leave this specific question to one side and admit that, for the time being, the precise background to Maimon’s version of the theory remains unknown to us. The harmonisation of Plato’s theory of the World Soul with Aristotle’s notion of celestial heat had considerable influence in Renaissance and Early Modernity, and this later reception is worthy of some further attention. It is of some significance for the history of early modern science and will thus take us back to the starting point of this investigation in the late 18th century. Undoubtedly, the 16th century was one of the periods during which interest in the World Soul was at its most intense. This theory appeared to serve well the dual fascination of leading thinkers from that age combining a commitment to science or philosophy of nature with a strong sense of the spiritual unity of the world. Accordingly, speculations about the World Soul are ripe in authors such as Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535) and Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) who apply them to subjects such as panpsychism, astrology or alchemy. Fundamentally, the equation of soul and life is still accepted at this time. Yet it is complemented and partly challenged by the further axiom that life is connected with heat. Hence philosophers and scientist, usually medics, studying the nature and origin of life emphasise both concepts and, in fact, frequently oscillate between them.57 Prominent example for this practice is Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576), a man whose changeable career and vast variety of interests, ranging from mathematics and medicine to technology, astrology and natural philosophy, make him the perfect epitome of his age.58 For Cardano, soul and heat are identical in their explanatory function. Even in his own time, this stark claim provoked the question what, if anything, such a fundamental hypothesis explained. Writes the sceptical medic Gabriele Falloppio, professor at Padua, ‘When he [sc. Cardano] later says that heat is soul or the instrument of soul, I say that up until now it has not been explained what soul is, let alone what heat is.’59

Cardano draws on the theory of celestial heat, but radicalises it making calor coelestis the single source of heat and, ultimately, the single active principle of the

57 Cf. Mulsow, M.: Frühneuzeitliche Selbsterhaltung, 201–250. 58 On Cardano more generally cf. Grafton, A.: Cardano’s Cosmos, 1999. 59 Falloppio, G.: De metallis atque fossilis, 347. I quote from Mulsow, M.: Frühneuzeitliche Selbsterhaltung, 202.

348 

 Johannes Zachhuber

universe.60 That he immediately connects this theory with the generation of individual life may at this point no longer surprise us. Given the overall tendency of his version of this theory, it is only consistent that for him all generation, in principle, is spontaneous. For it is celestial heat that as the active principle facilitates the generation of all life.61 While tracing back all heat to celestial heat as its origin, Cardano also identifies the latter with soul, evidently the World Soul: There is no heat that does not come from the heavens and therefore from the soul or from light.62

A little further on in the same book we read: Thus the substance of soul is explained as consisting in a certain celestial heat. […] For all celestial heat creates, destroys and is soul, instrument of soul or cause of soul. But it is not the instrument of soul because it is earlier, nor its cause because it is in rest, thus [it is] soul.63

Cardano is evidently part of the exegetical tradition connecting Plato’s World Soul with Aristotle’s ideas about celestial heat. While his starting point and the overall frame of his argument are more Aristotelian than Platonic, he makes two major adjustments that cannot be reconciled with Aristotelian principles yet are of fundamental significance for the overall shape of his thought. They betray, I think, the specific influence of the World Soul tradition. 1. The assumption that celestial heat (or World Soul) is the one, unifying principle of the world leads to a homogeneous conception of the cosmos that is substantially different from Aristotle’s model of celestial spheres. At the same time, the assumption of the world’s homogeneity was a major intellectual presupposition for the rise of modern science. This link between Cardano’s theory and the emergence of modern science is not belied by the fact that his favourite application of this insight was astrology. 2. A consequence of the universal role of celestial heat was Cardano’s affirmation of panpsychism: ‘Therefore, Anaxagoras says not inappropriately that all is intermingled and endowed with soul.’64

60 Schütze, I.: Die Naturphilosophie in Girolamo Cardanos De subtilitate, 111–113. 61 Schütze, I.: Die Naturphilosophie in Girolamo Cardanos De subtilitate, 113 f. 62 Cardano, G.: De subtilitate II, 374b. This text, as well as the two following quotations, is absent from the first edition of the work (Nuremberg 1550), cf. Schütze, I.: Die Naturphilosophie in Girolamo Cardanos De subtilitate, 119–120, 124. 63 Cardano, De subtilitate II, 388 a–b. 64 Cardano, De subtilitate II, 388b. Cf. also De subtilitate V, 439b–440a with references to Aristotle, De gen. animal. II 3.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 349

Such a commitment evidently has far-reaching consequences for the concept of nature; it will emphasise continuity between its various forms and developments and inform scientific study as well as human self-reflection. A careful and more extensive study of this period would confirm and differentiate the insights gained from the example of Cardano. Within the confines of the present paper such a full examination is not possible. A brief look at one of his contemporaries will nevertheless be helpful and at the same time take us back to our starting point in the late 18th century. The Florentine scholar Francesco Buonamici (1533–1603) was a much stricter Aristotelian than Cardano.65 In the fourth book of his treatise De alimento, which in its entirety discusses the formation of the foetus, he dedicates a full chapter to the problem of the life force (vis formatrix) responsible for growth and formation of the embryo. Once again, the influence of the Platonic-Aristotelian trajectory combining World Soul and celestial heat is evident in this text.66 Both Themistius and Averroes are mentioned.67 As one would expect of a self-confessed Aristotelian, Buonamici starts from Aristotle’s position; he quotes the classical passage from The Generation of Animals II 3 in full at the outset of his own discussion. He then considers counter-arguments proffered by certain recent Peripatetics who decided to follow Plato rather than Aristotle on this topic and effectively affirmed the hypothesis of a World Soul as necessary to explain origin and development of individual life.68 Buonamici disagrees with them arguing that the transcendent spirit (animus, spiritus) mediated through celestial heat could, in the semen, effect the transformation of the (female) matter into an ensouled being.69 Buonamici, who at the University of Pisa was Galileo’s teacher, today is scarcely remembered. This was still different in the 18th century. Blumenbach’s book Über den Bildungstrieb, the very writing that inspired Maimon’s speculation about the World Soul and which at first sight seems entirely detached from the pre-scientific attitude of earlier centuries, contains a reference to Buonamici’s work which indicates that the Göttingen naturalist was well aware of the Florentine’s writing. In fact, the reference is both specific and appreciative. Blumenbach, as I mentioned earlier, mocks those contemporaries who sought to align any new scientific discovery with traditional knowledge. They fail to see he

65 Cf. on Buonamici: Helbing, M. O.: La filosofia di Francesco Buonamici. 66 Bonamico, F.: De alimento, 527–531. 67 Bonamico, F.: De alimento, 529. 68 Bonamico, F.: De alimento, 529–531. 69 Cf. the summary of his own position at the beginning of the chapter: Bonamico, F.: De alimento, 527–528.

350 

 Johannes Zachhuber

argues that, conceptual similarities notwithstanding, scientific precision on the basis of the experimental method is a more recent achievement: I would be delighted if they could present a single one of the older authors who offers a reasonably accurate conception of their ‘plastic force’ according to the phenomena involved with generation in the way I have attempted to give it of the ‘formative impulse’ in the present pages.70

It is interesting, then, that the one author who is at least partly exempted from this comprehensive dismissal is none other than Buonamici. The ‘well-known Aristotelian’ has expressed himself ‘quite distinctly’ about the vis formatrix, Blumenbach writes in a note on the same page. The note then goes on with a lengthy quotation precisely from De alimento IV 19. Blumenbach thus, in spite of his protestations, was certainly aware of the older debate in natural philosophy concerning celestial heat and the World Soul. He would have known, too, about the parallel between the scientific controversy about evolution and epigenesis and the earlier theological and philosophical debate concerning latent and absolute creation. Maimon’s reading of his book, then, is less off the mark than might appear at first sight, even though Blumenbach would, intuitively, have agreed with Buonamici against the Platonic twist Maimon proposes to give to the debate. Still, considering the intellectual background as well as the character of Blumenbach’s argument, Maimon’s perception that it can and ought to be integrated into a broader philosophical debate is by no means absurd. Philosophy and the sciences at the end of the 18th century were still quite close, even though the parting of the ways, which was to become increasingly marked during the following century, became increasingly apparent.

4 Conclusion The idea of a World Soul flowing originally from Plato’s Timaeus has over the centuries influenced many and various debates. The purpose of this present paper has been a partial clarification of its reception history. I have shown how a particular reading of this theory, intent to align it with Aristotelian natural philosophy and specifically with his theory of celestial heat, led to its application to the problem of the origin of individual life. The interference of two ultimately very different conceptions provided for a variety of articulations. Some authors would come down more on the Platonic, others more on the Aristotelian side; the 70 Blumenbach, J. F.: Über den Bildungstrieb, 37–38.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 351

need to take into account theistic theologies of creation in Islam and Christianity was a further influential factor. Remarkable is the close proximity between philosophical and theological concerns on the one hand, and proto-scientific ones, whether physical, biological or medical, on the other. This close conjunction, it appeared, was not radically discontinued until the turn of the 19th century when ideas about the World Soul in combination with Aristotle’s celestial heat were still reappropriated along with the emergence of the natural science of Romanticism. Yet neither Maimon nor Schelling are pioneers of this new science; they are remembered today as philosophers while Blumenbach and his colleagues would rightly insist that the precision of their scientific explanation and not their detailed acquaintance with the learning of past ages would constitute the criterion by which their work ought to be measured.

References Allard, Michel: ‘Le rationalisme d’Averroès d’après une étude sur la création’, Bulletin d’Études Orientales 14 (1952), 7–55. Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, Grand commentaire de la métaphysique, texte arabe inéd. etabli par Maurice Bouyges, Venice 1962. Averroes: Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique d’Aristote: (Tafsīr mā bad at-tabī’at), livre Lam – lambda, traduit de l’arabe et annoté par Aubert Martin, Paris 1984. Avicenna, Fī itbāt an-nubuwwāt. Proof of Prophecies, ed. Michael Marmura, Beirut 1968. Bernasconi, Robert Lambert: ‘Kant and Blumenbach’s Polyps: A neglected chapter in the history of the concept of race’, in: Sara Eigen / Mark Larrimore (eds.): The German Invention of Race, Albany 2006, 73–90. Birkholz, Adam Michael: Disputatio de respiratione eiusque fine summo atque ultimo, Leipzig 1782. Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich: Über den Bildungstrieb, Göttingen 1789. Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich: Handbuch der Naturgeschichte, Göttingen 1779. Bonamico, Francesco: De alimento, Florence 1603. Cardano, Girolamo: De subtilitate, in: Id., Opera omnia, vol. 3, edidit Charles Spon, Lyon 1663, 357–672. Düsing, Klaus: Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff (Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte 96), Bonn 1968. Eigen, Sara / Larrimore, Mark (eds.): The German Invention of Race, Albany 2006. Falloppio, Gabriele: De metallis atque fossilis, in: Id., Opera genuina omnia, vol. 1, Venice 1606, 330–416. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, vol. 3, Stuttgart – Tübingen 1814. Grafton, Anthony: Cardano’s Cosmos. The Worlds and Works of a Renaissance Astrologer, Cambridge 1999. Hasse, Dag Nikolaus: Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300, London – Turin 2000.

352 

 Johannes Zachhuber

Hayoun, Maurice-Ruben: Les Lumières de Cardoue à Berlin. Une histoire intellectuelle du judaïsme, vol. 2, Paris 1998. Hayoun, Maurice-Ruben: La Philosophie et la Théologie de Moïse de Narbonne, Tübingen 1989. Helbing, Mario Otto: La filosofia di Francesco Buonamici, professore di Galileo a Pisa, Pisa 1989. Herder, Johann Gottfried: Gott (1787), in: Id., Sämtliche Werke, vol. 16, ed. Bernhard Suphan, Berlin 1887, 401–582. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich: Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, Breslau 1785. Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der Urteilskraft, in: Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 5, Berlin 1908, 165–485. Kant, Immanuel: Kant’s Briefwechsel, vol. 2 = Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 11, Berlin – Leipzig,2 1922. Kant, Immanuel, Correspondence, transl. and ed. Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge 1999. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, in: Id., Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. VI/6, Berlin 1962. Lenoir, Timothy: The Strategy of Life. Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth Century German Biology, Chicago 1982. Lerner, Ralph / Mahdi Muhsin (eds.): Medieval Political Philosophy, Ithaca 1963. Locke, John: An essay concerning human understanding, London 1894. Maimon, Salomon: ‘Ueber die Weltseele’, in Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung 8.1 (1790), 47–92. Maimon, Salomon: ‘Weltseele’, in: Id., Philosophisches Wörterbuch, Berlin 1791, 179–208 (= Id., Gesammelte Werke, ed. Valerio Verra, vol. 3, Hildesheim 1970, 203–232). Page numbers in the text refer to the original edition. Mulsow, Martin: Frühneuzeitliche Selbsterhaltung. Telesio und die Naturphilosophie der Renaissance, Tübingen 1998. Nemesius Emesenus, De natura hominis, edidit Morani Moreno, Leipzig 1987. Reimarus, Hermann Samuel: Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, Hamburg,3 1766. Renan, Ernest: Averroès et l’Averroïsme, Paris 1852. Richards, Robert J.: The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, Chicago 2002. Schmidt, Oscar: ‘Blumenbach, Joh. Friedrich’, in: Historische Commission bei der Königl. [sc. Bayerischen] Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, vol. 2, 1875, 748–751 [Online-Version]; URL: https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/ pnd116208503.html#adbcontent. Schütze, Ingo: Die Naturphilosophie in Girolamo Cardanos De subtilitate, Munich 2000. Themistius, In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis, edidit Richard Heinze, Berlin 1899. Themistius, In Aristotelis metaphysicorum librum Λ paraphrasis, edidit Samuel Landauer, Berlin 1903. Vassányi, Miklós: Anima Mundi: The Rise of the World Soul Theory in Modern German Philosophy, Dordrecht 2010. Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: ‘D’une Weltseele (1798) à l’autre ou du kantisme à l’ésotérisme dans la conception schellingienne de la nature’, Studi urbinati di storia, filosofia e letteratura 60 (1977), 395–457.

World Soul and celestial heat 

 353

Voltaire, Élémens de la philosophie de Newton (1738), in: Palissot de Montenoy (ed.), OEuvres de Voltaire, vol. 32, Paris 1792. Zabarella, Giacomo: Liber de calore coelesti, in: Id., De rebus naturalibus libri XXX, Cologne 1602, 555–582. Zachhuber, Johannes: ‘Weltseele und Himmelswärme. Zur Diskussion um den Ursprung des Lebens in der Neuzeit’, in: Ingolf Hübner / Karsten Laudien / Johannes Zachhuber (eds.), Biotechnologie und Selbstverständnis. Hintergründe einer aktuellen Debatte, Münster 2004, 113–130. Zachhuber, Johannes: ‘Weltseele’, in: Gottfried Gabriel (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 12, Basel 2004, 516–521.

Index of Names

Compiled by Laura Marongiu Adrastus 93–95, 98–99, 102, 106, 108–109, 113–115, 118, 121–123, 222 Aelianus 92–95, 106 Aëtius (Ps.-Plutarch) 44, 56 Alcinous 6–7, 17, 229, 231, 233–234, 297 Alexander of Aphrodisias 231, 235 Ammonius 310, 312–313 Antiochus of Ascalon 164–165 Apuleius 136, 138, 236 Archytas 106, 112 Aristides Quintilianus 43, 109 Aristotle 5, 7–8, 28, 30, 38, 43, 45, 50, 76–77, 83, 102, 105–139, 143–145, 148–150, 155, 159, 191, 193–194, 197, 199–201, 203, 206–208, 221, 227, 254–256, 262, 270, 292, 300, 311–312, 315–319, 328–329, 335, 341–351 Aristoxenus 114–115, 118–121 Atticus 76, 87, 220–221, 297 Averroes 344–346, 349 Avicenna 345–346 Birkholz, Adam Michael 339 Blumenbach, Friedrich 339–340, 345, 349–351 Buonamici, Francesco 349–350 Calcidius 16–17, 94, 122–123, 211–229, 231, 234, 236–240 Cardano, Girolamo 347–349 Chrysippus 49–56, 143, 147, 169–171, 173–174, 176–179, 181, 184–185, 230, 232, 269 Cicero 49–50, 54, 164–165, 168, 170–171, 176–177, 179–180, 232 Cleanthes 43, 54, 56, 174, 176, 181–184 Clearchus 121 Clement of Alexandria 42–43, 47 Crantor 108–113, 117, 121, 197–199, 201, 221–222, 297 Damascius 19, 313 n. 13, 327 n. 56 Diogenes Laërtius 31, 33–34, 170, 172–174, 176–177, 180–181, 183 Erathostenes 98–100, 106–107, 111, 122 Eudorus 103–104, 108–109, 191, 197–198, 203 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-016

Eusebius 181–184 Falloppio, Gabriele 347 Galen 18, 269–270, 280 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 2, 338 Heidegger, Martin 48 Heraclitus 11–12, 27–56, 182–183 Herder, Johann Gottfried 338 Hermias of Alexandria 212–213, 301 Hesiod 32, 54 Hippolytus 43, 48, 230 Homer 32, 54, 339 Iamblichus 303–304, 306 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich 338 Kant, Immanuel 2, 336–340 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 2, 338, 341 Locke, John 338 Macrobius 44 Maimon, Salomon 2, 336–342, 344–347, 349–351 Maimonides 336 Marcus Aurelius 167, 182 Maximus of Tyre 232–233, 235–236 Methodius of Olympus 245, 258 Musaeus 54 Nemesius 17, 43, 230–231, 233–234, 236 Nicomachus of Gerasa 98–102, 110–111, 113, 123 Nietzsche, Friedrich 46 Numenius 17, 29, 214, 216–217, 220–222, 228, 237, 239 Orpheus 54 Panaetius 106 Pappus of Alexandria 100–101 Philip of Opus 14, 155–156, 159–165 Philo of Alexandria 216, 223, 228, 238 Philodemus 49–55, 171–173 Philolaus 112 Philoponus, John 19–20, 217, 309–330 Plato 1–12, 30, 76–88, 91–92, 95–105, 107–123, 125–131, 143, 145, 148–150, 155–163, 165, 167, 170, 189–198, 200–201, 204, 208, 211–212, 214–219, 222–223, 226–228, 247, 249, 281, 283,

356 

 Index of Names

289–293, 295–301, 304, 306–307, 311–312, 316–317, 319, 321–322, 326–330, 335, 341–346, 348–350 Plotinus 3–4, 8–9, 17–18, 213, 222, 237–238, 245–266, 269–270, 274–288 Plutarch of Chaeronea 6–7, 17, 87, 95, 97–98, 101–105, 108–109, 111, 113, 118–123, 125–127, 177–179, 190, 196–199, 201, 214, 220–221, 230–231, 236, 297 Polemon 15, 155, 158, 163–165 Porphyry 18, 92, 106–107, 121, 216, 222, 245, 250–251, 269–278, 280–281, 284, 286–288, 303, 328 Posidonius 143, 169, 173–174, 176, 233, 236 Proclus 6, 9–10, 19–20, 87, 97, 100, 108–109, 113, 121, 136–137, 219–220, 222, 289–309, 311–312, 314, 318–322, 324, 326–329 Ps.-Archytas 202–205, 207 Ps.-Aristotle 14, 135, 142–143, 259 Ps.-Philolaus 192, 205–207 Ps.-Plutarch 17, 44, 181, 231, 233–234, 236–237

Ps.-Timaeus Locrus 7, 16, 189–196, 198–202, 204–207 Reimarus, Hermann Samuel 337–338 Schelling, Friedrich W.J. 2, 338, 351 Severus 109, 111, 121 Sextus Empiricus 35, 38, 168–169, 172, 179 Simplicius 19, 203, 312, 317, 329 Speusippus 155, 158–159, 163, 165, 193 Stobaeus 29, 34, 136, 163–164 Syrianus 212, 303–306 Themistius 231, 342–346, 349 Theodoretus 44 Theon of Smyrna 93–95, 97–100, 102–107, 109–111, 113–120, 122–123, 125–127 Theophrastus 136, 150 Thrasyllus 93, 106, 110–111 Voltaire 338, n. 12 Xenocrates 77, 155, 158–159, 163, 165, 193, 196–199, 201 Xenophanes 55 Xenophon 169 Zabarella, Giacomo 343, n. 41 Zeno of Citium 29, 50, 158, 164, 168–170, 174, 176, 179, 181–183, 185, 229–230

Index of Ancient Citations Compiled by Laura Marongiu Alcinous

Handbook of Platonism (Didaskalikos) – XIV, 169.35–39 7 – XXVI 231, 233

Alexander of Aphrodisias

De Mixtione – p. 226, 24–9 (= SVF 2.1048) 235

Aristotle

De anima A 2, 404b6-27 83 – A 2, 404b16–27 200, 316 – A 2, 405a25–29 (= Heraclitus DK 22 A 15) 28 – A 3, 406b26–28 312 – A 3, 406b26–407b11 5 – A 3, 407b13–26 227 Metaphysics – XII 9, 1074b34–35 143 Nicomachean Ethics – VI 4, 1140a2 255 – VI 4, 1140a10–13 254 On the Generation of Animals – II 3, 736b37 344 Physics – II 8, 199b28–9 254

Augustine

De civitate Dei – VII, 16 213

Calcidius

Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus – 26–29 217–218, 220 – 31 221, 228 – 35–39 123 – 44 (p. 92, 10–93, 4) 94 – 51 212 – 142–190 231 – 143–144 236 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-017

– 146–147 224–226 – 176–177 237, 239 – 178 212 – 188 238–239 – 197–198 226–227 – 244 (p. 256, 14–16) 216 – 276 217 – 297 220 – 300 218–219, 221 – 301 220–221 – 303–305 222, 224

Cardano, Girolamo De subtilitate – II, 374b 348 – II, 388a–b 348

Cicero

Academica – 1, 24–9 15, 164 – 2, 126 (= SVF 1.154) 176 De natura deorum – 1, 25–41 49–50, 54 – 2, 21 (= SVF 1.111) 168, 180 – 2, 22 (= SVF 1.114) 169–171 – 2, 58 (= SVF 1.172) 177

Clement of Alexandria

Stromata – V 103.6, II, p. 396 Stählin (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 50 = fr. 26 Marcovich) 46–49 – VI 17.1–2, II, p. 435 Stählin (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 36 = fr. 66 Marcovich) 41–45

Diogenes Laërtius

Lives – 7.134 173 – 7.135–136 (= SVF 2.580) 173–174 – 7.136 180 – 7.138–139 173

358 

 Index of Ancient Citations

– 7.139 (= SVF 2.634) 176 – 7.142 (= SVF 2.581) 174 – 7.142–143 (= SVF 2.633) 169–170, 176–177 – 7.147 172, 177 – 9.7 (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 45 = fr. 67 Marcovich) 31–35

Epictetus

Dissertations – 1.14.5–6 186 – 2.8.11 185

Eusebius

Preparatio evangelica – 15.15.4–8 (= SVF 2.528) 186 – 15.20.1 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels = SVF 1.128) 181 – 15.20.2–3 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels = SVF 1.5182) 182 – 15.20.4–5 (Arius Didymus, fr. 39 Diels = SVF 2.821) 184

Falloppio, Gabriele

De metallis atque fossilis – 347 347

Galen

On the Formation of the Embryo – 100,24–29 269 – 102,29–106,13 269

Heraclitus

– DK 22 A 15 28, 44 – DK 22 B 1 35–40 – DK 22 B 36 = fr. 66 Marcovich 41–45 – DK 22 B 45 = fr. 67 Marcovich 31–35 – DK 22 B 50 = fr. 26 Marcovich 39, 46–49 – DK 22 B 85 = fr. 70 Marcovich 30 – DK 22 B 87 = fr. 109 Marcovich 37 – DK 22 B 102 = fr. 91 Marcovich 45 – DK 22 B 108 = fr. 83 Marcovich 37–38 – DK 22 B 115 = fr. 112 Marcovich 34

Hippolytus

Philosophoumena – 21 (= SVF 2.975) 230

Marcus Aurelius Meditations – 5.27 167 – 6.13 182

Maximus of Tyre Dissertations – 5.4.80–87 233

Methodius of Olympus

Convivium Decem Virginum – 8.13.209 245

Musonius Rufus

Discourses – fr. 42, Hense 231

Nemesius

On the Nature of Man – 38 231, 234 – 105.14–17 230

Nicomachus of Gerasa Harmonicum enchiridium – 251, 12–13 110–111 – 260, 12–19 111 – 264, 6 ff. 111 Introductio arithmetica – II 122, 11 ff. 101–102 – II 142, 21–143, 8 102

Pappus of Alexandria Synagogê – III, XVIII ff. 100–101

Index of Ancient Citations 

Philip of Opus

Epinomis – 976d–977b 159–160, 164 – 982a–983c 159–162 – 984b–c 159 – 985a 162 – 988a–e 159, 162–163

Philo of Alexandria De opificio mundi – 47–52 123

Philodemus

De pietate – PHerc. 1428, cols. IV 13–V 2, ed. Henrichs (see also ed. Diels = SVF 2.1076)  171–172 – PHerc. 1428, cols. VII 12–VIII 13 49–56

Philoponus

De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum – 243.2–19 318 In De anima – 74.32–75.1 317 – 117.14–24 313 – 117.30–118.6 313 – 124.29–125.31 313

Plato

Laws – 715e–716a 149–150 – 730c 149–150 – 891e ff. 156 – 892a 158 – 896a 322 – 896a ff. 157 – 896d–898c 6 – 896e–897b 157–158 – 897b–c 322 – 899c–d 158 Phaedo – 113b 170

Phaedrus – 245c ff. 155, 301, 321 – 246b–c 247 – 247 212 Republic – 529–530 160 – 531d–535a 162 – 616c–617c 161 – 617d ff. 234 Sophist – 248e–249a 13, 77–79 Timaeus – 30a–31c 13, 77 – 30b 291 – 30b–c 1, 5, 82 – 33c–34a 293 – 34a–37c 2–3, 335 – 34b–36d 69, 214 – 34c 65 – 35a 69, 214, 296–298, 300 – 35a–b 193, 215, 222 – 35a–36d 2–3 – 35b–36b 91, 96, 99–100, 112, 295 – 36d–e 260 – 36d–37a 4, 238 – 36e 292–293 – 39e 249 – 41d 1, 69, 212, 226 – 47e–48b 194 – 49a 64 – 56e–58c 67 – 57d–58a 12 – 67b–c 94 – 80a–b 94

Plotinus

Enneads – I 1 [53] 11, 8–15 282 – II 1 [40] 5, 18–20 279 – II 2 [14] 3, 1–3 260 – II 3 [52] 9, 6–14 280 – II 3 [52] 15, 5–8 282 – II 9 [33] 4, 1–2 246 – II 9 [33] 4, 2–6 247 – II 9 [33] 8, 1–2 248

 359

360 

 Index of Ancient Citations

– II 9 [33] 12, 41–42 248 – III 1 [3] 251, 258 – III 1 [3] 1, 13–16 248 – III 2 [47]  251, 253 – III 3 [48] 2, 3–15 251–252 – III 3 [48] 4, 37–43 283 – IV 3 [27] 2, 54–56 266 – IV 3 [27] 5, 1–6 264 – IV 3 [27] 7, 25–31 283 – IV 3 [27] 10, 13–17 254 – IV 3 [27] 12, 12–20 282 – IV 3 [27] 18, 2–7 255 – IV 4 [28] 7, 1–3 261 – IV 4 [28] 9–12 252 – IV 4 [28] 25, 1–5 262 – IV 4 [28] 27, 15–16 213 – IV 4 [28] 39, 5–14 279 – IV 8 [6] 259 – IV 8 [6] 8, 13–16 254 – V 1 [10] 2, 1–7 249–250 – V 7 [18] 275–276 – V 7 [18] 2, 1–8 276 – VI 3 [27] 22, 9–13 256 – VI 3 [44] 22, 3–4 256 – VI 7 [38] 7, 8–16 285

Plutarch of Chaeronea

Coriolanus – 22.2 (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 85 = fr. 70 Marcovich) 30 De animae procreatione in Timaeo – 1019 B10–E4 101–102 – 1019 E5–1020 A11 103 – 1020 E7 ff. 118 – 1022 C6 ff. 121 – 1027 C8–10 97 – 1028 A5 ff. 122 De audiendo – 40 F–41 A (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 87 = fr. 109 Marcovich) 37 De sera numinis vindicta – 550 D 7 Stoic Self-Contradictions – 1052 C (= SVF 2.604) 178–179 – 1053 B (= SVF 2.605) 179

Porphyry

In Ptolemaei harmonica – 91, 4–95, 23 106 Quaestiones Homericae ad Iliadem – IV 4 (p. 69 Schrader) (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 102 = fr. 91 Marcovich) 45 To Gaurus On How Embryos are Ensouled – 6, 1–4 272 – 10, 1–2 272 – 10, 5–6 271 – 14, 3 273 – 16, 5 273

Proclus

Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus – I 10.24–31 300 – I 11.1–10 300 – I 402.15–28 291 – I 426.14–17 294 – II 18.29–19.3  100 – II 19.30–20.9 100 – II 103.14–19 302 – II 139.14 ff. 219–220 – II 141.8–14 295 – II 142.2–9 295–296, 298 – II 156.1–8 297 – II 171.9 ff. 97 – II 241.29–242.2 303–304 – II 289.29–290.6 305 – III 9–10 – III 69.28–70.1 292 Platonic Theology – I 14, 63.9–25 290 – I 14, 68.17–21 294 – III 2, 8.14–17 301 – V 23, 85.16 291

Ps.-Aristotle

De Mundo – 391a8–b10 142 – 391b10–12 143 – 396a33–b8 143 – 396b23–397b13 144 – 397b13–27 145

Index of Ancient Citations 

– 397b27–35 146 – 398a11–35 147 – 398b6–10 146 – 398b19–35 147 – 399a1–6 260 – 399a35–b32 148 – 400a33–b33 148 – 401a12–b29 149

Ps.-Plutarch

Placita – 5.4, 905 B (= SVF 1.128) 181

Ps.-Timaeus Locrus

On the Nature of the World and the Soul – 205,10–206,5 194 – 206,7–10 201 – 208,13–17 195

Sextus Empiricus

Against the Mathematicians – 9.130 (= SVF 3.370) 172 Against the Physicists – 1.101 (= SVF 1.113) 169 – 1.104 (= SVF 1.111) 168

Stobaeus

Florilegium – III 1.174, III, p. 129 Wachsmuth-Hense (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 108 = fr. 83 Marcovich) 37–38 – III 1.180a, III, p. 130 Wachsmuth-Hense (= Heraclitus DK 22 B 115 = fr. 112 Marcovich) 34

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta – SVF 1.111 168 – SVF 1.113 169 – SVF 1.114 169

 361

– SVF 1.128 181 – SVF 1.154 176 – SVF 1.172 177 – SVF 1.5182 182 – SVF 2.528 186 – SVF 2.580 173–174 – SVF 2.581 174 – SVF 2.604 178–179 – SVF 2.605 179 – SVF 2.633 169 – SVF 2.634 176 – SVF 2.821 184 – SVF 2.975 230 – SVF 2.1048 235 – SVF 2.1076 172 – SVF 3.370 172

Themistius

In Aristotelis metaphysicorum librum Λ paraphrasis – ‫ ז‬28 – ‫ ח‬2 (= Averroes, Tafsīr, 1492, 3–10)  342–343 – ‫ח‬, 18–21 (= Averroes, Tafsīr, 1494, 4–7) 343

Theon of Smyrna

Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium – 55, 15–56, 5 115 – 61, 18–72, 20 116 – 62, 1–63, 24 114 – 66, 19–72, 20 109, 118–119 – 81, 6–82, 5 106–107 – 87, 4–93, 7 97, 110 – 89, 9 ff. 117 – 93, 17–106, 11 122–123 – 106, 13–15 102 – 107, 24–108, 8 98 – 111, 10–113, 8 100, 122 – 113, 9–116, 7 102 – 116, 8–119, 16 102, 104–105

Index of Subjects

Compiled by Laura Marongiu aether 53–54, 161–162, 176, 184 being – as dunamis 78, 85 – perfect being (to pantelôs on) 13, 77–81, 83, 85, 87–88 celestial heat (calor coelestis) 20, 343–351 Christian Platonism 11 cosmos (→ world) craftsman (→ demiurge) demiurge 68–76, 83–84, 86–87, 146, 155, 192–193, 213–214, 223–225, 228, 234, 236–238, 245–246, 255, 297, 303 difference (→ sameness) dissimilarity (→ similarity) embryo 18, 180, 269–288 equality (isotês) – and inequality (anisotês) 12, 72–74 fate 16–17, 53, 142, 147, 149, 211–214, 225–226, 228–240, 258, 279 fire 28–30, 32, 41, 44–45, 47, 174, 178–179, 325 form – and matter 16, 194–196, 199–200, 203–204, 228, 285–286, 336, 341–342 free will 17, 229–230, 234–235 freedom 17, 147, 230–231, 236 god – as a preserver 14, 135, 143–146, 149–150 – as creator 149–150, 195, 259 – as thinking of thinking 143 – god’s power (dunamis, vis divina) 14, 54, 135, 141–150, 172, 229, 259 identity (→ sameness) immanent/immanence 14, 86, 135, 145–146, 149, 160, 163–164, 207, 246 inequality (→ equality) interval (diastêma) 93–97, 106–109, 116, 118, 126 leimma 96–97, 106, 108–109, 111, 113–114, 116, 118–121 logos – in Heraclitus 11–12, 27–56

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110628609-018

– in Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus 270–272, 276–287, 301 – in the Stoics 17, 173–174, 180, 223 matter 8, 10, 164, 173–175, 194–195, 200, 218–224, 269, 283–286, 336, 340 mean (mesotês) 97–98, 101–105, 125–126 motion – and rest 12, 64, 67–68, 73–74, 197, 199, 326 – disorderly motion 12, 63, 65–68, 70, 76, 221 Night – as a goddess 52–54 perfect animal (to panteles zoôn) 13, 77, 81, 83–85, 87–88 place 5, 35, 56 pneuma 15, 144–145, 147, 170, 172–173, 175, 177, 269 pre-cosmic becoming 12, 64–65, 75–76 providence 14, 17, 135, 173, 177, 211–214, 217, 224–226, 228–240, 249–253, 262, 279, 345 rest – and motion (→ motion) sameness (tauton) – and difference (heteron) 12, 69–71, 73, 214, 296–299 semen (sperma) 15, 168–169, 174, 179–182, 185, 349 similarity (homoion) – and dissimilarity (anhomoion) 12, 71–74 soul (psuchê) – human 5, 183, 185, 226–228, 250, 254, 261–262, 282 – hypercosmic 19, 289, 299, 302–306 – hypostasis (hê holê psuchê) 9–10, 18, 246, 263–266, 305 – individual 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 29–33, 42–45, 167–170, 176–178, 180–182, 184–186, 202, 250, 257–261, 263–266, 284–285, 287–288, 309, 312, 314–315, 322, 324, 337 – limits of (peirata) 31–33 – precosmic 6–8, 63, 76 tetraktys 96–104, 108, 115, 121–123

364 

 Index of Subjects

thumos (anger/desire) 30 time – and space 6, 9–10 – generation in 6, 217, 223, 250 transcendent/transcendence 14, 87–88, 135, 143, 145–146, 149–150, 159, 207, 238, 246, 259, 345 world – as ensouled animal (zôon empsuchon) 1, 5, 15, 82, 168–171, 178–179 – body of 3–4, 64–65, 69, 73, 226, 257, 260, 262–263, 265 – eternity of 149, 206, 250, 318 – generation of 6, 63–65, 75, 179, 224, 250 – perfection of 168–170, 251–252 – sublunary 14, 143, 149, 206, 238 World Soul (anima mundi, tou pantos psuchê) – apospasma (detached portion) of 15, 167, 169–171, 174, 181–182, 185–186 – as a creator or craftsman 17, 155, 246–257, 269

– as a source of movement 80–81, 85, 88, 157, 163, 193, 198–199, 214, 319–322, 324–325 – as intermediary 46, 291–292, 295–296, 298–299, 302–305 – existence of 290–291 – generation of 69–70, 74, 157, 192–193, 217–218 – impulses of 15, 170, 176–177, 186 – in embryology 269–288 – mathematical structure of 12, 72, 74–75, 197, 201–202, 299 – mixture of 69–72, 74, 192–196, 296–297 – only one 292–294 – self-motion of 73–74, 76, 85, 157, 198, 318–322, 341 – sense perception of 15, 167, 176–177, 184, 246, 261–262 zetêmata 13, 91–92, 96–98, 100–108, 112–131 Zeus 53–56, 171–173, 178, 186, 231, 233